Quad Plus and Indo-Pacific

This book explores how the Quad Plus mechanism is set to reshape the
global multilateral economic and security co-operations between Quad partner
countries and the rest of the world.
With the Quad partners—Australia, India, Japan and the United States—
seeing deteriorating ties with China, the book provides a holistic under-
standing of the reasons why Quad Plus matters and what it means for the
post-COVID Indo-Pacific and Asian order. It goes beyond the existing lit-
erature of the global post-COVID reality and examines how Quad Plus can
grow and find synergy with national and multilateral Indo-Pacific initiatives.
The chapters analyse the mechanism’s uncharacteristic yet active approach of
including countries like South Korea, Israel, Brazil, New Zealand and
ASEAN/Vietnam for their successful handling of the pandemic crisis,
thereby reshaping the new world’s geopolitical vision.
A unique study focused solely on the intricacies and the broader dialogue
of the “Quad Plus” narrative, the book caters to strategic audiences as well
as academics researching international relations, politics, and Indo-Pacific
and Asian studies.

Jagannath P. Panda is a research fellow and centre coordinator for East Asia at
the Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-
IDSA), New Delhi, India. He is the series editor for Routledge Studies on
Think Asia. Dr Panda is an expert on China and Indo-Pacific security with a
primary focus on East Asia: China, Japan, and the Korean Peninsula.

Ernest Gunasekara-Rockwell serves as the editor-in-chief of the Journal of

Indo-Pacific Affairs and director of the Consortium of Indo-Pacific
Researchers. Prior to these roles, he was the acting director and managing
editor of Air University Press and the acting dean of the Air Force Research
Institute.
Routledge Studies on Think Asia

Edited by Jagannath P. Panda, Institute for Defence Studies and

Analyses, India
This series addresses the current strategic complexities of Asia and forecasts
how these current complexities will shape Asia’s future. Bringing together
empirical and conceptual analysis, the series examines critical aspects of
Asian politics, with a particular focus on the current security and strategic
complexities. The series includes academic studies from universities, research
institutes and think-tanks and policy oriented studies. Focusing on security
and strategic analysis on Asia’s current and future trajectory, this series wel-
comes submissions on relationship patterns (bilateral, trilateral and multi-
lateral) in Indo-Pacific, regional and sub-regional institutions and
mechanisms, corridors and connectivity, maritime security, infrastructure
politics, trade and economic models and critical frontiers (boundaries,
borders, bordering provinces) that are crucial to Asia’s future.

URL: https://www.routledge.com/Routledge-Studies-on-Think-Asia/book-
series/TA

Mongolia and Northeast Asian Security

Nuclear Proliferation, Environment, and Civilisational Confrontations
Edited by Alicia J. Campi and Jagannath P. Panda

Asian Geopolitics and the US-China Rivalry

Edited by Felix Heiduk

ASEAN and India-ASEAN Relations

Navigating Shifting Geopolitics
Edited by M. Mayilvaganan

Quad Plus and Indo-Pacific

The Changing Profile of International Relations
Edited by Jagannath P. Panda and Ernest Gunasekara-Rockwell

Indo-Pacific Strategies
Navigating Geopolitics at the Dawn of a New Age
Edited by Brendon J. Cannon and Kei Hakata

China in India's Post-Cold War Engagement with Southeast Asia

Chietigj Bajpaee
Quad Plus and Indo-Pacific
The Changing Profile of
International Relations

Edited by
Jagannath P. Panda and
Ernest Gunasekara-Rockwell
First published 2022
by Routledge
2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN
and by Routledge
605 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10158
Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business
© 2022 selection and editorial matter, Jagannath Panda and Ernest
Gunasekara-Rockwell; individual chapters, the contributors
The right of Jagannath Panda and Ernest Gunasekara-Rockwell to be
identified as the authors of the editorial material, and of the authors for
their individual chapters, has been asserted in accordance with sections 77
and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced
or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means,
now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording,
or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in
writing from the publishers.
Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or
registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation
without intent to infringe.
British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
A catalog record has been requested for this book

ISBN: 978-1-032-04860-4 (hbk)

ISBN: 978-1-032-07314-9 (pbk)
ISBN: 978-1-003-20640-8 (ebk)
DOI: 10.4324/9781003206408

Typeset in Times New Roman

by Taylor & Francis Books
Contents

List of tables vii

List of contributors viii
Acknowledgments xii
List of abbreviations xiii

Introduction: Quad Plus: Shaping relationships in the Indo-Pacific? 1

JAGANNATH P. PANDA AND ERNEST GUNASEKARA-ROCKWELL

PART I
Beijing, Quad and the Quad Plus 15
1 China’s views of the Quad and Quad Plus arrangements 17
JEFFREY BECKER

2 Competition and coalitions: The United States, Quad Plus and

the Chinese challenge in the Indo-Pacific 30
AKRITI VASUDEVA

3 The Quad Plus and India’s pointed alignment strategy 44

JAGANNATH P. PANDA

4 Nurturing the Quad Plus formula: Institutional perspective of

Japan’s FOIP 78
KEI KOGA

5 Australia, New Zealand and the Quad Plus 94

MIGUEL A. HÍJAR-CHIAPA

PART II
The “Plus” perspectives 109
6 Fracturing architecture?: The Quad Plus and ASEAN centrality
in the Indo-Pacific 111
EVAN A. LAKSMANA
vi Contents
7 Britain in the Indo-Pacific—and the Quad Plus, or even
a “Quint”? 124
JOHN HEMMINGS AND JAMES ROGERS

8 The Quad Plus and South Korea’s quest for foreign

policy autonomy 136
KUYOUN CHUNG

9 Israel, India and Quad Plus: Searching for alternatives to

Western perspectives 150
GIUSEPPE DENTICE

10 France and the Quad Plus: Keeping flexibility in the Indo-Pacific 164
CÉLINE PAJON

11 Function over form: Canada’s bolting-in and capabilities-led

approach to Quad Plus engagement 177
STEPHEN NAGY

12 The Indo-Pacific Quad Plus at Atlantic Latin American shores:

Moment of covet or reckoning for Brazilian foreign policy? 192
DATTESH PARULEKAR

PART III
A view from the others 209
13 Russia’s attitude to the Quad Plus: Troublesome present,
hazy future 211
ANNA KIREEVA AND ALEXEY KUPRIYANOV

14 Quad Plus: A role for Indian Ocean island states? 225

NILANTHI SAMARANAYAKE

15 The Quad Plus proposition in a Middle Eastern context 235

BRENDON J. CANNON

16 The Quad Plus and promoting international connectivity:

A focus on the Makran region 249
KENTA AOKI

Index 263
Tables

3.1 India’s key defence/military agreements with Quad countries 49

3.2 India’s key defence/military agreements with Quad
Plus countries 55
8.1 South Korea’s major experiences in networked
security architecture 145
11.1 Japan, Australia, India, US and Canada’s converging and
diverging interests 181
Contributors

Kenta Aoki is a research fellow at Middle East Institute of Japan (MEIJ),

Tokyo, Japan. He taught at Ochanomizu University before joining MEIJ
in 2019. His research primarily focuses on the Contemporary Politics in
Afghanistan and Iran. His recent publications include “Chabahar: The
Fault-line in India-Japan Infrastructure Cooperation”, in Jagannath P.
Panda (ed.), Scaling India-Japan Cooperation in Indo-Pacific and Beyond
2025: Corridors, Connectivity and Contours (KW Publishers, 2020) and
“Afghan Local Police and Statebuilding”, in Hybrid Statebuilding
(Nakanishiya Shuppan, 2019; in Japanese).
Jeffrey Becker directs the Center for Naval Analyses’ Indo-Pacific Security
Affairs Program. His recent work has focused on China’s military as a
global force, including China’s military diplomacy, US–China military
engagement, China’s economic statecraft, and the security implications of
China’s expanding global presence. Dr. Becker’s book Peasants to Pro-
testers: Social Ties, Resources, and Migrant Labour Contention in Con-
temporary China was published in 2014 by Lexington Books. His more
recent publications include “Securing China’s Lifelines Across the Indian
Ocean” (US Navy War College, 2020), and China’s Presence in the Middle
East and Western Indian Ocean: Beyond Belt and Road (CNA, 2019).
Other peer-reviewed writings have appeared in “Comparative Political
Studies,” “Journal of Chinese Political Science,” and “Naval War College
Review.”
Brendon Cannon is assistant professor of international security at Khalifa
University, Abu Dhabi, UAE. He earned a Ph.D. in Political Science from
the University of Utah, USA (2009). His research focuses on the nexus of
international relations, security studies, and geopolitics. He has published
on topics related to regional security and geopolitics, the arms industry,
and shifting distributions of power across the Indo-Pacific. Cannon’s
articles appear in Defence Studies, Small Wars and Insurgencies, and Third
World Quarterly. His forthcoming book, edited with Kei Hakata, is Indo-
Pacific Strategies: Navigating Geopolitics at the Dawn of a New Age
(Routledge).
 List of contributors ix
Kuyoun Chung is assistant professor of political science at the Kangwon
National University. Her research focuses on US foreign policy and
Indo-Pacific security issues including regional security architecture, mar-
itime security and grey-zone conflict, and South Korea’s foreign policy.
Her recent publications include “South Korea’s Perspective on Quad Plus
and Evolving Indo-Pacific Security Architecture” (Journal of Indo-Pacific
Affairs, 2020) and “American Voters’ Threat Perception on North Korea
and their Voting Behavior: Analysis on the 2018 Midterm Election Survey
Data” (Journal of Parliamentary Research, 2020).
Giuseppe Dentice is the head of the Middle East and North Africa desk at
the CeSI - Center for International Studies, where he is researching geo-
political and security issues in the MENA region, as well as US foreign
policy in the Middle East. He has also contributed to several reports for
the Italian Parliament and Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and he is regularly
interviewed on MENA affairs by Italian and international media outlets.
John Hemmings is a professor at the Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center
for Security Studies (DKI APCSS), a Department of Defense Regional
Center. His areas of focus at DKI APCSS are northeast Asian security,
Japanese defence policy, the Indo-Pacific concept, alliance theory, and US
alliances. He holds adjunct fellowships with Pacific Forum and CSIS and
is a James Cook Associate Fellow in Indo-Pacific Geopolitics at the
Council on Geostrategy. He regularly contributes writing to academic and
policy journals and occasionally provides expert commentary to various
media, including the BBC, Sky News, the Telegraph and others.
Miguel A. Híjar-Chiapa is associate professor of International Relations at
the Center for North American Studies of the Pacific Studies Department,
University of Guadalajara, Mexico, and president of the Australian and
New Zealand Studies Association of North America. He has been a visit-
ing scholar at the Center for Australian and New Zealand Studies at the
University of Texas at Austin, and the Centre for Defence and Security
Studies at Massey University, New Zealand. His research interests include
International Relations theory, security in the Indo-Pacific, and the for-
eign and defence policies of Australia, Canada, India, New Zealand, the
UK, and the US.
Anna Kireeva holds the positions of Associate Professor at the Department
of Asian and African Studies and of Research Fellow at the Center for
Comprehensive Chinese Studies and Regional Projects at Moscow State
Institute of International Relations (MGIMO University). She focuses on
strategies and foreign policy of great/major powers in East Asia and the
Indo-Pacific: China, Japan, the US and Russia as well as India as an
emerging power. Her research has recently been centred on Russia’s Asian
pivot and Russia’s relations with Japan, China, South Korea, North Korea
and East Asia in general.
x List of contributors
Kei Koga is an Assistant Professor in the Public Policy and Global Affairs
Programme, School of Social Sciences, Nanyang Technological University,
Singapore. His research interests include international security, interna-
tional institutions, institutional changes, and East Asian/Indo-Pacific
regional security, Japanese Foreign Policy, and ASEAN. He is the author
of Reinventing Regional Security Institutions in Asia and Africa (Routle-
dge, 2017), and his articles appear in International Affairs, International
Studies Review, The Chinese Journal of International Politics, The Pacific
Review and Contemporary Southeast Asia, among others. His current
research includes Strategic Alignments and Institutional Dynamics in the
Indo-Pacific region, focusing on Japan and ASEAN.
Alexey Kupriyanov is a Senior Research Fellow, Head of the Research Group
on the South Asia and the Indian Ocean Region, Center for Asia Pacific
Studies, Primakov National Research Institute of World Economy and
International Relations, Russian Academy of Sciences. He is interested in
the history and contemporary development of South Asia and the Indian
Ocean region. He is the author of over two dozen articles on the Indo-Pacific
and Russian interests there.
Evan A. Laksmana is a Senior Research Fellow with the Centre on Asia and
Globalisation at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, National
University of Singapore. He was previously a senior researcher at the
Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Jakarta, Indone-
sia. His research has appeared at the Journal of Contemporary Asia, Asian
Security, Asia Policy, Asian Politics & Policy, Defense & Security Analysis,
Defence Studies, Contemporary Southeast Asia and others. His essays have
been published in The New York Times, Foreign Policy, Foreign Affairs,
South China Morning Post and others.
Stephen Nagy is a senior associate professor at the International Christian
University in Tokyo, a fellow at the Canadian Global Affairs Institute
(CGAI) and a visiting fellow with the Japan Institute for International
Affairs (JIIA). His recent funded research projects are “Sino-Japanese
Relations in the Wake of the 2012 Territorial Disputes: Investigating
Changes in Japanese Business’ Trade and Investment Strategy in China”
and “Perceptions and Drivers of Chinese View on Japanese and US For-
eign Policy in the Region”. He is currently working on middle power
approaches to great power competition in the Indo-Pacific.
Céline Pajon is Head of Japan research at the Center for Asian Studies of the
French Institute of International Relations (IFRI), Paris. She analyses
Japan’s foreign and defence policy, as well as geostrategic dynamics of the
Indo-Pacific area. Additionally, she is a Senior Fellow with the Japan
Program of the VUB, Brussels and an international research fellow with
the Canon Institute for Global Studies (CIGS) in Tokyo, where she stayed
to conduct research field work. In 2016, she was an invited fellow with the
 List of contributors xi
Japan Institute for International Affairs (JIIA), the think tank of the
Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
Dattesh D. Parulekar is assistant professor of international relations and area
studies, at the School of International and Area Studies (SIAS), Goa
University. His realms of specialisation include India’s foreign policy and
diplomacy, Chinese political economy, strategic maritime affairs with
respect to the Indo-Pacific, and Latin American affairs. He is a visiting
faculty at the Naval War College (NWC), Goa, as also the College of
Defence Management (CDM) and the Air Warfare College (AWC),
Secunderabad. Besides being the non-resident fellow of the Middle East
Institute (MEI), New Delhi, and the editorial advisory board member of
the FINS Journal of Diplomacy and Strategy, he lectures regularly at
public universities and think-tanks, in China and across Europe and Latin
America.
James Rogers is co-founder and director of research at the Council on
Geostrategy, where he specialises in geopolitics and British strategic
policy. Previously, he held positions at the Henry Jackson Society, the
Baltic Defence College, and the European Union Institute for Security
Studies. He has been invited to give oral evidence at the Foreign Affairs,
Defence, and International Development committees in the Houses of
Parliament.
Nilanthi Samaranayake is director of the Strategy and Policy Analysis Pro-
gram at CNA, a non-profit research organisation in the Washington area.
She is the author of publications on Indian Ocean security issues and
small states in international affairs, including China’s Engagement with
Smaller South Asian Countries (US Institute of Peace, 2019) and Island
States in a Region of Great Powers (Stimson Center, 2014). Samaranayake
holds an MSc in International Relations from the London School of
Economics and Political Science. The views expressed in her writings are
solely those of the author and not of any organisation with which she is
affiliated.
Akriti Vasudeva is a research analyst with the South Asia Program at the
Stimson Center. Her research focuses on US–India defence and strategic
cooperation, geopolitics of South Asia and the Indo-Pacific, and Indian
foreign policy. She is also editor-at-large at South Asian Voices, an online
magazine featuring strategic analysis and commentary on the security,
politics, and economics of the subcontinent. Her analysis has appeared on
BBC and NPR and in publications such as Foreign Policy, The National
Interest, and The Diplomat. Previously, she worked as a print journalist in
India, reporting on environmental issues for The Indian Express in
Mumbai, and on education policy for Hindustan Times, New Delhi.
Acknowledgments

First and foremost, we would like to express a special thanks to the Journal
of Indo-Pacific Affairs (JIPA), a professional journal of the Department of
the Air Force, published by the Air University, Maxwell AFB, Alabama, US.
This book has emerged as an outcome of the journal’s special issue, “Quad
Plus: Form versus Substance”, published in December 2020, edited by Dr
Jagannath P. Panda.
Building on the special issue, this edited volume provides revised and
updated chapters that take into account recent developments, with argu-
ments that are further refined. We extend our sincere appreciation for the
editorial assistance of JIPA’s excellent staff in compiling the special issues
and providing assistance for this manuscript. The completion of this project
would not have been possible without them.
This volume also benefited enormously from the meticulous editorial
assistance of Ms Mahima Duggal, Ms Eerishika Pankaj and Ms Mrittika
Guha Sarkar—we gratefully thank them for their time and edits.
Finally, we appreciate the candid, useful and insightful comments of the
peer reviewers that helped improve the papers/chapters of the volume. This
book could not have been published without the enthusiasm, expertise, and
exacting attention to detail of the various contributors, editors and reviewers.
List of abbreviations

AANZFTA ASEAN–Australia–New Zealand Free Trade Area

ACSA Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement
ADB Asian Development Bank
ADIZ Air Defence Identification Zone
ADMM+ ASEAN Defence Minister’s Meeting–Plus
AEP Act East Policy
AIIB Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank
ANZUS Australia, New Zealand and United States
AOIP ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific
APEC Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
ARF ASEAN Regional Forum
ASEAN Association of South-East Asian Nations
ASPI Australian Strategic Policy Institute
BDN Blue Dot Network
BECA Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement
BIOT British Indian Ocean Territory
BRI Belt and Road Initiative
BRICS Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa
BUILD Better Utilization of Investments Leading to
Development Act
CCP Chinese Communist Party
CEPA Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement
CICA Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building
Measures
COMCASA Communication Compatibility and Security Agreement
CPEC China–Pakistan Economic Corridor
CPTPP Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for
Trans-Pacific Partnership
CRIMARIO Critical Maritime Routes in the Indian Ocean
CSDP Common Security and Defence Policy
CSFH Community with a Shared Future for Humankind
DCCP Digital Connectivity and Cybersecurity Partnership
DMZ Demilitarised Zone
xiv List of abbreviations
EAS East Asia Summit
ECS East China Sea
EDGE Enhancing Development and Growth through Energy
EEZ Exclusive Economic Zone
EMASOH European Maritime Awareness mission in the Strait
of Hormuz
EPQI Expanded Partnership for Quality Infrastructure
EU European Union
FCDO Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office
FDI foreign direct investment
FIPA Foreign Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement
FOIP Free and Open Indo-Pacific
FON Freedom of Navigation
FONOPS Freedom of Navigation Operations
FPDA Five Power Defence Arrangements
FTA Free Trade Agreement
FVEY Five Eyes
GDP gross domestic product
HA/DR Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief
HDVC High Direct Voltage Cables
IAI Israel Aerospace Industries
IBSA India, Brazil and South Africa Dialogue Forum
IFC-IOR Information Fusion Centre for the Indian Ocean Region
INDOPACOM Indo-Pacific Command
IONS Indian Ocean Naval Symposium
IOR Indian Ocean Region
IORA Indian Ocean Rim Association
IPRD Indo-Pacific Regional Dialogue
IR International Relations
ISA Information Security Agreement
ISA International Solar Alliance
ISEAS Institute of Southeast Asian Studies
ISIS Institute for Science and International Security
ITAN Infrastructure Transaction and Assistant Network
JBPP Japan Brazil Partnership Programme
JCPOA Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action
JUSBE Japan-US-Brazil Exchange
KIDD Korea–US Integrated Defense Dialogues
LAC Latin America and Caribbean
LNG liquified natural gas
MAF Ministry of the Armed Forces
MB Muslim Brotherhood
MDA Maritime Domain Awareness
MDP Major Defence Partner
MEFA Ministry of the European and Foreign Affairs
 List of abbreviations xv
MENA Middle East–North Africa
MINUSTAH United Nations Stabilisation Mission in Haiti
MLSA Mutual Logistics Support Agreement
MNREGA Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment
Guarantee Act
MOU memorandum of understanding
NAPCI Northeast Asia Peace and Cooperation Initiative
NAPCOR Northeast Asia Plus Community of Responsibility
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NDB New Development Bank
NSG Nuclear Suppliers Group
NSP New Southern Policy
NSR Northern Sea Route
OCI Overseas Citizen of India
ODA Official Development Assistance
OSOWOG One-Sun One-World One-Grid
PLA People’s Liberation Army
PLAN PLA Navy
PRC People's Republic of China
PSI Proliferation Security Initiative
QLS Quad Leaders’ Summit
R2P responsibility to protect
RCEP Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership
RIMPAC Rim of the Pacific Exercise
ROK Republic of Korea
RUSI Royal United Services Institute
RwP responsibility while protecting
SAARC South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation
SAGAR Security and Growth for All
SCO Shanghai Cooperation Organisation
SCRI Supply Chain Resilience Initiative
SCS South China Sea
SLOC sea lines of communication
SOFA Status of Forces Agreements
SSC South-South Cooperation
TCOG Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group
THAAD Terminal High Altitude Area Defense
TPP Trans-Pacific Partnership
TSD Trilateral Strategic Dialogue
UK United Kingdom
UNCLOS United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
UNDP United Nations Development Programme
UNSC United Nations Security Council
USA United States of America
WIO Western Indian Ocean
Introduction
Quad Plus: Shaping relationships in the
Indo-Pacific?
Jagannath P. Panda and Ernest Gunasekara-Rockwell

The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (hereafter Quad 2.0) has quickly

emerged as a fulcrum of minilateralism in the Indo-Pacific. Amid the chan-
ging geopolitical, geoeconomic and geostrategic environment in the region,
the Quad 2.0 has assumed a prominent position in the foreign policy and
strategic ambits of its constituent members—India, Japan, Australia and the
United States (US). Over the past four years since its revival in 2017, the
grouping has gathered momentum, with recent actions looking to further
evolve it into a normalised and institutional part of diplomacy in the region.
Critically, such an institutionalised process has entailed both the Quad 2.0’s
elevation and expansion over the past year.
First, in terms of elevation of the grouping, in March 2021, the Quad
states came together in a landmark “Quad Leaders’ Summit” (QLS) that saw
a consultation among the state leaders of India, Japan, Australia and the US.
With the QLS, the Quad 2.0 went from being a biannual foreign ministerial
dialogue to a prime ministerial/presidential-level consultation. Furthermore,
the QLS not only marked the Quad 2.0’s elevation in diplomatic terms but
also its substantial upgradation. For instance, it saw the release of the Quad
grouping’s first ever joint statement (titled “The Spirit of the Quad”),1 which
reaffirmed their shared vision of a free, open, rules-based, resilient and
prosperous Indo-Pacific and their commitment to realising the same. Impor-
tantly, the meeting also took the Quad 2.0 from being a largely consultative
forum to one that is more action-oriented and focused on practical coop-
eration through the institution of three key working groups—the Vaccine
Experts Group, the Climate Working Group, and the Critical and Emerging
Technology Working Group.2
These groups highlight the core areas of the Quad as enhancing cap-
abilities for COVID-19 vaccine production, enabling “last mile” vaccine dis-
tribution, supporting and strengthening climate change mitigation,
cooperating on climate financing, building resilience and capacity through
new technologies, coordinating in global technology governance standard-
setting, and risk diversification in critical tech supply chains. Much of this
elevation was driven not only by the changing geopolitical situation but also
the election of President Joe Biden to the White House. Although assuming
DOI: 10.4324/9781003206408-1
2 Panda & Gunasekara-Rockwell
office in a time best characterised by uncertainty and tensions, President
Biden was quick to assure Washington’s continued support toward its allies
in the Indo-Pacific. For instance, in his first telephonic conversation with
Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga of Japan and Prime Minister Scott Morrison
of Australia in November 2020, Biden reiterated his intentions to further
strengthen bilateral ties in tackling shared challenges—including COVID-19,
climate change, and regional security (in a subtle reference to rising Chinese
and North Korean adventurism).3
Moreover, at the US–Japan Security Consultative Committee meeting
between the Foreign and Defence Ministers of both states in March 2021,4 as
well as the Biden–Suga joint leaders’ summit in April 2021,5 Washington
strongly reasserted its support for Japan’s position vis-à-vis its Senkaku
Islands dispute with China. The US confirmed that its long-standing security
alliance extended to the defence of the Senkaku Islands; Biden also opposed
“any unilateral action” that compromised Japan’s administrative control of
the islands and committed to bolstering joint defence capabilities to enhance
deterrence—and therefore preserve the security and stability of the Indo-
Pacific in face of concerning, if not outrightly belligerent, Chinese activities.
Second, the elevation of the Quad dialogue was accompanied by its
expansion, which involved the Quad states’ collaboration with other regional
and global partners. At times, such cooperation came under a trilateral fra-
mework with certain third countries (such as the India-Australia-France tri-
lateral). However, the most prominent grouping for such an expanded
dialogue came under what has been popularly (although not officially)
referred to as a “Quad Plus” framework. Rather than a concrete (let alone
formalised) mechanism, the Quad Plus emerged as an abstract concept in the
region. First emerging in March 2020, the Quad Plus conceptualisation refers
to a minilateral dialogue that extends the Quad 2.0 grouping beyond the four
lynchpin powers of India, Japan, Australia and the US to include other cru-
cial emerging economies—such as South Korea, Vietnam, New Zealand,
Israel and Brazil. Despite its abstract nature and uncertainty over whether
the Quad Plus will be realised as definite and tangible association, the Quad
Plus comes as a critical lens through which to view, dissect and evaluate the
growth of strategic minilateralism in the Indo-Pacific region.

The Quad Plus: only a product of the COVID-19 pandemic?

The Quad Plus represents a rather novel idea, borne from the uncertainty
and global tensions surrounding the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic.
The grouping originated from a unique Quad 2.0 meeting initiated by former
US Deputy Secretary of State Stephen Biegun on March 20, 2020, at the
foreign secretary level. Initially instituted as a weekly meeting, the consulta-
tion was meant to enable an exchange of assessments of the national pan-
demic situation of participant nations and synergise their responses to
contain its spread.6 The forum continued with discussions surrounding issues
 Introduction 3
like vaccine development studies; formulating strategies for alleviating the
pandemic’s devastating impact on the global, national, and domestic econo-
mies; navigating the challenge of citizens stranded in foreign nations; and,
coordinating assistance packages to smaller states in the region.
Importantly, in its earlier stages, the Quad Plus extended the Quad 2.0
forum to South Korea, Vietnam and New Zealand, raising critical questions
about whether such a broadened platform could be sustained and whether it
could feasibly translate into a mechanism for security cooperation. Yet,
despite the many questions surrounding the viability, and indeed the exis-
tence, of a Quad Plus framework, a foreign ministers-level meeting in May
2020 with the addition of South Korea, Brazil and Israel imbibed it with a
global characteristic.7 Additionally, on a nongovernmental or think-tank
level involving the strategic communities, the US-based Heritage Foundation
has organised Track 1.5 roundtable consultations under a Quad Plus label
since 2013, which have involved Philippines, Indonesia, Singapore, Taiwan,
France and Sri Lanka on a rotating basis.8 Hence, while the thematic idea of
a Quad Plus structure has been around for some time, it is now being wit-
nessed in its practical implementation, usage and value as an international
platform.
Although merely a virtual assembly of agreeable nations that engage and
meet to address or counter a shared (and urgent) challenge at present, the
Quad Plus format holds great promise amidst persisting regional uncertainty.
It represents, potentially, the amalgamation of Eastern and Western “like-
minded” countries. Even in its current status, the construct includes a wide
array of states—developing and developed economies and middle and major
powers. This indicates that the grouping could possibly be regarded as an
amalgamation of countries committed to maintaining a rules-based, liberal
institutional order. Whether the Quad Plus will be based simply on demo-
cratic values or international rules and norms remains to be seen. However,
rather than reflecting a broader democratic coalition that is very much
abstract at present, a Quad Plus framework is likely to be based more on
shared commitment to the existing international order rather than “demo-
cratic values”, which are harder to define and more exclusive in nature.
Instead, what states must envision is a broad, all-embracing and compre-
hensive framework that can stand as a pillar for regional security and stability,
multilateralism, and defending global institutionalism and the status quo.
In this context, perhaps the most salient feature of a Quad Plus mechan-
ism is its plural, inclusive nature. While the Quad Plus is led and organised
by the US, the distribution of power within its framework allows participat-
ing countries to also deepen engagement with counterparts under the strate-
gic ambit of the Quad 2.0 grouping.9 By building on their own national
interests, while being active participants to the fulfilment of national interest
goals of other nations, the Quad Plus dialogue is poised to take up greater
salience as a potential extension of the Quad 2.0 mechanism. Its salience is
further highlighted when placed in context of the Quad 2.0’s growing
4 Panda & Gunasekara-Rockwell
momentum and increased focus on practical cooperation within the region.
Any such collaboration to realise the goal of a free, open, resilient and rules-
based region must involve (if not rely on) cooperation with third states; the
Quad Plus framework can grow and be formalised into such an open and
inclusive platform for issue-based cooperation. The Quad Plus emerged with
the aim of discussing an international response to the coronavirus pandemic
by coordinating an efficient crisis response and humanitarian aid.10 However,
in a post-COVID period, the scope for cooperation and convergence among
the Quad Plus nations has the potential to, and must, emerge as a geopolitical
reality.
Indeed, even in the absence of a shared, urgent challenge that the pan-
demic presents, the increasingly multipolar vis-à-vis multiplex regional order
implies that there are plenty of foreign policy choices and challenges for
rising powers, including the Quad 2.0 and Plus nations. The arrival of new
institutions, emergence and reinstitutionalisation of trilateral, minilateral,
and multilateral groupings—as well as growing bilateral synergy among like-
minded nations—are key contours of this regional order.11 The strategic
choices and challenges of Indo-Pacific nations are increasingly being shaped
and conditioned by these contours. China, as a regional and a global com-
petitor, figures greatly in the multipolar choices that actors like India, Japan,
South Korea and others are making in Asia and beyond.

Quad Plus and the Indo-Pacific narrative

It is important to note the larger implications that the emergence of a Quad
Plus dialogue can have for regional security in the post-pandemic period,
which, by all signs, will be marked by notable differences. For instance, the
Quad Plus could potentially play a central role in the Indian Ocean Region
(IOR). The economies of the IOR are demonstrating growth at a remarkable
pace as the region, along with the Indo-Pacific as a whole, is becoming one
of the most crucial geopolitical and economic areas of the world. Con-
currently, a rise of security concerns related to vital sea routes and lines of
communication, aggressive maritime militarisation and the scramble for nat-
ural resources have threatened the transformation of the IOR.12 In this con-
text, the “Blue Economy” has emerged as an arena for nations to reframe
their approach in managing the oceans for a sustainable maritime
environment.
Here, Blue Economy refers to the sustainable use of precious ocean
resources for “economic growth, improved livelihoods and jobs, and ocean
ecosystem health”.13 While the economic aspects of the Blue Economy are
widely accepted, the political and security importance it holds as a geopoli-
tical instrument has received less international focus. To this effect, the Quad
2.0 nations could create a viable and comprehensive strategy to reach the
geopolitical, security and economic potential of the Blue Economy. In fact,
the Quad Plus mechanism would offer an ideal platform to further this
 Introduction 5
paramount factor, with countries like Australia, South Korea, Japan, Vietnam
and India attributing increasing focus to their maritime economies.14
At the same time, in a strategic context, considering the realistic national
security threats prevalent in contemporary times, the Quad Plus would allow
participating nations to create a strategic alignment that has otherwise
proved difficult to materialise. The potential grouping could, therefore, rein-
force the liberal international order in the Indo-Pacific and, by extension, the
world. Due to its composition of like-minded states, the Quad Plus could
indicate a growing, or at least temporary, embrace of a US-led order in the
Indo-Pacific region while still not becoming part of a set “alliance frame-
work”. An expansion of its scope, or a shift in its priorities from pandemic-
induced disaster relief to China, remains an unlikely scenario for many of the
potential partners in the forum.
Therefore, the emergence of the Quad Plus dialogue as China-centric is not
a goal that most of the participating nations would like to openly espouse,
with almost all sharing elaborate economic ties with Beijing, even if they are
wary of China’s coercive, unilateral and destabilising actions.15 Though eco-
nomic and trade ties with China are witnessing redaction in a post-COVID
order, with nations aiming to create newer, more sustainable and broader
supply chains, the embedded nature of China in the world economy is unli-
kely to be upended, with globalisation here to stay.16 Under such circum-
stances, although the Quad Plus will, at least for the foreseeable future, shy
away from being a China-focused grouping owing to fraught tensions that
are likely to hinder a convergence of national outlooks toward the major
power. Nevertheless, a Quad Plus framework could be a multilateral pillar
for securing international norms and laws and ensuring a secure and pros-
perous region. Today, despite a misalignment of approaches of individual
states, their Indo-Pacific policies and metanarratives are becoming increas-
ingly securitised. While a militarisation of the Quad 2.0 (let alone the Quad
Plus) remains highly improbable, the fact that the Quad Plus dialogue will
focus on securing and underpinning a rules-based order is highly probable.
In this context, it should be noted that the Indo-Pacific has emerged as the
next global theatre of power politics and competition. The rise of the region
has multiple facets attached to it: it is geographically hard to define which
results in greater disagreements among the countries; such politicisation of
its geography only further attests to its importance.17 The region is crucial to
both the US and China, with the US Department of Defense characterising
it as “the single most consequential region for America’s future”.18 Despite a
large number of potential flashpoints, the region remains one of the most
important economic and energy trade hubs of the present world order.19 The
Indo-Pacific incorporates the world’s most populated state (China) and the
most populated vote-based political system (India). Seven of the ten largest
standing armed forces on the planet can be found in the Indo-Pacific,20 and
around one-third of worldwide trade goes through the South China Sea
alone.21 The Indian Ocean too forms a critical conduit of international trade,
6 Panda & Gunasekara-Rockwell
as the “world’s busiest trade corridor” with approximately 80 per cent of
global maritime oil trade.22 Its sea lanes act as channels for 80 per cent of
China’s and 90 per cent of Japan’s and South Korea’s oil imports, making
these lanes strategically critical for the region’s energy security.23
Interestingly, the Chinese leadership and strategic circles have persistently
argued that the singular motivation behind US focus in the Indo-Pacific and
its Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP)24 strategy is to contain China’s ascent
to power.25 To a limited (but certain) degree, the Indo-Pacific has become a
point of convergence of the US–China competition in present times and will
continue to be a theatre for their contestation in the coming decade. The US–
China rivalry is set to reshape key geopolitical, geoeconomic and geostrategic
elements in the regional and global order. In many ways, this rivalry is set to
unfold a new-era “cold war” dimension that will pressurise smaller states in
the region and beyond—such as the Quad 2.0 and Quad Plus nations—to
choose between the security assurance offered by the US and their economic
dependence on China. Many Indo-Pacific states are already altering their
foreign policy strategies to account for such emerging geopolitical uncer-
tainties. Japan’s “Free and Open Indo-Pacific”, India’s “Act East Policy”,
South Korea’s “New Southern Policy” and Australia’s “Pacific Step-up” have
been ideated to encourage deeper and dedicated bilateral synergy among
nations in an attempt to ensure security vis-à-vis an increasingly belligerent
China and the US. This bilateral synergy could eventually be carried forward
within a Quad Plus framework that is more multilateral than US-centric—
thereby ensuring an inclusive and multipolar Indo-Pacific construct.
In fact, bilateral synergy among the Quad 2.0 nations has been growing
exponentially, leading to deeper quadrilateral synergy and the creation of the
Quad Plus. Till now cited as the weakest bilateral link26 in the Quad 2.0
framework, India–Australia ties have recently been upgraded to a Compre-
hensive Strategic Partnership, with both nations signing a mutual logistics
support agreement.27 Meanwhile, the fourth foundational pact between India
and the US—the Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement (BECA)—has
been signed.28 Similarly, the Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement
(ACSA)29 between India and Japan, signed amidst rising tensions with China
for both nations and domestic changes in Japan, symbolises a boost in strategic
defence ties between New Delhi and Tokyo at a time of turmoil.30 The
agreement comes in addition to similar ACSAs that Tokyo shares with
Washington and Canberra. These agreements (and elevation of bilateral part-
nerships) will set the stage for the future of security cooperation among the
Quad states. Against such a background, the Quad Plus could potentially take
forward the Quad process and imbibe it with a more global undercurrent.

Quad Plus in regional frameworks

Although a key grouping in the Quad 2.0’s horizontal expansion, the Quad
Plus is by no means the only regional framework that has emerged in recent
 Introduction 7
times in the Indo-Pacific. In a major boost to trilateralism, India, Japan and
Australia have launched a Supply Chain Resilience Network (SCRI),31 which
aims to diversify risk in global value chains by reducing over dependence on
the manufacturing giant, China. Such a platform can gain notable success by
engaging economically with the Quad Plus nations of South Korea, New
Zealand, Brazil, Israel and Vietnam. The emergence of alternative global
supply chains is a reality of the post-COVID-19 era. In the coming times, the
global economies will perhaps be divided into two separate value chains: one
for China, and one for the rest of the world. As this shift occurs, South and
Southeast Asia, alongside other developing economies, will seek to benefit by
integrating themselves in the new nexus. States like India and Vietnam will
also seek to establish themselves as technological competitors or search for
new technologies to offer a viable alternative for value-added advanced-
technology manufacturing.
Here, the Quad Plus can prove to be a vital tool for the states to further
their economic and technological goals by providing an additional avenue for
building bridges and opportunities for growth and development. A joint
statement released at the launch of the SCRI highlighted the mechanism’s
initial focus as sharing best practices and promoting investment opportu-
nities that further their diversification goals.32 Here, the SCRI could coordi-
nate efforts under the Quad Plus aegis as well—such as through regular,
broad-based investment promotion and buyer-seller matching events that
invite private enterprises from the Quad Plus nations. Australia–India–Japan
have already indicated their openness to the SCRI’s expansion in due
course;33 such an expansion can potentially begin on an ad hoc basis under
the Quad Plus.
Similarly, the US–Japan–Australia-led Blue Dot Network (BDN),34 aimed
at improving infrastructure-related activities in the Indo-Pacific, has emerged
as an initiative with much potential. Meanwhile, the India–France–Australia
trilateral, ideated in 2019, aims at creating an inclusive Indo-Pacific by
rebalancing China’s assertiveness in the region and is a further testament to
growing focus being attributed to the Indo-Pacific by nations beyond the
region.35 The Australia–Japan–India trilateral, established in 2015, advances
Westphalian ideals of democracy, sovereignty and rule of law while building
itself as an anti-China, yet not China-containment, model. These emerging
Indo-Pacific frameworks must be considered, in conjunction with the Quad
Plus, as added mechanisms to bolster the security dialogue emerging in the
region and the strategic positioning of like-minded states in reinforcing their
vision.
To consider the potential outcomes that a post-pandemic era Quad Plus
platform might take, it is also important to consider whether any such coa-
lition could feasibly stand the test against China’s ire and potential retalia-
tion. In recent times, Beijing has proved to be a coercive trade partner,
willing to pressurise states to bend to its will by applying China’s consider-
able economic prowess. As one of the world’s largest economies, still growing
8 Panda & Gunasekara-Rockwell
steadily despite a brief downturn during the pandemic, China is a veritable
global economic heavyweight. For many of the states in the region and
beyond, Beijing is still their largest trading partner, meaning that these states
are considerably dependent on China for their own economic growth. How-
ever, instead of being a responsible trade partner, Beijing has openly and
frequently used its might to extend its influence and achieve its diplomatic
goals through economic coercion over states and businesses.
In other words, Beijing has expanded its foreign policy tools to include
realist notions of hard and soft power.36 It has harshly punished countries
that undermine China’s national interests and foreign policy goals through
high tariffs, import bans, popular boycotts and limiting tourism. For exam-
ple, in response to South Korea agreeing to host the US’s Terminal High
Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) antimissile systems on its territory, Beijing
unleashed an economic retaliation campaign that left the middle-power
economy severely damaged. China not only targeted major companies like
Hyundai and Lotte with boycotts but also stopped Chinese tourism to the
country, banned K-pop and other cultural products, and held up licenses of
Korean agencies in China. Although the cumulative impact of China’s retri-
bution is difficult to calculate, South Korean companies are still feeling their
impact.37
In 2020, in response to Australia’s calls for an independent investigation
into the origins of COVID-19 and subsequent perceived anti-China state-
ments, Beijing levied sanctions on imports from Australia—the world’s most
China-reliant economy.38 This involved a massive tariff of 30 per cent on
Australia barley exports, a decision which has now been taken up in the
World Trade Organization.39 Since, China–Australia ties have attained a new
low, China recently announced the imposition of tariffs between 116 and 218
per cent on Australian wine following an antidumping investigation.40 Fur-
thermore, as their tensions intensified, China indefinitely suspended the
China-Australia Strategic Economic Dialogue—an important (and one of
the few remaining) diplomatic fora for the two countries to negotiate on
trade issues—as payback for Canberra’s “Cold War mindset”.41 Yet, China is
so deeply integrated into the global economy that despite the push for alter-
native supply chains, a complete decoupling is a highly unlikely scenario for
most states.42 Such circumstances will be critical in determining the outcome
and the scope of a Quad Plus framework—and is very likely to be the major
reason that the potential mechanism is limited in its China approach.
As such, there are multiple outcomes that the COVID-era Quad Plus dia-
logue can reach. By performing exceedingly well, it may just establish a place
for itself as a continued exercise between the nations that have been invited
until now or a rolling observer membership order with the Quad 2.0 nations
leading the charge. In other words, it can transcend from a mere expansion
of the Quad 2.0 forum to become a systematised form of a coalition. Alter-
natively, the Quad Plus mechanism can overtake the Quad 2.0 altogether,
reverting its focus to disaster management, coupled with national and
 Introduction 9
strategic security discussion focus areas of Quad 2.0, that led to the creation
of the “core” four group in 2004, then known as the Regional Core Group,
serving a joint response to the Indian Ocean tsunami.43 This, however, is an
unlikely scenario.
Despite its overtly broad agenda, the rebirthed Quad 2.0 dialogue is largely
focused on unifying efforts to counter China’s aggressive rise, and any
expansion into humanitarian aid will divert attention from this primary
focus. On the other hand, the Quad Plus format is likely to focus more
explicitly on areas like crisis response that are generally easier to coordinate
and receive more robust support within a broadened forum of liberal, like-
minded states. Additionally, the possibility of both the Quad 2.0 and the
Quad Plus mechanism coexisting in the post-COVID order is also likely. The
symbiotic existence of both dialogues, with a rotational membership beyond
the Quad four for the Quad Plus dialogue, can lead to the establishment of a
new-era framework that seeks to provide aid to Indo-Pacific and Asian
nations while strengthening bilateral and multilateral modes of interaction.

The future trajectory of the Quad Plus

Therefore, although the future trajectory of the Quad Plus remains uncertain
while it exists in its abstract character, the grouping has considerable poten-
tial to be a pillar of inclusivity in the Indo-Pacific. Not only is inclusivity
central to India’s Indo-Pacific strategy, but it has also been an increasingly
important part of the Quad’s joint vision, as highlighted in their first joint
statement.44 As China’s rather loudly voiced criticisms show, both the Quad 2.0
and Quad Plus are frequently perceived to be US-dominated and espousing
Washington’s anti-China policy. No matter how much the Quad countries
aim to make the Indo-Pacific environment inclusive; Beijing would continue
to question their motive and perhaps, would see the “anti-China” narrative
that establishes the closer linkages between the Quad process, “Quad Plus”
and Indo-Pacific. In a way, the Quad 2.0 growing synergy indicates its
immense potential to mould the region’s future while the Quad Plus exhibits
potential as a framework that can boost and take the Quad process for-
ward.45 Critically, the expanded grouping can act as a gateway to envisage a
combined, inclusive regional response to shared challenges, including China’s
growing adventurism. Amidst the pandemic, Chinese President Xi Jinping
has visibly accelerated his ambition of transforming China to a great power,
reverting to its medieval glory. Such a rising China has come to adopt rather
aggressive tactics—such as its “wolf warrior” diplomacy—which have natu-
rally been subject to deeper scrutiny and more prominent international cri-
tique.46 The US, Japan, Australia and India have seen their own bilateral
relations with China deteriorating, while the Quad’s institutionalisation and
synergy has come in tandem with, and therefore been at least partially driven
by, Chinese adventurism. A Quad Plus mechanism offers an avenue for the
Quad 2.0 member-nations to expand their solicitation efforts and reach out
10 Panda & Gunasekara-Rockwell
to more partners in developing newer regional economic and security struc-
tures. In essence, the Quad Plus is an expansion of the Quad 2.0, permitting
the creation of a “continental connect”47 and “corridor of communication”.
Building on such evolving Indo-Pacific realities and emerging dynamics,
this volume posits some key questions to better comprehend the shaping
forum that is the Quad Plus. First, where does the Quad Plus stand in the
emerging post-pandemic order? In other words, what are the grouping’s
implications for the Indo-Pacific region in the coming times? Second, beyond
the Quad 2.0 nations—that have become somewhat of pillars in the region—
which nations are key stakeholders in the Quad Plus concept? Where does
the Quad Plus grouping stand in the strategic ambits of these participant
states? Third, how can the Quad Plus grow from its present conceptual exis-
tence to a more formalised and regularised forum? Furthermore, as a more
concrete framework, how can the Quad Plus find synergy with other emer-
ging Indo-Pacific initiatives (whether multilateral, minilateral, or national)?
To answer these questions, this volume brings together a range of scholarly
perspectives to evaluate and project the prospects of the Quad Plus. It
approaches the posed research questions from the outlook of the involved
member-states, thus factoring varied national and regional connotations. To
do this, the volume will be structured in three parts. Part I of the volume
discusses the Quad Plus from the point of view of its foremost stakeholders—
the US, Japan, Australia and India. With China being such a critical factor
in the Indo-Pacific, and shared security concern for the Quad nations, the
section also outlines the Chinese perception of the Quad and Quad Plus
frameworks. It aims to understand the driving forces behind these states’
participation and promotion in the grouping and how China factors in the
same. Part II moves attention to the other Plus nations or entities: ASEAN,
the United Kingdom, South Korea, Israel, France, Canada and Brazil. These
entities are chosen as middle powers with a stake in the Indo-Pacific. Part III
includes chapters on perspectives of “other” (or peripheral) states and
regions, like Russia, the Indian Ocean island nations, the Middle East region,
and the Pakistan–Afghanistan–Iran triangularity. This expanded scope
addresses the history and geopolitics that these entities share with the Indo-
Pacific and how they may be stakeholders in the connectivity and infra-
structure overtures of the region. On the whole, this book’s scope and struc-
ture aims to present the attitudes of the concerned nations (or regions)
toward the Quad Plus and how the grouping may be embedded within their
foreign policy outlook, particularly within the context of intensifying US–
China great-power rivalry in the Indo-Pacific.

Notes
1 “Quad Leaders’ Joint Statement: ‘The Spirit of the Quad’”, White House, 12
March 2021, www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/03/12/
quad-leaders-joint-statement-the-spirit-of-the-quad.
 Introduction 11
2 “Fact Sheet: Quad Summit”, White House, 12 March 2021, www.whitehouse.gov/
briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/03/12/fact-sheet-quad-summit.
3 Hyonhee Shin, Sakura Murakami and Simon Lewis, “Biden Reassures US Allies
in Calls with Leaders of Japan, South Korea, Australia”, Reuters, 12 November
2020, www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-election-asia-allies-idUSKBN27S0EU.
4 Office of the Spokesperson, “US–Japan Joint Press Statement”, US Department
of State, 16 March 2021, www.state.gov/u-s-japan-joint-press-statement.
5 “U.S.-Japan Joint Leaders’ Statement: ‘US–Japan Global Partnership for a New
Era’”, The White House, 16 April 2021, www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/sta
tements-releases/2021/04/16/u-s-japan-joint-leaders-statement-u-s-japan-global-par
tnership-for-a-new-era.
6 “Foreign Secretary’s Conference Call with counterparts from Indo-Pacific Coun-
tries”, Ministry of External Affairs, 20 March 2020, https://mea.gov.in/press-relea
ses.htm?dtl/32592/Foreign+Secretarys+Conference+Call+with+counterparts+fro
m+IndoPacific+Countries.
7 “Meeting on the Novel Coronavirus Disease among Foreign Ministers of Inter-
ested Countries, Hosted by the United States”, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of
Japan, 11 May 2020, www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/press4e_002806.html.
8 “The Quad-Plus”, The Heritage Foundation, www.heritage.org/the-quad-plus; see
also, “The Quad Plus Additional Resources”, The Heritage Foundation, www.
heritage.org/article/the-quad-plus-additional-resources.
9 Jeff M. Smith, “How America Is Leading the ‘Quad Plus’ Group of 7 Countries
in Fighting the Coronavirus”, The Heritage Foundation, 1 April 2020, www.herita
ge.org/global-politics/commentary/how-america-leading-the-quad-plus-group-7-co
untries-fighting-the.
10 Vijay Gokhale, “On the Quad, Define the Idea, Chart a Path”, The Hindu, 1
October 2020, www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/on-the-quad-define-the-idea-cha
rt-a-path/article32735780.ece.
11 A. J. Dolman, “The Like-Minded Countries and the New International Order:
Past, Present and Future Prospects”, Cooperation and Conflict 14, 2, (1979), 57–
85, https://doi.org/10.1177/001083677901400201.
12 “Drivers of Blue Economy in Asia and Pacific Island Countries: An Empirical
Investigation of Tourism and Fisheries Sectors”, Asian Development Bank, July
2020, www.adb.org/publications/drivers-blue-economy-asia-pacific-island-countries.
13 “What is the Blue Economy?” The World Bank, 6 June 2017, www.worldbank.
org/en/news/infographic/2017/06/06/blue-economy.
14 “Blue Economy”, PEMSEA, at pemsea.org/our-work/blue-economy.
15 Derek Grossman, “Don’t Get Too Excited, Quad Plus Meetings Won’t Cover
China”, The Diplomat, 9 April 2020, https://thediplomat.com/2020/04/dont-get-
too-excited-quad-plus-meetings-wont-cover-china.
16 Jonathan Woetzel, Diaan-Yi Lin, Jeongmin Seong, Anu Madgavkar, and Susan
Lund, “China’s Role in the Next Phase of Globalization”, Mckinsey and Com-
pany, 17 April 2017, www.mckinsey.com/featured-insights/china/chinas-role-in-
the-next-phase-of-globalization#.
17 Kai He and Li Minjiang, “Four Reasons Why the Indo-Pacific Matters in 2020”,
OUP Blog, 7 February 2020, https://blog.oup.com/2020/02/four-reasons-
why-the-indo-pacific-matters-in-2020.
18 “Indo-Pacific Strategy Report”, The Department of Defense, 1 June 2019, http
s://media.defense.gov/2019/Jul/01/2002152311/-1/-1/1/DEPARTMENT-OF-DEFE
NSE-INDO-PACIFIC-STRATEGY-REPORT-2019.PDF.
19 “Indo-Pacific: Strategic Significance and Emerging Challenges”, International
Political Science Association, www.ipsa.org/wc/panel/indo-pacific-strategic-signi
ficance-and-emerging-challenges#:~:text=The%20emerging%20strategic%20articu
12 Panda & Gunasekara-Rockwell
lations%20are,world%20passes%20through%20this%20region.&text=India%2C%
20Japan%20and%20Australia%20share,free%20and%20open%20Indo-pacific.
20 “Area of Responsibility”, US Indo-Pacific Command, www.pacom.mil/About-U
SINDOPACOM/USPACOM-Area-of-Responsibility.
21 “How Much Trade Transits the South China Sea?” China Power, https://chinap
ower.csis.org/much-trade-transits-south-china-sea.
22 CRS, “China-India Great Power Competition in the Indian Ocean Region: Issues
for Congress”, report no. R45194, Congressional Research Service, 20 April 2018,
www.everycrsreport.com/reports/R45194.html.
23 Ibid.
24 “A Free and Open Indo-Pacific”, US Department of Defense, 4 November 2019,
www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/Free-and-Open-Indo-Pacific-4Nov2019.
pdf.
25 “World Voices Condemn US’ Containment Mind-Set of New Cold War”, The
Global Times, 5 August 2020, www.globaltimes.cn/content/1196814.shtml; for a
governmental outlook, read, “Interview on Current China-US Relations Given by
State Councilor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi to Xinhua News Agency”, For-
eign Ministry of the People’s Republic of China, 6 August 2020, www.fmprc.gov.
cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1804328.shtml; read also, Yamazaki Amane, “The
PRC’s Cautious Stance on the US Indo-Pacific Strategy”, The Jamestown Foun-
dation, 28 February 2020, https://jamestown.org/program/the-prcs-cautious-sta
nce-on-the-u-s-indo-pacific-strategy.
26 Dhruva Jaishankar, “The Australia–India Strategic Partnership: Accelerating
Security Cooperation In The Indo–Pacific”, The Lowy Institute, 17 September
2020, www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/australia-india-strategic-partnership
-security-cooperation-indo-pacific; Chinese circles too have expressed the view that
India–Australia ties are most “distant” and “weak” compared to bilateral ties
among Quad 2.0 nations, which is why growing synergy between the two is
alarming for Beijing; see Qian Feng, “India-Australia Closeness Draws Attention”,
The Global Times, 21 July 2020, www.globaltimes.cn/content/1195220.shtml.
27 “Joint Statement on a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership between Republic of
India and Australia”, Ministry of External Affairs, 4 June 2020, www.mea.gov.in/
bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/32729/Joint_Statement_on_a_Comprehensive_Strateg
ic_Partnership_between_Republic_of_India_and_Australia.
28 Rajat Pandit, “India, US Agree to Expedite Work on BECA, Strengthen Defence
Ties”, Times of India, 26 February 2020, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/
india/india-us-agree-to-expedite-work-on-beca-strengthen-defence-ties/articleshow
/74307875.cms#:~:text=NEW%20DELHI%3A%20Even%20as%20India,-Spatial
%20Cooperation%20(BECA).
29 “Japan and India Sign Military Supply-Sharing Pact”, The Japan Times, 10 Sep-
tember 2020, www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2020/09/10/national/japan-india-sign-m
ilitary-supply-sharing-pact.
30 For a more enhanced perspective on Japan’s expectations of Quad Plus, read
Jagannath Panda, “The Abe Doctrine on ‘Quad Plus’”, The Japan Times, 17 July
2020, www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2020/07/17/commentary/japan-commentary/a
be-doctrine-quad-plus.
31 Jagannath Panda, “Opinion: What Supply Chain Resilience Means for Australia-
India-Japan Ties?” Kyodo News, 3 September 2020, https://english.kyodonews.net/
news/2020/09/17d5e87a566d-opinion-what-supply-chain-resilience-means-for-aust
ralia-india-japan-ties.html.
32 Ministry of Commerce & Industry, “Australia-India-Japan Trade Ministers’ Joint
Statement on Launch of Supply Chain Resilience Initiative”, Press Information
Bureau, Government of India, 27 April 2021, https://pib.gov.in/PressReleaseIfram
ePage.aspx?PRID=1714362.
 Introduction 13
33 Ibid.
34 “Blue Dot Network”, US Department of State, www.state.gov/blue-dot-network.
35 “India, Australia & France to Jointly Create Inclusive Indo-Pacific”, The
Economic Times, 28 August 2019, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/
defence/india-australia-france-to-jointly-create-inclusive-indo-pacific/articleshow/
70864929.cms; see also, Ministère de l’Europe et des Affaires étrangères, “The
Indo-Pacific Region: A Priority for France”, www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/coun
try-files/asia-and-oceania/the-indo-pacific-region-a-priority-for-france.
36 Minxin Pei, “China in Xi’s ‘New Era’: A Play for Global Leadership”, Journal of
Democracy 29, 2 (2018), 37–51, www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/china
-in-xis-new-era-a-play-for-global-leadership.
37 Andrew Salmon, “Korea Still Taking Chinese Economic Hits Over US Missile”,
Asia Times, 6 December 2019, https://asiatimes.com/2019/12/korea-still-taking-
chinese-economic-hits-over-us-missiles.
38 See James Laurenceson, Michael Zhou and Tom Pantle, “PRC Economic Coer-
cion: The Recent Australian Experience”, Australia-China Relations Institute, 14
September 2020, www.australiachinarelations.org/content/prc-economic-coercion-
recent-australian-experience.
39 Su-Lin Tan, “China-Australia Relations: WTO Confirms Appeal Lodged against
Beijing’s Tariffs on Australian Barley”, South China Morning Post, 22 December
2020, www.scmp.com/economy/china-economy/article/3114916/china-australia
-relations-wto-confirms-appeal-lodged-against.
40 “China to Impose up to 218% Five-Year Anti-dumping Duties on Australian
Wines, Effective Sunday”, Global Times, 26 March 2021, www.globaltimes.cn/pa
ge/202103/1219535.shtml.
41 Li Xuanmin and Chen Qingqing, “China’s Suspension of Economic Dialogue
with Australia ‘a Necessary Step’ to Defend National Interests: Analysts”, Global
Times, 6 May 2021, www.globaltimes.cn/page/202105/1222747.shtml; Michael
Smith and Andrew Tillett, “China Payback Kills Dialogue”, Australian Financial
Review, 6 May 2021, www.afr.com/world/asia/china-suspends-a-key-agreement-wi
th-australia-20210506-p57phq.
42 “Is it Possible to End China’s Control of the Global Supply Chain?” The Economic
Times, 10 June 2020, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/international/busi
ness/is-it-possible-to-end-chinas-control-of-the-global-supply-chain/articleshow/76278
008.cms?from=mdr; read also, Yasmeen Serhan and Kathy Gilsinan, “Can the West
Actually Ditch China?” The Atlantic, 24 April 2020, www.theatlantic.com/politics/a
rchive/2020/04/us-britain-dependence-china-trade/610615.
43 “Tsunami ‘Core Group’ of Relief Nations Disbanded”, Relief Web, 6 January 2005,
https://reliefweb.int/report/myanmar/tsunami-core-group-relief-nations-disbanded.
44 “Quad Leaders’ Joint Statement: ‘The Spirit of the Quad’”.
45 While the Quad Plus is admittedly emerging as a crucial doctrine for the future,
there are still many challenges awaiting the same. See Prof. Pankaj Jha, “Quad,
Quad Plus, and the Indo-Pacific: The Core and Periphery”, Modern Diplomacy,
29 October 2020, https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2020/10/29/quad-quad-plus-a
nd-the-indo-pacific-the-core-and-periphery.
46 Jagannath Panda, “Xi’s Lost Chance in Asia”, The Japan Times, 16 October 2020,
www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2020/10/16/commentary/world-commentary/xi-china-as
ia.
47 Jagannath Panda, “India’s Continental Connect on Indo-Pacific and Quad 2.0”,
East West Center, 26 September 2018, www.eastwestcenter.org/publications/india
s-continental-connect-indo-pacific-and-quad-20.
Part I
Beijing, Quad and the
Quad Plus
1 China’s views of the Quad and Quad
Plus arrangements
Jeffrey Becker

Introduction
In January 2021, the US Navy and naval and air forces from Australia, India,
Japan and Canada took part in the multilateral anti-submarine warfare exer-
cise Sea Dragon 2021, in what some would quickly label a “Quad plus 1”
event.1 Meanwhile, analysts in South Korea have begun discussing whether
that country should play a larger role in Quad activities, or whether remaining
aloof from the Quad could impact the county’s relations with the United
States.2 Two days after the completion of the Sea Dragon exercise, while
speaking at an online forum hosted by the US Institute for Peace, President
Biden’s National Security Advisor, Jake Sullivan, noted that the US was open
to the possibility of working with and expanding upon the Quad, saying:

We really want to carry forward and build on that [Quad] format, that
mechanism, which we see as fundamental, a foundation upon which to
build substantial American policy in the Indo-Pacific.

In response to these events, Chinese officials have, to date been relatively

muted. When asked about the possibility that the United States sought to
strengthen the Quad, People’s Republic of China (PRC) Foreign Ministry
Spokesperson Hua Chunying simply stated “we hope that cooperation
between relevant countries is open, inclusive, and win–win”, and is “a positive
force for good, and not an attempt to target specific countries”.3
Hua’s tone appeared to echo that of Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi,
who famously argued in 2018 that the Quad was a “headline grabbing idea”
that “would soon dissipate”. Others, however, such as Luo Zhaohui, China’s
Deputy Foreign Minister for Asian Affairs, have been less sanguine. Speak-
ing at a Foreign Ministry seminar in September 2020, Luo described the
Quad as an “anti-China front line”. He also referred to the Quad as “the
‘mini-NATO’”, thus connecting the Quad’s rise to one of Beijing’s older,
longstanding concerns.4
Since its re-emergence in 2017, the Quad has been a subject of both debate
and speculation. How does China perceive cooperation among Quad

DOI: 10.4324/9781003206408-3
18 Becker
countries, or even among the Quad and an additional grouping some have
labelled as “Quad Plus” arrangements? This article examines how the Quad
is being viewed from China, and how Chinese academics and government-
and military-affiliated analysts view its potential impact on Chinese interests
in the region.
With its origins in the response to the December 2004 Sumatra–Andaman
earthquake, Quad country representatives would meet for the first time in May
2007, on the sidelines of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in Manila.5
That September, navies from the four Quad countries, as well as participants
from the Singapore Navy, would participate in the Malabar naval exercise,
held 350 km southwest of the Andaman Islands.6
This increased cooperation would not go unnoticed in Beijing. Following
the Manila meetings, China issued formal diplomatic protests to each of the
Quad countries.7 When asked about the 2007 five-nation Malabar exercise,
Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Jiang Yu noted that China calls upon “all
countries to establish a new security concept and carry out dialogue and
cooperation on the basis of mutual trust and mutual benefit”.8 Meanwhile,
Beijing sought to convince Canberra and New Delhi that an assertive Quad
arrangement could jeopardise their economic relations with the People’s
Republic of China (PRC).
While Beijing was successful in slowing Quad cooperation, in 2007–2008,
China’s re-evaluation of the balance of power in Asia following the 2008
financial crisis helped bring the Quad back into play.9 Following the crisis,
Chinese leaders saw an opportunity to modify Deng Xiaoping’s traditional
axiom of “keeping a low profile and biding one’s time” and instead pursue
the country’s overseas interests more aggressively.10 Indeed, in the decade
since, one can see this assertive posture in a range of activities, including the
establishment of an air defence identification zone (ADIZ) in the East China
Sea, island building in the South China Sea, and continued border disputes
with India.
Economically, Chinese domestic growth slowed during this time as the
economy grew and matured, with GDP growth declining from more than 14
per cent in 2007 to less than 7 per cent in 2017, while demands for imported
energy continued to grow.11 In part, this demand for new sources of growth
helped spur China’s outward economic expansion in the form of overseas
investment projects, culminating in China’s massive Belt and Road Initiative
(BRI), President Xi Jinping’s flagship policy designed to leverage Chinese
lending, investment and technical expertise to integrate China more closely
with the rest of the world, primarily through infrastructure development.12
As China’s reliance on overseas energy imports and overseas investments
grew, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), particularly the PLA Navy
(PLAN), was given responsibility for protecting these interests. This subse-
quently expanded the PLAN’s presence in the Indian Ocean beyond its tra-
ditional counter-piracy operations, to include submarine patrols and the
establishment of the PLA’s first overseas base in Djibouti.13
 China’s views 19
This reassessment of the international situation post-financial crisis, and
corresponding shift toward a more assertive PRC foreign policy, served to
rekindle interest in cooperation among the four Quad member-states. In the
United States, this was made evident in the Trump Administration’s 2017
National Security Strategy, which noted the desire to “seek to increase
quadrilateral cooperation with Japan, Australia and India”.14 While not
naming the Quad specifically, Australia’s 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper
notes that it pledges to “build on the growing strategic collaboration between
Australia, India and Japan”.15
The re-emergence of the Quad was witnessed in November 2017, as senior
officials from all four countries met again in Manila ahead of that year’s
ASEAN summit.16 Between 2017 and 2019, Quad member representatives
would meet again in Singapore in June and November 2018, and New York
and Bangkok in September and November 2019. In March, the four coun-
tries met in an expanded “Quad Plus” virtual session at the vice-ministerial
level, involving South Korea, New Zealand and Vietnam.17In November
2020, Australia once again joined India, Japan and the United States in the
Malabar naval exercise after a 13-year hiatus.18
In February 2021, foreign ministers from all four Quad countries held a
virtual meeting for the first time under the Biden Administration. According
to the US State Department’s official press, the US emphasised cooperation
on COVID-19 response and recovery, as well as combating climate change.19
Meanwhile, Japanese readouts emphasised the “challenges to the existing
international order”,20 while Australia noted the need to “respect[ing] and
uphold[ing] international rules and obligations”,21 and India emphasised the
group’s “commitment to upholding a rules-based international order, under-
pinned by respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty”.22
Publicly, official PRC government statements were not as strident follow-
ing the Quad’s “revival” in 2017 as they were in 2007 (China did not, for
example, demarche all four countries as it did in 2007). However, Beijing
certainly took notice, often seeking to link India and other Quad members’
activities directly to US policies. When asked about the Quad meetings in
Manila, PRC Foreign Ministry spokesperson Geng Shuang stated that “these
visions and proposals [in the Indo-Pacific] should be open and inclusive and
conducive to enhancing win–win cooperation. Politicised and exclusionary
ones [i.e. the Quad] should be avoided”.23 When asked about Malabar 2017,
Geng provided similar comments, noting, “We hope such relations and
cooperation are not targeted at a third party and are conducive to regional
peace and stability”.24 When asked about the Quad at the March press con-
ference for the first session of the 2018 National People’s Congress, Wang Yi
noted:

It seems there is never a shortage of headline-grabbing ideas. They are like

the sea foam in the Pacific or Indian Ocean: they may get some atten-
tion, but soon will dissipate. Contrary to the claim made by some
20 Becker
academics and media outlets that the “Indo-Pacific strategy” aims to
contain China, the four countries’ official position is that it targets no
one. I hope they mean what they say and their action will match their
rhetoric.25

Chinese media coverage, however, was more strident. Writing in the Global
Times immediately following the 2017 Manila meetings, Ling Shengli of the
China Foreign Affairs University argued that “interference [in the South
China Sea] by the US, Japan, Australia and other nations … cannot be left
unnoticed” and was adding tensions to an otherwise peaceful environment in
the South China Sea.26 The overseas edition of the People’s Daily, the official
newspaper of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Central Committee,
raised the question “Should the United States, Australia, Japan and India
Join Forces to Counter China?”27 When discussing the possibility of Aus-
tralia participating in Malabar 2020, PRC news outlets such as the Global
Times again argued that the exercise was “directed at China”, connecting
India’s acquiescence to Australia’s participation in the exercise to recent
escalations in tensions between China and India.28
Stepping back from immediate coverage of events, how do Chinese scho-
lars and analysts view the Quad’s evolution and resurgence? First, it should
be noted that some of the writings examined here see the Quad’s resurgence
as a secondary concern and not yet a critical foreign policy issue akin to
Taiwan or the South China Sea. Ye Hailin at the Chinese Academy of Social
Sciences (CASS), for example, notes that, to date, Quad activities have been
focused within the Indian Ocean, which, Ye says, constitutes China’s “sec-
ondary strategic direction” (Zhongguo de Eryao Zhanlue Fangxiang; 中国的
次要战略方向) compared to more critical issues such as Taiwan or the
Korean Peninsula.29 That being said, many Chinese analysts writing about
the Quad often discuss it within the context of an evolving regional and
international structure that continues to move from the unipolar post-Cold
War world toward the bipolarity of a post-9/11 environment. According to
this analysis, the Quad is often viewed as part of the United States’ attempts
to prevent this shift and reverse its decline in the Indo-Pacific.30
This viewpoint is evident in statements by PRC officials as well. As noted
by President Xi at the June 2018 Foreign Affairs Work Conference, “it is
necessary to grasp the general trend of accelerating multi-polarisation of the
world and to attach importance to the in-depth adjustment of relations
between major powers”.31 When speaking at the September 2020 ASEAN
Foreign Ministers’ Meeting, Wang Yi argued that differences in US–China
relations are fundamentally about the United States’ refusal to embrace the
historical trend toward multipolarity.32
It is within this context that Chinese analysts often see the Quad as a
mechanism by which Washington can prevent this power shift and undermine
China’s growing influence in the region. When discussing the re-emergence of
the Quad, Zhang Li at Sichuan University argues explicitly that China,
 China’s views 21
particularly its expanding maritime activities and overseas investments in the
form of the BRI, are the Quad countries’ main target.33 Zhang Jie at CASS
points to Japanese Foreign Minister Taro- Ko-no’s October 2017 interview,
during which Ko-no expressed a desire to work with the Quad countries to
counteract China’s expansion under BRI, as evidence that the Quad is
explicitly designed to “compete with China’s Belt and Road Initiative and
[also] its [China’s] strategy to become a maritime power”.34 More recently,
Liu Aming at the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences (SASS) argues that
the Quad’s “obvious intention” since its 2017 restart has been to contain
China.35
Examining the Quad’s resurgence in the context of the US Indo-Pacific
Strategy, many Chinese authors argue that the Quad is merely an extension
of that strategy, designed to maintain the US position in the region and curb
China’s rising power. Xia Liping at the Shanghai Institute for International
Strategic Studies (SIISS) for example, argues that the United States sees the
Quad as a means of bolstering America’s network of alliances in Asia, which
had eroded in recent years to the point where it was insufficient to contain
China’s rise. Xia specifically ties the Quad’s resurgence to the White House’s
2017 National Security Strategy, which calls for increasing security ties with
Quad countries.36 Editorials in the PRC’s official English newspaper, China
Daily, connect the Quad and the Indo-Pacific strategy explicitly, stating,
“China-haters in Washington have been celebrating the administration’s
Indo-Pacific strategy, especially the so-called Quad alliance” (emphasis
added).37
A subset of authors, however, do see Australia and Japan as having a
larger hand in the Quad’s resurgence,38 viewing this as a consequence of the
US retreat from the region, rather than its recommitment, which has moti-
vated Australia and Japan to try and keep Washington engaged “and bring
India in to jointly cope with the rise of China”.39 According to Zhang Jie at
CASS, “as the first step, Japan and Australia have attempted to work toge-
ther to fill the ‘power vacuum’ left by the US and curb the rapid expansion
of China’s influence”.40 Moreover, Zhang believes that because the Quad is
being promoted by Japan and Australia, it is quite separate from the US
Indo-Pacific Strategy, and, as a result, may also develop faster in both the
economic and security fields.
Regardless of whether the Quad is a US construct or a result of the power
vacuum created by the US absence, most scholars examined here view the
Quad as a means to contain China’s rise. This concern has no doubt been
intensified by a series of policy speeches by Trump cabinet members during
the summer of 2020, which outlined China’s hostile behaviour, and presented
policy options designed to counter that behaviour.41 To be sure, concerns
that US policy in the region is designed to contain China are nothing new,
and the Quad is certainly seen by many as an extension of that objective.
Reporting on a July 2018 speech by US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, the
China Daily noted that “Pompeo and other State Department officials have
22 Becker
tried to depict the Indo-Pacific strategy as inclusive and not meant to contain
China, but such words are not credible”.42 A June 2020 Global Times article
argues just as explicitly that “to contain China, the US proposed to build a
‘Quad Alliance’ of the US, Japan, India and Australia”.43 Analysis by Chi-
nese academicians is more nuanced but draws similar conclusions. Xia Liping
argues that the Trump Administration views the current security architecture
in the region to be inadequate, implying that the Quad is designed to resolve
those shortcomings.44 Others are more direct, stating, “For the United States,
the Quad provides a way to restrict China in the Indo-Pacific region”.45
Nor are the Quad’s economic dimensions lost on the Chinese research
community. Many see the Quad as a mechanism through which the four
countries can respond to China’s BRI. Scholars such as Zhang Jie go as far
as to argue that the potential threat of economic cooperation between the
four Quad countries poses an even greater threat to China than does the
security cooperation.46
To be sure, economic cooperation between the four Quad nations has
grown: the United States, for example, recently surpassed China as India’s
largest trading partner, and Japan and United States have been within the
top five-largest sources of foreign direct investment to India since 2017.47 The
four countries are also reportedly discussing a “supply chain resilience
initiative” to lessen reliance on Chinese factories, as well as a mechanism for
improving the quality and transparency of infrastructure investment, known
as the Blue Dot Network.48 However, none of these initiatives appear ready
to rival the breadth and scope of China’s BRI. For example, the Blue Dot
Network in its current form lacks the types of dedicated financing similar to
that provided by Chinese policy banks such as the China Development Bank
or the Export-Import Bank of China.

Responding to the Quad

Some Chinese authors see the Quad as a work in progress and caution
against conducting what they refer to as “undermining work” (fenhua waijie
gongzuo; 分化瓦解工作).49 Others, however, point to economic diplomacy as
perhaps the PRC’s most useful tool, arguing that economic pressure suc-
cessfully undermined the Quad in the past. Zhang Li notes that as a result of
Chinese economic pressure in 2007, Australia refocused on economic and
trade relations with China at the Quad’s expense.50
Such economic pressure can be directed at either Quad members or
against others in the region. Chinese analysts initially focused on India, for
example, as a possible target for its economic diplomacy to hinder Quad
development.51 In 2018, Xia Liping and Zhong Qi suggested that India could
be severed from the Quad though Chinese diplomatic overtures.52 As recent
as 2019, Ye Hailin posited that “China should focus on India when for-
mulating a strategy to respond to the US–Japan–India–Australia security
mechanism”.53 Mu Xiaoming at China’s National Defense University and
 China’s views 23
Liu Aming at SASS argue that India’s desire to maintain its “strategic
autonomy” (zhanlue zizhuxing; 战略自主性) will hinder the development of
US–India relations, with Liu going further, arguing that India represents the
“weakest link (zuiruo yihuan; 最弱一环) within the Quad.54
Yet opinions expressed within the Chinese literature regarding India’s
commitment to the Quad do not appear to account for more recent events in
Sino-Indian relations. Over the past five years, a host of tensions in the
relationship have only served to make India a less attractive target for Chi-
nese economic outreach. These include China’s sale of submarines to India’s
archrival Pakistan, and China’s growing presence in the port of Gwadar,
which Chinese analysts often consider as a possible location for a future
Chinese military facility.55 Moreover, in June 2020, the worst military esca-
lation between the two sides in 40 years broke out in the disputed Galwan
River Valley region, resulting in the death of at least 20 Indian soldiers and
helping to spur nationwide anti-China protests.56 Interestingly enough, some
Chinese analysts have argued that if Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi
faces strong anti-China, nationalist sentiments at home, this would certainly
limit China’s ability to use economic outreach to India to undermine the
Quad.57 To date, this appears quite prescient, as growing anti-China senti-
ment within India makes neither China–India rapprochement nor India
backing away from the Quad appear likely to occur in the near term.
Others contend that should the four Quad countries continue to align their
regional policies, this new, united group would undermine “ASEAN Cen-
trality”, the idea that, as the region’s most important multilateral institution,
ASEAN has a key role to play in the region’s diplomatic architecture.58 Ge
Hongliang and Wang Nana of Guanxi University argue that “the Quad will
pressure ASEAN to pick a side while also undermining ASEAN
centrality”.59 Writing in the Global Times, Zhao Minghao argues that:

Southeast Asian countries … worry that the quadrilateral cooperation

mechanism of the US, Japan, India and Australia would pose challenges
to ASEAN’s centrality in the regional architecture. Having realized that
the Indo-Pacific strategy is likely to trigger confrontation between China
and the US and drag Southeast Asia into a dilemma over which side to
lean, ASEAN countries are working on a common position to deal with
the strategy.60

ASEAN centrality remains core to the organisation’s perceptions of itself.

One need look no further than the 2019 ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific,
which “envisages ASEAN Centrality as the underlying principle for …
maintain[ing] its central role in the evolving regional architecture in South-
east Asia and its surrounding regions”.61 This focus on ASEAN Centrality is
echoed in member-states’ official government documents, such as Malaysia’s
first-ever Defense White Paper, which notes that “a strong and unified
ASEAN is at the core of Malaysia’s security and defence reliance”.62 In May
24 Becker
2018, Singapore Foreign Minister Vivian Balakrishnan noted that the Quad
concept did not adequately address whether ASEAN would remain central
to the region’s architecture.63
Political elites in ASEAN member-states are not universally opposed to a
larger role for the Quad, however, and although Singapore and Malaysia
voice concern, others, such as Vietnam, appear supportive.64 According to a
survey of Southeast Asian elite opinions, roughly 57 per cent of those sur-
veyed are generally in support of the Quad, while only 10 per cent outright
oppose. Moreover, 46 per cent believe the Quad is complementary to the role
of ASEAN in the region.65
To address these concerns, officials from Quad member-states have expan-
ded their outreach to ASEAN member-states. In a formal statement follow-
ing the 26 September 2019 ministerial meetings, the group went on record to
officially reaffirm their support for ASEAN Centrality in the Indo-Pacific,
noting that “we [the Quad] want to compliment ASEAN’s critical role in the
region”.66 This position was reaffirmed in November of that year in Bang-
kok, as Quad officials again formally “reaffirmed their countries’ strong
support for ASEAN centrality, ASEAN-led regional architecture, and
ASEAN’s adoption of its Indo-Pacific outlook”.67 Following the February
2021 “virtual” Quad ministerial meeting, each of the four Quad member-
states separately reaffirmed their commitment to ASEAN Centrality.68

Expanding cooperation: a Quad Plus arrangement?

Some states, including ASEAN members, have begun to cooperate with the
Quad in what has been referred to as a “Quad Plus” arrangement. In March
2020, Quad member-states were joined by Vietnam, South Korea and New
Zealand in a “Quad Plus video-conference” to discuss ways to coordinate
their COVID-19 response.69 As described above, units from the Royal
Canadian Airforce took part in the Sea Dragon 2021 ASW exercise with
Quad members in January 2021. Within China, while these initial steps
toward broader Quad Plus cooperation are welcome in their ability to better
coordinate and manage the region’s pandemic response, to the extent they
are related to larger Quad activities, they are viewed with suspicion. For
example, when discussing the aforementioned March 2020 “Quad Plus”
videoconference, Liu Zongyi at SIIS argued that “although they [Quad Plus]
claimed to be mainly aimed at dealing with COVID-19 issues, the efforts to
institutionalise the Quad and the intention to expand it to Wellington, Seoul
and Hanoi cannot be underestimated”, suggesting a high degree of mistrust
of anything associated with the Quad.70
Overall, however, perceptions of any Quad Plus expansion appear to be a
mixture of concern and ambivalence. Some have sought to downplay con-
cerns over the Quad’s expansion. Following Vietnamese Foreign Minister
Nguyễn Xuân Phúc’s trip to Australia in 2018, a Global Times editorial with
the headline “Is Vietnam Moving to Join the Quad?” went to great pains to
 China’s views 25
downplay the chances of this occurring, arguing “we don’t need to read too
much into Phuc’s visit and what came of it”.71 Others however, see any Quad
Plus activities as further evidence of the Quad’s threat to ASEAN. Wang
Jingchao, for example, argues that the Quad’s outreach efforts to Vietnam
has the potential to split ASEAN and the latter’s “central position will fall,
and its risk of marginalisation will increase”.72 One issue to watch, therefore,
will be the extent to which these Chinese writings on the Quad Plus begin to
coalesce around either of these viewpoints.

China, the Quad and “Quad Plus” arrangements

Since its inception, the ability of the Quad to retain cohesion has, to a large
extent, been driven by Beijing’s assessment of the balance of power in the
region, and China’s corresponding behaviour. A key reason for the Quad’s
lost momentum in the mid-2000s was China’s continued adoption of Deng’s
low-profile diplomacy, undermining the impetus for Quad cooperation at the
time. As Beijing reassessed the international situation and pursued overseas
interests more aggressively, Quad members again found common cause.
When considering confrontation, early Chinese writings discussed a mul-
tipronged approach, employing economic diplomacy directed at both India
and ASEAN. Yet China’s ability to either carve India off from other Quad
members or play to ASEAN’s fears may be circumscribed in the future.
Initial efforts by the Biden Administration to reinvigorate America’s relations
with partners and allies suggest that the Quad may evolve from its myopic
focus on China during the Trump Administration to, as National Security
Advisor Jake Sullivan stated, a “foundation” upon which to build American
policy in the Indo-Pacific. The United States’ apparent willingness to employ
the Quad as a tool to tackle broader collective security challenges, such as
COVID-19 and climate change, may increase acceptance of the Quad among
the more apprehensive nations in the region, including ASEAN member-
states who remain concerned about its impact on ASEAN centrality. More-
over, this more broad-based approach to the Quad’s activities may also create
space for like-minded Indo-Pacific democracies such as South Korea, New
Zealand and others, to take part in “Quad Plus” initiatives, while simulta-
neously undermining Chinese criticisms regarding the Quad’s
“exclusiveness”.

Acknowledgements
The author wishes to thank Dr Satu Limaye and Dr Jagannath Panda for
their comments on previous drafts. The views and opinions expressed here
are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the
Center for Naval Analyses or the US Navy.
26 Becker
Notes
1 MC1 Glenn Slaughter, “Multinational Exercise Sea Dragon Concludes in
Guam”, Commander, US Pacific Fleet website, 28 January 2021, www.cpf.navy.
mil/news.aspx/130798; and Anirudh Bhattacharyya, “Canada Joins Quad Joint
Naval Exercise in Pacific Ocean”, Hindustan Times, 25 January 2021, www.hin
dustantimes.com/india-news/canada-to-join-quad-joint-naval-exercise-in-pacific-oc
ean-101611556512917.html.
2 Do Je-hae, “Korea Faces Calls to Join the Quad”, The Korea Times, 7 February
2021, www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/nation/2021/02/113_303675.html.
3 “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hua Chunying’s Regular Press Conference on
February 18, 2021” [2021 Nian 2 Yue 18 Ri Waijiaobu Fayanren Hua Chunying
Zhuchi Lixing Jizhehui; 2021年2月18日外交部发言人华春莹主持例行记者会],
Foreign Ministry of the People’s Republic of China, 18 February 2021, www.fmp
rc.gov.cn/web/fyrbt_673021/t1854801.shtml.
4 Shi Jiangtao, “South China Sea: Beijing Warns ASEAN Members Against Back-
ing ‘Troublemaker’ US in Region”, South China Morning Post, 3 September 2020,
www.scmp.com. On Beijing’s long-standing concern of an “Asian NATO”, see
Jagannath Panda, “Beijing’s ‘Asian NATO’ Maxim on Quad Is Structural”,
PACNET Forum 61 (22 November 2019), https://idsa.in.
5 Brahma Chellaney, “‘Quad Initiative’: An Inharmonious Concert of Democ-
racies”, Japan Times, 19 July 2007, www.japantimes.co.jp.
6 Phase One of Malabar 2007 took place in April that year and was held in the Wes-
tern Pacific. See Gurpreet S Khurana, “Joint Naval Exercises: A Post-Malabar-2007
Appraisal for India”, Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies 52 (September 2007).
7 Brendan Nicholson, “China Warns Canberra on Security Pact”, The Age, 15 June
2007, www.theage.com.au.
8 Xinhua, “Foreign Ministry Spokeswoman: China Advocates for All Countries to
Establish a New Security Concept” [Waijoabu Fayanren: Zhongfang Zhuzhang
Geguo Shuli Xin Anquanguan; 外交部发言人�中方主张各国树立新安全观], Sina
News, 6 September 2007, http://news.sina.com.cn.
9 Scott W. Harold, Tanvi Madan, and Natalie Sambhi, “US–Japan Alliance Con-
ference” (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2020), www.rand.org.
10 Bonnie S. Glaser and Benjamin Dooley, “China’s 11th Ambassadorial Conference
Signals Continuity and Change in Foreign Policy”, Jamestown China Brief 9, 12,
https://jamestown.org.
11 Wayne M. Morrison, “China’s Economic Rise: History, Trends, Challenges, and
Implications for the United States”, Congressional Research Report, 25 June
2019, 6, https://fas.org.
12 See, for example, Jeffrey Becker, Erica Downs and Ben DeThomas, China’s Pre-
sence in the Middle East and Western Indian Ocean: Beyond Belt and Road,
(Arlington, VA: Center for Naval Analyses, 2019), www.cna.org.
13 Becker, Downs, and DeThomas, China’s Presence in the Middle East and Western
Indian Ocean; and Erica Downs, Jeffrey Becker, and Patrick deGategno, China’s
Military Support Facility in Djibouti: The Economic and Security Dimensions of
China’s First Overseas Base (Arlington, VA: Center for Naval Analyses, 2017),
www.cna.org.
14 National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Washington, DC:
White House, 2017), www.whitehouse.gov.
15 Government of Australia, 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper (Canberra: Depart-
ment of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2017), 40, 42.
16 Kallol Bhattacherjee, “India, Japan, US, Australia Hold First ‘Quad’ Talks at
Manila Ahead of ASEAN Summit”, The Hindu, 12 November 2017, www.the
hindu.com.
 China’s views 27
17 US Mission India, “Readout of US–Australia–India–Japan Ministerial (‘The
Quad’)” (US Embassy & Consulates in India), 3 October 2019, https://in.usemba
ssy.gov; Derek Grossman, “Don’t Get Too Excited, ‘Quad Plus’ Meetings Won’t
Cover China”, The Diplomat, 9 April 2020, https://thediplomat.com; and Bha-
gyashree Garekar, “Quad Leaders Stress Asean’s Centrality in Their Indo-Pacific
Visions”, Straits Times, 17 November 2018, www.straitstimes.com.
18 Task Force 70 Public Affairs, “India Hosts Japan, Australia, US in Naval Exercise
MALABAR 2020”, US Navy Press Office, 2 November 2020, www.navy.mil/
Press-Office/News-Stories/Article/2402780/india-hosts-japan-australia-us-in-naval-
exercise-malabar-2020.
19 US Department of State, “Secretary Blinken’s Call with Quad Ministers”, 18
February 2021, www.state.gov/secretary-blinkens-call-with-quad-ministers.
20 “Japan-Australia-India-US Foreign Ministers’ Telephone Meeting”, Ministry of
Foreign Affairs of Japan, 18 February 2021, www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/p
ress3e_000172.html.
21 Senator the Hon Marise Payne, “Quad Foreign Ministers’ Meeting”, Website for
the Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Minister for Women, 19 February
2021, www.foreignminister.gov.au/minister/marise-payne/media-release/quad-for
eign-ministers-meeting.
22 Ministry of External Affairs, “3rd India-Australia-Japan-USA Quad Ministerial
Meeting”, Government of India Media Center, 18 February 2021, www.mea.gov.
in/press-releases.htm?dtl/33540/3rd+indiaaustraliajapanusa+quad+ministerial+me
eting.
23 PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Geng Shuang’s
Regular Press Conference on November 13, 2017”, 14 November 2017, www.fmp
rc.gov.cn.
24 PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Geng Shuang’s
Regular Press Conference on July 7, 2017”, 7 July 2017, 7, www.fmprc.gov.cn.
25 PRC Foreign Ministry, “Foreign Minister Wang Yi Meets the Press”.
26 Ling Shengli, “A Regional Solution Needed for South China Sea”, Global Times,
23 November 2017, www.globaltimes.cn.
27 “Should the United States, Australia, Japan and India Join Forces to Counter
China?” [MeiAoRiYin Yao Lianshou Kangzheng Zhongguo?; 美澳日印要联手抗衡
中国�], People’s Daily Online, 24 February 2018, http://world.people.com.cn.
28 Xu Guangyu, “Strategic Intent Behind New Delhi’s Plan to Invite Australia to
Join Malabar Drill”, Global Times, 11 July 2020, www.globaltimes.cn.
29 Ye Hailin, “Strategic Thoughts on China’s Addressing of the US’s New Version of
the ‘Indo-Pacific’ Concept” [Zhongguo Yindui Meiguo Zaibian ‘Yintai’ Genia de
Celuexing Sikao; 中国应对美国再版‘印太’概念的策略性思考], Indian Ocean
Economic and Political Review 5 (2019): 7.
30 See Panda, “Beijing’s ‘Asian NATO’ Maxim on Quad Is Structural”.
31 “Xi Jinping: Work Hard to Create a New Situation in Major Country Diplomacy
with Chinese Characteristics” [Xi Jinping: Nuli Kaichuang Zhongguo Tesi Daguo
Waijiao Xinjumian; 习近平�努力开创中国特色大国外交新局面], Xinhua, 23 June
2018, www.xinhuanet.com.
32 “China Urges US to Follow Historical Trend Toward Multi-Polar World”,
Xinhua, 10 September 2020, www.xinhuanet.com.
33 Zhang Li, “Exploring the Quad: An ‘Indo-Pacific’ Perspective” [‘Yintai’ Shiyuz-
hong de MeiYinRiAo Sibian Jizhi Chutan; ‘印太’视域中的美印日澳四边机制初
探], South Asian Studies Quarterly 4 (2018).
34 Zhang Jie, “The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue and Reconstruction of Asia-
Pacific Order”, (MeiRiYinAo ‘Sibian Duihua’ yu Yatai Dichu Zhixu de Zhonggou;
美日印澳“四边对话”与亚太地区秩序的重构), China International Studies 5
(2018), 11. On FM Ko-no’s statement, see “Japan to Propose Strategic Dialogue
28 Becker
with US, India and Australia: Nikkei”, Reuters, 26 October 2017, www.reuters.
com.
35 Liu Aming “Quadrilateral Security Dialogue: Developments and Prospects”
[‘Sifang Anquan Duihua’ de Xin Fazhan ji Qianjing Tanxi; 四方安全对话”的新发
展及前景探析], Global Review 1 (2020), 91.
36 Xia Liping and Zhong Qi, “Analysis on Indo-Pacific Strategy of Trump Admin-
istration” [Telangpu Zhengfu Yintai Zhanlue Gouxiang Pingxi; 特朗普政府‘印太
战略构想’评析], Contemporary International Relations 1 (2018), 24.
37 Chen Weihua, “‘America First’ Policy Dooms US’ Indo-Pacific Strategy to
Failure”, China Daily, 3 August 2018, www.chinadaily.com.cn.
38 Wang Jingchao, “The Evolution of US Indo-Pacific Strategy and Its Influence on
Regional Situation” [Meiguo Yintai Zhanlue de Yanjin Jidui Diqu Jushi de Ying-
xiang; 美国印太战略的演进及对地区局势的影响], Journal of East China
University of Science and Technology 3 (2019), 65.
39 Zhang, “Quadrilateral Security Dialogue and Reconstruction of Asia-Pacific
Order”.
40 Ibid.
41 See David Shambaugh, “Parsing the Trump Administration’s Broadside Against
China”, China-US Focus, 31 July 2020, www.chinausfocus.com.
42 Chen, “‘America First’ Policy Dooms US’ Indo-Pacific Strategy to Failure”.
43 Long Xingchun, “India’s Betting with Washington and Canberra Is a Poor
Move”, Global Times, 22 June 2020, www.globaltimes.cn.
44 Xia and Zhong, “Analysis on Indo-Pacific Strategy of Trump Administration”.
45 Zhang, “Exploring the Quad: An ‘Indo-Pacific’ Perspective”.
46 Zhang, “Quadrilateral Security Dialogue and Reconstruction of Asia-Pacific
Order”.
47 Department for Promotion of Industry and Trade, Government of India, “Fact
Sheet on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) From April 2000 to March 2020”,
March 2000, https://dipp.gov.in; and Ministry of Commerce and Industry,
Department of Commerce, Government of India, “Export Import Data Bank”,
2019–2020, https://commerce-app.gov.in.
48 Shruti Srivastava and Isabel Reynolds, “Japan, India and Australia Eye ‘Supply
Chain Pact’ to Counter China”, Japan Times, 23 August 2020, www.japantimes.
co.jp; Jagannath P. Panda, “India, the Blue Dot Network, and the ‘Quad Plus’
Calculus”, Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs 3, 3 (Fall 2020), 3–21, https://media.
defense.gov; and US Department of State, “Blue Dot Network”, www.state.gov.
49 Ye Hailin, “Strategic Thoughts on China’s Addressing of the US’s New Version of
the ‘Indo-Pacific’ Concept”, 2.
50 Zhang Li, “Exploring the Quad: An ‘Indo-Pacific’ Perspective”.
51 Zhang, “Quadrilateral Security Dialogue and Reconstruction of Asia-Pacific
Order”.
52 Xia and Zhong, “Analysis on Indo-Pacific Strategy of Trump Administration”,
22.
53 Ye, “Strategic Thoughts on China’s Addressing of the US’s New Version”, 1.
54 Mu Xiaoming, “New Tricks Keep Coming: US Wants to ‘Solidify’ Its ‘Indo-
Pacific Strategy?’” [Buduanchu XinZhao: Mei “Yintai Zhanlue” Yao “Shixinhua?”;
不断出新招�美“印太战略”要“实心化’?], People’s Daily, 6 August 2018,
http://military.people.com.cn; Liu Aming, “Quadrilateral Security Dialogue:
Developments and Prospects”, 103.
55 For a useful overview of the growing list of issues in the China–India relationship,
see Jeff Smith, “Democracy’s Squad: India’s Change of Heart and the Future of
the Quad”, War on the Rocks, 13 August 2020, https://warontherocks.com.
56 Jeffrey Gettleman, Hari Kumar, and Sameer Yasir, “Worst Clash in Decades on
Disputed India-China Border Kills 20 Indian Troops”, New York Times, 16 June
 China’s views 29
2020, www.nytimes.com; and Rajesh Roy, “Indians Rage at China After Bloody
Border Clash”, Wall Street Journal, 18 June 2020, www.wsj.com.
57 Ye, “Strategic Thoughts on China’s Addressing of the US’s New Version”, 13–14.
58 Liu Aming, “Quadrilateral Security Dialogue: Developments and Prospects”,
104–107.
59 Ge Hongliang and Wang Nana, “An Analysis on ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-
Pacific” [Dongmen de Yinduyang Yitaipingyang Zhangwang Pingxu; 东盟的印度
洋—太平洋展望评析], Crossroads: Southeast Asian Studies 6 (2019), 25.
60 Zhao Minghao, “Southeast Asia Not a Stage for Washington’s Game”, Global
Times, 21 August 2018, www.globaltimes.cn.
61 Association of Southeast Asia Nations, “ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific”,
23 June 2019, 1, https://asean.org.
62 Malaysian Ministry of Defence, Defence White Paper (Percetakan Nasional
Malaysia Berhad, 2020), 70, www.mod.gov.my. For other discussions of the
importance of ASEAN Centrality in the white paper, see pp. 17, 20, 23, 28, 31
and 64.
63 Charissa Yong, “Singapore Not Joining US, Japan-Led Free and Open Indo-
Pacific for Now: Vivian Balakrishnan”, Straits Times, 14 May 2018, www.stra
itstimes.com.
64 Nguyen Quang Dy, “Vietnam May Turn Threats into Opportunity”, YaleGlobal
Online, 2 June 2020, https://yaleglobal.yale.edu.
65 Le Thu Huong, “Southeast Asian Perceptions of the Quadrilateral Security Dia-
logue: Survey Findings” ASPI Special Report, 2018, https://s3-ap-southeast-2.ama
zonaws.com.
66 US Department of State, “Readout of US–Australia–India–Japan Ministerial
(‘The Quad’)”, 26 September 2019, www.state.gov.
67 US Department of State, “US–Australia–India–Japan Consultations (‘The
Quad’)”, 4 November 2019, www.state.gov.
68 US Department of State, “Secretary Blinken’s Call with Quad Ministers”; Minis-
try of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “Japan-Australia-India-US Foreign Ministers’
Telephone Meeting”; Senator the Hon Marise Payne, “Quad Foreign Ministers’
Meeting”; Ministry of External Affairs, “3rd India-Australia-Japan-USA Quad
Ministerial Meeting”.
69 Jeffrey Becker, “COVID-19 Offers a Golden Opportunity to Reengage with the
Indo-Pacific”, Defense One, 27 April 2020, www.defenseone.com.
70 Yu Jincai, “India Plays with Fire Spicing up G7 Expansion”, Global Times, 5 June
2020, www.globaltimes.cn.
71 “Is Vietnam Moving to Join the Quad?”, Global Times, 20 March 2018, www.
globaltimes.cn.
72 Wang, “Evolution of US Indo-Pacific Strategy”, 68–69.
2 Competition and coalitions
The United States, Quad Plus and the
Chinese challenge in the Indo-Pacific
Akriti Vasudeva

Introduction
While the Trump and Biden Administrations have understandably exhibited
divergence on most issues, there has been remarkable convergence in their
outlook on China. In his first few days in office, President Joe Biden reversed
many Trump-era decisions, such as the United States’ withdrawal from the
Paris climate agreement and the World Health Organization,1 but he kept
many elements of Trump’s China policy intact. These include pursuing stra-
tegic competition with Beijing, committing US attention to the Indo-Pacific,
and developing interest-based or balancing coalitions to deal with China’s
rise.
Since early in his administration, Biden has been vocal about how America
has been losing its advantage to China over the last few years. In his first full
press conference since coming to office, in comments reminiscent of the
Trump government’s messaging, Biden said:

China has an overall goal […] to become the leading country in the
world, the wealthiest country in the world and the most powerful coun-
try in the world. That’s not going to happen on my watch because the
United States is going to continue to grow and expand.2

Additionally, Biden has retained the Trump Administration’s treatment of

the Indo-Pacific as the “most consequential region for America’s future”.3
His administration’s Interim National Security Strategic Guidance acknowl-
edges that US “vital national interests compel the deepest connection to the
Indo-Pacific”4 and Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin has designated the
Indo-Pacific as a priority theatre.5 But Biden has sought to make Trump’s
Indo-Pacific approach more balanced by focusing on both economic and
military/geopolitical dimensions to address the needs of partners big and
small and compete more effectively with China in the region.
Most importantly, besides agreeing on the seriousness of the threat that
China poses and the need to bolster US presence in the Indo-Pacific, both
administrations have recognised that the key to deterring China is investing

DOI: 10.4324/9781003206408-4
 Competition and coalitions 31
in coalitions with like-minded partners who can help hold China accoun-
table, defend the rules-based order, and offer support to Indo-Pacific part-
ners. The Trump Administration helped revive the Quad, a consultative
mechanism involving the United States, India, Japan and Australia, to ensure
a free and open Indo-Pacific, and elevated it to the ministerial level.6 In order
to share best practices to deal with the coronavirus pandemic, they also
expanded the framework for cooperation in the Indo-Pacific to a grouping of
Quad members and others such as Vietnam, Korea, New Zealand, Brazil,
and Israel, dubbed “Quad Plus” by the media.7 The Biden Administration
has gone one step further, recognising the Quad as the “foundation” of
American policy in the Indo-Pacific8 and developing it as a coalition that can
deliver “practical solutions” to regional and global challenges,9 such as a
vaccine initiative to help countries in the Indo-Pacific mitigate the spread of
the coronavirus.10 They have also continued the Quad Plus coordination calls
to facilitate cooperation on the coronavirus pandemic.11
What explains this convergence despite ideological differences? This chap-
ter explores how a bipartisan consensus on the need for competition with
China has developed in the United States over the past 20 years; how the
Trump and Biden Administrations have utilised coalitions like the Quad and
the Quad Plus to shape Chinese behaviour in the Indo-Pacific; and what the
future of such groupings is likely to be.

