ORF SpecialReport 173 AUKUS
ORF SpecialReport 173 AUKUS
173
no.
AUKUS and the Indo-Pacific: Stakeholders
Weigh their Wins and Losses
Harsh V Pant and Rahul Kamath
Editors
DECEMBER 2021
© 2021 Observer Research Foundation. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, copied, archived, retained or transmitted through
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Introduction
T
he trilateral security partnership
between Australia, the United
Kingdom, and the United States
(AUKUS), announced on 15 What AUKUS primarily does is enable
September 2021, has instantly Australia to acquire nuclear-powered submarines
become a matter of interest, and controversy, in with assistance from the US and UK, and diversify
the Indo-Pacific, the region that is unfolding as its cooperation in cyber capabilities, artificial
a theatre for 21st century’s geopolitical affairs. intelligence, quantum technology, and undersea
Touted as Canberra’s biggest defence partnership capabilities. It is an extraordinary move, in fact,
in decades, the trilateral aims to strengthen the for the US and UK to commit to exporting
security arrangement in the Indo-Pacific along with nuclear technology to a non-nuclear powered
the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue or the Quad.1 nation such as Australia. In November 2021,
This was made clear in their joint statement, which AUKUS members also signed the naval nuclear
described the pact as a “historic opportunity for the propulsion information agreement that allows
three nations, with like-minded allies and partners, sharing of sensitive information to improve their
to protect shared values and promote security and mutual defence postures.
prosperity in the Indo-Pacific region.”2
For the US, this alliance will allow it to
expand its sphere of influence in the Indo-Pacific
region. As President Joe Biden has said, this
pact “is about investing in our greatest source
of strength, our alliances and updating them to
better meet the threats of today and tomorrow.”3
Attribution: Harsh V Pant and Rahul Kamath, “AUKUS and the Indo-Pacific: Stakeholders Weigh their Wins and
Losses,” ORF Special Report No. 173, December 2021, Observer Research Foundation.
2
Indeed, maintaining the balance of power in the
Indo-Pacific is of utmost priority for Washington
especially at a time of China’s belligerence, planned—have been postponed, and analysts
including towards Taiwan. Therefore, the US assume that it is in retaliation for the cancellation
is willing to work with its allies in the region to of the French-Australian submarine deal worth
enhance their defence potential through sharing €56 billion. AUKUS has also widened the divide
of sensitive defence technology. Similarly, for in the trans-Atlantic relationship between the
Britain, strengthening its traditional ties with US and Europe, especially after Washington’s
Australia and the US is an effective way of gaining unilateral decision to pull its troops out of
a greater voice in the region. British Defence Afghanistan without consulting its European
Secretary Ben Wallace declared that with China allies.
“embarking on one of the biggest military spends
in history” and “engaged in some disputed areas”, Some hostility has also come the way of AUKUS
the UK’s regional partners “want to be able to stand from China. Beijing has said that the agreement
their own ground.”4 From an Indian standpoint, was “extremely irresponsible” and accused the
meanwhile, AUKUS is highly important as it allows member states of initiating an “arms race” in the
the country to be more ambitious in its foreign Indo-Pacific. Other countries in the region have
policy and defence approaches and gives it greater responded differently. Japan, Vietnam, Taiwan,
strategic room to manoeuvre in the Indo-Pacific. and the Philippines, have welcomed the trilateral
To be sure, however, some quarters have expressed partnership, whereas Indonesia and Malaysia
concerns that AUKUS could end up marginalising have voiced concerns over the potential presence
the Quad. of a nuclear-powered weapon in their waters. At
the same time, Indonesia is seeking to boost its
Along with the interest is some controversy, defence capabilities amidst ongoing tensions with
as AUKUS has reignited the diplomatic tensions China in the South China Sea. It is negotiating
between certain global powers. France, for one, a deal with France for the sale of 36 Rafale
recalled its ambassadors from Washington and fighter jets which would allow Paris to increase its
Canberra for the first time in 243 years. Even the security footprint in the region as a compensatory
European Union (EU) expressed dissatisfaction measure after the cancellation of the France–
with Australia’s decision to abandon its ties with Australia submarine deal.
France. The Australia–EU Free Trade talks—long
3
In this Special Report, ORF scholars examine
AUKUS from five perspectives: Australian,
American, British, French, and Indian. The aim is
to obtain a thorough understanding of the trilateral
security arrangement and explore the role it will The announcement of AUKUS has thrown the
play in the Indo-Pacific region. From strengthening challenges in the Indo-Pacific in sharp relief as
Washington’s Pacific anchor, to reigniting the like-minded nations attempt to find an adequate
Global Britain Brand and strengthening Australia’s response to the strategic churn in the region. With
strategic ambitions, AUKUS can have diverse regional powers trying to evolve partnerships
impacts on not only the three participating that will see closer alignment of regional policies
members but also other regional powers. While and actions as well as greater integration of
India has displayed solidarity with its Quad their defence forces, challenges are also likely to
partners against rising tensions with China, France emerge which will need careful assessment and
has sought to look elsewhere in the Indo-Pacific consideration. The debate on AUKUS has only
to bolster its 2018 Indo-Pacific Strategy especially just begun; even at its nascence, however, the
after the AUKUS rift, leaving the French and the trilateral can already have long-lasting impacts on
Europeans to ponder their strategic autonomy. the strategic map of the Indo-Pacific.
