2012 Honeywell Users’ Group EMEA

Sustain.Ability.
2014 Honeywell Users Group EMEA

Alarm Management Workshop

Defining and Implementing Best Practices to take you Beyond the Acceptable

Jay Marsh/Jens Hecker

 Workshop

2
 Alarm & Operations Management - Intro

• When things go wrong they can go wrong

badly!
• However most incidents are minor and
result in reduced production or increased
costs
• Mainly due to bad Operational Awareness
resulting in process deviations from the
desired production ‘envelope’
• Alarm Management focus’ on the ability to ensure all alarms are
relevant, meaningful and targeted, so that incident impacts can be
reduced
• However we should be aiming to go beyond the acceptable

• Lets start by looking at Abnormal Situations

3
 What is an Abnormal Situation?

Definition
• Any unexpected event or situation that confronts the operator
during the course of his/her duties that causes the plant operation
to be upset or disturbed to the point of concern.

• The normal plant control

systems cannot cope with
the disturbance or fail to do
so… so operator
intervention is then
required.

4
 What is an Abnormal Situation?

5
 Cost Impacts of an Abnormal Situation

A significant number of unforeseen situations cause large

numbers of small (but cumulatively expensive) losses:

• Direct economic losses due to equipment and property damage

• Product losses
– loss of production
– decreased or uneven quality
• Schedule/delivery disruptions
• Personnel injuries
• Environmental damage

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 Cost Impacts of an Abnormal Situation

7
 Target of Abnormal Situation Management

• Unexpected Upsets Cost

2 - 8% of Capacity

8
 How Does ASM Work?

• Monitor the true state of the plant

• Determine normal operating envelope
• Assess the degree of abnormality

• Propose realistic, effective actions

– Return to normal
– Move to a safe state
– Safely shut down

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 Abnormal Situation Management Consortium

• The Abnormal Situation Management Joint Research and

Development Consortium conducts research and shares
experiences on factors contributing to the successful
reduction of abnormal situations in petrochemical
processes, and develops, evaluates and proves new
solutions to reduce risks even further.

• The ASM Consortium was informally established in 1992

as an outgrowth of an effort to define improvements to
current DCS alarm system technologies.

• Realizing that the alarm system was simply a part of the

larger issue of the management of unexpected process
upsets, a number of companies teamed with Honeywell to
develop a problem statement and a vision for the solution.

The ASM Consortium is now celebrating its 20th year!

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 Understanding Abnormal Situations

• It is important to understand the factors that cause or

influence abnormal situations
• Root and contributing causes may appear in isolation or in
combination with each other

• There are four principal types of sources or causes of

abnormal situations
– People and work context factors
– Equipment factors
– Process factors
– Physical environmental antecedents
• Such as lightning, earthquakes, storms; are infrequent and usually
obvious as a root cause and will not be discussed here

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 Understanding Abnormal Situations

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 Understanding Abnormal Situations

• The frequency distribution shows the relative contribution

of root cause categories
• People and Work Context Factors Almost Always
– largest contributors Preventable

• Inadequate or no procedure
• Inadequate or incorrect action People
• Failure to follow procedure/instruction 40%

• Equipment Factors Process

Equipment
40%
– largest contributor 20%

• Equipment or mechanical failure

Often

• Process Factors Mostly

Preventable
Preventable
– largest contributor
• Operating beyond the original design limits

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 People and Work Context

• Humans will always be part of the decision-making process

in plant operations
– Human error can thus contribute to abnormal situations, by
• Not responding with appropriate actions
• Responding with inappropriate actions which cause or escalate
process upsets

• The consequence of human error varies

– Depending on the nature of the abnormal situation
– The point at which the upset is detected

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 The Paradox of Automation

• Better automation leads to more sophisticated processes

• More sophisticated processes lead to more opportunities
for error
• We “fix” the increasing errors with still more automation
• This distances the operator from the normal operation of
the plant, hence…
• When things go wrong, people have
difficulty intervening to correct the
problem because of the high complexity!

