Blackouts during navigation in narrow

passages

Tuomas Roos
Jerry Virkkunen

Degree Thesis for Bachelor of Marine Technology

Degree Programme of Maritime Management
Turku 2016
BACHELOR’S THESIS

Author: Tuomas Roos, Jerry Virkkunen

Degree Program: Degree Program in Maritime Studies, Turku
Specialization: Bachelor of Marine Technology
Supervisor: Bo Lindroos

Title: Blackouts during navigation in narrow passages

__________________________________________________________________________________________________
Date 30.3.2016 Number of pages 45 Appendices 7

Summary

This thesis gives you the basic knowledge about the characteristics of blackouts. You
will also learn how to react as an officer in a blackout situation.
The thesis consists of two parts: theory and research. The theory part will give you
details on what a blackout is, details on ship electricity and emergency power sources
and above all, things to consider as an officer in a blackout situation. The theory part
also includes law text in an easy to understand form.
The latter part is a description of a simulator based study. 15 students completed
exactly the same simulator exercise where they experienced a blackout onboard their
ship. The students formed eight bridge teams which were divided into two groups.
Half of the students were given a blackout checklist and the other half had to manage
without it.
The goal for the research was to measure the importance of a checklist in a blackout
situation. We were able to conclude that the checklist did not save the vessel from
grounding but it appeared to help when performing minor tasks involved in bridge
procedures during a blackout.

__________________________________________________________________________________________________
Language: English
Key words: blackout, ship electricity, bridge routines, simulator research
__________________________________________________________________________________________________

The examination work is available at the electronic library Theseus.fi

Table of contents
1 Introduction ....................................................................................................................................... 1
1.1 Objective ...................................................................................................................................... 1
1.2 Problem formulation............................................................................................................... 1
1.3 Delimitation ................................................................................................................................ 1
2 What is blackout? ............................................................................................................................. 2
2.1 Level one ...................................................................................................................................... 2
2.2 Level two...................................................................................................................................... 2
2.3 Level three .................................................................................................................................. 2
3 Electricity onboard .......................................................................................................................... 3
3.1 Electricity consumers ............................................................................................................. 3
3.2 Electricity production onboard........................................................................................... 3
3.3 Providing electricity in emergency situations .............................................................. 4
3.3.1 Emergency generator ..................................................................................................... 6
3.3.2 Uninterruptable Power Source .................................................................................. 6
3.3.3 GMDSS-batteries .............................................................................................................. 7
4 Reaction in case of a blackout ..................................................................................................... 8
4.1 Checklist ....................................................................................................................................... 8
4.2 Actions to be taken on bridge .............................................................................................. 8
4.3 Actions to be taken in the engine room ........................................................................ 11
4.3.1 Emergency steering ..................................................................................................... 11
4.4 Possible outcome of a blackout ........................................................................................ 12
4.5 How to recover from a blackout ...................................................................................... 13
5 Reasons for blackout .................................................................................................................... 13
5.1 How to prevent blackout situations ............................................................................... 13
5.2 Other causes for loss of control on bridge ................................................................... 14
6 Land based organizations .......................................................................................................... 14
7 Improvements for ships.............................................................................................................. 17
8 Blackout onboard M/S Amorella ............................................................................................. 18
9 Simulator research........................................................................................................................ 19
9.1 Objective ................................................................................................................................... 19
9.2 Description............................................................................................................................... 19
9.3 Participants’ background ................................................................................................... 21
9.4 Ship details ............................................................................................................................... 22
9.5 Bridge equipment.................................................................................................................. 23
9.6 The exercise ............................................................................................................................. 24
 9.7 Actions of the teams ............................................................................................................. 26
9.7.1 Items on the datasheet and collected data ......................................................... 27
9.8 Exercise outcomes ................................................................................................................ 31
9.8.1 Team specific outcomes ............................................................................................. 31
9.9 Questionnaire ......................................................................................................................... 40
9.10 Conclusion............................................................................................................................ 41
9.11 Project evaluation ............................................................................................................. 42
10 Final words................................................................................................................................... 43
References ................................................................................................................................................. 44
Figures......................................................................................................................................................... 45
Appendices
List of terms

Shaft generator = Generator type which gets its power from the main propulsion
plant
UPS = Uninterruptible Power Supply
OOW = Officer Of the Watch
SOLAS = Safety Of Life At Sea
VTS = Vessel Traffic Service. VTS monitors all vessels within its area, organizes traffic,
provides navigational assistance if necessary, informs vessels about relevant weather
and traffic information and provides knowledge about the state of the fairways and
the navigational safety equipment. All vessels must monitor VTS-traffic channels
while being within the VTS-area.
MRCC = Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre
GMDSS = Global Maritime Distress and Safety System
GT = Gross Tonnage, is a unitless index related to a ship's overall internal volume
Classification Society = A non-governmental organization that establishes and
maintains technical standards for the construction and operation of ships
RPM = Rounds Per Minute
KaMeWa = brand name of the controllable-pitch propellers manufacturer (AB
Karlstad Mekaniska Werkstads)
Override tiller = Emergency steering method that overrides all other steering
methods
COC = Certificate Of Competence
IMO = International Maritime Organization

ISM Code = International Safety Management Code

SAR = Search and Rescue

MOB = Man Over Board

ECDIS = Electronic Chart Display and Information System

GPS = Global Positioning System
AIS = Automatic Identification System
Azipod = The registered brand name of electric podded azimuth thrusters
LORO-vessel = Lift On/Roll On-vessel
 1

1 Introduction
One should consider blackout as a threat no matter which ship he is working on.
Blackout occurring in the wrong position at the wrong time might seriously damage
the ship, its cargo, crew or passengers. Many sailors have experienced blackout and
even we have during our relatively short careers. Knowledge of blackouts is often
quite poor among sailors and this is why we decided to study the matter a bit deeper.

1.1 Objective

Our main goal was to improve our knowledge on the subject. We wanted to describe
possible reasons for blackout and proper ways to react on the bridge when it
happens. We wanted to prepare ourselves and the reader for facing blackouts
onboard and increase the level of understanding towards it. We also wanted to find
out if we would be able to construct a simple checklist for the bridge team which
could minimize the risk for human error during blackout situations.

1.2 Problem formulation

Checklists are good to have during crisis situations but is it a good tool when you find
yourself in a middle of a blackout situation up on the bridge? Can you make a
universal checklist that suits all ships and all conditions? Can you compensate the
lack of education and experience with a good checklist? These are questions that this
thesis aims to provide an answer.

