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 $6.50

THE GROWTH

AND DECLINE OF

THE CUBAN REPUBLlC

by Fulgencio Batista

Translated from the Spanish

by BIas M. Rocafort
Fulgencio Batista rose from abject poverty,
made incredible sacrifices to gain an education
and regarded Abraham Lincoln as his ido!. His
story of Cuba under his leadership is told here in
order to keep the record straight.
Written with restraint and a remarkable ab­
sence of personal bitterness, the Batista years, as
presented by their creator, offer a sharp contrast
to the Castro era which has followed. There can
be no question about which offered more oppor­
tunity or security to the average man and woman
in Cuba.
The book is a heavily documented, highly
FULCENCIO BAT ISTA was born January 16, 1901 a t Banes
factual record of the slow and successful struggle in Orienta Province. H e worked as a cane cult er, mechanic
of the Cuban people to advance from backward­ and sea les foreman in lh e suga r li e ld s; as a nreman,
ness to becoming the most advanced nation in brakeman and co nductor Oll the railroad; lhen as a store
c1erk untíl he pas'e d exam inations as a stenographer·'taff
Latin America with the highest per capita stand­ sergeant. Attainin g hi s edu ca tion at nights, he opened a
ard of living and the lowest rate of illiteracy. private tutorin g school , dealt in real eslate and farm pro·
du ce. rn 1931 he joined a patriotic organization opposed to
Pro-communist propaganda has depicted Presi­ United Sta tes int ervention in Cuba und er lhe Plan Amen d·
dent Batista as a brutal and dictatorial spokesman ment and on Sept. 1, 1933, he led th e "Revolution of the
Sergeants," and turn ed over government control to a
of reaction and his regime as one callous to the civilian Junta whieh subseq uently appointed him Chief oí
needs of the Cuban people. Readers of his book Armed Forees. In 1939 Batista 's government lost the election
willlearn that his government engineered a revo­ under th e new co nstilulion and he resigned írom the Army
to beco me a presid ential ca ndidate. He won the elections,
lution in public health and popular education, but in 1944, his party lost to DI'. Ramón Grau San Martín.
aided free trade unions, protected the Cuban Batista \Vas not a ca ndidate beca use th/' President could not
masses with a farftung social welfare system and be reelec ted under the provisions of the 1940 Constitution.
A.fter inaugurating lh e President Elect, in October 1944,
radically transformed the institutions of the is­ he leít Cuba for a tour oí Latin America. He then lived in
land so as to open wide the gates of opportunity exile at Oaytona Beach, Florida until he was elecled senalor
in absentia in 1948 and returned to Cuba. Then, 1952, he
for all Cubans. led a bloodless co up. He won the eleelions held in 1954.
Before inauguratin g lhe winning candidale in February
THE DEVIN·ADAIR COMPANY 1959, he was íorced to resign in favor of lhe Oean of lhe
Publishers Supreme Courl J usti ces ano immedialely thereafter Castro
forces took overo
23 East 26th Street, New York, N. Y.
THE GROWTH AND DECLINE
OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC

Fulgencio Batista

THE DEVIN-ADAIR COMPANY

New York 1964

BOOKS BY FULGENCIO BATISTA

Sombras de America
Respuesta
(Cuba Betrayed)
Piedras y Leyes
(The Growth & Decline of the Cuban Republic)
Paradojas
Translated from the Spanish
by BIas M. Rocafort
Copyright © 1964 by The Devin-Adair Company
All rights reserved. No portion of this
book may be reproduced in any form without
written permission from the publisher.
The Devin-Adair Co., 23 East 26th St., New York. 10010
except by a reviewer, who may quote brief passages
in connection with a review.
Canadian Agent; Abelard-Schuman Canada, Ltd., Toronto
Library of Congress Catalog card number: 64-23749
Manufactured in the United States of America
by H. Wolff, New York
 "You can fool all the people some of the time, and some of
the people all the lime, but you can not fool all the people aU
the time.

- ABR AHAM LINCOLN

Speech at Clinton. 8 September 1858.

Preface

The purpose of this book :is to present a buthful and factual ac-
count of the economic, social and political development of Cuba
during the quarter of a century between the overthrow of the
Machado Administration in 1933 and the conquest of my country
by Communist guile in 1959.
During seventeen of those twenty-five years (between 1933
and 1944 and again between 1952 and 1959), I had the privilege
and great responsibility of serving as the de facto or de jure Chief
of State.
For readily understandable reasons, this era has been consist-
ently maligned. Although public opinion in the United States is
deluged with statements about Cuba, it is misinfonned concern-
ing the progressive, forward-looking, socially conscious and dem-
ocratic society which Castro and his Communists assaulted and
eventually destroyed.
The study of history is not a useless pastime, but a means of
using the past as a guide to the future. Eventually, my country-
men will win freedom from their Communist oppressors and they
will then face the task of rebuilding a free and progressive society
on such £inn foundations that it can never again be subverted. To
achieve this, it is imperative that they understand that past, not
through the veil of propaganda, but as it actually was: "Ich will
bloss sagen wie es eigentlich gewesen m," as the great German
historian, Leopold Ranke, once put it. l
1 "I will merely state how it actually was."
 x Preface
This book is based, wherever possible, on official documents
and other unimpeachable sources. Although no Cuban can be
emotionally indifferent to the Calvary of his country, I have tried
in these pages to suppress emotions and rely on facts to persuade.
r trust that this work will show clearly that the fundamental
orientation of Cuba under my leadership was toward the welfare
of the people and particularly its underprivileged elements. I
shall show that the social legislation which we introduced, im-
plemented and enforced was, in many respects, the most progres-
sive and advanced of its kind in the Western Hemisphere. I shall
point out in detail how we established free clinics and free hospi-
tals throughout the Island, thereby almost entirely eliminating
the scourge of tuberculosis which had previously been rampant,
reducing infant and general mortality to minimum levels, vastly
improving the general health of the people and ameliorating pub.
lic health standards to such an extent that we were recognized as
outstanding by such entities as the World Health Organization.
The official records will also reveal the vast number of scb.ools
and other educational institutions constructed which transfonned
my countrymen from a sadly illiterate people into one of the best
educated in Latin America. By presenting easily verifiable statis·
tical data and other facts, I shall show that, although our oppo-
nents predicted that my social welfare program would bring
flnancial ruin to Cuba, the Island reached new peaks in industrial
output, mining, agriculture, gold and foreign excb.ange reserves,
per capita national income and the other basic indexes of eco-
nomic stability and progress. Largely because of faith in the sta-
bility and integrity of government, hundreds of millions of dollars
of foreign capital were invested in Cuba in the 1950s, creating
new industries and new jobs for skilled Cuban workers.
Both in war and in peace, we always collaborated with the
United States in its struggles to preserve freedom against the
twin totalitarian challenges of nazism and communism. Al-
though Cuba is a comparatively small country, we became one of
the largest importers of United States products in the world. To·
day, all this has been changed. Cuba is ranged with the totalitar-
ian bloc dedicated to burying America and the Cuban market is
closed to United States goods. The irony of it is that the United
States Government bears a large measure of responsibility for
feeding the cancer that is today killing Cuba and menacing the
United States.
 xi Preface

Without being too immodest, let me point out that, as early as

1952, I sounded a solemn warning to all the nations of the West-
ern Hemisphere concerning Communist penetration of the New
World, but unfortunately that warning went unheeded. In that
year of 1952, I severed diplomatic relations with the Soviet Un-
ion and thus my AdministTation and I became the special targets
of Communist hatred and Communist destructive force.
In the sphere of political thought, an amazing, almost unbe-
lievable. transfonnation began to occur, to gather momentum
and finally to sweep all opposing ideas out of its path. My Ad-
ministration, which had been correctly characterized as one that
combined democratic institutions and support of free enterprise
with bold and continual advances by the State in the areas of so-
cial welfare and support of the just demands of organized labor,
was labelled as a cruel, reactionary, semi-feudal despotism,! no-
torious for its "indifference to the needs of the people for educa-
tion, medical care, hOUSing, for social justice and economic op-
portunity . . ." s
The Communists had decided to employ, in Cuba as elsewhere,
the technique of the big lie. To justify the Castro assault on free
institutions, it was necessary to falsify recent Cuban history in
toto and to impose upon world opinion a characterization of Cu-
ba's Government and social institutions thoroughly at variance
with the facts , This was achieved. by repetition, by the planned
utilization of the gullible, the ignorant, the na"ive, the unscrupu-
lous, the perennial sympathizers with leftwing causes, the
thwarted, the psychic and physical cripples, the men of resent-
ment-choosing, of course, only those who sat in high places, And
as these lies were repeated, in some cases in innocence, in others
with guilt, the truth dissolved like a mirage. In the "'enlightened"
literary and political circles of the United States, a time came
when everybody "blew" that Cuba was a backward country and
a land of reactionary feudalism; that it frowned on social welfare,
suppressed the labor unions and modelled itself on Mussolini and
Hitler. The fact that an of this was nonsense, that it was refuted
by the published statistics, by the historic record and by the testi-
mony of unimpeachable contemporary witnesses carried little
2 Obviously, a dcspollim cannot be semi-feudal, because feudalistn implies
decentralization of power, though d~ntrallz.ation does not mean fcudal-
13m, but then the comrades are more teamed in villification than in history.
S United States State Department, While Paper on Cuba, April 19(31.
 xii Preface
weight. For ignorance and prejudice were in the saddle and had
no desire to look at the record and honestly examine the facts.
It would be fruitful for a competent historian to make a thor-
ough and dispassionate analysis of the successive stages and the
mechanics of this great deception. We would then learn how the
image of free Cuba in the mind of world public opinion was per-
verted, what forces were brought into action and how they oper-
ated. It would be a useful study because the Communists use
basically similar techniques to destroy free societies everywhere.
And to be infonned is to be anned.
I end this preface with a sad commentary. In March 1958,
when my Government purchased the military equipment it
needed to defend itself against the onslaught of Castro and his
Communists, delivery of this equipment was denied us by the
United States Government. At the same time, my Administration
and I were subjected to a concerted and savage assault, seem·
ingly coordinated, by some of the most influential publicists of the
press, radio and television of the Free World. A leading corre·
spondent of one of the most powerful newspapers in the United
States praised Fidel Castro to the skies and, by poisoning the
mind of the public, played an outstanding role in placing the
yoke of communism on the shoulders of my people.
The Western World is now reaping the harvest of the years of
sentimental illusions about the true nature of Soviet communism,
which has already brought the world to the edge of nuclear war
and which can destroy civilization forever.
Fulgencio Batista
EstoriI, Portugal.
June 1, 1964.
Contents

Preface ix

1 The Battle for Cuban Sovereignty 3

2 Reconstruction and Political Struggles LI

3 Rule by Gangsters 2S

4 Order Through Revolution 31

5 Steps Toward Democracy as

6 Pan American Relatio1l3 50

7 Maritime and Other Agreements 56

8 Trade Unions and Labor Legislation 61

9 The Challenge of Public Education 77

10 The Battle Against Epidemics 93

11 The Growth of Hospitals 102

12 Institutions of Public Welfare no

13 Fiscal Policy and Taxes ~22

14 The Public Debt ~30

15 Banking, Currency and National Income ~35

16 Financing Production, Foreign Trade and Fishing ~44

17 Land Reform and Rural Credit ~52

18 Aiding Crop and Livestock Production ~62

19 The Sugar Industry: From Chaos to Stability ~74

20 The Mining and Smelting Industries ~84

21 Beaches, Hotels and Tourism ~go

22 The Highway Construction Program '99

23 Maritime, Rail and Air Transport 2 05

24 Public Housing and Slum Clearance .,8

25 The Government Building Program 229

26 Electric Power and Industrial Development 238

27 Rebuilding Havana 247

28 The War Against Christianity 252

Epilogue: Slavery and Its Apologists 26~

Appendix: Autonomous Organizations 273

Statistical Appendix 276

Index 293
THE C"flOWTH AND DECLINE
OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC
 10
The Battle Against Epidemics

As a result of the n evolution of 1933, Cuba became the first

country in the world to create a Ministry with Cabinet status to
guard the health of its people.
One of the first organizations we created in this sphere was the
Technical Institute of Rural Sanitation (ITSR ). In short order,
we succeeded in eradicating such scourges as fr nmboesia,l 1be
Institute was engaged in a frontal assault on epidemics and also
concentrated on basic measures for the preservation of health in
the countryside. It emphasized what was called ..the sanitary
tripod of rural improvement": a waterproof cement £loor for
the Cuban peasant's traditional thatch-roofed hut, a hennetically
sealed water well with manual pump and a sanitary latrine, of
which tens of thousands were distributed gratis.
The other great organizational achievement of the year 1933 in
the public health area was the Malaria Commission, which car~
ned out sanitary works projects in cooperation with the Rocke£e1~
1er F oundation. In 1934, some 54,232 cases of malaria were re-
ported in Cuba. As the result of a vigorous campaign against the
Anopheles mosquito, the carrier of tbis disease, cases of mruaria
were reduced to 1,10:5 in 1940. A£ter the second revolution, that of
the lOth of March 1952, we launched a new program, sought out
the few remaining refuges of the Anopheles mosquito in the prov-
1 "A chronic contagious dL~ease peculiar to the Negro. snd characterized by
raspberry-like elrCl'eCenCeSi the yaws." The Oxford Eflgl~h Dictionary, 1961
printing.
 94 The Grou;th and Decline of the Cuban Repubtic
inces of Las Villas, Camagiiey and Oriente and eradicated these
last sources of contamination.

THE YELLOW FEVER MOSQUITO

Humanity is indebted to a Cuban for the discovery of the carrier

of yellow fever. Tbanks to tbe genius of Dr. Carlos Finlay, the
world was fiunny rid of this terrible scourge and civijjzation was
able to penetrate inhospitable tropical forests and launch such
mammoth enterprises as the Panama Canal.
An international agreement for tbe eradication of the yellow
fever carner, tbe Aedes Aegypti mosquito, was signed in 1953 be-.
tween our government and the Pan American Sanitary Bureau in
Washington. The immediate problem was to prevent a threat-
ened outward radiation of the Aedes Aegypti from its South Amer-
ican foci. We proceeded to increase sanitary supervision of all air-
ports and seaports and to carry the war to the most probable sites
of infection.
'When work was actually started in March 1954, it was assumed
that the infected area would comprise 30,888 square miles (80,·
000 1an2) of the nation's total area of 44,206 square mi1es-in
other words, two-thirds of the national terrain, A preliminary sur-
vey showed that, of 45,912 homes inspected. 9,699, or 21.1%. had
deposits of Aedes.
This showed. as we had suspected, that Cuba, due to her geo-
graphical position and to h er grea t volume of international trad e,
offered exceptionally favorable conditions for the spread of the
mosquito carrier.
In less than tw-o years, we reduced the index of infection to
6.41. This achievement was aU the more remarkable wben one
considers that the yellow fever virus could be found just a few
hours Bight from Cuban airports-in Mexico, Guatemala, Panama,
Columbia and Venezuela. The Government maintained stocks of
anti-yellow fever vaccine at all ports and airfields, to be given to
every person leaVing Cuba for any of the countries considered
dangerous from a yenow fever standpOint.
By September 1958. 1,361,605 houses had been inspected and
24,530,806 deposits and 75,187 breeding areas of Aei:1es discov-
ered. SoUle 835,550 houses with a total of 19,328,987 deposits were
sprayed.
 95 The Battle Against Epidemics
As a result, the national infection coefficient was again reduced
-to 5.5%-with the assurance that, in the forthcoming months,
there would be still further reduction. These percentages refer
only to the breeding grounds of the mosquito. Yellow fever had
previously been totally eliminated in Cuba.

THE PROBLEM OF POLIO

In 1944, my Administration completed the construction of a hos~

pital equipped specially for the treatment of polio. Despite evi~
dent need, this hospital was not put into service until many years
later, when it was named the Institute for Orthopedic Surgery.
Meantime, polio remained latent with only occasional outbreaks.
\Vhen 265 cases were reported in 1955, urgent measures had to
be taken. \Ve resorted to preventive measures which resulted in
a drop to 56 cases and only three deaths the following year. Dr.
Salk's vaccine had already brightened the horizon. We instituted a
free vaccination program and sought, as quickly as possible, to
immunize the majority of Cuban children.
The large number of aqueducts constructed by my adminis-
tration made a solid contribution to the eradication of typhoid
fever. During the last period of free Cuba, this disease ceased to
be a major health hazard. In 1955, 495 cases were reported; two
years later, there were only 187.
In 1957, Cuba was stricken with an influenza epidemic, but,
of 65,840 cases, only 12 deaths were reported. Hundreds of thou-
sands of people were vaccinated, with special attention given to
school children and other students.
We observed international quarantine regulations as scrupu-
lously as possible and this made Cuba the subject of favorable
comments throughout the world. In 1955, only six countries on
earth were exempt from quarantine measures of one sort or an-
other. I am proud to say that Cuba was one of them.
The National Commission for Smallpox Vaccination was created
in 1954 in cooperation with the Pan American Sanitary Bureau.
Vaccination was carried out systematically with the cooperation
of the Cuban people, who were convinced of its efficacy.
By agreement with the World Health Organization, the Inter-
national Vaccination Certificate became one of our institutions.
Moreover, in accordance with the provisions of the International
 96 The Growth and Decline of the Cuban Republic
Covenant on Rabies, we began to produce anti-rabies vaccine for
human and veterinary purposes and to make it available at cost
to the other countries and territories of the Antilles.
The improvement in sanitary conditions and the great strides
forward taken in public health were revealed by the following
figures for cases of contagious disease in Cuba, (a country of
6~630,921 inhabitants) for the mst six months of 1958:

Tuberculosis 589
TyphOid Fever 187
Diphtheria 85
Malaria 61
Gastroenteritis 57
Chickenpox 46
Leprosy 9
Polio 6
Scarlet Fever 4
Rabies 1

INSTITU'IE OF HYGIENE

The National Institute of Hygiene (INH) began operations to·

ward the close of my first Administration. It served as a central
laboratory for research and for the manufacture of prophylactic
and curative biological products. It soon showed splendid results
in diagnosis of rare contagious and infective diseases, in the cou·
trol of impure foods, drinks and medicines and in the control of
the manufacture of medicines and sera.
The powers of this Institute were circumscribed by the Auten-
tico administration, but, when I returned to power in 1952, I saw
that they were restored, particularly in the pure food area. The
Institute was encouraged to control standards for insecticides as
well as for antibiotics.
Reorganization of the Food Science and Biochemical Depart-
ments of the Institute improved the nutrition and public health
conditions of the nation. It was in these laboratories that the new
anti-smallpox vaccine was developed, in addition to the anti-
rabies vaccine, which Cuba had made available to the other na-
tions of this Continent.
The National Center for the Study of Viruses was established as
an annex to the Institute for specialized studies of virus diseases.
 97 The Battle Against Epidemics
It was given an excellent laboratory for the production of vaccines.
Between March 1952 and June 1958, the biological laboratories
of the National Institute of Hygiene manufactured the following
products:

Anti-typhus vaccine 2,819,861

Anti-parasite units (doses) 107,536
Distilled water (liters) 94,132
Anti-whooping cough vaccine 28,942
Diphtheria anti-toxin 22,380
Schick Tests 11,750
Glucose and Physiological Sera (liters) 9,729
BCG Vaccine (tuberculine) 8,200
Antigens for diagnosis of enteritic disease (cc) 4,650

A gratifying result of our conquest of epidemic disease and

establishment of modern public health services was that by 1958
the Cuban general death rate was 75 per thousand inhabitants-
one of the lowest in the world.

TIm THREE "BANKS" OF IlEAL TH

My administration gave the initiative for the creation of three

''banking institutions" for the protection of human health: the
Blood Bank, the Blood Vessel Bank and the Bank of Human Or-
gans.
The origin of the blood banks goes back to the first stages of my
goverrunent. The first one was installed in the Calixto Garcia
Hospital. Thereafter, fourteen more were set up in the main hospi-
tals of the nation. Thousands of people owe their lives to blood
made available by these institutions, which were always open to
those who needed help. In 1952, I provided that the costs of these
services be defrayed from funds of the general national budget.
At the Lila Hidalgo Hospital at Rancho Boyeros, the first blood
vessel bank in Latin America was organized. Until then, the only
other such institution had been in New York City. Staffed by
skilled surgeons, our blood vessel bank served to replace defec-
tive blood vessels under special conditions and circumstances.
The Bank of Human Organs, established by Law # 1595 of Au-
gust 4, 1954, was designed to obtain and preserve organs or
parts of organs of the human body, particularly bones, cartilage
 98 The CrOWtll and Decline of tlu! Cuban Republic
and corneas. The Bank was directed by a board on which the
forensic medical corps, the Instihlte of Legal Medicine and the
orthopedic surgeons of Cuba were represented. It was located in
the new building of the Judicial Morgue in Havana. The law pro-
vided that branches of the bank be created in public and pri-
vate hospitals.

