Psychonomic Bulletin & Review

1994, 1 (2), 239-249

Contextualism: Is the act in context the

adequate metaphor for scientific psychology?
E. J. CAPALDI and ROBERT W. PROCTOR
Purdue University, West Lafayette, Indiana

According to some, psychology as it has been practiced is based on a world view known as mech-
anism. Individuals from a number of different areas of psychology, most recently within the
behavior-analytic community, have strongly argued that psychology should be based on a differ-
ent world view, contextualism. They emphasize a variety of characteristics that, in their view,
differentiate a contextualistically based psychology from one based on mechanism. We examine
these characteristics and find them to be of dubious value for differentiating a contextualistic
approach to psychology from others. One proposal of some advocates of contextualism is that con-
textualistic approaches should develop independently from most ofthe remainder ofpsychology,
which they regard as mechanistic. This proposal is said to be derived from the metaphilosophy
ofPepper (1942). We evaluate this proposal and reject it. We go on to suggest that the mechanis-
tic/contextualistic dichotomy is too constraining to realistically describe various approaches to
psychology.

In 1942, Stephen C. Pepper published a book entitled sequently, by critically focusing on the case advanced by
World Hypotheses , in which he presented a framework the behavior analysts, we should be able as well to sup-
for classifying philosophic systems. This framework has ply a general critique of the more salient arguments
met with considerable acceptance among a variety of psy- offered by various adherents of Pepper 's metaphilosophy.
chologists from different fields over the past two decades.
Pepper's classifications have been used by some ofthese PEPPER'S METAPHILOSOPHY
psychologists to reject what may be regarded as the dom-
inant or conventional approaches to theory and research According to Pepper (1942), most philosophic positions
in psychology in favor of certain newer alternatives. If can be subsumed under one or another of four relatively
these alternative approaches should come to be widely ac- adequate world views. He goes on to say that each ofthese
cepted, the result would be a revolution in the way psy- world views derives from a distinctive root metaphor that
chological research is practiced and theory is generated. provides a different, coherent, and defensible way of in-
Any arguments advocating radical change obviously de- terpreting the world. These four world views are jormism,
mand close scrutiny. However, although a few of the ar- organicism, mechanism, and contextualism.
guments stemming from Pepper's metaphilosophy have The root metaphor of the world view known as formism
encountered some opposition (e.g., from Kendler, 1986; is similarity. The members of any dass of objects or ideas
Marr, 1993; Staddon, 1993), so far they have escaped are similar to one another either because these members
the extensive examination they deserve. We intend to rec- are the reflection of some independently existing norm
tify this shortcoming here. (Plato) or because we can see in the particulars that all
The most recent proponents of radical change in psy- members of the dass manifest the norm (Aristotle). For
chology based on Pepper's metaphilosophy are individu- Plato, oak trees are oak trees because they participate in
als within the behavior-analytic framework stemming the norm for oak trees, whereas for Aristotle, all oak trees
from the work of B. F. Skinner. Because the behavior- have a common essence. The truth criterion of formism
analytic arguments, more than others that have been made, is correspondence of the individual to the characteristics
are addressed specifically to how experimental psychol- of the dass. For example, this particular bird is a bird
ogy is practiced, they are most relevant to members of because it has the characteristics peculiar to the dass of
the Psychonomic Society and deserve particular attention. birds.
Although some of the arguments advanced by certain For organicism, the root metaphor is the growing or-
members of the behavior-analytic community are unique, ganism. Things are seen as developing toward certain
in many cases they correspond to those advanced by other ends, according to predetermined stages. Piaget's stages
psychologists, such as developmental psychologists. Con- of cognitive development make up one example of organi-
cism within developmental psychology. The criterion of
Correspondence should be addressed to E. J. Capaldi, Psychology
truth for organicism is coherence. Systems-as, for ex-
Department, Psychology Building 1364, Purdue University, West ample, scientific theories-progress over time (i.e., de-
Lafayette, IN 47967-1364. velop) toward greater and greater inclusion or coherence.

