COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE

COMMANDANT

MAJOR GENERAL G. H. DAVIDSON

ASSISTANT COMMANDANT

F. TRAIN

BRIGADIER GENERAL W.

EXECUTIVE FOR INSTRUCTION

COLONEL J. A. GAVIN, Infantry

EXECUTIVE FOR RESEARCH AND EVALUATION

COLONEL S. L. WELD, JR., Artillery

SECRETARY

COLONEL JOHNF. FRANKLIN, JR., Armor

DEPUTY POST COMMANDER

COLONEL C. P. ROBBINS, Armor

 MILITARY REVIEW

VOLUME XXXV JULY 1955 NUMBER 4

CONTENTS
TACTICAL AIR SUPPORT FOR ARMY FORCES _________________________ 3
Colonel Jules E. Gonseth, Jr., Signal Corps
NEEDED AMERICAN "GUARDS" OUTFITS ___________________________ 17
Major Mark M. Boatner, III, Infantry
ATOMIC DEFENSE ______ _ _______________________ _________ _ 22
- Lieutenant Colonel F. O. Miksche
WARTIME ROLE FOR COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES __________ _ 31
Colonel Anson D. Marston, Corps of Engineers
LABOR MOBILITY IN THE ATOMIC AGE _________________ _ 45
Colonel O. Z. Tyler, b·., Infantry
JUNIOR OFFICER TRAINING _______ _____________________ 48
First Lieutenant Walter A. Coole, Jr., United States Army Reserve
NOTES ON PACK ARTILLERY _ _________ __________________ _ 51
Captain Michael F. Pal'rino, United States Army Reserv.e
SMOKE SUPPORT OF RIVER CROSSINGS _______________________ 56
Lieutenant Colonel E. Van Rensselaer Needels, Chemical Corps
MILITARY NOTES AROUND THE WORLD _~ 63
________________________
FOREIGN MILITARY DIGESTS ____________________________________ 73
The Council of Europe -------------------- - ________________ 73
Guided Missiles ___ _______________ _ ----- _______________ 80
War-Limzted or Unlimited? ---- ____________________________ 85
Helicopters for the Army ___________________________________ 88
Night Operations -- ________________________________________ 94
Saseno-Moscow's Gibraltar - -- _-- ----------- - - -- ________ .:. __ 99
Day or Night Attack for the Infantry? --------------------- ___ 101
BOOKS OF INTEREST TO THE MILITARY READER - ------ _____________ ~_110

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 MILITARY REVIEW STAFF

EDITOR IN CHIEF

COLONEL DONALD L. DURFEE

NORTH AMERICAN EDITION

Editor: LIEUTENANT COLONEL GREY DRESSER

Assistant Editor: MAJOR JOHN J. EARLEY

SPANISH-AMERICAN EDITION

Editor: MAJOR GILBERTO GONZALEZ-JULIA

Assistllnt Editors: CAPTAIN ANTONIO V. MUNERA, CAPTAIN TOMAS H. GUFFAI~

CAPTAIN ORLANDO ORTIZ MORENO

B/lAZILIAN EDITION

Editor: LIEUTENANT COLONEL HERMANN BERGQVIST

Assistllnt Editor: LIEUTENANT COLONEL TACITO T. G. DE OLIVEIRA

Administrlltive Officer Production Officer

MAJOR LINO BONUCCI MAJOR JAMES A. TRENT

The printing of this publication hils been approved by

the Director of the Burellu of the Budget 2 July 1953.

MILITARY REVIEW-Published monthly by the Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenwolth.
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 TACTICAL AIR SUPPORT,

FOR 'ARMY FORCES

Colonel Jules E. Gonseth, Jr., Signal Corps

Assistant Commandant, The Army Aviation School, Camp Rucker, Alabama

The 1,iews expressed in this article for vociferous and at times public demands
arc the author's and are not neces­ cannot long be ignored. This paper will
sltrily those of the Departmeltt of the -attempt to set forth the case from the
Army or the Command and General viewpoint of the Army and focus attentiolJ.
Staff College.-The Editor. on the needs of the Army for the airplane
type of supporting weapon.

T ACTIICAL airpower is a most impor­

In order to appreciate fully the tasks
facing the Army in the event of global
tant facet of the military capability of war, 01' even a series of "police actions,"
any great nation in the world today. How­ the capabilities of the Soviet Army-Air
ever, this type of airpower is much dis­ Force combination will be touched upon.
cussed, and, unfortunately, much misun­ This potent military force is the onc
derstood, and it is necessary to have a which must be defeated 01' neutralized in
common understanding of the term "tac­ the event of open warfare, as it is the
tieal air support" for the discussion to only major enemy military force opposing
be' meaningful. One of the purposes of the United States today.
this article will be to clarify the concept
of what is meant by tactical ail' support The Problem •
of ground forces. From the aviation viewpoint there are
There appear to be three viewpoints on two major types of aIr operations, stra­
the subject of tactical airpower; the first tegic and tactical. While' the subject of
as seen from the vantage point of the this article is tactical ail', the concept
Air Force, the second as envisioned by of strategic air will be established for
the Navy-Marine combination, and last, a better understanding of the deep inter­
but not the least important, the ground diction problem which will be brought out
level view of the Army, which, after all, later.
is the key to the problem as it is the Strategic air operations are those air
majo" force being supported. The Army operations designed to effect-through
viewpoint has never really been set forth the systemic application of force to a
strongly and independently, and it is selected series of targets-the progres­
probably its own fault in this regard, sive destruction and disintegration of the

The Army should exert every effOl:t to obtain satisfactory close' air
support from the Air Force for its ground units engagea in combat.
Failing in this the Army must plan to provide its own close air support
 MILITARY REVIEW JULY 1~55 .

enemy's warmaking capacity to a point be interdicted to deny the movement of

where he 'no longer retains the ability. or enemy troops, equipment, and supplies.
the will, to wage war. Targets may in­ 3. That close tactical air support must
clude key manufacturing systems, sources be provided to the surface forces'in the
of raw material. critical materials, stock­ battle area.
piles, power systems. transportation sys­ The first task mentioned above il:; ex­
tems, communications facilities, concen­ clusively the traditional role of the air­
trations of uncommitted elements of enemy plane in air-to-air combat, and includes
armed forces, key agricultUl'al areas, and in modern warfare the bombing of eu­
other target systems. emy aidields and other facilities which
Tactical Air Support contribute to his airpower. As this task
Tactical ail' opemtions al'e those ai!' is expanded upon, it overlaps into the
operations conducted against an enemy's interdiction battle, and, finally, into the
military forces, his installations, and his strategic role, as, for instance, the de­
routes of communication. A vel'y impor­ struction of the enemy's petroleum sources
tant facet of this type of air operation and facilities. These tasks are of inter­
is the understanding that the general mis­ est to the ground commander under the
sion of tactical airpowel' assigned to the guise of general support, and, of course,
support role in a battle area is the same they are of paramount interest to the
aR that assigned the supported fOl'ces­ theater commander. However, the task
the defeat of the enemy military forces. which is of prime concern to the ground
This understanding impinges upon one commanders at all echelons is the close
of the fundamentals of military opera­ support role.
tions-that of unity of command on the
CI.ose Support
battlefield-and has been the source of
wide disagreement among the forces in­ In the accomplishment of his close sup­
volved, The resolution of this point is port mission, the ground commander uti­
one of the l{eys to successful tactical air lizes his infantry-either on foot or mech­
operations. anized-as his chief means of gaining and
Under the broad principles of employ­ holding ground ·wrested from the enemy.
ment of airpower, it is generally agreed All other forces are in the nature of sup­
porting means; however, this does not
there are three tasks to be accomplished
lessen their importance, and they must be
by tactical airpower:
1. That air superiority in the theater of
integrated and co-ordinated with the op­
operations must be gained and maintained. erations of the infantry. Particularly is
2. That the selected battle area must this ,true of the forces which contribute
firepower to the destruction of the enemy,
Calonel Jules E. Gonscth, JJ'., is a UJ'ad­ such as artillery, tanks, rockets, missiles,
uate of the University of Illinois. He was and mortars-and there is no reason to
Assistant Signal Executive Officer, GHQ, exempt airborne delivery of firepowel',
Far East Command, in 1945, and later
1'ctu1'ned to the Far East as Signal Offi­ It is for this reason that the ground
cer of the 11th Airborne Division and 7th commander is vitally interested in the
Division. 1n 1951, he completed the Army third task of tactical air-that of close
Aviation Tactics Course at Fort Sill. He
planned and activated the Signal Corps air support. More exactly, this term should
Army Aviation Center, Fort Monmouth, be direct air support of ground troops,
and became its first Commanding Officer. A with close air support being a subtask.
graduate of the Army War College in 1954, This article will adhere to the follOWing
he is now Assistant Commandant, Army
Aviation School, Camp Rucker. Alabama. definition of the terms:
 TACTIC,AL AIR SUPPORT FOR ARMY FORCES 5
Direct. ai1' 8upport.-Air operations jor functions or categories of airpower
which are directly related to the combat if.! which it is interested, strategic and
operations of ground troops. tactical, and both terms are used in their
Close air 8upport.-A subtask of direct broadest military sense. Therefore, at
air support involving the attack by air­ present, the "tactical" aspect of airpower,
craft of hostile ground targets which are as defined by the Air Force, is almost
so close to friendly forces as to require anything in the way of airpower that is
detailed integration of each air mission not a part of the strategic air command.
with the fire and movement of those forces. This means that in its bl'oadest sense,
Close reconnaissance air suppo1·t.-A airpower allotted to a theater of opera­
subtask of direct air support whereby tions will be assigned to missions to fur­
complementary information or intelligence ther the objectives of that theater, and
is gained visually, electronically, and pho­ that any missions which are not strategic
tographically by aerial means. in nature are tactical.
The United States Air Force Air-Ground
Scope Operations School stresses this point in
The subject of air!,>ower is so vast that its instructions; the theater air commander
even a small segment. of the topic can integrates the airpower under his con­
hardly be discussed adequately in a lim­ trol with the Army operations. The air
ited space. efforts are designed to further the mili­
While it is difficult to break the sub­ tary campaign by:
ject into segments, and to get any two 1. Neutralizing or otherwise preventing
authorities to agree on the composition the enemy from using airpower against
of the segments, my purpose at this time friendly surface forces.
will be to treat on the subject of di­ 2. Containing the enemy within a cer­
rect air support as defined here. More tain area by preventing a flow of supplies
specifically, it will confine the treatment and reinforcements to his frontline units
to the two major subtasks of close aii· and thereby facilitate their destruction by
support and close reconnaissance air sup­ friendly surface forces.
port, as dcfined. This is not to say that 3. Attacking and destroying enemy posi­
i1 is not recognized that there may be tions, personnel, and equipment on the
other segments to the problem of direct immediate front to facilitate the advance
ail' support such as air transport by hel­ of friendly surface forces.
icopter or fixed-wing aircraft. but for the In order to accomplish the above mis­
purposes of this article the subject will sions, various types of wings such as
be delimited as explained. fighter bomber, night intruder, reconnais­
sance, and a tactical air control group are
Close Air Support Analysis assigned to a tactical air force; and they
During the growth phase of airpower, are employed in consonance with the prin­
the Air Force expanded tremendously and ciples of integration of effort, centralized
dUring the process was able to write its control, flexibility, and mobility.
own concepts, functions, and organization. These are the classic principles of em­
Thb phase culminated in the establishment ployment, but some senior Air Force offi­
of 9 separate air force. cers have added a new one-that of equal­
Tile Air Force concept of what con­ ity of command between air ann ground.
stit>,tes its job continues on an almost It must be remembered that these are
unilateral basis. strictly Air Force principles, but they
Tne Air Force deems there are two ma­ have cut across other, and more funda-'
6 MILITARY REVIEW JULY 1955

mental, considerations. One of these time­ mented or equipped therefol', nor are the
tried considerations is decentralization of aircrews trained to work with the ground
responsibility and authority, as opposed forces on a tactical mission.
to the formal principle of nnity of com­ With the Air Force thus disposing its
mand on the field of battle. This conflict available aircraft to meet the requirc­
of .considerations is one of the existing ments of tactical aviation-by its def­
hard core problems which will be discussed inition-it is apparent that the higher
in more detail later. priority mission of air superiority will
There is no disagreement on the ne­ have first call upon the tactical air forces,
cessity for air superiority, or air su­ and the ground commander must, per­
premacy, if it can be attained, on a thea­ force, wait for any direct air support.
ter-wide basis-or at least on a local air How long must he wait? According to
sUperiority basis at times in order to win present plans, he must wait until the Air
local battles. It has been stated by well­ Force concludes that air superiority, even
known contemporaries that if an enemy if in a local area, has been attained and
nation makes more than a token air ef­ that tactical aircraft can be released to
fort against such a highly mechanized make a direct contribution to the ground
force as the United States Army, the operation.
Army can have no hope of achieving This is a grim thought from the view­
success unless it has adequate tactical air point of the doughboy and the ground
support. commander, for it means they must fight
The threat of a potential enemy to chal­ virtually without benefit of one of their
lenge this air superiority is one of the most potent weapons.
most pressing problems facing the Air Of course, it is pointed out by the
Force. Air Force that the theater commander
It is indeed clear, that with the Soviet assigns the priority of missions in his
Union-the largest potential enemy of the theater, and that if the ground support
United States and possessing one of the mission is assigned, they will execute it.
However, every battalion commander in a
largest air forces-air superiority in the
frontline battalion cannot have accesg to
early phase of a war will be a vital re­
the field marshal to ask for a close sup­
quirement for the victor apparent. Stu­
.port strike, with priority.
dents of this military situation, playing
However, what the battalion command­
force against force, have concluded that ers and all other ground commanders must
during the early part of any such war, and do is make their requirements for close ail'
possibly extending for a longer period of support known to all echelons of the serv­
time, the scarce tactical air forces of the ices, and promulgate and defend them
United States will be preoccupied with together with their doctrine of employ­
the Soviet tactical air force and its bases, ment-the same as they do for artillery,
rather than on the direct support of the guided missile, or mortar support. Other·
gTound battle. wise, they will do little but continue in
Further, the strategic air forces will their present position and aceept the Air
be occupied with their own missions, and Force concept of when and how much air
it is highly unlikely that they will be support they will get in direct support of
diverted from their primary missions to the ground battle.
render close ground support. Strategic No discussion of close air support would
type aircraft are not well suited to the be complete without mention of actual
close support role and are not instru­ operational experience. The air capability
 TACTICAL AIR SUPPORT FOR ARMY FORCES 7

had not yet developed during World War This caused Major General Hiekey, who
I to a point where any significant deduc­ commanded an armored division in the
tions can be made, but, World War II and operation, to exuberate, "The best tank
the Korean "police action" do furnish val­ destroyer we h~ve is a P-47." The his­
uable information on the subject. Even a torians point to further co-operation
little can be gleaned from the recent small whereby remarkable results were obtained
war in Indochina. by air-ground assault elements in rapid
The significance of the point noted ear­ advances and critical attacks through the
lier of distinguishing between the various use of forward controllers. It is signifi­
Air Force missions may be further appre­ cant to note that during these operations
ciated by a statement in a report sum­ the ground commanders were allowed to
marizing tactical air operations in the talk pilots down to the target--a practice
European Theater during World War II which is presently not possible.
which points out that it is indeed difficult The preoccupation of the air command­
to draw a fine line between strategical air ers with their own air-to-air battle, and
operations and tactical air operations. strategic and deep interdiction bombing,
This situation is even more true today as left extremely little close support for the
ranges and speeds of aircraft have in­ ground commander. Of course, it is ad­
creased over their predecessors. mitted that the close support air strike
is probably one of the most difficult to
No Joint Doctrine accomplish successfully, day in and day
It is not generally recognized that at out, but, in 1944, only about 8 percent of
the outset of World War II, even with the Eighth Air Force in Europe was em­
the Air Corps being a part of the Army, ployed tactically. Even the tactical ail'
there was no approved joint doctrine of command-whose primary mission was
employment and neither were there manu­ close co-operation with the ground army
als nor traihing literature. The air and -dispatched only a little more than one­
ground commanders were strictly on their third of its available sorties for this pri­
own, and it ,was this condition which sowed mary function. It is difficult not to con­
the seeds which reaped the separate air clude that the ground forces did not have
force and left the Army without its direct the type of ground support which they
tactical support. Historians repeatedly deserved or which had been planned for
point out that throughout the war the air them.
commander had to consider his own prob­ The difficulty the ground commander
lemg first, and such support as was given had, during the crucial battles of 1944, of
to the ground forces was a result of mu­ obtaining such close support may be im­
tual co-operation between tactical air com­ agined, when, in each case, it had to be
rnan,is and the armies developed during decided by no one less than the Supreme
operations. This is not to say that mutual Commander. It is understood that massing
co-operation is not good, for the record of bombers for carpet bon;bing in front of
sho\"'; that some of the most remarkable ground troops is extremely costly in terms
achi':vements were those attained by day­ of effort diverted from other targets, and
to-day co-operation. These successes war­ that co-ordination of air and ground had
rant a closer look to see if the problems of to be accomplished. But why at such a
toda:: 'may not be solved similarly. high level? It placed the Supreme Com­
D';ring the St.' La breakthrough, air mander in the position of having to de­
firel'i)wer destroyed 2,000 vehicles, 80 ar­ cide on a basis of winning campaigns as
tillel y pieces, and 100 tanks in 1 week. opposed to battles.

..... -.­
8 MILITARY REVIEW JULY 1955'

Yet, it was such close support-when combat-few ground commanders experi.

it was provided-that was so destructive enced the benefits of close air support un­
of the enemy's forces. Captured German der combat conditions which required a1l­
commanders stated that the heavy carpet out air support.
bombing along lIhe main line of resistance The Korean conflict may be represented
was the type of aerial :firepower most by three oversimplified generalities: first,
detrimental· to their ability to defend a the United Nations forces had air supe­
position. Still other German commanders riority, which later became air supremacy;
considered that the ground controlled . second, except for the first year's :fighting
frontline :fighter-bomber type of air mis­ which was mobile, the balance of the ac­
sion was most detrimental, especially to tion was a war of intrenched position;
the morale of the defending troops and the and third, weak and confused political con­
'destruction of forward supply dumps. siderations hampered the military com­
However successful was tactical air manders in the field through delimiting the
during the I-week battle at St. Lo, in battle area, permitting the enemy to have
the mission of close support, this was a privileged sanctuary and year-long truce
one of the few such actions. Some divi­ talks.
sions never received any close support In retrospect, the :first anomaly of the
at all, and others in varying degrees, de­ Korean conflict was that, in spite of clear­
pending upon "the mutual co-operation." cut air superiority, all air support for the
A review of the over-all air effort in­ ground forces had to be co-ordinated and
dicates that a large part of the effort directed by the United Nations Com­
of the tactical air force was expended mander in Tokyo. The ground commander
in the classic task of tactical air interdic­ in Korea had absolutely no command or
tion of the battle:field. About one-third of operational control over air or naval craft
all the bombs dropped in the European in support of his operations. As a result.
Theater-roughly one-quarter of a million the enemy buildup continued almost un­
tons-were dropped in this effort against abated, although the interdiction and
transportation targets. In ih" ov"r-all, pseurlm;tl'aregic ail' campaigns ",gn!
~mly l.m el>timateri 8 Fe~·..~mt %f Genllim pm'hed t<} the utm.<}st, These so-culled
tank casualties was caused by tactkaI air «str~mgle« operations against the enemy
strikes. This is quite a contrast to Korea, rail and highway traffic in daylight were
where; with no enemy air opposition, tac­ not decisive in the over-all effects, but it
tical air strikes caused about 40 percent did force the enemy to move at night,
casualties to enemy tanks. which he did with great effectiveness.
The second anomaly was that even with
K&M&n C»nlliS!t ail' supremacy, the air commanders ch()~
The entire story of the Korean opera­ to expend the major force of their capa­
tion is an anomaly in itself, for while bility on other than close air support
a review of the tactical air support given missions. Only an average of a dozen or
the ground forces reveals some interesting so flights were made daily in support of
operations, conclusions drawn should be the ground divisions actively engaged
scrutinized with great care. The Supreme against the enemy in 1952-although the
Commander himself cautions that the Ko­ supporting air forces had a far greater
rean conflict should not be the sole basis sortie-rate capability. Marine Corps avia­
for changing any of the fundamental doc­ tion, when permitted to do so, generally
trines on the role of tactical air support. provided about three times this amount
In fact-except in the early stages of the of close air support in 'terms of planes,
 TACTICAL AIR SUPPORT FOR ARMY FORCES 9
bombs, rockets, and napalm, and were traditional position of the airman is ex­
more efficient in their use-attacking more pressed by the' Air Officer Commanding,
enemy troops and gun positions, and fewer Far East, France, who states:
huts and buildings-than the Air Force.
The air command cannot agree without
The political prohibition against using
protest to equipment as costly and scarce
the strategic bombers in their normal role
as the aircraft being used for missions
across the Yalu, produced another oddity
(close support) which can be accomplished
of the Korean conflict by forcing the use
equally well as [by] less costly armS, such
of these big bombers, B-29s, for close sup­
as the artillery.
port carpet bombing operations, if they
were to be used at all. Some of these He admits that a less costly means is
attacks were made by radar control at vitally necessary to deliver firepower from
night and the exact results could not be the air, and he further deduces that the
measured quantitatively. Such attacks in current system of calling up firepower to
daylight were exploited by immediate fol­ hit lucrative targets in the Indochinese
lowup ground troops who reported the type of warfare is something less than
raids were stunningly effective. The tre­ satisfactory. He goes on to say:
mendous effort and cost of using large
bombers for close support may be imag­ The small, slow observation aircraft,
ined, eyen if it did slow down the enemy the 'midge,' has thus become the corner­
in his night attacks. stone of the war in Indochina, as in Ko­
rea, and as in Europe tomorrow. The
In the spring of 1953, the air and ground
'midge' sees but does not itself. attack,
forces in Korea conducted a joint experi­
and can only call up the attackers. How­
ment to smooth out 13 problem areas ex­
ever quickly the latter may arrive, the
isting under the present joint doctrine.
advantage of surprise is frequently lost,
This was in the nature of a controlled
and the Vietminhs have already decamped,
maneuver for training purposes, for there
whenever they can. We should, therefore,
was no enemy air opposition and the
work on a light, tactical, 2-seater, with
ground forces were in a static position. As
a maximum speed of not more than 240
a result, the findings were not necessarily
miles an hour, and a minimum speed of
conclusive as there were few good targets
about 50 miles an hour. Its weight­
and the ground forces could not exploit
about a ton-would enable it to use any
the attack after the air strikes. What the
kind af airstrip of some 400 yards long,
test did show was that even with good It should be armed with two machineguns,
communications, and good co-ordination
a few rockets, a very high frequency
between the air, ground, and artillery, it
(radio) set, and be armored underneath.
still took almost an hour to bring air
firepower onto targets by friendly planes The French are procuring an American­
on ground alert; it also indicated the need designed aircraft-the Fletcher-which is
for a great deal more photographic and manufactured in Japan, for this purpose.
visual reconnaissance by both Air Force
and Army aircraft. Summary
One area of the world in which a hot A summary of the lessons to be deduced
war recently operated was in Indochina. from these examples of operational usage
This again was a war in which the of close air support of ground forces
friendly forces had air superiority, but the seems to be that such a type of air support
terrain and guerrilla type fighting forced is extremely effective in supporting the
a reassessment of the air capability. The ground battle. The complete integration
10 MILITARY REVIEW JULY 1955

of all types of supporting fires is essen­ all echelons is the key to the successful
tial to the success of the ground battle; functioning under this doctrine of air­
this includes conventional artillery, guid­ ground operations. Any use of air in the
ed missiles and rockets, antiaircraft ar­ ground campaign is, perforce, a joint op­
tillery, and thp air bomber. Radar con­ eration, and requires that all the planning
trolled bombardment aviation is distinctly and execution and close co-ordination
effective, and interdiction and neutrali­ peculiar to joint operations be achieved
zation bombing· of enemy concentrations between army groups and tactical air com­
accomplished during the hours of darkness mands and between field armies and tacti·
will greatly aid in the defeat of the en­ cal air forces.
emy. Artillery and air support must be It should be noted that joint planning
prompt and continuouB as long as enemy is possible only at these two levels of
pressures endure. When the enemy breaks command-except for theater level-but
contact to retire, only close air support concurrent planning extends through all
can pm·sue rapidly enough to be effeeti1w. echelons of both forces. An important
The relative paucity of close and con­ planning principle is that co-operative
tinuous air support of all the combatant air-ground effort is integrated at that
ground forces, actually engaged against command level which produces the maxi­
the enemy in past hot wars, indicates a mum continuing results froJU the availa­
need for a fundamental and vital decision ble air and ground forces. To provide
whether air support operations to gain rapid communications, flexibility, and con­
and maintain air superiority should be trol, it is essential that these operations be
planned sufficiently independently of in­ conducted at the lowest possible echelon
terdiction and close support operations of command. Since the tactical air force
to permit a separate requirement for close is the lowest echelon of the air forces
support. which plans and conducts independent op­
erations, the field army and the tacti­
Current Doctrine cal air force form the fundamental air­
The Air Force concepts of air support g-round team.
were dealt with in some detail earlier. Thus, instead of the supporting arms
The current doctrine in use for joint conforming to the level of command and
training and operations largely reflects organization of the ground forces being
those Air Force concepts. The principle supported, the supported forces are com­
of unified command at theater level is ac­ pelled to complicate their structure to
cepted as the apex of the command pyra­ meet the form of the supporting unit. This
mid. Under the theater commander there is an untenable situation which has been
are two forces, the ground and the air, criticized repeatedly. Since the basic tac­
with coequality of command. Under the tical unit in the ground forces is the
ground forces there is a vertical chain of division, it would seem only logical to
command, and, similarly, under the air integrate aerial firepower at this level.
commander there is a vertical organiza­ This discrepancy in the logic of our ad­
tion. ministrative and command organization
These two vertical forces come int6 par­ has been pointed out repeatedly by stu­
allel at the army group level with a dents of the situation. In fact, many
coequal tactical air command, and the military commander.s feel that detailed
field army level with a tactical air force. planning for close air support operations
Below this level there is not a compara­ should be carried on at army corps level
ble parallel organization. Co-operation at or lower.
 TACTICAL AIR SUPPORT FOR ARMY FORCES

On the other hand, if the current doc­ The struggle for air superiority should
trinal organization is sound, since the be centered first 'of all around the ground
tank is a costly. mobile, and flexible effort. The reason for this is that only
weapon, it would be just as logical to by means of ground action can the stra­
plan, co-ordinate, and direct the firepower tegic aims of the war be attained. No
of tanks in the reconnaissance company of independent air action can hope to achieve
the division from a fire direction center results of importance equal to those of
at army headquarters. air actions carried out in the interest of
The problem of coequality of command the success of the over-all ground effort.
of a supporting force commander with the
supported ground commander is one of the Earlier, the noted Soviet airplane de­
signer, Sergei Ilyushin, declared in a
crucial problems which must be solved if
efl'ective close air support is to be ob­ speech in.,1942 that:
tained. We have never accepted the doctrine
The Marine Corps has solved this prob­ of an independent air force winning a
lem by maintaining the basic principle war by massive long-range bombardmlmt.
which governs comma.nd relationships We have always thought that the main
without regard to the particular type of role in aviation was the support of g1'ound
weapon being used. Thus, while the Ma­ farces.
rines have separate aircraft wings and This policy was definitely confirmed as
helicopter assault forces as a part of their official Soviet doctrine by Marshal Kon­
aviation organization, they are placed un­ stantin Vershinin, Chief of the Soviet
der operational control of ground com­ A ir Force, in his statement that the pri­
manders as necessary. The tasks being mary mission of the Soviet Air Force is
performed will govElrn the assignment of to assist the Army. Nearly everyone is
operational control. The Army could well working hard to develop the ability to
profit from this example. strike the enemy forces on the ground and
to protect the Army's groU/nd operations.
Soviet Tactical Air
The Soviet Union is a great believer in The Soviets have implemented their doc­
tactical air support for her ground forces, trine in full measure, for over half of
and, since she is the only potential major all Soviet airpower is designed primarily
military threat to the United States, it for direct support of ground forces. These
would be only prudent to take a look at Soviet' ground forces are heavily and di­
military makeup and capability of these rectly supported by tactical aviation as
forct's which could conceivably face our an essential combat arm performing some
own on the field of battle. roles normally reserved for armor ano
Unfortunately, the Soviets guard their artillery. In fact, the co-ordination be­
military secrets zealously, and we do not tween the air force and the artillery was
have too many details concerning their excellent in the battles by the Soviet
operations. However, what we do know, Union against Germany.
coupled with what we suspect, is enough The Soviets have organized their air
to giye pause to the military planners and arm in a manner which makes it possible
tactidans. to serve with, and in, the ground organ­
The basic doctrine of the Soviet mili­ ization as an integrated team. The or­
ta)'y like most things Russian, is fun­ ganizational nomenclature of the air units
danwntally realistic, and is probably well corresponds to that used for ground units,
expressed by Volkov's statement: and in supporting ground actions, air
12 MtLITARY REVIEW 'ULY 1955

units are used as members of the infantry, demand more and more air cover in the
armor, artillery team, and use the same future.
radio frequencies as the units they are
Students of military science and tactics,
supporting.
and military commanders themselves, are
Thus, the ba'sic tactical air unit is the
coming into agreement with the concepts
air regiment with a fixed table of organ.
ization and equipment containing from 30 of this statement, but the details of how
much, when, by whom, and similar con­
to 50 planes-depending upon" type-and
siderations have yet to be resolved in the
is assigned usually on a basis of one
per assault ground division. United States Army.
This type organization is built up ver· The Army takes the position that there
tically-much the same as a United is an indispensable requirement for ade­
States Army-to the point where the air quate, effective air support for ground
regiments have grown into air armies and operations at all times, and that this re­
assigned normally one for each ground quirement should be met at the earliest
army group and tactically subordinate to possible date.
the ground commander. Senior army commanders have taken a
The tactical employment of the air army firm stand of the indispensability of the
assigned to the army group is in conso· Army's requirement, and have further
nance with the Soviet tactical doctrine stated the need for operational control
that support of the ground troops is the of the air support by the ground com­
main task of the air force. For the prepa· mander. They admit--to counter the Air
ration and breakthrough phase the air Force argument-that the present-day
units act in support of ground units; but, fighter·bomber aircraft at times may be
under the fluid conditions of the exploita· used to assist in the air battle in the
tion and pursuit phase, air units are at· gaining of air superiority, and that it
tached directly to mobile ground units on should be used in this role-but only at
the basis of one air regiment per ground such times as there is not an overriding
division. Ground attack air units are fre· requirement for close support.
quently placed in support of a rifle unit There may be situations where the mil­
operating a distance away from the army itary forces are engaged against an enemy
group or, perhaps, to an armored unit op· having a great superiority of airpowcr
erating behind the enemy lines. The army when centralized control of tactical air
commander then does not have to appeal units under a senior air force commander
to any group to require quick action from may be necessary. If this should occur,
the Soviet Air Force units. By subordinat· however, this commander must have the
ing the air supporting unit to the ground authority to allocate such air wings as
supported unit, the Soviets achieve the are necessary to support the field armies,
unity of command so vital on the battle· depending on the over-all air situation
field. and relative needs of the various armies
for close air support. However, when
The Army's Position
once allocated to the support of an army.
It has been stated recently by John or independent corps, the army or corps
W. R. Taylor in The Royal Air Force commander should have operational con­
Quarterly that: trol of such wings, and he should expect
Close air support is one of the finest to continue to have such support and con­
weapons \any modern army can possess, trol until the completion of his mission.
and it is certain that ground force8 will The parallel between this Army concept
 TACTICAL AIR SUl'PORT FOR ARMY FORCES 13

and the Soviet sYstem,.which was explain­ receive appropriate consideration of their
ed, is at once apparent. The Army concept, requirements in the application of avail­
however, i~ not accepted by the Air Force able air support; that ground command­
and it is along this line of cleavage that ers will be able to depend on the use of a
the present air support doctrine is split. definite amount of tactical air 'support
The Air Force insists on controlling its While it has been allocated for close sup­
own units on a coequal basis with the port and integrate its use in his plan
ground commander and providing air sup­ of battle; and that the power of decision
port in co-operation with him. The Army on targets to be attacked in the execution
must stick to its guns, for it has an of the ground campaign will be vested in
abundance of support for its position. the responsible ground commander.
Experiences in Korea indicated that the Although the first of these requisites­
Army should have the capability of apply­ unity of command-is a time-tried and
ing close air support on targets near front­ fundamental principle of war, the Air
line positions within 5 to 10 minutes of Forces have resisted-and probably will
detecting the target. However, even under continue to resist-vigorously, any action
the most favorable conditions, it takes which might tend to allow the dispersal
about 1 hour to bring such targets under of Air Force elements to ground force
air attack under the present system. Some­ commanders. That this principle is really
times the targets do not wait that long. basic and even applies to the field of
It is such experiences in combat that logistics was pointed out by General Bre­
show that it is almost inevitable that hon Somervell soon after the close of the
considerable time mUst elapse before re­ war in his statement: "If there is one
quest by one service for support from thing in the world that this war taught,
another service can be complied with. as far as I am concerned, it is the ques­
There have been repeated instances of tion of unity of command!'
delay by the Air Force in the furnishing For its 'part, the Air Force has intro­
of badly needed air reconnaissance and duced a new and untried-and therefore
tactical air support to army units in dubious-principle of comj>lementary com­
critical areas. Of course, this is not by mand which requires some type of mutual
desig;n or plan, but the complicated joint co-operation for any success it might in­
mechanics of communications and com­ duce. The ground force commander has
mand channels consume time, and the air thus been forced to adopt the Air J.:'orce
force commander must necessarily consider doctrine in its entirety together with all
the competing demands of other air force the electronics and rommunications neces­
mis, ions on his available resources. The sary for effective use of air support. Under
observation that optimum efficiency of tac­ this doctrine, control of the aircraft J;e­
tical air support can never be achieved un­ ~lains with the Air Force through the
der the present doctrine is attributed to forward air controller. These controllers
a fOJ'mer Chief of Army Field Forces. are pilots from the tactical air force as­
Other senior- Army commanders have signed for ground duty with a division
strc>ised that nothing less than operational on a basis of one per battalion, or nine
con! rol-over both tactical offensive and per division. This seems a waste of highly
tact Jcal reconnaissance air elements­ trained fliers, and it is probable that
will be required in any future war against there never will be enough to man the
a major power in order to assure that ground billets-and fly too.
there will be unity of command on the Under the present doctrines, against an
field. of battle; that Army commanders will enemy with strong airpower, as brought
14 MILITARY REVIEW JULY 195;;

out earlier, the Air Force will undoubt­ would be excellent for operations from
edly use the tactical air force primarily snow, mud, or swamps. The Navy also
for tactical counterair operations and tac­ has two experimental vertical takeoff
tical air defense, while the Army's re­ fighter types which are expected to have
quirement for 'close air support will be exceptional performance. They are espe­
relegated to third priority. If "air superi­ cially adapted to the close support role as
ority" is never quite realized against such they could land well up in the forward
an enemy, the Army probably never will area, could be well dispersed on the
get any close support, or at least only in ground, and be instantly available to the
the degree that air superiority is attained. ' ground troops.
The United States Army has its re­
A Solution quirement for close support regardless of
Faced with this grim possibility, some the other missions of the tactical air force,
Army commanders have considered the and it must be in position to have such
practicability of the Army providing its air support available and control it at
own close support with airplanes especial­ all times. As has been mentioned, under
ly designed for the job. There is much to the present concept and doctrine it can
be said for this concept as it can be do neither. Such aircraft should be avail­
shown that the job can be done at much able under division control to perform
less cost in terms of aircraft, aircrews, in the antitank and antipersonnel role
and logistical support. In other words, at all times. Speed of execution, certainty
tal'gets which the Air Force says it is of availability, and completeness of con­
unprofitable for it to attack because of trol with a relatively cheap weapon should
the risk or diversion of a costly, high­ be its outstanding features. A group of
performance aircraft from the mission for from 50 to 75 such planes should be as­
which the plane was designed-and it is signed to each division engaged in com­
hard to take issue with the argument on bat operations. By being satellited on the
either a basis of cost or logic-could be division, the need for the large overhead
attacked by less costly, but especially de­ of the present wing organization would
signed, aircraft under control of the Army. be eliminated, but additional communica­
As was previously mentioned, the tions and maintenance support would have
French came around to this point of view to be provided by the division to support
in the war in Indochina. Further, they the combat group. As an average, about
have been spending much effort in de­ three combat air support groups should
veloping a plane especially designed for be assigned for each foul' divisions in a
close support, which has high performance, theater of operations.
and which does not require prepared air­ Some thought has been given to using
fields. Their BUI'oudeur is a 600-mile-an­ light, 01' liaison type, aircraft armed with
hour jet plane which takes off from a 1'ockets and napalm in the close support
dolly over unprepared strips, leaves the role. In fact, this proposal has sufficient
dolly behind, and lands on skids. merit to warrant testing without further
The United States Navy has developed delay. Several years ago, during the war,
a jet, the Sea Dart, which operates from General Stilwell personally brought to the
water using a hydrofoil which streamlines attention of General George Marshall that
into the fuselage. This high-performance the L-5 liaison aircraft could bomb ef­
plane would be ideal for close support as fectively with a load of 500 pounds or
it could use any river, canal, or other more, and should be pushed energetically
body of water for its base. This plane as a material contribution to shortening
 TACTICAL AIR SUPPORT FOR ARMY FORCES 15
the war. By June' 1945, both the Navy nor Marines argue against it-is that
and the Army at Fort' Sill, proved that such type of aircraft could not live in the
light airplanes firing rockets were success­ battle area. This same, tired argument
ful as close support aviation, but nothing was raised when the Army adopted small,
further has been done about it. unarmed liaison planes for artillery spot­
Aircraft designers and manufacturers ting and courier service early in World
outside the armed services have concermid War II, but the record of these planes dur­
themselves with this very problem and ing that war, and in Korea, is sufficient
hav.e set forth the following succinct line proof to dispel the argument, Critical
of logic: thought and immediate attention should
be given to this matter by the Army plan­
If the aircraft used to gain air super i­ ners and tacticians,
{wity and pm-jorm missions of inte?'dic­
The luxury of mediocre intelIigencl;l can
tion arc to be of the highest performance
110 longer be tolerated in our Army. While,
possible, their design and functions should
in the above discussion on close air sup­
not be compromised by the conflicting 1'C­
port, attention was given primarily to
quiremcnts for close support of grollnd
firepower support, it is also necessary
operations. This line of reasoning, there­
fore, clearly defined a need for a special­
that adequate visual, photographic, and
ized close support weapon to augment the electronic reconnaissance capability be in­
cluded as a basic requirement in order
existing tactical air fOl·ce.
to ensure adequate planning of the battle
A plane of this type has already been and effective placement and integration
dpsigned and flown and could be produced of all available firepower. However, the
at a cost of about $25,000. When it is exploring of all the ramifications of such
realized that the cost of today's high­ reconnaissance is a matter for a separate
performance jet fighters varies from $250,­ study and is only mentioned here in recog­
000 to $500,000 each, sober thought must nition of the problem. Tactical air recon­
be g'iven to the proposition that 10 times naissance should be included as a stated
the number of airplanes which could de­ mission of close air SUPPO!·t rather than
liver 5 times the amount of close support m; an implied function.
firepower could be purchased for the same
amount of money or less. Conclusions
Further, this type aircraft requires Close air support of ground forces with
much less logistical support and ground complete integration of effort is a must
crew support, is easier to learn to fly, and for the United States Army.
will, therefore, require less pilot training The Army has officially made known its
time. More important, however, this type quantitative requirements for close air
aircraft does not require million-dollar­ support to the Air Force, but the Air
a-mile paved runways 7,000 feet long, but Force has not met the request.
can operate off shorter, relatively unim­ The Army, in consonance with a funda­
proved fields or strips in the forward mental principle of war, "unity of com­
iu'eas-much closer to their targets and mand on the battlefield," has asked for
the troops they are supporting. They would operational or mission control of any air­
also be' well dispersed around such unpre­ craft allocated for the close support of
pared fields and camouflaged for their ground units, but this has not been ac­
own protection, ceded to by the Air Force.
The traditional Air Force argument-it The Air Force has instituted new prin­
should be noted that neither the Navy ciples of "flexibility, centralized control,
16 MILITARY REVIEW JULY 1955

and complementary or coequal command" he performs with an airborne type unit.

in the command relationships between the The Army is capable of developing its
commander giving support and the com­ own close air support means at less cost
mander receiving support. than would be provided by the Air Force.
Present doctrihe has not provided ground This would have the greater advantage of
forces engaged in combat with adequate having the planes where needed when the
close air support-including both fir.e­ need arose, and having them flown by pi­
power and reconnaissance-and is unsatis­ lots who understood the needs of the
factory in the following respects: ground units with which they worked and
1. The necessity for a joint operations of which they are a part.
center at field army level, when the rela­ The Soviet Union, our strongest poten­
tively simple function of bringing fire tial enemy, has a large ground force well
upon a target could be performed by exist­ supported by tactical air forces under
ing fire support co-ordinating centers at control of the ground commander.
division and corps level. Recommendations
2. The necessity for a plethora of ground 1. The Army should exert, vigorously,
communications and radar and for dupli­ every effort at high level to obtain, from
cate communications either on the ground the Air Force, satisfaction of the request
or in the aircraft to effect air-ground com­ for the quantities and control of close
munications. air support required to support ground
3. The use of high-cost, high-perform­ units engaged in combat, and should
ance, or strategic type aircraft to perform amend the doctrine accordingly.
a ground support function which could be 2. Failing in this, the Army should take
performed by less costly and more spe­ the necessary steps to amend agreements
cialized aircraft. and memoranda of understanding and pro-'
4. The requirement for highly trained ceed with plans to provide its own organic
pilots to perform frontline ground con­ close air support with aircraft, organi­
troller functions, and the necessity of dou­ zations, and other means especially de­
ble training the pilot as a parachutist-if signed for the purpose.

