SPECIAL ARTICLE

DCR33
From Development Control to Promotion

Hussain Indorewala

In 2018, almost 10 years after the process was initiated in Conventional planning ... seemed more and more discredited. Instead,
planning turned from regulating urban growth, to encouraging it by
2009, the development plan of Mumbai was sanctioned. any and every possible means. Cities, the new message rang loud and
The first draft of the plan, which sought to significantly clear, were machines for wealth creation; the first and chief aim of
planning must be to oil the machinery. The planner increasingly iden-
reform urban planning in Mumbai, was scrapped in tified with his traditional adversary, the developer; the gamekeeper
2015. However, contrary to the widespread assumption turned poacher.
— Peter Hall (2001: 379)
that the first draft was rejected due to public opposition,

I
n February 2015, the Municipal Corporation of Greater
this paper argues that a key factor behind the scrapping
Mumbai (MCGM) headed by the Shiv Sena party unveiled a
was to reform one of the central regulations of the 1991 Earlier Draft Development Plan (EDDP) for the city. Pre-
Development Plan of Mumbai, Regulation 33, which pared on behalf of the city government by a private consulting
provides development rights incentives and planning firm, with a former chief planner of the Mumbai Metropolitan
Region Development Authority (MMRDA)1 as the lead advisor, the
relaxations to property developers in Mumbai. Through
plan was presented as a departure from the ruling axioms of
an analysis of Mumbai’s development plan process, this development planning in Mumbai (MCGM 2015). Yet, two
paper offers a glimpse into the divergent values and months later, following a massive furore led by activists, civil
interests of powerful groups, and how these interests society groups, political parties, and even celebrities, the state
government, which only had the authority to sanction the
are coordinated and reconciled in the city. The process
plan, jettisoned it, and later amended the law to legitimise its
reveals the extent to which real-estate capital shapes intervention. The government directed the MCGM to prepare a
urban space and common sense of urban planning new draft in four months, and an officer on special duty (OSD)
in Mumbai. was appointed to oversee this process. The Shiv Sena, rather
than resisting government intrusion into city affairs, thanked
the chief minister for having “consigned this sin [of the Deve-
lopment Plan] to flames” (Outlook 2015). Soon after, in a confer-
ence organised by the National Real Estate Development
Council (NAREDCO), the chief minister explained that he
scrapped the EDDP because it was ridden with mapping errors
and favoured specific individuals. Meanwhile, numerous civil
society organisations that had formed tentative alliances to
oppose the plan hailed the government’s decision. In media
reports, the decision was publicised as people’s victory over a
builder-friendly development plan that had allegedly sought
to increase the city’s floor space index (FSI), reduce the
city’s green cover, and introduce irrelevant concepts such as
transit-oriented development (TOD) in the planning process
(HT 2015a, 2015b; Chitlangia 2016).
A year later, in 2016, the MCGM replaced the scrapped EDDP
with a revised development plan (RDP), which was sanctioned
in parts over the next two years. The RDP eliminated almost all
the positive features of the EDDP, and greatly expanded the
The author thanks the anonymous referee for valuable comments and proposals that had elicited criticism in the EDDP. While the
suggestions to an earlier draft of this paper.
earlier plan was criticised for being builder-friendly, the devel-
Hussain Indorewala ([email protected] ) teaches at opment rules of the revised plan were drafted by the planning
KRVIA, Mumbai.
authority in close consultation with the city’s most entrenched
48 december 24, 2022 vol lVii no 52 EPW Economic & Political Weekly
 SPECIAL ARTICLE

lobby for property developers—the Practising Engineers and selective and differentiated elevation of land values, a practice
Architects and Town Planners Association (PEATA). While that is threatened by any programme of extensive regulation
social justice and environmental groups formed the most vocal as well as deregulation.
