Judgment reversed and set aside, appellant Ramon

Frondozo y Dalida acquitted and ordered released.

Note.—The dangerous drug is the very corpus delicti

violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act. (People vs. Kimura,
428 SCRA 51 [2004])
——o0o——

G.R. No. 178624. June 30, 2009.*

JOSE CONCEPCION, JR., petitioner, vs. COMMISSION

ON ELECTIONS, respondent.

Parties; Court cannot recognized the petitioner as a party-in-

interst who can directly assail the COMELEC’s April 2, 2007
Resolution in original Rule 65 petition before the Court.—The
above features of the petition render it fatally defective. The first
defect lies in the petitioner’s personality to file a petition for
certiorari to address an adjudicatory resolution of the COMELEC
in which he was not a party to, and where the direct party,
NAMFREL, does not even question the assailed resolution. It
would have been another matter if NAMFREL had filed the
present petition with the petitioner as intervenor because of his
personal interest in the COMELEC ruling. He could have
intervened, too, before the COMELEC as an affected party in
NAMFREL’s Manifestation and Request for Examination. As a
last recourse, the petitioner could have expressly stated before
this Court the procedural problems he faced and asked that we
suspend the rules based on the unusual circumstances he could
have pointed out. None of these actions, however, took place.
Instead, the petitioner simply questioned the COMELEC’s April
2, 2007 Resolution without explaining to this Court his reason for
using Rule 65 as his medium, and from there, proceeded to attack
the validity of COMELEC Resolution 7798. Under these
questionable circumstances, we cannot now recognize the
petitioner as a party-in-

_______________

* EN BANC.
 421

VOL. 591, JUNE 30, 2009 421

Concepcion, Jr. vs. Commission on Elections

interest who can directly assail the COMELEC’s April 2, 2007

Resolution in an original Rule 65 petition before this Court.
Election Law; Certiorari; The requirement of personality or
interest is sanctioned no less by Section 7, Article IX of the
Constitution which provides that a decision, order, or ruling of a
constitutional commission may be brought to this Court on
certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty (30) days from
receipt of a copy thereof.—The requirement of personality or
interest is sanctioned no less by Section 7, Article IX of the
Constitution which provides that a decision, order, or ruling of a
constitutional commission may be brought to this Court on
certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt
of a copy thereof. This requirement is repeated in Section 1, Rule
65 of the Rules of Court, which applies to petitions for certiorari
under Rule 64 of decisions, orders or rulings of the constitutional
commissions pursuant to Section 2, Rule 64. Section 1, Rule 65
essentially provides that a person aggrieved by any act of a
tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction may file a petition for certiorari.
Same; Same; Under Section 1, Rule 65, an aggrieved party is
one who was a party to the original proceedings that gave rise to
the original action for certiorari under Rule 65.—An aggrieved
party under Section 1, Rule 65 is one who was a party to the
original proceedings that gave rise to the original action for
certiorari under Rule 65. We had occasion to clarify and explain
the “aggrieved party” requirement in Tang v. Court of Appeals,
325 SCRA 394 (2000).
Same; Same; The petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is not
available to any person who feels injured by the decision of a
tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions.—We had this to say in Development Bank of the
Philippines v. Commission on Audit, 422 SCRA 459 (2004)—a
case that involves a certiorari petition, under Rule 64 in relation
with Rule 65, of a ruling of the Commission on Audit (a
constitutional commission like COMELEC): The novel theory
advanced by the OSG would necessarily require persons not
parties to the present case—the DBP employees who are members
of the Plan or the trustees of the Fund—to avail of certiorari
under Rule 65. The petition for certiorari un-

