13/2/2023 IPUE el 9 de maig es el dia d’europa

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THE HYSTORICAL CONTEXT
FROM POST-WAR EUROPE TO THE SINGLE EUROPEAN ACT

WHAS IT THERE AN IDEA ON A UNITED EUROPE BEFORE 1945?

 Before 1945: and across the centuries, the idea of integration and cooperation
among states in Europe was the domain of intellectuals who did not have any
or very little weight in political decisions.
 During the post WWI peace process, the League of Nation.
 But in the 1930 economic depression and social crisis led to the rise on
nationalism and fascism, burying any attempt of integration such as the “Briand
Memorandum”.

WW II AS A CATALYST FOR EUROPEAN COOPERATION

• The devastating consequences of WWII

– The necessity of economic re-construction
– Post-war settlement: Europe divided…
• The ‘German’ question
– How to avoid another war in Europe?
– Maximize the economic and military potential of the FRG for the
benefit of the West w/o alarming the neighbours
• The Cold War
– The ideological division
– Growing military confrontation
– Western Europe start to define itself around a common interest of
defence and economic recovery
– Questioning of the validity of independent statehood as the
foundation of political and international order
NORMATIVE, PROTO-INTEGRATION PERIOD
• Altiero Spinelli, the “Ventotene Manifesto”
– It would be in vain if the fight against fascism it merely led to the re-
establishment of the old European system of sovereign nation-states in
shifting alliances. This would inevitably lead to war again.
– “Constitutional break’: Establishment of a European federation by the
democratic powers after the war.
– European Federalist Movement (an idea and a movement)
• Churchill, discourse at the University of Zurich (Sept. 1946): United States of
Europe, Council of Europe
 • 1948: Benelux, Treaty of Brussels (Benelux+FR+UK), OEEC (linked to the
Marshall Plan) , Federalist Congress of Europe at The Hague
• 1949: the establishment of NATO frees Europe from military concerns
• Positive attitude of the USA towards political end economic integration

COUNCIL OF EUROPE (1949)

• A weak compromise between federalists and nationalists
• Unwieldy (requires unanimity) but it nonetheless represent the first European
political institution ever, having the merit to place integration firmly and
visibly on the agenda
• The question is not ‘if’ integration is necessary but ‘how’ to achieve it:
– intergovernmental collaboration vs. supranationalism
• Represents a watershed: federalism is put aside so the will to take on board all
European states (specially UK) at whatever cost and compromise
• Still operating to date, the primary aim of the Council of Europe is to create a
common democratic and legal area throughout the whole of the continent,
ensuring respect for its fundamental values: human rights, democracy and the
rule of law.

A STABLE SOLUTION TO THE GERMAN QUESTION

• Maximize the potential of the FDR w/o alarming the neighbors…

• The USA expect UK to take the lead and come up with a solution, but for its
historic sovereign tradition, the latter fails to stand up
• The USA put then pressure on France, who wants to keep the old enemy down
and control the coal- rich Ruhr region so to avoid German remilitarization
• Failure of the International Ruhr Authority
• But FDR experiences a rapid economic recovery and the USA want to
capitalize on that potential…
• How to reconcile these divergent interests?

THE SCHUMAN PLAN AND THE COMMUNITY IDEA

A solution to Franco-German relations was provided by the Schuman Plan (May 9 th,
1951), drafted by federalist French civil servant Jean Monet.
“Europe will not be made all at once, or according to a single plan, it will be
built through concrete achievements which first create a de facto solidarity. The
coming together of the nations of Europe requires the elimination of the age-old
opposition of France and Germany. Any action taken immediately on one limited but
decisive point.”
 • The Plan envisages the pooling of coal and steel resources and the policies
therein under the control of a supranational body.
• The European Coal and Steel Community is launched in 1952, comprised of
two main bodies:
– A High Authority vested with extensive powers representing and
upholding the supranational interest
– A Council of Ministers representing and defending MS’s interest
– Plus…
– A Common Assembly with no legislative power
– This peculiar division of executive and decision- making powers is still
at the core of the institutional set- up of the EU
– The ECSC lasted until 1967, when it is absorbed into the EC
– A political milestone in European history, while its record of economic
success was rather mixed and did not produced the expected
‘functional spillovers’ into other sectors

