neither

star wars
nor
sanctuary
This page intentionally left blank
 neither
star wars
nor
sanctuary
Constraining the
Military Uses of Space

Michael E. O’Hanlon

brookings institution press

washington, D.C.
 Copyright © 2004
the brookings institution
1775 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036
www.brookings.edu

All rights reserved

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication data

O’Hanlon, Michael E.
Neither Star Wars nor sanctuary : constraining the military uses
of space / Michael E. O’Hanlon.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 0-8157-6456-1 (cloth : alk. paper) —
ISBN 0-8157-6457-x (pbk. : alk. paper)
1. Space warfare. 2. Astronautics, Military—United States.
3. Ballistic missile defenses—United States. 4. United States—
Military policy. 5. World politics—21st century. I. Title.
UG1530.O33 2004 2004004467
358'.8—dc22

987654321

The paper used in this publication meets minimum requirements of the

American National Standard for Information Sciences—Permanence of
Paper for Printed Library Materials: ANSI Z39.48-1992.

Typeset in Sabon

Composition by R. Lynn Rivenbark

Macon, Georgia

Printed by R. R. Donnelley
Harrisonburg, Virginia
To Grace and Lily

and their mom

This page intentionally left blank
 CONTENTS

Foreword ix

Acknowledgments xiii

1 Introduction 1

2 A Brief Primer on Space and Satellites 29

3 Current Threats and Technology Trends 61

4 A Future Taiwan Strait Conflict 91

5 Arms Control in Space 105

6 Preserving U.S. Dominance while

Slowing the Weaponization of Space 119

Notes 143

Index 165

vii
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 FOREWORD

Land, sea, and air—those are three environments where

wars are waged. That is why the United States, like most
countries, has three branches of armed forces: an army, a
navy, and an air force. But with the onrush of technology,
a new battlefield looms: outer space. So far, no nation
stations weapons in space or deploys effective weapons
on Earth with the intended purpose of threatening satel-
lites. In the jargon that Mike O’Hanlon understands so
well (and, mercifully, avoids in his own prolific writing),
while space is not “weaponized” it is militarized. Today
the U.S. Department of Defense uses space assets far
more than ever before. Satellites, employed primarily in
the cold war for strategic communications and for
nuclear targeting and arms control monitoring, are now
very much the instrument of the tactical warfighter.
Weapons are guided to target by satellite, commanders
plan their tactical operations using satellite links, real-
time battlefield information is conveyed via satellite,

ix
 x
FOREWORD

enemy forces are located and attacked in large part on the basis
of information gained and transmitted via U.S. space assets.
Other countries, including even the most technologically
sophisticated of the United States’ allies, cannot yet do most of
these things. But they are gaining more and more expertise at
monitoring Earth and communicating using satellites. New
technologies, such as small satellites, are in the works as well,
not only in Europe and Japan but also in China, India, Russia,
and elsewhere. And ballistic missile defense programs, espe-
cially in the United States but also abroad, are gaining latent
capabilities that could make them useful against low-Earth
orbit satellites in particular—even as they are developed for
much different reasons.
With the military uses of space expanding rapidly, there is a
looming possibility that space will soon be truly weaponized, if
only through the natural course of ongoing events. American
military doctrine seems to take this trend for granted, even
though no president has formally endorsed it as a desirable
objective, nor has the U.S. government and strategic commu-
nity carefully weighed the likely costs and benefits. An impor-
tant part of what we do at Brookings is, precisely, assessing the
costs and benefits of public policy choices facing the nation. It
is Mike’s premise that the weaponization of space would be a
development of such consequence that the United States and
other countries must make conscious decisions about whether
to move in that direction, rather than simply drifting into what
would be a revolutionary state of affairs.
Mike’s own view is that space weaponry, under current and
foreseeable circumstances, is neither necessary nor wise.
However, he can imagine the situation changing—partly
because military activities in space are hard to verify, making
lasting bans on space weaponry impractical; partly because as
 xi
FOREWORD

other countries gain more military capability in space, their

satellites may threaten American interests; and partly due to
progress in ballistic missile defense technologies, with their
inherent capabilities against low-Earth orbit satellites. Mike
offers his own guidelines on how to reconcile sound judgments
about the present with the uncertainties of the future, arguing
for policies that deliberately attempt to slow movement toward
the weaponization of space where possible, without foreclosing
options for the United States in the future.
Brookings is grateful to the National Defense University and
to the MacArthur Foundation for financial support of this
project.
Strobe Talbott
President
Washington, D.C.
March 2004
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 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This book benefited enormously from the help of many

individuals. Adriana Lins de Albuquerque and Aaron
Moburg Jones provided excellent research assistance.
General Mike Hamel and his colleagues at Vandenberg
Air Force Base, as well as Dr. Don Daniel of the National
Defense University, provided very important guidance as
well (though, of course, they should not be held account-
able for any opinions or mistakes in the manuscript,
which are entirely the author’s doing). Others who kindly
assisted the author include Gordon Adams, Theresa
Hitchens, Michael Krepon, Michael Levi, Jan Lodal,
David Mosher, and a number of experts at Kirtland Air
Force Base. Richard Garwin, Lt. Col. Peter Hays, James
Clay Moltz, and James Steinberg reviewed the manu-
script carefully and extremely helpfully. Finally, the
author would like to acknowledge his deep intellectual
debt in this subject to, among others, Robert Bell, Bruce
Blair, Tom Christensen, Andrew Krepinevich, Andrew
Marshall, John Pike, Jeffrey Richelson, Walt Slocombe,
Tom Stefanick, Frank von Hippel, Barry Watts, and most
of all Ashton Carter, Richard Garwin, and Paul Stares.

xiii
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“Our nation may find it necessary to disrupt, degrade, deny or
destroy enemy space capabilities in future conflicts. . . . U.S. Space
Command currently does not have an operational anti-satellite
weapon. . . . Research and development into anti-satellite technology
is continuing.”
U.S. Space Command
November 26, 2001

“The Outer Space Treaty contains one over all rule: space shall be
preserved for peaceful purposes for all countries.”
George Bunn and John B. Rhinelander
June 2002
 CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

What future role will space play in warfare? And what

should the United States do about it now? These ques-
tions have not been the focus of intensive and sustained
political debate since the cold war days of the 1980s. In
the meantime, technology has changed a great deal;
geopolitics has changed even more. This book attempts to
answer these broad questions for the context in which
military space policy will be made in the early years of
the twenty-first century.
Space is already militarized. Indeed, it has been milita-
rized for more than four decades. But satellites played a
rather benign role during much of the cold war, when they
were most important for preserving strategic stability. Par-
ticularly since the cold war ended, however, space assets
have been reestablished as competitive military instru-
ments, especially by the United States. This trend has not
extended to placing weapons in space or developing
weapons for the purpose of threatening objects in space,

1
 2
INTRODUCTION

but that clearly could change in the coming years. And weapons
now being developed for other purposes, most notably missile
defense, will make low-altitude satellites increasingly vulnerable
even if no explicit steps are taken to achieve that end.
The Soviet Union and the United States employed satellites
during most of the cold war. They did so largely for purposes of
watching each other’s nuclear tests, missile launches, and mili-
tary force deployments. They also used space for communicat-
ing with their own global force deployments and operations,
weather forecasting, mapping, measuring Earth’s gravitational
field (largely to improve the accuracy of ballistic missiles), and
maintaining exact and uniform time standards for their de-
ployed military forces. Many of these activities ultimately served
the nonconfrontational and desirable purposes of maintaining
strategic nuclear stability and promoting arms control. But their
purposes were still basically quite military—contributing, for
example, to the development of nuclear war plans—and hence
were competitive as well. Indeed, from the launching of Sputnik
in October 1957 until 1963, when a series of UN resolutions,
implicitly at least, acknowledged and allowed the use of recon-
naissance satellites, the Soviet Union struggled with the question
of whether to tolerate U.S. satellites over its own territory. Both
superpowers ultimately concluded that mutual toleration served
their interests. The United States wanted means to tie together its
global force deployments and to monitor capabilities in closed
societies like the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of
China (PRC). The Soviet Union saw its space program as a sign
of national prestige and may have found reconnaissance satel-
lites quite useful for watching events in places such as Cuba,
China, and Europe.1
As time went on, both sides explicitly agreed not to interfere
with the operations of each other’s satellites in a number of arms
 3
INTRODUCTION

control accords, including the 1972 ABM Treaty, the 1974

Threshold Test Ban Treaty, the 1976 Peaceful Nuclear Explo-
sions Treaty, the 1979 SALT II Treaty, the 1990 multilateral CFE
Treaty, and the 1991 START accords.2 (They also signed the
1992 Open Skies Treaty, along with a couple dozen European
countries, providing mechanisms for aerial monitoring under
specific circumstances.)
Since the cold war, the United States has increasingly used
satellite assets for tactical warfighting purposes in wars against
Iraq, Serbia, and the Taliban in Afghanistan. Space systems,
notably the global positioning system (GPS) satellite constella-
tion, were used to help American soldiers navigate in the fea-
tureless desert starting most notably in the 1991 war against
Iraq. GPS satellites are employed to synchronize operations in
time as well, with remarkable accuracy. They are also increas-
ingly used to pinpoint the locations of enemy targets and help
guide precision-strike munitions, such as cruise missiles and the
GPS-guided joint direct attack munition (JDAM), to those tar-
gets. Hundreds of JDAMs were used in the Kosovo war of
1999. More than 5,000 were employed in the Afghanistan war
of 2001–02, striking as close as five meters from their aim-
points, and a comparable number were used in Operation Iraqi
Freedom in 2003.3 GPS devices are also integral to the “blue
force” tracking systems that keep tabs on friendly units in a
given region to reduce fratricide. Such systems still have only
limited capabilities and use, and present challenges for filtering
data so that users are not swamped by information they do not
need, but they are quite useful nonetheless.4
Communications satellites are used for an increasing range
of activities as well. While they still carry traditional voice mes-
sages, they also transmit real-time imagery taken by cameras
and radar on platforms such as unmanned aerial vehicles
 4
INTRODUCTION

(UAVs) and reconnaissance aircraft to individuals far removed

from the scene of battle, whether for purposes of data process-
ing or for command and control.5 They transmit detailed air
war targeting plans to commanders and pilots.
As a result, the use of such satellites in war has skyrocketed.
In Desert Storm, a total of sixteen military satellites and five
commercial satellites provided coalition forces with a maxi-
mum possible transmission rate of 200 million bits per second
(the equivalent of nearly 40,000 simultaneous telephone calls).
Nearly twice as much capacity was available during the Kosovo
war eight years later—much of it commercial, however, and
hence unhardened against possible enemy action, such as elec-
tronic jamming, and unsecured. It was used for purposes that
included teleconferencing among commanders.6 Available
capacity doubled again, to close to a billion bits per second,
during the Afghan campaign of 2001–02. Again, much of the
data flowed through commercial systems.7 What that means is
that, remarkably, a U.S. military operation of some 50,000
troops in 2001–02 used five times as much communications
bandwidth as did a war with 500,000 troops a decade earlier—
fifty times as much bandwidth per person, on average. In Oper-
ation Iraqi Freedom, the military used 2.4 gigabits per second.8
But the 2003 Iraq war was less notable for further increases
in bandwidth, perhaps, than for several other aspects. More
than fifty satellites were used in the war effort; commercial
firms, including France’s leading satellite services company, pro-
vided the majority of communications capacity and a fair
amount of imagery as well. Satellite channels in the so-called
EHF frequency band gave ships fifty times more bandwidth for
secure data transmissions than in the past (128 kilobits per sec-
ond). And the GPS permitted the United States to drop more
than 6,000 satellite-guided JDAMs.9
 5
INTRODUCTION

Recognizing what satellites now offer the warfighter, the

U.S. military is improving its means for utilizing their services.
A space team was established and put on full-time duty in the
Persian Gulf in late 2002 to plan operations against Iraq, for
example. Among other things, its purpose was to help air
planners understand when the greatest number of GPS satel-
lites would be available to help guide bombs to target as accu-
rately as possible.10
Space systems may soon be used to maintain a track on bal-
listic missiles, so that ground-based interceptors can be
launched to shoot them down. Further in the future, space-
based weapons may be used to destroy the ballistic missiles
directly, though this is not necessarily a desirable goal for Amer-
ican policymakers anytime soon, as discussed below.
The increasing militarization of space is not exclusively a
superpower story, however. The United States certainly domi-
nates military space spending—accounting for more than
90 percent of the total, by some measures.11 U.S. space funding
over time is reported in table 1-1; the country’s military space
budget totals exceed $15 billion a year.12 But other countries
besides the United States and Russia have also increasingly
sought military satellites, largely for reconnaissance and com-
munications purposes so far, and will surely continue to pursue
space capabilities of many types in the future. They may make
use of civilian and commercial assets for military purposes as
well. They are surely studying American capabilities to find,
track, and quickly attack targets using space assets. Some are
trying to emulate the United States; some are trying to find vul-
nerabilities in U.S. space systems so they can challenge them in
any future wars. China may be the most notable example of a
country that is doing both. Its progress to date is limited, as far
as we can tell, and its progress in the coming years is likely to
 6
INTRODUCTION

Table 1-1. U.S. Government Space Funding

Billions of 2002 dollars

Department
Fiscal Year NASA of Defense Other Total
1959 1.3 2.4 0.2 4.0
1960 2.3 2.8 0.2 5.3
1961 4.6 4.0 0.3 8.9
1962 8.8 6.3 1.0 16.1
1963 17.5 7.5 1.2 26.2
1964 23.9 7.6 1.0 32.5
1965 24.1 7.4 1.1 32.7
1966 23.4 7.8 1.0 32.2
1967 21.9 7.5 0.9 30.3
1968 19.4 8.4 0.7 28.6
1969 16.2 8.5 0.7 25.4
1970 14.3 6.8 0.6 21.7
1971 11.9 5.8 0.6 18.3
1972 11.2 5.1 0.5 16.9
1973 10.8 5.7 0.5 17.0
1974 9.2 5.9 0.5 15.7
1975 9.1 5.9 0.5 15.5
1976 11.5 6.9 0.6 19.0
1977 8.8 6.2 0.5 15.5
1978 8.9 6.7 0.6 16.2
1979 9.3 7.0 0.6 16.8
1980 10.0 8.2 0.5 18.6
1981 9.8 9.4 0.5 19.6
(continued)
 7
INTRODUCTION

Table 1-1. U.S. Government Space Funding (continued)

Billions of 2002 dollars

Department
Fiscal Year NASA of Defense Other Total
1982 9.8 11.9 0.6 22.3
1983 10.5 15.0 0.5 26.1
1984 10.9 16.3 0.6 27.8
1985 10.6 19.6 0.9 31.2
1986 10.7 21.0 0.7 32.4
1987 14.3 23.7 0.7 38.6
1988 11.8 25.0 1.0 37.8
1989 13.8 24.5 0.8 39.1
1990 15.11 20.6 0.7 36.4
1991 16.6 18.0 1.0 35.6
1992 16.1 18.4 1.0 35.5
1993 15.6 16.8 0.9 33.2
1994 15.1 15.3 0.7 31.2
1995 14.3 12.1 0.9 27.3
1996 14.0 12.8 0.9 27.8
1997 13.6 12.8 0.9 27.3
1998 13.2 13.3 0.9 27.4
1999 13.2 14.0 1.0 28.2
2000 13.1 13.5 1.1 27.7
2001 13.6 14.7 1.1 29.4
2002 13.9 15.7 1.2 30.8
Total 568.1 505.1 32.9 1,106.2
Source: Tamar A. Mehuron, “2003 Space Almanac,” Air Force Magazine
(August 2003), p. 28.
 8
INTRODUCTION

be modest as well—but these prognostications may prove

wrong, and in any case will not be applicable forever.
Although space is becoming increasingly militarized, it is not
yet weaponized—at least as far as we know. That is, no country
deploys destructive weapons in space, for use against space or
Earth targets, and no country possesses ground-based weapons
designed explicitly to damage objects in space. The challenges of
weaponizing space should not be overlooked; in the words of
one top Air Force specialist, space is a very challenging environ-
ment in which to work.13 It is also a very different medium than
the air, as Air Force Chief of Staff General John Jumper empha-
sized when he discarded the popular term “aerospace” and
instead insisted that the Air Force must specialize in both air and
space operations.14 On the other hand, trends in technology and
the gradual spread of space capabilities to many countries will
surely threaten the status quo. Not only the United States but
other major western powers, China, and smaller states as well,
will have weaponization opportunities within reach.
But space is not a true sanctuary from weapons today. Virtu-
ally any country capable of putting a nuclear weapon into low-
Earth orbit (LEO) already has a latent, if crude, antisatellite
(ASAT) capability (though in many cases such weapons would
have to be modified so that the warheads could be detonated by
a timer or by remote control). Not only would such a weapon
be likely to physically destroy any satellite within tens of kilo-
meters of the point of detonation and to damage or destroy
unhardened satellites within line of sight many hundreds of
kilometers away (if not even further); it would also populate the
Van Allen radiation belts with many more charged particles,
which would destroy most low-Earth orbit satellites within
about a month.15
 9
INTRODUCTION

Nor has space been treated as an inviolable sanctuary in the

past. The nuclear superpowers made some progress toward
developing antisatellite weapons in fits and starts from the
1950s through the 1980s. For example, the United States had
something of an ASAT capability with its Nike Zeus and Thor
nuclear-armed interceptor missiles in the 1960s and early
1970s, and with the Spartan program of the 1970s. The Sovi-
ets later developed and tested a nonnuclear “co-orbital” ASAT
that needed to conduct a couple orbits to gradually approach
its target (see table 1-2). Into the 1980s, the United States
developed a nonnuclear “direct ascent” ASAT, launched by an
F-15, that would reach its target much more promptly and
then collide with it.16 Soviet antiballistic missile (ABM) systems
deployed around Moscow probably had ASAT capability as
well; given the size of their warheads, they may have been able
to damage satellites as distant as hundreds of kilometers from
their detonation points.17 Some of these capabilities may
remain warehoused in some form. Still, the ASAT competition
was held in check. Likewise, technological constraints made
any deployment of space-based ballistic missile defenses
impractical, even though the idea of such missile defenses was
hotly debated.18
Decisions not to deploy ASATs or space-based missile de-
fenses during the cold war did not, however, reflect any perma-
nent commitment to keep space forever free from weaponry.
Nor do existing arms control treaties ban such activities.
Instead, they ban the deployment or use of nuclear weapons in
outer space, prevent colonization of heavenly bodies for mili-
tary purposes, and protect the rights of countries to use space to
verify arms control accords and conduct peaceful activities.19 In
addition, in 2000 the United States and Russia agreed to notify
Table 1-2. Soviet Antisatellite Tests, 1968–82a
Target orbit Intercept orbit
Perigee; Perigee; Attempted
Test number Inclination apogee Inter- Inclination apogee intercept Probable
and date Target (degrees) (km) ceptor (degrees) (km) altitude (km) outcome
Phase I
1. Oct. 20, 1968 K248 62.25 475; 542 K249 62.23 502; 1,639 525 Failure
2. Nov. 1, 1968 K248 62.25 473; 543 K252 62.34 535?; 1,640? 535 Success
3. Oct. 23, 1970 K373 62.93 473; 543 K374 32.96 530; 1,053 530 Failure
4. Oct. 30, 1970 K373 62.92 466; 555 K375 62.86 565; 994 535 Success
5. Feb. 25, 1971 K394 65.84 572; 614 K397 65.76 575?; 1,000? 585 Success
6. Apr. 4, 1971 K400 65.82 982; 1,006 K404 65.74 802; 1,009 1,005 Success
7. Dec. 3, 1971 K459 65.83 222; 259 K462 65.88 231; 2,654 230 Success

Phase II
8. Feb. 16, 1976 K803 65.85 547; 621 K804 65.86 561; 618 575 Failure
9. Apr. 13, 1976 K803 65.86 549; 621 K814 65.9? 556?; 615? 590 Success
10. Jul. 21, 1976 K839 65.88 983; 2,097 K843 n.a. n.a. 1,630? Failureb
11. Dec. 27, 1976 K880 65.85 559; 617 K886 65.85 532; 1,266 570 Failurec
12. May 23, 1977 K909 65.87 993; 2,104 K910 65.86 465?; 1,775? 1,710 Failure
13. Jun. 17, 1977 K909 65.87 991; 2,106 K918 65.9? 245?; 1,630? 1,575? Successd
14. Oct. 26, 1977 K959 65.83 144; 834 K961 65.8? 125?; 302? 150 Success
15. Dec. 21, 1977 K967 65.83 963; 1,004 K970 65.85 949; 1,148 995 Failurec
16. May 19, 1978 K967 65.83 963; 1,004 K1009 65.87 965; 1,362 985 Failurec
17. Apr. 18, 1980 K1171 65.85 966; 1,010 K1174 65.83 362; 1,025 1000 Failurec
18. Feb. 2, 1981 K1241 65.82 975; 1,011 K1243 65.82 296; 1,015 1005 Failurec
19. Mar. 14, 1981 K1241 65.82 976; 1,011 K1258 65.83 301; 1,024 1005 Success
20. Jun. 18, 1982 K1375 65.84 979; 1,012 K1379 65.84 537; 1,019 1005 Failurec
Source: Paul B. Stares, Space and National Security (Brookings, 1987), p. 86.
? = Uncertain; n.a. = not available.
a. All missions were of two revolutions, except tests 8, 9, 12, and 13, which were one revolution.
b. Apparently failed to enter intercept orbit.
c. Reportedly used new optical sensor.
d. Conflicting data exist for intercept orbit.
 12
INTRODUCTION

each other in advance of most space launches and ballistic mis-

sile tests.20 Most other matters are still up for grabs. And the
concept of space as a sanctuary will be increasingly difficult to
defend or justify as space systems are used more and more to
assist in the delivery of lethal ordnance on target.21
Some scholars, such as Ambassador Jonathan Dean, do argue
that the START I, Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF),
and multilateral CFE treaties effectively ban the use of ASATs by
one signatory against any and all others, given the protection
they provide to satellite verification missions. But these treaties
were signed before imaging satellites entered their own as tar-
geting assets for tactical warfighting purposes, raising the legal
and political question of whether protection originally provided
to a satellite for one, generally nonprovocative and stabilizing
mission can be extended to its use in a more adversarial fashion.
Moreover, no one argues that these treaties ban the develop-
ment, testing, production, or deployment of ASATs.22
In the late 1980s and 1990s, debates over military space pol-
icy became less visible than they had been during the Reagan
era and a number of periods during the cold war. Détente, and
then the end of the cold war, defused the immediate argument
for such systems. Bill Clinton’s election in 1992 reinforced these
strategic developments, among other things leading to a shift in
missile defense efforts from strategic to theater systems, for
which weapons based in space did not figure prominently
(though some theater missile defense [TMD] systems could
have capabilities against low-Earth orbit satellites). Even when
Clinton reemphasized national missile defense in mid-decade,
his plan called for land-based interceptors. Sensor technology
was to be based in space, but other capabilities were not. Clin-
ton also curtailed the development of a kinetic energy, or “hit-
 13
INTRODUCTION

to-kill,” antisatellite system that he inherited from George

H. W. Bush, as well as a microsatellite program known as Cle-
mentine II, despite the efforts of Senator Robert Smith of New
Hampshire and other conservatives.23
But Clinton did not stop technology in its tracks. Two of the
missile defense systems he promoted steadily, the midcourse
national missile defense program and the airborne laser theater
missile defense program, continue to this day and have latent
capability as ASATs (see chapter 3). Moreover, he allowed the
use of the mid-infrared advanced chemical laser (MIRACL) in a
test against a target in space, confirming that the United States
may have at least a rudimentary capability of using that ground-
based high-energy laser in an ASAT mode.24 (Meanwhile, some
work continued more quietly and is ongoing under President
Bush. For example, the Army has reportedly been working on
laser dazzlers to blind surveillance satellites and jammers to dis-
rupt communications and surveillance satellites.25 It also, again,
has a kinetic energy ASAT program, though funding has been
near nil for several years and the Pentagon leadership has
decided not to request funding for a flight test in 2004.26)
The election of George W. Bush as president, and, even more
important, his decision to select Donald Rumsfeld as secretary
of defense, made it likely that such efforts would accelerate. Just
before he became secretary, Rumsfeld chaired a commission on
the military uses of space that warned of a possible future
“space Pearl Harbor” for the United States unless it took a wide
range of defensive and offensive steps to better protect its secu-
rity interests in the heavens.27 The worry was that countries
such as China and Iran, among others, would gradually get
their hands on technologies, such as high-energy lasers or hom-
ing microsatellites, that could threaten U.S. space assets. But
 14
INTRODUCTION

the secretary’s thinking is not strictly defensive. Rumsfeld’s

major strategic plan as secretary of defense states, “The mission
of space control is to ensure the freedom of action in space for
the United States and its allies and, when directed, to deny such
freedom of action to adversaries.”28
It is possible to exaggerate the change that occurred in U.S.
policy when the Bush administration came into power. During
the Clinton era, Air Force leaders increasingly discussed space
as a military theater like any other. They envisioned the day
when the Air Force would become an air and space force, or
even a space and air force.29 And Rumsfeld’s language quoted
above resembles official statements on Clinton administration
space policy. Consider this excerpt from Space Command’s
1998 Long-Range Plan in regard to one option it would even-
tually wish to develop more fully:

Negation means applying military force to affect an adver-

sary’s space capability by targeting ground-support sites,
ground-to-space links, or spacecraft. Negation will be exe-
cuted when prevention fails. High-priority targets include
an enemy’s ability to hold US and allied space systems at
risk. Negation will evolve from current concepts, which
emphasize terrestrial attacks on an adversary’s ground
nodes, to a full range of flexible and discriminate techniques
against the most appropriate node. Acting under clear lines
of authority and rules of engagement, USCINCSPACE will
take actions necessary to meet the National Command
Authorities’ objectives and defend our nation’s vital space
interests. Actions will range from temporarily disrupting or
denying hostile space systems to degrading or destroying
them. Our objectives must consider third-party use, plausi-
 15
INTRODUCTION

ble deniability and how actions will add to debris or other-

wise affect the environment.30

But in broader context, Rumsfeld’s approach indeed seems

more assertive than policies under Clinton.31 To quote Peter B.
Teets, undersecretary of the Air Force for acquisition and head
of the National Reconnaissance Organization, the nation must
develop “ways to get a vehicle rapidly off the pad to any orbit
on short notice. . . . It is easy to see how such a responsive capa-
bility could be useful for rapid constellation replenishment and
sustainment, but I leave it to your imagination . . . to find other
ways to employ such a capability to achieve desired warfighting
effects.”32 Little imagination is needed if one reads official doc-
trine, given its emphasis on disrupting, degrading, and, if nec-
essary, destroying enemy space assets in future combat.33 This
approach also seems to have emboldened a number of Air Force
officers to make more public statements about the inevitability
of weaponizing space.34 As one example, Brigadier General Pete
Worden argues that small launchers could be useful to the U.S.
military for, among other reasons, their ability to launch
weapons on short notice against targets in space.35 Certain spe-
cific actions have already affected the policy landscape quite
directly as well. For example, the Bush administration’s deci-
sion to withdraw from the ABM Treaty, an action that was pub-
licly announced in December 2001 and officially put into effect
in June 2002, opened up the legal possibility of space-based bal-
listic missile defenses. Eliminating Space Command as one of
the country’s ten unified commands and placing space functions
under Strategic Command may also reflect an inclination to
think about space as another theater of combat, rather than as
a special, and possibly safeguarded, domain.36
 16
INTRODUCTION

Not all policymakers agree with Rumsfeld. For example,

Senate Majority Leader Tom Daschle made a strong statement
against such activities in 2001 and suggested that most other
Democrats also opposed putting weaponry in space.37 This
position is probably rooted, at least in part, in the philosophi-
cal view that space should remain a natural preserve of all
mankind. As such, it should be devoted to nonmilitary—or at
least nonthreatening and nonoffensive—purposes. Beyond that
ideological point, opponents of weaponization also make a
practical national interest argument: as the world’s principal
space power today, the United States stands to lose the most
from the widespread weaponization of space, since that out-
come could jeopardize the communications and reconnaissance
systems on which it so disproportionately depends.38
Opponents of weaponizing space also point to the world’s
growing economic dependence on satellites, and the risk of
damaging those capabilities should weaponry be based or used
above the atmosphere. Worldwide, commercial revenues from
space ventures exceeded government spending on space activi-
ties in the late 1990s, reaching and then exceeding $50 billion
a year. The spread of fiber-optic cable has actually reduced the
relative importance of satellites in global telephone services,
and global economic conditions caused a downward revision in
forecasts for space services.39 But nonetheless the global satellite
business now involves more than 1,000 companies in more
than fifty countries.40
Non-American opponents of weaponizing space make many
of the same arguments. They also worry about a unilateralist
America pursuing its own military advantage at the expense of
other countries, most of which do not favor putting weapons in
space. This dispute has much of its origins and motivation in
the history of the ballistic missile defense debate, as well as the
 17
INTRODUCTION

ASAT debate of the 1980s. But it has taken on a new tone in

what many view as an era of American unipolarity or hege-
mony. In recent years, China and Russia have been consistently
vocal in their opposition to the weaponization of space and
their desire for a treaty banning the testing, deployment, and
use of such capabilities.41 So have a number of U.S. allies,
including Canada, which in 1998 proposed that the United
Nations convene a committee on outer space in its Conference
on Disarmament in Geneva.42 The UN General Assembly has
continued to pass resolutions, for more than twenty straight
years, opposing the weaponization of space. In December 2001
it called for negotiations on a treaty to prevent an arms race in
outer space at the Geneva Conference. (The vote passed by 156
to 0; the United States, Micronesia, Israel, and Georgia ab-
stained.)43 In 2001 China presented an incomplete draft treaty
banning the weaponization of space, and in 2002 China and
Russia jointly presented another draft that included bans on
weapons based in space and on any use of weapons against
objects in space.44
For most defense planners today, by contrast, developing
more military applications for outer space is an important
imperative. Much thinking about the so-called revolution in
military affairs and defense transformation emphasizes space
capabilities. Ensuring American military dominance in the com-
ing years—which proponents tend to see as critical for global
stability as well—will require that the United States remain well
ahead of its potential adversaries technologically. For some
defense futurists, the key requirement will be to control space,
denying its effective use to U.S. adversaries while preserving the
unfettered operation of American satellites that help make up a
“reconnaissance-strike complex.” Others favor an even more
ambitious approach. Given that fixed bases on land and large
 18
INTRODUCTION

assets such as ships are increasingly vulnerable to precision-

strike weaponry and other enemy capabilities—or to the politi-
cal opposition of allies such as Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and
France, who have sometimes opposed use of their territories or
airspaces for military operations—they favor a greater U.S.
reliance on long-range strike systems. These include platforms
in space.45
Advocates of space weaponry also argue that, in effect, space
is already weaponized, at least in subtle ways. As noted, most
medium-range and long-range rockets capable of carrying
nuclear weapons constitute latent ASATs. Likewise, rockets and
space-launch vehicles could probably be used to launch small
homing satellites equipped with explosives and capable of
approaching and then destroying another satellite. Such capa-
bilities may not even require testing, or at least testing easily
detectable from Earth. Advocates of weaponization further
note that the United States is willing to use weapons to deny
other countries wartime use of the atmosphere, oceans, and
land, raising the question of why space should be a sanctuary
when these other media are not. As Barry Watts put it, “Satel-
lites may have owners and operators, but, in contrast to sailors,
they do not have mothers.”46
Specific military scenarios can bring these more abstract
arguments into clearer focus. Consider just one possibility. If in
a future Taiwan Strait crisis China could locate and target
American aircraft carriers using satellite technology, the case
for somehow countering those satellites through direct offen-
sive action would be powerful. If jamming or other means of
temporary disruption could not be shown to provide reliable
interruption of China’s satellite activities, outright destruction
would probably be seriously proposed—and would not imme-
diately be unreasonable as an option. Indeed, China may be
 19
INTRODUCTION

taking steps in the direction of using satellites for such targeting

purposes, for example, with the recent launch of a 155-mile-
range antiship cruise missile that may eventually be able to
receive navigational updates by satellite communication link.47
Moreover, despite rhetorical and diplomatic opposition to the
weaponization of space, China’s military planners have also
reportedly given thought to how they might attack U.S. military
space systems. That is quite a natural reaction for any defense
planner who thinks his country may have to take on the United
States someday. But it also underscores the strong pressures
toward the weaponization of space, given current trends.48
Although technological progress, the absence of arms control
regimes banning most military uses of space, and the growing
use of space for tactical warfighting purposes suggest that space
may ultimately be weaponized, the issue is not a simple yes or
no proposition. The nature of the weapons that might ulti-
mately reach space, or affect space assets, is important. So does
the timing of weaponization, and the state of great power rela-
tions when it occurs. Even if weaponization is indeed inevitable,
in other words, when and how it happens may matter a great
deal. Accordingly, even if most weapons activities are not
banned categorically by treaty, reciprocal restraint by the major
powers, together with some limited and formal prohibitions on
activities in space, may make sense.
This book is designed to move beyond the ideological debate
of whether or not space should be preserved as a nonweapon-
ized sanctuary, and instead to develop and analyze a number of
specific proposals for future U.S. space policy.49 The analysis is
technical as well as strategic. It considers military, warfighting
issues as well as arms control and political matters. Missile
defense is not discussed in detail—numerous studies already
exist on that subject—but its linkages to the space weapons
 20
INTRODUCTION

debate are central and unavoidable, and thus frequently in-

voked in these pages.50
These questions need to be answered, in part, because there is
at present no official U.S. position on most of them. Or, to put it
differently, there are various competing positions. The military’s
publicly stated views are quite assertive, even if its actual pro-
grams for moving ahead with the weaponization of space are
generally restrained for the moment. Moreover, most possible
moves toward weaponization are unconstrained by any arms
control accords. The Outer Space Treaty of 1967 only bans a
small set of activities—notably, nuclear weapons in space, as
well as hostile colonization of the moon and the planets.