422

422 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Concepcion, Jr. vs. Commission on Elections

der Rule 65, however, is not available to any person who

feels injured by the decision of a tribunal, board or officer
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions. The “person
aggrieved” under Section 1 of Rule 65 who can avail of the
special civil action of certiorari pertains only to one who was a
party in the proceedings before the court a quo, or in this
case, before the COA. To hold otherwise would open the courts
to numerous and endless litigations. Since DBP was the sole party
in the proceedings before the COA, DBP is the proper party to
avail of the remedy of certiorari.
Same; Same; The petition converts an express challenge of an
adjudicatory resolution—made without the requisite standing—
into a challenge for the nullity of a regulation through an original
Rule 65 petition for certiorari.—The second fatal defect lies in the
petition’s thrust; it opened with and professed to be an express
challenge to the COMELEC’s adjudicatory April 2, 2007
Resolution, but in its arguments solely attacks and prays for the
partial nullity of COMELEC Resolution 7798 issued in the
exercise of the COMELEC’s rule making power. This approach is
fatally defective because the petition thereby converts an express
challenge of an adjudicatory resolution—made without the
requisite standing—into a challenge for the nullity of a regulation
through an original Rule 65 petition for certiorari.

SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court.

Certiorari.
   The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
  Bernas Law Offices for petitioner.
  The Solicitor General for respondent.

BRION, J.:
Before us is the petition for certiorari1 filed by Jose
Concepcion, Jr. (petitioner) “seeking to set aside the En
Banc Reso-

_______________

1 Filed under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

 423

VOL. 591, JUNE 30, 2009 423

Concepcion, Jr. vs. Commission on Elections

lution dated 02 April 2007 and Order dated 8 May

2007” of respondent Commission on Elections
2
(COMELEC).
The petition cites and quotes the assailed rulings, then
recites that on January 5, 2007, the National Citizen’s
Movement for Free Elections (NAMFREL) filed a Petition
for Accreditation to Conduct the Operation Quick Count
with the COMELEC, docketed as SSP No. 07-001.3 The
present petitioner—then the incumbent Punong Barangay
of Barangay Forbes Park, Makati City—was one of the
signatories of the NAMFREL petition in his capacity as the
National Chairman of NAMFREL.
On the same date, COMELEC promulgated Resolution
No. 77984 (Resolution 7798) that reads in full—

“WHEREAS, Section 3 of Executive Order [EO] No. 94 dated

March 2, 1987, provides as follows:
Sec. 3. Prohibition on barangay officials.—No barangay
official shall be appointed as member of the Board of
Election Inspectors or as official watcher of each duly
registered major political party or any socio-civic, religious,
professional or any similar organization of which they may
be members.
WHEREAS, the barangay is the smallest political unit of
government and it is a widely accepted fact that barangay officials
wield tremendous influence on their constituents or the residents
in the barangay;
WHEREAS, the Boards of Election Inspectors [BEIs] are
charged with the duty of maintaining the regularity and
orderliness of the election proceedings in each precinct to the end
that elections will be honest, orderly, peaceful and credible:
WHEREAS, records of past political exercises show that on
election day, the Commission on Elections usually receive
numerous complaints against barangay officials entering polling
places and interfering in proceedings of the BEIs thereby causing
not only delay

_______________

2 Rollo, p. 4.
3 Id., p. 6.
4 Id., pp. 67-69.
 424

424 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Concepcion, Jr. vs. Commission on Elections

in the proceedings, but also political tension among the BEIs, the
voters and the watchers in the polling place;
NOW THEREFORE, to insure that elections are peaceful,
orderly, regular and credible, the Commission on Elections, by
virtue of the powers vested in it by the Constitution, the Omnibus
Election Code [OEC], EO No. 94, and other election laws
RESOLVED to prohibit, as it hereby RESOLVES to prohibit:
1. The appointment of barangay officials which includes the
Punong Barangay, Barangay Kagawad, Barangay Secretary,
Barangay Treasurer, and Barangay Tanod, as Chairman/person
and/or Member of the BEIs or as official watcher of any candidate,
duly registered major political party, or any similar organization,
or any socio-civic, religious, professional [sic], in the May 14, 2007
National and Local Elections. The prohibition extends to
barangay officials, employees and tanods, who are
members of accredited citizens’ arms.
2. The barangay officials, employees and tanods from
staying inside any polling place, except to cast their vote.
Accordingly, they should leave the polling place
immediately after casting their vote.
This Resolution shall take effect on the seventh day after the
publication in two (2) newspapers of general circulation in the
Philippines.
The Education and Information Department shall cause the
publication of this Resolution in two (2) daily newspapers of
general circulation and shall furnish copies thereof to all field
officers of the Commission and the Department of Interior and
Local Government, other deputies and heads of accredited
political parties.
SO ORDERED.” [Emphasis supplied.]