DISCRETION IS THE ORDER OF THE DAY

Business circles and coal and steel producers in particular were deliberately not
involved in the planning stage. Had the plan been disclosed it would probably have
given rise to numerous objections from French business leaders and evoked the
suspicion of their German counterparts. Similarly, Robert Schuman decided to leave
French parliamentarians in the dark, fearing that they would be more interested in the
institutional implications than in the project itself. Very few people outside France
were aware of the plan. Bypassing diplomatic channels, the American Secretary of
State, Dean Acheson, was informed personally of the plan and he immediately assured
Schuman of his interest and support. On 8 May, Schuman himself presented his plan to
the five Ministers for Economic Affairs from Great Britain, the three Benelux countries
and Italy at a highly secret meeting in Paris. On the evening of 8 May, all the working
documents were destroyed. Strengthened by this endorsement from France’s allies,
Schuman dispatched his personal envoy, Robert Mischlich, to Bonn in order to inform
Konrad Adenauer. At the beginning of the year, Adenauer had already had the
opportunity to discuss with Schuman whether the time was ripe for a Europe-wide
accord. On the morning of 9 May, Mischlich handed the German Chancellor and his
private secretary, Herbert Blankenhorn, the official text of the French proposal for a
joint High Authority as well as a confidential letter that referred to the extremely
political nature of the plan. Adenauer was delighted and he immediately assured
Mischlich of his support. As soon as Schuman was notified by telephone, he was able
to inform the French cabinet late morning on 9 May. Everything was then ready for a
press conference at the Quai d’Orsay at 6 p.m. the same day.
 A FAILED ATTEMPT OF FURTHER INTEGRATION: THE ECD
• The Korean War makes necessary a contribution to the strategic defense of
Europe by a German army. This American request stirs European countries,
especially France
• The six ECSC countries resort, in 1952, to the same sort of institutional set-up,
the European Defense Community, trying to make a virtue (integration) out of
necessity (German re-miltarization).

• The plan meet with fierce resistance in France and it is eventually voted down
by the French Parliament in 1954, and thus abandoned
• The new West German army was finally put under the umbrella of the Western
European Union (UK+ the Six) in 1954, while FDR joined NATO, via the WEU, in
1955, regaining full formal sovereignty

THE REVIVAL OF THE INTEGRATION PROCESS: THE EEC

• Driven by the international trade relations, there is a push for freeing up
trade via the creation of a ‘common market’ within Europe (Declaration of
Messina, 1955), building on a Dutch proposal of 1952
• France, a traditionally protectionist country, asks as way of compensation the
establishment of a (protectionist) common agricultural policy based on
guaranteed prices and export subsidies, assistance for French overseas
territories and support for common civil atomic energy
• UK drops out of negotiations because of opposition to CAP and
supranationalism
• 1957: Treaties of Rome establishing a European Economic Community and a
European Atomic Energy Community
• Most Europeans at that time were unaware of both events…
• Difference among:
• Free Trade Association
• Custom Union
• Common Market: free movements of capital, services, labor and goods-
no internal barriers and quotas, the ‘four freedoms’- + common
external tariff and a common commercial policy
• This was to be obtained in 3 steps and in a 12 years period
• Single Market
• Other common policies are also envisaged
• agriculture, trade and transport
• The EEC institutional set-up (now shared with the ECSC and Euratom) is
based on:
• A supranational European Commission
• An Assembly (non elected) later ‘European Parliament’
 • A Council of Minister
• A Court of Justice
• ‘Coreper’

• The establishment of the EEC and the creation of the Common Market had two
objectives:
– Economic: transforming the conditions of trade and manufacture on the
territory of the Community.
– Political: EEC as a contribution towards the functional construction of a
political Europe and a step towards the closer unification of Europe.
• In the preamble, the signatories of the Treaty declare:
– “determined to lay the foundations of an ever closer union among the
peoples of Europe, resolved to ensure the economic and social
progress of their countries by common action to eliminate the barriers
which divide Europe, affirming as the essential objective of their efforts
the constant improvements of the living and working conditions of
their peoples”

CONSOLIDATING THE ECC AND THE STALLING OF AMBITION

• The initial phase prove successful, b/c of favorable internal/external economic

conditions and no impingement on ‘core’ national sovereignty
– The custom union implemented ahead of schedule but…
– …the CAP, arduous to compromise complicated protectionist policy
in contrast to the liberalizing ethos of the Community
• By the early ’70s the ECC was no nearer its goal than it had been a decade
earlier: the problems that still beset it to present day start to surface
– Deepening and widening of policies (extent, rate and degree of
integration) and enlargement
• Political context further complicated by the return of De Gaulle to the
presidency of France.
Suspicious of the consequences of supranational integration on France sovereignty:
intergovernmental integration was good as long as served French national interest.
• 1962: Rejection of the ‘Fouchet Plan’ by FR’s partners
• In 1965 De Gaulle was not ready to accept the Treaty of Rome clause stating
that decisions in key polices areas (CAP among them) were due to be become
subject to QMV
– The reasons for the crisis were twofold: a) the difficulties in financing
the CAP and
– the supranational character of the EEC supported by France’s partners.
 – The financial problems in the EEC and the CAP crisis shook the
Community to its very foundations.
– De Gaulle also vetoed the UK’s repeated bids to gain membership
(1961- 63- 67) and deters others candidatures
• The crisis simmering between France and its partners in the EEC reached
boiling point in 1965 ‘Empty Chair Crisis’ (June 1965)
• Luxembourg compromise (Jan. 1966):
– the QMV is maintained but the Council would not take a vote if a MS
insisted that very important interests were at stake (a de facto veto
power)
– As a consequence, the EC takes an intergovernmental turn with
detrimental effects on decision making until the Single European Act.
• The Merger Treaty (or Brussels Treaty, 1965) combines the executive bodies of
the ECSC, Euratom and the EEC into a single institutional structure
– Although each Community remained legally independent, they shared
common institutions (prior to this treaty, they already shared
a Parliamentary Assembly and Court of Justice) and were together
known as the European Communities.