Slowing the Weaponization of Space

This book’s basic argument is that space should not yet be

weaponized by the United States. For a combination of techno-
logical and strategic reasons, however, it may not prove practi-
cal to sustain this policy indefinitely. Thus the United States
should also avoid most types of formal arms control categori-
cally prohibiting the weaponization of space, even as it seeks to
delay the arrival of that weaponization indefinitely.
Slowing and delaying the weaponization of space may strike
many as an unsatisfying policy. It neither establishes a clear
legal and political red line against such activity nor endorses it.
Presumably, one might contend, putting weapons in space is
either good or bad. If bad, should it not be precluded perma-
nently; and if good on national security grounds, should it not
be pursued without guilt or reservation?
In point of fact, space weapons are not inherently good or
bad. Unlike biological weapons or many types of land mines,
they are not by nature inhumane; yet, unlike the next type of
 21
INTRODUCTION

fighter jet or munition, they are not just the natural progression
of military modernization. Their political significance is much
greater than that of most types of weaponry.
In addition, the United States enjoys a remarkably favorable
military position in space today, without suffering much politi-
cal and strategic fallout for making major use of the heavens for
military purposes. It should preserve that situation as long as
possible. And it has no need to rush to change current circum-
stances to maximize its own military capabilities. Some con-
cepts, such as space-based ballistic missile defense, while hold-
ing a certain inherent appeal, would be needlessly provocative
and exceptionally uneconomical to pursue at present. The satel-
lites of other countries (and private companies) are not yet mil-
itarily significant enough to warrant development of destruc-
tive antisatellite weapons.
Extreme positions that would either hasten to weaponize
space or permanently rule it out are not consistent with tech-
nological realities and U.S. security interests. The 2001 report
of the Commission on Outer Space, which warned of a possible
space “Pearl Harbor” and implied that the United States needed
to take many steps—including offensive ones—to address such
a purportedly imminent risk, was alarmist. It exaggerated the
likely space capabilities of other countries. In fact, only certain
classes of satellites are potentially vulnerable to enemy action in
the coming years, and it may be some time before that potential
vulnerability becomes real. Moreover, the United States can
take passive and defensive measures to reduce the associated
risks—and to know more clearly if and when it is being chal-
lenged in space.
To proceed on the basis of worst-case assumptions and has-
ten development of ASAT capabilities would be to ignore the
serious political and strategic consequences of any U.S. rush to
 22
INTRODUCTION

weaponize the heavens. American satellites, so dominant today,

could be put at risk by the countervailing actions of other coun-
tries more quickly than they would be otherwise. Even more
important, relations with Russia and China, which have im-
proved in recent years but remain fragile, could suffer. Even if
the United States someday does put weapons in space or
develop weapons against objects in space, timing matters in
international politics. Witness how the events of September 11,
2001, and the focused personal diplomacy between Presidents
George W. Bush and Vladimir Putin preserved good relations
between the United States and Russia even after the United
States’ withdrawal from the ABM Treaty in June 2002—an
event that could have seriously damaged bilateral relations if it
had occurred only a little earlier. Today, weaponizing space
could reinforce the image of a unilateralist United States too
quick to reach for the gun and disinclined to heed the counsel of
others. Given that almost all countries routinely support an
annual UN resolution calling for a treaty outlawing the
weaponization of space, and that most currently find the United
States too ready to flex its military muscle, any near-term deci-
sion to weaponize space would be very bad timing.
By the same token, the dismissive attitude toward any and all
space weapons evidenced by large elements of the arms control
community is too purist. Space, as noted, is increasingly used
for warfighting purposes, so it cannot be viewed as a true sanc-
tuary from military activity even today—and it is not clear that
space should be seen as a less appropriate place to fight than
Earth. If satellites increasingly become tools of the tactical
warfighter rather than linchpins of strategic stability between
nuclear-armed powers, it is not clear that they should merit
complete protection from attack even as they are used to help
kill targets on the ground. Leaving aside philosophical argu-
 23
INTRODUCTION

ments, there are also practical military rationales for keeping a

future ASAT option. While the United States might like to pre-
serve its current dominance in space for intelligence, communi-
cations, and tactical warfighting purposes, it will not enjoy that
luxury forever. Passive steps to defend itself, such as satellite
hardening, may not suffice to protect its interests—even in the
hypothetical case of an ASAT treaty banning the development,
deployment, and use of antisatellite weapons. Too many non-
ASAT technologies have potential applications as ASATs, espe-
cially in a world of increasingly capable missile defenses and a
growing number of satellites and microsatellites. And other
countries may learn to use satellites for tactical warfighting,
including against the United States.
Some would argue that missile defenses themselves are
unwarranted. But in the international enviroment, the demise of
the ABM Treaty is quite certainly now permanent, with no
prospect of a replacement accord prohibiting such technologies.
Even defenses designed against shorter range missiles (often
known as theater missile defenses), which have not been con-
troversial in the United States, have certain antisatellite capa-
bilities. Moreover, a number of these technologies are close to
realization in the United States. Regardless of whether one
thinks it would be desirable, it is simply not feasible to put the
horse back in the barn.
That said, the United States should pursue some types of
binding arms controls on military space activities and, even
more important, show unilateral restraint on its space activities
in a number of ways. It should agree to a ban on any tests in
space that would create debris (notably, tests of antisatellite
weapons that use explosives or collisions to destroy targets). It
should publicly declare that it will forgo space tests of any anti-
satellite system for the foreseeable future. And it should also
 24
INTRODUCTION

seriously consider revising its military space doctrine to declare

that it will not even develop dedicated ASAT technologies in
the coming years. This policy will probably prove temporary,
but because the coming years will be critical for the further mat-
uration and improvement of great power relations (especially
with Russia and China), improving the prospects for strategic
stability in that period is important. If and when the United
States needs to change its policy in the future, the danger of
strategic fallout may be reduced.
The approach recommended here differs greatly from the
early rhetorical position of the incoming Bush administration. It
differs less from the de facto approach of the Bush administra-
tion since September 11, 2001, when the United States chose to
emphasize the need for great power security cooperation
against terrorism and to seek accommodation or delay on issues
that could impede that priority effort. But even today, the Bush
administration retains the aspiration for space-based missile
defense and funds programs to that effect; it retains a space pol-
icy doctrine emphasizing the possibility of destroying the satel-
lites of potential adversaries; it refuses to negotiate even very
limited accords on uses of space that might, for example, pre-
vent the production of more debris in low-Earth orbit; and it
establishes no policy roadblocks to the rapid weaponization of
space, should it choose to move in that direction in any new
budget plan. It should make its de facto restraint more formal
in certain areas and reinforce it in several others.
Translating these broad strategic observations and premises
into policy terms leads to the set of core recommendations de-
scribed below. They begin with more straightforward, passive,
and nonthreatening actions that the United States could take to
ensure its reliable use of military space assets in the future. But
they also include options for the weaponization of space, par-
 25
INTRODUCTION

ticularly in regard to antisatellite capabilities of various types,

should future circumstances so warrant.

Passive and Defensive Measures

—Beyond improving its ground-based space surveillance
capabilities as currently planned, the United States could place
surveillance assets on individual satellites to identify and report
any attacks on them. Most military satellites lack such capabil-
ities today.
—Although details are classified, the United States appears
not to have sufficiently hardened its military satellites. It needs
to do so not only against natural radiation and nuclear effects,
but also against certain other threats; laser attacks against low-
Earth orbit satellites are among the most worrisome. Hardening
of new military satellites is generally feasible and practical,
albeit not cost free.
—A related measure could be to subsidize hardening of com-
mercial satellites (particularly communications systems) on
which the United States increasingly depends. Jamming and
nuclear-induced atmospheric disturbances are among the more
serious threats to guard against. But these steps may not be
practical given classification concerns, commercial satellites’
emphasis on high-data-rate transmissions, and other factors.
Thus the United States needs to continue to emphasize laser
satellite communications systems and reduce its dependency on
commercial satellites in warfighting environments. In the
interim, the U.S. armed forces also need to be able to streamline
their insatiable demands for data and bandwidth, because such
wide bandwidths may not be reliably available in future con-
flicts. Specifically, the military needs to prioritize its data needs
and develop mechanisms for ensuring that the most important
information can continue to flow in combat even if 25 percent,
 26
INTRODUCTION

50 percent, or 75 percent of total desired bandwidth proves at

least temporarily unavailable due to enemy action.
—The United States needs to be able to recover if major
satellite capabilities, such as low-Earth orbit imaging assets, are
damaged or destroyed. Many in the military community favor
development of rapid reconstitution capabilities—extra satel-
lites in warehouses, coupled with rockets ready to launch
within weeks or even days of a decision to do so. But if satellites
on orbit proved vulnerable, a second batch of satellites might
be, too. Thus air-breathing capabilities, such as the P-3, EC-
135, JSTARS, and various UAV systems need to be retained.
The GPS constellation may be sufficiently robust and distrib-
uted that most of its satellites will survive any plausible attack,
but the signals of current-generation GPS satellites are relatively
easy to jam or otherwise disrupt. That may suggest the need for
airborne targeting capabilities as a backup to GPS; more likely,
it suggests that the United States needs to modernize its GPS
system by putting into orbit an improved generation of satellites
without further delay.
—The United States should research active defenses for satel-
lites. These would not necessarily have to be general-purpose
ASAT weapons; they could instead be short-range self-defense
weapons placed on the satellite to be defended and designed to
strike only nearby objects. Their kill mechanisms could, for
example, be high-powered microwaves or lasers of modest total
power.

Antisatellite Technologies
—Partly because the future survivability of its own satellites
cannot now be assumed, and partly because the future surviv-
ability of adversary satellites may not be tolerable under certain
circumstances, the United States should not rule out the possi-
 27
INTRODUCTION

bility of developing ASAT capabilities of its own. It should not

hasten to develop, test, or deploy advanced systems for this pur-
pose. Yet nor should it preclude the possibility, either by treaty
or by excessive constraints on its basic research and develop-
ment activities.
—In fact, the United States will soon possess latent ASAT
capability. These systems will not be found only in the form of
nuclear-tipped intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) or
submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), which could be
programmed to detonate at a certain time near a certain point
in space; nor solely in the form of the MIRACL laser already
operational in New Mexico. They will increasingly be found in
ballistic missile defense programs as well. In particular, the mid-
course intercept system soon to be deployed in Alaska and Cal-
ifornia surely has at least latent capability against low-Earth
orbit satellites, even if it might require software upgrades to
accept targeting data from different sensors than would likely
be used for missile defense. And the airborne laser (ABL) will
soon have similar capabilities. Again, the ABL would need help
from external sensors to find and track a satellite, and quite
likely would require software upgrades to be able to accept the
data from those sensors. These types of software modifications,
and actual testing of these weapons in an ASAT mode, should
be avoided indefinitely. But their intrinsic ASAT capabilities
against most types of lower-Earth orbit satellites appear rather
significant.
—The United States should not build dedicated ASATs soon.
It has enough advantages in any ASAT competition in the form
of its ABL and midcourse ballistic missile defense programs that
it need not be first in each and every technology category, in-
cluding microsat ASATs. The downside of developing microsat
ASATs first is that doing so would harm great power strategic
 28
INTRODUCTION

relations and help accelerate an ASAT arms race that the United
States does not stand to benefit from in the foreseeable future.
Similarly, a kinetic energy ASAT is unnecessary, and would be
undesirable vis-à-vis other possible ASAT technologies in any
event, given the debris it would cause in space.

Missile Defenses and Space-to-Earth Weapons

—The United States should not hasten the development or
deployment of space-based missile defenses, which would have
inherent ASAT capabilities. They are not needed for missile
defense against extremist states with modest arsenals—the only
real rationale for ballistic missile defense systems in the fore-
seeable future—given the variety of ground-based options soon
to be available. For purposes of missile defense they would have
to be deployed in such numbers (given absentee ratios, due to
the movement of satellites above Earth) that they could pose a
very serious threat to many satellites simultaneously, as well as
being extraordinarily expensive.
—Space-to-Earth weapons are not a promising concept for
the foreseeable future. In addition to being politically very
provocative, they offer few benefits to a global military power
already capable of rapid intercontinental strike. The technolo-
gies within reach, such as tungsten rods or a common aero vehi-
cle that could function first as a reentry vehicle and then as a
guided aerodynamic device, do not warrant advanced develop-
ment and deployment. They are either too limited in capabili-
ties, too expensive, or too uninteresting in terms of their limited
attributes relative to ground-based systems. Further conceptual
exploration and basic research may be warranted; nothing
more than that is even desirable in the coming years—and
hence budgets need not be substantially increased.
 CHAPTER TWO

A BRIEF PRIMER ON
SPACE AND SATELLITES

Space is a remarkable and unique environment. It is also

now a fairly heavily populated one. Near-Earth space is
home to a wide range of military and civilian satellites,
not to mention vast amounts of debris that can interfere
with satellite operations. Assets in space also require
assets on the ground, and links with the ground, to pro-
vide services to military users of satellites. This chapter
explains some of the basic geometry and physics of space,
rocketry, and satellite operations and surveys the existing
capabilities in space of a number of nations and firms, as
well as capabilities they intend to develop and orbit in the
near future. It also notes trends that will tend to reduce
the U.S. military dominance of space over time. The
United States will not lose its large technological lead, but
it is likely to lose the near-monopoly it has enjoyed in this
sphere of military competition in recent years.

29
 30
SPACE AND SATELLITES

Satellite Orbits

Most satellites move around Earth at distances ranging from

200 kilometers to about 36,000 kilometers. This region is
divided into three main bands (see figure 2-1). Low-Earth orbit
extends out to about 5,000 kilometers.1 Geosynchronous orbit
(GEO) is the outer band for most satellites. It is 35,888 kilo-
meters or 22,300 miles above the equator of Earth. At that alti-
tude, a satellite’s revolution around the Earth takes exactly
twenty-four hours, meaning that it remains over the same spot
on Earth’s equator continuously. Medium-Earth orbit (MEO) is
essentially everything in between LEO and GEO. MEOs are
concentrated between 10,000 and 20,000 kilometers above the
surface of Earth.
The range of LEO orbits begins just above Earth’s atmos-
phere, which is generally considered to end at an altitude of
about 100 kilometers—though a considerable number of air
molecules are found even higher, meaning that there is atmos-
pheric drag on especially low LEO satellites. (Aircraft do not fly
above 40–45 kilometers, so the region from 50 to 150 kilome-
ters is “uninhabited.)2 The altitude of LEO orbits is less than
the radius of Earth (which is about 6,400 kilometers, or almost
4,000 miles). In other words, if one viewed low-altitude satel-
lites from some distance, they would appear quite close to Earth
(see figure 2-1). The dimensions of geosynchronous orbits are
large relative to the size of Earth (though they are still small rel-
ative to the distance between Earth and the moon, about
380,000 kilometers). In other words, by the standards of the
solar system, all artificial satellites are very close to Earth,
meaning that any one can “see” only a small part of Earth’s
surface at a time (see table 2-1). They are also all clearly within
the range and influence of Earth’s gravitational field; they have
 31
SPACE AND SATELLITES

Figure 2-1. Major Orbit Types

Geosynchronous orbit (GEO) Molniya orbit
Missile warning Missile warning (Russia)
Communications Communications (Russia)
Electronic Surveillance

m
00 k
20,0
40,000 km
36,0
00 k
m
6,400 km 1,500 km

Low-Earth orbit (LEO)

Photoreconnaissance Semisynchronous orbit
Ocean surveillance
(a type of MEO)
Electronic surveillance
Communications Navigation
Navigation
Meteorology

Source: Ashton Carter, “Satellites and Anti-Satellites: The Limits of the Possible,”
International Security, vol. 10, no. 4 (Spring 1986), p. 49.

not been imparted with enough speed to escape it, as would be

required for a space probe.3 Earth’s gravitational field, together
with the velocity (speed and direction of movement) of a satel-
lite, establish the parameters for that satellite’s orbit. Once these
 32
SPACE AND SATELLITES

Table 2-1. Single Satellite Coverage Requirements in Polar Orbita

Number of satellites Altitude (miles)
60 300
50 400
30 600
25 800
20 1,000
12 2,000
3 (GEO) 23,000
Source: Paul B. Stares, Space and National Security (Brookings, 1987), p. 40.
a. Table shows the number of imaging satellites required to keep all of Earth in
constant view.

physical parameters are specified, the orbit is determined and

trajectories are predictable.
Close-in satellite orbits take as little as ninety minutes. As
noted, geosynchronous orbits take exactly twenty-four hours.
Satellites in close-in circular orbits move at nearly eight kilome-
ters per second; those in geosynchronous orbit move at about
three kilometers per second. Those following intermediate orbits
have intermediate speeds and periods of revolution about Earth.
Satellite orbits are generally circular, though a number are
elliptical, and some are highly elliptical—passing far closer to
Earth in one part of their orbit than in another. Satellites may
move in polar orbits, passing directly over the North and South
Poles once in every revolution around Earth. Alternatively, they
may orbit continuously over the equator, as do GEO satellites,
or may move along an inclined path falling somewhere between
polar and equatorial orientations.
Getting satellites into orbit is, of course, a very challenging
enterprise. They must be accelerated to very high speeds and
properly oriented in the desired orbital trajectories. Modifying a
satellite’s motion is very difficult once the rocket that puts it into
 33
SPACE AND SATELLITES

space has stopped burning; generally, the satellite’s own boosters

are only capable of fine-tuning a trajectory, not changing it fun-
damentally. Even though satellites in GEO end up moving much
more slowly than satellites in LEO, they must be accelerated to
greater initial speeds. That is because they lose a great deal of
speed fighting Earth’s gravity as they move from close-in alti-
tudes to roughly 36,000 kilometers above the planet’s surface. If
they are to reach the final GEO destination with enough speed to
stay there in orbit, they require an initial speed near Earth’s sur-
face of about 10.5 kilometers per second, nearly enough to
escape Earth’s gravitational pull and its orbit altogether. By con-
trast, a rocket putting a satellite into LEO typically only reaches
its final speed once it is nearing the desired altitude, so it would
not exceed eight kilometers per second at any time.
When rocket propulsion is involved, the difference between
8 kilometers per second and 10.5 kilometers per second is much
more than those numbers would suggest. Gaining the final
2.5 kilometers per second of speed requires enormous effort
and fuel. A three-stage rocket that could carry a payload of fif-
teen tons into LEO, for example, could only transport three
tons into GEO.4 For that reason it typically costs two to three
times as much per pound of payload to put a satellite into GEO
as into LEO.5 And even getting to LEO is difficult. For example,
putting a payload into low-Earth orbit typically requires a
rocket weighing 50 to 100 times as much as the payload.6 Con-
sequently, even low-Earth orbit launch is stubbornly expensive,
despite longstanding efforts to reduce launch costs; putting a
satellite into LEO typically costs from $3,000 to $6,000 per
pound (though some Ukrainian and Chinese launch services
charge less than $2,000).7
Most satellites weigh from 2,000 pounds to 10,000 pounds,
roughly speaking, implying launch costs of about $10 million
 34
SPACE AND SATELLITES

for smaller satellites in LEO to $100 million for larger satellites

in GEO. There are exceptions, however, including the large
imaging satellites known as Lacrosse and KH-11, each of
which is believed to weigh about 30,000 pounds and to require
a rocket with the capabilities of the enormous Titan IV to
launch it (at a cost of $400 million). In addition, most satellites
have dimensions ranging from 20 feet to 200 feet and power
sources capable of generating 1,000 to 5,000 watts—though
again, imaging satellites would be expected to exceed these
bounds.8
A final note on this brief primer on space and satellites con-
cerns the so-called Van Allen radiation belts, discovered by a
scientist of that name in the late 1950s. Satellites operating in
these regions require extra shielding to protect themselves from
the electrons and protons that tend to be trapped in these zones
over extended periods by Earth’s magnetic fields. There are two
belts, the inner one consisting largely of protons and most
intense at about 3,500 kilometers above Earth, the outer con-
sisting largely of electrons and peaking in intensity at about
16,000 kilometers. The inner belt begins somewhere between
400 kilometers and 1,200 kilometers, depending on latitude
(and is most prevalent from 45 degrees north to 45 degrees
south), and extends out to about 10,000 kilometers. The outer
belt begins at roughly the latter distance from Earth and
extends well beyond GEO, going as high as 80,000 kilometers,
depending on the recent activity of the sun. Although the two
belts can overlap, they are both weak in the region where they
would do so. As a practical matter, therefore, satellites in the
lowest LEOs as well as MEOs of roughly 10,000 kilometer alti-
tude need not be shielded particularly strongly against the Van
Allen belts.9
 35
SPACE AND SATELLITES

Current Military and Commercial Satellites

There are currently 8,000 to 9,000 objects in space that are large
and visible enough to be tracked by U.S. monitoring equipment.
Given the state of technology at present, that implies a diameter
of at least ten centimeters (about four inches). Less than 1,000 of
these objects are working satellites; the rest are old satellites or
large pieces of debris from rockets (see table 2-2).10
In recent years, about a third of all launches have been from
Russia and other former Soviet republics, just over a third from
the United States, and just under a third from the rest of the
world in aggregate. Commercial and military launches were
placing about 150 satellites in orbit annually at the end of the
1990s, though only about sixty to sixty-five a year in 2001
through 2003. Projections posit a modest increase in the global
market in coming years—in 2003 one source estimated that
about 100 satellites would be orbited in 2004, 110 in 2005,
and nearly 130 by 2007. The associated growth in the expected
value of launched units was from $10.2 billion in 2004 to
$11.8 billion in 2007 (in constant 2003 dollars).11
The recent downturn in the global market began before Sep-
tember 11, 2001. It was a reflection of cyclical economic factors,
the continued high cost of launch, and the growing use of fiber-
optic landline communications, producing a lack of growth in
the market for satellite communications capabilities. Although
considerable recovery is expected, as noted, the market is un-
likely to take off anytime soon. Buttressing this conclusion, tech-
nological progress in launch vehicle technology is quite modest at
present, and hopes for drastically lower launch prices remain
stymied by the lack of radical technological breakthroughs in
materials, fuels, or reusable rocket technologies (see chapter 3).12
 36
SPACE AND SATELLITES

Table 2-2. Objects in Earth Orbit, as of May 31, 2003

Number Number
Country or of of space Pieces
organization a satellitesb probes of debris Total
Commonwealth of
Independent States 1,338 35 2,550 3,923
United States 889 49 2,842 3,780
European Space Agency 33 2 305 340
People’s Republic of China 36 0 282 318
India 25 0 124 149
Japan 80 6 56 142
International Telecom
Satellite Organization 60 0 0 60
Globalstar 52 0 0 52
France 33 0 15 48
Orbcomm 35 0 0 35
European Telecom Satellite
Organization 24 0 0 24
Germany 19 2 1 22
United Kingdom 21 0 1 22
Canada 20 0 1 21
Italy 11 0 3 14
Luxembourg 13 0 0 13
Australia 8 0 2 10
Brazil 10 0 0 10
Sweden 10 0 0 10
Indonesia 9 0 0 9
International Maritime
Satellite Organization 9 0 0 9
NATO 8 0 0 8
Arab Satellite Communication
Organization 7 0 0 7
Argentina 7 0 0 7
Sea Launch 1 0 6 7
South Korea 7 0 0 7
(continued)
 37
SPACE AND SATELLITES

Table 2-2. Objects in Earth Orbit, as of May 31, 2003 (continued)

Number Number
Country or of of space Pieces
organization a satellites b probes of debris Total
Mexico 6 0 0 6
Spain 6 0 0 6
Netherlands 5 0 0 5
Asia Satellite Corporation 4 0 0 4
Czech Republic 4 0 0 4
International Space Station 1 3 0 4
Israel 4 0 0 4
Thailand 4 0 0 4
Turkey 4 0 0 4
Malaysia 3 0 0 3
Norway 3 0 0 3
Saudi Arabia 3 0 0 3
Egypt 2 0 0 2
France and Germany 2 0 0 2
Philippines 2 0 0 2
Algeria 1 0 0 1
Chile 1 0 0 1
China and Brazil 1 0 0 1
Denmark 1 0 0 1
EUME 1 0 0 1
Greece 1 0 0 1
NICO 1 0 0 1
Pakistan 1 0 0 1
Portugal 1 0 0 1
Taiwan 1 0 0 1
Saudi Arabia and France 1 0 0 1
Singapore and Taiwan 1 0 0 1
United Arab Emirates 1 0 0 1
Total 2,831 97 6,188 9,116
Source: Tamar A. Mehuron, “2003 Space Almanac,” Air Force Magazine
(August 2003), p. 24.
a. The Commonwealth of Independent States includes Russia and the former
Soviet Union. EUME is the European meteorological satellite.
b. Not all satellites are still functional.
 38
SPACE AND SATELLITES

The vast majority of most countries’ current satellites are in

LEO or GEO. In fact, excluding Russian satellites (with their
particular history and their particular circumstances, servicing a
large northern country), each of those zones accounts for about
45 percent of the 600 satellites in active use today.13 Another
5 percent are in MEO; most of the remainder are located in
highly elliptical orbits. Of the total of 600 non-Russian satel-
lites, nearly 350 are used for general communications, 140 for
military communications and imaging, 60 for navigation, and
50 for scientific or other commercial purposes.
In many cases, the dividing line between military and civilian
satellites is blurred. The United States uses GPS satellites for mil-
itary and civilian purposes. It buys time on commercial satellites
for military communications, which now constitute well over
half of all total satellite communication capacity.14 Since 1994,
when President Bill Clinton issued his presidential decision
directive (PDD) 23, private U.S. companies have been allowed to
operate imaging systems provided that the government can
maintain “shutter control” in times of national crisis.15 (PDD-23
was superceded in 2003 by the U.S. Commercial Remote Sens-
ing Policy, which stated that the government would go even fur-
ther and use commercial assets whenever possible, even for
national security needs.) The U.S. military and intelligence serv-
ices often purchase imagery from private firms, especially when
relatively modest-resolution images (with correspondingly larger
fields of view) are adequate (see figure 2-2). For example, during
the war in Afghanistan in 2001, the National Imagery and Map-
ping Agency (NIMA) signed an agreement with the Space Imag-
ing Corporation, reportedly for $1.9 million a month, obtaining
exclusive access to its imagery through early January 2002 (per-
haps in part to deny these services to others, including the
United States’ enemies).16 And some satellites provide weather
 39
SPACE AND SATELLITES

Figure 2-2. Trends in Commercial Earth Imaging Satellites

Resolution (meters)

U.S. Landsat 1 Canadian radar imaging

80
Indian IRS-1C
70 EarlyBird (failed)
60 Ikonos-2
U.S. Landsat 3
50

40
U.S. Landsat 4
30

20
French Spot 1
10

1972 1978 1982 1986

95

97

99
19

19

19
Source: Barry D. Watts, The Military Uses of Space: A Diagnostic Assessment
(Washington: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2001), p. 66.

data to the military as well as to other government agencies.

Indeed, the civilian satellite systems made use of by the U.S.
armed forces form a lengthy list (see table 2-3).
Other countries do likewise. China deploys communications
and reconnaissance satellites ostensibly under civilian pretexts,
but there can be little doubt that its military has use of them and
the data they create. Many countries purchase satellite imagery
from commercial firms for their own national security purposes,
or use commercial satellite communications links for a fee.
Because of this blurring between military and commercial uses,
the summary of global satellite capabilities that follows discusses
all assets of a given country (or association of countries).
Table 2-3. Major Civilian Satellites in U.S. Military Use, as of 2003
Number Orbit
First in con- altitude Weight
Satellite Mission/capabilities launch stellation (miles) (lbs)
Advanced Communications Demonstration satellite for new types 1993 1 22,300 3,250
Technology Satellite of K- and Ka-band communications
(ACTS) technologies
Geostationary Operational Weather data collection for forecasting 1975 2 22,300 4,600
Environmental Satellite
(GOES)
Globalstar Mobile communications with 1998 48 878 990
security controls
Ikonos One-meter resolution Earth imaging 1999 1 423 1,600
Inmarsat Peacetime mobile communications
services 1990 9 22,300 4,545
Intelsat Routine communications and 1965 20 22,300 7,480
distribution of Armed Forces Radio
and TV Services network
Iridium Voice and data transmission for 1997 66 485 1,516
handheld mobile communications
Landsat Imagery 1972 1 438 4,800
Loral Orion Rooftop-to-rooftop communications 1994 3 22,300 8,360
for U.S. Army
NOAA 15 and NOAA 16 Weather worldwide 1978 2 517 4,900
(NOAA or TIROS)
Orbcomm Mobile communications in Joint 1995 35 500– 90
Interoperability Warfighter Program 1,200
Pan Am Sat Routine communications 1983 21 22,300 6,760
Quickbird 2 High-resolution imagery for mapping, 2001 1 279 2,088
military surveillance, weather
research, and other uses
Satellite Pour l’Observation Terrain imaging used for mission 1986 3 509 5,940
de la Terre (SPOT) planning systems, terrain analysis,
and mapping
Tracking and Data Relay Global network facilitating communi- 1983 6 22,300 5,000
Satellite System (TDRSS) cation between LEO satellites and
control stations without an elaborate
ground network
Source: Mehuron, “2003 Space Almanac,” pp. 43–44.
 42
SPACE AND SATELLITES

Before proceeding to this discussion, a brief word is in order

about the vast majority of man-made material in space. In
short, it is junk, and dangerous junk at that. There are proba-
bly 100,000 pieces of debris larger than a marble in orbit; those
at altitudes above 1,000 kilometers will remain in orbit for cen-
turies, and those above 1,500 kilometers for millennia.17 Per-
haps 300,000 small objects, such as chips of metal or even
specks of paint, are too small to be tracked—yet at least four
millimeters in size, large enough to do potential harm to any
object they would strike, given the enormous speeds of collision
implied by orbiting objects. In 1983, for example, a paint speck
only 0.2 millimeters in diameter made a 4 millimeter dent in the
Challenger space shuttle’s windshield.18 Only two other colli-
sions between debris and operational satellites were known to
have occurred through 2001, but with debris in low orbital
zones growing at the rate of about 5 percent annually, more can
certainly be expected.19 Indeed, a small satellite at an altitude of
800 kilometers now has about a 1 percent chance annually of
failure due to collision with debris. And below 2,000 kilome-
ters, there is now a total of 3 million kilograms of debris of var-
ious kinds (in contrast to about 200 kilograms of meteoroid
mass).20

The United States

Operational U.S. military satellites number about sixty. Most
individual types of satellites are in LEO or GEO (see table 2-4
for unclassified satellite programs). However, in terms of total
numbers, MEO is also heavily populated, due to the twenty-
nine global positioning satellites now in that region. These pro-
vide navigation aid to military and civilian users; since 2000,
they have provided both types of users with their positions to
within about five meters.21
 43
SPACE AND SATELLITES

The U.S. military operates LEO satellites for ocean reconnais-

sance, weather forecasting, and ground imaging. The number of
White Cloud ocean reconnaissance satellites that listen for emis-
sions from ships probably has diminished with the effective end
of the Soviet navy but may still total a dozen or more, deployed
in groups of three at altitudes of roughly 1,000 kilometers.22 The
United States has two weather satellites, known as Defense
Meteorological Satellite Program systems, in polar LEOs (they
also carry gravity-measurement, or geodetic, sensors).
The United States also deploys probably half a dozen high-
resolution imaging satellites in that LEO zone. They are of two
principal types: radar imaging satellites, known as Lacrosse or
Onyx systems, and optical imaging satellites, known as Keyhole
systems, with the latest types designated KH-11 and KH-11
follow-on or advanced satellites. The Lacrosse radar satellites
operate at roughly 600 to 700 kilometers above Earth, are capa-
ble of effective operations in all types of weather, and produce
images with sufficient clarity to distinguish objects one to three
meters apart. The KH satellites are capable of nighttime as well
as daytime observations, by virtue of their abilities to monitor
infrared as well as visual frequencies. They acquire information
digitally and transmit it nearly instantaneously to ground sta-
tions. Their mirrors are nearly three meters in diameter, and they
move in slightly elliptical orbits ranging from about 250 kilo-
meters at perigee (point of closest approach to Earth) to
400 kilometers or more at apogee. Ground resolutions are as
good as roughly 15 centimeters (6 inches) or even less under nor-
mal daylight conditions.23 They can take images about 100 miles
to either side of their orbital trajectories, allowing a fairly wide
field of view.24 They do not work well through clouds, however.
In GEO or near-GEOs, the United States deploys communi-
cations satellites, early-warning satellites for detecting ballistic
Table 2-4. Major U.S. Military Satellite Systems, as of 2003a

