Emory International Law Review Emory International Law Review
Emory International Law Review Emory International Law Review
Volume 33 Issue 2
2019
Rosa Curling
Recommended Citation
Yakaré-Oulé (Nani) J. Reventlow & Rosa Curling, The Unique Jurisdiction of the African Court on Human
and People's Rights: Protection of Human Rights Beyond the African Charter, 33 Emory Int'l L. Rev. 203
(2019).
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.emory.edu/eilr/vol33/iss2/1
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Emory Law Scholarly Commons. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Emory International Law Review by an authorized editor of Emory Law Scholarly
Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected].
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INTRODUCTION
This Article seeks to explore the jurisdiction of the African Court on Human
and Peoples’ Rights (the Court) to consider human rights violations under
treaties other than the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (the
Charter).1 Unlike its regional counterparts—the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights or the European Court of Human Rights (the Inter-American Court and
the European Court, respectively)—the African Court does not restrict itself to
considering human rights violations exclusively under the regional human rights
system under which it was established. This raises questions as to how the Court
exercises its jurisdictional powers as it establishes its jurisprudence, which we
seek to take initial stock of here.
First, the authors summarize the legal mandate given to the Court by the
Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the
Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights (the
Protocol).2 Second, an overview is provided of the Court’s case law as it relates
to the interpretation of this mandate, focusing on the issue of the Court’s
approach to violations of other treaties than the Charter, either at its own
initiative or in response to submissions made by the parties. Analysis reveals
that the Court does not yet have a consistent approach on matters of jurisdiction,
which, in the interests of the applicants and participating Member States, we
would invite it to cultivate. In the third section, the authors sketch a number of
possible routes the Court could consider taking in this regard.
*
Yakaré-Oulé (Nani) Jansen Reventlow is a human rights lawyer, Lecturer in Law at Columbia Law
School, and Associate Tenant at Doughty Street Chambers; Rosa Curling is a Solicitor at Leigh Day. The authors
are deeply grateful for the valuable contributions made to this article by Lucy Cadd and Anna Dews, also at
Leigh Day, and Gerald Neuman, Co-Director of the Human Rights Program at Harvard Law School, who
provided valuable input on a previous draft.
1
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Jun. 27, 1981, 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982).
2
Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Establishment of an African
Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, June 10, 1998, Org. of African Unity [OAU] [hereinafter the Protocol].
(Entered into force on June 25, 2004. The Court started operations in 2006.); see also African Court in Brief,
AFRICAN COURT ON HUMAN AND PEOPLES’ RIGHTS, http://www.african-court.org/en/index.php/2-
uncategorised/47-african-court-in-brief (last visited Nov. 7, 2018).
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3
Protocol, supra note 2, at 2; see Solomon T. Ebobrah, Towards a Positive Application of
Complementarity in the African Human Rights System: Issues of Functions and Relations, 22 EUR. J. INT’L L.
663, 663–88 (2011) (exposing the issue of complementarity in the African human rights system); see also Frans
Viljoen, A Human Rights Court for Africa, and Africans, 30 BROOK. J. INT’L L. (2004) (explaining the
background on the African Court).
4
See Protocol, supra note 2, at 3, 7. This issue will be considered further, below.
5
Article 3(4) of the Supplementary Protocol mandates that the Economic Community of West African
States (ECOWAS) Court determine the “violation of human rights that occur in any Member State.”
Supplementary Protocol A/SP.1/011/05 (amending the Preamble and Articles 1, 2, 9, and 30 of Protocol
A/P.1/7/91 relating to the Community Court of Justice and Article 4 Paragraph 1 of the English version of the
said Protocol). art. 3, ¶ 4, http://www.courtecowas.org/site2012/pdf_files/supplementary_protocol.pdf
[hereinafter Supplementary Protocol].
6
The Treaty for the Establishment of the East African Community, (EAC Treaty) gave the Court
jurisdiction to hear human rights cases, but the East African Community’s policy organs did not follow up to
activate this power. Treaty for the Establishment of the East African Community, Nov. 30, 1999, Kenya-Tanz.-
Uganda, available at http://www.eala.org/uploads/The_Treaty_for_the_Establishment_of_the_East_Africa_
Community_2006_1999.pdf [hereinafter EAC Treaty]. In the case of Katabazi v. Uganda the Court used the
Treaty principles of rule of law and human rights to assert jurisdiction over claims that are presented to it as
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human rights violations. Katabazi v. Uganda, No. 1/2007, Ruling, East African Court of Justice, (Nov. 1, 2007),
http://eacj.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/NO._1_OF_2007.pdf. For more information on the EAC Treaty’s
principles regarding the rule of law and human rights, see Art. 6(d) of the Treaty.