HANSEN'S DISEASE

Cuba's only two instihltions for the benefit of victims of leprosy

were established as a result of the 4th of September Revolution.
These were the Association for the Prophylaxis of Leprosy, Skin
Diseases and Syphilis (PLEeS) and the San Luis de Jagua Hos-
pital in the province of Oriente.
The Association established ten dispensaries throughout the
Island, where victims of Hansen's disease were treated according
to the most modern scientific methods and with promising results.
Treatment of leprosy also occurred in the Alto Songo and Rinoon
hospitals. In the last days of my Administration, plastic surgery
was applied to remove the scars leprosy left on its victims. We
had to acquire special equipment for this type of surgery. In addi-
tion, a research department with competent staH was attached to
the Association.

THE WHITE PLAGUE

The 4th of September Revolution devoted intense and persevering

effort to the protection of the people against the Koch bacillus.
The first major step was to create the National Council for Tuber-
culosis with its hospitals, sanataria, preventive clinics, dispensa-
ries and laboratories for the production of vaccine. The Ambrosio
Grillo Hospital in Oriente province and the adjacent Aballi Hos-
pital for children were achievements of my firs t Administration.
By the last years of my second Administration. the battle against
hlberculosis among children had been virtually woo; the beds in
the AbalH Hospital were virtually empty and we decided to COD-
vert it into a general hospital for children's diseases.
The great campaign against tuberculosis had been crowned by
the construction of .£lve hospitals, 28 dispensaries, two preventive
clinics and a fin e laboratory. During the last year of my Ad.minis-
tration. 145,570 out-patients registered in the dispensaries-most
 99 The Battle Against Epidemics
of them for preventive treatment-and 3,228 in-patients were
hospitalized. Some 546,275 medical services were provided annu-
ally to these tubercular patients and, in addition, 12,450 cases
were examined by mobile units in congested city arcas.
In 1956, we reorganized the battle against the \Vhite Plague,
providing new methods and better equipment. A Research Insti-
tute was established with a school attached. The Institute was to
develop new methods of struggle against tuberculosis and im-
proved diagnostic techniques. The school disseminated public
health infonnation. The improvement in diagnostic methods re-
sulted in an apparent increase in the tuberculosis rate in 1957
over that of 1956; this "increase" simply meant that we were find-
ing and correctly diagnosing cases that had been mishandled
previously.
Two of the five hospitals-the colossus of Topes de Collantes
and AbalH Children's Hospital were made autonomous-for bet-
ter administration and improved services. 2 These hospitals and
the other facilities, such as the dispensaries and the tuberculosis
wards in the 17 new hospitals we had built, gave the National
Council for Tuberculosis the tools it needed. They represented
an effort to eradicate tuberculosis unprecedented in Latin Amer-
ica.

THE COLOSSUS OF TOPES DE COLLANTES

In 1944, my administration left the immense building of the

Topes de Collantes Sanatorium almost completed. Its situation
was ideal for it stood on a mountainous height, which had been
made accessible by bulldozing a highway of great scenic beauty
over very intractable and rugged terrain. All the equipment, from
the power plant to the kitchen utensils, was in the warehouses,

2 My critics sought to discredit the system of foundations and autonomous

administrative bodies, which I had introduced into public administration
for the rapid and efficient achievement of national and social goals. The
Communist government branded the creation of the Autonomous Jurisdic-
tion of Topes de Call antes as illegal, because "it was a service pertaining
to the Ministry of Public Health" (Decree #722 of January 22, 1960);
nevertheless it did not hesitate to grant the National Ararian Rcfonn In-
stitute $2,000,000 (Decree #771 of April 21, 1960) to • construct hospitals
in Oriente" as if that were not also the function of the Ministry of Health.
Decree #722 was used to destroy many fine institutions that had provided
vitally needed services to the people of Cuba.
 100 The Growth and Decline of the Cuban Republic
awaiting a few details of minor importance prior to installation
and inauguration of the project.
However, the Autenticos were elected in that year and no in~
auguration occurred. The fine equipment disappeared and was
used for illicit purposes and we had to rebuild and re-equip the
huge bUilding. The great project was completed during the first
years of my Tast Administration. Finally, on November 11, 1954,
the Tuberculosis Sanatorium of Topes de Collnntes was fannally
opened after an unjustified delay of ten years and its 1,000 beds
were made available to patients who were able to recuperate in
that ideal environment in the midst of pines and eucalyptus trees.
As a matter of convenience and to avoid a repetition of the mis.-
appropriation which had just occurred, we placed aU national
properties in the vicinity of Topes de Collantes under the control
of a Board of Trustees with specific administrative authority over
the complex. Law #1008 of August 6, 1953 authorized planned
development of !be zone, including tourism. The historic and ar-
chitectural attractions of the ancient city of Trinidad contrib-
uted to the success of this program. The Autonomous Jurisdiction
of Topes de CoUantes was a successful experiment in that decEm-
tralization of governmental controls which I have always favored.
Subsequently, the Anc6n Peninsula, the Civil Hospital and the
Aqueduct of Trinidad, the new medical UDits of the port of Ca-
silda and SnaJ1r the Luis Ortega Bolanos tuberculosis colony in
the province 0 Havana were all incorporated into the Autono-
mous Jurisdiction of Topes de Collantes.
From its official opening in 1954 until June 30, 1958, 1,930 pa-
tients were admitted into the Sanatorium. Of these, 1,285 were
discharged as cured, 30 died and 815 were under treabnent on
June 30th. Medical services rendered, inc1ucUng those to residents
of the district, amounted to 454,953 treatments or consultations, of
which 13,785 were of an emergency nature.
& the Sanatorium was in a distant and isolated place, a regular
hospital city b~an to sprout up around it. By the end of 1958, a
residence for the director, 20 homes for doctors and two apart-
ment houses, one for nurses and other female employees, the
other for men working for the Sanatorium, had been constructed.
The men and women. dedicated to the self-sacrificing profes-
sion of caring for the sick, already bad their social security fund.
To increase their income further, the Government built, near the
gigantic new National Hospital under construction, a National
 }01 The Battle Against Epidemics
School for Nurses with a clinic adjoining it, that was comparable
to the best anywhere in the world, Nursing schools were also
added to the new Proviocial Hospital of Oriente and to the
Crunagiiey General Hospital. To provide recreational facilities for
the muses of both sexes, I saw to it that the Government officially
prOVided fund s to help them establish their club at Vista Her-
mosa beach to the east of Havana,
 11
The Growth of Hospitals

During my Brst Administration, we wera engaged in raising the

standard of living of the Cuban workers, cstabllshing better social
and economic conditions, improving educational and health
standards and in general promoting national progress. In those
days, my political enemies focused their criticism on Cuba's mili-
tary construction which, the "comrades" alleged, was prompted
by "warlike" desIgos, The fact of the matter was that we built
new barrac1:s to give the soldiers that minimum of comfort to
which they were entitled Simply because they were human be-
ings and which had been denied them under a dictatorship which
stripped them of human dignity and treated them like animals. If
my administration had had "warlike" deSigns, it would have
threatened other countries. The historical record shows that it did
not do so.
After my second Administration had gotten Wlder way and at a
time when its implacable opposition to communism was clearly
apparent for nil to see, the "comrades" played a different tune. I
was a dictator, a servant of reactionary capital, a President who
had no interest in the weliare of the common man. This. of rowse,
was the technique of the big lie, so successfully carried out by
Adolf Hitler and so successfully imitated by his Communist totali-
tarian brothers under the skin.
To demonstrate the untruthfulness of this campaign of calumny,
either after the 1933 Revolution or after that of 1952, it would
have sufficed for a disinterested observer to have visited any Cu-
 103 Tile Growth of Hospitals
bnn community and to have asked: Who built this hospital?
Who built this ward? \<\'ho was responsible for the courthouse?
Who constructed the school center, the post office building and the
fi scal office? Who built the highway? Or the rural school house?
And the children's homes in the back country? And who pro~
vided the teachers of home economics. the d octors, nurses, mid-
wives and the medica] supplies for the rural families? Who saw to
it that the workers on the sugar plantations had the right to share
in the profits of the sugar industry? Similar qu estions might have
been asked concerning civic, religious, welfare and other institu-
tions and similar answers would have been obtained.
Characteristic of these criticisms based on ignorance of the
fa cts was the charge made in the U. S. State Department's White
Paper on Cuba of April 3, 1961 that ". . . the (Batista) regime's
indifference to the needs of the people for education, medical
care, housing, for social justice and economic opportunity-all
these, in Cuba as elsewhere, constituted an open invitation to
revolution." This document was prepared, according to the New
York Times, by the socialist historian and presidential advisor,
Arthur M . SchleSinger, Jr., a man profoundly i~oran t of L.'ltin
America whose judgment was warped by his ideological preju-
dices. The White Paper was characterized by fonner Ambossador
to Cuba Spruille Braden, a gentleman distinguished by his love of
truth and justice, as "one of the most indefensible documents
I ever have seen issued by a presumably responSible foreign of-
fice.'" 1
For my part, 1 have no desire to argue with Mr. SchleSinger or
with other propagandists. 1 prefer to state the facts and let them
speak for themselves. In the specific matter of medical care and
hospitalization, it should suffice to sta te briefly what the facilities
of the Cuban nation were on the eve of the 1933 Revolution and
what they had become when the night of communism fell upon
the island. The record will show that my administrations chaUced
up more constructive progress in this field than any other regime
in the history of Cuba.
1 Spruille Braden, Speech to the Cuban Chamber of Commerce in the United
States, May 17, 1961.
 104 The Growth and Decline of the Cuban Republic

STAlE OF HOSPITALS IN 1933

When the Revolution of the 4th of September triumphed, we
found that the nation had only 34 state-owned hospitals, together
with two municipal hospitals in the city of Havana. These had a
total cap acity of 6,893 beds. During the first 30 years of Cuba's e:t-
istence as an independent nation, only ten hospitals had been
built with a total of 2,365 beds. The other 26, with a total of
4,529 beds, dated back either to Colonial times or to the days of
U.S. military intervention.
By the end of my first Administration, the number of hospitals
had been increased by 18 and the number of beds had risen by
6,732, that is to say, they had almost doubled. In addition, 20
new hospital buildings had been erected to replace obsolete in-
stallations or to house new institutions.
At the end of my second term in 1958, Cuba had an additionaJ
7,516 hospital beds, raising the total contribution of my two peri-
ods of power to 14,248. We had establlshed 15 new hospitals and
constructed 53 hospital buildings.

GREAT HOSPITALS

Some of these huge hospitals were not yet in service at the end of
December 1958 when I had to leave Cuba, but they were never-
theless fully equipped or, at the very least, their equipment had
been purchased and paid for. My Administration had intended to
open them formally during the 54 remaining days of its oonstitu-
tionallife.
Fidel Castro did not hesitate to claim these hospitals as his own
public improvements. The ignorant and the gullible were sup-
posed to believe that, in just a few months, Castro had created
5,543 hospital beds out of thin air! This W3 S every bit as daring
and unscrupulous as the calumny of the 20,000 corpses. In both
cases, it was the application of the Hitlerian technique of the big
lie!
Despite these fraudulent claims of Castro and his band of mur-
derers, claims which have been uncritically reproduced by some
of the more credulous and some of the more unprincipled re-
porters of the United States press, the hard, stubborn facts re-
mnin. We constructed, modernized, extended, equipped and, in
 105 Th e Growth 0/ lfospitai&
short, created the greatest hospital system Cuba has ever known.
M y associates and I found 6,893 hospital beds and we left 21,141.

ORGAl\''IZA TlO~ AI. STRUC'TIJRE

With the plan to construct 17 new hospitals and reconstru ct oth-

ers under way, the finishing touch to the public welfare hospitali-
zationlrogram was Law #2fJ17 of January 27, 1955. This statute
create a $10,000,000 fund to operate the new chain of hospitals.
In accordance with my policy of administrative decentraliza-
tion, we set up an autonomous authority called the National Or-
ganization for the Ad..-ninistration of Government Hospitals. This
entity was charged with coordinating hospital management and
tho management of other centers of social welfare of a similar
nature. It had broad responsibilities for construction, founding
and organizing such public centers, for acquiring the equipment
needed by the hospHals, etc.
ONAHE, as it was called, survived only the Brst months of the
Communist regime and that after a drastic purge of its personnel.
By Decree #145 of March 11, 1959, it was stripped of its autonomy
and absorbed by the Ministry of Public Heal th. On September 15,
1959 (Decree #556 ), it was dissolved. The Communists had in-
herited a balance in ONAHE accounts of $5,858,289, net of liabili~
ties. With characteristic disregard for the welfare of the Cuban
people, the Reds turned over $1,380,000 of these hospital funds
to the Navy. The balance of $4,478,289 was assigned to the un-
restricted account of the Minister of Public Health, who squan-
dered it for purposes remote from those Originally intended.

FICHT AGAINST CANCER

Thanks to my wife's untiring eHorts and generosity, completely

equipped wards were set up, such as the one for children in the
Curie Hospital of the League Against Cancer. The Curie and
Dom(nguez Roldan hospitals were dedicated to the investigation
and treabnent of cancer, were under an effident and dedicated
management and received a fixed stipend for personnel and sup-
plies (rom the national budget. They also relied on support (yom
the general public.
The Curie Hospital was equipped with a radio-active isotope
laboratory, a blood bank and modem X-ray equipment. Support
 106 The Growth and Decline of the Cuban Republic
for the Dolores Bonet Clinical Laboratory, constructed in Santa
Clara through the philanthrophic initiative of one of that lady's
descendants, was incorporated in the national budget.
The new Dominguez Roldan Hospital took the patients who
had been under treatment in the old Cancer Institute of the Ca~
lixto Garcia Hospital, the cancer ward of which had been set up
by President Machado in 1929. In addition, the Government
granted about 12,000 square meters of city land for cancer insti~
tutions in Havana, Santa Clara and Santiago de Cuba. By Law
#1539 of July 27,1954, a building was erected to house the Juan
Bruno Zayas Radium Institute. Its cost, $455,000, was defrayed
by the Government. Within this Institute, there was a research
laboratory, which received $141,500 from the funds of the Na~
tiona! Lottery.

FOR TIm BLL.'l"D

Private initiative created four organizations to help and educate

blind people, all of which had the wholehearted cooperation of
my Administrations. Thus, we transferred $165,540 to the Lcague
Against Blindness for the construction of a hospital in Marianao.
In addition, my wife aSSigned it $60,000 from National Lottery re~
ceipts and $35,000 from other sources. The National Lottcry made
it possible to give $75,720 to the National Association for the Blind
and $165,000 to the Varona Suarez Cultural Foundation for the
Blind. My wife was deeply moved by the plight of these people
and made large contributions from her private funds.

NATIONAL HOSPITAL

In 1933, the Calixto Garda Hospital had a capacity of 1,000 beds.

As it is located within the University campus, my Administra~
tion acted favorably on a request by the School of Medicine and
transferred it to the University of Havana as part of the latter's
patrimony. After it was completely reconditioned, its capacity
was increased to 1,300 beds.
In compliance with a constitutional precept, my Administration
began construction of a National Hospital in 1943. However, when
the Auh~nticos took over in 1944, they Sidestepped the project.
On returning to power in 1952, I had a splendid hospital of 500
beds built with equally important adjacent buildings-one for
 107 The Growth of Hospitals
the Children's Hospital and another for the School of Nurses. All
of these were completed; their equipment had been ordered
and paid for; their budgets had been presented, and they only
awaited formal opening. However, at this point, the Communists
took power.

HOSPITALS: MYTH AND REALITY

These figures, and the detailed presentation I have made else-

where,2 give the lie to those who charged my regime with "indif-
ference to . . . medical care." Actually, few other countries
had as many hospital beds in relation to population as did Cuba.
Considering only government-operated hospitals and the mu-
nicipal hospitals of Havana, the total increased from 36 in 1933 to
54 in 1944 and 97 in 1958. The total number of beds rose from
6,893 in 1933 to 13,625 in 1944 and 21,141 in 1958, an increase
over the entire period of 207%.

MUTUALIST SOCIETIES

These figures, however, tell only part of the story. Private initia-
tive, which was consistently encouraged by my Governments as a
matter of principle, maintained no less than 250 other medical
institutions in service-hospital associations, clinics, polyclinics,
regional hospitalization centers, institutes, etc., with a combined
capacity of 15,000 beds.
A number of regional associations had been born in Cuba dur-
ing the last decades of the Colonial era. They flourished rapidly
under the Republic and were organized on a mutualist basis
which permitted the constnlCtion of immense sanatoria, that were
commonly known as quintas de salud (health villas). By Septem-
ber 1933, they achieved such impetus that there was scarcely a
nucleus of population of any importance in the nation without
one of them. 'Where a local hospital had not been built, the
agents or delegations of these institutions provided their mem-
bers with the medical assistance and medicines they needed un-
til they couId go to a hospital for further or more specialized
treatment.
The regional associations of Havana, Santiago de Cuba, Cama-
goey, Cicnfuegos and other cities counted their members in the
2 See my Piedras y Leyes, Ediciones Bota, Mexico City, 1961, pp. 128-136.
 lOB Th e Growth and Decline 01 the Cuban Republic
tens of thousands. No less than 500,000 persons in the Republic
counted on these associations for hospitalization and excel1ent
medical service. Some of the associations also provided grade
school education and even special training in their own schools
for the children of their members. The three palaces of the Cali·
clan and the Asturian associations and of the Havana Association
of Business Clerks were monuments of democratic mutualism.
Their contribution to the cause of health is unparalleled in the
experience of the Americas. Following their example. other and
similar medical centers were created with the same sort of re-
gional ramifications. Thus, the health insurance system of the
country developed to the point where one could safely say that
one of every ten persons throughout the nation participated in the
benefits of these institutions at an average cost of only $3.00 per
month.
This was the origin of the La Bondad Clinic, the Cuban Bene-
Scia! Society, the Surgical-Medical Center of Vedado, the Business
Clerks' Medical Association, the Cuban Catholics' Association, the
Children's Institute, the Institute for the Aged and many others.
Through their offices, these organizations not only provided much
needed medical care (or their members, but reduced the pressure
on the national budget and on the private budgets of the sick.
All of these excellent results from the mutualist hospitalization
system were enhanced by the high quality of Cuban physicians.
At various international conferences of specialists, they re-
peatedly oHered proof of the excellence of their scientific training.
The most famous surgeons from the more advanced countries
would not hesitate to tum over their scalpels to their Cuban col-
leagues. In this field, as well as in others, Cuba ranked second
to none.
Unfortunately, there was a great deal of Communist infiltration
in the medical profession and this despite the tremendous em-
phasis my Governments had placed on health and despite the
many excellent hospitals and specialized medical institutions it
had launched.

HOSPITAL BEDS AND POPULATION

If we combine the number of beds in public and in private

hospitals, we reach a total of 35,000 beds in 1958. Witl~ a Cuban
population of 6,630,921, the average was one bed for every 190
 109 The Growth of Hospitals
inhabitants. This exceeds the goal fot' civilized countries of 200
persons per hospital bed; compares favorably with the United
States situation of one bed for every 109 inhabitants in 1960 and
places Cuba in the forefront of the world in terms of hospital fa-
cilities.
Five years previously, we had had 235 persons per bed in the
Republic as a whole and 100 per bed in the city of Havana. By
1958, Havana had 90 inhabitants per hospital bed.
All that the reader need do is compare this situation with that
prevailing in other Latin American, or for that matter, European
countries to realize that the charges made in the White Paper on
Cuba are remote from the truth.
The hospitals of Cuba offered silent, but conclusive, testimony
to the interest which I shared with my associates in the health of
Cubans in general and in medical assistance to the needy, the
aged, the children, the disabled and the underprivileged in par-
ticular.
The White Paper on Cuba slanders the Cuban people as a
whole. Hygiene is a tradition among us, not only public hygiene,
but also private hygiene. Ever since the eradication of yellow fe-
ver, thanks to the discovery of its carrier by a great fellow citizen,
Dr. Carlos Finlay, Cuba has striven for excellence in the field of
public health. The squalor of some of our neighbors and the epi-
demics that lash them could never break through the barriers of
our zealous sanitation officers and infect our Island, Until the
Communists came, we were not only one of the cleanest, but also
one of the healthiest, countries in the world.
 12
Institutions of Public Welfare

If it is important to establish public welfare institutions, it is

equally important to provide public funds, wherever necessary,
to operate and maintain those created by private initiative.
Accordingly, the Government, at my recommendation, as chief of
the revolutionary program, set up a National Corporation for Pub-
lic Welfare (CNAP) by Law #708 of March 30, 1936 to main-
tain privately created welfare instihltions which heretofore had
barely managed to subsist.
In 1953. we broadened this system by revising the bylaws of
CNAP and giving it such additional responsibilities as the elimina-
tion of public begging, aid to disaster victims and granting of
scholarships.
In my message to Congress of September 2, 1958, I mentioned
the fact that no country could ever feel secure as long as the mo-
rale of its citizenry was threatened by poverty and ignorance. A
constructive nationalism requires the elimination of illiteracy,
healing the moral wounds of social inequality and provision for
the basic physical and educational needs of underprivileged c1ru-
dren and of the aged poor.
By the end of 1958, the National Corporation was completely
maintaining 43 institutions and subsidizing 67 others. These bene-
fited 3,377 children and 881 old persons. The classification was as
follows:
 III In.ttitutions of Public Welfare
Institutwt!$ Maintained Sub$idl:.ed To fal
Day Nurseries 2.2 13 35
Nursery Homes 11 2 13
Homes for the Aged 4 4
Asylums 1 29 30
Schools 14 14
Children's Camps 5 5
Miscellaneous 9 9
TarAL 43 67 110

Of these 110 institutions. some ore worth special comment.

