ISSN: 2315-2540

Employment and
Social Developments in
Europe
Sustainable growth for all:
choices for the future of Social Europe

Annual Review 2019

Social Europe
 Employment and Social
Developments in Europe 2019

Sustainable growth for all:

choices for the future of Social Europe

European Commission
Directorate-General for Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion
Directorate A
Manuscript completed in June 2019
This publication was prepared in the Directorate-General of Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion under the
supervision of Joost Korte (Director-General), Barbara Kauffmann (Director, Employment and Social Governance),
Loukas Stemitsiotis (Head of Unit, Thematic Analysis), with advice on specific chapters from Jörg Tagger and
Egbert Holthuis.

The main contributors were Petrica Badea, Sigried Caspar, Fabio De Franceschi, Stefano Filauro, Alessia Fulvimari,
Mide Griffin, Endre György, Katarina Jaksic, Luca Pappalardo, Jörg Peschner, Giuseppe Piroli, Argyrios Pisiotis,
Marta Pradanos Gonzalez, Joé Rieff, Evi Roelen, Simone Rosini, Frank Siebern-Thomas and Tim Van Rie, under the
overall coordination of Frank Siebern-Thomas and Argyrios Pisiotis. Chapter 3 includes a contribution by D’Artis
Kancs from the Joint Research Centre. Chapters 4 and 5 include contributions by Maeve Roulette as well as by
Eurofound and the Joint Research Centre (units on Fiscal Policy Analysis and Knowledge for Finance, Innovation
and Growth, and on Economics of Climate Change, Energy and Transport). The Executive Summary was written by
Argyrios Pisiotis. Fabio De Franceschi coordinated the statistical annex and all technical aspects of the
publication.

The report has benefitted from comments and suggestions received from many colleagues in various
Directorate-Generals of the European Commission.

The cut-off date for data extraction was 19 June 2019.

Comments on the publication are welcome and should be sent to the following email address:
[email protected].

Manuscript completed in June 2019

Neither the European Commission nor any person acting on behalf of the Commission is responsible for the use
that might be made of the following information.

Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2019

© European Union, 2019

Reuse is authorised provided the source is acknowledged.
The reuse policy of European Commission documents is regulated by Decision 2011/833/EU (OJ L 330,
14.12.2011, p. 39).
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Print ISBN 978-92-76-08608-6 ISSN 1977-270X doi:10.2767/79057 KE-BD-19-001-EN-C

PDF ISBN 978-92-76-08609-3 ISSN 2315-2540 doi:10.2767/305832 KE-BD-19-001-EN-N
Foreword
In 2018, we witnessed positive developments in the European economy, labour markets
and society. For the sixth consecutive year, the EU’s ambitious agenda for jobs, growth
and investment boosted a robust and job-rich recovery.

As we come to the end of this political mandate, it is a good time to reflect on how to
keep sustaining growth and spread its benefits across the EU in the future.
Sustainability cannot be an afterthought. All our policies need to integrate the
economic, social and environmental dimensions of sustainability from the design phase
on, to keep our economy competitive and entrepreneurship innovative, to maintain our
valued welfare state and our ambitious climate-change engagements. In May, EU
citizens made choices during the European elections that will help to define the future
of our Union. In June, EU leaders advanced this reflection by adopting the EU’s strategic agenda for the next five
years and a vision of the Europe we want to live in by 2030 and beyond. Fostering a protective, competitive and
fair Europe and sustaining it for future generations is at the heart of this.

The Employment and Social Developments in Europe (ESDE) review is here again to provide evidence-based
groundwork for this reflection. The 2019 edition focuses on “Sustainable growth for all: choices for the
future of social Europe”. It explores the EU’s understanding of sustainable development and its links to
economic growth, social inclusion, equality and well-being, climate and natural resources, and labour market
institutions. The news from ESDE’s analysis is good. Making Europe’s development sustainable is a perfectly
realistic goal. Mainstreaming our actions upfront in the social domain as well as on climate and the environment
can be a productive investment in economic performance. This is key to preserve our living standards. In addition,
it is less costly than compensating in hindsight for unfavourable social outcomes. Therefore, this year’s review
analyses specific policies through which the EU and the Member States, with the support of the social partners,
could accompany our workforce and citizens in the sustainability transition. Social investment in education, skills
and childcare, as well as affordable housing and energy, can bring more people to better employment, help them
to fulfil their dreams and participate in society. It can also support them through the increasing number of life-
course transitions that we face in the changing world of work, and improve people’s well-being overall. The
simulations in this report also point to measures that could boost the impact of EU funding, such as the European
Social Fund +, in Member States and regions for the benefit of all EU citizens, as we are heading into a new
financing period under the 2021-2027 Multiannual Financial Framework. If we want to implement people’s social
rights across the board, we have to combat social and territorial inequalities. Everybody needs access to
opportunities, despite constraints such as demographic ageing, technological upheaval and public finances.

This year’s analysis follows in the footsteps of our previous ESDE editions that look at policy-relevant long-term
global trends.

The strategic choices the EU is facing make me confident that the valuable insights of this new edition of ESDE
will again resonate widely across academic circles and policymakers.

Marianne Thyssen
Commissioner for Employment,
Social Affairs, Skills and Labour Mobility

3
Contents
Foreword ........................................................................................................................................................................................................ 3

Executive Summary ......................................................................................................................................................................... 11

Sustainable growth for all: choices for the future of social Europe ..................................... 11

Chapter 1 Main Employment and Social Developments.............................. 30

1. Introduction ......................................................................................................................................... 30
2. Macroeconomic environment ........................................................................................................ 30
2.1. Shadows over favourable global macroeconomic developments ..........................................................................30
2.2. Employment rises as the economy expands ........................................................................................................................32
2.3. Productivity and labour costs ........................................................................................................................................................32

3. Labour market developments ....................................................................................................... 33

3.1. Employment rates/levels ..................................................................................................................................................................33
3.2. Unemployment rates ...........................................................................................................................................................................35
3.3. Activity rates .............................................................................................................................................................................................38
3.4. Regional dimension ..............................................................................................................................................................................39
3.5. Urban/rural dimension ......................................................................................................................................................................40
3.6. International dimension.....................................................................................................................................................................41

4. Social situation, poverty and income developments ........................................................... 42

4.1. Households’ financial situation is improved but not yet back to pre-crisis levels .......................................42
4.2. Social transfers mitigate persistent income inequality in the EU ..........................................................................44
4.3. Decline in the risk of poverty or social exclusion is due to lower rates of all three
components: AROP, joblessness and material deprivation .........................................................................................47
4.4. Social convergence in the EU? .......................................................................................................................................................51
4.5. EU Income trends: middle class, pan-European distribution and territorial dimensions ..........................52

5
Employment and Social Developments in Europe 2019

5. Employment and social situation of vulnerable groups .................................................... 56

6. Conclusions ........................................................................................................................................... 62
References...................................................................................................................................................... 64

Chapter 2 Sustainable growth and development in the EU:

concepts and challenges.................................................................... 66

1. Introduction ......................................................................................................................................... 66
2. Sustainability as an EU objective: defining and measuring the social
dimension............................................................................................................................................... 68
2.1. European citizens’ views and expectations regarding sustainability ....................................................................69
2.2. Measuring (social) sustainability .................................................................................................................................................69

3. Identifying the principal components of Sustainable Development: A factor

analysis................................................................................................................................................... 70
3.1. The principle components of sustainable development ...............................................................................................73
3.2. A taxonomy of sustainable social development in the EU ..........................................................................................74

4. Social Sustainability in the EU: Challenges, synergies, trade-offs ................................ 76

4.1. The Social-Economic Nexus ............................................................................................................................................................76
4.2. The Social-Environmental Nexus .................................................................................................................................................81

5. Conclusions ........................................................................................................................................... 83
Annex 1: The Social Scoreboard ............................................................................................................ 84
Annex 2: Variables in the factor analysis ......................................................................................... 85
A2.1.1. Additional variables complementing the Factor Analysis .........................................................................................85
A2.1.2. Explaining the variables used in the Factor Analysis...................................................................................................85
A2.1.3. Additional variables ..........................................................................................................................................................................87

Annex 3: Longer working lives help sustain pension systems.................................................. 88

References...................................................................................................................................................... 89

Chapter 3 Economic and social fundamentals: from productivity to

fair and sustainable growth............................................................. 94
1. Introduction ......................................................................................................................................... 94
2. Productivity in the regions: development and drivers ........................................................ 95
2.1. Strong differences across regions ..............................................................................................................................................95
2.2. Significant, yet uneven and decelerating growth of TFP within the EU ..............................................................96
2.3. The drivers of regional TFP development ..............................................................................................................................97
2.4. Summary ....................................................................................................................................................................................................99

3. Drivers of TFP: Analysis at firm level ........................................................................................ 99

3.1. Convergence at firm level .............................................................................................................................................................100
3.2. Drivers of TFP-levels: a base model .......................................................................................................................................100
3.3. Adding other variables to the base model .........................................................................................................................101
3.4. Summary .................................................................................................................................................................................................104

4. Supplementary evidence from a company survey ............................................................ 105

4.1. Main findings .........................................................................................................................................................................................106

6
 Contents

4.2. Summary .................................................................................................................................................................................................106

5. Strengthening Human Capital: a model-based analysis ................................................. 106

5.1. How a training subsidy impacts on the economy: the transmission path ......................................................107
5.2. Labour taxes matter: beware of the impact on net wages .....................................................................................107
5.3. Targeted training opportunities help low-qualified workers ...................................................................................108
5.4. How to help the most vulnerable while boosting innovation? ...............................................................................108
5.5. European Social Fund+ (ESF+) : an EU policy instrument promoting growth in the EU – a
simulation exercise ............................................................................................................................................................................109
5.6. Summary .................................................................................................................................................................................................112

6. Main findings in brief ..................................................................................................................... 112

7. Conclusions and policy choices .................................................................................................. 114
Annex 1: The concept of Total Factor Productivity .................................................................... 115
Annex 2: Determinants of regional TFP – a regression analysis.......................................... 116
Annex 3: A model for convergence using CompNet data ........................................................ 117
Annex 4: TFP growth and income inequality ................................................................................. 118
Annex 5: Logistic regression on CompNet data ........................................................................... 119
References................................................................................................................................................... 121

Chapter 4 Investing in people and social sustainability: short-term

costs vs long-term benefits ........................................................... 123
1. Introduction ...................................................................................................................................... 123
2. Investing in children and their families ................................................................................. 126
2.1. Introduction ............................................................................................................................................................................................126
2.2. Family expenditure and poverty reduction .........................................................................................................................127
2.3. Use of formal childcare and the Barcelona objectives ...............................................................................................129
2.4. Formal childcare use and costs and mothers’ employment decisions .............................................................130
2.5. Inequality in childcare use ............................................................................................................................................................133
2.6. Barriers in access to childcare ...................................................................................................................................................135

3. Investing in skills and lifelong learning ................................................................................ 138

3.1. Introduction ............................................................................................................................................................................................138
3.2. The education and training system: positive effects and resources allocated ...........................................138
3.3. The role of work experience during studies .......................................................................................................................141
3.4. Adult learning: participation and positive effects ..........................................................................................................144
3.5. Investment in education and sustainability .......................................................................................................................147

4. Investing in long-term care ......................................................................................................... 149

4.1. Introduction ............................................................................................................................................................................................149
4.2. Public expenditure on long-term care ...................................................................................................................................150
4.3. Policies to promote healthy ageing and employment opportunities for carers..........................................150

5. Investing in affordable and adequate housing ................................................................... 151

5.1. Introduction ............................................................................................................................................................................................151
5.2. Housing affordability: concepts and main facts .............................................................................................................151
5.3. Housing cost affordability by tenure status ......................................................................................................................153
5.4. Housing cost affordability by degree of urbanisation ................................................................................................156
5.5. Housing cost affordability by household type .................................................................................................................157

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Employment and Social Developments in Europe 2019

5.6. Housing deprivation ..........................................................................................................................................................................158

6. Conclusions and policy choices .................................................................................................. 160

Annex 1: Social impact investment................................................................................................... 161
Annex 2: Euromod simulations of the impact of the reduction of childcare costs on
the use of the service and on the mothers’ labour supply decisions ........................ 162
A2.1.1. Methodology .......................................................................................................................................................................................162
A2.1.2. Results ....................................................................................................................................................................................................162

References................................................................................................................................................... 165

Chapter 5 Towards a greener future: employment and social

impacts of climate change policies ............................................. 170
1. Introduction and main challenges ........................................................................................... 170
2. Towards a taxonomy of green jobs and occupations ...................................................... 173
2.1. Broadening the scope of the green economy ...................................................................................................................174
2.2. The potential of green(able) jobs in the EU .......................................................................................................................176

3. Employment and skills in the transition to a climate-neutral economy .................. 180

3.1. Main economic and social impacts of long-term climate change scenarios ................................................181
3.2. Regional impacts ................................................................................................................................................................................182
3.3. Medium-term adjustment costs and benefits: simulations up to 2030 ..........................................................185
3.4. Short- to medium-term impacts on sectors, skills, tasks and wages ...............................................................186
3.5. Health and safety risks in growing green sectors and the circular economy ..............................................189
3.6. Recycling carbon revenues ...........................................................................................................................................................189
3.7. Public perceptions of climate change and the social acceptance of climate action ...............................190

4. Climate action and energy poverty .......................................................................................... 194

4.1. Trends in energy poverty indicators .......................................................................................................................................195
4.2. Energy prices, expenditure and energy poverty ..............................................................................................................197
4.3. Energy efficiency measures ........................................................................................................................................................198

5. Climate change and air pollution: air quality impacts oN Local health ................... 199
6. Conclusions and eco-social policy choices............................................................................ 203
Annex 1: Studies on the 'greenness' of occupations ................................................................. 205
References................................................................................................................................................... 206

Chapter 6 Sustainability and governance: the role of social

dialogue ................................................................................................. 210
1. Introduction ...................................................................................................................................... 210
1.1. Sustainability is a topic for social dialogue .......................................................................................................................210
1.2. Conceptual framework ....................................................................................................................................................................211

2. Achievements of social dialogue .............................................................................................. 213

2.1. Equality at work, working conditions, workers’ rights..................................................................................................213
2.2. Inclusiveness .........................................................................................................................................................................................218
2.3. Ecologically sustainable economic activity ........................................................................................................................219
2.4. Governance and participation .....................................................................................................................................................223

8
 Contents

3. Conclusions ........................................................................................................................................ 224

References................................................................................................................................................... 226

Statistical Annex .............................................................................................................................................................................. 229

1. Country profiles ............................................................................................................................... 229
2. Selected indicators ......................................................................................................................... 319
3. Data sources and definitions ..................................................................................................... 325

9
Sustainable growth for all:
choices for the future of
social Europe
Executive Summary

SUSTAINABLE GROWTH FOR ALL: CHOICES FOR THE FUTURE OF SOCIAL EUROPE
In 2018, the EU economy saw a continuation of the improvements that began in 2013 when economic activity
started to recover from the financial and economic crisis. Employment in the EU reached new record highs, while
unemployment and the risk of poverty and social exclusion continued to fall. These developments provide
grounds for confidence and show that EU policies over the last years have had an impact. These developments
are materialising, however, at a time of accelerating change. This change particularly concerns the demographic
ageing of our societies as well as technological transformation and the fast digitalisation of our economies and
societies. Together, these mega-trends are leading to new forms of work requiring new skills, as well as to labour
shortages in some areas and new challenges for the European social model. (1)

Last year was also rich in reminders of the fragility of the recent achievements in the medium and long term. At
global level, new risks such as protectionist tendencies in trade and increased international economic and
geopolitical uncertainties contributed to a slowdown in global and EU growth in 2018 and led to further
downward corrections of economic forecasts. (2) In addition, while domestic dynamics are generally set to support
the European economy, major challenges need to be addressed to ensure a protective, competitive, fair and
sustainable Europe. (3) These challenges include low productivity growth, persistent gender gaps in employment
and pay, significant investment shortfalls, concerns regarding energy costs and housing affordability and a
reduced yet substantial burden of public and private debt.

Climate change, environmental degradation and inefficient use of natural resources also weigh on sustainable
development prospects in the EU and the world. Europeans are increasingly demonstrating a keen awareness of
these challenges and of the importance of addressing all three dimensions of sustainability – economic, social
and environmental – together. The aim is to make all of Europe’s achievements — its competitive economy, high

(1) For further detail on the employment and social impacts of these changes and mega-trends, see the 2017 and 2018 Employment and
Social Developments in Europe annual reviews, with their respective focus on “Intra-generational fairness and solidarity” and the “New
world of work: Beyond digitalisation”. For further analysis of skill shortages, labour mobility and migration, also see the 2015
Employment and Social Developments in Europe annual review, notably the chapter on “Mobility and migration in the EU: Opportunities
and challenges”.
(2) European Commission (2019), European Economic Forecast: Spring 2019, European Economy Institutional Paper 102, May 2019.
(3) See European Commission (2019), Europe in May 2019: Preparing for a more united, stronger and more democratic Union in an
increasingly uncertain world, The European Commission's contribution to the informal EU-27 leaders' meeting in Sibiu (Romania) on 9
May 2019.

11
Employment and Social Developments in Europe 2019

living standards, valued welfare state, and pioneering engagement with the environment — sustainable in the
long term for future generations. In particular by participating in weekly ‘climate marches’ across Europe since
the second half of 2018, students and other EU citizens have requested accelerated action against climate
change. Meanwhile, other parts of the population voiced their anxiety about the cost of the economic transition
necessary to combat climate change and the fairness of sharing that cost.

The EU has comprehensive Treaty foundations and long-

standing experience with policy agendas that pursue
economic, social and environmental objectives
simultaneously. It also had a leading role in the
formulation of the United Nations’ Sustainable
Development Goals (SDGs) in 2015. Moreover, in
December 2018, at the sidelines of COP24, (4) the EU and
20 Member States signed the Silesia Declaration on
Solidarity and Just Transition. In it, they underlined that
considering the social aspect of the transition towards a
low-carbon economy is crucial for gaining social approval
for the changes taking place. The EU and its Member States hence are key actors in shaping policy answers to the
complex challenges of our time not only at national and European levels but also at global level. The Reflection
Paper “Towards a Sustainable Europe by 2030”, issued on 30 January 2019, sets out in particular options for
internalising the Sustainable Development Goals in the EU’s strategic policy framework. The Paper reminds us
that “sustainable development is about upgrading people’s living standards by giving them real choices, creating
an enabling environment” and leading to “a situation where we are living well within the boundaries of our planet
through a smarter use of resources and a modern economy that serve our health and well-being.” It highlights
the links between the three dimensions of sustainable development, including the importance of the social-
environmental nexus, which is the crux of the sustainability puzzle, ( 5) and warns that, “no matter how
tumultuous the coming years will be, not losing sight of our goals for the future will be the most important
task.” (6)

As regards the social dimension of sustainable development, often referred to as “social sustainability”, the EU
has confirmed its policy commitments through the proclamation of the European Pillar of Social Rights by the
European Parliament, the Council and the Commission at the Gothenburg Social Summit of 17 November 2017.
The Pillar is at the very heart of the European project, not least in the light of the sustainability challenges that
social Europe is facing. Its proclamation also reflects the growing concern that the scars of the crisis may not yet
have healed evenly. In fact, there is a contrast between the enduring recovery and improvements in the
employment and social situation in the EU overall and less favourable developments for some income groups,
Member States and regions. The latter include slowing convergence between Member States in certain domains
and increasing divergence within some Member States as well as persistent unemployment, growing income
inequality and in-work poverty in several Member States.

These contrasts in the employment and social domain have important repercussions for how Europeans perceive
the economic and social situation in the EU. In recent Eurobarometer surveys, Europeans mention social concerns
related to rising prices, health and social security, pensions and the financial situation of their household as the
most important issues they face at a personal level. Concerns relating to environment, climate and energy issues
and housing are gaining ground over time. Europeans increasingly demand action to address the evident
contrasts, while continuing efforts to address other important challenges - notably migration and security - and
combat climate change and environmental degradation.

The policy challenge is multiple and requires simultaneous responses: to those who face difficulties making ends
meet, who feel uncertain about their employment prospects, who enjoy lower levels of well-being or feel left
behind; to those who believe that climate action is currently too limited and too slow; to those who fear that it is
happening faster than they can afford, or adjust to or that it is diverting resources away from other investments
or innovation; and also to those who caution that unilateral climate action might hurt the EU’s productivity and
competitiveness.

Finally, there is an increasing sense of urgency to make common, concrete and effective policy choices that
promote sustainable growth and development in the EU. This was recognised in the Sibiu Declaration of May 9
2019, which committed the EU and its Member States to “always uphold the principle of fairness, whether it be in
the labour market, in welfare, in the economy or in the digital transformation, […] further reduce disparities

(4) COP24 stands for the 24th Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change.
(5) See in particular European Commission (2019), Europe’s Sustainability Puzzle: Broadening the Debate, European Political Strategy Centre
paper, 8 April 2019.
(6) European Strategy and Policy Analysis System (ESPAS), Global Trends to 2030: Challenges and Choices for Europe”, April 2019

12
 Executive Summary

between us and […] help the most vulnerable in Europe, putting people before politics” and “safeguard the future
for the next generations of Europeans, [….] invest in young people and build a Union fit for the future, able to
cope with the most pressing challenges of the 21st century”. (7)

The 2019 Employment and Social Developments in Europe (ESDE) Review contributes to analysis of and
reflection on this problematic. It is titled “Sustainable growth for all: choices for the future of social
Europe” and examines the following topics:

Chapter 1 – Main Employment and Social Developments

Chapter 2 – Sustainable Growth and Development in the EU: Concepts and Challenges

Chapter 3 – Economic and Social Fundamentals: From Productivity to Fair and Sustainable Growth

Chapter 4 – Investing in People and Social Sustainability: Short-Term Costs and Long-Term Benefits

Chapter 5 – Towards a Greener Future: Employment and Social Impacts of Climate Change

Chapter 6 – Sustainability and Governance: The Role of Social Dialogue

Chapter 1 reviews key employment and social developments of the last year in the EU and its Member States,
focusing on trends in employment, unemployment and income distribution across the Member States as well as
on vulnerable groups. Chapter 2 reviews the main concept of sustainability and the definitions of its different
dimensions, including the social dimension. It identifies sustainability’s main drivers and related risks, it discusses
the challenges on the EU’s path to sustainable development as well as the synergies and potential trade-offs
between its social, economic, and environmental dimensions. Chapter 3 addresses one of the major sustainability
challenges, notably sluggish productivity growth despite accelerating technological change and the increasing
qualification levels of the EU labour force. It explores the preconditions for sustained economic growth, based on
region-level and firm-level data analysis, focusing on complementarities between efficiency, innovation, human
capital, job quality, fairness and working conditions. The chapter further identifies policies that could boost
productivity without increasing inequality. Chapter 4 focuses on social investment in selected areas and its role
for social sustainability. It analyses the potential of policies to raise activity, employment and productivity, while
alleviating unfavourable social situations. This chapter identifies childcare and long-term care, education and
training, skills, mobility and housing as key areas where policy intervention could enhance the sustainability and
upward convergence of Member States’ socio-economic performance. Chapter 5 reviews the impact of climate
action on the economy and on employment, income and skills. It also analyses aspects of energy poverty as a
distinct type of poverty in the EU and discusses the effects of environment-linked health risks, such as air
pollution, and the policies that would have a beneficial impact on both the environment and people. Finally,
Chapter 6 discusses what the social partners and social dialogue, including wage bargaining, can do and are
doing to promote sustainable growth and development.

1. MAIN EMPLOYMENT AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENTS

In both the EU and the euro area, the expansion of economic activity continued in Robust economic expansion
2018, although more slowly than expected. This reflects a slowdown in the slowed down in 2018 in the
global economy, after sustained economic growth over the last six years. midst of increasing uncertainties.
Economic forecasts have been corrected downwards as uncertainties have
increased and as low productivity growth, persistent labour market segmentation
and social and territorial disparities continue to constitute challenges to
sustainable growth in the EU.

EU employment continued to grow to EU employment soars to new

240.7 million reach the highest level ever recorded: heights but gender gaps persist.
in the first quarter of 2019, 240.7
Europeans were employed million people were in
in Q1 2019 employment, (8) 13.4 million more
than when the Juncker Commission
came into office in November 2014.

(7) The Sibiu Declaration, declaration of the informal EU-27 leaders’ meeting in Sibiu, 9 May 2019; accessible at:
https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2019/05/09/the-sibiu-declaration
(8) Eurostat, namq_10_pe

13
Employment and Social Developments in Europe 2019

The EU employment rate also registered a new record, reaching 73.5% at the The EU employment rate reached
end of 2018, and the employment rate gap with the US keeps closing. The 73.5% and the employment rate
employment rate in full-time equivalents (FTE) also grew for the fifth gap with the US is closing.
consecutive year and in 2018 stood at 67.2% - 2.2pp higher than in 2008.
However, the pace at which the employment rate increased has slowed down. At
the current pace of employment growth in the EU (1.3% per year vs. 1.6% in
2017), the EU employment rate in 2020 would slightly undershoot the 'Europe
2020' target of 75%. Moreover, despite earlier convergence between men’s and
women’s employment rates, progress in closing the gender gap in employment
has also slowed down. In 2018, the gender employment gap stood at 11.6 pp,
almost unchanged since 2013.

The annual EU unemployment rate EU unemployment recedes to

6.4% stood at 6.8% in 2018, down 0.8 pp historical lows without
from its 2017 level. In April 2019, substantially reducing differences
between Member States.
is a new historical low for unemployment reached a new historic
EU unemployment low of 6.4%. Several Member States
are now close to full employment.
Youth unemployment continued to
decrease to 15.2% in 2018 (and to 14.2% in April 2019), 0.7 pp lower than the
pre-crisis level in 2008, as did long-term unemployment. However, differences in
employment and unemployment rates at Member State and regional level
remain very large. The dispersion of employment rates across national and
subnational territories is gradually narrowing, while the dispersion of
unemployment rates has continued to widen since 2007.

The size of the middle class – the The size of the middle class is
53% backbone of EU societies defined as increasingly similar across
the income group between 75% and Member States…
of middle-class Europeans 200% of median national income – is
increasingly similar across countries
feel vulnerable
While this does reflect some upward
unemployment convergence, data also show a
tendency for the middle class to grow in size in eastern Member States while
shrinking in the EU’s West. At EU level, more than half (53%) of people in the
middle class report a feeling of vulnerability and difficulty in making ends meet,
financially.

The poorest income groups in the EU-28 have improved their

conditions compared with their pre-crisis level
% change of real disposable income in 2008-2015, selected percentiles, EU-28
income distribution. Source: DG-EMPL calculations. EU-SILC UDB and data series
produced by the World Inequality Lab (see chapter 1).

14
 Executive Summary

In 2018, the real annual growth of …and the income of lower income
4% higher income the gross disposable household groups in the EU has risen.
income (GDHI) was 2% in the EU and
for poorer people in the EU, 1.5% in the euro area. In the latest
relative to before the crisis year for which data is available
(2017), GDHI per capita in the euro
area surpassed the pre-crisis 2008
level (which, in the EU, had already been surpassed in 2015). However, GDHI per
capita has still not recovered to its 2008 level in eight Member States (notably
in Greece, Cyprus, Italy and Spain). After increasing in the wake of the economic
and financial crisis, income inequality within Member States began to decline in
some of them in 2017. Analysis of income in the EU as a single distribution
shows an improvement in the position of lower income groups and convergence
among subsets of EU Member States from 2007 to 2015. Those at the 10th
percentile of the population gained over 4% in real terms, compared to their pre-
crisis income. This was mostly a result of the rising income of some of the
poorest in the eastern Member States. Meanwhile, the income of the poorest in
the southern Member States deteriorated.

Incomes in cities are usually higher Incomes in cities usually exceed

As much as 90%: than those in rural areas. The most those in rural areas.
notable gaps exist in Romania and
highest gap in median income Bulgaria, where median income in
between EU cities and rural cities is around 90% and 60% higher
areas respectively. Nevertheless, the
likelihood of being in income poverty
and severe material deprivation is higher in cities than in rural areas in most
western Member States.

Some population groups (notably people with disabilities, people with a migrant Vulnerable groups’ access to
background and ethnic minorities) are more vulnerable than others in terms of education, services and the
access to education, services and the labour market. This translates into poorer labour market remains
employment outcomes, lower well-being and a higher risk of poverty and social challenging.
exclusion. For instance, in 2016 about 48.1% of people with disabilities were
employed in the EU compared with 73.9% of people without disabilities. The
European Pillar of Social Rights establishes principles that should guarantee
rights to these groups and guide related policy action at EU and Member State
levels.

The number of people ‘at risk of The number of people at risk of

4.2 million people fewer poverty or social exclusion’ (AROPE) poverty and social exclusion
has been falling slowly below its pre- declined below its pre-crisis 2008
at risk of poverty or social crisis level. By 2017, 4.2 million fewer low point…
exclusion in 2017 than in 2008 people were at risk of poverty and
social exclusion than at the 2008 low
point in the EU-27 (excluding Croatia,
which joined after the target was set). This decline reduced the AROPE share
from 23.7% in the pre-crisis year 2008, or from 24.8% in the peak year 2012, to
22.4% in 2017. All three components of the AROPE indicator declined: people at
risk of poverty, those in severe material deprivation and those living in very low
work-intensity households.

Severe material deprivation has declined continuously since 2012, indicating …supported by decreases in
improvements in standards of living. It affected 4.7 million people fewer in 2017 absolute poverty, relative poverty
than in 2016. After remaining broadly unchanged between 2014 and 2016, the and low work intensity.
proportion of people at risk of poverty declined from 17.3% to 16.9% in 2017.
The proportion of people in very low work-intensity households decreased from
10.5% in 2016 to 9.5% in 2017, i.e. by around 3.8 million people.

15
Employment and Social Developments in Europe 2019

Living standards have improved despite persistent poverty

and inequality
Poverty threshold (in real terms), at-risk-of-poverty rate, Gini coefficient of disposable
income, severe material deprivation rate (cumulative change – index 2008=100), EU. Source:
Eurostat, EU SILC, DG EMPL calculations (see chapter 1).

Selected Macroeconomic, Labour market and Social indicators for the EU28

20 0 8 20 13 20 17 20 18
Re al GDP (an n u al g ro wth ) 0.5 0.3 2.5 2.0
Emp lo yme n t
annual growth 1.0 -0.3 1.6 1.3
number of employed (000) 231 181 224 442 235 898 239 040
Emp lo yme n t rate (to tal, 20 -6 4) 70.2 68.4 72.2 73.2
rate (men, 20-64) 77.8 74.3 78.0 79.0
rate (women, 20-64) 62.7 62.6 66.5 67.4
Lab o u r p ro d u ctivity (an n u al g ro wth )
per person employed -0.5 0.6 0.9 0.6
per hour worked -0.3 1.0 1.3 0.8
Un e mp lo yme n t
rate (total, 15-74) 7.0 10.9 7.6 6.8
rate (men, 15-74) 6.6 10.8 7.4 6.6
rate (women, 15-74) 7.5 10.9 7.9 7.1
rate youth (15-24) 15.9 23.8 16.8 15.2
long-term unemployment rate 2.6 5.1 3.4 2.9
very long-term unemployment rate 1.5 2.9 2.1 1.8
number of unemployed (000) 16 768 26 334 18 774 16 887
Re al Gro s s Ho u s e h o ld Dis p o s ab le in co me p e r cap ita (20 0 8=10 0 ) 100.0 97.9 103.5 105.3
At-ris k-o f-p o ve rty o r e xclu s io n rate 23.7 24.6 22.4
In e q u ality
Income quintile share ratio S80/S20 5.0 5.0 5.1
GINI coefficient of disposable income 31.0 30.5 30.7

Source: Eurostat (National Accounts, LFS, SILC)

Note: EU27 for At-risk-of-poverty or exclusion rate, S80/20 and GINI in 2008

16
 Executive Summary

2. SUSTAINABLE GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT IN THE EU:

CONCEPTS, DEFINITIONS AND CHALLENGES
Sustainable development is defined as “meeting the needs of the present The EU has been supporting
without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs”. sustainable development goals at
This was the vision underlying the Lisbon agenda of June 2000. It was developed EU and global level.
further in the Europe 2020 agenda with its ambitious targets in the economic,
social and environmental domains. In 2015, the United Nations adopted a
resolution on the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, which set a
comprehensive global agenda for sustainable development covering its social,
economic, environmental and governance dimensions on an equal footing.

The Treaty on the EU includes The economic, social, and

The top 5 concerns sustainable development in its environmental dimensions of
economic, social and environmental sustainability are anchored in EU
law and embraced by Europeans.
of Europeans are socio- dimensions as a fundamental Union
economic and objective and considers inclusive
growth as an integral part of
environmental sustainability. The social dimension
covers the promotion of employment, good working conditions and well-being,
the improvement and harmonisation of living and working standards, the fight
against social exclusion and discrimination, social justice, human capital
development, gender equality and social dialogue. Evidence from Eurobarometer
surveys indicates that all three dimensions of sustainable development are high
on the list of European citizens’ preoccupations. According to the latest
Eurobarometer survey of autumn 2018 the top five concerns of EU citizens “for
them personally” are socioeconomic and environmental issues: rising prices
(32%), health and social security (17%), pensions (16%), the financial situation
of their household (13%) as well as taxation, education, the environment and
climate and energy issues (all at 10%).

The EU ranks very well in international comparisons in terms of social progress, While the EU ranks high in
as confirmed by the indexes developed to monitor progress towards the international comparisons,
Sustainable Development Goals. Nonetheless, the track records and challenges further progress is needed
vary significantly across Member States. Moreover, the challenges emanating towards a sustainable social
Europe …
from the mega-trends of ageing, digitalisation, globalisation and climate change
risk undermining the sustainability of these achievements.

Demographic change results in a … that promotes productivity

less than 2 workers growing number of older people and a growth and its wider distribution
shrinking working-age population: in an increasingly digital
economy ...
per person over 65 years of between today and 2060, the number
age by 2060, as opposed to of people aged over 65 is expected to
over 3 today increase from 30.5 to 51.6 per 100
people of working age (15-64). This
implies that for economic growth to be sustainable, it has to rely increasingly on
productivity gains and their wider distribution. In addition, inter-generational
fairness and the financial sustainability of the welfare state are at stake.
Digitalisation has opened the way for new forms of work organisation, including
platform work, as well as for the increasing automation of work. Digitalisation
also brings considerable job creation potential, especially in innovative, high-
productivity businesses and for well-educated, highly skilled people. The legal
framework and social protection systems need to evolve in order to cover these
new forms of work better.

Challenges to social sustainability include still large disparities within Member … as well as equality of
States and persistent inequalities, which have emerged since the economic crisis opportunities, including in places
and result from labour market segmentation and the polarisation of skills and undergoing difficult industrial
income. In some cases, the convergence patterns of regions differ from those of transition, with the support of EU
funds and industrial policy tools.
Member States. For example, while there was convergence of Member States in
relation to the employment rate over 2004–2016, divergence was recorded at
regional level. Containing geographical disparities depends on the ability of
national and subnational territories to converge upwardly and to guarantee

17
Employment and Social Developments in Europe 2019

equal access to services in different areas. Tackling divergence calls for a mix of
policies that accompany both people and places in the transition to new ways of
producing and working, while respecting local specificities. Such a policy mix
includes support from EU Structural and Investment Funds, notably the European
Social Fund, and can benefit from increasing attention to EU action that supports
industrial competitiveness and innovation.

There are ever more people of retirement age relative to

those of working age
Old age dependency ratio (population aged 65+ over population aged 15-64), EU-28. Source:
Eurostat [demo-pjanind] (see chapter 2).

A factor analysis identified four principal components (factors) which reinforce A skilled workforce, labour
each other and linking the different dimensions of sustainability. These motivate productivity, efficient labour
the four main chapters of this report. The first component regroups factors markets, trust in institutions and
contributing to a virtuous circle of sustainable development by promoting effective social welfare are key
ingredients of sustainable
productivity and efficiency through policies focusing on human capital (skills and
development.
social welfare in general) and institutions (functioning collective bargaining and
trust in the work of government institutions). The second factor revolves around
labour market efficiency as a precondition for sustainable development. It
reveals structural weaknesses in product and labour markets that undermine
sustainable development and hence competitiveness, wage increases and
employment prospects. A third factor reflects favourable social conditions and
relates to the efficiency of the welfare state in lowering poverty rates and
inequality. Finally, a fourth factor represents limitations to growth potentially
linked to high labour taxes.

A cluster analysis points to significant sustainability challenges and persistent Member States are not all on a
structural labour market problems in the South of Europe, with high sustainable development path.
unemployment, poor labour market performance of vulnerable groups and low
bargaining power of employees. Most North-Western Member States, on the
other hand, are found to have solid sustainability foundations: investment in
skills which supports higher productivity, reinforced by effective and trustworthy
institutions. These countries also invest more in social welfare and display higher
efficiency in the use of natural resources. Eastern Member States have been
catching up with the other Member States in GDP per capita and labour
productivity, even though their tradition of social dialogue is less developed,
trust in their institutions remains lower and they often lag behind in the
implementation of skills and environmental policies.

18
 Executive Summary

3. ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL FUNDAMENTALS: FROM

PRODUCTIVITY TO FAIR AND SUSTAINABLE GROWTH
Given the limitations on human Sluggish TFP growth and its
19% Total Factor resources imposed by demographic widening dispersion is one of the
EU’s main sustainability
Productivity growth ageing, and scarcity of natural
challenges.
resources, growth in the EU has to
rely increasingly on changing the
in the EU since 1995 modes of production and
vs. 24% in the US consumption and on a more efficient
use of existing resources. One of
Europe’s chronic challenges relates to Total Factor Productivity (TFP), which
measures that part of economic growth that is due not to an increase in factor
input but to higher efficiency in production. TFP is an important indicator of the
sustainability of growth. TFP growth in the EU is low relative to other major
economies. Its increase between 1995 and 2020 (including forecasts for 2019
and 2020) is estimated at 19% in the EU, compared with 24% in the US. There
is considerable dispersion in TFP performance both between and within Member
States as well as between sectors and companies of different size. TFP levels in
Eastern European countries have been converging towards the EU average,
albeit from low levels.

EU TFP grows more slowly than before the crisis

TFP between 1995 and 2020, 1995=100. Source: Commission services AMECO database
(see chapter 3).

A region’s capacity to innovate and the education level of its labour force raise Innovation based on R&D, human
total factor productivity and efficiency. The further away a region is from the so- capital and efficient institutions
called ‘technology frontier’, the higher tends to be its TFP growth, and hence the drives up TFP in European
faster its convergence. At the same time, a region's TFP growth potential regions…
depends on its capacity to adopt new technologies from advanced, “technological
benchmark” regions, and this in turn depends on the skills of the workforce. The
better educated a region's workers are, and the higher its R&D expenditure, the
stronger is its capacity to adopt new technologies. Effective government
institutions and citizens’ and companies’ trust in those institutions also play a
key role in raising productivity.

Analysis at firm-level shows that firms with high TFP usually invest in high- …as well as in firms, producing a
quality, innovative capital as opposed to simply increasing previous-standard higher-wage dividend for
capital stock. By becoming more competitive in this way, they create more jobs workers, too.
and pay a productivity premium to their workers so that higher wages
accompany efficiency in production. Exporting firms also tend to exhibit higher
TFP, mainly because their exposure to global competition forces them to become
more efficient.

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Employment and Social Developments in Europe 2019

Labour market imperfections Excluding people from important

Efficient labour markets, weigh on economies’ growth resources and equal
potential. Examples include opportunities limits growth
innovative capital, equal potential.
entry barriers for certain
opportunities and good workers, uneven job protection,
working climate foster TFP or low bargaining power of
certain groups of workers
relative to others. This
underlines the importance of equal opportunities in the labour market. Labour
market segmentation due to discrimination or exclusion from job or training
opportunities distorts wage setting and in turn leads to the sub-optimal use of
labour, eventually lowering the growth potential.

According to the European Working Conditions Survey (EWCS), managers Productivity is higher in firms
consider that a good working climate, greater workers' autonomy and workers’ with a good working climate and
regular access to training favour productivity growth, including through improved training opportunities.
motivation and a lower incidence of sick leave, greater attraction of skilled
workers and higher retention rates. According to managers, firms that create
new products or introduce new production processes also enjoy higher
productivity.

EU instruments and policies play a EU policies and instruments have

GDP: +1% key role in promoting competitiveness a key role: the European Social
Fund can help boost productivity,
and raising productivity. A tentative
simulation exercise shows that the especially in less developed
in the long term in less regions.
EU’s Cohesion Policy has a long-
developed regions through lasting positive impact on the
2021-27 ESF+ economy. The simulation takes the
European Social Fund (ESF) as an
example. The ESF in particular contributes to improving workers' employability
through social investment and training. For 2021-2027, the Commission has
proposed total ESF+ spending worth EUR 101.2 billion. The simulation shows
that investment supported by the ESF+ is expected to have an impact on the
economy of receiving countries, which lasts much longer than 2027, the last
year of the programme. A particularly strong positive impact is expected in the
EU's Less Developed Regions, i.e. those regions where GDP per inhabitant is less
than 75% of the EU average. In those regions, investments supported by the
ESF+ could raise labour productivity by 0.7% and GDP by 1% in the long term,
compared with a no-investment scenario.

Policies can contribute significantly to improving the EU's productivity Training subsidies can increase
performance. Model simulations confirm the positive long-term macroeconomic productivity, notably by targeting
impact notably of government training support to firms, designed to motivate those most in need, while
their workers to take up more training. The sources of finance for training supporting innovation and
investment in excellence.
support can vary and include public, private and shared financing. This matters
for its impact, especially on employment, GDP and the wage share. Training
increases workers’ productivity,
Public support to training and, consequently,
demand and wages. The impact
labour

and upskilling increases of such measures also depends

on their target groups. Raising
productivity and GDP the overall qualification level
requires a combination of
training support specifically for
the lower-qualified and incentives to encourage their upskilling through further
studies. The resulting increase in the average qualification level would contribute
to improving sustainability by enhancing the economy’s innovation potential and
labour reallocation, while improving the employability of those most in need of
support.

20
 Executive Summary

4. INVESTING IN PEOPLE AND SOCIAL SUSTAINABILITY:

SHORT-TERM COSTS AND LONG-TERM BENEFITS
Enhancing the skills and qualifications of the EU workforce and strengthening its Social investment enables people
innovation potential are only a few of several areas in need of investment, in to reach their potential and
order to support sustainability. Given major demographic and technological supports them in critical life
shifts, there is a broad consensus on the need to invest in people. Such ‘social course transitions.
investment’ helps to improve individuals’ well-being and prevent and mitigate
social risks, by enabling citizens to acquire new skills and become or remain
active in the labour market and by providing them with support during critical
life course transitions. This chapter focuses on selected areas related to such
transitions, notably on childcare and long-term care, education, training and
skills, and housing.

Returns on social investment are higher at early life stages

Expected returns on social investment and rate of return, by life stage. Source: J. Kvist
(2014). “A framework for social investment strategies: Integrating generational, life course
and gender perspectives in the EU social investment strategy.” Comparative European Politics,
13(1), 131-149 (see chapter 4).

Investing in children and families and promoting equal opportunities can take Investing in childcare and long-
different forms, including affordable and high-quality early childhood education term care and access to basic
and care (ECEC) and long-term care (LTC). Income support through social services help address
transfers can in particular help to address disadvantage stemming from disadvantage.
inequality of opportunity among children, as well as e.g. lack of access to basic
services in remote or rural areas or old-age poverty.

Between 2008 and 2016, family- Childcare use intensity varies

Over 20 hrs/week related expenditure per child widely between Member States.
increased in most Member States. The
is the biggest difference in use of formal childcare has increased
considerably in the EU although there
childcare use intensity
is room for further improvement. Half
between Member States of the Member States have yet to
reach the two Barcelona targets on formal childcare use set in 2002, i.e. to
provide childcare by 2010 to at least 90% of children between 3 years old and
the mandatory school age, and to at least 33% of children under 3. The average
number of hours of formal childcare use per week in 2017 varied by more than
20 hours across Member States.

The availability of affordable and good quality childcare is important for parents Access to childcare enables
as it increases incentives or enables them to work. There is evidence that the parents to work.
care of children plays a crucial role in mothers’ and households’ labour supply

21
Employment and Social Developments in Europe 2019

decisions: in 2017, the employment

More than 14 pps rate of women with children aged 6
or less was 64.6% in the EU as
is the employment rate gap opposed to 79% for women without
between mothers and other children. Availability and affordability
of childcare services can largely
women in the EU explain the different levels of
mothers’ employment across the EU.
The higher the use of formal childcare for children below 3 years old, the higher
is women’s employment. Sweden and Czechia are two clear examples of this
relationship at opposite ends of the spectrum. In Sweden, the high employment
rate of mothers (82.8%) is accompanied by a high use of childcare services
(52.6%), while Czechia has both a very low maternal employment rate (45.1%),
and very low childcare use (6.5%).

Childcare is not only beneficial to Poorer families tend to make less

Average use of childcare mothers’ employment. Formal use of childcare.
childcare services provide children
by richer families is more with stimulating environments where
than double that of poorer they can gain new skills they can
families capitalise on throughout their life
course and which can reduce
inequalities at the start of school life. It is important that these services be
provided for all social groups, in particular for the most vulnerable. However,
poorer families use childcare services less than richer families, and lack of
affordability is the main reason. At EU-level, average childcare use by the
families in the lowest quintile of the income distribution is 18.3% of children
aged 3 or less, whereas average use by families in the top quintile is 42.5%
(measured in full-time equivalents of 30 hours a week for every child enrolled).

Because of population ageing, Population ageing will impact

Public expenditure on public expenditure on long-term public expenditure on long-term
long-term care will care is expected to increase care.
substantially over future decades
increase (from 1.6% of GDP in 2016 to
2.7% in 2070). The provision of
from 1.6% of GDP in 2016 to high quality and affordable long-
2.7% in 2070 term care and work-life balance
arrangements (such as flexible
work and care leave) may alleviate the burden on people with caring
responsibilities, and therefore have a positive impact on their employment.

The European social model has historically considered skills as one of the Skills are the key to labour
primary tools for improving labour market participation and boosting productivity market participation and future
and competiveness. A labour force with an up-to-date skill set is key to growth.
sustainable development and growth.

EU governments fund more than 80% Higher qualifications have

45% greater likelihood of education spending. Nominal important individual and social
investment in education and training benefits, yet education
of having a job for people systems grew in the last decade, expenditure is falling behind.

with tertiary education albeit less than GDP. Real education

expenditure per student has
remained fairly stable in the EU
overall and fallen in some Member States, notably Ireland, Greece and the UK.
Investing in education has several positive spillovers. Higher qualifications are
linked to higher employment rates and higher wages (+16% for people with
secondary education, +45% for those with tertiary education,) and to better
health conditions for individuals. Benefits for society include higher tax revenues
and social security contributions, lower social expenditure and more active
citizens. Yet, since tertiary educational attainment is correlated across
generations, there is a risk of accumulated advantage (the so-called ‘Matthew
effect’), i.e. public spending on education ultimately conferring more benefit on
families that already have a good level of education than on those that do not.

22
 Executive Summary

While the number of students has gradually increased, real

expenditure per student is around pre-crisis levels
Evolution of number of students and real expenditure in education per student in the period
2008-2017; number of students (in thousands) on rhs, and real average expenditure (in EUR)
by student on lhs. Source: DG EMPL calculations based on Eurostat data (see chapter 4).

Work experience during studies as part of the curriculum increases the chances Work experience and vocational
of subsequent employment. Europeans with paid working experience during their education improve the chances of
studies had a roughly 9% higher likelihood of working compared with those finding a job.
without such experience. Vocational pathways at secondary level are also linked
to higher employment. These effects apply to all groups, although the
employment probability is generally higher (by up to 6%) for EU mobile citizens
and lower (by up to 11%) for people with a non-EU migrant background.

Adult education and training are increasing in the EU, driven by non-formal Adult education and non-formal
training. This most likely reflects the higher flexibility of non-formal training, its training are increasing.
lower costs, and the limited transferability of the skills acquired from such
training: all these characteristics commend it to employers who fund it.

Housing as a sector and policy field is distinct from enabling social policies that Access to affordable housing is
directly invest in people. Access to affordable and adequate housing, including key for access to education and
social housing, is an important factor enabling Europeans to access education employment, and participation in
and training opportunities and to enter and stay in the labour market, where they society overall.
can best fulfil their potential and participate in community life and relevant
social networks. By doing so, it contributes, both directly and indirectly, to skills
formation, increased productivity, sustained growth and social cohesion.
Affordable housing is a decisive factor in accessing enabling public services and
facilitates mobility and labour market transitions. Inadequate housing can have
adverse long-term effects on health and social inclusion. The housing situation
differs markedly across EU Member States with regard to such key features as
affordability, quality, ownership status and average tenure.

‘Daily living costs’ depend on housing While on average housing costs

28% of tenants spend expenses for the main dwelling, which and financial overburden have
more than 40% of include the cost of the home (mortgage declined in the EU, housing
affordability is an issue for
or rent) and the costs of utilities and
their income on insurance. Several indicators point to
tenants and single parents,
notably in cities.
housing positive developments in the EU since the
economic recovery. Housing costs as a
percentage of disposable income decreased on average from 22.7% of
disposable income in 2014 to 21.4% in 2017. The self-reported heavy burden of
housing costs declined from a peak of 38% of households in 2013 to 31% in
2017. At the same time, the share of households that spend more than two
fifths of their income on housing costs declined from 11.6% to 10.4% of the

23
Employment and Social Developments in Europe 2019

population, although the situation varies across Member States. Despite these
positive trends, there are specific groups, which are more likely to face housing
affordability issues: tenants, single people, particularly those with children and
those living in cities.

One in ten Europeans spends 40% or more of household

income on housing costs
Housing cost overburden rate, 2008-2017. Source: Eurostat, EU-SILC (see chapter 4).

Severe housing deprivation is declining, particularly in Central and Eastern Severe housing deprivation is
Europe. However, approximately one out of seven Europeans lives in a dwelling declining in the EU, while
that has a leaking roof, damp walls, floors or foundation, or rot in window homelessness is increasing in
frames or floor. These issues predominantly affect tenants, including those in many Member States.
social housing. Owners with mortgages tend to be the least vulnerable group,
both in terms of affordability and housing deprivation. Despite certain general
improvements in the affordability and quality of housing, extreme forms of
housing exclusion such as homelessness are growing in many countries.

Beyond social cohesion, housing plays an important role in promoting sustainable Housing impacts labour mobility,
economic growth, enabling mobility and efficient labour allocation. Housing is energy use, pollution and
also an important sector for environmental sustainability. Long commutes to the therefore economic and
workplace create negative environmental spillovers, while residential buildings environmental sustainability.
are responsible for one quarter of the EU’s overall energy consumption.

5. TOWARDS A GREENER FUTURE: EMPLOYMENT AND SOCIAL

IMPACTS OF CLIMATE CHANGE
Environmental sustainability is one of the main dimensions of sustainability. Progressing towards Sustainable
There are many synergies between environmental sustainability and economic Europe 2030 requires a broad
performance, from the impacts of production and consumption patterns on policy mix and has many
employment, through effects on job quality and health and safety at the benefits.
workplace, to new opportunities for innovation. The socio-economic cost of
inaction on environmental and climate issues would be huge, leading to frequent
severe weather events and natural disasters as well as reducing EU GDP by up
to 2% and GDP in southern Europe by more than 4% in the long term. Making
progress towards a Sustainable Europe 2030 and achieving the ambitious vision
defined in the Commission Communication “A Clean Planet for All” of November
2018 requires a broad policy mix. It also requires timely implementation of
measures, at EU, national and regional levels in energy and transport, taxation,

24
 Executive Summary

research, industrial and competition policy as well as employment and social

policies. Like social investments, climate-related investments bring long-term,
largely universal benefits while having short-term and largely concentrated
costs.

EU welfare losses from climate inaction by main socio-

economic impact
% of GDP. Source: European Commission, PESETA III studies, Joint Research Centre, Seville.

Employment and value generation in Low-carbon sectors spearhead

75% of EU workers the EU economy are taking place structural change and job
increasingly in economic sectors that creation, but progress is not
are employed in sectors automatic.
are relatively low in carbon emissions
producing less than 10% and material inputs. Electricity
of CO2 emissions production, transport, extractive
industries, agriculture and
manufacturing, together produce close
to 90% of all CO2 emissions by business sectors, yet account for less than 25%
of employment and gross value added in the EU. These sectors have to reduce
their emissions and expectations are growing in this respect. Research and
innovation as well as new technologies can help meet these expectations. On the
other hand, low-carbon industries and service sectors produce less than 10% of
all CO2 emissions, but employ more than 70% of the EU workforce and are also
the sectors with the strongest employment increases. Yet progress is not
automatic, as service sectors also rely increasingly on electricity. This means
that targeted policies are needed to steer the process of decarbonisation.

Overall, projections of the impacts of a The low-carbon transition

1.2 million more jobs full implementation of the Paris contributes to GDP and
agreement (9) show that the transition to employment growth and
may be just one of the a low-carbon economy could raise GDP by mitigates job polarisation.

benefits of the green an additional 1.1% and employment by

0.5% compared to a scenario without
transition climate action policies. This amounts to
an additional 1.2 million jobs in the EU by 2030, on top of the 12 million new
jobs already expected. Job creation is projected mostly in growing green(ing)
sectors, both in industry and services, including construction, waste management
and sustainable finance. The positive impact on GDP and employment is largely
due to the investment required to achieve such a transition, together with lower
spending on fossil fuel imports. Furthermore, lower consumer prices, notably of
solar photovoltaic electricity, would increase disposable incomes, consumer
expenditure and consequently the demand for (generally labour-intensive)
consumer services. The low-carbon transition could also somewhat mitigate
ongoing job polarisation resulting from automation and digitalisation by creating
jobs in the middle of the wage and skill distributions. These impacts, however,
vary considerably among sectors and countries but, overall, are positive.
Projections undertaken for the longer term (2050) confirm a similarly positive

(9) Eurofound (2019), Future of manufacturing - Energy scenario: Employment implications of the Paris Climate Agreement, Eurofound
Research Report, February 2019

25
Employment and Social Developments in Europe 2019

impact on total employment, in particular if carbon revenues are used to

generate a tax shift away from labour and towards environmental taxes.

Employment gains from climate action in EU Member States,

2030
Employment impacts by country, deviation from the baseline in %, in 2030. Source:
Eurofound (2019), Future of manufacturing - Energy scenario: Employment implications of
the Paris Climate Agreement, Eurofound Research Report, February 2019 (see chapter 5).

The transition to a low-carbon, circular, climate-neutral economy will not be However, the transition to a low-
inclusive by default as it implies potentially significant costs and risks for specific carbon economy is not inclusive
sectors. Necessary measures and reforms may have a substantial impact on by default and comes with risks,
people and regions, including significant labour reallocation across sectors and too, including labour reallocation.
occupations and profound changes in future skill requirements. EU instruments
such as the ESF and the European Globalisation Adjustment Fund (EGF) as well
as the European Social Dialogue can contribute to a just transition by supporting
workers and families who have been dependent on work in energy-intensive
sectors during the transition, including through retraining, reskilling,
individualised job search counselling and potentially income replacement.

Adequate warmth, cooling, lighting and energy to power appliances are essential Another potential risk is energy
for ensuring a decent standard of living. One risk related to decarbonisation is poverty, which has decreased in
energy poverty, where a growing share of households is unable to afford heating the EU but still affects low and
or other energy services due to a combination of low income, high expenditure middle-income households in
several Member States.
on energy and poor energy efficiency of their homes. Energy poverty has impacts
on health, the environment and productivity. This highlights the importance of
affordable and quality housing, including social housing, for social fairness and
for securing acceptance of climate action. Energy prices, one of energy-poverty’s
key drivers, have risen substantially over the last two decades, increasing
financial pressure on households. Well-targeted social benefits, social housing
and energy bill support, as well as energy-efficiency measures, can mitigate
energy poverty. Overall, there have been some recent positive developments in
the EU and the ability to keep one’s home warm, has on average decreased
below its 2010 level. However, not only low-income households but in some
Member States also a significant proportion of the middle income households
are still not able to keep their homes warm, particularly in towns and rural areas.
The Clean Energy for All Europeans package brings a new and holistic focus to
energy poverty in the EU climate and energy framework – addressing it in
electricity market legislation, energy efficiency legislations and in National
Energy and Climate Plans. This represents a key component of ensuring a just
transition.

26
 Executive Summary

The greatest environmental health risk in the EU is air pollution, causing around Air pollution is the greatest
400 000 premature deaths per year. Emissions of the main air pollutants in the environment-linked health risk in
EU have decreased but still exceed relevant EU and World Health Organisation the EU, affecting particularly the
guidelines. Certain groups are more vulnerable than others to the negative elderly, children and poorer
people.
effects of air pollution, including children, the elderly, those with pre-existing
health problems and those from lower socio-economic backgrounds. More urban
than rural dwellers report being exposed to pollution and other environmental
problems. Tackling air pollution through climate action is an opportunity for
raising popular and political support for climate change policies because the
gains from reducing air pollution are local, visible and short-term compared with
more abstract climate mitigation action. Targeted measures, including those
under climate change action, could prevent one third of premature deaths by
2050.

Finally, “greening” production and consumption patterns and supporting green job Climate action offers new
creation also foster opportunities for climate-smart and inclusive growth with opportunities for technology and
innovation and productivity benefits for firms and increased well-being for process innovation, fostering
people. Environmental taxation, notably a tax shift from labour to energy firms’ productivity.
consumption, waste and pollution in particular, could help internalise social and
environmental externalities, avoid the setting up of ‘pollution havens’ and
incentivise the reallocation of resources and re-orientation of global value chains
towards low energy-intensive and low carbon production.

6. SUSTAINABILITY AND GOVERNANCE: THE ROLE OF SOCIAL

DIALOGUE
Social dialogue plays an important role in promoting sustainability in all its Social partners contribute to
dimensions, economic, social and environmental. Given the substantial sustainable development by
challenges related to a just transition to a green economy and sustainable promoting good, inclusive
growth, engaging social partners is crucial in order to take into account relevant workplaces and multi-
stakeholder governance.
information and to reach consensus on action. Social dialogue can bring
considerable experience in facilitating cooperation and synergies between key
players. Social partners contribute actively to the implementation of the
European Pillar of Social Rights and EU policy agendas. They also contribute to
progress towards some of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), especially
by a) fostering equality at work and good working conditions, b) promoting
inclusiveness and c) agreeing on steps towards more environmentally friendly
ways of running our economies and d) by strengthening the democratic
foundations of our societies.

Core tenets of social dialogue such as Wage bargaining correlates with

Trade union density in the fairness at work, satisfactory working positive social outcomes,
Member State with the lowest conditions and workers’ rights are at including lower income inequality.
in-work poverty is 45 the heart of the social and economic
percentage points higher than dimensions of sustainability. Evidence
suggests that collective bargaining
in the Member State with the
reduces wage dispersion, that higher
highest in-work poverty centralisation of wage bargaining is
associated with lower income
inequality and that higher trade union density is associated with lower in-work
poverty rates. Employee representation, in general, tends to improve the quality
of the work environment. For instance, employees represented by a trade union
or works council are 34% less likely to consider that their work affects their
heath negatively. This suggests the importance of employee representation in
ensuring high standards in work environments, particularly given the projected
changes in work quality associated with the low-carbon transition.

27
Employment and Social Developments in Europe 2019

Social partners also promote inclusiveness, which is key to both social and Social partners promote inclusive
economic sustainability. Examples can be found in the areas of social protection social protection and, more often
and transnational activities, where social partners defend the extension of social than not, a transition to the low-
protection and other social rights to all workers in a specific sector, beyond their carbon economy…
own membership. Social partners have also become increasingly active in the
environmental dimension of sustainability. However, their approach to the low-
carbon transition differs markedly across sectors, from defensive attitudes in
those that are at risk of job loss, such as mining and fossil fuel extraction, to
whole-hearted promotion in sectors where the transition is expected to generate
employment, such as construction.
Εmployees with some form Essential for this low-carbon …and encourage upskilling with a
view to a just and socially fair
of representation have a transition is facilitating workers’
transition.
reskilling and upskilling. Education
66% higher chance and training can help sectors at risk
and help social partners to formulate
of receiving paid training responses that ensure a fairer
transition. Employee representation is
associated with more training opportunities within companies. For instance,
employees represented by a trade union are 66% more likely to receive paid
training.

In addition to facilitating the transition to sustainability, the processes of social Social dialogue supported by
dialogue, such as bipartite+ or tripartite+ partnerships, strengthen democratic expert advice and governments
participation in EU society. They allow workers and employers to influence the can identify the least disruptive
choices on the way to a greener economy, giving them some leverage in the solutions to sustainability issues.
midst of the megatrends transforming the world economy. Relying on social
partners for the management of transitions, in consultation with experts and
with the support of governments, can result in the least disruptive solutions. By
integrating environmental aspects into a traditional socio-economic agenda,
social partners are becoming crucial actors in fostering green and inclusive
growth.

CONCLUSIONS
For the sixth consecutive year, improvements in employment and social
outcomes have accompanied the economic recovery. Nonetheless, persistent
risks and emerging uncertainties at global and EU-level raise questions about
the prospects for further growth. Meanwhile, the continuing expansion of the EU
economy has shifted attention to long-term sustainability issues. The urgency of
the situation and increasing awareness of environmental degradation and the
effects of climate change has intensified pressure on policymakers to accelerate
the transition to a low-carbon, more circular, environmentally sustainable and
inclusive economic model. The EU can already boast an innovative, highly
performing economy, as well as high levels of social and environmental
protection. The objective is to make these achievements sustainable over time
so that future generations can avail themselves of the same resources that
current generations enjoy, and to improve people’s lives today, by ensuring their
social rights and equal opportunities. Employment and social policies in
particular should help to ensure social sustainability in a world reshaped by
demographic ageing, digitalisation, globalisation and action against climate
change. A generalized, upstream integration of social and environmental
concerns in future policies is essential and would contribute to promoting social
acceptance of necessary reforms.

Robust economic expansion in the EU cannot be sustained without higher total

factor productivity growth, which relies more on the efficient use of productive
factors, rather than just expanding their use. Total factor productivity thrives in
Member States and regions with strong labour market institutions and in firms
that invest in workers’ training and innovative capital and processes. Policies
that help to develop human capital and facilitate workplace innovation are most
effective in increasing productivity in the long term, provided labour markets do
not discriminate and firms can access the necessary capital.

28
 Executive Summary

Given major demographic and technological shifts, social investment contributes

to sustainability by preventing and mitigating social risks. It enables citizens to
be active in the labour market and acquire new skills, and provides support
during critical life course transitions. It thus raises activity and employment rates
and lowers social risks. Childcare and early childhood education stand out
among such investments, supporting mothers’ labour market participation and
employment, while fostering skills and equal opportunities early on in children’s
lives. Investment in skills, qualifications, and formal adult training supports
firms’ competitiveness as well as wages. Access to affordable and adequate
housing is an important factor enabling Europeans to fulfil their potential in the
labour market and to participate in society on more equal footing.

The transition to a low-carbon economy is generally expected to have positive

effects on GDP, total employment and well-being. Early preparation for this
transition through better and new skills can mitigate job losses in occupations,
sectors and regions still linked to the high-carbon economy and better avail of
the job-creation potential in green sectors. However, the transition to a climate-
neutral economy is not socially inclusive by default. Integrating the social
dimension from the outset is fundamental to the success of the EU’s climate
and energy strategy. Where appropriate, compensatory measures, including
those aiming to reduce energy poverty, can contribute to a socially fair transition
and should be part of necessary reforms. Environmental taxes also offer an
opportunity to generate a tax shift away from labour taxation, with positive
implications for total employment and earnings. Policy and investments should
also target environment-linked health hazards, such as air pollution, and can
help gain public support for climate action and reforms.

Finally, the multi-stakeholder governance of social dialogue is eminently suitable

for building a broad consensus to promote more sustainable economies and
societies. Well-functioning social dialogue enhances social fairness by improving
working conditions without hampering long-term economic performance. Trade
union and employer organisations could accelerate their efforts to manage the
transition to a low-carbon economy, despite persisting differences in positions,
linked to the uneven sectoral impact of the “greening” of the economy.

Mainstreaming and integrating social and environmental objectives in the design

of all EU policies, as opposed to addressing social and environmental risks
through ex-post remedial action, is the only credible way of pursuing a truly
balanced, multi-dimensional sustainable development model. This might not be
the silver bullet for all of the EU’s challenges, but it will guarantee a green and
social Europe that is committed to its global responsibilities.

29
CHAPTER 1

Main Employment and

Social Developments
income group between 75% and 200% of national
1. INTRODUCTION (10) median income, is sizeable in all Member States,
constituting from 53% to 77% of the total population.
In 2018 economic growth in the EU continued at However, its weight is shrinking in some Member
a slower pace than in 2016 and 2017. Positive States and there are signs of its perceived
labour market conditions persisted and employment vulnerability, with potential implications for social
rose to 240.7 million in the first quarter of 2019. The sustainability and political stability. In particular, the
employment rate reached 73.5% in the last quarter of proportion of individuals in the middle class who report
2018, the highest level ever recorded, while the that they have difficulty making ends meet stands at
activity rate maintained a steady long-term upward 53% (though similar levels were seen pre-crisis).
trend. In 2018 the unemployment rate stood at 6.8%
of the labour force, its lowest level since records Some groups in society have traditionally been
started at EU level in 2000, and it further declined to vulnerable. People with disabilities, people from
6.4% in March 2019. migrant backgrounds and ethnic minorities tend to find
themselves at a disadvantage in the labour market
The recovery has contributed to increasing and with regard to access to public services; they are
incomes and a visible reduction in poverty and also at higher risk of poverty and social exclusion.
social exclusion. The at-risk-of-poverty and social
exclusion rate (AROPE) decreased in 2017 to below its This chapter reviews the latest socio-economic
2008 level of 23.7%, recording 23.5% in 2016 and developments at the EU level and in Member
22.4% in 2017 and a reduction by 5 million per year in States. The analysis covers overall macro-economic
these two years. While the overall economic and developments and their implications for the labour
employment outlook remains positive, uncertainties market, including a focus on regional developments
have increased and important challenges remain with and territorial cohesion within the EU as well as
regard to productivity growth, labour market international comparisons. This chapter also assesses
segmentation and social and geographical recent trends regarding the social situation and income
convergence. And increasingly there are questions as developments, with a special focus on the middle class
to whether the world economy can avoid, and would and on the above-mentioned vulnerable groups.
be resilient in the face of a significant new economic
downturn. All of these represent risks to sustainable
growth and development in Europe. 2. MACROECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT
The middle class remains the backbone of 2.1. Shadows over favourable global
European societies and welfare states but is macroeconomic developments
more vulnerable. The middle class, defined as the
After a period of sustained economic growth
10
( ) This chapter was written by Petrica Badea, Fabio De Franceschi, since 2012, the global economy is showing signs
Stefano Filauro and Luca Pappalardo. of slowing down. Economic activity in some

30
 Chapter 1: Main Employment and Social Developments

advanced economies, such as the euro area and Japan, Chart 1.2
as well as in emerging economies, notably China, is Contribution to GDP real growth - EU 28
Percentage change on previous year
weaker than predicted. (11) The Chinese economy is 4.0
cooling down as a consequence of weakening exports 3.0
(which have been affected by uncertainties with regard 2.0
1.0
to future US-China trade relations) and moderate 0.0
internal consumption growth. The weakest economic -1.0
-2.0
growth rates were recorded in Japan, in line with the -3.0
sluggish trends of previous years. On the other hand, -4.0
the US economy grew slightly faster than the EU -5.0
-6.0
economy, and is expected to grow faster in 2019, 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
backed by a robust labour market and fiscal expansion Public final consumption Private final consumption
- in spite of some institutional and political Gross capital formation External balance
uncertainties that could hamper consumer sentiment GDP
and business investment. Source: Eurostat, National Accounts [nama_10_gdp]
Click here to download chart.
Chart 1.1
Real GDP growth in selected large economies
Percentage change on previous year In 2018 gross domestic product grew by 2.0% in
15% the EU and by 1.8% in the euro area. Uncertainty
10%
in respect of structural reforms and of the political
situation hampered growth, which was slower than in
5%
2017, when it grew by 2.6% and 2.4% respectively.
0% Nevertheless, the growth rate remains positive and
significant. The main contributions came from private
-5%
consumption and investment, and to a lesser extent
-10% from the external sector and government expenditure.
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Private consumption and investment each accounted
Eur opean Union Eur o area United States for about 40% of growth in both the EU and the euro
area,. Public consumption made a less significant
Japan China
contribution of about 10%. The external balance made
Source: AMECO except China; IMF for China the smallest contribution, accounting for about 10% of
Click here to download chart.
EU growth and about 5% of euro area growth.

In both the EU and the euro area, economic Chart 1.3

activity continued to expand in 2018, although Contribution to GDP growth - Euro area
Percentage change on previous year
more slowly than expected. The economy has been 4.0
expanding for six consecutive years in the EU, and for 3.0

five in the euro area, yet at growth rates below those 2.0
1.0
of 2017. These developments, and the leading 0.0
indicators such as new export orders, indicate that the -1.0
-2.0
economic outlook is weakening. Nevertheless, in 2019 -3.0
domestic consumption and investment should continue -4.0
-5.0
to ensure growth in economic activity and -6.0
employment, in spite of increasing geopolitical and 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018

international uncertainties and rising tensions in trade. Public final consumption Private final consumption
Gross capital formation External balance
GDP
(11) See for instance European Commission (2019a)
Source: Eurostat, National Accounts [nama_10_gdp]
Click here to download chart.

The external balance made the smallest

contribution to GDP growth. This drop was not
offset by the developments in internal demand.
External balance accounted for about 10% of EU
growth and about 5% of euro area growth, as exports
continued to perform below expectations. The weak
export performance of the euro area was due mainly
to a drop in exports of goods, even though exports of
services remained robust. The deceleration of growth
in world trade was felt relatively more strongly in the
euro area, because of the geographical orientation and
product specialisation of exports. However, to the
extent that fundamentals continue to support

31
Employment and Social Developments in Europe 2019

domestic demand, growth is expected to regain Employment in the EU continued to expand

momentum once the temporary factors hampering through 2018 and in the first quarter of 2019,
growth fade. reaching the highest level ever recorded, 240.7
million. This is 13.4 million more than when the
Chart 1.4
Member States' contribution to EU GDP growth Juncker Commission came into office in November
Percentage change on previous year 2014. Having been on a downward trend until 2013,
4% employment has been growing robustly since then and
3%
in 2016 surpassed its pre-crisis high for the first time.
2%
1%
In 2018, it grew by 1.3%. A similar trend was recorded
0% in the euro area, where the total number of people
-1% employed in 2018 was 158 million, 1.4% more than in
-2%
-3%
the previous year.
-4%
-5% In 2018 the growth of employment in the EU and
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
the euro area was in line with developments was
DE FR ES IT
somewhat weaker than in the US. In 2017,
UK NL Other MSs EU
however, after several years of recording stronger
results than Europe, the US experienced weaker
Source: Eurostat, National Accounts [nama_10_gdp] expansion than Europe. Japanese employment, after
Click here to download chart.
some years of weak growth, continued the upward
trend started in 2016 and grew in 2018 at a stronger
In 2018 the contribution to EU growth of the pace than that of the EU and the Euro area.
four largest economies (Germany, France, the UK
and Italy) declined further. Whereas in the previous The number of hours worked per employed
two years they accounted for about half of total person in the EU and euro area continued their
growth, in 2018 this share shrank to 43%. In slow steady decline in 2018. This number has been
particular, the contribution of German growth to that declining since 2012, in line with a decade-long steady
of the EU fell to 14.9, from 18.1% in 2017 and 22.9% downward trend. Thus the number of people employed
in 2016: this is the smallest figure recorded since grew faster than the total hours worked.
2012. France’s contribution accounted for 13.2%, the
UK’s for 10.5% and Italy’s for 4.9%. Meanwhile the 2.3. Productivity and labour costs
contribution of the smallest economies increased to
40% from 34% in 2017. Chart 1.6
Real productivity per person and per hour worked in the
In 2018 over a third of Member States recorded EU and in the euro area
Index (2010=100)
growth that was more than twice that of the EU. 110
Growth was particularly notable in Ireland, Malta, 108
where reached 6.7%, and Poland, which recorded a 106
rate of 5.1%. On the other hand, GDP in Belgium, 104
Denmark, Germany, Greece, France, Italy and the UK 102
grew less than in the EU overall. Italy recorded the 100
lowest rate of GDP growth (0.9%). 98
96
2.2. Employment rises as the economy 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018

expands EU - per person Euro area - per person

Chart 1.5 EU - per hour worked Euroe area - per hour worked
Employment growth in selected large economies
Percentage change on previous year Source: Eurostat, National Accounts [nama_10_lp_ulc]
2.0% Click here to download chart.

1.0%
Productivity per hour worked has been
0.0%
increasing steadily in both the EU and the euro
-1.0%
area. In 2018 it was 12% (EU) and 10% (euro area)
-2.0%
above the record low levels of 2009. However,
-3.0% productivity per person grew more slowly than
-4.0% productivity per hour worked, in line with trends over
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
the last decade.
European Union Euro area United States

Japan China

Source: AMECO except China; IMF for China.

Click here to download chart.

32
 Chapter 1: Main Employment and Social Developments

Chart 1.7
Employment and total hours worked per person employed - European Union and euro area
Index 2007 = 100

110 EU - employment Euro area - employment

EU - hours worked per person employed Euro area - hours worked per person employed
108

106

104

102

100

98

96

94

92

90
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Source: Eurostat, National Accounts [nama_10_pe, nama_10_a10_e]
Click here to download chart.

Chart 1.8
Real labour cost by sector of economic activity in the EU 3. LABOUR MARKET DEVELOPMENTS
Index - 2012 = 100
108
3.1. Employment rates/levels
106

104 The employment rate in the EU reached 73.2% in

102
2018 and 73.5% in the last quarter of the same
100
year, the highest rates ever recorded.
98
Furthermore, the employment rate in full-time
96
equivalents (FTE) grew for the fifth consecutive year
94
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
and stood in 2018 at 67.2%, 2.2pp higher than in
Industry Construction
2008.

Chart 1.9
Market services Non-market services
The employment rate is growing but at a slower pace
Note: Nominal labour cost index deflated by the harmonised index of consumer prices Employment rate, % of population aged from 20 to 64 years
Source: DG EMPL calculation on Eurostat data [lc_lci_r2_a, prc_hicp_aind]
Click here to download chart.
74

The labour cost index, after the fall experienced in the 72

years that followed the great recession, has been
growing again since 2013 in all sectors of economic
70
activity. Industry is the sector that has experienced the
biggest increase in real terms, and its labour cost is
7.2% higher than it was in 2012. The next biggest 68

increases have been in market services and EU28 EA19

Forecast
construction, which have followed similar paths in the 66
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
past decade, although construction suffered more in
Note: The forecast is calculated with the estimation of employment growth and
the aftermath of the crisis. In non-market services assuming a similar size of the workforce
labour cost grew more slowly, and is now about 5% Source: Eurostat, LFS [lfsi_emp_a], Commission Spring 2019 Economic Forecast and
EMPL calculations
higher than in 2012. It is worth highlighting that Click here to download chart.
between 2012 and 2018 GDP grew more than the real
labour cost index in all sectors of economic activity,
However, this positive performance masks a
and in 2018 it exceeded the 2012 level by more than
slowdown in the pace of growth of the
10%.
employment rate. The employment rate in 2018
grew by 1.0pp compared with 2017 to reach 73.2%, a
yearly difference that is slightly lower than that
recorded in 2017 (1.1pp). According to the Spring
2019 Commission forecasts, total employment will
grow in 2019 and 2020 at a slower pace than in 2018;
the forecasts also point out that "with moderate

33
Employment and Social Developments in Europe 2019

economic growth lasting longer, the question arises as and female employment rates. Between 2008 and
to how long and to what extent employment growth 2013, as the overall employment rate fell, these rates
can continue". (12) If these slower growth dynamics fell, too, by 3.5pp for men and 0.1pp for women.
continue, then the employment rate would reach During the recovery they have risen equally for both
74.3% in 2020 and the 'EU 2020' employment rate sexes. It is worth noting, however, that the gender
target of 75% could therefore be slightly missed. employment gap measured in full-time equivalents
(FTE) is higher and stood at 18pp in 2018, reflecting
Also, there are strong differences among the higher incidence of part-time work among women
Member States, regions and population groups. (see below for more details). Recent improvements in
The employment rates of Member States still vary the supply of childcare (14) may have had a positive
greatly. There is a difference of about 23 pp between effect in reducing the gender gap, but policies to
the lowest rate (Greece, 59.5%) and the highest support the participation of women in the labour
(Sweden, 82.6%). Nonetheless, all Member States have market should be maintained and where possible
seen an improvement in their employment rate in reinforced in order to make further progress. (15)
2018. Also, the difference between the highest and
lowest rate has been reduced by almost 1pp, Chart 1.11

suggesting that the employment rate continues on a The gender employment gap remains stable
Employment rates by sex (% of population aged 20-64 years, lhs) and gender
path of upward convergence. (13) employment gap (pps, rhs)
80.0 24.0

Chart 1.10 78.0

22.0

Most Member States have already reached their 76.0

20.0
'EU2020' target 74.0

18.0
Employment rate, % of population 20-64 72.0

70.0 16.0
50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85
EU28 73 68.0
14.0

EA19 72 66.0
12.0
SE 83 64.0

10.0
CZ 80 62.0

DE 80 60.0 8.0
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
EE 80 Males Females Gender employment gap Gender employment gap (FTE)

NL 79
UK 79
DK 78 Note: The gender employment gap is calculated as the difference in the employment
LT 78 rate of men and women aged 20 to 64
LV 77 Source: Eurostat, LFS [lfsi_emp_a] and EMPL own calculations
FI 76
Click here to download chart.

AT 76
PT 75
Employment rates have increased in all age
SI 75
MT 75
groups and most notably among people aged 55-
HU 74 64. The employment rate of older people (55-64) went
IE 74 up from 57.1% in 2017 to 58.7% in 2018. This may
CY 74
be due to the impact of demographic factors (as more
BG 72
SK 72
active cohorts have replaced previous ones in past
PL 72 years) as well as to the effects of recent pension
LU 72 reforms in several Member States. (16) The
FR 71
2008
employment rate in the largest age group (25-54) rose
RO 70
0.8pp to 80.5%. For young people aged 15 to 24 it
BE 70 2014
ES 67
increased by 0.6pp to 35.4%, which is still lower than
HR 65
2018
in 2008.
IT 63 EU2020 target
EL 60

Note: No Europe 2020 target for the UK. (14) See Chapter 4 for a more in-depth analysis of recent childcare
FR 2008 data is missing. The Europe 2020 target for France excludes the
overseas departments. The employment rate in 2018 for France without the
developments in the EU.
overseas departments was 71.8%. (15) See Eurofound (2016): "these persistent disparities and
The achievement of the national targets by all Member States does not imply the significant cross-country differences represent an economic
achievement of the EU28 target.
Source: Eurostat, LFS [lfsi_emp_a]
and social challenge and explain the emphasis policymakers
Click here to download chart.
put on women’s integration into the labour market" (p85).
(16) See European Commission (2018c), pp. 91-95) for a more
detailed analysis.
There remain important gender-related
difference in employment performances. The
gender employment gap is 11.6pp and has barely
changed since 2013, although the trend in the last ten
years has been towards convergence between male

(12) European Commission (2019a): p 48.

(13) See European Commission (2018a), chapter 1, for a more
detailed analysis of convergence in the EU.

34
 Chapter 1: Main Employment and Social Developments

Chart 1.12 Chart 1.13

Employment rates grow for all age groups but more Involuntary part-time work remains high especially
slowly for young people among men
Employment rate in the EU by age groups, % of population Involuntary part-time employment, % of total part-time employment (age 15-64)
85.0 Total 15-24 25-54 55-64 45.0

75.0
40.0

35.0
65.0

30.0
55.0
25.0
45.0
20.0
35.0
15.0

25.0 10.0
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018

Note: "Total" refers to the age group 15-64 5.0

Source: Eurostat, LFS [lfsi_emp_a] 0.0
Click here to download chart. 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Total Males Females

Temporary employment as a proportion of total Source: Eurostat, LFS [lfsa_eppgai]

Click here to download chart.
employment has remained broadly stable in the
last two years. However, it is still 0.6pp higher than
in 2013. Temporary contracts for people aged 15-64 In 2018, employment grew most in the services
amounted in 2018 to 12.1% of total employment, just sector, in line with post-crisis trends. According to
0.1pp lower than in 2017. For women, the figure was LFS data, the services sector, pushed in particular by
13.1%, about 2pp higher than that for men (11.2%); the "information and communication" subsector, grew
both figures were 0.1pp lower than in 2017. However, by 1.3%, while industry, pulled by construction, grew
there are very wide disparities among Member States. by 1.0%. Employment in agriculture, on the other hand,
Temporary work is at above 20%, and rising, in Spain shrank by 3.1% following a long-lasting declining
and slightly below 20% in Poland – on a declining trend.
trend – and Portugal. The United Kingdom, Romania,
Bulgaria and the Baltic States have rates below 5%. In 2018 the employment rate of host-country
citizens in the EU was 6.9pp higher than that of
The majority of temporary employees in the EU foreign citizens (73.8% versus 66.9%). (18) This
continue to be in temporary work involuntarily. difference increased in the years following the
They have represented over 50% of the total number financial and economic crisis: it was 4.3pp in 2008.
of temporary workers for more than ten years. More The Member States with the highest differences in
women than men are involuntarily in temporary work favour of host-country citizens are Sweden, Finland,
(53.7% versus 51.9% of temporary employees in France and the Netherlands. In Luxembourg and
2018), while for young employees (aged 15-24) the Poland, by contrast, foreign citizens have higher
percentage is lower and stands at 29.9%. In five employment rates than nationals by more than 5pp.
Member States (Spain, Croatia, Italy, Cyprus and
Portugal), at least four out of five temporary However, the employment rate of non-EU
employees are working involuntarily on this type of citizens is much lower than that of EU28
contract. nationals. The average difference between non-EU
foreign citizens and host-country citizens in the EU
Part-time work as a proportion of total was 14.5pp (73.8% versus 59.3%), with the highest
employment decreased slightly, from 19.4% in differences in Sweden, Belgium, Finland, Netherlands,
2017 to 19.2% in 2018. The reduction has been and Germany. These countries, in particular Sweden
greater, albeit from much higher levels, for women and Germany, experienced a strong inflow of refugees,
(down 0.4pp from 31.7% in 2017 to 31.3% in 2018) especially between 2014 and 2016, – although the
than for men (down from 8.8% in 2017 to 8.7% in gap was already large before 2014. The employment
2018). The incidence of involuntary part-time work rate is higher for non-EU citizens than for nationals in
remains significant although in decline. In 2018 about a few Member States, most notably Romania (8pp)
a quarter of part-time workers said they would like to and to a lesser extent in Poland, Malta, Czechia,
work more. (17) This percentage is higher among men Slovakia and Italy.
(33.4%) than women (22.1%), and it is above 50% in
several Member States (Bulgaria, Greece, Spain, Italy, 3.2. Unemployment rates
Cyprus and Romania). As 75% of part-time workers
The EU unemployment rate fell 0.6pp from 2017
are then voluntarily on this working pattern, this
means that about 5% of all workers are involuntarily to 2018, to reach a new historic low of 6.8% of
in part-time employment. the labour force. It has declined further to 6.4% in

(18) Foreign citizens are here considered people of different

citizenship, even of another EU Member State, from the country
(17) Involuntary part-time employment is one of the indicators
included under SDG8 (Decent Work and Economic Growth) in of residence. Section 5 of the Chapter will also present
the European Commission's Reflection Paper "Towards a evidence on the employment and social conditions gaps
Sustainable Europe by 2030" (European Commission, 2019b). between the non-EU born and the total population.

35
Employment and Social Developments in Europe 2019

April 2019. Unemployment rates have fallen in all Chart 1.15

Member States, with especially strong declines in All Member States have lower unemployment rates than
Cyprus (2.7pp), Croatia (2.5pp), Greece (2.2pp), in 2014
Unemployment rates by Member States, % of labour force
Portugal (2.0pp) and Spain (1.9pp). Rates in several
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
Member States have reached, or are very close to, the EU28 7
structural unemployment rate. (19) EA19 8
EL 19
Chart 1.14 ES 15
Unemployment in the EU reaches a historic low IT 11
Unemployment rate, % of labour force from 15 to 74 years FR 9
14 HR 9
CY 8
12
LV 7
10 FI 7
PT 7
8 SK 7
SE 6
6
LT 6
4 BE 6
IE 6
2
EE 5
Forecast
0 LU 5
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 BG 5
EU28 EA19 SI 5
Source: Eurostat, Unemployment series [une_rt_a] and European Commission Spring DK 5
2019 Forecast AT 5
Click here to download chart. RO 4
UK 4

The difference in unemployment rates between PL 4

NL 4
men and women is not very large overall. HU 4 2008
Nonetheless, the female unemployment rate is 0.5pp MT 4 2014
higher than the male rate (7.1% versus 6.6%). The DE 3
2018
difference has been stable since 2017 but is still CZ 2
Source: Eurostat, Unemployment series [une_rt_a]
higher than in any of the years between 2009 and Click here to download chart.
2016. The relatively small difference is in part
explained by women’s lower activity rates and higher
Youth unemployment continued to decline, as in
rates of involuntary part-time work.
previous years. In 2018, it stood at 15.2%. This is
0.7pp lower than the pre-crisis level of 2008. It further
(19) The estimated structural unemployment rate is the dropped in the first months of 2019 reaching 14.2% in
unemployment rate consistent with long-run price and wage April. The youth unemployment rate decreased in all
stability. See European Commission (2018b), pp 18-20, for a
Member States, but there are still huge differences
more detailed analysis.
within the EU. In Greece, the youth unemployment rate
is slightly below 40% and more than 24pp above the
EU rate. Rates in Spain and Italy are also above 30%
(34.3% and 32.2% respectively) and therefore more
than 15pp above the EU average. These high levels
suggest that there are difficulties in integrating young
workers into the economy, and they pose serious
problems regarding the sustainability of welfare states
in the Member States concerned. The youth
unemployment rate is lower for women (14.5%) than
for men (15.7%), a difference that has been roughly
constant over the last eight years.

The downward trend in the proportion of young

people aged 15-24 who are neither in
employment nor in education and training (NEET)
continued throughout 2018. The annual average
was 10.4%, down 0.5pp from 2017. Significant
reductions in NEET rates were recorded in most
Member States and particularly in Cyprus, Latvia and
Slovakia. However, rates in some countries are still
well above 2008 levels, and most notably in Cyprus
(3.5pp), Romania (2.9pp) and Greece (2.7pp). Italy is
the country with the highest NEET rate, with almost

36
 Chapter 1: Main Employment and Social Developments

Chart 1.16
Youth unemployment and NEET declined in almost all Member States but still with large differences
Unemployment rate (% of labour force, 15-24) and young people aged 15-24 neither in employment nor in education and training (NEET) (% of total population)

45.0 Youth unemployment 2018 NEET 2018 Youth unemployment 2008 NEET 2008

40.0

35.0

30.0

25.0

20.0

15.0

10.0

5.0

0.0
EU28 EA19 EL ES IT HR FR PT CY FI SE RO BE SK IE LU BG LV EE PL UK LT HU AT DK MT SI NL CZ DE
Note: No FR data in 2008
Source: Eurostat, LFS [une_rt_a; lfsi_neet_a]
Click here to download chart.

one young person out of five in this situation (2.6pp Chart 1.17
more than in 2008). Many people are still in long-term unemployment
despite general labour market improvements
Long-term and short-term unemployment (thousand people, lhs) and unemployment
Long-term unemployment rates rates (% of population 15-74, rhs)
30000 12
Long-term unemployment decreased in 2018 for
the fifth consecutive year, to 2.9% of the active 25000 10

population. Gender differences are very small, with

20000 8
rates for women at 3.0% and for men at 2.8%. Very
long-term unemployment (20) has also decreased, to 15000 6
1.8%.
10000 4
The decrease in long-term unemployment is good
5000 2
news for the integration of unemployed people
in the EU labour market. In all Member States this 0 0
indicator improved or remained stable, with the 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018

strongest decreases recorded in Greece, Cyprus and Short-term unemployment Long-term unemployment
Unemployment rate
Portugal. Differences among Member States have Note: Long-term and short-term unemployment figures are unadjusted, the
decreased, although almost 13 percentage points unemployment rate is seasonally and calendar adjusted
divide the highest rate (Greece, 13.6%) from the Source: Eurostat, LFS [lfsq_ugad, une_rt_q]
Click here to download chart.
lowest (Czechia, 0.7%).
Long-term unemployment also decreased in
(20) Very long-term unemployment refers to people who have not 2018, but about 7 million people are still
had a job for 24 months or more. affected by it. It decreased from 44.7% to 43.0% of
total unemployment. Very long-term unemployment
also decreased in 2018, from 27.9% to 26.7% of total
unemployment. The long-term unemployed account for
more than two thirds of all unemployed people in
Greece, against less than 20% in Sweden. Member
States with higher rates of unemployment tend to
have a higher proportion of long-term unemployment,
although in some countries such as Bulgaria and
Slovakia, quite high levels of long-term unemployment
co-exist with relatively low levels of unemployment,
around or below the EU average.

The causes of the persistence of long-term

unemployment may vary among Member States.
They include lack of economic growth, institutional

37
Employment and Social Developments in Europe 2019

constraints and, in some cases, ineffective labour proportion of people aged 20-64 who are inactive due
market policies for the activation and integration of to caring responsibilities stood at 21.9% in the EU in
unemployed people (Bentolila and Jansen, 2016; 2018: it has risen every year since the start of the
Council, 2016). current series in 2005, when it amounted to 16.9%,
and has increased for both sexes in the last years. The
Chart 1.18 percentage of men who are inactive for this reason
Some Member States with high unemployment rates
has increased in recent years and was 4.6% in 2018.
have also a high incidence of long-term unemployment
Long-term unemployment (% of unemployment) and unemployment rate (% of labour This cause of inactivity affects women
force 15-74) disproportionately, representing the reason why 31.7%
80
of them are not participating in the labour market. In
70 EL 2018, this was the main reason why women in the EU
SK
are inactive, ahead of own illness or disability, and
60
BG IT retirement.
50
BE

DE
RO
PT
EA19 Chart 1.20
Far more women than men are inactive because of their
SI
LV FR ES
40 HU EU28 HR

caring responsibilities
NL IE

LT
CZ
30 MT AT
PL
CY Percentage of population (aged 20-64 years) inactive due to caring responsibilities by
UK
EE
LU sex
DK FI
20
SE 35

10 30

0 25
0 5 10 15 20 25 30

Note: Long-term unemployment on y axis and unemployment rates on x axis. 2018

20
data
Source: Eurostat, unemployment series [une_ltu_a, une_rt_a]
15
Click here to download chart.

10

3.3. Activity rates 5

The activity rate (21) for people aged 15-64 in 0

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
the EU rose to a record 73.7% in 2018, 0.3pp Total Males Females

more than in 2017. The activity rate of women stood Note: This indicator shows the share of inactive population whose main reasons for not
at 68.3% while that of men was significantly higher at actively seeking work are caring responsibilities. "Inactivity due to caring
responsibilities" refers to looking after children or incapacitated adults and other
79.2%. The sustained increase of the activity rates in family or personal responsibilities.
the EU can be explained by several factors, including Source: Eurostat, LFS [lfsa_igar; sdg_05_40]
Click here to download chart.
increases in the retirement age (see European
Commission, 2018b, p.14).
The increase in the activity rate in 2018 was
Chart 1.19 again mainly driven by the rise in participation
The activity rate follows an increasing trend of people aged 55-64. The activity rate of people in
Activity rates, % of population 15-64
76
this age group rose by 1.4pp, from 60.6% in 2017 to
75
62.0% in 2018. The activity rate of the 25-54 age
group rose 0.2pp, to reach 85.9%, while that of the
74
15-24 age group remained stable at 41.7%.
73

72
On average, the activity rate for people aged
71
15-64 in the EU in 2018 was slightly higher for
70
citizens of the reporting country (73.8%) than
69
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
for foreign citizens (72.4%). (24) However, the
EU28 EA19 US situation varied between Member States. In half of the
Source: Eurostat, LFS [lfsi_emp_a] and OECD Member States, labour force participation was higher
Click here to download chart. among citizens of the reporting country, with the
widest participation gaps in the Netherlands (12.3pp)
The gender gap in labour force participation and Germany (10.1pp). In the other half, foreign
amounted to roughly 11pp. One of the causes (22) citizens had a higher activity rate than citizens of that
of this gap may be the fact that many more women Member State, with the strongest differences in
than men have caring responsibilities (23) The
"Inactivity due to caring responsibilities" refers to ‘looking after
21
( ) The activity rate is the measure of the participation of children or incapacitated adults’ and ‘other family or personal
responsibilities’.
population, whether employed or unemployed, in the labour
market. (24) Foreign citizens are here considered people of different
(22) See also European Commission (2017a, p.3). citizenship, even of another EU Member State, from the country
of residence. See also footnote in section 3.1. Only Member
(23) The indicator measures the reasons why individuals are not States for which reliable data are available are taken into
actively seeking work, so they are neither employed nor account in this analysis.
unemployed and considered to be outside the labour force.

38
 Chapter 1: Main Employment and Social Developments

Luxembourg (9.7pp), Malta (9.4pp) and Poland (8.3pp). lowest level since 2011. However, the spread in
Furthermore, within the foreign population there is a regional employment rates remains above the lowest
marked difference in the participation rate. In the EU, level observed since the start of the series in 1999,
the activity rate of those with citizenship from another which was recorded in 2007 (11.2%). The dispersion of
EU country was 79.8%, 12.9pp higher than for non-EU employment rates is highest in Italy (18.4%), Spain
citizens (66.9%). In almost all Member States for (9.5%) and Belgium (9.0%). Figure 1.1 highlights a
which there are reliable data the activity rate of divide between north-western and south-eastern EU
foreigners with citizenship from another EU country is regions. According to the latest Cohesion Report
higher than that of non-EU foreign citizens, with the (European Commission, 2017b), north-western regions
widest gaps in Finland (19.8pp), Germany (19.4pp) and can benefit from better interconnections and a more
the Netherlands (18.9pp). The activity rate is higher for innovative environment. The Cohesion Report suggests
citizens from non-EU countries in Slovakia, Greece and that stronger investment in innovation and skills is
Estonia. needed to reduce regional differences.

3.4. Regional dimension Chart 1.21

Regional dispersion of employment rates increased
Employment rates during the crisis but is now on a descending trend
Dispersion of regional employment rates of age group 15-64 by NUTS 2 regions, %

There were important variations in the 25.0 EU28 Germany Spain France Italy Poland United Kingdom

employment rate across EU regions (25) in 2018. 20.0

The highest rates were recorded in Stockholm, Sweden

15.0

(85.7%), Åland, Finland (85.1%) and Oberbayern,

Germany (84.1%). The lowest rates were found in 10.0

French overseas departments (Mayotte, La Réunion 5.0

and Guyane) and southern Italian regions (Sicilia,

Campania, Calabria and Puglia), all below or around 0.0
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017

50%. Source: Eurostat, [lfst_r_lmder]

Click here to download chart.

Figure 1.1
The employment rate varies strongly across EU regions Unemployment rates
Employment rates by NUTS2, % of population aged 20-64

The highest regional unemployment rates in the

EU in 2018 were recorded in Mayotte, France
(35.1%), Ceuta, Spain (29.0%), and Dytiki
Makedonia, Greece (27.0%). The lowest levels were
in Praha and Jihozápad, Czechia (1.3% and 1.5%
respectively), and Mittelfranken, Germany (1.8%).

employment (unemployment) rates within a country imply a

fairly wide dispersion.

Note: 2018 data

Source: Eurostat [lfst_r_lfe2emprt]
Click here to download figure.

The dispersion of regional employment rates (26)

across the EU stood at 12.2% in 2017, the

(25) In this subchapter "regions" are those at NUTS2 level except for
the urban/rural dimension where they are those at NUTS3 level.
(26) The dispersion of employment (unemployment) rates is
the coefficient of variation of regional employment
(unemployment) rates. The coefficient of variation is
defined as the ratio of the standard deviation to the mean. This
coefficient of variation is multiplied by 100 to make a
percentage. This indicator measures the spread of regional
employment (unemployment) rates as regards the national or
EU employment (unemployment) rate. If all the regional
employment (unemployment) rates of a country are equal, the
dispersion is zero. Significant differences between regional

39
Employment and Social Developments in Europe 2019

Figure 1.2
Differences in unemployment rates among EU regions are still very wide
Unemployment rates by NUTS2 regions, % of labour force aged 15 to 74

Note: 2017 data

Source: Eurostat, Regions and Cities Illustrated
Click here to download figure.

Unlike the equivalent measure for employment 3.5. Urban/rural dimension (28)
rates, the dispersion of regional unemployment
rates (27) has diminished for several Member Employment rates
States but has increased over recent years for
The (15-64) employment rate in 2017 was higher
the EU as a whole. It stood at 69.8% in 2017, the
in urban areas than in rural areas for 15 out of
tenth consecutive year of increase (except for a small
23 Member States with available data. This
decline in 2015) from the level of 44.1% in 2007. This
suggests that while within-countries differences have proportion has remained fairly stable over the last 15
diminished for large countries like Germany or Italy, years. The employment rate has increased on average
often as a consequence of the reduction of in all urban and rural areas within Member States
unemployment, differences among regions across the since 2014, with the highest increases in the urban
EU have increased. The latest Cohesion Report areas of Hungary (6.5pp) and Lithuania (6.1pp), and
(European Commission, 2017b) already pointed out the rural areas of Hungary (6.4pp) and Spain (5.8pp).
that the narrowing in regional disparities in terms of According to the latest Cohesion Report (European
GDP growth had not been reflected in a reduction of Commission, 2017b), p.58, the population in rural
differences in unemployment. This could be due to a areas increased slightly between 2005 and 2015, but
crisis in the competitiveness of middle-income regions only thanks to an increase in net migration, while in
("middle-income trap") and in the reduction of public urban areas the population has grown because of a
investment following the economic crisis (see positive balance between births and deaths. This could
European Commission, 2017b, pp.xii, xvii). put a strain on the employment rates of rural areas,
considering that the integration of people from a
Chart 1.22 different region in the labour market can be more
The dispersion of unemployment rates among EU difficult than the integration of local people.
regions has been on a growing trend since 2007
Dispersion of regional unemployment rates by NUTS 2 regions, %
90.0 EU28 Germany Spain France Italy Poland United Kingdom
(28) Eurostat defines areas as "predominantly" urban or
80.0
"predominantly" rural. For ease of reading, they will be referred
70.0 to in this section as simply "urban" and "rural" areas,
60.0 respectively. Intermediate areas have not been included in the
50.0 analysis of employment and unemployment rates. On the
40.0 "urban-rural" typology please see:
30.0 https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-
20.0 explained/index.php/Archive:Urban-rural_typology.
10.0

0.0
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017

Source: Eurostat, [lfst_r_lmdur]

Click here to download chart.

(27) See previous footnote.

40
 Chapter 1: Main Employment and Social Developments

Chart 1.23 Chart 1.24

Employment rates tend to be higher in urban areas than Differences in unemployment rates between urban and
in rural ones rural areas can be high, but with variations among MS
Employment rates by territorial typology, % of population 15-64 years Unemployment rates by territorial typology, % of labour force 15 years or over
100.0
EL Rural
Urban ES
IT
Rural PT Urban
FR
BE
90.0 AT
FI
LV
SE
IE
DK
HR
80.0 EE
NL
LT
UK
RO
SK
DE
70.0 PL
HU
BG
CZ
0.0 5.0 10.0 15.0 20.0 25.0
60.0 Note: Year 2017
Source: Eurostat, [urt_lfu3rt]
Click here to download chart.

50.0
3.6. International dimension
According to OECD data, the employment rate of
40.0
EL IT BE ES PT AT RO IE PL FI LV UK DE HU BG SK NL LT DK CZ SE EE HR the EU28 in 2017 was lower than that of other
Note: Year 2017 major world economies. However, the EU has been
Source: Eurostat, [urt_lfe3emprt]
Click here to download chart.
able to reduce this gap in recent years. In 2018 the
EU's employment rate "deficit" with respect to the US
and Canada was the lowest since 2000. Only in
Unemployment rates
comparison with Japan was the gap lower in the first
In 2017, for the 13 EU Member States out of the decade of the century, having remained stable over
24 for which data is available, the the last 5 years at about 7.5-8pp.
unemployment rate of people aged 15 years or Chart 1.25
over was higher in rural areas than in urban The EU is reducing the employment rate gap with US
areas. This disparity has evolved over time. For and Canada
Employment rate, % of population 15-64 years
example, in 2005 the unemployment rate was still
78
higher in urban areas for 15 out of 21 Member States. 76
However, the unemployment rate differences between 74
rural and urban areas have declined in recent years in 72
some Member States. Between 2014 and 2017, the 70
difference has decreased in Bulgaria from 8.6pp to 68
5.8pp, in Ireland from 2.8pp to 0.8pp, in Croatia from 66

11.3pp to 7.6pp and in Slovakia from 10.3pp to 6.5pp. 64

Except for the urban areas of Finland and Austria, the 62

tendency since 2014 has been towards a reduction of 60

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
average unemployment rates in both urban and rural EU Canada Japan US
areas in all Member States.
Source: OECD
Click here to download chart.

The gap in the rate of labour force participation

between the EU and the other major economies
has also been reduced. The difference with Canada
is below 5pp, down more than 3pp since 2005. The EU
participation rate has exceeded that in the US since
2015, partly due to the fact that the US was the only
major world economy to experience a prolonged
decline (2008-2015) in labour force participation
following the financial and economic crisis. The
participation rate in Japan exceeded that of the EU by
about 5pp. This could be the consequence of a
shortage in the Japanese labour supply due to an
ageing population combined with an improvement in

41
Employment and Social Developments in Europe 2019

the integration of women and older workers in the living at risk of poverty or social exclusion (AROPE),
labour market. (29) which was 10.8 million fewer than at the peak of
2012. Median income has been increasing in real
Chart 1.26 terms in most Member States (Chart 1.47) and the
The EU's activity rate has caught up with the US’s and is
number of people in material deprivation declined.
getting closer to Canada's
Labour force participation rate (15-64 years) Disposable income inequality was stable in 2014 and
80 2015 and then decreased slightly in 2016 and 2017.

78 Flash estimates (32) from Eurostat show that in

76
nearly all Member States there were only minor
changes in the at-risk-of-poverty rates (AROP) in
74
2018. The exceptions are Greece, Portugal and
72 Romania with significant decreases and the UK with a
very slight increase. However, for EU-28 one could
70 expect the AROP to continue the decrease started in
68
2017, due to the three mentioned countries and
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 combined with small decreases in other countries.
EU Canada Japan US Favourable developments in the economic situation, in
Source: OECD the labour market and in household incomes in 2017
Click here to download chart.
are likely to have led to improvements in the social
situation.
The rate of unemployment in the population
aged 15-64 has been systematically higher in 4.1. Households’ financial situation is
the EU than in other major economies. This gap improved but not yet back to pre-crisis
has nevertheless been reduced since 2013, its extent levels
is all the more remarkable considering that, as seen
above, the participation rate in the EU has grown Disposable income per capita still below pre-
faster than in these other economies, with the crisis level in eight Member States
exception of Japan. (30)
In 2017 the disposable income of households (33)
Chart 1.27 (GDHI) per capita exceeded the pre-crisis level of
The unemployment rate in the EU is higher than but 2008 in the euro area. This target was already
approaching the rates of other major economies achieved in the EU as a whole in 2015. However, there
Unemployment rate (% of labour force, 15-64 years)
12
are still eight Member States that are not yet back to
11 the 2008 level (Chart 1.29). In particular, GDHI per
10
9
and most of EMPL monitoring tools and reports use the survey
year. Moreover AROPE combines AROP, VLWI (previous year)
8
and SMD (survey year). The 2017 reference year is based on
7
EU-SILC 2017, which reflects the 2016 income year and
6 activity status in 2016.
5 (32) A flash estimate is an early estimate for an economic variable
4 of interest over the most recent reference period and is
3 normally calculated on the basis of a statistical or econometric
2 model. The flash estimate should have a release date
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 appreciably earlier than the first release date of the actual
EU Canada Japan US data for that variable. Although it is likely calculated using a
more incomplete set of information than the set used for
Source: OECD
traditional estimates, it is produced using the same
Click here to download chart.
methodology that is employed for the regular estimates.
Statistical techniques can help in adjusting the temporary
incomplete observations.
4. SOCIAL SITUATION, POVERTY AND (33) Gross disposable household income (GDHI) is the amount of
money that all of the individuals in the household sector have
INCOME DEVELOPMENTS available for spending or saving after income distribution
measures (for example, taxes, social contributions and
The social situation in the EU continues to benefits) have taken effect. The households sector is combined
improve. In 2017 (31) nearly 113 million people were with non-profit institutions serving households (NPISH) under a
single heading. The NPISH sector is relatively small. Yearly
gross disposable income of households and adjusted gross
(29) See European Commission. (2018b) for a more detailed disposable income of households in real terms per capita can
analysis (p.13). be found on the Eurostat non-financial transactions database:
(30) See European Commission. (2018b) for a more detailed nasa_10_nf_tr. Quarterly unadjusted and seasonally adjusted,
analysis (pp. 10-13). gross disposable income of households and adjusted gross
(31) Note on the reference year: EU-SILC data, used in poverty and disposable income of households in real terms per capita are
inequality indicators, reflect incomes of the previous year available on the Eurostat non-financial transactions database:
(except for the UK and Ireland where incomes refer to the nasq_10_nf_tr. EU and EA19 quarterly seasonally adjusted,
interview period). However, in this document, the reference year adjusted gross disposable income of households in real terms
is the survey year and not the income year. This choice is for per capita (% change on previous period) are available under
consistency with indicators commonly used: Eurostat indicators nasq_10_ki.

42
 Chapter 1: Main Employment and Social Developments

Chart 1.28
Disposable household income supported primarily by higher income from work
GDP and GDHI growth (% change on previous year), and contribution of GDHI components (pps), EU

4 Compensation of employees

Gross operating surplus and mixed income

Net property income

2
Net other current transfers

Net social benefits - net contributions

0 Taxes on income, wealth (negative)

Real GDHI

Real GDP
-2

-4

-6
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Note: The nominal GDHI is converted into real GDHI by deflating with the price-index of household final consumption expenditure [prc_hicp_aind].
Source: DG EMPL calculations based on Eurostat data, National Accounts [nasq_10_nf_tr, namq_10_gdp]; Data non-seasonally adjusted
Click here to download chart.

capita is about 30% less than in 2008 in Greece, 15% real terms was over 2% in EU and 1.5% in the euro
less in Cyprus, 9% less in Italy, 6% less in Spain and area.
4% less in Austria. Belgium, Ireland and Portugal
record also levels of GDHI per capita below 2008 by Households have continued to benefit from
2% or less. higher income from work, while social benefits
have stabilised over the last years. The labour
Chart 1.29
income of both employees and the self-employed
The GDHI per capita in eight Member States is not yet at
resumed its growth in 2014, mainly due to the
2008 levels
Gross disposable income of households in real terms per capita (2008=100) recovery in the labour market, and has continued since
140 then. Growth in property income and other transfers
120 has been mixed in recent years. At aggregate level,
100 households began to get less support in social benefits
80
and to make higher contributions as market incomes
60
improved. Increases in social benefits have moderated
40
since the second half of 2016 and virtually stabilised
20

0
in 2017. This development, combined with increases in
BG RO PL LT SE HU EE DK MT SK CZ DE LV LU FI FR UK NL SI PT IE BE AT ES IT CY EL social contributions which have been particularly
EU28 EA19
strong since 2016 (Chart 1.28) (35), resulted in the 'net
Note: Year 2017. Data not available for Croatia. social benefits-net social contributions' indicator
Source: Eurostat, National Accounts [tepsr_wc310]
becoming negative in the last few years.
Click here to download chart.

More social protection expenditure went

towards old-age pensions and health needs
Aggregate disposable household income Social protection played a major role in
benefits from higher income from work stabilising incomes between 2007 and 2009,
especially for the unemployed. After some
Aggregate disposable income of households in
reduction of benefits in 2011-2012 for all categories
the EU increased further in 2018. After dropping to
of beneficiaries from social protection, social
a low point in 2012-2013, gross disposable household
expenditure started to accelerate again in real terms
income has been increasing in real terms since then.
from 2013 (Chart 1.30). (36) Growth in expenditure
Household income continued to benefit from
expansion in economic activity and improved labour (35) For a detailed discussion of disposable household income from
market conditions (Chart 1.28). (34) In the EU, GDHI had work and wealth across different household compositions,
returned to its previous peak of 2008-2009 by 2015. based on the Household Finance and Consumption Survey
In the euro area, where GDHI had dropped much more (HFCS), see European Central Bank
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/scpsps/ecbsp18.en.pdf.
steeply than in the EU as a whole, it returned to its
(36) To reflect trends in real social expenditure, the harmonised
previous peak in 2016. In 2018, GDHI annual growth in index of consumer prices (HICP) is used as a deflator. It allows
estimation of the trend in the overall real value or purchasing
(34) See European Commission (2018b). power of social expenditure. Inflation reflects the differential in
HICP growth from one year to the other. When inflation is

43
Employment and Social Developments in Europe 2019

reached 3% in 2015, driven in particular by in-kind Between 2012 and 2016, expenditure on
expenditure. (37) pensions in countries with large crisis-related
fiscal consolidation needs, such as Greece and
By 2016, social protection expenditure shifted to Cyprus, decreased. Greece and Croatia spent less on
structural expenses (old-age pensions and sickness and disability; and Lithuania spent less on
healthcare). The increases in social expenditure in the social exclusion (Chart 1.31, left column). Expenditure
years 2013 to 2015 (Chart 1.31) were mainly due to on unemployment benefits declined notably in some
further increases in spending on old age (driven partly Member States, including Belgium, Cyprus, Ireland,
by demographic factors) and on healthcare. By Portugal and Spain, as labour markets improved (Chart
contrast, expenditure on unemployment stabilised in 1.31, left column).
2013 and declined in 2014, as the economic
environment improved. Expenditure on families, 4.2. Social transfers mitigate persistent
housing and combating social exclusion increased income inequality in the EU
slightly in 2014-2015. (38)
Disposable income inequality in the EU appeared
Chart 1.30
to be slightly lower in 2017 (income year 2016)
Old-age pensions and health-related expenditure drive
up social protection spending than in the previous year, but still slightly higher
Growth in social protection expenditure (% change on previous year, in real terms) and than in 2012. (39) Inequality at EU level, as measured
contribution by functions (pps), EU
by the GINI coefficient, (40) increased between 2012
7.5
and 2014 and then decreased for three consecutive
6.0
years (Chart 1.32). The quintile share ratio S80/S20 (41)
4.5
indicated that the top quintile had an equivalised
3.0
disposable income around five times higher than that
1.5
of the lowest quintile. In Lithuania and Bulgaria the
S80/S20 ratio exceeded 7.0 in 2017 while in Romania
0.0

-1.5
and Spain it was equal to 6.5 or higher.
-3.0
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Family Social exclusion and housing Old age and survivors

(39) The reporting year in this chapter refers to the EU-SILC survey
Sickness and disability Unemployment TOTAL year, which measures income of the previous year. The latest
Inflation survey 2017 data refer to income distribution in 2016.
(40) The Gini coefficient is an indicator with a value between 0 and
Note: The nominal expenditure is converted into real expenditure by deflating with the
Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices (HICP). Inflation reflects the differential in 1 (between 0 and 100 in this chart). Lower values indicate
HICP growth from one year to the other. When inflation is constant it has no higher equality. In other words a value equal to 0 indicates
impact, when inflation is declining it contributes positively, when inflation
increases it contributes negatively.
everybody has the same income, a value equal to 1 indicates
PL excluded from growth in 2014. that one person has all the income.
Gini is based on total equivalised disposable household income.
Source: Eurostat, ESSPROS [spr_exp_sum] and Price Statistics [prc_hicp_aind]; DG EMPL The year refers to the EU-SILC survey year referring to incomes
calculations
of the prevoius year except for IE and UK.
Click here to download chart.
(41) The S80/S20 income quintile share ratio refers to the ratio of
total equivalised disposable income received by the 20% of the
Social protection expenditure continued to country's population with the highest equivalised disposable
increase in nearly all Member States in 2016. income (top quintile) to that received by the 20% of the
country's population with the lowest equivalised disposable
Expenditure on old-age pensions and survivors’ income (lowest quintile).
pensions increased in most Member States (partly
reflecting demographic change) except in Denmark,
Lithuania, UK and Greece where expenditure on
pensions declined (Chart 1.31, right column). Sickness
and disability expenses contributed significantly to the
overall expenditure growth in most Member States,
except in UK and Finland where expenses on sickness
and disability declined (Chart 1.31, right column).

constant it has no impact, when inflation is declining it

contributes positively, when inflation increases it contributes
negatively. The HICP is a price index that reflects changes in
prices of a basket of goods and services, which appears closer
to the actual expenditure on consumption of households than
the deflator of household consumption from the National
Accounts (which also includes imputed rents, for instance).
(37) The available National Accounts data disaggregate expenditure
by in-cash and in-kind, but do not disaggregate it by function.
The National Accounts data on government expenditure are
available through 2016, as covered by the ESDE Annual
Review.
(38) This is in line with many country-specific recommendations of
the European Commission to shift social spending towards
working-age adults (European Commission 2019).

44
 Chapter 1: Main Employment and Social Developments

Chart 1.31
Social protection expenditure increases in most Member States
Growth in social protection expenditure in 2012-2016 and in 2015-2016 (% change, in real terms) and contribution (pps) by functions, EU Member States

2012-2016 2015-2016
-20 -10 0 10 20 30 -4 -2 0 2 4 6 8 10 12

EE RO
BG EE
PL BG
LV IE
MT LV
RO
SK
SE
DE
LU
SE
SK
MT
DE
AT
FI
ES
AT
CZ
LT
NL
HU
FI
FR
SI
DK
HU
CZ
Family LT Family
PT
HR
IT
Social exclusion and Social exclusion and
CY
BE housing housing
SI FR
Old age and survivors Old age and survivors
HR LU

IE Sickness and disability IT Sickness and disability

NL EL

ES Unemployment PT Unemployment
UK DK
TOTAL TOTAL
CY BE
EL UK

Note: The nominal expenditure is converted into real expenditure by deflating with the Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices (HICP). Poland data from 2014.
Source: Eurostat, ESSPROS [spr_exp_sum] and Price Statistics [prc_hicp_aind]; DG EMPL calculations
Click here to download chart.

According to Eurostat flash estimates, inequality Chart 1.32

remained stable in (income year) 2017. Flash Income inequality in the EU before and after social
transfers has been fairly stable over the last decade
estimates for the income year 2017, released as GINI coefficient before social transfers and GINI coefficient of disposable income, EU
experimental data by Eurostat in Autumn 2018, 39
indicate that no statistically significant change in 37
36.1 36.1 36.2 36

inequality, as measured by S80/S20, will be observed 35

between (income years) 2016 and 2017 in most 33
Member States. (42) Inequality was estimated to have 31.0 30.5 30.8 30.7
31
decreased significantly only in Luxembourg and to a
29
lesser extent in Greece and Cyprus. However, overall in
27
EU28 one could expect slight reductions.
25
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Gini coefficient of equivalised disposable income before
42
( ) See report on Flash Estimates by Eurostat at social transfers (pensions excluded from social transfers)
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/experimental- Gini coefficient of equivalised disposable income
statistics/income-inequality-and-poverty-indicators.
Note: The Gini coefficient is an indicator with a value between 0 and 1 (0 to 100 in this
chart). Lower values indicate higher equality. In other words a value of 0 indicates
everybody has the same income, a value of 100 indicates that one person has all
the income. Gini is based on total equivalised disposable household income.
The year refers to the EU-SILC survey year; income measured is from the
previous year. Values refer to EU27 between 2005 and 2007. The confidence
intervals may suggest that the yearly changes in the Gini coefficient may not
always be statistically significant.
Source: Eurostat, EU-SILC [ilc_di12, ilc_di12c]
Click here to download chart.

45
Employment and Social Developments in Europe 2019

Progress in reducing inequality varies across Chart 1.34

Member States The impact of social transfers on inequality varies
across Member States
GINI coefficient before social transfers and GINI coefficient of disposable income -
Income inequality increased in eight Member 2017, EU Member States
States and decreased in six between 2012 and 45
GINI coefficient of equivalised disposable income before social transfers (pensions excluded from social
2017. Several Member States (notably Bulgaria and transfers) - 2017
GINI coefficient of equivalised disposable income after social transfers - 2017
Lithuania) (43) saw increases in disposable income 40

inequality between 2012 and 2017 (Chart 1.33) The

extent to which the redistribution had an effect on
35

inequality differed. The impact of social transfers 30

other than pensions on income inequality (shown by
the green parts of the bars (Chart 1.34) differed 25

across Member States. Social transfers reduced

income inequality by less than 10% in Bulgaria, 20

BE

HR

EL
LU
PL

HU

EE

EU28

RO

LV

LT
PT

ES
CZ

CY
IT

IE
BG
DE
SK

MT

EA19

DK

UK
SI

NL

AT

FI

FR

SE
Greece, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Portugal and Romania
but by more than 20% in Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Note: Green bars reflect redistributive effects of taxes and transfers, measured by
differences between market income inequalities (the top of green bars) and
Ireland and Sweden. disposable income inequalities (the top of blue bars). The white bars represent the
confidence interval for the GINI coefficient of disposable income. The standard
errors to compute the confidence intervals have been obtained as in Zardo-
Chart 1.33 Trinidade and Goedemé (2016).
Income inequality increases in eight Member States, Source: Eurostat, EU-SILC [ilc_di12, ilc_di12c]
decreases in six and fairly stable for the rest Click here to download chart.
GINI coefficient of disposable income - 2012/2017, EU Member States
45
GINI coefficient of equivalised disposable income after social transfers - 2017 Income inequality in the EU as a world region is
GINI coefficient of equivalised disposable income after social transfers - 2012

40
Incomparable - breaks in series between 2012 and 2017 lower than in some other major advanced
economies, but it remains a concern. Inequality in
35 the EU is still lower than in Japan, the United States or
Australia. (46) Moreover, while inequality appears to be
30 rising in the United States, it has remained fairly
constant since 2010 in the EU-28. High inequality
25
raises concerns about fairness, as entrenched
inequality may result in inequality of opportunity and
20
reduce potential growth. Relatively high inequality may
HR

LV

BE

EU28

LU

LT
PL

PT

HU

EE

RO
EL
ES
IE

CY

BG
CZ

DE

IT

DK
SK

EA19

MT

UK
FR

SI

FI

AT

NL

SE

be associated to a higher risk-of-poverty rate and

Note: Breaks in series: EE 2014, SE 2015, BG, LU and NL 2016. These Member States
are classified based on EMPL estimation. For these Member States GINI 2012 is more pronounced social exclusion as well as a higher
marked with smaller dots to indicate that comparison of 2012 to 2016 values
should be avoided. Confidence intervals for the 2017 Gini coefficients suggest incidence of financial distress and, as such, it may
that the changes in the Gini coefficients may not always be statistically reduce social cohesion.
significant. The standard errors to compute the confidence intervals have been
obtained as in Zardo-Trinidade and Goedemé (2016).
Source: Eurostat, EU-SILC [ilc_di12, ilc_di12bdi12c]. Financial distress faced by the poorest
Click here to download chart.
households continued to ease in 2017 but it
persists at high levels. Measured as the percentage
Income inequality would be much higher without of people who need to draw on savings or to run into
the redistributive effects of transfers. These debt in order to cover current expenditure, financial
effects are measured by the difference between distress has eased over recent years, after a steep
market income inequality and disposable income increase between 2011 and 2013 when the gap
inequality. (44) Market income inequality (before between income groups widened as financial distress
transfers) has stabilised over recent years (2015 – increased most for people in the lowest quartile of
2017). The same is largely true for the redistributive household income. In 2017, 9% of adults in low-
effects of transfers, although these were slightly income households in the EU were in debt and a
stronger between 2008 and 2011 and weaker further 14% drew on savings to cover current
between 2013 and 2016 (Chart 1.32). (45) expenditure (compared with 4% and 9% respectively
for the total population).
(43) In both Bulgaria and Lithuania the increase in income inequality
is due to income growth more pronounced at the top than at
(46) For inequality trends among Europeans based on the EU-wide
the bottom of the income distribution, see the Eurostat figure:
income distribution see Filauro and Parolin (2018) and
ilc_di01.
Brandolini and Rosolia (2019). Both studies document that
(44) Market incomes are the gross incomes earned by individuals or inequality among EU individuals decreased before the crisis
households before any redistribution via taxes and transfers, and have remained constant since then.
while disposable incomes are final incomes taking into
consideration the effects of redistributive policies (which may
involve the provision of in-kind benefits and services).
(45) See European Commission (2016a).

46
 Chapter 1: Main Employment and Social Developments

4.3. Decline in the risk of poverty or social level has been underpinned by the same trend in
exclusion is due to lower rates of all AROPE’s three components: at risk of poverty rate,
three components: AROP, joblessness severe material deprivation rate and very low work
and material deprivation intensity rate (Chart 1.35).

The number of people at risk of poverty or social Severe material deprivation (49) (SMD) has been
exclusion (47) (AROPE) in the EU continued to declining continuously since 2012, indicating
decrease in 2017. (48) In 2017 (referring to income improvements in standards of living. In 2017, (50)
in 2016) 10.8 million fewer people in the EU were at 4.67 million fewer people were in SMD than in 2016.
risk of poverty or social exclusion than at the peak in This reduction added to a cumulative reduction of
2012. The AROPE decrease followed strong increases 16.37 million over 2012 - 2016. This continuous and
in incomes stemming from the recovery in economic significant drop at EU level was mainly driven by
activity and improvements in labour markets, including strong decreases in a few Member States, i.e. Bulgaria,
the reduction in long-term unemployment and in youth Germany, Hungary, Italy, Poland, Romania and the UK.
exclusion as well as increased participation of older However, the incidence of SMD for non-EU born
workers and women in the labour market. remains significantly higher than that of the EU-born
(15.2% against 6.4%, population over 18).
Chart 1.35
Risk of poverty and social exclusion continues to decline A recovery in the labour market led to a
due to decrease in all three components
At risk of poverty or social exclusion rate, at risk of poverty rate, severe material
reduction in the number of people living in very
deprivation rate (% of population), very low work intensity households (% of population low work intensity (51) (VLWI) households. The
aged 0-59), EU
VLWI rate decreased from 10.5% in 2016 to 9.5% in
30
27 2017, (52) meaning that around 3.8 million fewer
24
21
people were in jobless households.
18
15 Chart 1.36
12
Living standards have improved since 2012 despite
9
6 persistent poverty and inequality: median income (and
3 the poverty threshold) have risen and severe material
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
At-risk-of-poverty-or-social-exclusion
deprivation has fallen
Poverty threshold (in real terms), at-risk-of-poverty rate, Gini coefficient of disposable
At-risk-of-poverty income, severe material deprivation rate (cumulative change – index 2008=100), EU
120
People living in very low work intensity households (0-59)
115

Severe material deprivation 110

105
Note: The year refers to the EU-SILC survey year; income measured is from the
previous year. AROPE, AROP: income from the previous year, SMD: current year, 100
2017 data estimated. VLWI: status in the past year. EU27 until 2009, EU28 95
thereafter.
90
Source: Eurostat, EU SILC [ilc_peps01, ilc_li02, ilc_mddd11 (estimates) and , ilc_lvhl11]
85
Click here to download chart.
80

75

The number of people at risk-of-poverty or 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017

At-risk-of-poverty Severe material deprivation GINI

social exclusion (AROPE) fell back to the pre-
crisis level in 2016. It decreased more strongly in
2017. By 2017 the number of people at risk-of- Note: The year refers to the EU-SILC survey year; income measured is from the
poverty or social exclusion dropped to a level lower previous year. EU27 until 2009, EU28 thereafter. The nominal income is
converted into real income by deflating with the Harmonised Index of Consumer
than the 2008 low point by 3.096 million for the EU28. Prices (HICP).
The decline brought the AROPE rate down to 22.4%, Source: Eurostat, EU SILC [ilc_li02, ilc_mddd11, ilc_di12, ilc_di04]; DG EMPL calculations
Click here to download chart.
below the lowest 2009 value (23.3%) (Chart 1.35). Yet,
almost 113 million Europeans, including 74 million in
the euro area, were still at risk of poverty or social
(49) Severely materially deprived (SMD) people have living
exclusion (AROPE) in 2017. The Europe 2020 target of
conditions severely constrained by a lack of resources, i.e. they
lifting 20 million people out of poverty by 2020 was experience at least 4 out of the following 9 deprivations: they
set in 2008 before the crisis. The onset of the crisis, cannot afford i) to pay rent or utility bills, ii) to keep their home
which resulted in an increase in the AROPE rate from warm enough, iii) to face unexpected expenses, iv) to eat meat,
fish or a protein equivalent every second day, v) a week’s
23.3% in 2009 to 24.8% in 2012, made this target far
holiday away from home, vi) a car, vii) a washing machine, viii)
more challenging. The reduction in AROPE rate at EU a colour TV or ix) a telephone.
(50) Latest data available, estimated by Eurostat.
(47) The at-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion (AROPE) indicator (51) People living in households with very low work intensity (VLWI)
corresponds to the number of people who are in at least one of are those aged 0-59 living in households where the adults
the following situations: at risk-of-poverty or severely (aged 18-59, excluding students aged 18-24) worked not more
materially deprived or living in households with very low work than 20% of their total work potential during the past year
intensity.
(52) According to Eurostat, LFS data [lfsi_jhh_a]..
(48) The year in this chapter refers to the EU-SILC survey year,
which measures income in the previous year. The latest survey
2016 data refer to income distribution in 2015.

47
Employment and Social Developments in Europe 2019

The at-risk-of-poverty rate (53) (AROP) has gradually reduced between 2012 and 2017 in the
started to decrease again after three relatively remaining 8 Member States, namely Romania, Greece,
stable years. This component of AROPE has followed Croatia, Portugal, Poland, France, Slovakia and Finland.
a different pattern, due to its dependency on median In Greece, this reduction must be seen in the context
income. After its surge in 2014, the share of people at of the 20% reduction in the median income (or poverty
risk of poverty remained broadly unchanged up to threshold).
2016 at 17.3% thereafter decreasing to 16.9% in
2017. The number of people at risk of poverty
decreased by 1.6 million in 2017 (referring to incomes
in 2016), after cumulative increases by 152 000 in
2016 and 783 000 in 2015. The 2017 improvement
was driven mainly by the reduction in the number of
people in AROP broadly in the same Member States
recording fewer people were in severe material
deprivation.

The increase in the median income (Chart 1.47)

reflected an improvement in living standards.
However, it contributed to a deceleration in the
reduction of the at risk-of-poverty rate. The 2014-
2015 surge in the number of people at risk of poverty
reflected two different phenomena: first, the weak
economic and labour market situation until mid-2013:
and secondly, the upward shift in the median income
and therefore the poverty threshold (54) (set at 60% of
national median income) as household incomes
started to recover in mid-2013. However, after the
surge in 2014, both AROP and inequality in the EU
stabilised, whereas median incomes and poverty
thresholds increased by a significant 6.4% between
2013 and 2016 (Chart 1.36). Eurostat flash estimates
indicate that in 2017 there will be a further significant
increase in median income in most EU countries, of
more than 5% in eleven Member States.

Progress in reducing poverty and social

exclusion varies across Member States
The at-risk-of-poverty-or-social-exclusion rate
(AROPE) has decreased or stabilised since 2012
in most Member States. Bulgaria, Croatia, Hungary,
Ireland, Latvia, Poland and Romania recorded notable
declines while fourteen other countries recorded
smaller declines. Small increases appear only in
Greece, Estonia and the Netherlands (Chart 1.37). The
'at risk of poverty rate' (AROP) has either increased or
remained stable since 2012 in 20 Member States
(Chart 1.37, second column). Poverty rates were

(53) People at risk-of-poverty (AROP) have an equivalised

disposable income below the risk-of-poverty threshold, which is
set at 60% of the national median equivalised disposable
income (after social transfers).
(54) The 'at risk-of-poverty' threshold is set at 60% of the national
median equivalised disposable income (after tax and other
deductions and after social transfers). The total equivalised
disposable household income, used in poverty and inequality
indicators, takes into account the impact of differences in
household size and composition. The equivalised income
attributed to each member of the household is calculated by
dividing the total disposable income of the household by the
equalisation factor. This indicator gives a weight of 1.0 to the
first person aged 14 or more, a weight of 0.5 each to other
people aged 14 or more and a weight of 0.3 each to people
aged 0-13.

48
 Chapter 1: Main Employment and Social Developments

Chart 1.37
Risk of poverty or social exclusion declining in half of the Member States
At-risk-of-poverty-or-social-exclusion rate, at-risk-of-poverty rate, severe material deprivation rate (% of population), very low work intensity households (% of population aged 0-59),
EU Member States, 2012-2017

At risk of poverty or social At risk of poverty Severe material deprivation Very low work intensity
exclusion
0 10 20 30 40 50
0 10 20 30 40 50 0 10 20 30 40 50 0 10 20 30 40 50
CZ CZ CZ CZ
FI FI FI FI
SK SK SK SK
NL NL NL NL
FR SI FR FR
SI FR SI SI
DK DK DK DK
SE SE SE SE
AT AT AT AT
DE DE DE DE
MT MT MT
MT
PL PL PL
PL
BE BE BE
BE
LU LU LU
LU
UK UK UK
UK
EA19 EA19 EA19
EA19
EU28 EU28 EU28
EU28
IE IE IE IE
PT PT PT PT
EE EE EE EE
CY CY CY CY
HU HU HU HU
HR HR HR HR
ES ES ES ES
LV LV LV LV
IT IT IT IT
LT LT LT LT
EL EL EL EL
RO RO RO RO
BG BG BG BG

2017 (decrease) 2012

2012 2017 (increase)
2017 2012

Note: Green bars indicate decrease between 2012 (where light green bars end) and 2015 (where dark green bars end). Red bars indicate increase between 2012 (where light red bars
end) and 2015 (where dark red bars end), and grey bars indicate little or no change.
AROPE combines AROP, SMD and VLWI. The length of bars of components should not add to the length of AROPE bar, because components overlap in AROPE. The year refers to the
EU-SILC survey year, referring to the previous income year. AROPE, AROP: income from the previous year, SMD: current survey year, VLWI: status in the past year.
Breaks in series: AROPE: BG EE 2014, SE 2015, LU NL 2016, AROP BG LU NL 2016, SMD SE 2015, BG LU NL 2016, VLWI EE 2014, SE 2015, BG LU NL 2016. These Member States
are classified based on EMPL estimation. For these Member States the values for 2012 should not be compared to values in 2016.

Source: Eurostat, EU SILC [ilc_peps01, ilc_li02, ilc_mddd11, ilc_lvhl11].

Click here to download chart.

Median income in the EU increased by 6.4% in Chart 1.38

real terms between 2013 and 2017. However, Increase in risk of poverty may be linked with increase
of the median income
different distributional patterns emerge in relation to Poverty threshold (in real terms) and at-risk-of-poverty rate (%), EU Member States
disposable income in different quintiles of the 70

distribution in different Member States. The AROP rate y = 0.7674x + 10.919

R² = 0.2748 EE
60
could go up when the median income increases. (55) LV
This is what actually happened with the substantial 50
LT
Change in median income 2012-2017 (%)

rise of AROP rates in the Baltic States accompanied by 40

a significant increase in median incomes (Chart 1.38). 30

RO
BG
MT

The chart 1.38 shows that for these countries, PL

20 IE
between 2012 and 2017, the median income raised by HR
DE
SE NL
BE
more than 40% while the AROP rate raised as well 10
HU
FR
SI
AT
EU
UK
DK PT
LU
more than 15%. The reduction in the severe material 0 FI SK
CZ
IT
ES

deprivation rate has been the main factor contributing -10

to the reduction in AROPE in the Member States. The EL
CY
incidence of severe material deprivation has declined
-20

in most member States since 2012, while remaining -30

-15 -10 -5 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35
stable in Austria, Denmark, Spain, Luxembourg Finland, Change in AROP 2012-2017 (pps)

Sweden and the Netherlands. The only Member State Note: The year refers to the EU-SILC survey year, income measured is from the
where severe material deprivation increased in 2017 is previous year.
Breaks in series: BG LU NL 2016. Changes in AROP for these Member States are
Greece. indicative, based on EMPL estimation.

Source: Eurostat, EU SILC [ilc_li02, ilc_di04]; DG EMPL calculations

(55) A median income increase raises up the the AROP threshold Click here to download chart.
that is set at 60% of the median income. If the income of the
bottom end of the distribution increases at a lower pace, this
will result in a higher AROP rate.

49
Employment and Social Developments in Europe 2019

The reduction in the severe material deprivation Chart 1.39

rate has been the main factor contributing to Social and material deprivation declined in most
Member States in 2014-2017
the reduction in AROPE in the Member States. Social and material deprivation rate (% of population), EU Member States, 2014-2017
The incidence of severe material deprivation has 60 2015 2016 2017

declined in most member States since 2012, while

remaining stable in Austria, Denmark, Spain,
50

Luxembourg Finland, Sweden and the Netherlands. The 40

only Member State where severe material deprivation 30

increased in 2017 is Greece. 20

The decrease in low work intensity has also 10

contributed to reducing AROPE in many Member 0

MT PL IT IE HR PT CY HU BG LU CZ DE UK SI EA19 SK EU28 ES LV LT EL RO SE NL AT DK EE BE FR FI

States. This third component of AROPE has declined in Note:

strong decrease 2015-2017 decrease

This new indicator of social and material deprivation relates to people who have
stable increase

17 Member States, has stayed constant in another 7 experienced living conditions constrained by a lack of resources, as explained in
the footnotes defined here https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/products-eurostat-
and has increased in 4 (Chart 1.37, the far right news/-/DDN-20171212-1. T.
column). The year refers to the EU-SILC current survey year.,
Breaks in series: BG 2016, LU 2016, NL 2016, SE 2015. These Member States are
classified based on EMPL estimation.
The number of people living in social and Source: Eurostat, EU SILC [ilc_mdsd07]
material deprivation declined between 2014 and Click here to download chart.
2017. According to Eurostat's new measure of
deprivation, 13.7% of Europeans (70 million) Energy poverty
experienced a lack of resources to cover material
needs and ensure social participation in 2017, down An important aspect of household poverty is the
from 15.7% in 2016. Only Greece registered an inability to keep one’s home warm because of
increase of 2.2% between 2016 and 2017 while the expense involved. Latest SILC data show that
Denmark, Finland, Latvia and Slovenia had small countries differ in the evolution of indicators of energy
increases (Chart 1.39). poverty between 2008 and 2017 (Chart 1.40). The
percentage of the population not able to satisfy
Despite positive signs, the risk of poverty or heating needs has been falling sharply in Bulgaria,
social exclusion remains a challenge, especially Cyprus, Portugal, Romania, Latvia and Poland, but
in southern (56) and Baltic Member States. The risk increasing in Estonia, Spain, Greece, Ireland, Italy and
remains high in Bulgaria and Romania despite recent Lithuania (Chart 1.40, left hand side). Arrears in the
improvements, as well as in Greece – the only Member payment of utility bills are decreasing in 11 countries,
State where severe material deprivation has especially in Croatia, Italy and Romania, but increasing
intensified since 2012. Between 2012 and 2017, AROP in nine, with the strongest increases in Greece and
increased in nine countries (Chart 1.37). Together with Cyprus (Chart 1.40, right hand side). (57)
an increase in inequality in many Member States, the
persistence of the risk of poverty or social exclusion
ranks at the top of the challenges to social cohesion in (57) For a more in-depth discussion on energy poverty, see chapter
5.
the EU.

(56) In the remaining part of the Chapter southern Member States

are: Portugal, Spain, Italy, Greece, Malta and Cyprus. Central-
eastern Member States are: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland,
Czechia, Slovak Republic, Hungary, Slovenia, Croatia, Romania,
Bulgaria. The remaining Member States are the western ones.

50
 Chapter 1: Main Employment and Social Developments

Chart 1.40 Chart 1.41

Indicators of energy poverty: divergent evolution Increases in the AROP rate did not translate into higher
Population shares unable to keep home adequately warm and with arrears on utility divergence across the EU
bills - EU-SILC survey in 2017 as compared to 2008 At-risk-of-poverty rate, % of population, EU
Population share unable to keep home Population share with arrears on utility bills 0.3 19
adequately warm
0 10 20 30 40 50

LU
0 10 20 30 40 50
0.25
LU 18
FI
NL
SE
AT
CZ 0.2
NL
SE 17
DE
DK
EE
DK 0.15
AT
CZ
BE 16
DE
IT 0.1
SI
UK
SK
IE
SK 15
PT 0.05
FR
MT
BE
FR
UK
EE 0 14
PL
EU28 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
MT
ES
HU
FI
HR
EU28
LT coefficient of variation - left axis mean - right axis
PL
ES
IE
LV
RO
LV Source: Eurostat, SILC [ilc_li02]
CY
IT HU Click here to download chart.
PT SI
CY RO
EL HR
LT
BG
BG
EL
Severe material deprivation has developed along
2017 (decrease) 2008 (decrease) Colour code:
a trend of both convergence and improvement.
2008 (increase)
2017 (no sig. change)
2017 (increase)
2008 (no sig. change)
Green bars: countries experiencing a decrease between
2008 and 2017. Red bars, the same, but increasing. Grey Over the last decade the SMD rates for the EU Member
States showed clear signs of convergence (the rate
bars, no significant change

Note: Colour code:

Green bars: countries experiencing a decrease between 2008 and 2017. Red bars,
declined strongly in the EU as a whole). More recently,
the same, but increasing. Grey bars, no significant change. since 2014, while the average SMD rate has continued
Source: Eurostat, dataset: ilc_mdes07 and table sdg_07_60
to fall in almost all Member States, there has been
Click here to download chart. some convergence as well.

Chart 1.42
4.4. Social convergence in the EU? Severe material deprivation converged across the EU
Severe material deprivation rate, % of population, EU
Social convergence can be analysed by reference 1 15

to poverty - either relative poverty, as measured

0.8 12
by the at-risk-of-poverty rate (AROP), or severe
material deprivation rate (SMD). Alternatively, it 0.6 9

can be analysed by reference to inequality, which 0.4 6

remains a challenge, especially in certain Member
States. 0.2 3

0 0
While the AROP rate in the EU has not tended to 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017

converge over the last decade, increases in the coefficient of variation - left axis mean - right axis
AROP rate did not translate into higher
Source: Eurostat, SILC [ilc_mddd11]
divergence. As discussed in section 3 of this chapter, Click here to download chart.
the average AROP rate in the EU slightly increased
over the last decade and it only decreased between Inequality levels do not clearly converge. As
2016 and 2017. In terms of convergence as measured
measured by the GINI coefficient, (59) inequality
by the coefficient of variation of the rates for all
remained stable during the crisis and deteriorated
Member States, evolution has been stable, except
slightly during the recovery. During this time, the
during the early years of the crisis when some
indicator showed no clear convergence or divergence
downward convergence (58) was observed. This can be
pattern.
attributed mainly to exceptionally large reductions in
the AROP rate in Latvia and Estonia (-5.5pps and –
3.9pps in 2010), but the reductions were linked to (59) For the definition of GINI see footnote in section 4.2.
sharp declines in median income that were less
significant at the bottom of the income distribution.

(58) Here 'downward convergence' means a tendency of the

national rates to converge when the average is decreasing.
Thus, in the case of AROP or SMD, a downward convergence is
interpreted as an improvement.

51
Employment and Social Developments in Europe 2019

Chart 1.43 Chart 1.44

Inequality remained unchanged during the recovery; its The middle class makes up over 50% of the population
divergence across the EU has not increased in all EU countries
GINI coefficient, EU Distribution of disposable income by lower, middle and higher income groups, 2017
0,2 34 DK 12% 4% 77% 6%
16% 4% 74% 6%
FI 12% 7% 74% 8%
13% 9% 73% 4%
SK 12% 11% 73% 3%
0,15 32 9% 13% 72% 5%
NL 13% 9% 71% 7%
14% 9% 70% 7%
FR 13% 12% 67% 8%
13% 15% 66% 5%
DE 16% 12% 65% 7%
0,1 30 16% 15% 64% 4%
EU-28 17% 11% 64% 8%
20% 6% 64% 10%
PL 15% 15% 63% 7%
24% 6% 61% 9%
0,05 28 MT 17% 14% 61% 8%
16% 13% 61% 10%
EL 20% 11% 61% 9%
17% 14% 60% 9%
IE 16% 17% 60% 8%
0 26 19% 13% 60% 9%
HR 20% 15% 59% 6%
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 22% 9% 58% 12%
PT 18% 15% 56% 10%
21% 14% 56% 9%
LT
coefficient of variation - left axis mean - right axis
23% 9% 56% 12%
23% 13% 53% 10%
LV 22% 15% 52% 10%
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
Source: Eurostat, SILC [ilc_di12]
Lower income in poverty Lower income not in poverty Middle income Higher income
Click here to download chart.
Note: Individuals are in the middle class when they have an equivalised income
between 75% and 200% of the national equivalised median income. Individuals
are in poverty when they have an equivalised income lower than 60% of the
national median income.
Source: DG-EMPL calculations. EU-SILC UDB 2017.
4.5. EU Income trends: middle class, pan- Click here to download chart.
European distribution and territorial
dimensions The composition of the middle class based on an
income definition has changed since the crisis.
Different income groups have experienced
Chart 1.45 illustrates how the middle classes fared in
different developments over the last decade. the aftermath of the crisis and puts the size of the
While income poverty trends are well documented middle class in 2017 in a time perspective. For
through the at-risk-of-poverty (AROP) rate, this section example, the middle class in Latvia, which appeared
examines how the income conditions of EU citizens relatively small in 2017, has seen a sizeable increase
have changed across the whole income distribution in (over 3pps) as a result of both a decline of the higher
the different Member States and in the EU as a whole. income group and a reallocation of the lower income
group in the middle class. On the other hand, the large
The middle class is the backbone of EU middle class in Denmark, very sizeable in 2017, has
societies, converging across countries … decreased in size, partly in favour of the upper income
group and partly because a proportion slid into the
The middle class is a key component of economic
lower income group. All in all, in some central-eastern
growth and social cohesion in the EU Member
Member States there seems to be a general trend
States. A strong middle class is usually an engine for
towards a rising middle class. This is not the case for
consumption-led growth, as it has a higher propensity Slovenia or Hungary, where there has been a
to consume than the upper income groups. Moreover, a reallocation of 3pps of the middle class into the lower
strong and stable middle class is usually associated income group. In parallel, many richer Member States
with a higher level of social cohesion and trust in the have shrinking middle classes as a result of transition
institutions. Countries with a sizeable middle class are either to the upper income group (e.g. in Sweden) or to
also those with better educational and health the lower income group (e.g. in the Netherlands).
outcomes, at least in the EU, because an expanding
middle class has historically had the leverage to push
for higher shares of public expenditure to be spent on
health and education. (60)

The size of the middle class in the EU Member

States, based on an income definition, varied
considerably in 2017 (see Chart 1.44). Individuals
are considered to be in the middle class if their
equivalised income is included in the range from 75%
to 200% of the equivalised national median income. At
one end of the range, in Denmark, the middle class
accounts for 78% of the overall population. At the
other end, in Latvia, it accounts for 53% of the
population.

(60) An EU-financed OECD study (2019) shows that the middle

class has changed size in many EU countries over the last
decade. See also a forthcoming Eurofound publication.

52
 Chapter 1: Main Employment and Social Developments

Chart 1.45 strains in terms of their financial security and their

Middle class trends, very heterogeneous across Member ability to make ends meet. (62)
States – up or down?
Middle class change (pps), from 2007-2008 to 2016-2017
However, the proportion of those in the middle
RO
LV class who report financial strain varies
FI
LU dramatically across Member States. While the
IE
EL Scandinavian and northern middle classes report very
PL
PT low levels of difficulty in making ends meet, some
UK
AT other middle classes, mostly in central-eastern and
IT
SK
southern Member States, feel the strain more. In
EU-28
FR
Member States such as Greece, Bulgaria and Croatia
BG
ES
the middle class reports severe levels of perceived
CZ
MT
financial difficulty, while in Member States such as
SI
LT
Ireland and Italy, as well as in France, the middle class
EE report increasing difficulties since the crisis, with levels
BE
SE ranging from 53% in France to 70% in Italy in 2017.
HU
DK The strain perceived by middle classes in central-
DE
CY eastern Member States is much higher but the size of
NL
-10% -8% -6% -4% -2% 0% 2% 4% 6% 8% 10%
the middle class seems to be moderately converging
lower income group middle income group higher income group
with western Member States. Even if the national
Note: Middle class’ size has been averaged in 2007-08 and in 2016-17 to reduce
middle classes in the most crisis-hit southern Member
potential yearly volatility. Member States with negative green bars and positive States and in France have not shrunk in size, they
yellow and blue bars experienced an income polarisation.
Source: DG-EMPL calculations. EU-SILC UDB.
nonetheless report increasing distress in paying their
Click here to download chart. normal day-to-day expenses.

Chart 1.46
These income developments indicate a slight Over 50% of the middle class report that making ends
convergence in the size of the middle-income meet is difficult
group across EU Member States over the last Proportion of the middle class reporting that they have difficulty making ends meet (%)

decade. This results from a reduction in the size of 100%

90%

middle classes in the richer Member States coupled 80%

70%
with a rise in the middle class in some central-eastern 60%

Member States. Over a longer time horizon there has 50%

40%

been a composition change in the middle class of the 30%

relatively richer Member States. As regards the

20%
10%

demographic characteristics of the middle class over 0%

the last 30 years, the likelihood of people aged 65 or

2016-17 2007-08
more entering the middle- income group has increased
Note: The original question in the EU-SILC defines three categories: great difficulty,
to the detriment of working-age adults. Households difficulty and some difficulty. In this chart the three categories have been
with children have seen a reduction in the probability aggregated.
Source: DG-EMPL calculations. EU-SILC UDB.
of their being in the middle-income group over this Click here to download chart.
period, especially in the case of single parents who are
nowadays most likely to be found in the lower-income Median incomes improved very unevenly across
group. Finally, workers with middle- and low-skill jobs
Member States compared to pre-crisis levels.
find it more difficult to gain access to the middle-
While the evolution of size and characteristics of the
income class than in the past. These changes in the
middle class reveals much about societal changes of
skills distribution across income groups may generate
this group, the wellbeing of the average citizen is
dissatisfaction: lower-skilled workers may find their
usually approximated by the median income.
relative income conditions deteriorating in comparison
Moreover, the definition of the middle class is
with what they would have been in previous
anchored to the national median income (i.e. from
generations. (61)
75% to 200% of the national median income). Thus,
...but the perception of strain is relatively high the evolution of the median income since the crisis
may help explain the high financial strain experienced
The middle class’ perception of financial by the middle classes in some Member States despite
insecurity has changed over time within Member being larger in size. This is the case of Greece where
States but has stayed fairly constant at slightly the middle class has increased in size but mostly
because the real median income has worsened over
over 53% in the EU as a whole (see Chart 1.46).
time, lowering the threshold to access the middle-
There is a widespread perception that the middle
income group. As documented in section 4.1 for gross
classes, despite income levels well above the at-risk-
disposable household income (GDHI), median income
of-poverty threshold, are experiencing increasing
has improved compared to pre-crisis levels for a
(61) OECD, ibid.
(62) OECD, ibid.; Bussolo et al. (2018).

53
Employment and Social Developments in Europe 2019

majority of Member States while in some others real Chart 1.48

median incomes have lost since 2008 (see Chart 1.47). The poorest income groups in the EU-28 have improved
their conditions compared with their pre-crisis level
Real change of disposable income (2008-2015) in selected percentiles of the EU-28
Chart 1.47
income distribution
Median incomes improved very unevenly across Member
6%
States
Real growth of median income from 2007-2008 to 2016-2017. 4%

80%
2%
60%
0%
40%
-2%
20%
-4%
0%
-6%
-20%

-40% -8%
EL

ES

EE
HU
IT
HR

EU-28

NL
IE
LU
PT
CY

FI
SI

PL
LV
UK

DE
BE

DK
AT
RO

LT
FR
SE

MT

SK
CZ

BG
-10%
5 10 25 50 75 90 95 99 99.5 99.9
Note: Real median incomes in 2007-08 and in 2016-17 have been averaged to reduce
yearly volatility. Percentiles
Source: DG-EMPL calculations. Eurostat data (median income: ilc_di03; harmonised index Note: The EU-28 is treated as a single country. The EU-28 income distribution is
of consumer prices: prc_hicp_aind). obtained after pooling incomes of all EU MS, applying purchasing power parities
Click here to download chart. (prc_ppp_ind) and correcting for the national consumer price index
(prc_hicp_aind) to express them in real terms (2015 prices). Growth rates for the
99, 99.5 and 99.9th percentile are based on data series produced by the World
Inequality Lab (Blanchet, Chancel & Gethin 2019).
From the national to the pan-European view Source: DG-EMPL calculations. EU-SILC UDB and data series produced by the World
Inequality Lab, available on https://wid.world/

In terms of pan-European income developments, Click here to download chart.

the income levels of the European poor have

improved over the last decade. (63) The changes in The catching-up process of the central-eastern
the EU-28 income distribution over the last ten years Member States determined a real 4% increase of
are the result of the different income trends the EU-28 10th percentile. Their income growth was
experienced by different Member States. Chart 1.48 stronger than for all other Member States along the
shows an improvement in lower EU incomes, a whole income distribution. On the other hand, income
stagnation around the median and a decline of high- levels in southern Member States fell across the
income groups in the EU-28 distribution. (64) Overall, income distribution, but fell particularly strongly for
the evolution of incomes in the EU-28 has led to more low-middle income groups, which therefore diverged
equal outcomes than those of 2007, as the income from EU-wide income levels. (66) These income
condition of the poorest people in the EU, mostly developments across the EU are reflected in the EU
located in central-eastern Member States, has middle class, which is the group of all EU individuals
improved. Meanwhile, the income of the poorest in the with disposable income between 75% and 200% of
southern Member States deteriorated. ( 65) the EU median income. Between 2008 and 2016 the
proportion of Poles and other citizens from central-
eastern Member States in the EU middle class
(63) In this section, the EU-28 income distribution is considered as a increased, while the proportion of Greeks, Italians and
single country. Disposable incomes of individuals from different
French declined, especially at the lower end of the EU
Member States are corrected for the different purchasing
power parities following EUROSTAT procedures and expressed middle class (see Chart 1.48).
in real terms in 2015 values.
(64) This is also confirmed by a World Inequality Lab working paper
(2019) that examines pre-tax incomes, more accurately (66) Further empirical evidence can be found in Cseres-Gergely and
captured from fiscal data than surveys, for Europe as a whole Kvedaras (2019) and Brandolini and Rosolia (2019).
(including non-EU countries). However, when they look at the
long-run dynamics of the income distribution they state that:
“very rich groups benefited much more from the last decades
of the twentieth century than they were hurt by the 2007-2008
financial crisis” (Blanchet et al., 2019: p. 39).
(65) Joint Research Center (2019).

54
 Chapter 1: Main Employment and Social Developments

Chart 1.49
In 2016 more households from central-eastern Member States make it to the EU middle class compared with 2008
EU middle class by Member States in 2008 (left) and 2016 (right)
100% 100%

90% German speaking 90% German speaking

80% 80%

70% 70%
FR FR
Population share (%)

60% 60%

50% English-speaking English-speaking

50%

40% 40%
IT IT
30% 30%
Iberian Iberian
20% 20%
PL Benelux Benelux
Other MED PL
10% 10%
Scandinavian Scandinavian
Eastern Other MED Eastern
0% 0%
EU middle class, from 75% (left) to 200% (right) of the EU median EU middle class, from 75% (left) to 200% (right) of the EU median

Note: Individuals are included in the EU middle class when they have an equivalised income between 75% and 200% of the EU equivalised median income. EU-28 disposable income
distribution is obtained after pooling incomes of all EU Member States and applying EUROSTAT purchasing power parities (prc_ppp_ind). German-speaking Member States are
Germany and Austria; English-speaking Member States are the United Kingdom and Ireland; Iberian Member States are Spain and Portugal; Benelux is the Netherlands, Belgium
and Luxembourg. Scandinavian Member States are Sweden, Denmark and Finland; Other Med are Greece, Malta and Cyprus; Eastern Member States are Czechia, Slovak Republic,
Hungary, Croatia and Slovenia. Southern and Baltic Member States are the two residuals areas in the charts.
Source: DG-EMPL calculations. EU-SILC UDB.
Click here to download chart.

The territorial dimension of income evolution Chart 1.50

Median income is usually higher in densely populated
Income conditions throughout the European areas
Urban median income as a proportion of median income in rural areas (%)
Union have a spatial dimension. While some areas 100
have prospered in the last decade because they were
more suited to reaping the benefits of a more 80

knowledge-intensive economy, others have lagged 60

behind, especially former industrial areas. However,

40
the rural-urban territorial divide does not seem to have
become larger in the aftermath of the crisis, at least in 20

terms of employment, because the sectors most 0

affected, construction and industry, are less present in
rural areas, especially in the EU-15 where employment -20
BE UK AT DE NL DK SI CZ FR EA IE FI IT LU SE SK EU EE PT EL CY ES LV PL HU HR LT BG RO
was more affected in urban and intermediate 2017 2008 2012

areas. (67) Note: The ratio is negative when median income is higher in rural areas.
Source: DG-EMPL calculations. EUROSTAT data (ilc_di17).
The high concentration of economic activity in Click here to download chart.

urban areas is a reason why median disposable

income in cities is usually higher than in rural However, the picture is complicated by an ‘urban
areas in almost all Member States (see Chart paradox’. Although cities are characterised by greater
1.50). Especially in the EU-13 Member States, median economic activity, higher employment rates and larger
urban disposable income is at least 20% higher than stocks of wealth as well as a higher potential for
median income in rural areas. The most extreme cases growth than rural areas, the distribution of economic
are Romania and Bulgaria where median incomes in growth in the cities may be remarkably unequal. This is
urban areas are respectively over 80% and 60% the ‘urban paradox’: in cities there are more job
higher than in rural areas. opportunities but also higher proportions of people
living at the margins of the world of work. In turn,
spatial segregation in the cities tends to reproduce and
(67) European Commission (2017). deepen these inequalities across generations. (68)

As a consequence, the income differences

between urban and rural areas translate into
gaps in severe material deprivation between
areas. Central-eastern Member States where the
income gap between cities and rural areas is the
highest tend to display higher levels of severe material
deprivation in rural areas, with the exception of
Czechia. Conversely, in the EU 15 it is usually in the
cities, where the ‘urban paradox’ is present, that
people are more at risk of severe material deprivation,
as documented for all the Member States whose gap
in Chart 1.51 is positive.

(68) European Commission (2016b).

55
Employment and Social Developments in Europe 2019

Box 1.1: Urban, intermediate and rural areas: classification by degree of urbanisation

In this section rural and urban areas are categorised by degree of urbanisation. (1) The degree of urbanisation is a
classification of local administrative units (LAUs) that indicates the characteristics of a particular area, based on a
population grid composed of 1 km² cells (and clusters thereof), identifying:
 Densely populated areas: contiguous grid cells of 1km2 with a density of at least 1 500 inhabitants per km2 and
a minimum population of 50 000
 Intermediate areas: clusters of contiguous grid cells of 1km2 with a density of at least 300 inhabitants per km2
and a minimum population of 5 000
 Thinly populated areas: grid cells outside urban clusters.
Therefore, an urban centre is defined as contiguous (in other words, neighbouring or adjoining) grid cells of 1 km² with
a population density of at least 1 500 inhabitants per km²; these clusters are used to identify all cities with urban
centres of at least 50 thousand inhabitants. An urban cluster is defined as contiguous grid cells of 1 km² with a
population density of at least 300 inhabitants per km² and a minimum population of 5 thousand inhabitants. Rural grid
cells are defined as those grid cells outside of high-density and urban clusters.

(1) This is the same classification adopted for most of the “Urban Europe” Report (European Commission, 2016)

Chart 1.51 People with disabilities

Severe material deprivation is relatively higher in urban
areas in western Member States, while in the central- People with disabilities make up a large segment
eastern Member States it affects the rural areas more. of EU societies. In 2016, about 24.1% of over-16s
Severe material deprivation rate in urban areas as a proportion of severe material
deprivation rate in rural areas (%) declared an activity limitation (27.1% in 2014 and
10 25.3% in 2015), with more women than men
experiencing this condition (about 26.3% of women
5
compared with 21.8% of men on average in the EU). In
0 the EU-SILC, from which the following figures are
-5
derived, disability is self-reported on the basis of a
limitation in activities because of health problems for
-10
at least the last 6 months. ( 69) In 2016, about 48.1%
-15 of people with disabilities in the EU were employed
(47.4% in 2015) compared with 73.9% of people
-20
without disabilities (73.1% in 2015, see Table 1.1).
BG
RO
HU

HR
LV
CY

EU

LU

NL

BE
LT
EL

EE

DE
CZ

EA19
DK
ES

AT
SK

SE
SI

PL
FI

PT

FR

UK
IT
IE

However, the situation across Member States differs

2017 2008 2012
significantly and since 2010 there has been a
Note: The ratio is negative when the severe material deprivation rate is higher in rural
areas. continuous moderate increase in the employment rate
Source: DG-EMPL calculations. EU-SILC UDB. of people with disabilities.
Click here to download chart.

The proportion of early school leavers among the

young disabled is at 23.6%, much higher than
the 12.0% for non-disabled young people. (70)
5. EMPLOYMENT AND SOCIAL SITUATION Higher levels of early school leaving represent an
important barrier to the integration of disabled people
OF VULNERABLE GROUPS in the world of work and are one of the reasons for
their lower employment rate. ( 71) Besides current
This section considers developments for
vulnerable groups in EU societies, especially in (69) This definition may not necessarily coincide with the UN
terms of employment, income and educational Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (2006),
which states: “Persons with disabilities include those who have
outcomes. Vulnerable groups, by definition, are long-term physical, mental, intellectual or sensory impairments
exposed to greater risks than the majority of the which in interaction with various barriers may hinder their full
population, and some may end up being excluded from and effective participation in society on an equal basis with
others”.
access to housing and struggle to find employment,
(70) The current 2016 EU figure for early school leaving derived
depriving societies of their full potential. They may from the EU-LFS stands at 10.7%. However, in Table 1.1 the
also be exposed disproportionately to environmental or figure reported amounts to 12% because it is derived from the
health problems, including air pollution. The inclusion EU-SILC for the sake of comparing it with the figures referred
in educational systems and in employment of those to early school leavers with disabilities.
who are in a condition of disadvantage, as well as (71) A lower employment rate may not only be the result of an
education or qualifications problem, although these factors
their access to public services, is recognised as a key might further affect the employment probability of people with
element in the European Pillar of Social Rights. disabilities. This raises the question of the nature of the
adaptations and assistance required. While mobility problems
often lead to a need for technical aids and work place

56
 Chapter 1: Main Employment and Social Developments

Table 1.1
People with disabilities face challenges and more social risks than the rest of the population
Summary of the main EU indicators regarding people with limitations
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 * 2016 *
Persons with
limitations 16+ 25.1% 25.7% 25.0% 25.9% 26.1% 26.9% 27.1% 25.3% 24.1%
(Disabled)
Europe 2020 objectives, achievements and other indicators
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Employment 75 % of the population, aged 20-64, should be employed.
Disabled 46.4% 46.1% 46.0% 46.9% 47.9% 48.5% 48.7% 47.4% 48.1%
Total 68.7% 67.6% 67.3% 67.3% 67.0% 66.9% 67.8% 68.4% 69.3%
Unemployment rate (20-64)
Disabled 15.9% 17.3% 18.0% 17.4% 18.1% 19.0% 19.6% 20.2% 19.6%
Total 8.4% 10.2% 10.9% 11.2% 12.2% 12.9% 12.6% 12.1% 11.4%
Activity rate (20-64)
Disabled 55.1% 55.8% 56.1% 56.7% 58.5% 59.8% 60.6% 59.5% 59.7%
Total 75.0% 75.2% 75.5% 75.8% 76.3% 76.8% 77.5% 77.8% 78.2%
The share of early school leavers should be under 10% (Persons aged 18-24 with at most lower
Early school leavers
secondary education and not in further education or training). New classification in 2014.
Disabled 25.1% 23.0% 21.6% 18.9% 21.8% 21.5% 22.5% 22.0% 23.6%
Total 13.2% 13.1% 12.7% 11.6% 11.2% 10.7% 12.2% 12.5% 12.0%
Tertiary education 40% of persons aged 30-34 ought to have completed a tertiary or equivalent education. New
Disabled 20.4% 21.6% 22.8% 27.1%% 27.8% 28.0% 29.7% 29.4% 30.3%
Total 31.6% 33.9% 35.5% 36.0% 38.1% 39.3% 41.2% 41.6% 42.2%
Very low work People living in households where the adults work less than 20% of their total work potential during
intensity the past year. Age 16-59.
Disabled 23.2% 22.8% 24.2% 24.5% 23.9% 24.1% 25.1% 25.6% 25.8%
Total (9.1%) (9.1%) 10.2% 10.4% 10.8% 11.2% 11.6% 11.1% 11.0%
Persons with a household equivalised disposable income less than 60% of the median national
At risk of poverty
household equivalised disposable income (after social transfers). Age 16+
Disabled 20.1% 19.6% 18.9% 19.3% 19.1% 18.7% 19.7% 20.0% 20.2%
Total (ALL) 15.8% 15.7% 15.6% 16.1% 16.1% 15.9% 16.5% 16.6% 16.7%
Severely deprived Inability to afford certain goods or services (at least 4 items out of 9). Age 16+
Disabled 11.2% 10.5% 11.2% 12.1% 12.8% 12.6% 12.1% 11.3% 10.8%
Total 8.6% 7.8% 7.8% 8.5% 9.5% 9.3% 8.6% 7.7% 7.3%
At risk of poverty or social Persons at-risk-of-poverty after social transfers, severe material deprivation, or people
exclusion living in households with very low work intensity. Age 16+.
Disabled 30.9% 29.7% 29.6% 30.5% 30.3% 30.1% 30.1% 30.2% 30.1%
Total (ALL) (23.3%) (22.7%) 22.7% 23.6% 24.1% 23.8% 23.8% 23.2% 23.1%
* The data are not strictly comparable with those of 2014 due to a change of the definition of ‘activity limitations’.
** Total: It includes only persons for which we do have information on disability status. ALL: It includes all persons, including
those for which we do not have information on disability status. The difference between the two is marginal.
Note: Limitation in activities due to health problems is reported by the respondents in EU-SILC to the extent they are limited in activities people usually do, because of health problems,
for at least the last 6 months.
Source: Academic Network of European Disability (ANED)) figures (2019) based on EUROSTAT and EU-SILC UDB.
Click here to download table.

difficulties with finding, early school leaving may also men for all groups. Despite a persisting gap vis-à-vis
affect the future adaptability of people with non-disabled people, the proportion of people with
disabilities to technological change and the disabilities who have a degree has significantly
development of their careers when they are in increased over the last decade.
employment. This disadvantage is notably high for
young disabled people. In 2016, 30.3% of people with People with disabilities are also at higher risk of
disabilities had completed tertiary or equivalent poverty and social exclusion because they face
education, compared with 43.5% of people without higher risks under all three dimensions of
disabilities. Women reported higher achievements than AROPE: income poverty, severely material
deprivation and especially low work intensity. In
adaptations, depression and health problems require a
2016, at the European level, 30.1% of people with
different kind of assistance – in the form, for example, of
reduced working hours, a different kind of work, less stress at disabilities aged 16 and over lived in households that
work and personal support (Academic Network of European were at risk of poverty or social exclusion, compared
Disability Experts, 2019). with 20.9% of people without a disability in the same

57
Employment and Social Developments in Europe 2019

Box 1.2: Non-EU migrants, country of birth and citizenship

This Section considers integration challenges of non-EU migrants. This group may be referred to as
individuals born outside the EU or third country nationals (TCNs) when a non-EU born has acquired
citizenship rights. Although for policy purposes a clear-cut legal category such as TCNs is generally
preferred, the Section focuses on non-EU born, regardless of citizenship, as the challenges for their
integration in the host country societies do not depend only on citizenship access.
The figures presented here are hardly representative of the most recent inflow of refugees, due to their
relative size and the difficulty of traditional surveys to monitor these groups. For example, in 2017, there
were around 650,000 asylum requests in the EU and asylum was granted in 442,925 cases out of
973,415 decisions – resulting in 46% of the decisions granting refugee status (see migr_asydcfstq on the
EUROSTAT database).
Finally, the outcomes of EU-mobile citizens residing in an EU MS different from their own as well as those
native-born with a migrant background are not examined here as their socio-economic outcomes are
relatively more similar to those of natives as they are generally benefitting from the freedom of
movement granted in the EU and have personal characteristics more in line with the average of the
destination country. (1)

(1) For further analysis of the socio-economic outcomes of EU-mobile citizens, see European Commission (2018d).

age group. Moreover, as previous studies have recent joint EU-OECD publication (76) classifies host
documented, when household income is corrected for countries as:
a factor that takes into account the higher monetary
needs of people with disabilities, the income poverty of  Long-standing destinations
households with disabled people generally rises. (72)
The situation of people with disabilities in employment, with many recent and highly educated immigrants (LU,
education and social inclusion has not improved UK);
significantly over recent years, suggesting the need for
legislative action. With the aim of securing an with many settled low-level educated immigrants (BE,
improvement in these domains the European FR, NL as well as traditionally AT and DE);
Commission proposed a European Accessibility Act in
with significant recent and humanitarian migration
2015, adopted by the Council and the European
(DK, FI, SE).
Parliament on April 2019, to set common accessibility
requirements for certain key products and services  New destination countries
that would help people with disabilities in the EU to
participate fully in society in line with their capacities. with many recent, low-level educated immigrants (EL,
(73) This is in line with the European Pillar of Social IT, PT, ES);
Rights’ emphasis on the inclusion of people with
disabilities in society, focusing on social protection and with many recent highly-educated immigrants (CY, IE,
employment. (74) MT);

People with a migrant background where the immigrant population is shaped by border
changes and/or by national minorities, usually with
People born out of the EU accounted for 7.5% of small recent non-EU population (HR, CZ, EE, HU, LV, LT,
the total population living in EU-28 in 2018. (75) PL, SK, SI, BG, RO).
Member States differ considerably in both the relative
size and the composition of their immigrant groups. A Disparities in educational and employment
outcomes between the EU-born and the non-EU-
(72) Zaidi, A. and Burchardt, T. (2005). born tend to be more acute in long-standing
(73) The proposed directive aims to improve the functioning of the destination countries. Member States are clearly
internal market, making it easier for companies to provide
accessible products and services across borders by setting more exposed to integration challenges if they have a
common rules in the EU. The Accessibility Act is to be longer history of receiving immigrants with only low-
implemented by 2021. level education and humanitarian migrants, where the
(74) “People with disabilities have the right to income support that non-EU born are a larger segment of the population
ensures living in dignity, services that enable them to
(see Table 1.2). Although education, both formal and
participate in the labour market and in society, and a work
environment adapted to their needs.” See: informal, is a crucial driver of integration, non-EU-born
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/priorities/deeper-and-fairer- children participate at a lower rate in early childhood
economic-and-monetary-union/european-pillar-social- education and care. (77) They then often face
rights/european-pillar-social-rights-20-principles_en
(75) Figure derived from Eurostat (migr_pop3ctb). (76) OECD/EU (2018).
(77) Across the EU in 2016, 77% of all children aged 2 to 5 in
immigrant households attended some type of preschool

58
 Chapter 1: Main Employment and Social Developments

Table 1.2
Non-EU born migrants face significant disadvantages in many socio-economic domains
Summary of the main EU indicators regarding non-EU-born. 2017 (except for the % of population, 2018)
% of population Employment rate (20-64) Female activity rate (20-64) Early school leavers (18-24) At-risk-of-poverty rate Severe material deprivation
Non-EU born Non-EU born Native born Non-EU born Native born Non-EU born Native born Non-EU born Native born Non-EU born Native born
EU28 7.5 63 73 63 72.8 19.3 9.6 30.8 15.3 12.3 7
BE 9.0 52 71 62.9 79.9 16.7 7.9 46.3 11.4 14.8 3.5
BG 1.4 65.1 71.4 63.3 71.5 12.8 17 22.2 22.8 30.6
CZ 2.6 79.4 78.5 71.8 73.1 11 6.7 12.9 8.5 9.1 3.4
DK 7.8 61 78.9 49.7 71.2 11.8 8.8 30.2 11.8 14.3 2.5
DE 9.4 64.5 81.6 60.8 80.7 21.8 8.1 26.7 16.3 6.4 3.7
EE 13.1 71.3 79.6 69.6 80.5 10.9 31.4 20.6 6.6 3.9
IE 4.2 66.5 73.1 63.1 71.4 5.3 27.8 15.1 11.2 5.1
EL 8.7 54 58.1 65.5 64.7 16 5.4 43.1 17.4 51.8 18.2
ES 9.2 61.6 66 75.3 73 30 15.6 42.9 17.2 14.5 3.8
FR 9.0 55.6 72.6 56.4 75.7 15.2 8.3 26.5 10.7 11 3.5
HR 11.2 57.5 64.1 56.6 66.9 3.1 27.1 18.5 15.5 12.4
IT 7.2 62.1 62.3 58.5 59.5 30.9 12 36.6 17.1 22 8.9
CY 6.9 67.6 71 73.6 74.7 18.5 5.7 30.8 13.7 18.5 11.9
LV 11.3 67.1 75.7 67.2 80.4 8.6 29.5 21.8 12.2 11.5
LT 3.9 70.2 76.2 74 80.5 5.4 22.7 21 19.3 13.7
LU 11.6 62.7 69.3 63.3 68.8 6.8 40.6 8.8 3.8 1.3
HU 2.1 71.7 73.2 70 68.7 12.5 12.8 26.9 13.5
MT 8.7 64.1 72 56 61.1 18.4 26.1 15.4 6.1 2.9
NL 9.3 59.9 80.5 58.3 79 7.1 7.1 27 11.5 9.5 2
AT 10.5 60.9 77.8 60.9 77.3 22 5.3 34.1 9.4 12.9 2
PL 1.2 73 70.9 75.9 66.8 5 18.9 15.4 6.9 6.1
PT 6.2 74.5 73 79.5 76.4 12 12.5 21.3 17.7 9.8 6.7
RO 1.5 76.3 68.8 62.6 18.1 21.5 19.2
SI 8.9 68.7 74.1 70.1 76.1 4.2 23.5 12.3 8.2 4.6
SK 0.6 70.7 71.1 62.9 70.5 9.3 21.4 10.9 7.9
FI 4.3 56.2 75 60.2 79.3 7.9 25.2 11.3 4.2 2.1
SE 13.1 66.2 85.5 73.7 87.2 16.5 6.2 35.6 12 3.5 0.7
UK 8.7 70.6 78.8 64.6 77.3 6.6 10.8 23.1 14.5 5.4 4.7
Note: Non-EU born are all those individuals born outside the EU irrespective of their citizenship, i.e. they may have acquired the citizenship of the host country.
Source: EUROSTAT data: population: migr_pop3ctb; early school leavers: edat_lfse_02; female activity rate: lfsa_argacob; employment rate: lfsa_ergacob; AROP rate: ilc_peps06; severe
material deprivation: ilc_mddd16.
Click here to download table.

considerable difficulties in schools later on, with an Women also face a problem of activation: the
early school-leaving rate markedly higher than that of inactivity gap is particularly high when
the native-born. While Member States have made comparing native and non-EU-born women. In
progress in reducing early school leaving among both Belgium and Netherlands the inactivity gap amounts
the native-born and the foreign-born, the gap between to more than 20pp and in Germany, France, Finland,
them in 2016 still exceeded 10pps in Italy, Spain, Denmark and Austria it stands above 15pp. The
Germany, Greece, Austria and Cyprus (see Table 1.2). reasons why women are less likely to be in work in
long-standing destination countries need to be further
Challenges to integration into the education and analysed as the inactivity of women has a detrimental
training system include various factors. Among effect on the likelihood of the next generation being
these the most notable are: language learning; lack of actively in work (see Box 1.3). Recent studies showed
adapted teaching resources; training teachers in that immigrant women are more prone to involuntary
multicultural teaching; the low level of skills in children inactivity with family responsibilities rather than
and students who have been deprived of education discouragement as main reason to be economically
and training during a significant period of their life; inactive. (78)
geographical and social segregation; and finally civic
education. However, the degree of severity of these The challenges facing the non-EU-born and the
issues as well as policy responses in these areas disparities between them and the native-born in
varies starkly across Member States. education and employment translate into higher
social risks. Non-EU born people are more likely to be
Due to both lower activity and higher
income poor than the native-born: in 2016 the income
unemployment, employment rates among the
disparity in the EU between native and non-EU born
non-EU-born are relatively low in most though people was 15.5pp, and was over 30pp in Belgium and
not all EU Member States. The disparity with the Luxembourg and over 20pp in Sweden and Austria,
native born was about 20pp in Belgium, Finland, Greece and Spain. As migrant households tend to be
Netherlands and Sweden, and above 15pp in Denmark, larger than native ones, income also tends to be
Germany, France and Austria in 2017. Between 2008 shared among more members in non-EU-born
and 2017, the employment challenge increased as the households, contributing to lower individual income.
gap widened by about 5.5pp, with above average Severe material deprivation rates are also higher for
increases in Malta, Netherlands, Greece, Hungary, Italy, the migrant population in some Member States. In
Spain and Estonia (see Table 1.2). 2016, 12.3% of the non-EU-born population was
severely materially deprived, while the level was 7.0%
education and care against 81.2% among children in native
(78) OECD/EU, ibid Section 6.5.
households. (UE/OECD 2018).

59
Employment and Social Developments in Europe 2019

Box 1.3: Natives with a migrant background: employment and educational gaps

The EU-funded OECD Report ‘Catching-up Intergenerational Mobility and Children of Immigrants’ (2017) examines in
detail in cross-country comparison the persistent disadvantage that natives with a migrant background face in the
education system, the school-to-work transition and employment. (1)
In 2017, 21% of people aged 15-34 had a migrant background (25.5 million), of whom a little over 4% were the
native-born offspring of immigrants, with the same number arriving as children under 15; 5% were natives of mixed
parentage and a further 8% of the EU youth population immigrated as adults. (2)
Natives with non-EU parents have lower educational attainment and weaker learning outcomes than their peers with
native-born parents in most EU countries, especially in those countries with large-scale immigration of low-educated
immigrants in the past (FR, BE, AT).
This gap may become even more visible as native-born persons with two foreign-born parents are a growing group
virtually everywhere. Natives with non-EU parents are 4 pps less likely to choose an academic higher education
stream than their peers with native-born parents and similar education levels.
Nevertheless, there is a convergence of educational attainment across generations.
On average across the EU, natives with non-EU parents have on average 1.3 years more schooling than their parents,
(while their peers with native-born parents have 0.7 years) but this is the result of generally lower starting points of
the immigrant parents. This is particularly visible among the group with a Turkish immigrant background in Germany:
almost 50% of migrant women and about 30% of migrant men had no educational degree in 2012. In contrast, less
than 10% of their children born in Germany had left school without any diploma.
In the EU, the employment gap between children with non-EU parents and children of native-born decreases for the
highly educated - a person’s own education is a stronger driver for the employment among children of non-EU
immigrants than among children of natives. Low-educated natives with low-educated foreign parents have an
employment rate almost 8 pp lower than their peers with native parents, while the gap is only about half that for
higher levels of education.
15% of natives with non-EU parents have a mother with no completed formal education at all, which is five times
the share for the children of native born. The overrepresentation of mothers with no education among the children
with non-EU origin indicates that they have a more challenging “starting point” which could partly explain their
weaker employment rate, especially for girls. For example, less than 5% of children with Turkish immigrant parents
receive help with homework from their mothers in France compared to over 60% of children with native-born
mothers. Or in the Netherlands, 25% of the daughters of Turkish and Moroccan immigrants stop working in a paid job
after having their first child, compared with 10% of women with native Dutch parents.
Finally, natives with non-EU parents EU experience less occupational upward mobility than their peers with native-
born parents. About a third of natives with native parents manage to move upward on the occupational ladder. For
natives with non-EU parents, only 1 in 5 has a job requiring a higher skill level than his/her father needed in his
occupation.

(1) https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/social-issues-migration-health/catching-up-intergenerational-mobility-and-children-of-
immigrants_9789264288041-en
(2) UE/OECD (2018).

for the native-born. Other factors specific to the support migrants' inclusion in education and
integration of migrants in the labour market and employment and guarantee their full participation in
contributing to higher social risks are their lower skill all aspects of community and social life. Several
levels and resulting labour income, as well as their Member States have included their integration
lower hourly wages. In 2016 12.3% of the non-EU- priorities in general policies (public employment
born population was severely materially deprived, services, training and upskilling, youth employment
while the level was 7.0% for the native-born and NEET) but have taken some specific measures
population. (language training, recognition of skills and
qualifications and mentoring. (80) Continued coverage
Integration policies aim to reduce disparities of this topic within the European Semester will follow
between migrants and their receiving as integration of the non-EU-born will remain a key
communities and to ensure equal rights, challenge in the years ahead.
obligations and opportunities for all. The
Commission Action Plan on the Integration of Third-
(80) European Migration Network (2019). See:
Country Nationals (79) adopted in 2016 in particular https://ec.europa.eu/home-
sets out policy priorities and tools at EU level to affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/00_eu_labour_market_integratio
n_final_en.pdf.
(79) See: https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-
do/policies/legal-migration/integration/action-plan-integration-
third-country-nationals_en.

60
 Chapter 1: Main Employment and Social Developments

Roma surveyed except Greece, where the employment rate

of the total workforce is significantly below the EU
With an estimated population of 6 million, Roma average. There are other reasons for the poor
are the largest minority in the European Union. employment situation of Roma, both on the supply and
Four EU Member States (Romania, Bulgaria, Slovakia the demand side. On the supply side, they include poor
and Hungary) host large Roma populations (estimated employability due to lack of skills and competences,
to be up to +/- 10% of the total population). Czechia the limited role of the public employment services in
has a smaller Roma population (+/- 2% of the total supporting disadvantaged jobseekers and the spatial
population), followed by Greece and Spain (around segregation of the Roma communities. On the demand
1.6%). Roma are often the victims of discrimination side, a persistent barrier to their employment is the
and social exclusion and are at risk of deep poverty, discrimination by employers. These demand and
lacking access to quality education, employment, supply factors probably account for the markedly
healthcare and decent housing. Indicators on socio- higher NEET rate among young Roma.
economic outcomes of the Roma population computed
from the Second European Union minorities and The Roma population is at particular risk of
discrimination survey (MIDIS II) show remarkable poverty. Income poverty affects over 70% of the
levels of disadvantage compared with the rest of the Roma population in all the Member States surveyed
population (see Table 1.3). (81) except Czechia.

Roma represent a significant and growing The inclusion of Roma in education systems and
proportion of the school-age population and the employment is a relevant challenge for the
future workforce in Bulgaria and Romania. The Member States analysed and is high on the EU
average age of Roma is 25, compared with 40 for the agenda. The 2011 EU Framework for National Roma
general population. Around 20% of the new potential Integration Strategies up to 2020 is the policy
workforce is Roma, yet their outcomes in terms of the framework on Roma inclusion that calls on Member
Europe 2020 targets for education and employment States to have and implement a National Roma
are still far below the country averages. Integration Strategy (NRIS) and to advance Roma
inclusion notably in the areas of education,
Table 1.3
employment, health and housing. These are notably
Access to educational systems and subsequent
related to principles and rights of the European Pillar
employability are very low for Roma in the majority of
the Member States surveyed
of Social Rights that states: “regardless of gender,
Summary of the main EU indicators regarding Roma in selected EU MS with significant racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age
Roma population or sexual orientation, everyone has the right to equal
treatment and opportunities regarding employment,
Employment rate (20-64) Early school leavers (18-24) NEET 16-24 At-risk-of-poverty rate
Roma Total Roma Total Roma Total Roma Total

social protection, education, and access to goods and

BG 49 67.1 67 13.4 65 19.3 86 21.8
CZ 43 74.8 57 6.2 51 7.5 58 9.7
EL 52 54.9 92 7.9 60 17.2 96 22.1
ES 24 62 70 20 77 15.6 98 22.2 services available to the public”.
HR 21 60.6 68 2.8 77 18.1 93 19.4
HU 49 68.9 68 11.6 51 11.6 75 15
PT
RO
SK
38
46
43
69.1
66
67.7
90
77
58
13.7
19.1
6.9
52
64
65
11.3
18.1
13.7
70
87
25.1
12.6
Homelessness
Source: EUROSTAT and the Second European Union Minorities and Discrimination Survey
(EU-MIDIS II) Roma – Selected findings. Homelessness and housing exclusion are
Click here to download table. extreme manifestations of poverty and social
exclusion. (82) Many factors may trigger the incidence
Young Roma continue to be over-represented of homelessness: among them rising housing costs,
among early school-leavers, with high disparities intra-EU mobility and migration from third countries.
from the rest of the population. However, the gap (83) Other long-time demographic trends such as
in early school leaving varies among the Member ageing or increasing single parenthood may be drivers
States surveyed. When comparing these outcomes of homelessness, as may family breakdown and de-
with the previous MIDIS I survey, early school-leaving institutionalisation without adequate follow-up
for young Roma seems to be declining, particularly in support.
Bulgaria, Czechia, Romania and Slovakia.
There is no common indicator at EU level that
Low inclusion of Roma youth in the education estimates the number of the homeless, because
systems and high early school-leaving result in of the difficulty of monitoring people in such a
pronounced employment disparities between the state of deprivation through traditional surveys.
Roma workforce and the total population. This According to estimations by the OECD, all countries
gap is fairly high in almost all Member States with available data reported that homeless people
represented less than 1% of the total population in
(81) Data on socio-economic outcomes of the Roma population 2015. (84) However, recent data compiled by the
Overall, it should be noted that EU-MIDIS II is a comparative
survey between countries and sample sizes do not allow
disaggregating on a very detailed national level. EU MIDIS II (82) See:
indicators are often similar – but not always identical - to those https://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=1061&langId=en.
applied in standard European surveys, such as EU SILC or the (83) See Chapter 4 as regards the analysis of the evolution of the
EU LFS. housing costs.
(84) OECD Affordable Housing Database.

61
Employment and Social Developments in Europe 2019

federation of national civil society organisations  - Access to social housing or housing assistance
working with the homeless in Europe suggest a of good quality shall be provided for those in need.
deterioration of the situation in recent years. ( 85) In
2017, homelessness has increased in all Member  - Vulnerable people have the right to
States but Finland. (86) The population most at risk of appropriate assistance and protection against
homelessness in the EU is largely made up of middle- forced eviction.
aged men with long-standing social problems, mental
health issues and/or alcohol and drug addiction. (87)  - Adequate shelter and services shall be
However, in the aftermath of the crisis, the risk of provided to the homeless in order to promote their
homelessness has extended to other segments of the social inclusion.
population, in particular third country migrants, young
people, the newly unemployed and victims of loan To flesh out these principles, the EU has implemented
sharking. Due to the difficulty of monitoring such an various policy actions, for example in the frame of the
extreme phenomenon of social exclusion, it is difficult Social Investment Package (91) and the EU Urban
to identify the main characteristics of the homeless Agenda Housing Partnership. (92)
population. But some publications identify large
families with children, Roma communities and other
minorities as particularly exposed to homelessness. (88)
6. CONCLUSIONS
A favourable global macroeconomic outlook has
Homelessness remains a predominantly urban
started to show signs of a slowdown. In 2018
phenomenon. In terms of the education profile and
economic activity in some advanced economies, as
the spatial dimension, those with only lower-level
well as emerging ones, was weaker than expected,
education in urban areas seem to be overrepresented.
although the US economy continued to show positive
Before the crisis, some 70% of the young homeless
results. Gross domestic product grew by 2.0% in the
had left school with no more than lower secondary
EU and 1.8% in the euro area, marking a deceleration
education. (89) As regards the age profile of the risk of
in comparison with 2017. These results were below
homelessness, young people from a disadvantaged
expectations: they were affected by uncertainty over
background are more often exposed to mental and
structural reforms and the institutional environment
physical health problems. This puts them more at risk
and by underperforming exports, particularly as far as
of forced evictions, even where youth homelessness
goods are concerned.
remains invisible because many manage to stay
temporarily with friends or relatives. Productivity per hour worked is slowly but
steadily increasing in the EU and in 2018 it was
At the same time, a considerable and growing
12% higher than the record low of 2009. On the
number of people over 50 have been homeless or
other hand, productivity per person grew at a slower
exposed to housing exclusion for at least a
pace. The labour cost index has been growing in real
year. (90) Divorce, death of a spouse and an
terms in all sectors of economic activity since 2013.
inadequate pension are the major trigger factors. The Industry is the sector that recorded the strongest
growing lack of carers in ageing societies may also growth, and in 2018 it was 7.2% higher there than in
increase the vulnerability of older people to housing 2012.
exclusion. Older people who depend on affordable
home care and who are left struggling are also at risk Employment has reached a new record level,
of homelessness. with 240.7 million at work at the beginning of
2019. The employment rate in 2018 reached 73.2%,
The risk of homelessness may therefore affect
1.0pp higher than in 2017. However, the employment
very large segments of the population. As a
rate will need to grow at a faster pace in the next two
response, the EU recognises an integrated approach to
years for the EU to reach the EU2020 objective of
combat homelessness. In particular, the European
75%. Furthermore, the gender employment gap has
Pillar of Social Rights identifies three clear principles in
not improved substantially in recent years and remains
this policy area:
above 10pp.

(85) Although the figures are not comparable by country, due to At 6.8% of the labour force, the unemployment
different methodologies for monitoring the number of the
homeless, it is possible to monitor the evolution of the issue
rate reached a historically low level in 2018.
over time within the same Member State. Nonetheless, the incidence of long-term
(86) The FEANTSA report (2018) states that homelessness in the unemployment, albeit in slow decline, is still quite high.
Finnish case was tackled as a housing problem and a violation While weak economic conditions in some countries can
of fundamental rights rather than an inevitable social problem be a cause, an improvement in active labour market
resulting from personal issues.
policies could help the integration of the long-term
(87) European Commission (2012).
(88) FEANTSA (2007).
unemployed in the labour market.
(89) CSEYHP (2011). See:
https://www.movisie.nl/en/themes/combating-youth-
homelessness. (91) European Commission (2013).
(90) European Commission (2013). (92) See: https://ec.europa.eu/futurium/en/housing.

62
 Chapter 1: Main Employment and Social Developments

Differences among Member States and among income; the right to training; and facilitating access to
regions, especially in unemployment rates, housing and assistance for the homeless and to
remain very high, even where economic essential services for all.
conditions have improved. Policies to improve public
investment and to push regions out of the middle-
income trap can have a positive impact in the
reduction of differences in unemployment.

The social situation in the EU has improved,

especially with regard to higher standards of
living in most Member States. Over the last three
years, incomes from work have continued to increase
and, together with social transfers, have led to an
increase in the disposable incomes of households. The
risk of poverty or social exclusion in the EU has
steadily declined from its 2012 peak. Severe material
deprivation has decreased in all Member States except
Greece.

However, progress in reducing inequality and

relative poverty (AROP) has been modest.
Inequality in the EU has been largely stable since
2014. Without the redistributive effects of tax-benefit
systems, inequality and poverty in the EU would have
been much higher. Additionally, progress at the EU
level conceals significant differences between Member
States. The risk of poverty (AROP) has increased or
stabilised in most Member States, while inequality has
intensified in eight Member States and can therefore
be considered one of the main socio-economic
challenges in the EU. (93) The risks of poverty or social
exclusion are more pronounced for certain types of
workers and for vulnerable groups.

The middle class is a key component of all

European societies, making up well over half of
the EU population. However, in some Member States
the middle class feels under strain and reports high
levels of financial difficulty. Overall in the EU, there
has been an improvement for the lowest income
groups, mostly located in central-eastern Member
States as a result of their economic catching-up, while
the income conditions of the lower income groups in
Mediterranean Member States have, if anything,
worsened.

Improvements in labour markets should in

principle translate into better social situations
for more Europeans. Addressing the aforementioned
challenges in social situations calls, among other
things, for more effective and efficient social
protection systems. In this respect, there is scope for
more effective policy action by the Member States.
Such action could be focused on principles of the Pillar
of Social Rights, particularly on: the right to adequate
social protection; the right to adequate minimum

(93) While this statement is accurate in the EU context, Filauro and

Parolin (2018) and Blanchet et al. (2019) show that income
inequality in the EU can be considered low by comparison with
the USA. Darvas and Wolff (2016, p.2) present similar findings
in comparison to the emerging economies of Asia, Africa and
Latin America, and contend that poverty defined using very low
absolute income is rare in the EU.

63
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65
CHAPTER 2

Sustainable growth and

development in the EU:
concepts and challenges
employment and social progress, and a high level of
1. INTRODUCTION (94) protection and improvement of the quality of the
environment.” Thus, according to the Treaty,
Sustainability as a global concern emerged in sustainable development in the EU:
the second half of the 20th century out of
growing recognition of the detrimental impacts  presupposes enduring and inclusive economic
of economic development on the environment growth;
and human health. Sustainability refers to the ability
of a system, organism or human-made product to  is based on macroeconomic stability without
endure indefinitely. The concept evolved out of imbalances;
“sustainable development”, a term coined in 1987 by
the seminal report issued by the World Commission on  should be pursued through a highly competitive
Environment and Development, chaired by Norwegian “social market economy” (i.e. on a distinctly
Prime Minister Gro Harlem Brundtland under the European model of economic policies (97) which
auspices of the United Nations. The report called promote fair market competition within a welfare
sustainable development one “that strikes a balance state);
between meeting the needs of the present without
compromising the ability of future generations to meet  should aim at full employment and social progress;
their own needs.”(95) Related concepts emphasise the
 should aim at protecting and improving the
ultimate common goods and values that need to be
environment.
sustained, as in “sustainable society”: “one where
economic growth is compatible with planetary Sustainable development in the EU is understood
boundaries and fairly distributed among its
as having three interlinked and equal dimensions
citizens.”(96)
– economic, social, and environmental. Underlying
Sustainable development is one of the European this view (illustrated in Figure 2.1) is the belief that “it
Union’s fundamental aims and a matter of is not possible to achieve a desired level of ecological
international credibility. It is enshrined in Article 3.3 or social or economic sustainability (separately)
without achieving at least a basic level of all three
of the Treaty on the European Union (TEU), which
forms of sustainability, simultaneously.”( 98) The Europe
states that “The Union shall […] work for the
2020 strategy for “smart, sustainable and inclusive
sustainable development of Europe based on balanced
economic growth and price stability, a highly (97) The "social" element of the model refers to support for the
competitive social market economy, aiming at full provision of equal opportunity and protection of those unable
to enter the free market labour force because of old age,
(94) This chapter was written by Katarina Jaksic, Jörg Peschner and disability, or unemployment.
Argyrios Pisiotis. (98) The view owes much to the corporate accounting term “triple
(95) World Commission on Environment and Development (1987). bottom line,” coined by business sociologist John Elkington
(96) Falkenberg (2016). (1997) and (1999), p.75.

66
 Chapter 2: Sustainable growth and development in the EU: concepts and challenges

growth”, issued in early 2010, is also consistent with Figure 2.2

this tri-dimensional view of sustainable development. SDGs require simultaneous and mutually reinforcing
action towards three core objectives: economic growth,
Sustainable development has become a social inclusion and environmental protection
Sustainable Development Goals
mainstream concept. It has been invoked by
scholars, multinational business and advocacy groups,
governments and multilateral institutions. In
September 2015, the United Nations resolution on the
2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and its 17
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs, see Figure 2.2)
marked the culmination of a process that has made
“sustainability” the global framework for international
and national development efforts in all their economic,
social, environmental and governance dimensions.( 99)

Figure 2.1
Sustainability as the intersection between environment,
economy and society
Sustainability and its dimensions

Source: https://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/news/communications-material/
Click here to download figure.

The EU was one of the leaders in the formulation

of the SDG agenda and has taken follow-up
action towards its implementation. In 2017, the
European Commission established the High Level
Multi-stakeholder Platform on the SDGs, bringing
together ideas for the Commission’s Reflection Paper
“Towards a Sustainable Europe by 2030.”( 100) Issued
on 30 January 2019, the Reflection Paper contributed
to the wider debate on the ‘Future of Europe’, launched
in March 2017 by European Commission President
Source: Authors' own presentation.
Juncker. It aimed at stimulating further reflection on
Click here to download figure. the vision of a sustainable EU and a strategy for
implementation of sustainable development goals. It
complemented a series of other Reflection Papers
(99) See the UN resolution at launched before, including on the social dimension of
https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/post2015/transformingo Europe (101) and on Harnessing Globalisation. (102)
urworld. The concept of resilience, initially used in engineering
and environmental sciences, started being transferred to social Fast and bold common policy choices are needed
sciences, where it has also become a paradigm or “perspective”,
moulding development action in national settings and for making the EU sustainable. A recent report by
international cooperation. See Folke (2006) and Brown (2014), the European Commission’s Political Strategy Centre
pp. 107–117. In the EU, resilience has progressively gained points to “global existential challenges” which urgently
prominence as a concept similar to the concept of
sustainability. It can be defined as the “ability of the society to
required a common EU policy response. (103) In its
face shocks and persistent structural changes without losing its
ability to deliver societal well-being in a sustainable way,” while (100) Accessible at https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-
a “resilient society aims to sustain its level of individual and political/files/rp_sustainable_europe_30-01_en_web.pdf .
societal wellbeing in an intergenerationally fair distribution”; (101) The Reflection Paper on the Social Dimension of Europe
see Manca and Zec (2019) and Manca et al. (2017), p.6. discusses how to sustain our standards of living, create more
and better jobs, equip people with the right skills and create
more unity within EU society, in the light of major changes. See:
European Commission (2017), Reflection paper on the Social
Dimension of Europe, COM(2017) 206, 26 April 2017;
accessible at https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-
political/files/reflection-paper-social-dimension-europe_en.pdf.
(102) The Reflection Paper on Harnessing Globalisation discusses
ways to protect and empower citizens through robust social
policies and education and training support throughout their
lives, as well as through progressive tax policies and
investment in innovation. In external relations, the Paper posits
the need to shape a truly sustainable global order, based on a
multilateral set of global rules and a common agenda.
(103) European Political Strategy Centre (2019). The paper provides
an overview of the long-term structural trends accelerating and
intersecting at EU level. These trends bear economic,
technological, societal and governance-related risks. They
include significant growth divergence between countries,

67
Employment and Social Developments in Europe 2019

Reflection Paper, the European Commission outlined  working conditions and their harmonisation across
policy choices for setting the EU’s economy on a path Member States;
towards sustainability, while taking account of the
inextricable links between the various dimensions of  the improvement of living conditions and upward
sustainability, each facing particular challenges. (104) It convergence in living standards;
focuses on promoting a circular economy, sustainable
production, consumption, including in the key agro-  welfare states (indirectly through the stated
food sector, energy generation and consumption, and a preference for a “social market economy”);
socially fair transition to environmentally sustainable
economic growth. The Paper also identifies domains in  the fight against social exclusion and
which policy action can have a horizontal enabling discrimination;
effect in fostering sustainable development. These are
education, science, technology, research and  (proper) social protection;
innovation, financing, taxation and competition
policies, corporate social responsibility and coming to  social dialogue;
terms with new business models, open trade, and
effective multi-level governance.  human capital development;

This chapter reviews concepts of sustainability  gender equality;

and identifies key implementation challenges.
 protection of the rights of the child;
Different sections dedicated to: firstly, the concept of
sustainability and its measurement, with a focus on  economic, social and territorial cohesion; and
the social dimension of sustainability; secondly, a
factor analysis aimed at identifying the principal  solidarity among Member States.
components of sustainable growth as well as
synergies and trade-offs between the different The EU aims for “inclusive growth”, including
dimensions of sustainable development; and thirdly, through the implementation of its Europe 2020
identifying the main challenges to social sustainability strategy. As shown in Chapter 3, economic growth
in the EU. These are addressed in detail in the benefits from efficient product (and credit) markets
subsequent chapters. and fair competition. This is important for allocating
resources to their most productive use, and for
2. SUSTAINABILITY AS AN EU incentivising innovation. However, the concept of
inclusive growth is broader. For the EU, it includes
OBJECTIVE: DEFINING AND empowering people through opportunities for all
MEASURING THE SOCIAL DIMENSION throughout the lifecycle: investing in skills in order to
attain high levels of employment; fighting poverty and
The social dimension of the EU is of fundamental thus building a cohesive society; and sharing the gains
importance. Whether subsumed directly under of growth widely. For growth to be inclusive, labour
“sustainable development” or not, the scope of the markets need to be modernised, training and social
social dimension is broadly delineated in the Treaties protection systems adjusted to help people to
through explicit or implicit references to the following anticipate and manage technological transformation
aspects: (105) and more frequent labour market transitions. In its
Lisbon and Europe 2020 strategies, the EU anticipated
 (social) justice; the particular risks attached to Europe’s ageing
population and the need to make the fullest possible
 human dignity and equality; use of its labour potential to sustain growth and
prosperity. In this context, promoting gender equality
 inter- and intra-generational solidarity; and facilitating the inclusion of people with disabilities
is as much a measure of support for the EU’s growth
 promotion of (high) employment; potential, benefiting all, as it is a matter of principle
aimed at improving the lives of the individuals
regions and businesses; changing demographics and rising
concerned.
inequalities; unsustainable consumption patterns; societal
unease with rapid pace of change; rising protectionism; and
climate change. The European Pillar of Social Rights gives
(104) See European Commission (2019c), p. 3, chart adapted from prominence and visibility to the social dimension
Kate Raworth’s ‘Donut of social and planetary boundaries’ of sustainability. Proclaimed at the Gothenburg
(2017).
Social Summit of 17 November 2017 by the European
(105) All references are to either the Treaty on the European Union
(TEU) or the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
Parliament, the Council and the Commission, the Pillar
(TFEU). Article 2 TEU conveys the strong social content of the showed the commitment of EU institutions and
EU’s shared foundational values. Article 3.3. TEU lists primary Member States to work on all of the aforementioned
EU objectives emanating from these values (art. 2 TEU) and aspects of the social dimension. The principles of the
from the EU’s fundamental goal (art. 3.1 TEU.) Article 151 TFEU
elaborates on EU objectives related to human resource
Pillar provide a compass for upward convergence
development, labour markets and social conditions. towards more equal opportunities and access to the

68
 Chapter 2: Sustainable growth and development in the EU: concepts and challenges

labour market, fairer working conditions and more Table 2.1

decent living conditions through social protection and EU citizens’ personal and national challenges differ
inclusion. They can also be considered a “to do” list for significantly from those facing the EU and remain
predominantly focused on social issues
promoting social sustainability. Most important issues that the EU and citizens personally are facing (both in the view
of citizens)
2.1. European citizens’ views and Rank (% of respondents) Main concern Most important issue
expectations regarding sustainability at national level citizens are facing
personally
Immigration 3 15
All three dimensions of sustainable development Terrorism
(21%)
13
(6.0%)
16
are high on the list of European citizens’ (8%) (2.7%)
State of public finances 11
preoccupations, while environmental concerns (10%)
are gaining ground. According to the most recent Economic situation 5
(15%)
11
(8.1%)
standard Eurobarometer survey of autumn 2018, Climate change 7
(14%)
6
(10.3%)
citizens regard migration as by far the biggest issue Unemployment 1 7
the EU is facing, but concerns about climate change Rising prices
(23%)
2
(9.9%)
1
and environmental sustainability are growing, while (21%) (31.7%)
The environment 7 6
concerns about security, unemployment and the (14%) (10.3%)
overall economic situation continue to decline (see Crime 8
(12%)
14
(6.1%)
Chart 2.1). Pensions 6 3
(15%) (15.9%)
Energy supply 7
Chart 2.1 (14%)
EU citizens' see migration, security and sustainability as Taxation 13 5
(8%) (11.7%)
the most important issues the EU is facing Health and social security 4 2
Evolution of main challenges that the EU should address, identified by EU citizens (20%) (16.9%)
Household finances 4
(13.2%)
Education systems 10 8
(11%) (9.8%)
Working conditions 9
(8.6%)
Living conditions 10
(8.4%)
Housing 9 13
(11%) (6.9%)

Note: Data are percentages of EU total respondents. Responses regarding main

challenges at national level are based on pre-defined answer categories;
responses regarding main challenges faced personally are based on free answers
without pre-defined categories. The top four responses in each category are listed
in bold and in colour.
Note: Data are in percentage of EU-total respondents. Only the six most frequently
chosen answers are represented in the graph. Source: Eurobarometer, autumn 2018.
Source: Eurobarometer, autumn 2018.
Click here to download chart.
Europeans also see the need for modernising and
strengthening social welfare systems in the EU.
However, the concerns of EU citizens at personal
Whereas welfare systems are within the competence
and national level continue to focus on of Member states, it is worth noting that almost two
household finances, purchasing power and thirds of the citizens surveyed by Eurobarometer
employment outlook. Interestingly, when citizens are favour harmonising social welfare systems within the
asked – in the same survey of 2018 - about their EU, a two-point increase on the previous year. One in
“most important concerns personally and nationally”, four (26%) are opposed to this.
the results look somewhat different (see Table 2.1).
The top five concerns of EU citizens “for them 2.2. Measuring (social) sustainability
personally” are: rising prices (32%), health and social
security (17%), pensions (16%), the financial situation Measuring and assessing (social) sustainability
of the household (13%) as well as taxation, education are still in their infancy. The realization of the need
and environment, climate and energy issues (all at for such a measure is not new. The “Commission on
10%). Immigration (6%) and terrorism (3%), on the the Measurement of Economic Performance and Social
other hand, rank last in this survey. Main concerns at Progress”, (106) admitted the difficulty of devising
the national level mirror those at the personal level to measures that can accurately determine whether
a great extent with unemployment heading the list, current levels of well-being can be maintained for
followed by rising prices, immigration, health and future generations. The report emphasised that the
social security and the economic situation. While assessment of sustainability is complementary to the
depending on multiple factors, the discrepancies in determination of current economic performance or
reported EU-level, national level and personal concerns well-being and should be measured separately. The
accompany the observed divergences between EU authors warned against combining measures of
aggregate indicators and individual perceptions.
(106) The Commission, established by former President of France
Nicholas Sarkozy in 2008, was coordinated by Nobel laureates
Joseph Stiglitz and Amartya Sen and French economist Jean-
Paul Fitoussi.

