Cap 1 An Object Relations Model of Personality and Personality Pathology
Cap 1 An Object Relations Model of Personality and Personality Pathology
3
4 Psychodynamic Psychotherapy for Personality Disorders
Psychological Structures
The cornerstone of the object relations theory approach to personality
disorders is that descriptive features of personality pathology that char-
acterize a particular personality disorder can be seen to reflect the nature
Object Relations Model of Personality and Personality Pathology 7
1 We distinguish between this usage of the term structure and the psychometric
concept of structure. In trait theory, personality structure refers to a factor struc-
ture that fits existing data. This statistical method is used to explore latent vari-
ables underlying different personality traits by identifying covariation among
traits. Trait theory identifies structures across a population. In contrast, psycho-
dynamics uses structures to refer to how psychological functioning is organized
within a particular individual.
8 Psychodynamic Psychotherapy for Personality Disorders
internal object relations. The particular internal object relations that are
activated will organize the individual’s behavior and experience of that
setting and will be played out in his or her interpersonal relations.
As an example of how we conceptualize internal object relations and
their role in psychological functioning and subjectivity, consider an ob-
ject relation comprising the image of a small, childlike self interacting
with an image of a powerful, threatening authority figure in which the
interaction is linked to feelings of fear—or, alternatively, the image of a
small, childlike self and a caring, protective figure associated with feel-
ings of gratification and safety. In these illustrations, the internal object
relations described will become manifest in the adult to the degree that
they function to organize the individual’s expectations and experience
of dependent relations—coloring the experience of the self and of the
person depended upon, while activating, in the first case, an affective
experience of anxiety and fear and, in the second, an experience of grat-
ification and safety.
Kernberg (Kernberg and Caligor 2005) suggests that internal object
relations emerge from the interaction of inborn affect dispositions and
attachment relationships; from the earliest days of life, constitutionally
determined affect states are activated in relation to, regulated by, and
cognitively linked to interactions with caretakers. Over time, these in-
teractions are internalized as relationship patterns, which are gradually
organized to form the enduring, affectively charged psychological
structures that we refer to as internal object relations.
Our emphasis on internalized patterns of relating as central organiz-
ing features of psychological functioning is shared by many other ap-
proaches, including cognitive and behavioral theory, interpersonal
theory, and attachment theory. However, while there is much overlap
among these models, object relations theory is distinguished by virtue
of invoking a relatively complex, “dynamic” relationship between early
attachment relationships and the psychological structures that come to
organize adult experience. In the object relations theory model, we in-
voke not only early experience—colored by cognitive developmental
level—as affecting the nature of internal object relations, but also psy-
chodynamic factors, including the individual’s psychological conflicts,
defenses, and fantasies.
To illustrate the potential role of conflict and defense in determining
the nature of internal object relations, let’s return to our earlier example
of an internal object relation comprising a small, childlike self and a
powerful, threatening authority figure linked to feelings of fear. We are
suggesting that for a particular individual, the self experience of pow-
erlessness and fear in the setting of dependent relationships may reflect
10 Psychodynamic Psychotherapy for Personality Disorders
not only actual early experiences with a frightening parent but also de-
fensive needs or fantasy. For example, for someone like Ms. N, this ob-
ject relation might be a defensive construction in relation to conflictual
wishes to hurt a parental figure. Here we would speak of “projection,”
as if to say: “She is aggressive and sadistic, not me; I am weak and fright-
ened. Therefore I need not feel guilty for having sadistic feelings.”
Alternatively, for someone like Ms. B, a more extreme and highly affec-
tively charged version of this same object relation might function as part
of a defensive effort to protect a fantasy of a wished-for, perfectly grat-
ifying parental figure. This is an example of “splitting”: “This feels ter-
rible, but nevertheless it means that I can still hope to find a perfect
caretaker.” In sum, the internal object relations that organize subjective
experience in a particular setting may at the same time serve defensive
functions, protecting the subject from awareness of more threatening or
painful, conflictual experiences of self and other. In the object relations
theory model, the nature and quality of internal object relations are seen
to reflect temperamental factors (e.g., inborn affect dispositions), devel-
opmental experience, and also conflict and defense.
individuals in the NPO group. Ms. B and Mr. B are both illustrative of the
difficulties encountered in the BPO group; one can see that their person-
ality pathology affects virtually all areas of functioning. In Figure 1–1,
we orient the reader unfamiliar with this system by illustrating the rela-
tionship between the structural approach to personality disorders, em-
phasizing the dimension of severity, and the more familiar DSM-IV-TR
personality disorders.