Among them, there was the Carm ela Zaldivar Transients' Home,
which was opened on February 1. 1954 to provide temporary
lodgings for tip to 120 children wrested from miserable lives as
beggars. The Maria Luisa Dolz Improvement Home was dedicated
to the care of mentally retarded children, including their educa-
tion and treatment in a psychiatric clinic.
TIle Pilar Pedroso Day Nursery at San Jose de las Lajas was in-
augurated in July 1952. Then there was the Uno Figueredo Sum-
mer Camp at Sante Fe Beach (Bautal, which provided surf and
ocean bathing for the children in other institutions of the Corpo-
ration. There wos also a Children's Camp, absorbed by the Cor-
poration in 1956. which provided recreation for the children.
In addition, the Corporation provided milk for children, social
welfare for the really destitute, food rations, toys at Christmas
and scholarships.
At the end of my nrst Administration, the CNAP supported
59 institutions. By December 31, 1958, their number had in-
creased to 110. Then the Reds took over and absorbed the CNAP
into a new Ministry of Social Welfare (established by Law #181
of March 31,1959 ). This completely perverted and denaturalized
the charitable institutions we had established. Some were abol-
ished, others curtailed and the rest transformed into Communist
indoctrination camps.
To provide pTOpaganda show cases, chiefly for foreign jour-
nalists and publicists, the Communist dictatorship changed the
names of the philanthropic institutions it had inherited from free
Cuba and then claimed them as its own creations. Thus, the Drop
of Milk was renamed the Bank of Milk and hailed as an achieve-
 112 The Croulth and Decline of tlw Cuban Republic
ment of the Castro Revolution; the Students' Dining Rooms be~
came Students' Feeding Stations, etc. The men of resentment pre-
tended to have creal'ed something whereas they had merely
stolen what others had built and had failed even to maintain and
operate competently that which they had taken.

THE NATIONAL ORPHANAGE

Three charity and maternity homes had been inherited from

Spanish rule and these were supported by the Covernment. The
one in Matanzas became the responsibility of CNAP; the institu-
tion in Santiago de Cuba was supported from the general budget;
the most importaot of them. located jn Havana, received a fer-
tile 337-acre farm from the Covernment, enabling the young in-
mates to produce their own vegetables and dairy products. They
also received the agricultural machinery they needed from the
National Executive Commission of Agricultural and Mining C0-
operatives (CENCAM) and $430,620 from the National Lottery.
The historic National Orphanage was run with a truly maternal
spirit by the Sisters of Charity under the scrupulously honest man-
agement of an austere foundation. It seemed most desirable to
move it to a place more secluded from the bustling center of the
city and more suitable for education. After consulting at length
with lawyers, economists and teachers, my Covernment trans-
ferred the Orphanage to an ideal tract in eastern Havana, which
was then booming on the north side of the harbor because of the
Tunnel under the bay. The Orphanage was given a financi al shot
in the ann in the fonn of $3,080,500, paid for its old site by the
Cuban National Bank, which planned to use it for a magnificent
new headquarters.
If our plan had materialized, this worthy institution, that
boarded, educated and prepared for a dignified and socially use-
ful life over a thousand pupils yearly, would have had a new
campus with ample space for playgrounds and athletic facilities
and increased capacity for orphans.
We had already temporarily transferred some of the children
to the immigration camp at Tiscornia, pending relocation to the
new headquarters, when the sad events of January I, 1959 took
place. The great project was d estroyed and another institution
that promised to add to the richness of Cuban life fell victim to
Communist cruelty.
 113 Institutiom of Public Welfare

The president of the foundation had been Dr. Jose Ignacio de

Ia Camara y O'Reilly, member of a distinguished Cuban family of
pioneer settlers on the Island. Dr. Julio Cesar Portela was not only
the manager; he had been the guiding light of the institution for
over hventy years. He was beloved by the children and respected
by all who knew him. Because of his irreproachable management
of the institution's funds and his loving care of his wards, he had
been confhmed in his office by every Administration which had
governed Cuba since his original appointment.
However, when Castro and his hordes took power, they ar-
rested him and subjected him to various indignities and false ac-
cusations. Dr. Portela was replaced by an incompetent, but "obe-
dient" manager. No sooner had the new Adminish'ator taken over,
than he proceeded to expel the Sisters of Charity who had guided
their orphan wards ever since their original appointment by Bishop
Jer6nimo Valdes, the founder of the Orphanage.

FOR THE GLORIOUS VETERANS

The September 1933 Revolution took place in a time of eco-

nomic crisis and near bankruptcy. In those days, a group of veter-
ans of our War of Independence moved into an abandoned build-
ing at the old market, La Purisima, in Havana. This served as
their dormitory. Their mess hall was more than two miles distant.
When I realized their plight, I arranged to have a temporary
Veterans' Home set up at the Rancho Boyeros Exposition Park,
where they remained until we built them permanent quarters.
We left three veterans' homes in operation: one named for Gen-
eral Peraza in Havana with a capacity to house 200, the Pedro
V{lzquez Hidalgo with the same capacity in the city of Holguin
in Oriente, and the General Riva, accommodating 50 veterans, in
Pinar del Rio.
In September 1933, the men who had fought for Cuba's inde-
pendence were receiving the miserable pension of $6.00 a month.
As the national economy improved, we raised those pensions to
$10.66 in April 1935, to $15.00 in August 1935 and to $20.00 in
June 1944. In my second Administration, the pensions were set at
a minimum of $75.00 (Law #1 of 1957) for all veterans ranking
from private to lieutenant.
Some 7,474 veterans were favored by this law: 6,131 privates,
443 corporals, 532 sergeants, 253 second lieutenants and 115 lieu~
 114 The Growth and Decline of the Cuban Republic
tenants. The law gave these pension payments priority and estab-
lished an accounting system that ensured that they were paid
promptly all over Cuba. Buildings for the veterans' delegations
and tombs for the dignified burial of these glorious old men who
had won us our national freedom, among them my own father,
Sergeant Belisario Batista, were constructed with funds from the
National Lottery.

CInLDREN'S DISPENSARIES

Many other social welfare institutions, not attached to the CNAP,

were aided or inaugurated, within the limits of the resources
available, in the 1933-1944 period. It was in those years that the
workers' maternity hospitals were built in Havana and in the
provinces. We emphasized children's welfare from the pre-natal
stage on and much was done through the inspiration and dedi-
cated work of my wife, whose name became synonymous with
social welfare in Cuha.
The National Organization of Children's Dispensaries (aND!)
was organized in July 1952 to provide complete hospitalization
and medical facilities for children from the cradle to adolescence,
with particular emphasis on infancy. The OND! carried its cam-
paign for child health to the most remote areas.
My goal was to have institutions adequate to care for the
health of all Cuban children from the moment of birth, deploying
the resources of medical science to small hospitals, operating as
branches of provincial hospitals, the entire structure to be
crowned by a great national hospital. With the cooperation of our
best practitioners, pediatricians and other specialists, my wife
pushed this great work forward, an activity which expressed her
maternal feelings and her deep sympathy for the unfortunate and
the downtrodden.
Large financial resources were needed to carry out this vast
program, as defined in Law #279 of July 3D, 1952. With the ac-
quiescence of the management and workers in the breweries, we
levied a small tax on beer, amounting to 32 cents on every case
of 24 bottles. Of this, 24 cents was allocated to the aND! and the
remaining 8 cents went to the brewery workers' and employees'
retirement fund.
On July 2, 1954, we had 20 dispensaries in operation through-
 115 Institutions of Public Welfa re
out the Republic: 5 of them in Pinar del Rio, 4 in Havana prov·
iDee, 6 in Las Villas, 3 in Matanzas. 5 in CamagUey and 5 in Ori-
ente.
Hospitalization, medication and laboratory tests were given to
thousands of children who were attended by highly capable doc-
tors, nurses and technicians. All of the roomy and well-equipped
dispensaries had the necessary beds for emergency cases in transit
to the nearest hospitals. The wen-stocked phannacies, X-ray serv-
ices and laboratories and all other departments of the ONDI in-
stitutions served the sick without any charge whatsoever.
A General Hospital was built in Havana and three provincial
hospitals in Pinar del Rio, las Villas and Oriente. These had a total
capacity of 1,500 beds and cradles.
Even before completion of the ONDI program, pediatric treat-
ment had been extended to the remotest parts of the Island.
AU emergency cases were covered by the system. My wife, who
served as Chairman of the Board of Trustees, issued orders that
urgent cases be admitted immediately, regardless of the circum~
stances, by day, by night and during holidays. As long as the
condition of a sick chiJa did not improve, he was to remain un~
der the direct care of a physician, When special facilities were
needed, they were made available quickly and generously, My
wife visited the wards, giving hope and happiness to the sick
children. Christmas was always an occasion fOf Clrristian cheer
and the Three Wise Men invariably arrived with presents.
A survey in 1957 of three municipalities where ONDI dispen~
sarles had been installed demonstrated the benefits to child
health. The mortality rate from gastroenteritis, one of the most
common infantile diseases, had been 1.63 per thousand cases.
After the dispensaries were established, the mortality rate feU to
0.88 per thousand, or a 46% decrease.
From July 1954 to July 1958, the ONDI dispensaries made
available 4,223,795 medical services. These included 1,796,056
medical consultations, of which 445,956 were emergency cases;
401,276 injections, 181,991 dental services and 49,791 X-rays and
fluoroscopes. There were 2,782 hospitalizations and 2,189 surgi~
cn] operations.
The Communist regime incorporated the aNDY into the Minis-
try of Welfare ( Law #486 or August 19, 1959) and. instead or
increasing its sources of revenue, reduced them (Law #630 of
 116 The Growth and Decline of the Cuban Republic
October 29, 1959) by cutting the tax on beer to 10 cents a case.
The sale purpose of this measure was to destroy this philanthropic
organization so vital to the health of the Cuban people.

PANADE

In 1952, my government established by Law # 124 of June 10 the

Foundation for Aid to Children, Old, Destitute and Sick Persons
(PANADE ) for the follOwing purposes:
To provide social and economic aid to the destitute.
To pro\ide food, clothing, medicines and other direct aid.
To give economic aid to social welfare institutions.
To provide hospitalization, in Cuba and abroad. for poor citi-
zens needing specialized treabnent, inclusive of aD clinical and
surgical charges and travel costs for the patient and his next of
kin.
To provide aid to victims of public disasters, such as floods,
hurricanes, epidemics, etc.
The funds for these expenditures were obtained from the Na-
tional Lottery.
My wife had dreamed of this sort of institution for many years
and she served as Chairman of its Board of Trustees. She not
only personally directed its activities. but went into disaster areas
to organize aid. In Rood stricken regions. she would go to the
areas of maximum damage, wading across swollen rivers to see
the situation with her own eyes, evaluate the damage and per-
sonally distribute relief supplies.
To enumerale the services rendered by PANADE would re-
quire endless pages. They included: food, trousseaus for brides,
ambulance ana automobile service, land purchases and rentals.
scholarships, baby showers, furniture, wheelchairs. orthopedic
equipment, special beds. funerals, tools, typewriters, sewing ma-
chines, musical instruments of various types. scientific equipment,
radiOS, refrigerators, television sets. blood transfusions, kitchens,
oculists' prescriptions, textbooks, medicines. school registration
fees. hospitalization, surgery, medical and d ental bills. traveling
expenses for invalids and their companions, monthly stipends to
philanthropic and religious institutions, etc., etc.
 117 Institutions of Public Welfare

REHAnn.ITATJON OF INVALIDS

One of the major gaps in our medical and welfare organization

was lack of an organization for the treatment, retraining and re-
habilitation of invalids, especially those disabled by congenital,
pathological or accidental causes that limited their usefulness to
sOciety. To make up for this deficiency, we decided to create the
National Organization for the Rehabilitation of Invalids (ONRI) ,
financin g its needs by modest tax levies.
Employers, workers and private individuals welcomed the new
organization enthusiastically, contributing over a million dollars to
it in the first year. The ONRI was to become another of the wel-
fare organizations that would lay claim to the First Lady's time.
On June 12, 1954, an orthopedic hospital was opened in Mari-
anao, adjacent to Havana. Here, in less than a year, over 3,500
patients were treated. Nevertheless, this hospital was only a tem-
porary installation while a new one, covering more than 60,000
square meters, was under construction. '''hen this new institu-
tion, with a capacity of 170 beds and ultra-modern equipment
for rehabilitation of invalids, was formally opened, it earned the
approval of the medical profession of the world. In September
1956, when the International Congress of Plastic Surgery opened
its sessions in its magnificent amphitheatre. attending delegates
expressed their admiration of this fine hospital.
In less than two years ( to September 20, 1958 ), 12,620 patients
were cared for here. During the same period, 3,174 major opera·
tions were performed and 80,000 physiotherapy treatments ad-
ministered.
Thus, to complete the work of ONRI, we constructed a hos·
pitalization center to be used exclusively as a borne for the physi.
cally and mentally unfit. 'Ibis was created by the initiative of my
wife and placed under her direction. We consecrated it to Christ
of Limpias.
This institution , the first of its kind in Cuba's history, was
opened to the people on April JO, 1957, abundantly equipped with
scientific and profesSional facilities and placed under the care of
the D aughters of Charity of St. Vincent de Paul. It started with
250 patients chosen from among the most needy and destitute.
This was the pioneer of a series of similar institutions which were
completed later throughout the Republic.
 118 TIw Growth and Decline 0/ the Cuban Republic
ONR1 was subjected to its first depredation by the Communist
regime when it was incorporated (Law #486 of August 19, 1959)
into the Ministry of Public Health . The second blow-Law #728 of
February 17, 1960-diverted its funds to other purposes and thus
$1,270,000 was taken from it.

STlIDENT'S DININC ROOMS

The program to see that all Cuban school children got adequate
breakfasts had never been very successful. In fact, it was at a
standstill. We decided that it was necessary for the state to as-
sume this obligation.
A preliminary survey showed us that 8m; of the school pupils
suHered from nutritional deficiencies due to low standards of
living, to lack of nutritional knowledge in the homes or to both
causes.
Therefore, when the child arrived in school with an empty stom-
ach or an inadequately fed one, it was necessary to supply him,
not only with the brend of learning, but with a daily ration. We
were expanding this program to cover shoes and uniforms when
the Red terror brought our work to a standstill.
Despite the high standard of living attained by the Cuban pe0-
ple, we also had to tackle the problem of inadequate nourishment
for the adult poor. Thus, we opened the first People's Dining
Room in Havana, to be followed shortly by many others through-
out the Island.
Law # 1803 of November 18, 1954 gave this operation structure
and resulted in the establishment in 1956 of the National Organi-
zation of School and People's Dining Rooms. We provided for the
maintenance of this organization from National Lottery fund~ and
also used gift contests of the sort employed to advertise certain
products. We also levied a tax on race tracks and Jai-Alai Irontons
and aJlocated revenue from parking meters.
The Srst dining room for school children was opened in Guan-
ahacoa in Greater Havana to feed more than 500 children from
the public school of that municipnlity. By the time I left Cuba,
there were 88 in operation, 70 more completed and 45 more
scheduled to be opened short1y in the six: provinces of Cuba.
From the outset, ONCEP began to payoff in such results as
increased classroom attendance and more satisfactory student
progress as evidenced by grades. ONCEP included a medico-
 119 I n.stitutions of Public Welfare

social service for the ead y diagnosis of illness and simple, inex-
pensive treatment.
Every aspect of the children's welfare was considered. The
school lunches were scientifically prepared to provide the chil-
dren with two-thirds of their daily nutritional requirements of
calories, proteins, calcium, iron and vitamins. Provisioning Of-
ganizations were set up throughout the country to supply the
dining rooms in their zones. These had insulated trucks lor meat
deliveries.
The school dinin g rooms were open on week days from 11:00
A.M. to 2:00 P.;\i. so as to feed the children in both the morning
and the aftern oon sessions.
The meals were not free. We charged 5 cents for each so that
the child would feel he was paying for his meal. This stimulated
h is sense of dignity and prevented his feeling th at he was an ob-
ject of charity. Of course, the child was never left without his
meal because he did not have his nickel. This was foreseen in the
budget.
Up to June 30, 1958, ONCEP served 3,147,513 lunches, dis·
tributed in school years as follows:

1954-55 38,424
1955-56 364,183
1956-51 888,820
1957-58 1,856,086

This steady increase reflected the fact th:lt thc project was being
expanded to cover the entire nation.
We left 11 Peoplc's Dining Rooms in operation where 1,610,725
lunches were served up to June 30, 1958. There was a nominal
charge of 2.5 cents for each meal. We h ad been careful not to
jeopardize the int erests of commercial restomants in the vicinity
and also not to bu ild bad habits in the recipients of this charity.
An investigation of the means of every customer was made and
the meals were only served to those actually in financial distress.
This project contributed to the health of the people and pre-
vented the poor fro m sinking into a physical sta te in which they
would be unemployable.
On the first day of that tragic month of January of 1959, irre-
sponsible mobs stonned every one of these dining rooms, doing
extensive damage, Later, the Rebels used them for their own
 120 The Growth and Decline of the Cuban Republic
and their family's meals as they would restaurants. Law #407 of
July 19, 1959 incorporated the ONCEP into the newly created
Ministry of Public Welfare and its assets of $1,052,000 were then
diverted to other purposes more suited to the interests of com-
munism.

THE NATIONAL LOTTERY

The Revolution of the 4th of September 1933 defined the purposes

for which funds from the National Lottery were to be expended
and the Revolution of the lOth of March 1952 extended these
objectives into the field of social welfare. The National Lottery
ceased to be merely a means of increasing government revenues
and satisfying the urge to gamble; it became a major instrumen-
tality of cooperation with private and autonomous institutions en-
gaged in philanthropic, cultural and social undertakings.
The statistics that follow show the tremendous variety of social
purposes which the National Lottery served and the extent to
which it stimulated individual and local initiative by providing
grants in aid to civic, welfare and religious institutions.
Between March 10, 1952 and September 30, 1958, $60,076,834
of National Lottery revenues were expended on SOcially neces-
sary projects. About $2,000,000 more was thus expended between
that month and the usurpation of power by the Reds on January
1,1959.
In broad categories, the $60.1 million was spent for the follow-
ingpurposes: 1

(1) Social welfare: financial aid, clothing,

medicine and food for the needy; teaching and
culture; aid to invalids and unemployed; Christ-
mas rations and toys; medical aid and treabnent
all through PANADE... .. . .. . .. . . . . . . .. . .... $10.2 millions
(2) Support of students' and peoples' dining
rooms through ONCEP ......... . . . . .. . . . . . .. $ 9.0 millions
(3) Road and street construction and repair
and local aid in urban and rural areas through
CENPLUC ................................. $ 7.7 millions
(4) Project financing through National Bank
of Cuba. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. $ 5.5 millions
1 For a complete breakdown, see Piedras y Leyes, op. cit., pp. 154-159.
 121 Institutions of Public Welfare
(5) Construction of National Lottery Bldg... $ 3.5 millions
(6) Social security funds for government em-
ployees and servicemen ...................... . $ 3.7 millions
(7) Asylums and day nurseries, homes for
children and for the aged through the National
Corporation of Public Assistance ............. . $ 2.6 millions
(8) Assistance to literary societies and other
associations ................................ . $ 2.2 millions
(9) Allother ............................ . $16.7 millions.
 13
Fiscal Policy and Taxes

When I took power in March 1952, Cuba faced n severe fiscal

crisis. There were many reasons for this. The previous Auten-
tieo Administrations had plundered the Treasury to the tune of
tens of millions of dollars for purposes of personal enrichment. The
1952 sugar crop was excessively large nnd downward adjust-
ment of plantings in the two succeeding years were necessary.
Revenues from various tax sources had been diverted and there
had been lavish and suspicious resort to tariff and fiscal exemp"-
tions.
Accordingly, it became necessary to resort to deBcit spending
as a stopgap. In succeeding years, the budgets were balanced by
resorting to corrective fiscal measures and finding new sources of
revenue. In this situation, we issued Treasury notes to cover ob-
ligations Ihat, because of the cyclical components in the economy,
could not be met immediately from current revenu es.
Within two years, we were able to end the critical situation we
had inherited. The medicine was curbing wasteful government
expenditures, while at the same time expanding Cuba's socia1
and economic development plan. This fiscal policy resulted in the
steady growth of real national income, which reached an o.ll-time
high in the last years of my administration.
 123 Fisool Policy and Taxes

mea BUDGETS

We maintained high budgets at all times with the conviction that

government spending stimulated currency circulation and na-
tional wealth. In the 1957-1958 fiscal year, budgetary revenues
reached the highest level in Cuba's history, $397,040,930, as com-
pared with an estimated $309,459,260 during fiscal 1952-53, the
first year of the revolutionary regime.