Intensifying Sino-US strategic competition and conception of

Quad Plus
The Trump Administration is generally identified as having turned
Washington’s China policy more adversarial after decades of Sino-US
engagement. The 2018 National Defense Strategy named Beijing as a “stra-
tegic competitor” aiming to achieve “Indo-Pacific regional hegemony in the
near-term and displacement of the United States to achieve global pre-
eminence in the future”.12 Trump took an increasingly confrontational stance
toward Beijing on areas such as trade, technology, and human rights, parti-
cularly in the aftermath of the coronavirus pandemic (which he repeatedly
called “the Chinese virus”),13 leading analysts to warn that “a new type of
Cold War” was afoot14 between the two countries. However, even in 2000,
Condoleezza Rice, then a foreign policy advisor to George W. Bush’s cam-
paign and eventually National Security Advisor and Secretary of State, had
identified China as a “strategic competitor” that “would like to alter Asia’s
balance of power in its own favor”, and had proposed that the United States
“should never be afraid to confront Beijing when our interests collide”.15
Thus, it becomes pertinent to ask: (1) what factors explain how US percep-
tions of China have come full circle in the past two decades; and (2) in what
ways has this evolution in Washington’s thinking impacted the development
of the Quad, the Indo-Pacific strategy and the Quad Plus? These questions
are considered below, analysing each US administration in turn.
32 Vasudeva
The George W. Bush Administration came into office at a time when the
world was starting to come to grips with the rise of China. His administra-
tion had a hard-nosed view of China militarily, ideologically and geopoliti-
cally. During the campaign, candidate Bush asserted that the United States
“must deal with China without ill-will—but without illusions”.16 He criti-
cised the Clinton Administration for being soft on Beijing, particularly with
regard to threats China made to Taiwan,17 and pledged to strengthen rela-
tions with allies in Asia, particularly Japan. The mid-2000s was also when
Sino–US economic and trade issues became acute, due to concerns in
Washington about Chinese currency manipulation to keep export rates low,
Beijing offering state-owned enterprises land sops and other subsidies to
compete with foreign firms, and American companies being asked to sur-
render technology to continue accessing Chinese markets.18 Thus, the Bush
Administration was aware of the risks that China posed, as articulated by
Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick in a speech in September 2005
registering alarm about Chinese military modernisation, lack of transparency,
and intellectual property theft, among other concerns.19
However, the Bush government had little policy space to address some of
these challenges, dealing as it was with more pressing threats such as terror-
ism, two wars, and a domestic financial crisis. In addition, the United States
and China were already fairly economically intertwined by then, and China’s
more assertive foreign policy stance, such as confrontation with US naval
vessels20 and threatening of freedom of navigation in the Indo-Pacific com-
mons or coercion of neighbours through “salami-slicing” tactics,21 was still a
few years away. Thus, overall, the Bush Administration believed it could
constructively engage China on economic issues and that being a “respon-
sible stakeholder” and playing by the international rules and norms was
fundamentally in Beijing’s interest.22
However, the administration did take steps to hedge against China’s rise. It
was under President Bush that the idea of the shared values of democracies
as a balancing force against China came about. Former Bush Administration
officials Michael J. Green and Daniel Twining wrote shortly after leaving
office that “a network of Asia-Pacific great and regional powers, united by a
shared democratic identity and the desire to hedge against Chinese domina-
tion, could work to preserve a multi-polar regional order as American pre-
ponderance eventually wanes”.23 This vision called for strengthening
relations with countries such as Japan, India and Australia and became the
underlying rationale for the Quad, which was imagined as “the hub of a new
alignment of like-minded democracies prepared to provide greater public
goods to the region”24 after it proved successful as an ad hoc grouping to
coordinate responses to the Indian Ocean tsunami in December 2004.25 In
fact, although the Quad disbanded after a single meeting and a military
exercise in 2007, in the 2008 campaign for the US presidential elections,
candidates Barack Obama and John McCain both spoke of the idea of a
concert or league of democracies to deal with global challenges.26
 Competition and coalitions 33
Although President Obama did have concerns about the US trade deficit
with China and what he viewed as unfair practices on Beijing’s part,27 his
administration came into office with a desire to maintain stability in the
Sino–US relationship so that they could elicit Chinese cooperation on issues
such as combating climate change and denuclearisation of North Korea and
Iran while “managing differences”.28 However, while the Obama Adminis-
tration was focused on reviving the economy after the 2008 financial crisis
and dealing with an uptick in violence in Afghanistan, China become
emboldened by a distracted United States and began asserting itself region-
ally and globally,29 illustrated by Beijing’s expansion of China’s maritime
claims in the South China Sea.30
As the nature of the challenge from China became clearer, the Obama
Administration shifted focus and attention from the Middle East to Asia
through its Pivot/Rebalance to Asia strategy, initiated in 2011.31 This aimed
to build a web of relationships and partnerships,32 both bilaterally and mul-
tilaterally, to maintain a balance of power in the region vis-à-vis China. This
included Washington ramping up engagement with the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) by officially joining the East Asia
Summit;33 initiating a trilateral dialogue with Japan and India;34 and
expanding US military presence in Australia and Singapore.35 In fact, it was
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton who first indicated that the United States
was seriously considering the “Indo-Pacific” construct in a 2011 piece for
Foreign Policy.36
However, when Beijing challenged the status quo and it came time for the
United States to enforce some of the red lines it had set, the Obama
Administration did not have the resolve to act decisively and instead privi-
leged maintaining cooperation and stability in its relationship with China.
For instance, President Obama had warned China of a negative impact on
Sino–US relations if Beijing reclaimed land in the Scarborough Shoal,37 and
said that Beijing must abide by the ruling of the international tribunal
against Chinese maritime rights in the South China Sea.38 However, the
consensus among analysts is that the Obama Administration did not follow
through on those warnings, and the Chinese maintained and, in fact, expanded
their aggressive presence in the maritime seas of the region.39
Thus, the Bush and Obama Administrations were either not entirely cer-
tain about the nature and extent of the threat from China or did not have the
resolve to act. However, by the time the Trump Administration came into
office, Beijing’s increasing dominance in all domains, whether military, eco-
nomics, technology, or geopolitics, had begun to blunt American advantage,
and the challenges it posed to US primacy and global leadership as well as
the rules-based order were clear. For instance, President Xi Jinping had
begun implementing largescale modernisation reforms to turn the People’s
Liberation Army (PLA) into a modern military capable of taking on the
most advanced of nations, chiefly the United States, and the PLA Air Force
was already cutting into US technical advantage.40 Beijing’s advancements
34 Vasudeva
with regard to A2/AD capabilities were posing increasing threats to US
ability to operate freely in maritime Asia, and the Chinese military had made
heavy investments in artificial intelligence, cyber, and space capabilities,
which led the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen Joe Dunford, to
remark that “in the last 10 or 15 years, [US] competitive advantage has
eroded, and it’s no longer as decisive as it was some years ago”.41 China had
begun to assert its economic influence from Asia to Europe by floating an
alternative to US-led financial institutions (i.e. the Asian Infrastructure
Investment Bank),42 as well as through the Belt and Road Initiative.43 China
had expanded its power projection capabilities, with its navy becoming the
largest in the world,44 the development of its first overseas military base in
Djibouti, and its build-up of strategic ports in the Indian Ocean region such
as in Pakistan and Sri Lanka—moves that had the potential to constrain US
choices in the region.45 Additionally, Beijing had ramped up abrasive tactics
toward US allies and partners by militarising islands in the South China
Sea46 as well as attempting to change the status quo by trying to construct a
road in disputed territory claimed by Bhutan.47
In addition, around this time, bipartisan consensus was starting to emerge
in the policy community in the United States that Washington’s decades-long
policy of engaging China economically and efforts to make it part of the
international system in hopes of shaping its political and military behaviour
was not working.48 For instance, former Obama Administration officials
Kurt Campbell and Ely Ratner, who went on to eventually join the Biden
Administration, wrote in March 2018 that “nearly half a century since
Nixon’s first steps toward rapprochement, the record is increasingly clear that
Washington once again put too much faith in its power to shape China’s
trajectory”.49 This was essentially the same position that the Trump Admin-
istration put forth in its National Security Strategy in December 2017, which
said: “These competitions require the United States to rethink the policies of
the past two decades—policies based on the assumption that engagement
with rivals and their inclusion in international institutions and global com-
merce would turn them into benign actors and trustworthy partners. For the
most part, this premise turned out to be false”.50
These developments forced a rethink on the US approach to and policy
toward China. The Trump Administration not only labelled China as a
strategic competitor, recognising the dangers Beijing posed to a rules-based
order, but it also developed a strategy to “preserve a free and open Indo-
Pacific where sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity are safe-
guarded”.51 One of the key elements of this strategy was developing stronger
security relationships with partners in the region that share US concerns
about Chinese adventurism and have a mutual interest in ensuring a safe,
secure, and transparent region that is open for all to conduct commerce and
navigation. This meant not only upgrading trilateral consultations such as
among the United States, Japan and India to the leader level52 or expanding
the scope of cooperation such as initiating an infrastructure investment
 Competition and coalitions 35
53
partnership with Australia and Japan, but also revitalising the Quad, as
stated earlier. The administration believed that linking these relationships in
the region would develop a “networked security architecture” that could
share the burden of responsibilities in the region, would be “capable of
deterring aggression”, and could support “regional peace and stability”.54
In the months before he came into office, the strategic community vigor-
ously debated how Biden would approach China.55 Would he return to the
Obama-era engagement of Beijing to secure tactical cooperation while
avoiding conflict or would he follow Trump’s more confrontational
approach? In hindsight, the question had already been answered over a year
before Biden took office, in a piece by Kurt Campbell and Jake Sullivan in
2019, who both went on to occupy prominent positions in the administra-
tion. “The best approach … will be to lead with competition, follow with
offers of cooperation, and refuse to negotiate any linkages between Chinese
assistance on global challenges and concessions on US interests”, they
wrote.56 From what we have seen so far, Biden has chosen to pursue “steep
competition” with Beijing,57 as demonstrated by his administration’s sanc-
tions on Chinese officials for human rights abuses in Xinjiang,58 and tigh-
tening of restrictions on Chinese telecommunication giant Huawei.59 He has
also emphasised enlisting collaboration from allies and partners, particularly
other democracies, to “confront China’s abusive behaviors” and “to shape
the rules of the road on everything from the environment to labor, trade,
technology, and transparency, so they continue to reflect democratic interests
and values”.60 Groupings like the Quad and the Quad Plus can be helpful in
this endeavour.
In this way, it is increasingly clear that Chinese military and economic
ascendance over the past two decades and US recognition of the threat it
poses, by both Republican and Democratic governments, have resulted in an
overall hardening in American views of Beijing in recent years. This has
pushed the United States to nurture coalitions like the Quad and the Quad
Plus to balance against China’s rise, which will be discussed in more detail in
the next section.

Trump’s rationale for Quad Plus and its progression in the Biden era
The tide had already begun turning against China in the United States
during the first three years of the Trump Administration, which were punc-
tuated by a trade war between the two countries61 as well as US and Chinese
ships facing off in the South China Sea.62 However, the coronavirus pan-
demic brought bilateral tensions to a low not seen in several decades.
Although President Trump was initially complimentary of President Xi’s
efforts to contain the virus,63 his administration soon reversed its stance,
perhaps partially to deflect blame for their own handling of the pandemic, as
reports emerged that China had initially not been transparent about the
spread and lethality of the virus.64 Tensions escalated when senior
36 Vasudeva
administration officials, including Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, traded
barbs with Chinese officials over where the virus originated and both sides
blamed the other.65 This nosedive in Sino–US relations in the aftermath of
the coronavirus pandemic and in the backdrop of an already escalating riv-
alry between the two countries over the past few years laid the foundation
for the Quad Plus grouping.
On 20 March 2020, then US Deputy Secretary of State Stephen Biegun
initiated a weekly coordination call with his counterparts in the Quad coun-
tries (i.e. India, Japan and Australia), as well as with Vietnam, South Korea
and New Zealand, to discuss best practices for and coordinating responses to
the coronavirus pandemic.66 In a similar call on 11 May but at a higher level
and with a slightly different group, Secretary Pompeo spoke with the foreign
ministers of the Quad member-countries along with Brazil, Israel and South
Korea to deliberate “the importance of international cooperation, transpar-
ency, and accountability in combating the COVID-19 pandemic and in
addressing its causes”.67 Multiple such calls took place in the last year of
Trump’s term.
Although the Trump Administration’s initiative to convene the Quad Plus
calls could be seen as driven by global health security concerns, it is perhaps
better viewed through the prism of US competition with China.68 A key
indication of this is the utilisation of the Quad mechanism as the basis for
facilitating this conversation. The Quad is widely known to be a response to
China’s rise and is meant to be a balancing coalition of democracies aimed at
deterring Beijing’s bid to threaten the stability of the Indo-Pacific. Until
recently, the Quad had done this primarily through increasing military
interoperability among its members and exchanging views on regional and
global challenges. That the Quad, led by the United States, brought together
other democratic partners to provide and share solutions to a problem the
Trump Administration viewed as created by China indicates the strategic and
geopolitical significance of this grouping.
To challenge the narrative about American decline and compete with
China in the Indo-Pacific, the Trump Administration began to paint Beijing
as a norm violator through various speeches and other public messaging long
before the pandemic. For example, former Secretary of State Rex Tillerson’s
remarks at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in October
2017 called China out for its predatory economics in the Indo-Pacific and
positioned the United States as a country that would work to ensure that
small states in the region retained their sovereignty.69 This rhetoric only
accelerated after the coronavirus pandemic, with US officials asserting that
“Beijing’s actions threaten our people and our prosperity” and calling for a
“new grouping of like-minded nations, a new alliance of democracies” to
deal with the challenge from China.70 Quad Plus was a part of that vision,71
with the Trump Administration utilising the grouping to marshal support for
an investigation into the origins of the coronavirus, develop ways to support
countries that may be vulnerable economically as a result of COVID-19, and
 Competition and coalitions 37
fight disinformation, all measures directed at China. Officials described the
72

Trump Administration’s preference for “mission-based coalitions” instead of

cooperation in large international institutions, and the Quad Plus fit that
description perfectly.73
What aided the Trump Administration in putting these coalitions together
was the increasing though selective convergence between its views and those
of its Quad partners on the risks China posed in the Indo-Pacific region. This
came about particularly due to the hardening of the stances of Australia and
India, the more reluctant of the Quad partners, towards China in the past
few years. While Australia has a high degree of economic dependence on
China and has been traditionally wary about rocking the boat in the rela-
tionship, Beijing’s increasing influence operations in the country and repe-
ated economic coercion have pushed Canberra to stand up to China.74
Similarly, India, which has had a longstanding border dispute and a large
military capability gap with China, has long preferred a hedging strategy to
deal with its northern neighbour. However, the coronavirus pandemic and
the border standoff in eastern Ladakh that began in spring 2020 forced a
rethink in New Delhi, which is now more comfortable in indicating resolve to
China through concrete balancing actions.75
The motivation behind the Quad Plus grouping was arguably not just
strategic but also economic. As discussed in the previous section, the US
government and private industry have long been frustrated with the growing
barriers and challenges that American firms face in doing business in China.
For example, estimates suggest that since 2013, the United States has incur-
red over 1.2 trillion USD in economic damages due to intellectual property
theft from Chinese companies.76 With the addition of trade tensions between
the two countries and the economic fallout generated by the coronavirus
pandemic, the Trump Administration pushed American companies to end
their dependence on Chinese manufacturing and move production out of
China.77 Thus, American companies began looking for countries with inex-
pensive labour to move their supply chains to.78 The Quad Plus was perhaps
envisioned as playing a role in facilitating and prioritising this cooperation at
the highest levels, particularly since grouping members Vietnam and India
could be attractive destinations for US firms.79 The Quad Plus grouping’s
focus on “reenergizing global growth and economic prosperity” in the after-
math of the coronavirus pandemic, particularly in smaller countries,80 was
also likely an effort to shield vulnerable countries from “unsustainable debt”
and China’s potential to “[take] possession of sovereign assets as collateral”,
as envisaged in the Trump Administration’s Indo-Pacific strategy.81 This is
also why they invested in economic instruments such as the Asia Reassurance
Initiative Act, the BUILD Act, and the Blue Dot Network to provide fair
and sustainable financing options to countries facing Chinese economic
coercion and looking for alternatives for their economic development.
A lot of early moves by the Biden Administration indicate significant
continuity with the Trump Administration’s policies, particularly with regard
38 Vasudeva
to economic decoupling from China and the importance of resilient supply
chains,82 as well as the embrace of issue-based coalitions to tackle diplomatic,
military, economic and geopolitical challenges in the Indo-Pacific.
In previous writings, Biden Administration officials have advocated for
“bespoke or ad hoc bodies”83 to maintain order in the Indo-Pacific and to
solve the region’s problems, something that has been evident in practice. For
instance, to mount diplomatic pressure on China over its human rights
abuses in Xinjiang, the Biden Administration coordinated with Canada, the
European Union and the United Kingdom to impose sanctions on Chinese
officials.84 Similarly, the administration worked with a coalition of 13 coun-
tries to call for an independent study into the origins of the COVID-19
pandemic, and voiced concerns over the lack of access provided by the Chi-
nese government for a previous such investigation conducted by the World
Health Organization.85 Militarily, the administration has sought to enhance
interoperability with its like-minded partners in the Indo-Pacific, not only
bilaterally but also by participating in a multilateral Quad plus France exercise
in the Bay of Bengal.86
Most consequentially, the three working groups announced during the first
Quad leaders’ summit in March 2021,87 a meeting initiated by the United States,
indicate the Biden Administration’s intentions of working with functional coali-
tions to address economic and geopolitical concerns arising as a result of
increasing Chinese dominance. For example, the critical and emerging technolo-
gies working group has come out of worries shared by Washington and its part-
ners that Chinese innovation in technologies of the future such as 5G or artificial
intelligence would allow Beijing to shape rules and standards to the detriment of
others and pose national security risks. And while this endeavour is restricted to
the Quad at the moment, the US and other members have indicated their desire
to work with other partners on these issues.88
Carrying forward the Trump era Quad Plus mechanism for pandemic
response in order to coordinate on vaccine development and distribution as
well as cooperation on economic revival89 suggests the Biden Administration
has found coalitions centred on and led by the Quad effective. But how can
such coalitions deliver on mitigating challenges of the future and what are
some areas ripe for cooperation? This will be discussed in the final section.

Future utility of Quad Plus and issue-based coalitions

The United States under Biden is looking to establish the Quad as one of the
most critical multilateral institutions in the Indo-Pacific to check Chinese asser-
tiveness. They hope to build a complementarity of interests between the Quad
and other partners, through various disparate Quad Plus configurations based
on issue area, in order to build capacity of states in the Indo-Pacific that are
targets of Chinese coercion and to ensure prosperity and stability in the region.
How can this be done? Biden has stressed that to compete with China
effectively, the United States needs to make tremendous investment in
 Competition and coalitions 39
technology, saying: “The future lies in who can in fact own the future as it
relates to technology”.90 This is not just for the United States to retain an
innovation edge, but also so that it can provide an alternative to countries in
the Indo-Pacific that are dependent on China for technology. This is an area
where a configuration with the Quad at its core and other partners who bring
comparative advantages would be required. For instance, Taiwan and South
Korea’s dominance in semiconductor manufacturing could be useful here.91
So would Europe’s technological prowess and innovation. In fact, the UK
has floated the idea of a D10, meaning ten democracies (inclusive of the
Quad members), working together on 5G technology.92 Other potential areas
to explore in a Quad Plus setting are maritime domain awareness, humani-
tarian assistance and disaster relief, and infrastructure development, to name
just a few.
But an issue-based coalition will only be successful if the outcome aligns
with the interests of all partners and involves burden-sharing. The United
States and like-minded countries should be careful to balance intent with
capabilities, or they risk overextending themselves in competing with China
and inadvertently handing Beijing a win.

Acknowledgements
Sections of this chapter are based on and draw from an article written by the
author for a December 2020 special issue of the Journal of Indo-Pacific
Affairs and a piece written by the author and Dr Jagannath Panda for The
National Interest in September 2020.

Notes
1 The White House, “Fact Sheet: President-Elect Biden’s Day One Executive
Actions Deliver Relief for Families across America Amid Converging Crises”, 20
January 2021, https://whitehouse.gov.
2 The White House, “Remarks by President Biden in Press Conference”, 25 March
2021, www.whitehouse.gov.
3 Department of Defense, Indo-Pacific Strategy Report: Preparedness, Partnerships,
and Promoting a Networked Region (Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of
Defense, June 2019), 1, https://defense.gov.
4 The White House, “Interim National Security Strategic Guidance”, March 2021,
10, https://whitehouse.gov.
5 Jim Garamone, “Austin Reviews DOD Progress Made During Biden Adminis-
tration’s First 100 Days”, DOD News, 6 May 2021, https://defense.gov.
6 Department of State, “Readout of US–Australia–Japan–India Ministerial (‘The
Quad’)”, 26 September 2019, https://2017-2021.state.gov.
7 Ministry of External Affairs, India, “Foreign Secretary’s Conference Call with
counterparts from Indo-Pacific Countries”, 20 March 2020, https://mea.gov.in;
Department of State Office of the Spokesperson, “Secretary Michael R. Pompeo’s
Video-Conference with Partners on COVID-19”, 11 May 2020, www.state.gov;
Indrani Bagchi, “India, Quad-Plus Countries Discuss Covid-19 Battle, Economic
Resurgence”, Times of India, 28 March 2020, http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com.
40 Vasudeva
8 Jake Sullivan, “Passing the Baton 2021: Securing America’s Future Together”,
Remarks at the United States Institute of Peace, Washington DC, 29 January
2021.
9 The White House, “Remarks by President Biden, Prime Minister Modi of India,
Prime Minister Morrison of Australia, and Prime Minister Suga of Japan in the
Virtual Quad Leaders Summit”, 12 March 2021, https://whitehouse.gov.
10 The White House, “Quad Leaders’ Joint Statement: ‘The Spirit of the Quad’”, 12
March 2021, https://whitehouse.gov.
11 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Korea, “Outcome of Video Tele-
conference on COVID-19 Response between Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs
Choi and his Counterparts”, 22 March 2021, www.mofa.go.kr.
12 Department of Defense, Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the
United States of America: Sharpening the American Military’s Competitive Edge,
(Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, December 2018), 1–2, http
s://dod.defense.gov.
13 Katie Rogers, Lara Jakes, and Ana Swanson, “Trump Defends Using ‘Chinese
Virus’ Label, Ignoring Growing Criticism”, New York Times, 18 March 2020,
www.nytimes.com.
14 Michael C. Bender, Gordon Lubold, Kate O’Keeffe, and Jeremy Page, “US Edges
Toward New Cold-War Era With China”, Wall Street Journal, 12 October 2018,
www.wsj.com; and James Kynge, Katrina Manson, and James Politi, “US and
China: Edging Towards a New Type of Cold War?” Financial Times, 8 May 2020,
www.ft.com.
15 Condoleezza Rice, “Promoting the National Interest”, Foreign Affairs January/
February 2000, www.foreignaffairs.com.
16 “Text of Remarks Prepared for Delivery by Texas Gov. George W. Bush at
Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, Simi Valley, Calif. on November 19, 1999”,
Washington Post, www.washingtonpost.com.
17 Thomas W. Lippman, “Bush Makes Clinton’s China Policy an Issue”, Washington
Post, 20 August 1999, www.washingtonpost.com.
18 Paul Blustein, “The Untold Story of How George W. Bush Lost China”, Foreign
Policy, 1 October 2019, https://foreignpolicy.com.
19 Robert B. Zoellick, “Whither China: From Membership to Responsibility?”
Remarks to National Committee on US–China Relations, New York City, 21
September 2005.
20 Alex Lockie, “China Just Confronted the US Navy in the Pacific—and it Looks
like China Came Out on Top”, Business Insider, 20 December 2016, www.busi
nessinsider.com.
21 Robert Haddick, “Salami Slicing in the South China Sea”, Foreign Policy, 3
August 2012, https://foreignpolicy.com.
22 Zoellick, “Whither China”; and Blustein, “The Untold Story of How George W.
Bush Lost China”.
23 Michael J. Green and Daniel Twining, “Democracy and American Grand Strat-
egy in Asia: The Realist Principles Behind an Enduring Idealism”, Contemporary
Southeast Asia 30, 1 (April 2008), 13, www.jstor.org.
24 Ibid., 14–15.
25 Shyam Saran, “The Quadrilateral: Is it an Alliance or an Alignment?” Hindustan
Times, 25 November 2017, www.hindustantimes.com.
26 Green and Twining, “Democracy and American Grand Strategy in Asia”, 3; and
Dhruva Jaishankar, “‘There Are Real Differences between Me and Obama on
Issues that Matter Greatly to India,’” Indian Express, 25 October 2008, https://
indianexpress.com.
27 Doug Palmer, “Obama Says China Must Stop Manipulating Currency”, Reuters,
29 October 2008, www.reuters.com; and Mark Landler, “Obama’s Journey to
 Competition and coalitions 41
Tougher Tack on a Rising China”, New York Times, 10 September 2012, www.
nytimes.com.
28 Jeffrey Bader, Obama and China’s Rise: An Insider’s Account of America’s Asia
Strategy (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2013), 20–25, 28–29.
29 Jeff Smith, “Beware China’s Grand Strategy”, Foreign Affairs, 20 May 2015,
www.foreignaffairs.com.
30 Department of State, Limits in the Seas No. 143-China: Maritime Claims in the
South China Sea, 5 December, 2014, 1–3, www.state.gov.
31 Hillary Clinton, “America’s Pacific Century”, Remarks at the East West Center in
Honolulu, Hawaii, 10 November 2011, https://2009-2017.state.gov.
32 James Kitfield, “Is Obama’s ‘Pivot to Asia’ Really a Hedge Against China?” The
Atlantic, 8 June 2012, www.theatlantic.com.
33 The White House, “Fact Sheet: East Asia Summit”, 19 November 2011, https://
obamawhitehouse.archives.gov.
34 Josh Rogin, “Inside the First Ever US–Japan–India Trilateral Meeting”, Foreign
Policy, 23 December 2011, https://foreignpolicy.com.
35 “Pivot to the Pacific? The Obama Administration’s ‘Rebalancing’ Toward Asia”,
Federation of American Scientists, 28 March 2012, https://fas.org.
36 Clinton, “America’s Pacific Century”.
37 Demetri Sevastopulo, Geoff Dyer, and Tom Mitchell, “Obama Forced Xi to Back
Down Over South China Sea Dispute”, Financial Times, 12 July 2016, www.ft.
com.
38 “South China Sea: Obama Urges Beijing to Abide by Ruling”, BBC, 3 September
2016, www.bbc.com.
39 Graham Webster, “Making Good on the Rebalance to Asia”, Foreign Affairs, 3
March 2016, www.foreignaffairs.com; Julian Ku, “Assessing the South China Sea
Arbitral Award after One Year: Why China Won and the US is Losing”, Lawfare
(blog), 12 July 2017, www.lawfareblog.com; Prashanth Parameswaran, “US South
China Sea Policy after the Ruling: Opportunities and Challenges”, Brookings
Institution, 22 July 2016, www.brookings.edu; Josh Rogin, “The Obama Admin-
istration Is Failing to Stop China’s Pacific Aggression”, Washington Post, 24 June
2016, www.washingtonpost.com; and Eli Lake, “The Philippines Just Blew up
Obama’s Asia Pivot”, Straits Times, 24 October 2016, www.straitstimes.com.
40 Graham Allison, “What Xi Jinping Wants”, The Atlantic, 31 May 2017, www.
theatlantic.com; and Department of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military
and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2017,
(Washington DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, May 2017), https://dod.
defense.gov.
41 Jim Garamone, “Dunford: US Military Advantage Over Russia, China Eroding”,
DOD News, 16 November 2017, www.defense.gov.
42 Tamar Gutner, “AIIB: Is the Chinese-led Development Bank a Role Model?”,
Council on Foreign Relations(blog), 25 June 2018, www.cfr.org.
43 Peter Cai, “Understanding China’s Belt and Road Initiative”, Lowy Institute, 22
March 2017, www.lowyinstitute.org.
44 Steven Lee Myers, “With Ships and Missiles, China Is Ready to Challenge US
Navy in Pacific”, New York Times, 29 August 2018, www.nytimes.com.
45 “China Opens First Overseas Military Base in Djibouti”, Reuters, 1 August 2017,
www.reuters.com.
46 Jesse Johnson, “Beijing Continuing ‘Steady Pattern of Militarization’ in South
China Sea”, Japan Times, 24 February 2017, www.japantimes.co.jp; and Center
for Strategic and International Studies, A Constructive Year for Chinese Base
Building, 14 December 2017, https://amti.csis.org.
47 Ministry of External Affairs, India, “Recent Developments in Doklam Area”, 30
June 2017, www.mea.gov.in.
42 Vasudeva
48 Kurt Campbell and Ely Ratner, “The China Reckoning”, Foreign Affairs, March/
April 2018, www.foreignaffairs.com; and Nadia Schadlow, “The End of American
Illusion”, Foreign Affairs, September/October 2020, www.foreignaffairs.com.
49 Campbell and Ratner, “The China Reckoning”.
50 Department of State, National Security Strategy of the United State of America
(Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of State, December 2017), 3, www.
whitehouse.gov.
51 Department of Defense, Indo-Pacific Strategy Report, 3.
52 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan, “Japan–US–India Summit Meeting”, 30
November 2018, www.mofa.go.jp.
53 The White House, “Joint Statement of the Governments of the United States of
America, Australia, and Japan”, 17 November 2018, www.whitehouse.gov.
54 Department of Defense, Indo-Pacific Strategy Report, 44–45.
55 See: Thomas Wright, “Between Restoration and Change”, Order from Chaos
(blog), 1 October 2020, www.brookings.edu; Aaron Friedberg, “Beware the
China Reset”, Foreign Policy, 1 October 2020, https://foreignpolicy.com; and
Bonnie Glaser and Jude Blanchette, “Neither China nor the US Wants a Hot
War. Dialogue Can Help Separate Fact from Fiction”, South China Morning Post,
19 November 2020, www.scmp.com.
56 Kurt Campbell and Jake Sullivan, “Competition Without Catastrophe”, Foreign
Affairs, September/October 2019, www.foreignaffairs.com.
57 The White House, “Remarks by President Biden in Press Conference”.
58 Department of Treasury, “Treasury Sanctions Chinese Government Officials in
Connection with Serious Human Rights Abuse in Xinjiang”, 22 March 2021, http
s://treasury.gov.
59 Karen Friefeld, “Biden Administration Adds New Limits on Huawei’s Suppliers”,
Reuters, 11 March 2021, https://reuters.com.
60 Joseph R. Biden, Jr., “Why America Must Lead Again”, Foreign Affairs, March/
April 2020, www.foreignaffairs.com.
61 Ana Swanson, “As Trump Escalates Trade War, US and China Move Further Apart
With No End in Sight”, New York Times, 1 September 2019, www.nytimes.com.
62 Catherine Wong, “US, Chinese Warships within Meters of Collision in South
China Sea, Leaked Pictures Show”, South China Morning Post, 3 October 2018,
www.scmp.com.
63 Nathan McDermott and Andrew Kaczynski, “Trump Repeatedly Praised China’s
Response to Coronavirus in February”, CNN, 25 March 2020, www.cnn.com.
64 Emily Feng and Amy Cheng, “Critics Say China Has Suppressed and Censored
Information in Coronavirus Outbreak”, NPR, 8 February 2020, www.npr.org;
and David Cyranoski, “Scientists Question China’s Decision Not to Report
Symptom-Free Coronavirus Cases”, Nature, 20 February 2020, www.nature.com.
65 Zachary Cohen, Alex Marquardt, and Kylie Atwood, “Blame Game Escalates
between US and China over Coronavirus Disinformation”, CNN, 25 March 2020,
www.cnn.com.
66 Ministry of External Affairs, India, “Foreign Secretary’s Conference Call with
counterparts from Indo-Pacific Countries”, 20 March 2020, https://mea.gov.in.
67 Department of State, “Secretary Michael R. Pompeo’s Videoconference with
Partners on COVID-19”, 11 May 2020, www.state.gov.
68 Jagannath Panda and Akriti Vasudeva, “US–China Competition and Washing-
ton’s Case for ‘Quad Plus’”, National Interest, 28 September 2020, https://nationa
linterest.org.
69 Rex Tillerson, “Defining Our Relationship with India for the Next Century: An
Address by US Secretary of State Rex Tillerson”, Remarks at the Center for
Strategic and International Studies in Washington, DC, 18 October 2017, www.
csis.org.
 Competition and coalitions 43
70 Michael Pompeo, “Communist China and the Free World’s Future”, Remarks at
the Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, Yorba Linda, California,
23 July, 2020, www.state.gov.
71 Panda and Vasudeva, “US–China Competition and Washington’s Case for ‘Quad
Plus’”.
72 Department of State, “Indo-Pacific Cooperation on COVID-19”, 12 May 2020,
www.state.gov.
73 Schadlow, “The End of American Illusion”.
74 Natasha Kassam, “Great Expectations: The Unraveling of the Australia-China
Relationship”, Brookings Institution, 20 July 2020, www.brookings.edu.
75 Akriti Vasudeva, “Shedding the Dogmas in India’s China Policy”, South Asian
Voices, 27 June 2020, https://southasianvoices.org.
76 Schadlow, “The End of American Illusion”.
77 “Trump Dangles Cash for US Firms Moving from China”, BBC, 18 August 2020,
www.bbc.com.
78 Ana Swanson and Jim Tankersley, “Companies may move supply chains out of
China, but not necessarily to the US”, New York Times, 22 July 2020, www.nytim
es.com.
79 Panda and Vasudeva, “US–China Competition and Washington’s Case for ‘Quad
Plus’”.
80 Department of State, “Indo-Pacific Cooperation on COVID-19”.
81 Department of Defense, Indo-Pacific Strategy Report, 9.
82 The White House, “Executive Order on America’s Supply Chains”, 24 February
2021, www.whitehouse.gov.
83 Kurt Campbell and Rush Doshi, “How America Can Shore up Asian Order”,
Foreign Affairs, 12 January 2021, www.foreignaffairs.com.
84 Department of State, “Promoting Accountability for Human Rights Abuse with
Our Partners”, Press statement by Antony J. Blinken, Secretary of State, 22
March 2021, https://state.gov.
85 Department of State, “Joint Statement on the WHO-Convened COVID-19 Ori-
gins Study”, 30 March 2021, https://state.gov.
86 US Navy 7th Fleet Public Affairs, “Multinational Naval Forces Conduct Exercise
La Perouse”, 6 April 2021, https://navy.mil.
87 The White House, “Quad Leaders’ Joint Statement: ‘The Spirit of the Quad’”.
88 Ibid.
89 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Korea, “Outcome of Video Tele-
conference on COVID-19 Response …”.
90 The White House, “Remarks by President Biden in Press Conference”.
91 Arjun Kharpal, “How Asia Came to Dominate Chipmaking and What the US
Wants to Do about it”, CNBC, 11 April 2021, https://cnbc.com
92 “Britain Wants US to Form a 10-Nation 5G alliance to Cut Reliance on China’s
Huawei”, South China Morning Post, 29 May 2020, https://scmp.com.
3 The Quad Plus and India’s pointed
alignment strategy
Jagannath P. Panda

Since the Cold War era, India has championed a non-alignment strategy
which enabled it to strike a balance in its ties with the two superpowers of
the time—the United States (US) and the Soviet Union—without being
drawn into Cold War politics. Over time, the non-aligned movement (NAM)
became a key pillar of Indian foreign policy, serving as a tool for New Delhi
to cooperate and collaborate with other middle and small developing nations
that had come together over their shared values and interests. Since the end
of the Cold War, this non-aligned strategy has evolved into a “multi-align-
ment” approach, which entailed India to reach out to and enhance ties with
varied nations (both bilaterally and multilaterally). In recent years, India’s
multi-alignment has arguably taken on contours of a pointed alignment
strategy—particularly in the Indo-Pacific region. Although India has con-
tinued to refuse to endorse an “alliance framework”, it has become more
open to participation in coalitions of “like-minded” countries coming toge-
ther to work towards the achievement of national, regional and global ben-
efit.1 Although India’s official stance continues to reflect an overt rejection of
an alliance structure;2 in practice, New Delhi’s post-Galwan foreign policy is
riddled with complexities that indicate a greater openness to specific, pointed
alliances aimed at bolstering New Delhi’s strategic posturing and building
national security strengths.
India’s stance on the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad 2.0) mechan-
ism—which constitutes of the US, Australia, Japan and India—and its active
participation in the same is drawn from such a pointed alignment strategy.
Over the past year, amidst a tumultuous period in the geopolitical and stra-
tegic environment in the Indo-Pacific, with tensions between China and the
Quad nations rising considerably, the Quad 2.0 has seen a remarkable
synergy and a more robust efforts to progress towards its formalisation and
institutionalisation. Perhaps most prominently, in March 2021, the Quad
held its very first leadership summit (virtually) bringing together Indian
Prime Minister Narendra Modi, Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga,
Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison and American President Joe
Biden.3 The summit not only marked the elevation of the Quad dialogue
from Foreign Ministers’ level to Prime Ministerial level, but also resulted in
DOI: 10.4324/9781003206408-5
 India’s pointed alignment strategy 45
the Quad’s first ever joint statement as well as its first ever effort at collective
action. Titled the “Spirit of the Quad”, the joint release defined the group-
ing’s priorities (COVID-19 vaccine distribution, critical and emerging tech-
nologies, and climate change) and came as a political affirmation of their
commitment to a “free, open, inclusive, healthy Indo-Pacific anchored by
democratic values”.4
In the same tradition of building Quad synergy and strengthening the
Indo-Pacific construct as inclusive and accessible, the Quad 2.0 has also
made a concerted effort to expand the compass of the Quad to a “Quad
Plus” mechanism. It should be noted that although the phrase “Quad Plus”
has not yet been officially mentioned, it has nevertheless gained strategic
traction among academics, policymakers and the media. Initiated by the
former US Deputy Secretary of State Stephen Biegun in March 2020, the
“Quad Plus” consisted of regular Foreign Secretary level telephonic meetings
between the Quad nations and New Zealand, South Korea, Vietnam, Israel
and Brazil. These meetings were notably limited to discussions on exchanging
experiences and coordinating a response with respect to the worsening
COVID-19 pandemic. While the talks were initially restricted to Indo-Pacific
states, Israel and Brazil’s inclusion later on came as an indication of a
grander strategic intent to broaden the narrative to a global one. Since its
initiation, the “Quad Plus” has been implicitly highlighted in statements by
Quad nations: for instance, a statement released by Japan post the second
Quad Foreign Ministers’ meeting in October 2020 (the first under Prime
Minister Suga) highlighted the four states’ resolve to broaden cooperation
with other states and welcome their proactive efforts to realise their “Free
and Open Indo-Pacific” (FOIP) vision.5
The “Quad Plus” is therefore an undoubtedly major development in the
Quad process and evolution. This chapter seeks to understand the position
that such an abstract grouping holds in India’s strategic thinking and chan-
ging foreign policy outlook. It situates the “Quad Plus” framework within
India’s emerging pointed alignment strategy which marks New Delhi’s
openness and willingness to pursue a closer alignment with a more con-
centrated power structure in the Indo-Pacific. It argues that the conjectural
alliance posited by a “Quad Plus” framework comes as one built on shared
democratic values and a commitment to a rules-based, inclusive and multi-
polar regional order; such contours of the grouping align with New Delhi’s
interests and ambitions, making it synergetic with India’s foreign policy out-
look. The first section of the chapter traces the “Quad Plus” framework’s
origin from the Quad 2.0. Next, the chapter positions the conjectural alliance
in India’s pointed alignment strategy in an attempt to unpack India’s per-
spective and approach towards the grouping. Lastly, the chapter examines
the rapidly transforming India–China ties and power-partner contention to
discuss how the “Quad Plus” is drawn, at least partly, on India’s dynamics
vis-a-vis China. It argues that the Quad Plus emerges as not only an attempt
by New Delhi to build on Indo-Pacific security frameworks but as a pathway
46 Panda
to enhance India’s identity as an Asian power and its vision of a multipolar
order in Asia and the Indo-Pacific.

From Quad 2.0 to the “Quad Plus” conjectural alliance

China’s political and diplomatic clout, as well as international footprint, is a
direct result of its monumental economic growth and prowess—in 2019,
China’s gross domestic product (GDP) was the largest in the world totalling
USD 22.5 trillion.6 Hence, Chinese foreign policy derives its direction and
power from economic diplomacy and policies, especially post the global
financial crisis.7 On the contrary, for India, economic growth has not been in
tandem with that of China; in the post-pandemic order, this gap is only
expected to widen. Indian foreign policy, hence, has always revolved around
New Delhi’s goal to “secure its national interests”,8 resulting from a need to
protect itself in a largely rival or non-friendly neighbourhood with nations
like Pakistan and China threatening India’s territorial sovereignty.
India’s synergy with the Quad 2.0 partners has grown fundamentally
stronger in economic, security and defence sectors. With respect to the Indo-
Pacific, all four nations are increasingly finding consonance in advancing a
“free, open and rules-based” maritime order, with a focused effort to balance,
if not limit or counter, China’s aggressiveness in the region. The ideation of
national initiatives by Quad 2.0 partners has found synergy with India’s own
“Act East Policy”, Security and Growth for All (SAGAR), “Neighbourhood
Policy” and Indo-Pacific initiatives such as Sagarmala which aims at rejuve-
nating 7,500 km of India’s coastline in a major boost to its maritime sector;9
Project Mausam which focuses on better connecting Indian Ocean littorals
by complementing the monsoon patterns;10 and India’s Cotton Route project
which emerged as a low-end counter to China’s BRI by aiming to improve
India’s ties with Central Asian nations.11
Meanwhile, under Japan’s “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” (FOIP), the
establishment of the Expanded Partnership for Quality Infrastructure (EPQI)
12
has resulted in expansive India–Japan collaboration, especially in India’s
Northeast and specific cooperation in third countries. A partnership coop-
eration between Asia and Africa is also being envisioned where both India
and Japan can possibly take a leadership position, to enhance an inter-con-
tinental level of cooperation. Such ventures are crucial to forming a “con-
tinental connect” that both India and Japan have long envisioned, both
officially and non-officially. With Australia, while India’s regional and bilat-
eral synergy has only just started to develop, Canberra’s action-oriented
“Pacific Step Up” policy highlighted in its 2017 Foreign Policy white paper13
has arrived as a welcome addition for promoting greater collaborative
synergy in the economic, political as well as defence domain wherein both
India and Australia are looking to indigenise as well as diversify. In the US,
the Trump Administration brought with it a deeper and active focus on the
Indo-Pacific, more than the policy “pivot” of Obama, with the establishment
 India’s pointed alignment strategy 47
of multiple initiatives that are to remain as key projects with bipartisan sup-
port despite the outcome of the 2020 Presidential election. Initiatives like
Digital Connectivity and Cybersecurity Partnership (DCCP), Infrastructure
Transaction and Assistant Network (ITAN), Asia Enhancing Development
and Growth through Energy (Asia EDGE), and the Better Utilization of
Investments Leading to Development (BUILD) Act of 2018 presented a
conjoined effort by the US focused on rebuilding and strengthening the US
presence in the Indo-Pacific.14 These initiatives are focused on not only
challenging Chinese adventurism, but also improving the US’s own strategic
outreach to Asia, wherein India has emerged as a crucial partner. Among
these national initiatives that have transformed into bilateral synergy, it is
important to also note two key trilateral ventures: the India–Japan–Australia
led Supply Chain Resilience Initiative (SCRI)15 and the US–Japan–Australia
led Blue Dot Network (BDN).16
The implementation of such initiatives by Quad nations has enhanced the
sphere of influence Quad 2.0 wields in the Indo-Pacific. By way of the “Quad
Plus” narrative, much like how the synergy grew among the Quad nations
themselves, an expansion of the outreach of such ventures with nations like
Vietnam, New Zealand, Brazil, Israel and South Korea can be promoted. By
advocating for a truly global outlook via multilateral support for such ven-
tures, they can together shape the post-COVID economic future of Asia and
the Indo-Pacific in a sustainable fashion.
For India, the “Quad Plus” “conjectural alliance” has received a more
proactive thrust, particularly post the Galwan Valley clash. The national
security calculus is encouraging India to take a more pro-active foreign
policy approach: Protection of Indian territorial resources and the maritime
domain are the strong variables shaping India’s changing “China policy” as
well as its increasing focus on the Quad framework. The nature of the con-
jectural alliance of Quad 2.0 is that of a strategic alignment which does not
conform entirely to an “alliance framework”, unlike that of the US. Here, it
is important to note that the COVID-19 pandemic has ushered in a new era
of regional flux and power-balancing in Asia. India’s post-Galwan foreign
policy directive is shaping into a unique “pointed alignment’17 strategy
embracing a focus on stronger military, economic and security ties with
Quad 2.0 partners. This significantly allows New Delhi to move away from
China economically while securing its national interests strategically. Hence,
promotion of security and economic synergy in frameworks like “Quad Plus”
is vital for India.

Delhi’s shift from pointed engagement to pointed alignment

Over the past two decades—and even more in the months post Galwan—
Indian foreign policy has taken on an active outreach route driven by con-
cretisation of bilateral ties, especially with Quad partners. While advance-
ment of such bilateral ties has taken place across a wide spectrum of sectors,
48 Panda
defence and military strategic collaborations indicate how national security
has shaped the Indian foreign policy landscape (see Table 3.1). In a quick
recap, it can be noted that India–Australia ties have been upgraded to a
“Comprehensive Strategic Partnership” with both nations signing a mutual
logistics support agreement.18 Further, India, which was termed a “Major
Defense Partner” (MDP) by the US in 2018,19 has now signed the fourth
foundational military pact with the US-Basic Exchange and Cooperation
Agreement (BECA).20 Similarly, the signing21 of the much-awaited “Acqui-
sition and Cross-Servicing Agreement” (ACSA) between India and Japan
amidst India’s rising tensions with China and domestic changes in Japan
signals the importance of strategic defence ties between the two nations at a
time of turmoil. These agreements will set the stage for the future of security
cooperation between India and the Quad; Japan already shares ACSAs with
US and Australia, further strengthening the scope of regional bilateral,
trilateral and quadrilateral modes of cooperation.
Beyond bilateral synergy, such “pointed alignment” by New Delhi is
taking shape in multilateral and trilateral forums as well. In this context,
India’s active support of and participation in the “Quad Plus” mechanism in
itself is a defining factor of its emerging “pointed alignment” strategies.
Furthermore, “Quad Plus” has the potential to deepen other new and emer-
ging initiatives India is a part of. With the goal of exporting military hard-
ware worth USD 5 billion by 2025,39 India has begun to move beyond its
extensive defence procurement and import sector and focus on exports by
building on “Make in India”. Here, the UK’s “Democratic 10”40 framework
and potential inclusion of India in the same sets a new reference for deeper
tech-security collaboration in a multilateral framework driven by “like-
minded” countries. Similarly, the SCRI by Japan–India–Australia can seek to
gain much broader implementation and success by closer economic integration
with the “Quad Plus” partners.
Factoring China in its foreign policy formulation or managing its rela-
tionship with Beijing is not a strategic choice for India; rather, it is a strategic
necessity. A complex bilateral and neighbourhood environment, competing
foreign policy interests between the two and China’s rise as an influential
economic and political actor in the global decision-making process make
these strategic necessities quite critical for India. Prime Minister Narendra
Modi’s Shangri-La dialogue speech in June 2018 reflected this , “No other
relationship of India has as many layers as our relations with China” and
that both the countries need to work together for a better Asia and the world
while being “sensitive to each other’s interests”.41 A similar reference was
equally discernible when, former Indian Prime Minister (late) Atal Bihari
Vajpayee signed the “Declaration on Principles for Relations and Compre-
hensive Cooperation” between the two nations during his state visit to China
in 2003. To this effect, India’s choices of interest in Asia and beyond vis-à-vis
China is complex and raises complementarities as well as contradictions
which are partly structural and partly systemic.42
Table 3.1 India’s key defence/military agreements with Quad countries
S. No. Name of agreement Year Signatories/discussants Key features/remarks
AUSTRALIA
1. Comprehensive Strategic June 2020 Indian PM Narendra Modi and a. Shared values of democracy and
Partnership22 Australian PM Scott Morrison rule of law
b. Shared vision of a free, open,
inclusive and rules-based
Indo-Pacific region
c. Shared Vision for Maritime
Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific
d. Commitment to a new phase of
Australia-India Strategic Research
Fund to promote innovative
solutions for responding to and
treating COVID-19
e. Commitment towards work in
areas of digital economy, cyber
security, and critical and emerging
technologies under Framework
Arrangement on Cyber and Cyber-
Enabled Critical Technology
Cooperation
2. Mutual Logistics Support June 2020 Indian PM Narendra Modi and
Agreement (MLSA)23 Australian PM Scott Morrison
3. Defence Science and June 2020 Indian PM Narendra Modi and Provides a framework for growing
Technology Implementing Australian PM Scott Morrison collaboration between the defence
Arrangement (DSTIA)24 science and technology research
organisations of both countries.
S. No. Name of agreement Year Signatories/discussants Key features/remarks
4. Framework on Security November 2014 Indian PM Narendra Modi and The action plan incorporated:
Cooperation25 Australian PM Tony Abbott a. Annual Summit on Foreign
Policy Exchanges and Coordination
b. Defence Policy Planning and
Coordination
c. Counter-Terrorism and
transnational crimes
d. Border Protection, Coast Guard,
and Customs
e. Disarmament, Non-proliferation,
civil nuclear energy and maritime
security
f. Disaster management and
peacekeeping
g. Cooperation in Regional and
Multilateral Fora
5. Joint Declaration on Security November 2009 Indian PM Manmohan Singh and a. Bilateral cooperation through
Cooperation26 Australian PM Kevin Rudd East Asia Summit and ASEAN
Regional Forum and other
multilateral frameworks
b. Defence Policy Talks (Senior
Officials level)
c. Consultations between National
Security Advisers of India and
Australia
S. No. Name of agreement Year Signatories/discussants Key features/remarks
5. Memorandum on Defence March 2006 Indian Defence Secretary Shekhar a. Marked the start of India–
Cooperation27 Dutt and High Commissioner for Australia strategic defence bilateral
Australia John McCarthy cooperation
b. Focused on terrorism, defence
cooperation, information sharing,
and extradition
UNITED STATES
1. Basic Exchange and October 2020 Ministry of Defence (GoI) and a. BECA pertains to geospatial
Cooperation Agreement National Geospatial Intelligence intelligence, sharing information on
(BECA)28 Agency (NGA), Department of maps and satellite images for
Defense of USA defence
b. This will allow India to use the
US’s advanced geospatial
intelligence and enhance the
accuracy of automated systems and
weapons
2. Industrial Security Annex December 2019 Indian Minister of Defence Rajnath Will allow exchange of classified
(ISA)29 Singh, Minister of External Affairs military information between Indian
S. Jaishankar and US Secretary of and the US defence industries
State Michael R. Pompeo, Secretary allowing partnership between US–
of Defense Mark T. Esper India private defence industries
3. Communications, September 2018 Indian Defence Minister Nirmala Sharing of high-end encrypted
Compatibility, Security Sitharaman, Indian EAM (late) communication and satellite data
Agreement (COMCASA)30 Sushma Swaraj and US Secretary of
State Mike Pompeo and Defense
Secretary James Mattis
S. No. Name of agreement Year Signatories/discussants Key features/remarks
4. Master Information Exchange 2018 Indian Ministry of Defence and US Exchange of Research &
Agreement (MIEA)31 Department of Defence Development information extended
for another term of 15 years, i.e. up
to Feb 2034
5. Memorandum of Intent32 2018 US Defence Innovations Unit (DIU) Co-production and co-development
and Indian Defence Innovation projects through the Defence
Organisation—Innovations for Technology and Trade Initiative
Defence Excellence (DIO-iDEX) (DTTI), and to pursue other
avenues of defence innovation
cooperation.
6. Logistics Exchange Memor- 2016 Indian Ministry of Defence and US LEMOA gives access to designated
andum of Agreement Department of Defence military facilities on either side for
(LEMOA)33 the purpose of refuelling and
replenishment. Primarily, LEMOA
covers port calls, joint exercises,
training and HADR.
7. India–US General Security of May 2002 Indian Defence Minister Rajnath Framework for exchange and
Military Information Agree- Singh, Indian EAM S. Jaishankar protection of classified military
ment (GSOMIA)34 and US Secretary of State Mike information between India and US
Pompeo and Secretary of Defense defence industries
Mark Esper
JAPAN
1. Acquisition and Cross- September 2020 Indian Defence Secretary Ajay Allows reciprocal provision of
Servicing Agreement Kumar and Japanese Ambassador supplies and services between the
(ACSA)35 Suzuki Satoshi Armed Forces of India and the
Self-Defense Forces of Japan
S. No. Name of agreement Year Signatories/discussants Key features/remarks
2. Implementing Arrangement October 2018 Indian Defence Minister Nirmala Maritime domain awareness (MDA)
for Deeper Cooperation Sitharaman and Japanese Defence – greater cooperation and exchange
between Japan Maritime Minister Itsunori Onodera of information
Self-Defense Force (JMSDF)
and Indian Navy36
3. Agreement concerning Trans- December 2015 Indian Foreign Secretary Dr S Enhance defence and security
fer of Defence Equipment and Jaishankar and Ambassador of cooperation by making available to
Technology Cooperation37 Japan to India Kenji Hiramatsu each other, defence equipment and
technology necessary to implement
joint research/development and/or
production projects
4. Agreement concerning December 2015 Indian Defence Secretary G Mohan Ensures the reciprocal protection of
Security Measures for the Kumar and Ambassador of Japan to classified military information
Protection of Classified India Kenji Hiramatsu transmitted to each other
Military Information38
54 Panda
India envisions a “multipolar Asia”, advocating a regional framework that is
much more exclusive, contradicting the Chinese conception of Asia. In the
Indian formulation, a multipolar Asia is more of a universal proposition
than a constricted regional proposition. The Indian contention, as reflected
in Prime Minister Modi’s inaugural speech at the Second Raisina Dialogue
on 17 January 2017,43 is that the world has absorbed multipolarity rapidly in
which a “multipolar Asia is a dominant reality”. India’s choice of a multi-
polar Asia rests on two critical aspects: (a) the diffusion of power makes the
notion of Asian security inter-linked with global security, making the situa-
tion advantageous to New Delhi’s security interest regionally and globally;
and (b) exclusivity should be the order of Asia, not inclusivity, indicating the
possibility of bestowing a space for an external power like the United States
to become a part and parcel of the evolving regional security architecture.44
Such an open framework allows India to stay connected strongly with
both the two prime powers in the world, the US and China. Besides, in the
Asian context, it allows India to promote a regional paradigm of “shared
leadership” among the three major Asian powers—India, China and Japan.
Australia, with whom India’s regional and bilateral synergy was not at par as
compared to India’s other Quad partners, is also quickly emerging as a major
Indo-Pacific partner, encouraged by a China disconnect both countries are
undergoing. On the contrary, the Chinese conception of Asia entails an
overhaul of the security structure, aimed at reducing the US-led security
architecture that is prevalent in the region since the Cold War. This assertion
was evident in Xi Jinping’s speech at the fourth Conference on Interaction
and Confidence Building Measures (CICA) in Asia in May 2014, where he
endorsed the rising status of Asia in world affairs but advanced the concept
of “Asia for Asians” to articulate a Chinese envisioned order with an exclu-
sive regional character.45 To China, the “Asia for Asians” proposition pro-
vides a context to bestow the security undertaking of the region in the hands
of Asians.
In this context, the “Quad Plus” framework has arrived at a crucial junc-
ture with much to offer. India’s defence collaborations with the “Quad Plus”
participating countries such as Israel, South Korea, Brazil and Vietnam have
been progressing over the years (see Table 3.2). Among these nations, Viet-
nam and India defence ties have seen the most maturation, with Vietnam’s
strategic importance as a claimant in the South China Sea (SCS) and partner
for India’s oil exploration activities in the SCS being a resounding factor
behind the dedicated focus on bettering ties. Defence ties with New Zealand
have seen the most minimal and incremental, if not absent, growth. Com-
plementarities in defence manufacturing, space and nano-technology as well
as defence cooperation are some of the critical issues that India could pursue.
India’s support for the “Quad” and “Quad Plus” narrative, considering the
post-Galwan security atmosphere, is obvious and presents a grander strategic
intent. Foreign Minister S. Jaishankar in a tweet identified the first “Quad
Plus” consultation as a “broad based virtual meeting” aimed at overcoming
Table 3.2 India’s key defence/military agreements with Quad Plus countries
S. No. Name of agreement Year Signatories/discussants Key features/remarks
ISRAEL
1. MoU to establish a new February 2020 Israel Aerospace Institute and Collaboration on establishing a new
centre for technical and India’s Bharat Electronics Limited centre for providing product life
maintenance cycle support including repair &
support for India’s air maintenance services for the
defence systems46 air-defence systems in India.
2. Strategic Collaboration February 2020 Israel Aerospace Institute and That UAVs will be made in India
Memorandum on UAVs47 India’s Hindustan Aeronautics Lim-
ited and Dynamatic Technologies
Limited
3. Deal for supply of Barak-8 October 2018 Israel Aerospace Institute (IAI) and This deal was a sign of a strong
missile defence system by IAI India’s Bharat Electronics Limited bilateral partnership in defence
for seven ships of the Indian which crossed USD 6 billion.
Navy48
S. No. Name of agreement Year Signatories/discussants Key features/remarks
VIETNAM
1. Multiple documents signed at December 2020 Various signatories depending on a. Joint Vision for Peace, Prosperity
India - Vietnam Virtual agreement and People: Adopted by PM
Summit49 Narendra Modi of India and PM
Nguyen Xuan Phuc of Vietnam
b. Plan of Action for period 2021–
2023 for further implementation of
Comprehensive Strategic
Partnership: signed by Indian
Minister of External Affairs S.
Jaishankar and Vietnamese Deputy
Prime Minister & Minister of
Foreign Affairs Pham Binh Minh
c. Implementing Arrangement on
Defence Industry Cooperation
between Dept. of Defence
Production, Ministry of Defence,
India and General Dept. of
Defence Industry, Ministry of
National Defence, Vietnam: Signed
by Indian Joint Secretary (Naval
Systems) Surendra Yadav and
Vietnamese Vice Chairman Luong
Thanh Chuong
2. Comprehensive Strategic September 2016 Indian PM Narendra Modi and Included a Line of Credit of
Partnership50 Vietnamese PM Nguyen Xuan Phuc USD100 million for defence
industry cooperation
S. No. Name of agreement Year Signatories/discussants Key features/remarks
3. Joint Vision Statement on May 2015 Indian Defence Minister (late) This included an MoU on
India–Vietnam Defence Manohar Parrikar and Vietnamese cooperation between Coast Guards
Relations for the period Minister for National Defence of the two countries.
2015–2051 Phùng Quang Thanh This effort was projected as part
of India’s Act East Policy, aimed at
deepening strategic and economic
relations.
4. MoU for the Establishment May 2015 Indian Coast Guard (ICG) and Following this agreement, the ICG
of Collaborative Relationship Vietnam Coast Guard ship ICGS Sarang conducted a
to Combat Transnational four-day port call to the city of Ho
Crime and Development Chi Minh from 27 to 31 August
Mutual Cooperation52 2015 where the coast guards of
both countries had elaborate
discussions over anti-smuggling and
anti-poaching patrols.
6. MoU on defence November 2009 Indian Defence Minister A K To help build closer interaction
cooperation54 Antony and Vietnamese Defence between the two nations through
Minister Phùng Quang Thanh regular defence dialogue, training,
exercises, Navy and Coast Guard
ship visits, along with capacity
building
7. Joint Declaration on July 2007 Indian PM Manmohan Singh and To intensify cooperation in defence
Strategic Partnership55 Vietnamese PM Nguyen Tan Dung supplies, joint projects, training and
intelligence. Also to enhance
interaction between their respective
defence and security establishments.
S. No. Name of agreement Year Signatories/discussants Key features/remarks
8. Joint Declaration on the May 2003 Indian EAM Yashwant Sinha and To enhance defence cooperation.
Framework of Comprehen- Vietnamese Minister of Foreign This agreement binds both nations
sive Cooperation56 Affairs Nguyen Dy Nien to conduct periodic high-ranking
visits including the expansion of
cooperation in defence and security
spheres.
9. Defence Cooperation March 2000 Indian Defence Minister George Included sale of advanced military
Agreement / Defence Fernandes Vietnamese Defence light helicopters, assistance in
Protocol57 Minister Pham Van Tra repairs and overhaul of Vietnam’s
MiG-21 aircraft, and training
assistance for pilots and
technicians. Also included joint
military exercises, joint campaigns
on anti-piracy in South China Sea
and anti-insurgency training.
SOUTH KOREA
1. MoUs on Defence September 2019 Indian Defence Minister Rajnath To enhance defence educational
Cooperation58 Singh and South Korea’s Defence exchanges and extend logistical
(military logistics support Minister Jeong Kyeong-Doo support to each other’s navies
agreement)
MoU on Defence Industry April 2017 Indian defence secretary Ashok This was conceived under the
Co-operation in Kumar Gupta and South Korean overall umbrella of the “Special
Shipbuilding59 Minister of Defense Acquisition Strategic Partnership” of May 2015
Program Administration Chang This cooperation was part of the
Myoung-jin Make in India policy, under which
warships will be built at domestic
shipyards with South Korea’s help.
S. No. Name of agreement Year Signatories/discussants Key features/remarks
2. MoU for Cooperation May 2015 Indian PM Narendra Modi and The MoU will finalise consultations
between the National President of ROK Park Geun-hye between National Security Council
Security Council Secretariat structures in a number of areas
of Republic of India and
Office of National Security of
Republic of Korea60
3. Agreement between the January 2014 Indian Defence Minister A K To cooperation in the field of
Government of Republic of Anthony and South Korea’s Foreign defence and to ensure the
Korea and The Government Minister Yun Byung-se protection of classified military
of the Republic of India on information
the Protection of Classified
Information61
BRAZIL
1. Joint Venture Agreement for January 2020 Jindal Defence (India) and Taurus Towards India–Brazil cooperation
manufacturing an array of Armas S.A. (Brazi) in the strategic defence sector. This
small arms62 agreement proposes setting up of a
JV company at Hisar (Haryana,
India) which will manufacture small
arms based on the “Transfer of
Technology” from Taurus to
achieve localisation of production
in accordance with the Defence
Procurement Procedure.
2. Action Plan to Strengthen January 2020 Indian PM Narendra Modi and
Strategic Partnership63 Brazilian President Bolsonaro
S. No. Name of agreement Year Signatories/discussants Key features/remarks
3. Strategic Partnership64 2006 President of the Federative Republic Based on a common global vision,
of Brazil Luiz Inacio da Silva and shared democratic values and a
Indian PM Manmohan Singh commitment to foster economic
growth with social inclusion for the
welfare of people of both countries
4. Defence Cooperation December 2003 Brazilian Defence Minister Jose Cooperation in defence related
Agreement65 Veiges Filho and Indian Defence matters, especially in the field of
Minister (late) George Fernandes Research & Development,
acquisition and logistic support.
Under this agreement, a “Joint
Defence Committee” has been
set-up that meets at regular
intervals
 India’s pointed alignment strategy 61
the challenges of the COVID-19 pandemic.66 Moreover, the press release by
Indian External Affairs ministry titled “Cooperation among select countries
of the Indo-Pacific in fighting Covid-19 pandemic” reflected more officially
India’s intentions to actively support the “Quad Plus” narrative.67 All the
more significantly, the support of a “Quad Plus” cycle demonstrates India’s
developing grasp and embrace of an American perspective that aims to
safeguard and fortify a liberal international order while zeroing in on build-
ing an Indo-Pacific narrative that has been undermined by the ascent of a
“revisionist” China.68 This is at a time when New Delhi has framed its rela-
tionship with China on a “power-partner” balance. To this effect, by seeking
a case-by-case module in managing China, India has tried to fortify the
multilateral method of relationship with Beijing, in the desire for rejuvenat-
ing and improving the Bretton Woods institutions to build an agent and
result-driven support for developing economies. Such a contention remained
in place between the two Asian giants regardless of the developing strains
with China over border conflicts and other international complexities; for
example, a challenged Indo-Pacific maritime domain. India’s multilateral
associations with China in the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB),
the New Development Bank (NDB) under the BRICS structure and inclu-
sion in the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), are instances of such
multilateral overtures by New Delhi.69
It is important to note that recognising the “Quad Plus” structure does not
imply that India will detach itself from these multilateral commitments with
China. Likewise, India’s endorsement of the “Quad” and the “Quad Plus”
narrative equally lends to the fact that New Delhi might be envisioning a
“pointed purposive” alignment with the United States. Yet, this does not
necessarily mean that India is completely accepting of a US-led order by
giving away its autonomous, independent and non-aligned frame of foreign
policy posturing.70 What is rather clearly visible is India’s “pointed align-
ment” within the rubrics of the “multi-aligned” foreign policy framework
that New Delhi has advocated in recent times. Beijing’s aggressive conduct
on the India–China boundary, its efforts to promote friction between India
and neighbours like Bhutan and Nepal (through Doklam and Kalapani,
respectively), its gradually growing sea claims in the South China Sea and the
East China Sea and its forceful policies towards Taiwan and Hong Kong:
every one of these developments are further guiding or prompting a case for
change or reconsideration in India’s China policies. Donald Trump’s invita-
tion to India, alongside Australia and South Korea, to join the Group of 7
(G7) mirrors the developing Indo-Pacific narrative in which a “Quad Plus”
course of action fits well.71 Here, it should be noted that Britain formally
invited India, Australia and South Korea to the G7 in June 2021 as guest
countries with the possibility of making it a permanent addition.72 UK’s
move came in combination with its emerging tilt towards the Indo-Pacific—
as envisioned in its landmark integrated review of its foreign, defence, devel-
opmental and security policies.73 Although Britain is not yet party to “Quad
62 Panda
Plus” discussions, Britain’s security alliance with the US, interest in a
democracy-driven Indo-Pacific construct, and status as a middle power fur-
ther strengthens the narrative of a broader and more inclusive Indo-Pacific
region that can be realised through a “Quad Plus” mechanism.

India and “Quad Plus” partners: a case of growing synergy

Beyond India’s existing and evolving ties with the Quad nations, and coun-
tries like South Korea via the synergy found between “Act East Policy” and
“New Southern Policy” extensively covered in strategic circles,74 a “Quad
Plus” framework will further a “pointed alignment” much needed in defence,
economic and political realms between New Delhi and Israel, Brazil, New
Zealand and Vietnam. Israel is vital to China’s advancement of Xi’s flagship
Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) into the Middle East and the US pressure to
choose between Washington and Beijing is a strategic problem for Israel.75
India and Israel are already strong bilateral strategic partners especially in
the defence sector; historically, defence trade has surpassed USD 1 billion
annually.76 In 2020, the two nations began deepening their defence industry
ties with Israel seeking long-term partnerships via India’s “Make in India”
ventures. The Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI) and India’s Bharat Electro-
nics Limited have signed a memorandum to create a new centre for Indian
air defence systems.77 Similarly, IAI and Hindustan Aeronautics and Dyna-
mitic Technologies Limited have finalised a collaboration to build unmanned
aerial vehicles in India.78 Diplomatically too, Israel has been a part of India’s
Indo-Pacific Regional Dialogue (IPRD) that comes as New Delhi’s effort to
enhance its engagement with strategic global partners on India’s “opportu-
nities and challenges in the Indo-Pacific”.79 In a reflection of India’s desire to
attain a “forward and upward trajectory” in bilateral ties with Israel, Foreign
Minister Jaishankar, in an address to Israeli Ambassadors to the Asia-Paci-
fic, called both states to further productive collaboration between them by
building on shared democratic values and commonalities.80 He described
Israel as part of India’s extended neighbourhood in New Delhi’s “concentric
circles” international outlook with a “neighbourhood first” policy. This
synergy must extend into a deeper defence alliance framework, possibly with
the US; in fact, such a potential trilateral cooperation has recently become a
part of discourse among Indian academic and policy circles.81 While an
economic synergy with China grows for Israel, a defence synergy with India
must be encouraged at par. Under the “Quad Plus” framework, such defence
synergy can be expanded via closer bilateral ties.
Similarly, both Vietnam and India have not shown much interest in alli-
ance structures in the past; but like India, Vietnam too is now looking to
change its foreign policy rhetoric along realistic lines. In 2016, the two sides
upgraded their ties to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership after almost a
decade of Strategic Partnership.82 As per its latest Defence White Paper,
Vietnam has shown a clear indication that it is willing, even aiming, to
 India’s pointed alignment strategy 63
83
pursue stronger military ties abroad. This comes amidst increasing Chinese
sovereignty claims in the SCS which Vietnam contests along with nations like
the Philippines, Taiwan, Brunei and Malaysia. China’s military and techno-
logical lead in the SCS, especially maritime control of the Paracel Islands
claimed by Vietnam, has become a major concern for Vietnam. For India
too, as Prime Minister Modi commented, Vietnam forms a central pillar of
its Act East Policy (AEP) and a long-term strategic partner under its Indo-
Pacific vision.84 In December 2020, both sides held a virtual summit which
culminated in their signing of seven key agreements in various sectors
including defence, and also adopted a joint vision for “peace, prosperity and
people” targeted towards the Indo-Pacific and the South China Sea.85
Looking for stronger ASEAN engagement, Vietnam and India can indeed
create a strong maritime alliance with a potential US trilateral base; fur-
thermore, via “Quad Plus” engagements, a more active thrust on the India–
Japan–Vietnam trilateral could be encouraged.86
The inclusion of Brazil and New Zealand was surprising but the motive
behind the move comes from US’s attempts to disengage countries from
Beijing that are extremely dependent on China. For India, Brazil is its most
important trading partner in the entire Latin America and Caribbean (LAC)
region with total bilateral trade worth USD 7.02 billion in 2019.87 Further-
more, the two nations are part of multiple plurilateral frameworks such as
BRICS, IBSA, International Solar Alliance, UN, BASIC and G-20. None-
theless, India–Brazil economic ties fall short of that shared between Brazil–
China; Beijing continues to be the main trading partner for Brazil with total
trade worth USD 98 billion in 2019.88
However, Brazil–China ties took a sour turn during the pandemic, with
President Bolsonaro’s son Eduardo (who is also an advisor to the President)
drawing rebuke from China for comparing Chinese handling of the virus to
erstwhile Soviet Union’s handling of the Chernobyl disaster.89 Further, Bra-
zil’s Education Minister Abraham Weintraub in a now deleted tweet said
that China is using the pandemic to dominate the world.90 On the other
hand, India has seen a surge in its political ties with Brazil during the course
of the pandemic, particularly under India’s vaccine diplomacy. As Brazil
faced severe vaccine shortages, Bolsonaro sought India’s help for expediting
the export process and arranging an urgent delivery of two million vac-
cines—which came through successfully. In a gesture of India–Brazil good-
will, Bolsonaro took to Twitter to thank Modi (in Hindi), appreciate its
“great partner” India’s efforts to “overcome a global obstacle by joining
efforts” and liken India’s delivered vaccine to a magical life-saving herb in
Hindu mythology.91 The incident is symbolic of the emerging political
synergy between both states, particularly on the issue central to the “Quad
Plus” and the Quad 2.0’s focus. Bolsonaro’s son, Weintraub and Foreign
Minister Ernesto Araujo are among Bolsonaro’s high-profile advisors who
advocate for less reliance on China and deeper convergence with the US.92
Hence, even though it is a BRICS and BASIC member and close trading
64 Panda
partner of China, Brazil chose to be a part of the Quad Plus grouping sig-
nalling a major potential shift in its commercial and political foreign policy
in a post-COVID order.
With China being an indispensable trading partner, the inclusion of New
Zealand in the Plus grouping was one of the more surprising ones. New
Zealand has maintained a stringent policy of not appearing to target Beijing
despite being one of the “Five Eyes” nations. By formally adopting the Indo-
Pacific construct in February 2020, New Zealand’s gradual pull away from
China can be noticed.93 India has been classified as a “priority for New
Zealand”. Hence, the mutual “interest in the prosperity and stability of the
Indo-Pacific region” makes ties between the two nations poised for greater
pointed alignment.94 New Zealand’s 2018 National Security Strategy high-
lighted that its “Indo-Pacific partners”—the Quad 2.0 nations of United
States, Australia, Japan and India—are “reinforcing the rules-based order”.95
For India, which is now also actively working on improving ties with Aus-
tralia, a New Zealand-Australia-India trilateral focused on the Pacific Ocean
and maritime economy as well as security can be a bold yet prudent step
forward. This will allow India to not only improve economic synergy, espe-
cially within the “Quad Plus” framework, but also expand its active maritime
presence in the Pacific, not limiting itself to the SCS.

“Quad Plus” and India’s strategic autonomy

With New Delhi endeavouring to put pre-emptive pressure on China to
address security concerns in the region, Beijing has simultaneously been
steadily promoting the establishment of a coercive maritime influence, mainly
in the South and East China Sea zones. Beijing’s grey-zone strategy, being
largely inoffensive, offers it adequate advantage to stake claims of its sover-
eignty over land, sea and sky.96 However, with the strategy gradually turning
coercive, many are now finding it difficult to challenge. In fact, no one
country can act as a balancer to China’s coercive maritime influence.
Contrastingly, India’s vision for the region stands at the significant inter-
section of partnerships and cooperation through shared goals. A multipolar
maritime Asia facilitates a flexible strategic environment for India to operate
with a range of countries, including the US, Japan and other like-minded
nations, through trilateral and quadrilateral formats, such as the Quad
stressing on freedom of navigation and overflight. A multipolar Asia, thus,
compliments a conjoined and concerted maritime effort across the Indo-
Pacific to balance out China’s adventurism.97 Nevertheless, India realises the
Chinese prowess as well as the concerns in the American Cold-War style
containment strategy which is far from effective, and perhaps difficult to
implement in today’s world.
If a “multi-aligned” policy strategy with a thrust on “strategic auton-
omy”98 has emerged as the defining feature of Indian foreign policy, it is to
find a balance or to accommodate China as a strategic partner, both in the
 India’s pointed alignment strategy 65
Asian and global framework. Strategic autonomy offers the space to better
position India’s strategic interests in a systemic calculus, whereas the multi-
aligned policy framework provides a multi-fold engagement structurally cov-
ering regional and global institutions, and across major and minor, immedi-
ate and extended neighbours. Interestingly, this allows India to position its
interests both in China-centred and US-centred institutions or envisioned
architecture without wholly subscribing to their respective regional visions.
India’s growing strategic outreach through its AEP, Link West policy, Con-
nect Central Asia policy, and SAGAR in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR)
builds a strategic context in India’s favour to back a multipolar Asian pro-
position where New Delhi can envision a greater role for itself in the regional
decision-making process.
The “Quad Plus” is instrumental in creating a “channel of communica-
tion” with the strategic framework of the grouping highlighting the rapid
creation of alignment structures towards a conjectural alliance. The recently
concluded ministerial Quad meeting has been dubbed as an “exclusive
clique” by China, focused on “harming third party’s interests”.99 The current
uncertainties in the geopolitical order present the right time for the Quad
Plus and Quad 2.0 to rise as a functioning political collective or “conjectural
alliance”. With India regularly being attributed as the most vulnerable con-
nection100 of Quad 2.0, the post-Galwan international strategy suggestions of
New Delhi have crucially demonstrated a more dynamic turn towards poin-
ted alignment and a more profound commitment to conjectural alliances like
the Quad.
By supporting the Quad Plus ambit, India is seemingly becoming more
accepting of the US perspective, with Washington having reciprocated by
including India in the recently expanded G7 aims. Likely to evolve as one of
the most unique and vital Indo-Pacific organisations of the post-COVID
period, it is important that the Quad Plus gathering focuses on recuperations
from COVID-incited financial mishaps while defining ways toward accom-
plishing monetary independence. For instance, member-nations must con-
sider removing barriers to trade and putting resources into vital activities like
SCRI.
In view of the BRI drawing focus for its alleged “debt-trap” setups coupled
with COVID-driven financial strains on the small economies, Xi Jinping’s
China is undergoing thorough worldwide examination in the post-COVID
period. The United States, Japan, India and Australia must, therefore, lever-
age this context to reinforce the Quad 2.0 grouping. They should cautiously
actuate India to join initiatives like the BDN and furthermore expand soli-
citation efforts vis-à-vis the new Quad Plus nations. As an expansion of the
Quad 2.0, Quad Plus seems to be allowing New Delhi to make a “continental
connect”101 and “corridor of communication”, which must further grow
towards seeking commitment from non-China friendly nations within the
grouping. Prime Minister Modi’s clarion call for self-reliance (“Aatma-
nirbhar Bharat”102) requires India to become less dependent on China-driven
66 Panda
worldwide supply chain systems. Joining the BDN and using the “Quad
Plus” framework to promote SCRI stands as a positive effort towards
making more stable supply chains and ensuring the public interest in the
wake of a resurgent and hyper-antagonistic China.

The China factor in India’s “Quad Plus” calculus

China’s vision for Asia, its planned military and economic rise within the
region and the inception of the “Community with a Shared Future for
Humankind” (CSFH)103 are crucial determinants behind India’s move
towards the Quad 2.0. President Xi’s efforts to present a universalist image of
China via the CSFH framework especially with its Asia-focused approach
has been eroded overtime due to Chinese revisionist actions. Beijing’s “charm
offensive” strategy with a simultaneous implementation of “wolf warrior”
diplomacy have only disenchanted Asia.
Nations like India have for long been actively pushing against the BRI
narrative and highlighting how China’s hypocritical actions do not put to
practice its CSFH ambitions. Adding to this argument, Beijing has now
sought to create its own Quadrilateral grouping in the South Asian trans-
Himalayan region, which could be termed as “Himalayan Quad”, with
Pakistan, Afghanistan and Nepal under the premise of combating COVID-
19.104 Its envisaged connectivity initiatives are geared towards the overall
objectives of procuring economic leverage and consolidating its normative
power by spreading its influence—ultimately to cement Beijing’s bid for
global governance leadership. Unlike the Quad 2.0 or “Quad Plus”, the
chances of rapid militarisation of a Chinese Quad are aplenty. Hence, such
Chinese belligerence has been a major factor behind bringing together the
Quad 2.0 and “Plus” nations.
India for its part has implemented a “power-partner” balancing approach
towards China in the different approaches it has taken vis-a-vis AIIB and
BRI.105 While India has welcomed most of the China-led multilateral insti-
tutions such as the AIIB and NDB, it has also opposed Chinese unilateral
schemes such as the BRI. From the beginning, New Delhi has perceived the
AIIB as a striking multilateral proposition coming from Asia that would
benefit the country’s resource accession in national and cross-border infra-
structure projects. As a result, India is its second largest shareholder.
In contrast, New Delhi had strong reservations about the BRI from the
very beginning. Its response to the Chinese invitation on the BRI was dip-
lomatically stout and resolute. An explicit Indian stance on the BRI, that is
rather dismissive, is seen in an official statement released on 13 May 2017.106
The fundamental difference between the AIIB and the BRI, according to
India, is the contested norms of universalism and unilateralism, respectively.
To India, the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) under the BRI
comes as a first-scale strategic hindrance since it ignores New Delhi’s
sensitivities on territorial integrity.
 India’s pointed alignment strategy 67
Reciprocity has been an iron principle in foreign policy which India swears
by; however, this principle is not visible when it comes to India–China rela-
tions, especially referring to the “One China Policy”.107 China has been
consistently undermining New Delhi’s territorial sovereignty, its vital inter-
ests in international organisations, border conflict, expanded maritime inter-
ests in the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea,108 all while India nurses a
huge trade deficit with Beijing. In particular, lack of reciprocity in bilateral
relations is reaffirmed as India shares China’s sensitivities over Taiwan, Tibet
and Xinjiang, but the same is not reciprocated by Beijing with regards to
India’s sensitivities over Arunachal Pradesh.
To strike power parity with China in global decision-making bodies, pri-
marily at the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), has always been
India’s ambition. As reflected in Prime Minister Modi’s speech at the UN
Sustainable Development Summit in November 2015, more representation at
the UNSC will only enhance its “credibility” and “legitimacy”.109 In other
words, a multipolar Asia corroborates India’s structural vision to reform the
UNSC, with Asia having a better and bigger voice or representation in world
affairs. Rather, the Indian proposition of a multipolar Asia looks to build
India’s strength globally and support from China at the UNSC is a strategic
necessity for India. Keeping such examples in mind, India’s ties with China
have been driven along a finely balanced line dividing competition and
cooperation.
Hence, India’s present China strategy is one of pragmatism, especially by
promoting economic collaboration despite security differences. In the midst
of this pragmatism, Prime Minister Modi plans to achieve equality of power
in the bilateral and regional realm that will situate India as a “peer partner”,
rather than just a partner, of China. The signing of their “developmental
partnership” in 2014, at the very onset of both Modi and Xi’s national lea-
dership roles, was a key example of the expectations both held vis-a-vis
bilateral ties.110 Modi’s China strategy has hence imbibed a particular por-
trayal of advancing commitment with balance or “engagement with equili-
brium”.111 Nonetheless, over the years, Chinese revisionist tendencies—
coming to a head at Galwan—have left a lasting impact on China–India ties,
with the same changing along realist paradigms in the emerging security
order.
Although both sides finalised a disengagement agreement in February
2021, there remain significant differences between both sides;112 the most
recent and 11th round of military consultations held on 9 April 2021, saw no
progress in further disengagement from the remaining friction points.113
More importantly, the nine-month long Galwan contention has embedded
itself as a dark spot in the India–China ties and signals a developing distrust,
regardless of diplomatic and military redressals, in the relations between the
two countries.114 India now is ready to exploit the power distribution,
reaching out past the Quad Plus nations. Such a cycle permits India to have
more military, economic and diplomatic engagement with nations that are
68 Panda
vital to India’s emerging fortune in the Indo-Pacific. As such, Quad Plus
enhancements provide a “corridor of communication” for India past the
Quad nations, for the most part with Brazil, Israel, Vietnam and South
Korea, and permits it to speed up a “continental connect” idea that its
comprehensive Indo-Pacific standpoint has been pitching for quite a while.
The “Quad Plus” is still in nascent stages, admittedly. It does not have an
institutional system nor is it clear how it is going to proceed in the future. It
is only natural that countries like Brazil, New Zealand, South Korea and
Vietnam are wary of taking part in an anti-China discussion, as every one of
them shares large-scale economic ties with Beijing. Despite such limitations,
the “Quad Plus” serves India’s enthusiasm for gaining power multilaterally,
by reinforcing its relations with nations that are key stakeholders of the
emerging order. The methodology of dealing with China under a “power-
partner” parity is seemingly becoming outdated and is poised to undergo a
lasting, rather concrete, change: China is now being seen as a force that
compromises Indian security, sovereignty and sway.

“Quad Plus” in post-Galwan India–China ties

India and China seem to have established a “new normal” in their ties post
the Galwan Valley incident and their military standoff; the “Quad Plus”
mechanism must necessarily be understood under India’s changed outlook in
the new era. Here, it must be noted that India’s stake in a multipolar Asia
comes more as a politico-security statement. New Delhi visualises a regional
and global order which facilitates a greater role for India in its diffusion and
distribution of power and therefore a greater voice and a more influential
role globally. As Jaishankar asserted previously, India’s endeavour has long
been to “go global and not be restricted by geographies”.115 New Delhi’s
Indo-Pacific outreach, as well as its outlooks towards Quad 2.0 and the
“Quad Plus” frameworks, are drawn from such thinking. In other words,
India’s endorsement and ambition of an inclusive Indo-Pacific order that is
multipolar in nature is primarily built upon India’s rising power status and
its desire to secure its position vis-a-vis China. New Delhi’s adoption of a
multi-alignment and pointed alignment strategy complements similar
aspirations.
Therefore, considering the importance of such imperatives of protecting
India’s security interests with respect to China in the post-Galwan period,
the Quad 2.0 and the “Quad Plus” have become more critical and assumed a
grander strategic value for New Delhi. Importantly, they signify India’s move
away from non-alignment and staunch commitment to strategic autonomy.
That is not to say that strategic autonomy is no longer a central imperative
for India; however, New Delhi has now been forced to balance its resolute
strategic autonomy policy with its security needs and turn towards engaging
in deeper security ties and enhancing defence cooperation. In this vein, India
has not only engaged in various minilateral groupings of like-minded nations
 India’s pointed alignment strategy 69
in the region, but also become more open to military engagements—such as
through its invitation to Australia to join the India–Japan–US MALABAR
naval exercises, thus making them a Quad endeavour.116 Beijing has repeat-
edly voiced its apprehensions over the Quad’s evolution to an “Asian
NATO” organisation targeted at China.117 And while this cannot be entirely
ruled out in light of the Quad’s growing synergy on security issues as well as
China policy, India’s active military engagement in the post-Galwan period is
based not on a desire for such a militarised body, but that for safeguarding
its territorial and maritime security and strategic autonomy vis-a-vis China.
India’s proactive stance towards the Quad 2.0 and acceptance and promotion
of a “Quad Plus” abstraction are products of a similar ambition.
The post-Galwan period in India has seen the rise of a popular anti-China
rhetoric. Such an environment has provided the Modi Administration the
need and impetus to push national programmes like “Aatmanirbhar Bharat”
and “Make in India” in a strategy to move value supply chains away from
China while bolstering India’s standing as a manufacturing hub and its
somewhat slumping economy. At the same time, it has mandated that the
Indian government not only rethink its China policy, but also review its for-
eign, economic, development, defence, and security policies as part of a
broader and more comprehensive move. The erosion of trust in India–China
relations has forced India to accept that its previously held goals for a Sino-
Indian developmental partnership are rather utopian and unlikely to be
achieved in the short- to middle-term. In other words, China will no longer
be a partner, but a competitor and a challenger (if not an outright threat) for
India. Under such conditions, New Delhi must urgently adhere to a more
realistic view that prioritises building comprehensive national power as part
of its grand strategy to compete with China and prepare itself for a potential
confrontation as China grows more aggressive in its quest to establish itself
as a great power. Diplomatic outreach and collaboration with like-minded
partners—such as through a “Quad Plus”—will be a key part of such a
strategy. As a communist and authoritarian regime, China’s values and vision
for the regional order is in direct conflict of India’s. While Beijing looks to
build a global order in Chinese characteristics (and likely under extensive
Chinese control), India supports a democratic order that is free, open and
inclusive for all and governed not by an authoritarian superpower’s whims
and interests but by the liberal international rules and norms. Therefore, the
India–China conflict spans not merely the physical boundaries of land and
sea, but also the ideological domain. As the Quad states seek to build and
protect a rules-based international order, the “Quad Plus” comes as a crucial
platform to forge a broader and lasting alignment of democratic or like-
minded states with shared goals and interests. In essence, enhanced synergy
with “Quad Plus” nations, in an attempt to sway their own “China connect”
policies and gradually break away from Chinese economic dependence, is
crucial to New Delhi in the coming, dramatically changed, times.
70 Panda
Notes
1 Dipanjan Roy Chaudhury, “India Never Had a NATO Mentality: EAM S
Jaishankar”, Economic Times, 14 April 2021, https://economictimes.indiatimes.
com/news/defence/india-never-had-a-nato-mentality-eam-s-jaishankar/articlesho
w/82071959.cms?from=mdr.
2 “India Will Never be a Part of an Alliance System, Says External Affairs
Minister Jaishankar”, The Hindu, 21 July 2020, www.thehindu.com/news/na
tional/india-has-never-been-part-of-an-alliance-and-will-never-be-jaishankar/arti
cle32142128.ece.
3 Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, “First Quad Leaders’ Vir-
tual Summit”, 9 March 2021, https://mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm?dtl/33601/
First+Quad+Leaders+Virtual+Summit.
4 “Quad Leaders’ Joint Statement: ‘The Spirit of the Quad’”, White House, 12
March 2021, www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/03/12/
quad-leaders-joint-statement-the-spirit-of-the-quad.
5 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan, “The Second Japan–Australia-India–US
Foreign Ministers’ Meeting”, 6 October 2020, www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/p
ress6e_000244.html.
6 World Bank, “GDP, PPP (constant 2017 international $)”, https://data.worldba
nk.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.PP.KD.
7 Timothy R. Heath, “China’s Evolving Approach to Economic Diplomacy”,
Asia Policy 22 (2016), 157–192, www.jstor.org/stable/24905122.
8 Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, “India’s Foreign Policy:
2014–19: Landmarks, achievements and challenges ahead”, 22 July 2019, www.
mea.gov.in/distinguished-lectures-detail.htm?833.
9 Ministry of Shipping, Government of India, “Concept & Objectives”, https://sa
garmala.gov.in/about-sagarmala/vision-objectives; read also, Admiral Anil
Chopra, “Sagarmala or SAGAR: A Maritime Dilemma”, Gateway House, 14
April 2016, www.gatewayhouse.in/sagarmala-or-sagar-our-maritime-dilemma.
10 Ministry of Culture, Government of India, “Mausam: Maritime Routes and
Cultural Landscapes”, www.indiaculture.nic.in/project-mausam.
11 Iftikar Gilani, “Cotton Route to Counter China’s Silk Route”, DNA, 13
December 2016, www.dnaindia.com/india/report-cotton-route-to-counter-china
-s-silk-route-2282313.
12 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan, “The G7 Ise-Shima Summit: Expanded
Partnership for Quality Infrastructure”, www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/oda/files/
000241007.pdf; read also, “India and Japan Cement Defence Ties! Ink Land-
mark ACSA Pact, India to Get Access to Djibouti in Africa”, Financial
Express, 10 September 2020, www.financialexpress.com/defence/india-and-japa
n-cement-defence-ties-ink-landmark-acsa-pact-india-to-get-access-to-djibouti-in
-africa/2079896.
13 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Australian Government, “Stepping
Up Our Engagement in the Pacific”, www.dfat.gov.au/publications/minisite/
2017-foreign-policy-white-paper/fpwhitepaper/foreign-policy-white-paper/chapte
r-seven-shared-agenda-security-and-prosperity/stepping-our.html.
14 US Department of State, “A Free and Open Indo-Pacific”, 4 November 2019,
www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/Free-and-Open-Indo-Pacific-4Nov20
19.pdf.
15 Jagannath Panda, “Opinion: What Supply Chain Resilience Means for Aus-
tralia-India–Japan Ties?” Kyodo News, 3 September 2020, https://english.kyodo
news.net/news/2020/09/17d5e87a566d-opinion-what-supply-chain-resilience-mea
ns-for-australia-india-japan-ties.html.
 India’s pointed alignment strategy 71
16 Jagannath Panda, “India, the Blue Dot Network, and the ‘Quad Plus’ Calcu-
lus”, Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs, Fall 2020, https://idsa.in/system/files/news/
india-bdn-quad-plus.pdf.
17 Jagannath Panda, “Modi’s ‘Self-Reliant India’ Has Key Foreign Policy
Aspects”, Asia Times, 13 July 2020, https://asiatimes.com/2020/07/modis-sel
f-reliant-india-has-key-foreign-policy-aspects.
18 Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, “Joint Statement on a
Comprehensive Strategic Partnership between Republic of India and Australia”,
4 June 2020, www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/32729/Joint_Statem
ent_on_a_Comprehensive_Strategic_Partnership_between_Republic_of_India_a
nd_Australia.
19 “US Recognises India as ‘Major Defence Partner’”, The Economic Times, 12
July 2018, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/us-recognise
s-india-as-major-defence-partner/articleshow/52645652.cms.
20 Rajat Pandit, “India, US Agree to Expedite Work on BECA, Strengthen
Defence Ties”, Times of India, 26 February 2020, https://timesofindia.indiatim
es.com/india/india-us-agree-to-expedite-work-on-beca-strengthen-defence-ties/a
rticleshow/74307875.cms#:~:text=NEW%20DELHI%3A%20Even%20as%20In
dia,-Spatial%20Cooperation%20(BECA).
21 “Japan and India Sign Military Supply-Sharing Pact”, The Japan Times, Sep-
tember 10, 2020, www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2020/09/10/national/japan-india
-sign-military-supply-sharing-pact.
22 “Joint Statement on a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership between Republic
of India and Australia”, Ministry of External Affairs, India, 4 June 2020, www.
mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/32729/Joint_Statement_on_a_Compreh
ensive_Strategic_Partnership_between_Republic_of_India_and_Australia.
23 Ibid.
24 Ibid.
25 “Framework for Security Cooperation between India and Australia”, Ministry
of External Affairs, India, 18 November 2014, https://mea.gov.in/bilatera
l-documents.htm?dtl/24268/Framework_for_Security_Cooperation_between_Ind
ia_and_Australia.
26 “India–Australia Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation”, Australian Hugh
Commission, New Delhi, 12 November 2009, https://india.embassy.gov.au/
ndli/pa5009jsb.html#:~:text=Recognising%20that%20India%20and%20Australi
a,common%20interest%20in%20maritime%20security%3B&text=Have%20decid
ed%20to%20create%20a,cooperation%20between%20the%20two%20countries.
27 “Agreements/MOUs Signed between India and Australia during Visit of Prime
Minister Mr. John Howard to India”, Ministry of External Affairs, India, 6
March 2006, https://mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm?dtl/6051/AgreementsMOUs
+Signed+between+India+and+Australia+during+visit+of+Prime+Minister+M
r+John+Howard+to+India
28 “Joint Statement on the Third India–US 2+2 Ministerial Dialogue”, Ministry of
External Affairs, India, 27 October 2020, www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.
htm?dtl/33145/Joint+Statement+on+the+third+IndiaUS+2432+Ministerial+Di
alogue.
29 “Joint Statement on the Second India–US 2+2 Ministerial Dialogue”, Ministry
of External Affairs, India, 19 December 2019, https://mea.gov.in/bilatera
l-documents.htm?dtl/32227/Joint+Statement+on+the+Second+IndiaUS+2432+
Ministerial+Dialogue
30 “Joint Statement on the Inaugural India–US 2+2 Ministerial Dialogue”, Min-
istry of External Affairs, India, 6 September 2018, https://mea.gov.in/bilatera
l-documents.htm?dtl/30358/Joint+Statement+on+the+Inaugural+IndiaUS+243
2+Ministerial+Dialogue.
72 Panda
31 “Ministry of External Affairs: Annual Report 2018–19”, Ministry of External
Affairs, India, 6 August 2020, www.mea.gov.in/Uploads/PublicationDocs/
31719_MEA_AR18_19.pdf.
32 “Indo-US 2+2 Dialogue”, Press Information Bureau, 31 December 2018, http
s://pib.gov.in/Pressreleaseshare.aspx?PRID=1557922.
33 “US-India Joint Statement on the Visit of Minister of Defence Manohar Parri-
kar to the United States”, US Department of Defense, 29 August 2016, www.
defense.gov/Newsroom/Releases/Release/Article/929270/us-india-joint-statement
-on-the-visit-of-minister-of-defence-manohar-parrikar-t.
34 “Joint Statement of India–US Defense Policy Group”, Ministry of External
Affairs, India, 23 May 2002, https://mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/
7570/Joint+Statement+of+IndiaUS+Defense+Policy+Group.
35 “Agreement Between the Government of Japan and the Government of the
Republic of India Concerning Reciprocal Provision of Supplies and Services
Between the Self-Defense Forces of Japan and the Indian Armed Forces”,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan, 9 September 2020, www.mofa.go.jp/files/
100091751.pdf.
36 “Joint Press Statement on the India–Japan annual Defence Ministerial Dialo-
gue”, Press Information Bureau, 20 August 2018, https://pib.gov.in/PressRelea
sePage.aspx?PRID=1543425.
37 “Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of the
Republic of India concerning the Transfer of Defence Equipment and Technol-
ogy”, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan, www.mofa.go.jp/files/000117470.pdf.
38 “Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of the
Republic of India concerning Security Measures for the Protection of Classified
Military Information”, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan, www.mofa.go.jp/
files/000117472.pdf.
39 “India Now Exports Defence Products to 42 Countries”, Mint, 10 February
2020, www.livemint.com/industry/manufacturing/india-now-exports-defence-p
roducts-to-42-countries-11581332398457.html.
40 “UK Wants 5G Alliance of 10 Countries, Including India, to Avoid Reliance on
Chinese Huawei”, The Print, 29 May 2020, accessed 11 October 2020, https://
theprint.in/world/uk-wants-5g-alliance-of-10-countries-including-india-to-avoid-
reliance-on-chinese-huawei/431735.
41 Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, “Prime Minister’s Keynote
Address at Shangri La Dialogue”, 1 June 2018, www.mea.gov.in/Speeches-Sta
tements.htm?dtl/29943/Prime+Ministers+Keynote+Address+at+Shangri+La+D
ialogue+June+01+2018.
42 Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, “Declaration on Principles
for Relations and Comprehensive Cooperation Between the Republic of India
and the People’s Republic of China”, 23 June 2003, www.mea.gov.in/in-focus-a
rticle.htm?7679/Declaration+on+Principles+for+Relations+and+Comprehensi
ve+Cooperation+Between+the+Republic+of+India+and+the+Peoples+Republ
ic+of+China.
43 Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, “Inaugural Address by
Prime Minister at Second Raisina Dialogue”, 17 January 2017, www.mea.gov.in/
Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl/27948/Inaugural_Address_by_Prime_Minister_at_
Second_Raisina_Dialogue_New_Delhi_January_17_2017.
44 “Chinese Realities”, East Asia Forum Quarterly 11, 2 (2019), https://press-files.anu.
edu.au/downloads/press/n5594/pdf/book.pdf; read also, Jagannath Panda, “India’s
‘Multipolar Asia’ Approach and China”, East Asia Forum Quarterly 11, 2 (2019),
25–29, https://press-files.anu.edu.au/downloads/press/n5594/pdf/book.pdf.
45 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, People’s Republic of China, “The 4th Conference
on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA) Summit Held
 India’s pointed alignment strategy 73
in Shanghai Xi Jinping Presides over the Summit and Delivers Important
Speech, Advocating Common, Comprehensive, Cooperative and Sustainable
Security in Asia for New Progress in Security Cooperation of Asia”, 21 May
2014, www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/topics_665678/yzxhxzyxrcshydscfh/t1162057.
shtml.
46 “IAI and BEL to Establish New Service and Maintenance Center for Air
Defense Systems in India”, Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI), 5 February 2020,
www.iai.co.il/iai-and-bel-establish-new-service-and-maintenance-center-for-air-d
efense-systems-in-India.
47 “HAL, Israel Aerospace Industries and DTL Form Strategic Collaboration for
Manufacturing Drones”, The Economic Times, 5 February 2020, https://econom
ictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/hal-israel-aerospace-industries-and-dtl-for
m-strategic-collaboration-for-drones/articleshow/73957865.cms?from=mdr.
48 “IAI to Provide $777 Million Worth of Barak 8 LRSAM Air & Missile Defense
Systems to State-Owned BEL in India”, Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI), 24
October 2018, www.iai.co.il/iai-provide-777-million-worth-barak-8-lrsam-air-m
issile-defense-systems-state-owned-bel-india.
49 “List of Outcomes: India–Vietnam Virtual Summit”, Ministry of External
Affairs, India, December 21 2020, www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/
33325/List_of_Outcomes_India__Vietnam_Virtual_Summit_December_21_2020
50 “Joint Statement between India and Vietnam during the visit of Prime Minister
to Vietnam”, Ministry of External Affairs, India, 3 September 2016, www.mea.
gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/27362/Joint.
51 “India–Vietnam Relations”, Ministry of External Affairs, India, July 2015,
http://mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/Vietnam_2015_08_18.pdf.
52 Ibid.
53 Suhasini Haidar, “India to Modernize Vietnam’s Defence Forces”, The Hindu,
29 October 2014, www.thehindu.com/news/national/indiavietnam-bilateral-tie
s-india-to-modernise-vietnams-defence-forces/article6542138.ece.
54 “Vietnam, India Sign MoU on Defence Cooperation”, Vietnam Plus, 6
November 2009, https://en.vietnamplus.vn/vietnam-india-sign-mou-on-defence-
cooperation/14228.vnp.
55 “Viet Nam, India Issue Joint Declaration”, Vietnam News, 7 July 2020, https://
vietnamnews.vn/politics-laws/166372/viet-nam-india-issue-joint-declaration.html.
56 “Joint Declaration on the Framework of Comprehensive Cooperation between
the Republic of India and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam as they enter the
21st Century”, Ministry of External Affairs, India, 1 May 2003, www.mea.gov.
in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/7658/Joint.
57 PK Chakravorty, “Intensifying India Vietnam Strategic Partnership”, Indian
Defence Review, 6 December 2018, www.indiandefencereview.com/intensi
fying-india-vietnam-strategic-partnership.
58 “India, S Korea Ink 2 MoUs to Boost Defence Cooperation”, ANI News, 6
September 2020, www.aninews.in/news/world/asia/india-s-korea-ink-2-mous-to-
boost-defence-cooperation20190906101508.
59 “India and Republic of Korea Sign Inter-Governmental MOU for Defence
Industry Co-Operation in Shipbuilding”, Business Standard, 21 April 2017,
www.business-standard.com/article/news-cm/india-and-republic-of-korea-sign-in
ter-governmental-mou-for-defence-industry-co-operation-in-shipbuilding-11704
2100842_1.html.
60 “India–Republic of Korea Joint Statement for Special Strategic Partnership”,
Ministry of External Affairs, India, 18 May 2015, www.mea.gov.in/bilatera
l-documents.htm?dtl/25261/india++republic+of+korea+joint+statement+for+sp
ecial+strategic+partnership+may+18+2015.
74 Panda
61 “India–Republic of Korea Joint Statement for Expansion of the Strategic Part-
nership”, Ministry of External Affairs, India, 16 January 2014, www.mea.gov.in/
bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/22752/India+Republic+of+Korea+Joint+Statement
+for+Expansion+of+the+Strategic+Partnership.
62 “Jindal Defence Signs JV Pact with Brazil’s Taurus Armas for Manufacturing
Small Arms”, Economic Times, 30 January 2020, https://economictimes.indiatim
es.com/news/defence/jindal-defence-signs-jv-pact-with-brazils-taurus-armas-for-
manufacturing-small-arms/articleshow/73697448.cms?from=mdr.
63 “Action Plan to Strengthen the Strategic Partnership Between India and
Brazil”, Ministry of External Affairs, India, 25 January 2020, www.mea.gov.in/
bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/32327/Action+Plan+to+Strengthen+the+Strategic
+Partnership+Between+India+and+Brazil#:~:text=Action%20Plan%20to%20S
trengthen%20the%20Strategic%20Partnership%20Between%20India%20and%2
0Brazil,-January%2025%2C%202020&text=%2D%20Strategic%20Dialogue.&te
xt=%2D%20To%20promote%20timely%20and%20in,international%20issues%2
0of%20mutual%20interest.
64 “India–Brazil Joint Communique”, Ministry of External Affairs, India, 12
September 2006, https://mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/6335.
65 “India–Brazil Relations”, Ministry of External Affairs, India, January 2019,
https://mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/Brief_dec_2018.pdf.
66 “Dr. S. Jaishankar”, Twitter, 11 May 2020, https://twitter.com/DrSJaishankar/
status/1259873685202075649.
67 Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, “Cooperation among Select
Countries of the Indo-Pacific in Fighting COVID-19 Pandemic”, 14 May 2020,
www.mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm?dtl/32691/Cooperation_among_select_count
ries_of_the_IndoPacific_in_fighting_COVID19_pandemic.
68 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan, “The Second Japan–Australia-India–US
Foreign Ministers’ Meeting”.
69 “China’s Grand Strategy, India’s Great Dilemma”, Mint, 8 February 2016,
www.livemint.com/Opinion/NXEvOkWe3OkrZrIO5jTNzN/Chinas-grand-strate
gy-Indias-great-dilemma.html.
70 Jagannath Panda, “Will India Pivot Towards the US After Galwan?” 9Dashline,
19 June 2020, www.9dashline.com/article/will-india-pivot-towards-the-us-a
fter-galwan.
71 “Donald Trump’s Move to Invite India, Russia, Australia, South Korea to
Attend G-7 Summit Riles China”, The Economic Times, 2 June 2020, 2020,http
s://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/international/world-news/donald-trump
s-move-to-invite-india-russia-australia-south-korea-to-attend-g-7-summit-riles-c
hina/articleshow/76157749.cms.
72 “UK Invites PM Modi for G7 Summit in June”, Business Today, 17 January 2021,
www.businesstoday.in/current/economy-politics/uk-invites-pm-modi-for-g7-summit-
in-june/story/428205.html.
73 HM Government, “Global Britain in a Competitive Age: The Integrated
Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy”, Presented to
Parliament by the Prime Minister by Command of Her Majesty, March 2021,
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/atta
chment_data/file/975077/Global_Britain_in_a_Competitive_Age-_the_Integrate
d_Review_of_Security__Defence__Development_and_Foreign_Policy.pdf.
74 Read, Jagannath Panda, “A View from India”, The Asan Forum, 7 January
2020, www.theasanforum.org/a-view-from-india; read also Jagannath Panda,
“Framing an Indo-Pacific Narrative in India–South Korea Ties”, Korea Eco-
nomic Institute of America, 7 January 2020, www.keia.org/sites/default/files/p
ublications/kei_aps_panda_200106.pdf.
 India’s pointed alignment strategy 75
75 Joshua Mitnick, “Why the US Can’t Get Israel to Break Up With China”,
Foreign Policy, 16 June 2020, https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/06/16/us-isra
el-china-deals.
76 Seth J. Frantzman, “New Joint Ventures Hint at ‘Burgeoning Relationship’
between Israel and India”, DefenseNews, 18 February 2020, www.defensenews.
com/industry/2020/02/18/new-joint-ventures-hint-at-burgeoning-relationship-bet
ween-israel-and-india.
77 “IAI and BEL to Establish New Service and Maintenance Center for Air
Defense Systems in India”, Defence Aerospace, 5 February 2020, www.defense-a
erospace.com/articles-view/release/3/209385/iai-and-bel-to-establish-new-air-defe
nse-maintenance-center-in-india.html#:~:text=LUCKNOW%2C%20India%20
—%20Israel%20Aerospace,the%20air-defence%20systems%20in.
78 “Media Releases”, Hindustan Aeronautics Limited, 5 February 2020, https://ha
l-india.co.in/HAL,%20IAI%20and%20DT/ND__288.
79 Huma Siddiqui, “India’s Concept of Indo-Pacific Is Inclusive and across
Oceans”, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, 8 November 2019,
https://mea.gov.in/articles-in-indian-media.htm?dtl/32015/Indias_concept_of_In
doPacific_is_inclusive_and_across_oceans.
80 PTI, “Jaishankar Asks Israeli Diplomats to Keep up ‘Forward and Upward
Trajectory’ in Bilateral Ties”, Times of India, 2 March 2021, https://timeso
findia.indiatimes.com/india/jaishankar-asks-israeli-diplomats-to-keep-up-forwar
d-and-upward-trajectory-in-bilateral-ties/articleshow/81295691.cms.
81 Sameer Patil, “Inserting India into US-Israel Defence Technology Coopera-
tion”, 15 April 2021, www.gatewayhouse.in/inserting-india-into-us-israel-de
fence-technology-cooperation.
82 “A Decade of India–Vietnam Strategic Partnership: Progress and Prospects”,
Institute of South Asian Studies, 13 March 2018, www.isas.nus.edu.sg/wp-con
tent/uploads/2018/03/ISAS-Insights-No.-484-A-Decade-of-India-Vietnam-Strate
gic-Partnership-1-2.pdf.
83 Ministry of National Defence, Vietnam, “2019 Vietnam National Defence”, 12
December 2019, www.mod.gov.vn/wps/wcm/connect/08963129-c9cf-4c86-9b5c-81a
9e2b14455/2019VietnamNationalDefence.pdf?MOD=AJPERES&CACHEID=0896
3129-c9cf-4c86-9b5c-81a9e2b14455; see also, Derek Grossman and Christopher
Sharman, “How To Read Vietnam’s Latest Defense White Paper: A Message To
Great Powers”, War on the Rocks, 13 December 2019, https://warontherocks.com/
2019/12/how-to-read-vietnams-latest-defense-white-paper-a-message-to-great-powers.
84 ET Bureau, “Vietnam Important Partner in India’s Indo-Pacific Vision: PM:
Modi”, The Economic Times, 22 December 2020, https://economictimes.indiatim
es.com/news/economy/foreign-trade/vietnam-important-partner-in-indias-indo-p
acific-vision-pm-modi/articleshow/79840868.cms?from=mdr.
85 Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, “List of Outcomes: India–
Vietnam Virtual Summit (December 21, 2020)”, 21 December 2020, https://mea.
gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/33325/List_of_Outcomes_India__Vietnam_
Virtual_Summit_December_21_2020; Prime Minister’s Office, “India–Vietnam
Joint Vision for Peace, Prosperity and People”, Press Information Bureau,
Government of India, 21 December 2020, www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.asp
x?PRID=1682468.
86 Jagannath Panda, “The India–Japan–Vietnam Trilateral: An ‘Inclusive’ Propo-
sition”, ISPI, 15 April 2019, www.ispionline.it/it/pubblicazione/india-japan-viet
nam-trilateral-inclusive-proposition-22860.
87 “India–Brazil Relations”, Embassy of India in Brazil, https://eoibrasilia.gov.in/?
8599?000.
76 Panda
88 “China remained Brazil’s main trading partner in 2019”, Macauhub, 7 January
2020, https://macauhub.com.mo/2020/01/07/pt-china-manteve-se-como-o-prin
cipal-parceiro-comercial-do-brasil-em-2019.
89 “Bolsonaro’s Son Enrages Beijing by Blaming China for Coronavirus Crisis”,
The Guardian, 19 March 2020, www.theguardian.com/world/2020/mar/19/
coronavirus-bolsonaro-son-china-row.
90 “China Outraged after Brazil Minister Suggests Covid-19 is Part of ‘Plan for
World Domination’”, The Guardian, 7 April 2020, www.theguardian.com/world/
2020/apr/07/china-outraged-after-brazil-minister-suggests-covid-19-is-part-of-pla
n-for-world-domination.
91 Deepali Sharma, “ ‘Namaskar’: Brazil’s Bolsonaro Thanks ‘Great Partner’ India,
PM Modi for Covid-19 Vaccines”, Hindustan Times, 22 January 2021, www.hin
dustantimes.com/india-news/namaskar-brazil-s-bolsonaro-thanks-great-partner-indi
a-pm-modi-for-covid-19-vaccines-101611330200228.html; “Brazil’s Bolsonaro
Terms Indian Vaccine as Sanjeevani after Receiving 2m Doses”, Mint, 23 January
2021, www.livemint.com/news/india/brazils-jair-bolsonaro-compares-indian-vacci
ne-to-sanjeevani-booti-after-receiving-2-million-doses-11611370579817.html.
92 “Brazil–China Diplomatic Spat Escalates over Coronavirus Supplies”, Reuters,
6 April 2020, https://in.reuters.com/article/health-coronavirus-brazil/brazil-china
-diplomatic-spat-escalates-over-coronavirus-supplies-idINKBN21O23Y.
93 David Scott, “New Zealand Picks Up on the Indo-Pacific”, East West Center,
18 March 2020, www.eastwestcenter.org/publications/new-zealand-picks-the-in
do-pacific.
94 Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, New Zealand, “India”, www.mfat.govt.
nz/en/countries-and-regions/south-asia/india.
95 New Zealand Government, “Reinforcing the Rules Based Order”, www.defence.
govt.nz/assets/Uploads/8958486b29/Strategic-Defence-Policy-Statement-2018.pdf.
96 James Holmes and Toshi Yoshihara, “Five Shades of Chinese Gray-Zone
Strategy”, National Interest, 2 May 2017, https://nationalinterest.org/feature/
five-shades-chinese-gray-zone-strategy-20450.
97 Jagannath Panda, “India’s ‘Multipolar Asia’ and China”, East Asia Forum, 27
August 2019, www.eastasiaforum.org/2019/08/27/indias-multipolar-asia-and-china/
98 C. Raja Mohan, “Raja Mandala: Two Discourses on Strategic Autonomy”,
Carnegie India, 18 September 2018, https://carnegieindia.org/2018/09/18/raja
-mandala-two-discourses-on-strategic-autonomy-pub-77278; see also, C. Raja
Mohan, “Today, India’s Strategic Autonomy Is about Coping with Beijing’s
Challenge to its Territorial Integrity, Sovereignty”, Indian Express, 25 August
2020, https://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/reinventing-india-stra
tegic-autonomy-china-us-6568347.
99 “China Criticises Forthcoming Quad Foreign Ministers Meet in Japan”, Out-
look, 29 September 2020, www.outlookindia.com/newsscroll/china-critici
ses-forthcoming-quad-foreign-ministers-meet-in-japan/1945169.
100 Derek Grossman, “India Is the Weakest Link in the Quad”, Foreign Policy, 23
July 2018, https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/07/23/india-is-the-weakest-link-in-the-
quad; read also, Jeff M. Smith, “India and the Quad: Weak Link or Keystone?”
ASPI, 15 January 2019, www.aspistrategist.org.au/india-and-the-quad-wea
k-link-or-keystone.
101 Jagannath Panda, “India’s Continental Connect on Indo-Pacific and Quad 2.0”,
East West Center, 26 September 2018, www.eastwestcenter.org/publications/
indias-continental-connect-indo-pacific-and-quad-20.
102 “Building Atmanirbhar Bharat & Overcoming COVID-19”, National Portal of
India, www.india.gov.in/spotlight/building-atmanirbhar-bharat-overcoming-covid-19.
103 Xinhua, “Commentary: Why President Xi Strongly Advocates Building Com-
munity with Shared Future”, Xinhuanet, 22 September 2020, www.xinhuanet.
 India’s pointed alignment strategy 77
com/english/2020-09/22/c_139388123.htm; read also, “Global Academic Coop-
eration Guided by a Community with Shared Future Provides a ‘Stabilizer’ for
the Changing World: Officials and Scholars”, Global Times, 25 October 2020,
www.globaltimes.cn/content/1204617.shtml.
104 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, People’s Republic of China, “State Councilor and
Foreign Minister Wang Yi Chairs Quadrilateral Video Conference on COVID-
19”, 27 July 2020, www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1801662.shtml.
105 Read, Jagannath Panda, “Why AIIB, Not BRI? India’s Fine Balance on
China”, in Asia between Multipolarism and Multipolarity, ed. Sujan R. Chinoy
and Jagannath P. Panda (New Delhi: MPIDSA, 2020), 109–134, https://idsa.in/
system/files/book/asia-multipolarism-book.pdf.
106 Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, “Official Spokesperson’s
Response to a Query on Participation of India in OBOR/BRI Forum”, 13 May
2017, https://mea.gov.in/media-briefings.htm?dtl/28463/Official+Spokespersons
+response+to+a+query+on+participation+of+India+in+OBORBRI+Forum.
107 Jagannath Panda, “India’s China Policy Signals a Shift Post-Galwan”, India Inc., 28
June 2020, https://indiaincgroup.com/indias-china-policy-signals-a-shift-post-galwan.
108 Jagannath Panda, “Will India Revisit its Stance on the South China Sea?” The
Strait Times, 5 August 2020, www.straitstimes.com/opinion/will-india-revisit-its-
stance-on-the-south-china-sea.
109 “PM’s Statement at the United Nations Summit for the Adoption of Post-2015
Development Agenda”, Narendra Modi, 25 September 2015, www.narendram
odi.in/text-of-pm-s-statement-at-the-united-nations-summit-for-the-adoption-of-
post-2015-development-agenda-332923.
110 Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, “Joint Statement between
the Republic of India and the People’s Republic of China on Building a Closer
Developmental Partnership”, 19 September 2014, www.mea.gov.in/bilatera
l-documents.htm?dtl/24022/Joint+Statement+between+the+Republic+of+India
+and+the+Peoples+Republic+of+China+on+Building+a+Closer+Developmen
tal+Partnership.
111 Jagannath Panda, “Narendra Modi’s China Policy: Between Pragmatism and
Power Parity”, Journal of Asian Public Policy, 9, 2, (2016), 185–197, www.ta
ndfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/17516234.2016.1165334.
112 Snehesh Alex Philip, “China Changes Stance, Wants De-escalation before Dis-
engagement in Ladakh. India disagrees”, The Print, 13 April 2021, https://thep
rint.in/defence/china-changes-stance-wants-de-escalation-before-disengagement-i
n-ladakh-india-disagrees/639373.
113 Vishnu Som, “Need ‘Full and Sincere’ Disengagement: India to China on
Border Issues”, NDTV, 30 April 2021, www.ndtv.com/india-news/need-full-a
nd-sincere-disengagement-india-to-china-on-border-issues-2425564.
114 Ashok Sharma, “Galwan Valley Clash Unmasks China’s Geopolitical Intent
and India’s Delusion with China”, Times of India, 3 July 2020, https://timeso
findia.indiatimes.com/blogs/ashoks-statecraft/galwan-valley-clash-unmasks-chin
as-geopolitical-intent-and-indias-delusion-with-china; see also, “Why China
Wants the Galwan Valley”, Rediff, 19 June 2020, www.rediff.com/news/inter
view/explained-why-china-wants-the-galwan-valley/20200619.htm.
115 PTI, “Jaishankar Asks Israeli Diplomats to Keep up ‘Forward and Upward
Trajectory’ in Bilateral Ties”.
116 Ministry of Defence, “Malabar 2020 Naval Exercise”, Press Information
Bureau, Government of India, 19 October 2020, https://pib.gov.in/PressRelea
sePage.aspx?PRID=1665830.
117 “Defining the Diamond: The Past, Present, and Future of the Quadrilateral
Security Dialogue”, CSIS, 16 March 2020, www.csis.org/analysis/defining-diam
ond-past-present-and-future-quadrilateral-security-dialogue.
4 Nurturing the Quad Plus formula
Institutional perspective of Japan’s FOIP
Kei Koga