Despite the apparently categorical nature of our framework as it is
described above and represented in Figure 1–1, in fact, our approach
assumes a dimensional perspective on personality pathology. At the
healthiest end of the spectrum are individuals with normal identity, pre-
Identity
The construct of identity anchors the object relations theory model of
personality disorders. Normal identity distinguishes the normal per-
sonality and neurotic-level personality disorders on the one hand from
the personality disorders organized at a borderline level on the other
(Table 1–1). Identity is the structural correlate of both the subjective sense
of self and the experience of significant others, which in this model are
viewed as inextricably linked. (The intimate relation between self expe-
rience and the experience of others has been empirically examined and
supported in a series of studies conducted by Andersen [Andersen and
Chen 2002].) As mentioned earlier, in the object relations theory model,
internal object relations are conceptualized as the building blocks of
higher-order structures. Kernberg (Kernberg and Caligor 2005) sug-
gests that in normal identity formation, internal object relations associ-
ated with the experience of self and others are organized in relation to
one another in a stable but flexible fashion. This organization corre-
sponds with an integrated sense of self, which is manifested subjec-
tively in experiences of both the self and significant others that are
complex, well differentiated, characterized by subtlety and depth, con-
tinuous over time and across situations, flexible, and realistic. In ad-
dition, normal identity is associated with the ability to accurately
appreciate the internal experience of others; to invest, over time, in pro-
fessional, intellectual, and recreational interests; and to “know one’s
own mind” with regard to one’s values, opinions, tastes, and beliefs.
Kernberg contrasts normal identity with pathological identity for-
mation; following Erikson (1956), he refers to the latter as the syndrome
of identity diffusion. In identity diffusion, internal object relations mak-
ing up the sense of self are polarized, by which we mean “all good” or
“all bad,” associated with strongly positive or strongly negative affect
states, and extreme. These highly affectively charged internal object re-
lations are poorly and unstably organized in relation to one another. At
a descriptive level, the outcome of this structural organization is the ab-
sence of an overarching, coherent sense of self or of significant others.
18
TABLE 1–1. Structural approach to classification of personality pathology
Normal personality Neurotic personality High-level borderline Low-level borderline
Structural domain organization organization personality organization personality organization
Reality testing Intact, stable Intact, stable Intact; some social deficits Intact; social deficits
(transient psychotic states)
3 We refer the reader to Westen and Cohen (1993) for empirical support for the
transitory, split, poorly integrated, and “black-and-white” quality of the self-
representation in severe personality pathology described by Kernberg.
20 Psychodynamic Psychotherapy for Personality Disorders
Defensive Operations
Defenses are an individual’s automatic psychological responses to stres-
sors or emotional conflict. Different levels of personality pathology are as-
sociated with different dominant defensive operations, and defenses
operate differently in individuals with consolidated identity than in those
whose identity is not consolidated. At the healthiest end of the spectrum,
defenses are flexible and adaptive and involve little or no distortion of in-
ternal or external reality. At the most pathological end of the spectrum,
defenses are highly inflexible and maladaptive, involving increasing de-
grees of distortion of reality (Vaillant 1993). Across the spectrum of per-
sonality pathology, defensive operations protect the individual from
anxiety and pain associated with the expression of conflictual object rela-
tions, but at the same time they introduce maladaptive rigidity and un-
derlying structural pathology into personality functioning.
Kernberg (1976) presents an approach to the classification of defen-
ses that divides them into three groups: 1) mature defenses, 2) repres-
sion-based or “neurotic” defenses, and 3) splitting-based or lower-level
(also referred to as “primitive”) defenses. This classification is in many
ways consistent with current consensus within the research community
(Perry and Bond 2005), while placing greater emphasis on the psycho-
logical mechanisms underlying defensive operations.
