FIRE DEPARTMENT CITY OF NEW YORK

SAFETY AND INSPECTION SERVICES COMMAND

INVESTIGA TIVE REPORT
QUEENS BOX 5-57512
12-20/22 ASTORIA BOULEVARD
JUNE 17,2001
CASE NUMBER 47-01
FATAL INJURY
FIREFIGHTER JOHN DOWNING
LADDER COMPANY 163
FIREFIGHTER BRIAN FAHEY
RESCUE COMPANY 4
FIREFIGHTER HARRY FORD
RESCUE COMPANY 4
VOLUME I
THE INVESTIGATION
I. SUMMARY
On Sunday June 17,2001, at 1420 hours, the Queens Communications Office of the New
York City Fire Department received a telephone alann, reporting a fire in a hardware store at 12
22 Astoria Boulevard. The dispatcher assigned Engine Company 260, Ladder Company 163 and
Battalion 45 to respond at 1421 hours.
Squad Company 288, which had taken up from a hazardous material incident in the area,
received a verbal report of a building fire. Squad Company 288 notified the dispatcher and
investigated. Arriving first at the scene, the Officer of Squad Company 288 investigated and
discovered that the location of the fire was actually 12-20 Astoria Boulevard. He notified the
dispatcher and initiated standard firefighting procedures.
The fire building was a two-story, non-fireproof structure, approximately 20 feet wide by
55 feet deep. A hardware store occupied the cellar, first and second floors. The cellar was used
for storage and the second floor contained office space and storerooms. The fire building was
attached on the exposure #2 side to a similarly constructed building (12-22 Astoria Boulevard).
This was a two-story, non-fireproof structure, approximately 51 feet wide by 60 feet deep,
irregular and triangular in shape. The exposure #2 building was occupied on the first floor and
cellar by the hardware store. The second floor of the building was used as a dwelling containing
two apartments. The fire building and exposure #2 were interconnected at both the first floor
and cellar levels. An opening of approximately 27 feet had been made on the first floor, joining
the two stores. A opening through the foundation wall had been made in the
ce]]ar. This opening was protected by a sliding metal fire door, which did not function because it
was blocked open with a piece of wood.
Squad Company 288 stretched a hoseline to the front entrance of the hardware
store and initiated forcible entry. Other units arrived and began operating at their assigned
locations. The front entrances were forced open. Squad Company 288 stretched their 2Y2-inch
hoseline through the main entrance of the hardware store (exposure #2). Hoselines also were
stretched to the rear exterior cellar entrance of 12-20 Astoria Boulevard. Searches were initiated
to identify the fire area and locate endangered occupants in the buildings. The location of the
fire was in the cellar, with possible extension up into the stores. The degree of fire invo]vement
could not be immediately determined. Smoke and heat were found at the top of the cellar stairs
in 12-22 Astoria Boulevard.
Two 2V2-inch charged hoselines were stretched into position. Squad Company 288
positioned one hoseline in the vicinity of the interior stairs to the cellar. Engine Company 262
posltioned the other hoseline in the vicinity of the rear exterior entrance to the cellar. Back-up
hoselines also were stretched to both locations. Battalion 49 believed that the attack on the fire
via the rear exterior cellar entrance would provide the safest path. Lines were in position, but
due to difficulties in gaining entry, no water was placed on the fire for approximately 25 minutes
preceding the explosion.
The door assembly at the rear exterior entrance to the cellar was very well secured in an
unconventional manner. Units ordered to gain entry used conventional forcible entry tools, a
rabbit tool, a power saw equipped with a metal cutting blade and a Hurst tool in a prolonged
effort to open this door. After 14 minutes of effort, Ladder Company 163 had partially opened
this door approximately 18 inches. The explosion occurred soon afterwards.
At approximately 1447 hours, a powerful explosion occurred in the cellars of both
buildings. The force of the explosion ejected some FDNY members out of and away from the
building. The wall on the 14th Street side of 12-22 Astoria Boulevard crumbled to the ground.
completely burying Firefighters Harry S. Ford of Rescue Company 4 and John J. Downing of
Ladder Company 163. Both succumbed to their injuries. The Outside Ventilation Firefighter of
Ladder Company 116 was partially buried under this collapsed wall and sustained serious injury.
The Lieutenant working in Ladder Company 163, who had been operating at the rear exterior
entrance to the cellar on exposure #3, was injured and knocked unconscious as a result of the
explosion. Both the Lieutenant from Ladder Company 163 and the Outside Ventilation
Firefighter from Ladder Company 116 were hospitalized in critical condition.
On the first floor of 12-22 Astoria Boulevard, Firefighter Brian D. Fahey of Rescue
Company 4 was thrown down the stairs into the cellar by the force of the explosion. He called
for help over his handie-talkie radio. All efforts to reach and rescue this member were
unsuccessful. Firefighter Fahey succumbed to his injuries. Fire Department EMS transported all
three Firefighters (Harry S. Ford, John J. Downing and Brian D. Fahey) to Elmhurst Hospital.
A rapidly expanding fire condition in the cellar, first and second floors of the fire
building and in exposure #2 followed the explosion and collapse. The threat and the occurrence
of a secondary collapse necessitated removal of all Firefighters from the front of both buildings
for a period of time. Many other Firefighters also were injured in the explosion. They were
removed to areas of safety, stabilized by EMS and transported to area hospitals.
As a result of the Safety and Inspection Service Command's investigation, 21
recommendations are made to improve fireground safety:
1. Implement a series of Chief Officer tactical training conferences with Command Chiefs.
2. Units commencing an interior attack optimally should start with a full SCBA air 2ylinder.
3. Reinforce to all members the requirement that they must communicate significant
fireground information to the Incident Commander.
4. Review the information contained in Professor Robert Zalosh's report, Backdraft
Explosion in June 17, 2001, Fire in Astoria Hardware Store, for possible inclusion into
department documents and training programs.
5. Train all Officers of the need to immediately transmit proper radio signals at incidents to
ensure that adequate resources are assigned and arrive in a timely manner.
6. Classify hardware stores as buildings or occupancies to be inspected annually.
7. Update and reissue Inspection Guides A-268 through A-299 as inspection forms.
8. Amend the Fire Prevention Manual, Chapter 8, to include actions that can be
implemented to assist units unable to achieve their fire prevention inspection objectives.
9. Train all members performing fire prevention inspections to be fully aware of conditions
that must be entered into the Critical fuformation Dispatch System (CIDS) and the effect
that CIDS information may have on Fire Department operations.
10. Train all members on the importance of recognizing and evaluating problems presented
by altered buildings and the proper reporting procedures required by Chapter 6 of the Fire
Prevention Manual.
:i of 68
11. Enhance the Department's Target Hazard Program and develop a standardized Target
Hazard pre-fire plan (template) specifying the type of data that must be included in the
plan.
12. Initiate a Quality Assurance Program to audit fire prevention inspections performed by
field units.
13. Develop a means of culling pertinent information for Fire Department purposes from the
Department of Building permits regarding alterations to buildings.
14. Review and update the lesson plans regarding fire prevention and inspection procedures
for both Probationary Firefighter School and 'First Line Supervisors Training Program.
15. Improve communications between the FieldlPublic Communications Unit and field units.
16. Improve the education and training program for Fire Protection Inspectors.
17. Improve the Bureau of Fire Prevention's Quality Assurance Program in order to provide
more thorough inspections by its Fire Protection Inspectors.
18. Review the methods by which Fire Protection Inspectors notify administrative units of
various conditions or hazards in buildings or occupancies.
19. Review and ensure that Fire Department documents arc current and complete regarding
hazards associated with commercial cellar fires and the precautions that can be taken to
reduce serious injury.
20. Review and ensure that Fire Department documents are current and complete regarding
the coordination of ventilation between the inside and the outside teams.
21. Instal! audio recorders in a11 Battalion vehicles to record handie-talkie transmissions.
II. THE INVESTIGATION
On June 17,2001. Firefighter John 1. Downing of Ladder Company 163, and Firefighters
Brian D. Fahey and Harry S. Ford of Rescue Company 4 responded to a stluctural fire at 12-20
Astoria Boulevard in the Borough of Queens. While operating at Box 55-7512, all three
Firefight.ers sustained fatal injuries.
Battalion Chief Lawrence Stack and Firefighter Brian Myers were on duty in the Safety
Battalion and responded to the fire on the second alarm. The Safety Battalion arrived on the
scene just as the front parapet wall of the two-SLOry building collapsed onto the sidewalk. The
time of their arrival was approximately 1502 hours. Chief Stack conducted a brief survey of the
scene and operated at the fTOnt entrance to the apartments where the attempted rescue of
Firefighter Brian Fahey was in progress. At approximately 1700 hours, Deputy Assistant Chief
Albert Turi of the Safety and Inspection Services Command requested the response to the scene
of on-duty Chief Officers with Safety Battalion experience and off-duty Chief Officers assigned
to the Safety Battalion. These Chief Officers were fonned into work groups and given specific
assignments. The assignments included documenting the scene, interviewing members,
collecting physical evidence, and visiting area hospitals to determine status of injured members.
The teams worked continuously throughout that day and night. On the following day. the
Safety team members pooled all their collected infonnation. The investigation continued
thereafter, led by Battalion Chiefs Lawrence Stack and Brian O'Flaherty, both of the Safety
Battalion. More than ] 00 interviews were conducted.