1.3 Delimitation

This thesis focuses mainly on blackouts occurring in coastal waters. Open water
blackout is not equally dangerous and does not require as fast actions as the blackout
in coastal waters. Also other kinds of crisis situations (fire, abandon ship, MOB) and
details on what happens in the engine room during blackout are left outside of this
thesis.
The credit for this thesis should be divided equally between Roos and Virkkunen.
Both students were always present when the work was composed.
 2

2 What is blackout?
Blackout is a temporary loss of electricity production that might lead to loss of
manoeuvrability. Most of the ships equipment needs electricity in order to operate.
During blackout electricity is not generated and therefore multiple equipments do not
function properly (or at all). This thesis limits blackout situations to three categories
which determine the severity of the situation.

In case of blackout, energy consumers are considered as either essential or non-

essential. Essential energy consumers are for example rudder pumps, navigational
equipment and emergency lights. Non-essential equipment includes air conditioning,
accommodation lights (excluding emergency lights) or fuel separators.

2.1 Level one

Level one blackout does not present significant threat to the safe navigation of a ship.
Level one blackout might occur if electricity production capacity is temporarily
lowered (for example failure of one auxiliary engine). This might result in loss of
some non-essential equipment and possibly is not even noticeable outside the engine
room.

2.2 Level two

Level two blackout is the outcome of complete loss of electricity production which
leads to lowered manoeuvrability due to loss of propulsion. During level two blackout
the backup system works and the emergency power source starts to feed electricity
to the rudder pump. This enables the use of the rudder but one should note the delay
for the emergency system to kick in as well as the limited effect of the rudder used
without propulsion.

2.3 Level three

Level three blackout is the most severe and it leads to complete loss of
manoeuvrability. This is because the emergency system doesn’t function properly or
the cause for the blackout is related to major engine problem. During level three
blackout the ship has to manage without propulsion or rudder.
 3

3 Electricity onboard

3.1 Electricity consumers

There is a high demand of electricity around a ship. It is needed for:

 manoeuvring equipment (rudder, pitch propeller)

 navigational equipment (radar, ECDIS, navigation lights)
 other bridge equipment (AIS, remote anchor release)
 deck machinery (winches)
 electric cargo units
 safety systems (WT-doors, fire alarms/sensors, automatic fire fighting
equipment)
 internal and external communications
 everything involved in accommodation systems (lightning, water supply, air
conditioning, heating)
 hydraulic equipment (stabilizers, ramps, hatches, cranes)
 engine room systems (fuel pumps, cooling water pumps, ventilation)

Modern ships may be equipped with so called electric podded propulsion unit,
meaning that it generates all the propulsion power within the propeller unit.
Therefore no propeller shaft is connected straight to the propeller, only electric
cables providing the electricity to the electric motor. (Laivakonetekniikka; Ship
Knowledge p. 250)

3.2 Electricity production onboard

The electricity can be generated by using shaft generators, auxiliary engines,

emergency generator, steam turbine generator, gas turbine generator or by taking the
electricity from land. While navigating in coastal waters or when entering a port, the
electricity is often produced using auxiliary engines. This improves the navigational
safety and is a more stable system compared to shaft generators. The operation of the
shaft generator often depend on fixed propeller shaft RPMs and a steady load. After
generating the electricity it is transferred via cables to main switchboard which is
located in the engine control room. From there it goes to primary electricity
consumers and/or subsequent smaller switchboards. Blackout may be caused by a
 4

malfunction in some of the switchboards. (Laivakonetekniikka; Ship Knowledge p.

250)

3.3 Providing electricity in emergency situations

The Classification Society demands that a cargo ship over 500 gross tonnage, a
passenger ship and a fishing vessel must be equipped with an emergency power
source. The emergency power source guarantees electricity supply if normal
electricity production fails. This enables proper operation of certain vital functions
which are listed on the next page. (Ship Knowledge, p. 308; Laivakonetekniikka)

The power source might be either an accumulator battery system or an emergency

generator. Batteries are only used in small ships. The power consumption on larger
ships (or ships carrying more than 32 passengers) is so big that battery capacity just
wouldn’t be enough or it wouldn’t be practical to equip a ship with an army of
emergency batteries. For this reason, an emergency generator is the most common
solution. (Ship Knowledge, p. 308; IMO Resolution A.325(IX))

In addition to main emergency power supply the ship is equipped with many
independent battery systems. These batteries must be connected to at least
machinery automatics, fire alarms, radio equipment and emergency generator start.
These batteries must not be confused to the accumulator batteries acting as the main
emergency power source. (Ship Knowledge, p. 308; IMO Resolution A.325(IX))

The emergency power source must be located above the freeboard deck (weather
deck). It must be accessible from outside and it cannot be placed forward of the
collision bulkhead. (Ship Knowledge, p. 308; IMO Resolution A.325(IX))
 5

Table 1. Emergency power unit must provide the power for the following items.

Item Passenger ship Cargo ship

Embarkation lights 36h 3h

Emergency lights 36h 18h

Navigational lights 36h 18h

Internal communication 36h 18h

equipments

Navigational equipment 36h 18h

Fire detection, fire alarms, 36h 18h

fire signals

Ship whistle, signal lamp, 36h 18h

manual fire alarms,
internal emergency signals

Fire pump 36h 18h

Automated sprinkler 36h -

pump

Emergency bilge pump 36h -

and valve system

Emergency steering 30 min (ships +10 000 GT) 30 min (ships +10 000 GT)

10 min (other ships) 10 min (other ships)

Water tight doors 30 min -

Elevators 30 min* -

*the elevator must be capable for 30 minutes to return the lift car back to deck level
and open the doors so no one gets trapped inside

(IMO Resolution A.325(IX); SOLAS Chapter II-1 regulations 29 (14) and 43 (2.6.1))
 6

3.3.1 Emergency generator

Onboard traditional vessels equipped with a propeller shaft the electricity is

produced in sea condition by shaft generator. If the shaft generator fails, emergency
generator takes over. One electricity production system must be stand-by in order to
minimize the time without power in case of blackout. The emergency generator is
constantly sensing the flow of electricity within the ship: if the current alterations
cross pre-set limits, the emergency generator starts automatically. In coastal waters
and narrow passages the electricity is often produced by auxiliary engines to increase
safety. (Ship Knowledge, p. 250, 308; Laivakonetekniikka)

The emergency generator must be equipped with two independent starting systems.
The crew must be able to start the generator manually by hand in case of total power
loss. Manual starting equipment might be a set of batteries, pre-pressurized start air
system, spring starter, hydraulic accumulator or an explosive charge. (Ship
Knowledge, p. 250, 308; IMO Resolution A.325(IX))