7
See Government Legal Experts Meeting on the Question of the Establishment of an African Court of
Human and Peoples’ Rights, Sept. 6–12, 1995, Cape Town, South Africa, OAU/LEG/EXP/AFC/HPR (I), 8 AFR.
J. INT’L & COMP. L. 493, 493–500 (1996); see also Organisation of African Unity (OAU), CM/Res.1674 (LXIV),
Resolution on Measures Taken to Implement Resolution AHG/Res.230 (XXX) Relating to the Strengthening of
the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights and the Establishment of an African Court on Human
and Peoples’ Rights (July 1–5, 1996); see also OAU, Decisions Adopted by the Sixty-Sixth Ordinary Session of
the Council of Ministers, CM/Dec.348 (LXIV) Report of the Secretary-General on the Draft Protocol on the
Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 9 AFR. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 457, 466 (1997).
8
See generally RACHEL MURRAY, THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE FINDINGS OF THE AFRICAN
COMMISSION ON HUMAN AND PEOPLES’ RIGHTS 50–51 (2015) (debating the binding nature of the African
Commission’s decisions, which includes varying viewpoints expressed by the Commission itself).
9
Protocol, supra note 2, at 4.
10
African Commission on Human and People’s Rights [Afr. Comm’n H.P.R.], Rules of Procedure, at
rule 84(2) and 118.
11
African Union, List of Countries Which Have Signed, Ratified/Acceded to the
Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Establishment of an African Court on
Human and Peoples’ Rights (June 15, 2017), www.au.int/web/sites/default/files/treaties/7778-sl-protocol_to_
the_african_charter_on_human_and_peoplesrights_on_the_estab.pdf [hereinafter List of Countries].
12
Protocol, supra note 2, at 5(3).
13
African Union, supra note 11 (showing that nine countries in total have made the Art. 34(6) declaration,
but Rwanda withdrew its declaration in 2016); see also Umuhoza v. Rwanda, Application No. 003/2014, African
Court on Human and People’s Rights [Afr. Ct. H.P.R.], ¶ 21 (Mar.18, 2016) (holding that a sunset period of 1
year applied, resulting in its ability to receive direct complaints from Rwandan citizens and NGOs ending on
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March 1, 2017).
14
See Protocol, supra note 2, at 3, 7.
15
Statute of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights art. 1, Oct. 31, 1979, 19 I.L.M. 634 [hereinafter
IACtHR Statute].
16
IACtHR Statute, art. 2.
17
IACtHR Statute, art. 64 (emphasis added).
18
“Other Treaties” Subject to the Consultative Jurisdiction of the Court (Art. 64 American Convention
on Human Rights), Advisory Opinion OC-1/82, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 1, ¶ 52 (Sep. 24, 1982).
19
Organization of American States, American Convention on Human Rights art. 29, Nov. 22, 1969,
O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123, http://www.cidh.org/basicos/english/basic3.american%20convention.
htm. Article 29 of the American Convention of Human Rights contains rules governing the interpretation of the
Convention and expressly prevents an interpretation of the Convention which limits the effect that “other
international acts of the same nature have.” Id.
20
Villagrán Morales v. Guatemala, Merits, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 63, ¶ 188 (Nov.
19, 1999); see also The Rights of the Child in the Inter-American Human Rights System, OEA/Ser.L./V/II.133,
doc. 34, ¶¶ 31–33 (2008).
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Inter-American Court also made clear that interpretation differs from direct
applicability.21
The European Court has a narrower jurisdiction. The European Convention
on Human Rights (ECHR) states that the European Court considers and applies
the European Convention and provides no authority to find violations regarding
“other” human rights treaties, whether in advisory or adjudicatory issues.22
The drafters of the American Convention and the European Convention
bestowed a mandate upon the courts established to oversee these respective
treaties, requiring them to apply only the relevant regional treaty in their
contentious decision-making. The Court’s mandate to consider human rights
violations under a much broader range of instruments raises important questions,
including issues regarding the application of treaties created in international
settings.
