Topic 1 - Summary of Cases
Topic 1 - Summary of Cases
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Can living human beings be owned?
Somerset’s Case, Somerset v Stewart: 1772
Habeas Corpus Granted to Slave
Somerset, a slave purchased by the defendant in Virginia, had been brought to England, but
then confined on board a ship. He brought a writ for habeas corpus.
Held: The plea in defence was insufficient. Lord Mansfield ordered an African slave to be
freed upon finding the custodian’s return insufficient. At common law a petitioner’s status as
an alien was not a categorical bar to habeas corpus relief, and the common law recognised no
status of slave, though some colonies might.
Lord Mansfield held that ‘The state of slavery is of such a nature, that it is incapable of being
introduced on any reasons, moral or political’. ‘Chattel slavery’ as ‘ ‘full ownership of
another human being’ had been unlawful under Imperial legislation dating back to colonial
times.
Facts
A stillborn baby with two heads is preserved by a doctor who displays it in his office.
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Later, the doctor dies and there is a question of whether the preserved corpse can be seen as
property.
Issue
Can there be property rights in a corpse?
Held
Yes, but only if skill has been involved in the preservation of the corpse.
Quote
“By whatever name the right is called, I think it exists, and that, so far as it constitutes
property, a human body, or a portion of a human body, is capable by law of becoming the
subject of property. It is not necessary to give an exhaustive enumeration of the
circumstances under which such a right may be acquired, but I entertain no doubt that, when
a person has by the lawful exercise of work or skill so dealt with a human body or part of a
human body in his lawful possession that it has acquired some attributes differentiating it
from a mere corpse awaiting burial, he acquires a right to retain possession of it, at least as
against any person not entitled to have it delivered to him for the purpose of burial, but
subject, of course, to any positive law which forbids its retention under the particular
circumstances.”
Held: The appeal failed. Next of kin have no right to regain possession of a deceased’s body
part which had been removed for autopsy. There was no ownership of a body after death. The
autopsy process did not transform a body part into an object capable of ownership. The claim
was pleaded in conversion, bailment and wrongful interference with the brain, and the
plaintiffs could not establish that they had the right to possession at the time the brain was
disposed of. The plaintiff’s desire to discover exactly what had happened to all the body parts
was not a sufficient reason for litigation.
Where there is no executor the duty to take possession of and dispose of the body of the
deceased falls upon the administrators of the estate, but they may not be able to obtain an
injunction for delivery of the body before the grant of letters of administration
Peter Gibson LJ, Butler-Sloss LJ, Peter Gibson LJ
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Theft of body parts used as anatomical specimens
Facts
The first defendant (K) had access to the Royal College of Surgeons to take drawings of
anatomical specimens. The second defendant (L) worked at the college. K asked L to remove
a number of human body parts from the college. The body parts were then taken to K’s home
where K made casts from them. The body parts were ultimately buried in a field near K’s
home.
Issue
K was found guilty of theft. The trial judge found an exception to the principle established in
common law that a corpse, or parts of a corpse, were not capable of being property (R v
Sharp (1857) Dears & Bell 160). The trial judge held that there was property in a corpse or
parts of a corpse when they have been preserved for medical or scientific examination or for
the benefit of medical science. On appeal, K contended that there was no property in human
body parts and therefore they could not be stolen.
Held
The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal. The exception expressed to the longstanding
common law rule regarding property in a corpse as relied upon by the trial judge and first
expressed in the Australian case of Doodeward v Spence 6 C.L.R. 406 was valid. When a
person applies lawful skill to a human body or part thereof which is in his lawful possession
it acquires usefulness which distinguishes it from an interred corpse and that person therefore
acquires a right to retain possession of it. Parts of a corpse are therefore capable of being
property within the meaning of section 4 of the Theft Act 1968.
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Each claimant was undergoing chemotherapy which would prevent them providing future
samples. They appealed a finding that they they had no losses, based on the suggestion that
the 1990 Act so circumscribed the management of the samples as to deny any assertion of a
proprietary interest in the samples. They claimed psychological injury and losses.
Held: The appeal was allowed. The hospital owed the claimants a duty of care. The concept
of ownership is no more than a convenient global description of different collections of rights
held by persons over physical and other things. The men owned the specimens. The Act itself
required expicit consent from the donors for various acts, and this itself acknowledged rights.
Doodward was framed as an exception to the common law rule, and was not a good basis for
the modern law. The common law needed re-examination.
The court considered and set out the law of bailment as it might apply to the case. The
defendants were bailees.
SLIDE 6
Bernstein v Skyviews and General Ltd [1978] QB 479
Facts
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Skyviews and General Ltd (S) took an aerial photograph a number of houses, including
Coppings Farm, Bernstein’s (B) country home. S then purported to sell the photograph to B.
B claimed damages for trespass onto his airspace and, or alternatively, invasion of privacy for
entering the air space above his property and taking the photograph without his consent.
Issue
The issue in question was whether a person has the right to privacy in airspace.
Held
There was no trespass. An owner of land has rights in the air space above his land only to
such a height as is necessary for the ordinary use and enjoyment of his land and the structures
upon it. B had no right to privacy in airspace and accordingly there had been no infringement
of B’s rights in the airspace above his property. It would be absurd to take the latin maxim
cujus est solum, ejus est usque ad coelum et ad inferos (whoever owns the soil it is theirs up
to heaven and down to hell) literally as it would mean that any time a satellite passed
overhead it would be trespassing. A property owner’s rights in this case must therefore
restricted to such height as is necessary for the ordinary use and enjoyment of his land and
the structures upon it, and to declare that above that height he had no greater rights in the
airspace than any other member of the public.
Issue
Are there property rights in a spectacle?
Held
There can be no property rights in a spectacle.
Any profit made from a premise is made so by charging entrance to an area.
A person should not have to divert their eyes from something as you walk past; there
was little difference in this case.
The plaintiff could complain that the actions diminish their profits. However, this is
little different to Taylor setting up a racecourse next door.
Quotes
“I find difficulty in attaching any precise meaning to the phrase “property in a spectacle.” A
“spectacle” cannot be “owned” in any ordinary sense of that word. Even if there were any
legal principle which prevented one person from gaining an advantage for himself or causing
damage to another by describing a spectacle produced by that other person, the rights of the
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latter person could be described as property only in a metaphorical sense. Any
appropriateness in the metaphor would depend upon the existence of the legal principle. The
principle cannot itself be based upon such a metaphor.”
(Latham CJ at page 497)
“If English law had followed the course of development that has recently taken place in the
United States, the “broadcasting rights” in respect of the races might have been protected as
part of the quasi-property created by the enterprise, organization and labour of the plaintiff in
establishing and equipping a racecourse and doing all that is necessary to conduct race
meetings. But courts of equity have not in British jurisdictions thrown the protection of an
injunction around all the intangible elements of value, that is, value in exchange, which may
flow from the exercise by an individual of his powers or resources whether in the
organization of a business or undertaking or the use of ingenuity, knowledge, skill or labour.
This is sufficiently evidenced by the history of the law of copyright and by the fact that the
exclusive right to invention, trade marks, designs, trade name and reputation are dealt with in
English law as special heads of protected interests and not under a wide generalisation.”
(Dixon J at pages 508-509)
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