1969-1979: CRISIS AND REVIVAL

• The new French President, Pompidou, takes a more positive attitude toward
integration
• Since the early 1970s, the leaders began to encounter more and more
obstacles to Community policy that could be overcome only by bringing their
political influence to bear.
• The Hague Summit (1969) stages the scene for the discussion on the future of
Europe around three themes:
– Completion of the Treaty’s objectives (CAP, budget, implementation of
the common market, economic and monetary union)
– Deepening of political union (discussion on the nature of the political
objectives of a united Europe in the light of its initial enlargement)
– Enlargement to new members
• The Hague summit marks a turning point in the style of decision-making:
– ‘summitry’ becomes the prevailing mode of taking vital decisions,
because of its potential of reconciling integration with national
interests.
• New institutional distribution of power formalized in 1974 with the
establishment of the European Council
• External factors also influenced MS to seek political power and a common
foreign policy:
 – The first global oil crisis
– End of the Bretton Woods International Monetary System

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE “THE HAGUE DECISIONS”

• Modest CAP reform (on full steam since 1972) due to fierce and spectacular
farmers’ opposition
• First enlargement to encompass UK, IRL and DK (but not Norway)
• Mid – 1970s: Establishment of the Regional and Social Funds (ERDF and ESF)
• Warner Report: achieving Economic and Monetary Union in 3 steps by 1980
– 1972: establishment of a zone of stability via the European Currency
Snake, (limited currency fluctuations within a fixed band), abandoned
in the wake of the 1973 oil crisis and the speculative tensions of the
1970s due to a devaluing dollar.
– Uncoordinated response to the ’70s crisis and the failure of ‘snake’ 
a less ambitious but more effective system of currency stabilization
spearheaded by FR and DE (European Monetary System) through a
European Exchange Rate System and a European Currency Unit.
– Despite the British opt- out, the system achieves stability and
convergence among participants’ currencies and economies
• Institutional reforms
– Direct election of EP (1979) who raise its political profile while
enhancing the EC’s political legitimacy
– ‘Balancing act’, the institutionalization of the European Council
– Gradual improvement of the Commission’s political fortune and
continued pivotal role of the case law of the ECJ
– The Franco- German axis is at the core of major decision- making, less
with the Giscard d'Estaing- Schmidt duo than with their successors,
Mitterrand- Kohl, starting in 1982.
– European Political Cooperation
– 1970, Davignon Report: provided for consultation among the Six on
foreign policy matters and the implementation of joint decisions but
no reference to consultation on matters of external security and
defense
– 1972, ECP as a structure of cooperation and coordination of foreign
policy

THE RUN UP TO THE SEA

• 2nd Enlargement: Formerly a ‘club’ of the industrialized countries of Northern
Europe, the EC opened its doors to the emerging democracies of Southern
Europe (1981, Greece; 1986, Spain and Portugal).
– It was therefore a factor of political stability and economic
development in Europe’s Mediterranean region.
– But enlargement also led to increased regional imbalances among the
Twelve, and this increased the need for a Common regional policy.
• The international context:
– Europe starts to feel ‘squeezed’ between the major contenders of the
Cold War; after 1985 it also feared its interests to be sidelined as a
consequence of the start of the rapprochement between the two
superpowers.
– Fears of losing out to USA and Japan on the new technology market
• Franco- German Rapprochement:
– Precondition for any new European initiative.
– F. Mitterrand comes to power (1981) with an agenda based on social
reform, preferring a social Europe to a Europe of monetary stability.
– In contrast, Germany’s economic policy makers, strongly influenced by
the Bundesbank, reluctant to renounce the dogma of stability.
– The new Chancellor, the Christian Democrat Helmut Kohl, in Oct. 1982,
renewed relations with France along the lines of Adenauer and Schmidt.
• Ensure public support for European integration: MS leaders wanted their
citizens to feel that they identified with,a single Community.
– Practical measures to reinforce European identity and citizenship.
• The concept of a “People’s Europe”, often talked about in the 1970s, acquired
official status in the early 1980s, particularly in reaction to the older concept of
a “Traders’ Europe” directly connected with the Common Market. (Tindemans
Report, 1976)
• EU Council Solemn declaration of Stuttgart (June 1983) to move toward a
European Union
• Under the impetus of the Italian MEP Altiero Spinelli, a Parliamentary
Committee on Institutional Affairs was created with a view to preparing a treaty
replacing the existing communities by the European Union.
• The European Parliament adopted the Draft Treaty on 14 February 1984.
• The Fontainebleau European Council, June 1984.
– An high-level ad hoc committee examined the institutional questions
inviting the European Council to convene an inter-governmental
conference (IGC) to negotiate a Treaty on the European Union (EU).
– It recommended the transformation of the ECs into a EU, the
attainment of a single economic area and the promotion of a European
external identity.
 • The White Paper on the Internal Market of 1985
– The Commission, under the impetus of its new President, Jacques
Delors, published a White Paper which identified the 279 legislative
measures needed to complete the internal market by December 1992.
• The Milan European Council of June 1985 finally proposed convening an IGC,
which opened September 1985 and closed in on 28 February 1986.