C. What Are the Implications for the Decision-making Powers of the Court?
The Court’s authority to issue binding decisions on “any other relevant
human rights instrument ratified by the States concerned” means that its
jurisdiction extends beyond applying and interpreting just the African Charter.23
For example, the Court would be able to determine whether States have fallen
short of obligations under, inter-alia, the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR);24 the Convention Against Torture (CAT);25 and the
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women
(CEDAW).26 The committees that were established under these treaties to
oversee their implementation by States Parties do not have the power to issue
binding decisions.27 As a result, the Court potentially has a greater influence than
21
See Bámaca-Velásquez v. Guatemala, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 70 (Nov. 25, 2000);
Las Palmeras v. Colombia, Preliminary Objections, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 67 (Feb. 4, 2000).
22
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Council of Europe, art.
32, 47 ¶¶ 1–2, Nov. 4, 1950, E.T.S. No. 5, http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Convention_ENG.pdf (Nov. 19,
2018).
23
Organisation of African Unity [OAU], Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights
on the Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Charter art. 3 ¶ 1, OAU Doc.
OAU/LEG/AFCHPR/PROT (III), June 9, 1998.
24
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171. [hereinafter
ICCPR].
25
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Dec.
10, 1984. 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Convention Against Torture].
26
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Dec. 18, 1979, 1249
U.N.T.S.13. [hereinafter CEDAW].
27
The U.N. Human Rights Committee, Committee Against Torture, and CEDAW Committee only have
advisory powers. See Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16,
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1966, 999 U.N.T. S. 17; Convention Against Torture, supra note 25, arts. 17–24; CEDAW, art. 2–5; Optional
Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Oct. 6, 1999,
2131 U.N.T.S. 83.
28
ICCPR, supra note 24, art. 17.
29
Illustrative of this situation is the case of the Coalition of African Lesbians, which was not granted
observer status by the African Commission on this basis for a long time. Statement on Decision of the African
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights to Grant Observer Status to the Coalition of African Lesbians
[CAL], COALITION OF AFRICAN LESBIANS (Apr. 25, 2015), https://www.cal.org.za/2015/04/25/statement-on-
decision-of-the-african-commission-on-human-and-peoples-rights-to-grant-observer-status-to-the-coalition-of-
african-lesbians-cal/. Their admission was ultimately only possible due to very persistent work and active
assistance from some Commission members. Id.
30
The development has been particularly noticeable in relation to non-discrimination cases. See Toonen
v. Australia Communication (488/1992), U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/50/D/488/1992 (1994) (considering that the
reference to ‘‘sex’’ in articles 2, paragraph 1, and 26 [of the ICCPR] is to be taken as including ‘sexual
orientation’). Id. at 2, 26 ¶ 8.7. The HRC therefore decided that sexual orientation-related discrimination is a
suspect category both in terms of the enjoyment of Covenant rights. Id. at 2, ¶¶ 8.7–11. See generally id. at 26,
¶¶ 6.14, 11 (discussing equality before and equal protection of the law); In Karen Atala and Daughters v. Chile,
Case 1271-04, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 42/08, OEA/Ser.L./V/II.130, doc.
22 rev. 1, ¶¶ 2, 4 (2008) (involving a lesbian mother and her daughters, who sought redress for a decision by the
Chilean authorities to deny custody based on the mother’s sexual orientation).
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their citizens to directly access the Court.31 These numbers indicate the delicacy
of the relationship between the Court and the Member States32 and the risk that
if the Court is overly proactive in its decisions, the support of Member States
might be lost.
31
See African Union, supra note 11, at 2; Ingabire Victoire Umuhoza v. Republic of Rwanda, supra note
13, ¶ 21.
32
See generally Karen J. Alter, James T. Gathii, & Laurence R. Helfer, Backlash Against International
Courts in West, East and Southern Africa: Causes and Consequences 27 EUR. J. INT’L L. 293, 293–328 (2016);
Tom Daly & Micha Wiebusch, The African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights: Mapping Resistance Against
a Young Court, 14 INT’L J.L. IN CONTEXT 294 (2018). But see Karen J. Alter et al., Backlash Against
International Courts in West, East and Southern Africa: Causes and Consequences, 27 EUR. J. INT’L L. 293
(2016); James Gathii, Mission Creep or a Search for Relevance: The East African Court of Justice’s Human
Rights Strategy, 24 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 249, 292 (2013–2014) (exploring how the East African Court of
Justice, is steadily carving out its own human rights mandate).