and visible civil society opposition to Mumbai’s 2015 plan, the In this paper, I argue that a key factor behind the scrapping
most influential (albeit behind the scenes) actors were the of the EDDP 2015 was its reform of Regulation 33 (or DCR33) of
various organisations that represent the interests of the city’s the 1991 Development Plan that prescribes incentive FSI and
real-estate industry. As the authors of the EDDP defended their relaxations to development controls, for redevelopment pro-
planning ideas and civil society groups spent their time and jects undertaken under the regulation.2 Although introduced
energy in debating and critiquing them, what was forgotten in the 1991 plan, as exemptions for specific public uses and
was that urban planning in Mumbai is organised to serve not welfare measures within the framework of containment, the
growth or welfare, but to serve the property industry in maxi- DCR33 now defines a general modality of incentive-extractive
mising their return on investment. The planners of the EDDP planning. Through this public authorities incentivise inflated
aimed to reform Mumbai’s planning by offering an abstract schemes to extract a share of the developer’s profits (in the
(neo-liberal) economic justification for a wholesale liberalisa- form of revenue as well as built space) in order to generate in-
tion of the city’s restrictive development regime. Civil society frastructure for public use. In other words, the DCR33 chapter
groups challenged this market-oriented conception of city was introduced in the 1991 plan as an exception. However,
planning and sought to restrict the scope of real-estate specu- over the years, it has expanded to become the core of planning
lation. Nevertheless, both of these groups failed to recognise in Mumbai. Crucially, while the Constitution envisions urban
that the aim of Mumbai’s current development planning regime planning as a function of local government, the DCR33 has
is not to restrict or expand growth and production per se, but a grown over the years through an estimated 44 amendments,3

Table 1: DCR33—‘Additional Floor Space Index Which May be Allowed in Certain Categories’
Category 1991 Plan’s DCRs 2018 RDP’s DPCRs*
33(1) Road widening/new roads Religious buildings
33(2) Public educational, medical and institutional buildings Public and private educational, medical and institutional buildings
33(3) Government/semi-government offices Government/semi-government offices on public or private land anywhere in the city
(only in the suburbs and extended suburbs)
33(4) Starred category residential hotels Any kind of residential hotels anywhere in the city
(only in the suburbs and extended suburbs)
33(5) Reconstruction of low-cost housing schemes of MHADA Development/Redevelopment of any MHADA housing schemes
33(6) Reconstruction of buildings destroyed by fire or Reconstruction of buildings destroyed by fire or which have collapsed or which have
which have collapsed or which have been demolished been demolished
33(7) Reconstruction of cooperatively owned cessed buildings Reconstruction or redevelopment of cooperatively owned cessed buildings, old
or old MCGM buildings MCGM buildings, dilapidated buildings or any other residential housing societies
33(8) Housing for those dishoused in the island city Affordable housing in special development zone (SDZ) [earlier called
for implementation of the development plan no development zone (NDZ)]
33(9) Repairs and reconstruction of cessed buildings and Reconstruction/redevelopment of clusters of buildings under cluster development
urban renewal schemes (by MHADA) schemes by public and/or private agencies, with special provisions for Dharavi and BDD Chawls
33(10) Rehabilitation of slum dwellers Redevelopment for rehabilitation of slum dwellers with special provisions for
Dharavi [33(10)(A)]
33(11) Sites and services schemes under the Urban Land Permanent transit tenements for slum rehabilitation scheme
(Ceiling and Regulations) Act
33(12) MHADA developments undertaken with World Bank assistance Redevelopment of contravening structures in town planning (TP) scheme plots and layouts
33(13) Resettlement and rehabilitation of project affected persons Buildings of (any) information technology establishments and “Smart Fin Tech Centre”
[33(13)(A)]
33(14) Redevelopment of contravening structures in Shifting of cattle sheds in the suburbs outside Greater Mumbai
town planning scheme plots
33(15) Redevelopment/reconstruction of contravening structures in Development of land earmarked for the MHADA/mill workers housing
town planning scheme layouts
33(16) Information technology establishments (software only) Reconstruction/redevelopment of urban villages
33(17) Biotechnology establishments
33(18) Development of multistorey public parking lots
33(19) Commercial buildings in central business district (CBD) or for plots within residential or
commercial zones
33(20) Affordable housing (AF), rehabilitation and resettlement (R&R)
33(21) Development and redevelopment of municipal market/public amenities by MCGM/
government
33(22) Exhibition-cum-convention centres
33(23) Transit oriented development [to be detailed]
This table compares the classificatory structure of Regulation 33 (the various development categories that can avail FSI “incentives” as well as “relaxations” in building and planning
norms), as first introduced in the 1991 plan with the current RDP 2016. Apart from the expansion of the scope and general increase in FSI and TDR, the various provisions have also changed
substantively (indicated as italics) as those that allowed exemptions for public uses, specific institutions and housing the poor, to those that now incentivise redevelopment generally.
*Development Control Regulations (DCR) in the 1991 plan were renamed Development Control and Promotion Regulations (DCPR) in 2016.

Economic & Political Weekly EPW december 24, 2022 vol lVii no 52 49
SPECIAL ARTICLE

issued by the urban development department (UDD) of the real-estate capital shapes urban space and common sense of
state government, which the MCGM has dutifully adopted. urban politics in Mumbai.
The EDDP valiantly sought to reduce the scope of this incen-
tive-extractive modality of the 1991 planning regulations. Planning Mumbai: The Evolution of the DCR33
The RDP reinstated the framework and approach of the Urban planners believe that the central concern of their work is
1991 plan, including land use reservations, zoning structure, the utilitarian dimensions of land use rather than the distribu-
and extending the scope of the labyrinthine and loop-holed tive problems of property and ownership (Krueckeberg 1995).