The emergency generator is a totally independent system and it is supposed to

automatically start within 45 seconds. It must be able to start with a list of 22,5
degrees. The generator has its own cooling system and separate fuel supply. The
capacity of the generator depends on the consumption of the emergency equipment.
(IMO Resolution A.325(IX))

The generator must be separated from the main generators and it has to have its own
switchboard with transformers, starting batteries or starting air unit, fuel tank,
starting-relay box and a lightning board. All these equipments must be placed in the
same compartment with the generator. (Ship Knowledge, p. 250, 308; IMO Resolution
A.325(IX); Laivakonetekniikka)

3.3.2 Uninterruptable Power Source

Uninterruptable Power Source is commonly abbreviated UPS. In practice it is a set of

batteries located in close proximity to the bridge. The electricity to the navigational
equipment is directed through the UPS-batteries which enables the batteries being
simultaneously and constantly charged. In case of a temporary power loss the UPS-
batteries provide the electricity needed for essential navigational equipment. An
audible and visual alarm should be placed on the bridge to inform about a possible
 7

fault in the UPS-system. (Note: The UPS-battery does not work as a single emergency
power source and cannot be considered as an alternative to the emergency generator.)
(Laivakonetekniikka; IMO COMSAR/Circ.32)

Figure 1: UPS-chart (Wikipedia)

3.3.3 GMDSS-batteries

Ship must be able to send a distress call even during total loss of power. Therefore a
ship is equipped with a separate set of batteries designated only to power GMDSS-
equipment in a case where all other means to produce electricity fail. These batteries
must provide electricity as follows:

 1 hour onboard a ship equipped with an emergency power source

 6 hours onboard a ship without an emergency power source

The battery system must be able to switch from A/C to battery supply automatically.
Battery system must be equipped with a charger which keeps the batteries full
constantly. This charger must be also connected to the emergency power supply in
addition to the main power supply. (SOLAS chapter IV, Regulation 13)
 8

4 Reaction in case of a blackout

What to do in case of a blackout is very ship specific. Every ship is unique when
considering engine room lay out, emergency electricity supply and bridge equipment.
Therefore plans on how to deal with a blackout must be prepared onboard every ship
individually. It is challenging to find an exact truth on how to prepare for a blackout.

4.1 Checklist

Checklist is a tool that reduces the risk of human error by stating clearly step-by-step
how to react in certain emergencies. It is mandatory to have ship specific checklists
designed separately for multiple different scenarios like for example blackout. The
ISM Code states: “The Company should establish procedures for the preparation of
plans and instructions, including checklists as appropriate, for key shipboard operations
concerning the safety of the ship and the prevention of pollution.” (ISM Code Part A
regulation 7)

4.2 Actions to be taken on bridge

This thesis recommends that the OOW determines the level of the blackout. Once the
blackout occurs, it might be that the OOW has only bad choices to choose from. In that
case he must be able to select the least bad one. The selection process comes easier if
the OOW realizes the threat of blackout and has considered his possible actions
beforehand.

Level one blackout doesn’t affect the safe navigation in any way. During level two
blackout, some of the ships control is maintained. This is because the emergency
generator starts feeding electricity to the rudder pump and therefore
maneuverability is partially restored. The Classification Society demands the
emergency generator to start within 45 seconds and OOW must be aware of this
delay. During level three blackout the propulsion is lost and the rudder is not
functional. The ship is drifting without control and there is not much that the crew
can do. Anchor may be released mechanically but the capability to stop a moving ship
using anchor is limited.
 9

Things to consider when facing a blackout situation:

 determine the level of the blackout

 alarm necessary crew members
o captain, chief engineer, watchman
 be aware of prevailing traffic situation and note terrestrial surroundings
o moving targets: position and predicted movement of other ships
o fixed obstructions: water depth, islands, sea marks (buoys,
lighthouses), landmarks (bridges, windmills)
 be aware of the forces acting on your ship
o prevailing weather conditions: wind (speed and direction), current
(force and direction)
o speed and heading of your vessel when the blackout occurred
o the angle where the rudders were when they last were controllable
o propeller pitch
 characteristics of your vessel
o number of propellers, left or right handed propeller
o ship type
o draft
 know your rudder
o be aware of existence of potential non-electric emergency steering
systems (for example pressurized gas driven)
o note the lowered manoeuvre speed of the rudder when using fewer
pumps
 write down time and position
 silence alarms
o acknowledging and resetting alarms is secondary, getting rid of the
distracting noise is priority
 steering
o reduce speed (if possible)
o determine if the steering controls are working on the bridge (override
tiller)
 monitor how the helm is responding
o go to hand steering and deploy helmsman if needed
 10

o establish emergency steering capability if other means fail

 when using pitch propellers, set levers to zero position
o if the lever is left to the position where it was before the blackout it
might lead to a situation where the ship starts to alternate its speed
automatically when the system is restored without the bridge team
noticing it
 emergency anchoring
o try to find a good anchoring area
o alert necessary crew members to be stand-by for possible anchoring
o do not drop the anchor with excessive speed (the chain might break)
o determine which anchor to use (keep in mind where the ship is
turning)
o anchor chain length according to water depth
 inform others
o radio notification (other ships, VTS)
o “not under command” –signals (night time two red lights, daytime two
balls in a vertical line)
 close all water tight-doors
o if the situation demands OOW must be ready to close all water tight
doors. OOW must also knowledge that some doors might demand
emergency operation locally and send a watchman to the emergency
closing location. (This only applies to ships equipped with remotely
controlled WT-doors and is more relevant to passenger vessels.)
 Master informs rest of the crew and passengers about the situation
o announcement on the loudspeaker
 Master alarms land based organizations according to the plan
o company (CSO, DP), MRCC

UPS works as a temporary power source for the bridge in case of a blackout. It has
very limited capacity and the crew must note that it lasts only a while. If the
emergency power source has a malfunction, the bridge will lose most of its devices
once the UPS system runs out of electricity.

(M/S Amorella blackout checklist; M/S Finneagle blackout checklist)

 11

4.3 Actions to be taken in the engine room

Engine crew starts to recover their systems one by one as soon as the blackout hits.
Below is provided an actual engine room blackout checklist that is in use onboard an
unnamed vessel.

Figure 2. Engine room blackout checklist.