33
In the Consolidated Matter of Tanganyika Law Society and the Legal and Human Rights Centre v.
Tanzania and Mtikila v. Tanzania, No. 009/2011 & 011/2011, Judgment, Afr. Ct. H.P.R., (June 14, 2013),
http://www.african-court.org/en/images/Cases/Judgment/Judgment%20Application%20009-011-2011%20Rev
%20Christopher%20Mtikila%20v.%20Tanzania-1.pdf [hereinafter In the Consolidated Matter of Tanganyika
Law Society].
34
Id. ¶ 99.
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In 2014, the Court handed down two judgments that concerned the rights of
journalists, both in cases brought against Burkina Faso. The first was Zongo v.
Burkina Faso,39 which concerned the failure by Burkina Faso to investigate the
killing of journalist Norbert Zongo in December 1998.40 The applicants seized
the Court in December 2011, arguing violations under the Charter, ICCPR, and
the revised ECOWAS treaty of the rights to have one’s case heard before a
competent national court, to equal protection of the law and equality before the
law, to freedom of expression—protection of journalists in particular—and to
life.41 The applicants also argued a violation of Article 1 of the Charter, which
contains the obligation to take appropriate measures to give effect to Charter
rights, and the right to an effective remedy under Article 8 of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR).42
35
Id. ¶ 89.2.
36
Id. ¶¶ 91–92.
37
Id. ¶¶ 120–21.
38
Id. ¶¶ 122–23 (emphasis in original).
39
Beneficiaries of Late Norbert Zongo, Abdoulaye Nikiema alias Ablass. . ., Ernest Zongo and Blaise
IIboudo & the Burkinabe Human and Peoples’ Rights Movement, No. 013/2011, Judgment, African Court on
Human and Peoples’ Rights [Afr. Ct. H.P.R.], (Mar. 28, 2013) [hereinafter Zongo v. Burkina Faso].
40
Id. ¶ 14.
41
Id. ¶¶ 7–15.
42
Id. ¶¶ 8, 11.
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43
Id. ¶ 157.
44
Id. ¶ 199.
45
Id. ¶ 180.
46
Id. ¶¶ 182, 185.
47
Id. ¶ 158–70.
48
Zongo v. Burkina Faso, No. 013/2011.
49
Konataté v. Faso, No. 004/2013, Judgment, Afr. Ct. H.P.R., (Dec. 5. 2014).
50
Id. ¶ 3.
51
Id. ¶¶ 5, 28.
52
Id. ¶ 170.
53
Id. ¶¶ 9, 12.
54
Zongo v. Burkina Faso, No. 013/2011.
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Notably, in Konaté, the Court also gave very detailed orders to the
Respondent State to bring its domestic legislation in line with the Charter,
ICCPR, and Revised ECOWAS Treaty.55 In other words, the Court not only
found a violation of these human rights treaties, but also included specific orders
in its judgment for measures and remedies:
[The Court o]rders the Respondent State to amend its legislation on
defamation in order to make it compliant with article 9 of the Charter,
article 19 of the Covenant and article 66 (2)(c) of the Revised
ECOWAS Treaty: [1] by repealing custodial sentences for acts of
defamation; and [2] by adapting its legislation to ensure that other
sanctions for defamation meet the test of necessity and proportionality,
in accordance with its obligations under the Charter and other
international instruments.56
After finding a violation of the same right under all the different applicable
human rights instruments in Konaté v. Burkina Faso, the Court took a mixed
approach in Alex Thomas v. Tanzania.57 The case concerned an applicant serving
a thirty-year prison term for charges of armed robbery.58 The applicant seized
the Court, arguing a number of violations of his right to a fair trial, all of which
were formulated as violations of the Charter only.59 The Court, however, at its
own initiative, included Tanzania’s obligations under the ICCPR in its
considerations when assessing the alleged fair trial violations60 and went on to
find a violation of both treaties.61 However, having raised the ICCPR at its own
initiative, the Court subsequently left out any discussion of the corollary ICCPR
Articles to Charter Articles 3, 5, 6, 7(1)(b), and 9(1), which protect the rights of
equality before the law, freedom from torture, personal liberty, presumption of
innocence, and freedom of expression. The Court found that these rights were
not violated, contrary to the applicant’s assertions.62
A similarly mixed approach was adopted in Onyango Nganyi & Ors. v.