The following items, records, documents and photographs were collected, examined and
evaluated:
1) Building and Enforcement Records from FDNY Bureau of Fire Prevention and
Engine Company 262
2) The fire report
3) Bureau of Fire Investigation report
4) Communications records, including the incident history and FDNY radio
transmissions
5) Records of response from the Bureau of Emergency Medical Service
6) Office of the Chief Medical Examiner autopsy report and findings
7) Photographs of the fire building. adjacent areas, fire operations and equipment
5 of 68
8) Riding lists and duty rosters
9) Official weather reports
10) Newspaper articles
11) Injury reports
12) Videotapes provided by FDNY, members of Fire Department "buff' organizations
and other concerned citizens
13) Sketches, notes, and drawings made at the scene
14)Examination and documentation of certain items of Personal Protective Equipment
andlor tools recovered at the scene
15) Reports regarding serviceability and operability of certain tools used by members at
the scene (e.g., handie-talkie radios and self-contained breathing apparatus)
In addition, the following resources were used:
1) FDNY Audio Visual Unit
2) FDNY Communications and Telco Unit
3) FDNY Forensic Unit
4) FDNY Mask Service Unit
5) FDNY Bureau of Fire Investigation
6) FDNY Bureau of Fire Prevention
7) FDNY Special Operations Command personnel
8) FDNY Human Resources
9) FDNY Bureau of Training
10) Verizon Inc. personnel
11) Russo Contracting personnel (demolition contractor)
12) National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)
13) Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms
14) Worcester Polytechnic Institute
15) Study by Robert Zalosh, Backdraft Explosion in June 17. 2001 Fire at Astoria
Hardware Store (June 2002)
. 16) City of New York Department of Buildings
,.. _.r /0
Information from photographs, witness statements, videotapes, physical evidence and
general knowledge were coupled with the expertise of the investigative team of the Safety and
Inspection Services Command to develop a time sequence chart reconstructing the events leading
up to the fatal injuries.
The Safety and Inspection Services Command recognized the need to understand and
explain the causes and manner of the structural collapse that occurred at this fire. The assistance
of the Bureau of Fire Investigation and opinions of experts from outside the New York City Fire
Department were sought during the investigation.
Investigations of this magnitude and gravity disclose a number of inconsistencies and
conflicting statements in the witness interviews. It is the opinion of the investigative team that
these inconsistencies and conflicting statements regarding the fatal injuries, resulted from
varying memories, different perspectives and various emotional factors. They do not result from
any attempt to mislead or conceal facts.
NOTE: '---
The investigative team would have liked to interview certain members again, either to
obtain additional information andlor provide clarification of their earlier interviews. However,
these members died in the September 11,2001 terrorist attack on the World Trade Center.
In addition, the investigation of the fatal fire at Queens Box 55-7512 was interrupted and
delayed when, due to the attack on the World Trade Center, two members of the Safety Battalion
Investigative Team were fatally injured and three others sustained injuries of such magnitude
that they were unable to return to fun duty.
nI. PHOTOS OF 1220 AND 1222 ASTORIA
BOULEVARD
Exposure 1
8 of 68
Aerial View of Exposure 2
90f68
v. FDNY OPERATIONS
On June 17,2001, at 1420 hours, the Fire Communications Office of the New York City
Fire Department in the Borough of Queens received a telephone alarm, reporting a fire at
Astoria Boulevard. Engine Company 260, Ladder Company 163 and Battalion 45 were assigned
to respond at 1421 hours.
After taking up from a hazardous material incident on 21 sl Street and 28
th
A venue, Squad
Company 288 proceeded north on 14th Street to return to quarters. As the Company approached
Astoria Boulevard, a civilian stopped them and informed them that there was a fire in a building.
At 1422 hours the Squad Company 288 Officer informed the dispatcher via Department radio
that they were stopping to investigate a verbal alarm for a fire in a store located at Astoria
Boulevard and Ith Street. Squad Company 288 was assigned to the Box.
Based on this second source, the dispatcher filled out the assignment with the units that
became available from the hazardous material incident. Engine Company 262, Ladder Company
117 and Battalion 49 were assigned to respond.
On arrival, a civilian took the Squad Company 288 Officer to the rear of the fire building
by going through the basement of 12-18 Astoria Boulevard (exposure #4). After exiting out into
the rear yard, the civilian brought the Officer to the rear exterior cellar door of 12-20 Astoria
Boulevard. The Squad Company 288 Officer heard fire crackling behind the cellar door. I He
called the Squad Company 288 Chauffeur on the handie-talkie radio and told him to transmit a
10-75 signal. The time was 1424 hours. Transmission of the 10-75 signal prompted the
response of Engine Company 312, Ladder Company 116 as the original FAST Unit, and Rescue
Company 4.
The fire building, 12-20 Astoria Boulevard, was a two-story, class 3,
structure, approximately 20 feet wide by 55 feet deep. This building was adjacent to the last
building in a row of similar buildings on that block. The first floor was used as a hardware store
and the cellar was used for storage. The second floor was used as office and storage space for
the hardware store. Access to the second floor was via an exterior door on the exposure #1 side
I Two mischievous teenagers were appJying graffiti near the rear exterior cel1ar door of 12-20 Astoria Boulevard
when they spilled over a can of gasoline. The spilled gasoline flowed under the rear door and was ignited by lhe
pilot flame of the gas-fed hot water heater.
1? (\f f\R
that led to a stairway. There was also a spiral stair within the store that went up to a second-floor
office/storage area.
Exposure #2 (12-22 Astoria Boulevard) was attached to the fire building. It was the
corner building on that block. It was a two-story, class 3, non-fireproof su-ucture, approximately
51 feet wide by 60 feet deep, triangular in shape, with the same hardware store occupying the
first floor. The cellar was used for storage for the hardware store. An opening in the foundation
wall approximately interconnected the cellars of the two buildings 12-20 and 12-22
Astoria Boulevard (Appendix B). This opening was protected by a sliding meta] fire door. At
the the fire, the fire door was blocked open by a piece of wood in such a way that
prevented it from functioning properly. Both buildings also were interconnected on the first
floor by an opening approximately in the common wall, thereby creating one large
store (Appendix B). The second floor of the exposure #2 building was used as a dwelling
containing two apartments. Access to these apartments was via an exterior door on the exposure
#1 side that led to a stairway.
The fire occurred on a Sunday afternoon. The hardware store was closed for business
and well secured. Metal roll-down gates covered the front entrances to the hardware store.
Access to the rear yard via 14th Street was secured by a large roll-down gate (to accommodate
delivery trucks) and a doorway for personnel. Neither the 12-20 nor 12-22 Astoria
Boulevard building had a sprinkler or standpipe system. A detailed history of the Fire
Prevention
2
inspections and enforcement actions for the two buildings is found in Appendix F.
Initial Operations
Members of Squad Company 288 started to stretch a 1 %-inch hoseline, but dropped it and
stretched a 2V2-inch hoseline when the Officer told them that the fire was in the store. Squad
Company 288 initiated forcible entry to the store at. 12-22 Astoria Boulevard because a civilian
told them that this was the main entrance to the hardware store. A hoseline was
stretched into 12-22 Astoria Boulevard. There was a Jight to medium smoke condition and the
hoseline was positioned in the vicinity of the interior entrance to the cellar stairs.
3
'2 Whenever the lerm "Fire Prevention" is used in the context of this report, it is to denote building inspection
performed by field units per Ole Fire Prevention Manual and also inspections performed by Fire Protection
Inspectors assigned to the Bureau of Fire Prevention .
.3 There was a stair to the cellar in 1220 Astoria Boulevard ("fire building"), but that cel1ar stairway had been closed
off prior to the fire. Heavy storage of stock piled on and in these stairs completely blocked this way to the cellar.
1 q off\R
The assigned FAST Unit. Ladder Company 116 was the first Ladder Company to arrive on the
scene and immediately began operations.
4
The apparatus initially was positioned on Astoria
Boulevard. Since overhead wires prevented use of the aerial ladder at this location, a 35-foot
extension ladder was raised for roof access. The Forcible Entry Team assisted Squad Company
288 in forcible entry operations at the front of 12-22 and 1220 Astoria Boulevard. The Ladder
Company 116 Officer quickly surveyed conditions on the second floor before immediately
rejoining his Forcible Entry Team. Upon gaining entry the Ladder Company 1] 6 Officer and
Forcible Entry Team entered the hardware store to vent, search and locate the fire. The Ladder
Company 116 Outside Ventilation Firefighter initially went with the Ladder Company 116 Roof
Firefighter to the roof via the portable ladder. The Ladder Company 116 Outside Ventilation
Firefighter then descended the same ladder and proceeded around the 14lh Street side to the rear
of the buildings to assist in operations. The Ladder Company 116 Chauffeur repositioned the
apparatus onto 14th Street and raised the aerial ladder to the roof of exposure #2.
Ladder Company 117 arrived as the second Ladder Company. The Officer and Forcible
Entry Team ascended the stairway to the second-floor apartments at 1222 Astoria Boulevard.
InitialJy. there were no reports of any fire extension to the upper floors of either building. Due to
the light smoke condition, windows on the second floor were removed instead of broken. The
Ladder Company 117 Outside Ventilation Firefighter forced the roll-down gate on 14th Street,
which provided access to the rear yard, and operated at that location. The Ladder Company 117
Roof Firefighter assisted the Ladder Company] 16 Roof Firefighter in roof operations. The
Ladder Company 117 Chauffeur assisted in forcible entry of the front doors, raised a 24-foot
extension ladder to the second floor and assisted in operations in the apartments.
Battalion 49 arrived as the first Chief Officer on the scene at 1425 hours and observed a
light smoke condition in front of the buildings. The Chief walked around to the exposure #2 side
(14
th
Street) and was taken by a civilian to the rear yard. As he walked on 14th Street, the Chief
noticed that the streetsloped downward. In the rear yard, both the fire building and the exposure
#2 building were three stories high with the cellar fonning the additional story. The civilian
explained that the fire was just inside the rear exterior door to the cellar of 12-20 Astoria
Boulevard. The manner of extension and degree of extension to the exposure #2 building could
not be immediately. There was no door to the rear yard from the exposure #2 (12-22
Astoria Boulevard) building.
4 Ladder 115 subsequently was dispatched as the replacement FAST Unit,
Engine Company 262 arrived as .the second Engine Company (Squad Company 288
arrived first and stretched the first hoseline) and was directed by Battalion 49 to stretch a
'hoseline to exposure #3. Engine Company 262 proceeded to stretch to the rear of the building
the 1
3
A-inch hoseline that Squad Company 288 initially had stretched. The Officer of Engine
Company 262 after sizing up the situation at this location directed two of his members to stretch
a 21h-inch hoseline to replace their initial hoseline.