4.3.1 Emergency steering

If steering capability from the bridge is lost, OOW/Captain should commence the
emergency steering procedure. The procedure includes placing one person who is
taking care of the emergency steering in the rudder pump room. The rudders can be
 12

operated locally if some power is provided. In case of a total loss of power, external
hydraulic pump unit should be available. The pump unit may be a combustion engine
unit or a compressed air unit. (Merenkulun perusteet 2, p. 41-42)

Emergency steering varies from ship to ship. When an officer comes onboard a new
ship he should familiarize himself with the ship specific emergency steering.
Emergency steering exercises are a part of regular drills onboard. Emergency steering
drill must be organized at least once every three months. The drill must take place
within the emergency steering compartment, the communication means between the
bridge and the steering post must be tested and also where applicable the operation
of alternative power supply shall be tested. (Merenkulun perusteet 2, p. 41-42; Solas,
Chapter V, regulation 26)

4.4 Possible outcome of a blackout

Blackout might generate complete loss of maneuverability. Blackout is a risk that

every ship faces and it often surprises the crew completely. It is a serious safety
threat that might lead to:

 damage to the ship

 grounding
 collision with another vessel
 sinking of the ship
 environmental damage
 loss of life
 cargo damage
 delay in schedule
 affecting the prevailing traffic situation and maybe generating more dangerous
or close call situations

Blackout might also cripple a vessel. Air conditioning and domestic water needs
electricity and life onboard without them becomes quickly quite uncomfortable.
Recovering from a blackout demands maintenance resources and might cost extra
money to the company in spare parts.
 13

4.5 How to recover from a blackout

When the blackout situation is over both deck and engine crew must go through a
thorough equipment check. Bridge team must for example check that their
navigational equipment (radar, compass, GPS) works properly and that the ship
devices (rudder indicators, navigational lights, helm) do not malfunction. Also radio
equipment, UPS-system and GMDSS-batteries must be checked. The Captain must
keep the company and officials up to date about the ships situation and possible
delays must be handled accordingly. Also inform third parties if the ship made any
damage (buoys, other ships) during the blackout situation. Remember to keep also
crew and passenger well informed about the situation.

5 Reasons for blackout

Blackout might present itself without any predicted reason. It is often only a chain of
unlucky events leading to drastic consequences. Sometimes the blackout is generated
by a human error. By closing a wrong valve in the engine room of by handling the
controls inconsiderably one might intentionally generate a blackout.

Fire in the main switchboard, changing the fuel filters or sudden changes in the flow
of electricity are examples of the reasons in the engine room for blackout. Also
dramatic main engine failure often leads to blackout. Fuel pumps might break or lube
oil pressure might disappear. The engines are also equipped with automatic
protection systems. So if any action makes the engine for example over heat it has the
capability to shut itself down independently. (Marinersgalaxy)

5.1 How to prevent blackout situations

Good level of maintenance in the engine room is maybe the best way to prevent
blackout. While sailing the engine crew must give attention how they are organizing
the ship’s electricity production. If the ship is relaying on only on shaft generator the
risk for it failing and leading to a blackout increases if compared to dual shaft
generator. (Personal communication with Hannu Yli-Heikkilä; Marinersgalaxy)

The bridge team must inform the engine crew about the sailing conditions. When
making way in narrow or heavy traffic passages it is justified to use more stable
 14

electricity production than in open waters. Also weather conditions affect the
probability of a blackout. For example heavy winds/waves and ice conditions might
increase the risk for blackout by making the engine work load highly variable. Also
ship specific characteristics in certain situations must be in common awareness of the
bridge team. Example could be predetermined fixed sailing speed. (Personal
communication with Hannu Yli-Heikkilä)

When designing a new ship one can make the vessel more resilient to blackouts by
giving extra attention to engine room features and propulsion specifics. Diesel
generated propulsion (i.e. Azipod) is free of mechanic connection between the engine
and the propeller and is therefore the ship is less probable to face a blackout. Diesel
electric propulsion also is quite versatile in means of selecting electricity production.
The ship is like a huge power plant where all the engines only generate electricity
which is then equally used for powering the propeller as it is for heating the sauna.
(Personal communication with Hannu Yli-Heikkilä; Marinersgalaxy)

5.2 Other causes for loss of control on bridge

Maneuverability might be lost for countless reasons. Blackout is just one of them but
the procedure to react to other causes resembles highly on the details presented in
this thesis. Bridge electricity distribution failure or rudder/propulsion failure are
examples of such events.

6 Land based organizations

Many land based organizations monitors and keeps records about blackouts
occurring. Finnish Transport Agency and local Vessel Traffic Service were able to
provide us detailed information about reported blackouts occurring under their
jurisdiction. Below is a chart showing the number of blackouts in the Finnish
VTS/GOFREP-area 2011-2014 provided by the Finnish Transport Agency. We also
paid a visit to the VTS center were we interviewed a shift supervisor about their
protocol of actions if a blackout happens within their area. (Personal communication
with Joonatan Ahlroos; Archipelago VTS Master’s Guide)
 15

Number of reported blackouts

18

16

14

12

10

0
2011 2012 2013 2014

Figure 3. Number of reported blackouts in the Finnish VTS/GOFREP-area 2011-2014. (Finnish Transport
Agency)

Master of a ship is obliged to report any significant event concerning the safe
navigation of the ship. These might be for example: blackout, unexpected ice findings,
heavy building of ice on outer structures of the ship, tropical storms, ship wrecks or
other floating objects that might be harmful for safe navigation. (Merenkulun
perusteet 2, p. 159; Archipelago VTS Master’s Guide)

Any substantial risk or hazard to the safe navigation must be reported to the VTS.
This includes even near miss situation. Informing the VTS is highly important. This
way the VTS operator is able to warn other traffic of potential hazards. Contacting
VTS in an abnormal situation might lead to an official investigation because VTS is
obliged to report all matters to the supervising authorities. Pilotage is often included
in the VTS-area, so big part of the reporting responsibility lies on the state pilot. If the
ship is sailing with a pilot exemption, the reporting responsibility is up to the Master
of a ship. Unfortunately the common reporting practice doesn’t favor coming to the
spotlight with near miss situations. This might lead to ignoring serious safety threats
and therefore might cause an accident in the future. The reports are used to build a
statistical database which enhances the identification of possible threats concerning
safety issues. (Merenkulun perusteet 2, p. 159; personal communication with
Joonatan Ahlroos; Archipelago VTS Master’s Guide)
 16

Vessel Traffic Service (VTS) monitors sea areas when entering coastal waters with
special or restricted navigation. In Finland, plans have been made to make the VTS-
area limit start from the sea border but nowadays it starts normally 12 miles before
entering a narrow passage. (Personal communication with Joonatan Ahlroos;
Archipelago VTS Master’s Guide)

Figure 4. VTS operator. (Promotional photograph)

When an emergency happens within VTS-area it is the ships responsibility to report it

to the operator. After the report from the ship is made, the VTS-operator starts a pre-
planned process to forward the message to the responsible emergency response
party, normally being MRCC. The ship only has to make a report to the VTS and after
that VTS takes care of the rest. (Note: Above only applies to Finnish VTS-areas, always
remember to check regional specifications. The Master is responsible for the safety of
the ship and in immediate threat of life he is recommended to follow GMDSS
procedures.) (Personal communication with Joonatan Ahlroos; Archipelago VTS
Master’s Guide)

VTS has a manual which includes actions to be taken in abnormal circumstances.

