007R

________________________________________________________

THE 2022 HARAMAYA UNIVERSITY COLLAGE OF LAW

5TH INTER-BATCH MOOT COURT COMPETITION

________________________________________________________

CASE CONCERNING THE SUTHAN REFERENDUM

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF ANTARA

(APPLICANT)

V.

VELAN KINGDOM OF RAVARIA

(RESPONDENT)

2022

ON SUBMISSION TO THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF

JUSTICE
_______________________________________________________

MEMORIAL FOR THE RESPONDENT

0
TABLE OF CONTENT
TABLE OF CONTENT................................................................................................i
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES.......................................................................................9
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION..........................................................................9
QUESTIONS PRESENTED.....................................................................................10
STATEMENT OF FACTS........................................................................................11
SUMMARY OF PLEADINGS..................................................................................14
PLEADINGS..............................................................................................................17
I. THE DOCUMENTS OBTAINED IN THE ILLEGAL SEARCH OF MS.
WALTERS’S VEHICLE AND THE MAY 30, 2021 RECORDINGS ARE
INADMISSIBLE AS EVIDENCE........................................................................17
A. Antara Unlawfully Obtained the Documents from Ms. Walters’s
Vehicle, Therefore Making the Documents Inadmissible as Evidence..........17
1. Antaran officials violated the VCDR and Ms. Walters’s diplomatic
immunity...........................................................................................................17
a. The VCDR grants diplomatic immunity to diplomatic families............18
2. Antaran officials violated international norms regarding unlawful seizure
and retention of diplomatic documents.............................................................19
B. Antara Unlawfully Introduces Conciliation Meeting Recordings as
Admissible Evidence before This Court...........................................................20
C. Antara Unlawfully Introduces Both the Documents and the Conciliation
Meeting Recordings before This Court............................................................21
1. Even if this Court finds that it can admit such evidence, such evidence is
unnecessary for proper adjudication of this case..............................................21
II. RAVARIA’S ALLEGED FINANCIAL CONTRIBUTIONS AND CYBER
OPERATIONS IN CONNECTION WITH THE SUTHAN REFERENDUM
WERE CONSISTENT WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW.................................22
A. Ravaria’s Alleged Financing of the Suthan Independence Party Was
Consistent with Antara’s Sovereign Rights under International Law..........22
B. Ravaria’s Alleged Use of Cyber Influence on the Suthan Referendum
Was Consistent with International Law...........................................................23
1. Ravaria is not responsible for the Lunar Botnet or its actions...................23
a. Suthans Against Domination is not an organ of Ravaria.......................24
b. Suthans Against Domination is not controlled by Ravaria....................25
III. ANTARA’S ORDER SUSPENDING PROFESSOR HUNLAND’S PANO
ACCOUNT VIOLATED INTERNATIONAL LAW AND, THEREFORE, IT
MUST RESCIND THE ORDER...........................................................................27
 A. Antara’s Order Violated Professor Hunland’s Right to Freedom of
Expression............................................................................................................27
1. Antara’s order violated the ICCPR............................................................27
B. Antara’s Order Violated Professor Hunland’s Right to Freedom of
Religion................................................................................................................30
1. Antara’s order violated the ICCPR............................................................30
2. Antara’s order violated the ICESCR.........................................................31
C. Antara’s Order Violated Professor Hunland’s Right to an Effective
Remedy................................................................................................................32
1. Antara’s order violated the ICCPR............................................................32
2. Antara’s order violated the ICESCR.........................................................33
IV. ANTARA’S INTERFERENCE WITH COMPUTERS AND DEVICES
OPERATING ON RAVARIAN SOIL VIOLATED INTERNATIONAL LAW.
33
A. Antara Violated Its Due Diligence Obligations Before It Launched
Operation Moonstroke.......................................................................................34
1. Antara violated its treaty obligations.........................................................34
2. Antara violated customary law on providing notice and demanding
cessation before seeking countermeasures........................................................35
B. Antara Violated Ravaria’s Territorial Sovereignty When it Launched
Operation Moonstroke.......................................................................................36
1. Antara violated the U.N. Charter...............................................................36
2. Antara violated the Budapest Convention.................................................37
C. Antara Violated the Human Rights of Ravarian Citizens When it
Launched Operation Moonstroke.....................................................................38
1. Antara violated the ICCPR Right to privacy.............................................38
2. Antara violated the Budapest Convention.................................................39
3. Antara violated property right....................................................................39
PRAYER OF RELIEF...............................................................................................40

ii
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

TREATIES, AGREEMENTS, AND CONVENTIONS

African Commission on Human and People’s Rights, Principles and Guidelines on the
Right to a Fair Trial and Legal Assistance in Africa,
DOC/OS(XXX)247 (May 16, 2002) ..............................................................................................................

American Convention on Human Rights, July 18, 1978, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123.....................................................

Charter of the United Nations, Oct. 24, 1945, 1 U.N.T.S. XVI........................................................................

Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards,

June 7, 1959 1 U.N.T.S. XII...........................................................................................................................

Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime,

Jan. 7, 2004, E.T.S. No. 185...........................................................................................................................

European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 ....................................................................................................................

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,

Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171..............................................................................................................

International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,

Jan. 3, 1976, 993 U.N.T.S. 3..........................................................................................................................

Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, 33 U.N.T.S 993...........................................................

Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, Apr. 18, 1961, 500 U.N.T.S. 95........................................................

Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 33………………
passim
CASES

Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.)

2002 I.C.J. Rep. 3 (April 11)..........................................................................................................................

Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. of the Congo v. Uganda).
Judgment 2005, I.C.J. Rep. 908 (Dec. 19)......................................................................................................

Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide

(Bosn. & Herz. Serb. & Montenegro),
Judgment, 2007 I.C.J. Rep. 43 (Feb. 26)........................................................................................................

Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), Judgment, 1949 I.C.J. 15 (Apr. 9).............................................................................

Island of Palmas, (Neth. v. U.S.) 2 R.I.A.A. 829, 838 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1928)...........................................................

Kiselev v. Council of the European Union,

Case No. T-262/15, General Court (Ninth Chamber),
(June 15, 2017) (Judgment) ...........................................................................................................................

Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.),

1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27) .................................................................................................................................

Mukong v. Cameroon, Communication No. 458/1991,

U.N. Doc.CCPR/C/51/D/458/1991 (July 21, 1994).......................................................................................

Perincek v. Switzerland, Case No. 27510/08, ECtHR (Oct. 15, 2015)......................................................................

Sunday Times v. United Kingdom, Case No. 6538/74,

2 ECHR 245 (March 29, 1979) (Judgment)....................................................................................................
Trail Smelter Case (U.S. v. Can.), 3 R.I.A.A. 1905, 1963-66
(Perm. Ct. Arb. 1938 and 1941).....................................................................................................................

United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran,

(U.S. v. Iran), Judgment 1981 I.C.J. 45 (May 12)..........................................................................................

UNITED NATIONS DOCUMENTS

G.A. Res. 56/83, Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts,
U.N. Doc. A/RES/56/83 (Jan. 28, 2002)........................................................................................................

G.A. Res. 57/199, Optional Protocol to the Convention Against Torture and
Other Cruel, Inhuman Or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,
U.N. Doc. A/RES/57/199 (Jan. 9, 2003).........................................................................................................

G.A. Res 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights,

U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948)...................................................................................................................

G.A Res. 2625, Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning

Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States in
Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations,
A/RES/2625 (XXV) (Oct. 24, 1970)..............................................................................................................

G.A. Res. 47/25, Disinformation and Freedom of Opinion and Expression,

Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and
Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression,
U.N. Doc. A/HRC/47/25 (Apr. 13, 2021) ......................................................................................................
G.A. Res. 44/12, Freedom of Opinion and Expression
U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/44/12 (July 16, 2020)...............................................................................................

G.A. Res. 68/167, the Right to Privacy in a Digital Age,

U.N. Doc.A/RES/68/167 (Jan. 21, 2014)........................................................................................................

Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 22,

U.N. Doc.CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.4 (July 30, 1993)......................................................................................

Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 16,

U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1 (July 29, 1994)................................................................................................

International Law Commission, Draft Articles on Diplomatic

Protection with Commentaries, G.A. Res 56/10
U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (Sep. 3, 2001)..................................................................................................................

TREATISES, MANUALS, AND BOOKS

TALLINN MANUAL 2.0 ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER WARFARE,

(Michael N. Schmitt ed., 2d ed. 2017)...........................................................................................................

THE RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL UNDER ARTICLE 14 OF THE ICCPR:

TRAVAUX PRÉPARATOIRES (Amal Clooney & Philippa Webb eds., Sep. 2021)............................................

ARTICLES, JOURNALS, AND WORKING PAPERS

Christine M. Nelson, Opening Pandora’s Box: The Status of the Diplomatic Bag in
International Relations, 12 FORDHAM INT’L L. J. 494 (1988).......................................................................

David E. Pozen, Self-Help and the Separation of Powers, 124 YALE L. J. 1 (2014).................................................

Eric Paul Witiw, Persona Non Grata: Expelling Diplomats

 Who Abuse Their Privileges, 9 N.Y.L.S. J. INT’L. COMP. L. 345 (1988).......................................................