Tanzania.63 The case concerned a series of fair trial violations argued by a group
of applicants who had been arrested and detained by Mozambican, Kenyan, and
55
Konaté v. Burkina Faso, No. 004/2013, at ¶ 170.
56
Id. ¶ 176 (8).
57
Thomas v. Tanzania, No. 005/2013, Judgment, Afr. Ct. H.P.R., (Nov. 20, 2015).
58
Id. ¶ 3.
59
Id. ¶ 19.
60
Id. ¶ 88.
61
Id. ¶ 161 (vii). See also id. ¶¶ 81–99, 111–31.
62
Id. ¶¶ 138–54, 161 (vi).
63
Nganyi v. Tanzania, No. 006/2013, Judgment, Afr. Ct. H.P.R., (Nov. 20, 2015).
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In the end, however, the Court found a violation of the Charter only.70 In
Abubakari v. Tanzania,71 the Court departed from this approach and undertook
a full review. It assessed the alleged violation of the applicant’s fair trial rights
under Article 7 of the Charter, as well as Article 14 of the ICCPR, and referenced
both treaties in its judgment.72 References to the applicant’s arguments
throughout the Court’s judgment show that the complaints had been formulated
as a violation of both treaties.73 The Court found a partial violation of the
applicant’s rights under both the Charter and the ICCPR.74
64
Id. ¶ 2.
65
Id. ¶ 46.
66
Id. ¶ 165.
67
Id. ¶¶ 184, 193 (viii).
68
Jonas v. Tanzania, No. 011/2015, Afr. Ct. H.P.R., (Nov. 20, 2015).
69
Id. ¶¶ 63–64.
70
Id. ¶ 100.
71
Abubakari v. Tanzania, No. 007/2013, Judgment, Afr. Ct. H.P.R., (June 3, 2016).
72
Id. ¶ 242.
73
Id. ¶ 127.
74
Id. ¶ 242(6).
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75
Afr. Comm’n on Human and Peoples’ Rights v. Libya, No. 002/2013, Judgment, Afr. Comm’n H.P.R.,
¶ 97 (June 3, 2016).
76
Id.
77
Id. ¶ 9–11.
78
Id. ¶ 77.
79
Id. ¶ 92.
80
Id. ¶¶ 86–93.
81
Id. ¶ 97.
82
Actions pour la Protection des Droits de L’homme v. Côte d’Ivoire, No. 001/2014, Judgment, Afr. Ct.
H.P.R., (Nov. 18, 2016) [hereinafter APDH v. Côte d’Ivoire].
83
Id. ¶ 20.
84
Id.
85
Id. ¶¶ 49–51. See generally African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance, Jan. 30, 2007
[hereinafter African Charter on Democracy].
86
APDH v. Côte d’Ivoire, No. 001/2014 at ¶ 63. See generally Protocol on Democracy and Good
Governance, Dec. 21, 2001.