Number Orbit
First in con- altitude Weight
Satellite Mission/capabilities launch stellation (miles) (lbs)
Advanced extremely high Successor to MILSTAR; provides world- 2007, 4 22,300 13,000
frequency satellite com- wide command and control communi- planned
munication system cations at five times the capacity,
(AEHF) but in a smaller unit
Defense Meteorological Collects air, land, sea, and space environ- 1962 2 600 2,545
Satellite Program mental data to support worldwide stra-
(DMSP) tegic and tactical military operations
Defense satellite com- Nuclear-hardened and jam-proof space- 1982 5 (10 on 22,000+ 2,580–
munications system craft used to transmit high-priority orbit) 2,716
(DSCS) III command and control messages
Defense Support Provides early warning of missile launch 1970 Classified 22,000+ 5,000
Program (DSP) by detecting booster plume
Global broadcast Wideband communication system to 1998 3 23,230 Uses a
system (GBS) provide digital multimedia data variety
to warfighters of systems
Global positioning Precise location anywhere on Earth 1978 28 10,900 2,174;
system (GPS) 2,370
MILSTAR Satellite Joint communications satellite that pro- 1994 5 22,300 10,000
Communications vides secure jam-resistant communi-
System (MILSTAR) cations for essential wartime needs
Polar military satellite EHF payload on a host satellite to 1997 3 (1 on 25,300 470
communications (Polar provide a cheaper alternative to orbit)
MILSAT-COM) MILSTAR for polar communications
Space-based infrared Advanced surveillance system for missile FY 2007, High GEO, Unknown
system (SBIRS) defense, missile warning, battlespace planned (none elliptical,
characterization, and intelligence on orbit) and low
UHF follow-on satellite Secure anti-jam communications 1993 4 (9 on 22,300 2,600–
(UFO) orbit) 3,400
Wideband gap-filler High-data-rate satellite broadcast system FY 2005, 3 GEO 13,000
system (WGS) designed to bridge the communications planned
gap between current systems and an
advanced wideband system
Source: Mehuron, “2003 Space Almanac,” pp. 41–42.
a. Classified systems are not shown.
 46
SPACE AND SATELLITES

missile launch, and signals-intelligence satellites for listening to

other countries’ communications or the emissions of their elec-
tronics systems, such as surface-to-air radars. Specifically, in the
communications domain it has three global broadcast system
(GBS) satellites for high-data-rate wideband communications;
four Navy fleetsatcom (FLTSAT) satellites for communications
primarily with ships; many Air Force satcom (AFSATCOM)
packages on various hosts (including GPS satellites in MEO)
for tactical communcations; roughly five functional defense
satellite communications system (DSCS) satellites; and four
MILSTAR (Military Strategic and Tactical Relay) satellites
hardened against nuclear effects and jamming for critical com-
munications. It also has about three defense support program
(DSP) satellites for early warning of ballistic missile launch (as
with most of its imaging satellites, exact numbers are classified).
Finally, the United States fields a handful of signals-intelligence
satellites in GEO, though like the Lacrosse, Keyhole, White
Cloud, and DSP systems, their exact number is classified.25 The
signals-intelligence satellites include the Magnum, with an an-
tenna reportedly 200 meters wide for eavesdropping on commu-
nications.26 Jumpseat satellites, flying elongated orbits, were
developed to listen into communications from northern parts of
the Soviet Union. That region could not be monitored by Mag-
num or its predecessor satellites in GEO because the curvature of
Earth prevented the signals from reaching them.27
In a survey of American satellite capabilities, it would be a
mistake to overlook the U.S. military’s use of commercial satel-
lites. The Pentagon used more commercial than military band-
width during the 2003 war in Iraq. As noted, under an April
2003 policy directive, the Bush administration directed all gov-
ernment agencies, including the military, to look first to the
commercial sector to meet their imaging needs.28 The Pentagon
 47
SPACE AND SATELLITES

has plans to spend about $100 million a year on commercial

imagery with resolutions of one meter or better.29
The United States puts its military payloads into orbit from
launch facilities at Cape Canaveral in Florida and Vandenberg
Air Force Base in California. It also operates a half dozen
smaller sites for some civilian payloads (see table 2-5). Its main
rockets include the Atlas, Delta, and Titan families, as well as
Pegasus and Athena rockets. The space shuttle has carried out
some military functions as well, though it remains to be seen
how much it will do into the future, in light of the 2003 Colum-
bia tragedy and the planned retirement of the shuttle fleet by
2010. The U.S. military’s future rocket requirements are to be
met by the Atlas V and Delta IV, the two specific systems being
developed under the so-called evolved expendable launch vehi-
cle (EELV) program.
Satellites require ground stations to monitor and remotely
maintain them, to adjust their trajectories, and to download
data. Major ground control stations include Onizuka Air Force
Base near San Francisco, Schriever Air Force Base near Col-
orado Springs, Vandenberg Air Force Base in California, and
Pine Gap in Australia.30 Other facilities important for one satel-
lite constellation or another include Fort Belvoir, Virginia; Fort
Meade, Maryland; Menwith Hill, United Kingdom; Guam;
Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean; Adak, Alaska; Winter Har-
bor, Maine; Kaena Point, Hawaii; Landstuhl, Germany; and
Norfolk, Virginia.31 Additional Space Command sites around
the world include Thule, Greenland; Kwajalein Atoll in the
Pacific; Ascension Island and Antigua in the Atlantic; Ramey in
the Caribbean; Moron, Spain; and Misawa, Japan.32 Up to half
a dozen mobile terminals were developed during the cold war,
primarily for receiving warning data about ballistic missile
launch and communicating with strategic forces.33
Table 2-5. U.S. Space Launch Sites
Number of
Civil or launches, Launch
Site military Location Missions and operations 1957–2002 vehicles
Cape Military Florida, 28.5° N, Launches civil, military, and commer- 583 Athena I, II;
Canaveral 80° W: USAF cial satellites into GEO via ELVs Atlas II, III, V;
AFS East Coast and serves as ballistic missile Delta II, III,
launch site defense (BMD) test facility IV; Titan IV
Vandenberg Military California, Launches weather, remote sensing, 620 Athena I; Atlas
AFB 35° N, 121° W: navigation, communications, and II, III, V;
USAF West reconnaissance satellites into polar Delta II, III,
Coast launch orbits and serves as Defense IV; Pegasus;
site ICBM and BMD test facility Taurus;
Titan II, IV
Alaska Civilian Alaska, 57.5° N, Conducts polar and near-polar launches 6 Athena I,
Spaceport 153° W of communications, remote sensing, suborbital
and scientific satellites up to
8,000 lbs.
Florida Space Civilian Florida, 28.5° N, Various launch complexes and sup- 6 Athena I, II;
Authority 80° W port facilities for the USAF and Minotaur;
Kennedy Space Center Minuteman III;
Taurus; Terrier
John F. Civilian Florida, 28° N, NASA’s primary launch base for the 133 Pegasus, space
Kennedy 80° W space shuttle shuttle, Taurus
Space
Center
Sea Launch Civilian Pacific Ocean, Heavy lift geosynchronous 8 Zenit-3SL
0° N, 154° W transfer orbit (GTO) launch
services for commercial customers
Spaceport Civilian California Polar and near-polar launches from 2 MM II—Delta III
Systems In- 34.7° N, Vandenberg and payload class
ternational, 120.46° W processing facility
L.P.
Virginia Civilian Virginia, 38° N, Launch facility for access to inclined 13 Athena I, II; Black
Space 76° W and sun-synchronous orbits; (since Brant; Lock-
Flight recovery support, storage, and 1995) heed Martin
Center processing facilities HYSR; Mino-
taur; Orion;
Pegasus;
Taurus; Terrier
Wallops Civilian Virginia 38° N, East Coast launch site for Orbital 30 Pegasus
Flight 76° W Sciences’ Pegasus and Defense
Facility missions
Source: Mehuron, “2003 Space Almanac,” p. 34.
 50
SPACE AND SATELLITES

As for tracking objects in space, today most countries con-

duct space surveillance using telescopes and radar systems on
the ground. Only the United States has a system providing some
semblance of global coverage (though its southern hemisphere
capabilities are quite limited). Its monitoring assets are located
in Hawaii, Florida, Massachusetts, England, Diego Garcia, and
Japan (see figure 2-3).34
A brief word on military organization is in order, though this
complex and important subject is not a main focus of this book.
The U.S. Air Force conducts and funds 80 to 90 percent of the
overall American military effort on space and provides a com-
parable fraction of the uniformed personnel specializing in mil-
itary space activities (about 35,000).35 The Air Force’s efforts
are directed under the umbrella of the 14th Air Force at Van-
denberg Air Force Base (AFB), California—which is one of the
two constituent parts of Air Force Space Command in Col-
orado, the other part focusing on nuclear-tipped missiles. For
satellite operations and ground control, the 14th Air Force
includes the 21st Space Wing at Peterson AFB, Colorado, the
50th Space Wing based at Schriever AFB, Colorado, and the
460th Air Base Wing at Buckley AFB, Colorado. For space
launch, the 14th Air Force employs the 30th Space Wing at
Vandenberg, largely for putting satellites into polar orbit and
for long-range missile tests, as well as the 45th Space Wing at
Patrick AFB, Florida, largely for launching GEO satellites from
Cape Canaveral. The other military services also have space-
related commands, notably the Army’s Space and Missile
Defense Command, based in Virginia with an operations head-
quarters at Peterson AFB in Colorado and a research head-
quarters in Alabama. But these are smaller operations, making
use of fewer resources.
 51
SPACE AND SATELLITES

In the future, the United States will naturally improve a num-

ber of its satellite capabilities. Specific programs involve addi-
tional MILSTAR satellites, a UHF-band follow-on communica-
tions system, three advanced EHF satellites, at least two more
Defense Satellite Communications System (DSCS) spacecraft,
three Wideband Gapfiller satellites, and four Mobile User Objec-
tive System (MUOS) spacecraft.36 (EHF signals include frequen-
cies from 30,000 to 3,000,000 megahertz; SHF covers the range
from 3,000 to 30,000; UHF from 300 to 3,000; VHF from 30 to
300; and HF from 3 to 30. In each case, the letters HF stand for
high frequency, with the other letters representing the words
extremely, super, ultra, and very.)37 In addition to this heavy focus
on communications systems, starting around 2004, GPS satel-
lites will be gradually upgraded to a more robust, jam-resistant
variety with a dedicated higher-power military frequency. The
United States will also modernize its early warning capabilities in
GEO by deploying the so-called SBIRS-High (space-based
infrared satellites at higher orbits) system. And it will purchase
low-altitude satellites in the Space Tracking and Surveillance Sys-
tem (STSS) to track missile warheads.38 The total price tag for all
of these systems is estimated at roughly $60 billion.39
The United States also will surely improve its imaging and
signals-intelligence systems, currently in LEO and GEO, respec-
tively, though data on these classified activities is difficult to
come by. The broad name for the project under which imaging
capabilities will be developed and deployed is the Future
Imagery Architecture. The FIA research and development pro-
gram was purportedly to cost $4.5 billion in all, but it has faced
major challenges and setbacks. Little more is known about the
project to date. The United States may try to develop a constel-
lation of radar satellites in space for purposes of continuously
Figure 2-3. Locations of U.S. Ground-Based Space Surveillance Sensors, Past and Present
120˚E 150˚E 180˚ 150˚W 120˚W 90˚W 60˚W 30˚W 0˚ 30˚E 60˚E

Thule
75˚N 75˚N

Clear

60˚N 60˚N
Fylingdales

Shemya
PARCS
Taegu St. Margarets
Beale AFB Millstone, Haystack
White Sands Otis AFB
Vandenberg AFB NAVSPASUR San Vito Pirinclik
30˚N 30˚N
Motif Amos Eglin AFB

San Miguel Maui Antigua

ALCOR Kaena Point

0˚ ALTAIR 0˚
Diego
Ascension Garcia

30˚S 30˚S

Dedicated sensors
Collateral sensors
Contributing sensors

120˚E 150˚E 180˚ 150˚W 120˚W 90˚W 60˚W 30˚W 0˚ 30˚E 60˚E

Source: Paul B. Stares, Space and National Security (Brookings, 1987), p. 206.
 53
SPACE AND SATELLITES

tracking and targeting objects on Earth. Toward this goal, a

program known as Discoverer II was initiated in the 1990s; the
idea was to put twenty-four to forty-eight satellites into LEO to
provide nearly continuous coverage.40 But difficulty in making
any progress toward cheaper satellites and other technical chal-
lenges recently led to the program’s cancellation. (Such assets
might cost $1 billion apiece today, and the constellation would
appear unaffordable unless the unit price could be brought
down to about $100 million.) The Pentagon’s 2005 budget
proposed $327 million in funding for a new space-based radar
program.
Over the longer term, the United States is clearly interested in
considering development and deployment of other possible sys-
tems, such as space-based lasers (SBLs) or kinetic-kill vehicles,
in LEO for purposes of ballistic missile defense. And any
ground attack systems for attacking objects on Earth from
space, as distant a prospect as such capabilities may now be,
would presumably be in the LEO zone as well.41

Russia
Although it has clearly fallen from its superpower status,
Russia remains the world’s second space power by most mean-
ingful measures. Its total space budget is roughly that of India,
and as a result of the dissolution of the former Soviet Union it
has lost direct control over a number of facilities (such as
directed-energy test beds at Dushanbe in Tajikistan and Sary
Shagan in Kazakhstan).42 But it continues to put satellites into
space at an impressive pace, averaging more than twenty-five
launches a year in recent times, in contrast to a U.S. level of
around thirty. It does so using at least eight different families of
launch vehicles of many sizes and payloads, including Molniya,
 54
SPACE AND SATELLITES

Soyuz, Cosmos, Shtil, and Start variants. It operates five of the

world’s twenty-seven major launch sites (see table 2-6).43 Rus-
sia’s manned space program also continues. In recent years, it
has maintained a typical flight schedule of two launches with
three to six cosmonauts per year.
Russia has more than forty working military satellites by
recent estimates, close in quantity to the United States. They
run the gamut from communications and navigation assets to
early-warning satellites to electronic intelligence devices.44 But
while Russia rivals the United States in numbers of satellites, the
equality ends there. For example, Russia’s GLONASS naviga-
tion system, designed to have nine to twelve satellites and pro-
vide just moderately accurate locational information in a best
case, had eight working satellites at last count. Only half of
Russia’s early-warning satellites were still operational in 2000.45
It reportedly had only one imaging satellite in service in the late
1990s and may have experienced a period when none was func-
tional. Overall, perhaps two-thirds of its satellites were beyond
their planned service lives by the end of the 1990s, and little has
improved since.46

China
China has more than thirty satellites in orbit. It has been
increasingly active, with up to half a dozen launches a year in
recent times. It operates three launch sites and is an increasingly
popular low-cost provider of orbiting services. It also is work-
ing on a manned space program, run by the People’s Liberation
Army (PLA), and put its first astronaut into space in 2003. It
also hopes to put an unmanned vehicle on the moon by 2010.
Most of China’s satellites are at least nominally civilian, as
opposed to military, assets. For example, it fields five civilian
Earth observation satellites in LEO (one in conjunction with
 55
SPACE AND SATELLITES

Table 2-6. Orbital Launch Sites Worldwide

Number
of launches,
Site Owner 1957–2002
Plesetsk Russia 1,535
Tyuratam/Baikonur, Russia 1,190
Kazahkstan
Vandenberg AFB United States 620
Cape Canaveral AFS United States 583
Kourou, French Guiana European Space Agency 166
John F. Kennedy Space United States 133
Center
Kapustin Yar Russia 101
Tanegashima Japan 35
Xichang China 33
Kagoshima Japan 30
Shuang Cheng-tsu/ China 30
Jiuquan
Wallops Flight Facility United States 30
Edwards AFB United States 20
Sriharikota India 16
Taiyuan China 16
Indian Ocean Platform United States 9
Pacific Ocean Platform Sea Launch 8
Palmachim Israel 5
Hammaguir, Algeria France 4
Svobodny Russia 4
Woomera Australia 4
Alcantara Brazil 2
Barents Sea Russia 1
Gando AB, Canary Islands Spain 1
Kodiak United States 1
Kwejalein, Marshall Islands United States 1
Musudan ri North Korea 1
Total 4,579
Source: Mehuron, “2003 Space Almanac,” p. 26.
 56
SPACE AND SATELLITES

Brazil) and some thirteen civilian communications satellites in

GEO (some of which may no longer be functional), as well as
two scientific devices in LEO, one weather satellite in LEO, and
three navigation devices.47
China uses a half dozen space launch vehicles in the Long
March series. Most are three-stage rockets. Their payloads
range from 2,000 to 10,000 pounds per launch.48 An improved
family of liquid-fueled rockets is being developed. One variant
is expected to have, among other features, the capacity to lift
24,000 pounds to LEO.49
China is improving its satellite and space capabilities with
vigor. It appears to be interested in developing imaging satellites
based on electro-optical capabilities, synthetic aperture radar,
and other technologies. Its Ziyuan imaging satellites, planned in
conjunction with Brazil, would have real-time communications
systems to get data to the ground quickly, as would be needed
for tracking mobile military targets. It is also cooperating with
Russia on a number of space programs, possibly including satel-
lite reconnaissance technology.50 And according to Desmond
Ball, it is quite possibly making progress on electronic intelli-
gence satellites.

Europe and Japan

A number of other major industrial countries field substan-
tial numbers of satellites; in addition, the European Space
Agency deploys thirty-two. Dozens are for communications
(though only four were dedicated to military communications
purposes as of this writing). Half a dozen are for Earth obser-
vation, including France’s two SPOT satellites and its two
Helios military satellites; radar imaging may follow.51 About a
dozen are for scientific purposes; and two are for weather fore-
casting.52 The European Space Agency and the European Com-
 57
SPACE AND SATELLITES

mission are now completing contracting for the Galileo naviga-

tion system, which is intended as a GPS-like constellation of
thirty navigation satellites, costing about 3.5 billion euros
(including ground stations). The ambitious schedule would
have initial service begin in 2008.53 It may be somewhat redun-
dant but promises also to be more robust than GPS and provide
broader and more continuous coverage—meaning that there is
little point in the United States trying to block it. Rather, the
United States needs to stay on the ball in its own plans for GPS
modernization if it is to compete successfully.54
Four of the world’s major launch sites are in Europe or are run
by Europeans. And the European Space Agency has been launch-
ing about ten rockets a year into space in recent times. Europe’s
rockets include France’s Ariane family, Italy’s Vega rocket, and
the Sea Launch Zenit (Sea Launch is a company made up of
American, Russian, Ukrainian, and Norwegian partners).55
Japan tends to average one or two satellite launches a year. It
operates two launch sites. Its current launch vehicle is the H-2A,
a smaller variant of the ill-fated H-2, which suffered two launch
failures and never became a dependable system despite years of
investment and effort. Japan’s orbiting assets include up to six-
teen GEO communications satellites, three scientific satellites,
and a weather satellite. In March 2003, it orbited a pair of imag-
ing satellites, one optical and one radar, with resolutions of
roughly one meter and one to three meters, respectively.56

Other Countries and Companies

Beside the countries discussed above, about twenty-five other
states have at least one or two satellites in space. Several coun-
tries, including Canada, India, Israel, Thailand, South Korea,
Brazil, and Argentina, own reconnaissance satellites. They oper-
ate them largely for environmental and economic and planning
 58
SPACE AND SATELLITES

purposes, but sometimes for military missions as well. Large

countries with numerous remote regions, such as India, Canada,
and Indonesia, as well as Russia and China, tend to see satellite
communications as important for civilian purposes. Such capa-
bilities clearly could have military applicability as well. Israel
does not need a satellite to connect geographically separated
regions but is planning to build a dedicated military communi-
cations satellite.57 Israel is also capable of producing images with
half-meter resolution and is considering selling some of them to
India.58
India operates its own launch site, as do Australia, Israel,
Brazil, Spain, Ukraine, and North Korea. Major families of
boosters include India’s GSLV, Brazil’s VLS-1, and Israel’s LK-1
and Shavit rocket systems.59
Commercial firms such as the French-British SPOT and the
American LANDSAT have provided Earth images for many
years. LANDSAT began with a satellite providing eighty-meter
resolution in 1972; by 1982, its latest model had improved that
figure to thirty meters. SPOT images have resolutions of about
ten meters. The capacity to produce images with even these lev-
els of resolution was enough to cause concern during Operation
Desert Storm in 1991 (they could have revealed preparations
for the famous “left hook” around Iraqi forces, among other
things). No images were provided to the Iraqis, but the concern
clearly remains for possible future wars.
Technology and commercial trends are clearly giving a grow-
ing number of companies, many not American, the capability of
producing high-resolution images for sale. Eleven such compa-
nies are expected to be in the market soon, including firms from
Canada, India, Israel, Russia, and possibly China. Recent U.S.
commercial efforts include Space Imaging, with its Ikonos satel-
lite; Earth Watch, with its Quickbird; and Orbital Sciences,
 59
SPACE AND SATELLITES

with its OrbView-3 and OrbView-4. The Ikonos satellite has a

resolution slightly better than one meter with black-and-white
images; a satellite company known as Orbimage anticipates
one-meter black-and-white resolution soon, as well.60 Space
Imaging is considering orbiting a satellite with twice as fine res-
olution within a couple of years.61
Other countries and companies are not too far behind. Rele-
vant private ventures include the International Telecom Satellite
Organization, Globalstar, Orbcomm, the European Telecom
Satellite Organization, the International Maritime Organiza-
tion, the Arab Satellite Communications Organization, and the
Asia Satellite Telecom Company. As one example, a constella-
tion of eight Eros imaging satellites, owned in part by the Israeli
government, with one- to two-meter resolution, is expected to
be in orbit soon.62

Conclusion

Satellite technology is complex and challenging, as are rockets

for putting satellites into space. But capabilities are becoming
widespread nonetheless. The rapid growth in space-related
business seen during much of the 1990s has slowed, but trends
are still upward and can be expected to remain that way. Space
is becoming somewhat crowded, not only with satellites but
also with debris from rocket parts and old satellites. Regardless
of how one views it, the recent period during which the United
States has dominated, and indeed almost monopolized, the mil-
itary use of space seems unlikely to endure—though no country
is anywhere close to approaching American capabilities in
either commercial or military terms.
This page intentionally left blank
 CHAPTER THREE

CURRENT THREATS AND

TECHNOLOGY TRENDS

If space-related technologies could be frozen in place in

their current state, the United States would be in a fortu-
nate position. It dominates the use of outer space for mil-
itary purposes today. Russia’s capabilities have declined,
to the point where its weakness may be of greater con-
cern than its strength, given the lack of dependable early-
warning satellites for ballistic missile launch. China’s as-
sets remain rudimentary, as do those of America’s other
potential rivals (or current enemies). The United States is
able to use satellites for a wide range of missions, includ-
ing not only traditional reconnaissance and early-
warning purposes but also real-time targeting and data
distribution in warfare. Although it hopes to develop
space-based missile defense assets someday, the present
need for such capabilities is generally rather limited, and
ground-based systems increasingly provide some protec-
tion, in any event. More exotic capabilities, such as

61
 62
CURRENT THREATS AND TECHNOLOGY

space-to-Earth kinetic rods, airplanes that would bounce along

the top of the atmosphere, or intercontinental artillery, are not
of pressing need given existing U.S. capabilities for projecting
power anywhere in the world. On the whole, the current con-
figuration of global space technologies and assets is highly
desirable from an American perspective and unlikely to im-
prove much further, if at all. Deterioration in the U.S. position
seems more likely.
Of course, it is not possible to freeze progress in technology,
nor to stop the continued dissemination of technologies already
available. So American policymakers will have to adapt. This
chapter provides a prognosis on some key areas of space-related
technology over the coming ten to fifteen years to provide a
foundation for consideration of various policy options in chap-
ter 6. It also underscores current vulnerabilities of American
military and commercial satellites, including some that are
probably underappreciated by policymakers (see table 3-1).
The chapter focuses on a few key technologies, including
high-powered lasers, launch vehicles, and microsatellites. The
emphasis is on fundamental trends in physics and engineering,
rather than on possible adaptations of existing technologies
(such as solar-powered stations or nuclear reactors in space).1 In
general, the emphasis is on the basic question of what will
become possible in space, rather than what might save money
or offer new conveniences. In addition, one old but sometimes
forgotten threat, the possibility of nuclear explosions in space,
is also considered.
One general theme about future technology is that, despite
the tendency of military strategists to rave about defense trans-
formation and a coming revolution in military affairs, many
satellite development programs are currently advancing more
 63
CURRENT THREATS AND TECHNOLOGY

slowly than once hoped. Leaving aside fundamental constraints

of the laws of physics, immediate engineering challenges are
making it harder than expected to develop systems that are gen-
erally believed to be within reach. For example, the nation’s
next generation of imagery satellites, known as the Future
Imagery Architecture, has recently been delayed by more than a
year and grown by more than $3 billion in cost. Problems also
afflict next-generation global positioning system satellites,
space-based infrared satellites at higher and lower orbits
(SBIRS-high and SBIRS-low), and communications systems
(such as the advanced extremely high-frequency satellite sys-
tem).2 Cheaper and/or reusable launchers are proving hard to
develop as well, as discussed below. Most futuristic technolo-
gies remain just that.
But another competing theme is that some areas of technol-
ogy are indeed changing in important ways. Chapter 1 has doc-
umented the increasing spread of satellite capabilities. As time
advances, these can be expected to provide more and more
countries with the ability to mimic the United States in real-time
targeting of military assets for tactical warfighting purposes.
Other countries will surely remain behind the American military
in their absolute capabilities—data rates per second, raw pro-
cessing power, wherewithal for global operations, ability to find
and destroy a wide range of military targets with high confi-
dence. But they may not need to compete on equal footing with
the United States to cause it great concern. For example, for
China, Iran, or another regional power to threaten shipping near
its shores, including possibly U.S. Navy assets, may only require
an intermittent ability to strike at a small number of large assets.
Such developments are not imminent, and are not reason
enough for a U.S. decision to develop antisatellite weapons in
Table 3-1. U.S. Space System Survivability Measures, up to 1987a
Link Ground
Satellite Anti- resistance station Overall
Mission or Nuclear Maneuver- Laser redun- jamming to nuclear Satellite redun- survivability
program hardening ability hardening dancy capability effects autonomy dancy rating
Reconnaissance L(P) n.a. n.a. L n.a. L n.a. L Low
Early warning L M(P) L(P) M L(P) L(P) L(P) L(P) Low to
medium (P)
Communication
DSCS III L H n.a. L H M M M Medium
FLTSATCOM L M N L L L L L Low
Leasat L n.a. N L L L L M Low
AFSATCOM — M — — L(P) L — — Low
SDS L n.a. n.a. L L L L L Low
NATO III L L N L L L L L Low
MILSTAR H H H M H H H H High
Navigation
Transit-Nova L M N M n.a. L L L Low
Navstar GPS n.a. H H H H H H H High
Nuclear explo- — H n.a. H n.a. L H H Medium to
sion detection high
(NDS)
Meteorology L H L(P) L L(P) L(P) L(P) L(P) Low to
(DMSP) medium
Source: Paul B. Stares, Space and National Security (Brookings, 1987), p. 198.
L = limited protection; M = medium protection; H = high protection; N = no protection; (P) = planned improvement; n.a. = not available.
a. After the cold war ended, less emphasis was placed on survivability, so many of these estimates are believed to remain correct today.
 65
CURRENT THREATS AND TECHNOLOGY

the foreseeable future, as is argued in later chapters. But these

trends bear watching, nonetheless.
New technologies will also be developed, and the United
States may not always lead the way. Three major possibilities
stand out. One is in the domain of high-energy lasers, capable of
damaging many unhardened and unprotected objects in low-
Earth orbit even if situated on the ground and even if lacking
adaptive optics to compensate for atmospheric distortion. A sec-
ond, perhaps even more important, development pertains to
microsatellites. Modern computing and other technological
improvements are making it possible for small satellites weigh-
ing just dozens of kilograms to maneuver and operate autono-
mously in space. They cannot necessarily maneuver extensively
on their own or provide multifaceted capabilities. But they may
soon be capable of harassing or destroying larger satellites at
virtually any altitude—and of being positioned to do so clan-
destinely. U.S. space tracking assets today could watch any
rocket carrying such microsatellites into space, but they might
not detect small objects making up part of the payload, and
might also lose track of a small maneuvering object over time.
Finally, the improvement of “hit-to-kill” ballistic missile defense
technologies against long-range missiles will provide latent
capabilities against low-altitude satellites as well, since any
weapon capable of intercepting a ballistic missile warhead in
space should be capable of intercepting a satellite at comparable
altitudes. Such satellites would be moving at only slightly greater
speeds than missile warheads, and along relatively similar and
even more predictable trajectories. In addition, the targeting and
communications system used to guide a ballistic missile inter-
ceptor to its target could be easily modified to accept data from
satellite surveillance and tracking stations (see figure 3-1).
 66
CURRENT THREATS AND TECHNOLOGY

Figure 3-1. ASAT Intercept Schemesa

s be
onou lt
nchr
y
os
Ge

4-hour
elliptical orbit

North Pole

a. Counter-rotator

Transit orbits

12-hour
Navstar orbit
b. Looper

c. Direct ascent

Source: Ashton Carter, “Satellites and Anti-Satellites: The Limits of the Possible,”
International Security, vol. 10, no. 4 (Spring 1986), p. 83.
a. ASAT intercept schemes aim to be able to attack all the satellites of a constel-
lation with a specific set of orbital maneuvers. The counter-rotator (panel a) travels
the GEO belt in the “wrong” direction, attacking all satellites within twelve hours.
The looper (panel b) climbs to semisynchronous orbit every four hours to pick off
one of the Navstar GPS satellites, which are phased every four hours in a twelve-
hour orbit. A battery of direct ascent ASAT interceptors based at the North Pole
(panel c) could attack all satellites in polar LEO in less than two hours.
 67
CURRENT THREATS AND TECHNOLOGY

Underappreciated Threats:
Nuclear Detonations and Microwave Weapons

Nuclear weapons are an effective means of targeting satellites.

They are often carried by ballistic missiles with guidance sys-
tems that could easily be reprogrammed to detonate at a point
in space; if it was known when a given satellite would pass near
that point, close-proximity intercept would not be difficult to
achieve (even without testing for that purpose). Nuclear weap-
ons are, of course, lethal from close range, even against hard-
ened satellites. Any country with nuclear weapons and even rel-
atively short-range ballistic missiles might be able to generate
this type of threat, since low-Earth orbit is so near and this type
of attack does not require great accuracy or finesse.
Some argue that adversaries would desist from using nuclear
weapons in space out of fear of retaliation. It is true, certainly,
that this would be a provocative action with considerable
potential for inciting some type of escalation from the United
States. But the assumption that an enemy would be deterred for
that reason is unconvincing and too optimistic. What better
way to use nuclear weapons than to destroy a key military
capability of an enemy country without killing any of its popu-
lation? The United States could threaten nuclear retaliation
after such an attack, but it is far from clear that such a threat
would be credible—or even appropriate. And an enemy might
feel it had little to lose anyway, if the United States was already
bent on regime overthrow as its ultimate objective in the war in
question. On balance, this concern is considerably more serious
than many appreciate.
LEO satellites are clearly the most vulnerable to nuclear at-
tack, though unshielded commercial satellites as far up as GEO
could be vulnerable to disruption from nuclear explosions at
 68
CURRENT THREATS AND TECHNOLOGY

lower altitudes.3 But in LEO, even hardened military satellites

are vulnerable. LEO satellites often are few in number in any
given constellation. More important, they can be roughly
100 times closer to Earth than a GEO asset, at least when pass-
ing directly overhead. Even SCUD-class missiles are capable of
reaching them, if a nuclear warhead is available small enough
to fit atop the SCUD. (By contrast, an ICBM could only reach
GEO if its normal payload was reduced by roughly a factor of
five, given the physics of rocket flight.)
Nuclear bursts can harm satellites in several ways. One is
direct destruction through proximity to the blast (especially due
to x-rays). They can destroy satellites at several hundreds of
kilometers from a detonation point, depending most impor-
tantly on the hardening of a satellite and to a lesser extent the
size of the explosion. A second possible means of damage is
through x-rays created by system-generated electromagnetic
pulse, for example from a burst at an altitude of 100 to
150 kilometers (which could damage or destroy 5 to 10 per-
cent of a constellation of LEO satellites, specifically those
within line of sight of the detonation).4 Either one of these
mechanisms can damage satellites thousands of kilometers
away; some satellites could be affected at distances of 20,000 to
30,000 kilometers (by a one-megaton blast, assuming limited
shielding of the satellite).5
A third mechanism by which nuclear weapons could damage
or destroy satellites is a more gradual effect. It results from the
so-called pumping of the Van Allen radiation belts by any ex-
plosion, particularly one crossing the 50 kiloton threshold, any-
where from roughly one hundred to several hundred kilometers
in altitude.6 Pumping of the Van Allen belts results when fission
products emit protons and electrons that are trapped by Earth’s
magnetic fields, striking satellites as they repeatedly orbit
 69
CURRENT THREATS AND TECHNOLOGY

through these regions in the ensuing days and months. For

example, a 1962 U.S. megaton-class test at 400 kilometers over
Johnson Island in the Pacific, known as Starfish, destroyed some
seven satellites in seven months and continued to affect the Van
Allen belts until the early 1970s.7 A fledgling nuclear power
might not have an explosive device approaching this yield, but
even smaller explosions would have deleterious effects of this
type. This mechanism is of greatest concern for unshielded satel-
lites in LEO; some military satellites in LEO, and at higher alti-
tudes within Van Allen belts (such as GPS satellites), are gener-
ally hardened and more resilient.8 Typically, unhardened LEO
satellites with expected lifetimes of five to fifteen years might last
only a few months or less under such conditions (see figure 3-2).9
These vulnerabilities are worrisome. They raise the question
of whether hardening requirements might be placed on U.S.
commercial satellites, with the government possibly subsidizing
the added costs, which often total about 2 to 3 percent of the
satellite’s value.10 But even more to the point, they raise the
question of whether current U.S. military satellites, many of
which are probably not hardened very well against nuclear
effects, need better protection. (They were not even hardened
that well during the cold war, and the degree of hardness on
subesquent satellites has probably declined.)
Those not convinced that a potential adversary would use
nuclear weapons against U.S. satellites should still worry about
high-powered microwave weapons. These explosive-driven de-
vices have the ability to generate very high power levels in an
intense burst. Large devices could be lethal to electronics out to
a range of many kilometers, perhaps dozens or even more;
smaller devices, such as those that could be placed on microsats,
could be effective at distances of perhaps tens to hundreds of
meters. The physics behind these weapons is not complicated,
 70
CURRENT THREATS AND TECHNOLOGY

Figure 3-2. Estimated Effects of Low-Yield, High-Altitude Nuclear Detonations

on the Service Lives of Selected LEO Satellite Constellationsa
Months

Persian Gulf launch (50KT, 250km)

120 North Korean launch (50KT, 120km)
Expected life
100

80

60

40

20

Teledesic Globalstar Orbcomm Iridium NOAA

Source: Barry D. Watts, The Military Uses of Space: A Diagnostic Assessment

(Washington: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2001), p. 99.
a. System hardness is assumed to be twice that needed for the natural environ-
ment. Satellite constellations are as follows: Teledesic, 1,350 km, 98° inclination;
Globalstar, 1,414 km, 52° inclination; Orbcomm, 775 km, 45° inclination; Iridium,
780 km, 84.6° inclination; NOAA, 850 km, 99° inclination.

and the engineering requirements are potentially within the

reach of many countries. Hardening against nuclear weapons is
not the same as hardening against these types of microwave
weapons, due to differences in wavelengths and intensities of
radiation. But there could be economies of scale and effort in
carrying out both types of hardening as part of the overall de-
sign or redesign of a given satellite.11
 71
CURRENT THREATS AND TECHNOLOGY

High-Energy Lasers on the Ground and in Airplanes

What about technology areas that are changing significantly?