Holly Cullen, The Irresistible Rise of Human Rights Due Diligence: Conflict Minerals and
Beyond, 48 GEO.WASH. INT’L L. REV. 743 (March 2019).............................................................................

James H. Boykin & Malik Havalic, Fruits of the Poisonous Tree:

The Admissibility of Unlawfully Obtained Evidence in International Arbitration,
TRANSNAT’L DISP. MGMT. (2015)..................................................................................................................

Jenny Gross, Family of U.K. Teen Reaches Deal with U.S. State Department After
Car Accident, N.Y. TIMES (Sep. 21, 2021)
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/09/21/world/europe/
Anne-sacoolas-harry-dunn.html......................................................................................................................

Luigi Fumagalli, Evidence before the International Court of Justice;

Issues of Fact and Questions of Law in the Determination of International Custom,
In 137 INT’L CTS. DEV. INT’L L. (Nerina Boschiero et al. eds., 2013) ..........................................................

Maria Moutzouris, Sending and Receiving: Immunity Sought By

Diplomats Committing Criminal Offences, RHODES UNIV. 86 (2009)...........................................................

Michael Schmitt, Foreign Cyber Interference in Elections:

An International Law Primer, Part III, EURO. L. J. (Oct. 19, 2020).............................................................

Peter Tomka & Vincent Joel Proux, the Evidentiary Practice of the World Court,
361 (Nat’l Univ. Sing. L., Working Paper No. 010, 2015..............................................................................

Philippa Webb, the Immunity of States, Diplomats and

International Organizations in Employment Disputes:
The New Human Rights Dilemma? 27(3) EUR. J. INT’L L. 745 (2016)..........................................................
Sean Cordey & Kevin Kohler, Cyber defense Report: The Law of
Neutrality in Cyberspace, CENTER FOR SECURITY STUDIES 26 (2021)..........................................................

William T. Worster, the Effect of Leaked Information on the

Rules of International Law, 28(2) AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 447 (2013)............................................................

Yehuda Z. Blum, De Facto Recognition and Diplomatic Immunities,

8 ISR. L. REV. 580 (1973) ..............................................................................................................................

OTHER SOURCES

ARTICLE 19, the Johannesburg Principles on Nat’l Security, Freedom of

Expression and Access to Information, GLOB. CAMPAIGN FREE EXPRESSION,
Principles 1(d), 7 (Oct. 1, 1995)
https://www.article19.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/joburg-principles.pdf..............................................

CENTRE FOR LAW AND DEMOCRACY, Briefing Note Series on Freedom of Expression:
Freedom of Expression as a Human Right, INT’L MEDIA SUPPORT,
http://www.law-democracy.org/live/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/
Foe-briefingnotes-1.pdf..................................................................................................................................

DIRECTORATE GEN. FOR INTERNAL POLICIES, POLICY DEPARTMENT, CITIZEN’S RIGHTS AND
CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS, Legal Frameworks for Hacking by Law Enforcement:
Identification, Evaluation and Comparison of Practices 28 (2017)...............................................................

Harriet Moynihan, the Application of International Law to Cyberattacks, CHATHAM HOUSE,

THE ROYAL INST. INT’L AFFS. (Dec. 2, 2019)
https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/publications/research/2019-11-29-
Intl-Law-Cyberattacks.pdf..............................................................................................................................
Jonathan Master, What is Extradition? COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
(Last updated Jan. 8, 2020) https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/what-extradition.pdf..................................

Mary Rundle & Malcolm Birdling, Filtering and the International System: A Question of
Commitment in Access Denied, OPENNET INITIATIVE 80 (2014)...................................................................

U.N. OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME, Model on Extradition 10 (2004)

https://www.unodc.org/pdf/model_law_extradition.pdf.................................................................................

U.N. O.H.C.H.R., Venice Commission: Guidelines on the Financing of Political Parties,

(Mar. 9-10, 2001)
https://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/RuleOfLaw/CompilationDemocracy/Pages/
CoEGuidelines3.aspx......................................................................................................................................

U.N. O.H.C.H.R, Special Rapporteur on the Right to Privacy: International standards,

https://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Privacy/SR/Pages/Internationalstandards.aspx........................................

U.S. Dep’t of State, Office of Foreign Missions, Diplomatic and Consular Immunity:
Guidance for Law Enforcement and Judicial Authorities (2018)...................................................................
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

The Democratic Republic of Antara (“Antara”) and Velan Kingdom of Ravaria

(“Ravaria”) have agreed to submit the present case concerning the Suthan Referendum before
the International Court of Justice (“I.C.J.”) in accordance with Article 40(1) of its Statute by
notification of the Compromis. The Jurisdiction of this Court over all issues is invoked in
accordance with Articles 36(1) and 40(1) of this Court’s Statute. The jurisdiction of this Court
is invoked without prejudice to any jurisdictional limitations concerning specific pleadings. On
September 13, 2021, Antara and Ravaria submitted declarations to the United Nations
declaring they recognized ipso facto the jurisdiction of this Court’s Statute in accordance with
36(2).
 QUESTIONS PRESENTED

I. Whether the documents obtained through the illegal search of Ms. Walters’s
vehicle and the May 30, 2021, conciliation recordings are admissible evidence
before this Court?

II. Whether Ravaria’s alleged campaign of financial contributions and cyber

operations were consistent with international law?

III. Whether Antara’s order suspending Prof. Hunland’s Pano account violated
international law? If so, whether Antara must therefore rescind the order?

IV. Whether Antara’s interference with computers and devices operating on Ravarian
soil, resulting from the decision to take down the Lunar Botnet, violated
international law?
 STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Democratic Republic of Antara (“Antara”) is a developed country located in the
northern Benthamian Peninsula populated by 21 million people. The Velan Kingdom of Ravaria
(“Ravaria”), located in the southern Benthamian Peninsula, is also a developed country
populated by 12 million people. Both countries became independent States after the Zemin
Empire (“Zemin”) dissolved in 1949. Sutha, located between both countries, is home to a
significant Velan religious center, the Kuvil Shrine. Because of its lack of self-sufficiency, Sutha
remained under Zemin’s colonial control until 1962.

THE TREATY OF SINGAPORE

An “intractable” dispute between Antara, Ravaria, and Zemin regarding Suthan
independence culminated in the ratification of the Treaty of Singapore (“Singapore Treaty”) on
October 29, 1962, whereby Sutha became an Antaran province for the following 25 years. The
terms of the treaty included: (1) Sutha having its own locally elected Legislative Council and (2)
after 1987, the Suthan Legislative Council and national Antaran Parliament, by 2/3 vote of both
parties, could authorize a referendum regarding Suthan independence. As required by the treaty,
Antara amended its Constitution to provide for the referendum.

RESTRICTIONS ON THE VELAN RELIGION AMID THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC

In 1955, the Velan religion was a minority in Antara, representing 24% of its population. In
Sutha, 47% of individuals self-identified as Velans and 85% of Ravarian residents practice Vela.
On February 1, 1957, Vela became the State religion of Ravaria. Velans’ religious practices are
deeply entrenched in community gatherings, including their religious obligation to visit and pray
at sacred temples, such as the Kuvil Shrine in Sutha, at least once in their lifetimes. Under the
Singapore Treaty, Ravarian Velans may visit the Kuvil Shrine. Antara implemented security
within the area of the Shrine and on its ground but could not impose restrictions on the Velans’
freedom of worship.
Responding to the COVID-19 pandemic (“COVID”), Antara issued a decree mandating mask
wearing in all public venues and places of worship and prohibiting gatherings of more than five
people, including for religious purposes. Consequently, the Antaran government closed its
borders to Ravaria, denying Ravarian Velans access to the Kuvil Shrine. The Ravarian
Ambassador to Antara, Benny Walters, immediately delivered a note of protest to the Foreign
Ministry, contending that the border restrictions were in violation of the Singapore Treaty. When
some Ravarians attempted to visit the Shrine, they were subsequently arrested.

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE SUTHANS AGAINST DOMINATION