239 Copyright 1994 Psychonomic Society, Inc.

 240 CAPALDI AND PROCTOR

Thus, Newton's theory is superior to that of Anaximenes. (1991), a behavior analyst, has argued that "for psychol-
Why? "Because, answers the organicist, it includes vastly ogy, mechanism is the wrong world-view for its subject
more data, because these data are much more determinant, matter, and always was" (p. 124). He goes on to say,
and because these determinant data are so closely in- "Contextualism, though, is the bold new alternative-an
tegrated so that in very large measure they are all mutu- alternative that is continuing to evolve" (p. 143).
ally implicative" (Pepper, 1942, p. 3(0). Contextualism has had its initial and major impact on
Of almost exclusive concern here are the remaining two developmental psychology (see, e.g., Ford & Lerner,
world views, mechanism and contextualism. According 1992; Lerner & Kaufman, 1985; Reese, 1991). It also
to Pepper (1942), the root metaphor ofmechanism is the has been influential in environmental psychology (e.g.,
machine. The parts of the machine are assumed to inter- Altman & Rogoff, 1987), social psychology (e.g., Ger-
act in a lawful manner to produce the functioning of the gen, 1989), and clinical psychology (e.g., Terwee, 1990).
entire machine. For example, the earth revolves around Arecent book by Gillespie (1992) argues that cognitive
the sun in a fixed pattern determined by the mutual gravita- psychology should become contextualistic, and contex-
tional attraction ofthe two bodies. Mechanism is regarded tualism has been strongly advocated as the proper ap-
by many as the metaphor of science and of most contem- proach for behavior analysis in particular and for psychol-
porary psychology (e.g., Gillespie, 1992; Morris, 1988). ogy in general (e.g., Hayes, Hayes, & Reese, 1988).
Mechanism would be identified with Newton's approach, Despite the numerous differences among the advocates
for example. Newton attempted to explain a variety of of contextualism, a theme that runs through the various
phenomena on the basis of a small set of laws. The truth contextualistic accounts is that stimulus-response (S-R)
criterion of mechanism is correspondence between hy- psychology and cognitive psychology are highly similar,
pothesis and experimental findings. This version of the in that both are exemplars of mechanistic systems and have
correspondence criterion of truth is so well known and serious shortcomings as approaches to psychology.
widely accepted as to require no elaboration. One may judge the fervor with which some have come
The root metaphor of contextualism is the ongoing act to embrace contextualism from remarks by Sarbin (1993),
in context. Contextualism sterns from pragmatism and is a personality-social psychologist. He states that coming
associated with the philosophic systems ofWilliam James, to accept contextualism in place of mechanism is a very
C. S. Peirce, and John Dewey. In contextualism, things difficult experience, requiring "something akin to reli-
are always seen as changing, but the change is not neces- gious conversion" (p. 53). To begin to appreciate how
sarily progressive, as in organicism. According to Pep- different his contextualistic approach is from the so-called
per (1942), "The ineradicable contextualistic categories mechanistic approach, consider the following:
may thus be said to be change and novelty" (p. 235). Pep-
We have crossed the threshold into a new era. We have
per states, "To give instances of this root metaphor in joined ranks with scholars who make the case for social
our language with the minimum risk of misunderstand- constructivism, for hermeneutics, for ethnomethodology,
ing, we should use only verbs. It is doing, and enduring, for psychobiography, for dramaturgy, for narrative psy-
CRITERIO enjoying" (p. 232). Contextualism favors an opera-
and chology, for ethogeny, all patently contextual, all ready
tional theory of truth, which has three distinct specifica- to advance knowledge through the study of exemplars or
DE tions. One of these truth criteria is that of "successful specimens. We havelived through a conversion experience,
VERDAD working." In terms ofthis criterion, Pepper states, "Truth and can now see the worldfrom the perspective of contex-
is utility or successful functioning, and that is the end of tualism, the root metaphor of which is the narrative. We
it" (p. 270). According to Pepper, the successful work- live in a story shaped world. Looking back, the dream of
a productive and complete science of psychology basedon
ing criterion eschews hypothesis testing altogether. The mechanistic principles served as a powerful incentive to
true is whatever works in a particular situation. For ex- do psychology according to theconventional paradigm. To-
ample, a rat finding its way to the goalbox has solved a day, we acknowledge that it was only a dream. (p. 63)
practical problem and, thus, has isolated the true path.
Because it will be more appropriate to consider the other THE CASE FOR CONTEXTUALISM
two truth criteria later in this paper, we defer considera- ADVANCED BY BEHAVIOR ANALYSTS
tion of them.
Among the most ardent advocates of contextualism in
THE EMERGENCE OF CONTEXTUALISM the past few years have been several behavior analysts.
IN PSYCHOLOGY Behavior analysis, in common with much of the remainder
of psychology, has in the past been considered by some
Since about 1970, the notion that mechanism is the to be based on the world view known as mechanism (see,
proper world view for science in general and psychology e.g., Gillespie, 1992; Morris, 1988, 1993a). Many be-
in particular has come to be increasingly rejected. It has havior analysts continue to see psychology in general, but
been argued by a diverse array of psychologists that con- not behavior analysis, as mechanistic (Hayes, 1988; Hayes
textualism provides either an additional approach to psy- et al., 1988; Morris, 1988). Hayes et al. state flatly, "Be-
chology or one that should replace mechanism entirely havior analysis is a contextualistic system" (p. 110). Simi-
(Ford & Lerner, 1992; Hayes, Hayes, Reese, & Sarbin, larly, Morris (1988) asserts that "contemporary behavior
1993: Rosnow & Georgoudi, 1986). For example, Morris analysis ... is contextualistic in world view, in contrast
 CONTEXTUAUSM MI

to its traditional characterization as being mechanistic" TUE ARGUMENTS FOR CONTEXTUALISM:

(p. 289), and Hineline (1990) states, "in its purest form, A DETAILED EXAMINATION
behavior analytic theory is contextualistic to the extent
of virtually excluding mechanistic metaphors" (p. 309). The previously mentioned arguments advanced by
The initial and most influential arguments for behavior Hayes et al. (1988) and by Morris (1988, 1991, 1993a,
analysis' being contextualistic rather than mechanistic 1993b) for classifying a given psychological approach as
were advanced in a review of Pepper's (1942) book by contextualistic will be examined below. In considering
Hayes et al. (1988), which appeared in the Journal ofthe whether an approach is contextualistic, neither Hayes
Experimental Analysis 01 Behavior. Some of the argu- et al. nor Morris, nor any other adherent, has suggested
ments made by Hayes et al. are unique to behavior anal- that a specific combination of characteristics must be taken
ysis; others overlap with those made by psychologists in together. Rather, they have merely listed in serial fashion
other areas. According to Hayes et al. (1988), the con- the characteristics that, in their opinion, render a partic-
textualistic features of behavior analysis that distinguish ular approach contextualistic. Therefore, in this paper,
it from mechanism are the concept of the operant, the cri- we evaluate each of these purported characteristics in
terion for truth or adequacy, the role of the scientist in serial fashion.
scientific analysis, and the possibility of novelty. Addi-
tional arguments suggesting that behavior analysis is con- Contextual Characteristics of the Operant
textualistic have subsequently been supplied by Morris According to Hayes et al. (1988), contained in contex-
(1988,1991, 1993a, 1993b). The arguments advanced by tualism is a view of behavior that is compatible with the
Morris, who sees considerable similarity between be- concept of the operant, as it has been developed in be-
havior analysis and developmental psychology, provide havior analysis. Therefore, the operant has several major
additional correspondence to those advanced by contex- characteristics that Hayes et al. see as particularly com-
tualists in other areas of psychology. Morris suggests that patible with contextualism. However, as discussed below,
contextualistic behavior analysis, unlike mechanistic ap- each of the purported contextualistic characteristics of the
proaches found in S-R psychology and cognitive psychol- operant identified by Hayes et al. can be found in other
ogy, is holistic rather then elementaristic, postulates an psychological approaches that have not been considered
active rather than a passive organism, rejects linear causal- contextualistic.
ity, and is not reductionistic. Act in context. In contextualism, the context must be
It is one thing to describe contextualism and mechanism included in the analysis of an act, because an act out of
as abstract systems, as Pepper (1942) has done. But it is context is not an act, and this is true of the operant, ac-
another thing to suggest what the implications of the two cording to Hayes et al. (1988). They state, "The events
positions rnight be for concrete scientific practice, as many participating in an operant cannot usefully be examined
psychologists have done. It is of course the latter activity independently because their nature depends on their re-
that is of concern here. We will suggest that many of the lations to the other participants" (p. 101). We suggest that
characteristics said to render behavior analysis, or indeed although it may be true that behavior analysts include con-
any other area of psychology, a contextualistic system fall text in the analysis of the act, the importance of includ-
into one oftwo categories: Either they are for one reason ing context is similarly recognized in many branches of
or another of dubious value for that purpose, or, as oc- psychology, if not by all psychologists. However, recog-
curs in the majority of cases, they can be found in equal nizing that context may be of critical importance in many
abundance in most approaches to psychology. If we are instances does not make one a contextualist in the sense
correct, then either all of psychology is contextualistic or, discussed in this article.
as we think, the criteria are vacuous. The importance of context has been recognized in a re-
Notice that, according to the position advanced here, cent book on learning, entitled Context and Learning
we are not arguing that psychology or some area of psy- (Balsam & Tomie, 1985), of which the following are
chology is or is not contextualistic, or mechanistic for that among a small sampIe of the opinions expressed by chap-
matter. Rather, our purpose consists in demonstrating that ter authors. Balsam states, "At a logical and procedural
a convincing case has not been made that behavior anal- level, all learning occurs in context" (p. 1). Similarly,
ysis in particular or scientific psychology in general, as Rescorla, Durlach, and Grau (1985) state, "Modern dis-
currently practiced, is or has been contextualistic. Per- cussions of Pavlovian conditioning increasingly acknowl-
haps convincing arguments can be advanced, but so far, edge the importance of the context in which learning and
we shall argue, this has not been the case. Having reached performance occur" (p. 23). Also, Medin and Reynolds
this conclusion, we will go on to examine and reject a (1985) state,
view advocated by Hayes et al. (1988) that contextually The present chapter describes work where context is af-
minded psychologists should not compete directly with forded a central status and where context effects are mani-
mechanistically minded psychologists. Finally, we will fest as strengths as weIl as limitations. We aim to show
raise a neglected question: How appropriate is it to apply that analyses of context can provide insights into some key
the terms contextualism and mechanism to science in gen- problems associated with learning and memory research.
eral and to psychology in particular? (p. 323)
242 CAPALDI AND PROCTOR

Clearly, the authors of these chapters, in common with the meaning of behavior is determined by the context in
other authors in the book, acknowledge the importance which it occurs. For example,jire uttered in a theater has
of context for understanding learning. An extended dis- an entirely different meaning thanjire uttered on the ri-
cussion of how a variety of modern learning theories deal fle range. Moreover, the phonemic restoration effect de-
with context may be found in Hall (1991). scribed above illustrates that context can alter the act of
The inclusion of context is hardly limited to learning hearing itself.
theories. Context is also presumed to playa crucial role A good example of a theory in which context is fun-
in perception, cognition, and memory. Jenkins, a theorist damental to determining what is learned is supplied by
widely recognized as emphasizing context in his approach Gibbon and Balsam's (1981) scalar expectancy theory
to memory, goes so far as to say this of modern memory (SET). Gibbon and Balsam state, "The central idea es-
theory: "Everyone now knows that memory phenomena poused is that the association between the signal and food
are much more complicated and contextually determined depends on an appreciation of the improvement in the
than we used to think they were" (1979, p. 430, empha- average delay to reinforcement in the signal compared
sis ours). The importance attributed to context in mem- with the average delay overall or in the background"
ory research is illustrated by the wide variety of studies (p. 248). According to SET, to judge the effect of a par-
examining environmental, internal, and semantic context, ticular learning trial, we have to take into account not only
many of which are reviewed in the book Memory in Con- that learning trial but its relation to other events. More
text: Context in Memory (Davies & Thomson, 1988). specifically, strength of expectancy in the signal and
Consider now perception. One of the classic studies in strength of expectancy in the background are constantly
this area is an experiment by Bruner and Minturn (1955), undergoing change, both in absolute terms and relative
in which an ambiguous character was read as a letter when to each other, depending on (I) whether the reinforcing
presented along with letters and as a number when pre- event follows the signal, and at what delay or trace inter-
sented along with numbers. In other words, the percep- val, (2) whether the signal occurs alone, (3) whether the
tion of the stimulus was influencedby the context in which reinforcing event occurs alone, and (4) the temporal spac-
it was embedded. Another example is the phonernic resto- ing of events in the background, including no event in
ration effect discovered by Warren (1970). He presented the background. Just as Hayes et al. (1988) say that the
subjects with sentences such as the following, in which events participating in an operant cannot usefully be ex-
the asterisk indicates a phoneme replaced by a nonspeech amined independently, Gibbon and Balsam are saying that
sound: the effect of a Pavlovian trial cannot be judged indepen-
dently of its relationship to (I), (2), (3), and (4) above.
It was found that the *eel was on the axle. Outside the act. Contextualists analyzing an act find
It was found that the *eel was on the shoe. themselves outside of the original event of interest, and
so too do behavior analysts, according to Hayes et al.
It was found that the *eel was on the orange. (1988). We suggest that while this may be true, it is also
It was found that the *eel was on the table. the case that mechanists analyzing events often find them-
selves outside of the original event of interest. For ex-
Even though the disambiguating context occurred after ample, in an attempt to understand the effects of context
the missing phoneme, subjects reported actually hearing on, for example, learning or perception, so-called mech-
for each of the four sentences above wheel, heel, peel, anistically oriented psychologists attempt to construct the-
and meal, respectively. Many other examples from other ories. In this way, they find themselves outside of the
areas of psychology could be cited. original event ofinterest. Thus, a theory developed in an
Although indicating that mechanists deal with context, attempt to understand the effects of context on a particu-
Hayes (1988) and Morris (1991) suggest that they do so lar behavior may be applied to a variety of other differ-
differently from contextualists. For example, Hayes ent behaviors (see, e.g., Hall, 1991). It is the attempt to
(1988) states, "For a mechanist, context is relevant, but understand context, and not whether one is either a mech-
it does not alter the nature of the act itself' (p. 11). Simi- anist or a contextualist, that results in one's interest's being
larly, Morris suggests that in contextualism, unlike in directed outside of the original act. This may be illustrated
mechanism, "context imbues behaviour with meaning; by the recently reported finding that preexposure of the
the meaning of behaviour emerges from its context" conditioned stimulus (CS) affected sensitivity to context
(p. 136). We think that the view expressed by Hayes and (Swartzentruber & Bouton, 1992). Three distinct explan-
Morris is only partially correct. In some instances, the atory mechanisms were suggested-that preexposure of
possibility that context is simply another variable influ- the CS might affect its associability , its processing, or
encing behavior, albeit an important one, is justified. Bad- retrieval ofthe CS-US association. Each ofthese distinct
deley (1982) has used the term independent context to refer explanations suggests a different line of further investi-
to such instances. In other instances, however, context gation outside of the original event of interest.
does have more fundamental effects; but this is generally Acts versus movements. Responses share membership
realized and accepted by all researchers. In these in- in an operant class to the extent that they produce com-
stances, which Baddeley has called interactive context, mon effects on the environment, according to Hayes et al.
 CONTEXTUALISM 243