CUBAN CQVERNMENT REVENUES

( in millioru of dollars)
Direct Indired
Fiscal Year Tlltation Taxat/on Othe1 Total
1955-56 78.1 254.3 13.2 345.6
1956-57 89.3 280.6 13.3 3&'3.2
1957-57 106.6 275.7 14.6 397.1

Averaging this period, revenues came from the follOwing

sources:
Aoorage Amount
1956-58
Source of Revenue (in $ millions) Percent of Total
Income Tax 70.5 18.5
Property taxes 30.7 8.1
Production & Consumption
taxes 151.0 39.7
Taxes on foreign trade 108.8 28.7
Miscellaneous 17.9 5.0
Totals 378.9 100.0

A l\"EW FlSCAL FOLICY

My Governm ent discarded the traditional motto of "everything

that the government wants, whether rightly or wrongly" and sub-
stituted a fiscal policy of full conformity to law which, without
resort to extraordinary measures, collected the revenues that
were needed. This eliminated the misgivings of certain investors,
who had been appalled at the multipflcity of taxes and the com-
plexity of the Cuban tax system. Ambiguous legal opinions had
 124 The Growth and Decline of the Cuban Republic
created continuous controversies concerning the reach of the tax
on dividends, which affected both domestic and foreign investors.
To avoid further retroactive interpretations of fiscal regulations,
we enacted Decree #1111 of April 22, 1955, which revised and
eliminated many claims of the tax authorities in this area.

PERSONAL INCO:ME TAX

My first Administration had created this source of government

revenue in addition to taxes on capital and corporate and real
estate income.
To improve collection of revenue from these sources, we com-
pletely reformed the tax administration system by Law #318 of
August 6, 1952, setting up mechanisms which would keep the
Government correctly infonned concerning income and capital
and thus ending the widespread evasion of payment of these
taxes. Organizations which specialized in economic matters as-
sisted my Administration in this area. By Law #439 of October 4,
1952 and subsequent measures, we created a more flexible and
efficient system and extended it to other agricultural, commercial
and financial activities.

REAL ESTATE TAX

Here again, the problems of control, evasion of tax payment and

irregular and erratic inspections created a chaotic situation. Law
#1943 of January 22, 1955 modernized the legal basis, regulations
and procedures, some of them dating back to 1892, of the tax on
Real Estate and Transfers of Property. Tax evasion was reduced
by listening to the suggestions of the taxpayers and treating them
as partners of the Government.

TAX O~ SUGAR

The sugar industry had been burdened with a variety of taxes,1

the collection of which reqUired a great deal of effort and ex-
pense by both Government and the industry. It had repeatedly
1 These taxes were 10 cents levied by a 1917 law, 9 cents by a 1936 law,
6 cents by a 1940 law [.nd 5 cents by a 1941 law. Molasses was taxed a
quarter of a cent per gallon.
 125 Fiscal Policy and Taxes
been proposed that these various taxes be consolidated into one.
After a careful study of the matter, we did this by Law #1362 of
April 10, 1954 and changed the basic assessment established in
1941. A single tax per 325 Ib5. of sugar was established with the
proviso that this amount would be retained when the capacity of
the bags was reduced to 250 Ibs. The same consolidation was ap-
plied to blackstrap molasses, which had previously been encum-
bered with five separate tax laws.

THE GREAT TARIFF REFORM

The tariff law which had been in effect since October 19, 1927
impeded the economic growth of the country. Accordingly, my
government directed the National Economic Council to study the
matter and propose Tefanns. A cabinet-level committee began to
study the report of the Council on August 15, 1956.
The previous year, major changes had been instituted in no-
menclature and definition of dutiable items. In accordance with
our rule of consulting public opinion in a democratic fashion,!ub-
lic hearings were held in which all interested parties coul ex-
press their views.
That part of the national output which was to be protected or
simulated by tariffs was subjected to duty revision first, all
changes being in strict accordance with our economic treaties
and agreements.
One can gain a conception of the magnitude of the task when
it is considered that there were 1,095 items and 5,505 sub-items,
based on the Brussels nomenclature as adapted to the realities of
our own economy, or a total of 6,600 items which had to be re-
viewed. This compared with the 1,075 items comprising the 1927
tariff.

CUSTOMS PROCEDURES

Cuba's first customs regulations were laid down in Military Order

#173 of June 22, 1901. As these were quite inadequate for an ad-
ministrative system, we ordered their complete reorganization
on June 12, 1953. Laws #1337 of March 30, 1954 and #1952 of
January 25, 1955 established an efficient and flexible system for
customs clearance at the various ports of Cuba. Customs reve-
nues had always been a major source of revenue for Cuba and, at
 126 The Growth and Decline of the Cuban Republic
the time of our emancipation from Spain, they were the pre-
ponderant source of government revenue.

PORT IMPROVEMENTS

By a law of July 24,1917, a "port improvement tax" was collected

at every Cuban port. This tax was later increased by 25% and
revenue from this source during 1944-1952 amounted to $17,303,-
400, The law provided that all port improvements were to be
paid from these tax proceeds and that $500,000 ~s to be set
aside yearly for general expenditures of the Republic.
During my first Administration, we completed a major dredg-
ing operation in the port of Cardenas and built the largest wharf
ever seen in Cuba, recompensing the contractor with certificates
of completed work, bearing 5% interest, which were completely
redeemed from the port improvement tax revenues when collected.
The success of this project was a stimulus to productive use of
these tax revenues as, during the previous 20 years, the only thing
that had been done in this area was dredging at the port of 1sa-
bela de Sagua with inadequate equipment, a project that never
approached completion. Inadequate dredging operations at Co-
chinos Bay had been financed inlart by loan funds.
We brought in technicians an speCialists to consider the broad
problem. They advised the use of powerful, modern equipment
-suction dredges, which were very costly to purchase and oper-
ate. For efficient use, these dredges had to be kept in operation at
maximum capacity. Unfortunately, we did not have the funds for
the execution of this plan.
Accordingly, my second Administration, by Law #352 of Au-
gust 21, 1952, covered project costs by pledging future revenues
from the port improvement tax, paying the contractors defen-ed
payment certificates of work done.
Once this financial device had been made operational, we were
able to dredge the port of Isabela at the mouth of the Sagua la
Grande river, to drain and improve the Paso Malo lagoon in
Varadero and to do various other dredging jobs in Oriente, Ca-
magiiey, Pinar del Rio and Havana provinces. We were also able
to clean the harbor of Havana by dredging the Marimelena inlet.
This was indispensable to the maritime traffic of the Belot Oil Re-
finery and the new Shell refinery then under construction. The
 127 Fiscal Policy and Taxes
oil companies needed deep channels so that their large ocean-
going tankers would have direct access.

NATIONAL ECONOMIC COUNCIL

We created the Economy Board by Decree #1437 of April 1,

1943 and later, by Law #2069 of January 27, 1955, transformed it
into the National Economic Council (CNE) and gave it technical
responsibility for making plans for the regulation and coordina-
tion of the Cuban economy to achieve high levels of employment,
output and government income.
During the Autentico era of 1944-1952, our economic policies
were interrupted or discarded, a circumstance that aroused pub-
lic opinion, especially in financial and business circles, and cre-
ated a strong demand for tariff and fiscal refonn.
Ever since national independence, the Cuban economy had
been essentially an export economy. As long as policies were pur-
sued which undermined the incentive to invest, industrial de-
velopment was stagnant and a large portion of the Cuban people
suffered from unemployment between sugar harvests. This condi-
tion was made worse by the mechanization of the sugar industry
and by technolOgical progress.
It was absolutely essential, therefore, to discover. stimulate
and develop new sources of production. It would be no easy mat-
ter to find foreign markets for new Cuban products since this
meant breaking down the tariff barriers against our goods.
The excessive dependence of our exports on sugar is illustrated
by 1955-1958 figures. Sugar and its derivatives accounted for
$563.3 millions of exports; minerals and metals for $47.2 mil-
lions; tobacco for $46.1 millions; food products for $24.6 millions;
forest products for $7.8 millions and miscellaneous for $6.5 mil-
lions. Sugar thus accounted for 80% of the total.

STIMULATING INDUSTRY

This problem inspired the enactment of Law # 1038 of August

15, 1953, governing guidance, regulation and protection of indus-
trial development and reorganization of all existing rules and
regulations in the interest of increasing employment levels. Three
years after the enactment of Law # 1038, Cuba had acquired
 128 The Growth and Decline of the Cuban Republic
39 new industries under its protection. These had a permanent
labor force of 6,858 workers and employees and had contributed
additional production worth $48,850,071.

IMPROVING TRADE BALANCE

Thus, my Administration sponsored an economic development

program that required : (a) purchase of machinery from abroad
in considerable quantities, (b) imports of metals and other es-
sential raw materials, and (c) increased fuel consumption.
While we still imported food products that could be grown at
home, there was a strenuous effort to diversify agriculture, one
that called for research, time and deployment of resources. With
rising population and income, we could foresee substantial in-
creases in grain consumption-particularly rice and wheat,
which we imported to the extent of $59,500,000 in 1955 and $62,-
000,000 in 1958. We also had to import fats, certain fruits, vege-
tables and various preserves. Yet we were moving toward greater
self-sufficiency in food production. Cuba's imports of U.S. farm
products declined from $146,800,000 in 1957 to $132,300,000 in
1958. Nevertheless, Cuba remained the number one market
for U.S. agricultural products, considerably larger than Mexico
with $106 million and Venezuela with $84 million of agricultural
imports in 1957.

],,{ACHINERY AND FOREIGN EXCHANGE

1f we wanted more industries, we had to import machinery and

this required foreign exchange. In the four-year period 1955-58,
we imported $439,900,000 worth of machinery. At the end of my
administration, Cuba's dollar reserves were somewhat depleted.
Yet in return, we had numerous Hourishing industries, most of
them entirely new to us, as a resu1t of our eHorts to stimulate in-
dustrial development. Many of these new plants could be readily
seen, as they were adjacent to. the Central Highway.
To achieve this great expansion in production, we did not
mock at the doors of the International Bank for Reconstruction
and Development or of the other international banks. We proved
Cuba's ability to stand on her own feet and we carried out in
practice the principle I had stated at the Panama Conference of
1955, namely, that "the raising of the standard of living of our
 129 Fiscal Policy and Taxe~

p eoples and the mobilization of our sources of wealth is the

individual concern of each nation." I had added that. while inter-
national coopera tion through negotintions, agreements and ac-
cords, was convenient, '\ve should not expect our principal aid
to come from abroad."
 14
The Public Debt

On March ]0, 1952, we inherited three outstanding loans. The

first was a credit of $11,200,000 which had been authorized by a
law of August 29, 1905. The second was an $85,000,000 loan, au-
thorized by a law of February 14. 1938, to fund obligations con-
tracted by President Cerardo Machado in carrying out the Public
Works Plan that gave Cuba the Central Highway, the National
Capitol, the second Aguada del Curu aqueduct of Havana and
other benefits. There were $48,218,800 bonds of this issue out-
standing in December 1958. Third, there was a $25,000,000 issue,
authorized in July 1948, to pay hack pensions to veterans of the
War of Independence. By Law #15 of November 22, 1949, an-
other $120,000,000 had been borrowed for this purpose. Of these
two Autentico loans, $99,480,000 was still outstanding in 1958.
The Government of the 10th of March, therefore, assumed
loans with a face value of $241.200,000, of which $86,983,900
had been amortized. The consolidated balance outstanding was
slightly in excess of $155,000,000. In addition, we had to float
loans of our own to promote the welfare of the nation.

NEW LOAN FLOTATIONS

From the outset, Cuban investors showed their confid ence in

our Administration. A $120,000,000 loaa was Houted to save the
sugar industry from the collapse it faced as a result of the Auten-
tico blunder of permitting the mammoth sugar hnrvest of 1952.
 131 The Public Debt
Thereafter, three major long-term bond issues were IToated for
a tota.1 of $595,000,000. Moreover, medium and short-term
Treasury obligations, amounting to $126,000,000, were Hoated.
Thus, the aggreg'a te of these obligations ,vas $721,000,000, which
was reduced by December 31, 1958 to $610,922,435 by full and
prompt payment of interest and principle.
On taking power on March 10, 19.'52, we found that the national
finances were in a state of chaos. Ono reason was the irresponSible
authorization of the huge sugar crop of 1952 by the Prio govern-
ment- a purely political measure. Another was that the reserves
of private retirement fund s had b een embezzled in a scandalous
manner, !vIoreovcT, high Autentico officials had pretended to
burn, and thus wi(bd raw from circulation, tens of millions of dol-
lars worth of bank notes, which werc in reality simply stolen.
These felonies had disrupted public finan ces and undermined
public confidence. Before launching our plam for social and
economic development, we considered it essential to clean up this
sordid mess and accordingly Law #925 "for the refonn of the
National Treasury" was passed on June 30, 1953.
Audits, completed by the Court of Accounts on D ecember 31,
1951, had revealed a cash shortage in the Treasury of over
$100,000,000, Most of this was due to the misuse of fu nds, col~
leeted. by the Government as trustee for private institutions. The
state had had the moral and legal duty to protect these funds,
but, under Aut~ ntico rule, it had done the opposite. The with.
drawals were chiefly due to an internal loan, which had been
£Ioated without legal authority and without the consent of the
creditors or depositors of the funds whose assets had been bor-
rowed. Such consent was a conditio sine qua non in matters of
this nature. To make the situation even worse, paper and worth·
less credit accounts from b rinks and firms that either no longer ex:·
isted or bad become totally insolvent were included in the bal·
ance sheet as Treasury assets.
The Law for the Reform of the National Treasury, together
with other rulings and measures in the same area, took care of the
cash shortage by authorizing the issuance of "credits on the Trens--
my" which were to be converted into Government bonds in the
1960 and 1961 fi scal years, After vcriScation by the Court of Ac-
counts, this issuc was set at $l 00,OOO,()(X) and it covered all the
claims of the social security funds and other groups defrauded by
the Treasury under the previous Administration.
 132 Tli e Growth and Decline of the Cuba n Republic

VETERANS, THE COURTS Al\'D NEW PROJECTS

Law # 1232 of December 2-8, 1953 authorized flotation of a

$145,000,000 loan to consolidate .five separate debts of the State.
Ko additi onal taxes were levied to senrice this consolidated
issue. Funds from current taxes were used together with pro·
cecds from the sale of stamps of the Building of the Tribunals
and the Palace of Communications and two yearly grants: one of
$1,200,000 from the National Lottery and another of $720,000
from the proceeds of the Public Works Tax Plan (Law #613 of
1952).
Holders of bonds of the .five old issues were offered $74,000,000
in the new bonds in exchange. AU but holders of $1,000,000
worth of the old bonds accepted, a remarkable testament to the
.financial solidity of the 10th of March administration. The $1,000,·
000 in old bonds was redeemed with cash.
The proceeds from the new bond issue enabled us to provide
the working capital of the Cuban Foreign Trade Bank and the
equipment for the Cuban Institute of Technological Research-
two organizations created by our Administration.

THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT PLAN

To carry out the vast plan adumbrated by Law # 1589 of August

4, 1954, it was necessary to attract domestic and foreign capital
through a government bond issue. The funds thus obtained
would be used for public improvements. profitable enterprises
and social welfare services. Accordingly, a Fund for Social and
Economic Development was instituted and the Chief Executive
was authorized to issue bonds at 41:, payable in 30 years, up to a
maximum of $350.000,000.
To make the public believe that the borrOwing was much
greater than it actually was, the Communists circulated a rumor
to the effect that other debts, over and above the $350,000,000 is-
sue, had been incurred by the Bank of Economic and Social De-
velopment ( BANDES) to the extent of $235,000,000. 'This was
the approximate amount of the .financing done by BANDES with
these funds , but it represented an asset, rather than a liability,
since those who had borrowed it owed BANDES the money. In
other words, the investors in the loan were creditors of the Gov·
crnment; the Covernment was a creditor of HANDES and
BA ~ DE S was a creditor of those to whom it had lent the money.
Since profitable projects were involved, these loans wero liqui-
dated without encumbering the taxpayer and while benefitting
the national economy.

OBUGATION S OF THE STATE

The Cuban practice had been to consider th at the various out-

lays in the budget should be met from the corresponding reve-
nues. This created the anomaly that the State, which is always and
juridically the same person, took a different attitude toward its
various debts, depending on when they were created and what
sources of revenue they laid claim upon.
It was detrimental to the nation that surpluses in preceding
budgets should he allocated to "special credits," while legitimate
debts of the nation remained unpaid because the speci.6c budget
income sources upon which they were to draw were inadequate.
The only moral attitude was to payoff the legitimate creditors
of the State promptly. When these payments could not be made in
cash and when due. because of lagging governmental collections.
then the creditors were at least entitled to get negotiable instru-
ments drn"m on the Treasury and acceptable in payment of
taxes. Of course. these debts would appenr in subsequent bu dgc t~
either as debit items or as a deduction from receipts in the year
that they fell du e.
n l ls situation prompted the promulgation of Law # 1225 of
December 15, 1953, providin g that all legitimate obligations of the
State were to be paid from the nation's revenues. This law aho
prOVided for the issuance of promissory notes in payment of cur-
ren t government obligation s. These notes could be transferred by
bank endorsement and thus were bearer instruments.
Until then, unpaid obligations of the state had constituted what
was known as "the floating debt," that is, the eternal deferment
of payment, since there was no provision for their inclusion in
subsequcn t budgets.
Our promissory notes matured within a year, bore no interest
and could not be issued in a total amount greater than 20$ of
average annual government revenue during the preceding nvc
years.
We used this instrumentality whenever it was desirable as
 134 The GrQWth and Decline of tlw Cuban Republic
we did the Treasury notes. Both were nonna! administrative de-
vices, almost routine in the public finances of democratic coun-
tries. They brought about eminently satisfactory economic results.

THE PUBUC DEBT UNDER CASTRO

Many ignorant, naive and gullible people swallowed the Commu-

nist propaganda which sou~t to discredit the fiscal policies of
my Administration as spendthrift or unsound. The same peorle
who spread the lie of the "20,000 corpses" and the fantasy 0 a
public debt of $1,400,000,000 went into an orgy of inBationary
public spending as soon as their tum arrived.
The total addition to the Cuban national debt, as of Decem-
ber 30, 1960, was $644,795,000. More recent figures are provided
by Un EstfJdio sabre Cuba, which has already been cited. Ac-
cording to this. the public d ebt of Cuba, without including obli-
gatioru of the State in private hands, amounted on April 26, 19tH
to $1,119,664,065, of which $45.485,000 represented foreign debt,l
By now, the Conununist regime has no doubt created a much
greater public debt than the $1,400,000,000 its lying propagan-
(lists charged my government with having inCUlTed.
1 Alvarez Diaz, op. cit., p. 1,373.
 15
Banking, Currency and
National Income

The Revolution of September 4th occurred at a time of economic

and financial collapse. Cuban exports had fallen from $272,440,~
000 in 1929 to $84,391,000 in 1933, or by more than two-thirds.
This was almost entirely due to the decline in sugar exports from
$216,590,000 to $61,255,000. There WaS an even greater reduction
in Cuban imports, which fell from $216,215,000 in 1929 to $42,-
362,000 in 1933 or by three-fourths.
Government revenues shrank to a fraction of nonnal. Currency
in c irculation declined from S72,186,OOO to $46,816,000, while de-
mand deposits shrank from $119,046,000 to $56,273,000. Payment
media per capita had plummeted from $54.25 in 1929 to $2·6.03
in 1933, a dedine of over 50i. Moreover, bank loans dropped by
58% from $241,700,000 to $101,725,000. The hunks still held in
their portfoH os millions of dollars worth of dubious loans which
had been contracted. before the 1920 sugar crash. In fact, bank
loans contracted subsequently to 1921 were almost entirely re~
lated to sugar production. For instance in 1933, bank acceptances
totaled only $2,2-95,000. In addition, there were $33,700,000 of
obUgations oontracted abroad with collateral of $19,333,000, con~
sisting of cash deposits and short~term assets.
1110 Revolution began under these inauspicious economic con~
ditions. One of the Covcrnment's primary tasks was to restore
faith and hope in the hearts of the people.
 136 The Growtl. and Decline of the Cuban Republic

CURRENCY

In those days, our money consisted of paper bil1s, silver, nickel and
bronze coins from the United States and $12,693,700 in Cuban
silver and nickel coins, the value of which had been maintained
at par with the dollar, even under the most adverse conditions,
e\'er since they had been minted by the law of October 29, 1914
under the administration of President Menocal.
The issuance of paper currency, or silver certificates, was an
achievement of the Itevolution. After severAl attempts, the 6rst
of which occurred toward the very end of President Machado's
tenure of office,l the first issue of $10,000,000 was authorized by
Law #670 of November 9, 1937.
Successive mintings of silver coinage became necessary to
stimulate Our economy. This induced speculators to engage in
agiotage and soon the value of our currency depreciated. When
$10,000,000 worth was minted in 1935, the peso was at 6rst
quoted at a small discount from the dollar. This continued after
the minting of another $20,000,000 worth as authorized on June
22,1936. When another $20,000,000 was coined (Law of June 23,
1938 ), the discount widened because of the expectation of fur-
ther mintings. This discount reached its maximum 12 27/3'19:, in
December 1938.
Drastic measures, adopted. through Decree #1358 of June 10,
1939 brought these dangerous developments to an end. Banks
were required to keep reserves in the proportions established by
law. The Monetary Stabilization Fund was created to service the
foreign d ebt and maintain th e international value of th e peso. Ex-
porters of sugar and molasses were required to exchange 20%
of their dollar earnings for pesos at par. 11tis was later increased
to 30% of the total value of exports. Eventually, we were able to
make both American and Cuban currencies legal tender and pro-
vide for their exchange at par by Act of Congress.
As a result of these measures, the discount declined steadily,
reaching an all-time low of 1/16th of I i in December 1942. In
the follOwing month, the Cuban peso was quoted at a premium
over the dollar and throughout 1943 the peso was in so much
demand that more than 70$ of government 1"Cvenue was co~
1 Law of May 16, 1933. Machado resIgned on August 12, 1933.
 137 Banking, Currenc!I and Nat ional Incom e
lected in pesos. Thus, within a short period of time, the Cuban
peso 'lad become one 0/ tile strongest currencies in the New
W orld.