“And this is where the workflow design team went insane.”

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 Impact of Operational Awareness

• E.g. Failure Occurrence in the Process or in the Safeguarding System

With typical alarm

systems, orienting begins
after an event creates an
abnormal plant state.
The extent of the problem
can impact operator’s
ability to be fully aware of
the locations of process
disturbances.
As disturbances propagate
the number of conditions
to be aware of increases
as well as the response
requirements and the
likelihood of missing
important information.

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 Effectiveness of Response

• Good Operator Decision Support is paramount to success!

• Reduces errors
• Decreases time
to implement
response
• Manages side
effects
• Increases
awareness

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 Good Alarm Design

• Clearly a well designed Alarm System is key to identifying

Abnormal Situations and reacting appropriately within an
adequate time.

• So what guidance is there for Good Alarm Design?

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 Good Alarm Design

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 Alarm Design Guidance

• There are numerous sources which give guidance on good

alarm system design, here is a partial list:

– “Alarm Systems: A Guide to Design, Management and Procurement”, EEMUA

Publication No. 191, Third Edition.
– ANSI/ISA-18.2: “Management of Alarm Systems for the Process Industries”.
– “Effective Alarm Management Practices”, ASM Consortium, 2009.
– IEC 62682 “Management of alarms systems for the process industries” 2014
– IEC 61508 “Functional Safety of Electrical, Electronic & Programmable Electronic Safety-Related
Systems”.
– IEC 61511 “Functional Safety – Safety Instrumented Systems for the Process Industry Sector”.
– In the UK: the HSE guidance note “Better Alarm Handling”.
– In the USA: ANSI/ISA-S84.01 … “Application of Safety Instrumented Systems for the Process
Industries”.
– In the USA: OSHA 1910.119 “Process safety management of highly hazardous chemicals”.
– In Norway: “Principles for alarm system design”, Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, Publication YA-711,
February 2001.
– In Germany: NAMUR document NA 102, “Alarm Management”, 2003.
– In the EU: The Seveso II Directive … concerning “Safety Cases” for hazardous plants.

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 Alarm Design Guidance

• Included in the questionnaire sent out to you before this year’s

HUG we asked
– Which industry standard does your company best align with?

• Here are the results:

None
ASM 0%
0% Other
17%
EEMUA
50%
ISA
33%

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 The Main Sources of Guidance

• Lets take a look some of the most well-known sources, including

the latest standard from the IEC and the ASM guidelines:

• EEMUA 191
– most widely-applied
• ANSI/ISA-18.2
– likely to be heavily-used in the USA, although it’s style (as a “standard”) is
less “user-friendly”
• IEC 62682
– Likely to have a better acceptance as an international “standard”
• ASM
– probably the easiest to use but not as widely known outside of the ASM
Consortium

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 EEMUA Publication 191

• Guidance (first published in 1999)

partly based on an extensive review of
alarm system practices and
performance in a range of UK
installations
• Major operating company active
participation – experienced people!
• Reviewed, endorsed (and financially
supported) by the Honeywell-led ASM
Consortium - which includes many of
the major refiners and several large
chemical companies
• Human factors emphasis
• Now at the Third Edition

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 EEMUA Publication 191

• Main document with 6 sections:

– 1. Alarm System Philosophy
– 2. Principles of Alarm System Design
– 3. Implementation Issues
– 4. ‘HCI’ Management Techniques
– 5. Alarm Configuration
– 4. Performance Measurement/Improvement
– 6. Buying a New Alarm System

• 20 Appendices which include:

– Examples of poor alarm management
– Prioritization methods
– Alarm processing methods
– Questionnaires/Checklists
– KPI’s