The COMELEC ruled on NAMFREL’s petition for

accreditation on April 2, 2007 in the assailed Resolution
(April 2, 2007 Resolution), conditionally granting
NAMFREL’s petition in the following tenor:5

“Having already discussed above the reasons, both factual and

legal, for the dismissal of the Verified Opposition, we find the
instant

_______________

5 Id., pp. 4-5.

 425

VOL. 591, JUNE 30, 2009 425

Concepcion, Jr. vs. Commission on Elections

petition for accreditation as the citizen’s arm of the petitioner

NAMFREL meritorious. Pursuant to Section 2(5), Article IX (C) of
the 1987 Philippine Constitution and Section 52(k) of the
Omnibus Election Code, as amended, this Commission en banc
hereby resolves to accredit petitioner NAMFREL as its citizens’
arm in the 14 May 2007 national and local elections, subject to its
direct and immediate control and supervision.
There is, however, one important condition that must be
fulfilled by the petitioner before its accreditation as citizens’ arm
could legally take effect. Accordingly, Mr. Jose S. Concepcion, Jr.,
the National Chairman of NAMFREL, must first be removed both
as a member and overall Chairman of said organization. As
correctly pointed out by the oppositor, Mr. Concepcion, being the
Barangay Chairman of Barangay Forbes Park, Makati City,
cannot be a member much more the overall chairman of the
citizens’ arm such as NAMFREL. This is explicitly provided for in
COMELEC Resolution No. 7798 promulgated on 5 January 2007,
pertinent of which we quote:
WHEREAS, Section 3 of Executive Order No. 94 dated
March 2, 1987 provides as follows:
Sec. 3. Prohibition on Barangay officials.—No
barangay official shall be appointed as member of the Board
of Election Inspectors or as watcher of each duly registered
major political party or any socio-civic, religious,
professional or any similar organization of which they may
be members.
xxx xxx xxx
NOW THEREFORE, to insure that the elections are peaceful,
orderly, regular and credible, the Commission on Elections, by
virtue of the powers vested in it by the Constitution, the OEC, EO
No. 94, and other election laws, RESOLVED to prohibit, as it is
hereby RESOLVES to prohibit:
1. The appointment of barangay officials which include the
Punong Barangay, Kagawad, Barangay Secretary, Barangay
Treasurer, and Barangay Tanod, as Chairman / person and/or
Members of the BEIs or as official watcher of any candidate, duly
registered major political party, or any similar organization, or
any socio-civic, religious, professional, in the May 14, 2007
National and Local Elections. The prohibition extends to the
barangay officials, employees and tanods, who are members of the
accredited citizens’ arms.

426
426 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Concepcion, Jr. vs. Commission on Elections

xxxx
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Commission en banc
RESOLVED as it hereby RESOLVES, to grant the instant
petition for accreditation finding it imbued with merit.
xxxx
The ACCREDITATION herein GRANTED is further
SUBJECT TO THE FOLLOWING CONDITIONS:
1. The petitioner is hereby enjoined and encouraged by the
Commission to re-organize in accordance with its own internal
rules and procedures as an independent organization, and to
submit before election day a list of its responsible officers and
members, deleting therefrom the names of any previous officer or
member similarly situated with Mr. Jose S. Concepcion, Jr. who
are disqualified to be part of the citizens’ arm in view of the
passage of COMELEC Resolution No. 7798 on 5 January 2007;
xxxx
9. This accreditation shall be deemed automatically revoked
in case petitioner violates any of the provisions and conditions set
forth herein.” [Italics supplied.]