Air-ground co-ordination, always of crucial importance, will be more im­

portant than ever before. The increased mobility of ground forces and the
enormously increased potential for destruction afforded by modern weapons
means that ground warfare will be more fluid. The so-called front may become
indiscernible on the map and on the ground, with opposing forces intermixed
in a swirl of individual battles. In such a situation, identification of friendly
ground units from the air will be correspondingly more difficult although, at
the same time, the need for swift and accurate air strikes will be more pressing.

General Charles L. Bolte, Retired

 NEEDED

'AMERICAN ~~GUARDS" OUTFITS

Major Mark M. Boatner, III,. Infantry

Student, Command and General Staff College

The views expressed in this article Forces is conducive to adoption of person­

are the author's and are not neces­ nel policies which deal with individuals on
sarily those of the Department of the a mass-production basis. Such procedures
A rmy or the Command and Geneml may p1'odnce dollar economy, but assuredly
Staff College.-The Editor. destroy unit and individual identity and,
with it, esprit.
T HERE is an old saying that if you
want a rabbit stew you must first catch
The report also points out that:
A further lowering of professional stand­
a rabbit. Similarly, if you want unit pride ards will not serve to lend attractiveness
-esprit de corps-you must first have a to a military career. On the contrary, re­
unit of which to be proud. sultant mediocrity will engender further
I wonder whether we have not tended to dissatisfaction thus encouraging others to
overlook this rather basic fact of military leave the service. Inadequate national pre­
life in our present concern over "increas­ pm'edness will assuredly result.
ing' service attractiveness."
The second heartening d~velopment an­
Two developments in recent months have
nounced in recent months is the Army's
served to encourage the dedicated career
decision to adopt the unit rotation system.
soldier to hope that our Army still may
Senior officers have expressed a firm .de­
attain the higher professional standards
termination to make the system work:
of which it is capable. The first is the
Womble Report,':· Let me quote just a One Elite Unit
few lines: Maybe we are finally ready to recog­
Esprit has been inhibited to the detri­ nize the need for developing a few units
ment of effective leadership. The continuous of outstanding quality in our Army. I am
influx and egress of personnel in the Armed talking about what other armies call
"Guards" or elit~ units.
* The report of the "Ad Hoc Committee on the
Futt. I e of Military Service as a Career that will Our prejudice against quality outfits
Ath<lct and Retain Capable Career Personnel."
ChaJ1'man was Rear Admiral J. P. Womble. Jr. is deeply rooted. The fact that they exist

Perhaps now we are ready to recognize the need for developing a few
regiments of outstanding quality within our Army-units which other
armies have had for centuries and which they refer to as Guards units
 ,-~

18 MILITARY REVIEW JULY 1955

in foreign armies is taken as evidence Personnel

that the concept is vaguely "un-American." To command our model regiment we
F~rthermore.. we have had a disenchant­ must pick a colonel who has already proved
ing experience with Ranger outfits both his ability to handle a regiment. (What
in Italy and K9rea. a radical thought.) This is no job for a
There are many people in our Army who "directed military occupational specialty
do not have to be sold on the idea that (MOS)" colonel-there is an entire regi­
elite units would payoff for us both in ment to be built up and the top man must
peacetime and in war. I am not so naive know what he is doing. A void picking
as to hope in the next few paragraphs to a "Boy Wonder" who will be more con­
convert those who are skeptical or down­ cerned with promoting his personal stock
right hostile. What I am naive enough to tha'n in developing a solid unit-we want
hope for, however, is that some day we sterling qualities in our regiment instead
will set up an elite unit as an expel"iment of chrome plate.
and give it.a fair trial. Othel' regimental officers and noncom­
The easiest way to build up an elite missioned officers, similarly, must be ex­
United States regiment would be to choose perienced leaders who have already dem­
a unit now in existence and shelter it for onstrated their ability to handle the jobs
a while from constant personnel changes. they will perform in the regiment. Be­
The 3d Infantry-the Army's oldest­ fore the conventional "personal adminis­
would be a logical choice, but it would tration" people accuse me of insanity for
have to be diligently "protected."The bat­ this last proposal, let me remind them that
tle streamers on the colors of the "Old our mission is to make an elite unit. Fill
Guard" read like an outline of American the regiment with officers and men who
military history through the Civil War. are fumbling around to learn their own
After World War II, the regiment was jobs out of the field manuals and the idea
actually deactivated. The sad fate of the starts with two strikes against it-and a
"Old Guard" has been so frequently cited cracked bat.
in the last few years as an example of Tours in the regiment would be stab­
the American disregard for military tra­ ilized at 3 years for officers and seniol'
dition that I will not dwell further on the noncommissioned officers. The majority of
crime. I mention the subject here at this enlisted men would be volunteers, and
time only to emphasize what I mean when would serve a full hitch in the regiment.
I say our elite units must be "protected." Approximately 30 percent of the men below
-------- ~-------- the grade of sergeant could join the unit
Majo)' Mm'k M. BoatncT, III, has sel'ved after they had received basie training-­
with troops at the platoon, company, bat­
talion, and regimental level dU)'ing most the regiment should be able to assimilate
of his careeT since graduating from the this number without a reduction of stand­
United States MilitaTU Academy in 1.943. ards. Substandard individuals, however,
In Italy, alteT World WaT If, he O1'ganized would be eliminated and good men would
and commanded the Lido Tmining Centel'
which tTained noncommissioned officeTs fOl' be given an opportunity to transfer in.
the initial TRUST Ga)'Tison. He was S3 After the regiment had taken about 3
of the 23d Infantry Regiment, 2d Infanh'Y years to shape up, it could start sending
Division, ill Korea, and TetuTned fTom the
Fm'East to attend the 1954-55 Regula)' out cadl·es. Officers and men who had
Course of the Command and Geneml Staff served a full 3 years in the parent regi­
College. He is the author of several mili­ ment would be qualified to serve one grade
taTY books, the latest of which is Army higher in the new unit. Noncommissioned
Lore. His next assignment will be at the
United States Military Academy. officer vacancies in the parent regiment
 NEEDED AMERIOAN "GUARDS" OUTFITS 19
would be filled by promotion within the good "professional privates" to teach our
unit. Insofar as permitted by Army-wi;<Ie recruits how to be good privates,
personnel policies, officer vacancies within It is time we started thinking of the
the regiment would be filled by moving United States Army as a permanent insti­
regimental officers up one notch. tution. It must have a "hard core" of
Those who subscribe to the theory that permanent units-not just a pool of trained
no capable leader should serve in the same individuals. These permanent units are
position for more than a few months are going to need a few permanent sergeants
now reaching for their pens (or secre­ and privates.
taries, according to the echelon). The ugly People who are hostile to any idea of

DIAGRAM SHOWING HOW ONE PROPERLY ORGANIZED "GUARDS" REGIMENT COULD PROVIDE HIGH QUAUTY CADRES
FOR THE IDABLISHMENT OF OTHER EUTE UNITS. ORIGINAL REGIMENT, THREE YEARS AnER BEING PROPERLY IDABUSHED,
WOULD CADRE A SECOND ELITE REGIMENT. THIS SECOND REGIMENT WOULD,IN TURN, START FURNISHING CARDES AT THE
END OF THREE YEARS.

""""
f1A~ r.rJ
~ ,,~ [~
L.J L.J L.J
~~
[Mil r.r.J

""
A+3 YEARS A+6 YEARS L.JL.J

A+9 YEARS '-.I L.J

IEGfND A+12 YEARS

A+15 YEARS
~ TllAlNfD REGIMfNTS 32 REGIMENTS

[J REGIMENTAL CADRE

A ACTIVATION DATE Of fIRST "GUARDS" REGIMENT

cry of "homesteaders" is raised. I main­ elite American units will advance the
tain that we need a few more "home­ stock objection that an elite unit robs the
steaders," if that is what you want to call rest of the Army of its share of good
a man who stays in the same job even men. Initially, our elite regiment will
aft"l· he becomes an expert in it. I would "rob" the rest of the service of enough
like to see a squad that is commanded by good men to form the cadre. Once es­
a sf'rgeant who had held the assignment tablished, the first elite regiment would
long enough to learn his job and to SllS­ repay the loan with compound interest.
tuil'. a high standard of performance in An elite unit would generate a high type
it. I think there is a place in our Army of officer and enlisted leader who would
for the man who is a magnificent sergeant go forth to spread higher professional
and who has neither the capacity nor the standards throughout the Army. Also, an
desire for anything more ambitious. I elite unit will make, good soldiers out of
think we have room in our Army for some many officers and men who would have
20 MILITARY REVIEW JULY 1955

turned out to be mediocre if they had What would we be able.to "prove" by such
been trained in run-of-the-mill outfits. Get an "experiment"? Initially, we would have
enough elite units in the Army, and we at least one fully mature, professional regi­
will attract a higher type of man into the ment in the American Army. We would
service. get a chance to see esprit de corps, Amer­
ican style. We would have one regiment in
Quality or Mediocrity?
which the officers and noncommissioned of­
"An elite unit puts YOUI' best eggs in one
ficers were fully qualified and whose men
basket," continue the Doubting Thomases.
looked, thought, and acted like real soldiers.
"All' units must be of uniform quality."
The numerous officers and men of our
In rebuttal, I would like to point out that
Army who have never been treated to the
complete uniformity in something as large
spectacle could see the difference between
as the American Army can only mean
a real military unit and a mere collection
reduction to the least common denominator
of men in uniform carrying the proper
of unit efficiency-in other words, uniform
MOS.
mediocrity. Most military missions can be
accomplished-with high losses-by units This Guards regiment would establish
of mediocre caliber. History shows many the practical ideal for all others. Assign
examples of tasks accomplished by a small it any normal mission-garrison, combat,
number of elite units-with small casual­ or occupation-and know that its perform­
ance would be the best any unit produced
ties-when mediocre units had tried and
failed. It is often sound military tactics by the American military system is capa­
to "put all your eggs in one basket" rather ble of giving. We could test our military
than to piecemeal them out. system under practical conditions. For ex­
Commanders have a tendency to work ample, how would this unit show up in
outstanding combat outfits to death. Our such things as absent without leave, ve­
nereal disease, courts-martial, company
elite units must be saved in combat for
the Sunday Punch and our commanders punishments and soldiers' deposits? How
must learn how to use them. "Ah," say the would it do on inspector general inspec­
tions? What would the re-enlistment rate
doubters, "So YOUI' elite units are going
be? How would troop information and edu­
to be so valuable you will not want to get
th.em shot up." Certainly they will get in cation work? What type of schools could
you run for officers and sergeants? Are
and slug it out in the mud when the time
the standards of the Expert Infantryman's
comes, like elite units before and since
Badge really too high? The questions are
Napoleon's Imperial Guard. However, they
countless.
will not be used to make the main effort
day after day while other units are per­ The regiment would be most valuable as
a training ground for the officers and men
mitted to loaf.
who served in it. They would, first, see
Living Proof the standards which the American soldier
This is not the place for complete ad­ is capable of attaining if properly trained
ministrative detail as to how the first elite and led. It would serve as a source of
regiment would be constituted. The funda­ highly trained leaders for other units.
mental points have been mentioned: put Once the regiment were well established,
a cOII).petent colonel in command and leave it could furnish a cadre for another first­
him and his people alone long enough to rate regiment about every 3 years without
develop a team; preserve unit integrity by destroying itself. Providing cadres from
protecting the regiment from excessive a unit over a long period of time is like
cadreing. giving blood. Of the 10 to 13 pints of
 NEEDED AMERICAN "GUARDS" OUTFITS 21
blood in a man's system lie can give only regiment would produce its second cadre
one at a time without jeopardizing his and the second regiment-now 3 years old
own health. He must give his system time -would produce its first cadre. At the
to rebuild the lost blood before he gives any end of another 3 years, you would have
mOl'e. Note also that if 10 patients need four elite regiments, each of which was
lliood and only one donor is available, you ready to cadre another regiment. This puts
do not decide "this is an emergency" and a geometric progression to work for us,
bleed the one donor dry. So with our elite doubling the number of elite regiments
units, we will have to fight off those who every 3' years. At the end of the first
will be determined to bleed them white. 18 years we would have 32 elite regiments
particularly during "emergencies." ranging in age from 3 to 18 years, and
Patience in the matter of providing each prepared to cadre another regiment.
cadres will payoff in the end. In a few (See diagram on page 19.)
years, this one "mother regiment" would Since World War II, we have tried
actually provide cadres for' mOl'e elite many "new" ways of making soldiers. The
regiments than we could support. It would results have been somewhat short of sen­
work like this. Three years after activa­ sational. Let us return to a method that
tion, the first regiment would cadre a worked well before Alexander the Great.
second one. In another ~ years, the first Good soldiers are made only in good outfits.
------
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 ATOMIC DEfENSE

, Lieutenant Colonel F. O. Miksche

Professor of General Tactics, Portuguese Army Staff College

This article is based on some ideas cannot be canceled out by tactical or

<!ppearil1g in the authM"S book, technical countermeasures, except by the
ATOMIC WEAPONS AND ARMIES, inventions of means of movement as rev­
publisheil recently by Frederick A. olutionary as the nuclear arms themselves
Pracger, New York. -means which are still very far from
The views expressed in this article being in sight.
a/'c the author's and are not neces· In warfare, everything assumes a dif­
sarily those of the Department of the ferent aspect when both sides are basing
A rmy or the Command and General their tactics upon the use of the same
Staff College.-The Edito)·. weapons. Clausewitz' old saying, "Defense
is the strong'er form of war," still remains

W HAT shape will the battles of to­

morrow assume? Does trench warfare­
valid. There are many factors which tend
to favor defense. The attacker is com­
pelled to operate in the open, whereas
with its deep shelters-provide us with field fortifications offer, to a certain de­
the correct picture or does the blitzkrieg­ gree, shelter against atomic weapons. The
'with its rapid and profound penetrations defender can also protect himself more
by armored armies-give us a true pic­ easily by camouflage. His strength is based
ture? These are questions which are dif­ mainly upon concentric fire, whereas suc­
ficult to answer. Tactics are essentially a cess in attack depends largely upon phys­
combination of fire and movement. New ical concentration of forces, suppm·ted by
weapons produce new forms of fighting­ fire. In atomic warfare, it will also be
new forms of attack and defense. The much easier for the defense to co-ordinate
growth of firepower tends to increase the firepower from several separated positions,
strength of the latter. As a result of the whereas for the attacker, it is incompara­
invention of atomic weapons, firepower in­ bly more difficult-if not entirely impos­
creased a thousandfold. At the same time, sible-to force a decision with his nec­
the means of Inovement on the ground re­ essarily dispersed forces while every
main unchanged. Trucks and tanks are concentration inevitably becomes a highly
used as they were in the last war. It is vulnerable target for atomic weapons.
easy to say that future tactics will re· Furthermore, an offensive can only be de­
quire more speed, more briskness, and more ployed from depth, and it is precisely there
flexibility in movement. However, all these that atomic weapons exert maximum effect.
notions have their invincible limits. It is Without concentration in attack there
difficult to see how ground maneuver can can be no piercing power. Fire alone can
ever !!ompete against tactical atomic weap· hardly decide the issue, while without
ons carried by 600·mile·an-hour jet air· movement there can be no maneuver-con­
craft, while guided missiles or atomic shells sequently, no decision. Could not all this
cannot be intercepted in flight. This fact again lead to a bogging down of the fight­
has its unavoidable consequences, which ing? In such circumstances it is very likely
 ATOMIC DEFENSE 23
that- mechanized forces would lose their of about 6 to 8 miles in rear of the front­
former importance; perhaps, less because line. With a range of 25 miles, it willal~
of the numerous antidotes which they en­ ways be possible to co-ordinate the fire of
counter on the battlefield than because of four or six such guns on threatened sec­
the high vulnerability of the cumbersome tors of approximately 20 miles width. The
auxiliary services on which their success probability is small that the attacker
depends. It would be no great problem, in might succeed in destroying all these weap­
atomic warfare, to cut off almost hermeti­ ons by air bombardments or other means,
cally the few supply channels in a 30- to and the dispersion described above is de­
40-mile sector of an offensive. Whether .signed to diminish any such eventuality.
paratroops would be of much avail also The security of these positions can fur­
remains a matter of doubt. Large-scale ther be enhanced by frequent changes.
landings can scarcely succeed in face of The use of qummy atomic guns would be
an enemy who has a powerful air forcc another method of dispersing the enemy's
at his disposal. That, however, is another attention in time and space.
story. Communication ensures co-operation be­
In World War I, the battlefronts bogged tween the individual atomic guns which,
down against the will of. both sides. In a in the same way as normal artillery, are
third war, in order to avoid a hostile in­ organized in troops of 4 and batteries
vasion and win time for mobilization, it of 12. Of course, on our imaginary front,
might be of interest to organize a type of the distribution of this special artillery
atomic trench warfare, a possibility which is not uniform but is adapted to the char­
is probably realizable with present-day acteristics of the theater of war-denser
tactical atomic weapons. Such disposition where the probability of attacks is greater,
would be based on the combination of and less so behind natural obstacles such
atomic artillery, tactical air forces and as rivers, or in mountainous areas. In its
guidpd missile battalions, and conven­ essentials, this system presents the same
tional ground forces. features as does that of conventional ar­
tillery. It is, however, carl'ied out on a
Atomic Artillery greatly magnified scale, where the g.uns
Try to imagine a front 400 miles long, are not 30 yards from each other, but
behind which atomic artillery is moved into spread over 4 to 6 miles, and where the
line. Because of our own troops' safety, batteries do not' cover a frontage of 1,!l00
it cannot deal with targets in the forward yards but some 40 to 50 miles. The pres­
area; therefore,-its zone of action is con- ent state of technique makes the co-ordi-

III warfare all tllillgs assume a differellt aspect wlzell botll combatallts
are basillg their tactics UPOIl tile. same weapolls. Clausewitz' state­
mellt tilat "Defellse is tile strollger form of ww·" still remaills valid

fined between 3 and 20 miles behind the nated functioning of such a system easily
enemy's line. In order to achieve ade­ realizable. A battery of 12 guns could
quate effect along the entire front and cover a frontage of about 50 miles,. which
to rover all possible sectors against attack, on an average eorresponds to a .sector held
it suffices if individual guns are put into by an army of 6 to 10 divisions. The de­
position separately at intervals of 4 to 6 fense of a front 400 miles long- would ne­
mik~ from each other and at a distance cessitate about 80 guns.
24 MILITARY REVIEW JULY 1955

Ammunition Supply quick delivery according to the require­

What would appear more difficult is the ments on the battlefield.
question of how to supply the positions It is difficult to gauge, in compariso~
with ammunitions. Atomic shells are costly with normal artillery, the firepower of 80
and the quanti1Jy available is much more atomic guns, spread over a frontage of
limited than ammunition for conventional 400 miles. Allowing 5,000 conventional guns
guns. Both for material reasons and on for one atomic gun, our line would be de­
grounds of security it is difficult for fended by a zone of fire cOl'I'esponding to
atomic artillery to be supplied with shells the enormous number of approximately
in the normal way. On the other hand, 400,000 field guns of medium caliber.
would an opponent be able to attack si­
multaneously on the entire length of a Guided Missile Battalions
400-mile front? Furthermore, he would While the atomic artillel'y covers the
take every precaution against divulging immediate real' of the enemy's forward
his intentions prematurely. Therefore, pil­ zone, the tactical ail' forces in conjunc­
ing up of shells at each guu would merely tion with missile battalions will have the
be a dispersion of valuable energy. task of extending this effect in depth.
However, here modern technique can Good results can only be expected if air
help. Perhaps, it would be sufficient to reconnaissance, radar locating, missile
keep, in each position, one atomic shell launching units, atom bomb-carrying air­
for each gun 01', in more exposed sectors, craft, and conventional fighter bombers
two 01' three. If 80 atomic guns protect work in conjunction. The main task of the
our front of 400 miles, then 100 to 120 tactical air forces and missile battalions
atomic shells would do as a first ammuni­ is to prevent enemy concentrations on the
tion scale, enabling the frontline to with­ front, thus making the launching of an
stand the first shock of an unexpected at­ offensive difficult. (See Figure 1.) Dur­
ta-ck. As we have said, our disposition, ing the battle, continuous ail' activity
in spite of its dispersion, is articulated in should isolate the attacking force's from
such a way that several guns can cover their supplies and reinforcements. Both
each sector. How should the further sup­ these tasks should be carried out with
ply of ammunition be organized? Scattered atomic projectiles as well as ordinary ones
at a distance of 80 or more miles be1.lind -generally in combination, to a depth of
100 miles.
the front, and in small, carefully concealed
dumps, supplies of atomic shells would be The further the air forces and guided
kept in readiness. Helicopters would assure missile battalions act in hostile territory,
the more indirect becomes the support
Lieutenant Colonel F. O. Miksche, for­ which they can bring to their own ground
me1'ly an officei' in the Czechoslovakian forces. A penetration of about 100 n1i1es
Army, is a well-known writer on military would appear to be ample in order to
subjects. He is the author of the following impede efficiently large concentrations
a1·ticles which have appeared in previous
issu,es of the MILITARY REVIEW: "The within this limit. A further extension of
Stmtegic Importance of Western Europe" this "harassing zone" into the enemy's rear
(July 1949); "The Atlantic Pact and Ger­ could easily provoke a dispersion of effort.
many" (March 1950); and "The Refugee
Prolllem" (October 1951). He left his The more the activity of the tactical air
country's service when the Communists forces and the missile battalions is car­
came into power at Prague, and is pres­ ried into depth, the greater becomes the
ently assigned as Professor of General Tac­ number of important targets to be neu­
tics at the Staff College of the Portuguese
A1·my. tralized; it is an old rule of tactics that
r'

I t'o be sl'multaneously everywhere aAtTOonMcleC DEFENSE

are blind, and without atom bomb-carry­

25
means to be nowhere in sufficient strength. ing aircraft and guided missiles the ef­
Plans made on a scale of 1 :500,000 proved fect of atomic artillery cannot be ex­
that in a western theater of war, within a tended in depth. Practically all action
zone 160 miles wide by 100 miles deep, against hostile atomic artillery and rocket
the harassing of an average of 8 to 12 launching sites is conditioned by the tac­
communication centers suffices in order to tical air forces-so is the protection of'
reduce the movements of the enemy by one's own atomic guns against enemy air
about 50 to 60 percent (see Figure 2). Be attack. The entire issue of the struggle, on
ATOMIC COMMANDS DEPLOYED ON BROAD FRONTAGES
THE COMBINED USE OF ATOMIC WEAPONS IN DEFENSIYI BAnLES

HARASSING ZONE

TACTICAL AI.FORCES AND

GUIDED MISSILES

;-;
x J:!l VII x

,~~,i~~\\i

lEGEND

cb ATOMIC ~~T~~~~ BATTERY

d) MISS"! ~~7tUON
'iII ATOMIC COMMAND HO
o IMPORTANT TARGEr

ATOMIC COMMAND I ATOMIC COMMAND II ATOMIC COMMAND III

hind this limit of 100 miles, the field of the ground as well as in the air, will in­
activity belongs to the strategical air evitably evolve into a contest between
forces. atomic weapons. They will become the
Th~ entire mechanism of the defense is main object of the battle, for it is logical
principally based on the combined effect that the side which succeeds in paralyzing
of atomic artillery, missile battalions, and the atomic weapons of the other, clears the
atom bomb-carrying aircraft, and it is way for the advance of its own ground
this ~ore around which the conventional forces.
al'ms must be grouped and to which they Since it is in close relation with the
must adapt themselves. The work of the tactical air forces that tactical atomic
atomi,' artillery and missile battalions de­ weapons, as used at present, would prob­
pend, much more upon the action of the ably find their most rational form of em­
ail' f )rces than upon the conventional ployment, the establishment of a new type
grouri:l forces, because without radar locat­ of higher unit-let us call them atomic
ing at.d air reconnaissance the atomic guns commands-becomes an obvious necessity.
26 MILITARY REVIEW JULY 1955

The atomic command"should be organized which these rules should be applied in the
in such a way as to include all weapons future. Therefore, atomic commands would
and auxiliary services required to fight operate in incomparably greater dimen.
an atomic battle. The atomic command sions than the conventional army corps of
might include) the ground forces. This circumstance might
1. Headquarters and staff for planning not ease the necessary co-ordination be·
and directing the action of the command tween both, especially should heavy atomic
as an entirety. weapons be subordinated to the latter. The
2. Special units, such as radar, topo­ rational exploitation of these new arms, the
graphical, ballistical, and meteorological need for their intimate co-operation calls
groups. for the creation of centralized leadership
3. Air reconnaissance squadrons. on one hand, and on the othe!" for a plan.
4. From 1 to 3 batteries of atomic artil­ ning on a scale corresponding to their
lery-12 to 36 guns." effects and ranges. In contrast to the
5. From 1 to 3 g·uided missile battalions normal army corps, the atomic commands
-6 to 18 sites. would act in sectors with frontages (}f
6. Combat air forces including both 120 to 160 miles, perhaps even more, and
fighters Hnd bombers-the latter carrying up to a depth of 100 miles into the enemy's
both atom and conventional bombs and rear-again according to the features of
rockets. the theater of war within which all atomic
7. Infantry and antiaircraft units for commands should be subordinated to their
the defense of ail' bases, atomic gun posi­ own atomic high command.
tions, and missile launching sites. In all kinds of large-scale operations.
R. The necessary signal units, engineer atomic fOI·ces might play a decisive role,
troopx, and supply and maintenance serv­ thus becoming the most important units
ll'es. of future armies. It will be their task to
Of course, the organic buildup of each prepare and to support offensive battles,
atomic command-which might be subdi­ to protect the open flanks of maneuvering
vided into artillery, missiles, and air force armies, or to cover their withdrawal in
divisions----eould greatly vary in composi­ case of retreat into new lines, and to "up·
tion and strength, according to the features port the resistance in the latter.
of the theater of war in which they are The deployment of higher atomic nnit~
intended to operate. They eould eventually on broad frontages does not necessarily
have only a temporary character. In de­ mean that their weapons will be used all
fensive battles, the strength of the tacti­ the time, similarly to the constant artil·
cal air forces should be at least equal to let·y dueling so characteristic of World
one-third of the attacker's airpower. War I. The high expenditure of atomic
In spite of their great effect and long projectiles makes such an evolution rather
range, atomic weapons are unlikely to improbable. On many sectors of the front,
change the classical rules of strategy and fighting will continue with conventional
tactics, but rather may alter the scale in material and atomic weapons might only
intervene in important battles to decide
~, The ol'1!amzation of atum](t artillery bntterie... pel' ·the issue with relatively small numbers
12 gun1-> ,!o\eems to be the best :-.ulution. Normally, each
battery wouhl support one armY of thlee conven~ of projectiles. At present, no one would
tional army COI'P:-o. while ('ach army <'Ol'P:-. would bl,'
~uppol'ted by n t,·oup of fOUl' guns. Jo:Ut'h battery
lbe able to say how great this numbel· will
i:-:: controlletl £'entra1Jy. Topos.n"aphical. balli"'tical. be. It might also happen that atomic com­
and radm' bpotting J.!rOU)1<; would be equipped with
helicoptel"~. the ~ame mean'" bein~ u~ed for nuick mands, kept in readiness, Will merely ~tand
reconnaissance of gun po<;itions. Missile launching by, in order to use their suicidal weapons­
battalionb should work on ~imi1ar lineb.
 ATOMIC DEFENSE :n
too dangerous to drop in eithel' sense-as the mere existence of a continuous bar­
IIltillla ratio only, rier, the enemy is forced into concentra­
tion, becoming, thereby, a paying target
COllvelltiQllal Groulld Forces for atomic weapons,
Without adequate protection, the atomic How should the front of the ground
command's po~itions would be left sus­ forces be constructed? To answer this
pended in midair, Therefore, ground forces question, let us first state that an atom
will be required in order to pl'otect them bomb or shell with an effective radius of
by a barrier, Some readers may ask: "In about 2 miles covers an area of 12,56
view of the enormous effect of atomic square miles. However, when a disposition

j.....---"GEND---~

III AT~M/c ARTIllERY

al ~~~~~c AMMUNITION

MISSILE BATTAliONS
(6 SITES,

AIR BASES

weap. ns, is it really necessary to use -whether offensive or defensive-is artic­

~I'ol1nd forces in number?" It is not diffi­ ulated to a depth of 1 mile only, then the
(ult tll answer this question, Without a real surface of the target is reduced to
(OntinllouS front, an enemy may easil~' about 4 square miles. Does not that mean,
attelllpt a massive infiltration, advancing that tactical forms' organized in broad
on a wide frontage, cross country, ant] lines could reduce the effect of atomic
oubnh l'ging the positions of the atomic weapons to one-third Of its maximum?
rOllllll:md and the weak forces protecting In attack, a deep articulation will be more
them. Against such a dispersed invasion, difficult to avoid, as offense must be d,,'­
atonw weapons would be of little avail. ployed from depth. However, a I-mile deep
On the' other hand, in order to bre~k belt of ground forces may be solid enough
thl'ol'.,'h a continuous front, the attacker to bring to a standstill an attack the im­
is ob:ig'ed to eonc~ntrate his forees, thus petus of which has been reduced by atomic
beeoJ,'mg' vulnerable. In other words, by bombing and aton1ic shelling.
28 MILITARY REVIEW JULY 1955

However, in order to lend a more solid to a minimum. The more the two sides are
depth to the defense, it is proposed to entangled with, each other,. the smaller
organize three or more successive belts, the probability that the attacker, because
each about 1 mile deep. In World War I, of his own troops' safety, will use atomic
it was said tqat successive defense lines weapons against the first belt. Such close
should be sufficiently distant from each contact, such mingling of both sides could,
other that the attacker could not reach in certain cases, be furthered by tracing
them from the same gun positions. Here, the position in zigzag form. In World War
in atomic warfare, the distance between I, the Germans succeeded several times in
the lines should be sufficiently great that escaping the murderous preparatory fire
two cannot be affected by the same atomic by simply evacuating their first position.
projectile. Of course, when marking out This method could, Pllrhaps, be used in a
defense positions, account will have to reverse sense. In certain cases, probably
be taken of such conventional factors as under cover of darkness, the attacker may
suitable field of fire, easy camouflage, and suddenly break contact and retire in order
good observation. An additional condition to use atomic weapons in preparation
will be that the configuration of the terrain against the first line. Normally, in spite
chosen for defense should offer at least of all his precautions, such movements
partial protection against atomic weapons. will hardly escape radar detection. In any
In atomic warfare, natural obstacles may case, the forestallment against this or
be of greater importance than ever. It is similar tactics necessitates constant alert­
difficult to imagine how an attacker could ness on the part of the defense, whose
cross a river if his immediate rear were tactical reserves must be kept in readi­
covered by heavy atomic fire. ness and able to follow at the enemy's
How are these belts organized-deep heels by moving forward with sufficient
trenches everywhere, dugouts, pillboxes strength almost immediately. As the evac­
and shelters, protected by barbed wire, uation of the first position by the attacker
minefields, and all kinds of other obstacles? may easily be a sign of an imminent of­
The spade will again become as indispen­ fensive, the atomic artillery of the defender
sable to the infantry as the machineguns, should, without delay, concentrate on the
the mortars, bazookas, and recoilless guns. supposed jumping off bases of the attack.
Here and there, small packets of tanks are However, the application of such de­
dug in and as carefully camouflaged as fense tactics will not always be possible.
other parts of the position. Some batteries When both sides are separated from each
of normal artillery are also built into this other by an important obstacle-such as
system. Their task consists of shelling the Elbe or Rhine-it would be difficult to
areas which, for reasons of safety, can­ follow immediately an enemy suddenly
not be covered by atomic shells, and also evacuating his forward zone. The old rule,
to prolong in time or to complete the effects that an obstacle can only be forced with
of atomic weapons, to support local coun­ difficulty if it is kept under fire, might also
terattacks, and to deal with special targets, retain its validity in atomic warfare. The
such as shelters or pillboxes. problem is to know with what kind of ­
The main strength of the defense will weapon this should be done-atomic or
be concentrated in the first belt. The prin­ conventional? ,The former is a thousand
ciple is tJ' cling as narrowly to the enemy times more powerful. Therefore, would it
as is practically possible. Therefore, the not be logical to site the forward-limit of
"no man's land," as well as the position the defense position about 6 to 10 miles
of the advanced posts, should be reduced behind the river, in order to keep both
 ATOMIC DEFENSE 29'

banks, especially at the crossing points, form of approach march-a form whose
within the range of the atomic artillery? basic principle would be to avoid the fire
Speaking from a general point of view, of the adverse atqmic artillery as long as
tactical situations which heretofore were possible, while at the same time assuring
exceptional may frequently become normal the entry into action of his own atomic
in atomic warfare. As it can be advanta­ guns at the earliest possible moment.
geous-according to terrain and other There is no doubt the chances of success
circumstances-to keep in close contact will largely favor the side which first suc­
with the adversary, in certain cases the ceeds in making use of his atomic artillery.

CONVENTIONAL FORM NEW LOOK

lEGEND . . INFANTRY l!l NORMAL ARTIllERY ATOMIC GUN-)()(- DIVISIONAL BOUNDARY

~ ARMOR , IiJ ENGINEERS A OBSERVATION"""" TRENCHES

POST
- SHElTER

IN NORMAL COUNTRY AN INFANTRY DIYISION OF B,500 MEN WILL DEFEND A SECTOR OF 8·10 MILES, THERE ARE TWO POSSI.
BilITlES OF ORGANIZATION ONE WOULD BE THAT TWO OF THE THREE INFANTRY REGIMENTS GARRISON THE FIRST BELT,
WITH AU THEIR BAnALlONS IN LINE, SIDE BY SIDE, THE THIRD REGIMENT DEFENDS THE SECOND 'BELT. THE DISADYANTAGE
Of THIS DISPOSITION 15 THAT EFFICIENT CONTROL Of THE THIRD REGIMENT, STRETCHED OYER A SECTOR OF B·10 MILES,
WOULD BE COMPLICATED UNDERTAKING THE OTHER POSSIBIUTY WOULD BE TO GARRISON THE FIRST BELT WITH TWO BAT·
TAlIONS Of EACH REGIMENT, WHILE THE THIRD BAnALlON WOULD OCCUpy THE SECOND BELT. BOTH METHODS CAN BE USED
IN COMBINAllON, OWING TO THE GREATER DISPERSION IN THE SECOND BELT, EVEN A DIRECT HIT COULD HARDLY AffECT
MORE THAN ONE BAnALlON.

security of the ground forces in defense The stages of a defensive battle are,
might be enhanced by an alternative solu­ then, roughly as follows: It is the func­
tion--that is to say by an abnormally deep tion of radar detection and air rj!con­
"no man's land" of about 10 or more miles. naissance to determine the intentions of
In such an eventuality the attacker would the enemy. Tactical air forces, in conjunc­
be f.)rced to employ an entirely new tech­ tion with missile battalions, hamper his
niqu~ of concentration, as well as a new movements on the lines of communication.
:10 MILITARY REVIEW JULY li)55

Those ~lttac1dng forces, which succeed in use could only accentuate the !'lbove men­
getting' through the successive bal"l"age~ tioned characteristics of ground fighting
as far as the jumpi'ng oft· area of the of­ in defensive battles by provoking "till
fensive, run into the fire zone of th(' atomic ~reater dispersion. The picture would not
artill<.'l"Y. Ho\\'~ver, should they, never­ be altered essentially by the massive in·
theless, sl1c('('(>d in launching the offensive, traduction of small atomic projectiles. By
then it is the task of the three successive using lighter atol11ic artillery-such as
belts of ground forces to stop their ad­ 120-ml11 or DO-mm calib('r-one might pos­
vanc,' altogeth<.'I·. The entire system ftmc­ sess the advantage of adapting the fire
tions Iik<.' a dcep filter. Seen on a magnified more elastically to the characteristics of
scale through t1w eyes of World War l, the targets. This would logically lead to
one may say that atomic bombing by the a more rational exploitation of the avail·
tactical air force, and missile battalions able firepower. In othel' words, the effect
takes over the rule of the former artillery of four 5-ldloton shells would be incom·
barl'uges; utomic artillery, the task of the parably 1I10re devastating than, fOI' ex­
nHl.<.·hinegtln~. ample, that of two 20-ldloton bombs.
Altholl~h thl' positions of the groun,1 The smallel' I;adius of destruction of
forct's arl' l'olllj.>urativpjy thin, the depth lighter ('alibers would have the further
of til!' ,lPfl'nse extends, in fact, to abont result of reducing' the safety zone. This
100 miles. Tl1<'reforc, the uttueker is com­ would allow a more intimate' co-opC'ration
p"llt'd to deploy his forces much sooner, with cOllventional ground forces and the
support of even local attacks or counterat­
whieh nwans maneuvC'ring them in frac­
tacks with atomic weapons. Of course, the
tions, on broad frontages. Without con­
range of light atomic ordnance would be
centration, however, the attack ean have
mol'£' restricted in the case of a 120-1111\1
no piercing power, yet e\'er~' eoncentration
gun in the neighborhood of about 10 miles.
inevitahly bL'l'omes a highly vulnen,ble Smaller ordn'lllce would, however, be more
tal"/.(·"t for atomie weapons. mohile and ("ould consequently be attaehe,i
In thl' ]a"t two wars, it wat> only within direetly to field formations. In such a ('a~e,
the range of the normal artillery and the heavier types of tactical atomic \\"Pap­
mu~hineglln fil'" that troops were forced ons would still not lose theil' raiso" Ii'rlfe.
to operate in thin, fOl'mutions--clinging' Their task would be to fight the long-range
to thl' ~:rol1nd, using every bit of covc,·. battle, while within such a framework the
and digging' foxholes. :\Todern t(>chnique light atomic guns would become the prin­
hat>, however, increased the powe!' and cipal weapons of the ground forces in their
range of firearms to such an extent that atomic close-range combat, Heavy atomic
in the futLII'e entire armies might be com­ ordnance, with longer range, will always
pelled to disperse while still very far from remain essential so long as the technique
the battle area pl'oper, approaching the of guided missiles has not yet achiewd the
fl'ont "cruwling on their stomachs" and same reliability and precision. as that
enhancing- their security by digging them­ of the artillery, No matter from which
selves in whenever possible. angle one considers the problem, the lighter
The ,'ventual employment of atomic atomic weapons will also favor def('nse
weapons heavier than the present ones in rather than attack.

If )OU are mo,-ing-, plea~e notify the MILITAHY HEVIEW, Fort Leavenworth, Kun,as,
of your change of address. He sure to include your name, old address, and new address.
 WARTIME ROLE

FOR COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES

Colonel Anson D. Marston, Corps of Enginee1'8

Engineer, Eighth United States Army (Forward), Korea

This a)·ticle is 1'eprillted /I'om MIL­ It is necessary first to determine what

ITARY AFFAIRS, Fall 1954. Copy­ kind of war is being discussed, and next,
"ight 1954 by the Ame/'ican Milita)'Y histories of past wars to be studied so that
[I1Mitute. past mistakes may be avoided and past
The views e'l'pressed in this article successes exploited. Passing from past to
Ill'" the author's and arc not lleccs­ future, certain military requirements for
s«()'ily those of the Department of the college training and facilities will exist;
ArlilY or the Command and Genc)'(ll these require analysis. Finally, nonmili­
St((ff Collcgc.-The Edito)·. tary educational requirements need to be
anticipated.