LESSOSN FROM DE DECADES OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION

• Integration as a gradual process: ups and downs in the formative decades

• The advantages of sectoral economic integration: The Community
method
• Array of complex interactions
• Interactions among the member states
• External context as an important factor

FI DEL TEMA 1!!!!!!

20/02>/2023
EUROPE AS AN “EUROPEAN UNION”
FROM THE SEA TO THE DECLARATION OF LAEKEN
THE SINGLE EUROPEAN ACT (1986)

• The chief objective of the SEA : complete the internal market.

• However, this goal was difficult to achieve on the basis of the existing treaties
– Decision-making process at the Council, imposed unanimity for the
harmonization of legislation.
• Negotiators had a dual mandate: conclude a Treaty relating to common
foreign and security policy and amend the EEC Treaty, at the level of:
– decision-making procedure within the Council;
– Commission's powers
– European Parliament's powers;
– extension of the Communities' responsibilities.
• The SEA preamble expresses the Member States' determination to transform
their relations as a whole with a view to creating a European Union.
• Establishes the unique character of the act,
– It brings together the common provisions as regards cooperation in
the field of foreign policy and the European Communities.
• Focuses on the two objectives of revising the treaties, i.e.:
– "to improve the economic and social situation by extending common
policies and pursuing new objectives" and
– "to ensure a smoother functioning of the Communities".
 SEA INSTITUTIONAL CHANGES

• To facilitate the establishment of the internal market increasing the number

of cases in which the Council can take decisions by qualified majority voting
(QMV) instead of unanimity.
– Unanimity is dropped for measures designed to establish the Single
Market, except taxation and the free movement of persons.
• Establishment of the European Council, with no decision-making powers or
powers of constraint vis-à-vis the other institutions.
• EP's powers enhanced by requirement of its assent when concluding an
association agreement and the institution of the cooperation procedure.
• Implementing powers: the Council confers on the Commission powers for the
implementation of the rules laid down by the former.

SEA POLITICAL CHANGES

• The Single Market is defined as "an area without internal frontiers in which the
free movement of goods, persons, services and capital is ensured in
accordance with the provisions of this Treaty".
– The aim of the Single Market was to offer larger markets for MS
products, while simultaneously increasing competition.
– Establishment of a single market and for the free movement of goods,
persons, services and capital by 31 December 1992.
– This followed on from the 1985 COM’s ‘White Paper’, with its list of
some 300 measures for the completion of the Single Market
• Single Market’s ancillary policies: an economic and monetary policy (although
only as a future objective to be attained).
• Social policy innovations to promote workers’ health and safety and to
develop the social dialogue.
– First treaty to set out the desire gradually to establish a European Social
Area.
– Promote dialogue between the social partners, with a view to the
conclusion of national multi-industry agreements. The role of the trade
unions was thus recognized.
• Reduction of the imbalances between the developed and the poorer regions,
which had continued to grow during the enlargement process
– the MS undertook to enhance economic and social cohesion.
• The COM also responsible for the reform of the Community’s structural funds
such as the European Social Fund (ESF), and the European Regional
Development Fund (ERDF).
• A common policy on applied research, through the establishment of a
multiannual framework programme and specific R&D programmes.
• The SEA also broke new ground by elevating environmental policy to the level
of a common policy and by making an explicit connection between economic
development and environmental protection.
• European Political Cooperation: SEA codifies the practices and procedures
which had been gradually developed since the early 1970s.
– According to the SEA, European foreign policy mechanisms were to be
based on consultation with and information to MS

THE TREATY ON THE EUROPEAN UNION (1922)

• Signed in Maastricht on 7-2-1992, entered into force on 1-11-1993.