Introduction
Japan has been a pivotal player in formulating the Quadrilateral Strategic
Dialogue, the so-called “Quad”. The initial idea was born in the late 2004,
when the “core group”, namely Australia, India, Japan and the United
States, successfully cooperated in conducting humanitarian assistant/disaster
relief (HA/DR) activities after the Indian Ocean tsunami. This experience
created a diplomatic desire among the member states to institutionalise such
a cooperative framework. While the idea of the Quad once dissipated in 2007
because of the divergence in member-states’ national interests, the Quad
framework was resurrected in November 2017 by holding a senior official
meeting in the Philippines at the occasion of the East Asia Summit.1 This
was triggered by the US initiative to launch its “Free and Open Indo-Pacific”
(FOIP) in 2017, but ultimately, the strategy was modelled on Japan’s FOIP in
2016.2 Since then, the term, the Quad, has entered into the strategic lexicon
of these four member-states, and the grouping has been steadily institutio-
nalised. In this sense, Japan has contributed to shaping the strategic concept
and the Indo-Pacific institutional arrangement.
At the same time, there is another diplomatic and strategic manoeuvre that
policy researchers and journalists have observed—the “Quad Plus”. Now
that the Quad has sufficiently institutionalised, by which senior officials and
foreign ministers regularly meet, many speculate that the Quad will reach out
to regional and non-regional states to discuss potential cooperation in
maintaining and enhancing the existing rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific
region.3 Prior to this ongoing discussion, however, the concept of the Quad
Plus has been discussed at the Track-2 level. Most notably, the research pro-
ject led by the Heritage Foundation in the United States, the Vivekananda
International Foundation in India, the Tokyo Foundation (until 2017), the
Japan Institute of International Affairs (from 2018), and the Australian
Strategic Policy Institute, organised several seminars and workshops on the
Quad Plus.4 Given that there was not any concrete institutional format of the
Quad Plus at the official level, this project assumed that the Quad Plus was
essentially Track-2 dialogue that focused on sharing their strategic prospects

DOI: 10.4324/9781003206408-6
 Institutional perspective of Japan’s FOIP 79
of the Indo-Pacific, including the rise of China.5 In this sense, there was no
single consensual definition of the Quad Plus other than the fact that the
grouping include the Quad member-states and other states.
This raises several questions—what is the Quad Plus in connection with
the current institutionalised Quad, and what role does it play in the Indo-
Pacific? Is there any official and formal vision for the Quad Plus from Japan
as the initiator of the FOIP vision? If not, how can we understand the “Quad
Plus” phenomenon in the current strategic environment in the Indo-Pacific,
where US–China rivalry intensifies?
In this chapter, I argue that Japan’s strategic objective of the “Quad Plus”
is not anti-China coalition-building, but to create an ad-hoc coalition-build-
ing device that serves the maintenance and enhancement of the rules-based
international order in the Indo-Pacific region. There is no open official dis-
cussion or declaration about the Quad Plus, and thus, there is no clear defi-
nition or fixed membership for such a framework. Rather, it functions as a
flexible strategic tool to attract like-minded states and induce their functional
and strategic cooperation, depending on their needs and demands of the day.
As such, the Quad Plus is an informal cooperative security and non-
traditional collective self-defence mechanism, which is not exclusive to any
states, including China.6 At the same time, Japan has two target states to be
included into the Quad Plus, the United Kingdom and France, because they
are residential powers in the Indo-Pacific region. To this end, Japan has
steadily strengthened its bilateral ties with them, just as it did with the
United States, India and Australia in the 2000s.
In this setting, the concept of “tactical hedging”, which refers to an
ambiguous declaratory policy to indicate a potential strategy shift in the
future, is useful in explaining the development of the Quad Plus as well as
the Quad. Essentially, the idea of the Quad Plus is nurtured by Japan’s FOIP,
and its development has gradually begun to facilitate certain functional
cooperation, such as to counter COVID-19. The Quad Plus is likely to evolve
over time, possibly including various regional actors for more strategic and
wider functional cooperation.
This chapter is divided into four sections. The first section discusses the
development and strategic convergence of Japan’s FOIP and Quad and
illustrates how the Quad Plus idea emerged. The second examines Japan’s
approach to the Quad Plus and discusses its four main characteristics. The
third employs the concept of tactical hedging to understand Japan’s
approach and its future prospect. Lastly, the fourth discusses the future of
the Quad-Plus from a Japanese perspective.

Historical development and strategic convergence of Japan’s Quad

and FOIP
Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe launched the “Free and Open Indo-
Pacific Strategy” in 2016, which emphasised the maritime and economic
80 Koga
connectivity between the Asian and African continents.7 Because of strategic
uncertainty in the Indo-Pacific region that was largely caused by China’s
rising assertiveness in the maritime domain and increasing influence through
its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Japan attempted to launch the FOIP
strategy to check China’s behaviour challenging existing international rules
and norms, particularly in the field of infrastructure development and
maritime law.
Nevertheless, Japan avoided open confrontation with China in order to
prevent unnecessary diplomatic tensions. Rather, Japan made the initial
principles of the FOIP deliberately vague but reiterated respect for existing
international rules and norms, such as the rule of law, the freedom of navi-
gation and overflight, democracy and human rights. In the meantime, Japan
collaborated with major powers in the Indo-Pacific region, in particular
Australia, India and the United States, to activate the Quad. Eventually, the
first Quad meeting was held on 12 November 2017, after US President
Trump met with Abe to agree with cooperation through the FOIP and offi-
cially used the term “Indo-Pacific” in the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
(APEC) in Vietnam.8
While the FOIP and the Quad are closely aligned with each other, the idea
of the Quad existed prior to the FOIP concept. When the Indian Ocean
earthquake and tsunami occurred in 2004, Australia, India, Japan and the
United States formed an ad-hoc military disaster-relief coalition, the so-called
“core group”, and coordinated their relief activities within themselves and with
the United Nations.9 Given the coalition’s short-term objective, the group was
not institutionalised, but this experience became a reference point for Japan to
discuss the possibility of furthering cooperation among the four states. Indeed,
although the Quad was not realised immediately, Japan doubled down its
effort to lay the foundation of its realisation through two means—strengthen-
ing strategic ties with Australia and India and launching a diplomatic doctrine
of a democratic coalition, the “Arc of Freedom and Prosperity”.
First, Japan expanded its bilateral strategic ties with Australia and India
from 2000s. In the 1990s, Japan’s security discussion predominantly revolved
around the redefinition of the US–Japan alliance because of the dis-
appearance of Soviet threats. After successfully securing the raison d’être of
the alliance by enhancing their diplomatic, security, economic and socio-cul-
tural cooperation, in the post-Cold War era through the 1996 US–Japan
Joint Declaration on Security, both Japan and the United States explored a
possibility to expand their strategic ties with regional states, particularly after
the 9/11 terrorist attacks.10 In 2002, Australian, Japanese and US senior
officials met to discuss security issues and potential cooperation in the Asia-
Pacific region and beyond, which led to the institutionalisation of the Tri-
lateral Strategic Dialogue (TSD) at the foreign minister level in 2005.11
Through these official interactions, Japan and Australia also issued the Joint
Declaration on Security Cooperation in March 2007, aiming to tackle non-
traditional security issues, such as counter-terrorism, HA/DR, and
 Institutional perspective of Japan’s FOIP 81
12
pandemics. The Japan–Australia bilateral cooperation has been further
strengthened through a series of security agreements, such as the Acquisition
and Cross-Service Agreement (ACSA) in 2010 and the Information Security
Agreement (ISA) in 2012.13
In the meantime, Japan also strengthened its ties with India. Despite
Japan’s economic sanction on India after its nuclear test in 1998, the bilateral
relationship started to improve after Prime Minister Yoshio Mori visited
India in 2000 and agreed to establish the “Global Partnership in the 21st
Century”, exploring a potential enhancement of Japan–India economic rela-
tions.14 Along with international events, including 9/11 and the 2004 Indian
Ocean tsunami, the bilateral relationship was further strengthened, and in
2005, both agreed to enhance not only bilateral relations but also coopera-
tion at the regional and global level, launching eight initiatives in 2005,
including institutionalising diplomatic dialogues and economic and security
cooperation.15 Eventually, their relationship elevated from the “Global Part-
nership” to the “Strategic and Global Partnership” in 2006 to the “Special
Strategic and Global Partnership” in 2014.16 In this process, both states also
started the 2+2 senior-official level dialogue in 2010, institutionalised the 2+2
Ministerial Meeting in 2019, and concluded the ACSA in 2020.17
Second, Japan launched a value-oriented diplomacy, which aimed to facil-
itate democratisation and the creation of a democratic coalition in the world.
In 2006, Foreign Minister Taro Aso made a speech, “the Arc of Freedom
and Prosperity”, advocating the importance of cooperation with like-minded
democratic states and institutions, particularly the United States, Australia,
India, G8, the EU and NATO, for promoting democratisation, market
economy and democratic values in the geographical scope from Northern
Europe to Northeast Asia.18 This diplomatic vision clarified Japan’s desire to
further cooperate with democratic states and consolidate the existing inter-
national rules and norms that were largely based on the UN Charter and
shaped by the United States and the West. Given this, it was not entirely
surprising that Prime Minister Abe proposed the formulation of the Quad in
2007. In fact, Abe convened the Quad meeting at the occasion of the
ASEAN Regional Forum in May 2007 to facilitate the establishment of a
world democratic coalition.19 Weaving the bilateral and trilateral cooperation
together among Australia, India, Japan and the United States, with Japan’s
value-oriented diplomacy, Abe stated at the Indian Parliament in August
2007, “By Japan and India coming together [in realising the Arc of Freedom
and Prosperity], this ‘broader Asia’ will evolve into an immense network
spanning the entirety of the Pacific Ocean, incorporating the United States of
America and Australia.”20 Nevertheless, these diplomatic efforts dissipated
because China expressed its concern about the possibility of the Quad
becoming a counter-China grouping, and India and Australia became hesitant
to further institutionalise it.21
The political momentum for the Quad re-emerged after Prime Minister
Abe launched the FOIP strategy in 2016.22 Although Abe had already
82 Koga
envisioned his political desire to create the Quad in 2012 before he assumed
the second-term prime ministership, it was not until 2017 that all four
member-states agreed to have a meeting together.23 This is mainly because
each of four member states still had different national interests and perspec-
tives towards China, yet China’s behaviour was increasingly seen as a chal-
lenge to the existing international rules and norms that those democratic
states were eager to maintain and strengthen. In this context, the Trump
Administration took the firm posture toward China by adopting its own
FOIP strategy and opened the window of opportunity for the Quad member-
states to convene the senior-official meeting in 2017. The United States con-
tinuously expressed its strategic concern by declaring China as one of “revi-
sionist states” in 2017, and the Quad meeting was regularly held, resulting in
the first ministerial meeting in 2019.24 The Biden Administration continued
to see China as a strategic competitor, which had been challenging the
existing international order and thus rapidly institutionalised the Quad by
holding a summit meeting and creating three working groups to facilitate
functional cooperation on COVID-19, critical and emerging technologies,
and climate change.25 Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga clarified that
Japan would not aim to create an “Asian NATO” on the basis of the Quad,
yet Japan also showed its willingness to strengthen the Quad framework for
the realisation of the FOIP.26
This development of the FOIP and the Quad indicates that Japan, parti-
cularly the Abe Administration, has attempted to formulate the Quad since
the 2000s, and China’s assertive rise has contributed to creating diplomatic
traction for Japan to push forward such an idea in the 2010s. However, in
this development process, Japan did not have a concrete vision about the
Quad Plus. Obviously, a de facto Quad Plus has been practised, such as the
2007 Malabar joint military exercises, which included Singapore in addition
to the Quad member-states.27 In 2017 and 2018, Foreign Minister Taro Kono
alluded that the FOIP aimed to facilitate “cooperation among many coun-
tries” and the “networking of allies and friendly nations”, although his par-
ticular emphasis went to the Quad member-states.28 In 2021, Foreign
Minister Toshimitsu Motegi pointed out that Japan would make the most of
“opportunities of bilateral and multilateral dialogues”, including the Quad,
for policy coordination.29 These statements and activities illustrates a possi-
bility of creating the Quad Plus, but there has yet to be any Japanese official
documents with regard to its vision, objectives, format or membership.

Quad Plus: Japan’s approach

Even within non-official discussion, the definition and concept of the Quad
Plus remain vague. The minimalist definition of the Quad Plus refers to a
minilateral cooperative framework in a particular issue area which includes
all the Quad member-states and other regional or non-regional states. Yet,
even by fulfilling the criteria, it remains unclear which multilateral
 Institutional perspective of Japan’s FOIP 83
framework can be classified as the Quad Plus. For example, a joint military
exercise, the La Perouse, led by France in April 2021 included the Quad
member-states.30 This exercise, however, was first established among France,
Australia, Japan and the United States in 2019, and India joined in 2021. By
definition, this military exercise can be qualified as the Quad Plus, but it was
not led by the Quad. This causes conceptual confusion because it can be very
expansive, making the Quad Plus any minilateral or multilateral institutions
that include the Quad member-states. Furthermore, the Quad is an evolu-
tionary institution, starting from a consultative group to a more structured
institution, which now has a regular ministerial meeting and an occasional
summit meeting. In this sense, the Quad might evolve into a multilateral
institution that has more members or devolve into a trilateral grouping if one
member defects. Because the Quad’s future is uncertain, it becomes difficult
to envision the future format and functionality of the Quad Plus.
However, as mentioned above, the idea of the “Quad Plus” was nurtured
through practice. There have been de facto “Quad Plus” activities since the
“core group” was formulated in 2004. Indeed, the US–India joint military
exercises, the Malabar, extended its cooperation with other states, including
Japan, Australia, and Singapore.31 The cooperation focused mainly on non-
traditional security issues, such as anti-piracy, humanitarian assistance, but it
also included the improvement of anti-submarine warfare capabilities.
Although these were one-shot exercises, the involvement of a fifth state also
indicated that the Quad Plus cooperation was not necessarily exclusive.
At the same time, Japan has particular target states it would like to
potentially include in the Quad cooperation. Just before Abe assumed the
second term of Japanese prime ministership, he touched upon the impor-
tance of the strategic connections with the United Kingdom and France. In
his op-ed, “Asia’s Democratic Security Diamond”, he asked the United
Kingdom and France to participate in “strengthening Asia’s security”.32
Although Abe understood that they would not be able to drastically increase
their security commitment to the region given their limited material cap-
abilities, they still possess certain strategic assets, such as the UK member-
ship in the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA) and presence in
Diego Garcia as well as France’s Pacific Fleet in French Polynesia and its
overseas collectivities in the Pacific and Indian Oceans, such as New Cale-
donia and Wallis and Futuna.33 Since these statements were provided in the
context of his main discussion on Quad cooperation, it inferred a certain
“Quad Plus” format.
Given that the Quad was one of the important institutional frameworks to
realise Japan’s FOIP, the strategic objectives of the Quad Plus is aligned with
the FOIP’s objectives—contributing to maintaining and strengthening the
rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific region, which has been largely shaped
by the United States since the end of the Cold War. As such, it is under-
standable that Abe emphasised Japan’s cooperation with the Western
84 Koga
democratic states, the United Kingdom and France, because they shared
democratic values and similar views towards the existing international order.
With this strategic objective, Japan’s approach toward the Quad Plus can
be characterised by four factors. First, Japan emphasises the creation of
bilateral, trilateral, or minilateral “cooperative clusters” in the Indo-Pacific.
Cooperative clusters here refer to groups of states that are willing to work
together to realise Japan’s FOIP in principle. By creating clusters and net-
working them, it would become a larger cluster. This is how Japan facilitated
the creation of the Quad, which is the most powerful cooperative cluster in
the Indo-Pacific because of its potential deriving from their aggregated
material capabilities. Although the divergent interests and commitment to the
FOIP principles exist among the members, the Quad would become the
powerful strategic pull if it were properly institutionalised. In this connec-
tion, the Quad Plus is the extension of the FOIP cooperative clusters, in
which the Quad becomes a hub.
Second, Japan does not consider the Quad Plus an exclusive institution, at
least for now. Because there is no concrete institutional format that Japan
has for the Quad Plus; its modality is still fluid, and thus, the general prin-
ciples of the FOIP can be applied, particularly the principle that Japan “will
cooperate with any country that supports [FOIP] ideas”.34 In fact, the Quad
members engage with various regional states, including South Korea, New
Zealand and Vietnam. The corollary of this is that Japan could also work
with China through the Quad Plus format. Nevertheless, such a possibility is
difficult to be realised because of certain diplomatic hurdles. Most notably,
the United States has shifted its strategic posture toward China and taken a
firmer stance since it now has a near political consensus that the prospect of
engagement in shaping China’s behaviour is bleak.35 Even if China is willing
to engage the Quad, the United States would not allow it to do so unless
China expresses its readiness to address its assertive posture.
Third, Japan maintains flexibility in developing the Quad Plus focus,
depending on the institutional development of the Quad. Although the Quad
has a certain counter-China connotation, the Quad Plus is not a mere
extension of the Quad and would probably focus on non-controversial, non-
traditional security cooperation, such as HA/DR and counter-COVID-19.
Admittedly, there is a cooperative cluster that will be associated with the
Quad, which can evolve into a counter-China coalition. Japan’s cooperation
with the United Kingdom and France is one of such clusters because they
have voiced their concerns about China’s assertiveness in the maritime
domain and have begun to buttress naval cooperation in the Indo-Pacific.
Indeed, the Japan–UK Foreign and Defense Ministerial Meeting (2+2) in
February 2021 clearly indicates China’s assertiveness in the maritime
domain, particularly in the East and South China Seas, and the importance
of the 2016 South China Sea arbitration tribunals, while expressing concerns
about China’s human rights violations in Xinjiang.36 While the latest Japan–
France 2+2 held in January 2019 did not use a naming and shaming tactic,
 Institutional perspective of Japan’s FOIP 85
both states agreed to cooperate over the Indo-Pacific, expressed concerns
about the East and South China Seas, and emphasised the importance of
international law, including the United Nations Convention on the Law of
the Sea (UNCLOS).37
At the same time, there are also other regional states, such as South Korea
and New Zealand, that attempt to avoid creating such a political coalition or
are at least willing to maintain an ambiguous political position vis-à-vis
China. To be sure, this does not mean that it is difficult for the Quad to
cooperate with them in contributing to maintaining the rules-based order in
the Indo-Pacific region. For example, the Quad member-states held a meet-
ing with South Korea, Vietnam and New Zealand to share their assessment
on the COVID-19 pandemic and sought for policy coordination between
them in March 2020, while the Quad members also had another meeting
with Brazil, Israel and South Korea for information sharing and policy
coordination on the pandemic.38 Although these meetings were not officially
called the “Quad Plus”, they can flexibly cooperate in a certain non-traditional
security issue area to ensure regional security.
Fourth, Japan maintains its respect for ASEAN centrality and unity. This
also reflects the Quad’s effort that has collectively highlighted its respect for
the ASEAN in regional cooperation since 2018 and endorsed the 2019
“ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific” (AOIP).39 The ASEAN’s support is
important because it provides diplomatic legitimacy for Japan to pursue its
FOIP. As such, Japan eagerly seeks ASEAN’s support for its FOIP and
synergies between the FOIP and AOIP. Additionally, Prime Minister Suga
made his first overseas trip in October 2020 to Vietnam and Indonesia and
issued the Joint Statement of the “23rd ASEAN-Japan Summit in Coopera-
tion on ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific” in November 2020. Given this,
the institutional principles of the Quad Plus should be consistent with
ASEAN centrality.
Undeniably, those four factors have not been the defining characteristics of
the Quad Plus. Rather, they reflect Japan’s approach and are subject to
change. However, there have been de facto functional cooperation on the
“Quad Plus” format, and thus, the “Quad Plus” exists as an ad-hoc coop-
erative security and non-traditional collective self-defence mechanism that
flexibly facilitates confidence-building and cooperation between the Quad
and other states.

Understanding the Quad Plus: by-product of Japan’s “tactical hedging”

Considering these characteristics of Japan’s approach to the Quad Plus, how
can we understand the development of the Quad Plus? Simply put, for Japan,
the Quad Plus is a by-product of its “tactical hedging” that created the con-
cept of the FOIP. Tactical hedging refers to “a declaratory policy doctrine
that aims to utilize temporal strategic ambiguity to understand and deter-
mine whether any long-term strategy shift is necessary or possible”.40 This
86 Koga
diplomatic tactic is particularly useful when a state faces strategic uncer-
tainty, because (1) it can signal the possibility of strategy shift to the inter-
national community; (2) because of its ambiguity, the tactic can modify the
principles and focus of the diplomatic doctrine over time; and (3) in so
doing, it can buy the hedger time to figure out reactions to the doctrine from
the international community and avoid outright criticism.41
For Japan, the strategic concerns in 2016 were the rise of China and the
relative decline of the United States, which had the potential to alter the
order.42 In this context, Japan sought a way to prevent China from overwriting
the existing international order by garnering diplomatic support from the
international community. However, it was not entirely clear how much explicit
support Japan could gain by taking the initiative and how antagonistic Japan’s
relations with China would become. This uncertainty propelled Japan to
launch the FOIP, which was conceptually vague but consistent with the exist-
ing international principles, and whose geographical scope matched with
China’s BRI. Although Japan’s FOIP concept in 2016 did not gain much
political and media attention, it drew international reactions after the United
States incorporated it into its own strategic narrative in 2017.
Initially, Japan’s FOIP did not specify what regional institutions would be
utilised, but emphasised the importance of strategic ties with Australia, India
and the United States, connoting the realisation of the Quad.43 This was
consistent with Abe’s vision of the “Asia’s Democratic Security Diamond”,
and with this idea, it was the US diplomatic traction on the FOIP that
brought four countries together in November 2017. The Quad started as an
ad-hoc consultative group, which did not have any guarantee of being insti-
tutionalised because of the different views existing among the four states
towards the Quad.44 As there would be no “Quad Plus” without the Quad,
the Quad became the focal institution for Japan to realise the FOIP, and the
idea of the “Quad Plus” was inevitably put on the backburner. By 2021, the
United States under the Trump and Biden Administrations effectively created
diplomatic momentum to institutionalise the Quad because of China’s con-
tinued assertive behaviour in the maritime domain, non-democratic beha-
viour in Hong Kong and Xinjiang, and increasing influence through the
provision of critical infrastructure in the Indo-Pacific region. It is in this
context that the “Quad Plus” format began to appear at the Track-1 level,
and thus, the Quad Plus can be seen as the by-product of Japan’s tactical
hedging.
That said, there are two institutional issues that will potentially hinder the
development of the functionality and institutionalisation of the Quad Plus.
The first, and perhaps most important, issue is Japan’s support for ASEAN
centrality and unity. Japan has long supported ASEAN’s role in East Asian
regionalism and attempted to safeguard ASEAN’s political autonomy that
could prevent great powers from politically and militarily intruding in South-
east Asia in the post-Cold War era.45 Against this backdrop, Japan con-
stantly shows its willingness to incorporate ASEAN’s opinion in developing
 Institutional perspective of Japan’s FOIP 87
its FOIP concept. For example, in Japan’s 2016 FOIP strategy, the ASEAN
factor was entirely missing, and it was unclear how Japan would situate
ASEAN in its new strategic vision. After several ASEAN member-states
raised their concerns about Japan’s FOIP strategy in 2018, Japan began to
incorporate ASEAN into its Indo-Pacific conceptual map, emphasising the
importance of ASEAN centrality.46
However, Japan’s explicit respect for ASEAN centrality poses a certain
dilemma in the development of the Quad Plus. On the one hand, Japan’s
support for ASEAN in the Indo-Pacific region reassures ASEAN that Japan
would not pose any threat to its raison d’être in the Indo-Pacific, playing a
“central and strategic role in developing and shaping an open, transparent,
inclusive and rules-based regional architecture”.47 While ASEAN as an
institution does not openly support Japan’s FOIP concept, it has also not
explicitly denied it. The objectives of the Quad and the Quad Plus are
essentially aligned with those of the FOIP, and thus, ASEAN’s non-denial
would ensure the existence of those institutions. On the other hand, ASEAN
centrality would likely prevent the Quad or Quad Plus from becoming the
central institution in the Indo-Pacific region. If they move in that direction,
ASEAN will point out the contradiction with the ASEAN centrality Japan
has openly supported and oppose any rigid institutionalisation of the Quad
and the Quad Plus that would play a central role in regional multilateralism
and shape the regional balance of power in the Indo-Pacific. Since ASEAN’s
support or non-denial for the FOIP, the Quad, and the Quad Plus is built on
Japan’s and Quad’s diplomatic support for the ASEAN centrality, this would
pose a critical limitation on the development of the Quad Plus.
Obviously, diverging views exist among the ASEAN member-states with
regard to the degree to which ASEAN centrality should be respected and the
degree to which the Quad should be institutionalised.48 Nevertheless, given
ASEAN’s consensus decision-making procedure, these subtle differences
among the member-states will disappear, and one opposition makes it
impossible for the Quad to gain ASEAN’s endorsement.
The second issue is Japan’s relatively low strategic priority on the Quad
Plus. Even without the Quad Plus, it is still possible for Japan to strengthen
bilateral and multilateral ties with non-Quad states in the Indo-Pacific
region, and so there is no immediate need to institutionalise the Quad Plus.
For example, Japan and the United Kingdom comprehensively strengthened
security, political and economic cooperation, particularly in the Indo-Pacific
region, by holding the 2+2 meeting from 2015, issuing the “Japan–UK Joint
Declaration on Security Cooperation” in 2017 and “UK–Japan Joint State-
ment” in 2019.49 Also, Japan and France nurtured its political and military
dialogue from 1997, resulting in the 2+2 ministerial meeting, which empha-
sised Indo-Pacific cooperation.50 Additionally, given the UK’s and French
strategic linkages with the United States, it would be highly possible for them
to cooperate with not only the Quad member-states bilaterally but also the
Quad multilaterally in the future.51
88 Koga
Furthermore, the immediate institutionalisation of the Quad Plus would
become counter-productive because first, ASEAN would demand that the
Quad member-states clarify the purpose of the institutionalisation and its
compliance with ASEAN centrality. Also, because of its chrematistics of
democratic coalition, China will castigate it as a counter-China one that
divides the region and the world. Once this image is created, those states
which have strong economic ties with China would refrain from explicitly
cooperating with the Quad. Japan is likely to avoid such repercussion as the
realisation of the FOIP requires political support from regional states.
Therefore, with its respect for ASEAN centrality and a potential reper-
cussion from regional states toward the immediate institutionalisation of the
Quad Plus, Japan is unwilling to prioritise the Quad Plus over bilateral and
minilateral cooperation with regional states and the institutionalisation of
the Quad.

Conclusion: Japan’s vision and the future of the Quad Plus

Japan has aimed to realise the FOIP since 2016, and its main means is
essentially coalition-building with likeminded states. To this end, Japan
strengthened bilateral and trilateral cooperation, facilitated the creation of a
core institution, the Quad, while pursuing tactical hedging to gain as much
international support for the FOIP as possible. In short, Japan nurtured
cooperative clusters in the Indo-Pacific and beyond and gradually wove them
together to make a large group of states for ensuring the international order,
including the Quad.
In this process, the idea of the Quad Plus emerged. Several official meet-
ings and joint military exercises, involving the Quad member-states and other
regional states, such as Brazil, France, Israel, South Korea and Vietnam,
have been already conducted. This de facto Quad Plus cooperation corre-
sponds to Japan’s willingness to include those who share the same strategic
goals of its FOIP. Admittedly, the Quad Plus does not have any official
recognition or principles. Its membership may not ever be fixed, and the
future of the Quad Plus is entirely uncertain. However, if the Quad Plus is
reconceptualised correctly, its fluid characteristics are paradoxically useful in
Japan’s tactical hedging for three reasons.
First, the Quad member-states can work with any regional or non-regional
states in the Indo-Pacific region in a particular issue area. For example, the
Quad met with New Zealand, South Korea and Vietnam in March 2020,
while its meeting in May was with Brazil, Israel and South Korea over the
COVID-19 issue. This membership flexibility allows Japan to understand
their strategic positions and political will to work together for the FOIP
objectives, which is helpful to tweak or reformulate its state strategy.
Second, the Quad member-states can also maintain flexibility in agenda-
setting for cooperation. The agenda can range from strategic ones, such as
the rise of assertive China, to geo-economic ones, such as physical and digital
 Institutional perspective of Japan’s FOIP 89
connectivity, to non-traditional security ones, such as HA/DR and COVID-
19 response. Without institutionalising a particular set agenda, the Quad can
flexibly use this framework to facilitate cooperation that would ensure the
existing international rules-based order.
Third, the Quad can create communication linkages with individual
ASEAN member-states and discuss a potential way to coexist with ASEAN
centrality. Obviously, it is difficult for all ASEAN members to hold a dialo-
gue with the Quad because some members are diplomatically more sensitive
about a possibility that ASEAN’s cooperation or dialogues with the Quad
would send a wrong signal to China. However, since Vietnam has already
joined in several dialogues with the Quad, there is a possibility that the Quad
can directly discuss with some ASEAN members. This provides a great
opportunity for the Quad to clarify a way to co-exist with ASEAN in the
Indo-Pacific without undermining ASEAN centrality.
Therefore, the Quad Plus best functions when it is an ad-hoc, flexible fra-
mework that can invite various states for various strategic or functional
cooperation.52 The fundamental objective of Japan’s FOIP is to ensure the
existing international order, which requires many supporters in the interna-
tional and regional community. As such, rather than fixing the member-
states and the objectives of the Quad Plus, the “Quad Plus” formula to
engage various states and non-state actors serves Japan’s strategic interests in
the Indo-Pacific.
Japan has attempted to realise the FOIP since 2016, conceptually weaving
Japan’s international activities together—from the partnership for quality
infrastructure to capacity building programmes for maritime law enforce-
ment—for its broader strategic objective. The Quad has been gradually
institutionalised and serves Japan’s interests, but this does not mean that the
Quad Plus concept should follow. Rather, since Japan’s tactical hedging
contributed to the idea of the Quad Plus, it would be beneficial for Japan to
use it as a tactical hedging tool. Although the current intensification of US–
China rivalry has begun to narrow an opportunity for cooperation, the
“Quad Plus” formula can mitigate diplomatic trends of creating a clear fault
line between the United States and China in the Indo-Pacific region. To this
end, Japan should play a role in fostering the “Quad Plus” formula.

Notes
1 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (MOFA), “Australia–India–Japan–US
Consultations on the Indo-Pacific”, 12 November 2017.
2 Kei Koga, “Japan’s ‘Indo-Pacific’ Question: Countering China or Shaping a New
Regional Order?” International Affairs 96, 1 (2020), 49–73.
3 For example, see Jagannath Panda, “India and the ‘Quad Plus’ Dialogue”, RUSI
Commentary, 12 June 2020; Sarah Teo, “What the Quad Meeting Means for
ASEAN”, The Diplomat, 9 October 2020; Sumitha Narayanan Kutty and Rajesh
Barur, “The Quad: What it Is—and What it Is Not”, The Diplomat, 24 March
2021; Charles Dunst, “Chinese Aggression Pushes Vietnam Ever Closer to
90 Koga
Washington”, Nikkei Asia, 6 April 2021; Bbhijnan Rej, “French Joint Comman-
der for Asia-Pacific Outlines Paris’ Indo-Pacific Defense Plans”, The Diplomat, 13
April 2021; Park Jin, “Korea Needs to Consider Joining Quad to Make ‘Penta’”,
The Korea Times, 22 April 2021; Derek Grossman, “Don’t Get Too Excited,
‘Quad Plus’ Meetings Won’t Cover China”, The Diplomat, 9 April 2020; Jagan-
nath Panda, “The Abe Doctrine on ‘Quad Plus’”, The Japan Times, 17 July 2020;
John Power, “What Is the Quad, and How Will it Impact US-China Relations
under the Biden Administration?” South China Morning Post, 24 February 2021;
“Seoul Shouldn’t Hesitate Joining the Quad Initiative: Korea Herald Editorial”,
The Straits Times, 15 March 2021; “US Congressman Praises Quad Plus France
Naval Exercise in the Bay of Bengal”, NDTV, 6 April 2021
4 The Heritage Foundation, “The Quad-Plus”, www.heritage.org/the-quad-plus.
5 Walter Lohman, Ravi Sawhney, Andrew Davies and Ippeita Nishida (eds), The
Quad-Plus (New Delhi: Wisdom Tree, 2015).
6 “Cooperative Security” mainly functions as confidence-building and information-
sharing among the member-states, while “non-traditional security self-defense”
facilitates inter-state cooperation in non-traditional security issues, such as inter-
national terrorism, piracy, and natural disaster. Kei Koga, Reinventing Regional
Security Institutions in Asia and Africa: Power Shifts, Ideas, and Institutional
Change (New York: Routledge, 2017).
7 MOFA, “Address by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe at the Opening Session of the
Sixth Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD VI)”, 27
August 2016, www.mofa.go.jp/afr/af2/page4e_000496.html.
8 MOFA, “Japan–US Working Lunch and Japan–US Summit Meeting”, 6
November 2017, www.mofa.go.jp/na/na1/us/page4e_000699.html; US Embassy
and Consulate in Vietnam, “Remarks by President Trump at APEC CEO
Summit”, 10 November 2017, https://vn.usembassy.gov/20171110-remarks-presi
dent-trump-apec-ceo-summit.
9 Marc Grossman, “The Tsunami Core Group: A Step toward a Transformed
Diplomacy in Asia and Beyond”, Security Challenges 1, 1 (2005), 11–14; “Tsu-
nami ‘Core Group’ of Relief Nations Disbanded”, Reuters, 6 January 2005, http
s://reliefweb.int/report/myanmar/tsunami-core-group-relief-nations-disbanded.
10 MOFA, “Japan–US Joint Declaration on Security—Alliance for the 21st Cen-
tury”, 17 April 1996, www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/security.html.
11 US Department of State, Archive, “Trilateral Strategic Dialogue Joint Statement”,
18 March 2006, https://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2006/63411.htm.
12 MOFA, “Japan–Australia Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation”, 13 March
2007, www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/australia/joint0703.html.
13 MOFA, “Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of
Australia Concerning Reciprocal Provision of Supplies and Services between the
Self-Defense Forces of Japan and the Australian Defence Force”, www.mofa.go.
jp/region/asia-paci/australia/pdfs/agree1005.pdf; MOFA, “Agreement between the
Government of Japan and the Government of Australia on the Security of Infor-
mation”, 17 May 2012, www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/press/release/24/5/pdfs/0517_04_02.
pdf.
14 MOFA, “Mori sori daijin enzetsu: Indo shokokaigisho renmei ni okeru enzetsu
(Prime Minister Mori’s Speech: Speech at the Federation of Indian Chambers of
Commerce and Industry)”, 24 August 2000, www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/press/enzetsu/
12/ems_0824.html.
15 MOFA, “Japan–India Partnership in a New Asian Era: Strategic Orientation of
Japan–India Global Partnership”, 29 April 2005, www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-pa
ci/india/partner0504.html.
16 Ministry of External Affairs, India, “Joint Statement Towards India–Japan Stra-
tegic and Global Partnership”, 15 December 2006, https://mea.gov.in/bilatera
 Institutional perspective of Japan’s FOIP 91
l-documents.htm?dtl/6368/Joint+Statement+Towards+IndiaJapan+Strategic+and
+Global+Partnership; MEA, “Tokyo Declaration for India-Japan Special Strate-
gic and Global Partnership”, 1 September 2014, https://mea.gov.in/bilatera
l-documents.htm?dtl/6368/Joint+Statement+Towards+IndiaJapan+Strategic+and
+Global+Partnership.
17 MOFA, “Dai ikkai indo jikan kyu ‘2+2’ taiwa oyobi nichi indo gaimu jikan kyu
seimu kyogi”, July 2010, www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/area/india/2plus2taiwa_2010.htm
l; MOFA, “Joint Statement: First Japan–India 2+2 Foreign and Defence Minis-
terial Meeting”, 30 November 2019, www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/files/000544338.pdf;
MOFA, “Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of
the Republic of India Concerning Reciprocal Provision of Supplies and Services
between the Self-Defense Forces of Japan and the Indian Armed Forces”, 9 Sep-
tember 2020, www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/files/100091751.pdf.
18 MOFA, “Diplomatic Bluebook 2007”, 2007, www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/blue
book/2007/chapter1.pdf.
19 Brahma Chellaney, “‘Quad Initiative’: An Inharmonious Concert of Democ-
racies”, 19 July 2007, www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2007/07/19/commentary/qua
d-initiative-an-inharmonious-concert-of-democracies/.
20 Emphasis added. MOFA, “Confluence of the Two Seas”, 22 August 2007, www.
mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/pmv0708/speech-2.html.
21 Siddharth Varadarajan, “Four-Power Meeting Drew Chinese Demarche”, The
Hindu, 14 June 2007.
22 This is often called “Quad 2.0”. See Jeff Smith, “The Quad 2.0: A Foundation for
a Free and Open Indo-Pacific”, Backgrounder 3481 (2020), www.heritage.org/sites/
default/files/2020-07/BG3481.pdf.
23 Shinzo Abe, “Asia’s Democratic Security Diamond”, Project Syndicate, 27
December 2012, www.project-syndicate.org/onpoint/a-strategic-alliance-for-japa
n-and-india-by-shinzo-abe.
24 White House, “National Security Strategy of the United States of America”,
December 2017, 25, https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp-content/uploads/
2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf
25 White House, “Interim National security Strategic Guidance”, March 2021, www.
whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/NSC-1v2.pdf; White House, “Quad
Leaders’ Joint Statement: ‘The Spirit of the Quad’”, 12 March 2021, www.white
house.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/03/12/quad-leaders-joint-statem
ent-the-spirit-of-the-quad.
26 Kiyoshi Takenaka, “Japan’s Suga Opposes Actions that Boost Tension in South
China Sea”, Reuters, 21 October 2020, www.reuters.com/article/us-japan-southea
stasia-idUSKBN2760BB; MOFA, “Japan–Australia–India–US Leaders’ Video
Conference”, 13 March 2021, www.mofa.go.jp/fp/nsp/page1e_000310.html.
27 Rahul Bedi, “Explainer: Why India Hasn’t Yet Invited Australia to the Quad’s
Naval Exercises”, 9 September 2020, https://thewire.in/security/australia-quad-ma
labar-exercises-navy; “India set for war games with US, China and Russia”, Hin-
dustan Times, 2 April 2007; Jagannath Panda, “India’s Call on China in the Quad:
A Strategic Arch between Liberal and Alternative Structures”, Rising Powers
Quarterly 3, 2 (2018), 83–111; “Kitty Hawk, Allies Complete Malabar Exercise”,
US Navy Releases, 19 September 2007.
28 MOFA, “Press Conference by Foreign Minister Taro Kono”, 2 November 2017,
www.mofa.go.jp/press/kaiken/kaiken4e_000432.html; MOFA, “Foreign Policy
Speech by Foreign Minister Kono to the 196th Session of the Diet”, 22 January
2018, www.mofa.go.jp/fp/unp_a/page3e_000816.html.
29 MOFA, “Foreign Policy Speech by Foreign Minister MOTEGI to the 204th Ses-
sion of the Diet”, 18 January 2021, www.mofa.go.jp/fp/pp/page3e_001106.html.
92 Koga
30 Kiran Sharma and Mailys Pene-Lassus, “France to Lead Quad Naval Drill in
Indo-Pacific Challenge to China”, Nikkei Asia, 2 April 2021, https://asia.nikkei.
com/Politics/International-relations/Indo-Pacific/France-to-lead-Quad-naval-drill-i
n-Indo-Pacific-challenge-to-China.
31 “What Is Malabar Naval Exercise? Why Is Chinese Media Considering it a Threat?”
India Today, 10 July 2017, www.indiatoday.in/fyi/story/malabar-exercise-2017-india
-us-japan-china-naval-navy-ins-vikramaditya-1023389-2017-07-10; Singapore Minis-
try of Defence, “Reply to Media Queries on Ex Malabar 07-02”, 29 July 2007, www.
nas.gov.sg/archivesonline/data/pdfdoc/20070729999.htm.
32 Abe, “Asia’s Democratic Security Diamond”.
33 Ibid.
34 This non-exclusivity principle was first confirmed at the US–Japan Summit in
2017. MOFA, “Free and Open Indo-Pacific”, 1 April 2021, www.mofa.go.jp/mofa
j/files/000430632.pdf; MOFA, “Japan–US Working Lunch and Japan–US Summit
Meeting”, 6 November 2017, www.mofa.go.jp/na/na1/us/page4e_000699.html.
35 Andrew Taffer, “Washington Still Wants China to Be a Responsible Stakeholder”,
Foreign Policy, 29 December 2020; Zack Cooper, “Diverging Perspectives on US–
China Relations”, Statement before the US–China Economic and Security Review
Commission Hearing on US–China Relations at the Chinese Communist Party’s
Centennial, Panel I: The State of US–China Relations Heading into 2021, 28
January 2021, www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/2021-01/Zack_Cooper_Testimony.
pdf. Also, for the debates, see Alastair Iain Johnston, “The Failures of the ‘Failure
of Engagement’ with China”, The Washington Quarterly 42, 2 (2019), 99–114.
36 MOFA, “Japan–UK Foreign and Defence Ministerial Meeting 2021—Joint
Statement”, 3 February 2021, www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/files/100145305.pdf.
37 MOFA, “Dai 5 kai Nichi-Futsu gaimu boei kakuryo kaigo kyodo seimei” (The
5th Japan–France Foreign and Defense Ministerial Meeting), 11 January 2019,
www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/files/000436917.pdf.
38 Ministry of External Affairs, India, “Foreign Secretary’s Conference Call with
counterparts from Indo-Pacific Countries”, 20 March 2020, https://mea.gov.in/p
ress-releases.htm?dtl/32592/Foreign+Secretarys+Conference+Call+with+counterp
arts+from+IndoPacific+Countries; MOFA, “Meeting on the Novel Coronavirus
Disease among Foreign Ministers of Interested Countries, Hosted by the United
States”, 11 May 2020, www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/press4e_002806.html.
39 White House, “Quad Leaders’ Joint Statement: ‘The Spirit of the Quad’”, 12
March 2012, www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/03/12/
quad-leaders-joint-statement-the-spirit-of-the-quad.
40 Kei Koga, “Japan’s ‘Free and Open Indo-Pacific’ Strategy: Tokyo’s Tactical Hed-
ging and the Implications for ASEAN”, Contemporary Southeast Asia 41, 2
(2019), 289.
41 Ibid., 291.
42 For example, see Ministry of Defense, Japan, “National Defense Program
Guidelines for FY2011 and beyond”, 17 December 2010, www.mod.go.jp/e/d_act/
d_policy/pdf/guidelinesFY2011.pdf.
43 MOFA, “Diplomatic Bluebook 2017”, 2017, 27, www.mofa.go.jp/files/000287676.
pdf.
44 MOFA, “Australia–India–Japan–US Consultations on the Indo-Pacific”, 12
November 2017, www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/press4e_001789.html.
45 Takeshi Yuzawa, Japan’s Security Policy and The ASEAN Regional Forum: The
Search for Multilateral Security in the Asia-Pacific (Oxon and New York: Rou-
tledge, 2010); Kei Koga, “Transcending the Fukuda Doctrine –Japan, ASEAN,
and the Future of the Regional Order”, Center for Strategic and International
Studies, (2017), https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/170401_
Japan_SEAsia.pdf?fEe_O7OZFMmS2g7NiPUB_sG4HlOxUpjT.
 Institutional perspective of Japan’s FOIP 93
46 MOFA, “Diplomatic Bluebook 2019”, www.mofa.go.jp/files/000401241.pdf;
MOFA, “Diplomatic Bluebook 2020”, www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/
2020/pdf/0d.pdf.
47 ASEAN Secretariat, “Joint Statement of the 23rd ASEAN-Japan Summit on
Cooperation on ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific”, 13 November 2020, http
s://asean.org/storage/2020/11/17-Joint-Statement-of-the-23rd-ASEAN-Japan-Sum
mit-on-Cooperation-on-ASEAN-O….pdf.
48 Huong Le Thu, “Southeast Asian perceptions of the Quadrilateral Security Dia-
logue: Survey findings”, ASPI Special Report, October 2018, https://s3-ap-southea
st-2.amazonaws.com/ad-aspi/2018-10/SR%20130%20Quadrilateral%20security%2
0dialogue.pdf.
49 MOFA, “Japan–UK Foreign and Defence Ministers’ Meeting”, 23 January 2015,
www.mofa.go.jp/erp/we/gb/page22e_000644.html; MOFA, “Japan–UK Joint
Declaration on Security Cooperation”, 31 August 2017, www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/
files/000285569.pdf; MOFA, “UK-Japan Joint Statement”, 10 January 2019,
www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/files/000436675.pdf.
50 MOFA, “Dai 16 kai nichifutsu gaimu boei tokyokukan (PM) kyogi no kaisai”, 7
February 2015, www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/press/release/25/2/0207_04.html; MOFA,
“Nihonkoku gaimudaijin Oyobi boei daijin to Furansu kyowakoku gaimudaijin
oyobi kokubo daijin tono aidano kyodo happyo” (Japan–France Foreign and
Defense Ministers’ Joint Statement), 6 January 2017, www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/files/
000216550.pdf.
51 Ken Moriyasu, “Trans-Atlantic ‘Quad’ Prepares for New Eastern Center of
Gravity”, Nikkei Asia, 20 February 2021, https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/Interna
tional-relations/Trans-Atlantic-Quad-prepares-for-new-Eastern-center-of-gravity.
52 Kei Koga, “Japan’s Strategic Vision on Indo-Pacific Institutions: Quad, Quad-
Plus, and ASEAN Centrality”, in Jagannath Panda (ed.), India–Japan–ASEAN
Triangularity: Between Alignment and Alliance (New York: Routledge, 2021)
[forthcoming].
5 Australia, New Zealand and the
Quad Plus
Miguel A. Híjar-Chiapa

Introduction
The first decades of the twenty-first century have brought about an impor-
tant number of transformations in the political landscape of the world.
Among such profound changes, the rise of China—and its ramifications—
stands out as the most significant challenge to the status quo. As a result, the
idea of the Asia-Pacific region has been reshaped in such a way that it is now
being called the Indo-Pacific by political leaders, academics, strategic thinkers
and journalists alike.
Although there is not a unified definition of the Indo-Pacific, it has
become the central concept in reimagining the regional order, that is the
“pattern of activity that sustains the elementary or primary goals of the
society of states, or international society”.1 This pattern, however, is not
the unintended consequence of international anarchy, but rather a social
construction,2 for, as Alexander Wendt claims, anarchy is what states make of
it.3 This means that states act towards others on the basis of the meanings
they give to those others. In this sense, this construct is shaping individual
and multilateral strategies across the Indian and Pacific Oceans. One of such
strategies is the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue—informally known as
Quad—which made its return after almost a decade-long hiatus at the end of
2017 due to a fundamentally altered strategic landscape. Since then, the four
partners have moved towards closer engagement and cooperation in diverse
areas.
Accordingly, in 2020, as the COVID-19 pandemic became the newest and
most pressing threat to the stability of the region, the Quad partners decided
to gather to discuss this issue with the additional involvement of some other
states. In early March, then-US Deputy Secretary of State Stephen Biegun
summoned foreign officials from India, Japan and Australia, as well as from
New Zealand, the Republic of Korea and Vietnam, for the first of regular
weekly meetings to discuss policy responses to the public health emergency.4
Then in May, then-US Secretary of State Michael Pompeo hosted a foreign
ministers’ meeting on the novel disease and the post-pandemic state of the
international order, which also included the representatives of the

DOI: 10.4324/9781003206408-7
 Australia, New Zealand and the Quad Plus 95
aforementioned countries—except for New Zealand and Vietnam—plus
Brazil and Israel.5 Consequently, this conjunctural expansion has led to the
belief that a broader partnership might be in the making in the form of a so-
called Quad Plus. This raises questions about the prospects for such a group
to emerge—not only as a result of the health and economic crises, but also of
a sense of shared interests and goals.
Official statements from the United States,6 India,7 Japan,8 the ROK9 and
Vietnam10 merely highlighted cooperation with partners across the Indo-
Pacific region to counter the spread of the virus, develop vaccines, address
the challenges of stranded citizens, and mitigate the impact on the global
economy (while Brazil and Israel have not released any statements on the
meetings yet). However, official statements from Australia and New Zealand
went further, calling to “build support for an independent review of the
COVID-19 outbreak, emphasise the importance of rules-based open mar-
kets”,11 and uphold the “fundamental Indo-Pacific principles of openness,
transparency, respect for sovereignty and adherence to international law”.12
Could this be a sign of a strong commitment from these two countries to the
idea of the Indo-Pacific and a possible first step towards closer collaboration
in the form of a Quad Plus?
For Australia, the potential incorporation of these actors to Quad could
be seen as a positive step towards wider acceptance of the proposal for an
Indo-Pacific order. Nevertheless, such an enthusiastic view raises important
questions for a country such as New Zealand, which has been quite cautious
about its engagement with the new idea of the region mainly due to its strong
economic ties with China.
Therefore, this chapter aims to explore the questions that an expanded Quad
may raise for Australia and New Zealand, how their identities and interests
might come into play in deciding to take part of such a potential alliance, as
well as the potential effects on their relations with other actors in the region.

Active support: Australia and the Quad

Although now regarded as one of its most enthusiastic advocates, Australia
has been blamed for abandoning and, therefore, putting an end to the first
iteration of the grouping to avoid enraging China.13 Reality, however, was
much more complex. As former Prime Minister Kevin Rudd has claimed in
an effort to set the record straight, it was not only his decision of suspending
Canberra’s participation—which was surprisingly announced by then-Foreign
Minister Stephen Smith while in a joint press conference alongside his Chi-
nese counterpart in Beijing14—that disbanded the forum, but also New
Delhi’s limited enthusiasm, Washington’s reticence, and Tokyo’s change of
priorities after Shinzo Abe’s first stint as Prime Minister was suddenly ended
in September 2007.15 Yet, Australia had to do damage control and, as Prime
Minister Scott Morrison has argued, work “patiently to restore trust and
confidence”.16
96 Híjar-Chiapa
Fast forward to 2017, with trust rebuilt and a much more assertive China
in sight, the Quad was reconvened. Since then, Australia has continued to
actively engage its three partners to deepen their security cooperation. And
now, with the world facing a grave health emergency, the incentives for fur-
ther collaboration are even stronger, for, as the Australian Department of
Foreign Affairs and Trade media release on the Quad Plus meetings main-
tains, “the stability, prosperity and resilience of the region will have a direct
impact on Australia’s interests”.17
Notwithstanding the lack of recognition of a possible expansion of the
original group in any of the official statements of the seven of the nine
countries that have been involved in the meetings (Brazil and Israel have not
released any), questions about its feasibility are being raised. But, given the
many opportunities this scenario could present to advance Australian inter-
ests, it would not be too audacious to say that Canberra could positively
welcome a Quad Plus. The logic behind this claim rests on Australia’s
enthusiasm in reimagining the regional order.
Australia’s first official embrace of the idea of the Indo-Pacific took place
in 2013 with the release of the Defence White Paper, in which, it was insisted,
the country was going through an “economic strategic and military shift to
the Indo-Pacific”.18 However, discourse was also accompanied by policy and,
therefore, the importance “to create and deepen defence partnerships and
contribute to regional security architecture”19 was highlighted. Then in 2016,
a new Defence White Paper was published, establishing a stable Indo-Pacific
region as one of Australia’s three key Strategic Defence Interests.20 The
document indicated that Australia will continue to work with the United
States under the Australia, New Zealand and United States (ANZUS)
Treaty21 to pursue close collaboration with strategic partners.22 Additionally,
the 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper asserted Canberra’s determination “to
realise a secure, open and prosperous Indo-Pacific, while also strengthening
and diversifying partnerships across the globe”.23 Due to this emblazonment
of the new regional construct across its strategies, Australia has sought to
build and deepen strategic partnerships with India, Japan, the ROK and the
countries of South-east Asia (especially Indonesia and Vietnam), and its
close friend New Zealand—apart from its alliance with the US.
Although Australia’s partnerships with Japan and India have continuously
deepened since the first decade of this century, the Indo-Pacific rationale has
furthered this process. In 2014, the relationship between Australia and Japan
was elevated to a Special Strategic Partnership.24 That same year, building on
the basis of the 2009 strategic partnership25 and Joint Declaration on Secur-
ity Cooperation,26 Australia and India extended defence cooperation.27 Then
in 2017, the three countries welcomed “continued and deepened trilateral
cooperation and dialogue”.28 And more recently, in the context of the
ongoing global pandemic, Australia reaffirmed with Japan their commitment
to combat the pandemic and build “a prosperous, open and stable post-
COVID-19 world, with a focus on the Indo-Pacific region”29 and “reached in
 Australia, New Zealand and the Quad Plus 97
principle agreement on a landmark defence treaty that will further deepen
the countries’ strategic and security relationship”,30 and decided with India
on a Shared Vision for Maritime Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region31
and elevated the bilateral Strategic Partnership to a Comprehensive Strategic
Partnership. Something to note is that the Joint Statement highlighted the
consultations on COVID-19 with Japan, New Zealand, the ROK, Vietnam
and the United States and “welcomed the inaugural Quad ministerial meet-
ing with Japan and the United States in September 2019, and reaffirmed their
commitment to ongoing Quad consultations” in the same paragraph.32
Whether this might be a subtle nod to the idea of expanding the Quad or
not, deeper multilateral cooperation would be the natural next step for Aus-
tralia, given the diverse range of partnerships and plans that it has agreed
with New Zealand, the ROK and Vietnam.
Australia and the ROK share values and a common strategic outlook and
also enjoy a mature economic relationship, yet cooperation on political,
defence and security issues needs to be enhanced.33 In 2009, both countries
agreed on a comprehensive Action Plan for Enhanced Global and Security
Cooperation, which committed to annual Foreign Ministers’ meetings and
cooperation on a wide range of issues.34 Then in 2014, a Vision Statement for
a Secure, Peaceful and Prosperous Future was issued35 followed by a Blue-
print for Defence and Security Cooperation in 2015, which extended security
and defence cooperation.36 And while the 2019 Foreign and Defence Minis-
ters’ 2+2 meeting resulted in a commitment to support a peaceful, prosper-
ous, and stable Indo-Pacific region through closer engagement and
coordination between Australia’s Indo-Pacific strategy and the ROK’s New
Southern Policy,37 the long due strategic partnership that could elevate ties
between both like-minded middle powers remains to be agreed.38
The relationship with Hanoi, nevertheless, is rather different to the one
with Seoul. Although no references are made to shared values between Aus-
tralia and Vietnam—due to the very different nature of their political sys-
tems—official statements have always alluded to shared interests.
Consequently, both countries decided to establish a Comprehensive Partner-
ship in 2009; a Plan of Action followed suit.39 Then in 2015, Canberra and
Hanoi committed to enhance the Comprehensive Partnership and develop a
second Plan of Action.40 Their growing mutual interests finally led to the
establishment of a Strategic Partnership three years later, pledging to work to
ensure that the “region remains peaceful, resilient and shaped by the rules
and norms that have prevailed for decades”41 through wide-range coopera-
tion. This particular case shows that convergent interests can also help to
create a sense of community—of a shared, collectively built idea of the
region—even between states with different identities and values.
On the other hand, the relationship with New Zealand is indeed one based
on shared identities and values and a common history that have turned the
two countries into “natural allies with a strong trans-Tasman sense of
family”.42 But, this is not like any other partnership with a like-minded state:
98 Híjar-Chiapa
it is Australia’s closest and most comprehensive of all its bilateral relation-
ships. Canberra and Wellington’s strong security ties have been formalised
through the 1944 Canberra Pact, the 1951 ANZUS Treaty, the 1991 Closer
Defence Relations agreement (updated in 2018), and a framework for closer
consultation and engagement on defence that has been implemented since
2012 (in accordance with the recommendations of the 2011 Review of the
Australia–New Zealand Defence Relationship) and materialised through a
long history of joint deployments and operations around the globe. Fur-
thermore, their prime ministers hold annual formal talks and their foreign,
trade and defence ministers meet regularly to discuss the bilateral relation-
ship and their close cooperation in global and regional fora.43 And, although
Australia recognises “that New Zealand will make its own judgements on its
national interests, and that New Zealand’s military capability choices may
not always reflect Australia’s”,44 more recently, following the pledge made in
the 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper, Canberra and Wellington have aligned
their Pacific Step-up and Pacific Reset policies and have committed to deepen
further their essential partnership in support of the economic growth, stability
and security of the region.45
Even when Brazil and Israel have not issued official statements on the
Quad Plus meetings, it is worth exploring Australia’s relations with these two
countries. Although there are historical links between Australia and Israel,
closer cooperation on security issues is very recent. Since 2017, both coun-
tries have expanded cooperation on national security, defence and cyber
security. Accordingly, annual strategic talks between defence officials started
in 2018, while in early 2019 a resident defence attaché to the Australian
Embassy in Tel Aviv was appointed and the two countries signed a Memor-
andum of Understanding on cyber security cooperation.46 Nevertheless, the
bilateral relationship is far from being at the same level as those with Seoul,
Hanoi or Wellington. In the case of Brazil, a Memorandum of Under-
standing for the Establishment of an Enhanced Partnership between the two
countries was signed in 2010 and in 2012 a Strategic Partnership was agreed.
The joint statement emphasised priority areas of dialogue and cooperation,
such as the global economy, international security, trade and investment,
resources and energy, education, science and technology, development coop-
eration, environment and sustainable development, and natural disasters.
They also agreed to intensify contacts between leaders, ministers and high-
level government officials.47 Nonetheless, the real potential of the strategic
partnership has not been exploited, for there have not been substantial
engagements since then.
The establishment and deepening of these Comprehensive and Strategic
Partnerships and the strong links that already exist among Australia and
New Zealand, the ROK and Vietnam could serve as the basis for welcoming
a potential expansion of the Quad (although the same cannot be said of
Israel or Brazil, notwithstanding the Strategic Partnership with the latter).
After all, Canberra’s priority of working with its “Indo-Pacific partners in
 Australia, New Zealand and the Quad Plus 99
other plurilateral arrangements”48 could be materialised in the form of a
Quad Plus.

Cautious engagement: New Zealand and the Quad

For the past few years, New Zealand has actively tried to follow a pragmatic
and logical approach to the increasingly changing landscape of the region, by
focusing on its trade relations with China and other Asian markets while
maintaining close cooperation with other like-minded states and traditional
partners, such as Australia and the United States.49 However, this balancing
act between Wellington’s economic and geopolitical interests has become a
very difficult task.
New Zealand has always tried to espouse an independent foreign policy in
order to avoid the fate common to small countries of being used by their
more powerful allies. Notwithstanding, it has also recognised the need for
US security architecture in the region and has accepted and subscribed to it,
albeit exerting its sovereignty.50 Although the United States suspended its
ANZUS Treaty obligations to New Zealand in the 1980s following a series of
disputes due to Wellington’s stance on nuclear weapons, repair efforts started
in the mid-1990s that restored elements of functionality and resulted in
major improvements in the 2000s, laying the foundations for the Wellington
and Washington Declarations during the 2010s. Since then, the bilateral
relationship has warmed and grown closer, as the US role as a guarantor of
regional stability and prosperity—and New Zealand’s traditional security
partner—has been successively acknowledged.51
At the same time, however, Wellington has been dealing with an increas-
ingly prosperous China that has become New Zealand’s largest trading
partner52—due to the Free Trade Agreement signed in 2008 and upgraded in
2019—and a participant in almost all regional and global international
organisations of interest to New Zealand; hence in all dimensions, a country
that Wellington needs to engage with and exchange views.53 Moreover, while
Chinese prosperity has benefited New Zealand and several other countries
around the world, it has also turned into a source of distress, for China’s
ambition to resume what it sees as its rightful place as not only the pre-
dominant regional power but also a major global power is reshaping the
security environment.54 And even though it is impossible to predict the out-
comes of the aforementioned process, there is an ongoing debate about the
future of the region: on the one hand, a China-centric vision of the Asia-
Pacific; on the other, the Indo-Pacific. This situation, evidently, is of great
concern for New Zealand, which has been walking a fine line in its dealings
with both sides.
In a speech to the Otago Foreign Policy School in 2018, then-Deputy
Prime Minister Winston Peters insisted that an Indo-Pacific configuration
makes a lot of sense for some countries, but the Asia-Pacific resonates more
with New Zealanders because of their own geography and the term’s
100 Híjar-Chiapa
consistency with—and complementarity to—Wellington’s partners’ policies.55
Nonetheless, rhetoric and policy started shifting that same year, with the
Ministry of Defence using the Indo-Pacific concept in its Strategic Defence
Policy Statement of 2018, as well as breaking new and forthright language in
the way New Zealand talked about China and its behaviour in the region.56
To that document, followed the Advancing Pacific Partnerships Executive
Report of 2019, which also engaged with the construct. Moreover, in late
2018, Foreign Affairs Deputy Secretary Ben King presented the ministry’s
outlook on the Indo-Pacific, adding that New Zealand understands and is
quite comfortable with the concept and how its interests are positioned
within that.57 Furthermore, in 2019, Winston Peters made a departure from
his previous articulations and welcomed the engagement with New Zealand’s
regional partners on the challenges facing the Indo-Pacific in what can be
read as the first official adoption of the terminology in a country’s foreign
policy statement. This embrace, consequently, has resulted in a different
approach to Wellington’s relations with the Quad partners as well as other
countries in the region.
Illustrative of this is then-Minister of Defence Ron Mark’s visit to Washing-
ton in January 2020 to meet his counterpart to discuss challenges that New
Zealand and the United States share in the Indo-Pacific region, and his later
travel to Honolulu for his first visit to the recently renamed US Indo-Pacific
Command.58 Another example is Jacinda Ardern’s visit to Sydney that same
month to meet with Scott Morrison, in which they emphasised the family rela-
tionship between Wellington and Canberra and the benefits they can reap from
their mutual effort to support an open, inclusive, and prosperous Indo-Pacific
region and deepen partnerships with other actors.59 Among these partnerships,
of course, are those with Tokyo and New Delhi.
New Zealand’s relationship with Japan is characterised by common values
and shared interests, as well as substantial political, trade, economic, tourism
and people-to-people links.60 Security and defence cooperation is mainly
underpinned by a Memorandum of Understanding signed in 2013 as a result
of the Strategic Cooperative Partnership between both countries.61 Yet, in
September 2019, Jacinda Ardern visited Japan to meet Shinzo Abe and both
leaders expressed their ambition to further strengthen the Strategic Coop-
erative Partnership and the security and defence relationship. In this context,
they welcomed commencing a joint study towards negotiating a security
information sharing agreement and decided to develop a Joint Declaration to
strengthen coordination and cooperation in the Pacific. At the same time,
they raised concerns about the situation in the South China Sea and the East
China Sea and insisted on the need to closely cooperate in the cybersecurity
and outer space realms. And, as a sign of further alignment, they “reiterated
their commitment to working proactively together to maintain and promote
a free and open Indo-Pacific region”.62
India and New Zealand have longstanding, friendly and growing ties that
go back to the 1800s. The relationship has become a key priority for New
 Australia, New Zealand and the Quad Plus 101
Zealand due to India’s strong economy, large population, international
influence and the values and interests they share.63 And now, with the emer-
gence of the Indo-Pacific as a strategic concept, both countries find them-
selves increasingly linked by what they have in common.64 This situation was
emphasised during Winston Peters’s visit to India in February 2020. In a
speech to the Indian Council of World Affairs, Peters highlighted the align-
ment of Wellington and New Delhi’s Indo-Pacific policies and the shared
commitment to a stable, peaceful, open and secure region. He also took the
chance to call for Indian leadership in regional and global governance issues
and announce the launching of a refreshed New Zealand–India strategy for
investing in the relationship.65 This document sets out a framework for New
Zealand Government agencies and partners to grow a more enduring strategic
relationship with India over the next five years.66
Therefore, while it is generally argued that “New Zealand cannot afford to
take sides in the US–China rivalry”,67 Wellington’s recent embrace of the
Indo-Pacific concept might be a signal of its willingness to cautiously align
with the Quad partners, rather than avoiding choosing sides. Adding to this,
relations with Beijing have come under increasing strain due to several
situations. These include the postponement of plans for a work plan under
the Belt and Road Initiative68 in order to determine an agenda that really
includes New Zealand’s interests69 and values;70 Wellington’s ambiguous
position on Huawei71 due to the identified “significant network security
risk;”72 New Zealand’s deep concern due to national security legislation
relating to Hong Kong;73 and Winston Peters’s decision to publicly endorse
the admission of Taiwan to the World Health Organization with an observer
status.74
Could this motivate Wellington’s interest in joining an expanded version of
the Quad? In a visit to India in 2018, New Zealand’s Chief of Defence Force
Lt. Gen. Tim Keating queried the objectives of the freshly resurrected group
and asserted that he would be very interested in engaging his counterparts
“to see what Quad means to them and put a question—do they see a role for
New Zealand?”75 The most important question is, however, if New Zealand
envisions a role for itself within a potential Quad Plus. It is therefore worth
asking if its links to the other potential new members could serve as solid
foundations for an extended group too.
Brazil and New Zealand enjoy a friendly relationship, assisted by growing
people-to-people links reflected in the growing numbers of many Brazilian
visitors and students. But, while the two countries are members of the New
Agenda Coalition focused on nuclear disarmament, security and defence
cooperation has not been furthered.76 The relationship with Israel has been
rather complex in recent years. In 2004, two Israeli citizens were jailed for
attempting to gain New Zealand passports illegally and working with orga-
nised criminal gangs. Then-Prime Minister Helen Clark insisted that the two
men were Mossad agents and that such acts were a violation of the country’s
sovereignty. New Zealand then imposed diplomatic sanctions on Israel and
102 Híjar-Chiapa
demanded an apology.77 The formal apology arrived in 2005 signed by then-
Foreign Minister Silvan Shalom and friendly diplomatic relations were
resumed.78 Then in 2016, New Zealand co-sponsored United Nations
Security Council Resolution 2334, which condemned the establishment of
Israeli settlements in the occupied Palestinian territory. The move prompted
Israel’s decision to recall their ambassador to New Zealand and ban New
Zealand’s ambassador from the country.79 A couple of months later, Prime
Minister Benjamin Netanyahu decided to downgrade diplomatic ties with
New Zealand by not returning Israel’s ambassador to Wellington and leaving
only a charge d’affaires.80 It was not until June 2017 that diplomatic relations
between New Zealand and Israel were restored after a letter from then-Prime
Minister Bill English expressing regret.81 The rapprochement, nevertheless,
has not resulted in closer engagement since then.
Relations with Seoul and Hanoi, on the other hand, are close and strong.
New Zealand and the ROK cooperate in regional and global forums and
have agreements for film, science and technology, education, and Antarctica,
as well as a Free Trade Agreement, which was signed in 2015. Additionally, a
defence relationship has developed out of New Zealand’s involvement in the
Korean War. Since then, New Zealand continues to support efforts to bring
peace and security to the Korean Peninsula and contributes a small number
of New Zealand Defence Force personnel to the United Nations Command
Military Armistice Commission.82 These links have also led to the signing of
the Information Sharing Agreement in 2012 and the Defence Materiel
Cooperation Arrangement in 2019. Furthermore, Hyundai Heavy Industries
is currently constructing a new supply ship for the Royal New Zealand Navy.
Seoul has also committed to the Christchurch Call to Action to eliminate
violent extremist content online, resulted from the attacks of 15 March 2019
against New Zealand’s Muslim community. There is also strong regional and
multilateral cooperation between both countries—especially in the Pacific—
born out of common interests and shared values.83
In the case of Vietnam, political, trade, defence and security, and people-
to-people links have grown closer and stronger since the establishment of
diplomatic relations in 1975, and especially since the agreement of the Com-
prehensive Partnership in 2009. In addition, trade ties have been under-
propped by the ASEAN–Australia–New Zealand Free Trade Area
(AANZFTA) and the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement on Trans-
Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) signed in 2009 and 2018, respectively.84 Building
on that momentum, and driven by their growing shared interests, common
outlook, and mutual trust, Wellington and Hanoi decided to formally elevate
the bilateral relationship to a Strategic Partnership in July 2020. Both coun-
tries committed to deepening bilateral political cooperation through frequent
high-level exchanges—particularly regular meetings between Prime Minis-
ters, and annual meetings between foreign, trade, and defence ministers—and
closer defence cooperation, including through high-level defence visits, port
calls, policy consultations, strategic dialogues, education and training, United
 Australia, New Zealand and the Quad Plus 103
Nations peacekeeping operations, intelligence exchanges, information sharing,
maritime security cooperation, and enhanced coordination in regional fora.85
New Zealand has insisted it needs “to keep working on deepening political
partnerships across the region and with other partners” and, above all, to put
its “principles into action, maintaining the ethos of partnership and respect
that has underpinned New Zealand’s engagement to date”.86 In this context,
its recent engagements with the United States, Australia, Japan, India, the
ROK and Vietnam (unlike those with Brazil and Israel) have the potential to
serve as an excellent foundation on which to build the Quad Plus.

Conclusion
In the first Quad Leaders’ Summit, which took place on 12 March 2021,
President Joe Biden insisted that “the Quad is going to be a vital arena for
cooperation in the Indo-Pacific”; Prime Minister Modi affirmed that the
“summit meeting shows that Quad had come of age” and it “will now remain
an important pillar of stability in the region”; Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga
expressed his wish to advance the Quad’s “cooperation to realize a free and
open Indo-Pacific and to make visible and tangible contribution to the peace,
stability, and prosperity of the region”; and Prime Minister Morrison that
“[i]t is the Indo-Pacific that will now shape the destiny of our world in the
21st century”.87 An expansion of the Quad, therefore, could be seen as the
logical step forward in this direction.
For Australia, an ardent supporter of the Indo-Pacific construct, the move
could be positively welcomed, for Canberra’s close links to Seoul, its Strate-
gic Partnership with Hanoi, and its special relationship with Wellington are
an ideal platform for such an expansion. At the same time, New Zealand’s
recent invocations of the Indo-Pacific in its dealings with several partners
and its inquiries about its potential role within the security dialogue might be
signs of a shift in its strategy of avoiding choosing sides in the ongoing cli-
mate of strategic competition. Added to the increasingly complicated rela-
tionship with Beijing, this new resolve may result in “closer New Zealand
involvement with the Quad mechanism, which would be welcomed by all
current Quad members”.88
Nevertheless, any attempt to expand the Quad should use some lessons
from its own past, for, as Rory Medcalf warned back in 2008, “such ventures
will be more sustainable if based on convergent interests and the ability to
contribute rather than on shared values”.89 In this sense, the Quad has to
communicate clearly its purpose and its agenda to avoid any misperceptions
about wanting to gang up on China instead of creating a context where not
only China but every country in the region “has to engage with norms, rules
and material realities set by a community of interests”.90
An international society exists when a group of states, conscious of certain
common interests, conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules
in their relations with one another and cooperate in the working of common
104 Híjar-Chiapa
institutions.91 In this sense, if a Quad Plus is to be formed, Australia and
New Zealand could play a fundamental role in promoting such a regional
international society that can fulfil “the Spirit of the Quad”, the promise of a
“free, open, accessible, diverse, and thriving Indo-Pacific”.92

Notes
1 Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics (New
York: Columbia University Press, 2002), 8.
2 Christian Reus-Smit, “Cultural Diversity and International Order”, International
Organization 71, 4 (2017), 5.
3 Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy is What States Make of it: The Social Construction
of Power Politics”, International Organization 46, 2 (1992), 395.
4 Jagannath Panda, “India and the ‘Quad Plus’ Dialogue”, The Royal United
Services Institute, 12 June 2020, https://rusi.org.
5 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan, “Meeting on the Novel Coronavirus Disease
among Foreign Ministers of Interested Countries, Hosted by the United States”,
11 May 2020, www.mofa.go.jp.
6 Michael R. Pompeo, “Remarks to the Press”, US Department of State, 29 April
2020, https://translations.state.gov.
7 Ministry of External Affairs, India, “Foreign Secretary’s Conference Call with
Counterparts from Indo-Pacific Countries”, 20 March 2020, https://mea.gov.in.
8 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan, “Japan–US Foreign Ministers’ Telephone
Talk”, 20 March 2020, www.mofa.go.jp.
9 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Korea, “Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs
Holds Telephone Conversation with His Counterparts on Response to COVID-
19”, 20 March 2020, www.mofa.go.kr.
10 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Vietnam, “Remarks by the Spokesperson of the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Viet Nam Le Thi Thu Hang to a Request for
Confirmation of Viet Nam’s Recent Phone Calls with India, the US, the ROK,
Japan, New Zealand and Australia to Discuss Post-Covid-19 Economic
Cooperation and Recovery”, 14 May 2020, www.mofahcm.gov.vn.
11 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Australia, “DFAT Secretary Discusses
COVID-19 Response with Indo-Pacific Countries”, 13 May 2020, www.dfat.gov.au.
12 New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, “COVID-19 Coordination
with Indo-Pacific Partners”, 14 May 2020, www.mfat.govt.nz.
13 Ramesh Thakur, “Australia and the Quad”, 5 July 2018, www.aspistrategist.org.
au; Daniel Flitton, “Who Really Killed the Quad 1.0?” 2 June 2020, www.low
yinstitute.org.
14 National Library of Australia, “Joint Press Conference with Chinese Foreign
Minister”, 18 September 2009, https://webarchive.nla.gov.au.
15 Kevin Rudd, “The Convenient Rewriting of the History of the ‘Quad’”, Nikkei
Asian Review, 26 March 2019, https://asia.nikkei.com.
16 Scott Morrison, “The 2019 Lowy Lecture”, Lowy Institute, 4 October 2019, www.
lowyinstitute.org.
17 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Australia, “DFAT Secretary discusses
COVID-19”.
18 Commonwealth of Australia, 2013 Defence White Paper (Canberra: Department
of Defence, 2013), ix.
19 Ibid., 12.
20 Commonwealth of Australia, 2016 Defence White Paper (Canberra: Department
of Defence, 2016), 17.
 Australia, New Zealand and the Quad Plus 105
21 Ibid., 42.
22 Ibid., 56–58.
23 Commonwealth of Australia, 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper (Canberra:
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2017), iii.
24 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan, “Prime Minister Abbott and Prime Minister
Abe Joint Statement. Special Strategic Partnership for the 21st Century”, www.
mofa.go.jp.
25 Australian High Commission to India, “Indian and Australian Prime Ministers
agree a Strategic Partnership”, 12 November 2009, https://india.embassy.gov.au.
26 Australian High Commission to India, “India–Australia Joint Declaration on
Security Cooperation”, 12 November 2009, https://india.embassy.gov.au.
27 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Australia, “Joint Statement by Prime
Minister Abbott and Prime Minister Modi, Brisbane November 2014”, 18
November 2014, www.dfat.gov.au.
28 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Australia, “Joint Statement by Prime
Minister Turnbull and Prime Minister Modi, visit to India 2017”, 10 April 2017,
www.dfat.gov.au.
29 Prime Minister of Australia, “Japan–Australia Leaders’ VTC Meeting”, 9 July
2020, www.pm.gov.au.
30 Prime Minister of Australia, “Reciprocal Access Agreement”, 17 November 2020,
www.pm.gov.au.
31 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Australia, “Joint Declaration on a
Shared Vision for Maritime Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific Between the Repub-
lic of India and the Government of Australia”, 4 June 2020, www.dfat.gov.au.
32 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Australia, “Joint Statement on a
Comprehensive Strategic Partnership between Republic of India and Australia”, 4
June 2020, www.dfat.gov.au.
33 Commonwealth of Australia, “Indian and Australian Prime Ministers Agree a
Strategic Partnership”, 42.
34 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Australia, “Joint Statement on
Enhanced Global & Security Cooperation between Australia & the Republic of
Korea”, 5 March 2009, www.dfat.gov.au.
35 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Australia, “Vision Statement for a
Secure, Peaceful and Prosperous Future between the Republic of Korea and
Australia 2014”, 8 April 2014, www.dfat.gov.au.
36 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Australia, “Blueprint for Defence and
Security Cooperation between Australia and the Republic of Korea 2015”, 11
September 2015, www.dfat.gov.au.
37 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Australia, “Joint Statement: Australia–
Republic of Korea Foreign and Defence Ministers’ 2+2 Meeting 2019”, 10
December 2019, www.dfat.gov.au.
38 Yasir Rehman, “Long due Strategic partnership with Australia will be a game changer:
Ambassador Baeksoon Lee”, Vibe Media, 21 October 2019, www.vibemedia.net.au.
39 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Australia, “Australia–Viet Nam Com-
prehensive Partnership”, 7 September 2009, www.dfat.gov.au.
40 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Australia, “A Declaration on Enhan-
cing the Australia–Viet Nam Comprehensive Partnership”, 18 March 2015, www.
dfat.gov.au.
41 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Australia, “Joint Statement on the
Establishment of a Strategic Partnership between Australia and Viet Nam”, 15
March 2018, www.dfat.gov.au.
42 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Australia, “New Zealand Country
Brief”, accessed 4 September 2020, www.dfat.gov.au.
43 Ibid.
106 Híjar-Chiapa
44 Commonwealth of Australia, “Indian and Australian Prime Ministers Agree a
Strategic Partnership”, 127.
45 Ibid., 100.
46 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Australia, “Israel Country Brief”,
accessed 1 October 2020, www.dfat.gov.au.
47 Australian Embassy to Brazil, “Brazil-Australia Strategic Partnership”, 21 June
2012, https://brazil.embassy.gov.au.
48 Commonwealth of Australia, “Indian and Australian Prime Ministers Agree a
Strategic Partnership”, 40.
49 Rouben Azizian, “Security and Strategy in the Asia-Pacific: Challenges and
Opportunities for New Zealand”, in New Zealand National Security: Challenges,
Trends and Issues, ed. William Hoverd, Nick Nelson, and Carl Bradley (Auck-
land: Massey University Press, 2017), 67.
50 Simon Murdoch, “Interests, Influence and ‘Relationship Capital’: NZ/US Rela-
tions”, in New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade. An Eye, an Ear and
a Voice: New Zealand in a Changing World, ed. Brian Lynch (Wellington: New
Zealand Institute of International Affairs, 2019), 221–237.
51 Ibid.
52 “Goods and Services Trade by Country: Year Ended June 2019”, Stats NZ, 2
September 2019, www.stats.govt.nz.
53 John McKinnon, “New Zealand’s Relations with China”, in New Zealand Minis-
try of Foreign Affairs and Trade. An Eye, an Ear and a Voice: New Zealand in a
changing world, ed. Brian Lynch (Wellington: New Zealand Institute of Interna-
tional Affairs, 2019), 209–212.
54 Michael Powles, “The Regional Security Environment and Architecture in the
Pacific Islands Region”, in Regionalism, Security & Cooperation in Oceania, ed.
Rouben Azizian and Carleton Cramer (Honolulu, HI: Daniel K. Inouye Asia-
Pacific Center for Security Studies, 2015), 33.
55 Winston Peters, “Next Steps”, Speech to Otago Foreign Policy School, University
of Otago, Dunedin, New Zealand, 29 June 2018, www.beehive.govt.nz.
56 Anna Fiefield, “Under Jacinda Ardern, New Zealand Pivots on How to Deal with
China”, The Washington Post, 6 July 2020, www.washingtonpost.com.
57 Ben King, “Remarks on the Indo-Pacific”, in New Zealand Ministry of Foreign
Affairs and Trade: An Eye, an Ear and a Voice: New Zealand in a Changing
World, ed. Brian Lynch (Wellington: New Zealand Institute of International
Affairs, 2019), 142–143.
58 Ron Mark, “Minister of Defence Concludes Successful Visit with His US Coun-
terpart”, Official Website of the New Zealand Government, 25 January 2020,
www.beehive.govt.nz.
59 Jacinda Ardern, “Joint Statement: Prime Ministers Jacinda Ardern and Scott
Morrison—Sydney, 28 February”, Official website of the New Zealand Govern-
ment, 1 March 2020, www.beehive.govt.nz.
60 New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, “Japan”, accessed October
1, 2020, www.mfat.govt.nz.
61 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan, “Joint Statement on a Strategic Cooperative
Partnership between Japan and New Zealand—Shared Values and Vision”, 9 June
2013, www.mofa.go.jp.
62 Jacinda Ardern, “New Zealand-Japan Summit Joint Statement 2019”, Official web-
site of the New Zealand Government, 19 September 2019, www.beehive.govt.nz.
63 New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, “India”, accessed October 1,
2020, www.mfat.govt.nz.
64 Winston Peters, “The Indo-Pacific: From Principles to Partnerships”, Speech to
the Indian Council of World Affairs, Delhi, India, 26 February 2020, www.bee
hive.govt.nz.
 Australia, New Zealand and the Quad Plus 107
65 Ibid.
66 New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, India–New Zealand 2025:
Investing in the Relationship (Wellington, 2020), 1–2.
67 Rouben Azizian, “Security and Strategy in the Asia-Pacific”, 67.
68 Sam Sachdeva, “NZ Still Plotting Place in China’s Belt and Road”, Newsroom, 16
June 2020, www.newsroom.co.nz.
69 Richard Harman, “What is Winston Trying to Say about China?” Politik, 5
March 2018, www.politik.co.nz.
70 Sam Sachdeva, “NZ Still Plotting Place in China’s Belt and Road”.
71 Katie Fitzgerald, “Huawei ‘Never Were Not’ Allowed to Run 5G Network—
Jacinda Ardern”, Newshub, 19 February 2019, www.newshub.co.nz.
72 Government Communications Security Bureau, “GCSB Statement”, GCSB, 28
November 2018, www.gcsb.govt.nz.
73 Winston Peters, “Deep Concern at Hong Kong National Security Legislation”, 28
May 2020, www.beehive.govt.nz.
74 Sam Sachdeva, “Taiwan’s WHO Claims a Test of Peters’ Diplomatic Nous”,
Newsroom, 12 May 2020, www.newsroom.co.nz.
75 Dinakar Peri, “New Zealand Defence Chief Raises India’s Role in IOR”, The
Hindu, 19 February 2018, www.thehindu.com.
76 New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, “Brazil”, accessed October
1, 2020, www.mfat.govt.nz.
77 British Broadcasting Company, “New Zealand-Israel Row Deepens”, BBC News,
16 July 2004, http://news.bbc.co.uk.
78 Helen Clark, “NZ Receives Formal Apology from Israel”, Official website of the
New Zealand Government, 27 June 2005, www.beehive.govt.nz.
79 NZ Herald, “Israel bars New Zealand Ambassador from the Country in Further
Security Council Fallout”, nzherald.co.nz, 27 December 2016, www.nzherald.co.nz.
80 Raphael Ahren, “Israel permanently downgrades its ties to New Zealand, Sene-
gal”, The Times of Israel, 10 February 2017, www.timesofisrael.com.
81 Radio New Zealand, “Israel Agrees to Restore Diplomatic Ties with NZ”, RNZ,
14 June 2017, www.rnz.co.nz.
82 New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, “Republic of Korea
(South)”, accessed October 1, 2020, www.mfat.govt.nz.
83 Winston Peters, “New Zealand and Korea: A Close Partnership in a Complex
Region”, Official website of the New Zealand Government, 30 October 2019,
www.beehive.govt.nz.
84 New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, “Viet Nam”, accessed
October 1, 2020, www.mfat.govt.nz.
85 New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, “Joint Statement on the
Strategic Partnership between the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam and New Zeal-
and”, 23 July 2020, www.mfat.govt.nz.
86 Peters, “The Indo-Pacific: From Principles to Partnerships”.
87 The White House, “Remarks by President Biden, Prime Minister Modi of India,
Prime Minister Morrison of Australia, and Prime Minister Suga of Japan in the
Virtual Quad Leaders Summit”, 12 March 2021, www.whitehouse.gov.
88 David Scott, “New Zealand Picks Up on the Indo-Pacific”, Asia Pacific Bulletin
502 (Washington, DC: East-West Center, March 2017), 2.
89 Rory Medcalf, “Mysterious Quad More Phantom than Menace”, ABC News, 8
April 2008, www.abc.net.au.
90 Rory Medcalf, “Five Dangerous Myths in Australia’s Relations with China”,
Financial Review, 11 September 2020, www.afr.com.
91 Bull, The Anarchical Society, 13.
92 The White House, “Quad Leaders’ Joint Statement: ‘The Spirit of the Quad’”, 12
March 2021, www.whitehouse.gov.
Part II
The “Plus” perspectives
6 Fracturing architecture?
The Quad Plus and ASEAN centrality in
the Indo-Pacific
Evan A. Laksmana

Will South-east Asian states and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN) embrace the expansion of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, or
the Quad, into a Quad Plus arrangement by adding South Korea, Vietnam,
New Zealand, Brazil, and possibly others? What are the trade-offs of pushing
for a Quad Plus and will it alter the broader regional security architecture?
This chapter provides several answers to these questions. First, there is no
singular “South-east Asian” view of both the Quad and Quad Plus. Some
South-east Asian states like Vietnam appear to welcome a stronger, addi-
tional counterbalance to China while others like Indonesia are more con-
cerned with the negative repercussions of the US–China strategic
competition.
Second, the Quad members—Australia, India, Japan and the United
States—should not be “too fast and too furious” at expanding the grouping
into a Quad Plus arrangement. For one thing, they should focus on institu-
tionalising the Quad following their first summit in March 2021. After all,
getting the four countries on the same page and commitment regarding the
Quad was already challenging. For another, all Quad members already have
bilateral strategic partnerships and alliances with potential Quad Plus mem-
bers like South Korea or Vietnam. It remains unclear whether formally
inducting these states into a Quad Plus brings significant added strategic
value, especially if such an arrangement might limit the Quad’s flexibility.
Furthermore, it remains unclear whether a Quad Plus arrangement can be
separated from the pandemic-triggered and Trump-conceived context of its
origins. This not only hinders the broader and long-term appeal of the Quad
Plus, but it might complicate the domestic political calculations of potential
new members.
Finally, it remains unclear to what extent the Quad—let alone a new Quad
Plus—will reorder the existing ASEAN-led regional security architecture. On
the one hand, the Quad meetings came out of the sidelines of ASEAN-related
meetings. So, to some extent, ASEAN institutions facilitated the rise of the
Quad. But on the other hand, a more robust and functional Quad would
have a different set of agenda and priorities compared to those developed by
ASEAN. For more than two decades, ASEAN has developed a set of
DOI: 10.4324/9781003206408-9
112 Laksmana
region-wide institutions, including the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the
ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting Plus (ADMM+), and the East Asia
Summit (EAS) to engage regional powers, from China and Russia to all the
four Quad members. It remains to be seen whether the Quad will comple-
ment, supplant, or simply co-exist with these institutions that collectively
make up the ASEAN-led regional security architecture. But it is hard to
ignore the possibility that as the Quad develops its own robust institutions,
the ASEAN-led regional security architecture might fracture.
The following sections expand and elaborate these arguments. The first
examines how South-east Asian states view the Quad. It will also consider
whether and how ASEAN Centrality could exist alongside the Quad. The
second section analyses the trade-offs of expanding the Quad and explore
the potential implications of the Quad Plus for the ASEAN-led regional
security architecture. Subsequently in the third section, I suggest the
broader policy implications of expanding the Quad and consider options
to mitigate potential adverse effects a Quad Plus arrangement might have.
Finally, I draw some broader conclusions about the future of the Indo-
Pacific security order in light of our discussion of the Quad Plus and
ASEAN centrality.

South-east Asian views of the Quad and ASEAN centrality

We cannot easily keep the prospect of a Quad Plus separate from two pri-
mary contexts. First, the differing if not ambivalent views of the Quad
among South-east Asian countries. Second, the specific conditions under
which the Quad Plus arrangement appear to have taken off: the COVID-19
pandemic and the hardening of the US–China strategic competition. I will
discuss the second context in the next section while I focus on the first one
here. Examining these two contexts will help us better understand the trade-
offs and implications of expanding the Quad into a Quad Plus arrangement.
It should be noted that there is no “ASEAN view” of the Quad, whether in
its first iteration in 2007 or the latest Quad 2.0 that reconvened in 2017.1
There is certainly no official ASEAN-related mechanisms or dialogues, as of
yet, involving the Quad. What we have are instead different South-east Asian
views about the potential trade-offs associated with the Quad.
In general, most South-east Asian states are not publicly and fully
embracing the Quad, nor are they actively working to challenge or denounce
the grouping. A recent regional elite survey by the Singapore-based Institute
of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute) shows that sup-
port for the Quad was “soft”, as less than half the respondents consider the
grouping as having a “positive” or “very positive” impact on regional secur-
ity (more than half view it as having either “negative”, “very negative” or
“no impact”).2 Somewhat paradoxically, however, more than 60 per cent
expressed that South-east Asian countries should participate in the Quad’s
security initiatives and military exercises. However, different South-east Asian
 Fracturing architecture? 113
countries appear to have different degrees of ambivalence. According to the
same survey, Indonesia, Malaysia, Laos, Thailand and Cambodia are the top
sceptics of the Quad; Vietnam and the Philippines, on the other hand, are the
biggest supporters.
These findings confirm earlier surveys. For example, according to the
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI), roughly more than half of
regional experts were on the fence, disagreed, or strongly disagreed with the
Quad.3 In fact, the same survey notes that almost 40 per cent thought that
the Quad had more of a “diplomatic and symbolic value”, rather than
becoming a critical initiative for the Indo-Pacific. It also notes that different
South-east Asian countries view the Quad differently. On the one hand,
Vietnam, Thailand and the Philippines appear to be among the biggest
supporters of the Quad, while Singapore and Indonesia were the sceptics.4
While these two elite surveys differ in their specific country-by-country
results, they still demonstrate the absence of a coherent picture. On the one
hand, the Quad sceptics do not necessarily share identical reasonings for
their reticence. Indonesia is more concerned about the side-lining of
ASEAN—and by implication, its own regional leadership profile—while
Singapore is likely to be more concerned about the sharpening of the US–
China competition. Indonesia under the current Joko Widodo administration
also appears to be less concerned about foreign policy issues that are not
“popular among its people”, including the Quad.5 Laos and Cambodia,
meanwhile, are more likely to be wary of the impression of the Quad as an
“anti-China” coalition, given their increasingly close ties with Beijing.
On the other hand, those who are potentially more welcoming of the Quad
seem to share similar concerns over China’s recent behaviours, especially in
the South China Sea. Vietnam and the Philippines are perhaps the two South
China Sea claimants that have been increasingly at loggerheads with China.6
This was particularly the case over the landmark 2016 UNCLOS tribunal
ruling that favoured Manila over Beijing and practically invalidated China’s
infamous “nine-dash line” map. But other South China Sea claimants like
Malaysia and Brunei appear to be more muted in their responses to China’s
militarisation and aggressive behaviours—largely due to domestic politics
and economic constraints. In any case, there is no clear, consistent and
coherent picture of South-east Asian views of the Quad other than the fact
that some appear to be sceptical of the grouping while others may (partially)
welcome it.
Aside from these country-specific concerns, this general lack of clarity is a
function of several factors. First, there is a lack of clarity among the Quad
members themselves; they have yet to fully agree on what the group is and
could be, although this is slowly changing. They also define the Indo-Pacific
in different ways.7 The group’s 2017 meeting addressed seven broad themes:
(1) a rules-based order in Asia, (2) freedom of navigation and overflight in
the maritime common, (3) respect for international law, (4) enhancing
connectivity, (5) maritime security, (6) the North Korean threat and non-
114 Laksmana
proliferation, and (7) terrorism.8 The first Quad summit in March 2021 may
have added more clarity on these issues, although it led with vaccine diplo-
macy and created three new working groups on vaccines, emerging technology
and climate.9
Second, there is a lack of a clarity among South-east Asian states on
whether China—the unspoken “threat” the Quad is seeking to address—
represents the biggest challenge for their respective interests. Numerous stu-
dies have noted that different South-east Asian states consider China as
representing varying degrees of opportunities (especially economic) and
challenges (especially security).10 For that matter, South-east Asian views of
the United States have also been historically ambivalent as well.11 Despite
the aspirations of many analysts, the structural ambivalence between South-
east Asia and the great powers is unlikely to change anytime soon. Extending
the Quad into a Quad Plus arrangement is unlikely change this structural
feature. If anything, the more the Quad seeks to engage South-east Asia
driven by great-power politics, the more likely this structural ambivalence
becomes more pronounced.
Finally, some South-east Asian states remain concerned about the extent
to which the Quad may supplant, rather than complement, existing ASEAN-
led mechanisms such as the EAS or the ADMM+.12 After all, the above-
mentioned agenda that the Quad seeks to address are also policy issues that
ASEAN-led institutions purport to address as well. At some point, regional
policymakers are bound to ask whether it is worth investing in the Quad or
ASEAN when they both seek to address, for example, maritime security
threats. There is also a concern that the “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” con-
cept inherent in the Quad may be another way to “step on China’s toes”.13
These concerns persist despite the fact that Quad meetings have taken place
on the side-lines of the ARF and EAS meetings over ASEAN-promoted
issues. In short, ASEAN-related mechanisms have “facilitated the Quad
process rather than the Quad process threatening ASEAN”.14
However, concerns over the Quad’s supposed challenge to ASEAN are less
about both institutions coexisting in the same strategic sphere. The concerns are
instead about: (1) whether the Quad gets to drive the broader regional agenda (a
distinct possibility given the strategic heft of its members), (2) whether different
members of ASEAN, ARF and EAS might decide to spend more energy and
resources for the Quad or Quad Plus rather than ASEAN-related institutions,
and (3) whether some ASEAN members like Indonesia could afford to “sur-
render” regional order management to others at a time when they do not have
strategic alternatives beyond ASEAN.15 In other words, for all the talk about
ASEAN Centrality, some ASEAN members remain deeply insecure about the
prospect of an alternative regional order-making institution like the Quad.
It should perhaps be noted that ASEAN Centrality is more of a process
than an outcome. As defined by the ASEAN Charter, Centrality is the
notion that ASEAN should be the “primary driving force” in shaping the
group’s external relations in a regional architecture that is open, transparent
 Fracturing architecture? 115
and inclusive. In other words, ASEAN Centrality is, at heart, an ongoing
process of continuous engagements with external partners.16 As such, a sig-
nificant feature of ASEAN Centrality lies in whether regional and great
powers are “willing” to surrender regional initiatives and agenda-setting to
ASEAN.17 This is part of the reason why ASEAN champions like Indonesia
are often “sensitive” to the possibility of ASEAN no longer driving the
regional agenda.