Engine Company 260 arrived as the third Engine Company and assisted Engine Company
262 in their stretching the 13A-inch hoseline and the 2Y2-inch hoseline. Engine Company 262
manned the 2Yz-inch hoseline and Engine Company 260 manned the l.!-inch hoseline. Shortly
thereafter, the Officer of Engine Company 260 directed his members to stretch another 21h-inch
hoseline to the exposure #3 location.
Hazardous Material Company 1 was passing the scene after taking up from the previous
hazardous material incident and reported to Battalion 49 to see if they could be of any assistance.
Battalion 49 directed them to the rear exterior cellar door of the fire building (exposure #3).
Hazardous Material Company 1 assisted in forcing access to the rear yard and was directed by a
civilian to the location of the fire.
Ladder Company 163 arrived as the third Ladder Company and positioned the apparatus
on J4th Street near the corner of exposures #2 and #3. This position facilitated ventilation of rear
windows in the fire building, access to the roof and eventuaHy tower ladder stream operations
into the rear of the fire building. Battalion 49 assigned Ladder Company 163 to also perform
forcible entry of the rear exterior cellar door to the fire buiJding.
Engine Company 312 was the fourth Engine Company to arrive and was directed by
Battalion 49 to assist in the hoseline stretches. Engine Company 312 eventually stretched a
2Y:z-iuch hoseline to the front of the building.
Battalion 45 arrived as the second Battalion on the scene at 1430 hours. Battalion 49
directed Battalion 45 to supervise operations in the rear of the fire building (exposure #3).
Initial Operations in Hardware Store and Second Floor
After forcing entry to the main entrance of the hardware store at 12-22 Astoria
Boulevard, Ladder Company 116 and Squad Company 288 entered the store. Squad Company
288 located the interior door leading to the cellar stairs about 30 feet into the store. Ladder
Company 116 began a search of the hardware store in a smoke condition without excessive heat
150f68
and reached the rear wall of the store: Ladder Company 116 then went to the location of the
door leading to the interior cellar stairs. The Ladder Company 116 Officer opened this interior
door and observed flames behind it. There was no charged hoseline yet in position, so he closed
the door and continued the search of the hardware store. Squad Company 288 charged their 2Y2
inch hoseline and positioned it to allow advancement down the cellar stairs.
It was determined that the fire was in the celJar below them and had not extended to the
first floor. Returning to the location of the intell0r stairs, the Ladder Company 116 Officer
opened the door a second time and observed heavy, black smoke and no flames. He heard
Battalion 49 say to keep the interior cellar door closed, since an exterior entrance was found and
the Chief did not want opposing hoselines operating. Battalion 49 had entered the hardware
store and informed Squad Company 288 that a hoseline would be coming in from a rear exterior
cellar entrance. The Squad Company was to hold its present position and protect tJle intelior
cellar stairs from any extension of fire.
When it was transmitted over the handie-talkie radio that the operating units at the
exposure #3 location were having difficulty gaining entry, the Ladder Company 116 Officer
opened the interior cellar door a third time and entered the cellar stair enclosure. Obstructions
were removed from within the strur enclosure. There was shelving filled with stock on both
sides of the enclosure leading to the stairway. The Ladder Company 116 Officer attempted to
descend the cellar stairs, but noted that a piece of plywood was placed over the steps, thereby
creating a slide. The plywood was then turned sideways and removed. The Ladder Company
116 Officer descended halfway down the stairs. There was no visibility and conditions were
worsening. The stairway was narrow and cluttered. Popping sounds were heard coming from
the cellar. These sounds were similar to electrical arcing or an electrical transformer fire. The
popping sounds were almost constant. The investigativc tcam of the Safety and Inspection
Services Command believes that bursting aerosol cans of paint and other materials caused these
popping sounds.
Rescue Company 4 arrived on the scene at 1430 hours. The Rescue Company 4 Officer
and Can Firefighter entered the hardware store via the 12-20 Astoria Boulevard address. The
Rescue Company 4 Can Firefighter searched the hardware store with the thermal imaging
camera (TIC) and asked why the units were not advancing down the cellar stairs with the
hoseline. The Squad Company 288 Officer informed him that Battalion 49 ordered the Squad
Company to hold their position. The smoke condition worsened. The smoke behind the interior
.,,. _ r rn
cellar door was puffing and smoke was pushing up through cracks in the floor. At one point, the
door blew open and blue flames filled the lower half of the doorway. Just as the Squad
Company 288 Nozzle Firefighter was about to open the hoseline, the flames went out. The fire lit
up again and this time orange flames filled the entire door opening. The Squad Company 288
Nozzle Firefighter operated the hoseline for a few seconds and knocked down the fire. The
flames did not seem normal. The hoseline then was operated for a few more seconds. The
members recalled that flames were blue and then later orange. The smoke had an unusual odor
or smell, not the odor of regular smoke from burned wood.
Taking the hoseline down the cellar stairs was discussed. However, due to the
narrowness of the cellar stairway and the stock load, it was believed that there would be great
difficulty evacuating the cellar should the need arise. Squad Company 288's hoseline was
backed away from the stair enclosure.
Handie-talkie transmissions indicated that the units in the rear would be operating on the
fire shortly. At about this time, Battalion 49 entered the store again. The Chief conferred with
Squad Company 288 and told them to continue holding their position since a hoseline would be
coming in from the rear.
Ladder Company 117 performed vent and search operations of the second-floor
apartments at 12-22 Astoria Boulevard. Initially, the smoke condition was light and windows
were removed instead of broken. Ladder Company 117 had operated there for about 20 minutes
when the explosion occurred. During that time, the smoke became heavier, but no fire was
discovered on that level. Ladder Company IITs Forcible Entry Team and Chauffeur performed
searches at that location. At various times members from other units (Ladder Company] 16,
Rescue Company 4, Squad Company 288, Hazardous Material Company 1 and Engine Company
312) operated in these apartments. Firefighter Brian Fahey of Rescue Company 4 and the Squad
Company 288 Control Firefighter examined the second floor of the fire building (12-20 Astoria
Boulevard). The Roof Firefighters from Ladder Company 1] 6, Ladder Company 117, Ladder
Company 163 and Rescue Company 4 vented the skylights and scuttle covers. The smoke
condition was light on the roof during the early stages at this operation.
17 of 68
Initial Operations in the Rear
The rear exterior door to the cellar of the fire building ( 1 2 ~ 2 0 Astoria Boulevard) was a
wooden door covered with sheet metal. It opened inwardly. This door was recessed in the
foundation wall, making forcible entry operations more difficult. Behind this exterior door was a
heavy gauge iron gate, covered with steel plating. Securing the iron gate were two flat steel bars
placed horizontally across the gate, approximately one-third the distance from the top and bottom
of the gate. These bars were held in place by brackets on both sides of the door that were bolted
through the foundation wall. In addition, there were two vertical steel rods, approximately
3/4 inch thick placed against the horizontal bars and secured into the floor and top of the
opening.
Using conventional forcible entry tools (axe and halIigan tool, commonly referred to as
the irons), Hazardous Material Company 1 initially started forcible entry of the rear cellar door.
The first member forcing the door heard popping sounds coming from the cellar and noted a light
smoke condition. The Hazardous Material Company 1 Officer heard a strange sound like water
hitting the rear door from the inside and thought that Squad Company 288 must be using water.
Ladder Company 163, assigned forcible entry operations at the exposure #3 location in addition
to Hazardous Materials Company I, also initially used their normal forcible entry tools, but
switched to a power saw with a metal cutting blade when the irons proved unsuccessful. The
saw blade quickly wore down after a small triangular hole was partially cut into the metal
covering the door. Members of Ladder Companies 116 and 117 soon joined the above members.
Battalion 45 supervised the operations at the exposure #3 location. Little headway was
made using the Rabbit Too] on the sides of the door. It was then decided 10 try the Hurst Tool.
Firefighter John Downing, Ladder Company 163 Chauffeur brought the Hurst Tool to the rear
exterior cellar door. Ladder Company 163 members started to operate the Hurst Tool at
approximately 1440 hours. The Hurst Tool was only partially successful in opening the two
doors. The outer door was well secured and the steel bars securing the inner iron-gate would not
yield completely.
Initially, there was a light brownish/yellow smoke condition at the rear door location.
This smoke had an unusual smell and taste. According to one Firefighter, the smoke condition
actually became lighter in this area as units operated. As the forcible entry operation progressed,
1n_rLn
members noticed that water was hitting the inside of the rear cellar door. It was assumed that. an
interior hoseline was in place and hitting the fire, however this assumption was incorrect.
After operating at the scene for approximately 14 minutes, Ladder Company 163 was
able to open the cellar door approximately 18 inches. The Ladder Company 163 Officer and
Battalion 45 Chief squeezed into the cellar. There was a light smoke condition "hanging" mostly
at the ceiling level. The smoke wasn't pushing and it wasn't under pressure. There was stock
burning in the cellar. The Ladder Company 163 Officer used the thermal imaging camera and
saw "red" up at the ceiling level, which indicat.es high heat levels. As Battalion 45 and the
Ladder Company 163 Officer entered the cellar, water was coming down on them from above
and also hitting the inside of the door. It was believed that a unit had water on the fire. The
Ladder Company 163 Officer believed that the fire had been knocked down and that his unit
would be used to overhaul. The investigative team of the Safety and Inspection Services
Command believes that the water was coming from burst water lines in the ceiling area, perhaps
water lines leading to the hot water heater.
Battalion 45 surveyed the situation and felt that the limited access and egress provided by
the partially opened door presented an unacceptable danger to members who would operate in
this area. Before Battalion 45 would allow the Engine Company to enter the cellar with the
hoseline, Ladder Company 163 was directed to remove the door completely. Ladder Company
163 members resumed cutting the steel rods. Battalion 45 now notified Battalion 49 that there
was partial access in the rear and it would take a few more minutes to remove the door.