• This Treaty is the result of external and internal events
– At external level, the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe and
the outlook of German reunification led to a commitment to reinforce
the Community's international position.
– At internal level, the Member States wished to supplement the
progress achieved by the SEA with other reforms.
• This led to the convening of two IGCs (EMU + political union) 
• Not a definitive constitution but merely one stage in the evolutionary process
of European integration.
– Provision for a review of IGC/new Treaty after 1996, as requested by
the States that deemed TEU inadequate.
• With the TEU the Community clearly went beyond its original economic
objective (common market) and its political ambitions came to the fore.
• In this context, the Treaty of Maastricht responds to five key goals:
– strengthen the democratic legitimacy of the institutions;
– improve the effectiveness of the institutions;
– establish economic and monetary union;
– develop the Community social dimension;
– establish a common foreign and security policy.
• Institutional structure of the Union made up of three distinct pillars:
– The European Community (a term that has replaced European
Economic Community, since its powers now cover other areas such as
education, culture, health, environment, etc.),
– The ‘second pillar’, common foreign and security policy (CFSP)
– The ‘Third Pillar’, justice and home affairs (JHA)
• The Council of Ministers, primary role: its powers cover all three pillars
• Commission, although linked to all Council’s activities, has the exclusive right to
propose legislation only with regard to Community affairs.
• The European Parliament plays a consultative role only for the second and
third pillars, and the ECJ is virtually excluded from them.
• The first pillar consists of the European Communities and concerns the
domains in which MS share sovereignty
• The process known as the Community method, proceeds from an integration
logic and has the following salient features:
– Commission monopoly of the right of initiative; 
– General use of qualified majority voting in the Council;
– an active role for the EP in co-legislating frequently with the Council;
– uniformity in the interpretation of Community law ensured by the ECJ.
– Promotion of the deepening of the single market by establishing
Community policies in six new areas:
– Trans-European networks; industrial policy; consumer protection;
education; youth; culture.
• Community action is limited by the principle of subsidiarity, whereby the
Community may intervene only when the objectives of the Union cannot be
attained by a MS acting on its own.
– This principle may be applied only to areas where powers are shared
with the MS and not to areas where the Community has exclusive
competence
• The second pillar: common foreign and security policy (CFSP).
– Replaces the provisions of the SEA and allows MS to take joint action in
the field of foreign policy.
– Intergovernmental decision-making process which relies on unanimity.
– The Commission and EP play a modest role and the ECJ has no say in
this area.
• The third pillar: cooperation in the field of justice and home affairs (JHA).
– Joint action so as to offer European citizens a high level of protection in
the area of freedom, security and justice.
– The decision-making process is also intergovernmental.
• Europe of ‘bits and pieces’, lack of uniformity?

MAASTRICHT INSTITUTIONAL CHANGEES

• QMV in the Council of Ministers is extended to several sectors of the

Community’s new policies (education, health, vocational training, consumer
protection and social policy, etc.).
– QMV in the Council strengthens the Commission’s role, since its
proposals are more likely to be adopted.
• Unanimity is maintained in:
 – Constitutional provisions (Treaty revision, enlargement, own resources
of the Community budget, etc.)
– National sensitive policies (economic and social cohesion, tax,
framework programme of research, industry, culture)
• Commission’s democratic legitimacy is increased:
– EP wins the right of scrutinyon the appointment by the governments
of the COM President and approval of new College of Commissioners,
which appears before and submits its programme to the EP.
• The EP benefits the most from this round of institutional reform:
– Extension of the ‘assent procedure’, which is the right to approve or
reject decisions taken by the Council in some important areas.
– Establishment of a ‘legislative codecision procedure’
– Democratization also carries a growing complexity and a lack of clarity
for average citizen, since four legislative procedures are juxtaposed
– the consultation, cooperation, codecision and assent procedures.
• A Committee of the Regions, consisting of representatives of local and regional
authorities, is established at the request of the Federal Republic of Germany,
supplements the Community system.
• The Economic and Social Committee (already established by the Rome
Treaties) includes representatives from various categories in the economic and
social spheres.
• Both committees must be consulted by the Council in certain circumstances
and may decide to issue opinions, should they deem it necessary.

MAASTRICHT AND CITIZENSHIP

• Major innovation: European citizenship over and above national citizenship:

citizens who is are national of a MS are also EU citizens.
• This citizenship establishes new rights :
– to circulate and reside freely in the Community;
– to vote and to stand as a candidate for European and municipal
elections in the MS in which he or she resides;
– Protection by the diplomatic or consular authorities of a MS other than
the MS of origin on the territory in which the state of origin is not
represented;
– to petition the EP and to submit a complaint to the Ombudsman.
 MAASTRICH AND ECONOMIC AND MONETARY UNION