T Much discussion and debate will be re­

HIS article is an effort to determine quired before a final policy can be deter­
the I'ole which colleges and universities mined. Despite its very real importance,
should play in an all-out war. the subject has been sadly neglected. It
Review of past experience in this field is hoped that this article will stimulate
emphasizes the need to develop a clear­ and, in some small way, guide this neces­
cut policy for wartime utilization of our sary discussion and debate.
Institutions of higher learning. Instead What will the next war be like? Will we
of waiting' until the emergency arises, and be faced by a true struggle' for survival,
then g'roping through fog in belated effort as Great Britain after the fall of France
to dE'termine the best way to enroll them in 1940? Or, will we be able to provide
in the struggle, prudent leaders will study both guns and butter, as we did following
the problem while there is yet time for Korea? To a major extent, the role which
careful analysis and debate. Once deter­ our colleges and universities should play
mined, the policy should be explained to depends upon the answers to these ques­
all interested parties-to the military, to tions.
our ('Ivilian leaders, and to our educators. War has a nasty habit of defying predic·
Each must then do necessary advance tion. Campaigns seldom go "according to
planning. Only thus can acceptable effi­ plan." Axioms proved in one war, as the
rien",,· be obtained. Today, Mars rides power of the defense was proved in 1914-18,
in jet planes, impatient at delays and may turn out to be false in the next.
lost I lotion which past isolation permitted.• There do, however, seem to be several

Colleges and universities are the keystone in a strong educational sys­

tem. Past experience emphasizes the need for the wartime utiliza­
tion of these institutions should we become involved in an all-out war
32 MILITARY REVIEW JULY 195.

featul'es of the next war which can be a year, and to train new technicians. In
predicted with reasonable certainty. One is a technological war, the milita.ry must
the mobilization of manpower if the early have men able to operate ami to l'epair
attacks are not decisive and an all-out complicated equipment in the mud, rain,
struggle ensu/is. snow, and dust of combat.
As mobilization progresses, there are After about 2 years of war, the buildup
very important changes in the nature of phase will end. Officer spaces and tech­
military manpower requirements; these nician spots will be filled. The training
affect the role of colleges and universities. problem will change radically at this time,
During the first few months, the greatest as emphasis shifts to the training of men
need is for trained individuals to bring to replace battle casualties. The bulk of
existing units up to strength. As an illus­ these casualties will come in the ground
tration, the typical National Guard divi­ forces, and normally about 80 percent of
sion has most of its officel's and key non­ ground force losses are infantry losses.
commissioned officers, but less than half of Thus, after about 2 years of war, military
its total enlisted strength, I~ normal times, requirements for new manpower will find
each Regular Army division is several infantry platoon leaders and infantry pri·
thousand short of full strength. With vates preponderating. There will bl) sur·
pl'Oper management, the trained reservists prisingly little demand for additional tech­
mentioned above should fill the most urgent nicians. This fact is hard to get across to
portion of this early requirement. laymen, but no college training program
In addition to the early demand for can claim to serve military requirements
trained replacements, there comes a de­ unless it fits into this situation.
mand to provide new units-either by Thus, we see that, in all probability,
calling in units from the civilian com­ the next war will find both the United
ponents, or by creating new ones. Properly States and her enemies scourged by atomic
managed, the 155,000 trained Reserve of­ attack, Our survival as a nation will de­
ficers immediately available to the Army, pend upon the skill and speed and determi.
and corresponding reservists in the Navy nation with which we recover from this
and Air Force, should fill much of the of­ destruction. Past experience gives little
ficer demand during the early part of this to guide us as we contemplate the "sur·
buildup phase. Many enlisted spaces can vival economy" which will result. Our
be filled in a similar manner. Extensive institutions of higher learning can make
programs will, however, be necessary to very important contributions; none can
retrain those out of the service more than doubt that they will devote themselves
wholeheartedly to the struggle. The pres­
Colonel Anson D. Marston served in the ent need is to determine how best they can
European and North African Theaters dur­ serve.
ing World War 11; he was G3 of the Com­
munications Zone, NATOUSA, and of Wartime Experiences
Southern Lines of Communications, ETO­
USA. From 1946 to 191,8, he was assigned In studying the role to be played by
as an iustruct01' at the Command and colleges and universities in this kind of
General Staff College. He has attended war, the next step is to review past ex­
the.Air Wm' Col/ege (1948-1.91,9) and the
Industrial College of the Al'med Forces periences.
(1953-1951,). He was with the Office of the Histories of the Civil War tell vividly
Assistant Chief of Staff, GI" Department about entire classes marching en masse
of the Army, from 1949. to 1953, and is to serve the Confederacy. In the North
presently 8el'ving as The Engineer, Eighth
United States Army (F01·ward). there were few such cases. At Princeton,
 WARTIME ROLE FOR COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES 33

, for example, the orderly procedUre of col­ others urged against depopulation of the
lege exerc,ises was not materially affected colleges.
during the 4 years of war. Male enrollment A general meeting of college representa­
at Oberlin College fell off 40 percent dur­ tives was held in Washington, on 5 May
ing the first 2 years of the war, but rose 1917, and full s\lpporf was pledged the
thereafter. war effort. Use of college facilities to
Prior to and during the Civil War there train men for the military commenced 17
was a movement to improve opportunities May 1917, with initiation of aviation cadet
for higher education in the newly formed training, and grew steadily thereafter. Be­
western states. On 2 July 1862, the fam­ ginning 4 September 1917, five enlisted Re­
ous law was passed establishing what are serve corps-medical, engineer, veterinary,
now known as the land grant colleges. This signal, and quartermaster-were organized
law provided for: by the Army. By the summer of 1918,
The endowment, support, and mainte­ more than 34,000 enlisted men were being
uance of at least one college in each state trained by the colleges in some 20 basic
to teach such branches as related' to agri­ trades.
culture and the mechanic arts ... and in­ This training was of a vocational and
cluding miiita1'Y tactics . . . in order to trade nature, rather than collegiate level.
promote the liberal and practical educa­ Most of these courses lasted 2 months.
tion of the industrial classes in the several Nearly 95,000 received this training. De­
p1!fsl<its and professions of life. spite the vocational level of the courses,
This was supplemented by the act of 28 the colleges gave wholehearted support.
July 1866, which authorized the detail of On 6 May 1918, the Student Army Train­
Army officers as instructors at those col­ ing Corps (SATC) was announced. It was
leges for the purpose of "promoting a formally inaugurated at more than 400
knowledge of military science of the colleges on 1 October 1918, and ultimately
United States." included some 516 units. The program had
These two acts form the statutory base two parts: Section A covered collegiate
both for the State University and for the work; Section B covered tIre vocational
Resel've Officers' Training Corps (ROTC) training described above. All, students
as We know them today. were enlisted in the Army; provision was
made to call them away from the colleges
World War I for active service in the same proportions
World War I found the colleges playing and at the same periods as other men of
a more important part. As early as 10 comparable age were drafted. On 26 No­
February 1917, they organized in Wash­ vember 1918, the War Department an­
ington an Intercollegiate Intelligence nounced its decision to demobilize the,
Bureau to help locate trained men for SATC within 2 months.
government jobs. It should be noted that during its short
Dedaration of war-on 6 April 1917­ history the SATC was handicapped by the
found the country without a definite mili­ influenza epidemic.
tary policy. For the initial period, vohm­ With regard to research and develop­
teering was the only possible means of ment, college and university facilities were
raising' an army, and thousands of high­ not fully utilized. Inquiry by the Bureau
spirited college men rushed to the colors. of Education elicited the fact that only
Latel, the War Department took steps to about 40, from a total of 216 institutions
recov<!r these trained men from the ranks, replying, were carrying on research work
and l'ublic statements by the President and of any type on war problems.
 MILITARY REVIEW JULY 1950

JV orld War II students were admitted before graduation.

Again in World War II, the colleges and Students and faculties experienced some
universities were prompt to offer their difficulties as a result of acceleration. Stu­
services. In 1940, a National Committee dents depending upon vacation earnings
on Education vias organized under the aus­ found themselves in financial difficulties;
pices of the American Council on Educa­ faculties found their workload greatly in­
tion and the National Education Associa­ creased with little or no increase in sala·
tion. In October 1940, the colleges were ries.
called upon to provide training in specific In the spring and summer of 1942, when
fields. I>'or a population scarcely recovered the draft age was still 20, many requests
from long- years of depression, short were made to the War Department to ex­
courses in Engineering, Science, and Man­ pand the ROTC. This was opposed by those
agement Defense Training (ESMDT) training our combat soldiers, because the
were authorized. Students were g-iven free need for officers and noncommissioned of·
tuition but provided their own subsistence ficers was acute at that time. The ROTC
and supplies. Participation was limited to graduates would not become available un·
public or tax-exempt, degree granting, in­ til after th" period of acute shortage. The
stitutions. Students were required as a ROTC units continued to operate through­
minimum to be high school graduates. In out the war, but the basic ROTC, covering
practice, a larg'c majority took these the til'st 2 years of college without special,
courses as a form of inservice training-. ization in technical fields, was all that sur·
Later renamed Engineering-, Science, viwd. Numbers of cadets dropped to II
and Management Wal' Training (ESM­ fraction of prewar figures.
WT), this prog-ram trained more than In September IfJ42, lowering of the dmft
1,300,000 men and women by January H144. age from 20 to 18 was anticipated. The
Some 12,500 shol·t cou.rses were offered in Secretary of War then approved plans for
1.000 towm; and cities by ovel' 200 colleges. the specialized training of selected enli,.;tcd
Students took courses as follows: 356,000 men, using the j'('soUl'ces of colleg,',; and
in env;ineering, 14,000 in chemistry, !l,000 universities. This program, known a, the
in phYllics, and 120,000 in production man­ Army Specialized Training Program
ag-ement. A total of 21 percl'rlt of the stu­ (ASTP), was established primarily to cn­
dents were women. sure a continuous flow of technically and
On :l and 4 January 1!142. with Pearl profes,ionally trained men. At fir,!, it
Hal'bor still a fresh memory, the colleg-es was contemplated that most of these men
and universities sent reprpsentatives to would become officers.
a conference in Baltimore to discuss the The prog-ram did not match a sjH'~ifir
problems involved. This conferenee was need for such men at the time they·\\oultl
sponsored by the National Committee on complete their training-a fatal error. as
Education and the United States Office of events were to prove. It was strongl~' op·
Education. The conference pledv;ed the posed on strictly military grounds by l.ieu­
total strength of the college~ to support tenant General Lesley J. McNair. who
t:le war, and recommended that courses commanded Army Ground Forces and was
be accelerated. Some 600 colleges chang'ed responsible for training combat sol,liNS.
their schedules to implement this recom­ General McNair argued that it would take
mendation. In general, they adopted a 48­ I,ey, hig-h-grade men from units need,·d in
week year, with a 6-day week. The general combat, and would compete with th(' Offi- .
result was to make graduation possible in eel's' Candidate Schools (OCS). H,' ex­
3 years or less. Some qualified high school pressed the feeling that the Arm~' had
 WARTIME HOLE FOR COLLEGES AND UNIVEHSITIF.S 35
enough college trained men to last until uates were too specialized for exact as­
W44. signment in the combat arms, yet the need
Formal announcement of the ASTP, and for intelligent combat leaders was too
of the cOl'l'esponding Navy College Train­ great to permit their assignment exclu­
in),!; Program (NCTP), came in December sively to service troops. There was a
1H42. Selected candidates were to be in grave shortage of combat replacements to
lllliform, receive pay, and be subject to mil­ replace the battle casualties experienced.
itary discipline. They were to receive ba~ic At the same time, a crisis existed in the in­
military training before starting college fantry units being readied for movement
wo!'1e overseas-a crisis caused by draining off
CUl'l'icula for the ASTP were prepared high-score men for ASTP and other tmin­
with the immediate objectives of 'the Army ing programs, and by wholesale transfer
in mind. They included mathematics, phys­ of infantry privat('s to the replacement
ic" chemistry, premedical and medical, stream. Under these conditions, the ASTP
eng'ineering, area studies, and similar sub­ was cut to 35,000 by 1 April 1944, leaving
jeds. After preparation. these cUlTicula mostly those in advanced medicine, den­
were ,ubject to review by an advisory com­ tistry, and engineering. A total of li4,:\32
mittee of ~ix college presidents. men were graduated by ASTP between
Th(' academic year included foul' 12­ April 1943 and December 1945,
week terms. At the pnd of each the diB­ The ASTP made positive and worth­
position of men in the program was con­ while contributions to victory, but in bal­
sid(,l'cd, with some continuing their studies, ance it fell short of possible achievements.
some g'oing on to OCS, and others going The basic fault was failure to supply the
buck to the troops. type of man needed at the time he was
Selection tests were first given 12 April needed. Instead of determining the number
l!I4::' I nitial requirements called for a· of officers the Army would need during
5('01'(' of at least 110 on the Army General future periods, designing curricula to pre­
CI",sification Test (AGCT), for gradua­ pare for those specific positions, and limit­
tion from an accredited high school, and ing enrollment to the numbers required,
for completion of a minimum of 9 weeks the program undertook to train technical
of ba,ic military training. Age limits for men who "ought" to be needed. Just as
thL' basic ASTP course were 18 to 21 inclu­ the hunter who fires at a flock of ducks,
siv(,. Candidates for the advanced course with no specific target, often g'oes hungry,
had to be at least 18 years old, and to so did ASTP miss its target in many cases.
haH' at least 2 years of work in a recog­ When the replacement crisis arose, the pro­
niz.'d college or university. Later, the I'e­ gram was vulnerable, and became a casu­
qUlfed AGCT score was raised to 115, and alty. It should be noted that the language
al'l"mgements plade to accept the results area studies, engineering courses, and
af ,,·,ts administered by the College En­ medical courses did in most cases fill spe­
traloee Examination Board. cific military needs.
The ASTP reached its peak in December For many of its trainees, ASTP resulted
194 :, when 380,000 trainees were enrolled in disillusionment. They were given at
in ,; ,9 institutions. Men began to return least implied promises of commissions, yet
fro"I'the ASTP to troop units in the late were suddenly withdrawn to serve'in the
SUll mer of 1943. By that time the major ranks. Had they not been sent to college,
huE IUp of the Army was over, and most many would undoubtedly have gone to' OCS
offi. ,.,' and specialist jobs were already and become officers. Understandably, civil­
fill" I. Except for engineers, these grad­ ian educators participating in the program
36 MILITARY REVIEW 'JULY 1955

found it difficult to understand the abrupt in undergraduate enrollment was made up

termination of their efforts. during the postwar enlisted man bulge.
These failures-if failures they be­ However, one lasting effect of deferment
should sene to emphasize that training policies was the drop in numbers of grad­
programs adop~d in time of war will sure­ uate students. In 1945, for example, only
ly fail unless they meet directly an urgent, 40 percent as many science doctorates were
specific, wartime need. granted as in 1941. This loss has not been
As a successor to ASTP, the Army Spe­ made up during the postwar years, and a
cialized Training Reserve Program was recent study concluded that the loss from
announced 3 March 1944. It was a pro­ World War II was at least 10,000 doctor's
gram for training 17-year-old civilian high degrees in science. In our present techno­
school graduates. logical race with the forces of communism,
The Navy College Training Program this is a serious shortage indeed. In 1950,
(NCTP)--often spoken of as V-12-was the United States had only 40,000 men and
announced at the same time as the Army's women with such training.
ASTP. It took over those men in the en­ In the important field of research and
listed Reserve already in coI\ege in civilian development, the colleges and universities
status under the V-I and V-7 programs. were far better employed than in World
Admission was open also to qualified en­ War I. Many crucial developments had
listed men on active duty, and to civilians their genesis in university laboratories­
who could meet requirements. In April witness, for example, the atom bomb. A
1943, a total of 123,206 applied; only 16,­ survey made toward the end of 1942, by the
000 were accepted. National Academy of Sciences, at the re­
The V-12 program became an integral quest of the Wal' Production Board,
part of the Navy's long-range program to showed that university laboratories had
procure Naval Reserve and Marine Corps all but 28,000 hours per week of research
Reserve commissioned officers. It sailed a workers' time, or the equivalent of 700 men
course more steady than that followed by at 40 hours per week, already engaged in
ASTP, although there was a progressive war work. This was substantially full use
25 percent cutback in 1944. A total of of available facilities.
219,150 men were graduated under NCTP.
An idea of the magnitude of these two Summarg
programs-ASTP and NCTP-can be In summary, our institutions of higher
gained from the fact that, during its 3 learning played an important role on the
years of existence, the Joint Army-Navy stage of world conflict in the years 1941­
Board for Training Unit Contracts ex­ 45. They gave generously of their time
pwded more than 300 million dollars. and facilities to meet the training and
As the war progressed, draft deferment other demands of the armed servi.ces. Cer­
"policies for students became tighter. By tain fundamental mistakes in emphasis on
1943-44, deferment was limited to students the part of the Army kept this contribu­
taking courses directly preparing them for tion from reaching its full potential value;
critical occupations in essential industries. this experience should serve as an impor­
In general, students in scientific or spe­ tant guide in any future emergency. Train­
cialized fields such as engineering, chemis­ ing for the Navy did not suffer as much
try, physics, and medicine, were the only from such mistakes as did the Army pro­
ones being deferred. Civilian male enroll­ gram.
ment dropped to about 30 percent of the The services rendered by our institu­
1939-40 base. Much, if not all, of this drop tions of higher learning were, for the most
 WARTIME ROLE FOR COLLEGES AND UNlVERSlTIES 37
part, short-range services, designed to con­ mittees, appointed in the autumn of 1948
tribute directly to the early defeat of a by the Director, Selective Service Sy~tem,
,great opposing military force. Enduring to advise concernIng deferment policies,
educational objectives were, of necessity, had submitted a set of recommendations.
subordinated to the life-and-death struggle Out of these came the deferment policies
of the time. still (April 1954) in effect, under which
talented students are deferred until com­
Korean Conflict pletion of their studies, without granting
On 25 June 1950, the clouds of war permanent exemption from military serv­
muttered ominously as open conflict broke ice, and without regard to the courses be~
out in Korea. For months it appeared that ing taken. Many of the members of these
World War III might well be under way. committees were present at the conference,
Once again the colleges and universities and the committee recommendations were
sprang into action. The American Coun­ incorporated in the conference report. In
cil on Education called a conference in his address to the conference, Major Gen­
Washington 9 July 1950. In attendance eral Lewis B. Hershey, Director, Selective
were representatives of national organiza­ Service System, referred to the committees
tions concerned with higher education and as "your scientific advisory committees."
having headquarters in Washington. Pres­ The first declaration in the General Reso­
ent also were representatives of the De­ lutions expresses the strong feeling of the
partment of Defense, National Security educators that a properly safeguarded stu­
Resources Board, Office of Education, and dent deferment policy is in the national in­
Selective Service. Steps were taken to terest, and their strong opposition to any
study the possible effect of mobilization policy basing student deferment on courses
upon colleges and universities, and to call or curricula leading to specific professions
another meeting within a month. or vocations.
At this second meeting, steps were taken Events proved unfounded the fears of
to increase the membership of the Com­ 1950 that a new, all-consuming world war
mittee on Relationships of Higher Educa­ might already be under way.' The colleges
tion to the Federal Government, and to and universities have continued, albeit
convene a national conference of represent­ with some difficulty, to serve long-range,
atives of higher education and of govern­ enduring educational objectives. They have
ment. This latter conference was held in continued also to render important serv­
Washington, D. C., 6-7 October 1950, and ice through ROTC programs and in their
was attended by approximately 1,000 edu­ laboratories. The magnitude of their con­
cators, representing some 600 colleges and tribution in the field of research and de.
universities. Their General Resolutions, velopment is indicated by the fact that'
I'epe:lting the declaration made at the 1942 approximately 150 million dollars were
Conference on Higher Education and the paid them during Fiscal Year 1952 for
War, pledged to the President of the work on research contracts for the Depart­
United States their total strength-their ment of Defense. The status of their con­
facuJ ties, their students, their administra­ tribution in the educational field is indi­
tive organizations, and their physical fa­ cated by the fact their enrollment in the
cilitles. ' fall of 1953 stood at 2,250,000 as compared
The question of student deferment poli­ to 2,456,000 in the fall of 1950, although
cies received very lively attention at the large numbers of veterans were still pres­
conference. On the day before the confer­ ent in 1950.
ence opened, six Scientific Advisory Com­ In moving from past to future contri­
38 MILITARY R~:VIEW JULY l!~5-o

butions by colleges and universities, we take the same element into battle and ron­
must keep in mind the neal' certainty that serve its powers with complete efficiency,
this future war will be a struggle for ac­ is the most important man in the service.
tual survival. Death and destruction will Many efforts have been made ,to define
strike our ho~s. our cities, and our fac­ leadership, and to describe the training
tories. Nothing short of all-out effort will needed by military leaders. One of the
suffice. best is the following statement by Gen­
Uequirements eral C. B. 'Cates. when he was Comman­
Under these circumstances, it seems cer­ dant of the Marine Corps:
tain that our colleg'es must. once again, Leadc?'ship is intangible, hal'd to meas·
accelerate their schedules to permit con­ 1/l'C and difficult to describe. Its quailties
centrated study 12 months a year. Soldiers would seem to stem from many factors.
in their foxholes and workmen in factories But cel·tainly they must include a merlSIO'e
wiII cast aside the 40-hour week. and the of inilel'ent ability to control and dirrct.
scholar must equal their effort. self-confidence based on ('xpa/ knowledge.
Education can survive under future initiative. loyalty. pride. and a sense of
wartime conditions only as it meets def­ rcsponsibility. lnilo'cnt ability obviously
inite requirements for trained men and can1/ot be instilled, but that which is lalcut
women. There are such requirements. The or dormant can be acquired. They arc 110t
Armed Forces haVe> certain needs, predict­ rasily taugilt or casily learned. But lead­
able with reasonable accuracy. The coun­ ei's can be and m'e made. The avcrage
try has ce>rtain additional requirements: good man ill 010' sel'vice is and must be
these we must foresee as accurately as cOllsidC1"crl a potential leader.
possible. Here is a usable outline of the objec­
First, let us di:;cuss military require­ tives which must govern the bulk of col­
ments. In considering them, the time ele­ lege level wartime education for the Armed
ment is of pl'ime importance. Even with Forces. Potential students must be screened
accelerated schedules, a student entering to select those with inherent ability to
college after war starts cannot become control and direct other men. Those who
available to the Armed Forces fo\' 30 to qualify must be given an education which
36 months. (Those already in college will, will develop this inherent ability. and
of course, become available sooner.) As which will also impart the other ingrl'di.
stated earlier, the greatest military re­ ents of leadership. Except for specialized
quirement for additional trained men training, to be discussed later. college level
comes in the first 24 to 30 months of the education which fails to meet this require­
war. Probably the greatest military need ment cannot argue that it has direct mili­
is for trained and competent leaders. tary value.
Armies, navies. and air forces provide The prescription is far easier to write
the severest possible test of leadership. than to apply. Selection procedures of
This is true particularly in small units, today leave much to be desired in their
where a single officer must personally lead ability to identify and measure inherent
a group of tired, often scared, men through leadership qualities. Much additional re­
the smoke and confusion of battle into di­ search is. then, needed in this field.
rect' personal contact with the enemy. The Present college curricula serve many
natural leader is the real specialist of the diverse ends; few place major emphasis
Armed Forces.. The man who can control on leadership as an end by itself. Most
and develop his platoon or crew or squad­ college students aspire in a vague way
ron under training conditions, and then to ultimate positions of leadership in their
 WARTIME ROLE FOR COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES 39

community, but with some exceptions their officers should come from OCS or from
immediate goals are jobs as engineers, law­ ROT9·
yers, teachers, and so on. Probably the During the buildup phase of a mobiliza­
two service academies, at West Point and tion, additional officers must come first
Annapolis, have given more thought to this from already trained Reserve officers, and
requir~ment than any other institutions of next from OCS. Time will not permit the
higher learning; educators should study use of colleges, which require more than
their wartime curricula as guides for their 30 months to complete a training cycle,
own mobilization planning. as the major source of officers during this
Many volumes have been written discuss­ phase. The present Army OCS covers a
ing the relative merits of general educa­ total of 968 hours of instruction. Experi­
tion and specialized education. The ideal ence has demonstrated that when this
objectives of general education have been course is taken under the grim compulsion
best stated, by the Harvard Committee on of war, with death, or rather survival, as
the Objectives of a General Education in a factor in learning', and with an officer's
a Free Society, as the developing of abili­ commission as the immediate reward fo'r
ties in effective thinking, communication, success, graduates are superior as combat
the making of relevant judgments, and the leaders. In contrast, ROTC gTaduates, with
discrimination of values. These are re­ 480 hours of campus instruction, spread
markably similar to the leadership require­ over the entire college course, plus 288
ments quoted above, although they do not hours in summer camp, require additional
mention the ability to direct and control training before they can be sent into bat­
other men. tle. One very important factor is the dif­
Specialized education in today's com­ ference in psychological tension between
plicated world tends to teach more and an OCS camp and a college campus.
mol'<' about ever narrower fields. In its This dependence upon OCS has the addi­
ideal form, it does a" splendid job of tional advantage that it gives qualified
haining engineers, scientists, doctors, law­ enlisted men the opportunity to compete
yer" and other specialists. With many for commissions.
shinlfig exceptions, scientists and other Full dependence upon OCS, without any
spet'ialists do not as a class excel in in­ utilization of colleges to train potential
spimtional leadership of men. officers, would ignore the very real ad­
Thus, it appeal ~ that the military re­ vantages of a college education as prepara­
quill'ment for trained combat leaders can tion for life in the world of today. In war­
be tilled better by the product of general time, the services can use large numbers of
edu( ation than by specialists; requirements, junior officers whose abilities are limited
for technical specialists are discussed un­ to the battlefield, but they must have ·a
der the next subtitle. very substantial leavening of officers whose
E"sential combat skills do not lend them­ horizons extend beyond actual combat. To­
selv"s to study on the college campus. An day, less than half of the Army officers on
infantry platoon leader, for example, must active duty are college graduates. (A
fire many types o'f high-powered weapons, study of officers on active duty 27 March
and goO on many practice patrols under sim­ 1953, prepared by the Career Management
ula;<'d battle conditions, before he is quali­ Division, Office of The Adjutant General,
fied to lead men into battle. This part of showed that 25 percent of all Army com­
his 'raining must be given at Army camps missioned officers on active" duty had no
lind 'r strict military discipline. college education, and 30.2 percent had at­
111is raises the question whether combat tended college but not graduated.) This
40 MILITARY REVIEW JULY 1955

prpportion is particularly low in the in­ ing trained for the military. To meet mili­
fantry, armor, and artillery, where only tary requirements, curricula need certai~
42 percent are college graduates. Addition changes. For example, an Army engineer
to this base of large numbers of OCS grad­ must know how to use Bailey and other
uates-predomiljantly not college men­ military bridges. He must know field ex­
would leave this vital portion of the Army pedients not widely used by civilian engi­
dangerously low in this respect. Air Force neers. He must know how to layout forti­
figures are even lower than those for the fications, and how to blow up bridges and
Army, because for years the flying train­ other structures. Many other changes in
ing program pas accepted applicants with emphasis will appear on close comparison
2 years or less of college. The Navy has of present curricula with specific military
a higher proportion of college graduates. job requirements.
In an ideological war, this shortage The numbers enrolled for both types of
of all-around officers in the Army and college level training must be limited to
Air Force would be serious, because as specific military requirements; otherwise
a rule the broader background of the col­ the 1944 ASTP experience will surely be
lege graduate gives him a better under­ repeated. In 1941, the Army had no real
standing of the ideological issues involved. experience on which to base forecasts of
Thus, sound personnel planning will call personnel requirements. Today, with World
for wartime education by the colleges of War II and Korea as background, the
large numbers of potential combat troop armed services should be able to predict
leaders. In selection of men for this train­ their needs with acceptable accuracy.
ing, leadership must be the paramount re­ In addition to trained officers, the armed
quirement. Other qualities normally re­ services have a tremendous requirement
quired for college admission must follow. for enlisted specialists. This need will be
Some way must be found to eliminate fi­ particularly large during the 2 years or so
nancial means as a requirement--we can­ of buildup; thereafter it will drop to a
not afford to limit our selection to the sons level matching losses.
of well-to-do parents. The armed services are alreadY training
such specialists, and have well-developed
Scientists and Technicians curricula and training procedures. Much
This emphasis upon combat leaders must of this instruction could, if necessary, be
not obscure the requirement for large num­ given on college campuses.
bers of engineers, scientists, and doctors. In many cases, present mobilization
In this technological war, the armed serv­ planning contemplates opening additional
ices will have a tremendous requirement schools to handle expected increases in
for professionally trained men. In the proc­ student loads. Each additional service
ess, recognition must be given the fact that school will require overhead personnel on
technical service officers are troop leaders a ratio of about 650 staff per 1,000 stu­
as well as technicians. Leadership training dents. These additional instructors, mess
must be emphasized, along with technical and supply personnel, and administrative
subjects. personnel must be organized and trained at
Traditional peacetime curricula cannot a time when the over-all training and pcr­
be accepted without change, even in such sonnel loads are most critical. Most of
technical fields as engineering. Men being them will be released for other duties as
trained for the armed services will, in the training load decreases.
large part, be deferred from combat mili­ The coileges should be asked to assist
tary service on the basis that they are be­ in this training, as they did in previo;)s
 WAR'rIME ROLE FOR COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES 41
war8. Although naturally reluctant to Officers' Training Corps (NROTC) plan,
change drastically their type of instruc­ sometimes called the "Holloway Plan."
tion, there is every'reason to believe that, This might take the following form:
as it patriotic service, they would meet StUdents could be enrolled after com­
military requirements. Military leaders petitiVe tests similar to present NROTC.
like to keep such training under their own tests. They could be required to sign an
control; the extra manpower and other agreement to serve on active 'duty after
costs of such a policy cannot be condoned graduation, although the war might end
in an all.out emergency. while they were in school. Their tuition
could be paid, and an additional pay­
ROTC versus ASTI' ment 'made to cover overhead costs. A
In World Wars I and II, college train­ subsidy (currently $50 per month for
ing programs involved bringing students NROTC) could be paid the student, to
into the service, giving them certain mili­ cover food and other expenses. Uniforms
tary training, and then sending them to could be furnished, as for NROTC, and, if
college in military status. deemed necessary, students could be re­
This procedure is exceedingly expensive, quired to wear uniforms at all times. Stu­
with its real cost little understood. The dents failing, or dropped for other reasons,
total of all personnel costs, including such could be reported to Selective Service as
Items as pay, allowances, food, clothing, available for induction. It should be noted
medical care, and so on, is in the neighbor­ that this plan would require new legisla­
hood of $5,000 per man per year. Mere tion.
dollar cost is bad enough, but these figures Such a plan would meet essential objec­
are only one indication of the real cost tives. It would hold costs to a reasonable
in manpower and natural resources to minimum. It would permit major savings
keep a soldier in uniform. To this must in overhead to handle cadet administra­
be added the very real cost in later years tion, releasing some overhead personnel
of various veterans' benefits. for combat duty. By holding cadets to the
Is this cost necessary? To answer, it terms of their agreement, the services
IS necessary to review the training ob­ could gain some protection" against loss
Jectives and the arguments for military of key personnel in hasty demobilization
status. following any sudden end to hostilities.
The primary objective is, of course, This plan would also facilitate the main­
to train potential officers or enlisted spe­ tenance of academic traditions, and would
cialists. This must be done under heavy offer some safeguard against arbitrary ac­
pressure, with maximum use of the motiva­ tion to cancel the program and call stu­
tion resulting when students see the di­ dents into the ranks, with consequent waste
rect application of things being learned. of talent.
It must be done in a way that will keep The chief drawbacl!: of such a program
morale high. It must avoid discrimination would be the indisputable fact that mil­
in fllvor of boys from well-to-do homes. In itary authorities would have less control
the process, colleges are entitled to fair over students, and less freedom to use
reinlbursement, both for tuition charges them elsewhere in case of emergency.
and for overhead costs. All these objec­ For enlisted technicians there does not
tive" cim be met by placing students in appear to be any acceptable substitute for
uniform. military status. These students are re­
P"I" officer candidates, they can be met quired to meet certain military prerequi­
also by a variation of the Naval Reserve sites before they can qualify for such train­
 c~
42 MILITARY REVIEW JULY 1955' j

ing. Their stay will be much shorter than Long-Range National Objectives
that of officer candidates. ·The basic reason for fighting a war
Any program training college students at all is our determination to preserve
for the military must be policed, to see American ideals, standards, and "way of
. that each service gets an equitable por­ life." Our kind of political, social, and
tion of the most desirable students. There economic system is on trial today; open
is at least a suspicion that, in World War warfare will be merely a further stage
II, many steps in the establishment and in this trial. Probably it will not be
administration of the ASTP and NCTP the final stage. Unless we can preserve
programs were influenced by competition those things essential to achievement of
for high-grade men. In recent years, there our long-range objectives, there is little
has been constant argument over the rel­ reason for fighting.
ative needs of the Army, Navy, and Air What are these long-range objectives,
Force for such men. Unless firm control and how important are the institutions
is established from the start, the program of higher learning in their pursuit?
will be torn by dissension over this point. In declaring our independence, we held
Research and Development that all men are created equal, and listed
Although vitally important to victory, "Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happi­
the role of college laboratories and of ness" as among the inalienable rights
the scientists on college faculties is so of men. We are dedicated to the continu­
widely recognized and acclaimed that ation of a form of government based on
lengthy discussion here would be redun­ free elections and free expression of
dant. It is mentioned only to complete the opinion. We seek honesty and efficiency
listing of college contributions. Research in all governmental units, as well as in
agencies of the Department of Defense our private lives. We also strive to reach
are already making extensive use of two goals typically and uniquely Ameri­
available college facilities. In war it can can: equality of opportunity for all the
be assumed safely that both the colleges youth of our Nation, and maximum social
and the military would expand this pro­ mobility and fluidity-opportunity for
gram to the maximum. those born into one occupational group to
In summary, the military requirements shift to another, without social distinction
to be met by colleges and universities in between groups.
the next war are very large and very In order to preserve our kind of de­
important. Leaders must be trained; sci­ mocracy, we have long realized the im­
entists, engineers, and other specialists portance of an informed electorate. Today,
must be given professional training under as we battle for people's minds, it is
heavy pressure; enlisted specialists must even more important than in the past that
be trained during the buildup phase of we maintain a strong educational system.
mobilization. Colleges and universities are the keystone
Present planning for this requirement in such a system. We simply cannot per­
~s disjointed and unimaginative. Neither mit them to be crippled, even in a strug"gle
the Department of Defense nor the edu­ for survival. Education must and will
cators have prepared realistic plans for continue; the only valid question conc('rns
the 'employment of colleges and universi­ its form and size.
ties during a full-scale war. Without such One critical type of education which
planning, inexcusable confusion and waste must continue is graduate training for
motion would surelY exist in the vital scientists. Gone are the days when 4
opening months of conflict. years of undergraduate work could P1'O­
 WARTIME ROLE FOR COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES 43

duce a "competent scientist. The amazing phasis in past wars will demand atten­
progress being made in many scientific tion in the future. As a result of the
fields can continue only as we continue to unprecedented postwar rise in the birth­
produce adequately trained scientists. In rate, a tremendous flood of children is
this day of technological war, such train­ now engulfing our schools. Today, for
ing and such progress are truly essential example, the number of students in ele­
to victorY, although we do not put uni­ mentary and secondary schools is 5,600,­
forms on our research workers. 000 higher than it was only 4 years ago.
Deferment policies must, then; permit By 1960, a further 8 million students
qualified students to continue graduate must be provided with teachers and
work in essential scientific fields. Such schools. These prospective students are
deferment needs to be tied strictly to already born; not even war can stay their
aptitude on the part of the student and advance to school age. Colleges must train
to essentiality of the scientific field. increasing numbers of teachers, even in
Many educators will argue against the wartime. An aggressive campaign will be
latter limitation, contending that all needed to persuade students to shift to
fields of advanced study are important teacher training. Major emphasis should
to our long-range objectives. This argu­ be placed on women teachers. But this
ment has much force, and should be sus­ task of providing trained young teachers
tained in any struggle short of all-out must not be overlooked.
war, but under the conditions being con­ Adult training, along the general lines
sidered here it must be overruled. In a of World War II Engineering, Science,
stern struggle for national life itself, and Management War Training Program,
popular clamor will demand abolition of is another important task which colleges
all deferments for graduate study unless and universities should prepare to meet.
such deferments are tied closely" to vic­ Throughout the war, many students not
tory. involved directly in the war effort must
continue their education. Women must be
Demands for doctors and nurses will be
encouraged to continue their studies.
unprecedented, and they must be trained
Youths below military age must be given
at a rate differing radically from peace­
the best possible preparation for service
time practice. With millions of civilian
to their nation. The need for inspira­
casualties, plus heavy military casualties,
tional teaching, for training which will
a new approach must be found to produc­
impart understanding of the problems of
tion of medical practitioners. Mo~t civil­
modern living and world leadership, and
ian casualties will involve burns, wounds
for emphasis on high ideals and high
caused by flying debris, or radiological
standards, will be even greater than in
injury. Modern industry breaks down pro­
peacetime. With proper leadership the
duction jobs to permit use of semiskilled
colleges can and will amply justify their
workmen. So must the medical profession
survival in any future crisis.
prepare for mass production and utiliza­
tion of partially trained healers. The Educators Speak
m"logical warfare may complicate the What do educators say about the role
problem with artificially induced epidemics their institutions should fill? Probably.
amO! g men, animals, or crops. These will the best indication of their feelings lies
be cO'lc~ntrated in narrow fields, and must in their resolutions adopted at' the Octo­
be r,"'ught with similar mass production ber 1950 conference in Washington. Their
meH",ds. General Resolutions were briefly referred
AI·Jther field which received little em­ to earlier in this article.
44' MILITARY REVIEW JULY 1965

To appreciate fully the importance of fectively. This lack of information still.

this conference, it is necessary to re­ applies, as far as wartime plans are 'con­
create the atmosphere of the time. The cerned.
Communists attacked in Korea in June With regard to student deferment poli­
1950. By that fall, many sincerely advo­ cies, the conference expressed a strong
cated full-Beall mobilization, feeling that feeling that such deferment should not be
all-out war was almost certain. In early based on courses or curricula leading to
October, Communist forces in Korea werc specific professions or vocations, although
on the run, but still the atmosphere was it did leave a loophole in case such defer­
one of rcal crisis. Those present had the ment were later judged necessary in the
feeling that war was a strong possibility. national interest. The conference also ex­
In the absence of contrary information, pressed a feeling that there is an obliga­
it can be assumed that these General Res­ tion for deferred students to serve in the
olutions, plus the more detailed resolu­ Armed Forces or in other work of na­
tions adopted in the l{) Section Meetings. tional importance once their education is
represent the considered stand of those completed. If war, unhappily, comes again,
present regarding their role in a major many educators can be expected once more
war. to urge against policies limiting student
Two points stand out as one peruses the deferment to those taking specific courses.
conference report. One is the willingness Everything said or written by our edu­
of colleges and universities to serve to cators, either at this 1950 conference or
the maximum of their ability. The other elsewhere, indicates their sincere desire
is their feeling that they did not have to serve the Nation in time of war with
the information they needed to serve ef­ the total strength of their institutions.