69
Employment and Social Developments in Europe 2019

current well-being and sustainability into a single A focus on “common goods” and “capabilities”
indicator or confusing the former with the latter. This could further enrich the approach of social
means that measurement of sustainability in the sustainability. The concept of functional
employment and social domains cannot be “capabilities” builds on the premise that the citizens’
tantamount to the measurement of current established rights to certain public goods are
performance in these domains, based on familiar meaningless without active measures by governments
stylised indicators. to enable citizens to exercise these rights. These
include economic facilities and social opportunities,
Measuring sustainability requires a methodology such as education and healthcare, which allow people
based on “stocks”, “flows” and “thresholds.” The to live better lives and realise their potential.( 111) The
report of the “Stiglitz Commission” concluded that any capabilities approach has become a predominant
assessment of sustainability, in the economic, paradigm for policy in human development, inspiring
environmental or social dimensions, requires a the creation of the UN's Human Development Index,
dashboard of indicators partly reflecting the which captures health, education, and income
methodology of the environmental sciences. This capabilities. (112) The strengths of the capabilities
methodology would represent the variability of the approach are: a) the emphasis of welfare economics
“stocks” to be sustained, i.e. quantities and qualities of on subjective individual choices; b) the
natural, physical, human, and social capital. It would contextualisation of development efforts in a specific
also monitor “flows” in and out of these stocks and society with its regulatory, institutional and legal
establish threshold values for each stock “beyond aspects; and c) the possibility of weighting indicators
which [adverse effects] would be highly detrimental to of development according to people’s situation in life.
future well-being” (107).
The Social Scoreboard accompanying the
The social dimension of sustainability has European Pillar of Social Rights offers a
commonly been measured through stylised framework for measuring social sustainability in
indicators of labour market and social outcomes. the EU. Although measuring social sustainability does
These are indicators such as employment, activity and not have to mimic methods developed for the
unemployment rates and their breakdown components, environmental dimension, monitoring flows in and out
Gross Disposable Household Income and its of the existing stocks can be crucial to policy.
distribution, (108) the rate of people at risk of poverty Ascertaining the positive or negative direction of an
and social exclusion and its breakdown components, indicator’s evolution can assist policy target setting to
in-work poverty, gender gaps, etc. ( 109) This stems influence the direction and speed of this evolution. ( 113)
from the relative difficulty of suggesting a definition The European Semester uses the Social Scoreboard to
of social sustainability that would gain widespread monitor performance in the social dimension (see
visibility and political acceptance, as has happened Annex 1).
with environmental sustainability. This simple yet
practical approach could be complemented with the
measurement of the forward-looking dimension of the 3. IDENTIFYING THE PRINCIPAL
desired performance under each such indicator. It also COMPONENTS OF SUSTAINABLE
foregoes any attempt to explore the interplay between
indicators and whether and how they reinforce each DEVELOPMENT: A FACTOR ANALYSIS
other.
The previous section shows that the concept of
The EU's SDG indicators offer an extensive view 'social sustainability' is not clear-cut. The
of the evolution of the social dimension. Yet they empirical analysis in this chapter therefore starts by
concentrate on trends and outcomes rather than attempting to refine and realise the concept. This
assessing the sustainability of current well-being. section seeks to complement previous efforts to
From 2017 onwards, the Commission carried out operationalise the social dimension in two ways:
regular monitoring of the SDGs in an EU context,
developing a reference indicator framework for this (111) The capabilities approach developed out of the collaboration of
purpose and drawing on the wide range of ongoing development economists Amartya Sen, Sudhir Anand and
monitoring and assessment across the Commission, James Foster and philosopher Martha Nussbaum. See Sen
Agencies, European External Action Service and (2001) and (2010), pp. 195–220, Nussbaum and Sen (1993).
Member States. (110) (112) The Human Development Index (HDI) is a statistic composite
index of life expectancy, education, and per capita income
indicators, which is used to rank countries into four tiers of
human development. A country scores a higher HDI when the
(107) Stiglitz et al (2009), p. 266. lifespan is higher, the education level is higher, and the GDP
(108) Income distribution is typically measured using the Gini- per capita is higher.
coefficient and the S80/S20 ratio. (113) This is particularly true since many social system
(109) This approach is similar to that of Eurofound in the project characteristics (e.g. human capital development, social
titled “Developing a conceptual framework to monitor networking, leadership) allow for both adaptation and
convergence in the European Union.” See Mascherini et al. transformation of human production, consumption and
(2018). conservation activity. See Apgar et al. (2015), cited in Johnson
(110) European Commission, 2016a, p. 16; See also Eurostat et al. (2018), p. 15.
(2018b).

70
 Chapter 2: Sustainable growth and development in the EU: concepts and challenges

Box 2.1: Explorative Factor Analysis

The factors are being extracted from the original  Extraction happens in a way as to maximise
dataset, following two rules: correlation of a factor with some variables while
minimising correlation with other variables. This
 The extracted factors themselves are uncorrelated
makes it possible to interpret each factor as each
(orthogonal) so that they reflect different
factor can be related to certain variables.
dimensions of social sustainability (are independent
of each other). The correlation between the factors and the original
variables is called 'factor loading'.

Firstly, it seeks synergies between the different further step was to use information about cross-
aspects of the social dimension, as represented by country correlations between these variables to find
the principles of the Social Pillar. In other words, it out whether there are common drivers behind them.
explores whether and which of these aspects/principles Those are the factors, or principal components, of
reinforce each other. sustainable development, with a focus on the social
dimension.
Secondly, it extends the quest for synergies
beyond the social dimension, to the other two The final list of indicators taken into account for the
dimensions of sustainability — the environmental and factor analysis is shown in Table 2.2, first column. It
economic. comprises 45 indicators from very different sources,
distributed across six broad themes (policy areas) that
The objective of the analysis is to identify the are considered relevant to people's well-being: (1) the
principal components of sustainable labour market situation in the respective country, (2)
development. These bind together the social, the availability of job-related skills and qualifications,
environmental and economic dimensions. The (3) the macro-economic conditions, (4) the social
principles of social sustainability are listed in the outcomes, (5) the welfare state and institutions, and
previous section. If they are pursued without paying (6) the environmental conditions. The table also
attention to the constraints imposed by environmental displays the Sustainable Development Goals covered
and economic concerns the EU risks making progress by the respective theme. Annex 2 explains variables
on one dimension at the expense of the other two. To and their data sources, indicating why they were
mitigate such risks, it is crucial to pursue included.
improvements in the social dimension by capitalising
on potential synergies with the other dimensions. The
analytical framework usually used for this kind of
question is an explorative Factor Analysis (FA), also
called 'Principal Component Analysis' (see Box
2.1). (114)

A factor analysis identifies groups of inter-

correlated macro, social and environmental
variables. (115) In the present case, the first step was
to identify all the country-level variables deemed
relevant to describing the core dimensions of the UN
Sustainable Development Goals. The next step was to
reduce this list of more than 400 variables to a
manageable set of indicators. (116) This reduced final
list contains variables that correlate highly with others
which have been eliminated in the reduction process.
Annex 2 presents a table of non-included variables
together with their correlations with the factors. (117) A

(114) See, for example, Backhaus et al (2008), Ch. II.7.

(115) See European Commission (2011, p. 210). The ESDE 2011 had
used the same methodology in the context of identifying the
main dimensions of Active Ageing.
(116) Starting out from several hundred variables, the final list is the
outcome of numerous rounds of reduction of redundant
variables, or adding of new variables, based on the themes
they cover and the contribution they made to the overall
model's explanatory power.
(117) That is, these variables were taken into account although they
were technically not part of the model.

71
Employment and Social Developments in Europe 2019

Table 2.2
Sustainable development can be summarized through four main factors
Four factors extracted from 45 labour market, social and institutional variables

Note: The overall variability of the model is normalised to a value of 45, i.e. 45 variables with a standardised variance of one each.
Summing up the (squared) loadings along one variable gives the variable's communality. It denotes the percentage of this variable's cross-country differences that all four factors
manage to explain.
Summing up the (squared) loadings over one factor gives the factor's Eigenvalue. It denotes the percentage of all original variables' cross-country differences that each factor can
explain.
The sum over all four Eigenvalues is equal to 33.0, equal to the sum over all 45 communalities. The four factors thus explain 73% (33/45) of the cross-country differences
between the 45 original variables.
Source: DG EMPL calculation based on Eurostat: EU LFS, EU SILC National Accounts; Eurofound: EWCS, ESS; ICTWSS database (University of Amsterdam).
Click here to download table.

72
 Chapter 2: Sustainable growth and development in the EU: concepts and challenges

3.1. The principle components of sustainable  signs of adjustment to persistently unfavourable

development labour market situations. A high Factor 2 score
combines high government gross debt (reflecting
The right part of Table 2.2 presents each of the four long-standing structural problems) and low wage
factors as they were extracted from the analysis dynamics;
(columns). The table shows how each factor correlates
with each original variable - the so-called factor Factor 2 explains 26% of the original dataset's cross-
loadings. Only those higher than 0.5 are shown. The country differences. Henceforth it is referred to as
following observations can be made: "Degree of labour market (in-)efficiency”.

Factor 1: Human capital and effective Factor 3: Favourable social outcomes.

institutions favour productivity.
 Factor 3 has a strong negative correlation with all
Countries scoring high on the first factor also tend to poverty-related and inequality-related variables. A
high score in Factor 3 implies very favourable
 score high on all skill-related variables. In other social outcomes.
words, the first factor correlates strongly with
skills;  At the same time, in countries scoring high on
Factor 3, social transfers tend to be effective in
 score high on productivity, GDP per capita and reducing poverty.
income (60% of median income is used as the
poverty threshold); This factor explains 17% of the original variables'
overall cross-country variance. Henceforth, factor 3 is
 score high on variables that indicate high coverage referred to as "Effective welfare states favour good
of workers by collective bargaining. In other words, social outcomes".
workers benefit from coordinated (as opposed to
individual) bargaining over working conditions as Factor 4: Regulatory barriers, high taxes and
members of trade unions. Factor 1 also correlates inefficient social expenditure represent
positively with favourable indices of corruption, important ‘limits to growth’.
accountability, the rule of law and government
effectiveness, signalling trust in the functioning The fourth factor correlates with only a few variables
and effectiveness of government institutions; and therefore contributes least to the overall variance
(13%). However, it is included because it is effective in
 score high in terms of social expenditure; capturing growth and labour taxation characteristics.
Countries scoring high on Factor 4:
 score high on 'green' indicators that may indicate
prior investment in energy productivity and  show low recent productivity-growth and hence
resource efficiency of production. GDP growth rates;

Factor 1 is the factor with the highest explanatory  tend to show high tax wedges on labour which,
power. It explains the biggest share (44%) of the together with lower export shares in GDP, may
cross-country differences in the 45 original variables reflect competitiveness problems in some
included. Henceforth it is referred to as "Human countries;
Capital" (unless otherwise noted).
 spend much of their GDP on old-age-related social
Factor 2: Labour market efficiency is a protection, which implies little investment in the
precondition to sustainable development. current workforce;

This factor has a negative connotation. A high score First conclusions

signals less favourable outcomes. Countries scoring
high on Factor 2 show: Before considering how countries perform on the four
factors, some important findings can be derived from
 low employment outcomes (and high the way factors emerge from the comprehensive
unemployment) for different groups of workers; original dataset and how they reinforce each other.
Comparing countries' performance on the four factors,
 signs of imperfect labour markets in the form of it seems that:
strong labour market dualities, with privileged
insiders and certain groups at a high risk of being  Skills go hand in hand with higher
(and remaining) outsiders. A high Factor 2 score productivity. Effective and trustworthy political
implies high job tenure, a high level of involuntary and labour-market institutions further reinforce
temporary work, a high share of self-employment, this link. Countries where this is the case are also in
a low share of at least medium-educated people a position to invest more in social welfare in a
and low overall job satisfaction; more efficient use of natural resources. Factor 1
provides evidence that policies focusing on human

73
Employment and Social Developments in Europe 2019

capital and social and environmental sustainability allow them to be assigned to any of the broader
create trust and favour (rather than hinder) clusters. (120) The following findings emerge:
economic efficiency.
There is structural labour market inefficiency in
 Structural inefficiency in the labour market, the South of Europe. Southern Member States show
if not tackled, accumulates over time. It can clear signs of segmented labour markets, with high
thus lead to internal devaluation in the form of low unemployment and low employment performance of
wage increases and subdued employment vulnerable groups such as young people, women, or
prospects. people with only low-level qualifications. Workers'
bargaining power has generally weakened in these
 High effectiveness of welfare spending goes countries, especially for workers on non-standard
hand in hand with lower poverty rates and contracts, so it may be difficult for them to push
lower inequality. effectively for higher wages.

 Regulatory barriers may hamper productivity There is an East-West divide in terms of

growth and a high tax wedge on labour raises institutions. Almost all eastern Member States (121)
labour costs and reduces workers' take-home (EU-13, green and blue) are on the left side of the
pay. Both may thus lead to lower rates of chart, while western Member States (EU-15) are on the
economic growth. (118) This may be the case for right. (122) The eastern EU countries tend to perform
Member States where income levels are already less well on the Human Capital factor (which also
high and where certain social and institutional captures productivity and effectiveness of institutions).
standards have been developed over past decades, They are still in the process of catching-up
the financing of which requires higher labour taxes. economically with western Member States, with labour
To the extent that high labour taxes are needed to productivity and per-capita GDP not yet reaching the
guarantee high social standards, this could hint at same standard. The culture of social dialogue appears
problems of competitiveness that may arise in the less developed as the share of workers covered by
future. Yet countries like the Nordic Member States, collective bargaining tends to be lower than in western
Germany and Austria score well on both the Human Member States. In addition, in a number of eastern
Capital (Factor 1) and Limits to Growth (Factor 4) Member States trust in the functioning of labour
factors. That is, they combine high social standards market institutions is significantly lower. Finally, these
with high productivity. Member States face relatively large environmental
challenges and/or struggle with an investment gap in
3.2. A taxonomy of sustainable social pollution abatement.
development in the EU
(120) Ireland and Malta are distant outliers on the ‘Limits to Growth’
Based on the components (factors) of dimension (which complicates this factor's interpretation). They
sustainable development identified it is possible show by far the highest GDP and productivity growth and are
to show how Member States score on each of the among the countries with the lowest tax wedge for labour.
Hence, these countries gain competitiveness through low
factors. It appears that in some countries the taxation and (especially in the case of Ireland) low growth in
foundations of sustainable development have been labour costs. One should also consider a certain upward bias in
laid. In others, there seem to be shortcomings in one or Ireland’s GDP measurement, reflecting the impact of mere
more dimensions of sustainability. A Cluster Analysis changes in accounting practices of multinational companies.
Luxembourg has a highly competitive and particularly large
(CA) seeks to build a hierarchy of groups (clusters) of financial sector (European Commission (2019a). It pushes
countries based on the similarity or dissimilarity of Luxembourg's score on the Human Capital dimension to the
their scores on all four factors. (119) Chart 2.2 plots the top. Its small open economy is highly exposed to global
first two factors against each other. They are the competition and shows by far the highest export share in GDP
and the highest per-capita GDP in the EU.
strongest factors in the sense that they represent 70%
(121) For the purpose of the analysis, "eastern” Member States are
of the total variation on all four factors. The colours considered those that acceded in the EU in 2004 or later (EU-
chosen for the chart reflect the clusters identified for 13).
Member States, based on all four factors. Factor (122) "Western" Member States are those 15 countries that made up
values are standardised to ensure that a value of zero the EU before the 2004 enlargement (EU-15).
reflects the (unweighted) average across all countries.
The factor scores of certain smaller countries do not

(118) Earlier model-based Commission analysis on the allocative

impact of higher labour taxes confirms this finding. See ESDE
2016.
(119) The method is called "hierarchical clustering", where the Ward-
methodology is being used. See Backhaus et al (2008), pp.
420ff, European Commission (2011), p. 212.

74
 Chapter 2: Sustainable growth and development in the EU: concepts and challenges

Chart 2.2
A South-East-West divide
The components of Sustainable Development (factors 1 and 2)
3
EL

2
IT
Degree of labour market (in-) efficiency

ES

HR
1

CY FR
PT
BE
SI IE
PL MT
0
-2 -1,5 SK
-1 -0,5 0 0,5 FI 1 1,5 2
UK NL
HUCZ
RO AT
BG DK LU
DE
SE
-1
LV

LT EE

-2

-3
Human capital and effective institutions favour productivity
Note: Luxembourg, Ireland and Malta are not assigned to any of the clusters.
Source: DG EMPL calculations
Click here to download chart.

Southern Europe and parts of eastern Europe

face challenges as regards social outcomes. The
clustering procedure assigns the Baltic States as well
as Romania and Bulgaria to one cluster (green),
separate from other eastern Member States (blue).
These eastern European Member States are less
affected than the southern cluster by labour market
segmentation (vertical on Chart 2.2). Yet, like the
southern cluster, they show relatively unfavourable
scores on factor 3 “Effective welfare state favours
good social outcomes". This factor captures Member
States' performance on indicators related to inequality,
poverty, and the potential for social transfers to
reduce poverty. Factor 3 is shown on the vertical axis
of Chart 2.3 where it is plotted against the "Human
Capital" factor.

75
Employment and Social Developments in Europe 2019

Chart 2.3
A diverse eastern European pattern
The components of Sustainable Development (Factors 1 and 3)
3
Effective welfare states favour good social outcomes

CZ
2

SI FI

PL
SK 1
HU
DK
CY NL
FR
HR IE
AT
UK DE BE SE
0 MT
-2 -1,5 -1 -0,5 0 0,5 1 1,5 2
PT
EE
EL
LV
-1

IT LU
LT ES

BG RO

-2

-3
Human capital and effective institutions favour productivity
Note: Luxembourg, Ireland and Malta are not assigned to any of the clusters.
Source: DG EMPL calculations.
Click here to download chart.

economic recession represented a major setback in

4. SOCIAL SUSTAINABILITY IN THE EU: terms of employment and social inclusion, including
CHALLENGES, SYNERGIES, TRADE- poverty. Since the recovery, employment has grown
strongly again, severe material deprivation has
OFFS decreased, while activity rates have continued their
long-term upward trend. The crisis and its aftermath
The Reflection Paper “Towards a sustainable
made it clear that employment and social goals cannot
Europe by 2030” states that “sustainable
be disconnected from broader growth objectives.
development is about upgrading people’s living
standards by giving people real choices, creating While public finances currently have some room
an enabling environment” and leading to “a situation for manoeuvre, long-term (economic and social)
where we are living well within the boundaries of our sustainability remains an issue. After substantial
planet through smarter use of resources and a modern de-leveraging and reinforced fiscal discipline to
economy that serves our health and well-being”. (123) safeguard financial stability, EU level debt is forecast
This section looks at where the EU stands today and to fall to 78.8% of GDP in 2020, 10 pp. lower than its
which issues are particularly challenging on the EU’s peak in 2014 but more than 20 pp. higher than its pre-
path to achieving this declared vision of balanced crisis low. The overall deficit for 2019 and 2020 is
development. Specifically, the section examines the forecast to remain below 1% of GDP. (124) However, in
synergies and trade-offs between the different high-debt countries fiscal buffers need to be further
sustainability dimensions, which the factor analysis reinforced to create fiscal space for stimulating growth
has already identified, by confirming and expanding during the economic slowdown while at the same time
upon them with examples from literature and some investing in social and environmental
key findings from the subsequent chapters. sustainability. For example, welfare systems need to
be sufficiently robust to cushion the impact the ageing
4.1. The Social-Economic Nexus of the society may have on economic growth and
Decades of economic growth have brought higher demographic dependency. ( 125) Welfare systems
also need to fund better protection and empower
steady improvements in living standards in the
people to make the most of labour market
EU. On average, Europeans today live longer than ever
before and are better educated. However, the (124) European Commission Spring Economic Forecast 2019 (no-
policy assumption).
(123) European Commission (2019c). (125) European Commission (2017b): ESDE2017, Chapters 2 and 4.

76
 Chapter 2: Sustainable growth and development in the EU: concepts and challenges

opportunities. In this context, the quality, effectiveness Chart 2.4

and composition of public spending is of paramount The gender pay gap is high and cannot be explained only
importance and difficult reforms to public spending by the characteristics of the female workforce
Unadjusted gender pay gap (% of average gross hourly earnings of men) and the
and taxation may therefore be needed.( 126) Efficient 'unexplained' proportion of the gap, in hourly wages (2014)
tax systems incentivise investment in areas that foster 35

productivity and equity, thus supporting growth. In the 30

25

absence of such structural reforms, ageing-related 20

expenditure (pensions, health and long-term care) is 15

10

projected to exert significant long-term pressure on 5

the public budgets of a majority of Member States.

0

LU
IT

IE

UK
LT

CY

LV

CZ
NL
RO

BE

EL

BG

ES

EE
DK

DE
HR

HU
SI
PO

SE

PT

FR

FI
SK
MT

EU28

AT
-5
-10

Labour markets and productivity -15

Unadjusted pay gap Explained pay gap

Note: The unexplained pay gap is the gap that cannot be explained by differences in the
Current employment levels are at a record high average characteristics of the male and female workforce (age, education,
but further gains depend on the ability to occupation, job experience, employment contract, working time, enterprise
characteristics). Countries are sorted by unexplained pay gap. Only unadjusted
provide quality jobs. The margin for further gains is gender pay gap are considered official statistics.
Source: Figures from Eurostat (2018), Decomposition of the unadjusted gender pay gap
largest for groups currently facing difficulties in using Structure of Earnings Survey data. (2014 wave).
participating in the job market, such as young people, Click here to download chart.

the low-skilled, the elderly, the disabled, migrants and

marginalised communities. The prolonged detachment Similar to labour market participation,
from work of many young people and migrant women productivity growth becomes ever more
in particular can have negative consequences for important. To maintain and improve standards of
potential growth and be disadvantageous for the living, the EU economy needs to remain competitive
individuals concerned; they face skill depreciation and and resilient to shocks. (128) High productivity growth
a higher risk of poverty and social exclusion later in contributes to competitiveness and competitive
life. economies are more likely to grow sustainably and
inclusively. (129) Projected demographic trends indicate
Gender gaps persist across the board, weighing
that productivity growth will become the main source
down on the sustainability of both economic of economic expansion in the long term. Policy-induced
growth and social cohesion. These gaps encompass changes leading to both higher fertility rates and
employment rates, pay, caring and household duties, increased net immigration, if well managed, would
part-time work and pension entitlements. The gender also be beneficial to economic growth. (130) This
employment gap illustrates the mixed progress requires continuous structural reforms and investment
achieved in reducing gender gaps. While the gender in both human and physical capital. Equality of
employment gap remains stable at EU-level, it has opportunities and adequate mechanisms for
widened in 11 Member States. In addition, the higher redistribution through tax benefit systems need to be
educational attainment levels of women, coupled with in place to allow everyone to benefit from economic
their over-representation in jobs below their growth. In addition to generating higher productivity
qualification and skill levels, represent a clear growth, enhancing human capital improves social
productivity loss for the economy. In 2014, female mobility, supports living conditions and improves
workers earned 16.6% less than male workers on people’s employability across generations. (131)
average (see Chart 2.4). Women working more
frequently in lower-paying sectors and occupations Investment in human capital is crucial. This is
can explain part of this gap. In some Member States, demonstrated by the factor analysis and is one of the
however, the average characteristics of the female main findings of the regional and firm-level analyses
workforce are more favourable than those of the male of Chapter 3. The efficient use of productive factors
workforce and female workers would be expected – all largely depends on firms’ human capital: workers’
else being equal – to earn more than men if they were qualifications, their access to training as well as more
remunerated on the same basis. (127) transversal elements, such as the workers’ potential to
innovate or to transfer knowledge across regions and
companies. Fast-changing technological frontiers
(126) European Commission, Annual Growth Survey 2019.
further accentuate the need for well-skilled labour. In
(127) This holds for countries where the explained part of the gender
pay gap is negative. The Member States where the largest general, investment in human capital through the life
proportion of the gap is explained by the different average cycle gives workers access to the resources they need
characteristics of the female workforce are Germany, Austria, to be successful in the labour market. (132) These
the Netherlands, Finland, and Denmark. See also ESDE 2018,
policies benefit society because they aim to contain
Chapter 4, pp. 123-126.

(128) For recent work by European Commission services on resilience,

see Bencur (forthcoming).
(129) World Economic Forum.
(130) See European Commission (2017b): ESDE (2017), Chapter 2.
(131) European Commission (2018): ESDE 2018, Chapter 3.
(132) ESDE 2018, Chapters 2 and 3.

77
Employment and Social Developments in Europe 2019

costs by preventing social risks rather than Chart 2.5

compensating for them ex-post. In its productive From 2008 to 2017, in-work poverty increased in the
function, social investment promotes higher majority of Member States
Change in in-work poverty rate, percentage points, 2008-2017
participation in the labour market, employment and
productivity, work-life balance and longer working LV
FI

lives; it provides incentives for skills acquisition and PL

EL

reskilling, thus smoothing out transitions in the labour IE

AT

market (see Chapter 4). LT

PT
SE
HR

Social outcomes and social protection CZ

RO
BE
DK

Poverty and social exclusion reflect a lack of SK

MT

resources to ensure a sustainable livelihood, as FR

EU
EA
well as limited access to education and other NL
SI
basic services. Supported by robust economic and CY
ES
employment expansion, the proportion of people at DE
EE

risk of poverty or social exclusion fell below pre-crisis BG

IT

levels to 22.5% of the total population in 2017, LU

HU

representing 113 million people. The decrease was -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5

driven by lower numbers of people in severe material

Source: Eurostat, ilc_iw01.
deprivation and/or in very low work intensity Click here to download chart.
households. However, there are large differences
between Member States. The residual effort necessary
Income inequality and inequality of opportunities
to reach the 2020 poverty and social exclusion
may negatively impact medium- and long-term
reduction target at EU level remains considerable.
Social risks can emanate from social isolation and the growth. While higher productivity tends to be
instability that can accompany changing lifestyles and rewarded by higher wages, equality of opportunities
smaller families. For example, one-person households and adequate mechanisms for redistribution through
stand a much higher risk of poverty than the entire tax benefit systems need to be in place to enable
population. (133) In 2015, they accounted for a third of everyone to benefit from economic expansion and thus
all households in the EU. enhance the human capital stock necessary to sustain
economic growth for the long duration. ( 134) Inequality
Work does not always protect from social risks. of opportunities, notably in access to quality education
Working poverty in the EU affected 9.6% of the and training, remains a pressing issue in the EU and
employed in 2017, up from 8.5% in 2008. Although it contributes to weaker upward social mobility. People
has slightly declined in the last two years, since 2014 with highly educated parents are much more likely to
the in-work poverty rate has oscillated higher than have a higher education themselves than those from
before the crisis. From 2008 to 2017 in-work poverty families with low levels of education.( 135) The negative
increased in the majority (16) of Member States (see consequences of inequality on social outcomes have
Chart 2.5), indicating that work is less of a guarantee been fully identified by research.( 136) Furthermore,
of a secure, adequate income than before the crisis. failure to deliver inclusive growth increases the
difficulty of building a political consensus around
structural reforms. (137)
(133) At-risk-of-poverty rates for the EU-28: 26% for single person,
16.9% for the whole society (2017). Source: Eurostat EU SILC. Social sustainability also depends on containing
socio-economic disparities between territories,
particularly in the larger EU context. Cohesion
across territories is a fundamental objective of the EU
(Article 3.3 TEU). Containing geographical disparities
depends on the ability of national and subnational
territories to converge upward and to guarantee equal
access to services in different areas. The profile of
inequalities described in Chapter 1 and outlined above
is different at EU, Member State and subnational level.
Regional heterogeneity is often masked at Member
State level (see Figure 2.3 and Figure 2.4). Notably,

(134) OECD (2014), "Focus on Inequality and Growth - December

2014”.
(135) European Commission (2018b): ESDE (2018), Chapter 3.
(136) See Klasen and Lamanna (2008); Dabla-Norris et. al. (2015);
Hirschman (1973), pp. 29-36.
(137) See Ostry et al. (2014); Easterly (2007), pp. 755-776;
Thorbecke and Charumilind (2002), pp. 1477-1495.

78
 Chapter 2: Sustainable growth and development in the EU: concepts and challenges

where labour market indicators are concerned, Figure 2.4

disparities are usually larger between EU regions than … does not capture the significant socio-economic
between EU Member States. Furthermore, in some disparities within Member States
S80/S20 income quintile share ratio at NUTS 2 level, 2016
cases, the convergence patterns of regions differ from
those of Member States. For example, over 2004–
2016 Member States’ employment rates converged
while divergence was recorded at regional level. (138)
Moreover, income inequality in the EU population has
increased considerably over the 2011-2016 period,
with still large differences between Member
States, (139) reflecting the impact of the economic
crisis. The variation among euro zone Member States
has increased and regional disparities have expanded
since the onset of the crisis. (140)

Figure 2.3
Income inequality at national level….
S80/S20 income quintile share ratio at Member State level (NUTS 0), 2016

Note: Inequality is measured here by the S80/S20 income quintile share ratio. The
darker colours on the map denote higher values and therefore higher inequality.
NUTS refers to the EU nomenclature of territorial units for statistics. NUTS 2,
shown here, is the primary regional level in which Cohesion Policy intervenes.
Source: Map by Commission services, based on Eurostat data.
Click here to download figure.

Such policies may further underpin economic

performance to the extent that, in the absence
of insurance, people are likely to be more risk-
averse in their choice of activities. When protected
Note: Inequality is measured here by the S80/S20 income quintile share ratio, which
by the benefit system, people engage in risky and
refers to the ratio of total equivalised disposable income received by the 20% of profitable economic activities, which they would
the country's population with the highest equivalised disposable income (top
quintile) to that received by the 20% of the country's population with the lowest probably not undertake otherwise. Social insurance
equivalised disposable income (lowest quintile). The darker colours on the map
denote higher values and therefore higher inequality. NUTS refers to the EU
may thus contribute to aggregate economic
nomenclature of territorial units for statistics. NUTS 0 denotes the Member State performance by facilitating better matching between
level. The current NUTS 2016 classification, which entered into force on
01/01/2018, lists 104 regions at NUTS 1, 281 regions at NUTS 2 and 1348 labour demand and supply (e.g. unemployment
regions at NUTS 3 level. insurance facilitating a search for jobs that match
Source: Map by Commission services, based on Eurostat data.
Click here to download figure.
one’s skills better) or encouraging innovation and
entrepreneurship, which in turn can raise productivity
and growth.
Social protection systems have the potential to
raise economic efficiency and contribute to In addition, public social insurance schemes play
economic growth in the face of market failures. a major role in macroeconomic stabilisation. They
The efficient market-based provision of insurance dampen fluctuations in real GDP and thereby in
against ill health or unemployment and for old age is unemployment by acting as automatic stabilisers.
often subverted by imperfections in the corresponding These help to limit the loss of economic efficiency
markets. State intervention ensuring the provision of resulting from volatility in the economy, contributing to
such insurance has a clear economic benefit: it allows enhanced economic performance - to the extent that
individuals to smooth out consumption over the life large output fluctuations can, notably in the absence
cycle (old-age pension) and face important risks of wage flexibility, result in a trend increase in
(sickness, unemployment). unemployment (hysteresis effects) and erode human
capital thereby undermining existing living standards.
(138) Mascherini and Istituto per la Ricersa Sociale (2018), p. 5.
The effectiveness of social transfers (excluding
(139) Mascherini and Bisello (2018), p.12. Eurostat data on the Gini
coefficient confirms that inequality has significantly increased pensions) in poverty reduction has been
in a number of Member States such as Bulgaria, Denmark, different across Member States. The EU’s limited
Spain, Lithuania, Hungary and Austria.
success in poverty reduction under EU2020 and
(140) Ibidem.

79
Employment and Social Developments in Europe 2019

persisting inequalities call for enhancing access to and increased by almost 60% (see Chart 2.7). These
coverage by social protection systems, while improving developments have a profound impact on the
the adequacy of benefits. Beyond becoming more sustainability and adequacy of pension systems as
inclusive, modernised social protection also entails well as on accessible provision of quality long-term
combining minimum income support schemes with care and health care. All this puts particular pressure
stronger incentives to participate in the labour market. on the cohorts of young Europeans, who will,
compared with their parents, have to pay higher
In the future, demographic change may impose contribution rates and will receive lower pensions in
further challenges to social sustainability. retirement. Indeed, earlier Commission analyses have
Advances in the medical sciences and a higher quality identified this 'double burden' for today's young and
of life have enabled Europeans to live longer. In line for future generations. Ageing, together with frequent
with a universal process of rising living standards and breaks in their careers or part-time work, contributes
a transition from pre-modern to post-industrial to that situation. In addition, the uncertainty of the
demographic patterns, (141) average life expectancy at legal framework and social protection regarding new
birth in the EU has risen to roughly 81 years. As a types of work further accentuates this concern. (143)
result, the EU’s old age dependency ratio has
increased uninterruptedly in the last two decades (see However, longer working lives can alleviate this
Chart 2.6). Demographic change is also affected by pressure. The concerns above do not factor in the
migration. Although migration influences the size of many years of healthy and potentially active lives that
working-age population, it may not necessarily lower Europeans live today. Reaching the age of 65 does not
the ratio between people not in employment and the have to be the end of a person’s productive life, so
employed population (Economic Dependency Rate). there is a margin for extending the labour force
(142) A lot will depend on how well migrants get participation of older workers. Flexible retirement ages
integrated into the labour market and whether they and working arrangements as well as adjusted
settle for the long-term (in which case they would add infrastructure and equipment can help to alleviate the
to the dependent part of the population after their economic challenges arising from changes in the
working lives). traditionally defined working-age population and the
increasing ratio of workers to non-workers
Chart 2.6 (dependency ratio). Annex 3 demonstrates that longer
The EU's old-age dependency ratio has been rising
working lives would significantly lower the burden on
rather fast
Old age dependency ratio (population aged 65 and over to population aged15-64, EU- the working population. Finally, a similar and very
28) effective remedy to the negative repercussions of
32,0 population ageing is increasing the labour force
participation of women to levels closer or equal to
30,0 those of men.

Chart 2.7
28,0
The shares of Europeans in inactive age is increasing
rapidly, putting pressure on the labour force and social
26,0 protection systems
Proportions of population aged 65 or over and 80 or over, EU-28
24,0 20
18
16
22,0
14
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018

12
Source: Eurostat [demo-pjanind] 10
Click here to download chart. 8
6
4
Demographic ageing puts pressure on social 2
security systems. An increasing proportion of people 0
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018

in retirement age (65+) raises concern due to their

dependence on a smaller labour force. Between today
Proportion of population aged 65 years and more, EU-28
and 2060, the number of people aged over 65 is
expected to increase from 30.5 to 51.6 per 100 people Proportion of population aged 80 years and more, EU-28

of working age (15-64). Moreover, between 2001 and Source: DG EMPL calculations based on Eurostat data [demo_pjanind].
2018 the proportion of people aged 80 and over Click here to download chart.

(141) See Rosling (2018), Chapter 2. Demography and Mobility

(142) See the findings of the study co-authored by the European
Commission’s Joint Research Centre on Demographic Scenarios Despite its important benefits, intra-EU labour
for the EU in Lutz (2019), pp. 36-43. ESDE 2015 had also
shown that the number of migrants necessary to maintain
mobility can magnify the effects of population
today's economic dependency rate in the future would have to
climb to unrealistic magnitudes (p. 165). (143) See ESDE 2018, Chapters 2, 4, 5.

80
 Chapter 2: Sustainable growth and development in the EU: concepts and challenges

ageing in some cases. One of the four fundamental Chart 2.8

freedoms of the EU single market, the free movement Under certain conditions, intra-EU mobility could affect
the population size of Member States
of people between Member States has also Change in total population of selected Member States based on the assumption of a
contributed to population changes in the EU. By continuation of mobility trends without substantial increase in returns, or, alternatively,
enhancing the allocation of productive factors, free on the hypothetical scenario of a full stop to mobility

movement of labour has beneficial effects on the

economies of sending and receiving countries and of 30

the EU as a whole. Short-term benefits of sending 20

countries include the absorption, through mobility, of 10

0
labour demand shocks, when these cause
-10
unemployment, and thereby a reduction of the burden -20
on public finances and insurance systems due to lower -30
expenditure on unemployment benefits and social -40
assistance. On the other hand, labour flows into the UK AT DE LT LV RO
Total population of selected Member States in 2060 if current trends of intra-EU
receiving Member States may compensate for mobility continue

shortfalls in their labour supplies. Total population of selected Member States in 2060 if intra-EU mobility stops

Source: Authors' chart based on calculations in the publication 'Demographic Scenarios

Even when certain patterns of intra-EU mobility for the EU: Migration, Population and Education' (2019).
Click here to download chart.
are disruptive, they are reversible. Over the last
two decades, differences in wages and living
standards between Member States encouraged many
citizens to seek employment outside their countries of 4.2. The Social-Environmental Nexus
origin. The main flows are from East to West and from
South to North, influencing the size of both the total The EU has been at the forefront of decoupling
population and the labour force of sending and economic activity from its negative effects on
receiving Member States but having a disproportionate the environment. This decoupling has to be achieved
effect on the former, due to their usually smaller size.
through resource and energy efficiency increases,
A pattern of high emigration of educated citizens
sustainable consumption and production. The
(‘brain drain’) and other skilled labour can mean a
transition to a low-carbon, low-waste, low-polluting
smaller and lower-skilled workforce in sending
economy requires the transformation of production
countries. In the medium- to long-term, this can lower
methods and consumption patterns in a manner that
productivity and innovation potential and accelerate
addresses the three dimensions of sustainable
depopulation and population ageing, as emigrants are
development simultaneously: boosting competitiveness
often early-career adults (see Chart 2.8). As a result,
to promote economic growth, create new jobs and
sending countries may experience skill shortages,
promote equity and inclusiveness while ensuring that
erosion of their tax bases, lower overall return from
this growth does not have a negative impact on the
their earlier investments in the welfare and education
environment. Inter alia, this requires “closing the loop”
of their citizens and difficulty to maintain
in the life cycles of products and materials, i.e. from
infrastructure and services. In turn, this may increase
production and consumption to waste management
socio-economic disparities between Member States
and then to markets for secondary raw materials, as
and their regions, counteracting the objectives of
recognised in the 2015 European Commission’s action
certain EU policies, notably of cohesion policy. (144)
plan “Towards a circular economy”. The 2030 climate
However, the recently increasing returns of skilled
and energy framework, addressing energy efficiency,
labour to EU sending countries show that these trends
renewable energy, revised Emissions Trading Scheme
are not predictable with certainty. Changing
and emission standards was adopted to achieve EU-
macroeconomic and labour market positions and
wide targets and policy objectives under the ‘Paris
incentivizing policies (e.g. competitive employment
agreement’. The framework is a key driver of the
opportunities for the highly skilled) can safeguard
transition to a low-carbon economy and builds an
sending countries from excessive loss of talent (see
energy system, which ensures that there is a secure
Box 4.2 in Chapter 4 for a detailed discussion of ‘brain
supply of and affordable energy for all, creates new
drain’ in the EU).
opportunities for growth and jobs and brings
environmental and health benefits through reduced air
(144) See Lutz (2019), pp. 44-50. pollution. (145)

Greater efforts are required at the EU and global

level. The urgency of the transition to a low-carbon
economy raises the question of potential trade-offs.
The recently-published climate change report by the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)( 146)

(145) https://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/strategies/2030_en
(146) IPCC (2018), Special Report on the impacts of global warming
of 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels and related global

81
Employment and Social Developments in Europe 2019

urges further decisive action on climate change (one of completely new set of skills, as, for example, in the
the ‘planetary boundaries’) to limit the rise in global case of digitalisation. (147)
warming since pre-industrial times to 1.5 degrees.
Beyond this limit, the risks of droughts, floods, In the transition to a low carbon economy,
extreme heat and poverty worsen significantly. energy prices are expected to increase in the
Additional efforts imply additional costs as well as medium term, having a potentially detrimental
opportunities for the economy and society. This begs effect on energy poverty.(148) Energy-poor
the question of whether economic expansion and households experience inadequate levels of essential
environmental sustainability can reinforce each other energy services - warmth, cooling and lighting - which
or if the one can only be achieved to the detriment of guarantee a decent quality of life including health. This
the other. The cost of the transition to a low-carbon does not necessarily affect only those at the bottom
economy in terms of employment, skills and the ability of the income distribution and it requires measures in
to meet basic needs also has to be explored, as do the addition to those for fighting poverty. Energy poverty
distributional effects of bearing this cost. Who would is driven by a combination of factors including high
be the losers from this and what compensation and energy prices, low incomes and inefficient buildings
adjustment mechanisms can be put in place to enable and appliances. In 2015, the poorest households spent
a fairer sharing of the costs of transition? around 10% of their total consumption expenditure on
energy products including electricity, gas, liquid and
Climate change action and the related energy solid fuels and central heating. Differences across
transition are expected to have limited, typically Member States are significant, ranging from 3% in
positive total employment effects, but Sweden to 23% in Slovakia. ( 149) Up to 2030, energy
composition effects are also important. Several expenses are expected to increase significantly in
recent studies and model projections (impact absolute terms, but in relative terms they will increase
assessment on long-term GHG reduction strategy less than they did between 2000-2015. After the
2018, impacts of circular economy policies on the 2030 peak a decline is expected under different
labour market 2018, Employment in Europe report modelling scenarios, as the benefits of the energy
2009) have shown that climate change action to meet transition materialise fully. Subsidies to poor
the Paris agreement targets should have a limited households are often badly designed, subsidising the
impact on GDP growth (between -1.3% and +2.2%) cost of energy instead of compensating poor
and aggregate employment in the EU (+0.3% to households for lost income and / or enabling them to
+0.9%). However, the transition to low carbon society invest in energy efficiency and thus lowering future
is bound to produce winners and losers across various consumption costs. These subsidies do little to
economic sectors and regions, at least in the short to encourage energy saving and switching to non-fossil
medium term. The composition of employment across fuels. In addition, poor households face greater
some sectors is likely to be affected significantly. Job constraints in frontloading investment in energy
increases are projected primarily in the renewable efficiency and renewable energy.
energy and energy efficiency sectors, including
construction and eco-system services (e.g. agriculture). There is no standardised or commonly accepted
Jobs are most likely to disappear in mining and way of assessing vulnerability to environmental
extraction, while the results for services and health hazards. (150) However, recent studies show
manufacturing are more ambiguous. EU regions that that the detrimental impact of degrading
rely predominantly on sectors expected to experience environmental components is already visible today. For
job losses and those where industry will have to adapt example, the recent Court of Auditors report finds that
the most, are likely to see more significant challenges air pollution is the biggest environmental risk to health
from the transition. It will therefore be important to in Europe (151). It causes about 400,000 premature
design compensation and adaptation measures in deaths in the EU and results in hundreds of billions of
order to support these regions in transition. As the euro in health-related external costs. This has a direct
economy restructures, so will skill requirements of effect on the quality of life, on productivity in terms of
existing jobs. The current workforce in the declining lost days at work and on public budgets.
sectors is not a perfect substitute for the human
capital needs in the expanding sectors and, therefore, Environmental health hazards tend to affect
reskilling will be necessary. However, the transition to more negatively groups of lower socio-economic
a low-carbon economy is expected to require more of standing. However, evidence about the level of
the existing skills sets, with the emphasis on exposure of different groups is mixed. Regions that are
transversal skills in design, monitoring, and both relatively poorer and more polluted in terms of
communications rather than the development of a particulate matter (PM) are located mainly in eastern

greenhouse gas emission pathways, in the context of (147) CEDEFOP (2012); Cambridge Econometrics et al. (2018).
strengthening the global response to the threat of climate (148) Methodological issues related to the concept of energy poverty
change, sustainable development, and efforts to eradicate call for a cautious interpretation of these estimates.
poverty,, https://www.ipcc.ch/sr15/
(149) EU energy poverty observatory, https://www.energypoverty.eu
(150) European Environmental Agency (2018). p. 77.
(151) For the link between climate change and air pollution see
Chapter 5.

82
 Chapter 2: Sustainable growth and development in the EU: concepts and challenges

and south-eastern Europe. There is also a link between reveals four principal components (factors) linking the
socio-economic status and exposure to PM at a finer- different dimensions of sustainability.
scale, local level. Wealthier sub-national regions tend
to have higher average levels of nitrogen dioxide The first factor – policies focusing on human
(NO2), mostly because of the concentration of traffic capital (skills and social welfare) - most
and industrial activities in these locations. However, resembles a virtuous circle of sustainable
poorer communities also tend to be exposed to higher development. This factor also shows how effective
local levels of NO2, as shown by studies with finer institutions and high energy productivity create social
spatial granularity. In many cities, poorer communities trust and favour economic efficiency. By contrast, the
are exposed to higher temperatures because of the second factor illustrates conditions and weaknesses
urban heat island effect. (152) These temperatures are that undermine sustainable development -
projected to continue to increase gradually due to unaddressed structural problems, which accumulate
climate change. However, a relatively high proportion over time and lead to internal devaluation. Another
of the individuals reporting pollution and other factor suggests that targeted welfare spending can be
environmental problems in the EU belong to the effective in lowering poverty rates and inequality.
national middle classes (see Chapter 5).
The factor analysis identifies clusters of Member
States according to their (social) sustainability
5. CONCLUSIONS characteristics. The cluster analysis presents some
Sustainable development in its economic, social initial evidence of structural labour market
inefficiencies in certain Member States in the South of
and environmental dimensions is a fundamental
Europe. Such inefficiencies are indicated by high
EU objective. All three dimensions of sustainable
unemployment, poor labour market performance of
development, including the social, are high on the list vulnerable groups and low bargaining power of
of European citizens’ preoccupations. employees. (153) Most north-western Member States
seem to have solid sustainability foundations: a skilled
The social dimension figures prominently among
workforce coincides with higher productivity, reinforced
EU priorities as set out in the Treaties and
by effective and trustworthy institutions. These
policies. It covers areas such as the promotion of countries also invest more in social welfare and
employment, good working conditions, improvement of display higher efficiency in the use of natural
living standards, the fight against social exclusion and resources. Eastern Member States are still catching up
discrimination, social justice, human capital with founding Member States in terms of GDP per
development, gender equality and social dialogue. The capita and labour productivity. Their tradition of social
EU ranks very high in international comparisons in dialogue is less developed and people have a lower
terms of social progress, as confirmed by a number of level of trust in institutions. Finally, a number of these
international indices developed to monitor progress countries lag behind in terms of skills and
towards the Sustainable Development Goals. environmental policy implementation. The Baltic States
Nonetheless, challenges resulting from ageing, together with Romania and Bulgaria have high poverty
digitalisation and globalisation risk undermining the and inequality and low potential for social transfers to
sustainability of these achievements. ameliorate these social outcomes.
Social sustainability in its temporal aspect is Policy action needs to exploit synergies between
difficult to measure. Different approaches have the social and other dimensions of sustainable
been proposed in the past. The Social Scoreboard can development. Employment and social policies need to
be considered as a tool for measuring progress in the
support social sustainability in a world that is being
social dimension of sustainability. Its overall reshaped by demographic change, automation/
methodology implicitly measures existing stocks and
digitalisation and climate change. Social policies have
monitors flows under 14 headline indicators. to be accompanied by a broader policy mix to ensure
that no one is left behind in the upcoming transitions.
Identifying synergies among different
To secure social acceptance of the necessary reforms,
dimensions of social sustainability as well as
a generalized upstream integration of the social
between social, economic and environmental
dimension in all future policies is essential.
dimensions is crucial. Useful as these approaches
are, dashboard-type metrics do not necessarily identify
synergies between the constituent aspects of the (153) For a more detailed analysis of labour-market inefficiency and
social dimension or between the social and other its drivers see section 3.3 of Chapter 3.
dimensions of sustainability. More information on
these synergies could provide pivotal guidance to
policymakers on promoting various objectives across
all dimensions of sustainability in a balanced manner.
This chapter has undertaken a factor analysis that

(152) European Environmental Agency (2018).

83
Annex 1: The Social Scoreboard
The Social Scoreboard is a central tool for monitoring average, over the previous available year (2017 or
performance in the employment and social domains, 2016). The most significant progress was recorded in
and convergence towards better living and working (overall and long-term) unemployment rates, which
conditions. It helps to monitor the situation of Member decreased in all Member States in 2017, with only one
States on measurable dimensions of the Pillar, "critical situation" highlighted. Although labour markets
complementing the existing monitoring tools, e.g. the have improved considerably across the Member
Employment Performance Monitor and the Social States, the fact that most problematic flags appear in
Protection Performance Monitor. The Scoreboard’s 14 the social situation is an additional indication of the
headline indicators assess employment and social fact that the dividends of recovery/growth are
trends in: unevenly distributed across income quintiles and
territories. Similar to the 2018 Joint Employment
 Equal opportunities and access to the labour Report, problematic flags appear more frequently in
market the area of ‘public support/social protection and
inclusion’, with an average of 9.8 cases (of which 3.5
 Share of early leavers from education and training, are ‘critical situations’) per indicator. ‘Children aged
age 18-24 under 3 in formal childcare’ appears as the indicator
with most flags, i.e. for 12 Member States (of which 4
 Gender gap in employment rate, age 20-64 are in the bottom category).

 Income inequality measured as quintile share ratio The Social Scoreboard measures progress in key
- S80/S20 dimensions of the Social Pillar, using mostly existing
and well-established indicators. The methodology
 At-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion rate (AROPE) allows measurement of convergence by analysis of
both the levels of and changes in the indicators. The
 Young people neither in employment nor in presentation of results using a colour code is relatively
education or training (NEET rate), age 15-24 straightforward. However, the Scoreboard does not
cover all Social Pillar principles. It also does not allow
 Dynamic labour markets and fair working capturing upward convergence, as the benchmark is
conditions: the change regardless of the direction.
 Employment rate, age 20-64

 Unemployment rate, age 15-74

 Long-term unemployment rate, age 15-74

 Gross disposable income of households in real

terms, per capita

 Net earnings of a full-time single worker without

children earning an average wage

 Public support / Social protection and inclusion

 Impact of social transfers (other than pensions) on

poverty reduction

 Children aged under 3 in formal childcare

 Self-reported unmet need for medical care

 Share of population whose overall digital skills are

basic or above.

The methodology for analysing headline indicators has

been agreed by the Employment Committee and the
Social Protection Committee. The 2019 exercise of the
Scoreboard shows that Europe is making progress in
labour market and social situations. In a context of
improving labour markets and declining poverty, all 14
headline indicators recorded an improvement, on

84
Annex 2: Variables in the factor analysis
A2.1.1. Additional variables complementing factors provided in the chapter.
the Factor Analysis
The following sections explain variables whose
Table 2.2 of this chapter presented the results of a definition may not be self-explanatory or commonly
Factor Analysis, which included 45 different variables known.
from seven thematic blocks that are relevant to
sustainable development. A2.1.2. Explaining the variables used in the
Factor Analysis
Those 45 original variables were reduced to just four
principal components of sustainable development. NEET rate for population aged 15-24 – total
Given that the original variables are correlated, it was
possible to radically reduce their numbers while Young people neither in employment nor in education
keeping 73% of the information about cross-country or training
differences captured in the original variables.
Source: Eurostat
However, the number of indicators that were funneled
into the analysis as input information was much higher Job satisfaction
than 45 - several hundred variables from very
Measurement based on a question from the Quality of
different sources were tested. Most were eliminated
Life Survey 2016: "Could you please tell me on a scale
because they did not sufficiently contribute to
of 1 to 10 how satisfied you are with the job, where 1
explaining one of the factors (no correlation). Others
means you are very dissatisfied and 10 means you are
were not sufficiently related in terms of the content of
very satisfied?"
one of the seven thematic blocks. In addition, a
number of variables were excluded from the final Source: Eurofound
Factor Analysis because they were so highly correlated
to other variables that they would not yield any Lifelong learning (percentage of adult population
additional information. participating in education and training)
A number of variables not included may well have Information from the EU Labour Force Survey 2017:
added value. However, inserting too many variables in Participation in formal and non-formal education and
the extraction of only four factors would render the training in the last four weeks before the survey.
factors unstable and complicate their interpretation.
The following table gives a selection of variables for Source: Eurostat
which this is the case, presenting their correlation with
the four factors (if the value of their loading is equal
to at least 0.5). They confirm the interpretation of the
Chart A2.1
Additional variables confirm the four principal components of sustainable development
Variables not included in the Factor Analysis of Table 2.2: correlation with the four factors (suppressed if < 0.5)

Note: Data sources: 1: Eurostat EU Labour Force Survey (2017); 2: Eurostat EU Survey of Income and Living Conditions (2017); 3: Eco-Innovation Index published by Eurostat
Source: Commission Services
Click here to download chart.

85
Employment and Social Developments in Europe 2019

Poverty threshold (60% of median income) Tax wedge, earnings 100%, single

60 % of the national median equivalised disposable An OECD measure defined as the ratio between the
income after social transfers. Information from the EU amount of taxes paid by an average single worker (a
Survey of Income and Living Conditions. single person at 100% of average earnings) without
children and the corresponding total labour cost for
Source: Eurostat the employer.'

At-risk-of poverty rate Source: OECD

The share of people with an equivalised disposable Trade union density

income (after social transfers) below the at-risk-of-
poverty threshold. Information from the EU Survey of A measure that OECD defines as ‘union membership
Income and Living Conditions. as a proportion of wage and salary earners'.

Source: Eurostat Source: OECD

Impact of social transfers (incl. pensions) in Bargaining coverage rate

reducing poverty
The 'proportion of all wage earners with right to
The reduction in percentage of the risk of poverty rate, bargaining' defined in the Database on Institutional
due to social transfers: compares the at-risk-of Characteristics of Trade Unions, Wage Setting, State
poverty rates before and after social transfers Intervention and Social Pacts (ICTWSS), maintained by
(transfers without pensions). the University of Amsterdam.

Source: Eurostat Source: ICTWSS

Severe material deprivation rate Collective Bargaining at Sectoral or Regional

level
A measure of living conditions severely constrained by
a lack of resources, in which people experience at least In the questionnaire of the 2013 European Company
4 out of the following 9 deprivations: they cannot Survey distributed to managers one question was: "Are
afford i) to pay rent or utility bills, ii) to keep their employees in this establishment covered by any of the
home warm enough, iii) to face unexpected expenses, following collective wage agreements?" One of the
iv) to eat meat, fish or a protein equivalent every answer options is: "A collective agreement negotiated
second day, v) a week’s holiday away from home, vi) a at sectoral or regional level" (as opposed to national,
car, vii) a washing machine, viii) a colour TV or ix) a or individual - i.e.company - level).
telephone.
Source: Eurofound
Source: Eurostat
Voice and Accountability
In-work poverty
According to the Worldwide Governance Indicators
The proportion of employed persons at risk of project (WGI) this indicator "reflects perceptions of the
poverty. Information from the EU Survey of Income extent to which a country's citizens are able to
and Living Conditions. participate in selecting their government, as well as
freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a
Source: Eurostat free media."

S80/S20 Source: WGI (World Bank)

Ratio between the highest and the lowest income Government Effectiveness
quintile, i.e., the 80th percentile divided by the 20th
percentile of the income distribution. According to the Worldwide Governance Indicators
project (WGI), this indicator "reflects perceptions of the
Source: Eurostat quality of public services, the quality of the civil
service and the degree of its independence from
Social protection expenditure in % of GDP political pressures, the quality of policy formulation
and implementation, and the credibility of the
Under the European system of integrated social government's commitment to such policies."
protection statistics (ESSPROSS), the expenditure of
social protection is classified by type and function, old- Source: WGI (World Bank)
age being one of these functions.
Rule of Law
Source: Eurostat

86
 Annex 2: Variables in the factor analysis

According to the Worldwide Governance Indicators Source: Eurostat

project (WGI), this indicator "reflects perceptions of
the extent to which agents have confidence in and Persistent at-risk-of-poverty rate
abide by the rules of society, and in particular the
quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the People at risk of poverty for the current and at least
police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of two out of the preceding three years.
crime and violence."
Source: Eurostat
Source: WGI (World Bank)
Median relative income ratio of elderly people
Control of Corruption Index (65+)

According to the Worldwide Governance Indicators The ratio of the median equivalised disposable income
project (WGI), this indicator "reflects perceptions of the of people aged above 65 to the median equivalised
extent to which public power is exercised for private disposable income of those aged below 65.
gain, including both petty and grand forms of
corruption, as well as 'capture' of the state by elites Source: Eurostat
and private interests."
Housing deprivation (65+)
Source: WGI (World Bank)
Percentage of the population deprived of certain
Energy productivity housing items. For more information see Eurostat.

The indicator measures the amount of economic Source: Eurostat

output that is produced per unit of available energy.
Self-perceived health (very good + good)
Further Information: Eurostat. The variable is part of
the set of indicators supporting the Sustainable
Indicator expresses subjective assessment by the
Development Goals in an EU context.
respondent of his/her health. It is based on one
Source: Eurostat question from the EU statistics on income and living
conditions (EU-SILC): "How is your health in general?"
Resource productivity and domestic material (four answer options).
consumption
Source: Eurostat
Gross domestic product divided by domestic material
Gender gap in part-time employment
consumption (DMC). DMC measures the total amount
of materials directly used by an economy. For further Difference between the share of part-time
information see Eurostat. The variable is part of the employment in total employment of women and men
set of indicators supporting the Sustainable aged 20-64. The indicator is based on the EU Labour
Development Goals in an EU context. Force Survey.
Source: Eurostat Source: Eurostat

Eco-Innovation Index
A2.1.3. Additional variables A composite indicator is calculated from 16 sub-
indices, which measure ecological efficiency and
People at-risk-of poverty or social exclusion
innovation. For more information see EU Open Data
People at risk of poverty (threshold: 60% of the Portal.
national median equivalised income) or severely
Source: Eurostat.
materially deprived or living in households with very
low work intensity. People living in households with
very low work intensity are those aged 0-59 living in
households where the adults (aged 18-59) work 20%
or less of their total work potential during the past
year.

Source: Eurostat

Relative median poverty risk gap

Gap between the median income of those living below

the poverty threshold and the poverty threshold itself
(as percent of the poverty threshold).

87
Annex 3: Longer working lives help sustain pension
systems
In the 2017 Employment and Social Developments in The left chart shows the average contribution rate
Europe annual review a simple illustration was workers of the different cohorts would have to pay
presented to demonstrate how demographic ageing in throughout their entire working lives. For workers born
the EU may impact future pension levels and today it is already very close to the 20% limit, much
contribution rates to the EU's pension schemes. (154) higher than what today's workers pay on average
This model can be extended to show how longer (14%).
working lives can help sustain current pension
Chart A3.1
systems.
Longer working lives can reduce the double burden on
The model starts from the extreme assumption that future cohorts significantly.
Average lifetime contribution rate and average pension level by cohort if contribution
the EU had one single pension scheme, with one single rates were not to increase beyond 20%, EU-28
contribution rate paid by workers and one average 50%
24%
level of pensions, relative to average wages. Everyone 22%
Average lifetime contribution rate
48%
Today's pension level
for a person born in year ... 46%
of working age (20 to 65 years) is assumed to be in 20% 44%
employment, everyone older than 65 is on a pension. 18% 42%

The pension level is assumed to be 47% of the 16% 40%

Prolonging working lives by 1 year
14%
average wage, which corresponds to today's average 12%
Today's contribution rate 38%
36% Average lifetime pension level for a
level of pensions. Under these assumptions, workers 10% 34% person born in year ...

will have to pay a contribution rate equal to 14% of

2008
1996
1999
2002
2005

2011
2014
2017
2020
2023
2026
2029
2032
2035
1996
1999
2002
2005
2008
2011
2014
2017
2020
2023
2026
2029
2032
2035
wages in order to finance these pensions in a pure Source: Commission calculations based on Eurostat 2015 population projection s
Pay-As-You-Go pension system. Click here to download chart.

Under these simple assumptions, the only determinant The right chart shows the level of pensions (in percent
of the pension level and the contribution rate is of wages) which the respective cohorts will receive
demographic change. (155) Working-age population is when retired. The same cohorts that had to pay higher
projected to decline whereas the number of older contributions during their working lives will receive a
people will increase. As a result, there will be more pension equivalent to some 37% of average wages,
than 0.5 older people per person of working age in much lower than today's pension level of 47%. This
2060, up from 0.3 today. Considering the strong decline is necessary because we do not allow the
increase in demographic dependency, it is assumed increase of the contribution rate beyond 20%, so that
that some kind of pension reform will be implemented higher pensions can no longer be financed.
today (in the base-year 2017). This reform will lower
the level of pensions with the aim of limiting the To demonstrate the impact of longer working lives one
expected necessary increase of the pension could assume that every worker worked for one more
contribution rate to a maximum of 20% (which year (47 instead of 46), retiring aged 67 instead of 66.
otherwise would increase beyond that level). The As a result, contributions are being paid for one more
reforms may be deemed necessary to keep labour year. Accordingly, pensions would have to be paid for
costs from increasing too strongly, given that only 19 instead of 20 years. In that case, an average
employers will have to pay their share of workers' lifetime contribution rate of 20% would be sufficient
social security contributions. to finance a lifetime pension level of 39%, two
percentage points higher than without with lower
The model looks at cohorts, starting with workers born retirement age (see right side of the Chart). The
in 1997 who are assumed to start their working lives ‘double burden’ of ageing for future cohorts would be
aged 20 (in 2017) and then work for 46 years, before thus alleviated to a significant extent.
receiving a pension for 20 years.

(154) ESDE 2017, Chapter 4, especially Box 4.2 on pp. 122-3.

(155) ESDE 2018 extends the model by including a labour market
scenario (Chapter 5, especially Box 5.5).

88
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CHAPTER 3

Economic and social

fundamentals: from
productivity to fair and
sustainable growth
continue over the next few decades. (159) Moreover,
1. INTRODUCTION (156) growth may not be socially sustainable, for instance, if
it excludes workers from decent wages, decent social
Current economic growth may not be sustainable protection standards or wider career opportunities.
over the long-term. Chapter 2 showed that the Finally, GDP growth may not be sustainable if it relies
concepts of growth and welfare need to incorporate a on obsolete technologies and if it focuses too little on
number of dimensions in order for growth to be innovation and raising competitiveness in the future
sustainable over the long term. High economic growth (see Chapter 4).
tends being accompanied by environmental problems,
suggesting that there may be a trade-off between our Quality growth comes from efficient use of
economy delivering welfare gains and staying within scarce resources. The constraints mentioned above
the limits set by planetary boundaries (157). Indeed, the are highly relevant to the quality dimension of
economy consumes resources to achieve a certain economic growth. Many of them may not be
level of income. The scarcity of these resources could sufficiently captured by the standard economic
cause bottlenecks in the future while the accounting framework, with GDP as the traditional
consequences of not respecting the planetary measure of economic activity and welfare. (160) Yet,
boundaries may include social costs in the form of this standard framework still allows for analysing
environmental harm and climate change (see Chapter problems that arise from the inefficient use of
5). (158) resources in generating production. Economic growth
depends on the possibility of increasing the input of
The use of natural resources is not the only labour or other resources in production. But it also
challenge to sustainable growth. Labour supply, comes from using these factors more efficiently in
too, is becoming scarcer due to demographic production. A given quantity of productive factors can
developments and the shrinkage of the EU's working- be used more efficiently in two ways: (161)
age population that started in 2010 and is set to
 Productive factors are re-allocated to tasks where
(156) This chapter was written by Jörg Peschner, Giuseppe Piroli (DG they can add more to production so that their
Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion) and D'Artis Kancs
(DG Joint Research Centre).
potential is not wasted (allocative efficiency).
(157) European Political Strategy Centre (2019), p. 4
(158) Human activities have significantly changed the climate and
 The quality of the factors increases, e.g. through
increased the magnitude of extreme weather events such as improved work organisation, smoother procedures,
heat waves, heavy precipitation and droughts. Climate-related
extremes will affect many European regions in the future. “The (159) ESDE 2017 (Chapter 2) has shown that the pressure to achieve
total reported economic losses caused by climate-related productivity growth in the future will strongly increase as
extremes in the EEA member countries over the period 1980– working-age population declines.
2013 were almost EUR 400 billion (2013 value) " (European (160) The 'Beyond GDP' initiative seeks alternative measures for
Environmental Agency, 2017, p. 195. 'more inclusive environmental and social aspects of progress'.
See http://ec.europa.eu/environment/beyond_gdp/index_en.html
(161) Nicodème and Sauner-Leroy (2004), p. 3.

94
 Chapter 3: Economic and social fundamentals: from productivity to fair and sustainable growth

more use of innovative capital, faster diffusion of Chart 3.1

knowledge or better trained labour Roughly one third of the EU's potential GDP growth
(productive/dynamic efficiency). (162) comes from growth in TFP
Growth of potential GDP between 2001 to 2020 and its components, percent
190
Total Factor Productivity is an indicator of
150
qualitative aspects of growth. While the concepts TFP Factor Input
110
of labour and capital productivity relate a firm's output
70
to labour or capital input, Total Factor Productivity
30
(TFP) accounts for the specific part of output
expansion that is not due to an increase of factor -10

PT
DK

DE
NL

MT
GR

FR
FI

AT

ES

SE
SI

LU
EE

PL
IT

LV

LT

SK
BE
HR

UK

CY
HU

CZ

BG

RO

IE

EU-28

US
Euro Area
input. TFP can thus be interpreted as a measure of the
qualitative part of economic growth, i.e. the extent to Note: 2019 and 2020: Commission 2019 Spring Forecast
which a given range of productive factors are used Source: Commission Services' AMECO database
Click here to download chart.
efficiently. TFP can therefore be considered as an
indicator of a firm’s innovative capacity and its degree
Chart 3.2
of resource efficiency in production. (163)
TFP grows more slowly than before the crisis
Annex 1 provides a technical explanation of the TFP between 1995 and 2020, 1995=100
concept of TFP. 130
EU-28 Euro area United States Japan

Many countries have considerable potential for 125

higher growth through higher efficiency. Chart 3.1 120

shows that roughly half of the EU's cumulative growth
115
in potential GDP since the turn of the century is due to
TFP growth. However, the EU's TFP growth has been 110

lower than in the US in the last few decades. There is 105

Fore-

also little evidence that the EU's TFP levels catch up to

cast

the US in recent years. (164) Authors attribute this 100

1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
finding to problems in the market services sector in
particular: market imperfections (low competition) as a Note: Includes the Commission's Spring Forecast
Source: Commission services AMECO database
result of non-completion of the single market and a Click here to download chart.
failure effectively to tap into the potential of ICT
technologies. (165) Within the EU, there is a wide
However, TFP growth slowed down worldwide
variation across Member States. For a number of
during the crisis. During the crisis productivity
Member States, the overall GDP growth performance
has been modest. These countries have the potential declined sharply. In the EU, the main reason was the
to improve their GDP growth rates significantly hoarding of labour that took place as short-term work
through higher TFP growth rates. arrangements were used to smooth out the economic
downturn. (166) Despite the economic recovery since
2013, the rate of growth of TFP is not back up to its
(162) Improving the quality of capital or the skills of workers will pre-crisis level (Chart 3.2). (167)
increase workers' productivity. Workers will then, on average,
add more value to production. These improvements can be This chapter is devoted to assessing recent
attributed to labour input and the efficiency gain will be treated
as additional labour input (referred to as 'labour augmented
developments in productivity growth with a particular
progress' in the literature). By contrast, pure labour input can focus on TFP. It looks at convergence over time and
be separated from these efficient gains and thus considered across regions and explores the determinants of TFP,
only in terms of the number of hours worked. In this case the making use of regional growth accounting data and
efficiency gains will appear in the accounts of total factor
productivity. The latter is the approach taken in the following
firm-level information.
unless otherwise indicated.
(163) For example, see Comin (2010), p. 260. The link between
productivity and innovation is complex however (Hall, 2011). 2. PRODUCTIVITY IN THE REGIONS:
(164) Thum-Thysen and Raciborski (2017) explored euro area TFP DEVELOPMENT AND DRIVERS
convergence with the US.
(165) Timmer et al (2010), van Ark (2014). 2.1. Strong differences across regions
TFP growth comes from higher efficiency.
According to its conventional residual calculation, TFP-
growth is the part of output growth that is not due to
increased input of the productive factors of labour and

(166) People stayed employed but did not actively work. See Arpaia
et al (2010), p. 12.
(167) See Majumdar (2017).
https://www2.deloitte.com/insights/us/en/economy/behind-the-
numbers/decoding-declining-stagnant-productivity-growth.html

95
Employment and Social Developments in Europe 2019

capital (see the technical details in Annex 1). The Chart 3.4
following analysis takes into account information Faster TFP growth in Eastern Europe regions during the
about 274 European regions at NUTS-2 territorial last two decades supported convergence
Growth of TFP from 1995 to 2015 (standardised values)
level (168) for the period between 1995 and 2015. (169)
Chart 3.3 outlines major differences in current regional
TFP performances in 2015: a number of peripheral
regions, especially in Eastern Europe, are still lagging
significantly behind. There is also wide variation within
countries.

Chart 3.3
TFP: Eastern European regions lag behind. Strong
variation within countries
Total factor productivity per NUTS-2 region

13

11

9
TFP in 2015

Note: Index (standardised values). Data for Croatia not available.

5
Source: Commission services
3 Click here to download chart.

In many Southern European regions TFP

PL

IT

IE
BG

HU

CZ

PT

CY

BE

DE

DK
FI

FR
LV

MT
RO

LT

EE

SK

EL

ES
SI

AT

SE

LU
NL

UK

Note: Each blue dot represents one region. Red dots represent averages per country
(weighted by regional gross value added). Data for Croatia not available. Inner
London is not reported to improve visualisation.
performance has been low. This is the case for Italy
Source: Commission services in particular. 19 out of 21 Italian NUTS-2 regions
Click here to download chart. appear to have shown negative TFP growth. (171) The
Commission's 2019 Country Report on Italy sees
2.2. Significant, yet uneven and decelerating structural obstacles as the main reason for low TFP
growth of TFP within the EU growth, noting that 'they hamper an efficient
allocation of production factors across the economy'
Eastern Europe has grown comparably fast in and a faster diffusion of new technologies'. (172)
terms of TFP. Chart 3.4 reveals that the last 20 years
have seen Eastern Europe grow relatively fast. The Chart 3.5

strong TFP growth rates boosted convergence in this The South of Europe is over-represented amongst
regions with negative TFP growth
region especially between the 1990s and 2008. (170) Percentage of NUTS-2 regions where TFP growth between 1995 and 2015 was
negative.
100

(168) Regions are categorised according to the Nomenclature of 90

Territorial Units for Statistics (NUTS). NUTS-2 stands for 'basic 80

regions for the application of regional policies'. See Eurostat at 70
https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/nuts/background. Croatian 60
regions and a number of outermost Spanish, French and 50
Portuguese regions are excluded from the analysis for technical 40
reasons.
30
(169) Data on regional output and labour came from a regional 20
database built by Cambridge Econometrics and publicly
10
available on the website of the Commission's Joint Research
0
Centre. The authors are grateful to Ben Gardiner (director at CZ DK EE IE CY LV LT LU HU MT PL SI SK FI SE DE NL FR AT BE UK RO ES PT BG EL IT
Cambridge Econometrics), who provided the time series of Source: Commission services
regional capital stocks for the period up to 2008 (see Gardiner Click here to download chart.
et al, 2011). These time series were extended by using data on
regional gross fixed capital formation from Eurostat and
national capital stocks from EU-KLEMS database, see While TFP growth has slowed down, regions tend
http://www.euklems.net/. Main missing information, i.e. national to converge. The overall increase in TFP between
capital stock for Belgium and Portugal, was filled using official
national statistics. 1995 and 2015 was around 0.5% per year, while in
(170) International Monetary Fund (2016), p. 3. the first ten years of the period (1995 to 2005) it was
significantly higher (0.75%) (173) However, despite
slowing TFP growth there has been regional
convergence of TFP throughout the entire period. Chart
3.6 shows the link between regions’ starting level of

(171) Given the measurement errors included in the calculation of

TFP and the small magnitude of some negative changes,
however, the finding should be considered as evidence of no
growth in TFP especially in the South of Europe.
(172) European Commission, Country Report Italy 2019, p. 8.
(173) During the period 2005-2015 it was lower than 0.3%.

96
 Chapter 3: Economic and social fundamentals: from productivity to fair and sustainable growth

TFP in 1995 and their growth rate until 2005 and knowledge external to the region. (176) Also, institutions
2015, resp. In both periods the link is negative: regions seem to have a strong impact on a region's innovation
where productivity levels were low at the beginning potential and thus on its productivity growth. (177)
tended to experience faster TFP growth.
The convergence thesis tested: a regression
Chart 3.6 model. The analysis in this section tests examines
TFP: Lagging regions tend to converge
TFP: 1995 levels (horizontal axis) and changes in percent (vertical)
these inter-relationships using a TFP-catch-up
framework for European regions (178), for which a
complete cross-regional database has been built
covering the period 1995-2015.

A region's stock of human capital is proxied here by

the average years of schooling in each region. Its
'absorptive capacity' is its ability to learn, or more
accurately, its 'ability to identify, assimilate, and
exploit knowledge from the environment'. (179) The
model tests whether a region's absorptive capacity is a
function of both the stock of human capital and R&D
expenditure. (180) Both factors are thus seen as
potential reasons for differences in the speed with
which follower regions catch up with more developed
Note: Levels: 1995 and changes: 1995-2015. The curve has a negative slope. A lower regions that represent the technology frontier. Annex 2
level of TFP would imply higher TFP growth. Lagging regions thus tend to catch up
(convergence).
outlines the technical explanation of the model
Source: Commission services adopted.
Click here to download chart.

2.3. The drivers of regional TFP development (176) See also Thum-Thysen and Raciborski (2017) who find that
"spill-overs stemming, for instance, from technology adoption
or imitation and also by the global impact of the economic
Absorbing benchmark technology is key for crisis" (p. 41) are important drivers of TFP-convergence of EU
regions to catch up. The further a region lags behind countries towards the US.
the technological frontier, the higher its TPF growth (177) Rodríguez-Pose and Ganau (2018) support this view in a
potential may be, provided it is able to adopt the presentation given at ECFIN Annual Research Conference “The
productivity challenge: Jobs and incomes in the dawning era of
benchmark technology. Understanding the drivers intelligent robots”, Brussels, November 2018.
behind the processes of convergence and technological (178) The model uses the approach of Benhabib and Spiegel (2005).
diffusion is of paramount importance. One argument (179) Cohen, W. M., Levinthal, D. A., Innovation and Learning: The two
supporting the hypothesis of convergence is that the Phases of R&D, The Economic Journal, 99, September 1989, p.
differences that still exist between regions increase 569.
the potential of low-performance locations to catch up (180) Eurostat regional data are used here.
(convergence thesis). A study on the convergence of
TFP across German states (Länder) finds a significant
role for what they call the 'technological frontier' for a
region's TFP performance. The frontier is here a certain
region considered as a technology benchmark. The
capacity of a lagging region to absorb cutting-edge
technology which has been developed in a benchmark
region helps the lagging region to catch up (i.e. reduce
the distance to the benchmark) faster. (174)

Human capital and R&D are key drivers of TFP

performance. Circumstances in which the TFP of
lagging regions converges towards the technology
frontier have been extensively investigated in the
literature. The main challenge for European regions'
labour productivity growth is that regions are not
making the most of their human capital and
innovation potential. In addition, the level of
knowledge resources (175) within a region is the key to
benefiting from dissemination of technological

(174) Burda and Severgnini (2018). Earlier literature has identified

this as the main “advantage of the latecomer.” See, for
instance, Mathews (2002).
(175) Vogel (2013) finds R&D would facilitate the imitation of
technologies from geographically close regions.

97
Employment and Social Developments in Europe 2019

Table 3.1
Human capital, R&D and the gap to the benchmark strongly determine TFP
Regression coefficients with TPF as dependent variable

Dependent variable: TFP growth Model A1 Model A2 Model A3 Model B1 Model C1 Model D1
Human Capital 0.057*** 0.016*** 0.080*** 0.070*** 0.070*** 0.016

Human Capital*gap -0.030*** -0.028*** -0.031*** -0.035*** -0.033***

R&D 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.005***

KSI 0.013*** 0.01

Human Capital*R&D*gap -0.011***

Constant -0.093*** -0.146*** -0.122*** -0.128*** -0.037

Dummies countries ye s ye s ye s ye s

Dummies years ye s ye s ye s ye s

Observations 4172 4172 4172 4172 4172 4172

Regions 263 263 263 263 263 263

Note: 'Gap' is defined as a region's TFP divided by the TFP of the technological frontier. If the distance between the two is high, 'gap' will be low.
Source: Commission services
Click here to download table.

Well-educated workers and high research new variable is introduced, which draws on the
activity strongly favour TFP growth. The results of European Quality of Government Index (QoG) (184), as
various model specifications are shown in Table 3.1. another factor explaining the growth in TFP. Based on
They can be summarised as follows: (181) perceptions, it is a proxy for the quality of institutions.
The composite indicator calculated from survey data
 There is a strongly significant and positive link (using subjective information) has three main sub-
between human capital and TFP in all model components (i) absence of corruption, (ii) the strength
specifications: Better-educated workers increase of 'the rule of law' and (iii) ‘government effectiveness,
production efficiency. voice and accountability’ as perceived by the
respondents. (185) All of these indicators illustrate the
 A region's high expenditure on R&D improves its extent to which people trust governmental institutions.
TFP performance significantly. The results are shown in Table 3.2 and can be
summarised as follows:
 A high TFP gap vis-a-vis the benchmark region
tends to trigger a region's TFP growth because
"more" technology is available for being potentially (184) Comparative database provided by the Quality of Government
(QoG) Institute at the University of Gothenburg;
absorbed. This finding broadly confirms the https://qog.pol.gu.se/data.
convergence thesis. However, the higher a region's (185) For further details see Charron, Dijkstra and Lapuente (2014).
TFP gap the more important become human capital
and R&D for the process of absorbing benchmark
technologies. Both research-orientation and the
availability of qualified labour facilitate a region's
capacity to absorb technology from other regions.

 Industrial specialisation (“Krugman Specialisation

Index” (182)) in certain products tends to increase
TFP as learning effects may be stronger and help
to improve efficiency in production.

Quality of institutions seems to favour TFP. For

the years from 2010 to 2013 (183) data makes it
possible to include a variable that captures the role of
quality institutions in TFP development. Therefore, a

(181) The main results are confirmed by the panel specifications of

the model and by the analyses provided in Manca and Piroli
(2011) for the period 1995-2005 in a spatial approach.
(182) See Annex 2.
(183) For 2010, the EQI contains 172 regions based on a survey that
was answered by 34,000 citizen respondents. For 2013 the
EQI has been expanded to 206 regions based on a survey that
was answered by 85,000 citizen respondents, which is the
largest sub-nationally-focused survey on QoG to date.

98
 Chapter 3: Economic and social fundamentals: from productivity to fair and sustainable growth

Table 3.2
Quality institutions are crucial for productivity
Explaining TFP growth: the role of institutions
D e p e n d e n t v a ria b le : T F P g ro w t h Model A4 Model B2 Model C2 Model D2 Model E1 Model E2 Model E3
Human Capital 0.0807*** 0.0938*** 0.0838** 0.054 0.0803*** 0.0752*** 0.0719***

Human Capital*gap -0.0230*** -0.0256*** -0.0262*** -0.0217*** -0.0234***

R&D 0.0007 0.0028 0.0016 0.0056***

KSI -0.0083 -0.0154

Human Capital*R&D*gap -0.0097** -0.0158***

Quality of Government 0.0003*** 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001

Corruption 0.000 0.000 0.000

Rule of law 0.0003* 0.0003* 0.0002

Effectiveness, voice and accountability 0.0003* 0.0003* 0.0003*

Constant 0.0807*** 0.0938*** 0.0838** 0.054 0.0803*** 0.0752*** 0.0719***

Dummies countries ye s ye s ye s

Dummies years ye s ye s ye s

Observations 526 526 526 526 526 526 526

Regions 263 263 263 263 263 263 263

Note: 'Gap' is defined as a region's TFP divided by the TFP of the technological frontier. If the distance between the two is high, 'gap' will be low.
Source: Commission services
Click here to download table.

 People's trust in high-quality governmental 2.4. Summary

services supports higher productivity. The
estimated impact of the overall QoG index on TFP  TFP is driven by a region’s capacity to
is highly and positively significant. This finding had innovate: educated workers and a strong
already emerged from the factor analysis in orientation towards research and development
Chapter 2. It is also broadly confirmed by the (R&D) clearly foster efficiency.
literature. (186)
 The convergence thesis is largely confirmed.
 Though significantly correlated with each other, The further away from the benchmark, the higher a
two of the three single sub-indices also tend to be region’s TFP growth tends to be. Yet a region's TFP
significant in most model specifications: people's growth potential depends on its capacity to absorb
perception of the 'rule of law' and government new technologies from technological benchmark-
'effectiveness'. regions. The absorption capacity, in turn, is higher
the better educated the region's workers and the
higher its R&D expenditure.
(186) For example, see Annoni and Catalina-Rubianes (2016).
 Trust in the effectiveness of government
institutions favours productivity. This finding
confirms the factor analysis in Chapter 2. Those
countries where institutions generate trust and
project efficiency tend to have significantly higher
productivity.

3. DRIVERS OF TFP: ANALYSIS AT FIRM

LEVEL
Some firms are more productive than others. This
chapter extends the analysis of TFP and its
convergence but changes perspective: instead of
regional differences, it looks at differences across
firms.

The comprehensive CompNet firm-level-based dataset

is used for this purpose. It is provided by the
Competitiveness Research Network founded by the
European Central Bank and offers a wide range of
productivity-related indicators constructed on the basis

99
Employment and Social Developments in Europe 2019

of firm-level information for 18 EU countries. (187). A reflect the human capital dimension discussed in
variety of specific variables depict a firm's innovative the previous section, pointing to the fact that
capacity, notably its total factor productivity (TFP), appropriately priced human capital favours
which can be interpreted as a measure of efficiency in efficient production.
production.
 Firms that are further away from the TFP
This section looks first at the TFP dynamics of firms frontier improve TFP faster – if they survive.
with at least 20 employees ( 188), exploring whether the For the purposes of the regression, the frontier firm
convergence thesis also holds at firm level. It then can be seen as the technological benchmark. It is
turns to the question of the characteristics of a firm defined here as the one firm at the 95 th percentile
that lead to higher (or lower) productivity. of the TFP distribution. In other words, 95% of
firms in a sector (191) attain a TFP lower than this
3.1. Convergence at firm level benchmark firm. The higher the distance between
the frontier and the average TFP in that sector, the
Convergence holds if a firm improves its efficiency in
higher is the sector's TFP growth. Indeed, the least
production over time so as to come closer to those
competitive firms either manage to catch up, or
firm(s) that represent the TFP benchmark. Using data
they need to leave the market. Convergence at firm
from 2004 to 2015 this section looks at how firms'
level is therefore a result of market selection.
TFP performance changed over a period of four years
and what the drivers of the change were. Annex 3  A presence of more firms with high TFP tends
provides a technical explanation of the regression
to trigger other firms' TFP growth potential. If
model, while Table 3.3 presents its results. They can be
the TFP-distribution is 'left-skewed' this implies
summarised as follows:
that there are relatively few firms with low TFP in
Table 3.3 the sector concerned while a relatively large
There is considerable TFP convergence at firm level. number of firms attain high TFP. There are thus
Regression coefficients, dependent variable: 4-year change of TFP of a given type of many benchmark firms from which other firms
firm
could learn. The scope for transferring knowledge
Coefficient Std.Error Sign.
from firm to firm is therefore higher.
Wage growth .885 .000 .000
TFP distance to frontier .397 .001 .000
Left-skewed distribution .052 .003 .000  Small firms stand a lower chance of
Crisis -.042 .000 .000 increasing TFP. This finding holds after controlling
Small Firm -.023 .000 .000 for the TFP distance to the frontier which captures
Controlled for country yes a firm's relative competitiveness. However, the next
Controlled for macro-sector yes section will show that there are means to
Note: Data used: 1999-2016 (different data availability across countries)
TFP growth: log of TFP in t minus log of TFP in t-4; Wage growth: log of wages per overcome the size-disadvantage: those include
worker in t minus log of wages per worker in t-4,
TFP distance from frontier: log of the difference between a firm type's TFP and
exposure to international competition through
the TFP of the benchmark firm (the latter being the firm at the 95% percentile of participation in global value chains, removal of
the TFP distribution)
Left-skewed distribution: dummy capturing whether the skewedness of the labour and product market imperfections, and
distribution in the firm-cluster is negative CRISIS: Dummy equal to one during the
crisis years 2008-2013, zero otherwise.
access to credit.
Small Firm: Dummy equal to one if firm has less than 50 employees, zero
otherwise.
 The crisis has reduced TFP growth. Data from
Source: Commission services based on CompNet data
Click here to download table. 2004 to 2015 was used. During the years 2008 to
2013 firms' TFP growth was significantly lower.
 Faster-growing wages go hand-in-hand with
3.2. Drivers of TFP-levels: a base model
higher TFP. Wage growth correlates with TFP
growth. This finding says little about the direction The following analysis looks at differences between
of causality. (189) Yet it signals that there might be the levels of TFP across firms. It measures the
a productivity dividend in wages. (190) In addition, as determinants of a firm's innovative capability. First, it
wages represent the price of human capital, they orders all firms in the dataset with respect to their TFP
performance, building ten equal-sized deciles of the
(187) The 6th Vintage CompNet Dataset includes firm-level sample. It then performs an ordinal logistic regression
information from Belgium, Croatia, Czechia, Denmark, Finland,
France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Lithuania, Netherlands, to calculate a firm's chances (odds) of being in a
Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain and higher TFP decile (192), depending on an array of
Sweden, see CompNet (2018), p. 6. explanatory variables.
(188) This is done in order to avoid a number of technical problems
at lower firm level and have a more homogeneous sample of
countries, see CompNet (2018), p. 5. (191) The CompNet file used here looks at firms of a given sector,
(189) There could be reversed causality: wage growth following year and size-class.
productivity growth. (192) The ratio of odds relates cumulative probabilities to their
(190) The Efficiency Wage Theories suggest that wages may well counter-probabilities. For example, it can be odds for a firm of
drive productivity. For example, firms may pay higher wages being in deciles 7-10, relative to being in deciles 1-6; or: in
than productivity would justify in order to increase work decile 8-10, relative to 1-7. See, for example, Norušis (2012),
satisfaction and to remain attractive for qualified workers. esp. p. 75-76.
(Katz, 1986). Higher TFP would result.

100
 Chapter 3: Economic and social fundamentals: from productivity to fair and sustainable growth

The results of a series of ordinal logistic regressions Trade-firms belong to the lowest two deciles. Sectors
are presented in a table in Annex 5. The sections below which traditionally depend on a high input of both
give a non-technical overview. The variables included physical and human capital, such as Manufacturing or
in the base model allow the following conclusions to Construction cannot benefit from the same
be drawn: (193) possibilities.

Larger firm size favours the attainment of Chart 3.8

higher TFP. The model controls for the number of The nature of a firm's business is related to its TFP
potential
employees in a firm. There is a strong positive link Share of firms of a sector in the lowest two and the highest two deciles of all firms
between firm size and the level of TFP. Like TFP, the Share of firms in lowest two TFP-deciles
number of employees per firm is arranged in deciles, Share of firms in highest two TFP-deciles
the biggest firms being in the 10th decile. All else being 0 20 40 60

equal, their chances of achieving higher TFP are more Manufacturing

than double those of firms in the lowest (smallest- Construction
firm) decile. Trade
Accomodation and food services
Chart 3.7 Transport and storage
Firm size favours efficiency ICT
Odds of achieving higher firm-level TFP by firm size
Real estate
1.2
Professional, scientific, technical

1.0 Administrative etc.

0.8 Source: CompNet database

Click here to download chart.
0.6

0.4 Higher wages go hand in hand with higher TFP.

Firms were also regrouped into deciles w. r. t. the level
0.2
of labour costs per worker. Chart 3.9 shows the
0.0 statistical chances of a firm’s belonging to a higher
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Number of employees in a firm (deciles)
TFP-decile, depending on the labour cost decile to
which that firm belongs. From the base model
Note: Logisitic regression (Base model)
Source: Commission services based on the CompNet database
specification (blue) a positive (and progressively
Click here to download chart. increasing) link between wages and TFP can be clearly
identified. This finding holds under 'everything else
The financial crisis had a dampening impact on being equal' conditions. That is, it holds after taking
productivity. To control for the business cycle, 15 account of the fact that labour costs and TFP are
years of observation (2002-2016) are taken into different for different firm sizes, in different sectors,
account. A dummy variable assumes the value of one and in different countries. There is hence a supplement
for the years from 2009 to 2013 – the years of the firms pay on wages for higher productivity (TFP).
financial crisis and the subsequent recession. All else
being equal, the chances of achieving higher TFP
3.3. Adding other variables to the base
during these years are one third lower than what they model
were in non-crisis years.
This section adds additional explanatory variables to
Different sectors are not equally capable of the base model. (194) The following findings emerge:
achieving a higher TFP. When analysing TFP, taking Firm-specific wage premiums are linked to a
into account sector-specific differences is essential. firm's TFP and make the wage distribution more
This is because a firm's capacity to achieve efficiency
progressive. Chart 3.9 shows that wages contain a
gains through using innovative techniques varies with
supplement which is related to TFP. The CompNet-
the nature of its business. For example, thanks to
variable 'wage premium' is defined as the difference
online trading which involves customer-action and
between a firms' labour cost per person from the
therefore requires less factor input by firms, the Trade
sector median (195). When estimating TFP, this
sector achieves far-above average TFP. Chart 3.8
premium can be included as another independent
shows that Trade-firms are over-represented in the
variable. In that case the link between labour costs and
highest two TFP-deciles of all firms (the 20% of firms
TFP changes. As the green line in Chart 3.9 shows, the
where TFP is the highest). On the other hand, only few
link becomes much less progressive compared with the
(193) Apart from the variables mentioned in the following, country blue line which does not include the wage premium as
effects are also included in each regression to control for separate variable. In other words, the productivity-
differences across countries and for statistical noise which
affects firm-information in different countries differently. Firm- (194) In order not to cross too many variables in one equation it is
data from 16 EU countries is included. Belgium, Croatia, Czech avoided that the additional variables overlap in one model.
Republic, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Lithuania, The They will thus be included one by one. Each regression only
Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, controls for the variables of the base model. See Annex 5.
Spain and Sweden. (195) CompNet (2018), p. 73.

101
Employment and Social Developments in Europe 2019

related supplement changes the wage distribution variables is the depreciation rate (capital
towards workers in those firms where TFP is high (i.e., consumption). Depreciation is included in the
the most innovative and efficiently working firms). investment ratio and captures investment made not to
increase the capital stock but to replace 'old with new'
Chart 3.9 capital. The chart shows the ratio of chances of
Wages bear a premium for high efficiency
Odds of achieving higher TFP by labour cost decile (highest decile=1)
achieving higher TFP per decile, relative to the lowest
1.2 decile for which the respective chances are normalised
Base model to a value of 1.
1.0
Base model, controlled Chart 3.10
0.8 for wage premium
Modernising the capital stock fosters high TFP
0.6 Odds of achieving higher TFP by labour growth, capital growth and investment activity
(in deciles, lowest decile=1)
0.4 6.0
Invest ratio Capital growth Labour growth
0.2
5.0

0.0
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 4.0
Labour cost per worker (decile)
3.0
Note: Ordinal logistic regression
Source: Commission services based on the CompNet database
2.0
Click here to download chart.

1.0
The productivity-related wage premium is thus
likely to cause some wage inequalities. A number 0.0
of variables can capture unequal wage distributions. It 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Decile of the respective variable
is possible to compare the wages at the top of the
wage distribution with those at the bottom. How to
Note: Ordinal logistic regression
define 'the top' and 'the bottom'? For example, one Capital growth: Growth of the capital stock / capital stock
Invest ratio: (Capital growth + depreciation) / capital stock (CompNet (2018)
could consider 'the top' firm the one paying higher Source: Commission services, based on the CompNet database
wages than 90% of firms in the respective sector. Click here to download chart.
Correspondingly, wages paid by the bottom firm are
lower than in 90% of all firms in the same sector. Unlike capital growth, total investment has a strongly
Alternatively, one could assume a threshold of 75%, positive link with TFP. The replacement component in
instead of 90%. (196) The ratio between the top and the investment strongly pushes efficiency in production as
bottom wage would then be an indicator of wage replacement may be 'an important vehicle for
inequality. Another indicator could be the overall introducing new techniques' (198) while a pure increase
skewedness of the wage distribution as explained in the capital stock may also substitute for TFP rather
above (197). For all these indicators, the analysis finds than support TFP-growth. (199) These results are in line
that wage inequality is significantly correlated with the with Musso (2006) who found a strong positive impact
wage premium; higher TFP goes hand in hand with of capital depreciation on TFP in the US. This is
higher wage inequalities. These inequalities happen because higher depreciation rates can signal shorter
because the wage premium rewards workers in capital life cycles and thus higher pressure to
efficiently working firms for their high productivity. modernise a firm's productive equipment. (200)
However, Annex 4 reveals that there is no such link
between higher TFP and total disposable income Exposure to international competition increases
inequality. This is because low-wage earners may be efficiency in production. This holds true even after
supported by social transfers. The EU's welfare taking account of the size of firms (201). It is known
systems thus reduce inequalities through re- that "new exporters display [not only] a productivity
distribution of primary income. [but also] a size advantage" (202) compared with firms
that do not export. There are two major reasons why
Replacing old with new capital is accompanied
exporting firms are more productive. First, they need to
by efficient production. Chart 3.10 shows the be more productive in order to be able to pay the costs
chances of achieving higher TFP by decile of firms' related to trade "so that expansion into foreign
year-on-year investment ratio (blue) and capital
growth (red). The difference between these two (198) Aldcroft, D.H. and Fearon, P. (1969), "Economic Growth in
Twentieth Century Britain", p. 45.
(196) Outliers in the top decile of the wage distribution could skew (199) Burda and Severgnini (2018) come to a similar conclusion in
the results. the context of Germany's East-West convergence.
(197) The skewedness (S) measures deviation from normal (200) Busso, P., (2006), Capital Obsolescence, Growth Accounting and
distribution of wages. It is negative if high wages have a Total Factor Productivity", Revue de l'OFCE 2006/5 (no. 97), p.
relatively high weight, positive if low wages are more 217-233. See https://www.cairn.info/revue-de-l-ofce-2006-5-
numerous. In the OLS regression of TFP with skewedness as page-217.htm#
one explanatory variable, its coefficient is negative and highly (201) The firm size is controlled for as part of the base model (see
significant. That is, lower S (higher share of high wages) would previous section).
trigger TFP.
(202) European Central Bank (2017), p. 86-87.

102
 Chapter 3: Economic and social fundamentals: from productivity to fair and sustainable growth

markets is profitable". (203) Second, the stronger the  The firm reports loan applications which were not
competition a firm faces in a market, the less pursued by the firms because the borrowing costs
flexibility it has to increase the price for its products were too high;
and the more it is forced to organise its production
efficiently. Firms that sell their products in the world  The firm did not apply for a loan for fear of
market face global competition. Correspondingly, the rejection (i.e. discouraged borrowers).
regression analysis confirms that firms engaged in
export activities attain higher TFP than those firms Even after controlling for firm size ( 208) the link
that serve only domestic markets. The box explains between credit constraints and TFP is straightforward:
this result in technical terms. the higher the credit constraints the lower is their
likelihood of achieving higher TFP. This finding
__________Export activity fosters TFP______________ underlines the importance of efficient credit markets
that guarantee access to credit for innovative,
CompNet offers a number of variables that capture a productive firms.
firm's export activity. One dummy variable measures
whether or not a firm is at all engaged in export Chart 3.11
activities. Those firms have a much higher chance of Access to capital is crucial for efficiency
Odds of achieving higher TFP by credit constraint status (in deciles, highest decile=1)
achieving higher TFP rates than other firms. (204) This
6.0
finding is in line with the literature that sees firms in
tradable sectors being more exposed to competition 5.0

and therefore forced to increase efficiency in 4.0

production. Therefore, productivity in tradable sectors
tends to be higher. (205) _________________________ 3.0

2.0
Efficiency can go hand in hand with high quality
1.0
labour. Higher capital growth (see red line in Chart
3.10) seems to dampen TFP. (206) Firms cannot rely 0.0
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
just on capital deepening to improve efficiency of Credit constraints indicator (decile)
production. High quality labour input is crucial as well.
Note: Ordinal logistic regression
The green line in Chart 3.10 shows that labour growth
Source: Commission services based on the CompNet database
tends to go hand in hand with higher TFP. Rather than Click here to download chart.
engaging in jobless growth based solely on capital, the
most innovative firms seem to attract more workers Labour market imperfections reduce efficiency.
and create jobs with innovative up-to date capital. This The CompNet database includes an indicator for the
finding is in line with the capital-skills- degree of labour market imperfection at firm level.
complementarity (207) found in earlier ESDE editions:
well-qualified workers attract smart capital. Both high- _____ Measuring labour market imperfection _______
quality labour and capital raise productivity and allow
for higher wages. This indicator is equal to the difference between a
firm's markup (209) on intermediate products and the
Access to capital is important for innovation. markup on labour input according to Dobbelaere and
Physical investment in a firm's capital stock, be it Mairesse (2013). This means that the 'intermediate
replacement or expansion, requires access to the input market can be seen as competitive
capital market. CompNet takes into account whether or benchmark'. (210) In other words, unlike labour,
not firms face constraints when borrowing from the intermediate products can be traded, and their price
capital market. Four criteria define a credit constraint tends to be a direct outcome of demand and supply.
(CompNet (2018), p. 47): Differences between the markup of intermediate
products and labour may therefore hint at
 The firm reports loan applications which were imperfections in the labour market and potential
rejected; market failure. _______________________________

 The firm reports loan applications for which only a Labour market imperfections have many faces.
limited amount was granted; Imperfections imply that productive factors are not
used where they are most productive. There are
numerous examples:
(203) Ibidem, p. 87.
(204) The statistical odds for exporting firms are actually four times
as high. Another variable measures whether firms belong to  Discrimination against certain groups of workers
the respective sector's top-10-exporters. In this case the odds may create entry barriers to the labour market.
rate from the point of view of these top-exporters is 5:1.
(205) For example: Mano and Castillo (2015), esp. p. 23. (208) The number of employees is included in the base model, see
(206) A simple OLS regression on continuous values (rather than Chart 3.7 above.
deciles) for TFP as dependent variable results in a significant (209) The markup is the ratio between the output (production) and
negative coefficient for capital growth. the input of a certain productive factor.
(207) See, European Commission (2018b), Chapter 2. (210) CompNet (2018), p. 48.

103
Employment and Social Developments in Europe 2019

These can keep even well-qualified workers out of  Modernising the capital stock increases TFP.
the market or force them to work below their Rather than simply relying on more capital, highly
qualifications (dual labour markets). productive firms invest in high-quality, innovative
capital that makes them more competitive.
 Inflexible wage structures can keep wages from
rising if there is strong labour demand or from  Exposure to global competition raises firms'
falling during a recession. TFP. Higher efficiency enables firms to create more
jobs and pay better wages to workers. For the trade
 Market power may be unevenly distributed within the EU this finding underlines the
between firms and workers (monopolies or importance of the EU Single Market. Its proper
monopsonies). functioning 'stimulates competition and trade,
improves efficiency [and] raises quality'. (212) That
 In all these cases, wages will not reflect workers'
is, it calls for structural reforms on product and
productivity. (211) If there is a positive wedge service markets that improve their functioning by
between wages and productivity (ie the wage is
increasing fair competition amongst firms. (213)
'too high' for certain activities), workers may be
motivated to pursue these activities instead of  Labour market imperfections go at the
others where their productivity would be higher. As
expense of efficiency. Similar to product market
a result, labour market imperfections can lead to
imperfections, imperfect labour markets also tend
the inefficient allocation of productive factors. TFP
to lower TFP. Those imperfections have many
will then decline, i.e., the same factor input can
facets. Workers with non-standard contracts may
generate only lower output, and hence lower
be excluded from certain social protection rights or
growth.
may receive wages at different level from what
Such distortions tend to weigh on TFP. Chart 3.12 would be justified by their productivity. Others may
not even have access to the labour market because
shows that firms where TFP is high tend to be those
they do not have the right skills, or, as certain
where labour market imperfections are low and vice
categories of migrants, may not be allowed to
versa. It is important to note that this finding is not
work. These situations create dual labour markets
related to the size of the firm, nor can it be explained
with privileged, well protected workers on the one
by country-specific imperfections. These effects have
hand, and outsiders on the other hand. The latter
been controlled for in the underlying regression.
may be talented. They could potentially add a lot of
Chart 3.12 value to the production. Yet they are forced to stay
Labour market imperfections exist at the expense of TFP out of the labour market or work (and paid) below
Odds of achieving higher TFP by degree of labour market imperfection (in deciles, the level of their skills and qualifications.
highest decile=1)

3.0  It is therefore important to offer equal

2.5 opportunities in the labour market to all
workers. Labour market imperfections limit
2.0
efficiency in production. They can be the result of
1.5 discrimination or exclusion from job- or training-
opportunities so that some may not have the
1.0
chance to join the labour market and engage in
0.5 productive activities, thus remaining idle or working
in low-productivity jobs. These dynamics lead to
0.0
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 lower growth and hinder marginalised individuals
Labour Market Imperfection Index (decile) and groups from achieving their potential in the
Note: Ordinal logistic regression
Source: Commission services based on the CompNet database
labour market and in society.
Click here to download chart.
 The next section explores how policies can actively
3.4. Summary support strong productivity growth and higher
wages.
 Efficient firms pay higher wages. Efficient
firms produce jobs and pay a productivity premium (212) See European Commission on
to their workers. There is little evidence that higher https://ec.europa.eu/growth/single-market_en
wages hamper TFP. Both go hand in hand (note (213) Traditional Schumpetrian models had claimed that competition,
that this finding holds after controlling for the size by reducing monopolist rents, also reduce firm's incentive to
of firms). innovate. However, this view has given way to new evidence
that supports the notion of competition incentivising produce
and process innovation (Nicodème and Sauner-Leroy, 2004,
esp. pp. 12 and 13).
(211) To put is as in Dobbelaere and Mairesse (2013): "... input
factors' estimated marginal products are often larger than their
measured payments" (p. 33, 34).

104
 Chapter 3: Economic and social fundamentals: from productivity to fair and sustainable growth

Table 3.4
In the eyes of managers innovation, good working conditions and training help boost productivity
Odds rate for a firm of having higher labour productivity growth
Specification: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
Basic model
The private sector 0.74 0.69 0.73 0.75 0.69 0.73 0.76 0.72 0.74 0.74 0.73 0.74 0.74 0.75
1 Establishment is part of ...
The public sector 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
10-49 0.70 0.76 0.76 0.79 0.66 0.73 0.69 0.76 0.63 0.68 0.70 0.64 0.70 0.72
2 Number of employees in establishment 50-249 0.99 1.00 1.02 1.04 0.96 1.00 1.00 1.01 0.94 0.99 0.99 0.94 0.99 1.00
250+ 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Establishment is a member of any employers’ Yes 0.98 1.04 0.97 0.94 0.99 0.97 0.92 0.97 1.01 0.98 0.97 1.01 0.98 0.97
3
organisation which participates in collective No 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

Country effects included yes

Specific tests
Increased 2.71
Since the beginning of 2010, has the total
4 Decreased 0.56
number of employees has..
Stayed about the same 1
Since the beginning of 2010 has this Yes 1.84
5
establishment introduced any new or No 1
Since the beginning of 2010, has this
establishment introduced any new or Yes 1.93
6
significantly changed processes (process
innovation)? No 1

Less than 20% 1

Percentage of employees are older than 50
7 20% to 39% 0.89
years of age?
40% to 59% 0.79
60% to 79% 0.61
80% to 99% 0.40
Less than 20% 1
Percentage of employees working in jobs which
20% to 39% 1.15
require at least one year of on the job learning in
8 40% to 59% 1.10
order for the person to become proficient in
60% to 79% 1.05
his/her task (high skill requirements)?
80% to 99% 1.12
Who decides by whom tasks are to be Team members decide 1.21
9
performed (work autonomy) Tasks are distributed 1

Less than 20% 1

In the past 12 months, what percentage of
10 20% to 39% 1.20
employees have received on the job training?
40% to 59% 1.30
60% to 79% 1.54
80% to 99% 1.45
Improved 7.50
Since the beginning of 2010, the general work
11 Remained about the same 2.18
climate in this establishment…
Worsened 1
Yes 0.83
12 High level of sickness leave?
No 1
Difficulties finding employees with the required Yes 1.11
13
skills? No 1
Yes 0.41
14 A need to reduce staff?
No 1
Yes 1.00
15 Collective wage agreement exists?
No 1
Employees Representation: A structure exists in Yes 1.05
16
the establishment? No 1
Source: Commission services based on Eurofound's European Company Survey 2013
Click here to download table.

Table 3.4 presents the results of a logistic regression

4. SUPPLEMENTARY EVIDENCE FROM A on ECS firm-level data. It shows the chances that a
COMPANY SURVEY firm's manager considers labour productivity in her/his
firm to have improved (215) from the beginning of
A series of regressions on data from the last available 2010 until 2013, the year of the survey and in which
(2013) European Company Survey (ECS) (214) for all 28 labour markets in the EU started recovering. The table
Member States confirms earlier findings that a firm's shows these for a variety of variables. For each
success largely depends on its human capital: workers’ variable, it presents the chance of perceived
qualifications, their access to training and their improvements in productivity in the form of a ratio
potential to innovate.
(215) The possible replies were: since 2010, productivity (1)
improved, (2) stayed the same, (3) worsened. The odds ratio is
(214) The ECS is done every four to five years by the European the odds of the manager replying (1) or (3) relative to the odds
Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working of replying (2). This ratio is assumed equal the odds of replying
Conditions. For an overview see Eurofound (2015). (2), relative to the odds of replying (3).

105
Employment and Social Developments in Europe 2019

relative to a reference group, which is marked in red Training helps to improve productivity as it makes
and normalised to a value of 1. workers more efficient and increases the firms'
innovative capacity (row 10): the more workers have
There are 14 different model specifications for had access to training during the last 12 months, the
alternative variables included as explanatory variables higher a firm's labour productivity growth tends to be.
in the regression. Four variables describe the firm and, This may reflect the direct effects of enhanced
as part of the basic model, they are thus included in all workers’ skills and better matching, as well as indirect
14 specifications. effects due to their contributions to product and
process innovation.
4.1. Main findings
In the eyes of managers an older workforce does
Collective bargaining and employee not support productivity growth. In establishments
representation do not seem to affect managers' where the proportion of workers aged over 50 is high,
perceptions of labour productivity. Whether or not managers tend to expect lower productivity growth.
an organisation participates in collective wage The effect of ageing on productivity is controversially
bargaining (row 3) does not significantly affect a discusses by scholars, and research in this area is still
firm's perceived productivity growth performance in in its infancies. (218) However, the finding confirms
any of the model specifications. This finding does not most recent evidence that a changing age distribution
support the concern, often argued by managers, in Europe towards older ages may reduce labour
according to which collective bargaining, by supporting productivity mainly through the channel of lower TFP
workers' bargaining power, raises labour costs and growth. (219) If this result holds more broadly,
thus reduce firms' incentives to hire or retain workers. increasing productivity growth in an ageing society
Correspondingly, whether or not workers in the firm emerges as a challenge (220) that calls for policies with
are covered by a collective wage agreement at any a focus on training of older workers and on innovation
level (company, sector, occupation, cross-sectoral) through R&D. (221)
does not seem to impact productivity gains as
managers perceive them (row 15). On the contrary, the 4.2. Summary
chances of increasing productivity growth tend to be
higher in firms where there is some form of employee Managers perceive productivity growth to be higher in
representation (row 16) (216). A higher training-intensity firms where:
and better working conditions may contribute to this
finding. Indeed, Chapter 6 finds that firms with an  Better working conditions support higher
employee representation perform significantly better productivity (good working climate, workers'
on a series of indicators that measure the quality of autonomy, few incidences of sick-leave).
work.
 New products are invented or new processes
Good working conditions clearly support introduced, confirming that innovation boosts
productivity. Improving the working climate (row 11) productivity.
and promoting workers' autonomy (row 9) correlate
very strongly with higher productivity growth. The  Workers tend to be younger.
same is true for low sick leave incidence (row 12), an
indicator that correlates strongly with good (perceived)  Workers have regular access to training.
working conditions. (217)

Innovation boosts productivity. Two ECS variables

5. STRENGTHENING HUMAN CAPITAL: A
capture innovation: if a firm has invented new MODEL-BASED ANALYSIS
products or services since 2010, this could be
considered a proxy for product innovation (row 5), or it The Commission's Labour Market Model (LMM) is used
could otherwise have introduced new processes, to describe the transmission path of productivity-
including organisational or production processes enhancing policy measures in the labour market and
(‘process innovation’ - row 6). In both cases, an the economy, for a given country. (222)
innovative firms' chance of achieving higher
productivity growth is almost the double that of non-
(218) International Labour Office (2015)
innovative firms.
(219) Aiyar et al (2016), p. 18.
(220) The European Commission (2017b) dealt with the challenge of
ageing for the fairness across generations (ESDE 2017).
(216) In firms where there is some kind of employee representation
the odds of having higher labour productivity (as perceived by (221) Ibidem, p. 19.
managers) is 5% higher. This odds ratio is significant at a level (222) Currently, LMM supports 15 Member States, any of which can
of 10%. be taken as the country where the policy measure is taken. For
(217) A regression analysis based on Eurofound's 6th Working a description of LMM see Berger et al (2009).
Conditions Survey (2015) reveals that job satisfaction (the
dependent variable) is significantly negatively clinked to the
number of days on sick leave (controlled for age, gender,
education, firm-size, and country-effect).

106
 Chapter 3: Economic and social fundamentals: from productivity to fair and sustainable growth

5.1. How a training subsidy impacts on the 5.2. Labour taxes matter: beware of the
economy: the transmission path impact on net wages
The LMM is used to simulate the long-term impact of A medium-sized training subsidy: Chart 3.14 shows
a government subsidy to firms in order to promote the long-term results of such a measure along the
job-related training for workers. The subsidy tends to above-described transmission path, which is similar for
raise firms' incentive to offer such training to their all the countries the LMM covers. The results are
employees and some of them will take up training. The shown for Belgium, where it is assumed that the
chart depicts the transmission path of such training government spent 0.1% of GDP per year on a subsidy
subsidies in LMM. incentivising firms to offer more training to their
employees. A distinction is made as concerns the
Chart 3.13
financing of the training subsidy. In order not to alter
Training improves workers' productivity
Direct and indirect impact of a subsidy granted to firms in order to encourage them to the allocation of resources between capital and
offer training to workers workers, funding could take place through levying a
lump-sum tax on all households. Alternatively, the
government could raise the necessary funding through
increasing labour taxes.

Chart 3.14
Investing in higher productivity: labour taxes matter
Grant a subsidy to firms in order to encourage them to sponsor training to workers:
0.1% of GDP, alternative funding regimes, Belgium
Financed over lump-sum transfers
Financed over labour taxes

GDP

Capital

Workers in employment

Gross wage rate per hour

Net wage rate per hour

Note: Transmission path of a training subsidy into the economy
Wage share (ppts)
Source: Commission Services, based on EMPL's Labour Market Model (Berger et al, 2009)
Click here to download chart.
-0.15%

-0.10%

-0.05%

0.00%

0.05%

0.10%

0.15%

0.20%

0.25%

0.30%
The higher uptake of training increases workers' Source: Commission services based on EMPL's Labour Market Model
Click here to download chart.
productivity directly. As a result, firms have a
stronger incentive to hire more workers. Labour
demand thus increases, pushing up wages. Higher While higher productivity leads to higher growth,
market wages will attract more workers who were workers' take-home pay may decline. Under both
previously unemployed or inactive to take up a job. funding regimes the economy sees increases in GDP,
Hence employment increases. As there are more employment, labour productivity (the difference
people working, firms step up investment as they between the two), and wages along the lines described
equip the additional workers with capital. Both higher above. However, the long-term impact on GDP is
employment and higher investment boost productivity almost twice as strong in the more 'worker friendly'
and hence GDP. way of funding through lump-sum taxes. The relative
impact on (gross) wages is nearly the same in both
A government subsidy increases both workers' cases. However, in the case of labour-tax funding, the
and firms' rent. Besides the direct productivity- increase in workers' take-home pay (net wages) would
related impact, there is an indirect transmission path. be less than half as strong due to higher labour taxes.
Notwithstanding the subsidy's original purpose, it is a
transfer from the government to the private sector. It A positive impact on labour supply is stronger if
thus increases (as would any other transfer to increased labour taxes are avoided through
companies) the rent of a firm-worker-match. It alternative financing. Lower net wages reduce the
therefore provides an additional incentive for firms to incentive for workers to join the labour market. For a
create jobs, and it makes them more conciliatory when given level of labour demand, the effect on
it comes to bargaining on wages, i.e. the subsidy tends employment is lower than would be the case if the
to reduce the cost of the employee-firm relationship government decided to finance the subsidy via neutral
so that they bargain less hard on wages than without lump-sum taxes, as will be the additional investment
the policy measure. As a result, depending on the because there are fewer workers to be endowed with
relative bargaining power of workers and firms, part of new capital. Finally, with employment and net wages
the additional firm-worker-rent is transferred to increasing by much less than investment, the labour-
workers in the form of higher wages. tax funded subsidy will reduce the wage share in GDP.
The share of workers' rent in GDP will therefore decline
while firms' share will increase.

107
Employment and Social Developments in Europe 2019

Investment in skills creates a win-win situation increase their productivity, they become more
for firms and workers, yet there are nuances. attractive to firms. The latter will thus hire more low-
Investment in workers skills will pay out for both firms and medium qualified workers. As a result, their wages
and workers. For firms the firm-worker-match will will increase. Attracted by higher wages, low- and
yield a higher return as productivity increases. Workers medium qualified workers will feel a stronger incentive
will also get their share of this welfare surplus as they to join the labour market while highly-qualified
will be able to bargain more successfully for higher workers' employment declines. The latter are affected
wages than before the measure. The relative change in by higher wage taxes while not being targeted by the
their improvement will however depend on the policy's measure. There is thus a structural effect on
distributive impact. Higher labour taxes will reduce employment away from highly qualified towards
workers' net wages which may have an impact on lower-qualified workers. In other words, the (formal)
labour market participation. qualification level of the workforce decreases on
average because of the expansion of training for low-
5.3. Targeted training opportunities help low- qualified workers in particular, pulling down average
qualified workers productivity.

Lower-qualified workers need more incentive to Capital and qualifications are complementary. So
take up training. LMM distinguishes a worker's a decrease in average qualification levels has knock-
qualification and her skills. While qualification refers to on effects. It will induce firms to invest less because
the formal level of education, skills are specific capital and qualifications are complementary. In other
competences and abilities that are relevant for her job. words, firms feel less inclined to invest in innovative
The two concepts are closely linked. Indeed, the take- capital if employment of well-qualified workers
up of training to improve job-specific skills depends a declines. As highly qualified workers have higher
lot on the qualification of workers. The lower the level wages, their declining number reduces the wage share
of the qualification, the lower workers' lifelong of workers in GDP (despite lower investment).
learning activity tends to be. (223)
The distributional impact of training targeted on
Governments may offer new training the most vulnerable remains favourable. The
opportunities. The government may therefore training subsidy will strongly improve low-qualified
consider targeting the subsidy specifically on low and workers' employment prospects, thus increasing their
medium-qualified workers because they are more wages. It would thus have favourable implications for
likely to be in need of skills upgrades as their take-up Belgium's low-qualified workers whose employment
of training is much lower than that of tertiary- rate is currently one of the lowest in the EU. They
educated workers. (224) Chart 3.15 shows the long- would improve competitiveness, labour market
term impact on Belgium's economy and its labour performance and wages. However, the particular
market. It is assumed that the subsidy be funded via design of such targeted policy measure may come at
higher labour taxes (borne by all workers). the cost of lower productivity of the workforce as a
whole. It is thus necessary to design the focus of
Chart 3.15 Active Labour Market Policies, training measures
Training for lower-qualified workers improves their carefully, in particular, keeping in mind both general
labour market performance economic targets as well as social objectives such as
Grant a subsidy to firms in order to encourage them to sponsor training to workers,
0.1% of GDP, targeted to low- and medium-qualified workers, Belgium fair wages and inclusiveness.

GDP 5.4. How to help the most vulnerable while

Capital
boosting innovation?
Workers in employment
- low qualified In this section, simulation is performed to complement
- medium qualified the targeted training subsidy by an additional incentive
- highly qualified
for young students. The latter are granted a
-0.2%

-0.1%

-0.1%

0.0%

0.1%

0.1%

0.2%

0.2%

scholarship for the take-up of tertiary-education

Note: Assumption: The measure is financed through higher labour taxes. study. (225) As in the above example, 0.1% of GDP is
Source: Commission services based on EMPL's Labour Market Model spent. However, instead of spending the entire amount
Click here to download chart.
only on a training subsidy for low- and medium-
qualified workers, it is assumed that only half of it
A focus on lower-qualified workers pushes their (0.05% of GDP) will be spent on that purpose. The
employment. More training granted to lower-qualified other half will be used to fund scholarships for
workers increases their productivity. However, workers incentivising the take-up of relevant tertiary-education
compete with each other in the labour market. This studies.
also holds true across different qualification levels. In
other words, lower-qualified workers are imperfect More highly qualified workers as a result of the
substitutes for better-qualified workers but if they scholarship. The training component of the policy
(223) European Commission (2018a), Chapter 3. (225) A similar measure was simulated in last year's ESDE for the
(224) See Chart 6.4 in Chapter 6. Czech Republic (European Commission (2018b), Chapter 2).

108
 Chapter 3: Economic and social fundamentals: from productivity to fair and sustainable growth

would support low and medium-qualified workers' future growth and ultimately challenging the
productivity performance as described above. In sustainability of Europe's social model.
addition, the study-scholarship would induce more
young workers to engage in studies and thereafter ESF+ is investment for socially sustainable
work in a job that requires higher qualifications. In the growth. Established in 1958, the European Social
long run, the share of highly qualified workers in total Fund (ESF) is one of the EU's main financial
employment would therefore increase. This would instruments for supporting national policies that seek
trigger Belgium's innovative capacity and its workers' to increase employment, improve quality and
average productivity. productivity at work, and reduce social exclusion and
regional employment disparities. (227) In May 2018, the
Chart 3.16 Commission adopted a proposal for a European Social
A policy mix that includes support to highly qualified
Grant a subsidy to firms in order to encourage them to sponsor training to workers,
Fund Plus (ESF+) for the next programming period
0.1% of GDP, alternative target groups, labour-tax funded, Belgium 2021-2027. (228) The Commission's proposal aims at
Training granted to low and medium qualified workers helping Member States achieve (i) a skilled and
Training granted to low and medium qualified workers, study scholarship
resilient workforce, (ii) high employment levels, and (iii)
GDP fair social protection (see Art. 3 of the ESF+
Regulation). Table 3.5 gives an overview over the
Capital
respective investment plan. In line with these three
Workers in employment
general objectives, the ESF+ will concentrate its
investment in three main areas: education,
employment and social inclusion and health. The
-0.1%

-0.1%

0.0%

0.1%

0.1%

0.2%

0.2%

Source: Commission services based on LMM proposal foresees a total investment of EUR 88.6
Click here to download chart. billion in today's prices (EUR 101.2 billion in current
prices). According to the Commission's proposal, more
A balanced investment strategy that also than half of the funds (62%) would be allocated to
includes the best qualified serves both economic Less Developed Regions (229).
and social targets. The less favourable impact on
Table 3.5
the workforce's average qualification that was the ESF+: almost €89 billion in today's prices to be spent
result of the training-only policy is avoided in the between 2021 and 2027
policy scenario that includes the student support. Commitment appropriations for the ESF+ by region type for 2021-2027, million Euro in
While 'training only' would reduce average productivity, 2018 prices
Investment in Investment in Investment in
in the case of 'studies included' the workforce would education employment social inclusion
on average become more innovative, thus more Less Developed Regions 22056.1 25206.9 15754.3
productive than in the initial (do-nothing) situation. A Transition Regions 5100.9 5829.6 3643.5
More Developed Regions 3869.2 4421.9 2763.7
higher share of highly qualified workers triggers
Source: Commission Services
additional capital investment so that GDP increases. A Click here to download table.
balanced investment strategy helping the most
vulnerable while also fuelling innovation thus helps This section attempts to provide further evidence on
achieve both economic growth and social targets. the potential impacts of this ESF+ investment. (230)
5.5. European Social Fund+ (ESF+) : an EU 5.5.1. Distinguishing structural from demand
policy instrument promoting growth in effects
the EU – a simulation exercise
Estimating the long-term economic impact of
New and old challenges call for policies that ESF-spending is challenging. Projecting the effect
improve access to training. The findings so far of regional investment on the EU's economy, its
reveal that higher productivity calls for adapted society and the environment is extremely complex.
education and training systems. Everyone should have First, regions are closely intertwined in economic
access to training in order to avoid labour market terms, whether within a sector or across various
imperfections in the form of segmented labour
markets. The employment situation in the EU has (227) Available at:
improved since 2013. Yet in many regions the levels of https://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/en/policy/what/glossary/e/eu
long-term and youth unemployment are still ropean-social-fund
significant. In addition, too often jobs fail to pull (228) European Commission (2018c).
people out of severe low-income conditions. Despite (229) In Less Developed Regions, GDP per capita is less than 75% of
the EU average; Transition Regions have a GDP per capita
recent improvement, the proportion of employed between 75% and 90% of the EU average, while in More
people at risk of poverty and social exclusion still Developed Regions GDP per capita is above 90% of the EU
stands at 12%. (226) These factors produce outsiders average.
largely cut off from opportunities in the labour market, (230) A detailed description of the analysis presented in this section
with all the assumptions and sensitivity analysis will be
thus undermining the foundations for present and
provided in the JRC report Kancs, D. and Piroli G., "Economic
Impacts of the European Social Fund Plus: A Model-based
(226) Eurostat EU SILC (series ilc_peps02) for 2017. Assessment", JRC Working Papers Joint Research Centre,
European Commission, (forthcoming).

109
Employment and Social Developments in Europe 2019

sectors. Second, there may be a long time-lag between Causal effects of ESF+ spending are difficult to
the investment being made and its return flowing measure. This section undertakes a model-based
back. This is typically the case with the support of tentative endeavour to quantify how macro-variables
training or education. Three types of potential may react in the future with and without ESF+
economic effects of ESF+ investments are of interventions. (232) It then draws conclusions from the
particular interest in the context of the 2021-2027 differences between the two scenarios.
measures: (i) demand effects (e.g. hiring of workers
and teachers); (ii) structural effects (e.g. productivity Total effects of ESF+ investments on the economy, as
and human capital growth); and (iii) macroeconomic shown in Chart 3.17, are referred to as the sum of
effects (e.g. on GDP and employment). In line with the structural and demand effects. Providing evidence for
focus of this chapter, the main emphasis of the a causal effect of European Cohesion Policy measures
analysis is on structural effects, especially the impact on the economy is challenging. Important magnitudes
on productivity. such as output, consumption, trade, employment or
GDP may be observable. Yet the impact of increased
The immediate effects of ESF+ spending on ESF+ spending on these variables is blurred by various
aggregate demand tend to be measurable. When coincidental effects that may neutralise or confound
the ESF+ invests in education and training, the each other.
observable effects include the number of teachers or
the number of administrative staff required for 5.5.2. Simulation results: productivity
training new students and trainees, additional increases while unit labour costs
textbooks needed, or costs of school utilities and decline
maintenance. In Chart 3.17 these directly measurable
effects are referred to as the demand effect on the The impact of ESF+ investment as shown in Table 3.5
economy. is estimated for labour productivity.

Chart 3.17 ESF+ increases labour productivity, and lowers

Demand and structural effects of ESF+ spending on the unit labour costs. Chart 3.18 shows, on the vertical
economy axis, the simulated impact of ESF+ spending on unit
Mechanics of ESF+ impact on the EU's economy
labour costs (left panel) and labour productivity (right
panel). (233) This strand of impact was referred to as
structural effects on the economy (Chart 3.17). Chart
3.18 shows the estimated impact, which depends on
how much is actually spent on the ESF+ measures.
Therefore, the horizontal axes of Chart 3.18 show the
intensity of the 'treatment' (the level of ESF+
investment). There is a certain error probability in
these estimations. To capture the degree of
uncertainty, the dashed lines in Chart 3.18 frame the
estimation in what is called a confidence interval. ( 234)
Source: Commission Services (Joint Research Centre)
Click here to download chart.
(232) The analysis is not to be interpreted as a forecast, nor is it a
fully-fledged in-depth impact assessment of ESF+ spending.
Structural effects are not directly measurable.
(233) The simulation uses data from the previous programming
Measuring how many new firms are created by newly period 2014 to 2020. It follows a non-parametric approached
educated or trained workers or the impact of their explained in Kancs and Siliverstovs (2016 and 2019).
post-training professional activities on their (234) The estimation of the impact is based on a sample. It is
productivity is more difficult. In Chart 3.17 these not therefore not known for sure that it is the true parameter. The
significance level is assumed at 95%: Imagine one draws 100
directly measurable effects are referred to as the such samples. In this case the impact as calculated from the
structural effect on the economy. These structural samples will be 95 times within the corridor as framed by the
effects are overlain by other simultaneous dashed lines in the chart.
developments and policies, making it extremely
challenging to establish a causal link to ESF+
investments. Given that it is very difficult to measure
them on a case-by-case basis, another model-based
scenario analysis is provided for simulating how GDP
and productivity would evolve with and without the
ESF+ investment. (231)

(231) The spending under the ESF+ programme for the period 2021
to 2027 may overlap with measures under the previous ESF
programming period (2014 to 2020). This modelling exercise
looks only at the potential impact of future (ESF+) spending,
notwithstanding any other measures that may have been
implemented in addition to ESF+.

110
 Chapter 3: Economic and social fundamentals: from productivity to fair and sustainable growth

Chart 3.18 5.5.3. GDP increases, especially for Less

ESF+ supports labour productivity Developed Regions
Results: estimated impact of ESF+ on unit costs (left) and productivity (right)

The impact on Less Developed Regions is higher.

The estimated ESF+ impact on labour productivity is
used as input into a macroeconomic model (235) to
simulate the impact on GDP (to which Chart 3.17 has
referred as total effect on economy). The resulting
change of GDP, relative to the baseline, is shown in
Chart 3.19 for Less Developed, More Developed and
Transit Regions. The aggregate impact of ESF+
investment on GDP is positive for all three groups of
regions. However, the impact is higher the lower the
level of the regions' development. This finding can be
explained by the fact that ESF+ spending in less
developed regions can be a significant proportion of
Source: Commission Services (Joint Research Centre) overall spending.
Click here to download chart.
ESF+ triggers positive spill-over effects. There
The following results emerge: are significant spill-over effects across regions and
sectors, including on those not directly benefiting from
 ESF+ spending tends to support labour productivity the ESF+ investment. (236) This is due to:
and lower unit labour costs. Unit labour cost is the
ratio between labour costs and productivity. Hence,  cross-border and cross-sectoral trade of goods and
part of the decline in unit labour costs is due to services. It is likely that there will be fiercer
higher productivity. ESF+ will therefore improve the competition between firms of different regions or
EU's competitiveness. sectors due to the crowding-out of less competitive
firms by new firms that emerge as a result of the
 This result becomes more uncertain the lower the enhanced ESF+ spending (indirect economic effects,
assumed ESF+ spending intensity is. Indeed, the see Chart 3.17);
confidence intervals (dashed lines) suggest that at
low ESF+ intensities the estimated policy impact is  labour migration and capital flows and
not significantly different from zero. Only when a
certain critical mass is reached does the ESF have  spill-overs of knowledge and the spatial diffusion
a statistically significant impact on unit labour of technology.
costs and productivity.
Investment may take time before revealing its
The impact of ESF+ on productivity is non-linear. full impact. The full positive effect of ESF+
However, the estimated impact is not a straight line. In investment on GDP lags by several years. This is
other words, it cannot be assumed that increases in because it takes time for the impact of education and
the intensity (the level of expenditure) will change training programmes to materialise in the form of
productivity or unit labour costs in a linear manner. higher productivity and thus higher GDP growth. The
This is because there are two margins of adjustment time-lag implies that, in the first years, the program's
to such a policy shock: the increasing headcount of cost (see the bars in Chart 3.19) is higher than its
workers and the improvement of their skills and positive economic effect on GDP. Indeed, in the short-
qualifications. run the demand effect (see Chart 3.17) dominates as
modernising classrooms, building new schools and
ESF+ programmes help disadvantaged workers hiring additional teachers drives government
to improve their labour market performance. consumption immediately.
Both effects may work in the opposite direction. The
reason has already been outlined in the previous In the long-term, structural effects support
section. Where training incentives are improved (only) growth more strongly. Only when the structural
for lower-qualified workers, ESF+ spending may effects (higher productivity growth) start materialising
change the structure of the workforce towards more does the policy-induced GDP growth accelerate and
lower-qualified workers. For example, the social eventually exceed the costs. In the long run, the effect
inclusion strand of ESF+ also includes support for on productivity (and GDP) will decline somewhat,
people from disadvantaged communities, such as assuming that no further intervention is made after
migrants and Roma, in order to increase their labour
market participation. These workers typically have (235) The employed macroeconomic model is described in the JRC
Technical Report: Ivanova, O., Kancs D., and Thissen, M. (2019):
lower-than average qualification profiles. European Economic Modelling System, JRC Working Papers,
Joint Research Centre, European Commission.
(236) See the evidence about the impact of Cohesion Policy in
previous programming periods' as presented in European
Commission (2017a), p. 186.

111
Employment and Social Developments in Europe 2019

the end of the programme in 2027. However, although be focused on lower-qualified workers, knowing
the measure stops in 2027, there will be a lasting that they are mostly in need of training. In that
positive impact on productivity and GDP which could case, their wages would increase as a result of
amount to around 0.1% of GDP in Less Developed higher productivity. However, overall productivity
Regions could decline, as more workers could feel attracted
by higher wages in the low-qualification segment
Chart 3.19 and would therefore not invest in higher
ESF+ spending supports GDP, especially for Less
qualifications. In that case, more low and less
Developed Regions
Simulated impact on GDP (percent increase relative to the baseline) higher-qualified workers were in employment. The
average qualification of workers of all workers
would thus decline, pulling down investment
because qualifications and capital investment are
complementary. The effect on GDP could well,
therefore, be negative.

 Supporting higher studies boosts productivity.

The government could avoid the negative side
effect of a lower average qualification level of
workers by strengthening incentives to invest in
higher qualifications. In addition to the training
subsidy, it could support the take-up of higher
studies through a scholarship. In that case, the
average qualification could increase, raising the
Source: Commission Services (Joint Research Centre) economy's investment and its innovation potential.
Click here to download chart.

 Investment in human capital through ESF+ is

The financing of ESF+ investment matters for its expected to trigger growth. ESF+ spending as
impact. As shown in the previous section in the programmed for the period 2021 to 2027 is
example of a training subsidy, the allocation of labour expected to boost workers' productivity and firms'
(and capital) depends on whether labour taxation competitiveness in the long run. As workers
finances the ESF+ investment. There is no such direct become more productive, this helps firms to reduce
link for the funding of ESF+. Similarly to the entire EU unit labour costs. Significant governmental cost in
budget, ESF+ has certain sources of financing that in the short run will be followed by lasting positive
the model are traced back to taxes paid by households GDP effects in the long run.
and business in each Member State and region. Part of
the required ESF+ funding comes from extra  These findings underline the importance of EU
household savings, part of it comes from a borrowing initiatives in the area of skills. The New Skills
abroad, and yet another part is derived from relocating Agenda for Europe was launched in June 2016 and
existing savings that might have been invested comprises ten concrete action plans, from adult
differently. upskilling initiatives aimed at strengthening
vocational training and education (VET) to sharing
5.6. Summary best practice. (237) Reforms in these areas attract a
lot of policy attention. Within the framework of the
The long-term macroeconomic impact of training European Semester, 22 out of 28 Member States
support granted to firms has been analysed (on the have received Country-Specific Recommendations
example of Belgium). Firms receive a subsidy which in the area of Education and Skills, VET and Adult
motivates them to offer more training to their workers. Learning in 2018.
 Training increases workers' productivity, thus
labour demand and wages. However, the way 6. MAIN FINDINGS IN BRIEF
the subsidy is financed matters a lot for workers'
income. If funded through an increase in labour In line with earlier ESDE analyses (238), in a context of
taxes instead of neutral lump-sum levies on every a serious demographic challenge and fast-changing
household, the positive impact on workers' take- working patterns, the EU needs to speed up its
home pay is less strong. This is because higher productivity growth.
labour taxes lower net wages. This is a disincentive
for workers to join the labour market. The Growth should rely more on the efficient use of
employment impact is therefore lower in the case resources in order to be sustainable. Given the
of labour-tax funding. scarcity of natural and human resources, productivity

 Human capital investment should be well (237) See https://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=1223.

balanced across target groups. Instead of (238) European Commission (2017b) on intergenerational fairness,
see esp. Chapter 2. European Commission (2018b) on
granting support to all workers, the subsidy could Digitalisation and the World of Work, see Chapters 2 and 3.

112
 Chapter 3: Economic and social fundamentals: from productivity to fair and sustainable growth

growth should rely more on the efficient use of absorb benchmark regions' innovative technologies.
existing productive factors than on increasing factor The transfer of new ideas helps them grow faster
input. themselves. Indeed, all else being equal, the further
away a region is from reaching the technology
Are there ways to increase efficiency? This benchmark the larger its own TFP growth potential
chapter explores the driving forces of productivity, tends to be. Both research-orientation and the
especially Total Factor Productivity (TFP), as a measure availability of qualified labour facilitate a region's
of innovation and efficiency in production. Its main capacity to absorb benchmark technologies from
findings are illustrated in Chart 3.20. Each point other regions.
represents a sector in a given year and a given
country. It shows the sector's average TFP and how far  The perceived effectiveness of Government
it is away from the sector's technological frontier. The intervention also strengthens a regions' TFP
chart summarises the points, which, according to this performance, a finding that confirms the factor
chapter’s findings, promote the catching-up process. analysis presented in Chapter 2.

Chart 3.20  There is a tendency for TFP performance to

Factors promoting higher efficiency: human capital converge also at firm level. Similarly to regions, the
counts.
Firms in CompNet by sectors: Sectoral average TFP performance (red) and the
further a firm lags behind the technological
technololical frontier (black) frontier, the higher its TFP potential growth. Within
20000 a sector, the more firms that are close to the
frontier, the higher are the chances of other firms
18000
increasing their efficiency through learning and
16000 absorbing new technologies.
14000
 Firms working efficiently pay significant wage
12000
premiums to workers for more efficiency in
production. Everything else being equal, the wage
Average TFP in the respective sector, index

10000
+ innovation & absorption of new
technologies: education, R&D
premium increases progressively with increasing
+ wage premium for high efficiency TFP. Reducing wage differentials would require
8000 + access to credit
+ exposure to competition investing in those workers who are trapped in low-
6000
+ functioning of labour market
+ working conditions productivity activities with little access to the
+ support of small firms
resources necessary to improve their qualifications
4000
and job prospects.
2000
 While the efficiency premium is significant, there is
0 little evidence that higher TFP increases overall
0 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000 12000 14000 16000 18000 20000
TFP of high-performers (95th percentilein the sector), index disposable income inequality ex post. The EU's
Note: The technological frontiers are considered those firms that are at the 95th social transfer systems seem to mitigate primary-
percentile of the sector's TFP distribution
Data from 2004-2015.
income inequalities stemming from TFP
Each point represents a sector in a given country and a given year (n=9.190). differentials.
Source: Commission illustration based on CompNet data
Click here to download chart.
 There is little evidence that high wages hamper
competitiveness. This has implications for
In particular, the chapter finds: employment as well. Indeed, all else being equal,
highly efficient firms tend to raise employment.
 At regional level: lagging regions catch up in terms There is no obvious trade-off between efficiency in
of TFP performance under certain conditions. production and employment.
 The overall growth in TFP has significantly  Increasing a firms' capital stock may not
decreased in the last two decades, especially in necessarily increase TFP. It may also serve as a
some regions of Southern Europe, as in Italy. substitute for TFP-growth. On the other hand,
modernising a firm's productive capital (replacing
 There is a significant dispersion of regional TFP 'old by new' capital) tends to foster TFP. Innovative
performance across Europe, although Eastern capital makes firms more productive.
Europe has been catching up over the last 20
years.  All else being equal, smaller firms tend to work less
efficiently. It is therefore important to improve
 Investment in Research and Development and the their access to resources that allow for innovative
availability of well-qualified workers have a direct investment. In that context, insufficient access to
positive impact on regions' innovation potential. credit has a significantly negative impact on TFP.
On the other hand, this chapter has also shown
 TFP-differences across regions can be considered that investment in training and qualifications helps
as an opportunity for growth in those regions that to increase productivity. This is important in the
still lag behind today. This is because they can context of small firms because their workers seem

113
Employment and Social Developments in Europe 2019

to have scarcer access to training than their 7. CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY CHOICES
colleagues in larger organisations (see Chapter 6).
Lagging regions and firms tend to catch up in
 All else being equal, labour market imperfections terms of efficiency, but workers' qualifications
are a drag on TFP. These include segmented labour
are crucial in that process. The analysis has
markets with groups of workers excluded from
showed that higher efficiency in production does not
major opportunities such as decent wages or
come only from investing in more or better capital.
training. In those cases, outsiders may either be
Workers and their qualifications also play an important
trapped in unemployment or motivated to search
role for two reasons. First, they determine the
for jobs where their wages are not in line with their
potential of firms and regions to innovate. Second,
productivity. As a result, human resources and
they determine their potential to absorb new high-end
capital are not allocated where they are most
knowledge from the technological frontier. This is
productive. Lower TFP and lower growth are the
important for regions and firms lagging behind in
consequence.
terms of their productivity performance. These tend to
grow faster, but the speed of catching up depends on
 In the eyes of managers, favourable working
the availability of human capital, notably well-
conditions (a good working climate, workers'
educated, highly-skilled workers and on the resources
autonomy, low sick leave incidences) as well as
devoted to Research and Development.
process- and product innovation are conducive to
higher productivity.
Policies that focus on education and training
Furthermore, model-based policy-simulations help to boost productivity growth. Such
suggest: investment would help the most vulnerable while also
fuelling innovation. It is shown to boost both
 Supporting firms in their efforts to offer employment and productivity, hence triggering further
productivity-enhancing training to their workers capital investment complementary to better trained,
yields a high and lasting return. For workers, it better qualified workers. In this context, the ESF+
increases their wages and improves their job investment plan, as proposed by the Commission for
prospects. Firms enjoying higher profits through the period between 2021 and 2027, is likely to have
increased productivity are able to strengthen their significantly positive economic effects especially in
competitiveness. those regions that today lag behind in economic terms.
Yet, much of the expected positive impact depends on
 Improving access of low-qualified workers to whether both firms and workers have access to the
training increases their wages in line with higher resources necessary to be innovative. For firms, this
productivity. It may thus help those workers who implies improving access to capital, especially for
are most in need of support. However, as small companies. For workers, it implies opening up
employment prospects of low-qualified workers segmented labour markets that discriminate against
improve, their numbers may increase, so that the outsiders by keeping them away from the labour
average qualification level of workers may decline, market, away from decent working conditions and
pulling down overall productivity. Therefore, away from developing the necessary tools to upskill.
incentivising the take-up of higher level studies as
part of the policy mix boosts innovation and
increases overall productivity, employment and
hence GDP.

 EU Cohesion Policy is expected to boost both the

EU's productivity and its growth performance,
especially in its Less Developed Regions. This
finding is the result of a tentative simulation,
based on the example of spending under the
European Social Fund Plus (ESF+) programme, as
foreseen for the next programming period 2021-
2027. It confirms studies that have assessed the
impact of the ESF in earlier programming
periods. (239)

(239) See European Commission, Supporting the Impact Assessment

of Human Capital Investments (Final Report, May 2018), esp.
p. 44.

114
Annex 1: The concept of Total Factor Productivity
The conventional approach for TFP considers that What does TFP look like in the regions?
output is a function of labour input L, capital input K,
and a factor TFP capturing the degree of efficiency at Figure A1.1 maps, in eleven classes, the level of TFP in
which labour and capital are used in production. The 2015 for EU-regions. There is a significant difference
conventional Cobb-Douglas model is therefore the between core and peripheral regions. The regions with
following: the higher performance in TFP are Inner London West
(29.15) (243), Southern and Eastern Ireland (13.70),
𝑌𝑟,𝑡 = (𝐿𝑟,𝑡 )𝛼 ∙ (𝐾𝑟,𝑡 )(1−𝛼) ∙ 𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑟,𝑡 (1) Stockholm (13.34), Inner London East (13.33),
Luxembourg (12.51) and Île de France (11.86), while
where 𝑌𝑟,𝑡 is real output (Gross value added) in region Severen tsentralen (2.10), in Bulgaria, Nord-Vest (2.07)
r at time t, 𝐾𝑟,𝑡 is the (physical) capital stock and 𝐿𝑟,𝑡 and Sud-Vest Olteniaex (1.99), both in Romania,
the total labour input (labour volume measured as exhibit the lowest levels.
total hours worked by workers) at the regional level. α
Figure A1.1
and (1 - α) are the output elasticities of labour and
TFP in EU regions: High dispersion
capital input, respectively. For the regional analysis of Total Factor Productivity (TFP) in 2015
section 2 it is assumed, in line with Behnabib and
Spiegel (2005), that α = 1/3.

TFP is 'the proportion of output not explained by the

amount of inputs used in production'. (240) Thus, with
TFP being a residual, ∆TFP > 0 would imply that an
increase of production would thus not come from a
mere increase of input of K and L, but would also
capture a certain productivity dividend from a more
'efficient and intense' use of inputs in production. (241)
For example:

 A certain amount of capital may be installed in a

firm, but it may be obsolete or its capacity may not
be fully used.
Note: Data for Croatia not available
 A certain volume of labour may be employed, but Source: Commission services based on data from Eurostat, Cambridge Econometrics, EU-
workers could become more innovative through KLEMS and national sources (for BE and PT)
Click here to download figure.
training.

 Re-organising work my yield higher output even

(243) This value should be considered as an outlier.
with a given stock of capital and a given number of
workers.

TFP is thus a better indicator for efficiency than

labour productivity. To demonstrate, one can divide
(1) by labour input L:
𝑌𝑟,𝑡 𝐾𝑟,𝑡 (1−𝛼)
=( ) ∙ 𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑟,𝑡 (2)
𝐿𝑟,𝑡 𝐿𝑟,𝑡

The left-hand side of (2) shows labour productivity,

that is: Output per unit of labour. On the right-hand
side one can see that labour productivity depends on
TFP, but also on the input levels K and L. (242)

(240) Comin (2010), p. 260 or Lopez-Garcia et al (2015), pp. 24, 25.

TFP is thus calculated as a residual. There are other methods to
estimate TFP (parametric and non-parametric estimations).
(241) Ibidem.
(242) As marginal productivity of labour declines with higher labour
input so would (average) labour productivity. On the other hand,
more capital input would augment production per worker.

115
Annex 2: Determinants of regional TFP – a regression
analysis
Regional TFP estimates are used to test the existence is not specialized, and takes a maximum value of 2 if
of regional convergence in TFP on the basis of the it has no sectors in common with the rest of the EU,
Benhabib and Spiegel's framework (244). The approach reflecting strong sectoral specialization, according to
also takes into account a region's degree of industrial the following formula for six sectors i:
specialisation and its expenditure in Research and
𝑋𝑟,𝑖 𝑋𝑖 −𝑋𝑟,𝑖
Development (R&D): 𝐾𝑆𝐼𝑟,𝑡 = ∑𝑖𝑟,𝑡 𝐴𝐵𝑆 [
𝑋𝑟
−
𝑋−𝑋𝑟
] (4)

̇ 𝑟,𝑡 = 𝑏0 + 𝑏1 𝑙𝑛𝐻𝑟,𝑡−1 + 𝑏2 𝑙𝑛𝐻𝑟,𝑡−1 ∗ (𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑟,𝑡−1

𝑇𝐹𝑃 ∗ ) + 𝑒𝑟,𝑡 (2) 𝑅&𝐷𝑟,𝑡 (248) is the intensity of the expenditure in
𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑟,𝑡−1
Research & Development and represents a region's
where 𝑇𝐹𝑃 ̇ 𝑟,𝑡 represents the annual growth in TFP of attitude towards innovation.
the region 𝑟 at time t. 𝐻𝑟,𝑡 is human capital, calculated
as the average number of years of schooling. The final
term proxies a region's the capacity to absorb
technology that comes from a leader region 𝑟 ∗ . (245)
The intuition of the model is that human capital
increases productivity growth of a region per se by
fostering innovative activities as in Romer's (1990)
endogenous growth model. The higher a region's level (248) R&D is Intramural R&D expenditure (GERD) taken by Eurostat
of human capital the higher will be its productivity due and represents the total of the regional expenditure in R&D as
percentage of gross domestic product. The human capital is
to its augmented innovative capacity. measured accounting the number of schooling years according
to the shares in employment by three different levels
However, regions also grow due to the transfers of educational attainment level. All data are regional specific.
technology and knowledge from the technology Missing Eurostat data in R&D and human capital are filled
frontier. In the second part of the equation, human using simple interpolation methods depending on the specific
case (proportion or average).
capital interacts with the TFP gap in order to capture
the absorptive effect that human capital is expected to
have on these technology transfers.

The larger the TFP gap to the technology frontier the

higher is TFP growth because "more" technology is
available to be absorbed from the technology frontier.
However, in order to be able to benefit from this
technology, the receiving region needs a certain level
of absorptive capacity.

Model (2) is extended by two additional variables:

̇ 𝑟,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑙𝑛𝐻𝑟,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2 𝑅&𝐷𝑟,𝑡−1 + 𝛽3 𝐾𝑆𝐼𝑟,𝑡−1
𝑇𝐹𝑃

) + 𝑒𝑟,𝑡 (3)
𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑟,𝑡−1
− 𝛽4 𝑙𝑛𝐻𝑟,𝑡−1 ∗ ( ∗
𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑟,𝑡−1

where 𝐾𝑆𝐼𝑟,𝑡 represents the Krugman Specialisation

Index (246), which compares the industrial structure of
the region with the rest of the EU (247). The index takes
value zero if the region has an industrial structure
identical to the reference region, indicating that region

(244) Benhabib and Spiegel (2005).

(245) Due to the choice of using a logistic diffusion function for the
TFP catch up analysis, we expect a negative sign for the
coefficient 𝑏2 meaning that higher levels of human capital
interacted with the TFP gap lead to faster TFP growth. For a
discussion of the different functional form which can be used
in this context, see Benhabib and Spiegel (2005).
(246) The Krugman Specialisation Index (KSI) is described in Mongelli
et al (2016), p. 29
(247) Usually this index is calculated using gross value added or GDP,
but we prefer to use employment due to the fact that, having
only data for six sectors, it shows higher variability then the
index calculated by output, although being highly correlated.

116
Annex 3: A model for convergence using CompNet data
A regression estimates the change of TFP over time.
For TFP, the CompNet-variable used for the analysis is
'tfp_va_macCD'. It is based on the broader sector's
value added (as opposed to firm revenue) and
assumes a Cobb-Douglas production function.

Let 𝑑 signal the difference of the respective variable

between a given year t and t-4. Then 𝑑 ln(𝑇𝐹𝑃) is the
(logarithm of the) change of TFP over a four year
period up to the current year t. Correspondingly,
𝑑 ln(𝑤) is the change in wages, measured as labour
costs per worker.

One could consider a sector's benchmark firm as the

firm at the 95th percentile of the TFP distribution. One
would then measure the distance to the benchmark as
the TFP difference between that firm (𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑝95 ) and the
average 𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑚 of the respective class. A class are all
firms of the same sector, same year, same size group.

The regression further controls for the skewedness of

the distribution within a class, using the skewedness γ
of its distribution. A dummy variable takes the value of
one if γ<0, zero otherwise. That is, if the mass of the
distribution is on the right side of the distribution, this
would imply that there are many firms with relatively
high TFP performance in the same group of firms.

A dummy variable controls for the crisis years up to

2013. Finally a last dummy captures the firm size: it
takes the value of one if the firm belongs to the 20%
smallest, zero otherwise. The model specification is
thus:

𝑑 ln(𝑇𝐹𝑃) = 𝛽1 ∗ 𝑑 ln(𝑤) + 𝛽2 ∗ ln(𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑝95 − 𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑚 )

+ 𝛽3 ∗ 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑅𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑆𝑘𝑒𝑤

+ 𝛽4 ∗ 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠

+ 𝛽5 ∗ 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚

+ 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡

117
Annex 4: TFP growth and income inequality
TFP growth may raise wage premiums but may For the period between 2010 and 2013 the chart looks
not necessarily raise income inequality, mainly at EU regions at the level of NUTS-2. It plots the
thanks to social transfers. Savoia (2019) found regions' change in TFP against the change in both
that European regions have converged to higher levels inequality indicators and calculates the correlations:
of income inequality during the period 1989- They are weak, even negative: -0.1 and -0.09,
2013. (249) This study had provided two indicators of respectively.
inequality that are used in the following to explore the
link between income inequality and Total Factor This finding suggests that even though productivity
Productivity at regional level. (250) These are: premiums are paid on wages, an increase in
productivity will not necessarily lead to higher income
 the share of the richest, relative to the poorest inequality, taking into account the effect of social
20% of the population in total disposable income transfers in balancing out part of these inequalities.
(that is, the income share of the 5th relative to the Indeed, earlier Commission analyses had
1st income quintile); demonstrated that the EU's redistributive systems
reduce (disposable) income inequality
 the Gini index of disposable household income significantly. (251)
(that measures inequality in the entire income
Chart A4.2
distribution). TFP growth between 2010 and 2013, plotted against Gini coefficient change

Chart A4.1
TFP growth between 2010 and 2013, plotted against quintile ratio change (5th relative
to 1st quintile)

Source: Commission Services based on Eurostat EU SILC

Click here to download chart.

Source: Commission Services based on Eurostat EU SILC

Click here to download chart.

(249) The study also shows that the Cohesion Policy seems to have
significantly accelerated the pace of convergence. (251) See European Commission (2017b), pp. 41-42.
(250) Both indicators are calculated from different waves of the
Luxemburg Income survey (LIS).

118
Annex 5: Logistic regression on CompNet data

Table A5.1
Logistic regression, odds rates
Model specifications for the regression on CompNET data; Independent variable: Firm-level TFP
Odds rates of being in a higher TFP decile, relative to the respective refrence group (highlighted in red and normalised to a value of 1)

Note: CompNET data covering the time span between 2004 and 2016 (16 EU countries included). Example: A firm's odds of belonging to one of the higher TFP-deciles is 50% higher
during non-crisis years (crisis: 2008-2013), relative to crisis-years (odds ratio: 1.5).
Source: Commission Services based on CompNET data
Click here to download table.

119
Employment and Social Developments in Europe 2019

Table A5.2
Logistic regression, odds rates (continued)
Model specifications for the regression on CompNET data; Independent variable: Firm-level TFP
Odds rates of being in a higher TFP decile, relative to the respective refrence group (highlighted in red and normalised to a value of 1)

Source: Commission Services based on CompNet data

Click here to download table.

120
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122
CHAPTER 4

Investing in people and

social sustainability: short-
term costs vs long-term
benefits
Population ageing will have a strong economic
1. INTRODUCTION (252) and budgetary impact. A growing number of elderly
people and increases in life expectancy will require
The EU and its Member States are among the growing expenditure on pensions (up to 2040) and
most equal and inclusive societies in the world health care and long-term care (up to 2070). Despite
and share a strong commitment to the European improvements in employment rates, partly linked to
social model. From a global perspective, European pension reforms, the number of workers in Europe is
countries rank very high in the fight against poverty, expected to decrease from 2021 until at least
promoting healthy lives, gender equality, decent work 2070. (254) As a result, today's younger generations
and reducing inequalities. (253) The European and future generations will bear a double burden
Parliament, the Council and the Commission because: 1) throughout their working lives they will
proclaimed in November 2017 the European Pillar of pay higher contributions for their social security than
Social Rights, which sets out twenty principles in the today's workers; 2) the same cohorts will receive, on
area of equal opportunities and access to the labour average, a lower pension than today's pensioners
market, fair working conditions and social protection (relative to wages). (255) Because of these expected
and inclusion. The Pillar acts as a compass to address demographic changes, GDP growth will rely on
future challenges, reaffirming existing rights and improvements in productivity. (256) Social investments
adding new principles. Some of the issues looked at in to facilitate increased productivity and labour force
the present chapter, such as care, housing, education participation (such as in childcare, skills, long-term
and training, are explicitly addressed under the Pillar. care and housing) will prove crucial in ensuring
sustained increases in productivity and tax revenues.
To ensure high social standards not only now but
also for future generations, Europe’s welfare Technological change and new forms of work
systems will need to evolve towards sustainable create many new opportunities, but also
solutions. While there is much diversity in national challenges. A growing number of tasks can be
systems and policies, all Member States are facing the performed using robots or digital technologies. Many
same challenging megatrends. These include ageing workers benefit when repetitive aspects of their jobs
populations, major shifts in the labour market and are automated, reducing physical strain or allowing
changing life course and family patterns, as well as them to focus on more rewarding duties. However, for
interlinked challenges related to climate change and those who mainly perform standardised tasks,
technological transformation. technological advances carry a risk of job loss or
significant job transformation. Structural changes in
(252) This chapter was written by Alessia Fulvimari, Míde Griffin, (254) European Commission and Economic Policy Committee (Ageing
Simone Rosini and Tim Van Rie, with contributions from Working Group)(2018).
Eurofound, the Joint Research Centre units on Fiscal Policy
(255) European Commission (2017a).
Analysis and Knowledge for Finance, Innovation and Growth,
and Maeva Roulette. (256) European Commission and Economic Policy Committee (Ageing
Working Group) 2018:
(253) European Commission (2019a).

123
Employment and Social Developments in Europe 2019

the labour market also bring greater diversity in forms of social investment include enabling services such as
of employment. These deviate from the ‘standard’ high quality early childhood education and care (ECEC),
open-ended full-time dependent employment for a education and training or active labour market policies
single employer. Such developments may open new and social services. (260) In recent years, the European
gaps in labour law, in the coverage for certain social social model has evolved in this regard, steered by
risks, or in the financing base of social protection initiatives put forward by the European Union for
systems. (257) example on work-life balance (Directive on work-life
balance for parents and carers) (261), the quality of
Europe’s welfare states will need to adjust to early childhood education and care systems (Council
changing household patterns. In the past, when the Recommendation on High-Quality Early Childhood
male breadwinner model prevailed, women mainly Education and Care Systems) (262), skills and LifeLong
performed unpaid work, including domestic tasks and Learning (such as the upskilling pathways
care for children and frail relatives. Now that younger recommendation (263) and the blueprint for sectoral
generations of European women are increasingly cooperation on skills) and long-term care (the subject
taking up paid work, they generally work more of a forthcoming report) in the overarching framework
combined paid and unpaid hours than men, even if of the European Pillar of Social Rights.
they are employed in part-time jobs. In addition to
gender inequality, this gives rise to work-life balance Investments in people and social sustainability
issues, which social investment policies can help to also relate to housing. Affordable, accessible and
address. energy-efficient housing is crucial to enable people to
fulfil their potential. Secure housing gives people the
Moreover, households are increasingly diverse, confidence to invest in themselves, for example, to
with growing numbers of single adults and lone choose a new career path in the light of major shifts in
parents, and more young people postponing the labour market or to start a family. There is also
household formation. Living standards have growing attention to the synergies between different
improved steadily in the EU, but young people have policy areas, such as the joint provision of housing and
benefited less from this than older generations. Poor social services. In addition, policy makers and experts
employment prospects for younger people during and in Europe emphasise the complementarities between
to some extent still after the economic crisis and enabling services and cash benefits (including
current housing affordability issues in many European minimum income). Such benefits provide income
capitals appear to have had a negative impact on their security during transitions and may help to avoid
economic independence and capacity to establish scarring effects from job loss or other negative
independent households, including having children and events. (264)
buying a house. Postponing household formation,
homeownership and parenthood may in turn have Social investments in childcare, skills, long-term
inter-generationally adverse consequences on fertility care and housing are intrinsically interlinked.
rates and therefore also on the sustainability of Combining multiple dimensions of social investments
pension systems. (258) may have a cumulative effect, with the total being
greater than its parts (the opposite effect to that of
Investing in people and social sustainability can multiple dimensions of deprivation). Furthermore, they
help to address these common challenges. Social are interlinked with other dimensions of sustainability
investment refers to policies designed to strengthen – better-educated citizens contribute not only to
people’s skills and capacities and support them to economic progress and fiscal stability but may also
participate fully in employment and social life. Such make better choices regarding environmental
policies can not only foster individual potential and sustainability and climate change.
more inclusive societies but also contribute to an
improved fiscal position, through higher productivity, The social investment approach emphasises
increased employment and a broader tax base. Over investment in people, throughout their life
the longer term, social investment can improve the
demographic balance through increased fertility. These (260) European Commission (2013).
policies can also help to reduce long-term reliance on (261) European Parliament and the Council reached a provisional
agreement on the European Commission's proposal for a new
compensatory social policies, along with reductions in Directive on work-life balance for parents and carers on 24
poverty and social exclusion. (259) January 2019.
https://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?langId=en&catId=1311&fur
European welfare systems provide ample proof therNews=yes&newsId=9285
that social investment policies are not just a (262) https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/eycs/2019/05/22-
23/
cost, but can be productive as well. Social
(263) https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
investment policies not only promote social rights, but content/EN/TXT/?uri=OJ%3AJOC_2016_484_R_0001
also contribute to economic growth. Key policy fields (264) E.g. Hemerijck (2018) discusses the ‘buffer’ function of social
investment, which secures income protection for individuals
(257) European Commission (2018a). and (macro-)economic stabilisation. This complements the
(258) European Commission (2017a). ‘stock’ function (strengthening skills and capacities) and the
‘flow‘ function aiming at efficient labour allocation over the life
(259) Kvist (2016).
course.

124
 Chapter 4: Investing in people and social sustainability: short-term costs vs long-term benefits

Figure 4.1
Returns on social investment are particularly high at early life stages
Expected returns on social investment and rate of return, by life stage

Note: Representation of rate of return is theoretic, not empirical. Types of policies and types of returns are placed according to the moment in life in which they materialise (x-axis). Their
position on the y-axis is instead random. For example, the fact that parental leave is positioned above ECEC does not mean that the former has a higher return rate than the latter.
Source: The graph in Figure 4.1 is a simplified version of Kvist (2014).
Click here to download figure.

course. (265) In this context social investment is effective social investments, it is often equally
subject to the so-called ‘life course multiplier’. (266) important to consider barriers or enabling conditions.
Investments at a young age (cognitive development in These may include statutory rights that cannot readily
early childhood) provide a sound basis for investments be monetised, or access to relevant information for
with higher returns at later stages (further education, beneficiaries.
labour market participation, LifeLong Learning and
active ageing). At young ages, the returns tend to be The returns on social investment materialise
highest for children from disadvantaged backgrounds, over different time horizons, but the gains are
implying that such investments can promote both expected particularly over the long-term. Certain
efficiency and equity. (267) From a longer-term returns on investment for social policies materialise
perspective, these investments can be transmitted relatively quickly: for example, a job seeker finding a
from one generation to the next. new position via active labour market policies, formal
long-term care resulting in social contributions (thus in
Effective social investment policies require tax revenues for the state and welfare provision for
social investors and adequate institutional the individual) or a parent re-entering the labour
frameworks. There is a debate on the roles of market while the child attends day care. Other returns
different social ‘investors’: citizens, companies, social on social investment, however manifest themselves
partners and public authorities at different levels. many years later. Young children attending high
Traditionally, many social policies in Europe have been quality care may benefit immediately in terms of
funded through public resources or mandatory private cognitive development. However, the productive return
contributions. In a context of limited fiscal space and in terms of labour market participation will be
pressing social needs, there is growing attention to the observed only once the child enters the labour market.
role of voluntary private investments. These aim to If the child goes on to attend higher education, this
combine a financial return with a positive social impact may be more than 20 years after the initial
(see Annex 1). In addition, social investment policies investment.
rely not only on the provision of funds, but also on
adequate institutional frameworks. When measuring The distributive impact of social investment
social investment, expenditure and monetary flows are policies has been subject to debate. Analyses of
an important yardstick. (268) However, to ensure specific policies have highlighted the risk that
childcare, for example, may mainly benefit the (upper)
(265) European Commission (2013). middle class, while the most vulnerable groups make
(266) Hemerijck et al. (2016). less use of such enabling policies. This is also known
(267) Woessmann (2008); Cunha et al. (2006); Heckman and as the ‘Matthew effect’ after a passage from the
Karapakula (2019). gospel of Matthew which notes ‘unto everyone that
(268) De Deken (2017).

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Employment and Social Developments in Europe 2019

hath shall be given’ benefits and privileges accrue Recommendation on labour market participation of
more readily to those who already possess them. women.
There are ongoing debates on how to alleviate such
effects - including providing stronger incentives to use Returns to investment in children and their
the services - and on the long-term distributive impact families are high not only for children and
of this uneven use. parents (especially mothers), but also for
society. This is because of their potential positive
This chapter focuses on specific policy areas relating impact not only at the social level but also on fiscal
to investment in people and social sustainability: sustainability and at the demographic level. First, early
investments in children and their families; skills and childhood education and care provides children with a
LifeLong Learning; long-term care and affordable and stimulating environment where they can develop
adequate housing. cognitive, social, language and emotional skills. This is
very important for the development of children,
2. INVESTING IN CHILDREN AND THEIR particularly those from disadvantaged backgrounds:
non-school factors (e.g. family and neighbourhood) are
FAMILIES a major source of inequality, and high quality childcare
for all social groups may help to reduce this inequality.
2.1. Introduction (271)(272) Early childhood education and care helps to
reduce inequality of opportunities at an early stage of
Investing in children and their families from a
life: early childhood education influences children’s
life course perspective is an imperative for the overall development more than other types of
EU. The Social Investment Package (2013), the education (273) and can strongly increase educational
Commission Recommendation on Investing in Children mobility. (274) Children can capitalise on this
(2013) and the Council Recommendation on High- investment throughout their subsequent lives. And,
Quality Early Childhood Education and Care Systems early interventions, particularly for the most
(2019) called on EU Member States to tackle child disadvantaged children, have much higher returns than
poverty and social exclusion through integrated investment in later ages. (275) Secondly, the availability
strategies ensuring access both to adequate resources of quality childcare increases parents’ (especially
and to affordable quality services, including childcare mothers’) employment opportunities. This may help to
and children’s right to participate in play, recreation, reduce inactivity, unemployment and gender
sport, cultural activities and decision-making that inequality, including career ceilings or gender pay gaps
affects their lives. The European Pillar of Social Rights that may build up as an indirect consequence of career
includes a principle devoted to childcare and support to interruptions. Thirdly, family benefits and early
children. It states that “children have the right to childhood education and care contribute to reducing
affordable early childhood education and care of good poverty levels among children. Addressing child
quality” and that “children have the right to protection poverty at an early age is less costly for public
from poverty”. (269) In addition, “children from budgets than dealing with its possible long term
disadvantaged backgrounds have the right to specific consequences (e.g. unemployment, health problems,
measures to enhance equal opportunities”. social exclusion etc) later, because early intervention
can reduce the need for social protection expenditure
Investment in children and their families can
in the future. This is important in terms of fiscal
take different forms: It starts with providing sustainability, as risk prevention tends to be less costly
affordable quality early childhood education and care, than risk correction. Finally, childcare is one of the
but can also take the form of adequate income measures used to reverse low birth rates. This is
support through social transfers (i.e. family and crucial at demographic level given the decreasing
children benefits) and balanced paid family-related fertility rates in the EU.
leaves. The combination of in-kind and cash support in
the form of integrated services has proved to be more Investing in children and their families generates
effective than their independent use. (270) Whatever a high multiplier effect. (276) The positive short-term
form the investment in children and their families effects on the beneficiaries of this investment can
takes, its effectiveness depends crucially on its level. create positive long-term effects for the whole of
Through the European Semester process the European society. Investing in children and their families
Union encourages Member States to 1) improve the activates a “life course multiplier” of productivity and
availability of affordable quality childcare, 2) to adapt growth not only during the life course of the children
tax and benefits systems to remove disincentives to but also across generations. To give an example, if
work for second earners and, 3) to develop distribute
paid family-related leave between women and men in (271) Downey, von Hippel et al. (2004).
a more balanced way. In 2018 eight Member States (272) Esping-Andersen et al.(2002); OECD (2017); Woessmann
(Austria, Czechia, Germany, Estonia, Ireland, Italy, (2008).
Poland and Slovakia) received a Country Specific (273) Schleicher (2019).
(274) Burger (2012).
(269) https://ec.europa.eu/commission/priorities/deeper-and-fairer- (275) Heckman (2006).
economic-and-monetary-union/european-pillar-social-rights_en (276) Hemerijck et al. (2016).
(270) Commission Recommendation on Investing in Children (2013).

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 Chapter 4: Investing in people and social sustainability: short-term costs vs long-term benefits

child poverty is tackled, the same cohort will suffer family expenditure per potential beneficiary aged
less from poverty in adulthood. Thus, their children will below 18 (282) as a proportion of GDP per capita (Chart
be less likely to born into a poor household and will 4.1, first panel), grew in the first two years of the
face less risk of poverty themselves. 2008 crisis, then decreased slightly between 2010 and
2011 and increased again between 2011 and 2016.
To achieve the highest returns from investment This dynamic is likely to have been influenced by
in children and their families it is crucial to indexation mechanisms and how the indexation is
ensure equal access and use of the services. smoothed over the cycle, particularly in the euro area
There seems to be a “social gradient” which results in Member States. (283)
children from disadvantaged socio-economic
Chart 4.1
backgrounds using early childhood education and care
Family expenditure per child increased in most Member
services less than their counterparts. This can lead to a
States between 2008 and 2016, although levels diverge
Matthew effect (277), in which existing inequalities widely across the EU
among children from different backgrounds are Average and dispersion (coefficient of variation) of family expenditure per child (0-17)
reinforced by the fact that disadvantaged families’ as a share of GDP per head in the EU (first panel), and average family expenditure per
child (0-17) as a share of GDP per head by Member State (second panel), 2008-2016
children use early childhood education and care 40%
services less than advantaged families’ children.
35%

There are different views on the Matthew effect 30%

in childcare use. According to some academics a 25%

focus on Matthew effects runs the risk of 20%

underestimating the long-term benefits of investment 15%

in childcare because the use of these services will 10%
ensure better parenting and work for mothers, better
5%
human capital and securing income protection for
0%
families. (278) Other academics are more critical of this 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
social investment and argue that the middle class CV Average
benefits disproportionately from it at the expense of
25%
poorer families. (279) In this context, some questions
arise: is inequality in childcare use just a temporary 20%
by-product of a switch to social investment? Or does it
15%
reinforce inequalities over the life course and long
term? Does this social investment switch spending to 10%
services at the expense of the most vulnerable? Or
does it free up more resources in social budgets for 5%

those who need help most? The analysis in this

0%
Chapter tries to shed light on these questions by

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presenting empirical evidence based on the most

recent available data. In the following the focus will be 2008 2016

on childcare, rather than on early childhood education Note: 2016 data are provisional.
Source: DG EMPL calculations based on ESSPROS (dataset “spr_exp_ffa”).
and care. The main reason behind this choice is data
Click here to download chart.
driven. Indeed, the empirical evidence in the section
mostly refers to childcare attendance, which can be
considered as a proxy of early childhood education and Since 2011 expenditure per child has diverged
care attendance, though is a narrower concept. (280) across the EU and Member States’ expenditure
levels vary greatly. At the EU level average family
2.2. Family expenditure and poverty expenditure per child converged until 2009 and
reduction strongly diverged after 2011. This suggests an
increasing difference in average family expenditure
Family expenditure per potential beneficiary has per potential beneficiary among Member States (Chart
on average increased since 2008. (281) Average 4.1, first panel). In 2016, expenditure per child ranged
from around 6% of GDP per capita in Ireland, the
(277) Pavolini and Van Lancker (2018). Netherlands, Greece and Malta to above 16% in
(278) Hemerijck (2017). Denmark, Luxembourg (284) and Germany (Chart 4.1.,
(279) Cantillon (2011). second panel). In the majority of countries expenditure
(280) Flisi, Meroni and Vera-Toscano (2016).
(281) The source of family expenditure is the European System of interventions from public or private bodies. At the time of
Integrated Social Protection statistics. This branch of drafting, 2016 ESSPROS data were available for all Member
expenditure includes both cash benefits (i.e. income States, but only provisionally.
maintenance benefit in the event of childbirth, birth grant, (282) Statistics on family expenditure define children as those aged
parental leave benefit, family or child allowance, other cash between 0 and 17 years old.
benefits) and benefits in kind (i.e. child day care,
(283) European Commission (2016b), Chapter 1.
accommodation, home help, other benefits in kind). Both
means-tested, and non means-tested benefits are included, (284) To be noted that in Luxembourg a significant amount of family
while tax allowances are not. ESSPROS data encompasses all benefits are paid to non-residents.

127
Employment and Social Developments in Europe 2019

per child increased between 2008 and 2016. The 2016, possibly as a consequence of the policies
highest increases were registered in Poland, Italy, implemented during the crisis, the proportion of high-
Bulgaria, Latvia and Croatia (more than 25%), while in income families with children receiving this type of
Ireland and Lithuania registered sharp decreases benefits decreased by 8.5 pps.
strongly (of above 30%). Changes in family
expenditure per potential beneficiary as a proportion Chart 4.3
In countries with high child poverty rates, poverty
of GDP per capita may have been driven by changes in
reduction through social transfers is fairly limited
the number of children and by dynamics in GDP per Children (0-17) at-risk-of poverty and impact of social transfers (other than pensions)
capita. While the number of children has remained in reducing child poverty, 2017
fairly stable over time, GDP per capita has been more 80 35

% reduction in risk of poverty for children

volatile. Therefore big decreases (increases) in family 70 30
expenditure per potential beneficiary as a proportion 60
25

% of children (0-17)
of GDP per capita – as in Ireland – are probably driven 50
20
by the increase (decrease) in GDP per capita between

(0-17)
40
15
2008 and 2016. 30
10
20
Chart 4.2 5
10
Low and medium-income families are more likely to
0 0
receive family benefits than high-income families. In

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recent years the proportion of high income families
receiving family benefits has decreased Impact of transfers in reducing child poverty, left axis
Child poverty (0-17), right axis
Percentage of households with children below 6 years old receiving family benefits in
the EU-28, by income group, 2007-2016 Note: The indicator must be interpreted with caution for a number of reasons. First, no
account is taken of other measures that can have the effect of raising the
85%
disposable incomes of households and individuals, namely transfers in-kind, tax
credits and tax allowances. Second, the pre-transfer poverty risk is compared to
% of households with children below 6

the post-transfer risk with all other things being equal —assuming unchanged
80% household and labour market structures, thus disregarding any possible
behavioural changes that the absence of social transfers might entail.
Source: DG EMPL calculations based on EU-SILC cross-sectional data 2017 (2016 for IE
75%
years old

and UK) Users’ Database.

Click here to download chart.
70%

The proportion of children at-risk-of poverty

65%
varies considerably across the EU, as does the
60% impact of social transfers on poverty reduction.
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 In some Member States such as Romania, Bulgaria
1st tertile 2nd tertile 3rd tertile
and Spain, more than one in every four children lives in
Note: All EU-28 countries are shown together (weighted average). Tertiles are based on
the disposable household income distribution of households with children below 6
a family at-risk-of poverty (Chart 4.3). The proportion
years old. falls to one every ten children in countries such as
Source: DG EMPL calculations based on EU-SILC cross-sectional data 2007 and 2016
Users’ Database.
Denmark and Finland. Social transfers other than
Click here to download chart. pensions help to reduce child poverty. The strongest
poverty reduction impacts are registered in countries
It is not only the level of family expenditure that with low or medium levels of child poverty (e.g.
matters, but also its redistributive capacity, i.e. Finland, Hungary, Denmark, Ireland, UK, Poland,
its power to reduce poverty and inequality. Germany, Austria and Slovenia).
Looking at the proportion of households with children
below 6 years old receiving family benefits, ( 285) it
seems that these benefits are to some extent targeted
towards low-income and medium-income families
(Chart 4.2). A considerably lower proportion of high-
income households with children receive family
benefits compared with low and medium-income
households in the EU. Moreover, between 2010 and

(285) The source of family benefits is the European Union Statistics

on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC, see footnote 290 in
Section 2.3). Family benefits include: 1) income maintenance
benefit in the event of childbirth; 2) birth grant (i.e. benefits
normally paid as a lump sum or by instalments in the case of
childbirth or adoption); 3) parental leave benefit; 4) family or
child allowance (i.e. periodical payments to a member of a
household with dependent children to assist with the costs of
raising children); 5) alimonies or supports paid by government
(central or local) if the spouse for some reason does not pay
the alimony/child support; 6) other cash benefits (i.e. benefits
paid independently of family allowances to support households
and help them meet specific costs, such as costs arising from
the specific needs of lone parent families or families with
handicapped children).

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 Chapter 4: Investing in people and social sustainability: short-term costs vs long-term benefits

Box 4.1: Education and training 2020 benchmark on early childhood education and care

Beyond the Barcelona targets on childcare use established in 2002, the European Council also adopted, in 2009, the
early childhood education and care (ECEC) benchmark within the Education and Training 2020 strategic framework. (1)
According to the benchmark, “at least 95% of children between 4 years old and the age for starting compulsory primary
education should participate in childhood education”. The benchmark was adopted “with a view to increasing
participation in early childhood education as a foundation for later educational success, especially in the case of those
from disadvantaged backgrounds”.
While progress towards the Barcelona targets is measured with EU-SILC data, the Education and Training 2020
benchmark refers to administrative data reported by Ministries of Education or National Statistical Offices according
to international standards, definitions and classifications. (2)

(1) https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52009XG0528(01)&from=EN
(2) Flisi, Meroni and Vera-Toscano (2016).

2.3. Use of formal childcare and the sectional data from 2007 to 2017 at the country level.
Barcelona objectives EU-SILC contains information on the number of hours
of childcare during a normal week. (291) The formal
Improving the availability and affordability of childcare indicators used to measure Member States’
childcare services has been high on the political progress towards the Barcelona objectives and also
agenda of the EU since the Barcelona Summit of included in the Social Scoreboard uses this information
2002. At that summit, the European Council set in the form of a binary variable (i.e. whether the child
objectives of providing formal childcare to “at least has used the service or not). Formal childcare refers to
90% of children between 3 years old and the the following EU-SILC variables: 1) education at
mandatory school age, and to at least 33% of children preschool, 2) education at compulsory school, 3)
below 3 years of age.” (286) The indicator used to childcare at centre-based services outside school
measure the Barcelona objective for children aged hours and, 4) childcare at a day-care centre.(292)
under 3 has been included in the Social Scoreboard of
Indicators (287) accompanying the European Pillar of Half of the Member States have not reached the
Social Rights. (288) two Barcelona objectives. Formal childcare use has
increased from 28% in 2010 to almost 33% in 2017
Formal childcare is defined as all types of care across the EU for the group of children under 3.
arrangements in day-care centre, whether However, the objective of 33% has not yet been
organised and/or controlled by a public or reached in fifteen Member States (Chart 4.4), while the
private provider. It does not take into account care objective of 90% among children between 3 years old
provided by childminders without any structure and the compulsory school age remains unfulfilled by
between the carer and the parents (direct sixteen Member States. According tostatistics on
arrangements) (289) or care provided by family or population projections, the number of children under 3
friends. The formal childcare indicator is based on the will fall by 1.6% in the EU-28 by 2030. In all countries
European Union Statistics on Income and Living which have not reached the 33% objective, except
Conditions (EU-SILC). (290) Some of the empirical Austria, a decrease is expected in the number of
analyses in this Section and in Sections 2.4 and 2.5 are children under 3. For example, the number of under-3s
supplemented by analysis based on EU-SILC cross- is projected to decrease by more than 30% in
Lithuania and Latvia, by 22.6% in Greece and by more
(286) http://ec.europa.eu/invest-in- than 15% in Bulgaria, Poland and Czechia. These
research/pdf/download_en/barcelona_european_council.pdf trends are clearly related to decreasing fertility rates
(287) https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/european-pillar-of-social- and possibly to emigration and the labour mobility of
rights/indicators/social-scoreboard-indicators the young workforce. The population projections
(288) The Social Scoreboard indicator refers to the proportion of suggest that the demand for childcare services may
children aged less than 3 years in formal childcare.
decrease in the future. However, the reduction in
(289) These arrangements have been excluded from the definition of
"formal care" in order to take into account only childcare demand may be not enough to compensate for the
recognised as fulfilling certain quality patterns. current gaps in formal childcare. (293)
(290) the European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions
(EU-SILC) is an EU-wide survey which collects detailed data on
individuals’ and households’ income components (291) The question is asked about all household members over 12
(https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/income-and-living- years old.
conditions). It also covers poverty, social exclusion, housing, (292) It is not possible to distinguish between public and private
labour, health and education. EU-SILC data of a given year childcare services in EU-SILC, nor by the financing source of the
reflect incomes in the previous year (except for the UK and service. For the EU-SILC-based analysis on childcare the cross-
Ireland where incomes refer to the last 12 months before the sectional weight for children (RL070) has been used and the
interview period), i.e. in EU-SILC 2017 income components refer personal cross-sectional weight (RB050) was used instead if
to 2016. Weights are provided by Member States. At the time the former was missing.
of drafting this chapter 2017 EU-SILC micro-data were not
(293) European Commission (2014a).
available for Ireland and UK.

129
Employment and Social Developments in Europe 2019

Chart 4.4
The Barcelona objectives are still not being reached everywhere
Achieving Barcelona objectives - use of formal childcare, 2017

100
Target 90% for children between 3 and compulsory school age
90

80

70

60

50
Target 33% for children under 3
40

30

20

10

0
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Children aged less than 3 years old
Children from 3 to compulsory school age
Note: 2017 values for HU is not available and 2016 is reported instead.
Source: DG EMPL elaboration based on Eurostat (variable "ilc_caindformal").
Click here to download chart.

Achievement of the Barcelona objectives is an Chart 4.5

important step but is not necessarily equivalent Countries ranking in childcare use change when taking in
to account the great variation in the average number of
to achieving accessible and affordable childcare hours of use per week
provision for all. First, there is inequality in the use Formal childcare use (binary variable and use in FTE) and average hours of childcare
of the services. For most children from disadvantaged use per week among children under 3, 2017
50
socio-economic backgrounds the Barcelona objectives 80%
are far from being reached. This issue is analysed in 70% 40
more detail in the following sections. Secondly,
Formal childcare use

60%
national averages very often hide existing differences 50% 30

Hours per week

in childcare availability and quality between rural and 40%
20
urban areas, with the former facing considerably 30%
higher gaps in childcare supply. 20%
10
10%
Inequality in the intensity of childcare use can 0% 0
be assessed by expressing the formal childcare
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indicator as a full-time equivalent (FTE). The FTE Use Use in FTE Average hours per week (lhs)
definition of formal childcare assumes that all children
Note: For IE, HU, UK and EU-28 2017 data are not available (or not reliable) and 2016
using formal childcare use these services for 30 hours data are reported instead. Data are not reported for MT and SK as not reliable
per week. FTE correction is commonly used in the due to low sample size. Full-time equivalent (FTE) formal childcare use is defined
as the proportion of children using formal childcare multiplied by the average
scientific literature on the topic. ( 294) The difference in number of hours per week, expressed as a proportion of 30 hours per week.
Source: DG EMPL calculations based on EU-SILC cross-sectional data 2016 and 2017
the average number of hours of formal childcare use Users’ Database.
per week is more than 20 hours (e.g. 39 hours in Click here to download chart.
Portugal against 16.7 in the Netherlands). Countries’
ranking changes when the FTE indicator is applied (see 2.4. Formal childcare use and costs and
Chart 4.5). For example, when hours are taken into mothers’ employment decisions
account, the Netherlands moves from being in second
place - after Denmark – for use of formal childcare, The labour market participation of mothers of
with the highest proportion of children under 3 small children depends, to a considerable extent,
attending formal childcare, to just slightly above the on their access to affordable, high-quality
EU-28 average. This is not entirely surprising, given the childcare services. There is a significant difference
high proportion of women in the Netherlands who between the employment rates of women with
work part-time in order to take care of their children. children and women without them, suggesting that
motherhood and related care responsibilities have a
(294) Van Lancker (2013).
significant employment impact. In 2017, the
employment rate of women with children aged 6 or
less was 65% as opposed to 79% for women without
children (Chart 4.6). In general, use of formal childcare
is positively correlated with mothers’ employment rate.
Evidence also shows that more extensive use of

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 Chapter 4: Investing in people and social sustainability: short-term costs vs long-term benefits

childcare for young children under 3 is strongly linked Chart 4.7

to their mothers' chances of employment (Chart Employment rates of mothers tends to be higher in
4.7). (295) This seems to suggest that while countries with high use of formal childcare for children
under 3
motherhood plays a crucial role in labour supply Correlation between mothers’ employment (aged 25-49) and use of formal childcare
decisions (from the decision whether to work or not to for children under 3, 2017
choices of work intensity), it is the availability and 80

affordability of childcare services that explain different 70 DK

ρ Pearson= 0.66 NL
levels of mothers’ employment across the EU. Indeed, 60 LU
BE
the countries where there is greater use of childcare

Formal childcare use

FR SE
50 ES
PT
usually exhibit higher employment rates of mothers. MT
40 SI
However, for the same level of childcare use, there is IT EU-28 IE
FI UK
30
some variation in terms of mothers’ employment rates EE DE CY LV

among EU countries (Chart 4.7). This is the case, for 20

HU
EL
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AT LT
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example, for Hungary and Romania, for Greece and 10
CZ
BG
PL

Lithuania, for Spain and Slovenia and for Belgium and 0 SK

Sweden. These cases (similar level of childcare use but 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
Employment rate of mothers of children below 6 years old
different employment rates of mothers) show that the
effect of using childcare on mothers’ employment Note: 2017 value of formal childcare use is not available for HU and 2016 data is
reported instead.
depends partly on other factors, particularly the Source: DG EMPL elaboration based on Eurostat (variables “ilc_caindformal” and
“lfst_hheredch”).
institutional context of the countries, including family
Click here to download chart.
policies, labour market flexibility (296) and cultural
norms.
Mothers are much more exposed to part-time
Chart 4.6 work than fathers, due to caring responsibilities.
The impact of motherhood on employment is quite Despite improvements in womens’ labour force
strong in most Member States participation, the work patterns of men and women
Mothers’ employment rate compared to fathers and women without children (people
aged 25-49), 2017 continue to differ greatly (see Chapter 1, Section 3).
100 Parenthood affects not only the level of mothers’
employment (Chart 4.6), but also the intensity of their
80 work. At EU level in 2017, almost 40% of mothers of
Employment rate

children under 6 were in part-time work, while less

60 than 6% of fathers (and only 19% of women with no
children) worked part-time (Chart 4.8). There is much
40 variation among Member States. Part-time
Women with children less than 6 years old
employment rates for mothers move from below 10%
Women with no children
20
Men with children less than 6 years old
in Croatia, Romania, Lithuania, Portugal and Latvia, to
above 50% in UK, Germany, Austria and the
0 Netherlands. While high part-time employment rates
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may be explained by cultural norms and different

Source: DG EMPL elaboration based on ESDE 2015 (Chapter III.2, Chart 11) and on motherhood models, a high level of part-time work
Eurostat (variable “lfst_hheredch”) among mothers may also indicate difficulties in
Click here to download chart.
combining work and family life.

Chart 4.8
(295) European Commission (2016a), Chapter III.2. Part-time employment rates are considerably higher for
(296) Cascio, Haider, and Nielsen (2015); Vuri (2016). mothers of young children than for women with no
children
Mothers’ part-time employment rate compared to that of fathers and women without
children (people aged 25-49), 2017

80
Women with children less than 6 years old
Women with no children
Part-time employment rate

60 Men with children less than 6 years old

40

20

0
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FR
CZ

MT
LT

EU-28
EL
RO

LV

SK

SI
EE

ES

LU

AT
SE

UK

NL

Note: Data are not available for BG.

Source: DG EMPL elaboration based on Eurostat (variable “lfst_hhptechi”).
Click here to download chart.

131
Employment and Social Developments in Europe 2019

Full-time use of formal childcare services is Mothers’ disincentives to take up a job differ
associated with high maternal work intensity. considerably across countries, and depend
Conversely for mothers of young children, the higher heavily on whether or not childcare costs are
the average hours of formal childcare use, the lower considered. The OECD tax-benefit model
the part-time employment rate of mothers (Chart 4.9): (TaxBEN) ( ) makes it possible to analyse the PTR of
298

countries where the average use of childcare exceeds the second adult in a household taking up a job,
35 hours per week tend to show low part-time accounting for childcare costs and abstracting from
employment rates for mothers. This is the case in them (Chart 4.10). The higher the participation tax
Croatia, Portugal, Latvia and Lithuania. At the opposite rate, the greater the disincentive to work. Disincentives
end of the distribution are countries such as the to work are considerably higher when childcare costs
Netherlands and Austria, with low average hours of are considered. This is true of all countries in the EU.
childcare use and very high part-time rates for
mothers. There are also outliers, such as Romania, The disincentives to entering employment are
Germany and the UK, where other factors - possibly generally higher for low-income families,
related to the institutional labour market - may be particularly when the income lost to childcare
important in explaining mothers’ work intensity costs is taken into account (Chart 4.10, first panel).
decisions. This suggests that childcare costs can be significant in
creating disincentives to work and indicates the
High childcare costs may affect mothers’ labour
importance of affordable and high-quality childcare
supply decisions by discouraging them from services provision in enabling parents to balance work
working. Mothers’ incentives to enter employment are and family life. The biggest difference in disincentives
determined not only by the wages they receive in work, to taking-up a job with and without childcare costs are
but also by the amount they lose in higher taxes and found in the UK, Ireland and Slovakia, which suggests
lower benefits, and by the childcare costs they may that, for mothers of young children, the biggest
incur if they no longer care for their children disincentives to entering employment are found in the
themselves. Participation tax rates (PTRs) are a way of countries with the highest childcare costs.
measuring the disincentive to take up work: they
represent the proportion of mothers’ additional
earnings which are lost in higher taxes or lower (298) The OECD tax-benefit model (TaxBEN) calculates childcare
benefits, and to childcare costs, if any (297). costs for the years for the years 2004, 2008, 2012, 2015 and
2018. It provides a “unified framework for estimating the cost
of childcare to parents in a consistent way across countries,
Chart 4.9
taking into account both the gross childcare fee amounts and
The average number of hours of formal childcare use is entitlements to fee subsidies and childcare benefits and tax
lower in countries with a higher part-time employment credits”. These entitlements are calculated for specific family
rate for mothers types, accounting for interactions with other taxes and benefits.
Correlation between part-time employment rate of mothers (aged 25-49) and average Malta and Romania are excluded from the analysis due to data
hours of formal childcare use (per week) for children under 3, 2017 constraints. For details on childcare see Browne and Neumann
40 HR PT (2017).
LV
LT SI
Average hours of formal childcare use

35 EE DK
PL HU LU
CY FI SE DE
FR BE
30
EU-28
EL IT
25 ES
CZ IE
RO
20 AT
NL
15 UK

10
0 20 40 60 80 100
Part-time employment rate of mothers of children below 6 years old

Note: Data on part-time employment rate of mothers are not available for BG. As
concerns data on hours of formal childcare use, these are not available (or not
reliable) for IE, HU, UK and EU-28 for 2017 and 2016 data are reported instead.
Data not reported for MT and SK as not reliable due to low sample size.
Source: DG EMPL elaboration based on Eurostat (variables “lfst_hhptechi”) and on EU-
SILC cross-sectional data 2016 and 2017 Users’ Database.
Click here to download chart.

(297) PTRs are defined as follows: “fraction of additional gross

earnings lost to either higher taxes, lower benefits or childcare
fees when a parent with preschool children enters employment
and uses centre-based childcare services” (OECD 2018,
http://www.oecd.org/social/benefits-and-wages/data/). The
OECD tax-benefit model calculates PTRs either accounting for
additional income lost to childcare costs or abstracting from
childcare costs entirely (i.e. assuming no childcare-related
costs, benefits or tax reductions).

132
 Chapter 4: Investing in people and social sustainability: short-term costs vs long-term benefits

Chart 4.10 in facilitating female employment (299). And while

Incentives to work differ for low and high-income some countries may display consistency across family
families and are highly dependent on whether or not policy domains, many do not. Denmark is generous
childcare costs are taken into account
Participation Tax Rates (PTRs) for low- (first panel) and high-income families (second
across all the three important areas (leave policies,
panel) with and without childcare costs across the EU, 2018 childcare subsidies and preschool programmes) while
100 Spain has generous childcare subsidies and universal
90 preschool (300), but (until recently) had a limited leave
80
policy. (301) There is evidence(302) that countries which
70
make the most effort to foster the employment of
60
mothers through paid leave and public provision of
50
40
childcare are also those with high female employment
30
rates and high ratios of female earnings to household
20 incomes.
10
0 There is some debate over the most effective
policies to support working mothers. Redistribution
HR
PT

IT

HU

BE

DK
CY

BG

CZ

DE
FR

FI

PL
IE
LV
EE

LT
ES

EL

LU
SE

SK
UK
NL

AT

SI PTRs without childcare costs PTRs with childcare costs

and investment in public services benefit women more
100
than men, because women earn less than men on
90
80
average and tend to make more use of services,
70
especially childcare and the infrastructure surrounding
60 the unpaid care economy(303). Social investment e.g.
50 early childhood spending is likely to be more beneficial
40 for female work outcomes than extended maternity
30 benefits and leave(304). Critics of conventional social
20 policies to reduce gender inequality emphasise how
10 they can have the effect of segregating women in
0 family-friendly workplaces such as the public sector,
IT

PL

DK

IE
HR

HU
CY

CZ

BG
PT

DE

BE
FR
FI
LV
ES

LU
EE
SE

EL
LT

UK
AT

SI
SK
NL

PTRs without childcare costs PTRs with childcare costs leaving other workplaces unchanged, and of easing
Note: PTRs are defined as the fraction of additional gross earnings lost to either higher
work-family conflicts without challenging the gendered
taxes, lower benefits and/or childcare fees. A low-income family has a primary allocation of household labour (305). Also a more
earner with gross earnings at the 50th percentile of the earnings distribution and
the secondary earner with earnings at the 20th percentile upon entering work. A progressive tax system with targeted tax expenditures
high-income family has a primary earner with gross earnings at the 80th
percentile of the earnings distribution and the secondary earner with earnings at
may be beneficial for working mothers.
the 50th percentile upon entering work. Malta and Romania are excluded due to
data constraints.
Source: OECD tax-benefit model
2.5. Inequality in childcare use
Click here to download chart.
To be effective, childcare services need to be of
high quality and provided for all social groups,
Investing in childcare policies by lowering
but particularly for the most vulnerable.(306)
childcare costs has a positive effect on the use
There may be financial barriers to accessing childcare
of childcare as well as on the labour market
especially in countries where public childcare services
participation of women. EUROMOD
are fairly limited, but parents may also decide
microsimulations shows the impact of a reduction of voluntarily to reduce working time to stay at home
childcare costs in a selection of countries (Annex 2). with their children. Such decisions may be influenced
Two pairs of countries are analysed: a pair which is by cultural norms on motherhood in their country ( 307),
still far away from the 33% Barcelona target for and these norms may differ between poorer and richer
children under 3, namely Hungary and Lithuania, and families, with, for example, poorer families having a
other pair which has reached that target, Finland and lower preference for using childcare services. When
the Netherlands. The analysis shows that decreasing childcare costs are high, incentives to work may be
childcare costs increases the use of childcare and insufficient for some parents, leading them to stay at
mothers' employment in countries where childcare home with the children and not use childcare service.
costs are currently high (Finland and the Netherlands). However, households with a high work intensity
In countries where these costs are low (i.e. Hungary typically do use childcare services. Barriers in access to
and Lithuania), other policies focused on increasing childcare will be analysed in the following section,
availability might work better in enhancing childcare
use and the labour supply of women. (299) Blum (2016); Daly and Rake (2004).
(300) Cascio, Haider, and Nielsen (2015).
When considering childcare use in the context of (301) Spain has adopted in 2018 a new law extending the right of
mothers’ employment, it can be difficult to fathers to paid paternity leave from 4 to 5 weeks.
disentangle the impact of policies versus (302) European Commission (2016a).
preferences. Policies can, of course, shape personal (303) Himmelweit (2002); Mengyesi and Kalaverzou (2014).
preferences and vice versa. Parental leave policies (as (304) Olivetti and Petrongolo (2017).
distinct from maternity leave) and public childcare (305) See Korpi, Ferrarini and Englund (2013), for an overview.
provision are seen as the most important instruments (306) Esping-Andersen et al. (2002).
(307) Pavolini and Van Lancker (2018).

133
Employment and Social Developments in Europe 2019

while this section focuses on existing differences in Chart 4.12

the use of childcare services between families from Across almost all countries childcare use is lower for
different socio-economic backgrounds. children from low-income families than for children
from high-income families
Formal childcare use in FTE among children under 3 (first panel) and children between 3
Chart 4.11
years old and compulsory school age (second panel), in the first and fifth quintile of the
Children from low-income families use childcare less income distribution, 2017
than those from medium- and high-income families 90%
Formal childcare use (binary variable and use in FTE) among children under 3 (first 80%

% of children aged below 3 years old

panel) and children between 3 years old and compulsory school age (second panel), by
income quintiles, 2007-2016, EU-28 70%
60%
50% 50%
% of children under 3 years old

40%
40%
30%
30% 20%
10%
20%
0%

PL
HR

HU

IE
IT

PT
BG

DE
BE

DK
CZ

CY
FI

FR
EU-28
RO
LT

UK
EL

ES
LV

SI

LU
EE
SE
AT

NL
10%
1st quintile 5th quintile
0%
100%
Use Use in FTE Use Use in FTE

% of children from3 to compulsory school

90%
2007 2016
80%
1st quintile 2nd quintile 3rd quintile 4th quintile 5th quintile
70%

70% 60%
% of children between 3 years old and

50%
age
60%
40%
compulsory school age

50% 30%
40% 20%
10%
30%
0%
20%
PL

IE

IT

HU

PT
HR

DE

BE
DK
CY
BG
CZ

FI

EU-28
FR

ES
EL
LT

SE

SI

EE

LV
LU
UK

AT

RO

NL
10%
1st quintile 5th quintile
0%
Use Use in FTE Use Use in FTE Note: Quintiles are based on the disposable household income distribution of
households with children below 6 years old (first quintile has the lowest income).
2007 2016 For EE, IE, HU, UK and EU-28 2017 data are not available (or not reliable) and
1st quintile 2nd quintile 3rd quintile 4th quintile 5th quintile 2016 data are reported instead. Data not reported for MT and SK as not reliable
due to low sample size. Full-time equivalent (FTE) formal childcare use is defined
Note: All EU-28 countries are shown together (weighted average). Quintiles are based as the proportion of children using formal childcare care multiplied by the
on the disposable household income distribution of households with children average number of hours per week expressed as proportion of 30 hours per week.
below 6 years old (first quintile has the lowest income). Full-time equivalent (FTE) Source: DG EMPL calculations based on EU-SILC cross-sectional data 2016 and 2017
formal childcare use is defined as the proportion of children using formal Users’ Database.
childcare care multiplied by the average number of hours per week expressed as
Click here to download chart.
proportion of 30 hours per week.
Source: DG EMPL calculations based on EU-SILC cross-sectional data 2007 and 2016
Users’ Database.
Click here to download chart.
In the EU there is considerable inequality in the
use of childcare services, with low-income
families more likely to forego childcare services
than high-income families. This carries risks, as it
reinforces existing inequalities and contributes to
accumulating both serial and multiple disadvantages.
While over time the use of formal childcare has
increased among all income groups, both for children
under 3 (Chart 4.11, first panel) and for those aged
between 3 and compulsory school age (Chart 4.11,
second panel), inequality in its use has not declined.
Inequality in childcare use is considerably higher for
children under 3 than for older ones. Correcting for FTE
increases the inequality in childcare use, suggesting
higher intensity of childcare use by richer families.
Inequality in childcare use is particularly high in some
countries (Chart 4.12), such as Croatia, UK, France and
Finland, where differences in the use of childcare
services between families in the first and fifth
quintiles are equal or above 100%, both for children
under 3 (Chart 4.12, first panel) and for those between
3 and compulsory school age (Chart 4.12, second
panel). Among very young children (under 3) the
difference in childcare use between first and fifth
quintiles is also very high in Bulgaria, Lithuania and
the Netherlands.

134
 Chapter 4: Investing in people and social sustainability: short-term costs vs long-term benefits

Children with non-working mothers attend education (Chart 4.14). This is linked to evidence that
childcare less than those with working mothers. a high education level is strongly correlated with
Unsurprisingly, and in line with the macro evidence having a job. However, the level of maternal education
presented in a previous section, parents are more likely does not seem to play a strong role in determining the
to revert to childcare services if the mother works. This extent of childcare use for older children.
reinforces the evidence that childcare services are less
Chart 4.14
likely to be used for children from disadvantaged
Highly educated mothers of children under 3 use
socio-economic backgrounds. The disparity in the use
childcare slightly more than less highly educated
of childcare services according to the labour market counterparts
status of mothers exists both among very young Formal childcare use (binary variable) among children under 3 (first panel) and children
children (Chart 4.13, first panel) and among the group between 3 and compulsory school age (second panel), by education level of the mother,
2017
between 3 and compulsory school age (Chart 4.13, 90%
second panel), but it is slightly higher in the first group.

% of mothers with children below 3 years

80%
There are, however, countries where there is no or little 70%
difference in childcare use between children of non- 60%
working and working mothers. In these cases it is 50%
possible that children are being taken care informally,

old
40%
by other family members. For very young children, this Mothers with tertiary education
30%
is the case in some of the Southern countries - Italy, Mothers without tertiary education
20%
Greece and Spain – and in Ireland, Lithuania and
10%
Sweden; for older children, this is the case in Italy,
0%
Greece, Spain, Ireland, and Romania. The reasons may

HU

BE
BG

PL

DE
HR

IT

IE

PT
CY
CZ

FI
EU-28

FR

DK
RO
LT

EL

LV
EE
AT

UK

SI
SE

ES
LU

NL
depend on motherhood norms, but the (lack of)
availability of high-quality childcare services is 100%
% of mothers with children between 3 and

probably also relevant. 90%

80%
compulsory school age

Chart 4.13 70%

Childcare used more for children with working mothers 60%
than for children of mothers who do not work in most 50%
Mothers with tertiary education
Member States 40%
Mothers without tertiary education
Formal childcare use (binary variable) among children under 3 (first panel) and children 30%
between 3 years old and compulsory school age (second panel), by working status of 20%
the mother, 2017
10%
90%
0%
% of mothers with children below 3 years

80%
PL

IT

IE
HR

HU
CZ

BG

DE

PT

BE

DK
CY

EU-28

FI

LU
FR
EE
LT

LV
UK

EL

SE

ES
RO

AT

SI

NL
70%
60%
Note: For EE, IE, HU, UK and EU-28 2017 data are not available (or not reliable) and
50% 2016 data are reported instead. Data not reported for MT and SK as not reliable
due to low sample size.
old

40%
Source: DG EMPL calculations based on EU-SILC cross-sectional data 2016 and 2017
30%
Users’ Database.
20% Click here to download chart.
10%
0%
2.6. Barriers in access to childcare
PL

IT

IE

HU
CZ

HR

PT

DE
BG

CY

BE

DK
EU-28

FI

FR
LT

ES

LV

LU
SE
RO

EL

UK

EE
AT

SI

NL

Working mothers Non-working mothers Access to childcare can be difficult for different
100%
reasons, ranging from affordability and
% of mothers with children between 3 and

90%
80% availability to proximity, opening hours and
70% quality. (308) Not only costs and availability but also
compulsory school age

60%
preferences and social norms may drive childcare
50%
choices. (309) Scientific research (310) seems to indicate
40%
30%
that preferences and cultural norms on motherhood
20% (demand-side factors) alone are not good predictors of
10% childcare use. However, affordability and availability
0% (supply-side factors) are structural constraints to
HR

DE

HU
PL

BG

IT

IE

PT

BE
CY

FR
FI

DK
CZ
LT

EU-28
EL
RO

UK

LU
AT

ES
SI

SE

LV
EE

NL

childcare use that matter everywhere. There are other

Working mothers Non-working mothers less obvious barriers to accessing childcare which may
Note: For EE, IE, HU, UK and EU-28 2017 data are not available (or not reliable) and affect poorer families more – travel costs, the added
2016 data are reported instead. Data not reported for MT and SK as not reliable
due to low sample size.
pressure of caring for larger families, difficulty in
Source: DG EMPL calculations based on EU-SILC cross-sectional data 2016 and 2017 applying for childcare subsidies or concerns about
Users’ Database.
eligibility particularly for immigrant families. ( 311) Low-
Click here to download chart.

(308) Eurofound (2017).

Young children of mothers with a high level of (309) Vuri (2016).
education are more likely to attend childcare (310) Abrassart and Bonoli (2015); Pavolini and Van Lancker (2018).
than those whose mothers have a low level of (311) Austin et al. (2005).