Blackout wasn’t part of the Finnish VTS procedures guide but it was included in the
part which focused on the procedures in a case of a dramatic engine malfunction.
Engine shutdown often might lead to a blackout. The manual is classified so it is not
presented in this thesis. (Personal communication with Joonatan Ahlroos;
Archipelago VTS Master’s Guide)
 17

7 Improvements for ships

Our personal experience from working onboard has shown that some improvements
could be justified. We came up with few improvements that could be useable.

Equipment:

 Silence all alarms by a push of a single button

o During a blackout multiple bridge equipments start to sound an alarm
all at the same time. This often leads to loss of focus and resetting the
alarms needs an extra hand during a time where one is not easily
available. High sound level also makes bridge communication a lot
more difficult. This would probably need totally integrated bridge
system where all of the equipment is connected to each other.
 Captain call button
o This already exists in some ships but we think it should be more
common. It is a button that sounds an alarm directly in the captain’s
cabin and the navigation team wouldn’t have to dial his number and
call him on the phone. This would save crucial seconds during a hectic
situation.
 ECDIS-repeater to the engine control room
o Installing an ECDIS-repeater in the engine room would allow the engine
crew to determine to some extent the navigational status and plan their
maintenance accordingly.
 Hands free headset
o Connection with the engine room during blackout is essential but the
captain has his hands full with the controls of the ship. Equipping the
bridge with a wireless headset connected to the engine room would
provide the captain a constant flow of information from the engine
room without constraining him to the phone.

Routines:

 Determine high risk areas

o The navigational team could determine so called high risk areas. These
areas would then be informed to the engine room (by phone or by
 18

separate display). When sailing in these areas the engine crew would
have to avoid certain maintenance work (ones that could lead to
blackout) or be at a higher level of readiness to be able to react if
something goes wrong.
 Blackout drills
o Blackout might be quite rare but it often happens eventually. Training
the crew to face blackouts would be effective way to minimize the
damage caused by blackouts. At least according to our experience this
does not occur anywhere. Training could include emergency anchoring
procedures, bridge team preparedness for blackouts, updating and
improving checklists or practicing engine room communications.
 Including blackout in the muster list duties
o It would be helpful for everyone onboard to acknowledge beforehand
where they are needed and what are their duties during a blackout. For
example watchman could be positioned in the emergency anchoring
position and motorman in the emergency steering room.

8 Blackout onboard M/S Amorella

Blackout is an unpredictable happening that might strike any vessel in any situation.
Good example of such is the grounding of passenger vessel M/S Amorella in the
Archipelago sea of Åland in December of 2013.

Amorella was on a voyage from Turku to Stockholm via Marienhamn. The ship had a
blackout during a turn before entering a narrow buoy fairway of Hjulgrund. The
blackout caused a total loss of maneuverability and despite using non-electric
emergency steering and anchoring the ship ran aground. The ship got a leakage in the
forward peak but as only damage it was insignificant and did not present great threat
to the ship. With the assist of tugboats Amorella was released and granted a
permission to continue its journey towards Marianhamn. The repairs of the damages
required dry docking and the ship was out of traffic for a period of six days.

The event was caused by a combination of bad luck and bad management. The
blackout happened due to interference in the fuel input for auxiliary engines and the
interference was caused by human error in the engine room. The engine crew was
 19

conducting maintenance work on the auxiliary engines’ fuel pre-heaters when they
managed to get a fuel leak. This led to a need for operating the fuel valves which
ended up interfering with the fuel intake of the auxiliary engines. The auxiliary engine
failure caused the diesel generators to detach from the ships grid which caused a
blackout and a total loss of maneuverability.

During the blackout the ship was in a position which was highly demanding for the
bridge crew. During that time the engine crew should not have conducted
maintenance work which would have presented a risk for having a blackout. The
instructions for conducting such maintenance work did not include any information
of the presence of such risk.

(Investigation report of Safety Investigation Authority Finland)

9 Simulator research

9.1 Objective

The objective of the research was to distinguish the necessity of a written aid in a
highly stressful situation. It also tries to point out if a checklist can replace proper
education and experience in a crisis situation. The research also illustrates how well
3rd and 4th year students are able to perform in a blackout situation. We were not able
to find earlier researches with similar objectives.

9.2 Description

Our method of conducting this research was to put maritime students into to a ship
simulator and simulate a blackout situation. Participants were divided into two
groups: half of the students were equipped with a checklist specifically made for a
blackout situation and the other half had to manage without a checklist. The students
with the blackout checklist were given also other checklists (fire, SAR, MOB) as
“decoys” to avoid any clues about the upcoming events. The simulated event and the
bridge equipment available were identical with both groups.
 20

The provided blackout checklist was specially made for this exercise using the data
gathered in chapter four. The goal of the list was to suite all ships in all conditions and
not to provide any special aids for this particular simulation set up.

We were able to gather 15 maritime students who formed 8 bridge teams which were
divided into two groups, Group A (4 teams) and Group B (4 teams). Seven teams
consisted of two students and one team had only one student in it. Within the team
the students were given roles as either the Captain or as an 1st Officer. The students
were allowed to divide the roles within the team themselves but it was
recommendable to pick the student with higher amount of sea going experience to act
as the Captain of the simulator vessel. Group B was equipped with the checklists and
group A had to manage without them.

Conducting this research took two days. Group A did their run during the first day
and Group B during the second day. The days were consecutive in order to minimize
any information of the exercise of reaching the participants in the Group B. It was
highly important that all of the teams stepped into the simulator equally clueless of
what was ahead of them. Knowledge gained beforehand would have granted an
advantage for a team taking the test.

All of the teams received an identical briefing prior the exercise (except that group B
were provided with four checklists and the checklist location was mentioned during
the briefing). The briefing took about fifteen minutes and it included gathering
participants’ background information, ship details, bridge equipment familiarization,
communication methods (intership and walkie-talkie), prevailing weather condition,
position and route plan. The students were also given a recommendation to maintain
sufficient speed in order to keep up with the ships schedule. After the briefing the
students were given some time to get acquainted with the bridge equipment and the
surroundings. The simulation was started after the team confirmed that they are
ready to start. The briefing followed the same pattern with all of the teams and it was
confirmed by using a paper stating all the relevant items to the briefing (Attachment
1).