Battalion 45 also mentioned that an oifbumer or tank was blocking their path inside the cellar.
There was a gas boiler and a water heater to the right, just inside the door to the cellar. The time
was now approximately 1446 hours.
Initial Operations on Exposure #2 Side
On the 14
tb
Street side of 12-22 Astoria Boulevard were two cellar windows accessible
from the sidewalk. The top of these windows was about waist high. Each was enc10sed in a
steel bar cage. Galvanized tin covered each window opening.
Venting the cellar area was important to allow members to advance the hoseline into the
cellar. Firefighters Harry Ford of Rescue Company 4 and John Downing of Ladder Company
163 worked together at this location. They operated Rescue Company 4's Hurst Tool to force
the steel bars on the rear-most window. When the tin was being removed from this opening, a
190f68
greenish/yellow smoke appeared for about 10 seconds. Later, the smoke was light in color and
came out from the top of the window. Firefighters Harry Ford and John Downing then
proceeded to the front most window. When the tin was being removed from this opening, a
greenish/yellow smoke appeared for about 20 seconds. Later, the smoke became darker and
came out from the top half of the window. The smoke was not rolling and it was not being
driven or forced out. The Ladder Company 116 Outside Ventilation Firefighter was now
operating at the rear most window on the 14th Street side, pushing one-gaBon yellow cans from
the shelving inside the window to better vent the opening.
The Engine Company 260 Officer was walking to the rear on the 14th Street side when
Firefighter John Downing told him, "I don't see any fire, but it's pushing like helL"
Prior to Explosion
Battalion 49 conferred with Battalion 45 several times regarding progress in the rear
(exposure #3). Battalion 45 reported that units finally were getting in, but an "oil burner or tank"
was blocking their access. Battalion 49 decided that he no longer could delay attacking the fire.
Battalion 49 entered the store and infonned Squad Company 288 to get ready to advance the
hoseline down the interior stairs. The Squad Company 288 Officer instructed members to check
the amount of air remaining in their cylinders. All members had about one-half tank left in their
45-minute cylinders. The Squad Company 288 Officer then gave the members the necessary
instructions for hoseline advancement down the cellar stairS. At this timet the Squad Company
288 Nozzle Firefighter remembered hearing a vibralert sound, and then shortly thereafter another
vibralert sounded nearby. These were apparently the vibralert's of the Ladder Company 116
Officer, and the Ladder Company 116 Irons Firefighter.
Battalion 49 ordered a hoseline stretched to back up Squad Company 288's position.
Ladder Company 116 was low on air by this time as the Ladder Company 116 Officer's vibralert
was sounding and Ladder Company 116 Irons Firefighter had about one-quarter tank of air
remaining. The Ladder Company 116 Can Firefighter had exited the hardware store earlier to
replace his own cylinder,
The Engine Company 260 Nozzle Firefighter was standing by at the rear exterior door
with the hoseline when he noticed that the smoke from the rear of the first floor looked greenish
and heavy, similar to "pea soup," The Engine Company 260 Officer noticed that greenish/brown
smoke was coming out windows in the rear on all floors prior to the explosion, The Engine
Company 260 Chauffeur stated that the explosion occurred within a short time after Firefighters
Han), Ford and John Downing had vented the two cellar windows on the 14th Street side. The
Ladder Company 163 Officer stated that the explosion occurred about two to three minutes after
the rear door was partially forced open.
The Rescue Company 4 Floor Above Firefighter, who was operating in the second-floor
apartments of 12-22 Astoria Boulevard (exposure #2), notified his Officer via hand ie-talkie of an
odor of varnish. In less than one minute after this transmission, the explosion occurred.
The Ladder Company 116 OUlside Ventilation Firefighter was perfonning fUither
ventilation of the rear-most cellar window on the 14th Street side. He heard either Firefighter
Harry Ford or Firefighter John Downing shout, "It's going to blowl" He does not know what
Firefighter Harry Ford or Firefighter John Downing saw that prompted tbis response. Ladder
Company 116 Outside Ventilation Firefighter "took two steps" away from the building and heard
"a deep, hollow boom." The next thing he remembered was the wall falling on him.
A witness noticed that heavy yellowlbrown smoke was coming from the rear-most cellar
window on the 14th Street side. There was no visible fire, only smoke. The Ladder Company
116 Outside Ventilation Firefighter was operating there to vent the window. The witness stated
that in less than one minute after he noticed the heavy smoke, the explosion occurred.
While perfonning a size-up of the fire operation, Division 14 realized more help would be
necessary and directed the Division 14 Firefighter to transmit a second alarm. The Firefighter
started to walk toward the Battalion 49 car when suddenly a violent explosion occurred. The
time was approximately 1447 hours.
The Explosion
Exposure #1 Side
Members operating in the front of the building were blown off their feet as a result of the
explosion. A member operating on the front sidewalk reported that he was thrown 15 feet into
the street; another member operating in the hardware store was blown out onto the front
sidewalk. One member described hearing a sound like a jet engine just prior to being thrown out
into the street. The force was described as a strong gust of wind and debris. A fireball was seen
coming from the hardware store. When the Division 14 Firefighter recovered, he ran to the
Hazardous Material Company apparatus across the intersection and requested a full second alarm
from the Queens dispatcher. The second alarm was transmitted at 1448 hours. The Division 14
21 of6&
Firefighter also infonned the dispatcher that there had been a major explosion. Under orders
from Division 14, the Battalion 49 Firefighter transmitted the following to the Queens
dispatcher: "We're going to go to a fourth alarm. We've had an explosion; exposure #2
collapsed. We may have members underneath debris, K." Battalion 49 also requested the
response of EMS due to many injured members. A member of Hazardous Material Company ]
transmitted a request to the dispatcher for two additional Rescue Companies. He also stated that
Firefighters were possibly trapped.
At the time of the explosion, a police officer was standing on the sidewalk near the front
of the building. He stated that the ground shook and there was a sound like thunder. He then felt
a rush of air "almost like a vacuum" pulling him toward the building. Then, everything blew out
at him.
Fire Building and Exposure #2 Building
The Ladder Company 116 Officer and Irons Firefighter were preparing to exit the
hardware store and replenish their air supply when the explosion occurred. The explosion was
described by members in the store as a rumbling sound, followed by the floor suddenly lifting
upward about three feet. All members were thrown to the ceiling. When they fell to the floor,
some thought they were in the cellar. Debris and inventory were falling on them.
Members in the second-floor apartment were thrown violently upward as the floor rose
several feet. In the cellar of 12-22 Astoria Boulevard, the explosion lifted the ceiling upward. A
lally column supporting the girder was lifted upward and pulled several inches out of its base in
the concrete flooring. As the ceiling rose, a steel bolt holding the column to the girder snapped.
Exposure #2 Side (14
th
Street)
The Ladder Company 117 Irons Firefighter, operating in the second floor apartment of
exposure #2, was blown out of a window opening. He landed and rolled head over heels on the
collapsed pile of bricks on 14th Street. The entire exposure #2 wall of 12-22 Astoria Boulevard
seemed to lift up and collapse. A witness described seeing a blue/white flash, similar to a flash
bulb going off at the roofline and all around the perimeter of the wall. This occurred as the wall
was lifting up. It exhibited a "halo effect." Two witnesses described the exposure #2 wall of
12-22 Astoria Boulevard as that it had "come out at the bottom followed by the collapse of the
entire upper section of the wall". The upper two stories of the wall then broke and fell in a
cUltain-fall type collapse. An EMS member standing on the 14th Street side stated that the wall
fell in a wave. burying everyone on that side. Losing the support of the wall, the roof and second
floor sagged toward 14th Street. The debris covered the area from the foundation wall out past
the curb line.
Firefighters Harry Ford of Rescue Company 4 and John Downing of Ladder Company
163 were operating to vent the front-most window on that side. Both Firefighters Harry Ford
and John Downing were completely bUlied under the falling bricks of the exposure #2 waIL The
Ladder Company 116 Outside Ventilation Firefighter was buried up to his chest with bricks and
a sign across his body, possibly fTom the side ofthe building. Fire now appeared on the first and
second floors on the 14th Street side, accompanied by a heavy smoke condition.
Exposure #3 Side
On the exposure #3 side, bricks fell from the rear wall of the buildings. There was black
smoke, followed by a force that pushed members backward. Members forcing the rear exterior
cellar door were thrown off their feet and back into the rear yard. The Ladder Company ] 63
Officer was covered with debris and rendered unconscious. A large section of the rear wall of
12-20 Astoria Boulevard was pushed outward and in immediate danger of further collapse.
Battalion 45 ordered the units to account for their members. All members were removed from
the rear yard.
Conditions on the Roof
At the roof level, there had been a minor smoke condition and members were opening
skylights and scuttle covers. Fortunately, no members were on the roof of 12-22 Astoria
Boulevard when the explosion occurred. There was a parapet wall separating the roofs of 12-20
and 12-22 Astoria Boulevard. There was heavy smoke pushing from the chimney above the roof
of 12-20 Astoria Boulevard. Suddenly the roof shook and members were knocked back either on
or off their feet. An extremely heavy smoke condition occurred at the entire roof level. The
Ladder Company 116 Roof Firefighter noticed that the roof of 12-22 Astoria Boulevard was
gone. Actually, the roof of 12-22 Astoria Boulevard was sagging downward toward the 14th
Street side, and was not visible to the Ladder Company 116 Roof Firefighter. There was fire and
heavy smoke showing as roof cuts were made. There was heavy fire coming up from the rear of
230f68
the building. The members continued cutting holes on the roof of 12-20 Astoria Boulevard.
Shortly afterward, Division 14 ordered everyone off the roof.