The nature of the world we live in is such that if general war should come
llgain, not a mlln, woman, or child would be unaffected; more than that, virtually
every citizen would be confronted with the responsibility of his own personal
care in a desperllte effort to survive. This stark reality is being brought home to
people as never before by the growing awareness that we are no longer insuillted
by the oceans lind the Arctic wllstes. If this great test of national effort should
ever come, every military man would be vitally concerned with the affairs of
industry lind civilian defense; and every nonuniformed contributor would, in
some m~asure, need to have knowledge of military requirements in order that
they can intelligently be supplied and fulfilled. Towllrd the top of the ladder
of national effort, where the great decisions must be mllde, there will be a cor­
responding requirement for a grellter and broader understanding of human
affairs. All of these things point to a need for brolldening the scope of our'
nationlll educational system with the difficult concomitant of increasing the
amount of llctual precise knowledge of an ever-expanding list of subjects.
Actually, these are the only principles on which an effective educational struc­
t ure can be built.
.(tdmiral Robert B. Cm'ney
 LABOR MOBILITY
I

IN THE ATOMIC !AGE

Colonel O. Z. Tyler, Jr., Infantry

Student, Industrial College of the Armed Forces

The views expressed in this article swift calamity. It is not idly said that
fll"r the author's and fire not neces­ rear areas have now become the frontline.
sarily those of the Department of the We must mobilize and organize industrial
Army or the Command and General manpower on which our national survival
Staff College.-The Editor. depends to meet or counter devastating
attack. We must gird for the struggle at
home, just as we do on the frontline of
W E TEND to think of American battIe. Half measures will not do in
labor as being fairly flexible. Rooted in lightning, total war.
beliefs in the traditions of our pioneer Our experts tell us that our labor
forebears, who traveled far, and faced is not mobile. Lloyd G. Reynolds-pro­
great hardships in search of freedom and fessor of economics at Yale University
an honest living, we think this condition -cites as conclusions on labor mobility
persists. Moreover, nurtured on the tales the following principles;
of Horatio Alger, we see our young men,
"poor but proud," moving from place to 1. Most labor turnover OCCU1'S within
place in search of fame and fortune. a small segment of the labor force. Only
Would that this fable were so. We need a minOl'ity of the force changes jobs with­
mobility in our labor force today as never in a given year, and it is a minority
before.
of this minority~those who move two or
more times during the year-which ac­
American industry will need a flexible counts for most of the movement.
working contingent to meet any mobiliza­ 2. Unskilled workers change jobs mOl'e
tion. Faced with· the urgent necessity frequently than the semiskilled and these
of hitherto unheard of expansion over­ in turn move more frequently than skilled
night in reaction to atomic attack, our workers.
IVorker group must be readily expansible. 3. The propensity to change employers
In addition, where such attack might eas­ diminishes rapidly with increasing length
ily wipe out one entire segment of an in­ of service, 'also with increasing age.'
dust ry, the ability to shift to fill this
gap is essential. No thinking person will Gladys Palmer, in a study published
den~ that there is a real danger. Plans recently, verifies this tendency of the
must be made to mobilize against this working force to remain relatively fixed.

American industry needs a flexible working contingent to meet any

mo'lilization. Faced with the urgent necessity of hitherto unheard of
eXl:ansion in reaction to atomic attack, our workers must be expansible
46 \ MILITARY REVIEW JULY JU50

The economis(dsePh Shister, states in duction during the years 1940-45. The
his Economics of the Labor Market: vast number involved will be appreciated
. a sample study made after World when it is realized that only nine states
War II in a lOfal market disclosed that had populations of over 4 million at that
only 14 percent of those sampled had time.
changed jobs in something over a year. Many cities were jammed with migrant
Furthc)'mol'e, the voluntary changes are workers. Imagine the crowded conditions
concentrated among a definite sector of of San Diego where 27 percent of the pop­
the work force, the shM't service people ulation was made up of migrants. Hous­
and young workers. ing, roads, schools, sanitary facilities, and
police and fire protection, to name but a
There appears to be a definite inertia few things, were vastly overburdened.
in labor mobility. Although there is sub­ Wichita, Kansas. center of a booming air­
stantial evidence that initial job selec­ craft industry. bulged with a mobile work
tion is somewhat haphazard, a worker population of 20 percent. These conditions
ordinarily hates to move. Shistel' brings will occur again unless we take drastic
out that even among dissatisfied workers steps to forestall them.
only 20 percent did anything about chang­ However, the problem is not to be licked
ing jobs. Whether or not we can thank by physical expansion alone. Plans must in­
be,tter administration by an enlightened clude adequate increases in all supporting
management for this condition is debata­ facilities to include housing, schools, hos­
ble. It is certain that part of the re­ pitals, and transportation and recreation
luctance to move stems from improved sen­ facilities. Attractiveness will be an im­
iority rules and pension plans. Perhaps, pOl·tant feature of this mobilization proj­
the Government's program of making ect. The necessity for more than routine
available more and better housing is a effort is evident from the following expe­
measurable factor. In two recent studies rience of the United States Employment
improved pay and promotion were over­ Service in Baltimore in 1942.
riding factors given by approximately half It was urgent to get men to take vital
of those who did change jobs. Moreover, jobs in war production work. From
both studies again brought out that the 20,000 cases reviewed, 2,734 workers,
fraction which did change jobs was small. considered to be best qualified, were inter­
However, to meet the stress of war the viewed. Of this number, 1,123 of those se·
labor force will have to move.. Let us look . lee ted were given the opportunity of the
at what happened in World War II. It is jobs on a voluntary basis. Although a few
estimated that approximately 5,560,000 more accepted the offer, only 26 verified
workers moved in connection with war pro­ placements resulted from this tremendous
CO/Mwl O. Z. Tyler, J1'., was graduated effort at the peak of the war period. Some­
from the United States Milital'y Academy thing more than volunteering was ne~es­
in 1.931. He served in Okinawa and t1!e sary.
Philippines as a battalion commander In
the 77th Division during WOl'/d War II. Clarence D. Long, writing in The Labor
A membel' of the Logistics Division, War Forces in War and Transitions, states:
Depal·tmcl1i Geneml Staff, for 2 years, he "The heavy emphasis on defense produc­
was assigned to the Command and General tion called for mass shifts of workers to
Sta.fJ College as an instl'uct01' in August
1949, He served in Germany as Commande)' new industries. In these shifts eompul,;ioll
of the 8th United States Infantry and as played a role not to be ignored." ..
Chief of Sta.fJ of the 4th Infantry Division. Whether you believe in universal nlll!­
He is now a student at the Industrial Col­ tary training or not it seems obvious that
lege of the A1'1ned FQ1·ces. .
 LABOR MOBILITY IN THE ATOMIC AGE 47
some form of all-out effort will be required to plan to make it as painless as possible.
to meet the threat of total war. That this Knowing that these people are reluctant,
all-out mobilization must include the labor to leave homes and pleasant familiar com­
force appears only right and proper, the munities we must plan to provide pleasant
protestations of representatives of both homes, schools, churches, and all the mod­
management' and labor notwithstanding. ern seminecessities possible. The majority
When "the front is everywhere," where is of these workers will be married-most of
the equity in drafting a man only for mili­ the single men will be in the military
tary service? When an enemy attack wipes forces. Therefore, we must plan commun­
out Gary, Indiana, it will be too late fo), itywise.
labor shifts by voluntary methods. Moreover, to the greatest extent pos­
Totalitarian state you cry. Yet, there sible, we will not move our workers at all.
seems to be nothing incompatible in the In-plant training will be stressed to the
suggestion to marshal labor as a national maximum. Wherever possible, the job will
resource just as we do our military forces. be brought to the worker.
Mobilization of the labor force may not Finally, we must protect seniority and
be required to the same extent. That will pension rights for our workers. A man in
depend .on the necessity. It could be done the working force must have the same
with the same machinery, the local draft equity in his old job as that accorded a
board, supplemented by representatives member of the Armed Forces. Pension
of management, labor, and the United rights might be transferred as the worker
States Employment Service. Here we have moves.
in one agency the people most concerned The above constitutes a very sketchy
with, and who know most about, the local treatment of a tremendously complex prob­
resources and requirements, civil and mili­ lem. But the urgency of the situation is
tary. Local decisions should be made at frightening. Everybody talks about man­
home by duly constituted local people. This power but not enough is being done about
is thoroughly democratic-and realistic. it. I submit that when the bombs start
The program must be realistic. It deals, falling is no time to settle matters by the
of course, with that most personal, most committee method. We must"plan for total
basic element----people. If we have to shift manpower mobilization and get the ma­
.

them about in their jobs we are impelled chinery in motion now .

I
We could never afford to maintain for a long period of time a standing
Army sufficiently large to see us through much more than the initial stages
of a major war, or even of a so-called "brush fire" war. In any future emer­
gency" the strength of this Nation will, as always, be measured by the quality
and number of its civilian soldiers. It is hardly likely we will ever again have
the time to mobiliz~ and train a great army from scratch after war breaks
out. Therefore, our civilian soldiers will'have to be trained, organized, equipped.
and ready to go before war comes. This is vital to our security.

Secretary of the Army Robert T. Stevens

 JUNIOR OFFICER. TRAINING

Firs) Lieutenant Waltel' A. Coole, Jr., United States A1'1ny Reservl'

Tlte views ea'presscd in this al'tide "Associate level" courses provide infol­
are the author's and al'e not neces­ mation and orientation for new officers
sarily those of the Department of the for a particular career field beyond the
Army or the Command ami General basic tactical and technical subject mat­
StaIr CoT/ege.-Thc Edit",·. ter of his precommission training, How­
ever, such courses are not designed to

B ECA USE the lieutenant is the last

commissioned rank to interpret and exe­
include every detail encountered in all
duties of one pal,ticular career field; the
information and policies contained in
cutc policy, he becomes the chain of a sue h courses eventually become obsolete
coml1land~r's intitwnce. In any military and are revised. Thus, the changes ever
force, the potential weakness lies among present in a progressive army !tnd the
the inexperienced and untrained. need for more detailed training make it .
Several factors increase the need fo,· necessary for a junior officer to receive
junior officer b'aining: more tl'aining unless he is to learn on
1. The present system of duty rotation the job by trial and error. Mistal{es of
places a greater stress on adaptability a junior officer are often costly to the
to various duties and conditions. Government, detrimental to morale, and
2. The promotion rate is more rapid irritating to the commander-not to men­
than during prewar years, so that an of­ tion their being embarrassing to the young­
ficer has less experience to draw upon officer, himself.
than before.
:3. Our military force is Illore complex Unit Training
in its structure. l\1any operational units conduct officers'
4. Technological advances "equire a schools which immediately contl'ibute to
gTeater variety of background informa­ the needed proficiency. Their subject mat­
tion for one to be properly· oriented. ter includes reviews of tactical concepts,
This ineressed need is met in the serv­ changes in administrative and logistical
ice by several programs aimed at increas­ procedures, and matters of local impor­
ing the value of a newly commissioned tance-they are often the most convenient
officer. means of passing information down to the
leaders of subordinate units. Several lim­
Service Schools itations, however, prevent them from till­
The sCI'vice school represents the major ing in the deficit between the training­
elfort toward officer training. It is the furnished by the service school and the
most economical way to train officers be­ training needed to perform an officl'l"s
cause it. is a centralized activity and per­ duties at the level of efficiency desired by
mits 'the officer to devote his attention to many commanders. In units larger or
the training program instead of dividing more compl!lX than a rifle company, the
it between training and operational duties. training officer has difficulty in choo~ing
 JUNIOR OFFICER TRAINING' 49

, subject matter of equal value to all offi­ Courses. Thes.e courses, commonly call'ed
cers-the problems of a motor officer are "series courses," are offered 'by every
'of little interest to the surgeon or the branch of the service-free of charge,
rifle platoon leader. Most operational even of postal cost-and are valuable to
units have such a diversity of activity an officer who wishes to prepare for
that assembling all the officers at one changes in duty assignment and pro~o­
place during duty hours causes a break­ tion. The study material is uniformly note­
down in concurrent activities; operational book-size; if it is clipped into a notebook,
units are not able to spend long periods it may be carried around and studied
of duty time training their officers. The piecemeal, without loss of value or back­
alternative 'is a night class; night train­ tracking. Each course is divided into sub­
ing is seldom attended with eager interest. courses-pertaining to specific subject
matter-such as map reading,' personnel
Self-Improvement administration, tactical intelligence, and
The training required for maximum ef­ vehicle maintenance. If this material is
ficiency in the performance of duty is kept by the student, it is often valuable
provided, to a large extent, by the serv­ to an officer because it has excellent sub­
ice schools and unit officer schools, but ject matter organization, and furnishes
the final complement-which is never com­ references, additional material, and dia­
pleted-depends upon an individual's own grams and pictures which can be blown
effort toward his training. Thc service up for training aids when the student is
supports-in varying degrees-a variety called upon to instruct. The program and
of activities from which an officer can curricula offered are described in Depart­
construct a program to extend his knowl­ ment of the Army Pamphlet 20-100, An­
edge of both military and general subject nouncement of Army Extension Courses,
matter to increase his value to the serv­ available in most 83 offices.
Ice, and promote his own interests.
To accomplish extensive profits of self­ USAFI
Improvement, an officer must utilize his Widely publicized in military units i~
time with care. Exclusive use of offduty the United States Armed Forces Institute
time for study results in lost vitality (USAFI) Program, which offers corre­
which comes from inadequate recreation. spondence courses at high school and col­
However, many situations occur during lege level. The Program, administered by
the course of military life other than com­ Troop Information and Education, offers
bat which permit study, for instance: the a variety of "broadening" courses at a

Although service schools and unit training schools provide much of the
training which is necessary to a young officer, it becomes the duty of
the individual officer to complete the process of his own development

delay ;n a meeting or of a court-martial cost of $2 for the initial course-succeed­

proceC'uing, the passive supervision of a ing courses are free. The USAFI courses
class Or exercise conducted by a non­ are designed for study in the service. and
comm, ;sioned officer, or travel aboard a the material furnished is all that is re­
ship. quired for reference. This material, like
The most direct approach to individual­ the Army Extension Courses, is capable of
ized n,i1itary "study is the Army Extension being tailored physically, so that it can be
50 MILITARY REVIEW JULY 1951)

carried around and be worked on at odd Services libraries carry a large number of
moments during the day. Because there is military and general nonfiction books and
an increasing educational requirement for periodicals. Through reading, an officer"
officers, the USAFI Program becomes can acquire a wide variety of information
more interestiilg to many career officers and opinion that cannot be derived from
since it offers an inexpensive solution to official sources because of its controversial
a deficiency in formal education. Often, nature or because of its general nature.
the subject matter, although seemingly In embarking upon a reading program,
nm'elated to military service, can be one should remember that reading for
drawn upon directly for the solution of pleasure depends upon temporary whim,
daily problems of military leadership. but reading for self-improvement"tlepends
In addition to thc USAFI course, the upon a planned program. Random read·
Troop Information and Education Pro­ ing leads to a lopsided progression in one
gram offers a large number of corre­ area or to disconnected, unrelated infoI"
spondence courses administered by civil­ mation that is seldom retained. A pat­
ian schools. These courses are more tern should be established so that there
difficult to study during the "blank spaces" is a progression from the simple to the
in duty hours because they often have a complex, and there is an eventual cover­
great number of materials, require more age of wider areas of thought. Authors
concentrated hours, and require more ex­ should be investigated and subject matter
tensive reference materials which are not should be given critical consideration be­
always immediately available. However, fore it is accepted as authoritative.
these courses are of great value to indi­
viduals who wish to explore the diverse Summary
subject matter they offer. Half of the tui­ As an officer increases his value to
tion is paid by the Government. the service, he contributes to his own
interest. To any individual who seeks to
Reading Lists advance himself in the military service.
For a reading program, the Govern­ any training or study represents a means
ment offers assistance to the individual toward a higher level of proficiency and
through several means: reading lists are often a wider academic achievement. Serv­
maintained by various headquarters for ice school grades and efforts toward self­
guidance, purchase is facilitated through improvement affect efficiency reports,
the maintenance of bookstores, and Special which, in turn, affect future promotion.
To the junior officer, training beyond
First Lieutenant Waite?' A. Coole, Jr., his "associate level" branch training is
attended Texas Military Institute and essential to acquire enough appreciation
Trinity University, San Antonio, Texas.
He served in Tokyo with the 720th MiN­ of the broad picture of the effort of the
tm'y Police Battalion, and ?'eceived his military service so as to be firmly ori·
commission in 1950 while on state duty ented as he progresses to more complicated
in the 36th Division, Texas National and responsible duties. The present sys­
Guard. He attended the Medical Field
Service School, Brooke Army Medical Cen­ tem of service schools and unit training
ter, Fort Sam Houston, Texas. He was provides a large portion of that training,
assigned as Training Officer, Medical Com­ but, finally, the individual officer must
party, 99th Infantry Regiment, in Niirn­ complete the process of his own de\-elop­
berg, Germany, and is now a student at
the University of Chicago. ment.
 NOTES ON PACK ARTILLERY

Captain Michael F ..Parrino; , United Stntes. Army ReseTTle

The views expressed in this article fanciful for a world of natural barriers
(Lre the author's and are not neces­ such a:s has always existed.
sarily those 01 the Department 01 the One need search no further than the
Army or the Command and General comparatively late Italian campaigns 'of
Staff College.-The Editor. World War II to appreciate the fallacy,
that had long pervaded the character of
su~h military thinking. Needless to say,
A T THE close of World War I, the the mountain ranges and the climatic ir­
services of pack transport and pack ar­ regularities of that peninsula did again
tillery began to suffer the lot of the an­ prove formidable barriers-as they had
tiquated. The latest vogue in warfare, in Hannibal's time-and the mighty ma­
of course, was the power-driven wheel chine began to falter before their vastness.
which, at that time, had already begun to
shape military thinking as no one imple­ Italy
ment of war, with the possible exception So marked was the need then for mules
of gunpowder, had ever done before. and pack artillery in Italy that General
Horses and mules-ignominous partici­ Danford, former Chief of Artillery, suc­
pants in man's battles for many centuries cinctly remarked, "The Appenines of Italy
-we;e now doomed to an even greater just shout for pack artillery." Again the ..
humiliation than that' now given to in­ mule was destined to tread the roads and
difference-namely, the minimization of byways as had countless predecessors be­
the very tactical principles that had long fore him.
been associated with them. The notion of It has been supposed in. many quarters
blitzkrieg warfare based on the employ­ that had pack artillery been prepared and
ment of high geared mobile units-al­ committed in numbers throughout the
though then only a paper.concept-rapidly mountains of Italy, the campaigns there
begun to modify such age-old doctrines of may have been resolved sooner, although
warfare known simply in military parlance the problem was expeditiously and' ulti­
as accessibility, ease of maneuver, and the mately resolved through the imprQvisation
ability to sustain continuous operations of native mule trains for attachment to
in the field. The newer concept of mobile units of General Mark Clark's Fifth Army.
war seemingly spawned on broad, flat Hastily recruited pack trains drawn
countrysides, unencumbered by mountains, from Italian organizations, and heavily
stJ'pams, or jungle and, in many quarters, laden with much needed supplies, enabled
folbwed a pattern that was to clothe such the 45th and 34th Infantry Divisions, for
terms as double envelopment and pincer example, to sustain operations under the
movement with an elegance decidedly too most trying conditions of weather and

TIle ever-present possibility of other "local actions" makes it imper­

at:ve that we divert more attention to employment of pack transport
lJJilh its ability to deliver firepower anywhere under any conditions
52 MILITARY BEVIEW JULY 195.

terrain. Even the lOth Mountain Division, Even at West Point there were mules,
composed mainly of packers and pack ar­ for in 1913, a complement of packers and
tillerymen, played a major role in the mules were stationed there to provide
defeat of the Germans in that mountainous cadet training, "because when officers
country, althoul)h its impact was not fully went to their posts they were entirely
felt until a comparatively late date in ignorant in packing and managing a pack
the war. train." .
The East In World War I, pack was ordained with
In the China-Burma-India Theater, the an even greater respect for its talents.
situation was somewhat different in that When war broke out there were some 20,­
it was not so much the need for artillery 00.0 mules serving in the United States and
on mules that demanded our attention, as th~ Philippines. The number was increased
it was in maintaining long supply lines. until 29,000 mules were sent overseas as
Only too recently, Korea indicated the part of our Expeditionary Force. In ad­
necessity for packers and pack mules dition, 29,000 mules from France, Eng­
trained in the ways of mountain warfare. land, and Spain were given to the United
Certainly it would be no miscalculation States Army, making the total serving in
to surmise an even further use of pack, France approximately 58,000. Men and
elsewhere, under conditions similar to mules, it is to be noted, were well trained.
those found in these hapless countries. That it was held in high esteem is un­
This is particularly true if one were to questioned. Consider the attitude of the
consider the possible detenent effect of British, for example, toward its pack serv­
the so-called modern weapons of oblitera­ ice in India, where mountain artillery ac­
tion such as are possessed by the United tivities inspired many a glorious page in
States and the Soviet Union. For example, the annals of British military achieve­
Iran offers herself as a most likely coun­ ments. It is interesting to note, likewise,
try for the use of pack artillery in the that ill 1924 mountain artillery was of-'
event of war there-and, also, the Balkans. ficiaJly recognized as a corps d'elite in
Prior to World War II, the usefulness the Royal Artillery, and that "it was de·
of pack was seldom questioned. In fact, it cided to maintain lists of officers especially
was as much a part of our military struc­ recommended for pack artillery, as well
ture as the Infantry and Cavalry. Captain as for horse artillery, as both these
A. D. Schenck, in 1894, briefly summarized branches were considered to require offi­
the inquiry as to its role when he said, cers of mOl'e than average ability."
"At this time, much consideration [must Thus, we see that in those earlier days
01' should] be given to pack artillery as packing and pack artillery were most cer­
accompanying Cavalry and the Infantry." tainly worthy components, and that sol­
diers everywhere regarded them as highly
Captain Michael F. Pan'ino served dur­ important adjuncts to any army. Typical
ing Wm'ld War 1I with the 607th Pack Ar­ of such an attitude was the statement ap­
tillel'Y Battalion. He was graduated h'om
the Auimal Transport School at Fo/·t Sill pearing in the Chicago Post in 1916, .. An
in 1944, and assigned as Executive Office?' army without a mule seems as strange as
of a Pack Firing Batte?·y· In 1951, he an army without a general."
served with the National Gual'd Section,
G8, ,Headquarters, Army Field Forces. However, despite all this, the death'
Sincc 1958, he has been assigned to the knell of pack was about to be struck. As
77th Infantry Division. The author of In­ long ago as World War I, General Richard­
troduction to Pack Transport and Pack son of the Royal Artillery, for instance,
Artillery, he is an Attorney at Law at
Mount Vernon, New Yo?·k. "foresaw" the advent of mechanized waf­
 NOTES ON PACK A'ltTILLERY ·53

fare and wrote, "Now it seems to me that should even replace them, but, rather, on
to advocate mule transport is in these the assmmption that many parts of the
days retrograde," and; "It is much easier world ,still remain inaccessible to the
to feed motors with petrol or other mo­ motor-driven wheel.
tive power, than to feed a line of mules,
and probably the original outlay would be The Problem
much less." Also ascribed to the General Thus it is that the value of pack trans­
was his statement, "And with a single port then lies in its readiness to be em­
track a strong "detachment could take a ployed under the most adverse conditions
gun anywhere and bring it into action as of terrain. Yet, unlike the machine, its

lboye, a mule pack train of mountain field artillery being used to great advantage in
tran'porting supplies and equipment across a stream.-Department of Defense photo.

quickly or, perhaps, quicker than mule component parts cannot be turned off an
gun' are now brought." assembly line and quickly put together
P, om that time the service of pack ar­ and placed in the field. Mules are fa1'
tillery began to deteriorate before the more complex. Their growth and cultiva­
onru~hing philosophy of absolute victory tion require time and patient handling.
through motive power. The fact that our stock in periods of war
has come from the farm,s and the country­
The Question sides is not to be taken as a problem to
B.l\~ever,we are again reminded of the be easily solved in the future. True, many
dist>nct possibility of the future employ­ of our mules do emigrate from the' farm
men:, of pack, although not on any basis pastures, but this does not necessarily
that it would serve more efficiently than mean that all are acceptable to the rigid
the tank or the full-track, or that it specifications required if they are to be of
54 MILITARY REVIEW JULY 1905

any lasting use to pack. The necessity tery. Thus, the battery commander, execu·
for breeding is too well marked for fur. tive officer, reconnaissance officer, and
ther comment, except, to add that the de­ assistant executive are charged with prac:
sired product must be of such qualities tically the same duties as their counter­
as to be capaple of being trained and parts in the motorized artillery. On the
hardened for the rigors of campaign. other hand, a conspicuous change is noted·
in the substitution of a stable officer for
Planning the motor officer in a motorized unit-the
In many instances, when the Army has former being another duty of the assistant
had to employ the mules of other lands, executive.
the fact that they differed in size and It is within the ranks that many changes
stature necessitated an even greater ap­ may be seen. These changes are character­
preciation for that prior planning so vital istically in a class· by themselves, but are
from the standpoint of manufacturing of secondary importance for this treat­
suitable saddles and other equipment, and ment in the sense that they do not ma­
even of their training for combat. terially affect the primary functions of
Needless to say, the planning and prep­ the field artilleryman. The mode of trans'
arations must precede many years the pur­ portation necessarily dictates that he be
pose for which they are to be employed. skilled in such additional duties as sad­
With that thought in mind, it would be ap­ dling, packing, and horseshoeing.
propriate at this point to review briefly Other than these considerations pack
certain considerations pertinent to pack and motorized artillery have much in com­
artillery units and their employment in mon organizationally and administratively.
future wars. However, pack differs radically from the
To begin with, the employment of pack modern motarized unit in other ways.
artillery as an adjunct to the organic ar­ The Fire Direction Center, for instance,
tillery of an infantry division is quite demands a higher degree of efficiency and
unlike that Of its motorized counterpart. co-ordination than might be attained in
Both, of course, servc the same purpose: the motorized. There must be the utmost
readiness and ability to deliver firepower of close support with the Infantry. The
when needed-the facility to provide prop­ battalion commander must constantly be
er support. with the infantry commander for recon­
Administratively, there is. little or no naissance is most importa:ht. In addition,
difference. The organizational makeup ammunition supply requirements are
seeks no appreciable change from a motor­ greater.
ized table of organization. The reason is The battalion commander has the fur­
that the organic functions remain essen­ ther problem of conditioning men and ani­
tially the same for each. Some exception:" mals. Animals, too, must be afforded pro­
may be noted, however, such as in com­ tection from gas and shellfire and, finally,
bining the functions of the battalion ex­ movement plans must be well prepared in
ecutive officer with those of the operations advance and co-ordinated to enable pack
officer, and the requirement of additional artillery units to reach their destination
liaison section or sections. in time, considering that their rates of
Each battalion has its headquarters bat­ march differ substantially from those of
tery and firi&g batteries-the former as­ other units. As noted by Captain A.
suming also the service of supply; battery Mortureux in his book, Some Remarks an
officers retain the same duty titles as Mountain Artillery, liaison, command, and
those found in a motorized artillery bat­ supply are most complicated. The battalion
 NOTES ON PACK ARTILLERY 55
commander is constantly confronted with within the unit. Battalions containing re­
scarcity of roads of communication, rough­ coilless rifle teams, however, would be
ness of terrain, and lack of provisions confronted with problems of ammunition
and quarters. As far back as 1922, when supply and organizational equipment for
his article was written, he suggested communications, if they were to be capa­
that the air arm be utilized toward solv­ ble of sustaining operations in the field.
ing the problem of supply. The point of the matter is that pack
This thought is significant at this time artillery is but another means which ar­
because of the increasing importance at­ tillery, in general, plays when armies take
tached to the latest use of the helicopter. the field. It must be able to march, shoot,
It has been suggested, for instance, that and communicate. The underlying factor
the helicopter might serve as an able re­ in the use of pack artillery is terrain.
placement for the pack service in that The potency of firepower no more changes
it is able to land anywhere and unload the nature of the support mission of ar­
guns-presumably, pack guns-m~n, and tillery-including that of pack-than the
ammunition. The difficulty, however, is motive power employed. The growth of
that a "helicopter pack battalion," if the artillery as an arm, is, in one sense, the
expression may be used, would lose its result of the constant search for more
effectiveness at the very outset because effective firepower with the lightest weap­
it would be unable to maintain sustained on possible-that is, firepower embracing
operations for which animal pack is noted. maximum range and destructive power.
Stealth of movement, surprise, maneuver­ Atomic warheads, for instance, in the
ability, and choice of battle positions are hands of an effective arm such as pack
inherently the forte of pack artillery. The artillery-with its penchant for reaching
helicopter may readily enhance the use the inaccessible, coupled with a maximum
of pack because of the former's, ostensi­ of maneuverability and surprise, and, its
bly. favoring effect on long supply lines capacity to sustain continuous operations
which has always been a subject of mili­ -make it all the more pertinent that we
tal'Y . inquiry-particularly in respect to retain and improve this venerable branch
mountain warfare units.' Its ability to of the service.
I'cl'onnoiter and its maintenance of closer Long before the advent of the atomic
liaison than heretofore possible are other era, Colonel H. L. Scott-when he was Su­
fadors favoring this type of aircraft as perintendent of the United States Mili­
a l'omplement to pack. Since modern pack tary Academy-stated, "I urge upon all
units already possess organic liaison type persons in authority that they cherish the
aircraft, the conversion to helicopters pack train and the packer, and see to it
sh,mld solve many of the problems pecul­ that proper trains are always ready in
iaI' to pack such as observation, commu­ time of need, which time will come at the
ni. ations, and supply. In short, the heli­ very beginning of any war on land." ,
copter would enhance the employment of The ever-present possibility of another
pack artillery by serving as an integral "local action" like the Korean conflict
part thereof rather than its replacement. makes it imperative, then, that we divert
Modern weapons such as the 75-mm more attention to this highly purposeful
re.,oilless rifle also could be utilized, not and noteworthy arm-pack artillery­
to replace pack, as a tactical arm, but, with its ability to deliver firepower, in­
merely, to supplement or to improve its cluding the deadliest weapon known to
fil epower and, thus, remain integral parts man anywhere and under any condition_s.·
 Smoke Support of Riuer Crossings

Lieutenant Colonel E. Van Rensselael' Needels, Chemical C01:PS

Instructor, Command and General Staff College

J
The views e:rpressed ill this articlc It was quite evident, however, that some
/lrc the author's and arc not neces­ commanders lacked understanding of the
sarily those of the Department of thc potentialities of smoke screening, and
AI'my or the Command allli G"ucl'al many World War II lessons regarding
Staff College.-Thr Editor. methods of employment and how to plan
and control smoke screening operations
had to be relearned. Assault of a river
SMOKE was known to ancient captains line is considered-under current doctrine
of war as an effective means of concealing -a special operation. This implies a re­
the activities of a combat force from the quirement for services of highly trained
eyes of the enemy. It was not until World technical specialists. The smoke plan to
War II, however, that its use became pop­ Rupport a river crossing is prepared by
ular to cover river crossing activities. the staff chemical officer who is the spe­
Fl'om the modest use of smoke pots at sites cialist in his field. Being in support of a
wherc VI Corps crossed the Volturno River combined arms operation it must be plan­
in Italy in October 1943, to the seemingly ned concurrently with the over-all plan.
endless screen of smoke along the Rhine Principles of employment of smoke in
in preparation for Ninth Army crossing support of river crossings are illustrated
in March 1945, the art of this type of in the following assumed tactical situa­
support advanced along with development tion. United States forces are on the of­
of smoke making equipment. fensive moving eastward against Aggres­
Throughout the war in Europe, the suc­ sor forces. United Sates I Corps has been
cessful execution of smoke operations in directed to prepare a plan to seize and
support of river crossings made the con­ secure a bridgehead east of the Rhine
struction of heavy bridges possible at an River, although our forces are being held
earlier phase of the river crossing- opera­ up approximately 50 miles west of the
tion than would have been possible other­ Rhine. A target date, 30 days hence, has
wise, and this speeded the support of ar­ been established as D-day.
mor and heavy artillery and facilitated It is assumed that I Corps will be
supply of the forces in the bridgehead. screening along the west bank of the
Actions in Korea added little to the Rhine River approximately 5 days prior
knowledge of how to use smoke in support to the assault crossing, employing the 72d
of major river crossings. True, smoke Infantry Division and 201st Armored
was used in many places, but, usually for Cavalry Regiment. The crossing will he
special, small-scale operations such as made by the 20th and 55th Infantry Divi­
screening individual artillery positions, sions in their respective zones. After be­
narrow defiles, and vital points along ing passed through, the 72d Infantry Divi­
lines of communication. Reports of those sion will assume responsibility for the area
experiences have contributed materially to north of the zone of the 20th Infantry
develo'pment of doctrine for such special Division. There will be a show of strength
operations. They also point out require­ along the entire corps front intended to
ments for improvement of equipment and deceive the enemy as to our exact inten­
methods of handling and maintaining them. tions. The 350th Chemical Smoke Genera­
 ,
SMOKE SUPPORT OF RIVER CROSSINGS 57
tor Battalion will have the mission of sup­ of I Corps, support elements-both or­
porting the crossing and of partjcipating ganic and attached-and to higher and
in. the corps deception plan. The situation adjacent units.
is shown graphically in Figure.!. Paragraph 1, Situation. Provided the
The weather forecast for the period is basic operation plan accompanies or pre­
generally fair. Skies probably will be cedes the smoke annex the essential in­
clear throughout the period with visibil­ formation regarding both enemy and
ity of about 10 miles. Early morning friendly situations need be stated only
ground haze and fog in the valley of the once, in the operation plan, and reference
Rhine River usually dissipates about 0900 made to it in the smoke annex. If avail­
each morning. Wind is expected to be able information, not contained elsewhere,
from the northwest 6 to 10 miles an hour. is of value to the success of the smol{e
The average maximum temperature for operation, it should be disseminated
the period will be 56 degrees; minimum through this medium. The situation as it
temperature 34 degrees. will exist at the time of execution cannot
A crossing operation is generally con­ be ascertained at this time: Certain as­
sidered from three aspects: intelligence sumptions may be required to localize the
and l'econnaissance, planning, and exe­ planning. In the sample plan the assump­
clition. The smoke requirements must be tion regarding weather is based upon a
considered concurrently with all other study of available weather and climate
phases of the operation, and, therefore, records-in addition to long-range· fore­
may be discussed here in view of the three casts and local observations, The logis­
aspects stated above. tical support situation will be watched
At this early stage, reconnaissance will closely and whatever actions are required
be limited to aerial and map reconnais­ to validate the second assumption will
sance, Matters of great importance are have to be taken,
weather and terrain. At this time, only Paragraph 2, Mission, is a clear, concise
a general plan for the smoke operation can statement of the task to be accomplished
be stated, but by issuing it early the units and its purpose. "Corps esta.blishes smoke
that will be executing it will know what screen to support river crossing and corps
to look for in their reconnaissance and deception plan, and to provide conceal­
have a directive to proceed as soon as our ment of crossing sites." This is a state­
advance forces produce more detailed in­ ment of the decision made by the com­
formation gained in the area along the mander based upon the advice of his staff
river, and his own judgment.
An example of a plan for smoke support Paragraph 3, Execution. The first sub­
of this river crossing is shown in Figure 2, paragraph states the concept of the opera-,

The control' of smoke operations must be retained at the level of the

highest command engaged in the operation to ensure that smoke sup­
pori is used to maximum advantage considering the over-all operation
It shuuld be noted that the form followed tion. In this operation smoke will be
here conforms generally with the style of provided by several means. The 72d In­
the operation order and annexes recently fantry Division will make smoke in its
adopted for United States Army usage. It own area by use of smoke pots. They
is articipated that a smoke plan of this should be able to do this with ease since
magritude will be issued to all divisions they will not be called upon to prepare
 """""'!IJ!II
58 MILITARY REVIEW JULY 1955

for or make any assault crossings. Ac­ gressor as to our selected crossing sites,
tual crossings will be made by the 20th thereby dividing his force. Since we have
and 55th Infantry Divisions, so it is decided upon areas D and E for bridge
within their areas that the major smoke sites, it is desirable to give priority of
effort will be made by the attached smoke support to these areas. The instruction to
generator battalion. provide smoke "haze" gives some guidance
Provision is made for the 701st Infan­ for spacing of smoke installations and
try Battalion (Heavy Mortar) to support for logistical requirements. Detailed plan­
the generator battalion with projected ning by the executing units will be l'e­
smoke in case the smoke plan is imple­ quired to carry out the plan prescribed
mented before or coincident with the cross­ in the corps plan.
, ing. If the crossing is commenced in hours In this example, smoke missions for all
of darkness or prior to the lifting of the smoke producing units are stated in the
morning fog, the assault divisions may corps plan. It follows that tactical con­
have advanced beyond the range of mor­ trol of smoke in the screening operation
tars on the near bank before the smoke op­ must be exercised by the highest tactical
eration is commenced. Corps operation or­ commander in order to assure a co-ordi­
der will provide for relief of the mortar nated operation, This control can best be
battalion from its smoke support mission, effected through the Fire Supp'ort Co­
and attachment to divisions after the re­ ordination Center.
quirement of the smoke generator battal­ Paragraph 4, Administration and Logis­
ion has been satisfied. Additional smoke tiC8, cross references with the appropri­
support will be obtainable from corps ar­ ate administrative order, In addition, it
tillery on call. designates the Army supply points which
To fulfill the requirements stated in'· will support the smoke elements of the
the concept, specific instructions for giv­ operation-with the exception of ammuni­
ing smoke support are stated in subse­ tion which will normally be indicated in
quent subparagraphs of paragraph 3. the fire support plan and supplied through
The lettered areas A through H have been normal procedures, It is necessary, at
selected previously as possible crossing this time, to make an allocation of smoke
sites. (See Figure 1.) The enemy will pots to the using units. One of the as­
also be familiar with the suitability of sumptions was that logistical support will
these sites and may logically concentrate be available to support the mission, but
his force to defend them. It is planned an allocation must be stated to assure the
to make smoke demonstrations at as many proper distribution of the supplies.
.sites as possible in order to deceive Ag- Paragraph 5, Command and Signal, lists
Lieutenant Colonel E. Van Rensselaer only the instructions needed for the smoke
Needels was with the San Francisco Chem­ operation not appropriate for inclusion in
ical Warfa?'e Procm'ement District during the basic operation plan or other annexes.
World Wa?' II, He has served as Chemical
Corps Representative to the United King­ It is too early to state the locations of
dom and technical adviB01' on Chemical command posts for smoke support ele·
War/m'e to the Joint American Military ments, but it should be made clear that
Advisory Group, London. He is a graduate their locations will be supplied when
0/ Missouri State College (BS, Chemistry known.
and 'Physics) and the University 0/ Cal­
ifornia (MA). In 1952, he was graduated The staff chemical officer, as a tech­
from the Command and General Staff Col­ nical specialist, will be the principal ad­
lege and is now an instructor and Special visor in the smoke support operation. He
Representative for Chemical Corps at the
College. will, normally, have been given the re­
 SMOKE SUPP,ORT OF RIVER CROSSINGS 59
sponsibility of preparing the smoke plan.' attack. to achieve maximum surprise.
DUring the operational-or execution­ Therefore, pre-D-day use of smoke to
phase he must work in the Fire Support screen preparations and aid in deception
Co-ordination Center to give guidance in is considered undesirable. Inasmuch as
the implementation of this plan. He will the commander has specified that smoke
watch the progress of the crossing opera­ wJll be used to conceal the assault cross­
tion and make recommendations as to the ing and bridge sites, smoke operations
advisability of making smoke, continuing must commence on D-day.
smoke, and stopping smoke. In this loca­ Based upon prevailing weather condi­
tion, he will have access to reports of tions there should be an early ground fog

ASSUMED SITUATION
D·DAY
o ©
CROSSING SITE BRIDGE SITE

1====,===~lr' MiltS

meteorological conditions coming in from and haze until about 0900 on D-day. Con­
the Air Weather Service, Corps Artillery sidering the time required to build up a
Ob,ervation Battalion, and the smoke smoke haze, the smoke operation should
generator units. He will analyze and rec­ begin about 0830 to ensure there will be
ommend the action to be taken on requests no break between the natural fog and the
for additional large area screening or calls artificial screen. The G3 and chemical
for smoke by artillery. Keeping abreast of officer must give close daily attention to
the tactical situation, he may recommend the behavior pattern of this ground fog
changes to the smoke plan and draft or­ and haze. If the pattern is so inconsistent
der,; to effect the approved changes. The that it is felt that no reliance can be
cor;lS chemical officer must also maintain placed upon it, smoke operations may be
surveillance over the availability of smoke ordered for BMNT (beginning of morn­
muuitions and make recommen4ations for ing nautical twilight). Conversely, if a
ther allocation to ensure the most effec­ heavy fog is forecast to 'last well into the
tive screening. morning, smoke operations could be with­
The corps commander has specified an held during that period.
60 MILITARY REVIEW JULY 1955

Once comm,enced, smoke operations will craft th'ey should experience little difficulty
continue until the bridgehead (0-3 line) in making their attack. Under normal
is secured. At that time, emphasis will be conditions, the density of the haze will
shifted to provide a smoke blanket over permit suitable observation from directly
the bridges, and the smoke generator units above, and it is unlikely that smoke will
will be placed under the operational con­ rise to a height which would interfere
trol of the antiairCl'aft artillery com­ with control of aircraft.
mander responsible for defense of those The control of strikes against point
bridges. targets by target director posts is con­
The employment of smoke should not sidered unsafe in light of the probable
impair seriously the effectiveness of ar­ error, and the close-in location of the tar­
tillery support. Although a preparation get to friendly troops.
will not be fired, fires in support of the The operation plan of the smoke genera­
attack will be planned. The bulk of the tor battalion will provide for displacement
observation required for fire adjustment across the river of the necessary gen­
on targets of opportunity will be accom­ erators. The displacement can be accom­
plished by the forward observers accom­ plished as soon as the assault troops have
panying the assault rifle elements. In the reached the range of enemy direct fire
densest portions of the haze-up to 5 miles (0-1 line)-providing all generators are
beyond the river-these observers will not required to maintain the haze. Should
have a minimum visibility of about 400 all generators be in operation on the near
yards, /l:radualJy increasing to visibility bank at the time of a shift of wind direc­
unrestricted by the haze 8 to 15 miles tion, they would be moved rapidly aCl'OS8
from the river, depending upon the wind the river under cover of smoke projected
velocity. by artillery and mortars, and from smoke
Fire adjustm<>nt for the 72d Infantry pots ignited by the advancing assault
Division-after its displacement to the t)·oops on the far bank.
)lo)·th-must· be accomplished from Army Because smoke movement is subject to
aircraft and ground observation posts on weather and terrain conditions, and may
high g'round 011 the nearside of the river, rise or drift into areas which are the
inasmuch as this division will not have responsibilities of othe)' commanders, the
forward observers across the river. The tactical control of large area smol,e op­
degree to which the behavior of the smoke erations must rest with the commander of
will interfere with the observers on the the highest level participating in the op­
high ground to the west will depend upon eration. In this situation, this is the com­
the wind and temperature gradient. Smoke mander of I Corps. However, such control
tends to cling to ground when tempera­ of large area smoke operations does not
ture decreases with elevation; and to lie preclude the use of local smoke by' a
between these two extremes when temper­ subordinate unit to blind enemy observa­
ature remains constant with elevation. tion, protect an exposed flank, cover the
Air attack of targets located within extrication of a trapped unit, or for ,im­
the dense portion of the smoke haze will ilar purposes.
be limited by the ability of the forward In addition to the co-ordination of the
air ,controller to see the target and pin­ smoke operation that is necessary within
point its location to the attacking air­ the corps, the smoke plan must also be
craft, and by troop safety restrictions co-ordinated with air defense and \\ ith
announced by the commander. Once the adjacent units-particularly II Corps. The
target has been located by the strike air­ predicted direction of the wind will re­
 SMOKE SUPPORT OF RIVEROROSSINGS 61·

( Classifteationl
COpy No 5
I Corps
OBERSTEIN (
27 Sep - - ­

Ann€'x D (Smoke) to Opn Plan 17 (2) Priority of support to at'eas D and E.