Soon thereafter, NAMFREL filed a “Manifestation and

Request for Re-Examination” that: (1) contains information
regarding NAMFREL’s reorganization and its new set of
officers showing that the petitioner had stepped down as
National Chair and had been replaced by a new Chair; (2)
manifests NAMFREL’s acceptance of the conditional grant
of its petition for accreditation; and (3) includes
NAMFREL’s request for a re-examination without further
arguments of the April 2, 2007 Resolution as it specifically
affected the petitioner’s membership with NAMFREL. In
this Manifestation and Request for Re-examination,
NAMFREL outlined its various objections and concerns on
the legality or validity of Resolution 7798.
The COMELEC, in its Order of May 8, 2007, noted the
information relating to NAMFREL’s current officers, and
denied the request to examine its (COMELEC’s)
interpretation of the April 2, 2007 Resolution prohibiting
petitioner’s direct
427

VOL. 591, JUNE 30, 2009 427

Concepcion, Jr. vs. Commission on Elections
participation as member and National Chairman of
NAMFREL. The COMELEC reasoned out that the April 2,
2007 Resolution is clear, and NAMFREL had not presented
any convincing argument to warrant the requested
examination.
NAMFREL did not question the COMELEC’s
ruling.

The Petition

Instead of a direct reaction from NAMFREL, the

petitioner filed the present petition, ostensibly
questioning the COMELEC’s April 2, 2007
Resolution, but actually raising issues with respect
to Resolution 7798. To illustrate this point, the headings
of the petitioner’s cited grounds were as follows:

COMELEC HAS ACTED WITHOUT JURISDICTION OR IN

EXCESS OF ITS JURISDICTION WHEN IT ISSUED COMELEC
RESOLUTION NO. 7798 WHICH HAS NO STATUTORY
BASIS.6
COMELEC SERIOUSLY ERRED AND GRAVELY ABUSED
ITS DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION
OR IN EXCESS OF ITS JURISDICTION WHEN IT
RETROACTIVELY APPLIED COMELEC RESOLUTION NO.
7798 TO NAMFREL’S PETITION.7
NAMFREL CHAIRMAN JOSE CONCEPCION WAS NOT
ACCORDED DUE PROCESS WHEN HE WAS NEITHER GIVEN
THE OPPORTUNITY TO QUESTION COMELEC RESOLUTION
NO. 7798 NOR THE OPPORTUNITY TO PRESENT HIS SIDE
REGARDING THE PROHIBITION.8

The petitioner expounded on the invalidity of Resolution

7798 with the following arguments which, for brevity and
ease of presentation, we summarize below:

_______________

6 Id., p. 9.
7 Id., p. 14.
8 Id., p. 15.

428

428 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Concepcion, Jr. vs. Commission on Elections

1. EO No. 94—issued by then President Corazon

Aquino on December 17, 1986—prohibits the
appointment of barangay officials as members of the
BEI or as official watchers of each duly registered
major political party or any socio-civic, religious,
professional or any similar organization of which
they may be members. This law, according to the
petitioner, could not however be the statutory basis of
Resolution 7798 because:
a. the prohibition under EO No. 94 applies only to
the February 2, 1987 plebiscite. The restrictive
application is evident from a reading of the EO’s title9
and of one of its whereas clauses.10
b. nothing in EO No. 94 prohibits the petitioner’s
membership with NAMFREL or the petitioner’s
appointment as Chair or member of a duly accredited
COMELEC’s citizen arm. The petitioner, who then
chaired NAMFREL, was never appointed as BEI
member or as poll watcher.
c. the underlying purpose of Resolution 7798 is to
prevent barangay officials from wielding their
influence during the voting and canvassing stages by
entering polling places under the pretext of acting as
poll watchers. The petitioner was not a poll watcher;
the COMELEC could have therefore simply
prohibited the appointment of barangay chairmen as
BEI members or poll watchers, and would have
already achieved its purpose.