• The EMU puts the finishing touches to the single market

• Economic policy consists of three components, MS:
– must ensure coordination of their economic policies,
– must provide for multilateral surveillance of this coordination,
– and are subject to financial and budgetary discipline.
– The objective of monetary policy is to create a single currency and to
ensure its stability through price stability
• Establishment of a single currency in three successive stages:
– Liberalization of the movement of capital, began on 1 January 1990;
– Convergence of the Member States' economic policies (January 1994)
– Creation of a single currency and the establishment of a European
Central Bank (January 1999)
• Special opt-out from Eurozone membership apply to two Member States.
– The UK did not have to proceed to the third stage.
– Denmark obtained a protocol providing that a referendum should
decide on its participation in the third stage (referendum was held in
2000 with the victory of the ‘No’ vote)

MAASTRICHT AND DE SOCIAL PROTOCOL

• The Charter of Fundamental Social Rights was adopted on Dec. 1989 by eleven
MS (the UK opted out) with the aim of ensuring the respect of the established
rights in the single market (Community’s social dimension)
• However, success was minimal.
• It was necessary to take further measures during Treaty negotiations
– UK remained hostile to social policy being subject to Community
legislation.
– However, the British PM agreed not to block the new provisions,
provided that UK was accorded exemption from entering the social
policy obligations.
• The Social Protocol annexed to the Treaty, sets out minimum requirements
that must be adopted by means of directives:
– promotion of employment;
– improvement of living and working conditions;
– adequate social protection;
– social dialogue;
– the development of human resources to ensure a high and sustainable
level of employment;
– the integration of persons excluded from the labour market.
 • Again, UK was still not a signatory of this protocol.
– It was not until Tony Blair’s Labour Party came to power that the UK
allowed the social policy to be included in the Treaty, with the
amendments by the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997.

THE 4TH ENLARGEMENT

• On 1 January 1995, Austria, Finland and Sweden, all MS of the European Free
Trade Association (EFTA), became full members of the EU.
– Rich countries facing a rather Eurosceptic public opinion, sought to
vigorously defend their economic interests and the ‘Nordic model’.
– Although they had already accepted many of the existing Community
rules under the EEA (1994), the accession negotiations were
particularly arduous in relation to agriculture, regional aid, budgetary
matters and fishing quotas.
– Accession submitted to the popular vote.
The results were roughly as forecast: a clear and massive ‘Yes’ in Finland and Austria, a
small ‘Yes’ in Sweden, and another ‘No’ from the Norwegians.

REVIEWING THE UNION: 1996 IGC AND THE TREATY OF AMSTERDAM

• An IGC was convened to draw up a draft treaty, adopted by the Amsterdam

European Council on June 1997. After being ratified by all MS the Treaty of
Amsterdam entered into force on 1 May 1999.
• Drivers:
– Shortcomings of the ‘three pillars’ structure
– Reluctance of the more recalcitrant MS to more integration vs.
necessity to ‘bring the EU closer to the citizens’…discussion about
flexible mechanisms allowing for a ‘variable geometry’ or ‘multi-speed’
Europe
– Ineffective foreign policy (Yugoslav war)
– Copenhagen Council (1993) setting ‘accession criteria’ thus placing
enlargement as a permanent agenda item  need to avoid an
‘institutional paralysis’ due to ineffective enlarged institutions

REFORMS INTRODUCED BY THE AMSTERDAM TREATY

• Establishment of an ‘area of freedom, security and justice’

– Most important elements of the 3rd pillar (visa policy, asylum,
immigration and judicial cooperation on civil matters) transferred to the
1st pillar, and an ‘area of freedom, security and justice’ was
 established, irrespective of the institutional structure to which it
belonged (1st or 3rd pillar)
– Comprehensive approach towards movement of persons:
safeguarding internal security became the primary objective of the
European Union.
– 3rd pillar restricted to police and judicial cooperation in criminal
matters…
– …but it could not be left either under an ineffective ‘old style’
intergovernmental management: establishment of clear objectives
requiring coordinated action on the part of MS
– The Schengen Agreement, an intergovernmental convention, is
incorporated into the new Treaty, allocated between pillar 1 and 3.
– It provides for the gradual abolition of borders between the
participating countries…
– …this being offset by a more effective surveillance of their external
borders.
– It establishes short-term ( simplifying internal border checks and
coordinating the fight against drug trafficking and crime)….
– and long-term measures (harmonization of legislative provisions
relating to drugs and arms trafficking, police cooperation and visa
policies).
• However, the UK and Ireland refused to implement Schengen Agreement so
retaining their border controls.