Map: GERMANY, ;:100,000, FRANKFURT­ (3) Provide continuing support until OMS line
MANNHEIM .:: is secured. ,
(4) Provide haze over bridging operations in
I. S ITUATION areas D and E on order.
Enemy forces. Annex A (Intel) to Opn Plan (6) Co~ordinate with assault Div relative to
position areas and UBe of crossing means.
11. d, 701st lnf Bn (Hv Mort) : Support pre-H-hour
h. FriE>ndly forces. Annex B (Opn Overlay) to
~moke operations of 350th em} SMoke Genr
Opn Plan 17. Bn.
Attachments .and detachments. (See Opn Plan
17.)
Corps Arty
(1) 60ad FA Gp: 628th FA Bn (l66-mm How,
Assumptions.
towed) and 629th FA Bn (166-mrn
(1) That normal wea.ther will prevail in area
during period of smoke operation. How, towed) provide smoke support
e2) That Bufficient logistical support will be on call beginning H-hour.
available to suPtJort the smoke opera­ (2) 609th FA Gp: 646th FA Bn (Hv, SP)
(155-1'l1m Gun) provide smoke support
tion. on call beginning H-hour.
2. MISSION
f. Appendix 1. Smoke Overlay.
g. Co-ordinating in~truction9.
Corps establishe~ tlmoke ~creen to support river (1) Control of smoke this headquarters.
t'ru~hing and corps deception plan. and to pto­ (2) Smoke mission co-ordinated through FSCC.
vide concealment of cros~ing ~ites. (3) Be prepared to sustain continuous smoke
operations during daylight hours D
'1. EXgCUTlON minus 1 through D plus L
n. Conc(>pt of Operation. 72d Inr Div will screen (4) Request for air delivery of smoke through
area North of 20th lnr Div crossing site FSCC.
with continuous smoke haze utilizing smoke
pots, and projected smoke munitions, to 4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS
},upport the corps deceptive maneuver. 350th a. AdminO--- -' ,
eml Smoke Genr Dn will ~creen approaches h. Fog oil CI III Sup Pt 674 ALZEY (2727),
to crossing sites, the cro~sing by assault ('. Smoke Pots.

unit8, and bridging operations in the 20th (0 ASP 934 MARNHEIM (2214).

Inf Div and 65th lnf Div zones, and sup­ (2) Allocation.
port ('orp~ deception maneuver with feint'5
nnd demon~tration. Projected smoke muni­
tion'> in dil'e<.~t ::.upport of the 350th Cml Unit M4A2 M6
Smoke Genr Bn. will be provided by 7018t 20th lnf Div 00 100
tnf Bn u... required. Additional fire rnh;sion::,.
obtainable un cuB from corps artiUery. 55th Inf Div 50 100
~2d Inf Div 72d Inf Div 600 10,000
At('h 350th Cml Smulte GE"nr Un 400 600
20h.t Arrnd Cav All Other::; Basic Load
111 Provide bmoke haze over areaH A and n
by Ube of f:,moke pots and organic fire.
(2) Provide continuing support until 0-3 line d. WP and He ~hell. See AnnE"x C (Fire ~ Spt
secured or on order. Plan) to Opn Plan 17.
t' '\50th Cml Smoke Genr Bo
At('h 36114t eml Smoke Genr Co 5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL
362d Cm} Smoke Genr Co a. Normal radio traffic all areaB.
363d emI Smoke Gen r Co h. Command.
364th Cml Smoke Genr Co (I) CP 350th Crnl Smoke Genr 13n - - :.
j I} Provide t.->moke haze over areas C, D. E. (2) CP 701st Inf Bn tHv Mort)
F, G, H. (3) FSCC
ApP{']'flix I-Smoke Overlay
Acknowledge.
Dhtl"hution: A

First Army

II Corps

Ninth TAF(FTR)

OFFJ,:IAL:
,JONES
isl Ihtcher
Lt Gen
)!'JTCHER

(.:

(Classification)

FIGURE 2.
62 MILITARY REVIEW JULY 1956

suit in the haze covering a portion of II be in position before the need for screen­
Corps area. The II Corps must know that ing develops. To meet this requirement,
I Corps will be using smoke so that it the smoke plan should be developed con­
may make plans to take advantage of the currently with the over-all tactical plan
smoke; revise their plans if the" smoke and issued as early as possible. Based
will interfere; abd know that the smoke is upon their knowledge of the supported
from friendly sources and with whom to units' mission, the smoke plan, and per­
communicate for adjustment of the smoke sonal reconnaissance and detailed analysis
density. of weather and terrain, the commanders
Another item for consideration is the of smoke units must prepare detailed plans
possible use of smoke for protection for furnishing the required smoke sup·
against thermal effects of an Aggressor port.
atomic attack. The great assemblage of The smoke plan is normally prepared
personnel and equipment at the crossing by the staff chemical officer of the head­
sites just prior to an assault crossing quarters in charge of the over-all cross­
would be a lucrative target for an atomic ing operation. It is published as part of,
attack. If such an attack appeared to be or annex to, the crossing plan. During
imminent or if tactical surprise had been the planning and the operational phases,
lost in the face of a known enemy atomic the chemical officer, or his representative,
capability, a large area smoke screen to will function as a member of the Fire
protect friendly troops from the heat ef­ Support Co-ordination Center.
fects might well be justified. In anticipa­ The area covered by smoke must exceed
tion of this type smoke screening opera­ that actually required for the preparation
tion, appropriate instructions should be and assault. Too small an area permits
includcd in the smoke annex. the enemy to mass artillery fires, air
Smoke may be used effectively to sup­ effort, and atomic attack on likely areas
port assault river crossing operations. neal' crossing sites. The area covered by
Depending upon the tactical situation it smoke must include several crossing sites,
may be used to conceal preparations for plausible assembly areas, and suitable ac­
the river crossing, to assist in the de­ cess roads. A large area serves to con­
ception plan, and to afford protection at fuse the enemy as to the intended site of
the site of the actual crossing. The means th"!! crossing, permits a maximum amount
for smoke screening should be established of dispersion to reduce the effects of en­
on the far shore early-not oI)ly to assist emy fires, and affords some protection
in concealing crossing activities, but also against flash burns and incidental fires
to cover the advancing troops until the from atomic attacks.
bridgehead is secure. The employment of smoke will restrict
The primary means of producing smoke the ability of ground observers to adjust
over large areas is the mechanical smoke artillery fires and air strikes on targets
generator. In addition, smoke pots are of opportunity located within the smoke
very effective for area screening, and have haze. The presence of smoke may also
special advantages such as quietness of cause local interference with bridging op­
operation. Their small bulk permits them erations, reconnaissance, and movement of
to be set up quickly for filling gaps in vehicles. Consequently, the control of
screens, protection of primary generator smoke operations must be retained at the
sites, and ease of supply and transporta­ level of the highest command engaged in
tion. Smoke may also be delivered by air­ the operation to ensure that the smoke
craft, artillery, and mortar shell. support is used to maximum advantage
If practicable, smoke generators should considering the over-all operation.
 UNITED STATES

Drone Control Global Command Network

An improved ultra-high frequency radio Designed to ease the command pressure
system providing for continuous control on the naval communications center at
now guides relp.ote controlled jet planes. Washington, the Navy recently opened its
A miniature electronic "brain" takes over 15.5 million dollar command communica­
within 5 seconds, if radio control signals tions system. The new network, which ie
shut off while the drone is in flight, di­ global in scope, will serve as the hub of
recting the plane to a preset altitude communications for the Atlantic Fleet and
where it circles until signals are restored. for the North Atlantic Treaty Organiza­
The new system can be applied to piston tion commands. The system has three ma­
as well as jet aircraft and operates both jor centers. The receiving unit is locatfi)d
gl'ound-to-air and air-to-ground.-News neal' Norfolk, Virginia; the transmitter
release. facility is near Suffolk,' Virginia; and
the control center is located at the Nor­
Inventory 'Clerk' folk Naval Base.-News release.
A mammoth electronic "brain" is being
installed at the Detroit tank-automotive Rotation Plan Set
c..nter by the Army to replace 350 clerks Under Operation GY1'o8cope, seven posts
who keep an inventory of the replacement have been designated as the permanent
parts needed to keep all United States home stations for 16 divisions 'involved
nlilitary vehicles rolling. It was explained in the new unit rotation program. The
tl!at the machine can do in minutes what permanent home stations announced by
it required the clerks a month to accom­ the Army are Fort Riley, Kansas; Fort
plish. When it sees stocks falling on any Lewis, Washington; Fort Ord, California;
0" 450,000 items, the machine will flash Fort Hood, Texas; Fort Campbell, Ken­
a warning to buy more. According to tucky; Fort Benning, Georgia; and' Fort
the announcement, it will be the Army's Bragg, North Carolina. Except in the
lil'st electronic "brain" and is known as case of the 1st and 10th Infantry Divi­
r. izmCLc. When data is fed into the ma­ sions at Fort Riley, the Army did not iden­
('::ine, it types out its answers in tt~ipli­ tify the divisions that will call the various
c ,te.-News release. posts horne.-News release.
64 MILITARY REVIEW JULY 190fi

flying Platform 'Aerobee-Hi' Rocket

A small wingless "flying platform," To obtain information on the atmos­
which has made short successful flights phere at altitudes up to 135 miles, the Air
carrying a pilot, has been developed un­ Research and Development Command has,
der the auspices10f the Office of Naval developed the Aerobee-Hi Rocket . • The
Research. The small circular device, on rocket is expected to obtain data on so­
which the pilot stands, uses a new prin- IaI' radiation, sky brightness, and other
important natural phenomena encountered
at altitudes wen above 100 miles. It is
powered by a 4,OOO-pound thrust motor.
The rocket is fired from a launch tower.
It is manufactured of lighter, stronger
metals than previously used and is nearly
:10 feet long.-News release.

Boundary Layer Control

Details of two practical systems of
boundary layer control which will reduce
aircraft takeoffs and landing speeds by
one-third and lengths of runways required
by one-half were disclosed by the Ai!'
Research and Development Command. The
boundary layer is the name applied to the
thin layer of air found next to the sur­
Wingless flying platform tested for Navy. face of aircraft wings in flight. As the
wings move through the air, this thin
ciple of lift and propulsion called the layer drags along the wing surface and
ducted fan. Two propellers rotating in causes the air stream to separate from
opposite directions suck air through holes the wings at certain points, particularly
in the platform and supply a downward at the wing flaps or at the sharp leading
thrust which provides the vertical lift. edges of thin wings. As the lifting power
Inclosed in a circular casing which pro­ of a wing is dependent on a continuou~.
tects the pilot from the blades, the pro­ uninterrupted flow of the air stream over
pellers are powered by separate engines its surface. the separation of the stream
which together develop less than 100 horse­ caused by the dragging boundary layer
power. The flights indicate that this prin­ considerably reduces lift. The first meth­
ciple has possible applications in larger od employs a suction system which was
vertical flight aircraft. The machine. used at the leading edge of an F-86F plane.
which combines the principle of control The second method was designed for a
by "weight shifting" with the "ducted wing flap combination and a C-123 tram­
fan," definitely establishes the feasibility port airplane was used. In this system.
of radically simplified flight. Directional both suction and blowing are used to J'('­
flight is achieved by leaning in the di­ move or otherwise nullify the effect of
rection one wishes to go. Further research 'the boundary layer. The Germans ha,j
lind development will be necessary before proposed the use of this system on 01'';
these principles can be applied in the of their heavy transport aircraft durin'\'
production of military aircraft it was World War II, although they planned to
pointed out.-News release. use rockets in the wings.-News release
 MILITARY NOTES An.OUND THE WOn.LD 65
Super Com$tellation Smallest Guided Missile
A, new turbo.pro..i? Super Constellation Carrying its o.Wn powerplant which
designated the YC-121F, made its maiden drives it at superso.nic speeds, the United
flight recently. Po.wered by fo.ur 5,700 States Air FOIice's Fa/con, a guided air­
ho.rsepo.wer turbo.pro.P engines, the 440­ craft rocket; is described as thb small­
mile-an-ho.ur plane has a no.rmal cruis­ est guided missile in production. The
ing altitude o.f 20,000 feet, and a take­ Falcon'.q o.wn guidance system can direct
off' weight o.f 75 to.ns, It can fly 106 it to. a maneuvering target, and the at-
passengers, 18 to.ns o.f cargo., o.r 73 litter
patients. The plane has a rate o.f climb
o.f 2,240 feet a minute with full lo.ad.­
News release.

Single Shoe Style

As the culminatio.n o.f several years'
research, study, and experimentatio.n in
efforts to. improve the sho.e design, reduce
the number o.f sizes, and develo.P itemg
of fo.otwear suitable and acceptable to.
all the services, the Armed Fo.rces have
ado.pted a single design o.f men's lo.w­
quarter dress shoes. The standardized
shoes will be purchased fo.r issue after
present stocks o.f sho.es and lasts are
exhausted. The new lasts o.n which the
shoes will be made, develo.ped by the
Army Quartermaster Co.rps in co.-o.pera­
tion with the other services, will reduce
th" number o.f sizes no.w carried in the
ArlllY's supply system fro.m 235 to. 113 as
well as co.mparable reductio.ns in the o.ther
services. The reductio.n is acco.mplished by
elilllinating alternate widths no.W em­
ployed. Reductio.n o.f stocked sizes by o.ver
one-half will simplify sto.rage and issue Smallest guided missile packs big punch.
IHwedures and result in substantial sav­
ing-,.-News release. tached warhead is capable of destro.ying­
a bo.mber. Acco.rding to. info.rmatio.n re­
Microscopic Germ Counter ceived, it wiII be carried in quantity by Ail'
,\ n instrument kno.wn as the aero.so.lo.­ Fo.rce intercepto.r aircraft. The intercep­
'(,Ol'e has been develo.ped by the Army tors are guided to the proper firing Po.sitio.n
Ch, mical Scho.o.I to. give instant warning o.f by electronic co.ntro.I systems which lo.ck
an ' nemy germ warfare attack. The device o.n an enemy bo.mber by radar and fire the
mel ,ures and co.unts micro.sco.pic airbo.rne Falcon missiles automatically, During
gel '!lS, dust, and mo.isture particles, o.ne tests the missile has kno.cked do.wn maneu­
at i, time, at the rate o.f 100 per second. vering QB-17 and QF-80 jet aircraft even
It -\'ill also count radio.active particles when no. explosive warhead was attached.
an" determine their size.-News release. -News release.
 66 MILITARY REVIEW JULY 1955

Camouflage Scheme Wingf'ap P'ane

As the result of experiments, all Navy Tests are being conducted on a new type
and Marine Corps combat planes are to of experimental wing flap that would allow
'receive a new paint scheme which has vertical takeoff for conventional looking
proved to be be~er camouflage than the planes. The phm involves fast moving,
familiar dark blue now used. Navy car­ triple-blade propellers with a somewhat
rier and Marine combat planes will be larger than usual diameter which are
painted glossy white on the lower wing mounted on the wings in conventional
and fuselage surfaces and light "gull" position. The lift is achieved by these
gray on the upper wing, fuselage, and propellers thrusting back high velocity
horizontal tail surfaces. The upper por­ winds that are deflected downward by
tion of the wing control surfaces also movable wing flaps. To achieve normal
will be white. Helicopters will be painted flight once the plane is in the air, the
light gray, while patrol aircraft, both flaps could be set in horizontal position,
land-based and seaplanes, will be painted although this has not as yet been tested.­
a semigloss "seaplane" gray color. In News release.
addition to the new scheme for combat
planes, jet trainers, other than primary, 'Arctic Subways'
and reciprocating multiengine trainers The possibility of tunnels under the
will be painted a split orange and white ice and snow to facilitate the movement
color scheme. All primary trainers will of materials, equipment, and troops will
retain the present over-all orange-yellow be studied during the Army Engineers'
color.-News release. Arctic Task Force expedition to the Green­
land icecap. The subsurface tunnel plan
Automatic Ejection Seat has been tentatively proposed as a means
A new, totally automatic ejection seat, of avoiding serious problems of weather,
which operates in the shortest possible navigation, and trailmarking in travel
time and frem the lowest possible alti­ about the 700,OOO-square mile icecap. The
tudes, is now being used in the vertical Task Force has the mission of studying
takeoff fighter planes. Under the new sys­ Arctic conditions as they relate to the
tem as the ejection seat is fired from movement of troops and supply of facili­
the plane, the safety belt is opened. ties, and developing new techniques. A
Strong nylon cords then halt the seat for trench 25 feet deep and,12 feet wide will
a fraction of a second when it is 6 feet be cut into the snow with special snow­
out of the cockpit. The parachute is then plowing equipment. The trench will then
opened and inflated, and the pilot is free be covered over with snow blocks in a
both from the airplane and the seat.­ fashion similar to building subways.
News release. Other projects of the Task Force include
studies of ice ramps, crevasses, and ice
Study Move cliffs as they influence access onto the
The possibility of moving Fifth Army icecap; problems of navigation and route
Headquarters from its present location in finding systems; the building of exper­
Chicago to either Fort Des Moines, Iowa, imental roads and airfields on and of
Omaha, Nebraska, or Jefferson Barracks, snow; the building of subsurface st1'l1C­
Missouri, is under study. A survey is be­ tures such as storage arellS, warehouses,
ing conducted to determine what problems garages, and hangars with a minimum of
would be involved in the proposed trans­ imported materials; and a study of water
fer.-News release. and power sources.-News release.
 MILITARY NOTES AROUND THE WORLD 6,7

High-Flying Rocket Airlift Units

An aluminum ball, carrying rugged in­ The first combat units of Operation
>struments to collect upper atmospheric Gyro8cope to be: moved tactically by the
data and radio the information to the Air Force between an oversea station and
ground as it falls, will be carried 75 the United States will be the 187th Air­
miles into the air by an 8-foot, needle­ borne Regimental Cqmbat Team from Ja­
nose J·ocket. The 220-pound rocket will pan and the 508th J Airborne Regimental
drop the ball when it reaches its pre­ Combat Team now stationed at Fort
scribed height. Booster units will carry Campbell, Kentucky. The 187th will return
the rockets to high altitudes and then to Fort Bragg while the 508th will replace
it will continue under its own power. it in Japan. The rotation movement will
When it reaches the high point in its be supported by C-tf!" Globema8ter troop
flight, I the rocket's hull will burst open carriers in the 12,OOO-mile round trip air­
to release the ball.-News release. lift over the Pacific. The plan to airlift
the units is designed to test the effec­
Medical Insignia
tiveness of procedures governing the tac­
To identify Air Force Medical Service
tical air movement of combat units to
physicians and dentists more readily, a
and from overseas stations and it will be
new medical insignia design has been
evaluated for future moves.-News release.
approved for use in the near future. Flight
surgeons will continue to wear their wing
Supersonic Interceptor
insig:nia. The insignia is a small silver
Assigned the task of stopping enemy
badge with a caduceus, or serpent, en­
bombers before they reach American tar-
twined on a staff and mounted in its cen­
ter. The dental badge is identical to the
one to be worn by physicians except for
a "0" superimposed on the caduceus. The
badge will be worn above the left breast
porket.-News release.
Nuclear Propulsion
Under two projects announced r~cently
by the Atomic Energy Commission and the
Department of Defense, nuclear propul­
SiOl1 for large naval vessels will be devel­
oped. Under one project, research and
development work on a reactor suitable
for large ship propulsion is to be accom­
pli,hed, while under the other separate F-I02A mans the country's outer defenses.
deSign studies of large nuclear powered gets, the F-t02A all-weather supersonic
ships will be undertaken.-lIlSTS. jet interceptor is undergoing test flights.
Convert Sea Water The plane differs from its prototypes in
Conversion of sea water to fresh water a longer fuselage, streamlined fairings
at I easonable cost appears as a promising at the afterend, upswept wingtips,. and
PI'O,pe~t on the basis of tests now being a canopy redesigned for greater pilot vis­
ron,jucted. It would serve as a source for ibility. A J-57 jet engine with afterburner
the world's fresh water needs in the event powers this day or night continental de­
of 'J shortage.-News release. fense weapon.-News release.
68 MILITARY REVIEW JULY 1955

EGYPT THE NETHERLANDS

Troops Depart Weather Forecasting
The last British troops have left the The biggest movable radiotelescope in
Suez area and the remaining British in­ the world, now under construction at
stallations there have been taken over Dwingelo, may lead' to improved weather
by Egyptian authorities. The action is forecasting. Its bowl, made from fine wire
part of a 20-month plan for the evacuation mesh and designed to catch ultra-short­
of British forces from the entire Suez wave emissions, will be 81 feet across
Canal Zone under the terms of the Anglo­ and mounted on pivots and a turntable
Egyptian agreement reached last October. so that it can be tilted and trained at
-News release. will. Until the development of radar, no
means was known for detecting electro­
News Agency magnetic waves given out by interstellar
The formation of the first big Egyptian matter. Radar research opened a new
news agency, a private concern subsidized field for astronomy and showed that it
by the government, was announced re­ was possible to pick up hydrogen radia­
cently. It will be staffed by Egyptians, tions on a wave length of about 21 centi·
with offices in most capitals of the world meters. 'As hydrogen is the most common
and correspondents in other places. The element in the universe, astronomers are
agency will have a photographic section. paying particular attention to this wave
A 2-way service, sending Egyptian news length. The new radiotelescope is designed
to the outside world and providing world for the decimeter waves ranging from 10
news coverage for Egypt, will be provided centimeter,; to 1 meter. Useful data on
by the agency.-News release. weather conditions in the upper strato­
sphere, closely affecting the earth's cli­
INDIA mate, is also provided.-News release.
'Citizen Army'
Designed to train a "citizen army" of SWEDEN
half a million men within 5 years, 34 Robot Weapons
military training camps have been opened As the result of intensive research by
all over India. It is hoped to train 100,­ the Robot Weapons Bureau for the past 6
000 volunteers annually. The camps will years, the country will be well equipped
give basic military training to groups of with this type of armament soon. Present
volunteers between the ages of 18 and 40 plans call for a cut in the Army and Navy
for a period of 1 month. It was explained strength, while the Air Force will be in·
that the training of the new National creased. All three branches of the military
Volunteer Force was not so much for the will be equipped with robot weapons, per­
defense of the country as to inculcate a mitting the cut in personnel.-News reo
feeling of discipline and self-reliance lease.
among the people.-News release. JAPAN
Transfer Minesweepers
Record Budget Three minesweepers have been trans­
The country's first billion-dollar budget, ferred to the Japanese Government by the
with about 4 rupees in every 10 going United States Navy it was announced re­
to the military, was released recently. cently. The transfer completed the allot­
During the coming fiscal year 424 million ment of seven such vessels promised in the
dollars will be spent on defense, much of Mutual Defense Assistance Pact betwpen
it for increased pensions.-News release. the two nations.-News release.
 !I'IILITARY NOTES AROUND THE WORLD 69
GREAT BRITAIN
Test 'Hosepipe' Rocket Motor
The Cumberland, the cruiser being used A liquid-propellant rocket motor, the
for "atomic age" trials by Great Britain, Spectre, specifically designed for high­
will test new equipment designed to fight performance fighter planes is ready ,for
off jet planes and counter radioactive testing. Combined with a normal jet en­
fallout~ The main item to be tested is gine, the Spectre will give a fighter ver~T
a new, fully automatic antiaircraft gun rapid takeoff power and the ability to
known as the Hosepipe. It automatically maintain an outstanding rate of elimb to
pumps 3-inch shells at attacking jet extreme altitudes.-News release.
planes, once they are picked up on radar,
at a rate comparable to that of a machine­ Largest Transport
gun. An automatic system for washing The first production model of the 100­
down the ship's upper structure during and foot-long Beverley, Great Britain's larg­
after fallout from atomic explosions while est air transport to date, recently com­
the crew remain under cover and continue pleted its maiden flight. It is the first
to control their weapons and ship from
between decks is to receive additional
trials. Other items to' be tested include
a 25-foot motor cutter made of fiberglass,
fin stabilizers, survival suits, control in­
struments for pilotless target planes, and
an experimental distilling plant.-News
release.

Sa't Water Spray

In order to protect its ships against
c()ntamination by radioactive particles, Troops board Britain's largest transport.
the Admiralty has ordered all new war­
ships to be fitted with nozzles distributed British aircraft designed "principally for
about the ship through which salt water dropping heavy military equipment by
in great amounts can be sprayed over all­ parachute. The plane also can be' used
weather surfaces. It is felt that salt as a troop carrier or air ambulance. De­
water, sprayed with an intensity exceed­ spite its size, the Beverley can operate
ing that of a tropical rainstorm, is one from 1,000-yard runways and can "float
effective method of accomplishing this pro­ down" to land in almost helicopter-like
tection. As the result of an experiment, manner. The transport is powered by four
the Admiralty feels that fission matter is Centaurus engines. It has a normal range
les; likely to adhere to a surface while of 1,600 miles with a maximum speed of
it is being subjected to a systematic salt 238 miles an hour.-News release.
water washdown, and such as does adhere
can more speedily be removed from the Midget Submarine
inf"cted parts. The system is considered Realizing the value of the midget sub­
particularly suitable for the Navy's new, marine, the British have developed the
fas' 'antisubmarine frigates on which X51 to replace those of the XE class used
WOI king spaces are entirely inclosed­ during the last war. The speed was not
eve'1 the lookout positions being under revealed but the craft is said to be fast
pIa ,tic domes.-News release. and maneuverable.-News release.
70 MILITARY REVIEW JULY 1955

SOUTH KOREA AUSTRALIA

Graduating Class Pay Raise
Modeled as closely, after the United Pay raises for commissioned officers of
States Military Academy as the national the armed services, ranging from about
conditions, custOIitlS, and characteristics of $3.46 a week for second lieutenants to
the people permit, the Korean Military $25.87 a week for brigadiers, were an­
Academy, located at Muk-Tong, graduates nounced recj:lntly.-News release.
its first class of 160 cadets soon. The
Academy had its beginning in 1945 in a Revise Training
school known as the Military English To meet requirements imposed by new
Language School. It was redesignated the methods of warfare and the possible use
Korean Military Academy in 1948 on the of atomic and thermonuclear weapons, the
third anniversary of the liberation of Army has revised its system of training,
Korea. The school was blasted into rubble with provisions for the introduction of
in the summer of 1950 and it was not until new methods and modern equipment in all
1952 that a new class was enrolled in the sections. The new doctrine is to be adopted
academy. Military advisors, all West immediately, and will be adjusted from
Point graduates, were assigned to assist time to time as demanded by develop­
in the establishment of the school and ments in new types of warfare. The mod­
West Point ideas and ideals were embodied ifications to present teachings in tactics
ill the new academy. The 4-year academic and operational procedures considered nec­
curriculum, the military instruction and essary to cope with the new conditions
tactical training, and the daily routine of have been drawn up and are being issued
the two academies are generally parallel. in a training pamphlet by Army Head­
The course of instruction is designed to quarters. During the current year, 23
give a liberal education, with accent on Army schools of instruction are to be
the natural "dences, and a broad under­ held, and it is estimated that more than
standing of the entire military establish­ 10,000 students will attend for instruction
ment. Specialization has been avoided. in 400 courses. Command training activ­
The famed West Point honor system has ities are to be increased, also. In addi­
been adopted and applied at the Korean tion to the training for atomic warfare,
Academy.-News release. additional facilities are being provided
for training in jungle and tropical opel'a­
SOUTH AFRICA tions and two Commando units are being
Study Purchase raised for training in guerrilla warfare.
To strengthen the Union's ail' defenses, Plans are being made for a cadre of
the South African Air Force is consider­ trained pilots among Army officers and
ing buying Gnat lightweight jet fighters. noncommissioned officers.-News releaRe.
Serious consideration is said to be given
to the plan to establish an assembly plant New Rifle
in the Union, an indication that a large The new FN 30 rifle, a Belgian weapon
number of the planes is to be purchased. which is to be made in Australia, will
For the cost of six standard fighters, 20 replace the Lee Enfield .303 rifle as
lightweights can be produced and fitted standard equipment in the Army. The new
with' all essential flying, navigational, and rifle has been accepted as a standard
armament equipment. The light fighters weapon by North Atlantic Treaty Organ­
are highly maneuverable and easy to fly ization members. It has been designed to
and service.-News release. have a minimum of recoil.-News release.
 MILITARY NOTES AROUND THE WORLD

NORWAY FRANCE

Deliver Minesweepers Rear Jets

Under the United States Offshore Pro­ By placing the jet engines in the rear
curement Program two of five minesweep­ part of the fuselage of the twin jet,
ers were delivered to the Norwegian Navy medium transport SE.210 Caravelle, the
by Norwegian boatyards recently. All five designers were able to achieve an exeep­
are of the AMS class with a displacement tionally clean wing which also contains
of 270 tons. Their minimum speed is 15 the fuel tanks. Because of this, the con­
knots and the over-all length is 136 feet. trol surfaces are not affected by any
Previously, two,United States minesweep­ neutral zone generally associated with the
ers were made available to the Norwegian engine cowlings. An additional safety
Navy under the United States Mutual De­ factor has been achieved by placing the
fense Assistance Program.-News release. fuel tanks far from the powerplants. The
position of the engines allows for a lower
Atomic-Powered Ship level of cabin noise than usually found
Under a 5-year research program on in other aircraft.-News release.
atomic ship propulsion proposed by Jen­
ne1', an international atomic research proj­ 'Super Mysfere'
ect, it was reported that if the plan is Official trials have begun for the Mys­
approved by the Norwegian Government, tere IV B.l, called the "Super Mystere,"
the first experimental ship reactor could a plane which has passed the sound bar­
be ready in 2 or 2 % years. The work rier in a shallow dive and in level flight
would be undertaken by Norway and the without any modifications. The supersonic
Netherlands at their joint atomic research I
laboratory at KjeHer, near Oslo accord­
ing to the announcement.-News release.

TURKEY
Middle Eastern Defense .
Visible progress toward the establish­
ment of the kind of solid Middle Eastern
deft'nsive system that has often been at­
tempted without success in the past was
seen in the recent defensive pact signed
between Turkey and Iraq. The new link
in collective defensive strength against Supersonic interceptor ready for trials.
pos;;ible aggression provides for co-opera­
tion to safeguard the security and defend interceptor is powered by a RA.7 jet
the territorial integrity of the signatory engine with afterburner. The wings and
roultries. It is for 5 years and renewable tail surfaces of the aircraft have a con­
for i-year periods. It is open for adherence siderable degree of sweepback. The plane
by tny Arab or other state which is in­ is equipped with an all-flying tail of the
ten··'ted in the peace and security of the slab type and the cockpit has been com­
regl.>n and recognized by the contracting pletely redesigned to offer better visibil­
par'ies. Turkey is a member of NATO and ity. The air intake has a flat oval·shape.
aln ldy has separate alliance with each Supersonic speeds were reached at an al­
of t'1e following countries: Greece, Y ugo­ titude of about 52,500 feet according to
slav,a. and Pakistan.-News release. the announcement.-News release.
 72 MILITARY REVIEW JULY 195[,

USSR

Rail Extension Ease Curbs

The Murmansk railroad, the Soviet's As Austria waits for the approval by
Arctic lifeline which served as the main the parliaments of the Unite'd States,
route for deliveuy of American Lend-Lease Great Britain, France, and the Soviet
supplies during World War II, has report­ Union of the peace treaty which makes
edly been extended northwest about 100 her a sovereign, independent, and demo­
"( miles, almost to the Norwegian frontier. cratic nation again, the Soviet Union has
It was said that the strategic extension announced that she is easing the burden
of the railroad, consisting of a single of occupation in that country. The So­
line, was now completed. Every effort has viets agreed to hand over to Austrian au­
been made by the Soviets to keep the thorities the right to permit French and
existence of the track secret. I t is re­ West German shipping on the Austrian
ported that the Soviets are currently reaches of the Danube; to place' no hin­
transporting military supplies to their drance in the way of entry without visas
numerous airfields and troop concentra­ into Soviet-occupied eastern Austria by
tion centers neal' the Arctic coast over citizens of states with whieh Austria has
this line. The line terminates at Liina­ concluded agreements for the abolition of
hamari, the chief harbor of Petsamo, and entry and exit visas; and to cease to
« naval base. The existence of the base is examine consignments of goods at the de­
said to be a new development. Airfields marcation line dividing the Soviet zone
are located at Loustrai and Polarnoje. from Western Austria. Under the agree­
The railroad is also used to transport ment, the Soviets stated that when the
Ol'e from the nickel mines at Petsamo and treaty is signed all her occupation troops
in conjunction with power building' proj­ will be withdrawn; all Austrian prisoners
ects i!1 the area.-News release. held in the Soviet Union will be returned;
Soviet-held shipyards and oil refineries
Huge Cannon will be returned; and that Austria could
The Soviets recently displayed four pay her war debts to Moscow in goods in­
huge, secret cannon which appeared more stead of cash. Within 90 days after the
elaborate and technical than necessary peace treaty is signed by the, countries
for conventional artillery, and included concerned, all foreign troops will leave
a curious looking recoil sys~em. It was Austria and she will become a neutral
felt by observers that they might be able country similar to her neighbor Switzer­
to fire atomic shells of somewhat less Ian d.-News release.
than 6-inch caJiber.-News release.
Develop Weapons
New Loan Soviet development of guided missile
For the development of the national and jet artillery has been announced by
economy, the Soviet Council of Ministers the Army newspaper Red Star, which is
announced a 20-year loan of about 7,857 the same paper that told the Russian peo­
million dollars. It was announced that ple of the atom bomb. The guided missile
the loan would run from November of this is claimed to be the equivalent of the
year to November 1975 and that the bonds United States Nike. The only explanation
would be tax free. The last Soviet state given on the operation of the jet artillery
loan for this purpose was launched in was that it can fire heavy barrages much
June 1954, but it was only for half the farther than conventional type weapons.
amount of the new loan.-News release. -Air Training.
 The Council of Europe
Digested by the MILITARY REVIEW from an article by S. H. C. Woolrych in "The Journal of
the Royal United Service Institution u (Great Britain) November 1954.