DCR33 (Table 1, p 48).4 Therefore, the junking of the EDDP, Nevertheless, the way property is defined, the rights that it
justified in the name of correcting mapping errors, must be accrues to owners, and the way it is distributed, are affected by
seen as the state government’s reassertion of control over the planning and its outcomes. Although land is often conceived as
city’s planning process. any other commodity, it is unique in that it is a fundamental basis
The Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning (MRTP) Act for all economic activity. It is immobile and naturally scarce,
of 1966 mandates preparation of 20-year development plans. It therefore, inherently prone to externalities (Ryan-Collins et al
requires development plans to include public use facilities and 2017: 4). Hence, private ownership of land is the cause of a
building regulations in addition to zoning, proposals for trans- range of problems (such as economic rent, or coordination of
port, sanitation, flood control, water supply infrastructure, economic activities) that necessitates planning. However,
utilities, and pollution control. However, since the 1970s and property also constitutes a constraint on planning since it
1980s, development planning debates have been centred almost involves impinging on the rights of private owners. Land is a
entirely around land use and development control rules social resource as well as a private right. Therefore, planning can
(DCR s) (Phatak and Patel 2015). Apart from the numerous be understood as a response to what Fogelsong (1986) calls the
modifications by the state government to the DCR s, multiple property contradiction of capitalist urbanisation: the contra-
state and central government parastatal agencies operate in diction between “the social character of land and its private
the city with their own plans and projects that act indepen- ownership and control.” While the rules that govern the insti-
dently, often in contravention to the 20-year plan. Even in tution of property are essentially political, the reasons for state
terms of planning territory, parts of the city’s land are intervention in property markets (planning) are subject to
planned by different authorities. In effect, Mumbai’s planning political pressures and have varied historically. In Mumbai, for
system is institutionally balkanised (Patel 2014) and function- instance, the earliest planning interventions were driven by
ally fragmented. The development plan has come to represent sanitary concerns that sought to regulate quality and condi-
little beyond the rules, tools and categories that govern land tions of the built environment. The Bombay Town Planning
and property development. Act of 1915 was introduced as a mechanism to assemble and
An examination of the often acrimonious debates over convert agricultural land to urban use in collaboration with
the latest development plan, which lasted almost 10 years, (often speculative) landowners. In the late 1940s, rent controls
provides a glimpse into the various actors and interests that were introduced to protect tenants from evictions. In the post-
shape land-use planning in Mumbai. My own involvement as independence decades, concerns about haphazard urbanisa-
a researcher-activist in these debates began in 2012, after the tion and environmental degradation led to zoning regulations
existing land use survey was released for public suggestions that imposed limits on development intensity in certain areas.
and objections, and lasted till the revised plan was sanctioned Nevertheless, even among and within the various strands of
in 2018. I was a part of a coalition of activists, academics and capital, the demand for and response to specific planning inter-
non-governmental organisations (NGOs) called Hamara Shehar ventions are contested and contingent. For instance, the sanitary
Mumbai Abhiyan (our city Mumbai campaign) that filed regulations and state built housing introduced in early 20th-
numerous responses to the planning proposals, suggested century Mumbai was endorsed by industrial capital, but resisted
alternative approaches, participated in consultations organised by landowners as a “confiscation of [their] property” (Indorewala
by various institutions, organised meetings with communi- 2018). Or for that matter, the proposal of how to recycle Mumbai’s
ties and planning officials, and published critical commen- mill lands in the 1990s differed between sections of the city’s
taries in the popular press. This six-year-long engagement elite and real-estate interests (Balakrishnan 2004).
with the city’s planning process has informed the reflections Thus, the idea that land use planning is a technical quest for
in this paper. In what follows, we will first look briefly at the maximising utility that has little to do with the politics of
evolution of planning in the city in the post-independence pe- distribution is pure mystification, often used to sidetrack
riod and the gradual transition from a command-and-control progressive critics. In cities, the value of land parcels almost
regulatory regime to a market-based planning one, especially entirely depends on what can legally be built on it (Ryan-Collins
the growing role and influence of DCR33. The background et al 2017: 32). Therefore, the extent to which land is commod-
will then be followed by a comparative analysis of the two ified is a matter of degree, determined by the various planning
iterations of the latest plan (the overturned EDDP and the regulations that govern it. Planning interventions, by allowing
sanctioned RDP). I argue that while the two plans diverged in or disallowing specific uses, imposing reasonable restrictions
their arguments and technicalities, both embody a model on development intensity or built form, limit the ability of
of market rationality. They represent the extent to which landowners to externalise costs and internalise benefits. On
50 december 24, 2022 vol lVii no 52 EPW Economic & Political Weekly
 SPECIAL ARTICLE

the other hand, through diminution of regulations, up-zoning, second development plan was initiated. It was during this
and infrastructure investments, planners can facilitate increase period that organisations representing the city’s landowners
in rents, revenue streams, and investment opportunities. In and developers strengthened their ties with the development
other words, planning has the power to erode or entrench the planning wing of the municipal government. In particular,
commodity value of land, either by protecting or rendering the PEATA’s innovations in policy practices and experiments
vulnerable all those who depend on land for personal use, carried out in the shadows of the local government began to
from those who seek the right to profit from land. appear as formal planning rules (Nainan 2012: 78, 100). For
The first planning legislation in Bombay was the Town Plan- instance, one such experiment involved senior planning
ning Act of 1915, which was shaped by colonial-era concerns officials and a prominent builder, where the latter was al-
of land-use change, land assembly and adjustment (without lowed to use floating FSI (transferring development rights to
acquisition) and sanitary improvements. When the act was another plot) for profit.6 The “scheme” was declared unau-
amended in 1954, the scope of planning was enlarged to enable thorised, but the idea eventually took roots as the transfera-
preparation of master plans for the whole city. Drawing mainly ble development right (TDR) instrument in Mumbai’s plan-
from the British planning system, post-independence planning ning system (Nainan 2012: 83).7
was based on the acceptance of a mixed economy, where an In the 1980s, the system of mutual benefit through granting
enlarged public sector would coexist with markets, balancing exemptions to the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act
public and private interests by retaining private ownership (ULCRA) had strengthened the relationship between real-estate
rights in land and property (property was a fundamental right players and the state government; however, the state govern-
between 1950 and 1978), while the state would regulate the ment expanded its control over the institutions of urban
market by its control over development rights (Taylor 1998: 22). development (Nainan 2012: 79). During the preparation of the
Although land could be privately owned, the right to develop second development plan in the mid-1980s, a major scandal
land was socialised. In practice, this would mean that land- erupted when the MCGM’s Planning Committee that was meant
owners and developers would need to seek planning permis- to hear public suggestions and objections to the draft plan
sion for construction or change in land use and adhere to the deleted 1,380 public use reservations to favour landowners. A
regulations set by the planning authority. It was with the 1964 committee of senior state government administrators and
development plan that, for the first time, planners moved away planners called the D’Souza Committee was set up to investi-
from the volumetric controls on buildings (such as setbacks gate charges of corruption. It rejected the deletions. However,
and building height limits). They adopted a numerical ratio to instead of penalising the bargains struck between the Plan-
control development intensity, linking permitted buildable ning Committee and landowners, it recommended the imple-
area with the area of the plot. Like the earlier method, this mentation of reservations by adopting accommodation reser-
concept of FSI was meant to “limit concentration of people vation and widening the application of TDR as an escape route
and their activities, thereby limiting the loads on traffic, util- from compulsory acquisition (Nainan 2012: 89−90). The
ity and social services” (BMC 1964: 147). FSI allocation in the accommodation reservation instrument is a form of value re-
city was variably based on an assessment of infrastructure capture that allows a landowner who surrenders a part of their
and utility demand, existing development characteristics, liv- land or built space to the government for public use, to use
ing space standards, and desired limits on population growth the development rights of the entire plot on the part retained.