– A Protocol granted them the right to retain border controls and to opt
out of the new policies forming part of the 1 st pillar of the Union (on
visas, asylum, immigration, other policies relating to the free
movement of persons).
– Denmark also enjoyed some opt-outs
• On the other hand, Schengen Area was enlarged to include countries which
did not form part of the EU (Norway, Iceland, Switzerland)
• To avoid fragmentation, the Treaty laid down that the Schengen acquis must
be accepted in its entirety by all countries applying for accession to the
Union.
• Democratization extension of the EP’s powers.
• Codecision with the Council now encompassed new fields.
• EP approval of the appointment of the COM President by the
governments, which in turn would consult EP before nominating new
Commissioners.
• Failure to agree the re- weighting of votes in the Council after the increase
from 12 to 15 members.
 • Blocking minorities are easier to put together
• Introduction of mechanisms for ‘closer cooperation’, although with strict
restrictions (never used to date).
THE UNION AND THE CITIZENS

• Development of the concept of European citizenship, with additions to the list

of civic rights enjoyed and a clarification of the link between national and
European citizenship;
• Insertion of a chapter on employment, providing for the development of
common strategies and the coordination of national policies;
• Incorporation of a stronger social agreement with a commitment to tackle
social exclusion and uphold equality between men and women;
• Consolidation of environmental policy, with emphasis on sustainable
development, integration of environmental aspects in all sectoral policies and
the simplification of Community decision-making;
• Improvement in the instruments available for promoting high standards of
public health;
• clarification of the aims of consumer protection policy and better integration
into other policies:
• Guaranteed right of access for citizen to the documents produced by the EU
institutions and the right to communicate with the institutions in their own
language.

TOWARD AND EFFECTIVE AND COHERENT EXTERNAL POLICIY

• The second ‘pillar’ remained intergovernmental.

• Only minor amendments as to improve its capacity for action:
– European Council was given the right to decide on ‘common strategies’;
a ‘policy planning and early warning unit’ was created;
– a High Representative for the CFSP was introduced to assist the six-
monthly Council Presidencies, which remained responsible for its
implementation.
– The rule of unanimity persisted, marginally affected by ‘constructive
abstention’ that allowed MS who disagreed with a decision to opt out
from its application without preventing others from carrying it forward.
– The right to veto also remained, even with regard to the
implementation of measures adopted by qualified majority.

PREPARING THE ENLARGEMENT: THE TREATY OF NICE AND BEYOND

• Concern about the impact of the forthcoming enlargement on Community
policies and asked the COM to look into the matter
• COM (1997) presents ‘Agenda 2000: For a stronger and wider Union’, setting
out its vision of the reforms that were needed.
– Agenda 2000 expressed the COM’s views on the opening of accession
negotiations with those applicant countries able to fulfill the required
conditions and proposed the measures needed to prepare them for
accession.
• Enlargement would have a significant impact on Community policies and that
the budget, regional policy and the common agricultural policy would have to
be reformed.
•  heated debate because of the Member States’ different interests.
• After scrutiny of applications against the Copenhagen Criteria, the COM
considered that only a group of six countries might be eligible to accede in
around 2002–2003 and suggested that negotiations should begin only with
them (Cyprus, Czech Rep., Estonia, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia).
– The European Council (1997), however, wishing to avoid any
discrimination, decided to concede the candidate status to all CEECs
countries, along with Cyprus, while opening negotiations only with the
six countries selected by the Commission.
– The European Council (1999), in the aftermath of the Kosovo war, also
decided to open conferences with the other six applicants (Bulgaria,
Latvia, Lithuania, Romania and Slovakia, along with Malta).
• The Council also decided to give some satisfaction to Turkey by granting it the
status of ‘candidate State’, offering it the benefits of pre-accession but w/o
opening accession negotiations or setting a date for accession.
• Institutional change and the ‘Amsterdam leftovers’
– Central issue of the efficiency of the decision-making process in a
enlarged Union. It was necessary to
• Limit the number of Commissioners in order to maintain the
cohesion and efficiency of the Commission.
• Re-weighting of votes in the Council so to prevent a possible
majority of smaller countries from ganging up against the most
important demographically, economically and politically MS.
– The two issues were linked:
• the ‘larger’ MS would have accepted one Commissioner instead
of two on condition that the re-weighting of votes in the Council
took account of the demographic importance of each MS;
• ‘smaller’ countries wanted above all to have their own
Commissioner.
• The two groups failed to resolve the issue.
 – A Protocol annexed to the Treaty of Amsterdam presented the only
hope of a compromise, establishing that with any further enlargement
‘the Commission shall comprise one national of each of the Member
States, provided that, by that date, the weighting of the votes in the
Council has been modified (…) in a manner acceptable to all Member
States.’
– A more extensive reform would have to be implemented at a later
date, but the exact terms were not specified.
• The European Council (1999) confirmed the need to consider the unsettle
institutional issues to be resolved before enlargement.
• The European Council (1999) also decided that the IGC would look at the size
and composition of the Commission, the weighting of votes in the Council, the
extension of QMV
• The IGC opened on Feb. 2000 under the Portuguese Presidency.
• National interest outweighed Europe's during the arduous debate that took
place at the Nice European Council.
• However, after a lot of give and take an agreement was reached.
• For the optimists, it was the only realistic way of go on progressing.
• For the pessimists, the European momentum was fading out.
• Nice European Council (Dec. 2000) agrees the Treaty’s final version (thus called
‘Treaty of Nice’)