Quad Plus and regional security architecture

The concerns outlined in the previous section might worsen if the Quad
morphs into a Quad Plus arrangement and incorporates both ASEAN’s
dialogue partner (e.g. South Korea) and one of its key leaders (e.g. Vietnam).
For one thing, while theoretically ASEAN and Quad Plus memberships are
not mutually exclusive, one cannot be faulted for allocating limited resources
to a few, limited set of strategic tools given the worsening strategic environ-
ment. In other words, if ASEAN and the Quad Plus are both seeking to
address similar or overlapping regional security challenges without a clear
division of labour or functional differentiation, then at some point members
might choose to focus more on one tool over the other. To some extent, this
problem is merely an extension of the broader ASEAN–Quad problem
discussed in the previous section.
For another, it is difficult to ignore some of the specific contexts in which
the Quad Plus came about, especially the sharpening of the US–China com-
petition before and during the COVID-19 pandemic. We can trace the Quad
Plus to March 2020 when US Deputy Secretary of State Stephen Biegun
initiated a weekly online meeting with his counterparts from India, Japan,
Australia, Vietnam, South Korea and New Zealand to coordinate responses
to the pandemic. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo subsequently held a video
conference with the foreign ministers of India, Australia, Japan, Brazil, Israel
and South Korea. Various calls featuring these configurations have happened
since. These meetings are not just about how to handle the pandemic, but the
US also views this group “from the prism of its competition with China and
sees it as a way to reemphasise its leadership in the Indo-Pacific”.18 The
Quad Plus, in other words, was driven and strengthened by the US–China
strategic competition, rather than by a conscious effort to make the Quad
more inclusive.
Also, this context cannot be easily disentangled from how badly President
Trump handled the pandemic in his last year in office. The way the admin-
istration ramped up its anti-China rhetoric by blaming China for the pan-
demic makes it difficult to separate the geopolitical concerns from domestic
partisan ones.19 In other words, one could argue that the Quad Plus was not
just another tool to expand the “anti-China” coalition, but it also had the
added benefit of deflecting responsibility from the administration’s cata-
strophic failure to tackle the pandemic. Indeed, since Trump’s re-election
116 Laksmana
campaign could not be based on ending the trade war, it shifted gear into
blaming China for the virus and the economic downturn the US faced by
late 2020.20
One problem with this pandemic-induced context is that as far as most of
South-east Asia is concerned, China was there for them—in terms of medical
supplies and vaccine distribution—earlier and in a scale that the US and its
allies simply did not and could not match. The growing global vaccine
inequality by early 2021 reinforces the narrative that “China stepped up while
the West did not”. A commitment to one billion vaccines proposed by the Quad
Summit will not easily reverse this narrative, especially since India seems to be
struggling with its own vaccine commitments. The narrative that the Quad
Plus was an extension of US domestic politics and Trump’s failure will make it
harder to dislodge those concerns. Furthermore, pandemic management and
economic recovery is now closely tied to the domestic legitimacy of many
regional states. Trying to push for the Quad (or the Quad Plus) further using
“vaccine diplomacy” might backfire if it means disrupting existing plans
regional policymakers already have in place, including arrangements with
Chinese companies on medical and vaccine research and supplies.
Given these China-driven, Trump conceived, and pandemic-triggered con-
texts, any prospect for the Quad Plus to reorder regional security architecture
depends on whether the Quad finds ways to engage ASEAN, rather than
expanding the group’s membership. Even South Korea, rather than going full
speed to join a Quad Plus arrangement, is now considering cooperation with
the Quad on an issue-by-issue basis.21 There are certainly benefits for expand-
ing the Quad. Japan, for example, finds the Quad Plus beneficial to strengthen
its “strategic synergy” in the maritime domain with the new set of countries,
while Tokyo seeks to create a sustainable post-COVID-19 economic structure
in Asia.22 But whether these benefits outweigh the cost of the broader buy-in
from regional states remains a question mark. Indeed, many in South-east
Asia do not appear excited for the expansion of the Quad. As the 2018 ASPI
survey notes, a median of 68 per cent across all ASEAN member-states think
that the Quad should not be further expanded.23 Rather than being seen as
“prying away states from China” (and ASEAN, for that matter) by developing
the Quad Plus, the Quad in its current format should find ways to complement
and strengthen ASEAN-led institutions and gain a wider buy-in from South-
east Asia. Once there is a wider buy-in, extending the Quad into a Quad Plus
arrangement may be less challenging.
Such an argument requires Quad leaders to make a mental switch from
“expand the Quad to demonstrate resolve and pry South-east Asian states
away from China” to “strengthen South-east Asian states’ strategic auton-
omy so they can choose for themselves”, even if that means some of them
may be critical of the Quad. For all its faults and inability to deal with stra-
tegic crisis like the South China Sea, ASEAN remains the only regional
mechanism that all South-east Asian states embrace. If the Quad could invest
in boosting ASEAN-led mechanisms, it could increase a wider buy-in from
 Fracturing architecture? 117
South-east Asian states. After all, doing so complements existing bilateral
and minilateral engagements each of the Quad members has developed with
different South-east Asian countries over the past decade (e.g., in maritime
security). In short, for the Quad to remain “central” in the minds of South-
east Asian policy makers, the group should find practical ways to boost
ASEAN-led mechanisms rather than expanding into a Quad Plus.

Policy implications and recommendations

As the Quad is picking up some strategic steam, its leaders should be careful
not to move too fast and too furious at challenging China while sidelining
ASEAN-related mechanisms. An overly critical push on China might create
unease for regional countries currently vulnerable to and dependent on
China in terms of their economic and pandemic recovery plans. Reinventing
the wheel on options to address regional security challenges without incor-
porating ASEAN-led mechanisms worsens the fear of Quad sceptics. So,
what should be the ideal next step? First, the Quad needs to provide a sys-
tematic, coherent and consistent framework to institutionalise and deepen
cooperative mechanisms among its own members. If the Quad members
cannot agree on a long-term strategic framework for the grouping, there is
no reason the region should take it seriously. If anything, the Quad could
learn from ASEAN’s missteps when the latter organisation tried to expand
its mechanisms beyond South-east Asia in the 1990s and 2000s without first
solidifying its own integration projects.24 Overall, the Quad’s prospects will
be determined by the extent to which national interests and threat percep-
tions align across all four of its members.25 The March 2021 Quad Summit
was, therefore, a step in the right direction.
Second, if and when the Quad could develop and implement its own long-
term strategic framework, then its leaders should find ways for the group to
engage South-east Asian states individually as well as with the wider set of
ASEAN-related institutions, from ARF to ADMM+. After all, there is no
South-east Asian consensus rejecting any future role for the Quad. Indeed,
almost half the respondents in the 2018 ASPI survey thought that the Quad
complements existing regional security frameworks to varying degrees.26 In
other words, bearing in mind the concerns above, there is nothing inherently
“toxic” about the Quad’s future engagement with ASEAN.
The key, therefore, is to find “the right ladder and the right rung”. The
Quad’s engagement with ASEAN would be effective if it meets the strategic
interests of both groups (the right ladder) and when the specific mechanisms
are a good match between ASEAN’s pre-existing initiatives and capacity
with what the Quad could offer (the right rung). In the long run, finding the
right ladder means figuring out the convergence of strategic interests between
the Quad as a minilateral grouping and ASEAN as a multilateral one. These
include, for example, (1) the extent to which regional order depends on mul-
tilateral and collective efforts, rather than unilateral power projections; (2)
118 Laksmana
the extent to which regional institutions enhance strategic autonomy, rather
than becoming extensions of great-power politics; and (3) the extent to which
prosperity and security are not mutually exclusive, just as no regional coun-
try should be left out of regional institutions.
These normative benchmarks should not be too difficult for leaders of the
Quad and ASEAN to agree on. The ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific
(AOIP), for example, is filled with normative principles many regional coun-
tries have agreed to for years. Surely the Quad members could easily align
the group with and support the AOIP in principle. After all, since the AOIP
commits no resources and practical mechanisms, there is virtually no risk for
the Quad members to publicly declare their support for AOIP. In other
words, while the AOIP may have been “defective at birth” as far as strategic
outcomes are concerned, it can still provide an initial normative launching
pad for closer collaboration with other regional groupings such as the Quad.27
The more difficult challenge lies in how the two groups could build on
shared normative principles to practical engagements. In this regard, finding
the right rung is essential. This means that the Quad should avoid reinvent-
ing the wheel in terms of regional initiatives, whether about maritime secur-
ity, trade or military exercises. Instead, the Quad should aim to be a strategic
filler, supporting and elevating existing ASEAN-led initiatives where they
exist and suggesting collaborative new ones where they are absent. In the
defence sphere, for example, the Quad could provide an additional layer of
cooperative engagement, from joint exercises to training, in areas where
ASEAN-related institutions (e.g. ADMM+) remain underdeveloped.28 The
Quad could also support ASEAN-led initiatives such as the Regional Com-
prehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) or the Master Plan on ASEAN
Connectivity. After all, ASEAN has traditionally been more comfortable
with the so-called “ASEAN Plus” mechanisms—dialogues and cooperative
mechanisms between ASEAN and a single or several strategic partners.29
To sum up, the Quad should ideally consider how it could persuade and
obtain buy-in from the South-east Asian states. Differences regarding China
aside, almost every South-east Asian state is unlikely to challenge initiatives
seeking to strengthen ASEAN-led mechanisms. Given the geopolitical and
geostrategic centrality of South-east Asia within the Indo-Pacific, whether
there is regional buy-in could very determine the Quad’s long-term strategic
viability. The Quad leaders should also formulate a gradual, long-term
engagement strategy built around (1) a strategic commitment to a set of
shared principles and interests, and (2) a set of institutionalised mechanisms
to provide strategic amplification to ASEAN-led mechanisms. In other
words, rather than waiting for different South-east Asian states to come
around on their own volition to engage the Quad, leaders of the Quad should
present ways the grouping could strengthen ASEAN. At the very least, the
efforts made to find the right ladder and the right rung between the Quad
and ASEAN could create channels of communication and habits of dialogue
that were not present before.
 Fracturing architecture? 119
Conclusions and Indo-Pacific security order
The Indo-Pacific is in a state of strategic flux. The US–China strategic com-
petition risks creating a new bipolar structure across the region. The fre-
quency and duration of crises among regional powerholders—between Japan
and South Korea, India and China, Australia and China, North and South
Korea and others—have also grown in recent years. Historical legacies, ter-
ritorial and maritime disputes as well as broader strategic competition are
creating regional flashpoints.30 While these strategic trends are slowly
unfolding, day-to-day security challenges, from illegal fishing to transna-
tional crime, continue to strain the resources of regional countries. Domestic
political populism across the region has also led to stronger protectionist and
isolationist impulses, leaving cumbersome multilateral institutions fiercely
competing for attention. The pandemic has also likely accelerated and
exacerbated these destabilising trends.
Under these conditions, it would be strategic malpractice for Indo-Pacific
states to not develop new foreign policy options. For more than two decades,
ASEAN-led regional institutions have tried to develop a region-wide habit of
dialogue and cooperation, on the one hand. On the other, traditional bilat-
eral alliances and strategic partnerships have also proliferated. However, as
the Indo-Pacific increasingly becomes a single geostrategic theatre, the slow-
paced nature of multilateralism and the limited scope of bilateral partner-
ships are no longer seen as sufficient. The rise of minilateralism—more than
two countries but less than a full multilateral grouping—across the Indo-
Pacific has become a “new normal”.31 The rise of the Quad fits this pattern.
Indeed, the Quad may seem like a strategic inevitability, even though some
argue it is nothing more than “a forum for discussion and information
exchange intended to lead to better policy coordination” between the four
countries.32 The United States, Japan, India and Australia certainly cannot
“out compete” China on their own. The regular homage to ASEAN Cen-
trality notwithstanding, these countries do not consider ASEAN institutions
as sufficiently agile and capable to respond to the strategic challenges posed
by China. Tokyo, New Delhi, Canberra and Washington are certainly aware
of how divided ASEAN has been and how some member-states are publicly
aligning themselves with China. Therefore, South-east Asian leaders are
aware that getting the Quad leaders to disband may seem like a fool’s errand.
After all, ASEAN itself has seen its own minilateral arrangements. The
ASEAN Our Eyes information-exchange initiative on violent extremism,
radicalisation, and terrorism (Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines,
Singapore and Thailand) under the purview of the ADMM builds on exist-
ing subregional cooperation such as the Malacca Strait Patrols (Indonesia,
Malaysia and Singapore) and the Trilateral Cooperative Arrangement in the
Sulu Sea (Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines).33
This is one of the reasons why Indonesia has pushed for the AOIP. If
South-east Asia cannot stop the Quad in its strategic tracks, it can at least
120 Laksmana
articulate an alternative strategic vision—no matter how devoid of resources
and practical steps it may be. After all, as Indonesian scholar Dewi Fortuna
Anwar notes, because South-east Asia is located at the geographic midpoint
between the Indian and Pacific Oceans and all the lands around and within
them, ASEAN must continue to retain its centrality in the evolving Indo-
Pacific construct.34 South-east Asian states in general, after all, remain
committed to strategic non-alignment and hedging—if only to avoid the
impression that they are taking sides in the face of growing great-power riv-
alry.35 However, that does not mean that they would seek to push back or
prevent the Quad from moving forward.
As the above analyses have shown, the challenge is figuring out whose
centrality matters and how to ensure that both the Quad and ASEAN not
only coexist but also complement one another in regional architecture
building. As a relatively new grouping, the ball is in the Quad’s court, so to
speak. The Quad leaders should be the ones to persuade South-east Asia of
its strategic utility, rather than the other way around. As suggested above,
finding the right ladder and the right rung is essential for the future of
Quad–ASEAN relations. The Quad becoming a strategic filler to and a
strategic amplifier for existing ASEAN initiatives and institutions are cer-
tainly not the only means forward for the group. Expanding the Quad into a
Quad Plus arrangement by bringing in members like South Korea, Vietnam
or Brazil may, for example, ameliorate the perception of the group as purely
an “anti-China” coalition.
But if the Quad cannot exercise strategic prudence and expands too soon
and too furiously anti-China, even if India and Australia are now all in, we
might see a fracturing regional security architecture. A new Quad Plus might
offer overlapping initiatives on regional security challenges with those pro-
posed by ASEAN-led mechanisms like ARF, ADMM+ or EAS, eventually
forcing members to prioritise one over the other. ASEAN member-states,
unwilling to disrupt their economic and pandemic recovery plans that are
likely dependent on their ties with China, might find the “anti-China”
undertones of a Quad Plus to be an unnecessary distraction. Rather than
working to revive ASEAN-led multilateral institutions to deal with great
power politics, a Quad Plus arrangement might hasten their strategic demise.
It should be in the Quad’s interest therefore to boost South-east Asia’s
collective strategic autonomy, including through ASEAN-led mechanisms.
There is no need to “integrate” Quad-led institutions with ASEAN-led ones.
Coordination and cross-sectoral support on key issues like maritime security
underpinned by ASEAN-led mechanisms should be sufficient to lay the
groundwork for the Quad and ASEAN to co-exist and strengthen one
another in the Indo-Pacific. By strategically positioning the Quad as a strong
supporter of ASEAN, the new grouping can challenge the Chinese view that
it will be nothing more than “a foam in the ocean”.
 Fracturing architecture? 121
Notes
1 On the evolution of the Quad, see Ashok Rai, “Quadrilateral Security Dialogue 2
(Quad 2.0)—a Credible Strategic Construct or Mere ‘Foam in the Ocean’?”
Maritime Affairs: Journal of the National Maritime Foundation of India 14, 2
(2018), 138–148.
2 Tang Siew Mun, et al., The State of Southeast Asia 2020 Survey Report (Singa-
pore: ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute, 2020), 33.
3 Huong Le Thu, Southeast Asian Perceptions of the Quadrilateral Security Dialo-
gue: Survey Findings (Canberra, ACT: Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 2018),
11.
4 Ibid., 24.
5 Shafiah Muhibat and M. Habib Abiyan Dzakwan, “Indonesia and the Quad: Can’t
or Won’t Decide?” The Strategist, 7 December 2018, www.aspistrategist.org.au.
6 See the discussion in Madhu Sudan Ravindran, “China’s Potential for Economic
Coercion in the South China Sea Disputes: A Comparative Study of The Phi-
lippines and Vietnam”, Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs 31, 3 (2012),
105–132; Carlyle A. Thayer, “Chinese Assertiveness in the South China Sea and
Southeast Asian Responses”, Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs 30, 2
(2011), 77–104.
7 See the discussion in Rahul Roy-Chaudhury and Kate Sullivan de Estrada,
“India, the Indo-Pacific and the Quad”, Survival 60, 3 (2018), 181–194; and
Sharon Stirling, ed., Mind the Gap: National Views of the Free and Open Indo-
Pacific (Washington, DC: German Marshall Fund of the United States, 2019).
8 See Ankit Panda, “US, Japan, India, and Australia Hold Working-Level Quad-
rilateral Meeting on Regional Cooperation”, The Diplomat, 13 November 2017,
https://thediplomat.com.
9 See Abhijnan Rej, “In ‘Historic’ Summit Quad Commits to Meeting Key Indo-
Pacific Challenges”, The Diplomat, 13 March 2021, https://thediplomat.com.
10 See, for example, David Denoon, ed., China, The United States, and the Future of
Southeast Asia: US–China Relations (New York: NYU Press, 2017); Don
Emmerson, ed., The Deer and the Dragon: Southeast Asia and China in the 21st
Century (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 2020); and Sebastian Stran-
gio, In the Dragon’s Shadow: Southeast Asia in the Chinese Century (New Haven,
CT: Yale University Press, 2020).
11 See the discussion in John D. Ciorciari, The Limits of Alignment: Southeast Asia and
the Great Powers since 1975 (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2010);
and Evelyn Goh, “Great Powers and Hierarchical Order in Southeast Asia: Analyz-
ing Regional Security Strategies”, International Security 32, 3 (2008), 113–157.
12 See the discussion in Anton Tsetov, “Will the Quad Mean the End of ASEAN
Centrality?”, The Diplomat, 15 November 2017, https://thediplomat.com.
13 Joel Ng, “The Quadrilateral Conundrum: Can ASEAN Be Persuaded?” RSIS
Commentary, 17 July 2018.
14 Malcolm Cook and Hoang Thi Ha, “Formal and Flexible: ASEAN and the New
Strategic Disorder”, ISEAS Perspective, 17 August 2020, 5, www.iseas.edu.sg.
15 On Indonesia’s lack of Indo-Pacific options, see Evan A. Laksmana, “Buck-
Passing from Behind: Indonesia’s Foreign Policy on the Indo-Pacific”, Order
from Chaos (blog), 27 November 2018, www.brookings.edu.
16 For a longer discussion, see Evan A. Laksmana, “ASEAN Centrality in the South
China Sea”, in Southeast Asian Perspectives on US–China Competition, ed. Aaron
Connelly (Council on Foreign Relations and Lowy Institute for International
Policy, 2017), 9–13.
17 After all, ASEAN Centrality was historically correlated with the incapacity of
great powers to successfully mediate their relations on their own in the post-Cold
122 Laksmana
War world. See Lee Jones, “Still in the “Drivers’ Seat”, but for How Long?
ASEAN’s Capacity for Leadership in East-Asian International Relations”,
Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs 29, 3 (2010), 95–113.
18 See Jagannath Panda and Akriti Vasudeva, “US-China Competition and
Washington’s Case for ‘Quad Plus’”, The National Interest, 28 September 2020.
19 See the discussion in Sheila Smith, “US Pandemic Politics Spells Trouble for its
Asian Partners”, East Asia Forum, 24 May 2020; Georg Lofflmann, “America
First and the Pandemic: Trump’s Grand Strategy of Blaming China”, Observer
Research Foundation Online, 17 June 2020.
20 See Philip Gordon and James Steinberg, “Trump’s Flip-Flops on China Are a
Danger to National Security”, Foreign Policy, 29 July 2020; “Trump’s China
Policy Has No Strategy—Except to Boost His Reelection Campaign”, The
Washington Post, 24 July 2020; Brandon M. Boylan, Jerry McBeath, and Bo
Wang, “US–China Relations: Nationalism, the Trade War, and COVID-19”,
Fudan Journal of the Humanities and Social Sciences (2020), 1–18.
21 Kim Seung-yon, “S. Korea Willing to Cooperate with Quad Countries on Issue-
by-Issue Basis: Official”, Yonhap News Agency, 6 April 2021.
22 See Jagannath Panda, “The Abe Doctrine on Quad Plus”, Japan Times, 17 July
2020.
23 Huong, Southeast Asian Perceptions, 18.
24 After all, achieving ASEAN Centrality in regional architecture building versus
maintaining it represents a different set of challenges requiring a different set of
tools. See Mely Caballero-Anthony, “Understanding ASEAN’s Centrality: Bases
and Prospects in an Evolving Regional Architecture”, Pacific Review 27, 4 (2014):
563–584.
25 Euan Graham, “The Quad Deserves its Second Chance”, in Debating the Quad,
Centre of Gravity Series, ed. Andrew Carr (Acton, ACT: Strategic and Defence
Studies Centre, Australian National University, 2018), 4.
26 Huong, Southeast Asian Perceptions of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, 15.
27 See Evan A. Laksmana, “Flawed Assumptions: Why the ASEAN Outlook on the
Indo-Pacific is Defective”, AsiaGlobal Online, 19 September 2019, www.asiagloba
lonline.hku.hk.
28 See, for example, the discussion in See Seng Tan, “The ADMM-Plus”, Asia Policy
22 (2016), 70–75, https://muse.jhu.edu.
29 See the discussion in Chien-peng Chung, “China and Japan in ‘ASEAN Plus’
Multilateral Arrangements: Raining on the Other Guy’s Parade”, Asian Survey
53, 5 (2013), 801–824, www.jstor.org.
30 See the discussion of these key trends in Brendan Taylor, The Four Flashpoints:
How Asia Goes to War (Carlton, VIC: La Trobe University Press, 2018).
31 See Bhubhindar Singh, and Sarah Teo, eds., Minilateralism in the Indo-Pacific:
The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, Lancang-Mekong Cooperation Mechanism,
and ASEAN (New York: Routledge, 2020); Wooyeal Paik and Jae Jeok Park,
“The Quad’s Search for Non-Military Roles and China’s Strategic Response:
Minilateralism, Infrastructure Investment, and Regional Balancing”, Journal of
Contemporary China (2020), 1–17; and Troy Lee-Brown, “Asia’s Security
Triangles: Maritime Minilateralism in the Indo-Pacific”, East Asia 35, 2 (2018),
163–176.
32 Ian Hall, “Meeting the Challenge: The Case for the Quad”, in Debating the Quad,
Centre of Gravity Series, ed. Andrew Carr (Acton, ACT: Strategic and Defence
Studies Centre, Australian National University, 2018), 13.
33 Cook and Ha, “Formal and Flexible”, 5.
34 Dewi Fortuna Anwar, “Indonesia and the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific”,
International Affairs 96, 1 (2020), 114. See also I Gusti Bagus Dharma Agastia,
“Understanding Indonesia’s Role in the ‘ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific’: A
 Fracturing architecture? 123
Role Theory Approach”, Asia Pacific Policy Studies (2020), 1–13, https://online
library.wiley.com.
35 See the discussion in See Seng Tan, “Consigned to Hedge: South-east Asia and
America’s ‘Free and Open Indo-Pacific’ Strategy”, International Affairs 96, 1
(2020), 131.
7 Britain in the Indo-Pacific—and the
Quad Plus, or even a “Quint”?
John Hemmings and James Rogers

Introduction
In leaving the European Union, the United Kingdom (UK) has undertaken a
once-in-a-generation shift in its geostrategic posture while taking stock of
intensification of geopolitical competition in regions outside of the Euro-
Atlantic and reviewing its own capabilities. In the words of the recently
published Integrated Review, “Global Britain in a Competitive Age”: “By
2030, it is likely that the world will have moved further towards multipolarity,
with the geopolitical and economic centre of gravity moving eastward
towards the Indo-Pacific”.1 The Integrated Review notes the deterioration in
the strategic environment caused by the persistent but incremental challenges
posed by Russia—described in the review as an “acute direct threat”—and
China—defined as a “systemic competitor”—on the global order and their
efforts to undermine, shift and, ultimately, project control onto strategic
parts of the global maritime system.2 In recognising the uncertainties of the
global order, the UK has naturally looked to new security-based groupings,
including the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) to bolster its international
power and influence.
Before we show why the UK is likely to become more active in the Indo-
Pacific in the years ahead—and perhaps become more involved with the
Quad—it is important—both for context and for the sake of our argument—
to look at the strategic context of Britain’s global security posture. It is also
necessary to spend some time describing the nature of Russian and Chinese
challenges to the maritime trading order because they directly impact states
in Europe and in the Indo-Pacific.
Since the 1960s, when British strategists first conceptualised an “Indo-
Pacific”,3 and the end of the Cold War, the UK’s interests and capabilities in
the region have more waned than waxed, particularly after its decision to
focus more on the Soviet threat in Western Europe.4 In the wake of that
decision taken in 1968, Britain’s security posture as a Euro-Atlantic power
was gradually solidified as forces were withdrawn from the Indo-Pacific
region. However, since at least 2010, there has been growing UK–Asian
security cooperation and from 2013, growing voices in London began

DOI: 10.4324/9781003206408-10
 Britain in the Indo-Pacific 125
arguing that the time had come to rekindle a posture “east of Suez”. That
year, the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), Britain’s oldest strategic
policy think tank, published an essay entitled “A Return to East of Suez?”.
Michael Clarke, RUSI’s then-Director, asserted in the foreword: “The UK
appears to be approaching a decision point where a significant strategic
reorientation of its defence and security towards the Gulf is both plausible
and logical”.5 The report noted that the two new UK facilities in the Gulf
would allow it to deploy greater power into the region. Since then, the topic
has remained an on-and-off again favourite of think tanks and government
papers, but only began to crystallise when the UK began to recast its foreign
policy under the Global Britain brand. This chapter thus joins that pedigree
and takes the argument into the thorny question of the UK’s involvement in
the Indo-Pacific and potential membership of the Quad.
This chapter focuses on two aspects—capabilities and interests—and fol-
lows three lines of argument. First, we claim that as China and Russia chal-
lenge the historic mare liberum, the UK with its historic interest in unfettered
maritime communication lines and open trade routes has overlapping inter-
ests to the Quad members. Second, we look at many of the assumptions
made about the limits to a British role in the Indo-Pacific and in relation to
the Quad, assumptions that are often based on misconceptions or over-
simplifications of both interests and capabilities.6 We explore what some of
those assumptions are and why Britain’s interests and capabilities make it a
possible Quad Plus partner, even a future member. The question, we assert, is
one of politics and one of prioritisation. Finally, we explore the capabilities
the UK has in the region and how these have expanded in recent years,
noting the recent extension of Britain’s “geostrategic array” of facilities and
how they foster London’s ability to project power in the region. We attempt
to assess whether these will plateau, reduce or continue rising and what this
means for Britain’s role in relation to the Quad.

Challenges Posed by Russia and China to Mare Liberum

While each of the Quad members have differing reasons for joining the
grouping, a common concern has been China’s behaviour in the maritime
space, particularly in the South China Sea where Beijing has made expansive
claims over most of the sea’s fisheries, energy resources, and international
waters. In a 2019 report “The South China Sea: Why it Matters to Global
Britain”,7 we argued that China’s unlawful and excessive claims in the South
China Sea were both a threat to an open maritime order and to the UK’s
direct national interests—after all, 12 per cent of British trade transits the
waterway.8 However, we would like to focus this first argument on an
expansion of the principle of maritime access, and that is the health of the
global maritime system that concerns Quad members, and that this is the
“connecting tissue” between the UK and the Quad. After all, the Royal
Navy’s historic role for much of Britain’s history was to support the principle
126 Hemmings & Rogers
of mare liberum—freedom of the sea—and this often called British warships
into conflict with states that sought to control or restrict shipping. In the
case of China and Russia, we argue that their attempts at expansion of de
facto sovereign control over what were free seas and the jurisdictional claims
that negate the historic principle of “innocent passage” are a direct threat to
the maritime system as it has existed for some four hundred years.9
If we examine what China has done in the South China Sea, it becomes
clear that China has been seeking to normalise the radical notion that states
transiting what Beijing claims as its own territorial waters and exclusive
economic zones are required to gain permission in advance of transits.10 This
fundamentally threatens the right of “innocent passage” as guaranteed in the
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which China
has ratified.11 Furthermore, China has steadfastly refused to utilise interna-
tional law or the international courts to resolve the issue of its wider claims
in the so-called “9-dash line” and has determined to confirm its interpreta-
tion through grey zone coercion (the use of fishing militias) and implied force
(through its militarised island bases).12
Russia has followed a similar route in the Arctic. In March 2019, Moscow
put forward a policy requiring foreign warships to give 45 days’ advance
notice to gain “permission” to transit the Northern Sea Route (NSR), citing
Article 234 of UNCLOS, which allows for special rules by coastal states in
ice-covered regions to protect the environment. Again, it has in effect threa-
tened the right of “innocent passage” by making the right conditional—
beyond the conditions already spelled out in UNCLOS (i.e. passage with
“innocence of manner”, etc.). In addition, Russia demands each vessel
include the vessel’s name, purpose, route, timetable, and technical specifica-
tions, a gross violation of the sovereign immunity enjoyed by warships at sea.
This attack on “innocent passage” was followed by legislation in 2017 that
restricted foreign commercial vessels from loading and unloading at ports
along the NSR,13 which, again, is counter UNCLOS, to “non-dis-
criminatory” requirement in Article 234. In the case of both Chinese claims
in the South China Sea and Russian claims in Arctic, it is apparent that both
states are asserting—using the threat of military coercion14—wild extensions
of sovereign powers over critical maritime chokepoints, challenging historic
principles embedded in mare liberum and specific codes of the UN Convention,
which support an open maritime order.

What are the assumptions in the Quad’s membership?

With regards to the Quad, we hold the following assumptions. First, that the
Quad is a geographically delineated security group, with an explicit Indo-
Pacific focus and identity. Second, that its four members are primarily interested
in the growth of China’s military capabilities and bases; China’s activities in
the South China Sea; and the Chinese navy’s increasing presence in the
Indian Ocean. In debates about Britain’s tilt to the Indo-Pacific and by
 Britain in the Indo-Pacific 127
extension, its possible membership to the Quad, the following are often
repeated. First, that Britain is far from the Indo-Pacific, the central interest
point of the Quad, and therefore unlikely to partner with the grouping in a
meaningful way. Second, that Britain is constrained by budgetary factors and
lacks the regional footprint and therefore must prioritise its presence closer
to home, primarily in the Euro-Atlantic, and perhaps the Middle East.15
While we do not contest these assumptions entirely—they do have traction—
we do think they are open to alternative framing. Let us deal with them, one
by one.
First, the argument that the Quad is geographically fixed or has a fixed
membership is open to debate. If one considers the recent widening of its
membership to “Quad Plus” to seven countries,16 it is apparent that the body
is not yet fixed and remains in a highly fluid state, evolving and changing as
the four nations decide the group’s equities across a range of sectors. One can
see this most clearly in the recent upgrading of the grouping into the Quad
Plus format. It is also not clear that the Quad members hold a clear position
on the exclusion of external powers, particularly other large powers with
sovereign interests in the Indo-Pacific. At a Quad meeting in Tokyo in
October 2020, Japanese Foreign Minister Toshimitsu Motegi and former US
Secretary of State Mike Pompeo discussed the possibility of adding countries
like the UK and France to the grouping. Motegi responded that it was
“important to cooperate with as many nations as possible that share these
basic values and common rules”.17 In a speech in London, Harsh Vardhan
Shringla, the Foreign Secretary of India, praised the Netherlands, Germany
and France for their Indo-Pacific strategies and expressed hope that “the UK
too will finalise its Indo-Pacific strategy”.18 Clearly, the participation of
external powers in the Quad has not been ruled out by its core members.
Thus, while we cannot argue that the UK has a right to be a Quad
member, it is possible for it to join or establish a permanent dialogue with
the group, perhaps as a future Quad Plus partner. The decision is, ultimately,
a political one.
Second, the assumption that the Quad members’ interests are narrowly
defined by the Indo-Pacific region is worth exploring. If we think of the
Quad as geographically focused around the area under the United States
Indo-Pacific Command—“from Hollywood to Bollywood”—then Britain’s
inclusion in the Indo-Pacific and as a Quad member looks less obvious,
particularly when viewed through the prism of the country’s growing role in
the Gulf and broader Middle East. This claim contains a kernel of truth, but
we respond with two counter points. First, the Quad’s interests are free and
open maritime space and sustainable development, both areas where the UK
has commitment and capacity (for example, its Official Development Assis-
tance budget is one of the largest in the world).19 London’s position as a
preferred financial centre, the large number of infrastructure companies
headquartered there, and its experience in innovative infrastructure finance
put it in a strong position to partner with the Quad’s efforts to provide
128 Hemmings & Rogers
alternatives to China’s Belt and Road Initiative.20 Second, if one takes the
Japanese and Indian geographical definitions of the “Indo-Pacific”, then the
UK is very much an Indo-Pacific power with interests and capabilities from
the Gulf and the Indian Ocean Region, right through to Southeast Asia. It is
also the leading party of the region’s only multilateral security grouping: the
Five Power Defence Arrangements—established in 1971 to underline British
support for the security of the Malay Peninsula after the termination of the
Anglo-Malayan Defence Agreement. When the geography of the Quad is
considered in relation to this axis and in terms of Britain’s support for a free
and open maritime system, then the UK’s inclusion is not only possible, but
desirable.
There have been at least two other regional organisations that have opened
their membership to non-regional states. The first is the Asian Infrastructure
Investment Bank, which Britain joined in 2015—though it was originally
conceived as a region-only group to finance China’s Belt and Road Initiative
infrastructure projects.21 The second is the Trans-Pacific Partnership, another
group with an ostensibly regional identity. Despite this, in October 2018,
Japan signalled its willingness to include Britain in the grouping,22 which the
UK has also expressed interest in. Our point is not to say that the UK’s
potential membership within the Quad is likely or probable, but to argue that
its involvement will be based on political factors and on common interests
and capability, not on geography or a misunderstanding of UK or Quad
interests.

Britain’s capabilities in the Indo-Pacific

We will now discuss in greater depth the level of Britain’s footprint in the
Indo-Pacific to determine what it could bring to the Quad. While it is true
that the British home islands are located thousands of kilometre s away in
the Euro-Atlantic, the UK remains, by virtue of its overseas territories—Pit-
cairn in the Pacific and British Indian Ocean Territory in the Indian Ocean—
a power with deep strategic interests in the Indo-Pacific. Despite having
deliberately “pivoted” away from the Indian and Pacific oceans during the
second half of the twentieth century to deter the Soviet Union in the Euro-
Atlantic region, and avoid commitments “east of Suez”, Britain retained the
military means to reach into the Indo-Pacific to defend its interests. This was
proven in the regional conflicts in the 1990s and 2000s in the Middle East—
twice in Iraq and once in Afghanistan—where Britain deployed large num-
bers of armed forces. The Royal Navy also sent a large naval group, Taurus,
to Singapore in 2009 to demonstrate its continued ability to project power
further east and underscore Britain’s continued commitment to the Five
Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA).
This ability to project power has been predicated on a “geostrategic array”
of British military and logistical facilities that stretch from the Middle East
to South-east Asia.23 These are linked by the strategically pivotal British
 Britain in the Indo-Pacific 129
Indian Ocean Territory, home of the giant UK–US naval, air and space
facility on Diego Garcia. These points allow British naval and air forces to
access the region from the Mediterranean, not least via Britain’s naval facil-
ities at Gibraltar and the Akrotiri air station in the British Sovereign Base
Areas on Cyprus. In addition, the UK has long operated military and logis-
tical facilities in Kenya, Nepal, Singapore and Brunei. In Kenya, the British
Army has a Training Unit in Nanyuki, supported by smaller offices in Nair-
obi. In Kathmandu and Pokhara in Nepal, Britain operates facilities for the
recruitment of the Ghurkas, while at Sembawang, in Singapore, it operates a
refuelling station for British and allied warships. And at Sittang Camp and
the Medicina Lines, Brunei acts as host for the British Army’s Jungle
Warfare Training Division.
It is important to note that these British Indo-Pacific military facilities are
not merely the relics of empire; instead, they form part of a dynamic geos-
trategic network that the UK has continued to moderate in accordance with
new, evolving strategic requirements. Indeed, in keeping with the British
government’s announcement to refocus “east of Suez” after 2013, Britain’s
geostrategic network has grown in the western-most edge of the Indo-Pacific.24
The Royal Navy’s shore facilities in Bahrain were upgraded between 2015 and
2018 to become a fully fledged naval base, HMS Jufair, while a “defence hub”
was established in 2017 in Duqm, Oman, to replenish and service British war-
ships operating in the Indian Ocean, including the largest vessels, such as assault
ships and aircraft carriers.25 New British regional defence staffs for the Middle
East and Southeast Asia were set up in 2016 in the United Arab Emirates and
Singapore, respectively.26 And in December 2018, Gavin Williamson, the then
Defence Secretary, announced that the Ministry of Defence was investigating
plans to transform Britain’s logistical facility in Singapore to a naval base or
open an entirely new one in Brunei.27
Besides acting as points to uphold Britain’s sovereign claims and geos-
trategic presence in the Indo-Pacific, these military and logistical facilities
also function to support the presence and reach of the British Armed Forces,
particularly the Royal Navy. Already, in 2011, the Royal Navy had large
naval and auxiliary ships on the scene after Typhoon Hainan to deliver dis-
aster relief faster than many regional powers, including Australia and Japan.
In keeping with the UK’s renewed focus “east of Suez”, this presence has
also witnessed a considerable uptick in recent years as several Royal Navy
vessels have been deployed to the region. In August 2018, HMS Albion, a
large amphibious assault ship, steamed through the Paracel archipelago en
route from Tokyo to Hanoi. At that point, the Royal Navy became the only
navy, other than the US Navy, to have directly challenged China’s illegitimate
maritime claims in the South China Sea—in this case Beijing’s imposition of
so-called “straight baselines” around the Paracel islands.28 As Defence
Secretary Gavin Williamson promised the increased presence would not be
“a flash in the pan but actually a commitment to the region that goes
forward over the coming years”.29
130 Hemmings & Rogers
In 2020, the Royal Navy deployed six warships supported by logistics ves-
sels from the Royal Fleet Auxiliary to the Middle East alone, building on a
plethora of vessels fanning out across the Indo-Pacific in recent years.30 And
in 2021, Britain’s new supercarrier, HMS Queen Elizabeth, will be deployed
on its maiden operational tour with a full strike group to the Indian and
Pacific Oceans.31
This rise in UK strategic activity is part of a wider but often overlooked
British “tilt” towards the Indo-Pacific region, a policy that has been under
way since at least 2010. Since 2012, Britain has signed two new defence
treaties each with Japan and Australia.32 Initially, much of this activity was
an attempt to provide balance in relation to the government of David
Cameron’s geoeconomically driven attempts to court China, a policy that has
fallen flat given China’s increasingly revisionist tone in recent years.
It has also been animated by Brexit, particularly as the government has
sought to flesh out the concept of “Global Britain”—the slogan that was
adopted after the referendum to account for the country’s new post-EU
international approach. Serving as Foreign Secretary in 2016, Boris Johnson
explained at the Manama Dialogue that Britain’s “policy of disengagement
East of Suez” during the Cold War “was a mistake” and that “in so far as we
are now capable, and we are capable of a lot, we want to reverse that policy”.
He went on to outline that the renewed British effort “east of Suez” would
drum up sales for British manufacturers and service providers, contribute to
regional peace, and ensure the UK remained “active in and deeply committed to
the region”.33
Since then, Britain has not only stepped up its diplomatic engagement
“east of Suez” but has also begun to appraise its conceptual understanding
of the region. In 2018, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office—now the
Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO)—amplified its
diplomatic presence in the South Pacific, a point British diplomats have been
keen to trumpet.34 Equally, joining Japan, India, Australia, the United
States, ASEAN, and France, UK officials and political leaders have also
begun to adopt the term “Indo-Pacific”; in 2020, for example, the FCDO
established a new Indo-Pacific section, replacing the older section dealing
with the “Asia-Pacific”.
Finally, despite stressing the centrality of the Euro-Atlantic space to Brit-
ish interests, the Integrated Review focused extensively on the Indo-Pacific. It
was mentioned 34 times to the Euro-Atlantic’s 15; the review also contained
a special two-page spread on the importance of the Indo-Pacific.35 The
review stated that the UK would “deepen” its “engagement in the Indo-
Pacific” through a “tilt” to the region. It committed Britain to “establishing
a greater and more persistent presence than any other European country”.
And it stressed the importance of the Indo-Pacific to the UK’s “economy
and security”, as “a focal point for the negotiation of international laws,
rules and norms”, while recognising that the region “will become more
important to UK prosperity over the next decade”.36
 Britain in the Indo-Pacific 131
How will Britain become the European country with the widest presence
in the Indo-Pacific? Although British membership of the Quad is not speci-
fically mentioned in the Integrated Review, the review states that UK interests in
the Indo-Pacific will be achieved primarily through:

 Economic means, such as pursuing new bilateral trade relationships, as

well as new partnerships with multilateral frameworks and organisations,
including “acceding to the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement
for Trans-Pacific Partnership”;37
 Geostrategic means, through “strengthening defence and security coop-
eration, including in maritime security, building on our overseas military
bases and existing contribution in the Indo-Pacific”, while enhancing
UK “engagement and exercising with … FPDA partners”, and
“increasing … engagement with regional security groupings”.
 And diplomatic means, such as using “ODA more strategically”,
including “support to high-quality infrastructure”.38

Further, Prime Minister Boris Johnson already confirmed the UK would

increase defence spending by some £16.5 billion (US$22.6 billion) across
2021–2025—meaning that it would be at least £7 billion (US$9.6 billion)
higher in 2024–2025 than under previous plans.39 It is clear where some of
this spending will be directed. The Defence Command Paper, the Ministry of
Defence’s contribution to the Integrated Review, stated that the Royal Navy
would receive more warships to increase its operational capability.40 It also
confirmed that Britain would “increase” its “maritime presence in the
Indo-Pacific region through the deployment of Offshore Patrol Vessels from
2021”, the “Littoral Response Group from 2023”, and “Type 31 frigates [a
new design] later in the decade, including to uphold freedom of
navigation”.41

Conclusion
It is clear from the tone of the Integrated Review that Britain’s presence in
the Indo-Pacific will increase in the coming years. This was never dependent
on the UK’s membership of the EU; as we have shown, the British “tilt”
towards the Indo-Pacific began long before the referendum of 2016. That
said, the decision to leave the EU has amplified the UK’s desire to branch
out and consolidate its initial gains; the election of Boris Johnson as Prime
Minister has only compounded that desire.
The UK is drawn to the region by a number of drivers or factors:

1 Economic interests, particularly as the Indo-Pacific continues to grow in

its position as the economic core of the world.
2 Geostrategic interests, in upholding British sovereignty over the British
Overseas Territories and dissuading China’s attempts to control the
132 Hemmings & Rogers
South China Sea and the maritime space, but also in terms of providing
an alternative to Chinese economic coercion through the Belt and Road
Initiative.
3 Diplomatic interests, in providing support to close British allies, such as
the US, Australia, Canada and New Zealand, but also to increasingly
close partners such as Japan, the ASEAN countries and India.
4 Humanitarian interests, in supporting democratic forces, reducing
extreme poverty, and implementing policies designed to counter envir-
onmental degradation, whether in terms of greenhouse gas emissions or
oceanic contamination.

It is hard to imagine that these forces will not continue to pull Britain into
the Indo-Pacific in the years ahead. However, due to the geographic location
of the British home islands, the UK will always be seen by resident Indo-
Pacific powers as something of an outsider, despite its overseas territories
and wider interests in a free and open maritime order. But this does not
necessarily matter. This is because the Indo-Pacific is not a bubble, but is
instead becoming increasingly woven into and bound up with other regions
of the world. As Europe, and then the Euro-Atlantic region, grew in organi-
sational and economic power in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, it
reached out and bound other regions into its internal affairs. In the twenty-
first century, countries in the Indo-Pacific are doing the same: Japan, China,
India and the rest, are reaching out—albeit in different ways—connecting
themselves to Europe, Africa and the Americas, and these regions are all in
turn bound to the Indo-Pacific, giving fresh animation to Nicholas Spykman’s
concept of the “rimland” stretching around the southern underbelly of
Eurasia, from the British Isles in Europe to Japan in the Pacific.42
Insofar as Europe and Africa are as much part of this broader strategic
theatre as the Indo-Pacific, Britain’s presence, posture and role in the Indo-
Pacific cannot be held in isolation, or seen in zero-sum terms.43 The UK and
Japan have already recognised this fact in their 2017 Joint Statement on
Security Cooperation, where they declared one another “to be the closest
security partners respectively in Asia and Europe”.44 Consequently, British
support for a “free and open Indo-Pacific” may come directly: through new
military facilities, diplomatic posts, ODA, and the persistent, even perma-
nent, deployment of Royal Navy warships, even strike groups.
But it will also come indirectly, through Britain’s role in the defence of the
wider Euro-Atlantic region, a key destination of China’s economic and stra-
tegic efforts. Britain would thus free up US resources for deployment else-
where, not least to the Pacific. Moreover, by dissuading potential, and
deterring active, revisionists closer to home, the UK could assist with con-
straining China’s westward geostrategic push, manifested today through the
ports and chokepoints of the Belt and Road Initiative and Maritime Silk
Road, but likely tomorrow via a Chinese military presence. Indeed, if pri-
marily Euro-Atlantic powers like the UK (and France) have to adjust and
 Britain in the Indo-Pacific 133
“tilt” to new realities in the Ind o-Pacific, the Indo-Pacific powers—Japan,
India and Australia chief among them—will have to do the same in reverse.
But what of the Quad? The Quad is still developing and may not have yet
reached its full potential. To fully mature, it will need to properly define its
own functions; secondly, it will have to define its own interests—be these
geographically restricted or wider. Britain may never become a full
member—rendering the Quad a Quint—but the question will not be decided
by geography; it will be decided by interests: the interests of the existing
Quad members to have the UK close to their tent (as a Quad Plus partner)
or inside their tent (as a full member), and Britain’s interests in joining—in
one way or the other—one of the Indo-Pacific’s most important security
groups.

Notes
1 “Global Britain in a Competitive Age: The Integrated Review of Security,
Defence, Development, and Foreign Policy”, HM Government, 16 March 2021,
www.gov.uk/government/publications/global-britain-in-a-competitive-age-the-inte
grated-review-of-security-defence-development-and-foreign-policy.
2 John Hemmings, “China and Russia: Closing the Maritime System?” Britain’s
World, 16 March 2021, www.geostrategy.org.uk/britains-world/the-chinese-russia
n-maritime-approach-towards-a-closed-system.
3 “UK National Archives, Defence and Oversea Policy (Official) Committee, “Defence
Review Studies: Indo-Pacific Strategy”, CAB 148/44, 6 October 1965, 9; “Defence
Review Studies: Indo-Pacific Strategy”, CAB 148/44, 20 October 1965, 10.
4 For more on Britain’s series of decisions that resulted in its key role in the defence
of Europe, see J. Rogers, “Defending Europe: Global Britain and the Future of
European Geopolitics”, Henry Jackson Society, 2018, http://henryjacksonsociety.
org/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/HJS-Defending-Europe-Global-Britain-Report-
NEW-web.pdf.
5 Gareth Stansfield and Saul Kelly, “A Return to East of Suez? UK Military
Deployment to the Gulf”, RUSI Briefing Paper, 26 April 2013, https://rusi.org/
system/files/East_of_Suez_Return_042013.pdf.
6 P. Shetler-Jones, “Ten Myths about the British ‘Tilt’ to the Indo-Pacific”, Britain’s
World, 13 March 2021, www.geostrategy.org.uk/britains-world/ten-myths-about-
the-british-tilt-to-the-indo-pacific.
7 John Hemmings and James Rogers, “The South China Sea: Why it Matters to
‘Global Britain’”, The Henry Jackson Society, January 2019, https://henryja
cksonsociety.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/HJS-South-China-Sea-Report-web-
1.pdf.
8 “How Much Trade Transits the South China Sea?” CSIS Chinapower, https://
chinapower.csis.org/much-trade-transits-south-china-sea.
9 We date this to 1609 with the publication of Hugo Grotius’s Mare Liberum.
10 Zou Keyuan, “Innocent Passage for Warships: Chinese Doctrine and Practice”,
Ocean Development and International Law 29, 3 (1997), 195–223.
11 See Section 3, Article 19, of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea, United Nations, www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/
unclos/part2.htm.
12 Fu Ying, “Why China Says No to the Arbitration on the South China Sea”,
Foreign Policy, 10 July 2016, https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/07/10/why-china-sa
ys-no-to-the-arbitration-on-the-south-china-sea.
134 Hemmings & Rogers
13 “Russian Tightens Control over Northern Sea Route”, Maritime Executive, 8 March
2019, www.maritime-executive.com/article/russia-tightens-control-over-northern-sea
-route.
14 The argument that both China and Russia are attempting to base their new legal
interpretations on military coercion is based on the military bases and substantive
military forces that both have placed in the respective seas. For further informa-
tion on China’s military bases in the South China Sea, see “Chinese Power Pro-
jection Capabilities in the South China Sea”, AMTI CSIS, https://amti.csis.org/
chinese-power-projection. For further information on Russia’s new military bases
in the NSR, please see Matthew Malino and Heather A. Conley, “The Ice Cur-
tain: Russia’s Arctic Military Presence”, CSIS Report, www.csis.org/features/ice-
curtain-russias-arctic-military-presence.
15 Jeremy Shapiro and Nick Witney, “The Delusions of Global Britain”, Foreign
Affairs, 23 March 2021, www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/europe/2021-03-23/delu
sions-global-britain.
16 Jeff M. Smith, “How America is Leading the ‘Quad Plus’ Group of 7 Countries in
Fighting the Coronavirus”, Heritage Foundation, 1 April2020, www.heritage.org/
global-politics/commentary/how-america-leading-the-quad-plus-group-7-countrie
s-fighting-the.
17 Satoshi Sugiyama and Jesse Johnson, “Suga Clears First Diplomatic Hurdle in
Meeting with Pomeo”, Japan Times, 6 October 2020, www.japantimes.co.jp/news/
2020/10/06/national/mike-pompeo-yoshihide-suga-tokyo-japan-quad.
18 Harsh Vardhan Shringla, “Speech: India’s Vision of the Indo-Pacific”, Policy
Exchange, 2 November 2020, https://policyexchange.org.uk/pxevents/india
s-vision-of-the-indo-pacific.
19 “Net ODA Provided, Total (current US$)—United Kingdom, United States,
Japan, Germany, France (2016)”, World Bank, https://data.worldbank.org/indica
tor/DC.ODA.TOTL.CD?locations=GB-US-JP-DE-FR.
20 India Global Business Staff, “India and the UK: Partnering for Infrastructure
Development”, India Global Business, www.indiaglobalbusiness.com/igb-archive/
india-and-the-uk-partnering-for-infrastructure-development-india-global-business.
21 Martin A. Weis, “Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank”, Congressional
Research Service, 3 February 2017, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R44754.pdf.
22 “Brexit: Japan ‘Would Welcome’ Britain to TPP Says Abe”, BBC News, 8
October 2018, www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-45780889.
23 J. Rogers, “European (British and French) Geostrategy in the Indo-Pacific”,
Journal of the Indian Ocean Region 9, 1 (2013), 69–89.
24 See Gareth Stansfield and Saul Kelly, “A Return to East of Suez? UK Military
Deployment to the Gulf”, RUSI Briefing Paper, 26 April 2013, https://rusi.org/
system/files/East_of_Suez_Return_042013.pdf.
25 “UK Opens Permanent Military Base in Bahrain”, Reuters, 5 April 2018, https://
uk.reuters.com/article/uk-uk-bahrain/uk-opens-permanent-military-base-in-bahra
in-idUKKCN1HC2NR; “Defence Secretary Strengthens Ties between UK and
Oman”, HM Government, 28 August 2017, www.gov.uk/government/news/defen
ce-secretary-strengthens-ties-between-uk-and-oman.
26 “Britain Extends Global Defence Reach”, HM Government, 12 December 2016,
found at: www.gov.uk/government/news/britain-extends-global-defence-reach.
27 C. Hope, “Britain to Become ‘True Global Player’ Post-Brexit with Military Bases
in South East Asia and Caribbean, Says Defence Secretary”, Daily Telegraph, 30
December 2018, www.telegraph.co.uk/politics/2018/12/29/britain-become-true-
global-player-post-brexit-new-military-bases/.
28 Collin Koh, Twitter, 12 October 2020, https://twitter.com/CollinSLKoh/status/
1315588895761854465?s=20.
 Britain in the Indo-Pacific 135
29 S. Carrell, “South China Sea: UK Could Send Aircraft Carrier to Back Aus-
tralian Vessels”, The Guardian, 21 July 2018, www.theguardian.com/world/2018/
jul/21/south-china-sea-uk-could-send-aircraft-carrier-to-back-australian-vessels.
30 “What Military Capability Does Britain Have Deployed in the Gulf ?”, Forces
Net, 12 January 2020, www.forces.net/news/navy/what-true-extent-britains-nava
l-deployment-gulf.
31 See J. Rogers, “Is it Time for a Royal Navy ‘Great Grey Fleet’ to Show the World
Britain Means Business?”, Warships—International Fleet Review, 16 December 2019,
www.warshipsifr.com/features/is-it-time-for-a-royal-navy-great-grey-fleet-to-show-the-
world-britain-means-business; L. Fisher, “Britain Set to Confront China with New
Aircraft Carrier”, The Times, 14 July 2020, www.thetimes.co.uk/article/britain-set-to-
confront-china-with-new-aircraft-carrier-v2gnwrr88.
32 See P. Shetler-Jones, “Searching for the ‘Strategic’ in the UK–Japan ‘New Type of
Alliance’”, Asia-Pacific Bulletin 306, 31 March 2015, www.eastwestcenter.org/p
ublications/searching-the-%E2%80%9Cstrategic%E2%80%9D-in-the-uk-japan-%
E2%80%9Cnew-type-alliance%E2%80%9D.
33 B. Johnson, “Foreign Secretary Speech: ‘Britain is Back East of Suez’”, HM
Government, 9 December 2016, found at: www.gov.uk/government/speeches/for
eign-secretary-speech-britain-is-back-east-of-suez (last accessed 9 April 2021).
34 See M. Smith, “UK ‘Stepped Back Too Much’ from Pacific—High Commis-
sioner”, RNZ, 4 July 2019, www.rnz.co.nz/international/pacific-news/393653/
uk-stepped-back-too-much-from-pacific-high-commissioner; C. Paskal, “Britain’s
New Pacific Presence”, The Interpreter, 24 April 2018, www.lowyinstitute.org/
the-interpreter/are-uk-s-new-diplomatic-posts-game-changer.
35 “Global Britain in a Competitive Age: The Integrated Review of Security,
Defence, Development, and Foreign Policy”, HM Government, 16 March 2021,
www.gov.uk/government/publications/global-britain-in-a-competitive-age-the-inte
grated-review-of-security-defence-development-and-foreign-policy.
36 Ibid.
37 Ibid.
38 Ibid.
39 “Defence Funding Boost ‘Extends British Influence’, Says PM”, BBC News, 19
November 2020, www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-54988870.
40 “Defence in a Competitive Age”, Ministry of Defence, 22 March 2021, www.gov.
uk/government/publications/defence-in-a-competitive-age.
41 Ibid.
42 Spykman, N., The Geography of the Peace (New York City: Harcourt, Brace, and
Co., 1944), 38.
43 See J. Rogers and A. Lanoszka, “A Crowe Memorandum for the Twenty-First
Century”, Council on Geostrategy, 2 March 2021, www.geostrategy.org.uk/resea
rch/a-crowe-memorandum-for-the-twenty-first-century.
44 “Japan–UK Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation”, HM Government,
August 2017, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/
uploads/attachment_data/file/641155/Japan-UK_Joint_Declaration_on_Security_
Cooperation.pdf.
8 The Quad Plus and South Korea’s
quest for foreign policy autonomy
Kuyoun Chung

Introduction
Competition with China in the Indo-Pacific has resulted in the United States
reinforcing its ties with allies and strategic partners through a networked
security architecture. This idea of networked security architecture was first
presented at the US Department of Defense’s Indo-Pacific Strategy Report in
2019 and understood as “a network of interwoven bilateral, minilateral and
multilateral defence arrangements between the US and allies and partners,
and that also partly include China”.1 Forging this architecture does not
suggest that all the security relationships in the Indo-Pacific theatre should
be integrated as an Asian NATO under US leadership. Rather, it implies that
minilateral and multilateral institutions need to complement the existing
hub-and-spoke bilateral alliance system in East Asia.
Against this backdrop, the Quad would serve as a core foundation to build
US policy on the Indo-Pacific. US officials under the Trump Administration
previously made an instructive remark on this point. During the US–India
Strategic Partnership Forum on 31 August 2020, Stephen Biegun, the former
US Deputy Secretary of State, mentioned that four countries in the region—
US, Japan, Australia and India—would work together as “a bulwark against
a challenge from China” and would invite more countries to align in a more
structured manner.2 Jake Sullivan, the current National Security Advisor
also stated that the Biden Administration would continue to build on the
Trump Administration’s Indo-Pacific strategy and the Quad.3 Furthermore,
the Quad is expected to expand to include diverse groupings of like-minded
countries, as observed from the coordinated responses of the Quad Plus—the
original Quad members and South Korea, Vietnam and New Zealand—
towards the COVID-19 pandemic. A recent joint naval drill between the
Quad members and France in the Bay of Bengal in April 2021 led some to
infer another Quad Plus is taking shape in the domain of maritime security
as well. As such, this platform of Quad Plus is likely to evolve into a flexible,
issue-based, and action-oriented platform among like-minded countries.
This networked security architecture, with participation of like-minded
democracies, not only serves as a military counterweight against China but

DOI: 10.4324/9781003206408-11
 South Korea’s quest for autonomy 137
also slows down the pace of geopolitical transition and allows the US to
restore its leadership and the rule-based order in the Indo-Pacific, which was
substantially depleted under the Trump Administration. The regional dis-
tribution of power has been indeed shifting disadvantageously to the US and
its allies compared to rising revisionist powers such as China.4 Furthermore,
China’s selective revisionism has not been completely rejected by regional
countries, whose responses toward China vary from accommodation to bal-
ancing.5 Such allied decline, therefore, has not only made it difficult for the
US to provide leadership and maintain regional stability, but also weakened
the hard power that underwrites the US-led liberal order. While rebuilding
the networked security architecture, the US is now probing the willingness of
regional countries to join a like-minded democratic coalition in countering
China.
However, US allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific are reluctant to join
the United States in any confrontation with China. While US–China com-
petition continues to serve as an organising principle for the Biden Admin-
istration’s foreign policy, the prospect of complete decoupling and
disengagement between these two great powers seems remote. As the ultimate
end-state of the current competition is uncertain, allies and partners in the
Indo-Pacific are hesitant to join the United States in allied confrontation,
despite their concerns over Chinese revisionism.
This is mainly because forging a networked security architecture would
deepen the Chinese fear of encirclement, which is likely to lead to a strategic
or economic counter-move towards US allies and partners participating in
the architecture. This was evidenced by Chinese economic coercion during
the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) deployment dispute in
South Korea in 2016. However, the response of the United States against
Chinese coercion has not reassured allies and partners enough during the
dispute. Of greater concern, significantly narrower unilateralism from the
previous Trump Administration has spread a perception of further US
decline and attenuated an otherwise favourable balance of power.6
Meanwhile, South Korea under the Moon Jae-in Administration prior-
itises foreign policy goals of improving the inter-Korean relationship in its
attempt to facilitate US–North Korea dialogue and denuclearise North
Korea. As long as North Korea remains the core driver of South Korea’s
foreign policy, South Korea cannot but maintain a working relationship with
China, which remains the biggest trade partner and main benefactor of
North Korea, as it is expected to sustain the momentum of inter-Korean
dialogue. To this end, South Korea strives to maintain foreign policy autonomy
in the midst of great power rivalry.
Against this backdrop, this chapter argues that South Korea’s priority of
maintaining foreign policy autonomy during great power competition and
paving the way to build a non-nuclear peace regime on the Korean peninsula
has not been fully compatible with the US grander strategic motivation of
building a networked security architecture under the Free and Open Indo-
138 Chung
Pacific (FOIP) strategy. This chapter addresses the Moon Administration’s
understanding on the current US–China competition and changing regional
security landscape in the Indo-Pacific region. Furthermore, it discusses how
the Quad Plus generates a strategic dilemma for South Korea. Such a
dilemma will be discussed in the context of South Korea’s pursuit of its own
foreign policy priorities and its regional initiative of the New Southern Policy
(NSP), which is being attuned with the US FOIP.

How South Korea understands the current great power competition

As China has started to reassert its influence both regionally and globally,
the United States is increasingly being challenged in the security, economic,
technology, and even governance domains. Such confrontation from China
raises question about the United States’ status as the preeminent power.
Since the end of the Cold War, Washington has been able to enjoy a unipolar
moment with its own unparalleled strength. Furthermore, such primacy was
bolstered because most countries next to it in overall geopolitical strength
were its closest allies.7 The United States has used that primacy to shape the
international system to be highly conducive to its own interests and ideals. In
particular, it employed its power-projection capabilities, forwarded presence,
and expeditionary intervention to uphold stability in key regions, to promote
the spread of democracy, to anchor a liberal economic system, and to roll
back or contain the influence of adversaries that might disrupt the US-led
liberal order.8 However, the distribution of global military and economic
power has shifted significantly since the mid-1990s. While the decline of the
United States and its allies is not universal, allied decline relative to the rise
of adversaries has eroded the broader influence that US allies can bring to
maintain the liberal order.
Meanwhile, as a main competitor to the United States, China can be better
conceptualised as a selective revisionist.9 Chinese strategic behaviour is more
accurately captured by the phrase “regional restructuring” than simply
“revisionism”. China would certainly prefer to alter the status quo of the
current international order, but aims to revise certain aspects of the regional
order to better suit its own interests. Specifically, as China primarily intends
to shape international order to be more amenable to the exercise of Chinese
power, regional restructuring mainly requires weakening of the US alliance
system as an obstacle to those goals while leaving other elements of the order
intact.
The hub-and-spoke bilateral alliance system of the United States poses a
three-fold threat to China. First, the persistence of volatile sovereignty dis-
putes between China and neighbouring countries—such as Taiwan, the Phi-
lippines and Japan, who are mostly allied with the US—carries the risk that a
localised clash could escalate into a devastating full-scale war between China
and the United States. Second, from Beijing’s perspective, US provision of
extended deterrence encourages and enables US allies to act more assertively.
 South Korea’s quest for autonomy 139
Third, a robust US alliance system grants the United States the option of
assembling an anti-China coalition to contest leadership in East Asia should
relations deteriorate. Therefore, finding ways to weaken US alliances offers
Chinese leaders the benefit of reducing the risk of all-out war with the
United States while advancing objectives that the United States opposes
most, such as ending or reducing US access to allied bases. This would make
military intervention in a regional conflict infeasible. Without the ability to
project forces from forward bases in allied countries, conducting any
intervention would be highly costly for the United States.
Accordingly, China has long upheld the realisation of “national rejuvena-
tion” since the 1980s. President Xi refined this vision into the “China
Dream”, the ideal of which is to build “a community of common destiny”
where China leads neighbouring countries in managing their own security
affairs.10 In Xi’s words, “it is for the people of Asia to uphold the security of
Asia”,11 which would inevitably reduce the United States’ presence in the
region. To promote this vision, Beijing has promoted new initiatives that aim
to build a parallel security order featuring dialogue and multilateral coop-
eration to address shared security threats without granting any role for alli-
ances. Such structures include the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation
(SCO), the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures
(CICA), and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). Furthermore, China has
conducted multilateral and bilateral exercises to develop its capacity to con-
duct multi-nation humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR)
operations, engage regional US allies, and ease anxieties among China’s
neighbours concerning the growing capabilities and expanding missions of
the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). For instance, recent joint exercises
between China and regional countries have included Cobra Gold, the ARF
Disaster Relief Exercises, Khaan Quest, Kowari Exercise, Tropic Twilight,
and Falcon Strike. These exercises also support Xi’s foreign policy by seeking
to ease regional concerns while attempting to shape the international system
and improve the security environment along China’s borders.12
In addition to the aforementioned engagement measures, China’s growing
influence provides both positive and negative measures through a combina-
tion of coercion and alliance splitting.13 Regarding coercion, Beijing uses
both coercion and coercive diplomacy to shape the behaviour of neighbour-
ing countries. For instance, Beijing has employed punitive economic sanc-
tions against Japan and the Philippines following confrontations in 2010
between the Japanese Coast Guard and a Chinese fishing vessel in the East
China Sea, and between the Philippine Coast Guard and Chinese maritime
law enforcement ships at Scarborough Reef in the South China Sea in 2012,
both over illegal Chinese fishing activities. China temporarily banned the
export of rare-earth elements to Japan and unofficially imposed import
restrictions on bananas from the Philippines.14
Notable examples of alliance splitting include the case of South Korea’s
THAAD deployment dispute, which highlighted South Korea’s strategic
140 Chung
dilemma between its economic engagement with China and its security rela-
tionship with the United States. Furthermore, Beijing seeks to exploit seams
in relationships and has attempted to drive a wedge between Japan and
South Korea, whose alignment is critical to the US security strategy in
Northeast Asia.15
Meanwhile, the Trump Administration mainly concentrated on great-
power competition and balancing China, without long-term vision of
restoring the United States’ leadership and the liberal order in the Indo-
Pacific. Therefore, US foreign policy under Trump involved a combination of
retrenchment and realignment. Retrenchment has been pursued to con-
centrate the limited assets of the United States to the great power competi-
tion in the Indo-Pacific theatre, while realignment indicates that the United
States is willing to cooperate with any actors to sustain its primacy, raising
some concern among allies and partners.16 In this context, US calls for a
networked security architecture have initially been regarded as less credible,
as numerous commitments to multilateral institutions have been abandoned
during the Trump Administration. Examples include the US withdrawal
from the Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership (TPP) and the Joint
Comprehensive Plan of Action (JPCOA).
While the idea of great power competition between the United States and
China has lingered in the US foreign policy beltway, the devastating effects
of the COVID-19 pandemic have catalysed US resolve to disengage from
China during the great power competition. The current pandemic has clearly
revealed US economic interdependence with its geopolitical rival, ranging
from life-saving medical equipment to supply chains of technology in
national-security related infrastructure. Such dependence is believed to
render the United States more vulnerable to China’s coercive economic
statecraft.17
It should be noted that this disengagement and decoupling are also driven
by peacetime nationalist urges of both great powers, which leads to the
question of how far the decoupling will be escalated.18 The Trump Admin-
istration framed the US–China interdependence as “economic surrender”,
threatening “we could cut off the whole relationship”.19
President Joe Biden also shares this necessity for US disengagement from
China to a certain degree. Although labelled a foreign policy centrist, Biden
has been pressured to move further left by Democrats, especially by supporters
of Bernie Sanders. As clearly stated in the 2020 Democratic Party Platform,
Democrats also share this hostility against Chinese economic practice in the
global market, especially for manipulating currencies and stealing intellectual
property.20 Hence, this bipartisan urge for decoupling is likely to outlast the
Trump Administration. Indeed, the recent survey research reveals that the
American voters support a tougher stance towards China, specifically on the
issue of human rights and economic issues.21 Besides, given that the Biden
Administration will soon confront the midterm election cycle in 2022, it is less
likely to take an accommodating approach toward China until then.
 South Korea’s quest for autonomy 141
However, the decoupling from China will not only incur an undoubted and
unbearable cost to the US economy, but will also impose collateral economic
damage on its allies and partners. Furthermore, disengaging China would
make the US post-coronavirus recovery even harder, and the opportunity to
hold China accountable in the domains of human rights, the environment,
development cooperation, and global health issues would be lost.22 More-
over, it is undeniable that China is the second-largest economy with the
world’s largest population and a permanent member of UN Security Coun-
cil, which could undermine US interests across the board. Global issues such
as climate change, Iran or North Korea cannot be effectively managed with-
out a working relationship with China. However, the United States is cur-
rently determined to ensure that the economic activities of US firms should
not serve the interests of an authoritarian competitor.23
For this reason, the Biden Administration has provided a much clearer
vision of restoring liberal order and the United States’ leadership and pri-
macy. While the Biden Administration acknowledges that great power com-
petition would be unavoidable for a long time, it is making more specific
commitments to make the Indo-Pacific freer and more open than its pre-
decessor, which will not allow China’s attempt to divide it into spheres of
influence and violate the rule-based order and values that sustain the liberal
order with cooperation from allies and partners in the region. Meanwhile,
countries in the Indo-Pacific region do not universally share the same level of
threat or interest from Chinese selective revisionism. This means they might
align differently with US efforts to build a networked security architecture.

Quad Plus as a component of networked security architecture

The idea of multilateralising the bilateral hub-and-spoke system is not new.
In fact, the hub-and-spoke alliance network in East Asia has already been
transformed into a “less hierarchical and more pliable basis” for security
cooperation.24 Originally, the hub-and-spoke system was based in East Asia
to allow the United States to exert control over potentially unruly leaders
such as Taiwan’s Chiang Kai-Shek.25 Therefore, US allies had very few ties
between each other. However, China’s growing assertiveness and the defi-
ciencies of the US strategic commitment in East Asia, particularly during the
George W. Bush Administration, has necessitated a number of regional
alignments. This has led to the forging of both minilateral and multilateral
alignments, creating a more fluid regional security architecture that reflects
the diversity of emerging regional architects.26 In particular, military and
diplomatic ties between China’s rival claimants in the South China Sea are
proliferating, with countries such as Vietnam, Thailand and the Philippines
building a bilateral partnership. Further, three of the Quad countries—India,
Australia and Japan—are deepening security cooperation and are actively
participating in other multilateral groups such as EAS, ARF, and ADMM+.
Regional countries who are not treaty-based allies of the United States, such
142 Chung
as Singapore, Vietnam and Indonesia, also participated in building partner-
ships to preserve the normative and material base of the rule-based order in
the region. In other words, while the hub-and-spoke system remains, the
region as a whole has started to become increasingly interconnected in the
face of a changing security landscape. Such a political and military web that
pools capacities enables them to resist China’s selective revisionism.
However, institutionalising a sustainable networked security architecture
would require the United States to consider whether this architecture could
find equilibrium between the two potentially countervailing frames in mobi-
lising regional democracies: “balance of threat” and “balance of interests”.
Realist theories suggest that common threats drive states to form a military
alliance as an institution for hard balancing.27 However, as a selective revi-
sionist, China is far from being a common enemy that poses the same level
of threat across countries in the region. For instance, South Korea feels less
threatened by China than does Japan, which indeed has made South Korea
accommodate, rather than balance against, China’s rise.28 Even countries in
the Indo-Pacific region intentionally allow China to develop vested interests
in the stability of the existing order, as evidenced by the China–South Korea–
Japan Trilateral Cooperation Secretariat, EAS, ARF, and ADMM+, or even
joint military exercises such as RIMPAC.
Uneven distribution of threat perception from China’s rise may hinder US
efforts to institutionalise a networked security architecture in a sustainable
manner. In other words, the balance of threat among democratic allies and
partners may not be universally perceived. In this context, portraying US–
China rivalry as a “geopolitical competition between free and repressive
vision of the world order”,29 which is more value-oriented, can mobilise more
regional democracies by legitimising the necessity of current competition with
their existential threats.
Meanwhile, different levels of economic interdependence with China could
create different incentive structures for regional countries to calculate whe-
ther to join US-led economic minilateral groups in the region, as evidenced
by the Economic Prosperity Network. Particularly noteworthy is a wedging
strategy conducted by China that intentionally used the Belt and Road
Initiative (BRI) to dissuade regional countries from engaging in anti-China
institution-building in the Indo-Pacific region.30 Furthermore, such a strat-
egy might offset threat perception among regional states. For instance, the
failure of Quad 1.0. offers a clear example in which a “democratic diamond”
was confronted by sudden demise after Australia’s withdrawal.31
In addition, the national security agendas of US allies and partners in the
Indo-Pacific region have already become diverse and often contradictory.
Therefore, forging a networked security architecture would require a measure to
overcome the issue of compartmentalisation among minilaterals. In fact, com-
partmentalisation has been a major issue in the relationship between the West
and Russia in the past. While Western leaders emphasise that they share
common interests with Russia in the issues of the war on terrorism, the Iranian
 South Korea’s quest for autonomy 143
nuclear programme, and stabilisation operations in Afghanistan, Russia sought
to exploit the West’s efforts to compartmentalise as a way of undermining Wes-
tern interests. This was demonstrated by the hybrid wars in the Caucasus and
Central Asia and the Syrian War.32 These examples demonstrate that expanding
the areas of cooperation among countries does not necessarily make their
interests converge. Their interests in specific domains may collide with others in
different domains, which will undermine the overall security architecture that
the United States intends to forge.
Altogether, institutionalising the multilateral security architecture remains
uncertain. Forging a networked security architecture depends on regional
democracies’ willingness and capabilities, which reflect their interests and
threat perception regarding China’s selective revisionism and the US intent
to decouple its relationship with China. Regional countries will not easily
choose to bandwagon one of these great powers, but will try to diversify the
scope of alignment with great powers and with countries in the region, as
they collectively hedge the risk of great power rivalry.

South Korea’s foreign policy priority and regional strategy

Some argue that South Korea holds the key to success of the Free and Open
Indo-Pacific (FOIP) strategy of the United States.33 As two great powers
compete with each other, both need regional architecture through which they
can project their geopolitical strategies and garner support from other coun-
tries in the region. However, the Quad, which serves the FOIP strategy to
balance China’s BRI, does not have participants that can enhance its own
strategic leverage concerning China. Japan is a predictable actor as a treaty-
based ally of the United States; India is now more willing to balance itself
against China after the recent India–China border dispute in the Galwan
Valley; and Australia has suffered a trade war with China for years. There-
fore, inviting South Korea, New Zealand and Vietnam to the Quad Plus,
each of which still hedges US–China great power rivalry, demonstrates the
Quad’s effort to expand its own influence.34
However, South Korea under the Moon Administration prioritises main-
taining foreign policy autonomy during the great power competition, making
Seoul reluctant to quickly embrace the FOIP strategy. As much as endorsing
the idea of the FOIP is regarded an attempt to contain China, Quad Plus is
considered to be another driver that globally supports the anti-China narrative
of the United States.35
South Korea’s relatively accommodating attitude toward China has been
observed for decades. As the current Moon Administration’s foreign policy is
mainly prioritised with North Korea, it even attempted to forge a multilateral
initiative to be connected with North Korea. For instance, South Korea has
strived to link its Eurasian Initiative during the Park Geun-hye Administra-
tion with the One Belt, One Road initiative (now BRI) of China and to
facilitate infrastructure-building that could reconnect South and North
144 Chung
Korea, and ultimately even to the European continent. The New Northern
Policy of the current Moon Administration has the same strategic purpose.
Further, South Korea’s middle power diplomacy, which envisions its bridging
role to build inclusive like-minded groups, attempts to take positional
advantage in the global hierarchy as well as its geographical location between
the global north and south, great powers and small powers, the West and
East, and continental and maritime powers.36 Although such an attempt of
middle power diplomacy was catalysed by the Trump Administration’s lack
of commitment to sustain the liberal order while solely focusing on great-
power competition, it was another attempt to hedge the risk of great power
competition during the Trump-Xi period that destabilises the foundation of
liberal order that middle powers depended on. As a result, South Korea has
taken a more accommodating attitude to regional countries including China,
and a more inclusive approach as a regional strategy, evidenced by the New
Southern Policy and the New Northern Policy under the Moon
Administration.
However, as shown in Table 8.1, South Korea’s endeavour to join a regio-
nal architecture remains nascent yet, which make the current Moon Admin-
istration’s attempt to maintain foreign policy autonomy less fruitful. Most
experiences are bilateral, and even minilateral and multilateral cooperation
have been limited to engaging neighbouring countries in Northeast Asia.
This is also mainly due to its foreign policy priority on North Korea and
subsequent accommodating attitude toward China, which does not necessa-
rily support US efforts to build a networked security architecture to resist
China’s revisionism.
In response to the Trump Administration’s pursuit of great-power compe-
tition, South Korea under the Moon Administration attempted to hedge
great power rivalry by forging an alternative network among middle powers
such as Australia, ASEAN and India, who are economically and strategically
trapped by the US–China competition. This is contrasted with Japan’s
attempt to compensate the declining US commitment in the Indo-Pacific
region. Particularly during the Trump Administration, South Korea attemp-
ted to share the concern over the collapse of the international order out of
great power decoupling with those middle powers by forging a buffer from
which the two great powers’ rivalry can be attenuated.
That does not suggest South Korea’s commitment to the ROK–US alli-
ance was diminished. South Korea clarified its position over the escalating
great power rivalry when President Donald Trump visited the Demilitarised
Zone (DMZ) on 30 June 2019 to hold a meeting with Kim Jung-un of North
Korea, President Trump also discussed the US–South Korea bilateral rela-
tionship with President Moon Jae-in of South Korea. During this meeting,
both countries agreed to present harmonious cooperation between South
Korea’s New Southern Policy and the US FOIP strategy. Indeed, South
Korea maintains its bilateral participation in the broader US regional effort
in domains such as energy, infrastructure, the digital economy, and good
 South Korea’s quest for autonomy 145
Table 8.1 South Korea’s major experiences in networked security architecture
Types Initiative Year since Partners
Bilateral Joint Vision for the Alliance 2009 US
The Korea–US Integrated 2011 US
Defense Dialogues (KIDD)
Security of Military 2015 Japan
Information Agreement,
GSOMIA
Defense Cooperation 2015 Singapore
Defense Cooperation 2017 Indonesia
Memorandum of 2015 Vietnam
Understanding
Intelligence Sharing 2015 Australia
Defense and Security 2015 Australia
Cooperation Blueprint
Protection of Military 2015 Philippines
Information
Minilateral Trilateral Coordination and 1998–2003 US, Japan
Oversight Group (TCOG)
China–Korea–Japan Trilateral 2011 Japan, China
Summits and Secretariat
Multilateral Proliferation Security Initiative 2009 Global
(PSI)
Northeast Asia Cooperation 2003 Japan, China,
Initiative Russia, North
Korea, US
Northeast Asia Peace and 2013 Japan, China,
Cooperation Initiative Russia, North
(NAPCI) Korea, Mongolia,
US
Northeast Asia Plus 2018 Japan, China,
Community of Responsibility Russia, North
(NAPCOR) Korea, Mongolia,
US, India,
ASEAN
Seoul Defense Dialogue 2015 Global
Source: Matteo Dian, “Japan, South Korea and the Rise of a Networked Security Architecture
in East Asia”, International Politics 57 (2020), 185–207.
146 Chung
governance.37 Further, South Korea’s New Southern Policy was introduced
as an attempt to better posture itself to strengthen economic ties with South-
east Asia and to expand the diplomatic horizon beyond North-east Asia
during the great power competition. While South Korea attempts to syner-
gise its New Southern Policy and the US’s Indo-Pacific Strategy, the New
Southern Policy should be understood as a hedge to gradually reduce eco-
nomic reliance on China.38 South Korea’s bitter experience as a result of
China’s economic sanctions in response to South Korea’s deployment of the
US THAAD missile defence system in 2016 is reflected in this endeavour.
However, South Korea has a different attitude toward multilateral or
minilateral cooperation with the United States, particularly with regard to
Quad Plus. In retrospect, the success of the Quad with HA/DR cooperation
after the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami disaster has been less dynamic follow-
ing the withdrawal of Australia and India, until the arrival of the Trump
Administration in 2017. While many doubted the feasibility of the Quad’s
strategic cooperation in the region, the spread of COVID-19 provides an
ample opportunity for the Quad countries to engage major middle powers in
the region, such as Vietnam, New Zealand and South Korea, into “Quad
Plus”. Vietnam (the previous chair of ASEAN in 2020), New Zealand (one
of the Five-Eyes partners), and South Korea (one of the treaty-based bilat-
eral allies of the United States) are all capable contributors in fighting the
COVID-19 pandemic and strengthening the soft power of the Quad by fur-
ther addressing issues of HA/DR in the Indo-Pacific region.39
While joining Quad Plus could provide South Korea with a number of
strategic and economic advantages, the group is still in its early stage of
development. Quad countries have already conducted spoke-to-spoke strate-
gic cooperation. For example, India and Australia’s Mutual Logistics Sup-
port Agreement (MLSA) in June 2020, India and Japan’s Acquisition and
Cross-Serving Agreement (ACSA) in September 2020, and the United States
and India’s Communication Compatibility and Security Agreement (COM-
CASA) in September 2018 all represent the deepening strategic cooperation
among Quad countries. Also, over the non-strategic domain, Australia,
Japan and India cooperate on the Supply Chain Resilience Initiative (SCRI)
while France, India and Japan are developing multilateral norms for digital
economy. France and India are leading the International Solar Alliance of
121 countries to mobilise investment for deploying solar energy at an
affordable cost to developing countries.
The Quad Plus also presents a geopolitical challenge to South Korea, as it
signals a unified resolve among Indo-Pacific countries to counter China.
Similarly, none of the “plus” countries mentioned previously are likely to
append their names to the Quad Plus easily. New Zealand, for instance,
maintains strong economic ties with China as one of their largest trading
partners; Vietnam, with its three Nos principle of defence policy—no mili-
tary alliance, no foreign troops stationed on its soil, and no partnering with a
 South Korea’s quest for autonomy 147
foreign power to combat another—is constrained to take part in Quad Plus
and counter China.40
South Korea prefers a free and open Indo-Pacific region that does not
exclude any country within that region. That said, South Korea does not
want the formation of Quad Plus to be an instrument for regional “blocisa-
tion” or for great power competition that might further accelerate the pace
of decoupling. South Korea, within the US–ROK alliance framework, is
willing to cooperate on a number of domains as both countries already have
accomplished so far. South Korea would also cooperate on a working level
with participants in the Quad Plus, both in economic and security domains.
However, the umbrella of Quad Plus might send the wrong signal to other
countries that South Korea is choosing sides in the great power rivalry.

Foreign policy that forges inclusive international order

From the Moon Administration’s perspective, Quad Plus is one of the geo-
political minilateral groups that serves the networked security architecture of
the United States. South Korea recently was confronted by a number of
occasions where it had to choose to join Quad Plus, D-10, Five Eyes Plus,
and G-11. South Korea generally welcomes any discussions on economic
cooperation for bilateral or regional empowerment, investment in infra-
structure for developing countries, or non-traditional security issues from
which it can elevate its positional power as a middle power in the Indo-
Pacific region and foster a better strategic environment to build an inclusive
international order. Similarly, South Korea’s support for the US FOIP strat-
egy is channelled through its implementation of the New Southern Policy in
the Indo-Pacific region, which can be taken as a more conflict-avoidance
approach in regard to China by mostly participating in economic, social, and
non-traditional security issue projects. Also, it demonstrates South Korea’s
continuing commitment to the ROK–US alliance. As such, South Korea
increasingly focuses on expanding the domains of cooperation with the
United States to ensure the US–ROK alliance cooperation can be strength-
ened. This approach is expected to contribute to the peace and prosperity of
the Korean Peninsula and regional stability. In the long term, South Korea
may be gradually aligned more with FOIP strategy if Chinese assertiveness
impinges on its foreign policy autonomy and its national interests. However,
for now, South Korea prefers to foster a more inclusive international order
that accommodates every country in the region in its attempt to reduce the
risk of great power competition and subsequent decoupling and
disengagement.

Notes
1 Matteo Dian, “Japan, South Korea and the Rise of a Networked Security
Architecture in East Asia”, International Politics 57 (2020), 185–207.
148 Chung
2 Robert Delaney, “US Seeks Formal Allies to NATO with India, Japan and Aus-
tralia, State Department Official Says”, South China Morning Post, 1 September
2020.
3 “Biden Administration Sees Quad as Fundamental Foundation to Build US Policy
on Indo-Pacific”, The Economic Times, 1 February 2021, https://economictimes.india
times.com/news/defence/biden-administration-sees-quad-as-fundamental-foundation-
to-build-us-policy-on-indo-pacific/articleshow/80599039.cms?from=mdr.
4 Hal Brands, “Dealing with Allies in Decline: Alliance Management and US
Strategy in an Era of Global Power Shift”, Center for Strategic and Budgetary
Assessments, 2017; The White House, Interim National Security Strategy Gui-
dance (Washington, DC: White House, 2021), 7–8.
5 Matteo Dian, “Japan, South Korea and the Rise of a Networked Security Archi-
tecture in East Asia”, International Politics 57, 2, 185–207; Bonnie Glaser, “China
as a Selective Revisionist Power in the International Order”, ISEAS Yusof Ishak
Institute Perspective 21, (2019), 1–9.
6 Mira Rapp-Hooper, “China, America and the International Order after the
Pandemic”, Warontherocks Commentary, 24 March 2020.
7 Hal Brands, “Dealing with Allies in Decline”, 6.
8 Hal Brands, “The Era of American Primacy is Far from Over”, The National
Interests, 24 August 2016.
9 Evan S. Medeiros, “The Changing Fundamentals of US–China Relations”, The
Washington Quarterly 42, 3 (2019), 93–119.
10 Timothy Heath, “China Overhauls Diplomacy to Consolidate Regional Leader-
ship, Outline strategy for Superpower Ascent”, China Brief 14, 24 (December
2014).
11 “Remarks at the Fourth Summit of the Conference on Interaction and
Confidence Building Measures (CICA)”, Xinhua, 21 May 2014.
12 Michael Greene et al., “Asia-Pacific Rebalance 2025: Capabilities, Presence, and
Partnership”, Center for Strategic and International Studies, January 2016, 13.
13 Kristien Bergerson, “China’s Effort to Counter US Forward Presence in the Asia-
Pacific”, US–China Economic and Security Review Commission, 15 March 2016, 5.
14 Phillip C. Saunders, “China’s Coercive Economic Diplomacy – A New and Wor-
rying Trend”, Pacific Forum CSIS, 23 July 2012.
15 Robert G. Sutter, Michale E. Brown, and Timothy J.A. Adamson, “Balancing
Acts: The US Rebalance and Asia-Pacific Strategy”, Elliot School of International
Affairs, George Washington University, August 2013, 21.
16 N. Silove, “The Pivot before the Pivot: US Strategy to Preserve the Power Balance
in Asia”, International Security 40, 2 (2016), 45–88.
17 John Lee, “Decoupling the US Economy from China after COVID-19”, The
Hudson Institute, May 2020.
18 Keith Johnson and Robbie Gramer, “The Great Decoupling”, Foreign Policy, 14
May 2020.
19 Andrew Soergel, “Trump Threatens to ‘Cut Off’ Relationship with China, Claims
Coronavirus Proved ‘Trump was Right’”, US News, 14 May 2020; Brendan
Greeley, “Trump raises prospect of ‘decoupling’ US economy from China”,
Financial Times, 8 September 2020.
20 2020 US Democratic Party Platform, www.demconvention.com/wp-content/uploa
ds/2020/07/2020-07-21-DRAFT-Democratic-Party-Platform.pdf.
21 Pew Research Center, “Most Americans Support Tough Stance Toward China on
Human Rights and Economic Issues”, 4 March 2021.
22 Robin Niblett, “Avoiding a Virus-Induced Cold War with China”, The Chatham
House, 17 April 2020.
23 Michael R. Pompeo, “Communist China and the Free World’s Future”, Speech,
23 July 2020.
 South Korea’s quest for autonomy 149
24 William T. Tow, “Minilateral Security’s relevance to US Strategy in the Indo-
Pacific: Challenges and Prospects”, The Pacific Review 32, 2 (2019), 232–244.
25 Victor Cha, “Powerplay: Origins of the US Alliance System in Asia”,
International Security 34, 3 (2010), 158–196.
26 Elena Atanassova-Cornelis, “Alignment Cooperation and Regional Security
Architecture in the Indo-Pacific”, International Spector 55 (2020), 18–33.; Kei
Koga, “Japan’s Diplomatic Strategy toward East Asia: Creation and Evolution of
‘Dual-Track Diplomacy’ in the Post-Cold War Era”, Baltic Journal of European
Studies 9, 2 (2019), 40–60.
27 Stephen Walt, The Origins of Alliance, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press,
1990).
28 David Kang, “The Balance of Power and State Interests in International
Relations”, EAI Working Paper Series No. 5, 27 January 2007, 1–45.
29 The White House, National Security Strategy of the United States of America,
(Washington, DC: The White House, 2017).
30 Timothy W. Crawford, “Preventing Enemy Coalition: How Wedge Strategies
Shape Power Politics”, International Security 35, 4 (2011), 155–189.
31 Australia’s withdrawal from Quad 1.0. has been also explained as constructivist’s
core explanatory variable, identity, does not work in institutionalising Indo-Pacific
security architecture. Kai He and Huiyun Feng, “The Institutionalization of Indo-
Pacific”, International Affairs 96, 1 (2020), 149–168.
32 Svant E. Cornell, “The Fallacy of ‘Compartmentalisation’: the West and Russia
from Ukraine to Syria”, European View 15, (2016), 97–109.
33 Ramon Pancheo Pardo, “South Korea Holds the Key to the Indo-Pacific”, The
Hill, 18 August 2019.
34 Jagannath Panda and Akriti Vasudeva, “US–China Competition and Washington’s
Case for ‘Quad Plus’”, The National Interests, 28 September 2020.
35 Jagannath Panda, “The Abe Doctrine on ‘Quad Plus’”, The Japan Times, 17 July
2020.
36 Sohn Yul, “South Korea’s Drive for Middle-Power Influence”, Global Asia 11, 1
(2016).
37 US Embassy & Consulate in the Republic of Korea, “US & ROK Issue a Joint
Factsheet on their Regional Cooperation Efforts”, 2 November 2019.
38 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Korea, 2019 Diplomatic White Paper,
Seoul.
39 Jeff Smith, “How America is Leading the Quad Plus” Group of Seven Countries
in Fighting the Coronavirus”, The National Interests, 30 March 2020.
40 Derek Grossman, “Don’t Get Too Excited, ‘Quad Plus’ Meetings Won’t Cover
China”, The Diplomat, 9 April 2020.
9 Israel, India and Quad Plus
Searching for alternatives to
Western perspectives
Giuseppe Dentice

Introduction: Israel’s Asianisation strategy

The end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 cre-
ated the premise for a new international scenario, with numerous countries
strengthening and diversifying their global relations and alliances. This
approach has been one of the main tools and initiatives also for Israel’s
rapprochement with Asian countries. A rebalancing process from West to
East that has been accelerated by several variables related both to the coun-
try’s domestic national interests and its new international ambitions. More-
over, this realignment has been based on Israel’s assumption that Asian
powers will dominate several world dynamics. In this gradual switch from a
pro-Western perspective to an Eastward-looking vision, Israel began to
undertake a number of initiatives to engage the main Asian powers. In this
regard, Israel has also been attracted to expanding its diplomatic network,
engaging in good relations with Asian powers such as China, India and
Japan. From the Israeli perspective, this is a choice aimed not to replace its
strategic alliance with the United States and its important trade relations
with Europe (63 per cent of Israel’s trade is still with Western partners),1 but
instead an attempt to balance its Western alliances and interests with stron-
ger economic and strategic ties in Asia.2 Nevertheless, this Israeli recalibra-
tion in foreign policy is part of an old strategy peculiar to its history and its
needs, based on the quest for security and legitimacy. This path, indeed, is a
new version of the country’s traditional “periphery doctrine”, an ambitious
multidimensional strategy aimed to develop close “peripheral alliances” with
non-Arab Muslim states in the Middle Eastern neighbourhood.3
As noted by Jacob Abadi, this approach isn’t new in Israeli history. In fact,
since the foundation of Israel, its institutions tried to engage Asian countries
to overcome its isolation in Western Asia and in the international commu-
nity. But the Israeli decision to support the UN military action in the Korean
War (1950–1953) and its direct participation, with the UK and France, in the
Suez Crisis (1956) alienated the sympathies of the main Asian leaders,
making it fail in its attempt to appear as a non-aligned nation. Israel’s
acceptance in Asia began in the mid-1990s, after the establishment of full

DOI: 10.4324/9781003206408-12
 Israel, India and Quad Plus 151
diplomatic ties with China and India (1992). In this path, Jerusalem searched
for new partnerships outside Israel’s immediate regional sphere.4
As part of Israel’s new policy towards Asia, the Indo-Pacific become a
priority in terms of international foreign policy and global geo-economic
targets. In particular, closer ties with India are perceived by Israeli policy-
makers as a step serving to exert leverage and influence in Asia. From this
perspective, good relations with India help Israel’s multidimensional goals
based on (1) containing Iran in Western Asia; (2) shaping the future inter-
national status of Israel as a new middle power in Asia; and (3) contributing
to forging a strong regional system in the Indo-Pacific and to penetrating
newly enlarged markets. In addition, good relations with India are important
to implementing Israel’s soft power in terms of identities (such as supporting
Jewish communities in India as well as in Asia). Here in this process of rap-
prochement also lies Israel’s participation in the Quad Plus Dialogue, con-
firming how the Indo-Pacific region could be strategically functional for
Jerusalem and for its foreign policy priorities in Asia.5

From taboo to cooperation: Israel’s changing relations with India

Much of the success in this refreshed relationship is mainly due to the efforts
of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi. Before becoming prime minister
in 2014, Modi was the chief minister of Gujarat state (2001–2014) and in this
position flew to Israel in 2006 to reinforce his personal interest in the coun-
try. That interest continued and strengthened when he became premier in
2014 and especially after Modi’s historic visit to Israel in July 2017, which
can be considered as mostly successful since seven memorandums of under-
standing (MoU) between the countries were signed. Moreover, during the
visit, Modi met with the Indian diaspora in Israel and announced Overseas
Citizens of India (OCI) cards for Indian Jews and for those who had com-
pleted their military service in the Israeli Defense Force. This visit was var-
iously proclaimed as “historic” and “special” not only by the media of both
countries but by Modi and Netanyahu themselves. In this regard, Modi’s
visit to Israel was a break from the past, because it confirmed a new direction
in the bilateral relationship, which was further confirmed by Netanyahu’s trip
to India in January 2018.6
On this reciprocal visit, Netanyahu received a warm welcome. A large
delegation of prominent Israeli business leaders accompanied him. During
the visit, both countries reinforced their fields of cooperation like defence,
trade, science and technology, signing nine MoUs. In addition, akin to
Modi’s tribute to the Indian diaspora in Israel, on his Indian trip Netanyahu
paid homage to the Indian soldiers killed a century ago in the Battle of Haifa
during the last months of the Palestine campaign of World War I. As well as
leveraging great symbolism, both visits highlighted the growing personal
appreciation between the two leaders and their political interests in basing
the bilateral relationship on the idea of a vital partnership upheld by a
152 Dentice
security approach and on a moral foundation of democracy.7 In other words,
Modi and Netanyahu used their “excellent” personal relations to deepen the
bilateral ties that are moving in an “upward trajectory”, as also stated by
India’s Ambassador to Israel, Pavan Kapoor, in an interview released to the
Indian newspaper The Hindu in June 2019.8
Compared with the past 25 years, in which the relationship has always
been a balancing act given India’s sizeable Muslim population and the
country’s dependence on oil imports from Arab countries and Iran, Netanyahu
and Modi have inaugurated a new momentum, or, with more emphasis, “the
dawn of a new era” in the Indo–Israeli relationship, as reported by the BBC.9
This new relationship developed simultaneously with the slow eclipse of two
traditional leftist parties (India’s Congress Party and Israel’s Mapai/Labor
Party) and the rise of new rightist alignments in both countries: the Hindu
nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) in India and the Jewish conservative
Likud in Israel. The improved relationship has produced a strategic align-
ment not only on security matters but also regarding water and agricultural
needs.10 From Netanyahu’s perspective, the rapprochement with India has
been aimed at breaking long-standing anti-Israel stereotypes and providing
benefits to the Indian population from Israel’s know-how in innovation and
technology. From the Indian perspective, Modi’s government aimed to over-
come the Nehruvian ideology that has prevailed since India’s independence
to build a new image and international vision of a modern India, with a
foreign policy at the centre of the changes in the global order.11

The growing convergence of interests in the military dimension

Undoubtedly, the main pillar of the Indo-Israeli relationship is the military/
security factor. After the Cold War, India established an informal, largely
sceptical relationship with Israel focused on low-level cooperation on intelli-
gence and handicapped due to the two nations’ relationships with competing
superpowers. In fact, the purchase of Israeli military equipment—employed
in the wars against China (1962) and Pakistan (1965, 1971)—was the only
exception to this in their diplomatic ties.12 Following the conclusion of the
Cold War, India boosted its military cooperation with Israel. In fact, since
the mid-1990s, Israel has become one of India’s main arms suppliers, a deci-
sive factor that allowed India to regain possession of Kargil during the war
against Pakistan (1999).13 According to Sanjay Singh, Israel’s fundamental
assistance to India in the conflict transformed the relationship into a de facto
strategic partnership.14
Following the establishment of diplomatic relations in 1992, bilateral trade
between Israel and India increased from 200 million USD in 1992 to 5.84
billion USD in 2018. This increase intensified after the BJP came to power in
May 2014. Since then, trade in the defence and security sectors has wit-
nessed—and will probably continue to see—significant growth. In particular,
arms sales, technology transfers and licensed production have emerged as
 Israel, India and Quad Plus 153
important dimensions of the Indo–Israeli strategic relationship.15 Today,
Israel is second only to Russia among India’s largest arms suppliers, with
sales worth an average of 1 billion USD each year. According to a report by
the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, India accounted for 45
per cent of Israel’s arm exports between 2015–2019.16
In addition to the undeniable weight and importance of arms sales in the
Indo–Israeli relationship, other security and defence affairs have witnessed
tremendous growth as well. Counterterrorism and general military ties have
been in the forefront of this cooperation. In fact, both leaders consider and
perceive militant Islam to be one of the main domestic threats to their
country’s security and a common source of concern in South Asia. After the
Mumbai attack in November 2008,17 both countries exchanged information
on the finances, recruitment patterns and training of terrorist groups—
exchanges conducted away from the public eye. In fact, Israel and India are
part of the Joint Working Group on Counterterrorism and have signed sev-
eral deals on cooperation in homeland security, protection of classified
material and cybersecurity. Further, among the different cooperation activ-
ities, Israel’s National Police Academy hosts members of the Indian Police
Service every year for training, and the Indian Border Security Force uses
Israeli security technologies (smart fencing systems, radar and other surveil-
lance technology) in sensitive border areas such as the volatile region of
Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh.18 In fact, it is not by chance that another
key element in this bilateral strategic partnership is the regional variable. The
growing border tensions with China along the contested Line of Actual
Control in the Himalayan region of Ladakh has forced India to speed up the
purchase of military hardware from the United States, Russia, France and,
obviously, Israel.19 Lastly, with the backdrop of the ongoing COVID-19
pandemic, a joint team including representatives from the Indian and Israeli
ministries of defence, foreign affairs, and health has collaborated to develop a
rapid screening test system to track down coronavirus patients. From this
perspective, the significant improvement in bilateral relations, especially
under Modi’s premiership, has favoured an important convergence of inter-
ests on a range of issues aimed to define a new pattern in their cooperation.20
Thus, the growing partnership in this specific domain shows that Israel
and India has reached a significant level of cooperation, considering that the
two countries are facing both traditional and non-traditional security threats
but are not formally bound by a military alliance.21 In fact, according to
Alvite Ningthoujam, the increasing “demand for defence items due to these
emerging security challenges, the quest for technological advancement in
defence industries, and Israel’s readiness to meet some of the requirements of
India—will lead to further expansion of defence cooperation”.22 In this sense,
the Indo–Israeli security cooperation is a “strategic asset” in which Israel will
remain an important source of defence equipment and technology for India
and a reliable key source to help New Delhi in developing a self-reliant
national defence industry.
154 Dentice
Opportunities, variables and shadows in the Israel–India partnership
It’s crystal clear that both countries have pursued a pragmatic approach in
their foreign policy. The geopolitical shift that has seen an improvement in
ties between Israel and the Gulf States, coupled with the seemingly dimin-
ishing role played by the Palestinian issue, has similarly influenced the Indo–
Israeli bilateral agenda. This, in turn, has led India, especially under Modi,
to strengthen its ties with Israel, disengaging the relationship from the
Israeli–Palestinian question.23 In this regard, it is interesting how India’s
policy toward the Palestinians has changed, although in official narrative the
Indian government continues to support the Palestinian cause. To support
this, New Delhi cited multiple examples, such as Modi’s February 2018 visit
to Ramallah and the Palestinian territories—becoming the first-ever Indian
prime minister to visit these territories.24
Nevertheless, the need to pursue independent relationships with Israel and
the Palestinian Authority has primarily driven Modi’s uncritical support for
the Palestinian cause, allowing greater manoeuvring space with both.25 For
the same principle, Modi has never officially made any declarations about the
Israeli plan to unilaterally annex parts of the West Bank.26 Conversely,
Indian Foreign Minister Dr Subrahmanyam Jaishankar has welcomed the
Abraham Accords between Israel, the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain,
focusing on the opportunities for peace in the Middle East and for boosting
regional cooperation with Gulf monarchies and Jerusalem in the Indo-Pacific
region.27 It is evident that the marginalisation of the Palestinian question on
the Indian foreign policy agenda strongly facilitated engagement with
Israel.28 In fact, New Delhi considers Jerusalem a strategic partner, as well as
the Gulf countries in the Middle East–North Africa (MENA) region, with
whom India has good relations. Since his first term in 2014, Modi has vig-
orously engaged with Gulf leaders, attempting to preserve huge interests,
given the number of Indian workers living in those countries—about 7.6
million people, vastly more than the 85,000 Indian Jews in Israel—and
India’s dependence on them for energy sources.29 At the same time, this
approach is aimed to neutralise domestic pro-Arab and Palestinian opposi-
tion groups (leftist forces, the Congress Party, and the Muslim minority) and
to safeguard India’s shared regional goals with Arab countries and Israel.
The main issue in which security and geopolitics create common axes of
convergence among Israel, the Gulf monarchies, and India is related to the
growing leverage of Iranian foreign policy in the MENA region and in the
Western Indian Ocean (WIO)—an instrumental and recalibrated posture that
not only drives India and Israel towards each other but also confirms a
strong interdependence between the Middle East and India.30
However, this triangulation in the bilateral relationship also has some
shadows. While New Delhi is helping Iran to develop its port in Chabahar,
maintaining close energy ties, Gulf monarchies boost relations with Islama-
bad to isolate and counter Tehran’s growing influence in the Middle East. It
 Israel, India and Quad Plus 155
is evident how peculiar the Indian role is in this triangulation, because it is in
New Delhi’s interest to counter possible Iranian support for Pakistan’s posi-
tions on Kashmir but also to impede a strong relationship between Islama-
bad and the Gulf monarchies aimed to diminish and isolate Indian leverage
in South Asia. On the contrary, in this path Israel may be exposed to Iranian
pressure, particularly if Indian and Gulf interests do not symbiotically colli-
mate against Tehran but work indirectly in its favour. According to Yiftah
Shapir:

India is attempting to walk a fine line: to maintain its ties and essential
interests with Iran, which is an energy supplier and an important land
bridge to Central Asia and has cultural and historical importance to
India, and at the same time, to preserve its important strategic ties with
the United States and with Israel.31

In other words, full Indo–Israeli relations are still dependent on multiple

changes in the status of Arab–Israeli ties and India’s relations with the
MENA countries, including Iran and Turkey, which are hostile to Israel, as
well as on the marginalisation of the Palestinian cause from regional and
international agendas that could impact different regional dynamics of
cooperation between Western Asian countries and nations of the Indo-Pacific
region.32 At the same time, the Indo–Israeli nexus has various implications
related to China’s growing presence in the WIO, where India is an important
actor and Israel is trying to stimulate greater interest.33 For this reason, from
an Israeli perspective, it is evident that the growing relationship with India
reflects the awareness of the structural changes in the international system
that place Asia and the Indo-Pacific region in particular at the centre of
multiple dynamics.