(BMC 1964: 147−50).5 Like TDR, accommodation reservation began as an irregular
In the dense bazaar areas of the island city, where many practice, but was soon formalised as a planning instrument. As
buildings were rent-controlled, the FSI prescribed (2.0) was Nainan (2012: 89) points out, the D’Souza Committee’s admini-
generally lower than the existing development with the strators echoed the views of the state government that the city
expectation that redevelopment would reduce density and must enable private participation and liberalisation of the FSI
improve neighbourhood quality. In 1969, an exemption was regime and forgo the misguided pursuit of controlling growth.
granted when the Bombay Repairs and Reconstruction Board It must be noted that all of these interventions took place
was formed to undertake maintenance of dilapidated rent- during a period of political flux in Maharashtra, where Chief
controlled buildings (Phatak 2007: 47). This was the first de- Minister Sharad Pawar emerged as a dominant political leader.
viation granted to a class of buildings defined by another As a representative of the landowning and industrial classes,
scheme (rent control), afflicted by an undesirable condition he emerged as the forerunner of economic (and land policy)
(dilapidated) and a responsibility of another authority liberalisation in the state well before the rest of the country
(Repairs Board). However, in this case, the relaxation to FSI caught on. In 1989, Pawar himself deleted 285 reservations in
was for reconstruction, to accommodate existing tenants. It the development plan (mainly on the land belonging to large
did not deviate as such from the goal of the plan to restrict landowners listed under the ULCRA), granted permissions to
population growth. In the 1970s, FSI began to be offered as mill-owners to use surplus land for commercial and residential
compensation to landowners, for surrendering land for build- developments, and oversaw the change of zoning of 10,000
ing or widening roads (Phatak 2007: 47; Nainan 2012: 90). hectares of agricultural land to urban land in the northern
The biggest shifts with respect to development rights began suburbs of Vasai–Virar resulting in a windfall for speculators
in the mid-1970s and 1980s, just as the preparation for the (ToI 1990; Mishra 1991; Nainan 2012: 87).
Economic & Political Weekly EPW december 24, 2022 vol lVii no 52 51
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Come 1991, the second development plan was sanctioned8 to sit in the aisles to watch PEATA’s presentations on different
after 14 years of haggling. The final result was characterised aspects of the new regulations. Since its release, the narrative
as “the best hotchpotch possible” by the then urban develop- in the media about the EDDP was that it was builder-friendly,
ment secretary, D T Joseph (Fernandes 1991). It was a curious mainly due to the new zoning structure that increased FSI
mixture of containment and liberalisation: consisting of broad from the earlier 1.33 (island city) and 1.0 (suburbs), to variable
zoning regulations such as the no development zone (NDZ) and zones assigned FSI of 2.0, 3.5, 5.0 and 8.0 based on their prox-
zonal FSI that was lower than the 1967 plan. On the other imity to infrastructure corridors. Since FSI increases benefit
hand, it adopted a regime of FSI exemptions, regulatory builders, these new FSI zones were criticised by activists as an
relaxations, and market-based instruments such as accommo- unprecedented gift to the real-estate industry. Even the EDDP
dation reservation and TDR, now relying on landowners and planners expected the market to welcome their new liberal FSI
developers for the implementation of the plan. The DCR33 regime with open arms. However, the mood in the PEATA
(additional FSI) was born with 16 subsections. Many of these workshop was not one of elation but irritation. As the presen-
were for reconstruction or redevelopment of different categories tations revealed, the so-called increase in FSI was in fact a de-
of settlements defined by a separate scheme or a function of a crease in many cases, and the PEATA spokespeople grumbled
different authority (Table 1). What crystallised in this period about the planners trampling all over their expectations. They
was the close entanglement of the government’s interests with complained that the EDDP was not as friendly as the so-called
those of the property industry. The political class henceforth restrictive 1991 regulations (Table 3, p 53).