This article was prepared for pub­ There still remained a political problem,
lication prior to the recent changes in The countries of western Europe, finding
the Austrian Government.-The Ed­ themselves counting for less and less every
itor. day beside such great powers as the So­
As WE KNOW, Europe before the war viet Union on the one side and the United
consisted largely of countries of various States on the other, felt that if they were
sizes and shapes which alI went their own not to be swept up into the systems of
way. Their only preoccupation was to see either one or the other they would have
that no one member unduly dominated the to form a bigger unit somehow. That is
re~t. That was the doctrine of balance of precisely what they are trying to do at
power. After the war, that doctrine went this very moment. I must warn you at
west, or perhaps I should say went east, the outset that it will not be a quick
beeause of two factors. The first was the or an easy business. Many people thought
emergence of the Soviet Union as World originally that when the Council or' Eu­
Power II, and the second was the forcible rope was formed they would make one
attachment to her system of most of the large federation in Europe. That idea is
conntries of eastern Europe. Under those now out, at all events for years to com,e,
conditions, there could be no such thing and what is taking plac-e is something
as a return to the doctrine of balance of much slower, more difficult, and more 'com­
power except on" a world basis. In fact, plicated. Therefore, one must not expect
the' countries of western Europe found quick results.
th.'mselves struggling to avoid the same
fate as that of their eastern neighbors. Birth of the Council
We know all about the Brussels Treaty Let us start at the beginning and ask
an,] the North Atlantic Treaty, which were ourselves what is the Council of Europe
dr::wn up to prevent that happening, but and how did it start? I think it really
we are not concerned with those "now be­ started with Winston Churchill's speech
c,lllse they are mainly military treaties. at Zurich in 1946 in favor of European
74 MILITARY REVIEW JULY 1955

unity. In that speech he stressed the de­ there was the famous row between Tito
cadence which he felt sure must come to and Stalin, as a result of which Tito pulled
a disunited Europe. That speech fired all out of the Soviet circle, although his coun­
the European movements which were then try still remained Communist.
starting, and theJresult was that 2 years That leaves two other countries-Spain,
later, in 1948 at the Hague, an enormous who was not invited because she was not
Congress of more than 1,000 delegates considered to be sufficiently democratic.
from 1lJ European countries was held, and Portugal, who will not come in beca·use
with most of the principal statesmen in Spain has not been invited. Nevertheless.
Europe present. That Congress fathered these 15 states make up a population of
the entire idea of the prpsent Council of approximately 255 million, as against 151
Europe, and its Charter was signed in million Americans and 193 million Rus­
London shortly afterward on 9 May 1949, sians. As far as production of coal and
by 10 Em'opean countries, which are: Bel­ steel is concerned, they come about half­
gium, Denmark, FrancE', the Irish Repub­ way between the production of the Soviet
lic, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Union and the production of the United
Norway, Sweden, and the United King­ St11tes; so you will appreciate that they
dom. Thr£'e months later, at the opening do make up a fairly powerful bloc.
session at Stl'asbourp:, they were joinpd r think that we may view the Council as
by GI'eece and Turkey, and in the follow­ a battleground between two conflicting'
iug' year by WesterA Germany, the Saar, ideas of uniting Europe. There are gov­
lind Iceland. That makes 14, not 15, mem­ ernments like our own who prefer to
bers, because thc Saal' territory is not a keep it on an association . level-an "as­
sovereign state. Thel'efore, the Saar is sociation at government level" is the COI'­
not a full member; she is o,nly an associate. rect term-which means agreements be­
Even so, those 15 members make up only tween foreign secretaries which have to
half of EurQpe because the Soviet Union be ratified afterward in the national par­
lind her satellites did not come in. liaments. Then there are countries such
Therc al'C six other countries who are as Germany, Italy, Holland, and, until re­
not members, although they a1'e certainly cently, France, who prefer to have a
not satellites of the Soviet Union. There tight federal union on the model of the
is Switzerland, who clings to her neutral­ United States. However, the Charter had
ity- Switzerland was not an unconditional to be drawn in wide. vague terms in
member of the League of Nations in order to gain as many members as possi­
former days and has not joined NATO 01' ble and to discourage as few as possibl,'.
the United Nations-and Austria, who and in so doing they came nearer to the
would be a member if she could. She al­ British idea of unity than to the Fedel'­
ready has observers at Strasbourg, but the alists' idea of union.
Soviets will not agree to a peace treaty for
Austria and that unfortunate country is Council in Action
still occupied by the foul' former wartime Now let us see how that works out in
Allies. The remark of Dr. Renner that practice. The Council consists of two bod­
Austria is like a skiff occupied by four ele- . ies. There is the Committee of Ministers;
phants is all too true. For much the sam~ and the main body, the Consultative A,­
reason the Soviet Union would not allow sembly. The sole executive power belon,"'s
Finland to be a member, although she i3 to this Committee of Ministers which con­
certainly no satellite. On the other hand, sists of 14 Foreign Ministers, and at their
Yugoslavia was a satellite until 1948, when meetings each Minister speaks for his.
 FOREIGN MILITARY DIGESTS 75

own country. I have said the "sole execu­ are to be enjoyed not only by European
tive power," because the Foreign' Min­ countries, but also by their colonial sub­
isters are the only people who can pledge jects. It was not many months ag'o that
their governments to carry out whatever the British Government made them apply
it is the Council asks them to do. to 42 colonial territories, with populations
The main body, the Consultative Assem­ -mainly colored, of course-of 78 million.
bly, consists entirely of parliamentarians, Therefore, you will see that countries such
who are elected, not by governments, but as OUl' own, with vast colonial responsibil~
by the parliaments themselves. We send ities, have had ta watch their step before
lR Members of Parliament, comprising at agreeing to a Convention of this kind.
Jll'esent 9 Conservatives, 8 Socialists, and At the same time, two more Conventions
I Liberal. Before the last General Elec­ now make it possible for a British subject
tion it was the other way around, that is, working' in any of the other 14 countries
n Socialists, 8 Conservatives, and 1 Liberal. to enjoy the same social and medical bene­
The job of the 132 parliamentarians is fits as if he were a national of the coun­
to draw up, discuss, and pass resolutions try, and the same applies to any I€ f their
on a number of topics of g.·eneral impor­ Ilationals in this country. Another Con­
tan<~e to Europe, and those resolutions are yention seeks to clear up the disorder in
then sent on to the Committee of Min­ European patent law, which I am given to
i:.;ters. If the Committee of Ministers con­ understand is chaotic. The fifth is one
sider those resolutions to be wild or woolly, by which the universities of western Eu­
they reject them, as they have done several rope agree to recognize each other's di­
times. On the other hand, if they con­ plomas and examinations, so that a boy or
sider that they are g.'ood, or even promis­ girl studying at Oxford or Cambridge who
ing', they send them back to their own wants to complete his or her studies, say,
countries to be studied. at Leyden, Bologna, or the SOI'bonne, wiII
Tl)e Council is in no sense a European be able to do so, in the future, without
Parliament and has no executive powers. any of the present tiresome formalities of
!\lany people rather rudely call it a "talk entrance examinations in. each case.
shop," and so it is in a sense; but I The Council of Europe has also been
think you will agrce that one is desirable discussing such subjects as refugees,
provided that it does voice the opinions which is enormously important in Europe
of Europeans, and does call attention to at the present time; unemployment, Which
those things which should be taken in is closely linked with it, especially in a
hand. For instance, the Council has drawn country like Italy; housing, manpawer.
up about five or six Conventions, of which and a host of other subjects. If anything,
quite the most important is the Conven­ there is rather a tendency to bite ,off
tion on Human Rights. This Convention more than they can chew; so much so, in
01: Human Rights is not just a collection
fact, that M. Spaak, the .first President,
of pious intentions. On the contrary, it once told the Assembly that he thought
is a practical, as well as an important, that they would probably get more done if
document, because it sets out in black they concentrated more and more on less
al,d white what we all feel should be the and less,
mll1imum human rights or freedoms en­ Issue of Federation
joved by any civilized man or woman to­ You will probably have guessed that the
day. In passing, do not let us forget that Council had not been in existence very
,they are not enjoyed by 50 percent :of long before the battle was on between the
E,.ropeans at the present time. And they Federalists and the rest. The Federalists
76 MILITARY REVIEW JULY 1955

want to .make Strasbourg the capital of the Pacific? Could you really expect the
Europe and to make the "House of Eu­ businessman in Vanco~ver or Brisbane'
rope," as they call the Assembly, a Euro­ to accept a European currency or to base
pean Parliament with full powers. That his export trade on some arrangement
issue of federaUon was hotly debated made in Strasbourg? Looking at it from
throughout 1950, but in the end it was the European point of view, it was obvious
found that only 6 out of 14 full members that if we were to join this European fed­
really wanted a tight federation of that eration without the Commonwealth we
kind. The poor little Saar would be only should not be nearly so popular.
too glad to federate tomorrow if she could
do so as it sovereign state, but France and Coal and Steel
Germany will not agree to that. The Saar From this discussion on federation the
territory is only roughly about the size fact emerged that Strasbourg was not go­
~f Surrey, although her coal and steel ing to become the. capital of Europ,e or
are, of course, of very great importance. the European Parliament; but that was
They are so important, in fact, that it by no means the end of the business,' be­
would probably make all the difference in cause the Federalists were determined to
the world to the balance between Ger­ go ahead, although it was a much smaller
many and France as to which country federation than was originally desired.
controls that coal and steel. It was then that we began to heal' about
Restricted Communities, and it is these
Attitude of Great Britain
Restricted Communities which are trans­
Before I go any further, perhaps forming Europe at this moment. The gen­
should say something about the attitude eral idea behind them was that member
of the British Government toward a possi­ states would agree to the pooling of Itheir
ble European federation. That attitude resources in certain given fields. To take
was set out .first by a Socialist adminis­ coal as an example, the members would
tration and soon after by a Conservative agree to put under one body not only all
one, and in much the same terms. It is their coal mines, but everything connected
that we feel that we cannot very well join with coal. That in itself was a revolu­
a European federation because we are al­ tionary proposal. In fact, it was: coal
ready members of a worldwide confedera­ and steel which M. Schuman propo~ed in
tion of sovereign states which we call the 1951 should be pooled. Behind M. flchu­
Commonwealth. No member of that Com­ man's proposal was a Franco-German ar­
monwealth-so runs the argument-could rangement between M. Schuman and Dr.
very well join any local federation which Adenauer by which they both felt that
is going to demand complete control over if neither side could control their coal and
all its defense forces, all its finances, its steel, there could be no further wars be­
coal, steel, and other resources, without tween France and Germany; because with­
hurting the rest of the Commonwealth. In out coal and steel a war cannot be
fact, Lord Salisbury said recently that waged. Therefore, the Coal and Steel Com­
if Great Britain were to join a Euro­ munity was set up: the six member states
pean federation, that would be the end of being France, Western Germany, Italy,
the Commonwealth. How could we put all and the Benelux countries. We were
of the British Army, and the Royal Air pressed to join, but we could not do so as
Force for that matter, into Europe when full members for exactly the same reason
we might need them to go to the help of that we could not federate, that is to say,
Australia or New Zealand if attacked in we could not afford to put under a strictly
 FOREIGN MILITARY DIGESTS ']7

European body all of our coal and steel I do not think that there is any point in
reSOUl'ces when we might need some of going into the question of a European
them to honor our commitments at the army, which was the central feature of
other end of the world. r this entire EDC project, because· it has
We were, however, able to find a way now been killed by the failure of the
around the difficulty, and when the Coal French Parliament to ratify the project
and Steel Community set up its headquar­ which the French had themselves put for­
ters in Luxembourg in September 19,52, un­ ward 27 months earlier.
der M. Monnet, the British Government European Political Community
'sent out a high-powered delegation under However, unfortunately, the damage did
the chairmanship of Sir Cecil Weir to do not stop there, because another European
business with that Community, and to see body went overboard at the same time.
how far it would be possible to work in When the statesmen were discussing the
with it in the common market which had question of the European army, they kept
already been established in those six coun­ coming back to the same question of who
tries for coal and steel. That British would give the orders; who would control
collaboration has succeeded to the point. the army? Much the same thing happened
where M. Monnet now wishes to negotiate both in the case of the coal mines and the
with Her Majesty's Government with a steelworks. Obviously, it had to be a
view to finding further fields of collabora­ supreme body, a democratic body, and one
tion, and the answel' of the Foreign Office on which the six countries were all prop­
has been to ask M, Monnet to come over erly represented. So in the winter of
here and discuss it with them, 1952, the experts sat down in Strasbourg
European Defense Community arid in Paris and worked out a constitution
The next Community which was pro­ for western Europe called the European
posed was the' ill-fated European Defense Political Community, under which there
Community (EDC). would be a President, an Executive Coun­
That meant pooling nothing short of cil, a Committee of Foreign Ministers
all the armies and air forces in Europe. pro tem, and an upper and'lower chamber,
You will realize that it is NATO, and the representatives in the lower chamber
not the Council of Europe, which is re­ being elected by popular suffrage; in
sponsible for the defense of Europe, and other words, a federal Parliament. The
it was General Eisenhower, as Supreme entire logic of these communities p-oints
Commander, who was convinced that it to some such body as a' Parliament to con­
would be impossible to defend Europe trol them, but it was recognized all the
without German contingents. way through that the fate of this Euro­
Ever since that view was accepted, as pean constitution was bound up with that
it had to be, the entire problem has been of the EDC-and for this reason. If there
to reconcile French fears with a military is to be a joint European army, it is nec­
ne('essity. French fears are not so far­ essary to have a joint Parliament to con­
fetched, because within living memory trol it, but if coal and steel only are being
France has three times been invaded by dealt with-which is the case at the mo­
th,' Germans. ment-then it is not quite so necessary.
1 have been living in Strasbourg for Anyhow, for the time being it is a thing
run!'e than 2 years and I have come across of the past.
Al:,atians, getting on in years, who have We have been reading a great deal lately
ha,j five nationalities in their lifetime. about the journeys of Mr. Eden to the Eu­
T/.at gets a little tiring after a time. ropean capitals and about this Nine-Power
78 MILITARY REVIEW

Conference which has been sitting in Lon­ way in which the. British Commonwealth
don and which has, fortunately, succeeded. has developed and, as we know, it has 110
That was, if one may say so. in the na­ written constitution except the Statute of
ture of an emergency operation. It was Westminster, which states that the mem­
rather like stopptng a hole in a sea dike, bers are free to walk out when they like.
because there certainly was a frightening There are great opportunities at ~tras­
breach in the wall of Western defense, bourg and a great deal of work to be donf'.
and national passions had begun to flare Sometime ago they were debating what
up once again. However, the statesmen was to be done to put something' in the
themselves recognize that the military place of the EDC, and it was right that
aspect is not the only, or even the chief, continental statesmen of the caliber of III.
one. Alliances and treaties are all very Spaak and M. Mendes-France should bt·
well-I sometimes think we have too many 5peaking there, because Strasbourg ils the
-but sm'ely what mattel'S most is what bpst f'Ol'l1m in which to address not only
lies behind them. There is, for instance. one's fellow parliamentarians, but Euro­
the Anglo-Soviet Pact, which is, at th<.> pean opinion at larg·e. These debates at
present moment, a dead letter because Strasbourg in which the parliamentarians
neither side trusts the other. In western of 15 countries take part are bound to
Europe no ingeniously phrased treaty, no have a considerable effect on European
paper safeguards, will work unless the opinion.
entire atmosphere of Franco-German re­
la tions is riA·ht. We have to get rid of General European Framework
this French dread of German aggression, In what are called practical matters,
aR well as of German suspicion that the the activities at Strasbourg are almost
French are out to deny them theil' full ceaseless. Let me give you two instances.
,;overeignty. Reconciliation between those Not too long ago an entire day was spent
countries is <;ertainly necessary, but what in discussing the convertibility of CUI'·
is required is something more permanent. rency. IR not that rather technical allLI
Partnership is really necessary. That abstruse, you will say? Well, is it? If
we mean what we say about seeking to
pal'tnel'ship was provided for in the EDC,
rid ourselves of the remaining' ecollomit'
and somehow 01' other we have to recreate
shackles which bind us, if we want to Jib­
that .sense of partnership between France erize trade not only in Em'ope but through·
and Germany and the other partners. That out the world, can we afford to ignore
is where the Council of Europe comes in, the money we use to buy both food and raw
because here is an organization which can materials? If we were all free to buy
do more than anything else to foster the whatever we could afford in whatever mar­
spirit of European unity. ket we chose, if we were all free to take
How will it achieve that, you may ask? our money at will from one country to an­
Surely, the federal idea has broken down? other, if we could visit the United State,
Well, federation is only one ·of the pos­ without having to submit our reasons ill
sible answers. I notice that The Ob,serl'er writing to the Treasul'y before receivin\!'
is constantly pushing the idea of con­ a single dollar, would not that affe,'t
federation, but one sometimes doubts most of us?
whether they have worked it all out. Then the Council is also waging a heroie
Surely the thing to do is not to waste too fight to modify some of the restrictions
much time on constitution building, but at frontiers, and to make it easier for
rather to get on with the job which lies us to visit each other's countries. A fir:'-!­
under our hands. That, after all, is the class report was drawn up sometime ag'o
 FOREIGN MILITARY DIGESTS 79

by a committee under Mr. Montgomery pUblic can influence these specialist or­
Hyde, and was circulated to governments' ganizations and through which the special­
for their comments. A certain amount of ist .organizations in their turn can ad­
lirogress has been made, but that progress dress the public.
is all too slow. I am afraid that govern­ However, there is a strong case for
ments are inclined to let their civil serv­ uniting many of these specialist bodies
ants persuade them that all these restric­ under the general framework of the Coun­
tions and formalities are really necessary. cil of Europe, and for seeing that there is
They are, perhaps, necessary if one is no duplication of functions as, for in­
thinking 'only in terms of the control of stance, the social and economic activities
immigrants, customs, and currency, but of the Brussels Treaty. There is every
governments are elected, according to a reason why European govei'nments should
nineteenth century statesman, to tell the not set up any more independent commit­
rivil service what the public will not stand tees, as they have done, such as those to
for, and that the rights and feelings of the consider agriculture and transport. Stras­
ordinary man have to be respected. It bourg should be the framework for all Eu­
is verY doubtful whether all these restric­ nlpean activities other than defense, in
tions are really so necessary. For in­ the same way as' the United Nations fo­
stance, the inhabitants of the Scandina­ cuses world problems, There is no clash
vian countries pass from one country to between the United Nations and the Coun­
another without showing any passports cil of Europe because the Council is regis­
01 identity documents, and the security tered under the Charter of the UN as a
('hecks, customs, and currency are re­ "regional arrangement" covering Europe,
,tl'icted to something like one or two pas­ and is, therefore, a part of the whole.
"engel'S in every hundred. When the Ger­
British Support
lIIan Federal Republic abolished visas fol'
people visiting Western Germany, the We now come to the question of what
should be the attitude of the British to
!lumber of tourists rose the next season
this Council of Europe. I can think of
by 25 percent. One can only hope that the
three good reasons for supporting it. First
C"l'llet and lI'iZJtyql/c, which are necessary
of all there are the political activities at
ill Europe to move cars from one country Strasbourg which are bound to increase
(" another, will become obsolete, as they with time. If continental Prime Ministers
already are between the United States and and Foreign Ministers can go thel:e and
Canada; but all this will only come about expound their countries' points of view,
b,' joint action at international level. can we afford to do anything less our­
At Strasbourg there are meetings of ex­ selves? In any case, it is first-class ex­
I','rts on all types of subjects, from pat­ perience for our Members of Parliament
<'pts to extradition law, and reports are to meet their opposite numbers from 14
II tide to the Council by a number of other othe!' countries, not only in debate in
o'ganizations such as the Organization the Chamber at Strasbourg, but also un­
f"r European Economic Co-operation, the officially ill the large members' bar, which
1 nited Nations Educational, Scientific, has a number of tables with many chairs
a'id Cultural Organization (UNESCO), which are so conducive to forming' groups
li<P World Health and Refugee Org'aniza­ around them.
("lnS, and so on. You may ask whether Second, I ,think that Strasbourg will
t .ere is not some duplication in all this. I increasingly be an organization whose
I'" not think so, because the Council of Eu­
J .,pe is the mouthpiece through which the
services will be looked to for settling
European disputes. The Council has done
80 MILITARY REVIEW 'JULY 1955

a wonderful piece of work already in con­ back on that, because in all the things
nection with the Saar dispute which was that count for most in this world-the
referred to it in June 1953. Although general standards of life, of education,
that Saar dispute is not yet settled, I things of the mind, and spiritual values
think there is eVflry chance that the rec­ -Europe is still supreme, and the civil­
ommendation of the Council of Europe that ization of Europe is still the civiliza­
the Saar territory should become the first tion of the world. I think that Europe
European territory is the most likely so­ will continue to count as one of the great
lution. We also have to be prepared for world factors so long as we decide to
the question of the sovereignty of CYPl'US stick together. We have not found the
being raised against us in the Council of right answer yet to European unity, but
Europe. I do suggest that it is our duty to play
Third, there is the question of what our part, which must be a major part be­
will happen in the future on the conti­ cause we are the biggest member, in find­
nent of Europe. Sooner or later a group ing the right answer to this question of
or bloc of powers is bound to be formed, European unity.
because these countries will not go on It is pleasant at Strasbourg to see
forever dying on their feet and counting British Members of Parliament of all
for less and less. We may, or may not, be parties, with every session which they at­
able to join that group because of our tend, speaking less and less as party poli­
Commonwealth commitments, but surely it ticians and beginning to talk more and
is a matter of life and death to us to be more as European statesmen, facing, to­
associated with it on terms of utmost co­ gether with colleagues from 14 other coun­
operation and cordiality. There can tries, problems which are common to us
equally be little doubt that, as one of all. That, I venture to suggest, is an
the founder states of the Council of Eu­ attitude of mind which we can all afford'
rope, we are very well placed to any to learn. It is by studying our neighbors
bloc which may emerge from it. and what goes on in our name in the
Then, finally, there is the matter of Council of Europe that we are most likeJy
our European heritage, and we cannot go to learn it.

Guided Missiles
Digested hy the MiLiTARY REVIEW from an article by Major G. D.
Hinde in hThe Journal of the Royal Artillery" (Great Britain) January 1955.

Most of us would be quite content to her resources to produce would be power­

ll'a ve the stars twinkling mystel'iollsly at IRSS to prevent an atomic attack if the
their safe astronomical distances-how main weight of the assault came /1'0111
snugly self-contained the world was when supersonic missiles instead of bombers.
jokes about the moon being made of green
In a recent Times editorial where the
cheese were still fresh.-The Times, 27
United States Army exercise Flash Burll
.January 1953.
was discussed and in which guided missiles
In his new book. Development of the were actually used. is issued a challenge
Guided Missile, Mr. Kenneth W. Gatland to the British Army:
says:
, '" where the overworked regimental
All the fighter aircraft and antiair­ officer is often too busy with his National
craft weapons which Britain is straining Servicemen to study the les8 primitive ele­
 FOREIGN MILITARY DIGESTS 81
of his profession. lIe is apt to put
111el1t Hitler's order' that a weapon was to -be
his trust in his seniors and the scientists built with which Great Britain eould be
-but that is not the way that Montgom­ subjected to a continuous bombardment.
erys-or Churchills-are bred. The V-I had a' range of 185 miles and car­
ried an explosive charge of 1,540 pounds.
The object of this article is to discuss We learn that out of about 8,000 missiles
the development of guided missiles in such launched against this country during 1944­
a way that the regimental officer may have 45, about 50 percent were either trapped
food for thought and be able to lead in barrages or shot down, while 25 percent
discussions with the troops under his com­ were lost through unreliability of the
mand. It does not attempt to go into such weapon, 25 percent reached their targets
technical details which are the province and a number of these failed to detonate.
of the scientists and technical staff officers. Up to 27 percent of the launchings had to
History be repeated and 14 percent of the missiles
came to grief at once. The radio proxim­
Like many inventions, which appear new ity fuze of British antiaircraft shells ac­
but are, in .fact, as old as the hills, the counted for most of the missiles destroyed.
rocket was conceived long ago. In a novel
This was one of the German's greatest in­
by Jules Verne about 1880, he described ventions, and had it been handed to the
a rocket projectile with target-seeking de­
scientists at the time, greater benefit
vice and a proximity fuze. In 1901, P.
would have come from it, to our serious
Y. Alexander read a paper "on sounding
disadvantage.
the air by flying machines controlled by
Hertzian waves." The V-1 flying bomb The V-2
was anticipated by a French artillery of­ The V-2 was, mainly, the idea of Her­
ficer, Rene Lorin, who, in February 1910, mann Oberth, a Romanian. General Becker
described his design in detail. In 1915, of the German Army created the work. It
A. M. Low approached British authorities needed about 30,000 parts in its construc­
with a suggestion to develop unmanned tion. The majority of the workers em­
radio controlled airplanes for destruction ployed were slave labor~rs. This was a
of specific targets. About 1934, the Queen long-range rocket as opposed to the V-1
[J,'e pilotless aircraft, a biplane, was de­ which was a flying bomb. Its range was
veloped and used for training antiaircraft also 185 miles. The explosive charge was
gunners. In the brochure, Guns and Gun­ 2,160 pounds, an increase of 620 pounds.
llel'S, appear photos of a rocket troop of Experiments with the final version of the
1814 and 1838 and rocket boats of 1816, V-2 began in July 1942 and the first suc­
used in the bombardment in Algiers. It cessful launching took place on 3 October
is interesting to note that the Treaty of 1942 over a range of 150 miles. When the
Vl'l'sailles forbade the operation of con­ original weapon had been displayed before
trolled, unmanned airplanes by the Ger­ Goering and his staff, a series of acci~
mans. dents caused one rocket to fail to ascend,
and merely to burn on the ground; another
The V-J to fall back. and explode after launching;
The wartime production cost of the Ger­ and a third to explode without moving at
m;m V-1 flying bomb was about $8,400 all. It is reported that Goering remarked
against $28,000 to $44,800 for a V-2 rocket. on it being a fine weapon "for short-range
The V-2 could be built for about one-sixth destruction." Not so humorous was it for
of the cost and one-fifth the man-hours General Becker, who committed suicide. On
required for an equivalent bomber. It was 8 September 1944, the first two V-2s were
82 MILITARY REVIEW JULY 1955

launched against London. Forom the which is familial' to every gunnel' officer.
Hague, 1,027 rockets were launched, 7.7 Coast artillery can cope quite happily with
percent were failures and 600 reached the a ship steaming along at a few knots, and
target area. Of all the missiles launched, field artillery is not particularly worried
42 percent wer~ ineffective. It is in­ over a static target which can be ranged
teresting to note that the Germans needed on and then punished at fire for effect.
6 hours to prepare a launching. Antiaircraft artillery has a big headache
Mr. A. V. Cleaver, Chairman of the trying to hit a small plane traveling at
British InterplanHary Society, has written supersonic speed which may be in the zone
that "within the next generation the of the gun for 2 or 3 seconds only. Even
guided missile will gTadualIy assume many if the gun could fire 500 rounds pel' min­
of the duties of present fighters and bomb­ ute, the chance of hitting the plane would
ers." Mr. A. R. Weyl, in his book, Guided be slight because the sky is very vast. Any­
Missiles, says: . way, the mechanism of a piece of equip­
ment has a limit to the number of times
To some (.':I.·t(,l1t, gllllS and manned bomb­
a second its gears can rotate. Even with
('/·s may be sllpCl'seded by va)·;o.1{S fO/'ms
first-class modern layout of radar, early
of guided missilfs; all the whole, however,
warning, and all the devices man call
SlIch ll1issilcs will b(' IIsed to implement
create, one would have to have knowledg'c
the artillcl'y alld all' fo>·ce.
of enemy aircraft about 200 miles out.
The Royal Regiment will be particularly Traveling toward the gun area at the
interested in the guided missile in a de­ speed of sound, it is only a matter of
fensive role. In a Parliamentary report minutes, sometimes seconds, during which
which appears in The Times of 27 January the range, bearing, and height can be
1U5;), the Minister of Supply made it quite found, fed into a predictor, the round
clear that the stage had now been reached loaded, fuze set, and fired. The gun, opell­
when: ing with maximum range, wiII be firing at
lI'e cO/lld s('(' that slfl'fac(.'-to-((ir gllided a target which it cannot even see, but
lIIissiles, togetha with til" jightl'l's of thf which it knows is on the way. It would 1I0t
Royal Air Force ((nd the antiaircraft guns hear it coming until it has gone past. Al­
of the Army, lwd l! very importallt part lowing for the time of flight factor, alway~
to piay ill the (/i,' t/cf('nsc of the Ullited a nuisance, the shell may meet the plane.
Kingdom. With proximity fuzes, the chances arc
better. The number of guns could be mul­
The ruling' that the manning and opera­
tiplied, with twin pieces on each equip­
tion of these guided weapons should be­
ment, or more guns per troop, but evt'll
come the responsibility of the Royal Air
with increased rates of fire, the problem
Force was given in the light that surface­
is not simple. Ag'ainst enemy planes there
to-ail' g'uided missiles were complementary
to fighter aircraft, operated in the same is a chance of destroying them with good
airspace and must, therefore, be under radar and good drill. Against the "-I
there was also a good chance, but againc.t
the same ground control. Within a short
the guided missiles of the future we re­
time of this statement, officers of the
quire something better.
Royal Regiment were being' asked by their
brother officers in other arms, when they Mr. Weyl has given a list of the vario'"
would be changing from khaki to air force uses of guided missiles in the belligerelit
blue. One of the reasons for this article role (see listing on page 83).
is to see how serious this remark could be. This article only covers a few of the,e
There is nothing new in this problem, types of missile and their possibie use"
 FOREIGN MILITARY DIGESTS 83

\I'here they have a bearing on the role decided to launch several g'uided missiles'
(If the Royal Regiment. at one time, it is to be considered whether
each defensive rocket would find its own
Ground-to-Air opponent, or whether each defensive rocket'
This is an antiaircraft problem, but would make for one and the same oppo­
instead of the heavy antiaircraft and nent, No doubt the scientists and statis­
l1l~dium antiaircraft guns known today, tidans can assure us on that point. How­
the ~uided rocket would be released from ever, suppose one of the enemy rockets
the ~round, and set off on a predetermined was fitted with an atom bomb, how would
rolll'Se to find the enemy aircraft cominv; the defenders know which one was the
ill, The usual setup of radar and early most danv;erous? It must never be as­
\\al'ninv; would be required, and the tar­ sumed that a guided missile can be more
get would have to be tracked fl'ol11 as fal' than a mere weapon, Robots can never
,\\\ay as possible, so that those responsible r ..place soldiers,
for ~ettinv; the v;uided missile away have
'" much time as possible, because it would Royal Air Force
htl\'e to be prepared, aimed, and initiated It has already been stated that surface­
,'II its journey. This is where the antiair­ to-ail' missiles were complementary to
" aft gllnners of tomol'!'ow mip;ht find a fiv;hter aircraft and on .. role of the Royal
Ill'\\' role, As the Royal Ail' Force would bl' Air Force may be to cany the 'guided mis­

Air-to-air Ground-to-air Ship-to-ail'

Air-to-sea Ground-to-sea Ship-to-sea
Ai 1'- to-8 pace Ground-to-space Ship-to-space
Air-to-ground Ground-to-ground Ship-to-ground

I(',ponsible [01' this functioning' of ~uided sile away from the United Kingdom and
IIII~silps, tIll' antiaircraft gunners might release it in midail', The missile could be
h, rl'f]uirel\ to transfer, othenvise it is left to find its own way to the tarv;et,
dJll,C\!lt to see whpl'e the persol1llel an' whethel' it be enemy ailylane or enemy
t(l ('0111(1 fron). guided missile. The pilot would not be re­
qui!'ed to travel any farther but allow the
Ground-to-Ground missile to do the job, except that, perhaps,
I'his type of rocket would resemble the he may correct and adjust it during its
! with lon~ range and be used strategic­ flight by electronic means of a television
al,\', Strictly, however, the 1'-2 was not camera system, There are problems con­
11" Til 11101'e guided than a shell, because as nected with the efficiency of the aircraft
Sl'''" as the 111otor ceased to operate, the if large missiles are attached, whether to
llIhsile adjusted itself to a predetermined wingtips 01' to undercal'l'iage. It may pos­
an,,'le of elevation as it <yirtually coasted sibly mean a false 01' second undercarriav;e
ab'n!!:, It is fully expected that the Ger­ if a large missile is to be loaded centl'ally
111." 1'-2 has by now been developed to below the plane, and stability under su­
('a ryan atomic warhead. What the out­ personic flight may not be as simple as
rOle would be of a v;uided missile fired it sounds. However, if a guided missile
fl' n\ the ground in a defensive role is in­ could do the job, maybe there would be
teo ,'sting speculation, If the targ'et were no further use for the supersonic fiv;hter.
~I .thel' guided missile, which would dt'­ If the battle can be fought over the water,
st ()v whieh? The ideal would be for them so much the happier for the civilian pop­
tf' lit'stroy each other, but if the enemy "ulation. It is obviously vital that antiair­
 84 MILITARY REVIEW JULY 1955

craft guns should not fire at such a time These few examples will suffice to show
when the planes are battling it out with the different types of missiles which are
guided missiles. If the enemy target is being produced today to fill the many
a guided missile, the Royal Air Force roles which they are likely to perform.
has a chance oj destroying it before it From the point of view of the inside of
reaches the shores of this country. the missi1e, a large percentage of the
How long it will be before the guided rocket must be the fuel itself, which
missiles arQ produced, tested, and passed sends the rocket on its way. The V-2 had
as possessing all the necessary require­ liquid oxygen and alcohol, while the V-l
ments is difficult, if not impossible, to carried 140 gallons of low-grade gasoline.
estimate. According to the Stuart Report, The V-I shut off the valves early in order
the United States does not expect to have to avoid burning them out before the rocket
large step rockets before 1960. It may was over the target. Solid fuel requires
give the enemy a headache trying counter­ a careful size charge with a constant
measures in the way of jamming the elec­ bUrning surface. It may also have a solid
tronic devices. fuel boost, which falls off as soon as the
rocket is on its way. This may, in the
Composition future, be made of plastic to avoid out­
The rocket is divided into several parts, raged citizens. The technique of launching
which are, in very general terms: . one rocket from another has been devel­
Warhead and fuze. oped and by use of the "step" principle, it
A housing for the mechanism which will is possible that a rocket may be able to
Type Length Diameter Propellant weight Remarks
VI 25-37 feet 32.2 inches 1,000 pounds Flying bomb
V2 46 feet 66 inches 19,300 pounds
Aerobee 18.8 feet 15 inches Maximum altitude 372,000 feet
Mighty
Mouse 3.3 feet 3 inches Air-to-air
Soviet 1.95 feet 3.2 inches Made in 1943
Viking 48.59 feet 32 inches Built in 1948
Maximum altitude 200 miles

receive, interpret, and use the intelligence travel 3,000 miles. The Viking, in 1952,
about the position of the rocket as com­ launched at an American proving ground,
pared with the position of the target. climbed to an altitude of 135 miles-the
An equipment which will make use of summit of the trajectory being reached in
the intelligence and allow the rocket to 4 minutes 23 seconds. The future policy
. alter its course in space. of fuel may be away from liquid propel­
Energy which will send the rocket at lants for rockets and the increase in fuel
high speeds in order to achieve the re­ weight of solid fuel may be accepted.
quired range and at the same time outpace Apart from the fuel, the rocket will con­
the enemy rocket. tain a warhead if it is to do any damage,
A propulsion system in order to over­ and in the case of the V -2 this consisted of
come gravity and the aerodynamic drag 2,150 pounds of amatol high explosive.
set up in flight. Then there are the stabilization and con­
For the benefit of readers who have trol devices, a steam turbine, and com­
not seen any figures of the size and com­ bustion chamber. Other types of rocket
position of guided missiles, a few facts may have a radar, with scanning dish in
and figures may help (see chart above). " the nose, 01' television camera.
 FOREIGN MILITARY DIGESTS 85
Production the field guns, tanks, and armor must take
Production of guns requires heavy ma­ second place until there is an answer to
c~inery, and factories making guns and the defense from guided missiles.
planes are very good targets for the en­ Research
emy. The guided missile is a feat of light An article on guided missiles would not
engineering and the production load could be complete without reference to .the pro­
be spread. The rocket engine is simpler jectiles which are helping science to find
than the aero engine, but not so simple out more about the universe. Finding out
as one would imagine. Rockets are ex­ about the weather, cosmic rays, and re­
pendable in one attack, but they are still search into the upper altitudes will occupy
economical when compared with a bomber scientists for years to come. The subject
which may be lost after a few missions, of interplanetary flight is one full of
and the cost of overhaul and maintenance excitement and anticipation. The moon
of all planes is no small matter. An -our closest neighbor-may be within
American B36 costs 3.5 million dollars reach within the llext century. Whether
and half that much again for replacement : atomic energy features in such develop­
annually. It is debatable whether any ment is open to speculation. Fission pro­
country could afford another large-scale duced from exhaust could contaminate the
war without becoming bankrupt, but it landing area and dust clouds thrown up
seems very likely that if such a war should by the blast would become radioactive.
come, through no wish of our own, we Whether we like it or not, the missile and
must first look to our defense from the ail' its repercussions on our training and, in­
before anything else, and in planning, deed, on our lives cannot be ignored.

Wor--Limited or Unlimited?
Digested by the Military Review from an article by Air Marshal Sir Robert

Saundby in "Air Power" (Great Britain) January 1955.

IT SEEMS probable that the twentieth Civil wars were an exception, and were
c~ntury will be known to historians as notoriously bloody and bitter, !jetting
the century of the world wars. family against family and even brother
If we study the history of war, we shall against brother. Religious wars, also,
find that for many centuries wars were owing to the fanatical element liable to
fOLIght for limited objects, and the mili­ be involved, were sometimes fought ""ith
ta ry operations were correspondingly lim­ a passion and cruelty that was unusual.
itl'd in scope and violence. Wars were Even so, material destruction was not wide­
la"gely dynastic-waged to turn out a spread, but usually directed to some lim­
m'urper or make good the claims of a pre­ ited purpose, such as the destruction of
terlder-and in such campaigns it was ob­ the baronial castles by Cromwell.
vi..usly to the advantage of both sides I am not.saying that medieval wars had
to caT,lse the minimum of material destruc­ no aspects of cruelty-the inhabitants of
I ti"n. The ordinary people were not par­ captured towns, especially if the defense
tir ularly interested, and, as far as possi­ had been long and stubborn, were some­
bI". tried to carryon with their normal times treated with savage brutality. By
o(I'upations and keep out of trouble. and large, the armies were composed of
86 MIl.lTARY RF.V!F.W JULY 1955

mercenary troops, who fought dispassion­ cant that his final defeat at Waterloo
ately, or of peasants owing a military duty was followed by a period of 100 yearK
to their lord, whose main object was to which was less marred by warfare than
get the war over and return home. The any before 01' since. Only a few minor
worst f<\lIlt of sU\ih armies was their habit war" OCCUlTed in Europe-the Franco­
of pillaging and looting, and this was German War of 1870 was the most impor­
largely a consequence of their irreg'ldal' tant-and, apart from the Crimea and the
s~'stem of payment. Iildian Mutiny, this country enjoyed pel\('('
The merc<'naries, being professional t'xcept for colonial troubles in North and
,oldiers undt'rtaking fighting as a busi­ South A frica, culminating' in the Boer
ness, did not init'nd to get themselves killed \Val'.
l1nnecessaJ'i1y. Although well aware that The Change
they had cho,en a risky pJ'ofession, they
In Illl', \\'orld \Val' I ended the pea~ ..­
did not ex)wc-t their generals to fight
fnl ce,ltury. It was \Vaged with exceptional
pitch"d l"tttit's under unfavorable circum­
bittl't'ness alld fel'oeity on a widespread
stdlwes, or cail upon tl1Plll to die in the
"'ale, and dil-ectly and indirectly causc,l
last ditch in till' defense of some fortress
the lu"s, in little mOl'e than 4 years, of
01 otl1('l'. On th" eontl'ar~', armies went
more than 10 million livl's. This-was quite,
into wintel' qual'tel" to avoid the m1:leries
llnprc~edented, and such wholesale slaugh­
of (..'arnpaig'lling' ill W(.'t, ('old, und HllHl.
it'l' t'ngelHjcred hatred and bitterness ue­
Cl'l'tain cou)'t(l~ies \\'lll'Ll obs£.ll'ved, and
tween people on a scale never befon'
WU1't4 tended to beeOll1(l eX(ll'ch.;ps in pro­
known. World \Vat· II aro~e directly out
fes,ional ~l;jll b~' the opposing genel'als.
oj' the problems which World War I had
They \"t'],(' affairs of strategy and maneu­
It·ft unMolved, and had its mainspring ill
\'l'r, lllttl't'hes, (,OHlltCl'lnal'ches, and Bieg'e::;:
the injustices, resentments, and inflanwd
all itl'ietly gOVt'l'ned by the "diseiplinC's of
fpt'ling's which wel'e the lep;acy of tht'
till' Wt1l'," as. Fha'lIen ('all('d them.
~'t'ars 1!114-18. In \\'orl,\ War II, all p]'('­
[n the l'i.e;hteenth century, the discovery vio\\~ records wele tl'ansc{'nded. Atroeitie,
and dt'vl'lopnll'nt of lIew lands and the \\'el'l' committed on a scale nevel' before
gl'owth of OVCI':"l'as trade Ipd to a series imaginl'd, and national hatrpds wen' ftll­
of ~ol(\niul wal's. Such wars W(,l'e fought tht'l inHamed by reclde~s pl'Opag'anda. Tht,
for ,;ti ictly limited objeets, and the forct's civilian populations, now brought fuJly
ili\'olved Wel'(' "eldom large. within the devastating orbit of WaI' b\'
This patteI'll of campaigning persisted ail' bombal'dment, sult'ered severely. Tht­
1I11tii the Napoleonic wal's. Napoleon, af­ war raised many mol'c problems than it
ter his initial successe,;, did not play fair. solved, worsenC'd international relation~,
His ambitions were so vast that he refusE'd lowered moral standards, and sowed abun­
to be bonnd by the ntles of the g'ame. His dant s{'cds from which a third world war
great annie-s, raised by a /C1'(>(, ell musse, could only too easily arise. If that should
'Vl're inspired by patriotic feelings and hap]len, the powerful weapons of mas­
by a fel'vid devotion to their gifted leader. destruetion, now at the disposal of both
However, even in the Napoleonic wars, sides, would cause unima/!:inable loss of
nu deep-seated national hatreds were en­ life and material I'uin. The work of man',
gendered, and some sense of proportion hands for the last thousand years woulol
was observed. largely disappear, and it is probable that
Napoleon's long series of campaigns civilization itself, as we know it, could nllt
had affected the lives ,of ordinary people survive what Mr. Adlai Stevenson ha:,
to an unusual extent, and it is signifi­ called a "thermonuclear holocaust."
 ~'OREIGN MILITARY DIGESTS 87
Even if, as seems probable, the appall­ wished to destroy the Russian power and,
ing power of modern weapons and the as far as possible, extended his sovereignty
very completeness of the destruction cer­ over the vast territories of Russia in Eu­
tain to overtake all the belligerents will rope. Every schoolboy knows the story of
make resort to a third world war unlikely, his failure and how, during the terrible
we are living in a world of tension, di­ retreat from burning Moscow in the depths
vided into two ideological groups quite of a Russian winter, the Grande Armee
irreconcilably opposed. withered away and only a miserable rem­
Toward the end of the nineteenth cen­ nant survived. Napoleon's power was
tury, most Europeans were firmly con­ broken by this disaster and, although he
vinced that civilization was making great struggled on through numerous vicissi­
progress, and that they could look forward tudes until his defeat at Waterloo in 1815,
to peace and increasing prosperity. Man's it was his attempt to conquer and subju­
illhumanity to man seemed to be fading gate Russia that brought about his ruin.
illto the past and, in this country at least, The next war in which Russia became
man's cruelty to animals was of more involved was the Crimea, in 1854. Russia
concern to the public conscience. had long coveted the great warm water
port of Constantinople. Observing the
Reasons crumbling power of the Ottoman Empire,
What has gone wrong with the twentieth the Czar thought he saw an opportunity
c(,lltury? Why has the Western World, in of securing this prize. However, Great
spite of its great efforts to stand up for Britain, France, and Italy came to the aid
liberty, justice, and truth, and its des­ of Turkey, with the limited aim of repell­
perate yearning for peace and higher ing the Russian aggression and restoring
standards of living, brought itself to the the status quo. They succeeded in this
very brink of universal disaster? aim, in spite of an almost complete lack
I think that one very important reason of generalship, and the grossest misman­
is that we have lost sight of our object agement of the allied resources.
in war, and have allowed the means to In 1904, Japan determined to stop the
obscure the end. advance of Russia in the Far East. The
Tn the past, wars fought for a limited Russian armies had overrun the great
oh.iect-keeping that object firmly in view' Chinese province 'of Manchuria, fortified
-have often been successful. Wars having Port Arthur, and were threatening Korea.
an unlimited object have seldom if ever The aim of the Japanese was the limited
sllcceeded, in the sense of creating a one of forcing the Russians to withdraw
"udd situation more favorable than if from these territories. The result caused
there had not been a war, and they have great astonishment. The Japanese \V.ere
always caused widespread destruction and rapidly victorious on land and sea, the
10- s of life. fOl'tress of Port Arthur was stormed and
Let me give an example. Russia has taken, and the Russians were thrown back
b, "n involved in four wars during the last behind their own frontiers.
lfil) years. In the. first one, Napoleon at­ Finally, in 1941, Hitler turned against
tat"ked Russia in 1812. The immediate the Soviet Union. The Soviets had signed
caLIse -of the war was Russia's refusal to a nonaggression pact with Germany in
support any longer the "continental sys­ August 1939, and had joined with Hitler
telil" aimed at the economic isolation of in partitioning Poland. They had done
Gl eat Britain, but Napoleon's real object their best to side with Germany, and
"as, or became, an unlimited one. He believed that they had backed the winning
88 MILITARY REVIEW JULY 1955

horse. Hitler, faced with the necessity tilities with the Communist third of the
of dealing with Great Britain, feared that world, we should take great care to select
if he became locked in a life-and-death and adhere strictly to a limited object.
struggle in the west, the Soviets-in spite Such an object was suggested by Marshal
of the pact-would .seize the opportunity of the Royal Air Force Sir John Slessor
of attacking him from the east. So he de­ in his book, Strategy for the West, pub­
cided to stand on the defensive in the west, lished in June 1954. He proposed that oU!'
and deal with the Soviet Union first. object should be "to drive militant com­
His object was the unlimited one of the munism back behind his own frontiers
complete destruction of the Soviet mili­ and keep it there." That seems to me very
tary power, and the annexation of a large wise advice. For if we should be betrayed
part of Soviet territory, including the into a war against the Soviet Union in
Ukraine and the Caucasus. In this am­ which our objects were the unlimited one
bitious attempt Hitler failed disastrously. of destroying Soviet power-possibly, as
This, combined with the strategic air bom­ we did in the last war, demanding uncon­
bardment of Germany from the west, laid ditional surrender-then, even if we
Europe open to the Allied invasion and gained the eventual victory, we should
lost him the war. fail. Such a victory would be worth­
Of the four wars in which Russia has less if in the course of the struggle we
been engaged since the beginning of the brought about the destruction of almost
nineteenth century, two had limited ob­ everything upon which our Western stand­
jects and were successful, while two had ards of living are based.
unlimited objects and ended in catastrophic If we cannot abolish war, then at least
failure, accompanied by terrible destruc­ we must bring it back under control. For
tion and loss of life. we have at last, after several false alarms.
Of course, there are other factors in­ reached the point where unlimited war
volved, but it seems to stand out clearly will mean general suicide and the begin­
that. if and ~hen we get emhmiled in hos­ ning of a new Dark Age.