135
Employment and Social Developments in Europe 2019

income families working under non-standard contracts Out-of-pocket childcare costs are higher for low-
and/or working non-standard hours not only face income families than higher-income families
reduced income and employment predictability across the EU, although there is considerable
necessary to maintain childcare use, but also may not variation in these costs (Chart 4.17). The OECD tax-
work the regular hours that are essential for dropping benefit model facilitates a cross-country comparison
children off and collecting them from childcare of net childcare costs for specific family types at
centres. (312) Low-wage earners often have to contend various earning levels (314). In many countries, low-
with less accommodating and family-friendly policies income families pay higher net childcare costs as a
despite arguably being those most in need of them, percentage of their disposable income, though there
because they are more likely to have health care are some notably progressive exceptions (Luxembourg,
needs, to be single parents and caregivers and to have Netherlands, and to a lesser extent Belgium and
longer commutes. (313) Low-wage employees are also France). Countries with low net childcare costs (e.g.
at greater risk than high-wage earners if they lose Italy, Austria, Croatia, Portugal, Cyprus, Estonia,
their jobs because of conflicting work and family Sweden, Hungary, Germany, Spain and Greece) tend to
commitments (e.g. if they have to leave work to care show very small differences between poorer and richer
for a sick child and their employer uses this as families in the effect of these costs on disposable
grounds for dismissal). income. However, in countries where childcare costs
consume a much higher share of families’ net income
One third of Europeans have some difficulty in (e.g. the UK, Ireland, Slovakia, Poland, Lithuania and
affording childcare services, according to the Latvia), there are much bigger differences between
2016 EU-SILC ad hoc module on access to income groups in net childcare costs as a percentage
services (Chart 4.15). The main reasons for not using of disposable income. The cross-country disparities for
more formal childcare (when needed) is affordability low-income families are particularly striking. High-
(almost 50%), while in second place are reasons linked income families in Luxembourg, the Netherlands and
to the availability of the service (around 20%). From Ireland all spend a similar proportion of income on
this evidence it seems clear that higher childcare childcare (circa 21%) but low-income families are
subsidies would increase childcare use. paying drastically different amounts, with costs in
Luxembourg at 8% of disposable income compared
Chart 4.15
with 35% in Ireland.
More than 30% of families with young children using
formal childcare find it difficult to afford it
Barriers to childcare access among families with children under 3 using childcare
services, 2016, EU average (314) Net childcare costs refer to cost of full-time centre-based care
for a two-parent two-child family, where both parents are in
Affordability of childcare

Very easily
Easily
full-time employment and the children are aged 2 and 3. Net
childcare costs are comprised of gross fees minus childcare
services

Fairly easily
benefits/rebates and tax deductions, plus any resulting changes
With some difficulty
in other benefits received following the use of childcare and/or
With difficulty change in family income). See footnote 298 (Section 2.4) for
With great difficulty details on the OECD tax-benefit model.
Cannot afford it
making more use of
Main reason for not

formal childcare

No places available
Not nearby
Opening hours not suitable
Quality not satisfactory
Other

0 10 20 30 40 50

Source: DG EMPL calculations based on EU-SILC ad-hoc module 2016 Users’ Database.
Click here to download chart.

High childcare costs for low-income families, and

the low progressivity of these costs, are likely to
be a major cause of the existing inequality in
childcare use. Given that lack of affordability is the
main reason for parents not making more use of
formal childcare, it is worth analysing how the net
costs of childcare (taking into account tax deductions)
differ between low-income, medium-income and high-
income families.

(312) National Women’s Law Center (2014). Literature on this topic

suggests that flexible working impacts parents’ childcare
choices (Han (2004)). Parents who work non-standard hours
spend longer in paid work with less time to spend on childcare
and flexible working further entrenches gender inequalities in
childcare burdens (Craig and Powell (2011)).
(313) https://psmag.com/economics/work-life-balance-benefits-low-
wage-workers-employers-35733

136
 Chapter 4: Investing in people and social sustainability: short-term costs vs long-term benefits

Chart 4.16
There is considerable cross-country variation, not only in the level of net childcare costs but also in how these costs
are determined
Net childcare costs by component for a low-income family as a percentage of disposable income, 2018

80%

Childcare Fee Tax reduction Other benefits Childcare benefit Net childcare costs as a percentage of disposable income
Net childcare costs by component, % of disposable income

60%

40%

20%

0%

-20%

-40%

-60%
IT AT HR PT CY EE SE CZ HU DE ES EL BG LU SI FR DK BE LV LT PL NL FI SK IE UK
Note: Net childcare costs refer to cost of full-time centre-based care for a two-parent two-child family, where both parents are in full-time employment and the children are aged 2 and
3. Net childcare costs are comprised of gross fees minus childcare benefits/rebates and tax deductions, plus any resulting changes in other benefits received following the use of
childcare and/or change in family income). A low-income family has a primary earner with gross earnings at the 50th percentile of the distribution and a secondary earner at the
20th percentile.
Source: OECD tax-benefit model.
Click here to download chart.

Chart 4.17 benefits. The potential for inequalities in childcare

Net childcare costs are in general higher for low-income access supports the case for measures which keep out
families than for medium-income and high-income of pocket fees low and offer free provision in the first
families
Net childcare-related costs and benefits as a percentage of disposable income for two-
instance.
parent families with two children at various earning levels, 2018
50% The ways in which out-of-pocket costs are
low-income family
Net childcare-related costs and benefits,%

45% moderate-income family determined can have distributional impacts. Tax

40% high-income family reductions for childcare use may, for example, benefit
35% only families with incomes high enough to pay taxes.
disposable income

30% Universal free provision is becoming increasingly

25% common, offering at least partial coverage (e.g.
20% Ireland(315) and in some cases full-time care (e.g.
15%
Berlin, Germany (316)). These examples show a strong
10%
commitment to the provision of childcare as an
5%
important public service/investment and as a social
0%
right in line with the European Pillar of Social Rights.
IT

HR
PT
CY

HU

BG

PL

IE
FR
DK
CZ

DE

BE

FI
EL

LT

SK
AT

EE
SE

ES

LU
SI

LV

UK
NL

However, such measures are not targeted and may

Note: Net childcare costs are as defined in footnote 314 (Section 2.6). A low-income require high public expenditure. Other measures may
family has a primary earner with gross earnings at the 50th percentile of the
distribution and a secondary earner at the 20th percentile; a moderate-income be needed to ensure that low-income families can
family has two earners at the 50th percentile, and a high-income family has a
primary earner with earnings at the 80th percentile and a secondary earner at the supplement the hours provided for free or at a
50th percentile. reasonable cost.
Source: OECD tax-benefit model.
Click here to download chart.

(315) https://www.dcya.gov.ie/viewdoc.asp?DocID=4786&ad=1
In terms of the composition of net childcare (316) https://www.dw.com/en/berlin-first-in-germany-to-scrap-child-
costs, there is considerable cross-country day-care-fees/a-44883019
variation in how fees are determined (Chart 4.16).
Some countries have low initial fees, often with
subsidies going directly to providers (e.g. Italy, Austria),
others have high fees but high childcare benefits
(Luxembourg, Slovenia) while others use a mix of
childcare benefits and other benefits to reduce net
childcare costs.

The majority of countries with low childcare

costs achieve this by virtue of low initial costs,
as opposed to high costs balanced by high

137
Employment and Social Developments in Europe 2019

Chart 4.18 skills was considered “crucial” in the European

Countries where families spend more on childcare tend Commission communication in the assessment of
to show greater disincentives to work progress on structural reforms in the 2019 European
Scatter plot between participation tax rates (PTR) accounting for childcare costs and net
childcare costs as a percentage of disposable income across EU countries for low- Semester, where the need to strengthen and
income families, 2018 modernise the education and training system is seen
45%
UK as the main route to tackling skills shortages and
Net childcare costs as a % of disposable

40%
mismatches. (320) At the same time, upskilling and
35%
IE
reskilling policies should boost the resilience of
30%
individuals, especially those belonging to
25% SK disadvantaged groups.(321)
income

20% FI
NL
PL
15% LT
LV FR BE
3.2. The education and training system:
SI DK
10%
EE
SE
BG LU positive effects and resources allocated
ES EL CZ DE
5% CY
HR HU AT
0%
PT IT Investment in education and training yield
0 20 40 60 80 100
significant returns for workers, the economy and
PTR accounting for childcare costs
society. Education and training have several beneficial
Note: PTRs are defined as the fraction of additional gross earnings lost to either higher
taxes, lower benefits and/or childcare fees. Net childcare costs are as defined in effects justifying investment. In this section the focus
footnote 314 (Section 2.6). A low-income family has a primary earner with gross
earnings at the 50th percentile of the earnings distribution, and a secondary
will be on three main dimensions: workers, the
earner at the 20th percentile when in employment. economy, and the society. The advantages for workers
Source: OECD tax-benefit model.
start in the labour market where higher levels of
Click here to download chart.
formal education are associated with higher
employment rates (Chart 4.19), lower unemployment,
Barriers in access to childcare are also barriers better matching between jobs and workers, and higher
to employment (as discussed in Section 2.4). The wages. (322) Moreover, having a job is a prerequisite for
higher the proportion of their income that low-earning access to insurance-based social benefits. As regards
families spend on out-of-pocket childcare costs, the the effect on the economy, a high stock of human
lower their incentives to take up employment. While capital has two main advantages. First, economic
this is simply a correlation and not evidence of a theory (323) shows that education and training have a
causal relationship (Chart 4.18), it seems natural that positive effect on workers’, capital, and total factor
more affordable childcare should make it easier for productivity through their skills and ultimately in terms
those caring for young children (in many cases of economic growth. (324) Secondly, given the effects
mothers) to enter employment. This is true in on participation and employment, investment in
particular, but not only, for low-income households. human capital leads to lower expenditure in
unemployment benefits, and higher revenues from tax
3. INVESTING IN SKILLS AND LIFELONG and social contributions. As for the positive effects for

LEARNING (317) cooperation in education and training (“ET 2020”) in the

following targets, among others:
3.1. Introduction fewer than 15% of 15-year-olds should be under-skilled in reading,
mathematics and science;
The European social model aims to strengthen the rate of early leavers from education and training aged 18-24
should be below 10%;
the skills base so as to boost employment and
at least 40% of people aged 30-34 should have completed some
competitiveness as well as better living form of higher education;
conditions. Efforts to strengthen human capital have at least 15% of adults should participate in learning;
been made throughout the history of European Union. at least 20% of higher education graduates and 6% of 18-34 year-
In the Europe 2020 strategy for smart, sustainable olds with an initial vocational qualification should have spent
and inclusive growth,(318) investment in skills was seen some time studying or training abroad;
as a way to improve competitiveness and productivity, (320) In the context of the European Semester, the Commission also
made a proposal on the framework to benchmark adult skills
while helping to achieve the Europe 2020 target of and learning, which was endorsed in the Employment
75% of the adult population in employment by 2020. Committee (EMCO).
(319) More recently, the European effort to promote (321) https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/file_import/2019-
european-semester-communication-country-reports_en_0.pdf
(317) This section will not cover childcare, even if it is a topic covered (322) There are also differences between general and vocational
by the title, since it has been discussed in the previous pages. qualification levels. For instance, for what concerns
(318) https://ec.europa.eu/info/business-economy-euro/economic- employment rate in 2018: young people (defined as aged 20-
and-fiscal-policy-coordination/eu-economic-governance- 34) having completed education 1-3 years before the survey
monitoring-prevention-correction/european- with a medium-level qualification diploma (ISCED levels 3 and
semester/framework/europe-2020-strategy_en 4) reveal a difference of 13 pp in terms of employment rate:
66,3% for those having obtained a degree with general
(319) The centrality of investment in education and training in the
orientation, 79,5% for those with a vocational orientation
European Social Model is confirmed by the fact that two of the
degree.
other Europe 2020 targets were on education, namely: “rates
of early school leavers below 10%”, and “at least 40% of (323) Among others, worth mentioning are: Mincer (1958); Becker
people aged 30–34 having completed higher education”. These (1964); Mincer (1974).
were supported by the strategic framework for European (324) Woessmann (2016).

138
 Chapter 4: Investing in people and social sustainability: short-term costs vs long-term benefits

society, evidence from the European Union shows that education is shown in the first two columns. The
being employed, or in education or training, is results of the regression indicates that, all other things
associated with a higher level of institutional trust and being equal, secondary education in the EU-28 is
of engagement with society and participatory associated with a higher level of real hourly wage
democracy.(325) Moreover, it helps people to fulfil their (+16.2%). This is even more true for tertiary education
potential as human beings and citizens. For instance, (+44.7%), after controlling for factors including
the modernisation and digitalisation of the welfare contract type, working hours, occupation, work
state, while reducing expenditure and increasing experience, age and gender. These results are in line
efficiency, requires a minimum level of digital skills. with other studies on this topic (332).Tertiary education
Individuals not equipped with those skills may face in particular is the factor with the biggest correlation,
significant barriers. followed by being employed in a “high-skilled white
collar” cluster of occupations (managers, professionals,
Chart 4.19 technicians), and having an open-ended contract.
Higher level of formal qualifications are linked with
Seniority is also positively correlated with higher
higher employment rates
Employment rate by educational attainment level (ISCED), population aged 20-64 salary, as is being male.
90.0
80.0 Chart 4.20
70.0 Secondary and, most of all, tertiary education are
60.0
50.0 correlated with significantly higher income for
40.0 employees
30.0
Regression coefficients of the logarithm of real hourly wage of employees aged 25-64,
20.0
years 2009-2017.
10.0
0.0 Male
20052006200720082009201020112012201320142015201620172018 Age
Less than primary, primary and lower secondary education W Exp: above 30 years
(levels 0-2) W Exp: above 9 until 29 years
Upper secondary and post-secondary non-tertiary W Exp: above 4 until 9 years
education (levels 3 and 4) W Exp: above 2 until 4 years
Tertiary education (levels 5-8) Skilled agricultural and craft workers
Clerical and service workers
Managers, professionals, technicians
Note: There are large and persistent differences across formal qualification groups. The
results hold for all age groups. In the 55-64 age bracket, there is an upward trend Full Time Worker
in this period, probably driven by a cohort effect and by higher female labour Open Ended Contract
market participation. Tertiary education
Source: Eurostat [tepsr_wc120] Secondary education
Click here to download chart.
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
Logarithm of real hourly wage
Upper secondary and tertiary formal Note: All estimated coefficients in the chart are statistically significant at 1%. The
qualifications are associated with a higher level variables names starting with the expression "W Exp" refer to years of working
experience. The base categories for the dummy variables refer to: primary or
of income in an important and statistically below primary education, in Germany, non-standard contract, person in the
clustered occupation group of plant machine operators and elementary
significant way. (326) The positive link with education occupation, with less than two years of experience, and female as gender. Control
variables have been included for all MS. Employees in the armed forces have
goes beyond employment status, and is also evident in been omitted from the analyses.
levels of income (327). Using EU-SILC data(328), it is Source: DG EMPL calculations based on EU-SILC cross-sectional data from 2009 to 2017.
Click here to download chart.
possible to show the position for EU Member States at
the present time. Chart 4.20 shows the correlation
(regression coefficients) between a number of Results hold broadly true for every Member
conditions and the real hourly wage( 329) (330) for State, though with some differences in the
employees. The “effect” (331) of secondary and tertiary relative effect of secondary and tertiary
education. The analysis shown in Chart 4.20 was
(325) Eurofound (2015). conducted for every year of the sample and for every
(326) For all the section, we would use upper secondary for ISCED Member State. The positive effects of secondary and
levels 3-4 and tertiary for ISCED levels 5-8.
tertiary education hold in every country. Chart 4.21
(327) Becker (1964); Mincer (1974).
shows only the coefficients for secondary and tertiary
(328) See footnote 290 (Section 2.3) for information on EU-SILC.
education for all Member States. The ratio between
(329) The wage information in EU-SILC is available with a reference
period of 1 year. Hourly wages are calculated as annual wages
the two coefficients illustrates some remarkable
divided by annual hours worked. Annual gross wages are differences across Member States, the smallest
available in the survey (variable PY010G), while annual hours difference being in Sweden (where secondary
worked are derived as total number of months spent at full- education raises the real hourly wage by 17.5% and
time work as employee (variables PL073 and PL074) multiplied
by number of hours usually worked per week in a job (variable
PL060). Given the discrepancy in EU-SILC between the income the literature as the endogeneity problem or ability bias. From
reference year (e.g. 2015 in EU-SILC 2016) and hours worked a theoretical perspective, high ability people should pursue
and employment status (2015 in EU-SILC 2016), hourly wages higher qualifications to signal their ability to the labour market.
are calculated only for those employees who maintained their With the regressions presented in this section it is only possible
labour market status for seven or more months during the to acknowledge this link.
income reference year. (332) Blundell, Deardan and Sianesi (2005), for example, find an
(330) The logarithm of real hourly wage on employees was used. average return of 18-24% to secondary schooling and of 48%
to tertiary education. More recent analysis by the OECD (2018),
(331) The word ‘effect’ should not be interpreted in a causal way. The Psacharopoulos (2014) and Glocker and Steiner (2011) also
figures reported in this section refer to correlation, which does find high returns, including in the EU.
not imply causation. The lack of a causal link is referred to in

139
Employment and Social Developments in Europe 2019

tertiary education by 22.6%), the highest in the United an investment gap in the domain of education and
Kingdom (where the estimated coefficients are 7% training. This amounts to EUR 15 bn per year, a
and 33.6% respectively). Among the other results of significant figure given that total investment in social
the regressions not shown in graph 4.21, seniority is infrastructure is EUR 65 bn (Fransen et al., 2018) ( 337).
also linked with a statistically significant positive Social infrastructure (338) is mostly outside the remit of
effect. The same holds true for being male and for this report.
people having an open standard contracts. The other
coefficients broadly hold, but each of them turns out Chart 4.22
While the number of students increased over the last
to have a statistically insignificant effect in at least
decade, real expenditure per student did not
one other Member State. Number of students and real expenditure on education per student in the period 2008-
2017
Chart 4.21
Secondary and tertiary qualifications are correlated with
higher employees' income in each Member State
Regression coefficients of on the logarithm of real hourly wage of employees aged 25-
64, years 2008-2017.
0.8

0.7

0.6

0.5

0.4

0.3

0.2

0.1 Note: Number of students (in thousands) on the right, and real average expenditure (in
EUR) by student on the left. Students’ figure refers to all enrolled pupils and
0 students, from early childhood to doctoral degree. For countries where number of
FI DKSE BEUKEE EL IT IE FR NLDEAT SK ES CYHUROBGCZHR LTMTPL LU LV SI PT enrolled students was not available for 2017, the same figure as 2016 were used
Secondary education Tertiary education instead.
Source: EMPL calculations based on the following Eurostat data codes: [gov_10a_exp],
Note: All estimated coefficients shown in the graph are statistically significant at 1%. [educ_enrl1tl], [nama_10_gdp] and [educ_uoe_enra02].
The variables named starting with the expression “W Exp” refer to years of
working experience. The omitted variables refer to: primary or below primary Click here to download chart.
education, non-standard contract, person in the clustered occupation group of
plant machine operators and elementary occupation, with less than two years of
experience, female gender. Control variables have been included for all MS. Chart 4.23
Employees in the armed forces have been omitted from the analyses.
Member States trends in numbers of students and
Source: EU-SILC, own calculations
Click here to download chart.
expenditure on education differ substantially
Changes in numbers of students and real expenditure on education in the period 2008-
2017, by Member States
Investment in skills and training have remained 40%
Change in number of students, 2008-2017

stable in recent years, and an investment gap 30% IE

remains. Expenditure on education and training in the 20%
LU
UK SE
EU is mostly by governments (80.9% in 2015), with CY DK
10% EL ES NL
some differences across Member States. In the UK, FI AT BE
EU28 FR DE
71% of the expenditure comes from public finances 0%
IT
SI HR CZ
MT
while in Slovakia the figure is 96%. In this section the -10%
PT EE
BG
focus is on public expenditure, leaving private spending HU PO SK
-20% LV
RO
for the ‘Investment in education, training and LT
sustainability’ section. On average, public expenditure, -30%
-30% -20% -10% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50%
expressed as a percentage of GDP, decreased from
Change in real expenditure in education 2008-2017
2008 to 2017, while real expenditure remained
Source: EMPL calculations based on the following Eurostat data codes: [gov_10a_exp],
broadly stable. This trend was coupled with an [educ_enrl1tl], [nama_10_gdp] and [educ_uoe_enra02].
increase in the number of students in national Click here to download chart.

education systems. (333) (334) Chart 4.22 shows that

overall in the period 2008-2017 real expenditure per
student decreased slightly. (335) Yet, according to the Commission, a High-Level Task Force on investing in social
analysis conducted by the High-Level Task Force on infrastructure in Europe was established in February 2017. This
was chaired by Romano Prodi and Christian Sautter.
investing in social infrastructure in Europe, (336) there is
(337) The calculations refer to 2015, and are based on national
accounts’ data from Eurostat.
(333) The figure refers to all students together, from early childhood
(338) The report defines social infrastructure in the education and
to doctoral degree.
LifeLong Learning domain as tangible (including kindergartens,
(334) In 2017 there were 2.5 million more students in the EU than in childcare centres, schools, vocational colleges, universities,
2008, though 13 Member States registered a reduction. laboratories, ICT equipment & related Cloud infrastructure,
(335) The average hides substantial differences. As can be seen in student accommodation, adjacent supporting infrastructure)
Chart 4.23, while the UK experienced an 18% increase in the and intangible (including facility maintenance, energy
number of students coupled with a drop in real expenditure of efficiency/low carbon, student lending, R&D programmes,
14 pp, Slovakia saw a decrease in the number of students by education software development).
17% paired with an increase in real expenditure of 35 pp. .
(336) Following an initiative promoted by the European Association of
Long-Term Investors, in close consultation with the European

140
 Chapter 4: Investing in people and social sustainability: short-term costs vs long-term benefits

The number of underachieving students in maths Chart 4.24

is slowly decreasing, while the opposite is true Europe showed small average improvements in reducing
the proportion of students underperforming in
for science. While analysing social investment, it is
mathematics
important to keep in mind that expenditure on Underachieving 15-year-old students in mathematics
education alone does not guarantee improvements in 50,0

student performance. Nevertheless, better results in 45,0

tests for mathematical and scientific skills, as well as 40,0

cognitive skills more generally, show a consistent and 35,0

strong link with economic growth. ( 339) Chart 4.24 and 30,0

Chart 4.25 show the evolution in the number of 25,0

20,0
underachievers (340) in PISA tests in mathematics and
15,0
science. (341) On average, EU countries have shown
10,0
some modest improvements in mathematics and some
5,0
uneven trends in science across the latest three 0,0
surveys (in 2009, 2012 and 2015). Internationally,

RO
RU

SE

SK
SI

CZ
AT
IE
KR

IT

BG
BE
JP

HU

HR
UK

US
DK

DE
NL

FR

LU
LV

LT
FI

EU
ES

EL
EE

PL

PT
these developments led to Europe outperforming the 200 9 201 2 201 5

US in terms of reducing the proportion of low Note: No complete time series for CY and MT. EU is unweighted average. RU=Russia; US
= United States; JP=Japan; KR= South Korea.
achievers, and moving the EU closer to South Korea. Source: OECD PISA survey [educ_outc_pisa]
However, countries such as Russia showed marked Click here to download chart.
improvements over the same timespan, and Japan
managed to reduce further their already low Chart 4.25
proportion of low achievers. This may indicate further Conversely, the proportion of students underperforming
potential for improvements in Europe, and the need to in science increased
Underachieving 15-year-old students in science
devise better strategies to tackle underachievement
45,0
and improve the efficiency and effectiveness of
40,0
education spending. (342) Recent evidence also shows
35,0
that non-traditional competences such as effort and
30,0
perseverance, measured through PISA test log-files,
25,0
correlate positively with traditional skills ( 343)
20,0
strengthening the case for further attention to
15,0
education and training.
10,0

5,0
(339) Hanushek and Kimko (2000); Hanushek and Woessmann 0,0
(2015); Hanushek and Woessmann (2017).

HU
HR
FI

UK

FR
LV

US

LT
LU
DK

DE

IT
EE

IE

ES
NL

EU

EL
PL

PT

SE
SI

RU

SK

RO
CZ
JP

KR

AT
BE

BG
(340) The indicator measures the share of 15-year-old students 200 9 201 2 201 5
failing to reach level 2 (‘basic skills level’) on the PISA scale for Note: No complete time series for CY and MT. EU is unweighted average. RU=Russia; US
the three core school subjects of reading, mathematics and = United States; JP=Japan; KR= South Korea.
science (here only the last two are presented). The data stem Source: OECD PISA survey [educ_outc_pisa]
from the Programme for International Student Assessment Click here to download chart.
(PISA), which is a triennial international survey which aims to
evaluate education systems by testing the skills and knowledge
of 15-year-old students.
(341) The focus is on PISA tests since data are easily available.
Moreover, it has been estimated that an increase of 50 points
3.3. The role of work experience during
in the educational achievements in these test lead to an studies
increase of around 1 pp in the economy (see Woessmann,
2016). Work experience during secondary and tertiary
(342) Canton et al. (2018). education is positively linked with employment,
(343) European Commission (2019b).
but with strong differences at country level. In
the 1960s, academic literature discovered a negative
correlation between educational attainment and
unemployment. (344) European labour markets have
evolved substantially since then, and in the 2010s
policymakers undertook several rounds of reforms of
education systems, often with the aim of improving
the matching between education systems and labour
market needs and outcomes. These reforms were
accelerated during the crisis, with the aim of to
facilitating the integration of younger cohorts in the
labour market.(345) The LFS(346) ad-hoc module 2016

(344) Becker (1964).

(345) ETUC (2016).
(346) The EU Labour Force Survey (EU-LFS) is the largest European
household sample survey, covering 35 countries (EU28, three

141
Employment and Social Developments in Europe 2019

(347) on “Young people on the labour market” allows This positive correlation of work experience
estimation of the effect of work experience, both paid during education with being in employment
and unpaid, during studies. (348) Chart 4.26 shows that afterwards holds after controlling for a number
for people in the age bracket 25-34 the likelihood of of factors such as age, gender and education
being employed increases substantially when they level. In order to isolate the effect of having work
have had work experience, especially if they had paid experience, both paid and unpaid, at the highest
work experience. Nevertheless, there is great variation educational attainment level, a more sophisticated
between Member States in the employment status of type of analysis is needed, keeping a focus on the
those who have had work experience (both paid and possibility of being employed for individuals
unpaid) at the highest educational attainment level undertaking training. (349) In these series of charts, we
and those who have not. The discrepancy ranges from will only consider working experience included in the
2 pp in Czechia and Romania, to 23 p.p. in Bulgaria and curriculum, often targeted by policy recommendations
Italy (Chart 4.27). and regulated by policymakers. (350) Chart 4.28 shows
Chart 4.26
the outcome for all EU Member States pooled
For people aged 25-34, work experience during studies together. Almost all the relationships estimated are
is correlated with higher employment rate (EU) statistically significant, (351) the exceptions being those
Labour status during reference week based on work experience during studies referring to as EU-15 mover (352) and European
No work experience during Highest
migrant (the box in the following page presents more
educational attainment level detailed evidence on labour mobility and return
mobility). Both the paid and unpaid work experience
Unpaid work experience only have a positive effect on the possibility of being
employed, other factors being equal. Paid work
experience (raising the probability of having a job by
Paid work experience only
9.7pp) has the fifth biggest effect on employment
levels, and is third among the positive effects, trailing
Both paid and unpaid work experience only the presence of tertiary and secondary
qualifications. Vocational curricula are also linked with
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
a higher employment rate. (353) Conversely, all else
Work Lay off, military service, community service or NEET
being equal, being a woman or being an immigrant is
Source: LFS AHM 2016 - Young people on the labour market – microdata. DE was
excluded due to errors in coding the replies which were not yet corrected at linked with a lower probability of being employed.
writing.
Click here to download chart.

(349) The methodology chosen was logistic regression. Logistic (or

Chart 4.27 logit) regression is a type of regression analysis that estimates
For people aged 25-34, work experience during studies the parameters of a logistic model, and it is a type of binomial
regression. From an econometric point of view, the dependent
is correlated with higher employment rate
Difference between "Both paid and unpaid work experience" and "No work experience
variable can only have two possible values. In this case the
during highest educational attainment level" values are: being employed or not.
25 (350) For the interested reader, including the individuals who are
working outside of the curriculum has barely any effect on the
20 results. The main two are that BG, EL, and UK coefficients of
the regressors linked with unpaid working experience gain
15
significance. This is mostly due to the fact that removing
students working outside the curriculum reduces the sample
size.
10
(351) At 1%.
5
(352) Following the intra EU labour mobility report, EU-15 movers are
EU citizens coming from EU-15 who reside in an EU-28 country
other than their country of citizenship. EU-13 movers are the
0
BG IT HU LT BE FR IEEU28FI UK ES DKMTSE AT NL SK CY PT EE HRLU PL SI LV CZ RO same but coming EU-13.
Difference between "B oth paid and unpaid work experience" and (353) For the interested reader, a comprehensive description of VET
"No work experi ence duri ng Highest educational attai nment level" systems in Europe by country can be found at the CEDEFOP
Note: All estimated coefficients reported in the graph are statistically significant. DE
website: http://www.cedefop.europa.eu/en/events-and-
was excluded due to errors in coding the replies which were not yet corrected at projects/projects/vet-europe
writing.
Source: LFS AHM 2016 - Young people on the labour market – microdata
Click here to download chart.

EFTA countries and four candidate countries). Its main

statistical aim is to classify the population aged 15 years and
over into: employed persons, unemployed persons, and
economically inactive persons
(347) LFS ad hoc modules are yearly models dealing with a particular
labour market topic. They complement the standard sets of LFS
questions with supplementary sets of variables.
(348) ‘During studies’ refers to the studies that led to the highest
educational attainment level.

142
 Chapter 4: Investing in people and social sustainability: short-term costs vs long-term benefits

Chart 4.28 Chart 4.29

Work experience during the highest educational level is The positive correlation between employment and
positively correlated with the probability of being working experience during studies is positive and
employed in a statistically significant way statistically significant for most Member States
Average Marginal Effects from logit regression based on LFS AHM 2016 on young Average Marginal Effects from logit regression based on LFS AHM 2016 on young
people in the LM (25-34) people in the LM (25-34)
African or Asian migrant 0.25
European migrant
EU 13 mover 0.2
EU 15 mover
Vocational formal education started… 0.15
Vocational highest educational…
Unpaid work experience during the… 0.1
Paid work experience during the…
gender (female) 0.05
tertiary education
secondary education 0
age BE BG DK EE IE EL ES FR IT CY LT HU NL AT PT SI SK FI SE UK
Paid work experience during the highest level of education
-0.2 -0.1 0 0.1 0.2 0.3
Unpaid work experience during the highest level of education

Note: Students excluded from analyses. EU15 mover is lighter blue because not Note: CZ, HR, LV, LU, MT, PL, RO did not have statistically significant coefficients of the
statistically significant. DE was excluded due to errors in coding the replies which regressors estimated for neither paid nor unpaid working experience during
were not yet corrected at writing. Complete name fifth regressor: “Vocational highest educational attainment. DE was excluded due to errors in coding the
formal education started after reaching highest level of education”. Complete replies which were not yet corrected at writing.
name sixth regressor: “Vocational highest educational attainment”.Complete Source: LFS AHM 2016 - Young people on the labour market – microdata.
name seventh regressor: “Unpaid work experience during the highest level of
Click here to download chart.
education ”.Complete name eighth regressor: “Paid work experience during the
highest level of education”.
Source: LFS AHM 2016 - Young people on the labour market – microdata.
Click here to download chart.
The effect is lower than 5pp in only three countries.
Unpaid work experience alone is less significanct in
most Member States, mainly due to its lower incidence
These effects tend to be confirmed at national
(10% of the overall sample, against 29% for paid work
level, with some important differences between
experience). The negative correlation with being a
Member States. Chart 4.29 shows the effects of paid woman is confirmed and statistically significant in
and - where this is statistically significant - unpaid every Member State, with a negative effect of 15% on
working experience during the highest level of average on the probability of being employed, varying
education in different Member States. The country from 3% to 25%.
where the effect is highest is Italy, where previous
paid work experience increases the probability of Diverse institutional settings are the most likely
employment by 21pp. (354) drivers of the differences in the coefficients.
Chart 4.30 illustrates Spain and Denmark, which are
(354) IT has more unpaid than paid working experience (15% against
characterised by different institutional settings: a
11%) and is above average in terms of of unpaid working social democratic welfare state regime in the case of
experience (15% against an EU average of 10%). Yet it does Denmark, and a Southern welfare model in the case of
not rank in the EU top five in terms of diffusion of unpaid Spain. The countries reacted differently to the crisis:
working experience (these are FR, HU, LT, PL, SK). With the
exception of FR, also in these other countries unpaid working
while in Denmark the employment rate was close to
experience is more common than paid working experience. 80% at the beginning of the crisis and decreased by
less than 4 pp at its peak, Spain experienced a drop of
11pp in the employment rate between 2007 and 2013
(from 69.7 to 58.6). (355) The situation was particularly
serious for younger cohorts, who tend to suffer
disproportionately from negative economic shocks.
Youth unemployment in Spain tripled between 2007
and 2013, moving from 18.1% in 2007 to 55.1% in
2013, (356) particularly as a result of job losses in the
construction sector. (357) Analyses carried out on these
two countries reflect these differences. In the Spanish
case, the magnitude of the estimated coefficients
linked with secondary and tertiary education are
smaller than in the EU case, possibly reflecting the
decision of younger people to undertake further
classes and raise their human capital rather than
becoming NEETs, even at the risk of over-education. In
the Danish case, the results are different. The positive

(355) Eurostat, [lfsi_emp_a].

(356) Eurostat, [une_rt_a].
(357) A phenomenon described already in Wölfl and Mora-
Sanguinetti (2011).

143
Employment and Social Developments in Europe 2019

impact of tertiary education is also lower than the EU particularly in the EU.(361) In this section the analysis
average, but the vocational nature of the highest will cover adults (defined as people aged 25-64), and
educational attainment is the second largest more specifically their participation in education and
estimated coefficient, emphasising the importance of training during the last 12 months. So far Eurostat has
vocational curricula in Denmark (the proportion of categorised learning activities (362) in three main
students involved is four times higher than in Spain). typologies:
Having had paid work experience during the
programme leading to their highest educational Formal learning: learning that occurs in an organised
attainment remains positively and significantly and structured environment (such as in an education
correlated with being employed subsequently. or training institution or on the job) and is explicitly
labelled as learning (in terms of objectives, minimum
Chart 4.30 duration and resources). The programme must be
Institutional settings play a role in explaining the recognised by the relevant national education or
differences at country level
Average Marginal Effects from logit regression based on LFS AHM 2016 on young
equivalent authorities, and will normally have specific
people in the LM: the Spanish and Danish cases (25-34 years old) requirements (in terms of admission and registration)
African or Asian mig rant and lead to certification.
European migrant
EU 13 mover
Non-formal learning: learning embedded in planned
EU 15 mover
Vocationa l formal education started…
activities which are institutionalised but outside a
Vocationa l hig hest educational… recognised programme. Non-formal learning does not
Unpaid work experience during th e… have not explicit learning objectives, minimum
Paid work experience during the…
duration or learning support).
gender (fema le)
tertiary education
secondary ed ucation Informal learning: learning resulting from daily
age activities related to work, family or leisure. It is not
-0,2 -0,15 -0,1 -0,05 0 0,05 0,1 0,15 0,2 organised or structured in terms of objectives, time or
Denmark Spain learning support. (363)
Note: Lighter colour means that the result is not statistically significant. Vocational
formal education started is significant at 5% rather than 1%. Complete name Chart 4.31
fifth regressor: “Vocational formal education started after reaching highest level
of education”. Complete name sixth regressor: “Vocational highest educational Participation in formal education and training increased
attainment”.Complete name seventh regressor: “Unpaid work experience during in the last decade in only nine Member States
the highest level of education ”.Complete name eighth regressor: “Paid work
Participation in formal education and training in the last 12 months, by country.
experience during the highest level of education”. DE was excluded due to errors
in coding the replies which were not yet corrected at writing. 16,0
Source: LFS AHM 2016 - Young people on the labour market – microdata.
14,0
Click here to download chart.
12,0

3.4. Adult learning: participation and positive 10,0

effects 8,0

6,0
Participation in adult learning has spread
4,0
through Europe over the last decade thanks to
non-formal training, while participation in 2,0

formal training is decreasing. Over the last 25 0,0

SK RO L T CZ BG IT CY F R DE E L HR PT L V PO EAEU28 SI E E AT BE MT HU IE L U NL ES UK DK SE F I

years, human capital policies have increasingly 200 7 201 1 201 6

widened their focus from younger cohorts to older Source: AES database [trng_aes_100]
ones, leading most countries to adopt “LifeLong Click here to download chart.

Learning” policies. (358)(359) Among the first formal

steps was the Delors report (Delors et al., 1996), (360)
and since then adult policies have only expanded,

(358) European Commission (2006).

(359) The change of focus has been accompanied by a change in the
data source. While previous results were based on the LFS ad
hoc module 2016, focusing on “young people on the labour
market”. This module contains rich data in terms of granularity, (361) Adult education is also a second chance education for people
but covers only people aged 15-34, and most of the analyses who never completed, or underperformed in, secondary and
keep the focus on the 25-34 age bracket. This section intends tertiary education when they were younger. Many migrants or
to focus its analysis on adults. It is therefore necessary to use people with a migrant background depend on this type of
another data source, the Adult Education Survey (AES). AES education for their future careers.
covers adults’ (defined as people aged 25-64) participation in (362) Learning activities are defined as “any activities of an
education and training during the last 12 months. individual organised with the intention to improve his/her
(360) The Delors report introduced a vision of education based on knowledge, skills and competences”. Source: Eurostat (2016:1).
two main concepts: learning throughout life and the so-called (363) Ibid.
“four Pillars of Education” (learning to know, learning to do,
learning to be, and learning to live together).

144
 Chapter 4: Investing in people and social sustainability: short-term costs vs long-term benefits

Box 4.2: Intra-EU labour mobility and return flows

Intra-EU labour mobility helps the allocation of to be occupied as managers, professionals and
productive factors. The free movement of workers is technicians (+8% on average), while being
one of the four fundamental freedoms of the EU, along underrepresented among clerical and service workers (-
with those of capital, services, and goods. As such, it is 3%) and skilled agricultural and craft workers (-5%).
enshrined in Article 45 of the TFEU. From an economic EU13 movers, however, are more heavily represented
perspective, freedom of movement for workers allows than natives among plant machine operators and
improvements in efficiency of factor allocations (Borjas, elementary occupations (+20%), less heavily
1995). Reducing barriers to movement should indeed represented among managers, professionals and
improve the matching of supply and demand, leading to technicians (-23%) and skilled agricultural and craft
lower unemployment, higher growth and tax revenues in workers (-3%). While the above patterns provide some
the receiving country (Boswell and Geddes, 2011). From evidence of brain drain, particularly for EU13 countries,
an inequality perspective, the effect of mobility depends and while return rates are generally lower for countries
on the skillset of the movers: inflows of skilled workers with significant emigration rates, there is also evidence
should raise their relative supply and increase that return rates to some traditional emigration
competition among them (Boeri and Van Ours, 2013), countries are increasing (Chart 1). This is especially the
while empirical evidence found little evidence of effect case for Member States that have returned to economic
on natives’ wages (Peri, 2014). growth after the crisis (e.g. Spain, Ireland, Portugal) as
well as for Member States with low unemployment
Sending countries may benefit from mobility in
rates (e.g. Czech Republic, Poland, Estonia). Such return
the short term, especially if they have a high migration shows that intra-EU labour mobility can be
level of unemployment, but may also face skill beneficial for both individuals and sending and receiving
shortages, tax erosion and lower returns from countries.
social investment. Thus, while weighing on the
Chart 1
capacity of sending countries to support adequate
investment and social protection (CEPS, 2019), intra-EU Several Member States affected by high outflows
during the crisis are registering high and/or growing
labour mobility can act as a shock absorber in
return migration flows
asymmetric crises (Barslund and Busse, 2016). Return migration relative to emigration flows
Outflows of unemployed people can reduce the strain 1.4
on public finances through lower expenditure on
1.2
unemployment benefits and social assistance. In the
long term, sending countries may suffer from 1

emigration, especially if emigrants were high skilled 0.8

workers, thus potentially affecting country productivity
0.6
and tax revenues (Mohapatra et al., 2012). They can
also represent a loss in terms of social investment, 0.4

since the sending country incurs a cost whose benefits 0.2

are reaped by the receiving country.
0
EU movers tend to be better educated and skilled SK HU EE ES NL SE IE FI CZPO RO PT AT UK DE EL BELU FR BG IT SI LV LT HR
2012 2017
and there is evidence of over-qualification
Note: CY, DK, MT excluded from the analysis. All countries registered return rates
(European Commission 2015). 17.5 million EU citizens higher than 100% in both years.
were living abroad in 2018. Mobility is a growing Source: Eurostat: [migr_imm1ctz] and [migr_emi1ctz].
phenomenon (it has increased by more than 20% since
2014), and affects mostly men (55% vs 45%). The two
main movement patterns are from Eastern countries to
Western ones, and from Southern to Northern ones. On
average, EU movers have a higher employment rate
(74%, as against 69% for natives) (1) Moreover, the
skillset of EU movers is correlated with their country of
origin. In particular, people coming from the EU15 are
more likely to have tertiary education than natives of
the receiving country (38% against 25%), while those
from the EU13 are less likely (22%): more of them have
primary education only. Also, EU15 movers are more
often in high skilled occupations, while EU13 movers
are more frequently in low skilled ones. More
specifically, EU15 movers are more likely than natives

(1) This is true also for younger cohorts, for both EU 15 and
EU13 movers. The regression carried out in section 3.3 of
this chapter confirms this findings: while removing the
country dummies in the regression, both coefficients
(signalling citizenship of another EU Member States, either
EU15 or EU13, become statistically significant.

145
Employment and Social Developments in Europe 2019

This section will focus on formal and non-formal considerations may play a role in the decision of
learning, since these tend to be easier to monitor than companies and participants to undertake training,
informal learning and can provide clearer messages including costs and the time needed. Outcomes
for policymakers. Overall participation in education and decreased between 2011 and the 2016 survey across
training has continued to grow in Europe: 35.2% of the board Chart 4.34 shows the results of both forms
adults took part in education and training in 2007, but of training by Member State, including a breakdown by
that rose to 40.3% in 2011 and 45.2% in 2016. sex, where a small but clear gap in favour of men is
Women tend to report slightly lower outcomes at EU observed.
level. At country level, Scandinavian and Baltic Member
States have a higher presence of men in formal Workers undertaking non-formal learning report
education and training while the opposite is true in an increase in their performances more often
most Southern and Eastern European countries. The than those participating in formal training.
overall increase in participation in education and Formal training has a stronger impact than non-formal
training has been driven solely by non-formal training in almost all categories. The only exception is
education and training (an increase of one third in the work performance, as reported by the training
share of participants in that period), as shown in Chart participants. Chart 4.33 shows that this trend holds in
4.32. On the other hand, participation in formal the great majority of Member States. This may help to
programmes declined by more than 10% in the EU as explain why non-formal training has increased
a whole over the same time span (Chart 4.31). substantially in recent years. While participants may
be more willing to undertake formal training, which is
Chart 4.32
more easily recognisable in the labour market and
Participation in non-formal education and training rose
leads more frequently to higher salaries and
in all but five countries in the last decade
Participation in non-formal education and training in the last 12 months, by country. promotions, companies are more interested in
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 improved performance by their employees, and may
80,0 70,0 want to limit the risk that investment in training an
70,0 60,0 employee may lead to their losing that employee to
60,0
50,0
another employer who is prepared to offer a higher
50,0 position and salary.
40,0
40,0
30,0 Chart 4.33
30,0 Outcomes of adult training are similar across gender
20,0 Outcomes of education and training by type of education and training, type of outcomes
20,0
and sex.
10,0 10,0
80
70
0,0 0,0 60
RO EL BG PO L T HR MT ES IT EE BEEU28SI DK PT CZ SK L U L V E A CY UK F I IE F R DE HU SE AT NL
50
200 7 201 1 201 6 40
30
Source: AES database [trng_aes_100] 20
10
Click here to download chart. 0
2011 2016 2011 2016 2011 2016 2011 2016
FBetter performance
M F
Getting a new job M
FE NFE
Higher salary New tasks
Formal and non-formal education and training No outcome yet Pers onal r easons
have positive effects on work performance, Promotion
though formal programmes more often lead to
promotions and higher salaries. AES respondents
stressed that formal and non-formal training both Note: The four groups of columns on the left are on formal training, while the four on
the right are non non-formal training. The first, the second, the fifth and the sixth
have a beneficial effect, particularly in (self-reported) groups of columns refer to women, the other four to men.
better performance, achievement of personal Source: AES database, extraction.
Click here to download chart.
objectives and ability to undertake new tasks. (364)
Formal training is generally associated with slightly
better outcomes and better performance. Almost three
out of ten respondents stressed that formal education
helped them in getting a new job while almost two out
of ten said that it led to a higher salary. More than
10% of respondents reported a promotion. Non-formal
training also yields positive results, although normally
with a slightly reduced effect. The relation between
participation figures, trends and reported outcomes
may seem contradictory. However, other

(364) As shown in the charts, the survey asks for outcomes in terms
of: better performance, salary, promotion, getting a new job,
personal reasons. No outcome yet is also a possible answer.

146
 Chapter 4: Investing in people and social sustainability: short-term costs vs long-term benefits

Chart 4.34
Non-Formal training is associated with a stronger positive effect on better performances in all but four MS
Percentage of workers reporting better performance as outcome as effect of formal and non-formal training, in 2016.

80

70

60

50

40

30

20

10

0
FE NFE FE NFE FE NFE FE NFE FE NFE FE NFE FE NFE FE NFE FE NFE FE NFE FE NFE FE NFE FE NFE FE NFE FE NFE FE NFE FE NFE FE NFE FE NFE FE NFE FE NFE FE NFE FE NFE FE NFE FE NFE FE NFE FE NFE FE NFE
AT BE BG CY CZ DE DK EE EL ES EU28 FI FR HR HU IT LT LU LV MT NL PL PT RO SE SI SK UK

Note: LU, SE, UK low reliability. Formal education for BG, CZ, DE, EL, HR, LT low reliability. Missing values for RO and SK corresponds to not publishable values because of low reliability.
Source: AES database, extraction.
Click here to download chart.

3.5. Investment in education and medium-term. (368) Inequalities weaken aggregate

sustainability demand because of the higher consumption propensity
of poorer people, (369) and because they lead to lower
Investment in education and training is mainly productivity, (370) and misallocation of resources. (371)
public. Public finances are the main contributor to Nevertheless, while investment in education and
expenditure in education and training in Europe, training supports fiscal sustainability, such investment
accounting for slightly more than 80% of the total may only pay off in the longer term. In the short term,
(Chart 4.35). This acknowledges the importance that governments tend to be discouraged from investing by
European welfare systems give to education, and the high levels of public debt, which can lead to a sub-
role of this expenditure as an investment that helps optimal level of spending on this budget item. (372)
long term sustainability. Recent estimates show that
the investment has a remarkable payoff: the public Chart 4.35

costs of enabling a person to attain tertiary education More than 80% of educational expenditure in EU comes
from general government
are offset by a public return three times as high by the Funding on education by sector, excluding early childhood educational development,
time the person retires.(365) 2015
120.0%

Investment in education and training can 100.0%

improve the long-term sustainability of public
80.0%
finances in several ways. Several beneficial effects
stemming from this public finance item justify the 60.0%

heavy involvement of states in this field. Section 3.2 40.0%

showed that higher education attainment is correlated
20.0%
with a higher employment rate and income levels.
Therefore, efficient spending can lead to a broader the 0.0%
tax base and a decrease in welfare expenditure (e.g. IE SE FI LU ATRO EL BE FRHU SI CZDEPO MTEUNL LV IT LT BGES PT CY SKUK
Non-educational private sector
unemployment benefits and social assistance). General government
Moreover, since ageing costs are a long-term International organisations

determinant of fiscal sustainability, (366) investment in Note: Subsidies to households and students from other non-educational private entities
are excluded. Denmark, Estonia, and Croatia not available. EU based on average
education and training may be worthwhile in order to of available data.
Source: Eurostat, [educ_uoe_fine01]
extend working lives. This in turn will help to tackle
Click here to download chart.
workforce decline, support the sustainability of pension
systems and, ultimately, also sustain public
finances. (367) Finally, expenditure on education has
(368) European Commission (2017).
been shown to reduce inequalities in Europe over the
(369) Galor and Zeira (1993).
(370) Stiglitz (2012).
(365) OECD (2015).
(371) Alesina and Perotti (1996).
(366) European Commission (2015).
(372) Estimates from the European Commission (2017) show that an
(367) European Commission (2017) ESDE 2017, Intergenerational
increase in the debt-to GDP ratio by 1 pp can lead to a
fairness and solidarity in Europe.
reduction in investment of around 0.1%.

147
Employment and Social Developments in Europe 2019

Box 4.3: ESF education and training

The European Social Fund (ESF) is the main EU The “Second Chance” School in Gijón, Spain, offers
instrument to invest in people (1). As a budgetary vulnerable young people (low-skilled, early school
instrument, its strategy is determined jointly by EU leavers (ESL), those who lack socio-familial support,
governments, the European Parliament and the have health problems, etc) practical and tailor-made
Commission; and as one of the Structural Funds, it aims training that focuses on skills and abilities to help them
to support economic and social development in the EU reintegrate into/remain in education or find a job. The
and to reduce disparities within and between Member school also offers educational support and career
States and regions. guidance, as well as artistic, health-related and citizen
participation activities. Between 2009 and 2017, 1,379
The ESF’s mission is to promote high levels of
people took part in this project, which won a prize at the
employment - investments in education and Global Junior Challenge in Rome in October 2017 in the
training today are key for tomorrow's category “Technologies and work with young people
employability. To this end, in the period from 2014 to from education and training in order to promote
2020, one-third of the Fund’s total EU budget has been innovation and inclusion”.
allocated to education and training investments (EUR
27.3 billion out of EUR 84 billion). In Latvia, an ESF project focuses on the participation of
VET students in work-based learning and work
The Fund supports the entire education cycle from placements in enterprises. The aim of the ESF support is
early childhood education to life-long learning, to increase the number of qualified VET students
and includes higher education and vocational through participation in work-based learning (WBL) and
education and training (VET) to make sure that placements (or traineeships) in enterprises. Work-based
people get the right knowledge and skills at all stages learning constitutes at least 25% of the curriculum. A
of life. The ESF places a particular focus on equal tripartite agreement is signed between the student, the
access for disadvantaged groups. As such, the Fund school and the enterprise to create an individualised
supports the implementation of important EU policy plan, which sets out what has to be covered during the
initiatives such as the New Skills Agenda for Europe. work-based learning. By May 2018, 1,400 enterprises,
Member States have used the ESF to enhance the 34 vocational education establishments and 2,916 VET
students were involved, with 641 students in work-
basic skills of low-qualified adults, to strengthen
based learning and 2,275 in traineeships.
professional skills and to help inactive people get
back into work. Member States have also invested in Looking forward, the Commission has proposed a
bridging the gap between education and work by European Social Fund Plus (ESF+) for the 2021-
supporting traineeships or internships, in updating 2027 period, which Member States can use to
curricula to create closer links between the education build on what they have already achieved. The
sector and industry, and in promoting particular ESF+ will continue to provide support for improving the
curricula and industries to certain demographics (for quality, effectiveness and labour market relevance of
example, to attract more women into STEM sectors). education and training systems. Moreover, the Fund will
promote equal access to education and training at all
Examples of progress made thanks to the ESF by the
levels, in particular for disadvantaged groups. Finally,
end of 2017 include the following:
the ESF+ will promote flexible upskilling and reskilling
• 4.5 million participants received opportunities for all, to facilitate career transitions and
education and/or training support; help workers adjust to change.
• One million participants gained a
qualification; and
• 583 000 participants were in education
or training;
In addition, 1.8 million students will benefit from
European Regional Development Fund projects investing
in school infrastructure.
The examples below highlight how the ESF functions in
practice by investing in people:
The examples below highlight how the ESF functions by
investing in people.

(1) The ESF is complemented by other funds which also

contribute to investing in people albeit on a lower budgetary
scale, such as Erasmus+ which supports education, training,
youth and sport, with a budget of EUR 14.7 billion for 2014-
2020, and InvestEU which will further boost investment,
innovation and job creation for the 2021-2027 period with
a budget of EUR 15.2 billion.

148
 Chapter 4: Investing in people and social sustainability: short-term costs vs long-term benefits

Although public funding remains the main Chart 4.36

financing source for tertiary education and Having a parent with tertiary education is associated
with higher probability gaining tertiary qualifications
training, children of tertiary-educated parents Odds ratio from logit regression based on LFS 2017 on people aged 25-64
have a higher probability of having tertiary African or Asiena migrant
education themselves. Chart 4.36 shows that having European migrant
EU 13 mover
a parent (especially a mother) with tertiary education
EU 15 mover
is correlated with a higher probability of attaining Live in Cities
tertiary educational qualification. It is not surprising Live in towns and suburbs
that tertiary-educated parents encourage their children Age 56-64
Age 46-55
to take advantage of the opportunities tertiary
Age 36-45
education affords. This is line with research evidence Female
on the topic, (373) resulting in a Matthew effect (see Father tertiary edu
Introduction) on tertiary education attendance. While Mother tertairy edi

the database used for Chart 4.36 does not contain -2,00000 -1,00000 0,00000 1,00000 2,00000 3,00000

detailed information on the income of students’ Odds ratio

families, a good proxy is the educational attainment of Source: LFS microdata 2017.
Click here to download chart.
both parents of the individuals. Higher educational
attainments is correlated with both higher income, and
with higher probability of having children attaining
tertiary qualifications. Consequently, public
4. INVESTING IN LONG-TERM CARE
expenditure in tertiary education may benefit
4.1. Introduction
disproportionately people with higher income. Yet,
public investment in tertiary education remains Long-term care encompasses a range of services
particularly advisable in a period of fast technological and support for people who depend on help in
change, (374) when a growing share of future vacancies
their daily living. Needs for long-term care result
requires higher educational attainment. (375)
from mental or physical frailty (often but not always
Living in more densely populated areas is due to old age) or disability. The support needed
includes assistance with basic ‘activities of daily
associated with a higher chance of having
living’ (376), ‘instrumental activities of daily living’ (377),
tertiary education, Living in a city rather than in a
or permanent nursing care.
scarcely populated area may lower the costs of
attending university or other institutions providing Long-term care takes many different forms.
tertiary education (in terms of reduced transport fees, People reliant on long-term care usually need both
lower time and opportunity costs for commuting personal care and help with household activities. Care
students and less need to rent a room for those living recipients may be living at home (378) or in a residential
near or willing to move close to tertiary education care institution. Relatives, friends or acquaintances
institutions, which are mostly located in cities). Yet this provide informal care, as opposed to formal care by
finding may also reflect the fact that many people health or social care professionals. Depending on
from rural areas decide to move to the city after specific care needs, formal and informal care can be
obtaining a tertiary education degree: cities tend to combined.
have higher productivity and salary levels for those
with stronger cognitive skills, also due to Adequate provision of affordable long-term care
agglomeration economies (Behrens et al, 2014; is a key principle of the European Pillar of Social
Bacolod et al, 2009). Rights. In November 2017, the European Parliament,
Council of the European Union and the European
(373) See, among others: European Commission: ESDE 2018 on the Commission affirmed the principle that “Everyone has
changing world of work; Blossfeld & von Maurice, 2011. the right to affordable long-term care services of good
(374) Nelson, R.R., Phepls E.S., 1966. ; quality, in particular home-care and community-based
https://www.oecd.org/education/benefits-of-university- services.”
education-remain-high-but-vary-widely-across-fields-of-
study.htm
(375) https://skillspanorama.cedefop.europa.eu/en (376) Self-care activities that a person must perform every day such
as bathing, dressing, eating, getting in and out of bed or a
chair, moving around, using the toilet, and controlling bladder
and bowel functions.
(377) Activities related to independent living, such as preparing
meals, managing money, shopping for groceries or personal
items, performing light or heavy housework, or using a
telephone.
(378) In community-based care, recipients continue live at home, but
use services provided by the community.

149
Employment and Social Developments in Europe 2019

4.2. Public expenditure on long-term care on long-term care. Health promotion can strengthen
the autonomy of people with health limitations and
The provision of formal long-term care is uneven thereby reduce long-term care needs. For anyone who
across Member States and unequal within has experienced a health incident (such as a stroke or
countries. In those Member States with a relatively fracture), rehabilitation policies can help avoid frailty
low GDP per capita, there is very little use of formal setting in. Frail and disabled people can benefit from a
home-care; among richer Member States there is broad range of policies and services, which improve
greater diversity. (379) Older people with low income or their opportunities for independent living. Those with
few assets are much more likely to use informal care disabilities may need accessible transport, adequate -
than peers with more financial resources. (380) As and in some cases adapted - housing (383), and
regards formal care, there are some indications that accessible products and services. (384)
providing users with allowances to purchase care (as
in Italy or Germany) may be associated with more Innovations in long-term care provision can help
unequal use than direct service provision (as in France to contain cost growth, while improving care
or Denmark). (381) recipients’ quality of life. Adequate home-care and
community-based care can be more cost-effective
Public expenditure on long-term care is expected than residential care for low level needs, while
to increase strongly over the next few decades. responding to many users’ wishes to remain in their
Due to population ageing, public spending on long- home. Greater integration of health care and social
term care in the EU under existing national policies is care (for example through single points of access or
projected to increase from 1.6% of GDP on average in case and care managers) can lead to both efficiency
2016 to 2.7% in 2070 (Figure 4.3). Expenditure may gains for care providers and improved user-
increase even more, particularly if Member States with experiences for persons with care needs.
low levels of coverage extend the availability of their
services and shift provision from informal to formal Formal care and work-life balance
care. Labour costs in the sector may increase due to arrangements, such as flexible work
staff shortages. The public cost of long-term care will organisation and care leaves, enable people with
also depend on increases in life expectancy and on the caring responsibilities to stay in employment.
number of additional life years spent in good Women are the main providers of informal long-term
health. (382) care, as for many other forms of unpaid work
(including informal childcare). Providing care, especially
Chart 4.37
at a high-intensity, is associated with lower outside
In the long run (to 2070) public expenditure on long-
term care is expected to increase considerably employment and a deterioration in carers’ health. (385)
Public long-term expenditure as % of GDP Because of caring responsibilities for parents or frail
7 relatives, many women reduce their working hours,
6
interrupt their careers or retire early. For the carers in
question, this may have a very negative impact on
5
their income and pension entitlements. (386) At a
4 broader societal level, there may be major costs in
terms of reduced employment and productivity,
3
foregone tax revenues and social security
2 contributions.
1
Integration in the labour market is a challenge
0 not only for those providing informal care, but
HU

PL

IT
IE
HR

DK
BG

PT

DE
CY

CZ

BE
MT
FR

FI
EL

LV

LU

SE
EE

SI

LT
ES
RO

SK

UK

AT
EU27

NL

also for former carers. The age group 50-64 is

Source: European Commission, Ageing Report 2018. over-represented among informal carers. At this age, it
Click here to download chart.
is particularly hard to find work when care
commitments decrease or cease. Access to a wide
range of flexible long-term care options, adjustable to
preferences and needs, would at least allow carers to
4.3. Policies to promote healthy ageing and remain employed part-time while providing informal
employment opportunities for carers care and make it easier for them to return to full-time
employment.
Policies to promote healthy ageing and to ensure
accessible products, services and infrastructure
can play an important role in reducing reliance (383) Eurofound (2019, forthcoming).
(384) European Accessibility Act. Most recent text (March 2019)
(379) Eurofound (2019, forthcoming). https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
(380) Ilinca, Rodrigues and Schmidt (2017). content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CONSIL:ST_7174_2019_INIT&from=E
N
(381) Albertini and Pavolini (2015).
(385) Kolodziej, Reichert and Schmitz (2018); Bauer and Sousa-Poza
(382) European Commission and Economic Policy Committee (Ageing
(2015); Colombo et al. (2011).
Working Group)(2018).
(386) Social Protection Committee and European Commission (2018).

150
 Chapter 4: Investing in people and social sustainability: short-term costs vs long-term benefits

The provision of formal care and the policy coincide: studying, beginning a career, starting a family
context matter for employment outcomes. The and having children. Such changes in professional and
employment rate among frequent carers in countries private life may trigger a need to find new
where formal long-term care is least common is 10 accommodation. Later in life, new housing needs may
percentage points below that of other people. In also arise after a separation or job loss.
countries where formal care is most common, this
informal care employment gap is about three times Housing may be a decisive factor in accessing
lower: 3 percentage points. Multiple explanations are enabling public services. (389) Where public services
possible. People in employment are less likely to are conditional on out-of-pocket-payments, very high
provide frequent informal care in countries with wider housing costs may become a factor limiting access.
formal care availability if this implies loss of The distance or time needed to travel from home can
employment, as there is an alternative. In these be an obstacle to accessing public services. In some
countries, formal care is also more effectively cases (e.g. schools or childcare centres) priority in the
combined with informal care in preventing loss of allocation of places may be given to people living near
employment. (387) It is thus important for increased the facility.
provision of flexible long-term care options to be
combined with measures which facilitate flexible work Inadequate housing can have adverse long-term
options, such as reversible partial retirement schemes. effects on health and social inclusion. Where
As women continue to perform most of the informal there is a lack of affordable accommodation,
care and housework, it is important to complement households may need to share a dwelling that is not
such policy measures with general policies to adapted to the number of people living there (in terms
stimulate gender equality. of rooms or available living space). Homes with major
structural problems such as leaks or damp may have
Political attention to long-term care is long-term adverse consequences on their occupants’
increasing as, despite significant differences in health.
national systems, the challenges are similar
across the EU. Analytical work is ongoing to help 5.2. Housing affordability: concepts and
deepen the understanding of these challenges, main facts
including the adequacy of social protection for long-
Accommodation is a basic need. Since housing is a
term care, the long-term care workforce, the quality
fundamental need, households’ accommodation-linked
and efficiency of long-term care and the economic
expenses are to some extent ‘inelastic’. If the cost of
value of informal care. To enable monitoring of the
housing increases, households cannot reduce their
situation across the EU, the Commission together with
demand indefinitely. In most European countries, the
Member States is developing a common portfolio of
cost of covering basic needs, including housing, rose
indicators for long-term care at EU level, which should
more strongly than the cost of other goods and
help future analyses. These efforts will feed into a
services between 2001 and 2015. Low-income
report on long-term care to be produced jointly by the
households typically spend a larger share of their
European Commission and the Social Protection
income on such basic needs than do medium or high-
Committee in 2020.
income households. As a consequence, inequalities in
‘disposable’ income tend to increase after factoring in
5. INVESTING IN AFFORDABLE AND these costs. (390)
ADEQUATE HOUSING The cost of housing is a major expense for most
households and for many it is a burden. On
5.1. Introduction
average, households in the EU spend more than one
Housing as a sector and policy field is clearly distinct fifth of their disposable income on housing. One in ten
from social policies which aim to invest directly in Europeans live in a household that spends 40% or
people’s skills and employability. Nonetheless, more of its income on housing costs. If housing
affordable and adequate housing is often an expenses are deducted from the households’
important factor in social investment. disposable income, the population at risk of poverty in
2017 increases from 17% to 32%. Almost one third of
Housing is closely linked to the life course, and is the EU population considers housing costs to be a very
of particular concern to young adults. While heavy financial burden on their household.
securing and maintaining adequate housing is
important for all age groups, young adults in particular (389) Omic (2018).
consider lack of availability of accommodation as an (390) Gürer and Weichenrieder (2018).
immediate short-term risk to themselves and their
families. (388) Early adulthood is a period when major
transitions tend to follow in close succession or to

(387) Eurofound (2019, forthcoming); Walsh and Murphy (2018).

(388) OECD (2019a).

151
Employment and Social Developments in Europe 2019

Box 4.4: Housing cost affordability indicators

Housing costs in the EU-SILC survey include the monthly costs connected with the household’s right to live in the
accommodation. For homeowners, this includes any mortgage payments for the main dwelling (net of tax relief). For
tenants, rental payments (gross of housing allowances) are included. For all types of occupant, the costs of utilities
(water, electricity, gas and heating) resulting from the actual use of the accommodation are included. Where
applicable, housing costs include taxes on the dwelling, structural insurance, mandatory services and charges
(sewage removal, refuse removal, etc.), regular maintenance and repairs (including all those undertaken regularly to
keep the home in good working order, but excluding those which change its performance, capacity or expected
service life).
Housing cost burden is defined as total housing costs (net of housing allowances) as a percentage of total
disposable household income (net of housing allowances).
The housing cost overburden rate is the percentage of the population living in a household where the housing
cost burden is higher than 40%.
The at-risk-of-poverty rate after housing expenses is the percentage of the population living in a household
whose equivalised disposable income minus housing costs is below the poverty threshold (set at 60% of median
equivalised disposable income).
Self-reported heavy burden of total housing cost indicates the percentage of the population living in a
household where the person responsible for accommodation considers their total housing cost to be a heavy financial
burden (as opposed to either a slight burden, or no burden at all).

Chart 4.38 Recent improvements in the affordability of

One in ten Europeans live in a household that spends housing expenses contrast with dynamic
40% or more of its income on housing costs, with large
increases in house prices. House prices in the EU
differences across Member States
Housing cost overburden rate, 2008-2017 have increased steadily since the start of the economic
40 recovery and have accelerated recently. In a growing
35 number of countries, house price trends are showing
signs of possible overvaluation. At the same time,
Housing cost overburden rate, %

30

25
prices in countries where house overvaluation was
20
most pressing have recently seen a moderation, linked
15
to policy interventions, or affordability issues. (391)
10
House prices and housing costs reflect different
5
aspects of affordability. The housing costs that are
0
the focus of this section cover the current
HR

HU
IE
CY
FI

PL
PT

IT

BE

DE
DK
BG
MT

FR

LT

CZ

EU-28
EE

EL
SI

LV
AT

SV
SE

ES
LU

RO
UK
NL

accommodation expenses households must meet to

2008 2017 continue to live in their dwellings, along with costs for
Note: Note: Percentage of the population living in a household where total housing the use, including utilities (See Box 4.4). For the
costs (net of housing allowances) represent more than 40% of the total
disposable household income (net of housing allowances). affordability of housing costs, income pooling and cost
Source: Eurostat, EU-SILC (ilc_lvho07a) sharing at the household level can play an important
Click here to download chart.
role. House prices, by contrast, reflect the value of real
estate transactions for houses including land. Such
Chart 4.39 transactions include not only houses acquired as a
House prices in the EU have increased markedly since main dwelling, but also second homes, holiday homes
the start of the economic recovery
House price index (2015 = 100) - quarterly data, 2005 Q1-2018 Q4
or dwellings used for investment. House prices provide
120 an indication of the state of the housing market and
115 they are monitored (392) to identify potential housing
110 bubbles, when prices move beyond fundamentals. (393)
105 House prices can provide an indication of affordability
100
for prospective buyers. They do not convey direct
95
information on the current affordability of housing
90
costs for substantial categories of the population,
85
including tenants paying reduced rent or current
EU2 8
80
Eur o area (391) European Commission (2019c).
75
(392) Indicator in the Macro-Economic Imbalance Procedure: year-on-
2005Q1

2006Q1

2007Q1

2008Q1

2009Q1

2010Q1

2011Q1

2012Q1

2013Q1

2014Q1

2015Q1

2016Q1

2017Q1

2018Q1

year changes in house prices relative to a Eurostat

consumption deflator, with a threshold of 6%.
Source: Eurostat [prc_hpi_q]
(393) Trends in house prices can be benchmarked against trends in
Click here to download chart.
income, rent, population, real housing investment and real long-
term interest rates. Philiponnet and Turrini (2017).

152
 Chapter 4: Investing in people and social sustainability: short-term costs vs long-term benefits

homeowners. For tenants in the private sector, Chart 4.41

increases in house prices may only become a factor in Tenants are the most mobile, whereas owners without a
the rent after a time lag, for example, when a new mortgage are the least
Population by number of years since household’s installation in current dwelling and
lease is signed. (394) tenure status, %, EU, 2016
100 3 4 7
Chart 4.40 90 11 7 16
29 13
The degree of housing mobility varies greatly across 80 18
Member States 70
21
39 25
Population by number of years since household’s installation in current dwelling, %,
60 25
2016
35 24
100% 50
21
90% 40
26
80% 30 20
23 46
70% 20
34
60% 10 8 21 20
50% 0 5

40% Owner, outright Owner, mortage Tenant, market Tenant, reduced Free

30% 0-4 5-9 10-19 20-35 36+

20% Note: No information for DK, EE, FI, LV, NL
10% Source: DG EMPL calculations, based on EU SILC Users’ database
0% Click here to download chart.
IT

PL

IE
HR

HU
PT
BG

CY
CZ

DE

BE
MT

FR
LU
EL

LT

ES

SE
RO

SK

SI

EU28
AT

UK

0-4 5-9 10-19 20-35 36+ 5.3. Housing cost affordability by tenure
Note: No information for DK, EE, FI, LV, NL. status
Source: DG EMPL calculations based on EU-SILC Users’ database 2016
Click here to download chart. There are major differences between European
Member states in terms of housing tenure. Across
The link between house prices and households’ the EU, 43% of the population own their homes
current housing expenses depends crucially on outright, living in a dwelling on which there is no
mobility. There are major differences between outstanding mortgage or home loan. Several Central
Member States in terms of how long households have and Eastern European Member States have
lived in a dwelling since acquiring their home or exceptionally high rates of outright homeownership.
starting or renewing their lease. Housing mobility is This is a legacy from the transition to a market
linked to differences in housing markets, patterns of economy. Many of these countries adopted a policy of
household formation and policies such as taxes on privatisation of formerly public housing, often selling
housing transactions. Just one fifth of homeowners homes to tenants at relatively low prices. Private
with a mortgage had acquired their property in the mortgage markets in these countries started to
previous 5 years. Private tenants tend to be most develop mainly in the 2000s, in some cases quite
mobile, but even among this category more than half dynamically. (397) EU-wide, 26% are homeowners with
have lived in their current dwelling for 5 years or more. an outstanding mortgage or home loan. In Sweden and
This implies that households’ decisions regarding the Netherlands, there are many households with
housing and relevant policies typically have effects mortgages, which are at least partly linked to
over the long-term. generous systems of mortgage tax relief in these
countries. Across the EU, approximately one fifth of
High transaction costs on properties may limit the population are tenants paying rent at private
mobility on the housing market. Many Member market rates. In Germany and Austria, the proportion
States still levy transaction taxes on immovable of tenants is relatively large. These Member States
property. Tax rates and revenue vary substantially each have a large and relatively strongly-regulated
across Member States (395). Transaction taxes tend to private rental sector. A further 6.5% of the EU
discourage property sales and purchases. As such, population are tenants paying rent at a reduced rate,
these taxes can reduce volatility of house prices and either renting social housing, or renting at a reduced
likelihood of bubbles, which have a major impact on rate from an employer, or renting accommodation
housing affordability. However, they may also restrict where the rent is fixed by law. The UK, Malta, Ireland,
workers’ mobility and add to imperfections in the France and Finland have relatively large proportions of
labour market. In such cases, a shift away from reduced-rent tenants. Finally, a relatively small
transaction taxes towards recurrent property taxes minority EU-wide live in accommodation that is
would maintain a constant level of revenue while provided rent-free, either by an employer or another
reducing the distortions caused by transaction private source.
taxes. (396)
(397) Hegedus, Horvath and Somogyi (2017).
394
( ) Le Roux and Roma (2018).
(395) European Commission (2018b).
(396) European Commission (2015).

153
Employment and Social Developments in Europe 2019

Table 4.1
Tenants generally have more difficulties with housing cost affordability than homeowners
Selected housing cost affordability indicators and poverty indicators, by tenure status, 2016

Housing cost Self-reported

Median housing At-risk-of-poverty AROP (income after
overburden heavy burden of
cost (%income) (AROP, income) housing expenses)
(>40% income) housing cost
Owner, outright 12 7 16 27 32
Owner, mortgage 15 8 8 16 29
Tenant, market 30 28 27 56 35
Tenant, reduced 23 16 30 59 36
Free 12 9 29 30 39
Note: Shading applied by column, to highlight tenure status with most favourable outcomes (green) or least favourable (red)
Source: DG EMPL calculations, based on EU SILC Users’ database.
Click here to download table.

Chart 4.42 essentially housing ‘consumption’, in the sense that its

The majority of Europeans are homeowners, but the cost only contributes to meeting current needs. For
rates differ strongly across countries many households, however, homeownership plays an
Population by housing tenure status of the household, by Member State, %, 2017
100%
important role in wealth accumulation. Acquiring a
90%
home can be considered an investment, in the sense
80%
that it contributes to a right to future use of the
70%
dwelling. However, in view of strong increases in house
60%
prices, there are concerns that homeownership may
50% Free
become unattainable for lower income groups and for
40% Tenant, reduced rent
younger cohorts. (399)
30% Tenant, market price
20%
Across the EU, homeowners with mortgages tend
Owner, mortgage
10%
to face relatively few issues with housing cost
Owner, outright
0% affordability. At least part of the explanation is a
selection effect: the conditions for accessing such
HU
HR

FI

FR
LU

UK
LT

LV
MT

DK

DE
ES

EL

IT

IE

NL
EE
PL

PT
RO

SK

SI

SE
CY
CZ

EU28

AT
BG

BE

Note: In the Netherlands, Denmark and Sweden, tenants paying rents at reduced rates loans may include a steady income, while credit is
are included under the category ‘Tenant, market price’.
often capped to reflect the borrower’s ability to service
Source: DG EMPL calculations based on EU-SILC Users’ database 2016]
Click here to download chart.
debts. In addition, for owners with more mature loans,
the recent macro-economic context has been
Chart 4.43
favourable, with low interest rates allowing some
Housing tenure is closely linked to the life course renegotiation of existing loans. (400) Also, several
Tenure status by age category of the oldest person in charge of accommodation, %, Member States apply mortgage interest deductibility,
EU28, 2016
which reduces the cost of debt-financed housing. In
100%
90% general, tax relief for homeowners tends to benefit
80% higher income households, thereby generating an
70%
inequality-increasing effect, which may be offset by
60%
50% caps. (401) Outright homeowners generally have lower
40% housing costs than owners with a mortgage, but more
30% low-income households are in this category: owners
20%
10%
without mortgages include many elderly people, who
0% may have relatively low income from pensions.
Tota l
75+
20-24

25-29

30-34

35-39

40-44

45-49

50-54

55-59

60-64

65-69

70-74

Owner, outright Owner, mortgage Taxation of housing in many countries still

Rent, market Rent, reduced favours homeownership. Since 2009, property taxes
Fr ee
Note: The data refer only to the oldest person in charge of accommodation in the
on real estate have increased quite substantially as a
household (not including any other household members living in their dwelling). share of total revenue (6.6% in 2017 vs. 5.6% in
Source: DG EMPL calculations based on EU-SILC Users’ database 2016 2009). This is mainly due to the increased use of
Click here to download chart.
recurrent property taxes. These are considered to be
the revenue source least detrimental to growth, while
Housing tenure is closely linked to the life the immobility and visibility of its tax base makes
course. For households headed by young evasion difficult. (402) In all EU Member States, owner-
householders (including single person households), occupied housing is taxed in a favourable way. Except
renting on the private market is the most common in the Netherlands, the return on investment of owner-
tenure status. Rental housing does provide flexibility, occupied housing (i.e. imputed rent) is not included in
which may fit well the certain demands of a mobile
workforce and in some cases reflect tenants’ own (399) OECD (2019b).
preferences. (398) For tenants, rent paid to a landlord is (400) Le Roux and Roma (2018).
(401) World Bank (2018).
(398) Haffner, Hegedus and Knorr-Siedow (2018). (402) European Commission (2018b).

154
 Chapter 4: Investing in people and social sustainability: short-term costs vs long-term benefits

the personal income tax base. Nevertheless, in several allowances (cash transfers for tenants or owners) and
Member States owner-occupiers can, fully or partly, housing development combined. (409)
deduct mortgage interest payments from their income
for tax purposes. In addition, capital gains from the Tenants on the private market are a vulnerable
sale of a primary residence are typically exempt from group when it comes to affordability of housing
capital gains tax. Moreover, recurrent property taxes, expenses. Their median housing cost burden is the
which are a kind of user charge to finance locally highest of all categories considered, with half of
rendered public services, are often based on outdated private tenants spending at least 30% of their
housing values (for example in Luxembourg, France, disposable income on housing, and more than a
Ireland and Latvia). This favourable tax treatment of quarter spending 40% or more. Private tenants also
owner-occupied housing produces a tax bias towards make up a relatively large proportion (over one
homeownership in all EU Member States. In 2017, quarter) of the households that are at risk of poverty
Denmark introduced a reform to re-align property based on their income. In combination with housing
taxes with actual property values, which will come into costs, private tenants become particularly vulnerable.
force in 2021.
Several Member States are reforming the
Preferential tax treatment of owner-occupied regulation of the private rental market, to
housing tends to be regressive. Favourable stimulate its development and foster mobility. In
taxation of owner-occupied housing is mainly justified countries with high rates (and subsidisation) of
by positive spillover effects on society, such as wealth homeownership, and/or a large social rent sector (such
accumulation and more stable neighbourhoods. as the Netherlands), there may be limited supply in the
Neutrality and efficiency, however, would call for private rental sector. The Dutch government has
removing the preferential tax treatment of submitted a draft law to Parliament to increase the
homeownership. There are also distributional reasons supply of mid-priced private rental housing. In other
in favour of taxing net imputed rent to ensure the Member States, weak protection of landlords is seen
equal treatment of homeowners and renters. (403) as a factor behind low investment in rental housing. In
Mortgage interest deductibility tends to benefit high- Latvia, for example, the government is trying to
income earners disproportionately, as the advantage address such issues via a draft rental law. Regulation
often depends on the taxpayer's marginal tax rate. (404) of rent can also result in below-market levels
Correction for this homeownership bias and taxing net (particularly in urban areas), with strong incentives for
imputed rent in the personal income tax system has sitting tenants to remain in their accommodation, and
been shown to have no adverse effects on income difficulties for new entrants to access the market. In
inequality. (405) Other factors, like the distribution of this regard, the Swedish government announced plans
homeownership across the population, contribute to to introduce a more flexible rent-setting system for
the distributional impact of taxing imputed rent. (406) newly constructed housing.

Tax expenditures for homebuyers and The role of housing allowances varies
homeowners represent substantial amounts in considerably across Member States. While housing
certain Member States. Tax expenditures include allowances tend to have a progressive design,
exclusions, deductions, credits and reduced rates for favouring lower income groups, their inequality-
specific activities or for specific groups of taxpayers. reducing impact relies crucially on coverage, which is
While they can be justified in some cases, they narrow generally quite low. (410)
the tax base and are costly in terms of revenue
foregone. Moreover, they make the tax system Tenants paying reduced rent are vulnerable in
complex, increase tax governance costs and are often terms of low income, and still sizeable housing
not means-tested. Therefore, they do not necessarily costs. This is a fairly diverse group, including
have a positive impact on income distribution and may occupants of social housing along with tenants paying
even be regressive. (407) As such, these benefits are regulated rent. Ceilings related to income or wealth
considered by some as part of ‘the hidden welfare may apply to target the most needy. This may explain
state’. (408) In certain countries, including Belgium, Italy, why this category has the highest risk of income
Luxembourg and the Netherlands, the monetary value poverty (if not housing cost burden, which is higher for
of these expenditures is larger than that of housing tenants paying rent at private market rates).

(403) See for an overview of costs and benefits of homeownership, In many countries, the demand for social housing
Andrews and Caldera Sánchez (2011); Harding and Marten far exceeds the supply, even despite recent
(2018).
(404) European Commission (2019, forthcoming).
initiatives. Several Member States have recently
(405) Figari et al. (2017) analyse the distributional effect of increased the supply of social housing (Germany,
removing income tax provisions favouring homeownership in France Ireland), but still face sizeable waiting lists. In
Belgium, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands and the light of such shortages, there are debates in several
United Kingdom.
(406) European Commission (2019, forthcoming). (409) World Bank (2018).
(407) European Commission (2014b). (410) Fatica and Prammer (2017); Figari et al. (2016); World Bank
(408) Howard (1999). (2018).

155
Employment and Social Developments in Europe 2019

Member States on allocation mechanisms, as well as and Eastern Europe, (414) while regulation also plays a
rules regarding duration or succession rights. In France, role. However, the supply of short-term lets tends to
the recently adopted ELAN law aims to target social be particularly concentrated in historic city
housing better to those in need. The situation of centres. (415), which implies that its broader impact
tenants in high demand areas will be re-evaluated remains to be seen.
every 3 years, and a generalised scoring system will
apply in large urban areas. The affordability of housing costs in cities is
subject to an urban ‘paradox’. Cities are hubs of
5.4. Housing cost affordability by degree of innovation, productivity and employment, with
urbanisation opportunities for education and training and high
income. Urban areas are often the destination of
There are increasing concerns that housing in choice for young adults. However, in many cities
cities is becoming either unaffordable or a very unemployment rates are higher than in towns, suburbs
large burden for low-income groups. (411) The high or rural areas, (416) while inequalities are larger.
cost of housing in cities can be linked to growing
demand (due to urbanisation), and limitations to The housing cost overburden tends to be highest in
expanding supply (constraints on providing new cities (13% EU-wide), compared with towns and
dwellings in densely built areas, including planning suburbs and rural areas. Income poverty tends to be
permissions). highest in rural areas, where overall income and living
standards may be somewhat lower. To some extent,
Over the past decade, house price increases these two factors tend to cancel each other out when
have been particularly strong in capital cities. the risk of poverty after housing expenses is
During the upturn in the early 2000s and up to 2009, calculated, the risk is similar in cities and rural areas,
house prices in capital cities moved broadly in line with and slightly lower in towns and suburbs.
national aggregates. They started to diverge around
Chart 4.44
2010. (412) In several Member States – and particularly
About two fifths of the population lives in cities, with
in their capital cities - foreign investment in housing is
major differences across Member States
substantial. Foreign investments in capital cities are Population by degree of urbanisation of the dwelling and by MS, 2016
part of a broad pattern of looser global financial 100%
conditions, whereby prices in major cities may become 90%

more sensitive to international conditions and prices. In 80%

70%
some cases, these effects are mitigated by exchange
60%
rate flexibility or macro-prudential tools intended to
50%
protect the stability of the financial system, for 40%
example capital conditions banks to provide 30%
mortgages. (413) As discussed earlier, the impact of 20%
house prices on housing expenses may be limited to 10%

certain population groups, indirect and subject to a lag. 0%

HU
HR

FR
FI
LU

LT

UK

LV
MT
DK

IT

EL

IE

ES

EE
PL

PT
SK

SE
RO
CZ

EU25

CY
AT
BE

BG

Given higher rates of housing mobility (but also more

private tenants) in cities, the effects may be seen Cities Towns and suburbs Rural areas
more quickly there. Note: No data for DE, NL, SI.
Source: DG EMPL calculations, based on EU SILC Users’ database
Click here to download chart.
Short-term rentals via on-line platforms may
have an impact on private rental markets,
particularly in popular tourist destinations. For
(414) Adamiak (2018).
homeowners seeking to rent out their property,
(415) Artioli (2018).
offering accommodation to tourists and travellers via
(416) Nevertheless, cities have potentially more job opportunities and
peer-to-peer platforms may be a lucrative alternative allow for wider job choices. See Eurostat (2017).
to long-term rents. There is a wide degree of variation
in the offers online: some are available year-round,
whereas others are only rented for a few months.
Some accommodation offers refer to entire properties,
others are for rooms or shared rooms. The
displacement of long-term rents by peer-to-peer
short-term accommodation may be particularly strong
where local incomes and wages are below what is
offered on the international market for short-term
accommodation for example in Southern and Central

(411) Grabka, Goebel and Liebig (2019).

(412) European Central Bank (2017), data for the Eurozone.
(413) Alter et al (2018).

156
 Chapter 4: Investing in people and social sustainability: short-term costs vs long-term benefits

Table 4.2
Housing cost affordability and poverty are subject to an ‘urban’ paradox
Selected housing cost affordability and poverty indicators, by degree of urbanisation of the dwelling, EU25, 2016

Housing cost Self-reported

Median housing At-risk-of-poverty AROP (income after
overburden heavy burden of
cost (%income) (AROP, income) housing expenses)
(>40% income) housing cost
Cities 16 13 16 31 36
Towns and suburbs 15 10 16 30 37
Rural areas 14 9 21 33 37
Note: No data for DE, NL, SI. Shading applied by column, to highlight which areas have most favourable outcomes (green) or least favourable (red)
Source: DG EMPL calculations, based on EU SILC Users’ database
Click here to download table.

Chart 4.45 parents into young adulthood and to elderly persons

Households headed by young adults are more likely to residing with their children.
be in the cities
Tenure status by age category of the oldest person in charge of accommodation, %,
EU25, 2016 In terms of housing cost affordability, cohabiting
100% can have advantages. On the cost side, it allows for
90% economies of scale: the required living space or
80%
consumption of utilities may increase as more people
70%
60%
live in a dwelling, but the increase is not proportional
50%
to the number of persons in the household. On the
40% income side, having several adults in a household can
30% help to pool and diversify income.
20%
10% Chart 4.46
0% Diversity of household types in EU Member States
Tota l
75+
30-34

35-39

40-44

45-49

50-54

60-64

65-69

70-74
20-24

25-29

55-59

Population by household type and Member State, 2016.

100%
Cities Towns and suburbs Rural areas
80%
Note: No data for DE, NL, SI.
Source: DG EMPL calculations, based on EU SILC Users’ database 60%
Click here to download chart. 40%

20%

0%

PT
DK

PL
DE

HU
Total

HR
CZ
IT

IE

CY
BG

RO
BE

UK
FR

SK
SE

NL
FI

SI
AT

MT
EE

ES
EL
LV

LU
LT

A lack of affordable housing in areas with many Single adult Two adults, no children
job opportunities may hamper labour mobility, or Other household, no children Single parent
lead to long commutes and traffic congestion. In Two adults, children Other households, children

certain countries (including Finland) regional Other

differences in housing costs are larger than the Note: Children refer household members aged 17 or less or household members aged
between 18 and 24; economically inactive and living with at least one parent.
respective wage premiums. This may hinder mobility to Source: DG EMPL calculations, based on EU SILC Users’ database
the regions with the highest demand and largest job Click here to download chart.
opportunities. Limited supply of rental housing may
also be a factor limiting mobility within a country, even One possible effect of limited availability of
leading some jobseekers to move abroad instead (e.g. affordable housing is overcrowding. The
Latvia). In other cases, a high housing cost relative to overcrowding rate takes into account the number of
income may provide incentives to commute across the rooms available to the household and the number of
border rather than to take up residence there (e.g. household members (see Box 4.5). The proportion of
Luxembourg). people living in overcrowded households has declined
gradually, from 18.7% in 2007 to 15.5% in 2017
(EU27, not including Croatia). Bulgaria, Croatia,
5.5. Housing cost affordability by household Hungary, Poland and Romania still have overcrowding
type rates of 40% or more. Not only the number of rooms,
but also the size of dwellings differs strongly across
There are large differences between Member Member States, and is closely related to overall living
States in the structure of households. This applies standards. Whereas an overcrowded household in Italy
particularly to single person households, which account had a median living space of 20m² per household
for more than one fifth of the population in Denmark, member in 2012, the equivalent in Romania was only
Sweden or Germany, but less than one tenth in several 10m².
Member States, including Cyprus, Slovakia and Poland.
There are also major differences in the prevalence of
households with three or more adults. This is linked
both to children continuing to cohabit with their

157
Employment and Social Developments in Europe 2019

Table 4.3
Single adults, and particularly single parents, tend to be most vulnerable to poverty and problems with housing
expenses
Selected housing cost affordability and poverty indicators, by household type, EU28, 2016

Housing cost Self-reported

Median housing At-risk-of-poverty AROP (income after
overburden heavy burden of
cost (%income) (AROP, income) housing expenses)
(>40% income) housing cost
Single adult 26 26 26 50 28
Two adults, no children 16 9 12 19 24
Other, no children 11 6 11 32 38
Single parent 23 21 34 63 43
Two adults, children 16 10 17 30 32
Other, children 13 6 20 31 47
Note: Shading applied by column, to highlight which household types have the most favourable outcomes (green) or least favourable (red)
Source: DG EMPL calculations, based on EU SILC Users’ database
Click here to download table.

Chart 4.47 Chart 4.48

Dwelling size varies considerably across countries, Fewer Europeans experience severe housing deprivation
including for overcrowded households than ten years ago
Median average living space (m2) per household member, by country and overcrowding Severe housing deprivation rate by Member States, %.
status, 2012 35
90
30
80

70 25

60 20

50 15
40
10
30
5
20

10 0
IE

IT

HR

PL
CY

DE

DK

HU
CZ

BE

PT

BG
FI

FR
ES
MT

LU

SE

EE

SI

LV
SK

EL

LT
UK
NL

AT

RO
EU28
0
HR

HU

FR

FI
UK

LU
LV

LT

DE

MT
DK
IE

NL
EL
ES
EE

IT
PL

PT
SI
RO

SK

SE

CY
CZ

AT
BG

BE

2007 2012 2017

Total Overcrowded Not
Note: EU28 refers to EU27 (-HR) for 2007
Source: DG EMPL calculations, based on EU SILC Users’ database Source: Eurostat, EU-SILC [ilc_mdho06a].
Click here to download chart. Click here to download chart.

5.6. Housing deprivation Homes that lack basic plumbing installations are
concentrated in certain Central and Eastern
The quality of housing, in terms of the properties of European Member States. In Romania, Latvia,
the dwellings in which Europeans live, varies Lithuania and Bulgaria, more than 10% of the
considerably across Member States, as well as within population live in a dwelling that is not equipped with
countries. Some aspects of housing quality are closely either a shower or a bath (compared with 2% in the
linked to the overall living standards of the country or EU28). A similar proportion of households does not
households, whereas others can be seen as providing have an indoor flushing toilet for the sole use of the
possible indications of the energy-efficiency of the household. In fact, dwellings that lack one tend to lack
building. the other as well. One exception is Bulgaria, where
nearly twice as many homes lack an indoor flushing
Severe housing deprivation rates have been
toilet as lack a shower or bath. While major
declining in Europe over the past ten years. The improvements have been observed, in line with current
strongest progress was recorded between 2007 and trends, these issues will only be fully resolved by
2012 in all the Central and Eastern European Member 2040.
States, followed by a period of relative stability in
several countries, and a renewed decline shown in the
most recent data. A few countries with low rates of
deprivation have seen minor increases, such as
Belgium, Sweden and Denmark, although it remains to
be seen whether this is a robust trend.

158
 Chapter 4: Investing in people and social sustainability: short-term costs vs long-term benefits

Box 4.5: Housing deprivation indicators

The severe housing deprivation rate is the percentage of population living in a dwelling considered to be
overcrowded which also exhibits at least one of the housing deprivation measures.
Housing deprivation is a measure of poor amenities, referring to households whose dwellings have a leaking roof,
have no bath/shower and no indoor toilet, or are considered too dark.
An overcrowded household is one which does not have at least: one room for the household; one room per couple
in the household; one room per single person aged 18 or more; one room per pair of single people of the same
gender aged 12-17; one room per single person aged 12-17 and not included in the previous category; and one room
per pair of children aged under 12.

Chart 4.49 Chart 4.50

Homes which lack basic plumbing facilities are becoming Damp living conditions are generally on the decline, but
rarer, with the remaining ones concentrated in a few remain widespread in the EU
Member States Population living in a dwelling with a leaking roof, damp walls, floors or foundation, or
Population not having indoor flushing toilet for the sole use of their household, %. rot in window frames of floor, by MS, %
40
50
45 35

40 30
35 25
30
20
25
15
20
10
15
10 5

5 0

PL

IE

IT
HR

DK

HU
PT
CZ

BG
DE

BE
FI

CY
MT
FR
SE

ES

EL

LU
EE

LT

LV
SK

RO

AT

EU28*

UK

SI
NL
0
2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040
2007 2012 2017
RO BG LV LT EE EU2 8
Note: For 2007, EU28 refers to EU27 (-HR).
Note: Dotted lines represent linear extrapolation of trend 2005-2017 (2008 for RO,
2010 for EU) Source: Eurostat, EU-SILC survey [ilc_mdho01]
Source: Eurostat, EU-SILC survey [ilc_mdho03]. Click here to download chart.
Click here to download chart.

Chart 4.51
Damp living conditions are relatively widespread Tenants are most likely to have damp living conditions
across EU Member States. Approximately one in Population living in a dwelling with a leaking roof, damp walls, floors or foundation, or
rot in window frames or floor, by tenure status, 2016
seven Europeans lives in a dwelling that has a leaking 60
roof, or has walls, floors or foundations which are
damp, or has rot in window frames or the floor. These 50

deficiencies may have a negative impact not only on 40

the occupants’ comfort, but also on their health. (417)
Those living in rented accommodation, and particularly 30

those with reduced rent are especially affected by 20

these issues. Damp living conditions may also indicate
poor insulation or ventilation of the home and be 10

considered as a proxy for low energy efficiency.

0
HR

HU
FI

FR

LT

LU

LV
MT

DE

DK
NL
ES

EL

IT
EE

PT
PL

SI
SE

RO
SK

CZ

CY
AT

BG

BE

Owner, outright Owner, mortgage Rent, market Rent, reduced

(417) Eurofound (2016).
Source: DG EMPL calculations, based on EU SILC Users’ database
Click here to download chart.

159
Employment and Social Developments in Europe 2019

differentials, and across Member States there are

6. CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY CHOICES signs of overqualification. Moreover, tertiary
qualification attainments are significantly correlated
Given major demographic and technological across generations, which raises the issue of public
shifts, there is a broad consensus in Europe on investment in education and training having a
the need to invest in people and social ‘Matthew effect’.
sustainability. Such investments help to prevent and
mitigate social risks by enabling citizens to acquire Adult education training is increasing in EU, a
new skills and be active on the labour market and by positive sign likely to be linked with the spread
providing them with support during critical life course of upskilling and reskilling policies. However, this
transitions (such as re-entering the labour market increase is primarily driven by non-formal training,
after studies, childbirth, unemployment or inactivity). whereas formal training is reported to have higher
positive outcomes in terms of better performance,
Investing in children and their families through salaries, tasks, promotion and the chances of finding a
affordable and quality childcare services and new job.
income support is an effective investment for
the development of children and for parents’ An increase in formal long-term care can lead to
(especially mothers’) employment. Despite advantages both for carers and for the state.
increases in family expenditure per capita, and Formal long-term care reduces burdens on family or
increases in the use of formal childcare in most informal carers, allowing them to stay in paid
Member States after 2008, there is still room for employment, and so increases tax revenues. Paid
improvement. carers make social contributions, thereby supporting
the financial sustainability of social protection
More efforts are needed to avoid vicious cycles systems, while giving these workers access to
which could reinforce existing inequalities insurance-based benefits and pension entitlements.
between children from disadvantaged and Better data and indicators on this important policy
advantaged backgrounds. At present, the area would allow further investigations and, ultimately,
disadvantaged are less likely than the advantaged to better policies.
use childcare services. While childcare choices are
influenced by factors ranging from affordability and Access to affordable and adequate housing is an
availability to proximity, opening hours, quality, important factor enabling Europeans to fulfil
preferences and social norms, the data analysed in their potential in the labour market. There are
this Chapter show that lack of affordability is the main concerns that housing is becoming less affordable, due
reason for not making more use of formal childcare. to dynamic house prises, particularly in capital cities,
High childcare costs for low-income families, and low which are major centres of productivity. This may limit
progressivity in these costs, are likely to be a major opportunities for workers, particularly at the start of
cause of the existing inequality in childcare use. The their careers. Very high housing costs may also
analysis in this Chapter also shows that reducing prevent some households from investing in skills or
childcare costs in countries where these costs are making use of childcare. Affordability of housing costs
relatively high has a positive effect on the use of has generally improved in recent years. However, there
childcare, and, allows mothers to work more if they remain many Europeans who face difficulties in
wish to. In countries where these costs are low, other meeting the monthly cost of accommodation. These
policies focused on increasing availability might work include in particular tenants (both on the private
better in enhancing childcare use and employment of market and paying reduced rent) and single persons,
mothers. particularly single parents. Likewise, severe housing
deprivation is generally declining in Europe, but
Education and training remain very important in specific groups remain at high risk (including tenants
the European Social Model. Expenditure on in the private rented sector). The increase in
education and training has continued to grow over the homelessness (Chapter 1) that has been observed in
last decade in absolute terms, although less than GDP. many countries points to severe forms of exclusion.
There is a statistically significant relationship between Many Member States provide extensive support for
higher educational attainment levels on the one hand, homeowners, but there may be scope to further
and higher employment likelihood and higher salaries developing policies for more vulnerable groups.
on the other. Unsurprisingly, work experience during
studies has an analogous (if smaller) effect on the
probability of a student becoming employed. This
probability is stronger if the work experience is paid.
These relationships are linked with the transformation
affecting European labour markets, which increases
the demand for highly qualified and experienced
individuals. Thus further investment in education and
training systems is recommended. Yet a signalling
effect is likely to play a role in wages and employment

160
Annex 1: Social impact investment
Social impact investment (418) is the use of capital socially impactful investment targets. The European
flows to generate both social and financial returns, perspective builds on the political and institutional
offering a way to help social organisations access concept of additionality and falls within the scope of
suitable financing and improve their ability to deliver the (participatory) re-engineering of public finance and
impact. In other words, social impact investment refers a new generation of social policies.
to «investments made into companies, organisations,
and funds with the intention to generate a
measurable, beneficial social or environmental impact
alongside a financial return».

Decisions on capital investments typically take two

variables into consideration: risk and financial return
on investment. When the risk increases, the return
required by investors generally increases as well.
Social impact investment adds a new variable into the
investment decisions: impact, defined as the creation
of value for society. The correlation between variables
is not necessarily negative – the impact and the
financial returns are not mutually exclusive.

Social impact investment can be used to finance the

day-to-day delivery of a specific programme, such as
upfront funding to deliver an outcomes-based
contract, or it can be used to help enterprises realise
their mission over the long term by helping them
develop their strategy and service model and expand
their operations. Since the inception of the concept in
2007, its practice has spread across the globe and the
interest has grown at scale. Its growth was
accompanied by a decade of evolutions in the field:
social impact investment emerged amid other
concepts such as sustainable finance, responsible
investment, and philanthropy or strategic giving.

Through the involvement of additional capital flows,

social impact investment allows distributing the
financial and political costs of possible failures of
highly innovative social policies or initiatives.
Outcome-based contracts tie at least a portion of a
contractor’s payment, contract extensions or contract
renewals to the achievement of specific outcomes that
are measurable and predictable. Under these
contracts, social service providers need liquidity to
operate until they generate revenues. Outcome-based
contracts require a focus on the consequences of a
given set of activities and outputs. The focus is on the
outcome to be achieved and not on the service or good
provided. This triggers innovation along the process,
changing the set of behavioural incentives and driving
efficiency and effectiveness.

The most representative practices of European social

impact investment differ significantly from the global
perspective. The latter seems to be focused on new
strategies in asset identification and creation, as well
as the reallocation of capital supply in favour of these

(418) This Annex provides a summary of the JRC – Science for policy
report “Social impact investment in the EU.” by Maduro et al.
(2018).

161
Annex 2: Euromod simulations of the impact of the
reduction of childcare costs on the use of the service
and on the mothers’ labour supply decisions
The aim of Annex 2 is to provide empirical evidence on populations of EU Member States in a comparable way
how childcare costs affect the usage of formal across countries on the basis of the tax-benefit rules
childcare among children under 3, and the labour in place and information available in the underlying
supply of mothers. The analysis below shows the datasets. Market incomes and income components
impact of a reduction of childcare costs in a selection which are not simulated due to lack of information (on
of countries. Two groups of countries are analysed: a e.g. previous employment and contribution history) are
group still far away from the 33% Barcelona target for taken directly from the data. Simulations are based on
children below 3 years of age, namely Hungary and 2015 policy rules and 2016 EU-SILC microdata
Lithuania, and another group who have reached it, (referring to 2015 incomes). For the simulation of
Finland and the Netherlands. Despite important cross- parental fees for subsidized childcare a EUROMOD
country differences, results show that decreasing extension was added to the model. Childcare fees are
childcare costs increases the use of childcare and estimated according to the rules in place in each
mothers' employment country taking into account the family characteristics
and financial situation. For Finland and the
A2.1.1. Methodology Netherlands income related parental fees are
simulated, while for Hungary and Lithuania a daily cost
To analyse the effect a reduction of childcare costs on including for example food, is simulated. (421) For the
the use of childcare and on mothers' labour supply, the Netherlands net childcare costs are simulated, taking
microsimulation model EUROMOD and a simplified into account the childcare allowance for children in
version of the micro-econometric model is used. (419) subsidised childcare slots.
In the micro-econometric model mothers of children
under 3 years old are allowed to choose from a set of A2.1.2. Results
childcare alternatives and a set of labour supply
alternatives. The three childcare alternatives refer to The results show the effect of a reduction of the
formal childcare, informal childcare (which is care childcare costs by 50% on the use of formal childcare
provided by grandparents or other family members for four countries: Hungary, Lithuania, Finland and
and is free of payment), and maternal care. In the Netherlands. Table A2.1 and Table A2.2 present the
simulations formal childcare corresponds to subsidised change in childcare use and mothers' labour supply
childcare, although in general formal childcare includes (respectively) for the unrestricted sample and the
both subsidised and non-subsidised facilities. For all restricted sample. The restricted sample is limited to
countries full-time childcare attendance (30 mothers whose partner works full-time. This selection
hours/week) is simulated, except for the Netherlands shows the pure mothers’ labour supply behaviour,
(20 hours/week). (420) Rationing of childcare availability while considering the behaviour of the father as
and grandparents is not modelled due to the lack of exogenous. (422)
information in the data. The labour supply alternatives
consist of a non-market alternative, part-time and full- Table A2.1 shows the share of formal, informal and
time working arrangements. Additionally, mothers maternal care for the restricted and unrestricted
receiving a self-employment income, pension or sample of mothers in the baseline and the reform
disability benefits are dropped to exclude other factors scenario (the reduction in childcare costs by 50%). The
such as disability status, early retirement, unrestricted sample refers to all selected mothers
entrepreneurship and professional choice that can (under the above-mentioned rules). Restricted sample
affect labour supply decisions of mothers but cannot refers to the selected mothers whose partner is
be controlled in the modelling. working full time. Both the use of childcare and the
mothers' labour supply is higher in Finland and the
The disposable income and the childcare costs faced Netherlands compared to Hungary and Lithuania.
by the selected households at each alternative of the Finland and the Netherlands are also characterised by
choice set are derived using EUROMOD. EUROMOD is a relatively higher childcare costs and a higher
multi-country European wide tax-benefit availability of childcare services. In general, the use of
microsimulation model that simulates tax liabilities formal childcare is slightly higher in the restricted
(direct taxes and social insurance contributions) and sample than in the unrestricted sample. A reduction of
cash benefit entitlements for the household
(421) For more information, see Hufkens and Verbist (2017); Hufkens
(419) As described in Figari and Narazani (2017). et al. (2016).
(420) The Netherlands has a very low average number of hours of (422) Endogenising the father’s labour supply would imply a larger
childcare use in a usual week (below 20) compared to the EU choice set which complicates the estimation procedure but
average. Therefore, it is unrealistic to assume full-time without significant improvement given that the majority of
childcare attendance. fathers is in full time employment.

162
 Annex 2: Euromod simulations of the impact of the reduction of childcare costs on the use of the service and on the mothers’ labour supply decisions

Table A2.1
The average working hours and labour participation in the unrestricted (on the left) and restricted (on the right) sample
Finland Finland
Baseline Reform Diff Baseline Reform Diff
Mother care 0.187 0.154 -0.179 Mother care 0.178 0.134 -0.044
Formal care 0.450 0.548 0.098 Formal care 0.467 0.598 0.132
Informal care 0.363 0.299 -0.065 Informal care 0.355 0.268 -0.088

Netherlands Netherlands
Baseline Reform Diff Baseline Reform Diff
Mother care 0.079 0.070 -0.009 Mother care 0.068 0.066 -0.002
Formal care 0.529 0.590 0.061 Formal care 0.535 0.551 0.016
Informal care 0.392 0.340 -0.051 Informal care 0.397 0.383 -0.014

Lithuania Lithuania
Baseline Reform Diff Baseline Reform Diff
Mother care 0.365 0.359 -0.006 Mother care n/a n/a n/a
Formal care 0.278 0.290 0.012 Formal care n/a n/a n/a
Informal care 0.357 0.350 -0.006 Informal care n/a n/a n/a

Hungary Hungary
Baseline Reform Diff Baseline Reform Diff
Mother care 0.439 0.437 -0.002 Mother care 0.429 0.427 -0.002
Formal care 0.241 0.245 0.004 Formal care 0.274 0.278 0.004
Informal care 0.320 0.318 -0.002 Informal care 0.296 0.294 -0.002
Source: European Commission, Joint Research Centre, based on the EUROMOD model.
Click here to download table.

childcare cost by 50% triggers an increase in the use childcare costs by 50% leads to a significant increase
of formal childcare for countries where the childcare in average working hours and participation rates in
costs are relatively high (Finland and Netherlands), Netherlands and Finland but a small effect for
while in countries with relatively low childcare cost Lithuania and Hungary. This increase ranges from
(Hungary and Lithuania) the increase in formal around 1.7% (unrestricted sample) in the Netherlands
childcare use is very small. to 3.3% (unrestricted sample) in Finland. However,
these countries start from different labour market
The reduction of childcare costs also impacts the situations, and different compositions of part-time and
labour supply decisions of mothers. The table below full-time workforce. Although participation rates are
shows the average weekly working hours and labour around 80% both in Finland and the Netherlands, the
participation rates of the restricted and the average working hours are higher in Finland than in
unrestricted sample of mothers. A reduction of the Netherlands, a country where women are more
Table A2.2
The average working hours and labour participation in the unrestricted (on the left) and restricted (on the right) sample.

Finland Netherlands
All sample Restricted All sample Restricted

% % % %
Hours Hours Hours Hours
Participation Participation Participation Participation

Baseline 26.09 0.77 27.33 0.79 Baseline 22.22 0.87 22.87 0.89
Reform 26.96 0.80 28.19 0.83 Reform 22.60 0.89 22.98 0.89
% change 3.32% 4.26% 3.17% 4.78% % change 1.71% 1.34% 0.51% 0.21%

Lithuania Hungary
All sample Restricted All sample Restricted (N=263)

% % % %
Hours Hours Hours Hours
Participation Participation Participation Participation

Baseline 18.42 0.49 n/a n/a Baseline 6.88 0.19 7.02 0.20
Reform 18.48 0.49 n/a n/a Reform 6.94 0.19 7.07 0.20
% change 0.34% 0.39% n/a n/a % change 0.90% 0.89% 0.78% 0.76%
Source: European Commission, Joint Research Centre, based on the EUROMOD model.
Click here to download table.

163
Employment and Social Developments in Europe 2019

likely to work part-time. In Hungary and Lithuania the

change in supplied labour in absolute terms is less
than 1 pp.

164
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CHAPTER 5

Towards a greener future:

employment and social
impacts of climate change
policies
ecosystems, water quality and quantity and
1. INTRODUCTION AND MAIN infrastructure, climate change has a particularly
CHALLENGES (423) significant impact on agriculture, fisheries and food
production, as well as on global transport routes and
Environmental sustainability is one of the main activities. In November 2018, the Commission put
dimensions of sustainable development and, for forward a strategic long-term vision for a competitive,
many, is the essence of sustainability. It plays an prosperous and climate neutral economy by 2050. This
important role in research and in raising awareness of is a necessary contribution of the EU to the Paris
sustainability as a whole, and it is often used as the Climate Agreement objectives.
primary yardstick for assessing and ranking
Attention to social and environmental
sustainability performance overall. While the
environmental dimension is a broad concept, this inequalities and distributional impacts of
chapter focuses on the main linkages, climate action is important for ensuring that the
complementarities and trade-offs between climate burden is fairly distributed across individuals,
change policies and social sustainabilityincluding the groups, sectors and regions. (425) The right to a safe
role of social policies to ensure just transition to and healthy environment is a crucial element of well-
climate-neutral economy. being. However, access to natural resources and the
impacts of climate change and pollution (air, water,
Environmental and social sustainability are noise, chemicals) are generally distributed unequally
interlinked, as environmental and climate and are likely to affect low-skilled workers and
change risks and related economic activities and vulnerable, low-income households more than others.
policy measures affect regions, sectors, workers These population groups may also be
and population groups in different ways. While disproportionately subject to the effects of more
job gains can be expected across many sectors and frequent extreme weather events, partly because they
regions, adverse employment impacts will be have fewer resources with which to take precautionary
concentrated in regions depending on sectors that will or evasion measures. Furthermore, though these
have to undergo extensive transformations to enhance groups probably contribute less to overall emissions,
environmental protection and achieve climate they may be more affected by the direct or indirect
neutrality. (424) Through its impact on natural costs of climate action, such as environmental taxes
when these are regressive, rising energy bills, changing
(423) This chapter was written by Míde Griffin, Endre György, mobility costs and new product standards or targeted
Katarina Jakšič and Frank Siebern-Thomas, with contributions regulatory bans of certain goods, products or
from Stefano Filauro and Tim van Rie as well as Eurofound, technologies as well as harmful consumption patterns.
Cambridge Econometrics, the Social Situation Monitor and the
Joint Research Centre unit on Economics of Climate Change,
Energy and Transport.
(425) For a broader discussion of the interplay between socio-
(424) i.e. a level of greenhouse gas emission that does not surpass economic and environmental inequalities, see in particular
the absorption level , sometimes also referred to as net-zero Alvaredo et al. (2019).
GHG emissions.

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 Chapter 5: Towards a greener future: employment and social impacts of climate change policies

Chart 5.1
Climate inaction would have significant socio-economic costs for Europe, particularly southern Europe
Welfare losses (% of GDP) for two climate inaction scenarios (high warming scenario and 2˚C scenario)

Source: European Commission, PESETA III studies, Joint Research Centre, Sevilla
Click here to download chart.

Inaction on environmental degradation and production and consumption patterns and promoting
climate change has significant economic and green jobs (430), climate action not only has an impact
social costs. In its PESETA III study, (426) the on labour markets, job quality and health and safety
Commission provides a detailed assessment of six at the workplace (431), but also fosters innovation and
specific climate impacts in Europe for two scenarios - productivity and enhances opportunities for green,
a high-warming scenario and a 2 degrees scenario. climate-smart growth. (432) Putting a price on
The impacts are significant, and risk annual welfare environmental harm such as waste and pollution,
losses of up to 2% of GDP in the EU, and of more than either by environmental taxation or by a cap-and-trade
4% of GDP in southern Europe. The strongest impacts system such as the Emissions Trading System (ETS),
are on mortality, coastal floods and labour can help in this regard. Such measures can help
productivity, and Southern Europe is most affected internalise social and environmental externalities,
(Chart 5.1). Similarly, for the US, the costs of past prevent ‘pollution havens’, encourage reallocation of
extreme events (427) since 1980 are estimated at resources and re-orient global value chains towards
above $1.1 trillion. Future economy-wide direct low energy-intensive and low carbon production. The
damages, interpreted as costs of inaction, are revenue generated can contribute to the financing of
estimated to reach up to 1.2% of GDP per year per social policies and of targeted, growth-enhancing
1°C, of global warming and up to around 20% of total social investments, e.g. education and reskilling, or it
income in the regions most affected, thereby can fund temporary support for the transition to new
increasing inequalities between regions and potentially activities and other accompanying or compensatory
social conflict. (428) measures. (433)

Since there are evident synergies between Broad social acceptance of environmental
environmental sustainability and economic protection and climate action measures is vital
performance, tackling climate change can be an for their effective implementation and for
opportunity for EU businesses. (429) By greening
change not only a challenge, but also a business opportunity if
426 addressed in the right manner.” (European Commission, 2019c).
( ) European Commission (2018g).
(430) See in particular Cambridge Econometrics et al. (2011),
(427) such as “simultaneous heat and drought, wildfires associated
Cedefop (2010, 2013), European Commission (2011, 2014),
with hot and dry conditions, or flooding associated with high OECD (2010), and OECD and Cedefop (2014).
precipitation on top of snow or waterlogged ground” (USGCRP
(2018)) (431) See in particular Eurofound (2013), EU-OSHA (2011) and ILO
(2018a, 2018b, 2018c).
(428) See USGCRP (2018).
(432) See e.g. Dechezleprêtre and Sato (2018), European Commission
(429) “There can be no greater return on investment than a clean (2012a, 2014), Koźluki and Timiliotis (2016), OECD (2012a),
planet, reduced energy import dependency, sustainable Stern (2007, 2015) and World Bank (2014).
economic growth and an increased uptake of clean energy and
efficiency solutions. European companies are among the (433) See e.g. Abdullah and Morley (2014), Chancel (2017), Chancel
leaders in the world as regards clean tech. This makes climate and Voituriez (2015), Dechezleprêtre et al. (2018), Vandyck
(2013), and Vandyck and Van Regemorter (2014).

171
Employment and Social Developments in Europe 2019

making progress towards the Sustainable further stipulates that social issues are generally
Development Goals. Societal trends have a strong better addressed through social policy and welfare
impact on the environment, through changing systems, the financing of which could benefit from tax
preferences and consumption choices, including e.g. shifts and revenue recycling. (436) The European Council
dietary changes or changes in travel behaviour. Social discussed the Long Term Strategy on several
networks and social movements such as the school occassions and the conclusions of the 20-21 June
climate strikers contribute to raising awareness, meeting stressed that the transition to a climate-
changing perceptions and re-framing political and neutral EU should be just and socially balanced, taking
public debates. The debate is also intensifying among into account Member States’ national circumstances.
academics and policy makers, recognising the need to
improve the understanding and modelling of social The EU budget and employment and social
and distributional aspects of environmental policies, as well as cohesion policies, have a key
degradation and climate change and related policy role to play in this context. (437) Support for a just
action; to take better account of social concerns and transition can be provided in accordance with the
social acceptance; and to design and implement principles of the European Pillar of Social Rights,
policies to promote necessary behavioural changes, notably to support transitions, adequate social
including mitigating measures or compensatory protection systems and inclusive education, training
actions where relevant. These elements are recognised and lifelong learning. Social partners need to be
in the Commission’s Reflection Paper 'Towards a involved in the design and implementation of
Sustainable Europe by 2030' putting forward three transition measures. With a budget of EUR 100 billion
scenarios for the discussion on how to implement the in the 2020-2027 period, the ESF+ programme will
SDGs. help to ensure that Europeans have the right skills and
will be proactive in supporting the most vulnerable in
This environmental-social intersection is at the the EU. It will contribute to achieving a greener,
heart of the Commission’s proposed strategic climate-neutral Europe through the improvement of
long-term vision for a prosperous, modern, education and training systems necessary for the
competitive and climate-neutral economy by 2050, ‘A upskilling and reskilling of the workforce, and it will
Clean Planet for All’. (434) The strategy shows how support job creation in sectors related to the
Europe can lead the way to climate neutrality by environment, climate and energy and the
investing in realistic technological solutions, by bioeconomy. (438)
empowering citizens and aligning actions in key areas
such as industrial policy, finance or research, while This chapter focuses on three aspects of
ensuring social fairness for a just transition. The environmental and social sustainability in the
strategy covers many EU policies; it is in line with the EU: first, the taxonomy and development of green jobs
Paris Agreement objective to keep the global and occupations in the EU economy; secondly, the key
temperature increase to well below 2°C and to pursue findings of recent climate action scenarios on the
efforts to keep it to 1.5°C. expected impacts of the transition to a climate-neutral
economy on employment, skills, income and task
However, the intended transition to an structures at disaggregated levels; and thirdly, energy
environmentally sustainable, climate-neutral poverty and the link between climate action, air
economy is not socially inclusive by default. pollution and human health.
Employment and social policies therefore are key to
supporting a just transition. The Commission Building on recent climate action scenarios and
Communication mentioned above recognises that the related impact assessments, the chapter
transition is likely to have significant employment and presents an additional focus on social outcomes.
social impacts and could result in regional disparities if It does so by presenting additional detail on the
not well managed. It also recognises the vital role that impacts of the transition to a climate-neutral economy
social acceptance and social policy will play in the by 2050 on employment, skills and tasks and by
success of any climate action, notably for making focussing on distributional impacts and links to income
growth green and inclusive at the same time. (435) It and poverty. It also highlights synergies between
calls on the EU and Member States to take the social environmental and social goals, for example in relation
implications of the transition into account from the to job creation, skills acquisition, energy efficiency and
outset, and to deploy all relevant policies to mitigate reduced health expenditure.
the risks, particularly for those on low incomes. It

(434) “Making the transformation towards a net-zero greenhouse gas (436) European Commission (2018a).
economy happen is not just about technologies and jobs. It is (437) See in particular European Commission (2005), Eurofound
about people and their daily lives, about the way Europeans (2013), ILO (2016) and OECD (2011, 2012b).
work, transport themselves and live together. Moving towards a (438) European Commission (2018c). For additional funds that are
net-zero greenhouse gas economy can only be successful with relevant in this regard, see the conclusions and discussions of
citizens that embrace change, get engaged and experience it as policy choices in section 6.
beneficial for their lives and that of their children.” (European
Commission, 2018a).
(435) See also Global Green Growth Initiative (2018), Jha et al.
(2018) and OECD (2017 a,b).

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 Chapter 5: Towards a greener future: employment and social impacts of climate change policies

2. TOWARDS A TAXONOMY OF GREEN transitions and promote mobility as well as support

further job creation. It also recommended improving
JOBS AND OCCUPATIONS data quality and recognised the need to address
existing bottlenecks and challenges, for example:
The labour market potential of green jobs and regions with energy-intensive, high-carbon industries
eco-industries has long been recognised. In 2009, and poor economic diversification could suffer; older
the European Commission (439) emphasised the scope and low-skilled workers would be more vulnerable to
for creation of green jobs and the greening of existing change; and job quality and health and safety should
jobs. However, due to the challenges surrounding the not be neglected in the transition.
definition and measurement of such jobs the
estimates of the scale of green jobs varied greatly, While the transition to a greener, circular and
from 2.4 to 36.4 million in 2000. The definition of climate–neutral economy is expected to have a
green jobs has evolved, from initially focussing only on slightly positive impact on total employment
direct jobs (440) to introducing indirect jobs, and levels, its sector-specific employment and skills
subsequently a broader understanding of varying impact will be significant (e.g. in the construction
degrees of "greenness" and a spectrum of green
and renewable energy sectors). (444) The roll-out of
jobs (441), covering occupations with green(ing) tasks
increasingly ambitious climate action will coincide with
and/or jobs in circular economy value chains more
other megatrends, such as automation and
generally. Irrespective of the definition, the overall net
digitalisation that are likely to have major impacts on
employment effect of the transition to a green
future skill needs. Preparing workers for new
economy as assessed by the European Commission
occupations and tasks in a green economy is
was expected to be neutral or slightly positive, at least
important. While these changes are expected to affect
in the long term. (442) a minority of European workers, they will be
In its 2014 Communication on the Green substantial for specific occupations and sectors. (445) In
general, developing specific new green skills may be
Employment Initiative, the European Commission
less important for the overall transition to a greener
put forward a framework for a job-rich recovery.
economy than the continuous improvement of existing
This was in response to the job creation potential of transversal and specific skills, including digital
the green economy, which had been well anticipated skills. (446)
notably in the 2013 and 2014 Annual Growth Surveys
(see Box 5.1 for further detail on green and inclusive Measures to address the skills challenge can
growth). There has in fact been considerable, above help to harness the employment potential of the
average job creation in the environmental goods and green economy for the benefit of all skill levels.
services sector (EGSS) since 2000, including during the
The impacts of greening across the skills and income
economic crisis (443), highlighting the resilience of
distribution will be balanced to some degree.. Initially
green jobs. In 2016, there were 4.5 million people
high-skilled labour may benefit more than lower-
(full-time equivalent) employed in the environmental
skilled labour but as the green economy develops,
economy in the EU, up from 3.2 million in 2000. To
many traditionally lower-skilled sectors will see
exploit the job potential in these areas more fully
increased demand too, notably waste management
during the recovery, the Communication emphasised
and sectors related to the circular economy, making it
the need to bridge skill gaps, anticipate change, secure
possible to harness the employment potential of the
(439) European Commission (2009).
green economy in a way that could benefit all skill
(440) See in particular the European Commission/Eurostat statistics
levels in society. (447) In turn, these sectors can be
on employment in the environmental goods and services expected to also employ more sophisticated
(EGSS) sector which comprises two broad groups of activities technologies and become more capital intensive, thus
and products: (1) environmental protection, i.e. activities whose demanding higher skills.
primary purpose is the prevention, reduction and elimination of
pollution and any other degradation of the environment; and
(2) resource management, i.e. activities whose primary purpose
is preserving and maintaining the stock of natural resources
and hence safeguarding against depletion. Latest data are
available for 2016 (released in June 2019). For further detail, (444) See section 3.
see Eurostat (2018). For a definition of and for monitoring (445) See e.g. OECD and Cedefop (2014) and Cedefop and OECD
green jobs at global level, see also ILO (2015) and (2015).
http://www.ilo.org/greenjobs.
(446) See also European Commission (2012b). Trasversal skills are
(441) See in particular Bowen et al. (2018), Eurofound (2012, 2013), not specifically related to a particular job, task, or discipline,
OECD and Cedefop (2014) and Vona et al. (2017) , as well as while specific skills are.
Rivkin et al. (2009) and UNEP/ILO/IOE/ITUC (2008). Full detail (447) European Commission (2012a)
on the broad taxonomy of green economy sectors and
occupational categories developed by the US Department of
Labor, as well as projections on the expected evolution of green
skills occupations, are available at the O-NET Resource Center
under http://www.onetcenter.org/initiatives.html#green-
occupations.
(442) European Commission (2016b).
(443) European Commission (2014).

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Employment and Social Developments in Europe 2019

Box 5.1: Measuring and monitoring green and inclusive growth

Several measurement initiatives for green growth have been developed in recent years. The Global Green Growth
Institute is currently developing the Green Growth Potential Assessment and the Green Growth Performance Measurement,
which offer country-specific indicators and simulation tools to help highlight the potential benefits of green policies and
investments. Its Green Growth Index is based on more than 35 indicators that represent green growth dimensions including
socioeconomic resilience, green economic opportunities and social inclusion. Meanwhile the Global Green Economy Index (1)
measures the green economy performance of 130 countries using quantitative and qualitative indicators on four key
dimensions. It is used to benchmark performance, communicate areas that need improvement, and help diverse stakeholder
promote progress in these areas.

The OECD Green Growth Indicators facilitate better monitoring of green growth. (2) They enable the monitoring of
progress towards four primary objectives: "establishing a low-carbon, resource-efficient economy; maintaining the natural
asset base; improving people’s quality of life; and implementing appropriate policy to realise the economic opportunities of
green growth". (3) Indicators that reflect how environmental conditions and risks interact with people’s well-being are
included. These also demonstrate the role of amenities in supporting well-being and show the extent to which income growth
is matched by improvements to well-being (or not). Such indicators, along with other well-being indicators such as those of
the OECD Better Life Index (4) are crucial to understanding the interplay between economic, social and environmental
sustainability. OECD analysis indicates that while several EU countries are global leaders at the forefront of the transition
towards green growth (including Luxembourg, Denmark and the Netherlands), others lag behind, notably Greece, among the
five weakest performers. These measures account for multiple dimensions of green growth, but often even high performers
make progress on one aspect while standing still on others.

Several EU initiatives exist to support green growth. In the European Semester exercise, annexes to Country Reports
include a green growth table containing several intensity indicators reflecting the relative decoupling of environmental
pressure from GDP growth. A monitoring framework has been developed in the context of the circular economy action
plan (5) as well as key indicators for each dimension of the Energy Union for both the EU and each Member State. (6)

Figure 1: Monitoring green growth, relative to the leaders

Source: OECD 2017

(1) http://dualcitizeninc.com/global-green-economy-index/
(2) http://www.oecd.org/greengrowth/green-growth-indicators/
(3) OECD (2017a)
(4) OECD (2017b)
(5) COM/2018/029, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?qid=1516265440535&uri=COM:2018:29:FIN
(6) https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/swd-energy-union-key-indicators_en.pdf

2.1. Broadening the scope of the green

economy

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 Chapter 5: Towards a greener future: employment and social impacts of climate change policies

The increased importance of the service sector Furthermore, given the global nature of the
and its lower carbon intensity can help to drive greenhouse effect, the risk of the most polluting
the EU towards a low-carbon future. The EU has activities being outsourced to other parts of the world
been experiencing a structural shift to the service needs to be addressed. Lastly, with workers' and
economy, with lower value added and employment consumers' behavioural responses to shifting rules and
shares of traditional ‘brown’ sectors and higher shares opportunities, there are potentially important second-
of employment in intrinsically ‘green’ sectors. round effects of the transition towards a low-carbon
Employment and value generation are taking place economy. In this perspective, ‘greening the economy’
increasingly in business sectors that are relatively low does not simply mean doing the same things with
in carbon emissions and material inputs (see Chart lower CO2 emissions and material inputs, but doing
5.2). fundamentally different things, with knock-on effects
on incentives and wages and economic policymaking.
Most of the employment in the EU is not in
carbon intensive sectors (Chart 5.2). More than Circular economy policies and new business and
70% of the workforce works in sectors which produce work organisation models are related to climate
less than 10% of all CO2 emissions. Construction, action and have labour market implications. New
wholesale and retail trade and other services sectors forms of work organisation that allow for more
together create more than 70% of gross value added flexible, telework can reduce the need for commuting
and employ more than 75% of the workforce, while and thus have an impact on traffic and related
producing less than 12% of all CO2 emissions. emissions. Moreover, processes that make the
Employment also grows most strongly in these sectors. economy increasingly circular through more efficient
On the other hand, electricity production, use of raw materials contribute to total factor
transport (448), manufacturing, agriculture and mining productivity improvements and hence to economic
sectors together produce close to 90% of all CO2 growth and job creation. It has been shown that a set
emissions in the EU, while they account for 25% of of mainly technological changes to improve resource
gross value added and less than 25% of employment. efficiency in five key sectors (food, motor vehicles,
If well managed, the shift towards a climate-neutral construction, electronics and waste management) can
economy can provide employment opportunities for all potentially create an additional 700,000 jobs in the EU
skill levels. by 2030, compared with a business-as-usual
scenario. (451) This favourable impact is mainly driven
Progress is not automatic, and targeted policies by job creation in the waste management sector, but
are needed to accompany, steer and accelerate an overall shift from capital-intensive towards more
the ongoing process of decarbonisation. Although labour-intensive activities also plays a role. However,
the increasing share of services in the economy some of the emerging activities could be automated.
contributes to reducing the carbon intensity of output,
parallel action is needed to decarbonise the energy- A narrow definition of ‘green jobs’ leads to
intensive activities. Moreover, some service sectors underestimating the potential labour market
rely on heavy use of electricity (especially those impact of the transition towards a climate-
associated with fintech, data servers or block chain neutral economy. Based on the Eurostat definition,
technologies). (449) As long as electricity is produced there are currently (2016) 4.5 million jobs in the EU in
through carbon-rich methods, the growing energy the so-called environmental goods and services
demands in these sectors remain problematic and sectors, up from 3.2 million in 2000. These include
hence shifts towards sustainable energy production jobs in areas such as waste management,
are necessary. Moreover, shifts towards increasingly environmental protection and energy preservation,
integrated global value chains bring with them usually jobs in easily-identifiable industries that are
increased demands for transport of intermediate and clearly shaped by environmental regulation. However,
final goods. This can significantly increase the focusing on existing jobs in existing industries (such as
ecological footprint of final goods production. (450) the environmental goods and services sectors) risks
missing larger and more diffuse developments
(448) Not all sub-sectors contribute equally (e.g. rail transport is far associated with low-carbon and environmentally
less polluting than some other forms of transport). sustainable activities in the economy and the labour
(449) See in particular International Energy Agency and OECD (2017), market, and ignores significant changes in
as well as Krause and Tolaymat (2018) and Vranken (2017).
According to estimates, the annual energy consumption of occupational profiles, task structures and skill
Bitcoin could be at the 43rd place of country rankings, just after requirements.
Switzerland and before Colombia, hence exceeding the total
energy consumption levels of 159 countries in the world. Its
consumption would be equivalent to e.g. 20% of the total 2008. This increase is likely to be associated with an increase
energy consumption of Italy, or 45% of that of the in CO2 emissions, given the repeated and long-haul transport of
Netherlands. For a critical discussion of these estimates, see intermediate goods involved. For a specific example of the
e.g. Digiconomist (2018). importance of intra-EU value chain integration, see also
(450) See e.g. Timmer et al. (2014) who show, based on a http://www.theguardian.com/business/2017/mar/03/brexit-uk-
decomposition of value chains using the World Input-Output car-industry-mini-britain-eu
Database (WIOD), the increasing fragmentation of value chains (451) See in particular European Commission (2018e).
e.g. in car manufacturing where the proportion of foreign
components in cars increased from 21% in 1995 to 34% in

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Employment and Social Developments in Europe 2019

Chart 5.2
More than 70% of jobs are in sectors that emit less and grow faster
CO2 emissions, employment and Gross Value Added (GVA) across industries in the EU, 2016-17
100%

80%

60%

40%

20%

0%

Administrative services
Mining and quarrying

Arts and entertainment

Education
Manufacturing

Construction

Accommodation and food

Health and social work

Transportation and storage

Wholesale and retail trade

Public administration

Finance and insurance

Agriculture, forestry and fishing

Real estate activities

Professional activities

Other service activities

Information and communication
Electricity, gas, air conditioning

Water and waste management

Cumulative emissions (2017) Cumulative employment (2016) Cumulative gross value added (2017)
Note: Cumulative employment, emissions and GVA in % of total, with sectors (NACE 08) ordered by decreasing share of CO2 emissions.
Source: Eurostat, and calculations by Bowen and Hancké (forthcoming).
Click here to download chart.

For a better assessment of the potential and  The suggested taxonomy will be subject to
impact on jobs of the transition towards the stakeholder consultation and further negotiation
green economy, broader typologies of with the EU legislators.
green(able) activities need to be considered. This
has been recognised in particular in the European 2.2. The potential of green(able) jobs in the
Commission’s recent action plan on financing EU
sustainable growth. (452) Under the plan, the EU
In this section, we explore a taxonomy of
Technical Expert Group on Sustainable Finance
presented a Technical Report setting out the basis for ‘greenable’ jobs in the EU, based on the
an EU Taxonomy for sustainable activities. (453) The taxonomy proposed for the US under the O*NET
Taxonomy considers three kinds of activities that can programme. Such a taxonomy could help to identify
make a substantial contribution to climate change the potential for ‘greening’ activities or tasks within
mitigation. These are: existing jobs, their evolution over time and the scope
for handling the distributive costs of the transition
 Activities that are already low carbon (e.g. zero through job redesign, retraining, labour reallocation
emissions transport); and wage formation. The taxonomy is based on a
broad definition of greenable jobs as all
 Activities that contribute to a transition (e.g. cars jobs/occupations that will be affected by greening, i.e.
with emissions below 50g CO2/kWh); reducing fossil fuel usage and addressing
environmental degradation and greenhouse gas
 Activities that enable those above (e.g. emissions, recycling materials, increasing energy
manufacture of wind turbines). efficiency and developing renewable energy sources.
The term does not necessarily describe the actual
(452) European Commission (2018d). In this Action Plan, ‘sustainable current amount of green jobs today, but rather the
finance' is defined as “the process of taking due account of potential of ‘green and greenable’ jobs in the sector or
environmental and social considerations in investment the economy. (454)
decision-making, leading to increased investments in longer-
term and sustainable activities. More specifically,
environmental considerations refer to climate change In terms of ‘greenness’, the following five
mitigation and adaptation, as well as the environment more categories of jobs can be identified. (455)
broadly and related risks (e.g. natural disasters). Social
considerations may refer to issues of inequality, inclusiveness,
labour relations, investment in human capital and communities. (454) Other definition have been suggested in the literature. See in
Environmental and social considerations are often intertwined, particular ILO (2015) and European Commission (2012a).
especially as climate change can exacerbate existing systems
(455) See Bowen et al. (2018) and Bowen and Hancké (forthcoming).
of inequality. The governance of public and private institutions,
including management structures, employee relations and Based on a first approximation of the International Standard
executive remuneration, plays a fundamental role in ensuring Classification of Occupations (ISCO) used by Eurostat with the
detailed occupational classification proposed by O-NET for the
the inclusion of social and environmental considerations in the
decision-making process.” US (which suggests a detailed classification of occupational
categories in line with their degree and potential of
(453) EU Technical Expert Group on Sustainable Finance (2019).

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 Chapter 5: Towards a greener future: employment and social impacts of climate change policies

1. Green Increased Demand (Green ID) jobs 5. Other Non-Green Jobs are non-green jobs
are existing jobs that are expected to be in high that are less likely to be affected (at least in the short
demand due to greening, but do not require significant term) by the greening of the economy, because of
changes in tasks, skills or knowledge. These jobs are their lack of similarity to green occupations (including
considered indirectly green because they support green perhaps occupations such as notaries, medical doctors
economic activity, but do not involve any specifically and pharmacists or nurses).
green tasks (e.g. bus drivers as key actors in public
transport, counted in the occupational category ‘bus According to this taxonomy, European labour
drivers, transit and intercity’, as well as e.g. renewable markets have a significant green potential and
energy engineers, sales and marketing professionals, job growth over the past decade has been green
organic agriculture farmers, etc). to some extent. Many occupations have a significant
green component, and their number has grown, both in
2. Green Enhanced Skills (Green ES) jobs are absolute terms and as a proportion of total
existing jobs that require substantial changes in tasks, employment (Table 5.1). Across all industries, by 2006
skills and knowledge as a result of greening (e.g. more than 75 million jobs, i.e. around a third of all
electric vehicle electricians, counted in the jobs, were green(able) by the above definition based
occupational category ‘automotive speciality on the task content of occupations. Since then, net job
technicians’, but also construction workers, architects, creation has added more than 6.5 million jobs in the
urban planners, teachers, human resource EU (equivalent to 3.2% overall job growth). The rise in
professionals, etc). the number of green(able) jobs between 2006 and
2016 was more striking, and exceeding12 million jobs.
3. Green New and Emerging (Green NE) jobs Consequently, the proportion of jobs (across all
are unique jobs (as defined by worker requirements) categories) that have the potential to be affected by
created to meet the new needs of the green economy. greening increased from 35% to 40% of all jobs.
(e.g. fuel cell engineers, counted in the occupational
category ‘engineering professionals’ as well as e.g. Table 5.1
sustainability auditors and sustainable finance Many occupations have a significant green component
Green jobs in total in the EU, 2006-2016
experts).
2016 2006

4. Green Rival Jobs are non-green jobs that Employment

Proportion of
total
Employment
Proportion of
total
(million persons) (million persons)
are ‘similar’ to one of the three ‘green’ job categories, employment (%) employment (%)

either because they involve very similar tasks or (in Total 219.0 100 212.3 100
Green Increased Demand 51.3 23.4 49.7 23.4
the case of new employees) because they require Green Enhanced Skills 43.9 20 34.8 16.3
similar skills and other worker attributes. They are Green New and Emerging 38.2 17.4 22.9 10.8
87.6 40 75.4 35.5
likely to be affected by the greening of the economy Green Total
Note: Total in millions, and share in % of total employment (15-64) in the respective
because of their similarity to existing green category. Green Total adjusted to correct for potential 'double-counting'; the
figures for the different categories of green jobs (G-ID, G-ES and G-NE) cannot be
occupations (e.g. lorry drivers, industrial engineers in added up as some occupations at 3-digit ISCO level contain green jobs (defined in
fossil-fuel-based production or investment managers O-NET at a more disaggregated level) of more than one type. For a detailed
explanation, see Bowen and Hancké (forthcoming).
concentrating on non-green economic sectors and Source: Eurostat (LFS) and own calculations; based on Bowen and Hancké (forthcoming)
criteria other than sustainability). Click here to download table.

‘greenness’), Bowen and Hancké (forthcoming) have developed

a taxonomy of the EU labour market that takes into account
the ongoing shift towards environmentally sustainable Employment in such green(able) jobs has
economic activities. They have also provided first estimates of increased for all categories, but most strongly in
the number of occupations and employment shares that are occupations requiring new green skills and
likely to be affected by the systematic decarbonisation of the
economy. The authors note, however, that the correspondence retraining in response to new activities and
between occupations and sectors in the EU and the US is not technologies. The largest sub-category of green(able)
perfect, and they make the case for an EU-wide study to verify jobs remain Green Increased Demand (G-ID) jobs, with
the assumption that occupations and tasks are structured
broadly in the same way in the EU and the US economies.
almost 50 million jobs in 2016, or 22.5% of total
The taxonomy proposed under the O*NET programme counts any
employment. The fastest employment growth,
occupation that will be affected by greening as a greenable job, however, was recorded in Green Enhanced Skills (G-ES)
and defines three subcategories of greenable jobs according to jobs and in Green New Emerging (G-NE) jobs that saw
the effect that greening will have on the tasks, skills, and their employment shares rise to 20% and 17% (up by
knowledge required for the job, namely changing skill green
occupations (e.g. construction workers and farmers); higher
4 and 6 pp), respectively. While the largest number of
demand green occupations (e.g. bus and train drivers and jobs potentially affected by greening can be found in
renewable energy engineers); and new green occupations (e.g. manufacturing and construction sectors, there was
energy and sustainability auditors and sustainable finance important growth in green(able) jobs in some (large)
managers).
service sectors such as transport and communication,
The US occupational classification maps directly onto the
international classification ISCO used by Eurostat. Therefore,
as well as in the financial sector, including carbon
the authors could relate the job titles provided by O*NET for the credit trading, and in health and social work. However,
US to the job titles used to provide ISCO codes in order to some of these service sectors, especially the financial
identify green jobs in the EU Labour Force Survey. sector (above 50%), still record relatively high levels of

177
Employment and Social Developments in Europe 2019

Table 5.2
Highest job growth in occupations with new or enhanced green skills
Employment composition and change in selected sectors in the EU, by green job typology 2016
Total ecoonomy Total green jobs G-ID G-ES G-NE Green rival
change change change change change
Sectors 2016 (in thousands) share 2016 share 2016 share 2016 share 2016 share 2016
2006-2016 2006-2016 2006-2016 2006-2016 2006-2016
Agriculture, forestry and fishing 8737 25.9 4.22 18.64 0.13 8.5 4.89 8.35 4.32 53.17 -8.31
Mining and quarrying 757 54.36 17.2 33.47 4.46 31.66 12.89 29.56 18.32 41.25 -1.57
Manufacturing 34157 52.23 -1.36 34.18 -1.53 22.5 -0.29 15.55 1.4 28.91 -6.33
Energy and water supply and waste managment 3236 58.01 3.78 29.75 1.6 33.87 2.33 29.8 3.27 23.52 -5.69
Construction 14716 73.32 6.33 58.67 9.52 36.74 -2.88 19.46 9.14 22.74 -8.77
Wholesale and retail trade and repair 30712 33.87 -0.26 17.62 -3.92 20.11 6.01 14.93 -1.75 45.18 -7.61
Accommodation and food service activities 10567 21.83 -4.5 17.47 -5.05 5.05 1.8 5.18 -3.71 19.52 0.61
Transportation, storage and ICT 18180 60.7 9.83 36.63 2.1 30.09 8.49 21.01 11.1 38.41 -2.95
Financial and insurance activities 6476 36.79 14.85 12.96 1.56 23.69 10.56 42.21 32.81 55.81 2.42
Professional, scientific, technical and administrative activities 22994 51.55 8.06 25.38 4.37 29.12 1.68 35.48 13.44 35.67 -6.51
Public administration 15176 45.28 7.92 28.9 2.09 18.07 3.86 22.72 16.99 40.38 -5.96
Education 16639 15.31 9.32 5.53 1.34 4.28 2.09 6.93 5.12 39.92 -0.79
Human health and social work activities 23820 21.41 10.03 9.68 3.09 15.62 9.38 11.34 8.01 21.96 -5.47

Note: See defintions and comments for Table 5.1.

Source: Eurostat and own calculations,; based on Bowen and Hancké (forthcoming)
Click here to download table.

non-green jobs (e.g. when concentrating on financing green jobs as defined in the taxonomy, are most
activities based on fossil fuels rather than supporting prevalent in accommodation and food services as well
activities promoted in the Sustainable Finance Action as in education and health and social work.
Plan). (456) Furthermore, the proportion of Green Rival Employment trends differ significantly across these
Jobs declined significantly across all industries categories: proportions of new and emerging green
between 2006 and 2016, suggesting that the divide jobs have increased in all sectors except
between green and other jobs is becoming more accommodation and food services, while proportions
pronounced. of green rival jobs have decreased. This suggests that
change towards green(er) occupational profiles and
activities is underway across the economy, supported
by retraining and upskilling. However some high-
Skill requirements and education levels are emission sectors, notably manufacturing, have not
increasing fast in the green economy, faster seen an increase in green(able) jobs in the period
than in the economy overall. Educational 2006-2016.
attainment levels rose in all categories of green jobs
between 2006 and 2016 (Chart 5.3), most strongly for Chart 5.3
Skills requirements increase fast in green(able) jobs
green new and emerging jobs (G-NE) of which more Proportion of green jobs in the EU as a share of total employment in %, by category of
than 40% in 2016 were held by people with tertiary green jobs and by educational attainment, 2006-2016
education (more than 6pp above the average, and 50

more than 12pp higher than ten years before). The 40

proportion of middle-skilled jobs, while stagnating or 30

even declining in the economy overall (457), increased 20

in all categories of the green economy, particularly for
10
green enhanced skills (G-ES) jobs. The proportion of
workers with low skills declined twice as much in green
0
H M L H M L H M L H M L

jobs as in the economy overall, and by up to 18pp for Green Increasing Demand
(G-ID)
Green Enhanced Skills (G-
ES)
Green New and Emerging
(G-NE)
Green jobs (total)

green enhanced skills (G-ES) and green new emerging 2016 2006

(G-NE) jobs, compared with an average decline of 7pp Note: Shares of employment, total and by qualification level, in a given green job
in the economy overall. category in % of total employment (15-64), correcting for potential inclusion of
certain ISCO occupational categories in more than one of the proposed green job
categories.. H denotes ‘Tertiary education’ (ISCED11 levels 5-8), M denotes ‘Upper
secondary and post-secondary non-tertiary education’ (ISCED11 levels 3 and 4)
The sectors supporting a transition towards and L denotes ‘Less than primary, primary and lower secondary education’
green jobs are mainly construction, transport, (ISCED11 levels 0-2).
Source: Eurostat and own calculations; based on Bowen and Hancké (forthcoming).
manufacturing and services sectors. The highest Click here to download chart.
proportions of employment in green(able) jobs are
found in construction (73%), transport (61%) and in Change is also driven by the services sector. Job
manufacturing, energy and waste management and creation due to increased demand is positive in all
professional service activities (Table 5.2). The highest service sectors, often leading to relatively high
proportions of employment in ‘green rival’ jobs, on the proportions of jobs with green characteristics. More
other hand, are found in the financial sector, wholesale interestingly, the service sectors also create a high
and retail trade and mining, and interestingly also in number of new jobs with a significant green task
agriculture. ‘Other non-green’ jobs, i.e. jobs with tasks component. These could be energy auditors,
and activities very different from those required by sustainability officers, compliance managers, carbon
credit traders and analysts, sustainable finance
(456) European Commission (2018d) and EU Technical Expert Group
on Sustainable Finance (2019). investment underwriters, climate change analysts or
(457) See e.g. European Commission (2018f) and OECD (2019). others.

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 Chapter 5: Towards a greener future: employment and social impacts of climate change policies

Table 5.3
Need for significant upskilling for new emerging green jobs, particularly in manufacturing, construction and transport
Skill composition of green new and emerging (G-NE) and non-green jobs in selected sectors in the EU, 2016

G-NE Green rival

Sectors H M L H M L
Agriculture, forestry and fishing 31.6 38.9 29.5 23.7 33.0 43.3
Mining and quarrying 24.1 51.8 24.1 15.4 38.3 46.3
Manufacturing 38.8 52.2 9.0 32.5 46.9 20.6
Energy and water supply and waste managment 41.9 49.3 8.8 30.3 49.9 19.9
Construction 40.8 49.5 9.7 25.2 48.5 26.3
Wholesale and retail trade and repair 23.1 65.5 11.4 18.5 52.5 29.0
Accommodation and food service activities 28.1 48.0 23.9 21.3 48.1 30.6
Transportation, storage and ICT 41.8 48.5 9.7 25.1 50.3 24.6
Financial and insurance activities 49.5 46.3 4.2 38.6 52.6 8.8
Professional, scientific, technical and administrative activities 42.8 42.8 14.4 33.8 45.9 20.4
Public administration 41.8 50.5 7.8 27.4 49.2 23.3
Education 55.4 41.0 3.6 42.4 46.0 11.7
Human health and social work activities 44.9 51.8 3.4 35.5 42.8 21.6
Note: See legend and comments for Table 5.1.
Source: Eurostat and own calculations; based on Bowen and Hancké (forthcoming)
Click here to download table.

There is further scope for greening public transition support. Table 5.3 shows the contrast in
services, notably education. Significant increases in skill composition between new and emerging green
green jobs and tasks, as defined in the taxonomy, took jobs on the one hand and non-green ‘green rival’ jobs
place in some parts of public administration, notably in on the other. This contrast is significant for all sectors,
health and social work. However the education sector, notably manufacturing, construction and transport,
one of the largest civil sectors in public administration, which have high proportions of workers in low-skilled
stands out as having a particularly low percentage of employment in non-green jobs. This illustrates the
jobs potentially affected by greening, and growth in skills challenges of the transition to the green
these jobs has also been weak. On the other hand, the economy and the need for significant upskilling in
sector obviously has a fundamental role in shaping these sectors. The skills profile of new and emerging
environmental awareness, consumer behaviour and green jobs, the fastest growing cateorgy, can be seen
new skills of current and future generations, and as a proxy for future skill needs in these sectors.
encouraging the transition to a green and climate-
neutral economy and society overall.

As regards skills development, there has been Going forward, the transition to a green
relatively less upskilling in the EU’s traditional economy is expected to accelerate and to
industrial sectors. In most traditional sectors, such involve large segments of the workforce. It has
as agriculture, mining, manufacturing, water and to be recognised that there is no dichotomy, and
energy, the demand for skills has barely increased. certainly no normative distinction, between green and
Construction is the exception, probably because of non-green jobs as defined above. Their task structures
increasing demand for renovation and upgrading of and occupational content may differ substantially and
the building stock, including insulation and more warrant a different ‘green’ or ‘non-green’
efficient heating, electricity or plumbing. In addition, categorisation. Yet they may have an important role to
the construction sector has undegone a rapid play in supporting the transition to a climate-neutral
trechnological change in its production methods, such economy. A case in point is that of teachers, who are
as pre-fabricated housing and greening of materials. vital for educating and training future generations of
This increased demand mainly results from policy green jobholders and responsible consumers. This said,
changes and related shifts in relative prices for energy the low green growth figures for several large service
and other natural resources. By contrast, the relative sectors, such as education and health and social work,
stability of skill profiles and employment in as well as the relative stagnation of the skills profile
manufacturing may indicate a need to accelerate of large sectors such as manufacturing, suggest that
adjustments to production processes and training much more can be done. In the UK, for example,
provision in order to respond to current ecological government research estimates that 21% of all jobs
pressures and opportunities. will see a shifting skill requirement, where "around
10% of workers have skills that could be in more
Given the pace at which new and emerging green demand, while 10% are more likely to need
jobs require increasingly high skill levels, people reskilling". (458) If anything, the taxonomy of green jobs
employed in non-green jobs may well need
(458) Grantham Research Institute (2019).

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Employment and Social Developments in Europe 2019

and occupations and the related trends presented in Rulebook, implementing the Paris agreement. Parties
this section probably show that such estimates may be agreed to revise and enhance their NDCs and to detail
too conservative. financial support for developing countries and a
consensus was found on how to carry out a “global
While the transition to the green economy is well stocktake” and assess progress.
underway, novel green occupations are not
limited to the production of narrowly-defined In the current section, ‘climate action’ is
environmental goods and services. In addition, understood to be the set of policy measures that
some of the high-emission sectors have not shown either disincentivise greenhouse gas emissions
any significant increase in green jobs over time. There or promote investment in low-emission
is considerable potential for new green jobs and structures or technologies. The first category of
greener jobs in all sectors of the economy, and policies are disincentive measures including regulatory
substantial need to speed up adjustment processes, standards and price mechanisms (such as the ETS and
notably in agriculture, manufacturing and public environmental taxation) that penalise emissions. The
services. Means of achieving this include regulation, second category includes investment projects,
financial incentives, training support, active labour subsidies, loans etc. to encourage low-emission
market policies and education sector reforms. methods of producing capital goods (notably buildings
and power generation equipment), and promoting
research and development in climate-neutral energy
3. EMPLOYMENT AND SKILLS IN THE generation, energy efficiency and the like. Climate
TRANSITION TO A CLIMATE-NEUTRAL action also needs to be supported by training,
ECONOMY reskilling, upskilling and other measures that help to
address the need for labour reallocation across
This section projects the main economic and sectors, occupations and regions, as well as other
employment impacts of climate action until social and distributional impacts of climate change.
2050. It builds on the most recent available scenarios
Economic, social and employment impacts of
and simulations, notably the in-depth analysis and
climate action arise from an aggregate of policy
modelling of impacts of various pathways at EU level
underpinning the Commission’s proposal for a long- components, with some interventions having a
term vision up to 2050 for a prosperous, modern, stimulus effect and others acting as a drag. First,
competitive and climate neutral economy (European investment projects, such as the building of energy
Commission, 2018a, 2018b). It is also based on efficient structures and the refurbishment of existing
additional assessments with shorter time horizon, structures, have a generally positive economic
including the impact assessments for related impact. (460) However, assumptions about financing
individual initiatives, such as the ETS revision or the and crowding out are crucial i.e.if investments with the
review of the Energy Efficiency Directive, which make sole purpose of improving energy efficiency could only
it possible to identify the impact of specific initiatives be carried out by redirecting resources from other
by 2030. Moreover, the section discusses the available productive uses, the balance may be negative. Second,
evidence on the expected impact of climate action on with energy as an important input to production,
skills and task structures by 2030 (based in particular policies that increase energy prices in order to reflect
on Eurofound (2019)). the full environmental and social costs may have a
negative impact on the macro-economy in the near
Climate action has gained considerable term, as well as lead to increases in household
momentum in recent years at a global and EU expenditure and energy poverty. Third, in the European
level. The Paris Agreement was adopted in December context, a shift from imported fossil fuels to
2015, aiming to keep the rise in global temperature domestically sourced renewables improves trade
well below 2 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial balances and creates new employment in the EU.
levels and pursue efforts to keep it at 1.5 degrees Fourth, developments in the price of capital, triggered
Celsius, through Nationally Determined by investment policies, can lead to a reallocation of
Contributions (NDCs), with enhanced support for factors of production, including labour, between
developing countries to achieve this. Since then, the sectors that differ in capital intensity. Fifth, a
European Commission has outlined in its comparative advantage in the production of
Communication and associated analyses (459) its long- environmentally sustainable goods can translate into a
term vision for climate neutrality, highlighting boost in economic activity, particularly if partner
opportunities ahead and the need for a socially just economies increasingly demand such goods. Sixth,
transition to a green economy. Member States also carbon revenue recycling to cut labour taxation,
need to prepare National Energy and Climate Plans, a including labour taxation for vulnerable groups or to
requirement under the Energy Union Governance finance social investment and social protection
Regulation. At the Katowice Climate Change systems, can lead to a boost in employment and
Conference (UNFCCC COP 24) of December 2018, 196 strengthen the welfare state.
countries worked together to agree the Katowice
(460) See European Commission (2016a), pp 106-106.
(459) European Commission (2018a; 2018b)

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 Chapter 5: Towards a greener future: employment and social impacts of climate change policies

Assessing such impacts with the help of terms, agriculture, forestry and construction
macroeconomic simulations requires a baseline combined could add up to 2.4 million jobs to their
scenario. The long-term strategy models both 2°C baseline levels (depending on the specification, see
and 1.5°C scenarios, the latter achieved through below). The power sector could gain up to 250,000
carbon neutrality in the EU by 2050. The economic and jobs. In relative terms, some of the biggest expected
social impacts are expressed as differences compared winners are power generation and agriculture, with
with a baseline scenario that includes all policies of almost 25% of job gains in electricity supply. The
the so-called 2030 climate package (see section 3.3). range is also positive under all scenarios for the
Implementing these policies by 2030 presents a construction sector, while agriculture and forestry
significant challenge, for which social acceptance and could gain significantly under some scenarios. Gains in
public support will be important (see also section 3.7). agriculture and forestry are explained by a higher
With regard to employment, the baseline assumes a biomass demand, while gains in the power sector are
slightly decreasing employment figure in the EU until driven by increased electrification of the economy in
2050, which mainly reflects a small decline in all climate scenarios. The positive employment
working-age population. developments in construction result from a predicted
investment hike driven by the increased demand for
3.1. Main economic and social impacts of energy-efficient structures. In relative terms the
long-term climate change scenarios biggest job-losing sectors are fossil fuel extractive
industries, which could experience a loss of up to 60%
Overall, the economic and employment impacts of their jobs. On the other hand, small relative gains in
of deep transformations – notably technological the services sector could translate into an additional
change (461) and climate change - are expected to 1.5 million jobs, though some scenarios also see job
be positive. These transformations will require losses of up to 3 million in this sector due to
significant additional investment in all sectors of the reallocation of the labour force across the economy
economy as well as a significant reallocation of labour and potential impacts on GDP developments.
across certain sectors and regions and changing skill
requirements. Simulations based on two global The model specifications underlying these
macroeconomic models (JRC-GEM-E3 and E3ME) (462) simulations differ in their assumptions, first as
provided detailed results for sectoral employment regards climate policies implemented by global
under ambitious climate policies (1.5°C scenarios, partners, and secondly as regards market
implying zero net emissions by 2050, and 2°C behaviour. Some specifications (labelled
scenarios implying an 80% reduction in emissions 'Fragmented') assume that Europe alone would be
compared with 1990 levels). (463) In terms of total implementing measures aiming at zero net emissions
employment in 2050, the 1.5°C scenarios point to by 2050 - an 80% reduction im emissions - while the
potential gains of 0.6% to 0.9%, or about 1.5 to 2 rest of the world does no more than maintain current
million jobs, compared with the baseline. (464) ambitions set out in Nationally Determined
Contributions under the Paris Agreement. Other
Employment impacts will differ significantly specifications (labelled 'Global') are based on the
across sectors and regions. Job gains in assumption of a worldwide take-up. They assume that
construction, agriculture and forestry and renewable the rest of the world reduces emissions by 2050 by
energy sectors could be partly offset by a contraction 46% to 72%, compared to 1990 levels, respectively in
in sectors such as fossil fuel-related mining and line with global pathways to limit climate change well
quarrying. Furthermore, some sectors such as steel, below 2C and to 1.5C.
cement and chemicals will have to transform
themselves as part of the low-carbon transition,. Car Global demand is determined by choices made by
manufacturers, too, will see a shift to new production trading partners through three principal
processes with new skills required. Moreover, the channels. First, according to the JRC-GEM-E3 model,
regions most affected will be those where economies stepping up climate policies worldwide could lower
depend on sectors that are expected to decline or be moderately the economic growth of the trading
transformed in the future. Many of these are located partners, leading to a subdued demand for exports to
in Central and Eastern Europe but some are in these economies. By contrast, the E3ME model
Germany. assumes that higher climate ambition boosts
investment and increases economic growth. Secondly,
The biggest projected winners are the demand for environmentally friendly products
agriculture, power generation, construction and originating in Europe would be stronger as trading
consumer goods sectors (see Table 5.1). In absolute partners increasingly import energy-efficient products.
Thirdly, more ambitious climate action by global
(461) See European Commission (2018f). competitors would give a competitive advantage to
(462) JRC-GEM-E3 is a general equilibrium model with neo-classical European industry which is already more carbon-
underpinnings; E3ME is a macro-econometric model with neo-
efficient than other regions. On balance, the 'Global'
Keynesian underpinnings.
(463) See European Commission (2018b).
specifications show more EU employment in traded
(464) The scenarios do not include simulations of the labour market
goods sectors including energy intensive goods,
impact of digitalisation and similar technological trends. consumer goods and agricultural products, but a

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Employment and Social Developments in Europe 2019

negative employment impact related to declining EU 0.6% - 0.9%. By contrast, the JRC-GEM-E3 and E3ME
exports in other sectors, including business services. models differ in their conclusions on GDP. The former
indicates that a small negative impact on output could
Table 5.4 be expected as a result of crowding out of investment
Long-term employment impacts differ significanly
in other sectors. The latter, which assumes only partial
across sectors
Sectoral employment impact, difference from baseline in 2050, % crowding out, foresees a small positive impact on real
Share of Range of change in GDP, following an increase in total investment.
Sector total jobs in jobs by 2050,
2015 compared to 3.2. Regional impacts
Construction 6.7% +0.3% to +2.8% In the transition to a carbon-neutral society
Services 71.7% -2.0% to +0.9% certain regions will need to undergo significant
adjustments. Fossil fuel extraction and mining
Agriculture 4.5% -0.7% to +7.9% industries will decline, which will mostly affect the few
Mining and extraction 0.5% regions with a high proportion of employment in these
-62.6% to -2.9%
sectors: North Eastern Scotland (11.3%), Silesia in
Power generation 0.7% +3.6% to +22.3% Poland (5.3%) and Sud-Vest Oltenia in Romania
Manufacturing (1.8%). (See Box 5.2 for details on transitions in coal
2.0%
(Energy intensive industries) -2.6% to +1.8% and carbon-intensive regions in the EU).
Other manufacturing 13.3%
-1.4% to +1.1%
Note: Employment effects from JRC-GEM-E3 and E3ME. Ranges of estimated changes
in jobs in 2050 depend on the underlying model and modelling assumptions.
Source: Adapted from European Commission (2018a) pp. 227-229
Click here to download table.

The second dimension in which the JRC-GEM-E3

model differs concerns the assumptions on the
behaviour of European product and labour
markets and the use of carbon revenues. The
'revenue recycling' scenarios assume imperfect wage
adjustment in the labour market, the use of carbon
revenues to reduce labour taxation and market-share-
maximising firm behaviour. 'Lump-sum transfer'
scenarios, on the other hand, are based on the
absence of wage rigidities in the labour markets and
the lump-sum redistribution of carbon revenues to
households and profit-maximisation by firms. In these
scenarios, labour market changes are captured by the
wage channel only, assuming an unchanged overall
employment level in the EU relative to the baseline,
while allowing for structural changes that imply a
reallocation of jobs between sectors.

Policies will have significant impacts on labour

market outcomes. The scenario modelling using the
JRC-GEM-E3 model points to an important policy
conclusion: that using revenue from environmental
taxes, including carbon pricing, to generate a tax shift
away from labour taxation, generates employment
gains as it reduces labour costs overall. This finding is
as valid for the fragmented specification as it is for
the global specification and does not depend on the
level of ambition (1.5° or 2°C).

The various model runs all show an increase in

total employment relative to the baseline. The
baseline scenario implies a moderate reduction in EU
total employment between 2015 and 2050, including
as a result of falling total population and population
ageing. The 1.5°C scenarios as simulated under the
JRC-GEM-E3 and E3ME models would lead to an
employment increase over the baseline scenario of up
to 1.5 to 2 million jobs, equivalent to an increase of

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 Chapter 5: Towards a greener future: employment and social impacts of climate change policies

Box 5.2: EU and regional initiatives for coal and carbon-intensive regions

The decline of coal production and use in the EU and a slowdown in global coal demand growth are well under way.
Phasing out coal is seen as a low hanging fruit of climate policy, with coal-based energy accounting for a substantial
1
amount of greenhouse gas emission, yet a low share of total employment. ( ) However, such activities appear in 41 EU
regions, with most of the jobs in coal sector concentrated in a handful of those regions, where they are a cornerstone of
livelihoods and the overall economy. While the environmental impacts of a reduced coal sector will benefit all, the social
and employment will affect some regions more than others. Ensuring a just transition to a greener economy for these
regions is crucial.

The low-carbon economy will go some way to filling gaps which arise from a move away from coal, but may not appear
in the right places at the right time and these structural imbalances must be tackled head on. Forward-looking policies
that consult workers, provide timely information, recognise the needs of different workers (retirement, reskilling),
individualised active labour market policies and personalised guidance are ways to make the transition work for all.

The role of the EU in the just transition away from coal

The EU aims to help Member States achieve EU 2030 energy and climate targets through National Energy and Climate
Plans. These were submitted by all Member States by early 2019 and the Commission will help Member States to hone
and implement these plans. The importance of a just transition will be reflected in these documents. The European
Commission has also formally endorsed the Silesia Declaration on Solidarity and Just Transition at COP 24 in Katowice.

The EU has a number of funds available to help coal-dependent regions transition to a green economy. In terms of EU
Cohesion policy, the European Structural and Investment Funds (ESIF), the Cohesion Fund (CF), the European Social Fund
(ESF) and the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) can all contribute. The EU’s LIFE Fund can support projects
2
regarding EU environmental legislation such as the ecological restoration of old mining sites. ( ) The Modernisation Fund of
the EU Emissions Trading System can support employment transition and reskilling and the European Investment Bank
(EIB) and the European Institute of Innovation and Technology (EIT) promote the development of clean energy
technologies.

EU Initiative for coal and carbon-intensive regions in transition

The coal sector provides direct jobs to an estimated 180,000 workers in coal and lignite mining and an additional 60, 000
3
in coal- and lignite-fired power plants across the EU. ( ) The EU Initiative for Coal and Carbon-Intensive Regions in
Transition assists in mitigating the social consequences of the low carbon transition, and helps 41 coal regions across 12
Member States to define low-carbon transition strategies and address potential negative socio-economic impacts. The
Initiative consists of a series of Countries Teams to support pilot coal regions in their transition efforts and a dedicated
Platform for Coal Regions in Transition for the exchange of best practices, and discussion of strategies and projects to
kick-start the transition process.

The platform has facilitated a broad range of activities, including working group sessions and regular trilateral meetings
with EU Member State Governments and coal regions. Within the platform, over 120 project ideas were proposed by 10
coal regions in Germany, Poland and Czechia, including proposals for infrastructure and renewable energy investments, as
well as the development of tourism and agricultural activities.

In the context of the EU’s Cohesion Policy, over 120 smart specialisation strategies for the 2014-2020 period have been
4
developed with more than EUR 40 billion allocated to regions through the European Regional Development Fund. ( )
Interregional smart specialisation partnerships focus on industrial modernisation, energy and agrifood.

( 1) Galgóczi (2019)
( 2) ibid.
( 3) https://ec.europa.eu/energy/en/topics/oil-gas-and-coal/coal-regions-in-transition
( 4) https://ec.europa.eu/clima/sites/clima/files/docs/pages/initiative_5_support_en_1.pdf
(Continued on the next page)

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Employment and Social Developments in Europe 2019

Box (continued)

Examples of regional transition strategies are being developed in coal regions in Greece, Slovakia and Romania which
benefit from technical assistance delivered by the European Commission Structural Reform Support Service. For the EU’s
largest coal region, Silesia, EUR 100 million have been ring-fenced under the Regional Operational Programme to support
projects in urban infrastructure, clean air and redeveloping former mining sites. In addition, 12 pilot industrial transition
regions are offered region-specific support by the Commission for boosting innovation (including Wallonie (BE), Piemonte
(IT) and Cantabria (ES)).

Phasing out coal extraction in Germany

The German Commission on Growth, Structural Change and Employment (or so-called “coal commission”) presented its
5
final report ( ) on Germany’s strategy to phase out coal by 2038 at the latest. States traditionally reliant on coal (North
Rhine-Westphalia, Brandenburg, Saxony and Saxony-Anhalt) will receive considerable help to transform their industries.
EUR 1.3 billion will be set aside over the course of 20 years as well as EUR 700 million a year to related particular
projects. The report estimates that 60,000 jobs are directly or indirectly dependent on brown coal. An adjustment fund and
compensation for pension deficits will apply for those aged 58 or older. This has an expected cost of up to EUR 5 billion for
the German federal government and firms. Education and training investments will foster younger workers’ employment
opportunities.

Phasing out coal extraction in Poland

The role of hard coal in electricity production in Poland will decrease over time, according to the National Energy and
Climate Plan (NECP) for 2021-2030, however, coal will remain the most important source of electricity production in
2030. The NECP will be subject to revision and input from the Commission during 2019 and there will be both support
and pressure for greater reduction in carbon intensity in Poland. The expected rise in demand for electricity will be
covered mostly by gas, wind and solar and later also by nuclear generation.

(5) https://www.handelsblatt.com/downloads/23912864/3/190126_abschlussbericht_kommission-wachstum-strukturwandel-und-
beschaeftigung_beschluss.pdf?ticket=ST-1651747-mabuNGf03qQtr0Etjcxy-ap1,

Energy intensive industries and automotive attainment level and an above-average rate of
manufacturing will also have to be transformed. participation in adult training (11.8% in 2016).
Almost all Member States have a region with a higher Moreover, it is also a leader in renewable energy,
than 1% share of employment in these sectors, but mostly wind turbines.
only in 25 regions this share is higher than 5%,
requiring a large scale adjustment. In Slovakia and
Czechia almost all regions are expected to undergo
this transformation, while in Germany at least eight
regions are affected. In Hungary, Poland and Romania
the transformation will mostly affect regions with a
higher than average national GDP per capita (excluding
the capital region) and an impact on the national
economy as a whole.

The tertiary education level in all of the above

regions is far below the EU average, as is adult
participation in training (ranging from 1.1% - 7.5%
in 2016 compared with the EU average of 10.8%),
posing an additional challenge to the adjustment
process (see Figure 5.1). Similarly, some affected
German regions have a lower than national and EU
average level of participation of adults in training
coupled with a relatively low-educated adult
population (especially in lower Bavaria and Saarland).
This may be a constraint on adjustment but the
traditionally strong engagement of social partners in
training provision should help. The Spanish region of
Navarra stands out: it is a region with relatively high
GDP per capita, an above-average tertiary education

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 Chapter 5: Towards a greener future: employment and social impacts of climate change policies

Figure 5.1 thereby compromising the effective transition to a

Most regions with a high proportion of employment in green, more circular and climate-neutral economy.
energy-intensive industries and automotive
manufacturing have low participation rates in adult 3.3. Medium-term adjustment costs and
training (2016)
Percentages of adults participating in training, in regions with >5% of employment in
benefits: simulations up to 2030
energy intensive industries and automotive manufacturing
The employment impacts described above are
relative to a baseline scenario that assumes full
implementation of all adopted policy initiatives.
They incorporate the effects of climate policies that
are part of the 2030 EU climate and energy
framework already adopted (‘the 2030 package’, key
elements of which are listed in Table 5.5), against the
backdrop of the ‘Paris Agreement’ and subsequent
‘Katowice roadmap’. (467) Impacts by 2050 compound
the effect of measures to 2030 that have already
been adopted, and therefore are reflected in the
baseline for the long-term scenarios presented above,
and the net-zero GHG objective. The full impacts of
climate action by 2050 can be derived by aggregating
the impacts of the existing climate policies included in
the 2030 package and those of the assumed post-
2030 policies.

Table 5.5
Employment impacts of elements of the 2030 package
are mostly positive but modest
Note: Sectors considered are the following: C20, C23, C24 and C29 in line with Employment impacts of selected elements of the 2030 climate package
European Commission (2018a)
Source: Eurostat, trng_lfse_04. No data on sectors at the NUTS 2 level in some regions, Legislative act Impact Methodology Employment
e.g. Braunschweig. The latter has a participation rate of adults in traning below Assessment impact
the EU average and would fall into the yellow category.
Energy efficiency SWD(2016)405 E3ME + GEM- +2% and -1.5%
Click here to download figure. directive revision E3

Renewable SWD(2016)418 E3ME + GEM- - 0.2 to 0.2%

At the same time, many regions are likely to energy directive E3
recast
benefit from the transition to a green economy,
Energy SWD(2016)414 E3ME + 0.1 to 0.25%
including those that are or could be involved in performance of
the production of renewable energy. (465) The buildings
directive
potential for producing renewable energy depends on
Emission SWD(2017)650 E3ME + GEM- Small positive
the geo-physical characteristics of the regions as well performance E3;
as on the strategy and policy choices and their standards for sectoral results
LDVs
effective implementation at national and regional
levels. Coastal regions have a high potential for Amendment to
the ETS directive
SWD(2015)135 Sector-specific
effects, based
Negligible positive

producing wind energy, especially those along the on elasticities

shores of the North and Baltic Seas and some Emission SWD(2018)185 Macro-model: Negligible
Mediterranean islands. Other regions are better placed standards for EXIOMOD
heavy duty
to invest in the production of solar energy, vehicles
hydroelectricity or biomass. Yet others may decide to
pilot and champion the development of the bio- Source: European Commission, impact assessments (references included in the table).

economy or the circular economy, and develop new

ways of combining rural and urban planning, traffic, The employment impacts of the various
production and waste management. elements of the 2030 package are often
positive, yet modest, with sectoral differences. In
Comprehensive strategies and effective policies order to obtain a more complete picture, it is important
are needed at regional and local level, to avoid to review the estimated labour market impacts of the
hysteresis effects and multiple, persistent 2030 package. The analysis related to the revision of
disadvantage. This is especially important as
repeated restructuring and multiple disadvantage at (467) The full implementation of the package requires action at both
regional level are one of the main drivers - perhaps EU and Member State level. National Climate and Energy Plans
(https://ec.europa.eu/energy/en/topics/energy-strategy-and-
the most important driver - of political discontent and energy-union/governance-energy-union/national-energy-
democratic backlash. (466) Those may in turn reduce climate-plans) are the framework within which the Commission
public support for climate action and related policies, aims to help Member States achieve their NDCs. These and
other EU regulations e.g. on CO2 emission performance
standards for new heavy-duty vehicles (COM(2018)0284,
(465) See in particular European Commission (2018b).
adopted 18th April 2019) are subject to implementation at
(466) See e.g. Dijkstra et al (2018). national level.

185
Employment and Social Developments in Europe 2019

the Energy Efficiency Directive (European Commission projects detailed employment impacts (for EU
(2016a)) in particular employs the same two models aggregates and by country and sector) of the
as the European Commission (2018a) and presents implementation of the Paris Agreement, with an
similar sector-specific conclusions. additional focus on skills, tasks and wages. These are
not available in the long-term scenarios described in
As various elements of the policies interact, section 3.1 or in the individual impact assessments
there is no straightforward way to produce an listed in Table 5.4.
estimate of the aggregate effects. Some elements
may reinforce one another, while other measures may The scenario investigates the employment
overlap. Moreover, as the table indicates, the impacts in the EU of the policies (471) necessary
methodologies applied in various impact assessments to meet the 2°C limit by 2050. It analyses the
are different, with some of the impact assessments impacts across sectors and occupations, with particular
relying on general equilibrium or similar models, and focus on manufacturing and industry-related services.
others presenting partial effects on the markets The analysis is carried out using the E3ME macro-
directly affected. Baselines, too, are defined in sectoral model, which provides information on sectoral
different ways across the impact assessments, in line impacts, in combination with the Warwick Labour
with the fact that the studies were prepared over the Market Extension model for occupational analysis and
course of several years. With each study incorporating Eurofound’s European Jobs Monitor.
the most recent macroeconomic scenario available at
the time of writing, the baselines differ across the The results show that EU GDP and employment
studies. Hence the same percentage effect in two effects in 2030 are expected to be significant
assessments may indicate different absolute effects. and positive (+1.1% employment and +0.5% GDP
Subject to these caveats, it is possible to state the growth). This amounts to an additional 1.2 million
following conclusion: the available studies point to jobs in the EU by 2030, on top of 12 million jobs
small, and overall positive (468), economy-wide impacts expected to be created under the baseline (from 2015
on the 2030 horizon. Those that include sectoral to 2030). The positive impact on GDP and the number
breakdowns present significant impacts for some employed is largely due to the investment activity
sectors, and an important re-structuring across required to achieve such a transition, together with the
sectors. impact of lower spending on the import of fossil fuels.
Lower consumer prices, notably of solar photovoltaic
Implementation issues have been identified in electricity, further boost disposable incomes, consumer
the impact assessments related to the policy expenditure and consequently the demand for
initiatives included in the 2030 package and have consumer services, which are all generally labour-
been analysed in further detail in Eurofound (2019). intensive.
While adopted at EU level and implied in the baseline
for the long-term simulations, these policy initiatives Chart 5.4

require effective implementation and follow-up at the Employment implications of the Paris Climate
Agreement in EU Member States, 2030
national level, including policy choices with potential Employment results by country, 2030, % difference from baseline
impacts on specific sectors, groups or regions over the 1.0%

coming years. (469) These will be discussed in further 0.8%

detail in the next section. 0.6%

0.4%

3.4. Short- to medium-term impacts on 0.2%

sectors, skills, tasks and wages 0.0%

BE EL DE EL SK LV MT CZ IT EU UK RO AT PT EE HU HR FI FR LT BG NL SE DK LU IE SI CY PL
Note: Deviation in 2030 from the baseline in %
This section builds on the main results of the so- Source: Source: Eurofound (2019)

called ‘energy scenario’ developed under the Click here to download chart.

Future of Manufacturing in Europe (FOME) pilot

project (Eurofound, 2019). (470) The scenario Employment impacts, however, vary considerably
between sectors and countries (see Chart 5.4 and
(468) See press release issued at the launch of the package in 2016, Table 5.5). To give some examples, GDP effects are
that includes an estimate 900,000 new jobs created. expected to be highest in Latvia, given its strong
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-4009_en.htm, where dependency on fossil fuel imports, yet employment
(469) See in particular the (draft) National Energy and Climate Plans
effects are likely to be moderate. The employment
in which Member States lay out their strategies for the next
decade and provide further detail on the policy measures, impacts of climate action policies would be positive
thereby providing clarity and predictability for businesses and
the financial sector to stimulate necessary private investments, forecast. For the full mandate and set of deliverables, see:
and the Commission’s assessments and recommendations. https://www.eurofound.europa.eu/observatories/emcc/fome.
(470) The pilot project ran from April 2015 to April 2019 and was (471) These include: a carbon emission price set at global level, public
mandated by the European Parliament. It was implemented by programmes to fund energy efficiency, subsidies for the
the European Commission (DG GROW) through delegation to investment in and uptake of renewables across a range of
Eurofound, in consultation with the European social partners. technologies, subsidies and feed-in-tariffs to guarantee the
The energy scenario has been developed by Eurofound and price received by renewable electricity producers, taxes on
Cambridge Econometrics, with inputs from Cedefop and registrations of vehicles related to their carbon emissions, and
Warwick University. The baseline is that of the CEDEFOP skills regulation to phase out the least fuel-efficient vehicles.

186
 Chapter 5: Towards a greener future: employment and social impacts of climate change policies

and substantial in Belgium, Spain and Germany, where construction. Two sectors would see net employment
employment increases by up to 1% of total reductions overall in the short- to medium-term:
employment (equivalent to some 60,000 additional mining and extractive industries, and the utilities
jobs in Belgium, 200,000 in Spain and 350,000 in sectors. In the former, employment would decline as a
Germany). By contrast, impacts on GDP and direct consequence of reduced fossil fuel extraction
employment are would be insignificant in Denmark as and coal mining. For the latter, employment is
it is already well advanced in the uptake of renewables expected to decrease only limitedly, and only
and energy efficiency, and the additional investment temporarily as a consequence of energy efficiency
required to meet the CO2 emissions reduction target is gains. Increased energy efficiency in buildings and
hence small. The impact on Poland’s GDP and overall households in particular would lead to lower
employment growth would also be small but for a production activity and output in the electricity and gas
different reason, as job losses in the country’s supply sectors, compared to the baseline. However on
substantial coal production sector are expected to the 2050 horizon, (see Table 5.4), demand for
offset gains in other sectors. electricity, and thus employment, is projected to grow
strongly, as industry, transport and other services
Employment is expected to increase in become increasingly electrified leading to employment
manufacturing sectors producing renewable gains in that sector. Despite these patterns being
technologies or related to construction and the common across Member States, the extent of job
circular economy, as well as in service sectors. gains and losses in the various sectors and the
Unsurprisingly, though, employment is projected to expected ensuing labour market transitions between
decrease in most Member States in mining and oil & sectors may vary across countries.
gas sectors (as a result of declining activity in the
energy extracting sectors) as well as in electricity and Job creation due to climate change policies could
gas supply (due to higher energy efficiency measures) further mitigate job polarisation in the economy,
and in motor vehicles (because of demand for electric which is expected to widen under the baseline
cars). Sectors expected to see increases in scenario. Future job creation is expected to increase
employment include: manufacturing sectors producing job polarisation overall, as it will be driven by
renewable technologies and those in their supply digitalisation and further integration in global
chains, including basic metals, non-metallic minerals, production networks and value chains. Yet job creation
mechanical engineering, computer, optical and due to climate change policies, albeit smaller in
electronic equipment; sectors supplying goods and volume, is expected to mitigate these tendencies by
services to the construction sector; and service sectors adding middle-skilled, middle-paying jobs, notably in
generally (benefitting from increased economic the construction sector and in services sectors more
activity). The sectoral shift in favour of production of generally (Chart 5.5 and Chart 5.6). Climate action is
new construction materials and the expected increases expected to lead to job gains in all sectors except
in construction activity overall should lead to mining and extraction, and to the creation of middle-
employment gains among workers in building and skill, middle-paying jobs notably in construction and
related trades and metal, machinery and related industry. Overall, much of the expected employment
trades, while no major changes are expected for other creation is found at the bottom and the middle of the
occupational groups. wage distribution. These jobs will be filled by
employees with lower levels of education performing
Table 5.6 less complex tasks, to a greater extent than in the
Employment implications of the Paris Climate
baseline forecast.
Agreement at sectoral level, 2030
Employment results for the EU by sector, 2030
Sector percent thousands
As for employment effects overall, the skill
Agriculture 0.5 40 composition of job creation due to climate
Mining -16.6 -93 action, and hence its impact on job polarisation,
Manufacturing 0.7 209 varies significantly across EU Member States .
Utilities -2.4 -72
Overall, climate action favours job creation for all skill
Construction 1.1 160
Distribution, retail, horeca 0.6 305 groups, notably for middle-skilled and also for low-
Transport, communications 0.5 64 skilled (see Chart 5.7). In Germany, job creation due to
Business services 0.7 473 climate action is expected to be relatively balanced
Education, health, government 0.3 142 across job-wage quintiles, against overall very
Total 0.5 1228 polarised employment projections. In Spain, Ireland,
Note: Deviation in 2030 from the baseline in % and in thousands of persons
Source: Eurofound (2019)
Estonia, Lithuania and Slovakia, climate action is
Click here to download table. expected to mitigate job polarisation somewhat by
creating middle-skilled, middle-paying jobs, though not
Implementing climate action policies will lead to necessarily large numbers of them. In Cyrpus, Greece,
significant labour reallocation across sectors Austria, Romania and the UK, on the other hand,
and regions. In the stylised Eurofound modelling, climate action is more likely to support low skilled job
most economic sectors would see net employment creation.
gains by 2030, notably business services and
distribution as well transport, manufacturing and

187
Employment and Social Developments in Europe 2019

The Eurofound simulations above depend on Chart 5.6

modelling assumptions, some of which have Climate action favours job creation in services, as well
as middle-paying jobs in construction and industry
important policy implications. First, the model Projected job wage profiles in the in the energy scenario by sector, 2015-2030
assumes no labour market frictions. This includes the 350
assumption that the labour force adapts to the 300
structural change in skill requirements associated with 250
the transition to a low-carbon economy. However, the 200
faster the change happens, the more likely it is that 150
there will be frictions that leave some workers 100
unemployed and some demands for new skills unmet, 50
preventing the full potential benefits from being 0
realised. Moreover, it is assumed that there are no -50
barriers to accessing the finance necessary for the -100
investments needed to support the transition. It is also low-wage middle-wage high-wage
assumed, with a view to modelling future production primary sector industry construction services
patterns and trade flows, that countries which Note: In thousands; deviations from the baseline by wage quintile
currently have a lead in certain sectors will be able to Source: Eurofound (2019)
Click here to download chart.
maintain that lead when switching to new
technologies. For example, it is assumed that the main
Chart 5.7
manufacturers of conventional cars and trucks become
Climate action favours job creation for all skill groups,
the main manufacturers of electric vehicles. notably for middle-skilled and also for low-skilled
Projected job wage profiles in the baseline and energy scenarios, 2015-2030
Chart 5.5
Climate action favours the creation of middle-skilled, 8000
middle-paying jobs and mitigates job polarisation Baseline scenario
Projected job wage profiles in the baseline and energy scenario , 2015-2030 6000

6,000
4000
Baseline scenario
5,000 2000

4,000 0

-2000
3,000
-4000
2,000 low-wage middle- high-wage
wage
1,000

350
- Energy scenario
low-wage middle-wage high-wage 300

250

200
350
Energy scenario 150
300
100

250 50

200 0
low-wage middle- high-wage
150 wage
low medium high
100

Note: In thousands; deviations from 2015 for the baseline scenario; from the baseline
50
for the energy scenario, by wage quintile.
Source: Eurofound (2019)
0
low-wage middle-wage high-wage
Click here to download chart.
Note: In thousands; deviations from 2015 for the baseline scenario; from the baseline
for the energy scenario, by wage quintile.
Source: Eurofound (2019) Finally, the modelling results assume
Click here to download chart.
implementation of certain policy measures
affecting household expenditure, production costs
and/or fiscal sustainability. (472) These measures
include:

(472) For full detail of underlying assumptions see Eurofound (2019),

section 2 “Policies implemented in the2-degree scenario”.

188
 Chapter 5: Towards a greener future: employment and social impacts of climate change policies

 a carbon emission price set at global level but Chart 5.8

applied on a national bases through cap-and-trade Importance of anticipating new and emerging health
and safety at work risks
systems and/or carbon taxes; Non-fatal accidents at work: incidence rates for 2016
4,500
 public programmes to fund improvements in the 4,000

Non-fatal accidents at work , per 100,000

3,500
efficiency of energy consumption in households, 3,000
2,500
industry and commerce and support for the uptake

people employed
2,000
1,500
of electric vehicles in the public sector; 1,000
500
0
Total - all Agriculture, Crop and Forestry and Electricity, gas, Waste Remediation Construction
 direct subsidies to cover significant parts of the NACE activities forestry and
fishing
animal
production,
logging steam and air collection,
conditioning treatment and
activities and
other waste

additional investment cost and to incentivise the hunting and

related service
activities
supply disposal
activities;
materials
management
services

uptake of renewables across a range of recovery

Note: Categories correspond to NACE REV 2 (Statistical classification of economic

technologies; activities). “All NACE activities” refers to the average across all categories shown.
Non-fatal accidents are defined as those that imply at least four full calendar
days of absence from work. Statistics on accidents at work can reflect under-
 subsidies and feed-in-tariffs (FiTs) to guarantee coverage (the appropriate population is not covered by the data source i.e. a
sector is excluded) or under-reporting (an accident that took place is not reported
the price received by renewable electricity despite the sector being included).
producers; Source: Eurostat [hsw_n2_03]
Click here to download chart.

 taxes on the registration of vehicles related to their

carbon emissions per kilometre, plus higher road 3.6. Recycling carbon revenues
fuel taxes; and
Another important aspect of managing the
 regulation from 2018 to phase out the least fuel- transition to a green, climate-neutral economy is
efficient vehicles as they reach the end of their the use of revenues generated from climate
natural life. policy measures. Carbon taxes and the revenue from
auctioning emission permits (as under the ETS)
All of these measures have impacts and costs generate resources which enable governments to fund
for the public budget and potentially for programmes to support upskilling and reallocation of
households, and may require accompanying or the workforce or to mitigate some of the negative
compensatory measures. They also presuppose impacts of higher energy prices. The design of such
effective uptake and behavioural changes by a range programmes needs to take into account equity and
of stakeholders, including firms, investors, households, efficiency considerations, and also the interplay
consumers and local administrations. Additional tax between economic inequality and other forms of
revenues stemming from the implementation of some inequality, including environmental injustice, at both
of the measures could be used to mitigate the effects global and EU levels. (475) From the efficiency point of
on stakeholders and compensate them where view, what needs to be mitigated is the negative
necessary. impact of higher energy prices on production, including
its employment aspects. Equity considerations focus
3.5. Health and safety risks in growing green on the impact of higher energy prices on consumer
sectors and the circular economy budgets. As explained below, the two considerations
motivate diverging policy measures.
Care must be taken to ensure that the necessary
sectoral shifts are accompanied by policies to The two main types of carbon-revenue-funded
ensure high job quality in a climate-neutral expenditure programmes discussed in the
circular economy. While some high-risk sectors such literature are lump-sum transfers and cuts in
as fossil fuel extraction will decrease in size, others labour taxation. The main advantage of lump-sum
will increase, necessitating new occupational health transfers is that they can compensate for the losses
and safety policy priorities (see Chart 5.8). (473) A suffered by lower-income households as they face
recent report by EU-OSHA notes that the accelerating higher energy prices (Bruegel 2018). On a per-income
pace of technology change and potential moves basis, the transfer could be proportionately larger for
towards a green economy mean it is increasingly low-income households than for high-income ones. In
important to anticipate new and emerging risks. (474) that way it can be seen as a measure to address
However, the transition also provides an opportunity to equity concerns. Such measures could be means-
anticipate risks, improve standards and build workers’ tested in order to concentrate the subsidy on
health and safety into the design of green jobs, households that need that form of compensation, and
including in sectors with currently high risk exposure not to 'waste' the funds on wealthier households.
such as waste management and construction.
Labour tax cuts, by contrast, may provide higher
efficiency gains. While they may be problematic in
(473) This analysis may represent an upper bound if the sectors
covered are less likely to under-report compared other sectors,
terms of equity considerations, labour tax cuts are
but they may represent a lower bound if they are more likely to accompanied by efficiency gains, according to a range
under-report.
(474) EU-OSHA (2013). (475) See e.g. Chancel and Piketty (2015).

189
Employment and Social Developments in Europe 2019

of simulation exercises. Lowering taxes on labour of energy networks). Additionally, according to the
improves work incentives in general, and particularly European Commission's legislative proposal,
for low wage earners. In the particular case of a assistance in the case of unexpected major
compensating measure that accompanies raising restructuring events caused by the transition to a
carbon revenue, it can be thought of as a way to climate-neutral economy will be a specific objective of
enhance employers' incentives to maintain their the European Globalisation Adjustment Fund in the
workforce while production costs increase. As noted 2021-2027 period. (478)
above, the incentive effect of labour tax cuts is the
reason why two of the four JRC-GEM-E3 scenarios 3.7. Public perceptions of climate change
show positive employment outcomes even though the and the social acceptance of climate
GDP impact of climate policies is slightly negative. action
Other simulation exercises have confirmed this Achieving EU climate targets presents a
effect. Chateau et al. (2018) directly compared significant challenge and social acceptance of
various revenue recycling policies in their study climate action is crucial to its success. Tensions
analysing the introduction of a hypothetical worldwide are rising on this topic across urban and rural divides,
carbon tax. They find that the best total employment high and low-income groups, and younger and older
outcomes are achieved in the case of wage income tax generations. A younger generation of climate strikers
cuts, whereas from a distributional standpoint is pushing policy-makers to further climate action.
disadvantaged categories of workers fare relatively Their message is driven by a narrative of
better under a lump-sum programme. Barrios et al. sustainability: climate action is seen as an urgent
(2013) compare the efficiency impacts of raising global imperative for a world fit for future generations.
funds through green taxes and labour taxes, and find This view is increasingly gaining acceptance among all
that green taxes produce fewer distortions. That result EU citizens. (479)
also suggests that efficiency gains can be achieved by
spending carbon revenue on labour tax cuts, taking Across the EU, the vast majority of the public
into account that carbon unit price is adjustable. A accept that climate change is happening (Chart
group of leading economists, by contrast, argue for 5.9). In EU countries for which survey data are
returning carbon tax revenue to the public in the form available, (480) 95% of respondents believe climate
of a lump-sum transfer, which would constitute a change is happening either ‘definitely’ or ‘probably’;
'carbon dividend' (Climate leadership council, 2019). 61% believe this ‘definitely’. This belief is held across
Their argument rests on 'fairness and political viability' all education levels (Chart 5.9 Panel A) and age groups
considerations, noting that the majority of US families (Panel B), and in most countries (Panel C).
would get more from the transfer than they would
lose in increased energy prices. Furthermore, many feel a high level of personal
responsibility to reduce climate change across
Last, evidence from behavioural science EU countries (Chart 5.10). 40% of respondents rank
indicates that increasing the salience of benefits their sense of responsibility as at least 7 on a scale of
from carbon taxation can enhance its 0 (not at all) to 10 (a great deal). The highest levels of
acceptability. For example, a design feature personal responsibility to reduce climate change were
underlying public support for a carbon tax in the obtained in France, where 64% ranked this at at 7 or
Canadian province of British Columbia is that part of above and 13% at 10.
the revenue is redistributed to taxpayers in the form of
cheques, instead of tax cuts which would be less
visible. (476) (478) See COM/2018/380 final, Article 3.
(479) http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-
room/20190417IPR41755/support-for-eu-remains-at-
Under EU legislation, part of the revenue from historically-high-level-despite-sceptics
ETS is spent on just transition measures. In the (480) These countries are Austria, Belgium, Czechia, Estonia, Finland,
period of 2021-2030, a Modernisation Fund will France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Lithuania,
operate in the EU, supporting low-carbon investments Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, United
Kingdom. Educational categories are defined as follows: Lower-
in 10 lower income EU Member States. (477) The size of
educated refers to ISCED I and II (lower secondary or less);
the Fund is 2% of the total allowances for the period. Medium-educated refers to ISCED IIIb, IIIa and IV (upper
Priority areas covered under the Fund, collectively secondary, advanced vocational); Highly educated refers to
benefitting from at least 70% of subsidies, include ISCED V1 and V2 (tertiary).
support of just transition by redeployment, re-skilling
and up-skilling programmes (alongside green energy-
specific items such as renewable electricity generation,
improvement of energy efficiency and modernisation

(476) See Klenert et al. (2018). See also the next section which
discusses the issue of social acceptability in more detail.
(477) See Articles 10 and 10d of the ETS Directive (consolidated
version of Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament
and of the Council)

190
 Chapter 5: Towards a greener future: employment and social impacts of climate change policies

Chart 5.9 Chart 5.10

The vast majority believe climate change is taking place, Many feel a strong sense of personal responsibility to
across education levels, age groups and countries tackle climate change, with the more educated tending
Responses to the question “Do you think the world's climate is changing?” by education to display a greater sense of this
level (Panel A), by age group (Panel B) and by country (Panel C). Responses to the question “To what extent do you feel a personal responsibility to try to
100% reduce climate change?” on a scale of 0 (not at all) to 10 (a great deal).
90% 45

40
80%
35
70%
30
60%
25
50%
20
40%
15
30%
10
20% 5
10% 0
0 1 to 3 4 to 6 7 to 9 10
0%
Lower-educated Medium-educated Highly-educated Lower-educated Medium-educated Highly-educated
Definitely Probably Probably not Definitely not Note: Categories “Refusal to answer” and “Don’t know” excluded
100% Source: European Social Survey data (2016).
90% Click here to download chart.
80%
70%
Despite widespread awareness of climate
60%
change and of the responsibility and urgency to
50%
40%
act, support for climate action is mixed, and
30% stronger for standards than taxation. On average,
20% only 31% of respondents are strongly or somewhat in
10% favour of taxes on fossil fuels to reduce climate
0% change. Those with higher levels of education display
15-24 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 65-74 75+
Definitely Probably Probably not Definitely not
higher levels of support (Chart 5.11 Panel A) as do
100%
younger cohorts (Chart 5.11 Panel B). While these can
90%
be interpreted only as correlations, literature on the
80% topic suggests that such traits play an important role
70% in climate action support (see below). Across countries,
60% the picture is mixed, with those in favour of such taxes
50% ranging from 15% in Poland to 61% in Sweden (Chart
40%
5.11 Panel C). Citizens in western and northern Europe,
30%
with the exception of France, are more in favour of
20%
10%
such taxes than Southern and Eastern Member States.
0%
CZ FI EE LT HU PL AT IT SE UK DE FR BE IE NL SI ES PT Energy prices present a challenge for achieving
Definitely Probably Probably not Definitely not a just transition and citizens are concerned that
Note: Categories “Refusal to answer” and “Don’t know” excluded.
these costs are too high (Chart 5.12). The proportion
Source: European Social Survey data (2016)
Click here to download chart. of people extremely or very worried amounts to 71%
in Spain and 68% in Portugal. Energy costs impact
people’s ability to heat their homes (see Section 4) and
to to incur the transport costs necessary to work and
participate in society. When such costs become
unaffordable, they may have a strong adverse impact
on public support for climate action.

191
Employment and Social Developments in Europe 2019

Chart 5.11 Some research suggests that perceived costs and

Support for fossil fuel taxes exists but varies across perceived climate benefits are the strongest predictors
different groups of support for climate action, but that political
Responses to the question “To what extent are you in favour of or against taxes on
fossil fuels to reduce climate change?” by education level (Panel A), by age group (Panel affiliation also plays an important role. (481) Other
B) and by country (Panel C). research finds that, in the Norwegian context, support
100
for fuel taxation is in fact best predicted by beliefs
90
80
about environmental consequences, not by self-
70
interest. (482) There is evidence of a strong impact of
60 culture on policy support as well as complex, non-
50 linear relationships between information, beliefs and
40 public policy opinion formation. (483) Understanding the
30
reasons for support for and resistance to climate
20
action will be crucial to policy formation.
10
0
Lower-educated Medium-educated Highly-educated There is also a growing movement calling for
In favour Neither in favour nor against Against changes to consumption patterns and consumer
100
behaviour. In a list of the most effective climate
90
80
change mitigation actions, a move towards plant-
70 based diets is ranked at number four out of 80, with
60 potential to reduce emissions by over 66 gigatons. (484)
50 Initiatives such as ‘Meatless Mondays’ and ‘VB6’
40 (Vegan before six pm) are helping to challenge norms
30
and habits around meat and protein consumption. A
20
significant shift towards plant-based foods is
10
0
occurring, driven by younger generations. However, all
15-24 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 65-74 75+ age groups are making considerable efforts to reduce
In favour Neither in favour nor against Against energy consumption, with greater efforts among older
100%
cohorts (Chart 5.13). Support for banning sales of
90%
80%
inefficient household appliances and increasing the
70% likelihood of buying efficient appliances is also strong
60% across countries (Chart 5.14 and Chart 5.15), although
50% hypothetical situations may reflect aspirations more
40%
than actual behaviour.
30%
20%
Chart 5.13
10%
Efforts are made to reduce energy consumption by all
0%
PL EE FR ES PT IT LT CZ SI HU BE AT IE UK DE NL FI SE age groups, particularly by older respondents
In favour Neither in favour nor against Against Responses to the question “In your daily life, how often do you do things to reduce your
energy use?”
Note: “In favour” refers to those who responded either strongly or somewhat in favour,
100
“against” refers to either strongly or somewhat against. Categories “Refusal to
answer” and “Don’t know” excluded. 90
Source: European Social Survey data (2016). 80
Click here to download chart. 70
60
50
Chart 5.12
40
Citizens are concerned about high energy prices 30
Responses to the question “How worried are you that energy may be too expensive for
20
many people in [country]?”
10
100
0
90 15-24 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 65-74 75+
80
Never Hardly ever Sometimes
Often Very Often Always
70
Cannot reduce
60 Note: Categories “Refusal to answer” and “Don’t know” excluded.
50 Source: European Social Survey data (2016).
40 Click here to download chart.

30
20
10 (481) Tobler, Visschers and Siegrist (2012)
0 (482) Kallbekken and Sælen (2011)
SE NL AT IE PL FI DE HU SI EE UK IT FR BE CZ PT ES LT
Not at all Not very Somewhat Very Extremely
(483) Shwom et al. (2010), Todd et al. (2017)
(484) See Hawken (2018). “Drawdown” is a collaborative plan to
Note: Categories “Refusal to answer” and “Don’t know” excluded
reverse global warming edited by Paul Hawken; it ranks
Source: European Social Survey data (2016)
potential contributions in to climate mitigation emission
Click here to download chart.
reduction capacity.

Evidence on the determinants of support for

climate action is complex and country-specific.

192
 Chapter 5: Towards a greener future: employment and social impacts of climate change policies

Chart 5.14 responsibility to address climate change e.g. by

There is support for the banning of inefficient insulating their homes, and choosing to walk or cycle
appliances to tackle climate change across all countries to work. Moreover, the 2014 Public Procurement
Response to the question “To what extent are you in favour of/against banning sales of
the least energy-efficient household appliances to reduce climate change?” directive enables national and local authorities to
100 make better use of strategic procurement, with
90 particular consideration to social and environmental
80 objectives. (486)
70
60 Greener supply is as important as greener
50
demand and the EU is helping to foster this. The
40
Eco-design Directive (487) provides a framework for
30
20
improving the environmental performance of energy-
10
related goods and for product bans and phase-outs of
0 inefficient products such as incandescent lightbulbs.
LT SE EE HU IE NL UK FI CZ PL FR ES AT SI BE IT DE PT EU energy labels can increase green demand for
In favour Neither in favour/against Against
energy-related products. For other categories of
Note: “In favour” refers to those who responded either strongly or somewhat in favour, products, various ecolabelling schemens sometimes
“against” refers to either strongly or somewhat against. Categories “Refusal to
answer” and “Don’t know” excluded. coexist and trust in eco-labelling must be maintained.
Source: European Social Survey data (2016). As the “greenwashing” of environmentally or socially
Click here to download chart.
irresponsible companies is considered a potential
problem, there is a clear rationale for government to
Chart 5.15
regulate and create incentives to ensure that signals
A large majority of people are at least somewhat likely
and markets operate effectively.
to buy energy-efficient appliances, with between 15%
and 45% saying they are extremely likely to do so
Response to the question “If you were to buy a large electrical appliance for your home, Trends in green consumption and consumers’
how likely is it that you would buy one of the most energy-efficient ones?” (On a scale willingness to alter their behaviour offer much
of 0 to 10 where O is not at all likely and 10 is extremely likely).
100
scope for exploration. Research suggests that green
90 consumption and green citizenship are in fact distinct
80 concepts and that their determinants are complex. (488)
70 Many factors play a role, including individuals’ habits,
60 trust and values, perceived consumer effectiveness, as
50 well as product availability, social norms, brand image
40 and eco-labelling, with the consumer’s environmental
30 concern and the product’s functional attributes
20
emerging as the two major determinants. (489) Gaps
10
between attitudes and behaviour and inadequate
0
NL SE FI UK BE FR IE EE LT ES CZ AT HU SI IT PL DE PT information can be major barriers to the purchase of
0 1 to 3 4 to 6 7 to 9 10 eco-friendly products, e.g. the lack of awareness and
Note: Categories "Refusal to answer" and "Don't know" omitted. misunderstandings around refurbished mobile
Source: European Social Survey data (2016). phones. (490)
Click here to download chart.

Behavioural interventions show how consumer

Citizens are increasingly aware of their power as habits and defaults can be “nudged” in a green
both consumers and citizens to tackle climate direction and how societal norms can be changed
change. Citizens can reduce their individual climate and exploited. Synergies can achieve win-win
footprint but also pressure business and government outcomes in the public and private interest, for
through consumption and participation to respond to example reducing plate sizes and providing social cues
popular demand. Grassroots initiatives against single- can reduce food waste in hotels, with benefits for both
use plastic have led, for example, to fast-food chains
abandoning plastic straws, as well as to changes at (486) By using their purchasing power to choose socially responsible
governmental level such as the EU Single Use Plastics goods, public authorities can set a positive example and
encourage enterprises to make wider use of social standards in
Directive. the management, production and provision of services.
Moreover, public authorities can also spur eco-innovation by
The European Commission has been trying for using new award criteria in contract notices that place more
some time to encourage sustainable purchasing emphasis on environmental considerations. For an overview of
the legal rules and implementation see:
and consumption. The 2012 Communication on http://ec.europa.eu/growth/single-market/public-
consumer empowerment included proposals to procurement/rules-implementation_en.
improve awareness on environmental and (487) https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
sustainability aspects. (485) Housing and transport are content/en/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32009L0125&from=EN
other areas where more can be done to encourage (488) Guckian, De Young and Harbo (2017)
consumers to act on their feelings of personal (489) Joshi and Rahman (2015)
(490) Young et al. (2010), van Weelden, Mugge, Bakker (2016)
(485) SWD(2012) 132 final

193
Employment and Social Developments in Europe 2019

the environment and business. (491) Low-cost energy poverty needs to take into account the
interventions can exploit social norms to reduce necessary domestic energy services needed to
excessive energy consumption. (492) guarantee basic standards of living in the relevant
national context, existing social policy and other
Reducing food waste is crucial to tackling relevant policies. At a basic level it can be described as
climate change. One third of food raised or prepared conditions where “individuals or households are not
does not make it “from farm or factory to fork”, and able to adequately heat or provide other required
this food waste contributes 4.4. gigatons of carbon energy services in their homes at affordable
dioxide equivalent into the atmosphere every year. (493) costs”. (497) A limited number of Member States have
In terms of climate change mitigation, reducing food defined energy poverty at the national level (e.g. the
waste is ranked at number three out of 80, with UK, FR, CY, SK, IE) while almost all have identified
potential to reduce emissions by over 70 gigatons. This vulnerable consumers in the context of retail gas and
seems a particularly pertinent problem in a world electricity markets with a view to protecting them. In
where nearly 800 million people go hungry and most cases, these are recipients of social benefits (e.g.
resources are increasingly under pressure. The unemployment benefit or social assistance) or specific
Sustainable Development Goals call for the halving of socio-economic groups based on income, age and/or
per capita global food waste at the retail and health characteristics. (498)
consumer level by 2030, as well as reducing food
losses along production and supply chains. Key to this
is firstly pre-empting food waste before it happens, (497) Thomson and Bouzarovski (2018)
(498) Ibid.
and then reallocating unwanted food. Standardising
date labelling to focus on safety as opposed to
optimal taste is important, as is consumer education,
and campaigns such as “Feeding the 5000”. (494)
France and Italy have passed laws requiring
supermarkets to pass on unsold food to charities,
animal feed or composting companies instead. Food
waste is one of the horizontal principles that applies to
the design and implementation of the Fund for
European Aid to the Most Deprived. This Fund supports
EU Member States’ action to provide food and/or basic
material assistance to the most deprived. (495)

Food waste prevention is an integral part of the

Commission’s Circular Economy Package and it
will also foster competitiveness, sustainable
growth and employment. The Revised EU Waste
Legislation, adopted on May 30th 2018, requires
Member States to reduce food waste at each stage of
the supply chain, to monitor food waste levels and to
report on progress made. An EU methodology to
measure food waste and a multi-stakeholder platform
(EU Platform on Food Losses and Food Waste (496)) will
help with this, which includes a dedicated sub-group
working on simplifying and promoting better use and
understanding of date-marking.