4
Endnotes
1 On the emerging agenda of Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, see Harsh V Pant and Shashank Mattoo (eds), “The Rise and
Rise of the ‘Quad: Setting an Agenda for India,” ORF Special Report No 161, September 2021,https://www.orfonline.org/
wp-content/uploads/2021/09/ORF_SpecialReport_161_Quad-India-Agenda.pdf
2 The White House, Joint Leaders Statement on AUKUS, September 15, 2021, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/
statements-releases/2021/09/15/joint-leaders-statement-on-aukus/
3 The White House, Remarks by President Biden, Prime Minister Morrison of Australia, and Prime Minister Johnson of the
United Kingdom Announcing the Creation of AUKUS, September 15, 2021, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/
speeches-remarks/2021/09/15/remarks-by-president-biden-prime-minister-morrison-of-australia-and-prime-minister-
johnson-of-the-united-kingdom-announcing-the-creation-of-aukus/
4 BBC, “Aukus: UK, US and Australia launch pact to counter China,” September 16, 2021, https://www.bbc.com/news/
world-58564837
5
1
The View from the American
Beltway
Vivek Mishra
T
he long-term deal between Australia,
the UK and the US (AUKUS) is
important for Washington for various Shifting US Priorities in Asia
reasons. For the first time in 50
years, the US is sharing its submarine The AUKUS deal augments Canberra’s
technology with other countries; it had previously strong alliance with the US. To begin with, it
only shared nuclear propulsion technology with came on the heels of the US withdrawal from
Britain in 1958.1 The trilateral security agreement Afghanistan which happened in August 2021.
covers a broad spectrum of partnerships including As the troop withdrawal, and the subsequent
the sharing of information and technology in a fall of Kabul to the Taliban, caused the US a
number of areas such as intelligence and quantum loss of credibility regarding its role in regional
technology, as well as the acquisition of cruise security, the AUKUS deal sought to fill the
missiles.2 Its first major initiative will be the delivery strategic vacuum in America’s long-sought
of a nuclear-powered submarine fleet for Australia. ‘Pivot to Asia’ strategy. The deal marks a power
Over two decades, the agreement will see broad shift—4 a reorganisation of US priorities in Asia,
collaborations between the three nations in the areas while strengthening Washington’s Pacific anchor
of science and technology, industries, and defence which was undermined in the Trump era. The
forces. In the first 18 months, the three countries AUKUS deal is also being projected as the Biden
will undertake consultations to devise mechanisms administration’s step to reassure its Pacific allies
that will ensure compliance with commitments to about American presence and security guarantee.
nuclear non-proliferation.3
6
Regional Security in the Indo-Pacific
7
In this strategy, Australia could prove to be the
most critical strategic outpost in the Pacific theatre
for the US. Assisting Canberra in augmenting its
defence capabilities could be a useful strategy to anchored in the Pacific theatre; and second,
ameliorate the impact of a rapidly closing US- AUKUS could complement the Quad with
China power gap. Politically, Australia’s recent firm its differentiated regional and security focus.
posturing vis-à-vis China8 has created a regional The AUKUS’s purpose can also be assessed as
bulwark in the Pacific for Washington; to this, the complementing that of the Quad, even as the
AUKUS deal adds a security layer and strengthens strategic and security focus of the former can be
external balancing in the region. Besides reassuring kept as distinct from the broad mix of agendas of
its partners, the AUKUS deal will look to repair the the Quad. This provides the member countries a
US’s hub-and-spoke system of alliance which has spectrum of available manoeuvres.
sustained its partnerships in the Pacific theatre at
least since the end of the Second World War. In the Essentially, AUKUS seeks to complete the
long run, a stronger Pacific alliance will allow the loop that attempts to rebalance the US strategic
US to depend more on burden-sharing between positioning to the Asia-Pacific. Furthermore, the
partners and allies in the Indo-Pacific. agreement reinforces the US’s commitment to the
Indo-Pacific, potentially enhancing its relevance
Despite the fact that Washington has juxtaposed in the region. It promises to augment the US’s
AUKUS to its growing network of partnerships partnerships in the region, increase coordination
in the Indo-Pacific region—including ANZUS, and cooperation, and even provide abilities to
ASEAN, Five Eyes and the Quad,a the former cause counter-disruptions in the Indo-Pacific
distinguishes itself from the others. For instance, region in the future. Finally, in the emerging
between AUKUS and the Quad, the US has ruled competitive geopolitics of the Indo-Pacific, the
out the idea of adding India or Japan to the new two most pertinent aspects that would keep the
trilateral security partnership.9 This decision core regional interests of the US in the region
is reflective of two important things: first, that hinged to AUKUS will be regional stability and
AUKUS is purposefully intended to be strategically arms race.
a The ANZUS Pact is a formal Pacific security treaty between Australia, New Zealand, and the United States that was signed in San
Francisco on September 1, 1951. ASEAN or the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, is an economic union comprising 10 member
states in Southeast Asia. The Five Eyes partnership is an intelligence alliance comprising Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United
Kingdom, and the United States. Quad or the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue is a group of four countries: the United States, Australia,
India, and Japan for furthering broad cooperation in the Indo-Pacific and ensuring security and stability in the region.
8
Endnotes
1 S. Tewari, “Aukus: UK, US and Australia pact signals Asia-Pacific power shift,” BBC, September 16, 2021, https://www.bbc.
com/news/world-asia-58540808
2 Tewari, “Aukus: UK, US and Australia pact signals Asia-Pacific power shift”
3 Remarks by President Biden, Prime Minister Morrison of Australia, and Prime Minister Johnson of the United Kingdom
Announcing the Creation of AUKUS, September 15, 2021, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-
remarks/2021/09/15/remarks-by-president-biden-prime-minister-morrison-of-australia-and-prime-minister-johnson-of-
the-united-kingdom-announcing-the-creation-of-aukus/
4 Tewari, “Aukus: UK, US and Australia pact signals Asia-Pacific power shift”
6 Tewari, “Aukus: UK, US and Australia pact signals Asia-Pacific power shift”
7 Remarks by President Biden, Prime Minister Morrison of Australia, and Prime Minister Johnson of the United Kingdom
Announcing the Creation of AUKUS
8 James Laurenceson, “By standing up to China, Australia may end up standing alone”, October 14, 2021, https://fortune.
com/2021/10/13/australia-china-relations-trade-aukus-embargo-james-laurenceson/
9 “U.S. rules out adding India, Japan to AUKUS,” The Hindu, September 23, 2021, https://www.thehindu.com/news/
international/us-rules-out-adding-india-japan-to-aukus/article36624520.ece.