(1988). They go on to say that an operant may be any- employed in classical conditioning appear to fall in this
thing from a thumb twitch to cooking a four-course meal. category" (pp. 42-43). Moreover, Adams (1984), an ex-
Morris (1991) makes the same argument, in a somewhat pert in the area of motor learning, has suggested that al-
different manner. He states, "Mechanism adheres to though concern with the act is legitimate, so is concern
elementarism, representing behavior and the environment with movement sequences. He has gone so far as to state
as but collections of materially fundamental, atomic re- that preoccupation with the act in both human and ani-
sponses and stimulus elements (or switches). Complex ac- mallearning has had deleterious consequences for the un-
tion is then but an associative compounding of the basic derstanding of movement sequences (see especially pp. 3
elements and their interrelations" (p. 132). and 4 of his article).
Although some psychologists may identify the animal Verbs. In contextualism, the verb-like quality of be-
as learning particular and specific behaviors, the idea that havioral interaction is emphasized. This is true of behavior
responses share membership in an operant dass to the ex- analysis, according to Hayes et al. (1988), as well as
tent that they produce common effects on the environment Morris (1993a), who states, "Behavior analysis takes as
has long been recognized by many psychologists. Indeed, its subject matter what we describe in the grammar of
it was examined experimentally by Muenzinger (1928) verbs-behaving, constructing, and thinking" (p. 28).
prior to the time it was emphasized by behavior analysts. Compare Morris's statement to that of Tolman (1932):
The well-known Muenzinger study was prominently men-
A rat running a maze; a cat getting out of a puzzle box;
tioned by Tolman (1932), a cognitive behaviorist, to il-
a man driving horne to dinner; a child hiding from a
lustrate the "multiple trackness" of behavior. In that stranger; a woman doing her washing or gossiping over
study, guinea pigs given over 1,000 acquisition trials used the telephone; a pupil marking a mental-test sheet; a psy-
a variety of responses over the course of the experiment. chologist reciting a list of nonsense syllabies; my friend
Thus, the animal might use its left paw for a number of and I telling one another our thoughts and feelings-these
trials and then switch over to using its right paw, and then are alt behaviors. (p. 8)
switch again to using its left paw.
As may be seen, even for a cognitive behaviorist presuma-
Tolman (1932) cites another study by Muenzinger,
bly on the opposite pole from behavior analysis, the oper-
Koerner, and Irey (1929), in which the experimenters lim-
ant need not be restricted to any particular dass of be-
ited the animals to the use of the right paw. However,
havior, and each of the behaviors described by Tolman
even here, the animals showed considerable response vari-
emphasizes verb-like interactions, no less than those de-
ability. In Muenzinger et al.'s words:
scribed by Morris above. Would it be possible for any
The right paw might be used with a firm and deliberate variety of behaviorism to ignore the verb-like quality of
pressing down of the lever, or a bare touch on the lever, behavioral interactions?
or a quick tap, or a succession of quick taps, or brushing It seems clear to us that a point-by-point comparison
or sliding over the lever, or circular movement partly of the contextualistic position adopted by Hayes et al.
around the lever, or a gentle placing of the paw on the lever (1988) on the operant with that ofTolman (1932) and sub-
with pressure after some time, or a crossing of the right
paw over the left. (p. 427)
sequent writers on the nature of the response would re-
veal them to be highly sirnilar, to the point ofbeing almost
All of these behaviors were regarded by To1manand Muen- identical. Perhaps this is not accidental. In his later writ-
zinger as equivalent, despite their physical differences. ings, Pepper (1967) favored a new world view, seen by
Tolman's approach emphasizing response equivalence him as highly sirnilar to contextualism, called selectivism.
continues to be influential on the contemporary scene. For Selectivism was heavily influenced by the writings ofTol-
example, Mackintosh (1974) specifies several theories of man. The root metaphor of this new world view is the
instrumentallearning that "rnay be regarded as modern goal-seeking, purposive act, which Pepper saw as an adap-
vers ions of the theory of learning advanced by Tolman tation of the position advocated by Tolman in his 1932
(1932)" (p. 199). Mackintosh continues, "One of the book, Purposive Behavior in Animals and Men. It may be
most direct sources of support for such a theory is that that in focusing on acts in context, one is driven to an
provided by evidence of response equivalence" (p. 199). analysis of behavior that stresses goals and purposes, as
Mackintosh then goes on to cite many additional experi- exemplified by Hayes and Hayes's (1992) treatment of the
mental examples of the sort of findings originally reported goals of analysis. Thus, many implications that follow
by Muenzinger and colleagues. from contextualism, such as stressing goals and purposes,
The view that behavior may be characterized in terms for example, may follow equally well from other positions
of acts rather than specific movements has been so widely that would not typically be considered contextualistic.
accepted that we find the contrary opinion expressed by
Hayes et al. (1988) and Morris (1991) to be utterly with- The Role of the Scientist in Scientific Analysis
out foundation. For example, Spence (1956), a leading There are two features of the contextualistic approach
S-R psychologist, said, "Certainly all of the responses to science that Hayes et al. (1988) suggest differ from
involved in instrumental conditioning and selective learn- those of a mechanistic approach. First, contextualists "be-
ing situations would be classified as acts rather than move- lieve that scientists cannot stand apart from the world
ments, and contrary to common belief, even the responses under analysis; they are, rather, apart of that world"
 244 CAPALDI AND PROCTOR