During briefing students were given two UHF walkie-talkies which were set to
different channels. They were told that the other one is used to connect to Kotka VTS
and the other one is used to reach watchman. They were also told that if they would
 21

need to drop anchor it would be possible by contacting watchman and requesting him
to manually drop it. In reality “watchman” was one of the researchers who was sitting
in the instructor room and he relayed the command to drop the anchor to the teacher
who was operating the software.

In order to run a ship simulation it is necessary to have people to conduct all the
“acting” and controlling the simulator software. The simulator control room was
manned with two researchers (Roos and Virkkunen) playing the roles of VTS
operator, engine room crew and deck crew. Researchers also recorded relevant
findings during the exercise. Third person involved was an experienced teacher
supervising the exercise and operating the simulator software.

The actual exercise part took about 20 minutes. After completing the exercise the
students were interviewed with the focus on the question about their initial plan for
action after they realized having a blackout onboard. They were also handed an
anonymous questionnaire to be filled in a separate class room right after the exercise
(Attachment 2). The questionnaire gathered participants’ personal views on whether
the checklist was actually helping or not.

9.3 Participants’ background

15 students took part in this research. 27% of the participants were 3rd year students
and 73% were 4th year students so the general experience level was high. 87% of the
participants were male. Group A had an average 329 seadays per participant while
group B average was 303. The difference is considered to be meaningless.
Educationally Group B had slightly more advanced members. 86% of Group B
members were 4th year students while the corresponding figure for group A was
63%. Certificate wise group A was slightly more competent: 38% of the members had
Deck Officer certificate (OOW) while 29% of group B members had it. Rest of the
participants had Watchman’s certificate (OS). Three out of four of Group A teams had
a member equipped with OOW certificate while half of the group B teams had such
member.
 22

Table 2. Simulation participant background information.

9.4 Ship details

The simulation was done using a LORO-type vessel equipped with own deck cranes.

 Length overall: 173,5 m

 Breadth: 23,05 m
 Maximum draft: 8,1 m
 Two anchors with 11 shackles of chain in each
 Maximum rudder angle 35 degrees
 Single controllable pitch propeller ship with propeller rotating left
 One main engine (power: 9540 kW)
 Maximum speed: 18 knots
 23

Figure 5. Similar vessel to the one used in the exercise. (Hafen-Hamburg)

9.5 Bridge equipment

The exercise was conducted using Transas ship simulator in Aboa Mare training
center in Turku. We used two identical bridge simulators which were equipped like a
basic ship bridge would be. The relevant equipment for this exercise were:

 two radars
 ECDIS
 2 walkie-talkies
 steering controls (autopilot, override tiller, manual hand wheel)
 control panel for navigational lights
 conning display (e.g. engine revolutions, propeller pitch and ship movement)
 log book
 written route plan
 list of phone numbers (Attachment 7)
 check lists (for group B teams)
 24

Figure 6. Bridge simulator used in the exercise (Promotional photograph)

9.6 The exercise

The simulation started outside Loviisa harbor and the team was informed that they
were heading out of Loviisa. The selected location needed to be such that by taking
the correct measures the team would be able to steer the ship to safety.
Simultaneously the location had to be challenging enough so that by taking the wrong
measures the ship would run aground.

Readymade route plan (Attachment 6) was provided and it was briefly discussed with
the team before commencing the exercise. The planned route was also visible on the
bridge ECDIS screen. The team was also informed that the ship had a tight schedule
and it was not recommended to reduce the speed. They were also told that the ship
was sailing within VTS area and that the VTS operator was available if a needed. The
team gained the knowledge that also ship’s crew was available using intership
communications (phone/walkie-talkie) and that anchor lowering (if needed) would
happen by contacting the watchman.

The speed at the starting point of the simulation was 10 knots and it was rising
slowly. The engine control levers were set to full ahead and at the point of the
 25

blackout the speed had increased to 12,4-13,2 knots depending slightly on the
previous actions of various teams.

During the exercise all teams had to enter a narrow passage and make one turn
before arriving at the blackout position. The blackout was simulated using the
simulator software and it was inflicted to all teams at the same position which was
determined using a green buoy.

The team received information about the blackout via phone call from the engine
room (simulator control room). They were informed that the situation looks bad and
it will probably take some time to fix. This was done in order to emphasize the need
of urgent action from the bridge team. The blackout was also visible from the
simulator conning display but hardly distinguishable. According to our division this
was a Level 2 blackout. This meant that the team had a working rudder but the
propulsion was lost. In practice this enabled the team to perform one or two efficient
rudder commands before losing maneuverability completely because of lack of speed.

After the blackout the teams were given totally free hands to act the best way they
thought possible in that situation. Researchers monitored constantly the actions the
team made but did nothing in order to assist in any way. Simulated VTS operator and
normal ship crew were available if needed.

The simulated event took place during midday. The weather was clear with the wind
blowing 10 m/s from Northeast. No current or significant waves were present. The
ship was at full loading condition.
 26

Figre 7. The route illustrated on a paper chart.

9.7 Actions of the teams

Researchers used a separate datasheet to help gather consistent data during and after
the simulation (Attachment 1). The group code (A or B) was clearly marked on the
datasheet to ensure easy separation of the data afterwards. The collected data is
presented in this chapter.

Prior to blackout all teams maintained requested speed and followed the planned
course. This enabled equal starting to the blackout situation. After receiving the
information that there had been a blackout onboard all of the teams acknowledged it
right away and started planning the best way to handle the situation. There was no
misunderstanding with any team so any irregularities in the outcome were
eliminated this way.
 27

9.7.1 Items on the datasheet and collected data

Item 1: Inform VTS

In case of a blackout within VTS area the vessel must report it to the local VTS. The
chart below shows that only half of the teams in the group A did the right thing. All of
the group B teams contacted VTS accordingly.

Group A

YES
NO
Group B

0% 20 % 40 % 60 % 80 % 100 %

Item 2: Write down time and position

During an incident it is important to record time and position for the possible
investigation that takes place afterwards. The result shows that one team without the
checklist didn’t write down time and position.

Group A

YES
NO
Group B

0% 20 % 40 % 60 % 80 % 100 %
 28

Item 3: Set lever to zero position

When the ship is recovering a blackout situation it is important to remember to reset

the engine command levers to zero position. If they are left some other way the
rudder might start producing propulsion without the crew noticing when the power
is restored. Half of the group A teams did not realize to do this.

Group A

YES
NO
Group B

0% 20 % 40 % 60 % 80 % 100 %

Item 4: Inform watchman

The ship used in the simulation was equipped so that the anchor was released locally
from the forward mooring station. Quick notice to the watchman after the blackout
was important because it takes time to make the anchor ready to be dropped. All
teams in both groups informed the watchman.