9
2
A Fit with the UK’s ‘Global
Britain’ Goals
Rahul Kamath
T
he Indo-Pacific region continues to
attract regional and non-regional
powers as it unfolds into a key London as a “permanent opportunist”, stressing
geopolitical arena. The signing of on London’s junior status vis-à-vis the US.
the AUKUS pact in September adds Nonetheless, the government of Prime Minister
another dimension to the security architecture Boris Johnson considers AUKUS as a milestone,
in the region; with AUKUS, Australia’s regional especially following Brexit and since it outlined its
prowess combines with the technical expertise of new Indo-Pacific strategy in March 2021.1
the UK and the US in what can only be described
as an amplification of regional security. The deal Since Brexit, PM Johnson has been
immediately resulted in some diplomatic wrangling, attempting to once again hoist the banner
especially between France and the European Union of “Global Britain” and claim for the UK a
(EU) as the former recalled its ambassadors from greater stake in the international community.
Canberra and the US—a first in their 243-year- Johnson has remarked that the success of Global
long association. France did not, however, recall Britain would depend on the security of the
its ambassador from London; it views the UK as homeland, and the stability of the Euro-Atlantic
playing only second-fiddle to the US. Paris refers to area while expanding its vision eastwards.2
10
The British Indian Ocean Territories constitute
a keystone for the UK in the Indo-Pacific: Diego
Garcia is leased to the US; and Duqm port in Oman In other words, the region is a canvas for the
receives aircraft carriers in a critical geostrategic UK in its effort to balance military engagement
location near the chokepoint of the Gulf of Oman, and economic and strategic partnerships with
between Oman and Iran. The UK also opened its like-minded democracies in the region to achieve
naval support facility in Bahrain in 2018—its first significant outcomes. The AUKUS’s establishment,
permanent base since withdrawing from the Suez for the UK, could translate to high-skilled job
Canal in the 1970s. The UK has only begun to creation4 and the preservation of global stability.
understand the importance of the region in recent Reacting to hostile remarks from French officials
years; after all, it was embroiled in contentious following the AUKUS signing, Johnson was
domestic affairs, primary of which was the Brexit quoted to have said, “I just think it’s time for some
negotiations. of our dearest friends around the world to Prenez
un grip (get a grip) about this and Donnez moi un
Following Brexit, the UK has initiated break (give me a break).”5 The UK on multiple
engagements with the Indo-Pacific, a region occasions has accused France of overreacting. At
accounting for almost half of global economic the same time, Johnson is aiming to sign a new
output. The former UK foreign secretary, Dominic entente cordiale (cordial agreement) with France.
Raab, in his visit to India in 2020 said, “If you look The rupture in mutual trust is significant as these
at India and the Indo-Pacific region and take a long- powers fight for position in the world’s fastest-
term view, that is where the growth opportunities growing region.
will be.”3 The UK is seeking global leadership and
increased prosperity since its departure from the At the same time, the EU is also trying to
EU as it aims to have a meaningful security role achieve consensus on establishing a European
in the region, guided by Washington. The UK Strategic Autonomy and France will aim to
recognises China as a systemic competitor and aims coordinate with other Indo-Pacific powers to
to work through regional multilateral organisations not only protect its EEZs but also sustain in
to counter Chinese aggression in the Indo-Pacific, the region to effectively compete with China.
especially in the South China Sea and the Taiwanese
waters. PM Johnson has hinted at expanding G7
into G10 by inviting three Indo-Pacific powers—i.e.,
South Korea, India, and Australia.
11
The promises made by the Boris administration
during the Brexit negotiations relied heavily on
expanding the country’s role beyond its territorial to deploy the Rolls Royce nuclear reactor to
confines; the UK’s inclusion in the Pacific security power the submarines and provide quiet pump-
pact could partly realise these promises. The UK’s jet propulsion. This could result in job creation in
Integrated Review, which is its blueprint for Global the UK. The AUKUS trio aim to expand beyond
Britain published in March 2021, refers to the Indo- nuclear sub as they develop joint technologies
Pacific region 30 times.6 The document asserts the to protect the undersea cables by incorporating
country’s position in the Indo-Pacific by declaring the use of artificial intelligence and quantum
ambitions to establish the most integrated presence communication. The AUKUS countries have
of any European nation in the Indo-Pacific. The signed a Naval Nuclear Propulsion Information
document also focuses on rebuilding ties with Agreement, which allows for the exchange of
allies by elevating the status of the UK’s special sensitive information and formalises Australia’s
relationship with the US, followed by aligning with access to highly sensitive nuclear submarine
Australia.7 technology. AUKUS situates seamlessly in the
UK’s Defence Command Paper and Integrated
To be sure, however, AUKUS does not fully Review as an integral and strategic part of the
extend the idea of “Global Britain” as there is no idea of Global Britain. London has promised to
military element and Britain’s defence investments increase the British defence budget by 10 percent
and deployments have remained fairly within in this decade to showcase their Machtpolitik
European territory. Downing Street seeks to (Power politics).9 The dispatch of the new Royal
emphasise on restoring the lost glory of NATO Navy Carrier Strike Group (CSG21) to the
against the backdrop of EU’s Strategic Autonomy.8 Mediterranean and the Indo-Pacific in May 2021
—the first operational deployment of the UK
The UK further seeks to expand its role in Carrier Strike Group since 2011—was not solely
the Five Eyes, an intelligence alliance between showboating; rather it was signalling the UK’s tilt
Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the UK, and the towards the region. AUKUS also fits in the UK’s
US, besides training the Australian military in new new Integrated Operating Concept (IOpC)10
nuclear submarine technology. The UK is expected as it introduces two critical functions: engaging
partners and constraining rivals through
confrontation.