_______________

9 AMENDING CERTAIN PROVISIONS OF THE OMNIBUS ELECTION CODE OF THE

PHILIPPINES FOR PURPOSES OF THE FEBRUARY 2, 1987 PLEBISCITE AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES.
10 WHEREAS, in the interest of free, orderly and honest conduct of the
plebiscite, there is an immediate necessity to amend Section 52,
paragraph (c) of the Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines, so as to
empower the Commission on Elections to promulgate expeditiously rules
and regulations for the plebiscite on February 2, 1987, considering the
time element involved.

429

VOL. 591, JUNE 30, 2009 429

Concepcion, Jr. vs. Commission on Elections

d. the COMELEC cannot, in the guise of

regulation, go beyond or expand the mandate of a law
because the COMELEC has no law-making powers.
 e. Resolution 7798 cannot be applied
retroactively. Its effectivity clause provides that it
shall be effective on the 7th day after its publication
in a newspaper of general circulation, that is, only on
January 14, 2007. Since NAMREL’s petition was filed
on January 5, 2007 (or before Resolution 7798’s
effectivity), it could not have applied to NAMFREL’s
petition.
2. Resolution 7798 is an invalid implementing
regulation, as it failed to comply with the following
requisites for the validity of implementing rules and
regulations:
a. the rules and regulations must have been
issued on the authority of law;
b. the rules and regulations must be within the
scope and purview of the law;
c. the rules and regulations must be reasonable;
d. the rules and regulations must not be contrary
to laws or to the Constitution.
3. On constitutional grounds, the petitioner objected to
Resolution 7798 because:
a. the Resolution is unreasonable, as it bears no
relation to the very purpose of the law; its prohibition
is harsh, oppressive, and serves no purpose at all.
b. Resolution 7798 violates the petitioner’s right
to association through its enforced removal of the
petitioner as member and Chair of NAMFEL.
c. the COMELEC denied him of his right to
procedural due process; he was not afforded the
cardinal ad-
430

430 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Concepcion, Jr. vs. Commission on Elections

ministrative due process right to a hearing,11 as he

was not given the opportunity to be heard or at least to
comment on Resolution 7798 upon which his removal
as National Chair and member of NAMFREL was
based. He should have been heard since he was not a
party to the petition for accreditation in his personal
capacity. Thus, the April 2, 2007 Resolution
conditionally granting NAMFREL’s petition for
accreditation should be nullified insofar as it required
the petitioner’s resignation from NAMFREL as a pre-
condition for the effectivity of its accreditation.
 The OSG Response

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) defends the

validity of Resolution 7798 with the following arguments:
1. Resolution 7798 was issued by the COMELEC as a
valid exercise of its quasi-legislative power to implement
elections laws. Hence, notice and hearing are not required
for its validity. The OSG cites Section 52 (c) of the OEC
empowering the COMELEC to “promulgate rules and
regulations implementing the provisions of this Code (the
OEC) or other laws which the Commission is required to
enforce and administer…” in relation with the settled
principle [citing Central Bank v. Cloribel (44 SCRA 307
[1972])] that notice and hearing are not required when an
administrative agency exercises its quasi-legislative
power,12 as opposed to quasi-judicial power which requires
notice and hearing;13 and

_______________

11 Citing the cardinal due process rights under Ang Tibay v. Court of
Industrial Relations, 69 Phil. 635 (1940).
12 An action in the form of a general rule for the future to govern the
public at large.
13  An action which results from investigation, declaration and
enforcement of liabilities as they stand on present or past facts and under
existing laws.