US–China competition in the “Quad Plus” complex: the role of Israel

Also fitting into this process of transregional realignments is Israel’s attempt
to reinforce its diplomatic ties with China. Today, China is a reliable partner
of Israel (second only to the United States), with bilateral trade of around 15
billion USD in 2018 and some 22 per cent of all Israeli exports are now
destined for China.34 This new step in the Sino–Israeli relationship began in
1992, but their bilateral ties have expanded significantly in the past 10 years.
Jerusalem and Beijing had also begun extensive military cooperation as early
as in the 1980s—exactly as in the case between Israel and India—even
though no formal diplomatic relations had been forged. This evolution in
their relationship has forged a comprehensive strategic partnership. In fact,
in 2017, during a state visit to China, Netanyahu said that the bilateral
partnership between Israel and China “was a marriage made in heaven”.35
While Jerusalem is a fundamental key partner for Beijing and a gateway to
the Mediterranean in China’s global strategy also known as the Belt and
156 Dentice
Road Initiative (BRI), for Israel, its relationship with China represents an
opportunity to shift its foreign policy approach from a close Western (and in
particular a pro-United States) alliance to a new Eastern geopolitical
approach. From this perspective, Jerusalem became a member of the Asian
Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), and Israel’s geostrategic proximity to
the Red Sea and Suez Canal places the country at the centre of Chinese
interests. Furthermore, Israel has shown great support for China’s BRI,
hoping that the entry of Chinese companies into Israel will lead to better
infrastructure and collaboration with Israeli companies, especially in hi-tech
fields. For these reasons, Beijing has invested massively in upgrades to the
ports in Haifa and Ashdod, as well as in the Med-Red railway between Eilat
and Ashdod.36 The Shanghai International Port Group, one of the most
important assets in China’s foreign strategy, has already invested over 2 bil-
lion USD in the Haifa port, which some US officials believe could be used to
conduct surveillance on the US 6th Fleet operating in the Mediterranean. In
addition, the China Railway Tunnel Group has a contract worth 1.4 billion
USD to dig tunnels and operate electronic systems for a new Tel Aviv com-
muter line. Undoubtedly, the Sino–Israeli convergence of interests created
enough concerns in the United States and India to be highly criticised by
both powers. In fact, both the US and Indian strategic positions fit into the
Indo-Pacific region as geopolitical crossroads among the Gulf Peninsula,
East Africa and South Asia. This allows for commercial and military pro-
jection in the Indo-Pacific region as a whole but also the chance to secure oil
trade and freedom of navigation through the straits of Hormuz and Bab el-
Mandeb. A strong partnership between China and Israel, and Beijing’s
growing leverage in the Middle East and Iran, is a vital concern both for
Washington and New Delhi.37 In other words, in this global competition
between the United States and China, Israel must choose a side to solve this
strategic dilemma.38
In fact, after years of blooming bilateral relation, the Trump Administra-
tion expressed its displeasure with increased Chinese investment in Israel.
The White House is even more concerned about the depth of Chinese
investment in Israel, particularly in the technological, commercial, strategic
and security sectors. For this reason, Washington remonstrated Jerusalem,
pressuring Israel to downsize its ties with Beijing and to support the US
global response strategy against China.39 In January 2019, US Secretary of
State Mike Pompeo said that unless Jerusalem reduced its ties with China,
Washington might reduce intelligence sharing and security facilities with
Israel. Then in May 2020, Pompeo further insisted that Israel sever ties with
China in security matters. Not surprisingly, indeed, US policymakers pres-
sured the Netanyahu cabinet to choose a local company (IDE Technologies),
rejecting the Hong Kong conglomerate CK Hutchison’s project to build
Israel’s largest water desalination plant in the Dead Sea for 1.5 billion
USD.40 Although Israel has substantially reduced its ties with Beijing, Jer-
usalem has come to depend on China to upgrade its infrastructure.
 Israel, India and Quad Plus 157
Conversely, the country is less dependent on American influence, and this
caused great displeasure in the Trump Administration.
Beyond discussing the role of US grand strategy in the Middle East and
Asia, this situation poses a security dilemma in terms of alliances with tra-
ditional partners.41 Another clear example of the US–China competition
involves the Persian Gulf and the historical alliance between Arab Gulf
monarchies and the United States. Although Chinese influence in the Ara-
bian peninsula has grown immensely in the last decade, the Gulf monarchies
will not risk turning away from Washington’s leverage to preserve China’s
interests in those areas. In this geopolitical pattern aimed to deter China
from the Middle East, the Israeli–Gulf normalisation also becomes a key
part of a much bigger game in which Asian powers (primarily China and
India) are trying to decodify the shifting geopolitics in the Middle East.42 It
is clear that Israel is part of the US–China strategic competition and it is
obvious that this pattern could be replicated in several other geostrategic
issues related to the rising and assertive role of Beijing in Asia, which
endangers American hegemony in the Indo-Pacific region.43
Finally, and no less important, is the domestic factor caused by the
COVID-19 pandemic. The second wave of coronavirus has imposed a new
nationwide lockdown that could have important implications in terms of
economic impact in Israel. The United States has used China’s lack of
transparency in managing this crisis to criticise Beijing and to convince
Netanyahu to cut ties with China. In this sense, Washington is trying to use
the COVID-19 situation as a test not only to strengthen its relations with
Israel but also to influence—and possibly to sever—cooperation between
Jerusalem and Beijing.44 At the same time, if the US leadership aims to
maintain a strategic primacy in those areas to contrast Beijing rising power,
Washington should consolidate its highly complex project of establishing a
global militarised anti-Chinese bloc among its European, Middle Eastern,
and Asian allies—a scenario in which Israel could play a crucial role in the
US pivot to the Indo-Pacific.45
In this regard, to avoid a profound diplomatic rift with Washington, Israel
could follow Joe Biden Administration’s recent moves on China in order to
impede collateral effects in Israel’s strategic partnership with the United
States.46

Israel and Quad Plus 2.0: cooperation and future prospects

This geopolitical dilemma in the Israel–China–US triangle also affects the
Indo–Israeli nexus that is not directly dependent on the US factor but is of
great importance in Washington’s efforts to secure US assets in those areas.
Indeed, the Indo–Israeli relationship reflects several emerging geopolitical
and geo-economic needs affecting many international players involved in the
Indo-Pacific region (such as China, the Gulf countries and Iran).47 An
explanation for this evolution is what Ashok Sharma and Dov Bing
158 Dentice
underlined about the role of United States in the Indo-Pacific: Washington
feared that strong Israeli cooperation with China—particularly in the mili-
tary sector—could directly endanger US strategic interests, while this was not
perceived in Indo–Israeli security ties. In other words, the United States
confirms itself as a strategic power in the region, trying to guide or influence
several dynamics, such as the reinforced Indo–Israel relationship, into the US
sphere of geostrategic interests.48 From this perspective, both the US
administrations led by Trump and Biden have tried to redefine and shift,
coherently with Obama’s Pivot to Asia, US strategic priorities from the
MENA region to the Indo-Pacific region, at the same time building a parallel
security system that connects Western Asia with South Asia. However, to
achieve this ambitious goal, it is necessary to transform the Quad Plus into
an articulate military and security architecture that protects both US and
Asian interests against China’s growing leverage in those areas.49
All these developments are further encouraging Jerusalem to revisit its
current approach toward Beijing to preserve Israel’s broader strategic inter-
ests. In fact, the enlargement of the original Quad Plus to other countries
(including Israel) responds to the different needs and convergent geopolitical
alignments, strongly supported and shared by the United States and its Asian
allies. In this scenario, it could be useful for Jerusalem to reinforce strategic
partnerships with Washington and its Asian allies.50 In fact, Quad Plus can
help Israel elevate its status and capabilities in the international system, as a
maritime power and a fundamental player involved in freedom of navigation
in the WIO region. In addition, growing Israeli involvement in the Indo-
Pacific dynamics under the banner of Quad Plus can help Jerusalem weaken
Chinese influence in the country, diversify Israel’s supply chains, and encou-
rage alternative infrastructural outlets, for example, under the Blue Dot
Network Initiative.51
Further, from the Israeli perspective, this strategic reengagement with
India fits into a fluid geostrategic scenario aimed to protect and expand
Israeli commercial and security routes that connect the MENA countries’
interests in East Africa and the Red Sea, creating a new potential bloc with
other coastal states (Gulf countries in particular), with whom Israel shares a
common vision and aspirations in Indian Ocean dynamics.52 In fact, the port
of Eilat allows a certain penetration in the oil and commercial routes to and
from the Eastern Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean, as do the Suez Canal
and the strait of Bab al-Mandeb. The geographical contiguity between these
two subregions once again clarifies the strategic importance of the WIO
quadrant and its surrounding littorals. This renewed Israeli interest in Asia
focuses on the opportunity to expand its know-how and skills in terms of
technologies, innovation and security matters and to develop economic ties
and penetrate new giant markets in the wider area. At the same time, this
new approach shows a constant growth in status and leverage of Israeli
diplomacy in Asia, also favoured by convergences of interests with those
countries of the WIO region (especially with Egypt, East African countries,
 Israel, India and Quad Plus 159
Gulf monarchies and South Asian states as a whole) in the military and
security fields to fight terrorism, illegal trafficking and piracy between the
Red Sea and the Arabian Sea, as well as to manage several crises (such as in
Somalia, Yemen,53 the Ethiopia’s Tigray and the Nile dam issue) or tensions
(in the Persian Gulf and in the Pakistan–Iranian corridor) in that quadrant.
This growing cooperation between Israel and Afro-Asian countries could
represent an extremely important factor of change in the Israeli attempt to
define a new and coherent focus in its own pivot to Asia.54 Thus, strategic
trends seem to dictate a strong alignment between Israel, India, the United
States, and the latter’s key allies in the Indo-Pacific (such as Japan and Aus-
tralia), particularly in the maritime domain. At the same time, this new
development also reinforces the foreign policy status of India, which has
developed excellent diplomatic relations with many Arab states, who see in
New Delhi an important alternative to their economic dependence on China.
Finally, this new era in the regional context demonstrates how fundamental
the US factor still is in Indo-Pacific dynamics (especially in the security
dimension) and how stridently US policymakers are working to forge a
coherent and strong security architecture between the Near East and the
Indian Ocean to counterbalance China’s multilayered presence in those areas.55

What’s next for Israel in the Indo-Pacific?

The changing perspectives in Israeli foreign policy are an irreversible process
and at the same time the success of its Eastward-looking orientation. Unlike
in the past, Israel is not perceived as a Western bastion in Asia, but as a
reliable partner with which to promote state relationships in the political,
military, economic, financial, technological and cultural spheres. At the same
time, a new era in the Indo-Israel relationship, as well as a growing partner-
ship between Jerusalem and Beijing, could be a cornerstone of Israel’s dip-
lomatic recalibration.56 In this path, the leap in quality with India represents
not only the main change in Israel’s diplomatic re-engagement, but also a
very clear and purposeful way to pivot itself towards Asia.57 Basically, the
convergence of interests between Israel and India implemented this shift,
creating affinities in some shared geopolitical goals and strategic targets in a
wider range of fields. All these elements also show a strong connection with
other different regional dynamics in Western Asia and the Indo-Pacific
region, as part of the power competition among regional players and
between China and the United States.58
Nevertheless, the rapprochement with Asian powers is vulnerable to several
factors. First of all, the Israeli outreach to the East represents a partial structural
and strategic shift in its foreign orientation. In fact, this Eastward-looking policy
is aimed to counterbalance especially its traditional relations with Western
powers, maximising the new and huge opportunities that these contexts poten-
tially offer Jerusalem. Second, there is a misperception in the roots of the Indo-
Israel relationship. India is more concerned about China, while Israel is wary of
160 Dentice
Iran. India and Israel need to come to an agreement about this point and they
should try to align their respective priorities in order to define a real and coher-
ent strategy in the bilateral relationship, but also in their goals of foreign policy
with the United States and other regional powers.59
Finally, it’s evident for Israel that strengthening relations with different Indo-
Pacific players, not only with the US allies (India, South Korea, Japan and
Australia), could be a good option to avoid being caught in the crossfires of US–
China competition, while preserving its goals and overcoming possible delays.

Notes
1 Observatory of Economic Complexity (OEC), Israel, https://oec.world/en/profile/
country/isr.
2 A. M. Agdemir, “Israel ‘Looks East’: Besides India and China, Israel’s Relations
with Japan Seem to Flourish”, Japanese Journal of Political Science 18, 2 (2017),
262–285.
3 Y. Alpher, Periphery. Israel’s Search for Middle East Allies (Lanham-Boulder-
New York-London: Rowman & Littlefield, 2015).
4 J. Abadi, Israel’s Quest for Recognition and Acceptance in Asia. Garrison State
Diplomacy (London: Routledge, 2004).
5 For more details, see J. L. Samaan, Israel’s Foreign Policy Beyond the Arab
World. Engaging the Periphery (London-New York: Routledge, 2018), 124–144.
6 R. Rao, “Shaping New Dimensions: India’s Relations with Israel and Russia”,
International Journal of Multidisciplinary Educational Research (IJMER) 8, 8(6),
(2019), 189–191.
7 V. Kaura, “Indo-Israeli Relations in the Modi Era: A Transformative Shift”,
Israel Affairs (2019), 1–17; A. Saha, “The India–Israeli Security Relationship:
Nature, Scope and Challenges”, Strategic Analysis (2020) 1–12.
8 “India–Israel Ties in Upward Trajectory Courtesy Modi-Netanyahu Equation:
Indian Envoy”, The Hindu, 16 June 2019, www.thehindu.com/news/international/
india-israel-ties-in-upward-trajectory-courtesy-modi-bibi-equation-indian-envoy/a
rticle27956240.ece.
9 “Netanyahu and Modi Praise ‘New Era’ in India-Israel Ties”, BBC, 15 January
2018, www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-42686597.
10 S.S.C. Rajiv, “India and Israel: Strategic Partners on the Move”, BESA Center Per-
spectives Paper, The Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies (BESA), 728, 30 Jan-
uary 2018, https://besacenter.org/perspectives-papers/india-israel-strategic-partners.
11 P. Roy, “Benjamin Netanyahu’s State Visit to India”, Israel Affairs 25, 5 (2019),
789; Kaura, “Indo-Israeli Relations in the Modi Era”, p. 4.
12 P. R. Kumaraswamy, “Redefining ‘Strategic’ Cooperation”, Strategic Analysis 41,
4 (2017), 359–361.
13 M. B. J. Hirsch and M. Chatterjee Miller, “Otherness and Resilience in Bilateral
Relations: The Cases of Israel‒Germany, India‒Russia, and India‒Israel”, Journal
of International Relations and Development (2020), 17.
14 S. Singh, “India–Israel: The View from West Asia”, Strategic Analysis 41, 4
(2017), 353.
15 Saha, “The India–Israeli Security Relationship”, 4–7.
16 P. D. Wezeman, A. Fleurant, A. Kuimova, D. Lopes da Silva, N. Tian and S. T.
Wezeman, “Trends in International Arms Transfers, 2019”, Stockholm Interna-
tional Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), March 2020, www.sipri.org/sites/default/
files/2020-03/fs_2003_at_2019.pdf.
 Israel, India and Quad Plus 161
17 During the Mumbai attacks (2008), in which approximately 166 people died, one
of the targets carried out by an Islamist extremist cell based in Pakistan was a
Jewish religious centre. Six Israeli citizens were killed by jihadists. This event cre-
ated a special feeling between Israelis and Indians, also reinforcing their coop-
eration in terms of security and counterterrorism. For more information, see A.
Cowshish, “India–Israel Defence Trade: Issues and Challenges”, Strategic Analy-
sis 41, 4 (2017), 401–412; N. A. K. Browne, “A Perspective on India–Israel
Defence and Security Ties”, Strategic Analysis 41, 4 (2017), 325–335.
18 A. Sharma, and D. Bing, “India–Israel Relations: The Evolving Partnership”,
Israel Affairs 21, 4 (2015), 623–625.
19 “India to Sign Defence Deal with Israel amid Rising Tensions with China”, Eur-
asian Times, 24 July 2020, https://eurasiantimes.com/india-to-sign-defence-dea
l-with-israel-amid-rising-tensions-with-china.
20 S. Sen, “India’s Alliance with Israel Is a Model for the World’s Illiberal Leaders”,
Foreign Policy, 10 September 2020, https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/09/10/indias-a
lliance-with-israel-is-a-model-for-the-worlds-illiberal-leaders.
21 Browne, “A Perspective on India–Israel Defence and Security Ties”, 333.
22 A. Ningthoujam, “The Future of India–Israel Arms Trade”, The Jerusalem
Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS), 21 July 2020, https://jiss.org.il/en/
ningthoujam-the-future-of-india-israel-arms-trade.
23 Kaura, “Indo-Israeli Relations in the Modi Era”, 6–7.
24 “India Pledges to Contribute $5 Million in 2020 to UN Palestine Refugee
Agency”, The Economic Times, 13 November 2019, https://economictimes.india
times.com/news/politics-and-nation/india-pledges-to-contribute-5-million-in-2020-
to-un-palestine-refugee-agency/articleshow/72035600.cms?from=mdr.
25 S. Shay, “Israel and India Celebrating ‘Silver Jubilee’”, The Diplomatist, June
2017, http://diplomatist.com/dipo201703/article002.html.
26 A. Roy, “Israel Plans to Annex West Bank: India’s Deafening Silence”, National
Herald India, 21 June 2020, www.nationalheraldindia.com/opinion/israel-pla
ns-to-annex-west-bank-indias-deafening-silence.
27 “UAE-Israel Deal Has Opened ‘Lots of Opportunities’: S Jaishankar”, The Hindu-
stan Times, 26 August 2020, www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/uae-israel-deal-ha
s-opened-lots-of-opportunities-s-jaishankar/story-nS364lj7ccwqihpAfSJClK.html.
28 Kumaraswamy, “Redefining ‘Strategic’ Cooperation”.
29 While 42 per cent of India’s oil imports come from the GCC countries, 52 per
cent comes from Iran. B. Abdi, “India’s Crude Oil Imports from Iran Jumped 52
Per Cent in June”, The Economic Times, 24 July 2020, https://energy.economictim
es.indiatimes.com/news/oil-and-gas/indias-crude-oil-imports-from-iran-jumped-52-
percent-in-june/65119168.
30 C. R. Gharekhan, “India–Israel: Retrospective and Prospective”, Strategic Ana-
lysis 41, 4 (2017), 321.
31 Y. Shapir, “Walking a Fine Line: Israel, India, and Iran”, Strategic Assessment 16,
1 (2013), 75–85, www.inss.org.il/publication/?ptype=401.
32 Kaura, “Indo-Israeli Relations in the Modi Era”, 3–4.
33 S. Baru, “Indian Ocean Perspectives: From Sea Power to Ocean Prosperity”,
Strategic Analysis, 1–6.
34 Observatory of Economic Complexity (OEC), “Israel”, https://oec.world/en/p
rofile/country/isr.
35 S. Tiezzi, “Israel and China a ‘Marriage Made in Heaven,’ Says Netanyahu”, The
Diplomat, 22 March 2017, https://thediplomat.com/2017/03/israel-and-china-a-ma
rriage-made-in-heaven-says-netanyahu.
36 For more details, see R. Yellinek, “The Israel–China–US Triangle and the Haifa
Port Project”, Middle East Institute, 2018, www.mei.edu/publications/israel-china
162 Dentice
-us-triangle-and-haifa-port-project; S. S. C. Rajiv, “Israel–China Ties at 25: The
Limited Partnership”, Strategic Analysis 41, 4 (2017), 413–431.
37 For more details on the US and Indian strategy in the Indo-Pacific region, see D.
Scott, “The Indo-Pacific in US Strategy: Responding to Power Shifts”, Rising
Power Quarterly 3, 2 (2018), 19–43; J. Panda, “India and the Pacific Ocean: The
‘Act East’ Between Trade, Infrastructure and Security”, in Axel Berkofsky and
Sergio Miracola (eds), Geopolitics by Other Means. The Indo-Pacific Reality, Ita-
lian Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI) (Milan: Ledizioni Ledi
Publishing, 2019), 71–96.
38 J. Mitnick, “Why the US Can’t Get Israel to Break Up with China”, Foreign
Policy, 16 June 2020, https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/06/16/us-israel-china-deals.
39 A. Orion, “Illusion, Awakening, Rage, and Response: The United States Strategic
Approach to China”, INSS Insight, Institute for National Security Studies
(INSS), 1338, 21 June 2020, www.inss.org.il/publication/usa-strategy-towa
rds-china.
40 Mitnick. no. 38.
41 N. Sachs and K. Huggard, “Israel and the Middle East amid US–China Compe-
tition”, Brookings Institution, 20 July 2020, www.brookings.edu/articles/israel-a
nd-the-middle-east-amid-u-s-china-competition.
42 After the signing of the Israel–UAE–Bahrain normalisation agreement (15 Sep-
tember 2020), Dubai’s state-owned DP World, which operates ports from Hong
Kong to Buenos Aires, signed a series of agreements with Israel’s DoverTower
including a joint bid in the privatisation of Haifa Port on the Mediterranean, one
of Israel’s two main sea terminals. This move was strongly supported by the
United States to downgrade the Chinese presence in a strategic project like in
Haifa port. For more details, see “Dubai’s DP World to Partner with Israeli Firm
in Bid for Haifa Port”, Reuters, 16 September 2020, www.reuters.com/article/
us-israel-emirates-shipping/dubais-dp-world-to-partner-with-israeli-firm-in-bid-for
-haifa-port-idINKBN2670XR.
43 For more details, see S. Efron, H. J. Shatz, A. Chan, E. Haskel, L. J. Morris, A.
Scobell, “The Evolving Israel–China Relationship”, RAND Corporation, Santa
Monica, 2019, www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2641.html.
44 For more details, see T. Kavaler, “Pandemic Tests Israel–China Ties”, The Med-
ialine, 11 June 2020, https://themedialine.org/by-region/pandemic-tests-israel-china
-ties.
45 S. Yom, “US Foreign Policy in the Middle East: The Logic of Hegemonic
Retreat”, Global Policy 11, 1 (2020), 75–83.
46 A. Pinkas, “To Avoid an Unnecessary Clash, Israel Should Closely Follow Biden’s
Moves on China”, Haaretz, 18 March 2021, www.haaretz.com/us-news/.premium
-to-avoid-an-unnecessary-clash-israel-should-closely-follow-biden-s-moves-on-chin
a-1.9628389.
47 E. Inbar, “The Background to the First Ever Visit to Israel by an Indian Prime
Minister”, Asia Pacific Bulletin, East-West Center, 383, 7 June 2017, www.ea
stwestcenter.org/system/tdf/private/apb383_1.pdf ?file=1&type=node&id=36132;
Kaura, “Indo-Israeli Relations in the Modi Era”, 7–8.
48 A. Sharma and D. Dov Bing, “India–Israel Relations: The Evolving Partnership”,
Israel Affairs 21, 4 (2015), 630.
49 For more details, see J. Mehra, “The Australia–India–Japan–US Quadrilateral:
Dissecting the China Factor”, ORF Occasional Paper, Observer Research
Foundation, 264, August 2020.
50 For more information on the Indian geostrategic view in the region, see J. Panda,
“India, the Blue Dot Network, and the ‘Quad Plus’ Calculus”, Journal of Indo-
Pacific Affairs (JIPA) 3, 3 (Fall 2020).
 Israel, India and Quad Plus 163
51 The Blue Dot Network (BDN) initiative, led by the United States, Japan and
Australia, was launched in November 2019 at the 35th ASEAN summit in Thai-
land, with the aim to foster infrastructural connectivity in the Indo-Pacific region.
This initiative is clearly aimed at containing Chinese OBOR projects around the
world, proposing itself as an alternative in the infrastructure project. In February
2020, India agreed with the United States to join the BDN. For more details, see
M. P. Goodman, D. F. Runde, J. F. Hillman, “Connecting the Blue Dots”, Center
for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), 6 February 2020, www.csis.org/ana
lysis/connecting-blue-dots.
52 E. Inbar, “Israel and India: Looking Back and Ahead”, Strategic Analysis 41, 4
(2017), 377.
53 According to Jforum, the official site of the French-Jewish community, after the
normalised relationship, the UAE and Israel are setting up “spy bases” on Soco-
tra island, which is about 350 kilometres from the Yemeni mainland, to collect
information throughout the region, particularly from Bab al-Mandeb to the Horn
of Africa, and monitor the strategies of Iran, China and Pakistan in those areas.
See “Israël/EAU: grande base de renseignements sur Socotra”, Jforum, 30 August
2020, www.jforum.fr/israel-eau-base-de-renseignements-sur-lile-de-socotra.html.
54 For more information, see H. Halem, “Strategic Convergence and Prospects for
Indo-Israeli-US Maritime Cooperation”, Center for International Maritime
Security (CIMSEC), 16 April 2018, http://cimsec.org/strategic-convergence-prosp
ects-indo-israeli-u-s-maritime-cooperation/35973; E. Ardemagni, “Gulf Powers:
Maritime Rivalry in the Western Indian Ocean”, Analysis, Italian Institute for
International Political Studies (ISPI), 321, April 2018, www.ispionline.it/en/p
ubblicazione/gulf-powers-maritime-rivalry-western-indian-ocean-20212.
55 See N. Blarel, “Assessing US Influence over India–Israel Relations: A Difficult
Equation to Balance?” Strategic Analysis 41, 4 (2017), 384–400; S. Gurjar,
“Geopolitics of Western Indian Ocean: Unravelling China’s Multi-dimensional
Presence”, Strategic Analysis (2019), 1–17.
56 Kumaraswamy, “Redefining ‘Strategic’ Cooperation”, 366.
57 S. Azad, “Tapping into the Zeitgeist: Israel’s East-Looking Policy”, Israel Affairs
26, 2 (2020), 183–197.
58 Kaura, “Indo-Israeli Relations in the Modi Era”, 3–4.
59 Rao, “Shaping New Dimensions”, 192.
10 France and the Quad Plus
Keeping flexibility in the Indo-Pacific
Céline Pajon

Introduction
In France, the launch of the Quad Plus raised little attention. The emergence of
yet another minilateral framework in the Indo-Pacific attracted some interest
but also raised many doubts about the sustainability of this initiative. The
general impression was that this new grouping: the Quad (the United States,
Japan, India and Australia) plus New Zealand, South Korea, Vietnam, Brazil
and Israel was quite heterogeneous and maybe not the most relevant to
tackle the challenge it sought to address: the COVID-19 crisis. Indeed,
Washington initiated the so-called Quad Plus in March 2020, in the midst of
the pandemic, to exchange best practices and coordinate consular policies
and strategic supplies between like-minded countries. From mid-March to
mid-May, officials from the foreign affairs services held weekly discussions on
practical issues pertaining to the management of the COVID crisis (visa
exemptions, repatriation of nationals, maintenance of critical medical sup-
plies, and so on).1 The Quad Plus, nevertheless, prompted a flurry of com-
ments and discussions about the opportunity for the Quad to expand its
membership and develop cooperation in domains other than maritime
security, counterterrorism, humanitarian assistance/disaster relief (HA/DR),
or connectivity.
Since the Quad Plus is still a very nascent and debated initiative, it is dif-
ficult to discuss how Paris sees it and how France could formally associate or
cooperate with the grouping. That said, the examination of France’s various
engagements in the Indo-Pacific can provide some clues regarding the synergies
or divergences with the Quad Plus initiative.
In 2018, Paris unveiled its own Indo-Pacific strategy, which reflects a stra-
tegic reassessment of the region for French interests: the area is now widely
acknowledged as the world economic powerhouse, and major trade partners
are located there. The Indo-Pacific is also a key region when it comes to the
governance of the commons and multilateralism. At the same time, there is
now a recognition that China’s rise is increasingly challenging French inter-
ests in the area. The Indo-Pacific terminology serves to highlight the strategic
dimension of France’s comprehensive approach to the region, by providing a

DOI: 10.4324/9781003206408-13
 France and the Quad Plus 165
powerful narrative. This narrative also strengthens Paris’s legitimacy to act in
the area and is useful to develop and expand cooperation with like-minded
partners. Through its Indo-Pacific strategy, France can thus more adequately
protect its sovereign interests while promoting and advancing its very own
vision for a balanced, multipolar, inclusive Indo-Pacific regional order,
upheld by key liberal principles and multilateral schemes.
This chapter offers perspectives on the development of the French Indo-
Pacific strategy over the past three years. Maritime security is a core interest
and objective in developing an Indo-Pacific approach. The French Indo-
Pacific vision also relies on key strategic partnerships with all the members of
the Quad. However, a concern to keep its strategic autonomy in the context
of a worsening US–China rivalry and the strong interest to coordinate with
European partners in the Indo-Pacific explain why Paris has been reluctant
to join the Quad Plus formally so far. While the election of Joe Biden could
facilitate the rapprochement between France and the Quad as a group, Paris
will certainly continue to give priority to flexible, ad hoc, issue-based coali-
tions in which it would maintain a greater autonomy, as well as a deepening
of bilateral relations with members of the Quad Plus.

France’s strategic vision of the Indo-Pacific

The Indo-Pacific concept has recently entered the French narrative. President
Emmanuel Macron referred to an “Indo-Pacific axis”2 when he visited Aus-
tralia in May 2018, and subsequently, both the Ministry of the Armed Forces
(MAF) and the Ministry of the European and Foreign Affairs (MEFA)
issued key documents to present the French vision of the region.3
France has interest to act in a sovereign manner in the Indo-Pacific area,
having territories both in the Indian Ocean (La Réunion and the Scattered
Islands) and the Pacific (New Caledonia and French Polynesia). Among
these territories,1.5 million citizens are living—along with approximately
200,000 French living in other countries throughout the region—and more
than 90 per cent of France’s large (9 million km2) exclusive economic zone
(EEZ) is located in the Indo-Pacific. France maintains a modest military
presence of 7,000 personnel to protect this vast area. There is now a wide
recognition that the deterioration of the security environment in Asia puts
these interests at risk. The 2017 Defense and National Security Strategic
Review notes that French overseas territories as well as freedom of supply
and navigation are at risk.4 President Macron repeatedly underlined the risks
of a Chinese hegemony and the need for France to develop its own approach
of the Indo-Pacific region.5
Beyond this, the Indo-Pacific is now recognised as a central stage where
major transformations are ongoing that have global consequences, with
direct implications for French interests. The Indo-Pacific is the economic
epicentre of world trade and production and hosts vital sea lines of commu-
nications (SLOC). It forms a security continuum where freedom of
166 Pajon
navigation (FON) should not be challenged, in which issues such as terror-
ism, environmental issues and great-power politics trigger tensions and where
different models of development, cooperation and regional integration com-
pete. The region is also a central stage for key issues regarding the govern-
ance of the commons (oceans, cyber) and of transnational challenges such as
climate change and biodiversity and a crucial milieu for the shaping of
international norms. President Macron has made clear that he wants to
restore France’s global influence by upholding its values and principles and
for Paris to be a central player for global governance and multilateralism.6
The Indo-Pacific is at the core of challenges to the world order, and therefore,
France should be engaged as a responsible stakeholder there.
France seeks to develop a principled approach to the Indo-Pacific and
aims to maintain a multipolar and law-based order in the Indo-Pacific and to
encourage multilateral regional cooperation to tackle the challenges in the
security, political, and economic spheres. France supports a multipolar,
inclusive, and balanced region, “where hegemonic tendencies along with
temptations of division or confrontation [should be] discouraged”.7 In parti-
cular, “The rise of an increasingly assertive China” is mentioned as a chal-
lenge, both for the diversity of the region and the maintenance of
multilateralism. The focus on multipolarity and multilateralism is certainly
different from the Trump Administration’s more confrontational vision of an
Indo-Pacific strategy aimed at building anti-China coalitions. France is not
supporting Washington’s attempt to decouple economically from China.
Also, Paris insists that its Indo-Pacific strategy is not military-driven, which
again is a significant difference from the American one (for example, the
renaming of the US Pacific Command to the Indo-Pacific Command
[INDOPACOM]). France’s vision encompasses broader issues such as the
blue economy and environmental questions.
Taking into account the coexistence of several models—for example, the Belt
and Road Initiative, Free and Open Indo-Pacific, and Association of Southeast
Asian Nations (ASEAN)-led multilateralism—France’s aim is to “propose an
alternative aimed at promoting a stable, law-based and multipolar order”, in an
inclusive and balanced way.8 Stability should be fostered through “an interna-
tional order based on dialogue and multilaterally set rules” to deal with trans-
national risks and governance of the commons (maritime security, nuclear
proliferation, terrorism, climate change and biodiversity, cyber, and space).9
Three major pillars have been identified: maritime security, connectivity and
infrastructure, and environmental issues (climate and biodiversity). All three
priorities relate to the ocean, the good order at sea, the sustained management
of marine resources, and safety of the sea lanes.

Maritime security as a core interest

In its approach to the region, Paris is placing priority on a broadly defined
maritime security. At the 2019 Raisina Dialogue, French admiral Christophe
 France and the Quad Plus 167
Prazuck, Chief of Naval Staff, presented a holistic approach regarding pro-
tecting the commons at sea: France is interested in keeping the safety of
“dots” (chokepoints like Hormuz, Malacca, and Bab el-Mandeb Straits),
SLOCs, and stocks (fish, hydrocarbons, and rare earths present in respective
EEZ).10
Accordingly, France supports the strict application of the United Nations
Convention for the Law of the Sea, contributes to actions against crime at
sea, and is keen on actively demonstrating its commitment to the FON. In
2016, the statement of the then Minister of Defense Jean-Yves Le Drian at
the Shangri-La Dialogue emphasised the need to discourage unilateral coups
de force in the China seas, for fear that such actions might expand in other
strategic areas like the Mediterranean Sea.11 Thus, while not taking sides on
sovereignty matters, Paris has consistently sent its ships to the South and
East China Seas in recent years, through the passing of the Jeanne d’Arc
mission or the surveillance frigates based in New Caledonia. Last June, the air-
craft carrier Charles de Gaulle was dispatched to Singapore during the
Shangri-La Dialogue. The French Minister of the Armed Forces, Florence
Parly, then promised that French vessels would sail at least twice a year in
the South China Sea and will continue upholding international law in a
“steady, non-confrontational but obstinate way”.12 In February 2021, the
Ministry of Armed Forces revealed the passage of a French nuclear-powered
submarine (SSN) in the South China Sea.13
Thus, maritime security prevails in today’s French Indo-Pacific approach.
It has been so far embodied mostly by naval diplomacy through the dis-
patches of frigates or aircraft carrier groups to the region. But beyond the
military dimension, other issues, such as the blue economy, are of interest for
France.14 The management of the large French EEZ in the region requires
proper protection of the marine resources and a sustainable development of
these resources. In addition, President Macron has identified the blue econ-
omy as an important engine for growth in the context of the COVID-19-
induced economic crisis.15 The security implications of environmental issues
such as the depletion of resources (fisheries) and climate change are also core
issues of concern. These kinds of risks, along with natural disasters, actually
represent the primary threat to human lives in the Indo-Pacific area.
Therefore, France aims to develop its maritime surveillance capability in
the region, through capacity-building, networking of partners and informa-
tion sharing. Maritime security and surveillance may indeed be the least
common denominator that gathers the majority of the Indo-Pacific countries,
from great powers to small island states. Maritime domain awareness (MDA)
is a requirement for better managing one’s own sovereign territory and EEZ
but also to ensure the safety of international waters, SLOCs, and FON. It is
also instrumental to prevent crises resulting from environmental issues such
as natural disaster or fishery depletion. Thus, it is possible to foster interna-
tional cooperation on a crucial capacity (a shared MDA) but in a con-
sensual, or non-confrontational, manner (environmental crisis prevention).
168 Pajon
To concretise this project, France is building up its strategic partnerships in
the region.

Central importance of strategic partnerships

To increase its leverage and compensate for limited capacities, France is
putting priority on strengthening relations with its partners and building up a
network of strategic partnerships with India, Australia and Japan, as well as
Malaysia, Singapore, New Zealand, Indonesia and Vietnam. Therefore, Paris
has already initiated a dynamic cooperation with all members of the Quad
and many of those envisioned as members of the Quad Plus.
During his visit to Australia in May 2018, President Macron referred to a
“Paris-Delhi-Canberra axis”, bound to expand. The two key partnerships,
with Australia and India, are founded upon common values and similar
interests and are supported by defence equipment sales and concrete security
cooperation (facilitated by acquisition and cross-servicing agreement [ACSA]
deals) with a strong focus on maritime security.

India
In January 2017, India and France signed a white shipping agreement to
enable information sharing on maritime traffic and MDA in the Indian
Ocean Region. In March 2018, a logistics exchange memorandum of agree-
ment granted reciprocal access to each other’s bases.16 Since then, the French
frigate Cassard made a port call in the Mumbai harbour (January 2019) and
in March 2020, despite the pandemic, an Indian Navy P-8 aircraft visited La
Réunion to conduct a coordinated maritime patrol with French forces.17 In
Spring 2019, France and India held their biggest naval exercises, with a total
of 12 warships and submarines, including the aircraft carrier Charles de
Gaulle, patrolling off the coast of Goa for the annual Varuna exercises.
The two countries have signed a common strategic vision for their coop-
eration in the Indian Ocean, including maritime intelligence and protection
and exchange of sensitive information. India and France are co-developing a
constellation of satellites to monitor the Indian Ocean, in an effort to
strengthen the MDA.18 France was also the first country to send a liaison
officer to the Information Fusion Centre for the Indian Ocean Region (IFC-
IOR), created in Delhi in 2018. Finally, the two countries are deepening their
coordination in multilateral settings, with New Delhi supporting Paris’s
application to join the Indian Ocean Rim Association.
While maritime security in the Indian Ocean lies at the core of the
Franco–Indian partnership, the cooperation extends beyond that, in the
realm of climate change and global commons for example. France and India
jointly launched the International Solar Alliance (ISA) at the 2015 United
Nations Climate Change Conference (COP 21) in Paris, and the first ISA
summit, dedicated to the promotion of solar energy, was held in March
 France and the Quad Plus 169
2018—the ISA is the first international organisation headquartered in India.
The ISA is now gathering 121 member-countries. However, Quad Plus
countries such as the United States, Vietnam and Israel are still not part of
this grouping. Promoting and enlarging the ISA to these countries and
implementing projects under the ISA umbrella would be a way to boost
cooperation among these countries. India, as well as Australia, was among
the few non-member-countries invited by President Macron to the G7
Summit in Biarritz last year, demonstrating that Paris considers New Delhi
and Canberra as key players for global governance.

Australia
The strategic partnership with Australia has been concentrating more on the
South Pacific region. The two countries, plus New Zealand, are part of the
1992 FRANZ arrangement, signed to coordinate their assistance for Pacific
island nations during natural disasters. Paris and Canberra also coordinate
with Washington and Wellington within the Pacific Quadrilateral Defense
Coordination Group, which coordinates maritime security efforts in the Pacific.
The partnership is also developing along the lines of an important industrial
cooperation, after the French company Naval Group (formerly known as
Direction des Constructions Navales or DCNS) won the bid in 2016 to pro-
vide 12 submarines to be phased into the Australian navy until 2050. This
long-term deal implies that France will stay engaged in the region for the
coming decades, and in 2017, the two countries signed a joint statement to
set their cooperation in the years to come. France was the first partner of the
2018-founded Australian Space Agency, and the two partners also cooperate
on monitoring of climate change and sustainable development issues
(biodiversity and fisheries) in the South Pacific.19
The French ambition is to develop regular trilateral discussions out of
these two parallel partnerships. This has been done at the Track 1.5 level in
2019, and the first trilateral dialogue at the official level was held in Septem-
ber 2020. The talks focused on enhancing cooperation in the maritime sector,
promoting global commons (climate, environment and biodiversity, health)
and multilateralism in the Indo-Pacific.20 The Joint Strategic Vision of India-
France Cooperation in the Indian Ocean Region,21 issued in March 2018,
and the Vision Statement on the Australia-France Relationship,22 released in
May 2018, also mentioned the possibility of coordinating with third partners
through trilateral dialogues and joint exercises.

Japan and other partners

From this perspective, Japan appears as a key partner for France, as it has
the capacity to help monitor the SLOCs and shares France’s concern about
keeping multipolarity in the region and avoiding Chinese hegemony. The
bilateral security cooperation has expanded in recent years and has been
170 Pajon
gradually institutionalised. Beyond the annual 2+2 meeting (between the
defence and foreign affairs ministers), an agreement on the transfer of
defence equipment and technology, in force since December 2016, has
opened way to joint research and development of new-generation underwater
minesweeping technology. In July 2018, an ACSA was signed to allow the
sharing of defence supplies and services, an important step to expand coop-
eration in peacekeeping and HA/DR operations and facilitate more ambi-
tious joint exercises. So far, the bulk of bilateral cooperation has been
focused on maritime security, mostly in Asia, where Japan is taking part in
HA/DR joint training held by France in the South Pacific, for example, but
also in the Gulf of Aden with participation in multinational antipiracy
operations. A maritime dialogue has been launched with Tokyo in 2019, and
a joint reflection to identify concrete areas of cooperation in the Indo-Pacific
is ongoing.
Other identified partners to expand the network are Malaysia, Singapore
(where a French liaison officer is dispatched at the Intelligence Fusion
Center), New Zealand, Indonesia and Vietnam. A deepening of relations
with the ASEAN countries is set as a priority. ASEAN Centrality is seen as a
stabilising factor, given that South-east Asia is again a milieu for the “Great
Game” between China and the United States. Therefore, the aim is to
achieve a convergence of views on a number of issues and to help build up
these countries’ resilience vis-à-vis China, through maritime capacity-building
assistance. This kind of activity can also be coordinated with local partners
such as Japan, India or Australia. The ultimate aim is to build up an open,
inclusive and transparent cooperation architecture that will allow a shared
MDA to prevent or manage crises resulting from environmental issues, natural
disaster, crimes at sea, or so forth.
While France does not share the confrontational and militarised approach
that the Trump Administration developed in the Indo-Pacific vis-à-vis China,
the United States is also a powerful partner in the region. A French liaison
officer is hosted in the US INDOPACOM, and naval exercises have provided
opportunities to strengthen ties. Quadrilateral drills on amphibious opera-
tions were held in Spring 2017 among Japanese, French, US and British ships
as part of France’s Jeanne d’Arc mission near Guam. In May 2019, France
led the La Pérouse exercises with the Japanese, US and Australian navies,
conducting their first joint exercises in the Bay of Bengal.23 In April 2021,
India joins the La Pérouse exercises. While some commentators and media
have qualified this as a de facto France + Quad joint exercises,24 Paris refer-
red to it as “five like-minded” powers coming together in the support of a
“free and open Indo-Pacific”.25
Therefore, France maintains close and dynamic strategic partnerships with
the four members of the Quad. However, France has so far refused to for-
mally be associated with the Quad. This has to do with Paris trying to walk a
fine line on China; while it is clear that France’s Indo-Pacific strategy is
motivated by China’s rise and has elements of a hedging approach vis-à-vis
 France and the Quad Plus 171
Beijing, by sending signals and seeking to gain leverage through its partners,
France seeks to avoid antagonising China. Paris indeed highlights the
importance of engaging China, keeping a robust dialogue and partnership,
and encouraging Beijing to play the role of a responsible stakeholder on
issues such as climate change or the reform of the World Trade Organiza-
tion.26 This ambiguous approach generates frustrations internationally as
well as domestically and so far has prevented France from joining initiatives
that may have anti-China connotations. This position is also about main-
taining France’s strategic autonomy amid the growing rivalry between China
and the United States.

Strategic autonomy, EU backing and the Quad Plus

Keeping its strategic autonomy will indeed be key in determining how
France will navigate in the Indo-Pacific. An inclusive, multilateral approach
is preferred, even if the reality of cooperation points toward more limited
groups of like-minded countries to advance an agenda in an efficient way.
Paris will promote flexible tools such as ad hoc, minilateral groups to tackle
a specific issue and uphold common understanding and norms as a regime.
France will also take advantage of its overseas territories to play as a local actor,
nurture cooperation with regional partners and maximise its military pre-
sence in the area. The focus will be on upholding principles, multilateralism,
maritime security and environmental matters.
In this perspective, the formation of the Quad Plus appears as a positive
development. It encourages greater coordination between interested countries
to work on a specific topic (the management of the COVID-19 crisis) rather
than to cooperate “against” an actor. It encourages a minilateral initiative
(the Quad) to expand into a more multilateral setting, without being institu-
tionalised. However, seen from Paris, the Quad Plus also has some draw-
backs—the more important one being that it came at the initiative of a
Trump Administration that was eager to shape the narrative as a joint reac-
tion to a global crisis created by a China-originated virus. The United States
also reportedly planned to use this format to launch its Economic Prosperity
Network, aimed at accelerating the restructuring and relocation of supply
chains out of China.27 This American, or more precisely Trumpian, print on
this initiative would have made France very cautious to join if it were invited,
especially as this Quad Plus was launched during the last months of the
Trump administration. Another concern is about the relevance of the group
of countries that were gathered in the Quad Plus. In particular, when Secre-
tary of State Mike Pompeo upgraded the session at the political level in May,
he invited his counterparts from Brazil and Israel to join.28 This grouping
makes little sense in terms of Indo-Pacific strategy or COVID-19 crisis man-
agement but points again to a US-led initiative that may not be attractive to
France. It is worth noting that even the terminology Quad Plus stemmed
from the media and analysts, not the participants’ public diplomacy.
172 Pajon
The election of Joe Biden in November 2020 would certainly make a rap-
prochement between France and the Quad or Quad Plus easier, as the new
US administration shares greater interests with the Europeans, at least on the
importance to revitalise multilateralism and cooperate on climate change.
This said, Washington’s approach to China is not similar to that of France
and interests are not completely aligned in the Indo-Pacific. For these rea-
sons, France will more likely go on with its own, inclusive, initiatives (as long
as partner countries share a basic understanding and principles). Paris will
favour multilateral settings and, more importantly, is emphasising the
importance of a coordinated European approach in the region.
In the maritime security domain, coordinating with European partners is
indeed a way to enhance the visibility and the significance of French
deployments and activities. Back in 2016, Jean-Yves Le Drian called for a
greater European presence in the region, through a better coordination,
especially in the South China Sea.29 Accordingly, 52 British troops and their
helicopters, as well as 12 officers from European countries and one EU offi-
cial joined the French naval mission Jeanne d’Arc in 2017, and British ships
sailed alongside the French naval group in 2018. In August 2019, at an
informal meeting at Helsinki, EU defence ministers agreed to the concept of
an EU Coordinated Maritime Presence. The aim is to ensure a coordinated
presence at sea, based on a voluntary forces contribution by the EU member-
states, under national control. The first test is set up in the Strait of Hormuz
with the European Maritime Awareness mission in the Strait of Hormuz
(EMASOH) mission that started in February 2020. It provides a new flex-
ibility for the EU to show the flag and set up a multinational naval presence
outside of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) framework—
thus, evading the necessity to reach consensus of all member-states to act.30
It also affirms European strategic autonomy vis-à-vis the United States. In
the future, such a European Task Group could sail the South China Sea for
political signalling, naval diplomacy, and information gathering. As for now,
France can take advantage of the EU’s already extensive experience in con-
tributing to maritime security by combating piracy in the Horn of Africa and
building MDA capabilities in the Western Indian Ocean over the past 12
years. The EU is expanding its cooperation to the Eastern Indian Ocean and
Southeast Asia through the Critical Maritime Routes in the Indian Ocean
(CRIMARIO) II programme (2020–2023).31
While France was the first EU country to present an Indo-Pacific strategy
and although views among EU member-states on an Asia policy are still
diverse, the Indo-Pacific narrative is gaining momentum in Europe. Distrust
toward China has been growing in 2020, following the COVID-19 crisis, the
fiasco of the mask diplomacy, the harsh rhetoric of several top Chinese dip-
lomats in Europe, the realisation of an excessive economic dependence vis-à-
vis Beijing, and the shocking imposition of the Hong Kong security law. This
growing consensus came with a realisation that Europe should step up to
better defend its interests in Asia too. Indeed, the COVID-19 crisis
 France and the Quad Plus 173
exemplifies the vulnerabilities of the supply chains as well as the importance
of Asia for Europe’s security. As a result, we have seen several declarations
from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security
Policy, Josep Borrell, calling for the EU to diversify its supply chains and
build up cooperation with Asian democracies.32 Germany, once very cautious
about not antagonising China, published its own Indo-Pacific strategy in
September 202033 and Berlin announced that it will send a frigate to the
Indo-Pacific—including in the South China Sea—in 2021. The Netherlands
also issued its own Indo-Pacific policy in November 2020 and a first version
of an EU Indo-Pacific approach was published in Spring 2021.34 France has
been instrumental in encouraging EU countries to step up their presence and
commitments to the region.35
Diversification of partners and supply chains will be a key objective of this
European approach to the region. A stronger strategic autonomy with regard to
industrial and economic policy is indeed a core objective of the post-COVID
recovery plan proposed by France and Germany and adopted at the EU level.36
While Paris is likely to prioritise cooperation with the EU and European part-
ners, this agenda regarding the diversification of value chains is similar to the
Supply Chain Resilience Initiative (SCRI) that Japan pushes together with India
and Australia and could provide a basis for expanded cooperation among the
partners.37 Another way to find synergies is on health cooperation. France
wants to make a vaccine against COVID an international common good. The
Coronavirus Global Response event back in May 2020 helped raise funding to
achieve this goal. Japan was a co-convenor, along with France and other part-
ners.38 This kind of initiative could certainly be useful in developing cooperation
with other Quad Plus countries. The Quad Summit of March 2021 indeed
announced its own COVID-19 vaccine initiative, as well as working groups on
critical and emerging technology, and climate change.

Conclusion
The French approach to the Indo-Pacific is in an ascending phase. The
overall objective is to increase France’s contribution to build up a stable
Indo-Pacific governed by the rule of law and to mitigate the risks of great-
power competition in an area key for French interests. Thus, multipolarity
and multilateral cooperation should be fostered. To achieve this vision,
France relies on its strategic partnerships in the region and strives to build up
a network to mutualise capacity and have a greater impact. Minilateral, ad
hoc groupings should be privileged to discuss and adopt a shared under-
standing and common principles to tackle issues, from climate change to
governance of the commons (oceans, Internet). Paris will also empower its
overseas territories to play as regional actors, as it is still unclear to what
extent France will be able to mobilise additional assets to deploy in the broad
area. For now, Paris puts priority on keeping its flexibility and implements
concrete initiatives to flesh out its vision.
174 Pajon
So far, France has been insisting on maintaining its strategic autonomy in
the region, hence pushing back against propositions to associate with the
Quad, for example. This said, Paris has also been working to build up a
network of partners in the region. Hence, multilateralism and minilateralism
are both present in the French approach. The extent to which France can be
associated or interested in working with the newly minted Quad Plus will
certainly depend on the possibility of maintaining its strategic autonomy and
walk a fine line between the United States and China, especially as the Sino–
US rivalry worsens. This would not prevent a deepening of the bilateral
relations with the members of the Quad Plus and ad hoc coordination on
specific issues. The election of Joe Biden facilitates the cooperation with the
US in the Indo-Pacific. It has also empowered the Quad that increasingly
appears as one core grouping for minilateral and multilateral cooperation in
the region. In this sense, France might be interested to associate with it,
while still keeping a flexibility in its cooperation engagements in the region.

Notes
1 Indrani Bagchi, “New Alliances, Grouping Being Created in Response to Covid-
19”, The Times of India, 14 May 2020, http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com.
2 Ben Doherty, “France and Australia Can Be Heart of New Indo-Pacific Axis,
Macron Says”, The Guardian, 2 May 2018.
3 The title of the Ministry of Defense’s brochure on the French security approach to
Asia evolved from “France and Security in the Asia Pacific” in 2016 to “France and
Security in the Indo-Pacific” in 2018. The brochure was updated in 2019. See the
Ministry of the Armed Forces’ website: www.defense.gouv.fr. Only an excerpt of the
strategy is made public. The document is available in French and English: 2030 French
Strategy in Asia-Oceania. Towards an Inclusive Asian Indo-Pacific Region, French
Ministry of European and Foreign Affairs, Paris, August 2018, www.diplomatie.gouv.
fr. The document has been updated in 2019: “Stratégie française dans l’Indo-pacifi-
que: Pour un espace indo-pacifique inclusif”, August 2019, www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/fr/
dossiers-pays/asie-oceanie/la-zone-indopacifique-une-priorite-pour-la-france.
4 “Strategic Review of Defense and National Security”, Ministry of the Armed
Forces of France, 2017, 26.
5 “China, while actively participating in the classic multilateral game, promotes its
own vision of the world, its own vision of a reinvented, more hegemonic multi-
lateralism. […] And so I hope France to promote a balanced vision and to protect
both our interests and our worldview in this constructive, demanding and con-
fident dialogue with China. […] So, in March and May of this year, I proposed in
New Delhi and Sydney to work on a new strategic Indo-Pacific axis, which should
not be directed against anyone and can be an essential contribution to interna-
tional stability.” [Author’s translation] “Discours du Président de la République à
la conférence des Ambassadeurs [Speech by the President of the Republic at the
Conference of Ambassadors]”, Paris, 27 August 2018, www.elysee.fr. See also
Emmanuel Macron, Speech at Garden Island Naval Base, Sydney, 2 May 2018;
Emmanuel Macron, Joint media briefing: Statement by the French President, New
Delhi, 10 March 2018, https://in.ambafrance.org/Joint-media-briefing-Statem
ent-by-the-French-President-15342; “Discours du Président de la République
Emmanuel Macron sur la Nouvelle-Calédonie à Nouméa [Speech by the
 France and the Quad Plus 175
President of the Republic Emmanuel Macron on New Caledonia in Nouméa]”, 5
May 2018, www.elysee.fr/front/pdf/elysee-module-2070-fr.pdf
6 “Discours du Président de la République à la conférence des Ambassadeurs
[Speech by the President of the Republic at the Conference of Ambassadors]”,
Paris, 29 August 2017, www.elysee.fr/emmanuel-macron/2017/08/29/discours-du-p
resident-de-la-republique-a-l-ouverture-de-la-conference-des-ambassadeurs.
7 “2030 French Strategy in Asia-Oceania: Towards an Inclusive Asian Indo-Pacific
Region”, French Ministry of European and Foreign Affairs (MEFA), 2018, 3.
8 Ibid., 4.
9 Ibid.
10 Christophe Prazuck, Chief of Naval Staff, France, at the Raisina Dialogue 2019,
Panel: Indo-Pacific: Ancient Waters and Emerging Geometries, 9 January 2019,
www.youtube.com.
11 Jean-Yves Le Drian, “The Challenges of Conflict Resolution”, Statement by
French Minister of Defense for the fourth plenary session, 15th Asia Security
Summit, IISS Shangri-La Dialogue, Singapore, 5 June 2016.
12 “Discours de Florence Parly, ministre des Armées, Allocution au Shangri-La
Dialogue [Speech by Florence Parly, Minister of the Armed Forces, Shangri-La
Dialogue]”, 1 June 2019, www.defense.gouv.fr/salle-de-presse/discours/discours-de
-florence-parly/discours-de-florence-parly-ministre-des-armees_allocution-au-shan
gri-la-dialogue.
13 “French Nuclear Submarine Patrolled in South China Sea—Navy”, Reuters, 9
February 2021.
14 “Discours du Président Emmanuel Macron à l’occasion des Assises de l’Econo-
mie Maritime à Montpellier [Speech by President Emmanuel Macron on the
Occasion of the Assises de l’Economie Maritime in Montpellier]”, 3 December
2019, www.elysee.fr/front/pdf/elysee-module-14857-fr.pdf.
15 “L’accélération de la stratégie maritime annoncée par Emmanuel Macron: Extrê-
mement important pour notre filière [The Acceleration of the Maritime Strategy
Announced by Emmanuel Macron: Extremely Important for Our Industry]”,
Outremers360°, 16 June 2020.
16 The Indian Navy will be able to benefit from logistical support and bunkering
within the French military facilities of Reunion, Mayotte and Djibouti, and,
potentially, the bases of the Emirates and the Pacific Ocean.
17 Xavier Vavasseur, “Indian Navy P-8I MPA in Reunion Island for Combined
Training with French Forces”, Naval News, 5 March 2020, www.navalnews.com/
naval-news/2020/03/indian-navy-p-8i-mpa-in-reunion-island-for-combined-trainin
g-with-french-forces.
18 Chethan Kumar, “India, France to Develop a Constellation of Satellites”, Times
of India, 23 August 2019.
19 “France and Australia Sign Landmark Space Cooperation Agreements”, Space-
watch Asia Pacific, 1 March 2019, https://spacewatch.global/2019/03/france-and-a
ustralia-sign-landmark-space-cooperation-agreements.
20 “The Indo-Pacific: 1st Trilateral Dialogue between France, India and Australia”,
French Embassy in New Delhi, 11 September 2020, https://in.ambafrance.org/
The-Indo-Pacific-1st-Trilateral-Dialogue-between-France-India-and-Australia.
21 Joint Strategic Vision of India-France Cooperation in the Indian Ocean Region (New
Delhi, 10 March 2018, Ministry of External Affairs of India), www.mea.gov.in.
22 “Vision Statement on the Australia-France Relationship by The Honourable
Malcolm Turnbull, Prime Minister of the Commonwealth of Australia and His
Excellency Emmanuel Macron, President of the French Republic”, 2 May 2018,
Prime Minister of Australia, www.pm.gov.au.
23 “US, France, Japan and Australia hold first combined naval drill in Asia”, Reu-
ters, 16 May 2019, https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-usa-france-japan-australia/
176 Pajon
us-france-japan-and-australia-hold-first-combined-naval-drill-in-asia-idUKKCN1
SM11N.
24 Kiran Sharma and Mailys Pene-Lassus, “France to Lead Quad Naval Drill in
Indo-Pacific Challenge to China”, Nikkei Asia Shimbun, 2 April 2021.
25 “Port call in Kochi by French Navy Ships Before La Pérouse Exercise”, Consulate
General of France in Bangalore, 31 March 2021.
26 “Discours du Président de la République à la conférence des Ambassadeurs
[Speech by the President of the Republic at the Conference of Ambassadors]”,
Paris, 27 August 2018.
27 Humeyra Pamuk and Andrea Shalal, “Trump Administration Pushing to Rip
Global Supply Chains from China: Officials”, Reuters, 4 May 2020.
28 Indrani Bagchi, “Focus on Covid in Quad Plus Meet”, The Times of India, 13 May
2020, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/jaishankar-discusses-covid-19-with-co
unterparts-in-us-5-other-countries/articleshow/75702875.cms.
29 Jean-Yves Le Drian, “The Challenges of Conflict Resolution”, Statement by
French Minister of Defense for the fourth plenary session, 15th Asia Security
Summit, IISS Shangri-La Dialogue, Singapore, 5 June 2016.
30 Jessica Larsen, “The European Union as a Security Actor. Perspectives from the
Maritime Domain”, DIIS Report 2019:06, 2019, p. 40–41.
31 “Europeans and Maritime Security in the Indo-Pacific: Demonstrating a More
Proactive Commitment”, Céline Pajon and Masashi Nishihara (eds), “East Asia
Security in Flux. What Regional Order Ahead?” Études de l’Ifri, May 2020.
32 “We Need a More Robust Strategy for China, Which Also Requires Better Rela-
tions with the Rest of Democratic Asia”, Opening speech by Josep Borrell, High
Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, 18th
Conference of the Heads of German Missions, 25 May 2020.
33 “Germany–Europe–Asia: Shaping the 21st Century Together: The German Gov-
ernment Adopts Policy Guidelines on the Indo-Pacific Region”, 1 September
2020, www.auswaertiges-amt.de/en/aussenpolitik/regionaleschwerpunkte/asien/ger
man-government-policy-guidelines-indo-pacific/2380510.
34 Josep Borrell, “The EU Needs a Strategic Approach for the Indo-Pacific”, 12
March 2021, https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage_en/
94898/The%20EU%20needs%20a%20strategic%20approach%20for%20the%20Ind
o-Pacific.
35 Noah Barkin, “Watching China in Europe—September 2020”, GMF, 1 Septem-
ber 2020, www.gmfus.org/blog/2020/09/01/watching-china-europe-september-2020.
36 “French–German Initiative for the European Recovery from the Coronavirus
Crisis”, Paris, 18 May 2020, French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, www.diplomatie.
gouv.fr/en/coming-to-france/coronavirus-advice-for-foreign-nationals-in-france/cor
onavirus-statements/article/european-union-french-german-initiative-for-the-europ
ean-recovery-from-the.
37 Dipanjan Roy Chaudhury, “India–Japan–Australia Decide to Launch Resilient
Supply Chain Initiative in the Indo-Pacific Region”, The Economic Times, 2 Sep-
tember 2020, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/economy/foreign-trade/
india-japan-australia-decide-to-launch-resilient-supply-chain-initiative-in-the-indo
-pacific-region/articleshow/77870346.cms?from=mdr.
38 “Coronavirus Global Response: €7.4 Billion Raised for Universal Access to Vac-
cines”, European Commission, Press Release, 4 May 2020, https://ec.europa.eu/
commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_20_797.
11 Function over form
Canada’s bolting-in and capabilities-led
approach to Quad Plus engagement
Stephen Nagy

Introduction
The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (hereafter, the Quad) continues to
evolve in conjunction with the demands of Indo-Pacific stakeholders and
Chinese behaviour towards to region.1 The March 2021 Quad Leaders
Virtual Summit attests to its evolution.
The Quad leaders’ joint statement (“The Spirit of the Quad”) focused on
four areas:

1 supporting a region that is free, open, inclusive, healthy, anchored by

democratic values, and unconstrained by coercion;
2 promoting a free, open rules-based order, rooted in international law to
advance security and prosperity and counter threats to both in the Indo-
Pacific and beyond;
3 pledging to respond to the economic and health impacts of COVID-19,
combat climate change, and address shared challenges, including in
cyber space, critical technologies, counterterrorism, quality infrastructure
investment, and humanitarian-assistance and disaster-relief as well as
maritime domains; and
4 joining forces to expand safe, affordable, and effective vaccine production
and equitable access, to speed economic recovery and benefit global health.2

The expansion of activities of the Quad suggest that the Quad’s evolution
will be less focused on form and more focused on the functional domains of
cooperation that current Quad members or future Quad Plus adherents agree
upon. Canada joined the Quad exercises around Guam in the Sea Dragon
213 exercises in January 2021. France has followed, leading joint exercises in
April 20214 in the Indian Ocean. This participation has enhanced the debate
on the role and possible expansion of the Quad towards concrete functional
cooperation.
This chapter examines Canadian inclusion into a Quad Plus formulation.
Key lines of enquiry revolve around identifying Canadian middle-power
interests in a Quad Plus formulation, capabilities that Canada can bring to

DOI: 10.4324/9781003206408-14
178 Nagy
the Quad Plus, and how to formulate participation. Findings reveal that
Canada’s potential Quad Plus inclusion is based on a function over form by
“bolting-in” and a capabilities-led approach to Quad Plus engagement.
Functional cooperation will be wedded to its middle power identity. Core
areas of functional cooperation will include but not be exclusive to enhan-
cing maritime awareness and consensus building of the consultative process
through proactive diplomacy.
To address the lines of enquiry raised in this introduction, this chapter is
organised into four sections. The first section below briefly examines the current
Quad members, their characteristics, defence budgets, identities, and the
deployment of their military and defence assets. The next examines the conver-
ging and diverging interests of the current members of the Quad to pinpoint
where and how additional members, in this case Canada, could contribute to
the Quad. The following section then looks at South-east Asia’s views of the
Quad as a criterion to understand how the region that forms the central locus of
the Quad’s activities views the Quad and what trajectory they would like to see
the Quad evolve towards. The final section will then discuss Canada’s role in a
Quad Plus arrangement based on the analysis in the previous three sections.

Quad as an institution
The Quad’s diverse membership speaks volumes as to its potential and chal-
lenges. The US dominates the three other middle-power members in all
measurements of power. Australia is a self-professed middle power that
belongs to middle-power groups such as MIKTA, an informal foreign min-
istry-led partnership between Mexico, Indonesia, South Korea, Turkey and
Australia. India is considered a future great power, while Japan, arguably a
great power in terms of potential, behaves as a middle power by “maintain-
ing of the international order through coalition-building, by serving as med-
iators and ‘go-betweens’, and through international conflict management and
resolution activities”.
Critically, China remains Japan’s, Australia’s, and India’s most important
trading partner limiting both their interest and ability to participate in a
Quad institution that has as its primary objective containment.
Taking a granular look at the Lowy Institute’s Asian Power Indices5
between 2018 and 2020, one is struck by the fluidity of power between states
measured in the index.
The fluidity of power and the shift towards China are even more salient in
the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic, as China has enhanced its assertive
behaviour in its periphery, evidenced by the Sino-Indian border violence in
May,6 hyperbole toward Taiwan,7 enhanced grey-zone and blue-hull naval
operations in the South China Sea (SCS) and East China Sea (ECS),8 and
the adoption of the new National Security Law in Hong Kong in June 2020.
The current Quad members bring significant defence resources to the
Indo-Pacific table. In order of defence budgets, the United States brings
 Canada’s approach to Quad Plus engagement 179
approximately 750 billion USD, India 61 billion USD, Japan around 49 bil-
lion USD, and Australia 26 billion USD to the collective military resources
of the Quad.9 Despite the pandemic-induced global recession, each of the
current Quad members continues to increase their defence budgets to reflect
the realisation that more and more resources will need to be directed at the
Indo-Pacific to ensure the region is not shaped by China unilaterally. For
instance, the July 2020 Australian Strategic Defence Update envisions a
region that will demand more robust maritime, submarine and strike capabilities
to defend itself in the coming decades.10 In its 2021defence budget request,
Japan plans a record 5.49 trillion yen, focusing on space, cyber and the
electromagnetic spectrum.11 These are meant to deal with immediate chal-
lenges, such as North Korea’s weapons of mass destruction and missile
development and the long-term challenge of China’s re-emergence as the
dominant organising state in the region and determination to reorganise
the region to protect Beijing’s core interests.12
The United States and India have increased their military budgets as well.
In the US’s Indo-Pacific Strategy 13 and defence budget proposal,14 demands
included increased resources to be developed and deployed in the region to
counter China’s revisionist behaviour. India continues to increase its military
spending to push back against a growing Chinese maritime presence in the
Indian Ocean,15 a military presence along the Indo-China border,16 and
China’s support for India’s arch-rival, Pakistan.17
Lastly, comparing the deployment of defence and military assets, we find
that Japan, Australia and India have deployed most of their assets in their
near abroad. For Japan, that means throughout the Japanese archipelago, the
ECS, the SCS and parts of the Indian Ocean.18 Australia, in contrast, has
deployed the majority of its military assets in the Pacific Islands area, SCS
and parts of the Indian Ocean.19 India deploys most of its assets in the
Indian Ocean and along its northern borders with China and Pakistan.20
Even though the United States has a global deployment of its assets, it star-
ted tilting its resources to the Asian region, first under the Obama Adminis-
tration’s Rebalancing Strategy 21 and accelerated under the Trump
Administration through its Indo-Pacific Strategy. 22

Quad Members on the same page of the book? Implications for Quad
Plus partners
While the March 2021 Quad Leaders’ Virtual Summit highlighted the unity of
the grouping, it also masked divergences in its current membership. Under-
standing these converging and diverging interests of its current members pro-
vides insight for Canadian policy-makers to identify synergies and opportunities
to establish a Canadian middle-power role in any Quad Plus engagement.
Existing areas of convergence include growing economic interdependence
with China and it’s track record of using economic coercion as leverage for
strategic gains.23 China’s surrogates in North-east Asia and South Asia, in
180 Nagy
particular nuclear weapons development in North Korea and Pakistan, also
create worries in Japan and India.24 China’s objection to expanded repre-
sentation in the United Nations Security Council, despite attempts by Japan
and India, represents another shared concern for Quad members.25 China’s
expanding maritime claims in ESC, SCS and the Indian Ocean have the
potential to disrupt sea lines of communication (SLOC).26 The most recent
220-blue hulled Chinese fishing vessels moored in line formation at Julian
Felipe Reef (international name Whitsun Reef)27 in April 2021 highlights the
challenges Quad and non-Quad members face in the wake of Chinese grey
zone operations in the SCS and ECS.
Quad members are also united in their continued frustration with China’s
role in fracturing ASEAN unity.28
Finally, there is also growing interest among Quad members to use
arrangements such as the Quad to enhance partnerships through specific
initiatives such as strengthening and diversifying global supply chains.29
These convergences are important foundations for Canadian Quad Plus
engagement. Especially pertinent are concerns over economic interdependence,
coercion and eschewing international law in the ECS and SCS. In the case of
the former, Canada has been subject to economic coercion and hostage diplo-
macy following the arrest of Huawei executive Meng Wanzhou. In the case of
the latter, Canada sees a tangential connection between rejection of international
law in the ECS and SCS and the practice of economic coercion and hostage
diplomacy; both are the embodiment of a state that rejects a rules-based order.
Divisive divergences continue to make deeper institutionalisation of the
Quad a challenge. For India and Japan, issue linkage over North Korea and
Pakistan’s nuclear capabilities continues to foster disagreement.30 Tokyo
would like to get India’s support for North Korea, and New Delhi seeks
Tokyo’s support for Pakistan—but neither side is willing to seriously support
the other’s concerns. Another area of divergence is Tokyo, Washington and
Canberra’s comfort with alliances, alignment and minilaterals, whereas New
Delhi continues to wed itself to the Non-aligned Movement. More critically
perhaps is the gap between New Delhi and its Quad counterparts in terms of
the geographic understanding of the Quad and the Free and Open Indo-
Pacific (FOIP). Here, India sees the Indian Ocean as the geographic scope of
the Quad’s activities, whereas the other members of the Quad have much
more expansive understandings.31 Last but not least, each member of the
Quad has different degrees of concern regarding the securitisation of the
Quad or FOIP. For India, Japan and Australia, their largest trading partner
is China, and that relationship cannot be easily changed.

Stakeholder buy-in: the Quad and South-east Asia

The Quad or Quad Plus in its current form is unlikely to get regional buy-in
from ASEAN or the South-east Asian states. The most anti-China states,
Vietnam and the Philippines, do not want to choose between their security
 Canada’s approach to Quad Plus engagement 181
Table 11.1 Japan, Australia, India, US and Canada’s converging and diverging
interests
Japan, Australia, India, US and Concern
Canada
Converging interests 1. Growing economic 1. Economic coercion
interdependence with China
(Glaser, 2017)
2. Chinese surrogates in 2. DPRK, Pakistan
North-east Asia and South Asia (missile and nuclear
tech)
3. UNSC permanent member 3. Monopolisation of
status (Mohan, 2013, 283) representation
4. China’s expanding maritime 4. SLOCs
claims in ESC, SCS and Indian
Ocean (Abe, 2015)
5. China’s role in fracturing 5. ASEAN centrality
ASEAN unity
6. Resilience of Global Supply 6. GSC disruption
China (Basu, 2020)
7. Infrastructure, connectivity 7. Development,
integration
Diverging interests 1. Issue linkage (Panda, 2011, 8) 1. DPRK vs Pakistan
2. Alliance/ alignment/ 2. Legacy of NAM,
mini-laterals US-JP Alliance, TSR
3. Competing visions 3. Indian Ocean vs
(Roy-Chaudhury and Sullivan de Indo-Pacific
Estrada, 2018)
4. Over securitisation of Quad or 4. Exclusion of China
FOIP and conflict

and their economic prosperity and as such do not hope for the Quad to be a
hard security-focused regional institution.32 They welcome the Quad or
Quad Plus to the region depending on what the Quad aims to do. For them,
the right formulation of the Quad would be another tool to hedge against an
assertive China.
In the COVID-19 pandemic era, the Quad and a Quad Plus formulation
can act as a stable, rules-based, provider of public goods to the region. The
Quad Leaders’ Summit has already demonstrated this with its pledge to
“collaborate to strengthen equitable vaccine access for the Indo-Pacific, with
close coordination with multilateral organisations including the World
Health Organization and COVAX”.33
The COVID-19 pandemic also demonstrated the vulnerabilities that the
South-east Asian states face in terms of supply chains and in particular the
182 Nagy
vulnerability of their medical supply chains.34 States like Vietnam and Cam-
bodia, which are deeply dependent on China’s supply chains, are increasingly
in need of finding ways to diversify their trade and supply-chain portfolio to
preserve their strategic autonomy as the US–China strategic competition
intensifies.
To capitalise on this, the Quad and Quad Plus engagement needs to be
reinvented to focus on the needs of South-east Asian countries rather than
some kind of Indo-Pacific NATO arrangement to contain China.
An example the Quad can follow is Japan’s FOIP shift away from a more
security-focused FOIP 1.0 to what Hosoya Yuichi of Keio University calls
FOIP 2.0, a revamped FOIP that is more in line with the needs of the littoral
states in the Indo-Pacific.35
Critical to garnering support will be the inclusion of a clear statement
supporting ASEAN Centrality, an overt shift toward infrastructure and
connectivity, development and trade as the key pillars of a reinvented Quad.
Canada’s potential engagement in a Quad Plus arrangement should be
informed by stakeholders in the Indo-Pacific such as the South-east Asian
states and not just the original Quad members. This will provide Canada
critical political capital in the region ensuring that it is not seen merely as a
junior partner in a US led initiative. In this sense, Canada must consider
Quad Plus engagement through stakeholder engagement based on its
comparative advantages that it can bring to the region.

Canada’s bolting-in and capabilities-led approach to Quad

Plus engagement
Canada’s hitherto engagement in the region has been through an Asia-Pacific,
not an Indo-Pacific framework, focusing on multilateral architecture such as
the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) on the trade side. Canada
was a founding member of APEC in 1990 and has been a dialogue partner in
the ARF since its formation in 1994. Canada’s activities in the region also
include international development in the form of support, cooperation and
membership in the Asian Development Bank (ADB), and more recently
membership—while not before considerable internal debate—of the Chinese-led
Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) in 2017.
On the political-security side, Canada’s engagement has been through the
ARF.36 Traditionally, this is primarily meant to strengthen cooperation
among member-states within the Asia-Pacific context, and now this is falling
increasingly under the umbrella of the Indo-Pacific framing.
Canada has yet to find a way to contribute to the region’s security archi-
tecture through institutional participation. Nevertheless, Canada actively
participates in multilateral defence activities such as the Shangri-la Dialogue,
the Tokyo Defense Forum, the United States Pacific Command Chiefs of
Defense Conference, the Jakarta International Defense Dialogue, the Multi-
national Planning and Augmentation Team Program, and the Seoul Defense
 Canada’s approach to Quad Plus engagement 183
Dialogue, which bring together senior defence officials at the deputy minister/
vice minister level. Canada continues to express its interest in becoming a
member of both the ADMM+ and the EAS.37
Currently, Canada’s regular military activities in the Indo-Pacific area
include the biennial Rim of the Pacific Exercises (RIMPAC). In 2014,
Canada deployed more than 1,000 Canadian Armed Forces personnel; ships,
such as the HMCS Calgary, HMCS Nanaimo and HMCS Whitehorse; sub-
marines, such as the HMCS Victoria; and several aircraft (eight CF-188
Hornets, one CC-130 Hercules, one CC-150 Polaris, and three CP-140 Aur-
oras).38 In addition to these multilateral exercises, Canada also participates
in Cobra Gold,39 one of the largest exercises in the region next to RIMPAC;
ARF’s disaster relief exercise (DiREx), which is a training opportunity
through which ASEAN countries can exercise coordination of civil-military
international assistance to strengthen cooperation in HA/DR cooperation;
and Ulchi-Freedom Guardian Exercise,40 which tests the operational control
of the combined forces in defence of the Korean Peninsula. Canada’s parti-
cipation has consisted of personnel from the 1st Canadian Division, acting as
a Division Headquarters under the 1st US Corps, among other military
training exercises in the region.
Reflecting on Canada’s participation in multinational defence fora and its
interests in the Quad, there is a convergence on many issues in the Indo-Pacific
region—but less so as to the nature of the Quad. In fact, little is written about
Canada’s perception of the Quad, with some mis-characterisations such as
“the Quad is nowadays contextualised first of all by issues around the mili-
tarisation of Chinese international behaviour”, an impression of the Quad
which resonates with South-east Asian states and other states as well.41
Compared to other middle powers within the Quad, Canada spends
around 22.5 billion USD per year, a number that is comparable to Australia
but well below the other Quad members’ budgets.42 Ottawa deploys most of
its resources toward NATO-related activities and peacekeeping operations. It
was only in 2012 when Canada began its “mini-pivot” to the Asia-Pacific in
which we saw regularised Canadian ships visit the region.43 These activities
have continued to expand, with the Canadian navy seeing greater engage-
ment in Asia.44 Still, a common refrain when advocating for enhanced
security-related engagement in the Indo-Pacific is that Canada already is
significantly overstretched to manage its security in the Pacific, Atlantic, and
now the Arctic Ocean and that it is simply impossible to divert more
resources to the Indo-Pacific in any meaningful manner outside the
regularised joint exercises listed above.
If that is the case, Canada’s ability to contribute to the Quad’s capacities
significantly is limited by the realities of finite resources. Nonetheless, that
does not mean that Canada cannot contribute to the Quad in other areas,
such as enhancing maritime domain awareness (MDA) activities, HA/DR
operations, international development, infrastructure and connectivity. As
Robert M. Cutler writes, Canada can even assume the role of a stable
184 Nagy
“producer and exporter of Canadian oil and gas to Canadian allies in the
Indo-Pacific region”.45
In this sense, Canada’s potential role within the Quad will depend less on
who is part of the Quad or Quad Plus formulation but rather on what activ-
ities the Quad members agree to be the core agenda of the nascent institu-
tion. If the Quad evolves toward a security grouping aimed at curbing
China’s assertive behaviour in the Indo-Pacific, the contributions that Ottawa
could practically provide would be limited to enhancing the capacities of the
other members through leveraging Canada’s experience and expertise in
particular maritime-based activities such as MDA. In discussions with
Canadian naval personnel, the core competencies that Canada could provide
in MDA is leveraging their intelligence-gathering experience and expertise to
bolster the collective capabilities of Quad members. This targeted form of
collaboration suggests that there might be scope for other forms of targeted
cooperation within the Quad framework as well. These may include multi-
lateral sanctions enforcement in the case of North Korea, capacity building,
search-and-rescue operations and HA/DR activities.
If the Quad evolves in a direction that inculcates the needs of South-east
Asian states such as development, the diversification of global supply chains,
infrastructure and connectivity, and non-traditional security cooperation
such as anti-piracy, anti-poaching, illegal immigration and food security,46
Canada will have more latitude in terms of the meaningful contributions it
could provide to a revamped Quad. Here, Canada’s existing track record in
international development could be leveraged alongside Quad members such
as Japan, which already has an established, longstanding track record of
providing official development assistance (ODA) for regional development.
This could be through the ADB, the AIIB, or both, depending on the project
and target of developmental aid. In the area of non-traditional security
cooperation as well, there is extensive overlap between MDA operations to
monitor blue- and white-hull ships of sanction evaders and states attempting
to dominate the ECS and SCS and the monitoring of pirates, illegal fishing
and human trafficking.
Contributing to capacity building of states on the frontline of Chinese
assertive behaviour will be critical. This means providing training and tools
such as coast guard vessels, MDA technologies, and intelligence so that states
in the region can manage their bilateral challenges with China on more even
ground. It also means more joint training exercises focusing on HA/DR and
search-and-rescue to develop interoperability and experience.
Building on Canada’s pre-existing bilateral relations with each of the cur-
rent Quad members, pre-existing multilateral cooperation in institutions such
as the Five-Eyes, and joint training exercises with Australia, Japan and the
US, Canada is well positioned to contribute directly to current Quad members
both within the Quad framework or outside.
Canada has actively courted India to expand cooperation in many areas
including a Foreign Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement (FIPA)
 Canada’s approach to Quad Plus engagement 185
and the Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) under
former Prime Minister Stephen Harper.47 Harper further expanded cooperation
to include foreign direct investment (FDI), technology transfers, trade agree-
ments and leveraging diaspora links towards expanding ties with India.48
Justin Trudeau further deepened this engagement with India with the
recognition of “the rapid emergence of the global South and Asia and the
need to integrate these countries into the world’s economic and political
system”.49 Ottawa’s courting of New Delhi was aimed at inculcating stability
into the Asia-Pacific with the rise of China and its assertive behaviour in the
region.
While not explicitly supporting Freedom of Navigation Operations
(FONOPS) in the Indo-Pacific and not linking its activities in the Indo-
Pacific to Chinese maritime behaviour, Canada has aimed to both support
and enhance its relationships with states like India in the region at the same
time it engages with China.
Infrastructure, connectivity and energy remain areas of synergy between
Canada and India. Working through the Blue Dot Network (BDN), Canada
could leverage its pre-existing capacities and cooperate with Australia, Japan
and the US to undertake infrastructure and connectivity projects to help
India develop its smart cities, diversify global supply chains, and make India
and the region more resilient to shocks to supply chains and also economic
coercion.
Energy is another area that Canada could lend weight to relieve pressure
on states with concerns over SLOCs in the SCS being disrupted by inten-
tional or accidental conflicts in the region. By providing a steady flow of
energy resources to the region, Canada could assist Quad members and
South-east Asian states to be less dependent on energy flows in the SCS. For
South-east Asian states, this gives them more strategic autonomy by
decreasing their reliance on SCS-based SLOCs. For Quad members, guaran-
tees of stable supplies of energy strengthens their resilience against disrup-
tions, allowing their economies to be less affected by conflict, coercion and
endogenous and exogenous shocks.
On the energy front, we already see Canada reaching out to India. For
instance, at the second “India–Canada Ministerial Energy Dialogue”, the
Minister of State for Petroleum and Natural Gas Dharmendra Pradhan said,
“India and Canada share common values and ideals and believe in long term
sustained partnerships. Our energy cooperation is steadily growing, but the
potential is much higher.”50
Mehta highlights that: In times of growing pressure from the US to cut oil
imports from Iran, Canada could be an alternative energy source for India.
Canada can also be a significant source of liquified natural gas (LNG) for
India; it is estimated that the latter will import 44 billion cubic metres of
LNG by 2025.51
Aside from India, Canada has also reached out to the other existing Quad
members to provide support for cooperation and a growing alignment of the
186 Nagy
Free and Open Indo-Pacific vision (FOIP). For instance, on the occasion of
Canada’s Defence Minister Harjit Sajjan visit to Japan in June 2019, both
countries agreed to continue to “advance the FOIP”.52 This declaration came
in the wake of the previous years’ Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agree-
ment (ACSA) to strengthen cooperation between the Canadian Armed
Forces (CAF) and the Japanese Self-Defense Forces.53 The agreement
“advances cooperation between the two countries in response to humanitarian
and disaster crises, peacekeeping initiatives, and allow greater collaboration
with third-partners, including the US”.54
Cooperation between Canada and Japan is not limited to the bilateral level
as highlighted above. We have also seen Canada participate in the “Keen
Sword” trilateral exercises from 2018. The latest rendition of Keen Sword
included one Canadian Destroyer and aimed at: “US military and their
JSDF counterparts will train in a comprehensive scenario designed to exer-
cise the critical capabilities required to support the defence of Japan and
respond to a crisis or contingency in the Indo-Pacific region”.55
While participation is modest, the regularised presence of the Royal
Canadian Navy working alongside Japan and the US sends a strong signal
that Canada is committed to working with like-minded countries in the
Indo-Pacific on issues it deems critical to a rules-based order. This partici-
pation outside the Quad framework and without signing on to FONOPS
squarely aimed at deterring Chinese maritime activities does not speak to
Canada’s lack of support for these activities, more so it aims to maximise its
strategic flexibility towards China while demonstrating its support for and
ability to contribute to multilateral cooperation in the region.
Maritime monitoring and surveillance is another domain in which Canada
has been engaged in since 2018, using aircraft based at Kadena Air Base, and
subject to a UN Status of Force Agreement, to counter illicit maritime
activities, including the ship-to-ship transfers of North Korean-flagged ves-
sels that are prohibited by United Nations Security Council Resolutions.56
Here, leveraging the pre-existing Five Eyes (FVEY) network provides a
springboard to expand cooperation between current Quad members such as
Australia and the US while at the same time basing cooperation on the
FVEY framework excludes two of the current Quad members, Japan and
India.
Canada recently held a virtual FVEY defence ministers’ meeting virtually
on 15–16 October 2020. Building on the June 2020 FVEY meeting, partici-
pants expanded their talks to focus on China and the Indo-Pacific. This
focus may provide a framework where Canada can provide value in the Indo-
Pacific. While this maybe be welcome to identify where current and potential
Quad members could cooperate, some see a FVEY framework for Canada to
participate in the region a “risk that by diluting an intelligence-sharing and
joint collection mechanism into something with an expansive agenda, the
core missions of the grouping could be sidelined. Issues-based coalitions
work much better than all-purpose ones”.57
 Canada’s approach to Quad Plus engagement 187
Another area where Canada can work within a Quad Plus formulation is
middle power diplomacy to promote promoting multilateralism and non-
military solutions to Indo-Pacific challenges.58 Recent examples in which
Canada worked with other middle powers and the US include the January
2018 Vancouver foreign ministers’ meeting on security and stability on the
Korean Peninsula59 and the coalition building to push back against hostage
diplomacy and economic coercion resulting in the February 2021 “Declaration
Against Arbitrary Detention in State-to-State Relations”.60
This kind of diplomacy can gain a critical massive through the vehicle of
Quad Plus cooperation and could easily be expanded to cover other shared
interests such as protecting each other from economic coercion and bullying.
Canada should use Kurt Campbell’s recent statement that “the US is not
prepared to improve relations (with China) in a bilateral and separate con-
text at the same time that a close and dear ally is being subjected to a form
of economic coercion”61 to mobilise Quad and Quad Plus participants to
realise Campbell’s pledge more formally.
Last but not least, the COVID-19 pandemic and a recent track record of
economic coercion clearly illustrated the dangers of global supply chains
being overcentralised in one state. In the case of the former, the shutdown of
the Chinese economy to control the COVID-19 outbreak severely affected
the supply and distribution of products, including medical equipment and
personal protective equipment,62 parts and products to the world.63
In the case of the latter, economic coercion against Australia, Canada,
South Korea and Japan in recent years demonstrates the need to diversify
and strengthen supply chains such that countries can be better positioned to
deal with shocks to global supply chains and the weaponisation of trade. To
do this, Japan’s approach has been primarily economic. It is investing in
building resilience into the Indo-Pacific economic integration through infra-
structure projects, strengthening global supply chains throughout South-east
and South Asia, developmental and technological aid that strengthens eco-
nomic integration, support for a shared rules-based understanding of trade,
and the use of SLOCs.64 To illustrate, the supplementary budget for fiscal
2020 includes subsidies to promote domestic investment for support of
supply chains (220 billion yen) and for supporting diversification of global
supply chains (23.5 billion yen). These are examples of this investment during
the COVID-19 pandemic, but many of the core pillars of the FOIP vision
also illustrate this commitment.
Taking a page from Japan’s approach to deal with economic coercion and the
possibility of another shock to global supply chains, Canada should work with
other Quad members in investing in the diversification and resilience of supply
chains. This serves to enhance their collective economic security while providing
to South-east Asian and South Asian states critical infrastructure and con-
nectivity that enhances their development. At the same time, it enhances these
states’ strategic autonomy to deal with assertive behaviour without directly
confronting China or creating a security competition with China.
188 Nagy
Conclusion
Canada’s participation in the Quad Plus formulation will be through bolting-
in on existing cooperation as we saw with the Sea Dragon 21 joint exercises
and through functional, capability-led cooperation in an ad-hoc manner.
Part-in-parcel of a sustainable and meaningful role a Quad Plus participant
will be informed by Canadian national interest, the Quad’s diversification of
its functions in the Indo-Pacific, and ensuring that those functional forms of
cooperation resonate with the needs of South-east and South Asian nations.
In the short-term, Canada’s contributions to the Quad Plus will be limited by
its current poor relations with China and the continuation of hostage diplomacy
and punitive economic measures by Beijing as a retaliation for the arrest of
Huawei executive Ms Meng Wanzhou. Ottawa worries that explicit acceptance
of a Quad Plus role will inflame relations between Canada and China.
Notwithstanding these concerns, Canada will continue to bolt-in to Quad Plus
activities as an observer or full-fledged participant and lend it capabilities to deal
with traditional and non-traditional security challenges and developmental issues
in the Indo-Pacific. These will include infrastructure and connectivity, energy
cooperation, maritime domain awareness, HA/DR, and search and rescue activ-
ities. Above and beyond bolting-in, to craft a Quad Plus role, we will see Canada
leverage its comparative advantages to promote pro-active middle-power diplo-
macy, supporting cyber-initiatives and an open, well-regulated digital economy,
and contributing to diversifying and making supply chains more resilient.

Acknowledgements
Part of the research associated with this chapter was supported by the Japan
Society for the Promotion of Science (JSPS) Grant related to a project on
“Japan’s Grand Strategy? Chinese interpretations of Japanese Foreign Policy
in the post-Cold War Era” (grant number 17K03590).
The author would like to express his gratitude to Ms. Hanh Nguyen for
her editorial assistance.