Rescue Operations
After recovering from the initial impact of the explosion, the Deputy Chief of Division 14
ran to the corner of 14th Street. He saw that the entire wall on 14th Street had collapsed. Division
14 immediately told the BattaHon 49 Firefighter to transmit a fourth alarm and inform the
dispatcher that there was an explosion, a major collapse with members trapped and that EMS
was needed. The fourth alarm was transmitted at 1449 hours and the fifth alarm was transmitted
at 1452 hours.
Injured members appeared on the first and second floors. Members of Squad Company
288, Rescue Company 4 and Ladder Company 116 were trying to make their way out of the
hardware store via the collapsed wall opening on 14th Street or through the front doorway. Many
members came to their aid and assisted them to safety. There were injured members of Rescue
Company 4 and Ladder Company 117 hanging from debris at the edge of the opening on the
second floor (14
th
Street side). Portable ladders were raised on the exposure #1 and #2 sides to
facilitate members' escape. . Members operating at the exposure #3 location also were injured.
The Lieutenant working in Ladder Company 163, who was operating by the rear exterior cellar
entrance, was critically injured and rendered unconscious. He was removed by less seriously
injured members to an awaiting EMS ambulance and was en route to New York Cornell Hospital
at 1458 hours.
Division 14 attempted to control the handie-talkie network and ordered the roll caJJ of all
units. When it was determined that Firefighter Brian Fahey of Rescue Company 4 was trapped
in the cellar, Ladder Company 115, the FAST Unit, and Squad Company 41 were assigned to
this rescue operation. Witnesses reported to Division 14 that several members had been working
on the 14th Street side where the wall had collapsed. Division 14 assigned members and units to
search that area. Initially, there were several reports of other missing members. During and after
the ron call, some of the missing members were accounted for. Division 14 now was aware that
Rescue Company 4 was missing two members and that Ladder Company 163 was missing one
member. Division 14 also was aware that one member was trapped in the cellar and that two
members were buried in the rubble of the collapsed wall.
The Ladder Company 116 Officer informed Division 14 that a large section of the front
wall on 12-22 Astoria Boulevard was leaning and in danger of collapse. Division 14 ordered
everyone in that area evacuated. The wall section fell to the sidewalk shortly thereafter. Some
people interviewed descIibed a second explosion. This collapse of the front parapet wall was
probably the noise that they perceived as a "second explosion".
Firefighter Brian Fahey of Rescue Company 4 was seen at various locations while
operating at this fire. Prior to entering the first floor of the fire building, the Rescue Company 4
Officer noticed Firefighter Brian Fahey and the Rescue Company 4 Floor Above Firefighter at
the main entrance to the hardware store. This is where Squad Company 288's hoseline was
positioned. Hazardous Material Company 1 Decon 1 then observed Firefighter Brian Fahey re
entering the first floor of the fire building (12-20 Astoria Boulevard).
After completing ventilation of the storefront of exposure #2, the Squad Company 288
Door Firefighter observed Firefighter Brian Fahey attempting to force the exterior entrance to the
stairway leading to the second floor of the fire building. Firefighter Brian Fahey, along with the
Squad Company 288 Control Firefighter forced entry of this exterior entrance to the second
floor, and searched the second floor storage area. Upon completion they exited this building and
operated in the second-floor apartment of exposure #2 (12-22 Astoria Boulevard). The Squad
Company 288 Control Firefighter returned to the hardware store on the first floor when informed
via handie-talkie radio that Squad Company 288 was going to take their hose line inlo the cellar.
It appeared that Firefighter Brian Fahey also exited the second-floor apartment and entered the
hardware store.
The Rescue Company 4 Officer was operating in the hardware store in the vicinity of the
opening that connected both stores. Just prior to the explosion, the Rescue Company 4 Officer
heard Firefighter Brian Fahey's voice coming from the area in 12-22 Astoria Boulevard, forward
of Squad Company 288's position. The explosion lifted the floor, throwing everyone about. It is
believed that Firefighter Brian Fahey was thrown down the stairs and landed on the floor in the
cellar, however no one witnessed this event.
In the post-fire investigation, the investigative team of the Safety and Inspection Services
Command found a Halligan tool on the landing leading to the interior ceUar stairs. The Halligan
tool had a bJue marking of the type used by Rescue Company 4. Also, an axe marked and
a handlight were found on the cellar floor near the base of the stairs. A work glove with the
initials "BP' was recovered on that stair under the debris. Considering the fire conditions prior
?" of
to the explosion. the investigative team believed that Firefighter Brian Fahey never would have
descended that stairway voluntarily without his Halligan tool. Firefighter Brian Fahey was
injured and trapped in the cellar at the bottom of these stairs.
A fireball came out the front of the store during the explosion. A pushing black smoke
followed and fire eventually engulfed the entire store. The fire was unusual in that it was
pushing in and out. Fire a]so erupted on the exposure #2 (l4
lh
Street) and exposure #3 sides.
Hoselines and Jarge-caliber streams were assembled and put into operation on the exposure #1
(Astoria Blvd.), #2 and #3 sides. Ladder Company 163 operated their tower ladder stream into
the rear of the top floor of the fire building.
Rescue Operations for Firefighter Brian Fabey
The Rescue Company 4 Officer conducted a roll call of his members via handie-talkie
radio. Firefighter Brian Fahey of Rescue Company 4 responded, "Rescue Irons, rm trapped in
the basement."
Engine Company 312 operated their hoseline into the hardware store as Engine Company
312's Officer entered the front stair hallway of 12-22 Astoria Boulevard. The staircase
providing access to the second floor had been dislodged, thereby creating an opening at the base
of the stairs. Through the opening. the Engine Company 312 Officer observed the stripes of a
Firefighter's bunker coat directly below in the cellar. The Officer immediately summoned
Battalion 49 to that location. Battalion 49 could see the reflective stripes on Firefighter Brian
Fahey's coat. Battalion 49 called to Firefighter Brian Fahey. but received no response.
Initial rescue efforts by the Rescue Company 4 Officer and Can Firefighter to reach
Firefighter Brian Fahey involved an attempt to cut and enlarge the hole at the base of these stairs.
At this time, there was an expanding fire in the cellar of the hardware store. The heat rising
through the opening at the base of the stairs became unbearable. Visibility was zero. Attempts
by the Rescue Company 4 Can Firefighter to cut the stairs with the saw were unsuccessful and
the Firefighter had to retreat due to extremely high heat conditions at the opening. The Rescue
Company 4 Officer now attempted to cut the flooring, which was composed of tile and concrete.
At approximately 1457 hours, Firefighter Brian Fahey gave another MAYDAY via the handie
talkie a?d indicated that he was trapped under the stairs. His voice was lower than the first
message and the vibralert alarm on his Self Contained Breathing Apparatus (SeBA) was audible
in the background.
The Rescue Company 4 Officer and Can Firefighter continued operating in the hallway
until ordered to evacuate the area due to instability of the front wall. They then moved their
operation into the cellar of exposure #4.
Squad Company 41 had arrived at the scene at 1453 hours. After operating for a few
minutes on 14th Street, the Squad Company 41 Officer heard the MAYDAY given by Firefighter
Brian Fahey indicating that he was under the stairs. Battalion 49 assigned Squad Company 41
the task of trying to reach Firefighter Brian Fahey via the front stair hallway of 12-22 Astoria
Boulevard. The Squad Company 41 Officer entered the stair entrance area, but quickly was
pul1ed out by a Chief Officer due to the instability of the front wall. Seeking another avenue of
access to the cellar, the Officer of Squad Company 41 went to the cellar of exposure #4 (12-18
Astoria Boulevard). A breaching operation was begun through the foundation wall between
exposure #4 (12-18 Astoria Boulevard) and the fire building. That proved to be a formidable
task as the concrete and stonewall was very thick. Three members of Squad Company 41 were
assigned to continue this operation, while the Officer returned to the front stair hallway at 12-22
Astoria Boulevard.
It was after the front parapet wall collapsed that Squad Company 41 began their
operations in the hallway at the base of the stair to the second floor of 12-22 Astoria Boulevard
in an attempt to reach Firefighter Brian Fahey. There was fire burning in the hallway at this
time. After Engine Company 312 extinguished the visible fire, the Squad Company 41 Officer
had his members use a partner saw in an attempt to open the floor. These attempts were
unsuccessful due to the penny tile floor on top of several inches of concrete. There was extreme
heat in this hallway. There was so much debris from the collapse that only one member at a time
could fit in the area. Members were getting burned as they worked. The Squad Company 41
Officer noticed that the staircase had been dislodged by the explosion and was in danger of
collapse. He described the staircase "as going upward at a 90-degree-angle," but was unable to
see the upper portion due to the smoke condition. His men were working at the base of these
stairs. The entire staircase moved when hand tools were used to enlarge the opening in the stairs,
so a cordless sawzall was put into operation.
There was extreme heat rising from the opening in the hallway. A hoseline had to be
used for a period of time to cool that area. A scissor ladder was placed into the hole. A
Firefighter attempted to descend the ladder, but quickly was driven back by the intense heat. The
thermal imaging camera was used in an attempt to locate Firefighter Brian Fahey again. This
?7 ()fnR
proved unsuccessful due to the intensity of surrounding heat and hot spots. A second attempt to
descend the ladder was made by a Chief Officer, but due to the intense heat, this attempt also
failed. Operations to gain direct access into this area continued for some time. The hoseline was
used again. Cel1ar pipes and distributors also were used.
Eventually, the breaching operations through the foundation wall from exposure #4 into
the cellar of the fire building were completed. Squad Company 4] had breached an opening
approximately in the center of the cellar wal1, measuring front to rear. Rescue Company 3 had
breached an opening more toward the rear. These members discovered that there was about
three feet of water throughout the cellar of the fire bUilding. Numerous hoselines, tower ladders
and multiversals had been used to control the heavy fire condition, which occurred after the
explosion. There were flammable liquids spreading and burning on the surface of the water in
the cellar.