431

VOL. 591, JUNE 30, 2009 431

Concepcion, Jr. vs. Commission on Elections

2. EO No. 94 applies to the May 14, 2007 national and

local elections. While EO No. 94 may have been issued
primarily for the February 2, 1987 plebsicite, its spirit and
intent find applicability and relevance to future elections.
Thus, the COMELEC’s reliance on EO No. 94 when it
issued Resolution 7798 is certainly valid and proper;
 3. While the petitioner is not appointed as member of
the BEI or as watcher, he nonetheless labors under a
conflict of interest, given that a COMELEC-accredited
citizens’ arm is also entitled, under Section 180 of the OEC
to appoint a watcher in every polling place. Additionally,
the fact that the petitioner is a barangay chairman and at
the same time the NAMFREL Chair clearly raises
questions on his neutrality and non-partisanship;
COMELEC non-partisanship may at the same time be
compromised, as it is the COMELEC which accredits its
citizens’ arm.
The OSG—in arguing that Resolution 7798 was issued
pursuant to the COMELEC’s mandate and is not,
therefore, tainted with grave abuse of discretion—also
harks back at the extent of the power of the COMELEC
under Section 2(1) of Article IX(C) of the Constitution that
gives COMELEC the broad power to administer the
conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum
and recall;14 there can hardly be any doubt that the text
and intent of the constitutional provision is to give
COMELEC all the necessary and incidental powers for it to
achieve the objective of holding free, orderly, honest,
peaceful, and credible elections.

The Court’s Ruling

We resolve to DISMISS the petition for blatant

misuse of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

_______________

14  Pangandaman v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 134340,

November 25, 1999, 319 SCRA 283.

432

432 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Concepcion, Jr. vs. Commission on Elections

A primary consideration for us in looking at the petition

is its thrust or focus. The petition mentions three legal
instruments related with the case, namely: (1) EO No. 94
issued by then President Aquino; (2) COMELEC’s April 2,
2007 Resolution conditionally granting NAMFREL’s
accreditation, subject to the conditions that the petitioner
and similarly situated barangay officials shall not be
included as members or officials of NAMFREL; and (3)
COMELEC Resolution 7798, issued pursuant to EO No.
94 and which in turn is the basis for the April 2, 2007
Resolution.
We reiterate that the present petition, by its express
terms, seeks to “set aside the En Banc Resolution dated
02 April 2007 and the Order dated 8 May 2007 of
Respondent COMELEC who, in grave abuse of discretion
and in gross violation of Petitioner’s right to due process of
law, denied Petitioner’s right to associate when the
Respondent COMELEC, as a condition of NAMFREL’s
accreditation as citizen arm, directed the removal of
Petitioner as overall Chairman and member.” In arguing
for this objective, the petitioner directs his attention at
Resolution 7798, not at the April 2, 2007 Resolution, as can
be seen from the grounds summarized above. In the
process, he likewise raises issues that call for the
interpretation of Resolution 7798’s underlying basis—EO
No. 94.
Expressed in procedural terms, the petitioner now seeks
to assail, in his individual capacity, a COMELEC
adjudicatory resolution (i.e., the April 2, 2007
Resolution) for its adverse effects on him when he was not
a party to that case. NAMFREL (the direct party to the
case and who had accepted the COMELEC accreditation
ruling), on the other hand, is not a party to the present
petition. Its non-participation is apparently explained by
the position it took with respect to the April 2, 2007
Resolution; in its Manifestation and Request for
Examination, it asked for a re-examination of the April 2,
2007 Resolution, but interestingly stated that—

“21. NAMFREL accepts the terms of the accreditation

and further manifests that it has commenced full efforts into

433

VOL. 591, JUNE 30, 2009 433

Concepcion, Jr. vs. Commission on Elections

preparing for the performance of its duties and obligations

as the Commission’s citizen arm.” [Emphasis supplied.]

Thus, the present petition is clearly the petitioner’s

own initiative, and NAMFREL, the direct party in
the COMELEC’s April 2, 2007 Resolution, has
absolutely no participation.
Another unusual feature of this case is the focus of the
petition. While its expressed intent is to assail the
COMELEC’s April 2, 2007 Resolution (an exercise of the
COMELEC’s quasi-judicial functions), its focus is on the
alleged defects of Resolution 7798, a regulation issued by
the COMELEC in the exercise of its rulemaking power.
The above features of the petition render it fatally
defective. The first defect lies in the petitioner’s
personality to file a petition for certiorari to address an
adjudicatory resolution of the COMELEC in which he was
not a party to, and where the direct party, NAMFREL, does
not even question the assailed resolution. It would have
been another matter if NAMFREL had filed the present
petition with the petitioner as intervenor because of his
personal interest in the COMELEC ruling. He could have
intervened, too, before the COMELEC as an affected party
in NAMFREL’s Manifestation and Request for
Examination. As a last recourse, the petitioner could have
expressly stated before this Court the procedural problems
he faced and asked that we suspend the rules based on the
unusual circumstances he could have pointed out. None of
these actions, however, took place. Instead, the petitioner
simply questioned the COMELEC’s April 2, 2007
Resolution without explaining to this Court his reason for
using Rule 65 as his medium, and from there, proceeded to
attack the validity of COMELEC Resolution 7798. Under
these questionable circumstances, we cannot now recognize
the petitioner as a party-in-interest who can directly assail
the COMELEC’s April 2, 2007 Resolution in an original
Rule 65 petition before this Court.
434