started achieving its electoral goals by offering more conces- Behind this seeming paradox was the EDDP’s attempt to
sions to the city’s builders. The most striking illustration of reform the incentive approach of the 1991 regulations. First,
this was Bal Thackeray’s 1995 election campaign promising the EDDP significantly cut down the scope of DCR33 to allow
free houses to the city’s slum dwellers. When elected to power, incentive FSI in only four redevelopment categories: cessed
the Shiv Sena government sought to implement the new buildings, slums, urban renewal schemes, and MHADA buildings
scheme in partnership with developers, without burdening its (Table 2). Although the EDDP increased FSI values across the
finances, and through a judicious utilisation of land values board, it proposed that FSI zones would indicate an upper limit,
(Afzulpurkar 1995: 2). where all built-up areas would be included in the computation
Therefore, it is more appropriate to characterise development of FSI, including areas hitherto considered exempt from FSI
planning in Mumbai since the 1980s as a collection of develop- computation (such as service areas, circulation areas and com-
ment schemes structured into an elaborate development mon amenities). This was a major change from the then preva-
taxonomy. It referred to one or more factors such as settle- lent practice of FSI as being the basic minimum, allowing the
ment conditions, settlement function, planning/development limit to be breached through various incentives and exemp-
agency, landownership, land-use zone, or even some prior tions. For example, as per the 1991 regulations, an open plot in
policy or regulation, each carrying its own set of regulations, the suburbs had a permissible FSI of 1.0, but developers could
entitlements and incentives. There is no coordination between add 100% TDR and buy 35% premium (or fungible FSI), which
these schemes, or any assessment of their particular or cumu- would result in an effective (saleable) FSI of 2.70. In effect, de-
lative impacts on the city. A “slum redevelopment scheme” in velopers could buy the right to build an additional 1.7 times the
the language of Mumbai’s development actors offers a unique plot area, beyond the base FSI. Furthermore, the regulations
set of risks and opportunities and demands a specific set of also exempted some features, such as service areas, circula-
skills and expertise. Therefore, any change in the rules that tion areas and common amenities from FSI computation, im-
govern this scheme is evaluated by them in cost and benefit plying that the developers could build these features without
terms with reference to the existing scheme. Over the decades, having to buy the rights to do so. On the other hand, the same
a complex network of transactional relationships between plot, if developed in the 3.5 FSI zone under the EDDP regula-
public agencies, liaisons and private firms, and any reform tions, would result in only 2.45 times the plot area as saleable
that threatens to alter these relationships without a corre- Table 2: Special DCRs (SDCR) of the 2015 EDDP
sponding increase in gains, is likely to be resisted around this Category Purpose Incentive FSI
development taxonomy. It is with this context in mind that we SDCR 1 Redevelopment of cessed buildings Yes
now examine the controversial EDDP that was released in 2015, SDCR 2 Redevelopment of cluster(s) of buildings under
urban renewal scheme(s) Yes
and the RDP that eventually replaced it.
SDCR 3 Redevelopment of existing housing schemes of MHADA Yes
SDCR 4 Redevelopment of slums through owners/developers/
The EDDP 2015 cooperative housing societies Yes
Twenty days after the EDDP was published for public sugges- SDCR 5 Development or redevelopment of lands of cotton
tions and objections, on 18 March 2015, the PEATA organised a textile mills No
workshop called Unlock Draft DP/DC Regulation 2034. Unlike SDCR 6 Conservation of heritage No
SDCR 7 Special DCRs for streetscapes No
the numerous workshops organised by other civil society The EDDP’s SDCRs allowed incentive FSI only for those buildings that required rehabilitation
groups in the city to discuss the EDDP, this one was attended by of existing tenants. The maximum permissible built up area on the plot would be based on
the zonal FSI (and not scheme-by-scheme as in the case of the 1991 and 2018 DP). In cases
the MCGM planners. Every seat in the 800-seat auditorium was where the rehabilitation area and incentive area exceeds the zonal FSI limit, the surplus
taken by the city’s architects, engineers and builders. Many had would be granted in the form of TDR.