(p. 103). Second, contextualists suggest that science is not velopment. On the contrary, in some important respects,
directed "toward the attainment of ultimate knowledge" though by no means all, Einstein's general theory of rela-
(p. 103). Although these positions may characterize the tivity is closer to Aristotle's than either ofthem is to New-
views of contextualists, they also would be widely accepted ton's. (pp. 206-207)
by psychologists and scientists of various persuasions, and To summarize, there seems to be little doubt that psy-
we cannot understand how this could be doubted. chologists in general, in common with contextualists, be-
Hanson (1988), a philosopher of science who is quoted lieve that scientists do not stand apart from their subject
favorably by a wide variety ofpsychologists, suggests that matter and that ultimateknowledge is not within our grasp.
our very observations are influenced by the theories that
we hold. He states:
The Possibility of Novelty
To say that Tycho and Kepler, Simplicius and Galileo, Regarding the contextualistic category of novelty,
Hooke and Newton, Priestley and Lavoisier, Soddy and Hayes et al. (1988) note that "this aspect of contextual-
Einstein, De Broglie and Born, Heisenberg and Bohm all ism does not have obvious parallels in behavior analy-
make the same observations but use them differently is too sis" (p. 103). However, they go on to assert that "the
easy. It does not explain controversy in research science.
Were there no sense in which they were different observa-
contextualistic concept of novelty does indeed show up
tions, they could not be used differently. (p. 193) in behavior analysis" (p. 103). One problem with this
view is that novelty is not defined in a clear, unambigu-
It is hard to imagine a more intimate relationship between ous manner by either Pepper (1942) or Hayes et al. That
scientists and their subject matter than that suggested by is, no contextualist, to our knowledge, has indicated how
Hanson, because it involves perception itself. Most books we would recognize novelty when and if it should occur.
on psychological research methods state flatly that our ob- For example, how would we distinguish between an event
servations are influenced by our preconceptions. Indeed, unexpected on the basis of current scientific theory and
in an undergraduate research methods book, Meyers and one that was truly novel? Failure to deal with this issue
Grossen (1978) cite Hanson favorably in making this is a very serious deficiency, for we lack the criteria for
point. evaluating a fundamental category of contextualism-
Few, if any, psychologists would claim that science novelty. Another problem with novelty, as specified by
deals with ultimate knowledge. Consider a point of view pure contextualism, is that it does not preclude total dis-
suggested by Evans (1985) in a textbook on research order. As Cicirelli (1994) has suggested, "In pure con-
methods: textualism, not only is there no end-point to development,
Reflecting the skeptical attitude, scientific understanding but the direction of development is totally unpredictable"
is tentative and ever-ehanging. Thus, theories and conclu- (p. 34).
sions are constantly undergoing revision as additional data These problems aside, one possible meaning of novelty
are accumulated. The replacement of Newtonian physics is that laws or phenomena that hold for one period, how-
with relativity theory and quantum mechanics is a classic ever long or short, may not hold in some succeeding pe-
example ofthis. In Newton's day, his view ofthe universe riod. Clearly, being a contextualist is not a necessary re-
was the truth. But the truth changed rather quickly with quirement for acknowledging this logical possibility. It
the appearance of new accounts that could explain more. is one that seems as open to mechanists, formists, and
(p. 19) organicists as to contextualists. None of us is in a posi-
The examples above were obtained simply by examin- tion either to affirm or deny that laws are or are not im-
ing a few books at random. Dozens of similar examples mutable. In any event, whether or not the possibility of
could be found with relatively little effort. If this be novelty in this sense is accepted would seem to have no
doubted, consider Kuhn (1970), certainly one of the most impact on how science is practiced, unless or until such
influential philosophers of science on contemporary psy- novelty appears and, moreover, is recognized.
chology. As regards standing apart from one's subject
matter, Kuhn (1970) suggests, "To an extent unparalleled Active Versus Passive Organism
in most other fields, they [the members of a scientific com- Morris (1991) states, "Within the mechanistic account,
munity] have undergone similar educations and profes- causation is characterized in terms of the effects of effi-
sional initiations; in the process they have absorbed the cient independent causes on dependent material-material
same technicalliterature and drawn many of the same les- that is otherwise at rest" (p. 134). Morris suggests that
sons from it" (p. 177). As a result ofthese educational in contextualism, as opposed to mechanism, performance
experiences, members of a scientific community are con- must be understood in terms of an environment interact-
strained to see matters in a particular way and find it dif- ing with the organism. The notion that a passive organ-
ficult to communicate with others educated in a different ism is postulated by all but contextualists is simply in-
"disciplinary matrix." As for ultimate truth, Kuhn states: correct. That the organism is an active information
I do not doubt, for example, that Newton's mechanics im- processor has been advocated in any number of sources,
proved on Aristotle's and that Einstein's improved on New- a few of which we will cite here.
ton's as instruments for puzzle-solving. But I can see in ln a classic paper, which deals with the problem of serial
their succession no coherent direction of ontological de- order behavior, whose influence in a variety of areas of
 CONTEXTUALISM 245