12
Therefore, for the UK, the AUKUS framework
can have long-term, strategic impacts that in turn
can revitalise Johnson’s vision of “Global Britain”.
The next crucial challenge for the UK would be to Indo-Pacific. Still, the UK will continue to play
normalise its relations with France and the EU, and a significant role as a significant security actor in
develop a new transatlantic approach to the Indo- the Indo-Pacific. Its intent to put more emphasis
Pacific region to counter their common systemic on Asia in its foreign policy would achieve its
rival. PM Johnson’s aspirations to compete in the desired outcome only if the UK is more settled
Indo-Pacific while tilting away from Europe and the domestically and regionally.
EU could fail to achieve its objectives owing to the
greater presence of stronger regional actors in the
13
Endnotes
1 The UK Government, Global Britain in a Competitive Age: the Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy,
United Kingdom, 2021, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/global-britain-in-a-competitive-age-the-integrated-
review-of-security-defence-development-and-foreign-policy
2 Patrick Wintour, “Why the Britain is tilting to the Indo-Pacific region”, The Guardian, March, 15, 2021, https://www.
theguardian.com/politics/2021/mar/15/why-britain-is-tilting-to-the-indo-pacific-region
3 Foreign Secretary’s visit to India: joint press conference opening statement, December 15, 2020, https://www.gov.uk/
government/speeches/foreign-secretarys-statement-during-visit-to-india-tuesday-15-december
4 “Aukus: UK, US and Australia launch pact to counter China”, BBC, September 16, 2021, https://www.bbc.com/news/
world-58564837
5 Heather Stewart, “Aukus row: Boris Johnson tells France Donnez Moi un-break”, The Guardian, September 22, 2021, https://
www.theguardian.com/world/2021/sep/22/aukus-row-boris-johnson-tells-france-donnez-moi-un-break
6 Georgina Wright, “AUKUS Golden Opportunity Global Britain”, Institut Montaigne, September 23, 2021, https://www.
institutmontaigne.org/en/blog/aukus-golden-opportunity-global-britain
7 Georgina Wright, “UK’s integrated review – what global Britain means”, Institu Montaigne, March 17, 2021, https://www.
institutmontaigne.org/en/blog/uks-integrated-review-what-global-britain-means-france
8 Robin Niblett, “AUKUS reveals much about the new global strategic context”, Chatam House, September 18, 2021, https://
www.chathamhouse.org/2021/09/aukus-reveals-much-about-new-global-strategic-context
9 Julian Lindley-French, “AUKUS Future Western led Geopolitical Networks”, Clingendael Institute, October 19, 2021, https://
spectator.clingendael.org/en/publication/aukus-future-western-led-geopolitical-networks
10 Sidharth Kaushal, “What does AUKUS deal provide its participants”, RUSI, September 21, 2021, https://www.rusi.org/
explore-our-research/publications/commentary/what-does-aukus-deal-provide-its-participants-strategic-terms
14
3
Australia Ponders a Win
Premesha Saha
B
y being part of AUKUS, Australia has
made it clear that it is taking the side
of the United States amidst growing
Chinese belligerence in the Indo- Australia’s primary strategic concern has
Pacific region. A US government historically been the South Pacific and, to
spokesperson has described AUKUS as “the biggest some extent, Southeast Asia in its extended
strategic step Australia has taken in generations.”1 neighbourhood. In recent years, however,
As the US and UK agree to share their nuclear- Northeast Asia and the looming China threat
powered submarines technology with Australia,2 has begun to have more influence on Australia’s
the White House has noted, “These submarines strategic and security calculus. Australia is
will allow Australia to deploy for longer periods, bandwagoning with the United States in
are quieter, much more capable and will allow us to conducting military operations in the Indo-
sustain and to improve deterrence across the Indo- Pacific, and undertaking strong measures and
Pacific.”3 The AUKUS pact also covers enhancing mechanisms to deter China’s aggression. On
joint capabilities, deeper military interoperability, its surface, the AUKUS deal does aim to boost
“new architectures” of meetings and engagements Australia’s defence capabilities; at the same time,
between defence and foreign policy officials, and to some analysts are questioning whether it will serve
“spur co-operation across many new and emerging Australia to rely on this arrangement.5 Australia
arenas” – cyber, applied AI, quantum technologies seems certain that the “United States will remain
and “some undersea capabilities.”4 engaged in Asia for the long haul and will be
prepared to face down China if necessary.”6
a In 2019, the US, Russia and China formed the Troika on Afghanistan, which became the Extended Troika with the addition of Pakistan.
The Moscow Format was set up in 2017 for talks among special representatives from Russia, Afghanistan, China, Pakistan, Iran and
India. The representatives of five Central Asian countries also attend its meetings. The US has also been invited to its consultation.