4. CLIMATE ACTION AND ENERGY

POVERTY
Energy poverty is a multi-dimensional concept
which lacks a uniform definition. Its measurement
poses practical and conceptual challenges. Defining

(491) Kallbekken and Saelen (2013)

(492) Allcott (2011)
(493) Hawken (2018).
(494) A public event where a free lunch is provided to 5000 people
using ingredients that would otherwise be thrown away.
(495) https://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=1089#navItem-1
(496) See https://ec.europa.eu/food/safety/food_waste/eu_actions/eu-
platform_en and https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-
regulation/initiatives/ares-2018-705329_en

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 Chapter 5: Towards a greener future: employment and social impacts of climate change policies

Figure 5.2
Energy poverty is a multifaceted phenomenon
Drivers and effects of energy poverty

Source: Rademaekers, K et al (2016).

Click here to download figure.

Energy poverty has a number of drivers. EU. (500) Indicators of energy poverty, encompassing
Household income is clearly important, but energy the inability to keep a person’s home adequately warm
prices, and energy efficiency also play a role. and being in arrears on utility bills (501), has followed a
Affordability of energy-efficient housing contributes to similar trend to being at risk of poverty or social
the reduction of energy poverty and improves exclusion in the last decade, albeit at a significantly
environmental outcomes (see Figure 5.2). Socio- lower level; they were increasing between 2009 and
political systems also influence the energy market 2013, when they reached their peak. Since the onset
system, its degree of liberalisation and level of of the recovery, they have been decreasing to below
competition, as well as the energy mix, thereby pre-crisis levels. Energy poverty has multiple drivers,
determining energy prices. Another important driver is so it does not fully overlap with monetary poverty or
the local natural environment, which influences the being at risk of poverty or social exclusion (see Chart
demand for heating or cooling. The local climate also 5.16).
affects the quality of dwelling stock in terms of how
insulation and provision of heating systems.
(500) Thomson and Bouzarovski (2018)
Energy poverty has an indirect effect on many (501) Measurement of energy poverty is complex. The EU Energy
Poverty Observatory proposed several indicators to capture
policy areas, including health, environment and different aspects of the phenomenon. In this section, we use
productivity. Adequate warmth, cooling, lighting and the”Inability to keep home adequately warm” and “arrears on
the energy to power appliances are essential for utility bills” as proxies to describe the trends and spread of
energy povertyin the absence of an agreed definition. The main
ensuring a decent standard of living and citizens’ drawback of these two indicators is their subjective nature. In
health. These services also enable citizens to fulfil addition, the latter does not cover only energy-related utility
their potential and enhance social inclusion. Therefore bills but also others. See also: energypoverty.eu
addressing energy poverty has the potential to bring
multiple benefits, including lower spending on health,
reduced air pollution (by replacing unfit heating
sources), better comfort and wellbeing, improved
household budgets and increased economic
activity. (499)

4.1. Trends in energy poverty indicators

It is now widely acknowledged that energy
poverty is a distinct form of deprivation. It is
estimated to affect almost 50 million people in the

(499) Energy poverty observatory:

https://www.energypoverty.eu/about/what-energy-poverty

195
Employment and Social Developments in Europe 2019

Chart 5.16 Malta and Austria, households in cities are more likely
Indicators of energy poverty do not fully overlap with to be in arrears on utility bills. (502)
being at risk of poverty or social exclusion
Population with arrears on utility bills, unable to keep home adequately warm and being
Chart 5.18
at risk of poverty and social exclusion in the EU, 2008-2017
Significant proportions of those who cannot keep their
% population with arrears on utility bills
% population unable to keep their homes adequately warm home adequately warm belong to the middle class
AROPE Proportion of individuals reporting inability to keep home adequately warm by income
group (2017 and 2008)
25

20 2017

IE HU HR FR FI ES EL EE DK DE CZ CY BG BE AT
2008 low income
2017
15 2008
2017 middle class
10 2008
2017
5 2008 high income
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2017
2008
2017
Source: Eurostat, ilc_mdes07, ilc_mdes01, ilc_peps01. 2008
2017
Click here to download chart. 2008
2017
2008
2017
Although decreasing to pre-crisis levels overall, 2008
2017
important differences in indicators of energy 2008
2017
2008
poverty between Member States remain. Between 2017
2008
2008 and 2017 the proportion of people who found it 2017
2008
difficult to warm their homes adequately increased in 2017
2008
Greece, Spain, Italy, Lithuania and Malta. Similarly, the 2017
2008
proportion of those with arrears in utility bills UK SK SI SE RO PT PL NL MT LV LU LT IT
2017
2008
2017
decreased overall, but increased in Cyprus, Greece, 2008
2017
Spain, Portugal, Ireland, Lithuania, Latvia and Slovakia. 2008
2017
2008
2017
Chart 5.17 2008
2017
Indicators of energy poverty in cities less spread than in 2008
2017
rural areas and towns in most Member States 2008
Proportion of individuals reporting arrears on utility bills (panel A) and inability to keep 2017
2008
home adequately warm (panel B) per degree of urbanisation (2017) 2017
2008
36 2017
2008
32
Urban Towns and suburbs Rural 2017
2008
28 2017
2008
24 2017
2008
20
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
16
Note: 2010 instead of 2008 for HR and 2016 instead of 2017 for the UK and IE
12
Source: EU-SILC
8
Click here to download chart.
4

0
A significant proportion of households unable to
HU

HR
SE

DK
SK
DE

UK
LU

CZ

AT
MT

ES
IT

BE
FI
EE
LT

PT
FR

PL
CY

LV

RO
BG
EL
IE

45 keep their homes warm or with arrears in utility

40 bills belong to the middle income group. More
35 than half of those who are unable to keep their home
30 warm in Finland, Romania, Slovenia, Denmark and
25 Greece belong to the middle class (503), while out of
20 this group Greece (25.7%) and Romania (11.3%) report
15 higher proportions of people unable to keep their
10 homes warm than the EU average of 7.8%. In Greece,
5 Finland, Denmark, Latvia, Romania, Czechia and Italy
0
more than half of households with arrears in utility
DK

HU
HR
UK
SE

DE
SK
LU
FI

EE
CZ
AT

FR

PL

ES

RO

CY

EL
IE
MT

BE

LV

PT
IT

BG
LT

bills belong to the middle income group. This is an

Note: 2014 instead of 2017 for DE, 2017 instead of 2017 for IE and UK. No degree of
urbanisation reported for NL and SI issue particularly in Greece and Romania, which record
Source: EU-SILC higher proportions of the total population reporting
Click here to download chart.
inability to pay their utility expenses (see Chart 5.18).
In most Member States, people living in cities
show lower indicators of energy poverty, but (502) When interpreting the results by degree of urbanisation, the
there are some notable exceptions. Households in number and sizes of cities, particularly in smaller member
states, should be kept in mind (See Chapter 1).
cities are less able to keep their houses warm in (503) See chapter 1 for the discussion on the middle class.
Lithuania, Latvia, Belgium, Austria and to some extent Individuals belonging to the middle class are defined as those
in Portugal, Ireland and the UK. In Romania, Estonia, with income between 75% and 200% of the national median.
The size of the middle class in a specific Member State varies
across time, which should be taken into account.

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 Chapter 5: Towards a greener future: employment and social impacts of climate change policies

In more than a quarter of Member States the 4.2. Energy prices, expenditure and energy
proportion of people reporting arrears in utility poverty
bills has increased over the last decade. Arrears
are an increasing problem, both for those on low Energy prices, one of the key drivers of energy
incomes and for the middle class. This development poverty, have increased substantially over the
coincindes with the increase in energy prices over the last two decades, putting additional pressure on
period (total household electricity prices rose at a 2% those with lower incomes. The price increases were
annual rate from 2008 to 2017) (504) and to the fall in driven by the combined impact of steadily growing
real household disposable income in some Member network charges and taxes. (505)This development,
States. In Greece the middle class contributed coupled with unfavourable trends in real gross
significantly to the rising proportion of people with disposable household income during the crisis,
arrears in utility bills - particularly worrying in a increased the pressure on households in general.
country where the proportion of people unable to keep Without matching improvements in energy efficiency
their house warm was increasing up to 2016. The this reduces available income for consumption on
situation has improved somewhat in the last two other goods, putting additional pressure in particular
years, but remains considerably worse than pre-crisis. on those with lower incomes.

In almost all Member States where the While spending more in absolute terms, higher
proportion of people reporting they are unable income households use a smaller proportion of
to keep their homes warm increased in the last their income on energy. In 2015 (506), households in
decade, this has become more of an issue for the the lowest income decile spent 10.4% of their total
middle class. While most Member States recorded a consumption expenditure on energy. (507) For low-
decrease in the proportion of individuals reporting income households, the proportion of energy costs in
being unable to warm their homes, the proportion has total consumption expenditure varies between Member
increased in Greece, Italy and Latvia, particularly States from 3% in Sweden to 23% in Slovakia, with
among the middle income group. In Spain, however, almost all Central and Eastern Member States
the increase was more significant among people with displaying significantly higher shares than others.
low incomes. Middle-income households (508) spend more in
absolute terms but use proportionately less of their
Chart 5.19 total expenditure on energy products (7.1% compared
In many Member States the middle class is less troubled to 10.4%). Middle-income households in Central and
by arrears on utility bills than a decade ago Eastern Member States spend much more of their
Proportion of individuals reporting as being in arrears on utility bills, per income group
(2017 and 2008) total consumption expenditure on energy than middle-
2017 income households in North and Western Member
AT

2008 low income

2017 middle class
States (10-15% compared to 4-8%). Large variations
BE

2008
2017 high income

across Member States are driven mostly by the

BG

2008
2017
CY

2008
2017
variations in household disposable income, but energy
CZ

2008
2017

prices and energy efficiency, particularly of buildings,

DE

2008
2017
DK

also play a role.

2008
2017
EE

2008
2017
EL

2008
2017
ES

2008
2017
FI

2008
2017 (505) European Commision (2019b).
FR

2008
2017
(506) The most recent available data.
HR

2008
2017
HU

2008
2017 (507) Energy expenditure covers electricity, gas, liquid and solid fuels
IE

and central heating.

2008
2017
IT

2008
2017
(508) These are households in the third to fifth decile and in some
LT

2008

cases second to third decile.

2017
LU

2008
2017
LV

2008
2017
MT

2008
2017
NL

2008
2017
PL

2008
2017
PT

2008
2017
RO

2008
2017
SE

2008
2017
SI

2008
2017
SK

2008
2017
UK

2008
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40

Note: 2010 instead of 2008 for HR, HU, IT, MT and 2016 instead of 2017 for the UK
and IE.
Source: EU-SILC.
Click here to download chart.

(504) European Commission (2019)

197
Employment and Social Developments in Europe 2019

Chart 5.20 first type of policy measures tackle energy poverty

Complex picture when comparing ability to warm home indirectly through social protection systems. Social
to the proportion of energy expenditure in total benefits in different forms (e.g. unemployment benefit,
expenditure
% of households at risk of poverty whose homes are not being kept adequately warm;
minimum income support) can contribute to tackling
energy expenditure as % of total expenditure for households in the third decile energy poverty indirectly by increasing the disposable
income of low-income households. Social housing
systems in some countries in Northern and Western
Europe often provide low-income households with
relatively energy-efficient housing, thereby decreasing
their energy bills. Energy bill support and social tariffs
providing (targeted) financial support to households to
pay their energy bills also reduce immediate pressures
on the energy poor. However, they do not address the
underlying drivers of energy poverty in the same
manner as measures to improve building insulation of
housing or replace heating systems. (511)

4.3. Energy efficiency measures

Source: European Commission (2019).

Measures to improve the energy efficiency of
Click here to download chart. buildings and appliances can decrease total
residential energy consumption. Lower
For households below the poverty threshold, consumption levels result in reduced energy import
there is no strong correlation between the dependence, which makes households more resilient
proportion of their total spending on energy, and and less vulnerable to oil and gas price fluctuations,
their perception of their ability to keep their particularly in winter. Heating-related energy use
homes warm. In most Mediterranean Member States, represents approximately two thirds of the total
energy consumption of households. In the period up to
with their warmer climates, the share of energy
2015 significant decreases could be observed in EU
expenditure in total consumer expenditure is lower
household energy consumption (a 5.7% fall between
than the average (see Chart 5.20). However, this is not
2008 and 2016). This was largely due to decreasing
reflected in people’s perception of their ability to keep
heating-related consumption through building
their homes adequately warm. In part this is because
refurbishments and more efficient heating systems
energy performance standards in the warmer Member
(e.g. replacing boilers which had low energy
States tend to be lower than in those with colder
weather. This, coupled with often inadequate heating efficiency). (512)
systems in dwellings in warmer climates, results in the
Bringing residential buildings up to energy-
exposure of households to cold during those months
efficiency norms requires investment in
when the temperatures fall below the level considered
renovation. In 2012 (latest data available) poorly
comfortable. (509)
equipped or insulated homes were still identified as a
Although transport fuel use and expenditure are major reason for households facing difficulties to keep
not captured by energy poverty indicators, they their homes warm during wintertime (see Chart 5.21).
have important implications for the transition to According to the High-Level Task Force on Investing in
Social Infrastructure in Europe (513), the funding gap
a climate-neutral society and its social
for social infrastructure in housing is approximately
acceptance. Unlike household energy use, the
450,000-500,000 new homes plus 800,000 homes
proportion of expenditure on transport fuels within
requiring renovation. Belgium has relatively old
total expenditure increases as household income
building stock, and major needs for renovation and
increases. In 2015, households in the first income
retro-fitting of dwellings to improve energy efficiency.
decile spent 3.1% of their total expenditure on
Reaching the targets of the 2030 Climate and Energy
transport fuel, while households in the fifth decile
Framework and a low-carbon economy by 2050 would
spent 4.3%. Higher income households rely more on
require a doubling of the current annual renovation
private transport and therefore they spend
rate, from 0.7% to 1.3%. In Ireland, the cost of
proportionately more on diesel than low income
upgrading the housing stock to energy rating B3 would
households. However, diminishing differences in excise
require an investment of EUR 35 billion. Hungary
duties on petrol and diesel, environmental legislation
(despite recent improvements), Lithuania and Romania
and public acceptance (see Chart 5.13) are expected to
face similar issues of low energy efficiency in
reverse this trend in the future. (510) residential buildings. France has introduced ambitious
plans to retro-fit social and private housing, but
Both social policy measures and energy policy
measures can help mitigate energy poverty. The (511) Thomson and Bouzarovski (2018).
(512) European Commission (2019b).
(509) Rademaekers (2016).
(513) Fransen et al (2018).
(510) European Commission (2019).

198
 Chapter 5: Towards a greener future: employment and social impacts of climate change policies

Chart 5.21
In addition to the cost of energy, another major reason for households experiencing cold in winter is poorly equipped
homes
Proportion of the population living in homes that are not comfortably warm during wintertime, by reason, 2012
100%
90%
80% Poorly equipped and
70% cannot afford
60% Poorly equipped
50%
40% Cannot afford
30%
20% Comfortably warm
10%
0%

E…
ES
EL

HU

EE

HR

AT
CY

IT

FR

IE

NL
BG

BE
DK
CZ

SK
RO

FI
SI

SE
DE
LT

MT

LU
LV

PL

UK
PT

Note: ‘Cannot afford’ refers to a lack of financial resources to keep the home adequately warm during wintertime. ‘Poorly equipped’ refers to a dwelling where the heating system is
insufficiently effective, or where the home is insufficiently insulated against the cold.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on EU-SILC 2012 User Database, ad hoc module 2012 on housing conditions.
Click here to download chart.

unlocking private investment remains a major situations of private tenants, social tenants or
challenge. (514) Seeking new sources of efficiency precarious homeowners. (519)
improvements in other areas, such as the use of
electricity appliances, will also be crucial to reaching In the medium run, energy poverty may increase
the targets. in the absence of policy change, if energy costs
rise faster than total disposable household
Several factors hold back investment in the income. Long-term simulations confirm that,
energy efficiency of homes, including regardless of the scenario chosen, energy expenditure
informational barriers, financial constraints and (including fuel costs and energy equipment
misaligned incentives. Many households remain expenditure) is projected to increase in the medium
unaware of the return on investment from greater term (with an increase between 2015 and 2030 of
energy efficiency. Some may find it difficult to access 21%). Given expected increases in household income,
information on the improvements needed for their overall energy expenditure is projected to stay at a
specific dwelling. Households may also lack similar share of household disposable income in 2015
understanding of the grants or loans they could access and 2030, amounting to 7.3%. After 2030 energy
to support their investment. (515) Other important expenditure tend to continue to increase in absolute
impediments to investments in energy efficiency and terms but varies considerably between the scenarios
renewable energy are low income, limited wealth or (see section 3.1.), with some of the lowest levels of
lack of access to credit. (516) Among home-owners increase under the energy efficiency scenario and the
there is a consistent pattern across Member States of highest in the scenarios based on the implementation
those on lower incomes being less likely to adopt of high tech solutions with focus on an increased
retro-fitting improvements to the energy efficiency of circular economy or changes in consumer
their homes, despite government support preferences. (520) But more importrant these scenarios
measures. (517) For rented homes, the costs and see energy expenditure increase less fast after 2030
benefits of energy efficiency measures are often split than household income, resulting in a decreasing share
between landlords and tenants. Whereas the cost of of household disposable income after 2030,
renovation or improvements in energy efficiency are underlining the long term benefits of a transition to a
typically financed by landlords (at least initially), the more resource and energy efficient economy.
benefits in terms of reduced energy bills typically go to
the tenant. (518) Proliferation of rentals may hold back
investment in energy efficiency in old buildings in city
5. CLIMATE CHANGE AND AIR
centres where it is most needed. Improving energy POLLUTION: AIR QUALITY IMPACTS ON
efficiency for vulnerable households may therefore LOCAL HEALTH
require policies that are adapted to the specific
Climate change and air pollution are intrinsically
(514) Respective 2019 Semester country reports.
related. Carbon dioxide is the largest driver of climate
(515) Ugarte et al. (2016).
change but other non-CO2 ‘climate forcers’ also
(516) Ameli and Brandt (2015).
(517) Schleich (2019).
(519) See Vanhille et al. (2017) and CEPI/UIPI (2010).
(518) See Burlinson et al., Economidou (2014), Vanhille et al. (2017)
(520) Impact assessment on Long-term greenhouse gas emissions
and Zachmann et al. (2018).
reduction strategy.

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Employment and Social Developments in Europe 2019

Figure 5.3
Air pollution affects human health and climate change
Interaction between emissions, quality of air and impacts on human health and climate

Source: Based on European Environment Agency – Air quality in Europe 2010. For illustration purposes only.
Click here to download figure.

contribute to global warming (see Figure 5.3). Ground The related total health costs of air pollution have
level ozone (O3), one of the key air pollutants that has been estimated at EUR 330 - 940 billion annually,
a significant impact on human health, can also be including EUR 15 billion in lost workdays. (523) Air
worsened by global warming. Fine particulate matter pollution also has a negative impact on ecosystems,
(PM), another major air pollutant, contains black damaging soil, forests, lakes and rivers and reducing
carbon, which has a warming effect, while sulphur agricultural yields.
oxydes may, in some cases, contribute to cooling the
climate. While most of the measures to cut emissions
have the win-win effect of reducing air pollution and
contributing to climate change mitigation, certain People from lower socio-economic backgrounds,
measures lead to trade-off effects between air quality children, older people and those with pre-
and climate change. (521) existing health problems are the most
vulnerable to the negative effects of air
Air pollution is the greatest environmental pollution. People from lower socio-economic
health risk in the EU and it has a direct impact backgrounds tend to be more affected by air pollution
on individuals’ quality of life. Chronic exposure to than the general population, as the negative effects of
air pollutants increases the risk of heart disease, pollution aggravate the effects of poor diet, unhealthy
stroke and pulmonary and respiratory diseases, lifestyles and inadequate healthcare. Air pollution can
including lung cancer. Each year, air pollutants such as also have a detrimental effect on children’s
particulate matter, nitrogen dioxide and ground level development and health. The occurrence of bronchitis,
ozone are responsible for around 400,000 premature pneumonia and sinusitis in children has been linked to
deaths in the EU. Air pollution also has a considerable air pollution. Children’s delayed neural and cognitive
economic impact, cutting lives short, increasing development can sometimes be attributed to air
medical costs and reducing productivity across the pollution. It can have a negative impact on their early
economy through working days lost due to ill health or school performance and subsequently their
dragging down the productivity of those working. (522) educational attainment, employability and income.

(521) EEA (2012). (523) European Commission (2013).

(522) Graff et al (2012).

200
 Chapter 5: Towards a greener future: employment and social impacts of climate change policies

Long-term exposure to air pollution is associated with and Greek cities, while less than 10% of city dwellers
stress, anxiety, cardiovascular and respiratory diseases in Sweden, Cyprus, Ireland and Estonia reported
in older people, who are also more likely to suffer from suffering from these conditions. (527) People living in
frailty and reduced lung function. Finally, air pollution towns and suburbs (12.9%) and those living in rural
can exacerbate the already poor health of those with a areas (8.1%) are less likely to report this problem (see
pre-existing health condition. (524) Chart 5.23). Air pollutants tend to concentrate more in
urban areas due to factors such as higher density of
Emissions of the main air pollutants have been economic activity, population and the built
decreasing in the EU, showing a significant environment.
absolute decoupling from economic activity.
Chart 5.23
Despite this positive trend (see Chart 5.22), the levels
People in cities report being more exposed to pollution
of air pollution (525) still exceed the EU limits in zones
and other environmental problems than those living in
and agglomerations across the EU. Road transport is rural areas
one of Europe’s main sources of air pollution, Proportion of people living in an area with problems related to pollution, grime or other
especially for harmful pollutants such as nitrogen environmental problems, by degree of urbanisation, 2017

dioxide and particulate matter. Emissions from 36 Cities Towns and suburbs Rural areas

32

agriculture, energy production, industry and 28

households also contribute to air pollution. 24

20

Chart 5.22 16

Emissions in the EU have been decreasing...

12

8
Development in EU28 emissions, 2000-2016 (% of 2000 levels), main air pollutants
4

0
IE EE CY SE FI HR ES UK SK DK NL PT HU AT CZ FR BG PL EU28 IT SI LV RO LT LU BE MT EL DE

Note: Low reliability of data for MT rural areas; 2016 for the UK.
Source: Eurostat, ilc_mddw05.
Click here to download chart.

The proportion of people who report being

exposed to problems related to pollution, grime
and other environmental problems has been
decreasing, although it varies widely across
Member States. This encouraging trend, in line with
the overall reduction in air pollution, can be observed
in most Member States, with the exception of Austria,
Note: GDP expressed in chain-linked volumes (2010), % of 2000 level
Germany, Hungary, Lithuania and Luxembourg.
Source: EEA: Air Quality in Europe 2018
Click here to download chart. However the proportion of those reporting
environmental problems in areas where they live is
still above 20% in Germany and Malta.

Those living in cities are more exposed to the The evidence on vulnerable groups being more
detrimental effects of air pollution on health. exposed to air pollution is mixed. Social, economic,
Although emissions of air pollutants have decreased political and environmental factors contribute to how
considerably since 1990, air pollutant concentrations environmental risks are distributed in a society. People
in specific localities still remain high, with urban areas from lower socio-economic backgrounds are more
being the most affected. Up to 96% of EU citizens likely to live in more affordable, densely built-up and
living in urban areas were exposed to O3 populated city centres with higher traffic concentration
concentrations above the levels set in the World and thus suffer higher exposure to air pollution than
Health Organisation guidelines in the 2014-2016 those living in suburbs, for example. A number of local
period. The proportion of the EU-28 urban population studies confirm that people from less privileged socio-
exposed to PM2.5 and PM10 levels above WHO economic backgrounds live in areas more exposed to
guidelines was the lowest since 2000, but still reached air pollutants. These studies were conducted in
42-52% and 74-85% respectively. (526) Germany, Czechia, France, Belgium and the
Netherlands. (528) However, Chart 5.24 shows that,
Urban dwellers also report to suffer more than despite a decrease in the last decade in most Member
others from air pollution and other States, a relatively high proportion of those reporting
environmental problems. In 2017, almost one fifth environmental problems in areas where they live
of the EU 28 population living in cities reported belong to the middle class (the proportion with high
suffering from pollution, grime or other environmental income is relatively small.) Evidence is similarly mixed
problems. This problem was most severe in German as regards specific age groups, such as the elderly and
children.
(524) EEA (2018a).
(525) EEA (2018b). (527) A number of factors influence these results: city size,
(526) Ibid. geographical/weather characteristics and human activity.
(528) EEA (2018a). The evidence refers to spacial correlation.

201
Employment and Social Developments in Europe 2019

Chart 5.24 Figure 5.4

A relatively high proportion of individuals reporting Less developed regions tend to be more exposed to
pollution, grime and other environmental problems pollutants
belong to the middle class Exposure to fine particulate matter mapped against long-term unemployment
Proportion of people living in an area with problems related to pollution, grime or other
environmental problems by income group, 2008 and 2017
low income

2017
middle class
AT

2008 high income

2017
BE

2008
2017
BG

2008
2017
CY

2008
2017
CZ

2008
2017
DE

2008
2017
DK

2008
2017
EE

2008
2017
EL

2008
2017
ES

2008
2017
FI

2008
2017
FR

2008
2017
HR

2008
2017
HU

2008
2017
IE

2008
2017
Note: Exposure is expressed as population-weighted concentrations; mapped for NUTS
IT

2008
2017
2 regions
LT

2008
2017
Source: EEA (2018)
LU

2008
2017
Click here to download figure.
LV

2008
2017
MT

2008
2017
NL

2008
2017
Figure 5.5
PL

2008
2017

The link between regional development and air pollution

PT

2008
2017
RO

is weak
2008
2017
SE

2008
2017
Exposure to NO2 mapped against household income (2013-2014)
SI

2008
2017
SK

2008
2017
UK

2008
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40

Note: 2010 instead of 2008 for HR, 2016 instead of 2017 for IE and the UK.
Source: EU-SILC.
Click here to download chart.

The correlation between the level of regional

development and air pollution is not
straightforward. In general, less developed regions,
as measured in terms of unemployment, educational
level and household income, are more exposed to
pollutants such as PM2.5 and PM10 (see Figure 5.4).
Note: Exposure is expressed as population-weighted concentrations; mapped for NUTS
More densely populated areas or those with higher 2 regions
levels of industrialisation such as those in northern Source: EEA (2018)
Click here to download figure.
Italy, western Germany and the UK suffer more from
NO2 pollution (see Figure 5.5). However, a more
granular assessment shows that within these regions, Climate change action has the potential to
those with lower socio-economic status are often more improve air quality (and therefore human health)
exposed. (529) and vice versa. Policies aimed at mitigating climate
change reduce greenhouse gases and local air
pollutants when these have the same underlying
(529) For example, almost half of the most deprived neighbourhoods source, which is often the case. Transition to the
in London suffer from NO2 exposure above EU limits compared
to 2% of the least deprived ones (Aether 2017). energy systems necessary to reach the targets agreed
in the context of the Paris Agreement on climate
change can help to improve air quality and
consequently human health through reduced use of
fossil fuels. The impact can be even stronger if more
ambitious policies than those limiting global warming
to 2.0 degrees Celsius are implemented, and
accompanied by gradual diffusion of air pollution
control measures or even full adoption of the best
available air pollution abatement technologies by
2030. Compared with 2010, pollution-related
premature mortality in the EU is projected to increase
by roughly a quarter by 2050 if additional climate
change mitigation measures and air pollution
measures are not taken. Under the most ambitious
scenario in terms of climate and air pollution action,

202
 Chapter 5: Towards a greener future: employment and social impacts of climate change policies

roughly one third of premature deaths can be emerging tasks and skill requirements. The costs for
avoided. (530) these measures need to be shared fairly. The positive
health effects of reduced pollution in general, and of
Climate action therefore has the potential to changed sourcing and production processes relating to
gather further political support by focusing on the circular economy, should also be borne in mind.
the co-benefits of air pollution reduction and
avoiding the few trade-offs. (531) This is the case However, the transition will require significant
because the benefits of air pollution are local and reskilling and labour reallocation, and hence
visible in the short term, compared with the longer raises questions about potential costs and risks
term and global effects of climate mitigation action. in the employment and social domain and their
distribution. The measures and reforms necessary to
reach the climate targets will have substantial impacts
6. CONCLUSIONS AND ECO-SOCIAL on people and regions, including significant labour
POLICY CHOICES reallocation across sectors and occupations. They will
particularly affect workers and families whose
The transition to a low-carbon economy is livelihoods have so far been dependent on work in
expected to have small but positive effects on energy-intensive sectors: these workers will need
GDP, and employment. GDP and employment effects support for the transition, including retraining,
by 2030 are expected to be respectively up to 1.1% reskilling and possible job search, as well as income
and 0.5% higher than they would be without climate support and compensatory measures where
action necessary for meeting the 2 degrees target appropriate.
under the Paris Agreement. This amounts to an
additional 1.2 million jobs in the EU by 2030, on top of The measures and reforms will further affect
the 12 million additional jobs expected to be created those lower and middle-income households
on the baseline scenario. Simulations of pathways already at greater risk of disproportionately
towards a climate-neutral (i.e. net zero greenhouse high spending on energy and mobility and even
gas emissions) EU economy by 2050, consistent with energy poverty. Their hardship would be deepened
the EU contribution to limiting global warming to 1.5 by regulatory or fiscal measures which potentially
degrees, also show a positive net overall employment have regressive effects, whereas progressive
impact of 1.5 to 2 million extra jobs by 2050, with a measures could help to mitigate these negative
small GDP impact which is either positive or negative, effects.
depending on modelling specifications.
Careful design and adequate funding sources to
The transition to a climate-neutral economy is support the necessary accompanying or
expected to provide additional jobs in growing, compensatory measures are essential for a just
green(ing) sectors both in industry and services, transition. Options include tax shifts from labour to
including construction, waste management and energy consumption, waste and pollution, as well as
sustainable finance. The positive impact on GDP and the use of revenues from climate policies to finance
employment is largely due to the investment activity social transfers ensuring a fair burden sharing.
required to achieve such a transition, together with the Revenue recycling schemes which use revenues from
impact of lower spending on the import of fossil fuels. carbon taxation for the financing of subsidies to
Furthermore, lower consumer prices, notably of solar taxpayers have been shown toenhance the
photovoltaic electricity, boost disposable incomes, acceptability of climate action measures overall.
consumer expenditure and consequently the demand Climate action has also potential to gather further
for consumer services, which are generally labour- social acceptance by bringing forward the co-benefits
intensive. The design of revenue recycling is a major with air quality.
driver of economic and employment outcomes. The
impacts, however, will vary considerably between Progress towards Sustainable Europe 2030 and
sectors and countries, ranging from slightly negative the ambitious vision defined in the
employment impacts in Poland to additional job Communication “A Clean Planet for All” of
creation of up to 1% of the total workforce in Belgium, November 2018 entails a broad policy mix. It
Spain and Germany. requires effective and timely implementation of a
whole range of policy measures and fundamental
Moving to a climate-neutral economy may also reforms at EU, national and regional levels, including in
help to mitigate further job polarisation areas such as energy and transport, taxation, research,
resulting from digitalisation, by creating jobs in industrial and competition policy as well as
the middle of the wage and skill distributions. employment and social policies.
Targeted support is needed for retraining and
upskilling of the workforce, in response to new The Commission has put in place an enabling
framework of policies and programmes that are
(530) Vandyck et al (2018). of key relevance in this context. In addition to the
(531) Which can occur in the case of biomass burining, often
detrimental for air quality.

203
Employment and Social Developments in Europe 2019

many energy- and climate-related initiatives (532), and For the EU’s climate and energy strategy to
the overall commitment for climate mainstreaming succeed, it is of key importance to integrate the
across all EU programme, with a target of 25% of EU social dimension from the outset and not as an
expendicure comtributing to climate objectives, they afterthought. As indicated in the long-term strategy
include in particular: for a climate neutral EU economy by 2050, this will
help to ensure a socially fair, just transition and,
 the European Pillar of Social Rights, which declares eventually, social acceptance and public support for
among other things a right of access to good reform. Social concerns and impacts need to be taken
quality essential services such as water, sanitation, into account from the outset in policy design and
energy and transport, and indicates that support implementation. Where needed, mitigating or
for access to such services should be available for compensatory measures need to be part of the
those in need. It also declares a right to quality and reforms. This approach reflects the importance of the
inclusive education, training and life-long learning environmental-social nexus in the EU development
and a right to adequate social protection – all model.
crucial elements of a fair and just transition.

 the European Structural and Investment Funds,

notably the European Social Fund and the
European Regional Development Fund, which offer
financial support for infrastructure investments
and for reskilling, upskilling, retraining and
transition support.

 the European Globalisation Adjustment Fund, which

supports workers made redundant as a result of
major structural change caused by globalisation,
the continuation of the crisis, or the transition to
low-carbon economy.

 the InvestEU programme, which provides an EU

budget guarantee to support investment and
access to finance in the EU for sustainable
infrastructure, research, innovation and
digitalisation, SMEs and social investment and
skills.

 economic policy coordination under the European

Semester which, among other things, helps to
promote progress towards the Europe 2020
targets. These include lifting Europeans out of
energy poverty, identifying investment needs and
promoting reforms in support of a more circular,
low-carbon economy, including tax shifts away
from labour towards environmental taxes.

 the Initiative for Coal and Carbon-Intensive Regions

in Transition, which helps to mitigate the social
consequences of the low carbon transition and
assists the regions concerned to define low-carbon
transition strategies and address potential negative
socio-economic impacts.

 the Modernisation Fund, which supports low-carbon

investments in 10 lower income EU Member States,
including support of just transition by
redeployment, re-skilling and up-skilling
programmes.

the involvement of stakeholders, notably social

partners, in the design and implementation of these
policies and initiatives.

(532) e.g. Clean Energy for All package, ETS, ESR, LULUCF, emission
standards for cars and vans, eco-design, etc..

204
Annex 1: Studies on the 'greenness' of occupations
Despite the generally accepted view on the significant effects that the transition to a climate-
neutral economy would bring for skills and tasks, only relatively few studies have assessed this
issue in detail. There are surprisingly few reliable statistics on the nature, number, and sectoral concentration of
the jobs affected and relatively less effort has been expended on assessing the ‘greenness’ of different
occupations. Among the few exceptions in the literature are Ast and Margontier (2012) and Eurofound (2012) for
France, Bowen et al. (2018) for the US and Marin and Vona (2018) for the EU:( 533)

 Ast and Margontier (2012) and Eurofound (2012) provide a taxonomy of green and ‘greenable’
occupations in France. They estimate the number of people in green occupations in France in 2008 at 136
000, and that of people in ‘greenable’ occupations at 3.5 million. They find that green occupations are
concentrated in traditional activities such as waste management, treatment of pollution, energy production
and distribution, and protection of the environment, and predominantly held by male employees in stable jobs.
By contrast, they found ‘greenable’ occupations to be much more diverse, with two thirds of them in activities
unrelated to the environment.

 In a study for the US Department of Labor, Bowen et al. (2018) identify occupations subject to ‘greening’ on
the basis of the tasks that the workers in these occupations performed, and identified the ensuing skills needs
for the main economic sectors. Based on this typology, they estimate the share of jobs in the US that would
benefit from a transition to the green economy, and present different measures for the ease with which
workers are likely to be able to move from non-green to green jobs. Using the US O*NET database and its
definition of green jobs,(534) they find that 19.4% of US workers can be considered being part of the green
economy in a broad sense. A large proportion of this ‘green employment’, however, would be ‘indirectly’ green,
comprising existing jobs that are expected to be in high demand due to greening but do not require significant
changes in tasks, skills, or knowledge. They further analyse the task content of jobs and conclude that green
jobs vary in their degree of ‘greenness,’ with very few jobs consisting of green tasks only. They find that non-
green jobs generally differ from their green counterparts in only a few skill-specific aspects, suggesting that
most re-training can happen on-the-job and that greening of the economy holds important growth potential.

 In Bowen and Hancké (forthcoming), the authors are exploring the results when transferring the taxonomy
to the EU economy. This is ongoing work the results of which are presented below.

 Marin and Vona (2018), by contrast, examine the impact of different climate change policies on skills in 15
industrial sectors in 14 European countries, based on a taxonomy of economic sectors according to their
exposure to climate policies. They conclude that climate policies, proxied by energy prices, have a very small
negative impact on total employment, while favouring skilled workers (e.g. technicians and managers) against
manual workers. Climate policies also have a pronounced bias towards technical occupations (e.g. physical
and engineering science technicians, process control technicians).

(533) Jacob et al. (2015) further provide a sector-based typology and analysis of green jobs and their impacts with particular focus on
emerging and developing economies.
(534) See Rivkin et al (2009) and https://www.onetcenter.org/overview.html.

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Vandyck, T. (2013), Efficiency and equity aspects of

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Vandyck, T. and Van Regemorter, D. (2014),

Distributional and regional economic impact of energy
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Vandyck, T., Keramidas, K., Kitous, A., Spadaro, J.V., Van

Dingenen, R., Holland, M. and Saveyn, B. (2018), Air
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Vanhille, J., Verbist, G., & Goedemé, T. (2017) Energie-

efficiënt wonen, ook voor gezinnen in armoede?
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wonen: creatieve ideeën voor een toekomst zonder
energiearmoede (Onderzoeksdag Universitaire

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CHAPTER 6

Sustainability and
governance: the role of
social dialogue
2 has shown that both investment and effective
1. INTRODUCTION (535) institutions are necessary for productivity growth.
Accordingly, investments, for instance in skills and
Sustainability requires balancing economic, infrastructure, can be reinforced by well-functioning
social and environmental objectives and striking institutions that ensure proper management and
compromises between different stakeholders. It implementation. Independently of how it is organised,
challenges the governance system. Objective criteria, social dialogue helps to create a shared understanding,
such as the foreseeable costs and benefits of policy paving the way for joint actions.
options should play an important role for decision
making. However, finding compromises between By bringing together workers and employers,
different stakeholders will require negotiations social dialogue has the additional advantage of
between parties with different interests, so to arrive at representing a large part of society. Social
a common understanding of the issues at stake and of partners are therefore considered key actors when it
how a compromise could look like. Social dialogue comes to reforming and modernising societies and
provides arrangements for such negotiations and can economies. High trade union density and collective
therefore help finding compromises to deliver on bargaining coverage tend to coincide with higher
sustainable development, especially in case of investment in social welfare and stronger trust in
reforms. This chapter will start with linking public institutions. Moreover, transitions at various
sustainability and the Sustainable Development Goals levels tend to be managed better if discussed and
(SDGs) to the areas where social dialogue contributes. agreed by the social partners. This is one explanation
It identifies four areas of social partners’ actions: (1) for associating functioning social dialogue with a
equality at work, working conditions and workers’ perception of stronger governmental effectiveness and
rights, (2) inclusiveness, (3) ecologically sustainable accountability.
economic activity and (4) governance and participation.
The chapter will show how social dialogue has Sustainability requires compromises which go
contributed so far regarding the social, economic and beyond the topics social partners have focused
environmental components of sustainability. on so far. Social dialogue traditionally aims at
compromises, which directly affect those represented
1.1. Sustainability is a topic for social in the negotiations. Sustainability, and in particular its
dialogue environmental component, aims at compromises for
which the consequences are less immediate and where
Social dialogue can facilitate the transition also interests of parties not or less directly
towards a more sustainable economy by represented at the negotiation table (e.g. future
developing a joint understanding of the generations or workers in third countries) need to be
challenges and the way to address them. Chapter taken into account to avoid negative external effects.

(535) This chapter was written by Sigried Caspar, Joé Rieff and Evi Social partners have gradually broadened their
Roelen.
approach and included environmental and social

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 Chapter 6: Sustainability and governance: the role of social dialogue

inclusion aspects into their discussions and 2030 (540) and provide a comprehensive framework for
negotiations. While the Annual Review of Working sustainable development, which aims at world-wide
Life in 2017 explicitly recognises that there was not recognition, so to allow for a global discourse on the
much national cross-industry social dialogue on topics included. Social partners can contribute to most
greening the economy or environmental topics, it of the SDGs, as identified in an issues paper jointly
shows that social partners discuss issues, which are published by the International Labour Organisation
not traditional key domains of social dialogue. (536) (ILO) and the International Trade Union Confederation
Attention to these topics, however, differs very much (ITUC). (541) Building on this work, the chapter will be
over time. (537) Recent examples of top-level national structured around four clusters, defining areas in
social dialogue on broader themes are reforms of which social dialogue and social partners’ activities
social security systems, including pension schemes, impact the SDGs (see Table 6.1). These clusters cover
and increasing employability. In most instances, the the following areas:
discussions also involved third parties, such as the
government or training providers. Further examples for  conditions, rights and equality of work,
broader topics are activation measures for the encompassing the key activities of collective
unemployed in Finland or Poland, the integration of bargaining;
refugees and migrants in Denmark and Sweden,
quotas for foreign workers in the Czech Republic and  the inclusiveness of working life and society, which
Estonia. (538) includes the integration of groups at risk of
marginalisation into the labour market and the link
Broadening the scope of negotiations requires between the area covered by collective bargaining
new partnerships and new strategies. The new and the bordering areas of social security coverage;
approaches can generally be divided into two
categories:  a resource efficient and environmentally
sustainable economic performance, smooth
 Social partners incorporate sustainability aspects transitions in case of restructuring and
more than so far in their programme. They do so
for several reasons. Some aspects (e.g. pollution)  governance and participation, taking into account
might have an influence on the quality of life for the contribution to fostering a democratic society.
their members or their members’ children or they
might negatively impact on the possibility to (540) European Commission (2019).
continue with a certain business model in the (541) ILO-ITUC (2017).
longer run. In other cases they might be motivated
by solidarity with poorly paid and exploited workers
in third countries and - linked to that – a negative
reputation when not taking into account all
dimensions of sustainability, can motivate a
broader scope of social dialogue.

 Social partners cooperate with other stakeholders,

such as environmental organisations or
organisations promoting fair trade, which bring on
board the necessary knowledge on these relatively
new issues.

1.2. Conceptual framework

This chapter links social dialogue to the 17 UN
Sustainable Developments Goals (SDGs) by
clustering the SDGs into four groups. The
SDGs, build on other strategic documents such as the
‘2020 Energy Strategy’ of the EU, with which the
European Union had committed in 2010 to reduce
greenhouse gas emissions until 2020 by 20%, to
increase the use of renewable energy to 20% of the
energy consumption and to achieve energy savings of
at least 20%. (539) These SDGs have been taken up in
the Reflection Paper towards a Sustainable Europe by

(536) Eurofound (2018a).

(537) European Commission (2013).
(538) Eurofound (2018a), p. 29.
(539) European Commission, COM (2010) 639.

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Employment and Social Developments in Europe 2019

Table 6.1
Areas where social partners could contribute
Potential for social partners' involvement in Sustainable Development Goals

working conditions

economic activity
Equality of work,

Governance and
Inclusiveness

participation
Ecologically
sustainable
and rights
GOAL 1: No Poverty x x

GOAL 2: Zero Hunger

GOAL 3: Good Health and Well-being x

GOAL 4: Quality Education x

GOAL 5: Gender Equality x

GOAL 6: Clean Water and Sanitation (x)

GOAL 7: Affordable and Clean Energy (x)

GOAL 8: Decent Work and Economic Growth x x

GOAL 9: Industry, Innovation and Infrastructure x

GOAL 10: Reduced Inequality x

GOAL 11: Sustainable Cities and Communities (x)

GOAL 12: Responsible Consumption and x

Production

GOAL 13: Climate Action x

GOAL 14: Life Below Water (x)

GOAL 15: Life on Land (x)

GOAL 16: Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions x

GOAL 17: Partnerships to achieve the Goal x

Note: Comment: x indicates that the respective cluster contributes directly to the SDG, (x) indicates an indirect contribution of the respective cluster towards the SDG.
Source: http://www.un.org/development/desa/disabilities/envision2030-goal4.html

Cluster 1, on equality at work, working management’ as a factor increasing creativity and

conditions and rights, contributes to: longer term competitiveness;

 No poverty (SDG 1) - e.g. by ensuring minimum  Decent Work and Economic Growth (SDG 8) – e.g.
wages and better working conditions, including the by concluding collective agreements, which include
protection from arbitrary decisions of management health and safety or working time provisions; by
and no arbitrary lay-offs; the anticipation of changing skill needs and the
timely adaptation of workers to new requirements;
 Gender Equality (SDG 5) - e.g. by trade unions
promoting equal pay and ensuring transparent and  Reduced inequality (SDG 10) – e.g. by negotiating
fair treatment of all workers and by employers’ pay schemes which work for different groups of
considering a well-developed ‘diversity employees.

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 Chapter 6: Sustainability and governance: the role of social dialogue

Cluster 2, ‘inclusiveness’, has an impact on:  Partnerships to achieve the goal (SDG 17) - e.g.
bringing together different interest groups, finding
 No Poverty (SDG 1) – e.g. by helping the compromises within and between each side of
unemployed finding their way back to the labour industry and beyond.
market, by training employed to remain part of the
working population, by organising – with public Cluster 4 is distinct from the others, since it
support – job creation companies, by supporting emphasizes next to the results of social dialogue also
transitions in case of mass redundancies or social the negotiation process. The benefits of social dialogue
partner actions to ensure decent pensions; are not only in the decisions taken, but also in the
negotiations per se.
 Good Health and Well-being (SDG 3) – e.g. by
involvement of social partners in the financing and The chapter will deal with the four clusters mentioned
design of the health insurance; above. Especially, cluster 1 and cluster 3 will rely on
data produced for the factor analysis, explained more
 Quality Education (SDG 4) – e.g. by providing in detail in chapter 2 of this publication. For social
training, which ensures the employability of dialogue and collective bargaining, the factor analysis
workers; relies mostly on data from the database on
institutional characteristics of trade unions, wage
 These first two clusters are closely linked to the 20 setting, state intervention and social pacts
principles of the European Pillar of Social Rights (ICTWSS). (543)
which was jointly proclaimed by European
Parliament, the Commission and the Council at the
Social Summit in Gothenburg in November 2017. 2. ACHIEVEMENTS OF SOCIAL DIALOGUE
Cluster 3, ecologically sustainable economic The following section of the chapter will discuss social
activity, makes a direct contribution to: partners’ contributions to each of the clusters. The
promotion of social dialogue is enshrined in the Treaty
 Decent Work and Economic Growth (SDG 8) – e.g. on the Functioning of the EU. The ‘New Start for Social
by maintaining the competitiveness of the Dialogue’ initiative recognized the importance of social
economy, promoting decent work and a safe work dialogue for recovery and competitiveness. (544) This
environment; section will provide different examples for the
effectiveness of social dialogue and explain how social
 Industry, Innovation and Infrastructure (SDG 9) – partners can add to the performance of national
e.g. by negotiating the transition towards more economies.
environmentally friendly and efficient use of
resources. This will allow the industry to implement 2.1. Equality at work, working conditions,
innovations without leaving people behind; workers’ rights

 Climate Action (SDG 13) – e.g. the transition Equality at work, working conditions and
towards new technologies, such as the transition to workers’ rights are core topics for social
low carbon technologies, requires that social dialogue and link to the SDGs in the economic
partners agree on operational steps and and social sphere. They are part of collective
understand the need for joint efforts. The absence agreements and efforts of trade unions are
of such jointly agreed strategy causes friction and immediately directed at improving the situation on
reduces the social acceptance of such these aspects.
transitions; (542)
Reducing wage dispersion and ensuring a
 Furthermore, functioning social dialogue can sufficient income for workers are core objectives
indirectly contribute to find better solutions for the of trade unions. Dispersion of labour earnings is an
SDGs 6, 7, 11, 14 and 15. important reason for inequality; it accounts for 88% of
income inequality (2015) in the EU. (545) Collective
Finally, cluster 4, governance and participation, bargaining allows workers to secure a share in
contributes to: economic growth and contributes to adequate working
conditions. (546) Workers covered by a collective
 Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions (SDG 16) –
e.g. social dialogue can provide a platform for the (543) Visser (2016).
mediation of conflicts. Different from the new (544) Initiative started with a high level conference on 5 March 2015
social movements, social partners have well- and was supported by a quadripartite declaration of 27 June
2016 (Social Partners, the Netherlands Presidency of the
defined mandates and represent a clearly defined Council of the European Union, the Commission)
group; https://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?newsId=2562&langId=en&c
atId=89&furtherNews=yes&
(545) European Commission (2018b), p.115.
(542) ILO ACTRAV (2018). (546) Visser (2016).

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Employment and Social Developments in Europe 2019

agreement tend to have higher wages than other (Chart 6.1). A rather high wage dispersion coinciding
workers. (547) with a low coverage of collective agreements can be
observed in countries like Latvia, Lithuania, Poland,
New technologies will lead to the automation of Estonia, United Kingdom, Hungary and Bulgaria. On the
tasks, thus making it necessary to prepare for other end, for France, Belgium, Denmark, the
transitions. Timely and regular updating of skills Netherlands, Italy, Sweden and Finland high coverage
helps workers to adapt to changing requirements and rates coincide with low wage dispersion. There is a
preparing for new tasks; thus facilitating transitions. third group of intermediate coverage rates with
Workers with higher skills levels have so far been less moderate wage dispersion, formed by Slovenia, Malta,
at risk of being replaced by machines than low skilled Croatia, Germany, Luxemburg, Czech Republic, Greece
workers. Routine tasks, which require only a low level and Ireland, and, finally, there are six Member States,
of skills, are more likely to be automated. (548) Slovakia, Romania, Cyprus, Portugal, Spain and Austria
However, a recent study by Eurofound (549) suggests showing values which cannot be explained in this
that the transition towards a green economy could context. The extent to which collective bargaining
lead to jobs being created at the bottom and middle reduces wage dispersion depends on the structure of
range of the wage distribution. This might mitigate the collective bargaining, i.e. on the degree to which
polarisation of the labour market due to automation. bargaining is coordinated among different national
sectors and on the number of workers covered by a
Technological change and globalisation tend to collective agreement.
reduce the bargaining power of trade
unions. They appear to put pressure on the labour Social partners influence the setting of minimum
income share. (550) Globalisation, in particular the wages and the financing of the social security
threat of off-shoring, reduces the bargaining power of system. 22 Member States have minimum wages.
trade unions. (551) Thus it has contributed to the decline Adjustments to these wages, which are important for
of the labour income share over the last decades. the lower income households, often involve social
(552) Considering these trends, a well-functioning partners. (557) The ability of social partners to influence
social dialogue plays an important role and remains these decisions largely differs between Member States
essential for guaranteeing appropriate wages for and over time. Following the crisis, employers
workers. successfully argued for wage moderation. With the
improved economic situation, in 2018 a number of
Social dialogue can help to stabilise or increase countries substantially increased the minimum wage.
the wage share. In Germany, Spain and Italy, for Via their influence in tripartite structures, social
example, trade unions have been successful in that partners have substantial impact on who pays how
respect. (553) The effectiveness is linked to the much into the social security schemes.
bargaining structure, such as the degree of
Chart 6.1
centralisation (i.e. whether decisions are taken at Gross income inequality tends to be lower for higher
company, sectoral or cross-industry, at regional or coverage rates
national level) and the coverage by collective Income inequality and collective bargaining
agreements, but also to less measurable factors, such
as tradition and the interaction of these different
elements. (554) In general, higher bargaining power of
trade unions increases the labour income share. (555)

Collective bargaining improves social

sustainability by reducing wage dispersion. (556) A
central objective of collective bargaining is to
negotiate wages and working conditions. While the
final income distribution is affected by a large number
of factors, some patterns can be observed when Source: Coverage rate: ICTWSS & GINI-Coefficient DG-EMPL calculations, EU-SILC UDB.
looking at the distribution of gross earnings and the Click here to download chart.
share of workers covered by collective agreements

(547) European Commission (2018a), p. 109; Blanchflower and

Bryson (2003); Felbermayer et al. (2014).
(548) European Commission (2018b).
The level at which bargaining predominantly
(549) Eurofound (2019). takes place matters. Collective bargaining
(550) OECD (2018). agreements signed at higher levels cover a larger
(551) Dumont (2006) and IMF (2017a). number of workers, than those at lower levels.
(552) IMF (2017a; 2017b) and European Commission (2018a). Generally, the more inclusive the bargaining
(553) Guschanski and Onaran (2018). agreement, i.e. the higher the wage bargaining
(554) Empirical evidence is not clear-cut; see Guschanski and Onaran
(2018) and Pak and Schwellnuss (2019). (557)
(555) IMF (2017b). https://www.eurofound.europa.eu/publications/article/201
9/minimum-wages-in-2019-first-findings
(556) OECD (2018).

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 Chapter 6: Sustainability and governance: the role of social dialogue

coverage, the larger its impact on the wage well as through wage negotiation, social partners can
distribution (558). Company level bargaining allows contribute to a reduction of in-work poverty and to
taking into account individual characteristics and firm social sustainability.
specificities. Thus, remuneration to individual
educational level is higher in decentralised wage Chart 6.3
Countries with a high trade union density have lower
bargaining setting. (559) The level of centralisation of
poverty rates
wage bargaining differs from one country to another In-work poverty rate and trade union density
and sometimes also between different areas of an
economy. Indicatively four approaches to collective
bargaining can be distinguished: (a) centralised
collective bargaining, where binding norms or ceilings
are established at central or cross-industry level; (b)
collective bargaining which alternates between central
and industry or sector level; (c) collective bargaining
oscillating between sectoral or industry and company
level and (d) fully decentralised collective bargaining
(i.e. company level only). Centralised wage bargaining
involves a levelling of different situations and implies
more solidarity between different employment
situations. The higher the level of centralisation the Source: In-work poverty: EU-SILC (2016) survey [ilc_iw01]. Trade unions density: OECD -
less differences of productivity between enterprises ICTWSS database and Visser (2016).
Click here to download chart.
can be taken into account but the more employees are
likely to get comparable and fair wages. In terms of
solidarity between groups of employees: collectively Workers represented by a trade union or works
negotiated wages tend to be associated with a lower council are more likely to consider their pay as
age premium and lower benefits of higher appropriate (Chart 6.4). The company level thereby
education (560) than salaries negotiated individually. matters, because it allows for a complementary
individualised assessment of each worker’s situation.
Chart 6.2 This additional possibility of raising concerns and being
Higher Centralisation of Wage Bargaining is associated involved in the process of wage determination
with lower gross income inequality
Income inequality and centralisation of wage bargaining
increases the chances that an outcome is considered
fair. (562)

Going beyond wages, collective agreements deal

also with working conditions and workers’ rights
in a broader sense. They regulate, for example, the
organization of work, such as foreseen working hours,
or access to continued training. It is an instrument to
help adapting to economic and technological changes,
cyclical downturns or international competition. (563) At
the company level, social dialogue improves the
working environment. Chart 6.4 shows that workers
Source: Centralisation of Wage Bargaining: Visser (2016) & GINI-Coefficient : DG-EMPL
are more likely to overall report good working
calculations, EU-SILC UDB. conditions, if a workers’ representation is ensured in
Click here to download chart. the company, as opposed to companies with no
representation. Hence, social dialogue adds to good
health and dignified working conditions, which are
important aspects of social sustainability.
The EU Member States with the highest trade
union density show below average rates of in-
work poverty, whereas the three countries with the (562) Cloutier et al. (2012).
highest in-work poverty rates show an average or (563) TUAC (2018).
below average rate of union membership (see Chart
6.3). The most obvious reason for in-work poverty is
receiving a low salary. Other explanations are low work
intensity or high needs, due to a high number of
dependent children for example (561). With their
involvement in welfare and social security policies, as

(558) Bosch (2015).

(559) Dahl et al. (2013) and OECD (2018).
(560) OECD (2018).
(561) Eurofound (2017).

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Employment and Social Developments in Europe 2019

Chart 6.4 Trade union presence helps less skilled to access

Employee representation improves the quality of work training. The impact of trade unions or works councils
environment
Chances (odds) for workers of enjoying good working conditions (four different (Chart 6.7) appears to be strongest for service and
indicators) in firms where there is a works councils/trade union representation. sales workers, followed by workers in elementary
occupations. Other groups benefit as well, however,
the impact is less pronounced. (567)

Chart 6.5
Less skilled workers in smaller companies are less likely
to receive training
Chances (odds) for different groups of employees of recently having received training,
relative to a reference group (grey bar), 2016

Note: The odds are expressed relative to workers in firms without a works
councils/trade union representation (for which it is normalised to a value of 1).
Source: Own Calculations based on EWCS (2015).
Click here to download chart. Note: For the respective reference group the odds are normalised to a value of 1.
Source: Commission’s calculations based on LFS, 2016. The baseline level is in grey.
Click here to download chart.
Trade union and work councils are positive for
training opportunities: where a trade union or works
Company level social dialogue has a significant
council represents employees, the chances of receiving
impact on the perception of individual career
paid training are 66% higher (Chart 6.4). (564) Social
prospects Chart 6.4. The chances that employees are
partners’ involvement in professional training are
manifold. For instance, in Finland, they are – in close of the view having a job with better career prospects
cooperation with national authorities - running are 28% higher, if a trade union or works council is
campaigns to increase the attractiveness of VET and present in the company or organization. This links with
they contribute to new training and education curricula the better training opportunities, but also to unions
in the national training and education committee. (565) requiring management to implement transparent and
Technological change and greening of the economy fair human resource development strategies. (568) This
require workers to participate in lifelong learning in will be dealt with later on in the chapter. A finding of
order to improve their skills to be able to keep up with the analysis is thereby that trade unions have a
the changes in the labour market. positive impact irrespective of the sector or the
occupation. Thus, trade unions have the potential to
The probability of taking up vocational training improve career prospects for all workers, independent
differs according to firm size and skills levels. of their skill-level.
Different socio-economic factors, such as the type of
Where trade unions and works councils are
company, age or educational background, affect the
present, workers have a more positive
likelihood of taking up paid training. In general,
workers that are older, low-skilled, working on perception of the impact of their work on health.
temporary contracts or in smaller firms are less likely The chances that a worker perceives that his or her
to undergo training. This is presented in Chart 6.5, health is not negatively impacted by work, is 34%
Chart 6.6 and Chart 6.7. Accordingly, individuals higher if (s)he is represented by a works council or
working in jobs requiring only low skills are less likely trade union. This goes, however, along with an
to participate in lifelong learning, as compared to increased awareness of the health risks incurred with
those working in high skill occupations. Beyond that, the job. In many countries, social partners are key
firm size is an important determinant. However, when actors in supervising, monitoring and implementing
taking into account the presence of trade union or regulations relating to health and safety at the
works council representation, firm size becomes a less workplace. (569) In Sweden, for example, trade unions
important determinant for taking up paid training organize a system of regional safety representatives,
(Chart 6.6). (566) who monitor health and safety issues at work.
Furthermore, a safety committee needs to be set up in

(564) OECD (2018). duration, contract of unlimited duration); education (ISCED

(565) Cedefop (2014). levels 1- 6); age; country effects and occupation (ISCO, one
digit). The dependent variable is whether or not a worker took
(566) In Chart 6.4, the estimations are for all Member-States and up paid training in the last 12 months.
occupations. The graph represents the odds of receiving
(567) ILO (2012), associating the International Standard
training when working in a company of 250+ employees or a
Classification of Occupations (ISCO) with the skills needed
company with 10 to 249 employees respectively, as compared
within the respective occupation to carry out the main tasks.
to working in a company of 2 to 9 employees. The regressions
correct for gender; type of contract (no contract, traineeship, (568) Peters et al. (2017).
temporary employment agency contract, contract of limited (569) Eurofound (2009).

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 Chapter 6: Sustainability and governance: the role of social dialogue

companies with more than 50 employees. In Austria, Chart 6.7

social partners are directly involved in public accident Low-skilled workers are less likely to participate in
insurance, which is autonomously managed by social training
Effect of Trade Union presence on paid training opportunities for different groups of
partners. (570) In France, companies with more than 50 employees
employees are required to have Workplace Health and
Safety Committees (Comité d’hygiène, de sécurité et

Chart 6.6
Smaller firms' training disadvantage diminishes with
employee representation
Chances (odds) of having recently undergone training by size of the workplace

Source: Own calculations based on EWCS (2015). In order to analyse whether the effect
of trade unions on paid training opportunities differs across different occupations,
separate regression have been run for the separate occupations. Due to a low
number of observations, occupations related to skilled agricultural, forestry and
fishery work were not retained
Click here to download chart.

Gender equality is an important aspect of

equality at work and for social dialogue. It is as
such a SDG goal (SDG 5). Jointly social partners set
Note: Odds are normalised to a value of 1 for small workplaces with less than 10 rules and fight stereotypes. The activities thereby
workers. Red bars control for the existence of an employee representation. range from equal pay for equal work, similar career
Source: Own calculations, based on EWCS (2015).
Click here to download chart.
perspectives for both sexes to advertising parental
leave for fathers and mothers etc. From an employer
perspective, the benefits are the better use of the
des conditions de travail). (571) These committees are
labour force potential, more diversity and an overall
formed by workers’ representations together with the
better work-life-balance with related lower levels of
heads of the companies and they monitor health and
sickness. At the European level, this has been on the
safety issues at work. Employee participation appears
agenda since many years. The cross-industry social
to be particular relevant in designing and
partners concluded a framework of actions on gender
implementing measures to prevent psychosocial risks.
equality in 2005. (573) This agreement was followed by
A recent survey indicates that on average (EU-28),
further more concrete action plans in specific sectors
63% percent of the companies report that employees
at the EU level, such as in central and local and
were involved in addressing the different risks. (572) On
regional government administration. For local and
average, respondents in larger companies are more
regional government administration also a joint
likely to respond that their work is impacting their
initiative to close the gender pay gap has been
health positively.
recorded. Social partners from the transport sectors
cooperate to attract women to their sectors (e.g. in rail,
(570) urban public transport and Shipping) and have joined
https://www.auva.at/cdscontent/?contentid=10007.67128 the “Women in Transport – EU Platform for
0&viewmode=content. Change” (574) which was launched by the European
(571) See https://travail-emploi.gouv.fr/sante-au-travail/les-acteurs- Commission. Also at the national level social partners
et-interlocuteurs-de-la-sante-au-travail/comite-d-hygiene-de-
securite-et-des-conditions-de-travail/qu-est-ce-qu-un- – sometimes encouraged by the legislator – are taking
chsct/article/le-comite-d-hygiene-de-securite-et-des- initiatives to promote gender equality at the work
conditions-de-travail-chsct. place.
(572) EU-OSHA (2016).
Overall collective bargaining contributes to
fairer and more sustainable wage structures.
However, sometimes specific professional groups
advocate successfully a rather segmental interest,
thus creating the perception of unfairness and non-
sustainable solutions being promoted by social
partners. In general, such problems are less relevant if
unions represent a broader membership, since they are
then required to balance the expectations on collective

(573) https://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=521&langId=en&agre
ementId=1171
(574) https://ec.europa.eu/transport/themes/social/women-transport-
eu-platform-change_en

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Employment and Social Developments in Europe 2019

agreements for different professional groups already 46.79 billion per year and covers all aspects of social
internally. This suggests that a certain level of protection of the rural population, with independent
centralisation and coordination of collective bargaining farmers and their families as main beneficiaries. (582)
increases its social dimension. Further examples can be found in the live performance
and audio-visual sectors, where trade unions advocate
2.2. Inclusiveness the "access to social protection to all workers, including
genuinely self-employed workers and those in non-
A lack of inclusiveness is perceived as a major standard forms of employment, and no matter the
threat to our societies. Over two hundred years ago, duration of the employment relationship" (583).
the father of modern economic theory, Adam Smith,
asserted that “no society can surely be flourishing and Trade unions support inclusiveness, beyond the
happy, of which the far greater part of the members borders of their membership. For example, in the
are poor and miserable”. ( 575) The European European agriculture sector, where around 4 million
Commission states the need for active inclusion, and people work across borders on a part-time, often
defines that this means enabling every citizen, notably seasonal, basis and some have no written employment
the most disadvantaged, to fully participate in society, contracts, trade unions take initiatives. The European
including having a job. (576) In practical terms, this Federation of Food, Agriculture and Tourism Trade
includes adequate income support, inclusive labour Unions (EFFAT) together with its national affiliates
markets and access to quality services. Also in this help these temporary workers by informing them
area, which reaches beyond traditional social partners’ about their rights, reducing problems related to social
activities, they can make a crucial contribution to the insurance and representing them before national
SDGs. authorities and courts. Many of these temporary
workers are not members of a trade union, neither in
Well-functioning social protection systems are their country of origin, nor in their country of
recognised as a key element of sustainable destination. (584)
development. Social protection links to the SDG 3
‘Good Health and Well-being’. A Council Social partners also foster inclusiveness beyond
Recommendation on access to social protection for Europe. There are a few Transnational Company
workers and self-employed encourages Member States Agreements (TCAs), such as the Bangladesh accord,
to provide everyone who works with access to social the framework agreement between Vinci-QDVC and
protection schemes. (577) Since such schemes are often BWI (Builders and Woodworkers international) and the
financed through contributions of employees, jobless framework agreement on living wages, which was
and also self-employed find themselves frequently signed by IndustriAll and garment companies. These
excluded from social protection. ETUC has argued for agreements focus on social sustainability, defined as
the importance of providing protection for all ( 578) and certain minimum working conditions for workers in
employers have also been active in this respect. developing countries. These agreements react mainly
to very specific problems on which European media
Sectoral social partners have taken initiatives to had reported widely, namely the fire in the garment
strengthen and extend social protection at the factory in Bangladesh, the mistreatment of
European and national level. For instance, Italian construction workers to prepare Qatar for the football
railway workers went on general strike several times in championships in 2022 and the poor pay in some
2018 defending the extension of social protection countries with a strong textile sector. Also company-
rights and working conditions to all workers in the level agreements ensure certain minimum standards
sector, including those sub-contracted (579), clearly in countries outside Europe. For example, the
striving for more inclusiveness. ETUC is arguing to framework agreement between Acciona S.A., Building
include platform workers into social protection and Wood Workers’ International and CCOO
schemes. (580) Also initiatives of platform workers, such Construction and Services and MCA-UGT, which aims
as Uber-drivers or Deliveroo-riders to benefit from at promoting the principles defined in the Universal
workers’ rights and the inclusion in social protection Declaration of Human Rights, the ILO Tripartite
schemes have been registered. (581) The European Declaration, the OECD Guidelines for Multinational
Network of Agricultural Social Protection Systems Enterprises and the United Nations Global
(ENASP) is active in six Member States, Austria, Compact. (585) The Global Agreement on
Finland, France, Germany, Greece and Poland, with Environmental and Social Responsibility between
altogether 12.3 million beneficiaries, a budget of EUR Auchan Retail International and UniGlobal and
UniCommerce establishes a forum for information and
(575) Smith (1776), Chapter 8. dialogue between the signatories and confirms the
(576) https://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?langId=en&catId=1059&
(577) https://ec.europa.eu/social/BlobServlet?docId=20982&langId=en (582) ENASP (2015).
(578) https://www.etuc.org/en/theme/social-protection-policy-social- (583) Debate on the application of the anti-cartel provisions of Art
inclusion 101 TFEU to the self-employed.
(579) https://www.etf-europe.org/etf-backs-italian-railway-workers- (584) EFFAT (2018)
in-strike-action/ (585)
(580) Prassl (2018). https://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=978&langId=en
(581) European Parliament (2017). &agreementId=258

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 Chapter 6: Sustainability and governance: the role of social dialogue

importance of following best business, environmental 2010, ITUC adopted a ‘Resolution on combating
and social practices, wherever the company is climate change through sustainable development and
present. (586) just transition’, developing the concept of just
transition. This has become a key concept, which
Social partners contribute to the design of recognises that ecological questions are social
inclusive education and training. Good quality questions.
education and training is important to succeed in the
labour market. In many European countries social The approach of trade unions towards ecological
partners participate in designing vocational education topics has evolved over time and is still
and training programs, also reaching out to groups, heterogeneous. Already in 1996, the German trade
which are difficult to integrate into the labour market. union association DGB included the achievement of an
The involvement of social partners in the governance ecologically sustainable development into its policy
of VET systems ensures the relevance of the objectives. (591) Research on the subject with
curriculum and provides in-work training opportunities, substantial involvement of trade unions, dates back
facilitating the transition into employment. It is a many years. (592) For the Austrian trade unions, a shift
factor underpinning the success of these systems. (587) has been observed from non-activity on ecological
In Denmark, a council appointed by the social partners issues towards their active support. For instance, in the
is responsible for making recommendations on new period 1970-1990s, Austrian trade unions were on
initial vocational training programs, before being several occasions unfavourable towards ecological
approved by the Ministry of Education. Lithuania and concerns and they were much more inclined to take on
Slovakia have advisory bodies in which the social board economic considerations. In doing so, they
partners advise the government on vocational positioned themselves as opponents of environmental
education and training. (588) In Austria and Germany, movements. As from the year 2000 onwards, however,
social partners are a central stakeholder in the their position has changed. The ‘job versus
development of apprenticeship schemes. They are environment dilemma’ was replaced by a more
represented on the regional and federal boards, ecological approach. (593) Contributions from trade
providing opinions on new apprenticeships schemes. unions reflect thereby also an internal debate. One
Furthermore, they prepare the training regulations and position suggests that the transition to a green
training standards and are represented in examination economy should be seen as an evolutionary process,
boards. (589) In Luxembourg, employers and employees requiring the economic and social system to undergo
are organised in five professional chambers, which are major reforms. However, the fundamental rules should
consulted on all major decisions related to VET. These remain in place. The alternative position suggests the
chambers are involved in the identification of training need for a more radical approach, prominently
and qualification needs, the revision and elaboration of advocated by the De-growth movement. This position
training curricula frameworks, the organisation of questions the existing socio-economic model’s
initial and vocational education and training in capacity to reach the sustainability goals and demands
secondary schools and training companies and they an overhaul of the current focus on economic growth
assess the quality of the VET system. In 2008, the towards broader environmental and social
legal framework for the VET in Luxembourg was objectives. (594)
decided in partnership between the employers’ and
employees’ chambers as well as the government. (590) Enterprises and their representatives
increasingly position themselves towards the
2.3. Ecologically sustainable economic sustainability goals in general and the emission
activity reduction targets in particular. A recent
BusinessEurope position paper supports the EU
Maintaining welfare, growth and social cohesion, while
ambition of net-zero greenhouse gas emissions
using natural resources in a sustainable way, avoiding (climate neutrality) to reach the objectives of the Paris
pollution and limiting greenhouse gases are the key Agreement but it asks for attention to the framework
elements of the ecological dimension of sustainability. conditions. (595) In the position paper on expectations
from COP24, BusinessEurope stressed the need to
Trade unions are working on the subject of
adopt a strong rulebook, putting emphasis on
ecological sustainability since many years at
monitoring, verification and accounting rules. A major
international, European and national level. In concern is the absence of equally strong positive
actions from some major Non-EU economies. (596) The
(586)
https://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=978&langId=en
&agreementId=289 (591) DGB (1996) (still valid).
587
( ) ILO (2018a). (592) Blazejczak et al. (1998).
(588) European Commission (2016). (593) Soder (2018).
(589) https://www.apprenticeship-toolbox.eu/social-partners- (594) e.g. Pochet, P. (2017).
companies/involvement-of-social-partners/12-involvement-of- (595) BusinessEurope, 29 April 2019:
social-partners-in-austria. https://www.businesseurope.eu/publications/european-business-
(590) https://www.apprenticeship-toolbox.eu/social-partners- views-competitive-energy-climate-strategy
companies/involvement-of-social-partners/38-involvement-of- (596) BusinessEurope: Our expectations from COP24, Position paper
social-partners-in-luxembourg. of 30/11/2018

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Employment and Social Developments in Europe 2019

report on European Business’ Views on a Competitive Measurable progress towards embracing the
Energy and Climate Strategy states in the foreword ecological challenges has been slow so far.
that ‘the strategy is not the end of the road, but rather Already in the report Industrial Relations in Europe
the beginning of a new chapter’, suggesting that there 2012 the situation is summarised as ‘The role of the
are also internal discussions ongoing in social partners in the transition to green and greener
BusinessEurope. (597) The other cross-industry jobs has been gradually increasing in recent years.
employer organisations, representing small and However, more needs to be done to build a lasting and
medium sized enterprises (SMEunited) and the sustainable social dialogue that can help to meet the
European Centre of Employers and Enterprises challenges posed by the move to a competitive, low-
providing Public Services and Services of general carbon and resource efficient economy.’ Comparing
interest (CEEP) follow a similar approach. (598) this with the statement of EU cross-industry social
SMEunited stresses that SMEs are key to fight climate partners of 2017, progress during these five years was
change, while also stating the need to support SMEs in slow. Surveys, undertaken in Germany in 2006 and
this transition. (599) The energy intensive industries, similarly in 2017, show, that over this period the
which will have to go through significant importance attributed to the responsibility towards
transformation, have become very active in the debate future generations has declined. (602)
on how they can transition towards carbon neutrality
asking recognition on the framework conditions that Results of social dialogue at national cross-
they see as necessary. (600) industry level with direct ecological implications
concern mainly reactions to governmental
The diversity of organisations affiliated to the initiatives. That was the case, e.g. in Bulgaria, where
cross-industry employer organisations makes social partners reacted to the energy directive, in
determined action difficult. The cleavage on the Croatia, where the strategic development planning act
side of the organised employers is not about whether was under discussion. An example of bipartite action
sustainability requires substantial reforms or a provided the Belgian social partners. They agreed to
paradigm shift, but more whether substantial reforms develop a mobility budget for employees, including the
with strong governmental intervention are needed, or option for employees to exchange their company car
whether this could be left largely to the markets and for more sustainable alternatives. (603)
to cost-efficient innovation processes. Organisations
such as ‘The Prince of Wales’s Corporate Leaders Some national social dialogue structures are
Group’ follow a distinct ‘green’ agenda and could mark better prepared to negotiate agreements on
the start of a trend. (601) Table 6.2 shows that most innovative topics such as ‘green issues’. (604)
economic activities are likely to benefit from the Factors which facilitate innovative agreements on
transition towards a low-carbon economy. A positive green topics are trust between the social partners, high
approach increases the probability of being able to level of competence of the parties negotiating, a
shape the policies and restructuring, imminent or cooperative mindset of the parties involved (as
already under way. opposed to a competitive mindset) and the ability to
keep the conflict at the task level, thus avoiding – to
Social partners understand the need for action the extent possible – that it becomes categorical or
to avoid global warming of more than 2°C. For personal. Managers from 11 European countries were
instance, EU cross-industry social partners have asked for their views about the cooperation with
agreed on a statement ‘Tapping the potential from employees’ representatives. For Germany, the
greening the economy for jobs creation’ (30/05/2017), Netherlands and Estonia they responded that
in which they recognise that achieving the Sustainable employee representatives had considerable impact.
Development Goals ‘requires further efforts, in These are countries where the relations between the
particular a greener and more sustainable growth’ and social partners are characterised by high mutual trust
that this implies considerable investment and skills- and a strong cooperative mindset. In two countries
related initiatives. Furthermore, they promise to with traditionally strong social dialogue structures,
support this transition process, without, however, going Italy and France, managers found the impact of
into details what sort of commitment they are willing employee representatives rather moderate. For France
to take. this was supported by the observation that industrial
relations are more categorical (touching on the
https://www.businesseurope.eu/sites/buseur/files/media/position relationship between the negotiators) than in other
_papers/iaco/businesseurope_cop24_statement.pdf
countries and that the parties have a remarkably low
(597) BusinessEurope, 29 April 2019:
https://www.businesseurope.eu/publications/european-business-
willingness to approach negotiations with a
views-competitive-energy-climate-strategy cooperative mindset. For Italy, remarkably little
(598) For CEEP see the CEEP Opinion on the Commission Proposal for deviations from the European mean have been found
a “Clean Energy for all Europeans” Package from 16 June 2017 suggesting that further institutional components, such
(599) https://smeunited.eu/news/smes-are-fundamental-for-
sustainability (602) Hilmer et al. (2017).
(600) VUB-IES (2018), Industrial Value Chain. A bridge towards a (603) Eurofound (2018a).
carbon neutral Europe, (604) e.g. García et al. (2015).
https://www.ies.be/files/Industrial_Value_Chain_25sept_0.pdf
(601) https://www.corporateleadersgroup.com/about

220
 Chapter 6: Sustainability and governance: the role of social dialogue

as labour management regulations, might need to be ‘Towards sustainable urban mobility’ (606). The
looked at. construction sector is elaborating guidelines to
improve workers skills for building low energy
The impact of climate change on industries consuming houses. The metal sector carried out a
differs across sectors. In terms of employment, an project aiming at anticipating the consequences of the
increase in jobs is expected in the construction, environmental sustainability agenda on employment
agriculture and power generation sectors, whereas the and skills in the machine tool & robotics sector. In
mining and extraction industry is expected to be sum, social partners have adopted a number of
negatively affected, especially due to the decline in documents to deal with the transition to a low-carbon
fossil fuel-related mining. Nevertheless, the energy economy. The focus is on reducing the environmental
sector as a whole is expected to experience job gains. damage caused by the industry and to develop more
This is shown in Table 6.2. sustainable practices, in particular in case the
economic and employment impact is expected to be
Table 6.2
positive for the sector.
Long-term employment impacts differ significanly
across sectors
Sectoral employment impact, difference from baseline in 2050, %
Greening the economy will have an impact on the
Range of change in structure and organisation of the sectors and on
Share of
jobs by 2050, the skills needed to retain employment. Beyond
Sector total jobs in
2015
compared to changing skill requirements within companies,
baseline greening of the economy might also mean that new
Construction 6.7% companies will emerge and others will disappear and
+0.3% to +2.8%
that there might be adjustments between regions. A
Services 71.7% report from 2012 for example already confirms that a
-2.0% to +0.9%
Agriculture 4.5%
more intensive use of renewables might increase the
-0.7% to +7.9% number of SMEs which often operate in more remote
Mining and extraction 0.5% areas, thus making unionisation far more difficult. (607)
-62.6% to -2.9%
Another prominent case in that respect is the
Power generation 0.7%
+3.6% to +22.3% ‘Kohlekompromiss’, which was negotiated in early
Manufacturing 2019 in Germany. This compromise provides a
2.0%
(Energy intensive industries) -2.6% to +1.8% pathway to phase out within the next 20 years the
Other manufacturing 13.3% production of electricity from lignite. The commission
-1.4% to +1.1%
that negotiated the compromise consisted of 31
Note: Employment effects from JRC-GEM-E3 and E3ME. Ranges of estimated changes
in jobs in 2050 depend on the underlying model and modelling assumptions. people, representing politics, industry, the regions with
Source: Source: Adapted from European Commission (2018a) pp. 227-229 substantial lignite mining, trade unions, environmental
Click here to download table.
organisations and scientists. To moderate negative
consequences of this phase-out, it was agreed to
At the sectoral level, social partners have provide structural support of around 40 billion Euro
discussed this transition in various ways. For throughout the process and to facilitate the necessary
instance, in 2016, social partners in the extractive transitions for the employees. While this compromise
industries agreed on a joint position regarding the has been criticised as particularly costly, considering
review of the EU Emission Trading System (ETS) for the 20000 jobs at stake (608), others praise the ability
the post-2020 period. They are in particular concerned to find a compromise. (609)
about the competitiveness of their sector. Beyond the
more defensive aspects of reducing the economic Sustainability might require a change in mindset
pressure on the sector by suggesting the allocation of in some sectors. Sectors with a particular
free emission rights and stressing the problem of responsibility towards sustainability are agriculture
carbon leakage, the social partners also asked for and seafisheries (SDG 14 and 15). These sectors
reliable framework conditions and to jointly work on a influence directly the natural resources and experience
‘just transition’ (605), fostering a transition to a low the tension between short-term output maximisation
carbon economy that is sustainable and fair for those and long-term sustainability. In the agricultural sector,
who might be most affected. The chemical sector discussions on the future of farming are ongoing.
commits to the COP21 objective and aims at further However, much of the transition towards biological
greening the sector. Also social partners in the farming so far has taken place outside the established
electricity sector developed joint positions on COP21 sectoral representation structures, indicating that also
and measures to mitigate social impacts and on the in the near future progress will depend on the
new energy market design. In 2016, the social partners framework conditions. In the seafisheries sector, social
in urban public transport adopted a joint statement partners appreciate the fact that overexploitation of
(605) IndustriAll, IMA Europe, APEP, euromines, Euracoal, UEPG: (606) ETF and UITP (Social partners in the local public transport):
Position of the Social Dialogue Committee of the extractive Towards sustainable urban mobility, March 2016.
industry with regards to the revision of the EU ETS directive for
(607) Eurofound (2012).
the post 2020 period, September 2016.
(608) Hermann et aL (2018),
(609) e.g. Mattheß (2019).

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Employment and Social Developments in Europe 2019

fish stocks has been reduced. (610) Other sectors, with Foundation for Training and Employment
a particular responsibility for the transition towards a (FUNDAE). This allows to constantly update training
more sustainable economy are the provision of public provision in the framework of active labour market
utilities, such as water, waste management, or urban policies, to keep up with the needs of the greening the
development (SDG 6, 7 and 11). economy.(616) Through these efforts, social partners
smoothen the transition towards a more digitalised
Governments and the European Commission are and more sustainable economy.
increasingly involving social partners in climate
policies. Since the New Start for Social Dialogue the Next to the inclusion of green topics into
European Commission has organised three dedicated existing structures, new formats of dialogue are
high level meetings to discuss issues related to the developed. Social partners cooperate with other
greening of the economy with the European social stakeholders, thus creating bipartite+ or tripartite+
partners. In some countries, social partners are partnerships. At European level, the involvement of
involved in national industry strategies for the BusinessEurope and ETUC and sectoral social partner
transition to green economy. In some cases, specific organisations such as the food processing industry, the
consultative bodies have been created. In the agricultural and the education sector in the SDGs’
Netherlands and Poland, for example, the social Multi-Stakeholder Platform (617) is a concrete example
partners are involved in the development of Low where social partners work next to other organisations
Carbon Strategies at regional level (611). In November to prepare for a sustainable development. The other
2016, the German government approved its Climate NGOs involved in the process concern, for example the
Action Plan 2050, setting out a strategy for becoming social platform, the European Environmental Bureau,
greenhouse-gas neutral by 2050. This plan includes the World Wildlife Found, and the Fair Trade Advocacy
for the first time the sectoral targets for the Office. This Platform has provided a contribution to the
proportional reduction of greenhouse gases, with Reflection Paper ‘Towards a sustainable Europe by
reductions of respectively 67-66% in construction, 62- 2030’ (October 2018). The contribution of the platform
61% in energy, 51-49 in industry, 42-40% in transport to the reflection paper concludes that the platform
and 34-31% in agriculture by 2030. A comprehensive should continue and ‘should liaise with and not
impact assessment of these targets has been carried duplicate any other regular sectoral or topical
out in the course 2018, the results of which have been dialogues with stakeholders at European level’ ( 618).
discussed with the social partners (612). The Belgian Agreeing to that means that social partners have
Federal Council for Sustainable Development, accepted that sustainability is an issue for social
established in 1997, advises the Belgian federal dialogue but goes beyond industrial relations into a
government on its policies towards sustainable broader social sphere, so that social partner
development. It focusses in particular on issues linked organisations have to work with other stakeholder
to climate, environment and biodiversity. Members of representatives on most aspects of sustainability. At
the Council are social partners, representing 50 national level, in Belgium, the Citizen Initiative ‘Sign
percent of its members with voting right, For My Future’, a petition launched by civil society,
environmental, development and consumer NGOs, universities, employer organisations and
organisation representatives and scientists. (613) company leaders and also supported by trade unions
in Belgium was launched on 5 February 2019. The
Social dialogue and tripartite structures support petition requests for a law on climate to become
the skills adaptations necessary for a greener climate-neutral by 2050; an investment plan for
economy. Greening the economy changes the climate that enters into force in 2022 at the latest;
production of goods and services. Itrequires the use of and the establishment of an independent council on
new technologies and therefore changes the demand climate to supervise climate policy in Belgium, entitled
for skills.(614) At the company level, social partners to make recommendations (619) (620). The ‘Sign For My
improve the prospects of participating in training as Future’ campaign was launched after several weeks of
discussed in section 2.1. At the sectoral and national climate protests by students and the general public. A
level, social partners are active in anticipating skills global strike for the climate took place on 15 March
and restructuring needs. In France, social partners are 2019.(621) In Spain, la Alianza por el clima, which
members of strategic committees identifying further
skills needs and jointly manage related training (616) Cedefop (2018b).
programs.(615) Similarly, in Spain, social partners take (617) https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/international-
strategies/global-topics/sustainable-development-goals/multi-
part in the process of skills need identification through stakeholder-platform-sdgs/platform-members_en
membership of joint committees within the State (618) SDG Multi-Stakeholder Platform to the Reflection Paper p. 47
https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/sdg_multi-
(610) Europêche press release of 17 September 2018. stakeholder_platform_input_to_reflection_paper_sustainable_e
(611) ETUC (2016): ETUC Project Industrial Regions and climate urope2.pdf
policies: Towards a Just Transition? A guide for Trade Unions. (619) https://www.rtbf.be/info/societe/detail_sign-for-my-future-300-
(612) https://www.bmu.de/fileadmin/Daten_BMU/Download_ patrons-academiques-associations-pour-le-
PDF/Klimaschutz/klimaschutzplan_2050_kurzf_en_bf.pdf climat?id=10137487
(613) FRDO, De Raad, https://www.frdo-cfdd.be/nl (620) https://arbeidenmilieu.be/
(614) ILO (2018b). (621) EPSU, EPSU Newsletter 20 February 2019,
(615) Cedefop (2018a). https://www.epsu.org/newsletter/epsu-newsletter-20-february

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 Chapter 6: Sustainability and governance: the role of social dialogue

became active in recent years, is a broad cooperation weakening the role of social partners. During the same
representing amongst others the environmental period in most Member States also deviation clauses
movement, trade unions, farmers and consumer and practices, i.e. the possibilities to deviate from
organisations, aiming at promoting an energy model higher level collective agreements, were revised. Often
that is renewable, sustainable, efficient and fair. The this took place to find a new balance between more
Italian Coalizione Clima, set-up in 2015, represents centralised forms, such as sectoral collective
organisations from the public sector, trade unions and bargaining, and more decentralised forms of wage
businesses, schools, universities and citizens. They bargaining. Only for three countries, Belgium, Malta
cooperate on the fight against climate change and aim and the Netherlands neither of these two types of
for a binding agreement to keep the level of global changes took place in the period 2000-2013.
warming below 2 degrees (622).
Tripartite structures also change over time.
2.4. Governance and participation These changes happen in various forms and on various
occasions. One example comes from Luxemburg,
Social dialogue and employee participation can where the government, in discussion with the social
contribute to good corporate governance, to partners, decided to abandon the distinction between
social cohesion and to equality. (623) Principle 8 of workers and employees, moving to a so-called single
the European Pillar of Social Rights affirms social [employment] status. (629) In line with this transition,
dialogue and the involvement of workers constitutes also a single chamber of employees was created,
principle 8 of the European Pillar of Social Rights. A bringing together two previously existing
recent study based on a sample of 14000 European chambers. (630) Trade unions welcomed the reform as
workers finds that employees with greater levels of it reduced the cleavage between white and blue-collar
individual autonomy and voice at work, are workers. (631) The newly created chamber of
significantly more engaged in pro-democratic employees represents 496000 workers in Luxembourg.
behaviour and have more trust in democracy. The The chamber is governed by a board, which is
report concludes that ‘the organisation of work has appointed in democratic elections by all those
non-economic implications beyond the represented by the chamber. Similar processes of
workplace’. (624)The possibility to actually influence merging or assimilating different traditional
working conditions and the protection provided by a employment status (worker, employee and sometimes
trade union at the enterprise level, are effective means also official) can be found in many Member States. A
to reduce the feeling of powerlessness and the appeal specificity of Luxemburg and a few other Member
of right-wing populism. (625) At European level, the States, such as Austria, is the existence of a specific
report ‘Benchmarking Working Europe 2019’ shows chamber of employees, with a general mandate on all
positive correlations between democracy at work on issues related to employment and elected by all
the one side and employee productivity, employment employees.
rate and income equality on the other side. (626)
Coordinated systems of collective bargaining are
Social dialogue structures change over time. For linked to higher employment and lower
2017, Eurofound registers in eleven Member States unemployment than fully decentralised or
changes affecting collective bargaining. (627) Some of centralised systems, (632) thus indicating that the
these changes encourage decentralised collective more sustainable solutions are probably not at the
bargaining, others feature a more centralised, sector- extremes of the coordination spectrum. Finding the
level bargaining. Altogether, there is no clear trend right balance between coordination and
visible. For the period 2000-2013, Eurofound decentralisation is important, as the organisational
identified in 18 Member States legal reforms that power of trade unions and employer organisations has
affected collective bargaining negotiations and seen a long-term decline. This decline has halted in the
processes. (628) These reforms range from new laws on recent past, but it might be too early to talk of a
collective agreements (Slovenia, 2006) to extending turnaround.
the scope of collective bargaining in public services
(France, 2010) or a new social dialogue act, There is a growing gap between countries, where
abolishing/weakening collective bargaining processes social dialogue plays a substantial role and
above company level (Romania, 2010). The aims of countries where this is not the case. In particular
these reforms range from strengthening social in Central and Eastern European countries,
dialogue and adapting it to new contextual conditions membership density of trade unions and employer
to giving more powers to the government, thus organisations has declined, leading to a weakening of
(622) ETUC (2018), p.40-45. (629) Law of 13 May 2008 on the introduction of a single status,
(623) Eurofound (2015a), p. 48. Memorial A, Number 60, 15 May 2008.
(624) Budd et al. (2018). (630) This single chamber of employees was preceeded by two
(625) Hilmer, et al. (2017). separate chambers for workers and for employees.
(626) ETUI (2019), chapter 4. (631) See: http://www.ogbl.lu/wp-
(627) Eurofound (2018b), p. 19. content/uploads/2011/10/statut_unique_fr.pdf (last accessed:
06.05.2018).
(628) Eurofound (2015b), p. 23 and 33.
(632) OECD (2018), Chapter 3.

223
Employment and Social Developments in Europe 2019

social dialogue also in its tripartite forms and lower The role of social partners for a well-functioning
influence on governmental reforms. On the other side, governance system can be summarised in four
in the countries with a (rather) stable situation social points:
dialogue has seen a broadening of the collective
bargaining agenda. (633)  Social dialogue can help to absorb sudden
shocks. Member States with strong and
Efforts are made to close this gap. Responding to cooperative social dialogue structures have overall
these developments, the European Commission resisted better to the economic crisis then
encourages for the next Multiannual Financial others.(637)
Framework, that countries with weak social dialogue
structures help their social partners to use European  Transitions, involving social partners, are
Social Fund Plus (ESF+) support to strengthen their overall smoother. Major initiatives to include
structures. This goes along with the political support social partners and to moderate transitions, like the
and attention provided to national social partners in just transition discussion (638), cause in general less
the context of the European Semester. friction because of the negotiation between the
relevant stakeholders allows to find the best
The benefits of social dialogue lie also in the
possible solution. This way of managing transitions
partnerships created. This adds to sustainability and stresses cooperation between the government,
more precisely to SDG 17 ‘partnerships to achieve a social partners and experts.
goal’. Particularly when dealing with the environmental
component, social partners often opt for new  Social partner organisations allow for
partnerships, for instance with environmental bundling and voicing interests, which might not
organisations. In doing so, they represent not only the be heard otherwise. This is in particular true for,
interests of workers and employers. Instead, they go interests of SMEs and for employees. By
beyond, representing an even larger part of society. representing those groups in decision-making
processes, social partners allow for more
Social partner organisations are well advised to
democratic decisions in every day live.
include environmental topics in their
programmes. High levels of economic development,  Social partner organisations coordinate
low levels of unemployment, together with the internal discussions. They do not only act
presence of tangible environmental issues are towards the other side of the industry or the
important factors to increase support for Green political decision makers, they also have internal
topics. (634) Under these conditions environmental discussions to form their opinion and to balance
topics are gaining attractiveness. Hower the transition different, often conflicting, internal views. These
towards an environmentally sustainable economy has internal discussions are necessary to identify the
significant distributional impacts, which require to be necessary changes and create acceptance for them
managed. (635) with the membership. However, sometimes those
discussions do notdedefo take place or they do not
A sustainable governance system needs to build
have a sufficient level of openness. In those cases,
on evidence-based and inclusive decisions,
the respective organisations risk to loose relevance.
requiring the involvement of social partners.
Considering the environmental challenges, ambitious
changes are urgently needed. This will require the 3. CONCLUSIONS
players to go beyond what they consider as their core
interests and to show mutual trust in order to be able Social dialogue contributes to more sustainable
to make the necessary concessions. Social dialogue societies. However, in order to reach their full
allows to produce such compromises. Social partners potential, social partner organisations and social
are key actors when it comes to reforming and dialogue need to change furtherThere is a risk to focus
modernising societies and economies as they allow on competitive disadvantages rather than on the
anchoring the sustainability project in the society and potential gains of a more sustainable management.
agreeing on realistic steps. Reaching sustainability
without or against them will be even more difficult. So far the contribution of social dialogue to
Hence, it pays off to involve social partners in sustainability seems to be most effective and
restructuring processes and allowing them to manage important in the core areas of social dialogue,
these processes. (636) linked to the economic and social sustainability. The
chapter finds that social dialogue is an important
means to find compromises and where the dialogue
(633) Eurofound (2015b), p. 55.
functions well, these compromises create a framework
(634) Grant and Tilley (2019),
to further develop and to ensure that the economy
(635) e.g. Strasser (2019).
develops in a way that workers are not left behind.
(636) ETUC (2016).

(637) European Commission (2015), p.209.

(638) ETUC (2016).

224
 Chapter 6: Sustainability and governance: the role of social dialogue

Public authorities set the framework for social

partners’ negotiations. As sustainability requires to
go beyond the direct concerns of social partners, their
negotiations are most productive if public authorities
provide guidance concerning the objectives to be
achieved. Social partners can contribute very
effectively to develop transitions once sufficient clear
framework conditions have been defined.

A key characteristic of well-functioning social

dialogue is mutual respect and trust between
the social partners, while acknowledging diverging
views and keeping in mind common interests. There
are strong indications that these governance related
aspects will be critical for developing the innovative
solutions needed for a more sustainable society. This
comes together with the development of new
alliances, such as the involvement of environmental
organisations and other groups constituting the civil
society.

Well-functioning social dialogue fosters social

fairness by improving working conditions
without damaging the longer-term economic
performance. Collective bargaining tends to reduce
wage dispersion, and higher centralisation of wage
bargaining is associated with lower income inequality.
Employee representation in general improves the
quality of the work environment.

Trade unions and employers cooperate on social

themes beyond the workplace. They reach out to
groups, such as people at the margin of the labour
market not necessarily being in a situation of standard
or even formal employment.

Climate change and global warming are

increasingly on the agenda of social partner
organisations and of tripartite discussions.
Following a phase in which both employers and
workers considered this discussion more ideological
there are now signs that both trade union
organisations and employer organisations are more
pro-active, accepting the necessity to manage this
transition. However, concrete achievements – beyond
the management of well-defined transitions – are not
easy to find.

Social partners strengthen the democratic

elements in our society. They allow workers and
employees to have a say on different issues linked to
their working life and beyond, and in doing so, to be
more in control. Furthermore, in particular trade unions
are actively involved in the public debate. They provide
platforms to discuss new technological developments
and what to do to address the environmental
challenges, thereby creating new partnerships.

225
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Statistical annex
1. COUNTRY PROFILES

European Union 28
European Union 28 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Real GDP 3.1 0.5 -4.3 2.1 1.8 -0.4 0.3 1.8 2.3 2.0 2.5 2.0
Total employment 1.9 1.0 -1.7 -0.7 0.1 -0.4 -0.3 1.0 1.1 1.3 1.6 1.3
Labour productivity 1.2 -0.5 -2.6 2.8 1.6 0.0 0.6 0.7 1.2 0.7 0.9 0.6
Macro Economic Indicators

Annual average hours worked per person employed 0.1 -0.2 -1.3 -0.3 0.2 -1.0 -0.4 0.1 -0.1 0.3 -0.4 -0.2
(Annual % growth)

Real productivity per hour worked 1.1 -0.3 -1.4 3.1 1.5 0.9 1.0 0.7 1.3 0.5 1.3 0.8
Harmonized CPI 2.4 3.7 1.0 2.1 3.1 2.6 1.5 0.6 0.1 0.2 1.7 1.9
Price deflator GDP 2.8 0.1 -1.5 2.0 1.2 2.4 0.6 1.7 3.0 -1.1 0.4 1.2
Nominal compensation per employee 3.3 0.5 -1.0 3.8 1.9 2.9 0.9 1.8 3.2 -0.5 1.0 2.4
Real compensation per employee (GDP deflator) 0.5 0.4 0.5 1.7 0.7 0.4 0.4 0.1 0.2 0.6 0.7 1.2
Real compensation per employee (private consumption
0.9 -3.1 -2.0 1.7 -1.2 0.2 -0.6 1.3 3.1 -0.7 -0.7 0.5
deflator)
Nominal unit labour costs 2.1 1.0 1.7 1.0 0.2 2.9 0.4 1.1 1.9 -1.2 0.1 1.8
Real unit labour costs -0.8 0.9 3.2 -1.0 -0.9 0.5 -0.2 -0.6 -1.0 -0.1 -0.2 0.5
Total population (000) 498301500297 b 502090 503171 b502965 b 504048 b 505163 507235 b 508520 b 510182 511373 b 512379
Population aged 15-64 (000) 334546335847 336478 336350 335459 b 334945 334154 333971 b 333201 b 333004 332290 b 331526
Total employment (000) 220165 222731 218793 216084 216258 215857 215484 218397 220940 224322 227655 230433
Employment aged 15-64 (000) 216355 218769 214811 212049 212070 211394 210846 213486 215821 218992 221995 224408
Employment rate (% population aged 20-64) 69.8 70.2 68.9 68.5 68.6 68.4 68.4 69.2 70.1 71.1 72.2 73.2
Employment rate (% population aged 15-64) 65.2 65.7 64.4 64.1 64.2 64.1 64.1 64.8 65.7 66.7 67.7 68.6
Employment rate (% population aged 15-24) 37.1 37.2 34.7 33.8 33.3 32.6 32.2 32.5 33.2 33.9 34.7 35.4
Employment rate (% population aged 25-54) 78.9 79.4 78.0 77.7 77.7 77.3 76.9 77.5 78.1 78.8 79.7 80.5
Employment rate (% population aged 55-64) 44.4 45.4 45.8 46.2 47.2 48.7 50.1 51.8 53.3 55.3 57.1 58.7
FTE employment rate (% population aged 20-64) 64.5 65.0 63.5 63.1 62.9 62.7 62.5 63.3 64.1 65.1 66.2 67.2
Self-employed (% total employment) 15.1 14.9 15.0 15.3 15.2 15.2 15.2 15.1 14.9 14.8 14.5 14.3
Part-time employment (% total employment) 17.4 17.5 18.0 18.5 18.8 19.2 19.6 19.6 19.6 19.5 19.4 19.2
Temporary employment (% total employment) 12.2 11.9 11.4 11.7 11.8 11.5 11.5 11.7 11.9 12.1 12.2 12.1
Employment in Services (% total employment) 67.7 b 69.1 69.9 70.2 70.6 71.1 71.3 71.6 71.9 71.9 72.1
Employment in Industry (% total employment) 27.6 b 26.2 25.4 25.2 24.8 24.4 24.3 24.2 24.1 24.2 24.2
Employment in Agriculture (% total employment) 4.7 b 4.7 4.8 4.6 4.6 4.5 4.4 4.2 4.0 3.9 3.7
Activity rate (% population aged 15-64) 70.3 70.7 70.8 71.0 71.1 71.7 72.0 72.3 72.6 73.0 73.4 73.7
Labour Market Indicators - Total

Activity rate (% population aged 15-24) 44.1 44.2 43.5 42.9 42.6 42.4 42.1 41.7 41.6 41.7 41.7 41.7
Activity rate (% population aged 25-54) 84.2 84.6 84.7 85.0 85.0 85.4 85.4 85.5 85.5 85.5 85.7 85.9
Activity rate (% population aged 55-64) 46.9 47.8 48.8 49.5 50.6 52.5 54.3 55.9 57.3 59.1 60.6 62.0
Total unemployment (000) 16998 16768 21385 23011 23154 25293 26334 24832 22900 20943 18774 16887
Unemployment rate (% labour force) 7.2 7.0 9.0 9.6 9.7 10.5 10.9 10.2 9.4 8.6 7.6 6.8
Youth unemployment rate (% labour force 15-24) 15.8 15.9 20.3 21.4 21.8 23.3 23.8 22.2 20.3 18.7 16.8 15.2
Long term unemployment rate (% labour force) 3.1 2.6 3.0 3.8 4.1 4.6 5.1 5.0 4.5 4.0 3.4 2.9
Share of long term unemployment (% of total
42.5 36.9 33.1 39.7 42.8 44.3 47.1 49.3 48.1 46.4 44.7 43.0
unemployment)

Youth unemployment ratio (% population aged 15-24) 6.9 7.0 8.8 9.1 9.2 9.8 10.0 9.3 8.5 7.8 7.0 6.3

Employment rate for low skilled 25-64 (ISCED 0-2) 57.0 56.5 54.6 53.8 53.4 52.7 52.0 52.5 b 53.2 54.3 55.6 56.8
Employment rate for medium skilled 25-64 (ISCED 3-
74.4 74.7 73.4 73.0 73.1 72.9 72.7 73.4 b 73.9 74.8 75.7 76.4
4)
Employment rate for high skilled 25-64 (ISCED 5-8) 85.1 85.1 84.3 83.9 83.7 83.5 83.4 83.7 b 84.1 84.8 85.3 85.8
Employment rate (Nationals aged 15-64) 65.4 65.9 64.7 64.4 64.5 64.5 64.5 65.2 66.0 67.1 68.1 69.0
Employment rate (Other EU28 aged 15-64) 69.6 69.6 67.7 67.6 68.0 67.9 68.2 69.2 70.5 71.8 72.9 73.9
Employment rate (Other than EU28 aged 15-64) 58.0 59.0 55.2 55.0 54.7 53.4 52.6 53.3 53.6 53.7 54.6 56.7
Employment rate (Born in the same country aged 15-
65.4 65.9 64.7 64.4 64.5 64.4 64.4 65.2 66.0 67.0 68.1 69.0
64)
Employment rate (Born in other EU28 aged 15-64) 69.1 68.7 66.8 66.7 66.6 66.1 66.6 67.5 68.8 69.9 72.8 73.9
Employment rate (Born outside EU28 aged 15-64) 62.7 63.1 59.4 58.8 58.0 57.0 56.1 57.0 57.6 58.7 60.6 62.3
Underemployment (% of labour force aged 15-74) 3.2 3.5 3.7 3.7 3.9 4.3 4.2 4.1 3.9 3.7 3.4
Seeking but not available (% of labour force aged 15-
1.2 1.1 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9
74)
Discouraged, available but not seeking (% of labour
3.2 3.1 3.4 3.5 3.6 3.7 4.0 3.9 3.8 3.6 3.3 3.1
force aged 15-74)

Click here to download table.

229
Employment and Social Developments in Europe 2019

European Union 28 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Total population (000) 242934 243991 b 244912 245500 b245185 b 245753 b 246382 247511 b 248219 b 249295 249969 b 250547
Population aged 15-64(000) 167334 168007 168307 168234 167556 b 167295 166917 166886 b 166553 b 166657 166372 b 166052
Total employment (000) 122069 123013 119709 117961 117773 117213 116701 118131 119479 121329 123050 124442
Employment aged 15-64 (000) 119691 120544 117264 115491 115195 114446 113820 115072 116287 117999 119541 120732
Employment rate (% population aged 20-64) 77.6 77.8 75.7 75.1 75.0 74.6 74.3 75.0 75.9 76.9 78.0 79.0
Employment rate (% population aged 15-64) 72.4 72.6 70.6 70.1 70.0 69.6 69.4 70.1 70.9 71.9 73.0 73.9
Employment rate (% population aged 15-24) 40.2 40.1 36.7 35.9 35.4 34.5 34.0 34.3 35.0 35.6 36.4 37.4
Employment rate (% population aged 25-54) 86.7 86.8 84.6 84.1 83.9 83.3 82.6 83.2 83.8 84.6 85.6 86.3
Employment rate (% population aged 55-64) 53.6 54.7 54.5 54.4 54.9 56.2 57.4 58.8 60.2 62.0 63.7 65.4
FTE employment rate (% population aged 20-64) 76.1 76.2 74.0 73.3 72.9 72.4 72.0 72.7 73.4 74.4 75.5 76.5
Self-employed (% total employment) 19.1 18.8 19.1 19.4 19.2 19.3 19.2 19.1 18.8 18.5 18.2 17.9
Part-time employment (% total employment) 6.9 7.0 7.4 7.8 8.0 8.4 8.7 8.8 8.9 8.8 8.8 8.7
Temporary employment (% total employment) 11.2 10.8 10.3 10.7 10.9 10.6 10.6 10.9 11.2 11.3 11.3 11.2
Employment in Services (% total employment) 56.3 b 57.6 58.4 58.9 59.4 59.9 60.2 60.4 60.6 60.8 61.0
Employment in Industry (% total employment) 38.5 b 37.0 36.1 35.8 35.3 34.8 34.6 34.5 34.5 34.4 34.4
Employment in Agriculture (% total employment) 5.3 b 5.4 5.5 5.3 5.4 5.3 5.2 5.1 5.0 4.8 4.6
Activity rate (% population aged 15-64) 77.5 77.8 77.6 77.6 77.5 77.8 78.0 78.1 78.3 78.6 78.9 79.2
Labour Market Indicators - Male

Activity rate (% population aged 15-24) 47.5 47.7 46.7 46.0 45.5 45.3 44.9 44.4 44.2 44.1 44.1 44.3
Activity rate (% population aged 25-54) 91.8 91.9 91.7 91.8 91.6 91.8 91.5 91.5 91.5 91.4 91.6 91.7
Activity rate (% population aged 55-64) 56.7 57.7 58.3 58.7 59.3 61.0 62.5 63.9 65.0 66.6 67.8 69.1
Total unemployment (000) 8632 8682 11755 12587 12473 13641 14182 13281 12249 11066 9844 8802
Unemployment rate (% labour force) 6.6 6.6 9.0 9.7 9.6 10.4 10.8 10.1 9.3 8.4 7.4 6.6
Youth unemployment rate (% labour force 15-24) 15.6 16.0 21.4 22.2 22.4 24.0 24.4 22.8 21.1 19.4 17.4 15.7
Long term unemployment rate (% labour force) 2.8 2.4 2.8 3.9 4.1 4.6 5.1 5.0 4.5 3.9 3.3 2.8
Share of long term unemployment (% of total
42.7 36.6 31.8 40.3 43.4 44.6 47.4 49.7 48.6 46.6 45.1 43.1
unemployment)

Youth unemployment ratio (% population aged 15-24) 7.3 7.6 9.9 10.1 10.2 10.8 10.9 10.1 9.3 8.5 7.7 7.0

Employment rate for low skilled 25-64 (ISCED 0-2) 70.1 69.7 66.6 65.2 64.3 63.0 61.9 62.5 b 63.5 64.9 66.3 67.6
Employment rate for medium skilled 25-64 (ISCED 3-
81.0 81.4 79.6 79.1 79.2 79.0 78.7 79.3 b 79.8 80.7 81.6 82.5
4)
Employment rate for high skilled 25-64 (ISCED 5-8) 88.7 88.9 87.8 87.4 87.3 87.3 87.1 87.3 b 87.9 88.6 89.2 89.5
Employment rate (Nationals aged 15-64) 72.3 72.6 70.8 70.2 70.1 69.8 69.6 70.2 71.0 72.0 73.1 73.9
Employment rate (Other EU28 aged 15-64) 78.1 78.2 74.9 74.7 74.8 74.6 74.9 76.2 77.3 78.6 80.1 81.3
Employment rate (Other than EU28 aged 15-64) 69.8 69.8 63.9 64.5 64.5 62.8 61.9 62.6 63.4 63.6 64.5 67.3
Employment rate (Born in the same country aged 15-
72.2 72.5 70.6 70.1 69.9 69.6 69.4 70.1 70.9 71.8 72.9 73.7
64)
Employment rate (Born in other EU28 aged 15-64) 78.4 77.7 74.1 73.6 73.4 72.7 73.0 73.9 75.2 76.6 79.7 81.0
Employment rate (Born outside EU28 aged 15-64) 73.7 73.1 67.6 67.2 66.5 65.4 64.3 65.3 66.2 68.2 69.6 71.5
Underemployment (% of labour force aged 15-74) 1.7 1.9 2.1 2.2 2.4 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.5 2.3 2.1
Seeking but not available (% of labour force aged 15-
0.9 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.8
74)
Discouraged, available but not seeking (% of labour
2.2 2.1 2.5 2.7 2.9 2.9 3.1 3.1 3.0 2.9 2.7 2.5
force aged 15-74)
Total population (000) 255366 256306 b 257178 257671 b257780 b 258295 b 258781 259724 b 260301 b 260886 261404 b 261832
Population aged 15-64(000) 167211 167841 168171 168116 167903 b 167649 167237 167085 b 166648 b 166347 165918 b 165474
Total employment (000) 98096 99718 99084 98123 98485 98644 98782 100266 101461 102993 104606 105991
Employment aged 15-64 (000) 96663 98225 97547 96558 96875 96948 97025 98414 99534 100993 102454 103676
Employment rate (% population aged 20-64) 62.0 62.7 62.2 62.1 62.2 62.4 62.6 63.5 64.3 65.3 66.5 67.4
Employment rate (% population aged 15-64) 58.1 58.8 58.3 58.2 58.4 58.6 58.8 59.6 60.4 61.4 62.5 63.4
Employment rate (% population aged 15-24) 34.0 34.3 32.7 31.7 31.2 30.6 30.3 30.6 31.3 32.1 33.0 33.4
Employment rate (% population aged 25-54) 71.2 72.0 71.4 71.3 71.4 71.3 71.1 71.7 72.3 73.0 73.8 74.7
Employment rate (% population aged 55-64) 35.7 36.6 37.6 38.5 40.0 41.7 43.3 45.2 46.9 48.9 50.9 52.4
FTE employment rate (% population aged 20-64) 53.6 54.4 53.7 53.6 53.6 53.6 53.7 54.5 55.4 56.3 57.4 58.5
Self-employed (% total employment) 10.2 10.1 10.1 10.3 10.3 10.4 10.3 10.4 10.4 10.3 10.2 10.1
Part-time employment (% total employment) 30.4 30.3 30.7 31.3 31.5 31.9 32.4 32.2 32.1 31.9 31.7 31.3
Temporary employment (% total employment) 13.4 13.2 12.8 12.8 12.8 12.5 12.5 12.6 12.8 13.0 13.2 13.1
Employment in Services (% total employment) 81.8 b 82.9 83.6 83.7 83.9 84.3 84.4 84.8 85.0 84.9 85.1
Employment in Industry (% total employment) 14.2 b 13.1 12.6 12.6 12.5 12.3 12.3 12.1 12.1 12.3 12.3
Employment in Agriculture (% total employment) 4.0 b 4.0 3.9 3.7 3.6 3.4 3.3 3.1 2.9 2.8 2.7
Activity rate (% population aged 15-64) 63.1 63.6 64.0 64.4 64.8 65.5 66.1 66.6 66.8 67.4 67.9 68.3
Labour Market Indicators - Female

Activity rate (% population aged 15-24) 40.5 40.7 40.3 39.7 39.5 39.4 39.3 38.9 38.9 39.1 39.2 39.0
Activity rate (% population aged 25-54) 76.6 77.2 77.7 78.2 78.4 79.0 79.2 79.5 79.5 79.6 79.8 80.1
Activity rate (% population aged 55-64) 37.8 38.5 39.9 41.0 42.6 44.6 46.5 48.4 50.0 52.0 53.8 55.2
Total unemployment (000) 8366 8085 9630 10424 10681 11653 12151 11551 10651 9877 8930 8084
Unemployment rate (% labour force) 7.9 7.5 8.9 9.6 9.8 10.6 10.9 10.3 9.5 8.8 7.9 7.1
Youth unemployment rate (% labour force 15-24) 16.2 15.8 19.0 20.4 21.0 22.4 23.0 21.4 19.5 17.9 16.1 14.5
Long term unemployment rate (% labour force) 3.3 2.8 3.1 3.7 4.1 4.6 5.1 5.0 4.5 4.0 3.5 3.0
Share of long term unemployment (% of total
42.4 37.1 34.7 39.0 42.0 44.0 46.8 48.7 47.6 46.1 44.3 42.8
unemployment)

Youth unemployment ratio (% population aged 15-24) 6.5 6.4 7.6 8.0 8.3 8.8 9.0 8.3 7.6 7.0 6.3 5.7

Employment rate for low skilled 25-64 (ISCED 0-2) 45.2 44.7 43.7 43.3 43.2 43.1 42.6 43.0 b 43.2 43.8 44.9 45.6
Employment rate for medium skilled 25-64 (ISCED 3-
67.3 67.5 66.9 66.5 66.6 66.5 66.4 67.1 b 67.7 68.5 69.3 69.9
4)
Employment rate for high skilled 25-64 (ISCED 5-8) 81.7 81.5 81.0 80.6 80.3 80.1 80.1 80.4 b 80.8 81.5 82.0 82.6
Employment rate (Nationals aged 15-64) 58.5 59.2 58.8 58.7 58.9 59.2 59.4 60.2 61.1 62.1 63.2 64.1
Employment rate (Other EU28 aged 15-64) 61.2 61.3 60.8 60.9 61.8 61.6 61.9 62.7 64.0 65.1 66.0 66.8
Employment rate (Other than EU28 aged 15-64) 46.3 48.1 46.6 45.9 45.3 44.5 43.9 44.5 44.5 44.0 45.0 46.3
Employment rate (Born in the same country aged 15-
58.5 59.2 58.8 58.7 58.9 59.2 59.4 60.2 61.1 62.2 63.3 64.2
64)
Employment rate (Born in other EU28 aged 15-64) 60.9 60.7 60.4 60.6 60.8 60.5 61.0 62.1 63.2 64.1 66.5 67.4
Employment rate (Born outside EU28 aged 15-64) 52.2 53.5 51.5 51.0 50.1 49.2 48.6 49.5 49.8 50.1 52.2 53.6
Underemployment (% of labour force aged 15-74) 5.1 5.3 5.5 5.4 5.7 6.2 6.1 5.9 5.5 5.2 4.8
Seeking but not available (% of labour force aged 15-
1.5 1.4 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1
74)
Discouraged, available but not seeking (% of labour
4.5 4.3 4.5 4.5 4.6 4.7 4.9 4.9 4.7 4.4 4.1 3.8
force aged 15-74)

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230
 Statistical annex - 1. Country profiles

European Union 28 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
At-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion (% of total
23.8 24.3 24.8 24.6 24.4 23.8 23.5 22.4
population)
At-risk-of-poverty (% of total population) 16.5 16.9 16.8 16.7 17.2 17.3 17.3 16.9
At-risk-of-poverty threshold (PPS single person)
Poverty gap (%) 22.9 23.0 23.4 23.8 24.6 24.8 25.0 24.1
Persistent at-risk-of-poverty (% of total
10.0 e 9.8 e 10.3 e 10.0 10.3 10.9 11.0 e 11.3 e
population)
At-risk-of-poverty before social transfers excl.
26.1 26.4 25.8 26.0 26.1 26.1 25.9 25.6
pensions (% of total population)
Impact of social transfers (excl. pensions) in
36.8 36.0 34.9 35.8 34.1 33.7 33.2 34.0
reducing poverty (%)
All

Severe Material Deprivation (% of total population) 8.4 8.8 9.9 9.6 8.9 8.1 7.5 6.6 6.2 e
Share of people living in low work intensity households
10.3 10.5 10.6 11.0 11.3 10.7 10.5 9.5
(% of people aged 0-59)
Real Gross Household Disposable income (growth %) 2.1 1.0 0.9 -0.5 -0.5 -0.8 0.0 1.0 2.3 2.2 1.1
Income quintile share ratio S80/S20 4.9 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.2 5.2 5.2 5.1
GINI coefficient 30.5 30.8 30.5 30.5 31.0 31.0 30.8 30.7
Early leavers from education and training (% of
14.9 14.7 14.2 13.9 13.4 12.7 11.9 11.2 b 11.0 10.7 10.6 10.6
population aged 18-24)
NEET: Young people neither in employment nor in
education and training (% of total population aged 15- 11.1 10.9 12.4 12.8 12.9 13.2 13.0 12.4 12.0 11.5 10.9 10.4
24)
At-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion (% of male
22.7 23.2 23.8 23.7 23.6 23.1 22.5 21.6
population)
At-risk-of-poverty (% of male population) 15.8 16.1 16.2 16.2 16.7 16.9 16.6 16.3
Poverty gap (%) 23.6 24.0 24.2 24.6 25.6 25.8 26.1 24.9
Persistent at-risk-of-poverty (% of male
9.3 e 9.3 e 9.7 e 9.6 9.9 10.4 10.4 e 10.8 e
population)
Severe Material Deprivation (% of male population) 8.2 8.6 9.7 9.4 8.8 8.0 7.3 6.4 6.0 e
Male

Share of people living in low work intensity households

9.6 9.9 10.0 10.5 10.9 10.2 10.0 9.1
(% of males aged 0-59)
Life expectancy at birth (years) 76.9 e 77.4 77.4 77.8 e 78.1 77.9 b 78.2 78.3
Healthy life years at birth (years) - men 61.8 e 61.7 61.5 61.4 e 61.4 62.6 b 63.5 63.3
Early leavers from education and training (% of males
17.0 16.7 16.1 15.8 15.3 14.5 13.6 12.7 b 12.4 12.2 12.1 12.2
aged 18-24)
NEET: Young people neither in employment nor in
9.9 9.7 12.0 12.4 12.6 13.0 12.8 12.2 11.7 11.2 10.6 10.0
education and training ( % of males aged 15-24)
At-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion (% of female
24.8 25.4 25.8 25.5 25.2 24.5 24.4 23.3
population)
At-risk-of-poverty (% of female population) 17.2 17.6 17.4 17.2 17.7 17.7 17.9 17.6
Poverty gap (%) 22.1 22.1 22.5 23.2 23.8 23.9 24.1 23.4
Persistent at-risk-of-poverty (% of female
10.7 e 10.3 e 11.0 e 10.5 10.7 11.3 11.5 e 11.6 e
population)
Social Indicators

Severe Material Deprivation (% of female population) 8.6 9.1 10.2 9.8 9.0 8.2 7.7 6.8 6.4 e
Female

Share of people living in low work intensity households

11.0 11.2 11.2 11.5 11.7 11.2 11.0 9.9
(% of females aged 0-59)
Life expectancy at birth (years) 82.8 e 83.2 83.1 83.3 e 83.6 83.3 b 83.6 83.5
Healthy life years at birth (years) - women 62.6 e 62.1 62.1 61.5 e 61.8 63.3 b 64.2 63.1
Early leavers from education and training (% of
12.8 12.7 12.3 11.9 11.5 10.9 10.2 9.6 b 9.5 9.2 8.9 8.9
females aged 18-24)
NEET: Young people neither in employment nor in
12.3 12.1 12.9 13.2 13.3 13.4 13.2 12.6 12.3 11.8 11.1 10.8
education and training ( % of females aged 15-24)
At-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion of children (% of
27.6 27.3 28.1 27.9 27.8 27.1 26.4 24.9
people aged 0-17)
At-risk-of-poverty (% of Children population) 21.0 20.7 20.6 20.5 21.1 21.2 21.0 20.2
Children (0-17)

Severe Material Deprivation (% of Children

9.9 10.1 11.8 11.1 10.4 9.6 8.5 7.1 6.9 e
population)
Share of children living in low work intensity
9.4 9.3 9.2 9.6 9.9 9.4 9.3 8.2
households (% of Children population)
Risk of poverty of children in households at work
15.8 15.6 15.7 15.7 16.0 16.1 15.9 15.6
(Working Intensity > 0.2)
Impact of social transfers (excl. pensions) in reducing
40.5 41.0 39.8 41.1 39.4 38.9 38.6 40.4
poverty (0-17) (%)
At-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion (% of working
23.6 24.5 25.4 25.5 25.4 24.7 24.2 23.0
age population)
At-risk-of-poverty (% of Working age population) 15.3 16.0 16.4 16.5 17.1 17.1 17.0 16.5
Working age

Severe Material Deprivation (% of Working age

8.4 8.9 10.0 10.0 9.2 8.4 7.8 6.8 6.4 e
(18-64)

population)
Very low work intensity (18-59) 10.6 10.9 11.0 11.4 11.7 11.1 10.9 10.0
In-work at-risk-of poverty rate (% of persons
8.3 8.8 8.9 9.0 9.5 9.5 9.6 9.4
employed 18-64)
Impact of social transfers (excl. pensions) in reducing
38.8 37.7 35.7 36.3 34.7 34.5 34.1 34.8
poverty (18-64) (%)
At-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion of elderly (% of
20.1 20.4 19.2 18.2 17.8 17.4 18.2 18.2
people aged 65+)
Elderly (65+)

At-risk-of-poverty (% of Elderly population) 16.0 15.9 14.5 13.7 13.7 14.1 14.6 15.0

Severe Material Deprivation (% of Elderly population) 6.7 7.3 7.4 7.0 6.3 5.6 5.8 5.3 5.0 e
Relative median income of elderly (ratio with median
0.88 0.90 0.92 0.93 0.94 0.93 0.93 0.92
income of people younger than 65)
Aggregate replacement ratio (ratio) 0.52 0.53 0.54 0.56 0.56 0.57 0.58 0.58
Sickness/Health care 7.3 8.0 8.0 8.0 p 8.0 p 8.1 p 8.1 p 8.1 p 8.0 p
protection indicators
Expenditure in social

Disability 1.9 2.0 2.0 2.0 p 2.0 p 2.0 p 2.0 p 2.0 p 2.0 p
Old age and survivors 11.3 12.3 12.3 12.3 p 12.6 p 12.7 p 12.6 p 12.5 p 12.4 p
(% of GDP)

Family/Children 2.1 2.4 2.4 2.3 p 2.3 p 2.3 p 2.3 p 2.4 p 2.4 p
Unemployment 1.2 1.7 1.6 1.6 p 1.5 p 1.5 p 1.4 p 1.3 p 1.3 p
Housing and Social exclusion n.e.c. 1.0 1.1 1.1 1.1 p 1.1 p 1.1 p 1.1 p 1.1 p 1.1 p
Total (including Admin and Other expenditures) 25.9 28.7 28.6 28.3 p 28.7 p 28.9 p 28.7 p 28.4 p 28.1 p
of which: Means tested benefits 2.9 3.3 3.3 3.3 p 3.3 p 3.3 p 3.3 p 3.3 p 3.3 p

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231
Employment and Social Developments in Europe 2019

Euro Area 19
Euro Area 19 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Real GDP 3.1 0.5 -4.5 2.1 1.6 -0.9 -0.2 1.4 2.1 1.9 2.4 1.9
Total employment 1.9 0.8 -1.9 -0.6 0.1 -0.4 -0.6 0.6 1.0 1.4 1.6 1.5
Labour productivity 1.2 -0.4 -2.7 2.7 1.5 -0.4 0.4 0.8 1.0 0.6 0.8 0.4
Macro Economic Indicators

Annual average hours worked per person employed 0.2 -0.1 -1.7 0.0 0.0 -1.2 -0.7 -0.1 0.1 0.0 -0.4 0.1
(Annual % growth)

Real productivity per hour worked 1.0 -0.3 -1.0 2.6 1.5 0.7 1.1 0.8 0.9 0.5 1.2 0.3
Harmonized CPI 2.2 3.3 0.3 1.6 2.7 2.5 1.3 0.4 0.2 0.2 1.5 1.8
Price deflator GDP 2.5 2.0 1.0 0.7 1.0 1.3 1.2 0.9 1.4 0.9 1.1 1.4
Nominal compensation per employee 2.6 3.4 1.7 2.0 2.1 1.5 1.5 1.3 1.4 1.3 1.6 2.2
Real compensation per employee (GDP deflator) 0.1 1.3 0.7 1.3 1.0 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.0 0.4 0.5 0.8
Real compensation per employee (private consumption
0.4 0.0 1.3 0.4 -0.7 -1.0 0.2 0.9 1.2 1.0 0.0 0.5
deflator)
Nominal unit labour costs 1.4 3.8 4.4 -0.6 0.5 1.9 1.2 0.6 0.3 0.7 0.8 1.8
Real unit labour costs -1.0 1.7 3.4 -1.3 -0.5 0.7 -0.2 -0.3 -1.0 -0.2 -0.3 0.5
Total population (000) 331205 333097 b 334470 335266 334573 b 335289 b 336045 337764 b 338562 b 339788 340535 b 341153
Population aged 15-64 (000) 220686 221860 222290 222222 221221 b 220959 220573 220795 b 220388 b 220550 220237 b 219918
Total employment (000) 145155 146615 143661 142160 142335 141502 140732 142142 143665 146182 148341 150355
Employment aged 15-64 (000) 143051 144419 141455 139966 140040 139026 138171 139422 140774 143151 145056 146817
Employment rate (% population aged 20-64) 69.8 70.1 68.7 68.3 68.4 68.0 67.7 68.2 69.0 70.0 71.0 72.0
Employment rate (% population aged 15-64) 65.4 65.8 64.3 64.0 64.1 63.7 63.5 63.9 64.6 65.5 66.5 67.4
Employment rate (% population aged 15-24) 37.5 37.3 34.6 33.3 33.0 31.7 31.0 30.7 31.0 31.5 32.4 33.4
Employment rate (% population aged 25-54) 79.0 79.3 77.7 77.3 77.3 76.5 75.9 76.1 76.7 77.5 78.2 79.1
Employment rate (% population aged 55-64) 43.1 44.2 45.0 45.7 47.0 48.6 50.0 51.7 53.3 55.3 57.2 58.8
FTE employment rate (% population aged 20-64)
Self-employed (% total employment) 15.1 14.9 15.0 15.1 15.0 15.0 15.0 14.9 14.8 14.6 14.3 14.1
Part-time employment (% total employment) 18.6 18.6 19.2 19.7 20.1 20.7 21.5 21.5 21.6 21.6 21.6 21.3
Temporary employment (% total employment) 13.8 13.6 12.9 13.0 13.2 12.7 12.6 12.8 13.1 13.3 13.7 13.9
Employment in Services (% total employment) 69.4 b 70.6 71.4 71.8 72.2 72.8 73.1 73.2 73.4 73.5 73.6
Employment in Industry (% total employment) 27.2 b 26.0 25.3 25.0 24.6 24.1 23.8 23.8 23.6 23.7 23.6
Employment in Agriculture (% total employment) 3.3 b 3.4 3.4 3.3 3.2 3.2 3.1 3.0 3.0 2.9 2.8
Activity rate (% population aged 15-64) 70.7 71.2 71.2 71.3 71.5 72.0 72.2 72.4 72.5 72.9 73.1 73.5
Labour Market Indicators - Total

Activity rate (% population aged 15-24) 44.2 44.3 43.4 42.2 41.9 41.4 41.0 40.2 39.8 39.7 39.9 40.1
Activity rate (% population aged 25-54) 84.6 85.0 85.0 85.2 85.2 85.6 85.5 85.5 85.4 85.5 85.5 85.7
Activity rate (% population aged 55-64) 46.0 47.0 48.3 49.3 50.7 52.8 54.6 56.4 58.0 59.8 61.3 62.7
Total unemployment (000) 11731 11967 15258 16178 16216 18219 19271 18662 17472 16258 14748 13386
Unemployment rate (% labour force) 7.5 7.6 9.6 10.2 10.2 11.4 12.0 11.6 10.9 10.0 9.1 8.2
Youth unemployment rate (% labour force 15-24) 15.5 16.1 20.7 21.5 21.4 23.6 24.4 23.7 22.3 20.9 18.8 16.9
Long term unemployment rate (% labour force) 3.2 2.9 3.4 4.3 4.6 5.2 5.9 6.0 5.5 5.0 4.4 3.8
Share of long term unemployment (% of total
43.6 38.6 35.0 42.1 45.0 46.2 49.4 52.2 51.1 49.7 48.5 46.3
unemployment)

Youth unemployment ratio (% population aged 15-24) 6.8 7.0 8.8 8.9 8.9 9.7 9.9 9.5 8.9 8.3 7.5 6.8

Employment rate for low skilled 25-64 (ISCED 0-2) 57.4 57.1 55.0 54.3 54.0 53.0 52.1 52.2 b 53.0 53.9 55.1 56.1
Employment rate for medium skilled 25-64 (ISCED 3-
75.0 75.5 74.3 74.1 74.0 73.7 73.3 73.7 b 74.1 74.9 75.5 76.2
4)
Employment rate for high skilled 25-64 (ISCED 5-8) 84.5 84.7 83.8 83.4 83.5 83.1 82.7 82.7 b 83.2 84.0 84.6 85.1
Employment rate (Nationals aged 15-64) 65.8 66.1 64.9 64.6 64.7 64.4 64.1 64.4 65.1 66.1 67.1 67.9
Employment rate (Other EU28 aged 15-64) 68.1 67.9 65.7 65.6 65.9 65.7 65.9 66.5 67.7 69.4 70.4 71.3
Employment rate (Other than EU28 aged 15-64) 57.7 58.6 54.5 54.3 54.0 52.6 51.5 52.1 52.5 52.4 53.5 55.7
Employment rate (Born in the same country aged 15-
65.7 66.1 64.9 64.5 64.6 64.2 64.0 64.4 65.1 66.1 67.0 67.8
64)
Employment rate (Born in other EU28 aged 15-64) 67.3 66.5 64.2 64.1 63.6 62.9 63.0 63.4 64.3 65.4 70.5 71.7
Employment rate (Born outside EU28 aged 15-64) 63.2 63.3 58.7 58.0 56.9 55.4 53.9 54.5 55.1 55.9 58.9 60.7
Underemployment (% of labour force aged 15-74) 3.5 3.7 3.8 3.8 4.0 4.6 4.6 4.5 4.3 4.1 3.8
Seeking but not available (% of labour force aged 15-
1.4 1.2 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
74)
Discouraged, available but not seeking (% of labour
3.2 3.3 3.5 3.6 3.7 3.9 4.2 4.4 4.3 4.1 3.8 3.6
force aged 15-74)

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232
 Statistical annex - 1. Country profiles

Euro Area 19 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Total population (000) 161550 162517 b 163200 163564 162976 b 163337 b 163743 164650 b 165083 b 165899 166304 b 166649
Population aged 15-64(000) 110616 111180 111344 111235 110489 b 110342 110128 110252 b 110064 b 110304 110165 b 110025
Total employment (000) 81241 81572 79049 77828 77654 76873 76173 76786 77575 78964 80128 81111
Employment aged 15-64 (000) 79866 80142 77630 76427 76172 75264 74506 75007 75716 77022 78041 78888
Employment rate (% population aged 20-64) 78.1 78.0 75.7 75.0 74.9 74.1 73.4 73.8 74.6 75.6 76.6 77.6
Employment rate (% population aged 15-64) 73.1 73.1 70.8 70.2 70.1 69.3 68.7 69.0 69.7 70.6 71.6 72.6
Employment rate (% population aged 15-24) 40.8 40.3 36.6 35.3 35.0 33.6 32.8 32.4 32.6 33.1 34.0 35.3
Employment rate (% population aged 25-54) 87.6 87.3 84.7 84.0 83.8 82.7 81.7 81.9 82.5 83.3 84.1 84.9
Employment rate (% population aged 55-64) 52.1 53.2 53.3 53.6 54.3 55.6 56.7 58.0 59.6 61.6 63.3 65.0
FTE employment rate (% population aged 20-64)
Self-employed (% total employment) 18.9 18.6 18.9 19.1 19.0 19.1 19.0 18.8 18.6 18.2 17.8 17.6
Part-time employment (% total employment) 6.7 6.8 7.3 7.6 8.0 8.4 8.9 9.1 9.3 9.3 9.4 9.2
Temporary employment (% total employment) 12.6 12.3 11.5 11.8 12.1 11.7 11.6 11.9 12.3 12.5 12.9 13.0
Employment in Services (% total employment) 57.6 b 58.8 59.6 60.2 60.7 61.4 61.7 61.8 62.0 62.2 62.3
Employment in Industry (% total employment) 38.4 b 37.2 36.2 35.8 35.3 34.6 34.3 34.3 34.1 34.1 34.0
Employment in Agriculture (% total employment) 4.0 b 4.1 4.1 4.0 4.1 4.1 4.0 3.9 3.9 3.8 3.7
Activity rate (% population aged 15-64) 78.4 78.5 78.2 78.1 77.9 78.2 78.1 78.1 78.1 78.3 78.5 78.8
Labour Market Indicators - Male

Activity rate (% population aged 15-24) 47.7 47.7 46.5 45.2 44.6 44.1 43.5 42.7 42.2 42.0 42.1 42.7
Activity rate (% population aged 25-54) 92.9 92.9 92.5 92.4 92.2 92.2 91.8 91.6 91.4 91.4 91.4 91.5
Activity rate (% population aged 55-64) 55.4 56.3 57.2 58.1 58.8 60.7 62.4 63.8 65.3 66.9 68.1 69.3
Total unemployment (000) 5784 6052 8255 8728 8637 9753 10316 9929 9276 8484 7640 6894
Unemployment rate (% labour force) 6.7 6.9 9.5 10.1 10.0 11.2 11.9 11.5 10.7 9.7 8.7 7.9
Youth unemployment rate (% labour force 15-24) 14.8 15.9 21.6 22.1 21.7 24.0 24.8 24.2 23.0 21.4 19.4 17.5
Long term unemployment rate (% labour force) 2.9 2.6 3.1 4.2 4.5 5.2 5.9 6.0 5.5 4.8 4.2 3.6
Share of long term unemployment (% of total
43.5 37.8 33.3 42.2 45.3 46.2 49.5 52.3 51.3 49.6 48.6 46.1
unemployment)

Youth unemployment ratio (% population aged 15-24) 6.9 7.5 9.9 9.9 9.6 10.5 10.7 10.3 9.7 9.0 8.1 7.5

Employment rate for low skilled 25-64 (ISCED 0-2) 71.7 70.9 67.4 66.0 65.2 63.3 61.9 62.1 b 63.1 64.3 65.8 67.1
Employment rate for medium skilled 25-64 (ISCED 3-
81.9 82.1 80.2 79.8 79.8 79.4 78.8 79.0 b 79.4 80.3 80.9 81.6
4)
Employment rate for high skilled 25-64 (ISCED 5-8) 88.5 88.6 87.5 87.1 87.1 86.8 86.3 86.3 b 86.9 87.7 88.4 88.8
Employment rate (Nationals aged 15-64) 73.2 73.2 71.2 70.5 70.3 69.7 69.1 69.2 69.9 70.8 71.8 72.6
Employment rate (Other EU28 aged 15-64) 76.8 76.6 72.8 72.8 72.8 72.2 72.5 73.4 74.8 76.1 77.5 78.9
Employment rate (Other than EU28 aged 15-64) 69.6 69.4 63.1 63.7 63.7 61.6 60.7 61.1 62.2 62.4 63.4 66.3
Employment rate (Born in the same country aged 15-
73.1 73.1 71.0 70.3 70.2 69.4 68.9 69.1 69.7 70.7 71.6 72.4
64)
Employment rate (Born in other EU28 aged 15-64) 77.2 75.8 71.7 71.5 70.8 69.2 69.2 69.5 70.9 71.8 77.5 79.1
Employment rate (Born outside EU28 aged 15-64) 74.2 73.2 66.6 66.1 65.0 63.1 61.6 62.0 63.3 65.3 67.7 70.0
Underemployment (% of labour force aged 15-74) 1.6 1.8 1.9 2.1 2.2 2.6 2.7 2.7 2.6 2.5 2.2
Seeking but not available (% of labour force aged 15-
1.0 1.0 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.9 0.8 0.8
74)
Discouraged, available but not seeking (% of labour
2.1 2.1 2.4 2.6 2.8 2.8 3.2 3.3 3.3 3.2 3.0 2.9
force aged 15-74)
Total population (000) 169655 170580 b 171270 171702 171597 b 171952 b 172302 173114 b 173479 b 173889 174231 b 174504
Population aged 15-64(000) 110070 110681 110946 110987 110732 b 110617 110445 110543 b 110324 b 110245 110072 b 109893
Total employment (000) 63914 65043 64612 64332 64681 64629 64559 65356 66090 67218 68213 69244
Employment aged 15-64 (000) 63185 64277 63826 63539 63868 63762 63666 64415 65058 66129 67015 67929
Employment rate (% population aged 20-64) 61.5 62.3 61.8 61.8 62.0 62.0 62.0 62.7 63.4 64.4 65.4 66.4
Employment rate (% population aged 15-64) 57.7 58.5 58.0 57.9 58.3 58.2 58.2 58.8 59.5 60.4 61.3 62.2
Employment rate (% population aged 15-24) 34.0 34.2 32.4 31.2 30.9 29.7 29.2 28.9 29.3 29.8 30.7 31.4
Employment rate (% population aged 25-54) 70.5 71.3 70.6 70.6 70.7 70.4 70.1 70.4 70.9 71.6 72.3 73.2
Employment rate (% population aged 55-64) 34.6 35.7 37.1 38.2 40.0 41.9 43.6 45.7 47.4 49.4 51.4 52.9
FTE employment rate (% population aged 20-64)
Self-employed (% total employment) 10.3 10.2 10.2 10.2 10.1 10.3 10.3 10.3 10.3 10.3 10.1 10.0
Part-time employment (% total employment) 33.5 33.4 33.7 34.3 34.6 35.3 36.1 36.0 36.0 35.9 35.7 35.3
Temporary employment (% total employment) 15.3 15.2 14.6 14.5 14.5 14.0 13.8 13.8 14.1 14.3 14.8 14.9
Employment in Services (% total employment) 84.2 b 85.0 85.4 85.6 85.8 86.1 86.3 86.5 86.7 86.6 86.6
Employment in Industry (% total employment) 13.3 b 12.5 12.1 12.1 11.9 11.7 11.6 11.5 11.4 11.6 11.6
Employment in Agriculture (% total employment) 2.5 b 2.5 2.4 2.3 2.2 2.1 2.1 2.0 1.9 1.9 1.8
Activity rate (% population aged 15-64) 63.1 63.8 64.3 64.6 65.1 65.9 66.3 66.7 66.9 67.5 67.8 68.1
Labour Market Indicators - Female

Activity rate (% population aged 15-24) 40.6 40.7 40.2 39.2 39.1 38.6 38.4 37.6 37.3 37.3 37.5 37.4
Activity rate (% population aged 25-54) 76.4 77.2 77.6 78.1 78.3 79.0 79.3 79.4 79.3 79.6 79.6 79.9
Activity rate (% population aged 55-64) 37.1 38.1 39.8 41.1 43.0 45.3 47.3 49.5 51.2 53.1 54.9 56.3
Total unemployment (000) 5947 5915 7002 7450 7579 8467 8954 8732 8196 7774 7108 6492
Unemployment rate (% labour force) 8.5 8.4 9.8 10.4 10.5 11.6 12.2 11.8 11.0 10.4 9.5 8.6
Youth unemployment rate (% labour force 15-24) 16.4 16.3 19.6 20.7 21.0 23.1 23.9 23.2 21.6 20.3 18.1 16.3
Long term unemployment rate (% labour force) 3.7 3.3 3.6 4.3 4.7 5.3 6.0 6.1 5.6 5.1 4.5 4.0
Share of long term unemployment (% of total
43.6 39.4 37.0 41.9 44.8 46.3 49.4 52.2 50.9 49.8 48.4 46.6
unemployment)

Youth unemployment ratio (% population aged 15-24) 6.6 6.5 7.7 8.0 8.2 8.9 9.1 8.7 8.1 7.6 6.8 6.1

Employment rate for low skilled 25-64 (ISCED 0-2) 44.0 44.1 43.2 43.1 43.2 42.9 42.4 42.4 b 42.9 43.4 44.1 44.8
Employment rate for medium skilled 25-64 (ISCED 3-
68.0 68.7 68.3 68.1 68.0 67.9 67.7 68.3 b 68.6 69.5 70.0 70.7
4)
Employment rate for high skilled 25-64 (ISCED 5-8) 80.4 80.8 80.3 79.9 80.1 79.7 79.3 79.4 b 79.8 80.7 81.2 81.8
Employment rate (Nationals aged 15-64) 58.3 59.1 58.7 58.7 59.0 59.1 59.2 59.6 60.4 61.4 62.3 63.2
Employment rate (Other EU28 aged 15-64) 59.6 59.5 58.9 58.8 59.5 59.7 59.7 60.0 60.9 62.8 63.5 63.9
Employment rate (Other than EU28 aged 15-64) 45.8 47.6 45.9 45.3 44.8 44.0 42.9 43.7 43.4 42.7 43.7 45.2
Employment rate (Born in the same country aged 15-
58.3 59.1 58.7 58.6 59.0 59.0 59.1 59.6 60.4 61.5 62.4 63.3
64)
Employment rate (Born in other EU28 aged 15-64) 58.9 58.4 57.7 57.7 57.6 57.8 57.8 58.3 58.8 60.1 64.2 65.0
Employment rate (Born outside EU28 aged 15-64) 52.7 53.8 51.2 50.5 49.4 48.3 46.8 47.7 47.6 47.5 50.6 52.0
Underemployment (% of labour force aged 15-74) 5.9 5.9 6.1 5.8 6.1 6.9 6.8 6.7 6.3 6.0 5.5
Seeking but not available (% of labour force aged 15-
1.8 1.6 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.2 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.2 1.2
74)
Discouraged, available but not seeking (% of labour
4.7 4.7 4.7 4.7 4.9 5.1 5.5 5.6 5.5 5.1 4.8 4.5
force aged 15-74)

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233
Employment and Social Developments in Europe 2019

Euro Area 19 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
At-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion (% of total
21.9 21.7 21.6 22.0 22.9 23.3 23.1 23.5 23.1 23.1 22.1
population)
At-risk-of-poverty (% of total population) 16.1 16.1 16.2 16.3 16.8 16.9 16.7 17.1 17.2 17.4 17.0
At-risk-of-poverty threshold (PPS single person)
Poverty gap (%) 22.2 21.4 21.9 22.5 22.8 23.2 24.0 24.8 24.9 24.8 24.3
Persistent at-risk-of-poverty (% of total
9.0 9.7 10.3 10.0 10.4 10.4 10.6 11.5 11.2 e 11.5 e
population)
At-risk-of-poverty before social transfers excl.
24.6 24.2 24.4 25.2 25.7 25.2 25.5 25.8 25.7 25.7 25.0
pensions (% of total population)
Impact of social transfers (excl. pensions) in
34.6 33.5 33.6 35.3 34.6 32.9 34.5 33.7 33.1 32.3 32.0
reducing poverty (%)
All

Severe Material Deprivation (% of total population) 5.6 5.9 6.0 6.1 6.9 7.8 7.5 7.4 7.0 6.6 5.9 5.4 e
Share of people living in low work intensity households
9.7 9.3 9.1 10.4 11.0 10.7 11.2 11.9 11.2 11.1 10.2
(% of people aged 0-59)
Real Gross Household Disposable income (growth %) 1.6 0.7 0.3 -0.6 -0.3 -1.7 -0.6 1.1 1.7 1.9 1.2
Income quintile share ratio S80/S20 4.8 4.9 4.9 4.9 5.0 5.0 5.1 5.2 5.2 5.2 5.1
GINI coefficient 30.0 30.5 30.3 30.3 30.6 30.5 30.7 31.0 30.8 30.7 30.5
Early leavers from education and training (% of
16.7 16.3 15.8 15.4 14.6 13.8 12.8 11.8 b 11.6 11.1 11.0 11.0
population aged 18-24)
NEET: Young people neither in employment nor in
education and training (% of total population aged 15- 10.9 11.0 12.6 12.8 12.7 13.1 12.9 12.5 12.1 11.6 11.1 10.5
24)
At-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion (% of male
20.2 20.2 20.3 20.9 21.8 22.2 22.2 22.6 22.3 22.1 21.2
population)
At-risk-of-poverty (% of male population) 15.1 15.0 15.2 15.5 16.0 16.1 16.1 16.5 16.8 16.7 16.3
Poverty gap (%) 22.8 22.2 22.4 23.0 23.8 23.9 24.7 25.7 25.8 25.6 25.1
Persistent at-risk-of-poverty (% of male
8.2 8.8 9.5 9.4 9.7 10.0 10.2 11.1 10.5 e 10.9 e
population)
Severe Material Deprivation (% of male population) 5.2 5.7 5.8 5.9 6.6 7.5 7.3 7.2 7.0 6.4 5.7 5.3 e
Male

Share of people living in low work intensity households

8.7 8.4 8.3 9.7 10.3 10.1 10.7 11.4 10.8 10.7 9.8
(% of males aged 0-59)
Life expectancy at birth (years)
Healthy life years at birth (years) - men
Early leavers from education and training (% of males
19.4 18.9 18.3 17.9 16.9 15.9 14.7 13.6 b 13.2 12.8 12.9 12.9
aged 18-24)
NEET: Young people neither in employment nor in
9.9 10.2 12.6 12.8 12.6 13.2 13.0 12.6 12.2 11.6 11.2 10.6
education and training ( % of males aged 15-24)
At-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion (% of female
23.5 23.2 22.9 23.1 24.0 24.4 24.0 24.3 23.8 24.0 23.0
population)
At-risk-of-poverty (% of female population) 17.1 17.1 17.1 17.1 17.6 17.6 17.3 17.7 17.7 18.1 17.7
Poverty gap (%) 21.6 20.9 21.5 22.1 22.1 22.6 23.5 24.2 24.1 24.2 23.7
Persistent at-risk-of-poverty (% of female
9.7 10.6 11.0 10.6 11.2 10.9 11.0 11.9 11.9 e 12.0 e
population)
Social Indicators

Severe Material Deprivation (% of female population) 6.0 6.2 6.2 6.2 7.2 8.0 7.7 7.5 7.1 6.9 6.1 5.5 e
Female

Share of people living in low work intensity households

10.7 10.2 9.9 11.1 11.6 11.4 11.6 12.3 11.6 11.6 10.6
(% of females aged 0-59)
Life expectancy at birth (years)
Healthy life years at birth (years) - women
Early leavers from education and training (% of
13.9 13.6 13.2 12.8 12.3 11.5 10.9 10.0 b 9.9 9.3 9.0 9.0
females aged 18-24)
NEET: Young people neither in employment nor in
11.9 11.8 12.6 12.8 12.9 13.0 12.8 12.3 12.0 11.6 10.9 10.5
education and training ( % of females aged 15-24)
At-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion of children (% of
23.0 23.7 24.3 25.4 25.5 25.6 25.2 25.7 25.4 25.3 24.3
people aged 0-17)
At-risk-of-poverty (% of Children population) 18.4 19.0 19.6 20.7 20.5 20.4 19.9 20.4 20.7 20.8 20.4
Children (0-17)

Severe Material Deprivation (% of Children

6.2 7.1 7.2 7.2 7.8 9.0 8.4 8.4 8.1 7.2 6.3 5.5 e
population)
Share of children living in low work intensity
7.4 7.0 7.1 8.6 9.0 8.3 8.7 9.4 8.7 9.0 8.1
households (% of Children population)
Risk of poverty of children in households at work
14.3 15.1 15.6 15.7 15.2 15.3 14.9 15.0 15.4 15.6 15.5
(Working Intensity > 0.2)
Impact of social transfers (excl. pensions) in reducing
41.8 39.9 39.1 38.9 39.2 37.8 40.1 38.6 38.0 37.7 37.4
poverty (0-17) (%)
At-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion (% of working
21.7 21.5 21.5 22.3 23.5 24.3 24.5 25.1 24.6 24.3 23.1
age population)
At-risk-of-poverty (% of Working age population) 14.6 14.6 14.8 15.3 16.2 16.6 16.8 17.4 17.4 17.4 16.9
Working age

Severe Material Deprivation (% of Working age

5.7 6.0 6.1 6.2 7.1 8.0 7.9 7.8 7.5 7.0 6.2 5.8 e
(18-64)

population)
Very low work intensity (18-59) 10.4 10.0 9.7 11.0 11.6 11.5 12.0 12.7 12.0 11.8 10.9
In-work at-risk-of poverty rate (% of persons
7.9 8.1 8.2 8.0 8.5 8.6 8.7 9.4 9.4 9.5 9.4
employed 18-64)
Impact of social transfers (excl. pensions) in reducing
37.1 36.5 36.5 38.1 36.7 34.7 35.4 34.3 34.3 33.6 33.5
poverty (18-64) (%)
At-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion of elderly (% of
21.5 20.4 19.5 17.6 18.2 17.6 16.5 16.2 15.9 17.3 17.1
people aged 65+)
Elderly (65+)

At-risk-of-poverty (% of Elderly population) 19.1 18.2 17.4 15.2 15.1 14.1 13.3 13.3 13.5 14.2 14.3

Severe Material Deprivation (% of Elderly population) 4.9 4.5 4.3 4.2 5.4 5.7 5.2 4.9 4.5 5.1 4.6 4.2 e
Relative median income of elderly (ratio with median
0.85 0.86 0.88 0.90 0.91 0.93 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.94 0.94
income of people younger than 65)
Aggregate replacement ratio (ratio) 0.49 0.49 0.51 0.52 0.54 0.54 0.56 0.57 0.58 0.58 0.59
Sickness/Health care 7.2 7.5 8.3 8.3 8.1 p 8.2 p 8.3 p 8.3 p 8.2 p 8.2 p
protection indicators
Expenditure in social

Disability 1.8 1.8 2.0 2.0 1.9 p 2.0 p 2.0 p 2.0 p 2.0 p 2.0 p
Old age and survivors 11.4 11.6 12.6 12.6 12.6 p 12.9 p 13.1 p 13.0 p 13.0 p 12.9 p
(% of GDP)

Family/Children 2.0 2.0 2.2 2.2 2.2 p 2.2 p 2.2 p 2.2 p 2.3 p 2.3 p
Unemployment 1.5 1.5 2.0 1.9 1.8 p 1.8 p 1.8 p 1.7 p 1.6 p 1.6 p
Housing and Social exclusion n.e.c. 0.8 0.8 0.9 0.9 0.9 p 0.9 p 0.9 p 0.9 p 0.9 p 1.0 p
Total (including Admin and Other expenditures) 25.8 26.5 29.3 29.2 29.0 p 29.4 p 29.7 p 29.7 p 29.3 p 29.2 p
of which: Means tested benefits 2.5 2.6 2.9 2.9 2.9 p 2.9 p 3.0 p 3.0 p 3.1 p 3.1 p

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234
 Statistical annex - 1. Country profiles

Belgium
Belgium 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Real GDP 3.4 0.8 -2.3 2.7 1.8 0.2 0.2 1.3 1.7 1.5 1.7 1.4
Total employment 1.7 1.8 -0.2 0.6 1.4 0.4 -0.3 0.4 0.9 1.3 1.4 1.3
Labour productivity 1.8 -1.0 -2.1 2.1 0.4 -0.2 0.5 0.8 0.8 0.2 0.3 0.1
Macro Economic Indicators

Annual average hours worked per person employed 0.3 -0.4 -1.4 -0.2 0.9 0.0 -0.1 -0.2 -0.5 0.0 0.1 0.2
(Annual % growth)

Real productivity per hour worked 1.5 -0.6 -0.7 2.2 -0.5 -0.2 0.7 1.0 1.4 0.2 0.2 -0.1
Harmonized CPI 1.8 4.5 0.0 2.3 3.4 2.6 1.2 0.5 0.6 1.8 2.2 2.3
Price deflator GDP 2.0 1.9 0.8 1.9 2.0 2.0 1.0 0.7 1.0 1.8 1.7 1.1
Nominal compensation per employee 3.6 3.7 1.1 1.4 3.1 3.2 2.6 0.9 0.0 0.5 1.9 1.7
Real compensation per employee (GDP deflator) 1.5 1.7 0.3 -0.5 1.1 1.2 1.5 0.2 -1.0 -1.3 0.3 0.6
Real compensation per employee (private consumption
1.7 -0.8 1.1 -0.9 -0.2 0.5 1.3 0.4 -0.6 -1.3 -0.3 -0.6
deflator)
Nominal unit labour costs 1.7 4.7 3.2 -0.7 2.7 3.4 2.0 0.1 -0.8 0.3 1.6 1.6
Real unit labour costs -0.3 2.8 2.4 -2.5 0.7 1.3 1.0 -0.6 -1.8 -1.4 -0.1 0.4
Total population (000) 10585 10667 10753 10840 11001 b 11076 b 11138 11181 11237 11311 11352 11399
Population aged 15-64 (000) 6977 7047 7101 7148 7250 7270 7287 7286 7296 7327 7329 7334
Total employment (000) 4380 4446 4421 4489 4509 b 4524 4530 4544 4552 4587 4638 b 4755
Employment aged 15-64 (000) 4348 4414 4389 4451 4471 b 4479 4485 4497 4499 4541 4587 b 4699
Employment rate (% population aged 20-64) 67.7 68.0 67.1 67.6 67.3 67.2 67.2 67.3 67.2 67.7 68.5 b 69.7
Employment rate (% population aged 15-64) 62.0 62.4 61.6 62.0 61.9 61.8 61.8 61.9 61.8 62.3 63.1 b 64.5
Employment rate (% population aged 15-24) 27.5 27.4 25.3 25.2 26.0 25.3 23.6 23.2 23.4 22.7 22.7 b 25.0
Employment rate (% population aged 25-54) 79.7 80.5 79.8 80.0 79.3 79.3 79.0 79.1 78.5 79.1 79.5 b 80.4
Employment rate (% population aged 55-64) 34.4 34.5 35.3 37.3 38.7 39.5 41.7 42.7 44.0 45.4 48.3 b 50.3
FTE employment rate (% population aged 20-64) 61.8 62.0 61.0 61.4 60.6 b 60.7 60.7 61.2 60.8 61.3 62.2 b 63.5
Self-employed (% total employment) 13.5 13.0 13.5 13.4 13.2 b 13.5 14.2 13.7 14.3 14.0 13.6 b 13.2
Part-time employment (% total employment) 21.9 22.4 23.2 23.7 24.7 24.7 24.3 23.7 24.3 24.7 24.5 b 24.5
Temporary employment (% total employment) 7.4 7.1 7.0 7.0 7.7 7.0 6.9 7.4 7.7 7.8 9.0 b 9.3
Employment in Services (% total employment) 73.8 b 75.0 75.2 u 75.5 bu 77.1 76.9 u 77.4 77.4 u 77.5 u 78.1 bu 77.9 u
Employment in Industry (% total employment) 24.7 b 23.6 23.5 u 23.3 bu 21.8 21.8 u 21.5 21.5 u 21.4 u 20.9 bu 21.2 u
Employment in Agriculture (% total employment) 1.5 b 1.4 1.3 1.2 b 1.1 1.3 1.1 1.1 1.2 1.1 b 0.9
Activity rate (% population aged 15-64) 67.1 67.1 66.9 67.7 66.7 66.9 67.5 67.7 67.6 67.6 68.0 b 68.6
Labour Market Indicators - Total

Activity rate (% population aged 15-24) 33.9 33.4 32.4 32.5 32.0 31.5 31.0 30.2 30.0 28.5 28.1 b 29.6
Activity rate (% population aged 25-54) 85.3 85.7 85.6 86.3 84.7 85.0 85.3 85.6 85.1 85.1 84.8 b 85.0
Activity rate (% population aged 55-64) 35.9 36.1 37.2 39.2 40.3 41.4 44.1 45.1 46.6 48.1 51.3 b 52.6
Total unemployment (000) 353 333 380 406 347 369 417 423 422 390 354 b 301
Unemployment rate (% labour force) 7.5 7.0 7.9 8.3 7.2 7.6 8.4 8.5 8.5 7.8 7.1 b 6.0
Youth unemployment rate (% labour force 15-24) 18.8 18.0 21.9 22.4 18.7 19.8 23.7 23.2 22.1 20.1 19.3 b 15.8
Long term unemployment rate (% labour force) 3.8 3.3 3.5 4.0 3.5 3.4 3.9 4.3 4.4 4.0 3.5 b 2.9
Share of long term unemployment (% of total
50.2 47.4 44.2 48.7 48.3 44.6 46.0 49.9 51.7 51.6 48.6 b 48.7
unemployment)

Youth unemployment ratio (% population aged 15-24) 6.4 6.0 7.1 7.3 6.0 b 6.2 7.3 7.0 6.6 5.7 5.4 b 4.7

Employment rate for low skilled 25-64 (ISCED 0-2) 49.8 49.4 b 48.0 48.9 47.7 b 47.6 47.8 47.5 b 46.6 46.4 46.5 b 46.5
Employment rate for medium skilled 25-64 (ISCED 3-
74.2 74.7 b 74.0 74.5 74.0 b 73.5 73.6 72.8 b 72.2 73.0 73.3 b 74.1
4)
Employment rate for high skilled 25-64 (ISCED 5-8) 84.9 84.7 b 84.2 84.0 84.2 b 84.6 84.1 84.7 b 84.6 85.2 85.2 b 86.1
Employment rate (Nationals aged 15-64) 62.9 63.1 62.5 62.8 63.0 b 63.0 62.9 62.9 62.8 63.3 64.1 b 65.4
Employment rate (Other EU28 aged 15-64) 61.2 62.3 59.6 62.4 62.2 b 62.0 60.6 62.5 63.1 64.4 65.0 b 65.7
Employment rate (Other than EU28 aged 15-64) 38.1 39.9 38.8 38.0 37.4 b 36.2 37.6 38.0 39.9 39.3 39.5 b 41.4
Employment rate (Born in the same country aged 15-
63.5 63.8 63.2 63.6 63.7 b 63.8 63.6 63.8 63.6 64.1 64.7 b 66.0
64)
Employment rate (Born in other EU28 aged 15-64) 57.8 60.8 58.7 61.2 62.1 b 61.5 62.1 62.6 63.2 65.2 65.8 b 67.2
Employment rate (Born outside EU28 aged 15-64) 45.2 48.1 47.1 46.5 45.8 b 45.4 46.0 45.7 46.2 46.8 50.0 b 52.0
Underemployment (% of labour force aged 15-74) 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 3.2 b 3.3 3.1 3.4 3.3 3.4 b 3.4
Seeking but not available (% of labour force aged 15-
1.8 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.4 b 1.2 1.2 1.0 1.1 1.1 1.3 b 1.4
74)
Discouraged, available but not seeking (% of labour
0.8 0.7 0.7 0.7 2.2 b 2.0 2.1 2.0 1.7 1.6 2.1 b 2.3
force aged 15-74)

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235
Employment and Social Developments in Europe 2019

Belgium 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Total population (000) 5181 5224 5269 5312 5402 b 5440 b 5473 5494 5524 5569 5589 5614
Population aged 15-64(000) 3508 3543 3570 3592 3650 3659 3667 3665 3669 3690 3689 3691
Total employment (000) 2444 2461 2429 2458 2462 b 2466 2451 2435 2434 2466 2496 b 2531
Employment aged 15-64 (000) 2421 2439 2406 2433 2435 b 2433 2420 2403 2397 2433 2461 b 2495
Employment rate (% population aged 20-64) 75.0 74.7 73.2 73.5 73.0 72.7 72.3 71.6 71.3 72.3 73.4 b 73.9
Employment rate (% population aged 15-64) 68.7 68.6 67.2 67.4 67.1 66.9 66.4 65.8 65.5 66.5 67.5 b 68.2
Employment rate (% population aged 15-24) 29.9 29.7 27.4 27.3 27.7 27.8 25.3 24.5 25.0 24.0 24.4 b 26.4
Employment rate (% population aged 25-54) 87.0 87.0 85.7 85.5 84.9 84.5 84.0 83.2 82.5 83.8 84.4 b 84.5
Employment rate (% population aged 55-64) 42.9 42.8 42.9 45.6 46.0 46.0 47.7 48.4 48.9 50.7 53.8 b 55.1
FTE employment rate (% population aged 20-64) 73.6 73.2 71.5 71.8 70.9 b 70.9 70.2 70.0 69.2 70.1 71.2 b 72.0
Self-employed (% total employment) 17.1 16.6 17.2 17.0 17.0 b 17.2 18.4 17.5 18.3 18.0 17.0 b 16.4
Part-time employment (% total employment) 7.1 7.5 8.2 8.4 9.2 9.0 8.7 8.4 9.3 9.5 10.2 b 10.0
Temporary employment (% total employment) 5.7 5.5 5.4 5.6 6.4 5.9 5.9 6.3 6.8 6.9 8.0 b 8.2
Employment in Services (% total employment) 61.7 bu 63.3 63.8 u 63.8 bu 65.6 65.2 u 65.6 u 65.5 u 65.7 u 67.1 bu 66.5 u
Employment in Industry (% total employment) 36.4 bu 34.9 34.6 u 34.7 bu 32.9 33.1 u 33.0 u 33.0 u 32.8 u 31.5 bu 32.3 u
Employment in Agriculture (% total employment) 1.9 b 1.8 1.7 1.6 b 1.5 1.7 1.4 1.5 1.5 1.5 b 1.2
Activity rate (% population aged 15-64) 73.6 73.3 72.8 73.4 72.3 72.5 72.7 72.4 72.2 72.3 72.8 b 72.8
Labour Market Indicators - Male

Activity rate (% population aged 15-24) 36.1 36.0 34.9 35.2 34.1 35.0 33.7 32.3 32.8 30.7 30.6 b 31.4
Activity rate (% population aged 25-54) 92.5 92.3 91.8 92.2 90.7 90.7 90.9 90.7 89.9 90.4 90.0 b 89.6
Activity rate (% population aged 55-64) 44.4 44.4 45.2 47.6 47.8 47.9 50.5 51.3 52.2 53.6 56.9 b 57.9
Total unemployment (000) 174 170 204 217 188 204 232 241 243 216 191 b 170
Unemployment rate (% labour force) 6.7 6.5 7.8 8.1 7.1 7.7 8.7 9.0 9.1 8.1 7.1 b 6.3
Youth unemployment rate (% labour force 15-24) 17.1 17.3 21.5 22.4 18.7 20.4 24.7 24.0 23.8 21.7 20.2 b 16.2
Long term unemployment rate (% labour force) 3.3 3.0 3.4 4.0 3.4 3.5 4.0 4.7 4.8 4.2 3.6 b 3.2
Share of long term unemployment (% of total
49.3 47.0 43.5 49.5 47.1 46.0 46.5 51.8 52.5 52.2 50.9 b 50.9
unemployment)

Youth unemployment ratio (% population aged 15-24) 6.2 6.2 7.5 7.9 6.4 b 7.1 8.3 7.7 7.8 6.7 6.2 b 5.1

Employment rate for low skilled 25-64 (ISCED 0-2) 61.9 60.6 b 58.7 59.2 57.9 b 57.5 56.9 56.1 b 54.4 54.6 55.2 b 55.0
Employment rate for medium skilled 25-64 (ISCED 3-
82.0 81.9 b 80.5 81.6 80.7 b 79.8 79.4 78.1 b 77.6 79.5 79.8 b 79.8
4)
Employment rate for high skilled 25-64 (ISCED 5-8) 88.2 88.2 b 87.2 86.7 86.9 b 87.2 87.2 87.2 b 86.8 87.5 88.3 b 88.3
Employment rate (Nationals aged 15-64) 69.2 68.9 67.7 68.0 67.8 b 67.8 67.3 66.5 66.0 67.1 68.0 b 68.6
Employment rate (Other EU28 aged 15-64) 69.4 70.4 67.3 68.5 68.3 b 67.1 65.5 67.3 69.0 68.4 70.0 b 71.0
Employment rate (Other than EU28 aged 15-64) 52.4 54.1 51.3 50.0 49.3 b 45.3 47.1 48.4 49.0 49.9 53.0 b 53.8
Employment rate (Born in the same country aged 15-
69.7 69.2 68.1 68.5 68.2 b 68.2 67.5 66.9 66.5 67.4 68.0 b 68.8
64)
Employment rate (Born in other EU28 aged 15-64) 65.5 69.5 66.8 67.6 68.1 b 67.4 67.5 67.6 68.8 70.3 72.1 b 73.1
Employment rate (Born outside EU28 aged 15-64) 57.2 60.1 57.1 56.5 56.7 b 55.2 55.5 55.0 54.8 56.6 61.1 b 60.7
Underemployment (% of labour force aged 15-74) 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.6 1.6 b 1.6 1.6 1.8 1.7 2.0 b 2.1
Seeking but not available (% of labour force aged 15-
1.4 1.1 1.2 1.4 0.9 b 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.9 0.9 1.0 b 1.1
74)
Discouraged, available but not seeking (% of labour
0.6 0.5 0.7 0.6 2.0 b 1.9 2.0 1.8 1.6 1.6 2.0 b 2.0
force aged 15-74)
Total population (000) 5403 5443 5484 5528 5599 b 5636 b 5665 5687 5713 5742 5762 5784
Population aged 15-64(000) 3468 3503 3532 3556 3600 3611 3620 3622 3627 3637 3640 3643
Total employment (000) 1937 1985 1991 2031 2047 b 2058 2080 2108 2118 2121 2142 b 2224
Employment aged 15-64 (000) 1927 1975 1984 2018 2036 b 2046 2065 2095 2102 2108 2126 b 2204
Employment rate (% population aged 20-64) 60.3 61.3 61.0 61.6 61.5 61.7 62.1 62.9 63.0 63.0 63.6 b 65.5
Employment rate (% population aged 15-64) 55.3 56.2 56.0 56.5 56.7 56.8 57.2 57.9 58.0 58.1 58.7 b 60.7
Employment rate (% population aged 15-24) 25.0 25.0 23.2 23.1 24.2 22.6 21.9 21.8 21.7 21.4 20.9 b 23.5
Employment rate (% population aged 25-54) 72.3 73.8 73.8 74.4 73.8 73.9 74.0 74.9 74.5 74.3 74.6 b 76.2
Employment rate (% population aged 55-64) 26.0 26.3 27.7 29.2 31.6 33.1 35.8 37.0 39.3 40.2 42.8 b 45.6
FTE employment rate (% population aged 20-64) 50.6 51.5 51.1 51.7 51.2 b 51.5 52.1 53.3 53.4 53.3 54.2 b 55.8
Self-employed (% total employment) 9.1 8.6 9.1 9.0 8.6 b 9.1 9.2 9.4 9.7 9.4 9.6 b 9.5
Part-time employment (% total employment) 40.5 40.8 41.4 42.1 43.3 43.5 42.5 41.2 41.4 42.1 41.2 b 41.0
Temporary employment (% total employment) 9.6 9.2 9.0 8.6 9.2 8.3 8.2 8.7 8.6 9.0 10.0 b 10.5
Employment in Services (% total employment)
Employment in Industry (% total employment)
Employment in Agriculture (% total employment) 1.0 b 1.0 0.9 0.8 b 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.7 b 0.6
Activity rate (% population aged 15-64) 60.4 60.8 60.9 61.8 61.1 61.3 62.3 63.0 63.0 62.9 63.2 b 64.3
Labour Market Indicators - Female

Activity rate (% population aged 15-24) 31.6 30.8 29.9 29.8 29.8 27.9 28.2 28.1 27.1 26.2 25.4 b 27.7
Activity rate (% population aged 25-54) 78.0 79.0 79.2 80.4 78.7 79.1 79.7 80.6 80.2 79.8 79.6 b 80.3
Activity rate (% population aged 55-64) 27.5 27.9 29.3 30.9 33.0 34.9 37.8 39.0 41.2 42.8 45.8 b 47.4
Total unemployment (000) 179 163 176 189 158 165 185 182 178 173 163 b 131
Unemployment rate (% labour force) 8.5 7.6 8.1 8.5 7.2 7.4 8.2 7.9 7.8 7.6 7.1 b 5.6
Youth unemployment rate (% labour force 15-24) 20.9 18.7 22.5 22.4 18.7 18.9 22.5 22.3 20.0 18.2 18.0 b 15.3
Long term unemployment rate (% labour force) 4.3 3.6 3.6 4.1 3.6 3.2 3.7 3.8 3.9 3.8 3.2 b 2.6
Share of long term unemployment (% of total
51.2 47.9 44.9 47.6 49.7 42.9 45.4 47.3 50.6 50.8 46.0 b 45.9
unemployment)

Youth unemployment ratio (% population aged 15-24) 6.6 5.8 6.7 6.7 5.6 b 5.3 6.3 6.3 5.4 4.7 4.6 b 4.2

Employment rate for low skilled 25-64 (ISCED 0-2) 37.7 38.1 b 37.0 38.2 37.0 b 36.9 37.9 38.1 b 38.1 37.5 37.2 b 37.3
Employment rate for medium skilled 25-64 (ISCED 3-
65.4 66.8 b 66.8 66.7 66.7 b 66.5 67.1 66.9 b 66.0 65.5 65.9 b 67.5
4)
Employment rate for high skilled 25-64 (ISCED 5-8) 81.9 81.5 b 81.6 81.6 81.8 b 82.3 81.5 82.6 b 82.7 83.2 82.6 b 84.2
Employment rate (Nationals aged 15-64) 56.6 57.3 57.3 57.7 58.1 b 58.1 58.6 59.4 59.5 59.4 60.1 b 62.1
Employment rate (Other EU28 aged 15-64) 52.0 53.5 51.2 55.8 55.9 b 56.8 55.3 57.5 57.1 60.0 59.9 b 60.4
Employment rate (Other than EU28 aged 15-64) 24.8 26.0 26.4 26.7 25.6 b 27.1 27.8 28.1 31.4 29.5 27.0 b 29.1
Employment rate (Born in the same country aged 15-
57.2 58.2 58.2 58.7 59.1 b 59.4 59.7 60.5 60.7 60.7 61.4 b 63.1
64)
Employment rate (Born in other EU28 aged 15-64) 50.7 52.8 50.9 55.2 56.8 b 56.5 56.9 57.9 58.2 60.4 60.0 b 61.9
Employment rate (Born outside EU28 aged 15-64) 34.2 36.6 37.4 36.9 35.2 b 35.9 37.0 36.8 38.0 37.5 39.1 b 43.4
Underemployment (% of labour force aged 15-74) 1.2 1.1 1.1 1.0 5.2 b 5.3 4.8 5.2 5.1 5.1 b 5.0
Seeking but not available (% of labour force aged 15-
2.4 2.0 2.2 2.1 2.0 b 1.6 1.4 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.7 b 1.7
74)
Discouraged, available but not seeking (% of labour
1.0 1.0 0.9 0.9 2.5 b 2.2 2.3 2.3 1.9 1.6 2.3 b 2.6
force aged 15-74)

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236
 Statistical annex - 1. Country profiles

Belgium 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
At-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion (% of total
21.6 20.8 20.2 20.8 21.0 21.6 20.8 21.2 21.1 20.7 20.3
population)
At-risk-of-poverty (% of total population) 15.2 14.7 14.6 14.6 15.3 15.3 15.1 15.5 14.9 15.5 15.9
At-risk-of-poverty threshold (PPS single person) 9787 10046 10501 10399 10895 11038 11738 11755 11953 12801 12566
Poverty gap (%) 17.8 17.2 18.1 18.0 18.6 18.7 19.2 18.8 17.4 19.4 17.7
Persistent at-risk-of-poverty (% of total
7.8 9.0 9.2 9.3 8.0 9.9 8.7 9.5 9.8 10.0 10.8
population)
At-risk-of-poverty before social transfers excl.
27.5 27.0 26.7 26.7 27.8 27.7 26.3 27.5 26.7 26.3 26.3
pensions (% of total population)
Impact of social transfers (excl. pensions) in
44.7 45.6 45.3 45.3 45.0 44.8 42.6 43.6 44.2 41.1 39.5
reducing poverty (%)
All

Severe Material Deprivation (% of total population) 5.7 5.6 5.2 5.9 5.7 6.3 5.1 5.9 5.8 5.5 5.1 5.0 p
Share of people living in low work intensity households
13.8 11.7 12.3 12.7 13.8 13.9 14.0 14.6 14.9 14.6 13.5
(% of people aged 0-59)
Real Gross Household Disposable income (growth %) 2.1 2.4 2.1 -1.0 -1.0 -0.1 0.3 0.5 0.3 0.9
Income quintile share ratio S80/S20 3.9 4.1 3.9 3.9 3.9 4.0 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.8
GINI coefficient 26.3 27.5 26.4 26.6 26.3 26.5 25.9 25.9 26.2 26.3 26.0
Early leavers from education and training (% of
12.1 12.0 b 11.1 11.9 12.3 12.0 11.0 9.8 b 10.1 8.8 8.9 b 8.6
population aged 18-24)
NEET: Young people neither in employment nor in
education and training (% of total population aged 15- 11.2 10.1 11.1 10.9 11.8 12.3 12.7 12.0 12.2 9.9 9.3 b 9.2
24)
At-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion (% of male
19.9 19.1 18.5 20.0 20.4 20.9 20.4 20.9 20.0 19.4 19.1
population)
At-risk-of-poverty (% of male population) 14.4 13.6 13.4 13.9 14.6 14.7 14.6 15.0 14.1 14.4 14.9
Poverty gap (%) 19.2 18.2 18.9 18.0 19.9 18.9 20.1 19.6 17.8 19.5 18.2
Persistent at-risk-of-poverty (% of male
7.3 8.3 7.8 8.5 8.2 9.5 9.1 9.6 9.9 9.0 8.7
population)
Severe Material Deprivation (% of male population) 5.2 5.2 4.9 5.7 5.9 6.3 5.5 6.2 5.5 5.3 4.8 4.6 p
Male

Share of people living in low work intensity households

12.6 10.3 11.1 11.9 13.2 13.4 14.0 14.2 14.1 13.1 12.6
(% of males aged 0-59)
Life expectancy at birth (years) 77.1 76.9 77.3 77.5 78.0 77.8 78.1 78.8 78.7 79.0 79.2
Healthy life years at birth (years) - men 63.5 63.4 63.9 64.0 63.4 64.2 64.0 64.5 64.4 63.7 63.5
Early leavers from education and training (% of males
13.9 13.4 b 12.8 13.8 14.9 14.4 13.2 11.8 b 11.6 10.2 10.4 b 10.6
aged 18-24)
NEET: Young people neither in employment nor in
10.2 9.2 10.5 10.8 11.6 12.5 13.2 12.6 12.5 10.1 10.0 b 9.4
education and training ( % of males aged 15-24)
At-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion (% of female
23.1 22.4 21.8 21.7 21.5 22.3 21.2 21.5 22.2 22.0 21.4
population)
At-risk-of-poverty (% of female population) 15.9 15.9 15.7 15.2 16.0 15.9 15.5 15.9 15.6 16.5 16.9
Poverty gap (%) 16.9 16.6 17.7 18.0 17.4 18.5 18.5 18.1 17.2 19.4 17.6
Persistent at-risk-of-poverty (% of female
8.3 9.7 10.4 10.0 7.8 10.3 8.4 9.4 9.7 11.0 12.6
population)
Social Indicators

Severe Material Deprivation (% of female population) 6.2 6.0 5.5 6.0 5.4 6.3 4.7 5.6 6.1 5.7 5.4 5.4 p
Female

Share of people living in low work intensity households

15.0 13.2 13.6 13.5 14.4 14.3 14.0 14.9 15.8 16.2 14.4
(% of females aged 0-59)
Life expectancy at birth (years) 82.6 82.6 82.8 83.0 83.3 83.1 83.2 83.9 83.4 84.0 83.9
Healthy life years at birth (years) - women 63.9 64.1 63.7 62.6 63.6 65.0 63.7 63.7 64.0 63.8 64.1
Early leavers from education and training (% of
10.3 10.6 b 9.3 10.0 9.7 9.5 8.7 7.7 b 8.6 7.4 7.3 b 6.5
females aged 18-24)
NEET: Young people neither in employment nor in
12.1 11.1 11.7 10.9 12.0 12.2 12.1 11.5 11.8 9.7 8.7 b 8.9
education and training ( % of females aged 15-24)
At-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion of children (% of
21.6 21.3 20.5 23.2 23.3 22.8 21.9 23.2 23.3 21.6 22.0
people aged 0-17)
At-risk-of-poverty (% of Children population) 16.9 17.2 16.6 18.3 18.7 17.3 17.2 18.8 18.0 17.8 18.6
Children (0-17)

Severe Material Deprivation (% of Children

7.0 7.3 6.5 7.7 8.2 8.3 5.5 6.8 7.9 6.9 6.5 7.0 p
population)
Share of children living in low work intensity
12.2 8.9 11.0 12.0 14.0 13.0 12.2 13.0 13.8 13.0 12.7
households (% of Children population)
Risk of poverty of children in households at work
9.2 11.1 8.8 10.3 8.5 8.6 9.2 10.1 9.1 8.2 8.9
(Working Intensity > 0.2)
Impact of social transfers (excl. pensions) in reducing
46.2 45.6 48.6 42.5 44.7 46.6 46.6 43.9 45.1 44.2 42.2
poverty (0-17) (%)
At-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion (% of working
20.7 20.1 19.3 20.0 20.0 21.3 20.8 21.6 21.7 21.7 20.7
age population)
At-risk-of-poverty (% of Working age population) 12.6 12.2 12.1 12.1 12.9 13.5 13.4 14.2 13.7 14.7 15.0
Working age

Severe Material Deprivation (% of Working age

5.9 5.7 5.3 6.0 5.6 6.6 5.8 6.5 6.1 6.1 5.5 5.3 p
(18-64)

population)
Very low work intensity (18-59) 14.4 12.8 12.8 12.9 13.7 14.2 14.7 15.1 15.3 15.2 13.7
In-work at-risk-of poverty rate (% of persons
4.3 4.7 4.5 4.4 4.1 4.5 4.4 4.8 4.5 4.7 5.0
employed 18-64)
Impact of social transfers (excl. pensions) in reducing
52.3 53.1 51.8 52.9 51.1 50.6 47.7 48.0 49.1 45.2 43.0
poverty (18-64) (%)
At-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion of elderly (% of
25.0 22.9 23.1 21.0 21.6 21.2 19.5 17.3 16.2 16.4 17.1
people aged 65+)
Elderly (65+)

At-risk-of-poverty (% of Elderly population) 23.0 21.2 21.6 19.4 20.2 19.4 18.4 16.1 15.2 15.4 16.0

Severe Material Deprivation (% of Elderly population) 3.6 3.2 3.1 2.8 2.6 2.8 2.0 2.4 2.1 2.1 2.2 1.7 p
Relative median income of elderly (ratio with median
0.74 0.74 0.74 0.75 0.74 0.74 0.76 0.77 0.79 0.76 0.79
income of people younger than 65)
Aggregate replacement ratio (ratio) 0.44 0.45 0.45 0.46 0.44 0.46 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.48 0.50
Sickness/Health care 7.1 7.5 8.1 8.0 8.1 8.2 8.3 8.4 7.7 7.5
protection indicators
Expenditure in social

Disability 1.7 1.8 1.9 2.0 2.0 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.4
Old age and survivors 10.1 10.7 11.5 11.1 11.4 11.5 11.8 11.8 12.8 12.6
(% of GDP)

Family/Children 2.1 2.1 2.3 2.2 2.2 2.1 2.2 2.2 2.1 2.1
Unemployment 3.1 3.2 3.7 3.7 3.6 3.4 3.4 3.4 3.1 2.5
Housing and Social exclusion n.e.c. 0.9 0.9 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.9 0.9 0.9
Total (including Admin and Other expenditures) 26.2 27.7 30.0 29.4 29.7 29.6 30.1 30.2 30.3 29.6
of which: Means tested benefits 1.2 1.3 1.5 1.4 1.4 1.5 1.5 1.4 1.4 1.5

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237
Employment and Social Developments in Europe 2019

Bulgaria
Bulgaria 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Real GDP 7.3 6.0 -3.6 1.3 1.9 0.0 0.5 1.8 3.5 3.9 3.8 3.1 p
Total employment 3.2 2.4 -1.7 -3.9 -2.2 -2.5 p -0.4 p 0.4 p 0.4 p 0.5 p 1.8 p -0.1 p
Labour productivity 4.0 3.6 -1.9 5.4 4.2 2.6 p 0.9 p 1.5 p 3.1 p 3.4 p 2.0 p 3.2 p
Macro Economic Indicators

Annual average hours worked per person employed 0.0 2.4 -2.8 -0.1 -0.1 0.1 p 0.0 p -0.1 p 0.0 p -0.1 p 0.0 p 0.1 p
(Annual % growth)

Real productivity per hour worked 4.0 1.2 0.9 5.5 4.3 2.5 p 0.9 p 1.5 p 3.1 p 3.5 p 2.0 p 3.1 p
Harmonized CPI 7.6 12.0 2.5 3.0 3.4 2.4 0.4 -1.6 -1.1 -1.3 1.2 2.6
Price deflator GDP 11.1 8.1 4.0 1.1 6.0 1.6 -0.7 0.5 2.2 2.2 3.4 3.6 p
Nominal compensation per employee 12.7 16.8 8.1 9.9 6.8 7.7 p 8.8 p 5.6 p 5.6 p 5.8 p 10.5 p 5.6 p
Real compensation per employee (GDP deflator) 1.5 8.0 3.9 8.7 0.8 6.1 p 9.6 p 5.1 p 3.4 p 3.5 p 6.9 p 1.9 p
Real compensation per employee (private consumption
4.8 4.3 5.5 6.7 3.3 5.2 p 8.4 p 7.3 p 6.8 p 7.2 p 9.2 p 2.9 p
deflator)
Nominal unit labour costs 8.3 12.8 10.2 4.3 2.5 5.0 p 7.8 p 4.1 p 2.5 p 2.3 p 8.4 p 2.4 p
Real unit labour costs -2.5 4.2 5.9 3.1 -3.3 3.4 p 8.6 p 3.6 p 0.3 p 0.0 p 4.8 p -1.2 p
Total population (000) 7573 7518 7467 7422 7369 7327 7285 7246 7202 7154 7102 7050
Population aged 15-64 (000) 5235 5194 5147 5097 5034 4966 4899 4832 4764 4694 4629 4564
Total employment (000) 3253 3361 b 3254 3075 b 2965 b 2934 2935 2981 3032 3017 3150 3153
Employment aged 15-64 (000) 3209 3306 b 3205 3037 b 2928 b 2895 2889 2927 2974 2954 3073 3069
Employment rate (% population aged 20-64) 68.4 70.7 68.8 64.7 b 62.9 b 63.0 63.5 65.1 67.1 67.7 71.3 72.4
Employment rate (% population aged 15-64) 61.7 64.0 62.6 59.8 b 58.4 b 58.8 59.5 61.0 62.9 63.4 66.9 67.7
Employment rate (% population aged 15-24) 24.5 26.3 24.8 24.3 b 22.1 b 21.9 21.2 20.7 20.3 19.8 22.9 20.7
Employment rate (% population aged 25-54) 79.4 81.3 79.2 75.1 b 73.3 b 73.1 73.3 74.5 76.1 76.2 79.4 80.1
Employment rate (% population aged 55-64) 42.6 46.0 46.1 44.9 b 44.6 b 45.7 47.4 50.0 53.0 54.5 58.2 60.7
FTE employment rate (% population aged 20-64) 68.1 70.6 b 68.4 64.4 b 62.5 b 62.5 63.1 64.3 66.7 67.1 70.9 71.9
Self-employed (% total employment) 11.3 11.4 b 11.5 11.5 b 11.1 b 10.8 11.5 11.8 11.4 11.1 11.1 10.9
Part-time employment (% total employment) 1.4 2.0 2.1 2.2 b 2.2 b 2.2 2.5 2.5 2.2 2.0 2.2 1.8
Temporary employment (% total employment) 4.4 4.3 4.0 3.9 b 3.6 b 3.9 4.9 4.6 3.9 3.6 3.9 3.6
Employment in Services (% total employment) 56.2 b 57.6 60.2 b 61.8 b 62.2 63.1 62.8 63.2 63.3 63.0 63.2
Employment in Industry (% total employment) 36.8 b 35.5 33.1 b 31.6 b 31.5 30.4 30.3 30.1 30.0 30.1 30.4
Employment in Agriculture (% total employment) 7.0 b 6.9 6.7 b 6.6 b 6.3 6.5 6.9 6.7 6.7 6.8 6.4
Activity rate (% population aged 15-64) 66.3 67.8 67.2 66.7 b 65.9 b 67.1 68.4 69.0 69.3 68.7 71.3 71.5
Labour Market Indicators - Total

Activity rate (% population aged 15-24) 28.9 30.1 29.5 31.2 b 29.5 b 30.4 29.6 27.2 26.0 23.9 26.3 23.7
Activity rate (% population aged 25-54) 84.5 85.5 84.3 82.9 b 81.9 b 82.3 83.1 83.3 83.2 82.0 84.3 84.3
Activity rate (% population aged 55-64) 45.7 48.7 49.2 49.3 b 48.9 b 51.1 54.1 56.6 58.0 58.8 61.8 63.7
Total unemployment (000) 242 202 240 352 d 376 410 436 385 305 247 207 173
Unemployment rate (% labour force) 6.9 5.6 6.8 10.3 d 11.3 12.3 13.0 11.4 9.2 7.6 6.2 5.2
Youth unemployment rate (% labour force 15-24) 14.1 11.9 15.1 21.9 d 25.0 28.1 28.4 23.8 21.6 17.2 12.9 12.7
Long term unemployment rate (% labour force) 4.1 2.9 3.0 4.7 b 6.3 b 6.8 7.4 6.9 5.6 4.5 3.4 3.0
Share of long term unemployment (% of total
58.8 51.7 43.3 46.1 b 55.7 b 55.2 57.3 60.4 61.2 59.1 55.0 58.4
unemployment)

Youth unemployment ratio (% population aged 15-24) 4.4 3.8 b 4.8 6.8 b 7.4 b 8.5 8.4 6.5 5.6 4.1 3.4 3.0

Employment rate for low skilled 25-64 (ISCED 0-2) 44.5 47.6 b 46.4 41.0 b 38.0 b 37.4 38.1 40.0 b 40.3 40.3 45.4 47.0
Employment rate for medium skilled 25-64 (ISCED 3-
75.7 77.8 b 75.4 70.7 b 69.3 b 69.1 69.3 71.1 b 73.0 73.5 77.0 78.5
4)
Employment rate for high skilled 25-64 (ISCED 5-8) 85.1 86.4 b 85.8 83.2 b 81.8 b 81.8 81.4 82.7 b 84.9 85.1 86.2 86.8
Employment rate (Nationals aged 15-64) 61.7 64.0 b 62.6 59.8 b 58.5 b 58.8 59.5 61.1 62.9 63.4 66.9 67.8
Employment rate (Other EU28 aged 15-64)
Employment rate (Other than EU28 aged 15-64) 60.6 u 42.7 u 42.5 bu 47.5 u 55.4 u 50.8 u 50.9 u 52.0 u
Employment rate (Born in the same country aged 15-
61.7 64.0 b 62.6 59.8 b 58.5 b 58.8 59.5 61.1 62.9 63.4 66.9 67.7
64)
Employment rate (Born in other EU28 aged 15-64)
Employment rate (Born outside EU28 aged 15-64) 61.0 u 55.2 bu 51.7 u 46.6 bu 49.7 bu 54.7 u 57.9 60.3 56.7 u 61.9 61.8 64.3
Underemployment (% of labour force aged 15-74) 0.6 b 0.6 0.8 b 0.8 b 0.8 1.0 1.0 0.8 0.7 0.8 0.6
Seeking but not available (% of labour force aged 15-
0.5 0.7 b 0.6 0.7 b 0.8 b 0.8 0.9 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.6
74)
Discouraged, available but not seeking (% of labour
8.0 5.8 b 6.8 8.2 b 8.5 b 8.1 7.5 6.9 6.4 6.3 4.6 3.9
force aged 15-74)

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238
 Statistical annex - 1. Country profiles

Bulgaria 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Total population (000) 3687 3660 3636 3614 3589 3567 3545 3525 3502 3477 3450 3422
Population aged 15-64(000) 2622 2604 2584 2562 2534 2501 2470 2439 2406 2373 2342 2310
Total employment (000) 1732 1793 b 1732 1640 b 1567 b 1542 1547 1577 1608 1608 1683 1685
Employment aged 15-64 (000) 1701 1756 b 1699 1614 b 1541 b 1517 1518 1543 1572 1569 1639 1637
Employment rate (% population aged 20-64) 73.4 76.1 73.8 68.6 b 66.0 b 65.8 66.4 68.1 70.4 71.3 75.3 76.5
Employment rate (% population aged 15-64) 66.0 68.5 66.9 63.3 b 61.2 b 61.3 62.1 63.9 65.9 66.7 70.6 71.5
Employment rate (% population aged 15-24) 27.1 29.3 28.0 27.3 b 25.1 b 24.9 24.0 24.0 24.0 23.1 26.5 24.2
Employment rate (% population aged 25-54) 82.5 84.7 82.7 77.6 b 74.7 b 74.3 75.0 76.4 78.5 79.2 82.8 83.5
Employment rate (% population aged 55-64) 51.8 55.8 54.1 51.3 b 50.5 b 50.8 51.9 54.5 56.8 58.3 62.5 65.4
FTE employment rate (% population aged 20-64) 73.2 76.2 b 73.5 68.3 b 65.6 b 65.2 66.0 67.4 69.8 71.1 74.7 75.9
Self-employed (% total employment) 14.3 14.1 b 14.2 14.1 b 13.7 b 13.5 14.5 14.9 14.5 13.8 13.9 13.8
Part-time employment (% total employment) 1.1 1.6 1.8 2.0 b 2.0 b 2.0 2.0 2.2 1.9 1.8 2.0 1.7
Temporary employment (% total employment) 4.0 4.7 4.4 4.2 b 3.8 b 4.2 5.2 4.8 4.0 3.9 4.2 3.8
Employment in Services (% total employment) 47.8 b 48.7 50.9 b 53.2 b 54.6 55.3 54.5 54.6 54.6 54.5 54.5
Employment in Industry (% total employment) 43.7 b 43.0 41.0 b 38.4 b 37.2 36.2 36.5 36.5 36.6 36.6 37.2
Employment in Agriculture (% total employment) 8.4 b 8.3 8.1 b 8.4 b 8.2 8.5 9.0 9.0 8.8 9.0 8.4
Activity rate (% population aged 15-64) 70.6 72.5 72.0 71.1 b 69.9 b 71.0 72.2 72.9 73.2 72.7 75.4 75.9
Labour Market Indicators - Male

Activity rate (% population aged 15-24) 31.7 34.0 34.0 35.5 b 33.9 b 35.3 34.3 31.5 30.5 28.0 30.5 27.8
Activity rate (% population aged 25-54) 87.5 88.8 88.0 86.1 b 84.5 b 84.8 85.7 86.2 86.4 85.7 88.0 88.3
Activity rate (% population aged 55-64) 55.3 58.7 57.4 56.6 b 55.8 b 57.3 59.9 62.5 62.7 63.4 66.8 69.2
Total unemployment (000) 123 105 132 200 d 219 241 250 221 174 142 114 102
Unemployment rate (% labour force) 6.5 5.5 6.9 10.9 d 12.3 13.5 13.9 12.3 9.8 8.1 6.4 5.7
Youth unemployment rate (% labour force 15-24) 13.5 12.8 16.7 23.2 d 26.0 29.5 30.2 23.8 21.2 17.4 13.3 13.2
Long term unemployment rate (% labour force) 3.7 2.7 2.8 5.0 b 7.0 b 7.7 8.1 7.7 6.1 4.8 3.6 3.4
Share of long term unemployment (% of total
56.6 50.0 40.7 46.0 b 56.9 b 56.7 58.3 62.4 62.4 59.2 56.5 59.9
unemployment)

Youth unemployment ratio (% population aged 15-24) 4.6 4.7 b 6.0 8.2 b 8.8 b 10.4 10.4 7.5 6.5 4.9 4.0 3.7

Employment rate for low skilled 25-64 (ISCED 0-2) 52.2 56.9 b 54.9 47.5 b 43.7 b 42.7 43.4 45.4 b 46.6 47.7 53.8 55.8
Employment rate for medium skilled 25-64 (ISCED 3-
80.9 82.7 b 80.1 75.3 b 72.7 b 72.1 72.5 74.7 b 76.8 77.6 81.2 82.5
4)
Employment rate for high skilled 25-64 (ISCED 5-8) 88.6 90.2 b 89.9 85.7 b 83.7 b 83.6 84.1 85.6 b 87.6 87.5 88.6 89.7
Employment rate (Nationals aged 15-64) 66.0 68.5 b 66.9 63.4 b 61.2 b 61.3 62.1 63.9 65.9 66.7 70.6 71.5
Employment rate (Other EU28 aged 15-64)
Employment rate (Other than EU28 aged 15-64)
Employment rate (Born in the same country aged 15-
66.0 68.5 b 66.9 63.4 b 61.2 b 61.3 62.1 63.8 65.9 66.7 70.6 71.5
64)
Employment rate (Born in other EU28 aged 15-64)
Employment rate (Born outside EU28 aged 15-64) 58.8 u 62.4 u 71.0 u 74.3 u 72.4 u 74.2 u
Underemployment (% of labour force aged 15-74) 0.5 b 0.6 0.8 b 0.7 b 0.7 0.7 0.9 0.7 0.7 0.9 0.5
Seeking but not available (% of labour force aged 15-
0.5 0.6 b 0.6 0.7 b 0.8 b 0.7 0.8 0.6 0.7 0.5 0.6 0.6
74)
Discouraged, available but not seeking (% of labour
7.6 5.4 b 6.5 8.3 b 8.8 b 8.1 7.8 7.2 6.6 6.4 4.5 3.8
force aged 15-74)
Total population (000) 3886 3858 3831 3808 3781 3760 3739 3721 3700 3677 3652 3628
Population aged 15-64(000) 2614 2589 2563 2535 2500 2465 2429 2393 2358 2321 2287 2254
Total employment (000) 1521 1568 b 1521 1435 b 1398 b 1392 1388 1404 1424 1409 1468 1467
Employment aged 15-64 (000) 1508 1551 b 1506 1423 b 1386 b 1378 1372 1384 1402 1385 1435 1432
Employment rate (% population aged 20-64) 63.5 65.4 64.0 60.8 b 59.8 b 60.2 60.7 62.0 63.8 64.0 67.3 68.3
Employment rate (% population aged 15-64) 57.6 59.5 58.3 56.2 b 55.6 b 56.3 56.8 58.2 59.8 60.0 63.1 63.9
Employment rate (% population aged 15-24) 21.8 23.1 21.4 21.2 b 19.0 b 18.7 18.4 17.3 16.5 16.3 19.1 17.0
Employment rate (% population aged 25-54) 76.2 77.9 75.8 72.5 b 71.9 b 71.8 71.5 72.5 73.6 73.0 75.8 76.5
Employment rate (% population aged 55-64) 34.5 37.7 39.2 39.2 b 39.4 b 41.3 43.4 46.0 49.5 51.0 54.3 56.4
FTE employment rate (% population aged 20-64) 63.1 65.1 b 63.4 60.5 b 59.4 b 59.8 60.1 61.0 63.5 63.0 67.0 67.8
Self-employed (% total employment) 7.8 8.3 b 8.3 8.6 b 8.1 b 7.7 8.1 8.3 7.9 8.1 8.0 7.6
Part-time employment (% total employment) 1.9 2.4 2.5 2.5 b 2.4 b 2.5 3.0 2.8 2.5 2.2 2.4 2.0
Temporary employment (% total employment) 4.8 3.9 3.7 3.5 b 3.3 b 3.6 4.6 4.4 3.7 3.3 3.6 3.4
Employment in Services (% total employment) 65.6 bu 67.8 u 70.7 bu 71.3 bu 70.6 u 71.7 u 72.1 u 72.9 u 73.3 u 72.8 u 73.2 u
Employment in Industry (% total employment) 28.9 bu 27.0 u 24.2 bu 24.0 bu 25.3 u 24.0 u 23.4 u 22.9 u 22.6 u 22.8 u 22.6 u
Employment in Agriculture (% total employment) 5.5 b 5.2 5.1 b 4.7 b 4.2 4.3 4.5 4.2 4.2 4.4 4.2
Activity rate (% population aged 15-64) 62.1 63.1 62.5 62.2 b 61.9 b 63.2 64.5 65.0 65.4 64.6 67.1 67.0
Labour Market Indicators - Female

Activity rate (% population aged 15-24) 26.0 26.1 24.8 26.6 b 24.8 b 25.3 24.7 22.7 21.2 19.6 21.8 19.3
Activity rate (% population aged 25-54) 81.4 82.1 80.6 79.6 b 79.3 b 79.8 80.3 80.2 79.8 78.2 80.5 80.2
Activity rate (% population aged 55-64) 37.2 40.2 42.1 42.9 b 42.8 b 45.5 49.0 51.4 53.8 54.6 57.3 58.7
Total unemployment (000) 120 96 108 153 d 157 169 187 163 131 106 93 72
Unemployment rate (% labour force) 7.4 5.8 6.7 9.6 d 10.1 10.8 11.8 10.4 8.4 7.0 6.0 4.7
Youth unemployment rate (% labour force 15-24) 14.8 10.5 12.8 20.1 d 23.6 26.0 25.7 23.7 22.3 16.9 12.4 11.9
Long term unemployment rate (% labour force) 4.5 3.1 3.1 4.4 b 5.5 b 5.8 6.6 6.0 5.0 4.1 3.2 2.6
Share of long term unemployment (% of total
61.0 53.5 46.4 46.2 b 54.1 b 53.0 55.9 57.6 59.6 58.9 53.1 56.3
unemployment)

Youth unemployment ratio (% population aged 15-24) 4.1 3.0 b 3.4 5.3 b 5.9 b 6.6 6.3 5.4 4.7 3.3 2.7 2.3

Employment rate for low skilled 25-64 (ISCED 0-2) 37.0 38.6 b 38.0 34.5 b 32.2 b 32.0 32.6 34.1 b 33.5 32.2 36.4 37.4
Employment rate for medium skilled 25-64 (ISCED 3-
69.9 72.2 b 70.0 65.3 b 65.1 b 65.5 65.4 66.8 b 68.4 68.4 71.7 73.5
4)
Employment rate for high skilled 25-64 (ISCED 5-8) 82.9 84.0 b 83.2 81.6 b 80.7 b 80.6 79.7 80.8 b 83.2 83.5 84.6 84.9
Employment rate (Nationals aged 15-64) 57.5 59.5 b 58.4 56.3 b 55.6 b 56.3 56.8 58.2 59.9 60.1 63.1 64.0
Employment rate (Other EU28 aged 15-64)
Employment rate (Other than EU28 aged 15-64)
Employment rate (Born in the same country aged 15-
57.5 59.5 b 58.4 56.3 b 55.6 b 56.3 56.8 58.2 59.9 60.1 63.1 63.9
64)
Employment rate (Born in other EU28 aged 15-64)
Employment rate (Born outside EU28 aged 15-64) 63.0 u 55.7 bu 53.3 u 46.7 bu 47.9 bu 51.1 u 54.9 u 53.8 u 52.7 u 52.4 u 55.6 u 57.6 u
Underemployment (% of labour force aged 15-74) 0.7 b 0.7 0.8 b 0.9 b 0.9 1.2 1.1 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.6
Seeking but not available (% of labour force aged 15-
0.5 u 0.8 b 0.6 0.7 b 0.9 b 0.8 1.0 0.9 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.6
74)
Discouraged, available but not seeking (% of labour
8.4 6.3 b 7.1 8.1 b 8.2 b 8.0 7.2 6.6 6.3 6.1 4.8 4.0
force aged 15-74)

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239
Employment and Social Developments in Europe 2019

Bulgaria 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
At-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion (% of total
60.7 44.8 b 46.2 49.2 49.1 49.3 48.0 40.1 b 41.3 40.4 b 38.9 32.8
population)
At-risk-of-poverty (% of total population) 22.0 21.4 21.8 20.7 22.2 21.2 21.0 21.8 22.0 22.9 b 23.4 22.0
At-risk-of-poverty threshold (PPS single person) 1979 2859 3436 3531 3499 3418 3540 4052 4129 4045 b 4516 4343
Poverty gap (%) 33.5 27.0 27.4 29.6 29.4 31.4 30.9 33.2 30.3 30.4 b 30.5 26.9
Persistent at-risk-of-poverty (% of total
10.7 16.4 16.9 12.9 13.4 16.5 16.2 15.3 b 15.9 15.9
population)
At-risk-of-poverty before social transfers excl.
25.5 27.1 26.4 27.1 27.4 25.9 26.7 27.3 28.4 27.9 b 29.2 29.5
pensions (% of total population)
Impact of social transfers (excl. pensions) in
13.7 21.0 17.4 23.6 19.0 18.2 21.4 20.2 22.5 17.9 b 19.9 25.4
reducing poverty (%)
All

Severe Material Deprivation (% of total population) 57.6 41.2 41.9 45.7 43.6 44.1 43.0 33.1 34.2 31.9 b 30.0 20.9
Share of people living in low work intensity households
16.0 8.1 b 6.9 8.0 11.0 12.5 13.0 12.1 11.6 11.9 b 11.1 9.0
(% of people aged 0-59)
Real Gross Household Disposable income (growth %) 4.3 14.7 1.5 -0.7 2.9 -3.0 4.8 -0.6 8.1 10.4
Income quintile share ratio S80/S20 7.0 6.5 5.9 5.9 6.5 6.1 6.6 6.8 7.1 7.7 b 8.2 7.7
GINI coefficient 35.3 35.9 33.4 33.2 35.0 33.6 35.4 35.4 37.0 37.7 b 40.2 39.6
Early leavers from education and training (% of
14.9 14.8 14.7 12.6 b 11.8 12.5 12.5 12.9 b 13.4 13.8 12.7 12.7
population aged 18-24)
NEET: Young people neither in employment nor in
education and training (% of total population aged 15- 19.1 17.4 19.5 21.0 b 21.8 b 21.5 21.6 20.2 19.3 18.2 15.3 15.0
24)
At-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion (% of male
59.4 43.0 b 44.1 47.3 47.7 47.6 46.5 38.8 b 39.5 38.5 b 37.2 30.8
population)
At-risk-of-poverty (% of male population) 20.9 19.8 19.8 19.0 20.8 19.5 19.7 20.9 20.0 21.7 b 21.8 20.4
Poverty gap (%) 37.1 26.8 27.3 29.0 31.0 32.6 31.8 34.8 32.9 33.6 b 32.4 30.1
Persistent at-risk-of-poverty (% of male
9.8 13.7 15.9 11.0 11.8 15.7 13.7 13.3 b 14.5 14.6
population)
Severe Material Deprivation (% of male population) 56.6 39.6 40.1 44.2 42.5 42.9 41.6 31.7 33.0 30.4 b 28.8 19.4
Male