High-energy lasers are a good place to start. Those with potential
as long-range weapons would probably be chemical lasers that
would destroy their targets by heating them with continuous
waves of infrared radiation. Unlike nuclear weapons, which gen-
erate intense x-rays, or pulsed lasers, they would not produce
sufficiently high-frequency rays to destroy through the sheer pen-
etrative and disruptive power of the photons or through the
physical jolt delivered to the system as a short impulse. But many
chemical lasers could have some effectiveness against unpro-
tected objects in LEO when they flew overhead; more powerful
devices could damage satellites further away. Such lasers are usu-
ally able to convert about 20 to 30 percent of the energy released
by chemical reactions into laser power.12
To damage a soft target like paper or human skin, a total
dose of about one Joule per square centimeter is required (a
Joule is a watt of power applied for a second). Wood is gener-
ally damaged after receiving about ten Joules per square cen-
timeter; metal, after 100 Joules per square centimeter. The type
of target usually envisioned for high-energy laser weapons
today, for example, the metal making up the skin of a SCUD
missile, might be damaged after receiving 1,000 Joules per
square centimeter.13 By contrast, many satellites could appar-
ently be damaged after receiving as few as ten Joules per square
centimeter, assuming a pulse lasting several seconds, according
to a 1995 Air Force scientific advisory study.14 Other public
estimates are in the range of fifty Joules per square centimeter,
through overheating of a satellite body or solar panels—though
1,000 Joules per square centimeter might be needed to effect a
 72
CURRENT THREATS AND TECHNOLOGY

quick, “brute force” kill of individual components.15 Much

depends on the specific characteristics of the satellites.16 The
main point is that satellites can be much easier to damage or
destroy than SCUDs, meaning that they could be targeted from
much longer distances.
Apart from chemical lasers, the two other types of laser tech-
nology that could most plausibly be used as weapons in the
future are the free-electron laser and solid-state laser. But both
are far removed from generating the types of power outputs
required for the missile defense or antisatellite job. The first,
which produces radiation by sending very fast electrons
through a magnetic field, is about a factor of one thousand too
weak at present. The second, which excites molecules inside a
crystal solid until they can be induced to return to a lower
energy state in unison, releasing radiation in the process, is now
about a factor of one hundred too weak (at roughly 10 kilo-
watts).17 Prospects for greatly increasing the intensity of solid-
state lasers, in particular, are mediocre, given the difficulty of
venting the heat created by the lasing process.18 Moreover, since
some 70 percent of total high-energy laser funding has been
directed to large demonstration projects in recent years, break-
throughs in these types of lasers seem relatively unlikely any-
time soon; only a few tens of millions of dollars a year have
been devoted to more basic research.19 The laser defense indus-
trial base has also lost much of its strength in recent years, and
most of today’s demonstration efforts involve projects begun in
the 1980s, based on technologies conceived in the 1970s.20
But what may be a curse for laser science in general is a boon
to one U.S. program in particular: the airborne laser, currently
in a fairly advanced stage of development as a missile defense
system. This system may have rudimentary capabilities against
ballistic missiles fairly soon, even though it will probably not be
 73
CURRENT THREATS AND TECHNOLOGY

fully deployable until late in the decade (if then). It could, with
relatively modest modifications, have ASAT capabilities any-
time thereafter, should the United States elect to proceed down
that path.
The idea of high-energy chemical lasers dates back to the
1970s. Airborne laser experiments go back two decades, to the
early 1980s, when an aircraft outfitted as an “airborne labora-
tory” used a laser to defeat several Sidewinder missiles launched
in its vicinity. In this period the MIRACL was also built at
White Sands, New Mexico. That laser uses deuterium fluoride
fuel and operates at 3.8 microns wavelength at the megawatt
level.
The ABL enjoys two major advantages over MIRACL. First,
it is airborne, meaning it can fly and operate above the atmos-
phere’s most dense region and above almost all clouds. Since
Earth’s atmosphere interferes with most kinds of visible and
near-visible light, scattering or absorbing much of it, this is a
great benefit. In addition, the infrared wavelength used by the
airborne laser is less affected by whatever atmosphere it does
encounter (a wavelength range of 0.5 to 1.5 microns is consid-
ered ideal; the ABL operates at 1.315 microns).21
Each ABL is actually designed to be a system of lasers. The
main beam is a high-power system for destroying an enemy
missile. Other lasers of lesser power on the aircraft are designed
for targeting and tracking and to measure atmospheric condi-
tions. The ABL is designed first and foremost to work against
liquid-fueled short-range missiles, such as SCUDs. It was de-
fined as a theater missile defense capability in the Clinton ad-
ministration, though it could certainly be used against long-
range liquid-fueled rockets as well. So the ABL is really a
boost-phase intercept concept for use against liquid-fueled bal-
listic missiles, regardless of their range.
 74
CURRENT THREATS AND TECHNOLOGY

Whether the ABL would work against solid-fuel ICBMs or not

is unclear. Its range might be diminished, because the basic con-
cept of weakening the booster body enough to produce a cata-
strophic leak and explosion might not work as quickly against
solid-fuel rockets. On the other hand, range might also be
increased, because the laser might be able to dwell on the target
longer than with a shorter range missile.22 The Missile Defense
Agency is contemplating tests of the ABL against ICBMs in mid-
decade that could shed more light on this matter.23
The ABL uses hydrogen peroxide, potassium hydroxide,
chlorine gas, and water as raw ingredients. A number of mod-
ules (six on the first test aircraft, fourteen eventually) will
together produce a beam with a strength of about 1 million to
2 million watts (1–2 megawatts) and a beam roughly the size of
a basketball at hundreds of kilometers’ range. It is to operate on
a modified 747 aircraft. At the 40,000 foot altitudes where it is
designed to function in wartime, it can be assured a relatively
clear shot at targets at comparable or higher altitudes, since
clouds rarely rise to that height. Its maximum range against a
short-range ballistic missile is estimated at up to several hun-
dred kilometers; with a single payload of chemical fuel, it could
fire about twenty shots, each lasting several seconds.24
The ABL almost surely will have latent antisatellite capabili-
ties. It can be directed against targets above it, perhaps even
directly above it. Its beam can be swiveled in the horizontal
plane almost back to the aircraft’s wings. The method for point-
ing the beam appears to allow just as wide a sweep in the verti-
cal direction—though exact figures are classified, perhaps
because of political sensitivity that others will see it as a possi-
ble ASAT. It makes sense that the ABL could damage certain
classes of satellites in low-Earth orbit, given that they often fly
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CURRENT THREATS AND TECHNOLOGY

over Earth at altitudes comparable to the expected lethal radius

of the ABL. (Of course, satellites’ orbits would only occasion-
ally take them over a spot where an ABL was flying.) But the
main issue with converting the ABL into an ASAT probably
concerns target acquisition and tracking. At present, the ABL
relies on hot rocket plumes for acquisition of the target; over-
head satellites would not provide such a signature. Thus the
ABL could not track and destroy a satellite unless its tracking
sensors were first cued to the satellite’s location by the space
surveillance system. The United States has such a system
already. Providing the necessary data links would require soft-
ware changes and perhaps even more, but it would not require
changes to the basic laser system of the ABL. That means it
could probably be accomplished relatively quickly.
The airborne laser does seem likely to work, even if schedule
delays may continue (plans for the first true flight test of the
integrated system, originally planned for 2002 and then 2003,
have continued to slip). The benefits of having a laser above
most cloud cover and much of the atmosphere are considerable,
so the United States can be expected to continue providing
strong support for the ABL. (The Navy gave up on similar tech-
nology for ship defense because of propagation losses for a
high-powered laser of 3.8 microns’ wavelength at sea level; fly-
ing at 40,000 feet and using a shorter wavelength beam is a
much different matter, however.)
The engineering challenges still remaining for the ABL are
considerable—modifying a chemical laser concept developed in
1977 to create a powerful laser small and light enough to fit on
an airplane, dealing with atmospheric distortions, keeping the
laser on the target while flying, and so on. Yet most of these are
on the path toward solution in one way or another. Solving
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CURRENT THREATS AND TECHNOLOGY

them may take time, but is likely to prove feasible. And for this
reason, a system with an inherent ASAT capability against low-
flying satellites seems likely to be in the U.S. inventory by the
second decade of the century.25
What could other countries do to exploit high-energy laser
technology for space weapons applications? Russia has much of
the necessary expertise but may lack sufficient financial re-
sources (and motivation). India may try to develop a laser that
can be used against targets in space over the next decade or so,
but its prospects for success are not yet clear.26
China is the more interesting concern for the future, espe-
cially given its ongoing disagreements with the United States
over Taiwan, and thus the potential for war. China is making
some progress with various laser technologies. It is now be-
lieved to have low-energy laser countermeasures for deflecting
antitank missiles, showing that it has solved some of the chal-
lenges in pointing lasers and keeping them fixed on their tar-
gets. The Pentagon also believes that it may have acquired (per-
haps from Russia) high-energy laser technology that could be
used in antisatellite operations. There are some reports that it
has thought about atmospheric “thermal blooming,” an effect
caused by the passage of high-powered laser light through the
atmosphere that leads to the distortion and weakening of a
high-powered laser beam if not properly addressed. But that
concern is not fleshed out in the Pentagon’s latest report on
China’s military capabilities.
Some U.S. analysis on China’s capabilities has gotten a bit
carried away. For example, the 1999 Cox report suggested that
Russia might help China develop nuclear-pumped lasers in
space, an extraordinarily challenging technology that probably
remains twenty-five years in the future even for the United
States, should it ever choose to pursue such a capability.27
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CURRENT THREATS AND TECHNOLOGY

But the matter does not end there. It is doubtful that China,
or for that matter any other country, could develop an airborne
laser capability in the next ten to fifteen years. The juxtaposi-
tion of various technologies and the resources required for such
a program are probably beyond its means. Yet China may soon
have the inherent ability to produce a ground-based high-
energy laser like the MIRACL, should it devote the very sub-
stantial resources and time needed to make such a program
work—even if such a weapon might lack adaptive optics and
other sophisticated features that would help concentrate its
power.28 The technology is now a couple of decades old. Plac-
ing such a system on the ground may not make for an ideal bal-
listic missile defense, given atmospheric effects and the fact that
Earth’s curvature would prevent the laser from striking most
missiles during most of their trajectory. But ASAT operations
are easier to contemplate, since in many scenarios one can wait
for a clear day and for the target to fly overhead.

Space-Based Laser Concepts

Although they, too, have been discussed and investigated for

decades, space-based laser concepts are much further from
fruition than ground-based systems or the ABL. The Pentagon
acknowledges that they are probably ideas for 2020 and
beyond.
The space-based laser program is currently run by the Missile
Defense Agency and the U.S. Air Force. It would employ a dif-
ferent type of chemical laser that makes use of hydrogen and
fluorine to create hydrogen fluoride, resulting in infrared radia-
tion at a wavelength of 2.7 microns. That is about twice the
wavelength of the airborne laser and is less suitable for use
within the atmosphere; given how strongly radiation at that
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CURRENT THREATS AND TECHNOLOGY

wavelength is absorbed by water vapor, it would probably only

penetrate down to 30,000 to 40,000 feet if directed into the
atmosphere from space.29 But against targets in space that dis-
advantage clearly would not matter. The fuels are light and rel-
atively stable, so good for long-term storage in space.30
In the SBL, a large mirror with a diameter of at least four
meters and perhaps as much as eight meters would be used to
create a fine beam. The mirror would have to be extremely light.
It would probably have to be furled up while being deployed
and unfolded once in space. The laser would have a length of
about twenty meters and weigh nearly twenty tons, according to
current plans. The program’s goal is to move toward a lethal
demonstration of the system in orbit by 2012, but a constella-
tion of a dozen or more satellites providing global coverage is
probably at least two decades away, according to a 2001
Defense Science Board assessment and other sources.31
By contrast with the ABL, the space-based laser concept
remains little more than a basic research and development con-
cept in the Department of Defense. Current funding levels are in
the range of tens of millions of dollars a year. If a demonstrator
is built over the next decade or so, it is currently estimated that
costs would total about $3 billion. To get to that point would
require realistic ground testing, which would necessitate con-
struction not only of the laser but of a test facility mimicking
space—which means a large vacuum chamber.32 Even if the
basic laser package could be built and orbited, major improve-
ments would be needed prior to building actual weapons,
including development of deployable larger-scale optical sys-
tems, at least a fivefold increase in power relative to today’s lev-
els, and progress in jitter control that would stabilize the laser
and keep the beam fixed on its target.33
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Each SBL would essentially be a combination of three

extremely complex technologies: the laser itself, the power
source for the laser, and the equivalent of a space telescope to
direct the beam. Integrating these elements may be no harder
than in the airborne laser. Indeed, a space-based laser would
not have to deal with any atmospheric distortion of its beam, as
does the ABL. But in other ways, the challenge associated with
the SBL is much greater. It is already proving difficult to put
lasers on aircraft with payloads of 100,000 pounds or more; it
is far harder to put them into space with rockets each capable
of lifting payloads less than half that weight. Even if high-
powered lasers, space telescopes, and large fuel payloads could
be individually orbited, assembling them in space and making
them work in that environment for the purposes of missile
defense or antisatellite operations is a far more challenging
proposition. (No launcher system is presently being developed
with the requisite capacity to launch a space-based laser weigh-
ing even forty tons.)
Constructing a device that could remain workable in space,
generally without maintenance, for many years is extraordinar-
ily difficult.34 The SBL’s chemical laser would create movement
as it operated—after all, it has many similarities to a small
rocket engine in the basic way it generates energy—making it
hard to keep a beam on target.35 In addition to dealing with jit-
ter, the telescopic system would have to point the beam with
remarkable accuracy.36
These challenges may or may not prove surmountable within
two decades. But absent major breakthroughs in materials or
rocketry, or both, the costs of building and orbiting a constella-
tion of space-based lasers may prove excessive, even if the con-
cept proves workable. Even if certain new laser concepts, such
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CURRENT THREATS AND TECHNOLOGY

as the free-electron laser or all-gas-phase iodine laser, were

developed in the megawatt range by then, the construction and
launch costs of the basic optics alone could still be staggering.
Costs for a constellation of two dozen laser weapons were
recently estimated at $50 billion or more by the Congressional
Budget Office.37

Communications Systems

Not all key space-related military technologies are weapons.

Indeed, as noted, today the most important are generally those
that image Earth or allow rapid, high-data-flow, long-range co-
mmunications. What are the prospects for further improvements
in existing communications and navigation systems that use
electromagnetic energy to send signals? What are the prospects
for laser communications and other innovative concepts?38
Radio communications may be the closest to technological
maturity of any of the major categories of technologies consid-
ered here. Current limitations on electromagnetic bandwidth
and data transmission rates are set by the laws of physics more
than by the state of contemporary science and engineering.
Indeed, given that future adversaries may well have much
greater capacity to disrupt information flows than the likes of
Iraq, Serbia, and the Taliban have had in recent years, the U.S.
military may have to assume less radio bandwidth in the future
rather than more.
Progress will still occur, but perhaps in indirect ways. Data
will be more effectively compressed, allowing a given number of
photos or a given video stream to be transmitted using several
times less bandwidth than is the case today.39 The priority asso-
ciated with different types of data transmissions will be more
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clearly established, allowing the military to quickly forgo luxu-

ries such as frequent teleconferencing in times of war. Contin-
ued improvements in the computational power of small com-
puters will allow more on-board processing of raw data on
many of the sensor platforms obtaining data. But these types of
improvements will do well to slow the growth in the U.S. mili-
tary’s demand for more bandwidth; it is quite unlikely that they
will reverse it. Meanwhile, commercial pressures may actually
encroach on military bandwidth—there is discussion in the
United States of moving the armed forces out of the 1755 to
1850 megahertz zone.40
Laser communications systems are another matter, however.
They can transfer information at very high data rates, since they
operate at high frequencies relative to radio waves. They are
often constrained by weather or other atmospheric effects, par-
ticularly if they have to communicate with individual ground
stations. But for communications among satellites, for commu-
nications in good weather at certain wavelengths, or for com-
munications able to make use of distributed ground stations
connected by high-speed links, they can easily transmit hun-
dreds of times more information than radio signals.41 To ensure
that ground stations will be available in convenient and cloud-
less locations for downlinking and then disseminating data, the
United States also plans to develop a global information grid
(GIG) bandwidth expansion program with a total of ninety
sites interlinked by fiber-optic cable.42
To be specific, laser communications systems capable of trans-
ferring more than 1.0 gigabit per second (Gbps)—more than the
entire bandwidth used in the Kosovo or Afghanistan wars—
have been under development in recent years. A laser communi-
cation link transmitting at 2.5 Gbps was tested at Livermore
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CURRENT THREATS AND TECHNOLOGY

labs in California in February 2002.43 It may well be feasible to

attain data rates of 10 Gbps or even 30 Gbps. Laser systems also
have the advantages of being difficult to intercept or jam, or for
that matter even detect, and of using smaller antennas, given
their short wavelengths.44
Some future systems may route information using lasers in
space and then break the information into smaller “packets” to
reradiate to Earth with directional antennas using traditional
radio waves or microwaves. UAVs above cloud cover could also
provide a type of relay. That could make for a truly impressive
new type of capability. Such a laser system is now under devel-
opment in the Pentagon, which is asking for $775 million in
2005 for such a “T-sat” program, though cost growth and tech-
nical challenges may delay its arrival until after 2010.45

Launch Vehicles, Interceptor Rockets, and Kinetic Energy Systems

A host of space systems rely for their performance on rocketry

technology: propulsion systems, aerodynamic technologies,
guidance systems, maneuvering capabilities. These are the basic
ingredients in launch systems that place objects in orbit, inter-
ceptors that would be used to destroy ballistic missiles or satel-
lites through collision or explosion, and a number of more
futuristic technology concepts, as well.
Fundamental improvements in the efficiency and cost of
space launch systems have been elusive for many years now.
Systems continue to improve in some ways, but basic physics
and engineering considerations limit progress.46 Progress in pro-
pellants and structural materials for rockets, be they launch
vehicles or ICBMs and SLBMs or interceptors, has been lim-
ited.47 Indeed, the theoretical maximum performance of current
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CURRENT THREATS AND TECHNOLOGY

chemical fuels is being approached. New materials used in the

structures of rockets can improve performance at the margin,
but major improvements are unlikely with current technology.48
It is doubtful that this situation will change much in the com-
ing one to two decades, even in light of the expected infusion of
new funds for President Bush’s proposed Mars mission. The
evolved expendable launch vehicle (EELV) program, the major
U.S. effort of late to achieve greater efficiencies and lower costs
in space launch operations, will do very well to reduce costs by
half.49 In fact, it seems more likely that it will do well to reduce
costs at all; despite the successful launches of the Atlas V and
Delta IV in 2002, the financial prospects of Lockheed Martin
and Boeing are not being immediately aided by their newest
launch vehicles (and Boeing’s legal troubles with the govern-
ment are causing it further problems).50 These EELV rockets do
offer some simplification in numbers of parts and manufactur-
ing processes, but their basic components and efficiencies do
not reflect radical improvement.51 Recent news suggests a large
price increase, in fact.52
Some innovative concepts may help at the margin for certain
applications. For example, there is an interesting idea afoot to
launch small satellites (ten kilograms or so) from balloons to
allow the use of smaller rockets (the benefit arises from reduc-
ing air drag and hence the need for structural strength and
weight in the rocket body).53 On the whole, however, rocket
technology is not advancing very fast at present.
But even existing rocket capabilities, when juxtaposed with
greater computing power and better sensors, may offer new
capabilities. The advent of hit-to-kill technology, beginning in the
1980s (for example, with the short-lived U.S. direct ascent ASAT
program) and accelerating significantly in the 1990s, reflects a
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new accuracy and quickness in sensors, computing, and resulting

course adjustment for small “kill vehicles.” For example, the
midcourse system for missile defense, begun under the Clinton
administration, deploys four small “divert thrusters” on its
140 pound exoatmospheric kill vehicle (EKV). It has already
struck its target on several occasions, revealing the remarkable
quickness and precision of a device that is trying to “hit a bullet
with a bullet” (notwithstanding other potential limitations in the
system due largely to the likely effects of enemy decoys).54
Advances in processing power and miniaturization could
also make a concept like brilliant pebbles more feasible than in
the past. The idea is to base small interceptors in space for bal-
listic missile defense, igniting their boosters when necessary to
attack a ballistic missile or its warheads. To make such a bril-
liant pebbles concept work, the interceptors will need to be very
fast (to reach ICBMs while they are still burning). Or they will
have to possess greater processing power and better sensor tech-
nologies—given the low temperatures in space and the fact that
warheads would not be identified by their rocket plumes once
boost phase was complete.55 But the concept may prove feasi-
ble. Indeed, the Missile Defense Agency is hopeful that a con-
cept for a boost-phase interceptor can be developed within half
a dozen years, initially using ground-based rockets but perhaps
shortly thereafter for space-based interceptors as well. Those
timelines do not seem wildly optimistic.56 That said, making a
single brilliant pebble technically feasible is a far cry from pop-
ulating low-Earth orbit with enough of them to provide even a
limited national missile defense capability. Because such peb-
bles would always be in motion relative to Earth, and because
only a pebble that was near a ballistic missile at the time of
launch could destroy it, given the short timelines available for
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CURRENT THREATS AND TECHNOLOGY

intercept, several dozen pebbles would be needed in orbit for

every missile that might need to be destroyed (see table 2-1).57
Even more futuristic weapons are being contemplated by
defense planners. For example, space-to-Earth kinetic energy
attack weapons could also be of interest. The basic science of
these types of vehicles is not particularly challenging. However,
a dedicated program to create the appropriate types of aerody-
namic vehicles would be needed, as would testing. It would be
necessary either to develop objects that would fall predictably
through the atmosphere without deviating from planned trajec-
tories or burning up, or to develop an aerial vehicle that could
fly to its destination once it had been decelerated. But orbiting
weapons and later deorbiting them does not offer advantages in
speed or cost or technological feasibility, compared, for exam-
ple, with ballistic missiles.58 Moreover, hypersonic missiles may
ultimately offer a less provocative alternative.59
Other new applications of existing technologies can be imag-
ined. To take an extreme example, notice of a large asteroid
headed toward Earth could require a dramatic response and
crash program, perhaps involving nuclear weapons aboard
long-range rockets.60 But in the shorter term, improving space
surveillance is probably the right way to begin to face this
unlikely, if extremely worrisome, concern.

Microsatellites and Satellite Swarms

Progress in electronics and computers, as well as improvements

in miniaturized boosters, have made possible increasingly small
satellites in recent years. These types of devices augur a whole
new era in satellite technology. One type of application could be
small, stealthy space mines that could position themselves near
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CURRENT THREATS AND TECHNOLOGY

other countries’ satellites, possibly even without being noticed,

awaiting commands to detonate and destroy the latter. They
could also use microwaves, small lasers, or even paint to disable
or destroy certain satellites. Moreover, they could be orbited
only as needed, permitting countries to develop ASAT capabil-
ities without having to place weapons in space until they wished
to use them.61
Most devices known as microsatellites weigh ten to one hun-
dred kilograms; nanosatellites are smaller, weighing one to ten
kilograms; picosatellites are even smaller.62 In recent years,
experimental picosatellites—devices weighing less than one
kilogram—have been orbited. Two have been put up by the
United States; there may be others in space as well, as yet unde-
tected. But it is microsatellites that are becoming prevalent. For
example, Germany, China, and the United States have all or-
bited satellites weighing about seventy kilograms, Brazil has put
up a satellite of just over 100 kilograms, and Thailand and Sur-
rey Satellite Technology in the United Kingdom have jointly
orbited a device weighing less than fifty kilograms.63 Advanced
microsatellite programs, designed largely for research purposes
but also for activities such as communications, are under way in
the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Russia, Israel,
Canada, and Sweden. Other countries collaborating with pri-
vate firms based in these locations include China and Thailand,
as noted above, as well as South Korea, Portugal, Pakistan,
Chile, South Africa, Singapore, Turkey, and Malaysia.64
Using microsatellites as ASATs may already be theoretically
within near-term reach for a number of countries. The maneu-
vering capability needed to approach a larger satellite through
a co-orbital technique is not sophisticated, especially if there is
no time pressure to attack quickly and the microsat can ap-
proach the larger satellite gradually. In June of 2000, for exam-
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CURRENT THREATS AND TECHNOLOGY

ple, the University of Surrey launched a five-kilogram nano-

satellite built for less than $1 million on a Russian booster (that
also carried a Russian navigation satellite and Chinese micro-
satellite). The nanosatellite then detached from the other sys-
tems and used an on-board propulsion capability to maneuver
and photograph the other satellites with which it had been
orbited.65 In early 2003, a thirty-kilogram U.S. microsat maneu-
vered to rendezvous with the rocket that had earlier boosted it
into orbit.66 Of course, these microsats were already near the
satellites they approached, by virtue of sharing a ride on the
same booster. But the principle of independent propulsion and
maneuvering is being established. Larger maneuvering space
mines quite likely are already within the technical reach of a
number of countries; smaller ones may be soon.67
Space mines could operate in a variety of ways. For example,
rather than using explosives, they could carry a high-powered
microwave device or the ability to generate a current of strong
electricity—or even spray paint. Large high-powered micro-
wave devices could theoretically produce trillions of watts of
energy, comparable to the U.S. power grid in output (for a very
brief moment). Small devices on microsats would be far less
powerful, but if maneuvered to the immediate proximity of a
satellite, potentially still quite harmful.
If attacked with such a space mine, be it large or small, the
United States might be able to determine its source by inferring
which rocket launch had at least roughly positioned the mine
near its own satellite. But this detective effort might only hap-
pen after the fact, meaning that the United States would proba-
bly not be able to prevent the attack. And a patient enemy
might be able to launch the microsat into a relatively distant
location (at a comparable altitude to its target) and gradually
position it properly for intercept, making such detective work
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CURRENT THREATS AND TECHNOLOGY

even harder. Electronically hardening satellites, as is commonly

done for GEO assets because of the intensity of radiation at
that altitude, could probably not protect against relatively mod-
est explosive charges. Most countries capable of sending 1,000-
kilogram nuclear payloads over intercontinental distances, or of
putting relatively large satellite payloads into LEO or MEO,
could probably accomplish this task.
The promise of small satellites for a number of applications
is real, even if it would be a mistake to assume extremely rapid
progress. Certainly, putting small objects into orbit is not a
challenge. Providing them with independent propulsion systems
capable of substantial maneuvers, as well as adequate guidance
packages and sensors to make them useful as ASAT devices,
would require work, even for the United States.68 But it is
clearly feasible.
Microsatellites may have benefits to the United States’ mili-
tary uses of space for reconnaissance and communications in
addition to their potential use as weapons. For example, large
antennas or large mirrors—which are very expensive and are
likely to remain so—might be replaced with a number of
smaller components acting as an array.69 They could in theory
maintain their positions precisely within the array, using navi-
gation devices and small on-board boosters. (Another approach
to reducing use of large, heavy antennas in the future would be
to replace structurally dense and solid devices with various
types of membranes and tethers that could be sufficient to
maintain a solid shape in the low-gravity reaches of space.)70
Challenges abound for the idea of satellite swarms, however.
Developing the necessary processing power for the signals col-
lected by the individual microsat components, as well as ensur-
ing the synchronization and positional accuracy of the individ-
ual components, are quite difficult tasks. This technology is in
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CURRENT THREATS AND TECHNOLOGY

its infancy and has a long way to go before being shown to be

practical, as the Air Force has recently acknowledged in slow-
ing a program, known as TechSat21, designed to investigate
this concept.71 Even if practical, it may not prove cost effective.
Indeed, even much simpler new satellite concepts are proving
difficult to realize. For example, the hope of building a Discov-
erer II constellation of several dozen satellites that would main-
tain constant coverage of all militarily significant parts of Earth’s
surface was predicated largely on the belief that satellites could
be built for $100 million each. Today, satellites of a similar size
cost closer to $1 billion, however, and again, evolution in exist-
ing technology seems highly unlikely to produce a tenfold (or
even twofold) reduction in costs.72 The Future Imagery Archi-
tecture (FIA) concept may produce its first launch only in 2007
or 2008, rather than 2006, and more than $3 billion had to be
added to the program’s expected price tag in 2003.73 The space-
based infrared system-high and SBIRS-low programs have each
more than doubled in cost since 1996 and continue to face sig-
nificant technical challenges with their infrared sensors, com-
munications systems, and weight. The former is designed princi-
pally for warning of missile launch, the latter for tracking
missiles and warheads in space for ballistic missile defense. First
launch has slipped from 2002 to 2007 for SBIRS-high, and for
the SSTS system (another, newer term for SBIRS-low), from
2004 to 2007. If these problems are harbingers of the difficulties
of developing much smaller satellites, their day is probably still
quite far off.74

Conclusion

The basic physics of the military use of space is challenging,

and change is not happening quickly in most major technology
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CURRENT THREATS AND TECHNOLOGY

sectors. Rocket boosters are only slightly improved from those

of two or three decades ago, space-based lasers appear a distant
and very expensive prospect, space-to-Earth weapons have lim-
ited intrinsic appeal, even if they probably could be built. But
some areas of technology, such as high-energy lasers and
microsatellites, are developing quickly enough that they could
substantially change the basic backdrop for making military
space policy in the coming decade or so. And existing tech-
nologies are spreading to many more users, as well.
 CHAPTER FOUR

A FUTURE TAIWAN
STRAIT CONFLICT

Preceding chapters have summarized the state of debate

over the future military uses of space, the use of space
today for civilian and military purposes, and trends in
underlying technologies that are likely to change the pol-
icy backdrop in coming years. To bring these various con-
siderations together prior to considering future policy
options for the United States in chapter 6, it is helpful to
analyze a specific scenario in which military space assets
could play a critical role. This chapter considers one such
possibility: a war between the United States and China
over Taiwan, set in the period 2010 to 2015.
Other countries could also pose concerns to the United
States at that time, of course. For example, Iran is report-
edly already considering its own reconnaissance satellite.1
But a China scenario is perhaps the most challenging to
the United States, given that country’s resources, the
extent of its interest in space, and its awareness of Amer-
ican capabilities in space. Consideration of this scenario

91
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A TAIWAN STRAIT CONFLICT

does not suggest it is likely; indeed, there is good reason to

think China and the United States will avoid military competi-
tion in the years ahead and gradually improve their relations.
But a prudent military planner must recognize the possibility of
crisis over Taiwan, nonetheless.
The following issues are of greatest interest. Would China
have a meaningful ability to impede U.S. warfighting goals using
antisatellite weapons? Might the United States need ASATs to
prevent China from tracking valuable large assets, such as air-
craft carriers? And how important would all these issues be in
the context of the overall military balance?
This chapter’s central answer to these questions is sobering,
yet not alarmist. China may well have the ability to impede the
United States’ use of satellites within a decade or so. It could
likely jam some commercial communications satellites on which
the U.S. armed forces increasingly depend in wartime. It could
almost surely threaten low-Earth orbit imaging satellites with at
least one of several possible types of weapons—nuclear-tipped
missiles (a real concern, since they could be used in space with-
out killing many people, if any), lasers, and possibly microsatel-
lites. It may be able to threaten a small number of key military
satellites in geosynchronous orbit as well—such as American
electronic eavesdropping devices—with microsatellites. In addi-
tion, China could well be capable of finding and targeting large
American military assets such as aircraft carriers, at least occa-
sionally, using its own space assets and command/control net-
works. It could do so perhaps via the periodic overflight of an
imaging satellite, which might be able to keep a carrier in its
field of view long enough to get coordinates to a cruise missile
launched from a submarine or aircraft. Or it might use a con-
stellation of radar reconnaissance satellites more akin to what
the Soviet Union used to employ.2 (It is not trivial to build such
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A TAIWAN STRAIT CONFLICT

constellations and make them work—malfunctions reportedly

prevented the Soviets from monitoring the 1982 Falklands War,
for example, despite considerable investment—but the technol-
ogy is well established and understood.)3
At the same time, the United States need not be immediately
and equally concerned about all of these potential threats. Nei-
ther the China-Taiwan scenario described below nor any other
justifies the use of the term “space Pearl Harbor.” The threats
that are most likely to become imminent can be countered by
improving and hardening certain U.S. satellite capabilities (as
discussed further in chapter 6) and by ensuring adequate air-
borne breathing backups to satellites. The ability to threaten
Chinese satellites, should any need arise, can be ensured by
continuing U.S. programs for jamming PRC communications
links and, as a hedge, by proceeding as planned with missile
defense programs that have latent ASAT capability. That
would allow for rapid adaptation of missile defense systems to
antisatellite weapons, should that become necessary. However,
it is not necessary at present, and sufficient warning can be
expected to allow for policy response, should that become
imperative.