15
To be sure, the country’s leaders had until
recently been talking about having a more self-
reliant defence posture. With this new security
arrangement, however, it appears to be “betting big Immediately following the AUKUS signing,
on the future of its alliance with the United States.”7 it became clear that the new arrangement will
Some observers have also noted that Australia have an impact on Australia’s relations with other
“has given up its strategic ambiguity and made countries, including France and countries in
itself a bigger target because of the pact.”8 There is Southeast Asia. To begin with, the lead-up to the
speculation that Australia could face more economic security pact was unknown to other countries in
retaliations from China, which is its biggest trading the region, and since then has generated anxiety
partner.9 among the Pacific Island countries. Australia’s
Secretary of Defence, Greg Moriarty, has said
There is little doubt that AUKUS is a watershed his government would be reaching out to the
for Australia: It is a big step for a country who had members of the Pacific Islands Forum to assure
walked away from the 2007 Quadrilateral grouping them that “the growth of Australian capabilities
to avoid irking Chinese sentiments. It remains to be [will contribute] to regional stability.”11
seen whether this strategy undertaken by Australia,
and primarily the United States, with a view to AUKUS has created a similar backlash in the
deterring China from using force in the Indo-Pacific ASEAN, with Indonesia and Malaysia being
region will work or only provoke China to act more most categorical in expressing their reservations.
aggressively in disputed areas like the South China Malaysia has expressed concern that the pact “can
Sea and the East China Sea. act as a catalyst for arms race.”12
Even before the AUKUS pact, however, Australia For Australia’s former Prime Minister, Malcolm
has already been taking steps that were hinting at a Turnbull, it was “potentially deceitful” that France
shift in its China policy. For example, it has barred was not told about the new trilateral deal.13 The
the Chinese telecommunications giant Huawei repercussions, Turnbull said, were not confined
from competing in its 5G infrastructure market, only domestically or even within the European
and it has introduced legislation to curb foreign Union, but also extended into other neighbouring
interference in politics. It also cancelled the projects countries.
that had been agreed to under China’s flagship Belt
and Road Initiative.10
16
Australia will likely derive benefits from the
AUKUS agreement to make itself a formidable been the pillars in Australian foreign policy, and
defence power. At the same time, it will need to work Australia would need to dig deep in its diplomatic
on strengthening its partnerships in Southeast Asia arsenal to involve these countries in discussions
and the Pacific, and also with France which is a notable revolving around security and convince them that
player in the region. These same geographies have AUKUS would help restore a peaceful and rules-
based order in the Indo-Pacific.
17
Endnotes
1 Patricia A. O’Brien, “AUKUS, born in secrecy, will have implications for Australia, wider region”, Business Standard,
September 22, 2021, https://www.business-standard.com/article/international/aukus-born-in-secrecy-will-have-implications-
for-australia-and-the-region-121092200202_1.html
2 Sam Roggeveen, “Australia Is Making a Risky Bet on the U.S.”, The New York Times, September 20, 2021, https://www.
nytimes.com/2021/09/20/opinion/AUKUS-australia-us-china.html
3 Patricia A. O’Brien, “AUKUS, born in secrecy, will have implications for Australia, wider region”
4 Patricia A. O’Brien, “AUKUS, born in secrecy, will have implications for Australia, wider region”
5 Alexander L. Vuving, “AUKUS Is a Short-Term Mess but a Long-Term Win for Australia”, Foreign Policy, October 11, 2021,
https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/10/11/aukus-australia-long-term-win/
8 Frances Mao, “Aukus: Australia’s big gamble on the US over China”, BBC News, September 22, 2021, https://www.bbc.com/
news/world-australia-58635393
11 Soli Middleby and Anna Powles, Massey University, and Joanne Wallis, “AUKUS and Australia’s Relations in the Pacific”
13 Grant Wyeth, “AUKUS, Australia, and the Importance of Trust in Foreign Policy”, The Diplomat, October 07, 2021, https://
thediplomat.com/2021/10/aukus-australia-and-the-importance-of-trust-in-foreign-policy/
18
4
France’s Unease in
Sharp Relief
Andrea Moreschi
T
he termination of the 56-billion-euro
submarine procurement contract
between Australia and France, and the
related announcement of the AUKUS however, be dangerously short-sighted to simply
defence alliance between Canberra, ascribe the backlash to a president’s bruised ego,
Washington, and London, have understandably as some commentators have hastened to do.3
been perceived as a grave diplomatic affront in There are, indeed, several layers to the French
Paris. The response was harsh, with French Foreign perspective, which can only be understood if
Minister Le Drian accusing the Anglo-Saxon alliance one acknowledges the complex constellation of
of “duplicity” and of behaviour not suited to long- interests and long-term goals that Paris has been
standing and trustworthy allies.1 Words were swiftly pursuing in the Indo-Pacific.