Notes
1 Stephen R Nagy, “What the ‘Quad’ Is and Isn’t”, The Japan Times, 19 March
2021, www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2021/03/19/commentary/japan-commentary/
the-quad-australia-india-the-united-states.
2 The White House, “Quad Leaders’ Joint Statement: ‘The Spirit of the Quad’”, 12
March 2021, www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/03/12/
quad-leaders-joint-statement-the-spirit-of-the-quad.
3 CTF 72 Public Affairs, “Sea Dragon 2021 Kicks Off Between US and Partner
Nations”, Commander, U.S. 7th Fleet, 11 January 2021, www.c7f.navy.mil/Media/
News/Display/Article/2468589/guam-hosts-partner-nations-in-exercise-sea-dragon
-2021.
4 Kashish Parpiani, “La Pérouse – Quad Naval Exercise and India’s Strategic
Partnership with France”, Observer Research Foundation (ORF), 4 April 2021,
 Canada’s approach to Quad Plus engagement 189
www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/la-perouse-quad-naval-exercise-and-indias-strateg
ic-partnership-with-france.
5 Hervé Lemahieu and Bonnie Bley, “Asia Power Index 2019 Pocket Book”, Lowy
Institute, 28 September 2019, https://power.lowyinstitute.org/downloads/Low
y-Institute-Asia-Power-Index-2019-Pocket-Book.pdf.
6 Ashley J. Tellis, “Hustling in the Himalayas: The Sino-Indian Border Confronta-
tion”, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 4 June 2020, https://carne
gieendowment.org/?lang=en.
7 Rik Glauert, “Will Taiwan Strait Tensions Lead to Conflict? Five Things to
Know”, Nikkei Asia, 25 September 2020, https://asia.nikkei.com.
8 Stephen Nagy and Hanh Nguyen, “Opportunism and Miscalculation by Clai-
mants in the South China Sea”, PacNet #41, Pacific Forum, 7 October 2020, http
s://pacforum.org.
9 Global Fire Power, “Defense Spending by Country (2020)”, 7 October 2020,
www.globalfirepower.com.
10 Department of Defense of Australia, “2020 Defense Strategic Update”, 7 October
2020, https://defence.gov.au.
11 “Japan’s Defense Ministry Seeks Record ¥5.4 Trillion Budget”, Japan Times, 1
October 2020, www.japantimes.co.jp.
12 In August, Japan’s Self Defense Force proposed a 2.1 per cent hike in defence
spending to ¥5.3 trillion (or US$48 billion), citing threats from North Korea’s
nuclear and missile programme as well as Chinese growing air and sea power in
the waters around Japan. For an insightful discussion on growing security threats
to Japan, see Masashi Murano and Rebeccah L. Heinrichs, “Transcript: Pushing
Back against Chinese and North Korean Missile Threats: Strengthening US-
Japan Deterrence Strategy and Joint Missile Defense Posture”, Hudson Institute,
3 August 2020, www.hudson.org.
13 US Department of State, “A Free and Open Indo-Pacific: Advancing a Shared
Vision”, 4 November 2019, www.state.gov.
14 US Department of Defense, “DOD Releases Fiscal Year 2021 Budget Proposal”,
10 February 2020, www.defense.gov.
15 David Brewster, “Silk Road and Strings of Pearls: The Strategic Geography of
China’s New Pathways in the Indian Ocean”, Geopolitics 22, 2 (2017), 269–291.
16 Tellis, “Hustling in the Himalayas”.
17 Rai Verma, “China’s New Security Concept: India, Terrorism, China’s Geos-
trategic Interests and Domestic Stability in Pakistan”, The Pacific Review, 13
September 2019, DOI: 10.1080/09512748.2019.1663902.
18 Ministry of Defense of Japan, “2020 Defense of Japan”, 8 October 2020, www.
mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/wp2020/DOJ2020_Digest_EN.pdf.
19 Department of Defense of Australia, “2020 Defense Strategic Update”.
20 Ministry of Defense of India, “Annual Report 2018–2019”, 9 October 2020, www.
mod.gov.in.
21 Renato Cruz de Castro, “The Obama Administration’s Strategic Rebalancing to
Asia: Quo Vadis in 2017?” Pacific Focus 33,2 (2018), 179–207.
22 US Department of Defense, “Indo-Pacific Strategy Report: Preparedness, Part-
nerships, and Promoting a Networked Region”, 1 June 2019, www.defense.gov.
23 Bonnie S. Glaser, “China’s Coercive Economic Diplomacy”, The Diplomat, 25
July 2012, https://thediplomat.com.
24 Malik Mohan, India and China: Great Power Rivals (New Delhi: Viva, 2012), 283.
25 J. Mohan Malik, “Security Council Reform: China Signals its Veto”, World
Policy Journal 22, 1 (2005), 20.
26 Shinzo Abe, “The Bounty of the Open Seas: Five New Principles of Japanese
Diplomacy”, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 18 January 2013, www.mofa.go.jp.
190 Nagy
27 Renato Cruz De Castro, “China’s Gray Zone Operation in the Making? A Com-
mentary on Julian Felipe Reef Crisis”, The PhilStar, 10 April 2021, www.philstar.
com/other-sections/news-feature/2021/04/10/2090207/chinas-gray-zone-opera
tion-making-commentary-julian-felipe-reef-crisis.
28 Huong Le Thu, “China’s Dual Strategy of Coercion and Inducement towards
ASEAN”, The Pacific Review 32, 1 (2019), 20–36.
29 Bloomberg, “Japan, Australia and India to Launch Supply Chain Initiative”, 1
September 2020, www.bloomberg.com/asia.
30 Rajaram Panda, “Changing Dynamics of India-Japan Relation: Future Trend”, in
Akihiro Iwashita, ed., India-Japan Dialogue: Challenge and Potential (Hokkaido:
Slavic-Eurasian Research Center, Hokkaido University, 2011), 8.
31 Rahul Roy-Chaudhury and Kate Sullivan de Estrada, “India, the Indo-Pacific
and the Quad”, Survival 60, 3 (2018), 181–194.
32 Vietnam and the Philippines perceive the Quad as an initiative to complement the
existing regional security framework and hope it will play a role in enforcing
rules-based order. To understand South-east Asia’s diverse view of the Quad, read
Huong Le Thu, “How Southeast Asians Really Perceive the Quadrilateral Secur-
ity Dialogue”, Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, Center for Strategic and
International Studies, 12 November 2018, https://amti.csis.org/how-southeast-asia
ns-really-perceive-quad.
33 The White House, “Quad Leaders’ Joint Statement: ‘The Spirit of the Quad’”, 12
March 2021,www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/03/12/
quad-leaders-joint-statement-the-spirit-of-the-quad.
34 Manisha Mirchandani, “Coronavirus exposes dependency of Southeast Asia’s
manufacturers on China”, Brink News, 15 March 2020, www.brinknews.com.
35 Yuichi Hosoya, “FOIP 2.0: The evolution of Japan’s Free and Open Indo-Pacific
Strategy”, Asia-Pacific Review 26, 1 (2019), 18–28.
36 David Dewitt, Mary Young, Alex Brouse and Jinelle Piereder, “AWOL: Canada’s
Defense Policy and Presence in the Asia Pacific”, International Journal 73, 1
(2018), 5–32.
37 Association of Southeast Asian Nations, “Canada to Further Strengthen Ties
with ASEAN”, 31 March 2016, https://asean.org.
38 Government of Canada, “Canada Participates in World’s Largest Maritime
Exercise – RIMPAC 2014”, 8 October 2020, www.canada.ca/en.html.
39 Zachary Williams, “Cobra Gold 2020: America’s Strategic Shift in Southeast
Asia”, The Diplomat, 6 March 2020, https://thediplomat.com.
40 Global Security Force, “Ulchi-Freedom Guardian”, 8 October 2020, www.globa
lsecurity.org.
41 Robert M. Cutler, “Canadian Energy Leadership in the Indo-Pacific Region”,
Conference of Defence Associations (CDA) Institute, January 2019, https://cda
institute.ca/on-track-2019-1.
42 Global Firepower, “Defense Spending by Country (2020)”.
43 Eric Lerhe, “The Asia-Pacific and the Royal Canadian Navy”, Canadian Global
Affairs Institute, June 2015, www.cgai.ca.
44 Gordon Arthur, “Canadian Navy Sees Greater Engagement in Asia”, Shephard
Media, 4 May 2018, www.shephardmedia.com.
45 Cutler, “Canadian Energy Leadership in the Indo-Pacific Region”.
46 Prakash Gopal, “Maritime Security in the Indo-Pacific: The Role of the US and
its Allies”, Maritime Affairs: Journal of the National Maritime Foundation of India
13, 1 (2017), 27–40.
47 Arthur Rubinoff, “Canada’s Re-Engagement with India”, Asian Survey 42, 6
(2002), 838–855.
48 Ibid.
 Canada’s approach to Quad Plus engagement 191
49 Rajiv Bhatia, “India-Canada Relations-Post Trudeau’s Visit: The Road Ahead”,
The Gateway House, 7 May 2018.
50 “Canada and India Highlight Growing Energy Relationship”, Press Information
Bureau, Government of India, 7 July 2015.
51 Mehta, Ketan, “India and Canada Relations: The Long Road to Recovery”,
Observer Research Foundation (ORF), Occasional Papers (2019).
52 Department of National Defence of Canada, “Joint Statement of the Ministry of
Defense of Japan and the Department of National Defence of Canada on
Defense Cooperation”, June 2019, www.canada.ca/en/department-nationa
l-defence/news/2019/06/joint-statement-of-the-ministry-of-defenseof-japan-and-th
e-department-of-national-defence-of-canada-on-defense-cooperation.html.
53 Global Affairs Canada, “Canada and Japan Sign Acquisition and Cross-Servicing
Agreement to Strengthen Military Cooperation”, April 2018, www.canada.ca/en/
global-affairs/news/2018/04/canada-and-japan-sign-acquisition-and-cross-servicing
-agreement-to-strengthen-military-cooperation.html.
54 Miller, Jonathan Berkshire, and Thomas Wilkins, “The Role for Middle Powers in
the Free and Open Indo-Pacific: Looking at Opportunities for Canada and
Australia”, Japan Review 3, 1 (2019).
55 Naval News, “US Military and Japan Self-Defense Forces Kick Off Keen Sword”,
26 October 2020, www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2020/10/u-s-military-and-japa
n-self-defense-forces-kick-off-keen-sword.
56 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan, “Monitoring and Surveillance Activities by
Canada against Illicit Maritime Activities Including Ship-to-Ship Transfers”,
press release, 24 May 2019, www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/press4e_002454.html.
57 Abhijnan Rej, “Five Eyes Defense Ministers Meet amid Widening Agenda”, The
Diplomat, 17 October 2020, https://thediplomat.com/2020/10/five-eyes-defense-m
inisters-meet-amid-widening-agenda.
58 Stephen R. Nagy, “Indo-Pacific Resilience, Prosperity and Stability: Canada’s
Capabilities-Led Approach to Strategic Free and Open Indo-Pacific Engage-
ment”, Canadian and Japanese Free and Open Indo-Pacific Visions, Policy Per-
spective, Canadian Global Affairs Institute, 3 March 2021, www.cgai.ca/indo_pa
cific_resilience_prosperity_and_stability_canada_s_capabilities_led_approach_to_
strategic_free_and_open_indo_pacific_engagement.
59 Global Affairs Canada, “Canada and United States to Co-host Vancouver For-
eign Ministers’ Meeting on Security and Stability on Korean Peninsula”, 19
December 2017, www.canada.ca/en/global-affairs/news/2017/12/canada_and_uni
tedstatestoco-hostvancouverforeignministersmeeting.html?wbdisable=true.
60 Government of Canada, “Declaration against Arbitrary Detention in State-to-
State Relations”, 12 February 2021, www.international.gc.ca/news-nouvelles/a
rbitrary_detention-detention_arbitraire-declaration.aspx?lang=eng.
61 Peter Hartcher, “‘Just Not Going to Happen’: US Warns China over Australian
Trade Stoush”, Sydney Morning Herald, 16 March 2021, www.smh.com.au/world/
north-america/just-not-going-to-happen-us-warns-china-over-australian-trade-sto
ush-20210316-p57b4l.html.
62 Talha Burki, “Global Shortage of Personal Protective Equipment”, The Lancet
Infectious Diseases 20, 7 (2020), 785–786.
63 Sara Hsu, “Effects of Coronavirus on China’s Supply Chains”, China-US Focus,
14 May 2020, www.chinausfocus.com.
64 US Indo-Pacific Command Public Affairs, “Japan Self-Defense Forces, US Mili-
tary to Begin Exercise Keen Sword”, 26 October 2020, www.cpf.navy.mil/news.asp
x/130731.
12 The Indo-Pacific Quad Plus at Atlantic
Latin American shores
Moment of covet or reckoning for Brazilian
foreign policy?
Dattesh Parulekar

Introduction
Brazil, with a populace of 240 million, a multi-trillion dollar economy, and a
repository of wide spectrum of strategic natural commodities, spanning
industrial coal to commercial minerals, encompassing the gamut of agrarian
raw materials to the flora and fauna biodiversity of the Amazonian deep-
foliage, headlines the transcontinental expanse of Latin America, which,
though a prominent arch-pillar of the much famed formulation of the
“Global South”, remains obscured from strategic consideration. Having been
at the vanguard of fuelling the societal prosperity of the East Asian and
Asia-Pacific economies, progressively for close to three decades, through its
profile of being a commercial vendor for natural resources exports, the epo-
chal role of Brazil and by extension, the geographical behemoth of Latin
America, could hardly be oblivious to anyone? This said, despite the tyr-
annical distance of geography that blights the region and Brazil in particular,
the South American powerhouse has plotted a remarkable presence across a
wide array of trans-regional and global forums and platforms of international
governance.
Brasilia has renowned itself as a feisty advocate for developing country
causes through the agricultural interests subset of the Cairns Group, as also
a proactive litigant through the trade-disputes redressal mechanisms of the
World Trade Organization. It enjoys coveted membership of the BRICS
grouping of emerging economies; the G20 constellation, in place since the
global economic and financial crisis; not to mention the G4 clique of coun-
tries, canvassing for democratic UN reforms. Notwithstanding, the Western
Hemispheric behemoth has long been invested in global commons portfolios,
be it the existential crisis of nuclear proliferation; the aggravating con-
tretemps surrounding free trade; even the metastasising scourge of climate
change. Brazil was an influential player in the Nuclear Suppliers Group
(NSG)1 in 2006–2007, at a critical juncture for India, which was con-
summating its Civil Nuclear Agreement with the US, and Brasilia’s con-
structive disposition, was an enabler in the exercise. Similarly, Brazil joined
Turkey in proposing an off-ramp solution in the US–Iran nuclear standoff

DOI: 10.4324/9781003206408-15
 Quad Plus and Brazilian foreign policy 193
over addressing the disposability of highly enriched uranium, in 2010.2 This
said, Brazil has been an innate member in championing the legitimate cause
and concerns of the developing world in climate change negotiations,
through the tactically convened collective of BASIC.
Notwithstanding, Brazil through the first decade of the twenty-first cen-
tury, manifested itself as a pioneer in conceptualising and implementing
path-breaking direct cash-benefit transfers, through the much touted pro-
gramme of Bolsa-Familia, recognised by the UNDP as a landmark initiative,
and which arguably became the tutelary basis, for roll-out of India’s
Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act
(MNREGA).3 Brazil has taken up its UN responsibilities with much lenity,
cranking up its humanitarian peace operations role, as was witnessed in its
shepherding of the United Nations Stabilisation Mission in Haiti (MINUS-
TAH) since 2004,4 but also in its contributing deployment of diplomatic
finesse to moderating the contentious “humanitarian intervention vis-á-vis
sovereignty”-related responsibility to protect (R2P) concept, through a
mutated formulation of the responsibility while protecting (RwP), albeit that
the phraseological ideation could not be sustained through the diplomatic-
corps beltways of New York.5
With so much going for it, what then explicates the disconnect between
Brasilia’s broadsheet footprint across the slew of global governance archi-
tectures and regimes on the one hand, and its underwhelming almost per-
ipheral at times role in shaping strategic discourses, ordering and landscape.
Clearly, this disparity speaks to a gap between participatory quotient of
insertion into structures, and meeting the threshold requirement, for quanti-
tative and qualitative systemic integration.6 The variables which hold the key
to decoding this discrepant profile are multitudinous, to say the least. A
country’s historic backdrop matters in the shaping of its foreign policy per-
spective, and the historicity of Brazil’s colonial era production systems con-
ditioned it to find succour in endeavours and forays, at intimately wedded
trading arrangements, with the global order driving Euro-Atlantic swathe.
This apart, the verities of Brazil’s multi-racial societal composition virtually
mandated it in moral terms to be impelled into funnelling development aid
and practising broader forms of diplomatic bonhomie with African nations,
whether bilaterally or in conjunction with third countries such as Japan for
instance, with the destination being those on the Western continental fron-
tier, juxtaposed across the Atlantic. This foregoing duality also exposes
Brazil to a torn conflicting identity problem in its foreign policy prioritisa-
tion, as it seeks to reconcile its traditional equations with the proverbial
North and the putative South, grappling with the challenge of dovetailing an
intrinsic impulse at pursuing solidarity and resistance to Western high-
handedness and hegemony on the one hand, with pragmatism, that increas-
ingly demands a multi-vectored and omni-aligned policy praxis, indexed to
refined national interests’ appraisal and supine calibration; not erratic,
idiosyncratic and preordained.7
194 Parulekar
Disconnects in Brazilian foreign policy: conflicting turns over “identity”
and “ideology”
Brazilian foreign policy, in its cognition and vent, also suffers from the sty-
mieing conditions brought on by an ideologically heady predilection and
predisposition in appreciation of strategic choices and national interests’
assessments. Through the social democratic years that marked the tenure of
President Henrique Cardoso (1995–2003), through the almost four successive
terms (2003–2019) of the Leftist Worker’s Party (PT) regimes of Presidents
Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva (2003–2011), his political protégé Dilma Rouseff
(2011–2016), and the interregnum Presidency of Vice President Michel Temer
(2016–2019), Brazilian foreign policy formulation and practice of statecraft
has leaned and lurched down the path of pragmatic engagement with Wes-
tern powers alright, but swaddled in the unmistakable alignment and asso-
ciation with the straddle of the “Global South”. This informs the dint of
Brasilia in BRICS, IBSA (including partaking in “IBSAMAR” exercises),
and other assemblages, under a Brazilian leftist-turn which was less dogma,
but more politico-ideologically doctrinaire.8
Since the 2019 helming advent of the incumbent right-wing dispensation, with
a military background populist in President Bolsonaro, Brasilia has unabashedly
pitched its tent with the preponderant northern neighbour, the United States,
exhausting every sinew to strike an elusive trade deal with Washington that
would compare with the latter’s strong commercial ties to regional rival Mexico,
and stumping for OECD membership through US support, given that arch-rival
Argentina is queued up ahead of it, and the Southern Cone likes of Chile are
already in it.9 Despite a fracas with Europe, France and Germany in particular,
over criticism of his Amazon deforestation policy and response to sylvan-incin-
erations therein,10 Brazil remains invested in Western powers, reinforced further,
through presidential sojourns to US allies Israel,11 Saudi Arabia and Qatar,12
and multiple interfaces with then Japanese Premier, Shinzo Abe.13 In contrast,
candidate Bolsonaro had railed against China from the campaign-stump back in
2018, and his abiding ranting run-ins since victory at the hustings, through the
utterances of his Congressman son and acrimonious dysfunction within his own
Cabinet over pro-Chinese elements most notably his Vice President, only adding
grist to the mill of his disinterest in lumping with the developing comity of
nations. The lackadaisical mannerisms that President Bolsonaro brought to
Brazil’s stewardship of BRICS during 2019 was not lost on anyone, and his
New Delhi visit, seminal in retrospect, only fructified because the invitation
accorded to him carried the festoon of Republic Day State Guest.14 For an
emerging global entity whose latent national power itself brings it a seat at the
global high-table, it behoves that, despite the profound nature of political
polarisation and personalised angst shaping the relationship between the
incumbent (Bolsonaro) and arguably his most likely opponent in elections next
year (Lula), Brazilian politics and foreign policy frames should edify and mature
such that there can be broad concurrence and national consensus on the
 Quad Plus and Brazilian foreign policy 195
fundamental strategic objectives and national interests, as also on the config-
uration and trajectory of extant diplomatic engagement, albeit subject to
comprehensible stylised differentiation; the sine qua non for any responsible
stake-holding.
The Indo-Pacific expanse is a landscape centripetal to global security, sta-
bility and prosperity, riding the crest of absorptive and purveyance capability,
in terms of trade volumes, financial flows, investible surpluses, and technol-
ogy transfers. No wonder then that the European mainstay sovereigns
(France, Germany, UK and even the Netherlands), as also advanced indus-
trial economies as far flung as Canada, have charted their respective Indo-
Pacific strategic outlooks, seeking to align their curated approaches with the
concurrent influential rise of Asian and African continentals. Brazil must
shed its enduring propensity for crass ad-hocism in foreign policy processes
and craft a futuristic strategic doctrine and dynamic security-development
strategy that chimes and segues with the prominence of the Indo-Pacific
theatre; ineluctable, if it desires to transition from a hesitant middle power
overbearing the Western-Southern hemisphere to enjoying the acclaim of a
robust global power. A smoothened relationship with a reinserting Washing-
ton, notwithstanding; inveterate ties to European powers ingress, no matter;
and affinities to resident Portuguese speaking decolonised sovereigns, no
issue; Brasilia’s Indo-Pacific charter must be premised on cultivation of
cogent and sustained bilateral equations, with the resident likes of Japan,
India and Australia, and ASEAN constellation, in the mix.

Japan–Brazil in Indo-Pacific: solidarist development-diplomacy to

strategically leveraged development
Mutual engagement embodies an acquaintance of longstanding vintage, but,
in many ways, is stuck in a time warp. Harking back to 1985, the year Brazil
wrung itself off its authoritarian lairs witnessed the jumpstarting of project-
based capacity-building cooperation across African third countries, in con-
junction with Japan. The marquee partnership which drew the moniker of
the Japan Brazil Partnership Programme (JBPP)—began, as Japanese dis-
seminated technical expertise, augmenting the wherewithal of Brazilian
capacitation, to deliver on soft sector initiatives through this instrument of
constructive compact—has through the early years of the twenty-first cen-
tury come to be pursued in a resplendent proposition of equitable contribu-
tion and emancipatory beneficence, by both protagonists.15 Yet, the bilateral
strand of the relationship represents a perpetuation of stereotypical ties,
marked by Brazilian exports of panoply of agricultural raw-materials and
mineral-deposits fuelling Japanese enterprise, and the latter’s dispatch of
manufactured mechanised goods for Brazilian societal harness. Amid desul-
tory political will at either end, underscored by the slenderest incidence of
politico-diplomatic dialogue and the patchy nature of exchanges, it was
deemed necessary in recent interactions between the two leaderships to
196 Parulekar
elevate this relationship through the enabling medium of the mutual ally,
Washington. Hence, the recent genesis of the trilateral cooperation forum
carrying the nomenclature of JUSBE (Japan–US–Brazil Exchange), launched
in November 2020, in Brasilia, as mechanism for an actionable agenda-
driven and ostensibly outcomes-oriented process, for triangulated con-
vergence and synergy.16 The identified pillars of policy-coordinated and per-
spectives-harmonised dimensions at strategic cooperation, viz., regional
security concerns, pursuit of shared economic prosperity, and considerations
of democratised and pluralised governance, behold to elevate the tenor and
scope of Brazil–Japan equities out of its transactional mundaneness, but
equally importantly, facilitate Brazil to leverage expertise and fiscal resources
to tectonically reorient its own economic structures, towards becoming a
potently contributing-cum-benefactor stakeholder in the Indo-Pacific strategic
architecture and vector.17
Engagement with Beijing brings a host of commercial interchange and
investment funnelling opportunities at unlocking potential across a raft of
Brazilian primary sectors, but also posits its fair share of aggravating vul-
nerabilities, in terms of unsustainable debt, profound dependency of sectors
on Chinese vagaries and vicissitudes, and machinations of punitive coercion
and duress, besides constraints to sovereign and strategic autonomy that
cannot comport or be countenanced, at the altar of a self-respecting emer-
ging power. In sharp contrast, interchange and indulgence with Tokyo brings
a different texture of engagement, given the higher order hue of the Japanese
economy whose exquisitely competent private sector is defined by its pench-
ant for excellence and the best practices panache of its development finance
institutions, such as JICA, JBIC, and others, underscoring sound principles
of integrity and rectitude.
Foibles and fault-lines sure exist that stem from mutual recriminations at
global fora, over Brazilian harangue at Japanese subsidies defraying agri-
cultural sector costs, in understood infraction of WTO rules, to Japanese
exasperating refrain over Brazilian persistence with diminishing-return
regimes of anachronistic tax structures and the labyrinthine maze of reg-
ulatory red-tape, rendering the economy, denuded, in terms of global com-
petitiveness. Yet, a greater measure of Japanese commercial involvement and
insertion of investible avenues into myriad elements of the Brazilian produc-
tive and revenue accruing economy would buffet and buttress domestic
capacity and national development, through infusion of funds, injection of
technological upgrade, multi-modal infrastructural-build, and sharing of
technical skills-sets of human and automated innovation, primed for enhan-
cing output and imparting efficiency to operations, across the phalanx of
industrious enterprises, from revolutionised agri-business to modern manu-
facturing.18 Like the recently pioneered Brazil-Japan compact on beneficent
protection and productive preservation of the uniquely complex bio-diversity
ecosystem of the Amazonian Rainforests, Brazil in turn, can be brought into
the mix of pluralised activities of resident states within the Indo-Pacific,
 Quad Plus and Brazilian foreign policy 197
sharing best practices and experiential comprehension of sustainable mining,
as also humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR) operations.
Japan would never be a supplanting match for the winnowed Chinese foot-
print across Brazil, as it lacks the voracious natural resources guzzling appetite
and commodious deep-pockets of state-based discretionary expenditure; arche-
typal to the Middle Kingdom. However, it can be confidently expected to spare
the gargantuan Latin American nation, the cupid avarice, when benchmarked
against Beijing’s pincer-like predator disposition and alacrity for insubordina-
tion, through coercive captivation. Across a wide spectrum application of tech-
nologies, in industrial continuums to civilian conveniences, through to the full
repertoire of digital to artificial intelligence ecosystems in value-unlocking and
value-accretion securitisation of Brazilian spheres of strategic endeavour, Japan
can grow Brasilia at home, and burgeon its stature abroad. Since Abe’s Latin
America sojourn of 2014 through to the recent barnstorm of Foreign Minister
Motegi across the region in January 2021, the Japanese commitment of compact
with Brazil and the region is forged in the “Juntos” policy exhortation, of
broad-based development, multi-vectored connectivity, and people-to-people
affinities, as the premise to a fulsome relationship.19

Brazil–Australia in the Indo-Pacific: turning notional schmooze to

complementing interface
Often described as exotic “Southern Lands”,20 wedged apart by formidable
physical distance, Brasilia and Canberra have often found themselves talking
over each other or past each other rather than through to each other. The
lynchpin regional powers, ensconced on the Southern Atlantic seaboard and
the Southern Pacific have on their back of similar profiles in natural resour-
ces endowment, spanning industrial-minerals, agrarian raw-materials and
animal husbandry, viewed each other as competitors, more so in terms of
vying for the commercial covet of the resource hungry East Asian trinity
nations, of China, Japan and the Republic of Korea, respectively. Their
socialisation orientations have also kept them in distinct corners: Brazil in
the global south, on account of its developing country credentials and long-
standing commitment to South–South Cooperation (SSC), whilst Australia,
entrenched in the high value economies of the OECD North; its long-time
Finance Minister, now the Secretary General of the plush collective. But
despite their differentiated traditions, there is recognition of convergences
that go beyond Brazil-Australia cooperation on championing the cause of
liberalised agricultural trade, whether through the Cairns Group, the forums
of the WTO, or the G20 platform, for that matter. Brazil-Australia political
and diplomatic exchanges are gaining momentum, albeit emanating from the
slimmest of notional interfaces, such that mutual experience-sharing, coa-
lesced around higher education, and research and technology collaboration,
of professionals and cutting-edge institutions of competencies, is fomenting,
and requites cementing, over time.21 Brazil’s hosting of the Olympics
198 Parulekar
extravaganza in 2016 drew on Aussie experiences from the turn of the mil-
lennium Sydney edition, and Aussie glean of Brazil’s staging of the Soccer
World Cup spectacle in 2014 should hold it in good stead as it gears up to
host the Women’s World Cup in 2023. This said, despite the inevitability of
searing competition between the strategic commodities titans on either side,
there remains appreciable latitude for medium and small enterprises and
commercial entities to lock-in on avenues of provisioning for equipment,
services and technology products. The two geographically gargantuan
nations, can further confluence in domains such as food-processing and
innovating verticals of agri-technologies, where Brazil’s globally lodestar
food industry can disseminate normative and operative understandings on
diffusing and diversifying risks associated with mono-focussed economies
such as Australia, even as mutual cooperation can enable the weaning-off
undue dependence and reliance on rudimentary commodities exports.22
In recent years, Brazil’s dependence on Chinese sourcing of its strategic nat-
ural commodities has yielded to potentially ensnaring Chinese investments into
strategic infrastructure and capacitation areas of the Brazilian economy, from
ports and port-operation services to oil-storage depots and warehousing facil-
ities, beholding national security and sustainable development ramifications.
With Australia famed for its logistics and last mile connectivity credentials,
noted no less in the recent Quad Summit and its developmental compact, Brazil
could extract much value from Australian best practices, at sustainable infra-
structural build alright, but more so dimensions of efficient administrative, fiscal
and human resources management of infrastructure related operations that can
unbundle exponential output and revenue performance metrics in an era where
transportation, handling services, storage and trans-shipment efficiencies are the
keys to commercial competitiveness.23
Brazil and Australia share glaring similarities in their ordained geographical
sculpture, which makes them “natural allies” in the quest to optimise potential
electricity generation, procreated from clean and renewable energy sources, be it
in solar, wind or thermal power. With the audaciously envisioned proposal of the
One-Sun One-World One-Grid (OSOWOG) multilateral global enterprise poised
for take-off, there would be unbridled opportunities brought on by the visage of
an interconnected grid of solar power transmission through deep sea cables.
Brazil could tap into its legendary reputation as an exponent of South-South
Cooperation (SSC), by harnessing Australian influence across the dotting island
countries of the South Pacific, to outreach to a region-subset where instilled
predominance of renewable energy within the overall matrix would enhance
ecologically conscious sustainable development of such sovereign patches.

Brazil and India in the Indo-Pacific: from transactional to strategic

scoping of engagement
Even though the Brazil–India track comes up in reference, at the back end of
the triumvirate of bilateralisms, reckoned to be the key anchor and impetus-
 Quad Plus and Brazilian foreign policy 199
plank for Brasilia to craft an autonomous Indo-Pacific strategy in terms of
normativity and policy, it is by no means the least regarded. In fact, one
could veritably adduce that, Brasilia–New Delhi interchange, which unlike
the Brasilia–Tokyo strand or Brasilia–Canberra sliver, has seen continued
upswings over the past two decades and remains, arguably, the most dynamic
Brazilian link to the Indo-Pacific; an association, relatively more diversified
in interaction, a socialisation of longer amiable vintage, and an empiricism of
relational content that productively straddles successive dispensations, across
the political spectrum. Mutual engagement, though steeped in stereotypical
transactional exchange, an archetypal for Brazil centric ties, nevertheless,
gripped imagination, through the early inadvertence but soon to be resplen-
dent cooperation over pharmaceuticals and healthcare. Lula’s Brazil turned
the screws on US pharmaceutical giants such as Merck over their predatory
pricing of antiretroviral and essential life-saving drugs, that seriously under-
cut the country’s subsidised anti-HIV campaign, and opted for product
acquisitions out of India, bringing significant cost reduction, besides, ren-
dering a footprint to Indian pharma majors that has seen improved bottom-
lines and increased localised shoring of production and distribution facilities.
Another high water mark in the relationship, dating back to 2002, is India’s
deepening breeding and leveraging of ethanol-based energy mix; drawing on
Brazil’s pioneering innovation in biomass and biofuels, with India bringing
prospective economies of scale to bear, on instrumentality of alternative socio-
economics.24 The January 2020 sojourn of President Bolsonaro, one that was
marquee in so far as the descent of a CEOs contingent and a six-member
ministerial delegation, spoke eloquently to the broad-sheeting function of the
relationship, the upshot of which was the fifteen strong accords, so concluded.
New Delhi and Brasilia morphed their skeletal defence ties up a qualitative
notch, with unprecedented fostering of joint ventures in small arms manu-
facture and a commitment to scale up the targeted fiscal spend on it, to a bil-
lion dollars, a sentiment capped off in the Modi government’s inclination to
opt for the C-390 Millennium tactical military transport platform, requisi-
tioned from the Boeing acquired Brazilian aircraft major Embraer, which sold
executive civilian (VVIP) jets to India in the past.25
This said, the fact that opportunities are brimming for two regional and
global powerhouses, which are premier emerging economies but also developing
societies with their fair share of mirroring vexations to alleviate and ameliorate,
is tempered in the sobering realisation that, as socio-economies in transition,
they often clash over issues of subsidisation of certain product-lines, patents and
intellectual property protection frameworks, and domestic regulatory issues.
However, with ISRO’s recent launch of Brazil’s maiden independently designed,
built and operated Amazonia-1 satellite,26 the scoping prospects for more qua-
litative maritime interoperability exercises in pursuance of EEZ management
and allied plausible forms of power projection, and potential for commissioning
deep underwater expeditionary missions for sustainable ocean-floor mapping
200 Parulekar
and sea-bed blue economy mining, brings mutually beneficial and productive
spatiality-quotient to relations.
The current pandemic scenario offered much latitude for Brazil and India,
to synergistically collaborate, beyond Brazil’s commercial acquisition of
hydroxylchloroquine, and more recent sourcing of the Serum Institute of
India produced AstraZeneca vaccine doses.27 Brazil and India, through their
credentialed laboratory investigation infrastructure, healthcare-specific pro-
duction capacities, and multiple indigenised candidates in anti-pathogen
clinical trials, could have forged a convergent model initiative at vaccine vial
development that could have satiated each other’s escalated requirements for
jabs-in-shoulders, whilst also enabling them to serve their respective devel-
opment-diplomacy sensibilities in ushering vaccine access, to low-income
countries and impoverished societies.28 Counteracting the underwhelming
nature of cooperation in the wake of the pandemic is Brazil’s unflinching
thrust to sustainable development through the clean and renewable energies
initiative of India, where it has been an early signatory, to the India broached
but Indo-French mooted conceptualisation of the International Solar Alli-
ance (ISA) and its most ambitious spin-off, the unfolding astounding pro-
mise of the OSOWOG project. India-Brazil cooperation could shine radiant,
as exceptional Brazilian hard capacity and soft skills ecosystem could meld
with India and larger Asia’s forage for renewables through securing out-
bound markets. Much akin to potential Australian facilitation of its bene-
ficent presence in the South Pacific, collegial soft-sector capacitation with
India in the IOR island-states could be realised.

Strategic dimensions of Brazilian ingress into the Indo-Pacific

agenda compact
The quadrant of democratic countries, geopolitically central to the conjoined
theatre of conception (i.e. the Indo-Pacific) has forged the geo-economic
canvass of the region, along a quartet of strategic interests. These could be
defined as strategic capacitation of multi-vectored hue; commoditised struc-
tures and processes within fragmented production; critical technologies, and
their securitisation for strategic autonomy; and sustainable development
through pluralised harness of global commons, across spatiality. Intriguingly,
despite being a geographically distant entity and self-avowedly aloof from the
region in geopolitical terms, a glacially emerging Brazil, at the cusp of many
a colossal transformation domestically, is willy-nilly staked-in on how Indo-
Pacific strategic transpiring shapes-up along these axes.

Strategic capacitation in the Indo-Pacific and beyond: whither

Brazilian relevance?
The Indo-Pacific expanse finds itself being punctuated by the statist-driven,
project-based capacitation enterprise of China, viz., the Belt and Road
 Quad Plus and Brazilian foreign policy 201
Initiative (BRI), which interestingly enough does not cloister itself simply
either along the elongated Eurasian continental landmass all the way into
Central and Eastern Europe or the maritime alignment that carries it along
the Eastern African littoral all the way to Western Europe. The transconti-
nental expanse of Latin America, most notably the Western bounded sover-
eign constellations of the Pacific Alliance, is already in the BRI’s crosshairs
through varied forms of strategic capacitation, not necessarily only physical,
but also financial, monetary and technological. Brazil’s galling bottlenecks in
physical infrastructure, its underwhelming and underperforming logistics
capacities and multi-modal transportation and mobility impediments have
sought to be capitalised upon by China, through humungous levels of alleg-
edly mop-up investments, the manner of which can only be described as
predatory forms of extra-territorial state-capture, in the making.
There is no gainsaying that a landmass behemoth such as Brazil needs
massive infusion of infrastructural related funds and commissioning of pro-
jects, but should there not be due diligence and processes that examine such
projects, in consonance with strategic national prioritization. Infrastructure
build projects being quintessentially a long-gestation enterprise ought to be
benchmarked on good order principles of democratic consensus, stakeholder
centricity in utilitarian terms, financial viability, ecological consciousness and
harmony, transparency in interlocutor dealings, and accountability for ulti-
mate outcomes. By no stretch of imagination do Chinese eye-popping infra-
structure projects or game-changer projections of their investments square up
to the foregoing attributes of sustainable higher-ordering. For far too long
Chinese infiltration onto the Brazilian landscape has been determined at the
sacrificial altar of ideological polarity, and cultivated deep-assets within
polity, bureaucracy, business constituencies, etc.
However, that need not persist, and the first filaments of potential alter-
native building is on the horizon with the Quad Summit determining the
triad of constructs to pool their respective core competencies around, and to
leverage strengths towards fructifying a new paradigm. The Quad pro-
nounced triad of vaccine development segueing into enduring healthcare
capacitation and pharmaceuticals based cooperation, critical technologies
ecosystem prioritising safety and integrity over pricing, and climate change
compact for decarbonisation and renewal energy recourse for resilient devel-
opment framework, are precisely the terms upon which Brazil could and
should endeavour to gravitate investments through the US–Japan construct,
bilaterally with Australian logistics involvement, vide India in sector specific
strategic realms, and even through the bright lights within ASEAN, such as
Singapore, with its financing and technological potency. Notwithstanding,
Brazil may also be able to leverage the increasingly evinced interest of Eur-
opean players such as France, Germany and the United Kingdom, which it is
currently unable to do of its own volition, courtesy ruffled feathers over a
slew of issues, from Amazonian policy to acrimony in EU-MERCOSUR
negotiations, for an unencumbered free-trade agreement.
202 Parulekar
Critical technologies discourse: inflexion-point for Brazilian foreign
policy in the Indo-Pacific?
A consequentialist decision of monumental proportions stares Brazil in the
face and has been for a while now, with Brasilia have managed to deflect
attention over it through prolonged dither, but procrastination, no longer.
China’s burgeoning influence in and over Latin America’s largest economy has
the South American nation’s technological landscape in its sights, through
incessant and inexorable pressure upon Brazil to embrace Huawei for its 5G
networking and grant unfettered access to meet the full spectrum of Brazilian
digital requirements, economic and societal. Beijing’s bare-knuckled dare of
deep punitive retaliation for any perceived undue disparate treatment to
Huawei vis-à-vis its competitors, has kept even the fulminating President Bol-
sonaro enduringly coy and noncommittal over the matter. In the interlude, the
Japanese overtures, an outcome of iterated confabulations between President
Bolsonaro and former Premier Abe has thrown the South Atlantic power-
house a much-vaunted lifeline. An outcome of early consultations through the
trilateral JUSBE framework has had Japan promising Brazil a neat and clean
alternative path to digitalisation, through its twin entities of NEC and Fujitsu,
long present in Brazil and competent to provide end-to-end technological
solutions across applications, premised on operative trust, and predicated
upon democratic, rules-based data-management safeguards.29
Its placed Brazil, akin to the multitude of sovereign technology consumers,
in a catch-22 dilemma over which attribute to prioritise for sustainable endure;
existential considerations of privacy, safety and integrity of data through and
through, or epochal costing metrics, which matter big to domestic technology
peer-partners. Now, Bolsonaro has shown the appetite to bite the bullet and
has fanned out his technology advisors and foreign and security policy aficio-
nados, to the clique of countries, pedigreed in digital technologies, viz., Scan-
dinavian countries of Sweden and Finland, and those in East Asia (South
Korea, Japan and China), for a detailed cost-benefit analysis and elaborate
assessment of competing competencies best suited, as part of his sixty-day
window for effecting a conclusive decision, on the issue.30
However, as Brazil remains poised for greater technological penetration of
its economy and society, both in terms of elevating the operational trajectory
of its industrial and commercial corporations, as also addressing the gross
digital divide inequities that keep human resource development circum-
scribed and basic technology access deprived off large swathes of Brazilian
demography, it boils down to a political decision above all, one that has to
factor in the imperative for strategic interdependence to yield to indepen-
dence and not plunge the Western Hemispheric emerging giant into pro-
nounced dependence. Brazil cannot afford to do to itself in the tech space
what it has allowed itself to be done to in the instance of COVID-19 vaccine
development, where, despite its home-grown candidates who should have
been tying-up loose ends with the democratic arc of Indo-Pacific sovereigns,
 Quad Plus and Brazilian foreign policy 203
were instead sold down the tube of crossfire, between a federal President
loathe to China and the consortium of provincial Governors supportive of
Beijing, rendering Brazilian nationals to be subjected to the instrumentality
of clinical trials for Chinese vaccine developers as if in the mould of guinea-
pigs or lambs for the slaughter.
Brazil has neither been invited nor framed in discussions spurred by the
United Kingdom for expansion of the current membership of the G7 into a
possible formulation of a “D10” (Democracies Ten) or a “T10” (Technolo-
gies Ten) that would work assiduously to build distinct alternative platforms
of sanitised technological systems and processes, and showcase them as high-
order options for countries seeking not just a higher trajectory growth
impetus, but also a higher-ordering texture of socio-economy. A fork-in-the
road awaits Bolsonaro and Brazil, and which way it swings shall determine
its longevity or stillborn context and pertinence to the Indo-Pacific construct
and framework in its strategic calculus.

Commodities-heavy Brazil’s incongruence to fragmented-production

architecture of the Indo-Pacific?
As an incontrovertible regional and transcontinental power emerging as a
globally pervasive actor of influence, Brazil embodies a paradox of kinds. It
heralds certain specific niche capabilities such as in the domains of aerospace
and aeronautics, small arms defence manufacturing, renewable energy, food-
stuffs processing, virology and biotechnological healthcare, sustainable
mining and ecological preservation, etc. However, due to a serious dearth of
focused policymaking, with regard to establishing the industrial and manu-
facturing foundations of the nation, through policy-regimes geared to grav-
itate foreign direct investment, impart market reforms within domestic
enterprise, effecting regulatory framework liberalisation, improving taxation
and legal compliance systems, etc., has meant that Brazil, which already
remained afflicted by the tyranny of distance, has been abidingly peripheral
to the political economy of modern-day production, more particularly to the
fragmented and dispersal nature of contemporary production methodologies,
assembly lines and vertical and lateral processes of product development
integration.31 However, as the cascading vulnerabilities of a China pre-
dominant supply chains network have manifested in the post-pandemic
schema, it has paved the way to an alternative reorienting if not full-on dis-
tinct restructuring of the localised supply chains ordering within the Indo-
Pacific, with implications beyond, as Indo-Pacific supply chains manufactur-
ing output is becoming progressively central to the mainstay Western econo-
mies of continental-Europe, island-Britain, and North America. If Brazil can
collaborate more effectively and not simply polemically, with the financial,
technological and logistics pedigreed sovereigns of the Indo-Pacific, to bring
localised production to its shores in a tempt to Indo-Pacific partners to
leverage Brazilian abundance of land and other factor productivity
204 Parulekar
availability, for manufacturing primed for the growing markets of the Wes-
tern Hemisphere, particularly advanced industrialised economies of North
America, given the similarity in time-zones and pristine trans-continent
skirting sea lanes of communication and shipping lines of conveyance.32
Alternatively, if Brazil can identify specific product lines for integration of
production with non-China Indo-Pacific partners, then it can exploit the
potential vistas built around its underperforming solar power equipment
manufacture,33 join the drive to restructure active pharmaceutical ingredients’
(APIs) geographical production coordinates, and the ilk.

Renewable-energy matrix for resilient sustainable development in the

Indo-Pacific: Brazil in the mix?
Brazil is in a league of its own, when it distils down to a discussion over
procreation and utilisation of renewable energy sources, for societal con-
sumption, inducing decarbonisation to combat climate change. With 83 per
cent of its electricity and 45 per cent of its composite energy mix, emanating
from renewables, this makes it the cleanest energy utilizing of economies,
from amongst the global top ten.34 It’s second in the pecking-order sweep-
stakes on hydropower utilisation; enjoys a mirrored standing on biomass;
and comes in eighth, on wind power harness. No wonder then that, despite
trailing a tad on the solar PV front, Brasilia has been an early bird cogent
votary of the International Solar Alliance (ISA) global treaty initiative,35
unveiled during COP21, which has now embraced the even more revolu-
tionary idea of an OSOWOG enterprise, at weaving global humanity into an
interconnection of solar-energy grids, with transmission envisaged through
the laying of high direct voltage cables (HDVC) on ocean-floors worldwide.
If Brazil adopts a proactive disposition towards this remarkable spatiality
conceptualisation, at benign but epochal soft-sector capacitating, in stark
contrast to the ponderously stomping BRI of largely hard-wired capacitat-
ing, it could go a long way in defining hallowed Brazilian credentials, in a
truly seminal realm of global governance, endeavouring for sustainable and
resilient development, empowering of lesser privileged countries and societies
across the swathe of the Global South, besides, not necessarily being an
initiative that is reductionist or confrontational to Beijing, a proposition
which would have Brazil spooked, in alarming apprehension of pyrrhic
blowback consequences. After all, Brasilia can point to the dint, of it having
been a pioneer in the longstanding leverage of its ethanol-based alternative
fuels strategy, a phenomenon that has seen it forge closer ties with the US on
the issue, and also witnessed a trenchant coalesce with an unequivocal expo-
nent, India. In fact, Brazil would be held in good stead, if its marquee
“beyond-science-without-borders” scholarship-in-erudition programme,
which has endured a rudderless drift due to non-application of strategic
mind, could be refashioned, through a wincing-out of Brazilian students
continually ensconcing themselves in the redundancies of Central and
 Quad Plus and Brazilian foreign policy 205
Eastern European peer research institutions, and repurposing them or others
downstream, towards institutions of functional research eminence punctuat-
ing the sovereign landscape of the Indo-Pacific, outside of China of course,
thereby consummating tangible scientific collaboration, and requisite higher
education internationalisation goals.36

Conclusion
The Quad Plus framework has thus far proved to be a one-off dilettante
fleeting exercise. However, it is not bereft of sound footing, if picked up and
reinvigorated along a dynamic agenda and contributing partners. The agenda
set out in the recent Quad Leaders’ Summit could well become the con-
stituting basis for the Quad Plus collective too, as it does not pilot or peddle
a distinct anti-China agenda, nor does it even imply any strategic encircling
of a strategically ascendant China. If anything, it propagates and hopefully
prospectively prosecutes the case for a pluralised strategic space of the Indo-
Pacific, replete in capacity-building, sustainable development, technological
interdependence and production autonomy, free from any stratagem of in-
subordinating corral, dislocating subversion or hegemonic coercion. Despite
being a geographically and geopolitically incongruous addition to the infor-
mal conversation in 2020, if Brazil’s policymakers are sentient of the coun-
try’s geo-economic stakes going forward, then it would imply the
existentiality of its presence nowhere, but in the Indo-Pacific expanse.

Notes
1 “Brazil Supports India on NSG”, The Economic Times, 17 July 2007, https://
economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-nation/brazil-supports-india-on-
nsg/articleshow/2211808.cms?from=mdr.
2 “Turkey Brazil Brokering Iran Nuclear Deal”, Reuters, 10 May 2010, www.reu
ters.com/article/us-iran-nuclear-sanctions-idUSTRE63T4QC20100430.
3 Andres Fortunato, “What India Can Learn from Brazil in Providing Social Pro-
tection to its Vulnerable Citizens”, 6 November 2020, https://scroll.in/article/
977601/what-india-can-learn-from-brazil-in-providing-social-protection-to-its-vul
nerable-citizens.
4 Rita Santos and Teresa Almeida Cravo, “Brazil’s Rising Profile in United Nations
Peacekeeping Operations since the end of the Cold War”, Norwegian Peace-
building Resource Centre (NOREF) Report, March 2014, https://core.ac.uk/
download/pdf/144049427.pdf.
5 Thorsten Benner, “Brazil as a Norm-Entrepreneur: The ‘Responsibility-while-
Protecting’ Initiative”, Global Public Policy Institute (GPPI) Working Paper,
March 2013, www.gppi.net/media/Benner_2013_Working-Paper_Brazil-RWP.pdf.
6 Celso Lafer, “Dilemmas and Challenges in Brazil’s Foreign Policy”, Institute of
Advanced Studies (IEP) Journal (2000), 65, http://200.144.254.127:8080/iea/eng
lish/journal/38/laferforeignpolicy.pdf.
7 Carlos Milani and Leticia Pinheiro, “The Politics of Brazilian Foreign Policy and
Its Analytical Challenges”, Foreign Policy Analysis 13 (2017) 288, doi:10.1093/
fpa/orw027.
206 Parulekar
8 Guilherme Casarões, “Itamaraty’s Mission”, The Cairo Review of Global Affairs,
Winter 2014, www.thecairoreview.com/essays/itamaratys-mission.
9 Carlos Malamud, “What Foreign Policy for Brazil Now?” Elcano Royal Institute, 12
November 2018, www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/wcm/connect/8b2d4541-b8f1-4372
-a448-d2017547f15e/ARI120-2018-Malamud-What-foreign-policy-now-Brazil.pdf?M
OD=AJPERES&CACHEID=8b2d4541-b8f1-4372-a448-d2017547f15e.
10 Marina Lopes, “Bolsonaro’s Amazon-Sized Spat with Germany and Norway
Threatens Europe-South America Trade Deal”, Washington Post, 21 August 2019,
www.washingtonpost.com/world/the_americas/bolsonaros-amazon-sized-spat-with
-germany-norway-threatens-europe-south-america-trade-deal/2019/08/20/cc60ee3c
-c2b8-11e9-8bf7-cde2d9e09055_story.html.
11 Noa Landau, “Brazil’s President Bolsonaro to Visit Israel Days Before Election”,
Haaretz, 28 February 2019, www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium-brazil-s-presi
dent-bolsonaro-to-visit-israel-days-before-election-1.6979716.
12 Anthony Boadle, “Brazil’s Bolsonaro Aims to Patch up with Arab Nations on
Gulf Trip”, Reuters, 25 October 2019, www.reuters.com/article/us-brazil-gulf-dip
lomacy-idUSKBN1X4182.
13 “Bolsonaro Thanks Shinzo Abe for Bolstering Ties with Brazil”, Agencia Brasil, 1
September 2020, https://agenciabrasil.ebc.com.br/en/politica/noticia/2020-09/bol
sonaro-thanks-shinzo-abe-bolstering-ties-brazil.
14 “Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro is 2020 Republic Day Chief Guest”, The
Economic Times, 14 November 2019, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/
news/politics-and-nation/brazilian-president-jair-bolsonaro-is-2020-republic-day-c
hief-guest/articleshow/72057574.cms?from=mdr.
15 Kota Sakaguchi, “Japan–Brazil Partnership Program: A Framework for Triangular
Cooperation”, www.jica.go.jp/jica-ri/publication/booksandreports/jrft3q000000297p
-att/2_PartII-Case8.pdf.
16 “Brazil Japan and the United States launch Trilateral Dialogue”, Mr. Social
News, 14 November 2020, www.mrsocialnews.com/post/brazil-japan-and-the-uni
ted-states-launch-trilateral-dialogue.
17 “Joint Statement on Japan–Brazil US Exchange”, US Department of State, 10
November 2020, https://2017-2021.state.gov/joint-statement-on-the-japan-u-s-bra
zil-exchange/index.html.
18 Roberto Rodrigues, “PRODECER: An Innovative International Cooperation
Program”, in A. Hosono et al., Development for Sustainable Agriculture: The
Brazilian Cerrado, Palgrave Macmillan, 2016, 220–234, https://link.springer.com/
content/pdf/10.1057%2F9781137431356_10.pdf.
19 Astha Chadha, “Japan Aims for Greater Engagement in Latin America”, The Dip-
lomat, 12 January 2021, https://thediplomat.com/tag/motegi-visit-to-latin-america.
20 Mark Thirlwell, Fernando Cardim, Patrick Carvalho, and Tim Harcourt, “Great
Southern Lands: Building Ties between Australia and Brazil”, Lowy Institute for
International Policy Report, 29 May 2013, www.lowyinstitute.org/sites/default/
files/great_southern_lands_0.pdf.
21 Ibid.
22 “Agri-Business to Brazil: Trends and Opportunities”, Australian Trade and
Investment Commission, www.austrade.gov.au/australian/export/export-markets/
countries/brazil/industries/agribusiness-to-brazil.
23 “Ports Provide and Ocean of Opportunity for Brazil”, Global Infrastructure Hub,
14 May 2020, www.gihub.org/news/ports-provide-ocean-of-opportunity-for-brazil.
24 Candice Vianna, “India and Brazil in the New Decade”, ORF Commentary, 24
January 2020, www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/brazil-and-india-in-the-new-deca
de-60614.
25 John Cherian, “India and Brazil: Allies in Arms”, Frontline, 28 February 2020,
https://frontline.thehindu.com/world-affairs/article30799263.ece.
 Quad Plus and Brazilian foreign policy 207
26 Elizabeth Howell, “India Launches Brazil’s Amazonia-1 Earth Observation
Satellite and 18 Others into Orbit”, 28 February 2021, www.space.com/india-la
unches-amazonia-1-satellite-18-others.
27 “Brazil Receives Two Million Doses of COVID19 Vaccines from India”, Business
Today, 23 January 2021,www.businesstoday.in/current/world/brazil-receives-2-m
illion-doses-of-covid-19-vaccine-from-india/story/428844.html.
28 “Brazil among 92 Other Countries Seeking Cheaper Made-in-India COVID 19
Vaccines”, Business Insider, 21 January 2021, www.businessinsider.in/india/news/
brazil-among-92-other-countries-seeking-cheaper-made-in-india-coronavirus-vacci
nes/articleshow/80385094.cms.
29 “Prospects for Brazil-Japan-US Cooperation in a Shifting International Political
Environment”, Online Webinar, ‘Dialogue: Leadership for the Americas’”, 23
March 2021, www.thedialogue.org/events/online-event-prospects-for-brazil-japa
n-us-cooperation-in-a-shifting-international-political-environment.
30 Angelica Mari, “Brazil Tech Round-Up: Ministerial 5G Tour, Data Protection
Authority Announces Strategy, Right to be Forgotten”, Forbes Magazine, 6 Feb-
ruary 2021, www.forbes.com/sites/angelicamarideoliveira/2021/02/06/brazil-tech-r
ound-up-ministerial-5g-tour-data-protection-authority-announces-strategy-right-t
o-be-forgotten/?sh=49f9a6db6976.
31 Timothy Sturgeon, Gary Gereffi, Andrew Guinn, and Ezequiel Zylberberg,
“Brazil in Global Value Chains: Implications for Trade and Industrial Policy”,
Funcex Magazine, 21 May 2013, https://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?
doi=10.1.1.447.8436&rep=rep1&type=pdf.
32 Otaviano Canuto, “Why Brazil Should Embrace Global Value Chains”, World
Economic Forum Commentary, 14 November 2014, www.weforum.org/agenda/
2014/11/why-brazil-should-embrace-global-value-chains.
33 Despite having one of the best solar resources on the planet, Brazil is still lagging
behind other countries in Solar PV, insofar as it finished in 16th place in the 2019
world ranking for Solar PV, well below its immense potential. For more, see www.
globalsolarcouncil.org/absolar-defends-more-brazilian-leadership-in-solar-power-a
t-the-international-solar-alliance.
34 N.B. Carvalho, et al., “How Likely is Brazil to Achieve its NDC Commitments in
the Energy Sector? A Review on Brazilian Low-Carbon Energy Perspectives”,
Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, 22 September 2020, doi:10.1016/j.
rser.2020.110343.
35 The ISA launched at the COP21 UN Climate Change Conference in Paris (2015)
reposes the ostensible objective of fostering collaboration of member-states, situ-
ated between the twin Tropics, and consequently awash in abundant sunlight, to
capture solar power and harness it for societal consumption. An estimated 1 tril-
lion USD (EUR 812 billion), is estimated to be mobilised, in pursuance of
investments in solar power projects by 2030, in support of cost-reducing and
wider transmission supportive logistics and technologies.
36 José Celso Freire Junior and Patrícia Gasparini Spadaro, “Beyond Science With-
out Borders”, World Education News + Reviews (WENR), 18 September 2017,
https://wenr.wes.org/2017/09/beyond-science-without-borders-brazil-retools-its-int
ernationalization-scheme.
Part III
A view from the others
13 Russia’s attitude to the Quad Plus
Troublesome present, hazy future
Anna Kireeva and Alexey Kupriyanov

Russia’s identity has been contested for a long time, as it geographically

belongs to both Europe and Asia. Besides that, Russia’s Far East faces the
Northern Pacific, making it a Pacific or an Asia-Pacific power. A more pro-
minent identity discourse tradition has been emphasising Russia as a con-
tinental Eurasian power. Asia can be considered one of the strategic
dimensions of Russia’s foreign and economic policy, with an important goal
being the development of the Far East.1 Although China can be considered a
centrepiece of Russia’s foreign policy in the region, Moscow has been keen
on pursuing a diversified foreign policy and having different economic links.
Among Russia’s key regional strategic partners are countries such as India
and Vietnam. Although political relations with Japan have not been devoid
of problems, Moscow still considers it an important regional actor to
maintain a dialogue and enhance economic cooperation.
A deep crisis in relations between Russia and the US together with the
Indo-Pacific strategies of many regional states, enhanced cooperation within
the Quad and the emergence of Quad Plus combine to make Russia’s pursuit
of a balanced foreign policy course much more challenging. In many ways,
Moscow increasingly finds itself between a rock and a hard place. Con-
frontation with the West gave it a huge impetus to developing ties with
China, especially in the military domain, while many of its other major
partners due to heightened tensions with the PRC have been drifting to
greater engagement with the US, with India and Japan being a part of the
Quad and Vietnam joining the Quad Plus. Against this background, the
Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Minister Sergey Lavrov, in parti-
cular, has developed a strictly negative stance on the Quadrilateral security
consultations between the US, Japan, Australia and India and the Indo-
Pacific as a concept. Lavrov’s February 2019 speech in Vietnam was the first
one where he started criticising these phenomena considering that, according
to his views, the contemporary world order can be considered a polycentric
and more democratic one in the making, with a number of economically and
politically rising powers. The Indo-Pacific was characterised as a region cre-
ated artificially and the United States was accused of attempts to contain
China drawing not only allies like Japan and Australia but also India to this
goal via military cooperation.2
DOI: 10.4324/9781003206408-17
212 Kireeva & Kupriyanov
While criticising the Indo-Pacific, Lavrov has also repeatedly questioned its
basic principles of freedom and openness, as the concept has been seen in the
Russian Foreign Ministry as leading to the creation of an exclusive rather
than inclusive and confrontational bloc, not an open structure. For Russia,
Asia-Pacific regional institutions represent the principles of inclusiveness and
multilateralism as they already have large participation and clear rules that
everyone has agreed upon. Hence, it is not clear for Moscow why should the
concept be changed to the Indo-Pacific without such inclusive institutions
and clear-cut rules.3

Russia’s Foreign and Security Policy in Asia

Russia’s interest in the Indo-Pacific region has a long history. For centuries,
Russia traded with Persia, China and India. Russian pioneers and pathfin-
ders fought their way to the East and to the Pacific Ocean; after the Bol-
shevik Revolution, Soviet leaders showed interest in spreading the ideas of
socialism and communism to the countries of the East. In the second half of
the twentieth century, Moscow’s policy in the Pacific and Indian Oceans was
defined through the prism of the Cold War, and both oceans, primarily the
Pacific, were viewed as battlefields. The difference between them was that in
the Pacific Ocean the Soviet Union had bases in Primorye and Kamchatka,
but there were no strong allies, while there were no Soviet bases in the Indian
Ocean, but there was a powerful friendly partner in India. The end of the
Cold War completely changed the situation. The collapse of the USSR and
the economic difficulties of the 1990s interrupted this emerging interest in the
Pacific Ocean. The general collapse of the Russian economy, the desire to
break with the Soviet legacy, the pro-Western orientation of the new leader-
ship in every sense, and a lack of strategic thinking led to the rejection of any
attempts to declare Russia as a powerful Pacific power.
However, as Russia overcame its protracted internal crisis, its leadership grew
aware that Moscow should pay more attention to the East, as the twenty-first
century would become the “Age of Asia”. One of the pioneers of this idea was
the head of Russian foreign intelligence, then Foreign Minister and Prime Min-
ister Yevgeny Primakov.4 His line was continued by Vladimir Putin, who, after
becoming president of Russia, took decisive steps in this direction. Such policy
enhanced Russia’s relations with Asian states as a strategic course to diversify
Moscow’s relations in politics, security, economics, and energy since the early
2000s and has been often labelled as a “pivot to Asia” or “turn to the East”.5
At the same time, even taking into consideration growing economic interaction
with Asia, Russia has been often considered as an “external player” or an
“absent power” due to it small share in regional trade and investment as well as
lack of participation in production networks. Russia’s involvement in regional
institutions is also facing a number of limitations.6
A crisis in Russia’s relations with the West in 2014 prompted Russia to
accelerate its pivot to Asia, as it had become apparent that only on the basis
 Russia’s attitude to the Quad Plus 213
of greater cooperation with Asian states would it become possible for
Moscow to realise its key goal of establishing a centre of power in Eurasia.7
For a long time, Russia’s policy in the region remained multi-vectored: while
strengthening relations with China, Moscow at the same time sought to
maintain close ties with India, improve economic and political ties with
Japan, actively promote the resolution of the Korean problem, maintain the
central role of ASEAN, and not spoil relations with the United States.
However, as events have played out over the past several years, Russia has
seemingly grown closer to China, and pressure from the United States is lit-
erally pushing Moscow into the arms of Beijing. Attempts by Washington’s
regional partners, primarily Japan and India, to avoid such a development
have proven unsuccessful, with American pressure proving so strong that
Tokyo and New Delhi’s efforts are in vain.
As far as Russia’s approach to regional security8 has been concerned, since
2010 it has been consistently advocating for creating an “inclusive, open,
transparent and equitable collective security and cooperation architecture in
the Asia-Pacific”,9 echoing the same approach for establishing a common
security architecture from Lisbon to Vladivostok.

Overview of Russia’s relations with Quad Plus states and China

United States
Relations between the United States and Russia are going through hard
times. Russia, having gone through economic decline in the 1990s and lost its
position in the world, seeks to restore its prosperity and prominence. The
United States sees these moves by Moscow as revisionist and Russia itself as
a country trying to disrupt the post-Cold War order in which the United
States is the hegemon. As a result, from the Russian perspective, the United
States is trying to put pressure on Russia, attempting to force Moscow to
admit defeat, and striving to keep Russia in the position of a secondary
player—thus maintaining Washington’s perception of the status quo.
Russia views such American pressure as unacceptable. Moscow’s main goal
is to restore Russia’s position as one of the great powers, with its own inter-
ests and sphere of influence. Washington’s accusations that Moscow is seek-
ing to destroy the liberal world order are perplexing and viewed by the
Kremlin as a cynical attempt to maintain American dominance. The pressure
from the United States is enough to complicate the Russian economic situa-
tion but insufficient to bring down the Russian economy, due to the relatively
small trade between the two countries and the lack of critical dependence of
Russian industry on American technologies. In fact, Washington’s actions
serve as a constant annoyance, forcing Moscow to develop economic autarky
and move closer to any opponents of the United States, including Iran and
China. The more Washington tries to get Moscow to agree to its demands,
the faster Russia moves towards Beijing.10
214 Kireeva & Kupriyanov
Moreover, America’s radical Indo-Pacific strategy creates new challenges
for Russia in Asia.11 The very wording “rules-based order”, actively pro-
moted by Washington, puzzles Moscow. Russia believes that the existing
order is already based on rules, primarily on the norms of international law
and on the UN Charter. Moscow rejects attempts to introduce any other
rules, demonstrating institutional conservatism.12 From Moscow’s point of
view, replacing Trump with Biden does not mean dramatic changes, as con-
tainment of China and attempts to make Russia a scapegoat due to US
internal problems will continue.

Japan
From a strategic perspective, Russia and Japan have increasingly regarded
each other as strategic regional players of great significance in Northeast
Asia, broader East Asia, and the Asia-Pacific. On Japan’s side, in particular,
Prime Minister Shinzo- Abe, during his term (2012–2020), undertook great
efforts to elevate Russia–Japan strategic, political, and security dialogues,
reflecting on the value of engaging Russia as an important global and regio-
nal player.13 Interestingly, both states pursued wedging strategies as a part of
their strategic interaction: Russia vis-à-vis the US–Japan alliance and Japan
regarding the Russia–China strategic partnership in order to prevent a uni-
fied Sino-Russian front against Japan.14 President Putin, on the Russian side,
has been an advocate of improving relations with Japan, aiming to reach a
new stage in bilateral relations characterised by comprehensive cooperation
in all spheres.15
Russia-Japan relations, however, have historically been far from cordial
and have been mired in territorial disputes and the absence of a peace treaty
since the end of World War II. These lingering questions have spoiled the
political relationship between Moscow and Tokyo for more than 70 years.
Despite a robust political dialogue and significant personal political capital
inserted by Abe into resolving these issues in 2016–2019, it proved to be too
overwhelming to reach this goal. Russian foreign policy officials have been
critical of the US–Japan alliance military build-up and generally regard
Japan as an actor not fully independent from the United States—and thus,
vulnerable to Washington’s pressure.16

India
Russian–Indian ties have a long history, and their main feature is that Russia
and India initially treated each other with friendliness and warmth. Their
relationship was sometimes close to being allies and has never been hostile.
The Soviet Union supported the Non-Aligned Movement and numerous
foreign policy initiatives of India, providing New Delhi with military and
development assistance. However, most importantly, during the Cold War,
Moscow and New Delhi were interested in curbing China’s ambitions. Since
 Russia’s attitude to the Quad Plus 215
the end of the Cold War, Russia has been able to resolve its differences with
China while India has not. As a result, Russian and Indian positions on the
Chinese issue are now radically different, and Moscow is watching with
dismay as its two strategic partners are quarrelling, exhibiting mutual dis-
trust and unwillingness to make concessions.
At the same time, Russia views India as a strategic partner and relations
do not depend on Russian or Indian relations with China. Russia plans to
continue cooperating with India on a wide range of issues, perceiving it as a
great power and one of the pillars of the future polycentric world.17 Moscow
is interested in Eurasia and the surrounding maritime space becoming a zone
of peace and stability, since any instability in this region will impede the
development of Russia, deprive Moscow of the possibility of foreign policy
manoeuvre, and force Russia to divert its already limited forces and resources
to counter a possible threat. Therefore, Russia does not enthusiastically
accept any steps aimed at rapprochement between India and the United
States, since Moscow believes Washington is ready to destabilise the situation
in Asia, in the Indian and Pacific Oceans, if it helps to stop the growth of
China’s power and removes the threat to the role of the United States as
world hegemon.18
The possibility of creation of a Russian naval base in Port Sudan, intensive
negotiations on the creation of the Chennai-Vladivostok maritime corridor,
an active dialogue between the foreign ministries of the two countries in
attempts to bring positions closer indicate that Moscow understands the
danger of a passive policy in the Indian track.

Australia
Australia is a relatively insignificant partner for Russia due to Moscow’s lack
of interests in the South Pacific. In addition, certain stereotypes regarding
Australia prevail in Moscow—it is assumed, in particular, that Canberra is a
reliable American ally and will take the side of the United States in any
conflict with Moscow or Beijing. Russia–Australia relations suffered in the
aftermath of the Ukrainian crisis, and, furthermore, Australia’s preference
for the Indo-Pacific and Quad meets little if any apprehension from the
Russian side. At the same time, Russia sees Australia as a partner it should
take into consideration while working in international organisations such as
the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) or the East Asia Summit
(EAS).19

Russia and Quad Plus powers

As far as the states that joined Quad Plus are concerned, the picture is not
much different. As a small power, New Zealand plays an absolutely marginal
role in Russia’s policy towards the Asia-Pacific. Russia has never had much
interaction with Wellington, and in most cases, relations are no different than
216 Kireeva & Kupriyanov
those with Australia. However, economic relations between the two countries
are quite developed, and Moscow and Wellington cooperate on a number of
areas of the international agenda like environmental protection and
conservation of the living resources of Antarctica.20
Russia regards South Korea (ROK) as a neighbour and an important
partner on the Korean Peninsula that needs to be a part of any regional
solution. Regionally, South Korea, together with China and Japan, has been
one of Russia’s key economic partners. The political climate in Russia–South
Korea relations depends greatly on whether the representatives of the pro-
gressive or conservative camps are in power in Seoul, with the former
enjoying much warmer relations with Russia due to their willingness to
engage in negotiations with North Korea, as illustrated by President Moon
Jae-in.21 A political dialogue between Russia and Seoul is heavily con-
centrated on the situation on the Korean Peninsula. South Korea’s will-
ingness to commit to the US Indo-Pacific strategy was met with
apprehension in Russian policy-making circles. At the same time, much like
Japan, the relationship also suffers from Russia’s criticism of the US–ROK
alliance and its role in exacerbating tensions on the Korean Peninsula.
Vietnam has been regarded as Russia’s key strategic partner in Southeast
Asia, and bilateral relations have always been cordial. Apart from being a
buyer of Russia’s military equipment, Hanoi has historically enjoyed military
and economic cooperation with Moscow. Russia and Vietnam have robust
security ties and exchanges and conduct an annual security dialogue. As a
mark of bilateral cooperation, since 2014, the Russian navy regularly makes
port calls at the naval base in Cam Ranh, where a Soviet naval base used to
be positioned. This bilateral political relationship is characterised by a high
level of trust. Moreover, a consensus has been established that development
of security cooperation between Moscow and Hanoi fully corresponds to the
long-term national interests of the two states.22 Russia’s relations with Viet-
nam have been an important factor in formulating Moscow’s stance on the
South China Sea dispute and Russia advocating a solution based on inter-
national law and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS).23 However, Vietnam’s recent policy of upgrading its cooperation
with the United States has been a point of concern for Moscow, quite similar
to concerns of India. Moscow remains wary of Vietnam’s possible inclusion
in the Quad and views this as a destructive policy by the United States
threatening Russia’s own strategic partnerships.
Russia has a difficult history of relations with Israel. Of late, however, the
relationship between Russia and Israel is relatively good, largely thanks to
people-to-people contacts and the large Russian-speaking diaspora in Israel.
At the same time, Russia and Israel are well aware that it is necessary to
separate profitable trade projects and sympathy at the level of the population
from considerations of geopolitics.24 In world politics, Russia and Israel
rarely support each other. Moscow is accustomed to the fact that Israel is
Washington’s main ally in the Middle East, so the possible accession of Israel
 Russia’s attitude to the Quad Plus 217
to the Quad will be perceived in Russia as a natural step and will not lead to
any changes in the Russian position.
Russian relations with Brazil, on the other hand, appear to be the exact
opposite of relations between Russia and Israel. Personal and trade contacts
are relatively few; however, Moscow views Brasilia as a potential major
player in the future world order. Similar to India, Brazil is considered an
important global partner for Russia as a participant of the Brazil, Russia,
India, China and South Africa (BRICS) grouping. Brazil’s participation in
the Quad Plus format will be perceived in Moscow, most likely, with bewil-
derment and generally negativity, but it will not affect Russia’s position.
Brazil and Israel can hardly be considered important players in Russia and
regional Latin American and Middle Eastern dynamics have primarily driven
Russia’s relations with the two states.

China
Contemporary Russia–China relations, starting with the end of the Cold War
era, can be characterised as a deep alignment in the form of strategic part-
nership. Cooperation has been based around a number of shared goals and
principles, including but not limited to the aim of building a multipolar or a
polycentric world order, opposition to the American hegemony and inter-
ventionism, support for the principles of respect for sovereignty and non-
interference in domestic affairs, and reformation of global governance to
better represent non-Western powers.25
Russia–China relations have seen a deeper alignment, starting with a crisis
in Russia’s relations with the West in 2014, as the Russian government
viewed improving relations with China as a major safeguard from the
damage dealt by Western economic sanctions. A new stage has been char-
acterised by robust political relations underpinned by Putin and Xi’s perso-
nal bond, increasing security cooperation and new economic deals and
projects, mostly large-scale ones implemented by state-owned enterprises.
Moreover, amid exacerbating strategic competition between the United
States and China and a deep crisis in US–Russia relations, Moscow and
Beijing took steps in 2018 and 2019 to heighten military cooperation,
improve interoperability, and broaden cooperation in the strategic sphere.
American policy has been effectively pushing Moscow deeper into Beijing’s
embrace. At the same time, Russia and China are not ready to enter a full-
fledged alliance with security guarantees, as it will hamper their autonomous
decision making.26 Russia does not deem it necessary to comply with China’s
policies in Asia, retaining strategic neutrality in China’s territorial disputes (i.e.
in South China Sea) and enjoying partnerships with states with which China
has disputes (i.e. India, Vietnam and Japan).27 Russian–Chinese relations are
most accurately described by the maxim “not always together, but never
against each other”.
218 Kireeva & Kupriyanov
Russia’s criticism towards the Indo-Pacific and Quad explained
So, how can Russia’s official negative stance towards the Indo-Pacific and
Quad be explained? First, the Quad is essentially perceived as an echo of the
Cold War alliances as well as a NATO-style arrangement that Russia is well
familiar with in the European region.28 Thus, Moscow views as negative the
Indo-Pacific strategies of the United States and its allies, which are pre-
dominantly perceived as a US-centric project.
The roots of this attitude lie in a traditional vision for the regional archi-
tecture. Russia has been supportive of ASEAN-centric regional architecture
and inclusive regional visions as expressed by ASEAN and India. During his
February 2019 speech in Vietnam, Foreign Minister Lavrov expressed strong
support for ASEAN as a solid foundation for security and cooperation
architecture with a number of security, diplomatic, and economic mechan-
isms such as the East Asia Summit, ASEAN Defence Minister’s Meeting–
Plus (ADMM+), and ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). The Indo-Pacific was
characterised as competing with ASEAN Centrality,29 moving away from
consensus-seeking mechanisms based on ASEAN to divisive ones, and thus
not welcomed by Russia. Moreover, Lavrov has repeatedly stressed that it is
not clear how the Indo-Pacific is geographically different from the Asia-
Pacific region.30 Russia fears that the Quad could supplant ASEAN-centric
institutions and lead to a further marginalisation of Russia’s regional
standing.31
Second, Russia has been a proponent of a polycentric and more demo-
cratic world order, where the voices of not only Western but also of other
global and regional powers can be heard. Accordingly, Russia supports
multilateral institutions that could ensure participation of key developing
powers in global governance such as the G20. In addition, Moscow has been
advocating adherence to international law as stipulated in the Charter of the
United Nations. Consequently, there has been a continuous discomfort on
the Russian side with the so-called rules-based order promoted by the United
States, Western states, and some US allies and endorsed by the Quad.
According to Lavrov, it is unclear what these rules are, who agrees on them,
what is wrong with the international law, and why it is not the international
law but some other set of rules that are being promoted.32
In a similar fashion, Russia has been questioning the concept of the liberal
world order promoted by the United States and other Western states. The
key problem is what exactly is meant by a liberal world order. If the key to its
definition is the dominance of Western states and Western models, then
Russia is categorically opposed to such a world order. If by liberal world
order, we mean a world of open borders, responsible development, and
mutually beneficial globalisation, then Russia is quite ready to integrate into
it. It is important for Moscow that the global order should be dynamic,
reflecting changes in the power balance and enabling absolutely all states to
realise their interests, which implies the reform of global governance
 Russia’s attitude to the Quad Plus 219
institutions to enhance the role of non-Western actors. However, the beha-
viour of Western countries, which change the rules of the game when the
Eastern ones have to adapt to them, causes Moscow to suspect that the liberal
world order is aimed at maintaining Western dominance.
Third, a closer look into Russia’s relations with Quad members and China
helps to explain Moscow’s official attitude towards this grouping. The Quad
is originally an anti-Chinese format, and no one disputes this thesis. As a
result, under current conditions, Russia cannot approve of either the Quad in
its current or in an expanded format until the grouping’s anti-Chinese foun-
dation is transformed into something more acceptable—for example, until it
transforms into an inclusive security format, which can include both Russia
and China. The problem with the Quad casts a shadow on the perception of
the Indo-Pacific. Since the problem of relations with the United States is
acute for Russia, the Russian Foreign Ministry perceives the Indo-Pacific
through the prism of the Quad as an anti-Chinese format—not always
making a distinction between the Indo-Pacific in the American and Indian
interpretations. A number of political structures, think tanks, and indepen-
dent researchers are taking a more nuanced approach.33 The Indian embassy
in Moscow plays an important role in this, seeking to clarify New Delhi’s
policy and the entire range of halftones.34
President Putin’s speech at the Valdai Discussion Club session in October
2019 exemplified a more nuanced approach. He stated that Russia is against
creating blocs and bloc divisions in Asia and believes that Asian countries
are unwilling to make choices and join blocs aimed against other states.
Additionally, he claimed that containing China is an unrealistic goal in itself
and those who are pursuing to do so will ultimately fail. At the same time, he
supported creating a network of institutions that could include different
organisations from Asia and ensure cooperative interaction (i.e. it could be
based on ASEAN-centric platforms). In addition, he stated that Russia
would welcome multilateral economic partnership in Asia and Eurasia.35
Finally, it is instructive to note that although Russia speaks against the
Quad, it does not mean that cooperation with specific member-states of the
grouping becomes impossible. Quite to the contrary, Russia still enjoys a
privileged strategic partnership with India and strategic partnership relations
with other powers, such as Vietnam, that are at odds with China. Security
dialogue with Tokyo is also highly valued as a means to engage in discussions
with one of the key regional stakeholders and address each other’s security
concerns. Similarly, Russia takes no interest in a China-dominated Asia and
would like the region to be polycentric, with Russia as one of the centres of
power and one of the key stakeholders in settling regional conflicts, such as
the one on the Korean Peninsula.36
Although Russia and China are closely aligned, Moscow would rather
prefer to remain neutral in the growing US–China strategic competition and
retain as much strategic autonomy as possible, while working to ease regio-
nal polarisation.37 Prime Minister Abe’s proposal to connect the free and
220 Kireeva & Kupriyanov
open Indian Ocean concept and Asia with the Russian strategy for the
development of the Russian Far East and the Arctic, with the help of Japan
and energy projects, together with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s
idea to make the Russian Far East the focal point for linking the Eurasian
Economic Union and an open and inclusive Indo-Pacific by establishing new
routes in trade and logistics, were articulated at the Eastern Economic
Forum in September 2019.38 If accepted by Russia, such proposals could
create a foundation for Russia’s cooperation with states and organisation
that advocate, or at least possess, Indo-Pacific strategies, such as Japan, India
and ASEAN.39 What is more, one important area of cooperation among
Russia and Japan, India, and ASEAN has been non-traditional security—a
major focus of the Quad Plus.

Conclusion
Russia’s negative position on the Indo-Pacific and Quad has been explained
by both looking into the core tenets of Russia’s Asia policy and the set of its
bilateral relations with regional states. Moscow has been clearly demonstrat-
ing a conservative approach to regional security architecture, emphasising
East Asia and the Asia-Pacific and regional institutions that it took part in
formulating or has been participating in for a long time already. It does not
seem to be ready to change its position and exchange its preference for con-
structing a collective security architecture for anything new, even despite the
fact that the concept is unlikely to be practically implemented any time soon.
Russia is concerned with the Indo-Pacific and exclusive institutions such as
Quad undermining ASEAN centrality, which is important for Moscow to
have a say in regional matters. The Indo-Pacific makes Russia feel margin-
alised and left out from decision making together with China, which is in
sharp contrast to its position as one of the regional stakeholders in East
Asia. Russia’s own key new foreign policy idea of the Greater Eurasian
Partnership emphasises the Eurasian landmass with Russia in its centre
rather than any part of its maritime identity, be it the Arctic or the Pacific.
Moscow has been focused on the American version of the Indo-Pacific, for
the most part paying no attention to other interpretations. Under this logic,
the Quad is regarded as the reincarnation of US-centred alliance system akin
to NATO that Russia is well familiar with. If anything, Quad Plus has been
regarded as following the same logic.
Russia’s relations with three out of four Quad member-states are far from
cordial. Deterioration of Russia–US relations to the point, where the return
back to normal could be a topic of only a distant future, seems to be the
major reason behind Russia’s stance on the Quad and Quad Plus. Japan and
Australia are viewed as loyal American allies and the territorial dispute with
Tokyo represents a significant spoiler. Although India is one of Russia’s top
strategic partners, India alone has not been capable of swaying Russian offi-
cials in favour of cooperation. The conduct of military exercise Malabar by
 Russia’s attitude to the Quad Plus 221
the four states in 2020 together with enhanced cooperation within the
grouping has only exacerbated Russia’s concerns. Besides that, supporting
anti-Chinese policies of the Quad seems to be impossible to the Russian lea-
dership. The latter seems to turn the blind eye to the reasons behind the
cooperation within Quad and Quad Plus, viewing both as anti-China for-
mats. Relations with Quad Plus member-states represent some more of the
same category: concerns about the drawing of another strategic partner
Vietnam into the anti-Chinese coalition, little if any significance of New
Zealand, attitude towards South Korea to a great extent similar to that
towards Japan. The additions of Israel as a staunch American Middle East-
ern ally and Brazil as Russia’s BRICS partner make no significant changes in
this attitude.
Discussing the prospects of any cooperation between Russia and the Quad
or Quad Plus, one should note that direct cooperation cannot be deemed
possible as it is generally impossible for Russia to take such explicit anti-
Chinese steps. However, there have been attempts by the leaders of Japan and
India to search for modes of cooperation between Russia’s Arctic, the Far
East and the Indo-Pacific and try to reach for some practical solutions and
projects. Such cooperation could take form of joint energy and economic
projects but is unlikely to make Russia change its position on the Quad.
Simultaneously, Russia takes no interest in promoting a China-dominated
Asia, and would rather continue to enjoy its strategic partnerships with both
India and Vietnam. Additionally, the possibility of the establishment of
Russia’s naval base in Sudan could pave the way for greater Russian maritime
presence in the Indian Ocean and represent a potential for cooperation with
both India and Japan, as witnessed by the first joint anti-piracy exercises
with the latter in the Arabian Sea in February 2020. The greatest potential
for cooperation lies in regional initiatives in the spheres where it possesses
considerable expertise such as combating non-traditional security threats,
both bilaterally and multilaterally. In 2019 President Putin mentioned that
Russia would welcome a network of institutions that could provide ground
for cooperative engagement. This means that Russia and regional states
could still promote common objectives that represent regional public good (i.
e. fighting the COVID-19 pandemic and its consequences together with
ASEAN and other regional states). Such cooperation could be based on the
bilateral level or through already existing regional institutions in Asia such as
the ARF, ADMM+ or EAS.

Notes
1 Ekaterina Koldunova, “Russia as a Euro-Pacific Power: Dilemmas of Russian
Foreign Policy Decision-making”, International Organizations 29, 3 (2015), 378–
394; Margarete Klein, Russia: A Euro-Pacific Power? Goals, Strategies and Per-
spectives of Moscow’s East Asia Policy, SWP Research Paper (Berlin: Stiftung
Wissenschaft und Politik German Institute for International and Security Affairs,
September 2014), 5–10.
222 Kireeva & Kupriyanov
2 “Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov’s Remarks and Answers to Media Questions
during the Russian-Vietnamese Conference of the Valdai International Discussion
Club, Ho Chi Minh City, 25 February”, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Rus-
sian Federation, 25 February 2019, www.mid.ru/en/press_service/minister_sp
eeches/-/asset_publisher/7OvQR5KJWVmR/content/id/3541050.
3 “Primakov Readings: Russia and Post-COVID World. Sergey Lavrov as a Special
Guest [Primakovskie chtenija: Rossija i postkovidnyj mir. Special’nyj gost’ Sergej
Lavrov]”, Interfax, 11 July 2020, www.interfax.ru/russia/716881
4 Kirill Barskii, “Eastern Vector Was Drawn by Primakov [Vostochnyi vektor
nachertil Primakov]”, Mezhdunarodnaia zhizn’, 10 (2016), 41–66, https://interaffa
irs.ru/jauthor/material/1746.
5 Koldunova, “Russia as a Euro-Pacific Power”, “Russia as a Euro-Pacific Power”,
384; Klein, “Russia: A Euro-Pacific Power?” no. 1, 5–10.
6 Ekaterina Koldunova, “Russia’s Involvement in Regional Cooperation in East
Asia. Opportunities and Limitations of Constructive Engagement”, Asian Survey
56, 3 (2016), 552–554.
7 Alexander Lukin, Pivot to Asia. Russia’s Foreign Policy Enters the 21st Century
(New Delhi: Vij Books India Pvt Ltd, 2017), 1–9.
8 For Russia’s approach to regional security in Asia, see Dmitry Streltsov, Anna
Kireeva, and Ilya Dyachkov, “Russia’s View on the International Security in
Northeast Asia”, The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis 30, 1 (March 2018),
115–134.
9 “Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation (approved by President of the
Russian Federation Vladimir Putin on November 30, 2016)”, Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of the Russian Federation, 1 December 2016, www.mid.ru/en/foreign_p
olicy/official_documents/-/asset_publisher/CptICkB6BZ29/content/id/2542248.
10 Anatoly Torkunov, Norma C. Noonan and Tatiana Shakleina, eds., Russia and
the United States in the Evolving World Order (Moscow: MGIMO University,
2018); Viktoria Zhuravleva, “Russia and the United States: Reflecting on the
Conflict”, Russian Politics & Law 55, 6 (2017), 401–418, DOI: 10.1080/
10611940.2017.1574499.
11 I.A. Istomin, “US Policy in the Indo-Pacific: Implications for Russia [Politika
SShA v Indo-Tihookeanskom regione: posledstviya dl’a Rossii]”, Russian Interna-
tional Affairs Council, Working Paper #49 (Moscow: NP RSMD, 2019), 38–40,
https://russiancouncil.ru/activity/workingpapers/politika-ssha-v-indo-tikhookeans
kom-regione-posledstviya-dlya-rossii.
12 “Lavrov: The Concept of ‘Rule-Based Order’ Affects UN Powers [Lavrov: kont-
septsiia ‘poriadka, osnovannogo na pravilakh’, zatragivaet polnomochiia OON]”,
TASS, 20 September 2019, https://tass.ru/politika/6906987.
13 Tsuruoka Michito, “Making Sense of Japan’s Approach to Russia”, The Diplo-
mat, 5 September 2019, https://thediplomat.com/2019/09/making-sense-of-japa
ns-approach-to-russia.
14 Matteo Dian and Anna Kireeva, “Wedge Strategies in Russia-Japan Relations”,
The Pacific Review, 2021, 1–31, doi:10.1080/09512748.2021.1887331.
15 “Press Statements Following Talks with Prime Minister of Japan Shinzo Abe”,
President of Russia, 29 June 2019, http://en.kremlin.ru/catalog/persons/356/events/
60860.
16 For more on improvement of Russia-Japan relations under Shinzo Abe and Vla-
dimir Putin in 2016–2019, see Anna Kireeva, “A New Stage in Russia-Japan
Relations: Rapprochement and its Limitations”, Asia-Pacific Review 26, 2 (2019),
76–104, DOI: 10.1080/13439006.2019.1692526.
17 “Putin Notes the Proximity of Moscow and New Delhi on Acute International
Problems [Putin konstatiruet blizost’ Moskvy i N’iu-Deli po ostrym mezhdunar-
odnym problemam]”, TASS, 24 December 2015, https://tass.ru/politika/2555900.
 Russia’s attitude to the Quad Plus 223
18 “Sergey Lavrov Announced the Threat to the Indo-Pacific Strategy of the United
States [Sergej Lavrov zajavil ob ugroze Indo-Tihookeanskoj strategii SshA]”,
Mezhdunarodnaja zhizn’, 11 September 2020, https://interaffairs.ru/news/show/
27423. For more on Russia-India relations, see Alexey Kupriianov, “Russian and
Indian Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific Region in the Context of Sanctions”,
International Organisations Research Journal 14, 3 (2019), 117–135, doi:10.17323/
1996-7845-2019-03-06.
19 Sergej Lavrov, “Russia and Australia: 75 years of interaction [Rossija i Avstralija:
75 let vzaimodejstvija]”, RIAC, 24 January 2018, https://russiancouncil.ru/ana
lytics-and-comments/comments/rossiya-i-avstraliya-75-let-vzaimodeystviya.
20 Winston Peters, “New Zealand and Russia: 75 Years of Diplomatic Relations
[Novaia Zelandiia i Rossiia: 75 let diplomaticheskikh otnoshenii]”, The Interna-
tional Affairs, May 22, 2019, https://interaffairs.ru/news/show/22557.
21 For more on this topic, see Anna Kireeva, “South Korea-Russia Relations after
the Cold War”, ed. Marco Milani, Antonio Fiori, Matteo Dian, The Korean
Paradox: Domestic Political Divide and Foreign Policy in South Korea (Oxon,
New York: Routledge, 2019), 137–156.
22 “Lavrov: Russia-Vietnam Dialogue Has Become Special in 70 years [Lavrov:
dialog Rossii i V’etnama za 70 let priobrel osobyj harakter]”, TASS, 29 January
2020, https://tass.ru/politika/7638207.
23 Klein, “Russia: A Euro-Pacific Power?” no. 1, 23–24.
24 On the dynamics of Russian-Israeli relations, see Irina Zvyagelskaya, “Israel-Russia:
Confronting Modern Challenges”, Valdai Discussion Club, 22 September 2015, http
s://valdaiclub.com/a/highlights/israel-russia-confronting-modern-challenges.
25 Vasily Kashin and Alexander Lukin, “Russian-Chinese Security Cooperation in
Asia”, Asian Politics & Policy 10, 4 (2018), 615–617, doi:10.1111/aspp.12423; Ma
Bin and Zhang Jian, “Present and Future Sino-Russian Cooperation: Chinese
Perspectives”, Sino-Russian Relations. Perspectives from Russia, China and Japan,
NBR Special Report 79, (Seattle: The National Bureau of Asian Research, May
2019), 27–29.
26 Alexander Lukin, China and Russia. The New Rapprochement (Cambridge: Polity
Press, 2018), 189–191; Vasily Kashin Vasily, “Russia-China Cooperation: A Rus-
sian Perspective”, Sino-Russian Relations. Perspectives from Russia, China and
Japan, NBR Special Report 79 (Seattle: The National Bureau of Asian Research,
May 2019), 1–21.
27 Kashin and Lukin, “Russian-Chinese Security Cooperation in Asia”, 621, 624;
Klein, “Russia: A Euro-Pacific Power?”, 18–19.
28 Ekaterina Koldunova, “Russia’s Ambivalence about an Indo-Pacific Strategy”,
Asia-Pacific Bulletin 476, 2(May 2019), www.eastwestcenter.org/publications/
russia%E2%80%99s-ambivalence-about-indo-pacific-strategy.
29 “Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov’s Remarks and Answers to Media Questions
during the Russian-Vietnamese Conference of the Valdai International Discussion
Club, Ho Chi Minh City, 25 February”.
30 “Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov’s Remarks and Answers to Questions at a Plenary
Session of the Raisina Dialogue International Conference, New Delhi, January 15,
2020”, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 15 January 2020, www.
mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/3994885.
31 Anton Tsvetov, “Indo-Pacific Front: Why Did a New Region Appear on the
Geopolitical Map and What Does It Mean for Russia? [Indo-Tihookeanskiı- front:
zachem na geopoliticheskoı- karte poiavilsia novyı- region i chto eto sulit Rossii?]”,
Moscow Carnegie Center, 22 March 2018, https://carnegie.ru/commentary/75706.
32 “Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov’s Remarks and Answers to Questions at a Plen-
ary Session of the Raisina Dialogue International Conference, New Delhi,
January 15, 2020”.
224 Kireeva & Kupriyanov
33 Anna Kireeva, “The Indo-Pacific in the Strategies of the US and Japan. Common
and Distinctive Features, Implications for Russia”, Russia in Global Affairs 18, 3
(July-September 2020), 98–127, DOI: 10.31278/1810-6374-2020-18-3-98-127. http
s://eng.globalaffairs.ru/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/098-127.pdf; Tsvetov, “Indo-
Pacific Front: Why Did a New Region Appear on the Geopolitical Map and
What Does It Mean for Russia?” no. 31; Aleksey Kupriyanov, “Factor of China
in Evolution of the Indian Approach to the Indo-Pacific Region [Kitajskij Faktor
v Formirovanii Indijskogo Podhoda k Koncepcii Indo-Tihookeanskogo Regiona]”,
Comparative Politics Russia 2 (2020), 68–75. https://doi.org/10.24411/2221-3279-
2020-10020; Aleksey Kupriyanov, “The Indo-Pacific Region and Russia”, Valdai
Discussion Club, 14 November 2018, https://valdaiclub.com/a/highlights/the-in
do-pacific-region-and-russia.
34 Ashwin Ahmad, “Russia Should Get Involved in Indo-Pacific to Safeguard Its
Own Interests, Says Indian Envoy”, StratNews Global, 18 July 2020, https://stra
tnewsglobal.com/russia-should-get-involved-in-indo-pacific-to-safeguard-its-own-i
nterests-says-indian-envoy.
35 “Valdai Discussion Club session [Zasedanie diskussionnogo kluba Valdaj]”,
President of Russia, 3 October 2019, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/
61719.
36 Klein, “Russia: A Euro-Pacific Power?” no. 1, 5–10, 18–19; Rensselaer W. Lee and
Artyom Lukin, Russia’s Far East: New Dynamics in Asia Pacific & Beyond
(Boulder, CO: Lynne Reinner Publishers, Inc, 2016), 3–4; Samuel Charap, et al.,
“The US and Russia in the Asia-Pacific”, The International Institute for Strategic
Studies, Primakov Institute of World Economy and International Relations, 2016,
8–11, www.iiss.org/en/events/events/archive/2016-a3c2/march-1194/the-us-and-rus
sia-in-theasia-pacific-39ff; Vasily Kashin, “Russia’s Approach to Regional Security
in Asia-Pacific and Prospects for Cooperation with Japan [Rossiiskii podkhod k
problemam regional’noi bezopasnosti v ATR i perspektivy sotrudnichestva s Iapo-
niei]”, (Moscow: Carnegie Moscow Center, June 2016), 13–14, https://carnegie.ru/
2016/06/17/ru-pub-63832.
37 Istomin, “US Policy in the Indo-Pacific: Implications for Russia”.
38 “Plenary session of the Eastern Economic Forum”, President of Russia, 5
September 2019, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/61451.
39 Kireeva, “The Indo-Pacific in the Strategies of the US and Japan. Common and
Distinctive Features, Implications for Russia”.
14 Quad Plus
A role for Indian Ocean island states?
Nilanthi Samaranayake

This chapter examines the potential factors that may enable Indian Ocean
island states to play a role in the Quad Plus, as well as factors that may
inhibit this outcome. A year after the United States launched an effort to
reach out to a handful of allies and partners to address the COVID-19 pan-
demic, the question should be asked whether there is room for Indian Ocean
island states in the Quad Plus.
The United States began an initiative in March 2020 to coordinate with
diplomats from India, Australia, Japan, South Korea, New Zealand and
Vietnam about responses to the COVID-19 pandemic. The US coordination
with its close Indo-Pacific allies and partners on this crisis recalls the inter-
national response to the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami. In the Tsunami Core
Group, diplomats from the United States, India, Australia and Japan coor-
dinated with their militaries to provide disaster relief to Indian Ocean
countries such as Indonesia, Thailand, Sri Lanka and Maldives.
However, the Quad Plus is more expansive than the Tsunami Core Group.
It also takes place in the context of rising threats and uncertainty posed by
China in the Indo-Pacific region and as a result, a renewed focus on the
Quad. This grouping, comprising the United States, India, Australia and
Japan, emerged as an informal strategic partnership out of the success of
their operational coordination after the 2004 tsunami. After being disbanded
a decade earlier, the Quad has gained momentum since 2017. In the months
since the Quad Plus concept was introduced, it has expanded to include
diplomats from countries farther from the Indo-Pacific: Brazil and Israel.
More importantly, the grouping has been raised from the deputy minister to
the ministerial level, with the US Secretary of State now coordinating with
counterparts from India, Australia, Brazil, Israel, Japan and South Korea on
COVID-19 response.
What are the chances for Indian Ocean island states to become part of the
Quad Plus? Would these states even want to be part of the grouping? For
example, Sri Lanka and Maldives were identified as partners in the US
Department of State’s 2019 report A Free and Open Indo-Pacific: Advancing
a Shared Vision. 1 News reporting from Sri Lanka has suggested the possi-
bility of deepening ties following the June 2020 call between Secretary of
DOI: 10.4324/9781003206408-18
226 Samaranayake
State Mike Pompeo and Sri Lankan Minister of Foreign Relations Dinesh
Gunawardane.2 Washington concluded a defence framework agreement with
Maldives in September 2020 and has discussed a forthcoming bilateral
security dialogue. At this point, the Quad Plus is only a virtual, operationally
focused conference and should not be overstated as a forum. Still, given ongoing
questions about the direction of the Quad Plus concept and the renewed
focus on the future for the Quad, it is worth considering both the possibilities
and limitations of expanding the Quad Plus to include the Indian Ocean
island states.

The seascape: Indian Ocean island states

One must review the Indian Ocean island states, including their geography
and identities, before considering how the Quad Plus concept may apply to
them. Some of the territories in the Indian Ocean are sovereign countries,
whereas others are colonial possessions. Beginning in South Asia, Sri Lanka
and Maldives are sovereign countries. As a near neighbour, India has wielded
much influence—cultural, ethnic, political, economic, military—throughout
their histories. As a result, both Maldives and Sri Lanka have a range of
interactions—both positive and negative from their perspectives—with their
dominant neighbour to the north.3
Farther west in the Indian Ocean are colonial-era territories held by the
United Kingdom and France. The former claims sovereignty over the British
Indian Ocean Territory (BIOT). However, Mauritius disputes Britain’s claim
to the Chagos Archipelago and is increasingly scoring victories in interna-
tional fora. As of 2020, this archipelago is represented on the 2020 United
Nations map as belonging to Mauritius and contains the key military base of
Diego Garcia, which will be examined later. Meanwhile, France also has
overseas nationals and territories in the Indian Ocean, such as Réunion and
Mayotte. Both islands contain military facilities as well. Finally, the western
Indian Ocean features multiple sovereign island countries off the east coast
of Africa: Seychelles, Mauritius, Madagascar and Comoros.
All these Indian Ocean island states have similarities and differences in
terms of traits. For example, while Maldives and Sri Lanka are part of South
Asian institutions such as the South Asian Association for Regional Coop-
eration (SAARC), Seychelles, Mauritius, Madagascar and Comoros claim an
African identity and are part of regional institutions such as the African
Union. Second, these Indian Ocean island states are at varying stages of
economic development. Seychelles and Mauritius are high-income econo-
mies, according to the World Bank, whereas Comoros, Sri Lanka and
Maldives are middle income and Madagascar is low income.
Despite their geographic, economic and institutional differences, these
states share a common region and maritime identity, which has fostered
centuries of people-to-people ties.4 Given these historical connections and
the development ambitions of the island states, there is increasing attention
 A role for Indian Ocean island states? 227
on regional institutions that can serve to unite Indian Ocean stakeholders.
One is the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA), an international organi-
sation whose secretariat is based in Mauritius. As of 2020, the aforemen-
tioned island countries are members. While IORA focuses on economic and
sustainable growth, another regional institution links Indian Ocean coun-
tries: the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS). Founded by India, IONS
focuses on maritime security and assembles meetings of regional naval and
coast guard leaders. Understanding the shared and distinct identities and
interests of small states in the Indian Ocean will be relevant to the future of
the Quad Plus.
An emerging field of international relations theory highlights the tradi-
tional inattention to small states—many of which are found in the Indian
Ocean region.5 The United States and China are clear examples of large
powers, while countries such as Australia and India—both Indian Ocean
stakeholders—are often discussed as “middle powers” with their significant,
but not global, might.6 Yet, attempts to understand small states are often
limited to identifying metrics such as population size or land area.7
Theorists of small states are moving toward a more relational understanding
of the drivers of these states’ international decisions. This is in recognition that
small states around the world have long understood their fundamentally asym-
metric relationships with large countries due to their smaller size and cap-
abilities.8 Each has needed to carefully navigate larger countries—from India to
the United States, the United Kingdom, or France. Godfrey Baldacchino and
Anders Wivel note that “small states are legally sovereign, but their actual
autonomy may vary”.9 As a result, small states such as Sri Lanka called for an
Indian Ocean Zone of Peace during the Cold War, while the Treaty of Pelindaba
was signed more recently to ensure a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Africa.
Comoros, Madagascar and Mauritius are signatories to the treaty. In addition
to understanding their geographic, social and economic traits, theoretical
knowledge about small states will be important for policymakers and academi-
cians if they wish to develop the Quad Plus as a conceptual and operational
force across the Indian Ocean and Indo-Pacific.

Commonalities across diverse Indian Ocean island states

This diverse constellation of Asian and African island nations, as well as
French and UK territories, has three broadly unifying aspects that are worth
considering when exploring the Quad Plus concept. First, they have common
needs such as building capacity for their maritime security services. Second,
island states share common concerns over sovereignty when challenged by
large powers. Third, despite their smaller size, they possess strengths such as
their strategic locations.10
First, these countries have common needs for economic development and
capacity challenges as small states. Recently, India played a critical role in
providing relief for populations in these countries, including Comoros, in
228 Samaranayake
responding to the COVID-19 pandemic. After the Indian Ocean tsunami, the
Tsunami Core Group countries provided relief to the small states of
Maldives and Sri Lanka. Beyond disaster relief, India has played a strong
role in building capacity for the maritime security services in Indian Ocean
island states. While these small island countries are currently facing chal-
lenges to their health systems and economies from COVID-19, their mar-
itime forces are also facing cutbacks to the maintenance of ships as well as
operations.11
Second, Indian Ocean island states also share common threats. They face
challenges such as rising sea levels due to climate change. They are also alert
to potential oil spills that can damage their ecology and have economic
effects, such as on tourism. For example, the maritime forces of Maldives
and Sri Lanka fear the threat of oil spills and prepare for the possibility of
such a disaster. In fact, a tanker fire off Sri Lanka’s east coast was contained
in September 2020 before it resulted in a major environmental disaster.
Unfortunately, in the preceding months, Mauritius confronted the damage of
an oil spill after a Japanese tanker ran aground. In addition to Japan pro-
viding assistance after Mauritius declared a state of environmental emer-
gency, India sent a navy ship and a coast guard team and France deployed
naval aircraft and advisers from nearby Réunion.
Moreover, small island states have had to confront large countries to
maintain their sovereignty or craft independent foreign policies. For example,
India faced protests in Seychelles when reports emerged about a potential
military base on Assumption Island.12 In the past several years, the United
States has faced controversy and eventual rejection of proposed status of
forces agreements (SOFA) with Maldives and Sri Lanka. Meanwhile, as dis-
cussed earlier, Mauritius disputes British sovereignty over the Chagos
Archipelago and has waged a successful campaign against the United King-
dom for several years in the Permanent Court of Arbitration, the Interna-
tional Court of Justice, and the UN General Assembly. In January 2021,
Mauritius’s position was further bolstered by an International Tribunal for
the Law of the Sea judgment on the delimitation of the maritime boundary
between Maldives and Mauritius. The fact that Mauritius has relied on
international diplomatic and legal institutions should be no surprise. Small
states need the “shelter” and capability that these institutions provide given
their limitations of size and capacity.13
Third, the Indian Ocean island states have surprising strengths given their
small size. Small island developing states, which include most of the coun-
tries examined in this study, are thought leaders on addressing global chal-
lenges such as climate security due to the threat of rising sea levels. Maldives,
for example, recently chaired the Alliance of Small Island States and was one
of the first countries to ratify the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement
within the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change.
Meanwhile, the locations of these small states provide them with strategic
and commercial advantages.14 For example, Sri Lanka operates the busiest
 A role for Indian Ocean island states? 229
container port in South Asia at Colombo, and Maldives is a leader among
the luxury tourism industry. Related to location is the use of islands for
military bases in strategic positions. Seychelles has permitted the United
States to base the MQ-9 Reaper unmanned aerial vehicles in support of
counterpiracy and counterterrorism missions. The United Kingdom estab-
lished the BIOT largely due to the desire to host a base, with US air and
naval presence, on Diego Garcia. This base has been critical to US military
operations—including combat—over the past 30 years.

Quad Plus: potential approaches for Indian Ocean island states

Having analysed the seascape in which Indian Ocean island states find
themselves and the commonalities shared by these small states, I will con-
sider the Quad Plus concept and the potential implications for this group of
states. Essentially, how can these states be involved in the Quad Plus? This
section will consider the factors that both enable the participation of Indian
Ocean island states, as well as hinder it.

Facilitating factors
To consider the prospects of Indian Ocean island states under the Quad Plus,
it is useful to employ a framework where these states can be considered to
play supporting vs. supported roles. First, a supporting role for these states in
the Quad Plus derives from their strengths. Location was discussed as a
strength of small states. This is certainly the case for the Indian Ocean
islands. Close to the main East–West sea lanes, Sri Lanka already permits
both merchant and military ships to refuel at Colombo port. Such visits
could play an important role in relief efforts as the COVID-19 situation
deteriorates in the developing world.
Another geographic strength of these small island states is the access they
offer for military basing across the vast Indian Ocean. In Mauritius, India
has been able to proceed with plans for base construction in the Agaléga
Islands in the form of a jetty and landing strip for use by the Mauritius coast
guard.15 This activity received less protest than similar efforts in Seychelles
due to India’s close bilateral ties with Mauritius. Basing here, as well as in the
British and French colonial territories of Diego Garcia and Réunion and
Mayotte, respectively, presents another opportunity for small Indian Ocean
islands to play a supporting role in the Quad Plus construct. These island
territories and basing access in the Indian Ocean suggest logical invitations
to France and Britain by current participants.
Alternatively, a supported role for Indian Ocean island states derives from
their needs. The fact that China has been supporting these countries not only
with health assistance but also financial relief, provides an additional
imperative for support from the Quad Plus construct. These states are likely
to continue requiring health assistance. Two of these Indian Ocean
230 Samaranayake
countries—Sri Lanka and Maldives—received relief in operations coordi-
nated by the Tsunami Core Group after the 2004 natural disaster.16 More
recently, India provided significant amounts of relief to neighbouring coun-
tries in response to COVID-19.17 In particular, the Indian Navy deployed to
small island states in South Asia and Africa. For example, in May and June,
INS Kesari steamed for roughly 7,500 nautical miles to deliver COVID-19
relief to Maldives, Mauritius, Madagascar, Comoros and Seychelles. Mean-
while, French naval forces deployed to Réunion and Mayotte to provide
relief to these overseas departments.
Beyond health assistance, the COVID-19 era has already harmed Indian
Ocean island countries’ economies and future development prospects. Mar-
itime traffic and trade have been adversely affected. Lockdowns and travel
restrictions have undermined tourism, which constitutes a significant source of
national income. For example, roughly two-thirds of Maldives’ economy is
fuelled by tourism, while one-quarter of Seychelles’s economy comes from
tourism. Meanwhile, the Indian Ocean island states have also seen diminished
remittances from overseas nationals, which is another important source of
revenue. The combined effect of decreased export revenue, tourism income and
remittances has resulted in fewer foreign exchange reserves for these coun-
tries—some of which already had deficient reserves before the COVID-19
crisis began. As a result, they have relied on international financial institutions
and multilateral development banks—as well as China—for assistance. Mald-
ives and Sri Lanka have also requested currency swaps from India. This clear
need from Indian Ocean island states suggests an opportunity for Quad Plus
countries to provide financial support to these developing economies.

Inhibiting factors
Beyond facilitating factors, there are factors which may inhibit Indian Ocean
island states’ participation in the Quad Plus. Some of these limitations derive
from the concerns of small states discussed above. First, island states may be
wary of the potential use of their territory. This diplomatic issue can have
operational effects. When China’s increasing ties with Sri Lanka or Maldives
are mentioned, both Colombo18 and Malé repeat a desire to avoid upsetting
India’s security interests such as by permitting foreign military bases on their
territory. Indian Ocean island states would likely refuse to participate in the
Quad Plus if it were to assume a military appearance, especially one seen as
being anti-China. How the Quad Plus framework navigates its relationship to
the Quad consultations—which are continuing at the ministerial level in the
new Biden Administration—will thus be important going forward with
regard to Indian Ocean island states.
A second limitation is conceptual with regard to the Indian Ocean region
and US blindspots. Since the origins of the Quad Plus in March 2020, the
United States has sought to keep the dialogue focused on the Indo-Pacific,
with an emphasis on countries bordering Pacific waters. Close US allies such
 A role for Indian Ocean island states? 231
as France and the United Kingdom are not even involved, despite their
possession of territories in the Indian Ocean region. Expanding the Quad
Plus’s attention to the Indian Ocean may not be a priority now for
Washington, beyond press releases and photo opportunities. China’s ongoing
expansion of its ties with Indian Ocean island states could be a catalyst that
increases US attention to the region. It is not clear, however, that India
would welcome greater US defence engagement with neighbours such as
Maldives. Although India did not object to a loose defence framework
agreement between the United States and Maldives in 2020, New Delhi had
previously discouraged Malé from pursuing a more intensive defence agreement
(i.e. a SOFA) in 2013–2014.
Another potential conceptual challenge is that Quad countries prioritise
different parts of the Indian Ocean. This raises questions whether all island
states can participate in the Quad Plus. As discussed earlier, the origins of the
Quad date back to 2004, when the United States, India, Japan and Australia
coordinated to provide disaster relief through the Tsunami Core Group.
While this group disbanded in 2005, the strategic rationale for these four
Quad countries to work together persisted, culminating in the September
2007 MALABAR exercise. A decade later, the grouping has re-emerged, largely
due to increased assertiveness by China in the South and East China Seas.
Despite the nominal shift in Washington’s previously declared “Asia-Pacific”
priorities to the new “Indo-Pacific” strategy, the Quad remains focused on
the Pacific in practice. Much of the “Indo” focus in the US concept of the
Indo-Pacific is concentrated on India in particular rather than the Indian
Ocean more broadly. More recently, however, White House officials (while in
India) discussed an extension of the Indo-Pacific definition to extend to
Africa. Whereas US officials had described the Indo-Pacific Command area
of responsibility as extending “from Hollywood to Bollywood”,19 this area
was characterised in January 2020 as extending “from California to Kili-
manjaro”.20 Nevertheless, this talking point has not yet translated into any
changes to the Unified Command Plan for this theatre. Likewise, the Indo-
Pacific remains a fundamentally Asian concept for Australia. In the recent
2020 Defence Strategic Update, Canberra prioritises the eastern Indian
Ocean through the use of maps and text mentions.21
As a result, islands in the western Indian Ocean do not receive significant
attention from the United States or Australia.22 For example, the African
countries of Mauritius, Seychelles, Madagascar and Comoros are not men-
tioned in the US’s A Free and Open Indo-Pacific report.23 Even territories
held by close US allies—Britain and France—are not mentioned.
On the other hand, India is centrally located in the Indian Ocean and
policymakers are increasingly focused on westward equities for their coun-
try—more so than the United States and Australia. India’s 2015 Maritime
Security Strategy resulted in the extension of the country’s primary area of
interest to encompass the entire western Indian Ocean, including the islands
in the south-western corner.24 This strategy has been operationalised through
232 Samaranayake
the Indian Navy’s mission-based deployments across the entire region. Japan
shares this expansive vision for the Indian Ocean and has partnered with
India on the Asia–Africa Growth Corridor, although this initiative has not
yet produced notable results.25

The way ahead

Having analysed the Indian Ocean island states, this chapter examines fac-
tors that could both facilitate as well as inhibit their participation in the
Quad Plus. A study of their traits shows that these states are unified by
common needs and concerns and possess surprising strengths. Basing access
for the provision of relief is a clear example of the supporting role the Indian
Ocean island states can play in the Quad Plus. On the other hand, during the
COVID-19 pandemic, these states have been supported through health and
financial assistance.
Despite these opportunities, the Quad Plus construct may pose some lim-
itations for Indian Ocean island states’ participation. Diplomatic leadership
of the Quad Plus will need to ensure it does not assume a discourse that is
negative to China. Such messaging could result in reduced operational access
by Indian Ocean island states to their territories. The mostly Asian and
Pacific focus of the Quad Plus is a conceptual limitation of the current
format, with less appreciation of the entire Indian Ocean region across which
island states reside. While the Quad Plus can provide health and financial
benefit to these states, they are unlikely to engage with US and Quad partners
on any strategic cooperation that bears an anti-China tone.
Moreover, the absence of US allies, France and the United Kingdom, from
the Quad Plus is a missed opportunity.26 Involving these countries, and by
extension their island territories, would widen the geographic scope of the
grouping to include all Indian Ocean islands.
During the past decade, the United States’ thinking about the Indian
Ocean has evolved significantly and appears likely to continue to do so over
the next decade. Despite the shift in political party in the White House with
the Biden Administration’s entry, Washington continues in 2021 to empha-
sise its rising threat perceptions from China. In fact, China features promi-
nently in President Biden’s Interim National Security Strategic Guidance, as
well as statements by Secretary of State Antony Blinken and Secretary of
Defense Lloyd Austin in March 2021.To this end, the United States should
continue to deepen its alliances and partnerships in the Indo-Pacific, including
in the Indian Ocean region and its small island states.