Share of people living in low work intensity households

15.6 7.8 b 7.0 7.8 11.1 12.5 12.9 12.1 11.7 11.7 b 11.4 9.2
(% of males aged 0-59)
Life expectancy at birth (years) 69.5 69.8 b 70.1 70.3 70.7 70.9 71.3 71.1 71.2 71.3 b 71.4 b
Healthy life years at birth (years) - men 67.1 62.1 b 62.1 63.0 62.1 62.1 62.4 62.0 61.5 64.0 b 62.9 b
Early leavers from education and training (% of males
15.2 14.1 13.7 12.4 b 11.2 12.1 12.3 12.8 b 13.3 13.7 12.0 12.6
aged 18-24)
NEET: Young people neither in employment nor in
17.7 15.6 18.1 20.3 b 21.8 b 21.6 22.1 19.2 18.6 17.1 13.6 13.3
education and training ( % of males aged 15-24)
At-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion (% of female
61.9 46.4 b 48.1 50.9 50.5 50.9 49.4 41.3 b 43.0 42.1 b 40.4 34.6
population)
At-risk-of-poverty (% of female population) 23.0 22.9 23.7 22.3 23.6 22.8 22.2 22.6 23.8 24.1 b 24.9 23.4
Poverty gap (%) 31.6 27.0 27.5 30.2 29.0 30.5 30.4 31.9 28.5 28.0 b 28.9 25.3
Persistent at-risk-of-poverty (% of female
11.5 18.9 17.8 14.6 15.0 17.3 18.4 17.1 b 17.1 17.1
population)
Social Indicators

Severe Material Deprivation (% of female population) 58.6 42.8 43.5 47.2 44.6 45.3 44.4 34.3 35.3 33.4 b 31.1 22.3
Female

Share of people living in low work intensity households

16.4 8.3 b 6.8 8.2 11.0 12.4 13.2 12.1 11.4 12.2 b 10.8 8.7
(% of females aged 0-59)
Life expectancy at birth (years) 76.6 77.0 b 77.4 77.4 77.8 77.9 78.6 78.0 78.2 78.5 b 78.4 b
Healthy life years at birth (years) - women 73.9 65.7 b 65.9 67.1 65.9 65.7 66.6 66.1 65.0 67.5 b 66.2 b
Early leavers from education and training (% of
14.7 15.5 15.8 12.9 b 12.6 13.0 12.7 12.9 b 13.4 13.9 13.5 12.8
females aged 18-24)
NEET: Young people neither in employment nor in
20.6 19.3 20.9 21.8 b 21.9 b 21.5 21.1 21.4 20.0 19.4 17.2 16.8
education and training ( % of females aged 15-24)
At-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion of children (% of
60.8 44.2 b 47.3 49.8 51.8 52.3 51.5 45.2 b 43.7 45.6 b 41.6 33.7
people aged 0-17)
At-risk-of-poverty (% of Children population) 29.9 25.5 24.9 26.7 28.4 28.2 28.4 31.7 25.4 31.9 b 29.2 26.6
Children (0-17)

Severe Material Deprivation (% of Children

58.3 40.8 43.6 46.5 45.6 46.6 46.3 38.4 37.3 36.1 b 33.1 19.1
population)
Share of children living in low work intensity
18.9 9.5 b 7.6 10.4 14.1 16.8 18.2 15.2 13.9 15.1 b 13.3 10.4
households (% of Children population)
Risk of poverty of children in households at work
16.6 18.2 19.3 19.3 19.0 17.0 16.6 22.5 15.3 22.1 b 19.9 19.8
(Working Intensity > 0.2)
Impact of social transfers (excl. pensions) in reducing
11.8 18.0 17.3 21.7 19.3 21.5 25.5 18.5 32.1 17.8 b 23.0 29.3
poverty (0-17) (%)
At-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion (% of working
57.9 39.5 b 40.6 45.0 45.2 45.6 44.3 36.4 b 37.4 37.2 b 34.8 28.3
age population)
At-risk-of-poverty (% of Working age population) 19.4 17.0 16.4 16.0 18.2 17.4 17.1 18.9 18.0 20.0 b 18.9 18.2
Working age

Severe Material Deprivation (% of Working age

54.9 36.2 37.1 42.2 40.3 40.8 39.9 29.5 31.3 29.0 b 27.0 17.3
(18-64)

population)
Very low work intensity (18-59) 15.1 7.7 b 6.7 7.3 10.2 11.2 11.6 11.2 10.9 11.0 b 10.5 8.6
In-work at-risk-of poverty rate (% of persons
5.9 7.6 7.5 7.7 8.2 7.4 7.2 9.3 7.8 11.6 10.0 10.1
employed 18-64)
Impact of social transfers (excl. pensions) in reducing
14.5 24.1 21.2 28.9 21.9 21.3 24.7 22.2 26.2 21.6 b 24.4 30.5
poverty (18-64) (%)
At-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion of elderly (% of
71.1 65.5 b 66.0 63.9 61.1 59.1 57.6 47.8 b 51.8 45.9 b 48.9 45.1
people aged 65+)
Elderly (65+)

At-risk-of-poverty (% of Elderly population) 23.9 33.8 39.3 32.2 31.2 28.2 27.9 22.6 31.7 24.3 b 32.0 29.2

Severe Material Deprivation (% of Elderly population) 67.2 61.0 58.4 58.1 53.7 53.2 50.7 40.3 40.9 37.5 b 36.3 32.7
Relative median income of elderly (ratio with median
0.78 0.66 0.63 0.74 0.72 0.74 0.76 0.82 0.71 0.80 b 0.71 0.75
income of people younger than 65)
Aggregate replacement ratio (ratio) 0.37 0.34 0.34 0.43 0.41 0.42 0.39 0.44 0.41 0.45 b 0.37 0.41
Sickness/Health care 3.5 4.2 3.6 4.0 4.2 4.2 4.4 5.0 4.6 4.7
protection indicators
Expenditure in social

Disability 1.1 1.1 1.3 1.3 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.4 1.3 1.3
Old age and survivors 6.7 7.1 8.1 8.5 8.0 8.0 8.6 8.9 8.7 8.5
(% of GDP)

Family/Children 1.1 1.3 1.9 1.9 1.8 1.7 1.8 1.9 1.9 1.8
Unemployment 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
Housing and Social exclusion n.e.c. 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3
Total (including Admin and Other expenditures) 13.4 14.7 16.1 17.0 16.5 16.6 17.6 18.5 17.9 17.5
of which: Means tested benefits 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.7 0.6

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240
 Statistical annex - 1. Country profiles

Czechia
Czechia 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Real GDP 5.6 2.7 -4.8 2.3 1.8 -0.8 -0.5 2.7 5.3 2.5 4.4 2.9
Total employment 2.1 2.2 -1.8 -1.0 -0.3 0.4 0.3 0.6 1.4 1.6 1.6 1.6
Labour productivity 3.4 0.5 -3.1 3.3 2.1 -1.2 -0.8 2.2 3.8 0.8 2.8 1.3
Macro Economic Indicators

Annual average hours worked per person employed -0.8 0.3 -0.6 1.2 0.3 -1.6 -0.7 0.8 -1.2 1.3 0.3 0.5
(Annual % growth)

Real productivity per hour worked 4.3 0.2 -2.5 2.2 1.7 0.4 -0.1 1.4 5.0 -0.4 2.4 0.9
Harmonized CPI 2.9 6.3 0.6 1.2 2.2 3.5 1.4 0.4 0.3 0.6 2.4 2.0
Price deflator GDP 3.5 2.1 2.6 -1.4 0.0 1.5 1.4 2.5 1.2 1.3 1.4 2.1
Nominal compensation per employee 6.1 4.1 -0.6 3.5 2.7 1.8 -0.3 2.6 3.0 4.0 6.4 7.6
Real compensation per employee (GDP deflator) 2.5 2.0 -3.1 5.0 2.7 0.3 -1.7 0.1 1.8 2.7 4.9 5.4
Real compensation per employee (private consumption
3.2 -2.1 -1.1 2.2 0.6 -1.8 -1.6 2.1 2.8 3.3 3.9 5.6
deflator)
Nominal unit labour costs 2.6 3.6 2.6 0.1 0.7 3.0 0.5 0.4 -0.8 3.1 3.6 6.2
Real unit labour costs -0.9 1.5 0.0 1.6 0.7 1.5 -0.9 -2.0 -2.0 1.8 2.2 4.0
Total population (000) 10254 10343 10426 10462 10487 10505 10516 10512 10538 10554 10579 10610
Population aged 15-64 (000) 7297 7358 7392 7369 7328 7263 7188 7109 7057 6998 6943 6899
Total employment (000) 4922 5003 4934 4885 4873 b 4890 4937 4974 5042 5139 5222 5294
Employment aged 15-64 (000) 4856 4934 4857 4810 4796 b 4810 4846 4884 4934 5016 5094 5147
Employment rate (% population aged 20-64) 72.0 72.4 70.9 70.4 70.9 b 71.5 72.5 73.5 74.8 76.7 78.5 79.9
Employment rate (% population aged 15-64) 66.1 66.6 65.4 65.0 65.7 b 66.5 67.7 69.0 70.2 72.0 73.6 74.8
Employment rate (% population aged 15-24) 28.5 28.1 26.5 25.2 24.5 b 25.2 25.6 27.1 28.4 28.6 29.1 28.4
Employment rate (% population aged 25-54) 83.5 83.8 82.5 82.2 82.8 b 82.9 83.5 83.8 84.5 85.7 86.7 87.5
Employment rate (% population aged 55-64) 46.0 47.6 46.8 46.5 47.7 b 49.3 51.6 54.0 55.5 58.5 62.1 65.1
FTE employment rate (% population aged 20-64) 70.9 71.3 69.8 69.1 70.2 b 70.6 71.6 72.8 73.9 75.6 77.4 78.2
Self-employed (% total employment) 15.6 15.5 16.2 17.1 17.5 b 17.8 16.9 17.4 16.7 16.6 16.7 16.5
Part-time employment (% total employment) 4.4 4.3 4.8 5.1 4.7 b 5.0 5.8 5.5 5.3 5.7 6.2 6.3
Temporary employment (% total employment) 6.6 6.1 6.3 6.7 6.5 b 6.8 7.5 8.0 8.3 8.1 8.0 7.0
Employment in Services (% total employment) 56.1 b 58.1 58.7 58.3 b 58.6 59.2 58.9 58.7 58.6 58.7 59.3
Employment in Industry (% total employment) 40.8 b 38.8 38.3 38.7 b 38.4 37.8 38.3 38.4 38.5 38.5 38.0
Employment in Agriculture (% total employment) 3.2 b 3.1 3.1 3.0 b 3.0 3.0 2.8 2.9 2.9 2.8 2.8
Activity rate (% population aged 15-64) 69.9 69.7 70.1 70.2 70.5 b 71.6 72.9 73.5 74.0 75.0 75.9 76.6
Labour Market Indicators - Total

Activity rate (% population aged 15-24) 31.9 31.1 31.8 30.9 29.9 b 31.3 31.5 32.2 32.5 32.0 31.7 30.4
Activity rate (% population aged 25-54) 87.8 87.3 87.7 87.8 88.0 b 88.4 89.1 88.8 88.6 88.9 89.1 89.3
Activity rate (% population aged 55-64) 48.2 49.5 49.6 49.7 50.6 b 52.4 54.8 56.8 58.0 60.8 63.6 66.5
Total unemployment (000) 276 230 352 384 351 367 370 324 268 212 155 121
Unemployment rate (% labour force) 5.3 4.4 6.7 7.3 6.7 7.0 7.0 6.1 5.1 4.0 2.9 2.2
Youth unemployment rate (% labour force 15-24) 10.7 9.9 16.6 18.3 18.1 19.5 18.9 15.9 12.6 10.5 7.9 6.7
Long term unemployment rate (% labour force) 2.8 2.2 2.0 3.0 2.7 b 3.0 3.0 2.7 2.4 1.7 1.0 0.7
Share of long term unemployment (% of total
52.2 49.2 30.0 40.9 40.6 b 43.4 43.4 43.5 47.3 42.1 35.0 30.5
unemployment)

Youth unemployment ratio (% population aged 15-24) 3.4 3.1 5.3 5.7 5.4 b 6.1 6.0 5.1 4.1 3.4 2.5 2.0

Employment rate for low skilled 25-64 (ISCED 0-2) 45.7 46.5 43.9 43.2 42.2 b 40.4 41.8 43.0 b 41.9 45.1 50.5 52.2
Employment rate for medium skilled 25-64 (ISCED 3-
76.1 76.6 75.1 74.5 75.2 b 75.9 76.6 77.6 b 78.9 80.7 82.2 83.5
4)
Employment rate for high skilled 25-64 (ISCED 5-8) 85.2 85.1 84.3 83.3 83.1 b 83.6 84.9 84.5 b 84.8 85.6 86.0 87.3
Employment rate (Nationals aged 15-64) 66.0 66.5 65.3 64.9 65.6 b 66.4 67.6 68.9 70.1 71.8 73.5 74.7
Employment rate (Other EU28 aged 15-64) 81.7 76.1 77.3 78.4 75.6 b 74.0 74.4 72.7 75.9 82.8 84.9 84.1
Employment rate (Other than EU28 aged 15-64) 71.6 72.1 68.2 70.9 70.0 b 72.9 76.0 75.4 73.3 75.6 74.3 78.6
Employment rate (Born in the same country aged 15-
66.1 66.6 65.4 64.9 65.7 b 66.5 67.7 68.9 70.2 71.9 73.5 74.6
64)
Employment rate (Born in other EU28 aged 15-64) 65.5 64.3 64.2 67.3 65.4 b 63.0 66.0 69.2 68.5 72.6 78.4 77.6
Employment rate (Born outside EU28 aged 15-64) 71.3 71.3 69.4 69.3 71.9 b 73.8 75.2 75.9 74.7 75.9 76.2 81.6
Underemployment (% of labour force aged 15-74) 0.3 0.4 0.6 0.5 b 0.5 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.4
Seeking but not available (% of labour force aged 15-
0.4 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.3 b 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.3
74)
Discouraged, available but not seeking (% of labour
0.8 0.7 1.0 1.1 1.1 b 1.2 1.3 1.1 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.6
force aged 15-74)

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241
Employment and Social Developments in Europe 2019

Czechia 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Total population (000) 5011 5065 5117 5136 5147 5158 5164 5162 5177 5186 5201 5220
Population aged 15-64(000) 3670 3710 3737 3727 3706 3676 3640 3601 3577 3550 3526 3509
Total employment (000) 2806 2863 2824 2798 2778 b 2779 2794 2817 2837 2877 2916 2947
Employment aged 15-64 (000) 2764 2820 2777 2753 2733 b 2732 2742 2764 2775 2806 2843 2862
Employment rate (% population aged 20-64) 81.5 82.0 80.2 79.6 79.9 b 80.2 81.0 82.2 83.0 84.6 86.3 87.4
Employment rate (% population aged 15-64) 74.8 75.4 73.8 73.5 74.0 b 74.6 75.7 77.0 77.9 79.3 80.9 81.8
Employment rate (% population aged 15-24) 32.8 32.4 31.1 29.6 29.0 b 29.2 29.9 32.3 33.1 33.8 33.8 32.2
Employment rate (% population aged 25-54) 91.7 92.1 90.5 90.5 90.9 b 90.9 91.2 91.5 91.9 92.7 93.7 94.4
Employment rate (% population aged 55-64) 59.6 61.9 59.6 58.4 58.9 b 60.3 62.5 64.8 65.5 68.2 71.7 74.0
FTE employment rate (% population aged 20-64) 81.4 81.9 79.9 79.4 80.2 b 80.7 81.4 82.6 83.5 84.7 86.6 87.0
Self-employed (% total employment) 20.2 19.9 20.5 21.6 21.8 b 21.9 20.7 21.7 20.6 20.0 20.3 20.4
Part-time employment (% total employment) 1.7 1.6 2.0 2.2 1.8 b 2.2 2.5 2.5 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.6
Temporary employment (% total employment) 5.2 4.5 4.8 5.3 5.2 b 5.4 6.0 6.6 6.7 6.5 6.2 5.2
Employment in Services (% total employment) 45.0 b 46.4 46.7 46.5 b 46.5 47.2 46.9 46.6 46.7 46.9 47.5
Employment in Industry (% total employment) 51.2 b 49.8 49.4 49.7 b 49.7 49.1 49.5 49.5 49.5 49.6 48.9
Employment in Agriculture (% total employment) 3.8 b 3.8 4.0 3.8 b 3.9 3.7 3.6 3.9 3.8 3.6 3.6
Activity rate (% population aged 15-64) 78.1 78.1 78.5 78.6 78.7 b 79.5 80.5 81.2 81.4 82.2 82.9 83.3
Labour Market Indicators - Male

Activity rate (% population aged 15-24) 36.7 35.9 37.3 36.2 35.5 b 36.4 36.8 38.1 37.4 37.5 36.5 34.4
Activity rate (% population aged 25-54) 95.0 94.8 95.1 95.5 95.3 b 95.5 95.8 95.6 95.4 95.4 95.7 95.9
Activity rate (% population aged 55-64) 62.5 64.2 63.2 62.5 62.6 b 64.0 66.1 67.9 68.3 70.9 73.2 75.3
Total unemployment (000) 124 103 175 191 171 178 176 151 125 101 70 54
Unemployment rate (% labour force) 4.2 3.5 5.9 6.4 5.8 6.0 5.9 5.1 4.2 3.4 2.3 1.8
Youth unemployment rate (% labour force 15-24) 10.6 9.8 16.6 18.2 18.2 19.9 18.7 15.0 11.3 10.0 7.4 6.4
Long term unemployment rate (% labour force) 2.1 1.7 1.6 2.6 2.4 b 2.6 2.5 2.2 2.0 1.4 0.8 0.6
Share of long term unemployment (% of total
50.6 49.5 27.8 40.0 40.6 b 43.3 41.8 43.8 47.8 41.5 35.0 32.5
unemployment)

Youth unemployment ratio (% population aged 15-24) 3.9 3.5 6.2 6.6 6.4 b 7.2 6.9 5.7 4.2 3.7 2.7 2.2

Employment rate for low skilled 25-64 (ISCED 0-2) 56.3 57.4 53.6 53.1 50.7 b 48.6 52.5 53.5 b 52.6 56.6 61.7 64.0
Employment rate for medium skilled 25-64 (ISCED 3-
85.2 85.9 84.0 83.3 83.5 b 84.3 84.5 85.6 b 86.3 87.6 89.2 90.3
4)
Employment rate for high skilled 25-64 (ISCED 5-8) 91.4 92.2 91.0 91.0 91.5 b 91.2 92.7 92.3 b 92.7 93.4 93.9 95.1
Employment rate (Nationals aged 15-64) 74.7 75.3 73.7 73.3 73.9 b 74.4 75.5 76.8 77.7 79.1 80.7 81.5
Employment rate (Other EU28 aged 15-64) 90.6 85.5 85.9 90.8 88.7 b 89.0 85.7 84.2 86.4 92.3 93.4 94.1
Employment rate (Other than EU28 aged 15-64) 80.6 82.7 77.7 83.5 80.8 b 86.6 86.6 88.4 86.9 85.9 85.5 88.7
Employment rate (Born in the same country aged 15-
74.8 75.4 73.8 73.4 73.9 b 74.5 75.5 76.8 77.7 79.1 80.7 81.5
64)
Employment rate (Born in other EU28 aged 15-64) 73.8 75.5 73.7 78.2 78.9 b 75.2 76.3 80.4 79.7 84.2 86.6 86.2
Employment rate (Born outside EU28 aged 15-64) 83.0 82.5 76.7 80.9 82.6 b 86.7 86.5 89.4 87.2 85.9 87.5 90.5
Underemployment (% of labour force aged 15-74) 0.1 u 0.2 0.2 0.2 b 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2
Seeking but not available (% of labour force aged 15-
0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 b 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.2
74)
Discouraged, available but not seeking (% of labour
0.6 0.5 0.8 0.8 0.9 b 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.4
force aged 15-74)
Total population (000) 5244 5278 5309 5326 5340 5347 5352 5350 5361 5368 5378 5390
Population aged 15-64(000) 3628 3648 3655 3641 3622 3587 3548 3508 3479 3447 3416 3390
Total employment (000) 2116 2139 2111 2087 2095 b 2112 2143 2157 2205 2262 2306 2347
Employment aged 15-64 (000) 2092 2114 2081 2057 2064 b 2079 2104 2120 2159 2210 2251 2285
Employment rate (% population aged 20-64) 62.4 62.5 61.4 60.9 61.7 b 62.5 63.8 64.7 66.4 68.6 70.5 72.2
Employment rate (% population aged 15-64) 57.3 57.6 56.7 56.3 57.2 b 58.2 59.6 60.7 62.4 64.4 66.2 67.6
Employment rate (% population aged 15-24) 23.9 23.5 21.7 20.6 19.8 b 21.0 21.0 21.6 23.4 23.2 24.3 24.3
Employment rate (% population aged 25-54) 74.9 75.2 74.1 73.4 74.3 b 74.6 75.5 75.7 76.7 78.4 79.3 80.1
Employment rate (% population aged 55-64) 33.5 34.4 35.0 35.5 37.2 b 39.0 41.4 43.8 45.9 49.3 53.0 56.6
FTE employment rate (% population aged 20-64) 60.5 60.7 59.6 58.8 60.2 b 60.6 61.8 62.9 64.3 66.4 68.2 69.4
Self-employed (% total employment) 9.5 9.6 10.4 11.1 11.9 b 12.4 11.9 11.8 11.7 12.3 12.1 11.5
Part-time employment (% total employment) 7.9 7.8 8.5 9.1 8.5 b 8.6 10.0 9.5 9.3 10.0 10.9 10.9
Temporary employment (% total employment) 8.4 8.1 8.3 8.6 8.3 b 8.6 9.5 9.8 10.4 10.1 10.2 9.3
Employment in Services (% total employment) 70.8 b 73.6 74.7 74.0 b 74.5 74.9 74.6 74.3 73.8 73.7 74.0 u
Employment in Industry (% total employment) 26.9 b 24.2 23.4 24.1 b 23.6 23.1 23.8 24.1 24.5 24.5 24.3 u
Employment in Agriculture (% total employment) 2.3 b 2.2 1.9 1.9 b 1.9 2.0 1.6 1.6 1.7 1.8 1.7
Activity rate (% population aged 15-64) 61.5 61.0 61.5 61.5 62.2 b 63.5 65.1 65.6 66.5 67.6 68.7 69.6
Labour Market Indicators - Female

Activity rate (% population aged 15-24) 26.9 26.1 26.1 25.3 24.1 b 25.9 26.1 26.1 27.4 26.2 26.6 26.2
Activity rate (% population aged 25-54) 80.3 79.6 79.9 79.8 80.4 b 80.9 81.9 81.6 81.4 82.1 82.1 82.3
Activity rate (% population aged 55-64) 35.2 36.1 37.2 38.0 39.4 b 41.5 44.2 46.3 48.3 51.2 54.5 58.0
Total unemployment (000) 153 127 177 193 180 189 194 172 143 111 86 68
Unemployment rate (% labour force) 6.7 5.6 7.7 8.5 7.9 8.2 8.3 7.4 6.1 4.7 3.6 2.8
Youth unemployment rate (% labour force 15-24) 11.0 9.9 16.7 18.5 18.0 19.0 19.3 17.1 14.4 11.4 8.7 7.2
Long term unemployment rate (% labour force) 3.6 2.8 2.5 3.5 3.2 b 3.6 3.7 3.2 2.9 2.0 1.3 0.8
Share of long term unemployment (% of total
53.6 49.1 32.2 41.9 40.5 b 43.4 44.8 43.2 46.8 42.6 35.0 28.9
unemployment)

Youth unemployment ratio (% population aged 15-24) 2.9 2.6 4.4 4.7 4.3 b 4.9 5.1 4.5 3.9 3.0 2.3 1.9

Employment rate for low skilled 25-64 (ISCED 0-2) 40.6 41.3 39.1 38.3 38.0 b 36.1 35.7 37.1 b 35.6 37.9 43.2 44.1
Employment rate for medium skilled 25-64 (ISCED 3-
66.4 66.6 65.5 65.0 66.2 b 66.8 67.9 68.7 b 70.7 73.1 74.4 75.9
4)
Employment rate for high skilled 25-64 (ISCED 5-8) 77.9 77.2 76.9 75.0 74.4 b 76.0 77.3 77.2 b 77.6 78.3 78.9 80.3
Employment rate (Nationals aged 15-64) 57.2 57.5 56.6 56.2 57.2 b 58.3 59.6 60.7 62.4 64.4 66.1 67.6
Employment rate (Other EU28 aged 15-64) 71.2 63.2 66.6 62.9 58.7 b 53.0 61.7 61.2 64.6 70.4 74.4 70.9
Employment rate (Other than EU28 aged 15-64) 61.5 62.3 58.9 58.7 59.1 b 60.3 63.1 60.5 59.0 64.9 63.3 68.0
Employment rate (Born in the same country aged 15-
57.3 57.6 56.7 56.3 57.3 b 58.3 59.6 60.7 62.5 64.5 66.1 67.5
64)
Employment rate (Born in other EU28 aged 15-64) 56.7 52.7 54.2 55.1 49.5 b 49.6 55.4 58.3 57.5 61.4 69.9 67.7
Employment rate (Born outside EU28 aged 15-64) 59.7 61.1 62.4 58.0 61.5 b 61.7 62.8 61.4 61.9 65.9 65.1 72.6
Underemployment (% of labour force aged 15-74) 0.6 0.8 1.0 0.9 b 0.9 1.2 1.1 0.9 0.9 0.7 0.6
Seeking but not available (% of labour force aged 15-
0.6 0.6 0.5 0.6 0.5 b 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4
74)
Discouraged, available but not seeking (% of labour
1.1 1.0 1.3 1.4 1.3 b 1.5 1.7 1.4 1.2 1.0 0.9 0.8
force aged 15-74)

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242
 Statistical annex - 1. Country profiles

Czechia 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
At-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion (% of total
15.8 15.3 14.0 14.4 15.3 15.4 14.6 14.8 14.0 13.3 12.2 12.2
population)
At-risk-of-poverty (% of total population) 9.6 9.0 8.6 9.0 9.8 9.6 8.6 9.7 9.7 9.7 9.1 9.6
At-risk-of-poverty threshold (PPS single person) 5305 5835 5666 5796 5993 6188 6481 6654 6991 7487 7579 7994
Poverty gap (%) 18.1 18.5 18.8 21.1 17.2 19.1 16.6 18.0 19.2 19.5 16.6 15.0
Persistent at-risk-of-poverty (% of total
3.9 3.7 5.5 4.2 4.3 4.1 3.4 4.5 4.3 4.4 6.3
population)
At-risk-of-poverty before social transfers excl.
20.1 20.0 17.9 18.1 18.0 17.6 16.6 17.2 16.8 16.3 15.8 15.6
pensions (% of total population)
Impact of social transfers (excl. pensions) in
52.2 55.0 52.0 50.3 45.6 45.5 48.2 43.6 42.3 40.5 42.4 38.5
reducing poverty (%)
All

Severe Material Deprivation (% of total population) 7.4 6.8 6.1 6.2 6.1 6.6 6.6 6.7 5.6 4.8 3.7 2.8
Share of people living in low work intensity households
8.6 7.2 6.0 6.4 6.6 6.8 6.9 7.6 6.8 6.7 5.5 4.5
(% of people aged 0-59)
Real Gross Household Disposable income (growth %) 3.4 2.4 2.0 0.4 -1.5 -1.2 -0.7 2.9 4.1 3.3 1.8
Income quintile share ratio S80/S20 3.5 3.4 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.4 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.4 3.3
GINI coefficient 25.3 24.7 25.1 24.9 25.2 24.9 24.6 25.1 25.0 25.1 24.5 24.0
Early leavers from education and training (% of
5.2 5.6 5.4 4.9 4.9 b 5.5 5.4 b 5.5 b 6.2 6.6 6.7 6.2
population aged 18-24)
NEET: Young people neither in employment nor in
education and training (% of total population aged 15- 6.9 6.7 8.5 8.8 8.3 b 8.9 9.1 8.1 7.5 7.0 6.3 5.6
24)
At-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion (% of male
14.2 13.3 12.3 12.7 13.7 13.7 13.1 13.3 12.3 12.0 10.5 10.0
population)
At-risk-of-poverty (% of male population) 8.7 8.0 7.5 8.0 8.9 8.7 7.7 8.9 8.5 8.5 7.6 7.8
Poverty gap (%) 19.0 21.4 22.0 23.6 19.1 20.2 17.8 18.7 20.9 22.6 18.4 16.4
Persistent at-risk-of-poverty (% of male
3.5 3.1 5.1 3.8 3.4 3.3 3.4 3.9 3.4 3.3 5.5
population)
Severe Material Deprivation (% of male population) 7.0 6.3 5.8 5.8 5.6 6.0 5.9 6.2 5.0 4.6 3.5 2.5
Male

Share of people living in low work intensity households

7.4 6.2 4.8 5.2 5.8 6.1 6.2 6.8 6.0 6.2 5.1 4.3
(% of males aged 0-59)
Life expectancy at birth (years) 73.8 b 74.1 74.2 74.5 74.8 75.1 75.2 75.8 75.7 76.1 76.1
Healthy life years at birth (years) - men 61.4 b 61.3 61.1 62.2 62.2 62.3 62.5 63.4 62.4 62.7 60.6
Early leavers from education and training (% of males
5.7 5.8 5.5 4.9 5.4 b 6.1 5.4 b 5.8 b 6.4 6.6 6.8 6.4
aged 18-24)
NEET: Young people neither in employment nor in
4.9 4.8 7.2 7.5 7.1 b 8.1 7.5 6.5 5.5 5.5 4.4 3.6
education and training ( % of males aged 15-24)
At-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion (% of female
17.4 17.2 15.7 16.0 16.9 16.9 16.1 16.3 15.6 14.6 13.9 14.3
population)
At-risk-of-poverty (% of female population) 10.5 10.1 9.5 10.0 10.6 10.5 9.4 10.5 11.0 10.8 10.7 11.4
Poverty gap (%) 17.2 15.1 16.3 18.9 16.5 17.7 16.1 17.4 16.7 16.6 15.1 13.9
Persistent at-risk-of-poverty (% of female
4.3 4.2 5.9 4.5 5.2 4.9 3.4 5.1 5.2 5.5 7.0
population)
Social Indicators

Severe Material Deprivation (% of female population) 7.7 7.3 6.5 6.5 6.7 7.2 7.2 7.2 6.2 5.0 4.0 3.1
Female

Share of people living in low work intensity households

9.9 8.2 7.1 7.6 7.4 7.5 7.7 8.4 7.8 7.2 5.9 4.7
(% of females aged 0-59)
Life expectancy at birth (years) 80.2 b 80.5 80.5 80.9 81.1 81.2 81.3 82.0 81.6 82.1 82.0
Healthy life years at birth (years) - women 63.3 b 63.4 62.7 64.5 63.6 64.1 64.2 65.0 63.7 64.0 62.4
Early leavers from education and training (% of
4.7 5.4 5.2 4.8 4.4 b 4.9 5.5 b 5.2 b 6.0 6.6 6.7 6.1
females aged 18-24)
NEET: Young people neither in employment nor in
9.1 8.7 9.9 10.3 9.5 b 9.8 10.8 9.9 9.5 8.6 8.3 7.8
education and training ( % of females aged 15-24)
At-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion of children (% of
21.5 18.6 17.2 18.9 20.0 18.8 16.4 19.5 18.5 17.4 14.2 13.2
people aged 0-17)
At-risk-of-poverty (% of Children population) 16.6 13.2 13.3 14.3 15.2 13.9 11.3 14.7 14.7 14.1 11.6 11.0
Children (0-17)

Severe Material Deprivation (% of Children

10.0 8.3 7.4 8.6 8.0 8.5 7.3 9.7 7.2 6.3 4.5 3.4
population)
Share of children living in low work intensity
10.0 7.6 6.2 7.0 6.9 6.7 6.2 9.4 8.2 8.3 6.2 4.6
households (% of Children population)
Risk of poverty of children in households at work
9.0 8.1 8.6 9.2 10.5 9.6 7.3 7.7 9.0 7.5 7.2 7.7
(Working Intensity > 0.2)
Impact of social transfers (excl. pensions) in reducing
46.1 55.6 47.4 45.0 43.7 46.5 49.6 42.8 38.5 39.5 42.0 41.2
poverty (0-17) (%)
At-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion (% of working
15.3 15.0 13.7 14.1 15.1 15.5 15.2 14.6 13.6 13.0 11.5 10.8
age population)
At-risk-of-poverty (% of Working age population) 8.6 8.3 7.6 8.1 9.1 9.3 8.6 9.1 9.0 8.8 7.9 7.7
Working age

Severe Material Deprivation (% of Working age

6.8 6.5 5.9 6.0 5.8 6.3 6.7 6.3 5.4 4.9 3.7 2.7
(18-64)

population)
Very low work intensity (18-59) 8.2 7.1 5.9 6.2 6.5 6.9 7.1 7.0 6.4 6.2 5.3 4.5
In-work at-risk-of poverty rate (% of persons
3.3 3.6 3.2 3.7 4.1 4.6 4.1 3.6 4.0 3.8 3.6 3.5
employed 18-64)
Impact of social transfers (excl. pensions) in reducing
54.3 55.4 54.5 52.6 47.7 47.2 49.7 45.8 45.5 44.3 47.3 45.4
poverty (18-64) (%)
At-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion of elderly (% of
10.9 12.5 11.7 10.1 10.7 10.8 10.4 10.7 10.9 10.1 12.6 15.6
people aged 65+)
Elderly (65+)

At-risk-of-poverty (% of Elderly population) 5.5 7.4 7.2 6.8 6.6 6.0 5.8 7.0 7.4 8.1 10.7 14.2

Severe Material Deprivation (% of Elderly population) 6.5 6.4 5.7 4.3 5.4 6.0 5.3 5.1 4.5 3.0 2.9 2.5
Relative median income of elderly (ratio with median
0.81 0.79 0.78 0.82 0.82 0.84 0.85 0.84 0.81 0.79 0.76 0.74
income of people younger than 65)
Aggregate replacement ratio (ratio) 0.51 0.51 0.51 0.54 0.53 0.55 0.56 0.55 0.51 0.50 0.51 0.50
Sickness/Health care 5.6 5.5 6.1 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 5.8 5.9
protection indicators
Expenditure in social

Disability 1.4 1.4 1.5 1.5 1.4 1.4 1.3 1.3 1.2 1.2
Old age and survivors 7.3 7.7 8.6 8.8 9.2 9.5 9.3 9.0 8.7 8.6
(% of GDP)

Family/Children 1.9 2.0 2.0 2.0 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.7 1.6 1.6
Unemployment 0.6 0.6 1.0 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.5
Housing and Social exclusion n.e.c. 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.5
Total (including Admin and Other expenditures) 17.6 17.9 20.1 20.0 20.1 20.4 20.2 19.7 19.0 18.9
of which: Means tested benefits 0.5 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5

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243
Employment and Social Developments in Europe 2019

Denmark
Denmark 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Real GDP 0.9 -0.5 -4.9 1.9 1.3 0.2 0.9 1.6 2.3 2.4 2.3 1.4
Total employment 2.3 1.2 -3.1 -2.3 0.0 -0.7 0.0 0.9 1.4 1.5 1.7 1.8
Labour productivity -1.4 -1.7 -1.8 4.3 1.4 0.9 0.9 0.7 1.0 0.9 0.6 -0.4
Macro Economic Indicators

Annual average hours worked per person employed -1.6 -0.2 -0.9 0.4 1.0 -1.0 0.2 -0.8 -0.5 0.4 -0.5 -0.9
(Annual % growth)

Real productivity per hour worked 0.2 -1.5 -0.9 3.9 0.3 1.9 0.8 1.6 1.4 0.5 1.1 0.6
Harmonized CPI 1.7 3.6 1.0 2.2 2.7 2.4 0.5 0.4 0.2 0.0 1.1 0.7
Price deflator GDP 2.4 4.1 0.5 3.2 0.6 2.4 0.9 1.0 0.4 0.7 1.4 0.4
Nominal compensation per employee 3.7 3.9 2.8 3.3 1.4 1.8 1.6 1.5 1.7 1.5 1.7 2.0
Real compensation per employee (GDP deflator) 1.3 -0.3 2.3 0.0 0.7 -0.5 0.7 0.4 1.3 0.8 0.3 1.6
Real compensation per employee (private consumption
2.0 0.2 1.8 1.1 -1.3 -0.5 1.1 1.1 1.5 1.5 0.6 1.3
deflator)
Nominal unit labour costs 5.2 5.6 4.7 -1.0 0.0 0.9 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.6 1.1 2.4
Real unit labour costs 2.7 1.5 4.1 -4.1 -0.6 -1.4 -0.3 -0.2 0.4 -0.1 -0.4 2.0
Total population (000) 5447 5476 5511 5535 5561 5581 5603 5627 5660 5707 5749 5781
Population aged 15-64 (000) 3598 3613 3628 3631 3632 3626 3625 3632 3646 3673 3692 3705
Total employment (000) 2804 2853 2771 2706 2703 2689 2688 2714 2752 2840 b 2816 b 2868
Employment aged 15-64 (000) 2759 2807 2724 2654 2643 2621 2622 2640 2678 2748 b 2734 b 2785
Employment rate (% population aged 20-64) 79.0 79.7 77.5 75.8 75.7 75.4 75.6 75.9 76.5 77.4 b 76.9 b 78.2
Employment rate (% population aged 15-64) 77.0 77.9 75.3 73.3 73.1 72.6 72.5 72.8 73.5 74.9 b 74.2 b 75.4
Employment rate (% population aged 15-24) 65.3 66.4 62.5 58.1 57.5 55.0 53.7 53.7 55.4 58.2 b 56.3 b 57.3
Employment rate (% population aged 25-54) 86.1 87.5 84.7 82.8 82.3 81.9 82.0 82.0 82.1 82.5 b 81.7 b 82.7
Employment rate (% population aged 55-64) 58.9 58.4 58.2 58.4 59.5 60.8 61.7 63.2 64.7 67.8 b 68.9 b 70.7
FTE employment rate (% population aged 20-64) 73.7 b 74.3 71.8 69.7 69.4 69.3 69.4 69.2 69.5 70.4 b 70.3 b 71.3
Self-employed (% total employment) 8.4 8.4 9.0 8.8 8.9 8.9 8.8 8.7 8.4 8.3 b 7.8 b 7.7
Part-time employment (% total employment) 23.0 23.8 25.2 25.6 25.1 24.8 24.7 24.6 24.7 26.4 b 25.3 b 24.8
Temporary employment (% total employment) 8.2 7.7 7.9 7.7 8.1 7.9 8.1 7.9 8.0 12.4 b 11.9 b 10.3
Employment in Services (% total employment) 74.5 bu 77.2 u 78.0 u 77.7 u 77.8 78.1 78.3 78.3 79.2 b 79.3 b 79.3
Employment in Industry (% total employment) 23.2 bu 20.3 u 19.7 u 20.0 u 19.8 19.6 19.4 19.3 18.6 b 18.7 b 18.6
Employment in Agriculture (% total employment) 2.4 b 2.5 2.3 2.2 2.4 2.3 2.3 2.4 2.3 b 2.1 b 2.1
Activity rate (% population aged 15-64) 80.1 80.7 80.2 79.4 79.3 78.6 78.1 78.1 78.5 80.0 b 78.8 b 79.4
Labour Market Indicators - Total

Activity rate (% population aged 15-24) 70.6 72.2 70.9 67.5 67.1 64.1 61.7 61.5 62.1 66.2 b 63.3 b 63.2
Activity rate (% population aged 25-54) 88.9 89.9 89.4 88.7 88.2 87.8 87.5 87.1 87.1 87.4 b 86.2 b 86.5
Activity rate (% population aged 55-64) 61.0 59.9 60.8 61.8 63.2 64.4 65.0 66.4 67.6 70.6 b 71.6 b 73.3
Total unemployment (000) 111 101 177 218 221 219 202 191 181 187 172 150
Unemployment rate (% labour force) 3.8 3.4 6.0 7.5 7.6 7.5 7.0 6.6 6.2 6.2 5.7 5.0
Youth unemployment rate (% labour force 15-24) 7.5 8.0 11.8 13.9 14.2 14.1 13.0 12.6 10.8 12.0 11.0 9.3
Long term unemployment rate (% labour force) 0.6 0.5 0.6 1.5 1.8 2.1 1.8 1.7 1.7 1.4 b 1.3 b 1.1
Share of long term unemployment (% of total
16.1 13.5 9.5 20.2 24.4 28.0 25.5 25.2 26.9 22.3 b 22.6 b 21.1
unemployment)

Youth unemployment ratio (% population aged 15-24) 5.3 5.8 8.4 9.4 9.6 9.1 8.1 7.8 6.7 7.9 b 7.0 b 5.9

Employment rate for low skilled 25-64 (ISCED 0-2) 67.5 b 68.4 65.2 62.8 62.6 61.4 60.9 61.4 b 60.5 63.5 b 62.1 b 62.5
Employment rate for medium skilled 25-64 (ISCED 3-
82.3 b 82.7 80.0 79.1 79.0 78.7 79.3 79.1 b 80.3 81.1 b 81.0 b 82.1
4)
Employment rate for high skilled 25-64 (ISCED 5-8) 87.2 b 88.5 86.8 85.7 85.8 86.4 86.5 86.0 b 85.9 86.0 b 85.9 b 86.9
Employment rate (Nationals aged 15-64) 78.1 78.7 76.0 74.1 74.1 73.7 73.5 73.8 74.7 75.8 b 75.2 b 76.5
Employment rate (Other EU28 aged 15-64) 75.0 80.8 80.2 75.4 72.4 71.7 72.3 75.7 75.9 76.4 b 75.6 b 74.9
Employment rate (Other than EU28 aged 15-64) 54.0 57.4 58.5 54.2 53.7 52.5 56.0 54.6 54.9 59.8 b 58.8 b 59.3
Employment rate (Born in the same country aged 15-
78.5 79.0 76.2 74.6 74.7 74.2 73.9 74.2 75.1 76.3 b 75.8 b 77.0
64)
Employment rate (Born in other EU28 aged 15-64) 75.7 78.8 77.6 73.5 71.0 71.8 73.3 76.1 75.4 76.0 b 75.6 b 75.3
Employment rate (Born outside EU28 aged 15-64) 60.5 64.1 64.3 59.6 57.9 56.5 58.3 58.3 58.2 62.1 b 59.8 b 61.8
Underemployment (% of labour force aged 15-74) 2.3 3.2 3.0 3.1 3.0 2.7 2.5 2.3 4.6 b 3.6 b 2.7
Seeking but not available (% of labour force aged 15-
0.9 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.9 0.8 0.9 0.8 0.7 1.7 b 1.7 b 1.4
74)
Discouraged, available but not seeking (% of labour
1.8 1.6 1.9 2.0 2.6 2.4 2.3 1.9 1.5 3.2 b 2.1 b 1.7
force aged 15-74)

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244
 Statistical annex - 1. Country profiles

Denmark 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Total population (000) 2697 2713 2732 2743 2757 2767 2779 2792 2811 2838 2860 2876
Population aged 15-64(000) 1816 1823 1831 1830 1830 1826 1826 1830 1839 1855 1865 1871
Total employment (000) 1492 1517 1454 1415 1421 1413 1410 1433 1461 1503 b 1487 b 1515
Employment aged 15-64 (000) 1460 1484 1421 1378 1381 1368 1365 1384 1408 1440 b 1431 b 1457
Employment rate (% population aged 20-64) 83.2 83.9 80.5 78.6 79.0 78.6 78.7 79.5 80.2 80.7 b 80.2 b 81.5
Employment rate (% population aged 15-64) 80.8 81.6 78.0 75.6 75.9 75.2 75.0 75.8 76.6 77.7 b 76.9 b 78.0
Employment rate (% population aged 15-24) 66.5 67.4 62.2 56.7 56.6 54.6 52.3 52.7 54.6 56.5 b 55.3 b 55.8
Employment rate (% population aged 25-54) 89.8 90.9 86.9 85.3 85.7 84.6 85.0 85.5 85.9 86.4 b 85.2 b 86.2
Employment rate (% population aged 55-64) 64.9 65.2 64.9 63.3 63.8 65.9 66.5 68.9 69.8 71.9 b 72.8 b 74.9
FTE employment rate (% population aged 20-64) 80.9 b 81.2 77.6 75.7 75.8 75.0 75.1 75.6 75.9 76.4 b 76.0 b 77.1
Self-employed (% total employment) 11.9 11.9 12.6 12.2 12.3 12.2 12.0 11.7 11.3 11.1 b 10.5 b 10.3
Part-time employment (% total employment) 12.4 13.3 14.3 14.0 14.2 14.8 14.8 15.2 15.6 16.8 b 16.2 b 15.6
Temporary employment (% total employment) 6.8 6.7 6.9 7.2 7.4 7.0 7.2 7.3 7.1 10.7 b 10.7 b 8.9
Employment in Services (% total employment) 63.6 bu 66.6 u 67.0 u 66.7 u 67.2 67.4 67.9 68.4 69.5 b 69.3 bu 69.2 u
Employment in Industry (% total employment) 32.9 bu 29.7 u 29.3 u 29.7 u 29.2 29.1 28.5 28.0 27.0 b 27.6 bu 27.7 u
Employment in Agriculture (% total employment) 3.6 b 3.7 3.7 3.5 3.7 3.6 3.6 3.5 3.5 b 3.1 b 3.1
Activity rate (% population aged 15-64) 83.7 84.3 83.6 82.6 82.3 81.4 80.6 81.1 81.6 82.6 b 81.5 b 82.1
Labour Market Indicators - Male

Activity rate (% population aged 15-24) 72.0 72.8 71.7 67.6 67.1 64.1 61.1 61.0 61.7 65.0 b 62.5 b 62.4
Activity rate (% population aged 25-54) 92.3 93.3 92.2 92.0 91.5 90.6 90.2 90.3 90.8 90.8 b 89.6 b 89.9
Activity rate (% population aged 55-64) 66.9 66.9 68.1 67.8 68.3 69.9 70.2 72.6 72.7 74.9 b 75.6 b 77.7
Total unemployment (000) 53 50 103 129 118 115 102 98 92 92 88 77
Unemployment rate (% labour force) 3.4 3.2 6.6 8.4 7.7 7.5 6.7 6.4 5.9 5.8 5.6 4.8
Youth unemployment rate (% labour force 15-24) 7.6 7.3 13.2 16.0 15.6 14.7 14.2 13.7 11.6 13.1 11.4 10.5
Long term unemployment rate (% labour force) 0.5 0.5 0.6 1.8 2.0 2.1 1.6 1.7 1.6 1.3 b 1.3 b 1.0
Share of long term unemployment (% of total
15.6 14.2 9.3 21.9 26.2 28.5 23.5 25.9 27.5 23.0 b 23.7 b 20.5
unemployment)

Youth unemployment ratio (% population aged 15-24) 5.5 5.4 9.5 10.9 10.5 9.5 8.7 8.4 7.2 8.5 b 7.1 b 6.6

Employment rate for low skilled 25-64 (ISCED 0-2) 75.8 b 76.2 71.7 69.6 70.0 67.1 67.6 69.2 b 68.9 71.7 b 70.9 b 69.6
Employment rate for medium skilled 25-64 (ISCED 3-
85.1 b 85.7 82.4 80.8 81.5 81.5 82.6 83.0 b 83.9 84.8 b 84.1 b 85.5
4)
Employment rate for high skilled 25-64 (ISCED 5-8) 89.6 b 90.6 88.7 87.5 88.2 89.2 88.4 89.2 b 89.4 88.7 b 88.5 b 90.5
Employment rate (Nationals aged 15-64) 81.6 82.1 78.3 76.0 76.5 75.9 75.6 76.3 77.2 78.2 b 77.6 b 78.7
Employment rate (Other EU28 aged 15-64) 81.5 87.6 84.8 77.5 76.9 77.0 77.8 81.5 82.4 82.1 b 79.7 b 81.3
Employment rate (Other than EU28 aged 15-64) 61.6 64.7 63.0 61.4 59.7 57.6 61.0 61.2 62.4 64.8 b 64.0 b 66.2
Employment rate (Born in the same country aged 15-
81.9 82.2 78.5 76.5 77.1 76.3 76.0 76.5 77.5 78.5 b 77.9 b 79.0
64)
Employment rate (Born in other EU28 aged 15-64) 83.4 84.5 82.2 72.9 73.5 77.5 78.3 82.2 82.5 80.4 b 79.6 b 80.3
Employment rate (Born outside EU28 aged 15-64) 66.7 72.6 69.6 64.6 63.2 61.2 62.3 65.2 64.4 68.3 b 65.8 b 68.3
Underemployment (% of labour force aged 15-74) 1.6 2.4 2.2 2.3 2.1 2.0 1.8 1.5 3.6 b 2.8 b 1.8
Seeking but not available (% of labour force aged 15-
0.7 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.8 0.7 0.8 0.7 0.6 1.4 b 1.4 b 1.2
74)
Discouraged, available but not seeking (% of labour
1.7 1.6 2.0 1.9 2.5 2.4 2.4 1.9 1.6 3.3 b 2.2 b 1.8
force aged 15-74)
Total population (000) 2750 2763 2779 2791 2804 2814 2824 2835 2849 2869 2889 2905
Population aged 15-64(000) 1782 1790 1797 1800 1802 1800 1799 1802 1807 1818 1827 1833
Total employment (000) 1312 1336 1316 1292 1282 1276 1278 1282 1291 1337 b 1329 b 1353
Employment aged 15-64 (000) 1299 1323 1303 1276 1262 1254 1257 1256 1270 1307 b 1304 b 1329
Employment rate (% population aged 20-64) 74.7 75.5 74.5 73.0 72.4 72.2 72.4 72.2 72.6 74.0 b 73.7 b 74.8
Employment rate (% population aged 15-64) 73.2 74.1 72.7 71.1 70.4 70.0 70.0 69.8 70.4 72.0 b 71.5 b 72.6
Employment rate (% population aged 15-24) 64.0 65.3 62.8 59.5 58.5 55.4 55.0 54.9 56.2 60.0 b 57.3 b 58.8
Employment rate (% population aged 25-54) 82.3 84.0 82.5 80.3 78.9 79.1 79.0 78.4 78.3 78.5 b 78.1 b 79.0
Employment rate (% population aged 55-64) 52.9 51.5 51.7 53.6 55.3 55.8 56.8 57.6 59.6 63.6 b 65.2 b 66.4
FTE employment rate (% population aged 20-64) 67.5 b 68.4 67.0 64.8 64.0 64.3 64.5 63.5 63.6 65.1 b 65.3 b 66.2
Self-employed (% total employment) 4.5 4.5 4.9 5.1 5.1 5.2 5.3 5.3 5.0 5.1 b 4.8 b 4.7
Part-time employment (% total employment) 35.1 35.6 37.2 38.1 37.0 35.8 35.3 35.0 34.7 36.9 b 35.3 b 34.8
Temporary employment (% total employment) 9.7 8.9 9.1 8.3 8.9 8.8 9.0 8.5 8.9 14.3 b 13.2 b 11.9
Employment in Services (% total employment)
Employment in Industry (% total employment)
Employment in Agriculture (% total employment) 1.1 b 1.1 0.8 0.8 1.0 0.9 0.9 1.0 0.9 b 0.9 b 1.0
Activity rate (% population aged 15-64) 76.4 77.0 76.8 76.0 76.1 75.8 75.6 75.0 75.3 77.2 b 76.1 b 76.6
Labour Market Indicators - Female

Activity rate (% population aged 15-24) 69.1 71.5 70.0 67.4 67.1 64.0 62.4 62.0 62.5 67.3 b 64.1 b 64.0
Activity rate (% population aged 25-54) 85.3 86.4 86.5 85.3 84.7 84.9 84.8 83.8 83.4 83.8 b 82.7 b 83.1
Activity rate (% population aged 55-64) 55.1 53.0 53.5 55.9 58.0 58.9 59.9 60.3 62.6 66.4 b 67.6 b 69.0
Total unemployment (000) 57 52 74 89 103 104 100 94 89 95 84 74
Unemployment rate (% labour force) 4.2 3.7 5.3 6.5 7.5 7.5 7.3 6.8 6.4 6.6 5.9 5.2
Youth unemployment rate (% labour force 15-24) 7.4 8.7 10.3 11.8 12.7 13.5 11.8 11.5 10.0 10.9 10.7 8.2
Long term unemployment rate (% labour force) 0.7 0.5 0.5 1.1 1.7 2.1 2.0 1.7 1.7 1.4 b 1.3 b 1.1
Share of long term unemployment (% of total
16.6 12.7 9.8 17.8 22.3 27.5 27.5 24.4 26.2 21.6 b 21.5 b 21.8
unemployment)

Youth unemployment ratio (% population aged 15-24) 5.1 6.2 7.2 7.9 8.5 8.6 7.4 7.1 6.3 7.3 b 6.8 b 5.2

Employment rate for low skilled 25-64 (ISCED 0-2) 59.8 b 61.2 59.3 56.3 55.3 55.5 53.9 52.4 b 50.9 53.8 b 51.2 b 53.3
Employment rate for medium skilled 25-64 (ISCED 3-
78.9 b 79.1 76.9 76.9 75.9 75.0 75.1 74.5 b 75.8 76.8 b 77.4 b 78.1
4)
Employment rate for high skilled 25-64 (ISCED 5-8) 85.1 b 86.6 85.3 84.3 83.9 84.3 85.0 83.4 b 83.3 83.8 b 83.9 b 84.2
Employment rate (Nationals aged 15-64) 74.5 75.2 73.5 72.2 71.7 71.4 71.4 71.2 72.1 73.2 b 72.8 b 74.4
Employment rate (Other EU28 aged 15-64) 69.9 75.1 75.2 73.4 68.3 66.7 67.2 69.1 68.3 70.4 b 70.8 b 68.1
Employment rate (Other than EU28 aged 15-64) 47.5 51.6 55.3 49.4 49.3 48.6 52.2 49.3 49.2 55.7 b 54.0 b 52.7
Employment rate (Born in the same country aged 15-
75.0 75.7 73.9 72.6 72.3 72.0 71.7 71.8 72.6 73.9 b 73.7 b 74.9
64)
Employment rate (Born in other EU28 aged 15-64) 69.8 73.7 73.1 74.2 68.7 66.8 69.0 69.6 68.0 71.5 b 71.2 b 70.1
Employment rate (Born outside EU28 aged 15-64) 54.7 56.6 59.8 55.6 53.7 52.3 54.8 52.2 53.0 56.8 b 54.3 b 55.8
Underemployment (% of labour force aged 15-74) 3.1 4.0 3.8 4.1 4.1 3.5 3.4 3.1 5.7 b 4.5 b 3.7
Seeking but not available (% of labour force aged 15-
1.1 0.8 0.9 0.8 1.0 1.0 0.9 0.9 0.8 2.0 b 1.9 b 1.6
74)
Discouraged, available but not seeking (% of labour
1.9 1.6 1.8 2.0 2.6 2.4 2.3 2.0 1.4 3.2 b 2.1 b 1.6
force aged 15-74)

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Employment and Social Developments in Europe 2019

Denmark 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
At-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion (% of total
16.8 16.3 17.6 18.3 17.6 b 17.5 18.3 17.9 17.7 16.8 17.2 17.6 p
population)
At-risk-of-poverty (% of total population) 11.7 11.8 13.1 13.3 12.1 12.0 11.9 12.1 12.2 11.9 12.4 12.8 p
At-risk-of-poverty threshold (PPS single person) 10121 10561 10751 10770 11510 b 11537 11846 11992 12231 12813 12567 12874 p
Poverty gap (%) 17.0 18.0 18.4 21.6 20.5 b 19.5 23.5 18.5 22.0 20.8 21.7 20.0 p
Persistent at-risk-of-poverty (% of total
4.7 4.9 2.7 6.3 6.4 5.7 5.1 5.3 4.3 7.2 5.5
population)
At-risk-of-poverty before social transfers excl.
27.1 27.8 31.2 29.1 27.9 b 27.4 27.8 26.9 25.8 24.9 25.3 24.0 p
pensions (% of total population)
Impact of social transfers (excl. pensions) in
56.8 57.6 58.0 54.3 56.6 b 56.2 57.2 55.0 52.7 52.2 51.0 46.7 p
reducing poverty (%)
All

Severe Material Deprivation (% of total population) 3.3 2.0 2.3 2.7 2.3 2.7 3.6 3.2 3.7 2.6 3.1 3.4 p
Share of people living in low work intensity households
10.1 8.5 8.8 10.6 10.5 10.2 11.9 12.2 11.6 10.7 10.0 11.2 p
(% of people aged 0-59)
Real Gross Household Disposable income (growth %) -0.3 -0.5 0.9 3.3 1.1 -0.2 1.1 0.7 3.9 4.1 2.5
Income quintile share ratio S80/S20 3.7 3.6 4.6 4.4 b 4.0 b 3.9 4.0 4.1 4.1 4.1 4.1 4.2 p
GINI coefficient 25.2 25.1 26.9 26.9 b 26.6 b 26.5 26.8 27.7 27.4 27.7 27.6 27.9 p
Early leavers from education and training (% of
12.9 b 12.5 11.3 11.0 9.6 9.1 8.0 7.8 b 7.8 7.2 b 8.8 b 10.2
population aged 18-24)
NEET: Young people neither in employment nor in
education and training (% of total population aged 15- 4.3 4.3 5.4 6.0 6.3 6.6 6.0 5.8 6.2 5.8 b 7.0 b 6.8
24)
At-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion (% of male
15.9 15.7 17.0 17.7 17.2 b 17.4 18.1 17.6 17.5 16.4 17.8 17.9 p
population)
At-risk-of-poverty (% of male population) 11.3 11.7 12.8 13.1 12.1 12.0 12.0 12.4 12.5 12.0 13.0 13.0 p
Poverty gap (%) 18.8 19.3 21.9 23.3 24.1 b 21.8 25.5 24.2 23.6 22.3 24.5 21.8 p
Persistent at-risk-of-poverty (% of male
4.5 5.2 4.0 5.5 6.7 6.0 4.0 5.4 3.8 7.9 7.7
population)
Severe Material Deprivation (% of male population) 2.9 1.5 2.2 2.8 1.7 2.7 3.5 3.2 3.5 3.1 3.6 3.5 p
Male

Share of people living in low work intensity households

9.1 8.4 8.2 9.7 10.3 10.5 12.2 11.8 11.1 10.4 10.6 10.4 p
(% of males aged 0-59)
Life expectancy at birth (years) 76.2 76.5 b 76.9 77.2 77.8 78.1 78.3 78.7 78.8 79.0 79.2
Healthy life years at birth (years) - men 67.4 62.4 b 61.8 62.3 63.6 60.6 60.4 60.3 60.4 60.3 59.8
Early leavers from education and training (% of males
16.2 b 15.0 14.3 14.1 12.1 10.8 9.9 9.5 b 9.7 8.5 b 11.3 b 12.5
aged 18-24)
NEET: Young people neither in employment nor in
4.7 4.4 5.8 6.7 6.4 6.6 6.3 6.2 6.3 6.5 b 7.0 b 6.9
education and training ( % of males aged 15-24)
At-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion (% of female
17.7 17.0 18.2 19.0 18.0 b 17.5 18.6 18.2 18.0 17.2 16.6 17.4 p
population)
At-risk-of-poverty (% of female population) 12.0 12.0 13.4 13.4 12.0 11.9 11.8 11.8 11.9 11.9 11.7 12.7 p
Poverty gap (%) 16.4 17.2 17.1 20.9 16.1 b 16.4 17.9 17.2 19.8 19.8 18.8 18.3 p
Persistent at-risk-of-poverty (% of female
4.9 4.6 1.5 7.0 6.1 5.3 6.2 5.2 4.8 6.5 3.4
population)
Social Indicators

Severe Material Deprivation (% of female population) 3.6 2.4 2.4 2.5 2.9 2.7 3.7 3.2 3.8 2.1 2.6 3.4 p
Female

Share of people living in low work intensity households

11.1 8.6 9.4 11.4 10.8 9.9 11.5 12.6 12.0 10.9 9.4 12.0 p
(% of females aged 0-59)
Life expectancy at birth (years) 80.6 81.0 b 81.1 81.4 81.9 82.1 82.4 82.8 82.7 82.8 83.1
Healthy life years at birth (years) - women 67.4 60.8 b 60.4 61.4 59.4 61.4 59.1 61.4 57.6 60.3 59.7
Early leavers from education and training (% of
9.5 b 10.0 8.1 7.7 7.0 7.4 6.2 6.1 b 5.7 5.9 b 6.2 b 7.8
females aged 18-24)
NEET: Young people neither in employment nor in
3.8 4.2 4.9 5.4 6.1 6.7 5.8 5.4 6.1 5.1 b 6.9 b 6.7
education and training ( % of females aged 15-24)
At-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion of children (% of
14.2 12.7 14.0 15.1 15.7 b 14.9 15.4 14.5 15.7 13.9 14.5 15.2 p
people aged 0-17)
At-risk-of-poverty (% of Children population) 9.6 9.1 10.6 10.9 10.3 10.4 9.1 9.2 10.4 9.4 10.0 10.7 p
Children (0-17)

Severe Material Deprivation (% of Children

4.8 2.5 2.1 3.1 2.9 4.0 3.8 3.1 4.3 3.0 3.1 4.3 p
population)
Share of children living in low work intensity
6.9 4.3 5.5 7.4 7.9 5.3 7.8 7.5 7.3 6.5 6.7 7.4 p
households (% of Children population)
Risk of poverty of children in households at work
6.2 7.6 7.9 6.8 7.7 b 7.4 6.6 6.6 8.0 6.9 6.8 6.7 p
(Working Intensity > 0.2)
Impact of social transfers (excl. pensions) in reducing
59.8 58.8 56.4 54.6 61.1 b 57.7 64.0 61.3 55.0 56.7 55.0 52.4 p
poverty (0-17) (%)
At-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion (% of working
17.4 17.1 18.1 19.5 19.0 b 19.6 21.6 21.3 20.9 20.3 20.6 21.2 p
age population)
At-risk-of-poverty (% of Working age population) 10.9 11.3 12.2 12.9 12.2 12.3 13.4 13.8 13.8 13.9 14.3 14.9 p
Working age

Severe Material Deprivation (% of Working age

3.3 2.0 2.7 2.9 2.5 2.9 4.3 4.0 4.3 3.1 3.8 4.0 p
(18-64)

population)
Very low work intensity (18-59) 11.5 10.2 10.1 11.9 11.6 12.2 13.5 14.0 13.3 12.4 11.3 12.7 p
In-work at-risk-of poverty rate (% of persons
4.2 5.0 5.9 6.3 6.3 b 5.3 5.4 4.8 5.1 5.3 5.4 6.1 p
employed 18-64)
Impact of social transfers (excl. pensions) in reducing
58.9 59.4 58.9 56.1 58.5 b 58.6 57.3 55.5 53.5 52.6 52.0 46.8 p
poverty (18-64) (%)
At-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion of elderly (% of
18.3 18.6 20.6 18.4 14.6 b 13.2 10.8 10.8 9.9 9.2 9.5 9.4 p
people aged 65+)
Elderly (65+)

At-risk-of-poverty (% of Elderly population) 17.7 18.1 20.1 17.7 13.9 12.8 10.1 9.8 9.1 8.5 8.8 8.7 p

Severe Material Deprivation (% of Elderly population) 0.8 0.9 0.9 0.9 1.1 0.6 1.1 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.9 1.0 p
Relative median income of elderly (ratio with median
0.70 0.70 0.71 0.71 0.74 b 0.75 0.76 0.78 0.77 0.75 0.77 0.78 p
income of people younger than 65)
Aggregate replacement ratio (ratio) 0.39 0.41 0.42 0.44 0.43 b 0.42 0.44 0.45 0.45 0.47 0.48 0.49 p
Sickness/Health care 6.0 b 6.2 6.9 6.7 6.6 6.5 6.4 6.3 6.2 6.2
protection indicators
Expenditure in social

Disability 3.8 b 3.8 4.2 4.2 4.1 4.1 4.1 4.1 4.0 3.9
Old age and survivors 11.9 b 11.8 13.2 12.6 12.7 12.7 13.3 14.0 13.5 12.8
(% of GDP)

Family/Children 3.7 b 3.8 4.2 4.0 3.8 3.7 3.6 3.5 3.5 3.4
Unemployment 1.2 b 1.0 1.6 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.8 1.6 1.5 1.4
Housing and Social exclusion n.e.c. 1.3 b 1.3 1.5 1.8 1.9 1.9 2.0 2.0 2.2 2.2
Total (including Admin and Other expenditures) 29.1 b 28.9 32.7 32.4 32.1 32.0 32.5 32.8 32.1 31.1
of which: Means tested benefits 9.4 b 9.5 10.3 10.7 10.9 11.0 11.2 11.3 11.3 11.1

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246
 Statistical annex - 1. Country profiles

Germany
Germany 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Real GDP 3.3 1.1 -5.6 4.1 3.7 0.5 0.5 2.2 1.7 2.2 2.2 1.4
Total employment 1.7 1.3 0.1 0.3 1.4 1.2 0.6 0.8 0.9 1.3 1.4 1.3
Labour productivity 1.5 -0.2 -5.7 3.8 2.3 -0.7 -0.1 1.3 0.8 0.9 0.7 0.1
Macro Economic Indicators

Annual average hours worked per person employed 0.0 -0.4 -3.2 1.3 0.2 -1.3 -0.9 0.3 0.2 -0.5 -0.2 0.1
(Annual % growth)

Real productivity per hour worked 1.5 0.2 -2.6 2.5 2.1 0.6 0.8 1.0 0.6 1.4 0.9 0.0
Harmonized CPI 2.3 2.8 0.2 1.1 2.5 2.2 1.6 0.8 0.7 0.4 1.7 1.9
Price deflator GDP 1.7 0.8 1.8 0.8 1.1 1.5 2.0 1.8 2.0 1.4 1.5 1.9
Nominal compensation per employee 0.9 2.1 0.2 2.6 3.0 2.5 1.8 2.8 2.7 2.2 2.6 3.0
Real compensation per employee (GDP deflator) -0.8 1.3 -1.5 1.8 1.9 1.0 -0.1 1.0 0.7 0.8 1.0 1.1
Real compensation per employee (private consumption
-1.4 -0.6 0.0 1.3 0.5 0.4 0.2 2.1 2.0 1.8 0.9 1.1
deflator)
Nominal unit labour costs -0.6 2.3 6.3 -1.2 0.7 3.2 1.9 1.4 1.9 1.3 1.8 2.8
Real unit labour costs -2.3 1.5 4.5 -1.9 -0.4 1.6 0.0 -0.3 -0.1 -0.1 0.4 1.0
Total population (000) 82315 82218 82002 81802 80222 b 80328 80524 80767 81198 82176 82522 82792
Population aged 15-64 (000) 54574 54417 54134 53878 52762 b 52951 53126 53272 53422 53994 53963 53911
Total employment (000) 37989 38542 38471 37993 b 38787 b 39127 39531 39871 40211 41267 41664 41915
Employment aged 15-64 (000) 37397 37902 37808 37337 b 38045 b 38321 38640 38908 39176 40165 40482 40636
Employment rate (% population aged 20-64) 72.9 74.0 74.2 75.0 b 76.5 b 76.9 77.3 77.7 78.0 78.6 79.2 79.9
Employment rate (% population aged 15-64) 69.0 70.1 70.3 71.3 b 72.7 b 73.0 73.5 73.8 74.0 74.7 75.2 75.9
Employment rate (% population aged 15-24) 45.4 46.6 46.0 46.2 b 47.9 b 46.6 46.9 46.1 45.3 45.7 46.5 47.2
Employment rate (% population aged 25-54) 80.3 80.9 80.8 81.6 b 83.0 b 83.3 83.4 83.5 83.7 83.9 84.2 84.9
Employment rate (% population aged 55-64) 51.3 53.7 56.1 57.8 b 60.0 b 61.6 63.6 65.6 66.2 68.6 70.1 71.4
FTE employment rate (% population aged 20-64) 63.0 64.0 64.1 65.4 b 66.2 b 66.5 b 66.8 67.3 67.5 68.3 68.8 69.5
Self-employed (% total employment) 11.0 10.8 11.0 11.0 b 11.1 b 11.0 10.7 10.5 10.4 10.0 9.8 9.6
Part-time employment (% total employment) 25.4 25.1 25.3 25.6 b 25.9 b 25.8 26.6 26.5 26.8 26.7 26.9 26.8
Temporary employment (% total employment) 13.0 13.1 13.0 13.0 b 13.0 b 12.3 12.0 11.8 11.8 11.9 11.7 11.5
Employment in Services (% total employment) 68.8 b 69.5 70.0 b 70.1 b 70.2 70.7 70.4 70.8 71.1 71.1 71.2
Employment in Industry (% total employment) 29.5 b 29.0 28.5 b 28.4 b 28.4 28.0 28.3 27.9 27.6 27.7 27.6
Employment in Agriculture (% total employment) 1.7 b 1.6 1.5 b 1.5 b 1.5 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.2 1.2 1.2
Activity rate (% population aged 15-64) 75.6 75.9 76.3 76.7 b 77.3 b 77.2 77.6 77.7 77.6 77.9 78.2 78.6
Labour Market Indicators - Total

Activity rate (% population aged 15-24) 51.5 52.2 51.8 51.3 b 52.4 b 50.7 50.8 49.9 48.8 49.2 49.9 50.3
Activity rate (% population aged 25-54) 87.2 87.0 87.1 87.3 b 87.7 b 87.7 87.7 87.6 87.6 87.3 87.3 87.7
Activity rate (% population aged 55-64) 57.2 58.7 61.0 62.6 b 64.1 b 65.4 67.5 69.1 69.4 71.3 72.6 73.6
Total unemployment (000) 3473 3018 3098 2821 2399 2224 2182 2090 1950 1774 1621 1468
Unemployment rate (% labour force) 8.5 7.4 7.6 7.0 5.8 5.4 5.2 5.0 4.6 4.1 3.8 3.4
Youth unemployment rate (% labour force 15-24) 11.8 10.4 11.1 9.8 8.5 8.0 7.8 7.7 7.2 7.1 6.8 6.2
Long term unemployment rate (% labour force) 4.9 3.9 3.5 3.3 b 2.8 b 2.4 2.3 2.2 2.0 1.7 1.6 1.4
Share of long term unemployment (% of total
56.0 51.8 44.9 46.8 b 47.6 b 45.1 44.4 44.0 43.6 40.8 41.7 40.9
unemployment)

Youth unemployment ratio (% population aged 15-24) 6.1 5.5 5.8 5.0 b 4.5 b 4.1 4.0 3.9 3.5 3.5 3.4 3.1

Employment rate for low skilled 25-64 (ISCED 0-2) 54.6 55.3 54.9 55.4 b 56.7 b 57.6 58.1 58.0 b 58.7 59.4 60.1 61.0
Employment rate for medium skilled 25-64 (ISCED 3-
74.4 75.3 75.5 76.3 b 77.6 b 78.2 78.9 79.7 b 79.9 81.0 81.6 82.3
4)
Employment rate for high skilled 25-64 (ISCED 5-8) 85.5 85.8 86.4 87.0 b 88.0 b 88.0 87.9 88.1 b 88.1 88.3 88.6 88.9
Employment rate (Nationals aged 15-64) 70.5 71.7 71.9 72.7 b 74.0 b 74.2 74.8 75.1 75.4 76.5 77.3 77.8
Employment rate (Other EU28 aged 15-64) 67.2 68.1 67.8 68.4 b 71.0 b 71.9 72.4 73.4 73.9 75.7 76.4 77.3
Employment rate (Other than EU28 aged 15-64) 48.4 50.0 50.6 51.6 b 53.8 b 55.0 54.9 54.7 54.2 51.4 52.3 55.0
Employment rate (Born in the same country aged 15-
70.7 71.7 71.9 72.5 b 73.8 b 74.0 74.5 74.9 75.2 76.2 77.0 77.5
64)
Employment rate (Born in other EU28 aged 15-64) 77.6 78.6
Employment rate (Born outside EU28 aged 15-64) 62.6 64.2
Underemployment (% of labour force aged 15-74) 5.9 5.4 5.4 b 4.6 b 4.3 4.2 3.9 3.7 3.4 3.2 2.8
Seeking but not available (% of labour force aged 15-
2.2 2.0 1.4 1.3 b 1.2 b 1.2 1.2 1.1 1.1 1.2 1.1 1.0
74)
Discouraged, available but not seeking (% of labour
1.4 1.4 1.6 1.3 b 1.4 b 1.3 1.3 1.2 1.3 1.3 1.2 1.1
force aged 15-74)

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247
Employment and Social Developments in Europe 2019

Germany 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Total population (000) 40301 40274 40184 40104 39125 b 39230 39381 39557 39835 40514 40697 40844
Population aged 15-64(000) 27629 27541 27386 27249 26509 b 26631 26745 26847 26968 27415 27400 27376
Total employment (000) 20745 21033 20816 20423 b 20802 b 21019 21143 21301 21454 22065 22289 22395
Employment aged 15-64 (000) 20378 20631 20401 20019 b 20338 b 20512 20584 20698 20808 21375 21552 21608
Employment rate (% population aged 20-64) 79.1 80.1 79.6 80.4 b 81.7 b 82.1 82.1 82.2 82.3 82.7 83.1 83.9
Employment rate (% population aged 15-64) 74.7 75.8 75.4 76.3 b 77.6 b 77.9 78.0 78.1 78.0 78.4 78.9 79.7
Employment rate (% population aged 15-24) 47.2 48.7 47.5 47.9 b 49.7 b 48.6 48.4 47.7 46.5 46.9 47.4 48.8
Employment rate (% population aged 25-54) 86.4 87.1 86.1 86.8 b 88.0 b 88.4 88.2 88.0 88.1 88.1 88.4 89.0
Employment rate (% population aged 55-64) 59.4 61.7 63.8 65.2 b 67.1 b 68.6 69.9 71.4 71.3 73.7 75.0 76.1
FTE employment rate (% population aged 20-64) 76.0 76.9 76.6 77.8 b 78.4 b 78.6 b 78.6 78.7 78.7 79.1 79.4 80.2
Self-employed (% total employment) 13.9 13.6 14.0 14.0 b 14.1 b 14.0 13.6 13.3 13.1 12.6 12.3 12.0
Part-time employment (% total employment) 8.5 8.3 8.6 8.5 b 8.9 b 8.9 9.1 9.2 9.3 9.4 9.7 9.6
Temporary employment (% total employment) 12.7 12.8 12.5 12.4 b 12.5 b 11.9 11.6 11.4 11.5 11.7 11.5 11.4
Employment in Services (% total employment) 56.4 b 56.9 57.4 b 57.4 b 57.5 58.1 57.7 58.0 58.7 58.7 58.9
Employment in Industry (% total employment) 41.6 b 41.2 40.7 b 40.7 b 40.7 40.2 40.7 40.3 39.8 39.8 39.6
Employment in Agriculture (% total employment) 2.1 b 1.9 1.9 b 1.9 b 1.8 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.6 1.5 1.5
Activity rate (% population aged 15-64) 81.7 82.0 82.2 82.4 b 82.7 b 82.6 82.6 82.5 82.1 82.2 82.4 82.9
Labour Market Indicators - Male

Activity rate (% population aged 15-24) 54.0 54.7 54.3 53.7 b 54.8 b 53.2 52.9 52.0 50.5 50.9 51.3 52.5
Activity rate (% population aged 25-54) 93.8 93.5 93.2 93.2 b 93.2 b 93.1 92.9 92.6 92.5 91.9 91.9 92.3
Activity rate (% population aged 55-64) 65.8 67.2 69.3 70.8 b 71.8 b 73.1 74.5 75.5 75.3 76.9 77.9 78.7
Total unemployment (000) 1855 1609 1747 1611 1336 1236 1231 1188 1123 1028 957 883
Unemployment rate (% labour force) 8.4 7.3 8.0 7.4 6.1 5.6 5.5 5.3 5.0 4.5 4.1 3.8
Youth unemployment rate (% labour force 15-24) 12.4 10.8 12.2 10.6 9.2 8.7 8.5 8.3 7.9 7.8 7.6 7.1
Long term unemployment rate (% labour force) 4.8 3.9 3.6 3.5 b 3.0 b 2.6 2.5 2.4 2.3 1.9 1.8 1.6
Share of long term unemployment (% of total
56.1 52.5 43.9 47.5 b 49.0 b 46.5 45.0 45.8 45.3 42.6 43.5 42.6
unemployment)

Youth unemployment ratio (% population aged 15-24) 6.8 6.0 6.8 5.8 b 5.0 b 4.6 4.5 4.3 4.0 4.0 3.9 3.7

Employment rate for low skilled 25-64 (ISCED 0-2) 65.5 66.3 64.9 65.7 b 67.0 b 67.8 67.8 67.4 b 68.0 68.4 68.5 69.6
Employment rate for medium skilled 25-64 (ISCED 3-
80.0 81.0 80.3 81.0 b 82.3 b 82.9 83.1 83.5 b 83.5 84.4 85.0 85.7
4)
Employment rate for high skilled 25-64 (ISCED 5-8) 89.1 89.4 89.7 90.3 b 91.1 b 91.4 91.3 91.3 b 91.3 91.3 91.7 92.1
Employment rate (Nationals aged 15-64) 75.8 76.8 76.5 77.1 b 78.3 b 78.5 78.6 78.7 78.7 79.7 80.3 80.9
Employment rate (Other EU28 aged 15-64) 74.6 76.0 74.5 75.8 b 78.5 b 79.6 80.4 81.5 81.5 83.0 84.1 84.5
Employment rate (Other than EU28 aged 15-64) 59.2 61.6 61.1 63.1 b 66.0 b 66.3 66.5 65.4 64.8 59.2 59.8 63.8
Employment rate (Born in the same country aged 15-
75.7 76.7 76.3 76.8 b 77.9 b 78.1 78.1 78.3 78.2 79.2 79.9 80.4
64)
Employment rate (Born in other EU28 aged 15-64) 84.8 85.0
Employment rate (Born outside EU28 aged 15-64) 69.2 71.9
Underemployment (% of labour force aged 15-74) 2.8 2.7 2.7 b 2.4 b 2.2 2.1 2.0 1.9 1.7 1.8 1.6
Seeking but not available (% of labour force aged 15-
1.9 1.7 1.2 1.2 b 1.1 b 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.0
74)
Discouraged, available but not seeking (% of labour
1.0 1.0 1.2 1.0 b 1.1 b 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.0
force aged 15-74)
Total population (000) 42014 41944 41818 41699 41097 b 41098 41143 41211 41362 41662 41825 41949
Population aged 15-64(000) 26945 26877 26748 26629 26253 b 26321 26381 26425 26454 26579 26564 26534
Total employment (000) 17244 17509 17655 17571 b 17986 b 18108 18389 18570 18757 19203 19375 19520
Employment aged 15-64 (000) 17019 17271 17407 17318 b 17708 b 17809 18056 18210 18368 18790 18929 19028
Employment rate (% population aged 20-64) 66.7 67.8 68.7 69.7 b 71.3 b 71.6 72.5 73.1 73.6 74.5 75.2 75.8
Employment rate (% population aged 15-64) 63.2 64.3 65.2 66.2 b 67.8 b 68.1 69.0 69.5 69.9 70.8 71.5 72.1
Employment rate (% population aged 15-24) 43.5 44.5 44.4 44.5 b 46.1 b 44.5 45.2 44.3 44.0 44.5 45.5 45.4
Employment rate (% population aged 25-54) 74.0 74.7 75.4 76.4 b 77.9 b 78.2 78.6 78.8 79.2 79.7 80.0 80.6
Employment rate (% population aged 55-64) 43.4 46.0 48.6 50.7 b 53.2 b 54.9 57.6 60.0 61.2 63.5 65.4 66.9
FTE employment rate (% population aged 20-64) 50.8 51.8 52.2 53.9 b 54.8 b 55.2 b 55.8 56.7 57.1 58.1 58.7 59.4
Self-employed (% total employment) 7.5 7.3 7.4 7.6 b 7.6 b 7.6 7.4 7.3 7.2 7.1 7.0 6.8
Part-time employment (% total employment) 45.6 45.2 44.9 45.3 b 45.4 b 45.3 46.7 46.3 46.6 46.5 46.4 46.3
Temporary employment (% total employment) 13.4 13.5 13.6 13.6 b 13.6 b 12.7 12.4 12.2 12.2 12.3 12.0 11.5
Employment in Services (% total employment) 83.7 b 84.2 84.5 b 84.6 b 84.7 85.0 84.8 85.2 85.3 85.3 85.2
Employment in Industry (% total employment) 15.1 b 14.6 14.4 b 14.3 b 14.2 14.1 14.3 13.9 13.8 13.9 14.0
Employment in Agriculture (% total employment) 1.2 b 1.2 1.1 b 1.1 b 1.0 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.8
Activity rate (% population aged 15-64) 69.4 69.7 70.4 70.9 b 71.9 b 71.9 72.6 72.9 73.1 73.6 74.0 74.3
Labour Market Indicators - Female

Activity rate (% population aged 15-24) 49.0 49.5 49.2 48.8 b 50.0 b 48.0 48.7 47.7 47.1 47.4 48.3 47.8
Activity rate (% population aged 25-54) 80.6 80.5 81.0 81.3 b 82.1 b 82.3 82.4 82.5 82.5 82.6 82.5 82.9
Activity rate (% population aged 55-64) 48.9 50.5 52.9 54.6 b 56.8 b 58.2 60.8 62.9 63.8 65.9 67.5 68.6
Total unemployment (000) 1618 1409 1350 1210 1063 989 951 902 827 746 664 585
Unemployment rate (% labour force) 8.7 7.6 7.2 6.5 5.6 5.2 4.9 4.6 4.2 3.8 3.3 2.9
Youth unemployment rate (% labour force 15-24) 11.0 9.9 9.7 8.8 7.8 7.3 7.1 7.1 6.5 6.1 5.8 5.1
Long term unemployment rate (% labour force) 4.9 3.9 3.4 3.0 b 2.6 b 2.2 2.1 1.9 1.7 1.4 1.3 1.1
Share of long term unemployment (% of total
55.8 51.1 46.3 46.0 b 45.8 b 43.4 43.5 41.6 41.3 38.2 39.0 38.4
unemployment)

Youth unemployment ratio (% population aged 15-24) 5.4 4.9 4.8 4.3 b 3.9 b 3.5 3.5 3.4 3.0 2.9 2.8 2.4

Employment rate for low skilled 25-64 (ISCED 0-2) 47.3 47.7 48.0 48.3 b 49.5 b 50.4 51.1 50.9 b 51.5 52.0 52.9 53.5
Employment rate for medium skilled 25-64 (ISCED 3-
68.9 69.8 70.7 71.8 b 73.0 b 73.6 74.6 76.0 b 76.5 77.7 78.3 79.0
4)
Employment rate for high skilled 25-64 (ISCED 5-8) 80.6 81.1 82.2 82.9 b 84.2 b 83.9 84.0 84.0 b 84.1 84.6 84.7 85.0
Employment rate (Nationals aged 15-64) 65.2 66.4 67.2 68.2 b 69.7 b 69.9 70.9 71.5 72.1 73.3 74.1 74.7
Employment rate (Other EU28 aged 15-64) 59.4 59.8 60.7 61.0 b 63.5 b 63.9 63.9 64.4 65.3 67.2 67.5 68.9
Employment rate (Other than EU28 aged 15-64) 37.4 38.4 40.2 40.7 b 42.5 b 44.2 44.0 44.5 43.7 42.9 43.8 45.3
Employment rate (Born in the same country aged 15-
65.6 66.7 67.4 68.2 b 69.7 b 69.8 70.8 71.4 72.1 73.2 74.1 74.6
64)
Employment rate (Born in other EU28 aged 15-64) 70.3 71.8
Employment rate (Born outside EU28 aged 15-64) 55.7 56.0
Underemployment (% of labour force aged 15-74) 9.6 8.5 8.5 b 7.3 b 6.7 6.6 6.1 5.7 5.2 4.8 4.2
Seeking but not available (% of labour force aged 15-
2.6 2.4 1.5 1.5 b 1.4 b 1.3 1.3 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.1
74)
Discouraged, available but not seeking (% of labour
1.9 2.0 2.2 1.6 b 1.8 b 1.7 1.6 1.5 1.5 1.4 1.4 1.2
force aged 15-74)

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248
 Statistical annex - 1. Country profiles

Germany 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
At-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion (% of total
20.6 20.1 20.0 19.7 19.9 19.6 20.3 20.6 20.0 19.7 19.0
population)
At-risk-of-poverty (% of total population) 15.2 15.2 15.5 15.6 15.8 16.1 16.1 16.7 16.7 16.5 16.1
At-risk-of-poverty threshold (PPS single person) 10395 10804 10770 10544 11037 11525 11687 11530 12219 12691 12750
Poverty gap (%) 23.2 22.2 21.5 20.7 21.4 21.1 20.4 23.2 22.0 20.7 20.9
Persistent at-risk-of-poverty (% of total
7.2 8.1 9.1 10.4 10.4 10.6 9.5 11.3 10.5 11.6
population)
At-risk-of-poverty before social transfers excl.
24.8 24.2 24.1 24.2 25.1 24.3 24.4 25.0 25.1 25.3 24.1
pensions (% of total population)
Impact of social transfers (excl. pensions) in
38.7 37.2 35.7 35.5 37.1 33.7 34.0 33.2 33.5 34.8 33.2
reducing poverty (%)
All

Severe Material Deprivation (% of total population) 4.8 5.5 5.4 4.5 5.3 4.9 5.4 5.0 4.4 3.7 3.4 3.4 p
Share of people living in low work intensity households
11.5 11.7 10.9 11.2 11.2 9.9 9.9 10.0 9.8 9.6 8.7
(% of people aged 0-59)
Real Gross Household Disposable income (growth %) 0.4 0.8 -0.4 0.4 1.0 1.1 0.5 1.6 2.0 2.3
Income quintile share ratio S80/S20 4.9 4.8 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.3 4.6 5.1 4.8 4.6 4.5
GINI coefficient 30.4 30.2 29.1 29.3 29.0 28.3 29.7 30.7 30.1 29.5 29.1
Early leavers from education and training (% of
12.5 11.8 b 11.1 11.8 b 11.6 10.5 9.8 9.5 b 10.1 10.3 10.1 10.3
population aged 18-24)
NEET: Young people neither in employment nor in
education and training (% of total population aged 15- 9.3 8.4 8.8 8.3 b 7.5 b 7.1 6.3 6.4 6.2 6.7 6.3 5.9
24)
At-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion (% of male
18.8 18.5 18.8 18.6 18.5 18.1 18.8 19.5 18.8 18.1 17.6
population)
At-risk-of-poverty (% of male population) 14.1 14.2 14.7 14.9 14.9 14.9 15.0 15.9 15.9 15.2 15.0
Poverty gap (%) 24.4 23.7 22.3 21.5 22.6 21.8 20.9 24.0 22.8 22.0 22.6
Persistent at-risk-of-poverty (% of male
6.6 7.0 9.0 10.0 9.9 10.0 9.5 11.3 9.6 10.9
population)
Severe Material Deprivation (% of male population) 4.3 5.3 5.3 4.4 5.0 4.5 5.2 4.8 4.2 3.4 2.9 3.3 p
Male

Share of people living in low work intensity households

10.5 10.9 10.5 10.7 10.5 9.2 9.4 9.8 9.5 9.1 8.4
(% of males aged 0-59)
Life expectancy at birth (years) 77.4 77.6 b 77.8 78.0 78.4 78.6 78.6 78.7 78.3 b 78.6 78.7
Healthy life years at birth (years) - men 59.0 56.4 b 57.1 57.9 57.9 57.4 57.8 56.4 65.3 b 65.3
Early leavers from education and training (% of males
13.1 12.4 b 11.5 12.5 b 12.5 11.1 10.2 10.0 b 10.4 11.0 11.1 11.5
aged 18-24)
NEET: Young people neither in employment nor in
8.4 7.4 8.2 7.6 b 6.7 b 6.3 5.5 5.5 5.4 6.1 5.8 5.4
education and training ( % of males aged 15-24)
At-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion (% of female
22.3 21.6 21.2 20.9 21.3 21.1 21.9 21.8 21.1 21.2 20.3
population)
At-risk-of-poverty (% of female population) 16.3 16.2 16.3 16.4 16.8 17.2 17.2 17.4 17.4 17.8 17.1
Poverty gap (%) 22.4 21.1 20.8 19.6 20.6 20.6 20.1 22.6 21.5 19.5 19.5
Persistent at-risk-of-poverty (% of female
7.7 9.0 9.2 10.8 10.9 11.1 9.5 11.3 11.4 12.4
population)
Social Indicators

Severe Material Deprivation (% of female population) 5.3 5.6 5.4 4.7 5.7 5.2 5.6 5.1 4.6 4.0 3.9 3.5 p
Female

Share of people living in low work intensity households

12.6 12.4 11.3 11.7 11.9 10.7 10.5 10.2 10.1 10.2 9.0
(% of females aged 0-59)
Life expectancy at birth (years) 82.7 82.7 b 82.8 83.0 83.2 83.3 83.2 83.6 83.1 b 83.5 83.4
Healthy life years at birth (years) - women 58.6 57.7 b 58.1 58.7 58.7 57.9 57.0 56.5 67.5 b 67.3
Early leavers from education and training (% of
11.9 11.2 b 10.7 11.0 b 10.7 9.9 9.3 8.9 b 9.8 9.5 9.0 9.1
females aged 18-24)
NEET: Young people neither in employment nor in
10.2 9.5 9.4 9.0 b 8.3 b 7.9 7.0 7.2 7.0 7.4 6.7 6.5
education and training ( % of females aged 15-24)
At-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion of children (% of
19.7 20.1 20.4 21.7 19.9 18.4 19.4 19.6 18.5 19.3 18.0
people aged 0-17)
At-risk-of-poverty (% of Children population) 14.1 15.2 15.0 17.5 15.6 15.2 14.7 15.1 14.6 15.4 15.2
Children (0-17)

Severe Material Deprivation (% of Children

5.4 6.9 7.1 5.2 5.4 4.8 5.6 5.0 4.7 3.6 3.3 2.8 p
population)
Share of children living in low work intensity
9.2 9.1 9.0 8.9 8.6 6.8 6.9 7.0 7.1 8.3 6.8
households (% of Children population)
Risk of poverty of children in households at work
9.2 9.6 9.7 11.7 10.5 10.8 11.3 11.8 10.6 11.1 11.4
(Working Intensity > 0.2)
Impact of social transfers (excl. pensions) in reducing
53.6 50.3 50.8 46.7 52.7 50.7 51.7 50.0 53.4 52.8 50.7
poverty (0-17) (%)
At-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion (% of working
21.9 21.5 21.1 20.8 21.3 21.2 22.0 22.0 21.3 20.2 19.6
age population)
At-risk-of-poverty (% of Working age population) 15.2 15.4 15.8 15.6 16.4 16.6 16.9 17.2 17.3 16.4 16.0
Working age

Severe Material Deprivation (% of Working age

5.5 6.1 5.8 5.2 6.0 5.5 6.0 5.6 5.0 4.0 3.8 3.7 p
(18-64)

population)
Very low work intensity (18-59) 12.3 12.4 11.4 11.9 12.0 10.8 10.8 10.9 10.6 10.0 9.3
In-work at-risk-of poverty rate (% of persons
7.4 7.1 6.8 7.1 7.7 7.7 8.6 9.9 9.6 9.5 9.0
employed 18-64)
Impact of social transfers (excl. pensions) in reducing
40.4 38.2 36.3 37.4 37.2 34.1 33.7 33.9 33.5 35.4 34.2
poverty (18-64) (%)
At-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion of elderly (% of
16.8 15.5 16.0 14.8 15.3 15.8 16.0 17.4 17.2 18.3 17.7
people aged 65+)
Elderly (65+)

At-risk-of-poverty (% of Elderly population) 16.2 14.9 15.0 14.1 14.2 15.0 14.9 16.3 16.5 17.6 17.0

Severe Material Deprivation (% of Elderly population) 2.2 2.1 2.5 2.1 3.2 2.8 3.2 3.2 2.4 2.7 2.2 2.7 p
Relative median income of elderly (ratio with median
0.87 0.87 0.88 0.89 0.90 0.88 0.89 0.90 0.87 0.84 0.85
income of people younger than 65)
Aggregate replacement ratio (ratio) 0.46 0.44 0.47 0.49 0.51 0.47 0.47 0.45 0.46 0.46 0.46
Sickness/Health care 7.7 8.1 9.5 9.3 9.2 9.4 9.7 9.7 9.8 p 9.8 p
protection indicators
Expenditure in social

Disability 2.0 2.1 2.2 2.2 2.1 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 p 2.3 p
Old age and survivors 11.1 11.1 11.8 11.5 11.0 11.0 10.9 10.9 10.9 p 10.9 p
(% of GDP)

Family/Children 2.7 2.8 3.1 3.1 3.1 3.1 3.1 3.1 3.2 p 3.2 p
Unemployment 1.5 1.4 1.8 1.6 1.3 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.0 p 1.0 p
Housing and Social exclusion n.e.c. 0.8 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.8 p 1.0 p
Total (including Admin and Other expenditures) 26.8 27.2 30.6 29.9 28.7 28.8 29.1 29.0 29.2 p 29.4 p
of which: Means tested benefits 3.2 3.1 3.5 3.4 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.4 3.5 p 3.7 p

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249
Employment and Social Developments in Europe 2019

Estonia
Estonia 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Real GDP 7.7 -5.4 -14.7 2.3 7.6 4.3 1.9 2.9 1.9 3.5 4.9 3.9
Total employment 0.2 -0.2 -10.2 -4.9 6.5 1.6 1.2 0.8 2.9 0.3 2.7 1.2
Labour productivity 7.5 -5.2 -5.0 7.6 1.0 2.6 0.7 2.1 -0.9 3.2 2.1 2.6
Macro Economic Indicators

Annual average hours worked per person employed -0.1 -1.5 -6.9 2.3 2.4 -1.7 -1.1 -0.3 -0.4 0.2 0.1 -2.5
(Annual % growth)

Real productivity per hour worked 7.7 -3.7 2.0 5.1 -1.3 4.4 1.8 2.5 -0.5 3.0 2.0 5.2
Harmonized CPI 6.7 10.6 0.2 2.7 5.1 4.2 3.2 0.5 0.1 0.8 3.7 3.4
Price deflator GDP 11.5 7.5 0.4 1.7 5.3 3.2 3.6 3.0 1.0 1.5 3.9 4.6
Nominal compensation per employee 25.6 10.6 -3.0 2.7 0.8 7.8 4.8 6.5 3.3 6.3 6.9 8.8
Real compensation per employee (GDP deflator) 12.6 2.9 -3.4 0.9 -4.3 4.5 1.2 3.4 2.2 4.7 2.9 4.0
Real compensation per employee (private consumption
17.6 0.0 -3.1 -0.1 -4.1 3.4 1.5 6.0 3.2 5.4 3.1 5.2
deflator)
Nominal unit labour costs 16.8 16.7 2.2 -4.6 -0.2 5.0 4.1 4.3 4.3 3.0 4.7 6.1
Real unit labour costs 4.7 8.5 1.8 -6.2 -5.2 1.8 0.5 1.3 3.3 1.5 0.8 1.4
Total population (000) 1343 1338 1336 1333 1330 1325 1320 1316 1315 b 1316 1316 1319
Population aged 15-64 (000) 911 906 903 899 894 885 875 866 859 b 854 848 846
Total employment (000) 658 656 594 568 603 615 621 625 641 645 659 665
Employment aged 15-64 (000) 632 632 574 548 582 591 597 600 613 612 626 630
Employment rate (% population aged 20-64) 76.9 77.1 70.0 66.8 70.6 72.2 73.3 74.3 76.5 76.6 78.7 79.5
Employment rate (% population aged 15-64) 69.8 70.1 63.8 61.2 65.3 67.1 68.5 69.6 71.9 72.1 74.1 74.8
Employment rate (% population aged 15-24) 34.1 35.9 28.3 25.3 31.1 32.3 32.4 33.3 36.3 37.5 40.5 41.7
Employment rate (% population aged 25-54) 84.8 83.9 76.5 74.9 78.2 79.5 80.4 80.9 83.0 82.6 83.9 84.2
Employment rate (% population aged 55-64) 59.9 62.3 60.3 53.8 57.5 60.5 62.6 64.0 64.5 65.2 68.1 68.9
FTE employment rate (% population aged 20-64) 75.1 75.5 68.0 64.8 68.6 70.1 71.4 72.5 74.3 74.5 76.4 77.0
Self-employed (% total employment) 8.9 7.7 8.2 8.3 8.5 8.6 8.9 8.9 9.2 9.4 10.0 10.5
Part-time employment (% total employment) 7.1 6.4 9.4 9.8 9.3 9.2 8.9 8.3 9.5 9.9 9.5 11.1
Temporary employment (% total employment) 2.0 2.3 2.2 3.4 4.1 3.2 3.2 2.8 3.1 3.4 2.8 3.1
Employment in Services (% total employment) 60.4 bu 64.3 u 65.1 u 62.7 63.9 64.9 65.6 65.0 65.9 66.2 66.5
Employment in Industry (% total employment) 35.8 bu 31.6 u 30.9 u 33.1 31.7 30.8 30.5 31.1 30.3 30.4 30.3
Employment in Agriculture (% total employment) 3.9 b 4.0 4.1 4.2 4.4 4.3 3.9 3.9 3.9 3.4 3.2
Activity rate (% population aged 15-64) 73.2 74.2 74.0 73.9 74.7 74.8 75.1 75.2 76.7 77.5 78.8 79.1
Labour Market Indicators - Total

Activity rate (% population aged 15-24) 37.9 40.8 39.0 37.8 40.0 40.8 39.8 39.2 41.8 43.3 46.1 47.3
Activity rate (% population aged 25-54) 88.5 88.2 87.8 88.3 88.4 87.8 87.6 87.1 87.9 87.8 88.6 88.3
Activity rate (% population aged 55-64) 62.2 65.0 66.5 64.3 65.1 65.1 66.6 67.7 68.7 71.0 72.2 72.9
Total unemployment (000) 32 38 d 93 114 85 68 59 50 42 47 40 38
Unemployment rate (% labour force) 4.6 5.5 d 13.5 16.7 12.3 10.0 8.6 7.4 6.2 6.8 5.8 5.4
Youth unemployment rate (% labour force 15-24) 10.1 12.0 d 27.4 32.9 22.4 20.9 18.7 15.0 13.1 13.4 12.1 11.9
Long term unemployment rate (% labour force) 2.3 1.7 3.7 7.6 7.1 5.5 3.8 3.3 2.4 2.1 1.9 1.3
Share of long term unemployment (% of total
49.8 31.1 27.3 45.3 57.3 54.7 44.5 45.3 38.3 31.6 33.5 24.9
unemployment)

Youth unemployment ratio (% population aged 15-24) 3.8 4.9 10.7 12.4 9.0 8.5 7.4 5.9 5.5 5.8 5.6 5.6

Employment rate for low skilled 25-64 (ISCED 0-2) 56.8 58.1 47.5 45.2 48.5 50.3 58.2 60.6 b 58.6 62.7 66.1 65.5
Employment rate for medium skilled 25-64 (ISCED 3-
79.4 79.6 71.6 68.8 74.0 74.4 74.5 75.3 b 77.7 76.9 78.8 80.0
4)
Employment rate for high skilled 25-64 (ISCED 5-8) 87.3 85.8 82.7 79.7 79.9 82.3 83.0 84.0 b 85.7 84.9 85.7 85.1
Employment rate (Nationals aged 15-64) 69.7 69.8 64.3 62.2 65.8 67.9 69.0 70.3 72.5 72.9 74.7 75.3
Employment rate (Other EU28 aged 15-64) 64.0 u 80.4 u 69.2 u 62.6 u 58.8 u 59.3 u 63.2 u 77.5 57.8 70.4 78.6 72.2
Employment rate (Other than EU28 aged 15-64) 70.3 71.1 61.3 56.1 62.6 63.4 65.4 64.8 68.4 67.2 70.6 71.7
Employment rate (Born in the same country aged 15-
69.0 69.3 63.2 61.5 65.5 67.1 68.5 69.8 72.1 72.3 74.4 75.3
64)
Employment rate (Born in other EU28 aged 15-64) 76.2 77.2 74.0 61.4 61.9 59.2 62.6 71.7 66.8 71.8 76.4 68.6
Employment rate (Born outside EU28 aged 15-64) 74.3 74.9 67.6 59.3 64.3 67.6 68.8 67.6 70.5 70.3 71.1 70.3
Underemployment (% of labour force aged 15-74) 0.7 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.5 1.2 1.0 1.2 1.2 0.7 1.0
Seeking but not available (% of labour force aged 15-
0.3 u 0.2 u 0.4 u 0.3 u 0.4 u 0.4 0.6 0.7 0.8
74)
Discouraged, available but not seeking (% of labour
4.2 3.4 5.4 6.0 6.4 6.0 5.1 4.8 4.1 4.7 4.2 4.4
force aged 15-74)

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250
 Statistical annex - 1. Country profiles

Estonia 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Total population (000) 624 622 621 621 620 618 616 615 615 b 617 618 621
Population aged 15-64(000) 444 442 441 440 438 434 430 427 424 b 423 421 422
Total employment (000) 335 334 291 278 303 309 315 320 328 329 338 342
Employment aged 15-64 (000) 324 323 282 269 295 300 305 309 317 317 324 328
Employment rate (% population aged 20-64) 81.4 81.5 71.0 67.8 73.5 75.1 76.7 78.3 80.5 80.8 82.4 83.4
Employment rate (% population aged 15-64) 73.5 73.7 64.3 61.7 67.8 69.7 71.4 73.0 75.3 75.7 77.4 78.1
Employment rate (% population aged 15-24) 38.2 38.9 30.0 26.5 33.1 34.2 34.0 33.4 39.4 38.8 42.8 43.5
Employment rate (% population aged 25-54) 89.6 88.2 77.4 75.8 81.6 83.1 84.7 85.6 87.7 87.9 88.5 89.5
Employment rate (% population aged 55-64) 59.0 64.7 59.3 51.9 57.2 59.2 61.4 65.1 63.1 63.7 66.6 65.9
FTE employment rate (% population aged 20-64) 80.6 80.9 69.8 66.6 72.9 74.3 75.7 77.1 79.4 79.7 81.2 82.0
Self-employed (% total employment) 12.5 10.6 11.4 11.5 11.9 12.3 12.1 12.2 11.9 12.1 13.6 14.2
Part-time employment (% total employment) 3.9 3.6 6.2 6.1 5.0 5.1 5.5 5.7 6.0 6.8 6.0 7.2
Temporary employment (% total employment) 2.4 3.1 2.7 4.4 5.0 4.1 3.6 2.9 3.4 3.4 2.9 3.1
Employment in Services (% total employment) 46.5 bu 50.8 u 47.7 u 48.8 u 50.5 u 52.4 u 51.5 u 52.7 u 52.9 u 53.6
Employment in Industry (% total employment) 48.2 bu 43.7 u 46.2 u 44.9 u 43.3 u 42.3 u 43.5 u 41.7 u 42.1 u 41.8
Employment in Agriculture (% total employment) 5.4 b 5.6 5.6 6.1 6.3 6.2 5.3 5.1 5.6 5.0 4.6
Activity rate (% population aged 15-64) 77.8 78.4 77.7 76.8 78.2 78.4 78.6 79.3 80.4 81.9 82.7 82.6
Labour Market Indicators - Male

Activity rate (% population aged 15-24) 43.5 44.5 43.8 41.2 43.4 44.3 41.4 41.4 45.7 46.1 49.7 49.6
Activity rate (% population aged 25-54) 93.5 92.8 91.9 91.8 92.1 92.1 92.3 92.2 92.6 93.7 93.3 93.4
Activity rate (% population aged 55-64) 63.4 68.3 67.3 64.3 67.0 65.3 66.9 69.1 67.7 70.4 72.0 70.9
Total unemployment (000) 19 20 d 58 66 45 38 31 27 22 26 22 20
Unemployment rate (% labour force) 5.4 5.8 d 16.7 19.3 13.1 10.9 9.1 7.9 6.2 7.4 6.2 5.4
Youth unemployment rate (% labour force 15-24) 12.2 12.6 d 31.6 35.6 23.8 22.8 17.7 19.3 13.8 15.8 13.9 12.4
Long term unemployment rate (% labour force) 2.9 2.0 4.4 9.3 7.9 6.1 4.2 3.9 2.5 2.4 2.2 1.5
Share of long term unemployment (% of total
53.3 35.5 26.6 48.3 60.5 55.5 46.6 50.2 40.8 32.8 36.0 27.2
unemployment)

Youth unemployment ratio (% population aged 15-24) 5.3 5.6 13.8 14.7 10.3 10.1 7.3 8.0 6.3 7.3 6.9 6.1

Employment rate for low skilled 25-64 (ISCED 0-2) 63.9 65.6 51.7 46.5 53.2 54.1 62.5 66.1 b 63.4 68.1 71.2 69.7
Employment rate for medium skilled 25-64 (ISCED 3-
84.7 83.8 72.8 71.9 78.1 79.1 79.4 81.3 b 82.9 81.8 83.0 84.5
4)
Employment rate for high skilled 25-64 (ISCED 5-8) 91.5 92.4 87.3 81.1 84.3 86.2 87.6 89.5 b 91.0 91.3 91.1 90.6
Employment rate (Nationals aged 15-64) 72.6 73.2 65.1 62.5 67.9 69.6 71.5 72.9 75.4 75.8 77.3 78.6
Employment rate (Other EU28 aged 15-64) 93.1 u 66.1 u 59.8 u 54.9 u 68.6 u 83.2 u 76.5 u 89.0 83.1 75.0
Employment rate (Other than EU28 aged 15-64) 77.3 75.8 61.2 58.1 67.7 69.8 70.6 72.7 74.9 74.5 77.5 76.2
Employment rate (Born in the same country aged 15-
72.9 72.8 63.8 61.9 67.5 69.5 71.3 72.8 75.3 75.5 77.4 78.6
64)
Employment rate (Born in other EU28 aged 15-64) 88.2 u 94.2 u 75.5 u 58.8 u 51.6 u 58.2 u 52.9 u 73.6 73.9 79.3 77.6 70.8
Employment rate (Born outside EU28 aged 15-64) 77.1 79.6 68.1 60.7 71.0 71.8 73.1 74.7 75.8 76.5 77.5 74.5
Underemployment (% of labour force aged 15-74) 0.6 u 1.7 1.3 1.0 1.1 1.0 0.9 0.8 1.0 0.5 u 1.0
Seeking but not available (% of labour force aged 15-
0.4 u 0.6 u 0.6 u 0.6 u
74)
Discouraged, available but not seeking (% of labour
4.3 3.5 5.5 5.7 6.1 6.0 4.7 4.3 3.5 4.5 3.9 4.1
force aged 15-74)
Total population (000) 719 716 714 712 710 707 704 701 700 b 699 698 698
Population aged 15-64(000) 467 464 462 459 456 451 445 439 435 b 431 426 424
Total employment (000) 323 322 303 290 301 306 307 305 313 315 321 322
Employment aged 15-64 (000) 309 309 292 279 287 291 292 291 296 295 302 302
Employment rate (% population aged 20-64) 72.6 72.9 69.0 65.9 67.8 69.4 70.1 70.6 72.6 72.6 75.1 75.6
Employment rate (% population aged 15-64) 66.2 66.6 63.2 60.8 63.0 64.7 65.7 66.3 68.5 68.6 70.9 71.4
Employment rate (% population aged 15-24) 29.8 32.9 26.7 24.1 29.0 30.3 30.7 33.3 33.1 36.1 38.2 39.9
Employment rate (% population aged 25-54) 80.1 79.7 75.7 74.0 75.0 75.8 76.1 76.1 78.2 77.2 79.2 78.7
Employment rate (% population aged 55-64) 60.7 60.5 61.1 55.3 57.8 61.5 63.6 63.1 65.7 66.5 69.3 71.5
FTE employment rate (% population aged 20-64) 70.1 70.6 66.3 63.3 64.7 66.3 67.3 68.1 69.5 69.6 71.9 72.1
Self-employed (% total employment) 5.2 4.7 5.1 5.2 5.0 4.8 5.6 5.5 6.4 6.6 6.3 6.6
Part-time employment (% total employment) 10.6 9.4 12.6 13.4 13.8 13.3 12.4 11.2 13.4 13.3 13.3 15.3
Temporary employment (% total employment) 1.5 1.4 1.8 2.5 3.3 2.3 2.7 2.8 2.8 3.3 2.7 3.1
Employment in Services (% total employment)
Employment in Industry (% total employment)
Employment in Agriculture (% total employment) 2.3 b 2.6 2.6 2.3 2.5 2.3 2.3 2.6 2.0 1.8 1.6
Activity rate (% population aged 15-64) 68.9 70.3 70.6 71.1 71.5 71.4 71.8 71.3 73.0 73.2 75.1 75.6
Labour Market Indicators - Female

Activity rate (% population aged 15-24) 32.1 37.1 34.1 34.3 36.5 37.2 38.2 37.0 37.7 40.4 42.4 45.0
Activity rate (% population aged 25-54) 83.6 83.7 83.8 84.8 84.7 83.5 82.9 82.0 83.0 81.8 83.7 83.0
Activity rate (% population aged 55-64) 61.2 62.4 66.0 64.3 63.5 65.0 66.5 66.5 69.4 71.4 72.4 74.6
Total unemployment (000) 13 17 d 35 48 39 31 27 22 20 20 18 18
Unemployment rate (% labour force) 3.8 5.1 d 10.3 14.1 11.6 9.1 8.2 6.8 6.1 6.1 5.3 5.3
Youth unemployment rate (% labour force 15-24) 7.2 11.3 d 21.8 29.5 20.7 18.5 19.8 10.0 12.2 10.6 10.0 11.3
Long term unemployment rate (% labour force) 1.7 1.3 2.9 5.8 6.2 4.9 3.4 2.7 2.2 1.8 1.6 1.2
Share of long term unemployment (% of total
44.4 26.1 28.6 41.1 53.7 53.6 42.1 39.4 35.7 30.1 30.3 22.5
unemployment)

Youth unemployment ratio (% population aged 15-24) 2.3 4.2 7.4 10.1 7.5 6.9 7.5 3.7 4.6 4.3 4.2 5.1

Employment rate for low skilled 25-64 (ISCED 0-2) 47.3 48.9 41.4 43.3 41.3 44.3 50.7 50.0 b 50.7 52.6 56.3 57.7
Employment rate for medium skilled 25-64 (ISCED 3-
73.5 74.8 70.2 65.1 69.3 68.8 68.7 68.4 b 71.3 70.8 73.5 74.1
4)
Employment rate for high skilled 25-64 (ISCED 5-8) 84.7 82.0 80.2 78.9 77.3 80.0 80.3 80.8 b 82.7 81.1 82.5 81.8
Employment rate (Nationals aged 15-64) 67.0 66.9 63.5 62.0 63.9 66.2 66.8 67.9 69.8 70.2 72.2 72.3
Employment rate (Other EU28 aged 15-64) 59.3 u 70.6 u 71.0 u 68.0 u
Employment rate (Other than EU28 aged 15-64) 62.5 65.5 61.4 53.9 56.7 55.8 59.2 55.7 60.3 58.7 61.4 64.9
Employment rate (Born in the same country aged 15-
65.2 66.1 62.6 61.2 63.5 64.8 65.7 66.8 68.9 69.1 71.5 72.0
64)
Employment rate (Born in other EU28 aged 15-64) 67.9 u 65.6 u 75.5 u 60.3 u 69.7 u 69.8 60.4 u 61.1 u 74.9 65.9 u
Employment rate (Born outside EU28 aged 15-64) 72.1 70.8 67.1 58.2 58.9 64.6 65.7 61.9 65.8 65.4 65.4 66.6
Underemployment (% of labour force aged 15-74) 0.8 u 1.9 2.3 2.6 1.9 1.4 1.1 1.7 1.5 0.8 1.1
Seeking but not available (% of labour force aged 15-
0.5 u 0.3 u 0.6 u 0.4 u 0.5 u 0.5 u 0.7 u 0.9 1.0
74)
Discouraged, available but not seeking (% of labour
4.0 3.2 5.3 6.2 6.7 6.0 5.5 5.2 4.6 5.1 4.6 4.7
force aged 15-74)

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251
Employment and Social Developments in Europe 2019

Estonia 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
At-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion (% of total
22.0 21.8 23.4 21.7 23.1 23.4 23.5 26.0 b 24.2 24.4 23.4
population)
At-risk-of-poverty (% of total population) 19.4 19.5 19.7 15.8 17.5 17.5 18.6 21.8 21.6 21.7 21.0
At-risk-of-poverty threshold (PPS single person) 3895 4538 4861 4448 4491 4734 5164 5545 b 6259 7120 7501
Poverty gap (%) 20.2 20.3 17.0 23.2 26.0 23.8 21.5 22.0 b 21.0 20.5 20.7
Persistent at-risk-of-poverty (% of total
11.1 13.6 12.9 9.9 10.5 12.0 9.3 11.2 b 13.1 13.5 16.1
population)
At-risk-of-poverty before social transfers excl.
25.2 24.7 25.9 24.9 24.9 24.8 25.4 28.4 b 27.8 28.9 28.9
pensions (% of total population)
Impact of social transfers (excl. pensions) in
23.0 21.1 23.9 36.6 29.7 29.4 26.8 23.2 b 22.3 24.9 27.3
reducing poverty (%)
All

Severe Material Deprivation (% of total population) 5.6 4.9 6.2 9.0 8.7 9.4 7.6 6.2 4.5 4.7 4.1 3.8 p
Share of people living in low work intensity households
6.2 5.3 5.6 9.0 10.0 9.1 8.4 7.6 b 6.6 5.8 5.8
(% of people aged 0-59)
Real Gross Household Disposable income (growth %) 11.1 4.6 -8.9 -4.0 3.0 3.1 2.5 4.2 5.5 4.0
Income quintile share ratio S80/S20 5.5 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.3 5.4 5.5 6.5 b 6.2 5.6 5.4
GINI coefficient 33.4 30.9 31.4 31.3 31.9 32.5 32.9 35.6 b 34.8 32.7 31.6
Early leavers from education and training (% of
14.4 14.0 13.5 b 11.0 10.6 10.3 9.7 12.0 b 12.2 10.9 10.8 11.3
population aged 18-24)
NEET: Young people neither in employment nor in
education and training (% of total population aged 15- 9.4 9.1 14.5 14.0 11.6 12.2 11.3 11.7 10.8 9.1 9.4 9.8
24)
At-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion (% of male
19.4 18.9 21.1 21.5 23.2 22.3 22.5 24.5 b 22.2 21.9 21.0
population)
At-risk-of-poverty (% of male population) 16.7 16.5 17.5 15.4 17.6 16.8 17.2 20.1 19.6 19.2 18.4
Poverty gap (%) 24.2 23.8 20.7 25.9 27.9 27.6 27.4 29.4 b 28.3 26.3 26.9
Persistent at-risk-of-poverty (% of male
9.5 10.1 11.5 7.8 9.9 11.6 8.6 11.0 b 11.5 11.4 13.5
population)
Severe Material Deprivation (% of male population) 5.4 4.8 6.2 9.3 8.8 9.5 8.1 6.2 4.3 4.6 3.6 3.7 p
Male

Share of people living in low work intensity households

6.6 6.0 6.5 9.7 10.9 9.6 9.5 8.6 b 7.3 6.6 6.6
(% of males aged 0-59)
Life expectancy at birth (years) 67.5 68.9 b 69.8 70.9 71.4 71.4 72.8 72.4 73.2 73.3 73.8
Healthy life years at birth (years) - men 49.8 53.1 b 55.0 54.2 54.3 53.1 53.9 53.2 53.8 54.4 54.7
Early leavers from education and training (% of males
21.4 19.8 17.9 b 14.4 12.8 13.3 13.6 16.0 b 14.2 14.3 14.2 16.1
aged 18-24)
NEET: Young people neither in employment nor in
8.8 8.5 14.4 14.6 11.8 11.2 10.8 11.7 9.0 6.8 8.4 10.8
education and training ( % of males aged 15-24)
At-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion (% of female
24.2 24.3 25.5 22.0 22.9 24.4 24.4 27.3 b 26.0 26.7 25.6
population)
At-risk-of-poverty (% of female population) 21.7 22.0 21.6 16.2 17.4 18.1 19.9 23.3 23.3 24.0 23.3
Poverty gap (%) 18.4 19.3 15.5 20.0 24.0 21.8 16.9 17.5 b 16.9 18.0 18.9
Persistent at-risk-of-poverty (% of female
12.5 16.5 13.9 11.7 11.0 12.3 9.9 11.4 b 14.4 15.5 18.4
population)
Social Indicators

Severe Material Deprivation (% of female population) 5.8 4.9 6.3 8.7 8.6 9.3 7.1 6.2 4.7 4.8 4.5 3.8 p
Female

Share of people living in low work intensity households

5.8 4.7 4.8 8.3 9.2 8.6 7.3 6.5 b 5.9 5.0 4.8
(% of females aged 0-59)
Life expectancy at birth (years) 78.9 79.5 b 80.2 80.8 81.3 81.5 81.7 81.9 82.2 82.2 82.6
Healthy life years at birth (years) - women 54.9 57.5 b 59.2 58.2 57.9 57.2 57.1 57.1 56.2 59.0 57.2
Early leavers from education and training (% of
7.2 8.3 9.1 b 7.6 8.4 7.3 5.8 7.9 b 10.0 7.4 7.3 6.4
females aged 18-24)
NEET: Young people neither in employment nor in
10.1 9.7 14.5 13.5 11.4 13.2 11.8 11.6 12.8 11.6 10.5 8.9
education and training ( % of females aged 15-24)
At-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion of children (% of
20.1 19.4 24.5 24.0 24.8 22.4 22.3 23.8 b 22.5 21.2 18.8
people aged 0-17)
At-risk-of-poverty (% of Children population) 18.2 17.1 20.6 17.3 19.5 17.0 18.1 19.7 20.0 18.6 16.5
Children (0-17)

Severe Material Deprivation (% of Children

4.1 5.3 7.0 10.7 9.1 9.2 7.0 5.7 3.9 4.0 3.4 3.5 p
population)
Share of children living in low work intensity
4.6 3.8 4.5 8.4 9.2 6.9 6.6 6.5 b 5.2 3.8 4.0
households (% of Children population)
Risk of poverty of children in households at work
14.4 14.3 17.8 12.1 13.7 12.8 13.4 16.1 b 16.6 16.2 14.1
(Working Intensity > 0.2)
Impact of social transfers (excl. pensions) in reducing
35.5 35.0 30.6 44.4 35.9 40.6 34.2 30.9 b 31.0 38.6 45.6
poverty (0-17) (%)
At-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion (% of working
19.1 17.5 19.9 21.8 24.2 24.2 22.7 24.0 b 21.0 20.3 19.2
age population)
At-risk-of-poverty (% of Working age population) 16.1 15.0 15.8 15.6 18.0 17.7 17.3 19.4 17.9 17.1 16.2
Working age

Severe Material Deprivation (% of Working age

5.5 4.5 6.1 9.1 9.3 10.0 8.0 6.3 4.4 4.7 3.7 3.6 p
(18-64)

population)
Very low work intensity (18-59) 6.8 5.8 5.9 9.1 10.3 9.8 9.0 7.9 b 7.0 6.5 6.4
In-work at-risk-of poverty rate (% of persons
7.9 7.4 8.3 6.7 8.2 8.5 7.7 11.8 b 10.3 9.9 9.7
employed 18-64)
Impact of social transfers (excl. pensions) in reducing
25.1 24.6 28.2 37.6 30.2 28.9 28.8 25.7 b 26.3 29.6 32.5
poverty (18-64) (%)
At-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion of elderly (% of
35.4 40.9 35.6 19.0 17.0 21.8 28.0 35.0 b 37.0 41.4 42.0
people aged 65+)
Elderly (65+)

At-risk-of-poverty (% of Elderly population) 33.2 39.0 33.9 15.1 13.1 17.2 24.4 32.6 35.8 40.2 41.2

Severe Material Deprivation (% of Elderly population) 7.9 5.8 5.6 6.6 5.8 7.1 6.3 6.4 5.2 5.4 6.0 4.4 p
Relative median income of elderly (ratio with median
0.65 0.62 0.66 0.73 0.75 0.72 0.69 0.63 b 0.62 0.60 0.59
income of people younger than 65)
Aggregate replacement ratio (ratio) 0.47 0.45 0.52 0.55 0.54 0.50 0.50 0.47 b 0.43 0.45 0.45
Sickness/Health care 4.0 4.7 5.3 4.7 4.3 4.2 4.1 4.3 4.5 4.9
protection indicators
Expenditure in social

Disability 1.1 1.4 1.8 1.9 1.8 1.7 1.8 1.7 1.8 1.9
Old age and survivors 5.2 6.2 7.9 7.7 6.8 6.6 6.6 6.5 7.0 6.9
(% of GDP)

Family/Children 1.4 1.7 2.2 2.2 1.9 1.7 1.6 1.6 2.0 2.1
Unemployment 0.1 0.3 1.2 0.7 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.5
Housing and Social exclusion n.e.c. 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2
Total (including Admin and Other expenditures) 12.0 14.7 18.8 17.6 15.6 15.0 14.8 14.9 16.1 16.6
of which: Means tested benefits 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2

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252
 Statistical annex - 1. Country profiles

Ireland
Ireland 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Real GDP 5.3 -4.4 -5.0 1.9 3.7 0.2 1.3 8.8 25.1 5.0 7.2 6.7
Total employment 4.4 -0.6 -7.8 -4.5 -1.9 b -0.5 3.0 2.7 3.5 3.8 2.9 3.5
Labour productivity 0.9 -3.8 3.1 6.7 5.8 b 0.7 -1.6 6.0 20.9 1.2 4.2 3.0
Macro Economic Indicators

Annual average hours worked per person employed -0.7 -1.1 -1.7 -6.4 0.5 b 0.4 b 0.2 0.7 0.5 -0.1 0.2 2.7
(Annual % growth)

Real productivity per hour worked 1.6 -2.7 4.9 14.0 5.2 b 0.3 -1.8 5.3 20.2 1.3 4.0 0.3
Harmonized CPI 2.9 3.1 -1.7 -1.6 1.2 1.9 0.5 0.3 0.0 -0.2 0.3 0.7
Price deflator GDP 1.2 -0.4 -4.6 -3.3 -1.6 2.2 1.3 -0.2 7.4 -0.8 0.4 1.5
Nominal compensation per employee 5.8 3.9 -1.1 -2.0 0.3 b 1.0 b -0.5 0.6 2.6 2.1 0.9 2.9
Real compensation per employee (GDP deflator) 4.5 4.4 3.7 1.3 1.9 b -1.2 b -1.8 0.9 -4.5 2.9 0.5 1.3
Real compensation per employee (private consumption
2.8 0.7 0.6 -0.4 -1.0 b -0.9 b -1.0 0.3 2.6 2.3 0.6 2.2
deflator)
Nominal unit labour costs 4.8 8.0 -4.1 -8.2 -5.2 b 0.3 1.1 -5.1 -15.2 0.9 -3.2 -0.2
Real unit labour costs 3.6 8.4 0.6 -5.1 -3.6 b -1.8 b -0.2 -4.9 -21.1 1.8 -3.6 -1.6
Total population (000) 4340 4458 4521 4549 4571 4589 4610 4638 4678 4726 4784 4830
Population aged 15-64 (000) 2992 3070 3094 3086 3072 3058 3053 3057 3071 3097 3129 3155
Total employment (000) 2221 b 2199 2015 1926 1888 1881 1938 1989 2057 2132 2194 b 2258
Employment aged 15-64 (000) 2177 b 2152 1970 1879 1840 1831 1885 1933 1995 2066 2125 b 2180
Employment rate (% population aged 20-64) 75.1 b 73.5 68.0 65.5 64.6 64.5 66.5 68.1 69.9 71.4 73.0 74.1
Employment rate (% population aged 15-64) 71.7 b 69.7 63.6 61.0 60.0 59.9 61.7 63.1 64.8 66.4 67.7 68.6
Employment rate (% population aged 15-24) 63.0 b 57.1 45.3 38.7 36.2 34.8 36.6 36.8 37.8 42.0 40.0 40.3
Employment rate (% population aged 25-54) 78.6 b 77.3 72.2 70.2 69.1 69.4 71.3 73.1 74.7 75.8 78.0 79.2
Employment rate (% population aged 55-64) 53.8 b 53.8 51.2 50.2 50.1 49.3 51.2 52.6 55.4 56.8 58.4 60.4
FTE employment rate (% population aged 20-64) 69.5 b 67.7 61.6 58.7 57.6 57.4 59.4 61.2 63.1 64.6 66.5 b 67.6
Self-employed (% total employment) 15.5 b 16.0 16.6 16.3 16.1 16.0 16.2 16.0 15.7 15.4 14.8 b 14.5
Part-time employment (% total employment) 17.9 b 18.7 21.3 22.4 23.3 23.7 23.7 23.0 22.2 21.9 20.1 19.5
Temporary employment (% total employment) 7.8 b 7.8 7.9 8.5 9.1 9.1 9.0 8.6 8.1 7.6 7.8 b 8.6
Employment in Services (% total employment) 72.0 b 75.2 76.8 77.5 77.9 77.6 77.9 77.2 76.8 76.8 b 77.2
Employment in Industry (% total employment) 23.5 b 20.0 18.2 17.7 17.2 17.5 17.6 18.4 18.8 19.0 b 19.0
Employment in Agriculture (% total employment) 4.5 b 4.8 5.0 4.9 4.9 4.9 4.6 4.5 4.4 4.2 b 3.8
Activity rate (% population aged 15-64) 75.6 b 74.8 73.0 71.6 71.2 71.1 71.8 71.8 72.1 72.7 72.7 72.9
Labour Market Indicators - Total

Activity rate (% population aged 15-24) 69.4 b 66.0 60.1 53.9 51.4 50.3 49.9 48.1 47.4 50.5 46.7 46.7
Activity rate (% population aged 25-54) 82.1 b 82.0 81.2 80.7 80.5 80.7 81.3 81.8 82.0 82.0 82.9 83.2
Activity rate (% population aged 55-64) 55.2 b 55.7 54.8 55.1 55.5 55.1 57.4 58.2 60.2 60.7 62.0 63.3
Total unemployment (000) 116 160 291 327 343 344 309 268 226 195 158 137
Unemployment rate (% labour force) 5.0 6.8 12.6 14.6 15.4 15.5 13.8 11.9 10.0 8.4 6.7 5.8
Youth unemployment rate (% labour force 15-24) 9.2 13.5 24.5 28.1 29.6 30.8 26.7 23.4 20.2 16.8 14.4 13.8
Long term unemployment rate (% labour force) 1.4 b 1.7 3.5 6.9 8.8 9.2 8.0 6.6 5.3 4.2 3.0 2.1
Share of long term unemployment (% of total
28.2 b 25.0 27.9 47.3 56.8 59.3 57.7 55.1 53.6 50.5 44.9 36.3
unemployment)

Youth unemployment ratio (% population aged 15-24) 6.4 b 8.9 14.7 15.2 15.2 15.5 13.3 11.3 9.6 8.5 6.7 b 6.4

Employment rate for low skilled 25-64 (ISCED 0-2) 58.1 b 56.5 50.2 47.3 45.4 43.7 46.5 47.0 b 49.3 49.9 51.3 b 52.3
Employment rate for medium skilled 25-64 (ISCED 3-
76.4 b 74.8 68.8 65.5 63.9 64.4 65.2 67.0 b 68.1 70.1 71.5 b 73.6
4)
Employment rate for high skilled 25-64 (ISCED 5-8) 86.9 b 85.5 82.4 81.2 80.8 80.5 80.8 81.1 b 82.5 82.9 84.7 b 85.0
Employment rate (Nationals aged 15-64) 71.1 b 69.1 63.4 61.0 59.9 59.8 61.5 63.0 64.7 66.1 67.1 b 67.9
Employment rate (Other EU28 aged 15-64) 78.9 b 75.1 66.8 63.5 63.1 63.8 66.3 67.3 68.7 72.0 73.8 b 75.5
Employment rate (Other than EU28 aged 15-64) 66.9 b 66.5 59.1 54.7 55.6 53.1 53.2 52.9 54.1 58.7 60.6 b 64.8
Employment rate (Born in the same country aged 15-
71.1 b 69.1 63.6 61.1 60.0 59.9 61.6 63.1 64.7 66.2 67.2 b 68.0
64)
Employment rate (Born in other EU28 aged 15-64) 77.2 b 73.6 65.4 62.4 61.7 62.1 64.8 65.9 67.8 70.8 72.2 b 74.0
Employment rate (Born outside EU28 aged 15-64) 67.3 b 67.3 59.5 55.8 56.0 55.4 56.4 57.2 58.5 60.5 62.4 b 64.2
Underemployment (% of labour force aged 15-74) 4.9 5.1 6.3 6.8 6.8 5.9 5.1 4.6 4.5 4.8
Seeking but not available (% of labour force aged 15-
0.3 b 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.5
74)
Discouraged, available but not seeking (% of labour
0.5 b 0.6 1.4 1.7 1.9 1.9 1.7 1.3 1.0 0.9 2.6 b 4.5
force aged 15-74)

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253
Employment and Social Developments in Europe 2019

Ireland 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Total population (000) 2173 2227 2253 2261 2269 2274 2283 2296 2313 2339 2368 2392
Population aged 15-64(000) 1514 1548 1553 1542 1532 1521 1517 1517 1521 1535 1550 1564
Total employment (000) 1265 b 1232 1091 1032 1009 1003 1045 1077 1116 1153 1187 b 1221
Employment aged 15-64 (000) 1232 b 1197 1058 998 975 967 1007 1038 1072 1108 1137 b 1167
Employment rate (% population aged 20-64) 84.2 b 81.4 73.1 69.9 68.9 68.8 71.8 74.1 76.1 77.5 79.1 80.3
Employment rate (% population aged 15-64) 80.4 b 77.0 68.2 64.9 63.8 63.7 66.4 68.4 70.3 71.8 73.0 74.1
Employment rate (% population aged 15-24) 66.8 b 58.5 42.9 36.5 34.2 32.5 36.0 36.9 38.3 42.2 40.2 41.2
Employment rate (% population aged 25-54) 87.8 b 85.6 77.9 75.2 74.1 74.6 77.0 79.4 81.1 82.3 84.5 85.7
Employment rate (% population aged 55-64) 67.6 b 66.1 60.8 57.8 56.7 55.4 58.8 60.9 64.6 65.1 66.6 68.6
FTE employment rate (% population aged 20-64) 83.0 b 79.9 70.5 66.8 65.4 65.0 68.0 70.3 72.6 74.0 76.1 b 77.2
Self-employed (% total employment) 22.4 b 23.2 24.7 24.2 23.9 23.7 23.5 23.3 22.6 22.0 21.2 b 20.5
Part-time employment (% total employment) 7.4 b 8.2 10.9 12.0 13.0 13.9 14.0 13.7 12.9 12.9 10.9 10.6
Temporary employment (% total employment) 6.2 b 6.2 6.4 7.3 8.0 8.1 8.3 7.7 7.4 6.7 7.0 b 7.7
Employment in Services (% total employment) 58.7 b 63.1 65.4 66.5 67.3 67.2 67.4 66.1 65.7 65.4 b 65.8
Employment in Industry (% total employment) 34.4 b 29.3 26.6 25.6 24.7 25.0 25.3 26.8 27.2 28.0 b 28.1
Employment in Agriculture (% total employment) 6.9 b 7.6 7.9 8.0 8.0 7.9 7.2 7.1 7.1 6.6 b 6.0
Activity rate (% population aged 15-64) 84.7 b 83.5 80.7 78.7 78.0 77.8 78.3 78.6 79.0 79.2 78.8 78.8
Labour Market Indicators - Male

Activity rate (% population aged 15-24) 74.5 b 70.0 62.7 56.0 53.6 51.9 51.6 50.2 50.1 52.6 47.8 48.4
Activity rate (% population aged 25-54) 91.6 b 91.3 89.7 88.9 88.3 88.6 88.8 89.5 89.6 89.4 90.1 90.0
Activity rate (% population aged 55-64) 69.2 b 68.6 65.7 64.3 64.1 63.6 66.8 68.0 70.7 70.1 70.8 72.1
Total unemployment (000) 67 101 194 212 217 215 182 156 134 114 90 75
Unemployment rate (% labour force) 5.0 7.6 15.1 17.2 17.8 17.8 14.9 12.7 10.8 9.1 7.1 5.8
Youth unemployment rate (% labour force 15-24) 10.2 16.5 31.6 34.8 36.1 37.4 30.3 26.6 23.6 19.7 16.1 14.8
Long term unemployment rate (% labour force) 1.7 b 2.2 4.7 9.0 11.2 11.7 9.6 7.8 6.4 5.1 3.5 2.3
Share of long term unemployment (% of total
33.1 b 28.4 31.0 52.5 62.9 65.9 64.4 61.0 59.3 56.3 48.7 40.1
unemployment)

Youth unemployment ratio (% population aged 15-24) 7.6 b 11.5 19.8 19.5 19.4 19.4 15.6 13.3 11.8 10.3 7.7 b 7.2

Employment rate for low skilled 25-64 (ISCED 0-2) 72.6 b 69.2 60.3 56.5 53.8 52.1 56.3 58.5 b 61.6 61.6 62.9 b 64.6
Employment rate for medium skilled 25-64 (ISCED 3-
88.7 b 86.3 76.7 72.6 71.0 71.7 73.1 75.8 b 77.2 79.5 81.3 b 82.9
4)
Employment rate for high skilled 25-64 (ISCED 5-8) 91.9 b 90.8 86.8 85.0 84.9 84.8 85.6 85.9 b 87.3 87.7 89.4 b 89.7
Employment rate (Nationals aged 15-64) 79.7 b 76.4 67.8 64.6 63.3 63.2 65.8 67.8 69.7 70.9 72.0 b 72.8
Employment rate (Other EU28 aged 15-64) 86.9 b 82.3 72.2 68.7 68.2 68.8 72.7 74.6 77.3 80.2 81.0 b 82.7
Employment rate (Other than EU28 aged 15-64) 76.6 b 76.2 66.7 61.6 63.4 60.4 61.5 61.9 62.3 69.3 70.8 b 76.5
Employment rate (Born in the same country aged 15-
79.7 b 76.3 67.8 64.6 63.5 63.2 65.7 67.8 69.8 70.9 72.1 b 72.8
64)
Employment rate (Born in other EU28 aged 15-64) 85.7 b 81.4 70.8 67.3 66.0 66.6 71.4 72.5 75.2 78.2 78.6 b 80.5
Employment rate (Born outside EU28 aged 15-64) 76.8 b 76.3 67.1 62.8 63.3 62.9 64.1 66.2 65.7 70.0 71.6 b 74.2
Underemployment (% of labour force aged 15-74) 3.8 4.0 5.0 5.5 5.5 5.0 4.4 3.9 3.5 3.8
Seeking but not available (% of labour force aged 15-
0.3 b 0.3 0.4 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.5
74)
Discouraged, available but not seeking (% of labour
0.5 b 0.7 1.7 2.2 2.3 2.1 1.9 1.4 1.0 1.0 2.3 b 3.9
force aged 15-74)
Total population (000) 2167 2231 2269 2288 2301 2315 2326 2342 2364 2387 2416 2438
Population aged 15-64(000) 1478 1522 1541 1544 1540 1537 1536 1540 1550 1562 1579 1591
Total employment (000) 956 b 967 925 894 880 878 893 911 941 979 1008 b 1036
Employment aged 15-64 (000) 945 b 955 912 881 866 864 878 895 923 959 988 b 1013
Employment rate (% population aged 20-64) 65.8 b 65.4 62.9 61.1 60.2 60.2 61.3 62.3 63.8 65.4 67.0 68.1
Employment rate (% population aged 15-64) 62.9 b 62.2 59.0 57.1 56.3 56.2 57.1 58.0 59.3 61.1 62.4 63.3
Employment rate (% population aged 15-24) 59.1 b 55.6 47.8 40.9 38.2 37.1 37.1 36.7 37.3 41.7 39.7 39.3
Employment rate (% population aged 25-54) 69.2 b 69.0 66.5 65.2 64.3 64.4 65.7 67.0 68.5 69.6 71.7 72.9
Employment rate (% population aged 55-64) 39.9 b 41.2 41.5 42.6 43.4 43.1 43.7 44.4 46.4 48.5 50.3 52.3
FTE employment rate (% population aged 20-64) 56.7 b 56.3 53.6 51.6 50.8 50.9 51.7 53.1 54.8 56.3 58.1 b 59.0
Self-employed (% total employment) 6.4 b 6.9 7.0 7.3 7.2 7.1 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.7 7.3 b 7.3
Part-time employment (% total employment) 31.6 b 31.8 33.4 34.2 35.0 34.7 34.9 33.7 33.1 32.4 30.6 29.9
Temporary employment (% total employment) 9.9 b 9.8 9.6 9.9 10.3 10.2 9.8 9.6 8.9 8.5 8.7 b 9.6
Employment in Services (% total employment)
Employment in Industry (% total employment)
Employment in Agriculture (% total employment) 1.6 b 1.5 1.7 1.4 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.4 1.3 1.4 b 1.2
Activity rate (% population aged 15-64) 66.2 b 66.0 65.3 64.5 64.4 64.5 65.4 65.2 65.2 66.3 66.6 67.1
Labour Market Indicators - Female

Activity rate (% population aged 15-24) 64.2 b 61.9 57.4 51.7 49.1 48.6 48.1 45.8 44.6 48.3 45.5 45.0
Activity rate (% population aged 25-54) 72.4 b 72.5 72.6 72.6 72.7 73.0 74.1 74.4 74.6 74.9 75.9 76.7
Activity rate (% population aged 55-64) 40.9 b 42.5 43.8 45.7 46.8 46.7 48.2 48.5 49.7 51.4 53.4 54.6
Total unemployment (000) 50 58 97 115 126 128 127 111 92 81 68 63
Unemployment rate (% labour force) 4.9 5.7 9.5 11.4 12.5 12.8 12.4 10.9 8.9 7.6 6.3 5.7
Youth unemployment rate (% labour force 15-24) 7.9 10.1 16.8 20.9 22.3 23.6 22.8 19.8 16.3 13.6 12.6 12.6
Long term unemployment rate (% labour force) 1.1 b 1.1 2.1 4.3 5.8 6.1 6.0 5.1 4.0 3.2 2.5 1.8
Share of long term unemployment (% of total
21.7 b 19.2 21.8 37.7 46.4 48.1 48.2 46.8 45.2 42.3 39.8 31.6
unemployment)

Youth unemployment ratio (% population aged 15-24) 5.1 b 6.2 9.6 10.8 11.0 11.5 11.0 9.1 7.3 6.5 5.7 b 5.7

Employment rate for low skilled 25-64 (ISCED 0-2) 40.5 b 40.6 37.7 35.9 35.1 33.3 34.1 32.2 b 33.6 34.3 35.3 b 35.4
Employment rate for medium skilled 25-64 (ISCED 3-
64.4 b 63.6 61.2 58.5 56.9 57.1 57.1 58.1 b 58.6 60.6 61.9 b 64.1
4)
Employment rate for high skilled 25-64 (ISCED 5-8) 82.5 b 80.9 78.6 78.1 77.4 76.9 76.9 77.2 b 78.6 79.0 80.8 b 81.2
Employment rate (Nationals aged 15-64) 62.4 b 61.8 59.1 57.4 56.5 56.4 57.3 58.3 59.8 61.3 62.4 b 63.1
Employment rate (Other EU28 aged 15-64) 69.7 b 67.2 61.3 58.3 57.9 58.9 59.8 60.1 60.3 63.9 66.6 b 68.3
Employment rate (Other than EU28 aged 15-64) 57.0 b 56.6 51.3 47.7 47.9 45.9 45.0 43.8 45.8 48.1 50.2 b 52.8
Employment rate (Born in the same country aged 15-
62.4 b 61.8 59.3 57.5 56.6 56.5 57.5 58.5 59.7 61.5 62.5 b 63.2
64)
Employment rate (Born in other EU28 aged 15-64) 68.0 b 65.7 60.0 57.6 57.5 57.8 58.5 59.4 60.7 63.7 66.0 b 67.7
Employment rate (Born outside EU28 aged 15-64) 57.5 b 57.8 51.9 48.8 48.5 48.2 49.0 48.5 51.8 51.5 53.9 b 54.7
Underemployment (% of labour force aged 15-74) 6.3 6.4 7.8 8.3 8.3 6.9 6.0 5.5 5.7 6.1
Seeking but not available (% of labour force aged 15-
0.4 b 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.8 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6
74)
Discouraged, available but not seeking (% of labour
0.6 b 0.5 1.0 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.4 1.2 0.9 0.8 3.0 b 5.2
force aged 15-74)

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254
 Statistical annex - 1. Country profiles

Ireland 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
At-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion (% of total
23.1 23.7 25.7 27.3 29.4 30.3 29.9 27.7 26.0 24.4 22.7
population)
At-risk-of-poverty (% of total population) 17.2 15.5 15.0 15.2 15.2 16.6 15.7 16.4 16.3 16.8 15.6
At-risk-of-poverty threshold (PPS single person) 10633 10901 10386 10102 9999 9962 10039 9939 10622 11038 10912
Poverty gap (%) 17.6 17.7 16.2 15.5 17.5 20.0 17.5 18.9 18.5 18.5 18.3
Persistent at-risk-of-poverty (% of total
11.6 8.8 13.2 9.1 10.7 9.4 10.8 9.3
population)
At-risk-of-poverty before social transfers excl.
33.1 34.0 37.5 39.9 39.6 39.5 38.3 37.1 36.2 34.6 32.9
pensions (% of total population)
Impact of social transfers (excl. pensions) in
48.0 54.4 60.0 61.9 61.6 58.0 59.0 55.8 55.0 51.5 52.6
reducing poverty (%)
All

Severe Material Deprivation (% of total population) 4.5 5.5 6.1 5.7 7.8 9.8 9.9 8.4 7.5 6.7 5.2
Share of people living in low work intensity households
14.3 13.7 20.0 22.9 24.2 23.4 23.9 21.0 19.2 17.8 16.2
(% of people aged 0-59)
Real Gross Household Disposable income (growth %) 4.9 4.2 -1.0 -2.0 -4.0 2.2 -1.9 -0.4 3.4 3.0
Income quintile share ratio S80/S20 4.8 4.4 4.2 4.7 4.6 4.8 4.7 4.9 4.5 4.4 4.6
GINI coefficient 31.3 29.9 28.8 30.7 29.8 30.5 30.7 31.1 29.8 29.6 30.6
Early leavers from education and training (% of
12.0 b 11.7 11.8 11.9 11.1 9.9 8.7 6.7 b 6.8 6.0 5.0 b 5.0
population aged 18-24)
NEET: Young people neither in employment nor in
education and training (% of total population aged 15- 10.1 b 12.5 18.3 19.4 19.1 19.2 16.4 15.2 14.2 12.6 10.9 10.1
24)
At-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion (% of male
21.6 22.7 25.0 26.5 29.0 30.0 29.4 27.4 25.4 23.3 21.8
population)
At-risk-of-poverty (% of male population) 16.0 14.5 14.9 14.6 15.4 16.4 15.7 16.2 16.1 16.2 14.7
Poverty gap (%) 17.7 18.9 17.1 15.5 18.7 21.7 17.9 18.4 19.0 18.3 16.9
Persistent at-risk-of-poverty (% of male
11.6 10.1 11.7 8.8 9.9 9.9 10.7 9.9
population)
Severe Material Deprivation (% of male population) 4.0 5.3 5.5 5.5 7.4 9.7 9.2 8.1 7.2 6.3 5.0
Male

Share of people living in low work intensity households

13.7 13.1 18.8 21.4 23.4 23.2 23.6 21.4 18.6 17.2 15.2
(% of males aged 0-59)
Life expectancy at birth (years) 77.3 77.9 77.7 78.5 78.6 78.7 79.0 79.3 79.6 79.9 80.4
Healthy life years at birth (years) - men 62.9 63.5 63.9 65.9 66.1 65.9 65.8 66.3 66.6 67.3
Early leavers from education and training (% of males
16.1 b 15.8 15.7 14.5 13.8 12.0 10.7 8.3 b 8.6 7.7 6.1 b 6.1
aged 18-24)
NEET: Young people neither in employment nor in
9.8 b 13.6 21.5 22.2 21.7 21.9 17.7 15.8 15.6 13.5 11.4 10.2
education and training ( % of males aged 15-24)
At-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion (% of female
24.6 24.7 26.4 28.1 29.8 30.7 30.5 28.1 26.6 25.5 23.5
population)
At-risk-of-poverty (% of female population) 18.5 16.4 15.1 15.8 14.9 16.9 15.7 16.7 16.4 17.5 16.5
Poverty gap (%) 17.1 17.4 14.9 15.5 16.6 18.7 16.8 19.1 18.2 18.6 19.0
Persistent at-risk-of-poverty (% of female
11.7 7.4 14.5 9.3 11.6 8.9 10.9 8.8
population)
Social Indicators

Severe Material Deprivation (% of female population) 4.9 5.8 6.8 5.9 8.3 10.0 10.6 8.6 7.8 7.1 5.4
Female

Share of people living in low work intensity households

15.0 14.3 21.2 24.5 25.1 23.5 24.1 20.6 19.7 18.5 17.1
(% of females aged 0-59)
Life expectancy at birth (years) 82.1 82.4 82.7 83.1 83.0 83.2 83.1 83.5 83.4 83.6 84.0
Healthy life years at birth (years) - women 65.6 65.1 65.2 66.9 68.3 68.5 68.0 67.5 67.9 69.8
Early leavers from education and training (% of
7.9 b 7.5 7.9 9.3 8.3 7.8 6.6 5.1 b 4.9 4.3 3.9 b 3.9
females aged 18-24)
NEET: Young people neither in employment nor in
10.3 b 11.4 15.0 16.7 16.6 16.4 15.1 14.7 12.9 11.6 10.5 9.9
education and training ( % of females aged 15-24)
At-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion of children (% of
26.2 26.6 31.4 34.1 34.1 33.5 34.4 30.4 28.8 27.3 25.2
people aged 0-17)
At-risk-of-poverty (% of Children population) 19.2 18.0 18.8 18.9 17.1 19.3 18.2 18.3 17.9 18.8 17.0
Children (0-17)

Severe Material Deprivation (% of Children

7.6 6.8 8.4 8.2 10.0 12.4 13.4 10.1 8.9 9.3 6.8
population)
Share of children living in low work intensity
15.8 15.1 23.4 25.6 26.0 22.8 24.2 21.4 19.8 19.3 17.9
households (% of Children population)
Risk of poverty of children in households at work
10.1 11.0 7.5 9.3 6.3 7.3 7.3 7.1 7.7 6.6 6.9
(Working Intensity > 0.2)
Impact of social transfers (excl. pensions) in reducing
50.6 55.2 59.7 62.9 65.2 58.0 59.5 58.1 57.7 52.8 56.2
poverty (0-17) (%)
At-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion (% of working
20.7 22.6 24.8 27.2 30.5 32.0 31.3 29.5 26.8 24.6 23.0
age population)
At-risk-of-poverty (% of Working age population) 14.4 13.4 13.2 14.6 15.1 16.2 15.7 16.7 16.0 16.0 15.3
Working age

Severe Material Deprivation (% of Working age

3.7 5.6 5.8 5.4 7.9 10.1 9.6 8.7 7.8 6.5 5.2
(18-64)

population)
Very low work intensity (18-59) 13.7 13.1 18.4 21.7 23.4 23.6 23.7 20.8 18.9 17.1 15.4
In-work at-risk-of poverty rate (% of persons
5.5 6.3 4.9 5.5 5.3 5.6 5.0 5.4 4.8 5.1 5.2
employed 18-64)
Impact of social transfers (excl. pensions) in reducing
50.3 56.6 61.4 61.8 61.4 59.2 59.6 55.6 54.4 52.2 51.3
poverty (18-64) (%)
At-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion of elderly (% of
28.7 22.5 17.9 11.3 13.8 15.2 13.7 13.9 16.5 18.1 16.2
people aged 65+)
Elderly (65+)

At-risk-of-poverty (% of Elderly population) 28.3 21.1 16.2 9.9 11.0 12.8 10.6 11.4 14.2 16.6 14.8

Severe Material Deprivation (% of Elderly population) 1.2 2.2 2.6 1.5 3.0 2.8 3.6 2.9 3.1 2.4 2.0
Relative median income of elderly (ratio with median
0.69 0.74 0.78 0.85 0.86 0.86 0.91 0.89 0.87 0.85 0.84
income of people younger than 65)
Aggregate replacement ratio (ratio) 0.49 0.49 0.48 0.47 0.43 0.42 0.37 0.38 0.38 0.35 0.33
Sickness/Health care 6.8 7.7 8.6 8.7 8.5 p 8.4 p 7.9 p 7.4 p 5.7 p 5.8 p
protection indicators
Expenditure in social

Disability 0.9 1.0 1.2 1.2 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 0.8 0.8
Old age and survivors 5.0 5.6 6.7 6.9 6.7 6.9 6.8 6.3 4.9 5.1
(% of GDP)

Family/Children 2.0 2.4 2.8 2.5 2.3 2.2 2.1 1.8 1.4 1.3
Unemployment 1.4 1.8 3.0 3.7 3.5 3.2 2.9 2.5 1.8 1.5
Housing and Social exclusion n.e.c. 0.7 0.9 0.9 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.9 0.8 0.6 0.6
Total (including Admin and Other expenditures) 17.6 20.2 24.1 24.8 24.2 23.6 22.6 20.6 15.8 15.8
of which: Means tested benefits 4.1 4.9 6.2 7.0 7.2 7.1 6.9 6.2 4.5 4.3

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255
Employment and Social Developments in Europe 2019

Greece
Greece 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Real GDP 3.3 -0.3 -4.3 -5.5 -9.1 p -7.3 p -3.2 p 0.7 p -0.4 p -0.2 p 1.5 p 1.9 p
Total employment 1.3 1.3 -0.6 -2.6 -6.9 p -6.3 p -2.6 p 0.9 p 0.7 p 0.5 p 1.5 p 1.7 p
Labour productivity 1.9 -1.6 -3.8 -3.0 -2.4 p -1.1 p -0.6 p -0.2 p -1.2 p -0.7 p 0.0 p 0.2 p
Macro Economic Indicators

Annual average hours worked per person employed -0.7 -0.2 -1.2 -3.0 0.9 p 0.9 p 0.2 p -1.9 p 0.5 p -0.1 p 0.8 p 0.0 p
(Annual % growth)

Real productivity per hour worked 2.6 -1.4 -2.6 0.0 -3.3 p -1.9 p -0.8 p 1.7 p -1.7 p -0.6 p -0.8 p 0.3 p
Harmonized CPI 3.0 4.2 1.3 4.7 3.1 1.0 -0.9 -1.4 -1.1 0.0 1.1 0.8
Price deflator GDP 3.4 4.3 2.6 0.7 0.8 p -0.4 p -2.4 p -1.8 p -0.3 p -0.2 p 0.6 p 0.5 p
Nominal compensation per employee 4.6 3.7 3.1 -2.0 -3.8 p -3.0 p -7.5 p -2.0 p -2.4 p -0.9 p 0.5 p 1.3 p
Real compensation per employee (GDP deflator) 1.1 -0.7 0.5 -2.6 -4.5 p -2.7 p -5.3 p -0.2 p -2.1 p -0.7 p -0.1 p 0.8 p
Real compensation per employee (private consumption
1.5 -0.6 1.7 -6.4 -6.7 p -4.0 p -6.7 p -0.6 p -1.3 p -1.0 p -0.6 p 0.5 p
deflator)
Nominal unit labour costs 2.6 5.3 7.1 1.0 -1.4 p -2.0 p -6.9 p -1.8 p -1.3 p -0.3 p 0.6 p 1.1 p
Real unit labour costs -0.8 1.0 4.5 0.3 -2.2 p -1.6 p -4.7 p 0.1 p -1.0 p 0.0 p 0.0 p 0.5 p
Total population (000) 11036 11061 11095 11119 11123 11086 11004 10927 10858 10784 10768 10741
Population aged 15-64 (000) 7357 7378 7388 7382 7349 7280 7180 7088 7011 6934 6894 6854
Total employment (000) 4564 4611 4556 b 4390 4054 3695 3513 3536 3611 3674 3753 3828
Employment aged 15-64 (000) 4476 4523 4469 b 4306 3979 3636 3459 3480 3548 3610 3683 3751
Employment rate (% population aged 20-64) 65.8 66.3 65.6 b 63.8 59.6 55.0 52.9 53.3 54.9 56.2 57.8 59.5
Employment rate (% population aged 15-64) 60.9 61.4 60.8 b 59.1 55.1 50.8 48.8 49.4 50.8 52.0 53.5 54.9
Employment rate (% population aged 15-24) 24.0 23.5 22.8 b 20.1 16.1 13.0 11.8 13.3 13.0 13.0 14.1 14.0
Employment rate (% population aged 25-54) 75.4 76.0 75.3 b 73.2 68.8 63.9 61.3 62.4 64.5 66.0 67.4 68.9
Employment rate (% population aged 55-64) 42.7 43.0 42.4 b 42.4 39.5 36.5 35.6 34.0 34.3 36.3 38.3 41.1
FTE employment rate (% population aged 20-64) 64.7 65.3 64.5 b 62.4 58.0 53.1 50.8 51.1 52.6 53.7 55.3 57.2
Self-employed (% total employment) 29.0 29.1 29.4 b 29.9 30.7 31.6 32.1 31.3 30.6 30.2 30.1 29.8
Part-time employment (% total employment) 5.4 5.4 5.9 b 6.3 6.7 7.7 8.4 9.3 9.4 9.8 9.7 9.1
Temporary employment (% total employment) 7.2 7.7 8.1 b 8.3 7.6 6.5 6.5 7.5 7.9 7.5 7.6 7.6
Employment in Services (% total employment) 67.1 b 67.6 b 68.5 70.5 70.8 71.0 71.9 72.6 72.8 73.0 72.9
Employment in Industry (% total employment) 22.5 b 21.4 b 19.8 17.9 16.7 15.7 15.1 15.1 15.4 15.6 15.4
Employment in Agriculture (% total employment) 10.5 b 11.1 b 11.7 11.7 12.5 13.3 13.0 12.3 11.7 11.5 11.7
Activity rate (% population aged 15-64) 66.5 66.7 67.4 b 67.8 67.3 67.5 67.5 67.4 67.8 68.2 68.3 68.2
Labour Market Indicators - Total

Activity rate (% population aged 15-24) 31.0 30.1 30.7 b 30.0 29.1 29.1 28.4 28.0 26.0 24.6 25.0 23.3
Activity rate (% population aged 25-54) 81.8 81.9 82.8 b 83.2 83.1 83.7 83.9 84.3 85.4 85.5 85.0 85.0
Activity rate (% population aged 55-64) 44.2 44.4 44.4 b 45.2 43.1 42.1 42.4 41.1 41.6 44.9 46.7 48.5
Total unemployment (000) 418 388 485 639 882 1195 1330 1274 1197 1131 1027 915
Unemployment rate (% labour force) 8.4 7.8 9.6 12.7 17.9 24.5 27.5 26.5 24.9 23.6 21.5 19.3
Youth unemployment rate (% labour force 15-24) 22.7 21.9 25.7 33.0 44.7 55.3 58.3 52.4 49.8 47.3 43.6 39.9
Long term unemployment rate (% labour force) 4.2 3.7 3.9 b 5.7 8.8 14.5 18.5 19.5 18.2 17.0 15.6 13.6
Share of long term unemployment (% of total
49.7 47.1 40.4 b 44.6 49.3 59.1 67.1 73.5 73.1 72.0 72.8 70.3
unemployment)

Youth unemployment ratio (% population aged 15-24) 7.0 6.6 7.9 b 9.9 13.0 16.1 16.5 14.7 12.9 11.7 10.9 9.3

Employment rate for low skilled 25-64 (ISCED 0-2) 59.9 60.2 59.8 b 58.1 53.9 48.4 46.3 46.9 b 48.5 48.4 49.5 50.3
Employment rate for medium skilled 25-64 (ISCED 3-
69.5 69.9 68.5 b 66.5 62.0 57.2 54.1 54.5 b 56.4 58.1 59.3 60.9
4)
Employment rate for high skilled 25-64 (ISCED 5-8) 83.0 83.0 82.5 b 80.0 75.1 71.4 69.1 68.5 b 68.7 70.4 71.8 74.1
Employment rate (Nationals aged 15-64) 60.4 60.8 60.3 b 58.6 54.7 51.0 49.0 49.3 50.8 52.0 53.6 55.1
Employment rate (Other EU28 aged 15-64) 62.2 61.6 63.0 b 64.3 61.7 53.7 49.7 51.9 54.0 50.9 53.6 50.8
Employment rate (Other than EU28 aged 15-64) 68.4 69.9 67.2 b 63.9 58.0 47.9 45.4 50.0 50.4 52.3 51.5 52.0
Employment rate (Born in the same country aged 15-
60.4 60.8 60.3 b 58.5 54.8 50.9 48.9 49.3 50.6 51.9 53.6 55.1
64)
Employment rate (Born in other EU28 aged 15-64) 62.7 62.4 62.6 b 64.3 60.6 53.3 50.6 53.3 56.2 54.6 54.4 52.1
Employment rate (Born outside EU28 aged 15-64) 67.0 68.4 66.2 b 63.4 57.5 48.7 46.6 49.5 51.5 53.5 52.4 53.0
Underemployment (% of labour force aged 15-74) 2.0 2.4 b 2.7 3.2 3.9 4.4 5.0 5.1 5.6 5.4 5.2
Seeking but not available (% of labour force aged 15-
0.5 0.4 0.4 b 0.3 0.5 0.7 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.8 0.8
74)
Discouraged, available but not seeking (% of labour
0.8 0.9 1.1 b 1.1 1.3 1.9 2.0 1.9 2.1 2.3 2.4 2.3
force aged 15-74)

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256
 Statistical annex - 1. Country profiles

Greece 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Total population (000) 5442 5448 5456 5461 5453 5424 5366 5313 5268 5224 5221 5210
Population aged 15-64(000) 3704 3709 3707 3697 3673 3629 3564 3504 3456 3410 3395 3377
Total employment (000) 2777 2787 2722 b 2601 2390 2168 2065 2056 2086 2129 2181 2238
Employment aged 15-64 (000) 2713 2722 2660 b 2542 2338 2126 2027 2017 2048 2092 2138 2189
Employment rate (% population aged 20-64) 80.1 80.1 78.5 b 76.0 70.8 65.0 62.7 62.6 64.0 65.8 67.7 70.1
Employment rate (% population aged 15-64) 74.2 74.4 73.0 b 70.3 65.4 60.1 57.9 58.0 59.3 61.0 62.7 64.7
Employment rate (% population aged 15-24) 29.1 28.3 27.3 b 24.2 19.4 16.1 14.6 15.8 15.2 14.7 15.9 15.9
Employment rate (% population aged 25-54) 90.1 90.1 88.3 b 85.3 79.9 73.9 71.4 71.8 73.7 76.0 77.5 79.6
Employment rate (% population aged 55-64) 59.1 59.2 57.8 b 56.5 52.3 47.7 46.0 44.0 44.9 46.2 49.6 53.3
FTE employment rate (% population aged 20-64) 80.2 80.4 78.6 b 75.7 70.0 63.9 61.3 60.9 62.2 63.9 66.0 68.5
Self-employed (% total employment) 34.6 34.5 35.1 b 35.5 36.2 37.3 37.7 37.0 35.9 34.9 35.1 34.8
Part-time employment (% total employment) 2.5 2.6 2.9 b 3.5 4.3 4.7 5.4 6.5 6.7 6.9 6.6 6.1
Temporary employment (% total employment) 5.8 6.3 6.7 b 6.9 6.6 5.4 5.6 6.7 7.0 6.5 6.3 6.1
Employment in Services (% total employment) 58.9 b 59.2 b 60.5 63.5 64.3 65.2 66.0 67.0 67.1 67.2 67.1
Employment in Industry (% total employment) 31.1 b 30.0 b 28.0 25.1 23.2 21.5 20.5 20.2 20.6 20.8 20.8
Employment in Agriculture (% total employment) 10.1 b 10.9 b 11.5 11.4 12.5 13.3 13.5 12.8 12.3 12.0 12.1
Activity rate (% population aged 15-64) 78.4 78.4 78.5 b 78.3 77.2 76.9 76.9 76.0 75.9 76.2 76.4 76.6
Labour Market Indicators - Male

Activity rate (% population aged 15-24) 34.4 34.0 33.9 b 33.0 31.7 31.2 31.6 30.0 27.7 26.4 26.2 25.1
Activity rate (% population aged 25-54) 94.6 94.4 94.4 b 94.2 93.5 93.6 93.6 93.1 93.1 93.2 93.0 93.2
Activity rate (% population aged 55-64) 60.9 61.0 60.2 b 60.2 57.3 55.2 55.0 53.4 54.9 57.3 59.8 61.4
Total unemployment (000) 154 151 204 290 426 595 669 635 579 528 473 407
Unemployment rate (% labour force) 5.3 5.1 7.0 10.1 15.2 21.6 24.5 23.7 21.8 19.9 17.8 15.4
Youth unemployment rate (% labour force 15-24) 15.5 16.9 19.5 26.8 38.8 48.5 53.8 47.4 45.2 44.3 39.3 36.4
Long term unemployment rate (% labour force) 2.2 2.1 2.4 b 3.9 6.8 12.2 16.2 17.2 15.8 14.1 12.6 10.5
Share of long term unemployment (% of total
41.6 40.0 33.9 b 38.3 44.7 56.4 66.0 72.8 72.7 71.1 70.8 68.1
unemployment)

Youth unemployment ratio (% population aged 15-24) 5.3 5.7 6.6 b 8.9 12.3 15.1 17.0 14.2 12.5 11.7 10.3 9.1

Employment rate for low skilled 25-64 (ISCED 0-2) 79.9 80.0 78.1 b 74.7 68.5 61.5 58.2 58.6 b 60.2 60.7 62.7 64.4
Employment rate for medium skilled 25-64 (ISCED 3-
85.6 85.5 83.0 b 80.6 75.6 69.5 66.8 67.0 b 68.9 70.7 72.1 74.3
4)
Employment rate for high skilled 25-64 (ISCED 5-8) 87.9 87.7 87.3 b 84.8 80.1 76.4 74.5 72.5 b 73.1 76.4 78.1 81.0
Employment rate (Nationals aged 15-64) 73.4 73.3 72.1 b 69.7 64.9 60.3 58.1 57.8 59.2 60.8 62.6 64.6
Employment rate (Other EU28 aged 15-64) 77.2 77.5 74.8 b 77.6 71.2 61.1 57.3 59.5 64.0 63.9 66.0 66.0
Employment rate (Other than EU28 aged 15-64) 86.8 88.3 82.7 b 76.7 70.3 56.8 55.1 59.3 59.6 64.1 64.1 67.6
Employment rate (Born in the same country aged 15-
73.3 73.3 72.1 b 69.6 64.9 60.3 58.0 57.9 59.1 60.6 62.6 64.5
64)
Employment rate (Born in other EU28 aged 15-64) 78.8 77.1 74.5 b 78.0 71.2 61.6 56.7 61.8 68.8 69.9 67.9 66.9
Employment rate (Born outside EU28 aged 15-64) 85.2 86.4 81.2 b 76.0 69.5 57.4 55.9 58.2 59.7 63.9 64.5 68.0
Underemployment (% of labour force aged 15-74) 1.2 1.4 b 1.9 2.6 2.8 3.3 4.0 4.2 4.6 4.3 4.2
Seeking but not available (% of labour force aged 15-
0.3 0.3 0.3 b 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.5
74)
Discouraged, available but not seeking (% of labour
0.4 0.3 0.4 b 0.5 0.6 1.0 1.1 0.9 1.1 1.3 1.2 1.2
force aged 15-74)
Total population (000) 5594 5613 5639 5658 5670 5663 5637 5614 5590 5560 5547 5531
Population aged 15-64(000) 3653 3669 3682 3684 3676 3651 3617 3584 3555 3524 3499 3477
Total employment (000) 1787 1824 1834 b 1789 1664 1527 1448 1480 1524 1544 1572 1590
Employment aged 15-64 (000) 1763 1801 1809 b 1765 1641 1510 1432 1463 1500 1519 1545 1562
Employment rate (% population aged 20-64) 51.7 52.6 52.9 b 51.8 48.7 45.2 43.3 44.3 46.0 46.8 48.0 49.1
Employment rate (% population aged 15-64) 47.7 48.6 48.9 b 48.0 45.0 41.7 39.9 41.1 42.5 43.3 44.4 45.3
Employment rate (% population aged 15-24) 18.8 18.7 18.3 b 16.1 12.9 10.0 9.1 10.9 10.9 11.3 12.4 12.0
Employment rate (% population aged 25-54) 60.9 62.0 62.3 b 61.1 57.8 53.9 51.4 53.1 55.4 55.9 57.2 58.2
Employment rate (% population aged 55-64) 27.0 27.5 27.8 b 29.1 27.5 26.1 26.0 25.0 24.7 27.2 28.0 30.0
FTE employment rate (% population aged 20-64) 49.4 50.4 50.5 b 49.5 46.4 42.7 40.7 41.6 43.2 43.8 44.9 46.1
Self-employed (% total employment) 20.2 21.0 21.0 b 21.9 22.9 23.6 24.2 23.4 23.3 23.7 23.3 22.9
Part-time employment (% total employment) 9.9 9.8 10.2 b 10.3 10.1 11.8 12.6 13.0 13.1 13.7 14.1 13.2
Temporary employment (% total employment) 9.3 9.7 10.1 b 10.2 9.1 8.1 7.7 8.7 9.0 8.8 9.6 9.8
Employment in Services (% total employment) 79.4 bu 79.9 u
Employment in Industry (% total employment) 9.5 bu 7.5 u
Employment in Agriculture (% total employment) 11.1 b 11.3 b 12.1 12.1 12.6 13.1 12.4 11.6 11.0 10.7 11.1
Activity rate (% population aged 15-64) 54.8 55.0 56.5 b 57.5 57.5 58.3 58.3 59.0 59.9 60.4 60.3 59.9
Labour Market Indicators - Female

Activity rate (% population aged 15-24) 27.5 26.1 27.4 b 27.1 26.6 27.0 25.3 26.1 24.3 22.9 23.9 21.5
Activity rate (% population aged 25-54) 69.2 69.5 71.1 b 72.4 72.8 74.0 74.3 75.6 77.7 77.7 77.0 76.7
Activity rate (% population aged 55-64) 28.2 28.7 29.5 b 31.1 29.9 30.0 31.0 29.9 29.5 33.6 34.9 36.9
Total unemployment (000) 265 237 281 349 456 600 661 639 618 603 554 508
Unemployment rate (% labour force) 12.9 11.5 13.3 16.4 21.5 28.2 31.4 30.2 28.9 28.1 26.1 24.2
Youth unemployment rate (% labour force 15-24) 31.7 28.3 33.3 40.3 51.6 63.1 63.8 58.1 55.0 50.7 48.2 43.9
Long term unemployment rate (% labour force) 7.0 5.9 6.0 b 8.1 11.6 17.4 21.4 22.4 21.2 20.5 19.4 17.5
Share of long term unemployment (% of total
54.4 51.6 45.1 b 49.8 53.7 61.7 68.2 74.2 73.5 72.7 74.4 72.1
unemployment)

Youth unemployment ratio (% population aged 15-24) 8.7 7.4 9.1 b 10.9 13.7 17.0 16.1 15.2 13.4 11.6 11.5 9.4

Employment rate for low skilled 25-64 (ISCED 0-2) 39.2 39.5 40.3 b 40.1 38.0 34.4 33.6 34.4 b 35.6 35.0 35.4 35.5
Employment rate for medium skilled 25-64 (ISCED 3-
55.1 55.7 55.2 b 53.7 49.8 46.0 42.5 42.9 b 44.6 45.7 46.5 47.5
4)
Employment rate for high skilled 25-64 (ISCED 5-8) 77.9 78.2 77.9 b 75.4 70.3 66.7 63.9 64.8 b 64.7 65.2 66.4 68.0
Employment rate (Nationals aged 15-64) 47.6 48.6 48.8 b 47.8 44.8 41.8 40.1 41.0 42.5 43.5 44.7 45.7
Employment rate (Other EU28 aged 15-64) 52.7 51.4 55.5 b 56.8 56.1 48.9 44.3 46.8 48.1 42.9 46.1 42.5
Employment rate (Other than EU28 aged 15-64) 46.8 47.3 48.7 b 48.6 44.0 38.1 35.2 40.0 40.9 39.5 39.0 37.6
Employment rate (Born in the same country aged 15-
47.6 48.5 48.7 b 47.7 44.8 41.8 40.0 40.9 42.3 43.3 44.6 45.8
64)
Employment rate (Born in other EU28 aged 15-64) 52.8 53.0 55.0 b 56.4 54.3 48.3 46.9 48.1 48.2 45.8 47.0 43.6
Employment rate (Born outside EU28 aged 15-64) 47.3 47.4 49.1 b 49.2 44.4 39.5 37.0 40.8 43.6 43.1 41.2 39.5
Underemployment (% of labour force aged 15-74) 3.2 3.7 b 3.8 4.1 5.3 5.8 6.2 6.2 6.8 6.8 6.4
Seeking but not available (% of labour force aged 15-
0.7 0.6 0.6 b 0.5 0.6 1.0 1.3 1.2 1.1 1.0 1.1 1.1
74)
Discouraged, available but not seeking (% of labour
1.5 1.7 2.0 b 2.0 2.3 2.9 3.3 3.2 3.3 3.5 3.8 3.8
force aged 15-74)

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257
Employment and Social Developments in Europe 2019

Greece 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
At-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion (% of total
28.3 28.1 27.6 27.7 31.0 34.6 35.7 36.0 35.7 35.6 34.8
population)
At-risk-of-poverty (% of total population) 20.3 20.1 19.7 20.1 21.4 23.1 23.1 22.1 21.4 21.2 20.2
At-risk-of-poverty threshold (PPS single person) 6873 7219 7521 7559 6976 6038 5427 5204 5281 5429 5411
Poverty gap (%) 26.0 24.7 24.1 23.4 26.1 29.9 32.7 31.3 30.6 31.9 30.3
Persistent at-risk-of-poverty (% of total
13.1 13.0 16.1 17.6 10.5 13.8 12.4 14.5 13.3 15.2 14.0
population)
At-risk-of-poverty before social transfers excl.
23.7 23.3 22.7 23.8 24.8 26.8 28.0 26.0 25.5 25.2 24.0
pensions (% of total population)
Impact of social transfers (excl. pensions) in
14.4 13.7 13.2 15.6 13.7 13.8 17.5 15.0 16.1 15.9 15.8
reducing poverty (%)
All

Severe Material Deprivation (% of total population) 11.5 11.2 11.0 11.6 15.2 19.5 20.3 21.5 22.2 22.4 21.1 16.7 p
Share of people living in low work intensity households
8.1 7.5 6.6 7.6 12.0 14.2 18.2 17.2 16.8 17.2 15.6
(% of people aged 0-59)
Real Gross Household Disposable income (growth %) 2.9 1.1 0.9 -11.1 -10.6 -8.9 -6.8 1.7 -2.2 -1.3
Income quintile share ratio S80/S20 6.0 5.9 5.8 5.6 6.0 6.6 6.6 6.5 6.5 6.6 6.1
GINI coefficient 34.3 33.4 33.1 32.9 33.5 34.3 34.4 34.5 34.2 34.3 33.4
Early leavers from education and training (% of
14.3 14.4 b 14.2 b 13.5 12.9 11.3 10.1 9.0 b 7.9 6.2 6.0 4.7
population aged 18-24)
NEET: Young people neither in employment nor in
education and training (% of total population aged 15- 11.3 11.4 12.4 b 14.8 17.4 20.2 20.4 19.1 17.2 15.8 15.3 14.1
24)
At-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion (% of male
26.8 26.3 26.1 26.0 29.6 33.9 34.6 35.3 34.8 34.4 33.9
population)
At-risk-of-poverty (% of male population) 19.6 19.6 19.1 19.3 20.9 22.5 22.4 22.2 21.5 21.2 20.2
Poverty gap (%) 25.6 24.4 24.4 23.4 27.2 29.9 32.9 32.1 32.9 33.6 30.9
Persistent at-risk-of-poverty (% of male
12.4 11.3 15.6 16.3 10.4 14.0 11.7 13.5 13.2 14.9 13.8
population)
Severe Material Deprivation (% of male population) 10.6 10.1 10.2 10.9 14.9 19.9 20.3 21.2 22.1 22.2 21.0 16.4 p
Male

Share of people living in low work intensity households

6.5 6.0 5.3 6.5 11.0 12.9 17.5 16.0 15.5 15.8 14.2
(% of males aged 0-59)
Life expectancy at birth (years) 76.9 77.5 b 77.8 78.0 78.0 78.0 78.7 78.9 78.5 78.9 78.8
Healthy life years at birth (years) - men 66.0 65.6 b 66.1 66.1 66.2 64.8 64.7 64.1 63.9 63.8 64.4
Early leavers from education and training (% of males
18.2 18.0 b 17.9 b 16.4 15.9 13.7 12.7 11.5 b 9.4 7.1 7.1 5.7
aged 18-24)
NEET: Young people neither in employment nor in
8.1 8.8 9.5 b 12.7 16.1 19.0 20.9 18.7 17.1 15.9 15.0 14.2
education and training ( % of males aged 15-24)
At-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion (% of female
29.9 29.8 29.0 29.3 32.3 35.2 36.8 36.7 36.6 36.6 35.7
population)
At-risk-of-poverty (% of female population) 20.9 20.7 20.2 20.9 21.9 23.6 23.8 22.0 21.2 21.2 20.2
Poverty gap (%) 26.3 25.0 24.1 23.4 25.6 29.1 32.6 30.8 28.3 30.8 29.8
Persistent at-risk-of-poverty (% of female
13.8 14.7 16.6 18.7 10.6 13.5 13.0 15.5 13.3 15.5 14.3
population)
Social Indicators

Severe Material Deprivation (% of female population) 12.3 12.2 11.7 12.2 15.4 19.1 20.3 21.8 22.2 22.6 21.2 17.0 p
Female

Share of people living in low work intensity households

9.8 9.0 8.0 8.6 13.0 15.6 18.9 18.4 18.0 18.6 17.0
(% of females aged 0-59)
Life expectancy at birth (years) 82.5 83.0 b 82.7 83.3 83.6 83.4 84.0 84.1 83.7 84.0 83.9
Healthy life years at birth (years) - women 67.6 66.2 b 66.8 67.7 66.9 64.9 65.1 64.8 64.1 64.7 65.1
Early leavers from education and training (% of
10.3 10.6 b 10.5 b 10.6 10.0 8.9 7.5 6.6 b 6.4 5.3 4.9 3.6
females aged 18-24)
NEET: Young people neither in employment nor in
14.5 14.1 15.2 b 16.9 18.7 21.3 20.0 19.6 17.2 15.7 15.5 14.0
education and training ( % of females aged 15-24)
At-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion of children (% of
28.2 28.7 30.0 28.7 30.4 35.4 38.1 36.7 37.8 37.5 36.2
people aged 0-17)
At-risk-of-poverty (% of Children population) 23.3 23.0 23.7 23.0 23.7 26.9 28.8 25.5 26.6 26.3 24.5
Children (0-17)

Severe Material Deprivation (% of Children

9.7 10.4 12.2 12.2 16.4 20.9 23.3 23.8 25.7 26.7 23.8 18.6 p
population)
Share of children living in low work intensity
4.6 3.9 2.7 3.9 7.2 7.6 13.8 10.2 10.6 10.9 9.4
households (% of Children population)
Risk of poverty of children in households at work
21.3 21.4 22.8 21.6 19.2 22.1 20.4 20.6 21.2 20.1 19.2
(Working Intensity > 0.2)
Impact of social transfers (excl. pensions) in reducing
14.0 10.9 6.0 10.9 10.6 9.7 18.2 17.7 18.4 20.3 20.7
poverty (0-17) (%)
At-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion (% of working
27.8 27.9 27.1 27.7 31.6 37.7 39.1 40.1 39.4 39.7 38.6
age population)
At-risk-of-poverty (% of Working age population) 18.7 18.7 18.1 19.0 20.0 23.8 24.1 23.5 22.5 22.7 21.7
Working age

Severe Material Deprivation (% of Working age

10.2 10.4 10.3 11.2 15.4 20.7 21.6 22.9 23.5 23.7 22.1 17.3 p
(18-64)

population)
Very low work intensity (18-59) 9.2 8.6 7.8 8.7 13.5 16.3 19.6 19.4 18.7 19.2 17.6
In-work at-risk-of poverty rate (% of persons
14.1 14.2 13.7 13.9 11.9 15.1 13.0 13.2 13.4 14.0 12.8
employed 18-64)
Impact of social transfers (excl. pensions) in reducing
13.4 13.8 13.0 14.4 13.0 14.4 16.3 14.5 14.8 14.7 14.2
poverty (18-64) (%)
At-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion of elderly (% of
30.6 28.1 26.8 26.7 29.3 23.5 23.1 23.0 22.8 22.0 22.8
people aged 65+)
Elderly (65+)

At-risk-of-poverty (% of Elderly population) 22.9 22.3 21.4 21.3 23.6 17.2 15.1 14.9 13.7 12.4 12.4

Severe Material Deprivation (% of Elderly population) 17.4 14.8 12.1 12.4 13.1 14.3 13.7 15.5 15.2 15.2 15.8 13.6 p
Relative median income of elderly (ratio with median
0.83 0.86 0.86 0.84 0.81 1.01 1.04 1.0 1.04 1.07 1.04
income of people younger than 65)
Aggregate replacement ratio (ratio) 0.40 0.41 0.41 0.42 0.45 0.52 0.60 0.60 0.62 0.64 0.62
Sickness/Health care 5.8 6.3 6.6 6.8 6.2 6.0 5.4 4.7 4.9 5.3 p
protection indicators
Expenditure in social

Disability 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.8 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.5 p
Old age and survivors 11.7 12.6 13.7 14.3 16.0 17.3 16.2 16.7 17.0 16.8 p
(% of GDP)

Family/Children 0.9 0.9 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.0 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.0 p
Unemployment 1.0 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.7 1.4 1.3 1.1 1.0 1.0 p
Housing and Social exclusion n.e.c. 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.2 0.2 p
Total (including Admin and Other expenditures) 21.3 22.8 24.8 25.9 27.3 28.1 26.4 26.0 26.1 26.2 p
of which: Means tested benefits 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.9 0.9 0.9 1.2 1.5 1.4 1.3 p

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258
 Statistical annex - 1. Country profiles

Spain
Spain 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Real GDP 3.8 1.1 -3.6 0.0 -1.0 -2.9 -1.7 1.4 3.6 3.2 p 3.0 p 2.6 p
Total employment 3.3 0.2 -6.3 -1.7 -2.7 -4.0 -2.6 1.0 2.8 2.6 p 2.6 p 2.1 p
Labour productivity 0.5 0.9 2.9 1.8 1.7 1.1 0.9 0.4 0.8 0.6 p 0.4 p 0.4 p
Macro Economic Indicators

Annual average hours worked per person employed -0.7 0.5 0.4 -0.5 0.3 -0.8 -0.5 0.1 0.3 0.1 p -0.7 p 0.6 p
(Annual % growth)

Real productivity per hour worked 1.2 0.4 2.5 2.3 1.4 2.0 1.4 0.3 0.5 0.5 p 1.1 p -0.2 p
Harmonized CPI 2.8 4.1 -0.2 2.0 3.0 2.4 1.5 -0.2 -0.6 -0.3 2.0 1.7
Price deflator GDP 3.3 2.1 0.3 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.4 -0.2 0.5 0.3 p 1.2 p 1.0 p
Nominal compensation per employee 4.6 6.7 4.5 0.2 0.7 -1.4 0.3 0.1 1.4 -0.2 p 0.6 p 1.4 p
Real compensation per employee (GDP deflator) 1.3 4.5 4.3 0.0 0.7 -1.5 0.0 0.3 0.9 -0.5 p -0.6 p 0.4 p
Real compensation per employee (private consumption
1.7 2.5 4.8 -1.9 -2.3 -3.8 -1.2 0.3 2.0 0.2 p -1.4 p -0.4 p
deflator)
Nominal unit labour costs 4.1 5.7 1.6 -1.6 -1.0 -2.6 -0.6 -0.3 0.6 -0.7 p 0.2 p 0.9 p
Real unit labour costs 0.7 3.5 1.3 -1.7 -1.0 -2.6 -1.0 -0.1 0.1 -1.0 p -1.1 p -0.1 p
Total population (000) 44785 45669 46239 46487 46667 46818 46728 46512 46450 46440 46528 46658
Population aged 15-64 (000) 30852 31480 31746 31742 31670 31613 31376 31005 30808 30721 30700 30720
Total employment (000) 20580 20470 19107 18725 18421 17633 17139 17344 17866 18342 18825 19328
Employment aged 15-64 (000) 20437 20317 18958 18574 18271 17477 17002 17211 17718 18183 18649 19136
Employment rate (% population aged 20-64) 69.7 68.5 64.0 62.8 62.0 59.6 58.6 59.9 62.0 63.9 65.5 67.0
Employment rate (% population aged 15-64) 65.8 64.5 60.0 58.8 58.0 55.8 54.8 56.0 57.8 59.5 61.1 62.4
Employment rate (% population aged 15-24) 39.2 36.0 28.0 25.0 22.0 18.4 16.8 16.7 17.9 18.4 20.5 21.7
Employment rate (% population aged 25-54) 77.1 75.6 71.0 70.0 69.1 66.7 65.8 67.4 69.4 71.5 73.2 74.7
Employment rate (% population aged 55-64) 44.5 45.5 44.0 43.5 44.5 43.9 43.2 44.3 46.9 49.1 50.5 52.2
FTE employment rate (% population aged 20-64) 66.6 65.1 60.3 59.4 58.1 55.5 54.0 55.5 57.6 59.7 61.3 62.8
Self-employed (% total employment) 16.4 16.5 15.9 b 15.9 15.6 16.6 17.2 17.0 16.7 16.5 16.0 15.6
Part-time employment (% total employment) 11.4 11.6 12.4 12.9 13.5 14.4 15.7 15.8 15.6 15.1 14.9 14.5
Temporary employment (% total employment) 26.2 24.1 21.1 20.7 21.1 19.5 19.1 19.9 20.9 21.8 22.4 22.7
Employment in Services (% total employment) 68.1 b 71.3 72.8 74.1 75.1 75.9 76.3 75.9 76.1 75.5 75.4
Employment in Industry (% total employment) 27.9 b 24.7 23.1 21.9 20.7 19.8 19.5 20.0 19.7 20.1 20.4
Employment in Agriculture (% total employment) 4.0 b 4.1 4.2 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.2 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.2
Activity rate (% population aged 15-64) 71.8 72.7 73.1 73.5 73.9 74.3 74.3 74.2 74.3 74.2 73.9 73.7
Labour Market Indicators - Total

Activity rate (% population aged 15-24) 47.9 47.7 45.0 42.7 40.9 39.0 37.8 35.7 34.7 33.0 33.3 33.0
Activity rate (% population aged 25-54) 83.1 84.0 84.8 85.7 86.2 86.9 87.2 87.3 87.4 87.4 87.0 86.9
Activity rate (% population aged 55-64) 47.4 49.1 50.0 50.7 52.4 53.5 54.1 55.4 57.6 59.2 59.6 60.5
Total unemployment (000) 1846 2596 4154 4640 5013 5811 6051 5610 5056 4481 3917 3479
Unemployment rate (% labour force) 8.2 11.3 17.9 19.9 21.4 24.8 26.1 24.5 22.1 19.6 17.2 15.3
Youth unemployment rate (% labour force 15-24) 18.1 24.5 37.7 41.5 46.2 52.9 55.5 53.2 48.3 44.4 38.6 34.3
Long term unemployment rate (% labour force) 1.7 2.0 4.3 7.3 8.9 11.0 13.0 12.9 11.4 9.5 7.7 6.4
Share of long term unemployment (% of total
20.4 18.0 23.8 36.6 41.6 44.4 49.7 52.8 51.6 48.4 44.5 41.7
unemployment)

Youth unemployment ratio (% population aged 15-24) 8.7 11.7 17.0 17.7 18.9 20.6 21.0 19.0 16.8 14.7 12.9 11.3

Employment rate for low skilled 25-64 (ISCED 0-2) 60.6 59.1 54.1 53.0 52.3 49.3 48.3 49.4 b 51.6 53.9 55.5 57.4
Employment rate for medium skilled 25-64 (ISCED 3-
76.6 75.5 71.0 69.3 67.9 66.3 64.5 65.9 b 67.7 69.2 70.2 70.9
4)
Employment rate for high skilled 25-64 (ISCED 5-8) 84.7 83.9 81.4 80.1 79.2 77.5 76.4 77.2 b 78.5 79.8 80.9 81.6
Employment rate (Nationals aged 15-64) 65.3 64.3 60.5 59.3 58.7 56.5 55.6 56.6 58.3 59.9 61.4 62.8
Employment rate (Other EU28 aged 15-64) 69.2 65.9 60.8 58.0 55.6 54.7 55.2 55.6 59.5 61.8 63.4 64.6
Employment rate (Other than EU28 aged 15-64) 69.1 65.3 55.1 55.4 52.8 48.7 46.4 48.1 51.3 53.7 55.7 56.6
Employment rate (Born in the same country aged 15-
65.1 64.1 60.3 59.2 58.7 56.5 55.6 56.6 58.3 59.9 61.4 62.6
64)
Employment rate (Born in other EU28 aged 15-64) 70.0 67.0 62.2 58.7 56.5 56.0 56.1 56.6 60.3 62.0 64.1 65.8
Employment rate (Born outside EU28 aged 15-64) 69.6 66.1 56.8 56.7 54.2 50.6 48.5 50.5 53.2 55.8 57.9 60.0
Underemployment (% of labour force aged 15-74) 3.5 4.3 4.8 5.3 6.0 6.7 6.9 6.6 6.2 6.0 5.6
Seeking but not available (% of labour force aged 15-
1.3 1.1 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.9 1.0 1.1
74)
Discouraged, available but not seeking (% of labour
3.3 3.3 4.0 4.2 4.1 4.6 5.0 4.7 4.1 3.9 3.7 3.4
force aged 15-74)

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259
Employment and Social Developments in Europe 2019

Spain 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Total population (000) 22119 22591 22881 22982 23049 23099 23018 22877 22827 22807 22835 22882
Population aged 15-64(000) 15632 15977 16112 16089 16033 15979 15824 15611 15495 15437 15412 15405
Total employment (000) 12067 11805 10733 10424 10153 9608 9316 9443 9760 10001 10266 10532
Employment aged 15-64 (000) 11968 11708 10643 10338 10068 9520 9237 9364 9676 9910 10162 10420
Employment rate (% population aged 20-64) 80.6 77.9 71.0 69.2 67.7 64.6 63.4 65.0 67.6 69.6 71.5 73.1
Employment rate (% population aged 15-64) 76.1 73.3 66.5 64.8 63.4 60.3 59.2 60.7 62.9 64.8 66.5 67.9
Employment rate (% population aged 15-24) 44.2 39.3 29.4 25.6 22.1 18.5 17.3 17.4 18.6 19.4 21.2 22.7
Employment rate (% population aged 25-54) 87.5 84.2 77.3 75.9 74.6 71.3 70.4 72.5 75.1 77.4 79.2 80.8
Employment rate (% population aged 55-64) 59.6 60.5 56.4 54.5 53.8 52.1 50.5 51.2 54.0 55.7 57.8 59.7
FTE employment rate (% population aged 20-64) 80.4 77.1 70.2 68.5 66.4 63.1 61.4 63.2 65.7 68.1 69.7 71.5
Self-employed (% total employment) 19.7 20.1 19.4 b 19.5 19.3 20.6 21.3 21.0 20.6 20.1 19.7 19.1
Part-time employment (% total employment) 3.9 4.0 4.7 5.2 5.8 6.4 7.7 7.7 7.8 7.6 7.2 6.7
Temporary employment (% total employment) 24.4 21.8 18.9 18.9 19.3 17.5 17.4 18.6 19.9 20.6 20.9 21.1
Employment in Services (% total employment) 54.8 b 58.6 60.7 62.2 63.9 64.7 65.4 64.9 65.1 64.4 64.3
Employment in Industry (% total employment) 40.2 b 36.1 33.8 32.4 30.5 29.3 28.8 29.3 29.0 29.5 29.8
Employment in Agriculture (% total employment) 5.0 b 5.4 5.5 5.4 5.7 6.0 5.9 5.8 5.9 6.1 5.9
Activity rate (% population aged 15-64) 81.4 81.6 80.8 80.6 80.4 80.1 79.8 79.5 79.5 79.2 78.9 78.8
Labour Market Indicators - Male

Activity rate (% population aged 15-24) 52.2 51.5 48.2 45.0 42.6 40.3 39.6 37.3 36.2 34.7 35.1 35.1
Activity rate (% population aged 25-54) 92.5 92.4 92.2 92.4 92.5 92.6 92.4 92.6 92.6 92.5 92.0 91.9
Activity rate (% population aged 55-64) 62.8 64.7 63.6 63.7 63.5 63.6 63.3 64.3 66.2 67.0 67.9 68.4
Total unemployment (000) 826 1320 2300 2536 2706 3131 3206 2916 2559 2213 1906 1675
Unemployment rate (% labour force) 6.4 10.1 17.7 19.6 21.1 24.6 25.6 23.6 20.8 18.1 15.7 13.7
Youth unemployment rate (% labour force 15-24) 15.2 23.6 39.1 43.1 48.2 54.1 56.2 53.4 48.6 44.0 39.5 35.2
Long term unemployment rate (% labour force) 1.1 1.4 3.7 7.1 8.6 10.7 12.5 12.3 10.5 8.4 6.7 5.4
Share of long term unemployment (% of total
17.4 14.1 21.1 36.0 40.8 43.5 48.9 52.0 50.4 46.1 42.5 39.6
unemployment)

Youth unemployment ratio (% population aged 15-24) 7.9 12.1 18.8 19.4 20.5 21.8 22.3 20.0 17.6 15.3 13.9 12.4

Employment rate for low skilled 25-64 (ISCED 0-2) 77.4 73.8 65.5 63.2 61.6 57.0 55.8 57.4 b 60.5 63.1 65.1 67.4
Employment rate for medium skilled 25-64 (ISCED 3-
85.4 83.6 77.1 75.9 74.4 71.9 69.9 71.6 b 73.9 75.9 77.0 77.8
4)
Employment rate for high skilled 25-64 (ISCED 5-8) 89.2 87.9 84.6 83.3 82.3 80.7 79.9 80.8 b 82.4 83.5 85.0 85.6
Employment rate (Nationals aged 15-64) 75.8 73.5 67.7 65.7 64.4 61.3 60.2 61.4 63.4 64.9 66.6 68.0
Employment rate (Other EU28 aged 15-64) 79.0 75.7 65.4 63.1 60.4 58.7 58.3 60.3 65.2 67.8 70.1 71.6
Employment rate (Other than EU28 aged 15-64) 78.2 70.9 56.9 57.1 54.8 50.4 48.7 51.4 55.9 61.0 63.3 64.6
Employment rate (Born in the same country aged 15-
75.6 73.4 67.6 65.6 64.4 61.4 60.3 61.5 63.4 65.0 66.6 67.8
64)
Employment rate (Born in other EU28 aged 15-64) 79.7 76.6 67.4 64.7 62.3 60.2 59.7 61.6 66.5 68.5 71.2 73.5
Employment rate (Born outside EU28 aged 15-64) 78.6 71.6 58.7 58.5 56.4 52.4 50.6 53.5 57.4 61.7 63.6 66.4
Underemployment (% of labour force aged 15-74) 1.4 2.0 2.4 2.8 3.2 3.9 4.0 4.0 3.8 3.5 3.1
Seeking but not available (% of labour force aged 15-
0.9 0.7 0.8 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.8
74)
Discouraged, available but not seeking (% of labour
1.5 1.7 2.3 2.5 2.4 2.8 3.0 3.0 2.6 2.4 2.3 2.1
force aged 15-74)
Total population (000) 22666 23077 23359 23504 23618 23719 23710 23635 23623 23633 23693 23777
Population aged 15-64(000) 15220 15504 15634 15653 15638 15634 15552 15395 15314 15283 15288 15315
Total employment (000) 8513 8665 8374 8301 8269 8025 7823 7902 8106 8341 8559 8796
Employment aged 15-64 (000) 8469 8608 8314 8236 8203 7957 7765 7847 8042 8273 8487 8717
Employment rate (% population aged 20-64) 58.6 58.9 56.8 56.3 56.1 54.6 53.8 54.8 56.4 58.1 59.6 61.0
Employment rate (% population aged 15-64) 55.3 55.4 53.3 52.8 52.6 51.2 50.3 51.2 52.7 54.3 55.7 56.9
Employment rate (% population aged 15-24) 34.0 32.6 26.7 24.3 22.0 18.3 16.3 16.0 17.3 17.2 19.7 20.5
Employment rate (% population aged 25-54) 66.3 66.5 64.4 63.9 63.4 62.0 61.2 62.3 63.7 65.6 67.1 68.6
Employment rate (% population aged 55-64) 30.2 31.2 32.1 33.1 35.6 36.0 36.3 37.8 40.2 42.8 43.5 44.9
FTE employment rate (% population aged 20-64) 52.9 53.2 50.6 50.6 50.0 48.1 46.9 48.1 49.7 51.6 53.2 54.5
Self-employed (% total employment) 11.8 11.8 11.5 b 11.3 11.2 11.8 12.3 12.2 12.1 12.1 11.6 11.4
Part-time employment (% total employment) 22.1 21.9 22.3 22.6 22.8 23.9 25.2 25.5 25.1 24.1 24.1 23.9
Temporary employment (% total employment) 28.6 27.2 23.8 23.0 23.3 21.8 21.1 21.4 22.1 23.2 24.3 24.6
Employment in Services (% total employment) 86.2 bu 87.5 u 88.0 u 88.7 u 88.5 u 89.3 u 89.3 u 89.2 u 89.4 u 88.8 u 88.7 u
Employment in Industry (% total employment) 11.3 bu 10.1 u 9.6 u 9.0 u 9.1 u 8.5 u 8.5 u 8.7 u 8.5 u 8.9 u 9.2 u
Employment in Agriculture (% total employment) 2.5 b 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.2 2.2 2.1 2.1 2.3 2.2
Activity rate (% population aged 15-64) 61.9 63.6 65.1 66.3 67.3 68.4 68.7 68.8 69.0 69.2 68.8 68.6
Labour Market Indicators - Female

Activity rate (% population aged 15-24) 43.4 43.7 41.7 40.2 39.2 37.6 35.9 34.0 33.2 31.3 31.5 30.8
Activity rate (% population aged 25-54) 73.3 75.3 77.2 78.8 79.7 81.1 81.8 82.0 82.0 82.3 82.0 81.8
Activity rate (% population aged 55-64) 32.7 34.2 37.1 38.4 41.8 43.9 45.2 46.9 49.4 51.7 51.8 52.9
Total unemployment (000) 1020 1276 1854 2104 2307 2680 2846 2694 2497 2268 2011 1805
Unemployment rate (% labour force) 10.7 12.8 18.1 20.2 21.8 25.1 26.7 25.4 23.6 21.4 19.0 17.0
Youth unemployment rate (% labour force 15-24) 21.7 25.5 36.1 39.6 44.0 51.4 54.6 52.9 48.0 44.9 37.4 33.3
Long term unemployment rate (% labour force) 2.4 2.8 4.9 7.6 9.3 11.4 13.5 13.7 12.4 10.8 8.8 7.4
Share of long term unemployment (% of total
22.8 22.0 27.1 37.3 42.6 45.3 50.5 53.8 52.8 50.6 46.4 43.7
unemployment)

Youth unemployment ratio (% population aged 15-24) 9.4 11.2 15.1 15.9 17.2 19.4 19.6 18.0 15.9 14.0 11.8 10.2

Employment rate for low skilled 25-64 (ISCED 0-2) 43.2 43.8 41.9 42.1 42.3 40.8 40.1 40.7 b 41.7 43.5 44.7 46.0
Employment rate for medium skilled 25-64 (ISCED 3-
67.2 67.1 64.7 62.5 61.4 60.8 59.2 60.1 b 61.3 62.5 63.4 64.3
4)
Employment rate for high skilled 25-64 (ISCED 5-8) 80.4 79.9 78.4 77.1 76.4 74.5 73.2 74.0 b 75.2 76.7 77.5 78.2
Employment rate (Nationals aged 15-64) 54.6 54.9 53.1 52.7 52.8 51.6 50.8 51.8 53.1 54.8 56.2 57.5
Employment rate (Other EU28 aged 15-64) 59.4 56.1 56.1 52.9 51.2 51.1 52.3 51.2 54.3 56.2 57.1 58.0
Employment rate (Other than EU28 aged 15-64) 60.2 59.5 53.4 53.7 50.8 47.2 44.3 45.1 47.0 47.0 49.0 49.5
Employment rate (Born in the same country aged 15-
54.3 54.5 52.8 52.5 52.7 51.4 50.7 51.7 53.0 54.7 55.9 57.1
64)
Employment rate (Born in other EU28 aged 15-64) 60.4 57.6 57.0 52.9 51.4 52.3 52.8 51.8 54.6 56.0 57.4 58.7
Employment rate (Born outside EU28 aged 15-64) 60.8 60.6 55.0 54.9 52.1 49.0 46.7 47.9 49.5 50.7 53.1 54.4
Underemployment (% of labour force aged 15-74) 6.4 7.4 7.8 8.3 9.3 10.0 10.3 9.7 8.9 8.9 8.5
Seeking but not available (% of labour force aged 15-
1.8 1.5 1.4 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.3 1.4
74)
Discouraged, available but not seeking (% of labour
5.7 5.6 6.2 6.3 6.1 6.7 7.2 6.8 5.9 5.6 5.2 4.9
force aged 15-74)

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260
 Statistical annex - 1. Country profiles

Spain 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
At-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion (% of total
23.3 23.8 b 24.7 26.1 26.7 27.2 27.3 29.2 28.6 27.9 26.6
population)
At-risk-of-poverty (% of total population) 19.7 19.8 20.4 20.7 20.6 20.8 20.4 22.2 22.1 22.3 21.6
At-risk-of-poverty threshold (PPS single person) 7614 9026 b 9338 8967 8655 8582 8550 8517 8678 9208 9305
Poverty gap (%) 25.9 25.6 b 25.7 26.8 27.4 30.6 30.9 31.6 33.8 31.4 32.4
Persistent at-risk-of-poverty (% of total
10.2 11.0 12.5 11.6 12.7 b 13.3 12.1 14.3 15.8 14.8 14.7
population)
At-risk-of-poverty before social transfers excl.
23.7 25.7 b 26.9 28.8 30.0 29.1 30.0 31.1 30.1 29.5 28.4
pensions (% of total population)
Impact of social transfers (excl. pensions) in
16.9 23.0 b 24.2 28.1 31.3 28.5 32.0 28.6 26.6 24.4 23.9
reducing poverty (%)
All

Severe Material Deprivation (% of total population) 3.5 3.6 4.5 4.9 4.5 5.8 6.2 7.1 6.4 5.8 5.1
Share of people living in low work intensity households
6.8 6.6 7.6 10.8 13.4 14.3 15.7 17.1 15.4 14.9 12.8
(% of people aged 0-59)
Real Gross Household Disposable income (growth %) 0.7 1.8 2.8 -3.4 -1.5 -5.7 -1.9 1.0 2.4 2.0
Income quintile share ratio S80/S20 5.5 5.6 b 5.9 6.2 6.3 6.5 6.3 6.8 6.9 6.6 6.6
GINI coefficient 31.9 32.4 b 32.9 33.5 34.0 34.2 33.7 34.7 34.6 34.5 34.1
Early leavers from education and training (% of
30.8 31.7 30.9 28.2 26.3 24.7 23.6 21.9 b 20.0 19.0 18.3 17.9
population aged 18-24)
NEET: Young people neither in employment nor in
education and training (% of total population aged 15- 12.0 14.3 18.1 17.8 18.2 18.6 18.6 17.1 15.6 14.6 13.3 12.4
24)
At-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion (% of male
21.9 22.4 b 23.8 25.5 26.1 27.3 27.9 29.4 29.0 28.0 26.0
population)
At-risk-of-poverty (% of male population) 18.6 18.4 19.4 20.1 19.9 20.7 20.9 22.4 22.5 22.6 21.0
Poverty gap (%) 26.0 27.1 b 26.1 27.4 27.9 30.7 31.4 31.7 34.5 31.0 32.4
Persistent at-risk-of-poverty (% of male
9.6 10.1 11.7 11.1 11.4 b 12.9 12.6 14.2 16.3 15.3 14.1
population)
Severe Material Deprivation (% of male population) 3.5 3.7 4.6 4.7 4.5 6.2 6.3 7.0 6.6 5.3 4.9
Male