followed by actions, as French President Emmanuel
Macron recalled his ambassadors to Australia and Fundamental to France’s advancement of its
the United States back to Paris—a historic first.2 strategic objectives is the defence industry; the
In part, France’s reaction can be read as having AUKUS pact hurts it. To be sure, the submarine
been motivated by diplomatic humiliation and deal was an ideal win-win situation for France:
exclusion, especially because Paris was completely Australia, a close and trusted allied, was to expand
blindsided by Australia’s decision. Considering its military capabilities, while the French defence
that President Macron, who is up for re-election industry was to increase its revenues and technical
in Spring 2022, has endeavoured a great deal to expertise. However, when Canberra pulled out
restore France’s global standing and prestige, the of the agreement, Naval Group, which had been
snub must have been particularly hard to swallow, chosen as the contractor in the 2016 deal, lost an
and therefore required a firm reaction. It would, estimated 10 percent of its annual revenue and
incurred other costs, mostly associated with the
ad-hoc establishment of an Australian subsidiary.4
19
Furthermore, the reputational damage suffered by
Naval Group can create ripple effects throughout
France’s global efforts. Indeed, the submarine multilateral security-building that France has
procurement deal represented an important piece been promoting through, for instance, multi-
in the expansionary strategy in the Indo-Pacific national training exercises with regional players,
defence market, which includes ongoing contracts such as India and Japan.9
with India, Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia.5
In the words of Naval Group President Pierre Éric In fact, at a deeper level and beyond transitory
Pommellet, the deal “was not just a programme, bouts of pride, the AUKUS rift is about the
it was a transformation for the company, we were emergence of two increasingly contrasting visions
projecting Naval Group into a new world […] It for the future of defence and security in the Indo-
was a transformation for France also.”6 Pacific. The triangular alliance has been explicitly
conceived in opposition to China’s growing
The most immediate reason for such an influence in the region, and it is therefore bound
increase in the involvement of Paris in matters of to reinforce the arbitrary power duality between
regional security and defence is that France is an Beijing and Washington. In other words, the
Indo-Pacific power. With almost 3 million citizens Anglo-Saxon solution, from the point of view of
residing in its overseas departments and territories, France, is one that perpetuates the existence of
as well as its 9 million sq km of exclusive economic a bipolar order in the Indo-Pacific and therefore
zones, France has more substantial and direct exacerbates the risk of conflict in the medium
stakes in the future of the region than the United to long term. This precise point is explicitly
Kingdom or the United States could ever claim.7 addressed in the French Strategy for the Indo-
In order to defend its interests, Paris maintains a Pacific, which states: “Chinese-American strategic
significant military presence between the Indian competition […], giving priority to bilateral
and the Pacific Oceans: between 7,000 to 8,000 arrangements and power relations in order to
military personnel, 15 warships, and 38 aircrafts.8 favour their own national interests, contributes
In this context, the announcement of AUKUS, and to the breakdown of the international order.”10
the subsequent increment in the military activities In contrast, France has been pursuing a strategy
of its three members in the Indo-Pacific, is seen as of geopolitical mitigation, by weaving a web of
a destabilising presence in the region. Additionally, inclusive, multilateral diplomatic initiatives with
it has been taken as a sign that Washington and regional powers that are equally invested in
Canberra are not really committed to the kind of preserving stability and peace.
20
For instance, President Macron has invested
time and energy into strategic convergence with
India, with which the country has signed a military It should therefore appear clear why France
procurement deal worth 7.9 billion euros for reacted strongly to the announcement of AUKUS.
the purchase of fighter jets.11 Another important From the point of view of France, the pact
partner has been ASEAN, which in 2020 signed reveals a fundamental discrepancy between the
a strategic partnership deal with the European strategic vision that the Anglosphere intends to
Union and most of whose members favour a non- promote in the Indo-Pacific—one that is framed
confrontational approach to China.12 Australia itself in terms of competition and containment—and
had been identified as a key contributor to the that of France which is “multipolar, stable, and
actualisation of France’s plans in the Indo-Pacific, inclusive”.15 AUKUS is certainly a challenge, but it
to the point that President Macron chose Sydney also bears some unique opportunities. Namely, as
as a location for the announcement of the French the French government was quick to point out, it
Indo-Pacific Strategy in 2018.13 That came after helps make the case for the need to build a global
the two countries had signed an agreement for defence initiative that is qualitatively different,
enhanced intelligence sharing, a comprehensive strategic, autonomous, and truly European.16 The
Strategic Partnership, and a Vision Statement on AUKUS rift is therefore likely to have an impact
the Australia-France relationship.14 on how the French and the Europeans think of
their own security and of the security of their own
interests in the long run.
21
Endnotes
1 Le Monde, “Sous-marins australiens : Jean-Yves Le Drian dénonce une « rupture majeure de confiance » avec les Etats-Unis
et l’Australie”, September 19, 2021, https://www.lemonde.fr/international/article/2021/09/18/sous-marins-australiens-jean-
yves-le-drian-denonce-une-rupture-majeure-de-confiance-avec-les-etats-unis-et-l-australie_6095174_3210.html
2 French Ministry of European and Foreign Affairs, “Statement by Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian”, September 17, 2021, https://
www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/country-files/australia/news/article/statement-by-jean-yves-le-drian-minister-for-europe-and-
foreign-affairs-17-sept
3 Henry Samuel, “Emmanuel Macron’s Vision for French supremacy is dead in the water”, The Telegraph, September 20, 2021,
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2021/09/20/emmanuel-macrons-vision-french-supremacy-dead-water-submarine/
4 Richard Lough, “French shipbuilding town in shock over lost Australian submarine order”, Reuters, September 24, 2021,
https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/french-shipbuilding-town-shock-over-lost-australian-submarine-order-2021-09-24/
5 French National Assembly, Rapport d’Information sur le contrôle des exportations d’armement, by Maire, Jacques and
Michèle Tabarot, November 18, 2020, https://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/dyn/15/rapports/cion_afetr/l15b3581_rapport-
information#_Toc256000000
6 Anna Gross and Sylvia Pfeifer, “French defence groups turn to Macron to redress submarine reputation hit”, The Financial
Times, October 3, 2021, https://www.ft.com/content/75bbfdcc-41e9-4160-acc0-79182cf3012c
7 French Ministry of European and Foreign Affairs, L’espace indopacifique: une priorité pour la France, July 2021, https://
