The following essay attempts to answer the seventh stimulus, which regards George Berkeley's

idealism, of PHI 301's second longer assignment. It will first define its key terms, then

reconstruct Berkeley's case. After reconstructing his argument, it will consider and reply to three

noteworthy objections. Finally, the essay will provide a contemporary evaluation of the strength

of Berkeley's case.

Regarding the key terms of the argument, it employs several phrases that may appear vague or

obscure at first glance. Among these are materialism and idealism. In using the word materialism

and its conjugates, this essay refers to the theory that any material things exist, and by idealism,

it refers to Berkeley's theory which holds that there are no material objects but only ideas and the

minds which perceive them. By material things, the essay denotes items that would continually

exist with or without the existence of thinking things like minds. It is these things with which

Berkeley primarily takes issue. Having defined these most critical terms of Berkeley's argument,

the essay will now turn toward its reconstruction.

Berkeley begins his Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge by assuming a

premise drawn from the Cartesian veil of ideas. This premise is that one's mind does not

immediately and inerrantly perceive the world but, instead, perceives it indirectly through a set

of ideas. According to Berkeley, these ideas have three types. The first type is the category of

ideas that are "actually imprinted on the senses" through sight, smell, touch, hearing, and taste,

which Berkeley calls ideas of sense. The second type is perceived "by attending to the passions

and operations of the mind." These he calls ideas of reflection. Finally, Berkeley finds that there

are ideas formed according to our memory and imagination regarding the other two types.

Through these types of ideas, he says, collections of ideas are formed, and these collections of

ideas come to be marked as one thing. Using the example of an apple, he describes a set of ideas
imprinted on us, which lead us to identify it according to its type. Among these are its redness,

smell, and taste, without which we would not identify the apple. Here we reach a crucial

principle of Berkeleian idealism: in observing what are commonly believed to be material

objects, we merely perceive a collection of ideas. These collections of ideas, in turn, make up all

of experience.

In section two of Berkeley's Principles, he discusses the mind or spirit. Here he notes that,

regardless of what ideas there are, there is another item that, in itself, perceives each idea. It is in

this item, the mind, that each idea exists. Without the mind, each idea would be rendered

imperceptible. As such, he comes to the following conclusion: the existence of ideas is

contingent on the existence of a mind. Here, he makes an implicit claim regarding existence,

later made explicit in section three. That is, as is written in the proceeding section, "esse is

percipi." To exist is to be perceived. Such a claim is relatively uncontroversial in regard to ideas

of reflection, memory, and imagination. However, regarding sensible ideas, the materialist may

be hesitant to accept it.

In section three, Berkeley further examines the contingent existence of sensible ideas on the

mind. He describes his relationship with the items in his study, noting that he is experiencing

them in sight and feeling. Berkeley believes this is the only medium through which one can say

that the items in his study exist. Furthermore, the only comprehensible way to say that something

exists without perceiving that thing in real-time is to claim either that if one were in the place

where that thing is, he would perceive it or that there is another being that does perceive the item

in real-time.
To use an example, the author of this assignment is, as he writes, having essay-like experiences.

In these experiences, he sees the whiteness of his computer screen and feels the keys through

touch. Were he to leave the room, the author would no longer have either room-like or essay-like

experiences. Nevertheless, it is still sensible to say that the essay and room exist if there is

another being having essay and room-like experiences or that if the author were in the room, he

would have essay and room-like experiences. However, Berkeley argues, it would not be

sensible to say that the essay exists if it were to go unperceived. If there were no ideas of the

paper, then there would be no mechanism by which one could say that it exists in any capacity.

It is through this claim that Berkeley eliminates the contention that material objects may exist.

He concludes that because nothing that is unperceived can coherently be said to exist, and

because material objects cannot be perceived but only the ideas associated with them, material

objects cannot be intelligibly said to exist. Thus, the only things that exist are determined to be

minds and the ideas within them, and the possibility of mind-independent material objects

existing is eliminated.

Having, according to Berkeley, established that existence is entirely composed of minds and

ideas, this essay will now turn to his opposition. The proceeding paragraphs will examine three

objections in ascending order according to their strength.

The first and perhaps most obvious grounds upon which one may object to idealism is that it

obliterates the distinction between imaginary and real things. Critics may argue that Berkeley

renders the universe arbitrary and unclear by likening previously supposed material objects to

thoughts and sentiments. However, Berkeley has a reply prepared for such an objection. In

section thirty, he reaffirms his distinction between the three types of ideas but further
distinguishes ideas of sense from their counterparts. Firstly, he writes, "ideas of sense are

stronger, livelier, and cleaner than those of the imagination." Further, he asserts that there is an

order to sensible ideas characterized by their obedience to the laws of nature. This stands in

contrast to the ideas of the will, which are "often random and jumbled." This reply successfully

distinguishes between real and false ideas and puts the objection to rest.