Share of people living in low work intensity households

6.5 6.1 7.2 10.6 12.9 13.8 15.9 17.0 15.8 14.9 12.4
(% of males aged 0-59)
Life expectancy at birth (years) 77.9 78.3 b 78.7 79.2 79.5 79.5 80.2 80.4 80.1 80.5 80.6
Healthy life years at birth (years) - men 63.5 64.0 b 63.1 64.5 65.4 64.8 64.7 65.0 63.9 65.9 69.0
Early leavers from education and training (% of males
36.6 38.0 37.4 33.6 31.0 28.9 27.2 25.6 b 24.0 22.7 21.8 21.7
aged 18-24)
NEET: Young people neither in employment nor in
10.4 13.9 19.4 18.8 19.2 19.6 19.4 18.0 16.4 15.1 13.8 13.0
education and training ( % of males aged 15-24)
At-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion (% of female
24.6 25.1 b 25.6 26.7 27.4 27.2 26.7 28.9 28.3 27.9 27.1
population)
At-risk-of-poverty (% of female population) 20.8 21.2 21.3 21.3 21.4 20.9 19.9 22.1 21.8 22.1 22.2
Poverty gap (%) 25.1 24.2 b 25.0 26.4 26.7 30.3 30.3 31.4 32.6 31.8 32.6
Persistent at-risk-of-poverty (% of female
10.9 11.9 13.3 12.2 14.0 b 13.7 11.6 14.4 15.2 14.3 15.3
population)
Social Indicators

Severe Material Deprivation (% of female population) 3.6 3.5 4.4 5.1 4.6 5.5 6.1 7.1 6.3 6.2 5.3
Female

Share of people living in low work intensity households

7.1 7.0 8.0 11.0 13.8 14.8 15.4 17.2 15.1 14.8 13.2
(% of females aged 0-59)
Life expectancy at birth (years) 84.4 84.6 b 84.9 85.5 85.6 85.5 86.1 86.2 85.8 86.3 86.1
Healthy life years at birth (years) - women 63.2 63.7 b 62.1 63.8 65.6 65.8 63.9 65.0 64.1 66.5 69.9
Early leavers from education and training (% of
24.7 25.1 24.1 22.6 21.5 20.5 19.8 18.1 b 15.8 15.1 14.5 14.0
females aged 18-24)
NEET: Young people neither in employment nor in
13.7 14.6 16.7 16.8 17.3 17.6 17.8 16.2 14.9 14.1 12.8 11.9
education and training ( % of females aged 15-24)
At-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion of children (% of
28.6 30.1 b 32.0 33.3 32.2 32.4 32.6 35.8 34.4 32.9 31.3
people aged 0-17)
At-risk-of-poverty (% of Children population) 26.2 27.3 29.0 29.3 27.5 27.9 27.5 30.5 29.6 29.7 28.3
Children (0-17)

Severe Material Deprivation (% of Children

4.4 5.5 6.7 7.4 5.2 7.6 8.3 9.5 9.1 7.1 6.5
population)
Share of children living in low work intensity
5.0 4.2 6.2 9.5 11.6 12.3 13.8 14.2 12.0 11.6 9.8
households (% of Children population)
Risk of poverty of children in households at work
23.7 25.4 b 25.8 24.1 21.3 20.4 19.3 22.6 22.9 22.8 22.1
(Working Intensity > 0.2)
Impact of social transfers (excl. pensions) in reducing
14.1 18.3 b 18.1 21.9 25.9 23.4 27.6 22.4 21.1 17.5 17.7
poverty (0-17) (%)
At-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion (% of working
20.8 21.5 b 22.7 24.9 26.7 28.6 29.2 31.8 31.2 30.4 28.2
age population)
At-risk-of-poverty (% of Working age population) 16.4 16.5 17.2 18.1 19.0 20.4 20.4 22.9 22.8 22.9 21.7
Working age

Severe Material Deprivation (% of Working age

3.3 3.5 4.5 4.9 4.8 6.1 6.5 7.6 6.9 6.4 5.6
(18-64)

population)
Very low work intensity (18-59) 7.3 7.3 8.0 11.2 13.9 14.9 16.3 18.0 16.5 15.9 13.7
In-work at-risk-of poverty rate (% of persons
10.2 11.3 b 11.7 10.8 10.9 10.8 10.6 12.6 13.2 13.1 13.1
employed 18-64)
Impact of social transfers (excl. pensions) in reducing
20.8 28.3 b 30.1 33.2 35.8 31.8 34.6 30.8 29.0 27.1 26.9
poverty (18-64) (%)
At-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion of elderly (% of
27.8 26.2 b 24.9 22.9 21.2 16.5 14.5 12.9 13.7 14.4 16.4
people aged 65+)
Elderly (65+)

At-risk-of-poverty (% of Elderly population) 26.1 25.5 23.8 21.8 19.8 14.8 12.7 11.4 12.3 13.0 14.8

Severe Material Deprivation (% of Elderly population) 3.6 1.9 2.3 2.2 2.7 2.9 2.7 2.4 2.2 2.5 2.4
Relative median income of elderly (ratio with median
0.79 0.83 b 0.87 0.88 0.91 0.96 1.0 1.03 1.01 1.01 0.98
income of people younger than 65)
Aggregate replacement ratio (ratio) 0.48 0.42 b 0.45 0.47 0.51 0.55 0.60 0.60 0.66 0.66 0.69
Sickness/Health care 6.2 6.6 7.1 7.0 6.9 6.6 6.5 6.5 6.6 p 6.6 p
protection indicators
Expenditure in social

Disability 1.5 1.5 1.7 1.7 1.8 1.8 1.9 1.8 1.7 p 1.7 p
Old age and survivors 8.5 8.8 9.8 10.3 10.8 11.4 12.0 12.3 12.0 p 12.0 p
(% of GDP)

Family/Children 1.2 1.3 1.5 1.5 1.4 1.3 1.4 1.3 1.3 p 1.3 p
Unemployment 2.0 2.3 3.5 3.2 3.6 3.4 3.3 2.7 2.2 p 1.9 p
Housing and Social exclusion n.e.c. 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.3 p 0.4 p
Total (including Admin and Other expenditures) 20.3 21.4 24.4 24.6 25.3 25.5 25.8 25.4 24.6 p 24.3 p
of which: Means tested benefits 2.7 2.8 3.3 3.6 4.0 3.7 3.7 3.5 3.2 p 3.1 p

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261
Employment and Social Developments in Europe 2019

France
France 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Real GDP 2.4 0.3 -2.9 1.9 2.2 0.3 0.6 1.0 1.1 1.1 2.3 p 1.7 p
Total employment 1.4 0.5 -1.1 0.1 0.8 0.3 0.2 0.5 0.2 0.6 1.0 p 1.0 p
Labour productivity 1.0 -0.3 -1.8 1.8 1.4 0.0 0.4 0.4 0.9 0.5 1.3 p 0.7 p
Macro Economic Indicators

Annual average hours worked per person employed 1.4 0.4 -0.7 0.6 0.4 -0.4 -1.0 -0.5 0.1 0.2 -1.1 p -0.7 p
(Annual % growth)

Real productivity per hour worked -0.5 -0.6 -1.0 1.3 1.0 0.3 1.4 1.0 0.8 0.3 2.4 p 1.4 p
Harmonized CPI 1.6 3.2 0.1 1.7 2.3 2.2 1.0 0.6 0.1 0.3 1.2 2.1
Price deflator GDP 2.6 2.4 0.1 1.1 0.9 1.2 0.8 0.6 1.1 0.5 0.5 p 0.8 p
Nominal compensation per employee 2.5 2.6 1.6 2.9 2.3 2.2 1.8 1.2 1.1 1.2 1.9 p 1.8 p
Real compensation per employee (GDP deflator) -0.1 0.2 1.5 1.8 1.4 1.0 1.0 0.6 -0.1 0.7 1.4 p 1.0 p
Real compensation per employee (private consumption
0.9 -0.5 1.5 1.1 0.0 0.0 0.8 0.6 1.0 0.9 0.7 p -0.3 p
deflator)
Nominal unit labour costs 1.5 2.9 3.4 1.0 0.9 2.2 1.4 0.7 0.2 0.7 0.6 p 1.0 p
Real unit labour costs -1.0 0.4 3.4 -0.1 -0.1 1.0 0.7 0.1 -0.9 0.2 0.1 p 0.2 p
Total population (000) 63645 64007 64350 64659 64979 65277 b 65600 66166 b 66458 66638 66804 66926
Population aged 15-64 (000) 41469 41683 41809 41912 42033 41959 41883 41954 b 41878 41788 41739 41655
Total employment (000) 25587 25926 25674 25731 25759 25805 25785 26377 b 26424 26584 26880 27122
Employment aged 15-64 (000) 25459 25793 25545 25581 25564 25568 25546 26109 b 26119 26243 26512 26745
Employment rate (% population aged 20-64) 69.9 70.5 69.5 69.3 69.2 69.4 69.5 69.7 70.0 70.4 71.0 71.8
Employment rate (% population aged 15-64) 64.3 64.9 64.1 64.0 63.9 64.0 64.0 64.1 64.3 64.6 65.2 65.9
Employment rate (% population aged 15-24) 31.2 31.4 30.5 30.1 29.6 28.6 28.4 28.1 28.4 28.2 29.1 30.4
Employment rate (% population aged 25-54) 82.1 83.2 82.1 82.0 81.5 80.9 80.6 80.4 79.9 80.3 80.6 81.2
Employment rate (% population aged 55-64) 38.2 38.2 38.9 39.7 41.4 44.5 45.6 47.0 48.8 49.9 51.4 52.3
FTE employment rate (% population aged 20-64) 65.6 66.0 64.7 64.6 64.5 64.6 64.8 64.5 b 64.6 64.8 65.4 66.5
Self-employed (% total employment) 10.3 10.0 10.3 10.9 11.1 11.0 10.8 11.2 b 11.2 11.4 11.3 11.4
Part-time employment (% total employment) 17.2 16.8 17.2 17.6 17.6 17.7 18.1 18.5 18.3 18.2 18.2 17.9
Temporary employment (% total employment) 13.4 13.5 12.9 13.4 13.6 13.5 13.7 13.4 14.1 14.1 14.8 14.7
Employment in Services (% total employment) 74.1 b 74.5 74.9 75.0 75.4 75.7 76.8 b 77.1 77.0 77.1 77.5
Employment in Industry (% total employment) 23.2 b 22.6 22.2 22.2 21.8 21.3 20.4 b 20.3 20.2 20.4 20.1
Employment in Agriculture (% total employment) 2.7 b 2.9 2.9 2.8 2.8 3.0 2.8 b 2.7 2.8 2.5 2.4
Activity rate (% population aged 15-64) 69.3 e 69.4 e 69.8 e 69.8 e 69.7 e 70.3 e 70.7 e 71.0 71.3 71.4 71.5 71.9
Labour Market Indicators - Total

Activity rate (% population aged 15-24) 38.4 38.5 39.6 38.9 37.9 37.4 37.4 36.6 37.3 37.2 37.2 38.0
Activity rate (% population aged 25-54) 87.9 88.5 88.6 88.7 88.2 88.2 88.3 88.2 87.8 87.8 87.7 88.1
Activity rate (% population aged 55-64) 40.0 39.8 41.2 42.2 43.9 47.4 49.0 50.7 52.6 53.7 54.9 56.0
Total unemployment (000) 2268 2121 2622 2680 2665 2855 3026 3026 3054 2972 2788 2700
Unemployment rate (% labour force) 8.0 7.4 9.1 9.3 9.2 9.8 10.3 10.3 10.4 10.1 9.4 9.1
Youth unemployment rate (% labour force 15-24) 19.5 19.0 23.6 23.3 22.6 24.4 24.9 24.2 24.7 24.6 22.3 20.7
Long term unemployment rate (% labour force) 3.3 e 2.9 e 3.3 e 3.9 e 4.0 e 4.1 e 4.4 e 4.5 4.6 4.6 4.2 3.8
Share of long term unemployment (% of total
39.2 36.6 34.5 39.5 40.7 39.6 40.2 42.5 42.6 44.2 43.8 40.2
unemployment)

Youth unemployment ratio (% population aged 15-24) 7.2 7.1 9.1 8.8 8.3 8.8 9.0 8.8 b 9.1 9.1 8.2 7.8

Employment rate for low skilled 25-64 (ISCED 0-2) 57.9 57.7 56.4 55.8 55.9 55.7 54.2 b 53.2 b 52.2 51.3 52.7 52.9
Employment rate for medium skilled 25-64 (ISCED 3-
75.7 75.8 74.9 74.6 73.7 73.6 73.2 b 72.5 b 72.6 72.9 73.0 73.5
4)
Employment rate for high skilled 25-64 (ISCED 5-8) 83.4 84.6 83.5 83.6 83.8 84.3 84.3 b 83.8 b 83.9 85.0 85.2 84.9
Employment rate (Nationals aged 15-64) 65.0 65.5 64.8 64.7 64.6 64.8 64.8 64.5 b 64.8 65.2 65.8 66.2
Employment rate (Other EU28 aged 15-64) 66.1 66.0 64.8 67.0 68.0 65.1 67.6 66.7 b 65.4 66.4 67.2 69.7
Employment rate (Other than EU28 aged 15-64) 46.1 50.2 46.3 46.3 45.7 46.4 46.0 44.9 b 44.2 44.3 45.2 48.7
Employment rate (Born in the same country aged 15-
65.2 65.6 65.0 64.8 64.8 65.0 65.1 64.8 b 65.1 65.6 66.0 66.5
64)
Employment rate (Born in other EU28 aged 15-64) 64.4 64.4 64.8 67.1 67.6 65.8 67.7 66.9 b 65.8 65.5 67.5 69.1
Employment rate (Born outside EU28 aged 15-64) 55.7 58.3 55.3 54.8 54.1 54.8 53.4 52.9 b 52.5 52.2 53.5 55.5
Underemployment (% of labour force aged 15-74) 4.5 b 4.7 5.0 4.7 4.7 5.4 b 5.5 5.7 5.5 5.3 5.0
Seeking but not available (% of labour force aged 15-
1.6 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.9 1.9 1.0 b 1.1 1.1 1.2 1.2 1.2
74)
Discouraged, available but not seeking (% of labour
1.3 1.3 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.2 2.3 2.4 2.3 2.2 2.2
force aged 15-74)

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262
 Statistical annex - 1. Country profiles

France 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Total population (000) 30803 30980 31148 31302 31463 31605 b 31773 32045 b 32174 32247 32319 32371
Population aged 15-64(000) 20521 20616 20669 20715 20771 20725 20685 20710 b 20660 20603 20571 20523
Total employment (000) 13545 13692 13485 13520 13531 13508 13434 13661 b 13658 13761 13948 14031
Employment aged 15-64 (000) 13468 13612 13406 13427 13415 13369 13294 13501 b 13478 13562 13746 13817
Employment rate (% population aged 20-64) 75.1 75.6 74.3 74.0 74.0 73.9 73.6 73.5 73.6 74.2 75.0 75.7
Employment rate (% population aged 15-64) 69.2 69.7 68.4 68.3 68.2 68.1 67.8 67.5 67.5 68.0 68.9 69.4
Employment rate (% population aged 15-24) 34.2 34.4 32.6 33.2 32.5 31.0 31.1 30.1 30.3 30.2 31.5 32.9
Employment rate (% population aged 25-54) 88.4 89.3 87.7 87.4 86.8 86.0 85.2 84.8 84.1 84.7 85.5 85.8
Employment rate (% population aged 55-64) 40.5 40.6 41.5 42.3 44.1 47.5 48.4 48.9 50.8 51.6 52.8 54.1
FTE employment rate (% population aged 20-64) 74.1 74.2 72.6 72.4 72.4 72.2 71.8 71.3 b 71.2 71.5 72.3 72.7
Self-employed (% total employment) 13.9 13.2 14.0 14.7 14.9 14.6 14.3 14.6 b 14.6 14.8 14.3 14.6
Part-time employment (% total employment) 5.5 5.6 5.8 6.4 6.5 6.4 6.7 7.3 7.3 7.4 7.6 7.7
Temporary employment (% total employment) 12.0 11.9 11.2 12.0 12.5 12.2 12.6 12.2 13.0 13.3 13.8 13.7
Employment in Services (% total employment) 62.4 b 62.4 63.0 63.6 63.9 64.4 65.7 b 65.9 65.7 66.4 66.6
Employment in Industry (% total employment) 34.2 b 33.8 33.2 32.7 32.3 31.5 30.5 b 30.4 30.4 30.2 30.0
Employment in Agriculture (% total employment) 3.5 b 3.8 3.9 3.7 3.8 4.1 3.8 b 3.7 3.9 3.5 3.4
Activity rate (% population aged 15-64) 74.7 74.7 75.0 74.9 74.6 75.3 75.5 75.3 75.5 75.6 75.9 76.1
Labour Market Indicators - Male

Activity rate (% population aged 15-24) 41.9 42.2 42.9 42.6 41.3 40.8 40.8 39.9 40.5 40.0 40.6 41.5
Activity rate (% population aged 25-54) 94.1 94.4 94.3 94.2 93.7 93.6 93.3 93.1 92.7 92.7 92.9 92.7
Activity rate (% population aged 55-64) 42.5 42.4 44.0 45.0 46.8 50.8 52.3 53.0 55.1 56.1 56.8 58.2
Total unemployment (000) 1132 1057 1360 1372 1344 1492 1590 1608 1654 1571 1456 1390
Unemployment rate (% labour force) 7.6 7.0 9.0 9.0 8.9 9.8 10.4 10.5 10.8 10.3 9.5 9.0
Youth unemployment rate (% labour force 15-24) 19.0 19.2 24.7 22.9 22.0 24.8 24.6 25.1 25.8 25.1 23.1 21.4
Long term unemployment rate (% labour force) 2.9 2.6 3.0 3.6 3.5 3.8 4.1 4.5 4.6 4.6 4.2 3.6
Share of long term unemployment (% of total
39.3 38.0 34.8 41.1 41.5 40.4 40.6 43.8 43.6 46.1 45.5 41.6
unemployment)

Youth unemployment ratio (% population aged 15-24) 7.7 7.8 10.3 9.4 8.8 9.8 9.7 10.0 b 10.4 10.0 9.3 8.8

Employment rate for low skilled 25-64 (ISCED 0-2) 65.3 65.9 64.1 62.9 63.0 63.3 61.8 b 60.4 b 58.9 58.6 60.7 61.1
Employment rate for medium skilled 25-64 (ISCED 3-
80.5 80.3 79.1 78.8 78.1 77.6 76.7 b 76.1 b 76.2 76.3 76.8 77.1
4)
Employment rate for high skilled 25-64 (ISCED 5-8) 86.9 88.1 86.9 87.0 87.2 87.6 87.3 b 86.4 b 86.7 88.1 88.3 87.9
Employment rate (Nationals aged 15-64) 69.5 69.9 68.8 68.5 68.4 68.4 68.0 67.5 b 67.6 68.0 68.9 69.1
Employment rate (Other EU28 aged 15-64) 73.0 72.5 71.7 74.8 74.2 70.7 73.3 71.5 b 70.0 69.6 70.2 74.5
Employment rate (Other than EU28 aged 15-64) 59.5 62.8 56.8 60.6 58.9 60.3 60.0 56.5 b 55.2 57.7 58.5 63.2
Employment rate (Born in the same country aged 15-
69.4 69.8 68.8 68.5 68.6 68.4 68.1 67.6 b 67.8 68.2 68.9 69.1
64)
Employment rate (Born in other EU28 aged 15-64) 71.1 70.4 70.6 73.1 72.9 70.9 73.3 70.8 b 69.6 68.3 69.7 73.2
Employment rate (Born outside EU28 aged 15-64) 66.2 68.3 63.8 64.5 63.4 64.6 64.0 61.5 b 61.0 62.2 64.3 66.4
Underemployment (% of labour force aged 15-74) 1.8 b 1.9 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.5 b 2.7 3.0 3.0 2.8 2.7
Seeking but not available (% of labour force aged 15-
1.1 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 0.9 b 0.9 0.9 1.0 0.9 0.9
74)
Discouraged, available but not seeking (% of labour
1.0 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.1 1.0 2.0 2.2 2.2 2.0 2.0
force aged 15-74)
Total population (000) 32842 33027 33202 33357 33516 33672 b 33828 34121 b 34284 34391 34485 34556
Population aged 15-64(000) 20948 21067 21139 21197 21262 21234 21198 21244 b 21218 21185 21168 21132
Total employment (000) 12042 12234 12189 12211 12228 12297 12351 12715 b 12766 12823 12932 13091
Employment aged 15-64 (000) 11992 12181 12139 12154 12149 12199 12252 12607 b 12640 12682 12766 12927
Employment rate (% population aged 20-64) 64.9 65.5 65.0 64.9 64.7 65.1 65.5 66.1 66.5 66.8 67.2 68.1
Employment rate (% population aged 15-64) 59.6 60.3 59.9 59.8 59.7 60.1 60.4 60.8 61.1 61.4 61.7 62.5
Employment rate (% population aged 15-24) 28.1 28.5 28.3 27.1 26.7 26.1 25.7 25.9 26.4 26.3 26.8 27.7
Employment rate (% population aged 25-54) 76.0 77.3 76.7 76.8 76.2 76.0 76.2 76.1 75.9 75.9 75.8 76.8
Employment rate (% population aged 55-64) 36.0 35.9 36.5 37.3 38.9 41.6 43.0 45.3 47.0 48.3 50.1 50.5
FTE employment rate (% population aged 20-64) 58.3 58.8 57.8 57.8 57.7 58.0 58.7 58.7 b 59.0 58.9 59.4 61.2
Self-employed (% total employment) 6.3 6.4 6.3 6.7 6.9 7.0 7.0 7.5 b 7.6 7.8 8.0 7.9
Part-time employment (% total employment) 30.3 29.4 29.9 30.0 29.9 30.0 30.4 30.6 30.1 29.8 29.6 28.8
Temporary employment (% total employment) 15.0 15.2 14.8 14.9 14.8 14.9 14.8 14.6 15.1 15.1 15.8 15.7
Employment in Services (% total employment) 88.1 u 88.7 bu 89.0 u 89.2 u 88.6 u 89.1 u
Employment in Industry (% total employment) 10.1 u 9.7 bu 9.4 u 9.3 u 9.9 u 9.6 u
Employment in Agriculture (% total employment) 1.8 b 1.9 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.6 b 1.6 1.6 1.5 1.3
Activity rate (% population aged 15-64) 64.9 65.2 65.7 65.8 65.7 66.3 66.9 67.4 67.6 67.9 67.9 68.5
Labour Market Indicators - Female

Activity rate (% population aged 15-24) 34.9 34.7 36.2 35.2 34.5 34.0 33.9 33.4 34.2 34.3 33.7 34.4
Activity rate (% population aged 25-54) 82.0 82.8 83.1 83.4 83.0 83.0 83.5 83.4 83.0 83.1 82.8 83.6
Activity rate (% population aged 55-64) 37.6 37.3 38.5 39.5 41.2 44.2 46.0 48.6 50.4 51.5 53.1 54.0
Total unemployment (000) 1135 1064 1262 1308 1321 1363 1436 1417 1400 1402 1332 1310
Unemployment rate (% labour force) 8.5 7.9 9.2 9.5 9.6 9.8 10.2 10.0 9.9 9.9 9.3 9.1
Youth unemployment rate (% labour force 15-24) 20.1 18.8 22.3 23.7 23.3 23.8 25.2 23.1 23.3 24.1 21.3 19.9
Long term unemployment rate (% labour force) 3.2 2.6 3.0 3.4 3.6 3.6 3.9 3.9 3.9 4.0 3.8 3.4
Share of long term unemployment (% of total
39.0 35.3 34.3 37.7 39.9 38.7 39.8 40.9 41.5 42.0 42.1 38.6
unemployment)

Youth unemployment ratio (% population aged 15-24) 6.8 6.3 7.8 8.1 7.8 7.9 8.3 7.7 b 7.9 8.2 7.1 6.8

Employment rate for low skilled 25-64 (ISCED 0-2) 51.5 50.4 49.6 49.7 49.6 48.9 47.5 b 47.0 b 46.2 44.7 45.5 45.5
Employment rate for medium skilled 25-64 (ISCED 3-
70.4 70.9 70.2 70.0 69.0 69.3 69.4 b 68.4 b 68.6 69.2 68.9 69.6
4)
Employment rate for high skilled 25-64 (ISCED 5-8) 80.3 81.7 80.6 80.8 80.8 81.5 81.7 b 81.6 b 81.6 82.3 82.6 82.5
Employment rate (Nationals aged 15-64) 60.7 61.3 60.9 61.0 60.9 61.4 61.7 61.5 b 62.0 62.4 62.8 63.4
Employment rate (Other EU28 aged 15-64) 59.4 59.8 57.8 59.1 61.4 59.0 61.6 62.2 b 61.0 63.4 64.2 65.0
Employment rate (Other than EU28 aged 15-64) 33.8 38.0 36.5 33.7 34.2 34.2 33.9 35.4 b 34.7 32.7 34.1 36.3
Employment rate (Born in the same country aged 15-
61.0 61.6 61.2 61.2 61.1 61.7 62.2 62.0 b 62.5 63.0 63.3 63.9
64)
Employment rate (Born in other EU28 aged 15-64) 58.9 59.2 59.5 61.6 62.7 61.0 62.5 63.6 b 62.3 63.0 65.5 65.5
Employment rate (Born outside EU28 aged 15-64) 45.9 48.8 47.4 45.8 45.9 45.9 43.9 45.5 b 45.0 43.6 44.0 46.0
Underemployment (% of labour force aged 15-74) 7.5 b 7.7 8.1 7.5 7.5 8.5 b 8.5 8.7 8.3 7.9 7.6
Seeking but not available (% of labour force aged 15-
2.2 1.9 2.1 2.1 2.3 2.3 1.2 b 1.3 1.2 1.4 1.4 1.4
74)
Discouraged, available but not seeking (% of labour
1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.5 2.5 2.5 2.4 2.4 2.3
force aged 15-74)

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263
Employment and Social Developments in Europe 2019

France 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
At-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion (% of total
19.0 18.5 b 18.5 19.2 19.3 19.1 18.1 18.5 17.7 18.2 17.1
population)
At-risk-of-poverty (% of total population) 13.1 12.5 12.9 13.3 14.0 14.1 13.7 13.3 13.6 13.6 13.3
At-risk-of-poverty threshold (PPS single person) 9089 10496 b 10644 10669 10897 11271 11516 11584 11931 12373 12268
Poverty gap (%) 17.9 14.5 b 18.2 19.5 17.1 16.2 16.8 16.6 15.7 16.6 16.9
Persistent at-risk-of-poverty (% of total
6.4 7.0 8.3 7.9 8.5 8.0 8.0
population)
At-risk-of-poverty before social transfers excl.
26.4 23.5 b 24.0 24.9 24.7 23.8 24.4 24.0 23.9 23.6 24.1
pensions (% of total population)
Impact of social transfers (excl. pensions) in
50.4 46.8 b 46.3 46.6 43.3 40.8 43.9 44.6 43.1 42.4 44.8
reducing poverty (%)
All

Severe Material Deprivation (% of total population) 4.7 5.4 5.6 5.8 5.2 5.3 4.9 4.8 4.5 4.4 4.1 4.7 p
Share of people living in low work intensity households
9.6 8.8 8.4 9.9 9.4 8.4 8.1 9.6 8.6 8.4 8.1
(% of people aged 0-59)
Real Gross Household Disposable income (growth %) 3.0 0.4 1.7 1.3 0.2 -0.8 -0.3 1.2 0.8 1.9
Income quintile share ratio S80/S20 3.9 4.4 b 4.4 4.4 4.6 4.5 4.5 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.4
GINI coefficient 26.6 29.8 b 29.9 29.8 30.8 30.5 30.1 29.2 29.2 29.3 29.3
Early leavers from education and training (% of
12.8 11.8 12.4 12.7 12.3 11.8 9.7 b 8.8 b 9.2 8.8 8.9 8.9
population aged 18-24)
NEET: Young people neither in employment nor in
education and training (% of total population aged 15- 10.7 10.5 12.7 12.7 12.3 12.5 11.2 10.7 11.4 11.5 11.0 10.6
24)
At-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion (% of male
18.0 17.3 b 17.1 18.4 18.6 18.4 17.3 17.5 17.1 17.3 16.6
population)
At-risk-of-poverty (% of male population) 12.8 11.7 11.9 12.7 13.5 13.6 13.1 12.6 13.2 12.8 12.9
Poverty gap (%) 18.0 14.7 b 18.8 19.5 17.8 16.3 16.7 17.1 15.7 16.8 16.4
Persistent at-risk-of-poverty (% of male
5.9 6.3 8.3 7.5 7.8 6.9 7.9
population)
Severe Material Deprivation (% of male population) 4.4 5.1 5.2 5.7 5.1 5.1 4.5 4.5 4.4 4.2 3.9 4.5 p
Male

Share of people living in low work intensity households

8.6 8.1 7.6 9.2 9.0 8.4 7.5 8.9 8.3 8.0 7.8
(% of males aged 0-59)
Life expectancy at birth (years) 77.6 77.8 78.0 78.2 78.7 78.7 79.0 79.5 79.2 79.5 79.6
Healthy life years at birth (years) - men 62.8 62.8 62.8 61.8 62.7 62.6 63.0 63.4 62.6 62.6
Early leavers from education and training (% of males
15.2 13.8 14.5 15.3 14.1 13.7 10.7 b 9.9 b 10.1 10.1 10.5 10.8
aged 18-24)
NEET: Young people neither in employment nor in
10.0 10.4 13.3 12.7 12.0 12.9 11.0 11.1 11.9 11.6 11.6 11.2
education and training ( % of males aged 15-24)
At-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion (% of female
20.0 19.7 b 19.7 19.9 19.9 19.6 18.9 19.5 18.2 19.1 17.6
population)
At-risk-of-poverty (% of female population) 13.4 13.3 13.8 13.9 14.5 14.6 14.3 14.1 13.9 14.4 13.6
Poverty gap (%) 17.7 14.4 b 18.0 19.7 16.4 16.2 16.8 16.1 15.7 16.5 17.1
Persistent at-risk-of-poverty (% of female
6.9 7.7 8.4 8.3 9.1 9.0 8.1
population)
Social Indicators

Severe Material Deprivation (% of female population) 5.0 5.7 5.9 5.8 5.4 5.5 5.4 5.1 4.7 4.6 4.4 4.9 p
Female

Share of people living in low work intensity households

10.6 9.6 9.1 10.5 9.7 8.5 8.6 10.4 8.8 8.8 8.3
(% of females aged 0-59)
Life expectancy at birth (years) 84.8 84.8 85.0 85.3 85.7 85.4 85.6 86.0 85.5 85.7 85.6
Healthy life years at birth (years) - women 64.4 64.5 63.5 63.4 63.6 63.8 64.4 64.2 64.6 64.1
Early leavers from education and training (% of
10.5 9.9 10.3 10.2 10.4 10.0 8.6 b 7.8 b 8.4 7.5 7.2 6.9
females aged 18-24)
NEET: Young people neither in employment nor in
11.3 10.7 12.1 12.6 12.6 12.1 11.4 10.3 11.0 11.3 10.4 9.9
education and training ( % of females aged 15-24)
At-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion of children (% of
19.6 21.2 b 21.2 22.9 23.0 23.2 20.8 21.6 21.2 22.6 22.3
people aged 0-17)
At-risk-of-poverty (% of Children population) 15.3 15.6 16.8 18.1 18.8 19.0 17.6 17.7 18.7 19.1 19.1
Children (0-17)

Severe Material Deprivation (% of Children

5.4 6.6 6.5 7.0 7.0 7.2 5.6 5.7 5.4 5.3 5.1 5.7 p
population)
Share of children living in low work intensity
7.7 7.4 6.6 8.8 8.2 7.2 6.3 8.1 7.4 7.6 7.5
households (% of Children population)
Risk of poverty of children in households at work
10.6 11.5 12.8 12.7 13.6 14.3 13.5 12.6 13.3 14.8 14.6
(Working Intensity > 0.2)
Impact of social transfers (excl. pensions) in reducing
58.5 55.3 b 51.5 50.0 47.5 44.3 48.1 48.4 45.2 44.5 46.8
poverty (0-17) (%)
At-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion (% of working
19.7 18.8 b 18.9 19.9 20.1 19.8 19.3 19.9 19.0 19.2 17.7
age population)
At-risk-of-poverty (% of Working age population) 12.3 11.6 11.8 12.7 13.5 13.7 13.7 13.2 13.4 13.3 12.9
Working age

Severe Material Deprivation (% of Working age

4.8 5.5 5.9 6.0 5.2 5.4 5.4 5.2 5.0 4.6 4.3 5.0 p
(18-64)

population)
Very low work intensity (18-59) 10.4 9.4 9.1 10.3 9.8 8.9 8.8 10.3 9.0 8.7 8.3
In-work at-risk-of poverty rate (% of persons
6.4 6.5 b 6.6 6.5 7.6 8.0 7.8 8.0 7.5 8.0 7.4
employed 18-64)
Impact of social transfers (excl. pensions) in reducing
50.4 47.3 b 47.8 48.0 43.8 41.0 43.9 45.2 44.6 43.9 46.5
poverty (18-64) (%)
At-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion of elderly (% of
15.2 14.1 b 13.4 11.8 11.5 11.1 10.8 10.1 9.3 10.0 9.5
people aged 65+)
Elderly (65+)

At-risk-of-poverty (% of Elderly population) 13.1 11.9 11.9 9.4 9.7 9.4 9.1 8.6 8.0 8.2 7.8

Severe Material Deprivation (% of Elderly population) 3.4 3.3 3.2 3.4 2.9 2.4 2.6 2.4 1.9 2.9 2.5 2.8 p
Relative median income of elderly (ratio with median
0.91 0.95 b 0.96 0.98 1.01 1.0 1.03 1.02 1.04 1.02 1.05
income of people younger than 65)
Aggregate replacement ratio (ratio) 0.60 0.65 b 0.66 0.65 0.64 0.65 0.66 0.69 0.69 0.68 0.68
Sickness/Health care 8.4 8.4 9.0 8.9 8.8 8.9 9.0 9.1 9.1 9.2
protection indicators
Expenditure in social

Disability 1.8 1.8 1.9 1.9 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.1 2.0 2.1
Old age and survivors 12.6 12.9 13.9 13.9 14.0 14.3 14.6 14.6 14.6 14.6
(% of GDP)

Family/Children 2.4 2.4 2.6 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.4
Unemployment 1.6 1.5 1.9 1.9 1.9 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0
Housing and Social exclusion n.e.c. 1.5 1.6 1.8 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.8 1.8 1.8
Total (including Admin and Other expenditures) 30.4 30.8 33.2 33.2 33.0 33.8 34.2 34.5 34.2 34.3
of which: Means tested benefits 3.2 3.1 3.5 3.4 3.4 3.4 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5

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264
 Statistical annex - 1. Country profiles

Croatia
Croatia 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Real GDP 5.3 2.0 -7.3 -1.5 -0.3 -2.3 -0.5 -0.1 2.4 3.5 2.9 2.6
Total employment 3.2 p 2.1 d -0.7 d -3.8 d -3.9 d -3.6 d -2.6 d 2.7 d 1.2 d 0.3 d 2.2 d
Labour productivity 2.1 p -0.1 d -6.6 d 2.4 d 3.7 d 1.4 d 2.2 d -2.7 d 1.1 d 3.2 d 0.7 d
Macro Economic Indicators

Annual average hours worked per person employed 0.1 p 0.1 dp -0.2 d 0.7 d -0.1 d -0.9 d -0.7 d -0.9 d -3.4 d 0.4 d -0.6 d
(Annual % growth)

Real productivity per hour worked 1.9 p -0.2 d -6.4 d 1.6 d 3.8 d 2.3 d 2.9 d -1.8 d 4.7 d 2.8 d 1.3 d
Harmonized CPI 2.7 5.8 2.2 1.1 2.2 3.4 2.3 0.2 -0.3 -0.6 1.3 1.6
Price deflator GDP 4.1 5.7 2.8 0.8 1.7 1.5 0.8 0.0 0.0 -0.1 1.1 1.7
Nominal compensation per employee 5.3 p 5.1 dp -0.2 d 1.9 d 3.7 d 0.4 d -0.9 d -5.2 d 0.4 d 1.3 d -1.1 d
Real compensation per employee (GDP deflator) 1.1 p -0.6 dp -2.9 d 1.0 d 2.0 d -1.2 d -1.7 d -5.3 d 0.3 d 1.4 d -2.2 d
Real compensation per employee (private consumption
2.5 p -0.7 dp -2.4 d 0.8 d 1.4 d -2.9 d -3.2 d -5.4 d 0.6 d 2.0 d -2.3 d
deflator)
Nominal unit labour costs 3.1 p 5.2 d 6.8 d -0.5 d 0.0 d -1.0 d -3.1 d -2.6 d -0.8 d -1.8 d -1.8 d
Real unit labour costs -1.0 p -0.5 dp 3.9 d -1.3 d -1.6 d -2.5 d -3.8 d -2.6 d -0.9 d -1.8 d -2.8 d
Total population (000) 4314 4312 4310 4303 4290 4276 4262 4247 4225 4191 4154 4105
Population aged 15-64 (000) 2879 2875 2875 2875 2874 2865 2852 2836 2809 2774 2737 2686
Total employment (000) 1734 1771 1757 1690 1625 1566 1524 1566 1585 1590 1625 1655
Employment aged 15-64 (000) 1694 1725 1708 1649 1584 1528 1494 1542 1559 1567 1603 1630
Employment rate (% population aged 20-64) 63.9 64.9 64.2 62.1 59.8 58.1 57.2 59.2 60.6 61.4 63.6 65.2
Employment rate (% population aged 15-64) 59.0 60.0 59.4 57.4 55.2 53.5 52.5 54.6 56.0 56.9 58.9 60.6
Employment rate (% population aged 15-24) 27.4 28.0 27.1 24.2 20.6 17.4 14.9 18.3 19.1 25.6 25.9 25.6
Employment rate (% population aged 25-54) 74.5 76.0 74.7 72.6 70.6 69.2 68.3 71.2 72.3 72.4 74.9 77.0
Employment rate (% population aged 55-64) 36.6 37.1 39.4 39.1 38.2 37.5 37.8 36.2 39.2 38.1 40.3 42.8
FTE employment rate (% population aged 20-64) 62.6 63.6 62.8 60.5 58.2 56.9 56.0 58.1 59.3 60.0 62.3 63.9
Self-employed (% total employment) 18.5 18.7 18.5 19.2 19.0 17.4 16.5 14.1 b 13.7 12.5 11.1 10.8
Part-time employment (% total employment) 6.1 6.5 6.5 7.0 7.2 5.6 5.4 5.3 6.0 5.6 4.8 5.2
Temporary employment (% total employment) 10.7 10.0 9.7 10.2 10.8 10.9 12.1 14.4 17.2 19.3 18.2 17.6
Employment in Services (% total employment) 57.5 bu 58.9 u 59.4 58.6 61.0 u 62.4 u 64.1 u 64.7 u 66.0 u 66.9 u 66.8 u
Employment in Industry (% total employment) 31.6 bu 29.8 u 28.0 28.6 28.5 u 28.1 u 27.2 u 27.0 u 27.2 u 26.7 u 27.7 u
Employment in Agriculture (% total employment) 10.9 b 11.4 12.5 12.9 10.6 9.6 8.7 8.3 6.8 6.4 5.6
Activity rate (% population aged 15-64) 65.7 65.8 65.6 65.1 64.1 63.9 63.7 66.1 66.9 65.6 66.4 66.3
Labour Market Indicators - Total

Activity rate (% population aged 15-24) 36.6 36.6 36.3 35.9 32.5 30.1 29.9 33.6 33.2 37.2 35.7 33.5
Activity rate (% population aged 25-54) 81.6 81.9 81.2 80.8 80.6 80.9 80.8 84.1 84.5 82.0 83.3 83.4
Activity rate (% population aged 55-64) 39.0 39.3 41.8 41.8 41.4 41.8 41.9 41.0 44.3 42.2 43.6 44.8
Total unemployment (000) 190 166 180 224 256 292 320 325 304 245 202 154
Unemployment rate (% labour force) 9.9 8.6 9.3 11.8 13.7 15.8 17.4 17.2 16.1 13.4 11.0 8.5
Youth unemployment rate (% labour force 15-24) 25.4 23.6 25.4 32.3 36.6 42.2 49.9 44.9 42.3 31.8 27.2 23.8
Long term unemployment rate (% labour force) 6.0 5.3 5.1 6.6 8.4 10.2 11.0 10.1 10.2 6.6 4.6 3.4
Share of long term unemployment (% of total
60.0 62.3 55.7 56.3 61.3 63.7 63.6 58.3 63.1 50.7 41.0 40.2
unemployment)

Youth unemployment ratio (% population aged 15-24) 9.2 8.7 9.2 11.6 11.9 12.7 14.9 15.3 14.0 11.6 9.8 7.9

Employment rate for low skilled 25-64 (ISCED 0-2) 45.7 47.8 48.9 46.7 b 43.5 41.2 39.3 38.3 b 39.7 38.1 34.9 37.5
Employment rate for medium skilled 25-64 (ISCED 3-
70.0 70.3 68.4 66.2 b 64.7 62.5 61.4 62.6 b 63.9 63.5 66.9 68.5
4)
Employment rate for high skilled 25-64 (ISCED 5-8) 83.0 83.9 82.9 81.0 b 78.9 77.9 77.7 80.5 b 80.9 82.1 83.8 83.8
Employment rate (Nationals aged 15-64) 59.0 60.0 59.6 57.5 55.2 53.5 52.5 54.6 56.0 57.0 59.0 60.6
Employment rate (Other EU28 aged 15-64) 76.1 u 71.8 u 63.4 u 43.1 u 55.3 u 69.5 u
Employment rate (Other than EU28 aged 15-64) 47.2 u 42.1 u 28.1 u 28.2 u 39.2 u 28.9 u 35.3 u 35.2 u 32.3 u 30.3 u 37.0 u 52.0 u
Employment rate (Born in the same country aged 15-
59.4 60.3 59.6 57.7 55.5 54.0 53.1 54.7 55.9 57.1 59.0 60.4
64)
Employment rate (Born in other EU28 aged 15-64) 61.4 64.8 70.8 63.9 59.5 56.2 52.9 57.1 61.0 64.5 70.6 71.6
Employment rate (Born outside EU28 aged 15-64) 55.4 56.8 56.7 53.6 51.4 47.8 46.6 52.5 55.8 54.3 56.9 60.6
Underemployment (% of labour force aged 15-74) 1.7 1.9 2.4 2.4 1.9 1.8 1.8 2.3 1.9 1.7 1.5
Seeking but not available (% of labour force aged 15-
0.7 0.6 0.6 0.8 0.9 0.7 0.6 0.9 0.6 0.9 0.7 0.7
74)
Discouraged, available but not seeking (% of labour
5.8 5.2 5.7 5.9 6.9 8.2 10.8 8.7 8.4 10.0 7.7 6.9
force aged 15-74)

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265
Employment and Social Developments in Europe 2019

Croatia 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Total population (000) 2076 2077 2077 2075 2069 2062 2056 2050 2039 2023 2005 1982
Population aged 15-64(000) 1435 1435 1436 1436 1436 1432 1426 1419 1405 1388 1369 1343
Total employment (000) 970 988 962 920 894 856 821 849 855 860 881 894
Employment aged 15-64 (000) 951 966 937 899 872 835 803 836 841 845 868 879
Employment rate (% population aged 20-64) 72.1 72.9 70.5 67.9 66.1 63.7 61.6 64.2 65.4 66.2 68.9 70.3
Employment rate (% population aged 15-64) 66.5 67.3 65.2 62.7 60.9 58.5 56.5 59.1 60.3 61.4 63.8 65.4
Employment rate (% population aged 15-24) 32.4 34.2 32.3 27.9 23.8 20.0 17.4 21.2 22.4 28.8 29.8 30.5
Employment rate (% population aged 25-54) 81.0 82.2 79.3 76.4 75.1 73.0 71.6 74.5 75.4 76.3 78.7 80.4
Employment rate (% population aged 55-64) 49.5 48.9 49.6 50.5 49.6 48.0 45.0 45.8 48.2 45.1 49.0 51.0
FTE employment rate (% population aged 20-64) 71.3 72.3 69.8 66.9 65.0 62.9 60.7 63.5 64.4 65.2 67.9 69.4
Self-employed (% total employment) 21.0 21.2 21.2 21.2 21.3 20.0 19.4 17.6 b 17.4 15.9 13.3 12.9
Part-time employment (% total employment) 4.6 4.9 4.9 5.1 5.6 4.6 4.6 4.2 4.8 4.4 3.8 3.8
Temporary employment (% total employment) 10.0 9.6 8.8 9.3 10.4 10.7 12.0 13.7 16.8 18.4 17.8 16.8
Employment in Services (% total employment) 47.8 bu 48.7 u 49.5 u 49.5 u 51.4 u 50.8 u 53.0 u 53.2 u 53.5 u 54.4 u 55.3 u
Employment in Industry (% total employment) 41.9 bu 40.4 u 38.7 u 38.2 u 37.9 u 38.8 u 37.1 u 37.1 u 38.0 u 37.7 u 38.2 u
Employment in Agriculture (% total employment) 10.3 b 10.9 11.8 12.4 10.7 10.4 10.0 9.8 8.5 7.9 6.5
Activity rate (% population aged 15-64) 73.0 72.5 71.0 70.6 70.7 69.8 68.9 70.9 71.6 70.3 71.5 70.9
Labour Market Indicators - Male

Activity rate (% population aged 15-24) 41.6 43.1 42.4 40.7 37.8 34.6 34.7 38.5 38.2 41.9 40.9 37.9
Activity rate (% population aged 25-54) 87.4 86.9 84.5 84.1 85.4 85.2 84.7 86.6 86.9 85.2 86.7 86.4
Activity rate (% population aged 55-64) 53.2 52.1 52.7 54.4 54.2 53.9 51.0 52.1 55.0 50.7 52.8 53.4
Total unemployment (000) 92 76 84 116 140 159 175 168 158 125 101 76
Unemployment rate (% labour force) 8.7 7.1 8.1 11.2 13.6 15.8 17.6 16.6 15.6 12.7 10.3 7.8
Youth unemployment rate (% labour force 15-24) 22.6 20.7 23.8 31.8 36.7 42.2 49.5 44.5 41.5 31.4 26.5 20.3
Long term unemployment rate (% labour force) 5.0 4.2 3.9 5.9 8.4 10.2 11.3 9.6 10.1 6.8 4.7 3.1
Share of long term unemployment (% of total
56.5 59.5 49.7 53.4 61.3 63.6 63.8 58.2 64.8 54.0 43.8 40.3
unemployment)

Youth unemployment ratio (% population aged 15-24) 9.2 8.9 10.1 12.8 14.0 14.6 17.3 17.3 15.8 13.1 11.1 7.4

Employment rate for low skilled 25-64 (ISCED 0-2) 59.2 61.3 60.5 58.1 b 54.2 51.2 49.8 47.0 b 49.1 47.6 44.8 46.7
Employment rate for medium skilled 25-64 (ISCED 3-
76.4 76.8 73.6 71.1 b 70.6 67.7 65.0 67.7 b 68.6 68.4 72.4 74.1
4)
Employment rate for high skilled 25-64 (ISCED 5-8) 84.6 84.6 83.3 80.7 b 78.4 78.3 78.6 80.9 b 81.3 83.3 84.7 83.9
Employment rate (Nationals aged 15-64) 66.5 67.3 65.4 62.8 60.8 58.4 56.4 59.1 60.4 61.4 63.9 65.4
Employment rate (Other EU28 aged 15-64) 80.1 u 89.1 u 85.8 u 57.9 u 70.6 u
Employment rate (Other than EU28 aged 15-64) 60.1 u 90.0 u 43.3 u 42.7 u 66.5 u
Employment rate (Born in the same country aged 15-
66.4 67.1 65.1 62.8 61.1 59.1 57.0 59.1 60.0 61.0 63.5 64.8
64)
Employment rate (Born in other EU28 aged 15-64) 74.0 u 71.9 u 71.3 u 70.6 u 59.7 u 59.4 50.3 u 63.8 u 65.8 71.8 73.5 71.9
Employment rate (Born outside EU28 aged 15-64) 66.8 68.7 65.6 60.9 58.7 52.3 52.4 59.0 62.7 63.0 65.3 69.8
Underemployment (% of labour force aged 15-74) 1.7 2.0 2.3 2.2 1.8 1.9 1.4 2.1 1.8 1.6 1.2
Seeking but not available (% of labour force aged 15-
0.5 u 0.3 u 0.4 u 0.6 u 0.4 u 0.4 u 0.3 u 0.7 u 0.5 u 0.7 u 0.6 u 0.5 u
74)
Discouraged, available but not seeking (% of labour
3.7 3.6 4.5 4.5 4.6 6.0 8.2 7.4 7.0 7.7 5.2 4.9
force aged 15-74)
Total population (000) 2237 2235 2233 2228 2221 2214 2206 2197 2186 2168 2149 2124
Population aged 15-64(000) 1444 1440 1439 1438 1438 1434 1426 1418 1404 1386 1368 1343
Total employment (000) 764 783 795 770 731 710 703 717 731 730 744 761
Employment aged 15-64 (000) 743 759 772 749 711 693 690 706 719 721 735 751
Employment rate (% population aged 20-64) 55.9 57.0 58.0 56.4 53.6 52.6 52.8 54.2 55.9 56.6 58.3 60.1
Employment rate (% population aged 15-64) 51.6 52.7 53.7 52.1 49.5 48.5 48.5 50.0 51.6 52.4 54.0 55.9
Employment rate (% population aged 15-24) 22.3 21.4 21.7 20.4 17.2 14.7 12.4 15.3 15.8 22.2 21.8 20.3
Employment rate (% population aged 25-54) 67.9 69.7 70.1 68.8 66.1 65.2 64.9 67.9 69.3 68.5 71.1 73.5
Employment rate (% population aged 55-64) 25.0 26.4 30.0 28.5 27.7 27.7 31.0 27.3 30.7 31.6 32.3 35.2
FTE employment rate (% population aged 20-64) 54.0 55.0 56.0 54.1 51.5 50.9 51.4 52.7 54.2 54.9 56.7 58.5
Self-employed (% total employment) 15.3 15.6 15.2 16.9 16.2 14.3 13.0 10.1 b 9.5 8.5 8.3 8.3
Part-time employment (% total employment) 8.1 8.4 8.5 9.4 9.2 6.9 6.4 6.7 7.3 7.1 6.0 6.8
Temporary employment (% total employment) 11.7 10.4 10.9 11.4 11.3 11.3 12.2 15.1 17.7 20.2 18.7 18.6
Employment in Services (% total employment) 71.3 u 69.8 u 77.4 u 78.3 u 80.2 u
Employment in Industry (% total employment) 15.3 u 16.8 u 15.5 u 15.3 u 15.3 u
Employment in Agriculture (% total employment) 11.6 b 12.0 13.4 13.5 10.5 8.6 7.1 6.5 4.8 4.6 4.4
Activity rate (% population aged 15-64) 58.4 59.0 60.3 59.6 57.6 58.0 58.5 61.3 62.3 60.9 61.4 61.7
Labour Market Indicators - Female

Activity rate (% population aged 15-24) 31.5 29.9 30.0 30.7 26.9 25.3 24.8 28.5 28.0 32.3 30.2 28.8
Activity rate (% population aged 25-54) 75.7 76.9 77.8 77.4 75.8 76.6 76.8 81.5 82.1 78.8 79.9 80.3
Activity rate (% population aged 55-64) 26.1 27.6 31.8 30.2 29.6 30.6 33.4 30.6 34.4 34.2 35.0 36.7
Total unemployment (000) 98 90 96 108 116 133 146 157 146 120 101 78
Unemployment rate (% labour force) 11.4 10.4 10.8 12.4 13.8 15.8 17.2 18.0 16.7 14.2 11.9 9.3
Youth unemployment rate (% labour force 15-24) 29.2 28.0 27.8 33.1 36.3 42.3 50.4 45.4 43.5 32.2 28.3 28.8
Long term unemployment rate (% labour force) 7.2 6.7 6.5 7.3 8.5 10.2 10.6 10.7 10.4 6.5 4.5 3.8
Share of long term unemployment (% of total
63.5 64.7 60.9 59.3 61.4 63.7 63.2 58.3 61.3 47.2 38.1 40.1
unemployment)

Youth unemployment ratio (% population aged 15-24) 9.2 8.5 8.2 10.3 9.7 10.6 12.4 13.2 12.2 10.1 8.4 8.5

Employment rate for low skilled 25-64 (ISCED 0-2) 37.0 38.5 40.7 39.0 b 36.5 34.5 32.0 32.3 b 33.3 31.2 27.5 30.5
Employment rate for medium skilled 25-64 (ISCED 3-
62.4 62.6 62.2 60.3 b 57.6 56.4 57.2 56.6 b 58.3 57.8 60.6 62.0
4)
Employment rate for high skilled 25-64 (ISCED 5-8) 81.6 83.2 82.6 81.3 b 79.3 77.5 77.0 80.2 b 80.5 81.2 83.1 83.8
Employment rate (Nationals aged 15-64) 51.6 52.8 53.7 52.2 49.6 48.6 48.6 50.0 51.7 52.5 54.1 55.9
Employment rate (Other EU28 aged 15-64) 69.0 u
Employment rate (Other than EU28 aged 15-64) 33.8 u 39.2 u 30.8 u 32.4 u 32.1 u 39.1 u
Employment rate (Born in the same country aged 15-
52.4 53.4 54.1 52.6 49.9 49.0 49.2 50.3 51.8 53.1 54.4 56.1
64)
Employment rate (Born in other EU28 aged 15-64) 51.0 u 59.8 70.5 60.5 59.3 52.7 u 55.7 u 51.8 u 56.1 u 56.5 u 67.3 71.4
Employment rate (Born outside EU28 aged 15-64) 43.8 45.7 48.6 46.9 44.4 43.4 41.0 46.7 49.2 45.4 48.8 51.6
Underemployment (% of labour force aged 15-74) 1.8 1.9 2.4 2.6 1.9 1.7 2.3 2.4 2.1 1.8 1.9
Seeking but not available (% of labour force aged 15-
1.0 u 1.0 u 0.8 u 1.0 u 1.4 1.0 u 0.8 u 1.2 0.8 u 1.1 u 0.7 u 0.9 u
74)
Discouraged, available but not seeking (% of labour
8.3 7.2 7.1 7.6 9.6 10.9 13.8 10.2 10.1 12.6 10.6 9.3
force aged 15-74)

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266
 Statistical annex - 1. Country profiles

Croatia 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
At-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion (% of total
31.1 32.6 32.6 29.9 29.3 29.1 27.9 26.4
population)
At-risk-of-poverty (% of total population) 20.6 20.9 20.4 19.5 19.4 20.0 19.5 20.0
At-risk-of-poverty threshold (PPS single person) 4567 b 4454 4417 4448 4644 4952 5391 5682
Poverty gap (%) 27.6 27.9 31.0 28.1 27.9 26.4 28.2 26.0
Persistent at-risk-of-poverty (% of total
13.2 14.7 14.5 15.2
population)
At-risk-of-poverty before social transfers excl.
30.0 b 30.7 30.6 29.7 29.9 31.0 27.3 26.6
pensions (% of total population)
Impact of social transfers (excl. pensions) in
31.3 b 31.9 33.3 34.3 35.1 35.5 28.6 24.8
reducing poverty (%)
All

Severe Material Deprivation (% of total population) 14.3 15.2 15.9 14.7 13.9 13.7 12.5 10.3 8.6 p
Share of people living in low work intensity households
13.9 15.9 16.8 14.8 14.7 14.4 13.0 12.2
(% of people aged 0-59)
Real Gross Household Disposable income (growth %) 3.0 2.7 -2.0 -0.7 -0.1 -2.7
Income quintile share ratio S80/S20 5.5 b 5.6 5.4 5.3 5.1 5.2 5.0 5.0
GINI coefficient 31.6 31.2 30.9 30.9 30.2 30.4 29.8 29.9
Early leavers from education and training (% of
4.5 4.4 5.2 5.2 b 5.0 5.1 4.5 2.8 bu 2.8 u 2.8 u 3.1 3.3
population aged 18-24)
NEET: Young people neither in employment nor in
education and training (% of total population aged 15- 12.9 11.6 13.4 15.7 16.2 16.6 19.6 19.3 18.1 16.9 15.4 13.6
24)
At-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion (% of male
30.1 31.7 31.8 29.6 28.6 28.4 27.3 25.5
population)
At-risk-of-poverty (% of male population) 19.7 19.7 19.4 18.8 18.7 19.3 18.6 18.9
Poverty gap (%) 28.6 28.2 32.3 28.8 28.0 27.8 30.2 27.0
Persistent at-risk-of-poverty (% of male
13.1 14.9 14.8 14.6
population)
Severe Material Deprivation (% of male population) 14.5 15.4 15.7 14.9 13.6 13.9 12.8 10.2 8.4 p
Male

Share of people living in low work intensity households

13.8 16.0 16.9 14.9 14.4 14.4 13.0 12.3
(% of males aged 0-59)
Life expectancy at birth (years) 72.2 72.3 73.0 73.4 73.8 73.9 b 74.5 b 74.7 74.4 75.0 74.9
Healthy life years at birth (years) - men 57.4 59.8 61.9 b 57.6 b 58.6 55.3 57.1
Early leavers from education and training (% of males
6.1 5.1 u 5.5 6.5 b 5.9 5.7 5.5 u 3.1 bu 3.5 u 3.5 u 3.8 u 3.5 u
aged 18-24)
NEET: Young people neither in employment nor in
12.4 11.2 13.4 17.1 17.8 17.9 20.6 21.9 20.5 19.0 15.4 13.2
education and training ( % of males aged 15-24)
At-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion (% of female
32.1 33.4 33.3 30.2 29.9 29.6 28.6 27.2
population)
At-risk-of-poverty (% of female population) 21.4 22.1 21.3 20.3 20.1 20.6 20.4 20.9
Poverty gap (%) 26.9 26.2 30.0 27.3 27.6 26.3 26.6 25.3
Persistent at-risk-of-poverty (% of female
13.4 14.5 14.1 15.7
population)
Social Indicators

Severe Material Deprivation (% of female population) 14.2 15.0 16.1 14.5 14.3 13.6 12.2 10.4 8.7 p
Female

Share of people living in low work intensity households

14.0 15.8 16.6 14.7 15.0 14.4 13.0 12.1
(% of females aged 0-59)
Life expectancy at birth (years) 79.2 79.7 79.7 79.9 80.4 80.6 b 81.0 b 81.0 80.5 81.3 81.0
Healthy life years at birth (years) - women 60.4 61.7 64.2 b 60.4 b 60.0 56.8 58.7
Early leavers from education and training (% of
2.9 u 3.7 u 4.8 u 3.8 bu 4.0 u 4.4 u 3.4 u 2.5 bu 2.0 u 2.0 u 2.2 u 3.1 u
females aged 18-24)
NEET: Young people neither in employment nor in
13.3 12.0 13.5 14.1 14.6 15.2 18.6 16.7 15.6 14.6 15.3 14.0
education and training ( % of females aged 15-24)
At-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion of children (% of
29.4 31.1 34.8 29.3 29.0 28.2 26.6 25.8
people aged 0-17)
At-risk-of-poverty (% of Children population) 19.6 21.1 23.3 21.8 21.1 20.9 20.4 21.4
Children (0-17)

Severe Material Deprivation (% of Children

14.8 14.4 18.1 13.7 13.1 13.4 11.6 8.8 7.6 p
population)
Share of children living in low work intensity
11.5 13.8 15.7 11.4 12.9 12.7 10.8 10.7
households (% of Children population)
Risk of poverty of children in households at work
11.5 13.0 14.0 14.8 13.3 12.3 13.0 13.8
(Working Intensity > 0.2)
Impact of social transfers (excl. pensions) in reducing
37.0 b 37.2 34.4 37.2 40.1 41.9 38.0 32.5
poverty (0-17) (%)
At-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion (% of working
29.9 32.0 31.8 29.6 29.3 28.5 26.9 24.6
age population)
At-risk-of-poverty (% of Working age population) 18.2 18.6 18.1 17.8 17.9 17.9 17.2 16.9
Working age

Severe Material Deprivation (% of Working age

13.8 15.2 15.4 14.4 13.9 13.6 12.1 9.7 7.9 p
(18-64)

population)
Very low work intensity (18-59) 14.7 16.6 17.1 15.9 15.3 15.0 13.7 12.6
In-work at-risk-of poverty rate (% of persons
6.2 6.5 6.1 6.2 5.7 5.8 5.5 5.8
employed 18-64)
Impact of social transfers (excl. pensions) in reducing
32.6 b 33.8 35.8 34.8 34.9 35.8 31.2 29.3
poverty (18-64) (%)
At-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion of elderly (% of
37.5 36.4 33.1 31.9 29.7 31.8 32.8 32.7
people aged 65+)
Elderly (65+)

At-risk-of-poverty (% of Elderly population) 30.5 29.4 25.6 23.4 23.1 26.3 26.5 28.6

Severe Material Deprivation (% of Elderly population) 15.7 16.3 15.5 16.9 14.7 14.5 14.5 13.6 11.6 p
Relative median income of elderly (ratio with median
0.78 b 0.82 0.84 0.88 0.88 0.85 0.84 0.82
income of people younger than 65)
Aggregate replacement ratio (ratio) 0.32 b 0.36 0.36 0.37 0.40 0.40 0.39 0.41
Sickness/Health care 6.2 7.0 7.0 7.0 7.4 6.9 6.8 7.1 7.0
protection indicators
Expenditure in social

Disability 2.5 2.8 2.9 2.8 2.7 2.7 2.6 2.5 2.3
Old age and survivors 7.6 8.4 8.5 8.5 8.7 9.0 9.3 9.1 9.0
(% of GDP)

Family/Children 1.5 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.9 1.9 1.8
Unemployment 0.2 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.5
Housing and Social exclusion n.e.c. 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3
Total (including Admin and Other expenditures) 18.8 21.0 21.3 21.0 21.6 21.4 21.8 21.8 21.3
of which: Means tested benefits 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.0

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267
Employment and Social Developments in Europe 2019

Italy
Italy 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Real GDP 1.5 -1.1 -5.5 1.7 0.6 -2.8 -1.7 0.1 0.9 1.1 1.7 0.9
Total employment 1.2 0.2 -1.7 -0.6 0.3 -0.3 -1.8 0.1 0.7 1.3 1.2 0.9
Labour productivity 0.2 -1.3 -3.9 2.3 0.3 -2.5 0.1 0.0 0.3 -0.2 0.5 0.0
Macro Economic Indicators

Annual average hours worked per person employed 0.3 -0.6 -1.7 0.1 -0.2 -2.2 -0.9 -0.1 0.1 0.2 -0.2 0.2
(Annual % growth)

Real productivity per hour worked -0.1 -0.7 -2.2 2.2 0.5 -0.3 0.9 0.2 0.2 -0.4 0.7 -0.2
Harmonized CPI 2.0 3.5 0.8 1.6 2.9 3.3 1.2 0.2 0.1 -0.1 1.3 1.2
Price deflator GDP 2.4 2.5 2.0 0.3 1.5 1.4 1.2 1.0 0.9 1.2 0.5 0.8
Nominal compensation per employee 2.2 2.8 0.5 2.3 1.0 -1.1 0.8 0.2 1.0 0.5 0.1 2.0
Real compensation per employee (GDP deflator) -0.2 0.4 -1.4 2.0 -0.5 -2.5 -0.4 -0.8 0.1 -0.7 -0.4 1.2
Real compensation per employee (private consumption
0.2 -0.7 -0.2 0.6 -1.9 -4.2 -0.5 0.0 0.9 0.6 -1.3 0.8
deflator)
Nominal unit labour costs 2.0 4.2 4.6 0.0 0.7 1.4 0.7 0.1 0.7 0.7 -0.4 2.0
Real unit labour costs -0.5 1.7 2.5 -0.3 -0.8 0.0 -0.4 -0.9 -0.2 -0.5 -0.9 1.3
Total population (000) 58224 58653 59001 59190 59365 59394 59685 60783 60796 60666 60589 60484
Population aged 15-64 (000) 38307 38553 38715 38764 38841 38698 38697 39320 39193 39014 38878 38759
Total employment (000) 22894 23090 22699 22527 22598 22566 22191 22279 22465 22758 23023 23215
Employment aged 15-64 (000) 22517 22699 22324 22152 22215 22149 21755 21810 21973 22241 22444 22586
Employment rate (% population aged 20-64) 62.7 62.9 61.6 61.0 61.0 60.9 59.7 59.9 60.5 61.6 62.3 63.0
Employment rate (% population aged 15-64) 58.6 58.6 57.4 56.8 56.8 56.6 55.5 55.7 56.3 57.2 58.0 58.5
Employment rate (% population aged 15-24) 24.5 24.2 21.5 20.2 19.2 18.5 16.3 15.6 15.6 16.6 17.1 17.7
Employment rate (% population aged 25-54) 73.4 73.4 71.8 71.1 71.1 70.4 68.5 67.9 68.2 68.8 69.4 69.8
Employment rate (% population aged 55-64) 33.7 34.3 35.6 36.5 37.8 40.3 42.7 46.2 48.2 50.3 52.2 53.7
FTE employment rate (% population aged 20-64) 59.0 59.0 57.9 57.1 57.0 56.4 55.0 55.1 55.6 56.5 57.3 57.9
Self-employed (% total employment) 24.3 23.7 23.4 23.7 23.5 23.5 23.4 23.3 23.0 22.6 21.9 21.7
Part-time employment (% total employment) 13.4 14.1 14.1 14.8 15.2 16.8 17.6 18.1 18.3 18.5 18.5 18.4
Temporary employment (% total employment) 9.9 10.0 9.5 9.6 10.1 10.5 10.1 10.4 10.8 10.9 12.1 13.4
Employment in Services (% total employment) 66.5 b 67.1 67.6 68.0 68.7 69.4 69.5 69.6 69.9 70.1 70.0
Employment in Industry (% total employment) 30.0 b 29.4 28.8 28.5 27.8 27.2 27.1 26.8 26.4 26.3 26.4
Employment in Agriculture (% total employment) 3.5 b 3.5 3.6 3.5 3.5 3.4 3.5 3.6 3.7 3.6 3.6
Activity rate (% population aged 15-64) 62.4 62.9 62.3 62.0 62.1 63.5 63.4 63.9 64.0 64.9 65.4 65.6
Labour Market Indicators - Total

Activity rate (% population aged 15-24) 30.8 30.7 28.8 28.1 27.1 28.6 27.1 27.1 26.2 26.6 26.2 26.1
Activity rate (% population aged 25-54) 77.5 78.1 77.2 76.9 76.9 77.8 77.1 77.0 76.8 77.5 77.9 77.9
Activity rate (% population aged 55-64) 34.5 35.4 36.9 37.9 39.3 42.5 45.3 48.9 51.1 53.4 55.4 57.0
Total unemployment (000) 1481 1664 1907 2056 2061 2691 3069 3236 3032 3012 2907 2755
Unemployment rate (% labour force) 6.1 6.7 7.7 8.4 8.4 10.7 12.1 12.7 11.9 11.7 11.2 10.6
Youth unemployment rate (% labour force 15-24) 20.4 21.2 25.3 27.9 29.2 35.3 40.0 42.7 40.3 37.8 34.7 32.2
Long term unemployment rate (% labour force) 2.9 3.0 3.4 4.0 4.3 5.6 6.9 7.7 6.9 6.7 6.5 6.2
Share of long term unemployment (% of total
46.9 45.2 44.3 48.0 51.4 52.6 56.4 60.8 58.1 57.4 57.8 58.1
unemployment)

Youth unemployment ratio (% population aged 15-24) 6.3 6.5 7.3 7.8 7.9 10.1 10.9 11.6 10.6 10.0 9.1 8.4

Employment rate for low skilled 25-64 (ISCED 0-2) 52.6 52.2 51.0 50.2 50.5 50.6 49.5 49.6 b 50.2 51.2 51.8 52.5
Employment rate for medium skilled 25-64 (ISCED 3-
74.4 74.3 73.1 72.5 71.9 71.0 69.7 69.8 b 70.1 70.6 70.9 70.9
4)
Employment rate for high skilled 25-64 (ISCED 5-8) 80.2 80.7 79.4 78.4 79.2 78.8 78.1 77.8 b 78.5 79.8 80.6 81.1
Employment rate (Nationals aged 15-64) 58.1 58.1 56.8 56.2 56.3 56.3 55.2 55.4 56.0 57.0 57.7 58.2
Employment rate (Other EU28 aged 15-64) 70.2 69.5 68.5 68.1 66.5 65.6 63.3 62.6 63.3 63.3 63.8 63.5
Employment rate (Other than EU28 aged 15-64) 66.1 66.0 62.6 60.8 60.5 58.5 56.1 56.7 56.9 57.8 59.1 60.1
Employment rate (Born in the same country aged 15-
57.9 58.0 56.8 56.2 56.2 56.2 55.2 55.3 55.9 56.9 57.6 58.1
64)
Employment rate (Born in other EU28 aged 15-64) 65.3 64.5 63.9 63.8 62.7 61.8 60.1 60.1 60.8 61.0 61.3 61.6
Employment rate (Born outside EU28 aged 15-64) 66.1 65.3 62.1 60.8 60.8 59.2 57.2 57.6 57.6 58.4 59.4 60.6
Underemployment (% of labour force aged 15-74) 1.6 1.6 1.7 1.8 2.3 2.5 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.8 2.6
Seeking but not available (% of labour force aged 15-
0.6 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.4
74)
Discouraged, available but not seeking (% of labour
10.3 10.5 10.5 11.1 11.6 11.7 12.1 13.2 13.6 12.6 11.6 11.2
force aged 15-74)

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268
 Statistical annex - 1. Country profiles

Italy 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Total population (000) 28212 28411 28570 28649 28715 28727 28890 29485 29502 29456 29446 29428
Population aged 15-64(000) 19095 19198 19260 19262 19273 19211 19218 19566 19511 19432 19387 19354
Total employment (000) 13812 13820 13541 13375 13340 13194 12914 12945 13085 13233 13349 13447
Employment aged 15-64 (000) 13515 13513 13252 13088 13050 12873 12584 12590 12718 12853 12934 13007
Employment rate (% population aged 20-64) 75.7 75.3 73.7 72.7 72.5 71.5 69.7 69.7 70.6 71.7 72.3 72.9
Employment rate (% population aged 15-64) 70.6 70.1 68.5 67.5 67.3 66.3 64.7 64.7 65.5 66.5 67.1 67.6
Employment rate (% population aged 15-24) 29.4 29.0 25.9 24.0 22.8 21.8 18.7 18.2 18.6 19.2 20.1 20.8
Employment rate (% population aged 25-54) 87.4 86.8 84.7 83.6 83.4 81.7 79.2 78.2 78.6 79.3 79.9 80.3
Employment rate (% population aged 55-64) 45.0 45.3 46.6 47.6 48.2 50.4 52.8 56.5 59.3 61.7 62.8 64.2
FTE employment rate (% population aged 20-64) 74.4 74.0 72.5 71.4 70.9 69.6 67.6 67.5 68.3 69.3 69.9 70.6
Self-employed (% total employment) 28.8 28.4 28.2 28.7 28.6 28.5 28.5 28.2 27.7 27.1 26.7 26.3
Part-time employment (% total employment) 4.6 4.8 4.7 5.1 5.4 6.6 7.4 7.8 8.0 8.2 8.3 8.0
Temporary employment (% total employment) 7.9 8.2 7.7 8.1 8.7 9.3 8.9 9.5 9.9 9.9 11.1 12.4
Employment in Services (% total employment) 56.5 b 56.5 56.9 57.5 58.0 58.8 58.7 59.0 59.3 59.3 59.4
Employment in Industry (% total employment) 39.5 b 39.3 38.9 38.4 37.7 37.0 37.1 36.6 36.1 36.1 36.1
Employment in Agriculture (% total employment) 4.0 b 4.1 4.3 4.2 4.3 4.2 4.3 4.5 4.6 4.6 4.5
Activity rate (% population aged 15-64) 74.3 74.3 73.5 73.1 72.8 73.7 73.3 73.6 74.1 74.8 75.0 75.1
Labour Market Indicators - Male

Activity rate (% population aged 15-24) 36.0 35.7 33.8 32.8 31.2 32.9 30.7 31.0 30.4 30.2 30.0 29.9
Activity rate (% population aged 25-54) 91.0 91.0 90.0 89.4 89.2 89.4 88.3 87.7 87.7 88.2 88.5 88.4
Activity rate (% population aged 55-64) 46.2 46.8 48.4 49.5 50.5 53.6 56.6 60.2 63.3 65.9 67.0 68.6
Total unemployment (000) 708 804 976 1084 1084 1434 1674 1742 1670 1617 1539 1452
Unemployment rate (% labour force) 4.9 5.5 6.7 7.5 7.5 9.8 11.5 11.9 11.3 10.9 10.3 9.7
Youth unemployment rate (% labour force 15-24) 18.4 18.8 23.2 26.9 27.1 33.7 39.0 41.3 38.8 36.5 33.0 30.4
Long term unemployment rate (% labour force) 2.2 2.4 2.8 3.5 3.8 5.0 6.5 7.1 6.6 6.2 6.1 5.6
Share of long term unemployment (% of total
44.9 43.2 41.8 46.8 50.9 51.2 56.2 59.6 58.1 57.1 58.6 57.5
unemployment)

Youth unemployment ratio (% population aged 15-24) 6.6 6.7 7.8 8.8 8.5 11.1 12.0 12.8 11.8 11.0 9.9 9.1

Employment rate for low skilled 25-64 (ISCED 0-2) 71.4 70.5 69.0 67.8 67.7 66.5 64.4 64.1 b 64.9 66.0 66.8 67.7
Employment rate for medium skilled 25-64 (ISCED 3-
84.2 83.9 82.4 81.8 81.2 80.3 79.1 79.1 b 79.8 80.7 81.0 80.8
4)
Employment rate for high skilled 25-64 (ISCED 5-8) 86.5 86.6 85.0 84.3 85.0 84.2 83.4 83.2 b 84.5 85.7 85.7 86.1
Employment rate (Nationals aged 15-64) 69.8 69.4 67.8 66.8 66.6 65.9 64.3 64.3 65.1 66.0 66.5 67.0
Employment rate (Other EU28 aged 15-64) 85.9 83.1 81.2 79.5 77.0 74.1 71.4 71.0 71.2 70.9 72.0 74.6
Employment rate (Other than EU28 aged 15-64) 83.0 81.7 76.5 74.9 75.0 70.6 66.9 67.0 68.7 70.9 72.6 73.4
Employment rate (Born in the same country aged 15-
69.6 69.2 67.6 66.6 66.3 65.6 64.2 64.1 64.9 65.7 66.3 66.7
64)
Employment rate (Born in other EU28 aged 15-64) 81.9 80.5 78.2 77.1 75.6 72.5 69.2 69.3 70.3 70.5 71.0 73.5
Employment rate (Born outside EU28 aged 15-64) 82.6 81.1 76.9 75.6 75.6 72.2 68.4 68.5 69.9 72.1 73.0 74.0
Underemployment (% of labour force aged 15-74) 0.9 0.9 0.9 1.1 1.4 1.6 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 1.8
Seeking but not available (% of labour force aged 15-
0.4 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.4
74)
Discouraged, available but not seeking (% of labour
5.9 6.2 6.6 7.3 7.9 7.6 8.3 9.2 9.4 8.9 8.4 8.1
force aged 15-74)
Total population (000) 30012 30242 30431 30541 30649 30668 30796 31298 31294 31209 31144 31056
Population aged 15-64(000) 19212 19354 19455 19501 19568 19488 19479 19753 19682 19582 19492 19405
Total employment (000) 9083 9270 9158 9152 9258 9372 9276 9334 9380 9525 9674 9768
Employment aged 15-64 (000) 9002 9186 9072 9064 9165 9276 9171 9220 9255 9388 9510 9579
Employment rate (% population aged 20-64) 49.9 50.6 49.7 49.5 49.9 50.5 49.9 50.3 50.6 51.6 52.5 53.1
Employment rate (% population aged 15-64) 46.6 47.2 46.4 46.1 46.5 47.1 46.5 46.8 47.2 48.1 48.9 49.5
Employment rate (% population aged 15-24) 19.5 19.2 16.9 16.3 15.5 15.0 13.7 12.8 12.4 13.7 13.9 14.3
Employment rate (% population aged 25-54) 59.6 60.2 59.1 58.8 59.0 59.2 58.0 57.6 57.9 58.5 59.0 59.4
Employment rate (% population aged 55-64) 23.0 23.9 25.3 26.1 28.1 30.8 33.2 36.6 37.9 39.7 42.3 43.9
FTE employment rate (% population aged 20-64) 44.4 44.9 44.1 43.7 44.0 44.1 43.2 43.4 43.7 44.4 45.4 46.1
Self-employed (% total employment) 17.4 16.8 16.3 16.3 16.1 16.3 16.2 16.5 16.5 16.3 15.4 15.3
Part-time employment (% total employment) 26.8 27.7 27.8 28.8 29.1 30.9 31.7 32.1 32.4 32.7 32.5 32.4
Temporary employment (% total employment) 12.8 12.6 12.0 11.8 12.0 12.2 11.7 11.6 12.0 12.1 13.4 14.8
Employment in Services (% total employment) 81.3 b 82.5 83.2 83.1 83.6 83.9 84.2 84.3 84.5 84.8 84.5
Employment in Industry (% total employment) 15.9 b 14.9 14.2 14.4 13.9 13.8 13.5 13.4 13.0 12.9 13.2
Employment in Agriculture (% total employment) 2.8 b 2.6 2.7 2.6 2.5 2.4 2.3 2.4 2.5 2.3 2.3
Activity rate (% population aged 15-64) 50.6 51.6 51.1 51.1 51.4 53.4 53.6 54.4 54.1 55.2 55.9 56.2
Labour Market Indicators - Female

Activity rate (% population aged 15-24) 25.4 25.5 23.7 23.1 22.8 24.0 23.4 23.1 21.7 22.8 22.1 21.9
Activity rate (% population aged 25-54) 64.1 65.3 64.6 64.5 64.7 66.5 66.1 66.4 65.9 66.8 67.3 67.4
Activity rate (% population aged 55-64) 23.4 24.6 26.0 26.9 28.8 32.2 34.7 38.3 39.6 41.7 44.5 46.1
Total unemployment (000) 773 861 930 972 977 1257 1394 1494 1362 1395 1368 1304
Unemployment rate (% labour force) 7.8 8.5 9.2 9.6 9.5 11.8 13.1 13.8 12.7 12.8 12.4 11.8
Youth unemployment rate (% labour force 15-24) 23.3 24.7 28.5 29.4 32.1 37.6 41.5 44.7 42.5 39.6 37.3 34.8
Long term unemployment rate (% labour force) 3.8 4.0 4.3 4.7 5.0 6.4 7.4 8.6 7.4 7.4 7.1 6.9
Share of long term unemployment (% of total
48.7 47.1 46.9 49.4 51.9 54.2 56.5 62.1 58.0 57.7 57.0 58.7
unemployment)

Youth unemployment ratio (% population aged 15-24) 5.9 6.3 6.8 6.8 7.3 9.0 9.7 10.3 9.2 9.0 8.2 7.6

Employment rate for low skilled 25-64 (ISCED 0-2) 33.5 33.5 32.8 32.4 32.9 34.0 34.0 34.1 b 34.5 35.1 35.5 35.9
Employment rate for medium skilled 25-64 (ISCED 3-
64.5 64.6 63.6 63.2 62.7 61.9 60.4 60.6 b 60.4 60.6 60.8 60.8
4)
Employment rate for high skilled 25-64 (ISCED 5-8) 75.0 76.0 74.8 73.6 74.5 74.7 73.9 73.7 b 73.9 75.5 77.0 77.5
Employment rate (Nationals aged 15-64) 46.3 46.8 45.9 45.7 46.1 46.6 46.1 46.4 46.9 47.9 48.8 49.4
Employment rate (Other EU28 aged 15-64) 59.9 59.8 59.5 59.5 59.0 60.0 57.8 56.9 57.8 58.1 58.2 56.0
Employment rate (Other than EU28 aged 15-64) 48.7 50.1 48.6 47.2 47.0 47.0 45.8 46.7 45.6 45.1 45.9 46.9
Employment rate (Born in the same country aged 15-
46.2 46.8 45.9 45.7 46.1 46.7 46.1 46.4 46.9 48.0 48.8 49.4
64)
Employment rate (Born in other EU28 aged 15-64) 54.2 53.7 54.4 54.4 53.8 54.9 54.1 53.9 54.3 54.7 54.9 53.9
Employment rate (Born outside EU28 aged 15-64) 50.1 50.2 48.1 47.3 47.5 47.4 46.9 47.4 46.1 45.6 46.7 48.2
Underemployment (% of labour force aged 15-74) 2.6 2.8 2.8 2.8 3.5 3.6 4.2 4.2 4.0 3.9 3.7
Seeking but not available (% of labour force aged 15-
0.9 0.9 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.6 0.5 0.6 0.6
74)
Discouraged, available but not seeking (% of labour
16.8 16.7 15.9 16.6 16.7 17.2 17.4 18.6 19.3 17.6 16.0 15.4
force aged 15-74)

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269
Employment and Social Developments in Europe 2019

Italy 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
At-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion (% of total
26.0 25.5 24.9 25.0 28.1 29.9 28.5 28.3 28.7 30.0 28.9
population)
At-risk-of-poverty (% of total population) 19.5 18.9 18.4 18.7 19.8 19.5 19.3 19.4 19.9 20.6 20.3
At-risk-of-poverty threshold (PPS single person) 8698 9158 9140 9135 9466 9297 9189 9152 9237 9742 9904
Poverty gap (%) 22.7 23.2 23.1 24.8 26.6 26.0 28.2 28.2 29.3 31.6 28.1
Persistent at-risk-of-poverty (% of total
14.6 12.7 13.0 11.6 11.8 13.1 13.2 12.9 14.3 14.5 13.9
population)
At-risk-of-poverty before social transfers excl.
23.7 23.5 23.3 23.7 24.6 24.5 24.6 24.7 25.4 26.2 25.2
pensions (% of total population)
Impact of social transfers (excl. pensions) in
17.7 19.6 21.0 21.1 19.5 20.4 21.6 21.5 21.7 21.4 19.4
reducing poverty (%)
All

Severe Material Deprivation (% of total population) 7.0 7.5 7.3 7.4 11.1 14.5 12.3 11.6 11.5 12.1 10.1 8.4 p
Share of people living in low work intensity households
10.2 10.4 9.2 10.6 10.5 10.6 11.3 12.1 11.7 12.8 11.8
(% of people aged 0-59)
Real Gross Household Disposable income (growth %) 1.4 -1.2 -2.0 -1.5 -0.3 -5.3 -0.8 0.3 1.3 1.1 0.6
Income quintile share ratio S80/S20 5.4 5.2 5.3 5.4 5.7 5.6 5.8 5.8 5.8 6.3 5.9
GINI coefficient 32.0 31.2 31.8 31.7 32.5 32.4 32.8 32.4 32.4 33.1 32.7
Early leavers from education and training (% of
19.5 19.6 19.1 18.6 17.8 17.3 16.8 15.0 b 14.7 13.8 14.0 14.5
population aged 18-24)
NEET: Young people neither in employment nor in
education and training (% of total population aged 15- 16.1 16.6 17.5 19.0 19.6 20.9 22.1 22.0 21.3 19.8 20.0 19.2
24)
At-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion (% of male
23.8 23.5 22.9 23.1 26.3 27.8 27.1 27.0 27.7 29.1 27.8
population)
At-risk-of-poverty (% of male population) 18.1 17.4 16.9 17.3 18.4 18.1 18.3 18.4 19.0 19.9 19.4
Poverty gap (%) 23.3 23.0 22.8 25.2 28.1 27.3 29.3 29.4 30.4 32.3 29.2
Persistent at-risk-of-poverty (% of male
13.4 11.5 11.8 9.9 10.9 11.4 11.7 12.0 12.7 13.2 13.4
population)
Severe Material Deprivation (% of male population) 6.7 7.2 7.0 7.2 10.7 13.9 12.3 11.7 11.7 12.1 10.3 8.5 p
Male

Share of people living in low work intensity households

8.8 8.8 7.7 9.1 9.2 9.2 10.3 11.4 10.7 12.2 11.2
(% of males aged 0-59)
Life expectancy at birth (years) 78.8 b 78.9 79.4 80.1 79.8 80.3 80.7 80.3 81.0 b 80.8 b
Healthy life years at birth (years) - men 63.4 b 62.9 63.4 63.5 62.1 61.8 62.5 62.6 67.6 b
Early leavers from education and training (% of males
22.6 22.4 21.8 21.8 20.6 20.2 20.0 17.7 b 17.5 16.1 16.6 16.5
aged 18-24)
NEET: Young people neither in employment nor in
15.1 15.2 17.0 18.9 19.4 21.1 22.8 22.7 21.8 20.0 20.2 19.0
education and training ( % of males aged 15-24)
At-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion (% of female
28.0 27.4 26.7 26.8 29.8 31.9 29.8 29.5 29.6 30.8 29.8
population)
At-risk-of-poverty (% of female population) 20.9 20.4 19.9 20.0 21.1 20.8 20.3 20.5 20.8 21.4 21.1
Poverty gap (%) 22.2 23.2 23.3 24.6 25.8 24.9 27.6 27.7 28.1 30.8 27.5
Persistent at-risk-of-poverty (% of female
15.6 13.7 14.1 13.3 12.7 14.8 14.6 13.7 15.7 15.7 14.4
population)
Social Indicators

Severe Material Deprivation (% of female population) 7.4 7.8 7.6 7.5 11.4 15.0 12.4 11.5 11.2 12.1 10.0 8.3 p
Female

Share of people living in low work intensity households

11.7 12.0 10.7 12.1 11.8 12.0 12.3 12.8 12.7 13.5 12.5
(% of females aged 0-59)
Life expectancy at birth (years) 84.2 b 84.2 84.6 85.3 84.8 85.2 85.6 84.9 85.6 b 85.2 b
Healthy life years at birth (years) - women 62.6 b 61.8 62.6 62.7 61.5 60.9 62.3 62.7 67.2 b
Early leavers from education and training (% of
16.4 16.7 16.2 15.3 14.9 14.3 13.6 12.2 b 11.8 11.3 11.2 12.3
females aged 18-24)
NEET: Young people neither in employment nor in
17.2 18.0 18.1 19.0 19.9 20.8 21.4 21.4 20.8 19.5 19.7 19.4
education and training ( % of females aged 15-24)
At-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion of children (% of
28.6 28.4 28.7 29.5 31.5 34.1 32.0 32.1 33.5 33.2 32.1
people aged 0-17)
At-risk-of-poverty (% of Children population) 24.6 24.2 24.1 25.2 25.9 26.2 25.2 25.1 26.8 26.7 26.4
Children (0-17)

Severe Material Deprivation (% of Children

7.8 8.6 8.5 8.6 12.1 16.8 13.5 13.7 13.0 12.4 9.8 8.1 p
population)
Share of children living in low work intensity
6.7 7.0 6.1 7.5 7.5 7.1 8.0 9.3 8.6 9.3 8.2
households (% of Children population)
Risk of poverty of children in households at work
20.5 20.0 20.9 20.6 21.6 22.1 20.6 19.5 21.6 21.5 21.9
(Working Intensity > 0.2)
Impact of social transfers (excl. pensions) in reducing
20.9 21.9 24.2 23.2 21.0 22.0 25.4 23.9 22.1 24.2 21.7
poverty (0-17) (%)
At-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion (% of working
25.3 25.0 24.4 25.3 28.5 30.4 29.7 30.0 30.4 31.5 30.5
age population)
At-risk-of-poverty (% of Working age population) 17.2 16.8 16.5 17.5 19.0 18.7 19.1 19.7 19.8 20.9 20.3
Working age

Severe Material Deprivation (% of Working age

7.0 7.4 7.4 7.4 10.9 14.4 12.7 12.0 12.2 12.3 10.5 9.0 p
(18-64)

population)
Very low work intensity (18-59) 11.3 11.5 10.2 11.5 11.5 11.7 12.4 13.0 12.7 13.9 12.9
In-work at-risk-of poverty rate (% of persons
9.4 9.1 10.2 9.7 11.1 11.1 11.2 11.1 11.6 11.8 12.3
employed 18-64)
Impact of social transfers (excl. pensions) in reducing
20.0 21.9 23.3 22.6 21.2 22.4 22.7 22.4 23.9 22.6 21.6
poverty (18-64) (%)
At-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion of elderly (% of
25.5 24.4 22.9 20.4 24.0 24.7 22.0 20.2 19.9 23.2 22.0
people aged 65+)
Elderly (65+)

At-risk-of-poverty (% of Elderly population) 22.2 20.9 19.6 16.7 17.0 16.1 15.0 14.2 14.7 15.3 15.6

Severe Material Deprivation (% of Elderly population) 6.5 6.7 5.9 6.3 10.8 12.7 10.3 8.8 8.2 11.1 9.4 7.0 p
Relative median income of elderly (ratio with median
0.86 0.88 0.89 0.92 0.92 0.96 0.97 0.99 0.99 1.01 1.02
income of people younger than 65)
Aggregate replacement ratio (ratio) 0.49 0.51 0.51 0.53 0.55 0.59 0.62 0.64 0.66 0.69 0.71
Sickness/Health care 6.4 6.7 7.0 7.0 6.8 6.8 6.8 6.8 p 6.6 p 6.6 p
protection indicators
Expenditure in social

Disability 1.4 1.4 1.6 1.6 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.7 p 1.7 p 1.7 p
Old age and survivors 14.5 14.9 15.9 16.3 16.2 16.7 17.0 16.8 p 16.8 p 16.4 p
(% of GDP)

Family/Children 1.1 1.1 1.3 1.1 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.6 p 1.7 p 1.8 p
Unemployment 1.1 1.1 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.6 1.8 1.7 p 1.7 p 1.7 p
Housing and Social exclusion n.e.c. 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 p 0.3 p 0.3 p
Total (including Admin and Other expenditures) 25.7 26.7 28.8 28.9 28.5 29.3 29.8 29.9 p 29.9 p 29.5 p
of which: Means tested benefits 1.5 1.5 1.8 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 2.1 p 2.2 p 2.3 p

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270
 Statistical annex - 1. Country profiles

Cyprus
Cyprus 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Real GDP 5.1 3.6 -2.0 1.3 0.4 -2.9 -5.8 -1.3 2.0 4.8 4.5 p 3.9 p
Total employment 4.4 3.5 0.0 0.5 0.0 -3.2 -5.9 -1.8 1.5 4.6 4.3 p 4.0 p
Labour productivity 0.6 0.1 -2.0 0.9 0.4 0.3 0.1 0.5 0.5 0.2 0.2 p -0.1 p
Macro Economic Indicators

Annual average hours worked per person employed 1.6 1.1 -0.7 -0.8 -0.8 -0.4 -1.6 -0.5 -0.1 0.1 -0.2 p -0.4 p
(Annual % growth)

Real productivity per hour worked -0.9 -1.0 -1.4 1.6 1.2 0.7 1.8 1.0 0.5 0.1 0.4 p 0.2 p
Harmonized CPI 2.2 4.4 0.2 2.6 3.5 3.1 0.4 -0.3 -1.5 -1.2 0.7 0.8
Price deflator GDP 4.1 4.7 0.3 2.0 1.8 1.7 -1.2 -1.6 -1.2 -0.6 1.7 p 1.6 p
Nominal compensation per employee 1.9 3.2 5.7 0.7 2.1 1.7 -5.4 -3.5 -1.3 -1.1 0.7 p 0.1 p
Real compensation per employee (GDP deflator) -2.2 -1.4 5.4 -1.3 0.2 0.0 -4.2 -1.9 -0.1 -0.5 -1.0 p -1.4 p
Real compensation per employee (private consumption
-0.3 -1.1 5.5 -1.9 -1.4 -1.3 -5.7 -3.3 0.3 0.1 0.1 p -0.6 p
deflator)
Nominal unit labour costs 1.2 3.1 7.9 -0.2 1.7 1.4 -5.5 -4.0 -1.7 -1.4 0.6 p 0.3 p
Real unit labour costs -2.8 -1.5 7.7 -2.2 -0.1 -0.3 -4.4 -2.4 -0.6 -0.7 -1.2 p -1.2 p
Total population (000) 758 776 797 819 840 862 866 858 847 848 855 864
Population aged 15-64 (000) 521 539 557 576 592 609 610 599 584 581 582 587
Total employment (000) 378 383 383 b 395 398 385 365 363 358 363 380 401
Employment aged 15-64 (000) 368 371 371 b 382 386 375 357 355 350 354 370 390
Employment rate (% population aged 20-64) 76.8 76.5 75.3 b 75.0 73.4 70.2 67.2 67.6 67.9 68.7 70.8 73.9
Employment rate (% population aged 15-64) 71.0 70.9 69.0 b 68.9 67.6 64.6 61.7 62.1 62.7 63.7 65.6 68.6
Employment rate (% population aged 15-24) 37.4 38.0 34.8 b 33.8 30.1 28.1 23.5 25.8 25.5 26.4 27.6 31.3
Employment rate (% population aged 25-54) 83.8 83.7 82.3 b 82.2 81.3 78.4 75.5 76.2 76.5 76.6 78.4 80.4
Employment rate (% population aged 55-64) 55.9 54.8 55.7 b 56.3 54.8 50.7 49.6 46.9 48.5 52.2 55.3 60.9
FTE employment rate (% population aged 20-64) 75.2 74.9 73.3 b 72.4 70.6 67.1 63.2 63.1 63.5 64.1 66.5 70.2
Self-employed (% total employment) 18.6 18.1 17.4 b 16.5 16.1 14.8 15.9 16.1 13.6 13.0 12.4 12.6
Part-time employment (% total employment) 6.4 6.8 7.5 b 8.3 9.0 9.7 11.9 13.5 13.0 13.4 12.2 10.8
Temporary employment (% total employment) 10.8 11.4 11.3 b 11.7 11.9 12.9 14.7 15.8 15.9 14.4 13.5 12.2
Employment in Services (% total employment) 75.2 bu 76.5 u 76.0 u 77.4 u 79.8 u 80.1 u 79.7 u 80.7 u
Employment in Industry (% total employment) 22.0 bu 20.7 u 21.1 u 20.3 u 17.7 u 16.3 u 17.1 u 17.2 u
Employment in Agriculture (% total employment) 3.1 b 2.8 b 2.8 2.9 2.3 2.5 3.9 3.6 3.2 2.1 1.8
Activity rate (% population aged 15-64) 73.9 73.6 73.0 b 73.6 73.5 73.5 73.6 74.3 73.9 73.4 73.9 75.0
Labour Market Indicators - Total

Activity rate (% population aged 15-24) 41.7 41.7 40.4 b 40.6 38.8 38.9 38.4 40.3 37.9 37.2 36.6 39.2
Activity rate (% population aged 25-54) 86.7 86.5 86.3 b 86.9 87.3 87.6 87.7 88.4 87.9 86.8 87.5 87.2
Activity rate (% population aged 55-64) 57.7 56.6 58.2 b 59.1 57.6 56.1 56.6 56.0 57.4 59.0 60.0 64.7
Total unemployment (000) 15 15 22 26 34 52 69 70 63 54 47 37
Unemployment rate (% labour force) 3.9 3.7 5.4 6.3 7.9 11.9 15.9 16.1 15.0 13.0 11.1 8.4
Youth unemployment rate (% labour force 15-24) 10.2 9.0 13.8 16.6 22.4 27.7 38.9 36.0 32.8 29.1 24.7 20.2
Long term unemployment rate (% labour force) 0.7 0.5 0.6 b 1.3 1.6 3.6 6.1 7.7 6.8 5.8 4.5 2.7
Share of long term unemployment (% of total
18.6 13.6 10.4 b 20.4 20.8 30.1 38.3 47.7 45.6 44.4 40.6 31.7
unemployment)

Youth unemployment ratio (% population aged 15-24) 4.2 3.8 5.6 b 6.7 8.7 10.8 14.9 14.5 12.4 10.8 9.0 7.9

Employment rate for low skilled 25-64 (ISCED 0-2) 66.1 63.6 64.3 b 66.1 64.8 57.9 55.5 54.5 b 55.3 56.9 57.8 62.0
Employment rate for medium skilled 25-64 (ISCED 3-
79.3 79.5 77.8 b 77.1 75.9 73.3 69.7 69.6 b 69.3 69.8 73.0 76.0
4)
Employment rate for high skilled 25-64 (ISCED 5-8) 87.6 87.6 86.2 b 84.7 83.3 80.8 79.0 79.7 b 80.2 80.0 80.7 82.1
Employment rate (Nationals aged 15-64) 70.9 70.5 68.8 b 68.1 66.5 63.3 60.7 60.8 61.6 63.2 65.2 68.8
Employment rate (Other EU28 aged 15-64) 66.4 73.0 71.2 b 72.1 70.8 67.0 61.2 63.0 64.0 67.1 69.4 68.6
Employment rate (Other than EU28 aged 15-64) 76.7 72.4 67.8 b 71.8 73.4 73.4 73.1 75.3 72.9 63.6 63.5 65.9
Employment rate (Born in the same country aged 15-
70.8 70.4 68.6 b 68.0 66.6 63.2 60.3 60.4 61.3 63.2 65.0 68.9
64)
Employment rate (Born in other EU28 aged 15-64) 67.1 71.7 69.9 b 72.3 71.3 68.0 64.2 65.6 65.4 67.1 69.6 67.7
Employment rate (Born outside EU28 aged 15-64) 75.2 73.4 70.6 b 70.6 69.7 69.3 67.8 70.7 69.2 63.5 65.1 67.7
Underemployment (% of labour force aged 15-74) 1.9 2.3 b 2.7 3.8 4.7 6.2 7.8 7.8 7.8 7.0 5.4
Seeking but not available (% of labour force aged 15-
0.3 u 0.5 0.6 b 0.8 0.4 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.6 0.9 1.4 1.6
74)
Discouraged, available but not seeking (% of labour
1.5 1.2 1.4 b 2.3 3.4 3.5 4.6 4.6 4.6 3.6 2.5 1.8
force aged 15-74)

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271
Employment and Social Developments in Europe 2019

Cyprus 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Total population (000) 372 380 390 400 409 419 421 418 412 413 417 422
Population aged 15-64(000) 256 264 272 280 288 296 296 291 283 282 284 286
Total employment (000) 210 212 205 b 209 209 202 190 185 184 188 198 210
Employment aged 15-64 (000) 202 203 196 b 199 200 194 184 180 178 182 191 201
Employment rate (% population aged 20-64) 86.4 85.2 82.8 b 81.7 79.6 76.1 72.6 71.6 72.3 73.8 75.7 79.3
Employment rate (% population aged 15-64) 80.0 79.2 76.3 b 75.3 73.7 70.4 67.0 66.0 66.7 68.6 70.0 73.3
Employment rate (% population aged 15-24) 39.1 39.4 36.4 b 34.4 31.8 30.5 24.0 25.8 24.0 26.5 24.2 27.3
Employment rate (% population aged 25-54) 92.4 91.4 89.2 b 88.3 86.4 83.3 80.4 79.6 80.6 81.7 83.6 86.2
Employment rate (% population aged 55-64) 72.5 70.9 71.2 b 70.5 69.2 63.5 61.1 57.1 57.8 61.0 64.9 70.3
FTE employment rate (% population aged 20-64) 86.5 85.2 82.5 b 80.5 78.0 74.1 70.0 68.3 68.5 69.6 72.2 76.5
Self-employed (% total employment) 25.2 24.7 23.4 b 22.1 21.8 20.5 21.9 21.6 16.9 16.7 15.2 15.5
Part-time employment (% total employment) 3.0 3.4 4.0 b 5.1 6.1 6.4 8.4 10.3 10.3 11.3 9.1 7.5
Temporary employment (% total employment) 5.8 6.3 5.9 b 5.6 5.6 7.3 8.1 10.3 11.0 9.8 10.3 9.0
Employment in Services (% total employment) 63.6 bu 63.4 u 65.7 u 67.8 u
Employment in Industry (% total employment) 33.1 bu 32.8 u 31.3 u 27.2 u
Employment in Agriculture (% total employment) 3.9 b 3.3 b 3.7 3.8 3.0 3.7 5.9 5.2 4.9 3.3 2.5
Activity rate (% population aged 15-64) 82.9 82.0 80.7 b 80.4 80.4 80.7 80.6 80.0 78.8 78.7 78.8 79.9
Labour Market Indicators - Male

Activity rate (% population aged 15-24) 43.9 43.1 42.1 b 40.9 41.4 42.8 40.8 41.2 36.8 35.8 33.2 36.5
Activity rate (% population aged 25-54) 95.0 94.0 93.5 b 93.4 93.1 93.8 94.0 93.5 92.6 92.2 92.9 92.7
Activity rate (% population aged 55-64) 74.8 73.0 74.4 b 74.3 72.9 71.2 71.2 69.9 70.0 70.5 71.6 75.2
Total unemployment (000) 7 7 11 14 18 29 38 38 33 27 24 18
Unemployment rate (% labour force) 3.4 3.2 5.3 6.2 8.1 12.6 16.6 17.1 15.1 12.7 10.9 8.1
Youth unemployment rate (% labour force 15-24) 11.0 8.7 13.6 15.9 23.3 28.8 41.1 37.4 34.7 25.8 27.0 25.0
Long term unemployment rate (% labour force) 0.8 0.5 u 0.6 bu 1.3 1.7 3.9 6.5 8.3 7.4 6.4 5.0 2.6
Share of long term unemployment (% of total
23.0 16.1 u 10.4 bu 20.9 21.4 31.4 39.1 48.6 49.2 50.5 45.5 31.6
unemployment)

Youth unemployment ratio (% population aged 15-24) 4.8 3.7 5.7 b 6.5 9.6 12.3 16.8 15.4 12.8 9.2 9.0 9.1

Employment rate for low skilled 25-64 (ISCED 0-2) 84.7 80.2 78.4 b 76.2 74.4 67.2 62.2 59.9 b 61.8 64.3 67.2 73.0
Employment rate for medium skilled 25-64 (ISCED 3-
88.4 88.8 86.9 b 86.2 84.4 79.5 77.7 75.1 b 75.3 77.9 80.0 82.6
4)
Employment rate for high skilled 25-64 (ISCED 5-8) 92.0 90.9 89.2 b 88.8 87.0 85.5 82.9 83.8 b 84.4 83.6 85.1 87.4
Employment rate (Nationals aged 15-64) 80.6 80.6 78.0 b 76.2 74.2 70.4 66.9 65.7 65.9 68.4 69.7 73.5
Employment rate (Other EU28 aged 15-64) 80.5 80.9 78.4 b 79.9 77.0 72.9 67.2 67.5 70.8 73.9 77.3 76.1
Employment rate (Other than EU28 aged 15-64) 67.8 58.5 48.3 b 53.2 58.4 63.0 68.7 68.3 70.2 59.8 60.9 66.2
Employment rate (Born in the same country aged 15-
80.5 80.3 78.0 b 76.0 74.0 70.2 66.4 65.3 65.8 68.2 69.6 73.4
64)
Employment rate (Born in other EU28 aged 15-64) 80.6 82.1 76.8 b 81.6 80.5 77.1 73.9 72.8 73.5 73.9 77.5 75.7
Employment rate (Born outside EU28 aged 15-64) 74.6 68.3 61.7 b 62.7 62.6 62.2 63.6 65.1 65.9 64.5 65.1 70.0
Underemployment (% of labour force aged 15-74) 1.2 1.7 b 2.0 3.2 3.9 5.0 6.5 7.0 7.8 6.3 4.7
Seeking but not available (% of labour force aged 15-
0.2 u 0.3 u 0.5 bu 0.6 u 0.4 u 0.8 0.7 0.8 0.6 u 0.8 1.0 1.3
74)
Discouraged, available but not seeking (% of labour
0.7 u 0.7 u 1.0 b 2.1 2.7 2.6 3.3 3.4 3.5 2.6 2.1 1.4
force aged 15-74)
Total population (000) 386 396 407 420 431 443 445 440 435 436 438 443
Population aged 15-64(000) 265 275 284 295 304 314 314 308 301 299 299 300
Total employment (000) 169 171 178 b 187 189 184 175 178 175 175 182 191
Employment aged 15-64 (000) 166 168 175 b 183 186 181 173 176 172 172 179 188
Employment rate (% population aged 20-64) 67.7 68.2 68.3 b 68.8 67.7 64.8 62.2 63.9 64.0 64.1 66.2 68.9
Employment rate (% population aged 15-64) 62.4 62.9 62.3 b 63.0 62.1 59.4 56.9 58.6 59.0 59.3 61.4 64.2
Employment rate (% population aged 15-24) 36.0 36.7 33.3 b 33.3 28.7 26.1 23.0 25.9 26.8 26.2 30.7 35.0
Employment rate (% population aged 25-54) 75.5 76.2 76.2 b 76.7 76.7 74.0 71.1 73.1 72.7 72.0 73.5 75.0
Employment rate (% population aged 55-64) 40.3 39.4 40.6 b 42.5 40.8 38.2 38.3 36.9 39.5 43.7 46.2 51.9
FTE employment rate (% population aged 20-64) 64.6 65.0 64.8 b 65.1 63.9 60.7 57.1 58.5 58.9 59.1 61.4 64.5
Self-employed (% total employment) 10.5 9.9 10.6 b 10.2 9.7 8.7 9.4 10.3 10.2 9.1 9.3 9.5
Part-time employment (% total employment) 10.4 10.8 11.5 b 11.8 12.1 13.1 15.6 16.8 15.8 15.6 15.6 14.4
Temporary employment (% total employment) 16.8 17.6 17.5 b 18.3 18.6 18.9 21.7 21.5 20.9 19.2 16.9 15.5
Employment in Services (% total employment)
Employment in Industry (% total employment)
Employment in Agriculture (% total employment) 2.1 b 2.2 b 1.9 1.8 1.4 1.3 1.8 1.9 1.4 0.8 1.0
Activity rate (% population aged 15-64) 65.4 65.7 66.0 b 67.4 67.4 66.9 67.2 69.1 69.4 68.5 69.3 70.4
Labour Market Indicators - Female

Activity rate (% population aged 15-24) 39.7 40.5 38.8 b 40.2 36.6 35.5 36.3 39.5 38.9 38.5 39.8 41.8
Activity rate (% population aged 25-54) 78.7 79.1 79.8 b 81.0 82.0 82.0 82.0 83.9 83.8 81.8 82.5 82.1
Activity rate (% population aged 55-64) 41.6 41.0 42.3 b 44.3 42.7 41.3 42.3 42.5 45.3 47.8 48.9 54.6
Total unemployment (000) 8 8 10 13 16 23 31 32 30 27 23 18
Unemployment rate (% labour force) 4.6 4.3 5.5 6.4 7.7 11.1 15.2 15.1 14.8 13.4 11.3 8.8
Youth unemployment rate (% labour force 15-24) 9.4 9.4 14.0 17.2 21.5 26.7 36.8 34.6 31.1 31.8 22.9 16.2
Long term unemployment rate (% labour force) 0.7 u 0.5 u 0.6 bu 1.3 1.5 3.1 5.6 7.0 6.2 5.1 4.0 2.8
Share of long term unemployment (% of total
14.6 u 11.3 u 10.4 bu 19.7 20.0 28.4 37.2 46.6 41.8 38.3 35.5 31.9
unemployment)

Youth unemployment ratio (% population aged 15-24) 3.7 3.8 5.4 b 6.9 7.9 9.5 13.3 13.7 12.1 12.2 9.1 6.8

Employment rate for low skilled 25-64 (ISCED 0-2) 49.6 49.1 52.4 b 57.4 56.0 50.2 49.7 49.5 b 49.3 49.7 48.9 50.8
Employment rate for medium skilled 25-64 (ISCED 3-
69.9 69.2 68.6 b 68.1 67.1 66.8 61.4 63.7 b 62.9 61.1 65.1 68.5
4)
Employment rate for high skilled 25-64 (ISCED 5-8) 83.4 84.5 83.6 b 81.1 80.5 76.9 75.7 76.5 b 76.8 77.2 77.3 78.0
Employment rate (Nationals aged 15-64) 61.2 60.4 60.1 b 60.2 59.1 56.5 54.5 56.1 57.3 58.3 60.9 64.3
Employment rate (Other EU28 aged 15-64) 54.0 65.6 64.2 b 64.7 64.5 61.2 55.8 58.7 57.8 60.6 61.9 62.2
Employment rate (Other than EU28 aged 15-64) 81.2 81.1 79.2 b 81.3 80.2 77.4 74.6 78.1 74.0 65.8 65.2 65.7
Employment rate (Born in the same country aged 15-
60.7 60.3 59.4 b 60.0 59.3 56.1 54.1 55.4 56.7 58.2 60.4 64.2
64)
Employment rate (Born in other EU28 aged 15-64) 57.5 63.2 64.0 b 64.6 63.2 60.0 56.5 60.1 58.7 61.2 62.9 61.7
Employment rate (Born outside EU28 aged 15-64) 75.5 77.0 76.4 b 75.3 73.8 72.9 69.8 73.5 70.7 62.9 65.1 66.0
Underemployment (% of labour force aged 15-74) 2.7 3.1 b 3.5 4.5 5.5 7.5 9.1 8.7 7.8 7.7 6.1
Seeking but not available (% of labour force aged 15-
0.4 u 0.6 u 0.7 bu 1.0 0.5 u 0.7 u 0.8 0.8 0.7 u 1.0 1.9 2.0
74)
Discouraged, available but not seeking (% of labour
2.4 1.8 2.0 b 2.6 4.2 4.5 6.0 5.9 5.9 4.6 3.0 2.2
force aged 15-74)

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272
 Statistical annex - 1. Country profiles

Cyprus 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
At-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion (% of total
25.2 23.3 b 23.5 24.6 24.6 27.1 27.8 27.4 28.9 27.7 25.2
population)
At-risk-of-poverty (% of total population) 15.5 15.9 15.8 15.6 14.8 14.7 15.3 14.4 16.2 16.1 15.7
At-risk-of-poverty threshold (PPS single person) 10951 10945 b 11256 10816 11497 11444 10299 9457 9188 9704 9886
Poverty gap (%) 19.7 15.3 b 17.2 18.0 19.0 19.0 17.7 18.5 19.8 17.3 15.1
Persistent at-risk-of-poverty (% of total
9.9 10.1 9.2 8.6 8.3 10.0 7.3 7.3 7.6 6.6
population)
At-risk-of-poverty before social transfers excl.
21.0 22.9 b 23.6 23.5 23.5 23.5 24.3 24.6 25.4 25.0 24.5
pensions (% of total population)
Impact of social transfers (excl. pensions) in
26.2 30.6 b 33.1 33.6 37.0 37.5 37.0 41.5 36.2 35.6 35.9
reducing poverty (%)
All

Severe Material Deprivation (% of total population) 13.3 9.1 9.5 11.2 11.7 15.0 16.1 15.3 15.4 13.6 11.5 10.5 p
Share of people living in low work intensity households
3.7 4.5 b 4.0 4.9 4.9 6.5 7.9 9.7 10.9 10.6 9.4
(% of people aged 0-59)
Real Gross Household Disposable income (growth %) 3.2 6.7 -2.7 1.2 -0.6 -4.0 -4.7 -8.2 1.7 6.0
Income quintile share ratio S80/S20 4.4 4.3 b 4.4 4.5 4.3 4.7 4.9 5.4 5.2 4.9 4.6
GINI coefficient 29.8 29.0 b 29.5 30.1 29.2 31.0 32.4 34.8 33.6 32.1 30.8
Early leavers from education and training (% of
12.5 13.7 11.7 b 12.7 11.3 11.4 9.1 6.8 b 5.2 7.6 8.5 7.8
population aged 18-24)
NEET: Young people neither in employment nor in
education and training (% of total population aged 15- 9.0 9.7 9.9 b 11.7 14.6 16.0 18.7 17.0 15.3 16.0 16.1 13.2
24)
At-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion (% of male
22.7 20.5 b 20.9 22.8 22.8 25.1 26.8 26.0 28.1 26.6 24.0
population)
At-risk-of-poverty (% of male population) 13.5 13.7 13.7 13.8 12.9 12.9 14.1 13.1 15.3 15.0 14.6
Poverty gap (%) 18.3 14.0 b 14.6 16.6 17.9 18.3 17.4 18.0 21.3 18.9 15.6
Persistent at-risk-of-poverty (% of male
8.2 7.4 7.3 7.5 6.3 8.7 5.7 6.2 6.7 5.2
population)
Severe Material Deprivation (% of male population) 12.5 9.0 9.1 11.5 12.0 15.1 16.6 15.6 15.9 14.0 11.7 11.2 p
Male

Share of people living in low work intensity households

2.9 3.3 b 3.0 4.2 4.2 5.8 7.6 8.9 10.3 9.9 8.6
(% of males aged 0-59)
Life expectancy at birth (years) 77.6 78.2 78.6 79.2 79.3 78.9 80.1 80.9 79.9 80.5 80.2
Healthy life years at birth (years) - men 63.1 63.9 64.8 65.1 61.6 63.4 64.3 66.1 63.1 67.5
Early leavers from education and training (% of males
19.5 19.0 15.2 b 16.2 15.1 16.5 14.8 11.2 b 7.7 11.4 9.4 9.9
aged 18-24)
NEET: Young people neither in employment nor in
8.3 8.2 8.6 b 10.4 15.1 17.8 20.6 19.0 15.9 15.0 16.2 14.8
education and training ( % of males aged 15-24)
At-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion (% of female
27.6 25.9 b 26.0 26.3 26.4 29.0 28.8 28.8 29.8 28.7 26.4
population)
At-risk-of-poverty (% of female population) 17.4 18.1 17.8 17.2 16.6 16.4 16.5 15.6 17.2 17.2 16.8
Poverty gap (%) 20.5 16.3 b 19.3 20.1 19.7 19.4 17.8 18.9 18.7 16.4 15.0
Persistent at-risk-of-poverty (% of female
11.5 12.6 10.9 9.6 10.3 11.2 8.9 8.2 8.6 8.0
population)
Social Indicators

Severe Material Deprivation (% of female population) 14.0 9.3 9.8 10.9 11.4 14.9 15.6 15.1 15.0 13.3 11.4 9.8 p
Female

Share of people living in low work intensity households

4.5 5.7 b 5.0 5.5 5.5 7.1 8.2 10.5 11.4 11.2 10.1
(% of females aged 0-59)
Life expectancy at birth (years) 82.1 82.9 83.6 83.9 83.1 83.4 85.0 84.7 83.7 84.9 84.2
Healthy life years at birth (years) - women 62.8 64.5 65.3 64.2 61.0 64.0 65.0 66.3 63.4 68.8
Early leavers from education and training (% of
6.8 9.5 8.7 b 9.8 8.1 7.0 4.2 2.9 bu 3.1 u 4.3 u 7.7 6.0
females aged 18-24)
NEET: Young people neither in employment nor in
9.6 10.9 11.1 b 12.8 14.2 14.4 17.0 15.3 14.7 16.9 16.0 11.7
education and training ( % of females aged 15-24)
At-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion of children (% of
20.8 21.5 b 20.2 21.8 23.4 27.5 27.7 24.7 28.9 29.6 25.5
people aged 0-17)
At-risk-of-poverty (% of Children population) 12.4 14.0 12.3 12.6 12.8 13.9 15.5 12.8 16.7 17.1 16.5
Children (0-17)

Severe Material Deprivation (% of Children

11.7 9.7 9.3 12.5 14.8 18.1 18.7 15.6 17.2 17.7 13.6 13.3 p
population)
Share of children living in low work intensity
2.8 3.4 b 3.1 3.6 3.2 5.0 6.4 7.3 9.4 9.0 7.7
households (% of Children population)
Risk of poverty of children in households at work
10.5 12.5 b 10.6 10.6 11.2 11.6 11.8 9.1 11.8 12.3 12.6
(Working Intensity > 0.2)
Impact of social transfers (excl. pensions) in reducing
37.7 44.0 b 51.4 49.6 47.1 45.5 43.6 52.9 44.7 41.4 41.5
poverty (0-17) (%)
At-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion (% of working
21.1 18.9 b 19.9 22.1 22.1 25.8 28.2 28.3 30.5 28.1 25.3
age population)
At-risk-of-poverty (% of Working age population) 10.1 10.8 11.2 11.9 11.5 12.2 14.4 13.4 15.9 15.1 14.2
Working age

Severe Material Deprivation (% of Working age

12.7 8.6 9.5 11.5 11.6 15.5 16.7 16.7 16.8 14.1 12.4 11.1 p
(18-64)

population)
Very low work intensity (18-59) 4.0 5.0 b 4.4 5.3 5.5 6.9 8.4 10.6 11.4 11.1 9.9
In-work at-risk-of poverty rate (% of persons
6.3 6.3 b 6.8 7.4 7.3 8.0 9.0 7.8 9.2 8.4 8.0
employed 18-64)
Impact of social transfers (excl. pensions) in reducing
34.0 36.5 b 38.1 37.4 42.5 41.9 38.2 43.7 36.7 37.9 39.8
poverty (18-64) (%)
At-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion of elderly (% of
55.6 49.3 b 48.6 42.6 39.8 33.4 26.1 27.2 20.8 22.9 24.6
people aged 65+)
Elderly (65+)

At-risk-of-poverty (% of Elderly population) 50.6 46.3 46.4 39.9 35.5 29.3 20.1 22.4 17.3 19.5 21.6

Severe Material Deprivation (% of Elderly population) 19.4 10.9 9.5 7.3 7.1 7.5 9.0 7.4 5.1 5.4 4.8 3.7 p
Relative median income of elderly (ratio with median
0.57 0.59 b 0.61 0.65 0.67 0.70 0.77 0.75 0.80 0.79 0.80
income of people younger than 65)
Aggregate replacement ratio (ratio) 0.29 0.33 b 0.37 0.37 0.39 0.39 0.40 0.39 0.43 0.44 0.43
Sickness/Health care 4.1 4.0 4.6 3.6 3.6 3.5 3.7 3.3 3.4 3.5
protection indicators
Expenditure in social

Disability 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.8
Old age and survivors 7.5 7.6 8.4 8.9 9.6 10.7 11.5 11.2 11.1 10.5
(% of GDP)

Family/Children 1.7 1.9 2.0 2.0 1.9 1.5 1.5 1.4 1.4 1.3
Unemployment 0.8 0.9 0.9 1.0 1.2 1.6 2.0 1.5 1.2 1.0
Housing and Social exclusion n.e.c. 1.4 1.7 2.3 2.4 2.3 1.8 1.4 1.4 1.6 1.6
Total (including Admin and Other expenditures) 16.4 17.6 19.1 18.8 20.2 20.9 22.8 20.0 19.9 19.1
of which: Means tested benefits 1.7 2.0 2.5 2.7 2.6 2.9 2.7 2.6 2.8 2.8

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273
Employment and Social Developments in Europe 2019

Latvia
Latvia 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Real GDP 10.0 -3.5 -14.4 -3.9 6.4 4.0 2.4 1.9 3.0 2.1 4.6 4.8
Total employment 3.8 -0.8 -14.3 -6.7 1.5 1.4 2.3 -1.3 1.4 -0.3 0.0 1.6
Labour productivity 5.9 -2.7 -0.1 2.9 4.8 2.5 0.1 3.3 1.5 2.4 4.7 3.1
Macro Economic Indicators

Annual average hours worked per person employed -1.5 6.6 -2.5 -0.9 0.9 -0.9 -0.3 0.6 -1.9 0.0 -0.8 0.3
(Annual % growth)

Real productivity per hour worked 7.6 -8.8 2.5 3.8 3.9 3.5 0.5 2.7 3.5 2.3 5.6 2.8
Harmonized CPI 10.1 15.3 3.3 -1.2 4.2 2.3 0.0 0.7 0.2 0.1 2.9 2.6
Price deflator GDP 20.1 11.8 -9.7 -0.8 6.4 3.6 1.6 1.8 0.0 0.9 3.2 4.2
Nominal compensation per employee 34.9 17.7 -10.9 -6.6 2.4 7.7 5.5 8.6 7.7 7.3 8.0 7.8
Real compensation per employee (GDP deflator) 12.3 5.3 -1.4 -5.9 -3.8 3.9 3.8 6.7 7.7 6.4 4.6 3.4
Real compensation per employee (private consumption
22.5 2.1 -13.8 -5.5 -1.7 5.3 5.5 7.8 7.5 7.2 4.9 5.1
deflator)
Nominal unit labour costs 27.3 21.0 -10.9 -9.3 -2.3 5.0 5.3 5.2 6.1 4.8 3.1 4.5
Real unit labour costs 6.0 8.3 -1.4 -8.5 -8.2 1.4 3.7 3.4 6.1 3.9 0.0 0.3
Total population (000) 2209 2192 2163 2121 2075 2045 2024 2001 1986 1969 1950 1934
Population aged 15-64 (000) 1511 1499 1473 1436 1399 1373 1352 1325 1303 1282 1259 1240
Total employment (000) 1057 1055 909 851 862 876 894 885 896 893 895 909
Employment aged 15-64 (000) 1016 1009 877 829 841 852 867 859 868 862 862 873
Employment rate (% population aged 20-64) 75.2 75.4 66.6 64.3 66.3 68.1 69.7 70.7 72.5 73.2 74.8 76.8
Employment rate (% population aged 15-64) 68.1 68.2 60.3 58.5 60.8 63.0 65.0 66.3 68.1 68.7 70.1 71.8
Employment rate (% population aged 15-24) 38.1 37.0 27.5 25.4 25.8 28.7 30.2 32.5 34.5 32.8 33.0 33.1
Employment rate (% population aged 25-54) 82.1 82.2 74.1 72.6 75.0 76.3 77.9 78.2 79.2 79.7 81.2 82.7
Employment rate (% population aged 55-64) 58.0 59.1 52.5 47.8 50.5 52.8 54.8 56.4 59.4 61.4 62.3 65.4
FTE employment rate (% population aged 20-64) 75.3 75.4 65.6 62.8 64.9 66.8 68.7 69.8 71.6 72.0 73.7 75.5
Self-employed (% total employment) 9.3 8.9 10.0 10.1 10.2 10.5 10.7 10.7 11.8 12.0 11.9 11.0
Part-time employment (% total employment) 5.6 5.9 8.2 9.3 8.8 8.9 7.5 6.8 7.2 8.5 7.7 7.2
Temporary employment (% total employment) 3.7 3.0 3.8 6.3 5.9 4.2 3.8 2.9 3.3 3.2 2.6 2.4
Employment in Services (% total employment) 62.7 b 67.0 68.3 68.3 u 68.2 68.0 68.7 68.4 68.0 69.6 69.1
Employment in Industry (% total employment) 29.6 b 24.5 23.4 23.0 u 23.6 24.2 24.1 23.9 24.4 23.5 23.9
Employment in Agriculture (% total employment) 7.7 b 8.5 8.3 8.7 8.1 7.8 7.3 7.7 7.6 6.9 7.0
Activity rate (% population aged 15-64) 72.6 74.2 73.5 73.0 72.8 74.4 74.0 74.6 75.7 76.3 77.0 77.7
Labour Market Indicators - Total

Activity rate (% population aged 15-24) 42.6 42.8 41.2 39.7 37.5 40.1 39.4 40.4 41.3 39.7 39.7 37.7
Activity rate (% population aged 25-54) 87.1 88.7 88.4 88.6 88.0 88.4 87.6 87.2 87.6 87.8 88.6 89.0
Activity rate (% population aged 55-64) 60.7 63.0 60.9 56.9 59.4 61.8 61.3 62.6 65.5 67.6 67.9 70.8
Total unemployment (000) 68 88 193 206 167 155 120 108 98 95 85 73
Unemployment rate (% labour force) 6.1 7.7 17.5 19.5 16.2 15.0 11.9 10.8 9.9 9.6 8.7 7.4
Youth unemployment rate (% labour force 15-24) 10.6 13.6 33.3 36.2 31.0 28.5 23.2 19.6 16.3 17.3 17.0 12.2
Long term unemployment rate (% labour force) 1.6 1.9 4.5 8.8 8.8 7.8 5.7 4.6 4.5 4.0 3.3 3.1
Share of long term unemployment (% of total
27.0 24.1 25.8 45.0 54.5 52.1 48.4 42.9 45.3 41.4 37.6 41.6
unemployment)

Youth unemployment ratio (% population aged 15-24) 4.5 5.8 13.7 14.4 11.6 11.5 9.1 7.9 6.7 6.9 6.8 4.6

Employment rate for low skilled 25-64 (ISCED 0-2) 59.3 57.4 48.1 47.1 48.5 51.8 50.9 51.3 b 53.2 56.7 58.4 58.2
Employment rate for medium skilled 25-64 (ISCED 3-
77.5 77.7 68.2 65.1 66.8 66.9 69.7 70.9 b 71.7 71.1 72.9 75.0
4)
Employment rate for high skilled 25-64 (ISCED 5-8) 87.8 87.4 83.5 80.7 84.4 86.2 85.2 84.2 b 85.8 87.2 87.6 89.1
Employment rate (Nationals aged 15-64) 68.1 68.1 b 61.0 59.5 61.4 64.0 66.0 67.0 68.8 69.6 70.9 72.7
Employment rate (Other EU28 aged 15-64) 80.8 63.2 u 76.7 u 76.6 u 78.9 u 77.4 79.0 u 61.2 u 66.2 u
Employment rate (Other than EU28 aged 15-64) 64.2 69.1 b 56.6 53.3 57.5 57.6 59.2 61.6 63.4 63.3 64.4 65.9
Employment rate (Born in the same country aged 15-
67.4 67.9 60.3 58.4 60.7 63.2 65.4 66.5 68.5 69.2 70.5 72.1
64)
Employment rate (Born in other EU28 aged 15-64) 67.0 59.3 48.5 53.7 57.2 53.0 59.1 62.3 62.1 75.7 63.8 56.8
Employment rate (Born outside EU28 aged 15-64) 73.5 71.7 62.0 60.0 62.2 62.2 62.3 64.4 64.2 63.0 66.9 70.6
Underemployment (% of labour force aged 15-74) 2.0 4.2 5.1 4.3 4.2 3.2 2.7 2.7 3.2 2.9 2.4
Seeking but not available (% of labour force aged 15-
0.6 0.6 0.4 0.5 0.8 0.6 0.5 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.7
74)
Discouraged, available but not seeking (% of labour
6.1 4.7 7.7 8.1 7.6 6.4 6.1 5.0 4.4 4.1 4.1 3.0
force aged 15-74)

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274
 Statistical annex - 1. Country profiles

Latvia 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Total population (000) 1014 1007 993 971 948 935 927 917 911 904 896 890
Population aged 15-64(000) 728 725 712 693 674 663 654 642 633 623 612 604
Total employment (000) 540 531 435 403 416 428 441 439 444 438 441 449
Employment aged 15-64 (000) 519 508 420 393 407 417 428 427 431 425 428 435
Employment rate (% population aged 20-64) 80.5 79.3 66.8 64.0 67.5 70.0 71.9 73.1 74.6 74.7 77.0 79.0
Employment rate (% population aged 15-64) 72.7 71.5 60.3 57.9 61.5 64.4 66.8 68.4 69.9 70.0 71.9 73.6
Employment rate (% population aged 15-24) 43.8 42.1 29.5 26.5 28.3 31.8 33.3 36.5 37.1 34.0 35.0 35.5
Employment rate (% population aged 25-54) 86.0 84.9 73.7 71.7 75.1 77.7 79.9 80.4 81.2 81.4 83.5 84.6
Employment rate (% population aged 55-64) 64.3 62.8 51.8 46.9 51.7 53.2 55.2 56.3 60.1 61.3 62.4 66.3
FTE employment rate (% population aged 20-64) 81.0 79.6 66.1 62.8 66.5 69.2 71.4 72.8 74.5 74.2 76.4 78.3
Self-employed (% total employment) 11.3 11.4 12.9 12.4 12.6 12.8 12.8 13.3 14.8 15.0 14.0 12.8
Part-time employment (% total employment) 4.1 4.3 6.8 7.6 7.0 6.7 5.6 4.7 4.5 6.1 4.8 4.7
Temporary employment (% total employment) 4.9 4.2 5.1 8.1 6.9 5.5 4.5 3.7 3.9 3.9 3.1 2.6
Employment in Services (% total employment) 48.7 b 54.3 u 54.7 u 55.0 u 54.7 u 54.2 u 54.5 54.3 54.1 56.4 u 55.3
Employment in Industry (% total employment) 41.3 b 34.4 u 33.8 u 32.5 u 33.4 u 34.8 u 35.1 35.0 35.5 34.0 u 34.7
Employment in Agriculture (% total employment) 10.0 b 11.3 11.5 12.5 11.8 11.1 10.4 10.7 10.4 9.7 10.1
Activity rate (% population aged 15-64) 77.9 78.3 76.6 75.3 75.8 77.1 76.6 77.8 78.9 78.8 79.8 80.5
Labour Market Indicators - Male

Activity rate (% population aged 15-24) 49.2 49.0 46.4 42.2 41.1 44.0 42.6 45.3 45.2 43.3 42.8 40.5
Activity rate (% population aged 25-54) 91.6 92.0 91.1 91.0 90.8 91.2 90.6 90.5 90.6 90.2 91.8 92.1
Activity rate (% population aged 55-64) 67.6 68.2 62.8 58.5 62.5 63.2 62.2 63.7 68.0 69.4 69.1 72.5
Total unemployment (000) 38 49 115 119 95 83 64 59 55 54 48 41
Unemployment rate (% labour force) 6.5 8.4 20.9 22.7 18.6 16.2 12.6 11.8 11.1 10.9 9.8 8.4
Youth unemployment rate (% labour force 15-24) 11.0 14.0 36.4 37.3 31.3 27.8 21.8 19.4 18.0 21.4 18.3 12.5
Long term unemployment rate (% labour force) 1.9 1.9 5.4 10.9 11.0 8.7 6.5 5.3 5.4 4.9 3.9 3.8
Share of long term unemployment (% of total
29.9 23.1 25.9 48.0 59.0 53.5 51.9 44.7 48.5 44.9 39.9 45.1
unemployment)

Youth unemployment ratio (% population aged 15-24) 5.4 6.9 16.9 15.8 12.9 12.2 9.3 8.8 8.2 9.2 7.8 5.1

Employment rate for low skilled 25-64 (ISCED 0-2) 68.2 64.8 50.4 49.5 53.6 59.0 56.8 58.3 b 60.8 62.7 64.7 63.9
Employment rate for medium skilled 25-64 (ISCED 3-
83.9 82.1 69.7 66.1 70.0 70.5 73.4 74.8 b 75.4 74.9 76.9 79.5
4)
Employment rate for high skilled 25-64 (ISCED 5-8) 89.8 90.7 85.8 81.9 84.2 87.7 88.7 86.6 b 88.9 88.7 89.9 90.6
Employment rate (Nationals aged 15-64) 72.7 71.2 b 60.6 58.6 61.3 64.9 67.3 69.1 70.3 70.2 72.2 73.8
Employment rate (Other EU28 aged 15-64) 85.6 u 88.2 u 81.2 u
Employment rate (Other than EU28 aged 15-64) 69.2 72.8 b 58.5 54.4 62.0 61.6 63.5 64.0 67.1 68.3 69.8 72.0
Employment rate (Born in the same country aged 15-
71.8 71.1 60.0 57.7 61.0 64.5 66.6 68.4 70.0 70.0 71.9 73.4
64)
Employment rate (Born in other EU28 aged 15-64) 68.7 70.0 58.8 52.1 58.1 58.2 68.1 61.8 60.4 82.2 68.7 62.5
Employment rate (Born outside EU28 aged 15-64) 80.4 75.0 63.1 60.4 65.9 64.2 68.0 69.1 70.2 67.7 72.9 77.2
Underemployment (% of labour force aged 15-74) 1.7 3.9 4.1 3.8 3.3 2.6 2.0 1.8 2.8 2.0 1.8
Seeking but not available (% of labour force aged 15-
0.4 0.4 0.4 u 0.7 0.6 0.4 u 0.4 u 0.3 u 0.5 0.4 u 0.7
74)
Discouraged, available but not seeking (% of labour
5.2 3.9 7.0 8.0 7.0 6.1 5.7 4.9 4.3 4.1 3.8 2.8
force aged 15-74)
Total population (000) 1195 1185 1170 1150 1127 1110 1097 1084 1075 1065 1054 1045
Population aged 15-64(000) 783 775 761 743 725 710 698 683 670 659 647 636
Total employment (000) 517 524 474 448 445 447 453 446 452 455 454 461
Employment aged 15-64 (000) 497 501 456 436 434 435 438 432 437 437 434 439
Employment rate (% population aged 20-64) 70.3 71.9 66.5 64.5 65.3 66.4 67.7 68.5 70.5 71.8 72.7 74.8
Employment rate (% population aged 15-64) 63.9 65.2 60.4 59.0 60.2 61.7 63.4 64.3 66.4 67.6 68.4 70.1
Employment rate (% population aged 15-24) 32.2 31.7 25.4 24.3 23.4 25.4 27.0 28.3 31.9 31.6 30.9 30.6
Employment rate (% population aged 25-54) 78.4 79.6 74.5 73.5 74.8 75.0 76.1 76.0 77.3 78.1 79.0 80.7
Employment rate (% population aged 55-64) 53.4 56.3 53.0 48.4 49.7 52.5 54.6 56.4 58.9 61.4 62.1 64.7
FTE employment rate (% population aged 20-64) 70.1 71.6 65.1 62.8 63.5 64.7 66.2 67.2 69.0 70.1 71.3 73.0
Self-employed (% total employment) 7.1 6.3 7.4 8.0 8.0 8.3 8.7 8.2 8.9 9.2 10.0 9.3
Part-time employment (% total employment) 7.1 7.6 9.4 10.9 10.4 11.0 9.4 8.9 10.0 10.8 10.6 9.8
Temporary employment (% total employment) 2.5 1.9 2.7 4.7 5.0 3.0 3.1 2.2 2.7 2.6 2.1 2.2
Employment in Services (% total employment)
Employment in Industry (% total employment)
Employment in Agriculture (% total employment) 5.5 b 5.9 5.4 5.1 4.6 4.6 4.2 4.8 4.8 4.2 3.9
Activity rate (% population aged 15-64) 67.8 70.3 70.7 70.8 70.1 72.0 71.6 71.6 72.8 74.0 74.3 75.1
Labour Market Indicators - Female

Activity rate (% population aged 15-24) 35.8 36.5 35.9 37.2 33.7 36.1 36.0 35.3 37.1 35.9 36.5 34.7
Activity rate (% population aged 25-54) 82.8 85.6 85.9 86.3 85.3 85.7 84.8 84.0 84.6 85.5 85.4 86.0
Activity rate (% population aged 55-64) 55.7 59.2 59.5 55.7 57.1 60.8 60.5 61.7 63.5 66.1 66.9 69.4
Total unemployment (000) 30 40 78 87 71 73 57 49 43 42 38 32
Unemployment rate (% labour force) 5.6 7.1 14.1 16.3 13.8 14.0 11.1 9.8 8.6 8.4 7.7 6.4
Youth unemployment rate (% labour force 15-24) 10.0 13.1 29.2 34.8 30.6 29.5 24.9 20.0 14.2 12.1 15.4 11.8
Long term unemployment rate (% labour force) 1.3 1.8 3.6 6.7 6.7 7.0 5.0 4.0 3.6 3.1 2.7 2.4
Share of long term unemployment (% of total
23.5 25.3 25.6 41.0 48.5 50.4 44.4 40.6 41.2 37.0 34.6 37.0
unemployment)

Youth unemployment ratio (% population aged 15-24) 3.6 4.8 10.5 12.9 10.3 10.6 9.0 7.0 5.3 4.4 5.6 4.1

Employment rate for low skilled 25-64 (ISCED 0-2) 46.9 47.1 44.7 43.1 40.3 40.0 41.0 39.1 b 39.9 47.2 48.0 48.5
Employment rate for medium skilled 25-64 (ISCED 3-
71.6 73.4 66.7 64.1 63.6 63.1 65.8 66.9 b 67.7 66.7 68.2 70.0
4)
Employment rate for high skilled 25-64 (ISCED 5-8) 86.7 85.7 82.3 80.0 84.5 85.4 83.3 83.0 b 84.3 86.4 86.3 88.2
Employment rate (Nationals aged 15-64) 64.0 65.3 b 61.4 60.2 61.5 63.1 64.7 65.1 67.4 68.9 69.7 71.6
Employment rate (Other EU28 aged 15-64)
Employment rate (Other than EU28 aged 15-64) 58.8 65.0 b 54.7 52.2 52.6 53.1 54.7 59.2 59.6 58.5 58.9 59.7
Employment rate (Born in the same country aged 15-
63.3 64.8 60.7 59.0 60.4 62.0 64.2 64.8 67.2 68.5 69.1 70.8
64)
Employment rate (Born in other EU28 aged 15-64) 65.3 51.8 39.5 55.1 56.4 48.4 50.8 62.7 63.1 69.4 57.1 51.5
Employment rate (Born outside EU28 aged 15-64) 68.2 69.1 61.1 59.7 59.3 60.6 57.9 60.7 60.0 59.7 62.6 65.4
Underemployment (% of labour force aged 15-74) 2.4 4.6 6.0 4.7 5.2 3.7 3.3 3.5 3.6 3.7 3.1
Seeking but not available (% of labour force aged 15-
0.8 0.8 0.4 u 0.6 u 0.9 0.6 0.6 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.7
74)
Discouraged, available but not seeking (% of labour
7.0 5.5 8.4 8.3 8.1 6.8 6.6 5.0 4.5 4.0 4.5 3.1
force aged 15-74)

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275
Employment and Social Developments in Europe 2019

Latvia 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
At-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion (% of total
35.1 34.2 b 37.9 38.2 40.1 36.2 35.1 32.7 30.9 28.5 28.2 28.4
population)
At-risk-of-poverty (% of total population) 21.2 25.9 26.4 20.9 19.0 19.2 19.4 21.2 22.5 21.8 22.1 23.3
At-risk-of-poverty threshold (PPS single person) 3352 4283 4279 3525 3566 3661 3868 4392 4855 5554 5534 6045
Poverty gap (%) 24.8 28.6 29.0 28.9 31.7 28.6 27.5 23.6 25.5 24.0 25.3 27.8
Persistent at-risk-of-poverty (% of total
12.6 15.6 10.5 9.3 12.6 b 12.1 10.8 10.1 15.2 14.9 15.5
population)
At-risk-of-poverty before social transfers excl.
27.5 30.2 31.0 28.5 26.8 25.7 26.0 27.0 27.3 27.8 28.3 28.8
pensions (% of total population)
Impact of social transfers (excl. pensions) in
22.9 14.2 14.8 26.7 29.1 25.3 25.4 21.5 17.6 21.6 21.9 19.1
reducing poverty (%)
All

Severe Material Deprivation (% of total population) 24.0 19.3 22.1 27.6 31.0 25.6 24.0 19.2 16.4 12.8 11.3 9.5
Share of people living in low work intensity households
6.2 5.4 7.4 12.6 12.6 11.7 10.0 9.6 7.8 7.2 7.8 7.6
(% of people aged 0-59)
Real Gross Household Disposable income (growth %) 10.6 3.6 -15.0 -5.3 -5.8 3.6 4.2 2.5 6.6 3.7
Income quintile share ratio S80/S20 6.4 7.3 7.4 6.8 6.5 6.5 6.3 6.5 6.5 6.2 6.3 6.8
GINI coefficient 35.4 37.5 37.5 35.9 35.1 35.7 35.2 35.5 35.4 34.5 34.5 35.6
Early leavers from education and training (% of
15.6 15.5 14.3 12.9 11.6 10.6 9.8 8.5 b 9.9 10.0 8.6 8.3
population aged 18-24)
NEET: Young people neither in employment nor in
education and training (% of total population aged 15- 11.9 11.8 17.5 17.8 16.0 14.9 13.0 12.0 10.5 11.2 10.3 7.8
24)
At-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion (% of male
32.3 31.4 b 36.0 37.6 39.9 35.5 34.2 30.6 27.9 26.0 24.9 25.2
population)
At-risk-of-poverty (% of male population) 18.7 23.3 24.4 21.4 19.8 19.3 18.9 19.5 19.7 19.4 19.1 20.4
Poverty gap (%) 27.7 26.7 31.7 31.5 34.0 31.8 30.3 28.3 30.5 26.7 28.9 29.0
Persistent at-risk-of-poverty (% of male
10.7 13.2 10.6 9.4 13.4 b 12.7 10.1 8.6 13.4 12.8 12.5
population)
Severe Material Deprivation (% of male population) 22.1 17.6 21.3 26.9 30.4 24.7 23.1 18.1 15.4 12.1 10.7 8.9
Male

Share of people living in low work intensity households

5.9 5.7 7.9 13.8 13.3 12.6 10.4 10.2 8.2 7.2 7.9 7.8
(% of males aged 0-59)
Life expectancy at birth (years) 65.3 66.5 68.1 67.9 68.6 68.9 69.3 b 69.1 69.7 69.8 69.8
Healthy life years at birth (years) - men 51.4 51.6 52.6 53.1 53.6 54.6 51.7 b 51.5 51.8 52.3 50.6
Early leavers from education and training (% of males
20.6 20.0 17.6 16.7 15.8 14.7 13.6 11.7 b 13.4 13.7 12.0 11.4
aged 18-24)
NEET: Young people neither in employment nor in
9.5 10.2 18.6 18.7 16.1 15.1 12.6 11.3 9.4 12.6 11.0 8.1
education and training ( % of males aged 15-24)
At-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion (% of female
37.4 36.6 b 39.4 38.6 40.3 36.8 35.9 34.4 33.4 30.6 31.1 31.1
population)
At-risk-of-poverty (% of female population) 23.4 28.1 28.0 20.4 18.3 19.1 19.8 22.5 24.8 23.9 24.6 25.8
Poverty gap (%) 24.1 29.3 27.4 25.9 28.7 25.7 25.8 21.2 22.4 22.9 24.1 27.6
Persistent at-risk-of-poverty (% of female
14.1 17.7 10.5 9.2 11.9 b 11.6 11.4 11.3 16.7 16.6 18.0
population)
Social Indicators

Severe Material Deprivation (% of female population) 25.6 20.6 22.8 28.3 31.5 26.5 24.7 20.1 17.3 13.4 11.8 10.0
Female

Share of people living in low work intensity households

6.5 5.2 7.0 11.4 12.0 10.8 9.6 9.1 7.4 7.2 7.6 7.4
(% of females aged 0-59)
Life expectancy at birth (years) 76.2 77.5 78.0 78.0 78.8 78.9 78.9 b 79.4 79.5 79.6 79.7
Healthy life years at birth (years) - women 54.8 54.3 56.0 56.4 56.6 59.0 54.2 b 55.3 54.1 54.9 52.2
Early leavers from education and training (% of
10.5 10.8 11.0 9.0 7.5 6.3 5.8 5.1 b 6.2 6.2 5.0 5.0
females aged 18-24)
NEET: Young people neither in employment nor in
14.4 13.5 16.3 16.9 16.0 14.6 13.4 12.8 11.7 9.7 9.5 7.6
education and training ( % of females aged 15-24)
At-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion of children (% of
32.8 32.4 b 38.4 42.2 44.1 40.0 38.4 35.3 31.3 24.7 23.9 22.5
people aged 0-17)
At-risk-of-poverty (% of Children population) 19.8 23.6 26.3 26.3 24.7 24.4 23.4 24.3 23.2 18.6 18.4 17.5
Children (0-17)

Severe Material Deprivation (% of Children

20.5 19.2 24.6 30.7 32.4 27.3 25.4 19.9 17.0 11.9 10.3 8.3
population)
Share of children living in low work intensity
5.5 4.6 6.9 12.4 12.6 10.4 9.2 9.6 7.4 6.3 6.4 5.9
households (% of Children population)
Risk of poverty of children in households at work
16.7 20.1 21.3 18.5 17.4 18.3 18.5 18.4 18.4 13.9 13.0 12.9
(Working Intensity > 0.2)
Impact of social transfers (excl. pensions) in reducing
33.1 22.9 22.0 28.5 32.3 28.5 28.2 27.5 24.4 35.9 35.7 34.2
poverty (0-17) (%)
At-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion (% of working
31.4 28.0 b 32.8 37.4 41.1 35.9 34.0 30.0 27.3 25.0 24.5 23.5
age population)
At-risk-of-poverty (% of Working age population) 17.7 19.4 20.5 20.4 20.2 19.3 18.8 18.4 18.6 17.7 17.5 17.8
Working age

Severe Material Deprivation (% of Working age

21.8 16.7 20.5 26.8 31.2 25.0 22.9 18.2 15.7 12.4 11.2 9.2
(18-64)

population)
Very low work intensity (18-59) 6.4 5.7 7.6 12.6 12.6 12.1 10.2 9.6 7.9 7.5 8.2 8.2
In-work at-risk-of poverty rate (% of persons
9.5 10.7 11.2 9.7 9.6 8.9 9.1 8.3 9.4 8.5 9.0 8.2
employed 18-64)
Impact of social transfers (excl. pensions) in reducing
25.3 17.5 18.0 27.1 28.9 25.2 25.4 23.0 20.2 23.7 25.5 23.3
poverty (18-64) (%)
At-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion of elderly (% of
51.4 58.8 b 55.5 36.8 33.0 33.7 36.1 39.3 42.1 43.1 43.9 49.0
people aged 65+)
Elderly (65+)

At-risk-of-poverty (% of Elderly population) 35.6 52.0 47.6 17.2 9.1 13.9 17.6 27.6 34.6 38.1 39.9 45.7

Severe Material Deprivation (% of Elderly population) 35.8 28.7 25.3 27.5 28.9 26.4 26.6 22.0 18.2 14.9 12.7 11.7
Relative median income of elderly (ratio with median
0.64 0.53 0.57 0.78 0.86 0.80 0.77 0.71 0.65 0.63 0.61 0.58
income of people younger than 65)
Aggregate replacement ratio (ratio) 0.38 0.30 0.34 0.47 0.53 0.49 0.47 0.44 0.42 0.42 0.43 0.40
Sickness/Health care 3.3 3.6 4.0 3.9 3.4 3.3 3.4 3.5 3.6 p 3.7 p
protection indicators
Expenditure in social

Disability 0.7 0.9 1.3 1.4 1.3 1.2 1.2 1.3 1.4 p 1.4 p
Old age and survivors 4.7 5.3 7.8 9.5 8.2 7.8 7.7 7.4 7.4 p 7.3 p
(% of GDP)

Family/Children 1.1 1.3 1.7 1.5 1.1 1.0 1.2 1.3 1.6 p 1.6 p
Unemployment 0.4 0.5 1.6 1.3 0.7 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.6 p 0.7 p
Housing and Social exclusion n.e.c. 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 p 0.2 p
Total (including Admin and Other expenditures) 10.6 12.1 16.8 18.3 15.3 14.4 14.6 14.5 14.9 p 15.1 p
of which: Means tested benefits 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.7 0.7 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.2 p 0.2 p

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276
 Statistical annex - 1. Country profiles

Lithuania
Lithuania 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Real GDP 11.1 2.6 -14.8 1.6 6.0 3.8 3.5 3.5 2.0 2.4 4.1 3.5
Total employment 2.0 -1.3 -7.7 -5.3 0.5 1.8 1.3 2.0 1.3 2.0 -0.5 1.1
Labour productivity 8.9 4.0 -7.7 7.3 5.5 2.0 2.1 1.5 0.7 0.4 4.7 2.4
Macro Economic Indicators

Annual average hours worked per person employed 1.6 1.6 -3.7 1.2 -1.4 -0.1 -0.9 -0.4 1.4 1.4 -2.2 0.5
(Annual % growth)

Real productivity per hour worked 7.2 2.4 -4.2 6.1 7.0 2.1 3.0 1.9 -0.7 -1.0 7.0 1.9
Harmonized CPI 5.8 11.1 4.2 1.2 4.1 3.2 1.2 0.2 -0.7 0.7 3.7 2.5
Price deflator GDP 8.6 9.7 -3.3 2.4 5.2 2.7 1.3 1.0 0.3 1.4 4.3 3.3
Nominal compensation per employee 14.1 14.1 -9.3 -0.1 6.4 4.2 5.4 4.7 5.9 6.8 8.7 8.0
Real compensation per employee (GDP deflator) 5.1 4.0 -6.2 -2.5 1.1 1.5 4.0 3.7 5.5 5.3 4.2 4.5
Real compensation per employee (private consumption
7.8 2.7 -12.9 -1.3 2.1 1.1 4.1 4.5 6.6 6.0 4.8 5.3
deflator)
Nominal unit labour costs 4.8 9.7 -1.7 -7.0 0.8 2.2 3.2 3.2 5.1 6.4 3.8 5.4
Real unit labour costs -3.4 -0.1 1.7 -9.1 -4.2 -0.5 1.8 2.2 4.7 5.0 -0.5 2.0
Total population (000) 3250 3213 3184 3142 3053 3004 2972 2943 2921 2889 2848 2809
Population aged 15-64 (000) 2188 2169 2154 2127 2053 2016 1993 1971 1949 1916 1876 1836
Total employment (000) 1452 1427 1317 1248 1254 1276 1293 1319 1335 1361 1355 1375
Employment aged 15-64 (000) 1423 1397 1290 1224 1226 1244 1264 1288 1301 1318 1306 1324
Employment rate (% population aged 20-64) 72.7 72.0 67.0 64.3 66.9 68.5 69.9 71.8 73.3 75.2 76.0 77.8
Employment rate (% population aged 15-64) 65.0 64.4 59.9 57.6 60.2 62.0 63.7 65.7 67.2 69.4 70.4 72.4
Employment rate (% population aged 15-24) 24.8 26.0 20.6 18.3 19.0 21.5 24.6 27.6 28.3 30.2 30.4 32.4
Employment rate (% population aged 25-54) 82.2 80.9 75.9 73.6 76.9 78.5 79.6 80.8 81.6 82.7 83.3 84.6
Employment rate (% population aged 55-64) 53.2 53.0 51.2 48.3 50.2 51.7 53.4 56.2 60.4 64.6 66.1 68.5
FTE employment rate (% population aged 20-64) 71.8 71.4 65.9 63.4 65.8 67.3 68.9 70.8 72.1 74.0 74.7 76.5
Self-employed (% total employment) 12.6 10.2 10.4 9.3 9.2 9.7 10.6 10.8 11.1 11.4 11.1 10.9
Part-time employment (% total employment) 8.6 6.5 7.9 7.8 8.3 8.9 8.4 8.6 7.6 7.1 7.6 7.1
Temporary employment (% total employment) 3.2 2.1 2.0 2.2 2.4 2.3 2.4 2.4 1.8 1.7 1.5 1.4
Employment in Services (% total employment) 65.8 u 66.0 u 65.8 u 66.8 u 67.1 u 67.0 u
Employment in Industry (% total employment) 25.9 u 25.1 u 25.4 u 25.5 u 25.5 u 26.0 u
Employment in Agriculture (% total employment) 8.0 b 8.9 8.7 8.3 8.8 8.4 9.0 8.8 7.7 7.4 7.0
Activity rate (% population aged 15-64) 67.9 68.4 69.6 70.2 71.4 71.8 72.4 73.7 74.1 75.5 75.9 77.3
Labour Market Indicators - Total

Activity rate (% population aged 15-24) 27.1 30.0 29.3 28.4 28.2 29.3 31.5 34.2 33.8 35.3 35.0 36.5
Activity rate (% population aged 25-54) 85.6 85.4 87.0 88.4 89.8 89.7 89.5 89.7 89.3 89.3 89.3 89.6
Activity rate (% population aged 55-64) 55.3 55.4 57.2 56.5 58.0 58.7 60.1 63.0 66.2 70.0 71.3 73.8
Total unemployment (000) 64 88 211 270 228 197 172 158 134 116 103 90
Unemployment rate (% labour force) 4.3 5.8 13.8 17.8 15.4 13.4 11.8 10.7 9.1 7.9 7.1 6.2
Youth unemployment rate (% labour force 15-24) 8.4 13.3 29.6 35.7 32.6 26.7 21.9 19.3 16.3 14.5 13.3 11.1
Long term unemployment rate (% labour force) 1.4 u 1.3 u 3.3 7.4 8.0 6.6 5.1 4.8 3.9 3.0 2.7 2.0
Share of long term unemployment (% of total
32.4 u 21.6 u 23.7 41.7 52.1 49.2 42.9 44.7 42.9 38.3 37.6 32.2
unemployment)

Youth unemployment ratio (% population aged 15-24) 2.3 4.0 8.7 10.2 9.2 7.8 6.9 6.6 5.5 5.1 4.6 4.1

Employment rate for low skilled 25-64 (ISCED 0-2) 48.6 41.9 37.9 31.6 32.9 36.0 38.9 43.2 b 45.0 44.8 46.1 48.3
Employment rate for medium skilled 25-64 (ISCED 3-
75.6 73.9 67.7 63.4 66.0 67.5 68.4 69.4 b 70.8 72.1 73.2 75.1
4)
Employment rate for high skilled 25-64 (ISCED 5-8) 89.2 88.8 86.7 86.7 88.3 88.2 88.6 89.4 b 89.6 91.0 90.7 91.0
Employment rate (Nationals aged 15-64) 65.0 64.4 59.9 57.6 60.3 62.0 63.7 65.6 67.2 69.4 70.4 72.4
Employment rate (Other EU28 aged 15-64) 84.7 u 95.2 u 95.3 u
Employment rate (Other than EU28 aged 15-64) 65.2 u 73.8 u 52.6 u 54.5 u 53.3 u 62.8 u 70.2 72.9 70.5 68.9 68.1 70.1
Employment rate (Born in the same country aged 15-
64.8 64.1 59.7 57.4 60.1 61.9 63.6 65.6 67.2 69.4 70.4 72.5
64)
Employment rate (Born in other EU28 aged 15-64) 82.7 u 76.7 u 57.2 66.9 72.6 70.2
Employment rate (Born outside EU28 aged 15-64) 69.8 70.6 63.6 62.6 62.4 64.5 67.5 68.6 69.3 69.2 69.8 71.2
Underemployment (% of labour force aged 15-74) 1.2 u 2.1 2.3 2.5 2.5 2.4 2.1 1.5 1.3 1.1 0.9
Seeking but not available (% of labour force aged 15-
1.2 u 1.8 0.8 0.9 0.5 0.5 u 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.8 0.9 0.9
74)
Discouraged, available but not seeking (% of labour
1.9 2.4 2.7 1.9 1.2 1.1 0.9 0.6 0.9 1.1 1.0 0.6
force aged 15-74)

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277
Employment and Social Developments in Europe 2019

Lithuania 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Total population (000) 1507 1487 1473 1450 1407 1384 1369 1356 1346 1330 1312 1297
Population aged 15-64(000) 1054 1046 1040 1024 990 972 962 953 944 928 911 895
Total employment (000) 736 720 630 591 604 618 636 647 654 663 660 679
Employment aged 15-64 (000) 719 703 616 579 590 603 620 632 637 643 636 655
Employment rate (% population aged 20-64) 76.6 75.6 66.8 63.5 67.2 69.1 71.2 73.1 74.6 76.2 76.5 79.0
Employment rate (% population aged 15-64) 68.2 67.2 59.3 56.5 60.1 62.2 64.7 66.5 68.0 70.0 70.6 73.3
Employment rate (% population aged 15-24) 29.4 30.1 21.2 19.1 20.9 22.8 27.6 31.0 30.8 32.5 32.3 34.1
Employment rate (% population aged 25-54) 84.2 82.6 74.2 71.1 75.7 77.7 79.8 80.7 81.8 82.6 83.1 85.2
Employment rate (% population aged 55-64) 60.7 60.2 55.5 52.1 54.1 55.9 56.1 58.8 62.4 66.8 67.2 70.5
FTE employment rate (% population aged 20-64) 76.2 75.5 66.1 62.8 66.5 68.5 70.9 72.9 74.0 75.5 75.8 78.4
Self-employed (% total employment) 16.2 13.4 13.5 11.8 11.3 12.1 13.1 12.9 13.7 14.5 14.1 13.6
Part-time employment (% total employment) 7.0 4.8 6.7 6.4 6.7 6.9 6.4 6.4 5.5 5.4 5.7 5.2
Temporary employment (% total employment) 4.3 2.6 u 2.6 2.9 3.2 3.0 3.0 3.1 2.1 1.9 1.8 1.5
Employment in Services (% total employment) 53.5 u 54.4 u 54.2 u 54.2 u 54.7 u 55.2 u
Employment in Industry (% total employment) 35.7 u 34.1 u 34.5 u 35.6 u 35.6 u 35.3 u
Employment in Agriculture (% total employment) 10.1 b 11.4 11.2 10.5 11.4 10.8 11.5 11.4 10.3 9.8 9.5
Activity rate (% population aged 15-64) 71.3 71.6 71.7 72.0 73.5 73.7 74.7 76.0 75.8 77.1 77.4 78.9
Labour Market Indicators - Male

Activity rate (% population aged 15-24) 31.6 34.6 32.7 31.3 32.1 32.4 35.8 38.6 36.7 38.7 37.8 38.8
Activity rate (% population aged 25-54) 87.7 87.3 88.0 89.0 90.7 90.5 90.6 90.8 90.4 90.2 90.4 91.0
Activity rate (% population aged 55-64) 63.3 62.9 63.3 62.6 64.3 64.6 65.2 68.2 69.8 73.6 73.3 76.2
Total unemployment (000) 32 46 130 159 132 111 96 90 73 66 61 50
Unemployment rate (% labour force) 4.2 6.0 17.1 21.2 17.9 15.2 13.1 12.2 10.1 9.1 8.6 6.9
Youth unemployment rate (% labour force 15-24) 7.0 13.0 35.1 39.0 34.9 29.7 23.0 19.6 16.0 15.9 14.6 12.0
Long term unemployment rate (% labour force) 1.5 u 1.1 u 3.7 9.0 9.4 7.4 5.5 5.4 4.4 3.4 3.2 2.3
Share of long term unemployment (% of total
34.9 u 17.6 u 21.7 42.6 52.4 48.9 42.2 44.3 43.6 37.7 37.6 33.5
unemployment)

Youth unemployment ratio (% population aged 15-24) 2.2 4.5 11.4 12.2 11.2 9.6 8.2 7.6 5.9 6.1 5.5 4.6

Employment rate for low skilled 25-64 (ISCED 0-2) 56.3 49.6 39.5 33.8 36.1 39.9 43.6 46.1 b 49.1 49.1 48.9 51.3
Employment rate for medium skilled 25-64 (ISCED 3-
80.9 78.4 69.4 64.7 68.8 71.2 72.1 72.4 b 73.7 75.2 76.1 78.7
4)
Employment rate for high skilled 25-64 (ISCED 5-8) 90.5 91.4 86.3 86.5 88.0 87.8 89.6 91.2 b 92.0 92.6 91.4 92.6
Employment rate (Nationals aged 15-64) 68.1 67.2 59.3 56.5 60.2 62.2 64.7 66.5 68.0 69.9 70.6 73.2
Employment rate (Other EU28 aged 15-64) 100.0 u
Employment rate (Other than EU28 aged 15-64) 78.3 u 68.9 u 71.7 u 73.9 u 72.8 u 70.1 u 77.1
Employment rate (Born in the same country aged 15-
67.9 66.9 59.1 56.2 59.9 62.1 64.5 66.3 67.9 69.8 70.6 73.3
64)
Employment rate (Born in other EU28 aged 15-64) 81.7 u 87.6 u 61.0 u 77.7 u 74.6 u 76.9 u
Employment rate (Born outside EU28 aged 15-64) 76.2 76.0 66.2 63.9 66.4 68.0 71.3 71.6 72.8 72.4 71.2 73.2
Underemployment (% of labour force aged 15-74) 0.9 u 2.0 1.8 2.1 2.0 2.0 1.7 1.1 0.9 u 0.9 u 0.7 u
Seeking but not available (% of labour force aged 15-
1.1 u 1.6 u 0.8 u 0.9 u 0.7 u 0.6 u 0.8 u 0.9 u 0.8 u
74)
Discouraged, available but not seeking (% of labour
1.7 u 2.4 u 3.2 2.2 1.4 1.5 1.1 u 0.8 u 1.1 1.3 1.2 0.6 u
force aged 15-74)
Total population (000) 1743 1725 1711 1692 1645 1620 1603 1587 1575 1559 1536 1512
Population aged 15-64(000) 1134 1123 1115 1103 1063 1044 1031 1017 1004 988 965 940
Total employment (000) 715 707 687 657 650 658 657 672 681 698 695 696
Employment aged 15-64 (000) 703 694 674 646 636 642 644 656 663 674 670 669
Employment rate (% population aged 20-64) 69.1 68.7 67.2 65.0 66.6 67.9 68.6 70.6 72.2 74.3 75.5 76.7
Employment rate (% population aged 15-64) 62.0 61.8 60.4 58.5 60.2 61.8 62.8 64.9 66.5 68.8 70.2 71.6
Employment rate (% population aged 15-24) 20.0 21.8 20.1 17.4 17.0 20.1 21.5 24.1 25.7 27.8 28.4 30.6
Employment rate (% population aged 25-54) 80.2 79.4 77.5 75.9 78.1 79.1 79.4 80.9 81.4 82.9 83.6 84.1
Employment rate (% population aged 55-64) 47.5 47.4 47.8 45.5 47.2 48.5 51.2 54.3 58.8 62.8 65.2 66.9
FTE employment rate (% population aged 20-64) 67.7 67.7 65.8 63.9 65.1 66.2 67.2 69.0 70.5 72.8 73.7 74.9
Self-employed (% total employment) 9.0 7.0 7.5 7.0 7.3 7.5 8.2 8.9 8.6 8.4 8.3 8.3
Part-time employment (% total employment) 10.2 8.3 9.1 8.9 9.9 10.7 10.2 10.6 9.7 8.8 9.4 8.9
Temporary employment (% total employment) 2.2 u 1.6 u 1.5 1.5 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.8 1.6 1.6 1.2 1.3
Employment in Services (% total employment)
Employment in Industry (% total employment)
Employment in Agriculture (% total employment) 5.8 b 6.5 6.4 6.3 6.3 6.1 6.6 6.4 5.2 5.1 4.6
Activity rate (% population aged 15-64) 64.9 65.5 67.6 68.6 69.4 70.1 70.3 71.6 72.5 73.9 74.6 75.8
Labour Market Indicators - Female

Activity rate (% population aged 15-24) 22.3 25.3 25.9 25.4 24.1 26.1 27.0 29.6 30.8 31.9 32.2 34.1
Activity rate (% population aged 25-54) 83.6 83.6 86.0 87.8 88.9 89.0 88.4 88.7 88.2 88.5 88.1 88.3
Activity rate (% population aged 55-64) 49.2 49.7 52.4 51.7 53.1 54.2 56.1 58.9 63.3 67.2 69.6 71.9
Total unemployment (000) 32 42 81 112 96 86 77 68 61 50 42 40
Unemployment rate (% labour force) 4.3 5.6 10.5 14.5 12.9 11.6 10.5 9.2 8.2 6.7 5.7 5.4
Youth unemployment rate (% labour force 15-24) 10.4 13.9 22.4 31.6 29.4 22.7 20.4 18.7 16.6 12.6 11.7 10.1
Long term unemployment rate (% labour force) 1.3 u 1.5 u 2.8 5.9 6.7 5.8 4.6 4.2 3.4 2.6 2.1 1.7
Share of long term unemployment (% of total
29.9 u 25.9 u 27.0 40.3 51.7 49.6 43.8 45.3 42.1 39.1 37.4 30.6
unemployment)

Youth unemployment ratio (% population aged 15-24) 2.3 3.5 5.8 8.0 7.1 5.9 5.5 5.5 5.1 4.0 3.8 3.4

Employment rate for low skilled 25-64 (ISCED 0-2) 39.2 32.9 36.0 29.2 29.3 30.9 32.7 39.1 b 38.8 37.9 41.4 43.3
Employment rate for medium skilled 25-64 (ISCED 3-
70.4 69.3 65.8 62.0 63.0 63.6 64.3 66.2 b 67.6 68.6 70.0 70.9
4)
Employment rate for high skilled 25-64 (ISCED 5-8) 88.3 87.1 86.9 86.8 88.5 88.5 88.0 88.2 b 88.1 90.0 90.2 90.1
Employment rate (Nationals aged 15-64) 62.1 61.8 60.5 58.6 60.3 61.8 62.8 64.8 66.5 68.9 70.2 71.6
Employment rate (Other EU28 aged 15-64)
Employment rate (Other than EU28 aged 15-64) 72.1 u 74.3 u 66.7 u 63.9 u 65.5 u 62.4 u
Employment rate (Born in the same country aged 15-
61.9 61.6 60.4 58.5 60.3 61.8 62.7 64.8 66.5 69.0 70.3 71.7
64)
Employment rate (Born in other EU28 aged 15-64) 83.7 u 66.5 u 53.7 u 56.4 u 70.3 u 61.4 u
Employment rate (Born outside EU28 aged 15-64) 64.4 65.7 61.6 61.6 58.9 61.8 64.4 66.0 66.4 66.5 68.5 69.5
Underemployment (% of labour force aged 15-74) 1.5 u 2.2 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.8 2.5 2.0 1.6 1.4 1.0 u
Seeking but not available (% of labour force aged 15-
1.4 u 2.0 u 0.7 u 0.9 u 0.7 u 1.0 u 1.0 u 0.8 u 0.8 u 0.9 u 1.1 u
74)
Discouraged, available but not seeking (% of labour
2.1 u 2.4 u 2.2 1.5 1.1 u 0.7 u 0.7 u 0.6 u 0.9 u 0.8 u
force aged 15-74)

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278
 Statistical annex - 1. Country profiles

Lithuania 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
At-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion (% of total
28.7 28.3 29.6 34.0 33.1 32.5 30.8 27.3 29.3 30.1 29.6
population)
At-risk-of-poverty (% of total population) 19.1 20.9 20.3 20.5 19.2 18.6 20.6 19.1 22.2 21.9 22.9
At-risk-of-poverty threshold (PPS single person) 3428 4111 4289 3611 3641 4034 4369 4557 4951 5618 5872
Poverty gap (%) 25.7 25.6 23.8 32.6 29.0 22.6 24.8 22.7 26.0 28.0 28.0
Persistent at-risk-of-poverty (% of total
10.9 11.4 7.4 7.7 b 12.3 10.2 16.0 14.3 13.5 16.1
population)
At-risk-of-poverty before social transfers excl.
25.5 27.4 28.6 31.3 30.2 28.4 30.3 27.5 28.6 27.9 29.8
pensions (% of total population)
Impact of social transfers (excl. pensions) in
25.1 23.7 29.0 34.5 36.4 34.5 32.0 30.6 22.4 21.5 23.2
reducing poverty (%)
All

Severe Material Deprivation (% of total population) 16.6 12.5 15.6 19.9 19.0 19.8 16.0 13.6 13.9 13.5 12.4
Share of people living in low work intensity households
6.4 6.1 7.2 9.5 12.7 11.4 11.0 8.8 9.2 10.2 9.7
(% of people aged 0-59)
Real Gross Household Disposable income (growth %) 2.0 7.5 -11.7 -0.4 1.1 0.3 4.7 1.8 3.8 4.5
Income quintile share ratio S80/S20 5.9 6.1 6.4 7.3 5.8 5.3 6.1 6.1 7.5 7.1 7.3
GINI coefficient 33.8 34.5 35.9 37.0 33.0 32.0 34.6 35.0 37.9 37.0 37.6
Early leavers from education and training (% of
7.8 7.5 8.7 7.9 7.4 6.5 6.3 5.9 b 5.5 4.8 5.4 4.6
population aged 18-24)
NEET: Young people neither in employment nor in
education and training (% of total population aged 15- 7.1 8.8 12.1 13.2 11.8 11.2 11.1 9.9 9.2 9.4 9.1 8.0
24)
At-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion (% of male
26.3 25.9 27.5 33.7 33.0 31.4 28.3 25.5 28.2 28.5 27.5
population)
At-risk-of-poverty (% of male population) 16.7 18.5 18.9 21.2 19.1 18.1 19.4 17.8 21.8 20.4 21.4
Poverty gap (%) 28.2 28.4 29.0 36.6 29.1 24.3 25.2 26.0 27.7 30.5 31.5
Persistent at-risk-of-poverty (% of male
10.2 9.1 6.7 9.1 b 12.5 9.9 15.5 12.5 11.5 14.0
population)
Severe Material Deprivation (% of male population) 15.8 11.9 15.0 19.9 18.7 19.0 14.2 12.8 13.4 13.2 11.5
Male

Share of people living in low work intensity households

6.5 6.5 7.7 10.0 12.9 11.8 10.9 9.2 9.3 11.3 10.6
(% of males aged 0-59)
Life expectancy at birth (years) 64.5 65.9 67.5 67.6 68.1 68.4 68.5 69.2 69.2 69.5 70.7
Healthy life years at birth (years) - men 53.3 54.5 57.2 57.4 57.0 56.6 56.8 57.6 54.1 56.2
Early leavers from education and training (% of males
10.1 u 10.2 u 11.6 9.8 10.0 8.1 7.8 7.0 b 6.9 6.0 u 7.0 6.1
aged 18-24)
NEET: Young people neither in employment nor in
6.3 u 8.6 u 13.7 14.7 13.1 12.8 11.6 9.5 9.1 10.0 9.1 8.4
education and training ( % of males aged 15-24)
At-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion (% of female
30.9 30.4 31.4 34.2 33.3 33.4 33.0 28.8 30.4 31.5 31.3
population)
At-risk-of-poverty (% of female population) 21.2 23.0 21.6 20.0 19.3 19.0 21.6 20.3 22.5 23.1 24.2
Poverty gap (%) 23.5 24.1 20.3 28.6 29.0 22.0 23.5 20.8 24.5 26.1 25.3
Persistent at-risk-of-poverty (% of female
11.5 13.3 8.0 6.5 b 12.2 10.4 16.4 15.9 15.1 17.9
population)
Social Indicators

Severe Material Deprivation (% of female population) 17.3 13.0 16.2 19.8 19.3 20.5 17.6 14.3 14.4 13.8 13.1
Female

Share of people living in low work intensity households

6.4 5.7 6.8 8.9 12.5 11.0 11.1 8.4 9.2 9.2 8.8
(% of females aged 0-59)
Life expectancy at birth (years) 77.2 77.6 78.7 78.9 79.3 79.6 79.6 80.1 79.7 80.1 80.5
Healthy life years at birth (years) - women 58.1 59.6 61.2 62.3 62.0 61.6 61.6 61.7 58.8 59.4
Early leavers from education and training (% of
5.5 u 4.7 u 5.8 6.0 4.6 u 4.6 u 4.7 u 4.6 bu 4.0 u 3.6 u 3.0 u
females aged 18-24)
NEET: Young people neither in employment nor in
7.9 u 9.1 u 10.5 11.6 10.4 9.5 10.6 10.3 9.3 8.8 9.2 7.6
education and training ( % of females aged 15-24)
At-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion of children (% of
29.9 29.1 30.8 35.8 34.6 31.9 35.4 28.9 32.7 32.4 31.6
people aged 0-17)
At-risk-of-poverty (% of Children population) 22.1 23.3 23.3 24.8 25.2 20.8 26.9 23.5 28.9 25.6 25.7
Children (0-17)

Severe Material Deprivation (% of Children

15.9 11.8 15.8 20.0 16.7 16.9 18.5 13.7 13.8 11.5 13.0
population)
Share of children living in low work intensity
6.4 4.7 5.4 5.7 11.7 9.3 9.8 6.9 8.5 9.8 9.9
households (% of Children population)
Risk of poverty of children in households at work
17.3 20.5 20.1 21.9 18.5 15.5 21.2 18.8 23.0 19.6 18.7
(Working Intensity > 0.2)
Impact of social transfers (excl. pensions) in reducing
24.3 26.0 36.3 43.1 37.3 41.1 33.9 32.7 21.9 25.2 31.1
poverty (0-17) (%)
At-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion (% of working
25.8 25.0 27.7 34.6 33.3 31.7 29.3 25.6 26.4 27.3 25.7
age population)
At-risk-of-poverty (% of Working age population) 15.6 17.5 18.4 22.2 20.2 17.9 19.0 17.6 19.5 19.1 18.8
Working age

Severe Material Deprivation (% of Working age

15.8 11.5 14.7 18.7 18.0 19.5 14.6 12.3 12.7 13.0 11.0
(18-64)

population)
Very low work intensity (18-59) 6.4 6.6 7.8 10.6 13.1 12.0 11.4 9.4 9.4 10.3 9.6
In-work at-risk-of poverty rate (% of persons
8.1 9.5 10.5 12.7 9.6 7.7 9.2 8.4 10.2 8.7 8.8
employed 18-64)
Impact of social transfers (excl. pensions) in reducing
30.4 28.3 30.8 32.3 37.3 36.3 35.4 33.8 25.6 24.8 27.7
poverty (18-64) (%)
At-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion of elderly (% of
39.1 39.9 35.3 29.8 30.9 35.7 31.7 31.9 36.0 37.4 40.3
people aged 65+)
Elderly (65+)

At-risk-of-poverty (% of Elderly population) 29.8 31.0 23.9 9.6 9.7 18.7 19.4 20.1 25.0 27.7 33.4

Severe Material Deprivation (% of Elderly population) 20.8 17.1 18.8 24.0 25.1 24.1 18.4 17.8 18.2 17.3 16.2
Relative median income of elderly (ratio with median
0.69 0.70 0.73 0.93 0.90 0.78 0.81 0.77 0.73 0.71 0.69
income of people younger than 65)
Aggregate replacement ratio (ratio) 0.40 0.43 0.48 0.58 0.52 0.45 0.48 0.45 0.46 0.45 0.43
Sickness/Health care 4.3 4.6 5.4 4.8 4.5 4.2 4.1 4.1 4.4 4.6 p
protection indicators
Expenditure in social

Disability 1.4 1.6 2.0 1.8 1.6 1.5 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 p
Old age and survivors 6.4 6.9 8.9 7.9 7.1 7.2 6.9 7.1 7.0 6.7 p
(% of GDP)

Family/Children 1.2 1.8 2.8 2.2 1.7 1.4 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 p
Unemployment 0.4 0.4 0.9 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.5 0.5 p
Housing and Social exclusion n.e.c. 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.3 p
Total (including Admin and Other expenditures) 14.2 15.9 21.0 19.1 17.0 16.3 15.4 15.3 15.6 15.4 p
of which: Means tested benefits 0.2 0.3 0.5 1.0 1.0 0.9 0.8 0.6 0.5 0.4 p

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279
Employment and Social Developments in Europe 2019

Luxembourg
Luxembourg 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Real GDP 8.4 -1.3 -4.4 4.9 2.5 -0.4 3.7 4.3 3.9 2.4 1.5 2.6
Total employment 4.4 4.8 1.0 1.8 3.0 2.4 1.8 2.6 2.6 3.0 3.4 3.7
Labour productivity 3.8 -5.8 -5.4 3.0 -0.4 -2.7 1.8 1.7 1.3 -0.6 -1.8 -1.1
Macro Economic Indicators

Annual average hours worked per person employed 0.9 0.0 -3.2 0.0 -0.1 -0.5 -0.4 0.2 0.5 0.0 -0.5 0.0
(Annual % growth)

Real productivity per hour worked 2.9 -5.8 -2.2 3.0 -0.3 -2.3 2.2 1.5 0.8 -0.6 -1.3 -1.1
Harmonized CPI 2.7 4.1 0.0 2.8 3.7 2.9 1.7 0.7 0.1 0.0 2.1 2.0
Price deflator GDP 1.5 3.9 1.4 3.6 4.8 2.6 1.7 2.7 -0.4 0.9 2.2 3.8
Nominal compensation per employee 4.2 2.8 1.7 1.9 1.9 1.8 2.3 3.5 1.6 0.9 3.3 2.2
Real compensation per employee (GDP deflator) 2.6 -1.1 0.3 -1.7 -2.7 -0.7 0.6 0.8 2.0 0.0 1.1 -1.6
Real compensation per employee (private consumption
1.5 -1.3 1.7 -0.9 -1.8 -1.1 0.6 2.8 1.6 0.9 1.2 0.1
deflator)
Nominal unit labour costs 0.4 9.1 7.4 -1.0 2.3 4.6 0.5 1.8 0.3 1.5 5.2 3.3
Real unit labour costs -1.1 5.1 6.0 -4.5 -2.4 2.1 -1.2 -0.9 0.8 0.5 3.1 -0.5
Total population (000) 476 484 494 502 512 525 b 537 550 563 576 591 b 602
Population aged 15-64 (000) 322 328 336 343 351 362 371 380 389 399 411 b 419
Total employment (000) 203 b 202 217 b 221 225 236 239 246 258 b 261 272 280
Employment aged 15-64 (000) 203 b 202 215 b 219 222 234 236 243 255 b 259 270 278
Employment rate (% population aged 20-64) 69.6 b 68.8 70.4 b 70.7 70.1 71.4 71.1 72.1 70.9 b 70.7 71.5 72.1
Employment rate (% population aged 15-64) 64.2 b 63.4 65.2 b 65.2 64.6 65.8 65.7 66.6 66.1 b 65.6 66.3 67.1
Employment rate (% population aged 15-24) 22.5 b 23.8 26.7 b 21.2 20.7 21.7 21.9 20.4 29.1 b 24.9 25.8 28.4
Employment rate (% population aged 25-54) 81.9 b 80.0 81.2 b 82.3 82.0 83.1 82.9 83.7 82.6 b 82.5 83.7 83.9
Employment rate (% population aged 55-64) 32.0 b 34.1 38.2 b 39.6 39.3 41.0 40.5 42.5 38.4 b 39.6 39.8 40.5
FTE employment rate (% population aged 20-64) 63.9 b 63.2 64.5 b 65.4 64.5 66.0 65.4 66.4 66.5 b 65.7 66.4 67.3
Self-employed (% total employment) 7.1 b 6.3 8.1 b 7.8 8.1 8.4 8.4 8.3 8.9 b 9.2 9.1 7.7
Part-time employment (% total employment) 17.8 17.9 17.6 17.4 18.0 18.5 18.7 18.4 18.4 19.2 19.5 17.7
Temporary employment (% total employment) 6.3 5.8 6.6 6.5 6.5 6.9 6.4 7.3 9.1 7.9 8.1 8.9
Employment in Services (% total employment)
Employment in Industry (% total employment)
Employment in Agriculture (% total employment) 1.7 b 1.3 b 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.4 1.3 0.9 b 0.9 1.2 0.9
Activity rate (% population aged 15-64) 66.9 b 66.8 68.7 b 68.2 67.9 69.4 69.9 70.8 70.9 b 70.0 70.2 71.1
Labour Market Indicators - Total

Activity rate (% population aged 15-24) 26.5 b 29.0 32.3 b 24.7 24.9 26.8 25.9 26.3 35.2 b 30.7 30.5 33.1
Activity rate (% population aged 25-54) 84.7 b 83.4 84.8 b 85.7 85.6 87.0 87.5 88.0 87.7 b 87.2 88.0 88.4
Activity rate (% population aged 55-64) 32.7 b 35.1 39.4 b 40.6 40.4 41.9 42.5 44.5 40.3 b 41.6 41.1 42.0
Total unemployment (000) 9 10 12 11 11 13 15 16 18 18 16 16
Unemployment rate (% labour force) 4.2 4.9 5.1 4.6 4.8 5.1 5.9 6.0 6.5 6.3 5.6 5.4
Youth unemployment rate (% labour force 15-24) 15.6 17.3 16.5 15.8 16.4 18.0 16.9 22.3 16.6 19.1 15.5 13.5
Long term unemployment rate (% labour force) 1.2 1.6 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.6 1.8 1.6 1.9 2.2 2.1 1.4
Share of long term unemployment (% of total
28.7 32.4 23.1 29.3 28.8 30.3 30.4 27.4 28.4 34.8 38.1 24.7
unemployment)

Youth unemployment ratio (% population aged 15-24) 4.0 b 5.2 5.5 b 3.5 4.2 5.0 4.0 6.0 6.1 b 5.8 4.7 4.7

Employment rate for low skilled 25-64 (ISCED 0-2) 62.3 b 61.1 61.6 b 61.9 62.0 63.0 61.8 60.9 b 60.8 b 58.7 58.8 60.8
Employment rate for medium skilled 25-64 (ISCED 3-
73.9 b 70.7 70.2 b 72.1 70.4 71.9 70.8 72.1 b 70.9 b 70.5 73.5 72.8
4)
Employment rate for high skilled 25-64 (ISCED 5-8) 84.5 b 84.7 85.1 b 85.0 85.0 84.8 84.9 84.6 b 84.5 b 85.7 85.6 84.9
Employment rate (Nationals aged 15-64) 60.6 b 60.8 62.8 b 62.5 61.5 62.6 62.8 63.7 63.9 b 63.3 63.2 63.2
Employment rate (Other EU28 aged 15-64) 69.9 b 69.1 69.6 b 69.5 69.7 70.9 70.0 71.4 70.1 b 69.8 71.3 73.3
Employment rate (Other than EU28 aged 15-64) 55.2 b 37.1 53.2 b 56.6 55.1 56.7 58.7 53.5 54.5 b 50.2 54.5 52.6
Employment rate (Born in the same country aged 15-
59.2 b 59.4 61.9 b 60.7 59.5 60.7 60.3 61.5 62.6 b 61.8 61.2 61.8
64)
Employment rate (Born in other EU28 aged 15-64) 73.0 b 72.2 71.1 b 72.2 72.5 73.6 73.6 74.0 71.8 b 71.7 73.6 74.6
Employment rate (Born outside EU28 aged 15-64) 59.9 b 48.5 59.9 b 62.9 59.9 60.9 62.0 62.4 60.3 b 57.5 60.1 58.7
Underemployment (% of labour force aged 15-74) 0.7 2.1 b 1.7 1.6 2.1 1.8 1.8 2.3 b 2.1 1.9 1.6
Seeking but not available (% of labour force aged 15-
0.3 u 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.7 2.7 b 2.5 2.0 2.2
74)
Discouraged, available but not seeking (% of labour
0.4 u 5.1 4.7 4.9 5.1 5.9 5.8 5.1 4.4 4.0 3.7
force aged 15-74)

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280
 Statistical annex - 1. Country profiles

Luxembourg 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Total population (000) 236 240 245 249 255 262 b 268 275 282 289 297 b 303
Population aged 15-64(000) 163 166 170 174 178 184 189 194 199 204 210 b 214
Total employment (000) 114 b 116 124 b 125 127 132 134 136 141 b 143 146 150
Employment aged 15-64 (000) 114 b 115 122 b 124 126 130 132 134 140 b 142 145 149
Employment rate (% population aged 20-64) 78.3 b 77.2 79.0 b 79.2 78.1 78.5 78.0 78.4 76.7 b 76.1 75.4 76.0
Employment rate (% population aged 15-64) 72.3 b 71.5 73.2 b 73.1 72.1 72.5 72.1 72.6 71.3 b 70.5 69.9 70.6
Employment rate (% population aged 15-24) 26.5 b 27.0 29.1 b 22.1 22.8 23.4 24.2 21.9 29.4 b 24.4 27.0 28.4
Employment rate (% population aged 25-54) 92.2 b 90.2 90.8 b 92.0 90.8 91.0 90.1 90.5 89.3 b 88.5 87.4 88.0
Employment rate (% population aged 55-64) 35.6 b 38.7 46.5 b 47.7 47.0 47.4 48.3 49.8 43.0 b 46.4 45.4 45.5
FTE employment rate (% population aged 20-64) 77.7 b 76.6 77.9 b 78.6 77.0 77.2 76.4 77.0 75.7 b 74.8 74.2 75.0
Self-employed (% total employment) 8.1 b 6.6 9.8 b 9.0 9.2 9.2 9.3 9.5 10.0 b 10.5 10.1 8.8
Part-time employment (% total employment) 2.6 2.7 4.5 3.4 4.3 4.7 5.1 4.7 5.6 6.2 6.0 5.7
Temporary employment (% total employment) 5.7 5.5 5.7 5.6 5.7 6.5 5.1 6.4 9.1 7.8 7.8 8.1
Employment in Services (% total employment)
Employment in Industry (% total employment)
Employment in Agriculture (% total employment) 2.0 b 1.6 b 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.9 1.8 1.2 b 1.2 1.7 1.3
Activity rate (% population aged 15-64) 75.0 b 74.7 76.6 b 76.0 75.0 75.9 76.3 77.2 76.0 b 75.1 74.0 74.7
Labour Market Indicators - Male

Activity rate (% population aged 15-24) 30.6 b 30.9 34.9 b 26.8 26.3 28.8 29.8 29.6 36.2 b 30.4 32.6 33.9
Activity rate (% population aged 25-54) 94.9 b 93.7 94.1 b 94.8 93.9 94.6 94.4 94.9 93.9 b 93.1 91.8 92.2
Activity rate (% population aged 55-64) 36.4 b 39.7 47.7 b 48.8 48.4 48.3 50.5 52.1 45.5 b 49.1 46.8 47.5
Total unemployment (000) 4 5 6 5 5 6 8 8 9 9 9 8
Unemployment rate (% labour force) 3.4 4.1 4.5 3.8 3.9 4.5 5.6 5.8 5.9 6.1 5.6 5.1
Youth unemployment rate (% labour force 15-24) 13.8 13.4 15.0 17.2 15.1 18.6 18.8 25.1 18.0 21.3 17.2 15.1
Long term unemployment rate (% labour force) 1.3 1.3 0.9 1.2 1.3 1.3 1.6 1.6 1.9 2.2 2.3 1.3
Share of long term unemployment (% of total
35.4 29.4 19.9 32.2 33.1 28.8 30.3 26.7 31.0 37.3 41.3 23.7
unemployment)

Youth unemployment ratio (% population aged 15-24) 4.1 b 3.9 5.8 b 4.7 3.5 5.4 5.6 7.7 6.8 b 6.0 5.6 5.5

Employment rate for low skilled 25-64 (ISCED 0-2) 75.7 b 75.2 74.9 b 74.6 74.9 73.1 72.8 70.0 b 69.6 b 69.3 67.2 68.2
Employment rate for medium skilled 25-64 (ISCED 3-
82.4 b 78.3 79.2 b 81.1 79.0 79.3 78.6 79.8 b 77.3 b 76.2 75.3 76.0
4)
Employment rate for high skilled 25-64 (ISCED 5-8) 87.9 b 88.9 90.6 b 90.7 89.8 90.1 89.3 88.9 b 88.7 b 89.1 89.0 88.9
Employment rate (Nationals aged 15-64) 68.7 b 69.4 70.7 b 70.2 67.9 68.7 68.3 69.5 67.8 b 67.5 66.0 66.3
Employment rate (Other EU28 aged 15-64) 77.5 b 76.5 76.8 b 76.9 76.8 76.9 77.0 76.7 75.3 b 74.8 74.9 76.3
Employment rate (Other than EU28 aged 15-64) 67.6 b 44.1 68.7 b 72.5 76.0 72.6 68.1 65.7 70.4 b 60.8 63.1 62.7
Employment rate (Born in the same country aged 15-
67.3 b 68.2 69.2 b 68.4 65.9 66.3 65.3 66.6 66.7 b 65.9 63.4 64.8
64)
Employment rate (Born in other EU28 aged 15-64) 80.3 b 78.7 78.8 b 79.6 79.9 80.0 80.7 80.4 76.3 b 76.9 77.1 77.7
Employment rate (Born outside EU28 aged 15-64) 72.7 b 57.4 74.3 b 74.7 73.5 74.7 72.1 70.7 71.7 b 65.3 69.0 65.8
Underemployment (% of labour force aged 15-74) 1.0 b 0.6 u 0.8 0.7 u 0.6 u 0.7 1.1 b 1.1 0.7 0.6 u
Seeking but not available (% of labour force aged 15-
0.6 u 0.6 u 0.5 u 2.0 b 1.7 1.7 1.9
74)
Discouraged, available but not seeking (% of labour
3.5 3.2 3.0 3.4 4.1 3.9 4.4 3.6 3.3 3.1
force aged 15-74)
Total population (000) 240 244 249 253 257 263 b 269 275 281 287 294 b 299
Population aged 15-64(000) 159 162 166 169 173 178 182 186 191 195 201 b 205
Total employment (000) 89 b 87 93 b 96 98 104 105 110 116 b 118 126 130
Employment aged 15-64 (000) 89 b 87 93 b 95 97 103 105 109 115 b 117 125 129
Employment rate (% population aged 20-64) 61.0 b 60.1 61.5 b 62.0 61.9 64.1 63.9 65.5 65.0 b 65.1 67.5 68.0
Employment rate (% population aged 15-64) 56.1 b 55.1 57.0 b 57.2 56.9 59.0 59.1 60.5 60.8 b 60.4 62.5 63.4
Employment rate (% population aged 15-24) 18.4 b 20.6 24.2 b 20.3 18.5 20.1 19.4 18.8 28.8 b 25.4 24.5 28.4
Employment rate (% population aged 25-54) 71.7 b 69.5 71.4 b 72.6 72.9 75.0 75.5 76.8 75.7 b 76.4 79.8 79.7
Employment rate (% population aged 55-64) 28.6 b 29.3 29.4 b 31.3 31.3 34.3 32.4 35.0 33.7 b 32.4 33.9 35.2
FTE employment rate (% population aged 20-64) 50.8 b 50.2 51.8 b 52.7 52.7 55.3 55.0 56.3 57.9 b 57.1 59.1 60.1
Self-employed (% total employment) 5.7 b 5.9 5.8 b 6.1 6.7 7.4 7.3 6.8 7.7 b 7.6 8.0 6.6
Part-time employment (% total employment) 37.1 38.2 34.8 35.6 35.8 35.9 35.8 35.3 33.9 34.8 35.1 31.6
Temporary employment (% total employment) 7.2 6.2 7.8 7.7 7.5 7.5 8.0 8.5 9.2 8.1 8.5 9.8
Employment in Services (% total employment)
Employment in Industry (% total employment)
Employment in Agriculture (% total employment) 1.2 b 0.8 bu 0.6 u 0.7 u 0.9 u 0.9 u 0.7 u 0.7 bu 0.5 u 0.6 u 0.5 u
Activity rate (% population aged 15-64) 58.9 b 58.7 60.7 b 60.3 60.7 62.8 63.2 64.2 65.6 b 64.7 66.2 67.4
Labour Market Indicators - Female

Activity rate (% population aged 15-24) 22.3 b 27.1 29.5 b 22.7 23.4 24.7 21.8 23.0 34.1 b 31.0 28.3 32.3
Activity rate (% population aged 25-54) 74.7 b 72.9 75.3 b 76.4 77.1 79.2 80.5 80.9 81.3 b 81.1 84.0 84.4
Activity rate (% population aged 55-64) 29.1 b 30.3 30.6 b 32.0 32.1 35.2 34.2 36.5 35.0 b 33.9 35.1 36.2
Total unemployment (000) 5 5 6 6 6 6 7 7 9 8 7 8
Unemployment rate (% labour force) 5.1 5.9 5.9 5.5 6.0 5.8 6.2 6.4 7.1 6.5 5.6 5.7
Youth unemployment rate (% labour force 15-24) 18.2 22.0 18.2 14.3 17.9 17.3 14.2 18.7 15.2 16.8 13.4 11.7
Long term unemployment rate (% labour force) 1.0 u 2.1 1.6 1.3 1.6 1.9 1.9 1.6 1.9 2.1 1.9 1.5
Share of long term unemployment (% of total
22.3 u 35.2 26.1 26.5 25.4 31.8 30.4 28.2 25.8 32.1 34.5 25.8
unemployment)

Youth unemployment ratio (% population aged 15-24) 3.9 b 6.5 5.2 b 2.3 4.9 4.6 2.4 4.2 5.3 b 5.6 3.7 3.8

Employment rate for low skilled 25-64 (ISCED 0-2) 51.4 b 49.5 51.2 b 52.1 50.9 54.3 51.7 53.5 b 51.9 b 48.6 50.6 53.2
Employment rate for medium skilled 25-64 (ISCED 3-
64.8 b 62.2 60.9 b 63.2 61.8 64.6 62.8 64.2 b 64.2 b 64.2 71.5 69.2
4)
Employment rate for high skilled 25-64 (ISCED 5-8) 80.8 b 79.9 78.6 b 77.9 79.4 78.5 80.0 79.7 b 80.0 b 82.0 82.3 80.9
Employment rate (Nationals aged 15-64) 52.7 b 51.9 54.8 b 54.5 54.9 56.4 57.2 58.0 60.0 b 59.1 60.4 60.1
Employment rate (Other EU28 aged 15-64) 61.9 b 61.4 62.0 b 62.0 62.1 64.3 62.6 65.6 64.5 b 64.5 67.4 70.2
Employment rate (Other than EU28 aged 15-64) 46.4 b 29.5 39.8 b 44.4 38.1 45.2 50.7 44.4 39.5 b 40.2 46.3 42.6
Employment rate (Born in the same country aged 15-
51.3 b 50.4 54.4 b 52.8 53.0 54.9 55.0 56.1 58.4 b 57.5 58.9 58.7
64)
Employment rate (Born in other EU28 aged 15-64) 65.4 b 65.3 63.1 b 64.5 64.3 66.8 65.9 67.3 66.9 b 66.2 69.7 71.2
Employment rate (Born outside EU28 aged 15-64) 50.1 b 39.8 46.5 b 52.7 49.7 50.1 54.2 55.3 49.3 b 50.3 52.5 51.3
Underemployment (% of labour force aged 15-74) 1.4 3.5 3.1 2.6 3.9 3.4 3.2 3.8 3.4 3.3 2.8
Seeking but not available (% of labour force aged 15-
0.8 u 1.0 u 1.0 u 1.0 1.0 0.9 1.0 3.6 3.3 2.3 2.5
74)
Discouraged, available but not seeking (% of labour
0.7 u 7.1 6.6 7.3 7.3 8.3 8.2 5.9 5.3 4.8 4.4
force aged 15-74)

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281
Employment and Social Developments in Europe 2019

Luxembourg 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
At-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion (% of total
15.9 15.5 17.8 17.1 16.8 18.4 19.0 19.0 18.5 19.8 b 21.5
population)
At-risk-of-poverty (% of total population) 13.5 13.4 14.9 14.5 13.6 15.1 15.9 16.4 15.3 16.5 b 18.7
At-risk-of-poverty threshold (PPS single person) 16108 16166 16265 15961 15961 15948 16818 16962 17571 17198 b 17604
Poverty gap (%) 18.8 16.6 17.6 18.6 15.7 15.0 17.5 16.3 17.4 23.2 b 21.8
Persistent at-risk-of-poverty (% of total
8.9 8.4 8.8 6.0 6.5 7.1 9.2 8.7 12.0 9.7 b 10.1
population)
At-risk-of-poverty before social transfers excl.
23.4 23.6 27.0 29.1 27.2 29.0 29.4 27.6 27.2 27.1 b 29.0
pensions (% of total population)
Impact of social transfers (excl. pensions) in
42.3 43.2 44.8 50.2 50.0 47.9 45.9 40.6 43.8 39.1 b 35.5
reducing poverty (%)
All

Severe Material Deprivation (% of total population) 0.8 0.7 1.1 0.5 1.2 1.3 1.8 1.4 2.0 1.6 b 1.2
Share of people living in low work intensity households
5.0 4.7 6.3 5.5 5.8 6.1 6.6 6.1 5.7 6.6 b 6.9
(% of people aged 0-59)
Real Gross Household Disposable income (growth %) 4.2 2.1 3.7 2.6 -0.7 3.8 1.7 3.1 2.8 2.9
Income quintile share ratio S80/S20 4.0 4.1 4.3 4.1 4.0 4.1 4.6 4.4 4.3 5.0 b 5.0
GINI coefficient 27.4 27.7 29.2 27.9 27.2 28.0 30.4 28.7 28.5 31.0 b 30.9
Early leavers from education and training (% of
12.5 b 13.4 7.7 b 7.1 6.2 8.1 6.1 6.1 b 9.3 b 5.5 7.3 6.3
population aged 18-24)
NEET: Young people neither in employment nor in
education and training (% of total population aged 15- 5.7 6.2 5.8 5.1 4.7 5.9 5.0 6.3 6.2 5.4 5.9 5.3
24)
At-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion (% of male
15.0 14.2 16.0 16.5 15.6 17.3 18.6 18.5 17.7 18.7 b 20.3
population)
At-risk-of-poverty (% of male population) 12.9 12.5 13.8 14.6 12.7 14.7 15.7 16.3 15.0 15.6 b 17.9
Poverty gap (%) 19.1 15.4 16.9 18.6 15.7 14.9 18.0 17.5 18.7 22.4 b 20.8
Persistent at-risk-of-poverty (% of male
7.9 7.7 7.7 5.2 5.6 6.4 8.5 7.2 11.3 9.9 b 9.4
population)
Severe Material Deprivation (% of male population) 0.8 0.6 0.9 0.4 1.3 1.3 1.5 1.4 1.8 1.7 b 1.1
Male

Share of people living in low work intensity households

4.3 3.8 4.9 4.8 5.1 5.1 6.5 5.6 5.5 6.4 b 5.9
(% of males aged 0-59)
Life expectancy at birth (years) 76.7 78.1 78.1 77.9 78.5 79.1 79.8 79.4 80.0 80.1 b 79.9 b
Healthy life years at birth (years) - men 62.3 64.8 65.1 64.4 65.8 65.8 63.8 64.0 63.7 61.4 b
Early leavers from education and training (% of males
16.6 b 15.8 8.9 b 8.0 7.6 10.7 8.4 8.3 b 10.5 b 6.8 9.8 6.8
aged 18-24)
NEET: Young people neither in employment nor in
4.7 4.6 6.0 5.6 4.6 6.3 5.9 7.8 6.6 5.1 6.1 4.6
education and training ( % of males aged 15-24)
At-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion (% of female
16.9 16.7 19.6 17.7 18.0 19.4 19.4 19.5 19.3 20.9 b 22.8
population)
At-risk-of-poverty (% of female population) 14.1 14.3 16.0 14.4 14.5 15.6 16.0 16.6 15.7 17.5 b 19.4
Poverty gap (%) 18.7 17.6 19.2 18.8 15.9 15.5 17.4 15.8 16.8 23.5 b 22.4
Persistent at-risk-of-poverty (% of female
9.8 9.2 9.9 6.9 7.5 7.8 9.8 10.3 12.6 9.6 b 10.8
population)
Social Indicators

Severe Material Deprivation (% of female population) 0.8 0.7 1.3 0.7 1.1 1.3 2.0 1.4 2.1 1.5 b 1.2
Female

Share of people living in low work intensity households

5.8 5.5 7.8 6.3 6.6 7.2 6.6 6.6 5.8 6.9 b 8.0
(% of females aged 0-59)
Life expectancy at birth (years) 82.2 83.1 83.3 83.5 83.6 83.8 83.9 85.2 84.7 85.4 b 84.4 b
Healthy life years at birth (years) - women 64.6 64.2 65.9 66.4 67.1 66.4 62.9 63.5 60.6 58.9 b
Early leavers from education and training (% of
8.4 b 10.9 6.6 b 6.0 4.8 u 5.5 3.7 u 3.7 bu 8.1 b 4.2 u 4.6 u 5.9
females aged 18-24)
NEET: Young people neither in employment nor in
6.6 7.8 5.5 4.7 4.9 5.5 4.0 4.6 5.7 5.7 5.7 6.0
education and training ( % of females aged 15-24)
At-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion of children (% of
21.2 20.9 23.7 22.3 21.7 24.6 26.0 26.4 23.0 22.7 b 23.6
people aged 0-17)
At-risk-of-poverty (% of Children population) 19.9 19.8 22.3 21.4 20.3 22.6 23.9 25.4 21.5 21.8 b 22.8
Children (0-17)

Severe Material Deprivation (% of Children

0.7 0.9 1.2 0.2 1.2 1.7 2.4 1.8 3.0 1.2 b 1.2
population)
Share of children living in low work intensity
3.5 3.2 4.1 3.2 2.9 4.0 4.5 4.2 2.6 3.4 b 3.8
households (% of Children population)
Risk of poverty of children in households at work
18.1 18.2 20.3 19.7 19.0 20.8 21.6 22.6 20.0 19.4 b 20.6
(Working Intensity > 0.2)
Impact of social transfers (excl. pensions) in reducing
40.1 41.3 43.7 50.4 50.0 50.7 46.3 40.4 43.1 43.1 b 39.5
poverty (0-17) (%)
At-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion (% of working
16.0 15.8 18.2 17.5 17.6 18.8 19.0 19.4 19.2 21.0 b 22.8
age population)
At-risk-of-poverty (% of Working age population) 12.7 12.9 14.2 13.9 13.1 14.5 15.0 15.8 14.9 16.3 b 18.8
Working age

Severe Material Deprivation (% of Working age

0.9 0.7 1.3 0.7 1.4 1.4 1.7 1.5 2.0 2.0 b 1.4
(18-64)

population)
Very low work intensity (18-59) 5.6 5.2 7.1 6.4 6.9 6.8 7.4 6.8 6.7 7.7 b 7.9
In-work at-risk-of poverty rate (% of persons
9.3 9.4 10.1 10.6 9.8 10.3 11.2 11.1 11.6 12.0 b 13.7
employed 18-64)
Impact of social transfers (excl. pensions) in reducing
44.8 44.9 46.2 50.5 50.8 47.3 46.8 41.3 45.2 39.4 b 36.5
poverty (18-64) (%)
At-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion of elderly (% of
7.2 5.4 6.2 6.1 4.7 6.1 7.0 6.4 8.2 9.1 b 11.8
people aged 65+)
Elderly (65+)

At-risk-of-poverty (% of Elderly population) 7.2 5.4 6.0 5.9 4.7 6.1 6.2 6.3 7.9 9.0 b 11.8

Severe Material Deprivation (% of Elderly population) 0.6 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.9 0.1 0.3 0.2 b 0.1
Relative median income of elderly (ratio with median
0.96 0.97 1.01 1.05 1.05 1.10 1.13 1.11 1.08 1.22 b 1.15
income of people younger than 65)
Aggregate replacement ratio (ratio) 0.61 0.58 0.62 0.68 0.74 0.79 0.78 0.85 0.80 0.88 b 0.86
Sickness/Health care 5.0 5.2 5.8 5.6 5.4 5.7 5.8 5.6 5.4 5.3
protection indicators
Expenditure in social

Disability 2.4 2.4 2.6 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.4 2.3
Old age and survivors 7.1 7.4 8.3 8.0 8.0 8.5 8.5 8.3 8.5 8.5
(% of GDP)

Family/Children 3.2 4.1 4.1 3.9 3.5 3.6 3.6 3.5 3.4 3.3
Unemployment 0.9 0.9 1.3 1.2 1.1 1.3 1.5 1.4 1.4 1.3
Housing and Social exclusion n.e.c. 0.6 0.6 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8
Total (including Admin and Other expenditures) 19.5 20.9 23.4 22.5 21.8 22.7 23.1 22.5 22.3 21.9
of which: Means tested benefits 0.6 0.6 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8