In 2018, the social media platform Pano became the most popular network in the
Benthamian Peninsula, averaging about 12 million users daily. The platform allows individuals
to share and post content, stream videos, create private chats, and message other users. Professor
Liam Hunland (“Prof. Hunland”)—a citizen of Ravaria, devout Velan worshipper, and active
voice for the Suthan Independence Party (“SIP”)—had acquired over 9 million followers on
Pano by 2019. Prof. Hunland used his personal account to advocate for Velan causes and against
Antara’s actions he considered unjust.
Between April 2020 and June 2020, Prof. Hunland posted over 600 public messages on
his Pano page, stressing that Antara’s Pandemic restrictions were an unjust infringement of the
freedoms of religion and assembly. Prof. Hunland also established a Sutha-based non-profit
foundation called Suthans Against Domination (“SAD”), which he described as “a think tank and
research institution dedicated to the promotion of Velan culture and Suthan autonomy.” Between
June 2020 and August 2021, SAD published a number of monographs and scholarly articles
about the history of Vela and the demographics of Sutha Province. Prof. Hunland organized and
held a rally to encourage Suthans to vote in the Suthan Referendum, which culminated in a
violent interaction with Antaran police. On February 15, 2021, Prof. Hunland’s Pano account
was suspended by court order for expressing his political and religious views.
THE SUTHAN REFERENDUM
In August 2020, SIP established in 1963, took majority in both the Suthan Legislative
Council and the national Antaran Parliament. A month later, SIP introduced resolutions in both
legislative councils proposing a first-time referendum for Suthan Independence. In October
2020, the resolution passed, exceeding the requisite 2/3 vote in both legislative councils. On
March 1, 2021, the referendum occurred, receiving a majority of votes in favor of Sutha’s
independence.
THE TAKEDOWN OF THE LUNAR BOTNET
On April 4, 2021, The Sydney Morning Herald reported that one week before the
referendum, the Antaran Data Protection and Cybersecurity Agency’s (“DPCA”) cybercrime
prevention unit received a court order under Section 8 of the Protect Antaran Cyberspace Act of
2017 (“PACA”) for the takedown of what it codenamed “Lunar Botnet.” During a closed-door
ex parte hearing, DPCA showed evidence to a judge in the Federal Court of Lower Antara that
Lunar Botnet had infected over 30,000 devices over the 3 months immediately preceding the
referendum. While DPCA claimed that the behavior and IP addresses of infected devices were
connected to misinformation spread on Pano, the identities of the individuals involved remained
unknown.
DPCA discovered that the command-and-control server at the centre of the Lunar Botnet
was physically located in Antaran territory and commenced Operation Moonstroke, which
involved hacking into the server and disabling the Lunar Botnet affecting thousands of
computers and devices in Ravaria. Ravaria’s Ministry of External Affairs issued a note to the
Antaran government, showing “dismay at what can only be described as a brazen act of
extraterritorial enforcement in clear violation of international law.”

THE SEARCH AND SEIZURE OF EMMA WALTERS’S VEHICLE

On April 25, 2021, Emma Walters (“Ms. Walters”), wife of Ravarian Ambassador Benny
Walters left a SAD Gala in Antara, driving a rented vehicle. Unfortunately, Ms. Walters was
involved in a car accident resulting in an Antaran citizen’s death. Antaran police responded and
subsequently: (1) seized Ms. Walters’s briefcase containing her identification and diplomatic
passport and (2) arrested Ms. Walters, charging her with vehicular manslaughter. While Ms.
Walters was detained, the sergeant on duty opened her briefcase and found documents detailing
Ravaria’s financial contributions to SIP and SAD. Without Ms. Walters’s consent, the sergeant
photocopied the documents and sent the photocopies to the Antaran National Intelligence
Agency (“Agency”). The Agency returned the original documents back to the Ravarian
Embassy.

DIPLOMATIC NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN ANTARA, RAVARIA, AND ZEMIN OFFICIALS

The Foreign Minister of Zemin, a personal friend of Ambassador Walters, facilitated an
ad hoc meeting with the Attorneys-General of Antara and Ravaria, to deescalate and resolve
rising tensions. The meeting finished on June 1, 2021, whereby the two States’ representatives
signed an agreement concluding the Ambassador and Ms. Walters would return to Ravaria, and
the Ravarian government would pay a confidential amount as compensation to the Antaran
citizen’s family. Although Antara apologized for the arrest of the Ambassador’s wife, it refused
to make any concessions regarding the documents. The official transcription of the meeting was
delivered to the two governments a few days after the conclusion of the meeting. The tape
recorder, however, captured an exchange between the Attorneys-General during the second day
of the meeting. During the exchange, the Attorney General of Antara assumed responsibility for
law enforcement’s unlawful touching of the briefcase.

SUMMARY OF PLEADINGS
I. The evidence introduced by Antara regarding the documents and recordings obtained
in the search and detention of Ms. Walters is inadmissible in this Court. First, in
accordance with the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (“VCDR”), Ms.
Walters retains diplomatic immunity, and as such, Antara abused its authority when it
arrested, detained, and searched Ms. Walters’s briefcase. Second, the recordings from
the Conciliation Meeting, catered as a response to the rising conflicts between both
countries, are protected under diplomatic immunity and customary practices in
international law. Thus, this Court should not admit these pieces of evidence.

II. Ravaria’s alleged financial contributions and cyber influence in the Suthan
Referendum complied with international law and Antaran domestic laws. First,
Ravaria’s alleged financial support of SAD and SIP was consistent with international
law. Second, Ravaria did not violate international law, because Ravaria is not
responsible for the Lunar Botnet operation. Alternatively, the alleged financial
contributions to the Lunar Botnet operation by Ravaria as well as the use of
information technology to influence the Suthan Referendum, complied with
international law and Antaran domestic laws. First, Ravaria did not violate Antara’s
sovereignty because election support is accorded under the Singapore Treaty. Second,
Ravaria did not violate customary international law, because there is no evidence that
 the Lunar Botnet is attributable to Ravaria. Ravarian government entities did not
commit an internationally wrongful act, because mere government approval and
propaganda campaigns are internationally lawful. Lastly, as a sovereign state, Ravaria
has authority to support any movement and ideas.

III. Antara’s order suspending Prof. Hunland’s Pano account violated international law
because the order violated recognized international human rights to freedom of
expression and freedom of religion. In accordance with the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”), the International Covenant of Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights (“ICESCR”), as well as customary international law, Antara was
obligated to respect these rights and allow Prof. Hunland to share his messages
advocating for his Velan community on Pano. Antara did not meet the exceptions
under the ICCPR allowing limitations on Prof. Hunland’s freedom of expression and
religion, because Antara failed to provide sufficient evidence demonstrating Prof.
Hunland actually posed an imminent threat to public safety. Both the ICCPR and the
ICESCR codify and bolster Prof. Hunland’s right to effective remedies to protect his
rights recognized therein. Consequently, Antara violated Prof. Hunland’s right to an
effective remedy by (1) allowing suspension of his Pano account without a robust
lower court proceeding, (2) denying his petition for appeal, and (3) failing to provide
an opportunity to contest the Antaran court’s extension of his suspension. Therefore,
Antara’s order suspending Prof. Hunland’s Pano account was a violation of
international law and should be rescinded.

IV. Antara’s interference with computers and devices operating on Ravarian soil violated
international law. First, Antara violated its due diligence obligations required before it
could take countermeasures. Antara’s treaty obligations require it to try to resolve
disputes peacefully and cooperate with Ravaria. Further, under the Council of Europe
Convention on Cybercrime (“Budapest Convention”), Antara should have notified
Ravaria that it had identified malware problems before it tried to take action
regardless of whether it knew that the SAD organization was involved. Indeed, under
customary law, Antara was required to provide notice to an alleged responsible party
and a demand for cessation before it could lawfully take countermeasures. However,
upon learning of the Lunar Botnet, Antara made decisions behind closed doors
without any notice to Ravaria before launching Operation Moonstroke. In doing so,
Antara’s action was excessive and arbitrary, resulting in a breach of Ravaria’s
territorial sovereignty by hacking into Ravarian citizens’ devices located on Ravarian
soil. Additionally, Operation Moonstroke resulted in human rights violations
regarding the Ravarian citizens’ right to privacy under both treaty law and customary
law. Ravarian citizens did not consent to the hacking of their computers and devices,
nor did Antara meet any special exceptions to the right of privacy provided in
international law.
 PLEADINGS
1. THE DOCUMENTS OBTAINED IN THE ILLEGAL SEARCH OF MS.
WALTERS’S VEHICLE AND THE MAY 30, 2021 RECORDINGS ARE
INADMISSIBLE AS EVIDENCE.

1. The Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations1 acknowledges the immunities and privileges
of foreign diplomats serving in other States.2 As a foreign diplomat, Mr. Walters and his family
were within their rights to receive immunity from the jurisdiction of Antara. 3 Therefore, all
evidence uncovered in Ms. Walters’s car is inadmissible as evidence in Antara’s cause of action
against Ravaria.4

2. Antara Unlawfully Obtained the Documents from Ms. Walters’s Vehicle, Therefore
Making the Documents Inadmissible as Evidence.

2. As highlighted in the VCDR, family members of diplomats are inviolable in most areas
relating to their mission in receiving States.5 While these privileges are not absolute, they are
close, because a family member is considered an extension of the person of the diplomat. 6
Therefore, the protection of the family member is considered necessary to ensure that the
diplomat can properly carry out his functions in the receiving State.7
3. Antaran officials violated the VCDR and Ms. Walters’s diplomatic immunity.