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 ANSI/ISA-18.2-2009

• Large focus on an Alarm System

Lifecycle
• Details Alarm System KPIs

• Sections on
– Compliance
– Alarm Philosophy
– Alarm System requirements
– Identification
ANSI/ISA-18.2-2009
– Rationalization Management of Alarm Systems for
the Process Industries
– Advanced Methods

• Less examples are given

• Complimentary to EEMUA 191

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 IEC 62682

• Very recent! Issued in October 2014

• As ISA-18.2 written as a Standard
• Organized in 2 parts; introductory
sections and the main body covering the
standards
• Acknowledges both ISA-18.2 and
EEMUA 191

• Provides requirements for alarm

management and alarm systems, for
those who:
– Manufacture/implement alarm systems
– Manufacture/implement alarm system software
– Design/install alarm systems
– Operate/maintain alarm systems
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 ASM Consortium Guidelines

• Perhaps the easiest of the 4 main

guidance/standards documents to use
in practice

• Organized under three categories:

– Management Practices guidelines describe
the effective practices for managing and
continuously improving the alarm system.
– Alarm System Design and Implementation
guidelines include processes and methods for
creating an effective alarm system.
– Training guidelines cover understanding site
policies, design team preparations, adequate
training for alarm changes, certification, and
simulator-based training solutions.

• Each category contains descriptions of

its Objective and its Rationale

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 ASM Consortium Guidelines

• The relative importance of each

guideline is indicated in terms of priority
ratings:
– Priority 1 - rated as one of the minimum set
of guidelines for achieving an ASM good
quality practice.
– Priority 2 - one of the comprehensive set of
guidelines for achieving an ASM high quality
practice.
– Priority 3 - one of the advanced set of
guidelines for achieving an ASM best practice.

• Covers 42 guidelines in total

• Each guideline contains
– explanations for Why this is recommended,
How it works and Examples of compliance.

• Also contains examples and

Appendices

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 Key Performance Indicators

EEMUA 191 ANSI/ISA-18.2 ASM Oil & Gas Chemicals Power

<144 ~150 <144

Average alarms (up to 288 (~300 may (up to 288
per day may be be may be 1200 1500 2000
manageable) manageable) manageable)

Average standing
alarms <10 <5 per day <10 50 100 65

Peak alarms
per 10 minutes <10 ≤10 <10 220 180 350

Average alarms per

1 ~1 (~2 may be 1 6 9 8
10-minute interval manageable)

Distribution %
(low/med/high) 80/15/5 80/15/5 80/15/5 25/40/35 25/40/35 25/40/35

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 Key Performance Indicators

• Included in the questionnaire sent out to you before this year’s

HUG we asked
– How many alarm KPI's do you regularly monitor?

• Here are the results:

4+ KPI's 0 KPI's
33% 33%

3 KPI's 2 KPI's
17% 17%
1 KPI
0%

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 ASM Guidelines Critical for Success

• During the America’s HUG in 2011 Luc De Wilde (Total

Petrochemicals) and Dal Vernon Reising (Human Centered
Solutions) discussed the on-going alarm management problems,
highlighted which ASM Guidelines were Critical to Success and
reflected where many companies may be situated today.

• Included in the questionnaire sent out to you before this year’s

HUG are a list of ASM Guidelines and we asked if you have
considered each of these and which ones you believed Critical to
Success.

• Let’s take a look at the results

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 Management Practices

ASM Guideline definition

• Objective: Strong management practices are necessary to

develop and maintain a good alarm management program.

• Rationale: The following are guidelines for ensuring that the

alarm management program has the required management
support and the management practices to be successful.

