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Gonzales vs. Comelec, 27 Scra 835

This case involved a challenge to provisions in the Revised Election Code that prohibited campaigning too early and limited campaign periods. The Court ruled that while freedom of expression is constitutionally guaranteed, it is not absolute and can be limited. There are two acceptable tests for permissible restrictions: 1) the "clear and present danger" rule, where the danger must be extremely serious and imminent, and 2) the "dangerous tendency" rule, where the speech advocates acts that the state has a right to prevent and has a natural tendency to cause substantive harm. For a restriction to be valid, the danger must be clear, present, and relatively serious - the state cannot restrict speech to prevent trivial harms.

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102 views2 pages

Gonzales vs. Comelec, 27 Scra 835

This case involved a challenge to provisions in the Revised Election Code that prohibited campaigning too early and limited campaign periods. The Court ruled that while freedom of expression is constitutionally guaranteed, it is not absolute and can be limited. There are two acceptable tests for permissible restrictions: 1) the "clear and present danger" rule, where the danger must be extremely serious and imminent, and 2) the "dangerous tendency" rule, where the speech advocates acts that the state has a right to prevent and has a natural tendency to cause substantive harm. For a restriction to be valid, the danger must be clear, present, and relatively serious - the state cannot restrict speech to prevent trivial harms.

Uploaded by

Maricel M. Soriano
Copyright
© © All Rights Reserved
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
Available Formats
Download as DOCX, PDF, TXT or read online on Scribd
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Gonzales vs.

COMELEC, 27 SCRA 835

FACTS:

Petitioners so alleged in his action, which they entitled Declaratory Relief with Preliminary
Injunction, filed on July 22, 1967, a proceeding that should have been started in the of Court of First
Instance but treated by this Court as one of prohibition in view of the seriousness and the urgency of the
constitutional issue raised. Petitioners challenged the validity of two new sections now included in the
Revised Election Code, under Republic Act No. 4880, which was approved and took effect on June 17,
1967, prohibiting the too-early nomination of candidates and limiting the period of an election campaign
or partisan political activity.

Petitioner Cabigao was, at the time of the filing of the petition, an incumbent councilor in the
4th District of Manila and the Nacionalista Party official candidate for Vice-Mayor of Manila to which he
was subsequently elected on November 11, 1967; petitioner Gonzales, on the other hand, is a private
individual, a registered voter in the City of Manila and a political leader of his co-petitioner. It is their
claim that "the enforcement of said Republic Act No. 4880 in question [would] prejudice [their] basic
rights..., such as their freedom of speech, their freedom of assembly and their right to form associations
or societies for a purpose not contrary to law, guaranteed under the Philippine Constitution," and that,
therefore, said act is unconstitutional.

ISSUE:

Whether the Right of Expression of Speech is susceptible of any limitation.

RULING:

Yes, Freedom of expression is not absolute. The Court spoke of two tests that may supply an
acceptable criterion for permissible restriction.

“The ‘clear and present danger’ rule means that the evil consequence of the comment or
utterance must be extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high’ before the utterance
can be punished. The danger to be guarded against is the ‘substantive evil’ sought to be prevented.” It
has the advantage of establishing according to the above decision “a definite rule in constitutional law. It
provides the criterion as to what words may be public established.”

The “dangerous tendency” rule explained “If the words uttered create a dangerous tendency
which the state has a right to prevent, then such words are punishable. It is not necessary that some
definite or immediate acts of force, violence, or unlawfulness be advocated. It is sufficient that such acts
be advocated in general terms. Nor is it necessary that the language used be reasonably calculated to
incite persons to acts of force, violence, or unlawfulness. It is sufficient if the natural tendency and
probable effect of the utterance be to bring about the substantive evil that the legislative body seeks to
prevent.
Why repression is permissible only when the danger of substantive evil is present? The evil
apprehended is so imminent that it may befall before there is an opportunity for a full discussion. If
there be time to expose through discussion the falsehood and fallacies, to avert the evil by the
processes of education, the remedy to be applied is more speech, not enforced silence.” The
apprehended evil must be “relatively serious.” For “[prohibition] of free speech and assembly is a
measure so stringent that it would be inappropriate as the means for averting a relatively trivial harm to
society.”

This test then as a limitation on freedom of expression is justified by the danger or evil of a
substantive character that the state has a right to prevent. Unlike the dangerous tendency doctrine, the
danger must not only be clear but also present. The term clear seems to point to a causal connection
with the danger of the substantial evil arising from the utterance questioned. Present refers to the time
element. It used to be identified as imminent and immediate danger. The danger must not only be
probable but very likely inevitable.

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