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of Article 3 of the Protocol.87 The Court concluded that, since both instruments
either expressly enunciate the subjective rights of individuals or place mandatory
obligations on State Parties for the enjoyment of such rights, the instruments fall
within the scope of Article 3.88
Interestingly, the Court appeared to find that a violation of the African
Charter on Democracy and the ECOWAS Democracy Protocol led to a violation
of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights:
[The Court r]ules that the Respondent State has violated its obligation
to establish an independent and impartial electoral body as provided
under Article 17 of the African Charter on Democracy and Article 3
of the ECOWAS Democracy Protocol, and consequently, also violated
its obligation to protect the right of the citizens to participate freely in
the management of the public affairs of their country guaranteed by
[Article 13(1) and (2)] of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’
Rights[.]89
The Court also found that Côte d’Ivoire did not fulfill its obligation to protect
the right to equal protection of the law under Article 10(3) of the African Charter
on Democracy, Article 3(2) of the Charter, and Article 26 of the ICCPR.90 No
mention was made of the UDHR, even though the applicants explicitly
mentioned it as one of the legal bases for their complaint.91 Arguably, the Court
did not consider the UDHR as imposing mandatory obligations on states, one of
the elements it used to determine whether the African Charter on Democracy
and the ECOWAS Democracy Protocol had been violated—although this was
not explicitly clarified.92 The Court ordered the Respondent State to amend its
national legislation to be “compliant with the aforementioned instruments to
which it is a Party,”93 including treaties other than the Charter, as it had
previously ordered in Konaté v. Burkina Faso.94
After fully utilizing its jurisdictional mandate in APDH v. Côte d’Ivoire, the
Court again adopted a limited approach in Ingabire v. Rwanda.95 The case
concerned the arrest, detention, and trial of Victoire Ingabire, the acting leader
87
APDH v. Côte d’Ivoire, No. 001/2014 at ¶ 65.
88
Id. ¶¶ 58–65.
89
Id. ¶ 153(5).
90
Id. ¶ 153.
91
Id.
92
Id. ¶¶ 57–65.
93
Id. ¶ 153(7).
94
Konaté v. Burkina Faso, No. 004/2013, ¶ 176(8).
95
Umuhoza v. Rwanda, No. 003/2014, Judgment on the Merits, Afr. Ct. H.P.R., ¶ 173 (ix) (Nov. 24,
2017).
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96
Id. ¶ 9, 77.
97
Id. ¶ 98, 173 (viii).
98
Id. ¶ 163, 173 (ix).
99
Anudo v. Tanzania, No. 012/2015, Judgment on the Merits, Afr. Ct. H.P.R., ¶ 88 (Mar. 22, 2018).
100
Id. ¶ 75–78, 88.
101
Id. ¶ 4–13.
102
Id. ¶ 14.
103
Id.
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that deals specifically with the right to nationality,104 but that it was recognized
as part of customary international law (as illustrated by) Article 15 of the
UDHR).105 Without further reflecting on the status of rules of customary
international law or the relevance of the U.N. Convention Relating to the Status
of Stateless Persons,106 which Tanzania had not ratified,107 the Court determined
that the burden of proof concerning Mr. Anudo’s nationality lay with Tanzania.
Finding that Tanzania had failed to meet this burden, the Court concluded that
the withdrawal of Mr. Anudo’s nationality had been arbitrary, in violation of
UDHR Article 15(2).
Interestingly, the applicant’s claim of a violation of his right to freedom of
movement was framed under Article 12 of the Charter, but reframed by the Court
as primarily concerning Mr. Anudo’s right to return to his country after having
left the territory involuntarily.108 It is not clear why the Court then proceeded to
focus on Article 13 of the ICCPR, which the applicant had not relied on,109
focusing on the question of whether Mr. Anudo had been arbitrarily expelled.110
The Court concluded that there had been a violation of Article 13 of the ICCPR
in this regard, without further mentioning the original complaint under Article
12 of the Charter.111
The Court found a violation of Mr. Anudo’s right to be heard under both the
Charter and ICCPR,112 as argued,113 and found that the other violations argued
were the consequences of his expulsion.114 The Court deferred consideration of
these violations, related to the “major violations” it had found, to the reparations
stage of the proceedings.115
104
The African Commission held in two cases that the complainants’ rights to nationality, as legal statuses,
had been violated under Article 5 of the Charter. See The Nubian Community in Kenya v. Kenya, No. 317/2006,
Merits, Afr. Comm’n H.P.R., ¶ 74, 140, 151 (May 30, 2016); Open Society Justice Initiative v. Côte d’Ivoire,
No. 318/2006, Merits, Afr. Comm’n H.P.R., ¶ 118–20, 138 (May 27, 2016).
105
Anudo v. Tanzania, No. 012/2015, Judgment on the Merits, Afr. Ct. H.P.R., ¶ 76 (Mar. 22, 2018).
106
Id. ¶ 76–79; see also United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons, Sept. 28,
1954, 360 U.N.T.S. 117.
107
Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons, UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION,
https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetailsII.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=V-3&chapter=5&Temp=mtdsg2&
clang=_en (last visited Nov. 21, 2018).