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space, while the remaining FSI would be consumed in circula- plan through a lens that is not coloured by the ruling axioms”
tion and services. In other words, 3.5 in EDDP was equivalent (MCGM 2015: 243). Instead of distorting the market through
to 2.45 in the prevalent regulations, less than what the 1991 state intervention, the development plan ought to be “a frame-
DCRs allowed. Another example explained by PEATA members work within which the market [can] function competitively to
showed that a redevelopment project under Regulation 33(7) respond to demands” (MCGM 2015: 243). At times, the rhetoric
in the island city could yield a saleable FSI of 6.5 under the posited the craftiness of the market against the folly of the
1991 regulations but 4.0 under the EDDP regulations (Table 3 planners. The report said that the long list of FSI exemptions
for details). The discontinuation of scheme-wise FSI alloca- in the 1991 plan was, “cunningly used by the market to bypass
tion (as in DCR33) as well as the reversal of FSI-exempt fea- the pernicious FSI control” (MCGM 2015: 308). For the drafters
tures irked the speakers who accused the MCGM of making of the EDDP, the city’s planning system was shaped not by a
money by charging premiums on FSI.9 PEATA was quick to particular configuration of institutional role, or the grip of
point out that the FSI value may be higher in the EDDP, but the powerful groups over decision-making, or even the politics of
saleable built-up area for developers had effectively reduced influence and accommodation, but by the foolhardy attempt
and the cost of acquiring development rights had increased. of planners to restrain the market. These sociologically naive
Almost every presentation in the workshop was a mundane abstractions obscure the multiple identities and roles that de-
comparative accounting of how much can be built, bought, velopment actors assume. They impact the web of relation-
sold, and made. The message was clear: the builders and ships between officials and private actors or government
liaisons were unhappy with the new plan. As one speaker tell- agencies and industry lobbies. Thus, they also impact the ex-
ingly remarked, “if the pie is not edible, we have to throw it tent of regulatory capture of the planning process. It became
out and cook a new pie.” clear that the EDDP was railing against a planning system that
Table 3: Comparison of Permissible Buildable Areas as per Regulation was far from being prescriptive, deterministic or restrictive. It
33(7) of 1991 versus the EDDP * was battling an imaginary ideological adversary rather than
1991 DCRs as per Regulation 33(7) EDDP DCRs a real one. The EDDP was an elaborate neo-liberal argument
Parameter Value Parameter Value
(sq m) (sq m) against conventional planning in a city where planning in the
Assume plot area 1,500 Assume plot area 1,500 conventional sense has almost ceased to exist.
Assume rehab carpet area 4,000 Assume rehab carpet area 4,000 Nevertheless, in its specifics, the EDDP introduced many
Rehab buildable area 4,800 Rehab buildable area 5,600 useful ideas such as disaggregation of the planning area into
[20% carpet area] [40% carpet area]
planning sectors, multi-tiered planning, integration of trans-
Incentive FSI 2,400 Incentive FSI 2,797.5
[50% of buildable area] [based on formula linked port and land use, simplification of FSI computation, and re-
to land cost] striction on parking along mass-transit corridors (Indorewala
Fungible FSI 2,520 and Wagh 2016; Patel 2015). However, the EDDP planners’
[35% of incentive + rehab]
framing and justifications was perceived by civil society
total built-up area 9,720 total built-up area 8,397.5
[fungible + incentive + rehab] [incentive + rehab]
groups as a political programme that sought to entrench rather
Permissible area as per FSI zone 5 7,500 than deviate from the status quo. City dwellers often unrealis-
[plot area x 5.0] tically expect the planning system to solve all the city’s
TDR for developer 897 problems. However, the EDDP lectured that planning ought to
[combined – permissible]
do little beyond responding to current trends and market
Circulation areas (free of FSI) 1,944 Circulation areas (included in FSI) 1,500
[20% of total built-up] [20% of permissible built-up]
forces. The result was a public relations debacle, and the
total saleable area 9,720 total saleable area** 6,000 widespread commotion that followed the release of the EDDP,
[total built-up] [total built-up - circulation] allowing the state government to step in and overturn the
FSI on site 7.8 FSI on site 5.0 plan in April 2015.
[total+circulation]/plot area [permissible]/plot area
FSI of saleable area on site 6.5 FSI of saleable area on site 4.0 The RDP 2018
[total saleable/plot area] [total saleable/plot area]
* For a hypothetical plot in Lower Parel, based on a calculation made by PEATA on 18 March 2015. A few days later, the municipal commissioner, Sitaram Kunte,
DCR33(7) facilitates redevelopment of cessed buildings in the island city. was replaced by Ajoy Mehta, allegedly over the development
** Saleable area is what developers sell to flat buyers. Since circulation areas were not
free of FSI in the EDDP, developers saw it as a cost of development. Even though TDR was plan disaster (HT 2015c). Ramanath Jha, a retired bureaucrat,
offered, the returns were seen as much less than what could be built on-site as per the was appointed as an OSD to oversee the plan revision process.
1991 regulations.
In the next few months, the MCGM consulted industry repre-
The EDDP’s explanatory report was highly critical of the re- sentatives to formulate planning proposals, and patiently heard
strictive planning approach in Mumbai. The EDDP was hacking and accommodated the reasonable concerns of NGOs. The
away at a straw man: “planners cannot accurately anticipate EDDP’s proposals were cherry-picked and incorporated into
[the future] and should therefore digress from formulating the 1991 plan’s land-use proposals and regulations. The pro-
over deterministic and prescriptive plans” (MCGM 2015: 257); gressive ideas listed above were dropped, and the regime of
a “restrictive development control regime affects competitive- incentives and exemptions was expanded scheme by scheme,
ness and inclusivity” by creating a “scarcity of development with new ones added. The RDP was released in parts between
rights” (MCGM 2015: 243). Readers were urged to “see [the] 2015 and 2016, after fulfilling the requisite formalities of
Economic & Political Weekly EPW december 24, 2022 vol lVii no 52 53
SPECIAL ARTICLE

hearing public suggestions and objections,10 sanctioned in can be done by offering incentives to developers to assemble
parts between 2016 and 2018. large parcels of land in the erstwhile NDZ areas. These are
After the draft of the revised plan was completed, in now reclassified as special development zones (SDZs). A share
June 2016, the PEATA organised another workshop, this time of the development needs to be handed over to the MCGM in
in a bigger auditorium. The mood was upbeat and municipal the form of smaller affordable units.