REFORM INTRODUCED BY THE TREATY OF NICE

• The bitter debate among big and small countries for the re-weighting of vote

in the Council rose the greater tensions.
• New re-weighting of vote for the current and the future MS:
• The new system involved 29 votes to the four big countries (Germany,
France, United Kingdom and Italy).
• In spite of the demographic imbalance, parity between France and
Germany was maintained.
• Spain got 27 votes, the same as Poland when joining the Union.
• The rest of the countries got progressively less votes up to Malta.
• A complicate system of majorities and minorities: three different ways to
block any decision of the Council:
• When the Union would reach 27 members, the whole number of votes of the
Council would be 345. The threshold for the QMV set at 255 and a minority of
88 votes could veto any resolution.
• That means that three big and one small countries would be always
able to impede any decision.
 • A simple majority of MS opposition would always prevent a decision from
being passed by a qualified majority.
• Finally, a demographic verification clause was adopted to give more power to
Germany: beyond the QMV of the number of MS, they also need to represent
at least 62% of the Union's population.
• It means that Germany needed the support of only two other big
nations to veto whatever decision.
• From 2005, countries that had two commissioners (Germany, France, United
Kingdom, Italy and Europe) would have only one.
• When the 27 members’ threshold had been reached, a definitive number of
commissioners would have been unanimously decided.
• The number would then be inferior to 27 and would be set up a fair system of
rotation taking into account the different demographic weight of the countries
and the diverse geographic areas of our continent.
• This was one of the main  battlefield between big and small countries and a
definitive solution has not yet been reached.
• Competences of the President of the Commission were enhanced.
• Now elected by qualified majority of the European Council and his
appointment ratified by the EP.
• Increase of QMV use (about forty policy domain by now, most of them
technical ones).
• However, governments' veto is maintained in sensitive national issues, such as
cohesion (Spain) , tax system (Britain), asylum and immigration (Germany) or
free trade in cultural an audiovisual sphere (France).
• The possibility of an Enhanced (reinforced) cooperation among MS in fields
related to further integration was set up, subject to conditions:
• It must involve at least eight countries
• It cannot involve: Community policies or anything involving the common
market, affairs related to Schengen , defense and weapon industry affairs.
• Other, non-institutional, changes:
• Mechanism for preventing a MS from infringing the founding principles of the
Union;
• Strengthening the defense capability of the Union;
• defining the tasks of Eurojust;
• Legal basis enabling regulations governing political parties at European level;
• The Treaty entered into force on February 2003 after a second referendum
was held in Ireland to ‘reverse’ the negative result of the first referendum.

BEYOND NICE: THE FUTURE OF THE DEBATE

• The Treaty of Nice made enlargement possible by establishing the place of the
new MS within the EU institutions…
• But it did not address the major issues surrounding the future of the Union: the
inadequacies of the method of intergovernmental negotiation are again laid
bare
• That is why, at Germany’s instigation, a ‘Declaration on the future of the
Union’ was annexed to the Treaty. It established discussions on:
– Establish a formal delimitation of competences between Union and
MS (as demanded by the Länder),
– Address the status of the Charter of Fundamental Rights,
– Simplify the treaties
– Define the role of national parliaments in the European architecture.
• At the Laeken European Council (December 2001), the governments were
divided on the method to follow and the objectives.
– Only the founding countries were determined to move forward,
although they disagreed on the federal destiny of a united Europe.
– Small countries were hesitant, fearing the creation of a political entity
dominated by the big countries.
• Finally, the long Laeken Declaration on ‘the future of the European Union’ was
adopted.
– ‘The Union needs to become more democratic, more transparent and
more efficient. It also has to resolve three basic challenges: how to bring
citizens, and primarily the young, closer to the European design and the
European institutions, how to organize politics and the European
political area in an enlarged Union and how to develop the Union into a
stabilizing factor and a model in the new, multipolar world. In order to
address them a number of specific questions need to be put.’
• The Declaration goes on to pose several sets of questions grouped under the
headings
– ‘a better division and definition of competence in the European Union’,
– ‘simplification of the Union’s instruments’,
– ‘more democracy, transparency and efficiency in the European Union’

– ‘towards a Constitution for European citizens’.

• As for the method to be adopted to draft the new Treaty, the experiences of
Amsterdam and Nice had shown that the IGC, where different conceptions and
mutually antagonistic national interests inevitably clashed, was not on its own
capable of making much progress, and that the debate needed to be widened.
• The way in which the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union
was drafted (Dec.1999 -Sept.2000) was considered a viable option to follow
 – The task had been successfully conducted by a Convention comprising
representatives of governments, the EP, national parliaments, and the
COM , deliberating publicly and incorporating contributions from many
non-governmental associations and organizations.
FIII TEMA 2