psychology would be difficult to overestimate (see, e.g., contextualists have attributed to scientists beliefs they do
Bruce, 1994), Lashley (1951) indicated: not hold, rnistaking strategic features for ontological ones.
My principal thesis today will be that input is never into
a quiescent or static system, but always into a system which Reductionism
is already excited and organized. In the intact organism, Morris (1993a) argues that, unlike contextualism, mech-
behavior is the result of interaction of this background of anism, and thus psychology in general, is necessarily
excitation with input from any designated stimulus. Only reductionistic in the sense that the aim is to reduce psy-
when we can state the general characteristics of this back- chology to a more fundamental discipline, ultimately
ground of excitation, can we understand the effects of a physics. We find this viewpoint to be fallacious for two
given input. (p. 112) reasons. First, as Bechtel (1988) has indicated, within psy-
Similarly, Postman (1972), in characterizing the organiza- chology in general and cognitive psychology in particu-
tional approach to memory, said the following: lar, there is a considerable difference of opinion as to
whether reductionism, in Morris's sense, is possible.
One of the sources of appeal of the concept of organiza- Fodor (1974), for example, is an outspoken opponent of
tion is undoubtedly that it implies an active learner who reductionism within cognitive psychology, contending that
imposes structure on the material to which he is exposed.
it is not possible to construct bridge laws equating terms
The subject is credited with discovering and utilizing the
systematic features introduced into the material by the ex-
in psychology with those of lower-level disciplines.
perimenter, and also with inventing idiosyncratic bases of A second matter that Morris's view overlooks is that,
organization. (p. 18) even within mechanism, a major alternative approach to
reductionism, interfie1d theory, has been proposed. Inter-
In a widely used textbook concerned with human mem- field theory is regarded by some as more realistic than
ory, Klatzky (1980) described her approach as follows: reductionism. Bechtel indicates that interfield theories "do
"From the information-processingperspective adopted by not attempt to derive one theory from another but rather
this book, '" human memory is depicted as a continu- seek to identify relationships between phenomena studied
ously active system that receives, modifies, stores, by the two different fields of inquiry" (p. 97). After de-
retrieves, and acts upon information" (p. ix). More re- scribing a variety of mechanistic examples of interfield
cently, in a textbook devoted to animal and human mem- theory, Bechtel goes on to state the following:
ory, Spear and Riccio (1994) state that there has been an
"increasing realization that humans typically are active The mechanistic interfield theories sketched here open
rather than passive processors of the information to be another possibility. This model can accommodate inter-
learned" (p. 13). Thus, from at least the early 1950s to action between cognitive and neural inquiries without re-
quiring reduction. It allows both analyses to inform each
the present, it has continuously been recognized that
other in the attempt to develop an interfield theory, but does
learners are active rather than passive in the processing not require subsuming one explanation under another.
of information. (p. 107)

Linear Causality
The Criterion for Truth
Another characteristic that Morris (1993a) attributes to
mechanism and that has been accepted by contextualists Both Hayes et al. (1988) and Morris (1988) argue that
in general is unidirectional, linear causality. Morris says, the truth criterion for contextualism is different from that
"In adhering to unidirectional and linear causality, the espoused by mechanism and corresponds to that already
mechanists explanatory model is an asymmetric, one-way employed by behavior analysis. This criterion is that of
relation between independently defined causes and ef- successful working, which "implies success with regard
to the accomplishment of some potentially attainable goal"
fects" (p. 34). Morris means by this that organisms are
(Hayes et al. , 1988, p. 102). In another paper, Hayes
merely the recipients of the forces that act upon them.
The arch-mechanist, Newton, would hardly agree with (1988) states, "all events and all analyses are evaluated
this. Newton's third law of motion states as follows: To in terms of successful working" (p. 12). Hayes also says,
every action there is always opposed an equal reaction; "More than anything else it is this truth criterion that
or, the mutual actions of two bodies upon each other are shows the contextualistic qualities of behavior analysis"
(p. 11). There is a major problem with this argument, in
always equal and directed toward contrary parts (Halli-
our view.
day & Resnick, 1966).
According to Pepper (1942), successful working is not
How can such a serious misunderstanding of mecha-
the best truth criterion of contextualism (p. 272). How
nism be explained? The likely reason has to do with the
the contextualistically rnindedbehavior analysts have man-
way that experimental research is normally conducted.
In experimental arrangements, as a practical matter, seien- aged to ignore Pepper's position on this issue is difficult
to understand, because Pepper states it so clearly and
tists seek to examine the effects of independent variables
explicitly:
on dependent variables. They are well aware, however,
that effects occur in the reverse direction, but ignore them The "successful working" theory excludes hypotheses from
not for epistemological or ontological reasons but for truth, yet hypotheses are prominent textures in contextu-
purely practical ones. If our reasoning here is correct, alism, and they are the very textures to which usage im-
 246 CAPALDI AND PROCTOR