TIlE GOLD RES ERVE

I recommended that Congress approve a law which would back

the silver certificates with a reserve of gold bullion and dollar
exchange. This was enacted on May 5, 1942. The Government
then proceeded to exchange silver certificates for United States
curroncy and to use the latter to buy gold bullion. which we de-
posited i.n the vaults of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
This gold purchase program began on May 3, 1943 with an au-
thorized purch ase of $15,000,000 worth. When I left office in Oc-
tober 1944, Cuba bad a gold reserve of $99,999,138.

TIlE F mST STEPS

There were four major financial obstacles to economic develop-

ment of the country: inadequate internal credit, the dual cur-
rency system, lack of a national banking system and lack of bu1-
lion reserves.
I detennined to create the necessary economic and financial
instruments for tbe solution of these problems as I had promised
during the 1940 electoral campaign. We obtained the advice of a
United States technical mission, comprising agricultural credit
experts and speCialists from the Treasury and the Board of Gov-
ernors, Fedeal Reserve System. After several weeks of intensive
w ork, the commission turned in a valuable report. which recom-
mended the creation of a Cuban central hank and the reorganiza-
tion of the Monetary Stabilization Fund.
ConSiderably before this, in fact in 1936, we had established
the Technical Committee 0 0 Banking and Currency Legislation.
Its recommendations had served as the basis for the laws which
ended speculation in our silver currency. For si.'( months (June
to December 1937), the Technical Committee had stayed in
\Vashington, where it drafted plans for the creation of a Supreme
Banking Council, a Bank of the Republic and an Agricultural
Credit Bank. It also proposed reforms in our currency system and
a law regulating banking.
 138 The Growth and Decline of the Cuban Republic
The report of the Technical Committee was widely circulated
among individuals and corporations interested in banking. La-
ter, it was submitted to the Senate (a body which had been appre-
hensive about such measures in 1921 and 1922 ), which opened
public hearings on these projects at which the leading banking.
economic and financial spokesmen testified.
While these public hearings were still in progress, the Techni-
cal Committee presented two reports on legislative projects and
banking legislation which provided the foundations for our na-
tional bank.
This was not a favorable moment for enactment of the needed
legislation. The project was interrupted by political opposition
and intense concentration on electoral matters. Yet these plans
resulted-six years later-in the creation of the National Bank of
Cuba ( BNe ) and its associated institution, the National Bank of
Agricultural and Industrial Development (BANFAIC).

TIlE NATIONAL DANK OF CUBA

The creation of the National Bank of Cuba. marked a turning point

toward Vigorous development of our resources. I decided to ex-
tend its activities into fields which, if they bad been foreseen by
law, had not been defined there.
A policy of freedom of exchange made me dictate measures
repealing various wartime financial controls and give the Mone-
tary Stabilization Fund additiona1 powers connected with ex:-
change controls, compliance with payment agreements, move-
ment of foreign exchange and regulation of the gold standard
( Law #569 of December 1, 1952) .
Law #384 of September 9,1952 prOvided the National Bank of
C uba with a broad er and more solid structure. It regulated three
essential activities of the Bank : d eposit insurance, procedure in
cases of payment suspension or liqUidation of private banks and
rules for certain specialized banking irutitutions.

DEpOSIT INSURANCE

The purpose of deposit insurance was to encourage saving and

create an atmosphere of security. eliminating the lack of public
 139 Banking, CUN'ency and National Incomo

confidence in banks caused by the bank failures of 1920 and

other periods. These failures had left the country in crisis and
d esolation. We decided to fanaw the procedures of countries with
n vigorous economy, which tcnd to insure all forms of wealth, in-
cluding deposits.
This insurance covered depositors o ~ member b anks of the Na-
tional Dank up to $10,000. J.t guaranteed payment, in the event of
failure of the de pository bank. to the depositors through the De-
positors' Insurance Fund. This Fund was supervised by a commit-
t ee comprising the Minister of Fino,ncc, the President of the Na-
tional Bank and a representative of the stockholders. It operated
with a capital of $10,000,00J.
By extending the samc d eposit insurance system which pre-
va iled in the United States banking system, the Depositors' In-
surance Fund destroyed the incentive to place savings deposits in
the United States rather than in Cuba.
The Fund was a ut110rized to issue obliga tions, if necessary, at an
interest rate not higher than the lowest rediscount rate of the Na-
tional Dank. to be purchased by retirement and pension funds
and social security institutions created by law.
The powers of the National Bank to intervene to protect the
insured depositors and the other creditors of associated banks
were c.'lrefully defined. If the situation of the bank subject to in-
tervention was such that suspension of operations became ad-
visable, the Depositors' Insurance Fund was specifically author-
ized to take over administration as trustee for the depOSitors and
to adopt all necessary measures to protect the rights of the parties
affected.

SAVINCS AND LOAN ASSOCIATIONS

Law #384 defined the requirements which savings and loan as-
sociations mu st meet and provided for their regulation and for
cases of liquidation. Thus, even though they were not covered
by the Depositors' Insurance Fund, the depOSitors in these banks
were given maximum security.
The flo urishing condition of these institutions under our Ad-
ministr3tion is shown by the t3ble. Figures are in millions of
dollars.
 140 The Growth and Decline of the Cuban Republic
Year Capital A!Iet.r Sub$C1iptiom Retel'OO
1953 2.9 32.5 28.3 26.8
1954 3.0 35.8 31.5 30.0
1955 3.2 38.4 34.2 32.6
1956 3.6 40.8 35.6 33.7
1957 3.6 42.3 36.8 34.8
1958 3.8 43.2 37.2 35.1

BANKING OPERATIONS

As a result of our policy of regulating banks to increase their se-

curity, they flourished. The figures which follow cover the con~
solidated operations of the 15 b anks associated with the National
Bank of Cuha. Again, figures are in millions of dollars:
Saol~I Told
YM' Copitali:.aJion D.,."." Dcporitl LooM
1951 37.1 113.6 667.7 394.7
1952 41.7 141.2 656.0 461.1
1953 40.8 159.6 629.0 427.8
1954 45.4 178.6 635.0 466.1
1955 49.3 212.2 704.0 532.5
1956 67.0 293.5 948.0 666.1
1951 74.2 395.8 1,089.9 784.5
1958 71.3 443.1 1,076.7 836.3
The above data, taken from the Annual Reports of the National
Bank of Cuba. cover calendar years and reveal the impact of
our economic policies after 1954 and the uninterrupted growth to
new record highs of banking capital, savings, total deposits and
loans. In 1957 and 1958, bank deposits exceeded one billion
d ollars. As for loans. the flow of private capita1 to business and
industry also reached levels that have never been equalled.
To increase the resources of the banking system, we required
all private retirement funds to deposit with any of ten banks ap~
proved by the National Bank for funds of official institutions. This
placed at least $100,000,000 a year mto the circulation of the
banking system.
The operations of the new Cuban Clearing Chamber, which
replaced the old Havana Cleating House, reflect the financial prog~
ress made during my Administration:
 141 Banking, Currency and Nat/onal Income
B(Jnk Cleari ngs
(millions o( dollars) 1mb
1951 4,130 100.0
1952 4,738 114.5
1953 4,237 102.5
1954 4,411 107.6
1955 5,045 122.1
1956 5,792 140.2
1957 6,746 163.2
1958 6,909 167.2

CURRENCY IN CIRCULATION

When banknotes of the National Bank of Cuba were substituted

for the old silver certificates, further minting of silver coins ceased
except for those needed in the Donnal course of business and ex-
cept for a few patriotic and commemorative rointings, such as
that celebrating the Golden Jubilee of the Republic in 1952 and
the Centennial of Jose-Marti in 1953. The last also served the pur-
pose of fDtroducing the new SO--cent and 25-cent pieces to replace
the old 40-cent and 20-cent coins.
When l1eft office at the end of my first Administration in 1944,
$234,125,212 of silver certiJicates were in circula tion. These were
backed by a rese rve of $79,850,000 in silver and $151,240,982 in
gold. This reserve ratio of 98.09% was the highest in our history.
When 1 again took power in 1952, National Bank of Cuba bills
to the value of $393,624,894 were ill circulation . In 1958 at the
end of my Administration, $488,500,000 were out. This was
hacked by 55.4% more reserves than the 25% coverage pre-
scribed by law.
After tho tragie seizure of power in January 1959, a grim story of
financial wrecking slowly began to unfold. In 1960, the gold re-
serves began to vanish while the printing presses were kept busy
making addHion:.tl raper money. This dcstmetion of the mone-
tary reserve and a the p eso as a store and standard of value
would have been incomprehensible had it not constituted an in-
tegral part of the Communist plan to expropriate the thrifty and
to wreck the Cuban economy.
 142 The Growth and Decline of the Cuban Republic

NATIONAL INCOME AND GNP

In 1957, the gross national product of Cuba was $2,803,300,000,

an all·time high. The fonowing tabulation shows the movement
of Cuban national income from 1902 to the end of 1958 by Ad-
ministration. The figures were compiled by the National Bank of
Cuba and are in millions of dollars.
Adm/nistrat/{)ns Average National Incame
( in millions of dollars)
Tomas Estrada Palma ( 1902·06) 232
Charles E. Magoon (1906-09 ) 244
(U.S. military intervention)
Jose Miguel G6mez 335
(restoration of the Republic)
Ma<io G. Menocal ( 1913-21) 676
(World War I boom)
Alfredo Zayas (1921·25) 708
( Period of postwar readjustment)
Gerardo Machado ( 1925·33) 563
(Great Depression)
Provisional Governments (1933-36) 364
(Period of transition )
Miguel M. G6mez (1936) 510
(Period of transition)
Fede rico Laredo Bru ( 193640) 500
(Period of readjusbnent)
Fulgencio Batista ( 1940-44 ) 883
( World War II)
Ram6n Grau San Martin (1944-48) 1,400
( InBation )
Carlos Prio Socarras ( 1948·52) l ,n3
(Korean War and Marshall Plan)
Fulgencio Batista (1952-58) 2,053
(Social and economic development)

Of this Gross National Product, which rose during my first six

years of office from 2.1 to 2.8 billion dollars, the proportion taken
by government expenditure fluctuated between 12.4$ and 13.2%.
 143 Banking, Currency nnd National Income
This is very modest in comparison with the United States and
Western Europe.
Prior to 1956, the increase in national income was due to the ef-
fect of loan-financed public works, to private investment and to a
higher value for exports, in that order. These factors changed in
quantity and position in 1957 in favor of private enterprise. This
was primarily due to a larger sugar crop than that of 1956 sold at
more advantageous prices. This accounted for 73% of the $343,-
100,000 increase.
This bonanza situation was reHected in the growth of the Na-
tional Bank of Cuba, the assets of which rose from $650 mHHon
in 1952 to $891 million by mid-1958. Its capital of $5.7 million in
1952 almost tripled in the ensuing six years. In a 1956 report, the
U. S. Department of C ommerce concluded: "Cuban national in·
come has reached levels which give the Cuban people one of the
highest standards of living in Latin America." 2
:! U. S. Department of Commerce, In vestm ent in Cuba. Government Printing
Office, Washington, D. C., 1956, p. 184.
 16
Financing Production, Foreign Trade
and Fishing

As we saw it, the National Bank should not be limited to the COD-
ventional activities of a central bank of issue and rediscount. It
was to become the nucleus of a congeries of financial organizations
which, through long-term investments, would make available the
capital resources required for the nation's economic development.
To achieve tJlis, it was not necessary to change the National
Bank's fundamental charter, but merely to complement it with
other institutions. The creation in 1952 of the deposit insurance
system aod later, in 1958, of the National Institute of Reinsurance,
put the nation on the road to continued economic and financial
progress, even beyond the heights attained in 1957. Only the vic-
tory of international communism prevented these prospects from
being realized. 1
The nationalist solution to the problem of sugar overproduction
in ]952 showed that private enterprise was prepared to assume-
risks and bear responsibilities in the realization of a master plan
for economic development. We were able to attract savings and
stimulate a high level of investment in Cuban development. The
National Bank contributed to this dynamiC forward movement of
the economy.
1 Testifying berore the Senate Internal Security Suix:ommittee on AUF,'st 30~
1960, former U. S. Ambassador to Cuba Earl E. T. Smith said : "'r.,: I...eteeR
hundred and fifty-seven wa~ one of the best years In the economic history
of Cuba." Communi.rt Threat to the Unitt;d States Thraugh the Caribbean,.
Hearfngs, Part 9, p. 694.
 145 Financing Production, Foreign Trade and Fishing

AG.ruCULT UnAL AND INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT

The Agricultural and Industrial Development Bank of Cuba

(BANFAIC) was created with a capital of $25,000,000. lts first
operations were highly successful and by December 31, 1958, it
had extended $103,005,700 of agricultural and $43,215,570 of in-
dustrialloans. Of these, only $430,000 had been advanced prior to
th e Revolution of the 10th of March 1952. No less than 148 bor-
rowers, most of them new industries, obtained loans from the In-
dustrial Branch of BANFAIC. The Bank's loan contribution to
Cuban economic development totaled $146,221,270.

NATIONAL FlSANCE CORPORATION

Article 49 of the Organic Law of tbe National Bank of Cuba banned

loans or advances to provinces, municipalities, autonomous cor-
porations of government or private individuals. Nevertheless,
such loans were necessary and accordingly the National Finance
Corporation (FiulJnciera NaciolUll de Cuba) was created by Law
:# 1015 of August I, 1953. In doing so, we were exercislng the
power deriving from Article 264 of the Constitution "to regulate
the development of national wealth by carrying out public imM
provemcnt projects to be paid, wholly or in part, by those who
benefit from them."
The Financiera Nacional was organized as an autonomous en-
tity, representing both government and private interests. In-
surance companies and private banks were equally represented
with the State in subscribing its initial capital of $4,000,000. By
June 30, 1958, its capitalization had increased to $6,326,955.
The goals of the new organization were to finance income-
producing public projects to the extent that they were self-liqUi-
dating. to stimulate public savings and to issue securities, backed
by the income·in-escrow of specific projects being financed.
The achievements of the National Finance Corporation were
enormous. These included: the tunnel built under Havana Har-
bor; five aqueducts, among them South Bend (Cuenca S ur) ~
whjch solved the water problem of the nation's capital and of
Marianao; the expansion of the Standard Oil Refinery on the Ha-
vana waterfront; two maritime terminals; three supermarkets; the
Windward Tourist Center (Centro Turfstico de BarIevento)
 146 The Crowth and Decline of the Cuban Republic
near the capital and the completion of the Municipal Palace of
Marianaa. In addition, there was the first hydroelectric power
plant of Cuba (PRICHEC), the completion of which on schedule
was made impossible by the spread of 26th of July terrorism,
The National Finance Corporation also contributed 336,000,000
to the building and expansion program of the Cuban Power
Company. Launched in 1954, this $135,000,000 project involved
the issue of bonds, which were promptly bought up by Cuban in-
vestors. When common stock of the Cuban Telephone Company
was offered. th e public a short time thereafter, the response was
equally favorable.

SOCIAL AND E CONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

Back in the old days after the 1933 Revolution, we had worked
very hard to put across a modest three-year plan. Since the Cuban
economy was still under the influence of depression, the task
had been difficult.
In the 19505, the situation was entirely different. In the course
of a few weeks, we floated two large loans: one of $120,000,000
to finance the sugar surplus and another of $145,000,000 for pub--
lic improvements and consolidation of previous bond issues. Cu-
ban investors, who had welcomed the lOth of March Revolution
with sighs of relief, promptly absorbed these bonds.
Our plans for development were based on some of the views I
had expressed at the Inter-Am erican Summit Conference at Pan-
ama in 1955. There I had said that the development of their
national resources by the Latin American Republics individually
was essential, particularly for those nations which bad not yet
reached a high level of economic and social evolution.
It was imperative that Cuba cease to be a monoculture, de-
pendent for its economic health on the hazards of the sugar crop
and of the world sugar market. We would have to diversify our
production and, through progressive industrialization of the na-
tion, free ourselves from dependency on foreign ers.
Accordingly, the Bank of Social and Economic Development
(BANDES) was created with a capital of $15,000,000 by Law
#1947 of January 22,1955. BANDES was to complement the ac·
tivities of the National Bank. which, by virtue of its role as a bank
of issue and central bank, was not allowed to use its assets for
 147 Financing Production, Foreign Trade and Fishing
long-tenn loans or the purchase of long-term obJigatioDS, with
the exception of regulated open-market transactions in govern-
m ent securities.
BAND ES was a special bank to provide resources and make
advance payments to autonomous credit institutions and banks,
enabling them to finance development projects comprised in the
master plan for social and economic development. In these trans-
actions, the securities which the borrower might issue or advance
would be discounted or else medium- or long-term loans would
be made with them as collateral.
Every loan application was closely scrutinized. When accepted,
the issue was backed by a first preferential mortgage on the
private company and the BANDES subSidiary. This system cre-
ated a new market for capital, encouraged and protected do-
mestic savings and nttracted forei gn capital to Cuba.
Finally. the minimum capitalization of Cuban banks was estab.-
lished at $500,000 with an additional $25,000 for each branch in
order to oHer greater protection to the banking system and to de-
positors. The banks were authorized to hold government se-
curities up to 40$ of their reserves and to subscribe to and Boat
government issues, in certain types of banking operations, up to
10$ of their deposits.

F:RUlTFUL RESULTS

The operations of BANDES were highly successful as contribu-

tions to our effort to securo the economic independence of Cuba.
The following tabulation shows the breakdown of BAN DES
loans and investments:

BANDES LOANS AND INVE STMENTS

(in millions of dollars)
Cntegory Amount
(A) Transportation:
Aviation 2o.s
Railways 69.7
Maritime 0.1
Motor 21.9
SmrrOTAL 112.2
 148 The Crowth and Decline of the Cuban Republic
(B) Industrial:
Chemical 26.5
Stone, Cement & Ceramics 4.0
Metal~ & Metallurgical 21.3
Packing 1.1
Foodstuffs 1.2
Textile 1.2
Industrial City 16.0
SunTOTAL 71.3
(C) Miscellaneous:
Government Departments 14.2
Banking Irutitutions 7.7
Toll Highways 40.0
Tourist Centers and Hotels 55.3
Maritime Projects 55.4
Labor Unions (loans) 1.1
Private and PubUc Construction 36.7
Sugar Industry 29.8
Electric Power Output 20.0
Communications and Mapping 14.0
SUBTOTAL 274.2

GRAND TOTAL 4Sl.7

FOREIGN TRADE EXPANSION

With a capital of $3,500,000, the Cuban Bank of Foreign Trade

(ECCE) was created by Law #1425 of May 12, 1954 to finance
the development and promotion of foreign trade, assisting private
enterprise where necessary.
The BCCE was highly successful in winning new markets.
The stimulus it gave Burley tobacco producers was a decisive
factor in getting this variety of tobacco into world markets. It
6.nanced tile purchase of 13 merchant ships with a total tonnage
of 39,m tons. It cooperated in improving the coffee crop, initiat-
ing new export policies and arranging tlnough its channels for
shipment of $15,000,000 worth of coffee overseas. Results would
have been even more impressive had it not heen for the ravages of
Castro and his outlaws in the coffee-producing zones, particularly
those of Oriente. Sugar sales through this organization to coun-
 149 Financing ProductIon, Foreign Trade and Fishing
tries which had not been regular customers of Cuba totaled
$120,000,000. The DeCE arranged for the display of Cuban ag-
ricultural and industrial products at several intern ational fairs,
thus opening new and rromisin g markets for them. The Bank
filled another fUnction 0 vital importance by closing transactions
in nonoCOnveltible currencies.
Und er the Communists, the Hank was transformed into the Bnnk
for Cuba's Foreign Trade ( Law #793 of April 25, 1960). As
such, it became an instrument of the State monopoly over foreign
trade. It seized control over foreign exchange and became tbe
totalitarian agency for a variety of barter and compensation deals.