China’s Current Military Capabilities

China’s military has many weaknesses, and the threat it poses

can be exaggerated. That said, China will improve its military
and could well be a future security challenge to the United
States. Moreover, any conflicts that pitted China against the
United States would probably occur close to the PRC’s shores,
giving China a number of advantages. Finally, the Taiwan issue
remains of great concern to China and is capable of again dete-
riorating into crisis, given views in Taipei and Beijing.
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A TAIWAN STRAIT CONFLICT

China has the world’s largest military, by far. It roughly ties

with Russia, Japan, the United Kingdom, and France for the
claim to second greatest level of military spending in the world.4
That conclusion is based on the most widely accepted estimates
of its actual expenditures (as opposed to its misleadingly low
official figures). Taiwan has a much smaller, and considerably
less expensive, military—but is still about tenth in the world in
total defense spending, and its reserve forces are actually larger
than those of China. Taiwan’s troops are generally better edu-
cated, trained, and equipped than China’s, even though they fall
short by some standards themselves.
China’s military has traditionally focused on internal and
border security much more than on foreign operations. Of
China’s nearly 2 million ground troops, only about 20 percent
are considered by the Pentagon to be mobile, even within main-
land China itself. Considerably fewer could deploy abroad,
given their dearth of logistics assets (for example, trucks, con-
struction and engineering equipment, mobile depots and hospi-
tals, and fuel-storage infrastructure). Even though Taiwan is
only about 100 miles away from mainland China, the fact that
it is separated by water further constrains the PRC’s ability to
project military power there. Few PRC troops could deploy
over water, given China’s very limited military airlift and sealift
capacity. Its seventy or so amphibious ships could move about
10,000 to 15,000 troops with their equipment, including per-
haps 400 armored vehicles; airlift could move another
6,000 troops, or perhaps somewhat more, counting the possi-
bility of helicopter transport as well.5
These shortfalls in transport and logistics would be magni-
fied by China’s other military weaknesses. Its training, and the
overall caliber of its armed forces, leave much to be desired.
Although Chinese military personnel are generally competent at
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A TAIWAN STRAIT CONFLICT

basic infantry skills, the armed forces do not tend to attract

China’s best, nepotism is prevalent, party loyalty is of para-
mount importance, most soldiers are semiliterate peasants serv-
ing short tours of duty, and a strong professional noncommis-
sioned officer corps is lacking. Combined-arms training, while
somewhat enhanced of late for elite rapid-reaction forces, is
infrequent, and joint service training remains rare. Specialized
assets, such as aerial refueling, electronic jamming, and com-
mand aircraft, are in short supply and of mediocre quality. The
Chinese military’s aspirations to conduct “local wars under
high-technology conditions” are far from being realized, and its
capabilities for taking advantage of the so-called revolution in
military affairs, while much ballyhooed, are in all likelihood
quite limited.6
These overall realities are unlikely to change soon. China’s
indigenous defense industry is of mediocre caliber. Much of the
country’s defense budget must be devoted to paying, training,
and supplying its large numbers of troops. For such reasons,
and given China’s limited defense resources—especially when
measured against such a large military—the Defense Intelli-
gence Agency estimates that only 10 percent of China’s armed
forces will have “late–cold war” equivalent hardware even by
2010. Its large attack submarine force includes only about a
dozen submarines that could be viewed as relatively modern—
and half of those, the nuclear-powered Han vessels, are rather
noisy and unreliable. The People’s Liberation Army Air Force
(PLAAF) is projected to add only twenty to thirty top-notch
fighter aircraft to its forces annually in the years ahead. More-
over, there are doubts about China’s ability to maintain and
effectively operate whatever modest number of advanced
fighter jets it is able to acquire.7 These facts cast doubt on
China’s ability to establish air superiority in a hypothetical war
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A TAIWAN STRAIT CONFLICT

against Taiwan even in five or ten years or to compete favorably

with Taiwanese ground forces, should China ever manage to
establish a toehold on a Taiwanese coast.
But China could be a threat to Taiwan for other reasons. It
could try to attack Taiwan with missiles, for example. A missile
strike seems rather plausible, given China’s ongoing buildup of
missiles near Taiwan and its ability to adjust rather precisely
the amount of force used with such weapons. However, assum-
ing that such missiles would be armed only with conventional
warheads, such an attack may not be particularly effective in
forcing Taiwan to capitulate. In fact, it might leave China with
no obvious next escalatory step—even as it probably unified the
Taiwanese people and increased their desire to resist.
A Chinese naval blockade of Taiwan could be more effec-
tive, threatening the sea routes on which the island’s economy
fundamentally depends. Even if the blockade is “leaky,” it
could convince many shippers not to risk the journey. Breaking
it would require a forcible convoy operation, as well as a de-
mining operation likely to remain beyond the capacity of Tai-
wan’s navy even in 2010 or 2015 and hence necessitating U.S.
involvement.8
On balance, the United States could handle the types of
threats that China might most plausibly pose in coming years.
It could not stop all missiles from striking Taiwan, of course,
but it would have a good chance of breaking a naval blockade.
Such a scenario would play out in the waters and airways of
the Western Pacific, where the United States and its allies are
strongest, rather than on the landmass of Asia. The United
States would still have difficulty handling the challenge and
could need a substantial fraction of its force structure (espe-
cially its naval and air capabilities) to prevail.9 Assuming no
escalation to nuclear warfare or to acts of state-sponsored ter-
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A TAIWAN STRAIT CONFLICT

rorism, it could probably win any battles with relatively lim-

ited loss of life and relatively little uncertainty about the out-
come. It could keep most of its key military assets in the waters
east of Taiwan. China would have a very difficult time getting
airplanes or submarines (not to mention surface ships) into
that region without having those assets preemptively destroyed
by the United States in time of war. And if it did not get such
military platforms into that region in considerable numbers,
China could not find or attack most U.S. assets—except, occa-
sionally, any smaller vessels that were escorting Taiwanese
ships into port.

The Role of Space in Future War

But what about the situation in 2010 or 2015? As the above

analyses and projections suggest, China is quite unlikely to have
a first-rate military by that point. However, China may not need
to approach U.S. capabilities to have a plausible chance—at
least in its own leaders’ eyes—of prevailing in war.
It is doubtful that trends in space capabilities or any other
aspect of defense modernization will radically alter the basic
military balance in the next decade or so. The size and caliber
of the U.S. military is sufficient that, even if China were able to
close the technological gap and have the potential to cause sub-
stantial losses to the United States in a war over Taiwan, the
American armed forces would still surely prevail. The United
States could lose a carrier or two and still maintain over-
whelming military superiority in the region.
But there is nonetheless a worrying feature of such a gradual
shift in the military balance. Given trends in military recon-
naissance, information processing, and precision-strike tech-
nologies, large assets such as aircraft carriers and land bases, on
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A TAIWAN STRAIT CONFLICT

which the United States depends, are likely to be increasingly

vulnerable to attack in the years ahead. Land bases can to an
extent be protected, hardened, and made more numerous and
redundant, but ships are a different matter. How fast, and
whether, China can exploit these trends remains unclear, as
noted above. But the trends are real nonetheless.10 As a recent
example, China reportedly tested an antiship cruise missile that
proved to have twice the range originally expected by U.S. intel-
ligence—155 miles.11 And its space assets are surely growing in
scope. Even if it does not have an extensive imaging satellite
network in a decade or so, it may be able to orbit one or two re-
connaissance satellites that could occasionally detect large ships
near Taiwan. That might be good enough. If China could find
major U.S. naval assets with satellites, it would only need to
sneak a single airplane or ship or submarine into the region east
of Taiwan to have a good chance of sinking a ship.
Knowing the U.S. reluctance to risk casualties in combat,
China might convince itself that its plausible ability to kill many
hundreds or even thousands of U.S. military personnel in a sin-
gle attack would deter the United States from entering into the
war in the first place. Such a perception by China might well be
wrong (just as Argentina was wrong to think in 1982, in a
somewhat analogous situation, that it could deter Britain from
deciding to take back the Falkland Islands); but it could still be
quite dangerous, given the resulting risks of deterrence failure
and war.
China is certainly taking steps to improve its capabilities in
space operations. According to the Pentagon’s latest assessment,
“Exploitation of space and acquisition of related technologies
remain high priorities in Beijing. China is placing major empha-
sis on improving space-based reconnaissance and surveillance.
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A TAIWAN STRAIT CONFLICT

. . . China is cooperating with a number of countries, including

Russia, Ukraine, Brazil, Great Britain, France, Germany, and
Italy, in order to advance its objectives in space.” China will
also surely focus on trying to neutralize U.S. space assets in any
future such conflict; no prudent military planner could do any-
thing else. According to the Pentagon,

Publicly, China opposes the militarization of space, and

seeks to prevent or slow the development of anti-satellite
(ASAT) systems and space-based ballistic missile defenses.
Privately, however, China’s leaders probably view
ASATs—and offensive counterspace systems, in general—
as well as space-based missile defenses as inevitabilities.
. . . Given China’s current level of interest in laser technol-
ogy, Beijing probably could develop a weapon that could
destroy satellites in the future. . . . A Hong Kong newspa-
per article in January 2001 reported that China had devel-
oped and tested an ASAT system described as a “parasitic
microsatellite.”12

Exactly how many U.S. satellites, and of what type, China

might be able to damage or destroy is hard to predict. But it
seems likely that low-altitude satellites as well as higher-altitude
commercial communications satellites would be vulnerable.
Low-altitude imaging satellites are vulnerable to direct attack by
nuclear-armed missiles, at a minimum, by high-energy lasers on
the ground, and quite possibly by rapidly orbited or predeployed
microsatellites as well. They are sufficiently hardened that they
would have to be attacked one by one to ensure their rapid elim-
ination. And they are sufficiently capable of transmitting signals
through or around jamming that China probably could not stop
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A TAIWAN STRAIT CONFLICT

their effective operation in that way. But they are few enough in
number, and sufficiently valuable, that China might well find the
means to go after each one.
For higher-altitude military satellite constellations, including
GPS, military communications, and electronic intelligence sys-
tems, China’s task would be much harder. Such constellations
often have greater numbers of satellites than do low-altitude
imagery systems. They are probably out of range of most plau-
sible laser weapons, as well as ballistic missiles carrying nuclear
weapons. They might, however, be reached by microsatellites
deployed as hunter-killer weapons, particularly if those micro-
sats had been predeployed (a few might be orbited quickly just
before a war, but launch constraints could limit their number,
since microsats headed to different orbits would probably re-
quire different boosters).
Finally, high-altitude commercial communications satellites
are quite likely to be vulnerable. Their transmissions to Earth
might well be interrupted for a critical period of hours or days
by jamming or a nuclear burst in the atmosphere. For example,
disruption of UHF radio signals due to a nuclear burst can last
for many hours over a ground area of hundreds or even thou-
sands of kilometers per dimension. Unhardened satellites might
be damaged by a large nuclear weapon even at distances of
20,000 to 30,000 kilometers.13 They might even be vulnerable
to laser blinding.
So it appears that China will remain quite far behind the
United States in military capability, relatively rudimentary in
its space capabilities, and lacking in sophisticated electronic
warfare techniques and similar means of disrupting command
and communications. But it could hamper some satellite oper-
ations. And it could have an “asymmetric capability” to find,
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A TAIWAN STRAIT CONFLICT

target, and attack U.S. Navy ships (not to mention commercial

ships trying to survive the postulated blockade of Taiwan).
Some might argue that the above analysis overstates the
potential role of satellites. For example, even if China would
have a hard time getting aircraft close enough to track U.S.
ships, given American air supremacy, it might have other
means. For example, it may be able to use a sea-based acoustic
network. Most probably such a system would be deployed on
the seabed, as with the U.S. SOSUS array.14 On that logic, China
may have so many options and capabilities that it need not
depend on any one type, such as space assets.
Or China may not be able to make good use of any improve-
ments it can achieve in its satellite capabilities. To use a recon-
naissance-strike complex to attack a U.S. carrier, one needs not
only periodic localization of the carrier, but real-time tracking
and dissemination of that information to a missile that is capa-
ble of reaching the carrier and defeating its defenses. The recon-
naissance-strike complex must also be resilient in the face of
enemy action. The PRC is not close to having such a capability,
either its constituent parts or as part of an integrated real-time
network.
But the case for concern in general, and for special concern
about Chinese satellite capabilities, is still rather strong. If
China does improve its satellite capabilities for imaging and
communications, the United States could be quite hard-pressed
to defeat them without ASAT capabilities. Destroying ground
stations could require deep inland strikes—and may not work if
China builds mobile stations. The sheer size of the PRC also
makes it difficult to jam downlinks; the United States cannot
flood all of China continuously with high-energy radio waves
(though it may be able to jam links to antiship cruise missiles
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A TAIWAN STRAIT CONFLICT

already in flight, if it can detect them, it would be imprudent to

count on this defense alone). Jamming uplinks may be difficult
as well, if China anticipates the possibility and develops good
encryption technology or a satellite mode of operations in
which incoming signals are ignored for certain periods of time.
Jamming any PRC radar-imaging satellites may work better,
since such satellites must transmit and receive signals continu-
ously to function. But that method would work only if China
relied on radar, as opposed to optical, systems.
In regard to the argument that China could use SOSUS arrays
or other such capabilities to target U.S. carriers, making satel-
lites superfluous, it should be noted that the United States has
potential means for countering any such efforts. To deploy a
fixed sonar array in the vast waters east of Taiwan where U.S.
ships would operate in wartime, China would need to predeploy
sensors in a region many hundreds of kilometers on a lateral
dimension at least. This could be technically quite difficult in
such deep waters. Although the United States has laid sonar sen-
sors in waters more than 10,000 feet deep, the procedure is usu-
ally carried out remotely from a ship or by a special submarine,
and hence is increasingly difficult as depth increases.15 In addi-
tion, the United States would have a very good chance of recog-
nizing what China was doing. Even though peacetime protocols
would prohibit preemptive attacks, the United States could be
expected to know where many of China’s underwater assets had
been deployed, allowing attacks of one kind or another in
wartime. The United States is devoting considerable assets to
intelligence operations in the region already, for example, with
its attack submarine force.16 It would similarly have a good
chance of detecting and destroying Chinese airborne platforms,
including even small UAVs, used for reconnaissance purposes.
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A TAIWAN STRAIT CONFLICT

On balance, growing Chinese satellite capabilities for target-

ing and communications could be an important ingredient in
what Beijing might take (or mistake) for a war-winning capa-
bility in the future. China would not need to think it had
matched the U.S. armed forces in most military categories, only
that it had an asymmetric ability to pose greater risks to the
United States than Washington might consider acceptable in the
event of a future Taiwan Strait crisis.
China might also have means to attack U.S. space assets, par-
ticularly lower-flying reconnaissance satellites, by 2010 or
2015. It is not entirely out of the question that China might use
a nuclear weapon to do so, knowing that such a strike might
greatly weaken U.S. military capabilities without killing many,
if any, Americans. China attaches enough political importance
to holding onto Taiwan that it might well prove quite willing to
run some risk of escalation in order to do so—especially if its
leaders thought they had deduced a clever way to escalate with-
out inviting massive retaliation. Whether it could disrupt or
destroy most satellites is unclear; whether it could reach large
numbers of GPS and communications assets in medium-Earth
orbit and geosynchronous orbit is doubtful. But for this and
other reasons it is also doubtful that the United States could
operate its space assets with impunity, or count on completely
dominating military space operations, in such a scenario.

Conclusion

The United States is not in danger of falling behind China,

Iran, or any other country in military capability in the coming
years and decades. And its own capabilities will probably
grow, in absolute terms, faster than those of any other country.
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A TAIWAN STRAIT CONFLICT

But its relative position could still suffer in a number of mili-

tary spheres, including space-related activities. Its satellites will
be less dependable in conflict than they are today, or have been
in recent years; other countries may also mimic the U.S. ability
to use satellites and accompanying ground assets for targeting
and real-time attack missions. The trends are not so unfavor-
able or so rapid as to require urgent remedial action; indeed,
the United States has military and political reasons to show re-
straint in most areas of space weaponry. But passive defensive
measures should be expanded and some potential offensive
capabilities investigated so as to retain the option of weap-
onizing them in the future, if necessary. These topics are the
subjects of chapter 6.
 CHAPTER FIVE

ARMS CONTROL
IN SPACE

Should the United States agree to restraints on the future

military uses of outer space, and in particular the
weaponization of outer space? That is, should it sign
treaties prohibiting the testing, deployment, or use of
weapons in space or of Earth-based weapons that might
be used against objects in space? And in cases where
treaties do not make sense, could less formal approaches
be useful?
Any formal treaties would probably have to be multi-
lateral. It makes little sense to consider bilateral treaties
because it is unclear which country would be the other
party. At this point, any space treaty worth the effort to
negotiate would probably have to include as many other
space-faring countries as possible, ranging from Russia to
European powers to China to India to Japan. The fact
that any accords would be multilateral does not mean
that they should be negotiated under the auspices of the
United Nations. There is a strong and perhaps ideological

105
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ARMS CONTROL IN SPACE

pro–arms control bias in the UN forums where many space

arms control discussions have occurred to date. In addition, it
appears that some countries may be using those forums to em-
barrass the United States rather than genuinely to pursue long-
term accords to promote international stability. The United
Nations might ultimately be involved to bless any such treaty,
but it might be best to negotiate it in some other context. Rus-
sia and China have recently expressed more flexibility on the
format of any possible talks, no longer insisting on formal
negotiations leading to a treaty at the Conference on Disarma-
ment.1 But one must still decide if such treaties are worth nego-
tiating in the first place.
The question of space arms control tends to elicit immediate
reactions from the left and the right—the former for, the latter
against most restraints. However, the subject is important
enough, and complex enough, to merit more than an instinctive
reaction. Treaty skeptics may at least want to consider bans on
certain kinds of space-based weapons that the United States
would be unlikely ever to use, such as antisatellite weapons pro-
ducing large amounts of debris. They also may wish to ask
themselves if unilateral, informal, and temporary restraints on
U.S. space activities could advance American interests by help-
ing to preserve the space status quo—in which weaponization is
absent and the United States benefits from unrivaled targeting
and communications assets in orbit. Treaty proponents may not
want to put themselves in the position of supporting accords
that are inherently unverifiable or easy to circumvent in other
ways. Many other aspects of the possible weaponization of
space merit careful attention as well.
This chapter briefly categorizes, summarizes, and assesses the
various main options in space arms control that the United
States and the international community might consider in the
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ARMS CONTROL IN SPACE

future. Only a couple of them merit strong American support at

this point, in my judgment. But those couple may be important
and should be seriously pursued. Specifically, the case is per-
suasive for an arms control accord banning debris-causing anti-
satellite tests in space. A more informal code of conduct that
would discourage testing of any ASAT weapon against any
satellite for the foreseeable future also makes sense, though this
accord should not be formal or permanent, since circumstances
may someday change. The United States should also consider
revising its space doctrine to forswear near-term development
of dedicated ASAT systems, even short of testing. And a debate
on whether to permanently ban space-to-Earth weapons should
also begin; this is a sufficiently futuristic matter that urgent
attention is not required, however.
Ideas for space arms control may be grouped into three
broad categories. First are outright prohibitions of indefinite
duration. The existing Outer Space Treaty’s bans on nuclear
weapons in space and military colonies in space are examples
of this type of accord. Prohibitions can be broad. They can also
be specific—such as bans on the testing or deployment of anti-
satellite weapons above certain altitudes or bans on destructive
ASATs that would produce long-lasting space debris. This cat-
egory might also include broad bans of temporary duration.
Second are confidence-building measures, such as advance
notifications of space launches and keep-out zones around
deployed satellites. Third are informal understandings, worked
out in talks or more likely established through the unilateral
but mutual actions of major state powers. An example might
be a decision to forgo the testing and deployment—and per-
haps even the development—of dedicated ASATs for the fore-
seeable future (table 5-1 sets out means of verification to mon-
itor such an ASAT test ban).
Table 5-1. Current and Potential National Technical Means of Verification for Monitoring a Comprehensive ASAT Test Ban
Current means of verification Potential means of verification
Ground- Space- Space-
based based long based Gamma
Reconnais- Signals- Ground- electro- wavelength multi- ray
ASAT sance intelligence based optical infrared spectral spectrom-
type satellites systems radar systems sensors imagers eters
Ground-based Launch site Telemetry; Maneuvers; Maneuvers; Maneuvers; n.a. n.a.
kinetic energy activity command impact impact impact
weapon and control debris debris debris
Ground-based high- Test site n.a. Debris Debris Thermal Thermal n.a.
energy laser activity radiation radiation
Conventional space n.a. Telemetry; Maneuvers; Maneuvers; Maneuvers; n.a. n.a.
mine command impact impact impact
and control debris debris debris
Nuclear space mine n.a. Telemetry; Maneuvers Maneuvers Maneuvers Gamma Gamma
command radiation radiation
and control
Space-based high- Functionally Telemetry; Functionally Functionally Thermal Thermal n.a.
energy laser related char- command related char- related char- radiation radiation
acteristics and control acteristics acteristics
Space-based neutral Functionally Telemetry; Functionally Functionally n.a. n.a. Gamma
particle beam related char- command related char- related char- radiation
acteristics and control acteristics acteristics from target
Source: Paul B. Stares, Space and National Security (Brookings, 1987), p. 164.
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ARMS CONTROL IN SPACE

Prohibitions

One type of arms control accord on activities in space would be

quite comprehensive—no testing, production, or deployment of
ASATs of any kind, whether based in space or on the ground, at
any time; no Earth-attack weapons in space, ever; with formal
treaties of permanent duration codifying these prohibitions.
These ideas are in line with proposals made by the Chinese and
Russian delegations to the UN Conference on Disarmament in
Geneva. They also are made by arms control proponents, such
as Ambassador Jonathan Dean, who believe that space should
be a sanctuary from weaponization and that the Outer Space
Treaty already strongly suggests as much.2
There are three main problems with such ideas, however. To
begin with, it is difficult to be sure that other countries’ satellite
payloads are not ASATs. This is especially true in regard to
microsatellites, which are hard to track. Some have proposed
inspections of all payloads going into orbit, but this would not
prevent “breakout,” in which a country on the verge of war
would simply refuse to abide by these provisions. Since micro-
sats can be tested for maneuverability without making them
look like ASATs, it will be difficult to preclude this scenario. A
similar problem arises with the idea of banning certain types of
experimentation, such as all outdoor experiments or flight test-
ing.3 A laser can be tested for beam strength and pointing accu-
racy as a ballistic missile defense device, without being identi-
fied as an ASAT. A microsat can be tested for maneuverability
as a scientific probe, even if its real purpose is different, since
maneuvering microsats capable of colliding with other satellites
may have no visible features indicating this intent. Bans on out-
door testing of declared ASAT devices would do little to impede
development of such capabilities.
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ARMS CONTROL IN SPACE

Second, in a broader sense it is not possible to prevent certain

types of weapons designed for ballistic missile defense from
being used as ASATs. This can be considered a problem of ver-
ification. But in fact, the issue is less of verification, per se, than
of knowing the intent of the country building these systems—
and ensuring that that intent never changes. This is unrealistic.
In other words, some systems designed for missile defense have
inherent ASAT capabilities and will retain them, due to the laws
of physics, regardless of what arms control prohibitions are
developed, and countries possessing these missile defenses will
recognize these latent capabilities.4 For example, the American
midcourse missile defense system and the airborne laser would
both clearly have inherent capabilities against low-Earth orbit
satellites if given good information on a satellite’s location and
perhaps some software modifications. The United States could
declare for the time being that it will not link these missile
defense systems to space surveillance networks or give them the
necessary communications and software capabilities to accept
such data. But such restraints, while currently worthwhile as
informal, nonbinding measures (see below), cannot be easily
verified and can be easily reversed. Thus no robust, long-term
formal treaty regime should be based upon them. Indeed, the
problem goes beyond missile defense systems. Even the space
shuttle, with its ability to maneuver and approach satellites in
LEO, has inherent ASAT potential. So do any country’s nuclear
weapons deployed atop ballistic missiles. Explicit testing in
ASAT modes can be prohibited, but could also have limited
meaning.
Third, it is not clear that the United States will always bene-
fit militarily from an ASAT ban. The scenario considered in
chapter 4 involving a war in the Taiwan Strait is a good exam-
ple of how, someday, the United States could be put at serious
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ARMS CONTROL IN SPACE

risk by another country’s satellites. This day is not near, and

there are many possible ways to deal with the worry in the near
term other than by developing destructive ASATs. But over
time, the need for such a weapon cannot be ruled out.
Finally, consider the longer-term question of Earth-attack
weapons based in space. Most such weapons would probably
require considerable testing, given the realities and difficulties
of atmospheric reentry. That means that prohibitions might
well be verifiable. Furthermore, prohibitions on such weapons
may cost the United States little, since it will retain other pos-
sible recourses to delivering weapons quickly over long dis-
tances. The most powerful argument against banning ground-
attack weapons in space is that they are a long-term prospect,
the need for which cannot be easily assessed now. But the
United States can probably make do without them, or find
alternatives. So, a ban may someday make sense but is not an
immediate priority.
A number of specific ASAT prohibitions, fairly narrowly
construed, are worth considering as well. They could be care-
fully tailored so as not to preclude development of various
capabilities in the future. But they could also help reassure other
countries about U.S. intentions at a time of still-unsettled great
power relations, and help protect space from excessive debris or
other hazards to safe use over the longer term. Such measures
could include
—temporary prohibitions, possibly renewable, on the devel-
opment, testing, and deployment of ASATs or Earth-attack
weapons,
—bans on testing or deployment of ASATs above certain
altitudes,
—bans on debris-producing ASATs, and
—prohibitions against first use of ASATs and space weapons.
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ARMS CONTROL IN SPACE

Temporary formal treaty prohibitions would be no more ver-

ifiable than permanent bans. But they could make sense in cer-
tain situations.
There are downsides to signing accords from which one might
very well withdraw, of course. If and when the United States
could no longer support the prohibitions, it would likely suffer in
the court of international public opinion by its unwillingness to
extend the accord—even if it was specifically designed as non-
permanent. The United States’ experience with the ABM Treaty
suggests that the damage from such decisions can be limited.
President Bush was able to withdraw from the ABM Treaty with-
out worsening U.S.-Russian ties, given that there were sound
strategic arguments that the case for missile defense had changed
fundamentally and strengthened greatly in the thirty years since
the treaty had been signed. That said, it is hard to withdraw from
treaties, suggesting that, on balance, the United States should not
sign most accords that it already knows to be temporary.
Bans on debris-producing ASATs do make sense, and could
well be codified by binding international treaty of indefinite
duration. Destructive testing of weapons such as the Clinton
midcourse missile defense system or other hit-to-kill or explo-
sive devices against objects in satellite orbital zones would not
only increase the risk of an ASAT competition. It would also
create debris in LEO regions that would remain in orbit indefi-
nitely (unless the testing occurred in what are effectively the
higher parts of Earth’s atmosphere, where air resistance would
ultimately bring down debris, and few, if any, satellites fly in
any case). The U.S. military worries about this effect of debris-
producing weapons. Tests of the midcourse system to date have
occurred at altitudes of roughly 140 miles, producing debris
that de-orbits within roughly twenty minutes, but future tests
will be higher. A ceiling of perhaps 300 miles might be placed
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ARMS CONTROL IN SPACE

on such tests, and a ban imposed on using targets that are in

orbit.
Another possible type of treaty regime might ban testing and
deployment of all types of ASATs, even those that do not pro-
duce debris, above a certain altitude. The natural cutoff region
might be around 1,000 kilometers above Earth’s surface. This is
roughly the ceiling for the flight trajectory of ballistic missile
warheads. It is also roughly the distance at which laser beams
like the ABL begin to become rather weak. By creating such a
ceiling, satellites located at heights of a few thousand kilometers
should enjoy considerable protection.5 This approach suffers
from most of the same problems as complete ASAT prohibi-
tions. Its stipulations are largely unverifiable, given the poten-
tial of microsats, in particular, to be developed and tested under
false pretenses. Its terms may not even be strategically advanta-
geous for the United States, over time.
A ban on the actual use, and particularly the first use, of
ASAT systems could be considered as well. The downside of
this approach is that in a war in which satellites are being used
for tactical warfighting purposes, it is not clear why they should
be given sanctuary—and dubious that they would be. On bal-
ance, this idea does not seem worthwhile. The ban on debris-
causing activities is the main possible prohibition that seems
sound today.

Confidence-Building Measures

Another category of arms accords includes those that do not

limit the weapons capabilities of states, but instead seek to
establish mechanisms for the use of their assets. The goals
would be to reduce tension, improve communications, calm
nerves, and build safety mechanisms into the military use of
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ARMS CONTROL IN SPACE

outer space. This approach would build on some of the meas-

ures the nuclear superpowers took to reduce the potential for
unintentional nuclear confrontation during the cold war, in-
cluding the 1972 Incidents at Sea accord and agreements to set
up communications hotlines.6 Here the stakes might not be so
great, but they could still be great enough to justify some
straightforward measures and rules of the road.
One such idea is that of keep-out zones around deployed
satellites. The concept here is that there is no reason for a satel-
lite to approach within a few tens of kilometers, or in some
orbits even within hundreds of kilometers, of another satellite.
Any close approach can be assumed to have hostile purposes
and thus ruled out as an acceptable action.
What real strategic purpose would be served by such zones?
Unless satellites were given self-defense capabilities—tough to
distinguish from those of offensive ASATs—they could not be
enforced. And any country wishing to develop a close-approach
capability for the purposes of ultimately launching a large-scale
ASAT surprise attack could do so despite the existence of keep-
out zones, by testing against its own space assets or even against
empty points in space.
That said, keep-out zones may still make sense, even though
they would not constitute a substantial limitation on military
capabilities. Creating such zones would add another step that
any state undertaking an attack would have to build into its
plan. ASATs could not easily be predeployed near other satel-
lites without arousing suspicion (especially if the United States
and other countries deployed satellites with sensors capable of
monitoring their neighborhoods). Any state violating the keep-
out zones would alert the targeted country to its likely inten-
tions; conversely, respecting the zones would constitute a form
of restraint that could calm nerves to some modest but perhaps
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ARMS CONTROL IN SPACE

worthwhile degree. On balance, this idea is sound, though not

worth a great deal of top-level time to negotiate.
What of advance notice of space launches? Again, this type
of accord, such as that reached between the United States and
Russia during the Clinton administration, would not prevent a
country from breaking out of the accord suddenly. It would not
constitute a meaningful constraint on capabilities. But as long
as it was observed, countries would have additional reassurance
that others were playing by the rules. They would also have
time to prepare to observe the deployment of satellites from any
launch, allowing slightly greater confidence that ASATs were
not being deployed. As a peacetime rule of the road, at least, it
makes sense.
Some have also suggested allowing international monitor-
ing of space payloads prior to their launch.7 This idea seems
more questionable, though, since satellites could effectively
function as ASATs without carrying payloads that were obvi-
ously offensive.
On balance, several of these confidence-building measures
seem marginally useful. They will not prevent the United States
from retaining its hedges against some future need for ASATs,
whether in the form of dual-purpose ballistic missile defense
programs or even a dedicated antisatellite system. They will not
prevent China or another country from quietly building inher-
ent ASAT capability. But they will add an extra step or two that
other countries choosing to weaponize space would need to
undertake before threatening American interests.

Informal Unilateral Restraints

A final category of arms control measures would not involve

arms control at all—in the formal sense of signed treaties and
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ARMS CONTROL IN SPACE

binding commitments—but unofficial and unilateral restraints.

The idea would not be for the United States to tie one hand
behind its back while other countries were free to pursue space
weapons. Rather, the hope would be to encourage countries to
show mutual restraint by setting a precedent and a tone
through U.S. action. To the extent some countries did not show
restraint, the policy could then be reconsidered.
This approach has a number of precedents in international
affairs. For example, countries showed restraint by not using
chemical weapons in World War II, even though there was no
formal agreement to avoid these terrible agents. More recently,
the United States reduced the alert levels of some nuclear forces
and took tactical nuclear weapons off naval vessels in the first
Bush administration, in part to encourage similar Soviet
actions, which then followed.8 And even in the absence of rati-
fication of the nuclear test ban treaty, almost all countries have
continued to respect a moratorium on testing.
Informal restraint can work more quickly than formal arms
control. It can also preserve flexibility for the future, should cir-
cumstances change. If the United States would have ample time
to change its policy in the event other countries failed to coop-
erate, without harm to its security interests in the interim, there
is much to be said for this approach.
Since the United States is not at present building or deploy-
ing space weapons, a policy of informal restraint could easily
apply to research and development and testing activities. As one
example, if a treaty to prevent the creation of space debris
through testing of any ASAT could not be quickly negotiated,
the United States could make a pledge unilaterally to accom-
plish this goal.9 The flexibility associated with such a unilateral
pledge might permit the United States to go further and also
pledge not to create any ASAT that would ever create such
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ARMS CONTROL IN SPACE

debris, given that even if it needs a future ASAT it would have

alternative technological options. (On a related but nonweap-
ons matter, it may also be worthwhile to consider requiring
commercial satellite builders to de-orbit old LEO satellites and
adopt other debris-mitigation measures as a condition for gain-
ing licenses to put objects into space.)10
The United States might also consider making a clear state-
ment that it has no dedicated ASAT programs and no intention
of initiating development or deployment of any. It could also
declare that it would not test any systems, including high-
powered lasers, microsatellites, and ballistic missile defenses, in
an ASAT mode. The latter approach would have the greatest
chance of eliciting verifiable reciprocation by other countries.
The downside to making such statements is that if and when
U.S. policy requirements changed, the statements would have to
be repudiated—raising alarm bells abroad and risking greater
diplomatic problems than if the United States had never held
itself to informal restraints. The advantage is that they might
buy the United States some time, allowing it to stigmatize space
weapons that it has no strategic interest in developing or seeing
developed anytime soon. All of these options are considered in
the final chapter of the book.
This page intentionally left blank
 CHAPTER SIX

PRESERVING
U.S. DOMINANCE
WHILE SLOWING THE
WEAPONIZATION
OF SPACE

As established in the preceding chapters, the basic back-

drop for devising future U.S. space policy is roughly as
follows. First, the United States increasingly uses space for
military purposes, particularly for tactical warfighting. It
will surely continue to increase its dependency on recon-
naissance, targeting, and communications satellites for
such activities. Second, although the United States in par-
ticular, and certain other countries to a lesser extent, have
militarized space in such ways, they have not yet weap-
onized space. That is, they have not placed weapons in
orbit or developed weapons designed to attack satellites.
Third, the ability of the United States and other coun-
tries to rely on space systems cannot be ensured indefi-
nitely. Already, the nuclear powers have ballistic missile
forces that constitute latent ASAT capabilities. The United
States, in particular, also is pursuing several ballistic mis-
sile defense programs; other countries may soon have sim-
ilar, if less technically advanced, capacity. For U.S. armed

119
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PRESERVING U.S. DOMINANCE

forces, of particular concern are inherent vulnerabilities in low-

altitude imaging satellites as well as commercial communica-
tions systems that a moderately capable adversary might even-
tually be able to exploit using microsatellites, lasers, or even
nuclear weapons. Fourth, other countries will gradually gain a
greater capability to use space for offensive military purposes.
In particular, they are likely to gain the capacity to find and tar-
get large mobile assets such as ships and major ground force
formations—if not continuously, at least sporadically.
Fifth and finally, more futuristic space capabilities, such as
space-to-Earth weaponry or large constellations of space-based
lasers for ballistic missile defense, are likely to remain futuristic.
But certain exotic concepts such as “brilliant pebbles” space-
based ballistic missile defense rockets may be feasible within a
decade or so—though their deployment in the numbers needed
for missile defense (even against a small threat) will likely re-
main extremely expensive and inadvisable on budgetary as well
as strategic grounds.
Basic technological and strategic realities argue for a moder-
ate and flexible U.S. military space policy. They argue against
two extreme positions that have been espoused by prominent
U.S. policymakers in recent years. The report of the Commis-
sion on Outer Space, which warned of a possible space “Pearl
Harbor” and implied that the United States needed to rapidly
take many steps—including offensive ones—to address such a
purportedly imminent risk, was alarmist. Most U.S. satellites
are not vulnerable to attack today and will probably not be in
the years ahead. Indeed, the director of the Defense Intelligence
Agency testified in early 2003 that even antisatellite methods
such as effective jamming, as well as kinetic and directed-energy
weapons, will not be easily and widely available in the next
ten years.1 Thereafter, many threats may be handled through
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PRESERVING U.S. DOMINANCE

relatively passive measures rather than an all-out space weap-

ons competition.
By racing to develop its own space weapons, the United
States would cause two unfortunate sets of consequences. Mil-
itarily, it would legitimate a faster space arms race than is other-
wise likely—something that can only hurt a country that effec-
tively monopolizes military space activities today. Second, it
would reinforce the current prevalent image of a unilateralist
United States, too quick to reach for the gun and impervious to
the stated will of other countries (as reflected in the huge major-
ity votes at the United Nations in favor of negotiating bans on
space weaponry). Among its other implications, this perception
can make it harder for the United States to oppose treaties that
it has good reasons to oppose—as was the case when the Bush
administration withdrew from the ABM Treaty. It can also be
harder for the United States to uphold international nonprolif-
eration norms if its own actions weaken its credibility in de-
manding that others comply with arms control regimes.
Conversely, the support for wide-ranging bans on space
weaponry in much of the arms control community is unjusti-
fied. Such accords would be generally unverifiable. They would
also be incapable of changing the simple fact that many ballis-
tic missile defense systems have inherent antisatellite potential
that could allow them to be transformed into antisatellite
weapons with relatively modest adjustments. This is a fact of
physics, not of policy, and cannot be changed. A similar con-
clusion applies to many space technologies, including the
increasingly prevalent microsatellites that are especially hard to
monitor.
Nor can the United States permanently forswear the need for
antisatellite capabilities. It does not need ASATs for now. That
said, it will not realistically be able to continue its monopoly on
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PRESERVING U.S. DOMINANCE

the current array of space technologies, which allows it to use

space assertively and confidently for military intelligence, com-
munications, and tactical warfighting while its potential ene-
mies cannot do so. And it needs to recognize that other coun-
tries are already interested in challenging America’s military
space monopoly, regardless of their political rhetoric on the
subject. While most may be a ways from advanced dedicated
ASAT systems—contradicting the sense of dire urgency of the
2001 Space Commission—they do already have nuclear-armed
ballistic missiles and small laser devices with at least some
inherent antisatellite potential.2 So a moderate and nuanced
policy, rather than an absolutist or ideological one, is the right
path for the United States to follow.