Mature defenses4 are the predominant defensive style in the normal
personality and are associated with flexible and adaptive functioning.
Mature defenses do not bar any aspect of a conflict from consciousness,
nor do they maintain a distance between aspects of emotional life that
are in conflict. Rather, mature defenses allow all aspects of an anxiety-
provoking situation into subjective awareness, with little or no distor-
tion, but in a fashion that minimizes psychological distress while opti-
mizing coping (Vaillant 1993).
Repression-based, or neurotic, defenses 5 avoid distress by repress-
ing, or banishing from consciousness, aspects of the subject’s psycho-
logical experience that are conflictual or a potential source of emotional
discomfort. Individuals organized at a neurotic level rely predomi-
nantly on a combination of repression-based and mature defenses
(Kernberg and Caligor 2005). While there are a variety of neurotic
defenses that work in different ways, they all involve repression; in the
setting of a relatively well-integrated sense of self, repression-based de-
fenses ensure that conflictual aspects of experience are split off from the
dominant sense of self and remain more or less permanently out of con-
scious awareness. This process protects against awareness of conflictual
experiences of self and other but at the same time introduces rigidity
into personality functioning (e.g., “I never get angry”). Thus, Ms. N is
unaware of having competitive or aggressive motivations, which are
conflictual, but the rigidity introduced by her repressive defenses leaves
her compelled to shy away from confrontation and to have difficulty ap-
propriately asserting herself. Repression-based defenses alter the sub-
ject’s internal reality, but they typically do so without grossly distorting
the subject’s sense of external reality. Although repression-based de-
fenses result in personality rigidity, influence cognitive processes, and
lead to subtle distortions of experience, and may cause discomfort or
distress, they typically do not lead to grossly abnormal or disruptive be-
haviors.
Whereas neurotic defenses make use of repression, the lower-level,
or splitting-based, defenses6 make use of dissociation,7 or splitting, to
avoid psychological conflict and emotional distress. When we use the
terms dissociation and splitting, we refer to a psychological process in
which two aspects of experience that are in conflict are both allowed to
emerge fully into consciousness, but either not at the same time as, or
not in conjunction with, the same object relation (Kernberg 1976). Thus,
splitting-based defenses, in contrast to repression-based defenses, do
not banish mental contents from consciousness per se, but instead com-
partmentalize or maintain at a distance conscious aspects of experience
that are in conflict or whose approximation would generate psycholog-
ical discomfort.
Kernberg (1984) suggests that splitting-based defenses are inti-
mately tied to identity pathology and that splitting is the prototypical
defense seen in patients with severe personality disorders. In patients
tude that had characterized their interactions up until this point, and the
certainty Mr. B had expressed in previous sessions that she cared about
him and was helping him. Mr. B responded that he remembered those
sessions, but they were irrelevant now; he now saw the therapist for
who she truly was, and that was the only thing that mattered.
Reality Testing
Sustained loss of perceptual reality testing is not a feature of personality
disorders. However, transient loss of reality testing can be seen in some
of the more severe personality disorders, especially in highly stressful or
affectively charged settings or in the context of alcohol or substance
abuse. When a patient presents with frank loss of reality testing, the
evaluation and treatment of psychosis becomes the highest priority, and
the issue of personality pathology is deferred until psychotic symptoms
resolve.
If we turn from reality testing proper to what we refer to as social re-
ality testing, we see that individuals organized at a BPO frequently
present with deficits in this area. Social reality testing is responsible for
the ability to read social cues, understand social conventions, and re-
spond tactfully in interpersonal settings, all of which are characteristic
of the normal personality and are also seen in the NPO. Deficits in social
reality testing can lead individuals who are organized at a borderline
level to behave inappropriately in social settings, typically without be-
ing aware of doing so, and misinterpretation of social cues may lead to
transient feelings of paranoia or fears of being abandoned.