Helicopters for the Army

Digested by the MILITARY REVIEW from an article by Major J. L1. Waddy
in "The Army Quarterly" (Great Britain) January 1955.

Tile wllole secret of the art of war lies in making oneself master of
tile communications.-Napoleon.

TODAY, modern armies are dependent communications on land have become an

upon a vast system of supplies and equip­ anchor to mobile operations, then supply
ment, without which they are powerless. and movement by air must become the
It is the communications now which master means to achieve mobility. The article will
the army and dictate its course of action. start with a description of the general
This' article will show that if the Allied problems facing the land forces in another
land forces are to defeat the enemy in war. The experiences of the use of heli­
any coming struggle, their mobility must copters will be discussed and their possi­
be increased and, indeed, made superior ble application in the military operations
to that of the Communist armies. If the to be encountered will then be enumerated.
 FOREIGN MILITARY DIGESTS 89
From our examination of these 'factors, and Marlborough, Wellington's Infantry
it will be possible to indicate the basic in Spain, and German armor in France
organization and types of aircraft to be in 1940 are sbme good examples. During
developed if helicopters are to become an a
the last war, new mobile arm was formed
integral part of Hie army transport system. -airborne forces-only to be neglected
It is not possible in the scope of this article when peace came.
to discuss the more interesting details The tactical mobility of ou'r Army is
of tactics and organization, which must now slower than ever, and it is, perhaps,
be left to a fuller study than this article fortunate that the Korean conflict has
allows. opened our eyes to the facts. The out­
standing fact immediately apparent was
Power of Maneuver
the inability of the United Nations armies
Although the Soviet Union is building to operate in strength away from the
a large strategic air force, her might still roads; a state of affairs which was only
lies in her massive Army and the count­ possible because of the over'whelming air
less Communist hordes of the Far East. superiority on their side. The Americans
Should the Soviet Union launch her armies were quick to realize that, if they were to
in an attack on Western Europe, there end this state, they must shake their
will be a considerable lapse of time before Army loose from the shackles of an endless
there is any appreciable diminishing in and increasing number of road vehicles:
their power however hard our own stra­ therefore, they started to develop heli­
tegic air offensive can ~trike at the vitals copters for the movement of men and sup­
of the Soviet Union. Their Far Eastern plies, and the helicopter soon displayed
armies will hardly be affected at all, for, the quality of being the most versatile,
there, it is manpower that is the most flexible, and valuable item of military
potent arm and the rifle the most effective equipment. It is from the Korean campaign
w~apon. The main task of the Allied land that the United States Army has acquired
forces-to destroy the enemy armies in a sense of urgency as regards the use of
the field-still remains as vital as ever. helicopters for military. transport.
A study of military history shows that
when commanders have been faced by Future Land Operations
superior enemy forces, they have always The pattern of future war on land has
striven to maneuver the enemy into posi­ one outstanding feature-dispersioll both
tions where they might be defeated. Suc­ strategical and tactical. Should the war
ce~sful generals achieved this aim by en­ spread to Europe, the Allied armies will
suring that their army was mobile, and, be hard pressed to hold the vital ground
therefore, they held in their hands the there. The situation in the Middle East
power of maneuver. This power is the and Far East will be more fluid, and at
ability to move fighting strength to the the outset our limited armies will be forced
place at which a dedsion can be had and to hold a few vital areas. These areas to
a victory gained. Since the advent of the be held are the bases from which our
gun in warfare, the power of the mobile forces must build up to regain the ini­
arlll has declined and the strength of tiative, and then take the offensive. While
armies has been developed upon mass­ our forces are dispersed strategically over
mCil and firepower. There are, however, the world, tactical dispersion in the field
in,tances where mobility has been ap­ also must be the first consideration. The
pr 'ciated correctly and the power of ma­ progress of tactical atomic weapons will
ne:lver gained-the cavalry of Cromwell never allow the concentrations of men and
90 MILITARY REVIEW JULY 1955

equipment as seen in the last war. The bad weather and clouds is difficult due to
intl'icate and massed system of supply lack of efficient instruments, although
and organization will be the first target these are now being evolved and should
for atomic attack. Guel'l'iIla forces will be in use soon to ease the difficulty. Until
be a very serio\ts threat, and will em­ night flying is possible, - the helicopter is
phasize the need for firm bases for sup­ a vulnerable target to fighter 'aircraft by
ply and for operations. It is likely that day. Finally, helicopters are costly both
these might be cut off from each other, to build and to maintain, although this
and, therefore, each area must be a for­ should be reduced somewhat with the
tress in itself and dependent upon the air development of tip-mounted jets to drive
for its line of communications. Again, in the rotors, and with the advent of mass
a conventional area of operations, the dis­ production.
'tances and frontages will be far greater
than hitherto, and the rapid movement Use
of reserves and supplies will be a bigger The helicopter does not seek to sup­
problem. However, as the speed of road plant the fixed-wing aircraft; but by virtue
movement decreases with the rate of of its characteristics, it can do many things
mechanization, then the Army must change the airplane cannot do. Our own opera­
to air transportation; and if it is to be tional experience is principally limited
flexible enough for Army use, the heli­ to that of Number 848 Naval Air Squadron
copter must become the transport vehi­ in Malaya. This unit of ten S.55 helicop­
cle. ters has carried out an amazing assort­
ment of taskR in the antiterrorist war.
Characteristics In 10 months of opel'ations, the squadron
Before the application of helicopter flew 3,500 hours, lifted 11 ,000 troops into
transport is discussed further, it is nec­ the jungle, and evacuated 275 casualties.
essary to enumerate its main characteris­ The efficiency with which these opera­
tics. Its ability to take off and land on tions were performed impressed General
almost any ground makes it entirely in­ Sir Gerald Templer so much that he de­
dependent of airfields. A helicopter can manded more helicopters.
hover should any landing area be un­ The military use for helicopters falls
suitable, and can load or unload by means into four main roles-tactical, airborne
of its winch 01' rope ladder. It,is extremely operations, administrative, and miRcella­
maneuverable, and the above character­ neous.
istic, coupled with its slow flying ability,
enables the helicopter to be flown almost Tactical
at ground level or along valleys or sides There are many possible applications
of hills, in order to evade detection or to of the use of helicopter transport to the
avoid enemy air attack. phases of war. Space will not allow more
As the fuselage does not have to be than a few examples to be discussed of
built to withstand high speeds, it can, the great benefit a helicopter force can
therefore, be built to the most efficient give to a commander in the field. First,
shape for carrying military cargoes. At both in attack and defense the rapid move­
present, there are disadvantages in the ment of reserves can be achieved, and
performance of helicopters, the greatest without interference to other formations.
being the limited payload. Furthermore, The commander can keep his reserves dis- ,
heat, humidity, and altitude all have an persed and well behind his positions, but
'adverse effect on performance. Flying in be capable of concentrating superior forces
 FOREIGN MILITARY DIGESTS 91­

at the decisive point, with the added ad­ been used. The United States Marines
vantage of surprise. Second, in assaults have recently held trial airborne assault
over obstacles, such as rivers or moun­ exercises from aircraft carriers, and have
tains, the bridgeheads can be seized quickly landed one regiment behind an enemy's
and without the need for concentrations, coastline in helicopters flown from a car­
which are a target for atomic attack and rier under way. This method of assault,
which forfeit surprise. The buildup can combining strategic and tactical mobility,
then be continued from dispersed bases could be of great value in dealing with
straight to the bridgehead, and the com­ the urgent situations which our Army is
mander can exploit success at once. Third, likely to face in the world today. In a
in pursuit the momentum of the advance hot war, the reinforcement of our bases,
can be increased by capturing bridges or or an attack on those of the enemy, would
defiles ahead of the armored advance and, be greatly assisted by the use of helicop­
thus, cut off enemy groups. The range of ters.
fast-moving armored columns has hitherto
been limited by the rate of supporting sup­ Administration
ply, but now the momentum could be The complete dependence of an army
maintained by helicopter supply. Fourth, upon its maintenance system has been
in withdrawal maximum delay can be im­ pointed out. Not only does this system act
posed upon the advancing enemy while as a brake to operations, but it also ab­
still allowing our main force to break sorbs an ever-increasing amount of men
contact to prepare rearward positions. and equipment at the expense of fighting
The rearguards can then be withdrawn troops. An infantry division needs about
entirely without danger of being cut off. 5,000 men as its own administrative or­
ganizations, and a further 15,000 to back
Airborne Operations it from the main base area forward. Their
Airborne forces, conceived and developed task is to unload, load, move forward, and
largely during the last war, were an deliver everything required by the fighting
answer which could improve the power of troops in action. This results in a slow
maneuver of modern armies. There are, and ceaseless stream of vehicles along
however, serious limitations which de­ congested roads, leaving little scope for
tract from their general usefulness, but the rapid movement by tactical traffic.
which the use of helicopters for airborne Because of the vulnerability of this· sys­
opprations will eliminate. First, there will tem, dumps of supplies must be main­
be no need for the expensive training of tained along the line. Each of these areas
spct'ialist parachute troops. The landing requires more troops to guard, sort, and
of heavy equipment and supporting weap­ deliver the supplies, with still more to
ons has always been difficult-gliders could supply and administer those who are ad­
do it, but were vulnerable and uneconom­ ministering the division. The result is a
ical. The dropping of vehicles and heavy military snowball.
weapons by parachute is difficult and in­ Air transport can reduce this admin­
efficient. Airborne troops are vulnerable istrative layout, but there are disadvan­
without their supporting arms, and if tages in supply by conventional aircraft
heli"opters are used not only can these be which make it impracticable except under
flown in directly to the exact area re­ certain rather unusual conditions. Tac­
qui! ed but their rate of buildup is fast. tical supply in the field by parachute, if
Om· can envisage a different outcome in on a large scale, is an inefficient means of
the Arnhem operation if helicopters had supply. The construction of airstrips in
92 MILITARY REVIEW JULY 1,955

forward areas, if practicable, would ab­ tasks possible are assistance in'the laying
sorb as much manpower as the' resulting of telephone cable or gasoline pipelines,
airlift would save. These disadvantages traffic control, bridge building, the carrying
are largely eliminated by the use of heli­ of long-range patrols, or as' stations for
copters, which .fan take supplies from television transmitters.
base areas directly to the users in the
field, thus, making a big saving in man­ Types
power, vehicles, and time. As weather and The types of military helicopters required
enemy ail' activity may interfere with fall into three general categories: first,
this air supply on occasions, it will still the light helicopter; second, the dual pur­
be necessary to hold a reserve pool of pose cargo and troop-carrier helicopter
road transport. -5 tons or 40 men; and, finally, the
A division needs about 450 tons of main­ heavy lift-50 tons-helicopters. The Brit­
tenance each day. The moving of these ish aircraft industry can provide, at pres­
supplies fOl'ward from an army base area, ent, only the first type-the Bristol 171
150 miles distant, to the division area or Westland S.55 .. the Bl'istol 173-14 man
requires 2 days, and, therefore, three -will soon be available, but is not really
hundred 3-ton vehicles are required each designed for military cargoes. It is doubt­
day. A helicopter of 3-ton payload could ful whether useful numbers of the other
do, say, three round trips per day, and, two types could be produced in less than
therefore, 50 helicopters could do the same about 6 years.
task, This is a simplified example, and
the exact figure of savings in manpower Operational Responsibility
and vehicles could only be found after ex­ If helicopters are to become the new
haustive studies. A rough estimate would transport vehicles of the Army, it is right
be that two-thirds of the administrative that they should be the entire responsi­
troops could be saved for each "gross bility of the Army. It would be unfair to
division." An increase in the army area burden the Royal Air Force with a large
for the servicing of the helicopter force increase in aircraft, with the attendant
would reduce this figure to about one­ requirement of maintenance services, if
half, which may finally make a saving of they are to reap no direct benefit from it.
about 5,000 men and 500 vehicles for As it is at present, a large proportion of
each division in the field. loads carried by Transport Command are
for the Army, but those aircraft operate
Miscellaneous from airfields and on routes already under
The number of minor jobs which a heli­ Royal Air Force control. The helicopter
copter can do is legion, but lack of space transport force would live and operate in
does not permit more than a short sum­ the tactical areas controlled by the Army.
mary of them. The smaJl helicopter will It will, therefore, be necessary to develop
become, and is today in some cases, more an organization in the Army to operate
necessary to commanders and staffs than this new force. It appears that the Glider
the jeep for reconnaissance and liaison. Pilot Regiment given its parent name­
The quick evacuation of casualties to base Army Air Corps-is the framework on
hospitals, while saving lives and man­ which this new force can be built. This
power, also reduces the medical services regiment already has a background of
in the forward area. It was estimated tradition and experience in Army air
that 5,000 lives were saved in 1 year in transport. The addition of mechanical
Korea by helicopter evacuation. Other engineer personnel from the reduced·trans­
 FOREIGN MILITARY DIGESTS 93
port workshops would solve part of the then they must be accepted in large num­
maintenance problem. Under this scheme, bers as soon as possible. The decision will
there must be co-operation with the Royal be a bold one, but it must be made. The
Air Force in such matters as the initial tactical flexibility and the improved ad­
training of pilot and 'ground crew instruc­ ministrative efficiency are so great as to
tors, meteorological services, radar warn~ outweigh ~he additional costs of building
ing, and supply of aircraft and spare and operating a large force of helicopters.
parts from maintenance units. This force Without such a force, our Army must
must be under the 'command of army, or remain a force of very limited mobility.
foree, headquarters in the field, in order The underdeveloped state of the British
to obtain full utilization. Aircraft must helicopter industry is not in any way due
only be suballotted to corps or divisions to lack of enterprise in the industry, but
for specific operations, except, perhaps, rather to lack of government and military
for a squadron of light and medium support. The services, particularly the
types. These would be for local and im­ Army, have been slow in making up their
mediate use within the division. minds and committing themselves to de­
Conclusion velopment, contracts, or orders, although
There is no doubt that the operation the recent order for 200 helicopters for
of such a force would be extremely costly. the services is a good sign that the need
Two hundred medium and heavy type heli­ is appreciated. However, the few which
copters is a rough estimate of the number are likely to be available for the Army,
required by an army of three corps: Over and their limited capabilities, make their
112 million dollars would be an even contribution a small one.
wilder guess at the initial cost, with, Immediate experience must be gained
perhaps, 66 million dollars per year as the by the Army Air Corps in the operations
cost of maintenance. It is difficult, how­ of helicopter transport, but no British
ever, to relate the cost in dollars to the medium or heavy types are yet available.
value of the services made possible. On The only way to get rapid development of
the credit side must go the increased mo­ these aircraft is to place a large order
bility of the Army, a saving in manpower, now. To fill the gap, until these British
and an increase in fighting power. types are developed, permission must be
If full value is to be obtained from the sought to build in this country, under
use of helicopters in the British Army, license, the best of the American mod~ls.

The helicopter has delVeloped to the ex'tent that the Army as a whole should
recognize it as the prime factor ·for improvement of ground tactical operations
of the future. The helicopter is not solely a device to improve the lot of the
transportation officer but represents a vital resource to the entire Military
Establishment.
Major General Frank A. Heileman, Retired
94 MILITARY "REVIEW JULY JU5.

Night Operotions
Digested by the MILITARY REVIEW from an article by Major V. P. Naib in
the "Journal of the United Senice Institution" Undia) October 1954.
J

THE progress of civilization is a record ized. The only way in which enemy suo
of man's struggle with nature either to periority in weapons and firepower and,
control the forces of nature for his needs quite often, adverse terrain can be over­
or to protect himself from the adverse come is by night operations. The Mahrat·
effects of those forces. The tendency of tas were adept at night operations and
the civilized man is, therefore, to draw their success against the vastly superior
away from nature rather than adapt him­ Mogul armies was due to their training
self to nature and live in harmony with it. and reliance on night operations. History
This attitude of the civilized man toward repeated itself during World War U. The
life and nature has been largely responsi­ vigorous emphasis on night operations dur­
ble for his aversion to darkness, fog, and ing World War II was due to the early
the extremes of weather, particularly the recognition of this need for neutralization
seasonal severities in certain climes. of superior enemy firepower and technique
Dur,ing the great campaigns of Marl­ by operating during the night. The Allies
borough and Napoleon, by an unwritten during the initial stages and the Soviets
law, both the opposing armies suspended throughout the war demonstrated the ef­
serious warfare during winter. In like fectiveness of night operations in the face
manner, the battles were largely fought of enemy superiority in firepower on the
during the hours of daylight, although ground and particularly in the air. Sim­
occasional tactical moves during the night ilarly, during the final stages of the war,
were not un~ommon. This state of affairs the Germans had to rely on night and fog
continued until World War I, although the as their allies when confronted with the
Boer and other colonial wars against less Allied supremacy in the air.
civilized people brought out the impor­ MOl'e recently, the Korean conflict has
tance and effectiveness of night operations. given the Western nations a very rude
Another contributing factor to the suspen­ jolt and has considerll,bly shal<en their
sion of fighting during the night was the complacent confidence in their technical
fact that the firepower of modern weap­ and firepower capabilities. For the first
ons, with their longer range and need for time, the Western Powers had to face the
observation, lost their full effectiveness mass attacks of the Communist hordes
and flexibility during darkness. delivered during the' hours of darkness
World War I proved the increasingly and, quite often, in inclement weather.
important role of night operations in mod­ These attacks were always pressed home
em warfare. The Russians were the first without regard to casualties and, in the
who exploited the pOSSibilities of night majority of cases, they were successful.
operations on a large scale in World War This new threat to the fire supremacy of
I, but only the Germans benefited by this the Western Powers, and particularly the
experience as there was no co-ordination United States, has set them thinldng
between the Allied and the Russian Revo­ about the means of restoring this fire su­
lutionary armies. This was again a case premacy during darkness in order to meet
of a less civilized or poorly equipped na­ the numerically superior horde .armiec of
tion fighting against an enemy equipped the Soviet Union and China. True to
with superior weapons and better organ­ their genius for technical and scientific
 FOREIGN MILITARY DIGESTS 95
developments to solve their problems, the agined. Long night marches through en­
Western Powers are focusing their atten­ emy held territory both by German infan­
tion increasingly on solving the problems try and armor were quite normal during .
of night vision scientifically. Considerable the Soviet campaign. Some of the German
research and experimentation are being commanders were agreeably surprised
carried out in the use of radar, infrared when the Allied armies in Normandy' did
rays, and other methods of battlefield il­ not make use of the night for the breakout
lumination by artificial light. and pursuit. If the Allies had ruthlessly
pressed home their success by movement
Scope
during the night, it is the considered
Operations at night include both action opinion of many German generals, that
and movement. There is a tendency in the stalemate on the Rhine could have
some quarters to restrict the scope of been avoided and the war could have been
night operations to attacks with limited terminated much earlier.
objectives. The scope of night operations
is very much larger. A resourceful and Night Vision Problem
daring commander will not only attack The problem of night vision has two
during the night but also exploit his suc­ aspects-the physical and the psychologi­
cess by movement during night in order cal. The physical aspect relates to visibil­
to gain operational advantages. This is ity or lack of it. As a consequence of this,
particularly important when operating night affects the imagination as well as
ag'ainst a night-shy enemy. At present, the nerves. The tendency is to imagine
we have become night-shy partly due to dangers which do not exist and this effect
lack of experience and mainly due to on the imagination is heightened or em­
the absence of a proper emphasis on night phasized by the exaggerated reaction of
training. Our night exercises usually ap­ the strained senses. Even well-disciplined
peal' to terminate with the reorganization troops are affected by the influences just
on a limited objective. In regard to the described. This explains why the civilized
usp of armor during darkness, even a man in particular, living in the cities
remote suggestion is apt to draw loud away from nature, dreads "the night. It
protests. While the antitank gun has ap­ also explains why less civilized people
parl'ntly compelled the tank to do long­ or those living close to nature, are not
range sparring at the expense of its mo­ afraid of darkness. The reliance on ar­
bility, there is a reluctance to resuscitate tificial aids to solve the problem of nig·ht
its mobility even during darkness when its VISIOn is, in a sense, a confession of
chipf enemy is blind and immobile. Grim failure 'on the part of civilized man. At
indl'cd are the prospects for the effective night and in forests, scientific and tech­
use of tanks in the face of such inertia. nical gadgets lose some of their glamoUl'
A successful attack delivered during the and the complete scientific solution to the
day or night can only be exploited by problem of night vision is not likely to
luthless movement, both during the day be achieved in the near future. These facts
and night, particularly the latter. Ac­ are of tremendous significance to the sol­
cording to General Manteuffel, the Ger­ dier, who is required to fight in future
mall' Panzers in the Soviet Union went a wars, and more particularly to the Indian
step further by breaking through the So­ soldier, who has to rely more on his in­
viet lines during the night and successfully dividual skill and toughness than tech­
supporting an attack next morning from nical aids for the simple reason that these
the rear of the enemy. The demoralizing aids may not be readily available to him.
effed of such an action can easily be im­ We, in India, must, therefore, solve the
96 MILITARY REVIEW

problem of night VISIon by night adapta­ down clearlY, among other things, the
tion and intensive training in night op­ routes of approach, the assembly place
erations. Technical aids like infrared rays and the line of departure, the direction
and artificial illumination are, at present, or axis of attack, the plan including de­
only of theoretical interest to us. It should fensive fire tasks, and the bringing up of
also be remembered that these technical weapons and supplies for reorganization.
aids, particularly artificial illumination, When planning, it must be remembered
are apt to have an adverse effect on the that the night operation is not entirely
natural night adaptation of a soldier tactical. The commander must enSUf'e that
trained to rely on such aids. It is common the plan "caters for those minor admin­
knowledge among soldiers with any ex­ istrative problems so simple by day and
perience of night operations, that even a so chaotic in the dark."
temporary and limited use of ordinary In the attack as well as defense, the
flashlight adversely affected the troops success of night action is based above
and it was sometime before they could all on the element of surprise. Loss of
regain their night vision and continue surprise will mean that an attack is
movement. That is one of the main rca­ stopped too soon or its tempo is redm·ed.
sons why color filtel's were used to ('ovel'
Therefore, intensive p"epal'ation and RC­
flashlights, taillights, and other means
crecy are the keynotes to success. This
of limited illumination. In this article, includes the movement of troops bl'fore
IlPl'rations in moonlight, and particularly they reach the line of departure. The
in full moon, a1'e not considered because movement of vehicle,;, particularly tra('ked
of the rbk of losing the element of S\ll'­ vehicles, must have noise covel' as well.
prisc. In any case, troops tl'ained to op­
Once the assaulting troops leave their
erate during complete darkness can cer­ line of departure, the maintenance of di­
tainly take {ull a(I\'antage of moonlight rection is their main problem. Thi;. is
whenevcr it is availabk. ,olved by making the plan of attack simple
Technique and selecting the line of departure dil't'l'tly
opposite to the objective. Any chang.. of
Only wcll-disciplined troops properly
direction during a night attack is apt to
tl ained in the technique of night oppra­
be very dangerous because, as it has hap­
tions are suitable for the successful con­
pened on certain occasions, the assaulting
duct of daring and far-reaching night op­
columns may never reach the objectivl' and
erations. ThesE' operations require a very
end up in quite a different place, For
high degree of integration between the
that very reason the objective selected
components of the force undertaking them.
must be definite, distinct, and visibll'­
In this artide, the technique of night
otherwise it will have to be indicate'd by
operations is considered undl'r two head­
tracer, airbursts, 01' other means. This
ingR-night actionR and night mOVeml'llt.
will, of course, mean loss of surp"iRe.
.YigM Actiol/s Selection of a definite objective and se­
Before a night attack can be launched, lection of a unidirectional axis will "Iso
there are certain prerequisites which must solve the difficult problem of co-ordination
be fulfilled. First of all, previous contact between the assaulting columns, although
shou'ld have been established. During this the troops will be marching in close 01 del'.
contact, by means of intensive reconnais­ The use of tracer from antiaircraft ar­
sance, the location of enemy defenses must tillery and the indication of the obje(,tive
be determined. This is followed by a de­ by means of a.irbursts or other means no
tailed plan of action which should lay doubt facilitates direction keeping, but the
 FOREIGN MILITARY DIGESTS 97
advisability of using such aids should be sible casualties to our own troops. In the
wci~hed against the consequent loss of event of a unit or subunit reaching the ob­
surprise. Similarly, in regard to the fire jective ahead of others and losing contact
support for a night attack, the commander with its flanking units, it should automat­
must decide whether he should launch a ically start reorganizing itself for all­
silt·nt attack and achieve surprise, or around defense.
whether he should put in a noisy attack The use of armor on a very dark night
with artillery support and sacrifice sur­ is normally limited to its participation in
prise. The best course is to aim at achiev­ the fire plan and reorganization phases.
ing' surprise by a silent attack with the Engagements of targets by tanks at night
fire support program on call. 1'he. impor­ will be exceptional. When they do occur,
tant point to remember about the fire the targets will be normally on the flanks
plan is thorough preparation and detailed of the objective and the tanks will have
briefing of the unit and subunit command­ to be suitably deployed much earlier and
ers. This briefing should enable the sub­ carry out their registration. However, the
tlmt commanders and, particularly, the importance of tanks being ready to move
forward observers to orient and map spot up during the night immediately following
themselves during the hours of darkness. the capture of the objective should not
_By means of a reference round of air­ be underestimated. The demoralizing ef­
bur,t. and sometimes even without it, fect of finding tanks on the objective, when
they should be able to brin~ down artillery the enemy puts in a counterattack sup­
fire on previously re~istered targets. This ported by his own tanks the next morn­
cannot be done unless the officers have ing, will be considerable. This will also
been trained in the location and engage­ facilitate rapid exploitation of success
ment of targets at night. either during the same night when suit­
\rhen all the conditions mentioned above able routes of advance are available or
hav,· been fulfilled, success will depend immediately after dawn.
upon the rapid and energetic execution of If tanks are expected to assault during
the plan. Once the attacking units leave a night attack, they must .do it in co­
the line of departure, the movement of our operation with infantry over suitable ter­
rain. For such attacks it is best to choose
atta.-king columns must be silent and con­
either a light night, that is, a moonlight
tinu'Hls until the objective is reached.
night, or arrangements must be made for
Thel e is no question of having intermedi­
artificial fighting light by means of searc'h­
ate "bjectives and new lines of departure. lights or parachute flare bombs. Direc­
Th,· advance must continue without halt tion keeping is facilitated by ordering the
brcallse any delay en route may easily re­ tanks to move on to the bursting shells
sult ill loss of surprise and failure. Co­ over the objective. The attack should be
ol'llll'ation between different subunits is on a nal'l'ow front with tanks moving in
very difficult during night attacks. Until close formation. A squadron of tanks
con!.,et is made, there will be very little should not cover more than 500 yards.
OCca Ion for the assaulting troops to use The simplest formation, that is, line or
thei, personal weapons. Even after con­ column, must be adopted. In line, the
tact. hand-to-hand fighting and the tech­ tanks march by the center where the
niql1,' Of close combat will be the "order of commander of the subunit should be.
th" 'light." Fire discipline must be very
stri, , and troops should not fire except at Attacks by tanks at night should be
poillt blank range. This ensures surprise, rehearsed in order that every commander
and llrevents indiscriminate firing and pos­ and driv('1' shall be quite clear as to how
98 MlLITARY REVIEW JULY lUfJQ.

fa)' thC'y should go, their dircction of He, therefore, recommends that the ad­
adJ'fll1cC', lIud what lIctioli thcy aI'C to take vance must take place in three 01' four
ill till' (,I){'nt of 11ariollR forms of enemll columns of compact combat teams. Where
retaliatioll. the !la\lcity of roads makcs this impracti­
cable, General Blumentritt recommends
Only thus can the commander at'hieve that only advance detachments should be
('ohesion and control, without which there pu~hed forward, The division itself mn
is no pI'obability of ,mecess. ,<tal't smooth driving at dawn,
Night Mot'cmcllt Val'ious aids for keeping direction and
Some aspects of nip;ht movement bdon' ,'ohesion during night marches have been
a nig-ht attack have already been consid­ <l('visf'd and practiced, The visual aids
en,d, The tactieal movenwnt of units and ih£'lud,' pinpoint taillights· with different
formatiolls as a pn'liminary to nig-ht 01' eoiorcd masks to indicate subunits nnd
day operations dot,,; not present any pI'oh­ l'ollnnanders, Very lights, and other simi­
lems, althoup;h the need for training- in lar items, However, the most ing'eniuu5
nig-ht marches along' roads, and night traf­ and t·ffective. and, at the same time simple>,
ne di,;cipline Hhould he horne in mind by aid was the usc hy the Germans of bieyde
{'omnlallller8 at alt levels, The conduct of I'eeollnaissanl'c at thc head of motorized
these moves is a mattel' of routine and troops, The need for reconnaissan('l' is
so w{'ll known that then' i,; no need to univcI'sal in all opel'ations, This npl'd is
InaJH,l speeiuI refel'cnee to thenl. partieulal'ly important in night marehes
;\lovement through l'nemy held tel'l'itory because of roadblocks, demolished brill~es,
by opemtiolllli night marches, pal'tit'nlal'1y and enemy antitank firc, The advantag'l's
by armor, has tl'enll'lldous pos,;ibilitie,;, of hieyele reeonnuissancc for opl'l'atiol1al
As aln>ady indicated. the Germans car­ nig'ht mal'l'hes are, ther'efor'e, obvious,
ried out sueh' move,; against the Soviet,; Speed is no problem because bicy('let' ('an
iI, the last war with 8U('ce,.;,.;, Such moves move at nig-ht as fast as motorized troops,
should he attempted after the obstacle If not fastel', The movement of th" latter
helts have been bl'eu('ht'd and the main without lights is bound to be slow and
enf'Il1Y d"fenses htwt' been Vl'Okell into, intt'l'l'ullted by oecasional stops, On the
The efft·('t of an armored breakthrough in othl'I' hand, bicycle reconnaissance is al­
htrength continuously during day ulltl night most noiseless, the riders cun dismount
I
will spl'l'ad ('ollstel'nution and demoraliza­
and tak.· ad ion quicldy, and, what is more
important, they can see and hear better
tion among the defenders in additioll to
preventing' the movement of tht'ir reserves than motorcyclists and personnc! in tanks
and thl' disruption of tht'i,' communica­ or Illotor vehicles, General Blulllentl'ltt
tions, A('(,Ol'llinp; to Gpnpral Guenther furthl'r I'ccommends that these bicydl' rc­
{'onnaissancl' troops should be handpit'ked
Blumentl'itt, who has considerable exper­
ipncp in sueh opprations: for their initiative, dash, and alel'tn,'%,
Theil' st!'l'ng-th need not exceed 10 to 12
Tit" w'/lltJl'cd brcaktltrough ill st/'cngtlt men and they should include some ~!1~i­
docs Iltd mel1/1 thnt th,' Jlight 111111'('h of en­ m'er", These troops should be equippt'd
ti,.,. {//'lIIol'('(l di"isiOIl.9, b"(,I1,1I1I1' thc ICllgth with lig'ht weapons because they are not
of slleh (( force, ('veil whl'lI split 1Ip into supposcd to fight but only to reconnoiter
two (,011111111,9 alollg 1'10'((11(,[ /'Olltcs, 1V0uld and investigate the road,
b,' Ilroilibiti1,,. both ill iimc ([lid space. In The superiority of troops fightmg
allY cas", the bulk of armor hardly (!!>er HJ'ound the clock over troops fighting only
gets a chalice to drive (Iud th" ,.('sult is fol' half the time during daylight i" ob­
S('IIBeleRs fatiguc, vious, The effectiveness of modern \\'I"ap­
 FOREIGN MILq'ARY DIGESTS U!)

on~ and the tremendous influence of ai1'­ to be ready for such operations, night
power on ground operations compel armies training in our Army needs' a complete
to nperate increasingly during the hours reorientation and,' certainly, very much
of darkness. These night operations should more attentioR thlll1 at present. In night
nnt be restricted to limited objectives 01' training, the emphasis should be more upon
limited penetrations. Major operations in night adaptation and the development of
the future should contemplate fighting night vision than upon the reliance on
around the clock, both by day and night, large-scal€! artificial illumination or com­
to [whieve speed and surprise. In order plicated ultramodern devices.
1

Saseno--Moscow's Gibraltar
Translated and di",e~t('d by the MILITARY REVIEW from an artidf>
in "Soldaten Zeitunlit" (Germnny~ 1 No,,·ember 19:)4.

Tiff: strategic significance of the Med­ the bay has about 9,000 inhabitants. It
Iterranean has caused England to secure was spared by the last war.
hers,·If from Gibraltar to Cyprus. Since The island of Saseno, key to Valona
th(· construction, by the Soviets, of a base Bay, is less .J:han 45 miles by airline from
OIl the Adriatic coast of Albania we may the Italian Adriatic coast. Thus, Taranto,
well wonder, however, wh(>thel' this system Italy's principal naval base, is within the
of '<'elll'ities would not be SUbjected to a reach of rocket weapons. The casemates
vcr)' severe test in the event of war. of Saseno, according to reliable reports,
Th" Valona Bay area and the island of are large enough for troops, ammunition,
SaSt'IlO lying off this area have become a and rations. Existing natural obstacles
SO\,\t'! submarine base and naval fortress would make any landing attempt diffi­
of t'on~iderable significance. From here, cult. On the south and west, Valona Bay,
the ('oast of Italy facing it is threatened with the cliffs of Cape Linetta and the
b)' I'Ockpt weapons, and the entire Medi­ Karaburun Mountains, whose highest
terranean is subject to attack by ~ub­ peak is 2,460 feet, form an effective bas­
mal mex. tion. Farther to the south, the mountains
Th,' little and unobtl'usive island of rise to a height of 6,250 feet. Their pas­
Sa"t 110 at the entrance to Valona Bay ses. which are few in number and very
PO"t'8Se8 an area of about 2.7 square narrow, could be held with but relatively
milt·-, is only moderately arable, mostly small forces. The opposite end of the bay.
baII',n of vegetation, and consists almost' north of Valona, also possesses a natural
entI' l'ly of reefs and rocks, some of them barrier in the form of a half-mile deep
d,it !! nearly 1,000 feet out of the water. stretch of boggy terrain extending along
Onl who knows the island involuntarily the coast for a distance of 6 to !) miles.
rOll I 'ares it with Gibraltar for, from the Kanina Peak is located less than 2 miles
,taI"!point of the possibilities of fortifica­ Routh of the city and rises to a height of
tion. it is as well favored as the "British almost 4,000 feet. It constitutes an ideal
lOr!. • and, like the latter, is honeycombed observation point ('ommanding ",the entire
by til ~xtensive system of subterranean inner bay.
l'a,;'.~s and caverns. It is astonishing that Saseno, in view
tl\\' <!ity of Valona which extends along of its strategic characteristics, was prac­
'100 MILITARY REVIEW JULY 195~

tically disregarded before the Soviets, extending southward from this area have
with the help of their Albanian operation been fortified with hundreds of positions
groups, appropriated it for their own for light and heavy weapons. On Ravina
use. The first move was made toward the Peak is a radar station whose effective
end of World War II, when a small band range extends across the narrow strip
of Albanian partisans occupied this island of sea clear to the Italian coast, and it
area which had been abandoned by the goes without saying thaUt is used for all­
Italians-Italian territory since 1!l20­ around air observation. Three airfields
almost without fighting. Albania became have also been constructed with subterra­
a Soviet satellite statl' and the leader nean fuel reservoirs and storage facilities
of the partisan units received his instruc­ for replacement parts and underground
tions from Moscow. hangal's-one at Valona, the second south­
east of the Dukatit Valley, and the third
Buildup east of the Sushitsa River.
Soviet Operation SaseI/o IlPgan system­ The operational center of gravity of
atically in the summe,' of 1!l48 after the all of the installations, however, is the
break between Tito and the KrC'mlin. In submarine base in Valona Bay. Between
July of that year, a modern torpedo boat the cliffs of the broken coast are numer­
under the Albanian fiag, entered Valona ous small inlets which are ideal hiding
harbo,'. A group of Soviet engineer offi­ places for submarines. These have been
cers and civilians. who proved to be "Ger­ carefully modified so as to be scareely
man {'xperts," landed, These Germans were disccrnible from the ail'. These submarine
fortification construction experts and stations afford room for about 100 ullits,
rocket projectile C'ngineers who had been 50 or 60 being reported there 11 t the
detached for a special mission. present time. If this figure is correet. one
Not too lonp: aftet' this, transport ves­ ('an best obtain an idea of its significance
sels arrived and disc-harged load after if one considers the fact that Germany
load of pool'ly nourished. wretchC'dly clad l'ntpl'cd the war in 1939 with a total of
human beings at the port. These people liD submarines ready for operation.
were immediatt'ly placed in hUlTiedly The danger that would threaten in euse
established camps surrounded by barbed of war is obvious. The Atlantic Paet na­
wire and guard towers. They 'were per­ tions are strongly dependent on th(' oil
sons who had been deportC'd from Soviet deposits of the Middle East for their oil,
eontrolled countries, principally the Baltic a fact which occasions no little anxiety
nations, They were joined by all persons on the part of the staffs of the Paris
capable of performing labor from Valona, headquarters. The great' joint maneu\'ers
and the inhabitants of the smaller villages of the English, Italian, and Greek naval
within a radius of about 25 miles. They and air forces 2 years ago may be re­
were registered for work on a "construc­ garded as an indication of this. In 'pite
tion project." of the favorableness of this situation as
After 4 years of ceasel('ss work-the regards the Soviets, there is, nevertheless,
work was done in three shifts-the ob­ one undeniable obstacle in the way of the
jective was practically attained in the fall Saseno fortifications and the Valona <ub­
of 1952. NumerouS rocket batteries, the marine base: Tito's Yugoslavia blocks
heaviest of which have a range of about the land communications.
50 miles, as well as effective antiaircraft Saseno was awarded to Albania after
artillery protection, were constructed there. the previous annexation of that region by
Like Saseno, the Karaburun -Mountains the Albanian partisans.
 FOREIGN MILITARY DIGESTS 101

Day or Night Attock for the Infantry?