Acknowledgement
The views expressed are solely those of the author and not of any organiza-
tion with which she is affiliated.
 A role for Indian Ocean island states? 233
Notes
1 US Department of State, A Free and Open Indo-Pacific: Advancing a Shared
Vision (Washington, DC: Department of State, 4 November 2019), www.state.gov.
2 Sri Lanka Ministry of Foreign Relations, “Minister Dinesh Gunawardena and US
Secretary of State Mike Pompeo in Discussions on Matters of Bilateral Interest”,
30 June 2020, https://mfa.gov.lk; US Department of State, “Secretary Pompeo’s
Call with Sri Lankan Foreign Minister Gunawardena”, 29 June 2020, www.state.
gov; and Kelum Bandara, “MCC: A Matter for the New Parliament to Decide”,
Daily Mirror, 2 July 2020, www.dailymirror.lk.
3 Nilanthi Samaranayake, “China’s Engagement with Smaller South Asian
Countries”, United States Institute of Peace, (April 2019), 15–16, www.usip.org.
4 For example, two-thirds of the citizens in Mauritius are thought to be of Indian
descent.
5 Matthias Maass, Small States in World Politics: The Story of Small State
Survival, 1648–2016 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2017).
6 Rory Medcalf and C. Raja Mohan, “Responding to Indo-Pacific Rivalry: Aus-
tralia, India and Middle Power Coalitions”, Lowy Institute, 8 August 2014, www.
lowyinstitute.org.
7 Jeanne A. K. Hey, “Introducing Small State Foreign Policy”, in Jeanne A. K.
Hey, ed., Small States in World Politics: Explaining Foreign Policy Behavior
(Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003), 2.
8 Anders Wivel, Alyson J.K. Bailes, and Clive Archer, “Setting the Scene: Small
States and International Security”, in Clive Archer, Alyson J.K. Bailes and
Anders Wivel, eds, Small States and International Security: Europe and Beyond
(New York: Routledge, 2014), 8–9.
9 Godfrey Baldacchino and Anders Wivel, “Small States: Concepts and Theories”,
in Handbook on the Politics of Small States (Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar
Publishing, 2020), 6.
10 Nilanthi Samaranayake, “Island States in a Region of Great Powers”, in David
Michel and Ricky Passarelli, ed., Sea Change: Evolving Maritime Geopolitics in
the Indo-Pacific Region (Washington, DC: Stimson Center, December 2014), 61,
www.stimson.org.
11 Author’s discussion with a military officer from an Indian Ocean island country,
August 2020.
12 Nilanthi Samaranayake, “Asian Basing in Africa: India’s Setback in Seychelles Could
Be Worse”, India in Transition, 24 September 2018, https://casi.sas.upenn.edu.
13 Baldacchino and Wivel, “Small States”, 11–12, 14.
14 Naren Prasad, “Small but Smart: Small States in the Global System”, in Andrew
F. Cooper and Timothy M. Shaw, ed., The Diplomacies of Small States: Between
Vulnerability and Resilience (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2013), 43, 51.
15 Mauritius’s Ambassador Jagdish Koonjul’s response to author’s question, “The
Future of Diego Garcia: Can America Maintain Its ‘Footprint of Freedom?’”,
Center for National Interest, 28 July 2020, https://youtu.be.
16 Nilanthi Samaranayake, Catherine Lea, Dmitry Gorenburg, Improving US–India
HA/DR Coordination in the Indian Ocean (Alexandria, VA: CNA, July 2014),
www.cna.org.
17 Nilanthi Samaranayake, “Smaller South Asia: Competition for Influence amid
COVID-19 Response”, in Maya Mirchandani, Shoba Suri, Laetitia Bruce Warjri,
eds, The Viral World (New Delhi: Observer Research Foundation, June 2020),
www.orfonline.org.
18 Kelum Bandara, “Our Independence and Sovereignty: Shouldn’t Be Subjugated
by Any Major Power - Jayanath Colombage”, Daily Mirror, 28 January 2020,
www.dailymirror.lk.
234 Samaranayake
19 Alice G. Wells, “Special Briefing: Alice G. Wells, Principal Deputy Assistant
Secretary”, Department of State, Office of the Spokesperson, 24 January 2020,
https://translations.state.gov.
20 Matthew Pottinger, Raisina Dialogue 2020, tweet, New Delhi, 16 January 2020,
https://twitter.com.
21 Australian Department of Defence, 2020 Defence Strategic Update, 1 July 2020,
www.defence.gov.au.
22 Even India did not include Comoros and Madagascar within its Indian Ocean
Region Division until December 2019, suggesting the evolving attention of this
region even for a country that is centrally positioned in the Indian Ocean. Dar-
shana M. Baruah, “India in the Indo-Pacific: New Delhi’s Theater of Opportu-
nity”, Carnegie India, 30 June 2020, https://carnegieindia.org.
23 US Department of State, A Free and Open Indo-Pacific.
24 Indian Navy, Ensuring Secure Seas: Indian Maritime Security Strategy—2015,
October 2015, www.indiannavy.nic.in.
25 Research and Information System for Developing Countries (RIS), “About
AAGC”, 25 August 2020, https://aagc.ris.org.in.
26 Nilanthi Samaranayake, “The Coronavirus Crisis Calls for an International
Response”, National Interest, 14 April 2020, https://nationalinterest.org.
15 The Quad Plus proposition in a Middle
Eastern context
Brendon J. Cannon

Conceptually, as well as geographically, the Middle East is difficult to define.

Economically, politically and culturally, it is highly diverse, making it difficult
to generalise about policy development or anything approaching region-wide
interests.1 Accordingly, three important and highly influential Middle East-
ern states—the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Iran and Turkey—have been
selected in order to analyse their interests in as well as their actions and
reactions to the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) and, by extension,
the Quad Plus.2 Using a qualitative and comparative methodology, the
chapter uses interviews, media articles and government statements to catalo-
gue and analyse the nascent positions of three Middle Eastern states vis-à-vis
the Quad and the Quad states’ strategic competitor China. It will thus ana-
lyse the alignment and enduring national interests of the UAE, Iran and
Turkey in order to better understand the Middle East–Quad Plus nexus and
test the chapter’s primary hypothesis: because it is US-led and is therefore
construed as an anti-China proposition, the Quad Plus is viewed with suspicion
or disinterest in the Middle East.

Quad Plus in the context of global distributions of power

The Quad Plus, led by the United States but supported strongly by Japan,
Australia, and India, certainly has some resonance in the Middle East in a
way that the Quad itself does not. The latter, while not officially so, is largely
a military-security mechanism to stymie China’s pursuance of national
interests—many of them alarming to neighbouring states such as Japan,
Taiwan and Vietnam—in the Pacific and Indian Oceans. The Quad Plus, on
the other hand, seems to be a more informal and inclusive mechanism that
holds out the possibility of international cooperation between the Quad and
other states and includes security but moves far beyond this to cover
contingencies such as pandemic responses and supply chains.3
Scholars of international relations (IR) generally subscribe to the theory
that the world is an anarchical system of states with finite amounts of power
on hand. At the very least, scholars agree there is no global policeman to
enforce rules and laws. While much separates realists from liberal
DOI: 10.4324/9781003206408-19
236 Cannon
institutionalists, the control of power and its largely zero-sum nature remain
the bedrock of IR theories. In this anarchical global system, significant
changes to distributions of power—shifting from one state to another state
or grouping of states—over a relatively short period create greater uncertainty,
thereby making the global state system even more anarchical.
Multiple IR theories have attempted to grapple with these questions of
rising and falling state power and the uncertainty that accompanies shifts in
distributions of power. Power transition theory, for example, predicts that
shifts in the balance of economic and military power are often a sufficient
trigger for a rivalry where previously none had existed.4 Today’s rising
powers such as China and India, or Germany in the late nineteenth century,
compete for power and influence to impose their will on the global order.
When this rivalry occurs between a hegemon and the rising power, the
ensuing competition exhibits a gravitational pull that drags other states in—
willingly or not.
At present, the United States is China’s only strategic competitor in terms
of size and power capabilities. This is not to say that China’s rise has not
spurred other would-be major powers such as India or global economic
powers such as Japan to take actions to safeguard their national interests and
security. Tokyo’s and New Delhi’s shifting stances toward China demonstrate
the conundrums faced by many states as they attempt to grapple with what is
increasingly perceived as a “China threat”, on the one hand, and the
“peaceful rise of China” on the other.5 That is, China is both a welcome
partner offering development, financing and expertise and an unwelcome
actor as its increasing share of power, territorial incursions, and “wolf war-
rior” diplomacy coincide to fundamentally threaten the foundations of a
post-World War II US-led world order. Beijing’s irredentist claims for dis-
puted territories or its dismissal of international court rulings may irk
neighbouring states like India and the Philippines, but it is China’s actions
such as hostile takeovers of port operations in Sri Lanka and island-building
in the disputed South China Sea as well as its massive military build-up,
including a powerful blue-water navy, that reinforce the dangerous array of
threats posed by Beijing.
One of the results of these shifts in global power from West to East and
the uncertainty accompanying them is the Quad and, subsequently, the Quad
Plus: a broad coalition of states willing to question not only China’s con-
troversial actions but act against it. Like-minded states have proliferated,
with Vietnam, Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia not only voicing their
serious concerns about China and Chinese actions but drawing closer to the
United States and its Quad partners for security. This newfound resolve,
however, is tempered by the fact that China remains the largest trading
partner for not only three of the four Quad states but also for the South-east
Asian states. The Quad also wishes to avoid being simply an anti-China bloc.
Its leaders, while criticising singular Chinese actions such as freedom of
navigation issues in the Taiwan Strait, continue to soothe China by arguing
 Quad Plus in a Middle Eastern context 237
for inclusion rather than exclusion, making it abundantly clear that New
Delhi, Canberra and Tokyo would prefer a friendly China in the room rather
than an aggressive China outside it.

Ties that bind? The Middle East and the Quad Plus
This book has provided detailed descriptions and analyses about the Quad
Plus. As such, this chapter focuses less on what the Quad Plus will or will not
do and instead explores the interests, actions and reactions of the three Middle
East states to the Quad states and their overtures via the Quad Plus. In terms
of the Middle East, the Quad Plus and related efforts such as the Blue Dot
Network (BDN) seem to hold relevance for states on the periphery of the
Indo-Pacific, like those in the Middle East, rather than the Quad states them-
selves or China’s South-east Asian neighbours. This means that the Quad Plus
may offer substantive alternatives to China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) or
more localised efforts in alleviating the serious infrastructural and develop-
mental deficits that bedevil many parts of the Middle East.
It may take some time and convincing to bring Middle East states around
to the Quad Plus. This is because China’s BRI, whatever else it may be, is
certainly clear, present and tactile in nature. It produces railroads, ports, pipe-
lines, and other forms of infrastructural, economic, and, naturally, political
connectedness to Beijing. To its credit, the Quad Plus proposition makes it
clear that the Quad states understand this and have begun to actively engage
regions like the Middle East using some of China’s strategies while eschewing
some of Beijing’s more alarming tactics. A statement made by India’s External
Affairs Minister, S. Jaishankar, perhaps summed up the Quad Plus best when
he noted it is “for something” rather than “against someone”. However, capi-
tal investment on a scale at least approaching China’s billions invested in its
BRI and related Maritime Silk Road not only need to be pledged by like-
minded states but need to result in finished projects. Nonetheless, the Quad
Plus and BDN are perhaps the beginning of an alternative to China and its
BRI on the developmental and economic fronts. Whether alternatives are
being sought or even thought about in the Middle East depends on a state’s
interests as informed by its security burdens and geopolitics.
While the Quad Plus remains unknown, China’s BRI is well known in the
Middle East. The UAE, Iran, Egypt and others all have extensive and
ongoing BRI projects funded by loans from Chinese state-backed or owned
banks. Iran is integral to both China’s maritime “belt” and terrestrial “road”.
The gravitational pull of China felt in the Middle East through its increasing
economic and political influence via the BRI is, nevertheless, beginning to be
resisted, though somewhat unevenly. The UAE, Egypt and Saudi Arabia rely
on the United States, China’s strategic competitor, for their security. Deals
made by the UAE, Egypt or Saudi Arabia with China for everything from
5G to military hardware have led to both public and private censure from
Washington. In contrast to Iran and the UAE, Turkey has largely remained
238 Cannon
immune to the BRI’s appeal. As its economic health and relations with the
United States and Europe continue to decline, however, Ankara has muffled
its criticisms of Beijing over its treatment of its Muslim Uighur minority in
Xinjiang and looked to China for much-needed loans.6

National interests and security burdens

A state’s extant and enduring security burdens often, but not always, define
its strategic choices and inform its national interests. Security burdens are
often divided into two tiers. First-tier security burdens can be understood as
those coming from states possessing the extant and enduring capability and
intent to cause catastrophic harm to the national security of the state in
question. Second-tier security burdens may be defined as those emanating
from states possessing the possible capability and intent to cause enduring,
persistent and serious harm to the national security of a country.7
While the Middle East exhibits unique characteristics in terms of foreign
policy development, in many ways the region’s states vary little from other
states: the leaders and policymakers of those states make choices that are
limited by the amount, proximity and tiered nature of their security burdens.
This includes not just “hard” security matters, such as those involving the
military and other security services, but economic and social matters as well.
States engage in relations with other states to hedge against and counter
these security burdens, which are necessarily impacted by a state’s geographic
location and history as well as population.
All states can be said to have national interests that influence the govern-
ment’s or leadership’s policies vis-à-vis internal and external threats, regard-
less of their genesis. States in the Middle East such as the UAE, Iran and
Turkey are, therefore, primarily interested in propositions and alignments
such as the Quad Plus or China’s BRI to further these national interests and,
relatedly, the security of the state and/or regime.

National interests and the United Arab Emirates

The security of the UAE and that of its regime are reliant to a large degree
on its ability to export its significant share of hydrocarbons, mainly oil.
Given the UAE’s geographic position as well as its reliance on the export of
oil, maritime shipping lanes in the Persian Gulf and the Arabian Sea must
remain open. For the UAE, throughout its first four decades of existence, this
has meant the Strait of Hormuz has been the primary security concern.8
However, with natural changes in leadership after the death of the UAE’s
founder, Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan al-Nahyan in 2004, coupled with a steady
increase in wealth, the UAE’s leaders have placed increasing emphasis on its
extra-regional and international standing as a small power.9 Accordingly, the
UAE’s leadership has overseen an extensive overhaul of the country’s armed
forces and intensified its weapons acquisition programmes.
 Quad Plus in a Middle Eastern context 239
The United States’ security umbrella in the Persian Gulf makes the UAE
less insecure in a highly volatile neighbourhood. The close US-UAE rela-
tionship, dating back to the Cold War, has ensured the UAE’s survival in the
face of threats from larger neighbours such as Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Iran.
In turn, the UAE’s emphasis on developing a highly tolerant society, a stable
economy, a capable military, and close relations with other US allies,
including (in mid-2020) Israel, have meant the UAE is even more secure as
Washington’s partner.
The UAE’s reliance on the United States, however, comes at the price of
insecurity should America ever choose to leave the region. Abu Dhabi has
recently turned to the East, establishing warm relations with China. As a
partner in China’s BRI, the UAE signed a Strategic Partnership with China
in 2018 and 3.4 billion USD in deals with Beijing in 2019. However, the
UAE’s leadership remains wary of China’s ultimate aims in the region.10
Accordingly, Abu Dhabi continues to look to the United States for its
security, eschewing the vast array of weaponry on offer from China except
for drones, rockets and rifles. These were reportedly only purchased on
account of speed of delivery and cost as well as political roadblocks in
Washington for US drones.11
Beyond regime security and stability for the country via the sale of
hydrocarbons, the UAE’s leadership worries deeply about the threat of mili-
tant Islam. The breakdown in the regional order following the 2011 Arab
Spring uprisings led the UAE to adopt a more assertive and interventionist
foreign policy ranging from Libya and Egypt to Yemen to counter what it
perceived as Islamist threats to its security. It culminated in the severance of
relations with Qatar, a fellow Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) member, by
the UAE, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain in 2017. The UAE accused Qatar of
supporting Muslim Brotherhood causes linked to political violence in places
ranging from Somalia and Egypt to Palestine. When Turkey, led by mild
Islamists with strong Muslim Brotherhood ties, strengthened its relations
with Qatar by stationing more troops in the country and expanding its mili-
tary facility there, the UAE’s leadership quickly perceived the threats facing
the country to now be double-barrelled, pitting the Arab World led by the
UAE and Saudi Arabia against the Turks and the Iranians.

National interests and Iran

Iran’s national interests are tightly bound up in its relationship with the
United States. Three factors have generated Iran’s national security prio-
rities: the 1979 revolution, Iranian foreign policy against Israel, and the
attacks of 9/11. These have led the United States to adopt increasingly
intransigent and harsh policies in relation to Iran, including sanctions that
have significantly curtailed Iran’s economic and military growth. Not only
is the United States a seemingly omnipresent adversary with a significant
military presence in Turkey, Iraq, and the Persian Gulf, but it also has
240 Cannon
over-the-horizon missile and nuclear capabilities that leave Iran’s leaders
even less secure.
Iran also faces a host of regional threats from medium to small states.
Indeed, a testimony about Iran delivered to the US Senate Foreign Relations
Committee remains as apt today as it was 20 years ago:

Iran’s “anarchical” regional environment has all the ingredients of an

strategic nightmare: Too many neighbours with hostile, unfriendly or at
best opportunistic attitudes, no great power alliance, a 25 years face-off
with [the] greatest super-power in history, living in a war infested region
(5 major wars in less than 25 years), a region ripe with ethno-territorial
disputes on its borders (Iran has been a major regional refugee hub), and
with a dominant Wahabi trans-regional movement which theologically
and politically despises Iran, and finally a region with nuclear powers;
Pakistan, Israel, and India. Iran is located at the centre of the
“uncontrollable centre” of post-Cold war and post-9/11 world politics.12

Iran has adopted a “self-help” approach to foreign policy and looked for
strategic alignments wherever it can get them. This has meant Tehran has
actively engaged states that have adversarial relations with Washington to
lessen the enduring security burdens heaped upon it by the United States.
The “golden ring” axis of Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, Russia and China may be
one such proposition. While short on details, it could eventually form a sig-
nificant anti-US bloc across Eurasia and, in the process, strengthen Iran
strategically, militarily, politically and economically.13 Iran, however, has
longstanding divergent interests with all these states except China, but China
is by far the most relevant and useful to Tehran, not least because China sees
Iran as its most important trade partner and hydrocarbons source in the
Middle East. For Beijing, Iran represents a way out of what China is
increasingly convinced is a US policy of containment. Accordingly, China
relies on Iran to diversify its energy supply. Doing so helps China’s hydro-
carbon imports avoid passing through the Strait of Malacca, which is con-
trolled by US allies in South-east Asia. China plans to overcome this
strategic predicament by ensuring Iran’s hydrocarbon flow is connected to
the pipelines stretching from Gwadar Port (part of the BRI-related China–
Pakistan Economic Corridor [CPEC]) in Pakistan to China. This, in turn,
explains China’s readiness to invest in the development of Chabahar, the
south-eastern Iranian port currently under construction, from which Beijing
can also access Afghanistan, Central Asia and Russia. For Iran, “the BRI
represents an opportunity at a time when Western powers are withholding
much-needed investment and advanced technology to develop its oil and gas
infrastructure and transportation capacity”.14
Beijing may be wary of getting pulled into festering and complicated
regional conflicts, but its interests do align with Tehran on one level: it sees
much utility in building stronger relations with Iran to thumb its nose at
 Quad Plus in a Middle Eastern context 241
Washington. Indicative of this is the 25-year Strategic Partnership signed
between Iran and China in mid-2020 that emphasises security and under-
scores Beijing’s long-term weapons transfer programmes with Iran, such as
the development of long-range anti-ship missiles and the reported purchase
of Chengdu J-10 fighter jets.
Iran also has a choice of additional partners, including traditionally non-
aligned states such as India. New Delhi has historically warm relations with
Iran and, until recently, remained a significant investment partner along with
other states more closely aligned with the United States such as France,
Germany and Japan. Nevertheless, increasingly targeted US sanctions insti-
tuted by former US President Donald Trump coupled with US financial
clout on a global scale meant that investments by Indian, French and Japa-
nese companies were largely curtailed, resulting in Iran’s increased isolation.
Despite the desire of US President Joe Biden to revive the Joint Compre-
hensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), the US is unlikely to relax most sanctions
and investors will remain wary of doing deals in a country where they may
be unable to recoup costs.

National interests and Turkey

Turkey’s enduring security burdens, like Iran’s, are wrapped up in its history
and geography. The fall of the Ottoman Empire and its attempted dis-
memberment by secret treaties between European powers and Russia have
led to a collective, long-running and almost paranoid emphasis on Turkey’s
territorial integrity. Russia continues to pose the largest and most powerful
threat to Turkey. This threat drove the newly minted secular republic to seek
an alliance with the West, particularly the United States, after World War II.
However, Turkey was always an uncomfortable partner for the West, and
Ankara—while useful from a strategic and tactical standpoint to the United
States and its NATO partners—never fully trusted its allies. Appearances
were kept up because the threat of Soviet (Russian) domination during the
Cold War was so great. The serious differences that did flare up between
Turkey and the West—from Cyprus in 1974 to the military coups d’état that
overthrew three civilian Turkish governments— were papered over.
The decrease in tensions accompanying the end of the Cold War led to an
opening up of Turkey’s political, economic and social spaces that witnessed
the rise of mildly Islamist politicians and their eventual democratic election
to power in 2002. Led by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the Justice and Develop-
ment Party (JDP) has been re-elected to power several times and has ruled
Turkey since then. Turkey’s transition to democracy and the rise of Erdoğan,
however, resulted in cooler rather than warmer relations with the United
States and Europe. The reasons for this are legion, but a primary cause was
the advent of a more powerful Turkey with a muscular foreign policy,
sometimes delivered in coarse, undiplomatic language by Erdoğan. As
Turkey failed to gain support from Europe first on EU membership and then
242 Cannon
on issues of migration, market access and Kurdish separatism, Turkey’s JDP
government also became more authoritarian, escalating dramatically in the
aftermath of the attempted military coup in July 2016.
The almost wilful misunderstandings about the Syrian crisis, Kurdish
separatism and arms sales/transfers have led to a souring of Turkey’s relations
with the United States. Fraying relations with the West, however, only increase
Turkey’s isolation and security burdens. Turkey remains wary of Russia, for
example, even though relations have warmed considerably. Yet, tacit coopera-
tion with Moscow in Syria and Ankara’s purchase of the S-400 missile system
have failed to paper over major differences in the Caucasus, Libya and Syria.
Ankara’s interests continue to dovetail more with those of its erstwhile ally, the
United States, than with those of the European states or Russia
Relations with Turkey’s Middle Eastern neighbours are no less proble-
matic. Despite being largely shunned by the West-facing republic until the
early 2000s, Turkey’s JDP initially saw great political potential in the Arab
Street, throwing its support behind the Palestinian cause and Hamas and
trashing its close relations with Israel in the process. However, mistrust and
bigotry on both Arab and Turkish sides—dating back to Ottoman times—as
well as domestic constraints in Turkey (economic shocks, separatism, declin-
ing JDP political power) resulted in compromises informed by realpolitik for
Turkey’s leaders. In addition, Ankara was forced to come to terms with the
fact that Turkey maintains cool-to-cold relations with almost every Arab
Middle Eastern state with the exception of tiny Qatar.
Iran, a revolutionary Shi’a state, holds even less appeal as a partner for
Turkey’s Sunni Islamists. But very much like Iran, Turkey’s security burdens
are suffocating. Turkey often feels threatened by states surrounding it,
though this is offset some by the presence of seas surrounding Turkey and
offering, in parts, a watery buffer. Turkey also relies on self-help and follows
the adage that “the enemy of my enemy is my friend” (in Turkish, düşmanı-
mın düşmanı dostumdur). The problem faced by Ankara is that neither Russia
nor the United States, adversarial as they may be to one another, can be
considered Turkey’s friend.
China does not pose an existential threat to Turkey. It is too far away. But
it could be a powerful partner in the alleviation of Turkey’s extant and
enduring security burdens. Turkey’s relations with China, nevertheless,
remain tepid, largely for reasons of politics. Turkey’s current regime sees
itself as the defender of Muslims a la the Ottoman sultans, and China’s
treatment of the ethnically Turkic Uighur negatively affects relations. Addi-
tionally, Turkey’s interests in Central Asia, also largely populated by ethnic
Turks, are now complicated by China as well as Russia. As such, Turkey has
been slow to warm to China’s BRI. Instead, Ankara has rolled out its own
vision of economic and transport connectivity, the Middle Corridor (in
Turkish, Orta Koridor). The idea is to bind Turkey ever closer to the hydro-
carbons, minerals and markets of Central Asia and the Caucasus with a rail
link stretching between China and Turkey.15
 Quad Plus in a Middle Eastern context 243
Potential and pitfalls of the Quad Plus in the Middle East
The promises of the Quad Plus, and its expansion to like-minded states
concerned about China, certainly hold potential for the Middle East. As the
research in the following section shows, for reasons of geopolitics as well as
security burdens and national interests, the Quad Plus may be viewed with
disinterest or outright hostility in certain quarters.

Quad Plus and the United Arab Emirates

All indications are that Abu Dhabi may take a neutral-to-positive position
vis-à-vis the Quad Plus. While requests for interviews with UAE officials
regarding the Quad Plus went unanswered, the author’s searches of UAE
media outlets seemed to support the somewhat ambiguous-to-positive stance
the UAE may take vis-à-vis the Quad Plus. Articles revolving around the
topics of the Quad, Quad Plus, and the Indo-Pacific, for example, contained
reporting largely reprinted from other news sources about events such as
joint military exercises in the Indian Ocean or ministerial meetings in Aus-
tralia. When editorials did surface, they were written by outsiders from one
of the Quad states.16 An article in the official news agency of the UAE,
however, quoted the Washington-based Hudson Institute’s report that placed
the UAE as an example of state-to-state cooperation. It argued that
Washington’s Indo-Pacific strategy be patterned on the UAE’s recent efforts
at cooperation with India.17 These may indicate that the UAE’s leadership
has either not taken notice or has not made decisions yet regarding a likely
invitation to participate in the Quad Plus.
The BDN’s supply chain initiatives as related to manufacturing and mili-
tary security as well as discussions on environmental security in the Indian
Ocean basin certainly should interest the UAE. Abu Dhabi, for example, is
already involved a 3 billion USD strategic investment fund for emerging
markets and technologies established by the UAE, Israel and the United
States.18 In addition, defence-related propositions are likely of particular
interest to the country’s leaders, and the Quad states offer much that is
desirable to the UAE in this field. This is because the UAE has been dili-
gently attempting to become an arms manufacturer and exporter and, in the
process, taken steps similar to Japan and India (as well as its political and
ideological adversary, Turkey).19 To do so, it has relied largely on a robust
offsets programme that has funnelled money and expertise into the country,
building infrastructure for weapons parts and products in the process.20 The
lion’s share of this has been performed by US defence companies, and the
UAE has consistently been one of the top buyers of US defence equipment in
the world.
The UAE remains assiduous in courting Beijing’s investments and part-
nerships in everything from education to oil extraction to ports construction
and operations. It will also continue selling its oil and participating in
244 Cannon
Chinese ventures ranging from 5G to COVID-19 vaccines.21 This does not
mean Abu Dhabi will forge stronger security relations with Beijing.22 China’s
close relationship with Iran naturally complicates matters for Abu Dhabi.
Equally important is Beijing’s own reticence to take an active security role in
the region. This is because, firstly, China can continue to act as a freeloader
on US security guarantees and, secondly, because China does not wish to be
dragged into a Middle Eastern conflict where it would need to choose sides.
In other words, an invitation to the Quad Plus—and with it the possibility of
drawing closer to the United States and Israel without angering China—
would probably be received favourably in Abu Dhabi.

Quad Plus and Iran

Contrary to the position of the UAE, Iran has little desire to see China’s
power curtailed. This is because Iran relies on China and expects little but
confrontation from the United States; the Quad Plus—even given its promise
of integrating supply chains between non-Quad states such as South Korea
and Vietnam—holds little interest for Iran. The Quad Plus proposition, for
example, would likely not result in assistance to Iran for COVID-19 or a
future pandemic given Washington’s intransigent stance. Iran, however,
readily accepted assistance from China for test kits and other medical
equipment.23 Additionally, the Quad Plus would not be used as an informal
organisational platform by the United States in any future negotiations with
Iran, with President Biden signalling he will resurrect negotiations under the
P5+1.24
Iranian commentary—not surprisingly—has been dismissive of the Quad,
the Quad Plus, and the broader Indo-Pacific visions, viewing them as US
Trojan horses to further bolster US power across the globe and curb those of
states such as Iran and China. The word “containment”, for example, is used
most often in Iranian commentary about the Indo-Pacific and the Quad Plus.
The concept is viewed as American-led, designed, and operated, thus making
it antithetical to Iran’s strategic goals. According to one Iranian analysis of
the emerging geopolitical alignment:

[The US] is working on getting India more involved in regional initiatives

by reviving [former US President] George W. Bush’s plan for closer
cooperation between Japan, Australia and India as a four-member
Quad. In this way, by bringing India into power equilibrium equations
against China, it [the US] will work with regional coalitions to contain
this emerging superpower.25

Reporting about the Quad Plus by Iran’s official media organisation accused
it of being an overreaction by the Quad states to China’s actions in the South
Pacific and of playing copycat to Beijing’s BRI, albeit on a smaller scale and
without offering anything new.26
 Quad Plus in a Middle Eastern context 245
Quad Plus and Turkey
Turkey’s political, economic and security situations have all worsened dra-
matically since 2011. Domestic and international actions taken by Turkey
not only pit Ankara against its former allies but have added to Turkey’s long
list of extant and enduring security burdens. The COVID-19 pandemic has
exacerbated these tensions. Instead of receiving help from its Western allies,
however, Turkey received over 350,000 rapid detection kits from China.27
Given the context, will Turkey have any interest in the Quad Plus? For all
its strides on the global stage over the past two decades, Turkey’s interests
and capabilities mean it remains focused on its near abroad. In contrast, the
Quad Plus, indeed the Indo-Pacific Partnership itself, remains a concept that
is wedded—by nomenclature as much as interests—to the Indian and Pacific
worlds. Turkey is not yet an active actor in either region. The Indo-Pacific is
simply too far away.
When asked about Turkey’s interest in the Quad Plus, for example, a
senior Turkish official drily noted, “We are here [in the Mediterranean/
Middle East]; the Indo-Pacific is way over there. Why would we be inter-
ested?”28 Adding to this, the official noted that Turkey perceives the Quad as
a US-led effort against China, with the Quad Plus simply being more of the
same with a new name. “Turkey doesn’t want to be part of an anti-China
front”, declaimed the official.29 Arguing for robust Turkish sovereignty and
freedom of action—domestically and internationally—the official opined that
the Quad Plus may limit Turkey’s sphere of outreach to other states such as
China, adding that Ankara did not see any use in joining the Quad Plus
simply because it makes the United States feel “more secure”.30
Searching for other evidence about Ankara’s position or potential role in
the Quad Plus, the author conducted a search of Turkish media outlets for
stories on the Quad, the Quad Plus, or the Indo-Pacific (in Turkish, Hint-
Pasifik). These yielded only descriptive articles and no editorials arguing for
or against such a proposition. On the contrary, a search of China’s One Belt,
One Road/Belt and Road Initiative (in Turkish, Bir Kuşak, Bir Yol or Kuşak-
Yol Projesi or Kuşak ve Yol Sanayi ve Ticaret Birliği) showed it is an inten-
sely well-known and controversial topic in the Turkish press. These searches,
therefore, seem a good indicator that Turkish officials either have yet to take
notice of the Quad Plus, have no interest in it, or both.

A two-way street: The Quad Plus–Middle East nexus

By pooling the resources and expertise—as well as money—of multiple states
(both inside and outside the Quad), the Quad Plus offers the promise of truly
being for something rather than against someone. It could potentially lead to
cooperation on projects that are largely apolitical such as secure supply chain
initiatives, quality infrastructure and pandemic or natural disaster responses.
As such, the nascent potential of the Quad Plus appears well suited to the
246 Cannon
complicated world of Middle East politics and security. The preceding
research has demonstrated, nevertheless, that the Quad Plus has an uneven
future in the Middle East. The Quad Plus, for example, is problematic on
two fronts for Iran: it is a US-led initiative and, therefore, is automatically
construed as an anti-China proposition. Likewise, Turkey is currently mis-
trustful, even antagonistic toward the United States and, therefore, US-led
initiatives. Of the three states, the initiative may resonate most with the UAE
given its potential to deepen its security relations not only with the United
States and India but also the Plus member-states of the Quad, like Israel.
The UAE’s importance to Washington and its generally favourable repu-
tation across the Quad states may mean that Abu Dhabi will be on the
shortlist of potential Quad Plus participants. The UAE occupies a strategic
location on both the Persian Gulf and the western Indian Ocean, exports
huge amounts of oil to not just China but also India and Japan, and main-
tains good relations with New Delhi, Tokyo and Canberra. An invitation to
the Quad Plus is even more likely because of its diplomatic recognition of
Israel in mid-2020. Contextually then, the UAE will likely chart a course that
takes advantage of more apolitical offerings from the Quad Plus such as
secure supply chain initiatives and pandemic responses. Nevertheless, if the
Quad Plus is understood to be an anti-China proposition (as some certainly
see the Quad), Abu Dhabi may limit its involvement, preferring instead to
develop its lucrative and beneficial relations with China, particularly in the
cutting-edge fields of artificial intelligence (AI) and 5G communications. In
other words, any Quad Plus initiatives that appear to act against China may
be a bridge too far for the leadership of the UAE.
Despite the election of Joe Biden as US President and his willingness to
engage Iran to defuse tensions heightened during the previous Trump
Administration, it is highly unlikely that Iran will be approached anytime
soon about the Quad Plus. US strategic considerations are currently driving
the Quad Plus, after all, and Iran has not been viewed warmly, regardless of
who controls the White House, since 1979. In addition, China is too impor-
tant economically and politically for Iran to favour anything like the Quad
Plus. The Quad Plus is bound to have a limited impact on the strategic land
connections stretching between Iran and China anyway. More worrisome for
Tehran are the growing connections between the United States and India.
Iran is worried India may increasingly be convinced to see things from
Washington’s perspective given New Delhi’s serious and ongoing security
concerns along its lengthy border with China. In other words, if India’s
constructive relations with Iran become problematic in relation to US-India
ties, Iran may be quietly dropped by New Delhi as an economic and political
partner.
Turkey is not active in either the Indian or Pacific Oceans. The concerns of
the Quad, which inform the nascent Quad Plus, have little in common with
Ankara’s strategic and national interests. In addition, Turkey’s frosty rela-
tions with the United States may continue under the Biden Administration.
 Quad Plus in a Middle Eastern context 247
On top of this, Turkey’s cosying up to Pakistan will worry India. In short,
there appears to be little interest from either the Quad partners or Turkey for
a Quad Plus arrangement.

Acknowledgements
The author thanks Dr Eric Lob for his research and comments about Iranian
statements related to the Quad Plus as well as any reactions to the Quad Plus
proposition by the Iranian government.

Notes
1 For the purposes of this chapter, the Middle East includes Turkey, Iran, the states
of the Levant, the Arabian Peninsula and Egypt (the only Middle East state in
Africa).
2 The UAE, Iran and Turkey were selected, in part, because they can be said to be
representative of the three primary ethnolinguistic and religious groupings of the
Middle East: Turkish (Sunni Muslim), Persian (Shi’a Muslim), and Arab (majority
Sunni Muslim), thus providing potentially rich case studies.
3 Jagannath P. Panda, “India, the Blue Dot Network, and the ‘Quad Plus’ Calculus”,
Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs 3, 3 (Fall 2020), 3–21, https://media.defense.gov.
4 Ronald L. Tammen, Jacek Kugler, and Douglas Lemke, “Foundations of Power
Transition Theory”, in William R. Thomson, ed., Oxford Research Encyclopedia
of Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 26 October 2017).
5 For more about the competing “China threat” and “peaceful rise” theories, see
Jianyong Yue, “Peaceful Rise of China: Myth or Reality?”, International Politics
45, 4 (2008), 439–456; and Ming Xia, “‘China Threat’ or a ‘Peaceful Rise of
China’?” New York Times, 2006, https://archive.nytimes.com/www.nytimes.com/
ref/college/coll-china-politics-007.html.
6 Aylem Alemdaroglu and Sultan Tepe, “Erdogan Is Turning Turkey into a Chinese
Client State”, Foreign Policy, 16 September 2020, https://foreignpolicy.com.
7 Federico Donelli and Brendon J. Cannon, “Power Projection of Middle East
States in the Horn of Africa: Linking Security Burdens with Capabilities”, Small
Wars & Insurgencies (2021). DOI: 10.1080/09592318.2021.1976573.
8 Subhes C. Bhattacharyya and Andon Blake, “Analysis of Oil Export Dependency
of MENA Countries: Drivers, Trends and Prospects”, Energy Policy 38, 2 (2010),
1098–1107; 1103.
9 Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, The United Arab Emirates: Power, Politics and Policy-
Making (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2016).
10 UAE academic and official, interview with author, Abu Dhabi, 2 April 2020; and
UAE academic, interview with author, 31 March 2020.
11 Mouza Alnuaimi, “Analyzing the Current Relationship between the UAE and
China: Strategic Hedging or Diversification of Partners?” (MA thesis, Abu Dhabi:
Khalifa University, 2020), 83–84.
12 US Senate, Testimony by Dr. Nasser Hadian Before the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee Hearing: Iran, Security Threats and U.S. Policy, 28 October 2003,
www.iranwatch.org/.
13 Alam Saleh and Zakiyeh Yazdanshenas, “Iran’s Pact with China Is Bad News for
the West”, Foreign Policy, 9 August 2020, https://foreignpolicy.com/.
14 “Iran turns to China & India in the Face of US Sanctions”, Belt and Road News,
27 December 2019, www.beltandroad.news/.
248 Cannon
.
15 “Çin’den Orta Koridor Üzerinden gelen en uzun Yük Treni Izmit’e Ulaşti [Long-
est Freight Train from China via Middle Corridor Reaches Izmit]”, TCDD Taşı-
macılık, 8 January 2020, www.tcddtasimacilik.gov.tr; and Selçuk Colakoğlu,
“China’s Belt and Road Initiative and Turkey’s Middle Corridor: A Question of
Compatibility”, Middle East Institute, 29 January 2099, www.mei.edu.
16 Brahma Chellaney, “Beijing quietly presses ahead with its expansionist agenda in
the South China Sea”, The National, 25 March 2018, www.thenationalnews.com.
17 Krishan Nayar, “Hudson Institute Hails UAE-India Cooperation as Model for
US’ Indo-Pacific Strategy”, WAM, 4 March 2020, www.wam.ae.
18 Rory Reynolds and Bryant Harris, “UAE, US and Israel Launch $3 Billion
Investment Fund”, The National, 21 October 2020, www.pressreader.com.
19 For the UAE’s attempt to achieve arms exporting status, see Zoltan Barany,
“Indigenous Defense Industries in the Gulf”, Center for Strategic and Interna-
tional Studies, 24 April 2020, www.csis.org/. For more about India’s efforts, see
Ash Rossiter and Brendon J. Cannon, “Making arms in India? Examining New
Delhi’s renewed drive for defence-industrial indigenization”, Defence Studies 19, 4
(2020), 353–372.
20 Athol Yates, The Evolution of the UAE Armed Forces (Solihull: Helion & Co.
2020), 132–147.
21 The UAE also readily accepted medical assistance and COVID-19 kits from
China. Conversely, Emirati offers of free COVID-19 tests for US Embassy officials
and US military personnel in the UAE using Chinese-made testing kits were
rejected by Washington on account of privacy concerns. Simeon Kerr, “UAE
Caught between US and China as Powers Vie for Influence in Gulf”, Financial
Times, 2 June 2020, www.ft.com/.
22 Alnuaimi, “Analyzing the Current Relationship between the UAE and China”,
79–84.
23 Megha Gupta and Mansheetal Singh, “COVID-19: China’s ‘Health Silk Road’
Diplomacy in Iran and Turkey”, Observer Research Foundation (ORF), 13 April
2020, www.orfonline.org.
24 China, France, Russia, United Kingdom, and United States, plus Germany and
the European Union.
25 “US Strategy to Contain China in the Indo-Pacific”, Taadol Newspaper, n.d.,
www.taadolnewspaper.ir.
26 Maryam Shafiee, “The United States, Australia, Japan and India Have Revived
the ‘Quad’ Strategic Group”, Islamic Republic News Agency, 5 October 2019,
www.irna.ir.
27 Gupta and Singh, “COVID-19: China’s ‘Health Silk Road’ Diplomacy in Iran
and Turkey”.
28 Senior Turkish government official, interview with author, 15 September 2020.
29 Ibid.
30 Ibid.
16 The Quad Plus and promoting
international connectivity
A focus on the Makran region
Kenta Aoki

Introduction
Promoting international connectivity in the political, diplomatic and economic
spheres encourages global stability and prosperity. Currently, the Quad Plus—
originally composed of Australia, India, Japan and the United States and later
joined by South Korea, Vietnam, New Zealand, Israel and Brazil1—works
hand-in-hand to enhance connectivity, expanding its scope from the Asia-Pacific
to the Indo-Pacific. However, previous studies focused primarily on Southeast
Asia under the motto of “ASEAN’s centrality and unity”, due to China’s
expansionism in the East China and South China Seas.2 Thus there has been
little discussion of the role of Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iran in the context of
the Quad Plus’s possible areas of cooperation in the Indo-Pacific.
This matters greatly to the Quad Plus, because the area includes the Strait
of Hormuz, one of the world’s most strategic chokepoints. It hosts an oil
flow of 17 million barrels per day, representing 30 per cent of all seaborne-
traded crude oil in 2015.3 In short, maintaining energy security and freedom
of navigation in the area are among the top priorities for the Quad Plus.
Given that background, this article argues that strengthening connectivity
with the Makran region, which straddles the southern coast of Iran and
Pakistan, is an urgent issue for the Quad Plus to address. In fact, the Trump
administration’s “America First” policy led Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iran
to look toward China and Russia for succour, which eventually amounted to
a diplomatic defeat for the members of the Quad Plus. Thus each member
needs to revisit its foreign policy.
This study consists of five sections. The first three sections examine Iran,
Pakistan and Afghanistan. The subsequent section discusses the arguments
in support of and against the proposed shift in policy, while the final section
discusses ways to synergise the efforts of members of the Quad Plus to
counter the spread of COVID-19. This chapter proposes that engaging Iran
and supporting the Afghan peace process are the key to greater peace and
stability, not only in this region but also globally. The methodology adopted
in this article is based on a literature review and field survey in Chabahar,
Iran, and Karachi, Pakistan, in February 2018 and March 2019, respectively.

DOI: 10.4324/9781003206408-20
250 Aoki
Iran: the point of contention

The Trump administration’s maximum-pressure campaign

After US President Donald Trump was inaugurated in January 2017, his
administration pursued a hard-line stance against Iran, labelling it the main
sponsor of global terrorism. The US–Iran standoff led Iran to approach
China, a move that damaged the interests of members of the Quad Plus. For
that reason, this section will examine US policy toward Iran during the
Trump administration.
Trump’s mistrust of Iran was deeply rooted, as he criticised Iran’s desta-
bilising activities in the Middle East throughout the 2016 campaign and into
his term as president.4 On 8 May 2018, Trump announced that the United
States would unilaterally withdraw from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of
Action (JCPOA),5 which was seen as one of the most important legacies of
the Obama Administration. On 21 May 2018, shortly after Trump’s
announcement, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo pledged to commence “the
strongest sanctions in history” and outlined 12 conditions required of Iran
before any new deal would be made with the country.6 These demands
encompassed various issues, such as abandoning nuclear programmes,
including plutonium processing and the development of ballistic missiles,
suspending support for Shia militias in Lebanon, Iraq, Yemen, Syria,
Afghanistan and elsewhere, and the cessation of threats toward Israel, Saudi
Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. These demands were designed to limit
Tehran’s strategic options, thus dealing a huge blow to the Iranian regime.
Under the maximum-pressure campaign, Iran has faced one of the most
serious financial crises in its history. Washington’s harsh policy toward Iran
took a phased approach. The biggest US step against the Iranian regime was
to end sanction waivers for Iranian crude oil imports for eight countries:
India, China, Turkey, Greece, Italy, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan. This
meant that few governments were allowed to import crude oil from Iran,
which was the country’s main source of revenue. Even though Iran needed
India’s continued support to buy fuel, India had to stop purchasing Iranian
crude oil. Hence it was no coincidence when Iran excluded India from a
railway project between Chabahar and Zahedan.7
With a wide range of financial sanctions imposed on Iranian companies and
individuals, as well as exclusion from the international money transfer network,
the country’s financial situation worsened from day to day. This led Tehran to
request USD 5 billion in emergency funding from the International Monetary
Fund (IMF) in March 2020.8 In addition, the COVID-19 outbreak hit Iran in
February 2020, exacerbating the financial situation and making normal daily life
more difficult for Iranian citizens. Due to the closure of borders with neigh-
bouring countries and the decrease of inbound tourists, revenue from the trade
of non-oil products and tourism, two potential alternative industries, also became
limited. In short, Iran faced a dual challenge: US sanctions and COVID-19.
 A focus on the Makran region 251
Compounding such economic issues was the fact that tensions between the
United States and Iran, centred on the Persian Gulf, Iraq and other places,
soared dramatically. The turning point was a US drone strike on IRGC Quds
Force commander Qasem Soleimani near Baghdad International Airport on
3 January 2020, which heightened tensions between Washington and Tehran.
In response, the IRGC launched more than a dozen missiles at al-Asad Air
Base in Iraq’s Anbar province, which hosts US troops, on 8 January 2020.9
Although many expected the United States to exact revenge against Iran, the
Trump administration did not approve further actions, on the grounds that
Iran avoided causing human casualties and eventually stood down. In addi-
tion, debates are still ongoing concerning the arms embargo on Iran and
attacks on nuclear facilities in Natanz.
This policy, as well as actions in support of Israel and against Iran, was
maintained by President Trump in his attempts to win a second term in
November 2020. However, former vice president Joe Biden won the election.
That victory created the opportunity for a significant shift in American
policy, as President Biden has officially expressed his wish to rejoin the
JCPOA if Iran resumes strict compliance with the deal.10 Iran has gradually
reduced its commitment under the JCPOA by exceeding the threshold (3.67
per cent) of uranium enrichment since May 2019. As of June 2020, the
Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) estimates that Iran’s
stock of low-enriched uranium has grown to 2,323.9 kilograms, all enriched
below 5 per cent, and breakout timelines are 3.5 months.11 It is true that Iran
engages in destabilising behaviour across the Middle East, brutally sup-
presses domestic protesters, and poses a threat to the interests of the Quad
Plus. However, it is also true that the JCPOA provided a platform in which
the UN Security Council’s five permanent members and Germany (referred
to as the P5+1) were able to engage in dialogue with Iran. In this sense, US
policy effectively pushed Iran to reactivate its nuclear development pro-
grammes. Israel, a member of the Quad Plus, would surely oppose any
cooperation with Iran, so cautious measures must be taken to reduce
tensions between the United States and Iran.

Development of the Chabahar port

Although it seems as if the members of the Quad Plus can offer little if any-
thing to Iran, it is notable that the Chabahar port is exempted from US
sanctions. According to the US Department of State, the United States
granted Chabahar an exemption because it is vital for the ongoing support of
Afghanistan’s growth and humanitarian relief.12 Washington might have also
taken its close diplomatic relations with India into consideration. Hence, the
development of the Chabahar port, an India-led initiative, is likely to be a
future strategic option for the Quad Plus members.
The Chabahar port is a deep-sea port located in Sistan and Baluchestan
Province in south-eastern Iran. The port faces the Gulf of Oman and is
252 Aoki
strategically important in that it connects the Middle East and South Asia. It
is just 160 kilometres west of the Gwadar port in Pakistan, which is being
developed as a gateway to the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC).
Most of the inhabitants in Sistan and Baluchestan Province are Balochis,
whose mother tongue is not Persian but Balochi, and the area has histori-
cally been more underdeveloped than other Iranian provinces. During the
Iran–Iraq War (1980–1988), the port played an important role in the export
and import of cargo because it is located outside of the Strait of Hormuz,13
but the port’s development itself was not promoted. On 23 May 2016,
Afghanistan, India and Iran signed a tripartite agreement for the develop-
ment of the Chabahar port. India announced its financial assistance to the
Chabahar port, as well as its surroundings and related facilities, which
amounted to USD 500 million. Furthermore, in February 2018, the opera-
tional rights for the Shahid Beheshti port, one of the two seaports at
Chabahar, were awarded to India Ports Global Limited.14
New Delhi is committed to developing the Chabahar port as a means of
containing China and Pakistan in the Indo-Pacific, promoting connectivity
with Central Asia, and supporting reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan.
First, India is believed to have begun supporting the development of the
Chabahar port to counter China, as the two countries are regional rivals.
Due to the port’s unique geographical location, Chabahar is a conjunction
point between the “free, open, and inclusive Indo-Pacific” vision proposed by
Narendra Modi and China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Although
India’s Indo-Pacific strategy officially represents an inclusive and open vision,
not aimed at countering a specific nation’s initiative, China’s increasing
influence is certainly problematic for New Delhi and its allies.
Second, India focuses on connecting with the Central Asian republics,
which possess vast natural resources and are potential energy suppliers for
India. India advocates the Connect Central Asia Policy, which aims to
deepen India’s relations and connectivity with the Central Asian republics in
areas such as politics, security, economy and culture. India has also been
promoting the International North-South Transport Corridor initiative,
attempting to establish a trade route with Central Asia and the Caucasus
region via sea, land and air. When India eyes Central Asia, the roles of Iran
and Afghanistan naturally become important, because India must bypass
Pakistan, which does not allow the transit of Indian goods. Literally, a route
through Iran and Afghanistan is the only way for India to access Central
Asia. Finally, it is believed that one of the main reasons India supports
Chabahar is in order to support reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan.
Afghanistan is a landlocked country surrounded by six other nations, and
access to the ocean has always been a matter of concern. For New Delhi,
stabilising war-torn Afghanistan is in India’s own national interest because of
security, counternarcotics and other issues. Looked at geostrategically, the
Chabahar port may well be a fault line in the Quad Plus infrastructure
cooperation in the Indo-Pacific.15
 A focus on the Makran region 253
Iran’s Eastern-oriented policy
The aforementioned argument can be evidenced through China’s increasing
presence in Iran, as well as Iran’s approach toward China in recent years. To
put it simply, this represents a potential threat to the Quad Plus and
considerable gains for China. A 25-year Iran–China comprehensive
cooperation programme—first proposed by China’s leader Xi Jinping during
a visit to Iran in 2016—was signed by Tehran in March 2021. The pro-
gramme was designed for China to purchase Iranian oil over the next 25
years. On the other hand, Iran is supposed to receive China’s support in
various areas, including military, security, banking, telecommunication,
infrastructure development, education, technology and science.16 Specific
details of the programme have yet to be publicly disclosed, but some believe
that the deal will give China a military foothold in the region. Ironically, this
situation was created by Washington’s maximum-pressure campaign, which
devastated Iran’s economy and subsequently led its leadership to look to
China. Thus engagement with Iran is inextricably linked to the Quad Plus
narrative.

Pakistan: CPEC as the main BRI project

China’s increasing influence

Likewise, Washington’s harsh policy toward Pakistan led Islamabad to fur-
ther deepen its strategic, political, and economic relationship with China.
China’s partnership with Pakistan is nothing new; it has relied on this rela-
tionship to counter India’s influence since the 1960s. With China’s economic
growth in the early twenty-first century, the relationship between both coun-
tries has improved over time. For instance, in April 2015, President Xi visited
Pakistan. In his interactions with Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, Xi
agreed to upgrade China–Pakistan relations to an all-weather strategic
cooperative partnership.17 The prospect of a greater Chinese presence via
CPEC and the Gwadar project poses increased security concerns for New
Delhi and other members of the Quad.18
China’s financial support is invaluable for Pakistan, which has long
suffered from financial crisis. Pakistan has asked for the IMF’s help several
times, as it is faced with a trade deficit, a declining foreign currency reserve,
and a drop in the value of the Pakistani rupee. Under such circumstances,
China’s proposal to develop Pakistan’s infrastructure via CPEC is a
meaningful offer. The Trump Administration drove Pakistan further toward
China with its hard-line stance, regarding Islamabad as a sponsor of
terrorism in Afghanistan and other places.19 The members of the Quad Plus
should counter China’s strategic outreach to Pakistan.
254 Aoki
Development of the Gwadar port
Since the Gwadar port plays an important role as a gateway to CPEC, find-
ing a way to diminish Gwadar’s importance is a matter of concern for the
Quad Plus. Although the Pakistani authority’s development of the Gwadar
port dates back to the 1950s,20 China’s interest in the port emerged only in
2001. A Chinese company drew a masterplan for development in October
2001 and won the contract to construct multipurpose berths.21 Although the
Port of Singapore Authority took charge of the management and operation
of the Gwadar port in January 2007, the lack of major progress in develop-
ment led Islamabad to end that contract in February 2013 and return stew-
ardship to the Chinese Overseas Ports Holding Company.22 President Xi
announced that China would commence the BRI during the Asia-Pacific
Economic Cooperation summit in November 2014. He declared CPEC to be
one of the key connectivity projects in China’s strategic vision.
It would not be easy to precisely identify China and Pakistan’s reasons for
promoting the development of the Gwadar port, but the reasons are certainly
strategic ones.23 First, the Gwadar port is expected to function as an alternative
transit route to circumvent the Malacca Straits. This matters greatly to China. It
is true that connecting with the Gwadar port and opening access to the Arabian
Sea through Pakistan might produce economic benefits for the Xinjiang Uygur
Autonomous Region, the relatively underdeveloped western part of China.
However, the Khunjerab Pass, on the border of China and Pakistan-occupied
Kashmir, is usually closed for three to four months each winter. Thus a land
route from Gwadar to Kashgar does not seem to be a stable and reliable path
for traders. It is also not cost-efficient for traders, as shipping goods by
container is much cheaper than transporting them by road.24
Second, as Gwadar is located far from the Indian border, it can be used as
an alternative port to Karachi by Pakistan in case of an emergency. During
the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971, India blockaded Karachi, and this nearly
happened again during the Kargil War of 1999. For this reason, focusing on
Gwadar enables Pakistan to expand its naval capabilities and to have more
strategic options.25 In the short term, China does not have to rely heavily on
the Gwadar port for military and strategic purposes, as China opened the
Chinese People’s Liberation Army Support Base in Djibouti in 2017. The
Chinese navy can resupply and refuel at Djibouti. Having said that, as men-
tioned above, the value of the Gwadar port cannot be measured based solely
on its accessibility and feasibility in normal situations. It would be fair to
state that China is investing in the Gwadar port with an eye toward its long-
term military and strategic potential.

“Strategic depth” and the Afghanistan connection

In fact, the members of the Quad Plus should be wary of Pakistan’s irre-
sponsible and aggressive behaviour in the region. Under the concept of
 A focus on the Makran region 255
“strategic depth”, Pakistan is believed to be covertly supporting the Taliban
in Afghanistan and jihadist groups fighting to “liberate” Kashmir in India.
As Ahmed Rashid mentions, Pakistan started supporting the Taliban in the
early 1990s,26 and Pakistan’s military establishment provides the Taliban with
sanctuary and resources even today.27 Pakistan’s influence in Afghanistan is
likely to increase in the wake of the 2020 US-signed Doha peace agreement
with the Taliban. This agreement paves the way for the Taliban to participate
in Afghanistan’s future political system, where it might even emerge as the
leading faction (in the process of withdrawing US troops, Taliban took con-
trol of almost all of Afghanistan in August 2021). In parallel with the Tali-
ban’s political rise, Pakistan’s influence in the region will increase
proportionally. This is particularly worrying for India, a core member of the
Quad Plus, and should lead New Delhi to revisit its foreign policy toward
Afghanistan.

Afghanistan: economic integration after the withdrawal of US troops

Development of Chabahar port as leverage against Pakistan

The withdrawal of US troops, as set down in the Doha Agreement, could create
a power vacuum, which might result in China and/or Russia gaining substantial
influence in Kabul. Thus, continued engagement by the Quad Plus is crucial for
maintaining security and stability in Afghanistan. In this context, the members
of the Quad Plus should take Afghanistan into consideration when shaping
their strategy in the Indo-Pacific, because Kabul is one of the main stakeholders
in the development of the Chabahar port. Iran signed a memorandum of
agreement with Afghanistan to lease 50 hectares of land for Afghan businesses
in May 2012.28 In this context, Afghanistan is supposed to be one of the users
of the Chabahar port. Ports are only a means to transport goods, so it could be
said that connecting them with markets is more important than building infra-
structure. Here Afghanistan’s significant role can be noted.
First, Afghanistan views the Chabahar port as a strategic project primarily
because Kabul seeks to end its dependence on foreign aid.29 Since the Bonn
Agreement on 5 December 2001, the international community has attempted
to democratise and liberalise Afghanistan in the political and economic
spheres. Nevertheless, politicians distributed vested interests to their own
patronage networks, and corruption has persisted. Additionally, the Afghan
state is far from achieving the self-reliance envisioned for it: it still relies
heavily on donor countries and agencies. Afghanistan needs to sell its own
products, such as natural agricultural resources, to foreign countries and earn
foreign currency on its own. The Chabahar port can be categorised as one of
many projects that provide better connectivity, along with the Lapis Lazuli
corridor, which opened in 2018 and links Afghanistan to Turkey via
Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan and Georgia; the Turkmenistan–Uzbekistan–
Tajikistan–Afghanistan–Pakistan power interconnecting project, which aims
256 Aoki
to export power from Turkmenistan to Afghanistan and Pakistan; and the
Central Asia–South Asia (CASA-1000) power project, which will allow for
the export of surplus hydroelectricity from Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan to
Afghanistan and Pakistan, and others.
Second, Afghanistan is committing to the development of the Chabahar port
to evade the influence of Pakistan. For a long time, Afghanistan and Pakistan
have had disputes, including skirmishes over the Durand Line. Indeed, in 1961–
1963 the two countries terminated diplomatic relations due to heightened ten-
sions. In recent years, the relationship has worsened, because Afghanistan pub-
licly accuses Pakistan of supporting terrorist organisations operating in
Afghanistan. A strategic calculation would allow Afghanistan to move towards
bypassing Pakistan in trading activities. In fact, for a long time, Pakistan was
Kabul’s primary trading partner, but starting in 2014, Iran replaced Pakistan in
that regard.30 The Chabahar port is being used as leverage against Pakistan, to
counter Islamabad’s influence in Afghanistan.

Doha Agreement and its aftermath

Regional dynamics should be noted, because the withdrawal of US troops
from Afghanistan will present a new challenge to members of the Quad Plus.
On 29 February 2020, Zalmay Khalilzad, US special representative for
Afghanistan reconstruction, and Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, deputy
leader of the Taliban31 and chief of the Taliban Afghanistan Political Office
in Doha, Qatar, signed a peace agreement. The agreement guarantees that
the Taliban will not allow its members, other individuals, or groups, includ-
ing al-Qaeda, to use Afghanistan’s soil to threaten the security of the United
States and its allies. The deal also states that the United States must reduce
the number of US forces in Afghanistan to 8,600 within 135 days, ultimately
completing the withdrawal of all remaining forces by May 2021.32 The
international community was concerned that Afghanistan might once again
become a safe haven for foreign terrorist organisations because of the power
vacuum created by the withdrawal of foreign troops. This deal partially
resolves such concerns; however, the Taliban has not agreed to either a
reduction in violence or a permanent ceasefire. For this reason, security in
Afghanistan is a grave concern for the Quad Plus.
Although violence in any form must be condemned, it is highly likely that,
in the long term, the Taliban will either be part of the political system or a
leading governing political faction in Afghanistan after the Doha Agreement,
which, in a way, guarantees the Taliban’s future political status. In this con-
text, it is imperative to integrate Afghanistan into international markets and
to contain Pakistan’s influence. First, as mentioned above, for Afghanistan to
cease being aid-dependent, Kabul needs to earn adequate revenue for the
country’s economy. The Quad Plus could consider offering business oppor-
tunities or investing in Afghanistan to explore its vast natural resources, such
as oil, gas, iron, copper and rare-earth metals, and purchase its abundant
 A focus on the Makran region 257
agricultural products, such as fruits and vegetables. This would ultimately
make Afghanistan more stable by providing economic prosperity.
Second, as Pakistan’s influence will inevitably increase in parallel with the
Taliban’s rise, the Quad Plus must maintain a channel with Pakistan’s mili-
tary establishment so that peace negotiations in Doha will move in a positive
direction. In this regard, Khalilzad’s meeting with Pakistan’s chief of army
staff, Qamar Javed Bajwa, on 14 September 2020, was meaningful,33 illus-
trating that Washington views Pakistan as an influential actor in the Afghan
peace process.34 While peace negotiations must be Afghan-led and Afghan-
owned, third parties can influence the process, as a similar case was evident
in the 2014 presidential election. These regional relations should be reflected
in the regional policies of the Quad Plus.

Dilemma between the BRI and the free and open Indo-Pacific
While Afghanistan is trying to diversify its trade routes, that does not
necessarily mean that it is turning its back on China’s BRI. It may be true
that, considering Kabul’s relationship with Pakistan, Afghanistan prefers to
export and import products through Iran via the Chabahar port. However,
this only means that Afghanistan wants to maintain a range of options
rather than limiting itself to only one. In fact, Afghanistan was among the
first countries to sign an agreement with China for the joint construction of
the BRI.35 At the same time, Afghanistan is believed to prefer the Free and
Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) initiative favoured by the Quad, as the United
States, Japan, India and Australia were major donors toward the recon-
struction of Afghanistan after the Bonn Agreement. Given Afghanistan’s key
geographical location, members of the Quad Plus need to develop a strategy
that engages Afghanistan in connectivity projects so that it does not lapse
into isolation and become a safe haven for terrorism again.

Policy implications for the Quad Plus

Arguments for a policy shift

From the above we can tentatively conclude that the Quad Plus should be con-
cerned about China’s growing influence in Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iran.
Thus, rejoining the JCPOA and promoting the development of the Chabahar
port is likely to encourage stability in the region. However, on this issue there
are arguments both for and against this shift. First, given China’s heavy invest-
ment in CPEC, the Quad Plus must contain China’s growing influence. As
mentioned earlier, China has almost unilaterally promoted the development of
the Gwadar port to ensure an alternative route in case the Strait of Malacca is
closed. In recent years, China has strengthened its naval capabilities and con-
structed alternate sea lanes. This matters to Japan, a member of the Quad Plus,
as it faces China’s aggressive behaviour in the East and South China Seas.
258 Aoki
Second, the allies of the Quad Plus, except the US and Israel, have had
favourable relationships with Iran; thus, engaging Iran will surely be a dip-
lomatic asset for these countries to ease US–Iran tensions. The US–Iran
military confrontation also poses a threat to the wider international com-
munity; therefore, third parties, such as Australia, Japan, India and South
Korea, can play a mediating role. In particular, Japanese Prime Minister Abe
visited Tehran in June 2019, which was followed by Iranian President Rou-
hani’s visit to Tokyo in December of the same year. Likewise, channels for
dialogue should be open.
Third, it is important to recognise that Afghanistan is a part of the tri-
partite agreement on Chabahar. Stabilising Afghanistan benefits the Quad
Plus as a whole, and developing Chabahar will promote Afghanistan’s self-
reliance as well as bypassing Pakistan’s increasing influence.

Arguments against a policy shift

On the other hand, it is too early to conclude that the Quad Plus should
abruptly change its policy toward Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iran. First,
given the legacy of the Trump Administration, it is not feasible for the Quad
Plus to become actively engaged with infrastructure development in Iran.
The United States cut off diplomatic relations with Iran on 7 April 1980,
after Iranian students seized the US Embassy in Tehran and took its staff
hostage on 4 November 1979.36 Although the Chabahar port is exempted
from US sanctions, it is not easy for the Quad Plus to drastically shift its
policy toward Iran.
Second, the Quad Plus should be cautious about Iran’s intentions. On 27
December 2019, Iran, China and Russia conducted a joint naval exercise
utilising the Chabahar port. This strongly implies that the Chabahar port is
being developed not only for commercial but also for military purposes. In
addition, the Rouhani regime aims to open a pipeline project connected to
the Jask port, which is also on the Makran Coast.37 The Islamic Revolution
Guard Corps is also expanding its naval capabilities by opening a new port
at Sirik.38 Taking all this into account, developing the Chabahar port could
be a double-edged sword for the Quad Plus.

Prospects and challenges

Based on the pros and cons discussed above, members of the Quad Plus
might consider the Chabahar port as a potential joint cooperation project.
For India, the port could serve to counter the Gwadar port under CPEC.
Other Quad Plus members might benefit from getting involved because the
port serves as a breakwater toward China’s expansion in South Asia and the
Middle East. Potential areas of cooperation include not only infrastructure
components but also research and development, human resources, environ-
ment and investment (heavy industries, tourism, etc.). In addition, the
 A focus on the Makran region 259
Chinese-sponsored CPEC is a potential risk for the Quad Plus because China
and Pakistan evidently view it from a strategic rather than an economic
viewpoint. In an emergency situation, CPEC and the Gwadar port could be
utilised to benefit China and Pakistan. At the same time, rejoining the
JCPOA would greatly reduce the current tension between Washington and
Tehran. Finally, the Afghanistan issue and repercussions of the Doha
Agreement should be taken into account. Stability in Afghanistan is a
common goal for Quad Plus members; thus supporting peace negotiations is
one of the potential areas for Quad Plus cooperation.
Having said that, uncertainty remains, as mutual trust between the United
States and Iran has been lost after the Trump Administration’s maximum-
pressure campaign. It would not be easy for Tehran to resume compliance with
the JCPOA, because Rouhani’s regime needs to consider the reaction of anti-US
political factions and his supporters. Nevertheless, Tehran has expressed will-
ingness to comply with the JCPOA if the United States apologises for its past
mistakes, compensates for the financial losses incurred by maximum pressure,
and returns to the JCPOA.39

Ways to counter the spread of COVID-19

Another possible area of Quad Plus cooperation in the region is in the
response to COVID-19. The spread of COVID-19, which began in China at
the end of 2019, is an urgent issue, particularly for Iran. As of 2 March 2021,
Iran had a total of 1,648,174 COVID-19 cases and 60,267 deaths.40 Taking
into account the financial and oil sanctions imposed on Iran, it is imperative
for Tehran to secure sufficient medical supplies and medicines and to imme-
diately start vaccination to gain herd immunity at the national level.
On 4 February 2021, Iran received its first shipment of Sputnik V, a Rus-
sian COVID-19 vaccine, and started vaccinating health care providers on 9
February. On 3 February, Iran’s health minister, Saeed Namaki, announced
that Iran would import 4.2 million doses of the AstraZeneca vaccine through
the COVAX scheme, which aims to accelerate the development and manu-
facture of COVID-19 vaccines while guaranteeing fair and equitable access
for every country. Iran has also attempted to develop three types of domestic
vaccines to accelerate nationwide vaccination campaigns. As such, Iran has
made every possible effort to curb the spread of COVID-19.
Nonetheless, every nation must synergise its efforts to contain the COVID-
19 pandemic. For this reason, the Quad Plus was initiated in March 2020.41
As the COVID-19 pandemic is a global phenomenon, mutual cooperation in
the international community is essential. Members of the Quad Plus are also
suffering from the pandemic themselves. For example, the United States has
had a total of 29,389,498 cases as of 2 March 2021—the most of any country
in the world. India follows the United States, with 11,139,323 cases. How-
ever, international politics as expressed through vaccine support will be an
important theme. It will be interesting to see how the members of the Quad
260 Aoki
Plus will respond to Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iran, which have historically
been subject to interference from the major powers. Now is the time to turn
these nations’ geography from a disadvantage to a benefit. Although the
members of the Quad Plus face their own domestic problems, they cannot
individually solve the challenges of the worldwide pandemic. Here, mutual
cooperation is key. The Quad Plus can support Pakistan, Afghanistan and
Iran through the COVID-19 crisis in other ways, including the provision of
equipment (such as ventilators, masks, and gloves), the empowerment of
health officials, and so on.

Conclusion
This chapter discusses how strengthening connectivity with the Makran
region helps the Quad Plus maintain energy security and freedom of naviga-
tion. In the case of Pakistan, Washington’s South Asia and Afghanistan
policies have cemented Pakistan’s deepening relationship with China. Like-
wise, Iran is looking east for help in resolving the worst financial crisis in its
history. In Afghanistan, the withdrawal of US troops will certainly result in a
fluid security situation and the future presence of China and Russia. Keeping
in mind that Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iran collectively represent a “missing
link” in the FOIP vision, this chapter pointed out that the Quad Plus should
promote connectivity with a particular focus on the Makran region.
Given all these factors, this chapter proposes that engaging Iran and sup-
porting the Afghan peace process is the way to achieve peace and stability.
President Trump’s foreign policy toward Iran, Pakistan and Afghanistan
ultimately only benefited China, which is seeking a bigger role in the region,
in access to oil and power.42 It is urgent for the Quad Plus, including the new
Biden Administration, to pursue a consistent approach, recognising that
seemingly separate issues are, in fact, interrelated.

Notes
1 In March 2020, US deputy secretary of state Stephen Biegun called a telephone
conference among the Quad countries and three new partners—South Korea,
Vietnam and New Zealand—to tackle the COVID-19 pandemic. Analysts started
to call this group “the Quad Plus”. In May 2020, Israel and Brazil also joined this
strategic alignment.
2 Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Basic Concept: Free and Open Indo-Pacific”,
May 2020, www.mofa.go.jp.
3 “World Oil Transit Chokepoints”, US Energy Information Administration, 25
July 2017, www.eia.gov.
4 See Yeganeh Torbati, “Trump Election Puts Iran Nuclear Deal on Shaky
Ground”, Reuters, 9 November, 2016, www.reuters.com; Eric B. Lorber, “Pre-
sident Trump and the Iran Nuclear Deal”, Foreign Policy, 16 November 2016,
https://foreignpolicy.com.
5 White House, “Remarks by President Trump on the Joint Comprehensive Plan of
Action”, 8 May 2018, www.whitehouse.gov.
 A focus on the Makran region 261
6 US Department of State, “After the Deal: A New Iran Strategy”, 21 May 2018,
www.state.gov.
7 Suhasini Haidar, “Iran Drops India from Chabahar Rail Project, Cites Funding
Delay”, The Hindu, 14 July 2020, www.thehindu.com.
8 Although Iran asked the IMF to help it recover from the financial crisis,
Washington blocked the IMF from releasing the funds, and the request has not
been approved till the time of writing. “Iran Asks IMF for $5 Billion Emergency
Funding to Fight Coronavirus”, Reuters, 12 March 2020, www.reuters.com.
9 “Missiles Launched by Iran against US Airbases in Iraq”, Guardian, 7 January
2020, www.theguardian.com.
10 Joseph R. Biden, Jr., “Why America Must Lead Again: Rescuing US Foreign
Policy After Trump”, Foreign Affairs, 23 January 2020, www.foreignaffairs.com.
11 David Albright, Sarah Burkhard and Andrea Stricker, “Analysis of the IAEA
Iran Verification and Monitoring Report”, ISIS, 8 June 2020, https://isis-online.
org.
12 Jonathan Landay, “Pompeo Allows Sanctions Exception for Iran Port Develop-
ment”, Reuters, 7 November 2018, https://jp.reuters.com.
13 Port and Maritime General Directorate of Sistan and Balochistan Province of
Iran (PMO), Chabahar Port: East Axis Development Stimulus, n.d., 6.
14 Press Information Bureau, Government of India (PIB), List of MoUs/Agreements
Signed during the Visit of President of Iran to India, 17 February 2018, http://pib.
nic.in.
15 In contrast to India, Iran and Afghanistan do not view Chabahar as a counter to
China’s influence. Rather, Iran puts importance on the development of the
Makran Coast for national development and to enhance strategic options. For
Afghanistan, Chabahar is a means to transport domestic products and to be
connected with markets. For details, see Kenta Aoki, “Chabahar: The Fault-Line
in India-Japan Infrastructure Cooperation”, Jagannath P. Panda eds., Scaling
India-Japan Cooperation in Indo-Pacific and Beyond 2025: Corridors,
Connectivity and Contours (New Delhi: KW Publishers 2019), 264–283.
16 “Barna-me Hamka-rı--ha- Ja-me (25 Sa-le) Īra-n va Chı-n”, Iran International, 7 July
2020, https://issuu.com/iranintl/docs/27998081; Farnaz Fassihi and Steven Lee
Myers, “Defying US, China and Iran Near Trade and Military Partnership”, New
York Times, 11 July 2020, www.nytimes.com.
17 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, “Xi Jinping Holds
Talks with Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif of Pakistan, and Both Sides Decide to
Upgrade China-Pakistan Relations to All-Weather Strategic Partnership of
Cooperation”, 21 April 2015, www.fmprc.gov.cn.
18 Gurmeet Kanwal, “Pakistan’s Gwadar Port: A New Naval Base in China’s String
of Pearls in the Indo-Pacific”, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2
April 2019, www.csis.org.
19 White House, “Remarks by President Trump on the Strategy in Afghanistan and
South Asia”, 21 August 2017, www.whitehouse.gov.
20 Rafaqat Hussain, “Gwadar in Historical Perspective”, Muslim Institute, 2016,
www.muslim-institute.org.
21 Ryohei Kasai, “China’s Belt and Road Initiative and Gwadar Port Development”,
Journal of Middle Eastern Studies (Middle East Trend 2019), March 2020, 1023–
1030.
22 Ibid.
23 The author, a Japanese national, applied for a No Objection Certificate (NOC) to
entry into Gwadar in early January 2019. However, Pakistani authorities did not
issue the NOC, for unknown reasons.
24 Communication to the author from an official of JETRO Karachi office, Karachi,
Pakistan, 20 March, 2019.
262 Aoki
25 Andrew Small, The China-Pakistan Axis: Asia’s New Geopolitics (Haryana:
Penguin Random House, 2015), 103.
26 Ahmed Rashid, Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000), 29.
27 Steve Coll, Directorate S: The C.I.A. and America’s Secret Wars in Afghanistan
and Pakistan (New York: Penguin Press, 2018).
28 Afghan Institute for Strategic Studies, Strategic Analysis of The Chabahar Port:
Afghanistan–Iran–India Relations, 2018, 39–64, www.aiss.af.
29 Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Realizing Self-Reliance: Commitments to
Reforms and Renewed Partnership, December 2014, http://mfa.gov.af.
30 Central Statistics Office (CSO), Afghanistan, Statistical Yearbook 2016–17, 2017,
http://cso.gov.af.
31 Taliban is a plural form in Pashtu and Dari of Talib (meaning “student” in
Arabic). The Taliban call themselves not the “Taliban” but the “Islamic Emirate
of Afghanistan”.
32 US Department of State, Agreement for Bringing Peace to Afghanistan between
the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan Which Is Not Recognized by the United States
as a State and Is Known as the Taliban and the United States of America, 29
February 2020, www.state.gov.
33 Inter Services Public Relations Pakistan, “A Delegation Headed by Ambassador
Zalmay Khalilzad, US Special Representative for Afghanistan Reconciliation
Called on COAS at GHQ, Today”, 14 September 2020, www.ispr.gov.pk.
34 Imran Khan, “Imran Khan: Peace Is Within Reach in Afghanistan. A Hasty
International Withdrawal Would Be Unwise”, Washington Post, 27 September
2020, www.washingtonpost.com.
35 “Afghanistan Has Benefited from Belt & Road Initiative”, Belt and Road News,
14 August 2020, www.beltandroad.news.
36 US Virtual Embassy Iran, “Policy & History”, n.d., https://ir.usembassy.gov.
37 “Iran Plans Oil Exports from the Gulf of Oman to Secure Crude Flow”, Reuters,
25 June 2020, www.reuters.com.
38 “IRGC Commander Inaugurates Iran’s New Naval Base East of Strait of
Hormuz”, Fars News Agency, 24 September 2020, www.farsnews.ir.
39 “Rouhani: Iranians Not to Succumb to Bullying”, Islamic Republic News Agency,
7 September 2020, https://en.irna.ir.
40 “COVID-19 Coronavirus Pandemic”, Worldometer, 2020, www.worldometers.info.
41 Minister of External Affairs of Government of India, “Foreign Secretary’s Con-
ference Call with Counterparts from Indo-Pacific Countries”, 20 March 2020,
https://mea.gov.in.
42 Jamil Anderlini, “China’s Middle East Strategy Comes at a Cost to the US”,
Financial Times, 9 September 2020, www.ft.com.
Index