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 Management Practices

Management Practices Questionnaire Response

Work In Not
No. Statement CTS (2011) CTS (2014) Complete Progress Started

1.1 Have you established support for alarm management from your company management? Yes Yes 67% 17% 17%

1.2 Have you developed a plant-wide philosophy for alarm management? Yes Yes 50% 33% 17%

1.3 Have you established an owner for the alarm system and ensured adequate staffing? Yes Yes 17% 50% 17%

1.4 Do you use a Management of Change (MOC) process for alarm changes? Yes Maybe 33% 33% 33%

1.5 Do you capture and integrate alarm requests generated from plant reviews? Yes Yes 33% 50% 17%

1.6 Have you established an alarm system’s worst actors monitoring program? Yes Yes 33% 17% 50%
Do you ensure that plant personnel understand and comply with the alarm management
1.7 philosophy? Yes Yes 0% 83% 17%

1.8 Do you run frequent backups and inspections of electronic journals? No Yes 50% 17% 33%

1.9 Do you ensure that alarm management is a part of an integrated safety program? Yes Yes 0% 50% 50%

1.10 Have you established an alarm system performance monitoring program? Yes Yes 17% 50% 33%

1.11 Do you periodically validate/enforce alarm settings? Yes Yes 17% 33% 50%

1.12 Do you perform periodic alarm rationalization revalidations? Maybe Yes 17% 17% 67%

1.13 Do you perform periodic alarm impact assessments? No Maybe 0% 33% 67%

1.14 Do you ensure that incident reviews include alarm system impact? Maybe Yes 33% 17% 50%

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 Alarm System Design & Implementation

ASM Guideline definition

• Objective: Develop the processes and methods to create and

configure an effective alarm system.

• Rationale: An effective alarm system notifies operators of

problems without distracting them with irrelevant and non-
instructive alarms. Well-designed alarms are meaningful, relate
directly to operator action, and tell the operator what action is
required.

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 Alarm System Design & Implementation #1

Alarm System Design & Implementation Questionnaire Response

Work In Not
No. Statement CTS (2011) CTS (2014) Complete Progress Started

2.1 Do you ensure instrument reliability and accuracy? Maybe Yes 50% 33% 17%

2.2 Have you developed design rules to accommodate all common alarm types? Yes Yes 17% 50% 33%

2.3 Do you use common alarms for groups of instruments that have common responses? Yes Maybe 17% 33% 50%

2.4 Do you provide access to the alarm rationalization information? Maybe Maybe 17% 17% 67%

2.5 Do you minimize chattering alarms? Yes Yes 17% 83% 17%

2.6 Do you integrate alarms into process graphics? Yes Yes 67% 17% 17%

2.7 Do you provide effective alarm annunciation? Yes Yes 17% 67% 17%

2.8 Do you ensure alternative support is available for alarm response? No Maybe 0% 0% 100%

2.9 Do you integrate multiple alarm systems? Maybe No 0% 0% 100%

2.10 Have you installed an alarm and event historian? Yes Yes 83% 17% 0%

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 Alarm System Design & Implementation #2

Alarm System Design & Implementation Questionnaire Response

Work In Not
No. Statement CTS (2011) CTS (2014) Complete Progress Started

2.11 Have you established an alarm improvement project plan? Yes Yes 0% 83% 17%

2.12 Do you perform a comprehensive alarm rationalization review? Yes Yes 17% 33% 50%

2.13 Do you provide an alarm configuration database? Yes Yes 33% 17% 50%

2.14 Have you established a new project execution protocol? Yes Yes 0% 17% 83%

2.15 Do you provide safety system design and safety-related alarm handling? Yes Yes 0% 17% 83%

2.16 Do you segregate diagnostic information and notifications from annunciated alarms? Yes Yes 0% 17% 83%

2.17 Have you implemented an alarm shelving/disabled application? Maybe Yes 33% 33% 33%

2.18 Do you provide online access to alarm rationalization information? No Yes 0% 17% 83%

2.19 Have you defined operating targets and limits appropriate to the mode of operation? Maybe Maybe 0% 33% 67%

2.20 Do you provide dynamic alarm management? No Yes 0% 33% 67%

2.21 Do you provide a system for user-initiated notifications? Maybe Maybe 0% 0% 100%

2.22 Do you provide advanced applications to support situation awareness? No Maybe 0% 0% 100%

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 Training

ASM Guideline definition

• Objective: To ensure that operators are trained to use the alarm

system effectively and that all plant personnel follow the alarm
management practices.