108
Anundo v. Tanzania, No. 012/2015, Afr. Ct. H.P.R., ¶¶ 95–96.
109
Id. ¶ 14.
110
Id. ¶¶ 100–05.
111
Id. ¶ 106.
112
Id. ¶¶ 107–15.
113
Id. ¶ 14.
114
Id. ¶ 115.
115
Id. ¶¶ 117–21.
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116
Mango v. Tanzania, No. 005/2015, Decision, Afr. Ct. H.P.R., ¶ 12 (May 11, 2018).
117
Id. ¶ 11.
118
Id. ¶¶ 60–27.
119
Id.
120
Id. ¶ 130.
121
Id. ¶¶ 149–50.
122
Id. ¶ 142.
123
Id. ¶¶ 145–46.
124
Id. ¶ 12.
125
Ass’n pour le Progrès et la Défence des Droits de Femmes Maliennes v. Mali, No. 04DF2016, Decision,
Afr. Ct. H.P.R., at 2 (May 11, 2018) [hereinafter APDF v. Mali].
126
OAU, Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in
Africa, July 11, 2003, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/66.6. As mentioned above, the ECOWAS Community Court of
Justice has a comparably extensive human rights jurisdiction as the Court. See Supplementary Protocol, supra
note 6. In 2017, the ECOWAS Court was the first regional adjudicatory body to issue a ruling on the basis of
the Protocol. Njemanze v. Nigeria, ECW/CCJ/JUD/08/17, (Oct. 12, 2017), https://africanlii.org/ecowas/
judgment/ecowas-community-court-justice/2017/10. For a discussion of the case and its implications for the
African human rights system, see Sègnonna Horace Adjolohoun, The Njemanze ECOWAS Court Ruling and
“Universal” Jurisdiction: Implications for the “Grand African Human Rights System”, BLOG OF THE
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, (Nov. 16, 2017), http://www.iconnectblog.com/2017/11/
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Mali’s Family Law violated the Maputo Protocol, the African Charter on the
Rights and Welfare of the Child (ACRWC),127 and CEDAW,128 specifically its
provisions on the “minimum age of marriage for girls,” the “consent to
marriage,” “right to inheritance,” and the “obligation to eliminate traditional
practices and conduct harmful to the rights of women and children.”129 The
Court found in favor of the applicants on all points, considering the alleged
violations in the context of the Maputo Protocol, ACRWC, and CEDAW as
argued by the litigants,130 and ordered the Respondent State to “harmonize its
laws with the international instruments.”131
the-njemanze-ecowas-court-ruling-and-universal-jurisdiction-implications-for-the-grand-african-human-rights-
system.
127
OAU, African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, July 11, 1990, OAU Doc.
CAB/LEG/24.9/49.
128
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Dec. 18, 1979, 1249
U.N.T.S. 13, 13.
129
APDF v. Mali, No. 046/2016, Afr. Ct. H.P.R., ¶ 9.
130
Id. ¶¶ 78, 95, 115, 125.
131
Id. ¶ 135.
132
Protocol, supra note 2, art. 3.
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133
Zongo v. Burkina Faso, No. 013/2011, Afr. Ct. H.P.R., ¶¶ 2, 8, 104; In the Consolidated Matter of
Tanganyika Law Society, No. 009/2011 & 011/2011, Afr. Ct. H.P.R., ¶¶ 85, 91, 92, 122.
134
Compare Thomas v. Tanzania, No. 005/2013, Afr. Ct. H.P.R., ¶ 88 with Nganyi v. Tanzania, No.
006/2013, Judgment, Afr. Ct. H.P.R. at ¶¶ 58, 113, 115–16, 169–79 (analyzing two claims of human rights
violations, both under the Charter, but using other instruments for interpretation).
135
Protocol, supra note 2, art. 3.
136
Takane Sugihara, The Principle of Jura Novit Curia in the International Court of Justice: With
Reference to Recent Decisions, 55 JAPANESE Y.B. INT’L L. 77, 84–85 (2012).
137
ICJ Reports 1974, p. 9, ¶ 17, p. 181, ¶ 18. Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua
(Nicaragua v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14, ¶ 29 (June 27, 1986) (capitalization in original). This view
was also referenced by Judge Ouguergouz (on a different topic) in his separate opinion in Afr. Comm’n on
Human & Peoples’ Rights v. Libya. No. 002/2013, Separate Opinion of Judge Fatsah Ouguergouz on Order for
Provisional Measures, Afr. Ct. H.P.R., ¶¶ 5–6 (Mar. 15, 2013). In this context, see also Onyachi v. Tanzania.