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282
 Statistical annex - 1. Country profiles

Hungary
Hungary 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Real GDP 0.4 0.9 -6.6 0.7 1.7 -1.6 2.1 4.2 3.5 2.3 4.1 4.9
Total employment 0.1 -2.0 -2.5 -1.1 0.0 0.2 1.1 4.8 2.4 3.1 2.0 2.2
Labour productivity 0.3 2.9 -4.2 1.8 1.7 -1.8 1.0 -0.6 1.1 -0.7 2.1 2.7
Macro Economic Indicators

Annual average hours worked per person employed -0.2 0.2 -0.9 -9.5 b -0.4 b -1.1 -0.3 0.4 -0.2 0.7 -1.1 -1.6
(Annual % growth)

Real productivity per hour worked 0.5 2.7 -3.3 12.4 b 2.1 -0.7 1.3 -1.0 1.3 -1.4 3.2 4.4
Harmonized CPI 7.9 6.0 4.0 4.7 3.9 5.7 1.7 0.0 0.1 0.4 2.4 2.9
Price deflator GDP 5.4 5.0 4.0 2.4 2.3 3.4 2.9 3.4 1.9 0.9 3.8 4.5
Nominal compensation per employee 5.2 7.3 -1.4 1.5 3.4 1.7 1.8 0.6 -1.5 4.4 6.2 9.6
Real compensation per employee (GDP deflator) -0.2 2.2 -5.3 -0.9 1.1 -1.6 -1.1 -2.6 -3.4 3.5 2.3 4.9
Real compensation per employee (private consumption
-2.5 1.2 -5.3 -3.1 -0.5 -3.7 0.1 0.6 -1.6 4.0 3.8 6.5
deflator)
Nominal unit labour costs 4.9 4.3 2.9 -0.3 1.7 3.6 0.8 1.2 -2.6 5.2 4.1 6.7
Real unit labour costs -0.5 -0.7 -1.1 -2.6 -0.6 0.2 -2.0 -2.1 -4.4 4.3 0.3 2.1
Total population (000) 10066 10045 10031 10014 9986 9932 b 9909 9877 9856 9830 9798 9778
Population aged 15-64 (000) 6931 6913 6898 6874 6857 6816 6776 6720 6664 6609 6546 6504
Total employment (000) 3902 3848 3748 3732 3759 3827 3893 4101 4211 4352 4421 4470
Employment aged 15-64 (000) 3873 3818 3717 3701 3724 3793 3860 4070 4176 4309 4373 4411
Employment rate (% population aged 20-64) 62.3 61.5 60.1 59.9 60.4 61.6 63.0 66.7 68.9 71.5 73.3 74.4
Employment rate (% population aged 15-64) 57.0 56.4 55.0 54.9 55.4 56.7 58.1 61.8 63.9 66.5 68.2 69.2
Employment rate (% population aged 15-24) 21.1 20.2 18.1 18.3 18.0 18.4 20.1 23.5 25.7 28.1 29.0 29.0
Employment rate (% population aged 25-54) 74.7 74.5 72.9 72.5 73.0 74.6 75.7 79.2 80.6 82.2 83.7 84.1
Employment rate (% population aged 55-64) 32.2 30.9 31.9 33.6 35.3 36.1 37.9 41.7 45.3 49.8 51.7 54.4
FTE employment rate (% population aged 20-64) 61.6 60.8 59.2 58.9 59.2 60.5 62.2 65.3 67.4 70.3 72.5 73.4
Self-employed (% total employment) 12.0 11.9 12.2 12.0 11.7 11.4 10.9 10.6 10.6 10.4 10.1 10.2
Part-time employment (% total employment) 3.9 4.3 5.2 5.5 6.4 6.7 6.4 6.0 5.7 4.8 4.3 4.2
Temporary employment (% total employment) 6.4 6.9 7.4 8.5 8.0 8.5 9.7 9.6 10.1 8.7 7.9 6.5
Employment in Services (% total employment) 63.3 b 64.2 64.7 64.2 65.1 65.3 64.9 64.7 64.5 63.3 62.7
Employment in Industry (% total employment) 32.4 b 31.3 30.8 31.0 29.9 30.0 30.5 30.4 30.6 31.7 32.6
Employment in Agriculture (% total employment) 4.3 b 4.6 4.5 4.9 5.0 4.7 4.6 4.9 5.0 5.0 4.8
Activity rate (% population aged 15-64) 61.6 61.2 61.2 61.9 62.4 63.7 64.7 67.0 68.6 70.1 71.2 71.9
Labour Market Indicators - Total

Activity rate (% population aged 15-24) 25.7 25.1 24.7 24.8 24.3 25.7 27.4 29.5 31.0 32.3 32.4 32.3
Activity rate (% population aged 25-54) 80.1 80.3 80.3 80.9 81.3 82.9 83.3 85.0 85.8 86.1 86.9 87.0
Activity rate (% population aged 55-64) 33.7 32.6 34.1 36.5 38.8 39.5 41.2 44.6 48.1 52.1 53.6 55.8
Total unemployment (000) 312 326 d 418 469 466 473 441 343 308 235 192 172
Unemployment rate (% labour force) 7.4 7.8 d 10.0 11.2 11.0 11.0 10.2 7.7 6.8 5.1 4.2 3.7
Youth unemployment rate (% labour force 15-24) 18.1 19.5 d 26.4 26.4 26.0 28.2 26.6 20.4 17.3 12.9 10.7 10.2
Long term unemployment rate (% labour force) 3.5 3.6 4.2 5.5 5.2 5.0 4.9 3.7 3.1 2.4 1.7 1.4
Share of long term unemployment (% of total
46.7 46.2 41.5 48.9 47.6 45.3 48.6 47.5 45.6 46.5 40.4 38.5
unemployment)

Youth unemployment ratio (% population aged 15-24) 4.6 4.9 6.5 6.6 6.3 7.2 7.3 6.0 5.4 4.2 3.5 3.3

Employment rate for low skilled 25-64 (ISCED 0-2) 37.7 38.2 36.9 37.0 37.3 38.1 39.2 45.3 b 48.1 51.7 55.1 57.0
Employment rate for medium skilled 25-64 (ISCED 3-
69.9 68.3 66.5 65.8 65.9 67.3 68.5 71.8 b 73.7 76.1 77.6 78.3
4)
Employment rate for high skilled 25-64 (ISCED 5-8) 80.3 79.5 78.4 78.2 79.3 79.5 80.0 81.8 b 83.0 85.0 85.1 85.8
Employment rate (Nationals aged 15-64) 57.0 56.3 55.0 54.9 55.4 56.6 58.0 61.7 63.9 66.5 68.2 69.3
Employment rate (Other EU28 aged 15-64) 63.5 64.5 65.9 67.9 61.7 62.2 65.1 71.6 67.0 67.7 57.9 65.8
Employment rate (Other than EU28 aged 15-64) 65.6 71.6 61.7 49.7 51.2 59.4 63.5 69.9 68.9 62.4 63.5 53.9
Employment rate (Born in the same country aged 15-
56.9 56.2 54.8 54.8 55.3 56.4 57.9 61.6 63.8 66.4 68.1 69.2
64)
Employment rate (Born in other EU28 aged 15-64) 64.4 64.0 65.3 67.1 64.1 66.5 67.8 72.5 70.5 76.9 76.4 74.3
Employment rate (Born outside EU28 aged 15-64) 63.3 66.0 62.5 59.0 59.0 66.6 67.6 64.3 72.5 67.3 68.6 66.5
Underemployment (% of labour force aged 15-74) 0.1 1.3 1.4 1.6 2.0 2.1 1.8 1.5 1.0 0.8 0.7
Seeking but not available (% of labour force aged 15-
0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
74)
Discouraged, available but not seeking (% of labour
3.8 4.1 4.6 4.8 5.2 5.2 5.2 3.9 3.2 2.8 2.6 2.2
force aged 15-74)

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283
Employment and Social Developments in Europe 2019

Hungary 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Total population (000) 4779 4770 4763 4757 4744 4725 b 4716 4703 4696 4689 4675 4672
Population aged 15-64(000) 3408 3403 3398 3391 3385 3367 3351 3327 3303 3282 3256 3242
Total employment (000) 2129 2094 2025 1993 2021 2049 2104 2221 2284 2363 2417 2446
Employment aged 15-64 (000) 2112 2076 2007 1975 2001 2029 2085 2203 2264 2337 2390 2412
Employment rate (% population aged 20-64) 69.8 68.7 66.5 65.5 66.4 67.3 69.3 73.5 75.8 78.6 81.0 82.1
Employment rate (% population aged 15-64) 63.7 62.7 60.7 59.9 60.7 61.6 63.7 67.8 70.3 73.0 75.2 76.3
Employment rate (% population aged 15-24) 24.4 23.3 20.0 19.9 19.7 19.8 23.0 26.4 28.1 31.5 32.9 33.4
Employment rate (% population aged 25-54) 81.6 81.3 79.1 78.0 79.5 80.2 81.4 85.3 86.8 88.2 90.1 90.4
Employment rate (% population aged 55-64) 40.1 37.7 38.7 38.6 39.3 41.4 44.8 49.6 54.4 59.7 62.6 65.5
FTE employment rate (% population aged 20-64) 69.5 68.3 66.0 65.0 65.7 66.7 69.0 72.6 74.8 78.0 80.7 81.7
Self-employed (% total employment) 14.9 15.0 15.2 15.0 15.0 14.1 13.6 13.4 13.0 12.7 11.9 12.1
Part-time employment (% total employment) 2.5 3.0 3.6 3.7 4.4 4.3 4.2 4.1 4.0 3.1 2.7 2.5
Temporary employment (% total employment) 6.5 7.3 7.7 8.6 8.2 9.0 9.9 9.7 10.1 8.2 7.3 5.9
Employment in Services (% total employment) 52.2 b 52.4 53.2 52.8 53.8 54.2 53.6 53.2 53.1 51.8 50.6
Employment in Industry (% total employment) 41.9 b 41.3 40.4 40.4 39.2 39.3 40.1 40.0 40.1 41.4 42.9
Employment in Agriculture (% total employment) 6.0 b 6.3 6.5 6.8 7.0 6.6 6.3 6.8 6.8 6.8 6.5
Activity rate (% population aged 15-64) 68.6 68.0 67.7 67.8 68.4 69.6 71.0 73.4 75.3 76.9 78.2 79.1
Labour Market Indicators - Male

Activity rate (% population aged 15-24) 29.5 28.7 27.7 27.5 27.0 27.9 31.0 33.0 34.4 36.1 36.5 37.1
Activity rate (% population aged 25-54) 87.2 87.3 87.1 87.3 88.2 89.4 89.5 91.2 92.0 92.4 93.3 93.3
Activity rate (% population aged 55-64) 42.1 39.8 41.5 42.2 43.7 45.4 49.0 53.2 57.8 62.4 64.5 67.1
Total unemployment (000) 164 174 d 232 262 252 262 239 182 162 128 96 88
Unemployment rate (% labour force) 7.1 7.7 d 10.3 11.6 11.1 11.3 10.2 7.6 6.6 5.1 3.8 3.5
Youth unemployment rate (% labour force 15-24) 17.6 18.9 d 27.9 27.8 27.0 29.1 25.6 20.0 18.3 12.9 9.7 9.8
Long term unemployment rate (% labour force) 3.3 3.6 4.3 5.7 5.2 5.2 5.0 3.6 3.1 2.3 1.5 1.4
Share of long term unemployment (% of total
46.3 47.3 41.4 49.3 47.3 45.5 48.6 48.0 47.1 45.8 40.6 40.6
unemployment)

Youth unemployment ratio (% population aged 15-24) 5.1 5.4 7.7 7.6 7.3 8.1 7.9 6.6 6.3 4.7 3.5 3.6

Employment rate for low skilled 25-64 (ISCED 0-2) 46.0 46.9 45.1 44.0 45.8 46.8 47.2 54.7 b 58.5 62.2 66.0 68.2
Employment rate for medium skilled 25-64 (ISCED 3-
76.6 74.9 72.6 71.1 71.5 72.3 74.2 78.2 b 80.5 82.9 84.8 85.6
4)
Employment rate for high skilled 25-64 (ISCED 5-8) 86.2 84.6 83.3 82.8 84.7 85.7 86.8 88.4 b 89.8 91.2 92.4 92.8
Employment rate (Nationals aged 15-64) 63.6 62.6 60.6 59.8 60.7 61.5 63.6 67.7 70.2 73.0 75.3 76.4
Employment rate (Other EU28 aged 15-64) 78.8 78.8 76.4 72.6 75.1 80.4 83.0 84.0 76.1 74.6 66.1 79.1
Employment rate (Other than EU28 aged 15-64) 75.0 80.8 72.0 u 56.9 u 60.6 69.0 77.9 92.5 u 77.5 u 69.7 60.9 57.0
Employment rate (Born in the same country aged 15-
63.5 62.5 60.5 59.7 60.5 61.4 63.4 67.6 70.0 72.8 75.1 76.2
64)
Employment rate (Born in other EU28 aged 15-64) 75.3 71.7 73.2 70.8 72.5 72.5 78.1 83.8 82.8 85.9 84.1 84.5
Employment rate (Born outside EU28 aged 15-64) 72.1 76.1 74.1 64.3 69.0 75.7 79.1 79.4 81.3 76.2 70.7 68.7
Underemployment (% of labour force aged 15-74) 0.1 u 1.0 1.1 1.3 1.4 1.6 1.5 1.2 0.8 0.6 0.5
Seeking but not available (% of labour force aged 15-
0.2 u 0.2 u 0.3 0.2 u 0.2 0.2 u 0.2 0.2 u 0.2 u 0.1 u 0.1 u 0.1 u
74)
Discouraged, available but not seeking (% of labour
3.7 3.8 4.4 4.5 5.0 4.9 4.9 3.6 3.0 2.6 2.3 1.9
force aged 15-74)
Total population (000) 5287 5276 5268 5257 5242 5207 b 5193 5174 5160 5142 5122 5107
Population aged 15-64(000) 3523 3510 3500 3483 3473 3449 3425 3393 3361 3328 3290 3263
Total employment (000) 1773 1755 1723 1740 1738 1778 1789 1880 1927 1989 2004 2023
Employment aged 15-64 (000) 1761 1742 1711 1726 1723 1764 1776 1867 1912 1972 1984 1999
Employment rate (% population aged 20-64) 55.2 54.8 54.0 54.6 54.7 56.2 56.9 60.2 62.1 64.6 65.7 66.8
Employment rate (% population aged 15-64) 50.7 50.3 49.6 50.2 50.3 51.9 52.6 55.9 57.8 60.2 61.3 62.3
Employment rate (% population aged 15-24) 17.7 17.1 16.2 16.6 16.2 17.0 17.0 20.5 23.1 24.6 24.8 24.3
Employment rate (% population aged 25-54) 67.9 67.9 66.9 67.0 66.6 69.0 70.0 73.2 74.4 76.2 77.2 77.7
Employment rate (% population aged 55-64) 25.8 25.3 26.3 29.4 31.9 31.7 32.1 35.2 37.7 41.5 42.4 44.9
FTE employment rate (% population aged 20-64) 54.2 53.7 52.7 53.2 53.0 54.6 55.6 58.3 60.3 62.9 64.5 65.3
Self-employed (% total employment) 8.5 8.1 8.7 8.5 7.9 8.2 7.8 7.4 7.7 7.8 7.8 7.8
Part-time employment (% total employment) 5.5 5.9 7.1 7.7 8.7 9.4 9.0 8.3 7.7 6.8 6.3 6.3
Temporary employment (% total employment) 6.2 6.4 7.1 8.4 7.7 7.8 9.6 9.5 10.2 9.3 8.7 7.3
Employment in Services (% total employment)
Employment in Industry (% total employment)
Employment in Agriculture (% total employment) 2.3 b 2.6 2.3 2.6 2.8 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.8 2.8 2.7
Activity rate (% population aged 15-64) 54.9 54.7 55.0 56.3 56.6 58.0 58.6 60.7 62.2 63.5 64.2 64.9
Labour Market Indicators - Female

Activity rate (% population aged 15-24) 21.8 21.4 21.5 22.0 21.5 23.4 23.6 25.9 27.5 28.3 28.2 27.2
Activity rate (% population aged 25-54) 73.2 73.4 73.6 74.6 74.4 76.5 77.1 78.8 79.6 79.8 80.4 80.7
Activity rate (% population aged 55-64) 26.9 26.6 28.1 31.7 34.8 34.5 34.7 37.4 39.9 43.5 44.3 46.3
Total unemployment (000) 148 153 d 186 208 214 211 202 162 146 107 96 84
Unemployment rate (% labour force) 7.7 8.0 d 9.7 10.7 11.0 10.6 10.1 7.9 7.0 5.1 4.6 4.0
Youth unemployment rate (% labour force 15-24) 18.6 20.4 d 24.5 24.7 24.7 27.1 27.9 20.9 16.0 12.9 12.1 10.7
Long term unemployment rate (% labour force) 3.6 3.6 4.1 5.2 5.3 4.8 4.9 3.7 3.1 2.4 1.8 1.5
Share of long term unemployment (% of total
47.2 45.0 41.6 48.4 47.9 45.0 48.5 46.8 44.0 47.3 40.1 36.4
unemployment)

Youth unemployment ratio (% population aged 15-24) 4.1 4.4 5.3 5.4 5.3 6.3 6.6 5.4 4.4 3.6 3.4 2.9

Employment rate for low skilled 25-64 (ISCED 0-2) 32.1 32.3 31.4 32.2 31.5 31.8 33.4 38.1 b 39.9 43.6 46.9 48.1
Employment rate for medium skilled 25-64 (ISCED 3-
62.6 61.1 59.5 59.8 59.6 61.6 62.0 64.6 b 66.1 68.2 69.3 69.9
4)
Employment rate for high skilled 25-64 (ISCED 5-8) 75.6 75.6 74.8 74.8 75.3 75.0 75.1 77.0 b 78.0 80.5 79.6 80.6
Employment rate (Nationals aged 15-64) 50.7 50.3 49.6 50.2 50.4 51.9 52.6 55.9 57.8 60.2 61.3 62.4
Employment rate (Other EU28 aged 15-64) 49.9 49.4 55.2 64.3 51.3 48.3 48.2 57.3 55.4 59.1 46.9 u 52.4
Employment rate (Other than EU28 aged 15-64) 57.2 u 64.0 54.0 u 40.9 u 40.8 u 47.5 u 50.9 u 58.6 u 50.7 u 67.6 u 47.7 u
Employment rate (Born in the same country aged 15-
50.6 50.2 49.4 50.0 50.2 51.7 52.5 55.8 57.7 60.1 61.1 62.3
64)
Employment rate (Born in other EU28 aged 15-64) 55.3 57.5 59.0 64.3 57.8 61.4 58.8 62.1 59.5 68.8 69.2 65.3
Employment rate (Born outside EU28 aged 15-64) 55.8 59.3 55.4 53.8 48.6 57.5 57.0 52.4 65.1 58.5 66.3 63.7
Underemployment (% of labour force aged 15-74) 0.2 u 1.6 1.8 2.0 2.7 2.7 2.2 1.8 1.3 1.0 0.8
Seeking but not available (% of labour force aged 15-
0.4 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 u 0.2 u 0.3
74)
Discouraged, available but not seeking (% of labour
3.9 4.4 4.9 5.1 5.5 5.5 5.6 4.3 3.4 3.0 3.0 2.6
force aged 15-74)

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284
 Statistical annex - 1. Country profiles

Hungary 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
At-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion (% of total
29.4 28.2 29.6 29.9 31.5 33.5 34.8 31.8 28.2 26.3 25.6 19.6
population)
At-risk-of-poverty (% of total population) 12.3 12.4 12.4 12.3 14.1 14.3 15.0 15.0 14.9 14.5 13.4 12.8
At-risk-of-poverty threshold (PPS single person) 3894 3958 4097 4025 4281 4563 4366 4535 4751 4960 4984 5164
Poverty gap (%) 19.8 17.3 16.3 16.5 18.2 20.9 21.0 22.3 21.8 18.8 16.7 24.1
Persistent at-risk-of-poverty (% of total
7.7 8.6 5.7 8.3 7.6 7.3 8.6 7.2 7.9 5.8 5.7
population)
At-risk-of-poverty before social transfers excl.
29.3 30.4 28.9 28.4 29.0 27.3 27.0 26.6 25.7 25.8 25.0 25.0
pensions (% of total population)
Impact of social transfers (excl. pensions) in
58.0 59.2 57.1 56.7 51.4 47.6 44.4 43.6 42.0 43.8 46.4 48.8
reducing poverty (%)
All

Severe Material Deprivation (% of total population) 19.9 17.9 20.3 21.6 23.4 26.3 27.8 24.0 19.4 16.2 14.5 10.1
Share of people living in low work intensity households
11.3 12.0 11.3 11.9 12.8 13.5 13.6 12.8 9.4 8.2 6.6 5.7
(% of people aged 0-59)
Real Gross Household Disposable income (growth %) -2.9 -2.3 -4.2 -2.5 3.8 -3.2 1.8 3.9 2.0
Income quintile share ratio S80/S20 3.7 3.6 3.5 3.4 3.9 4.0 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.4
GINI coefficient 25.6 25.2 24.7 24.1 26.9 27.2 28.3 28.6 28.2 28.2 28.1 28.7
Early leavers from education and training (% of
11.4 11.7 11.5 10.8 11.4 11.8 11.9 11.4 b 11.6 b 12.4 12.5 12.5
population aged 18-24)
NEET: Young people neither in employment nor in
education and training (% of total population aged 15- 11.5 11.5 13.6 12.6 13.2 14.8 15.5 13.6 11.6 11.0 11.0 10.7
24)
At-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion (% of male
28.6 27.3 29.1 29.4 31.1 32.9 34.4 31.4 28.0 26.0 24.9 18.9
population)
At-risk-of-poverty (% of male population) 12.3 12.4 12.8 12.6 14.5 14.8 15.5 15.5 15.6 14.4 13.1 11.9
Poverty gap (%) 20.5 17.9 16.3 16.9 18.9 21.6 23.1 22.8 21.7 18.8 17.9 25.5
Persistent at-risk-of-poverty (% of male
7.8 9.2 6.2 8.4 7.7 7.9 9.1 7.7 8.9 6.7 5.5
population)
Severe Material Deprivation (% of male population) 19.6 17.3 20.2 21.5 23.0 25.8 27.7 23.7 19.1 16.1 14.3 9.9
Male

Share of people living in low work intensity households

10.8 11.1 10.6 11.3 12.5 13.2 13.7 12.3 8.7 8.1 6.3 5.9
(% of males aged 0-59)
Life expectancy at birth (years) 69.4 70.0 70.3 70.7 71.2 71.6 72.2 72.3 72.3 72.6 72.5
Healthy life years at birth (years) - men 55.1 54.8 55.9 56.3 57.6 59.2 59.1 58.9 58.2 59.5 59.6
Early leavers from education and training (% of males
12.5 12.4 12.2 11.5 12.3 12.3 12.5 12.5 b 12.0 b 12.9 12.0 12.6
aged 18-24)
NEET: Young people neither in employment nor in
9.9 10.1 12.7 11.7 12.1 13.6 13.6 12.0 10.4 8.9 7.9 7.6
education and training ( % of males aged 15-24)
At-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion (% of female
30.1 29.0 30.0 30.3 32.0 34.0 35.2 32.3 28.4 26.5 26.1 20.3
population)
At-risk-of-poverty (% of female population) 12.3 12.4 12.1 12.0 13.7 14.0 14.5 14.5 14.4 14.5 13.7 13.6
Poverty gap (%) 18.9 17.0 16.3 15.6 17.9 19.8 20.2 21.6 22.0 18.8 16.0 22.6
Persistent at-risk-of-poverty (% of female
7.5 8.1 5.4 8.3 7.5 6.8 8.2 6.9 7.1 5.0 5.8
population)
Social Indicators

Severe Material Deprivation (% of female population) 20.1 18.4 20.4 21.6 23.7 26.8 27.8 24.4 19.6 16.3 14.7 10.3
Female

Share of people living in low work intensity households

11.8 12.9 12.0 12.5 13.2 13.7 13.6 13.3 10.2 8.3 6.8 5.4
(% of females aged 0-59)
Life expectancy at birth (years) 77.8 78.3 78.4 78.6 78.7 78.7 79.1 79.4 79.0 79.7 79.3
Healthy life years at birth (years) - women 57.8 58.2 58.2 58.6 59.1 60.5 60.1 60.8 60.1 60.2 60.8
Early leavers from education and training (% of
10.2 11.0 10.8 10.1 10.6 11.2 11.4 10.3 b 11.2 b 11.8 13.0 12.3
females aged 18-24)
NEET: Young people neither in employment nor in
13.0 12.9 14.5 13.4 14.3 16.0 17.4 15.3 12.8 13.3 14.3 14.0
education and training ( % of females aged 15-24)
At-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion of children (% of
34.1 33.4 37.2 38.7 40.4 41.9 43.9 41.8 36.1 33.6 31.6 23.8
people aged 0-17)
At-risk-of-poverty (% of Children population) 18.8 19.7 20.6 20.3 23.7 22.9 23.8 25.0 22.7 19.9 14.8 13.8
Children (0-17)

Severe Material Deprivation (% of Children

24.4 21.5 25.5 28.8 30.4 34.1 35.6 31.9 24.9 21.1 19.2 15.2
population)
Share of children living in low work intensity
10.0 11.1 11.9 13.9 14.8 16.4 15.1 15.2 11.2 9.2 7.5 4.8
households (% of Children population)
Risk of poverty of children in households at work
12.6 13.3 14.1 12.4 15.0 12.5 14.0 15.2 16.0 15.6 12.7 10.8
(Working Intensity > 0.2)
Impact of social transfers (excl. pensions) in reducing
57.8 57.7 55.5 57.2 51.3 47.7 45.7 45.2 48.1 54.4 64.1 66.1
poverty (0-17) (%)
At-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion (% of working
29.8 29.1 30.2 30.5 32.2 34.0 36.0 32.4 28.9 27.2 26.3 20.4
age population)
At-risk-of-poverty (% of Working age population) 11.6 12.0 11.9 11.9 13.8 14.0 15.2 14.9 15.5 15.0 14.2 13.4
Working age

Severe Material Deprivation (% of Working age

19.0 17.6 20.1 21.3 23.3 26.1 28.1 23.8 19.2 16.5 14.7 10.1
(18-64)

population)
Very low work intensity (18-59) 11.8 12.3 11.1 11.3 12.3 12.6 13.2 12.1 8.9 7.9 6.3 6.0
In-work at-risk-of poverty rate (% of persons
5.8 5.8 6.2 5.4 6.2 5.7 7.0 6.7 9.3 9.7 10.2 8.5
employed 18-64)
Impact of social transfers (excl. pensions) in reducing
59.3 60.3 58.0 57.0 51.9 48.5 44.1 43.6 39.7 41.0 42.0 44.9
poverty (18-64) (%)
At-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion of elderly (% of
21.1 17.5 17.5 16.8 19.0 22.0 20.2 19.0 17.1 15.1 16.8 13.3
people aged 65+)
Elderly (65+)

At-risk-of-poverty (% of Elderly population) 6.1 4.3 4.6 4.1 4.9 6.3 4.6 4.5 4.6 6.8 9.1 9.8

Severe Material Deprivation (% of Elderly population) 17.2 14.4 14.6 14.1 16.2 18.6 17.8 16.5 14.2 10.2 9.4 5.6
Relative median income of elderly (ratio with median
0.97 1.0 1.02 1.01 0.99 0.96 1.03 1.05 1.01 1.01 0.98 0.97
income of people younger than 65)
Aggregate replacement ratio (ratio) 0.58 0.61 0.62 0.60 0.60 0.58 0.62 0.62 0.65 0.67 0.64 0.59
Sickness/Health care 5.6 5.5 5.6 5.6 5.4 5.0 4.9 4.8 5.1 b 5.2 p
protection indicators
Expenditure in social

Disability 2.1 2.1 2.0 1.8 1.7 1.6 1.5 1.4 1.3 b 1.2 p
Old age and survivors 9.5 9.9 10.1 10.2 10.3 10.9 10.8 10.2 9.6 b 9.4 p
(% of GDP)

Family/Children 2.7 2.7 2.9 2.9 2.7 2.6 2.5 2.3 2.3 b 2.2 p
Unemployment 0.7 0.8 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.4 b 0.3 p
Housing and Social exclusion n.e.c. 1.0 0.8 0.8 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 b 0.5 p
Total (including Admin and Other expenditures) 22.1 22.3 22.7 22.5 21.6 21.3 20.8 19.8 19.3 b 19.1 p
of which: Means tested benefits 1.4 1.2 1.2 1.1 1.0 0.9 0.9 0.7 0.8 b 0.7 p

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285
Employment and Social Developments in Europe 2019

Malta
Malta 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Real GDP 4.0 3.3 -2.5 3.5 1.3 2.8 4.6 8.7 10.8 5.6 6.8 6.7
Total employment 2.2 2.5 0.0 1.7 2.9 2.8 3.8 5.4 4.1 4.3 8.1 5.3
Labour productivity 1.7 0.8 -2.5 1.8 -1.6 0.0 0.8 3.2 6.5 1.3 -1.2 1.3
Macro Economic Indicators

Annual average hours worked per person employed -0.4 0.5 0.3 -2.7 -3.0 -1.7 -1.2 -2.2 -0.4 3.2 -5.1 0.0
(Annual % growth)

Real productivity per hour worked 2.2 0.3 -2.7 4.6 1.5 1.8 2.0 5.5 7.0 -1.8 4.1 1.3
Harmonized CPI 0.7 4.7 1.8 2.0 2.5 3.2 1.0 0.8 1.2 0.9 1.3 1.7
Price deflator GDP 2.8 3.0 2.7 3.8 2.2 2.1 2.0 2.4 2.4 1.4 2.4 2.2
Nominal compensation per employee 3.7 4.1 3.0 2.0 3.3 3.3 2.1 1.4 5.5 2.9 -0.5 2.1
Real compensation per employee (GDP deflator) 0.9 1.0 0.3 -1.8 1.1 1.2 0.1 -1.0 3.0 1.5 -2.8 -0.1
Real compensation per employee (private consumption
3.0 -0.6 1.1 -0.1 0.8 0.0 1.1 0.6 4.3 2.0 -1.7 0.3
deflator)
Nominal unit labour costs 2.0 3.2 5.6 0.2 5.0 3.3 1.3 -1.7 -1.0 1.6 0.7 0.7
Real unit labour costs -0.9 0.3 2.8 -3.5 2.8 1.2 -0.7 -3.9 -3.4 0.2 -1.7 -1.4
Total population (000) 406 408 411 414 415 418 423 429 440 450 460 476
Population aged 15-64 (000) 282 286 288 289 288 287 289 291 297 303 309 320
Total employment (000) 155 159 160 163 167 173 182 191 198 208 221 234
Employment aged 15-64 (000) 155 158 158 161 164 171 179 187 194 205 217 230
Employment rate (% population aged 20-64) 58.6 59.2 59.0 60.1 61.6 63.9 66.2 67.9 69.0 71.1 73.0 75.0
Employment rate (% population aged 15-64) 55.0 55.5 55.3 56.2 57.9 59.9 62.2 63.9 65.1 67.2 69.2 71.4
Employment rate (% population aged 15-24) 46.8 46.6 44.1 44.2 45.0 44.5 46.7 46.7 45.6 46.2 47.3 50.4
Employment rate (% population aged 25-54) 66.2 67.2 68.1 68.6 70.6 73.5 75.6 77.2 78.2 79.9 81.8 83.0
Employment rate (% population aged 55-64) 29.5 30.1 29.1 31.9 33.2 34.7 37.1 39.5 42.3 45.8 47.2 49.7
FTE employment rate (% population aged 20-64) 56.9 57.4 57.1 58.1 59.3 61.3 63.2 64.2 65.6 67.6 69.7 71.6
Self-employed (% total employment) 14.2 13.7 13.8 14.4 13.5 13.3 13.7 13.5 13.8 14.0 14.8 14.2
Part-time employment (% total employment) 10.6 11.1 11.0 11.6 12.6 13.2 14.0 15.3 14.3 13.9 13.7 13.3
Temporary employment (% total employment) 4.4 3.6 4.2 4.5 5.7 6.0 6.6 6.7 6.5 6.6 5.1 6.7
Employment in Services (% total employment) 73.4 u 73.0 78.0 u
Employment in Industry (% total employment) 25.2 u 25.7 20.9 u
Employment in Agriculture (% total employment) 1.8 b 1.4 1.3 1.1 0.9 1.2 1.1 1.3 1.1 0.9 0.9
Activity rate (% population aged 15-64) 58.8 59.1 59.4 60.4 61.8 63.9 66.3 67.8 68.8 70.6 72.2 74.2
Labour Market Indicators - Total

Activity rate (% population aged 15-24) 54.1 52.7 51.6 50.9 51.9 51.7 53.5 52.9 51.6 51.8 52.9 55.5
Activity rate (% population aged 25-54) 69.8 70.7 71.9 72.9 74.7 77.3 79.5 81.0 81.7 83.2 84.5 85.6
Activity rate (% population aged 55-64) 30.6 31.4 30.9 33.3 34.2 36.2 39.1 42.1 44.6 47.5 48.4 51.4
Total unemployment (000) 11 10 12 12 11 11 12 12 11 10 9 9
Unemployment rate (% labour force) 6.5 6.0 6.9 6.8 6.4 6.2 6.1 5.7 5.4 4.7 4.0 3.7
Youth unemployment rate (% labour force 15-24) 13.5 11.7 14.5 13.2 13.3 13.8 12.7 11.7 11.6 10.7 10.6 9.2
Long term unemployment rate (% labour force) 2.7 2.6 2.9 3.1 3.0 3.0 2.8 2.7 2.4 1.9 1.6 1.1
Share of long term unemployment (% of total
41.3 42.7 42.0 44.9 47.3 48.8 45.9 47.5 44.2 39.7 40.1 30.8
unemployment)

Youth unemployment ratio (% population aged 15-24) 7.3 6.1 7.5 6.7 6.9 7.2 6.8 6.2 6.0 5.5 5.6 5.1

Employment rate for low skilled 25-64 (ISCED 0-2) 47.3 47.9 47.2 47.6 49.1 b 50.2 52.0 53.8 b 55.4 57.7 58.6 60.9
Employment rate for medium skilled 25-64 (ISCED 3-
81.4 79.8 79.8 79.5 77.6 b 81.4 81.6 82.6 b 82.7 83.6 85.2 84.9
4)
Employment rate for high skilled 25-64 (ISCED 5-8) 86.8 87.0 85.6 86.5 88.2 b 89.4 89.7 89.1 b 89.6 90.6 91.7 91.8
Employment rate (Nationals aged 15-64) 55.1 55.6 55.3 56.2 57.9 58.9 60.8 62.7 64.2 66.0 67.9 70.1
Employment rate (Other EU28 aged 15-64) 49.2 51.6 48.8 55.6 53.0 74.3 77.1 74.9 74.3 78.5 80.5 78.8
Employment rate (Other than EU28 aged 15-64) 52.1 54.6 57.3 59.6 61.2 78.0 82.7 77.3 70.2 73.4 70.6 75.8
Employment rate (Born in the same country aged 15-
54.8 55.3 55.0 56.0 57.7 58.9 60.8 62.6 64.0 65.7 67.7 69.7
64)
Employment rate (Born in other EU28 aged 15-64) 54.5 54.9 53.7 57.0 54.1 72.7 75.1 75.9 75.8 78.7 79.7 79.3
Employment rate (Born outside EU28 aged 15-64) 59.1 63.7 62.3 63.3 65.1 78.8 78.0 74.5 69.5 73.7 72.4 78.1
Underemployment (% of labour force aged 15-74) 1.8 1.9 2.5 2.4 2.2 2.7 2.4 2.1 1.8 1.3 1.5
Seeking but not available (% of labour force aged 15-
0.8 0.2 u 0.3 u 0.2 u 0.3 u 0.3 u
74)
Discouraged, available but not seeking (% of labour
1.5 1.3 1.1 1.1 2.2 2.4 1.9 1.2 1.1 0.7 0.7 0.9
force aged 15-74)

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286
 Statistical annex - 1. Country profiles

Malta 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Total population (000) 202 203 205 206 206 208 210 215 220 226 232 241
Population aged 15-64(000) 143 145 147 147 146 146 147 149 153 156 159 166
Total employment (000) 105 106 106 107 108 109 112 116 121 126 133 139
Employment aged 15-64 (000) 105 105 104 105 106 107 110 113 118 123 129 136
Employment rate (% population aged 20-64) 79.0 78.5 77.5 78.2 79.0 79.4 80.3 81.1 82.1 83.5 84.7 85.7
Employment rate (% population aged 15-64) 73.5 72.9 71.9 72.5 73.8 74.0 75.1 75.7 77.0 78.9 80.1 81.2
Employment rate (% population aged 15-24) 48.9 48.0 45.8 45.9 48.0 47.1 48.2 46.1 46.6 48.9 48.5 48.9
Employment rate (% population aged 25-54) 90.3 89.5 89.3 89.1 90.0 90.0 90.2 90.9 91.5 92.3 93.2 93.3
Employment rate (% population aged 55-64) 47.4 47.9 46.3 50.0 51.5 52.5 55.2 57.0 59.6 62.8 64.5 67.2
FTE employment rate (% population aged 20-64) 79.7 78.9 77.6 78.3 78.8 79.0 79.7 80.0 81.2 82.6 83.9 84.6
Self-employed (% total employment) 17.7 17.5 17.5 18.7 17.6 17.3 18.4 17.7 18.0 19.2 19.2 18.3
Part-time employment (% total employment) 3.9 4.1 4.6 4.9 5.4 5.7 6.5 6.9 6.4 6.0 6.3 6.5
Temporary employment (% total employment) 3.1 2.8 3.1 3.4 4.6 5.2 5.5 5.2 5.3 5.4 4.3 5.9
Employment in Services (% total employment) 65.8 70.6 u
Employment in Industry (% total employment) 32.3 27.9 u
Employment in Agriculture (% total employment) 2.5 b 1.9 1.9 1.6 1.3 1.6 1.6 2.0 1.7 1.4 1.3
Activity rate (% population aged 15-64) 78.0 77.2 77.0 77.8 78.6 78.5 80.0 80.8 81.5 82.5 83.4 84.5
Labour Market Indicators - Male

Activity rate (% population aged 15-24) 57.5 55.3 54.6 53.6 55.7 54.4 56.6 53.4 53.7 54.4 54.5 55.1
Activity rate (% population aged 25-54) 94.4 93.8 93.9 94.5 94.9 94.4 94.8 95.5 95.4 95.8 96.2 96.3
Activity rate (% population aged 55-64) 48.8 49.5 48.9 52.3 53.0 54.4 58.2 61.4 63.4 65.1 66.1 69.2
Total unemployment (000) 6 6 7 8 7 6 7 8 7 6 5 6
Unemployment rate (% labour force) 5.8 5.6 6.5 6.7 6.0 5.6 6.1 6.1 5.4 4.4 3.8 3.8
Youth unemployment rate (% labour force 15-24) 15.0 13.1 16.2 14.4 13.7 13.3 14.7 13.7 13.2 10.2 11.1 11.3
Long term unemployment rate (% labour force) 2.8 2.7 3.1 3.4 3.3 3.3 3.2 3.3 2.9 2.0 1.6 1.4
Share of long term unemployment (% of total
48.2 47.7 47.8 49.9 55.5 58.7 51.8 53.4 54.5 44.5 42.5 36.0
unemployment)

Youth unemployment ratio (% population aged 15-24) 8.6 7.2 8.8 7.7 7.6 7.2 8.3 7.3 7.1 5.5 6.1 6.2

Employment rate for low skilled 25-64 (ISCED 0-2) 74.6 73.5 72.7 73.2 74.5 b 73.2 74.3 75.3 b 77.4 78.7 80.0 81.1
Employment rate for medium skilled 25-64 (ISCED 3-
90.8 90.2 88.6 88.7 87.4 b 90.4 89.5 90.7 b 90.7 92.0 92.0 91.6
4)
Employment rate for high skilled 25-64 (ISCED 5-8) 92.2 92.8 91.9 91.5 92.5 b 93.3 93.8 92.9 b 93.0 93.8 94.4 94.9
Employment rate (Nationals aged 15-64) 73.7 72.8 72.1 72.6 73.9 73.1 74.1 74.8 76.1 77.6 79.4 80.9
Employment rate (Other EU28 aged 15-64) 59.0 u 71.5 58.9 69.3 71.4 90.0 87.6 87.0 84.5 83.9 85.2 85.3
Employment rate (Other than EU28 aged 15-64) 72.2 76.7 72.2 69.7 69.2 87.9 89.1 85.0 85.6 88.7 81.9 79.4
Employment rate (Born in the same country aged 15-
73.5 72.5 71.8 72.3 73.8 73.2 74.1 74.9 75.8 77.3 79.2 80.2
64)
Employment rate (Born in other EU28 aged 15-64) 66.4 74.9 68.0 69.6 74.7 87.0 85.3 85.3 87.1 85.7 84.6 86.8
Employment rate (Born outside EU28 aged 15-64) 76.5 83.2 79.9 82.5 76.8 87.3 85.7 81.5 83.7 88.0 83.6 84.3
Underemployment (% of labour force aged 15-74) 1.0 1.4 1.7 1.5 1.4 1.8 1.6 1.5 1.4 1.1 1.2
Seeking but not available (% of labour force aged 15-
74)
Discouraged, available but not seeking (% of labour
0.6 u 0.5 u 0.5 u 0.4 u 1.0 1.2 1.0 0.7 u 0.6 u 0.4 u 0.5 u 0.6 u
force aged 15-74)
Total population (000) 204 205 206 208 209 210 212 215 219 224 229 235
Population aged 15-64(000) 139 141 142 142 141 141 142 142 145 147 150 154
Total employment (000) 50 53 54 56 58 64 69 74 77 82 88 95
Employment aged 15-64 (000) 50 53 54 56 58 64 69 74 76 81 87 95
Employment rate (% population aged 20-64) 37.7 39.4 40.0 41.6 43.8 48.0 51.7 54.3 55.3 58.0 60.6 63.4
Employment rate (% population aged 15-64) 36.0 37.7 38.0 39.5 41.5 45.3 48.8 51.6 52.5 55.0 57.6 60.8
Employment rate (% population aged 15-24) 44.5 45.0 42.2 42.4 41.8 41.8 45.0 47.3 44.6 43.3 46.1 52.0
Employment rate (% population aged 25-54) 41.3 44.1 45.9 47.5 50.8 56.4 60.3 62.9 64.0 66.7 69.5 71.8
Employment rate (% population aged 55-64) 12.1 12.7 12.2 14.1 15.1 17.0 18.9 22.1 25.1 28.9 29.9 32.1
FTE employment rate (% population aged 20-64) 34.0 35.6 36.1 37.7 39.9 43.7 46.8 48.3 49.8 52.3 54.9 58.1
Self-employed (% total employment) 7.0 6.2 6.7 6.1 6.0 6.5 6.2 6.9 7.1 6.1 8.3 8.1
Part-time employment (% total employment) 24.6 25.1 23.4 24.4 25.8 25.8 25.8 28.1 26.5 25.9 24.6 23.0
Temporary employment (% total employment) 7.2 5.4 6.4 6.6 7.6 7.3 8.3 9.0 8.3 8.4 6.4 7.8
Employment in Services (% total employment)
Employment in Industry (% total employment)
Employment in Agriculture (% total employment)
Activity rate (% population aged 15-64) 39.1 40.4 41.2 42.5 44.7 48.9 52.0 54.3 55.5 58.0 60.2 63.1
Labour Market Indicators - Female

Activity rate (% population aged 15-24) 50.5 50.0 48.3 48.1 48.0 48.9 50.3 52.3 49.4 48.9 51.1 55.9
Activity rate (% population aged 25-54) 44.3 46.7 48.9 50.6 54.0 59.7 63.6 65.7 67.2 69.7 72.0 74.0
Activity rate (% population aged 55-64) 12.8 13.6 13.2 14.6 15.6 18.2 20.1 22.8 26.0 29.9 30.6 33.4
Total unemployment (000) 4 4 4 4 4 5 5 4 4 4 4 4
Unemployment rate (% labour force) 7.9 6.8 7.6 7.1 7.1 7.2 6.1 5.1 5.4 5.2 4.3 3.6
Youth unemployment rate (% labour force 15-24) 11.8 10.0 12.5 11.8 12.9 14.5 10.4 9.5 9.8 11.4 9.9 6.9
Long term unemployment rate (% labour force) 2.5 2.3 2.5 2.6 2.5 2.6 2.2 1.9 1.5 1.7 1.6 0.8 u
Share of long term unemployment (% of total
31.1 34.6 32.5 36.1 34.6 36.1 36.4 36.4 28.2 33.5 36.8 22.7 u
unemployment)

Youth unemployment ratio (% population aged 15-24) 6.0 5.0 6.1 5.7 6.2 7.1 5.2 5.0 4.9 5.6 5.1 3.9

Employment rate for low skilled 25-64 (ISCED 0-2) 22.6 24.2 23.2 23.6 24.6 b 28.0 29.7 31.7 b 32.0 35.0 35.8 39.2
Employment rate for medium skilled 25-64 (ISCED 3-
65.3 64.2 66.4 66.3 66.3 b 70.6 72.5 73.8 b 73.7 74.7 78.0 76.8
4)
Employment rate for high skilled 25-64 (ISCED 5-8) 80.6 80.4 79.3 81.5 83.6 b 85.4 85.8 85.1 b 86.5 87.6 88.9 88.7
Employment rate (Nationals aged 15-64) 35.9 37.7 37.9 39.1 41.3 44.4 47.0 49.9 51.6 54.0 55.9 58.3
Employment rate (Other EU28 aged 15-64) 42.0 u 35.1 u 40.0 45.7 39.9 53.3 62.1 61.3 63.3 71.1 74.6 71.5
Employment rate (Other than EU28 aged 15-64) 37.3 38.7 43.9 51.1 53.4 67.2 77.7 71.2 56.2 56.0 57.9 72.7
Employment rate (Born in the same country aged 15-
35.6 37.3 37.7 39.0 41.1 44.2 46.9 49.5 51.5 53.8 55.7 58.2
64)
Employment rate (Born in other EU28 aged 15-64) 44.6 39.8 40.1 46.4 38.7 55.2 60.4 65.1 64.3 69.7 74.0 70.8
Employment rate (Born outside EU28 aged 15-64) 42.5 46.3 46.3 47.4 54.1 69.3 71.6 68.7 55.4 57.7 59.3 72.2
Underemployment (% of labour force aged 15-74) 3.2 2.9 4.0 4.2 3.6 4.3 3.7 3.1 2.4 1.7 1.8
Seeking but not available (% of labour force aged 15-
1.6 u 0.5 u 0.5 u
74)
Discouraged, available but not seeking (% of labour
3.4 3.0 2.3 2.4 4.5 4.5 3.2 2.1 2.0 1.3 1.0 1.3
force aged 15-74)

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287
Employment and Social Developments in Europe 2019

Malta 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
At-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion (% of total
19.7 20.1 20.3 21.2 22.1 23.1 24.6 23.9 23.0 20.3 19.3
population)
At-risk-of-poverty (% of total population) 15.1 15.3 14.9 15.5 15.6 15.1 15.8 15.8 16.6 16.5 16.7
At-risk-of-poverty threshold (PPS single person) 7465 7958 8146 8023 8417 8760 9149 9412 10052 10358 10722
Poverty gap (%) 18.1 20.3 16.2 17.3 17.7 16.1 18.9 17.9 17.5 15.9 17.5
Persistent at-risk-of-poverty (% of total
7.7 7.7 9.1 11.4 9.7 8.5 10.6 12.7 11.3 10.7
population)
At-risk-of-poverty before social transfers excl.
21.5 22.9 22.9 23.5 23.2 24.0 23.4 23.7 23.8 23.8 23.9
pensions (% of total population)
Impact of social transfers (excl. pensions) in
29.8 33.2 34.9 34.0 32.8 37.1 32.5 33.3 30.3 30.7 30.1
reducing poverty (%)
All

Severe Material Deprivation (% of total population) 4.4 4.3 5.0 6.5 6.6 9.2 10.2 10.3 8.5 4.4 3.3 3.0 p
Share of people living in low work intensity households
9.6 8.6 9.2 9.2 8.9 9.0 9.1 9.9 9.2 7.3 7.1
(% of people aged 0-59)
Real Gross Household Disposable income (growth %)
Income quintile share ratio S80/S20 3.9 4.3 4.0 4.3 4.0 3.9 4.1 4.0 4.1 4.2 4.2
GINI coefficient 26.3 28.1 27.4 28.6 27.2 27.1 28.0 27.7 28.1 28.6 28.2
Early leavers from education and training (% of
30.2 27.2 25.7 23.8 22.7 b 21.7 20.8 20.9 b 20.2 19.2 17.7 b 17.5
population aged 18-24)
NEET: Young people neither in employment nor in
education and training (% of total population aged 15- 11.5 8.3 9.9 9.5 10.2 10.8 9.9 10.3 10.5 8.8 8.6 7.3
24)
At-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion (% of male
18.6 18.7 19.1 20.1 20.9 21.9 23.8 23.1 22.2 20.2 18.5
population)
At-risk-of-poverty (% of male population) 14.7 13.9 14.3 14.8 15.0 14.4 15.4 15.7 16.3 16.5 16.1
Poverty gap (%) 16.7 21.7 15.9 17.7 17.1 16.7 18.8 18.4 18.6 16.5 17.7
Persistent at-risk-of-poverty (% of male
7.7 6.3 8.4 10.2 10.0 7.2 10.6 13.6 10.9 11.2
population)
Severe Material Deprivation (% of male population) 4.0 4.1 4.8 6.3 6.4 8.6 10.1 9.9 8.5 4.5 3.2 2.7 p
Male

Share of people living in low work intensity households

8.2 6.9 7.3 7.4 7.0 7.6 7.8 8.9 8.6 7.2 6.4
(% of males aged 0-59)
Life expectancy at birth (years) 77.5 77.1 77.9 79.3 78.6 78.6 79.6 79.8 79.7 80.6 80.2
Healthy life years at birth (years) - men 69.2 68.8 69.4 70.1 69.9 71.5 71.6 72.3 72.6 71.1 71.9
Early leavers from education and training (% of males
34.8 31.1 30.1 29.9 28.8 b 26.4 23.3 22.5 b 23.3 23.1 20.9 b 19.4
aged 18-24)
NEET: Young people neither in employment nor in
11.9 6.8 9.4 8.2 9.7 10.2 9.7 8.8 9.3 6.9 8.4 6.8
education and training ( % of males aged 15-24)
At-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion (% of female
20.9 21.5 21.6 22.4 23.2 24.3 25.5 24.7 23.8 20.4 20.2
population)
At-risk-of-poverty (% of female population) 15.5 16.7 15.5 16.2 16.1 15.8 16.1 16.0 16.9 16.5 17.3
Poverty gap (%) 18.7 19.0 16.6 16.6 19.1 16.0 19.1 17.2 16.3 14.8 17.1
Persistent at-risk-of-poverty (% of female
7.8 9.0 9.7 12.6 9.5 9.8 10.7 11.8 11.7 10.2
population)
Social Indicators

Severe Material Deprivation (% of female population) 4.8 4.6 5.2 6.6 6.9 9.7 10.3 10.6 8.5 4.3 3.4 3.4 p
Female

Share of people living in low work intensity households

11.1 10.4 11.3 11.0 10.9 10.5 10.4 10.9 9.8 7.5 7.9
(% of females aged 0-59)
Life expectancy at birth (years) 82.2 82.3 82.7 83.6 83.0 83.0 84.0 84.2 84.0 84.4 84.6
Healthy life years at birth (years) - women 71.1 72.1 71.0 71.3 70.7 72.2 72.7 74.3 74.6 72.4 73.6
Early leavers from education and training (% of
25.3 23.2 21.1 17.4 16.3 b 16.9 18.1 19.2 b 16.9 15.0 14.3 b 15.5
females aged 18-24)
NEET: Young people neither in employment nor in
11.2 9.8 10.4 10.9 10.7 11.5 10.1 11.9 11.9 10.8 8.8 7.8
education and training ( % of females aged 15-24)
At-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion of children (% of
23.9 25.0 26.5 26.7 27.8 31.0 33.0 31.8 28.4 24.0 23.0
people aged 0-17)
At-risk-of-poverty (% of Children population) 19.8 20.4 21.2 22.1 23.0 23.1 24.5 24.6 23.4 20.9 21.2
Children (0-17)

Severe Material Deprivation (% of Children

6.4 6.3 7.2 7.7 7.7 12.3 12.7 14.1 10.6 6.1 5.1 4.0 p
population)
Share of children living in low work intensity
10.0 9.8 10.4 9.7 10.0 10.4 11.0 12.4 10.5 7.6 7.6
households (% of Children population)
Risk of poverty of children in households at work
13.6 14.1 15.9 16.0 16.9 17.0 18.4 17.0 16.2 15.6 15.5
(Working Intensity > 0.2)
Impact of social transfers (excl. pensions) in reducing
31.0 33.6 35.0 31.4 29.9 36.0 28.6 25.2 24.5 27.4 25.6
poverty (0-17) (%)
At-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion (% of working
17.8 17.5 18.1 19.6 20.7 21.1 23.2 21.8 21.1 17.7 16.4
age population)
At-risk-of-poverty (% of Working age population) 12.6 12.0 12.1 13.1 13.1 12.4 13.5 13.1 13.4 13.3 13.2
Working age

Severe Material Deprivation (% of Working age

4.0 4.0 4.6 6.4 6.8 8.9 10.3 9.7 8.8 4.2 3.1 2.8 p
(18-64)

population)
Very low work intensity (18-59) 9.4 8.2 8.9 9.0 8.6 8.6 8.5 9.1 8.8 7.3 7.0
In-work at-risk-of poverty rate (% of persons
4.6 5.1 5.4 5.8 6.1 5.2 5.8 5.5 5.5 5.8 5.8
employed 18-64)
Impact of social transfers (excl. pensions) in reducing
33.0 37.8 38.3 36.7 35.8 40.1 32.5 34.5 32.3 32.5 32.0
poverty (18-64) (%)
At-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion of elderly (% of
22.8 26.0 22.2 21.7 21.0 22.3 20.9 23.5 24.3 26.0 26.2
people aged 65+)
Elderly (65+)

At-risk-of-poverty (% of Elderly population) 20.3 24.3 19.7 18.2 17.6 17.3 14.9 17.0 21.3 23.9 24.9

Severe Material Deprivation (% of Elderly population) 3.1 3.1 4.1 5.0 4.7 6.4 7.1 8.1 5.0 3.6 2.2 3.0 p
Relative median income of elderly (ratio with median
0.78 0.73 0.77 0.81 0.79 0.80 0.80 0.77 0.75 0.72 0.71
income of people younger than 65)
Aggregate replacement ratio (ratio) 0.47 0.41 0.45 0.44 0.48 0.46 0.56 0.56 0.54 0.54 0.56
Sickness/Health care 5.5 5.7 6.3 5.9 5.8 5.9 6.0 5.9 5.5 5.4
protection indicators
Expenditure in social

Disability 1.1 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.6
Old age and survivors 8.9 9.1 9.9 10.2 10.0 10.2 9.8 9.2 8.5 8.5
(% of GDP)

Family/Children 1.0 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.1 1.0
Unemployment 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.4
Housing and Social exclusion n.e.c. 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.4
Total (including Admin and Other expenditures) 17.8 18.2 19.6 19.3 18.9 19.1 18.9 18.2 16.8 16.4
of which: Means tested benefits 3.0 2.4 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.4 2.4 2.3 2.2 1.9

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288
 Statistical annex - 1. Country profiles

Netherlands
Netherlands 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Real GDP 3.8 2.2 -3.7 1.3 1.6 -1.0 -0.1 1.4 2.0 2.2 2.9 p 2.7 p
Total employment 2.9 1.6 -0.9 -0.7 0.9 -0.2 -1.2 -0.1 1.0 1.1 p 2.2 p 2.5 p
Labour productivity 0.8 0.5 -2.8 2.0 0.7 -0.8 1.1 1.5 1.0 1.1 p 0.7 p 0.1 p
Macro Economic Indicators

Annual average hours worked per person employed -0.1 0.0 -0.6 0.0 0.0 -0.7 0.3 0.8 0.0 0.9 p -0.2 p -0.1 p
(Annual % growth)

Real productivity per hour worked 0.9 0.6 -2.3 2.1 0.6 -0.1 0.8 0.7 1.0 0.2 p 0.9 p 0.3 p
Harmonized CPI 1.6 2.2 1.0 0.9 2.5 2.8 2.6 0.3 0.2 0.1 1.3 1.6
Price deflator GDP 2.1 2.3 0.2 0.9 0.2 1.4 1.3 0.3 0.8 0.5 1.2 p 2.2 p
Nominal compensation per employee 2.8 4.0 2.5 0.7 1.9 2.0 1.8 1.7 -0.3 1.7 p 1.2 p 2.2 p
Real compensation per employee (GDP deflator) 0.7 1.7 2.3 -0.3 1.7 0.5 0.5 1.4 -1.1 1.2 p 0.1 p 0.0 p
Real compensation per employee (private consumption
1.2 1.8 1.5 -0.3 -0.6 -0.9 -0.7 1.3 -0.5 1.6 p -0.1 p 0.6 p
deflator)
Nominal unit labour costs 2.0 3.5 5.5 -1.3 1.2 2.8 0.8 0.1 -1.3 0.6 p 0.5 p 2.1 p
Real unit labour costs 0.0 1.1 5.2 -2.2 1.0 1.3 -0.5 -0.2 -2.0 0.1 p -0.7 p -0.1 p
Total population (000) 16358 16405 16486 16575 16656 16730 16780 16829 16901 16979 17082 17181
Population aged 15-64 (000) 11031 11055 11091 11124 11154 11117 11077 11060 11066 11094 11140 11179
Total employment (000) 8187 8378 8383 8290 8291 8345 8285 8236 8319 8427 8605 8798
Employment aged 15-64 (000) 8057 8241 8220 8145 8152 8175 8104 8029 8116 8223 8376 8543
Employment rate (% population aged 20-64) 75.5 76.9 76.8 76.2 76.4 76.6 75.9 75.4 76.4 77.1 78.0 79.2
Employment rate (% population aged 15-64) 73.5 74.9 74.6 73.9 74.2 74.4 73.6 73.1 74.1 74.8 75.8 77.2
Employment rate (% population aged 15-24) 63.1 64.3 62.9 60.7 61.3 61.1 60.1 58.8 60.8 60.8 62.3 63.9
Employment rate (% population aged 25-54) 83.9 85.5 85.0 84.4 84.0 83.6 82.2 81.7 82.2 82.9 83.5 84.6
Employment rate (% population aged 55-64) 47.8 50.0 51.8 52.9 55.2 57.6 59.2 59.9 61.7 63.5 65.7 67.7
FTE employment rate (% population aged 20-64) 60.7 62.1 61.6 60.7 60.9 60.9 60.2 59.8 60.8 61.7 62.9 64.0
Self-employed (% total employment) 13.5 13.9 14.3 14.5 14.5 14.8 15.6 16.1 16.3 16.4 16.4 16.4
Part-time employment (% total employment) 45.7 46.1 47.0 48.1 48.3 49.0 49.8 49.6 50.0 49.7 49.8 50.1
Temporary employment (% total employment) 15.3 15.4 15.5 15.4 15.4 16.2 17.0 17.7 16.7 17.2 18.1 17.8
Employment in Services (% total employment) 79.0 b 80.1 81.3 82.2 82.0 82.9 b 82.9 82.7 82.7 83.0 83.5
Employment in Industry (% total employment) 18.2 b 17.2 16.2 15.4 15.6 15.3 b 15.1 15.4 15.3 15.0 14.7
Employment in Agriculture (% total employment) 2.8 b 2.7 2.6 2.4 2.4 1.8 b 2.0 2.0 2.0 1.9 1.8
Activity rate (% population aged 15-64) 76.7 77.8 78.1 77.9 78.1 79.0 79.4 79.0 79.6 79.7 79.7 80.3
Labour Market Indicators - Total

Activity rate (% population aged 15-24) 69.6 70.3 70.0 68.3 68.1 69.2 69.2 67.4 68.5 68.2 68.3 68.9
Activity rate (% population aged 25-54) 86.6 87.7 87.8 87.8 87.4 87.6 87.4 87.1 87.1 86.9 86.7 87.0
Activity rate (% population aged 55-64) 49.9 52.1 53.8 55.3 57.9 60.8 63.5 64.9 67.1 68.4 69.5 70.9
Total unemployment (000) 355 318 381 435 434 516 647 660 614 538 438 350
Unemployment rate (% labour force) 4.2 3.7 4.4 5.0 5.0 5.8 7.3 7.4 6.9 6.0 4.9 3.8
Youth unemployment rate (% labour force 15-24) 9.4 8.6 10.2 11.1 10.0 11.7 13.2 12.7 11.3 10.8 8.9 7.2
Long term unemployment rate (% labour force) 1.5 1.2 1.1 1.3 1.6 1.9 2.5 2.9 3.0 2.5 1.9 1.4
Share of long term unemployment (% of total
37.2 33.7 25.1 26.8 32.3 32.9 34.9 39.2 42.9 41.5 39.5 36.6
unemployment)

Youth unemployment ratio (% population aged 15-24) 6.5 6.0 7.1 7.6 6.8 8.1 9.1 8.6 7.7 7.4 6.1 4.9

Employment rate for low skilled 25-64 (ISCED 0-2) 59.8 62.2 62.0 61.0 61.7 61.7 60.3 b 58.8 b 60.0 60.7 61.3 62.6
Employment rate for medium skilled 25-64 (ISCED 3-
78.9 80.4 80.4 79.9 79.6 79.6 77.8 b 77.9 b 78.2 79.4 80.1 81.2
4)
Employment rate for high skilled 25-64 (ISCED 5-8) 86.7 87.3 87.1 86.8 87.0 87.3 87.6 b 87.7 b 88.2 88.4 88.8 89.6
Employment rate (Nationals aged 15-64) 74.2 75.5 75.3 74.6 74.8 75.0 74.4 73.9 74.9 75.6 76.7 78.1
Employment rate (Other EU28 aged 15-64) 72.8 75.3 72.5 72.5 73.4 75.4 72.6 73.0 72.0 74.8 76.1 75.1
Employment rate (Other than EU28 aged 15-64) 47.1 54.2 52.9 51.0 50.6 51.6 48.4 49.1 48.9 49.3 50.0 54.0
Employment rate (Born in the same country aged 15-
75.2 76.4 76.3 75.4 75.8 76.1 75.5 75.0 76.1 76.9 78.0 79.2
64)
Employment rate (Born in other EU28 aged 15-64) 69.9 71.4 68.1 71.1 72.4 73.1 71.9 72.4 71.5 74.0 75.4 74.7
Employment rate (Born outside EU28 aged 15-64) 58.9 63.5 62.0 61.7 60.7 60.5 58.2 58.0 57.8 58.1 59.1 61.6
Underemployment (% of labour force aged 15-74) 1.1 1.3 1.4 1.4 1.7 6.6 6.7 6.3 5.7 5.0 4.2
Seeking but not available (% of labour force aged 15-
0.8 0.7 0.7 0.9 1.2 1.3 1.5 1.6 1.8 1.7 1.6 1.7
74)
Discouraged, available but not seeking (% of labour
3.3 3.0 3.2 3.6 3.3 3.6 3.9 4.1 3.9 3.6 3.0 2.5
force aged 15-74)

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289
Employment and Social Developments in Europe 2019

Netherlands 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Total population (000) 8089 8112 8156 8203 8243 8283 8307 8334 8373 8417 8475 8527
Population aged 15-64(000) 5563 5572 5589 5605 5616 5595 5571 5561 5563 5578 5604 5622
Total employment (000) 4531 4612 4584 4501 4475 4501 4459 4460 4482 4536 4617 4705
Employment aged 15-64 (000) 4438 4518 4471 4399 4377 4376 4324 4305 4336 4383 4449 4524
Employment rate (% population aged 20-64) 83.2 84.4 83.6 82.5 82.4 82.3 81.1 81.1 81.9 82.6 83.3 84.3
Employment rate (% population aged 15-64) 80.4 81.7 80.7 79.5 79.3 79.3 78.2 78.1 79.0 79.6 80.4 81.6
Employment rate (% population aged 15-24) 63.9 64.8 62.5 59.8 60.0 59.7 59.2 58.7 59.9 59.6 61.0 62.8
Employment rate (% population aged 25-54) 91.5 92.6 91.7 90.4 89.8 89.1 86.8 86.9 87.5 88.1 88.4 89.2
Employment rate (% population aged 55-64) 58.6 61.6 62.6 63.3 64.5 66.9 68.9 69.4 71.1 72.8 74.8 76.6
FTE employment rate (% population aged 20-64) 77.9 79.0 77.6 76.5 76.1 76.0 74.6 74.2 75.3 76.1 76.7 77.4
Self-employed (% total employment) 16.6 16.9 17.3 17.9 17.9 18.2 19.1 19.7 19.5 19.7 19.6 19.6
Part-time employment (% total employment) 22.2 22.5 23.3 24.0 23.9 24.6 26.0 26.1 26.5 26.2 27.0 27.5
Temporary employment (% total employment) 13.6 13.6 13.4 13.8 13.9 14.8 15.5 16.4 15.2 15.6 16.5 16.1
Employment in Services (% total employment) 69.1 b 70.5 72.0 73.3 72.9 73.8 b 74.0 73.6 73.5 74.1 74.9
Employment in Industry (% total employment) 27.2 b 26.0 24.6 23.5 23.9 23.8 b 23.4 23.8 23.8 23.4 22.8
Employment in Agriculture (% total employment) 3.7 b 3.5 3.4 3.2 3.1 2.5 b 2.6 2.6 2.7 2.5 2.4
Activity rate (% population aged 15-64) 83.2 84.2 84.1 83.3 83.2 83.9 84.3 84.2 84.6 84.4 84.2 84.7
Labour Market Indicators - Male

Activity rate (% population aged 15-24) 70.6 71.4 70.5 67.9 67.0 67.7 68.4 67.0 67.5 67.2 67.0 68.0
Activity rate (% population aged 25-54) 93.2 93.9 93.9 93.3 93.0 93.0 92.3 92.2 92.1 91.7 91.3 91.7
Activity rate (% population aged 55-64) 61.2 63.9 64.8 66.2 67.5 70.6 74.2 75.5 77.6 78.2 79.0 80.0
Total unemployment (000) 154 141 184 213 216 260 346 343 313 268 216 182
Unemployment rate (% labour force) 3.3 3.0 3.9 4.5 4.6 5.5 7.2 7.2 6.5 5.6 4.5 3.7
Youth unemployment rate (% labour force 15-24) 9.4 9.3 11.4 12.0 10.5 11.8 13.5 12.4 11.3 11.4 9.0 7.7
Long term unemployment rate (% labour force) 1.3 1.1 0.9 1.2 1.6 1.8 2.6 2.8 3.0 2.4 1.8 1.3
Share of long term unemployment (% of total
38.6 35.6 23.8 26.3 33.7 33.5 35.5 39.8 45.6 42.3 39.1 35.6
unemployment)

Youth unemployment ratio (% population aged 15-24) 6.7 6.6 8.0 8.1 7.0 8.0 9.2 8.3 7.7 7.6 6.0 5.2

Employment rate for low skilled 25-64 (ISCED 0-2) 75.9 77.6 76.9 74.8 74.4 74.1 71.7 b 70.9 b 71.8 72.9 73.5 74.6
Employment rate for medium skilled 25-64 (ISCED 3-
85.0 86.8 86.2 85.4 84.9 84.6 82.9 b 83.0 b 83.7 84.8 85.4 86.3
4)
Employment rate for high skilled 25-64 (ISCED 5-8) 89.6 90.0 89.7 89.3 89.7 90.0 89.7 b 90.3 b 91.1 91.3 91.7 92.3
Employment rate (Nationals aged 15-64) 80.9 82.0 81.1 80.0 79.9 79.7 78.8 78.6 79.5 80.2 81.0 82.2
Employment rate (Other EU28 aged 15-64) 81.4 81.7 79.9 79.4 78.0 80.5 79.7 80.7 79.5 80.5 82.6 83.4
Employment rate (Other than EU28 aged 15-64) 62.3 69.5 66.8 63.1 62.7 64.0 57.9 60.1 61.2 60.3 59.9 63.8
Employment rate (Born in the same country aged 15-
81.7 82.6 81.9 80.6 80.6 80.5 79.5 79.4 80.3 81.1 81.9 82.8
64)
Employment rate (Born in other EU28 aged 15-64) 79.5 77.1 73.8 77.0 79.1 79.1 79.8 80.6 79.0 81.1 81.8 81.6
Employment rate (Born outside EU28 aged 15-64) 68.8 74.2 72.0 70.3 69.1 69.3 66.0 66.7 68.1 66.5 67.5 70.9
Underemployment (% of labour force aged 15-74) 0.6 0.8 0.9 1.0 1.2 4.5 4.5 4.1 3.8 3.3 2.8
Seeking but not available (% of labour force aged 15-
0.5 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.9 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.4 1.3 1.3 1.3
74)
Discouraged, available but not seeking (% of labour
2.6 2.5 2.8 3.3 3.1 3.3 3.6 3.5 3.3 3.2 2.7 2.3
force aged 15-74)
Total population (000) 8269 8293 8329 8372 8412 8447 8472 8495 8528 8562 8606 8654
Population aged 15-64(000) 5468 5483 5502 5519 5538 5522 5506 5499 5503 5516 5536 5557
Total employment (000) 3655 3766 3800 3789 3816 3845 3827 3776 3836 3891 3988 4093
Employment aged 15-64 (000) 3620 3723 3750 3746 3775 3799 3780 3724 3779 3841 3927 4020
Employment rate (% population aged 20-64) 67.7 69.4 69.9 69.8 70.4 71.0 70.6 69.7 70.8 71.6 72.8 74.2
Employment rate (% population aged 15-64) 66.5 68.1 68.5 68.3 68.9 69.4 69.0 68.1 69.2 70.1 71.3 72.8
Employment rate (% population aged 15-24) 62.2 63.8 63.3 61.7 62.6 62.5 61.0 58.8 61.7 62.1 63.6 65.2
Employment rate (% population aged 25-54) 76.4 78.4 78.4 78.4 78.1 78.1 77.5 76.5 77.0 77.7 78.6 79.9
Employment rate (% population aged 55-64) 36.8 38.3 41.0 42.4 45.9 48.3 49.5 50.4 52.4 54.2 56.6 58.8
FTE employment rate (% population aged 20-64) 45.3 46.8 47.3 46.4 47.3 47.2 47.2 47.3 48.2 48.9 50.4 52.2
Self-employed (% total employment) 9.7 10.2 10.7 10.4 10.6 10.8 11.5 11.9 12.5 12.5 12.7 12.6
Part-time employment (% total employment) 74.5 74.7 75.1 76.3 76.6 77.0 77.1 76.7 76.9 76.4 75.8 75.6
Temporary employment (% total employment) 17.4 17.7 17.9 17.4 17.2 17.9 18.6 19.2 18.4 19.0 19.9 19.9
Employment in Services (% total employment) 91.6 u 93.1 u 93.1 u 93.2 u
Employment in Industry (% total employment) 6.8 u 5.6 u 5.7 u 5.7 u
Employment in Agriculture (% total employment) 1.7 b 1.7 1.6 1.5 1.5 1.1 b 1.2 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.1
Activity rate (% population aged 15-64) 70.1 71.3 72.0 72.3 72.9 74.0 74.4 73.8 74.7 75.0 75.2 75.8
Labour Market Indicators - Female

Activity rate (% population aged 15-24) 68.5 69.2 69.6 68.6 69.2 70.8 70.0 67.7 69.4 69.2 69.7 69.8
Activity rate (% population aged 25-54) 79.9 81.4 81.7 82.2 81.8 82.3 82.6 81.9 82.1 82.2 82.0 82.4
Activity rate (% population aged 55-64) 38.5 40.1 42.7 44.4 48.2 51.0 52.8 54.3 56.7 58.6 60.2 61.8
Total unemployment (000) 201 176 197 222 218 255 301 317 301 271 221 169
Unemployment rate (% labour force) 5.2 4.5 4.9 5.5 5.4 6.2 7.3 7.8 7.3 6.5 5.3 4.0
Youth unemployment rate (% labour force 15-24) 9.3 7.8 9.0 10.1 9.5 11.6 12.9 13.1 11.2 10.3 8.8 6.6
Long term unemployment rate (% labour force) 1.9 1.4 1.3 1.5 1.7 2.0 2.5 3.0 2.9 2.7 2.1 1.5
Share of long term unemployment (% of total
36.2 32.3 26.2 27.2 31.0 32.3 34.3 38.5 40.2 40.7 39.9 37.6
unemployment)

Youth unemployment ratio (% population aged 15-24) 6.4 5.4 6.2 7.0 6.6 8.2 9.0 8.9 7.8 7.1 6.1 4.6

Employment rate for low skilled 25-64 (ISCED 0-2) 46.0 48.7 48.7 48.7 50.3 50.4 50.0 b 47.8 b 49.0 49.3 49.5 51.0
Employment rate for medium skilled 25-64 (ISCED 3-
72.7 73.9 74.4 74.4 74.3 74.5 72.6 b 72.5 b 72.6 73.8 74.6 75.8
4)
Employment rate for high skilled 25-64 (ISCED 5-8) 83.5 84.1 84.2 84.0 84.1 84.5 85.4 b 84.9 b 85.3 85.5 86.0 87.0
Employment rate (Nationals aged 15-64) 67.4 68.9 69.3 69.1 69.8 70.2 69.9 69.0 70.3 71.0 72.3 73.9
Employment rate (Other EU28 aged 15-64) 65.4 70.0 66.5 66.8 69.5 71.1 66.7 66.6 65.9 70.2 70.9 68.3
Employment rate (Other than EU28 aged 15-64) 32.8 40.5 40.5 40.0 39.8 40.4 39.6 39.2 38.0 39.5 41.0 44.7
Employment rate (Born in the same country aged 15-
68.6 70.0 70.6 70.1 71.0 71.6 71.4 70.4 71.9 72.6 73.9 75.5
64)
Employment rate (Born in other EU28 aged 15-64) 62.5 67.0 63.9 66.5 67.5 68.8 66.0 66.4 65.9 68.7 70.5 69.1
Employment rate (Born outside EU28 aged 15-64) 49.6 53.3 52.6 53.7 52.8 52.2 51.1 49.9 48.5 50.6 51.3 53.4
Underemployment (% of labour force aged 15-74) 1.6 1.8 1.8 1.9 2.2 9.1 9.4 8.9 7.9 7.0 5.7
Seeking but not available (% of labour force aged 15-
1.1 1.0 1.0 1.2 1.6 1.5 2.0 2.0 2.1 2.0 2.0 2.0
74)
Discouraged, available but not seeking (% of labour
4.1 3.6 3.8 4.0 3.6 3.8 4.4 4.8 4.5 4.0 3.4 2.7
force aged 15-74)

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290
 Statistical annex - 1. Country profiles

Netherlands 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
At-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion (% of total
15.7 14.9 15.1 15.1 15.7 15.0 15.9 16.5 16.4 16.7 b 17.0
population)
At-risk-of-poverty (% of total population) 10.2 10.5 11.1 10.3 11.0 10.1 10.4 11.6 11.6 12.7 b 13.2
At-risk-of-poverty threshold (PPS single person) 10522 11485 11618 11288 11300 11387 11536 11283 11632 12713 b 12710
Poverty gap (%) 17.0 14.9 16.5 16.2 15.5 17.3 16.5 16.9 16.8 17.3 b 17.8
Persistent at-risk-of-poverty (% of total
6.4 4.7 8.2 7.7 5.8 6.5 7.7 7.3 7.2 b 5.6
population)
At-risk-of-poverty before social transfers excl.
20.6 19.9 20.5 21.1 20.9 20.6 20.8 21.3 22.3 22.1 b 21.9
pensions (% of total population)
Impact of social transfers (excl. pensions) in
50.5 47.2 45.9 51.2 47.4 51.0 50.0 45.5 48.0 42.5 b 39.7
reducing poverty (%)
All

Severe Material Deprivation (% of total population) 1.7 1.5 1.4 2.2 2.5 2.3 2.5 3.2 2.6 2.6 b 2.6 2.4 p
Share of people living in low work intensity households
9.7 8.2 8.5 8.4 8.9 8.9 9.3 10.2 10.2 9.7 b 9.5
(% of people aged 0-59)
Real Gross Household Disposable income (growth %) 1.9 0.8 1.5 -1.2 0.2 -0.8 -1.1 1.1 1.2 2.5 1.6
Income quintile share ratio S80/S20 4.0 4.0 4.0 3.7 3.8 3.6 3.6 3.8 3.8 3.9 b 4.0
GINI coefficient 27.6 27.6 27.2 25.5 25.8 25.4 25.1 26.2 26.7 26.9 b 27.1
Early leavers from education and training (% of
11.9 11.4 11.3 10.1 9.2 8.9 9.3 b 8.7 b 8.2 8.0 7.1 7.3
population aged 18-24)
NEET: Young people neither in employment nor in
education and training (% of total population aged 15- 4.3 3.9 5.0 4.8 4.3 4.9 5.6 5.5 4.7 4.6 4.0 4.2
24)
At-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion (% of male
14.6 14.3 14.3 14.1 14.9 13.6 14.9 15.8 15.9 16.1 b 16.7
population)
At-risk-of-poverty (% of male population) 9.6 10.5 10.8 9.7 10.8 9.5 10.2 11.3 11.8 12.8 b 13.2
Poverty gap (%) 17.5 14.6 16.9 15.1 15.3 17.3 15.1 17.7 15.5 17.7 b 19.4
Persistent at-risk-of-poverty (% of male
6.9 5.4 6.8 8.1 4.8 6.3 6.6 6.8 6.9 b 6.0
population)
Severe Material Deprivation (% of male population) 1.7 1.5 1.4 2.3 2.4 2.3 2.4 2.7 2.5 2.3 b 2.5 2.5 p
Male

Share of people living in low work intensity households

8.6 7.0 7.6 7.4 8.0 7.8 8.3 9.6 9.6 8.8 b 9.3
(% of males aged 0-59)
Life expectancy at birth (years) 78.1 78.4 b 78.7 78.9 79.4 79.3 79.5 80.0 79.9 80.0 b 80.2 b
Healthy life years at birth (years) - men 66.1 62.5 b 61.7 61.3 64.0 63.5 61.4 63.3 61.1 62.8 b 62.3 b
Early leavers from education and training (% of males
14.5 13.8 13.6 12.4 11.1 10.5 11.2 b 10.6 b 9.9 10.1 9.4 9.3
aged 18-24)
NEET: Young people neither in employment nor in
3.9 3.6 5.0 5.1 4.4 4.6 5.6 5.2 4.6 4.7 4.2 4.2
education and training ( % of males aged 15-24)
At-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion (% of female
16.9 15.5 15.9 16.0 16.6 16.3 16.9 17.2 16.9 17.3 b 17.3
population)
At-risk-of-poverty (% of female population) 10.7 10.4 11.3 10.8 11.1 10.6 10.6 11.9 11.5 12.7 b 13.3
Poverty gap (%) 16.9 17.0 16.3 16.4 16.5 17.1 17.2 16.2 17.8 17.1 b 16.2
Persistent at-risk-of-poverty (% of female
5.8 4.1 9.5 7.3 6.8 6.7 8.7 7.7 7.5 b 5.2
population)
Social Indicators

Severe Material Deprivation (% of female population) 1.7 1.6 1.5 2.2 2.6 2.4 2.6 3.6 2.6 2.9 b 2.7 2.3 p
Female

Share of people living in low work intensity households

10.8 9.4 9.3 9.3 9.7 10.0 10.4 10.9 10.9 10.5 b 9.7
(% of females aged 0-59)
Life expectancy at birth (years) 82.5 82.5 b 82.9 83.0 83.1 83.0 83.2 83.5 83.2 83.2 b 83.4 b
Healthy life years at birth (years) - women 64.3 59.9 b 60.1 60.2 59.0 58.9 57.5 59.0 57.2 57.8 b 57.5 b
Early leavers from education and training (% of
9.2 8.9 9.0 7.7 7.2 7.2 7.4 b 6.8 b 6.4 5.8 4.6 5.3
females aged 18-24)
NEET: Young people neither in employment nor in
4.6 4.2 4.9 4.5 4.2 5.1 5.7 5.9 4.7 4.4 3.8 4.2
education and training ( % of females aged 15-24)
At-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion of children (% of
17.2 15.5 17.5 16.9 18.0 16.9 17.0 17.1 16.8 17.6 b 16.6
people aged 0-17)
At-risk-of-poverty (% of Children population) 14.0 12.9 15.4 13.7 15.5 13.2 12.6 13.7 14.0 14.8 b 14.4
Children (0-17)

Severe Material Deprivation (% of Children

1.9 2.2 1.5 2.0 2.9 3.3 2.3 3.7 2.6 2.5 b 2.4 2.3 p
population)
Share of children living in low work intensity
6.2 5.1 5.4 5.8 6.3 6.4 6.4 7.3 6.5 7.9 b 6.6
households (% of Children population)
Risk of poverty of children in households at work
11.3 10.1 12.2 11.2 11.8 10.1 10.1 10.0 10.5 9.8 b 10.1
(Working Intensity > 0.2)
Impact of social transfers (excl. pensions) in reducing
43.6 43.9 38.9 45.6 36.2 44.5 47.3 43.2 43.8 38.1 b 36.0
poverty (0-17) (%)
At-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion (% of working
16.5 15.8 15.9 16.5 17.0 16.5 18.0 18.9 19.1 18.4 b 19.0
age population)
At-risk-of-poverty (% of Working age population) 8.9 9.9 10.3 10.1 10.5 10.1 10.9 12.4 12.5 13.2 b 13.8
Working age

Severe Material Deprivation (% of Working age

1.9 1.6 1.6 2.7 2.8 2.4 3.0 3.6 3.1 3.0 b 3.2 2.7 p
(18-64)

population)
Very low work intensity (18-59) 11.0 9.5 9.7 9.4 9.8 9.9 10.5 11.4 11.7 10.4 b 10.6
In-work at-risk-of poverty rate (% of persons
4.5 4.7 5.0 5.1 5.4 4.6 4.5 5.3 5.1 5.6 b 6.1
employed 18-64)
Impact of social transfers (excl. pensions) in reducing
55.3 50.0 49.3 53.5 51.6 53.7 51.3 46.8 49.8 43.1 b 40.5
poverty (18-64) (%)
At-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion of elderly (% of
9.8 9.7 8.1 6.2 6.9 6.2 6.1 6.9 6.1 10.0 b 10.6
people aged 65+)
Elderly (65+)

At-risk-of-poverty (% of Elderly population) 9.5 9.4 7.7 5.9 6.5 5.5 5.5 5.9 5.6 9.0 b 10.0

Severe Material Deprivation (% of Elderly population) 0.7 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.7 0.8 1.0 0.5 1.2 b 0.9 1.6 p
Relative median income of elderly (ratio with median
0.83 0.84 0.86 0.87 0.87 0.90 0.90 0.89 0.89 0.82 b 0.81
income of people younger than 65)
Aggregate replacement ratio (ratio) 0.43 0.43 0.44 0.47 0.46 0.47 0.47 0.50 0.52 0.50 b 0.52
Sickness/Health care 8.4 8.6 9.6 9.9 10.0 10.3 10.1 9.9 9.3 9.2
protection indicators
Expenditure in social

Disability 2.2 2.2 2.4 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.2 2.7 2.6
Old age and survivors 10.3 10.1 10.9 11.1 11.5 11.9 12.1 12.2 11.9 11.9
(% of GDP)

Family/Children 0.9 1.1 1.2 1.1 1.1 1.0 0.9 0.9 1.1 1.1
Unemployment 1.0 0.9 1.1 1.3 1.3 1.4 1.6 1.6 1.5 1.3
Housing and Social exclusion n.e.c. 1.4 1.5 1.7 1.6 1.7 1.7 1.9 1.8 1.7 1.8
Total (including Admin and Other expenditures) 25.9 26.1 29.0 29.3 29.9 30.6 30.8 30.6 29.9 29.5
of which: Means tested benefits 3.0 3.1 3.5 3.6 3.7 3.7 3.9 3.7 4.1 4.1

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291
Employment and Social Developments in Europe 2019

Austria
Austria 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Real GDP 3.7 1.5 -3.8 1.8 2.9 0.7 0.0 0.7 1.1 2.0 2.6 2.7
Total employment 1.8 1.9 -0.5 0.8 1.6 1.0 0.3 1.0 0.6 1.3 1.7 1.7
Labour productivity 1.9 -0.4 -3.3 1.1 1.3 -0.4 -0.3 -0.3 0.5 0.7 0.8 1.0
Macro Economic Indicators

Annual average hours worked per person employed -0.6 -0.4 -2.6 -0.4 0.4 -1.4 -1.0 -0.6 -1.0 0.8 -0.1 0.0
(Annual % growth)

Real productivity per hour worked 2.5 0.0 -0.7 1.5 1.0 1.1 0.6 0.4 1.6 0.0 0.9 1.0
Harmonized CPI 2.2 3.2 0.4 1.7 3.6 2.6 2.1 1.5 0.8 1.0 2.2 2.1
Price deflator GDP 2.2 2.0 1.9 0.9 1.8 2.1 1.6 2.2 2.2 1.4 1.3 1.6
Nominal compensation per employee 3.0 3.3 1.6 1.1 2.1 2.7 2.2 1.9 2.0 2.4 1.5 2.5
Real compensation per employee (GDP deflator) 0.7 1.3 -0.2 0.2 0.2 0.6 0.6 -0.3 -0.2 1.0 0.2 0.9
Real compensation per employee (private consumption
0.8 0.1 1.2 -0.6 -1.5 0.1 0.1 0.4 1.1 1.4 -0.8 0.4
deflator)
Nominal unit labour costs 1.1 3.7 5.1 0.0 0.7 3.1 2.5 2.2 1.4 1.6 0.6 1.5
Real unit labour costs -1.2 1.8 3.1 -0.9 -1.1 1.0 0.9 0.0 -0.8 0.2 -0.6 -0.1
Total population (000) 8283 8308 8335 8352 8375 8408 8452 8508 8585 8700 8773 8822
Population aged 15-64 (000) 5589 5607 5625 5633 5663 5688 5705 5732 5775 5849 5884 5902
Total employment (000) 3924 b 3994 3982 4017 4052 4085 4105 4113 4148 4220 4260 4319
Employment aged 15-64 (000) 3864 b 3929 3909 3944 3982 4013 4030 4034 4068 4143 4185 4241
Employment rate (% population aged 20-64) 72.8 b 73.8 73.4 73.9 74.2 74.4 74.6 74.2 74.3 74.8 75.4 76.2
Employment rate (% population aged 15-64) 69.9 b 70.8 70.3 70.8 71.1 71.4 71.4 71.1 71.1 71.5 72.2 73.0
Employment rate (% population aged 15-24) 53.8 b 54.4 53.1 52.8 53.9 53.7 53.1 52.1 51.3 51.0 50.6 51.3
Employment rate (% population aged 25-54) 82.9 b 83.4 82.9 83.3 84.1 84.3 84.0 83.4 83.5 83.6 84.1 84.6
Employment rate (% population aged 55-64) 36.0 b 38.8 39.4 41.2 39.9 41.6 43.8 45.1 46.3 49.2 51.3 54.0
FTE employment rate (% population aged 20-64) 65.1 b 65.7 64.9 65.1 65.3 65.4 65.5 64.7 64.7 65.1 65.8 66.6
Self-employed (% total employment) 11.3 b 11.2 11.5 11.7 11.3 11.2 11.4 11.3 11.4 11.2 10.9 10.8
Part-time employment (% total employment) 22.0 b 22.7 23.9 24.4 24.5 25.2 26.0 26.9 27.3 27.8 27.9 27.3
Temporary employment (% total employment) 7.7 b 7.8 7.9 8.2 8.4 8.2 8.1 8.1 8.0 7.9 8.1 8.1
Employment in Services (% total employment) 68.9 b 70.1 70.1 69.3 69.5 69.8 69.7 u 69.9 70.3 71.4 71.0
Employment in Industry (% total employment) 26.5 b 25.3 25.2 26.3 26.4 26.2 26.1 u 26.1 25.9 25.2 25.7
Employment in Agriculture (% total employment) 4.6 b 4.6 4.7 4.4 4.2 4.0 4.3 4.0 3.9 3.5 3.3
Activity rate (% population aged 15-64) 73.5 b 73.9 74.3 74.4 74.6 75.1 75.5 75.4 75.5 76.2 76.4 76.8
Labour Market Indicators - Total

Activity rate (% population aged 15-24) 59.4 b 59.5 59.5 58.3 59.2 59.2 58.8 58.0 57.4 57.5 56.1 56.7
Activity rate (% population aged 25-54) 86.5 b 86.5 87.0 87.1 87.6 88.1 88.3 88.0 88.0 88.4 88.7 88.5
Activity rate (% population aged 55-64) 37.2 b 39.7 40.5 42.2 41.4 43.1 45.5 46.9 48.6 51.7 53.6 56.2
Total unemployment (000) 200 172 223 203 194 209 231 245 252 270 248 220
Unemployment rate (% labour force) 4.9 4.1 5.3 4.8 4.6 4.9 5.4 5.6 5.7 6.0 5.5 4.9
Youth unemployment rate (% labour force 15-24) 9.4 8.5 10.7 9.5 8.9 9.4 9.7 10.3 10.6 11.2 9.8 9.4
Long term unemployment rate (% labour force) 1.3 b 1.0 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.3 1.5 1.7 1.9 1.8 1.4
Share of long term unemployment (% of total
27.2 b 24.3 21.7 25.4 26.3 24.9 24.6 27.2 29.2 32.3 33.4 28.9
unemployment)

Youth unemployment ratio (% population aged 15-24) 5.6 b 5.1 6.4 5.5 5.3 5.6 5.7 6.0 6.1 6.5 5.5 5.3

Employment rate for low skilled 25-64 (ISCED 0-2) 56.1 b 55.4 54.0 54.8 55.1 54.7 54.1 53.0 b 52.9 53.9 54.1 55.3
Employment rate for medium skilled 25-64 (ISCED 3-
75.4 b 76.9 76.3 77.0 76.8 77.1 77.5 75.9 b 75.7 75.9 76.6 77.6
4)
Employment rate for high skilled 25-64 (ISCED 5-8) 86.0 b 85.6 85.8 85.3 85.9 86.7 86.0 85.3 b 85.4 86.2 86.4 86.3
Employment rate (Nationals aged 15-64) 70.9 b 71.9 71.6 71.9 72.2 72.6 72.7 72.3 72.5 73.3 73.8 74.4
Employment rate (Other EU28 aged 15-64) 69.7 b 70.6 68.2 69.8 69.6 71.2 71.9 73.0 72.5 72.8 74.5 73.9
Employment rate (Other than EU28 aged 15-64) 56.5 b 56.5 55.5 57.0 58.2 57.0 55.2 54.2 53.7 52.6 54.3 58.6
Employment rate (Born in the same country aged 15-
71.2 b 72.3 71.9 72.0 72.3 72.7 72.8 72.6 72.8 73.4 74.0 74.5
64)
Employment rate (Born in other EU28 aged 15-64) 67.0 b 67.5 67.2 69.5 69.9 71.1 72.2 72.7 72.7 73.7 74.7 74.6
Employment rate (Born outside EU28 aged 15-64) 61.2 b 61.3 60.3 62.4 63.0 62.0 60.7 59.5 59.0 58.4 59.1 63.1
Underemployment (% of labour force aged 15-74) 3.2 3.5 2.9 3.1 3.4 3.8 3.9 4.2 4.2 4.0 3.3
Seeking but not available (% of labour force aged 15-
0.7 b 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 1.0 0.9 1.0 0.9 1.1 1.1 1.2
74)
Discouraged, available but not seeking (% of labour
3.8 b 3.5 3.7 3.7 3.4 3.5 3.3 3.6 3.7 3.3 3.0 2.5
force aged 15-74)

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292
 Statistical annex - 1. Country profiles

Austria 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Total population (000) 4030 4042 4057 4066 4079 4098 4124 4155 4200 4273 4312 4339
Population aged 15-64(000) 2799 2807 2814 2818 2831 2844 2854 2869 2896 2944 2964 2972
Total employment (000) 2138 b 2164 2134 2148 2162 2171 2180 2175 2194 2234 2254 2296
Employment aged 15-64 (000) 2100 b 2122 2087 2104 2120 2129 2134 2126 2145 2187 2209 2248
Employment rate (% population aged 20-64) 79.5 b 80.1 78.7 79.0 79.2 79.3 79.1 78.3 78.4 78.7 79.4 80.7
Employment rate (% population aged 15-64) 76.3 b 76.8 75.5 76.0 76.2 76.2 76.0 75.2 75.1 75.4 76.2 77.4
Employment rate (% population aged 15-24) 57.0 b 57.6 55.8 56.6 58.0 57.1 56.4 54.3 54.0 52.9 52.1 53.9
Employment rate (% population aged 25-54) 89.0 b 88.9 87.4 87.7 88.4 88.3 87.5 86.6 86.6 86.6 87.2 87.8
Employment rate (% population aged 55-64) 46.0 b 48.9 49.1 49.9 48.2 50.2 52.8 54.3 54.1 57.6 60.1 63.5
FTE employment rate (% population aged 20-64) 78.1 b 78.2 76.6 76.6 77.0 77.0 76.6 75.5 75.5 75.6 76.4 77.7
Self-employed (% total employment) 13.6 b 13.6 13.9 14.2 13.7 13.5 13.8 13.8 13.8 13.7 13.4 13.1
Part-time employment (% total employment) 6.2 b 7.0 7.5 8.0 7.8 8.0 9.0 9.6 9.8 10.5 10.6 10.0
Temporary employment (% total employment) 7.4 b 7.5 7.8 8.3 8.3 7.9 8.1 7.9 7.8 7.7 8.0 7.7
Employment in Services (% total employment) 56.9 b 58.1 58.2 57.1 57.2 58.0 u 57.7 u 57.4 57.7 59.0 u 58.6 u
Employment in Industry (% total employment) 38.6 b 37.3 37.1 38.3 38.4 37.8 u 37.9 u 38.5 38.2 37.4 u 37.8 u
Employment in Agriculture (% total employment) 4.5 b 4.6 4.8 4.5 4.4 4.2 4.4 4.1 4.1 3.6 3.6
Activity rate (% population aged 15-64) 80.0 b 80.0 80.0 80.0 79.9 80.2 80.4 80.0 80.1 80.7 81.0 81.6
Labour Market Indicators - Male

Activity rate (% population aged 15-24) 62.9 b 62.9 62.9 62.6 63.6 63.1 62.3 60.7 60.7 60.2 58.4 59.5
Activity rate (% population aged 25-54) 92.5 b 92.1 91.9 91.9 92.0 92.3 92.1 91.5 91.6 91.8 92.3 92.1
Activity rate (% population aged 55-64) 47.6 b 49.9 50.5 51.4 50.4 52.2 55.1 56.8 57.4 61.2 63.0 66.0
Total unemployment (000) 100 88 124 113 103 113 124 135 142 153 142 121
Unemployment rate (% labour force) 4.5 3.9 5.5 5.0 4.6 5.0 5.4 5.9 6.1 6.5 5.9 5.0
Youth unemployment rate (% labour force 15-24) 9.3 8.4 11.2 9.6 8.8 9.6 9.4 10.6 11.1 12.1 10.8 9.4
Long term unemployment rate (% labour force) 1.2 b 1.0 1.2 1.4 1.3 1.3 1.4 1.7 1.9 2.2 2.0 1.5
Share of long term unemployment (% of total
26.9 b 26.0 22.0 27.9 27.8 26.0 25.9 28.2 31.8 34.3 33.7 29.0
unemployment)

Youth unemployment ratio (% population aged 15-24) 5.8 b 5.3 7.0 6.0 5.6 6.0 5.8 6.4 6.7 7.3 6.3 5.6

Employment rate for low skilled 25-64 (ISCED 0-2) 65.8 b 65.0 62.8 62.8 63.6 62.3 61.2 59.1 b 59.3 60.5 60.6 62.9
Employment rate for medium skilled 25-64 (ISCED 3-
81.0 b 81.9 80.2 80.6 80.4 80.5 80.9 79.8 b 79.1 79.4 80.4 81.5
4)
Employment rate for high skilled 25-64 (ISCED 5-8) 89.1 b 88.7 88.6 88.8 89.0 89.6 88.6 87.2 b 87.4 88.5 89.2 89.3
Employment rate (Nationals aged 15-64) 76.9 b 77.4 76.4 76.7 76.8 76.8 76.8 76.2 76.0 76.7 77.3 78.2
Employment rate (Other EU28 aged 15-64) 80.6 b 80.1 75.8 75.7 76.2 77.3 77.3 77.5 78.2 77.1 80.8 80.3
Employment rate (Other than EU28 aged 15-64) 66.3 b 67.9 64.1 66.5 68.5 67.4 65.7 62.1 62.0 60.9 61.4 67.3
Employment rate (Born in the same country aged 15-
77.1 b 77.7 76.5 76.7 76.8 76.8 76.7 76.2 76.0 76.6 77.2 78.0
64)
Employment rate (Born in other EU28 aged 15-64) 77.4 b 75.4 75.5 75.1 77.0 77.5 79.4 78.6 78.9 78.5 81.0 80.5
Employment rate (Born outside EU28 aged 15-64) 70.1 b 71.2 67.8 70.6 71.4 71.2 69.0 66.4 67.1 66.1 66.7 71.8
Underemployment (% of labour force aged 15-74) 1.2 1.7 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.9 1.9 2.1 2.4 2.2 1.8
Seeking but not available (% of labour force aged 15-
0.6 b 0.7 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.9 0.8 1.0 1.1 1.0
74)
Discouraged, available but not seeking (% of labour
3.1 b 2.9 3.0 3.2 3.2 3.2 3.0 3.4 3.5 3.0 2.8 2.3
force aged 15-74)
Total population (000) 4253 4266 4278 4285 4296 4310 4328 4352 4385 4428 4460 4484
Population aged 15-64(000) 2790 2800 2811 2816 2832 2844 2852 2863 2879 2905 2920 2930
Total employment (000) 1786 b 1831 1849 1869 1890 1913 1925 1938 1954 1986 2006 2024
Employment aged 15-64 (000) 1763 b 1807 1822 1840 1862 1885 1897 1908 1923 1956 1977 1993
Employment rate (% population aged 20-64) 66.2 b 67.6 68.2 68.8 69.2 69.6 70.0 70.1 70.2 70.9 71.4 71.7
Employment rate (% population aged 15-64) 63.5 b 64.8 65.2 65.7 66.1 66.7 66.9 66.9 67.1 67.7 68.2 68.6
Employment rate (% population aged 15-24) 50.6 b 51.3 50.5 48.9 49.8 50.3 49.8 49.9 48.7 49.0 49.0 48.7
Employment rate (% population aged 25-54) 76.7 b 77.8 78.4 78.9 79.8 80.4 80.5 80.3 80.3 80.6 81.0 81.3
Employment rate (% population aged 55-64) 26.5 b 29.3 30.3 33.0 32.2 33.5 35.2 36.4 38.8 41.1 42.8 44.8
FTE employment rate (% population aged 20-64) 53.2 b 54.4 54.3 54.9 55.0 55.1 55.6 55.1 55.1 55.8 56.6 56.8
Self-employed (% total employment) 8.6 b 8.4 8.6 8.8 8.5 8.4 8.6 8.5 8.7 8.4 8.2 8.1
Part-time employment (% total employment) 40.8 b 41.2 42.6 43.2 43.5 44.6 45.1 46.3 46.8 47.1 47.2 46.9
Temporary employment (% total employment) 8.0 b 8.1 8.1 8.0 8.5 8.4 8.2 8.3 8.2 8.2 8.4 8.6
Employment in Services (% total employment)
Employment in Industry (% total employment)
Employment in Agriculture (% total employment) 4.7 b 4.7 4.6 4.3 3.9 3.8 4.1 3.9 3.6 3.3 3.0
Activity rate (% population aged 15-64) 67.1 b 67.8 68.7 68.9 69.3 70.0 70.7 70.8 70.9 71.7 71.8 72.0
Labour Market Indicators - Female

Activity rate (% population aged 15-24) 56.0 b 56.2 56.2 54.0 54.8 55.4 55.3 55.4 54.1 54.6 53.7 53.8
Activity rate (% population aged 25-54) 80.5 b 80.9 82.1 82.4 83.2 84.0 84.5 84.5 84.4 84.9 85.0 84.8
Activity rate (% population aged 55-64) 27.5 b 30.1 31.1 33.6 33.0 34.5 36.4 37.5 40.2 42.7 44.5 46.6
Total unemployment (000) 100 84 99 91 91 96 108 110 110 117 106 99
Unemployment rate (% labour force) 5.3 4.4 5.1 4.6 4.6 4.8 5.3 5.4 5.3 5.6 5.0 4.7
Youth unemployment rate (% labour force 15-24) 9.6 8.6 10.1 9.4 9.1 9.2 10.0 9.9 10.0 10.2 8.7 9.4
Long term unemployment rate (% labour force) 1.5 b 1.0 1.1 1.0 1.1 1.1 1.2 1.4 1.4 1.7 1.7 1.3
Share of long term unemployment (% of total
27.6 b 22.6 21.3 22.4 24.5 23.7 23.1 25.9 25.9 29.7 33.1 28.7
unemployment)

Youth unemployment ratio (% population aged 15-24) 5.4 b 4.8 5.7 5.1 5.0 5.1 5.5 5.5 5.4 5.6 4.7 5.0

Employment rate for low skilled 25-64 (ISCED 0-2) 51.0 b 50.2 49.4 50.5 50.3 50.5 49.9 49.5 b 49.1 49.9 49.9 50.6
Employment rate for medium skilled 25-64 (ISCED 3-
69.2 b 71.4 72.1 73.0 73.0 73.3 73.9 71.6 b 72.0 72.0 72.5 73.4
4)
Employment rate for high skilled 25-64 (ISCED 5-8) 81.8 b 81.5 82.4 81.0 82.2 83.2 82.9 83.3 b 83.1 83.8 83.6 83.1
Employment rate (Nationals aged 15-64) 64.9 b 66.4 66.8 67.1 67.6 68.3 68.6 68.5 69.0 69.9 70.3 70.5
Employment rate (Other EU28 aged 15-64) 60.4 b 62.8 61.6 64.5 63.9 66.0 67.4 69.1 67.3 68.9 68.6 68.1
Employment rate (Other than EU28 aged 15-64) 45.9 b 44.8 47.0 47.5 47.8 46.7 44.9 46.4 45.5 44.7 46.8 49.9
Employment rate (Born in the same country aged 15-
65.4 b 66.9 67.2 67.3 67.8 68.5 68.9 68.9 69.5 70.2 70.8 70.8
64)
Employment rate (Born in other EU28 aged 15-64) 59.0 b 61.5 60.8 65.2 64.4 66.3 66.6 67.9 67.6 69.8 69.4 69.6
Employment rate (Born outside EU28 aged 15-64) 52.5 b 51.6 52.6 54.3 54.8 53.1 52.7 52.7 51.2 50.8 51.4 54.5
Underemployment (% of labour force aged 15-74) 5.6 5.6 4.6 5.0 5.4 6.0 6.1 6.4 6.3 6.1 5.1
Seeking but not available (% of labour force aged 15-
0.8 b 1.1 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.2 1.0 1.1 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3
74)
Discouraged, available but not seeking (% of labour
4.7 b 4.2 4.4 4.2 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.9 3.9 3.7 3.1 2.8
force aged 15-74)

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293
Employment and Social Developments in Europe 2019

Austria 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
At-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion (% of total
16.7 20.6 b 19.1 18.9 19.2 18.5 18.8 19.2 18.3 18.0 18.1 17.5
population)
At-risk-of-poverty (% of total population) 12.0 15.2 14.5 14.7 14.5 14.4 14.4 14.1 13.9 14.1 14.4 14.3
At-risk-of-poverty threshold (PPS single person) 10686 11359 b 11683 11710 12255 12361 12542 12997 13189 13842 14006 13913
Poverty gap (%) 17.0 19.9 b 19.2 21.8 19.1 20.1 21.3 20.1 20.5 19.8 22.4 21.7
Persistent at-risk-of-poverty (% of total
5.5 5.6 6.2 6.5 9.8 b 8.7 8.9 8.5 8.8 8.1 9.1 10.2
population)
At-risk-of-poverty before social transfers excl.
24.7 25.9 b 25.3 26.0 27.1 25.8 25.9 25.4 25.6 26.3 24.9 25.2
pensions (% of total population)
Impact of social transfers (excl. pensions) in
51.4 41.3 b 42.7 43.5 46.5 44.2 44.4 44.5 45.7 46.4 42.2 43.3
reducing poverty (%)
All

Severe Material Deprivation (% of total population) 3.3 5.9 4.6 4.3 4.0 4.0 4.2 4.0 3.6 3.0 3.7 2.8
Share of people living in low work intensity households
8.2 7.4 b 7.1 7.8 8.6 7.7 7.8 9.1 8.2 8.1 8.3 7.3
(% of people aged 0-59)
Real Gross Household Disposable income (growth %) 2.2 1.0 -0.2 -0.8 -0.5 1.5 -1.8 0.3 0.3 2.5
Income quintile share ratio S80/S20 3.8 4.2 b 4.2 4.3 4.1 4.2 4.1 4.1 4.0 4.1 4.3 4.0
GINI coefficient 26.2 27.7 b 27.5 28.3 27.4 27.6 27.0 27.6 27.2 27.2 27.9 26.8
Early leavers from education and training (% of
10.8 10.2 8.8 8.3 8.5 7.8 7.5 7.0 b 7.3 6.9 7.4 7.3
population aged 18-24)
NEET: Young people neither in employment nor in
education and training (% of total population aged 15- 7.4 b 7.4 8.2 7.4 7.3 6.8 7.3 7.7 7.5 7.7 6.5 6.8
24)
At-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion (% of male
14.5 18.9 b 17.6 17.3 17.9 17.3 17.4 17.7 17.5 16.9 16.8 16.2
population)
At-risk-of-poverty (% of male population) 10.6 14.2 13.8 13.4 14.0 13.5 13.5 13.3 13.5 13.5 13.5 13.3
Poverty gap (%) 18.7 21.0 b 19.1 22.2 19.1 20.4 22.7 19.9 20.8 20.6 22.8 22.5
Persistent at-risk-of-poverty (% of male
3.5 4.9 4.4 5.8 8.5 b 7.5 7.9 6.6 8.1 8.0 7.8 9.4
population)
Severe Material Deprivation (% of male population) 3.1 5.5 4.2 3.9 3.6 3.8 4.3 3.8 3.8 2.9 3.6 2.7
Male

Share of people living in low work intensity households

6.6 6.1 b 5.5 6.7 7.5 6.7 7.0 7.8 7.3 7.5 7.5 6.9
(% of males aged 0-59)
Life expectancy at birth (years) 77.4 77.7 b 77.6 77.8 78.3 78.4 78.6 79.1 78.8 79.3 79.4
Healthy life years at birth (years) - men 58.7 58.5 b 59.5 59.4 59.5 60.2 59.7 57.6 57.9 57.0 57.4
Early leavers from education and training (% of males
11.5 10.4 8.6 8.4 9.0 8.0 7.9 7.6 b 7.8 7.7 9.0 8.9
aged 18-24)
NEET: Young people neither in employment nor in
7.0 b 6.8 7.7 7.2 7.3 6.6 7.2 8.0 7.7 8.0 7.0 6.6
education and training ( % of males aged 15-24)
At-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion (% of female
18.9 22.3 b 20.5 20.5 20.3 19.6 20.1 20.5 19.1 18.9 19.3 18.7
population)
At-risk-of-poverty (% of female population) 13.3 16.1 15.3 15.8 15.0 15.3 15.2 14.9 14.3 14.6 15.3 15.2
Poverty gap (%) 15.9 18.7 b 19.2 21.6 19.1 20.0 20.7 20.1 19.6 18.7 22.1 20.9
Persistent at-risk-of-poverty (% of female
7.3 6.3 7.9 7.1 11.0 b 9.9 10.0 10.4 9.6 8.2 10.4 11.0
population)
Social Indicators

Severe Material Deprivation (% of female population) 3.5 6.3 4.9 4.6 4.4 4.2 4.2 4.2 3.3 3.1 3.9 2.9
Female

Share of people living in low work intensity households

9.8 8.6 b 8.7 8.9 9.7 8.7 8.5 10.5 9.1 8.8 9.2 7.8
(% of females aged 0-59)
Life expectancy at birth (years) 83.1 83.3 b 83.2 83.5 83.8 83.6 83.8 84.0 83.7 84.1 84.0
Healthy life years at birth (years) - women 61.4 59.9 b 60.8 60.8 60.1 62.5 60.2 57.8 58.1 57.1 56.8
Early leavers from education and training (% of
10.2 9.9 8.9 8.3 8.0 7.6 7.1 6.5 b 6.8 6.0 5.8 5.7
females aged 18-24)
NEET: Young people neither in employment nor in
7.9 b 8.0 8.7 7.7 7.2 7.0 7.4 7.4 7.3 7.4 6.0 7.1
education and training ( % of females aged 15-24)
At-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion of children (% of
18.5 22.9 b 20.8 22.4 22.1 20.9 22.9 23.3 22.3 20.0 23.0 21.6
people aged 0-17)
At-risk-of-poverty (% of Children population) 14.8 18.1 17.1 19.0 17.8 17.5 18.6 18.2 17.8 16.5 19.1 19.2
Children (0-17)

Severe Material Deprivation (% of Children

3.7 6.7 5.0 5.6 5.8 5.8 6.4 6.0 4.2 3.5 5.3 3.6
population)
Share of children living in low work intensity
6.3 5.5 b 5.7 5.9 7.0 6.1 7.2 8.6 7.5 6.5 7.6 6.1
households (% of Children population)
Risk of poverty of children in households at work
11.6 15.6 b 14.2 15.4 14.4 14.1 15.3 13.6 14.7 13.5 14.7 15.1
(Working Intensity > 0.2)
Impact of social transfers (excl. pensions) in reducing
59.0 51.0 b 52.1 49.7 54.8 52.7 52.9 51.7 54.2 57.4 49.7 49.6
poverty (0-17) (%)
At-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion (% of working
16.7 19.8 b 18.7 18.3 18.8 18.4 18.3 18.9 18.4 18.6 18.0 17.1
age population)
At-risk-of-poverty (% of Working age population) 10.6 13.3 13.0 12.9 13.1 13.3 12.9 12.9 13.0 13.6 13.5 13.0
Working age

Severe Material Deprivation (% of Working age

3.4 6.0 4.9 4.5 4.0 4.1 4.3 4.0 4.0 3.4 4.0 3.1
(18-64)

population)
Very low work intensity (18-59) 8.8 8.0 b 7.5 8.4 9.1 8.2 7.9 9.3 8.4 8.7 8.6 7.7
In-work at-risk-of poverty rate (% of persons
6.1 8.5 b 8.2 7.5 7.6 8.2 7.9 7.2 7.8 8.3 7.7 8.0
employed 18-64)
Impact of social transfers (excl. pensions) in reducing
54.5 44.1 b 45.2 47.1 48.6 45.5 46.3 46.9 47.6 47.5 43.8 45.6
poverty (18-64) (%)
At-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion of elderly (% of
15.1 21.2 b 18.6 17.4 17.4 16.2 16.2 15.7 14.0 13.7 13.4 14.5
people aged 65+)
Elderly (65+)

At-risk-of-poverty (% of Elderly population) 14.0 18.9 17.4 16.8 16.2 15.1 15.4 14.2 13.2 13.2 12.9 13.9

Severe Material Deprivation (% of Elderly population) 2.1 4.4 2.8 1.9 2.1 1.9 1.8 2.0 1.4 1.2 1.4 1.0
Relative median income of elderly (ratio with median
0.93 0.88 b 0.89 0.90 0.92 0.93 0.95 0.95 0.98 0.97 0.97 0.95
income of people younger than 65)
Aggregate replacement ratio (ratio) 0.62 0.61 b 0.56 0.57 0.59 0.58 0.59 0.60 0.62 0.62 0.64 0.62
Sickness/Health care 6.8 7.0 7.4 7.3 7.2 7.3 7.3 7.3 7.4 7.4
protection indicators
Expenditure in social

Disability 2.0 2.0 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.0 1.9 1.8
Old age and survivors 12.7 13.0 14.0 14.1 13.9 14.2 14.5 14.7 14.7 14.5
(% of GDP)

Family/Children 2.8 2.9 3.1 3.1 2.8 2.8 2.8 2.7 2.8 2.8
Unemployment 1.4 1.3 1.6 1.6 1.5 1.5 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.7
Housing and Social exclusion n.e.c. 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.9
Total (including Admin and Other expenditures) 27.0 27.6 29.6 29.6 28.8 29.2 29.6 29.8 29.8 29.9
of which: Means tested benefits 2.0 2.1 2.3 2.4 2.3 2.3 2.4 2.5 2.6 2.8

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294
 Statistical annex - 1. Country profiles

Poland
Poland 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Real GDP 7.0 4.2 2.8 3.6 5.0 1.6 1.4 3.3 3.8 3.1 4.8 5.1
Total employment 4.5 3.8 0.4 -2.7 b 0.6 0.1 -0.1 1.7 1.5 0.8 1.3 0.3 p
Labour productivity 2.4 0.4 2.4 6.4 b 4.4 1.5 1.5 1.6 2.3 2.2 3.4 4.8 p
Macro Economic Indicators

Annual average hours worked per person employed -0.1 -0.4 -0.8 -0.3 b -0.3 b -0.3 -0.2 0.3 0.4 0.1 -1.1 -1.4 p
(Annual % growth)

Real productivity per hour worked 2.6 0.8 3.2 6.7 b 4.7 1.8 1.6 1.2 1.9 2.1 4.6 6.2 p
Harmonized CPI 2.6 4.2 4.0 2.6 3.9 3.7 0.8 0.1 -0.7 -0.2 1.6 1.2
Price deflator GDP 3.7 3.9 3.8 1.7 3.2 2.3 0.3 0.5 0.8 0.3 2.0 1.1
Nominal compensation per employee 5.7 8.3 3.4 8.9 b 5.3 b 3.6 1.7 2.2 1.7 4.8 5.8 7.8 p
Real compensation per employee (GDP deflator) 2.0 4.2 -0.4 7.2 b 2.0 b 1.2 1.4 1.7 0.9 4.5 3.7 6.6 p
Real compensation per employee (private consumption
3.1 3.9 -0.6 6.1 b 1.4 b -0.1 0.9 2.1 2.4 5.0 4.1 6.5 p
deflator)
Nominal unit labour costs 3.2 7.8 0.9 2.4 b 0.8 2.0 0.2 0.6 -0.6 2.5 2.3 2.8 p
Real unit labour costs -0.5 3.8 -2.7 0.7 b -2.4 b -0.3 -0.1 0.1 -1.3 2.2 0.3 1.7 p
Total population (000) 38125 38116 38136 38023 b 38063 38064 38063 38018 38006 37967 37973 37977
Population aged 15-64 (000) 26987 27083 27160 27044 27077 26986 26843 26639 26431 26199 25957 25693
Total employment (000) 15241 15800 15868 15473 b 15562 15591 15568 15862 16084 16197 16423 16484
Employment aged 15-64 (000) 14997 15557 15630 15233 b 15313 15340 15313 15591 15812 15902 16079 16133
Employment rate (% population aged 20-64) 62.7 65.0 64.9 64.3 b 64.5 64.7 64.9 66.5 67.8 69.3 70.9 72.2
Employment rate (% population aged 15-64) 57.0 59.2 59.3 58.9 b 59.3 59.7 60.0 61.7 62.9 64.5 66.1 67.4
Employment rate (% population aged 15-24) 25.8 27.3 26.8 26.4 b 24.9 24.7 24.2 25.8 26.0 28.4 29.6 31.0
Employment rate (% population aged 25-54) 74.9 77.5 77.6 77.2 b 77.3 77.2 77.0 78.4 79.5 80.3 81.4 82.4
Employment rate (% population aged 55-64) 29.7 31.6 32.3 34.1 b 36.9 38.7 40.6 42.5 44.3 46.2 48.3 48.9
FTE employment rate (% population aged 20-64) 61.7 64.1 64.0 63.4 b 63.7 64.0 64.2 65.8 67.0 68.6 70.2 71.4
Self-employed (% total employment) 19.2 18.8 18.8 19.1 b 19.1 18.9 18.5 18.3 18.3 18.1 17.8 17.9
Part-time employment (% total employment) 8.5 7.7 7.7 7.7 b 7.3 7.2 7.1 7.1 6.8 6.4 6.6 6.4
Temporary employment (% total employment) 21.8 20.9 20.6 21.1 b 20.9 20.9 21.1 22.4 22.2 21.9 20.9 19.5
Employment in Services (% total employment) 54.4 b 55.8 56.8 b 56.6 57.1 57.5 58.0 58.0 58.0 58.2 58.7
Employment in Industry (% total employment) 32.3 b 31.4 30.6 b 31.0 30.7 30.8 30.8 30.7 31.6 31.8 31.9
Employment in Agriculture (% total employment) 13.3 b 12.7 12.6 b 12.4 12.2 11.7 11.2 11.3 10.4 10.0 9.4
Activity rate (% population aged 15-64) 63.2 63.8 64.7 65.3 b 65.7 66.5 67.0 67.9 68.1 68.8 69.6 70.1
Labour Market Indicators - Total

Activity rate (% population aged 15-24) 33.0 33.1 33.8 34.6 b 33.5 33.6 33.3 33.9 32.8 34.5 34.8 35.1
Activity rate (% population aged 25-54) 81.7 82.5 83.4 84.1 b 84.2 84.6 84.6 85.1 85.1 84.9 84.9 85.2
Activity rate (% population aged 55-64) 31.8 33.3 34.5 36.7 b 39.6 41.8 44.0 45.6 46.9 48.3 50.1 50.3
Total unemployment (000) 1579 1165 1359 d 1650 1659 1749 1793 1567 1304 1063 844 659
Unemployment rate (% labour force) 9.6 7.1 8.1 d 9.7 9.7 10.1 10.3 9.0 7.5 6.2 4.9 3.9
Youth unemployment rate (% labour force 15-24) 21.6 17.2 20.6 d 23.7 25.8 26.5 27.3 23.9 20.8 17.7 14.8 11.7
Long term unemployment rate (% labour force) 4.9 2.4 2.5 3.0 b 3.6 4.1 4.4 3.8 3.0 2.2 1.5 1.0
Share of long term unemployment (% of total
51.3 33.5 30.3 31.1 b 37.2 40.3 42.5 42.7 39.3 35.0 31.0 26.9
unemployment)

Youth unemployment ratio (% population aged 15-24) 7.1 5.7 7.0 8.2 b 8.6 8.9 9.1 8.1 6.8 6.1 5.2 4.1

Employment rate for low skilled 25-64 (ISCED 0-2) 41.0 43.0 41.6 39.9 b 39.7 39.8 38.5 39.3 b 40.8 40.7 41.8 43.1
Employment rate for medium skilled 25-64 (ISCED 3-
65.2 67.1 66.3 65.4 b 65.8 65.4 65.2 66.1 b 67.2 68.5 69.6 70.4
4)
Employment rate for high skilled 25-64 (ISCED 5-8) 84.5 85.1 85.3 84.6 b 84.6 84.7 84.8 86.3 b 87.1 87.5 88.1 88.7
Employment rate (Nationals aged 15-64) 57.0 59.2 59.3 58.9 b 59.3 59.7 60.0 61.7 62.9 64.5 66.1 67.4
Employment rate (Other EU28 aged 15-64) 70.8 u 85.3 u 73.3 u 58.8 bu 75.3 u 74.5 u 70.7 u 73.9 u 79.0 u 64.3 u 79.8 86.4
Employment rate (Other than EU28 aged 15-64) 62.6 63.5 61.9 60.5 b 57.1 61.9 56.7 62.4 57.4 59.4 68.9 72.1
Employment rate (Born in the same country aged 15-
57.1 59.3 59.4 59.0 b 59.3 59.7 60.0 61.7 62.9 64.5 66.1 67.3
64)
Employment rate (Born in other EU28 aged 15-64) 34.2 40.3 34.2 u 41.9 bu 54.6 u 62.4 u 62.0 u 64.2 69.7 61.4 u 67.8 70.6
Employment rate (Born outside EU28 aged 15-64) 38.7 45.5 51.7 54.8 b 55.6 61.6 58.0 62.5 58.0 63.0 70.3 73.5
Underemployment (% of labour force aged 15-74) 1.5 1.7 1.8 b 1.8 2.0 b 2.1 2.2 1.9 1.6 1.4 1.1
Seeking but not available (% of labour force aged 15-
0.8 0.6 b 0.6 0.7 b 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.4
74)
Discouraged, available but not seeking (% of labour
4.8 3.8 3.8 3.7 b 3.7 3.7 3.9 3.7 3.2 2.8 2.5 2.3
force aged 15-74)

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295
Employment and Social Developments in Europe 2019

Poland 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Total population (000) 18427 18412 18415 18412 b 18430 18427 18426 18404 18397 18377 18378 18380
Population aged 15-64(000) 13406 13449 13485 13482 13496 13454 13388 13293 13196 13086 12974 12849
Total employment (000) 8403 8718 8722 8566 b 8648 8651 8641 8778 8867 8933 9066 9077
Employment aged 15-64 (000) 8258 8573 8578 8418 b 8496 8498 8486 8607 8690 8737 8842 8853
Employment rate (% population aged 20-64) 70.2 73.0 72.6 71.3 b 71.9 72.0 72.1 73.6 74.7 76.4 78.2 79.4
Employment rate (% population aged 15-64) 63.6 66.3 66.1 65.3 b 66.0 66.3 66.6 68.2 69.2 71.0 72.8 74.0
Employment rate (% population aged 15-24) 29.2 31.0 30.4 30.5 b 29.6 29.2 28.6 30.0 30.5 32.8 33.9 34.7
Employment rate (% population aged 25-54) 81.1 84.0 83.7 82.5 b 83.0 82.9 82.7 83.9 84.9 86.1 87.3 88.1
Employment rate (% population aged 55-64) 41.4 44.1 44.3 45.2 b 47.8 49.3 51.3 53.1 54.2 55.7 58.3 59.8
FTE employment rate (% population aged 20-64) 70.3 73.3 72.8 71.6 b 72.1 72.4 72.6 74.1 75.0 76.8 78.7 79.9
Self-employed (% total employment) 22.7 22.3 22.4 22.8 b 22.8 22.6 22.4 22.3 22.2 22.2 22.3 22.1
Part-time employment (% total employment) 5.8 5.1 5.0 5.0 b 4.7 4.5 4.5 4.4 4.2 3.7 3.7 3.8
Temporary employment (% total employment) 21.4 19.9 19.9 20.6 b 20.7 20.6 20.7 21.8 21.4 21.0 19.7 18.0
Employment in Services (% total employment) 42.8 b 43.9 44.9 b 44.5 44.7 44.9 45.6 45.5 45.1 45.2 45.8
Employment in Industry (% total employment) 43.8 b 43.3 42.2 b 42.5 42.4 42.6 42.2 42.3 43.6 43.7 43.8
Employment in Agriculture (% total employment) 13.4 b 12.8 12.9 b 13.0 12.9 12.5 12.2 12.3 11.4 11.1 10.4
Activity rate (% population aged 15-64) 70.0 70.9 71.8 72.1 b 72.6 73.3 73.9 74.6 74.8 75.7 76.6 77.0
Labour Market Indicators - Male

Activity rate (% population aged 15-24) 36.5 36.5 38.1 39.3 b 38.7 38.5 38.4 38.8 38.4 39.8 39.7 39.2
Activity rate (% population aged 25-54) 87.9 88.8 89.4 89.6 b 89.7 90.0 90.0 90.5 90.6 90.8 91.1 91.0
Activity rate (% population aged 55-64) 44.7 46.8 47.5 48.9 b 51.6 53.5 55.9 57.2 57.5 58.6 60.8 61.9
Total unemployment (000) 817 583 716 d 881 856 900 927 815 701 581 464 363
Unemployment rate (% labour force) 9.0 6.4 7.8 d 9.4 9.0 9.4 9.7 8.5 7.3 6.1 4.9 3.9
Youth unemployment rate (% labour force 15-24) 20.0 15.2 20.2 d 22.4 23.6 24.1 25.4 22.7 20.7 17.4 14.6 11.5
Long term unemployment rate (% labour force) 4.6 2.0 2.2 2.9 b 3.3 3.7 4.0 3.7 2.9 2.2 1.6 1.0
Share of long term unemployment (% of total
50.8 31.8 27.9 30.8 b 36.3 39.0 41.5 42.9 39.6 35.8 31.9 27.0
unemployment)

Youth unemployment ratio (% population aged 15-24) 7.3 5.6 7.7 8.8 b 9.1 9.3 9.7 8.8 7.9 6.9 5.8 4.5

Employment rate for low skilled 25-64 (ISCED 0-2) 51.8 55.0 53.4 49.5 b 49.2 49.6 49.0 49.7 b 51.5 51.9 52.9 54.0
Employment rate for medium skilled 25-64 (ISCED 3-
73.9 76.1 75.1 74.0 b 74.7 74.3 74.2 75.2 b 76.1 77.5 78.9 80.0
4)
Employment rate for high skilled 25-64 (ISCED 5-8) 88.3 89.2 89.9 88.6 b 88.9 89.1 89.5 90.9 b 91.5 92.1 93.2 93.4
Employment rate (Nationals aged 15-64) 63.6 66.3 66.1 65.3 b 66.0 66.3 66.6 68.2 69.2 71.0 72.8 74.0
Employment rate (Other EU28 aged 15-64) 77.2 u 89.0 u 82.0 u 83.3 u 84.7 u 83.6 u 82.3 u 84.6 u 71.6 u 84.5 u 93.0 u
Employment rate (Other than EU28 aged 15-64) 68.1 u 66.0 u 68.3 u 75.4 bu 70.5 u 73.7 u 71.8 u 70.2 u 70.2 72.3 74.7 77.4
Employment rate (Born in the same country aged 15-
63.7 66.4 66.2 65.3 b 66.0 66.3 66.6 68.2 69.2 71.0 72.8 74.0
64)
Employment rate (Born in other EU28 aged 15-64) 43.4 u 50.6 u 43.3 u 44.8 bu 59.8 u 69.8 u 73.9 u 72.4 u 71.7 u 61.6 u 73.2 u 79.4 u
Employment rate (Born outside EU28 aged 15-64) 51.9 u 51.9 60.9 u 68.4 bu 65.0 u 72.0 u 66.8 71.9 73.7 76.5 75.5 78.6
Underemployment (% of labour force aged 15-74) 1.1 1.2 1.3 b 1.3 1.4 b 1.4 1.4 1.3 1.1 0.9 0.8
Seeking but not available (% of labour force aged 15-
0.6 0.5 b 0.5 0.5 b 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.3
74)
Discouraged, available but not seeking (% of labour
3.8 3.0 3.0 3.0 b 3.0 3.0 3.2 3.0 2.6 2.3 2.2 2.0
force aged 15-74)
Total population (000) 19699 19704 19721 19611 b 19633 19636 19636 19614 19608 19590 19595 19596
Population aged 15-64(000) 13580 13634 13675 13562 13580 13531 13455 13346 13235 13112 12983 12843
Total employment (000) 6838 7082 7147 6908 b 6914 6940 6927 7084 7217 7264 7357 7407
Employment aged 15-64 (000) 6738 6984 7052 6815 b 6817 6842 6828 6984 7121 7165 7237 7281
Employment rate (% population aged 20-64) 55.5 57.3 57.6 57.3 b 57.2 57.5 57.6 59.4 60.9 62.2 63.6 65.0
Employment rate (% population aged 15-64) 50.6 52.4 52.8 52.6 b 52.7 53.1 53.4 55.2 56.6 58.1 59.5 60.8
Employment rate (% population aged 15-24) 22.4 23.7 23.2 22.1 b 20.0 19.9 19.5 21.3 21.3 23.7 25.2 27.0
Employment rate (% population aged 25-54) 68.8 71.0 71.6 71.7 b 71.5 71.5 71.2 72.7 73.9 74.5 75.3 76.5
Employment rate (% population aged 55-64) 19.4 20.7 21.9 24.2 b 27.2 29.2 31.0 32.9 35.5 37.6 39.3 39.1
FTE employment rate (% population aged 20-64) 53.6 55.4 55.7 55.4 b 55.5 55.8 56.0 57.6 59.2 60.5 61.8 63.2
Self-employed (% total employment) 15.0 14.5 14.3 14.5 b 14.6 14.2 13.7 13.3 13.4 13.0 12.3 12.7
Part-time employment (% total employment) 11.7 10.9 10.9 10.9 b 10.5 10.6 10.4 10.3 9.9 9.7 10.0 9.7
Temporary employment (% total employment) 22.3 22.2 21.4 21.8 b 21.1 21.3 21.6 23.2 23.1 23.1 22.5 21.2
Employment in Services (% total employment) 68.7 b 70.4 71.6 b 71.6 72.5 73.2 73.4 73.3 73.8 74.0 74.3
Employment in Industry (% total employment) 18.1 b 17.0 16.2 b 16.7 16.2 16.2 16.6 16.5 16.9 17.3 17.5
Employment in Agriculture (% total employment) 13.2 b 12.6 12.2 b 11.8 11.3 10.6 10.0 10.2 9.3 8.7 8.2
Activity rate (% population aged 15-64) 56.5 57.0 57.8 58.5 b 58.9 59.7 60.1 61.1 61.4 62.0 62.6 63.3
Labour Market Indicators - Female

Activity rate (% population aged 15-24) 29.3 29.6 29.4 29.6 b 28.1 28.4 27.9 28.7 26.9 28.9 29.7 30.7
Activity rate (% population aged 25-54) 75.6 76.3 77.5 78.6 b 78.6 79.1 79.1 79.6 79.6 79.0 78.7 79.3
Activity rate (% population aged 55-64) 20.6 21.6 23.2 25.9 b 29.0 31.3 33.3 35.2 37.3 39.0 40.5 39.9
Total unemployment (000) 763 582 644 d 769 802 850 866 752 603 482 380 296
Unemployment rate (% labour force) 10.3 7.9 8.6 d 10.0 10.4 10.9 11.1 9.6 7.7 6.2 4.9 3.9
Youth unemployment rate (% labour force 15-24) 23.7 19.7 21.1 d 25.4 28.8 30.0 30.1 25.5 20.9 18.0 15.1 12.1
Long term unemployment rate (% labour force) 5.4 2.8 2.9 3.2 b 4.0 4.6 4.8 4.1 3.0 2.1 1.5 1.0
Share of long term unemployment (% of total
51.8 35.1 33.0 31.5 b 38.2 41.8 43.5 42.6 38.8 34.0 30.0 26.7
unemployment)

Youth unemployment ratio (% population aged 15-24) 7.0 5.9 6.2 7.5 b 8.1 8.5 8.4 7.3 5.6 5.2 4.5 3.7

Employment rate for low skilled 25-64 (ISCED 0-2) 31.6 32.4 31.1 30.8 b 30.7 30.2 28.3 29.0 b 29.8 29.3 30.4 31.5
Employment rate for medium skilled 25-64 (ISCED 3-
56.1 57.4 56.9 56.0 b 55.8 55.4 55.0 55.9 b 57.1 58.0 58.7 59.0
4)
Employment rate for high skilled 25-64 (ISCED 5-8) 81.7 82.2 82.1 81.8 b 81.6 81.5 81.6 83.0 b 84.1 84.3 84.6 85.5
Employment rate (Nationals aged 15-64) 50.6 52.4 52.7 52.6 b 52.7 53.1 53.4 55.2 56.6 58.1 59.4 60.8
Employment rate (Other EU28 aged 15-64) 72.1 u
Employment rate (Other than EU28 aged 15-64) 58.2 u 61.4 u 57.9 u 49.2 bu 47.3 u 49.9 u 40.4 u 55.1 u 46.0 u 48.2 63.4 65.9
Employment rate (Born in the same country aged 15-
50.7 52.4 52.8 52.6 b 52.7 53.1 53.4 55.2 56.6 58.1 59.4 60.8
64)
Employment rate (Born in other EU28 aged 15-64) 28.2 u 61.2 u 59.4 u 56.9 u
Employment rate (Born outside EU28 aged 15-64) 29.4 u 39.8 u 45.8 45.6 bu 48.7 u 53.2 u 49.9 u 55.3 46.7 51.5 65.6 67.9
Underemployment (% of labour force aged 15-74) 2.0 2.1 2.3 b 2.4 2.8 b 2.9 3.1 2.6 2.2 2.0 1.5
Seeking but not available (% of labour force aged 15-
0.9 0.8 b 0.8 0.8 b 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.6
74)
Discouraged, available but not seeking (% of labour
6.1 4.8 4.7 4.5 b 4.4 4.5 4.8 4.7 4.0 3.4 3.0 2.6
force aged 15-74)

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296
 Statistical annex - 1. Country profiles

Poland 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
At-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion (% of total
34.4 30.5 b 27.8 27.8 27.2 26.7 25.8 24.7 23.4 21.9 19.5
population)
At-risk-of-poverty (% of total population) 17.3 16.9 17.1 17.6 17.7 17.1 17.3 17.0 17.6 17.3 15.0
At-risk-of-poverty threshold (PPS single person) 3365 4039 4417 4547 4993 5181 5495 5736 5970 6519 6635
Poverty gap (%) 24.0 20.6 22.7 22.2 21.4 22.2 22.6 23.2 22.3 24.4 23.6
Persistent at-risk-of-poverty (% of total
10.4 10.2 10.5 10.1 10.7 9.0 10.7 10.1 9.7 9.1
population)
At-risk-of-poverty before social transfers excl.
26.5 25.1 23.6 24.4 24.1 22.9 23.0 23.1 22.9 22.9 24.0
pensions (% of total population)
Impact of social transfers (excl. pensions) in
34.7 32.7 27.5 27.9 26.6 25.3 24.8 26.4 23.1 24.5 37.5
reducing poverty (%)
All

Severe Material Deprivation (% of total population) 22.3 17.7 15.0 14.2 13.0 13.5 11.9 10.4 8.1 6.7 5.9
Share of people living in low work intensity households
10.1 8.0 6.9 7.3 6.9 6.9 7.2 7.3 6.9 6.4 5.7
(% of people aged 0-59)
Real Gross Household Disposable income (growth %) 5.1 4.4 5.9 2.1 0.4 1.1 1.4 2.9 3.7 6.0
Income quintile share ratio S80/S20 5.3 5.1 5.0 5.0 5.0 4.9 4.9 4.9 4.9 4.8 4.6
GINI coefficient 32.2 32.0 31.4 31.1 31.1 30.9 30.7 30.8 30.6 29.8 29.2
Early leavers from education and training (% of
5.0 5.0 b 5.3 5.4 b 5.6 5.7 5.6 b 5.4 b 5.3 5.2 5.0 4.8 b
population aged 18-24)
NEET: Young people neither in employment nor in
education and training (% of total population aged 15- 10.6 9.0 10.1 10.8 b 11.5 11.8 12.2 12.0 11.0 10.5 9.5 8.7
24)
At-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion (% of male
33.5 29.9 b 27.0 27.0 26.6 26.1 25.5 24.7 23.7 21.6 19.3
population)
At-risk-of-poverty (% of male population) 17.6 17.0 16.9 17.4 17.8 17.1 17.3 17.2 18.1 17.1 15.1
Poverty gap (%) 25.4 21.5 23.7 23.3 22.8 23.3 23.4 24.4 24.1 25.6 25.5
Persistent at-risk-of-poverty (% of male
10.7 10.4 10.2 10.4 10.4 9.1 10.8 10.0 9.7 9.7
population)
Severe Material Deprivation (% of male population) 21.9 17.6 14.6 14.1 12.9 13.2 11.8 10.6 8.5 6.7 5.8
Male

Share of people living in low work intensity households

9.5 7.3 6.4 6.7 6.4 6.5 6.9 7.1 6.8 6.1 5.5
(% of males aged 0-59)
Life expectancy at birth (years) 71.0 71.3 71.5 72.2 72.6 72.6 73.0 73.7 73.5 73.9 73.9
Healthy life years at birth (years) - men 57.6 58.6 58.3 58.5 59.1 59.1 59.2 59.8 60.1 61.3 60.6
Early leavers from education and training (% of males
6.2 6.1 b 6.6 7.2 b 7.4 7.8 7.9 b 7.3 b 7.2 6.4 6.0 5.8 b
aged 18-24)
NEET: Young people neither in employment nor in
9.3 7.3 9.4 10.5 b 11.2 11.5 12.1 12.0 11.2 10.0 8.3 7.3
education and training ( % of males aged 15-24)
At-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion (% of female
35.1 31.2 b 28.6 28.5 27.7 27.3 26.2 24.7 23.2 22.2 19.6
population)
At-risk-of-poverty (% of female population) 17.1 16.7 17.4 17.7 17.6 17.1 17.3 16.8 17.2 17.4 14.9
Poverty gap (%) 22.8 20.0 21.8 21.0 20.3 21.2 21.9 22.3 21.1 22.9 22.1
Persistent at-risk-of-poverty (% of female
10.2 10.1 10.7 9.9 11.0 9.0 10.6 10.2 9.7 8.7
population)
Social Indicators

Severe Material Deprivation (% of female population) 22.7 17.9 15.3 14.4 13.2 13.8 12.0 10.2 7.8 6.6 6.0
Female

Share of people living in low work intensity households

10.7 8.6 7.4 8.0 7.4 7.2 7.4 7.5 7.1 6.8 5.8
(% of females aged 0-59)
Life expectancy at birth (years) 79.8 80.0 80.1 80.7 81.1 81.1 81.2 81.7 81.6 82.0 81.8
Healthy life years at birth (years) - women 61.5 63.0 62.5 62.3 63.3 62.8 62.7 62.7 63.2 64.6 63.5
Early leavers from education and training (% of
3.8 3.9 b 3.9 3.5 b 3.7 3.5 3.2 b 3.3 b 3.2 3.9 3.9 3.7 b
females aged 18-24)
NEET: Young people neither in employment nor in
11.9 10.8 10.8 11.0 b 11.8 12.2 12.3 12.0 10.8 11.1 10.7 10.1
education and training ( % of females aged 15-24)
At-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion of children (% of
37.1 32.9 b 31.0 30.8 29.8 29.3 29.8 28.2 26.6 24.2 17.9
people aged 0-17)
At-risk-of-poverty (% of Children population) 24.2 22.4 23.0 22.5 22.0 21.5 23.2 22.3 22.4 21.1 14.0
Children (0-17)

Severe Material Deprivation (% of Children

22.5 17.5 15.3 14.9 13.2 13.7 11.8 10.2 7.9 5.8 4.6
population)
Share of children living in low work intensity
6.6 5.0 4.7 4.8 4.1 4.6 5.0 5.1 5.0 4.9 4.1
households (% of Children population)
Risk of poverty of children in households at work
20.8 19.8 20.3 19.4 19.7 18.8 20.3 19.5 19.5 18.2 11.8
(Working Intensity > 0.2)
Impact of social transfers (excl. pensions) in reducing
29.9 31.1 23.6 26.7 26.9 25.6 22.4 24.2 20.6 24.6 52.9
poverty (0-17) (%)
At-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion (% of working
34.9 30.6 b 27.3 27.6 27.0 26.7 26.1 25.2 24.1 22.7 20.4
age population)
At-risk-of-poverty (% of Working age population) 17.2 16.3 16.0 16.9 17.1 16.5 16.7 16.7 17.6 17.3 15.6
Working age

Severe Material Deprivation (% of Working age

21.9 17.2 14.4 13.6 12.5 13.2 12.0 10.5 8.2 7.1 6.2
(18-64)

population)
Very low work intensity (18-59) 11.2 8.9 7.6 8.1 7.8 7.6 7.8 8.0 7.6 6.9 6.2
In-work at-risk-of poverty rate (% of persons
11.7 11.5 11.0 11.5 11.2 10.4 10.8 10.7 11.3 10.9 9.9
employed 18-64)
Impact of social transfers (excl. pensions) in reducing
36.5 34.5 30.4 29.9 28.2 27.0 26.8 28.3 24.8 26.1 35.5
poverty (18-64) (%)
At-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion of elderly (% of
27.3 26.9 b 25.8 24.4 24.7 23.4 19.7 18.2 17.0 16.1 17.4
people aged 65+)
Elderly (65+)

At-risk-of-poverty (% of Elderly population) 7.8 11.7 14.4 14.2 14.7 14.0 12.3 11.7 12.1 12.8 13.8

Severe Material Deprivation (% of Elderly population) 23.7 20.8 17.3 16.5 15.4 14.8 11.5 9.7 7.9 5.9 6.2
Relative median income of elderly (ratio with median
1.04 0.97 0.92 0.93 0.94 0.95 0.98 0.99 0.99 0.97 0.93
income of people younger than 65)
Aggregate replacement ratio (ratio) 0.58 0.56 0.56 0.57 0.55 0.58 0.60 0.63 0.62 0.62 0.62
Sickness/Health care 3.9 p 4.4 p 4.6 p 4.4 p 4.2 4.1 4.4 4.3 4.5 4.6
protection indicators
Expenditure in social

Disability 1.8 p 1.7 p 1.6 p 1.7 p 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.5 1.5 1.3
Old age and survivors 10.7 p 10.9 p 11.7 p 11.1 p 10.6 10.9 11.3 11.2 11.1 11.1
(% of GDP)

Family/Children 0.9 p 1.2 p 1.3 p 1.3 p 1.3 1.3 1.4 1.4 1.5 2.5
Unemployment 0.4 p 0.4 p 0.4 p 0.4 p 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2
Housing and Social exclusion n.e.c. 0.3 p 0.2 p 0.2 p 0.3 p 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
Total (including Admin and Other expenditures) 18.4 p 19.3 p 20.3 p 19.7 p 18.7 18.9 19.6 19.3 19.4 20.3
of which: Means tested benefits 0.9 p 0.8 p 0.7 p 0.7 p 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.9

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297
Employment and Social Developments in Europe 2019

Portugal
Portugal 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Real GDP 2.5 0.2 -3.0 1.9 -1.8 -4.0 -1.1 0.9 1.8 1.9 2.8 p 2.1 e
Total employment 0.0 0.4 -2.7 -1.4 -1.9 -4.1 -2.9 1.4 1.4 1.6 3.3 p 2.3 e
Labour productivity 2.5 -0.2 -0.3 3.4 0.1 0.1 1.8 -0.5 0.4 0.3 -0.5 p -0.2 e
Macro Economic Indicators

Annual average hours worked per person employed 0.9 -0.7 0.0 0.1 -1.2 -0.9 0.6 0.4 0.4 0.2 0.1 p -0.3 ep
(Annual % growth)

Real productivity per hour worked 1.6 0.5 -0.3 3.2 1.4 1.0 1.2 -0.9 0.0 0.1 -0.6 p 0.1 e
Harmonized CPI 2.4 2.7 -0.9 1.4 3.6 2.8 0.4 -0.2 0.5 0.6 1.6 1.2
Price deflator GDP 3.0 1.7 1.1 0.6 -0.3 -0.4 2.3 0.8 2.0 1.8 1.5 p 1.4 e
Nominal compensation per employee 3.5 2.6 2.4 2.1 -1.9 -3.1 3.6 -1.8 0.4 1.7 1.6 p 2.0 ep
Real compensation per employee (GDP deflator) 0.5 0.9 1.3 1.4 -1.6 -2.7 1.3 -2.5 -1.6 0.0 0.1 p 0.6 ep
Real compensation per employee (private consumption
1.0 0.0 3.3 0.7 -5.2 -5.7 3.2 -1.6 -0.1 1.1 0.0 p 0.8 ep
deflator)
Nominal unit labour costs 1.0 2.8 2.7 -1.2 -2.0 -3.2 1.8 -1.3 0.0 1.4 2.1 p 2.2 e
Real unit labour costs -2.0 1.1 1.6 -1.9 -1.7 -2.8 -0.5 -2.0 -2.0 -0.3 0.5 p 0.7 ep
Total population (000) 10533 10553 10563 10573 10573 10542 10487 10427 10375 10341 10310 10291
Population aged 15-64 (000) 7028 7039 7034 7025 7001 6962 6904 6836 6779 6740 6691 6654
Total employment (000) 5093 5117 4969 4898 4740 b 4547 4429 4500 4549 4605 4757 4867
Employment aged 15-64 (000) 4756 4786 4645 4577 4453 b 4256 4158 4255 4309 4371 4515 4615
Employment rate (% population aged 20-64) 72.5 73.1 71.1 70.3 68.8 b 66.3 65.4 67.6 69.1 70.6 73.4 75.4
Employment rate (% population aged 15-64) 67.6 68.0 66.1 65.3 63.8 b 61.4 60.6 62.6 63.9 65.2 67.8 69.7
Employment rate (% population aged 15-24) 34.4 34.1 30.8 27.9 26.6 b 23.0 21.7 22.4 22.8 23.9 25.9 27.2
Employment rate (% population aged 25-54) 80.9 81.6 79.7 79.2 77.8 b 75.5 74.6 77.4 78.8 80.2 82.5 84.3
Employment rate (% population aged 55-64) 51.0 50.7 49.7 49.5 47.8 b 46.5 46.9 47.8 49.9 52.1 56.2 59.2
FTE employment rate (% population aged 20-64) 70.5 71.3 69.3 68.4 65.9 b 63.0 62.3 64.8 66.3 68.1 71.0 73.3
Self-employed (% total employment) 23.7 23.4 23.2 22.2 20.9 b 21.4 21.3 19.2 17.9 17.1 16.5 16.2
Part-time employment (% total employment) 8.9 8.8 8.5 8.5 10.3 b 11.2 11.1 10.1 9.8 9.5 8.9 8.1
Temporary employment (% total employment) 17.8 18.3 17.7 18.6 18.2 b 16.9 17.6 18.0 18.7 19.1 19.0 19.0
Employment in Services (% total employment) 62.1 b 63.3 64.1 65.3 b 66.7 68.5 69.6 69.9 70.2 70.4 70.5
Employment in Industry (% total employment) 30.7 b 29.5 28.8 28.2 b 26.5 24.9 24.9 25.3 25.4 25.6 25.7
Employment in Agriculture (% total employment) 7.2 b 7.3 7.1 6.5 b 6.8 6.6 5.5 4.8 4.5 4.0 3.8
Activity rate (% population aged 15-64) 73.9 73.9 73.4 73.7 73.6 b 73.4 73.0 73.2 73.4 73.7 74.7 75.1
Labour Market Indicators - Total

Activity rate (% population aged 15-24) 41.3 40.9 38.7 36.1 38.2 b 37.1 35.0 34.3 33.5 33.2 34.0 34.2
Activity rate (% population aged 25-54) 87.7 88.0 87.8 88.7 88.4 b 88.5 88.3 88.6 88.8 89.1 89.6 89.8
Activity rate (% population aged 55-64) 54.6 54.3 53.8 54.3 53.6 b 53.3 54.4 55.3 57.0 58.5 61.5 63.4
Total unemployment (000) 494 476 574 645 688 835 855 729 648 571 465 363
Unemployment rate (% labour force) 9.1 8.8 10.7 12.0 12.9 15.8 16.4 14.1 12.6 11.2 9.0 7.0
Youth unemployment rate (% labour force 15-24) 21.4 21.6 25.3 28.2 30.2 38.0 38.1 34.7 32.0 28.2 23.8 20.3
Long term unemployment rate (% labour force) 3.8 3.6 4.2 5.7 6.2 b 7.7 9.3 8.4 7.2 6.2 4.5 3.1
Share of long term unemployment (% of total
47.1 47.3 44.0 52.0 48.4 b 48.8 56.4 59.6 57.4 55.4 49.9 43.7
unemployment)

Youth unemployment ratio (% population aged 15-24) 6.9 6.8 7.9 8.2 11.5 b 14.1 13.3 11.9 10.7 9.3 8.1 6.9

Employment rate for low skilled 25-64 (ISCED 0-2) 71.4 71.6 68.9 68.1 65.7 b 62.9 61.6 63.0 b 64.3 65.5 68.4 70.0
Employment rate for medium skilled 25-64 (ISCED 3-
80.0 80.7 80.2 79.9 79.3 b 76.0 75.8 77.6 b 78.7 79.4 81.8 83.7
4)
Employment rate for high skilled 25-64 (ISCED 5-8) 86.0 86.7 86.6 85.4 83.6 b 82.1 80.5 82.7 b 83.7 85.1 86.8 88.4
Employment rate (Nationals aged 15-64) 67.5 67.8 66.1 65.3 63.8 b 61.5 60.8 62.7 64.0 65.3 67.8 69.7
Employment rate (Other EU28 aged 15-64) 71.1 79.0 70.7 64.2 70.0 b 63.6 56.7 60.7 70.2 68.0 70.9 75.1
Employment rate (Other than EU28 aged 15-64) 71.5 72.0 65.7 65.4 62.4 b 57.5 54.4 59.0 58.9 64.3 67.5 66.1
Employment rate (Born in the same country aged 15-
67.2 67.5 65.7 64.9 63.4 b 60.9 60.4 62.2 63.5 64.7 67.2 69.1
64)
Employment rate (Born in other EU28 aged 15-64) 70.8 73.9 73.0 71.6 75.6 b 71.3 67.2 73.8 75.1 76.7 80.3 80.9
Employment rate (Born outside EU28 aged 15-64) 73.4 73.9 68.8 68.0 66.5 b 64.9 61.1 64.2 65.5 68.1 72.0 73.1
Underemployment (% of labour force aged 15-74) 1.8 1.7 1.8 4.0 b 4.8 5.0 4.8 4.7 4.4 3.9 3.3
Seeking but not available (% of labour force aged 15-
0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.6 b 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.4
74)
Discouraged, available but not seeking (% of labour
1.4 1.3 1.3 1.3 3.2 b 4.3 5.3 5.3 5.1 4.6 4.1 3.6
force aged 15-74)

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298
 Statistical annex - 1. Country profiles

Portugal 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Total population (000) 5064 5070 5066 5064 5054 5030 4996 4958 4924 4902 4882 4868
Population aged 15-64(000) 3446 3450 3442 3435 3419 3395 3361 3321 3286 3262 3236 3216
Total employment (000) 2725 2725 2612 2569 2487 b 2357 2288 2320 2334 2361 2442 2486
Employment aged 15-64 (000) 2539 2542 2436 2390 2306 b 2177 2116 2164 2182 2210 2286 2327
Employment rate (% population aged 20-64) 79.1 79.4 76.4 75.4 73.2 b 69.8 68.7 71.3 72.6 74.2 77.3 78.9
Employment rate (% population aged 15-64) 73.6 73.8 70.8 69.8 67.7 b 64.5 63.5 65.8 66.9 68.3 71.1 72.7
Employment rate (% population aged 15-24) 38.5 37.7 32.5 29.7 28.7 b 24.8 22.9 22.9 24.1 25.5 27.6 29.3
Employment rate (% population aged 25-54) 87.2 87.6 84.7 84.1 81.7 b 78.6 77.1 80.6 81.8 83.0 85.6 87.5
Employment rate (% population aged 55-64) 58.7 58.3 57.5 55.8 54.2 b 51.6 53.5 54.3 56.0 58.5 63.0 64.5
FTE employment rate (% population aged 20-64) 78.9 79.6 76.3 74.8 71.5 b 67.6 66.6 69.3 70.8 72.6 76.0 77.9
Self-employed (% total employment) 25.8 25.2 25.7 24.9 25.0 b 25.6 25.6 23.9 22.3 21.3 20.6 20.3
Part-time employment (% total employment) 4.7 4.1 4.4 5.0 7.1 b 8.4 8.2 7.6 7.1 6.8 6.1 5.7
Temporary employment (% total employment) 16.9 16.9 16.2 17.5 17.3 b 16.3 16.7 17.4 18.3 18.5 18.5 18.3
Employment in Services (% total employment) 51.2 b 52.1 52.8 53.6 b 55.0 57.9 59.1 59.3 59.3 59.4 59.4
Employment in Industry (% total employment) 42.2 b 40.8 39.7 39.2 b 37.1 34.1 34.0 34.7 34.9 35.2 35.4
Employment in Agriculture (% total employment) 6.6 b 7.1 7.4 7.2 b 7.9 8.0 7.0 6.0 5.7 5.4 5.2
Activity rate (% population aged 15-64) 79.2 79.2 78.2 77.8 78.0 b 77.3 76.5 76.7 76.7 77.2 77.9 78.1
Labour Market Indicators - Male

Activity rate (% population aged 15-24) 44.7 43.6 40.1 38.0 40.4 b 39.2 36.2 34.8 34.2 35.0 35.6 36.6
Activity rate (% population aged 25-54) 92.9 93.2 92.5 92.7 92.4 b 92.1 91.1 91.6 91.7 91.9 92.3 92.6
Activity rate (% population aged 55-64) 63.2 62.9 62.6 62.0 61.6 b 60.4 62.7 64.0 65.0 66.9 69.3 69.0
Total unemployment (000) 249 246 309 331 349 434 436 363 324 289 225 174
Unemployment rate (% labour force) 8.7 8.6 11.0 11.9 12.6 15.9 16.3 13.8 12.4 11.1 8.6 6.6
Youth unemployment rate (% labour force 15-24) 18.9 19.0 24.6 27.3 29.0 36.7 36.7 33.9 29.7 27.4 22.5 19.7
Long term unemployment rate (% labour force) 3.2 3.2 3.7 5.1 6.1 b 7.8 9.4 8.4 7.3 6.4 4.3 3.0
Share of long term unemployment (% of total
47.5 48.5 40.6 51.4 48.0 b 48.9 57.6 60.8 58.8 57.3 50.5 45.5
unemployment)

Youth unemployment ratio (% population aged 15-24) 6.2 5.9 7.7 8.2 11.7 b 14.4 13.3 11.9 10.1 9.5 8.0 7.2

Employment rate for low skilled 25-64 (ISCED 0-2) 80.0 79.8 76.5 75.4 72.7 b 68.9 67.2 69.1 b 70.7 71.8 75.9 77.2
Employment rate for medium skilled 25-64 (ISCED 3-
82.5 83.9 83.8 83.5 81.2 b 77.8 77.9 81.1 b 81.1 82.1 84.0 85.8
4)
Employment rate for high skilled 25-64 (ISCED 5-8) 89.3 90.3 87.6 86.1 83.7 b 82.6 82.7 85.5 b 85.2 86.8 87.9 89.6
Employment rate (Nationals aged 15-64) 73.4 73.5 70.8 69.7 67.7 b 64.6 63.7 65.9 66.8 68.2 71.0 72.6
Employment rate (Other EU28 aged 15-64) 83.0 88.6 85.3 72.2 72.2 b 71.8 66.5 66.9 72.4 70.0 76.8 78.2
Employment rate (Other than EU28 aged 15-64) 78.0 78.3 70.2 71.7 66.8 b 56.4 54.9 59.4 67.9 70.2 73.0 74.9
Employment rate (Born in the same country aged 15-
73.2 73.2 70.5 69.4 67.5 b 64.2 63.4 65.4 66.5 67.8 70.4 72.1
64)
Employment rate (Born in other EU28 aged 15-64) 78.7 83.9 79.9 78.2 77.4 b 76.9 73.0 77.7 76.0 80.0 82.6 83.1
Employment rate (Born outside EU28 aged 15-64) 79.2 79.3 73.1 72.8 68.6 b 65.4 61.2 66.6 69.8 71.1 76.1 78.5
Underemployment (% of labour force aged 15-74) 0.9 0.9 0.9 2.8 b 3.6 3.7 3.6 3.4 3.3 2.8 2.3
Seeking but not available (% of labour force aged 15-
0.2 0.4 b 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.4
74)
Discouraged, available but not seeking (% of labour
0.9 0.8 1.1 1.0 2.4 b 3.5 4.5 4.4 4.2 4.1 3.5 3.1
force aged 15-74)
Total population (000) 5468 5484 5497 5510 5519 5512 5492 5469 5451 5440 5427 5423
Population aged 15-64(000) 3582 3589 3591 3590 3582 3567 3544 3515 3493 3477 3454 3438
Total employment (000) 2367 2391 2357 2329 2253 b 2190 2141 2180 2214 2244 2314 2381
Employment aged 15-64 (000) 2217 2243 2209 2187 2147 b 2079 2042 2091 2127 2161 2229 2288
Employment rate (% population aged 20-64) 66.3 67.1 66.1 65.6 64.6 b 63.0 62.3 64.2 65.9 67.4 69.8 72.1
Employment rate (% population aged 15-64) 61.8 62.5 61.5 61.0 60.1 b 58.5 57.9 59.6 61.1 62.4 64.8 66.9
Employment rate (% population aged 15-24) 30.1 30.3 29.2 26.0 24.5 b 21.2 20.4 21.9 21.5 22.3 24.1 25.1
Employment rate (% population aged 25-54) 74.8 75.8 74.9 74.5 74.1 b 72.5 72.2 74.3 76.1 77.6 79.7 81.4
Employment rate (% population aged 55-64) 44.3 44.0 42.8 43.8 42.0 b 42.0 41.0 42.1 44.5 46.3 50.2 54.6
FTE employment rate (% population aged 20-64) 62.7 63.4 62.8 62.4 60.6 b 58.7 58.3 60.5 62.2 63.9 66.5 69.0
Self-employed (% total employment) 21.4 21.5 20.4 19.2 16.5 b 16.9 16.7 14.3 13.3 12.7 12.2 12.0
Part-time employment (% total employment) 13.7 14.1 13.2 12.4 13.8 b 14.2 14.0 12.6 12.5 12.1 11.7 10.5
Temporary employment (% total employment) 18.8 19.7 19.3 19.7 19.1 b 17.5 18.5 18.6 19.1 19.6 19.4 19.8
Employment in Services (% total employment)
Employment in Industry (% total employment)
Employment in Agriculture (% total employment) 7.9 b 7.5 6.8 5.7 b 5.7 5.2 4.1 3.5 3.2 2.6 2.3
Activity rate (% population aged 15-64) 68.7 68.9 68.9 69.7 69.5 b 69.7 69.8 70.0 70.3 70.5 71.6 72.4
Labour Market Indicators - Female

Activity rate (% population aged 15-24) 37.8 38.1 37.2 34.2 35.9 b 34.9 33.8 33.8 32.8 31.2 32.3 31.7
Activity rate (% population aged 25-54) 82.7 82.9 83.3 84.9 84.5 b 85.0 85.5 85.8 86.0 86.6 87.0 87.3
Activity rate (% population aged 55-64) 47.0 46.7 46.0 47.4 46.4 b 47.0 46.9 47.5 49.9 51.0 54.6 58.4
Total unemployment (000) 245 229 264 314 339 400 419 366 324 282 239 190
Unemployment rate (% labour force) 9.6 9.0 10.3 12.2 13.2 15.6 16.6 14.5 12.9 11.3 9.5 7.4
Youth unemployment rate (% labour force 15-24) 24.6 24.6 26.1 29.2 31.5 39.4 39.7 35.5 34.4 29.1 25.3 21.0
Long term unemployment rate (% labour force) 4.5 4.1 4.8 6.3 6.4 b 7.6 9.1 8.5 7.2 6.0 4.7 3.2
Share of long term unemployment (% of total
46.7 46.3 47.3 52.4 48.7 b 48.6 55.0 58.5 56.1 53.4 49.4 42.0
unemployment)

Youth unemployment ratio (% population aged 15-24) 7.7 7.7 8.1 8.2 11.4 b 13.7 13.4 12.0 11.3 9.0 8.3 6.6

Employment rate for low skilled 25-64 (ISCED 0-2) 62.7 63.2 61.1 60.4 58.4 b 56.6 55.6 56.4 b 57.5 58.8 60.3 62.1
Employment rate for medium skilled 25-64 (ISCED 3-
77.6 77.6 76.8 76.5 77.5 b 74.4 74.0 74.4 b 76.4 76.8 79.8 81.8
4)
Employment rate for high skilled 25-64 (ISCED 5-8) 83.9 84.4 85.9 85.1 83.4 b 81.8 79.1 80.9 b 82.8 84.0 86.2 87.7
Employment rate (Nationals aged 15-64) 61.7 62.3 61.5 61.0 60.1 b 58.5 58.1 59.7 61.3 62.5 64.8 67.0
Employment rate (Other EU28 aged 15-64) 59.7 69.7 59.2 59.0 68.3 b 57.6 48.8 54.9 68.3 66.5 66.2 72.5
Employment rate (Other than EU28 aged 15-64) 65.5 66.2 61.6 60.1 58.7 b 58.3 54.0 58.7 52.7 59.9 63.4 59.3
Employment rate (Born in the same country aged 15-
61.4 61.9 61.1 60.7 59.4 b 57.9 57.6 59.1 60.7 61.9 64.1 66.4
64)
Employment rate (Born in other EU28 aged 15-64) 63.6 65.4 67.9 66.4 74.1 b 66.0 62.1 70.5 74.3 74.0 78.5 79.2
Employment rate (Born outside EU28 aged 15-64) 68.0 68.9 65.0 63.7 64.7 b 64.4 61.1 62.3 62.1 65.7 68.6 68.5
Underemployment (% of labour force aged 15-74) 2.7 2.6 2.7 5.4 b 6.0 6.3 6.0 6.0 5.6 5.1 4.4
Seeking but not available (% of labour force aged 15-
0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.8 b 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.6 0.4
74)
Discouraged, available but not seeking (% of labour
1.9 1.7 1.6 1.7 4.0 b 5.2 6.2 6.3 6.0 5.3 4.8 4.1
force aged 15-74)

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299
Employment and Social Developments in Europe 2019

Portugal 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
At-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion (% of total
25.0 26.0 24.9 25.3 24.4 25.3 27.5 27.5 26.6 25.1 23.3
population)
At-risk-of-poverty (% of total population) 18.1 18.5 17.9 17.9 18.0 17.9 18.7 19.5 19.5 19.0 18.3
At-risk-of-poverty threshold (PPS single person) 5349 5702 5655 5837 5773 5877 5892 6075 6190 6483 6475
Poverty gap (%) 24.3 23.2 23.6 22.7 23.2 24.1 27.4 30.3 29.0 26.7 27.0
Persistent at-risk-of-poverty (% of total
14.1 13.1 9.8 13.2 13.6 11.4 11.7 12.0 13.6 11.5 14.2
population)
At-risk-of-poverty before social transfers excl.
24.2 24.9 24.3 26.4 25.4 25.3 25.5 26.7 26.4 25.0 23.6
pensions (% of total population)
Impact of social transfers (excl. pensions) in
25.2 25.7 26.3 32.2 29.1 29.3 26.7 27.0 26.1 24.0 22.5
reducing poverty (%)
All

Severe Material Deprivation (% of total population) 9.6 9.7 9.1 9.0 8.3 8.6 10.9 10.6 9.6 8.4 6.9 6.0 p
Share of people living in low work intensity households
7.2 6.3 7.0 8.6 8.3 10.1 12.2 12.2 10.9 9.1 8.0
(% of people aged 0-59)
Real Gross Household Disposable income (growth %) 1.4 1.2 1.5 1.0 -5.3 -5.3 -1.0 -0.5 2.5 2.7 1.6
Income quintile share ratio S80/S20 6.5 6.1 6.0 5.6 5.7 5.8 6.0 6.2 6.0 5.9 5.7
GINI coefficient 36.8 35.8 35.4 33.7 34.2 34.5 34.2 34.5 34.0 33.9 33.5
Early leavers from education and training (% of
36.5 34.9 30.9 28.3 23.0 b 20.5 18.9 17.4 b 13.7 14.0 12.6 11.8
population aged 18-24)
NEET: Young people neither in employment nor in
education and training (% of total population aged 15- 11.2 10.2 11.2 11.4 12.6 b 13.9 14.1 12.3 11.3 10.6 9.3 8.4
24)
At-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion (% of male
24.0 25.0 24.0 24.8 23.8 24.6 27.5 26.7 25.9 24.1 22.5
population)
At-risk-of-poverty (% of male population) 17.2 17.9 17.3 17.3 17.6 17.5 18.8 18.9 18.8 18.2 17.8
Poverty gap (%) 24.3 22.5 24.9 23.1 23.4 25.3 28.4 31.2 30.1 27.1 27.4
Persistent at-risk-of-poverty (% of male
13.1 12.0 9.2 13.0 13.3 10.9 12.1 12.0 14.0 11.2 13.6
population)
Severe Material Deprivation (% of male population) 9.2 9.5 8.9 9.2 7.8 8.3 10.9 10.1 9.5 7.9 6.5 6.0 p
Male

Share of people living in low work intensity households

6.7 5.8 6.6 8.4 7.9 9.9 12.3 11.9 10.6 8.8 7.9
(% of males aged 0-59)
Life expectancy at birth (years) 75.9 76.2 76.5 76.8 77.3 77.3 b 77.6 78.0 b 78.1 78.1 78.4
Healthy life years at birth (years) - men 58.5 59.2 58.3 59.3 60.7 64.5 b 63.9 58.3 b 58.2 59.9 60.1
Early leavers from education and training (% of males
42.8 41.4 35.8 32.4 28.1 b 26.9 23.4 20.7 b 16.4 17.4 15.3 14.7
aged 18-24)
NEET: Young people neither in employment nor in
9.8 8.9 10.6 10.4 12.2 b 14.6 14.2 12.3 10.4 10.8 9.2 8.4
education and training ( % of males aged 15-24)
At-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion (% of female
26.0 26.8 25.8 25.8 25.1 25.9 27.4 28.1 27.3 26.0 24.0
population)
At-risk-of-poverty (% of female population) 19.0 19.1 18.4 18.4 18.4 18.2 18.7 20.0 20.1 19.6 18.7
Poverty gap (%) 24.2 23.6 23.0 22.6 23.0 23.2 27.0 29.3 28.7 26.5 26.5
Persistent at-risk-of-poverty (% of female
15.0 14.1 10.4 13.5 13.8 11.9 11.4 12.0 13.2 11.8 14.8
population)
Social Indicators

Severe Material Deprivation (% of female population) 9.9 9.9 9.2 8.8 8.7 8.9 11.0 11.1 9.7 8.8 7.2 5.9 p
Female

Share of people living in low work intensity households

7.8 6.8 7.3 8.9 8.6 10.3 12.1 12.4 11.1 9.4 8.2
(% of females aged 0-59)
Life expectancy at birth (years) 82.5 82.7 82.6 83.2 83.8 83.6 b 84.0 84.4 b 84.3 84.3 84.6
Healthy life years at birth (years) - women 57.9 57.6 56.4 56.7 58.6 62.6 b 62.2 55.4 b 55.0 57.4 57.0
Early leavers from education and training (% of
30.0 28.2 25.8 24.0 17.7 b 14.0 14.3 14.1 b 11.0 10.5 9.7 8.7
females aged 18-24)
NEET: Young people neither in employment nor in
12.6 11.6 11.8 12.5 12.9 b 13.2 13.9 12.3 12.2 10.3 9.5 8.4
education and training ( % of females aged 15-24)
At-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion of children (% of
26.9 29.5 28.7 28.7 28.6 27.8 31.7 31.4 29.6 27.0 24.2
people aged 0-17)
At-risk-of-poverty (% of Children population) 20.9 22.8 22.9 22.4 22.4 21.8 24.4 25.6 24.8 22.4 20.7
Children (0-17)

Severe Material Deprivation (% of Children

11.8 11.8 10.5 10.8 11.3 10.3 13.9 12.9 11.0 9.6 7.4 5.7 p
population)
Share of children living in low work intensity
5.1 5.9 6.2 8.0 7.2 8.5 9.7 9.8 8.7 6.4 5.9
households (% of Children population)
Risk of poverty of children in households at work
17.6 19.5 19.3 17.1 18.3 16.4 18.2 19.9 19.8 19.1 17.2
(Working Intensity > 0.2)
Impact of social transfers (excl. pensions) in reducing
22.9 24.3 25.4 30.4 27.5 26.4 23.0 23.8 20.8 21.7 18.8
poverty (0-17) (%)
At-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion (% of working
23.1 24.5 23.5 24.1 23.2 25.6 28.5 28.3 27.4 25.6 23.9
age population)
At-risk-of-poverty (% of Working age population) 15.2 16.3 15.8 15.7 16.2 16.9 18.4 19.1 18.8 18.2 18.1
Working age

Severe Material Deprivation (% of Working age

8.6 8.9 8.3 8.3 7.6 8.2 10.7 10.3 9.6 8.6 6.6 6.0 p
(18-64)

population)
Very low work intensity (18-59) 7.9 6.5 7.2 8.8 8.6 10.6 13.0 12.9 11.6 10.0 8.7
In-work at-risk-of poverty rate (% of persons
9.3 11.3 10.3 9.6 10.2 9.9 10.4 10.7 10.9 10.8 10.7
employed 18-64)
Impact of social transfers (excl. pensions) in reducing
30.9 30.3 30.7 37.7 33.6 34.0 30.0 30.3 30.4 27.8 25.8
poverty (18-64) (%)
At-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion of elderly (% of
30.0 27.7 26.0 26.1 24.5 22.2 20.3 21.1 21.7 21.8 20.7
people aged 65+)
Elderly (65+)

At-risk-of-poverty (% of Elderly population) 25.5 22.3 20.1 21.0 20.0 17.4 14.6 15.1 17.0 18.3 17.0

Severe Material Deprivation (% of Elderly population) 10.7 10.1 10.6 9.6 7.7 8.4 9.0 9.8 8.4 6.7 7.2 6.2 p
Relative median income of elderly (ratio with median
0.80 0.83 0.85 0.82 0.87 0.92 0.94 0.94 0.92 0.91 0.92
income of people younger than 65)
Aggregate replacement ratio (ratio) 0.47 0.51 0.50 0.53 0.56 0.58 0.59 0.63 0.62 0.64 0.67
Sickness/Health care 6.2 6.2 7.0 6.7 6.1 6.2 6.2 6.1 6.0 6.0
protection indicators
Expenditure in social

Disability 2.2 2.1 2.0 2.0 2.0 1.8 2.0 1.9 1.8 1.7
Old age and survivors 10.9 11.5 12.4 12.6 13.4 13.7 14.6 14.7 14.4 13.9
(% of GDP)

Family/Children 1.1 1.2 1.4 1.3 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2
Unemployment 1.1 1.0 1.3 1.4 1.3 1.7 1.8 1.5 1.1 0.9
Housing and Social exclusion n.e.c. 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
Total (including Admin and Other expenditures) 23.0 23.4 25.8 25.8 25.8 26.4 27.6 26.9 25.7 25.1
of which: Means tested benefits 2.0 2.2 2.5 2.4 2.1 2.2 2.2 2.1 2.0 1.9

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300
 Statistical annex - 1. Country profiles

Romania
Romania 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Real GDP 7.2 9.3 -5.5 -3.9 2.0 2.1 3.5 3.4 3.9 4.8 7.0 p 4.1 p
Total employment 0.4 0.0 -2.0 -0.3 -0.8 -4.8 b -0.9 0.8 -1.3 -1.1 2.6 p 0.2 p
Labour productivity 6.8 9.3 -3.6 -3.6 2.8 7.2 b 4.4 2.6 5.2 6.0 4.3 p 3.9 p
Macro Economic Indicators

Annual average hours worked per person employed 0.5 0.0 -0.6 -0.4 1.8 -4.3 b -0.3 b -0.8 -0.4 1.3 0.1 p 0.1 p
(Annual % growth)

Real productivity per hour worked 6.3 9.3 -3.1 -3.3 1.0 12.1 b 4.7 3.4 5.6 4.6 4.2 p 3.8 p
Harmonized CPI 4.9 7.9 5.6 6.1 5.8 3.4 3.2 1.4 -0.4 -1.1 1.1 4.1
Price deflator GDP 15.8 16.0 4.1 3.5 3.8 4.0 3.4 1.7 2.6 2.5 4.7 p 5.9 p
Nominal compensation per employee 8.6 33.9 -3.2 8.2 -4.1 8.9 b 4.1 b 6.9 2.0 15.0 12.6 p 18.4 p
Real compensation per employee (GDP deflator) -6.3 15.5 -7.0 4.5 -7.6 4.7 b 0.7 b 5.1 -0.6 12.2 7.6 p 11.8 p
Real compensation per employee (private consumption
3.5 24.1 -8.3 2.0 -9.4 5.3 b 0.9 b 5.4 2.4 16.2 11.4 p 13.7 p
deflator)
Nominal unit labour costs 1.6 22.5 0.5 12.3 -6.7 1.5 b -0.3 4.2 -3.1 8.5 8.0 p 14.0 p
Real unit labour costs -12.3 5.6 -3.5 8.5 -10.1 -2.4 b -3.6 b 2.4 -5.5 5.8 3.2 p 7.7 p
Total population (000) 21131 20635 20440 20295 20199 20096 20020 19947 19871 19761 19644 19531
Population aged 15-64 (000) 14452 14076 13919 13814 13745 13669 13622 13556 13414 13258 13092 12928
Total employment (000) 9353 9369 9244 8713 b 8528 8605 8549 8614 8535 8449 8671 8689
Employment aged 15-64 (000) 8843 8882 8805 8307 b 8139 8222 8179 8254 8235 8166 8363 8382
Employment rate (% population aged 20-64) 64.4 64.4 63.5 64.8 b 63.8 64.8 64.7 65.7 66.0 66.3 68.8 69.9
Employment rate (% population aged 15-64) 58.8 59.0 58.6 60.2 b 59.3 60.2 60.1 61.0 61.4 61.6 63.9 64.8
Employment rate (% population aged 15-24) 24.4 24.8 24.5 24.3 b 23.4 23.7 22.9 22.5 24.5 22.3 24.5 24.7
Employment rate (% population aged 25-54) 74.6 74.4 73.7 76.8 b 75.8 76.6 76.3 77.1 77.4 77.6 79.9 80.6
Employment rate (% population aged 55-64) 41.4 43.1 42.6 40.7 b 39.9 41.6 41.8 43.1 41.1 42.8 44.5 46.3
FTE employment rate (% population aged 20-64) 63.7 63.5 62.6 63.5 b 62.5 63.5 63.3 64.2 64.3 64.9 67.5 68.5
Self-employed (% total employment) 21.2 20.8 20.8 22.6 b 20.9 21.2 21.1 20.5 19.4 18.1 18.1 17.3
Part-time employment (% total employment) 8.6 8.6 8.5 9.9 b 9.5 9.3 9.0 8.7 8.8 7.4 6.8 6.5
Temporary employment (% total employment) 1.1 0.9 0.7 0.7 b 1.0 1.1 1.0 1.1 1.0 1.0 0.9 0.9
Employment in Services (% total employment) 41.7 b 42.8 42.6 b 44.1 43.9 44.3 44.5 47.5 48.5 48.6 49.2
Employment in Industry (% total employment) 33.3 b 31.5 29.7 b 29.9 29.5 29.5 30.1 29.4 30.8 31.1 31.1
Employment in Agriculture (% total employment) 25.0 b 25.7 27.7 b 26.0 26.6 26.2 25.4 23.1 20.7 20.3 19.8
Activity rate (% population aged 15-64) 63.0 62.9 63.1 64.9 b 64.1 64.8 64.9 65.7 66.1 65.6 67.3 67.8
Labour Market Indicators - Total

Activity rate (% population aged 15-24) 30.5 30.4 30.9 31.2 b 30.7 30.5 30.1 29.6 31.3 28.0 30.0 29.5
Activity rate (% population aged 25-54) 79.0 78.3 78.5 81.9 b 80.9 81.5 81.5 82.1 82.5 81.9 83.4 83.6
Activity rate (% population aged 55-64) 42.4 44.2 43.9 42.1 b 41.4 43.0 43.4 44.6 42.7 44.2 46.0 47.5
Total unemployment (000) 634 549 624 652 659 627 653 629 624 530 449 380
Unemployment rate (% labour force) 6.4 5.6 6.5 7.0 7.2 6.8 7.1 6.8 6.8 5.9 4.9 4.2
Youth unemployment rate (% labour force 15-24) 19.3 17.6 20.0 22.1 23.9 22.6 23.7 24.0 21.7 20.6 18.3 16.2
Long term unemployment rate (% labour force) 3.2 2.4 2.2 2.4 b 2.9 3.0 3.2 2.8 3.0 3.0 2.0 1.8
Share of long term unemployment (% of total
50.0 41.3 31.6 34.5 b 41.0 44.2 45.2 41.1 43.9 50.0 41.4 44.1
unemployment)

Youth unemployment ratio (% population aged 15-24) 6.1 5.7 6.4 6.9 b 7.3 6.9 7.1 7.1 6.8 5.8 5.5 4.8

Employment rate for low skilled 25-64 (ISCED 0-2) 53.8 54.6 54.7 55.8 b 51.9 53.5 54.0 55.5 b 53.7 52.8 54.9 55.6
Employment rate for medium skilled 25-64 (ISCED 3-
70.1 69.5 68.5 69.6 b 69.2 69.7 68.8 70.4 b 69.7 70.3 72.5 73.7
4)
Employment rate for high skilled 25-64 (ISCED 5-8) 86.9 86.9 86.0 85.8 b 85.9 85.4 85.8 86.0 b 86.9 87.8 89.2 89.7
Employment rate (Nationals aged 15-64) 58.8 59.0 58.6 60.2 b 59.3 60.2 60.1 61.0 61.4 61.6 63.9 64.8
Employment rate (Other EU28 aged 15-64)
Employment rate (Other than EU28 aged 15-64) 64.3 58.7 60.8 u 74.3 u
Employment rate (Born in the same country aged 15-
58.8 59.0 58.6 60.2 b 59.3 60.2 60.1 61.0 61.4 61.6 63.9 64.8
64)
Employment rate (Born in other EU28 aged 15-64)
Employment rate (Born outside EU28 aged 15-64) 62.4 u 64.5 u 74.3 u 69.4 u 61.7 u 53.9 u 69.5 u 74.9 u
Underemployment (% of labour force aged 15-74) 2.2 2.0 2.4 b 2.3 2.3 2.5 2.6 2.9 2.4 2.3 2.2
Seeking but not available (% of labour force aged 15-
74)
Discouraged, available but not seeking (% of labour
3.5 2.9 3.8 4.4 b 4.9 4.5 4.4 4.1 3.9 3.8 3.0 2.6
force aged 15-74)

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301
Employment and Social Developments in Europe 2019

Romania 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Total population (000) 10290 10049 9952 9880 9833 9777 9761 9746 9707 9650 9603 9553
Population aged 15-64(000) 7185 7024 6967 6914 6879 6838 6839 6830 6764 6689 6622 6551
Total employment (000) 5116 5157 5101 4881 b 4734 4800 4791 4844 4848 4806 4893 4941
Employment aged 15-64 (000) 4863 4925 4890 4689 b 4555 4622 4621 4677 4704 4668 4744 4792
Employment rate (% population aged 20-64) 71.0 71.6 70.7 73.1 b 71.5 72.8 72.8 74.0 74.7 75.0 77.3 78.9
Employment rate (% population aged 15-64) 64.8 65.7 65.2 67.9 b 66.3 67.6 67.6 68.7 69.5 69.7 71.8 73.2
Employment rate (% population aged 15-24) 28.3 29.1 28.3 28.5 b 26.8 27.5 27.0 26.6 29.4 27.2 28.4 28.9
Employment rate (% population aged 25-54) 80.6 80.9 80.5 84.8 b 83.1 84.1 83.8 84.6 85.2 85.5 87.6 88.7
Employment rate (% population aged 55-64) 50.3 53.0 52.3 49.9 b 48.6 51.2 51.4 53.2 51.2 53.0 55.3 57.9
FTE employment rate (% population aged 20-64) 70.5 70.9 70.1 72.0 b 70.5 71.8 71.6 72.7 73.1 73.7 76.1 77.7
Self-employed (% total employment) 27.5 26.8 26.9 29.2 b 26.6 26.9 26.6 26.0 24.4 23.0 23.0 21.7
Part-time employment (% total employment) 8.3 8.1 8.0 9.8 b 8.8 8.7 8.6 8.2 8.5 7.3 6.7 6.2
Temporary employment (% total employment) 1.1 0.9 0.7 0.8 b 1.1 1.3 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.3 1.1 0.9
Employment in Services (% total employment) 36.2 b 37.1 36.5 b 38.0 37.9 38.1 38.2 40.6 40.9 41.2 42.0
Employment in Industry (% total employment) 39.7 b 38.1 36.3 b 36.9 36.0 36.0 36.6 35.9 37.6 37.7 37.6
Employment in Agriculture (% total employment) 24.1 b 24.8 27.2 b 25.1 26.1 25.9 25.2 23.6 21.6 21.2 20.4
Activity rate (% population aged 15-64) 70.1 70.6 70.9 73.7 b 72.1 73.2 73.4 74.3 75.3 74.8 76.2 76.9
Labour Market Indicators - Male

Activity rate (% population aged 15-24) 35.9 35.9 35.9 36.5 b 35.3 35.3 35.1 34.8 37.0 33.9 34.6 34.6
Activity rate (% population aged 25-54) 85.9 85.8 86.3 90.9 b 89.0 89.9 90.0 90.5 91.6 91.0 92.2 92.5
Activity rate (% population aged 55-64) 52.1 55.1 54.5 52.3 b 51.3 53.6 53.9 55.4 53.8 55.1 57.4 59.7
Total unemployment (000) 405 362 398 399 397 381 400 384 395 339 290 244
Unemployment rate (% labour force) 7.2 6.5 7.3 7.6 7.7 7.4 7.7 7.3 7.5 6.6 5.6 4.7
Youth unemployment rate (% labour force 15-24) 20.3 17.7 20.5 22.1 24.0 22.2 23.2 23.6 20.6 19.9 18.1 16.3
Long term unemployment rate (% labour force) 3.6 2.9 2.5 2.8 b 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.1 3.3 3.3 2.4 2.2
Share of long term unemployment (% of total
49.9 42.9 32.2 36.7 b 41.8 44.2 44.1 41.8 43.8 50.1 43.6 47.1
unemployment)

Youth unemployment ratio (% population aged 15-24) 7.6 6.8 7.6 8.1 b 8.5 7.9 8.1 8.2 7.6 6.7 6.3 5.6

Employment rate for low skilled 25-64 (ISCED 0-2) 66.3 67.2 67.2 70.0 b 62.9 65.2 66.7 67.9 b 69.0 68.6 71.2 72.2
Employment rate for medium skilled 25-64 (ISCED 3-
75.2 75.7 75.2 77.2 b 76.7 77.7 76.7 78.5 b 77.5 78.2 80.7 82.4
4)
Employment rate for high skilled 25-64 (ISCED 5-8) 87.6 87.8 86.5 86.8 b 87.5 87.4 87.8 88.0 b 89.5 90.5 90.8 91.8
Employment rate (Nationals aged 15-64) 64.8 65.6 65.2 67.9 b 66.3 67.6 67.6 68.7 69.5 69.7 71.8 73.2
Employment rate (Other EU28 aged 15-64)
Employment rate (Other than EU28 aged 15-64) 71.6 u 72.3 u
Employment rate (Born in the same country aged 15-
64.8 65.6 65.2 67.9 b 66.3 67.6 67.6 68.7 69.5 69.7 71.8 73.2
64)
Employment rate (Born in other EU28 aged 15-64)
Employment rate (Born outside EU28 aged 15-64) 80.4 u
Underemployment (% of labour force aged 15-74) 2.6 2.4 3.0 b 2.8 2.7 2.9 3.0 3.4 2.7 2.6 2.5
Seeking but not available (% of labour force aged 15-
74)
Discouraged, available but not seeking (% of labour
1.8 1.0 1.8 3.0 b 4.1 3.9 3.9 3.7 3.0 3.1 2.3 2.0
force aged 15-74)
Total population (000) 10841 10586 10488 10414 10366 10319 10259 10201 10164 10111 10042 9977
Population aged 15-64(000) 7267 7053 6952 6900 6866 6832 6783 6726 6650 6570 6470 6377
Total employment (000) 4237 4212 4143 3832 b 3794 3805 3758 3770 3687 3643 3777 3748
Employment aged 15-64 (000) 3980 3958 3915 3618 b 3584 3600 3558 3577 3531 3499 3620 3590
Employment rate (% population aged 20-64) 57.9 57.3 56.3 56.5 b 56.2 56.7 56.5 57.3 57.2 57.4 60.2 60.6
Employment rate (% population aged 15-64) 52.8 52.5 52.0 52.5 b 52.3 52.8 52.6 53.3 53.2 53.3 55.8 56.2
Employment rate (% population aged 15-24) 20.2 20.2 20.6 19.9 b 19.7 19.6 18.6 18.0 19.3 17.1 20.4 20.3
Employment rate (% population aged 25-54) 68.5 67.8 66.9 68.6 b 68.3 68.9 68.6 69.3 69.2 69.2 71.8 72.1
Employment rate (% population aged 55-64) 33.6 34.4 34.1 32.6 b 32.2 33.1 33.2 34.2 32.1 33.6 34.9 35.7
FTE employment rate (% population aged 20-64) 56.9 56.0 55.1 55.1 b 54.5 55.2 55.0 55.7 55.4 56.0 58.8 59.2
Self-employed (% total employment) 13.5 13.4 13.3 14.2 b 13.8 14.0 13.9 13.5 12.8 11.7 11.8 11.5
Part-time employment (% total employment) 8.9 9.3 9.1 10.0 b 10.3 10.0 9.6 9.5 9.2 7.7 6.9 6.9
Temporary employment (% total employment) 1.1 0.8 0.7 0.6 b 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.7
Employment in Services (% total employment) 48.6 b 50.1 50.5 b 51.8 u 51.7 u 52.3 u 52.6 u 56.8 58.6 u 58.3 u 58.7 u
Employment in Industry (% total employment) 25.4 b 23.2 21.1 b 21.0 u 21.1 u 21.2 u 21.8 u 20.9 21.8 u 22.6 u 22.3 u
Employment in Agriculture (% total employment) 26.0 b 26.7 28.4 b 27.2 27.2 26.5 25.6 22.4 19.6 19.1 19.0
Activity rate (% population aged 15-64) 56.0 55.2 55.4 56.2 b 56.1 56.4 56.3 56.9 56.7 56.2 58.2 58.3
Labour Market Indicators - Female

Activity rate (% population aged 15-24) 24.9 24.7 25.8 25.6 b 25.8 25.5 24.7 24.0 25.2 21.8 25.0 24.2
Activity rate (% population aged 25-54) 72.0 70.7 70.6 72.7 b 72.6 72.9 72.7 73.3 72.9 72.4 74.2 74.2
Activity rate (% population aged 55-64) 33.9 34.7 34.7 33.1 b 32.7 33.7 34.1 35.0 32.8 34.4 35.7 36.4
Total unemployment (000) 229 187 226 252 262 246 253 245 229 191 159 135
Unemployment rate (% labour force) 5.2 4.4 5.4 6.2 6.5 6.1 6.3 6.1 5.8 5.0 4.0 3.5
Youth unemployment rate (% labour force 15-24) 17.6 17.3 19.2 22.1 23.7 23.0 24.6 24.7 23.4 21.8 18.6 16.2
Long term unemployment rate (% labour force) 2.7 1.8 1.8 1.9 b 2.6 2.7 3.0 2.4 2.6 2.5 1.5 1.3
Share of long term unemployment (% of total
50.2 38.4 30.6 31.1 b 39.8 44.1 46.8 40.0 44.1 49.8 37.5 38.6
unemployment)

Youth unemployment ratio (% population aged 15-24) 4.7 4.5 5.2 5.7 b 6.1 5.9 6.1 5.9 5.9 4.8 4.7 3.9

Employment rate for low skilled 25-64 (ISCED 0-2) 45.8 46.1 46.0 45.8 b 44.0 45.1 44.5 45.2 b 41.1 39.5 41.0 41.1
Employment rate for medium skilled 25-64 (ISCED 3-
64.3 62.6 61.0 60.9 b 60.6 60.5 59.7 61.2 b 60.9 61.4 63.3 63.8
4)
Employment rate for high skilled 25-64 (ISCED 5-8) 86.1 86.1 85.4 84.9 b 84.4 83.5 83.8 84.1 b 84.5 85.3 87.8 87.8
Employment rate (Nationals aged 15-64) 52.7 52.5 52.0 52.5 b 52.3 52.8 52.6 53.3 53.2 53.3 55.8 56.2
Employment rate (Other EU28 aged 15-64)
Employment rate (Other than EU28 aged 15-64) 56.3 u
Employment rate (Born in the same country aged 15-
52.8 52.5 52.0 52.5 b 52.3 52.8 52.6 53.3 53.2 53.3 55.8 56.2
64)
Employment rate (Born in other EU28 aged 15-64)
Employment rate (Born outside EU28 aged 15-64)
Underemployment (% of labour force aged 15-74) 1.7 1.5 1.6 b 1.7 1.8 1.9 2.0 2.3 1.9 1.8 1.9
Seeking but not available (% of labour force aged 15-
74)
Discouraged, available but not seeking (% of labour
5.5 5.2 6.4 6.1 b 5.8 5.3 5.0 4.5 5.0 4.8 4.0 3.4
force aged 15-74)

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302
 Statistical annex - 1. Country profiles

Romania 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
At-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion (% of total
47.0 44.2 43.0 41.5 40.9 43.2 41.9 40.3 37.4 38.8 35.7 32.5
population)
At-risk-of-poverty (% of total population) 24.6 23.6 22.1 21.6 22.3 22.9 23.0 25.1 25.4 25.3 23.6 23.5
At-risk-of-poverty threshold (PPS single person) 1670 1837 2066 2122 2186 2226 2332 2408 2614 2835 3182 3745
Poverty gap (%) 36.6 32.3 31.4 31.3 31.4 31.1 33.6 34.6 38.2 36.2 34.5 35.2
Persistent at-risk-of-poverty (% of total
18.0 17.5 18.7 17.1 19.5 19.3 20.2 19.1
population)
At-risk-of-poverty before social transfers excl.
31.5 30.8 28.7 27.8 29.2 28.8 28.2 28.8 29.3 29.5 28.3 28.0
pensions (% of total population)
Impact of social transfers (excl. pensions) in
21.9 23.4 23.0 22.3 23.6 20.5 18.4 12.9 13.3 14.2 16.6 16.1
reducing poverty (%)
All

Severe Material Deprivation (% of total population) 38.0 32.7 32.1 30.5 29.5 31.1 29.8 25.9 22.7 23.8 19.7 16.8
Share of people living in low work intensity households
9.9 8.5 8.1 7.7 7.3 7.9 7.6 7.2 7.9 8.2 6.9 7.4
(% of people aged 0-59)
Real Gross Household Disposable income (growth %) 14.5 18.0 -2.4 -1.5 -3.0 -3.8 6.1 2.7 1.9 10.3
Income quintile share ratio S80/S20 8.1 7.0 6.5 6.1 6.2 6.6 6.8 7.2 8.3 7.2 6.5 7.2
GINI coefficient 38.3 b 35.9 34.5 33.5 33.5 34.0 34.6 35.0 37.4 34.7 33.1 35.1
Early leavers from education and training (% of
17.3 15.9 16.6 19.3 b 18.1 17.8 17.3 18.1 b 19.1 18.5 18.1 16.4
population aged 18-24)
NEET: Young people neither in employment nor in
education and training (% of total population aged 15- 13.3 11.6 13.9 16.6 b 17.5 16.8 17.0 17.0 18.1 17.4 15.2 14.5
24)
At-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion (% of male
46.1 43.0 41.8 40.5 39.9 42.5 41.3 40.0 36.5 37.8 34.9 31.0
population)
At-risk-of-poverty (% of male population) 24.1 22.8 21.2 21.0 21.9 23.1 23.0 25.3 25.1 24.8 22.9 22.5
Poverty gap (%) 36.6 32.9 31.7 31.9 33.5 31.8 35.1 38.3 39.1 37.6 35.1 37.2
Persistent at-risk-of-poverty (% of male
17.3 17.4 18.4 16.8 19.3 19.5 20.2 18.5
population)
Severe Material Deprivation (% of male population) 37.6 32.2 31.7 30.0 29.3 31.3 30.3 26.6 23.1 23.8 19.7 16.3
Male

Share of people living in low work intensity households

8.8 7.3 6.7 6.5 6.1 6.5 6.3 6.4 6.9 7.2 6.2 6.6
(% of males aged 0-59)
Life expectancy at birth (years) 69.5 69.7 69.8 70.0 b 71.1 70.9 71.6 71.4 71.5 71.7 71.7
Healthy life years at birth (years) - men 60.5 60.0 59.8 57.3 b 57.4 57.6 58.6 59.0 59.0 59.8 59.2
Early leavers from education and training (% of males
17.1 15.9 16.1 19.5 b 19.1 18.5 18.7 19.5 b 19.5 18.4 18.0 16.7
aged 18-24)
NEET: Young people neither in employment nor in
11.6 8.8 11.2 14.2 b 16.3 15.2 15.3 15.3 15.0 14.1 12.1 11.4
education and training ( % of males aged 15-24)
At-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion (% of female
48.0 45.3 44.2 42.4 41.9 43.8 42.5 40.7 38.2 39.8 36.5 33.9
population)
At-risk-of-poverty (% of female population) 25.1 24.3 23.0 22.1 22.6 22.8 22.9 24.9 25.7 25.7 24.2 24.5
Poverty gap (%) 36.9 31.5 31.0 30.5 29.0 29.3 32.5 32.6 37.1 34.8 33.7 34.4
Persistent at-risk-of-poverty (% of female
18.7 17.7 19.0 17.3 19.7 19.2 20.2 19.8
population)
Social Indicators

Severe Material Deprivation (% of female population) 38.4 33.2 32.5 30.9 29.8 30.9 29.3 25.2 22.4 23.7 19.7 17.2
Female

Share of people living in low work intensity households

11.0 9.8 9.5 8.9 8.6 9.3 8.9 8.0 8.9 9.2 7.7 8.2
(% of females aged 0-59)
Life expectancy at birth (years) 76.8 77.5 77.4 77.7 b 78.2 78.1 78.7 78.7 78.7 79.1 79.1
Healthy life years at birth (years) - women 62.5 62.9 61.7 57.5 b 57.0 57.7 57.9 59.0 59.4 59.0 58.3
Early leavers from education and training (% of
17.4 16.0 17.2 19.0 b 17.2 16.9 15.9 16.7 b 18.5 18.7 18.1 16.1
females aged 18-24)
NEET: Young people neither in employment nor in
15.1 14.5 16.8 19.2 b 18.7 18.5 18.7 18.8 21.4 20.8 18.4 17.8
education and training ( % of females aged 15-24)
At-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion of children (% of
51.8 50.9 50.6 48.1 49.2 52.5 51.4 50.7 46.8 49.2 41.7 38.1
people aged 0-17)
At-risk-of-poverty (% of Children population) 33.0 33.3 31.9 32.1 33.0 33.3 34.7 39.3 38.1 37.2 32.2 32.0
Children (0-17)

Severe Material Deprivation (% of Children

42.3 38.5 39.1 35.8 35.7 38.8 36.4 31.0 28.9 30.2 21.5 19.7
population)
Share of children living in low work intensity
8.6 6.1 5.3 4.7 4.7 5.6 6.1 6.1 7.5 8.5 5.8 7.0
households (% of Children population)
Risk of poverty of children in households at work
28.1 29.9 28.9 30.8 31.0 31.0 32.4 36.3 34.2 32.6 29.4 27.1
(Working Intensity > 0.2)
Impact of social transfers (excl. pensions) in reducing
23.4 23.6 22.0 19.6 22.9 20.0 18.0 10.3 12.6 16.4 20.1 20.2
poverty (0-17) (%)
At-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion (% of working
42.9 40.8 40.7 39.9 39.7 42.3 40.7 38.7 35.7 37.0 34.6 30.7
age population)
At-risk-of-poverty (% of Working age population) 20.7 19.8 19.4 19.5 20.9 21.9 21.7 23.4 23.3 23.3 21.9 21.2
Working age

Severe Material Deprivation (% of Working age

33.8 29.4 29.6 28.5 27.8 29.4 28.2 24.3 21.2 22.1 18.9 15.7
(18-64)

population)
Very low work intensity (18-59) 10.4 9.3 9.0 8.7 8.2 8.7 8.1 7.6 8.0 8.1 7.3 7.5
In-work at-risk-of poverty rate (% of persons
16.5 16.9 17.2 17.6 18.9 18.9 18.1 19.7 18.6 18.6 17.1 15.0
employed 18-64)
Impact of social transfers (excl. pensions) in reducing
23.6 26.4 25.7 25.3 26.2 21.8 19.9 14.6 14.3 15.0 18.0 16.5
poverty (18-64) (%)
At-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion of elderly (% of
57.9 49.4 43.3 40.1 36.2 35.4 35.8 35.0 33.3 34.0 33.2 32.8
people aged 65+)
Elderly (65+)

At-risk-of-poverty (% of Elderly population) 29.4 26.5 21.4 17.6 14.8 14.4 14.5 15.7 19.4 19.1 20.0 22.8

Severe Material Deprivation (% of Elderly population) 50.1 39.0 34.0 32.4 29.2 28.5 28.4 26.5 21.5 22.5 20.6 17.4
Relative median income of elderly (ratio with median
0.76 0.85 0.93 0.97 1.01 1.03 1.04 1.04 1.0 0.97 0.95 0.90
income of people younger than 65)
Aggregate replacement ratio (ratio) 0.44 0.50 0.56 0.64 0.67 0.67 0.68 0.65 0.63 0.66 0.61 0.51
Sickness/Health care 3.4 3.4 3.9 4.4 4.0 4.0 3.9 3.9 3.8 3.9
protection indicators
Expenditure in social

Disability 1.2 1.3 1.5 1.6 1.5 1.2 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.0
Old age and survivors 5.9 6.8 8.3 8.8 8.7 8.3 8.0 8.0 7.9 7.9
(% of GDP)

Family/Children 1.7 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.7 1.3 1.2 1.2 1.3 1.4
Unemployment 0.3 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1
Housing and Social exclusion n.e.c. 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
Total (including Admin and Other expenditures) 13.3 13.7 16.2 17.5 16.6 15.4 14.9 14.7 14.6 14.6
of which: Means tested benefits 0.8 0.7 0.9 1.2 0.8 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.5

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303
Employment and Social Developments in Europe 2019

Slovenia
Slovenia 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Real GDP 6.9 3.3 -7.8 1.2 0.6 -2.7 -1.1 3.0 2.3 3.1 4.9 4.5
Total employment 3.4 2.6 -1.8 -2.1 -1.7 -0.9 -1.1 0.4 1.3 1.8 2.9 3.0
Labour productivity 3.5 0.7 -6.1 3.4 2.4 -1.8 0.0 2.5 1.0 1.2 1.9 1.5
Macro Economic Indicators

Annual average hours worked per person employed -0.8 1.1 0.3 0.1 -1.0 -1.1 1.1 1.2 0.4 -2.1 -1.9 -1.2
(Annual % growth)

Real productivity per hour worked 4.3 -0.4 -6.4 3.3 3.4 -0.6 -1.1 1.4 0.6 3.4 3.8 2.6
Harmonized CPI 3.8 5.5 0.8 2.1 2.1 2.8 1.9 0.4 -0.8 -0.2 1.6 1.9
Price deflator GDP 4.2 4.5 3.4 -1.0 1.1 0.5 1.6 0.8 1.0 0.8 1.6 2.3
Nominal compensation per employee 6.2 7.2 1.8 4.0 1.5 -1.0 0.5 1.3 1.3 3.0 3.2 4.0
Real compensation per employee (GDP deflator) 1.9 2.6 -1.5 5.1 0.4 -1.4 -1.1 0.5 0.3 2.3 1.5 1.7
Real compensation per employee (private consumption
2.3 1.6 1.0 1.9 -0.5 -3.7 -1.4 0.9 2.1 3.2 1.6 2.0
deflator)
Nominal unit labour costs 2.6 6.4 8.5 0.6 -0.8 0.8 0.5 -1.2 0.3 1.8 1.3 2.5
Real unit labour costs -1.5 1.8 5.0 1.6 -1.9 0.4 -1.1 -2.1 -0.6 1.0 -0.3 0.2
Total population (000) 2010 2010 b 2032 2047 2050 2055 2059 2061 2063 2064 2066 2067
Population aged 15-64 (000) 1410 1403 1414 1421 1420 1416 1409 1400 1389 1378 1367 1355
Total employment (000) 985 996 981 966 936 924 906 917 917 915 959 981
Employment aged 15-64 (000) 957 975 955 942 915 907 888 893 902 903 944 962
Employment rate (% population aged 20-64) 72.4 73.0 71.9 70.3 68.4 68.3 67.2 67.7 69.1 70.1 73.4 75.4
Employment rate (% population aged 15-64) 67.8 68.6 67.5 66.2 64.4 64.1 63.3 63.9 65.2 65.8 69.3 71.1
Employment rate (% population aged 15-24) 37.6 38.4 35.3 34.1 31.5 27.3 26.5 26.8 29.6 28.6 34.7 35.2
Employment rate (% population aged 25-54) 85.3 86.8 84.8 83.7 83.1 83.3 81.9 81.9 82.9 83.5 86.1 87.5
Employment rate (% population aged 55-64) 33.5 32.8 35.6 35.0 31.2 32.9 33.5 35.4 36.6 38.5 42.7 47.0
FTE employment rate (% population aged 20-64) 71.0 71.6 69.9 68.1 66.4 66.4 65.2 65.7 66.9 67.7 70.9 73.1
Self-employed (% total employment) 11.1 9.9 10.7 12.4 12.6 12.2 12.1 12.7 12.5 11.8 11.8 12.5
Part-time employment (% total employment) 8.1 8.1 9.5 10.3 9.5 9.0 9.3 10.0 10.1 9.3 10.3 9.7
Temporary employment (% total employment) 15.8 15.1 13.9 14.5 15.2 14.4 13.8 13.7 15.1 14.6 15.2 13.5
Employment in Services (% total employment) 57.5 bu 59.1 59.9 60.9 61.7 61.5 60.8 u 62.1 u 62.5 u 61.9 u 62.0 u
Employment in Industry (% total employment) 35.6 bu 33.8 33.2 32.2 31.3 31.4 31.5 u 32.1 u 33.3 u 33.4 u 33.6 u
Employment in Agriculture (% total employment) 6.9 b 7.1 7.0 6.9 7.0 7.2 7.7 5.8 4.2 4.6 4.4
Activity rate (% population aged 15-64) 71.3 71.8 71.8 71.5 70.3 70.4 70.5 70.9 71.8 71.6 74.2 75.0
Labour Market Indicators - Total