• Rationale: To use the alarm system effectively, operators need to

be up-to-date and trained on alarm configuration basis and
changes, how to respond to alarms and new alarm management
support tools.

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 Training

Training Questionnaire Response

Work In Not
No. Statement CTS (2011) CTS (2014) Complete Progress Started

3.1 Do you provide operators with information and training on alarm system changes? Yes Yes 17% 67% 17%
Do you ensure alarm rationalization team members understand the alarm management
3.2 philosophy? Yes Yes 0% 67% 33%

3.3 Have you established scenario reviews and what if training? Maybe Maybe 0% 33% 67%

3.4 Have you enhanced training programs to include situation support tools? Maybe Maybe 0% 0% 100%
Have you enhanced training programs to include process control operators’ routine alarm
3.5 management duties? Yes Yes 0% 0% 100%

3.6 Do you educate process design personnel in alarm management? Yes Yes 0% 50% 50%

3.7 Do you use dynamic simulators as alarm management training tool? No Maybe 0% 0% 100%

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 ASM Guidelines Critical for Success

• What are the Takeaways?

• Alarm Management needs to be seen as a Continuous

Improvement commitment – that is always done as part of a
Lifecycle Maintenance work process

• Being successful requires a systems approach, not a pick-and-

choose approach to what guidelines are practiced

• Being successful also means going beyond ‘minimum practices’

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 Improving Alarm Design

• We have seen that Abnormal Situation events need to be

identified by suitably designed alarms to Operators

• We have reviewed where we can find good guidance for alarm

system design and which are Critical to Success

• Now let’s examine processes to Improve Alarms as a part of a

Continuous Improvement program

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 Get the Basics Right First!

• Engineering of signals:
– Make sure the installation practice for sensors does not propagate
disturbances into the DCS

• Good instrumentation practice:

– Proper signal ranging
– Proper match of transducer type to process application

• Filtering:
– Add or set filtering to ensure valid PV signal reception to DCS

• Etc...

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 #1 ANSI/ISA-18.2 Alarm Management Lifecycle

• 3 jointing points identified to the Alarm Management Lifecycle

• Philosophy
PHILOSOPHY
– Generally an entry point for new
installations.
IDENTIFICATION
– Can be used as the basis for the
alarm system requirements
specifications. RATIONALIZATION
MANAGEMENT
OF CHANGE

• Monitoring & Assessment

DETAILED DESIGN
AUDIT

– Begin monitoring the existing alarm IMPLEMENTATION

system and assessing performance.

– Problem alarms can be identified OPERATION
MONITORING
and addressed through maintenance & ASSESSMENT
or management of change. MAINTENANCE

• Audit
– Reviewing processes, etc in use.

42
 ANSI/ISA-18.2 Alarm Management Lifecycle

• Philosophy
– Alarm philosophy documents the
site approach to alarm
management PHILOSOPHY
– Includes the definitions and IDENTIFICATION

principles
– Details of the practices and RATIONALIZATION
MANAGEMENT
procedures for each of the OF CHANGE
remaining life cycle stages DETAILED DESIGN
AUDIT
– The philosophy provides a
lasting reference to sustain an IMPLEMENTATION

effective alarm system

OPERATION
MONITORING
– This defines your “Target” and & ASSESSMENT
MAINTENANCE
how you intend to reach it!