Translated alld digested by the MI LITARY' REVIEW from an article by George Lieb in
"Wehrwissenschaftliche Rundschau" (Germany) Of to her 1954.

1:-; WORLD War II, an infantry attack ment when the infantryman had to ,rise
on an enemy position was usually begun at to his feet to make the attack, the sup­
dawn and preceded by an artillery bom­ porting fire o.f the heavy weapons had to
bal·dment. Depending on the ammunition be halted in order not to endanger him.
supply. this usually lasted from 5 minutes Until it could be redirected at a new tar­
to I hour. In especially favorable cases, get, there ensued a forced cessation of
this fire preparation was followed by a fire and the infantry was unprotected.
sllpplpmentary bombing attack by tactical The infantry's own artillery now dis­
aviation or a rocket launcher unit. The continued its support almost entirely and
two latter supporting means could. how­ occupied itself with the combat of the
ewl', be used only at points of particularly enemy artillery or, because of the enemy's
intt·nsified effort. In most cases, the in­ g-l'ound support aviation which was now
fantry was supported only by division beginning its attack, it sought to conceal
artillery but, in a few case~, army artillery its presence temporarily.
wu< available. From the beginning- of the attack to the
When the artillery pl'epal'ation came to moment of penetration into the enemy's
an end, there was almost always a pause position, the infantryman was exposed,
in the firing during which the infantry, more or less without cover, to the defen­
at llIost supported by its own heavy weap­ sive fire of all the enemy's heavy weap­
on, and now and then by assault guns, was on~, his lig-ht infantry weapons, and his
fOll'pd to traverse the area in front of the g-round attack aviation and. as a result,
enl'my position without cover and break his losses were usually cOl'l'esponding-ly
info the adversary's main linl' of resist­ high.
ann'. Sometimes the infantry could not
pVI'n take advantage of the bombardment Hesults
to work its wa~' forward to the enemy Once the infantry had effected a pene­
pO-Ilion because in the attack order the tration, it immediately had to count on
be~'nning- of the attack almost always co­ enemy counterattacks. When these coun­
inc,ided with the termination of the bom­ tl'rattacks were conduded in organize-d
bUldment, and until this moment arrived trench positions. the infantry's heavy
th" infantry remained in its jumpoff po­ weapons were able to give but little aid
siti.,n. The best time for the approach, in repulsing- these attacks.
th,· time when conditions were most favor­ If, however, the infantry was not suc­
abl,' for it, was lost. cessful in its attempted penetration, this
I'.dnfully, thpn, and depending' on its often meant almost complete annihila­
0\\'1' resources, the infantry worked its tion for the isolated unit, for the with­
\Va) to the enemy's main line of resistance. drawal from the undamaged enemy posi­
Slll,port by heavy weapons during the in­ tion to the infantry's own jumpoff
fall I ry's penetration could never be more position had to be made in daylight and
tha:l slight-except when assault guns in the concentrated fire of all the enemy's
W\~I'~ available-and this support, espe­ weapons.
cia,ly in the main line of resistance and If a breakthrough had been effected and
on t he main field of combat, was only of counterthrusts and counterattacks suc­
a pl'otective character. Just at the mo­ cessfully repulsed, the infantry was often
102 MILITARY REVIEW JULY IU55

without the support of its artillery in at­ coming and was able to take the necessary
tacks on other centerS of resistance in the steps fol' defending himself and prepare
enemy's real' areas, as the artillery was a warm welcome for the attacker.
now obliged to change its positions and Dodging of the enemy's barrage fire oc­
could no longer give support from the old CUlTed only in those cases in which the
positions from which it had laid down attacking infantry was able to take ad­
the preparatory fire for the attacl,. 'vantage of its own preparatory fire for
The effects of our own fire preparations making its advance.
on the enemy's system of positions may OUI' own light infantry weapons, how­
be said always to have been ridiculously evel', became fully effective only imme­
small. Even wire obstacles and mine bar­ diately before and during the breach while.
deI'S were hardly damaged and th<' few on the contrary. the same weapons, in the
direct hits-and only these have any ef­ case of the defende". became fully effec­
fect on organizl'd positions-on rifle pits tive when we were but .half way to his
and bunkers naturally caused the enemy position. Assault guns. mortars. and heavy
few losses, henc<', the enemy'S' capacity for machineguns showed themselves to be
defense was scarcely affected. Moral ef­ the best support weapons for the attacker.
feets which, in thf' case of a "soft" ad­ With good training and thorough eo-or­
versary wel't' often considerable. wer(' dination with thesl' weapons. the infantry­
praetk'ally nonexistent in the case of the man was able to crush most enemy resist­
Rovil't soldier, for example. Rocket launch­ anee. provided he had first effected a
ers. also. produced astonishingly littll' penetration of the enemy position.
dl'ect on an adversary who was dug-in. The fixl'd tactical method which always
Aircraft weapons were. likewise, entirely stipulated early morning as the time for
without ,,/feet in such a case. the beg'inning of the attack was outmoded.
rendered impossible the necessary tactical
Losses flexibility. was no longer adapted to the
Our own expE'rience in defensl' confirms effects of the weapons that were in use,
the following: the German infantry lossl's and was productive. therefore. of un­
by a)'tille)'~' in defense Were relatively necessarily high losses.
small. In the ease' of an infantry regi· For thi~ l'Cuson alone, ~ucces:;; wa~ be­
nll'nt whil·h was engaged on the. southern coming more and more uncertain with the
Soviet front in 1!J43 and 1H44, they enemy knowing the kind of attacl, fol'
amountl'd to from 10 to 12 percent of the which to prepare himself.
total loss(·s. 1\1ost of the losses were caused It was shown that in all cases whl'I'e
by mOI·tljA·s-around 70 percent; infantry this method-an attack in daylight with
weapons eam!' "eeond with about 15 per­ prcceding artillery preparation-was de­
"ent; and artillery and ro('l(et launchl'l's parted from and the attacl, begun at
w('re third. nightfall or during' the nighttime, and pre­
We learned frolll the statements of pris­ paratory fire purposl·ly omitted-the ,HI'­
oners that the Soviet losses were of the priR(' factor thus being exploited-~ul'­
~allle OI·d('r. with respect to cause. as wer(' prising successes were recorded and. in
oUI's-perecntages were not obtainable. addition. these were achieved with )!Tl\­
In' addition to this. an artillery prepa­ tifyinp;ly small losses.
ration which lasted but minutes did more Attack, in darkness-designated silllply
harm to the attacker than to the enemy. as night attack-offers a number of wry
To the 11Ittel' it WllS also a call to awaken., important ,ldvantages to the well-trained
He knew that the enemy attack was now and well-led attacker.
 ,'ORElGN MILITARY DIGESTS 103

A d'ay attack can never be a surprise reserves are to push on into the enemy's
attack-in the full meaning of the term­ real', the attack must be started as early
to a defender, and especially when it is as possible in the night in order to be able
introduced by a preparatory fire of greater to take as mnch advantage as possible of
0)' lesser duration and involves an ad­ the darkness. In any case, however, the
vance over a greater or lesser stretch of night attack constitutes an unforeseeable
terrain. In addition to this, the assembly surprisp for the defender.
can be seen by observation 01' air recon­
nai8sance unless this phase tal{es place Concealment
during the preceding night, A night at­ If a daylight attack has begun, move­
ta,'k, on the other hand, cannot be detected ment on the field of battle as well as back
by th" defender until the attacking in­ of it is no longer possible without the
fantry is directly in front of his position defender's observing each of these move­
-that is, when it gets into the zone il­ ments and, therefore, being able to com­
luminated by flares or within range of bat them.
li~tening posts, Losses of personnel and the destruction
Naturally, there can be no preparatory of materiel are the logical consequences.
fin' by the artillery 01' other heavy weap­ Reserves intended for the point of main
on~, These weapons gct their ranges in l'/fort, for example, have often s\!/fered
as inconspicuous a manner as possible heavier losses during movement tp the
during' the days preceding the attack, and .front than the attacIdng units themselves.
make themselves known only when the at­ These disadvantages disappear for the
tad, is clearly recognized as such by the greater part in the case of the night
ddl'nder and his heavy weapons begin to attack because night covers all movement
la;- down a barrage, They then combat the with the concealing cIoak of darkness. If,
dl'fl'nder's heavy weapons, especiall~' his however. movement should be discovered
artillery, covel' the flanks of the penetrat­ by aviation, 01' harassing fire should be
ing' forcl's, 01' its withdrawal. Nevel' must laid down on any route that is being used.
th,'~' betray an attack by premature fire, it is easy to escape this •difficulty, to
Th"y must not "awaken the defendel'" detour around places that are und"r fire
and warn him, as was generally the case 01' which are only threatened, for terrain
dunng' the last war, which in daylight is open to observation
I f a penetration is rapidly and smoothly may be used without hesitation at night.
dr""tt'd and tht' enemy's heavy weapons The assault infantry is able to approach
s,·"n·l'I~· go into action 01' do not go into the enemy position erect, and cover from
a,'1 inn at all, one's own heavy weapons sight is pasily found, although the same
\I i,l, perhaps, remain entirely silent in cover in daylight would be inadequate. If'
01 ""I' to keep the defender completely in a penetration fails at a given point,
th, dark with rd,;ard to what is occur­ a withdrawal at night is easier than it
rill '.. would be in the daytime, and with a slight
'. night attack can begin as darkness is lateral shifting of forces, the attack may
BPi'ing in 01' later. in faint moonlight be repeated at some other point.
UI' ~tarlight, or exceptionally. even at All movements on the field of battle
,ilt" n. The decisive factor in the matter can be carried out much more rapidly after
j, i he atta'ck objective, the distance to it night than they could on the same terrain
fl" '11 the jumpo/f position, and the general in the daytime, for no portion of the ter­
na ilre of the attack. If. for instance, it is rain has to be avoided hence, the sho'l'test
to he developed into, a breakthrough and route can be chosen and, in spite of the
104 MrLITARY REVIEW Jt!LY In;;5

enemy's proximity, tte infantryman is As we have already mentioned, the at­

able to walk upright. Supply of the front, tacker is met frontally, only, by poorly
especially in l'E'gard to ammunition for armed infantry fire. At this monwnt,
the fighting forces, tl'unsportation of the every rifleman is still in full possession
wounded to the real', and meSl>enger ac­ of his strength for he has been able to
tivity are not nearly as difficult as in the COVel' the distance between the lines
da::timc. without combat and generally at a walk,
In addition to this, with the exception of
Barrage Fire possibly slight casualties, the unit is still
In a daylight attac!" it has hardly been at full strength and morale, consequently,
possible for the infantry to eRcape the is normal.
burruge fire of the enemy, or even his The enemy will still be partially in a
aimed fire ut considerable ranges. Many state of surprise, is easily thrown into
an attacl, has gone to pieces with ht.avy confusion in the case of rapidly conduded
losses in front of the main line of resist­ penetrations of his position in the dUl'k.
ance under the concentrated fire of the loses his orientation with regard to the
defense weapons, 01' a pl'nctration which situution, and is obliged to fight without
was finally effected, has been only a vic­ the support of his heavy weapons.
tory of the "PYl'rhus" type. He is not immediately able, however, to
If the night attack can be c'lll'l'ied to perceive the true intention of the attal'l(er,
a line immediately in front of the enemv's but at first believes-adjoining units are
main lint· of res'istance before being de­ prone to do this-that he is merely ('on­
teded, th(' attaeldng unit l'an no longer fronted by a patrol or an assault detaeh­
be taken under fire by the enemy's artil­ ment, as a night attack must be initiated
lery or heavy mortars. Fire against its on'a very narrow front.
flanks from infantry weapons is hardly to
be expected any longer, for those por­ Uncertainty
tions of thl' en"my position that are not If the main line of resistance is quickly
being attacked but are located to the broken through and attackers 8ud.lcnly
sides of the attack sectol', can see almost appear on the flanks and in the rear of
nothing and, in addition, mURt keep their the defender, pank and rout may l'a~ily
eye,; on their own forefield". The attacker ensue and spread in every direction. Ac­
who is breaking into the position will, tually, less difficul ty is encountel'l'ti in
therefore, be under the fire of only light rolling up a position at night than may, at
infantry Weapons whose fire, moreover, first, be thought possible. A defender ill an
ean only be roughly aimed at night, in inclosed position easily becomes unct'l'tain
contradistinction to the case in the day­ and abandons it because in it his vil'w is
time. An additional advantage for the at­ obstructed.
tacker, at the same time, is the fact that Because of these conditions, it is also
he is able to se~ the ('oneR of fire of the obvious that the defender will ha nlly
enemy's machine!!:uns as a result of their consider attempting counterthrusts, ~mce
use of tracer ammunition, One can simply his headquarters and his artillery ure
take, covel' at the proper moment from "blind," signal communication lines are
the sweeping fire of a machineg'un when often cut, and the situation is, then,fore,
it is firing with tracer ammunition, and difficult to appraise, his heavy weapons
an experienced l'ifieman is able to make are often not employed, nor are counter­
skillful use of this for approaching the attacks made. Numerous examples from
enemy position. the war, especially on the Eastern Front,
 FOREIGN MILITARY DIGESTS 105
confirm these statements. It was also ob­ little cause for the man on the ground'to
served that the Soviets, for example, had fear these at night however, for they can
no great love for night combat. In the both be heard and seen and, as a rule,
event of a night attack, concealed as they one is able to.get out of their path or to
were by the darkness and able to escape take cover for protection.
the eyes of their officers and commiss~rs,
the~' were prone to flee Or to desert to Heavy WeaponH
the Gennans. Changing the position of the heavy
In the ease of an organized position, weapons such as the artillery, antitank
the clearing of passages through any ex­ guns, infantry guns, and mortars has
isting wire obstacles or minefields is the always been difficult in daylight because
task of attached engineer detachments. covered movement, as a rule, has been
This is a task which is always difficult impossible, As these weapons were moved
and dangerous in daytime, yet it becomes forward without covel', they were observed,
ensit'r and safer at night. The engineers suffered losses, and arrived late at their
carry with them the propel' means for new positions. All too often, the infantry
the elimination of the obstacles, whose had to get along without their aid.
pl'c,('nce and nature have been determined This problem is easily solved at night.
pl'{'\'ioUf~ly by means of air reconnaissance, If the heavy weapons have completed
patrob, and obsl'l'vation, These are elon­ their work in the attack, they may im­
galt'll charges for blowing; up the wire mediately be moved forward, quietly seek
ob,tat'les, rolls of primacord netting; for SUItable positions, and be ready in the
millt' obstacles, and mine detecting appa­ morning for new operations in positions
mtll'. Further explanation is not needed as yet unknown to the enemy.
of I\l(' fact that the work which the engi­
nl't"" are required to do in a night attack Small Losses
rall hl' done more easily and rapidly under In most cases, heavy losses in .an at­
th" protection of darknpss than in day­ tack-although there are naturally excep­
lidl!. Wire ob~tades can also be breached tions-are a sign of poor lead('rship and
without detedion by wirecntting detach­ preparation, "The great('st attack suc­
lll"'''~ ('quipped with wil'l'cutterH. If it eesses with the least losses," must be a
,huIII!! be necessary, thest' night tasko-if basic principle of all tadical leadership.
pn'lIlaturely detected by the enemy-may Night attaek5 present an excellent op­
bl' !'('rformed with the additional aid of portunity for th(' attainment of this ob­
'111"I,,,'cr('ens for concealment from the jective.
ilhlJllination produced by fiareH. The facts brought out in the foregoing
pal'agraphs definitely support this as-.
Enemy A"iatioll Rl'rtion, and the best proof of it is con­
I' i~ self-evident that in a night attack, stituted by the experiences which the
thl' 'nemy ail' arm such as rec'o,nnaissance German infantry was able to gather, espe­
and ground support aviation-which at­ dally on the Eastern Front, although, un­
tal'" the infantry and forces it to the fortunately, all too little use of the pos­
gTe, nd-is almost entirely ",liminated from sibilities of the night attack was made.
the ,cene, This fact is of particular im­ Even attaeks which had lasted an entire
pOl .1l1ce where general enemy ail' super­ day without producing any success, when
iOl'i .1' exists. Only tactical night bombers, resumed under cover of darkness, soon
as rule, are employed against artillery reached their objective with almost negli­
pos ions and columns on roads. There is gible losses.
106 MILITARY REVIEW JULY 19••

A unit which achieves good successes tages. The main disadvantage is that the
with but few l()sses acquires great con­ attacking unit must be very well trained
fidence in its command and is, therefore, and drilled especially for night combat.
always al! eager Hnd reliable combat in­ Equally high qualifications are necessary
gtI'ument to have available. on the part of the lower commands. al­
though these commanders are often able
Ammunition EXllenditure to give a more mobile form to their 1'0111­
A faetor which is not to be ovedooked mand in darkness than in daylight.
is the saving in ammunition of all kinds In addition to this, the defender is more
that can be made in favor of the attacker easily able to escape destruction or eap­
in a surprise nig.ht attack. ture by means of flight in the darkness
Since there is ab~olut('ly no tire prep­ without heing' hampered by observed fire.
aration to be ('o]Hlut'ted by either artil­ One's own observation of the fieLd of
lery or aviation. and support of the infan­ combat is almost impossible at night, and
try during the attaek is often unne('essar~' must be limited to the observation of
providing the attack is developing' ~ue­ pyrotechnic signals that have been agreed
cessfully, the major part of the ammuni­ on in advance. This can make tactical
tion supply becomes available for' the command somewhat difficult if this dis­
intensive combat of new ob,h·<:tivco in the advantag'e is not compensated for by means
further breahhrough during the day of a good, fast operating' radio networl,­
which follow~, or for' the l'l·pulse of coun­ ultra-shortwave voice radio for the units,
terattacks. In view of the enormous quan­ from the rifle platoon to the battalion,
tities of ammunition used by 111od('rn weltp­ and the heavy infantry weapons.
ons of a high rate of fire, this is of gTeat Except fol' the employment of nig-ht
~ig'nificance. fighters or bombers for the combat of
An impoRl'd ,ilenee or redueed action enemy artillery and heavy weapons posi­
on the part of the heavy weapons as a tions whieh bl'tray their location by their
result of ammunition shortage-which muzzle flash or whose positions hav" al­
was often the case on the Eastern Front ready been learned by previous reconn::tis­
durinp.· World War Ii-may be larp.·ely sanee. there can be no support of the
avoided by the saving described in nig'ht infantry attacl( by tactical aviation. Ut­
attacks. tIe such support was grven during the last
Even the infantr'Y saves ammunition. war.
since the fire fight does not take place
until the attacking fo)'c('s are verr close I'rellaration and Execution
to the enemy position or Rometimes even For the execution of a night attack. the
as late as when effecting the penetration. following preparations must first be made:
This isyery important for the ammunition or
1. Accurate recollllaissallce ami st/ld"
consumption of th€ machine pistols-which the tamill.
art' especiaJlr suited for night combat­ The principal aim in this is to g:dn
is very high. an accurate picture of the enemy's def..n­
sive system. The best basis for this is
Disad"antage" provided by good ail' reconnaissance. The
That the infantry night attack. as con­ aerial photographs are to be supplemen,,,d
trasted with that conducted in the day­ by observation with field glasses and hy
time, has also a few disadvantages is patrol activity. The study of the ten.lIn
entirely obvious, yet, these are very easily is nE'cessary for ascertaining the j..·st
outweighed by the aforementioned advan­ ro~te for the approach. Dense wood, 01'

...
 FOREIGN MILITARY DIGESTS 107
w"ods with heavy underbrush, for ex­ heavy machinegun or a 2-centimeter can­
alllple, are not suited for night attacks. non fires at irregular intervals over the
E"l'ry unit commander down to the squad heads of the attacking forces, thus indicat­
Il'ader now is given a sketch of his attack ing the way.•
Sl'dor with his attack objective, which he It is clear that such means are only
h"" to imprint on his memory for use in auxiliary since, with any considerable
till' attack. As far as possible, every rifle­ repetition, they would soon arouse the sus­
man must have a look at it. picions of the adversary and betray the
In addition to this, the approach direc­ attack.
th)l1, with its compass reading, must be 2. Rallging of the al'tillay alld heavy
gi"cn every unit down to the squad. No illfantry weapoi18.
. tmit must fail to advance in the direc­ The heavy weapons adjust their ranges
tIOn assigned to it. in an inconspicuous manner--!over a period
"Pathfinders" who have already famil­ of several days-so that they can support
iarized themselves with the terrain by the attack by counterfire on the enemy)s
ill'tion with patrols in the area, may be heavy weapons. This is done only after
employed as guides. the enemy has discovered the attack and
\\' e call attention here to the need for is attempting to repulse it.
radio compass equipment: a g'uide beam Also, during the days preceding the
will be transmitted by the guide apparatus attack, known, important enemy objectives
to thl' objective from the jumpoff position may be reduced by means of artillery fire
-hattalion combat post. A messenger or bombing by aviation without betraying
with a receiver will be with the attacking the coming attack by overly intensive
unit-a company or a platoon. This mes­ activity.
,enger picks up the guide beam-long 3. The attack.
tont'-with headphones and leads the way In contradistinction to a day attack,
by thi" means. If he gets off the beam, instead of being made over a broad front,
another signal-short tone-is heard in the attack is conducted by narrow wedges.
the reeeiver as a warning. In a battalion sector, for example, either
It is no longer possib:e, when guided a single company attacks or, at most, two
in this manner, to 'get off one's course, wedges are formed which, at first, will be
eV\'1l when compelled, momentarily, to de­ engaged on the two wings. In the first
. pall from it somewhat because of enemy case, the main body of the battalion which
~~. Bearings given by this method are, follows, rolls up the enemy position to
in .1 way, similar to those employed with right and left; in the second case, the ad­
air, Taft in a night landing at airfields. versary is to be held off toward the outer­
Thl- apparatus is also suitable for main­ sides and then when caught in a pincers
tail, Ill!!,' bearings in a smokescreen. movement, attacked in the center. The
'j he following auxiliary means may also first unit actually to make the penetra­
be lIsed for maintaining' and checking tion-platoon or company-assumes the
bea'lngs: (ask of providing security and protection
I' )"("('Iil'r fire.-During' daylight hours to the rear.
bUI Is of artillery fire are used to direct Again, in the case of an attacking com­
tm 'jlS . onto the objective. This same pany, only one platoon is in the advance
nWl'lOd can be used during a night at­ attack formation. It is unnecessary to
tat" although not too many rounds should have more than two squads alongside one
be ired as it will alert the enemy. another at the same time while effecting
1 '((cer (J mnwllitioll t/"O jectories.-A the penetration.
108 MILITARY REVIEW JULY 1955

When the attack wedge is too broad, tion, every squad then turns its attention
unity of action is impah;ed, vision is lack­ independently to the mission that has
ing, and it would be easy for one's own been assigned to it.
units to attack each other as a result of For all these reasons night attacks, in
mistaken identity. In addition, keeping many respects, possess a definite shock
the attacking wedge narrow better ensures character.
surprise. for an attacker advancing over The necessity of a good radio net\\'ork
a broad front at night would somewhere for tactical command down to the lewl of
betray his presence by noise. It is im­ the squad has already been pointed out,
possible. moreover. in the dark and with as well as the necessity for the assault
a broad front. to ensurc lateral cohesion infantry to be armed with as many ma­
for any considerable length of time. chine pistols and assault rifles as possible.
In the approach. until the enemy dis­
It may be briefly mentioned that a
covers the movl·ment. a great deal of time
may be consumed because of the need to night-sighting device for pistols. maehine
hep silent. The unloading of all firearms pistols, and assault rifles was tried out in
demanded in AI'III!I S,,,,,';('" .1/'"lIflll 1.IIi-fl. Armored Forces Officer Candidate School
Section 27H, during approach, has ~hown Number II in Wieschau in March l!I45.
itself to be entircly wrong in practice, It consisted simply of a flashlight which
~in('e it gives tlH' rifleman the feeling of was mounted on the banel of the weapon.
being' unarmed and, in the ease of the Thl' lamp was turned on by the trigger
enemy appearing' suddenly. instead of 1'('­ Illeehanism as the trigger slack was takel1
acting. the soldier b oblig'ed to seek cOVcr, up. The b('am at 55 yards had a dian1<'te1'
when' ht, lose~ valuable time loading his of only a hand's bl'l>adth, and practically
weapon. This order was I'ntil'l,ly disre­ repl'l'scn1<'d the Jine of sight. since the lamp
garded in practice. was mounted pant!!el with the barrel. If
Moreover. the command of the advance th" light beam was on the target, the tl'l[(­
squads 01' platoons is fadlitated by the gl'" was pulled farther back until the \\ "ap­
ritkmen advancing in rl'latively dose on was discharged. Aiming was, therefore.
ol'dc1' for the pcn..tration. The large dis­ surprisingly simple and required but little
tal!(,(, and intervals that must definitely time. The lamp was shut off by the dis­
be maintained in a daylight attack and eharge of the gun, whereupon, the rifle­
which are not diminished until imme­ man \\'a:< again left in thl' jJrotection of the
diatply prior to thl' penetration are omit­ darkness. The device was easily mOllnted
ted from the very beginning in night in place before the weapon was used and
attacks. The Rquads work their way to had the appearance of a telescopic s,ght.
the enemy position in single file and as Since it 'has never been used again. n"th­
close tog'ethel' as possible and spread out ing can be said of its actual value. and it
laterally only at thl' last possible moment would have to be tested again.
before 01' during the penetration 01' when If th" penetration has succeeded and
the enemy opens fire. if they are prema­ thl' enemy position has been seized, the
turely detected. If the attack is discov('red heavy infantry weapons will be brom~ht
prematurely. then no more time should be up. Thus, when morning arrives, they ",ill
lost' and the enemy engaged as soon as be in their new positions ready. il1nl1e­
possible in order to take best advantage diately, for new operations. dependil1~ on
or the period liming which the enemy must the intention of the command and the
al{'rt its units. situation. All things considered, the m~ht
After penetration into the first posi­ attack can be the initial phase of a m.dol'
 FOREiGN MILITARY DIGESTS 109
.breakthrough of an offensive. It' cracks "to be extremely difficult and the infantry
the enemy front and makes it possible for would also benefit from its use. This also
the attack reserves or armored units to was nev.er given a practical test in actual
break through the following' morning into operations.
the enemy's rear areas without delay. The
breakthrough battles which are often very Conclusions
costly to tanks are largely avoided in this In the event of a Soviet atta<;k, we may
way. In the case of a deeply organized look forward, with certainty, to supe­
sy,;tc:m of positions consisting of several riority on the part of the Soviet Army in
switch positions, a corresponding number a material sense-tanks, artillery, avia­
of attacks distributed over several nights tion, and manpower. For this reason, it
may precede this breakthrough. will be the more necessary for the Western
Assault guns for the support of the defender to take advantage of nighttime
infantry may be employed at night in very for all combat activity and movement.
brig-ht moonlight or on nights made Only by this means-and especially in at­
brig-ht by snow, in addition to those made tacks-can its own inferiority be com­
useful by the addition of night-sighting' pensated for and the valuable human ele­
appamtus or searchlights. In ordel' not to ment spared. In the future, as has been
betray the attack, the assault guns in a the case in the past, the infantrymen will
nig-ht attack must remain in the assembly have to count on attacking without ar­
pOSitIOn until the attacking infantry is morC'd support, as a rulC', but even then a
detl'ded or has broken into the enemy night attack without armored support but
posltitln. Not until this occurs, do they with few losses, is to be preferred to a
h'bten forward and join in the battle. daylight attack \vith armor and heavy
Th,'y are received, first, by the infantry. losses.
Thi, is accomplished by colored flash The increased qualifications necessary
sigllals and radio, a means by which they for night attacks necessitates a corre­
mtlllltain contact with the infantry. sponding revision of infantry training
.~ t the same time or later, they are with comprehensive trC'atment Qf this type
as'I~ned the task of providing support of fighting in the corresponding service
fOl the operation by an infantry com­ manuals. Up to the present time, the sub­
mander or by a previously attached liai­ ject of night combat has been dealt with,
XOIl dl:tachment. in a very superficial manner.
Operating -after the fashion of assault When the necessary training in daytime
det-,,'hments, the rifle squads, in conjunc­ has been completed, the major portion of
tion with the assault guns and after liqui­ the training on the terrain should be con­
dUI ',n of the enemy antitank guns, can ducted at night.
COil "lete the !'Oiling up of the enemy's In schooling fOI' night combat, special
ma -I line of resistance and complete the emphasis should be placed on training in
hI', kthrough of the main field of combat. the modes of action and conduct of the
searchlight was tested at the pre­ huntsman, on close combat, on shock de­
via ,ly mentioned school in Wieschau in tachment training, on training in orien­
191 for the combat of targets by assault tation, and in radio voice communication.
gll1 '. It, is mounted on the gun itself. The The unit which is to engage in night
te,!, tin is searched with it and the combat combat on its own initiative must be bet­
of al'gets up to 330 yards is made pos­ ter trained than a unit which fights at
sib, '. The hitting of such a searchlight night only because it is forced' to by the
wi: 1 any type of firearm showed itself enemy.
THE AMEIHCAN TRAnITION IN FOH­ A MILITARY HISTORY OF THE WEST.
EIGN POLICY. By Frank Tannenbaum. EHN WORLD. Volume I, From the Earliest
178 Pages. University of Oklahoma Press, Times to the Battle of Lepanto. By Major
Norman, Okla. $3.50. General J. F. C. Fuller. 602 Pages. Funk &
By COL JAMES E. MRZEK, luf Wagnalls, New York, $6.00.
By LT COL MARSHALL H. ARMOR, JR., A,.fy
Today, a g-reat debate is rag-ing on the
proper American approach to foreign af­ The "Unconventional Soldier," after 10
fairs, One school, Pl'Ollosing the "realis­ yeal'S of scholarly labor, has produced a
tic" approach, would invoke power politics. rather unconventional military history
The other, for which Professor Tannen­ whkh not only describes in detail the de­
baum is an eloquent spokesman, asserts, cbive battles of the Western World, but
"the democratic faith is the basis of every­ places those battles in historical perspec­
thing' we cherish and is the overriding tIve as to the political and economic uri­
law (If American polky both at home and gins--and effects-of the wars in which
abroad." they occulTec!.
Pl'OfcHsor Tannenbaum coneludes that Volume I beg-ins with the Battlt, of
"Ollr ideas of fo'reign policy are part and l\1t>giddo (Armav;eddon), where in 1479
par('('1 of our beliefs in human freedom, B. C. King' Thutmose I II of Egypt beat a
in ('quality of men, and the dignity and Syrian host with a kind of double enVl'lop­
independence of nations." His solution to ment and thereby beg'an his career as his­
OUl' dilemma is a fJedel'ation of t'qual na­ tOl'y'S tirst empire builder. It concludes
tions. with the Battle of Lepanto, 1571 A. n.,
\Yhile his logic is diftkult to' refute, where 200-odd galleys of the Holy L('a~ue
the fundamental qu('stion exists. Can we l'outpd a Turkish armada in the last gn'at
afford to apply our geneml time-tpstE'd clash between oar-propelled warships.
principlE'S derived in a world undergoing In the sweep of a,ooo years bet\\·, l'n
a g-ra<iiml metamol'phosis from the :vI iddle these two battles, General Fuller relates
Ages to the present one, where changes the wal's of the Western World, and ::2
in political, economic, and ideolog'ical other decisive battles, to the developl1ll'llt
spheres are moving at a rapidly acceler­ of civilization, and to the rise and de(·I'lle
ated pace? We must be certain we are of great states.
alert to the application of other methods Volume II of the set will end \\ \th
in assuring our security, as we have been the Battle of Waterloo, and Volume ill
to .the adaptation and integration into will carryon to the present. Toget11l'r,
our way of life of the technological ad­ the three books will undoubtedly cOB-ti­
vances in recent years. This book furnishes tute a history of wars and warfare wh rh
background to those involved in formulat­ should not be absent from any milit., ry
ing our foreign policies. library, public or private.
 BOOKS OF INTEREST TO THE MILiTARY READER 111
llac.\UTH'UU: 1941-1951: By Major General WITH CUSTER'S CAVALRY. By Kath­
Charles A. Willoughby and John Chamber­ erine Gibson Fougera. 285 Pages. The Calf­
lain. 441 Pages. McGraw-Hili Book Co., ton Printers, Ltd., Caldwell, Idaho. $3.00.
Inc.. New York. $5.75. By MAJ MARK M. BOATNER, III, Illf
By MAJ JEAN K. JONES, USAF Written from the diaries and in the
fhe book covers the decade during which person of the author's mother, this is
:lIueArthul"s history-making activities and the story of a young Army girl who left
colorful character made him one of the her family in Washington, D. C., for a
most famous and controversial figures of visit with her sister at FOI·t Lincoln, Da­
his century. kota, headquarters qf the 7th United
Thl' authors document these 10 years, States Cavalry. Brevet Major General
giving' new facts behind previously mis­ George Armstrong Custer was .in com­
undcrstood events, as well as presenting mand. The date was 18~4.
the l'xciting account of unusual Pacific "Western" addicts will be particularly
\\'ar activities not heretofore published. intrigued by this authentic narrative of
Of perhaps the greatest interest is the the Old West. Through the eyes of an
:llal'Arthul' side of the Korean conflict intelligent, cultured young woman we see
Il'uf{'·dismissal issues as presented by the the day-to-day life on an old Army post
authol's. The new perspectives offered and meet the officers of the 7th Cavalry.
hen' ,hould be of real interest to the mil­ This book's delightful literary style de­
ilm·,. ]'l'ader. serves special mention, In addition to its
THE FHENCH THE01tY OF THE NA­ intrinsic chal'm as a story of the Army'~
T10~ IN AUMS, 1866-1939. Edited by The "dim, dark days beyond recall," With Cl/.~­
Faculty of Political Scienee of Columbia fa',. CUl'fII,·y is of considel'8ble historical
l'niYersity. 305 Pages. Columbia t:ni\'ersity value.
Pre", :\' en- York. $4.50.
By ~IAJ H. R. DU LATTAY, FI'( Ilrh Arll1!! THE LOST VILLAGES OF ENGLAND.

By Maurice Beresford. 4-t.i Pages. Philo­

Tili, book is a remarkable analysis of sophical Library, New York. $12'.00.

the (oneept of the "nation in arms" and

By MAJ JOHN N. HIGHLEY, USAF
of it, evolution ill France, since the revo­
lutiollary period up to the collapse of Here is a new kind of history-not the
W41l history found in the usual college text,
TI,,· author shows the patriotic and but the story of the rise and fall of'
eg-al" a dan origins of the theory of the small villages and groups of people. It
\ Ilatioll in arms and describes its wcces­ is a book that must be digested and ac­
I me tages. He then traces the nefarious tually studied in order to receive the full
illfill' lice of the frequent political strug­ benefit of its pages.
gle, which gave birth to an incomplete
ano ' 'gid conception of the nation in arms, INDEX-DIGEST AND ANNOTATIOXS
and ','hich was largely responsible for the TO THE UNIFORM CODE OF l\llLlTAUY
jll'ev ,!ling defensive mentality of 1939. JUSTICE. By Colonel Lee S. Tillotson, USA,
TJ·, book will be of interest to the Retired. 505 Pages. The :Uilitary Service
stud, 'It of contemporary history, and es­ Publishing Company, 'Harrisburg, Pa. $4.00.
peri. ly' for the officer who, more than
any" ,c, must have a clear view of the FIFTY YEARS IN CHINA. By John Leigh­
intl'l ate complexity of the org'unization ton Stuart. 346 Pages. Random House, New
of a y nation in wartime. York. $5.00.
112 MILITARY REVIEW JULY 1955

THE nESEHVIST'S GUIDE .\~D nEC­ AIR COMMANDO. By Serge Vaculik.

ORD. By Major Daniel J. Kern and Lieu­ Translated by Edward Fitzgerald. 320 Pages.
tenant Commander George L. Cantzlaar. E. P. Dutton & Co., Inc.• New York. $UlO.
233 Pages. David McKay Co., Inc., New By MAJ FREDERICK A. SMITH, JR., lul
York. $3.50.
Air Cqmlllando is the remarkable story
By MAJ ELIZABETH A. RUTLEDGE, WAC'
of Serge' Vaculik, a former French para­
This volume is a compilation and dis­ chutist of Czechoslovakian origin who, in
cussion of public laws and service regu­ the days following the fall of France,
lations pertaining to reserve personnel of risked his life to escape from the Ger·
the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marines, and mans and join the Free French Force~ of
Coast Guard presented in question and General de Gaulle in London. The story
answer form. It reduces legal phra~eology takes the author through the renowned
to simple and readable terms. British commando and parachute training
It will be current, however, only for which he underwent in preparation for
as long as the Selective Sel'vice Act of secret operations on the Continent.
1948, the Reserve Officer Personnel Act The military highlight of the story is
of 1954, and the service regulations upon a sU('cessful raid in Normandy immedi·
which it is based n'main essentially un­ ately following the Allied invasion. Vacu­
chang·ed. It should be used as a guide lik with II other parachutists blows up
only, as the title indicates, and always a German supply train, an ammunition
in conjunction with the latest regulations dump, and an important railroad tunnel.
whenever a matter affecting a reservist's
status is at stake. JET. By Sir Frank Whittle. 320 Pages.
D.\S HEEH 1!1:l3-1945 (The .\rm~ 19:13-1945). J'hilosophical Library, New York, $6.00.
By Burkhart Mueller-Hillebrand. 187 Pages. By MAJ JACK D. STEVENS, ['SAl-'
E. S. Mittler 8; Son, Inc., Darmstadt, Ger­ In IH29, Royal Air Force Pilot Otlicer
many. $3.57.
Frank Whittle presented to the Air Minis­
By LT COL 'Y. f'. MAf:ATIIA!\', JR.. Arty
try a scheme for propelling aircraft with
In this book, the first of thrpe volumes, a gas turbine engine instead of the COll­
the author, a former German Major Gen­ ventiollal piston engine. The Air Ministry
eral, has sketched the development of the was still skeptical of the practicability
German Army from the Treaty of Ver­ of the "pure jet" engine and rejected the
sailles up to the outbreak of wal' in 193!l. idea. Although disappointed, Whittl" was
In ·crisp, clear language, Muellel'-Hille­ urged by friends to patcnt his idea, which
Lrand has given a comprehensive cover­ he did in 1930. Powered by an eng-ine
age of the following aspects of the Army's built by Whittle, the world's first SUt" ess·
resurgence: political factors; legal bases; ful jet aircraft made its maiden flight 11
organization, training, disposition, and ex­ years later.
pansion of the active and reserve forces; Jet is primarily the story behind this
mobilization planning in all its ramifica­ historic event and the suMequent d"vel­
tions; frontier defense; and command and opment of jet engines during World War
staff organization, including tables and ap­ II. It is highly recommended as worth·
pendices amplifying the text. while and entertaining reading for al!.
This book, written in the German lan­
guage, is a refreshing contrast to the THE CASE OF MRS. SURRATT. By GUY
weighty tomes the hard-pressed reader W. Moore. 142 Pages. University of Okla·
usually encounters in this field. homa Press, Norman, Okla. $3.00.
 Subscriptions to the MILITARY REVIEW may be obtained by
writing directly to the Editor, Military Review, Command and General
Staff College, Fort L€avenworth. Kansas. In the fpIlowing countries
subscriptions will be accepted at the addresses listed below:

Argentina Mexico
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da Guerra, Rio de Janeiro.
Air Force.
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cito, Departamento de Informa­ Lima.
ciones, Santiago. Ground Forc••
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ca del Estado Mayor General, Lima.
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litares del EBtado Mayor Ge­ Uruguay
neral, Ministerio de Defensa, Biblioteca de la' Inspeccion Ge­
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de Publicidad y Bibliografia, General. Ministerio de la De­
San Salvador. fensa Nacional. Caracas.

The MILITARY REVIEW and the Command and General Staff College assume no responsi­
MUty Cor the Cactual accuracy oC the inCormation contained in the MILITARY NOTES
AROUND THE WORLD and the FOREIGN MILITARY DIGESTS sections oC this publi­
ration. The items are printed for the purpose of stimulating discussion and interest, and no
official endorsement of the views, opinions. or factual statements is to be implied.-The Ji;tlitor.
 ,

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