3. Antara had no authority to detain Ms. Walters. As soon as officials seized her paperwork and
saw her diplomatic status, her arrest became Ravaria’s concern. 8 In August of 2019, the British
Government was faced with a similar situation. There, Anne Sacoolas—wife of the U.S.
ambassador to the U.K.—was driving on the opposite side of a highway and collided and killed

1
The Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, Apr. 18, 1961, 500 U.N.T.S. 95 [hereinafter “VCDR”].
2
VCDR, art. 37(1).
3
VCDR, arts. 22-36, 37(1).
4
Compromis para 35-37.
5
International Law Commission, Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection with Commentaries, G.A. Res 56/10 U.N.
Doc. A/56/10 (Sep. 3, 2001).
6
Maria Moutzouris, Sending and Receiving: Immunity Sought By Diplomats Committing Criminal Offences,
RHODES UNIV. 86 (2009).
7
Id. at 103.
8
Compromis para 35-38.
19-year-old motorcyclist Harry Dunn, a British citizen. 9 Ms. Sacoolas’s husband worked at the
military base R.A.F—but was still considered an accredited member of the U.S. Embassy Office
—and was still accorded diplomatic immunity for that status. 10 Ms. Sacoolas did not face charges
in Britain but did in the U.S.—her country of origin.11

4. The VCDR grants diplomatic immunity to diplomatic families

4. Under Article 37(1) of the VCDR, a member of the diplomatic agent’s family—forming part
of his household—shall be immune from the receiving State’s jurisdiction, if they are not
nationals of the receiving State.12 Specifically, the immunities listed include: (1) inviolability
from any form of arrest or detention; 13 (2) inviolability of papers, correspondence, and
property;14 (3) immunity from criminal jurisdiction of the receiving State; 15 and (4) personal
baggage exempt from inspection, unless serious grounds exist for its search.16

5. Here, the key feature of the VCDR is that it offers protection to diplomats and their family
from the criminal jurisdiction of the receiving State where the diplomat’s mission is situated. 17
Antaran authorities should not have (1) seized Ms. Walters’ briefcase, 18 (2) arrested Ms.
Walters,19 (3) detained her in an Antaran jail,20 and (4) retained and made copies of the
briefcase’s contents.21

6. This Court’s decision in Congo v. Belgium22 Congolese foreign minister Ndombasi to prosecute him
for violations of international criminal law would be tried in the domestic courts of the DRC and be
subjected to prosecution in the International Criminal Court (“ICC”). 23

9
Jenny Gross, Family of U.K. Teen Reaches Deal with U.S. State Department After Car Accident, N.Y. TIMES (Sep.
21, 2021) https://www.nytimes.com/2021/09/21/world/europe/anne-sacoolas-harry-dunn.html.
10
Id.
11
Id.
12
VCDR, supra note 1, art. 37(1).
13
Id. art. 29.
14
Id. art. 30(2).
15
Id. art. 31(1).
16
Id. art. 36(2).
17
Id. art. 31(1).
18
Compromis para 35.
19
Id. para 35-36.
20
Id. para 36.
21
Id. para 37.
22
Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.) 2002 I.C.J. Rep. 3 (April 11).
23
Id.
7. Here, Ms. Walters’s arrest and detention was Ravaria’s prosecutorial concern and is similar to the
Congo case where the Court favored foreign immunity over criminal liability of an official. Hence,
custom supports that Ms. Walters’s criminal liability be adjudicated in Ravaria.

8. Further, Antaran authorities found Ms. Walters’s identification and diplomatic passport prior
to arresting her.24 Therefore, the Antaran police were aware of her diplomatic status and should
not have arrested Ms. Walters and retained the briefcase. Second, as soon as Antaran official
seized her briefcase and noticed her diplomatic status—they had a duty to relinquish all authority
vis-à-vis her arrest.25
5. Antaran officials violated international norms regarding unlawful seizure and
retention of diplomatic documents.
9. VCDR Article 3 lists several diplomatic functions that constitute a diplomatic mission. 26 These
include the promotion of friendly relations between the sending and receiving state, more
specifically, to develop their economic, cultural, and scientific relations. 27 Specifically, Article
27(2) protects “official correspondence” from a mission, which includes any and all
correspondence relating to the mission and its functions.28

10. Moreover, VCDR Article 27(3) provides that a diplomatic bag shall not be opened or
detained.29 Further, VCDR Article 36(2) establishes that the personal baggage of a diplomatic
agent shall be exempt from inspection unless there are serious grounds for presuming that it
contains items unrelated to duties, taxes, or other charges for storage.30

11. Here, Antaran officials lacked authority to open Ms. Walters’s briefcase for two reasons.
First, Antaran authorities seized the briefcase from Ms. Walters’s vehicle before she could
consent to its removal and not for any purposes relating to duties, taxes, or storage. 31
Accordingly, the timing of the Antaran officers’ handling of the briefcase violated the VCDR.
24
Id. para 35.
25
VCDR, supra note 1, art. 31(1).
26
VCDR, supra note 1, art. 3.
27
Id. art. 3(e).
28
Id. art. 27(2).
29
VCDR, supra note 1, art. 27(3); Christine M. Nelson, Opening Pandora’s Box: The Status of the Diplomatic Bag
in International Relations, 12 FORDHAM INT’L L. J. 494, 495 (1988).
30
Id. arts. 36(1-2).
31
Compromis para 35.
12. A case that developed the concept of "fruit of the poisonous tree," Wong Sun v. United States,
the evidence found during an illegal search is probably inadmissible in the courts. 32 Hence the
respondent submits that the evidence is illegal and not admissible before this court.

6. Antara Unlawfully Introduces Conciliation Meeting Recordings as Admissible

Evidence before This Court.

13. Diplomatic immunities and privileges accorded under the VCDR extend to de facto
diplomats.33 In this instance, the parties at issue include: (1) The Zemin Foreign Minister who
called the ad hoc meeting between the parties and catered diplomatic conversations that
continued for another month after the first Conciliation Meeting; and (2) both Attorneys-General
of Antara and Ravaria. Here, the parties are considered de facto diplomats for two reasons. First,
the parties gathered are heads of mission as alluded to in the VCDR’s categorization of
“Diplomatic Representatives.”34 Second, both Attorneys-General have “Diplomatic
Representative” status, rendering to the parties the privileges accorded to de jure diplomats that
carry out special missions.35

14. ICJ in subsequent cases, such as the Case Concerning the Frontier Dispute 36 excluded the
pre-negotiation evidences. The recording was the prior settlement negotiation and this is a clear
ground of inadmissibility or exclusion thus exists by virtue of the ICJ’s jurisprudence37.
Respondent submitted that the recording evidence produced by the applicant is inadmissible
evidence before this court.

32
Problems Relating to Admissibility of Evidence Challenged as Indirect Result of Illegal Search," Indiana Law
Journal: Vol. 24: Is. 2, Article 5. Available at: https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj/vol24/iss2/5
33
Philippa Webb, The Immunity of States, Diplomats and International Organizations in Employment Disputes: The
New Human Rights Dilemma? 27(3) EUR. J. INT’L L. 745 (2016).
34
Yehuda Z. Blum, De Facto Recognition and Diplomatic Immunities, 8 ISR. L. REV. 580, 584 (1973).
35
Id. at 586; G.A. Res. 57/199, Optional Protocol to the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, U.N. Doc. A/RES/57/199 (Jan. 9, 2003).
36
(Burkina Faso v Republic of Mali), Judgment, ICJ Reports 1986, 554.
37
Iran-US
15. Even if this Court does not find that full diplomatic immunities and privileges in an instance where
these recordings’ contents would not be protected, it could greatly hinder national security interests of all
three parties and subject them to serious repercussions in the midst of already grave circumstances. 38

7. Antara Unlawfully Introduces Both the Documents and the Conciliation Meeting
Recordings before This Court.

16. The Corfu Channel case is the most cited case that addresses issues with unlawfully
presented evidence in Court.39 There, the Court addressed whether illegally obtained evidence
should be excluded.40 Though, the Court considered the illegally obtained evidence, the Court
held that the United Kingdom had violated Albania’s sovereignty in collecting evidence of the
presence of explosive mines in the Corfu Channel. 41 However, the Court failed to reach a
determination, and failed to decide on a standard of procedure should this event happen again.42

17. In the Armed Activities judgment this Court held that it would make its own clear assessment
on the weight, reliability, and value of clearly identifiable documents presented before it. 43
Lastly, in the Bosnian Genocide case, this Court highlighted factors the Court should consider in
deciding the probative value of a piece of evidence including: (1) the source of evidence, (2) the
process by which evidence has been generated, and (3) the quality of the character of the item.44
1. Even if this Court finds that it can admit such evidence, such evidence is
unnecessary for proper adjudication of this case.
18. Antara’s attempt to introduce unlawfully obtained evidence is not only procedurally flawed
but is unnecessary in solving the dispute between Antara and Ravaria. For instance, in 2010,
Wikileaks published 250,000 confidential diplomatic cables from 274 embassies, consulates, and
missions of the United States. 45 There, the leaked documents could not be considered as evidence

38
Id.
39
Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), Judgment, 1949 I.C.J. 15 (Apr. 9) [hereinafter “Corfu Channel”].
40
Id. at 18.
41
Id.
42
Id.
43
Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda). Judgment 2005,
I.C.J. Rep. 908, para 59 (Dec. 19).
44
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Montenegro),
Judgment, 2007 I.C.J. Rep. 43, para 227 (Feb. 26) [hereinafter “Bosnia Genocide”].
45
James H. Boykin & Malik Havalic, Fruits of the Poisonous Tree: The Admissibility of Unlawfully Obtained
Evidence in International Arbitration, TRANSNAT’L DISP. MGMT. (2015).
per se, because they were obtained in violation of international law. 46 In this case, the same
scenario took place. The briefcase’s contents were unlawfully taken and as such, their
introduction into evidence is unsupported by international law, and thus unnecessary for this
Court to give any weight in deciding whether Antara or Ravaria violated their obligations
towards one another.
2. RAVARIA’S ALLEGED FINANCIAL CONTRIBUTIONS AND CYBER
OPERATIONS IN CONNECTION WITH THE SUTHAN REFERENDUM
WERE CONSISTENT WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW.