Hardening and Defending (or Doing without) U.S. Satellites

How can military satellites be protected? And to the extent pro-

tections are insufficient, how can backups be developed for pos-
sible emergency use in war? The basic fact of the matter is that
protection can be developed against a number of electronic
threats, but explosives are difficult to counter. As such, satellite
vulnerability is a physical fact of life. Moreover, the U.S. mili-
tary’s increasing dependence on commercial satellites for com-
munications means that it is now vulnerable to relatively simple
jamming as well.3
Several types of defensive responses can be imagined to
counter a growing vulnerability of American satellites. At the
simplest level, greater monitoring of space activities may be
desirable so that the United States will know with more confi-
dence if and when its satellites are being threatened. Greater
hardening and other passive defenses—against nuclear effects,
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PRESERVING U.S. DOMINANCE

lasers and artificial heating, homing microsatellites, jamming,

microwave weapons—would be next on the list. Then, some
simple satellite defenses, such as greater fuel capacity for ma-
neuvering and possible means of attacking homing enemy
microsatellites, could be envisioned. Ultimately, if and when it
was determined that all of the above could not reliably defend
U.S. space assets, further measures may be needed—ranging
from the capacity for rapid launching of replacement satellites
to airborne substitutes for satellites. (ASATs are discussed later.)
The specific recommendations that emerge from this analysis
are straightforward. First, military satellites should continue to
be hardened against nuclear effects, and where practical, more
should also employ radio transmission frequencies and signal
strengths capable of penetrating a nuclear-disturbed atmos-
phere. These recommendations should be straightforward to
implement; indeed, they already have been carried out for some
systems, such as MILSTAR. These measures will ensure at least
minimum levels of bandwidth even shortly after a nuclear
attack, though not necessarily enough for most tactical
warfighting purposes until the atmosphere begins to return to
normal.
Second, low-Earth orbit satellites should have sensors capa-
ble of detecting laser illumination and possibly other attack
mechanisms, as well as the means to protect themselves tem-
porarily against such attacks through shutter controls that
would shield their optics. (Someday, they may also need means
of shielding themselves from prolonged exposure from high-
energy lasers—Richard Garwin, for example, proposes a
deployable spinning “parasol” with the shiny side facing Earth
and the black side facing the satellite.) Such programs are
reportedly gaining support at the Pentagon.
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PRESERVING U.S. DOMINANCE

Third, despite such measures, it should be assumed that

many types of military satellites may not be available in future
war, and alternatives should therefore be maintained. This is
particularly true for lower-altitude assets.
Fourth, plans should be made in the event that commercial
communications satellites, which probably cannot be hardened
in any practical way, prove unavailable for warfighting. That
assumption should lead the U.S. military to devise means for
making do with much-reduced bandwidth in combat; it should
also buttress efforts to develop more dependable means of com-
munication, such as laser satellite constellations.

Improved Space Monitoring

The United States needs to know if its satellites are under
attack or likely soon to be under attack.4 Otherwise, notice may
only occur as multiple simultaneous satellite failures allow for
no other real possibility. Sensors can trigger the deployment of
shields or other protective measures against certain types of
threats, such as jammers or lasers. They may allow for satellite
maneuvers or other means of evading kinetic or explosive
attack, as discussed below. For example, if an enemy ASAT
were in reasonably close proximity, perhaps violating the
boundaries of a treaty-defined keep-out zone, it might be
defeated with high-energy short-range microwaves by a device
that would not necessarily constitute a more general ASAT
capability. But leaving aside the possible responses, which are
not urgently needed at present, space awareness is important on
several grounds and should be improved now.
Some U.S. satellites, including Defense Support Program
early-warning assets and National Reconnaissance Office imag-
ing satellites, already have some attack warning capability. But
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PRESERVING U.S. DOMINANCE

most U.S. satellites apparently do not.5 The U.S. space surveil-

lance network can track the movements of larger objects or
boosters, and that may suffice against homing space mines for
now. But at some future date, perhaps soon, satellites may need
their own warning of approaching microsats. And low-altitude
satellites should soon have sensors that would alert them to
artificial illumination by laser.

Greater Resilience to Jamming

It is generally fairly easy to jam the communications links of
satellites that have not been made resilient to such attacks. As
one example, at the Air Force Research Laboratory, engineers
“homebuilt” an effective jammer using about $7,500 worth of
goods bought at electronics and hardware stores.6 Similar de-
vices have been built elsewhere, such as Schriever Air Force
Base in Colorado. And Cuba recently interfered with the oper-
ations of a commercial communications satellite.7
A good deal of protection can be provided in this area, but it
is unlikely to be affordable for commercial satellites, on which
the U.S. military depends for many high-data-rate transmis-
sions, such as those needed in tactical targeting (even if not for
most high-level strategic command and control operations).
Such measures can require much higher power and can reduce
the flow of data substantially, fundamentally changing the eco-
nomics of commercial communications. Among its other impli-
cations, that fact heightens the importance of moving along
with the laser satellite communication system now under devel-
opment by the Department of Defense, which will provide
enormous bandwidth through the military’s own system.
But the military also needs to prepare for the possibility that it
may not have as much available communications bandwidth as
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PRESERVING U.S. DOMINANCE

it would like to have in future conflicts. The United States needs

to ensure some level of robust, survivable satellite communica-
tions. New DSCS satellites with bandwidths in the vicinity of
60 Mbps are a step in the right direction (well above the
MILSTAR capacities of 1 to 2 Mbps).8
Data transmission rates need to be minimized as much as pos-
sible. That can be accomplished through data compression tech-
niques that can transmit high-fidelity data with one-tenth the
bandwidth, or slightly degraded data at one-hundredth the band-
width, of standard means.9 It can also be done by maximizing the
amount of analysis done by the platform obtaining the data.10
Finally, the military needs to develop procedures for prioritizing
its use of satellites, so that it can make do with less capacity if
necessary. It may be necessary, for example, to reduce the use of
video teleconferencing, and to downlink UAV live-feed imagery
only to targeted receivers rather than throughout the battlefield.11
New GPS satellites with greater power will also be helpful to
counter jamming and should not be again postponed (the GPS 3
constellation is to begin deployment in 2011, according to cur-
rent plans).12 If possible, indeed, deployment should be has-
tened. For now, inertial guidance or other terminal guidance
may still be needed as a supplement to GPS for munitions used
against a foe capable of jamming operations.

Improved Electronic Hardening

Hardening against nuclear effects can require a thorough
shielding or redesign, to prevent an extremely intense and short
electronic pulse from finding a “back door” into a satellite.
Costs may grow by a few percent, up to perhaps 10 percent, as
a result, but for military satellites in particular, this would
hardly be onerous. If there has been any letup in such harden-
ing since the cold war ended, it should be rectified; it is scarcely
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PRESERVING U.S. DOMINANCE

beyond the realm of the conceivable that an enemy would

attack U.S. satellites with nuclear weapons.13
It is dubious that such hardening will ever be implemented
for most commercial satellites, however, again underscoring the
importance of not continuing to depend so greatly on such
capabilities for wartime purposes. Even if the government were
prepared to subsidize such hardening, commercial satellites
would remain vulnerable to jamming and to direct attack, call-
ing into question the value of the effort.
For military systems, however, hardening should be de rigeur.
It is important for low-Earth orbit systems, given their proxim-
ity to Earth-based threats.14 It is also desirable at higher alti-
tudes. Satellites in MEO are often already hardened, since nor-
mal Van Allen radiation is greater at such altitudes. But
standards may not be sufficiently demanding for all altitudes,
from what can be deduced through unclassified sources. If true,
that situation should be remedied.
There is yet another reason for radiation hardening, apart
from nuclear threats. Within perhaps fifteen years, countries
such as China could have the capacity to attack a variety of
satellites using high-powered microwaves. The basic physics of
radio-frequency weapons and high-powered microwave weap-
ons is not particularly complicated. The engineering challenges
associated with building devices that can emit very short pulses
of radio energy lasting perhaps just billionths of a second but
reaching billions of watts in power are considerable, but far
from insurmountable.15 As satellites are designed and produced
in the coming years, such possible enemy capabilities should
form part of the assumed future threat environment.16 Satellites
can be hardened against the electronic interferences created by
microwave weapons, largely by shielding their soft electronic
spots with a thin metal foil.
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PRESERVING U.S. DOMINANCE

Increased Defenses against Explosives

Physically shielding satellites from the effects of explosives
detonated as close as hundreds or dozens of meters, or even
fewer, is difficult, given the ability of a hunter-killer satellite or
space mine to approach arbitrarily close to a target satellite
before being detonated. It is probably simply not worth the
effort even to attempt such protection.
Could satellites maneuver, or be given self-defense weapons,
to evade hunter-killer satellites? (Decoys would be difficult to
employ effectively, given the size and electronic transmissions of
large, modern satellites.) If a small satellite can devote most of
its mass to fuel, it may be able to outmaneuver a large imaging
satellite. As a general proposition, such maneuvering may be
successful against simple ASATs with poor terminal guidance
but is likely to fail against small sophisticated ASATs.17 Perhaps
a larger satellite could be equipped with a small short-range
weapon to fire at such a device—something that would not cre-
ate space debris. Such concepts should be researched, to see if
defensive capabilities are feasible without at the same time
developing weapons indistinguishable from offensive ASATs in
their potential applications. Increased maneuvering capability
may not be a permanent solution, but it could buy the United
States time down the road and should be retained as an option,
albeit a costly one, given the corresponding fuel requirements.

Backup Satellite Capabilities and Alternatives to Satellites

If the United States could take the expensive but prudent step
of having some additional satellite capability in its inventory at
all times, together with the ability to launch and make opera-
tional such satellites quickly, it would mitigate its vulnerability
to antisatellite weapons. In particular, it would be better pre-
 129
PRESERVING U.S. DOMINANCE

pared against ASAT threats that were only capable of incapac-

itating a small number of its space assets.
Largely for this reason, Strategic Command would like to
gain the capacity to replenish satellites in orbit within days. It
hopes to have such an ability toward the end of the decade.18
However, since that goal was articulated in 1998, the United
States has not made rapid progress toward lowering launch or
satellite costs.
Regardless of progress on the rapid relaunch front, the
United States is probably entering an era when it should no
longer count on its satellites remaining safe and secure. It is
unlikely that any foe is close to having the ability to “clean up
the heavens,” systematically eliminating the dozens of GPS and
communications satellites on hand for U.S. military use when
needed. But satellites deployed now only in small numbers, such
as imaging and signals intelligence satellites, may more plausi-
bly be attacked. Over the long run, microsatellites or directed-
energy weapons may even put the large constellations at risk.
Although such a time is probably quite distant, the United
States should avoid blind optimism about the continued avail-
ability of all its satellite capabilities.
As a practical matter, this conclusion has several implications.
First, numerous airborne assets, particularly for imaging and sig-
nals intelligence, but also for targeting, guidance, and commu-
nications, should be in the force posture despite their nontrivial
cost. In some cases, for assets such as P-3 aircraft and EC-135
electronic reconnaissance aircraft, refurbishment or moderniza-
tion programs will be appropriate; in others, new and less
expensive assets (largely UAVs) make more sense. Second, addi-
tional backup capabilities, such as fiber-optic land lines and
undersea lines, should be retained in many regions of the world
to permit high-volume intercontinental communications even if
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satellites are lost. Third, naval fleets, ground-force units, and

aircraft should retain the ability to communicate internally
through line-of-sight and airborne techniques, so that battle
groups can always function as single entities, even if their access
to satellites is disrupted.

The Offensive Option: Antisatellite Weapons

Despite the wide range of available policy options in the defen-

sive realm, the United States may also need offensive military
capabilities in space at some point. It does not need them now.
But that could change.
Latent ASAT capabilities are already in the hands of many
U.S. rivals and foes, primarily in the form of nuclear-tipped bal-
listic missiles. Many countries capable of space launch could
also probably develop, in fairly short order, ASATs similar in
principle to the Soviet co-orbital interceptor concept developed
in the 1970s. To date they have not yet done so, as far as we
know, though it is remotely possible that a country could test
such a capability under the guise of putting a satellite into space
(by trying to guide it to a moving aimpoint following the tra-
jectory of a simulated satellite). Development of microsatellites
may give countries other, somewhat stealthier, options as well,
over time. This is not a trivial undertaking, but the technology
is advancing and can be expected to keep doing so. Microsatel-
lites might also be able to “sneak up” on other satellites gradu-
ally, using nitrogen jets rather than a rocket with its associated
plume for the final approach.19 Finally, ground-based directed-
energy systems, such as high-energy lasers, may be of concern,
too. All of these types of capabilities would be difficult to pro-
hibit using arms control arrangements and standard verifica-
tion tools. If other countries developed ASAT capabilities, a
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corresponding U.S. capability would probably be prudent as a

deterrent, if for no other reason.
In addition, it is conceivable that the United States would
wish to be the first to develop ASAT capabilities under certain
circumstances in the future. Specifically, if an enemy could plau-
sibly develop a war-winning capability, or even a notable mili-
tary advantage, through use of its own satellites, the United
States might decide that its security would be promoted by pos-
sessing ASATs. That might be true even if acquiring an ASAT
spurred other countries to develop similar capabilities that put
U.S. assets at risk.
As discussed in chapter 4, if in a future conflict near its
shores China had imaging satellites capable of finding U.S. air-
craft carriers and then passing targeting information to plat-
forms carrying long-range antiship missiles, U.S. aircraft carri-
ers might be put at acute risk. Oher countries might develop
similar capabilities, too. ASATs might then be seen as the only
way to make continued carrier operations in such waters feasi-
ble. Indeed, the United States might be willing to tolerate an
ASAT arms competition in which its own satellites were put at
greater risk in order to ensure incapacitation of the potential
enemy’s ability to strike large valuable American targets. This
would be particularly true if the United States heeded the above
advice about defensive measures and made sure its satellite
capabilities were hardened, redundant, and backed up with
nonorbiting assets that could take over the roles normally
played by satellites if need be. In such circumstances, as the
country projecting power, the United States might have a dis-
proportionate dependence on large and vulnerable military
assets; it would also probably have a greater ability to substitute
other types of command, control, communications, and intelli-
gence assets for satellites. So an ASAT competition might
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improve its prospects for decisive victory in such a war—and

hence also improve its ability to deter the conflict in the first
place—relative to an arrangement in which military space assets
were left free to operate.

The Pros and Cons of Weaponization

The above discussion is not meant to sanction the develop-
ment and use of antisatellite weapons now. The United States
could never take the decision to engage in an ASAT competition
lightly. Given the degree of international opposition to the
weaponization of space, the potentially destabilizing effects of
attacking satellites that provide reassurance and communica-
tions during crises, and the debris that could be created in or-
bital zones near Earth from kinetic energy and explosive weap-
ons in particular (should other countries develop such weapons),
ASATs would have major downsides. In addition, the United
States benefits greatly from the status quo in space, in which it
enjoys virtually exclusive capabilities to find and target enemy
forces using satellite technology; it should try to preserve this
state of affairs as long as possible. That the advantages of ASATs
might outweigh these downsides at a future date is at least pos-
sible. But the time is not yet right for that approach.
A cautious military planner might naturally tend to disagree
with the above assessment and advocate that the United States
progress more rapidly toward putting various types of weapons
in space. But cautious military planners should not make Amer-
ican security policy by themselves; their views should be bal-
anced by those of cautious strategic planners. And the latter
know that pursuit of unilateral military advantage sometimes
leads to dynamics that can render one’s own country, as well as
the potential adversary, less secure. Examples abound in the
realm of weapons of mass destruction—a much different arena
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PRESERVING U.S. DOMINANCE

from that of space warfare, but still illuminating as a precedent.

The United States has in modern times elected not to pursue
chemical or biological arms. It made that decision on the
grounds that deploying such arms would likely reduce its own
security—largely by legitimating weapons that the world com-
munity would be better off not to have widely used or even pos-
sessed, to the extent possible, especially given the potential for
such weapons to fall into the hands of irresponsible and aggres-
sive countries. It made similar decisions in the cold war in regard
to missile defense, certain types of nuclear testing, nuclear
weapons based in space, and indeed ASATs as well. In most
cases, it did not doubt its ability to outcompete its potential
adversary in narrow terms. But it recognized that the action-
reaction, or arms race, dynamic that could well result would not
advance its interests, and that in some cases it had asymmetric
dependencies on assets such as satellites that argued for restraint
in the development of weapons to threaten them.
Of course, many things have changed since the end of the
cold war. But that fact argues for rethinking a number of
American security policies from first principles, not for dis-
carding them simply because they arose under different strate-
gic circumstances.

A Hedging Strategy
So what are the proper components of U.S. strategy regard-
ing the weaponization of space? What is a prudent hedging
strategy? A central goal should be to make sure the United
States is not surprised, and technologically outdistanced, by
advances in ASAT capabilities that another country is able to
achieve. A related goal should be to gradually explore tech-
nologies of potential use in ASATs, in case the United States
someday finds it in its interest to develop these weapons—but
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PRESERVING U.S. DOMINANCE

not to actually develop any dedicated ASATs in the near-term

future.
This philosophy argues for laboratory research on basic
ASAT-related technologies. It also condones more advanced
development and testing of systems with some inherent, if sec-
ondary, ASAT potential, such as the midcourse and airborne laser
missile defense systems. But these should not now be given the
final capabilities needed to work as ASATs (notably, means of
finding and fixing on satellite targets) or tested in ASAT modes.
Nor should an actual ASAT program be initiated anytime soon.
This approach could also involve some elements of formal
arms control accords of indefinite duration. But any such limi-
tations would have to be carefully defined and rather specific,
most notably a ban on the creation of orbital debris. Informal
restraint, perhaps through temporary and unilateral pledges,
would be preferable in most cases. More specifically, elements
of a “lead, but with restraint,” or a hedging, strategy might
include the following:
pursue laboratory research at a moderate level. It
generally makes sense to conduct basic research and develop-
ment. But this need not be overemphasized. Funding in the
range of tens of millions of dollars a year for most basic types
of ASAT technologies and concepts is adequate.
Because such indoor laboratory activities cannot be remotely
monitored, and because they provide the United States long-
term options it may someday need, they should not be disal-
lowed by international accords, and the United States should
pursue them itself. However, the scale of effort should be re-
strained, given that the need for ASAT-related technologies is
not very urgent. Accelerating research now would waste money,
risk sending the wrong message to other countries if and when
the scale of a major program was revealed, and create bureau-
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PRESERVING U.S. DOMINANCE

cratic and political pressures in the United States to ultimately

field any system that was developed. None of those outcomes
serve near- to medium-term U.S. security interests.
Overall, space-related R&D funding is robust now and need
not be increased by more than already planned. Indeed,
planned increases may be excessive in some cases, though it is
difficult to be sure from unclassified sources. In 1999, space-
related research accounted for about $432 million, or 39 per-
cent of all Air Force science and technology funding. By 2005,
these figures are expected to reach $847 million and 59 per-
cent, respectively, and it is anticipated that they will keep going
up thereafter.
The main drivers of these upward cost trends include laser
communications, miniaturization concepts, imagery systems,
and other satellite concepts ranging from ballistic missile de-
fense to communications to navigation.20 The Pentagon’s Feb-
ruary 2002 budget request included money for a number of
broadly defined programs that may or may not have ASAT rel-
evance and may or may not include more than basic scientific
research: $40 million for directed energy technology, $14 mil-
lion for space control technology, $65 million (in three different
accounts) for high-energy laser research, and $122 million for
ballistic missile defense technology in a part of the budget that
had previously included funding for the space-based laser pro-
gram. In the 2004 budget request, the Department of Defense
requested about $250 million for very general space technology
programs, about $85 million for high-energy laser research, and
$15 million for space control technology. It also requested
$82 million for “counterspace systems,” a doubling from 2003,
when they were a new budget item.21
More information and transparency from the Pentagon
would be helpful for understanding the nature of these funds
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PRESERVING U.S. DOMINANCE

and the activities they support. In fact, there are reports that
ASAT activity is further along than these numbers would sug-
gest. For example, the Army has reportedly been working on
laser dazzlers to blind surveillance satellites and jammers to dis-
rupt communications and surveillance satellites.22 The former,
in particular, could be of concern if they are capable of causing
lasting damage to other countries’ satellites. And the Air Force
reportedly has had similar efforts under way, which are likely to
continue in some form—even if lethal ASATs may not be imme-
diately pursued at the advanced development or testing stages.23
The situation should be clarified by the Pentagon.
Any programs directly aimed at developing destructive ASAT
weapons should be stopped. The airborne laser and midcourse
ballistic missile defense systems already provide substantial
hedges against the possible U.S. need for antisatellite systems. If
the United States uncovers convincing, hard evidence that coun-
tries such as China are well along in ASAT development, it
might be justified in proceeding with research and development
too—though, depending on the state of China’s efforts, not nec-
essarily in testing.
continue advanced development/deployment of
missile defense concepts. Systems such as the Clinton
administration’s midcourse defense could easily have capabili-
ties against low-altitude satellites, which move at roughly the
altitudes and speeds characteristic of ballistic missile warheads.
That system is nearly halfway through its scheduled flight test
program and is slated for initial operational deployment on a
provisional basis soon. Even today, a test missile and kill vehi-
cle would probably have a respectable chance of destroying a
satellite in LEO if first linked to the U.S. space surveillance sys-
tem. In that sense, the United States already has a latent non-
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PRESERVING U.S. DOMINANCE

nuclear ASAT, even if its prototype missiles developed in the

1980s for launch from F-15s are no longer functional.
Other missile defense concepts may have similar capacity.
Notable is the airborne laser, designed primarily to intercept
relatively short-range missiles in their boost phase (see chap-
ter 3). LEO satellites are probably no more difficult to reach
with its beam than a burning rocket within the upper atmos-
phere. They would not be destroyed via the same mechanism as
a liquid-fueled ballistic missile, the intended target of the ABL,
but in many cases could be damaged or destroyed by its
megawatt-class laser. The airborne laser is not quite as ad-
vanced as the Clinton midcourse system, but it could be capa-
ble of an intercept within two to three years, if the program
stays on course.
The fact that these types of programs thus will provide real,
if latent, ASAT capabilities rather soon is not a reason to cancel
or curtail them. Missile defense is a sufficiently worthwhile
enterprise to justify the effort. LEO satellite trajectories are so
similar to those of ballistic missiles—in fact, easier to intercept,
since they are more predictable—that a long-range midcourse
missile defense system is in effect also a latent ASAT, at least
within certain geographic constraints. Because other means of
countering enemy satellites—jamming downlinks and uplinks,
destroying ground stations, hiding U.S. military assets or mak-
ing them hard to track—are not foolproof, some ASAT backup
may prove prudent in the future. The possibility that the United
States will someday need ASAT capability is great enough that
missile defense systems with potential ASAT applicability are
not undesirable. They are, in fact, a convenient hedge. At the
same time, however, it is strongly preferable that they are not
yet provided all the capabilities needed for ASAT purposes, or
 138
PRESERVING U.S. DOMINANCE

tested against satellites. An approach of hedging makes the

most sense.

A Role for Arms Control?

Although the United States may need ASAT capability at
some future date, certain restraints may be desirable. Some
could be informal, some temporary. In general, they should be
carefully tailored so as not to preclude development of various
capabilities in the future. But they could still help reassure other
countries about U.S. intentions at a time of still-unsettled great
power relations and help protect space from the creation of
excessive debris or other hazards to robust and safe use. Most
of all, they could help protect military space assets on which the
United States increasingly depends.
Some constraints might be formalized. For example, destruc-
tive testing of weapons, such as the Clinton midcourse missile
defense system, against objects in satellite orbital zones would
not only increase the risks of an ASAT competition. It would
also create debris in LEO regions that would remain in orbit
indefinitely (unless the testing occurred in what were effectively
the higher parts of Earth’s atmosphere, where air resistance
would ultimately bring down debris and where few if any satel-
lites fly in any case). A treaty banning any tests of ballistic mis-
sile systems or ASAT systems that would cause debris at alti-
tudes above 300 miles makes sense.
Less formally, the United States should state that it will not
test missile defense systems such as the ABL against objects in
space for the foreseeable future, and that it will not create a real
or virtual space-based test bed in the near future, either. Testing
is not necessary to ensure the inherent ASAT capabilities of such
systems. Tracking and pointing at satellite targets can be tested
without firing weapons, so a system such as the ABL can confi-
 139
PRESERVING U.S. DOMINANCE

dently be assumed to have inherent ASAT capability without

testing it in that mode.
Moreover, it is desirable to avoid the final steps of provid-
ing the ABL and other missile defense systems with an ASAT
capability. It is better to show some level of restraint, even as
the basic technological wherewithal for someday developing
an ASAT is ensured. Moving quickly and explicitly to an
ASAT capability would likely open a Pandora’s box of inter-
national outcry and military and strategic responses at U.S.
expense. Testing would only be needed at the final stage of
weaponization; the United States is nowhere near that point.
The hope is that it never will reach that point, if relations with
the other great and spacefaring powers continue to improve.
Policy should serve that latter goal rather than the narrow
goal of rapidly maximizing ASAT capabilities on the assump-
tion that the United States will fight countries such as China in
the future. Such assumptions are unwarranted and do not
serve U.S. interests; if given free rein, they can become self-
fulfilling prophecies. Military planners must not be allowed to
trump broader strategic planners in the American security
debate.
As a matter of policy, the United States should also publicly
state that it has no dedicated ASAT programs under way and no
intention of initiating any for the foreseeable future. This policy
may someday have to be reversed, but it would be beneficial in
the short term.

Emphasize Nondestructive ASAT Concepts

To reduce the onus and negative symbolism of any ultimate
development of ASAT technologies, the United States should
focus preliminary laboratory research on technologies that
would have the minimum destructive effect on any systems
 140
PRESERVING U.S. DOMINANCE

against which they were ultimately used. The goal of the United
States should, where possible, be to avoid destroying satellites,
even in a situation where some type of countersatellite capabil-
ity is ultimately deemed necessary.24 Not only kinetic or explo-
sive destruction, but even permanent damage to satellite optics
or electronics should be avoided if it proves possible to neutral-
ize satellites in a more temporary and benign fashion during
conflict. This approach is mirrored in U.S. military doctrine; the
challenge is not in gaining theoretical consensus but in provid-
ing resources where appropriate.
Options should include jamming communications and
destroying or otherwise neutralizing ground stations. The latter
tactic was used in Operation Desert Storm and could be pur-
sued in many cases, at least against countries possessing only
fixed and known ground stations. Jamming will not necessarily
work against a sophisticated adversary capable of frequency-
hopping operations, but can generally be successful against less
sophisticated adversaries. The United States is now looking into
more deployable jammers that could deny adversaries the use of
communications systems during conflict (by being located in the
combat theater, near enemy lines of communication, such jam-
mers could not easily be tuned out).25 Over the longer term,
high-powered microwaves could provide an option for either
lethal effects (if used at maximum pulse power) or, better yet,
temporary effects (if used at a lower, steadier power).26
In addition, the United States should explore other nonlethal
ASAT concepts, such as devices launched into space that would
unfurl large opaque shrouds just below enemy satellites, so that
the latter could not track objects on Earth or communicate with
Earth. Such options may not always be dependable or quickly
usable in the event of a crisis or war, but they should be inves-
tigated and perhaps someday built if necessary. This could give
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PRESERVING U.S. DOMINANCE

the United States ASAT capabilities without clearly crossing the

line toward space weaponization. But even these capabilities are
not operationally required now; research and development
efforts will suffice.