NEW HORIZONS FOR FlSFnNG

The reorganization of the fishing industry and its moderniza-

tion to proVide a better livi ng for the fishermen and a. more Vru'A
jed, abundant and inexpensive diet of seafoods became a high
priority objective of my second Administration. A parallel de-
velopment of the canning Jndustry was necessary to preserve the
products of the fisheries and increase demand for them.
Thirteen thousand persons depended directly and another 10,-
000 indirectly on fishing from the sea for their livelihood. This
was one vital dimension to the problem. Another was the need
for a larger output of seafood to supply proteins during the dry
season, which is a period of meat shortage.
In my 1952 campaign, 1 had pledged myself to get special leg-
islation on fisheries enacted so that the industry would be coor-
dinated and guided by appropriate organizations under the di-
rection of men with great experience in the field, 111e first step
was to ease the requirements for fishing licenses (Law #47 of
May 5, 1952). The second step was to create the Natjonal Associa-
tion of Owners of Fishing Vessels for the protection of the interests
of the industry (Law #1670 of August 28, 1954) . A Center of
Fishing Research, which was already in existence, was attached
to BANFAIC as was the Felipe Poey Fishennen's Credit Associ-
ation, comprising the owners of the Havana fishing Heel.
In February 1953, we purchased a refrigerator ship with SOO,A
000 pounds capacity. A wharf at Tallapiedra docks in Havana
was transferred to BANFAIC for research. The Research Center
came up with very valuable findings concerning oysters, groupers,
bonitos and shrimp, It designed 10wAcost, highly versatile fishing
 150 The Growth and Decline of the Cuban R.epublic
vessels capable of sailing botb over shallow waters and the smaller
weedbeds and over the open ocean with complete seaworthiness.
One of the results of the research program was the discovery of
a large shrimp banle in the waters to the south of Cuba. This was
important enough to warrant the purchase of a large shrimp
trawler, the Don Carlos de In Torre. This was the first step
toward prOViding the nation with an oceanographic institute,
equipped with high frequency detectors, circular n ets and speciaJ
fluorescent lights used in fishing for shrimp and sardines.
After carefully considering all angles of the problem and after
a series of tests, soundings and trips to the shrimp beds (which I
joined when my brief Presidential weekends p ermitted), the
Minister of Agriculture and his stafE of technicians and fishermen
came up with practical proposals. These were embodied in Law
#1891 of March 11, 1955. This created the National Institute of
Fishing ( INP) with full responsibility for taking the initiative in
explOiting the resources of the sea. Other activities, also of impor-
tance, such as sport fishing, were also represented in the Institute.
Flexible closed seasons were proclaimed t o conserve fish and
crustaceans which were approaching depletion or extinction.
Regulations were issued on the use of trawler nets and purse
seines t o protect young species.
During the first year of the National Fishing In~titute's opera.-
tions, the production of seafood totalled $5,451,225 as against
$2,474,100 in 1051. Despite her great marine wealth, Cuba had
been importing a bout $6,000,000 worth of codfish, sardines, her-
ring and other species, chiefly from Canada and Norway.
Covernment initiative and tbe expansion of the fishing industry
gave a vigorous stimulus to the canning industry. In 1957, there
were ten factories in Cuba which canned 2,400,000 pounds of
bonito and 200,000 pounds of lobster. Thus, most of the difficulties,
caused by inadequate fishing vessels, obsolete equipment and
antiquated methods, had been Overcome.
The supply of fish and other seafoods tends to Buctuate wildly.
Many species roam over vast expanses of ocean. Others migrate
to distant places. It is not unusua1 to find what appears to be a
great bank in the midst of a productive fishing area vanish almost
completely in the course of a few days.
To initiate the Cuban fisherman in the mooem practice of his
vocation by direct trai.ning in large, up-to-date vessels, the INP
contracted for the use of the Japanese ship, Sumiyosi MOnl, en-
 151 Financing Production., Foreign Trade and Fishing
rolling native fishermen for training on board her. In the first five
trips through Cuban waters, which served to explore the coastal
shelf and deep waters as well, 3,209,350 pounds of I1sh were
caught.
The continuous and powerful n orthers of the winter of 1957
damaged many boats. T o make the necessary repairs and keep
the crews active, the smaller shipowners had to apply to the State
for loans. A govemment-endorsed credit of $102,170 was ex-
tended through BANDES to 40 small shipowners.
On January 28, 1958, we laid the cornerstone of a great fishing
terminal in the port of Havana, equipped to handle 60,000
pounds of seafood every eight hours, with cold storage capacity
for a million pounds of se:tfood, warehouses able to handle an-
other 100,000 pounds and with all the space and equipment
needed for processing, packing, canning, deepfreezing and waste
CODversion. Once the fishing terminal was finished, the ships
would no longer have to wait for days at sea before they could
berth and unload their catches. We believed that, with the ter-
minal in operation, the fishing industry would become more
pro6table and the shipowners would overcome their reluctance
to give their crews a more generous share of the catch and their
aversion to testing new techniques and methods for developing
th e riches of the occan. 2
~ The Communist regime ha~ ta ken credit for the Fishi ng Terminal as it has
lor other projects it inherited. An example of illl propaganda is in the Feb-
ru ary 26, 1961 Jssue of Bohemia, which sttltes : 'The fishing terminal repre-
sents an investmcnt of $15,000,000; it has cold storage capacity for one mil-
lion pounds of fish, with a freezing and processing plant . . . The corner·
stone of the Fishing Tennlnal Wall laid d uring the tyronny of Bntisto, but
nothing was done to go ahead with the projet:t. The purpose of the Ter·
minal was to control, tltlVugh this wharf, which is more than 100 f~'Ct long,
the complete supply of seDfood arrivin* In Havann, thus killing the other
fifty fishing ports throughout the Island.
 17
Land Reform and Rural Credit

Land reform was needed in Cuba and, during my two Adminis~

trations, we proceeded with a variety of reform measures in the
interests of the peasants and designed to increase and diversify
crop production. We would have gone further, in a responsible
and constitutional manner, jf we had had the time. At no time
did we consider the revolutionary seizure of private holdings of in-
dividuals without compensation, judicial process or recognition
of property rights. The Communist version of land reform inevita·
bly destroys the foundations of justice and freedom.
The true agrarian reform began in Cuba when my Administra-
tion introduced measures which assured coffee growers fair re-
turns and gave the workers a minimum wage and a pay scale
which fluctua ted with the market price of unhusked beans. A re-
surgence of a prosperous coffee agriculture, which had almost van-
ished between the last Wars of Independence and the 1933 Rev-
olution, became visible jn the mountainous regions of three of OUI
provinces. The next step was to grant land from the national
domain to the peasants and then to recognize the right of tcnants
and squatters to remain on the lands of the sugar plantations
under the conditions or contracts in effect.
That was the first phase of a genuine, practical and nationalist
agrarian revolution. The second, the Law of Sugar Coordination
established equilibrium among the three key factors in the in-
dustry Without disturbing the free play of competition. Small
 153 Land Reform and Rural Credit
growers-those producing less than 750,000 pounds of cane1-
were given special protection, which was later extended to all sub-
tenants and other elements with modest economic power in sugar
cultivation. \Ve also eased the payment of debt, regulated the
rentals on coffee Boeas and provided a flexible wage scale for cut-
ting, hoisting and hauling sugar cane, which varied with the price
of sugar, but which could not fall below established minima.

THE AGRARIAN PROGRAM

The 1953 Population Census revealed that 43% of the people of

Cuba lived in the countryside. Yet the nation was importing
$150,000,000 of foodstuffs which could have been grown at home.
Major reforms in agriculture were obviously necessary and it
was equally essential that they be coordinated in a general plan.
Starting with the premise that the peasant's tenure of his land
must be considered fundamental, we formulated an eight-point
agrarian program based on recognition of the right of private
ownership:
(1) Promotion of agricultural production, especially of food-
stuffs.
(2) Establishment of centers of agricultural information, tech-
nical, economic and marketing assistance.
(3) Teaching the peasant families to reorganize and improve
their methods of tillage.
(4) Development of agricultural cooperatives on a nationwide
scale.
(5) Reorganization of rural education to provide more practi-
cal teaching and to inculcate the advantages and technique..,; of
cooperatives.
(6) Construction of a network of paved highways and gravel
roads to improve access of fann produce to distribution centers
and consumer markets.
(7) Reconstruction and rehabilitation of farm housing.
(8) Development of rural credit institutions to free the farmer
from usury and ensure that he he the master of the land and
never its slave.
This program was launched with the full cooperation of the
1 There were 13,641 of them who produced a total of 4,284,593,150 pounds
(If cane.
 154 The Crowth and Decline 0/ the Cuban Republic
creative forces of private enterprise and within the democratic
framework of 3 free country with free institutions. The results, in
most cases, surpassed our expectations.

THE PEASANT AND THE LAND

We enacted Law #241 of July 17, 1952 to beneJlt the small tenant
farmers who lacked title to the land and to increase governmental
guidance to agriculture. This statute protected the tenure of all
fanners who had been in possession of farms of 167 acres or less
on March 10, 1952. These peasants and farmers were given im~
mediate peaceful and guaranteed possession "to be followed by
complete and definitive ownership of the land and by the or~
gaoization of producers' cooperatives . . ,"
Law #247 protected the poor peasants who had always lived
under conditions of insecurity on land owned by others. They were
unable to secure their tenure at law because they could not af~
ford the complicated litigation involved. The new law set up sim-
ple and inexpt.'llsive procedures for validating legitimate tenure
within the framework of private property. Law #288 of August I,
1952 gave further protection to peasants and fanners with less
than 161 acres.
As a temporary, emergency measure before promulgation of
Law #247, we proclaimed on June 3, 1952 a moratorium on
landlord proceedings to evict tenants hom farm land. The exist-
ing laws on laDdlord-tenant relationships gave inadequate pro-
tection to the parties concerned. As a result, there were minor
disorders which had an adverse effect on production and food
supply. The stay of eviction proceedings was designed to insure
uninterrupted production on those lands which were subject to
litigation until the disputes could be .finally and expeditiously
settled under the new agrarian law.

COMMUNAL FARMS

There had been constant clamor from the possessors of holdings,

known in our country as communal farms , for the legal establish-
ment of their permanent right of possession of the land they had
tilled for years. This matter was complicated by the heated contro-
versies of opposing interests, which had sought since the begin-
ning of the Republic to have these lands diviCled. They had been
 155 Land Reform and Rural Credit
unsuccessful. For our part, we intended to try to do it. We promul-
gated Law #297 of August 5, 1952., which tenninated all liti-
gations concerning boundaries under Military Order #62 of 1902.
This law alsO terminated all otTIer proceedings and established
tho right of peasants, who had been in possession of lands within
the communal farms for more than one year, to record their titles.
Numerous legal actions were brought under tlus statute, but, in
the case of the San Felipe Ranch at Holgufn, the Supreme Court
ruled that four articles of Law #297 were un constitutional. Our
AdministratioD naturally obeyed the ruling of the Court. New
legislation was enacted, in accordance with the Supreme Court
majority decision.

LAND MONOPOLIES

We were desirous of limiting excessively large land holdings with-

out destroying efficient agricultural production. We protected the
interests of the peasants in this area without adopting collectiv-
ism.
By contrast, the Castro regime completely disregarded the
principle of eminent domain with just compensation, one univer-
sally recognized by civilized society. Land was expropriated
without reference even to the Communist Law of Agrarian Be-
fonn, whereupon the victims were offered so-called compensation
in the form of "bonds," which the Government did not even bother
to printl
'When expropriated farmers dared to take their case to the
Supreme Court, they were threatened and intimidated. The label
of "counterrevolutionary" was piDDed on those who opposed
these arbitrary procedures. This oonstihttes a felony under the laws
of the dictatorship and subjects the "'guilty" p:uty to long prison
sentences or execution by firing squad.
TIle cattle industry, a shining example of Cuban hard work
and initiative, was almost totally destroyed by the Communist
regime. On December 31, 1958, there were 5,385,000 bead of
cattle in the pastures of Cuba. The typical Cuban cattleman
worked hard to keep his pastures in good shape, sought to im-
prove his herds by caroful breeding with top-quality animals
and struggled without rest to increase his herds and put more
fat on his animals. He was driven from his land by the so·called
agrarian reform. The result was that a prosperous industry, which
 156 The Growth and Decline of the Cllban Republic
had done a great deal to improve the diet of the Cuban people,
was d estroyed by neglect and incompetence. Castro and his Com-
munist henchmen cared so little for their counby that they
shipped even breeding cattle to Russia, allowing Cuba to go bun-
gry. The poultry industry was wrecked in similar fashion with
the result that chJckens and eggs are scarcely obtainable in Com-
munist Cuha.

:MECHANIZATION OF AGRICULTIJRE

To increase farm output, we had to mechanize agriculture. The

team of oxen had to be replaced by the tractor, the rumbling
oxcart by the pneumatic tire. Since a large part of the farm popu-
jation was too poor to purchase the new equipment, the Govern-
ment provided ( Law #506 of November I , 1952) the necessary
funds and established agricultural committees in each municipal-
ity to assist the poorer farmers in tilling their fields, providing
them with the use of whatever mechanical equipment they
needed.
The first purchase comprised 980 pieces of equipment, includ-
ing 162 tractors. The following year, tractor-plowed acreage ran
into the millions and hundreds of irrigation wells had been
d>-med.

ACIUCULTURAJ.. AND }.ONING COOPERATIVES

The Executive Committee of Agricultural and Mining Coopera-

tives (CENCAM) was created by Law #1642 of August 14,
1954 to accomplish the following objectives on a nationwide scale:
(1) Bund irrlgation and pumping stations.
(2) Provide silos and other grain-storage faCilities.
(3) Set up ore concentration plants.
(4) Pursue economic measures to increase agricultural and
mining output through use of modem equipment, providing the
fanners and miners with technical education as to its use.
(6) Diversify farm production.
The first project of CENCAM was in the rich, extensive rice
zone of Consolaci6n del Sur in Pinar del Rio. CENCAM provided
the farmers of the zone with tractors, plows, grading equipment,
planters, fumig ators, harvest combines, huskers and grain wag-
ons. Irrigation systems were set up for the rice acreage, produce
 157 Land Reform and Rural Credit
farms and tobacco fields of the community. Pumps and drilling
equipment were made available for deep wells. Better use of
surface water was obtained.
In the basin of Sagua Ia Grande and Sagua Ia Chiea Rivers,
comprising five municipalities in the province of Las Villas, the
most important of which was Calabazar de Sagua, there was a large
expanse of dry rice acreage owned by small farmers. They
lacked technical assistance, could not afford mechanization and
were too poor to withstand the fluctuations of fann prices. To
avoid losing everything, they were forced to sell their crops at
any price.
The CENCAM stepped in and provided dryers, silos, ware-
houses and other facilities, conveniently located for all the farms
in the zone. Later, it brought in tractors, plows and graders,
launching a program of agriculhrral production that was an out-
standing success by the end of 1958. In that year, the number of
participating growers was close to 500 with 13,200 acres under
rice, yielding 20,000 Ibs. per acre. When the Communists took
over, this community program was absorbed by the centralized,
bureaucratic monstrosity, INRA.
In Caujed, Guantanamo (Oriente Province), primitive sowing
and harvesting methods were in use and there were no storage fa-
cilities. Moreover, the area was handicapped by having only a
single outIet, the Abra Pass, which had been chiseled by nahrre
between two mountains. In the rainy season, it became a river.
This was a fertile valley, where corn was grown by a large num-
ber of small fanners who had no capital and were continuously
exploited by middlemen and gouged by money lenders.
Here we put into effect a program similar to the one at Cala-
bazar de Sagua. The CENCAM doubled production, bringing it
up to 60,000,000 pounds, improved the quality of the corn and
built silos and warehouses. When the small grower could store his
crop, he could afford to wait for fairer prices.
With the aid of the National Executive Committee of Local,
Urban and Rural Foundations (CENPLUC), another autonomous
organization, created to crisscross the nation with graded roads,
a 14-kilometer road was built through the mountain pass. This not
only protected the peasants from the torrents of the rainy sea-
son, but linked their fanns with the Blue Highway, making low-
cost transportation of corn to markets in Guantanamo and Cai-
manera and to the seaports of Boquer6n and Baitiquiri possible.
 158 Th e Crowth and Decline of the Guban Republic
The cost of hauling com was reduced from 25 cents to 10 cents
per hundred pounds and the two-hour trip from the valley was
cut down to ten minutes to the Blue Highway. Thus, we achieved
the economic liberation of the community and raised the living
standards of the 1,200 families who lived there.
Three more agricultural centers were created by CENCAM:
one in Florida in Camagiiey for rice; another in Potrerillo in Las
Villas {or agricultural and mining operations and the third in
Colon (Matanzas) for rice crops, produce and citrus. Each of
these communities had a large concentration of small fanners in
need of machinery, credit and technical education. When these
advantages, which previously had been the exclusive possessions
of the great landlords, were distributed among the small culti-
vators, the latter were able to look funvard confidently to a better
life.

RURAL CREDIT

We guided BANFAIC into agrarian credit as the commercial

banks avoided loans to small cultivators. After conscientious joint
studies with officials and technical advisors of BANFAIC and
with the new Agricultural Census in sight, we created a system of
Rural Credit Associations, which were to supervise the oper-
ations of farm cooperatives throughout Cuba, iucluding planting
and lmrvesting, storage, tl'ansportation and processing of the
crops.
Thirteen of these associations were created with 11,013 mem-
bers, representing 116,111 farms with a total area of 87,070 square
kilometers. Capitalization of $1,650,000, of wllich $650,000 w as
contributed by BANFAle, gave them financial solidity.
The Rural Credit Associations always insisted on equitable
prices for their members and in sale to retaU outlets t1u:ough a
minimum of intennediaries. In February 1954, the Associations
created a Cooperative Agency of Distribution and Supply
(ADASCA). This group started its activities at La Trocha and
engaged in the sale of its agricultural products. especially or-
anges. on a large scale. ADASCA proved its usefulness when the
market price of potatoes fell and it was able to export 12,500,000
pounds of this crop to the United States, Canada and Puerto Rico
at a profit.
 159 Land Reform and Rural Credit

LOANS ON C!\OP COLLATERAL

Wh en BANFAIC created this type of credit in August 1953 to

provide for the needs of small farmers, a $2,000 ceiling was es-
tablished and a maximum maturity of 12 months for all loans.
Crowing crops were the collateral and no liens or certi6cates oE
title were required. I n the four-year period 1953/54 to 1956/57.
16,308 loans were mad o, totalling $8,819,641. Thus, the average
loan was for $540.50.
With the Rural Credit Associations in operation and ADASCA
functioning as their sales agency, the cooperatives proceeded to-
ward group purchase of their farm implements, seeds, fertilizers.
household articles and contracts to use agricultural machinery.
storage faciliti es and crop insurance. This rapidly expanding sys-
tem of democratic cooperation permitted, among other things,
the purchase of fertiliz ers at $20 below prevailing retail prices.
Similar redu ctions were obtained in insecticides, fungicides and
high-grade seeds. Large-scale seedbeds were cultivated which, in
the one year 1955/ 56, yie1ded 35,(O},OOO plants.
But credit olone could not solve the most pressing problems of
the small farmer. Living far from urban centers, he was supplied
by middlemen who usually charged exorbitant prices. 'We set up
warehouse and distribution centers, which supplied the small
fanners w ith food , clothing, hardware and other items at fair
prices.
Small d epots of agricultural machinery were set up with the
cooperation of the Bank to aid cooperators wHh the use of me-
chanical equipment for the cultivation of their 1and. Crop storage
space was rented them as a normal component of loan contracts
with crops as collateral. The perpetual problem of the small
farmer-the need to dump his crops when h.uvested regardless
of market prices-was at last overcome. Finally, group insurance,
chiefly against fire, was underwritten to the extent of about $3,-
000,000. This expanding coperative program WBS in full swing in
the latter part of 1958 and, had there been a democratic succes-
sion in Cuba, it would have been expanded aDd improved. As it
was, the Communists eradicated it totally.
 160 The Growth and Decline of the Cuban Republic

AGRICULTURAL FINANCING

Between March 1952 and June 1958, the Agricultural Division of

BANFAIC alone lent a total of $103,005,700 against $142,086,000
of crop and produce collateral. These loans were distributed as
follows (figures in millions of dollars):

Crop or Product Lo". Value of Collateral

Rice 38.5 48.0
Coffee and Corn 22.5 32.1
Tobacco 1l.7 20.5
Coffee 9.0 11.2
Cattle 8.0 10.4
Potatoes 0.8 1.5
Corn 0.8 1.3
Beans 0.3 0.5
All Other 11.6 16.5

VENTA DE CASANOVA

Under the Agricultural Development Plan, my administration

bought the huge Venta de Casanova estate in Oriente Province
and proceeded to evaluate the land in terms of its agricultural
possibilities. My plan was to settle the peasant families there who
had previously tilled the soil as tenants or laborers. \Ve concluded
that this land by itself was not enough to achieve our goal of
transforming these penniless cultivators into prosperous fanners
who could contribute to the economy of the nation. Accordingly,
33Jf acres of the estate's total of 16,214 acres, situated in the
municipalities of Palma Soriano and Jiguan!, was set aside to be-
come the nucleus of our entire training and production program.
It had a warehouse which could hold 1,500,000 Ibs. of rice, a
husking machine able to handle 15,000 Ibs. an hour, ample drying
equipment and several buildings to house the technicians, agron-
omists and other personnel.
My second Administration proceeded to distribute several state-
owned farms that had been expropriated and paid for in full with
over 55,000 acres. Among the estates awaiting distribution when
 161 Land Reform and Rural Credit
the Communists took power were Caujeri, Ubitas and Realengo
in Camaguey.