commissioner Mehta himself graced the occasion. The conve- It is evident that all the creative accounting and nomencla-
nor of the meeting explained that this time they did not title ture of the RDP report has little to do with the needs and
the workshop unlock DCRs because now “the old key will work demands of the residents. What is proposed is that residential
... the 1991 DC rules have not changed, it is an upgraded and commercial units are for investment, of great value even
version.” The municipal commissioner was profusely thanked when they lie vacant. What is called development planning in
for his leadership. The convenor pointed out that, “everything Mumbai is a collection of real-estate schemes, each designed
[the Commissioner] has done, he has always called PEATA.” to manipulate land values and increase gains for the property
He also candidly admitted that new regulations, titled Devel- industry, with state agencies grabbing a share of the developer’s
opment Control and Promotion Regulations (DCPR s), were profits for the achievement of some public policy goal. It has
written by the engineers of the MCGM’s building proposal evolved into a system where the coalesced interests of state and
department with the concerns of builders in mind. In the pre- capital seek to maximise development surplus and intensity
sentations that followed, this body of professional architects, while driving down costs on development, costs being public
engineers and town planners scrutinised the new regulations health and safety, environmental protections and social needs.
not in terms of public health, safety or equity, but in terms The development plan provides the framework for a managed
of benefits to developers. In one revealing presentation on fire increase in supply of urban land through reclassification and
safety regulations, the speaker compared the provisions of redevelopment, and to provide incentives and exemptions to
the 1991, 2015 and 2016 regulations. The 1991 DCR s stipulated satisfy the (evergrowing) appetite of the real-estate industry.
a 9 metre open space on one side of the building, less than It has turned into an instrument that feeds off the city’s exist-
24 storeys high, and on both sides for buildings more than ing inequalities and formalises them through a continuous
24 storeys high. The 2015 regulations had relaxed this to downward spiral of spatial segregation and living standards:
6 metres on any one side for all buildings. The 2016 DCPR s high densities of living, poor building standards, and environ-
(had perhaps unwittingly) reverted to the 1991 stipulations. mental degradation. Development planning in Mumbai
But, since the 2015 regulations were more lucrative, the emerged as the means to improve health, safety and environ-
speaker demanded that the more diluted provision of the mental well-being of its inhabitants. It now produces the very
scrapped plan be brought back. The sanctioned plan shows conditions it was tasked to prevent.
that the demand was accepted.
The RDP’s major innovation lies in its population forecast. In Conclusion
The EDDP’s forecast of population growth from the existing The development plan process provides a glimpse into the
12.44 million to 12.95 million in 2034 was revised by the RDP to divergent values and interests of powerful groups in the city.
11.4 million in 2034. A lower population estimate made the per It tells us how these interests are coordinated and reconciled.
capita open space and amenity provisions seem more respect- The process of drafting the latest plan suggests the extent to
able than the EDDP. One of the main objectives of the 1967 and which real-estate shapes the conceptual tools of urban
1991 development plans was to restrict Mumbai’s population planning and policy. When released in 2015, the EDDP’s mar-
growth through planning controls. The RDP 2018 in contrast ket-oriented conception of planning triggered a hostile
assumes that population trends are unaffected by planning public response, creating an opportunity for the state govern-
proposals. An example of this is the RDP plans to create 8 million ment to wrest control of a local planning process and to
office jobs in Mumbai by 2034. It is well understood that reinstate a system that was more advantageous to the
migration to urban agglomerations is directly linked to real-estate industry. The various NGO groups that participat-
economic factors, and employment is the main reason for ed in public debates as well as in invited forums were
immigration into Mumbai (Indorewala and Wagh 2016). The deftly managed and co-opted during the revision process.
RDP also plans to build 1 million affordable housing units dur- The RDP has even included a chapter in its report titled, “So-
ing the plan period by adding another scheme to DCR33, in cial Equity,” that was specifically meant to placate NGOs.11
addition to all the units produced through redevelopment. In Some NGOs were even offered pilot projects to assist the
other words, the RDP assumes that Mumbai’s population will MCGM achieve the goal of an inclusive city. On the other hand,
decline despite the creation of new jobs and new housing. But demands of urban poor groups that were mandated by law,
how will these new jobs be created? The answer, incredibly, such as mapping of street markets and provision of vending
is more FSI. The rationalisation is as follows. Each new job zones, were ignored by the MCGM. If planning is a form of
requires 12 square metre (sq m) of commercial space, there- social action in a context of competing values, and plans are
fore 8 million jobs would require 96 million sq m, divided by in essence political programmes, Mumbai’s latest develop-
available land gives an FSI of five for commercial develop- ment plan is a political programme of profiting from urban
ments. How will the new affordable housing be created? This land. In Mumbai, real estate rules.
54 december 24, 2022 vol lVii no 52 EPW Economic & Political Weekly
 SPECIAL ARTICLE

notes 10 The Planning Committee heard the suggestions Indorewala, Hussain (2018): “Resettling the City:
and objections of government organisations, Discriminatory Planning and Environmental
1 The Mumbai Metropolitan Region Develop- VIPs, private institutions and NGOs towards Deregulation in Mumbai,” KRVIA+BINUCOM.
ment Authority, a para-statal agency that also the end of 2016. The committee worked over- Indorewala, Hussain and Shweta Wagh (2016):
prepares regional plans for the city region. time to hear the property lobby (associations of “Mumbai’s Planners Propose Ingenious Way to
2 Historically, Mumbai’s Development Plans have propetry owners, developers, and architect- Create More Open Space: Just Change the
been published as a set of three documents: engineers such as PEATA, NARDECO, MCHI- Definition,” Scroll.in, 29 July.