Conclusion

The United States depends enormously on its military space as-

sets today. They do not function primarily as the great stabilizers
and arms control facilitators of the cold war; in general, they
have become the tools of the tactical warfighter. That reduces the
strategic and political case for treating them as protected assets or
viewing space as a sanctuary from military competition.
But any U.S. policy to pursue the actual weaponization of
space in the near term would be a mistake. It would probably
lead to an arms competition that would put American assets at
risk sooner than they otherwise would be. Coming in the face of
strong international opposition, it would further exacerbate the
image of the United States as a go-it-alone power. That could, in
turn, weaken Washington’s ability to hold other countries to
their arms control and nonproliferation commitments and to
induce multilateral cooperation on other security issues.
That said, military space competition will occur regardless of
American policy, and other countries will gradually learn to use
space more like the United States does today. That calls for a
two-tier approach from Washington. It must continue to antici-
pate, and protect against, attacks on its satellites to the extent
possible. Commercial communications satellites and low-
altitude military assets are probably the most apt to be vulner-
able fairly soon, if not at present. Measures ranging from
improved satellite hardening against lasers to more maneuver-
ing capability against microsats to retention of ground-based
 142
PRESERVING U.S. DOMINANCE

alternatives to satellites may thus be required. In addition, with-

out crossing the rubicon of weaponization or testing, the United
States should keep its technology options open for the develop-
ment of antisatellite weapons. Certain missile defense systems,
together with laboratory research on basic technologies, al-
ready provide such inherent, latent capabilities. No dedicated
ASAT programs are needed or desirable. And indeed the United
States should say so, as a matter of national space doctrine for
the foreseeable future.
The United States, leading the way on the increased milita-
rization of space, may not be able to prevent the weaponization
of space indefinitely. But slowing the process for as long as pos-
sible appears the best way to serve its core military and strate-
gic interests.
 NOTES

Notes to Chapter One

1. Paul B. Stares, The Militarization of Space: U.S. Policy,
1945–1984 (Cornell University Press, 1985), pp. 62–71; and
John Lewis Gaddis, The Long Peace: Inquiries into the History
of the Cold War (Oxford University Press, 1987), pp. 195–214.
2. Peter L. Hays, United States Military Space: Into the
Twenty-First Century (Montgomery, Ala.: Air University Press,
2002), pp. 15–20. The full names of these agreements are the
Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, the Strategic Arms Limita-
tion Talks (SALT), the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe
(CFE) Treaty, and the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
(START).
3. Department of Defense, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War:
Final Report to Congress (1992), p. K-41.
4. Jason Bates and Jeremy Singer, “GPS Devices Proving Key
to Avoiding Fratricide,” Space News, September 15, 2003,
pp. 25–27.
5. Barry D. Watts, The Military Uses of Space: A Diagnostic
Assessment (Washington: Center for Strategic and Budgetary
Assessments, 2001), pp. 44–45.
6. See Thomas A. Keaney and Eliot A. Cohen, Gulf War Air
Power Survey Summary Report (Government Printing Office,

143
 144
NOTES TO PAGES 4–9

1993), p. 193; Department of Defense, Kosovo/Operation Allied Force

After-Action Report (2000), p. 46.
7. William B. Scott, “Milspace Comes of Age in Fighting Terror,”
Aviation Week and Space Technology, April 8, 2002, pp. 77–78.
About half of this bandwidth, or 300 million bits per second, was in
the form of leased commercial capacity.
8. See Patrick Rayerman, “Exploiting Commercial SATCOM: A
Better Way,” Parameters (Winter 2003–04), p. 55.
9. Michael Sirak, “Flexibility Key to Weapon Mix,” Jane’s Defence
Weekly, June 18, 2003, p. 45; Andy Pasztor, “France’s Eutelsat Hits
Jackpot with U.S. Satellite Contracts,” Wall Street Journal, March 28,
2003; Vernon Loeb, “Intense, Coordinated Air War Backs Baghdad
Campaign,” Washington Post, April 6, 2003, p. 24; and J. R. Wilson,
“Plying the Space-Based Advantage,” Armed Forces Journal (June
2003), pp. 40–42.
10. William B. Scott, “Milspace Will Be a Major Player in ‘Gulf
War 2,’” Aviation Week and Space Technology, January 13, 2003,
p. 398.
11. Theresa Hitchens, “Monsters and Shadows: Left Unchecked,
American Fears Regarding Threats to Space Assets Will Drive Weap-
onization,” Disarmament Forum, vol. 1 (2003), p. 17.
12. See Congressional Research Service, “U.S. Space Programs,”
CRS Issue Brief IB 92011 (September 16, 2003), Summary.
13. Personal communication from General Mike Hamel, 14th Air
Force, Vandenberg Air Force Base, California, November 8, 2002.
14. Benjamin S. Lambeth, Mastering the Ultimate High Ground:
Next Steps in the Military Uses of Space (Santa Monica, Calif.:
RAND, 2003), p. 90.
15. Ian Steer and Melanie Bright, “Blind, Deaf, and Dumb,” Jane’s
Defence Weekly, October 23, 2002, pp. 20–23.
16. Paul B. Stares, Space and National Security (Brookings, 1987),
pp. 85–113.
17. Ashton B. Carter, “Satellites and Anti-Satellites: The Limits of
the Possible,” International Security, vol. 10, no. 4 (Spring 1986),
p. 75.
18. Notable works on space-based ballistic missile defense, as well
as antisatellite technology, include Carter, “Satellites and Anti-
Satellites;” Fred S. Hoffman, “Ballistic Missile Defenses and U.S.
National Security,” in Harold Brown and others, eds., The Strategic
 145
NOTES TO PAGES 9–14

Defense Initiative (Claremont, Calif.: Keck Center for International

Strategic Studies, 1985); Ashton B. Carter, Directed Energy Missile
Defense in Space, Background Paper (Washington: Office of Technol-
ogy Assessment, 1984); Stares, Space and National Security; the Pen-
tagon’s yearly Soviet Military Power; John Tirman, ed., The Fallacy of
Star Wars (Vintage Books, 1984); and James T. Fletcher, The Strategic
Defense Initiative Defensive Technologies Study (Department of
Defense, 1984).
19. See Stares, Space and National Security, p. 147.
20. Peter L. Hays, “Military Space Cooperation: Opportunities and
Challenges,” in James Clay Moltz, ed., Future Security in Space: Com-
mercial, Military, and Arms Control Trade-Offs, Occasional Paper 10
(Monterey, Calif.: Monterey Institute of International Studies, 2002),
p. 37.
21. This view is hardly confined to conservatives; see, for example,
Carter, “Satellites and Anti-Satellites,” p. 47.
22. Jonathan Dean, “Defenses in Space: Treaty Issues,” in Moltz,
Future Security in Space, p. 4.
23. See William B. Scott, “ASAT Test Stalled by Funding Dispute,”
Aviation Week and Space Technology, July 1, 1996, p. 59; Greg
Caires, “Limited ASAT System Could Be Fielded by 1999, Army
Says,” Defense Daily, August 5, 1996; Hunter Keeter, “Kinetic Energy
Anti-Satellite System Hangs in the Balance,” Defense Daily, June 29,
1999; Colonel John E. Hyten, “A Sea of Peace or a Theater of War?”
Air and Space Power Journal (Fall 2002), p. 81; and George C. Wil-
son, “Mr. Smith’s Crusade,” National Journal, vol. 33, no. 32 (August
11, 2001).
24. Steven Lambakis, On the Edge of Earth (University Press of
Kentucky, 2001), p. 102.
25. Benjamin S. Lambeth, Mastering the Ultimate High Ground
(Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 2003), p. 88.
26. Michael Krepon with Christopher Clary, Space Assurance or
Space Dominance? The Case Against Weaponizing Space (Washing-
ton, D.C.: Henry L. Stimson Center, 2003), p. 21.
27. Donald Rumsfeld, “Report of the Commission to Assess United
States National Security Space Management and Organization”
(Washington, January 11, 2001).
28. Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld, Quadrennial
Defense Review Report 2001 (Department of Defense, 2001), p. 45.
 146
NOTES TO PAGES 14–17

29. Colonel Frank G. Klotz, Space, Commerce, and National Secu-

rity (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1998); and Hays,
United States Military Space, pp. 15–20.
30. U.S. Space Command (before merging with Strategic Com-
mand), Long Range Plan (1998), chap. 5, available at www.space
com.mil/LRP.
31. See the White House, “Fact Sheet, National Space Policy,” Sep-
tember 19, 1996, available at www.aiaa.org/policy.
32. John A. Tirpak, “Challenges Ahead for Military Space,” Air
Force Magazine (January 2003), p. 25.
33. U.S. Space Command, Long-Range Plan, pp. 20–48.
34. See Lt. Col. Larry J. Schaefer, Sustained Space Superiority: A
National Strategy for the United States, Occasional Paper 30 (Mont-
gomery, Ala.: Air University Press, 2002); Hyten, “A Sea of Peace or a
Theater of War?” pp. 80–86; Major John Grenier, “A New Construct
for Air Force Counterspace Doctrine,” Air and Space Power Journal
(Fall 2002), pp. 20–21; and M. V. Smith, “Ten Propositions Regarding
Spacepower,” Thesis, School of Advanced Airpower Studies, Maxwell
Air Force Base, Ala., June 2001.
35. Jeremy Singer, “Pentagon Renews Interest in Small Launchers,”
Space News, March 3, 2003, p. 3.
36. This change was effective October 1, 2002. See William B.
Scott, “‘New’ Strategic Command Could Assume Broader Roles,” Avi-
ation Week and Space Technology, October 14, 2002, p. 63. The Air
Force still has a service-specific Space Command with 25,000 active-
duty military personnel and civilians as well as 14,000 contractors; see
Air Force Space Command, “Fact Sheet,” January 2002, www.af.mil/
news/factsheets/Air_Force_Space_Command.html.
37. See James Dao, “Rumsfeld Plan Skirts a Call for Stationing
Arms in Space,” New York Times, May 9, 2001, p. A13.
38, See, for example, Hitchens, “Monsters and Shadows,” p. 24.
39. Hays, United States Military Space, pp. 18–25.
40. Watts, The Military Uses of Space, pp. 8, 15, 21.
41. See NGO Committee on Disarmament, “Panel Discussion Held
in the United Nations,” October 19, 2000, transcript, available at
www. igc.org/disarm/T191000outerspace.htm; Hu Xiaodi, Ambas-
sador for Disarmament Affairs of China, Statement at the Plenary of
the Conference on Disarmament, June 7, 2001, available at www3.itu.
int/missions/China/disarmament/2001files/disarmdoc010607.htm; and
 147
NOTES TO PAGES 17–19

“China, Russia Want Space Weapons Banned,” Philadelphia Inquirer,

August 23, 2002.
42. See “Canadian Working Paper Concerning CD Action on Outer
Space,” January 21, 1998, available at www.unorg.ch/disarm/curdoc/
1487.htm; and James Clay Moltz, “Breaking the Deadlock on Space
Arms Control,” Arms Control Today (April 2002), available at www.
armscontrol.org/act/2002_04/moltzapril02.asp?print.
43. Dean, “Defenses in Space,” p. 5.
44. Vitaly A. Lukiantsev, “Enhancing Global Security through
Improved Space Management: A Russian Perspective,” in Moltz,
Future Security in Space, p. 47; Cheng Jingye, “Treaties as an Ap-
proach to Reducing Space Vulnerabilities,” in Moltz, Future Security
in Space, p. 49; and Dean, “Defenses in Space,” p. 5.
45. Hays, United States Military Space, pp. 11–13; Alvin and Heidi
Toffler, War and Anti-War: Survival at the Dawn of the 21st Century
(Boston: Little, Brown, 1993); Stuart E. Johnson and Martin C. Libicki,
eds., Dominant Battlespace Knowledge (Washington: National Defense
University Press, 1996); Keaney and Cohen, Gulf War Air Power Survey
Summary Report; William Owens, Lifting the Fog of War (Farrar, Straus,
and Giroux, 2000); Daniel Goure and Christopher M. Szara, eds., Air
and Space Power in the New Millennium (Washington: Center for Strate-
gic and International Studies, 1997); Defense Science Board 1996 Sum-
mer Study Task Force, Tactics and Technology for 21st Century Military
Superiority (Department of Defense, 1996); Harlan Ullman and others,
Shock and Awe: Achieving Rapid Dominance (Washington: National
Defense University Press, 1996); George Friedman and Meredith Fried-
man, The Future of War: Power, Technology, and American World Dom-
inance in the 21st Century (Crown, 1996); John Arquilla and David Ron-
feldt, eds., In Athena’s Camp: Preparing for Conflict in the Information
Age (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1997); National Defense Panel,
Transforming Defense: National Security in the 21st Century (Arlington,
Va.: December 1997); and Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Vision 2010 and
Joint Vision 2020 (Department of Defense, 2000 and 2002).
46. Watts, The Military Uses of Space, pp. 29–30.
47. Bill Gertz, “Chinese Missile Has Twice the Range U.S. Antici-
pated,” Washington Times, November 20, 2002, p. 3.
48. “Report of the Commission to Assess United States National
Security Space Management and Organization” (Washington, January
11, 2001), pp. 22–23.
 148
NOTES TO PAGES 19–33

49. Although there has been a recent resurgence of publications

about the future military uses of space, there has not yet been a study
that takes my approach, focusing squarely on future space policy in a
pragmatic way that attempts to balance technical and strategic con-
siderations. Two very good primers tend to shy away from policy
analysis: Watts, The Military Uses of Space; and Bob Preston and oth-
ers, Space Weapons, Earth Wars (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 2002).
Lambakis, On the Edge of Earth, provides good background material
as well. He finishes with strong advocacy for U.S. weaponization of
space, a position derived principally from a realist and determinist
sense about the nature of human technology and human conflict. Since
space is a new arena in which competition is possible, he argues, such
competition is inevitable; the choice for the United States is whether to
lead in that competition or to lose it. The argument is initially plausi-
ble, but also rather categorical, and in the end not persuasive.
50. See also James M. Lindsay and Michael E. O’Hanlon, Defend-
ing America: The Case for Limited National Missile Defense (Brook-
ings, 2001).

Notes to Chapter Two

1. Ashton B. Carter, “Satellites and Anti-Satellites: The Limits of the
Possible,” International Security, vol. 10, no. 4 (Spring 1986),
pp. 50–52.
2. M. V. Smith, “Ten Propositions Regarding Spacepower,” Thesis,
School of Advanced Airpower Studies, Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala.,
June 2001, p. 44.
3. Escape velocity for an object at or near the surface of Earth is
about eleven kilometers per second. See among physics textbooks on
mechanics, for example, Robert Resnick and David Halliday, Physics,
Volume I , 3d ed. (John Wiley, 1977), pp. 174–80; Herbert Goldstein,
Classical Mechanics (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1980),
pp. 29–31; and Curtis D. Cochran, Dennis M. Gorman, and Joseph D.
Dumoulin, eds., Space Handbook, 12th rev. (Montgomery, Ala.: Air
University Press, 1985), pp. 2-1–3-50.
4. Cochran, Gorman, and Dumoulin, Space Handbook, pp. 3–23.
To see why, think of the GEO rocket as operating in two separate
phases. First, it must reach the speed of the LEO rocket. At that point,
it must have enough fuel left to propel the payload up to GEO. That
 149
NOTES TO PAGES 33–38

means it must accelerate not only the payload but also a large amount
of fuel up to LEO speeds. Since that fuel has a large mass, the rocket
must do far more work for the GEO payload. In contrast, for many
vehicles operating on the surface of Earth extra mass imposes a much
less severe penalty, since they are not directly fighting gravity in the
way that a vertically oriented rocket must.
5. Barry D. Watts, The Military Uses of Space: A Diagnostic Assess-
ment (Washington: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments,
2001), p. 123.
6. See, for example, Thomas B. Cochran, William M. Arkin, and
Milton M. Hoenig, Nuclear Weapons Databook, Volume I: U.S.
Nuclear Forces and Capabilities (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1984),
pp. 1116–145; and Aviation Week and Space Technology, 2002 Aero-
space Source Book (January 14, 2002), pp. 144–53. Nor do trends in
rocket propellants or rocket structural materials promise radical
changes in this situation anytime soon; see Watts, The Military Uses of
Space, p. 58.
7. Watts, The Military Uses of Space, p. 123.
8. See, for example, Air Force Magazine (August 2002), pp. 40–42.
9. Cochran, Gorman, and Dumoulin, Space Handbook,
pp. 1-9–1-10.
10. U.S. Space Command, “Fact Sheet: Space Surveillance,” Febru-
ary 2001, available at www.spacecom.mil/space.htm.
11. Marco Antonio Caceres, “Cutbacks Reflect Sluggishness in
Commercial Satellite Market,” Aviation Week and Space Technology,
January 13, 2003, p. 151.
12. Marco Antonio Caceres, “Launch Services Market Going No-
where Fast,” Aviation Week and Space Technology, January 14, 2002,
pp. 139–40; Marco Antonio Caceres, “Hopes Fading for Most RLVs,”
Aviation Week and Space Technology, January 14, 2002, p. 142;
Marco Antonio Caceres, “Satellite Industry Stalls in Standby Mode,”
Aviation Week and Space Technology, January 14, 2002, p. 155; and
Watts, The Military Uses of Space, pp. 15, 61.
13. Watts, The Military Uses of Space, p. 50.
14. Personal communication from Major David Outlaw, 14th Air
Force, Vandenberg Air Force Base, California, November 8, 2002. The
medium-secure data rate for MILSTAR (Military Strategic and Tactical
Relay) satellites is about 1.5 million bits per second (1.5 megabits per
second, or Mbps), and for each defense satellite communications sys-
tem (DSCS) satellite about 60 Mbps; by contrast, as noted in chapter 1,
 150
NOTES TO PAGES 38–47

total bandwidth from all sources in Operation Enduring Freedom

approached 1 billion bits per second (1 gigabit per second, or Gbps).
15. Joseph C. Anselmo, “Shutter Controls: How Far Will Uncle
Sam Go?” Aviation Week and Space Technology, January 31, 2000,
pp. 55–56.
16. Peter L. Hays, “Military Space Cooperation: Opportunities and
Challenges,” in James Clay Moltz, ed., Future Security in Space: Com-
mercial, Military, and Arms Control Trade-Offs, Occasional Paper 10
(Monterey, Calif.: Monterey Institute of International Studies, 2002),
p. 38.
17. Joel R. Primack, “Debris and Future Space Activities,” in
Moltz, Future Security in Space, p. 18.
18. Watts, The Military Uses of Space, p. 79.
19. Peter L. Hays, United States Military Space: Into the Twenty-
First Century (Montgomery, Ala.: Air University Press, 2002), p. 133.
20. Primack, “Debris and Future Space Activities,” p. 20.
21. Watts, The Military Uses of Space, pp. 42–43.
22. Jeffrey T. Richelson, The U.S. Intelligence Community, 2d ed.
(Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1989), p. 201.
23. Craig Covault, “Secret NRO Recons Eye Iraqi Threats,” Avia-
tion Week and Space Technology, September 16, 2002, p. 23; Jeffrey
T. Richelson, America’s Secret Eyes in Space: The U.S. Keyhole Spy
Satellite Program (Harper and Row, 1990), pp. 130–32, 186–87,
206–08, 227, 236–38; and Office of Technology Assessment, Launch
Options for the Future (Washington, 1988), pp. 65–66.
24. Covault, “Secret NRO Recons Eye Iraqi Threats.”
25. Air Force Magazine (August 2002), pp. 40–42; Carter, “Satel-
lites and Anti-Satellites,” p. 56.
26. George Friedman and Meredith Friedman, The Future of War
(Crown, 1996), pp. 321–24.
27. James Bamford, Body of Secrets: Anatomy of the Ultra-Secret
National Security Agency (Doubleday, 2001), p. 369.
28. Jason Bates, “U.S. Government to Broaden Use of Commercial
Imagery,” Space News, May 19, 2003, p. 6.
29. Jason Bates, “Military Helps Stabilize Satellite Imagery Mar-
ket,” Space News, August 25, 2003, p. 8.
30. Dan Cragg, Guide to Military Installations, 5th ed. (Mechan-
icsburg, Pa.: Stackpole Books, 1997), pp. 30, 57; and Richelson, The
U.S. Intelligence Community, pp. 175–76.
 151
NOTES TO PAGES 47–54

31. Paul B. Stares, Space and National Security (Brookings, 1987),

p. 188.
32. See the Air Force Space Command website, www.spacecom.
af.mil/hqafspc/Library/Units/worldsites.htm; and the Federation of
American Scientists website, www.fas.org.
33. Bruce G. Blair, Strategic Command and Control: Redefining the
Nuclear Threat (Brookings, 1985), p. 253.
34. Watts, The Military Uses of Space, p. 78.
35. Benjamin S. Lambeth, Mastering the Ultimate High Ground:
Next Steps in the Military Uses of Space (Santa Monica, Calif.:
RAND, 2003), p. 136; and Robert S. Dudney, “Space Power in the
Gulf,” Air Force Magazine (June 2003), p. 2.
36. Craig Covault, “Military Satcom, Relay Programs Boost Indus-
try, Enhance Warfare,” Aviation Week and Space Technology, January
6, 2003, p. 43.
37. J. C. Toomay, Radar Principles for the Non-Specialist, 2d ed.
(Mendham, N.J.: SciTech Publishing, 1998), p. 175.
38. Warren Ferster, “MDA to Buy at Least One More Missile
Tracking Satellite,” Space News, November 17, 2003, p. 3.
39. Lambeth, Mastering the Ultimate High Ground, p. 145.
40. At an altitude of 500 kilometers, it would require sixty satellites
in polar orbit to maintain nearly continuous coverage. At 1,000 kilo-
meters, that number would drop to about thirty; at 1,600 kilometers,
it would be twenty. See Stares, Space and National Security, p. 40,
based on Patrick J. Friel, “New Directions for the U.S. Military and
Civilian Space Programs,” in Uri Ra’anan and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff Jr.,
eds., International Security Dimensions of Space (Hamden, Conn.:
Archon Books, 1984), p. 124, and D. C. Beste, “Design of Satellite
Constellations for Optimal Continuous Coverage,” IEEE Transac-
tions on Aerospace and Electronic Systems, no. 3 (May 1978),
pp. 466–73.
41. Watts, The Military Uses of Space, p. 80.
42. Michael Krepon with Christopher Clary, Space Assurance or
Space Dominance?: The Case against Weaponizing Space (Washing-
ton: Henry L. Stimson Center, 2003), p. 23.
43. Air Force Magazine (August 2002), pp. 26–46; Aviation Week
and Space Technology, 2002 Aerospace Source Book, pp. 144–52.
44. Air Force Magazine (August 2002), pp. 26–46.
45. Watts, The Military Uses of Space, pp. 36–40.
 152
NOTES TO PAGES 54–59

46. Steven Lambakis, On the Edge of Earth: The Future of Ameri-

can Space Power (University Press of Kentucky, 2001), pp. 159–60.
47. Aviation Week and Space Technology, 2002 Aerospace Source
Book, pp. 161–73; and Associated Press, “China Launches Key Satel-
lite,” Washington Post, May 26, 2003, p. A23.
48. Aviation Week and Space Technology, 2002 Aerospace Source
Book, pp. 146–47.
49. Craig Covault, “Chinese Rocket R&D Advances,” Aviation
Week and Space Technology, November 12, 2001, pp. 54–55.
50. Department of Defense, Annual Report on the Military Power
of the People’s Republic of China (July 2002), pp. 28–29, 45; Lam-
bakis, On the Edge of Earth, pp. 147–50.
51. See Eugene Gholz, “Military Transformation, Political Econ-
omy Pressures and the Future of Trans-Atlantic National Security
Space Cooperation,” Astropolitics, vol. 1, no. 2 (Autumn 2003), p. 32.
52. Aviation Week and Space Technology, 2002 Aerospace Source
Book, pp. 161–73.
53. Peter B. de Selding, “Europe Expected to Sign Galileo Contract
by July,” Space News, June 2, 2003, p. 7; and Laurence Nardon, “The
World’s Space Systems,” Disarmament Forum, vol. 1 (2003), p. 37.
54. David Braunschvig, Richard L. Garwin, and Jeremy C. Mar-
well, “Space Diplomacy,” Foreign Affairs, vol. 82, no. 4 (July–August
2003), pp. 156–64.
55. Aviation Week and Space Technology, 2002 Aerospace Source
Book, pp. 139–52; and “Sea Launch Information,” www.sea-launch.
com/special/sea-launch/information.htm.
56. Paul Kallender, “Spy Satellite Launch Marks New Era for Japan
in Space,” Space News, March 31, 2003, p. 8.
57. Barbara Opall-Rome, “Israel Moving Ahead with Military Sat-
com Plans,” Space News, June 23, 2003, p. 8.
58. Barbara Opall-Rome and Vivek Raghuvanshi, “India Seeks
Israeli Ofeq 5 Spy Satellite Imagery,” Space News, September 22,
2003, p. 8.
59. Lambakis, On the Edge of Earth, pp. 146–62.
60. Watts, The Military Uses of Space, pp. 65–69; and Orbital Sci-
ences’ website, www.orbimage.com.
61. Joseph C. Anselmo, “Commercial Space’s Sharp New Image,”
Aviation Week and Space Technology, January 31, 2000, p. 54.
62. Lambakis, On the Edge of Earth, p. 157.
 153
NOTES TO PAGES 62–70

Notes to Chapter Three

1. For an endorsement of such ideas, see Commission on the

Future of the United States Aerospace Industry, Final Report
(November 2002), p. 3-5, www.aerospacecommission.gov/Aero
CommissionFinalReport.pdf.
2. Anne Marie Squeo, “Officials Say Space Programs Face Delays,
Are ‘in Trouble,’” Wall Street Journal, December 2, 2002, p. 1.
3. Bruce G. Blair, Strategic Command and Control: Redefining the
Nuclear Threat (Brookings, 1985), pp. 201–07.
4. Ian Steer and Melanie Bright, “Blind, Deaf, and Dumb,” Jane’s
Defence Weekly, October 23, 2002, pp. 21–23.
5. Blair, Strategic Command and Control, p. 206.
6. Donald Rumsfeld, “Report of the Commission to Assess United
States National Security Space Management and Organization”
(Washington, January 11, 2001), pp. 21–22.
7. Dennis Papadopoulos, “Satellite Threat Due to High Altitude
Nuclear Detonations,” briefing slides presented December 17, 2002,
based on research done at the University of Maryland for Advanced
Power Technologies, Inc. Cited here by the permission of the author.
8. Ashton B. Carter, “Satellites and Anti-Satellites: The Limits of the
Possible,” International Security, vol. 10, no. 4 (Spring 1986),
pp. 89–92.
9. Barry D. Watts, The Military Uses of Space: A Diagnostic Assess-
ment (Washington: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments,
2001), p. 99.
10. Peter L. Hays, United States Military Space: Into the Twenty-
First Century (Montgomery, Ala.: Air University Press, 2002),
pp. 121–24.
11. Ira W. Merritt, U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Com-
mand, “Radio Frequency Weapons and Proliferation: Potential Impact
on the Economy,” statement before the Joint Economic Committee,
105 Cong. 2 sess., February 25, 1998; Barbara Starr, “Russian Bomb-
Disarming Device Triggers Concerns,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, March
18, 1998, p. 4; Carlo Kopp, “The E-Bomb—A Weapon of Electrical
Mass Destruction” (Monash University, Australia, 1998); “Russian
Electronic Bomb Tested in Sweden,” Agence France-Presse, January
21, 1998; David A. Fulghum, “Microwave Weapons Await a Future
War,” Aviation Week and Space Technology, June 7, 1999, pp. 30–31;
 154
NOTES TO PAGES 71–74

and Lexington Institute, Directed-Energy Weapons: Technologies,

Applications, and Implications (Washington, 2003), pp. 15–18.
12. Mark E. Rogers, Lasers in Space: Technological Options for
Enhancing U.S. Military Capabilities, Occasional Paper 2 (Mont-
gomery, Ala.: Center for Strategy and Technology, Air War College,
November 1997), p. 18 of 86 (www.milnet.com/milnet/pentagon/
laser/occppr02.htm).
13. Rogers, Lasers in Space, p. 16.
14. See Air Force Scientific Advisory Board, New World Vistas:
Directed Energy Volume (Washington: U.S. Air Force, December
1995), as quoted in Rogers, Lasers in Space, p. 56.
15. Defense Science Board, High Energy Laser Weapon Systems
Applications (Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
Technology, and Logistics, June 2001), p. 49.
16. High Energy Laser Executive Review Panel, “Department of
Defense Laser Master Plan” (Office of the Deputy Undersecretary of
Defense for Science and Technology, March 24, 2000), pp. 4–6.
17. Breck Hitz, J. J. Ewing, and Jeff Hecht, Introduction to Laser
Technology, 3d ed. (New York: IEEE Press, 2001), p. 191; and David
A. Fulghum, “Lasers, HPM Weapons Near Operational Status,”
Aviation Week and Space Technology, July 22, 2002 (www.
aviationnow.com/content/publication/awst/20020722/aw173.htm).
18. Elihu Zimet, “High-Energy Lasers: Technical, Operational, and
Policy Issues,” Defense Horizons 18 (Washington: National Defense
University, Center for Technology and National Security Policy, October
2002), pp. 6–7 of 16 (www.ndu.edu/inss/DefHor/DH18/DH_18. htm).
19. Defense Science Board, High Energy Laser Weapon Systems
Applications, p. 54.
20. High Energy Laser Executive Review Panel, “Department of
Defense Laser Master Plan,” pp. 7, 10.
21. Zimet, “High-Energy Lasers,” p. 6; Rogers, Lasers in Space,
p. 56; and Defense Science Board, High Energy Laser Weapon Sys-
tems Applications, p. 49.
22. Geoffrey E. Forden, “The Airborne Laser,” IEEE Spectrum
(September 1997), pp. 47–49.
23. Robert E. Levin, Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Manage-
ment, Testimony before the Subcommittee on National Security, Vet-
erans’ Affairs, and International Relations, Committee on Government
Reform, House of Representatives, in General Accounting Office,
 155
NOTES TO PAGES 74–80

“Missile Defense: Knowledge-Based Process Would Benefit Airborne

Laser Decision-Making,” GAO-02-949T (July 16, 2002).
24. Forden, “The Airborne Laser,” pp. 40–49; General Accounting
Office, Defense Acquisitions: DoD Efforts to Develop Laser Weapons
for Theater Defense, GAO/NSIAD-99-50 (March 1999); Missile
Defense Agency, “Airborne Laser Completes First Flight,” News
Release, July 18, 2002; and Federation of American Scientists, “Special
Weapons Monitor: Airborne Laser,” updated September 18, 2002,
available at www.fas.org/spp/starwars/program/abl.htm.
25. Zimet, “High-Energy Lasers,” p. 6.
26. James Clay Moltz, “Reining in the Space Cowboys,” Bulletin of
the Atomic Scientists (January–February 2003), p. 63.
27. Select Committee on U.S. National Security and Military/Com-
mercial Concerns with the People’s Republic of China, House of Rep-
resentatives, U.S. National Security and Military/Commercial Con-
cerns with the People’s Republic of China (1999), p. 209.
28. Department of Defense, Annual Report on the Military Power
of the People’s Republic of China (2002), pp. 5, 32, 40.
29. Zimet, “High-Energy Lasers,” p. 6; Sandra I. Erwin, “Killing
Missiles from Space: Can the U.S. Air Force Do It with Lasers?”
National Defense Magazine (June 2001), p. 5 (www. nationaldefense
magazine.org/article.cfm?Id=513).
30. Erwin, “Killing Missiles from Space,” p. 5.
31. Defense Science Board, High Energy Laser Weapon Systems
Applications, p. 3; and Missile Defense Agency, “Space Based Laser
Fact Sheet,” January 2002, available at www.acq.osd.mil/bmdo/
bmdolink.
32. Erwin, “Killing Missiles from Space,” p. 3.
33. Defense Science Board, High Energy Laser Weapon Systems
Applications, pp. 16–31.
34. General Accounting Office, Defense Acquisitions.
35. Zimet, “High-Energy Lasers,” p. 10.
36. Defense Science Board, High Energy Laser Weapon Systems
Applications, pp. 19–31.
37. Celeste Johnson and Raymond Hall, Estimated Costs and Tech-
nical Characteristics of Selected National Missile Defense Systems
(Congressional Budget Office, 2002), pp. 20–27.
38. As an indication of how seriously it takes this technology, the
Pentagon requested $452 million in its 2004 budget proposal for
 156
NOTES TO PAGES 80–83

development of a laser satellite communications capability. It also

requested $778 million for the advanced EHF satellite system (and
$299 million for a new space-based radar). See Department of
Defense, “FY 2004 Defense Budget Briefing Slides,” February 3, 2003,
p. 18, available at www.defenselink.mil.
39. It may be possible to transmit an image using one-tenth the
amount of bandwidth currently employed, and if some fidelity (1 to
2 percent of pixels) can be sacrificed, it may be possible to transmit
images with less than one-hundredth the current number of bytes. See
Michael Sirak, “U.S. Air Force Targets UAV Bandwidth Problem,”
Jane’s Defence Weekly, July 31, 2002, p. 28.
40. Peter L. Hays, “Military Space Cooperation: Opportunities and
Challenges,” in James Clay Moltz, ed., Future Security in Space: Com-
mercial, Military, and Arms Control Trade-Offs, Occasional Paper 10
(Monterey, Calif.: Monterey Institute of International Studies, 2002),
p. 41.
41. J. C. Toomay, Radar Principles for the Non-Specialist, 2d ed.
(Mendham, N.J.: Scitech Publishing, 1998), p. 154.
42. Frank Tiboni, “U.S. Military Has Enough Bandwidth for War
with Iraq, Pentagon CIO Says,” DefenseNews.com, January 22, 2003.
43. Katie Walter, “Laser Zaps Communication Bottleneck,”
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Science and Technology
Review (December 2002), pp. 18–21.
44. Craig Covault, “Military Satcom, Relay Programs Boost Indus-
try, Enhance Warfare,” Aviation Week and Space Technology, January
6, 2003, p. 43; and Rogers, Lasers in Space, pp. 45–46.
45. Amy Butler, “Wolfowitz Boosts MILSATCOM by Billions, Out-
lines Additional Buys,” Inside the Air Force, December 20, 2002, p. 1.
46. Brian Berger, “SLI Overhaul Marks Major Shift in NASA
Spending,” Space News, November 18, 2002, p. 3.
47. Commission on the Future of the United States Aerospace
Industry, Final Report (November 2002), p. 3-2.
48. Michael O’Hanlon, Technological Change and the Future of
Warfare (Brookings, 2000), pp. 76–78.
49. Craig Covault, “Rocket Propulsion Tests Aimed at X-33, X-34
and Delta 4,” Aviation Week and Space Technology, May 4, 1998,
pp. 51–53; Ira F. Kuhn Jr., “Potential for Long Standoff, Low Cost,
Precision Attack,” in Defense Science Board 1996 Summer Study Task
Force, Tactics and Technology for 21st Century Military Superiority,
vol. 3 (Department of Defense, 1996), p. III-28; O’Hanlon, Techno-
 157
NOTES TO PAGES 83–86

logical Change and the Future of Warfare, pp. 76–79; and Watts, The
Military Uses of Space, p. 58.
50. Andy Pasztor and Anne Marie Squeo, “New Boeing Rocket
Blasts Off in Long-Awaited First Launch,” Wall Street Journal,
November 21, 2002.
51. Craig Covault, “Delta IV Thrusts Boeing against Atlas V,
Ariane,” Aviation Week and Space Technology, November 25, 2002,
p. 22.
52. See Robert Wall, “Costs Skyrocket,” Aviation Week and Space
Technology, November 24, 2003, p. 24.
53. Stew Magnuson, “Air Force Explores Balloon-Assisted
Launches,” Space News, January 13, 2003, p. 20.
54. Raytheon Corporation, “Ground-Based Midcourse Defense
Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicle,” 2002, available at www.raytheon.
com/ekv.
55. American Physical Society, Report of the APS Study Group on
Boost-Phase Intercept Systems for National Missile Defense, vol. 1,
Executive Summary and Conclusions (July 2003).
56. Michael Sirak, “USA Works on Kinetic Energy Interceptor,”
Jane’s Defence Weekly, January 8, 2003, p. 2.
57. See Daniel Kleppner, Frederick K. Lamb, and David E. Mosher,
“Boost-Phase Defense Is a Challenge,” Space News, September 1,
2003, based on the American Physical Society’s 2003 study on boost-
phase defense and American Physical Society, Report of the APS Study
Group on Boost-Phase Intercept Systems for National Missile De-
fense, pp. 103–30.
58. Bob Preston and others, Space Weapons, Earth Wars (Santa
Monica, Calif.: RAND, 2002), pp. 40–49.
59. Andrew Koch, “USAF Takes New Look at ‘Big BLU’-Style
Bomb,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, October 30, 2002.
60. “Incoming,” New York Times, October 13, 2002, p. 3.
61. Simon P. Worden and Martin E. B. France, “Towards an Evolv-
ing Deterrence Strategy: Space and Information Dominance,” Com-
parative Strategy, vol. 20 (2001), pp. 453–66.
62. Watts, The Military Uses of Space, pp. 53–54.
63. See “Outlook/Specifications: Spacecraft,” in Aviation Week and
Space Technology, 2002 Aerospace Source Book (January 14, 2002),
pp. 164–66.
64. Rumsfeld, “Report of the Commission to Assess United States
National Security Space Management and Organization,” pp. 20–21.
 158
NOTES TO PAGES 87–94

65. Worden and France, “Towards an Evolving Deterrence Strat-

egy: Space and Information Dominance,” p. 464.
66. Craig Covault, “USAF Technology Satellite Plays Tag with GPS
Delta,” Aviation Week and Space Technology, February 3, 2003,
p. 39.
67. See Rumsfeld, “Report of the Commission to Assess United
States National Security Space Management and Organization.”
68. Personal communication from General Mike Hamel, 14th Air
Force, Vandenberg Air Force Base, California, November 8, 2002.
69. Brian Berger, “Cost Projections for NASA’s Next Space Tele-
scope Exceed Budget,” Space News, March 10, 2003, p. 1.
70. See Ivan Bekey, Advanced Space System Concepts and Enabling
Technologies for the 2000–2030 Time Period (Annandale, Va.: Bekey
Designs, July 7, 1998), pp. 13 and 24; Watts, The Military Uses of
Space, p. 55.
71. Jeremy Singer, “U.S. Air Force Halts TechSat 21 Flight Demon-
stration,” Space News, May 12, 2003, p. 9.
72. Watts, The Military Uses of Space, p. 81; Robert Wall, “Space-
Based Radar Development Begins,” Aviation Week and Space Tech-
nology, March 1, 1999, p. 33; O’Hanlon, Technological Change,
pp. 39–40.
73. See Anne Marie Squeo, “Pentagon Finds Satellite Programs Seri-
ously Flawed,” Wall Street Journal, September 5, 2003.
74. Jeffrey T. Richelson, “The Satellite Gap,” Bulletin of the Atomic
Scientists (January–February 2003), pp. 49–54.