In an attempt to enter the cellar through the breached opening made by Squad Company
41, a hoseline was operated to cool the area. There was fire in several directions. Every time the
hoseline was shut down, the fire on the surface of the water quickly would intensify. Two
members entered through the breached opening with the hoseline. They soon were driven back
by the enveloping fire conditions. Pyrocool foam was obtained from the Hazardous Material
Company. It was injected into the hoseline and began controlling the flames. Two more
attempts were made to establish a base of operations on the fire side of the breached opening by
members of Rescue Company 2, Squad Company 41 and Ladder Company 14 under the
supervision of the Special Operations Battalion. Deteriorating conditions thwarted both
attempts. There were extraordinary amounts of pipes, stock, wires and shelving, blocking the
cellar aisles. There was a heavy odor of fumes in the cellar. Noting the possible danger of a
flash fire erupting and the near-impossible mobility conditions in the cellar, operations ill the
cellar were ordered discontinued at that time. According to the Squad Company 41 Officer, "it
was at least three hours into the operation".
Breaching operations also were being carried out on the first floor of 12-18 Astoria
Boulevard for access into the first floor of the fire building. Operations into the cellar of the fire
building via the rear yard proved to be too hazardous.
The fire and intense heat continued to be a problem for some time. In one of many
efforts to gain control, Hi-Expansion Foam was pumped into the cellar of the fire building in an
attempt to extinguish the fire and suppress the vapors. Rescue Company 3 was assigned the task
I
of bringing down the remaining front wall of exposure #1, which was hanging overhead. This
exposed some fire that was then extinguished, and this improved the conditions.
Eventually, members of the Special Operation Command were able to enter the cellar of
12-22 Astoria Boulevard via the interior cellar stairs and operated a hoseline therein. Reaching
the bottom of the stairs, they found the body of Firefighter Brian Fahey at approximately 1830
hours. He was face down in the water. He was wearing his SCBA facepiece, but the regulator
had been removed. He was secured in a Stokes basket and removed up the stairs.
Firefighter Brian D. Fahey of Rescue Company 4 was removed to Elmhurst Hospital by
EMS. As noted on the certificate of death, the date and time of death was June 17,2001, at 6:45
P.M. The immediate cause of death was smoke inhalation.
Rescue Operations for Firefighters John Downing, Harry Ford, and Ladder Company
116's Outside Ventilation Firefighter
Firefighters John Downing of Ladder Company 163 and Harry Ford of Rescue Company
4 were completely buried under the collapsed brick wall on the 14th Street side of 12-22 Astoria
Boulevard. When the Rescue Company 4 Officer conducted a roll call of his members,
Firefighter Harry Ford did not respond. The Ladder Company 116 Outside Ventilation
Firefighter was partially buried and in need of immediate help. He was buried up to his chest in
brick and debris. A sign, possibly from the side of the building, was across his body. He was
found in front of a white car toward exposure #3 and halfway between the curb and the building.
The distance from the curb to the building line was approximately 16 feet. The Ladder Company
116 Firefighter was extricated and transported to Elmhurst Hospital via EMS at 1510 hours.
There was a heavy smoke condition on the exposure #2 side following the explosion.
Smoke became so heavy at times that the injured members who were being treated on the
opposite side of 14th Street had to be moved to another location. A whirlwind of smoke
constantly changed due to a slight breeze. Heavy fire foHowed shortly thereafter. During rescue
operations at the exposure #2 side, rescuers were confronted not only with heavy smoke and fire
conditions, but also flying missiles (aerosol cans). Many small explosions and hissing sounds
could be heard. The flames from the fire were orange and, at times, blue flames sporadically
would erupt from the bUilding.
Members of the Hazardous Material Company and others were assigned to search and
render assistance at the 14th Street location. On their arrival, Rescue Company 2 also was
290f68
assigned by Division 14 to assist in the< search for the two missing members under the collapsed
walL While digging in the collapse debris to search for buried members, the Hazardous Material
Company was directed by a sounding PASS alarm to an area some 15 feet north of their present
location. Hazardous Material Company members dug toward the sound of the PASS alarm and
found Firefighter Harry Ford in the vicinity of a white car. Digging continued in that area and
Firefighter John Downing was located in close proximity to Firefighter Harry Ford. Firefighter
John Downing was discovered while Firefighter Harry Ford was still being extricated from his
position. During the entire extrication operation, there were l o w ~ l e v e l fire eruptions and
explosions. Both Firefighters were completely buried under about two feet of brick. First aid
was given to both members and neither had any vital signs. They were removed from the debris
pile at approximately 1555 hours and transported to Elmhurst Hospital by EMS.
Firefighter Harry S. Ford of Rescue Company 4 was removed to Elmhurst Hospital by
EMS. As noted on the certificate of death, the date and time of death was June 17, 2001, at 4:27
P.M. The immediate cause of death was massive blunt trauma.
Firefighter John J. Downing of Ladder Company 163 was removed to Elmhurst Hospital
by EMS. As noted on the certificate of death the date and time of death was June 17,2001, at
4:30 P.M. The immediate cause of death was massive blunt trauma.
Post-Fire Investigation
Examination of the fire's path of travel found that the fire spread from the cellar of 12-20
Astoria Boulevard to the cellar of 12"22 Astoria Boulevard through the opening in the foundation
wall. This opening should have been protected by the fire door. The fire door was prevented
from closing as a result of a wooden stick or dowel placed into the lower door track and by the
ramp built over the lower door track. The ramp used to move stock over the lower track of this
fire door was nailed together and affixed in a somewhat permanent position. Numerous nails
were used to hold the sections together.
Reasonable attempts were made by the investigative team after the incident to collect and
examine personal protecti ve clothing and safety equipment used by the three deceased
Firefighters, the critically injured Firefighter of Ladder Company 116, and the critically injured
Lieutenant of Ladder Company 163. This testing is routine in any such case. In accordance with
Departmental policy, their SCBA and handie-talkies would have been tested at the start of the
tour and found to be serviceable or replaced if not serviceable at that time. Some items sustained
physical damage due to the explosion ,and resulting collapse. In any case, no failure or
deficiency of protective clothing, tools or equipment was found that contributed to the injuries
sustained by these five members.
11 of tlR
VI. FINDINGS
1. Approximately 25 minutes passed between the time of arrival of the first fire company
and the time of the expiosion. No water was applied to the fire in the cellar during this
critical time period. The dangerous conditions presented by the interior stair to the cellar
in 12-22 Astoria Boulevard precluded their initial use due to the presence of the exterior
entrance that led directly into the fire area from the rear yard. Extreme difficulties in
forcing entry into the cellar of the fire building from the rear doorway delayed the
application of water from hoselines pOSitioned at that entry point.
2. When the decision was made for Squad Company 288 to advance their 2lh-inch hoseline
down the stair to the cellar of 12-22 Astoria Blvd., they had been operating on the first
floor of the hardware store for approximately 15 minutes. The members checked their air
supply in preparation of descending the stair and reported that they had approximately a
half tank of air remaining in their 45-minute air cylinders. A 45-minute cylinder contains
1834.9 liters of air. At half capacity, there would be approximately 917.5 liters of air
remaining in the cylinder. The maximum deliverable airflow into a properly donned
facepiece is 102 liters per minute (lpm) as called for in the NFP A Standard. This is a
breathing rate that Firefighters would rarely reach. NIOSH uses a standard airflow rate
of 40 lpm, which measures breathing rales at a sedentary physical level of activity and is
unrealistic due to the heavy exertion levels associated with normal firefighting activities.
A breathing rate of 70 lpm is associated with a level of activity equaling a brisk walk.
Assuming that the members of Squad Company 288 were using a breathing rate of 80
lpm, these members would have commenced their advance into the cellar with
approximately 5.7 minutes of operational firefighting time before their vibralerts
sounded. They would have had approximately 5.7 minutes of exit time until their air
supply would have been depleted.
3. Unusual conditions observed from the many different locations in and around the fire
building were 10 the Incident Commander. At this operation, various
members observed many unusual conditions, e.g. smoke of unusual colors, such as
yellow smoke coming from the exterior cellar door at exposure #3 and from both
windows on the 14th Street side of exposure #2 (yellow smoke is an indication of a
pOlential backdraft). Unusual ~ were emanating from various building openings at
different times and locations. Popping noises were coming from the cellar. Blue flames
came up the ce)]ar stairs at one point. These conditions occasionally appear individually
at working fires. However, taken together. a more ominous situation may have become
apparent to the Incident Commander.
4. Professor Robert Zalosh prepared a report titled "Baclalraft 'txpiosion in June 17, 2001
Fire at Astoria Hardware Store" (Appendix E), for the New York City Fire
Department's Bureau of Fire Investigation. Professor Zalosh's conclusions are valuable

regarding backdraft explosions and should be evaluated for future Fire Department
training and tactical planning. He stated, "If the fire door [in the cellar] between 12-20
and 12-22 had dosed ... there would not have been a large fuel vapor concentration and
significantly reduced oxygen concentrations in 12-22. Therefore, there would probably
not have been any backdraft explosion when the window covers on the 14th St. wall were
removed. The opening of the rear basement door would probably not have caused a
backdraft explosion (indeed an explosion did not occur when the door was opened at
1442 011 June 17,2001) because the hot ceiling temperatures and shelving temperatures
near the ignition site were very close to the dOOIway, and there would not be much space
or time to develop a large mixing region before ignition occurs at the interface between
the fuel-rich region and the inflowing air.,,5
5. The 10-60 signal was not transmitted for this incident following the explosion. At a
collapse, fire and rescue operation staffing resources and Chief Officer supervision is of
the utmost importance. Additional Chief Officers are needed to reinforce the command
structure. Division 14 was ill the process of transmitting a second alarm when the
explosion occurred. Shortly thereafter a request for two additional Rescue Companies,
fol1owed by a fourth and fifth alann, were transmitted. Prompt transmission of the Signal
10-60 would have provided an earlier response of some units such as an additiona1
Deputy Chief, 4 additional Battalion Chiefs, Squad Company 1 with their second piece of
:; Zalosh, Robert. BACKDRAFf EXPLOSION IN JUNE 17.2001 FIRE AT ASTQRIA HARDWARE STORE.
p. 15, June 2002.