Group A

YES
NO
Group B

0% 20 % 40 % 60 % 80 % 100 %
 29

Item 5: Use of emergency steering

In this simulation the emergency steering was done by operating either the override
tiller or using follow up hand steering wheel. In the latter choice manual switching
from the autopilot to the hand steering had to be done. All teams in both groups
accomplished to maneuver the ship using emergency steering.

Group A

YES
NO
Group B

0% 20 % 40 % 60 % 80 % 100 %

Item 8: NUC signal

Not Under Command signaling is important measure to warn other vessels in vicinity
about difficulties to maneuver. 25% of the teams without the checklist did not do this.

Group A

YES
NO
Group B

0% 20 % 40 % 60 % 80 % 100 %
 30

Item 9: Inform (final) situation to VTS

It is important for the VTS to know when the situation is not evolving anymore and
when proper actions by the rescue and environment officials may commence. All
teams contacted the VTS latest when the ships was stationary.

Group A

YES
NO
Group B

0% 20 % 40 % 60 % 80 % 100 %

Item 10: Was the checklist used?

All teams that were given the checklist used it for assistance in decision making
during the blackout.

Items 6 & 7: Use of anchor

All of the teams used anchoring as a solution to deal with the blackout situation. Team
specific description on the use of anchor is described in the chapter 9.9.
 31

9.8 Exercise outcomes

Simulation ended when the team was not able to do anything to improve their
situation or when the situation was under control. All of the teams ended up either
anchored or ran aground. No significant difference between group A and B teams can
be found.

Group A Group B

Ancored Anchored
50 % 50 % 50 % 50 %
Grounded Grounded

9.8.1 Team specific outcomes

(The order of the teams inside the groups is scrambled in order to maintain anonymity.)
 32

Team A1

After the blackout the initial plan of team A1 was to maneuver through the narrow
channel. Quite fast they realized that it is not possible without engine power. At that
point they tried stop the vessel using anchors. First starboard side anchor was
released while the ship was making way with a speed of 7,0 knots. The anchor chain
broke under tension and the team dropped the port side anchor as well. The speed
was still 5,5 knots and therefore the PS anchor chain also broke. After that the team
had no options to influence the outcome and they eventually ran aground.
 33

Team A2

After the blackout the team looked for suitable place to anchor and found one on their
port quarter. They executed a hard to port turn after the green buoy and managed to
slow down the speed and take the vessel to safe waters. When the speed had dropped
to 1,9 knots the team dropped the port side anchor. The anchor held and the team
managed to avoid any damage to the ship.
 34

Team A3

Team A3 followed almost the same path as team A2. The only difference was that they
introduced starboard rudder angle during the swing to port. Their plan was to reduce
speed with this maneuver but in reality it made their turn radius larger and brought
them closer to danger. In the end the team managed to stop the ship using one anchor
and they remained anchored in safe waters.
 35

Team A4

Team A4 also did the swing to port but they dropped the first anchor at too high
speed and the chain broke. Second anchor was released while the ship had a speed of
2,8 knots. This was enough to brake the second anchor chain as well. This left the ship
drifting and eventually it would have run aground due to Northeast wind. Due to time
issues the simulation was stopped when there was nothing to do anymore in order to
make the situation better.
 36

Team B1

In the beginning team B1 did not use rudder to make the turn but instead dropped
port side anchor. Team was planning it would swing the vessel port and slow it down.
Due to high speed the chain broke. For a while after losing the first anchor the team
used starboard rudder but eventually started turning port. During the turn the team
dropped port side anchor but the speed was still too high and the chain broke.
Eventually the ship ran aground.
 37

Team B2

The team informed VTS that they had a blackout onboard. After the announcement
the team waited for VTS to provide assistance to deal with this matter. The team was
unable to get any additional help from the VTS and they decided to act themselves.
They did a port turn and dropped the first anchor with a speed of 3,0 knots. First
anchor was lost but se second one held. The outcome for this team was that they
remained anchored and the ship did not suffer any damage.
 38

Team B3

Team B3 tried to maneuver the ship through the narrow channel. They didn’t get
their heading towards the channel and they dropped their first anchor at 7,2 knots
speed but the chain broke. When the green buoy was on their starboard side they had
a speed of 4,8 knots and they dropped their second anchor. They had too much speed
for the chain to hold and they ran aground with both anchors lost.
 39

Team B4

After the blackout the team tried to avoid the first green buoy by introducing
starboard rudder angle. After passing the buoy they eliminated any rudder angle and
the ship started to turn port because of the wind force. Barely any rudder commands
were given during the swing to port. First anchor was dropped when the ship had
turned 90 degrees but the speed was enough to break the chain. The ship continued
turning and the team released second anchor when the speed had dropped to 2,4
knots. The team remained anchored and avoided any damage to the ship.
 40

9.9 Questionnaire

Question 1: How challenging did you find the situation?

1=not challenging at all 10=very challenging

Group A

Group B

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

Group A averaged 7,0 and group B averaged 7,5.

Question 2: Do you think you could have managed better by using a checklist?

1=no difference 10=much better

Group A

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

Group A averaged 4,5. Group B did not aswer to this question

Question 3: How safe do you think you handled the situation?

1=unsafe 10=safe

Group A

Group B

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

Group A averaged 7,9. Group B averaged 6,0.

 41

Question 4: Are you satisfied with your performance?

1=unsatisfied 10=satisfied

Group A

Group B

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

Group A averaged 7,9. Group B averaged 5,8.

Question 5: Estimate what is the probability that you will encounter a blackout
situation onboard in real life during your career.

1=probably not 10=most certainly

Group A

Group B

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

Group A averaged 9,1. Group B averaged 8,9.

9.10 Conclusion

Like statistics about the exercise outcome illustrated no significant difference

between groups A and B can be seen when considering whether the ship was safe or
not. Performing tasks of small importance improved when using the blackout
checklist. These tasks in real situation could lead to bigger problems but this was
challenging to point out in a simulator environment. It seems that checklist was not a
redeeming feature to survive from an extremely challenging situation.

Questionnaire shows that the teams without the checklist felt like they handled the
situation more safely than their colleagues with the checklist. The A group also felt
 42

more satisfied with their performance. This is an interesting fact considering that the
performance was actually quite the same between the groups. It might be that the
checklist generates fake sensation of safety in situations where you need rapid
thinking based on your previous experience and educational background.