Proposed Land Use (PLUs) maps, a Develop- CREDAI, etc) who were given a full day of hear- Krueckeberg, Donald (1995): “The Difficult Charac-
ment Control Rules (DCR) handbook, and a ing from 10.30 am to 8.30 pm. ter of Property: To Whom Do Things Belong?”
planning report that explains the rationale 11 The social equity provisions included space al- Journal of the American Planning Association,
behind the various proposals. location for working women, and institutional Vol 61, No 3, pp 301−09.
3 The 1991 regulations are published on the MCGM and building design guidelines the elderly and
MCGM (2015): Report on Draft Development Plan–
website with all its “track changes” visible. the physically handicapped.
2034, Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai.
4 As of 2018, the RDDP’s 402 page Development
Mishra, A (1991): “The Importance of Being Sharad
Control and Promotion Regulations (DCPR)
References Pawar,” Times of India, 30 June.
handbook consists of a total 70 regulations, of
which the DCR33, with 23 sub-sections alone, Afzulpurkar, Dinesh (1995): Program for the Reha- Nainan, Navtej (2012): “Lakshmi Raj: Shaping Spaces
takes up 129 pages. bilitation of Slum and Hutment Dwellers in in Post-industrial Mumbai-planning Instru-
Brihan Mumbai, Government of Maharashtra. ments and Development of Mumbai,” PhD thesis,
5 Central Business Districts and surrounding
Balakrishnan, S (2004): “City Bigwigs Want Sonia to University of Amsterdam.
areas were allowed the highest FSI (between
2.45–3.5), inner city areas were allowed less Halt Mill Land Sale,” Times of India, 18 December. Outlook (2015): “Sena Questions Time Frame
(2.0), and suburbs were allowed the least (1.0) BMC (1964): Report on the Development Plan for Granted for Fresh Development Plan,” Outlook
(BMC 1964: 154). Greater Bombay, Bombay Municipal Corporation. Magazine, 23 April.
6 The “concept” of floating FSI was first tried in Chitlangia, Risha (2016): “TOD Will Only Worsen Patel, Shirish (2014): “Balkanisation of Urban Plan-
1975. A controversial case of a builder (Baf-Hira) Congestion in Big Cities,” Times of India, ning,” Economic & Political Weekly, Vol 49,
who surrendered land in the north-western 19 October. No 28, pp 18−21.
suburb of Malad in lieu of FSI to be used in the Fernandes, A (1991): “DC Best of a Messy Job,” — (2015): “When Planning Becomes a Ritual,” Eco-
upper-income neighbourhoods in Bandra and Times of India, 4 March. nomic & Political Weekly, Vol 50, No 21, pp 69−73.
Khar. At that time, the price of land in Bandra Foglesong, Richard E (1986): Planning the Capitalist Phatak, Vidyadhar (2007): “Developing Land and
was five times that of Malad (ToI 1983). City: The Colonial Era to the 1920s, Princeton: Real Estate Markets,” Mumbai Reader 2007,
7 The TDR allows development rights to be “moved” Princeton University Press. Urban Design Research Institute.
to another plot if for some reason it could not be Hall, Peter (2012): Cities of Tomorrow, Oxford: Phatak, Vidyadhar and Shirish Patel (2015): “Would
consumed on the plot from which it originates. Blackwell Publishing. Decentralization Have Made a Difference?”
8 The ward level land-use plans were sanctioned HT (2015a): “Oppn Parties Hail Scrapping of Economic & Political Weekly, Vol 40, No 36.
between 1991 and 1993. Mumbai DP, Call It ‘Victory of the People,’” Ryan-Collins, Josh, Toby Lloyd and Laurie Macfarlane
9 The “premium” levied by the local authority can be Hindustan Times, 21 April. (2017): Rethinking the Economics of Land and
seen as a way of capturing some share of the land — (2015b): “Sena Leaders Oppose ‘Builder-friendly’ Housing, Zed Books.
value increase, and also a way to offset some of the DP,” Hindustan Times, 19 April. Taylor, Nigel (1998): Urban Planning Theory Since
impacts of the development. The insistence of — (2015c): “After Mumbai DP Disaster, Kunte Out, 1945, Sage.
developers on free FSI is essentially a demand Ajoy Mehta in as BMC Chief,” Hindustan Times, ToI (1990): “JD Urges Probe Into CM’s Hand in
for the private capture of unearned benefits. 27 April. Plots,” Times of India, 19 August.

THE INSTITUTE OF ECONOMIC GROWTH

The Institute is an autonomous research and training organization established in 1952. The Institute’s faculties work in several
areas of Economics, Sociology, and Demography. The Institute of Economic Growth (IEG), Delhi invites online applications for
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of Assistant Professor in a University, College or Accredited Research Institution/industry with a minimum of seven publications
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Economic & Political Weekly EPW december 24, 2022 vol lVii no 52 55