:i:i of 68
apparatus, and an additional Squad Company (Some of these units were eventually
assigned and responded).
6. The buildings located at 12-20 and 12-22 Astoria Boulevard were not classified as "A"
buildings. In 1995, the Fire Department Inspection Procedures were rewritten. The new
Fire Prevention Manual allowed Unit Commanders flexibility in creating an individual
cyc1ical inspection program adapted to the specific needs of its area. The goal was to
inspect all buildings (except private dwellings) within a specific time period. The
Apparatus Field Inspetion Duty (AFID) schedule established that time period as a
maximum of five years. A building would be inspected on a schedule according to the
potential risk and incidence of fire in relation to other buildings in that unit's district.
When these revised procedures took effect, 12-20 Astoria Boulevard and 12-22 Astoria
Boulevard were classified as "E" buildings for inspection purposes and were to be
inspected every five years. These buildings by reason of their degree of hazard
(construction, alterations, occupancy, and hazardous contents) could have been classified
as A" buildings and inspected annUally.
7. Using Inspection Guides A-268 through A-299 as actual inspection fonns instead of the
Fire Prevention Checklist Fonn A-1OI would have made for a more thorough,
meaningful inspection and reduced the likelihood of members on AFID overlooking
hazards such as fire doors purposely blocked open. The Fire Prevention Inspection
Checklist Fonn A-lO 1 was created with the introduction of the Fire Prevention Manual.
It is a generic checklist which when completed, is signed and placed in the appropriate
building folder until the next inspection for that building. Inspection Fonns A-268
through A-299 were reclassified as Inspection Guides and became reference material as
per section 3.6 of the Fire Prevention ManuaL
8. The administrative unit was unable to complete their five-year cyclical inspection
program. According to an endorsement by Battalion 49 on a report dated August 11,
2001, concerning Engine Company 262 Inspections, Battalion 49 stated that the time
allotted for Engine Company 262 was insufficient for the Company to complete their "E"
bUildings. Fire Prevention activity for Engine Company 262 reflected that 58 percent of
their inspection time was lost to Fire Duty, EMS response, fe-inspections (A-134P), and
inclement weather. According to entries on the Field Record Card Form A-119. during
the period 1970-1994, there were only six inspections with completed entries on the Field
Record Card (Appendix F) by the Administrative Company for the buildings in question.
During that time, these buildings were scheduled to be inspected every two years. It was
projected that these buildings (12-20 and 12-22 Astoria Boulevard) would have been
inspected in October or November of 2001, approximately 4 to 5 months after the fire.
9. There was no Critical.Information Dispatch System (CIDS) card for these buildings.
Members are often in a position on building inspection, response, and outdoor activities,
to recognize conditions that shouJd be incorporated into the CIDS program. There were
numerous reasons why these two buildings 12-20 and 12-22 AstOlla Boulevard, should
have been entered into CIDS:
The buildings were interconnected on both the first and cellar levels
Large quantities of flammable liquids and gases were stored in the cellar areas
The interior cellar stairs in 12-20 Astoria Boulevard were sealed
The rear exterior entrance to the cellar was well-secured
10. These buildings had numerous a1terations as noted in Appendix F of this Investigative
Report entitled "Building Description!' The alterations included these buildings being
interconnected in the cellar (1947) and first floor (1950); a portion of the existing show
window sealed up (1985); interior cellar stairs in 12-20 Astoria Boulevard sealed (date
unknown); and numerous exterior openings sealed (date unknown). Even though there
were major structural alterations in both ]2-20 Astoria Boulevard and 12-22 Astoria
Boulevard, no inspection form A-270R, "Alterations in Buildings Involving Structural
Changes," and no sprinkler recommendation was found in the Building Folders of the
Administrative Fire Company's Building Records. NOTE: Form A-270
"ALTERATIONS IN BUILDINGS INVOLVING STRUCTURAL CHANGES" was
originally promulgated in January 1967, and revised in November 1994 and January
1997.
11. Fire Protection Inspectors were at the premises annually from August 1995 through
August 2000, but did not conduct complete building or occupancy inspections.
NOTE:
Fire Protection Inspectors conduct inspections on the need for and the updating of
permits as well as witnessing on-site tests of various systems such as fire detection
systems, fire suppression systems, and sprinkler systems. They will cite other violations
when noticed in the performance of these duties. The Job Description in the Fire
Department's General Statement of Duties and Responsibilities for Fire Protection
Inspector, and in the"Notice of Examination for Fire Protection Inspector (Appendix D,
Section 3) states: Under supervision. pelforms work in the conduct of i1lhpections to
detect violations of laws, rules and regulations which are intended to reduce or eliminate
fire hazards or assist in extinguishing fires; performs related work.
12. The Bureau of Training is responsible for instructing probationary Firefighters attending
Probationary Firefighter School (PFS) and Lieutenants attending the First Line
Supervisor Training Program (FLSTP) in Fire Prevention and Building Inspections.
Currently, probationary Firefighters receive II Y2 hours of training on Fire Prevention.
After graduating from PFS, probationary Firefighters should have the knowledge to
identify basic violations, as well as be able to properly complete appropriate forms
(Notice of Vi olations-NOVs , Violation Orders-VOs, etc.). The Bureau of Fire
Prevention is capable of presenting Fire Prevention segments to probationary Firefighters
attending PFS, paying particular attention to the proper completion of forms such as the
NOV. Near the end of 2003, the Bureau of Fire Prevention started presenting a segment
on Fire Prevention to Lieutenants in FLSTP as well as to Battalion Chiefs in the Chief
Officers Command Course. According to the Fire Prevention Enforcement Unit, a
significant number of violations written by FDNY personnel are faulty in that they fail to
adequately describe the nature of the violation. Apparatus Field Inspection Duty (AFID)
is a very important function of the Fire Department. The Fire Department must provide a
strong commitment to Fire Prevention and Building Inspection for the safety of the
residents of New York City, and also for the well being of the uniformed force. The
commitment to enhancing building inspection must begin with the proper training of
probationary Firefighters and new1y promoted Lieutenants. The amount of instructional
time currently given seems to be inadequate, considering the importance of and the
____~ ~ - - - ~ - . - ..- ~ . - . - - - M
amount of instructional material that should be included in the training curriculum.
13. Handie-talkie transmissions were not recorded until the Fjeld Communications Unit
(FCU) arrived. This unit does not normalJy respond to first alarms in the beginning of
operations. The FCU responds on second or greater alarms. Critical operational
communications occur during the beginning of operations with the arrival of the first Fire
Department unit. This information is not recorded until the FeU anives on the scene.
This was evident at this fire with the FCU arriving at 1501 hours, thirty-seven minutes
after the signal 10-75 and fourteen minutes after the explosion occurred. Installing
recording devices in every Battalion vehicle would allow the handie-talkie channels to be
recorded from the arrival of the first Battalion at an incident, aiding in the investigation of
future mishaps.
NOTE: The Department is currently conducting a pilot program of handie-talkie
recorders in Battalion vehicles.
370f68
VII. CAUSES
DIRECT CAUSES
I) Inhalation of toxic levels of carbon monoxide and other gases (F.E Fahey),
2) Inhalation of the heated products of combustion (F.F. Fahey).
3) Blunt trauma to the head and torso from falling bricks (F.F. Ford).
4) Crushing injuries to the torso from falling bricks (EF. Downing).
INDIRECT CAUSES
1) A gasoline spill, by two mischievous young men applying graffiti near the rear exterior cellar
door of 12-20 Astoria Boulevard. The Bureau of Fire Investigation determined that the pilot
flame of the hot water heater was the ignition source of the fire.
2) The hardware store owner's failure to maintain the cellar fire door in proper operating
condition. This allowed the fire to spread unimpeded from the original fire building (12-20
Astoria Boulevard) to the exposure #2 building (12-22 Astoria Boulevard). The open fire
door was a critical element in allowing conditions to develop with the resulting explosion,
which caused the collapse of the exterior wall in 12-22 Astoria Boulevard.
3) Fire Department units' inability to apply water on the developing fire in a timely fashion.
4) Physical conditions of the interior stairway leading to the cellar in 12-22 Astoria Boulevard.
The stairway had shelving built out from the side, thereby reducing its width. There was a
piece of plywood over the steps, which was used as a slide to handle the movement of stock.
These conditions made use of this stairway for advancing a hoseline into the cellar
inadvisable and hazardous.
5) Existence of extremely well secured door protecting the rear exterior entrance into the cellar
of 1 2 ~ 2 0 Astoria Boulevard.
6) Members' failure to communicate unusual smoke, noises, smells and other signs of a
possible backdraft directly to the Incident Commander.
7) The occurrence of the backdraft explosion enhanced by the presence in the cellar of various
flammable liquids, which began to vaporize due to fire exposure. The explosion caused the
collapse of an exterior wall, resulting in injuries and death to Firefighters.
8) Members operating in an area that unexpectedly became a collapse zone.
BASIC CAUSES
]) Absence of a sprinkler system in the cellar of either building encompassing the hardware
store.
2) Storage of flammable liquids and gases in the cellar.
3) Elimination of access to the cellar of 12-20 Astoria Boulevard via the interior cellar stairs,
thereby impeding access to the fire by operating forces.
4) Sealing of cellar and first-floor exterior openings, preventing the units from accessing the fire
and ventilating at the earliest possible time.
5) Failure of the Administrative Fire Company to classify these buildings, which contained
hazardous storage, as "A" buildings. This classification would have required more frequent
inspections of these buildings.
6) Failure of the Administrative Fire Company to enter these two buildings into the Critical
Information Dispatch System (CIDS). Information indicating that the buildings were
interconnected on first and cellar levels; large quantities of flammable liquids and gases were
39 of 68
stored in the cellars of both buildings; the interior cellar entrance in 12-20 Astoria Boulevard
essentially was closed off and unusable. This information would have been invaluable to the
operating forces.