434 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Concepcion, Jr. vs. Commission on Elections

The requirement of personality or interest is sanctioned

no less by Section 7, Article IX of the Constitution which
provides that a decision, order, or ruling of a constitutional
commission may be brought to this Court on certiorari by
the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a
copy thereof.15 This requirement is repeated in Section 1,
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which applies to petitions for
certiorari under Rule 64 of decisions, orders or rulings of
the constitutional commissions pursuant to Section 2, Rule
64.16 Section 1, Rule 65 essentially provides that a person
aggrieved by any act of a tribunal, board or officer
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions rendered
without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction may
file a petition for certiorari.
An aggrieved party under Section 1, Rule 65 is one who
was a party to the original proceedings that gave rise to the
original action for certiorari under Rule 65. We had
occasion to clarify and explain the “aggrieved party”
requirement in Tang v. Court of Appeals17 where we said:

“Although Section 1 of Rule 65 provides that the special civil

action of certiorari may be availed of by a “person aggrieved” by
the
_______________

15 Section 7. Each Commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its

Members, any case or matter brought before it within sixty days from the date of
its submission for decision or resolution. A case or matter is deemed submitted for
decision or resolution upon the filing of the last pleading, brief, or memorandum
required by the rules of the Commission or by the Commission itself. Unless
otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of
each Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the
aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof.
16  SEC. 2. Mode of review.—A judgment or final order or resolution of the
Commission on Elections and the Commission on Audit may be brought by the
aggrieved party to the Supreme Court on certiorari under Rule 65, except as
hereinafter provided.
17 G.R. No. 117204, February 11, 2000, 325 SCRA 394, 402-403.

435

VOL. 591, JUNE 30, 2009 435

Concepcion, Jr. vs. Commission on Elections

orders or decisions of a tribunal, the term “person aggrieved” is

not to be construed to mean that any person who feels injured by
the lower court’s order or decision can question the said court’s
disposition via certiorari. To sanction a contrary interpretation
would open the floodgates to numerous and endless litigations
which would undeniably lead to the clogging of court dockets and,
more importantly, the harassment of the party who prevailed in
the lower court.
In a situation wherein the order or decision being questioned
underwent adversarial proceedings before a trial court,
the “person aggrieved” referred to under Section 1 of Rule
65 who can avail of the special civil action of certiorari
pertains to one who was a party in the proceedings before
the lower court. The correctness of this interpretation can be
gleaned from the fact that a special civil action for certiorari may
be dismissed motu proprio if the party elevating the case failed to
file a motion for reconsideration of the questioned order or
decision before the lower court. Obviously, only one who was a
party in the case before the lower court can file a motion for
reconsideration since a stranger to the litigation would not have
the legal standing to interfere in the orders or decisions of the
said court. In relation to this, if a non-party in the proceedings
before the lower court has no standing to file a motion for
reconsideration, logic would lead us to the conclusion that he
would likewise have no standing to question the said order or
decision before the appellate court via certiorari.” (emphasis
supplied)
 More importantly, we had this to say in Development
Bank of the Philippines v. Commission on Audit18—a case
that involves a certiorari petition, under Rule 64 in relation
with Rule 65, of a ruling of the Commission on Audit (a
constitutional commission like COMELEC):

“The novel theory advanced by the OSG would necessarily

require persons not parties to the present case—the DBP
employees who are members of the Plan or the trustees of the
Fund—to avail of certiorari under Rule 65. The petition for
certiorari under Rule 65, however, is not available to any
person who feels injured by the decision of a tribunal,
board or officer exercising judi-

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18 G.R. No. 144516, February 11, 2004, 422 SCRA 459.