19. Antara has failed to demonstrate that the Ravaria’s financial contributions to SIP And SAD
violated international law. First, Ravaria’s alleged funding to SIP is consistent with Antara’s
sovereign rights under international treaty law and custom regarding the public financing of
political parties.47 Second, the alleged use of cyber influence in connection with the Suthan
Referendum is not attributable to Ravaria based on customary attribution principles and the
actions of Ravarian governmental entities.

A. Ravaria’s Alleged Financing of the Suthan Independence Party Was Consistent

with Antara’s Sovereign Rights under International Law.

20. As ratifying members of the Charter of the United Nations (“U.N. Charter”) and Singapore
Treaty, Antara and Ravaria must respect and uphold each other’s sovereign rights. 48 Financially
contributing to a political party falls within freedom of association principles accorded by the
European Convention on Human Rights.49 Public financing between public entities when
significant portions of electoral bodies are part of an election is permissible under U.N.
standards.50 Embassies, as government organs, remain public entities of a state.51 Here, Ravaria
financing the SIP and SAD is permissible and does not amount to a violation of any Ravarian
international obligations toward Antara.

46
William T. Worster, The Effect of Leaked Information on the Rules of International Law, 28(2) AM. U. INT’L L.
REV. 447 (2013).
47
U.N. O.H.C.H.R., Venice Commission: Guidelines on the Financing of Political Parties, (Mar. 9-10, 2001)
https://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/RuleOfLaw/CompilationDemocracy/Pages/CoEGuidelines3.aspx.
48
Compromis para 46.
49
Vienna Commission, supra note 47.
50
Id.
51
Webb, supra note 33.
21. The provision in the U.N. Charter Article 2(1) establishes the right of sovereignty of all
states.52 The U.N. Charter’s purpose is to maintain international security and promote peace
between member states.53 Further, Article 2(4) provides that, “all members shall refrain in their
international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political
independence of any state.”54 As this Court determined in Nicaragua case, merely financing a
political movement does not reach the threshold for an action to constitute a “use of force.” 55
Likewise, the Singapore Treaty established that Antara, Ravaria, and Sutha are to respect each
other’s sovereignty.56 Specifically, the Singapore Treaty recognized that the results of the Suthan
Referendum must be accepted by all parties involved.57

2. Ravaria’s Alleged Use of Cyber Influence on the Suthan Referendum Was

Consistent with International Law.

22. Ravaria’s alleged use of cyber technology to aid or influence the Suthan Referendum lacks
evidence and cannot be attributed to Ravaria for two reasons. First, Lunar Botnet’s actions are
not attributable to Ravaria under customary principles outlined in the Articles on State
Responsibility.58 Second, the actions of the Ravarian External Affairs Ministry and Intelligence
Services comply with international law, because they do not constitute a breach of international
obligations to Antara.
1. Ravaria is not responsible for the Lunar Botnet or its actions
23. The Articles on State Responsibility indicate that a state is responsible only for international
obligations that are attributable to it.59 Accordingly, Article 2 of the Articles on State
Responsibility describes an internationally wrongful act to consist of an action or omission that

52
Charter of the United Nations, Oct. 24, 1945, 1 U.N.T.S. XVI, art. 2(1) [hereinafter “U.N. Charter”].
53
Id. art. 2(4).
54
Id.
55
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶ 94
(June 27). [Hereinafter “Nicaragua”].
56
Compromis para 6.
57
Id.
58
G.A. Res. 56/83, Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/56/83, art. 2(a) (Jan. 28, 2002) [hereinafter “Articles on State Responsibility”].
59
Articles on State Responsibility art. 1.
(1) is attributable to the State under international law and (2) constitutes a State’s breach of an
international obligation.60

24. In the Nicaragua case, this Court addressed limitations that exist in a state’s ability to
interfere in the internal affairs of another state. 61 Accordingly, intervention is “wrongful” when it
uses “methods of coercion…either in the direct form of military action, or in the indirect form of
support for subversive terrorist armed activities with another State.” 62 This Court’s decision was
affirmed by the U.N. General Assembly’s resolution 225 (XXV) where the U.N. noted that a
state assisting another in its threat or direct use of force is equally as wrongful, and therefore is
also defined as an internationally wrongful act.63

25. A cyber operation would qualify as use of force if undertaken by a governmental organ (e.g.
state intelligence, etc.).64 However, the threshold for use of force in the cyber context is unclear
so courts have to look at state practice in determining degree of harm and/or nature. 65 In other
words, a government sponsored coordinated cyber-influence campaign does not equate to use of
force. Here, the Lunar Botnet, aimed at merely persuading Suthans to vote for independence, is
in no way measurable to a government sponsored non-cyber use of force.66
a. Suthans Against Domination is not an organ of Ravaria
26. Articles on State Responsibility Article 4 establishes that private entities, empowered by
governmental authority, are treated as “organs” of the State provided that the entity is acting in a
governmental capacity in a given instance.67 Conditions that make a privatized company’s
actions attributable to that State fall to whether those actions were at the discretion of that State. 68

60
Id., art. 2.
61
Nicaragua, supra note 55, para 205.
62
Id.
63
Id.; G.A Res. 2625, Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation
Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, A/RES/2625 (XXV) (Oct. 24, 1970).
64
Tallinn Manual 2.0, supra note 47, R.10 (4).
65
Harriet Moynihan, The Application of International Law to Cyberattacks, CHATHAM HOUSE, THE ROYAL INST.
INT’L AFFS. (Dec. 2, 2019) https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/publications/research/2019-11-29-Intl-
Law-Cyberattacks.pdf.
66
Compromis para 37.
67
Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 58, art. 5.
68
Id.
Here, there is insufficient evidence to establish Ravaria explicitly empowered SAD to operate as
a governmental organ.69
2. Suthans Against Domination is not controlled by Ravaria
27. International law does not attribute the conduct of non-state actors to a State when it involves
acts or omissions of private persons, mobs, associations, unions, etc. 70 Under Articles on State
Responsibility Article 8, the conduct of non-state actors can be attributable to a State when that
group acts under that State’s instructions.71

28. In the Tehran Hostages case, this Court adjudicated whether mere governmental approval of
a non-state actor’s actions is enough to attribute responsibility to that State. 72 This Court
acknowledged that the Ayatollah’s approval of the U.S. Embassy takeover made non-state
actions into State actions.73 However, only the Iranian police’s failure to intervene was
attributable to Iran, not the actual actions of the students themselves.74

29. Further, the Nicaragua decision established the “effective control test” where this Court held
that to establish control, a State must go beyond “mere financing and equipping” of a non-state
actor group’s activities.75 Here, The Ravarian External Affairs Ministry allegedly approved
SAD’s operation of Lunar Botnet.76 Beyond its mere approval, there is no other evidence to
indicate“effective control” or that SAD, a private entity, was an organ operating on Ravaria’s
behalf. Thus, the Ravarian government should not face liability for a non-state actor’s actions in
this instance.
3. The actions of Ravarian governmental entities were consistent with international
law

30. The Ravarian External Affairs Ministry’s approval of SAD operating the Lunar Botnet is
insufficient to attribute responsibility to Ravaria.77 In the Tehran Hostages case, this Court
69
Compromis para 37.
70
Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 58, art. 8.
71
Id.; Tallinn Manual 2.0, supra note 47, R. 17 para 1.
72
United States v. Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran, Judgment (U.S. v. Iran), Judgment 1981 I.C.J. 45, para
71-73 (May 12) [hereinafter “Tehran Hostages”].
73
Id. para 74.
74
Id.
75
Nicaragua, supra note 55, para 205; Bosnia Genocide, supra note 44, para 403-06.
76
Compromis para 37(c).
77
Id.
adjudicated whether mere governmental approval of a non-state actor’s actions is enough to
attribute responsibility to that State.78

31. Here, The Ravarian External Affairs Ministry allegedly approved SAD’s operation of Lunar
Botnet.79 Beyond its mere approval, there is no other evidence to indicate that SAD, a private
entity, was an organ operating on Ravaria’s behalf. Thus, the Ravarian government should not
face liability for a non-state actor’s actions in this instance.

32. Further, Antara alleges that evidence of the Ravarian Intelligence Services’ plan for the
initiation of a propaganda campaign relating to the Suthan Referendum violated international
law.80 However, it is custom that propaganda campaigns are not necessarily a violation of
international law.81 In order to constitute a violation in an electoral process, the campaign must
have spread misinformation about the process of voting itself and/or the State. 82 Courts have
attempted to look at several factors that would indicate whether a spread of information aimed at
users is coercive or internationally wrongful.83 These include if the operation is (1) designed to
achieve a specific result; (2) the veracity of the information in question; and (3) the operation’s
scale and effects.84

33. Here, the propaganda campaign marked “TOP SECRET” is much too broad to be categorized
as internationally wrongful because it was generally aimed at persuading the citizens of Sutha to
vote for Suthan independence.85 While the promotion of Prof. Hunland’s candidacy to become
president of an independent Sutha is a specific objective, 86 it lacks specificity on the operation’s
scale and effects, therefore not constituting a violation of the Suthan Referendum electoral

78
United States v. Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran, Judgment (U.S. v. Iran), Judgment 1981 I.C.J. 45, para
71-73 (May 12) [hereinafter “Tehran Hostages”].
79
Compromis para 37(c).
80
Id. Para 37(d).
81
Tallinn Manual 2.0 supra note 47, R. 66(27); Michael Schmitt, Foreign Cyber Interference in Elections: An
International Law Primer, Part III, EURO. L. J. (Oct. 19, 2020).
82
Id.
83
Id.
84
Id.; U.N. Charter, supra note 52, art. 2(4).
85
Compromis para 37(d).
86
Id.
process. Thus, the Ravarian Intelligence Services acted appropriately and are within their right to
maintain this sort of campaign plan.