43
 ANSI/ISA-18.2 Alarm Management Lifecycle

• Identification
– Many methods utilized
– Process hazard analysis PHILOSOPHY

– Incident investigations
– Important step in the life cycle IDENTIFICATION
– Methods are not detailed in
SP18.2 RATIONALIZATION
MANAGEMENT

– Except the identification of

OF CHANGE

DETAILED DESIGN
alarms from routine AUDIT

monitoring
IMPLEMENTATION
– This stage in the life cycle is a
holding point for possible alarms
OPERATION
to be processed in the next MONITORING

stage MAINTENANCE
& ASSESSMENT

44
 ANSI/ISA-18.2 Alarm Management Lifecycle

• Rationalization
– Reconciling each individual
alarm against the principles and PHILOSOPHY

requirements of the alarm

philosophy IDENTIFICATION

– Documenting the alarm to RATIONALIZATION

support the other stages of the
life cycle MANAGEMENT
OF CHANGE
– Include operator action, DETAILED DESIGN
AUDIT
response time, and
consequence of deviation IMPLEMENTATION

– Critical to improve alarm clarity

for the operator OPERATION
MONITORING
– Consequences and the response & ASSESSMENT

time have been documented MAINTENANCE

– Assign the alarm a priority based

on a matrix of consequences
and priorities.

45
 The Rationalization Team

• Possible members
– Operator and/or Supervisor from the plant concerned
– Process or Mechanical Engineer
– Instrumentation and/or Control Engineer

• It may help to use a “Facilitator” whose functions are:

– To gather information “up front” including analysis reports that show alarm rates,
“Bad Actors”, standing alarms etc.
– To manage the meeting and take notes
– To follow-up after the meeting where additional information required etc.

• Others may be required (part-time) for

additional input:
– Maintenance personnel
– Operator trainer
– SHE

46
 Steps in Alarm Rationalization

• Assemble all the data prior to the team meeting

• At the start of the meeting:
– Review alarm philosophy with any new team members
– The alarm philosophy is your ‘target’

• Use a HAZOP-like process:

– Identify area of plant to be rationalised to the team
– Review the way in which the plant is operated
– Redesign each alarm in the area (see next slide)
– Review a group of alarms where appropriate
– Document each alarm

• Ordering often follows the main Process flow path

• You should ensure that each alarm works well with other alarms
in the same plant area – this may require iteration

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 Steps in Alarm Rationalization

• For each alarm:

– Review the data analysis
– What is the cause(s) of the alarm event?
– What is the consequence(s) of no action?
– What Action(s) is required? (No Action means No Alarm!)
– Is the alarm Type correct?
– Is the Trip Point correct? (May relate to other alarms etc.)
– Is the Priority correct? (As per the Philosophy)
– Is the Dead Band (if used) appropriate for this alarm?
– Identify any housekeeping changes required
– Document the results

48
 Attention Points!

• Safety-related alarms need special treatment

– E.g. typically require extra care checking of Safety Cases, HAZOPs, interlocks etc.

• Trip points must be set to recognise a specific, understood problem or concern

PLUS provide sufficient reaction time for normal corrective actions

• Dead bands must be “tuned” on a per-point class

– Point classes: flow, temperature, pressure, level
– Each type of “analyser” will need separate consideration
– Usually less than 5% of span

• Ensure that trip points and dead-bands do not interact

– Watch H/HH & L/LL

• Priority assignment is on a per alarm basis, not per tag

• Duplicate results to similar equipment items/process “trains”

49
 ANSI/ISA-18.2 Alarm Management Lifecycle

• Detailed Design
– Basic configuration of alarms
– Human machine interface (HMI) PHILOSOPHY

for alarms
– Advanced methods of alarm IDENTIFICATION

management
– Should be control system RATIONALIZATION
MANAGEMENT
specific DETAILED DESIGN OF CHANGE

– Usually separate from the alarm AUDIT

philosophy
IMPLEMENTATION
– Nuisance alarms and stale
alarms can be eliminated with
good basic configuration OPERATION
MONITORING
practices & ASSESSMENT
MAINTENANCE

50
 Detailed Design – advanced methods

• State-based Alarms & Dynamic Alarm Suppression

– These are 2 very powerful methods of alarm management, but for different
purposes.
– State-based Alarms are alarm configurations which relate to different States or
Modes within a process asset, for example a Compressor in Recycle or a
Production Train in an offline condition. The requirement is that the alarm settings
are changed to reflect the state of the process asset. This method often helps with
reducing Standing Alarms.
– Dynamic Alarm Suppression is the process of
masking consequential alarms from the key initiator
alarm, so the Operator can react to the cause and
not distracted by alarm noise. The reaction time for
dynamic suppression is key to the success of this
function so should always be engineered within the
DCS. Care should be taken in identifying the
consequential alarms from the initiator and
understanding when these alarms should be
unsuppressed!