Notes to Chapter Four

1. Barbara Opall-Rome, “Iran Reportedly Plans to Launch Recon-
naissance Satellite,” Space News, October 14, 2002, p. 10.
2. See Paul D. Neilsen, “Antisatellite Weapons: A Strategic Analy-
sis,” National Defense Library Special Collections Paper (Washington:
National Defense University, 1989), p. 12.
3. John Tirman, ed., The Fallacy of Star Wars (Random House,
1984), p. 194.
4. International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance
2002/2003 (Oxford University Press, 2002). U.S. government esti-
mates of China’s military spending are typically about twice as great as
 159
NOTES TO PAGES 94–95

those of the International Institute for Strategic Studies. See Arms Con-
trol and Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditures and Arms
Transfers 1996 (Government Printing Office, 1997), p. 65; for an
explanation of the methodologies involved, see pp. 186–92, as well as
International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance
1995/96 (Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 270–75.
5. William S. Cohen, “The Security Situation in the Taiwan Strait,”
Report to Congress pursuant to the FY99 Appropriations Bill (Depart-
ment of Defense, 1999), pp. 9, 11; International Institute for Strategic
Studies, The Military Balance 1999/2000 (Oxford University Press,
1999), pp. 187–88; William S. Cohen, “Future Military Capabilities
and Strategy of the People’s Republic of China,” Report to Congress
pursuant to the FY98 National Defense Authorization Act (Depart-
ment of Defense, 1998), pp. 15–16; and Edward B. Atkeson, “The
People’s Republic of China in Transition: An Assessment of the Peo-
ple’s Liberation Army,” Land Warfare Paper 29 (Alexandria, Va.: Insti-
tute of Land Warfare, Association of the U.S. Army, 1998), p. 11.
6. Gao Heng, “Future Military Trends,” in Michael Pillsbury, ed.,
Chinese Views of Future Warfare (Washington: National Defense Uni-
versity Press, 1997), pp. 85–94; Dennis J. Blasko, Philip T. Klapakis,
and John F. Corbett Jr., “Training Tomorrow’s PLA: A Mixed Bag of
Tricks,” in David Shambaugh and Richard H. Yang, eds., China’s Mil-
itary in Transition (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), pp. 225–60;
Cohen, “The Security Situation in the Taiwan Strait,” pp. 6, 11, 13;
Cohen, “Future Military Capabilities and Strategy of the People’s
Republic of China,” p. 8; Richard A. Bitzinger and Bates Gill, Gearing
Up for High-Tech Warfare? (Washington: Center for Strategic and
Budgetary Assessments, 1996); and Andrew N. D. Yang and Milton
Wen-Chung Liao, “PLA Rapid Reaction Forces: Concept, Training,
and Preliminary Assessment,” in James C. Mulvenon and Richard H.
Yang, eds., The People’s Liberation Army in the Information Age
(Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1999), pp. 56–57.
7. Richard A. Bitzinger, “Going Places or Running in Place?
China’s Efforts to Leverage Advanced Technologies for Military Use,”
in Susan M. Puska, ed., People’s Liberation Army after Next (Carlisle,
Pa.: U.S. Army War College, 2000), pp. 9–54; Tim Huxley and Susan
Willett, Arming East Asia, Adelphi Paper 329 (Oxford University
Press, 1999), pp. 75–77; Lieutenant General Patrick M. Hughes,
“Global Threats and Challenges: The Decades Ahead,” Statement for
 160
NOTES TO PAGES 96–101

the Congressional Record (Washington: Defense Intelligence Agency,

February 1999), p. 10; Avery Goldstein, “Great Expectations: Inter-
preting China’s Arrival,” International Security, vol. 22, no. 3 (Win-
ter 1997–98), p. 46; John Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai, “China’s
Search for a Modern Air Force,” International Security, vol. 24, no.1
(Summer 1999), p. 87; Eric McVadon, “PRC Exercises, Doctrine and
Tactics toward Taiwan: The Naval Dimension,” in James R. Lilley
and Chuck Downs, eds., Crisis in the Taiwan Strait (Washington:
National Defense University, 1997), p. 261; Kenneth W. Allen,
“PLAAF Modernization: An Assessment,” in Lilley and Downs, Cri-
sis in the Taiwan Strait, pp. 232–40; Jonathan Brodie, “China Moves
to Buy More Russian Aircraft, Warships, and Submarines,” Jane’s
Defence Weekly, December 22, 1999, p. 15; and Office of Naval Intel-
ligence, Worldwide Challenges to Naval Strike Warfare (Washington:
U.S. Navy, 1996), p. 29.
8. Michael E. O’Hanlon, Defense Policy Choices for the Bush
Administration (Brookings, 2002), pp. 154–203.
9. Thomas J. Christensen, “Posing Problems without Catching Up:
China’s Rise and Challenges for U.S. Security Policy,” International
Security, vol. 25, no. 4 (Spring 2001), pp. 5–40; and O’Hanlon,
Defense Policy Choices for the Bush Administration, pp. 154–203.
10. See, for example, Andrew F. Krepinevich Jr., A New Navy for a
New Era (Washington: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assess-
ments, 1996); and Andrew F. Krepinevich Jr., The Conflict Environ-
ment of 2016: A Scenario-Based Approach (Washington: Center for
Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 1996).
11. Bill Gertz, “Chinese Missile Has Twice the Range U.S. Antici-
pated,” Washington Times, November 20, 2002, p. 3.
12. Department of Defense, “Annual Report on the Military Power
of the People’s Republic of China” (2002 and 2003), available at
www.defenselink.mil.
13. Bruce G. Blair, Strategic Command and Control: Redefining the
Nuclear Threat (Brookings, 1985), pp. 201–07.
14. See Tom Stefanick, Strategic Antisubmarine Warfare and Naval
Strategy (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1987), pp. 241–64;
Robert E. Harkavy, Bases Abroad: The Global Foreign Military Pres-
ence (Oxford University Press, 1989), pp. 192–96; and Jeffrey T.
Richelson, The U.S. Intelligence Community (Cambridge, Mass.:
Ballinger, 1989), pp. 206–09.
 161
NOTES TO PAGES 102–116

15. Stefanick, Strategic Antisubmarine Warfare, pp. 38–41,

254–55.
16. Eric J. Labs, Increasing the Mission Capability of the Attack
Submarine Force (Congressional Budget Office, 2002), pp. 5–7.

Notes to Chapter Five

1. Alexander G. Higgins, “China, Russia Ease Up on Space Arms,”
Moscow Times, August 8, 2003, p. 4.
2. See Rebecca Johnson, Missile Defence and the Weaponisation of
Space, ISIS Policy Paper on Ballistic Missile Defense 11 (London: Inter-
national Security Information Service, January 2003), available at
www.isisuk.demon.co.uk; Jonathan Dean, “Defenses in Space: Treaty
Issues,” in James Clay Moltz, ed., Future Security in Space: Commer-
cial, Military, and Arms Control Trade-Offs, Occasional Paper 10
(Monterey, Calif.: Monterey Institute of International Studies, 2002),
p. 4; George Bunn and John B. Rhinelander, “Outer Space Treaty May
Ban Strike Weapons,” Arms Control Today, vol. 32, no. 5 (June 2002),
p. 24; and Bruce M. Deblois, “Space Sanctuary: A Viable National
Strategy,” Aerospace Power Journal (Winter 1998), p. 41.
3. For a proposal along these lines, see Michael Krepon with
Christopher Clary, Space Assurance or Space Dominance? The Case
Against Weaponizing Space (Washington: Henry L. Stimson Center,
2003), pp. 109–10.
4. For an earlier, highly sophisticated argument along these lines,
see John Tirman, ed., The Fallacy of Star Wars (Vintage Books, 1984).
5. James Clay Moltz, “Breaking the Deadlock on Space Arms Con-
trol,” Arms Control Today, vol. 32, no. 3 (April 2002).
6. For a good discussion, see Krepon and Clary, Space Assurance or
Space Dominance? pp. 114–24.
7. Krepon and Clary, Space Assurance or Space Dominance? p. 93.
8. For a summary, see David Mosher and Michael O’Hanlon, The
START Treaty and Beyond (Congressional Budget Office, October
1991), pp. 34–35; Ivo H. Daalder, Cooperative Arms Control: A New
Agenda for the Post–Cold War Era, CISSM Papers 1 (University of
Maryland at College Park, October 1992), pp. 23–27.
9. Peter L. Hays, “Military Space Cooperation: Opportunities and
Challenges,” in Moltz, Future Security in Space, p. 42.
 162
NOTES TO PAGES 117–127

10. James Clay Moltz, “Reining in the Space Cowboys,” in Moltz,

Future Security in Space, pp. 62–64.

Notes to Chapter Six

1. Vice Admiral Lowell E. Jacoby, Director, Defense Intelligence
Agency, Testimony, in “Current and Projected National Security
Threats to the United States, Hearings before the Select Committee on
Intelligence of the United States Senate, One Hundred and Eighth Con-
gress, February 11, 2003” (Government Printing Office, 2003).
2. Jacoby, Testimony, p. 17.
3. See James Clay Moltz, “Reining in the Space Cowboys,” Bulletin
of the Atomic Scientists (January/February 2003), p. 66.
4. U.S. Space Command (before merging with Strategic Command),
Long-Range Plan (1998), p. 21, available at www.spacecom.mil/LRP;
Robert Wall and David A. Fulghum, “Satellite Self-Protection Gains
Added Attention,” Aviation Week and Space Technology, October 28,
2002, p. 68.
5. Wall and Fulghum, “Satellite Self-Protection Gains Added Atten-
tion,” p. 68.
6. William B. Scott, “Innovation Is Currency of USAF Space Battle-
lab,” Aviation Week and Space Technology, April 3, 2000, p. 53.
7. Andrew Koch, “U.S. Seeks Solutions to Space Threats,” Jane’s
Defence Weekly, August 13, 2003.
8. Communication to author at Vandenberg Air Force Base, No-
vember 8, 2002.
9. Michael Sirak, “US Air Force Targets UAV Bandwidth Problem,”
Jane’s Defence Weekly, July 31, 2002, p. 28.
10. David A. Fulghum, “It Takes a Network to Beat a Network,”
Aviation Week and Space Technology, November 11, 2002, p. 31.
11. Paul Rehmus, The Army’s Bandwidth Bottleneck (Congres-
sional Budget Office, August 2003), pp. ix–xiii.
12. Jeremy Singer, “U.S. Air Force Scales Back GPS Upgrade Plans,”
Space News, January 27, 2003, p. 8.
13. Phillip J. Baines, “Prospects for ‘Non-Offensive’ Defenses in
Space,” in James Clay Moltz, ed., New Challenges in Missile Prolifer-
ation, Missile Defense, and Space Security, Occasional Paper 12 (Mon-
terey, Calif.: Monterey Institute of International Studies, July 2003),
pp. 40–41.
 163
NOTES TO PAGES 127–136

14. It may be possible, at least in theory, to clean up electrons

pumped into Van Allen belts after a nuclear explosion. In other words,
it may be possible to reverse the so-called Christofilos Effect, specifi-
cally through the use of low-freqency kilohertz waves emitted from
ground stations to make electrons “rain out” of orbit. This may help
make low-altitude space usable within months instead of years—pro-
vided, of course, that subsequent nuclear explosions can be prevented
and that new satellites can be orbited reasonably quickly to replace
those that have been lost. See Ian Steer and Melanie Bright, “Blind,
Deaf, and Dumb,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, October 23, 2002,
pp. 21–23.
15. Ira W. Merritt, U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Com-
mand, “Radio Frequency Weapons and Proliferation: Potential Impact
on the Economy,” Statement before the Joint Economic Committee,
105 Cong. 2 sess. (February 25, 1998); David A. Fulghum, “Micro-
wave Weapons Await a Future War,” Aviation Week and Space Tech-
nology, June 7, 1999, pp. 30–31; Carlo Kopp, “The E-Bomb—A
Weapon of Electrical Mass Destruction” (Monash University, Aus-
tralia, 1998); and Barbara Starr, “Russian Bomb-Disarming Device
Triggers Concerns,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, March 18, 1998, p. 4.
16. Robert Wall, “Chinese Advance in Electronic Attack,” Aviation
Week and Space Technology, October 28, 2002, p. 70.
17. See Tom Wilson, “Threats to United States Space Capabilities,”
paper prepared for the Commission to Assess United States National
Security Space Management and Organization (Washington, 2001),
pp. 41–46.
18. U.S. Space Command, Long-Range Plan, p. 24.
19. I am indebted to Richard Garwin for this observation (personal
communication, August 25, 2003).
20. John A. Tirpak, “Challenges Ahead for Military Space,” Air
Force Magazine (January 2003), pp. 25–26.
21. Marcia S. Smith, U.S. Space Programs: Civilian, Military, and
Commercial (Congressional Research Service, September 16, 2003),
p. 13; Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller),
RDT&E Programs (R-1), fiscal years 2003 and 2004 respectively,
available at www.defenselink.mil.
22. Benjamin S. Lambeth, Mastering the Ultimate High Ground
(Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 2003), p. 88.
23. Jeremy Singer, “U.S. Developing Ground-Based Systems to
Counter Satellites,” Space News, June 30, 2003, p. 6; Jeffrey Lewis,
 164
NOTES TO PAGE 140

“President Bush’s 2004 Budget Request: Implications for Space Weap-

onization,” draft, Center for International and Security Studies, Uni-
versity of Maryland, June 1, 2003 (cited with the permission of the
author); and “Air Force Budget Request for 2004” (specifically, pro-
gram element PE 0603401F), available at www.vs.afrl.af.mil/
Factsheets/XSS10.html.
24. Strategic Command recognizes as much. See U.S. Space Com-
mand, Long-Range Plan, p. 44.
25. Michael Sirak, “Pentagon Eyes Near-Term Ability to Block Sat-
com,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, July 24, 2002, p. 8.
26. U.S. Space Command, Long-Range Plan, pp. 46, 63.
 INDEX

ABL. See Airborne laser hit-to-kill technologies, 65,

ABM Treaty. See Anti-Ballistic 83–84; hunter-killer satellites,
Missile Treaty 128; intercept schemes, 66;
Afghanistan war, 3, 4, 38 keep-out zones, 114, 124;
AFSATCOM satellites, 46 kinetic energy, 13, 28, 85;
Airborne laser (ABL), 27, 72–76, kinetic kill, 53; microsatellite,
110, 113, 136, 137, 139 27–28, 86–88, 129, 130;
Aircraft, 26, 129, 137 microwave weapons, 69–70, 87,
Air Force, U.S., 50, 77, 136 124, 127; missile defense
Air Force Research Laboratory, systems and, 136–38; nuclear
125 detonations, 67–70; research
Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) and development, 133–42;
Treaty, 2–3, 15, 22, 23, 112 satellite vulnerabilities, 99–100;
Antisatellite (ASAT) programs, space mines, 87, 128; space
8–9; availability, 120; bans and weaponization and, 18, 21, 107,
prohibitions, 12, 23, 107–13; 122–42; testing, 138–39;
capabilities, 8, 18, 26–28, 129, verification, 107–08, 110, 111,
134; debris-producing, 106, 112, 113, 121. See also Lasers;
112–13, 116, 128, 132, 138; individual systems and countries
hardening and defense against, Arab Satellite Communications
25, 46, 68–70, 88, 93, 122–30; Organization, 59

165
166
INDEX

Argentina, 57, 98 Bush, George W.: ABM Treaty

Ariane rocket, 57 and, 112, 121; laser research
Arms control: accords and treaties, under, 13; Putin and, 22; space
2–3, 105–08, 120–21, 141; bans policy under, 13–14, 24
and prohibitions, 109–13, 121, Bush (George H. W.) admin-
130, 138; confidence-building istration, 116
measures, 113–15; deterrence, Bush (George W.) administration,
130–31; informal unilateral 15, 24, 46–47
restraints, 115–17; recommen-
dations, 138–39; verification, Canada, 17, 58, 86
107–08, 110, 111, 112, 113, CFE Treaty. See Conventional
121, 130 Armed Forces in Europe Treaty
Army, U.S., 136 Challenger space shuttle, 42
ASAT programs. See Antisatellite Chemical lasers, 71–72, 73, 77, 79
programs China. See People’s Republic of
Asia Satellite Telecom Company, China
59 CIS. See Commonwealth of
Athena rocket, 47 Independent States
Atlas rocket, 47, 83 Clementine II program, 13
Clinton, Bill, 12–13, 14, 38, 112
Ballistic missile defense: brilliant Clinton administration, 73, 84,
pebbles concept, 84–85, 120; in 115, 136, 137
cold war, 9; deployment, 9; hit- Cold war: antisatellite weapons, 9;
to-kill technologies, 65, 83–84; arms control, 113–14; arms
midcourse intercept system, 27, race, 133; development of
136, 137, 138; space-based, 28, mobile monitoring terminals,
53, 110; U.S. systems, 119–20. 47; nuclear weapons, 116; end
See also Lasers; Missiles; of, 12; use of satellites, 2–3; U.S.
individual systems missile defenses, 133
Ballistic missiles, 5, 16–17, 27, 67, Columbia space shuttle, 47
74, 110, 113, 119, 137; ICBMs, Commercial and civilian satellites,
27, 68, 74; SLBMs, 27. See also 40–41, 54, 56, 122, 127
Ballistic missile defense; Missiles Commercial Remote Sensing
Boeing, 83 Policy, 38
Brazil, 56, 57, 86, 99 Commission on Outer Space, 21,
Bush, George H. W., 13 120, 122
 167
INDEX

Commonwealth of Independent Earth: atmospheric effects, 73, 75,

States (CIS), 36. See also Russia; 76, 77–78; curvature, 77;
Soviet Union gravitational pull, 3031, 33;
Communications: satellites, 3–4, size, 30. See also Geosynch-
43, 46, 51, 56, 63, 100, 120, ronous orbit; Low-Earth orbit;
122, 125–26; systems, 80–82, Medium-Earth orbit
114 Earth Watch, 58
Computers and software, 27, 75 EC-135. See Aircraft
Conference on Disarmament, 17, Economic issues, 16, 35, 133–38
106, 109 EELV. See Evolved expendable
Conventional Armed Forces in launch vehicle
Europe (CFE) Treaty, 3, 12 Electromagnetic pulses, 68
Cosmos rocket, 53–54 Eros satellite, 59
Cox report (1999), 76 European Space Agency, 56, 57
Cuba, 2, 125 European Telecom Satellite
Organization, 59
Daschle, Tom, 16 Evolved expendable launch vehicle
Dean, Jonathan, 12, 109 (EELV), 47, 83
Defense, Department of, 78, 125,
135 F–15s. See Aircraft
Defense Intelligence Agency, 95, Falklands War, 93, 98
120 FIA. See Future Imagery
Defense Meteorological Satellite Architecture
Program, 43 Fiber-optic cable, 16, 35, 81, 129
Defense Satellite Communications FLSAT, 46
System (DSCS), 46, 51, 126 France, 18, 56, 57, 86, 94, 99
Defense Science Board, 78 Frequencies, 51
Defense Support Program, 46, 124 Future Imagery Architecture (FIA),
Delta rocket, 47, 83 51, 63, 89
Democratic position on space, 16
Discoverer II program, 53, 89 Garwin, Richard, 123
DSCS. See Defense Satellite Galileo navigation system, 57
Communications System Geosynchronous orbit: launching
of satellites, 50; region and
Early and attack warning satellites, range, 30–31, 32, 68; rockets
43, 46, 54, 124–25 for, 33; satellites in, 35, 38, 42,
168
INDEX

43, 46, 51, 54, 56; timing and International Maritime

speed, 32, 33; Van Allen Organization, 59
radiation belts and, 34; International Telecom Satellite
vulnerabilities of GEO satellites, Organization, 59
67–68 Iran, 13, 91
Germany, 47, 86, 99 Iraq. See Operation Desert Storm;
Global broadcast systems, 46 Operation Iraqi Freedom
Global positioning system (GPS) Israel, 57, 58, 59, 86
satellites, 3, 5, 26, 38, 42, 46,
51, 57, 63, 126 Japan, 47, 50, 57, 94
Globalstar, 59 JDAM. See Joint direct attack
GLONASS navigation system, 54 munition
GPS. See Global positioning JSTARS. See Joint Surveillance
system satellites Target Attack Radar System
GSLV rocket, 58 Johnson Island, 69
Joint direct attack munition
Hardening of satellites, 25, 46, (JDAM), 3, 4
68–70, 88, 93, 122–30, 141 Joint Surveillance Target Attack
Helios satellite, 56 Radar System (JSTARS), 26
High-energy lasers, 65, 71–77, Jumper, John, 8
123, 130, 135 Jumpseat satellites, 46
H-2 and H-2A rockets, 57
Keyhole (KH) satellite systems,
ICBMs. See Intercontinental 33–34, 43, 46
ballistic missiles Kosovo war, 3, 4
Ikonos satellite, 58–59
Imaging, 12, 34, 38, 43, 46, 51, Lacrosse satellite, 33–34, 43, 46
54, 56, 57, 58–59, 120, 126 LANDSAT, 58
Incidents at Sea agreement, 114 Lasers: all-gas-phase iodine laser,
India, 58, 76 80; antimissile and -satellite
Indonesia, 58 capabilities, 73–77, 122; attacks
INF Treaty. See Intermediate- by, 25, 123; beam strength and
Range Nuclear Forces Treaty range, 74, 77–78, 109; com-
Intercontinental ballistic missiles munications systems, 81–82;
(ICBMs). See Ballistic missiles construction requirements,
Intermediate-Range Nuclear 79–80; damaging doses, 71–72;
Forces (INF) Treaty, 12 dazzlers, 13, 136; Earth’s
 169
INDEX

atmosphere and, 73, 75, 76, Microsatellites, 65, 85–89, 100,

77–78, 79, 81; free-electron 109, 121, 125, 130; ASAT
lasers, 72, 80; laser satellite programs, 27–28, 86–88, 129,
constellations, 124; low-energy 130; Chinese, 86, 87, 92;
lasers, 76; mirrors and optical Russian, 86, 87; U.S., 86, 87, 88
systems, 78–79; nuclear-pumped Microwaves, 69–70, 87, 124, 127,
lasers, 76; pulsed lasers, 71; 140
satellite communications Mid-infrared advanced chemical
systems, 25, 125; solid-state laser (MIRACL), 13, 27, 73, 77
lasers, 72; wavelengths, 77–78. Military issues: air-breathing
See also Airborne lasers; capabilities, 26; future conflicts,
Chemical lasers; High-energy 91–104; militarization of space,
lasers; Space-based lasers; Mid- 1–2; military organization, 50;
infrared advanced chemical laser negation, 14–15; space-to-Earth
LEO. See Low-Earth orbit weapons, 28
Livermore labs, 82 Military Strategic and Tactical
LK-1 rocket, 58 Relay (MILSTAR), 46, 51, 123,
Lockheed Martin, 83 126
Long March rocket series, 56 Military use of satellites, 1–2, 3–4,
Low-Earth orbit (LEO): ASAT 21, 22–23, 38–39, 42, 43–46,
debris, 112; protection and 54, 56, 63, 88, 125–26; com-
hardening of satellites in, 123, mercial satellites and, 46–47,
127; region and range, 30, 68; 125; DSCS, 46; GPS, 3
rockets for, 33; satellites in, 8–9, MILSTAR. See Military Strategic
12, 26, 27, 35, 38, 42, 43, 51, and Tactical Relay
53, 54, 56, 127; timing and MIRACL. See Mid-infrared
speed, 33; Van Allen radiation advanced chemical laser
belts and, 34, 68–69; Missile Defense Agency, 74, 77, 84
vulnerabilities of satellites in, Missiles: antisatellite capabilities,
67, 68, 136, 137 27, 110, 119, 121; Chinese, 96,
98; defenses, 28, 84–85,
Magnum satellite, 46 136–37; early warning satellites,
Medium-Earth orbit (MEO): 43, 46; hypersonic missiles, 85;
hardening of satellites in, 127; interceptor missiles, 9, 84–85;
region and range, 30; satellites nuclear-armed or -tipped, 50,
in, 38, 42, 46; Van Allen 67, 92, 122, 130; recon-
radiation belts and, 34, 127 naissance-strike complex, 101;
170
INDEX

SCUDs, 68, 71, 72, 73; 38, 42–43; shape of, 32, 38, 43.
Sidewinders, 73; tracking, 51, See also Geosynchronous orbit;
65. See also Anti-Ballistic Low-Earth orbit; Medium-Earth
Missile Treaty; Ballistic missile orbit
defense; Ballistic missiles; OrbView-3 and -4 satellites, 59
Rockets and rocketry Outer Space Treaty, 20, 107, 109
Mobile User Objective System
(MUOS), 51 P-3. See Aircraft
Molniya rocket, 53–54 Pakistan, 86
MUOS. See Mobile User Objective Peaceful Nuclear Explosions
System Treaty, 3
Pegasus rocket, 47
National Command Authorities, People’s Republic of China (PRC):
14 future Taiwan Strait conflict,
National Imagery and Mapping 91–104, 110–11, 131; manned
Agency, 38 space program, 54; micro-
National Reconnaissance Office, satellites, 86, 87, 92; militari-
124 zation of space and, 17, 99;
National Reconnaissance military capabilities, 93–104;
Organization, 15 monitoring of, 2; People’s
Navy, U.S., 75 Liberation Army, 54, 95;
Nuclear weapons, 8, 67–70, 116, satellite launch services, 33, 54;
126–27 satellites, 39, 54, 56, 58, 61;
space capabilities, 5, 8, 13,
Observation satellites, 54, 56 18–19, 92–93, 98–104, 127;
Onyx satellite systems, 43 treaty negotiations, 106; U.S.-
Open Skies Treaty, 3 China relations, 22, 24, 92; use
Operation Desert Storm, 3, 4, 58, of lasers, 76–77
140 Picosatellites, 86
Operation Iraqi Freedom, 3, 4, 5, Political issues, 16, 21–22, 28,
46 103, 104, 106, 134–35
Orbcomm, 59 Portugal, 86
Orbimage, 58–59 PRC. See People’s Republic of
Orbital Sciences, 58 China
Orbits: altitude of, 30; elongated, Presidential decision directive 23,
46; objects in Earth orbit, 38
36–37; of satellites, 30–34, 35, Putin, Vladimir, 22
 171
INDEX

Quickbird satellite, 58 military and commercial, 34–42,

69, 125, 127; data transmission,
Radar, 50, 51, 53, 56 4, 56, 125–26, 149n14;
Radiation. See Lasers; Micro- defensive or offensive use, 5, 18,
waves; Van Allen radiation 93; de-orbit of, 117; effects of
belts; X-rays Earth’s curvature, 46; ground
Radio energy, 127 control stations, 47; hardening,
Research and development, 25, 46, 68–70, 88, 93, 122–30,
133–38 141; jamming, 125–26, 136,
Rockets and rocketry: develop- 137, 140; launching, 32–35,
ment of, 63, 90; EELV, 47, 83; 47–49, 55, 115; passive and
space launching, 33–34, 48–49, self-defense measures, 25–26;
82–84; space shuttle, 47. See satellite swarms, 88–89; speeds,
also Missiles; individual systems trajectories, and revolutions,
Rumsfeld, Donald, 13–14, 15, 16 30–33; Van Allen radiation belts
Russia: Chinese relations, 56, 76, and, 34; vulnerabilities, 99–101;
99; manned space program, 54; weight and size, 33–35. See also
microsatellites, 86, 87; military Microsatellites; Picosatellites;
spending, 5, 94; notification of individual systems
space launches, 12; satellites, 35, SBIRS. See Space-based infrared
38, 53–54, 58, 61; space budget, satellite systems
53; space facilities, 53; treaty SBLs. See Space-based lasers
negotiations, 106; use of lasers, Schriever Air Force Base, 47, 50,
76; U.S. relations, 22, 24, 115; 125
weaponization of space and, 17. Sea Launch, 57
See also Commonwealth of September 11, 2001, 22, 24, 35
Independent States; Soviet Shavit rocket, 58
Union Shtil rocket, 53–54
Signals-intelligence satellites, 46,
SALT II. See Strategic Arms 51
Limitation Talks SLBMs. See Submarine-launched
Sanctuary, space as, 8–9, 12, 15, ballistic missiles
18, 22 Smith, Robert, 13
Satellites: backups and SOSUS array, 101, 102
alternatives, 128–30, 137; Soviet Union: antisatellite
communications capabilities, 35, capability and tests, 9, 10–11,
51; costs, 33, 89; current 130; dissolution of, 53; listening
172
INDEX

to, 46; monitoring of, 2; nuclear Teets, Peter B., 15

weapons, 116; space program, Telephone services. See Fiber-optic
2, 92–93 cable
Soyuz rocket, 53–54 Telescopy, 50
Space and Missile Defense Terrorism. See September 11, 2001
Command, 50 Theater missile defense (TMD),
Space-based infrared satellite 12, 23
(SBIRS) systems, 51, 63, 89 Thermal blooming, 76
Spaced-based lasers (SBLs), 53, Threshold Test Ban Treaty, 3
77–80 Titan rocket, 34, 47
Space Command, 14–15, 47, 50 TMD. See Theater missile defense
Space Imaging Corporation, 38, Treaties: bans and prohibitions,
58 105–13; confidence-building
Space shuttle, 42, 47 measures, 113–15; United
Space Tracking and Surveillance Nations and, 105–06. See also
System (STSS), 51 individual treaties
Space Wings, 50
SPOT, 56, 58 UAVs. See Unmanned aerial
Sputnik, 2 vehicles
Start rocket, 53–54 Ukraine, 33, 58, 99
START I and II. See Strategic Arms United Kingdom, 47, 86, 87, 94,
Reduction Treaties 99
Strategic Arms Limitation Talks United Nations (UN): Conference
(SALT) II, 3 on Disarmament, 17, 106, 109;
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties: reconnaissance satellites, 2;
START I, 3; START II, 12 treaties, 105–06; weaponization
Strategic Command, 15, 129 of space, 17, 22, 121
STSS. See Space Tracking and United States: antisatellite
Surveillance System capability, 9, 12–13, 27, 63, 65,
Submarine-launched ballistic 105–17, 121–22, 130–42; arms
missiles (SLBMs). See Ballistic control measures, 23–24,
missiles 105–17; dominance in space,
Surrey Satellite Technology, 86 29, 61–62, 119–42; future
satellite capabilities, 51, 53,
Taiwan, 76, 91–104, 110–11 103–04; international views of,
Technology advances, 62–63, 89 22; launch facilities, 47–49;
TechSat21, 89 microsatellites, 86, 87, 88;
 173
INDEX

military and space spending, 5, Van Allen radiation belts, 8, 34,

6–7, 133–38, 155n38; missile 68–69, 127, 163n14
defense system, 110; notification Vega rocket, 57
of space launches, 12; and VLS-1 rocket, 58
regime change, 67; Russian
relations, 22, 24, 115; satellites, Watts, Barry, 18
35, 38, 42–53, 120, 122–30; Weapons of mass destruction
space policy and program, 2–3, (WMD), 132–33
16, 119, 120–22, 141; space Weather satellites, 38, 43
surveillance, 50, 75, 124–25; White Cloud ocean reconnaissance
space system survivability satellite, 43, 46
measures, 64; threats to, 13–14; Wideband Gapfiller satellites, 51
UN and, 105–06; weaponi- Worden, Pete, 15
zation of space, 16–24, 120–22, World War II, 116
132–42; weapons of mass
destruction, 132–33 X–rays, 68, 71
Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs),
3, 26, 82, 129 Zenit rocket, 57
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Robert A. Day Joel Z. Hyatt Beatrice W. Welters
Thomas E. Donilon Shirley Ann Jackson Stephen M. Wolf
Mario Draghi Ann Dibble Jordan Daniel Yergin
Michael H. Jordan

Honorary Trustees
Leonard Abramson F. Warren Hellman Samuel Pisar
Rex J. Bates Robert A. Helman J. Woodward Redmond
Louis W. Cabot Roy M. Huffington Rozanne L. Ridgway
A. W. Clausen James A. Johnson Charles W. Robinson
William T. Coleman Jr. Vernon E. Jordan Jr. James D. Robinson III
Lloyd N. Cutler Breene M. Kerr Warren B. Rudman
D. Ronald Daniel James T. Lynn B. Francis Saul II
Bruce B. Dayton Jessica Tuchman Mathews Ralph S. Saul
Charles W. Duncan Jr. David O. Maxwell Henry B. Schacht
Walter Y. Elisha Donald F. McHenry Michael P. Schulhof
Robert F. Erburu Robert S. McNamara Joan E. Spero
Henry Louis Gates Jr. Mary Patterson McPherson John C. Whitehead
Robert D. Haas Arjay Miller James D. Wolfensohn
Lee H. Hamilton Maconda Brown O’Connor Ezra K. Zilkha