www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/fr/dossiers-pays/asie-oceanie/l-espace-indopacifique-une-priorite-pour-la-france/
8 Abhijnan Rej, “French Joint Commander for Asia-Pacific Outlines Paris’ Indo-Pacific Defense Plans”, The Diplomat, April 13,
2021, https://thediplomat.com/2021/04/french-joint-commander-for-asia-pacific-outlines-paris-indo-pacific-defense-plans/
9 Xavier Vavasseur, “Australia France India Japan And The United States Take Part In Exercise La Pérouse”, NavalNews,
April 6, 2021, https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2021/04/australia-france-india-japan-and-the-united-states-take-part-
in-exercise-la-perouse/
11 John Pollock, “India and France: From Strategic Partners to a Strategic Alliance”, South Asian Voices, October 19, 2020,
https://southasianvoices.org/india-and-france-from-strategic-partners-to-a-strategic-alliance/
13 Ben Doherty, “France and Australia can be heart of new Indo-Pacific axis, Macron says”, The Guardian, May 2, 2018, https://
www.theguardian.com/world/2018/may/02/france-and-australia-can-be-heart-of-new-indo-pacific-axis-macron-says
15 French Ministry of European and Foreign Affairs, “L’espace indopacifique: une priorité pour la France”, July 2021, https://
www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/fr/dossiers-pays/asie-oceanie/l-espace-indopacifique-une-priorite-pour-la-france/
16 French Ministry of European and Foreign Affairs, “Statement by Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian and Florence Parly”,
September 16, 2021, https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/country-files/australia/news/article/statement-by-jean-yves-le-drian-
minister-for-europe-and-foreign-affairs-17-sept
22
5
A Divided Opinion in India
Abhijit Singh
T
he jury in New Delhi is still out
on AUKUS, the new security pact
between the United States, the United
Kingdom, and Australia. Eight weeks prioritise challenges in the non-military domain:
after it was announced, the issue vaccine diplomacy, infrastructure building,
continues to split political observers in India, with technology sharing, and climate change.5
little clarity over whether the agreement benefits Proponents say the pact allows New Delhi to
New Delhi or is detrimental to its interests.1 Many focus on a developmental agenda, with a degree
believe the pact is good for India and its Indo- of assurance that that the strategic threat in the
Pacific partners.2 By clearly declaring its intention Indo Pacific is being robustly met.6
to deter China, proponents say AUKUS offers New
Delhi vital ‘leverage’ in dealing with Beijing.3 The sceptics disagree.7 They say that however
noble its intended purpose, AUKUS undermines
As some see it, the continuing turbulence on the strategic order in Asia. First, it is plainly
India’s northern border, makes it imperative for provocative to China, and has the potential to
New Delhi to avoid joining an anti-China alliance.4 destabilise the Western Pacific (with inevitable
The pact, they aver, allows India—a key US partner consequences for Indian Ocean states).8 AUKUS
and Quad member—the freedom to set the terms can accelerate an undersea arms race that is
of engagement with its neighbour, without formally already underway, and could paradoxically tip
participating in a China-containment initiative. the balance against America and its allies in Asia.9
In a post-Covid-19 era, New Delhi also needs to Second, the agreement is prejudicial to French
interests, serving only to alienate Paris, injecting
distrust in the Western alliance. This, too, could
have unintended strategic consequences.
23
From a maritime operations perspective,
AUKUS gives many Indian experts pause. With the
Indian navy’s conventional underwater capability
fast shrinking, the possibility of Australian The possibility of Chinese aggressiveness in
submarines in the Indian Ocean is not reassuring the Indian Ocean is not merely hypothetical. In
for India’s security observers.10 While they are recent months, China’s military and non-military
happy for Australia — a Quad member and close activity in the IOR, has prompted the Indian navy
partner of India in the Indo Pacific — to receive to embark on a plan to develop a fleet of nuclear
nuclear submarine technology from the US and attack submarines. Ironically, the US has made no
the UK, Indian analysts are apprehensive of the offer of help.12 The “very rare” nature of AUKUS
possibility of a future increase in friendly nuclear – as announced by US officials immediately
attack submarines (SSNs/submersible ship nuclear) after the unveiling of the pact – leaves little to
in the Eastern Indian Ocean. Such a scenario could imagination.13 Washington does not anticipate
erode India’s regional pre-eminence in the Indian technology sharing on nuclear submarines with
Ocean.11 any partners other than the UK and Australia.
Of greater concern for Indian observers is the While it has rarely received submarine
possibility that provoked by AUKUS, China might technology from the US, New Delhi has been
respond—not so much in the congested South accepting of American discretion on the
China Sea, already gridlocked with posturing and matter. India has instead relied on Russia for
counter posturing—but in the Indian Ocean, where nuclear submarine technology, including in the
China has so far been relatively quiet. AUKUS could construction of the reactor of India’s first SSBN/
push China into assuming a more adventurous submersible ship ballistic missile nuclear (Arihant)
posture by deploying more warships and and in the acquisition (on lease) of a nuclear attack
submarines in the Eastern Indian Ocean. Chinese submarine. With the Indian Navy’s announcement
naval ships could well stay clear of Indian waters, of an indigenous SSN programme, however, there
but their mere presence in the littorals is likely to is a need for a nuclear reactor more powerful
put pressure on the Indian navy. In response, New than the one installed in the Arihant (a non-war-
Delhi might have to consider deploying warships in fighting platform). Following the deepening of
the Western Pacific, which could further aggravate Quad ties, some in India were hopeful that the
tensions. AUKUS, critics say, could push India- US would consider providing the Indian Navy
China maritime dynamics into a negative spiral. with nuclear submarine propulsion technology.
AUKUS gives many Indian experts pause.14
24
And yet, AUKUS goes well beyond the nuclear
submarines.15 The pact’s ultimate goal is to prevail
in the technology competition with China. Pooling For the moment, Indian officials are being
resources and integrating defence and industrial careful in articulating a formal position vis-à-vis
supply chains is a way for the US, Australia, and the AUKUS. On the eve of Indian Prime Minister
UK to beat China in the high-tech race for regional Narendra Modi’s visit to the United States for
and global supremacy.16 As AUKUS partners the first in-person Quad summit in September,
expand cooperation in artificial intelligence, Foreign Secretary Harsh Vardhan Shringla stated
quantum computing, and cyber operations, the that the deal was “neither relevant to the Quad
balance of power in the Indo-Pacific could shift in nor likely to have any impact on its functioning.”21
ways New Delhi and other regional capitals have This suggests an attempt to downplay the
not entirely accounted for. significance of AUKUS for India.22
All of this would still be acceptable if the new For India, however, the imperative is to display
alliance were to complement the Quad. Many solidarity with its Quad partners, especially at a
believe it does.17 There is something about time when tensions with China are again rising.