4. ANTARA’S ORDER SUSPENDING PROFESSOR HUNLAND’S PANO

ACCOUNT VIOLATED INTERNATIONAL LAW AND, THEREFORE, IT
MUST RESCIND THE ORDER.

34. Antara is a party to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (“VCLT”), and therefore,
under Article 26 of the VCLT, “every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be
performed by them in good faith.”87 Accordingly, as a party to the ICCPR and the ICESCR,
Antara must respect the provisions in both treaties. 88 Additionally, Antara is a party to Budapest
Convention,89 which also reaffirms the need to ensure the rights established in the ICCPR. 90 The
ICCPR guarantees the right to freedom of expression and freedom of religion. 91 Therefore,
Antara was obligated to respect these rights as they related to Prof. Hunland. As a result, Antara
violated international law when it suspended Prof. Hunland’s Pano account, effectively denying
him the right to express his opinions and share his Velan religious beliefs on the media platform
of his choice.92 Further, Antara denied Prof. Hunland an adequate remedy to protect his rights.
Consequently, Antara must rescind the order suspending his Pano account.

A. Antara’s Order Violated Professor Hunland’s Right to Freedom of Expression.

35. The right to freedom of expression is an international human right enumerated in the
international treaties to which Antara is bound. Further, international custom has long established
that freedom of expression is a fundamental human right, which should only be infringed upon
under the strictest circumstances.

87
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 26, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, art 26.
88
Compromis para 46.
89
Id.
90
Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime, art. 15(1), Jan. 7, 2004, E.T.S. No. 185 [hereinafter “Budapest
Convention”].
91
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, arts. 18-19, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter
“ICCPR”].
92
Compromis para 26.
 1. Antara’s order violated the ICCPR
36. Article 19(2) of the ICCPR provides that “[e]veryone shall have the right to freedom of
expression; this right shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart information . . .
regardless of frontiers . . . in writing . . . through any media of his choice.” 93 These rights
enumerated in the ICCPR have been given broad deference within the international community.
Indeed, in Sunday Times v. United Kingdom, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR)
considered whether to uphold an injunction granted to the United Kingdom restricting an article
from being published in the British newspaper, Sunday Times.94 There, the ECtHR balanced the
right to a fair and impartial trial with the right to freedom of expression and the public’s right to
information.95 Ultimately, the court reversed the injunction, holding that the right to freedom of
expression was superior to other due process considerations.96

37. Additionally, the Council of the European Union recognized in its judgement in Kiselev v.
Council, that freedom of expression “applies not only to ‘information’ or ‘ideas’ that are
favourably received or regarded as inoffensive . . . but also to those that offend, shock or disturb .
. . .”97

38. Here, Prof. Hunland was lawfully using the media of his choice, Pano, a social media
platform, to express his opinion and impart information to his followers.98 Prof. Hunland posted
messages on his Pano account expressing general dissatisfaction with the Antaran government
and its COVID response to Antara’s recent Decree No. 20-32, which prohibited religious
gatherings 99and directly violating the Singapore Treaty.100 Therefore, the Antaran court’s order
suspending Prof. Hunland’s account unlawfully prevented him from expressing himself and was
therefore, a violation of the ICCPR Article 2.

93
ICCPR, supra note 94, art. 19(2).
94
Sunday Times v. United Kingdom, Case No. 6538/74, 2 ECHR 245 (March 29, 1979) (Judgment).
95
Id.
96
Id.
97
Kiselev v. Council of the European Union, Case No. T-262/15, General Court (Ninth Chamber), ¶ 90
(June 15, 2017) (Judgment) [Hereinafter “Kiselev”].
98
Compromis para 13.
99
Id. para 16.
100
Id. para 15.
39. Ravaria submits that although the freedom of expression is not absolute, the exceptions to
this freedom “must be construed strictly, and the need for any restrictions must be established
convincingly.”101 Antara’s suspension order on Prof. Hunland’s Pano account exceeded these
narrow limitations on the freedom of expression.
ICCPR Article 3 provides that the right to freedom of expression may be restricted only when
those limitations are “provided by law and are necessary” in respect to the rights of others and to
protect “national security or [. . .] public order . . . .”102

40. In addition, Mukong v. Cameroon, the Human Rights Committee—the ICCPR’s supervisory
body—adjudicated a dispute between a citizens of Cameroon against the Cameroon
government.103 The Committee provided that (1) the restriction must be provided by law, (2) it
must address the goals enumerated in Article 19(3), and (3) it must be necessary to achieve the
legitimate purpose.104 There, the Committee acknowledged that the speech limitation was
provided by Cameroon law but ultimately the government failed to prove it was necessary.105 The
Committee further noted “that the legitimate objective of safeguarding and indeed strengthening
national unity under difficult political circumstances cannot be achieved by attempting to muzzle
advocacy of multi-party democracy . . . .”106

41. However, Ravaria submits that Antara’s suspension order was unnecessary and arbitrary
therefore not qualifying as a legitimate restriction under ICCPR Article 19(3)(b). Antara carries
the burden to prove the suspension order was “necessary and for a legitimate purpose.” 107 Antara
justified its suspension order as a means to protect national security or public order.108

101
Kiselev, supra note 100, para 90 (citing Perincek v. Switzerland, Case No. 27510/08, ECtHR, para 196(i) (Oct.
15, 2015)).
102
ICCPR, supra note 94, arts.19 (3) (a-b).
103
Mukong v. Cameroon, Communication No. 458/1991, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/51/D/458/1991 (July 21, 1994)
[hereinafter “Mukong”].
104
Id.
105
Id.
106
Id.
107
Mary Rundle & Malcolm Birdling, Filtering and the International System: A Question of Commitment in Access
Denied, OPENNET INITIATIVE 80, 82 (2014); ARTICLE 19, The Johannesburg Principles on Nat’l Security,
Freedom of Expression and Access to Information, GLOB. CAMPAIGN FREE EXPRESSION, Principles 1(d), 7 (Oct. 1,
1995) https://www.article19.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/joburg-principles.pdf.
108
Compromis para 27.
42. Similarly, Prof. Hunland was also advocating for Suthan independence by encouraging
voters to participate in Antara’s democratic process.109 Admittedly, the limitation complied with
Antara’s domestic legislation,110 and Antara has suggested that its suspension order meets Article
19(3)’s goals of protecting national security and public order. 111 However, Antara has failed to
prove that the suspension order was actually necessary to prevent imminent violence. Therefore,
for the reasons provided herein, Antara’s order suspending Prof. Hunland’s Pano account also
violated customary law on his right to freedom of expression.

2. Antara’s Order Violated Professor Hunland’s Right to Freedom of Religion.

43. Antara violated its treaty obligations under the ICCPR regarding the right to manifest one’s
religion, failing to follow ICCPR Article 18(3)’s strict exceptions. Furthermore, Antara violated
Prof. Hunland’s right to partake in cultural life under ICESCR Article 15(1).
1. Antara’s order violated the ICCPR
44. Article 18(1) of the ICCPR protects the right to “[f]reedom of thought . . . [t]his right shall
include freedom . . . to manifest his religion or belief in worship, observance, practice, and
teaching.”112 The U.N. Human Rights Committee has provided that this right encompasses a
broad range of acts.113

45. As a devout Velan and also a tenured Professor of Velan Theology at the University of
Sutha, this right would extend to Prof. Hunland’s use of his Pano account to advocate for Velan
autonomy.114 As the Compromis indicates, Prof. Hunland was using his Pano account as a
platform to manifest his belief in the Velan’s right to worship at the Kuvil Shrine to his nine
million followers.115

46. Due to Antara’s COVID restrictions preventing physical gathering at the Kuvil Shrine, Pano
became a critical means for Velan community building. Thus, in one fell swoop, the order
109
Compromis para 18.
110
Id., Annex 1, Part III, PACA § 5.
111
Id. para 26.
112
ICCPR, supra note 94, art. 18(1).
113
Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 22, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.4 (July 30, 1993)
[hereinafter “G.C. No. 22”].
114
Compromis para 13–14.
115
Id. para 13-15.
suspending his Pano account cut Prof. Hunland off from his nine million followers and,
therefore, unlawfully interfered with his freedom to manifest his Velan religion.