436

436 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Concepcion, Jr. vs. Commission on Elections

cial or quasi-judicial functions. The “person aggrieved”

under Section 1 of Rule 65 who can avail of the special civil
action of certiorari pertains only to one who was a party in
the proceedings before the court a quo, or in this case,
before the COA. To hold otherwise would open the courts to
numerous and endless litigations. Since DBP was the sole party
in the proceedings before the COA, DBP is the proper party to
avail of the remedy of certiorari.
The real party in interest who stands to benefit or suffer from
the judgment in the suit must prosecute or defend an action. We
have held that “interest” means material interest, an interest in
issue that the decision will affect, as distinguished from mere
interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental interest.”

The second fatal defect lies in the petition’s thrust; it

opened with and professed to be an express challenge to the
COMELEC’s adjudicatory April 2, 2007 Resolution, but in
its arguments solely attacks and prays for the partial
nullity of COMELEC Resolution 7798 issued in the
exercise of the COMELEC’s rule making power. This
approach is fatally defective because the petition thereby
converts an express challenge of an adjudicatory resolution
—made without the requisite standing—into a challenge
for the nullity of a regulation through an original Rule 65
petition for certiorari.
 To be sure, a COMELEC adjudicatory action can be
challenged on the basis of the invalidity of the law or
regulation that underlies the action. But to do this, a valid
challenge to the adjudicatory action must exist; at the very
least, the petitioner must have the requisite personality to
mount the legal challenge to the COMELEC adjudicatory
action.19 Where this basic condition is absent, the challenge
is unmasked for what it really is—a direct challenge to the
underlying law or regulation masquerading as a challenge
to a COMELEC adjudicatory action.
What is significant in appreciating this defect in the
petition is the legal reality that the petitioner was not
without

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19 See discussions on personality, at pages 11-14, this Decision.

437

VOL. 591, JUNE 30, 2009 437

Concepcion, Jr. vs. Commission on Elections

any viable remedy to directly challenge Resolution 7798. A

stand-alone challenge to the regulation could have been
made through appropriate mediums, particularly through a
petition for declaratory relief with the appropriate Regional
Trial Court under the terms of Rule 63 of the Rules of
Court, or through a petition for prohibition under Rule 65
to prevent the implementation of the regulation, as the
petitioner might have found appropriate to his situation.
As already mentioned, a challenge can likewise be made in
the course of validly contesting an adjudicatory order of the
COMELEC. Such challenge, however, cannot be made in
an original petition for certiorari under Rule 65
dissociated from any COMELEC action made in the
exercise of its quasi-judicial functions.
The petitioner’s unusual approaches and use of Rule 65
of the Rules of Court do not appear to us to be the result of
any error in reading Rule 65, given the way the petition
was crafted. Rather, it was a backdoor approach to achieve
what the petitioner could not directly do in his individual
capacity under Rule 65. It was, at the very least, an
attempted bypass of other available, albeit lengthier,
modes of review that the Rules of Court provide. While we
stop short of concluding that the petitioner’s approaches
constitute an abuse of process through a manipulative
reading and application of the Rules of Court, we
 nevertheless resolve that the petition should be dismissed
for its blatant violation of the Rules. The transgressions
alleged in a petition, however weighty they may sound,
cannot be justifications for blatantly disregarding the rules
of procedure, particularly when remedial measures were
available under these same rules to achieve the petitioner’s
objectives. For our part, we cannot and should not—in the
name of liberality and the “transcendental importance”
doctrine—entertain these types of petitions. As we held in
the very recent case of Lozano, et al. vs. Nograles,20 albeit
from a different perspective, our liberal approach has its
limits and should not be abused.

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20 G.R. Nos. 187883/187910, June 16, 2009.

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