REFORESTATION

In 1957, we created the Executive Committee on Forest and

Agro-Pecuarian Restoration (CEREFA) to intensify afforestation,
poultry production and cultivation of oiIseeds. Trainees received
special courses in Provincial Agricultural Schools. Nurseries, culti-
vating the most desirable types of trees, were encouraged. Tech-
nical aid was given to the Organization of Public Forests in the
various localities and to the National Forestry Society. In 1957
alone. some 650,000 saplings were distributed among 500 appli-
cants.
 18
Aiding Crop and Livestock Production

All plans to develop agricultural resources or, for that matter,

economic resources in general must be based on a thorough
knowledge of what is possible. Which cultivations can be substan-
tially improved? What sort of herds can best be increased? How
can the potential riches of the subsoil and of the sea be devel-
oped? How can ground water best be utilized? Increasing output,
expanding internal and forei gn markets and assuring fair re-
turns for the workers and adequate incentives for the investor are
also important factors.
These and similar considerations inspired our agricultural pro-
gram and channeled it into practical areas.

EXPERIMENTAL PLANTINGS

The September Revolution found an experimental station operat-

ing in Santiago de las Vegas. Highly successful and productive
research was conducted in its laboratories and fields.
During our first administration, we created the Tobacco Ex·
periment Station in San Juan y Martinez-the heart of Cuba's to·
bacco zone- and later a substation in Cabaiguan, Las Villas, to
serve that central province.
While working to rehabilitate our coffee plantings, we estab·
lished a CoHee and Cocoa Experiment Station in Oriente province.
This was followed by three sub·stations in diHerent parts of that
 163 Aidlflg Crop and Livestock Production
province (Alto SODgO, Dayamo and Yateras) and later two oth·
en in Las Villas (Trinidad) and Pinnr del Rio (Cabanas).
When we granted the Limones sugar central, with a mill which
was working at full capacity, to the Autonomous University of
II!lvana, my associates and I had hoped to see experimental sugar
cane fields sprout up under the guidance of th e University's pro-
fessors of agronomy. However, rather than use the mill and its
fertile land for research and study. the University leased them to
private enterprise as a source of additional income. 'Vhen we saw
what was going on, we established an experiment station in
Jovellanos, Matanzas. comprising two plantations that produced
25,000,000 pounds of sugar cane. Interesting experiments were
carried on there in the Reld of plaDt disease control and in the
creation of a hybrid cane of high yield und viability.
By Decree #.583 of May 2, 1958, we set up an Experimental
Station for Pastllres-Iater the Cattle Raising Experiment Station
of Cuba--on 40 hectares in Camaguey. Here I SO varieties of for-
age plants were cultivated and many foreign types were intro-
duced. These would be tried out on various fanns and fed to the
cattle in cooperation with those ranch men who were interested in
improving methods. We r~chcd posjtive conclUsions concerning
the best pastures and forages to fatten steers on the basis of high
proteiD yield and drought-resistant h erds.
Space limitations make it impossible to discuss all the agricul-
tural products which were studied- both those cultivated in Cuba
and those capable of being cultivated there.
We began with cotton, which had been grown over large areas
under ColonJ al rule, at which time Cuba exported the staple. My
Administration carried out experimeots on 335 acres at Ciego d e
Avila in Camnguey and in Oayaniguas in Pinar del Rio. The po."-
Hive results achieved in control of cultivation and production
costs in the last years of my second Administration were later pro-
claimed as its own achievement by the Communist dictatorship.
Geographical conditions favored olive cultivation and we im-
ported 160,000 plant stocks from Portugal and planted them in
different zones.
A hundred acres of soybeans were planted in Ciego dc A vila to
determine the ideal conditions for producing this food, which pro-
vides, not only high quality oil [or human consumption. but also
an excellent high-protein meal for animals.
 164 The Growth and Decline of the Cuban Republic
Another 167 acres were planted to sesame with a view toward
developing an oil industry. These seeds yield a high grade oil
of considerable nutritional value for humans. In Mexico, for in-
stance, sesame oil is in great demand by housewives.
In 1958, the last year of Cuban freedom, our agricultural pro-
duction, measured in terms of value, broke down as follows:

Sugar cane 56.7%

Rice 6.6%
Coffee 5.4%
Tobacco 2.5%
All Other 28.8%
TOTAL 100.0%

BRIGHT-LEAF TOBACCOS

My administration had four main goals in the Beld of tobacco cul-

tivation:
(1) Assure profitable prices for growers.
(2) Maintain the high quality and reputation which has made
Cuban tobacco internationally famous.
(3) Develop new varieties of bright-leaf tobacco with the
same desirable qualities as our traditional black leaf tobacco.
(4) Win new markets and expand old ones.
We maintained minimum farm prices for leaf tobacco, en-
forced them rigorously and thus ensured that the cultivator's hard
toil was fairly recompensed. We encouraged fair labor agree-
ments between workers and farmers to provide more employ-
ment opportunities at better wages. In some cases, auction ware-
houses were rebuilt and in others constructed from scratch with
funds supplied by Government.
As a result of these untiring efforts, the quality of Cuban Bur-
ley and flue-cured tobacco leaf began to gain international rec-
ognition. 'Vith the assistance of the Cuban Bank of Foreign
Trade, the European market absorbed the first 670,000 Ibs.
placed on the market. In the following year, 1958, we were able
to se114,000,000 lbs. abroad.
We installed the first drying plant in Cuba on the highway be-
tween La Salud and Gabriel. It covered an area of 7,500 square
meters. Utilization of drying processes in this plant improved the
 165 Aiding Crop and Liwstock Production
quality of our cigarettes, which were a blend of light and dark
tobaccos, and increased their market value.
In all trade agreements opening up new foreign markets, we
insisted on clauses which favored the Cuban tobacco industry.
In 1954, our tobacco sales abroad exceeded the $41,000,000 level
which my Administration had inherited and there were steady
increases thereafter until exports reached $52,000,000 in 1958.

COFFEE CULTIVATION

As we have seen, the 4th of September Revolution reinvigorated

the coffee industry. The first major step, taken by Law #486 of
September 14, 1934, created the Cuban Coffee Stabilization Insti~
tote (ICECAFE). After that, a series of measures became law,
ranging all the way from seed selection to revamping of bean
harvesters' wages, which heretofore had been miserable and a
disgrace. In time, we stimulated coffee crop increases enough to
meet domestic needs and even make it possible for Cuba to re-
ceive an export quota.
When I returned to power in 1952, the coffee industry was
again on the verge of disaster. A crop of 62.5 million pounds was
being harvested at a time when a 40 million pound surplus from
the previous crop hung over the market. The anarchy within the
industry (a consequence of the do-nothing policy of the previous
Administration) paralleled a similar situation in sugar and to-
bacco. The exports which we had won and which had gained
Cuba a quota in the world coffee market had virtually disap~
peared under Aub~ntico rule. In 1951 and 1952, Cuban exports of
coffee were worth merely $4,000 a year.
The economic recovery of Cuban coffee agriculture was initi~
ated by allocating the entire 1952-53 crop to the domestic market
(Law #435 of October 1, 1952). The reason for this decision was
that domestic demand was well above estimates and that by this
allocation we hoped to prevent rising costs to the Cuban house~
wife. At the right moment, minimum prices were fixed for coffee
beans, both green and roasted, and BANFAIC was authorized to
loan on the crop as collateral.
The 1952-53 crop yielded 68,721,200 Ibs. and there was little
hope of a larger harvest the follOwing year. As a trend toward
lower prices became evident, we insisted on maintaining the
 166 The Growth and Decline of the Cuban Republic
minimum prices guaranteed to the growers to enable them to
meet production costs and develop efficient cultivation methods.
Law # 1091 of September 22, 1953, based on the earlier statutes I
have already mentioned, authorized BANFAIC to continue to ex~
tend loans against crop collateral and to buy harvests, as trustee,
from the fanners whose crop it held as security for loans. The ex-
perience of those two years demonstrated the need of continued
loan aid to the coHee industry. The dual purpose of this was to
ensure better prices for growers and reasonable prices to con-
sumers. Accordingly, Law #1555 of August 4, 1954 created the
Coffee Purchase and Sale Administration (ACVCAFE) with a
fund of $800,000 with which to start operations.
In short order, the results of these measures became apparent.
The 1954-55 coffee crop totaIIed 83.8 million pounds, exceeding
that of the previous year by 3.8 million pounds. The 1955-56
crop soared to 121,226,700 lbs., representing an increase of 37.5
million pounds over the previous year. The 1956-57 harvest was
down to 79.6 million pounds, but in 1957-58, despite the terror
unleashed in the countryside by the bandits of the 26th of July
movement, output climbed to 94.8 million lbs. Beginning in 1956,
Cuba regained her position as a coffee exporter. In that year, our
sales abroad reached $20,828,000.
Production in 1958-59 fell to a mere 67.5 million pounds. The
reason for this decline was the tragic developments that led to
Red conquest of the island on New Year's Day of 1959. Of 334,-
162 acres planted in bearing coffee trees, only 212,295 acres were
actually harvested.
As a member of the Coffee-Growers' Federation of Central
America, Mexico and the Caribbean, Cuba subscribed to the
agreement for the stabilization of world coffee markets-and par-
ticularly the United States market-which was approved by fif-
teen Latin countries in Washington, D. C., on September 27, 1957.
In 1957, Cuba sold $8,269,383 worth of coffee to the United
States. This fell to $5,424,498 the follOwing year because of the
marauding activities of Castro and his Comintem agents.
Cocoa, which had played an important role in Cuban agri-
culture in the past, began its comeback after the March 1952
Revolution. High grade strains were imported and, after careful
selection of seed varieties, new plantations were started. In 1958,
my Administration left 22,445 acres under cultivation with a to-
tal production of 4,800,000 pounds.
 167 Aiding Crop and Livestock Production

CORN

In March 1952, the Cuban com economy was in wretched shape.

A controlled price of $4 per quintal had been set on the farm, but
nobody paid over $2. The BANFAIC, which had just been or-
ganized, did not have warehouses, husking machines or even
manpower. Nevertheless, we set up a loan fund for growers and
advanced money on com at 70% of the legal price. By June 30th
of 1952, these loans totalled $572,870.
A surplus of 30 million pounds loomed over the coming crop.
To solve the surplus problem quickly, we d ecid ed to stimulate an
infant fodder jndustry. Moreover, to encourage greater domestic
consumption of corn, we obligated the Armed Forces to feed it to
their livestock. In one year, 50,000 quintals were consumed in
this way. Exports to Caribbean countries were also stimulated.
Law #109:t. of September 22, 1953 helped meet the grower's de-
mand for stabilized prices. It authorized BANFAIC to buy
shelled corn over the next two years for 3):\ cents a pound and
sell it on the open market when propitious. Law #1554 of Au-
gust 4, 1954 created the Com Stabilization Administration (AEM),
under BANFAIC supervision, to proVide credit aid to growers.
The minimum price was again reduced. AEM moved cau-
tiously at JUst while the market held firm at $3. Eventually, busi-
nessmen decided to export com to Spain and Puerto Rico and the
balance between production and consumption was slowly re-
stored.
In 1958, 418.750 acres were planted, producing 322 million
pounds of com that brought $9,660,000 to brrowers. The stimulus
given production under the Plan of Social and Economic Devel-
opment had finally put an end to the unstable corn situation
that my Administration had inherited in 1952. 1
1 The very same week that Castto promulgated Law #8.51, confi=ting U.S.
prope1ties and corporations in retaliation for United Stllte, withdrawal hom
the Cuban tiugnf market, be was compelled to turn to the U.S. to buy coml
Despite promises thai tbe agrnrian reform would ennble Cuba to produce
her total domestic requJrernerlu, lNllA fanners 5uddenly found lhat tbey
had poultry feed for oruy ten days. After convincing themselves that Algen-
t.in.a was in no positJon to make quick deliveries and that the Czechoslovak
corn had been offered them at prohibitive prices, they placed an order for
150,000 bags: in the U.S .• followed by another ordu for 100,000 bags a few
days later.
 168 The Growth and Decline of the Cuban Republic

RICE

"When I turned over the Presidency to my successor in October

1944, I left him completed studies of various projects, which com-
bined development of rich hydroelectric potential with irrigation
of rice lands. Whether because he was badly informed or in ac-
cordance with his practice of never continuing projects initiated
by another Covernment, Dr. Grau San Martin abandoned these
projects so useful to the national economy.
We completed the first of them in our 1952 Administration.
After the organization of the Irrigation Community of Buey
River, thousands of acres were planted to rice, a basic staple of
both rich and poor in Cuba. Our success with rice research and
cultivation prompted many farm ers, especially in the provinces
of Oriente, Camagiiey and Pinar del Rio, to extend their sowing
program to cover rice.:
In November 1952, rice farmers had $957,600 in crop credits.
This credit program stimulated a vigorous market reaction and it
became necessary to provide warehouses in Manzanillo, Caibarien
and Havana. s On June 30, 1954, loans outstanding amounted to
$2,839,312,
As time passed, an the components of the rice industry, from
tillage and the husking mills to ultimate marketing of the product,
were coordinated by Government. This eliminated wild swings of
prices, windfall gains and losses and malign political influences
which, if left to their own course, would have jeopardized
healthy development.
Rice pla.nting on a large scale was progressing under the pro-
tection of an international agreement that fixed a yearly import
quota of 325.000,000 Ibs., subject to increase as necessary, to meet
any deficiencies in domestic production or any rise in domestic
consumption. At the time this agreement became effective, Cuba
Z Law # 1525 of Jul y 9, 19.54 gave a roneeulon for II hydt-oelectric dam on
the Toa River 10 Orie nte that would have eoornlously improved the pro-
ductive capacity of a vast farming zone. The bloody developments in Ori-
ente, however, magged the project. By Resolution #98 of Febtllary 23,
1959, the CClmmullbt regime transferred the concession to the National
Development Cammwlon. But it wa~ ne ver completed.
3 Soon after t.h.b, three more warehouses were built In ManzaniTIo; a fourth
in Caibarien, two more at Vegultas (Bayamo). a nother at ArteIJJisa and
still another In Consolaci6n del Sur in the province of Pinar del Rio.
 169 Aiding Crop and Livestock Production
was not producing enough rice (0 meet domestic requirements
over and above the import quota. This made the quota arrange-
ment advantageous for us.
Law #2028 of January 27, 1955 created the Rice Stabilization
Administration (AEA) which levied 10 cents a hundred pounds
on husked rice, whether of domestic or foreign origin. Tfie new
organization received $1,500,000 from BANDES as initial operat.
ing capital.
One of the AEA's first steps was to set basic prices-taking as a
basis the prices in the United States for the different varieties of
rice and adding shipping costs, insurance aod customs duties.
Purchasing centers were opened in Manzanillo and Caibari€n
for the benefit of growers with less than 837 acres under cultiva-
tion.

TIm WHITE STREAK

An epidemic of unknown origin devastated the rice plantations

and spread discouragement among the farmers. From the very
6rst, Cuban technicians suspected that it was a virus infection.
We decided to secure the services of Japanese specialists as they
had had long experience in fightin g plagues in the Japanese rice
plantations and were reported to be the finest in the field. These
experts confirmed the diagnOSiS of the Cubans and reported that
this type of disease was not known in their country. Many of our
rice fanners were ready to give up.
Soon after the discovery of the white streak, as we called this
plague, we found the means of suppressing it. Yields that in some
zones were 40,000 Ibs'Jer 33-acre section or even less were soon
increased to 80,000 an even 100,000 pounds. Cuban technicians
had conquered the plague and the battle for rice had b een won.
The most immediate consequence of the Red takeover in 1959
was the discontinuance of rice imports from the United States in
line with the Sino-Soviet "anti-imperialist" policy. There was also a
drastic fall in domestic production. The Reds endeavored to
offset the decline by imports from Ecuador, Egypt and Red
of
China. These countries never supplied the balance Cuban con-
sumption needs. Moreover, the rice obtained was very inferior to
the premium quality rice with which Cubans were familiar.
Trouble increased due to the chaos caused by confiscation of
the rice plantations. Ignorance and greed were in the saddle. The
 170 The Growth and Decline of the Cuban Republic
Communist Administration pledged to 'produce "all the rice
needed for domestic consumption in 1961. Yet by that year, out~
put was below the figures attained in my Administration (and
population had increased considerably in the meantime), Cuba
remained dependent on imports for over sm of its supply, "An
irrefutable proof of the collapse of rice production," Alvarez Diaz
and associates write in the authoritative work I have already
cited, "is the ration established in March 1962 of 6 pounds per
person monthly, Normal consumption before 1959 was 10 pounds
monthly per person," "

CATnE

In the last years of the War of Independence, our cattle industry

was almost annihilated. Yet, within a few years of Republlcan life,
the great enterprising spirit of the Cuban people brought it back
on its feet. The 376,650 head of cattle reported in the cattle cen~
sus of 1899 increased to 2,579,500 in 1900 and four years later a
minimum herd of 4,000,000 was constantly maintained.
In 1952, Cuba suffered from a terrible drought and the rain
gauges showed an average rainfall of 1.07 inches, an aU-time low.
These drought conditiom persisted tluoughout the followin g year
and got even worse in 1956-57. Since our Cuban dry season coin~
cides with the period of greatest economic activity, November to
April, the loss of cattle weight of up to 2,5$ created a major im·
balance between supply and demand for beef. This deficit would
become even more acute in April and May of the arid years and
sometimes the rupr1y of meat wou1d be interrupted.
Faced by one 0 these cyclical crises, we had to act quickly to
ensure a continued supply of beef to the people. As a first step, I
ordered a cattle census (Law #138 of June 12, 1952) so we
would know the achlal facts and have a more realistic insight into
the situation. We could then plan the strengthening and expan·
sion of the industry.
The job of taking the census was given to the National Army,
which had done such a brilliant job in taking a cattle census in
my previous Administration. This work was assigned to the Rural
Guard Corps and the Veterinary Department. The Census
showed 4,032,684 head of capita1, 80,000 head less than the 1946
count. We obtained these figures from the Anny for the insignifi~
.. op. cit., p. 1,:598.
 171 Aiding Crop and Livestock Production
cant cos t of $60,(X)(). Five years later, our herds WeTe estimated at
4,500,000 head. including 9,000 darry cows. Cuban beef pro-
duction in 1957 was 488,000,000 pounds, TllUs. per capita beef
consumption W08 73 pounds per year as compared t.LJ1J;h 80.5
pounds in tIle United States in the same year.
When the Communists took over, nationalizntion by INnA ce·
suIted in widespread destruction of herds, The mismanage-
ment, stupidity and incompetence of the untrained Red inter-
ventors created further havoc. In this situation, the Cuban people
began to suffer for the first time in years from a ~tringc nt meat
shortage. WIllie the regime naturally suppresses basic statistics,
since they would show the magnitude of its fai lures, we know
that the ration system as carly as 1960 provided for only" of a
pound of beef and pork per person per week. This worked out to
39 pounds of both meats per annum as against the 73 pounds per
annum of beef alone under my Administration. Moreover, sup-
plies were by no means sufficient to honor the ration stamps.