26 Psychodynamic Psychotherapy for Personality Disorders
Moral Values
The normal personality is associated with a commitment to values and
ideals and a “moral compass” that is consistent, flexible, and fully inte-
grated into the sense of self. In the NPO also, we see commitment to val-
ues and ideals and the absence of antisocial behavior, reflecting a fully
integrated and internalized sense of values and ideals. However, moral
rigidity, a tendency to hold the self to unreasonably high standards—
to be excessively self-critical or to anguish over the temptation to stray—
is a common feature of personality disorders organized at a neurotic
level. In contrast, the BPO is characterized by a variable degree of pa-
thology in moral functioning. At one end of the spectrum, we find a rel-
atively well developed but rigid and excessively severe level of moral
functioning characterized by severe anxiety and subjective distress, in
the form either of self-criticism or of anticipated criticism from others, in
relation to not adhering to internal standards. At the other end of the
spectrum, we see the absence of any internal moral compass and a lack
of capacity for guilt, characteristic of patients organized at a low border-
line level, and in particular those with antisocial personality disorder or
severe narcissistic pathology.
his behavior a second thought. When his therapist brought Mr. B’s lying
to his attention, Mr. B denied the significance of his behavior and ratio-
nalized that he did it to “smooth things out.”
when Mr. B’s therapist frustrated him by starting late, Mr. B felt fully
justified in attacking and devaluing her.
Where paranoid concerns are preeminent in the low-level BPO, in
individuals organized at a high-level BPO anxieties typically have more
to do with fears of closeness and dependency, and paranoid concerns
are secondary. Here, in the setting of a combination of repression-based
and splitting-based defenses, we typically see condensation of conflicts
in relation to dependency, sexuality, and self-esteem maintenance,
along with conflicts around aggression. In less conflictual areas of func-
tioning, repressive defenses are generally able to manage anxiety and to
protect the individual from the emergence into consciousness of poorly
integrated motivational states. However, in settings that activate core
conflicts or stimulate significant anxiety (often, depending on the indi-
vidual, these settings involve dependent relations, sexual intimacy,
competitive struggles in relation to authority and power, and/or ex-
treme threats to self-esteem), repressive defenses may fail, at times lead-
ing to episodes of intensely felt rage, hatred, and paranoia that seem
discontinuous with the individual’s overall level of psychological func-
tioning. For example, Ms. B was often able to maintain stable and mu-
tual relations with her friends; with her boyfriends, she would also do
well for a time. But as she became more dependent she also became
more brittle and volatile; if she felt that her boyfriend was not taking
care of her as she would like, she could hatefully turn on him in an in-
stant. In this setting, activation of core conflicts around dependency
overwhelmed otherwise stable repressive defenses.
Suggested Readings
Akhtar S: Broken Structures: Severe Personality Disorders and Their Treatment.
Northvale, NJ, Jason Aronson, 1992
Caligor E, Kernberg OF, Clarkin JF: Handbook of Dynamic Psychotherapy for
Higher Level Personality Pathology. Washington, DC, American Psychiat-
ric Publishing, 2007
Clarkin JF, Yeomans FE, Kernberg OF: Psychotherapy for Borderline Personal-
ity: Focusing on Object Relations. Washington, DC, American Psychiatric
Publishing, 2006
McWilliams N: Psychoanalytic Diagnosis. New York, Guilford, 1994
PDM Task Force: Psychodynamic Diagnostic Manual: Personality Patterns and
Disorders. Silver Spring, MD, Alliance of Psychoanalytic Organizations,
2006
The Structured Interview for Personality Organization (STIPO). The STIPO is a
semistructured interview based on the clinical structural interview de-
scribed in this chapter. The STIPO is available on the Web site http://
www.borderlinedisorders.com.
Symphoratapes: Master Clinicians at Work. A video presentation of Dr. Otto
Kernberg conducting a diagnostic interview focusing on structural features
of personality can be seen on a DVD that is part of this series produced by
Drs. Henk-Jan Dalewijk and Bert van Luyn. This DVD set also includes
interviews of the same patient by Marsha Linehan, Michael Stone, Larry
Rockland, Solomon Aktar, and Lorna Benjamin. The set of DVDs creates a
teaching tool for demonstrating clinical interviewing skills and illustrating
34 Psychodynamic Psychotherapy for Personality Disorders
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Object Relations Model of Personality and Personality Pathology 35