51
 ANSI/ISA-18.2 Alarm Management Lifecycle

• Implementation
– Stage where the design is put
into service PHILOSOPHY

– Training for the operator

included IDENTIFICATION

– Initial testing of the alarm system

functions RATIONALIZATION
MANAGEMENT
OF CHANGE

DETAILED DESIGN
AUDIT
IMPLEMENTATION

OPERATION
MONITORING
& ASSESSMENT
MAINTENANCE

52
 ANSI/ISA-18.2 Alarm Management Lifecycle

• Operation
– Alarm is in service
– Reporting abnormal conditions to PHILOSOPHY

the operator
IDENTIFICATION

RATIONALIZATION
MANAGEMENT
OF CHANGE

DETAILED DESIGN
AUDIT

IMPLEMENTATION

OPERATION
MONITORING
& ASSESSMENT
MAINTENANCE

53
 ANSI/ISA-18.2 Alarm Management Lifecycle

• Maintenance
– Process measurement
instrument may need PHILOSOPHY

maintenance
– Other components may need IDENTIFICATION

repair
– Repair frequency can be RATIONALIZATION
MANAGEMENT
scheduled or determined by OF CHANGE
monitoring DETAILED DESIGN
AUDIT
– Periodic testing is a maintenance
function IMPLEMENTATION

– During the maintenance stage,

the alarm is not in operation. OPERATION
MONITORING
& ASSESSMENT
MAINTENANCE

MAINTENANCE

54
 ANSI/ISA-18.2 Alarm Management Lifecycle

• Monitoring & Assessment

– Periodic collection and analysis
of data from alarms PHILOSOPHY

– Without monitoring almost

impossible to maintain an IDENTIFICATION

effective alarm system

– Should take place frequently RATIONALIZATION
MANAGEMENT
(daily or weekly) OF CHANGE

– Primary method to detect DETAILED DESIGN

AUDIT
problems; nuisance alarms, stale
alarms, and alarm flood IMPLEMENTATION

OPERATION
MONITORING
MAINTENANCE & ASSESSMENT

55
 ANSI/ISA-18.2 Alarm Management Lifecycle

• Management of Change
– Structured process of approval
and authorization PHILOSOPHY

– Make additions, modifications,

and deletions of alarms from the IDENTIFICATION

system
– Change process should feed RATIONALIZATION
back to the identification stage to MANAGEMENT
maintain consistency with the DETAILED DESIGN OF CHANGE AUDIT
alarm philosophy
IMPLEMENTATION

OPERATION
MONITORING
& ASSESSMENT
MAINTENANCE

56
 ANSI/ISA-18.2 Alarm Management Lifecycle

• Audit
– Periodic audit of the alarm
system and the processes PHILOSOPHY

detailed in the alarm philosophy

– May determine the need to IDENTIFICATION

modify processes, the

philosophy, the design guidance
RATIONALIZATION
MANAGEMENT
– Organization’s discipline to OF CHANGE
follow the processes may need
improvement
DETAILED DESIGN
AUDIT
IMPLEMENTATION

OPERATION
MONITORING
& ASSESSMENT
MAINTENANCE

57
 2012 Honeywell Users’ Group EMEA

Sustain.Ability.
2014 Honeywell Users Group EMEA

Alarm Management Workshop

Defining and Implementing Best Practices to take you Beyond the Acceptable

Thank you