Activity rate (% population aged 15-24) 41.8 42.9 40.9 39.9 37.4 34.4 33.8 33.6 35.3 33.7 39.1 38.6
Activity rate (% population aged 25-54) 89.3 90.1 89.6 90.0 90.1 90.8 90.7 90.3 90.8 90.5 91.9 92.0
Activity rate (% population aged 55-64) 34.6 34.2 36.9 36.5 33.3 35.1 36.0 38.4 39.7 41.2 45.6 49.5
Total unemployment (000) 50 46 61 75 83 90 102 98 90 80 67 53
Unemployment rate (% labour force) 4.9 4.4 5.9 7.3 8.2 8.9 10.1 9.7 9.0 8.0 6.6 5.1
Youth unemployment rate (% labour force 15-24) 10.1 10.4 13.6 14.7 15.7 20.6 21.6 20.2 16.3 15.2 11.2 8.8
Long term unemployment rate (% labour force) 2.2 1.9 1.8 3.2 3.6 4.3 5.2 5.3 4.7 4.3 3.1 2.2
Share of long term unemployment (% of total
45.7 42.2 30.1 43.3 44.2 47.9 51.0 54.5 52.3 53.3 47.5 42.9
unemployment)

Youth unemployment ratio (% population aged 15-24) 4.2 4.5 5.6 5.9 5.9 7.1 7.3 6.8 5.8 5.1 4.4 3.4

Employment rate for low skilled 25-64 (ISCED 0-2) 56.2 55.0 53.7 51.1 46.7 47.2 45.5 48.5 b 49.0 46.1 49.7 51.3
Employment rate for medium skilled 25-64 (ISCED 3-
75.1 76.4 74.6 73.0 70.6 70.7 69.5 69.5 b 69.7 71.0 73.6 75.9
4)
Employment rate for high skilled 25-64 (ISCED 5-8) 87.7 87.9 88.4 87.3 86.4 85.1 83.8 83.2 b 84.4 85.2 87.1 88.9
Employment rate (Nationals aged 15-64) 67.8 68.6 67.7 66.3 64.4 64.1 63.5 64.2 65.2 65.8 69.3 71.3
Employment rate (Other EU28 aged 15-64) 82.7 u 76.8 u 70.5 u 59.8 u 58.9 u 73.1 57.3 u 60.4 60.3 64.3 73.0 81.2
Employment rate (Other than EU28 aged 15-64) 60.3 65.3 52.2 59.3 65.4 60.9 56.5 54.1 67.2 66.7 68.6 67.3
Employment rate (Born in the same country aged 15-
67.8 68.6 67.7 66.3 64.7 64.1 63.5 64.5 65.7 66.2 69.6 71.7
64)
Employment rate (Born in other EU28 aged 15-64) 65.2 66.8 66.9 63.9 57.7 60.6 59.3 56.9 60.0 59.7 65.4 69.7
Employment rate (Born outside EU28 aged 15-64) 69.2 69.0 65.7 65.8 63.4 64.9 61.0 58.6 61.7 63.2 66.6 66.4
Underemployment (% of labour force aged 15-74) 1.3 1.8 1.9 1.9 1.8 2.3 2.5 3.1 2.8 2.8 2.1
Seeking but not available (% of labour force aged 15-
0.4 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.4 u 0.4 u 0.3 u 0.4 u 0.4 u 0.4 u 0.4
74)
Discouraged, available but not seeking (% of labour
2.1 1.4 2.0 1.7 1.8 1.8 2.5 3.4 2.5 1.9 1.3 1.1
force aged 15-74)

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304
 Statistical annex - 1. Country profiles

Slovenia 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Total population (000) 987 987 b 1004 1014 1015 1017 1019 1021 1022 1023 1025 1027
Population aged 15-64(000) 719 715 727 733 731 728 724 720 714 708 703 698
Total employment (000) 540 543 531 524 506 500 495 499 501 491 516 530
Employment aged 15-64 (000) 525 532 516 509 495 490 484 486 492 484 506 519
Employment rate (% population aged 20-64) 77.5 77.4 75.6 74.0 71.8 71.8 71.2 71.6 73.3 73.3 76.9 79.0
Employment rate (% population aged 15-64) 72.7 72.7 71.0 69.6 67.7 67.4 67.1 67.5 69.2 68.9 72.5 74.5
Employment rate (% population aged 15-24) 43.2 43.0 39.1 37.6 35.7 30.4 29.7 29.5 32.0 31.1 38.6 38.9
Employment rate (% population aged 25-54) 88.1 88.6 86.4 85.2 84.8 85.4 84.3 84.6 86.1 85.6 88.5 90.0
Employment rate (% population aged 55-64) 45.3 44.7 46.4 45.5 39.5 40.7 41.8 41.8 42.6 43.6 48.0 52.2
FTE employment rate (% population aged 20-64) 77.0 76.8 74.6 72.9 70.7 71.0 70.3 70.9 72.2 72.2 75.8 78.3
Self-employed (% total employment) 14.9 13.3 14.8 16.2 16.3 16.1 15.9 16.7 16.2 15.5 14.9 15.9
Part-time employment (% total employment) 6.5 6.2 7.4 7.4 7.1 6.3 6.5 6.8 7.0 6.0 6.7 5.9
Temporary employment (% total employment) 13.7 13.0 12.4 12.5 13.4 12.8 12.7 12.9 14.0 13.3 13.8 12.0
Employment in Services (% total employment) 46.6 bu 49.1 u 49.3 u 48.9 50.2 u 50.5 u 49.6 u 50.7 u 49.7 u 49.0 u 50.4 u
Employment in Industry (% total employment) 46.2 bu 43.7 u 43.6 u 43.6 42.2 u 42.1 u 42.6 u 43.6 u 45.3 u 45.8 u 44.8 u
Employment in Agriculture (% total employment) 7.2 b 7.2 7.2 7.5 7.6 7.4 7.7 5.8 5.0 5.2 4.7
Activity rate (% population aged 15-64) 75.8 75.8 75.6 75.4 73.9 73.7 74.2 74.3 75.4 74.5 77.1 78.2
Labour Market Indicators - Male

Activity rate (% population aged 15-24) 47.6 47.7 45.4 44.4 42.0 38.1 37.1 36.6 38.9 36.8 42.9 42.4
Activity rate (% population aged 25-54) 91.3 91.6 91.3 91.7 91.8 92.4 92.6 92.2 92.9 92.0 93.4 94.0
Activity rate (% population aged 55-64) 46.7 46.4 48.2 47.5 42.7 43.6 45.1 45.7 46.4 47.1 51.8 55.1
Total unemployment (000) 22 23 33 42 45 46 51 49 44 40 32 26
Unemployment rate (% labour force) 4.0 4.0 5.9 7.5 8.2 8.4 9.5 9.0 8.1 7.5 5.8 4.6
Youth unemployment rate (% labour force 15-24) 9.4 9.9 13.8 15.2 15.0 20.3 20.1 19.4 17.7 15.6 9.9 8.3
Long term unemployment rate (% labour force) 1.8 1.7 1.7 3.4 3.7 4.1 4.9 4.9 4.1 4.1 3.1 2.0
Share of long term unemployment (% of total
45.3 41.4 28.3 45.0 45.1 48.8 51.9 55.0 50.7 54.1 52.7 44.0
unemployment)

Youth unemployment ratio (% population aged 15-24) 4.5 4.7 6.2 6.8 6.3 7.7 7.5 7.1 6.9 5.8 4.3 3.5

Employment rate for low skilled 25-64 (ISCED 0-2) 65.4 63.4 62.5 60.8 55.5 56.1 55.1 55.6 b 56.9 53.7 59.0 61.9
Employment rate for medium skilled 25-64 (ISCED 3-
80.2 80.8 78.0 76.1 74.0 74.5 73.9 73.5 b 74.2 74.9 77.5 79.4
4)
Employment rate for high skilled 25-64 (ISCED 5-8) 88.9 88.7 90.3 89.6 87.4 87.4 86.3 86.5 b 88.3 86.5 89.1 91.6
Employment rate (Nationals aged 15-64) 72.6 72.4 70.9 69.6 67.4 66.9 66.7 67.3 68.6 68.2 72.1 74.1
Employment rate (Other EU28 aged 15-64) 92.3 u 88.9 u 89.1 u 70.4 u 67.3 u 85.2 u 79.2 u 70.5 u 72.1 u 81.4 u 78.4 u 82.5 u
Employment rate (Other than EU28 aged 15-64) 76.5 87.8 75.1 73.5 83.6 84.9 78.0 75.1 83.8 82.1 82.2 82.0
Employment rate (Born in the same country aged 15-
72.6 72.6 71.0 69.6 67.6 67.0 66.6 67.6 69.2 68.8 72.5 74.4
64)
Employment rate (Born in other EU28 aged 15-64) 71.5 73.3 70.7 70.9 64.9 64.1 66.1 63.4 65.2 61.2 67.4 74.2
Employment rate (Born outside EU28 aged 15-64) 75.4 74.3 70.9 70.0 69.7 73.3 72.9 67.8 70.0 71.1 74.2 75.9
Underemployment (% of labour force aged 15-74) 0.9 1.4 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.8 1.9 2.1 1.7 1.7 1.3
Seeking but not available (% of labour force aged 15-
0.4 u 0.4 u 0.4 u 0.4 u 0.4 u 0.2 u 0.3 u 0.3 u 0.3 u 0.4 u 0.4 u 0.3 u
74)
Discouraged, available but not seeking (% of labour
1.8 1.1 1.7 1.5 1.5 1.5 2.3 3.0 2.1 1.6 1.3 1.0
force aged 15-74)
Total population (000) 1023 1024 b 1028 1033 1036 1039 1040 1040 1041 1041 1041 1040
Population aged 15-64(000) 691 687 687 688 690 688 685 680 675 670 664 657
Total employment (000) 446 453 450 443 430 424 411 418 417 424 443 450
Employment aged 15-64 (000) 432 443 439 432 420 416 404 407 410 419 437 443
Employment rate (% population aged 20-64) 67.1 68.5 67.9 66.5 64.8 64.6 63.0 63.6 64.7 66.7 69.7 71.7
Employment rate (% population aged 15-64) 62.6 64.2 63.8 62.6 60.9 60.5 59.2 60.0 61.0 62.6 65.8 67.5
Employment rate (% population aged 15-24) 31.4 33.2 31.0 30.0 26.9 23.7 23.0 24.0 27.1 26.1 30.4 31.1
Employment rate (% population aged 25-54) 82.4 84.8 83.2 82.1 81.3 81.0 79.3 79.1 79.5 81.2 83.5 84.8
Employment rate (% population aged 55-64) 22.2 21.1 24.8 24.5 22.7 25.0 25.2 29.0 30.5 33.4 37.5 41.9
FTE employment rate (% population aged 20-64) 64.9 66.1 65.1 63.1 61.9 61.6 59.9 60.3 61.4 63.2 65.9 67.7
Self-employed (% total employment) 6.6 5.9 5.9 7.8 8.1 7.6 7.5 8.0 8.0 7.6 8.2 8.5
Part-time employment (% total employment) 10.0 10.4 12.1 13.6 12.2 12.2 12.6 13.7 13.7 13.1 14.5 14.3
Temporary employment (% total employment) 18.4 17.7 15.7 16.8 17.3 16.4 15.0 14.7 16.4 16.2 16.8 15.3
Employment in Services (% total employment) 71.0 u
Employment in Industry (% total employment) 22.1 u
Employment in Agriculture (% total employment) 6.5 b 6.9 6.7 6.3 6.4 6.8 7.6 5.9 3.3 4.0 3.9
Activity rate (% population aged 15-64) 66.6 67.5 67.9 67.4 66.5 66.9 66.6 67.2 67.9 68.6 71.2 71.7
Labour Market Indicators - Female

Activity rate (% population aged 15-24) 35.4 37.4 35.8 34.8 32.3 30.0 30.2 30.4 31.7 30.6 34.9 34.3
Activity rate (% population aged 25-54) 87.3 88.5 87.9 88.1 88.4 89.1 88.7 88.3 88.6 88.9 90.3 89.9
Activity rate (% population aged 55-64) 23.1 22.2 25.6 25.5 23.7 26.5 27.0 31.1 32.9 35.2 39.5 43.9
Total unemployment (000) 28 23 28 33 38 44 50 49 46 40 36 27
Unemployment rate (% labour force) 5.9 4.8 5.8 7.1 8.2 9.4 10.9 10.6 10.1 8.6 7.5 5.7
Youth unemployment rate (% labour force 15-24) 11.2 11.3 13.4 13.8 16.8 21.0 23.7 21.3 14.6 14.7 13.0 9.6
Long term unemployment rate (% labour force) 2.7 2.1 1.9 2.9 3.5 4.4 5.5 5.7 5.4 4.5 3.2 2.4
Share of long term unemployment (% of total
46.1 43.0 32.1 41.2 43.1 47.0 50.0 54.0 53.8 52.5 42.8 41.9
unemployment)

Youth unemployment ratio (% population aged 15-24) 4.0 4.2 4.8 4.8 5.4 6.3 7.1 6.5 4.6 4.5 4.5 3.3

Employment rate for low skilled 25-64 (ISCED 0-2) 48.9 47.9 46.4 43.0 39.5 39.3 36.4 42.2 b 42.0 39.6 41.4 41.4
Employment rate for medium skilled 25-64 (ISCED 3-
68.6 71.0 70.3 68.9 66.0 65.7 63.8 64.0 b 63.4 65.7 68.2 71.1
4)
Employment rate for high skilled 25-64 (ISCED 5-8) 86.7 87.3 87.1 85.7 85.7 83.5 82.0 80.8 b 81.7 84.3 85.7 86.9
Employment rate (Nationals aged 15-64) 62.8 64.5 64.3 62.9 61.3 61.1 60.0 60.9 61.6 63.3 66.3 68.3
Employment rate (Other EU28 aged 15-64) 61.8 u 48.1 u 45.0 u 41.9 u 60.4 u 34.8 u 48.4 u 50.1 u 53.1 u 67.4 u 80.1 u
Employment rate (Other than EU28 aged 15-64) 35.3 u 26.9 u 23.4 u 40.8 u 40.0 30.5 u 29.8 27.8 42.4 44.2 51.8 49.8
Employment rate (Born in the same country aged 15-
62.7 64.4 64.1 62.8 61.6 61.0 60.3 61.2 61.9 63.5 66.6 68.7
64)
Employment rate (Born in other EU28 aged 15-64) 59.0 60.8 63.5 57.5 50.0 57.3 53.6 51.0 55.8 58.6 63.5 65.4
Employment rate (Born outside EU28 aged 15-64) 62.2 62.7 59.8 60.8 55.9 54.5 46.9 48.4 51.9 54.1 58.7 56.2
Underemployment (% of labour force aged 15-74) 1.8 2.2 2.5 2.4 2.2 2.9 3.3 4.3 4.1 4.0 3.0
Seeking but not available (% of labour force aged 15-
0.5 u 0.5 u 0.6 u 0.7 u 0.5 u 0.5 u 0.6 u 0.4 u 0.4 u 0.4 u 0.3 u 0.5 u
74)
Discouraged, available but not seeking (% of labour
2.4 1.7 2.3 2.0 2.0 2.1 2.8 3.8 3.1 2.3 1.5 1.2
force aged 15-74)

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305
Employment and Social Developments in Europe 2019

Slovenia 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
At-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion (% of total
17.1 18.5 17.1 18.3 19.3 19.6 20.4 20.4 19.2 18.4 17.1
population)
At-risk-of-poverty (% of total population) 11.5 12.3 11.3 12.7 13.6 13.5 14.5 14.5 14.3 13.9 13.3
At-risk-of-poverty threshold (PPS single person) 7753 8287 8599 8009 8364 8563 8527 8597 9061 9150 9130
Poverty gap (%) 19.4 19.3 20.2 20.2 19.9 19.1 20.4 22.0 20.3 20.2 19.6
Persistent at-risk-of-poverty (% of total
7.7 7.0 6.9 7.5 6.1 7.5 9.5 8.1 8.5 8.2
population)
At-risk-of-poverty before social transfers excl.
23.1 23.0 22.0 24.2 24.2 25.2 25.3 25.1 24.8 24.3 24.0
pensions (% of total population)
Impact of social transfers (excl. pensions) in
50.2 46.5 48.6 47.5 43.8 46.4 42.7 42.2 42.3 42.8 44.6
reducing poverty (%)
All

Severe Material Deprivation (% of total population) 5.1 6.7 6.1 5.9 6.1 6.6 6.7 6.6 5.8 5.4 4.6 3.7 p
Share of people living in low work intensity households
7.3 6.7 5.6 7.0 7.6 7.5 8.0 8.7 7.4 7.4 6.2
(% of people aged 0-59)
Real Gross Household Disposable income (growth %) 4.5 2.7 -0.4 -0.5 0.1 -4.2 -1.9 1.6 2.0 4.8
Income quintile share ratio S80/S20 3.3 3.4 3.2 3.4 3.5 3.4 3.6 3.7 3.6 3.6 3.4
GINI coefficient 23.2 23.4 22.7 23.8 23.8 23.7 24.4 25.0 24.5 24.4 23.7
Early leavers from education and training (% of
4.1 5.1 5.3 5.0 4.2 4.4 3.9 4.4 b 5.0 4.9 4.3 4.2
population aged 18-24)
NEET: Young people neither in employment nor in
education and training (% of total population aged 15- 6.7 6.5 7.5 7.1 7.1 9.3 9.2 9.4 9.5 8.0 6.5 6.6
24)
At-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion (% of male
15.0 16.6 15.1 16.5 17.4 18.3 19.4 19.3 17.5 16.9 15.8
population)
At-risk-of-poverty (% of male population) 10.0 11.0 9.8 11.3 12.2 12.5 13.5 13.7 13.0 12.5 12.0
Poverty gap (%) 19.2 20.8 21.1 20.9 20.1 19.8 20.9 23.2 21.4 21.9 20.5
Persistent at-risk-of-poverty (% of male
6.3 5.8 5.6 5.9 4.9 5.7 8.5 7.0 7.5 6.2
population)
Severe Material Deprivation (% of male population) 4.9 6.4 5.9 5.6 5.8 6.8 6.6 6.7 5.4 5.2 4.3 3.4 p
Male

Share of people living in low work intensity households

6.4 6.2 4.8 6.0 6.7 6.8 7.4 7.7 6.5 6.7 5.7
(% of males aged 0-59)
Life expectancy at birth (years) 74.6 75.5 75.9 76.4 b 76.8 77.1 77.2 78.2 77.8 78.2 78.2
Healthy life years at birth (years) - men 58.7 59.4 60.6 53.4 b 54.0 56.5 57.6 57.8 58.5 58.7 55.3
Early leavers from education and training (% of males
5.8 7.2 7.2 6.4 5.7 5.4 5.0 6.0 b 6.4 6.7 5.8 5.3 u
aged 18-24)
NEET: Young people neither in employment nor in
6.8 6.7 7.9 8.1 7.8 9.7 9.8 9.7 9.9 9.1 6.7 6.1
education and training ( % of males aged 15-24)
At-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion (% of female
19.2 20.3 19.1 20.1 21.1 20.8 21.4 21.5 20.8 19.9 18.3
population)
At-risk-of-poverty (% of female population) 12.9 13.6 12.8 14.1 15.0 14.6 15.4 15.2 15.6 15.2 14.5
Poverty gap (%) 19.7 18.7 20.2 19.1 19.5 18.4 20.1 20.8 19.4 19.6 19.1
Persistent at-risk-of-poverty (% of female
9.0 8.1 8.0 9.1 7.3 9.2 10.5 9.1 9.5 10.2
population)
Social Indicators

Severe Material Deprivation (% of female population) 5.3 6.9 6.3 6.3 6.4 6.5 6.7 6.6 6.2 5.5 4.8 3.9 p
Female

Share of people living in low work intensity households

8.2 7.3 6.5 8.0 8.6 8.3 8.5 9.8 8.3 8.2 6.8
(% of females aged 0-59)
Life expectancy at birth (years) 82.0 82.6 82.7 83.1 b 83.3 83.3 83.6 84.1 83.9 84.3 84.0
Healthy life years at birth (years) - women 62.3 60.9 61.5 54.6 b 53.8 55.6 59.5 59.6 57.7 57.9 54.6
Early leavers from education and training (% of
2.2 u 2.6 u 3.2 u 3.3 u 2.5 u 3.2 u 2.6 u 2.7 bu 3.4 u 3.1 u 2.5 u 3.0 u
females aged 18-24)
NEET: Young people neither in employment nor in
6.6 6.2 6.9 6.0 6.3 8.8 8.6 9.2 9.1 6.9 6.3 7.2
education and training ( % of females aged 15-24)
At-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion of children (% of
14.7 15.3 15.1 15.2 17.3 16.4 17.5 17.7 16.6 14.9 15.1
people aged 0-17)
At-risk-of-poverty (% of Children population) 11.3 11.6 11.2 12.6 14.7 13.5 14.7 14.8 14.2 11.9 12.8
Children (0-17)

Severe Material Deprivation (% of Children

4.4 5.2 5.4 5.1 5.3 5.9 6.0 4.9 4.7 4.5 3.1 2.2 p
population)
Share of children living in low work intensity
4.5 3.7 2.5 3.4 4.4 3.2 4.0 4.6 3.7 3.4 3.2
households (% of Children population)
Risk of poverty of children in households at work
8.4 9.0 9.5 9.9 11.3 11.1 11.4 11.0 11.2 9.4 10.5
(Working Intensity > 0.2)
Impact of social transfers (excl. pensions) in reducing
54.8 50.4 53.7 51.4 45.4 47.7 45.2 46.2 45.8 50.0 50.2
poverty (0-17) (%)
At-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion (% of working
16.6 18.0 16.2 18.1 18.7 19.7 20.6 21.3 19.7 19.1 17.3
age population)
At-risk-of-poverty (% of Working age population) 9.8 10.5 9.2 11.0 11.7 12.2 13.0 13.7 13.6 13.4 12.6
Working age

Severe Material Deprivation (% of Working age

5.0 6.9 6.2 6.1 6.2 6.9 6.8 7.1 6.0 5.5 4.8 3.7 p
(18-64)

population)
Very low work intensity (18-59) 8.1 7.7 6.5 8.0 8.6 8.8 9.2 10.1 8.6 8.7 7.2
In-work at-risk-of poverty rate (% of persons
4.7 5.1 4.8 5.3 6.0 6.5 7.1 6.4 6.7 6.1 6.6
employed 18-64)
Impact of social transfers (excl. pensions) in reducing
53.3 49.0 52.1 49.8 45.8 49.0 44.9 42.7 43.1 43.2 44.3
poverty (18-64) (%)
At-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion of elderly (% of
22.4 24.4 23.3 22.8 24.2 22.8 23.0 20.1 20.2 19.9 18.3
people aged 65+)
Elderly (65+)

At-risk-of-poverty (% of Elderly population) 19.4 21.3 20.0 20.2 20.9 19.6 20.5 17.1 17.2 17.6 16.4

Severe Material Deprivation (% of Elderly population) 6.6 7.4 6.5 6.3 6.8 6.6 6.7 6.7 6.1 5.8 5.4 5.1 p
Relative median income of elderly (ratio with median
0.87 0.84 0.86 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.91 0.90 0.89 0.88
income of people younger than 65)
Aggregate replacement ratio (ratio) 0.44 0.44 0.45 0.45 0.47 0.47 0.46 0.45 0.46 0.47 0.46
Sickness/Health care 6.6 6.9 7.6 7.7 7.6 7.9 7.5 7.2 7.5 7.6 p
protection indicators
Expenditure in social

Disability 1.7 1.6 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.6 1.5 1.4 1.3 1.2 p
Old age and survivors 9.6 9.4 10.7 11.1 11.3 11.5 11.9 11.5 11.3 11.0 p
(% of GDP)

Family/Children 1.7 1.7 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 1.9 1.8 1.8 1.7 p
Unemployment 0.4 0.4 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.7 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.6 p
Housing and Social exclusion n.e.c. 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.7 p
Total (including Admin and Other expenditures) 20.9 21.0 23.7 24.4 24.5 24.9 24.7 23.9 23.7 23.3 p
of which: Means tested benefits 1.8 1.7 2.0 2.0 2.0 1.9 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 p

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306
 Statistical annex - 1. Country profiles

Slovakia
Slovakia 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Real GDP 10.8 5.6 -5.4 5.0 2.8 1.7 1.5 2.8 4.2 3.1 3.2 4.1
Total employment 2.1 3.2 -2.0 -1.5 1.8 0.1 -0.8 1.4 2.0 2.4 2.2 2.0
Labour productivity 8.5 2.3 -3.5 6.7 1.0 1.6 2.3 1.3 2.2 0.7 1.0 2.1
Macro Economic Indicators

Annual average hours worked per person employed 0.9 0.1 -0.7 1.4 -0.7 -0.2 -1.0 -0.7 -0.3 -0.8 -1.5 -0.9
(Annual % growth)

Real productivity per hour worked 7.5 2.2 -2.8 5.2 1.7 1.8 3.3 2.0 2.5 1.5 2.5 3.0
Harmonized CPI 1.9 3.9 0.9 0.7 4.1 3.7 1.5 -0.1 -0.3 -0.5 1.4 2.5
Price deflator GDP 1.1 2.8 -1.2 0.5 1.6 1.3 0.5 -0.2 -0.2 -0.5 1.2 2.1
Nominal compensation per employee 8.7 6.6 2.6 5.4 2.0 2.6 2.6 1.8 3.5 2.1 5.2 5.5
Real compensation per employee (GDP deflator) 7.5 3.7 3.8 4.9 0.3 1.3 2.1 2.0 3.6 2.6 3.9 3.3
Real compensation per employee (private consumption
6.7 2.6 1.6 4.7 -2.0 -1.1 1.1 1.9 3.8 2.6 3.8 2.8
deflator)
Nominal unit labour costs 0.2 4.2 6.3 -1.1 1.0 1.0 0.3 0.5 1.3 1.3 4.2 3.3
Real unit labour costs -1.0 1.3 7.7 -1.7 -0.6 -0.4 -0.2 0.7 1.4 1.8 2.9 1.2
Total population (000) 5373 5376 5382 5390 5392 5404 5411 5416 5421 5426 5435 5443
Population aged 15-64 (000) 3857 3871 3884 3885 3882 3881 3870 3853 3834 3810 3780 3749
Total employment (000) 2358 2434 2366 2318 2315 b 2329 2329 2363 2424 2492 2531 2567
Employment aged 15-64 (000) 2351 2423 2357 2307 2303 b 2317 2318 2349 2405 2472 2502 2533
Employment rate (% population aged 20-64) 67.2 68.8 66.4 64.6 65.0 b 65.1 65.0 65.9 67.7 69.8 71.1 72.4
Employment rate (% population aged 15-64) 60.7 62.3 60.2 58.8 59.3 b 59.7 59.9 61.0 62.7 64.9 66.2 67.6
Employment rate (% population aged 15-24) 27.6 26.2 22.8 20.6 20.0 b 20.1 20.4 21.8 23.3 25.2 26.9 27.5
Employment rate (% population aged 25-54) 78.0 80.1 77.8 75.8 76.5 b 76.4 76.0 76.8 78.1 80.0 80.0 81.2
Employment rate (% population aged 55-64) 35.6 39.2 39.5 40.5 41.3 b 43.1 44.0 44.8 47.0 49.0 53.0 54.2
FTE employment rate (% population aged 20-64) 66.7 68.2 65.6 63.8 63.9 b 64.0 63.8 64.4 65.8 68.0 69.4 71.0
Self-employed (% total employment) 12.8 13.7 15.5 15.8 15.9 b 15.4 15.5 15.3 15.0 15.3 15.2 14.7
Part-time employment (% total employment) 2.5 2.5 3.4 3.8 4.0 b 4.0 4.5 5.1 5.8 5.8 5.8 4.9
Temporary employment (% total employment) 4.3 3.9 3.6 4.7 5.5 b 5.7 5.8 7.4 8.9 8.4 8.0 6.9
Employment in Services (% total employment) 55.9 b 58.4 b 59.6 59.3 b 59.1 60.8 61.0 60.6 60.6 60.0 61.0
Employment in Industry (% total employment) 40.2 b 38.0 b 37.2 37.6 b 37.6 35.9 35.5 36.2 36.6 37.4 36.8
Employment in Agriculture (% total employment) 3.9 b 3.6 b 3.2 3.1 b 3.3 3.3 3.5 3.2 2.9 2.7 2.3
Activity rate (% population aged 15-64) 68.3 68.8 68.4 68.7 68.7 b 69.4 69.9 70.3 70.9 71.9 72.1 72.4
Labour Market Indicators - Total

Activity rate (% population aged 15-24) 34.6 32.4 31.4 31.1 30.1 b 30.5 30.8 31.0 31.7 32.4 33.2 32.3
Activity rate (% population aged 25-54) 86.9 87.8 87.2 86.9 87.0 b 87.1 87.2 87.3 87.3 87.6 86.6 86.5
Activity rate (% population aged 55-64) 38.8 41.9 42.8 45.1 46.0 b 48.5 49.5 50.1 51.8 53.9 56.4 57.2
Total unemployment (000) 293 254 321 386 363 d 378 386 359 314 267 224 180
Unemployment rate (% labour force) 11.2 9.6 12.1 14.5 13.7 d 14.0 14.2 13.2 11.5 9.7 8.1 6.5
Youth unemployment rate (% labour force 15-24) 20.6 19.3 27.6 33.9 33.7 d 34.0 33.7 29.7 26.5 22.2 18.9 14.9
Long term unemployment rate (% labour force) 8.3 6.6 6.5 9.2 9.2 b 9.4 10.0 9.3 7.6 5.8 5.1 4.0
Share of long term unemployment (% of total
74.2 69.6 54.0 64.0 67.9 b 67.3 70.2 70.2 65.8 60.2 62.4 61.8
unemployment)

Youth unemployment ratio (% population aged 15-24) 7.0 6.2 8.6 10.4 10.1 b 10.4 10.4 9.2 8.4 7.2 6.3 4.8

Employment rate for low skilled 25-64 (ISCED 0-2) 29.1 32.3 30.3 29.7 30.3 b 30.7 31.3 32.7 b 34.4 37.2 38.8 37.9
Employment rate for medium skilled 25-64 (ISCED 3-
73.2 74.8 72.0 69.9 70.1 b 70.3 69.9 71.0 b 72.6 74.3 75.3 76.9
4)
Employment rate for high skilled 25-64 (ISCED 5-8) 84.2 85.6 83.2 82.2 81.5 b 80.1 79.5 80.0 b 80.3 81.3 82.0 82.6
Employment rate (Nationals aged 15-64) 60.7 62.2 60.1 58.8 59.3 b 59.7 59.9 60.9 62.7 64.9 66.2 67.6
Employment rate (Other EU28 aged 15-64) 61.0 u 77.4 70.9 63.7 64.6 bu 70.1 78.6 80.3 76.7 77.5 79.2 67.2
Employment rate (Other than EU28 aged 15-64) 78.8 u 60.3 u 67.1 u 73.5
Employment rate (Born in the same country aged 15-
60.7 62.2 60.2 58.8 59.3 b 59.7 59.8 60.9 62.8 64.9 66.2 67.5
64)
Employment rate (Born in other EU28 aged 15-64) 67.4 70.8 58.8 54.3 54.7 b 64.2 65.7 64.4 55.5 62.3 68.3 69.3
Employment rate (Born outside EU28 aged 15-64) 60.9 u 59.5 67.9 64.2 69.3 b 62.5 68.2 70.3 66.7 64.9 68.6 80.8
Underemployment (% of labour force aged 15-74) 0.7 0.9 1.3 1.4 b 1.4 1.6 1.7 2.1 2.3 2.1 1.6
Seeking but not available (% of labour force aged 15-
0.4 0.3 0.5 0.5 0.5 b 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.4
74)
Discouraged, available but not seeking (% of labour
2.2 1.8 1.7 1.7 1.6 b 1.5 1.8 1.7 2.0 1.6 1.7 1.5
force aged 15-74)

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307
Employment and Social Developments in Europe 2019

Slovakia 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Total population (000) 2611 2614 2618 2624 2625 2632 2636 2639 2642 2646 2652 2657
Population aged 15-64(000) 1923 1932 1941 1943 1944 1945 1941 1934 1926 1916 1903 1889
Total employment (000) 1322 1364 1326 1285 1292 b 1304 1295 1316 1349 1378 1385 1414
Employment aged 15-64 (000) 1319 1357 1320 1279 1285 b 1296 1288 1308 1337 1367 1370 1395
Employment rate (% population aged 20-64) 76.0 77.4 74.6 71.9 72.5 b 72.8 72.2 73.2 75.0 76.9 77.5 79.2
Employment rate (% population aged 15-64) 68.4 70.0 67.6 65.2 66.1 b 66.7 66.4 67.6 69.5 71.4 72.0 73.9
Employment rate (% population aged 15-24) 30.9 30.8 26.8 23.8 24.8 b 24.1 24.4 26.8 28.4 31.9 32.4 34.0
Employment rate (% population aged 25-54) 85.0 86.4 84.2 81.4 82.5 b 83.0 82.2 83.2 85.1 86.3 86.3 87.9
Employment rate (% population aged 55-64) 52.5 56.7 54.9 54.0 52.5 b 53.6 53.3 53.1 53.6 55.1 56.6 58.4
FTE employment rate (% population aged 20-64) 75.9 77.2 74.0 71.2 71.7 b 71.9 71.2 72.0 73.6 75.5 76.2 78.3
Self-employed (% total employment) 17.2 18.4 20.2 21.2 20.8 b 19.8 20.1 19.7 18.9 19.2 19.1 18.8
Part-time employment (% total employment) 1.0 1.3 2.6 2.6 2.7 b 2.8 3.3 3.7 4.0 4.1 4.0 3.2
Temporary employment (% total employment) 4.0 3.6 3.6 4.3 5.0 b 5.1 5.3 7.2 8.0 7.8 7.3 6.1
Employment in Services (% total employment) 42.1 b 44.8 b 45.5 45.1 b 44.7 46.2 47.2 46.8 46.9 45.7 47.0
Employment in Industry (% total employment) 52.6 b 50.4 b 50.1 50.5 b 50.8 49.2 47.9 48.6 49.0 50.5 49.8
Employment in Agriculture (% total employment) 5.3 b 4.8 b 4.4 4.4 b 4.5 4.6 4.9 4.6 4.1 3.8 3.2
Activity rate (% population aged 15-64) 75.9 76.4 76.3 76.1 76.6 b 77.1 77.2 77.6 77.5 78.3 78.2 78.7
Labour Market Indicators - Male

Activity rate (% population aged 15-24) 38.9 37.8 37.1 36.4 37.2 b 37.1 37.6 38.0 38.3 39.8 39.6 39.7
Activity rate (% population aged 25-54) 93.1 93.4 93.6 92.9 93.5 b 93.8 93.6 94.0 93.6 93.5 93.1 93.2
Activity rate (% population aged 55-64) 57.0 59.9 58.7 59.7 58.8 b 60.3 59.5 58.9 58.4 60.1 60.0 61.1
Total unemployment (000) 144 124 169 211 203 d 204 210 194 155 133 119 92
Unemployment rate (% labour force) 10.0 8.4 11.5 14.3 13.7 d 13.5 14.0 12.8 10.3 8.8 7.9 6.1
Youth unemployment rate (% labour force 15-24) 20.6 18.6 27.9 34.8 33.3 d 35.0 34.9 29.5 25.8 19.8 18.1 14.3
Long term unemployment rate (% labour force) 7.4 5.8 5.8 9.0 9.4 b 9.3 10.0 9.4 6.9 5.5 5.2 4.0
Share of long term unemployment (% of total
75.2 69.1 50.9 63.2 69.2 b 68.8 71.7 72.9 66.9 62.3 65.7 65.2
unemployment)

Youth unemployment ratio (% population aged 15-24) 7.9 7.0 10.3 12.6 12.3 b 13.0 13.1 11.2 9.9 7.9 7.2 5.7

Employment rate for low skilled 25-64 (ISCED 0-2) 33.6 39.1 39.0 37.0 35.3 b 36.0 36.9 37.0 b 39.8 43.6 45.0 46.7
Employment rate for medium skilled 25-64 (ISCED 3-
82.1 82.9 80.0 77.2 77.5 b 78.2 76.9 78.1 b 79.4 80.7 80.9 82.5
4)
Employment rate for high skilled 25-64 (ISCED 5-8) 89.9 91.7 89.5 88.1 87.1 b 85.9 85.7 87.4 b 88.2 87.4 88.6 89.8
Employment rate (Nationals aged 15-64) 68.4 69.9 67.5 65.2 66.1 b 66.7 66.3 67.6 69.4 71.3 71.9 73.8
Employment rate (Other EU28 aged 15-64) 90.3 u 93.5 u 82.0 u 75.4 bu 84.0 u 100.0 87.9 u 87.2 u 89.5 89.3 u
Employment rate (Other than EU28 aged 15-64)
Employment rate (Born in the same country aged 15-
68.4 69.9 67.5 65.2 66.1 b 66.7 66.3 67.6 69.5 71.4 72.0 73.7
64)
Employment rate (Born in other EU28 aged 15-64) 75.0 79.5 73.7 71.1 67.8 b 64.5 67.9 77.5 65.9 70.2 76.7 88.9
Employment rate (Born outside EU28 aged 15-64) 60.8 u 87.8 u 84.2 bu 75.8 u 85.7 u 81.6 u 69.8 80.9 95.4 u
Underemployment (% of labour force aged 15-74) 0.5 0.8 1.2 1.2 b 1.3 1.4 1.6 1.8 2.1 1.7 1.3
Seeking but not available (% of labour force aged 15-
0.2 0.2 u 0.3 0.4 0.4 b 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.2 u
74)
Discouraged, available but not seeking (% of labour
1.7 1.6 1.4 1.3 1.3 b 1.1 1.5 1.3 1.6 1.3 1.5 1.3
force aged 15-74)
Total population (000) 2763 2762 2764 2767 2767 2773 2775 2777 2779 2780 2784 2787
Population aged 15-64(000) 1935 1939 1942 1941 1939 1937 1929 1919 1908 1895 1877 1860
Total employment (000) 1036 1070 1040 1033 1023 b 1026 1034 1047 1075 1114 1146 1153
Employment aged 15-64 (000) 1032 1066 1036 1029 1018 b 1021 1029 1041 1068 1105 1132 1138
Employment rate (% population aged 20-64) 58.7 60.3 58.2 57.4 57.4 b 57.3 57.8 58.6 60.3 62.7 64.7 65.5
Employment rate (% population aged 15-64) 53.0 54.6 52.8 52.3 52.5 b 52.7 53.4 54.3 55.9 58.3 60.3 61.2
Employment rate (% population aged 15-24) 24.1 21.5 18.7 17.4 15.0 b 15.9 16.2 16.5 18.0 18.2 21.1 20.6
Employment rate (% population aged 25-54) 71.0 73.7 71.2 70.1 70.4 b 69.6 69.6 70.2 70.9 73.5 73.4 74.4
Employment rate (% population aged 55-64) 21.2 24.2 26.1 28.7 31.4 b 33.6 35.7 37.2 41.0 43.5 49.6 50.4
FTE employment rate (% population aged 20-64) 57.8 59.4 57.3 56.4 56.1 b 56.0 56.3 56.9 58.0 60.5 62.5 63.7
Self-employed (% total employment) 7.2 7.7 9.6 9.2 9.7 b 9.8 9.7 9.8 10.1 10.5 10.4 9.7
Part-time employment (% total employment) 4.3 4.1 4.5 5.2 5.6 b 5.5 6.2 6.8 8.0 7.9 8.0 7.0
Temporary employment (% total employment) 4.7 4.3 3.7 5.2 6.1 b 6.4 6.3 7.7 10.1 9.1 8.8 7.9
Employment in Services (% total employment)
Employment in Industry (% total employment)
Employment in Agriculture (% total employment) 2.2 b 2.0 b 1.8 1.4 b 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.3 1.4 1.3 1.1
Activity rate (% population aged 15-64) 60.8 61.3 60.6 61.3 60.8 b 61.7 62.5 62.9 64.3 65.4 65.9 65.9
Labour Market Indicators - Female

Activity rate (% population aged 15-24) 30.2 26.7 25.4 25.5 22.7 b 23.6 23.7 23.6 24.9 24.7 26.5 24.5
Activity rate (% population aged 25-54) 80.7 82.1 80.7 80.9 80.4 b 80.4 80.5 80.4 80.8 81.5 79.8 79.7
Activity rate (% population aged 55-64) 23.3 26.4 29.0 32.3 34.6 b 38.0 40.4 42.1 45.8 48.2 53.0 53.7
Total unemployment (000) 149 130 152 175 160 d 174 176 165 159 134 105 87
Unemployment rate (% labour force) 12.8 11.0 12.9 14.7 13.7 d 14.5 14.5 13.6 12.9 10.8 8.4 7.0
Youth unemployment rate (% labour force 15-24) 20.7 20.3 27.1 32.6 34.3 d 32.5 31.6 30.1 27.5 26.3 20.2 16.1
Long term unemployment rate (% labour force) 9.3 7.7 7.4 9.5 9.0 b 9.5 10.0 9.1 8.3 6.2 4.9 4.1
Share of long term unemployment (% of total
73.3 70.0 57.4 65.1 66.3 b 65.4 68.5 67.1 64.7 58.1 58.7 58.2
unemployment)

Youth unemployment ratio (% population aged 15-24) 6.1 5.3 6.7 8.1 7.7 b 7.7 7.5 7.1 6.8 6.5 5.3 4.0

Employment rate for low skilled 25-64 (ISCED 0-2) 26.4 28.5 25.2 24.9 27.1 b 27.3 27.7 29.6 b 30.5 32.5 34.1 30.9
Employment rate for medium skilled 25-64 (ISCED 3-
63.7 66.2 63.5 62.1 62.1 b 61.4 62.2 63.3 b 64.8 67.0 68.9 70.3
4)
Employment rate for high skilled 25-64 (ISCED 5-8) 79.0 79.7 77.7 77.5 76.9 b 75.6 74.4 73.9 b 74.2 76.7 77.1 77.2
Employment rate (Nationals aged 15-64) 53.0 54.6 52.8 52.4 52.5 b 52.7 53.3 54.3 55.9 58.3 60.3 61.2
Employment rate (Other EU28 aged 15-64) 68.7 u
Employment rate (Other than EU28 aged 15-64)
Employment rate (Born in the same country aged 15-
53.0 54.6 52.8 52.4 52.6 b 52.7 53.3 54.3 56.0 58.3 60.3 61.3
64)
Employment rate (Born in other EU28 aged 15-64) 61.0 61.0 45.4 37.2 42.1 bu 64.0 63.6 52.3 46.6 55.5 62.8 50.9 u
Employment rate (Born outside EU28 aged 15-64) 58.2 u 69.2 u 60.8 u 69.7 u 59.3 u 57.8 u
Underemployment (% of labour force aged 15-74) 0.9 1.0 1.4 1.6 b 1.5 1.9 1.8 2.5 2.7 2.4 2.0
Seeking but not available (% of labour force aged 15-
0.5 0.5 0.7 0.7 0.6 b 0.6 0.9 0.8 0.6 0.5 0.6 0.6
74)
Discouraged, available but not seeking (% of labour
2.7 2.1 2.1 2.2 1.9 b 2.0 2.2 2.1 2.5 2.0 1.9 1.8
force aged 15-74)

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308
 Statistical annex - 1. Country profiles

Slovakia 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
At-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion (% of total
21.4 20.6 19.6 20.6 20.6 20.5 19.8 18.4 18.4 18.1 16.3
population)
At-risk-of-poverty (% of total population) 10.6 10.9 11.0 12.0 13.0 13.2 12.8 12.6 12.3 12.7 12.4
At-risk-of-poverty threshold (PPS single person) 3365 4058 4694 5016 5385 5879 5743 5883 6132 6280 6344
Poverty gap (%) 19.2 18.1 23.2 25.7 22.8 20.5 24.1 29.0 28.9 26.1 26.0
Persistent at-risk-of-poverty (% of total
4.9 5.4 6.0 7.8 8.6 7.1 9.8 7.4 7.7
population)
At-risk-of-poverty before social transfers excl.
18.2 18.4 17.1 19.8 19.5 20.0 20.1 19.6 19.0 18.4 17.5
pensions (% of total population)
Impact of social transfers (excl. pensions) in
41.8 40.8 35.7 39.4 33.3 34.0 36.3 35.7 35.3 31.0 29.1
reducing poverty (%)
All

Severe Material Deprivation (% of total population) 13.7 11.8 11.1 11.4 10.6 10.5 10.2 9.9 9.0 8.2 7.0
Share of people living in low work intensity households
6.4 5.2 5.6 7.9 7.7 7.2 7.6 7.1 7.1 6.5 5.4
(% of people aged 0-59)
Real Gross Household Disposable income (growth %) 9.2 4.9 1.4 0.5 -1.9 -0.6 0.1 2.6 4.2 3.2
Income quintile share ratio S80/S20 3.5 3.4 3.6 3.8 3.8 3.7 3.6 3.9 3.5 3.6 3.5
GINI coefficient 24.5 23.7 24.8 25.9 25.7 25.3 24.2 26.1 23.7 24.3 23.2
Early leavers from education and training (% of
6.5 6.0 4.9 4.7 5.1 b 5.3 6.4 6.7 b 6.9 7.4 9.3 8.6
population aged 18-24)
NEET: Young people neither in employment nor in
education and training (% of total population aged 15- 12.5 11.1 12.5 14.1 13.8 b 13.8 13.7 12.8 13.7 12.3 12.1 10.2
24)
At-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion (% of male
19.4 18.9 18.0 19.6 19.5 19.7 19.3 18.1 18.1 18.1 16.3
population)
At-risk-of-poverty (% of male population) 9.9 10.1 10.1 11.7 12.8 13.2 12.8 12.7 12.1 12.7 12.4
Poverty gap (%) 22.4 21.0 24.7 28.0 24.5 20.5 25.5 30.7 32.6 27.8 28.8
Persistent at-risk-of-poverty (% of male
4.6 5.1 4.6 7.6 8.5 6.7 10.3 7.2 7.4
population)
Severe Material Deprivation (% of male population) 12.8 11.1 10.5 11.1 10.1 10.1 10.0 9.7 8.9 8.1 7.2
Male

Share of people living in low work intensity households

5.7 4.5 5.1 7.4 7.5 7.0 7.2 7.2 7.4 6.6 5.3
(% of males aged 0-59)
Life expectancy at birth (years) 70.6 70.9 b 71.4 71.8 72.3 72.5 72.9 73.3 73.1 73.8 73.8
Healthy life years at birth (years) - men 55.6 52.1 b 52.4 52.4 52.1 53.4 54.5 55.5 54.8 56.4 55.6
Early leavers from education and training (% of males
7.2 7.1 5.7 4.6 5.4 b 6.0 6.7 6.9 b 6.9 7.6 8.5 8.3
aged 18-24)
NEET: Young people neither in employment nor in
11.0 9.6 12.2 13.8 13.9 b 14.5 14.2 12.8 13.3 10.9 10.5 8.4
education and training ( % of males aged 15-24)
At-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion (% of female
23.1 22.0 21.1 21.6 21.7 21.3 20.2 18.7 18.6 18.2 16.2
population)
At-risk-of-poverty (% of female population) 11.2 11.5 11.8 12.2 13.1 13.3 12.9 12.6 12.4 12.8 12.3
Poverty gap (%) 17.2 16.5 21.8 24.3 21.0 20.6 23.0 26.1 25.5 24.3 23.9
Persistent at-risk-of-poverty (% of female
5.2 5.6 7.3 8.0 8.7 7.4 9.4 7.7 8.0
population)
Social Indicators

Severe Material Deprivation (% of female population) 14.5 12.3 11.6 11.8 11.0 10.8 10.5 10.0 9.1 8.3 6.8
Female

Share of people living in low work intensity households

7.2 5.9 6.0 8.4 7.8 7.5 7.9 7.0 6.9 6.3 5.4
(% of females aged 0-59)
Life expectancy at birth (years) 78.4 79.0 b 79.1 79.3 79.8 79.9 80.1 80.5 80.2 80.7 80.7
Healthy life years at birth (years) - women 56.1 52.5 b 52.6 52.0 52.3 53.1 54.3 54.6 55.1 57.0 55.6
Early leavers from education and training (% of
5.8 4.9 4.1 4.9 4.6 b 4.6 6.1 6.6 b 6.8 7.2 10.3 8.8
females aged 18-24)
NEET: Young people neither in employment nor in
14.1 12.5 12.9 14.4 13.7 b 13.1 13.1 12.8 14.2 13.7 13.8 12.0
education and training ( % of females aged 15-24)
At-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion of children (% of
25.8 24.3 23.7 25.3 26.0 26.6 25.5 23.6 24.9 24.4 22.5
people aged 0-17)
At-risk-of-poverty (% of Children population) 17.2 16.7 16.8 18.8 21.2 21.9 20.3 19.2 20.1 20.8 19.9
Children (0-17)

Severe Material Deprivation (% of Children

16.3 12.6 12.7 13.5 12.4 11.9 13.0 12.1 11.2 9.7 9.1
population)
Share of children living in low work intensity
5.5 4.4 5.4 8.1 7.3 7.2 8.4 8.1 8.0 8.2 7.1
households (% of Children population)
Risk of poverty of children in households at work
13.0 13.7 12.7 13.0 16.1 16.4 13.4 12.7 14.2 14.6 14.2
(Working Intensity > 0.2)
Impact of social transfers (excl. pensions) in reducing
36.5 38.2 30.3 35.8 28.6 29.8 33.7 36.2 37.6 28.8 27.6
poverty (0-17) (%)
At-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion (% of working
20.1 19.3 18.5 20.2 20.6 19.9 19.4 18.1 17.8 17.6 15.5
age population)
At-risk-of-poverty (% of Working age population) 9.3 9.5 9.6 11.2 12.4 12.3 12.1 12.3 11.6 12.0 11.5
Working age

Severe Material Deprivation (% of Working age

12.3 10.8 10.6 11.0 10.3 10.1 9.7 9.4 8.4 7.9 6.5
(18-64)

population)
Very low work intensity (18-59) 6.7 5.4 5.6 7.9 7.8 7.2 7.3 6.9 6.9 6.0 4.8
In-work at-risk-of poverty rate (% of persons
4.9 5.8 5.2 5.7 6.3 6.2 5.8 5.7 6.1 6.5 6.4
employed 18-64)
Impact of social transfers (excl. pensions) in reducing
45.3 43.5 39.2 41.4 34.7 35.6 37.3 35.6 34.5 31.8 30.3
poverty (18-64) (%)
At-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion of elderly (% of
22.1 21.9 19.7 16.7 14.5 16.3 13.6 13.4 12.8 12.3 12.1
people aged 65+)
Elderly (65+)

At-risk-of-poverty (% of Elderly population) 8.5 9.9 10.8 7.7 6.3 7.8 6.0 6.2 5.6 5.7 6.9

Severe Material Deprivation (% of Elderly population) 17.7 15.3 11.7 11.1 9.7 10.8 9.2 9.2 9.2 8.0 6.9
Relative median income of elderly (ratio with median
0.81 0.79 0.81 0.83 0.86 0.81 0.90 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.89
income of people younger than 65)
Aggregate replacement ratio (ratio) 0.54 0.54 0.55 0.61 0.62 0.56 0.61 0.62 0.62 0.62 0.62
Sickness/Health care 4.6 5.0 5.6 5.4 5.3 5.3 5.5 5.6 5.5 5.8 p
protection indicators
Expenditure in social

Disability 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 p
Old age and survivors 6.6 6.5 7.6 7.6 7.5 7.7 7.9 8.2 8.1 8.0 p
(% of GDP)

Family/Children 1.5 1.4 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.6 1.6 p
Unemployment 0.5 0.6 1.0 1.0 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.5 p
Housing and Social exclusion n.e.c. 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.3 p
Total (including Admin and Other expenditures) 15.7 15.7 18.5 18.2 17.8 18.0 18.3 18.5 18.2 18.3 p
of which: Means tested benefits 1.0 0.8 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.7 p

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309
Employment and Social Developments in Europe 2019

Finland
Finland 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Real GDP 5.2 0.7 -8.3 3.0 2.6 -1.4 -0.8 -0.6 0.5 2.8 2.7 2.3
Total employment 2.1 2.2 -2.4 -0.7 1.3 0.9 -0.7 -0.5 -0.1 0.5 1.2 2.7
Labour productivity 3.0 -1.5 -6.0 3.7 1.3 -2.3 0.0 -0.2 0.6 2.3 1.5 -0.3
Macro Economic Indicators

Annual average hours worked per person employed -0.1 -0.4 -1.4 0.4 -0.3 -0.7 -0.7 -0.2 0.1 -0.2 -0.2 -0.1
(Annual % growth)

Real productivity per hour worked 3.1 -1.1 -4.7 3.3 1.6 -1.6 0.6 0.0 0.6 2.5 1.7 -0.3
Harmonized CPI 1.6 3.9 1.6 1.7 3.3 3.2 2.2 1.2 -0.2 0.4 0.8 1.2
Price deflator GDP 2.8 3.1 1.9 0.4 2.6 3.0 2.6 1.7 1.7 0.1 0.9 1.9
Nominal compensation per employee 3.3 4.3 2.0 2.2 3.6 2.8 1.4 1.0 1.5 1.1 -1.2 1.2
Real compensation per employee (GDP deflator) 0.6 1.2 0.1 1.9 1.0 -0.2 -1.2 -0.7 -0.2 0.9 -2.2 -0.7
Real compensation per employee (private consumption
1.7 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.3 -0.4 -0.9 -0.3 1.6 0.7 -2.1 0.1
deflator)
Nominal unit labour costs 0.3 5.8 8.5 -1.4 2.3 5.2 1.4 1.1 0.8 -1.2 -2.7 1.6
Real unit labour costs -2.5 2.7 6.5 -1.7 -0.3 2.2 -1.1 -0.6 -0.8 -1.4 -3.6 -0.3
Total population (000) 5277 5300 5326 5351 5375 5401 5427 5451 5472 5487 5503 5513
Population aged 15-64 (000) 3507 3531 3543 3553 3547 3533 3517 3500 3484 3468 3459 3443
Total employment (000) 2492 2531 b 2457 2448 2474 2483 2457 2447 2437 2448 2473 2540
Employment aged 15-64 (000) 2459 2497 b 2423 2410 2429 2431 2403 2386 2368 2380 2403 2465
Employment rate (% population aged 20-64) 74.8 75.8 73.5 73.0 73.8 74.0 73.3 73.1 72.9 73.4 74.2 76.3
Employment rate (% population aged 15-64) 70.3 71.1 68.7 68.1 69.0 69.4 68.9 68.7 68.5 69.1 70.0 72.1
Employment rate (% population aged 15-24) 44.6 44.7 39.6 38.8 40.4 41.8 41.5 41.4 40.5 41.7 42.5 44.0
Employment rate (% population aged 25-54) 83.4 84.3 82.4 81.6 82.3 82.0 81.0 80.5 80.0 79.9 80.6 82.5
Employment rate (% population aged 55-64) 55.0 56.5 55.5 56.2 57.0 58.2 58.5 59.1 60.0 61.4 62.5 65.4
FTE employment rate (% population aged 20-64) 71.5 b 72.5 b 70.4 69.6 70.5 70.4 70.1 69.8 69.1 69.8 70.1 72.7
Self-employed (% total employment) 12.0 12.3 b 13.1 12.8 12.9 13.1 13.0 13.5 13.8 13.5 12.8 12.8
Part-time employment (% total employment) 13.4 12.7 13.3 13.8 14.1 14.1 14.0 14.1 14.1 14.9 15.0 15.1
Temporary employment (% total employment) 14.0 13.1 12.6 13.4 13.6 13.5 13.4 13.4 13.1 13.6 13.9 14.2
Employment in Services (% total employment) 70.6 b 71.7 72.5 73.0 73.3 73.2 74.2 74.4 74.3 74.3 74.3
Employment in Industry (% total employment) 25.2 b 24.0 23.3 23.0 22.9 22.9 22.0 21.8 22.3 22.3 22.4
Employment in Agriculture (% total employment) 4.2 b 4.3 4.1 4.0 3.8 3.8 3.9 3.8 3.5 3.4 3.3
Activity rate (% population aged 15-64) 75.6 76.0 75.0 74.5 74.9 75.2 75.2 75.4 75.8 75.9 76.7 77.9
Labour Market Indicators - Total

Activity rate (% population aged 15-24) 53.4 53.5 50.4 49.4 50.5 51.6 51.8 52.1 52.2 52.2 53.2 53.1
Activity rate (% population aged 25-54) 88.0 88.6 88.2 87.5 87.7 87.3 86.8 86.6 86.6 86.3 86.8 87.8
Activity rate (% population aged 55-64) 58.8 59.7 59.1 60.2 60.9 62.3 62.9 63.8 65.2 66.4 67.8 70.3
Total unemployment (000) 183 172 221 224 209 207 219 232 252 237 234 202
Unemployment rate (% labour force) 6.9 6.4 8.2 8.4 7.8 7.7 8.2 8.7 9.4 8.8 8.6 7.4
Youth unemployment rate (% labour force 15-24) 16.5 16.5 21.5 21.4 20.1 19.0 19.9 20.5 22.4 20.1 20.1 17.0
Long term unemployment rate (% labour force) 1.5 1.2 1.4 2.0 1.7 1.6 1.7 1.9 2.3 2.3 2.1 1.6
Share of long term unemployment (% of total
22.6 18.2 16.7 23.8 22.0 21.2 20.6 22.1 24.4 25.7 24.2 21.8
unemployment)

Youth unemployment ratio (% population aged 15-24) 8.8 8.8 b 10.9 10.6 10.1 9.8 10.3 10.7 11.7 10.5 10.7 9.0

Employment rate for low skilled 25-64 (ISCED 0-2) 58.6 59.3 b 56.8 55.0 55.5 55.2 54.1 53.5 b 53.1 54.3 53.2 55.4
Employment rate for medium skilled 25-64 (ISCED 3-
76.2 77.3 b 74.8 74.1 74.7 74.6 73.6 73.2 b 72.7 73.0 73.4 75.3
4)
Employment rate for high skilled 25-64 (ISCED 5-8) 85.2 85.6 b 84.4 84.1 84.3 84.4 83.8 83.5 b 83.1 83.0 84.5 86.3
Employment rate (Nationals aged 15-64) 70.5 71.3 b 68.9 68.5 69.4 69.7 69.2 69.2 69.0 69.7 70.5 72.7
Employment rate (Other EU28 aged 15-64) 73.9 76.2 b 72.0 70.7 70.8 73.8 69.5 70.7 70.4 71.3 72.8 72.3
Employment rate (Other than EU28 aged 15-64) 49.4 51.6 b 51.5 46.9 47.4 48.8 50.9 47.6 45.9 44.1 48.0 48.2
Employment rate (Born in the same country aged 15-
70.5 71.3 b 68.9 68.5 69.4 69.6 69.2 69.2 69.2 69.8 70.6 72.8
64)
Employment rate (Born in other EU28 aged 15-64) 74.7 75.9 b 72.9 71.6 71.9 75.5 74.0 72.4 70.1 71.2 71.5 71.9
Employment rate (Born outside EU28 aged 15-64) 55.8 58.3 b 57.9 53.5 54.1 55.9 56.3 54.0 52.7 51.2 54.1 57.0
Underemployment (% of labour force aged 15-74) 2.7 3.0 3.0 2.9 2.8 3.0 3.4 3.7 3.8 3.5 3.7
Seeking but not available (% of labour force aged 15-
2.3 2.1 2.1 2.3 2.4 2.3 2.3 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.5 2.5
74)
Discouraged, available but not seeking (% of labour
3.0 2.8 3.4 3.7 3.7 4.1 4.6 5.1 5.3 5.7 5.2 4.6
force aged 15-74)

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310
 Statistical annex - 1. Country profiles

Finland 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Total population (000) 2584 2597 2612 2625 2638 2653 2667 2680 2692 2701 2712 2719
Population aged 15-64(000) 1773 1785 1791 1796 1793 1787 1779 1771 1763 1757 1755 1748
Total employment (000) 1290 1315 b 1255 1259 1278 1277 1261 1254 1249 1267 1282 1317
Employment aged 15-64 (000) 1268 1291 b 1233 1234 1249 1244 1228 1215 1206 1225 1238 1270
Employment rate (% population aged 20-64) 77.2 78.4 74.7 74.5 75.6 75.5 74.7 74.0 73.9 75.0 75.9 78.2
Employment rate (% population aged 15-64) 72.1 73.1 69.5 69.4 70.6 70.5 69.9 69.5 69.3 70.5 71.4 73.5
Employment rate (% population aged 15-24) 44.5 44.3 37.7 37.7 39.5 41.0 39.1 39.8 38.1 40.1 41.4 42.6
Employment rate (% population aged 25-54) 86.0 87.3 84.3 83.9 84.8 84.4 83.9 82.7 82.5 83.0 83.3 85.3
Employment rate (% population aged 55-64) 55.1 57.1 54.6 55.6 56.8 56.6 56.5 56.8 57.4 59.8 61.7 64.3
FTE employment rate (% population aged 20-64) 75.3 b 76.6 b 73.0 72.4 73.4 73.5 72.8 72.5 71.5 72.6 73.5 76.0
Self-employed (% total employment) 16.0 16.1 b 17.3 17.0 17.1 17.4 17.3 17.9 18.2 17.8 16.5 16.4
Part-time employment (% total employment) 8.3 7.9 8.3 8.9 9.4 9.1 8.8 9.2 9.7 10.0 9.9 10.0
Temporary employment (% total employment) 10.3 9.4 8.7 10.2 10.5 10.5 10.2 10.2 10.2 10.7 10.9 11.1
Employment in Services (% total employment) 55.4 b 56.7 58.3 58.4 58.5 58.4 59.7 60.1 60.2 60.0 60.2
Employment in Industry (% total employment) 39.0 b 37.5 36.2 36.1 36.1 36.2 34.9 34.4 35.0 35.3 35.2
Employment in Agriculture (% total employment) 5.7 b 5.8 5.5 5.5 5.4 5.4 5.5 5.5 4.9 4.7 4.6
Activity rate (% population aged 15-64) 77.2 77.9 76.4 76.4 77.2 77.1 76.8 76.8 77.2 77.7 78.5 79.5
Labour Market Indicators - Male

Activity rate (% population aged 15-24) 53.3 53.4 49.7 49.4 50.5 51.2 50.8 51.5 51.1 51.2 52.3 51.5
Activity rate (% population aged 25-54) 90.4 91.2 90.6 90.5 90.9 90.4 90.1 89.5 89.6 89.7 89.8 90.8
Activity rate (% population aged 55-64) 59.1 60.6 58.7 60.1 61.4 61.6 61.5 61.9 63.2 65.1 67.5 69.7
Total unemployment (000) 90 85 122 126 117 115 122 129 137 126 125 106
Unemployment rate (% labour force) 6.5 6.1 8.9 9.1 8.4 8.3 8.8 9.3 9.9 9.0 8.9 7.4
Youth unemployment rate (% labour force 15-24) 16.4 17.1 24.1 23.8 21.8 19.9 22.9 22.8 25.4 21.8 20.9 17.3
Long term unemployment rate (% labour force) 1.7 1.2 1.6 2.5 2.2 2.1 2.0 2.2 2.7 2.5 2.4 1.8
Share of long term unemployment (% of total
26.0 20.3 18.2 27.6 26.0 24.9 23.2 24.1 27.8 28.2 27.0 24.5
unemployment)

Youth unemployment ratio (% population aged 15-24) 8.8 9.2 b 12.0 11.8 11.0 10.2 11.6 11.7 13.0 11.2 11.0 8.9

Employment rate for low skilled 25-64 (ISCED 0-2) 62.7 63.5 b 60.0 59.1 60.3 59.0 58.2 58.1 b 58.4 61.2 59.5 62.0
Employment rate for medium skilled 25-64 (ISCED 3-
79.1 80.4 b 76.6 76.1 77.3 76.9 76.3 75.0 b 75.1 75.6 76.3 78.3
4)
Employment rate for high skilled 25-64 (ISCED 5-8) 87.5 88.8 b 86.9 86.8 87.2 86.9 86.3 85.6 b 84.8 85.4 87.2 88.8
Employment rate (Nationals aged 15-64) 72.2 73.2 b 69.6 69.5 70.7 70.7 70.1 69.6 69.5 70.7 71.5 73.7
Employment rate (Other EU28 aged 15-64) 78.1 79.9 b 72.0 74.1 77.0 76.8 70.9 73.0 73.6 77.7 79.0 78.5
Employment rate (Other than EU28 aged 15-64) 60.7 61.3 b 60.4 56.8 57.5 58.1 60.8 60.1 58.6 56.1 61.5 59.0
Employment rate (Born in the same country aged 15-
72.2 73.2 b 69.6 69.5 70.8 70.6 70.0 69.7 69.6 70.8 71.5 73.7
64)
Employment rate (Born in other EU28 aged 15-64) 78.6 76.7 b 71.5 73.1 74.7 78.5 75.4 72.6 73.7 75.5 74.3 76.4
Employment rate (Born outside EU28 aged 15-64) 62.0 66.7 b 65.0 61.6 61.1 62.2 64.4 62.1 59.7 60.5 64.7 65.9
Underemployment (% of labour force aged 15-74) 1.6 2.0 2.0 1.9 1.9 2.0 2.4 2.7 2.7 2.6 2.6
Seeking but not available (% of labour force aged 15-
2.0 1.8 1.9 1.9 2.0 2.0 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.2
74)
Discouraged, available but not seeking (% of labour
3.0 2.8 3.7 3.9 3.9 4.4 4.9 5.5 5.6 6.0 5.3 4.9
force aged 15-74)
Total population (000) 2693 2704 2715 2726 2737 2749 2760 2771 2780 2786 2791 2794
Population aged 15-64(000) 1734 1746 1752 1757 1753 1746 1738 1729 1720 1711 1705 1695
Total employment (000) 1202 1216 b 1202 1188 1196 1206 1195 1193 1188 1182 1191 1223
Employment aged 15-64 (000) 1191 1206 b 1191 1176 1179 1187 1176 1171 1162 1154 1165 1195
Employment rate (% population aged 20-64) 72.5 73.1 72.4 71.5 71.9 72.5 71.9 72.1 71.8 71.7 72.4 74.5
Employment rate (% population aged 15-64) 68.5 69.0 67.9 66.9 67.4 68.2 67.8 68.0 67.7 67.6 68.5 70.6
Employment rate (% population aged 15-24) 44.7 45.1 41.5 39.9 41.2 42.7 43.9 43.0 42.8 43.3 43.7 45.5
Employment rate (% population aged 25-54) 80.6 81.2 80.5 79.2 79.6 79.4 78.1 78.1 77.3 76.7 77.9 79.5
Employment rate (% population aged 55-64) 55.0 55.8 56.3 56.9 57.2 59.7 60.5 61.4 62.5 63.0 63.4 66.5
FTE employment rate (% population aged 20-64) 68.1 b 68.7 b 68.1 67.1 67.8 67.6 67.6 67.4 66.8 67.4 66.9 69.7
Self-employed (% total employment) 7.8 8.2 b 8.6 8.5 8.5 8.5 8.5 9.0 9.1 8.9 8.7 8.8
Part-time employment (% total employment) 18.8 17.8 18.5 19.0 19.0 19.4 19.4 19.3 18.7 20.2 20.5 20.6
Temporary employment (% total employment) 17.8 17.1 16.7 16.8 16.8 16.7 16.8 16.6 16.2 16.6 17.1 17.5
Employment in Services (% total employment)
Employment in Industry (% total employment)
Employment in Agriculture (% total employment) 2.6 b 2.7 2.7 2.3 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.1 1.9 2.0 2.0
Activity rate (% population aged 15-64) 73.8 73.9 73.5 72.5 72.7 73.4 73.4 73.9 74.4 74.1 74.9 76.3
Labour Market Indicators - Female

Activity rate (% population aged 15-24) 53.6 53.5 51.2 49.3 50.5 52.0 52.9 52.6 53.3 53.1 54.2 54.7
Activity rate (% population aged 25-54) 85.6 85.9 85.7 84.4 84.3 84.1 83.3 83.6 83.6 82.8 83.6 84.6
Activity rate (% population aged 55-64) 58.4 58.8 59.5 60.3 60.4 62.9 64.3 65.5 67.2 67.6 68.2 70.8
Total unemployment (000) 93 87 99 98 91 92 97 103 115 111 109 96
Unemployment rate (% labour force) 7.2 6.7 7.6 7.6 7.1 7.1 7.5 8.0 8.8 8.6 8.4 7.3
Youth unemployment rate (% labour force 15-24) 16.6 15.8 19.0 19.0 18.4 18.0 17.1 18.4 19.7 18.6 19.3 16.8
Long term unemployment rate (% labour force) 1.4 1.1 1.1 1.4 1.2 1.2 1.3 1.6 1.8 2.0 1.8 1.4
Share of long term unemployment (% of total
19.3 16.1 14.8 18.9 16.8 16.5 17.3 19.6 20.3 22.9 20.9 18.8
unemployment)

Youth unemployment ratio (% population aged 15-24) 8.9 8.4 b 9.7 9.4 9.3 9.4 9.0 9.7 10.5 9.9 10.5 9.2

Employment rate for low skilled 25-64 (ISCED 0-2) 53.5 53.7 b 52.5 49.4 48.9 49.8 48.3 46.5 b 44.8 43.7 42.7 44.2
Employment rate for medium skilled 25-64 (ISCED 3-
72.8 73.5 b 72.7 71.6 71.6 71.8 70.4 70.9 b 69.7 69.6 69.8 71.4
4)
Employment rate for high skilled 25-64 (ISCED 5-8) 83.4 83.3 b 82.6 82.1 82.2 82.5 82.0 81.9 b 81.9 81.3 82.6 84.5
Employment rate (Nationals aged 15-64) 68.9 69.3 b 68.3 67.4 68.0 68.6 68.4 68.7 68.6 68.6 69.4 71.6
Employment rate (Other EU28 aged 15-64) 68.8 71.5 b 71.9 67.4 64.2 70.4 68.0 68.1 66.9 64.3 65.4 64.5
Employment rate (Other than EU28 aged 15-64) 39.8 42.3 b 42.7 37.7 37.8 39.3 40.4 33.9 34.3 33.3 35.0 38.5
Employment rate (Born in the same country aged 15-
68.9 69.3 b 68.2 67.5 68.0 68.6 68.4 68.8 68.7 68.8 69.7 71.9
64)
Employment rate (Born in other EU28 aged 15-64) 70.3 74.9 b 74.4 70.0 69.0 72.7 72.7 72.3 66.6 67.1 68.5 66.6
Employment rate (Born outside EU28 aged 15-64) 50.5 50.8 b 51.4 46.4 48.0 49.9 48.9 46.4 46.5 43.5 45.2 49.4
Underemployment (% of labour force aged 15-74) 3.9 4.0 4.0 3.8 3.7 4.0 4.5 4.7 5.0 4.5 4.9
Seeking but not available (% of labour force aged 15-
2.6 2.5 2.4 2.6 2.8 2.8 2.6 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.9 2.7
74)
Discouraged, available but not seeking (% of labour
3.1 2.8 3.1 3.5 3.5 3.8 4.2 4.6 4.9 5.3 5.1 4.3
force aged 15-74)

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311
Employment and Social Developments in Europe 2019

Finland 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
At-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion (% of total
17.4 17.4 16.9 16.9 17.9 17.2 16.0 17.3 16.8 16.6 15.7 16.5
population)
At-risk-of-poverty (% of total population) 13.0 13.6 13.8 13.1 13.7 13.2 11.8 12.8 12.4 11.6 11.5 12.0
At-risk-of-poverty threshold (PPS single person) 9145 9933 10421 10327 10760 11146 11507 11550 11658 11998 11882 12031
Poverty gap (%) 14.1 15.7 15.1 13.8 13.5 15.0 15.0 13.9 13.2 13.9 13.7 14.2
Persistent at-risk-of-poverty (% of total
7.6 6.8 6.5 7.7 7.5 7.4 7.0 7.0 8.3 6.0 6.0 5.2
population)
At-risk-of-poverty before social transfers excl.
28.9 27.3 26.2 27.0 27.4 26.9 26.4 27.6 26.8 27.0 26.7 25.9
pensions (% of total population)
Impact of social transfers (excl. pensions) in
55.0 50.2 47.3 51.5 50.0 50.9 55.3 53.6 53.7 57.0 56.9 53.7
reducing poverty (%)
All

Severe Material Deprivation (% of total population) 3.6 3.5 2.8 2.8 3.2 2.9 2.5 2.8 2.2 2.2 2.1 2.8
Share of people living in low work intensity households
8.8 7.5 8.4 9.3 10.0 9.3 9.0 10.0 10.8 11.4 10.7 10.8
(% of people aged 0-59)
Real Gross Household Disposable income (growth %) 3.8 2.4 0.8 2.5 1.1 0.1 0.4 -0.7 1.4 1.2 0.9
Income quintile share ratio S80/S20 3.7 3.8 3.7 3.6 3.7 3.7 3.6 3.6 3.6 3.6 3.5 3.6
GINI coefficient 26.2 26.3 25.9 25.4 25.8 25.9 25.4 25.6 25.2 25.4 25.3 25.9
Early leavers from education and training (% of
9.1 9.8 9.9 10.3 9.8 8.9 9.3 9.5 b 9.2 7.9 8.2 8.3
population aged 18-24)
NEET: Young people neither in employment nor in
education and training (% of total population aged 15- 7.1 7.9 9.8 9.0 8.4 8.6 9.3 10.2 10.6 9.9 9.4 8.5
24)
At-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion (% of male
15.8 15.9 15.8 16.0 17.3 17.0 15.7 16.9 16.8 16.6 15.6 16.2
population)
At-risk-of-poverty (% of male population) 12.1 12.7 12.9 12.4 13.2 12.9 11.3 12.3 12.2 11.7 11.5 11.7
Poverty gap (%) 14.7 17.1 16.6 14.7 15.2 16.4 17.2 15.3 15.3 15.1 14.5 16.1
Persistent at-risk-of-poverty (% of male
6.5 6.2 5.1 7.4 6.8 6.6 6.5 6.6 7.6 5.5 5.9 4.5
population)
Severe Material Deprivation (% of male population) 3.0 3.2 2.9 2.6 3.2 3.0 2.5 2.7 2.1 2.0 2.0 2.9
Male

Share of people living in low work intensity households

8.6 7.3 8.7 9.6 10.4 10.2 10.0 11.0 11.9 12.4 11.7 11.7
(% of males aged 0-59)
Life expectancy at birth (years) 76.0 b 76.5 76.6 76.9 77.3 77.7 78.4 78.7 78.6 78.9
Healthy life years at birth (years) - men 56.8 b 58.6 58.2 58.5 57.7 57.3 58.7 59.4 59.1 58.3
Early leavers from education and training (% of males
11.2 12.1 10.7 11.6 11.2 9.8 10.4 11.9 b 10.6 9.0 9.5 9.2
aged 18-24)
NEET: Young people neither in employment nor in
6.3 7.8 10.5 9.4 8.7 8.5 10.6 11.8 11.5 10.7 10.0 8.7
education and training ( % of males aged 15-24)
At-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion (% of female
19.0 18.9 17.9 17.7 18.5 17.4 16.2 17.6 16.8 16.6 15.7 16.7
population)
At-risk-of-poverty (% of female population) 13.8 14.5 14.7 13.8 14.2 13.6 12.3 13.3 12.6 11.6 11.4 12.3
Poverty gap (%) 13.5 14.1 14.6 12.9 12.4 13.9 13.2 13.0 12.3 12.5 13.0 13.0
Persistent at-risk-of-poverty (% of female
8.5 7.4 7.7 8.1 8.1 8.1 7.4 7.3 8.9 6.5 6.2 5.8
population)
Social Indicators

Severe Material Deprivation (% of female population) 4.1 3.8 2.7 3.1 3.2 2.9 2.5 2.9 2.3 2.4 2.2 2.8
Female

Share of people living in low work intensity households

9.0 7.6 8.0 9.0 9.5 8.3 8.0 9.0 9.6 10.4 9.7 9.8
(% of females aged 0-59)
Life expectancy at birth (years) 83.1 b 83.3 83.5 83.5 83.8 83.7 84.1 84.4 84.4 84.5
Healthy life years at birth (years) - women 58.0 b 59.5 58.6 57.9 58.3 56.2 57.5 56.3 57.0 56.4
Early leavers from education and training (% of
7.2 7.7 9.0 9.0 8.4 8.1 8.3 7.2 b 7.9 6.9 6.9 7.4
females aged 18-24)
NEET: Young people neither in employment nor in
7.9 8.1 9.2 8.6 8.2 8.6 8.1 8.5 9.6 9.2 8.8 8.4
education and training ( % of females aged 15-24)
At-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion of children (% of
15.1 15.1 14.0 14.2 16.1 14.9 13.0 15.6 14.9 14.7 15.1 16.0
people aged 0-17)
At-risk-of-poverty (% of Children population) 10.9 12.0 12.1 11.4 11.8 11.1 9.3 10.9 10.0 9.3 10.2 11.1
Children (0-17)

Severe Material Deprivation (% of Children

3.4 3.1 2.5 2.3 3.2 2.8 1.8 2.0 2.0 1.8 1.8 2.7
population)
Share of children living in low work intensity
6.0 4.9 5.8 5.9 7.6 5.9 6.1 6.6 7.2 8.2 8.7 8.6
households (% of Children population)
Risk of poverty of children in households at work
8.2 9.1 7.9 7.6 7.5 7.7 6.3 8.5 7.2 6.0 6.2 6.8
(Working Intensity > 0.2)
Impact of social transfers (excl. pensions) in reducing
65.3 59.6 56.5 61.6 60.9 63.0 68.2 66.3 67.3 69.6 67.4 63.5
poverty (0-17) (%)
At-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion (% of working
16.8 16.5 16.2 17.1 18.0 17.3 16.7 17.9 18.1 18.2 16.7 17.5
age population)
At-risk-of-poverty (% of Working age population) 11.5 11.8 12.2 12.3 12.8 12.4 11.3 12.5 12.7 12.2 11.6 11.9
Working age

Severe Material Deprivation (% of Working age

3.9 3.7 3.1 3.3 3.5 3.4 3.1 3.4 2.6 2.5 2.5 3.4
(18-64)

population)
Very low work intensity (18-59) 9.8 8.4 9.3 10.6 10.9 10.6 10.1 11.3 12.1 12.6 11.6 11.6
In-work at-risk-of poverty rate (% of persons
5.0 5.1 3.7 3.7 3.9 3.8 3.8 3.7 3.5 3.1 2.7 3.1
employed 18-64)
Impact of social transfers (excl. pensions) in reducing
58.2 54.1 50.8 53.8 52.9 53.4 57.8 54.9 54.5 57.2 58.6 55.4
poverty (18-64) (%)
At-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion of elderly (% of
23.1 23.9 23.1 19.5 19.8 19.5 16.8 17.0 14.5 13.6 13.2 14.0
people aged 65+)
Elderly (65+)

At-risk-of-poverty (% of Elderly population) 21.6 22.5 22.1 18.3 18.9 18.4 16.1 16.0 13.8 12.3 12.3 13.2

Severe Material Deprivation (% of Elderly population) 2.6 3.2 2.2 1.7 2.1 1.5 1.1 1.7 1.2 1.7 1.1 1.3
Relative median income of elderly (ratio with median
0.74 0.72 0.73 0.78 0.78 0.78 0.78 0.79 0.81 0.83 0.84 0.82
income of people younger than 65)
Aggregate replacement ratio (ratio) 0.47 0.49 0.48 0.50 0.50 0.49 0.49 0.51 0.52 0.53 0.53 0.54
Sickness/Health care 6.2 6.5 7.2 7.2 7.2 7.4 7.5 7.5 7.4 7.1
protection indicators
Expenditure in social

Disability 3.0 3.1 3.4 3.4 3.3 3.4 3.4 3.4 3.2 3.1
Old age and survivors 9.1 9.2 10.9 11.2 11.2 11.9 12.5 13.0 13.4 13.6
(% of GDP)

Family/Children 2.8 2.8 3.2 3.2 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.2 3.2 3.1
Unemployment 1.8 1.7 2.3 2.3 2.0 2.0 2.3 2.6 2.7 2.6
Housing and Social exclusion n.e.c. 0.8 1.0 1.2 1.3 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.5 1.6 1.9
Total (including Admin and Other expenditures) 24.5 25.1 29.0 29.3 28.9 30.1 31.1 31.9 32.0 31.9
of which: Means tested benefits 1.1 1.0 1.2 1.2 1.3 1.5 1.6 1.8 1.9 2.0

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312
 Statistical annex - 1. Country profiles

Sweden
Sweden 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Real GDP 3.4 -0.6 -5.2 6.0 2.7 -0.3 1.2 2.6 4.5 2.7 2.1 2.4
Total employment 2.3 0.9 -2.4 1.0 2.1 0.7 1.0 1.4 1.5 1.9 2.3 1.8
Labour productivity 1.1 -1.4 -2.8 5.0 0.5 -1.0 0.3 1.2 2.9 0.8 -0.2 0.5
Macro Economic Indicators

Annual average hours worked per person employed 0.8 0.3 -0.5 1.6 -0.2 -0.9 -0.6 0.0 0.0 0.8 -0.8 0.3
(Annual % growth)

Real productivity per hour worked 0.3 -1.8 -2.4 3.3 0.7 -0.2 0.9 1.1 2.9 0.1 0.6 0.2
Harmonized CPI 1.7 3.3 1.9 1.9 1.4 0.9 0.4 0.2 0.7 1.1 1.9 2.0
Price deflator GDP 2.9 3.3 2.4 1.0 1.2 1.1 1.1 1.8 2.1 1.6 2.3 2.2
Nominal compensation per employee 5.3 3.7 2.7 2.2 3.2 3.1 1.9 2.2 2.7 2.5 2.0 3.4
Real compensation per employee (GDP deflator) 2.4 0.3 0.3 1.2 2.0 2.0 0.9 0.4 0.7 0.9 -0.3 1.2
Real compensation per employee (private consumption
3.6 0.3 0.8 0.3 1.8 2.1 1.5 2.0 2.0 1.4 0.1 1.4
deflator)
Nominal unit labour costs 4.2 5.2 5.7 -2.6 2.6 4.1 1.7 1.0 -0.2 1.7 2.2 2.9
Real unit labour costs 1.4 1.7 3.3 -3.6 1.4 3.1 0.5 -0.7 -2.3 0.1 0.0 0.7
Total population (000) 9113 9183 9256 9341 9416 9483 9556 9645 9747 9851 9995 10120
Population aged 15-64 (000) 5982 6033 6069 6100 6113 6114 6116 6127 6152 6187 6257 6319
Total employment (000) 4541 4593 4499 4524 4626 4657 4705 4772 4837 4910 5022 5113
Employment aged 15-64 (000) 4453 4494 4391 4403 4498 4510 4554 4598 4660 4736 4834 4921
Employment rate (% population aged 20-64) 80.1 80.4 78.3 78.1 79.4 79.4 79.8 80.0 80.5 81.2 81.8 82.6
Employment rate (% population aged 15-64) 74.2 74.3 72.2 72.1 73.6 73.8 74.4 74.9 75.5 76.2 76.9 77.5
Employment rate (% population aged 15-24) 42.2 42.2 38.3 38.8 40.9 40.2 41.7 42.8 43.9 44.5 44.9 45.1
Employment rate (% population aged 25-54) 86.1 86.5 84.5 84.0 85.1 85.2 85.4 85.4 85.6 85.9 86.3 86.8
Employment rate (% population aged 55-64) 70.0 70.1 70.0 70.4 72.0 73.0 73.6 74.0 74.5 75.5 76.4 77.9
FTE employment rate (% population aged 20-64) 74.0 74.3 72.6 72.2 73.6 73.9 74.3 74.7 75.2 75.9 76.7 77.5
Self-employed (% total employment) 10.3 10.2 10.5 10.7 10.2 10.2 10.4 10.1 10.0 9.7 9.6 9.4
Part-time employment (% total employment) 23.5 25.7 26.0 25.8 25.2 25.0 24.7 24.5 24.3 23.9 23.3 22.7
Temporary employment (% total employment) 15.5 14.3 13.5 14.4 14.9 14.4 14.7 15.2 15.1 14.7 14.7 14.3
Employment in Services (% total employment) 76.7 b 77.8 78.2 78.2 78.5 78.9 79.6 79.9 80.1 80.2 80.3
Employment in Industry (% total employment) 21.4 b 20.3 20.0 20.0 19.8 19.3 18.8 18.4 18.2 18.3 18.3
Employment in Agriculture (% total employment) 1.9 b 1.9 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.7 1.7 1.6 1.5 1.5
Activity rate (% population aged 15-64) 79.1 79.3 78.9 79.1 79.9 80.3 81.1 81.5 81.7 82.1 82.5 82.9
Labour Market Indicators - Total

Activity rate (% population aged 15-24) 52.2 52.8 51.0 51.6 53.0 52.6 54.5 55.4 55.1 54.8 54.7 54.2
Activity rate (% population aged 25-54) 90.0 90.4 90.0 89.8 90.3 90.6 90.9 90.8 90.9 90.9 91.3 91.6
Activity rate (% population aged 55-64) 72.8 72.8 73.9 74.8 76.0 77.0 77.5 78.2 78.7 79.7 80.5 81.6
Total unemployment (000) 298 305 408 425 390 403 411 411 387 366 358 344
Unemployment rate (% labour force) 6.1 6.2 8.3 8.6 7.8 8.0 8.0 7.9 7.4 6.9 6.7 6.3
Youth unemployment rate (% labour force 15-24) 19.2 20.2 25.0 24.8 22.8 23.7 23.6 22.9 20.4 18.9 17.8 16.8
Long term unemployment rate (% labour force) 0.8 0.8 1.1 1.6 1.5 1.5 1.4 1.4 1.5 1.3 1.2 1.2
Share of long term unemployment (% of total
13.6 12.3 13.1 18.1 19.0 18.3 17.7 18.2 19.6 18.3 18.5 18.6
unemployment)

Youth unemployment ratio (% population aged 15-24) 10.1 10.7 12.8 12.8 12.1 12.4 12.8 12.7 11.2 10.4 9.8 9.1

Employment rate for low skilled 25-64 (ISCED 0-2) 68.0 67.6 65.2 64.7 65.8 65.4 63.8 63.6 b 63.3 63.3 64.0 64.0
Employment rate for medium skilled 25-64 (ISCED 3-
84.2 84.4 82.6 82.4 83.9 84.1 84.4 84.5 b 84.9 85.1 85.9 86.6
4)
Employment rate for high skilled 25-64 (ISCED 5-8) 88.5 89.1 88.1 87.7 88.3 88.7 89.2 89.0 b 89.3 89.5 89.5 90.2
Employment rate (Nationals aged 15-64) 75.0 75.1 73.0 73.1 74.8 75.1 75.8 76.2 77.0 78.0 78.6 79.6
Employment rate (Other EU28 aged 15-64) 69.9 73.0 74.4 73.1 72.3 71.8 72.6 73.9 75.4 75.2 77.7 80.2
Employment rate (Other than EU28 aged 15-64) 49.9 50.3 47.1 44.6 44.1 44.2 46.3 47.8 46.8 47.9 50.2 49.1
Employment rate (Born in the same country aged 15-
76.2 76.3 74.2 74.4 76.0 76.2 77.2 77.7 78.5 79.3 79.9 80.8
64)
Employment rate (Born in other EU28 aged 15-64) 72.4 72.2 73.1 72.7 73.4 73.9 74.7 74.9 75.7 76.5 77.7 79.6
Employment rate (Born outside EU28 aged 15-64) 58.9 60.5 57.4 56.6 58.2 58.6 58.5 59.5 60.2 61.2 62.7 62.7
Underemployment (% of labour force aged 15-74) 4.4 4.8 4.6 4.5 4.7 4.9 4.6 4.1 3.4 3.2 2.8
Seeking but not available (% of labour force aged 15-
1.9 1.8 1.8 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.1 2.0 2.0 1.8
74)
Discouraged, available but not seeking (% of labour
2.2 2.1 2.8 2.7 2.4 2.6 2.8 2.6 2.4 2.1 1.8 1.7
force aged 15-74)

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313
Employment and Social Developments in Europe 2019

Sweden 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Total population (000) 4524 4564 4604 4649 4690 4727 4766 4814 4872 4931 5013 5083
Population aged 15-64(000) 3040 3067 3084 3100 3107 3107 3108 3114 3131 3152 3195 3230
Total employment (000) 2390 2422 2359 2394 2438 2442 2468 2502 2530 2562 2629 2680
Employment aged 15-64 (000) 2333 2357 2291 2312 2355 2350 2373 2391 2420 2457 2515 2564
Employment rate (% population aged 20-64) 83.1 83.5 80.9 81.1 82.1 81.9 82.2 82.2 82.5 83.0 83.8 84.7
Employment rate (% population aged 15-64) 76.5 76.7 74.2 74.6 75.8 75.6 76.3 76.5 77.0 77.5 78.3 79.0
Employment rate (% population aged 15-24) 42.0 42.2 37.7 38.5 40.8 38.8 40.5 41.6 42.4 43.1 43.9 43.6
Employment rate (% population aged 25-54) 89.1 89.4 86.9 87.0 87.9 87.8 88.0 87.8 87.9 88.1 88.5 89.1
Employment rate (% population aged 55-64) 72.9 73.4 73.2 74.0 75.2 76.3 76.9 76.5 76.8 77.5 78.4 80.0
FTE employment rate (% population aged 20-64) 80.7 81.1 78.6 78.6 79.7 79.6 79.9 80.0 80.1 80.7 81.4 82.2
Self-employed (% total employment) 14.6 14.2 14.6 14.7 14.2 14.3 14.3 13.9 13.7 13.3 13.3 13.0
Part-time employment (% total employment) 10.3 11.9 12.6 12.7 12.3 12.5 12.8 12.8 13.2 13.0 13.1 13.0
Temporary employment (% total employment) 12.7 11.5 10.9 12.2 12.6 12.0 12.2 12.9 13.1 12.8 12.8 12.3
Employment in Services (% total employment) 63.8 b 65.4 66.1 66.1 66.6 67.5 68.2 68.5 68.9 69.3 69.4
Employment in Industry (% total employment) 33.3 b 31.8 31.2 31.3 30.8 29.9 29.4 29.1 28.8 28.6 28.5
Employment in Agriculture (% total employment) 2.9 b 2.8 2.7 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.5 2.4 2.3 2.2 2.1
Activity rate (% population aged 15-64) 81.4 81.7 81.4 81.9 82.4 82.6 83.3 83.6 83.5 83.9 84.3 84.6
Labour Market Indicators - Male

Activity rate (% population aged 15-24) 51.8 52.6 51.1 52.0 53.2 51.8 53.9 54.9 53.8 54.2 54.1 53.1
Activity rate (% population aged 25-54) 92.9 93.1 92.8 92.9 93.2 93.5 93.6 93.5 93.3 93.3 93.6 93.9
Activity rate (% population aged 55-64) 76.2 76.5 77.8 79.3 79.9 80.9 81.6 81.5 81.8 82.5 83.2 84.4
Total unemployment (000) 149 152 222 227 207 218 220 222 206 202 195 182
Unemployment rate (% labour force) 5.9 5.9 8.6 8.7 7.8 8.2 8.2 8.2 7.5 7.3 6.9 6.4
Youth unemployment rate (% labour force 15-24) 18.7 19.7 26.3 25.9 23.3 25.0 24.8 24.3 21.3 20.5 18.7 18.0
Long term unemployment rate (% labour force) 0.9 0.8 1.2 1.7 1.6 1.7 1.6 1.6 1.7 1.4 1.4 1.3
Share of long term unemployment (% of total
15.5 13.9 13.6 20.1 21.0 20.1 19.5 19.5 21.9 19.5 20.7 20.7
unemployment)

Youth unemployment ratio (% population aged 15-24) 9.7 10.4 13.4 13.4 12.4 13.0 13.3 13.3 11.4 11.1 10.2 9.6

Employment rate for low skilled 25-64 (ISCED 0-2) 74.6 74.6 71.6 72.6 73.1 72.8 71.5 71.0 b 71.1 70.5 70.9 72.0
Employment rate for medium skilled 25-64 (ISCED 3-
87.3 87.3 85.1 85.5 86.8 86.9 87.2 87.1 b 87.3 87.4 88.2 89.3
4)
Employment rate for high skilled 25-64 (ISCED 5-8) 89.3 90.2 89.2 88.8 89.4 89.7 90.4 90.2 b 90.2 90.4 90.4 90.9
Employment rate (Nationals aged 15-64) 77.1 77.2 74.7 75.1 76.6 76.6 77.3 77.5 78.1 78.9 79.5 80.6
Employment rate (Other EU28 aged 15-64) 73.0 77.0 78.2 79.1 78.0 76.3 76.5 78.6 81.9 79.0 81.4 83.8
Employment rate (Other than EU28 aged 15-64) 57.6 59.3 55.4 54.9 53.9 52.5 54.0 55.6 53.1 55.3 59.2 56.5
Employment rate (Born in the same country aged 15-
78.0 77.9 75.6 76.0 77.5 77.4 78.3 78.5 79.3 79.8 80.4 81.5
64)
Employment rate (Born in other EU28 aged 15-64) 76.1 77.3 76.1 76.8 77.1 77.7 77.6 78.2 79.8 79.2 79.9 82.0
Employment rate (Born outside EU28 aged 15-64) 64.8 66.5 62.8 63.3 63.9 63.7 63.8 64.7 63.9 65.4 67.6 67.1
Underemployment (% of labour force aged 15-74) 2.2 2.8 2.7 2.6 2.9 3.2 3.0 2.8 2.4 2.3 2.0
Seeking but not available (% of labour force aged 15-
1.7 1.6 1.6 1.7 1.7 1.8 1.7 1.7 1.9 1.8 1.7 1.6
74)
Discouraged, available but not seeking (% of labour
1.9 2.0 2.6 2.5 2.2 2.5 2.7 2.5 2.3 2.1 1.8 1.7
force aged 15-74)
Total population (000) 4590 4619 4653 4692 4725 4756 4790 4831 4875 4920 4982 5038
Population aged 15-64(000) 2943 2966 2985 3001 3007 3007 3008 3012 3021 3034 3062 3089
Total employment (000) 2150 2171 2140 2130 2188 2215 2237 2270 2307 2348 2393 2433
Employment aged 15-64 (000) 2121 2137 2101 2092 2143 2160 2181 2207 2240 2278 2319 2358
Employment rate (% population aged 20-64) 77.1 77.2 75.7 75.0 76.5 76.8 77.2 77.6 78.3 79.2 79.8 80.4
Employment rate (% population aged 15-64) 71.8 71.8 70.2 69.7 71.3 71.8 72.5 73.1 74.0 74.8 75.4 76.0
Employment rate (% population aged 15-24) 42.3 42.1 38.9 39.2 41.0 41.6 42.9 44.0 45.5 45.9 46.0 46.8
Employment rate (% population aged 25-54) 83.0 83.5 81.9 80.9 82.2 82.5 82.7 82.8 83.3 83.7 84.1 84.3
Employment rate (% population aged 55-64) 67.0 66.7 66.7 66.9 68.9 69.6 70.3 71.5 72.1 73.5 74.4 75.8
FTE employment rate (% population aged 20-64) 68.5 68.7 67.5 66.8 68.4 69.1 69.6 70.2 70.9 71.8 72.5 73.2
Self-employed (% total employment) 5.5 5.6 6.0 6.2 5.8 5.7 6.0 6.0 6.0 5.8 5.5 5.4
Part-time employment (% total employment) 38.0 40.8 40.5 40.3 39.3 38.6 37.7 37.2 36.3 35.6 34.4 33.3
Temporary employment (% total employment) 18.6 17.5 16.3 16.8 17.5 17.0 17.5 17.8 17.2 16.7 16.8 16.4
Employment in Services (% total employment) 91.5 u 91.6 u 91.3 u 91.3 u 91.9 u 92.2 u 92.2 92.0 u 92.1 u
Employment in Industry (% total employment) 7.6 u 7.6 u 7.8 u 7.8 u 7.3 u 6.9 u 6.9 7.2 u 7.1 u
Employment in Agriculture (% total employment) 0.8 b 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.8
Activity rate (% population aged 15-64) 76.8 76.9 76.4 76.2 77.3 77.9 78.8 79.3 79.9 80.2 80.7 81.2
Labour Market Indicators - Female

Activity rate (% population aged 15-24) 52.7 53.1 51.0 51.3 52.8 53.4 55.2 56.0 56.5 55.5 55.4 55.4
Activity rate (% population aged 25-54) 87.1 87.6 87.1 86.6 87.3 87.6 88.1 88.0 88.4 88.5 88.8 89.2
Activity rate (% population aged 55-64) 69.4 69.0 69.9 70.2 72.1 73.0 73.4 74.9 75.5 76.9 77.8 78.8
Total unemployment (000) 148 152 186 198 184 185 191 189 180 165 163 162
Unemployment rate (% labour force) 6.5 6.6 8.0 8.5 7.7 7.7 7.9 7.7 7.3 6.5 6.4 6.3
Youth unemployment rate (% labour force 15-24) 19.8 20.8 23.7 23.6 22.2 22.3 22.3 21.5 19.5 17.2 16.8 15.5
Long term unemployment rate (% labour force) 0.8 0.7 1.0 1.3 1.3 1.2 1.2 1.3 1.2 1.1 1.0 1.0
Share of long term unemployment (% of total
11.7 10.8 12.5 15.8 16.7 16.0 15.5 16.5 17.0 16.9 15.9 16.2
unemployment)

Youth unemployment ratio (% population aged 15-24) 10.4 11.0 12.1 12.1 11.8 11.9 12.3 12.0 11.1 9.6 9.4 8.6

Employment rate for low skilled 25-64 (ISCED 0-2) 61.4 60.5 58.7 56.7 58.2 57.3 55.2 55.2 b 54.0 55.0 56.1 54.4
Employment rate for medium skilled 25-64 (ISCED 3-
80.4 80.7 79.3 78.4 80.2 80.4 80.9 81.1 b 81.8 82.1 82.8 82.9
4)
Employment rate for high skilled 25-64 (ISCED 5-8) 87.9 88.4 87.2 86.8 87.4 88.0 88.3 88.0 b 88.6 88.9 88.8 89.6
Employment rate (Nationals aged 15-64) 72.7 72.8 71.3 71.1 72.9 73.5 74.1 74.9 75.9 77.0 77.6 78.5
Employment rate (Other EU28 aged 15-64) 67.1 69.0 70.5 67.1 66.4 67.1 68.6 69.3 69.1 71.2 73.7 76.1
Employment rate (Other than EU28 aged 15-64) 42.3 41.8 39.4 35.2 34.5 36.1 38.4 40.0 40.2 39.9 40.3 40.4
Employment rate (Born in the same country aged 15-
74.3 74.5 72.8 72.8 74.4 75.0 75.9 76.8 77.7 78.8 79.4 80.1
64)
Employment rate (Born in other EU28 aged 15-64) 69.4 67.8 70.5 69.1 70.1 70.5 72.1 72.1 72.2 74.2 75.8 77.5
Employment rate (Born outside EU28 aged 15-64) 53.3 55.1 52.5 50.5 52.9 53.7 53.2 54.4 56.7 57.1 57.9 58.2
Underemployment (% of labour force aged 15-74) 6.8 7.0 6.8 6.6 6.7 6.7 6.4 5.5 4.6 4.2 3.7
Seeking but not available (% of labour force aged 15-
2.2 2.0 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.3 2.2 2.2 2.0
74)
Discouraged, available but not seeking (% of labour
2.4 2.3 3.0 2.9 2.7 2.8 3.0 2.8 2.4 2.1 1.9 1.7
force aged 15-74)

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314
 Statistical annex - 1. Country profiles

Sweden 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
At-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion (% of total
13.9 16.7 b 17.8 17.7 18.5 17.7 18.3 18.2 18.6 18.3 17.7
population)
At-risk-of-poverty (% of total population) 10.5 13.5 b 14.4 14.8 15.4 15.2 16.0 15.6 16.3 16.2 15.8
At-risk-of-poverty threshold (PPS single person) 9545 10495 b 10885 10535 10819 11366 12017 11718 12092 12573 12095
Poverty gap (%) 20.3 18.0 b 19.2 19.9 20.3 22.7 19.2 21.7 19.9 21.1 21.2
Persistent at-risk-of-poverty (% of total
2.1 2.6 3.7 4.9 4.1 7.2 b 7.6 6.6 7.0 b 6.1 7.1
population)
At-risk-of-poverty before social transfers excl.
27.5 30.0 b 28.8 29.0 29.8 29.0 28.9 30.0 29.8 29.9 29.3
pensions (% of total population)
Impact of social transfers (excl. pensions) in
61.8 55.0 b 50.0 49.0 48.3 47.6 44.6 48.0 45.3 45.8 46.1
reducing poverty (%)
All

Severe Material Deprivation (% of total population) 2.2 1.8 b 2.0 1.9 1.7 1.8 1.9 1.0 1.1 0.8 1.1
Share of people living in low work intensity households
6.0 7.0 b 8.5 8.5 9.4 8.1 9.4 9.0 8.7 8.5 8.8
(% of people aged 0-59)
Real Gross Household Disposable income (growth %) 5.5 3.3 1.8 2.6 3.2 3.5 2.2 2.8 2.6 3.4 2.2
Income quintile share ratio S80/S20 3.3 3.7 b 4.0 3.8 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.2 4.1 4.3 4.3
GINI coefficient 23.4 25.1 b 26.3 25.5 26.0 26.0 26.0 26.9 26.7 27.6 28.0
Early leavers from education and training (% of
8.0 b 7.9 b 7.0 6.5 6.6 7.5 7.1 6.7 b 7.0 7.4 7.7 9.3
population aged 18-24)
NEET: Young people neither in employment nor in
education and training (% of total population aged 15- 7.5 7.8 9.6 7.7 7.5 7.8 7.4 7.2 6.7 6.5 6.1 6.1
24)
At-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion (% of male
13.6 15.8 b 16.6 16.6 16.9 16.8 16.9 17.2 17.4 17.0 17.0
population)
At-risk-of-poverty (% of male population) 10.5 12.9 b 13.6 13.9 14.2 14.4 14.7 14.8 15.3 15.2 15.4
Poverty gap (%) 22.7 20.0 b 20.4 22.3 20.5 25.1 20.3 23.8 21.9 24.3 22.2
Persistent at-risk-of-poverty (% of male
1.9 2.5 3.1 4.4 2.9 6.1 b 6.9 5.2 5.8 b 6.3 6.7
population)
Severe Material Deprivation (% of male population) 2.2 1.6 b 2.0 1.8 1.7 1.9 1.8 1.1 1.1 0.9 1.0
Male

Share of people living in low work intensity households

5.6 6.7 b 8.3 8.3 9.4 8.1 9.3 8.8 8.0 8.3 8.5
(% of males aged 0-59)
Life expectancy at birth (years) 79.0 79.2 b 79.4 79.6 b 79.9 80.2 80.4 b 80.4 80.6 80.8
Healthy life years at birth (years) - men 67.7 69.4 b 70.7 67.0 b 67.0 66.9 73.6 b 74.0 73.0 73.2
Early leavers from education and training (% of males
9.5 b 9.0 b 8.0 7.5 7.8 8.5 7.9 7.3 b 7.6 8.2 8.2 10.4
aged 18-24)
NEET: Young people neither in employment nor in
7.5 7.5 9.7 7.8 7.6 7.9 7.7 7.5 6.9 6.9 6.1 6.2
education and training ( % of males aged 15-24)
At-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion (% of female
14.2 17.7 b 19.0 18.8 20.0 18.7 19.6 19.2 19.8 19.5 18.3
population)
At-risk-of-poverty (% of female population) 10.6 14.1 b 15.2 15.6 16.6 16.1 17.2 16.4 17.3 17.3 16.2
Poverty gap (%) 18.3 16.9 b 17.5 18.8 19.9 20.1 18.4 20.5 18.4 18.9 19.1
Persistent at-risk-of-poverty (% of female
2.2 2.7 4.3 5.2 5.2 8.2 b 8.2 8.0 8.3 b 5.8 7.4
population)
Social Indicators

Severe Material Deprivation (% of female population) 2.1 1.9 b 2.1 2.0 1.8 1.7 2.0 0.9 1.2 0.7 1.3
Female

Share of people living in low work intensity households

6.4 7.4 b 8.7 8.7 9.5 8.1 9.5 9.2 9.4 8.8 9.2
(% of females aged 0-59)
Life expectancy at birth (years) 83.1 83.3 b 83.5 83.6 b 83.8 83.8 84.2 b 84.1 84.1 84.1
Healthy life years at birth (years) - women 66.8 69.0 b 69.6 66.4 b 65.5 66.0 73.6 b 73.8 73.3 71.9
Early leavers from education and training (% of
6.5 b 6.8 b 6.0 5.5 5.4 6.3 6.2 6.0 b 6.4 6.4 7.2 8.0
females aged 18-24)
NEET: Young people neither in employment nor in
7.4 8.2 9.4 7.6 7.5 7.8 7.1 6.8 6.5 6.1 6.2 6.1
education and training ( % of females aged 15-24)
At-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion of children (% of
14.9 17.3 b 18.8 19.2 20.3 19.4 20.2 20.5 19.8 19.9 19.4
people aged 0-17)
At-risk-of-poverty (% of Children population) 12.0 15.1 b 16.0 17.1 17.9 17.7 19.0 18.2 18.1 18.7 18.6
Children (0-17)

Severe Material Deprivation (% of Children

3.2 2.2 b 2.2 2.1 2.2 2.1 2.6 1.5 1.4 0.7 0.9
population)
Share of children living in low work intensity
5.5 5.7 b 7.2 7.8 8.1 7.6 9.2 8.8 8.7 8.2 8.2
households (% of Children population)
Risk of poverty of children in households at work
8.4 10.7 b 10.7 10.7 11.8 11.6 10.9 11.9 11.4 12.2 11.7
(Working Intensity > 0.2)
Impact of social transfers (excl. pensions) in reducing
64.7 57.6 b 52.8 50.4 47.5 48.3 43.8 50.5 45.8 47.5 47.2
poverty (0-17) (%)
At-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion (% of working
14.5 16.8 b 17.8 18.1 18.5 17.6 18.6 18.8 18.9 18.1 17.5
age population)
At-risk-of-poverty (% of Working age population) 10.2 12.4 b 13.3 14.1 14.4 14.2 15.3 15.4 15.8 15.1 14.8
Working age

Severe Material Deprivation (% of Working age

2.2 1.8 b 2.3 2.1 1.9 2.1 2.1 1.1 1.3 1.0 1.4
(18-64)

population)
Very low work intensity (18-59) 6.2 7.5 b 9.1 8.7 9.9 8.2 9.4 9.1 8.7 8.7 9.1
In-work at-risk-of poverty rate (% of persons
6.5 7.4 b 7.5 7.8 7.5 7.3 7.6 7.7 8.1 6.8 6.9
employed 18-64)
Impact of social transfers (excl. pensions) in reducing
61.8 57.2 b 51.8 50.7 50.7 49.3 46.7 48.3 46.3 47.6 47.5
poverty (18-64) (%)
At-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion of elderly (% of
10.4 15.9 b 16.5 14.8 16.4 16.2 15.2 13.7 16.2 17.0 16.1
people aged 65+)
Elderly (65+)

At-risk-of-poverty (% of Elderly population) 9.9 15.3 b 16.2 14.2 15.9 15.9 15.0 13.6 15.9 16.8 15.8

Severe Material Deprivation (% of Elderly population) 0.6 0.9 b 0.8 1.0 0.7 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.5 0.3 0.6
Relative median income of elderly (ratio with median
0.81 0.76 b 0.76 0.79 0.77 0.78 0.79 0.82 0.79 0.77 0.78
income of people younger than 65)
Aggregate replacement ratio (ratio) 0.63 0.61 b 0.60 0.59 0.57 0.55 0.56 0.59 0.57 0.57 0.57
Sickness/Health care 7.1 7.1 7.5 7.0 7.1 7.3 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 p
protection indicators
Expenditure in social

Disability 4.1 4.0 4.2 3.8 3.6 3.6 3.6 3.5 3.3 3.2 p
Old age and survivors 10.9 11.5 12.7 12.1 12.1 12.6 13.1 12.8 12.6 12.6 p
(% of GDP)

Family/Children 2.8 2.9 3.0 2.9 2.9 3.0 3.1 3.1 3.0 3.0 p
Unemployment 1.0 0.8 1.2 1.3 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.1 1.0 1.0 p
Housing and Social exclusion n.e.c. 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.2 1.2 1.4 1.8 p
Total (including Admin and Other expenditures) 27.4 27.9 30.2 28.8 28.5 29.5 30.2 29.8 29.4 29.6 p
of which: Means tested benefits 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.7 p

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Employment and Social Developments in Europe 2019

United Kingdom
United Kingdom 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Real GDP 2.5 -0.3 -4.2 1.7 1.6 1.4 2.0 2.9 2.3 1.8 1.8 1.4
Total employment 0.8 0.8 -1.6 0.2 0.5 1.1 1.2 2.4 1.7 1.5 1.0 1.2
Labour productivity 1.7 -1.2 -2.7 1.5 1.1 0.4 0.9 0.6 0.6 0.3 0.8 0.2
Macro Economic Indicators

Annual average hours worked per person employed 0.1 -1.3 -0.3 -0.7 0.8 0.9 0.6 0.4 -1.0 0.9 -0.1 -0.3
(Annual % growth)

Real productivity per hour worked 1.6 0.1 -2.4 2.2 0.3 -0.5 0.3 0.2 1.7 -0.6 0.9 0.5
Harmonized CPI 2.3 3.6 2.2 3.3 4.5 2.8 2.6 1.5 0.0 0.7 2.7 2.5
Price deflator GDP 2.5 2.8 1.6 1.5 1.9 1.6 1.9 1.7 0.4 2.1 2.2 1.9
Nominal compensation per employee 5.4 0.6 2.4 3.0 1.1 1.9 2.7 0.6 1.1 2.8 3.1 2.7
Real compensation per employee (GDP deflator) 2.8 -2.2 0.7 1.5 -0.8 0.3 0.8 -1.1 0.7 0.7 0.9 0.8
Real compensation per employee (private consumption
3.0 -2.8 0.1 -0.2 -3.3 -1.0 0.2 -0.9 1.1 2.1 0.4 0.3
deflator)
Nominal unit labour costs 3.7 1.8 5.2 1.6 -0.1 1.5 1.8 0.0 0.5 2.5 2.2 2.5
Real unit labour costs 1.2 -1.1 3.6 0.0 -2.0 -0.1 0.0 -1.7 0.1 0.4 0.1 0.6
Total population (000) 61073 61572 62042 62510 63023 63495 63905 64351 64853 65379 65844 66274
Population aged 15-64 (000) 40498 40842 41100 41325 41577 41681 41659 41725 41875 42063 42200 42310
Total employment (000) 29261 b 29520 b 29059 29125 29282 29596 29954 30671 31197 31648 31965 32354
Employment aged 15-64 (000) 28622 b 28827 b 28319 28290 28404 28650 28917 29559 30020 30444 30786 31112
Employment rate (% population aged 20-64) 75.2 b 75.2 b 73.9 73.5 73.5 74.1 74.8 76.2 76.8 77.5 78.2 78.7
Employment rate (% population aged 15-64) 71.5 b 71.5 b 69.9 69.4 69.3 69.9 70.5 71.9 72.7 73.5 74.1 74.7
Employment rate (% population aged 15-24) 52.6 b 52.0 b 47.9 46.8 45.8 46.2 46.3 48.0 50.0 50.8 50.7 50.6
Employment rate (% population aged 25-54) 81.3 b 81.3 b 80.1 79.8 80.1 80.5 80.8 82.1 82.4 82.9 83.8 84.3
Employment rate (% population aged 55-64) 57.4 b 58.0 b 57.5 57.2 56.7 58.1 59.8 61.0 62.2 63.4 64.1 65.3
FTE employment rate (% population aged 20-64) 66.4 b 66.9 b 65.2 64.7 64.5 64.9 65.7 67.1 68.1 68.5 69.2 69.8
Self-employed (% total employment) 13.0 b 13.0 b 13.3 13.7 13.8 14.3 14.2 14.9 14.7 15.1 15.0 14.8
Part-time employment (% total employment) 24.1 b 24.1 b 24.9 25.6 25.5 25.9 25.6 25.3 25.2 25.2 24.8 24.6
Temporary employment (% total employment) 5.0 b 4.6 b 4.7 5.1 5.2 5.3 5.2 5.3 5.2 5.1 4.8 4.7
Employment in Services (% total employment) 77.0 b 79.4 79.8 79.8 80.0 80.3 80.0 80.4 80.6 80.8 81.0
Employment in Industry (% total employment) 22.0 b 19.6 19.2 19.2 19.0 18.8 18.9 18.6 18.5 18.3 18.1
Employment in Agriculture (% total employment) 1.0 b 1.0 1.1 1.1 1.0 0.9 1.1 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.9
Activity rate (% population aged 15-64) 75.5 b 75.8 b 75.7 75.4 75.5 76.1 76.4 76.7 76.9 77.3 77.6 77.9
Labour Market Indicators - Total

Activity rate (% population aged 15-24) 61.4 b 61.2 b 59.2 58.4 58.2 58.6 58.3 57.8 58.5 58.4 57.6 57.1
Activity rate (% population aged 25-54) 84.5 b 84.8 b 85.0 84.9 85.3 85.5 85.7 86.0 85.8 86.1 86.5 86.9
Activity rate (% population aged 55-64) 59.3 b 59.8 b 60.3 60.0 59.7 61.1 62.8 63.5 64.4 65.8 66.4 67.5
Total unemployment (000) 1624 1757 2369 2459 2559 2533 2437 1996 1746 1599 1447 1347
Unemployment rate (% labour force) 5.3 5.6 7.6 7.8 8.1 7.9 7.5 6.1 5.3 4.8 4.3 4.0
Youth unemployment rate (% labour force 15-24) 14.3 15.0 19.1 19.9 21.3 21.2 20.7 17.0 14.6 13.0 12.1 11.3
Long term unemployment rate (% labour force) 1.3 b 1.4 b 1.9 2.5 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.2 1.6 1.3 1.1 1.1
Share of long term unemployment (% of total
23.7 b 24.1 b 24.5 32.5 33.4 34.7 36.1 35.8 30.7 27.1 25.9 26.2
unemployment)

Youth unemployment ratio (% population aged 15-24) 8.8 b 9.2 b 11.3 11.6 12.4 12.4 12.1 9.8 8.6 7.6 7.0 6.4

Employment rate for low skilled 25-64 (ISCED 0-2) 64.2 b 59.4 b 57.8 56.0 b 56.4 b 57.4 57.5 59.6 b 60.1 62.8 64.3 65.7
Employment rate for medium skilled 25-64 (ISCED 3-
81.1 b 79.2 b 77.3 76.7 b 77.6 b 77.3 77.8 78.8 b 79.1 79.4 80.0 80.2
4)
Employment rate for high skilled 25-64 (ISCED 5-8) 88.0 b 86.0 b 85.4 85.1 b 83.8 b 84.1 84.9 85.3 b 85.5 85.6 85.7 86.1
Employment rate (Nationals aged 15-64) 71.9 b 71.8 b 70.2 69.7 69.6 70.2 70.9 72.2 72.9 73.7 74.3 74.8
Employment rate (Other EU28 aged 15-64) 76.2 b 77.0 b 75.6 74.9 75.7 75.7 76.5 77.9 78.8 78.6 80.0 82.0
Employment rate (Other than EU28 aged 15-64) 60.4 b 61.7 b 60.0 60.1 59.7 58.9 59.0 60.0 60.9 61.3 61.1 62.9
Employment rate (Born in the same country aged 15-
72.2 b 72.1 b 70.5 70.0 69.8 70.6 71.1 72.4 73.2 73.9 74.5 74.9
64)
Employment rate (Born in other EU28 aged 15-64) 75.9 b 76.8 b 75.5 74.6 75.5 74.7 75.9 77.9 79.1 79.2 79.8 81.5
Employment rate (Born outside EU28 aged 15-64) 62.8 b 63.5 b 61.9 62.3 62.0 62.4 63.4 65.0 65.5 67.1 67.8 68.9
Underemployment (% of labour force aged 15-74) 4.1 b 5.0 5.4 5.6 6.0 6.0 5.6 5.3 4.9 4.5 4.3
Seeking but not available (% of labour force aged 15-
1.0 b 0.9 b 1.0 1.1 1.0 1.1 1.0 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1
74)
Discouraged, available but not seeking (% of labour
2.1 b 2.3 b 2.5 2.7 2.5 2.5 2.4 2.1 2.1 1.9 1.8 1.6
force aged 15-74)

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316
 Statistical annex - 1. Country profiles

United Kingdom 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Total population (000) 29895 30164 30417 30669 30951 31206 31424 31663 31934 32226 32480 32710
Population aged 15-64(000) 20137 20312 20441 20556 20694 20752 20741 20780 20866 20977 21057 21120
Total employment (000) 15790 b 15890 b 15483 15527 15618 15808 15953 16325 16614 16854 16950 17147
Employment aged 15-64 (000) 15385 b 15447 b 15037 15027 15089 15233 15322 15661 15897 16117 16229 16390
Employment rate (% population aged 20-64) 82.2 b 81.9 b 79.7 79.3 79.3 80.0 80.4 81.9 82.5 83.1 83.4 83.7
Employment rate (% population aged 15-64) 77.6 b 77.4 b 74.9 74.4 74.3 75.0 75.4 76.8 77.6 78.3 78.6 79.1
Employment rate (% population aged 15-24) 54.0 b 53.3 b 47.9 47.6 46.3 46.4 46.4 48.2 50.3 50.5 50.5 51.4
Employment rate (% population aged 25-54) 88.2 b 87.7 b 85.7 85.4 85.9 86.6 86.7 88.0 88.3 89.0 89.6 89.8
Employment rate (% population aged 55-64) 66.2 b 67.2 b 66.1 65.1 64.1 65.4 66.8 67.8 68.6 69.6 69.3 70.3
FTE employment rate (% population aged 20-64) 79.3 b 79.2 b 76.7 75.8 75.6 76.0 76.8 78.3 78.9 79.3 79.9 80.2
Self-employed (% total employment) 17.5 b 17.6 b 17.8 18.1 18.3 18.6 18.5 19.1 18.7 19.1 18.9 18.5
Part-time employment (% total employment) 9.3 b 9.7 b 10.3 11.0 10.9 11.6 11.5 11.2 11.2 11.3 11.1 11.1
Temporary employment (% total employment) 4.2 b 3.8 b 4.1 4.6 4.6 4.6 4.6 4.7 4.6 4.4 4.2 4.2
Employment in Services (% total employment) 65.8 b 68.5 68.9 69.0 69.6 70.1 69.9 70.3 70.5 70.9 71.1
Employment in Industry (% total employment) 33.0 b 30.1 29.6 29.5 29.0 28.7 28.6 28.4 28.1 27.7 27.6
Employment in Agriculture (% total employment) 1.3 b 1.4 1.5 1.5 1.4 1.3 1.5 1.3 1.4 1.4 1.3
Activity rate (% population aged 15-64) 82.2 b 82.4 b 82.0 81.5 81.5 82.0 82.1 82.2 82.2 82.5 82.3 82.6
Labour Market Indicators - Male

Activity rate (% population aged 15-24) 64.2 b 64.3 b 61.3 60.9 60.7 60.9 60.2 59.5 60.0 59.3 58.3 58.5
Activity rate (% population aged 25-54) 91.6 b 91.6 b 91.7 91.4 91.7 92.0 92.0 92.2 91.9 92.2 92.4 92.5
Activity rate (% population aged 55-64) 68.9 b 69.8 b 70.3 69.2 68.4 69.5 70.6 70.9 71.4 72.6 72.2 72.7
Total unemployment (000) 921 1026 1437 1455 1477 1434 1377 1109 958 873 786 723
Unemployment rate (% labour force) 5.5 6.1 8.5 8.6 8.7 8.3 8.0 6.4 5.5 5.0 4.5 4.1
Youth unemployment rate (% labour force 15-24) 15.8 17.1 21.9 22.0 23.8 23.9 23.0 18.9 16.2 14.8 13.5 12.2
Long term unemployment rate (% labour force) 1.6 b 1.7 b 2.3 3.2 3.3 3.2 3.2 2.6 1.9 1.5 1.3 1.2
Share of long term unemployment (% of total
28.4 b 28.4 b 26.6 37.1 37.8 38.0 39.5 40.2 34.3 30.3 28.7 29.4
unemployment)

Youth unemployment ratio (% population aged 15-24) 10.2 b 11.0 b 13.4 13.4 14.4 14.6 13.9 11.3 9.7 8.8 7.9 7.2

Employment rate for low skilled 25-64 (ISCED 0-2) 70.8 b 70.5 b 68.3 66.3 b 66.9 b 67.8 68.0 70.3 b 70.3 73.0 73.6 74.8
Employment rate for medium skilled 25-64 (ISCED 3-
85.1 b 85.0 b 82.4 81.8 b 82.4 b 82.8 83.5 84.5 b 85.0 85.5 85.6 86.2
4)
Employment rate for high skilled 25-64 (ISCED 5-8) 89.9 b 89.7 b 88.8 88.6 b 87.9 b 88.7 88.9 89.4 b 89.7 89.7 90.0 89.7
Employment rate (Nationals aged 15-64) 77.6 b 77.3 b 74.8 74.4 74.2 74.8 75.3 76.6 77.4 77.9 78.2 78.6
Employment rate (Other EU28 aged 15-64) 84.3 b 85.7 b 83.9 81.9 81.8 83.1 83.9 85.5 84.5 86.1 87.6 89.0
Employment rate (Other than EU28 aged 15-64) 72.2 b 73.2 b 69.4 70.4 70.2 70.8 69.0 71.8 71.5 72.5 72.4 75.1
Employment rate (Born in the same country aged 15-
77.6 b 77.3 b 74.8 74.4 74.1 74.7 75.2 76.4 77.3 77.7 77.8 78.4
64)
Employment rate (Born in other EU28 aged 15-64) 84.1 b 85.2 b 82.9 80.7 81.3 82.1 83.4 84.6 84.4 86.0 87.0 87.8
Employment rate (Born outside EU28 aged 15-64) 74.7 b 74.6 b 72.1 72.3 72.7 74.1 73.6 76.2 76.2 78.0 79.0 79.5
Underemployment (% of labour force aged 15-74) 2.4 b 3.1 3.5 3.7 4.1 4.2 3.8 3.6 3.4 3.0 2.8
Seeking but not available (% of labour force aged 15-
0.8 b 0.7 b 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.9 0.8 0.8 0.8 1.0 0.9 0.9
74)
Discouraged, available but not seeking (% of labour
1.8 b 1.9 b 2.2 2.4 2.2 2.1 2.2 1.9 1.9 1.7 1.6 1.5
force aged 15-74)
Total population (000) 31178 31407 31626 31841 32071 32289 32481 32688 32919 33153 33364 33564
Population aged 15-64(000) 20361 20530 20659 20769 20883 20928 20917 20944 21010 21085 21143 21190
Total employment (000) 13471 b 13630 b 13576 13598 13664 13788 14001 14346 14583 14794 15015 15208
Employment aged 15-64 (000) 13237 b 13380 b 13281 13263 13315 13417 13595 13898 14123 14327 14556 14722
Employment rate (% population aged 20-64) 68.4 b 68.8 b 68.2 67.9 67.8 68.4 69.3 70.6 71.3 72.1 73.1 73.8
Employment rate (% population aged 15-64) 65.5 b 65.7 b 64.9 64.5 64.4 64.9 65.8 67.1 67.9 68.8 69.7 70.3
Employment rate (% population aged 15-24) 51.3 b 50.7 b 47.9 46.1 45.3 46.0 46.2 47.8 49.7 51.1 50.9 49.9
Employment rate (% population aged 25-54) 74.6 b 75.1 b 74.6 74.3 74.4 74.5 75.1 76.2 76.6 77.0 78.1 78.8
Employment rate (% population aged 55-64) 48.8 b 49.0 b 49.2 49.5 49.5 51.0 53.0 54.4 56.0 57.4 59.1 60.6
FTE employment rate (% population aged 20-64) 54.9 b 55.9 b 55.1 54.9 54.7 55.1 55.9 57.2 58.6 58.9 59.9 60.6
Self-employed (% total employment) 7.8 b 7.7 b 8.2 8.6 8.8 9.2 9.3 10.1 10.0 10.4 10.6 10.5
Part-time employment (% total employment) 41.3 b 40.9 b 41.5 42.2 42.1 42.2 41.4 41.2 40.9 40.8 40.2 39.7
Temporary employment (% total employment) 5.8 b 5.5 b 5.4 5.8 5.8 6.0 5.9 6.1 5.9 5.8 5.5 5.2
Employment in Services (% total employment) 89.9 b 91.8 92.1 91.9 91.8 91.8 91.4 91.8 91.9 91.8 92.1
Employment in Industry (% total employment) 9.5 b 7.7 7.4 7.5 7.6 7.7 8.0 7.7 7.6 7.7 7.4
Employment in Agriculture (% total employment) 0.7 b 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
Activity rate (% population aged 15-64) 68.9 b 69.3 b 69.5 69.3 69.6 70.2 70.9 71.3 71.7 72.2 72.9 73.2
Labour Market Indicators - Female

Activity rate (% population aged 15-24) 58.6 b 58.2 b 57.1 55.9 55.7 56.3 56.4 56.1 57.0 57.5 56.9 55.6
Activity rate (% population aged 25-54) 77.5 b 78.2 b 78.6 78.6 79.0 79.2 79.5 79.9 79.8 80.1 80.8 81.3
Activity rate (% population aged 55-64) 49.9 b 50.2 b 50.6 51.1 51.3 53.0 55.3 56.4 57.7 59.2 60.9 62.5
Total unemployment (000) 703 731 931 1004 1082 1100 1060 887 788 726 661 624
Unemployment rate (% labour force) 5.0 5.1 6.4 6.9 7.4 7.4 7.1 5.8 5.1 4.7 4.2 4.0
Youth unemployment rate (% labour force 15-24) 12.5 12.7 16.1 17.6 18.5 18.2 18.1 14.8 12.9 11.1 10.6 10.3
Long term unemployment rate (% labour force) 0.9 b 0.9 b 1.4 1.8 2.0 2.2 2.2 1.8 1.3 1.1 1.0 0.9
Share of long term unemployment (% of total
17.6 b 18.1 b 21.4 25.9 27.6 30.3 31.6 30.2 26.3 23.3 22.5 22.4
unemployment)

Youth unemployment ratio (% population aged 15-24) 7.4 b 7.4 b 9.2 9.8 10.3 10.3 10.2 8.3 7.4 6.4 6.0 5.7

Employment rate for low skilled 25-64 (ISCED 0-2) 58.8 b 51.0 b 49.7 48.0 b 48.0 b 48.6 48.2 50.4 b 50.9 53.0 55.1 56.2
Employment rate for medium skilled 25-64 (ISCED 3-
76.1 b 72.6 b 71.6 71.0 b 72.2 b 71.2 71.5 72.5 b 72.8 72.8 73.9 73.9
4)
Employment rate for high skilled 25-64 (ISCED 5-8) 86.1 b 82.4 b 82.1 81.8 b 79.9 b 79.8 81.3 81.5 b 81.7 81.8 82.0 82.9
Employment rate (Nationals aged 15-64) 66.2 b 66.5 b 65.6 65.1 65.0 65.7 66.4 67.8 68.5 69.5 70.5 70.9
Employment rate (Other EU28 aged 15-64) 67.9 b 68.5 b 67.9 68.3 70.3 69.0 69.8 71.3 73.5 71.6 72.8 75.6
Employment rate (Other than EU28 aged 15-64) 48.8 b 50.6 b 50.9 50.2 49.2 47.7 49.7 48.5 50.8 50.9 51.3 52.0
Employment rate (Born in the same country aged 15-
66.9 b 67.0 b 66.2 65.6 65.6 66.5 67.1 68.4 69.1 70.1 71.2 71.4
64)
Employment rate (Born in other EU28 aged 15-64) 67.9 b 68.9 b 69.0 69.0 70.5 68.1 69.5 72.0 74.3 72.8 73.2 75.8
Employment rate (Born outside EU28 aged 15-64) 51.4 b 52.8 b 52.1 52.7 51.9 51.5 53.6 54.3 55.5 56.9 57.7 59.3
Underemployment (% of labour force aged 15-74) 6.0 b 7.1 7.5 7.8 8.2 8.0 7.7 7.2 6.6 6.3 5.8
Seeking but not available (% of labour force aged 15-
1.1 b 1.1 b 1.2 1.3 1.2 1.2 1.3 1.3 1.4 1.3 1.3 1.3
74)
Discouraged, available but not seeking (% of labour
2.6 b 2.7 b 2.9 3.0 2.8 2.9 2.7 2.4 2.3 2.1 2.0 1.8
force aged 15-74)

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317
Employment and Social Developments in Europe 2019

United Kingdom 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
At-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion (% of total
22.6 23.2 22.0 23.2 22.7 24.1 b 24.8 24.1 23.5 22.2 22.0 b
population)
At-risk-of-poverty (% of total population) 18.6 18.7 17.3 17.1 16.2 16.0 15.9 16.8 16.6 15.9 17.0 b
At-risk-of-poverty threshold (PPS single person) 11267 11126 10091 9521 9466 9868 b 10060 10138 10669 10378 10826 b
Poverty gap (%) 22.4 21.0 20.6 21.4 21.3 20.9 b 19.6 19.4 20.4 22.4 20.1 b
Persistent at-risk-of-poverty (% of total
8.5 8.0 7.4 6.9 8.6 7.8 6.5 7.3 9.4 7.8
population)
At-risk-of-poverty before social transfers excl.
29.7 28.9 30.4 31.0 30.5 29.7 b 30.1 29.4 29.3 28.1 29.2 b
pensions (% of total population)
Impact of social transfers (excl. pensions) in
37.4 35.3 43.1 44.8 46.9 46.1 b 47.2 42.9 43.3 43.4 41.8 b
reducing poverty (%)
All

Severe Material Deprivation (% of total population) 4.2 4.5 3.3 u 4.8 5.1 7.8 8.3 7.4 6.1 5.2 4.1 b 4.6 p
Share of people living in low work intensity households
10.4 10.4 12.7 13.2 11.5 13.0 b 13.2 12.3 11.9 11.3 10.1 b
(% of people aged 0-59)
Real Gross Household Disposable income (growth %) 3.0 -0.4 1.7 -0.5 -1.9 2.8 1.3 1.1 5.2 0.0 -0.6
Income quintile share ratio S80/S20 5.3 5.6 5.3 5.4 5.3 5.0 b 4.6 5.1 5.2 5.1 5.4 b
GINI coefficient 32.6 33.9 32.4 32.9 33.0 31.3 b 30.2 31.6 32.4 31.5 33.1 b
Early leavers from education and training (% of
16.6 b 16.9 b 15.7 14.8 b 14.9 b 13.4 12.4 11.8 b 10.8 11.2 10.6 10.7
population aged 18-24)
NEET: Young people neither in employment nor in
education and training (% of total population aged 15- 11.9 b 12.1 b 13.2 13.6 14.2 13.9 13.2 11.9 11.1 10.9 10.3 10.4
24)
At-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion (% of male
21.1 21.7 21.1 22.1 21.4 23.4 b 23.6 22.9 22.5 21.1 21.0 b
population)
At-risk-of-poverty (% of male population) 17.6 17.4 16.7 16.4 14.8 15.8 15.4 16.0 16.1 15.2 16.1 b
Poverty gap (%) 22.9 21.1 20.9 23.0 22.2 21.9 b 19.9 19.6 20.7 23.6 20.1 b
Persistent at-risk-of-poverty (% of male
7.7 7.6 7.0 6.1 8.1 7.0 5.7 6.3 8.9 6.7
population)
Severe Material Deprivation (% of male population) 3.9 4.3 3.4 u 4.8 5.0 7.5 8.0 7.3 5.8 5.2 3.9 b 4.2 p
Male

Share of people living in low work intensity households

9.6 9.7 12.0 12.5 10.8 12.5 b 12.5 11.9 11.2 10.7 9.6 b
(% of males aged 0-59)
Life expectancy at birth (years) 77.6 77.7 78.3 78.6 79.0 79.1 79.2 79.5 79.2 79.4 79.5
Healthy life years at birth (years) - men 64.6 65.0 65.0 64.9 65.2 64.6 64.4 63.4 63.7 63.0
Early leavers from education and training (% of males
17.6 b 18.2 b 16.9 15.6 b 16.1 b 14.5 13.6 12.9 b 11.7 12.7 12.1 12.2
aged 18-24)
NEET: Young people neither in employment nor in
10.1 b 10.1 b 11.9 12.1 13.1 12.8 12.1 10.7 9.7 10.3 10.2 9.7
education and training ( % of males aged 15-24)
At-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion (% of female
24.1 24.7 22.8 24.2 24.1 24.9 b 25.8 25.2 24.4 23.2 23.0 b
population)
At-risk-of-poverty (% of female population) 19.6 20.0 17.8 17.8 17.6 16.3 16.4 17.6 17.2 16.5 17.9 b
Poverty gap (%) 21.9 20.9 20.5 19.3 20.5 19.5 b 19.2 19.4 19.9 21.5 20.1 b
Persistent at-risk-of-poverty (% of female
9.2 8.3 7.7 7.8 9.1 8.6 7.2 8.2 9.9 8.8
population)
Social Indicators

Severe Material Deprivation (% of female population) 4.4 4.8 3.2 u 4.9 5.1 8.1 8.6 7.5 6.4 5.2 4.3 b 5.1 p
Female

Share of people living in low work intensity households

11.1 11.2 13.4 13.9 12.3 13.6 b 14.0 12.7 12.7 11.9 10.6 b
(% of females aged 0-59)
Life expectancy at birth (years) 81.8 81.8 82.5 82.6 83.0 82.8 82.9 83.2 82.8 83.0 83.1
Healthy life years at birth (years) - women 66.0 66.3 66.1 65.6 65.2 64.5 64.8 64.2 63.3 63.1
Early leavers from education and training (% of
15.6 b 15.6 b 14.5 13.9 b 13.8 b 12.2 11.1 10.8 b 9.8 9.5 9.0 9.1
females aged 18-24)
NEET: Young people neither in employment nor in
13.7 b 14.1 b 14.5 15.1 15.4 15.0 14.4 13.1 12.4 11.5 10.4 11.2
education and training ( % of females aged 15-24)
At-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion of children (% of
27.6 29.6 27.4 29.7 26.9 31.2 b 32.6 31.2 30.3 27.2 27.4 b
people aged 0-17)
At-risk-of-poverty (% of Children population) 23.0 24.0 20.7 20.4 18.0 18.0 18.9 19.7 19.9 18.5 21.3 b
Children (0-17)

Severe Material Deprivation (% of Children

6.3 6.5 4.4 u 7.3 7.1 12.5 12.3 10.8 9.6 7.5 5.8 b 7.0 p
population)
Share of children living in low work intensity
13.8 13.9 16.1 17.1 14.1 16.3 b 16.7 15.1 14.8 13.0 10.9 b
households (% of Children population)
Risk of poverty of children in households at work
14.7 16.2 12.2 12.7 12.1 13.2 b 14.8 15.1 14.7 13.2 16.7 b
(Working Intensity > 0.2)
Impact of social transfers (excl. pensions) in reducing
43.6 39.6 51.6 54.2 57.6 57.0 b 57.2 53.8 53.8 53.1 49.2 b
poverty (0-17) (%)
At-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion (% of working
19.6 19.7 19.8 21.2 21.4 23.7 b 24.1 23.2 22.8 21.8 21.3 b
age population)
At-risk-of-poverty (% of Working age population) 15.1 14.7 14.8 14.9 14.1 15.3 14.7 15.6 15.6 14.6 15.5 b
Working age

Severe Material Deprivation (% of Working age

4.0 4.7 3.6 u 5.0 5.5 8.0 8.7 7.9 6.3 5.6 4.4 b 4.8 p
(18-64)

population)
Very low work intensity (18-59) 9.1 9.2 11.4 11.7 10.6 11.9 b 12.0 11.3 10.9 10.7 9.8 b
In-work at-risk-of poverty rate (% of persons
7.9 8.0 6.3 6.7 7.8 8.7 b 8.2 8.8 8.2 8.6 9.0 b
employed 18-64)
Impact of social transfers (excl. pensions) in reducing
38.9 38.0 44.4 45.2 48.0 44.0 b 46.6 41.4 41.1 43.6 41.3 b
poverty (18-64) (%)
At-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion of elderly (% of
27.9 28.5 23.1 22.3 22.7 17.3 b 18.1 19.0 17.9 18.0 18.0 b
people aged 65+)
Elderly (65+)

At-risk-of-poverty (% of Elderly population) 26.5 27.3 22.3 21.3 21.8 16.4 16.6 17.7 16.5 17.1 16.9 b

Severe Material Deprivation (% of Elderly population) 1.9 1.4 1.2 u 1.3 1.3 1.4 2.1 1.9 1.6 1.2 1.4 b 1.4 p
Relative median income of elderly (ratio with median
0.74 0.74 0.80 0.81 0.81 0.88 b 0.87 0.87 0.88 0.89 0.89 b
income of people younger than 65)
Aggregate replacement ratio (ratio) 0.44 0.43 0.44 0.48 0.48 0.50 b 0.53 0.51 0.50 0.53 0.54 b
Sickness/Health care 7.1 7.2 8.0 8.2 8.7 8.7 8.8 8.6 9.0 8.5 p
protection indicators
Expenditure in social

Disability 1.8 1.8 2.0 1.9 1.9 1.8 1.6 1.6 1.7 1.7 p
Old age and survivors 10.0 10.5 11.6 11.7 11.8 12.1 11.9 11.7 11.7 11.0 p
(% of GDP)

Family/Children 2.4 2.6 3.0 3.1 3.1 3.1 2.9 2.8 2.8 2.6 p
Unemployment 0.5 0.6 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.4 0.4 0.4 p
Housing and Social exclusion n.e.c. 1.9 2.1 2.4 2.4 2.3 2.3 2.2 2.1 2.0 1.9 p
Total (including Admin and Other expenditures) 24.6 25.7 28.4 28.8 28.9 28.9 28.3 27.5 27.6 26.2 p
of which: Means tested benefits 4.8 5.2 5.9 6.0 5.9 5.8 5.4 5.1 4.9 4.6 p

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318
2. SELECTED INDICATORS

Real GDP (yearly growth)

2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
European Union 28 3.1 0.5 -4.3 2.1 1.8 -0.4 0.3 1.8 2.3 2.0 2.5 2.0
Euro Area 19 3.1 0.5 -4.5 2.1 1.6 -0.9 -0.2 1.4 2.1 1.9 2.4 1.9
Belgium 3.4 0.8 -2.3 2.7 1.8 0.2 0.2 1.3 1.7 1.5 1.7 1.4
Bulgaria 7.3 6.0 -3.6 1.3 1.9 0.0 0.5 1.8 3.5 3.9 3.8 3.1 p
Czechia 5.6 2.7 -4.8 2.3 1.8 -0.8 -0.5 2.7 5.3 2.5 4.4 2.9
Denmark 0.9 -0.5 -4.9 1.9 1.3 0.2 0.9 1.6 2.3 2.4 2.3 1.4
Germany 3.3 1.1 -5.6 4.1 3.7 0.5 0.5 2.2 1.7 2.2 2.2 1.4
Estonia 7.7 -5.4 -14.7 2.3 7.6 4.3 1.9 2.9 1.9 3.5 4.9 3.9
Ireland 5.3 -4.4 -5.0 1.9 3.7 0.2 1.3 8.8 25.1 5.0 7.2 6.7
Greece 3.3 -0.3 -4.3 -5.5 -9.1 p -7.3 p -3.2 p 0.7 p -0.4 p -0.2 p 1.5 p 1.9 p
Spain 3.8 1.1 -3.6 0.0 -1.0 -2.9 -1.7 1.4 3.6 3.2 p 3.0 p 2.6 p
France 2.4 0.3 -2.9 1.9 2.2 0.3 0.6 1.0 1.1 1.1 2.3 p 1.7 p
Croatia 5.3 2.0 -7.3 -1.5 -0.3 -2.3 -0.5 -0.1 2.4 3.5 2.9 2.6
Italy 1.5 -1.1 -5.5 1.7 0.6 -2.8 -1.7 0.1 0.9 1.1 1.7 0.9
Cyprus 5.1 3.6 -2.0 1.3 0.4 -2.9 -5.8 -1.3 2.0 4.8 4.5 p 3.9 p
Latvia 10.0 -3.5 -14.4 -3.9 6.4 4.0 2.4 1.9 3.0 2.1 4.6 4.8
Lithuania 11.1 2.6 -14.8 1.6 6.0 3.8 3.5 3.5 2.0 2.4 4.1 3.5
Luxembourg 8.4 -1.3 -4.4 4.9 2.5 -0.4 3.7 4.3 3.9 2.4 1.5 2.6
Hungary 0.4 0.9 -6.6 0.7 1.7 -1.6 2.1 4.2 3.5 2.3 4.1 4.9
Malta 4.0 3.3 -2.5 3.5 1.3 2.8 4.6 8.7 10.8 5.6 6.8 6.7
Netherlands 3.8 2.2 -3.7 1.3 1.6 -1.0 -0.1 1.4 2.0 2.2 2.9 p 2.7 p
Austria 3.7 1.5 -3.8 1.8 2.9 0.7 0.0 0.7 1.1 2.0 2.6 2.7
Poland 7.0 4.2 2.8 3.6 5.0 1.6 1.4 3.3 3.8 3.1 4.8 5.1
Portugal 2.5 0.2 -3.0 1.9 -1.8 -4.0 -1.1 0.9 1.8 1.9 2.8 p 2.1 e
Romania 7.2 9.3 -5.5 -3.9 2.0 2.1 3.5 3.4 3.9 4.8 7.0 p 4.1 p
Slovenia 6.9 3.3 -7.8 1.2 0.6 -2.7 -1.1 3.0 2.3 3.1 4.9 4.5
Slovakia 10.8 5.6 -5.4 5.0 2.8 1.7 1.5 2.8 4.2 3.1 3.2 4.1
Finland 5.2 0.7 -8.3 3.0 2.6 -1.4 -0.8 -0.6 0.5 2.8 2.7 2.3
Sweden 3.4 -0.6 -5.2 6.0 2.7 -0.3 1.2 2.6 4.5 2.7 2.1 2.4
United Kingdom 2.5 -0.3 -4.2 1.7 1.6 1.4 2.0 2.9 2.3 1.8 1.8 1.4

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Employment rate (% population aged 20-64)

2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
European Union 28 68.8 69.8 70.2 68.9 68.5 68.6 68.4 68.4 69.2 70.1 71.1 72.2 73.2
Euro Area 19 68.8 69.8 70.1 68.7 68.3 68.4 68.0 67.7 68.2 69.0 70.0 71.0 72.0
Belgium 66.5 67.7 68.0 67.1 67.6 67.3 67.2 67.2 67.3 67.2 67.7 68.5 b 69.7
Bulgaria 65.1 68.4 70.7 68.8 64.7 b 62.9 b 63.0 63.5 65.1 67.1 67.7 71.3 72.4
Czechia 71.2 72.0 72.4 70.9 70.4 70.9 b 71.5 72.5 73.5 74.8 76.7 78.5 79.9
Denmark 79.4 79.0 79.7 77.5 75.8 75.7 75.4 75.6 75.9 76.5 77.4 b 76.9 b 78.2
Germany 71.1 72.9 74.0 74.2 75.0 b 76.5 b 76.9 77.3 77.7 78.0 78.6 79.2 79.9
Estonia 75.9 76.9 77.1 70.0 66.8 70.6 72.2 73.3 74.3 76.5 76.6 78.7 79.5
Ireland 74.7 75.1 b 73.5 68.0 65.5 64.6 64.5 66.5 68.1 69.9 71.4 73.0 74.1
Greece 65.6 65.8 66.3 65.6 b 63.8 59.6 55.0 52.9 53.3 54.9 56.2 57.8 59.5
Spain 69.0 69.7 68.5 64.0 62.8 62.0 59.6 58.6 59.9 62.0 63.9 65.5 67.0
France 69.4 69.9 70.5 69.5 69.3 69.2 69.4 69.5 69.7 70.0 70.4 71.0 71.8
Croatia 60.6 e 63.9 64.9 64.2 62.1 59.8 58.1 57.2 59.2 60.6 61.4 63.6 65.2
Italy 62.4 62.7 62.9 61.6 61.0 61.0 60.9 59.7 59.9 60.5 61.6 62.3 63.0
Cyprus 75.8 76.8 76.5 75.3 b 75.0 73.4 70.2 67.2 67.6 67.9 68.7 70.8 73.9
Latvia 73.2 75.2 75.4 66.6 64.3 66.3 68.1 69.7 70.7 72.5 73.2 74.8 76.8
Lithuania 71.3 72.7 72.0 67.0 64.3 66.9 68.5 69.9 71.8 73.3 75.2 76.0 77.8
Luxembourg 69.1 69.6 b 68.8 70.4 b 70.7 70.1 71.4 71.1 72.1 70.9 b 70.7 71.5 72.1
Hungary 62.6 62.3 61.5 60.1 59.9 60.4 61.6 63.0 66.7 68.9 71.5 73.3 74.4
Malta 57.9 58.6 59.2 59.0 60.1 61.6 63.9 66.2 67.9 69.0 71.1 73.0 75.0
Netherlands 73.7 75.5 76.9 76.8 76.2 76.4 76.6 75.9 75.4 76.4 77.1 78.0 79.2
Austria 71.6 72.8 b 73.8 73.4 73.9 74.2 74.4 74.6 74.2 74.3 74.8 75.4 76.2
Poland 60.1 62.7 65.0 64.9 64.3 b 64.5 64.7 64.9 66.5 67.8 69.3 70.9 72.2
Portugal 72.6 72.5 73.1 71.1 70.3 68.8 b 66.3 65.4 67.6 69.1 70.6 73.4 75.4
Romania 64.8 64.4 64.4 63.5 64.8 b 63.8 64.8 64.7 65.7 66.0 66.3 68.8 69.9
Slovenia 71.5 72.4 73.0 71.9 70.3 68.4 68.3 67.2 67.7 69.1 70.1 73.4 75.4
Slovakia 66.0 67.2 68.8 66.4 64.6 65.0 b 65.1 65.0 65.9 67.7 69.8 71.1 72.4
Finland 73.9 74.8 75.8 73.5 73.0 73.8 74.0 73.3 73.1 72.9 73.4 74.2 76.3
Sweden 78.8 80.1 80.4 78.3 78.1 79.4 79.4 79.8 80.0 80.5 81.2 81.8 82.6
United Kingdom 75.2 75.2 b 75.2 b 73.9 73.5 73.5 74.1 74.8 76.2 76.8 77.5 78.2 78.7

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319
Employment and Social Developments in Europe 2019

Activity rate (% population aged 15-64)

2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
European Union 28 70.1 70.3 70.7 70.8 71.0 71.1 71.7 72.0 72.3 72.6 73.0 73.4 73.7
Euro Area 19 70.4 70.7 71.2 71.2 71.3 71.5 72.0 72.2 72.4 72.5 72.9 73.1 73.5
Belgium 66.5 67.1 67.1 66.9 67.7 66.7 66.9 67.5 67.7 67.6 67.6 68.0 b 68.6
Bulgaria 64.5 66.3 67.8 67.2 66.7 b 65.9 b 67.1 68.4 69.0 69.3 68.7 71.3 71.5
Czechia 70.3 69.9 69.7 70.1 70.2 70.5 b 71.6 72.9 73.5 74.0 75.0 75.9 76.6
Denmark 80.6 80.1 80.7 80.2 79.4 79.3 78.6 78.1 78.1 78.5 80.0 b 78.8 b 79.4
Germany 74.9 75.6 75.9 76.3 76.7 b 77.3 b 77.2 77.6 77.7 77.6 77.9 78.2 78.6
Estonia 72.8 73.2 74.2 74.0 73.9 74.7 74.8 75.1 75.2 76.7 77.5 78.8 79.1
Ireland 74.9 75.6 b 74.8 73.0 71.6 71.2 71.1 71.8 71.8 72.1 72.7 72.7 72.9
Greece 66.7 66.5 66.7 67.4 b 67.8 67.3 67.5 67.5 67.4 67.8 68.2 68.3 68.2
Spain 71.1 71.8 72.7 73.1 73.5 73.9 74.3 74.3 74.2 74.3 74.2 73.9 73.7
France 69.2 e 69.3 e 69.4 e 69.8 e 69.8 e 69.7 e 70.3 e 70.7 e 71.0 71.3 71.4 71.5 71.9
Croatia 63.0 e 65.7 65.8 65.6 65.1 64.1 63.9 63.7 66.1 66.9 65.6 66.4 66.3
Italy 62.6 62.4 62.9 62.3 62.0 62.1 63.5 63.4 63.9 64.0 64.9 65.4 65.6
Cyprus 73.0 73.9 73.6 73.0 b 73.6 73.5 73.5 73.6 74.3 73.9 73.4 73.9 75.0
Latvia 71.0 72.6 74.2 73.5 73.0 72.8 74.4 74.0 74.6 75.7 76.3 77.0 77.7
Lithuania 67.6 67.9 68.4 69.6 70.2 71.4 71.8 72.4 73.7 74.1 75.5 75.9 77.3
Luxembourg 66.7 66.9 b 66.8 68.7 b 68.2 67.9 69.4 69.9 70.8 70.9 b 70.0 70.2 71.1
Hungary 62.0 61.6 61.2 61.2 61.9 62.4 63.7 64.7 67.0 68.6 70.1 71.2 71.9
Malta 57.9 58.8 59.1 59.4 60.4 61.8 63.9 66.3 67.8 68.8 70.6 72.2 74.2
Netherlands 75.4 76.7 77.8 78.1 77.9 78.1 79.0 79.4 79.0 79.6 79.7 79.7 80.3
Austria 72.4 73.5 b 73.9 74.3 74.4 74.6 75.1 75.5 75.4 75.5 76.2 76.4 76.8
Poland 63.4 63.2 63.8 64.7 65.3 b 65.7 66.5 67.0 67.9 68.1 68.8 69.6 70.1
Portugal 73.6 73.9 73.9 73.4 73.7 73.6 b 73.4 73.0 73.2 73.4 73.7 74.7 75.1
Romania 63.6 63.0 62.9 63.1 64.9 b 64.1 64.8 64.9 65.7 66.1 65.6 67.3 67.8
Slovenia 70.9 71.3 71.8 71.8 71.5 70.3 70.4 70.5 70.9 71.8 71.6 74.2 75.0
Slovakia 68.6 68.3 68.8 68.4 68.7 68.7 b 69.4 69.9 70.3 70.9 71.9 72.1 72.4
Finland 75.2 75.6 76.0 75.0 74.5 74.9 75.2 75.2 75.4 75.8 75.9 76.7 77.9
Sweden 78.8 79.1 79.3 78.9 79.1 79.9 80.3 81.1 81.5 81.7 82.1 82.5 82.9
United Kingdom 75.7 75.5 b 75.8 b 75.7 75.4 75.5 76.1 76.4 76.7 76.9 77.3 77.6 77.9

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Unemployment rate (% labour force)

2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
European Union 28 8.2 7.2 7.0 9.0 9.6 9.7 10.5 10.9 10.2 9.4 8.6 7.6 6.8
Euro Area 19 8.4 7.5 7.6 9.6 10.2 10.2 11.4 12.0 11.6 10.9 10.0 9.1 8.2
Belgium 8.3 7.5 7.0 7.9 8.3 7.2 7.6 8.4 8.5 8.5 7.8 7.1 b 6.0
Bulgaria 9.0 6.9 5.6 6.8 10.3 d 11.3 12.3 13.0 11.4 9.2 7.6 6.2 5.2
Czechia 7.1 5.3 4.4 6.7 7.3 6.7 7.0 7.0 6.1 5.1 4.0 2.9 2.2
Denmark 3.9 d 3.8 3.4 6.0 7.5 7.6 7.5 7.0 6.6 6.2 6.2 5.7 5.0
Germany 10.1 8.5 7.4 7.6 7.0 5.8 5.4 5.2 5.0 4.6 4.1 3.8 3.4
Estonia 5.9 4.6 5.5 d 13.5 16.7 12.3 10.0 8.6 7.4 6.2 6.8 5.8 5.4
Ireland 4.8 5.0 6.8 12.6 14.6 15.4 15.5 13.8 11.9 10.0 8.4 6.7 5.8
Greece 9.0 8.4 7.8 9.6 12.7 17.9 24.5 27.5 26.5 24.9 23.6 21.5 19.3
Spain 8.5 8.2 11.3 17.9 19.9 21.4 24.8 26.1 24.5 22.1 19.6 17.2 15.3
France 8.8 8.0 7.4 9.1 9.3 9.2 9.8 10.3 10.3 10.4 10.1 9.4 9.1
Croatia 11.6 d 9.9 8.6 9.3 11.8 13.7 15.8 17.4 17.2 16.1 13.4 11.0 8.5
Italy 6.8 6.1 6.7 7.7 8.4 8.4 10.7 12.1 12.7 11.9 11.7 11.2 10.6
Cyprus 4.6 3.9 3.7 5.4 6.3 7.9 11.9 15.9 16.1 15.0 13.0 11.1 8.4
Latvia 7.0 6.1 7.7 17.5 19.5 16.2 15.0 11.9 10.8 9.9 9.6 8.7 7.4
Lithuania 5.8 4.3 5.8 13.8 17.8 15.4 13.4 11.8 10.7 9.1 7.9 7.1 6.2
Luxembourg 4.6 d 4.2 4.9 5.1 4.6 4.8 5.1 5.9 6.0 6.5 6.3 5.6 5.4
Hungary 7.5 7.4 7.8 d 10.0 11.2 11.0 11.0 10.2 7.7 6.8 5.1 4.2 3.7
Malta 6.8 6.5 6.0 6.9 6.8 6.4 6.2 6.1 5.7 5.4 4.7 4.0 3.7
Netherlands 5.0 4.2 3.7 4.4 5.0 5.0 5.8 7.3 7.4 6.9 6.0 4.9 3.8
Austria 5.3 4.9 4.1 5.3 4.8 4.6 4.9 5.4 5.6 5.7 6.0 5.5 4.9
Poland 13.9 9.6 7.1 8.1 d 9.7 9.7 10.1 10.3 9.0 7.5 6.2 4.9 3.9
Portugal 8.9 9.1 8.8 10.7 12.0 12.9 15.8 16.4 14.1 12.6 11.2 9.0 7.0
Romania 7.2 6.4 5.6 6.5 7.0 7.2 6.8 7.1 6.8 6.8 5.9 4.9 4.2
Slovenia 6.0 4.9 4.4 5.9 7.3 8.2 8.9 10.1 9.7 9.0 8.0 6.6 5.1
Slovakia 13.5 11.2 9.6 12.1 14.5 13.7 d 14.0 14.2 13.2 11.5 9.7 8.1 6.5
Finland 7.7 6.9 6.4 8.2 8.4 7.8 7.7 8.2 8.7 9.4 8.8 8.6 7.4
Sweden 7.1 6.1 6.2 8.3 8.6 7.8 8.0 8.0 7.9 7.4 6.9 6.7 6.3
United Kingdom 5.4 5.3 5.6 7.6 7.8 8.1 7.9 7.5 6.1 5.3 4.8 4.3 4.0

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320
 Statistical annex - 2. Selected indicators

Youth unemployment rate (% labour force 15-24)

2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
European Union 28 17.7 15.8 15.9 20.3 21.4 21.8 23.3 23.8 22.2 20.3 18.7 16.8 15.2
Euro Area 19 17.1 15.5 16.1 20.7 21.5 21.4 23.6 24.4 23.7 22.3 20.9 18.8 16.9
Belgium 20.5 18.8 18.0 21.9 22.4 18.7 19.8 23.7 23.2 22.1 20.1 19.3 b 15.8
Bulgaria 18.3 14.1 11.9 15.1 21.9 d 25.0 28.1 28.4 23.8 21.6 17.2 12.9 12.7
Czechia 17.5 10.7 9.9 16.6 18.3 18.1 19.5 18.9 15.9 12.6 10.5 7.9 6.7
Denmark 7.7 d 7.5 8.0 11.8 13.9 14.2 14.1 13.0 12.6 10.8 12.0 11.0 9.3
Germany 13.6 11.8 10.4 11.1 9.8 8.5 8.0 7.8 7.7 7.2 7.1 6.8 6.2
Estonia 12.1 10.1 12.0 d 27.4 32.9 22.4 20.9 18.7 15.0 13.1 13.4 12.1 11.9
Ireland 8.8 9.2 13.5 24.5 28.1 29.6 30.8 26.7 23.4 20.2 16.8 14.4 13.8
Greece 25.0 22.7 21.9 25.7 33.0 44.7 55.3 58.3 52.4 49.8 47.3 43.6 39.9
Spain 17.9 18.1 24.5 37.7 41.5 46.2 52.9 55.5 53.2 48.3 44.4 38.6 34.3
France 22.0 19.5 19.0 23.6 23.3 22.6 24.4 24.9 24.2 24.7 24.6 22.3 20.7
Croatia 28.9 d 25.4 23.6 25.4 32.3 36.6 42.2 49.9 44.9 42.3 31.8 27.2 23.8
Italy 21.8 20.4 21.2 25.3 27.9 29.2 35.3 40.0 42.7 40.3 37.8 34.7 32.2
Cyprus 10.0 10.2 9.0 13.8 16.6 22.4 27.7 38.9 36.0 32.8 29.1 24.7 20.2
Latvia 13.6 10.6 13.6 33.3 36.2 31.0 28.5 23.2 19.6 16.3 17.3 17.0 12.2
Lithuania 10.0 8.4 13.3 29.6 35.7 32.6 26.7 21.9 19.3 16.3 14.5 13.3 11.1
Luxembourg 15.5 d 15.6 17.3 16.5 15.8 16.4 18.0 16.9 22.3 16.6 19.1 15.5 13.5
Hungary 19.1 18.1 19.5 d 26.4 26.4 26.0 28.2 26.6 20.4 17.3 12.9 10.7 10.2
Malta 15.5 13.5 11.7 14.5 13.2 13.3 13.8 12.7 11.7 11.6 10.7 10.6 9.2
Netherlands 10.0 9.4 8.6 10.2 11.1 10.0 11.7 13.2 12.7 11.3 10.8 8.9 7.2
Austria 9.8 9.4 8.5 10.7 9.5 8.9 9.4 9.7 10.3 10.6 11.2 9.8 9.4
Poland 29.8 21.6 17.2 20.6 d 23.7 25.8 26.5 27.3 23.9 20.8 17.7 14.8 11.7
Portugal 21.2 21.4 21.6 25.3 28.2 30.2 38.0 38.1 34.7 32.0 28.2 23.8 20.3
Romania 20.2 19.3 17.6 20.0 22.1 23.9 22.6 23.7 24.0 21.7 20.6 18.3 16.2
Slovenia 13.9 10.1 10.4 13.6 14.7 15.7 20.6 21.6 20.2 16.3 15.2 11.2 8.8
Slovakia 27.0 20.6 19.3 27.6 33.9 33.7 d 34.0 33.7 29.7 26.5 22.2 18.9 14.9
Finland 18.7 16.5 16.5 21.5 21.4 20.1 19.0 19.9 20.5 22.4 20.1 20.1 17.0
Sweden 21.5 19.2 20.2 25.0 24.8 22.8 23.7 23.6 22.9 20.4 18.9 17.8 16.8
United Kingdom 13.9 14.3 15.0 19.1 19.9 21.3 21.2 20.7 17.0 14.6 13.0 12.1 11.3

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Long term unemployment rate (% labour force)

2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
European Union 28 3.7 3.1 2.6 3.0 3.8 4.1 4.6 5.1 5.0 4.5 4.0 3.4 2.9
Euro Area 19 3.8 3.2 2.9 3.4 4.3 4.6 5.2 5.9 6.0 5.5 5.0 4.4 3.8
Belgium 4.2 3.8 3.3 3.5 4.0 3.5 3.4 3.9 4.3 4.4 4.0 3.5 b 2.9
Bulgaria 5.0 4.1 2.9 3.0 4.7 b 6.3 b 6.8 7.4 6.9 5.6 4.5 3.4 3.0
Czechia 3.9 2.8 2.2 2.0 3.0 2.7 b 3.0 3.0 2.7 2.4 1.7 1.0 0.7
Denmark 0.8 0.6 0.5 0.6 1.5 1.8 2.1 1.8 1.7 1.7 1.4 b 1.3 b 1.1
Germany 5.7 4.9 3.9 3.5 3.3 b 2.8 b 2.4 2.3 2.2 2.0 1.7 1.6 1.4
Estonia 2.9 2.3 1.7 3.7 7.6 7.1 5.5 3.8 3.3 2.4 2.1 1.9 1.3
Ireland 1.4 1.4 b 1.7 3.5 6.9 8.8 9.2 8.0 6.6 5.3 4.2 3.0 2.1
Greece 4.9 4.2 3.7 3.9 b 5.7 8.8 14.5 18.5 19.5 18.2 17.0 15.6 13.6
Spain 1.8 1.7 2.0 4.3 7.3 8.9 11.0 13.0 12.9 11.4 9.5 7.7 6.4
France 3.8 e 3.3 e 2.9 e 3.3 e 3.9 e 4.0 e 4.1 e 4.4 e 4.5 4.6 4.6 4.2 3.8
Croatia 6.7 6.0 5.3 5.1 6.6 8.4 10.2 11.0 10.1 10.2 6.6 4.6 3.4
Italy 3.3 2.9 3.0 3.4 4.0 4.3 5.6 6.9 7.7 6.9 6.7 6.5 6.2
Cyprus 0.9 0.7 0.5 0.6 b 1.3 1.6 3.6 6.1 7.7 6.8 5.8 4.5 2.7
Latvia 2.4 1.6 1.9 4.5 8.8 8.8 7.8 5.7 4.6 4.5 4.0 3.3 3.1
Lithuania 2.6 1.4 u 1.3 u 3.3 7.4 8.0 6.6 5.1 4.8 3.9 3.0 2.7 2.0
Luxembourg 1.4 1.2 1.6 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.6 1.8 1.6 1.9 2.2 2.1 1.4
Hungary 3.4 3.5 3.6 4.2 5.5 5.2 5.0 4.9 3.7 3.1 2.4 1.7 1.4
Malta 2.7 2.7 2.6 2.9 3.1 3.0 3.0 2.8 2.7 2.4 1.9 1.6 1.1
Netherlands 2.1 1.5 1.2 1.1 1.3 1.6 1.9 2.5 2.9 3.0 2.5 1.9 1.4
Austria 1.5 1.3 b 1.0 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.3 1.5 1.7 1.9 1.8 1.4
Poland 7.8 4.9 2.4 2.5 3.0 b 3.6 4.1 4.4 3.8 3.0 2.2 1.5 1.0
Portugal 3.9 3.8 3.6 4.2 5.7 6.2 b 7.7 9.3 8.4 7.2 6.2 4.5 3.1
Romania 4.1 3.2 2.4 2.2 2.4 b 2.9 3.0 3.2 2.8 3.0 3.0 2.0 1.8
Slovenia 2.9 2.2 1.9 1.8 3.2 3.6 4.3 5.2 5.3 4.7 4.3 3.1 2.2
Slovakia 10.2 8.3 6.6 6.5 9.2 9.2 b 9.4 10.0 9.3 7.6 5.8 5.1 4.0
Finland 1.9 1.5 1.2 1.4 2.0 1.7 1.6 1.7 1.9 2.3 2.3 2.1 1.6
Sweden 1.0 e 0.8 0.8 1.1 1.6 1.5 1.5 1.4 1.4 1.5 1.3 1.2 1.2
United Kingdom 1.2 1.3 b 1.4 b 1.9 2.5 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.2 1.6 1.3 1.1 1.1

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321
Employment and Social Developments in Europe 2019

At-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion (% of total population)

2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
European Union 28 23.8 24.3 24.8 24.6 24.4 23.8 23.5 22.4
Euro Area 19 22.1 21.9 21.7 21.6 22.0 22.9 23.3 23.1 23.5 23.1 23.1 22.1
Belgium 21.5 21.6 20.8 20.2 20.8 21.0 21.6 20.8 21.2 21.1 20.7 20.3
Bulgaria 61.3 60.7 44.8 b 46.2 49.2 49.1 49.3 48.0 40.1 b 41.3 40.4 b 38.9 32.8
Czechia 18.0 15.8 15.3 14.0 14.4 15.3 15.4 14.6 14.8 14.0 13.3 12.2 12.2
Denmark 16.7 16.8 16.3 17.6 18.3 17.6 b 17.5 18.3 17.9 17.7 16.8 17.2 17.6 p
Germany 20.2 20.6 20.1 20.0 19.7 19.9 19.6 20.3 20.6 20.0 19.7 19.0
Estonia 22.0 22.0 21.8 23.4 21.7 23.1 23.4 23.5 26.0 b 24.2 24.4 23.4
Ireland 23.3 23.1 23.7 25.7 27.3 29.4 30.3 29.9 27.7 26.0 24.4 22.7
Greece 29.3 28.3 28.1 27.6 27.7 31.0 34.6 35.7 36.0 35.7 35.6 34.8
Spain 24.0 23.3 23.8 b 24.7 26.1 26.7 27.2 27.3 29.2 28.6 27.9 26.6
France 18.8 19.0 18.5 b 18.5 19.2 19.3 19.1 18.1 18.5 17.7 18.2 17.1
Croatia 31.1 32.6 32.6 29.9 29.3 29.1 27.9 26.4
Italy 25.9 26.0 25.5 24.9 25.0 28.1 29.9 28.5 28.3 28.7 30.0 28.9
Cyprus 25.4 25.2 23.3 b 23.5 24.6 24.6 27.1 27.8 27.4 28.9 27.7 25.2
Latvia 42.2 35.1 34.2 b 37.9 38.2 40.1 36.2 35.1 32.7 30.9 28.5 28.2 28.4
Lithuania 35.9 28.7 28.3 29.6 34.0 33.1 32.5 30.8 27.3 29.3 30.1 29.6
Luxembourg 16.5 15.9 15.5 17.8 17.1 16.8 18.4 19.0 19.0 18.5 19.8 b 21.5
Hungary 31.4 29.4 28.2 29.6 29.9 31.5 33.5 34.8 31.8 28.2 26.3 25.6 19.6
Malta 19.5 19.7 20.1 20.3 21.2 22.1 23.1 24.6 23.9 23.0 20.3 19.3
Netherlands 16.0 15.7 14.9 15.1 15.1 15.7 15.0 15.9 16.5 16.4 16.7 b 17.0
Austria 17.8 16.7 20.6 b 19.1 18.9 19.2 18.5 18.8 19.2 18.3 18.0 18.1 17.5
Poland 39.5 34.4 30.5 b 27.8 27.8 27.2 26.7 25.8 24.7 23.4 21.9 19.5
Portugal 25.0 25.0 26.0 24.9 25.3 24.4 25.3 27.5 27.5 26.6 25.1 23.3
Romania 47.0 44.2 43.0 41.5 40.9 43.2 41.9 40.3 37.4 38.8 35.7 32.5
Slovenia 17.1 17.1 18.5 17.1 18.3 19.3 19.6 20.4 20.4 19.2 18.4 17.1
Slovakia 26.7 21.4 20.6 19.6 20.6 20.6 20.5 19.8 18.4 18.4 18.1 16.3
Finland 17.1 17.4 17.4 16.9 16.9 17.9 17.2 16.0 17.3 16.8 16.6 15.7 16.5
Sweden 16.3 13.9 16.7 b 17.8 17.7 18.5 17.7 18.3 18.2 18.6 18.3 17.7
United Kingdom 23.7 22.6 23.2 22.0 23.2 22.7 24.1 b 24.8 24.1 23.5 22.2 22.0 b

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At-risk-of-poverty (% of total population)

2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
European Union 28 16.5 16.9 16.8 16.7 17.2 17.3 17.3 16.9
Euro Area 19 15.6 16.1 16.1 16.2 16.3 16.8 16.9 16.7 17.1 17.2 17.4 17.0
Belgium 14.7 15.2 14.7 14.6 14.6 15.3 15.3 15.1 15.5 14.9 15.5 15.9
Bulgaria 18.4 22.0 21.4 21.8 20.7 22.2 21.2 21.0 21.8 22.0 22.9 b 23.4 22.0
Czechia 9.9 9.6 9.0 8.6 9.0 9.8 9.6 8.6 9.7 9.7 9.7 9.1 9.6
Denmark 11.7 11.7 11.8 13.1 13.3 12.1 12.0 11.9 12.1 12.2 11.9 12.4 12.8 p
Germany 12.5 15.2 15.2 15.5 15.6 15.8 16.1 16.1 16.7 16.7 16.5 16.1
Estonia 18.3 19.4 19.5 19.7 15.8 17.5 17.5 18.6 21.8 21.6 21.7 21.0
Ireland 18.5 17.2 15.5 15.0 15.2 15.2 16.6 15.7 16.4 16.3 16.8 15.6
Greece 20.5 20.3 20.1 19.7 20.1 21.4 23.1 23.1 22.1 21.4 21.2 20.2
Spain 20.3 19.7 19.8 20.4 20.7 20.6 20.8 20.4 22.2 22.1 22.3 21.6
France 13.2 13.1 12.5 12.9 13.3 14.0 14.1 13.7 13.3 13.6 13.6 13.3
Croatia 20.6 20.9 20.4 19.5 19.4 20.0 19.5 20.0
Italy 19.3 19.5 18.9 18.4 18.7 19.8 19.5 19.3 19.4 19.9 20.6 20.3
Cyprus 15.6 15.5 15.9 15.8 15.6 14.8 14.7 15.3 14.4 16.2 16.1 15.7
Latvia 23.5 21.2 25.9 26.4 20.9 19.0 19.2 19.4 21.2 22.5 21.8 22.1 23.3
Lithuania 20.0 19.1 20.9 20.3 20.5 19.2 18.6 20.6 19.1 22.2 21.9 22.9
Luxembourg 14.1 13.5 13.4 14.9 14.5 13.6 15.1 15.9 16.4 15.3 16.5 b 18.7
Hungary 15.9 12.3 12.4 12.4 12.3 14.1 14.3 15.0 15.0 14.9 14.5 13.4 12.8
Malta 14.2 15.1 15.3 14.9 15.5 15.6 15.1 15.8 15.8 16.6 16.5 16.7
Netherlands 9.7 10.2 10.5 11.1 10.3 11.0 10.1 10.4 11.6 11.6 12.7 b 13.2
Austria 12.6 12.0 15.2 14.5 14.7 14.5 14.4 14.4 14.1 13.9 14.1 14.4 14.3
Poland 19.1 17.3 16.9 17.1 17.6 17.7 17.1 17.3 17.0 17.6 17.3 15.0
Portugal 18.5 18.1 18.5 17.9 17.9 18.0 17.9 18.7 19.5 19.5 19.0 18.3
Romania 24.6 23.6 22.1 21.6 22.3 22.9 23.0 25.1 25.4 25.3 23.6 23.5
Slovenia 11.6 11.5 12.3 11.3 12.7 13.6 13.5 14.5 14.5 14.3 13.9 13.3
Slovakia 11.6 10.6 10.9 11.0 12.0 13.0 13.2 12.8 12.6 12.3 12.7 12.4
Finland 12.6 13.0 13.6 13.8 13.1 13.7 13.2 11.8 12.8 12.4 11.6 11.5 12.0
Sweden 12.3 10.5 13.5 b 14.4 14.8 15.4 15.2 16.0 15.6 16.3 16.2 15.8
United Kingdom 19.0 18.6 18.7 17.3 17.1 16.2 16.0 15.9 16.8 16.6 15.9 17.0 b

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322
 Statistical annex - 2. Selected indicators

Severe Material Deprivation (% of total population)

2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
European Union 28 8.4 8.8 9.9 9.6 8.9 8.1 7.5 6.6 6.2 e
Euro Area 19 6.0 5.6 5.9 6.0 6.1 6.9 7.8 7.5 7.4 7.0 6.6 5.9 5.4 e
Belgium 6.4 5.7 5.6 5.2 5.9 5.7 6.3 5.1 5.9 5.8 5.5 5.1 5.0 p
Bulgaria 57.7 57.6 41.2 41.9 45.7 43.6 44.1 43.0 33.1 34.2 31.9 b 30.0 20.9
Czechia 9.6 7.4 6.8 6.1 6.2 6.1 6.6 6.6 6.7 5.6 4.8 3.7 2.8
Denmark 3.1 3.3 2.0 2.3 2.7 2.3 2.7 3.6 3.2 3.7 2.6 3.1 3.4 p
Germany 5.1 4.8 5.5 5.4 4.5 5.3 4.9 5.4 5.0 4.4 3.7 3.4 3.4 p
Estonia 7.0 5.6 4.9 6.2 9.0 8.7 9.4 7.6 6.2 4.5 4.7 4.1 3.8 p
Ireland 4.8 4.5 5.5 6.1 5.7 7.8 9.8 9.9 8.4 7.5 6.7 5.2
Greece 11.5 11.5 11.2 11.0 11.6 15.2 19.5 20.3 21.5 22.2 22.4 21.1 16.7 p
Spain 4.1 3.5 3.6 4.5 4.9 4.5 5.8 6.2 7.1 6.4 5.8 5.1
France 5.0 4.7 5.4 5.6 5.8 5.2 5.3 4.9 4.8 4.5 4.4 4.1 4.7 p
Croatia 14.3 15.2 15.9 14.7 13.9 13.7 12.5 10.3 8.6 p
Italy 6.4 7.0 7.5 7.3 7.4 11.1 14.5 12.3 11.6 11.5 12.1 10.1 8.4 p
Cyprus 12.6 13.3 9.1 9.5 11.2 11.7 15.0 16.1 15.3 15.4 13.6 11.5 10.5 p
Latvia 31.3 24.0 19.3 22.1 27.6 31.0 25.6 24.0 19.2 16.4 12.8 11.3 9.5
Lithuania 25.3 16.6 12.5 15.6 19.9 19.0 19.8 16.0 13.6 13.9 13.5 12.4
Luxembourg 1.1 0.8 0.7 1.1 0.5 1.2 1.3 1.8 1.4 2.0 1.6 b 1.2
Hungary 20.9 19.9 17.9 20.3 21.6 23.4 26.3 27.8 24.0 19.4 16.2 14.5 10.1
Malta 3.9 4.4 4.3 5.0 6.5 6.6 9.2 10.2 10.3 8.5 4.4 3.3 3.0 p
Netherlands 2.3 1.7 1.5 1.4 2.2 2.5 2.3 2.5 3.2 2.6 2.6 b 2.6 2.4 p
Austria 3.6 3.3 5.9 4.6 4.3 4.0 4.0 4.2 4.0 3.6 3.0 3.7 2.8
Poland 27.6 22.3 17.7 15.0 14.2 13.0 13.5 11.9 10.4 8.1 6.7 5.9
Portugal 9.1 9.6 9.7 9.1 9.0 8.3 8.6 10.9 10.6 9.6 8.4 6.9 6.0 p
Romania 38.0 32.7 32.1 30.5 29.5 31.1 29.8 25.9 22.7 23.8 19.7 16.8
Slovenia 5.1 5.1 6.7 6.1 5.9 6.1 6.6 6.7 6.6 5.8 5.4 4.6 3.7 p
Slovakia 18.2 13.7 11.8 11.1 11.4 10.6 10.5 10.2 9.9 9.0 8.2 7.0
Finland 3.3 3.6 3.5 2.8 2.8 3.2 2.9 2.5 2.8 2.2 2.2 2.1 2.8
Sweden 2.1 2.2 1.8 b 2.0 1.9 1.7 1.8 1.9 1.0 1.1 0.8 1.1
United Kingdom 4.5 4.2 4.5 3.3 u 4.8 5.1 7.8 8.3 7.4 6.1 5.2 4.1 b 4.6 p

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Share of people living in low work intensity households (% of people aged 0-59)
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
European Union 28 10.3 10.5 10.6 11.0 11.3 10.7 10.5 9.5
Euro Area 19 10.3 9.7 9.3 9.1 10.4 11.0 10.7 11.2 11.9 11.2 11.1 10.2
Belgium 14.3 13.8 11.7 12.3 12.7 13.8 13.9 14.0 14.6 14.9 14.6 13.5
Bulgaria 14.7 16.0 8.1 b 6.9 8.0 11.0 12.5 13.0 12.1 11.6 11.9 b 11.1 9.0
Czechia 8.9 8.6 7.2 6.0 6.4 6.6 6.8 6.9 7.6 6.8 6.7 5.5 4.5
Denmark 9.6 10.1 8.5 8.8 10.6 10.5 10.2 11.9 12.2 11.6 10.7 10.0 11.2 p
Germany 13.6 11.5 11.7 10.9 11.2 11.2 9.9 9.9 10.0 9.8 9.6 8.7
Estonia 7.1 6.2 5.3 5.6 9.0 10.0 9.1 8.4 7.6 b 6.6 5.8 5.8
Ireland 12.9 14.3 13.7 20.0 22.9 24.2 23.4 23.9 21.0 19.2 17.8 16.2
Greece 8.1 8.1 7.5 6.6 7.6 12.0 14.2 18.2 17.2 16.8 17.2 15.6
Spain 6.4 6.8 6.6 7.6 10.8 13.4 14.3 15.7 17.1 15.4 14.9 12.8
France 9.1 9.6 8.8 8.4 9.9 9.4 8.4 8.1 9.6 8.6 8.4 8.1
Croatia 13.9 15.9 16.8 14.8 14.7 14.4 13.0 12.2
Italy 11.3 10.2 10.4 9.2 10.6 10.5 10.6 11.3 12.1 11.7 12.8 11.8
Cyprus 3.8 3.7 4.5 b 4.0 4.9 4.9 6.5 7.9 9.7 10.9 10.6 9.4
Latvia 7.1 6.2 5.4 7.4 12.6 12.6 11.7 10.0 9.6 7.8 7.2 7.8 7.6
Lithuania 8.3 6.4 6.1 7.2 9.5 12.7 11.4 11.0 8.8 9.2 10.2 9.7
Luxembourg 5.2 5.0 4.7 6.3 5.5 5.8 6.1 6.6 6.1 5.7 6.6 b 6.9
Hungary 13.1 11.3 12.0 11.3 11.9 12.8 13.5 13.6 12.8 9.4 8.2 6.6 5.7
Malta 9.7 9.6 8.6 9.2 9.2 8.9 9.0 9.1 9.9 9.2 7.3 7.1
Netherlands 10.9 9.7 8.2 8.5 8.4 8.9 8.9 9.3 10.2 10.2 9.7 b 9.5
Austria 8.1 8.2 7.4 b 7.1 7.8 8.6 7.7 7.8 9.1 8.2 8.1 8.3 7.3
Poland 12.4 10.1 8.0 6.9 7.3 6.9 6.9 7.2 7.3 6.9 6.4 5.7
Portugal 6.6 7.2 6.3 7.0 8.6 8.3 10.1 12.2 12.2 10.9 9.1 8.0
Romania 9.9 8.5 8.1 7.7 7.3 7.9 7.6 7.2 7.9 8.2 6.9 7.4
Slovenia 6.9 7.3 6.7 5.6 7.0 7.6 7.5 8.0 8.7 7.4 7.4 6.2
Slovakia 6.2 6.4 5.2 5.6 7.9 7.7 7.2 7.6 7.1 7.1 6.5 5.4
Finland 9.1 8.8 7.5 8.4 9.3 10.0 9.3 9.0 10.0 10.8 11.4 10.7 10.8
Sweden 6.8 6.0 7.0 b 8.5 8.5 9.4 8.1 9.4 9.0 8.7 8.5 8.8
United Kingdom 12.0 10.4 10.4 12.7 13.2 11.5 13.0 b 13.2 12.3 11.9 11.3 10.1 b

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323
Employment and Social Developments in Europe 2019

Income quintile share ratio S80/S20

2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
European Union 28 4.9 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.2 5.2 5.2 5.1
Euro Area 19 4.7 4.8 4.9 4.9 4.9 5.0 5.0 5.1 5.2 5.2 5.2 5.1
Belgium 4.2 3.9 4.1 3.9 3.9 3.9 4.0 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.8
Bulgaria 5.1 7.0 6.5 5.9 5.9 6.5 6.1 6.6 6.8 7.1 7.7 b 8.2 7.7
Czechia 3.5 3.5 3.4 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.4 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.4 3.3
Denmark 3.4 3.7 3.6 4.6 4.4 b 4.0 b 3.9 4.0 4.1 4.1 4.1 4.1 4.2 p
Germany 4.1 4.9 4.8 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.3 4.6 5.1 4.8 4.6 4.5
Estonia 5.5 5.5 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.3 5.4 5.5 6.5 b 6.2 5.6 5.4
Ireland 4.9 4.8 4.4 4.2 4.7 4.6 4.8 4.7 4.9 4.5 4.4 4.6
Greece 6.1 6.0 5.9 5.8 5.6 6.0 6.6 6.6 6.5 6.5 6.6 6.1
Spain 5.5 5.5 5.6 b 5.9 6.2 6.3 6.5 6.3 6.8 6.9 6.6 6.6
France 4.0 3.9 4.4 b 4.4 4.4 4.6 4.5 4.5 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.4
Croatia 5.5 b 5.6 5.4 5.3 5.1 5.2 5.0 5.0
Italy 5.4 5.4 5.2 5.3 5.4 5.7 5.6 5.8 5.8 5.8 6.3 5.9
Cyprus 4.3 4.4 4.3 b 4.4 4.5 4.3 4.7 4.9 5.4 5.2 4.9 4.6
Latvia 7.8 6.4 7.3 7.4 6.8 6.5 6.5 6.3 6.5 6.5 6.2 6.3 6.8
Lithuania 6.3 5.9 6.1 6.4 7.3 5.8 5.3 6.1 6.1 7.5 7.1 7.3
Luxembourg 4.2 4.0 4.1 4.3 4.1 4.0 4.1 4.6 4.4 4.3 5.0 b 5.0
Hungary 5.5 3.7 3.6 3.5 3.4 3.9 4.0 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.4
Malta 4.0 3.9 4.3 4.0 4.3 4.0 3.9 4.1 4.0 4.1 4.2 4.2
Netherlands 3.8 4.0 4.0 4.0 3.7 3.8 3.6 3.6 3.8 3.8 3.9 b 4.0
Austria 3.7 3.8 4.2 b 4.2 4.3 4.1 4.2 4.1 4.1 4.0 4.1 4.3 4.0
Poland 5.6 5.3 5.1 5.0 5.0 5.0 4.9 4.9 4.9 4.9 4.8 4.6
Portugal 6.7 6.5 6.1 6.0 5.6 5.7 5.8 6.0 6.2 6.0 5.9 5.7
Romania 8.1 7.0 6.5 6.1 6.2 6.6 6.8 7.2 8.3 7.2 6.5 7.2
Slovenia 3.4 3.3 3.4 3.2 3.4 3.5 3.4 3.6 3.7 3.6 3.6 3.4
Slovakia 4.1 3.5 3.4 3.6 3.8 3.8 3.7 3.6 3.9 3.5 3.6 3.5
Finland 3.6 3.7 3.8 3.7 3.6 3.7 3.7 3.6 3.6 3.6 3.6 3.5 3.6
Sweden 3.6 3.3 3.7 b 4.0 3.8 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.2 4.1 4.3 4.3
United Kingdom 5.4 5.3 5.6 5.3 5.4 5.3 5.0 b 4.6 5.1 5.2 5.1 5.4 b

Click here to download table.

NEET: Young people neither in employment nor in education and training (% of total
population aged 15-24)
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
European Union 28 11.4 11.1 10.9 12.4 12.8 12.9 13.2 13.0 12.4 12.0 11.5 10.9 10.4
Euro Area 19 11.4 10.9 11.0 12.6 12.8 12.7 13.1 12.9 12.5 12.1 11.6 11.1 10.5
Belgium 11.2 11.2 10.1 11.1 10.9 11.8 12.3 12.7 12.0 12.2 9.9 9.3 b 9.2
Bulgaria 22.2 19.1 17.4 19.5 21.0 b 21.8 b 21.5 21.6 20.2 19.3 18.2 15.3 15.0
Czechia 9.2 6.9 6.7 8.5 8.8 8.3 b 8.9 9.1 8.1 7.5 7.0 6.3 5.6
Denmark 3.6 4.3 4.3 5.4 6.0 6.3 6.6 6.0 5.8 6.2 5.8 b 7.0 b 6.8
Germany 10.1 9.3 8.4 8.8 8.3 b 7.5 b 7.1 6.3 6.4 6.2 6.7 6.3 5.9
Estonia 8.9 9.4 9.1 14.5 14.0 11.6 12.2 11.3 11.7 10.8 9.1 9.4 9.8
Ireland 11.8 10.1 b 12.5 18.3 19.4 19.1 19.2 16.4 15.2 14.2 12.6 10.9 10.1
Greece 12.0 11.3 11.4 12.4 b 14.8 17.4 20.2 20.4 19.1 17.2 15.8 15.3 14.1
Spain 11.8 12.0 14.3 18.1 17.8 18.2 18.6 18.6 17.1 15.6 14.6 13.3 12.4
France 11.3 10.7 10.5 12.7 12.7 12.3 12.5 11.2 10.7 11.4 11.5 11.0 10.6
Croatia 14.1 12.9 11.6 13.4 15.7 16.2 16.6 19.6 19.3 18.1 16.9 15.4 13.6
Italy 16.8 16.1 16.6 17.5 19.0 19.6 20.9 22.1 22.0 21.3 19.8 20.0 19.2
Cyprus 10.7 9.0 9.7 9.9 b 11.7 14.6 16.0 18.7 17.0 15.3 16.0 16.1 13.2
Latvia 11.5 11.9 11.8 17.5 17.8 16.0 14.9 13.0 12.0 10.5 11.2 10.3 7.8
Lithuania 8.3 7.1 8.8 12.1 13.2 11.8 11.2 11.1 9.9 9.2 9.4 9.1 8.0
Luxembourg 6.7 5.7 6.2 5.8 5.1 4.7 5.9 5.0 6.3 6.2 5.4 5.9 5.3
Hungary 12.4 11.5 11.5 13.6 12.6 13.2 14.8 15.5 13.6 11.6 11.0 11.0 10.7
Malta 10.3 11.5 8.3 9.9 9.5 10.2 10.8 9.9 10.3 10.5 8.8 8.6 7.3
Netherlands 4.9 4.3 3.9 5.0 4.8 4.3 4.9 5.6 5.5 4.7 4.6 4.0 4.2
Austria 7.8 7.4 b 7.4 8.2 7.4 7.3 6.8 7.3 7.7 7.5 7.7 6.5 6.8
Poland 12.6 10.6 9.0 10.1 10.8 b 11.5 11.8 12.2 12.0 11.0 10.5 9.5 8.7
Portugal 10.6 11.2 10.2 11.2 11.4 12.6 b 13.9 14.1 12.3 11.3 10.6 9.3 8.4
Romania 14.8 13.3 11.6 13.9 16.6 b 17.5 16.8 17.0 17.0 18.1 17.4 15.2 14.5
Slovenia 8.5 6.7 6.5 7.5 7.1 7.1 9.3 9.2 9.4 9.5 8.0 6.5 6.6
Slovakia 14.4 12.5 11.1 12.5 14.1 13.8 b 13.8 13.7 12.8 13.7 12.3 12.1 10.2
Finland 7.9 7.1 7.9 9.8 9.0 8.4 8.6 9.3 10.2 10.6 9.9 9.4 8.5
Sweden 9.3 7.5 7.8 9.6 7.7 7.5 7.8 7.4 7.2 6.7 6.5 6.1 6.1
United Kingdom 8.6 11.9 b 12.1 b 13.2 13.6 14.2 13.9 13.2 11.9 11.1 10.9 10.3 10.4

Click here to download table.

324
3. DATA SOURCES AND DEFINITIONS
Most of the data used in this report originates from Eurostat, the Statistical Office of the European Union. The
main data sources used are:

• European Union Labour Force Survey (EU-LFS)

• ESA2010 National Accounts

• EU-Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC)

• European System of Social integrated protection Statistics (ESSPROS)

The European Union Labour Force Survey (EU-LFS) is the EU’s harmonised household survey on labour market
participation. While in the early years, it was carried out as an annual survey conducted in the spring quarter in
many Member States it is now a continuous quarterly survey in all EU Member States. If not mentioned
otherwise, the results based on the LFS for years before the introduction of the quarterly survey refer to the
spring quarter of each year. LFS data covers the population living in private households only (collective
households are excluded) and refers to the place of residence (household residence concept). They are broken
down by various socio-demographic categories, in particular sex and age. The EU-LFS covers all EU Member
States as well as Montenegro, North Macedonia, Serbia and Turkey plus Iceland, Norway and Switzerland.

A particular data collection connected to the EU-LFS is Eurostat’s ‘LFS main indicators’ which present a selection
of the main statistics on the labour market. They encompass annual and quarterly indicators of population,
activity and inactivity; employment; unemployment; education and training. Those indicators are mainly but not
only based on the results of the EU-LFS, in few cases integrated with data sources like national accounts
employment or registered unemployment. National accounts employment data covers all people employed in
resident producer units (domestic concept), including people living in collective households. In the main indicators,
these national accounts figures are broken down by sex, working-time status (full-time/part-time) and contract
status (permanent/temporary) using LFS distributions. Where available, all key employment indicators in this
report are based on the ‘LFS main indicators’.

For the unemployment-related indicators, Eurostat’s series on unemployment comprises yearly averages,
quarterly and monthly data. It is based on the (annual and quarterly) EU-LFS data and monthly data on
unemployment, either from the national LFS or other national sources, mainly unemployment register data. For
the compilation of monthly unemployment estimates, these monthly figures from national sources are
benchmarked against the quarterly EU-LFS data, and they are used to produce provisional unemployment figures
for recent months which are not yet covered by quarterly EU-LFS results. Monthly unemployment by educational
attainment level or duration is not available from this data collection.

Most macro-economic indicators are based on Eurostat’s collection of national accounts data according to the
European System of National Accounts (ESA2010 National Accounts). Data is compiled by the Member States and
collected by Eurostat. The collection comprises aggregates such as GDP, from which derived measures such as
productivity and real unit labour costs are calculated. In addition, national accounts also cover population and
employment data, the latter expressed in persons and in hours worked and also broken down by economic
activity, but not by socio-demographic categories.

The main data source for the social indicators is the EU-SILC (EU-Statistics on Income and Living Conditions). The
EU-SILC instrument is the EU reference source for comparative statistics on income distribution and social
inclusion at the European level. It provides two types of annual data for 28 European Union countries, Iceland,
Norway, Switzerland and Turkey: Cross-sectional data pertaining to a given time or a certain time period with
variables on income, poverty, social exclusion and other living conditions, and Longitudinal data pertaining to
individual-level changes over time, observed periodically over a four year period. EU-SILC does not rely on a
common questionnaire or a survey but on the idea of a “framework”. The latter defines the harmonised lists of
target primary (annual) and secondary (every four years or less frequently) variables to be transmitted to
Eurostat; common guidelines and procedures; common concepts (household and income) and classifications
aimed at maximising comparability of the information produced.

Data regarding social protection expenditures are from the European System of integrated Social PROtection
Statistics (ESSPROS). ESSPROS is an instrument of statistical observation which enables international comparison
of the administrative national data on social protection in the EU Member States. The conventional definition
used for the scope of social protection definition is the following:

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Employment and Social Developments in Europe 2019

"Social Protection encompasses all interventions from public or private bodies intended to relieve households and
individuals of the burden of a defined set of risks or needs, provided that there is neither a simultaneous
reciprocal nor an individual arrangement involved. The list of risks or needs that may give rise to social protection
is, by convention, as follows: Sickness/Health care, Disability, Old age, Survivors, Family/children, Unemployment,
Housing and Social exclusion not elsewhere classified".

Physically, data is generally obtained from Eurobase, Eurostat’s online dissemination database and open to public
access. Data shown here represents availability and revision status of mid-July 2015.

3.1 Definitions and data sources of macro-economic indicators

1. Real GDP: Gross Domestic Product (GDP), volume, annual change (Source: Eurostat, ESA2010 National Accounts
[tec00115]).

2. Total employment: Employment, total economy, annual change (Source: Eurostat, ESA2010 National Accounts
[nama_10_a10_e]).

3. Labour productivity: GDP volume per person employed, annual change (Source: Eurostat, ESA2010 National
Accounts [nama_10_lp_ulc]).

4. Annual average hours worked per person employed, annual change (Source: Eurostat, ESA2010 National
Accounts and DG EMPL calculations).

5. Productivity per hour worked: GDP volume per hour worked, annual change (Source: Eurostat, ESA2010
National Accounts [nama_10_lp_ulc]).

6. Harmonised CPI: harmonised consumer price index, annual change (Source: Eurostat, HCIP [prc_hicp_aind]).

7. Price deflator GDP: Implicit price deflator of GDP, annual change (Source: Eurostat, ESA2010 National Accounts
[nama_10_gdp]).

8. Nominal compensation per employee, total economy, annual change (Source: Eurostat, ESA2010 National
Accounts and DG EMPL calculations).

9. Real compensation per employee (GDP deflator): nominal compensation deflated with the implicit deflator of
GDP, per employee, annual change (Source: Eurostat, ESA2010 National Accounts and DG EMPL calculations).

10. Real compensation per employee (private consumption deflator): nominal compensation deflated with the
implicit deflator of private consumption expenditure, per employee, annual change (Source: Eurostat, ESA2010
National Accounts and DG EMPL calculations).

11. Nominal unit labour costs: Nominal compensation per employee divided by labour productivity, annual change
(Source: Eurostat, ESA2010 National Accounts [nama_10_lp_ulc]).

12. Real unit labour costs: Real compensation per employee divided by labour productivity, annual change
(Source: Eurostat, ESA2010 National Accounts and DG EMPL calculations).

3.2 Definitions and data sources of key employment indicators

1. Total population in 1000s, excluding population living in institutional households (Source: Eurostat,
demographics [demo_pjanbroad]).

2. Total population aged 15-64 (the ‘working age population’) in 1 000s (Source: Eurostat, Demographics
[demo_pjanbroad]).

3. Total employment in 000s (Source: Eurostat, LFS [lfsa_egan]).

4. Population in employment aged 15-64 in 1 000s (Source: Eurostat, EU-LFS [lfsa_egan]).

5-9. Employment rates: calculated by the number of employed divided by the population in the corresponding
age bracket (Source: Eurostat, EU-LFS [lfsi_emp_a]).

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 Statistical annex - 3. Data sources and definitions

10. Full-time equivalent employment rate: calculated by dividing the full-time equivalent employment by the
total population in the 20-64 age group. Full-time equivalent employment is defined as total hours worked on
both main and second job divided by the average annual number of hours worked in full-time jobs (Source:
Eurostat, EU-LFS and DG EMPL calculations).

11. Self-employed in total employment: number of self-employed as a share of total employment (Source:
Eurostat, EU-LFS and DG EMPL calculations).

12. Part-time employment in total employment: number of part-time employed as a share of total employment
(Source: Eurostat, EU-LFS [lfsi_pt_a]).

13. Fixed-term contracts in total employees: number of employees with contracts of limited duration as a share
of total employees (Source: Eurostat, EU-LFS [lfsi_pt_a]).

14. Employment in services: employed in services (NACE Rev. 2 sections G-U) as a share of total employment
(Source: Eurostat, EU-LFS and DG EMPL calculations).

15. Employment in industry: employed in industry, including construction (NACE Rev. 2 sections B-F) as a share of
total employment (Source: Eurostat, EU-LFS and DG EMPL calculations).

16. Employment in agriculture: employed in agriculture, forestry and fishing (NACE Rev. 2 section A) as a share of
total employment (Source: Eurostat, EU-LFS and DG EMPL calculations).

17-20.Activity rates: labour force (employed and unemployed) as a share of total population in the corresponding
age group (Source: Eurostat, EU-LFS [lfsi_emp_a]).

21. Total unemployment in 1 000s (Source: Eurostat, EU-LFS [une_rt_a]).

22-23. Unemployment rates: unemployed as a share of the labour force (employed and unemployed persons) in
the corresponding age group (Source: Eurostat, EU-LFS [une_rt_a]).

24. Long-term unemployment rate: persons unemployed for duration of 12 months or more as a share of the
labour force (Source: Eurostat, EU-LFS [une_ltu_a]).

25. Share of long-term unemployment: persons unemployed for duration of 12 months or more as a share of the
total unemployed force (Source: Eurostat, EU-LFS [une_ltu_a])

26. Youth unemployment ratio: young unemployed (aged 15-24) as a share of the total population in the same
age group (Source: Eurostat, EU-LFS [yth_empl_140]).

27-35. Employment rates: calculated by the number of employed divided by the population in the corresponding
age bracket, by education attainment (based in the ISCED classification), nationality and country of birth (Source:
Eurostat, EU-LFS [lfsa_ergaed]).

36. Underemployment, persons in part-time jobs that would like to work more hours (Source: Eurostat, EU-LFS
[lfsi_sup_a]).

37. Seeking but not available, persons seeking a job but not available to work immediately (Source: Eurostat, EU-
LFS [lfsi_sup_a]).

38. Discouraged, available but not seeking persons available to work but not seeking job at the moment (Source:
Eurostat, EU-LFS [lfsi_sup_a]).

3.3 Definitions and data sources of key social indicators

 At-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion rate. Percentage of a population representing the sum of persons who
are: at risk of poverty or severely materially deprived or living in households with very low work intensity
(Eurostat, EU-SILC [ilc_peps01])

 At-risk-of-poverty rate. Share of people with an equivalised disposable income (after social transfer) below
the at-risk-of-poverty threshold, which is set at 60 % of the national median equivalised disposable income
after social transfers (Eurostat, EU-SILC [ilc_li02])

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Employment and Social Developments in Europe 2019

 At-risk-of-poverty threshold. 60 % of the national median equivalised disposable income after social
transfers (Eurostat, EU-SILC [ilc_li01])

 Poverty gap. Difference between the median equivalised disposable income of people below the at-risk-of-
poverty threshold and the at-risk-of-poverty threshold, expressed as a percentage of the at-risk-of-poverty
threshold (cut-off point: 60 % of national median equivalised disposable income) (Eurostat, EU-SILC [ilc_li11])

 Persistent at-risk-of-poverty rate. Percentage of the population living in households where the equivalised
disposable income was below the at-risk-of-poverty threshold for the current year and at least two out of the
preceding three years (Eurostat, EU-SILC [ilc_li21])

 At-risk-of-poverty rate before social transfers excl. pensions. Share of people having a median equivalised
disposable income before social transfers that is below the at-risk-of-poverty threshold (60% of median
equivalised income after social transfers) (Eurostat, EU-SILC [ilc_li10])

 Impact of social transfers. Computed indicator (Eurostat, EU-SILC), formula: 100*(B-A)/B, where:

 B: At-risk-of-poverty rate before social transfers excl. pensions

 A: At-risk-of-poverty rate

 Severe Material Deprivation rate. Inability to afford some items (at least 4 on a list of 9) considered by most
people to be desirable or even necessary to lead an adequate life (Eurostat, EU-SILC [ilc_mddd11])

 Share of people living in low work intensity households. Share of persons living in a household having a work
intensity below a threshold set at 0.20. The work intensity of a household is the ratio of the total number of
months that all working-age household members have worked during the income reference year and the total
number of months the same household members theoretically could have worked in the same period
(Eurostat, EU-SILC [ilc_lvhl11])

 Real Gross Household Disposable Income growth. The amount of money available for spending or saving.
This is money left after expenditure associated with income, e.g. taxes and social contributions, property
ownership and provision for future pension income (Eurostat, National Accounts and DG EMPL calculations)

 Income quintile share ratio S80/S20. Ratio of total income received by the 20 % of the population with the
highest income (the top quintile) to that received by the 20 % of the population with the lowest income (the
bottom quintile) (Eurostat, EU-SILC [ilc_di11])

 GINI coefficient. The relationship of cumulative shares of the population arranged according to the level of
equivalised disposable income, to the cumulative share of the equivalised total disposable income received by
them (Eurostat, EU-SILC [ilc_di12])

 Life expectancy at birth. The mean number of years a newborn child can expect to live if subjected throughout
his or her life to the current mortality conditions, the probabilities of dying at each age (Eurostat [hlth_hlye])

 Healthy life years at birth. Number of years that a person is expected to continue to live in a healthy condition
(Eurostat [hlth_hlye])

 Early leavers from education and training. Early leaver from education and training generally refers to a
person aged 18 to 24 who has finished no more than a lower secondary education and is not involved in
further (formal or non-formal) education or training; their number is expressed as a percentage of the total
population aged 18 to 24 (Eurostat, EU-LFS [edat_lfse_14])

 NEET: Young people not in employment, education or training. Share of people aged 15 to 24 who have left
formal education with at most lower secondary education and who are not employed (i.e. either unemployed
or economically inactive) nor engaged in any kind of further (formal or non-formal) education or training
(Eurostat, EU-LFS [lfsi_neet_a])

 Risk of poverty of children in households at work (Working Intensity > 0.2). Share of children at-risk-of-
poverty living in households with work intensity bigger than very low (Eurostat, EU-SILC [ilc_li06])

 In-work at-risk-of-poverty rate. The share of persons who are at work and have an equivalised disposable
income below the risk-of-poverty threshold, which is set at 60 % of the national median equivalised
disposable income (after social transfers) (Eurostat, EU-SILC [ilc_iw01])

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 Statistical annex - 3. Data sources and definitions

 Relative median income of elderly. Ratio of the median equivalised disposable income of people aged above
65 to the median equivalised disposable income of those aged below 65 (Eurostat, EU-SILC [ilc_pnp2])

 Aggregate replacement ratio. Ratio of the median individual gross pensions of 65-74 age category relative to
median individual gross earnings of 50-59 age category, excluding other social benefits (Eurostat, EU-SILC
[ilc_pnp3])

 Social indicators expenditure. Percentage of expenditure in different social protection areas in relation with
the GDP (Eurostat, ESSPROSS [spr_exp_sum, spr_exp_gdp])

329
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