AUKUS, however, that suggests it diminishes the The official narrative is that the new pact adds
value and usefulness of the Quad.18 Since its revival one more lever in efforts to balance China. Yet
in 2017, the Quad has displayed strategic flexibility concerns in India’s security establishment vis-à-
in dealing with China. The grouping’s allure is vis AUKUS are real. Despite an acknowledgement
its mystique—the ability to drive non-traditional of Canberra’s strategic motivations to bolster
cooperation, and yet pose a strategic counter to strategic deterrence against China, there is a
China in the maritime domain. AUKUS, critics say, palpable sense among security watchers that the
has taken some of that element away. The Quad new alliance impinges on Indian stakes in the
has been shown to be a non-military, non-security Indian Ocean.
grouping with agency in shaping the strategic
narrative of the Indo-Pacific.19 The new alliance of
the US, UK and Australia has seized the initiative.20
25
Endnotes
1 “What does India stand to gain or lose from AUKUS?”, The Indian Economist, November 21, 2021, https://qrius.com/what-
does-india-stand-to-gain-lose-from-aukus/
2 “AUKUS may benefit India”, Times of India, September 23, 2021, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/
aukus-trilateral-may-benefit-india/articleshow/86284371.cms?from=mdr
3 Nayamita Basu, “Why India could gain ‘major leverage’ as Australia, UK, US join hands to take on China”, The Print,
September 16, 2021, https://theprint.in/world/why-india-could-gain-major-leverage-as-australia-uk-us-join-hands-to-take-
on-china/734550/
4 Manjari Chaterjee Miller, “The Quad, AUKUS and India’s dilemmas”, Council for Foreign Research, October 13, 2021, https://
www.cfr.org/article/quad-aukus-and-indias-dilemmas
5 “India’s future and role in the post-COVID-19 world”, World Economic Forum, November 10, 2021 https://www.weforum.org/
agenda/2021/11/india-s-future-and-role-in-the-post-covid-19-world/
6 Akshobh Giridharadas, “Why the AUKUS helps the Quad?”, Observer Research Foundation, October 21, 2021, https://www.
orfonline.org/expert-speak/why-the-aukus-helps-the-quad/
7 Bharat Karnad, “A Post AUKUS world and India’s options”, Security-wise, September 27, 2021, https://bharatkarnad.
com/2021/09/27/a-post-aukus-world-and-indias-options/
8 Mark Julliane, AUKUS Rocks the Boat in the Indo Pacific and its not good news”, IFRI, September 29, 2021, https://www.
ifri.org/en/publications/editoriaux-de-lifri/lettre-centre-asie/aukus-rocks-boat-indo-pacific-and-its-not-good
9 Lyle Goldstien, “The unintended consequences of the AUKUS deal”, The Conversation, October 29, 2021, https://www.
defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2021/10/29/the-unintended-consequences-of-the-aukus-deal/
10 Abhijit Singh, “India is not a bystander in the AUKUS saga”, The Hindu, September 23, https://www.thehindu.com/opinion/
op-ed/india-is-not-a-bystander-in-the-aukus-saga/article36659188.ece
12 Sandeep Unnithan, “Why the US won’t give India nuclear submarines”, India Today, September 21, 2021, https://www.
indiatoday.in/india-today-insight/story/why-the-us-won-t-give-india-nuclear-submarines-1854818-2021-09-20
13 “Background Press call on AUKUS”, The White House, September 15, 2021, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/
press-briefings/2021/09/15/background-press-call-on-aukus/
15 Arzan Tarapore, “AUKUS is deeper than nuclear submarines”, East Asia Forum, September 29, 2021, https://www.
eastasiaforum.org/2021/09/29/aukus-is-deeper-than-just-submarines/
16 “US China tech race is the new world war”, Times of India, October 7, 2021, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/how-
close-is-china-to-beating-us-in-the-tech-race/articleshow/86835674.cms
17 Rajesh Rajagopalan, “Quad tent just got bigger with AUKUS. China’s aggressive behaviour will be under watch”, The Print,
September 20,2021, https://theprint.in/opinion/quad-tent-just-got-bigger-with-aukus-chinas-aggressive-behaviour-will-be-
under-watch/735973/
18 Interview with Brahma Challeney, Times of India, September 23, 2021, “Will AUKUS overshadow Quad and push India and
Japan to Tier-II relationship with US? https://m.timesofindia.com/videoshow/86438923.cms”
26
19 Raja Menon, “India dithered over projecting naval power. Now it’s been pushed to the sidelines of the Indo-Pacific”, Indian
Express, September 21, 2021, https://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/india-dithered-over-projecting-naval-
power-now-its-been-pushed-to-the-sidelines-of-the-indo-pacific-7530473/
20 Jyoti Malhotra, “It’s clearer to India than ever that Quad is no military alliance. Everything’s a bit AUKUS”, The Print,
September 21, 2021, https://theprint.in/opinion/global-print/its-clearer-to-india-than-ever-that-quad-is-no-military-
alliance-everythings-a-bit-aukus/737008/
21 “AUKUS alliance neither relevant to Quad nor will impact on its functioning”, New Indian Express, September 21, 2021,
https://www.newindianexpress.com/nation/2021/sep/21/aukus-alliance-neither-relevant-to-quad-nor-will-impact-on-its-
functioning-india-2361899.html
22 Chaarvi Modi, “What does India’s exclusion from AUKUS mean”, October 4, 2021, https://www.statecraft.co.in/article/what-
does-india-s-exclusion-from-aukus-mean
27
About the Authors
28
Ideas . Forums . Leadership . Impact