Written feedback from the participants pointed out that using a checklist in a crisis
situation might even direct ones focus on minor details. Researchers had difficulties
of constructing a blackout checklist that would always neglect individual error on
decision making and would always direct the ship away from harm’s way. It seems
like checklists are build for supporting an individual and do not replace the need of
situational awareness in a crisis situation.

9.11 Project evaluation

The result of this research is based on a small number of test subjects. 15 people
divided into eight groups is not big enough sampling for constructing reliable
research data. One of the teams in group B consisted only of one member. Already
this fact has impact on 25% of group B data and 12,5% of the whole sampling.
Limited amount of simulator facility resources prevented the use of bigger sampling.

The briefing was designed to meet the demands of this simulation and its
participants. The briefing contained specific information about the necessary actions
to deal with the challenges faced in the exercise. For example anchoring operations
were described in detail during the briefing and it probably made the subjects
mentally prepared for anchoring even though they were clueless of what they were
going to face. This could have made the exercise predictable and the result corrupt. In
addition to this the groups did not perform this exercise at the same time so it is
possible that also some information was revealed to the later groups from the
subjects that had already done the exercise.

The result of this research is based on a checklist made by the researchers

themselves. It might be that some other type of checklist could have been able to
perform much better in a similar blackout situation.

Providing checklists to group B already gave huge advantage compared to group A

because group B teams probably knew to anticipate some kind of a crisis situation to
 43

arise. On the other hand the decoy checklists could have misled some team to strongly
expect a wrong kind of crisis to deal with (e.g. preparing for fire alarm).

The surrounding environment and the prevailing traffic conditions in the simulation
were predetermined and tested by the researchers when the simulation was
constructed. After the blackout the wind pushed the bow of the vessel automatically
to port making the subjects instinctively reject the option of turning the vessel
starboard instead (the ship was unable to turn to starboard even with high rudder
angles). Actually by doing nothing at all made the ship end up in safe waters. This
might have aided some students to pick the safest option by coincidence and not
because they knew what to do.

In order to ratify our results a subsequent research should take place. A future
research could be conducted using a bigger sampling or in a different location with
different settings. Also studying psychological factors (stress reaction) during a
blackout situation would be a subject for future research.

10 Final words
The thesis was able to deliver answers to the questions given in the introduction part.
Theoretical part ignored most of the engine room details which left the technical
details of a blackout quite unknown. It is almost important to know the cause for the
blackout than it is to react to it. Otherwise theoretical part navigation wise managed
to cover most of the important subjects and that was our main goal. Research part
provided us with wanted results but the practical implementation was challenging.
The sampling was quite narrow and the simulation was done only in one scenario.
Bigger amount of participants with different simulation set up could verify our
results.

The thesis was constructed as teamwork. This turned out to be very suitable way to
work for both of us. The presence of a team mate helped in the moments where lack
of motivation was present. It also pursued team members to achieve proper level of
quality which was agreed before the work commenced. Both of us learned quite a lot
during the process: not only about the subject but also how to be part of a team in a
long process and how to contribute towards a common goal.
 44

References
Laivakonetekniikka (2010). Laivan sähköjärjestelmä.
http://laivakonetekniikka.wikispaces.com/Laivan+s%C3%A4hk%C3%B6j%C3%A4r
jestelm%C3%A4 (retrieved: 24.2.2015)

Merenkulun perusteet 2 (2nd ed). Piira O., Haavisto J. & Opetushallitus (2008).
Helsinki: Edita Prima Oy.

Personal communication with Joonatan Ahlroos, VTS shift supervisor, Turku

25.2.2015

Personal communication with Hannu Yli-Heikkilä, marine engineering specialist at

Aboa Mare maritime school, Turku 15.4.2015

Archipelago VTS Masters Guide. Liikennevirasto (2013).

http://portal.liikennevirasto.fi/portal/page/portal/f/ammattiliikenteen_palvelut/me
riliikenteen_ohjaus/vts/111216_Archipelago_su.pdf.pdf (retrieved: 25.2.2015)

IMO Resolution A.325(IX) Regulation 20 and 21 (1975). Recommendation concerning

regulations for machinery and electrical installations in passenger and cargo ships.
http://www.imo.org/blast/blastDataHelper.asp?data_id=22175&filename=A325%28
IX%29.pdf (retrieved 26.2.2015)

IMO COMSAR/Circ.32 Ref. T2/6-01, page 34 (2004) 7.6 Harmonization of GMDSS

requirements for radio installations onboard SOLAS ships.
http://www.imo.org/blast/blastDataHelper.asp?data_id=10750&filename=32.pdf
(retrieved: 3.3.2015)

SOLAS, Consilidated Edition 2004. IMO (2004) London

Investigation report of Safety Investigation Authority Finland (2014). Tutkintaselostus

M2013-06 M/S Amorella (FIN), sähköhäiriö ja karilleajo Ahvenanmaan saaristossa
14.12.2013.
http://www.turvallisuustutkinta.fi/material/attachments/otkes/tutkintaselostukset
/fi/vesiliikenneonnettomuuksientutkinta/2013/JKQwDPa6B/Tutkintaselostus_M201
3-06.pdf (retrieved: 5.5.2015)

M/S Finneagle Blackout checklist. M/S Finneagle Crisis & Alarm Plan (12.5.2015)

Marinersgalaxy (2014), Black Out on Ship, Recovery and Actions to be taken

http://www.marinersgalaxy.com/2014/07/black-out-on-ship-recovery-and-
actions.html (retrieved: 22.4.2015)

ISM Code 2002 edition. IMO (2006), London

 45

Figures
Figure 1:
http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/6/66/Standby_UPS_Diagram_SVG
.svg (retrieved: 27.2.2015)

Figure 2: Engine room blackout checklist. Source kept unnamed. (15.4.2015)

Figure 3: Number of reported blackouts in the Finnish VTS/GOFREP-area 2011-2014,

Finnish Transport Agency, senior inspector Kati Westerlund, (7.4.2015)

Figure 4: Promotional photo received from VTS shift supervisor Joonatan Ahlroos
(22.4.2015)

Figure 5:
http://www.hafen-
hamburg.de/images/image_cache/images/0/fotos/schiffe/9288045_0.jpg (retrieved:
26.1.2016)

Figure 6: Promotional photo received from Aboa Mare Quality Manager Bo Lindroos
(27.1.2016)
 1

Appendices
Appendix 1: Simulator exercise datasheet
2
 3

Appendix 2: Questionnaire
 4

Appendix 3: Simulator vessel Pilot card

 5

Appendix 4: Simulator vessel Wheelhouse poster

 6

Appendix 5: Blackout checklist for simulator group B members

 7

Appendix 6: Route Plan

 8

Appendix 7: Phone numbers