5G technology 38–39, 202, 237, 244, 246 Action Plan for Enhanced Global and
9/11 20, 80–81, 239–40 Security Cooperation 97
2004 Sumatra–Andaman earthquake 18 Active pharmaceutical ingredients
2007 five-nation Malabar exercise 18 (APIs) 204
2008 financial crisis 18, 33 ADMM+ 112, 114, 117–18, 120, 141–42,
2017 Defense and National Security 183, 218, 221
Strategic Review 165 ADMMASEAN Defence Minister’s
2018 ASPI survey 116–17 Meeting–Plus (+) 112, 114, 117–18,
2018 Foreign Affairs Work Conference 120, 141–42, 183, 218, 221
20 Adventurism 2, 9, 34, 47, 64: North
2018 National People’s Congress 19 Korean 2; rising Chinese 2
2019 ASEAN Outlook on the Afghanistan 10, 33, 66, 128, 143,
Indo-Pacific 23 239–40, 249–60: stabilisation
2019 ministerial meetings 24 operations in 143; violence in 33;
2020 ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ withdrawal of US troops from 255–56
Meeting 20 Afghanistan and Pakistan 255–56
2020 Australian Strategic Defence Afghan peace process 249, 257, 260
Update 179 Africa 46, 132, 154, 156, 158, 172, 217,
226–27, 230–32
A2/AD capabilities 34 Africa and India cooperation
Aatmanirbhar Bharat 65, 69 partnership 46
Abadi, Jacob 150 African nations 193
Abe, Shinzo, Japanese Prime Minister African Union 226
79–83, 86, 95, 100, 181, 194, 197, 202, Agaléga Islands 229
214, 219, 258: administration 82; Agenda and priorities 111
Asia’s Democratic Security Diamond Age of Asia 212
83, 86; Free and Open Indo-Pacific Aggression 35
Strategy 79; Latin America sojourn Aggressiveness 46
197; stated at the Indian Parliament Agreement on the transfer of defence
81 equipment and technology 170
Abraham Accords 154 Aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle 167,
Abraham Weintraub, Brazil’s Education 168
Minister 63 Aircraft carriers 129, 167, 168
Accountability 36, 201 Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ)
Acquisition and Cross-Servicing 18
Agreement (ACSA) 6, 48, 52, 81, 146, Akrotiri 129
168, 170, 186: US and Australia 48 Alignment 5, 32, 44–45, 47–48, 61–62,
Act East Policy (AEP) 6, 46, 57, 62–63, 64–65, 68–69, 100–101, 120, 140, 143,
65 152, 159, 180–81, 185, 194, 201, 217,
264 Index
235, 244: geopolitical 244; pointed 44, Arc of Freedom and Prosperity 80, 81
45, 47–48, 61–62, 64–65, 68; pointed Arctic Ocean 126, 183, 220–21: Russian
purposive 61; strategic 5, 47, 152; claims in 126
strategy 44–45, 68; structures 65 Ardern, Jacinda 100: visit to; Japan 100,
Alliance of Small Island States 228 Sydney 100
Alliances 2, 5, 21–22, 36, 44–47, 62–63, A Return to East of Suez? 125
65, 80, 95–96, 111, 119, 136, 138–39, ARF Disaster Relief Exercises 139
141–42, 144–47, 150, 153, 156–57, Argentina 194
168, 180–81, 200–201, 204, 214, Armed Forces of India 52
216–18, 220, 228, 232, 240–41: Artificial intelligence 34, 38, 197, 246
bilateral 119, 136, 138; conjectural ASEAN and India 25, 220
45–47, 65; defence 62; framework 5, ASEAN and Quad relations 120
44, 47, 62, 147; hub-and-spoke 141; ASEAN–Australia–New Zealand Free
Japan and US 80, 214; peripheral 150; Trade Area (AANZFTA) 102
pointed 44; political collective 65; ASEAN Centrality 23–25, 85–89,
South Korea and US 144, 147; 111–12, 114–15, 119, 170, 181–82,
strategic 150; structure 44; UK and 218, 220, 249: challenges to 23;
US 62 commitment to 24; feature of 115;
Allies 2, 25, 32, 34–35, 82, 97, 99, 116, impact on 25; in the Indo-Pacific 24;
132, 136–42, 146, 157–60, 184, 194, support for 24, 86
198, 211–12, 214, 218, 220, 225, ASEAN Charter 114
230–32, 239–41, 245, 252, 256–57: ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific
treaty-based bilateral 146 (AOIP) 23, 85, 118–19
Allies and partners and US 136 ASEAN Plus 118
Al-Qaeda 256 ASEAN–Quad problem 115
Amazonia-1 satellite 199 ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) 18, 50,
America First policy 249 81, 112, 114, 117, 120, 139, 141–42,
Anarchy 94 182–83, 218, 221
Andaman Islands 18 ASEAN-related meetings 111
Anglo-Malayan Defence Agreement 128 ASEAN summit 19
Animal husbandry 197 Ashdod Port 156
Ankara 238, 241–42, 245–46 Asia 4, 7, 18, 21, 23, 31–32, 33–34, 37,
Annual Summit on Foreign Policy 46–48, 50, 54, 62, 64–68, 78, 80–81,
Exchanges and Coordination 50 83, 86, 94, 96, 99, 112–14, 116–20,
Antarctica 102, 216 128–30, 132, 136, 139–41, 143–46,
Anthony, A K, Indian Defence Minister 150–51, 153, 155–59, 165, 170,
57, 59, 232 172–73, 178–83, 185, 187, 192, 200,
Anti-China: agenda 205; coalition 79, 202, 211–21, 226, 229–32, 240, 242,
113, 115, 120, 139, 166; discussion 68; 249, 252, 254–55, 258, 260: balance of
institution-building 142; narrative power in 18, 31; China-dominated
143; proposition 235, 246; rhetoric 69, 219, 221; China’s vision for 66;
115; states 180; bloc 157; policies 221 Chinese conception of 54; economic
Anti-HIV campaign 199 future of 47; Israeli interest in 158;
Anti-Israel stereotypes 152 multipolar 54, 64, 67–68; multipolar
Anti-piracy 58, 83, 184, 221: operations maritime 64; multipolar order in 46;
170 post-COVID-19 structure in 47, 116;
Anti-smuggling and anti-poaching power-balancing in 47; rules-based
patrols 57 order in 113
Anti-US bloc 240 Asia and India partnership cooperation
Anwar, Dewi Fortuna 120 46
Arab countries 152, 154 Asia for Asians 54
Arab countries and Israel ties 154–54 Asian allies and US 158
Arabian Sea 159, 221, 238, 254 Asian countries 23, 112–13, 117, 150,
Araujo, Ernesto, Foreign Minister 63 155, 159, 182, 219: security 54, 124
 Index 265
Asian Development Bank (ADB) 182, Australia and Brazil 98, 197–99:
184 cooperation 197; natural allies 198;
Asian giants 61 relations 98
Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank Australia and China 22, 143: economic
(AIIB) 34, 61, 66, 128, 156, 182, and trade relations 22; trade war 143
184 Australia and India 6, 9–10, 18–19,
Asian NATO 69, 82, 136 22–23, 32, 37, 46, 48–50, 64–65,
Asian states and Russia relations 212 79–81, 96, 119–20, 133, 136, 146, 164,
Asia-Pacific 32, 62, 80, 94, 99, 130, 168–69, 173, 179, 195, 211, 227, 244,
182–83, 185, 192, 211–15, 218, 220, 257: Annual Summit on Foreign
231, 249, 254: China-centric vision of Policy Exchanges and Coordination
99 50; Comprehensive Strategic
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Partnership 6, 48–49, 56, 62, 97;
(APEC) 80, 182, 215, 254 Consultations between National
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Security Advisers 50; Cooperation in
summit 254 Regional and Multilateral Fora 50;
Asia-Pacific region 80, 94, 218 defence cooperation 96; Defence
Asia Reassurance Initiative Act 37 Policy Planning and Coordination 50;
Asia’s Democratic Security Diamond 83, Defence Policy Talks 50; Defence
86 Science and Technology
Asia strategy 33: Pivot/Rebalance to 33 Implementing Arrangement (DSTIA)
Aso, Taro, Japanese Foreign Minister 49; Framework Arrangement on
81 Cyber and Cyber-Enabled Critical
Assault ships 129 Technology Cooperation 49;
Association of South-East Asian framework for growing collaboration
Nations (ASEAN) 10, 18–20, 23–25, between the defence science and
33, 50, 63, 81, 85–89, 102, 111–20, technology research organisations 49;
130, 132, 139, 144–46, 166, 170, Framework on Security Cooperation
180–83, 195, 201, 213, 218–21, 249: 50; Joint Declaration on Security
adoption of Indo-Pacific outlook 24; Cooperation 50, 80, 87, 96;
centrality 23–25, 85–89, 111–12, 181, Memorandum on Defence;
220; diplomatic support for 87, Cooperation 51; Mutual Logistics
importance of 87, Japan’s support for Support Agreement (MLSA) 49, 146;
86; decision-making procedure 87; partnerships 96; Shared values of
engagement 63; political autonomy democracy and rule of law 49; Shared
86; Quad’s threat to 25; role of 24, 86, Vision for Maritime Cooperation in
213; unity 85, 86 the Indo-Pacific 49, 97; Shared vision
Atlantic Ocean 124, 127–28, 130, 132, of a free, open, inclusive and
183, 192–93, 197, 202 rules-based Indo-Pacific region 49;
Austin, Lloyd, Secretary of Defense 30, stances of 37; ties 6, 48
232 Australia and Israel 98: cooperation on
Australia 1–2, 5–10, 17, 19–24, 31–33, national security 98; cooperation on
35–37, 44, 46–51, 54, 61, 64–65, 69, security issues 98; defence and cyber
78–81, 83, 86, 94–99, 102–04, 111, security 98; relations 98
115, 119–20, 129–30, 132–33, 136, Australia and Japan 7, 21, 31, 35–36, 47,
141–46, 159–60, 164–65, 168–70, 173, 80–81, 86, 94, 96, 129–30, 141, 159,
178–81, 183–87, 195, 197–98, 211, 160, 168, 180, 211, 220, 225, 231:
215–16, 220, 225, 227, 231, 235, bilateral cooperation 81; Joint
243–44, 249, 257–58: 2017 Foreign Declaration on Security Cooperation
Policy White Paper 19, 49; economic 80; partnerships 96; relations 96;
dependence on China 37; impact on Special Strategic Partnership 58, 96;
interests 96; Indo-Pacific strategy 97; ties 80, 86
Strategic Defence Interests 96; US Australia and New Zealand 95, 98, 100,
military presence in 33 102, 104: bilateral relationship 98;
266 Index
Comprehensive and Strategic Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) 18,
Partnerships 98; Pacific Step-up and 21–22, 34, 46, 62, 65–66, 80, 86, 101,
Pacific Reset policies 98 128, 132, 142–43, 156, 166, 201, 204,
Australia and Paris cooperation 169 237–40, 242, 244–45, 252–54, 257:
Australia and Quad 95 breadth and scope of 22; China’s
Australia and Russia relations 215 expansion under 21; Chinese
Australia and South Korea 97 invitation on 66; Indian stance on 66
Australia and UK defence treaties 130 Better Utilization of Investments
Australia and US 1, 48, 99 Leading to Development (BUILD)
Australia and Vietnam Comprehensive Act of 2018 37, 47
Partnership 97 Bharat Electronics Limited 55, 62
Australia, India and Japan strategic Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) 152
collaboration 19 Bhutan 34, 61: disputed territory
Australia, India, Japan and United claimed by 34
States 78, 80–81, 111, 249 Biden Administration 19, 25, 30–31, 34,
Australia-India Strategic Research Fund 37–38, 82, 86, 136–37, 140–41, 157,
49 230, 232, 246, 260: China as a
Australian Department of Foreign strategic competitor 34, 82; foreign
Affairs and Trade 96 policy 137; sanctions on Chinese
Australia, New Zealand and United officials 35
States (ANZUS) 96, 98–99 Biden, Joe, US President 1–2, 17, 19, 25,
Australia, New Zealand and United 30–31, 34–35, 37–38, 44, 82, 86, 103,
States (ANZUS) Treaty obligations 136–37, 140, 141, 157–58, 165, 172,
98–99 174, 214, 230, 232, 241, 244, 246, 251,
Australian Foreign Policy White Paper 260: Interim National Security
96, 98 Strategic Guidance 232
Australian Navy 169 Biden–Suga joint leaders’ summit 2
Australian Space Agency 169 Biegun, Stephen, US Deputy Secretary
Australian Strategic Policy Institute of State 2, 36, 45, 94, 115, 136
(ASPI) 78, 113, 116–17 Bilateral: alliances 119, 136, 138;
Australia Pact 98 challenges 184; cooperation 50–51, 81,
Autonomy 23, 64–65, 68–69, 86, 116, 88, 170, 216; dialogues 82;
118, 120, 136–37, 143–44, 147, 165, empowerment 147; engagements 117;
171–74, 182, 185, 187, 196, 200, 205, partnerships 6, 55, 119, 141, 155;
219, 227: political 86; strategic 23, political relationship 216; relations 9,
64–65, 68–69, 116, 118, 120, 165, 67, 81, 98–99, 102, 144, 151, 153–54,
171–74, 182, 185, 187, 196, 200, 160, 165, 174, 184, 214, 216, 220;
219 security cooperation 169; security
dialogue 226; strategic partners 62;
Bab el-Mandeb Strait 156, 167 strategic partnerships and alliances
Bahrain 129, 154, 239 111, 153; synergy 4, 6, 46–48, 54;
Bajwa, Qamar Javed, Pakistan’s chief of tensions 35; ties 2, 47, 62, 67, 79, 87,
army staff 257 152, 155, 229, concretisation of 47;
Balakrishnan, Vivian, Singapore Foreign trade 63, 131, 152, 155
Minister 24 Bilateralisms 198
Balance of power 18, 25, 31, 33, 87, 137: Biodiversity 166, 169, 192, 196: flora and
regional 87 fauna 192
Baldacchino, Godfrey 227 Biomass and biofuels 199
BASIC 63, 193 Bipartisan consensus 31, 34
Basic Exchange and Cooperation Blocisation 147
Agreement (BECA) 6, 48, 51 Blue Dot Network (BDN) 7, 22, 37, 47,
Battle of Haifa 151 65–66, 158, 185, 237, 243
Bay of Bengal 38, 136, 170 Blueprint for Defence and Security
BBC 152 Cooperation 97
 Index 267
Bolsa-Familia 193 128; geostrategic network 129;
Bolshevik Revolution 212 interests and capabilities 125; policy
Bolsonaro, Brazilian President 59, 63, of disengagement East of Suez 130;
194, 199, 202–03: visit to India 194 presence in the Indo-Pacific 131;
Bonn Agreement 255, 257 security posture 124; sovereign claims
Border 18, 37, 61, 66–67, 143, 153, 129
178–79, 246, 254: conflict/dispute 37, British Armed Forces 129
61, 67, 143, China and India 37, 61, British Indian Ocean Territory (BIOT)
143; protection 50; standoff 37 128, 226, 229
Border Protection, Coast Guard, and British Indo-Pacific military facilities 129
Customs 50 British Sovereign Base Areas on Cyprus
Borrell, Josep, High Representative of 129
the Union for Foreign Affairs and Brunei 63, 113, 119, 129
Security Policy 173 Burden-sharing 39
Brazil 2–3, 7, 10, 31, 36, 45, 47, 54, Bush, George W., US President 31–32,
59–60, 62–64, 68, 85, 88, 95–96, 98, 141, 244: administration 32, 33, 141;
101, 103, 111, 115, 120, 164, 171, government 32
192–205, 217, 221, 225: Amazon
deforestation policy 194; Amazonian Cairns Group 192, 197
policy 201; dependence on China 198; Cambodia 113, 182
economy 198; epochal role of 192; Cameron, David, UK PM 130
foreign policy 192, 194, 202, Campbell, Kurt 34–35, 187
formulation 194, prioritisation 193; Cam Ranh 216
humanitarian peace operations role Canada 10, 17, 38, 132, 177–78, 180–88,
193; politics 194; production systems 195: bolting-in and capabilities-led
193; reliance on China 63 approach to Quad Plus 177, 182;
Brazil and China ties 63 military activities in the Indo-Pacific
Brazil and India 59, 63, 198–200: Action 183; perception of the Quad 183
Plan to Strengthen Strategic Canada and India 185
Partnership 59; cooperation 200; Canada and Japan 186
Defence Cooperation Agreement 60; Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) 183, 186
goodwill 63; interchange 199; Joint Canadian Quad Plus engagement 180
Defence Committee 60; Joint Venture Canberra 6, 8, 18, 37, 46, 95–98, 100,
Agreement for manufacturing an 103, 119, 168–69, 180, 197, 199, 215,
array of small arms 59; Research & 231, 237, 246: “Pacific Step Up”
Development, acquisition and logistic policy 46
support 60; strategic partnership 60; Capability(ies) 1–2, 34, 37, 39, 83–84, 98,
ties 63, economic 63, political 63; 124–26, 128, 131, 138–39, 143, 158,
transfer of technology 59 167, 172, 177–80, 182, 184, 186, 188,
Brazil and Israel 3, 95–96, 98, 103, 164, 195, 203, 227–28, 236, 238, 240, 245,
171, 217, 225 254, 257–58: absorptive and
Brazil and Japan 196, 199: compact 196; purveyance 195; aggregated material
equities 196 84; anti-submarine warfare 83; cyber,
Brazil and New Zealand 63, 101 and space 34; limited material 83;
Brazil and Quad 45 military 37, 98; operational 131;
Brazil-Australia political and diplomatic power projection 34; power-projection
exchanges 197 138; strike 179; surveillance 167
Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Capacity: building 57, 89, 167, 170, 184,
Africa (BRICS) 61, 63, 192, 194, 217, 195, 205; domestic 196
221 Capacity building 57, 89, 184
Bretton Woods institutions 61 Cardoso, Henrique, Brazilizn President
Brexit 130 194
Britain 61–62, 124–33, 203, 226, 229, Cash-benefit transfers 193
231: capabilities in the Indo-Pacific Caucasus 143, 242, 252
268 Index
CC-130 Hercules 183 China and Japan 2, 86: relations 86;
CC-150 Polaris 183 Senkaku Islands dispute 2
Center for Strategic and International China and New Zealand 5, 22, 68, 88,
Studies 36 95, 99, 146: economic ties 5, 68, 88,
Central Asia 65, 143, 155, 240, 242, 252, 95, 146; free trade agreement 99; trade
255 relations 22, 99
Central Asian republics 252 China and Pakistan 46, 179, 240,
Central Asia Policy 252 252–54, 258–59: financial support 253;
Central Europe 201 partnership 253; relations 253
CF-188 Hornets 183 China and Quad tensions 44
Chabahar port, Iran 154, 240, 249–52, China and Russia 125, 213–14, 217, 219,
255–58: development of 251–52, 240: developing ties 211; relations 213,
255–57 217; strategic partnership 214
Chagos Archipelago 226, 228 China and Turkey relations 242
Challenges 2, 4, 9, 19, 23, 25, 31–33, China and UAE strategic partnership
35–38, 61–62, 95, 100, 114–15, 117, 239
119–20, 124–25, 153, 166, 177–80, China and US 5–6, 10, 20, 23, 31–33, 36,
184, 187–88, 214, 227–28, 258, 260: 54, 62, 79, 89, 101, 111–13, 115, 119,
bilateral 184; diplomatic 38; economic 137–38, 140, 142–44, 155–57, 159–60,
38; geopolitical 38; global 31–32, 35, 165, 170–71, 174, 182, 217, 219, 227;
36, 228; incremental 124; military 38; competition 6, 36, 113, 115, 137–38,
regional 31, 36; transnational 166 140, 144, 155–57, 160, 217;
Chang Myoung-jin, South Korean confrontation 23, 32; economic issues
Minister of Defense Acquisition 32; engagement 31; fault line 89;
Program Administration 58 interdependence 140, relations 20, 33,
Chengdu J-10 fighter jets 241 36, cooperation and stability 33,
Chennai-Vladivostok maritime corridor impact on 33, in the aftermath of the
215 coronavirus pandemic 36; rivalry 6,
Chernobyl disaster 63 36, 79, 89, 101, 142–43, 165, 174;
Chiang Kai-Shek 141 strategic competition 31, 111–12, 115,
Chile 194 119, 157, 182, 217, 219; trade, deficit
China and India 18, 20, 22–23, 45, 48, 33, issues 32, tensions 37, war 35
61, 67–69, 143, 151, 157, 178, 212, China Daily* 21
236: border 18, 37, 61, 153, 178–79, China Development Bank 22
conflicts 61, 69, dispute 18, 37, 143, China Dream 139
tensions 153, violence 178; China factor 66
Declaration on Principles for China Foreign Affairs University 20
Relations and Comprehensive China–Korea–Japan Trilateral Summits
Cooperation 48; developmental and Secretariat 145
partnership 69; economic outreach 23; China–Pakistan Economic Corridor
military, capability gap 37, escalation (CPEC) 66, 240, 252, 253, 254, 257,
23; multilateral associations 61; 258, 259
rapprochement 23; relations 23, 61, China, People’s Republic of (PRC) 2,
67, 69; tensions 20, 48; ties 45, 67, 68, 4–10, 17–25, 30–39, 44–48, 54, 58,
impact on 67, post-Galwan 68; trade 61–69, 79–82, 84–86, 88–89, 94–96,
22, 67, deficit 67 99–101, 103, 111–20, 124–26, 128–30,
China and Iran 213, 241, 244, 246: 132, 136–47, 150–53, 155–60, 164–67,
Strategic Partnership 241; weapons 169–74, 177–88, 194, 196–98,
transfer programmes 241 200–205, 211–17, 219–21, 225, 227,
China and Israel 62, 155–56, 158: 229–32, 235–46, 249–50, 252–55,
bilateral partnership 155; convergence 257–60: abusive behaviors 35; actions
of interests 156; cooperation 158; in the South Pacific 244; activities in
diplomatic ties 155; economic synergy the South China Sea 126; aggressive
62; partnership 156; relations 155 conduct 46, 61; American views of 35;
 Index 269
assertiveness 141; assessment of strategic competitor 237; strategy to
balance of power 25, behaviour 80, become a maritime power 21;
82, 84, 113, 125, 138, 179, 183, territorial disputes 217; threat from
aggressive 113, in Indo-Pacific 31, 33, threats to, US 34, Taiwan 32;
international 183, revisionist 179, unilateral schemes 66; unlawful and
strategic 138; challenge in the excessive claims in the South China
Indo-Pacific 30; “charm offensive” Sea 125; US perceptions of 31; values
strategy 66; claims in the South China and vision 69; vision for Asia 66
Sea 129; coercive economic statecraft China Railway Tunnel Group 156
140; coercive maritime influence 64; China’s National Defense University 22
competition with 31, 36, 115, 187; China–South Korea–Japan Trilateral
conception of Asia 54; currency Cooperation Secretariat 142
manipulation 32; dependent on China threat 236
technology 39, diplomatic, overtures Chinese Academy of Social Sciences
22, pressure on 38; doing business in (CASS) 20, 21
37; domestic growth 18; dominance Chinese belligerence 66
38; domination, hedge against 32, Chinese Communist Party (CCP) 20
economic, coercion 37, 132, 137, Chinese fishing vessel 139
expansion 18, growth 253, outreach Chinese maritime law enforcement ships
23, pressure 22, reliance on 146, 139: Chinese navy 126, 254: presence
sanctions against Japan 139, sanctions in the Indian Ocean 126
against Philippines 139, sanctions Chinese officials, sanctions on 35, 38
against South Korea 146; envisioned Chinese Overseas Ports Holding
order 54; expansion of influence 21; Company 254
expansion under BRI 21; fishing Chinese Quad 66
activities 139, foreign, policy 19, 32, Chinese virus 31
46, strategy 156; GDP growth 18; Christchurch Call to Action 102
global strategy 155, grey zone, Civil nuclear: agreement 192; energy 50
operations 180, strategy 64; gross CK Hutchison 156
domestic product (GDP) 46; hostile Clarke, Michael, RUSI’s then-Director
behaviour 21; human rights violations 125
84; hyper-antagonistic 66; hypocritical Clark, Helen, Prime Minister 101
actions 66; India’s policies against 61; Climate change 1–2, 19, 25, 33, 45, 82,
innovation in technologies 38; 141, 166–69, 171–73, 177, 192–93,
investment in Israel 156, maritime, 201, 204, 228: mitigation 1;
activities 186, claims 33, rights 33; monitoring of 169; negotiations 193;
markets 32; militarisation 113, scourge of 192
military, and economic ascendance 35, Climate financing 1
capabilities and bases 126, facility 23, Climate Working Group 1
modernisation 32; overseas investment Clinton Administration 32
projects 18; policies in Asia 217; Clinton, Hillary, US Secretary of State
policy 22; political and diplomatic 33
clout 46; power projection capabilities Closer Defence Relations agreement 98
34; pre-emptive pressure on 64; Coalitions 3, 7–8, 30–31, 35–39, 44,
presence in the port of Gwadar 23; 79–81, 84–85, 88, 113, 115, 120, 137,
reliance on overseas energy imports 139, 165, 166, 178, 186–87, 221, 236,
18; revisionist actions 66, rise of 21, 244: anti-China 166; balancing 30;
30, 32, 35–36, 48, 79, 86, 88, 94, 142, building 79, 88, 178; counter-China
164, 170, 185, 236, assertive 88, hedge 84; democratic 3, 80–81, 88, 137;
against 32, response to 36; rising, disaster-relief 80; functional 38;
assertiveness 80, power 21; sale of interest-based 30; issue-based 38, 39,
submarines to Pakistan 23; 165, 186; military 80; mission-based
“secondary strategic direction 20; 37; participation in 44; political 85
selective revisionism 137, 142–43; Cobra Gold 139, 183
270 Index
Coercion 8, 32, 37–38, 126, 132, 137, Conference on Interaction and
139, 177, 179–81, 185, 187, 196, 205: Confidence Building Measures
economic 8, 37, 132, 137, 179–80, 185, (CICA) 54, 139
187; grey zone 126; hegemonic 205; Confidence-building 85, 95
military 126 Conflicts 35, 61, 67, 69, 126, 128, 139,
Cold War 8, 20, 31, 44, 54, 80, 83, 86, 147, 152, 178, 181, 185, 215, 219, 240,
124, 130, 138, 150, 152, 212–15, 244: border 61, 67; China and India
217–18, 227, 239, 241: end of 44, 83, 69; international 178; management
124, 138, 150, 212, 215, 217, 241; era 178; regional 128, 139, 219, 240
44, 80, 86, 217; politics 44 Confrontation 23, 25, 32, 69, 80, 137–38,
Collaborations 2, 4, 19, 35, 46, 48–49, 166, 211, 244, 258: allied 137; China
54, 62, 67, 69, 95–96, 118, 156, 184, and US 23, 32; open 80
186, 197, 205: defence 54; defence Congress Party 152, 154
science and technology research Connect Central Asia policy 65
organisations 49; economic 67; Connectivity 10, 66, 80, 89, 113, 164,
India–Japan 46; scientific 205; 166, 181–85, 187–88, 197–98, 242,
strategic 48; tech-security 48 249, 252, 254–55, 257, 260: economic
Collective action 45 242; initiatives 66; international
Commercial competitiveness 198 249; multi-vectored 197; transport
Commonalities 62, 229 242
Common destiny 139 Conservatism 214
Common Security and Defence Policy Continental connect 10, 46, 65, 68
(CSDP) 172 Cooperation and stability 1–4, 6, 17–19,
Communication 4, 10, 51, 65, 68–89, 22–25, 31, 33–38, 45–46, 48–54,
118, 125, 180, 204: channel of 65; 56–62, 64, 67–68, 78–85, 87–89,
channels of 118; corridor of 10, 65, 68 94–103, 116, 119, 124, 131–32, 139,
Communication Compatibility and 141–46, 147, 151–55, 157–59, 164–74,
Security Agreement (COMCASA) 51, 177–78, 182–88, 195–201, 211–21,
146 226, 232, 235, 239, 242–45, 249,
Communism 212 251–54, 258, 259–60: agenda-setting
Community with a Shared Future for for 88; architecture 170, 213, 218;
Humankind (CSFH) 66 Asia and India 46; bilateral 50–51, 81,
Comoros 226–27, 230–31 88, 170, 216; capacity-building 195;
Comparative advantages 39, 182, 188 China and Israel 158; China and US
Compartmentalisation 142 33; comprehensive 48, 58, 214, 253;
Competitions 5–6, 30–31, 34–36, 67, 103, coronavirus pandemic 31; defence
111–13, 115, 119, 124, 136–38, 51–52, 54, 56, 58, 60, 68, 96–97,
140–44, 146–47, 155–57, 159–60, 173, 100–102, 153; development 98, 141;
182, 187, 198, 217, 219, 236 diplomatic 80; economic 22, 80, 87,
China and US 6, 36, 115, 137, 138, 140, 147, 211, 216, revival 38; framework
144, 155–56, 157, 217; geopolitical for 31; functional 79, 82, 85, 89, 177,
124, 142; great power 136–41, 143–44, 178; health 52, 173; industrial 169;
146–47, 173; strategic 30–31, 103, inter-continental level of 46;
111–12, 115, 119, 157, 182, 217, international 36, 167, 235; Japan and
219 France 84; Japan and UK 84; military
Complementarities 54 216; minilateral 88, 144, 146, 174;
Complexities 44, 61 multilateral 97, 102, 139, 144, 146,
Comprehensive and Progressive 173–74, 184, 186; mutual 198, 259–60;
Agreement for Trans-Pacific naval 84; partnership 46; political 87;
Partnership (CPTPP) 102, 131 practical 1, 4; Quad Plus 24, 83, 88,
Comprehensive Economic Partnership 187, 259; quadrilateral 19, 23, 48;
Agreement (CEPA) 185 regional 19, 35, 85, 99, 102, 137, 147,
Comprehensive Strategic Partnership 6, 154, 166, regional bilateral 48, 184,
48–49, 56, 62, 97 non-controversial 84, non-traditional
 Index 271
84, 184; security 3, 6, 22, 48, 53, Currency(ies) 32, 140, 230, 253, 255:
80–81, 84, 96, 98, 100, 103, 124, 131, manipulation 32, 140
141, 153, 168–69, 184, 216, 217; Cutler, Robert M. 183
socio-cultural 80; state-to-state 243; Cyber, and space capabilities 34, 177
strategic 79, 146, 196, 232; tactical 35; Cyber security 49, 98, 100, 153
trilateral 48, 62, 81, 88, 96, 196 Cyprus 129, 241
Cooperation in Regional and
Multilateral Fora 50 Da Silva, Luiz Inacio Lula 194
Cooperative cluster 84 Dead Sea 156
Cooperative clusters 84, 88 Debt 37, 65, 196: unsustainable 37, 196
Coronavirus Global Response 173: Decarbonisation 201, 204
Coronavirus pandemic 4, 31, 35–37: Declaration Against Arbitrary
aftermath of 31, 36–37; cooperation Detention in State-to-State Relations
on 31 187
Cotton Route project 46 Decoupling 8, 38, 137, 140–41, 144, 147
Counter-China coalition 84 Deep sea cables 198
Counter-China connotation 84 Deep underwater expeditionary missions
Counter-COVID-19 84 199
Counter-narcotics 252: Counter-piracy Defence Materiel Cooperation
18, 229; operations 18 Arrangement 102
Counter-terrorism 50, 80, 153, 164, 177, Defence Policy Planning and
229 Coordination 50
Countries: like-minded 3, 39, 44, 48, 136, Defence Policy Talks 50
164, 171, 186 Defence Science and Technology
COVAX vaccine 181, 259 Implementing Arrangement (DSTIA)
COVID-19 pandemic 1–5, 7–10, 19, 49
24–25, 31, 35–38, 45–47, 49, 61, 63, Defence Technology and Trade Initiative
66, 79, 81–82, 84–85, 88–89, 94–97, (DTTI) 52
111–12, 115–17, 119–20, 136, 140–41, Demilitarised Zone (DMZ) 144
146, 153, 157, 164, 167–68, 171–73, Democracies Ten (D10) 39, 147, 203
177–79, 181, 187, 200, 202–03, 221, Democracy(ies) 7, 25, 32, 35–36, 39, 49,
225, 228–30, 232, 235, 244–46, 62, 80, 136, 138, 142–43, 152, 173,
249–50, 259–60: assessment on 85; 241: alliance of 36; balancing
challenges of 61; combating 36; coalition of 36; Indo-Pacific 25; league
consultations on 97; cooperation on of 32; like-minded 32, 136; shared
19, 82; crisis 164, 171–72, 230, 260; values of 32
effects of 140; health impacts of 177; Democratic: coalition 3, 80–81, 88, 137;
investigation into the origins of 36; diamond 142; values 3, 45, 60, 62, 81,
issues 24; management of 171; origins 84, 177
of 38; outbreak 2, 95, 187, 250; Democratisation 81
recovery plans 117, 120, 173; second Deng Xiaoping 18, 25: low-profile
wave of 157; spread of 146, 249, 259, diplomacy 25
vaccine, against 173, initiative 173, Denuclearisation 33
production 1 Department of
CP-140 Auroras 183 Defense of USA 51
Credibility 67 Deterrence 2, 138
Crimes 50, 119, 167, 170: transnational Developing nations 44, 192, 197
50, 119 Development-diplomacy sensibilities 200
Critical and Emerging Technology Dialogues 1–5, 7–9, 18, 33, 44, 48, 57,
Working Group 1 78, 81–82, 87, 89, 96, 98, 102–03, 112,
Critical Maritime Routes in the Indian 115, 118–19, 127, 137, 139, 166,
Ocean (CRIMARIO) 172 169–71, 182, 195, 211, 214–16, 219,
Crude oil 249–50 226, 230, 251, 258: biannual foreign
Culture 252 ministerial 1; bilateral 82; defence 57;
272 Index
diplomatic 81; inter-Korean 137; 240; sovereignty 138; territorial 119,
military 87; minilateral 2; multilateral 214, 217, 240
82; North Korea and US 137; political Distrust 67, 172, 215
87; politico-diplomatic 195; strategic Doha peace agreement 255–56, 259
102; Track-2 78; trilateral 33, 169 Doklam 61
Diego Garcia 83, 129, 226, 229 Domestic: capacity 196; financial crisis
Differences 4, 20, 31, 33, 67, 87, 118, 32; legitimacy 116; political populism
215, 226, 241–42: AIIB and BRI 66; 119; politics 113, 116; technology 202
economic 226; FOIP and AOIP 85; Drian, Jean-Yves Le, Minister of
geographic 226; ideological 31; Defense 167, 172
institutional 226; managing 33; Dunford, Gen Joe, Joint Chiefs of Staff
security 67 34
Digital: divide 202; economy 49, 144, Duqm, Oman 129
146, 188; technologies 202 Durand Line 256
Digital Connectivity and Cybersecurity Dutt, Shekhar, Indian Defence Secretary
Partnership (DCCP) 47 51
Digitalisation 202 Dynamatic Technologies Limited 55
Diplomacy 1, 9, 22, 25, 46, 63, 66, 81,
114, 116, 139, 144, 158, 167, 171–72, East African countries 158
178, 180, 187–88, 195, 200, 236: East Asia 33, 50, 78, 112, 136, 139, 141,
coercive 139; economic 22, 25, 46; 145, 202, 214–15, 218, 220: US
hostage 180, 187–88; institutional 1; strategic commitment in 141
Israeli 158; low-profile 25; middle East Asia Summit (EAS) 33, 50, 78, 112,
power 144, 187; naval 167, 172; 114, 120, 141–42, 183, 215, 218, 221
normalised 1; solidarist development East China Sea (ECS) 18, 61, 64, 84–85,
195; vaccine 63, 114, 116; 100, 139, 167, 178–80, 184, 231, 249,
value-oriented 81; “wolf warrior” 9, 257
66, 236 Eastern African littoral 201
Diplomatic: architecture 23; bonhomie Eastern Europe 201
193; challenges 38; clout 46; Eastern Indian Ocean 172
cooperation 80; defeat 249; desire 78; East of Suez 125, 128–30
dialogues 81; doctrine 80, 86; efforts Ecological preservation 203
81; engagement 67, 130, 195; Economic: advantages 146; ascendance
exchanges 197; hurdles 84; legitimacy 35; benefits 254; challenges 38;
85; manoeuvre 78; network 150; coercion 8, 37, 132, 137, 179–81, 185,
outreach 69; overtures 22; 187; collaboration 67; concerns 38;
recalibration 159; redressals 67; connectivity 242; constraints 113;
relations 102, 152, 155, 159, 251, 256, cooperation 22, 38, 80, 87, 147, 211,
258; sanctions 101; support 86–87; 216; crises 95, 167; damages 37;
tactic 86; tensions 80; ties 102, 141, decline 213; decoupling 38;
151–52, 155; traction 82, 86; trends dependence 6, 37, 69, 159, 172;
89; vision 81 development 37, 226–27; differences
Direction des Constructions Navales 226; difficulties 212; diplomacy 22, 25,
(DCNS) 169 46; downturn 116; effects 228;
Disarmament 50, 101 engagement 67, 140; expansion 18;
Disaster management and peacekeeping fallout 37; growth 4, 8, 46, 60, 98,
50 239, 253; influence 34; instruments 37;
Disaster relief exercise (DiREx) 183 integration 48, 187, 255; interaction
Disengagement 67, 130, 137, 140, 147 212; interdependence 140, 142,
Disengagement agreement 67 179–81; interests 99; issues 32, 140,
Disputes 2, 18, 37, 99, 119, 137–39, 143, 251; leverage 66; liberal system 138;
192, 214, 216–17, 219–20, 226, 228, links 211; outreach 23; partnership
240, 256: border 18, 37, 143, China 219; policies 46, 69, 173, 211; power
and India 37, 143; ethno-territorial 132, 138, 236; pressure 22; prosperity
 Index 273
37, 181, 196, 256; recovery plans 117, Environmental: crisis prevention 167;
120; relations 18, 22, 57, 81, 97, 216, disaster 228; issues 166–67, 170–71,
253; revival 38; shift 96; shocks 242; security implications of 167
structures 196; surrender 140; synergy Erdog˘, Recep Tayyip 241
47, 62, 64; ties 5, 47, 63, 68, 88, 95, ESC 180, 181
146, 150, 158: Economic Prosperity Esper, Mark T., Secretary of Defense
Network 142, 171 51–52
Economics 33, 36, 199, 212: predatory Ethiopia 159
36 EU Coordinated Maritime Presence 172
Economy(ies) 2–5, 7, 8, 18, 33, 49, 61, Eurasia 132, 213, 215, 219, 240
64–65, 69, 81, 95, 98, 101, 130, 141, Eurasian Economic Union 220
144, 146, 166–67, 185, 187–88, 192, Eurasian Initiative 143
195–200, 202–04, 212–13, 226, 228, Euro-Atlantic 124, 127–28, 130, 132, 193
230, 239, 252–53, 256: Asia-Pacific Europe 34, 39, 81, 124, 132, 150, 172–73,
192; blue 166–67, 200; Brazilian 198; 194, 201, 203, 211, 238, 241:
developing 7, 61, 230; digital 49, 144, innovation 39; technological prowess
146, 188; East Asian 192; emerging 2, 39
192, 199; global 8, 95, 98; industrial Europe and Israel trade relations 150
195; industrialised 204; Japanese 196; European Maritime Awareness mission
Maldives’ 230; maritime 64; market in the Strait of Hormuz (EMASOH)
81; mono-focussed 198; political 203; 172
Russian 212–13; Seychelles’s 230; European Task Group 172
slumping 69; small 65; Western 203 European Union (EU) 38, 81, 124,
Education 98, 102, 197, 205, 243, 253: 130–31, 171–73, 201, 241
higher 197, 205 Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) 126,
Egypt 158, 237, 239 165, 167, 199
Empowerment 147, 260: bilateral 147; Exclusivity 54
demands for regional 18, 147 Expanded Partnership for Quality
Energy 5–6, 18, 50, 98, 114, 125, 144, Infrastructure (EPQI) 46
146, 154–55, 168, 185, 188, 198–201, Export-Import Bank of China 22
203–04, 212, 220–21, 240, 249, 252, Exports 8, 32, 48, 63, 139, 153, 155, 192,
260: clean and renewable 200; 195, 198, 230, 238, 246, 252, 255–57:
imported 18; imports 18; mix 199, Brazilian 195; Israeli 155; natural
204; renewable 198, 203–04; resources resources 192
125, 185; solar 146, 168 Extradition 51
Engagement 3, 31, 33–35, 47, 62–63, 65,
67, 69, 84, 94–95, 97–100, 102–03, Falcon Strike 139
115, 117–18, 130–31, 139–40, 154, Far East 211, 220–21
159, 164, 174, 177–, 182–83, 185, Fencing systems 153
194–96, 198–99, 211, 221, 231, 253, Fernandes, George, Indian Defence
255: ASEAN 63; bilateral 117; Minister 58, 60
cautious 99; China and US 31; Financial crises 18–19, 32–33, 46, 192,
cooperative 118, 221; diplomatic 67, 250, 253, 260: domestic 32; global 46
130, 195; economic 67, 140; measures Financial mishaps, COVID-incited 65
139; military 67, 69; minilateral 117; Financial strains, COVID-driven 65
multi-fold 65; mutual 195, 199; New Financing 1, 22, 37, 201, 236: fair and
Zealand and United States 103; sustainable options 37
Obama-era 35; pointed 47; practical Finland 202
118; pragmatic 194; Quad Plus” 63; Fiscal resources management 198
substantial 98; with equilibrium 67 Fisheries 125, 167, 169
English, Bill, then-Prime Minister 102 Fishing 119, 126, 139, 180, 184: activities
Enhancing Development and Growth 139; illegal 119, 184
through Energy (EDGE) 47 Fishing militias 126
274 Index
Five Eyes (FVEY) defence ministers’ concept of 80, 85–87; development of
meeting 186 82; objectives 83; principles of 80, 84;
Five Eyes (FVEY) framework 186 realisation of 82, 88; support for the
Five Eyes (FVEY) meeting 186 88; US diplomatic traction on 86
Five Eyes (FVEY) nations 64 Freedom of Navigation (FON) 32, 64,
Five Eyes (FVEY) network 64, 146–47, 80, 113, 131, 156, 158, 166–67, 185,
184, 186 236, 249, 260
Five Eyes (FVEY) partners 146 Freedom of Navigation Operations
Five Power Defence Arrangements (FONOPS) 185–86
(FPDA) 83, 128, 131 Freedom of supply and navigation
FOIP and Quad 80, 82 165
Food industry 198 Freedom of the sea 126
Food-processing 198 Free trade 192
Foodstuffs processing 203 Free Trade Agreement (FTA) 99, 102,
Foreign and Defence Ministers’ 2+2 201
meeting 97 French naval mission 172
Foreign, Commonwealth and French Polynesia 83, 165
Development Office (FCDO) 130 Fujitsu 202
Foreign direct investment (FDI) 22, 185,
203 G4 192
Foreign Investment Promotion and G7 (Group of 7) 61, 65, 169, 203
Protection Agreement (FIPA) 184 G7 Summit 169
Foreign ministerial dialogue 1, 177: G8 81
biannual 1; The Spirit of the Quad 1, G-11 147
177 G20 63, 192, 197, 218
Foreign Ministry seminar 17 Galwan River Valley 23, 44, 47, 54, 65,
Foreign Secretary level telephonic 67–69, 143: clash 47; contention 67
meetings 45 Ge Hongliang 23
Formalisation 44 Geng Shuang, PRC Foreign Ministry
Framework Arrangement on Cyber and spokesperson 19
Cyber-Enabled Critical Technology Geographical contiguity 158
Cooperation 49 Geopolitical: alignments 158, 244;
France 2–3, 7, 10, 38, 79, 83–84, 87–88, challenges 38, 146; competition 124,
127, 130, 136, 146, 150, 153, 164–74, 142; concerns 38, 115; crossroads 156;
177, 194–95, 201, 226–29, 231–32, dilemma 157; goals 159; interests 99;
241: engagements in the Indo-Pacific minilateral groups 147; strategies 143
164; global influence 166; Indo-Pacific Geopolitics 10, 33, 154, 157, 216, 237,
approach 167; Indo-Pacific strategy 243
165, 170; strategic autonomy 171; Geostrategic: centrality 118; issues 157;
strategic vision of the Indo-Pacific 165 network 129; posture 124
France and India 146, 168–69: logistics Germany 127, 173, 194–95, 201, 236,
exchange memorandum of agreement 241, 251
168; partnership 168 Ghani Baradar, Mullah Abdul 256
France and Japan cooperation 84 Ghurkas 129
France and Quad rapprochement 165, Gibraltar 129
172 Global: challenges 31–32, 35–36, 228;
France and Quad Plus rapprochement economic crisis 192; financial crisis 46;
172 governance 66, 101, 166, 169, 193,
France + Quad joint exercises 170 204, 217–18; institutions 65; order 6,
FRANZ arrangement 169 68–69, 124, 152, 193, 218, 236;
Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) 6, security 54, 124, 195
45–46, 78–89, 114, 138, 143–44, 147, Global Britain 124, 125, 130
166, 180–82, 186–87, 225, 231, 257, Global Britain in a Competitive Age 124
260: ASEAN’s support for 85; Global South 192, 194, 197, 204
 Index 275
Global Times 20, 22–24: “Is Vietnam Hegemony 31, 157, 165, 169, 193, 217:
Moving to Join the Quad?” 24 American 157, 217; regional 31
Goa 168 Heritage Foundation 3, 78
Golden ring axis 240 High direct voltage cables (HDVC) 204
Governance 1, 66, 101, 138, 146, 164, Himalayan Quad 66
166, 169, 173, 192–93, 196, 204, Hindu mythology 63
217–18: democratised 196; global 66, Hindustan Aeronautics Limited 55, 62
101, 166, 169, 193, 204, 217–18; Hindu, The* 152
international 192; leadership 66; Hiramatsu, Kenji, Ambassador of Japan
pluralised 196; regional 101; to India 53
technology 1 HMCS Calgary 183
Great Game 170 HMCS Nanaimo 183
Green, Michael J. 32 HMCS Victoria 183
Grey-zone strategy 64, 126, 180 HMCS Whitehorse 183
Gross domestic product (GDP) 18, 46: HMS Albion 129
China’s 46; growth 18 HMS Jufair 129
Groupings 1–6, 9–10, 18, 31–32, 35–37, HMS Queen Elizabeth 130
45, 64–66, 68, 78–79, 81, 83, 95, Hollywood to Bollywood 127, 231
111–13, 117–20, 124–25, 127–28, 131, Hong Kong 61, 86, 101, 156, 172, 178:
136, 164, 169, 171, 173–74, 179, 184, National Security Law in 178; security
186, 192, 217, 219, 221, 225, 231–32, law 172
236: ad hoc 32; counter-China 81; Horn of Africa 172
elevation of 1; like-minded nations 36; Hua Chunying, People’s Republic of
minilateral 68, 117; priorities 45; China (PRC) Foreign Ministry
quadrilateral 66; regional 118; Spokesperson 17
security-based 124; strategic Huawei 35, 180, 188, 202: restrictions on
framework of 65; trilateral 83 35
Guanxi University 23 Hub-and-spoke: alliance 136, 138, 141;
Gulf 125, 127–28, 154–59, 170, 238–39, system 141–42
246, 251: UK facilities in 125 Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster
Gulf and Israel 157 Relief (HA/DR) 5, 39, 52, 78, 80,
Gulf of Aden 170 83–84, 89, 129, 139, 146, 164, 170,
Gulf Peninsula 156 177, 183–84, 188, 197, 225, 228, 231:
Gulf States and Israel 154 coalition 80; multi-nation 139
Gunawardane, Dinesh, Sri Lankan Human resources management 198
Minister of Foreign Relations 226 Human rights 31, 35, 38, 80, 84, 140–41:
Gupta, Ashok Kumar, Indian defence violations 35, 38, 84
secretary 58 Hybrid wars 143
Gwadar port, Pakistan 23, 240, 252–54, Hyundai Heavy Industries 102
257–59: Chinese presence in 23;
development of 254, 257 IBSAMAR exercises 194
ICGS Sarang 57
Haifa Port 151, 156 Identity(ies) 32, 46, 95, 97, 126, 128, 151,
Hamas 242 178, 193–94, 211, 220, 226–27;
Harper, Stephen, former Prime Minister democratic 32; problem 193; regional
185 128; shared 97
Health/Healthcare 94–96, 141, 199–201, IDE Technologies 156
203, 229–30: assistance 229–30; Imports 6, 8, 18, 48, 139, 152, 185, 240,
capacitation 201; cooperation 173; 250, 252, 257, 259: crude oil 250;
crises 95; emergency 94, 96; issues energy 18
141 Inclusiveness 212
Hedging 37, 79, 85–86, 88–89, 120, Inclusivity 9, 54
170: strategy 37; tactical 79, 85–86, India 1–2, 4–7, 9–10, 17–23, 25, 31–34,
88–89 36–37, 44–59, 61–69, 78–81, 83, 86,
276 Index
94–97, 100–101, 103, 111, 115–16, India and Central Asian nations ties
119–20, 127, 130, 132–33, 136, 141, 46
143–46, 150–60, 164, 168–70, 173, India and Israel 55, 62, 151–55, 157–60:
178–81, 184–86, 192–95, 198–201, arms sales 152, bilateral, agenda 154,
204, 211–21, 225–32, 235–37, 240–41, partnership in defence 55, relations
243–44, 246–47, 249–55, 257–59: Act 151, trade 152; convergence of
East Policy 6, 46, 57, 62–63; interests 153, 159 cooperation 151–53,
anti-China protests 23; anti-China intelligence 152, security 153; Deal for
sentiment 23; as a “priority for New supply of Barak-8 missile defence
Zealand” 64; building national system 55; defence and security 152;
security strengths 44; China policies diplomatic relations 152; diplomatic
47, 61, changing 47; China strategy ties 152; Joint Working Group on
67; choices of interest in Asia 48; Counterterrorism 153, military,
commitment to Quad 23; Cotton alliance 153, cooperation 152,
Route project 46; defence equipment 152; MoU to establish a
collaborations 54; defence new centre for technical and
procurement 48; dependence on maintenance support for India’s air
energy sources 154; developing grasp defence systems 55; partnership 153,
61; economic growth 46; economic 154; productive collaboration 62,
sanction on 81; foreign direct relations 151–52, 157–59, arms sales
investment 22, foreign policy 44–48, 153, strategic 153; repair &
64, 154, formulation 48, outlook 45, maintenance services for the
post-Galwan 44, 47, pro-active air-defence systems in India 55;
approach 47; foreign policy initiatives Strategic Collaboration Memorandum
of 214; foreign policy status of 159; on UAVs 55; strategic partnership
identity as an Asian power 46; 152; technology transfers 152, ties,
Indo-Pacific initiatives 10, 46; bilateral 62, defence industry 62,
Indo-Pacific outreach 68; interests and military 153, security 158
ambitions 45; move towards the Quad India and Japan 6, 19–20, 33–34, 44, 46,
2.0 66; multi-alignment 44; 48, 52, 64, 81, 86, 96, 100, 146, 150,
multilateral overtures 61; multi-polar 180, 186, 211, 213, 221, 243, 246:
Asia, choice of 54; Mumbai attack Acquisition and Cross-Servicing
153; national interests 46; Agreement 6, 48, 52, 186; Acquisition
Neighbourhood Policy 46; nuclear test and Cross-Servicing Agreement
in 1998 81; official stance 44; oil (ACSA) 6, 48, 52, 81, 146, 168, 170,
exploration activities 54; 186; Agreement concerning Security
opportunities and challenges in the Measures for the Protection of
Indo-Pacific 62; pointed alignment Classified Military Information 53;
strategy 44–45, 47, 61, 68; proactive Agreement concerning Transfer of
stance towards the Quad 2.0 69; Defence Equipment and Technology
regional and bilateral synergy 46, 54; Cooperation 53; bilateral relationship
rising power status 68; security 54, 68, 81; collaboration 46; economic, and
interests 54, 68, 230; Security and security cooperation 81, relations 81,
Growth for All (SAGAR) 46; sanction 81; Global Partnership in the
strategic, autonomy 64, choice for 48, 21st Century 81; Implementing
interests 65, outreach 65, posturing Arrangement for Deeper Cooperation
44, thinking 45; strategy 44–45, 53; reciprocal protection of classified
non-alignment 44, pointed alignment military information 53; reciprocal
44–45; structural vision to reform the provision of supplies and services
UNSC 67, synergy 46, 54, bilateral 46, between the Armed Forces of India
54, regional 46, 54; territorial integrity and the Self-Defense Forces of Japan
66; territorial resources 47, protection 52; Special Strategic and Global
of 47; territorial sovereignty 46, 67; Partnership 81; Strategic and Global
vaccine diplomacy 63 Partnership 81; strategic defence ties
 Index 277
48, ties 80, 81, 86, bilateral strategic exchange and protection of classified
80, strategic 86 military information between India
India and Mauritius bilateral ties 229 and US defence industries 52;
India and MENA relations 155 India–US General Security of
India and Middle East interdependence Military Information Agreement
154 (GSOMIA) 52, 145; Industrial
India and New Zealand 54, 100–101: Security Annex (ISA) 51, 81, 168–69,
defence ties 54 200, 204; joint military exercises 83;
India and Quad 6, 48–51, 56, 62, 80, 87, Logistics Exchange Memorandum of
96–97, 146: Comprehensive Strategic Agreement (LEMOA) 52; Master
Partnership 6, 48, 49, 56, 62, 97; Information Exchange Agreement
Defence Science and Technology (MIEA) 52; Memorandum of Intent
Implementing Arrangement (DSTIA) 52; protection of classified military
49; Framework on Security information 52, 53; rapprochement
Cooperation 50; Joint Declaration on 215; relations 23; Sharing of high-end
Security Cooperation 50, 80, 87, 96; encrypted communication and
key defence/military agreements 49; satellite data 51
Memorandum on Defence India and Vietnam 5, 7, 37, 54, 56,
Cooperation 51; MLSA 49, 146; 62–63, 211, 221: Arrangement on
Mutual Logistics Support Agreement Defence Industry Cooperation 56;
(MLSA) 49; security cooperation 48; assistance in repairs and overhaul of
ties 62; India and Quad 2.0 military, Vietnam’s MiG-21 aircraft 58;
economic and security ties 47 Comprehensive Strategic Partnership
India and Quad Plus 55, 62: key defence/ 56, 62; cooperation in defence
military agreements 55 supplies, joint projects, training and
India and Russia ties 21380, 87, 14 intelligence 57; Defence Cooperation
India and South Korea: Agreement Agreement/Defence Protocol 58;
between the Government of Republic defence industry cooperation 56;
of Korea and The Government of the defence ties 54; Joint Declaration on
Republic of India on the Protection of Strategic Partnership 57; Joint
Classified Information 59; Declaration on the Framework of
consultations between National Comprehensive Cooperation 58;
Security Council structures 59; maritime alliance 63; MoU for the
defence educational exchanges and Establishment of Collaborative
extend logistical support 58; military Relationship to Combat
logistics support agreement 58; MoU Transnational Crime and
for Cooperation between the National Development Mutual Cooperation 57;
Security Council Secretariat of MoU on defence cooperation 57; Plan
Republic of India and Office of of Action for period 2021–2023 for
National Security of Republic of further implementation of
Korea 59; MoU on Defence Industry Comprehensive Strategic Partnership
Co-operation in Shipbuilding 58; 56; sale of advanced military light
MoUs on Defence Cooperation 58; helicopters 58; training assistance for
Special Strategic Partnership 58 pilots and technicians 58
India and UAE cooperation 243 India and Vietnam Virtual Summit 56
India and US 23, 51–52, 80, 83, 86, 136, India-Australia-France trilateral 2
146, 156, 179, 215, 246: Basic India– Australia strategic defence
Exchange and Cooperation bilateral cooperation 51
Agreement (BECA) 6, 48, 51; India, Brazil and South Africa Dialogue
Communications, Compatibility, Forum (IBSA) 63, 194
Security Agreement (COMCASA) 51, India–Brazil cooperation in the strategic
146; defence industries 52; Exchange defence 59
of Research & Development India–Canada Ministerial Energy
information 52; Framework for Dialogue 185
278 Index
India, Japan and Australia 7, 31, 36, 94, strategic concept 101; Australia and
180, 231 Brazil in the 197; Brazil and India in
India–Japan–Australia led Supply Chain the 198; Brazil and Japan 195;
Resilience Initiative (SCRI) 47 Britain’s capabilities in the 128;
India–Japan–US MALABAR naval challenges in 38, 62; Chinese
exercises 69 behaviour in 31; Chinese challenge 30,
India– Japan–Vietnam 63 construct 6, 45, 62, 64, 103, 120, 203,
Indian Border Security Force 153 as inclusive and accessible 45,
Indian Coast Guard (ICG) 57 democracy-driven 62; cooperation in
Indian Defence Innovation Organisation the 31, 84, 103, 170, 249, 252;
52 definition of 94, 128; economics in 36;
Indian External Affairs ministry 61: emergence of 101; France’s
Cooperation among select countries engagements in the 164; France’s
of the Indo-Pacific in fighting strategic vision of 165; free and open
Covid-19 pandemic 61 31, 34, 100, 103, 132, 147, 170, 257;
Indian Navy 53, 168, 230, 232 freedom of navigation 32; free, open,
Indian Ocean 4–5, 9–10, 18–20, 32, 34, inclusive, healthy 45; importance of
46, 65, 67, 78, 80–81, 83, 94, 120, 126, the 130; infrastructure in 86;
128–30, 146, 154, 158–59, 165, initiatives 10, 46; institutional
168–69, 172, 177, 179, 180–81, 212, arrangement 78; Israel in the 159;
215, 220–21, 225–32, 235, 243, 246: maritime domain 61; minilateralism in
Chinese maritime presence in the 179; 1, 2; multipolar order in 46; narrative
maritime interests in 67; PLAN’s 4, 61, 172; open, inclusive, and
presence in 18; strategic ports in 34 prosperous 100; order 68, 95; policies
Indian Ocean earthquake and tsunami 5, 101; prosperity and stability of 64;
80 regional hegemony 31; rules-based
Indian Ocean island countries 225–32 order in the 49, 78, 83, 85; secure,
Indian Ocean littorals 46 open and prosperous 96; security
Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS) frameworks 45; stability of 2, 36, 64,
227 strategic, architecture 196,
Indian Ocean Region (IOR) 4, 65, 128, capacitation in the 200, outlooks 195,
168–69, 200 strategic uncertainty in the 80;
Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) Trump’s approach 30; UK’s
168, 227 involvement in the 125; US presence
Indian Ocean Zone of Peace 227 in 30, 47
Indian Police Service 153 Indo-Pacific axis 165
India–US General Security of Military Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM)
Information Agreement (GSOMIA) 100, 127, 166, 170, 231
52 Indo-Pacific region
Indo–Israeli nexus 155, 157 Indo-Pacific Regional Dialogue (IPRD)
Indonesia 3, 85, 96, 111, 113–15, 119, 62
142, 145, 168, 170, 178, 225, 236: Indo-Pacific strategy 9, 20–23, 31, 37,
foreign policy issues 113; Joko 97, 127, 136, 164–66, 170–73, 199,
Widodo administration 113 211, 214, 216, 218, 220, 243, 252:
Indo-Pacific 1–2, 4–7, 9–10, 17, 19–25, Trump Administration’s 37, 136
30–34, 36–39, 44–47, 49, 54, 61–65, Industry(ies) 51–52, 153, 250, 258:
68, 78–80, 83–89, 94–101, 103–04, defence 51–52, 56, 62, 153
111–15, 118–20, 124–33, 136–38, Information: exchange of 168; gathering
140–44, 146–47, 151, 154–60, 164–67, 172; military 51–52, 53, 59; sensitive
169–74, 177–88, 192, 195–200, 168; sharing 51, 85, 100, 103, 167–68
202–05, 211–12, 214–16, 218–21, 225, Information Fusion Centre for the
227, 230–32, 237, 243–45, 249, 252, Indian Ocean Region (IFC-IOR) 168
255, 257: American policy in 17, 25, Information Security Agreement (ISA)
31; as a priority theatre 30; as a 81
 Index 279
Information Sharing Agreement 102 Intelligence Fusion Center 170
Infrastructure 7, 10, 18, 22, 34, 39, Interests 3, 19, 30, 32, 34, 48, 54, 62, 64,
46–47, 61, 66, 80, 86, 89, 127–28, 131, 66, 99, 101, 120, 125, 127–28, 141,
140, 143–44, 147, 156, 166, 177, 151, 155, 158, 164–67, 178, 180, 183,
181–85, 187–88, 198, 200–201, 240, 188, 201, 212, 219, 221, 231, 243–45,
243, 245, 252–53, 255, 258: 247, 252, 254: agricultural 192;
cross-border 66; development 18, 22, Australian 96; balance of 142; British
39, 80, 253, 258; investment 22, 34, 130; converging 181; diverging 181;
177; physical 201; projects 66, 128, economic 99; foreign policy 48;
187, 201; strategic 198 French 164, 165, 173; geopolitical 99;
Infrastructure Transaction and Assistant national 3, 8, 30, 46–47, 78, 82, 98,
Network (ITAN) 47 117, 125, 147, 150, 188, 193–95, 216,
Initiatives 7, 10, 22, 25, 31, 36, 46–48, 235–36, 238–39, 241, 243, 246, 252;
65–66, 78, 81, 86, 112–13, 115, overlapping 125; political 151; security
117–20, 138–39, 143, 150, 164, 54; shared 95, 97, 100, 102, 187;
171–73, 180, 182, 186, 188, 193, 195, strategic 65, 89, 117, 128, 158, 200;
200, 204, 214, 221, 225, 232, 243–46, Western 143
251–52, 257: connectivity 66; Inter-Korean dialogue 137
implementation of 47; India-led 251; International: agendas 155; ambitions
minilateral 171; multilateral 143; 150; anarchy 94; community 86, 150,
regional 115, 118, 221, 244; soft sector 255–56, 258–59; complexities 61;
195; supply chain 243, 245–46; US-led conflict 178; connectivity 249;
171, 246 cooperation 36, 167, 235; courts 126;
Innocence of manner 126 development 182–84; governance 192;
Innocent passage 126: Innovation 38–39, influence 101; institutions 34, 37; laws
52, 152, 158, 196, 199: automated 196; 85, 95, 113, 126, 130, 167, 177, 180,
defence cooperation 52; edge 39; 214, 216, 218; norms 5, 166;
Europe’s 39; technologies 38 organisations 67, 99, 215; principles
INS Kesari 230 86; reactions 86; rules and norms 3,
Institute for Science and International 32, 69, 80–82; rules and obligations
Security (ISIS) 251 19; security 98; society 94, 103–04;
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies strategy 65; tribunal 33
(ISEAS) 112 International Court of Justice 228
Institutionalisation 9, 44, 80, 86–88, 180 International Monetary Fund (IMF)
Institutions 4, 34, 37–38, 61, 65–66, 81, 250, 253
83, 86–87, 104, 111–12, 114, 116–20, International North-South Transport
136, 140, 150, 184, 196–97, 205, 212, Corridor 252
218–21, 226–28, 230: ASEAN-related International order 3, 5, 19, 61, 69, 79,
114, 116–18; China-centred 65–66; 82, 84, 86, 88–89, 94, 138, 144, 147,
global 65; inclusive 212; minilateral 166, 178: challenges to 19; liberal 5,
83, 136; multilateral 38, 66, 83, 61; rules-based 19, 69, 79
119–20, 136, 140, 218; regional 65, 86, International Politics* 145
118–19, 181, 212, 220–21, 226–27; International Relations (IR) 227, 235–36
regional order-making 114; International Solar Alliance (ISA) 63,
US-centred 65 146, 168, 200, 204
Integrated Review 124, 130–31 International Tribunal for the Law of the
Intellectual property 32, 37, 140, 199: Sea 228
protection 199; stealing 140; theft 32, International waters 125, 167: safety of
37 167
Intelligence 34, 38, 51, 57, 103, 152, 156, Interoperability 36, 38, 184, 199, 217
168, 184, 186, 197, 212, 246: Interventionism 217
cooperation on 152; exchanges 103; Investments 7, 18, 21–22, 34, 38, 98,
geospatial 51; maritime 168; sharing 146–47, 156, 177, 185, 187, 196, 198,
145, 156 201, 203, 212, 237, 240–41, 243,
280 Index
257–58: capital 237; infrastructure 22, Jaishankar, S., Minister of External
34, 177; mop-up 201; overseas 18, 21 Affairs 51–54, 56, 62, 68, 154, 237:
Iran 10, 33, 141, 151–52, 154–57, 160, address to Israeli Ambassadors to the
185, 192, 213, 235, 237–42, 244, 246, Asia-Pacific 62
249–53, 255–60: denuclearisation of Jakarta International Defense Dialogue
33; economic and military growth 239; 182
financial sanctions imposed on 250; Jammu & Kashmir 153
foreign policy 154, 239; infrastructure Japan 1–2, 4–7, 9, 10, 17, 19–23, 31–36,
development in 258; national interests 44–48, 52–54, 63–65, 69, 78–89,
239; national security priorities 239; 94–97, 100, 103, 111, 115–16, 119,
nuclear facilities in Natanz 251; 128–30, 132–33, 136, 138–46, 150,
nuclear pprogramme 142; US drone 159–60, 164, 168–70, 173, 178–82,
strike on 251; US sanctions on 241, 184–87, 193, 195–97, 201–02, 211,
251 213–14, 216–17, 220–21, 225, 228,
Iran and Quad Plus 244 231–32, 235–36, 241, 243–44, 246,
Iran and US 192, 241, 250–51, 258: 249–50, 257–58: approach to the
diplomatic relations 258; standoff Quad Plus 79, 85; diplomatic
250 legitimacy for 85; domestic changes in
Iraq 128, 239, 250–52 6, 48; economic sanctions against 139;
Island countries 198, 226–28, 230 Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) 6,
Israel 2–3, 7, 10, 31, 36, 45, 47, 54–55, 45–46, 78– 89, 138, 143–44, 147,
62, 68, 85, 88, 95–96, 98, 101–03, 115, 180–82, 186–87, 257, 260;
150–60, 164, 169, 171, 194, 216–17, international activities 89; strategic
221, 225, 239–40, 242–44, 246, objective 79; tactical hedging 85–86,
249–51, 257: Asianisation strategy 88–89, value-oriented diplomacy 81
150; Chinese investment in 156; Japan and New Zealand 100
diplomacy 158, diplomatic, network Japan and Russia 213–14, 220,: political
150, recalibration 159, re-engagement ties 213; relations 214
159, sanctions on 101; domestic Japan and South Korea 119, 140, 225
national interests 150; economic Japan and UK 84, 87: cooperation 84;
impact in 157; foreign policy 150, 159; defence treaties 130
foreign policy priorities 151; Japan and US 2, 7, 19, 22, 47, 78, 80–81,
geostrategic proximity 156; Indian 83, 86, 97, 111, 201, 214, 249; alliance
diaspora in 151; interest in Asia 158, 80, 214; construct 201; ties 86
international, ambitions 150, status of Japan Brazil Partnership Programme
151; in the Indo-Pacific 159; National (JBPP) 195
Police Academy 153; periphery Japanese Coast Guard 139
doctrine 150; policy towards Asia 151; Japanese Self-Defense Forces 186
role of 155; soft power 151, strategic, Japan–India–Australia 22, 48
interests 158, problem for 62 Japan Institute of International Affairs
Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI) 55, 62 78
Israel Aerospace Institute 55 Japan’s FOIP 78–79, 83–84, 86–87, 89,
Israel and Afro-Asian countries 159 182: concept 86–87; objectives of 89
Israel and Asian countries Japan–UK Foreign and Defense
rapprochement 150 Ministerial Meeting 84
Israel and New Zealand relations 102 Japan–UK Joint Declaration on Security
Israel and Quad Plus 45 Cooperation 87
Israel and Quad Plus 2.0 157 Japan-US-Brazil Exchange (JUSBE)
Israel and Russia 216, 217 196, 202
Israel and US 150, 157, strategic alliance JBIC 196
150, strategic partnership 157 Jeanne d’Arc mission 167, 170, 172
Israel–China–US triangle 157 Jeong Kyeong-Doo, South Korea’s
Israeli Defense Force 151 Defence Minister 58
ISRO 199 Jerusalem 151, 154–59
 Index 281
Jerusalem and China 155, 157, 159 Korean War 102, 150: UN military
Jiang Yu, Chinese Foreign Ministry action in the 150
spokeswoman 18 Korea–US Integrated Defense Dialogues
JICA 196 (KIDD) 145
Jihadist groups 255 Kowari Exercise 139
Jindal Defence (India) 59 Kurdish separatism 242
Johnson, Boris 130–31 Kyrgyzstan 256
Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action
(JCPOA) 140, 241, 250–51, 257, 259 Labour 35, 37, 115: inexpensive 37
Joint exercises, training and HADR 52, Ladakh 37, 153
118, 139, 169–70, 177, 183, 188 Laos 113
Joint military exercise 83 La Pérouse exercises 83, 170
Joint naval drill 136 La Réunion and the Scattered Islands
Joint Statement of the 23rd 165
ASEAN-Japan Summit in Latin America 63, 192, 197, 201, 202
Cooperation on ASEAN Outlook on Latin America and Caribbean (LAC) 63
the Indo-Pacific 85 Lavrov, Sergey 211–12, 218: speech in
Joint Strategic Vision of India-France Vietnam 211
Cooperation in the Indian Ocean Leadership 6, 33, 44, 46, 54, 66, 67, 101,
Region 169 113, 115, 136–37, 139–41, 157, 212,
Jose Veiges Filho, Brazilian Defence 221, 232, 238–39, 243, 246, 253:
Minister 60 governance 66; Indian 101; national
Julian Felipe Reef 180 67; regional 113; shared 54; UAE’s
Jungle Warfare Training Division 129 238–39, 243; US 136, 140–41, 157
Jurisdictional claims 126 Lebanon 250
Justice and Development Party (JDP) Leftist Worker’s Party (PT) 194
241–42 Legitimacy 67, 85, 116, 150, 165:
diplomatic 85; domestic 116
Kadena Air Base 186 Liberalisation 203
Kalapani 61 Libya 239, 242
Kapoor, Pavan, India’s Ambassador to Life-saving drugs 199
Israel 152 Like-minded nations 4, 36, 64, 68
Karachi port, Pakistan 249, 254 Like-minded states 236
Kargil 152, 254 Likud 152
Kashgar 254 Line of Actual Control 153
Kashmir 153, 155, 254–55: Pakistan’s Ling Shengli 20
positions on 155, Iranian support for Link West policy 65
155 Liquified natural gas (LNG) 185
Keating, Lt. Gen. Tim, New Zealand’s Littoral Response Group from 2023
Chief of Defence Force 101: visit to 131
India 101 Littoral states 182
Keen Sword 186 Liu Aming 21, 23
Kenya 129 Liu Zongyi 24
Khaan Quest 139 Lockdowns 230
Khalilzad, Zalmay 256 Logistics Exchange Memorandum of
Khunjerab Pass 254 Agreement (LEMOA) 52, 168
Kim Jung-un 144 Lowy Institute’s Asian Power Indices
King, Ben, Foreign Affairs Deputy 178
Secretary 100 Luong Thanh Chuong, Vietnamese Vice
Kono, Taro, Japanese Foreign Minister Chairman 56
82 Luo Zhaohui, China’s Deputy Foreign
Korean Peninsula 20, 102, 137, 147, 183, Minister for Asian Affairs 17: Quad
216, 219 as an “anti-China front line 17; Quad
Korean problem 213 as “the ‘mini-NATO’” 17
282 Index
Macron, Emmanuel, President 165–69: surveillance capability 167; trading
visit to Australia 168 order 124
Madagascar 226–27, 230–31 Maritime common 113
Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Maritime communication lines 125
Employment Guarantee Act Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA)
(MNREGA) 193 53, 167–68, 170, 172, 183–84
Major Defence Partner (MDP) 48 Market 32, 81, 95, 99, 140, 151, 158,
Major powers 3, 20, 80, 236, 260: 200, 203–04, 242–43, 255–56: access
adjustment of relations 20 242; Asian 99; Chinese 32; economy
Make in India 48, 58, 62, 69 81; global 140; international 256;
Makran region 249, 258, 260 open 95; reforms 203; rules-based 95
Malabar 2017 19 Mark, Ron, then-Minister of Defence
Malabar 2020 20 100: visit to US 100
MALABAR naval exercises 18–19, 69, Master Information Exchange
231 Agreement (MIEA) 52
Malacca Strait Patrols 119 Master Plan on ASEAN Connectivity
Malay Peninsula 128 118
Malaysia 23–24, 63, 113, 119, 168, 170, Mattis, James, Defense Secretary 51
236: Defense White Paper 23; security Mauritius 226–31
and defence reliance 23 Maximum-pressure campaign 250, 253,
Maldives 225–26, 228–31: economy 259
230 Mayotte 226, 229–30
Maldives and Mauritius maritime McCain, John 32
boundary 228 McCarthy, John, High Commissioner for
Maldives and US 226, 231: defence Australia 51
engagement 231; defence framework Media 20, 31, 45, 86, 96, 151, 170, 171,
agreement 226 235, 243–45: Chinese 20; coverage 20
Manama Dialogue 130 Mediterranean Sea 129, 155–56, 158,
Manila meetings 18, 20 167, 245
Manufacturing 7, 37, 39, 54, 59, 69, 196, Med-Red railway 156
203–04, 243: Chinese 37; defence 54, Memorandums of Understanding
203; hub 69; semiconductor 39 (MoU) 55, 57–59, 98, 100, 145, 151
Mapai/Labor Party 152 Memorandums of Understanding
Mare Liberum 125, 126 (MoU) for Cooperation 59
Marginalisation 25, 63, 154–55, 218 Memorandums of Understanding
Maritime 4–5, 6, 21, 33–34, 39, 46–47, (MoU) for the Establishment of an
49–50, 53, 61, 63–64, 67, 69, 79–80, Enhanced Partnership 98
84, 86, 89, 97, 103, 113–14, 116–20, Memorandums of Understanding
124–29, 131–32, 136, 139, 144, (MoU) for the Establishment of
158–59, 164–72, 177–81, 183–86, 188, Collaborative Relationship to Combat
199, 201, 215, 220–21, 226–28, Transnational Crime and
230–31, 237–38: activities 21, 186; Development Mutual Cooperation 57
awareness 178; claims 33, 129, 180–81; Memorandums of Understanding
coercive influence 64; domain (MoU) on cooperation between Coast
awareness 39, 183, 188; economy 64; Guards 57
effort 64; free and open space 127–28; Memorandums of Understanding
global system 124–25; intelligence (MoU) on cyber security cooperation
168; law enforcement 89, 139; 98
monitoring and surveillance 186; Memorandums of Understanding
multipolar Asia 64; patrol 168; power (MoU) on Defence Cooperation
21, 144, 158; principle of access 125; 57–58
rights 33; Russian presence 221; Memorandums of Understanding
security 50, 69, 103, 113–14, 117–18, (MoU) on Defence Industry
120, 131, 136, 164–72, 227–28; Co-operation in Shipbuilding 58
 Index 283
Mexico 178, 194 Modi, Narendra, Indian Prime Minister
Mexico, Indonesia, South Korea, Turkey 23, 44, 48–50, 54, 56, 59, 63, 65, 67,
and Australia (MIKTA) 178 69, 103, 151–54, 199, 220, 252:
Middle Corridor 242 administration 69; China strategy 67;
Middle East 10, 33, 62, 127–30, 150, 154, clarion call for self-reliance 65;
156–57, 216–17, 221, 235, 237–38, government 199; Shangri-La dialogue
240, 242–46, 250–52, 258 speech 48, speech at the, Second
Middle East and Quad Plus 237 Raisina Dialogue 54, UN Sustainable
Middle East–North Africa (MENA) Development Summit 67; uncritical
154–55, 158 support for the Palestinian cause 154,
Migration 242 visit to, Israel 151, Ramallah 154
Militant Islam 153, 239 Mohan Kumar, G, Indian Defence
Militarisation 4–5, 66, 113, 183 Secretary 53
Militarised island bases 126 Monetary independence 65
Military 18, 23, 30, 32–38, 47–49, 51–53, Mongolia 145
55, 58–59, 63, 66–69, 80, 82–83, Moon Jae-in, President of South Korea
87–88, 96, 98, 112, 118, 126, 128–29, 137–38, 143–44, 147, 216:
131–32, 136, 138–39, 141–42, 146, administration 137–38, 143–44, 147,
150–53, 155–56, 158–59, 165–67, 171, foreign policy 143, foreign policy
178–79, 183, 186–87, 194, 199, 211, autonomy 144, New Northern Policy
214, 216–17, 220, 226, 228–30, 144
235–39, 241–43, 253–55, 257–58: Mori, Yoshio, Japanese Prime Minister
ascendance 35; assets 179; bases 81: visit to India 81
131, 229, 230; behaviour 34, capability Morrison, Scott, Australian Prime
37, 98, choices 98, gap 37; challenges Minister 2, 44, 49, 95, 100, 103
38; coalition 80; coercion 126; Mossad 101
consultations 67; cooperation 216; Motegi, Toshimitsu, Japanese Foreign
counterweight 136; dialogue 87; Minister 82, 127, 197
engagement 67, 69; escalation 23; MQ-9 Reaper unmanned aerial vehicles
foundational pact 48; growth 239; 229
hardware 48, 153, 237; information Multi-alignment approach 44
51–53, 59; interoperability 36; Multilateral anti-submarine warfare
intervention 139; modernisation 32; exercise 17
power 138; redressals 67; resources Multilateral commitments 61
179; shift 96; standoff 68; ties 47, 63, Multilateralism 3, 87, 119, 164, 166, 169,
141, 153 171–72, 174, 187, 212: nature of 119;
Military exercises 32, 58, 82–83, 88, 112, regional 87
118, 142, 220, 243: joint 58, 82–83, 88, Multi-national Planning and
142, 243 Augmentation Team Program 182
Minilateralism 1–2, 119, 174, rise of Multipolarity 20, 54, 124, 166, 169, 173
119 Muslim Brotherhood (MB) 239
Ministerial Quad meeting 65 Mutual: benefit 18; cooperation 198,
Ministry of Defence, India 56 259–60; effort 100; engagement 195,
Ministry of National Defence, Vietnam 199; interests 34, 64, 97; trust 18, 102,
56 259
Ministry of the Armed Forces (MAF) Mutual Logistics Support Agreement
165 (MLSA) 6, 48–49, 146
Ministry of the European and Foreign Mu Xiaoming 22
Affairs (MEFA) 165
Missile 55, 146, 179, 181, 240–42, National: initiatives 46, 47; interests 3, 8,
250–51, anti-ship 241, development 30, 46–47, 78, 82, 98, 117, 125, 147,
179 150, 188, 193–95, 216, 235–36,
Missile defence system 55, 146 238–39, 241, 243, 246, 252; leadership
Mistrust 24, 242, 250 67; power 69, 194; rejuvenation 139,
284 Index
security, calculus 47, legislation 101, 102; Free Trade Agreement 102;
risks 38, strengths 44 regional and multilateral cooperation
National Geospatial Intelligence Agency 102
(NGA) 51 New Zealand and US 100, 103:
Nations: allies and friendly 82; engagements 103
like-minded 4, 36, 64, 68 New Zealand and Vietnam 19, 62, 84,
Natural: allies 97, 198; disasters 98, 167, 95, 102, 143, 225: bilateral
169–70, 230, 245 relationship 102; closer defence
Naval: bases 129, 215–16, 221; cooperation 102; Strategic
cooperation 84; vessels 32 Partnership 102
Navigation 32, 34, 64, 80, 113, 131, 156, New Zealand-Australia-India 64
158, 165–66, 236, 249, 260 New Zealand Defence Force 102
Navy and Coast Guard ship visits 57 New Zealand–India 101: strategy for
Near East 159 investing in the relationship 101
NEC 202 Nguyen Dy Nien, Vietnamese Minister
Negotiations 193, 201, 215–16, 244, 257, of Foreign Affairs 58
259 Nguyen Tan Dung, Vietnamese PM 57
Neighbourhood 46, 48, 62, 150, 239: Nguyễn Xuân Phúc, Vietnamese Foreign
extended 62; Middle Eastern 150; Minister 24: visit to Australia 24
rival or non-friendly 46 Nguyen Xuan Phuc, Vietnamese PM 56
Neighbourhood first policy 62 Nine-dash line (9-dash line) 113, 126
Neighbourhood Policy 46 Ningthoujam, Alvite 153
Neighbouring countries 138–39, 144, Nixon, US Preident 34: steps toward
230, 250 rapprochement 34
Nepal 61, 66, 129 Non-aligned movement (NAM) 44,
Netanyahu, Benjamin, Prime Minister 180–81, 214
102, 151–52, 155–57: visit to India 151 Non-Arab Muslim states 150
Netherlands, the 127, 173, 195 Non-China friendly nations 65
New Agenda Coalition focused on Non-nuclear peace regime 137
nuclear disarmament 101 Non-proliferation 50
New Caledonia 83, 165, 167 Non-state actors 89
New Development Bank (NDB) 61, 66 North America 203–04: industrialised
New Southern Policy (NSP) 6, 62, 97, economies of 204
138, 144, 146–47 North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
New Zealand 2–3, 7, 19, 24–25, 31, 36, (NATO) 17, 69, 81–82, 136, 182–83,
45, 47, 54, 62–64, 68, 84–85, 88, 218, 220, 241
94–104, 111, 115, 132, 136, 143, 146, Northeast Asia 81, 140, 144–46, 179,
164, 168–70, 215–16, 221, 225, 249: 181, 214: US security strategy in 140
2018 National Security Strategy 64; Northeast Asia Peace and Cooperation
Advancing Pacific Partnerships Initiative (NAPCI) 145
Executive Report of 2019 100; Northeast Asia Plus Community of
economic and geopolitical interests Responsibility (NAPCOR) 145
99; foreign policy 99–100; interests Northern Europe 81
101; military capability choices 98; Northern Pacific 211
partners’ policies 100; position on Northern Sea Route (NSR) 126: North
Huawei 101; stance on nuclear Korea 33, 137, 141, 143–45, 179–80,
weapons 99; Strategic Defence Policy 184, 216; denuclearisation of 33;
Statement of 2018 100 nuclear capabilities 180; weapons of
New Zealand and Quad 94, 99–100: mass destruction 179
cautious engagement 99; relations North Korean threat 113
100 Nuclear: capabilities 180, 240;
New Zealand and Quad Plus 45 disarmament 101; proliferation 166,
New Zealand and South Korea 102: 192, crisis of 192; weapons 99, 180,
common interests and shared values development 180
 Index 285
Nuclear-powered submarine (SSN) 167 China’s support for 179; nuclear
Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) 192 capabilities 180
Nuclear-weapon-free zone 227 Pakistan and Turkey 247
Pakistan–Iranian corridor 159
Obama, Barack, US President 32–35, 46, Palestinian cause 154–55, 242
158, 179, 250: administration 33–34, Paracel Islands 63, 129: claimed by
179, 250; Pivot to Asia 158 Vietnam 63; maritime control of 63
OECD 194, 197 Paris climate agreement 30: United
Official Development Assistance (ODA) States withdrawal from the 30
127, 131–32, 184 Paris-Delhi-Australia axis 168
Offshore Patrol Vessels 131 Park Geun-hye, President of South Koea
Omni-aligned policy praxis 193 59, 143: administration 143
One Belt, One Road initiative 143, Parly, Florence, French Minister of the
245 Armed Forces 167
One China Policy 67 Parrikar, Manohar, Indian Defence
One-Sun One-World One-Grid Minister 57
(OSOWOG) 198, 200, 204 Partnerships 6, 33, 35, 46, 51, 55, 62, 64,
Onodera, Itsunori, Japanese Defence 67, 69, 89, 95–98, 100, 103, 111, 119,
Minister 53 131, 141–42, 151–59, 165, 168–71,
Openness 7, 44–45, 95, 212 173, 178, 180, 185, 195, 214, 216–17,
Order: geopolitical 65; global 6, 68–69, 219, 221, 225, 232, 243, 253: Australia
124, 152, 193, 218, 236; Indo-Pacific and India 96; Australia and Japan 96;
68, 95; institutional 3; international 3, bilateral 6, 119; China and Israel 156;
5, 19, 61, 69, 79, 82, 84, 86, 88–89, 94, China and Pakistan 253; cooperative
138, 144, 147, 166, 178; law-based 253; defence 96; developmental 67, 69;
166; liberal 3, 137–38, 140–41, 144; economic 219; India and Israel 154;
maritime trading 124; multipolar 46, political 103; strategic 96–98, 111,
166; post-Cold War 213; post-pan- 119, 152–53, 155, 157–58, 165,
demic 10, 46; regional 4, 6, 32, 45, 168–70, 173, 214, 216–17, 219, 221,
68–69, 94, 96, 114, 117, 138, 165, 239; 225, importance of 168
rules-based 3, 5, 31, 33, 34, 64, 78, 83, Peace and stability 2–3, 19, 33, 35–36,
85, 89, 113, 137, 141–42, 177, 180, 38, 63–64, 94, 96, 98–99, 102–03, 130,
186, 214, 218, US-led 137–38; security 137–38, 142, 147, 154, 185, 187, 193,
67, 112, 119, 139, parallel 139; US-led 195, 214–15, 239, 249, 255–57,
5, 61; world 5, 142, 166, 211, 213, 259–60: regional 19, 35, 130
217–19, 236 People’s Daily* 20
Organised criminal gangs 101 People’s Liberation Army (PLA) 18, 33,
Orta Koridor 242 139, 254: first overseas base in
Ottoman Empire 241 Djibouti 18; modernisation reforms
Overseas Citizens of India (OCI) 151 33
Overseas military base in Djibouti 18, People-to-people: links 100–102; ties 226
34, 254 Permanent Court of Arbitration 228
Persia 212
P5+1 244, 251 Persian Gulf 157, 159, 238–39, 246, 251
Pacific 183 Peters, Winston, then-Deputy Prime
Pacific and British Indian Ocean Minister 99–101: speech to, Indian
Territory 128 Council of World Affairs 101, Otago
Pacific Ocean 19, 64, 81, 83, 94, 120, Foreign Policy School 99; visit to
130, 212, 215, 235, 246 India 101
Pacific Step Up policy 46 Pham Binh Minh, Minister of Foreign
Pakistan 10, 23, 34, 46, 66, 152, 155, Affairs 56
159, 179–81, 240, 247, 249, 252–60: Pham Van Tra, Vietnamese Defence
China’s increasing influence 253; Minister 58
China’s sale of submarines to 23; Philippine Coast Guard 139
286 Index
Philippines, the 3, 63, 78, 113, 119, 259: Brazilian 194; Cold War 44;
138–39, 141, 145, 180, 236: economic domestic 113, 116; great power 120;
sanctions against 139 great-power 114, 118, 166
Phùng Quang Thanh, Vietnamese Pompeo, Michael R. 51
Minister for National Defence 57 Pompeo, Mike, US Secretary of State 21,
Piracy 18, 58, 83, 159, 172, 184, 221 36, 51–52, 94, 115, 127, 156, 171, 226,
Pivot to Asia 159, 212 250
PLA Air Force 33 Populism 119
PLA Navy (PLAN) 18 Port Sudan 215
Polarisation: regional 219 Post-Cold War era 80, 86
Policy(ies) 1, 4–6, 8, 10, 19–20, 23, Post-Cold War world 20
31–34, 37, 44–48, 50, 61–62, 64, 67, Post-COVID-19 world 96
69, 96, 98–101, 113, 119, 125, 132, Post-Galwan period 68–69
136–40, 143–44, 147, 150–52, 154, Power: Asian 54, 150, 157, 159; balance
156, 159–60, 164, 192–95, 202, of 18, 25, 31, 33, 87, 137; diffusion of
211–12, 214–15, 217, 220–21, 228, 54; distribution 67; economic 132,
238–41, 249, 255, 257, 260: American 138, 236; equality of 67; Eurasian 211;
17, 19, 25, 31, 217, 251; assertive 19; Euro-Atlantic 124; European 195,
autonomy 136–37, 143–44, 147; 241; external 54, 127; fluidity of 178;
balanced 211; Brazilian 192, 194, 202; global 99, 195, 236; global
changing outlook 45; Chinese 19, 46; distributions of 235; great 86, 114,
commercial 64; declaratory 79, 85; 115, 136–37, 140, 143–44, 167, 213;
defence 61, 69, 146; development 69, international 124; maritime 144;
238; developmental 61; economic 46, middle 10, 62, 97, 144, 146–47, 151,
69, 173, 211; foreign 1, 4, 6, 8, 10, 178, 183, 187, 195, 227; military 138;
19–20, 31–32, 44–48, 61–62, 64, 67, national 69, 194; political 242;
69, 99–100, 113, 119, 125, 136–40, positional 147; projection 138;
143–44, 147, 150–52, 154, 156, projections 117; regional 32, 99, 112,
159–60, 192–95, 202, 211, 214–15, 129, 160, 197, 218; regional
220, 238–39, 240–41, 249, 255, 260; distribution of 137; residential 79;
formulation 48, 194; implications and revisionist 137; rising 4, 211, 236; shift
recommendations 117; Indian 44, 20; soft 8, 146, 151; structure 45;
46–48, 64, 154; industrial 173; vacuum 21, 255–56; Western 159, 194,
interests 48; Iranian 154, 239; Israeli 217, 240
159; issues 113–14; multi-aligned Power-partner balance 61
strategy 61, 64–65; neighbourhood Power-partner parity 68
first 62; options 21, 119; political 64; Pradhan, Dharmendra, Minister of State
posturing 61; priorities 138, 143–44, for Petroleum and Natural Gas
151; processes 195; regional 23, 257; 185
Russian 214; security 61, 69, 202, 212; Pragmatism 67, 193
self-help approach to 240; shift Prazuck, admiral Christophe, Chief of
257–58; speeches 21; strategic Naval Staff 166–67
autonomy 68; Trump Administration’s Primakov, Yevgeny, Russian Prime
37 Minister 212
Political: affirmation 45; autonomy 86; Priorities 5, 45, 95, 111, 138, 151, 158,
behaviour 34; capital 182, 214; clout 160, 166, 231, 239, 249
46; coalition 85; cooperation 87; Prioritisation 125, 193
dialogue 87; economy 203; foreign Project Mausam 46
policy 64; interests 151; partnerships Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) 145
103; polarisation 194; power 242; Prosperity 36–38, 63–64, 96, 99, 103,
relations 214, 216; synergy 63; ties 63, 118, 130, 147, 177, 181, 192, 195–96,
213; will 88, 195 213, 249, 256
Politics 5, 44, 113–14, 116, 118, 120, 125, Putin, Vladimir 212, 214, 217, 219,
166, 194, 212, 216, 240, 242, 246, 252, 221
 Index 287
Qatar 194, 239, 242, 256 Quad grouping 1
Quad 1–10, 17–25, 30–32, 35–39, 44–49, Quad Leaders’ Summit (QLS) 1, 38, 103,
54–55, 61–69, 78–89, 94–101, 103–04, 177, 179, 181, 205
111–20, 124–28, 131, 133, 136, 138, Quad meetings 19, 65, 80–82, 111, 114,
141–43, 146–47, 150–51, 155, 157–58, 127
164–65, 168–74, 177–88, 192, 198, Quad member-states 19, 24, 79, 82–83,
201, 205, 211, 213, 215–21, 225–27, 85, 87–88, 220
229–32, 235–38, 243–47, 249–60: 2021 Quad ministerial meeting 24, 97
“virtual” ministerial meeting 24; Quad Plus 1–10, 17–19, 24–25, 30–31,
ability of 25; acceptance of 25; 35–39, 44–48, 54–55, 61–69, 78–79,
activities 17, 20, 24–25, 177–78, 180; 82–89, 94–96, 98–99, 101, 103–04,
alliance 21, 22; as a US-led effort 111–12, 114–17, 120, 124–25, 127,
against China 245; as an “anti-China” 133, 136, 138, 141, 143, 146–47,
coalition 113; as an anti-Chinese 150–51, 155, 157–58, 164–65, 168–69,
format 219; as an institution 178; 171–74, 177–82, 184, 187–88, 192,
assertive arrangement 18; Britain’s 205, 211, 213, 215, 217, 220–21,
role in 125; British membership of the 225–27, 229–32, 235–38, 243–47,
131; Chinese criticisms 25; concept of 249–60: activities 25, 188; and India’s
24; consultations 97, 230; cooperation strategic autonomy 64; arrangement
18, 25, 83; creation of 6, 84; 24, 111–12, 114–16, 120, 178, 182,
development of 22, 31, 45, 79, 84–85, 247; Canadian inclusion 177;
87; diplomatic protests to 18; capabilities-led approach to 177–78,
economic cooperation 22; economic 182; characteristics of 85; China–US
dimensions 22; efforts 85, 143; efforts competition 155; Chinese writings on
to institutionalise 24; evolution and 25; conception of 31; concept of 10,
resurgence 20; exclusiveness 25; 89, 225–27, 229; configurations 38;
expanding the 97, 112, 116, 226, conjectural alliance 46; consultation
implications of 112, policy 54; cooperation 24, 83, 88, 187, 259;
implications of 112; expansion of 8, coordination 31; cycle 61; definition
10, 24, 65, 98, 103, 116, 177; flexibility of 79, 82; engagement 63;
111; formulation of the 81, 181; enhancements 68; expansion 24;
growing synergy on security issues 69; format and functionality of the 83,
India’s commitment to 23; initiatives 85–86; formation of 171; formulation
47; institutionalisation of 86–88, 180; 177, 181, 184, 187–88; framework 2,
joint statement 45; mechanism, 45, 54, 62, 64, 66; functional
utilisation of 36; military exercises cooperation on the 85; future of 88,
112; objectives of the 83, 87, 89; 227; idea of 83, 86; implications for
outreach efforts 25; realisation of 86; 179; implications of 112;
re-emergence of 19–20; resurgence infrastructure cooperation 252;
20–21; revival in 2017 19; security initiatives 25; institutional format of
initiatives 112; security ties 21; 78; institutionalisation of 86–88;
South-east Asian views 112, 178; institutional principles of 85; in the
statements 45; strategic cooperation Middle East 243; Japan’s approach 79,
146; threat to ASEAN 25 82, 84–85; Mechanism, for pandemic
Quad 1.0, failure of 142 response 38, Trump era 38; meetings
Quad and South-east Asia 180 96, 98; membership to 127; narrative
Quad and South Korea 45 47, 54, 61; objectives of the 87; policy
Quad and UK 125 implications for 257; Russia’s attitude
Quad and Vietnam 45 to the 211; strategic objectives of 83;
Quad countries 9–10, 18–19, 21–23, 36, structure 61; Trump’s rationale for 35;
44–45, 47, 49, 62, 68, 141, 146, 231 utility of 38; video conference 24
Quad dialogue, elevation of 2, 44 Quad plus 1 17
Quad exercises 177 Quad Plus and Russia 213, 215: relations
Quad Foreign Ministers’ meeting 45 213
288 Index
Quad Plus and Turkey 245 new construct 96; order 4, 6, 32, 45,
Quad Plus and UAE 243 68–69, 94, 96, 114, 117, 138, 165, 239;
Quad Plus arrangements 18, 25 paradigm 54; partners 100, 171, 213;
Quad Plus formula 78, 89 peace and stability 19, 35, 99, 130,
Quad plus France exercise 38 137, 147; polarisation 219; policies 23,
Quad Plus–Middle East nexus 245 257; power 99; powers 32, 112, 129,
Quadrilateral Defense Coordination 160, 197, 218; proposition 54,
Group 169 ASEAN-led 111–12; restructuring
Quadrilateral drills 170 138; security 2–4, 54, 85, 96, 111–12,
Quadrilateral grouping 66 115–17, 120, 131, 138, 141, 196, 213,
Quadrilateral Security Dialogue 1, 44, 220; stability 19, 35, 99, 137, 147;
94, 111, 124, 177, 235: expansion of stability and prosperity 99; states 78,
the 111 80, 82, 84–85, 88, 116, 128, 142, 211,
Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad 220–21; strategy 143–44; synergy 46,
2.0) 1– 6, 8–10, 44–47, 63–66, 68–69, 54; threats 240; trade and investment
94, 111–12, 124, 177, 235: conjectural 212; visions 65, 218
alliance of 47; elevation and Regional Comprehensive Economic
expansion 1; expansion of 8, 10, 65; Partnership (RCEP) 118
India’s proactive stance towards the Regional countries 141, 143
44, 69; mechanism 44; national Regionalism 86
initiatives by 46 Relations: Australia and Brazil 98;
Quadrilateral Strategic Dialogue 78 Australia and Israel 98; Australia and
Quad Summit 114, 116–17, 173, 198, 201 Japan 96; Australia and Russia 215;
Quad synergy building 45 bilateral 9, 67, 81, 98–99, 102, 144,
151, 153–54, 160, 165, 174, 184, 214,
Railway project 250 216, 220; China and India 23, 61, 67,
Raisina Dialogue 54, 166 69; China and Israel 33, 155, stability
Rapprochement 23, 34, 102, 150–52, in 33; China and Pakistan 253; China
159, 165, 172, 215; China and India and Russia 33, 213, 217, impact on
23 33, in the aftermath of the
Ratner, Ely 34 coronavirus pandemic 36; China and
Raw materials 192, 195, 197 US 20, 33, cooperation and stability
Recession 179 33; defence 100, 102; diplomatic 102,
Reciprocity, lack of 67 152, 155, 159, 251, 256, 258; economic
Red Sea 156, 158, 159 18, 22, 57, 81, 97, 216, 253; external
Regional: agenda 24, 87, 114, 115, 155, 114; global 150; India and Israel
ASEAN-led 24, rules-based 87; 151–53, 155, 158–59, 157; India and
architecture 23–24, 87, 114, 120, MENA 155; India and US 23;
143–44, 218; balance of power 87; inter-Korean 137; Japan and New
bilateral cooperation 48; challenges Zealand 100; Japan and Russia 214;
31, 36; concerns 139; conflicts 128, New Zealand and Quad 100; Quad
139, 219, 240; cooperation 85, 102, Plus and Russia 213; Russia and US
154, 166; countries 117–19, 137, 139, 211, 213, 217; Russia and Vietnam
142, 144; decision-making process 65; 216; security 34, 97, 100, 136, 140;
distribution of power 137; strategic 57, 97, 101, 153; trade 22, 99,
empowerment 147; flux 47; 150
framework 6, 54; governance 101; Republic of Korea (ROK) 59, 94–98,
groupings 118; hegemony 31; identity 102–03, 144, 147, 197, 216: New
128; initiatives 115, 118, 221, 244; Southern Policy 97
institution 181, 227; institutions 65, Resilience 1, 22, 96, 170, 185, 187
86, 118–19, 212, 220–21, 226–27; Resources 4, 47, 65–66, 98, 114–15,
integration 166; leadership 113; 118–20, 125, 132, 166–67, 178–79,
multilateralism 32, 45, 87, inclusive 183, 185, 192, 196–98, 202, 215–16,
45, multi-polar 32, 45, rules-based 45; 245, 252, 255–56, 258: accession 66;
 Index 289
agricultural 255; defence 178; Russia–Japan strategic, political, and
depletion of 167; energy 125, 185; security dialogues 214
fiscal 196; management 198; marine Russian Far East 220
166–67; military 179; natural 4, 192,
197, 252, 256 S-400 missile system 242
Responsibility to protect (R2P) 193 Sagarmala 46
Responsibility while protecting (RwP) Sajjan, Harjit, Canada’s Defence
193 Minister 186: visit to Japan 186
Retrenchment and realignment 140, salami-slicing tactics 32
150 Saudi Arabia 194, 237, 239, 250
Réunion 165, 168, 226, 228–30 Scarborough Reef 139
Review of the Australia–New Zealand Scarborough Shoal 33
Defence Relationship 98 Scholarship-in-erudition programme 204
Revisionism 137–38, 141–44 Science and technology 49, 98, 102, 151
Rice, Condoleezza 31 Sea Dragon 213 exercises 177
Rim of the Pacific Exercise (RIMPAC) Sea Dragon 2021 ASW exercise 17, 24
142, 183 Sea lines of communication (SLOC) 165,
Risks 32, 37, 38, 119, 165, 166–67, 173, 167, 169, 180–81, 185, 187, 204:
198: diversification 1; kinds of 167; SCS-based 185
trans-national 166 Security and defence 1–7, 9–10, 17–19,
Rivalry 6, 10, 36, 79, 89, 101, 120, 137, 21–23, 25, 30–31, 34–36, 38, 44–64,
142–44, 147, 165, 171, 174, 236: great 67–69, 79–81, 83–87, 89, 94, 96–103,
power 10, 120, 137, 143–44, 147; 111–20, 124–26, 128–33, 136–47,
China and US 6, 36, 79, 89, 101, 142, 150–54, 156–59, 164–73, 177–84,
143, 165, 174 186–88, 195–96, 198–99, 202–03,
Rouhani, Iranian President 258: visit to 211–14, 216–21, 226–28, 230–32,
258 235–46, 249, 251–53, 255–56, 260:
Royal Canadian Airforce 24 affairs 139, agreements 81,
Royal Canadian Navy 186 inter-linked 54, multilateral 143;
Royal Navy 125, 128–32 alliance 62; architecture 22, 35, 54, 96,
Royal New Zealand Navy 102 99, 111–12, 115–16, 120, 136–37,
Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) 140–45, 147, 158–59, 182, 213, 220;
125 Asian 54, 124; bilateral partnership in
Rudd, Kevin, Australian PM 50, 95 55; budgets 178, 179; burdens 237–38,
Rule of law 7, 49, 80, 173 240–43, 245; challenges 25, 115, 117,
Rules and norms 3, 32, 69, 80–82, 97, 119–20, 153, 188; collaborations 54;
130: contested 66; international 3, 5, collective 25, 213, 220, commitment
32, 69, 80–82, 166; multilateral 146 83–84, 184, non-controversial 84,
Russia 10, 112, 124–26, 142–43, 145, non-traditional 84, 184; concerns 4,
153, 211–21, 240–42, 249, 255, 258, 36, 64, 196, 219, 246, 253;
260: attitude to the Quad Plus 211; consultation and engagement on 98,
challenges for 214; claims in Arctic 211; cooperation 3, 6, 22, 48, 51,
126; foreign and economic policy 211; 53–54, 56, 58, 60, 68, 80–81, 84,
foreign and security policy 212; 96–98, 100–103, 124, 131, 141, 153,
foreign policy 214; interest in the 168–69, 184, 216–17; cooperative 79,
Indo-Pacific 212; policy in the Pacific 85; differences 67; global 54, 124, 195;
and Indian Oceans 212; policy hub 129; Indian 68; industries 51, 52,
towards the Asia-Pacific 215; pressure 56, 62, 153; informal cooperative 79;
on 213; regional standing 218 innovation cooperation 52; interest
Russia and South Korea relations 216 54, inter-linked 54, 80, 83, 85, 147,
Russia and US relations 211, 213, 217, non-traditional 80, 83, 85, 147;
220 international 98, issues 69, 80, 83, 85,
Russia and Vietnam relations 216 97, 98, 147, complementarities in 54,
Russia and West relations 212, 217 US–Japan–India–Australia 22;
290 Index
manufacturing 54, 203; maritime 50, Singapore 3, 18–19, 24, 33, 82–83,
69, 103, 113–14, 117–18, 120, 131, 112–13, 119, 128–29, 142, 145,
136, 164–, 227–28; mechanism 22, 167–68, 170, 201, 236, 254: US
235; national 5, 38, 44, 47–48, 98, 101, military presence in 33
142, 198, 238–39; new concept 18; Singapore Navy 18
non-traditional 83–85, 89, 147, 153, Singh, Manmohan, Indian Prime
184, 188, 220–21; order 67, 112, 119, Minister 50, 57, 60
139; parallel order 139; partnerships Singh, Rajnath, Indian Minister of
96; policies 61, 69, 146, 202, 212; Defence 51–52, 58
procurement 48; regional 2–4, 54, 85, Singh, Sanjay 152
96, 111–12, 115–17, 120, 131, 138, Sinha, Yashwant, Indian EAM 58
141, 196, 213, 220,; relations 34, 97, Sitharaman, Nirmala, Indian Defence
100, 102, 136, 140, national 38; Minister 51, 53
reliance 23; resources 178; risks 38; Soccer World Cup 198
strategic 6, 48, 51, 59, collaborations Socialism 212
48, ties 6, 48; synergy 62; systems 55, Solar-energy 204
62; territorial 69; threats 5, 114, 139, Solar power 198, 204
153, 221, networked 35, 136–37, Somalia 159, 239
140–45, 147, shared 139, traditional South Asia 153, 155–56, 158, 179, 181,
153, 221, US-led 54; ties 21, 47, 54, 187, 226, 229–30, 252, 255, 258, 260
68, 98, 158, 216, Vietnam and India South Asian Association for Regional
54; trade 62 Cooperation (SAARC) 226
Security and Growth for All (SAGAR) South Asian states 159, 187
46, 65 South China Sea (SCS) 5, 18, 20, 33–35,
Security information sharing agreement 54, 58, 61, 63–64, 67, 84–85, 100, 113,
100 116, 125–26, 129, 132, 139, 141, 167,
Self-defence 79, 85 172–73, 178–81, 184–85, 216–17, 231,
Self-Defense Forces of Japan 52 236, 249, 257: arbitration tribunals 84;
Self-reliance 65, 255, 258 China’s maritime claims in the 33;
Senkaku Islands 2 Chinese sovereignty claims in the 63;
Separatism 242 claimants in the 141; dispute 216;
Serum Institute of India 200 interference in 20; joint campaigns on
Seychelles 226, 228–31: economy 230 anti-piracy in 58; maritime rights in
Shalom, Silvan, then-Foreign Minister 33; militarising islands in 34; oil
102 exploration activities in 54; sea claims
Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences in 61
(SASS) 21, 23 South-east Asia 7, 23–24, 33, 86, 96,
Shanghai Cooperation Organisation 111–14, 116–20, 128–29, 146, 166,
(SCO) 61, 139 170, 172, 178, 180–85, 187, 216,
Shanghai Institute for International 236–37, 240, 249: regional architecture
Strategic Studies (SIISS) 21, 24 in 23
Shanghai International Port Group South-east Asian states 111–12, 114,
156 116–18, 120, 180–85, 236
Shangri-La Dialogue 48, 167, 182 Southern Lands 197
Shapir, Yiftah 155 South Korea 2–8, 10, 17, 19, 24–25, 36,
Shared challenges 2, 9, 177 39, 45, 47, 54, 58–59, 61–62, 68,
Shared Vision for Maritime Cooperation 84–85, 88, 97–98, 102–03, 111,
in the Indo-Pacific 49, 97 115–16, 119–20, 136–40, 142–47, 160,
Sharif, Nawaz, Pakistani Prime Minister 164, 178, 182, 187, 202, 216, 221, 225,
253 244, 249–50, 258: challenge to 146;
Shipping lines of conveyance 204 China’s economic sanctions to 146;
Shringla, Harsh Vardhan, the Foreign foreign policy 137, 143, foreign policy
Secretary of India 127 priority 143–44, on North Korea 144;
Significant network security risk 101 middle power diplomacy 144; New
 Index 291
Southern Policy 6, 62, 97, 138, 144, depth 254–55; dialogues 102; dilemma
146, 147; regional strategy 143; role in 138, 156; environment 44, 64, 79, 115,
Quad activities 17; strategic dilemma 124, 147; framework 65, 117; goals 88,
for 138 244; hindrance 66; importance 54,
South Korea and US 144, 147, 216: 158; inevitability 119; infrastructure
alliance 144, 147, 216; bilateral 198; intent 45, 54; interests 65, 89,
relationship 144 117, 128, 158, 200; leverage 143;
South Korea and Vietnam 97, 98, 103 linkages 87; manoeuvre 78;
South Korea Defense Dialogue 145, 182 motivation 137; narrative 86; national
South Pacific 130, 169–70, 198, 200, 215, prioritization 201; natural
244 commodities 192, 198; necessity 48,
South-South Cooperation (SSC) 197–98 67; objectives 83, 195; option 251;
Sovereignty 7, 19, 34, 36, 46, 63–64, outcomes 118; outlook 97; outreach
67–68, 95, 99, 101, 131, 138, 167, 193, 47, 65, 253; partners 62, 96, 118, 136,
217, 226–28, 245: disputes 138; 211, 215, 220; partnership 6, 48–49,
territorial 46, 67 56–60, 62, 96–98, 102–03, 111, 119,
Soviet Union 44, 63, 80, 124, 128, 150, 136, 152–53, 155, 157–58, 165,
212, 214, 216, 241: collapse of the 150; 168–70, 173, 214, 216–17, 219, 221,
threats 80 225, 239, 241, importance of 168;
Space and nano-technology 54 posture 84; priority 87; problem 62;
Spirit of the Quad 1, 45, 104, 177 pull 84; reengagement 158; relations
Sputnik V 259 57, 97, 101, 153; reorientation 125;
Sri Lanka 3, 34, 225–30, 236 requirements 129; shift 96; synergy
State actors 89 116; targets 159; ties 80, 86, 150, 155;
Statecraft 140, 194 traction 45; uncertainty 80, 86;
State-owned enterprises 32, 217 viability 118; vision 87, 120, 165, 168,
States: democratic 81–82, 84; 254; Strategic Partnership to a
like-minded 5, 7, 9, 69, 79, 99, 237, Comprehensive Strategic Partnership
243; likeminded 88; non-Quad 87, 97
244; non-regional 78, 82, 88, 128 Strategy(ies) 3–4, 6, 9, 20–23, 31, 33–34,
Status of Forces Agreements (SOFA) 37, 44–45, 47–48, 64–69, 78–82,
228, 231 85–88, 94, 96–97, 101, 103, 118, 127,
Stockholm International Peace Research 136, 138, 140, 142–44, 147, 150,
Institute 153 155–57, 160, 164–66, 170–73, 195,
Strait of Hormuz 156, 167, 172, 238, 199, 204, 211, 214, 216, 218, 220, 231,
249, 252 237, 243, 252, 255, 257: alignment 44,
Strait of Malacca 119, 167, 240, 254, 45, 68; Asianisation 150; “charm
257 offensive” 66; containment 64;
Strategic: activity 130; advantages 146; geopolitical 143; grey-zone 64;
alignment 5, 47, 152; alliance 150; hedging 37; individual 94;
alternatives 114; ambiguity 85; ambits Indo-Pacific 9, 20–23, 31, 37, 97, 127,
1, 10; assets 83; autonomy 23, 64–65, 136, 164–66, 170–73, 199, 211, 214,
68–69, 116, 118, 120, 165, 171–74, 216, 218, 220, 243, 252; international
182, 185, 187, 196, 200, 219; 65; multi-aligned policy 64;
behaviour 138; bilateral partners 62; multi-alignment 68; multi-dimensional
capacitation 200, 201, choices 4, 194, 150; multilateral 94; non-aligned 44;
238, defence 48; circles 6, 62; non-alignment 44; pointed alignment
collaborations 48; commitment 118, 44–45, 48, 68; regional 143–44;
141; commodities 198; community 35; security-development 195; shift 79,
competition 30–31, 103, 111–12, 115, 85–86
119, 157, 182, 217, 219; concerns 82, Submarine patrols 18
86; connections 6, 48, 83; cooperation Submarines 23, 168–69, 183
79, 146, 196, 232; cooperative Suez Canal 156, 158
partnership 253; defence 6, 48, 51, 59; Suez Crisis 150
292 Index
Suga, Yoshihide, Prime Minister of Tensions 2, 5–6, 8, 20, 23, 35, 37, 44, 48,
Japan 2, 44, 45, 82, 85, 103: trip to 80, 153, 159, 166, 211, 216, 241,
Indonesia 85; trip to Vietnam 85 245–46, 251, 256, 258: bilateral 35;
Sullivan, Jake, President Biden’s China and India 20; China and the
National Security Advisor 17, 25, 35, Quad nations 44; diplomatic 80; India
136, 181 and China 48; trade 37
Superpowers 44, 69, 152, 244 Terminal High Altitude Area Defense
Supply chain 1, 5, 7–8, 22, 37–38, 66, 69, (THAAD) 8, 137, 139, 146:
140, 158, 171, 173, 180–82, 184–85, deployment dispute 139
187–88, 203, 235, 243–46: global 7, Territorial: disputes 119, 214, 217, 240;
180, 184–85, 187; initiatives 243, integrity and sovereignty 19, 34, 46,
245–46; localised 203; medical 182; 66–67, 241; security 69; waters 126
network 203; resilience initiative 22; Terrorism 32, 50–51, 80, 114, 119, 142,
resilient 38; stable 66; systems 66 159, 166, 250, 253, 257: global 250;
Supply Chain Resilience Initiative war on 142
(SCRI) 7, 47–48, 65–66, 146, Thailand 113, 119, 141, 225
173: Surveillance 153, 156, 167, That UAVs 55
186: capability 167; frigates The South China Sea: Why it Matters to
167 Global Britain 125
Sustainable development 98, 127, 167, Threats 5, 22, 25, 30, 32–35, 69, 80, 87,
169, 198, 200, 204–05 94, 113–14, 117, 124–26, 138–39,
Swaraj, Sushma, Indian Defence 141–43, 153, 167, 177, 215, 221, 225,
Minister 51 228, 232, 236, 238–42, 250–51, 253,
Sweden 202 258: balance of 142; maritime security
Syria 242, 250 114; perception 142, 143; perceptions
Syrian crisis 242 117, 232; regional 240; security 5, 114,
Syrian War 143 139, 153, 221, traditional 153, 221;
seriousness of 30; Soviet 80; three-fold
Taiwan 3, 20, 32, 39, 61, 63, 67, 101, 138
138, 141, 178, 235–36, 250: China Tibet 67
threat to 32 Ties 2, 5–6, 8, 21, 44–48, 54, 62–64,
Tajikistan 255–56: Taliban 255–57: 67–68, 79–81, 86–88, 95, 97–98, 100,
political rise 255 102, 113, 120, 136, 141, 146, 150–58,
Taro--Ko-no, Japanese Foreign Minister 170, 185, 194–95, 199, 204, 211,
21 213–14, 216, 225–26, 229–31, 239,
Taurus Armas S.A. (Brazil) 59, 128 246: Arab and Israel 47, 155,
Taxation 196, 203 concretisation of 47; Australia and
Technologies Ten (T10) 203 India 6, 48; Australia and Japan 80;
Technology(ies) 1, 7, 31–33, 35, 38–39, bilateral 87; Brazil and India 63;
45, 49, 53–54, 82, 98, 102, 114, 138, China and India 45, 63, 67–68;
140, 151–53, 158, 170, 173, 177, commercial 194; defence 54;
184–85, 195, 197–98, 200–202, 213, diplomatic 102, 141, 151–52, 155;
240, 243, 253: access 202; American economic 5, 47, 63, 68, 88, 95, 146,
213; application of 197; critical and 150, 158; India and Central Asian
emerging 38, 45, 49, 82, 177, 200–202; nations 46; India and Israel 62, 154;
dependent on China 39; digital 202; India and Japan 80, 81; India and
domestic 202; governance 1; Quad nations 62; India and Russia
innovation in 38; Israeli security 153; 213–14; India and Vietnam 54; Japan
nano- 54; new 1, 7; surveillance 153; and Russia 213; military 47, 63, 141,
transfer of 152, 185, 195; transfers 153; multilateral 87; people-to-people
152, 185, 195; underwater 226; political 63, 213; security 21, 47,
minesweeping 170 68, 98, 158, 216; stereotypical 195;
Tech supply chains 1 strategic 6, 48, 80, 86, 150, 155
Temer, Michel 194 Tigray and the Nile dam issue 159
 Index 293
Tillerson, Rex, former Secretary of State violator 36, China as a strategic
36 competitor 34, 82, failure of 116,
Tokyo Defense Forum 182 Indo-Pacific strategy 37, 136, Interim
Tokyo Foundation 78 National Security Strategic Guidance
Tourism 8, 100, 228–30, 250, 258 30, maximum-pressure campaign 250,
Track 1.5 dialogue 3, 169 National Security Strategy in
Track-1 dialogue 86 December 2017 34, policies 37,
Track-2 dialogue 78 treatment of the Indo-Pacific 30:
Trade 5–8, 22, 31–33, 35, 37, 62–63, 65, China policy 30: confrontational
67, 98–99, 100, 102, 111–12, 116, 118, approach 35: Indo-Pacific approach
125, 131, 137, 143, 150–52, 155–56, 30: rationale for Quad Plus 35: US
164–65, 182, 185, 187, 192, 194–95, foreign policy under 140
197, 201, 212–13, 216–17, 220, 230, Trust 18, 69, 95–96, 102, 202, 216, 259
240, 250, 252–53, 257: agricultural Tsunami Core Group 225, 228, 230–31
197; barriers to 65; bilateral 63, 131, Tsunami in December 2004 32
152, 155; British 125,; China and US Turkey 155, 178, 192, 235, 237–43,
33, 35, 37, 116, 143, defence 62, 245–47, 250, 255: interests in Central
tensions 37, war 35, 116, 143; deficit Asia 242; isolation 242; JDP
33, 67, 253; relations 22, 99, 150; government 242; military presence in
routes 125, 257 239; security burdens 241–42;
Trade-disputes redressal mechanisms 192 territorial integrity 241; threat to
Trade-offs 111–12 241–42
Trading 8, 22, 63–64, 99, 124, 146, 178, Turkic Uighur 242
180, 193, 236, 256: arrangements 193; Turkmenistan 255
partners 146 Turkmenistan–Uzbekistan–Tajikistan–
Trafficking 159, 184 Afghanistan–Pakistan power
Training 52, 57–58, 102, 118, 153, 170, interconnecting project 255
183–84: anti-insurgency 58; joint Twining, Daniel 32
exercises 184 Typhoon Hainan 129
Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) 102,
128, 131, 140 UK and US security alliance 62
Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic UK–Asian security cooperation 124
Partnership (TPP): US withdrawal Ukrainian crisis 215
from 140 Ulchi-Freedom Guardian Exercise
Transparency 22, 32, 35–36, 95, 157, 201 183
Transportation 198, 201, 240 Uncertainty(ies) 2–3, 6, 65, 80, 86, 124,
Treaty of Pelindaba 227 225, 236, 259: strategic 80, 86
Trilateral: cooperation 62, 81, 88, 96, Unilateralism 66, 137
196; dialogues 169; grouping 83 United Arab Emirates (UAE) 129, 154,
Trilateral Coordination and Oversight 235, 237–39, 243–44, 246, 250:
Group (TCOG) 145 geographic position 238; reliance on
Trilateral Strategic Dialogue (TSD) 80 the United States 239; security of 238;
Tropic Twilight 139 weapons acquisition programmes 238
Trudeau, Justin 185 United Kingdom (UK) 10, 38–39, 48,
Trump, Donald, US President 19, 21, 22, 61, 79, 83–84, 87, 124–25, 127–33,
25, 30–31, 33–38, 46, 61, 80, 82, 86, 150, 195, 201, 203, 226–29, 231–32:
111, 115–16, 136–37, 140, 144, 146, capabilities 125; Democratic 10 48;
156–58, 166, 170–71, 179, 214, 241, “Democratic 10” framework 48;
246, 249–51, 253, 258–60: foreign policy 125; involvement in the
administration 19, 22, 25, 30–31, Indo-Pacific 125; national interests
33–37, 46, 82, 86, 115, 136–37, 140, 125; Official Development Assistance
144, 146, 156–57, 166, 170–71, 179, 127; strategic activity 130
246, 253, 258–59, 2017 National United Nations (UN) 63, 67, 80–81, 85,
Security Strategy 19, China as a norm 102, 126, 141, 150, 167–68, 180, 186,
294 Index
192–93, 214, 216, 218, 226, 228, 251: attention to Indo-Pacific 30; China as
reforms 192 a “strategic competitor” 31; China as
United Nations (UN) Charter 81, 214 one of “revisionist states” 82; China
United Nations (UN) Climate Change policy 30–31; Chinese threats to 34;
Conference (COP 21) 168, 204 competitive advantage 34; concerns
United Nations (UN) Command about Chinese adventurism 34; decline
Military Armistice Commission 102 of 86, 138; defence equipment 243;
United Nations (UN) Convention on the domestic politics 116; economic
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) 85, 113, interdependence 140; FOIP strategy
126, 216: Article 234 of 126; tribunal 144, 147; Indo-Pacific policy 21;
ruling 113 Indo-Pacific strategy 21, 146, 179,
United Nations (UN) Development 216; interests 35, 141; military
Programme (UNDP) 193 presence in Australia 33; military
United Nations (UN) Framework presence in Singapore 33; naval vessels
Convention on Climate Change 228 32; perception of China 31; perception
United Nations (UN) General Assembly of decline 137; policy 17, 19, 25, 31,
228 217, 251; policy in Indo-Pacific 17, 25,
United Nations (UN) peacekeeping 31, 136; policy of engaging China 34;
operations 103 policy toward China 34; policy toward
United Nations (UN) Security Council Iran 250; policy toward Pakistan 253;
(UNSC) 67, 102, 180–81, 186: India’s post-coronavirus recovery 141;
structural vision to reform the 67; presence in Indo-Pacific 30, 47;
Resolution 2334 102 presidential elections, 2008 campaign
United Nations (UN) Stabilisation for the 32; regional partners 213;
Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) 193 relations with partners and allies 25;
United States, India, Japan and relative decline of 86; security
Australia 31, 231 architecture 99; security strategy in
United States Indo-Pacific Command Northeast Asia 140; South-east Asian
127 views of the 114; strategic
United States, Japan and India 34 commitment in East Asia 141;
United States Pacific Command Chiefs strategic interests 158; strategic
of Defense Conference 182 outreach to Asia 47; suspended its
Universalism 66 ANZUS Treaty obligations 99;
Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) 55, 62, technical advantage 33; Trump-era
229 decisions 30; withdrawal from Paris
Uranium 193, 251 climate agreement 30; withdrawal
US 1–3, 5–10, 17, 19–23, 25, 30–38, from TPP 140
44–48, 51–52, 54, 61–65, 69, 78–81, US alliances 139
83, 86, 89, 94, 96, 99–101, 111–13, US allies 34, 116, 137, 138, 139, 141,
115–16, 119, 127, 129, 132, 136–47, 142, 160, 194, 218, 230, 231, 232, 239,
155–60, 165–66, 170–72, 174, 178–79, 240: national security agendas of 142
181–87, 192, 194, 196–97, 199, US Defence Innovations Unit (DIU)
201–04, 211, 214, 216–20, 225, and Indian Defence Innovation
229–32, 235–36, 239–41, 243–46, Organisation—Innovations for
249–51, 255–60: 9/11 terrorist attacks Defence Excellence (DIO-iDEX) 52
80; 2017 National Security Strategy US Department of Defense 5, 136:
19, 21; 2018 National Defense Indo-Pacific Strategy Report 136
Strategy 31; 2020 Presidential election US Department of State 225, 251: 2019
47; administration 31, 172; alliance report 225
system 138–39; alliances in Asia 21; US–India private defence industries 51
allies and partners 34, 137, 142; US–India Strategic Partnership Forum
anti-China narrative of the 143; 136
approach to China 34, 172; attempts US Indo-Pacific Command 100
to disengage countries from China 63; US Institute for Peace 17
 Index 295
US–Iran nuclear standoff 192 Vietnam Coast Guard 57
US, Japan, Australia and India 9–10, Vietnam Defence White Paper 62, 96
22–23, 136, 211: security mechanism Violence 33, 178, 239, 256
22 Virology 203
US–Japan–Australia led Blue Dot Virtually leadership summit 44
Network (BDN) 47 Virtual meetings 19, 54
US–Japan Joint Declaration on Security Virus 31, 35–36, 63, 95, 116, 171: spread
80 and lethality of 35
US–Japan Security Consultative Vision Statement for a Secure, Peaceful
Committee 2 and Prosperous Future 97
US Navy 17, 129 Vision Statement on the
US–North Korea dialogue 137 Australia-France Relationship 169
US Senate Foreign Relations Committee Vivekananda International Foundation
240 78
USSR: collapse of the 212
Uzbekistan 255 Wang Nana 23
Wang Yi, Chinese Foreign Minister 17,
Vaccine 1, 3, 31, 38, 45, 63, 95, 114, 116, 19–20
173, 177, 181, 200–203, 244, 259: Wanzhou, Meng 180, 188: arrest of 180
AstraZeneca 200, 259; development 3, Warships 58, 126, 129–32, 168: British
38, 201–02; development and dis- 126, 129
tribution 38; diplomacy 63, 114, 116; Washington and New Zealand 169
distribution 1, 45, 116; inequality 116; Washington Declarations 99
production 1, 177; shortages 63 Water desalination plant 156
Vaccine Experts Group 1 Waterway 125
Vaccine initiative 31, 173: Vajpayee, Atal Weapons 51, 99, 179–80, 238, 241, 243
Bihari, former Indian Prime Minister Weapons acquisition programmes 238
(late) 48: state visit to China 48 Weapons of mass destruction 179
Valdai Discussion Club 219 Weintraub 63
Values and interests 3, 8, 18, 25, 30–32, Wendt, Alexander 94
35, 38–39, 44–49, 60, 62, 65, 67–69, West and Russia 142
78, 81–82, 84, 89, 95–98, 99–103, 114, West Bank 154
117–18, 124–25, 127–28, 130–33, 138, Western Asia 150–51, 158–59
141–43, 147, 150–59, 164–66, 168, Western countries 219
172–73, 177–79, 181, 183, 185, 187, Western Europe 124, 201
192–95, 200, 213, 215–16, 218, 227, Western Indian Ocean (WIO) 154–55,
230, 235–43, 245–46, 250–51, 255: 158, 172
common 100, 168, 185; democratic 3, Whitsun Reef 180
45, 60, 62, 81, 84, 177,; shared 45, 60, Williamson, Gavin, the then Defence
62, 84; shared 32, 44, 97, 102, 103 Secretary 129
Varuna exercises 168 Win–win cooperation 19
Ventures 46–47, 62, 103, 199, 244: Wivel, Anders 227
multilateral support for 47; trilateral Women’s World Cup 198
47 World Bank 226: World Health
Vessels 32, 126, 129–30, 139, 167, 180, Organization 30, 38, 101, 181: World
184, 186: fishing 139; logistics 130 order: polycentric 217; US-led 236
Vietnam 2–3, 5, 7, 19, 24–25, 31, 36–37, World Trade Organization 8, 171, 192
45, 47, 54, 56–57, 58, 62–63, 68, 80, World War I 151
84–85, 88–89, 94–98, 102–03, 111, World War II 214, 236, 241
113, 115, 120, 129, 136, 141–43, WTO 196–97
145–46, 164, 168–70, 180, 182, 211,
216–19, 221, 225, 235–36, 244, 249: Xia Liping 21, 22: Xi Jinping, Chinese
Quad’s outreach efforts to 25; President 9, 18, 20, 33, 35, 54, 62,
strategic importance 54 65–67, 139, 144, 217, 253–54: efforts
296 Index
to contain the virus 35; foreign policy Yemen 159, 239, 250
139; speech at Conference on Yuichi, Hosoya 182
Interaction and Confidence Building Yun Byung-se, South Korea’s Foreign
Measures (CICA) in Asia 54; visit to Minister 59
Iran 253; Xinjiang 35, 38, 67, 84, 86, Yusof Ishak Institute 112
238, 254: human rights abuses in 35,
38; human rights violations in 84 Zahedan 250
Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region Zhang Jie 20–22
254 Zhang Li 20, 22
Zhao Minghao 23
Yadav, Surendra, Indian Joint Secretary Zhong Qi 22
(Naval Systems) 56 Zoellick, Robert, Deputy Secretary of
Ye Hailin 20, 22 State 32