The second objection to be reviewed here concerns the apparent existence of objects that go

unperceived by man and beast yet are said to exist. As described above, Berkeley asserts that the

existence of objects can be maintained even if one does not presently have experiences like that

object in two ways. The first is that another being continues to perceive ideas associated with

that object, and the second is that someone would have experiences like that object were they in

its presence. While the first option is relatively unobjectionable, the second raises a notable

concern in relation to the first objection. If real objects exist according to their ideas' being

imprinted against our will and their obedience to the laws of nature, then by what mechanism can

the second option maintain the existence of sensible ideas? While Berkeley did not speak to this

objection, it does not seem apparent that an idealist should be significantly concerned by it. The

idealist could resolve this objection in one of two ways. Firstly, he could concede the idea of

object permanence and argue that objects would pop in and out of existence according to the

perception of their sensible ideas. To return to the example of the essayist's essay, the sensible

idea of the paper would pop in and out of existence as he came and went from the room.

However, the idea of the essay generated by memory would remain within the essayist. While

this may mean backing down on Berkeley's second way of maintaining objects' existence, it does

not undermine the core of the philosophy, nor does it make any practical difference to the

operations of the world.

existence. In part twenty-nine of Principles, he discusses ideas that are not the products of our

will, writing that "when in broad daylight I open my eyes, it isn't in my power to choose whether

or not I shall see anything..." Because ideas, rather than existing independently, are merely the

products of minds, they cannot in themselves have causal power. Therefore, ideas cannot,

according to Berkeley, appear spontaneously. This being the case, Berkeley believes there must

be "some other will... that produces them." As such, Berkeley takes it as demonstrated that there

exists an omnipresent God who implants and provides us with ideas that would otherwise seem

uncaused. And here, we find the key to resolving the objection described in the previous

paragraph. If we can presuppose the existence of an omnipresent, immanent God, then there is,

in fact, no need for Berkeley's second method of maintaining an object's existence. There is

always a mind present to maintain object permanence; thus, the first method is always satisfied.

This essay's third objection concerns the veil of ideas. While Berkeley correctly believed that

virtually all of his contemporaries accepted that everyone perceives the world indirectly through

a prism of ideas, this is not the case among modern philosophers. Many readers may ask what

Berkeley has to offer in response to a hardcore materialist who denies this premise. Here, the

essay will examine one final argument of Berkeley's before proceeding to its closing section. To

this end, it will introduce Berkeley's so-called master argument. In sections twenty-two and

twenty-three of his Treatise, Berkeley introduces this relatively simple argument, which operates

as follows.

In determining whether any object can exist outside the mind, we must think of an unconceived

object. However, as soon as we try to think about this object, we have conceived of it. Thus,

nothing can exist outside the mind, so even after throwing out the veil of ideas, we will be
greeted by naught but bundles of perceptions. If taken as sound, this argument eliminates any

practical distinction between perceiving the world directly and indirectly, thus putting the third

objection to rest. In its closing section, this essay will offer its author's assessment of Berkeley's

argument. Therefore, it will adopt a first-person perspective.

In reviewing Berkeley's idealist theory, I was struck first and foremost by a nagging question

that, so far as I can tell, remains without a satisfactory answer. This question is as follows: what

is behind the veil of ideas? Berkeley takes himself to have resolved this question in his master

argument by reasoning his way back to collections of ideas being the only things behind the veil.

However, it does not seem to me that his argument is as strong as its moniker would signify. In

the Master argument, Berkeley asserts that it is impossible to conceive of a mind-independent

object because to conceive of such an object would involve having experiences like it, and he

believes we never experience mind-independent objects. I would argue that this conflates the act

of conception with the thing that is conceived of. In making this distinction, it appears that, while

Berkeley remains correct that we must have some perception to perceive something, it does not

follow from his premises that we cannot possibly conceive of a mind-independent object.

Instead, it becomes evident that the items the mind perceives are not necessarily immaterial.

Assuming that my reasoning is not mistaken, I believe this assessment of Berkeley's idealism is

quite damaging, as it presents a meaningful error that pervades nearly every aspect of his theory.

In closing, it appears to me that Berkeleian idealism, particularly its master argument, lacks the

flexibility to reconcile the distinction between the act of conception and the thing being

conceived. Through this distinction, the impossibility of material objects' existence is rejected.

As such, the master argument fails, and with it, the core of Berkeleian idealism.