No. 003/2015, Judgment, Afr. Ct. H.P.R., ¶ 13 (Sept. 28, 2017) (including the applicants’ argument that both
the Kenyan and Tanzanian governments had violated “all accepted principles of human rights and international
law”). The Court dismissed the case for lack of personal jurisdiction but held the following on the applicant’s
general claims:
[T]he Court has previously decided that it can only examine a specific allegation of human rights
violation only when either the facts indicating such violation or the nature of the right which was
allegedly violated is adequately stated in the Application. The instant allegation lacks precision
in both respects. The Applicants have not clearly stated the specific right or principle of human
rights or international law, which is said to be violated nor have they sufficiently indicated the
factual basis of such alleged violation. As a result, the Court is unable to make a determination
on the merits of the substance of the Applicants’ allegation because of its generalised nature and
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Following this reasoning from the International Court of Justice, the Court
not only has the discretion to bring into its consideration relevant human rights
treaties other than the Charter, but also, as a court, has a duty to do so.
The Court did this, on its own initiative, in the Abubakari case,138 as
discussed above.139 Also, in the case of Chacha v. Tanzania,140 in which the
applicants had cited only national law as a basis for their claims,141 the Court
stated that “where only national law or constitution has been cited and relied
upon in an application, the Court will look for corresponding articles in the
Charter or any other human rights instrument and base its decision thereon.”142
While these cases suggest that the Court might have an intention to establish
a more consistent practice in this regard, this approach does not yet appear to
have been structurally embedded. Possibly, this ambivalent approach reflects the
challenges the Court faces in balancing what are likely to be competing interests:
expansively interpreting the human rights it is mandated to protect and
potentially losing buy-in among the states that established it versus a more
cautious approach that could result in the Court not fulfilling its potential as a
custodian of human rights.
Of course, there can be significant drawbacks to adopting strict rules in this
regard. Most courts want to remain flexible and able to address the needs of
litigants over time, and this is especially true for a young court in its early phase
of development. However, this does not preclude the, perhaps informal,
formulation and use of a framework of guiding principles, which would increase
the legal certainty for litigants as well as the internal consistency of the Court’s
jurisprudence.
One such criterion could be remedial consequences for the applicant: if a
violation of the Charter has already been found, then does finding a parallel
violation under another human rights instrument make a difference in the
acknowledgment of the human rights violation that occurred? Arguably, there
can be extra weight from a symbolic viewpoint in finding a violation of not one,
finds no violation of a right protected in the Charter or other international human rights
instruments ratified by the Respondent.
Id. ¶¶ 156–57 (citation omitted) (capitalization in original).
138
See Abubakari v. Tanzania, No. 007/2013, Afr. Ct. H.P.R. at ¶ 32.
139
See discussion supra Part 3.
140
Chacha v. Tanzania, No. 003/2012, Ruling on Admissibility, Afr. Ct. H.P.R., ¶ 157 (Mar. 28, 2014)
(failing to make it to a judgment on the merits as it was declared inadmissible).
141
Id. ¶¶ 3–4. Tanzania used this fact to argue for inadmissibility. Id. ¶ 95.
142
Id. ¶ 113.
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but a series of human rights treaties. Yet, if this has no further impact on the
orders issued by the Court or the implementation that can be pursued by the
applicant, should the Court examine these parallel violations?
This raises another interesting question: if the recourse for redress offered is
different under another treaty than the Charter itself or if the Charter offers no
grounds for a human rights claim (such as a violation of the right to privacy
mentioned above),143 then should the Court explore the possibility of finding a
violation under another applicable human rights framework? The Court has
answered this question when it comes to applicants having cited only national
law in their submissions,144 as set out above, but not yet explicitly clarified its
position when it comes to international human rights instruments.
Whichever avenue the Court chooses, it would be beneficial for it to make a
clear choice and begin to consistently develop its jurisprudence in that direction,
not least for the sake of legal certainty for applicants seeking its assistance.
143
Id. ¶ 113.
144
Id.