7) Failure of the Administrative Fire Company that performed field inspection duty to recognize
and report significant structural alterations. There was no Inspection Form A270,
"Alterations In Buildings Involving Structural Changes," on file in the Building Record
Folders of either building.
8) Failure of Fire Protection Inspectors who perfonned permit. inspections in the hardware store
to recognize and report fire hazards to the administrative unit.
NOTE:
The Bureau of Fire Investigation of the New York City Fire Department determines the
cause of a fire or, in some cases the cause of explosions in the City of New York. As part of
their investigation, Professor Robert G. Zalosh was asked by the Bureau of Fire Investigation
to study and report on the circumstances surrounding this fire and explosion. Professor
Zalosh is a nationally recognized expert in the area of explosions. He has written the
Explosions section of the N.F.P.A. Handbookfor Fire Protection, Nineteenth Edition. Robert
Zalosh is a Professor of Fire Protection Engineering at the Center for Fire Safety Studies,
Worcester Polytechnic Institute, Worcester, MA 01609.
Based on his study of this fatal fire, Professor Robert G. Zalosh has concluded that the
cause of this explosion was an "unusually severe backdraft," caused by the flow of air into a
room in which high fuel vapor and low oxygen concentrations had developed. This was due
to the large quantities of flammable liquids, small openings in the basement walls and ceiling,
the absence of an automatic suppression system, a wedged-open fire door and the delayed
access by responding Firefighters. This particular backdraft produced higher pressures
because of the relatively small ventilation area, even after the air flowed into the basement
(See Professor Zalosh's study in Appendix E).
In conunenting on the nature of the conditions that led to the explosion at this incident, the
Safety and Inspection Services Command will defer to the expert findings of the Bureau of
Fire Investigation and that of Professor Zalosh. Therefore, some of the causes must be
predicated on these findings.
41 of 68
VIII. RECOMMENDATIONS
1. Implement a series of Chief Officer tactical training conferences with Command Chiefs.
Subjects should include risk management, as well as alternative strategies for
accomplishing fire and emergency goals during operations. The inability to apply water
streams onto a fire early in Fire Department operations should be considered as greatly
increasing the risk and dangers to members operating. Alternate methods for applying
water should be employed as stated in Fire Department publications, improvising when
necessary. Incident, Sector, and Unit Commanders must continuously conduct risk
assessment until operations are concluded.
2. Units commencing an interior attack should, optimally, start with a full SCBA air
cylinder. When circumstances preclude this possibility, the unit officer must notify the
Incident Commander of the units' remaining air supply status so that appropriate back up
or relief can be provided. Members beginning an attack with less than a fun SCBA air
cylinder may be able to operate for only several minutes before their vibralerts sound.
When the vibralert activates, members are required to make the appropriate notification
to their Officer and exit the IDLH immediately. Delayed relief increases the likelihood
of members continuing to operate when they should be exiting to a safe atmosphere.
Under these circumstances, exit time will be decreased, reducing the built-in safety
factors afforded by the activation of the vibralert. At a usage rate of 80 lpm, an air
cylinder depleted to half capacity will only allow approximately 5.7 minutes of
operational time and 5.7 minutes of exit time. All officers must recognize this potentially
dangerous situation and notify the Incident Commander to ensure that when an interior
attack is initiated it continues safely and uninterrupted.
3. Reinforce to all members the requirement that they must communicate significant
fireground information to the Incident Commander. Firefighters and Officers provide
information for use by the Incident Commander in perfonning size-up, and must
communicate unusual conditions when necessary.
4. Review the information contained in Professor Robert report, Backdraft
Explosion in June 17, 2001, Fire in. Astoria Hardware Store, for possible inclusion into
department documents and training programs. His findings are found in Appendix E,
Section ] and contain conclusions that are valuable regarding backdraft explosions that
must be evaluated for future Fire Department training and tactical planning. Infonnation
published in Department documents peltaining to backdrafts should be amended to
include the warning signs of backdraft situations and recommended safety actions.
5. Train all Officers of the need to immediately transmit proper radio signals at incidents to
ensure that adequate resources are assigned and aITive in a timely manner. Additional
..
alarms should be transmitted promptly to provide the required staffing for operations,
staging, and relief purposes. There should be no dilay in transmitting appropriate
communication signals such as the 10-60 signal for occl#tences that take place after Fire
Department arrival.
6. Classify hardware stores as buildings or occupancies inspected annuaUy. This new
classification should be documented in the Fire Prevention Manual, Section 2.2.2-A. At
the time of this fire, hardware stores were not in this classification. Based on their
hazards it is imperative that hardware stores be classified as such, since more frequent
inspections might have uncovered the many problems that led to the disaster. Hardware
stores usually contain various hazards that administrative units are well placed to address
through AFID. Such hazards include:
Storage of flammable liquids.
Storage of hazardous materials.
Reduced aisle space.
Reduced clearance between sprinkler heads and stock.
Concentrated floor loads due to the storage of heavy stock.
Alteration of building components for storage and transfer of materials
(interconnections, staircases moved, changed, e1iminated ...).
Below grade access limited to trap doors, or narrow steep stairway.
While any of the above conditions can have a deleterious affect on firefighting
operations, multiple combinations of these conditions increase the danger exponentially.
430f68
7. Update and reissue Inspection Guides A-268 through A-299 as inspection forms. The A
101 is a vague, generic inspection checklist for fire prevention inspection purposes.
Inspection Guides A-268 through A-299 provides much greater depth pertaining to
common hazards associated with specific occupancies, reducing the chance of violations
or hazards being overlooked. Units and individual members performing inspections
should be required to use these updated forms during fire prevention inspection duties
and maintain them as records of inspection activity and results thereof.
8. Amend the Fire Prevention Manual, Chapter 8, to include actions that can be
imple#mented to assist units unable to achieve their fire prevention inspection objectives.
Company Commanders, as well as Unit, Battalion, and Division Fire Prevention
Coordinators, must determine whether units are achieving fire prevention inspection
goals.
9. Train all members performing fire prevention inspections to be fully aware of conditions
that must be entered into the Criticallnformation Dispatch System (croS) and the effect
that ems information may have on Fire Department operations. There was no ems
information for these buildings.
10. Train all members on the importance of recognizing and evaluating problems presented
by altered buildings and the proper reporting procedures required by Chapter 6 of the Fire
Prevention Manual.
11. Enhance the Department's Target Hazard Program and develop a standardized Target
Hazard pre-fire plan (template) specifying the type of data that must be included in the
plan. The purpose of this form as recommended in NFPA 1620 " Recommended
Practice for Pre-Incident Planning" is to aid in the development of a pre-incident plan to
help responding personnel effectively manage emergencies with available resources.
This should not be confused with fire inspections, which monitor code compliance. All
members need to be cognizant of building conditions and possible violations that may
create operational problems for Fire Department units.
12. Initiate a Quality Assurance Program to audit fire prevention inspections performed by
field units. The purpose of this recommendation is to increase the effectiveness of field
unit inspections in citing all violations and hazards present during their inspections. and
to identify areas that require improvement.
13. Develop a means of culling pertinent information for Fire Department purposes from the
Department of Buildings permits regarding alterations to buildings. The present method
has each unit individually sorting through thousands of permits to uncover significant
alterations to buildings in their administrative area. This method is inefficient and leaves
a large margin for error. The Bureau of Fire Prevention should devise a more efficient
~
process to inform units of buildings being altered in their administrative area, and should
ensure that units perfonn immediate inspections of these buildings when warranted.
14. Review and update the lesson plans regarding fire prevention and inspection procedures
for both Probationary Firefighter School and First Line Supervisors Training Program.
Currently, probationary Firefighters receive only I 1 Y2 hours of training on Fire
Prevention. The Bureau of Fire Prevention started presenting a segment on Fire
Prevention to Ueutenants in FLSTP near the end of 2003. The Fire Department must
provide a strong commitment to Fire Prevention and Building Inspection for the safety of
the residents of New York City. and also for the well being of the uniformed force. The
commitment to enhancing building inspection must begin with the proper training of
probationary Firefighters and newly promoted Lieutenants.
15. Improve communications between the FieldJPub1ic Communications Unit and field units.
This can be initiated by issuing a document that lists the functions and responsibilities of
the Field/Public Communications Unit. The various issues on which the FieldlPubHc
Communications Unit can assist field units should be noted as wen as telephone numbers.
16. Improve the education and training program for Fire Protection Inspectors. The purpose
of this program is to increase the knowledge of Fire Protection Inspectors regarding
hazards relating to building construction and Fire Prevention Code violations.
450f6R
17. Improve the Bureau of Fire Prevention's Quality Assurance Program in order to provide
more thorough inspections by its Fire Protection Inspectors. The purpose of this
recommendation is to increase the effectiveness of these inspections in citing violations
and hazards present during their inspections, and to identify areas that require
improvement.
] 8. Review the methods by which Fire Protection Inspectors notify administrative units of
various conditions or hazards in buildings or occupancies. The Bureau of Fire Prevention
procedures must ensure that administrative units are prompt]y notified of hazards in all
situations.
] 9. Review and ensure that Fire Department documents are current and complete regarding
hazards associated with commercial cellar fires and the precautions that can be taken to
reduce serious injury.
20. Review and ensure that Fire Department documents are current and complete regarding
the coordination of ventilation between the inside and the outside teams.
21. Install audio recorders in all Battalion vehicles to record handie-talkie transmissions.
This would allow a more thorough investigation including discovering any early and
perhaps critical occurrences in an operation. The Field Communications Unit arrived at
1501 hours, thirty-seven minutes after the signal 10-75 and fourteen minutes after the
explosion occurred. Critical occurrences and communications at this fire were never
captured and recorded.
NOTE: The Department is currently conducting a pilot program for handie-talkie
recorders in three Battalion vehicles.