47. While ICCPR Article 18(3) provides for limiting the manifestation of one’s religion, it is
finite.116 Article 18(3) religious limitations must be “prescribed by law and are necessary to
protect public safety, order . . . or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others.” 117 The U.N.
Human Rights Committee, as the leading body interpreting the ICCPR, has advised that states
should strictly interpret the scope of permissible limitations under Article 18(3). It reaffirmed
that “restrictions are not allowed on grounds not specified there, even if they would be allowed
as restriction to other rights protected in the Covenant, such as national security.”118

48. Here, Antara’s actions did not comply with its law because there was not sufficient evidence
to demonstrate the order was needed to protect public safety. Antara cited concerns for imminent
incitement of violence as its reason for suspending Prof. Hunland’s account and pursued the
court order under Section 5 of its Protect Antaran Cyberspace Act of 2017 (“PACA”). 119
However, under PACA Section 5(3), “a federal court may issue a Content Takedown and User
Suspension Order only if the court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the Order is
necessary to prevent or counter a threat to the national security, public order, or public safety of
Antara.”120

49. However, the lower Antaran court did not provide proof that Prof. Hunland’s messages were
likely to incite imminent violence and only included examples of why his messages were
allegedly inaccurate and misleading.121 Thus, the preponderance of the evidence did not provide
examples of likely violence directly related to Prof. Hunland’s messages.122 Therefore, Antara
violated the ICCPR as it exceeded the scope of limitations provided in Article 18(3).

116
ICCPR, supra note 94, art. 18(3).
117
Id.
118
G.C. No. 22, supra note 116, para 35.
119
Compromis para 26.
120
Id., Annex 1, Part III, PACA § 5(3).
121
Id. para 25.
122
Id. para 15, 25.
 2. Antara’s order violated the ICESCR

50. Article 15(1) (a) of the ICESCR ensures that the “States Parties to the present Covenant
recognize the right of everyone to take part in cultural life.” 123 Vela is an important aspect of the
Ravarian culture and Prof. Hunland was exercising his right to take part in the cultural life of
Ravaria by expressing his opinions on his Pano account and airing his grievances about the
Antaran government’s interference with Velan worship.124 As a result, by suspending Prof.
Hunland’s Pano account, Antara effectively excised Prof. Hunland from participating in the
cultural life of Ravaria in direct violation of the ICESCR provisions.

3. Antara’s Order Violated Professor Hunland’s Right to an Effective Remedy.

51. Antara’s obligation to provide Prof. Hunland with a remedy is bolstered by explicit
references in both the ICCPR and ICESCR.
1. Antara’s order violated the ICCPR

52. ICCPR Articles 2(3) (a-c) provides that each Party must ensure that the rights recognized
therein are upheld and must provide an effective remedy determined by competent authorities.125
Indeed, the right to a fair trial is a fundamental right that should be respected. 126 As the African
Commission on Human Rights has explained, the right to a fair trial should include: (1) a public
hearing, (2) an adequate opportunity to present not only arguments but also evidence, and (3) a
chance to respond to opposing arguments.127 Further, the Human Rights Council contends that
having the right to an appeal is crucial in protecting human rights on social media and contesting
wrongful decisions.128
53. As previously discussed, the ICCPR provides for the right to freedom of expression and
freedom of religion. Thus, Antara was required to provide Prof. Hunland with sufficient means
in contesting the proposed suspension order that violated those rights. However, instead, the
Federal Court of Lower Antara decided on the parties’ briefs alone without requiring any

123
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Jan. 3, 1976, 993 U.N.T.S. 3, art 15(1) (a)
[hereinafter “ICESCR”].
124
Id. para 16, 23.
125
ICCPR, supra note 94, para 2(3) (a-c).
126
THE RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL UNDER ARTICLE 14 OF THE ICCPR: TRAVAUX PRÉPARATOIRES (Amal Clooney &
Philippa Webb eds., Sep. 2021).
127
African Commission, supra note 136, arts. 2(e), 1(f) (2).
128
G.A. Res. 47/25, supra note 130.
evidence be submitted before it suspended his account. 129 Further, the Federal Court of Appeal in
Antara affirmed the lower court’s decision without justification. 130 Later, the Lower Antaran
Court extended the suspension order for an additional six months without affording Prof.
Hunland the opportunity to contest the extension. 131 Thus, Antara’s lack of sufficient means to
contest the Pano suspension order violates the ICCPR, because it denied Prof. Hunland adequate
and reasonable proceedings before competent authorities.

2. Antara’s order violated the ICESCR

54. Similarly, the ICESCR also requires parties to take steps to ensure rights recognized therein
are fully realized by “all appropriate means.”132 The ICESCR also requires the rights be
recognized without discrimination, including rights related to religion, political opinion or other
opinion.133 Furthermore, as freedom of expression and religion are recognized rights under the
ICESCR, Antara was obligated under its provisions to provide sufficient steps for Prof. Hunland
to contest and protect his rights for the same reasons. Therefore, the Antaran court order
suspending Prof. Hunland’s Pano account violated international law, and consequently, this
Court should require that Antara rescind the order.
3. ANTARA’S INTERFERENCE WITH COMPUTERS AND DEVICES
OPERATING ON RAVARIAN SOIL VIOLATED INTERNATIONAL LAW.

55. A key principle widely recognized within the international community is respect for
territorial sovereignty of a State.134 In 1928, the Permanent Court of Arbitration in the Island of
Palmas provided, “[s]overeignty in the relations between States signifies independence.
Independence in regard to a portion of the globe is the right to exercise therein, to the exclusion
of any other State, the functions of a State.” 135 An International Group of Experts have identified
that “[t]he principle of State sovereignty applies in cyberspace” as well.136

129
Compromis para 26-27.
130
Clarifications para 2.
131
Id. para 3.
132
ICESCR, supra note 126, art. 2(1).
133
Id. art. 2(2).
134
Tallinn Manual 2.0 supra note 47, R. 1(1).
135
Island of Palmas, (Neth. v. U.S.) 2 R.I.A.A. 829, 838 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1928).
136
Tallinn Manual 2.0, supra note 47, R. 1(1).
56. Furthermore, this Court acknowledged in the Corfu Channel case, that it is “every State’s
obligation not to allow knowingly its territory to be used for acts contrary to the rights of other
states.”137 Consequently, Antara’s interference with computers and devices operating on
Ravarian soil was unlawful because it violated its treaty obligations and customary state practice.

A. Antara Violated Its Due Diligence Obligations Before It Launched Operation

Moonstroke.

57. While Antara may not have known where all the infected devices were located before it
launched Operation Moonstroke,138 it should have performed its due diligence to identify where
the devices were located before it carried out its operation. This Court acknowledged in the
Tehran Hostages judgment that authorities should “use the means which [are] at their disposal to
comply with their obligations.”139 Furthermore, in the Trail Smelter arbitration, the arbitrators
established that States have an obligation to take preventative steps to prevent transboundary
harm.140 Although Trail Smelter was decided based on environmental air pollution, the same
principle of prevention should apply here.

1. Antara violated its treaty obligations

58. As a party to the U.N. Charter, Antara was obligated to settle disputes peacefully.141 Both
Antara and Ravaria are parties to the Budapest Convention which promotes cooperation among
its members.142 Under the Budapest Convention, Article 25 mandates that “[p]arties shall afford
one another mutual assistance to the widest extent possible for purposes of investigations or
proceedings concerning criminal offences related to computer systems and data . . . .” 143
Budapest Convention Article 46(1) (a) also provides that States should consult with each other in
regards to cyber issues.144

137
Corfu Channel, supra note 39, 22.
138
Clarifications para 5.
139
Tehran Hostages, supra note 72, para 68.
140
Trail Smelter Case (U.S. v. Can.), 3 R.I.A.A. 1905, 1963-66 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1938 and 1941); Holly Cullen, The
Irresistible Rise of Human Rights Due Diligence: Conflict Minerals and Beyond, 48 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 743
(March 2019)
141
U.N. Charter, supra note 52, art. 2(3).
142
Budapest Convention, supra note 93, Preamble.
143
Id. art. 25(1).
144
Id. art. 46(1) (a).
59. However, Antara failed to provide Ravaria with a chance to cooperate, failed to diligently
investigate the location of the devices it planned to hack, and consequently, failed to seek
consent from Ravaria to hack the devices and computers located on its soil. Instead, Antara kept
its cybersecurity concerns and knowledge that 30,000 devices had been infected a secret. 145
According to the Tallinn Manual 2.0, law enforcement must seek State consent before it can
hack into servers located outside its territory even when that hacking is to disinfect bots used for
criminal purposes.146 Thus, while the server was located in Antara, 147 Antara should have
obtained Ravaria’s consent before it disinfected the devices on Ravarian territory. However,
Ravaria only learned of the infected devices and the subsequent Operation Moonstroke two
months after it occurred through an article in The Sydney Morning Herald.148

60. Furthermore, this Court should find that Antara’s DPCA—a sophisticated cybersecurity
agency—was capable of locating the devices it planned to hack and should have done so before
it implemented Operation Moonstroke. Therefore, Antara violated its treaty obligations to
communicate and cooperate with Ravaria to address the Lunar Botnet operation.

2. Antara violated customary law on providing notice and demanding cessation

before seeking countermeasures
61. Additionally, Antara violated customary law by failing to provide notice and a demand for
cessation. The Articles on State Responsibility are recognized by many States as authoritative.
Therein, countermeasures are justified under strict conditions. 149 One restriction is that
countermeasures may not contravene fundamental human rights.150 Additionally, when States
engage in self-help, they must provide some form of notice and demand for cessation to the
alleged responsible State before it can take lawful countermeasures.151

145
Compromis para 31.
146
Tallinn Manual 2.0, supra note 47, R. 11(7).
147
Compromis para 32.
148
Id. para 30–31.
149
Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 79, art. 50.
150
Id.
151
Id. arts. 52(1) (a–b); David E. Pozen, Self-Help and the Separation of Powers, 124 YALE L. J. 1 (2014).
62. Thus, even though Antara justifies its hacking and removal of the Lunar Botnet as a valid
countermeasure, it was not entitled to self-help if those actions would violate fundamental human
rights. As will be discussed further, Antara’s countermeasures violated Ravarian citizens’
fundamental human right to privacy.152 Moreover, Antara did not demand Ravaria’s cessation or
provide notice of its intent to invade the property and cyberspace of Ravaria. Therefore, Antara’s
response should not be considered a valid countermeasure.