plies truth and falsity. A contextualistic theory of truth that should develop in isolation from each other. Must, be-
leaves hypotheses out ofthe theory is not fitting common- cause effective communication between different world
sense truth as closely as possible into the contextualistic views is impossible. And should, because conceptual con-
categories. In fact, the "successful working" theory is only fusion arises from mixing of metaphors.
a haljhearted contextualistic theory. (p. 272, emphasis ours) Hayes et al. (1988) state, "using the categories of one
Pepper goes so far as to say that successful working is world view to analyze and criticize another is illegitimate
not only the narrowest of the truth criteria of pragmatism, and inherently useless" (p. 98). In another place, Hayes
but also "the one the enemies of pragmatism try to as- (1988) says, "Pepper claimed that it is illegitimate to criti-
sociate with it" (p. 269). On the basis of our reading of cize one world view in terms of the categorical concepts
the philosophicalliterature on pragmatism, we would cer- of another" (p. 12). That, in Hayes's opinion, there is
tainly agree with Pepper's evaluation of successful work- little to be gained from either competing with or criticiz-
ing and think that most pragmatists would too. It is be- ing mechanistic positions, or attending to their criticisms,
yond our understanding why modern proponents of is clear from the following statement: "The only true in-
contextualism in psychology would associate themselves tellectual allies and adversaries of a given specific posi-
with a position that in the past has been used to under- tion will always be found within a given world view"
mine their cause. (Hayes, 1988, p. 13). Hayes and Hayes (1992) state in
Pepper (1942) describes two other more adequate con- connection with mechanistic and contextualistic versions
textualistic truth criteria. The first ofthese is that ofverifi- of radical behaviorism, "The two positions are incom-
cation of hypotheses. "The slogan of this type of opera- patible, and the differences cannot be resolved by way
tionalism is that truth is verification. According to this of a compromise" (p. 231). The astounding implication
formulation, it is not the successful act that is true, but of this position, it will be recognized, is that contextu-
the hypothesis that leads to the successful act" (p. 272). alistic behavior analysis should be as independent of
The trial-and-error behavior of a rat in a maze would pro- mechanistic behavior analysis as of most of the remainder
duce true and false judgments according to the success- of psychology.
ful working criterion, but not according to the verified The first weakness ofthe preceding argument is, as we
hypothesis criterion. However, ifthe animal were enter- have shown previously, that the criteria which are said
taining some hypothesis as to the correct path, its judg- to distinguish between contextualistic and mechanistic ap-
ments would be true or false. The verification criterion proaches to psychology fail to do so. A second weakness,
seems more in character with the rest of psychology than in our opinion, is that the contextualistically minded be-
with behavior analysis. havior analysts have misinterpreted Pepper's (1942) po-
A third truth criterion is qualitative confirrnation, sition on the competition between world views, although
which, like the second one, emphasizes confirrnation of we must admit that Pepper is to some extent ambiguous
hypotheses. However, it adds to this the view that "the on this score. Consider the following statements from
body of hypotheses possessed by science and philosophy Pepper:
gives us a considerable amount of insight into the struc-
It is iIlegitimate to disparage the factual interpretations of
ture ofnature" (Pepper, 1942, p. 278). Pepper doesnot one world hypothesis in terms of the categories of
elaborate on what he means by the structure of nature. another-if both hypotheses are equally adequate. (p. 98)
In any event, the two more adequate truth criteria of con-
textualism, as described by Pepper , are quite close to the It is the cognitive obligation of a world theory to interpret
general position adopted by most psychologists. Conse- the danda [a type of corroborationJ and categories of other
world theories in terms of its own categories. (p. 100)
quently, the truth criterion of successful working cannot
be used to suggest that some area of psychology is more We need all world hypotheses, so far as they are adequate,
contextualistic than the remainder of psychology. for mutual comparison and correction of interpretive bias.
(p. 101)

HAYES ET AL.'S INTERPRETATION OF When we say that world theories are mutually exclusive,
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN we do not mean that they stand apart from one another like
MECHANISTIC AND so many isolated posts. Each theory is weil aware of the
CONTEXTUALISTIC SYSTEMS others, criticizes and interprets them, and entirely includes
them within its scope. (p. 104)
According to Hayes et al. (1988), who claim to be ex- Pepper's (1942) entire treatment ofthis issue seems to
pressing Pepper's belief, with which they agree, differ- suggest that the world views are in a constant state of
ent world views "cannot compete directly" (p. 98). growth and healthy competition. How can our interpre-
Moreover, as regards conflicts between world views, tation of Pepper on the relation between world views be
Hayes et al. (1988) state, "According to Pepper , world reconciled with that of Hayes et al. (1988)? In our view,
views are orthogonal to each other and therefore cannot Pepper discouraged criticizing the fundamental assump-
conflict. Apparent conflicts are really pseudoconflicts.... tions of one world view in terms of the fundamental as-
These kinds of conflicts are illegitimate and cannot be sumptionsof another world view, much as one might criti-
resolved; they can only be recognized" (Hayes et al. , cize an ethical system from a scientific viewpoint. Clearly,
1988, p. 105). World views, they maintain, must and criticism ofthis sort is not particularly useful. Pepper did
 CONTEXTUALISM 247