63. However, the DPCA did not request that the controllers of the Lunar Botnet cease its
operations.153 Even if DPCA did not know who controlled the Lunar Botnet, both DPCA and
Antara should have made a public announcement asking for cessation and notifying an intent to
take down the Lunar Botnet should the responsible party not identify themselves. As a result,
because DPCA did not take any required remedial actions, its countermeasures in launching
Operation Moonstroke violated international law.

3. Antara Violated Ravaria’s Territorial Sovereignty When it Launched Operation

Moonstroke.

64. Both the U.N. Charter and the Budapest Convention, both to which Antara is a party, include
provisions that protect state sovereignty; therefore, it was required to respect both as they applied
to Ravaria.
1. Antara violated the U.N. Charter

65. As a party to the U.N. Charter, 154 Antara was obligated to respect “the sovereign equality of
all its Members” under Article 2(1).155 However, Antara violated Ravaria’s sovereignty when its
DPCA agency launched Operation Moonstroke and hacked into thousands of computers and
devices located in Ravaria.156 Indeed, the European Parliament has commissioned a report that

152
See infra IV. B.
153
Compromis para 31.
154
Id. para 46.
155
U.N. Charter, supra note 52, art. 2(1).
156
Compromis para 32.
concluded hacking a computer located in another state is a violation of sovereignty.157 Thus,
Antara entered Ravaria’s territory without Ravaria’s consent and is liable for doing so.

66. Furthermore, the U.N. Charter Article 2(4) prohibits member States from the “use of force
against the territorial integrity . . . of any state.” 158 The Tallinn Manual 2.0 indicates “the mere
fact that a computer . . . is used during an operation has no bearing on whether that operation
amounts to a ‘use of force’ . . . .” 159 Indeed, the Tallinn Manual 2.0 noted that the Nicaragua
judgment established “that ‘scale and effects’ are to be considered when determining whether
particular norms amount to an ‘armed attack.’” 160 While the Tallinn Manual 2.0 does not indicate
strict criteria for determining whether an act amounts to a use of force, it identified that an act
may be defined as a use of force if there are sufficient factors warranting the harmed state to
perceive it as such.161 These factors include severity, immediacy, directness, and invasiveness.162

67. As it relates to the present dispute, this Court should find that the immediacy, directness and
invasiveness of Antara’s Operation Moonstroke would likely characterize it as an unlawful use
of force. First. The effects of Antara’s action was immediate in that it breached Ravaria’s
territory and left no time to reverse or settle the dispute peacefully. 163 Next, Antara’s actions
directly compromised Ravaria’s territorial sovereignty and its citizens’ privacy.164 Finally,
Antara’s action was highly invasive as it hacked into thousands of computers and devices on
Ravarian soil.165 Thus, Ravaria submits that this Court should determine that Operation
Moonstroke constituted an unlawful use of force against Ravaria’s territorial sovereignty.

157
DIRECTORATE GEN. FOR INTERNAL POLICIES, POLICY DEPARTMENT, CITIZEN’S RIGHTS AND CONSTITUTIONAL
AFFAIRS, Legal Frameworks for Hacking by Law Enforcement: Identification, Evaluation and Comparison of
Practices 28 (2017) [hereinafter “Hacking by Law Enforcement”].
158
U.N. Charter, supra note 52, art. 2(4).
159
Tallinn Manual 2.0, supra note 47, R. 69.
160
Id. (citing Nicaragua, supra note 76, para 195).
161
Tallinn Manual, supra note 47, R. 69.
162
Id.
163
Compromis para 32.
164
Id.
165
Id.
 2. Antara violated the Budapest Convention
68. As a party to the Budapest Convention, Antara violated Article 15(1), which provides that
each party shall abide by the “principle of proportionality” in its “establishment, implementation
and application” of the powers enumerated in the Convention. 166 However, Antara’s Operation
Moonstroke was excessive in that it hacked computers outside its territory when it should have
limited its operation to only the computers and devices located in its own territory. 167 Antara
discovered the Lunar Botnet one week before the Suthan Referendum was to take place, and
therefore, any influence the misinformation had on its citizens’ vote would likely not be reversed
before the election.168 Thus, the goals of removing any influential accounts perpetuating
misinformation should not outweigh the consequences of violating Ravaria’s territory.

3. Antara Violated the Human Rights of Ravarian Citizens When it Launched

Operation Moonstroke

69. The ICCPR and the Budapest Convention contain provisions upholding the human right to
privacy, which Antara must respect as a party to both treaties. Further, Antara’s obligation has
been reinforced under customary law, having recognized citizens’ right to privacy for decades.
1. Antara violated the ICCPR Right to privacy
70. The United Nations has acknowledged that “the right to privacy is enshrined by the Universal
Declaration on Human Rights,169 as a party to the ICCPR, Antara was obligated to follow its
provisions. Under Article 17(1), “[n]o one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference
with his privacy, family, home or correspondence . . .”170 The Human Rights Committee has
extended the interpretation of “arbitrary interference” to include interferences provided by law.171
Meaning, even if Antara complied with its domestic legislation within its PACA provisions, this
Court may still find that Antara unlawfully interfered with Ravarian citizens’ privacy.
Furthermore, the European Parliament has indicated that law enforcement “hacking techniques
are extremely invasive, particularly when compared with traditionally intrusive investigative

166
Budapest Convention, supra note 93, art. 15(1).
167
Compromis para 32.
168
Id.
169
G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, U.N. Doc. A/810, art. 12 (Dec. 10, 1948).
170
ICCPR, supra note 94, art. 17(1).
171
Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 16, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1, para 4 (July 29, 1994).
tools (e.g. wiretapping, house searches etc.)”172 For example, in hacking personal computers and
devices, law enforcement can gain access to a “person’s location and movement, all
communications, all stored data etc. consequently, the use of hacking techniques . . . inherently
restricts the fundamental right to privacy.”173

71. Thus, in its Operation Moonstroke, Antaran officials hacked into five thousand personal
computers and devices owned by Ravarian citizens. 174 These personal devices likely contained
photos, financial information, emails, text messages and other private information, which would
constitute a violation of their privacy and correspondence.
2. Antara violated the Budapest Convention
72. Article 32 of the Budapest Convention permits access of trans-border computer data under
two circumstances: (1) “when the access is publicly available store computer data . . . or (2) . . .
if the Party obtains lawful and voluntary consent of the person who has the lawful authority to
disclose the data to the Party through that computer system.”175

73. For the dispute at present, the first circumstance does not apply as the computers and devices
that were hacked by Antara were privately owned by Ravarian citizens. 176 Next, Antara did not
receive lawful and voluntary consent of those Ravarian citizens before it carried out Operation
Moonstroke because Antara did not identify the location of those computers and devices until
after its operation.177 Antara may argue that its PACA legislation Section 8(5) authorizes a Botnet
Takedown Order “even if that Order also affects servers or devices outside the national
territory.”178 Therefore, this Court should hold that Antara violated Budapest Convention Article
32.

3. Antara violated property right

74. Peaceful enjoyment of property right is protected under article 17 of UDHR 179. This right is
the right enjoyed by citizens which prohibit arbitrary and disproportionate interference's. In the
172
Hacking by Law Enforcement, supra note 195, 9.
173
Id.
174
Compromis para 32.
175
Budapest Convention, supra note 93, arts. 32(a–b).
176
Compromis para 32.
177
Id.
178
Id., Annex 1, Part III, PACA § 8(5).
179
Universal declaration of human right, G.A.res.217A (III), U.N.Doc A/810 at 71(1948) art 17. ( herein after
UDHR)
case of Sporrong and Lönnroth v. Sweden ECtHR decided that an interference with peaceful
enjoyment of possessions shall not disproportionate.180Operation moonstroke which is launched
by Antara organ (DPCA) without further investigations by only knowing the affected computer
numbers and the centere of the lunar botnet server, was arbitrary interference in peaceful
enjoyment of property right in Ravarian citizens.181

PRAYER OF RELIEF

The Velan Kingdom of Ravaria respectfully requests this Court to adjudicate that:

I. The documents obtained in the illegal search of Ms. Walters’s vehicle and the May
30, 2021 Conciliation Meeting recordings are inadmissible as evidence before this
Court.

II. Ravaria’s alleged financial contributions and cyber operations were consistent with
international law.

III. Antara’s order suspending Prof. Hunland’s Pano account violated international law
and therefore Antara must rescind the order.

IV. Antara’s interference with computers and devices operating on Ravarian soil,
resulting from the decision to take down the Lunar Botnet was in violation of
international law.

Sporrong and Lönnroth v. Sweden     judgment of 23 September 1982, Series a no. 52, p. 26,
180

para. 69). 
181
Compromis, para 32.