not intend, however, to discourage criticizing what we division of all philosophie systems into formism, organi-
shall call the products of a particular world view from cism, mechanism, and contextualism. Such seemingly un-
some other standpoint. Examples of products include such critical acceptance does not seem entirely healthy to us.
things as some particular theoretical formulation that is Consider, for example, the proposition that the commonly
developed from within a world view (e.g., HuIl's mech- accepted metaphor for science in general and psychology
anistic S-R theory) or some particular methodology that in particular is the machine. We have two observations
sterns from a world view (e.g., factor analysis or statis- about this proposition. First, even if one accepts the ma-
tics, generally). Our interpretation of Pepper is that such chine metaphor, and certainly it has been used extensively
products of world views are fair game for competition, within some areas of psychology, it does not imply that
conflict, and criticism. (See Gillespie, 1992, for a con- one literally thinks that all aspects of psychology are
textualist who agrees with our view on competition be- machine-like. Take the metaphorical utterance, The Presi-
tween contextualistic and mechanistic systems.) In our dent is the captain ofthe ship ofstate. We do not literally
opinion, then, Pepper encouraged, rather than discour- think that the President is steering a ship. Rather , what
aged, meaningful dialogue between individuals who sub- we attempt to illuminate by this metaphor is that in form-
scribe to different world views concerning the products ing government policy the President must avoid making
of those views. mistakes (i.e., avoid the reefs), that he must generate the
Regardless of whether our interpretation of Pepper or best possible plan (steer a good course), that the final de-
that of Hayes et al. (1988) is the correct one, we would cision is his (as a captain is in charge of the ship), and
suggest a third reason for rejecting their position that con- so on. In other words, when using metaphors, we take
textualistic systems should develop in isolation from other them not literally but metaphorically. As du Preez (1991)
formulations, such as mechanistic behavior analysis and has indicated,
cognitive psychology: It is a course of action that seems
What we ought to do is to attempt to explore the range and
counterproductive. By not engaging in dialogue with
power of each metaphor as a heuristic device. Each opens
others over specific interpretive and methodological dif- up a set of problems, questions and possible answers. Each
ferences, one invites the charge of being unreasonable, can be no more than a slice of the total. (p. 26)
if not anti-intellectual, No scientific approach that is seen
as being either unreasonable or anti-intellectual will be Our second point is that, as the preceding quote im-
able to exercise influence beyond its own boundaries. This plies, the machine metaphor is not the only popular
surely is not an end to be desired, even if further , more metaphor within psychology. For example, du Preez
adequate arguments than have been supplied so far should (1991) suggests that the foundation metaphor for social
ultimately reveal some portions of psychology to be con- psychology is theater (roles, actors, role distance, role
textualistic. relations, scripts). Another popular metaphor in many
We recognize that it is always difficult for people of areas of psychology is games. As other examples, the
different persuasions to communicate with each other, but mind has been considered to be a blank slate to be writ-
we do not see this problem as an insurmountable one. On ten on by experience (Locke) or an active organizing space
the problem inherent in such communication, we agree with apriori ideas and theories (Chomsky). Many other
with the prominent philosopher of science, Karl Popper metaphors that are commonly used in psychology could
(1970), who has commented as follows: be added to this list (see du Preez, 1991).
Thus, characterizing science exclusively in terms of the
I do admit that at any moment we are prisoners caught in machine metaphor has serious limitations. There is a better
the framework of our theories; our expectations; our past way to characterize science, in our opinion. We prefer to
experiences; our language. But we are prisoners in a Pick- think of science as an empirieal, analytic endeavor that
wickian sense; if we try, we can break out of OUT frame- deals with closed as weIl as open systems. By a closed
work at any time. Admittedly, we shall find ourselves again
system, we mean one in which the ideal is to exclude from
in a framework, but it will be a better and roomier one;
and we can at any moment break out of it again. The cen-
consideration al1 variables except those that we wish to ex-
tral point is that a critical discussion and a comparison of amine. A prime example of a closed system is what seien-
the various frameworks is always possible .... The diffi- tists attempt to achieve in conducting experiments. Note
culty of discussion between people brought up in different that the empirical/analytic approach is useful no matter
frameworks is to be admitted. But nothing is more fruitful what the metaphor employed to characterize psychology-a
than such a discussion. (pp. 56-57) machine, astage, agame, etc.
By an open system, we mean one in which significant
HOW APPROPRIATE IS IT Ta APPLY variables not under the control of the investigator intrude
THE TERMS CONTEXTUALISM to influence the phenomena of interest. Open systems are
AND MECHANISM TO to be found when one examines behavior in real world
PSYCHOLOGY? settings. One example of an open system is what contex-
tualists mean by the term multilevel context. In a multilevel
Having examined a number of articles and books writ- context, behavior would be understood in terms of
ten by contextualistically minded psychologists, we find "atomic, molecular, chemical, biological, physical, psy-
no contextualist who has quarreled with Pepper's (1942) chological, community, social, societal, cultural, and
248 CAPALDI AND PROCTOR

historical variables, and so on" (Cicirelli, 1994, p. 32). BALSAM, P. D., & TOMIE, A. (Eds.) (1985). Context and learning. Hills-
For many contextualists, exarnining phenomena in closed dale, NJ: Erlbaum.
BECHTEL, W. (1988). Philosophy 0/ science: An overview for cognitive
systems distorts the phenomena or limits their generality science. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
to restricted if not artificial contexts. BRUCE, D. (1994). Lashley and the problem of serial order. American
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ysis in her attempt to decide whether or not to send her and perceptual organization. Journal ofGeneral Psychology, 53, 21-28.
CICIRELLI, V. G. (1994). The individual in the family life cycle. In
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DU PREEZ, P. (1991). A science 0/ mind. San Diego, CA: Academic
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FORD, D. H., & LERNER, R. M. (1992). Developmental systems the-
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