TI1E MEAT PROBLEM

The apostles of "agrarian rdonn" proclaimed that the Cuban cat-

tle industry had been the preserve of great landlords. A cursory
Jook at the statistics shows, however, that of 120,000 ranches 38,-
000 had less than 10 steers, 37,000 had from 10 to 50 and 7,500
had from 50 to 100.
Moreover, cattle ranching, because of its demands for water
and rainfall, is most efficient when conducted on very large acre-
ages. The large ranches never hesitated to spend huge sums of
money to import the Bnest breeding stock and to develop the
types of meat and dairy products best adapted to the Cuban cli-
mate and environment. It was largely due to their efforts that the
Cuban cattle industry ranked as one of the finest in the world.
Whenever economic studies showed that prices needed revi-
sion, they were revised. The increase in per capita income under
the Plan of Social and Economic Development was reRected in
steadily increasing meat consumption by the Cuban people. Meat
was always available in abundance except on meatless Fridays
when other products replaced it.
Having overcome our production difficulties, we were soon
able to export and Law #1042 of August 27, 1953 authorized the
export of Brahma and Brown Swiss cattle.
 172 The Growth and Decline of ehe Cuba" Republic
Simultaneous1y, the dairy industry was encouraged. The pork
industry was growing and output of bacon, bam and pork was ex·
panding. The Covernment encouraged the efforts of the Cuban
Hog Growers Association to bring stability and progress into tills
field. Moreover, civic and industry groups. organized to promote
new cattl e fair grounds and exhibitions of agro-industrial prod-
ucts in such different parts of the Island as Pinar del Rio, Cien-
fuegos and S£lntiago de Cuba, all received government encourage-
ment and aid.

THE POULTRY INDUSTRY

Mter the lOtb of March 1952, the Cuban poultry industry began
to take enonnous strides forward. In 1952, Cuba imported 8,708,-
852 dozen fresh eggs. By 1958, these imports were down to 337,-
910 dozen. Domestic production of eggs rose £Tom 11.3 million
dozen in 1956 to 26 million in 1958. Further rapid increases were
projected for future years.
Our domestic egg consumption of 316.1 million units (1957),
which did not include household production, gave Cuba a per
capita consumption of 47 eggs yearly as aga.inst 67 in the United
States.
In 1958, there were 20 million chickens in Cuba. Of these, 18
million were butchered annuaDy, yielding 36 miUio n pounds of
meat. In addition, 975,300 dozen eggs in incubators were im·
ported and incuba.tor farms were encouraged. These had not ex·
isted in Cuba before 1952.
New businesses and industries were constantly developing for
the better utilization of these dairy and meat products.

THE WRECKERS

The flourishing condition in which we left the Cuban poultry in--

dustry proved particularly attractive to the Communists. INRA
charged poultry fanners with deliberately decreasing production
after the Red seizure of power and this was used as a pretext for
expropriating 30 of the finest poultry farms in Cuba (Resolution
#198 of August 4. 1960) and turning them over to the manage-
ment of the comrades, people who were ignorant, incompetent
and corrupt. As a result of this criminal stupidity, the poultry in·
 173 Aiding Crop and Livestock Production
dustry was wrecked and chicken and eggs became almost unob-
tainable in Cuban households.
The full extent of the havoc caused in poultry and hog produc-
tion was revealed in a statement by the Cuban Veterinarians' As-
sociation in Exile and carried by the Associated Press on May
27,1963,
The Association predicted that within eight months Cuba's
once flourishing poultry industry would be destroyed by disease
and lack of breeding stock. It added that cholera and other epi-
demics were raging unchecked among the hog population.
'There is 100% incidence of either infectious bronchitis or New-
castle disease in poultry farms," the report, which was released by
Dr. Cristobal Gonzi:Hez Mayo, President of the Association, stated.
"Pullorum disease and typhus also are present on all poultry
farms on the Island. In hatcheries, there is no sanitation control
of any kind. All breeding stock is infected.
"Further there has been no foundation stock for a long time
and breeding reaches the fourth generation."
Dr. Gonzalez Mayo added that the quality of fowl had degen.
erated to such an extent that they averaged less than two pounds
and that broiler/roduction was down to 300,000 units per month.
(This compare with 1,500,000 broilers butchered monthly in
1958.)
Because of the lack of vaccines, medicines, hygiene and tech.
nical personnel, hog deaths '1I.ave reached astronomical propor·
tions to the point where some fanns lost all their animals," the re·
port added. Among the stricken areas were Sagua La Grande, San
Cristobal and Bahia Honda. ErYSipelas, which caused 30% hog
losses in the last region, was spreading all over Cuba.
Thus, the "agrarian reformers" turned out to be the wreckers of
agriculture and animal husbandry. The anthem of world com·
munism, The Internationale, begins with the words, "Arise ye
prisoners of starvation!" Yet it turns out that "the prisoners of
starvation" are primarily those unfortunate human beings who
live under the hammer and sickle.
 19
The Sugar Industry: From Chaos
to Stability

The history of the sugar industry in Cuba has been characterized

by massive and violent fluctuations. In 1895, at the beginning of
our final military struggle for independence. production reached
1,000,000 long tons. VVlien peace returned, there were not enough
standing canc fields or enough sugar mills left to produce a quar~
ter of that amount. But the Cuban people, in cooperation with
North Americno capital, set to work to reconstruct the industry
vigorously and swiftly: 300,000 tons in 1900, 636,000 in 1901 and
850.000 in 1902. the first year of the Republic. In the follOwing
year, 1003, we again passed the milestone of a million tons.
The harvest just before World War 1. that of 1913, climbed to
2,442,000 tons and, when the Armistice was signed in November
1918, Cuba was placing 3,000,000 tons of sugar yearly at the dis·
posal of her Allies at sacrifice prices as her contribution to the tri-
umph of the great cause.

THE DANCE OF THE MILLIONS

During the last years of the War, the Cuban harvest had re-
mained around 3,000,000 tons. In 1919, the first postwar year, it
exceeded 4,000,000 tons at a price of 5.06 cents per pound. In the
follOWing year, there was unprecedented speculation and a crop
of 3,742,323 tons was sold at an average price of 11.95 cents,
which yielded $1,022,300,000. Yet, even before the end of that
year, prices bad begun their abrupt descent and the 1921 crop
 175 The Sugar IndlJ8try: From Chaos to Stability
fetched an average of 3.10 cents. The spread of 8.85 cents be-
tween one year's crop and the next dealt a tremendous blow to
the stability of the Cuban economy.
It took many years before the nation recovered from the blow.
The nickname which the public gave to the astronomically
priced 1920 crop was "the dance of the millions." All attempts to
improve the sugar situation were in vain. During the years follow-
ing 1924, crops of between four and five million tons were put on
the world market and in 1929, the year which marked the onset
of the Great Depression, Cuba harvested 5,156,279 tons. This
was the highwater mark up to that time. The average price was
3.82 cents. Meanwhile, in the United States, an economic disas-
ter gained momentum which would shrink the nation's income by
50 billion dollars.

FACING ADVERSITY

Cane cultivation was expanded and huge mills were built in the
provinces of Camagiiey and Oricnte to process the canc into raw
sugar. These great enterprises seemed to bave been born under
evil stars. After the 1929 crop came that of 1930-4,671,000 tons
sold at an avcrage price of 1.23 cents. In 1931, the crop declined
to 3,121,000 tons, but the price fell further-to 1.11 cents. In 1932,
2,604,292 tons wcre produced, only half of thc 1929 figure, but
the price was the infinitesimal figure of 0.71 cents. Thcn in 1933,
we had the smallest harvest since 1912, only 1,994,238 tons, sell~
ing for 0.97 cents per pound.
Thus, in twelve years, the price of sugar had fallen from 11.95
<:ents to less than three-quarters of a cent and volume had fallen
by over two and a half million tons. The value of the mainstay of
the Cuban economy had shrunk by 94% in price and by about
'96% in foreign exchange value. This brought the Cuban economy
to a desperate plight.
From September 4, 1933 on, Cuba waged the hard and difficult
battle to save her sugar industry. The highly protective Hawley-
Smoot Tariff, adopted on June 18, 1930 had immeasurably in-
creased our difficulties by imposing a tariff of two cents a pound
on our sugar shipments to the United States. In September 1934,
the new Reciprocity Treaty with the United States reduced this
duty to nine-tenths of a cent. Moreover, Cuba received a quota
equivalent to 28.6% of United States sugar consumption. These ar-
 176 The Growth and Decline of the Cuban Republic
rangements were a signal economic triumph for the government
of the Revolution of the 4th of September. Thus. we moved out of
economic adversity and the sugar industry slowly regained a
d egree of prosperity.

THE SUGAR COORDINATION LAW

This statute gave field workers and tenant farmers a share in the
profits of the industry. In 1944. the last year of my first Adminis-
tration, the crop was the largest since 1930-4,111,200 tons. Al-
though we could have obtained better prices, we sold the crop
for 2.45 cents in accordance with our wartime international com-
mitments to our Allies. We assured the United States abundant
supplies of sugar and, by h olding the price down, made a sub-
stantial economic contribution to the A1I1ed forces abroad fighting
Nazism and fascism.

THE M ARSHALL PLAN

To meet the shortages caused by the ravages of war in other

countries, we maintained sugar production at high levels in the
immediate postwar years. The Marshall Plan, launched by the
United States in 1947 to assist economic reconstruction and halt
the spread of communism, provided Free E urope with the fan-
tastic sum of 12 billion dollars in foreign aid over three and a haH
years. This made it easy for Cuba to dispose of her three subse-
quent sugar crops at an average price of 4,35 cents per pound.
The tennination of the Marshall Plan in 1950 coincided with
the outbreak of hostilities in Korea. The Autentico Administration
reacted by stepping up sugar output to 5,589,000 tons in 1951.
which was sold at 5.08 cents a pound. Surpluses began to accumu-
late the follOwing year, which should h ave rung an alann bell.
Instead. free ( non-quota) production was authorized, although
no new markets were in sight, which brought output to an all-time
high of 7,011,637 tons.
This blow d ealt to the economic future of the nation and to the
interests of workers and producers was not primarily due to eco-
nomic miscalculation. The Presidential campaign of 1952 was in
full swing and President Carlos Prio decided to make the sugar
crop a major campaign issue. Planters were allowed to grind all
 177 The Sugar Industry: From Chaos to Stability
their cane; workers were promised more hours of work and bet.
ter bonus payments; sugar mill owners were promised tax ad-
vantages, provided, of course, they made generous contributions
to the campaign fund of the Autenticos. The country was sup-
posed to re-elect the Administration because of a general eco-
nomic euphoria. The deluge and the inevitable reckOning werB
postponed until after the elections.
Consequently, the sugar crisis was the 6r5t serious problem
which the Government of the 10th of March Revolution had to
face. It was not a simple one. We could not cut production be-
cause the cultivation cycle had about reached its halfway point.
Something had to be done efficiently and decisively to relieve the
pressure on world prices caused by the enormous sUl1'lus from
the previous year and the huge crop under cultivation. It had to
be done fast, without hurting the mills, without ruining the
cane planters and without creating falls in wages and salaries. We
had to avoid a price slump, which would mean an expanding
spiral of deflationary stagnation radiating throughout the econ-
omy.
Right at the outset of the new regime, we faced decisions of
extreme gravity. We asked for a vote of confidence from the three
sections of the sugar industry most directly affected and from the
nation's banking system. It was absolutely necessary to withdraw
1,750,000 long tOns from the market, placing them in a stabiliza-
tion reserve to be sold in full as soon as possible at reasonable
prices and by 1956 at the very latest. In other words, the surplus.
had to be taken off the market and dumped gradually. The or-
ganizations charged with this delicate task accomplished it fully
in the course of four years.
At the end of the sugar production season, we enacted Law
#224 of July 8, 1952 which spelled out the procedure to be fol-
lowed. Sugar mills, cane planters and workers patriotically sup-
ported the government plan. Cuban banks contributed the
necessary $120,000,000, without asking for outside help, and tak-
ing the sUl1'lus sugar as loan collateral. This colossal operation we
proudly carried out with our own resources as a nation. Some 350,-
000 tons were taken from the stabilization reserve and set aside-
for United States consumption within the quota provided for by
the Sugar Act. This amount was to be deducted from our yearly
export quotas to the United States market over the next five years.
 178 The Growth and Decline of the Cuban Republic
What was particularly attractive about this procedure was that
we sold the 350,000 tons at an agreed.upon price which was dou-
ble the world price.

CROP CURTAILMENT

It was also necessary to reduce 1953 sugar production to sensible

levels. However, I was reluctant to ta~e that step without con-
sulting the sugar industry. Law #6252 of May 12, 1952 created a
spedal commission to hear the views of interested parties.
Total output for 1953 was set at 5,000,000 tons ( actually it
reached 5,007,000 tons) and each mill was assigned a quota
based on its 1941-52 operations. [n line with my general policy
of protecting small enterprise, I increased the base quota of the
smaller mills up to 100,000 bags and set m of the total quota
aside, that is to say, 125,000 tons, for the protection of the small
planters and a similar amount for the protection of those mills,
generally the small ones, which faced major economic difficulties.
These restrictive measures were kept in force until the 1956 crop
of 4,500,000 taos was sold at an average price of 3.81 cents. By
then, the entire 1952 surplus had been sold at normal prices and
the $120,000,000 loan had been totally repaid.
The 1957 crop of 5,506,000 tons was sold at 5.05 cents per
pound. one of the highest prices since the dance of the millions.
Terrorist activities were designed to burn and destroy the 1958
cane crop. Nevertheless, we managed to meet our quota and to
inercase it to cover unforeseen improvements in demand in some
places and decreased production by other producers, notably
Hawaii and Puerto Rico. This put another 100,000 tons into pro~
duction. Accordingly, total output for 1958 exceeded that of the
previous rear, reaching 5,613,000 tons of sugar and 253,265,000
gallons 0 high-test molasses. The production of green sugar for
cattle feoo was also very important that year. All told, the na-
tional income from sugar amounted to $660,000,000 in 1958. 1
1 Law # 1335 of March 30, 1954 authotiud sugar mills to continue grinding
cane thllt would otherwise have been leh uncut in the fields. Its pwpost:
was to produce high-test molasses after filting the sugar quota. This bene-
fitted workers, plaDters and mill owner!. The same law authorio:ed the Cu-
ban Sugar Stabilization Institute ( ICEA ) to buy the molasses crop for ex-
port. Proceeds oE ~e sales went into a special fund for producers. In
1955, 13.1 billion pounds of cane produced 220 million gallons of high-test
molasses.
 179 The Sugar Industry: From C1uJ.o, to Stability

WORLD SUGAR AGREEMENT

Having solved the problem of the mammoth 1952 sugar crop with
the approval of the people, we decided to tackle reorganization
of the sugar industry in accordance with the Sugar Coordination
Law. That meant striving for international agreement to balance
world supply with world demand, to assure stable prices for our
producers and to Bnd markets outside the United States.
With the agreement of a large number of countries, and par-
ticularly the United States, an International Sugar Conference was
held in London. On October 21, 1953, an international agreement,
regulating and stabilizing the production, consumption and prices
of sugar and supplanting the 1931 sugar covenant, emerged from
the London meeting.~ Among its salient provisions, were the fol-
lowing:
(1) The basis for export quotas was raised. Cuba's quota ton-
nage was increased by 165,000 metric tons to total 2,415,000 tons.
(2) There was a slight rcduction in both maximum and mini-
mum prices and in their range of permissible variation.
(3) A more fl exible mechanism for the quota system, which
was advantageous to exporting member nations and disadvanta-
geous to non·member exporters, was adopted. This advantage
was to be maintained regardless of price rises within the agreed.
upon range.
(4) Closer regulation of declared export shortages to a1low
them to be covered from surpluses without affecting the market,
as in the case of the 1952 Cuban surplus was instituted.
(5) The Sugar Council was authorized to regulate, at its own
discretion, the use of sugar not destined for human consumption.

GREEN SUGAR

This 1953 agreement was particularly benefiCial to a part of the

industry which had already been considered as a major expan-
:1 The seemingly permanent crisis in sugar had moved Congress to approve
the Chadbourne I:'lan (Law of Octohe:r 15, 1930), which was rupposed to
stabilize the world price of sugar. This law was in force until 1937, but it!
success wa~ dubious. In May 1937, the London International Agreement
was signed to reg;u1ate production and sales. This covenant was technically
in operation unliT it was replaced in 1953 by the new London International
Agreement.
 180 The Growth and Decline of the Cuban Republic
sian possibility in our Social and Economic D evelopment Plan ,
namely, green sugar (low quality raw sugar and third-grade
lumps, together with high-test or inverted molasses for animal
feed). This had great possibilities for our internal market and also
a real potential in world markets as ingredients in feeds for Uve-
stock and poultry. The manufacture of green sugar was first au-
thorized in Cuba by Decree #1249 of April 19, 1956. Shortly
thereafter, 180,374 one hundred pound bags were being pro-
duced by the Rio Cauto, Tanamo, Santa Martha and Cunagua
sugar mills.

NEW SUGAR BAGS

During the last yean of World War U in Europe (1942-44) we

tried to meet a just demand of the labor unions that the sugar bag
be reduced from its standard 325-pound size as a means of cut-
ting down muscular strain and physical toil. We were not able to
do this at the time because of the opposition of various interests,
production difficulties and the shortage of shipping space during
wartime.S
During my second Administration, the military-logistic prob-
lem no longer existed and I gave irnnlediate attention to the
matter. Law #581 of December 9, 1952 reduced the standard
sugar bag from 325 to 250 pounds. My Covernment also gave the
workers their other major demand : representation on the Cuban
Sugar Stabilization Institute on equal terms with the mill owners
and planters,

SUGAR CANE PLANTERS

In addition to the basic law of the industry, the Sugar Coordina-

tion Law, we instituted special legislation to protect the small
planters. Law #664 of January 29, 1953 extended this protec-
tion to al1 planters producing less than a million pounds of cane.
These smaU farmers had become twice as numerous by 1953 as
they had been in 1937, when the Sugar Coordination Law was
enacted.
The common law was too s10w and cumbersome to settle the
S The jute hod to be imported from India and obviously the larger the bag
the less jute requked. since the surface of bagging increases with the square
of any dimension I\nd thc volume of sugar carried with Its cube.
 181 The Suga r Industry: From Choo! to Stability
numerous disputes between planters and mills concerni.ng the
liquidatjon of ca ne, belonging to the planters, by the mills that
ground it. Great hardship to planters and workers resulted. Law
#805 of April 17, ] 953, as amended and improved by Law
#2048 of January 27,1955, sped up the procedure and protected
the injured/lurties .
Eventual y, the relationship between the sub-planters (small
tenants who tilled their land personally) and the mills was reg-
ulated by special legislation-Law #11 of July 30,1956.
We protected the independent cane planter in his right to re.-
tain his quota. We prevented the elimination of the railroads as
cane carriers. Every year, at their general conventions, the ten-
ant cane planters expressed their gratihlde to me and to my Ad-
ministration.
Unhappily, all these constructive efforts, extended over so
many years, to regulate the sugar industry on the basis of social
justice and free enterprise and in a manner consonant with Cu-
ban institutions were swept aside as soon as 1NRA made its ap-
pearance.

NATIONAL oWNEnsmp OF MILLS

In 1939, there were 174 working sugar mills in Cuba. The number
felI to 161 and remained at that level hom 1954 through 1958. In
1939, only 56 sugar mills were Cuban-owned and they produced
only 22.4% of the sugar output of the nation. In 1954, there were
116 Cuban mills and in 1958, 121 Cuban mills produced 62.1% of
our sugar.

PRODUCTION OF SUGAR BY NATIONALITY

CubanMflI.. American Mill! Oth61' Nat/om
Pct. of Pct. of Pct. of
Yru.
1939
No.
56
Ovt"",
22.4
No.
66
Output
55.1
No.
52
Outptl~
22.5
1954 116 57.8 41 40.0 4 1.2
1958 121 62.1 36 36.7 4 0.3

The nationa1ization of the sugar industry was eHected naturally,

without any violence whatsoever. Cubans not only bought out
these foreign investments, but they extended their purchases of
land and sugar mills to Florida, Mexico and Venezuela.
 182 The Growth and Decline of the Cuba n Republic

COMMUNISM AND THE SUGAR INDUSl1W

The first step of the Castro government was to seize all sugar
plantations owned by persons connected with my Administration.
Thereafter. on various pretexts, all sugar mills on the Island were
nationalized, regardless of the owner's nationality or politics.
Sugar "cooperatives" were set up under INRA on over 2,680,000
acres of expropriated land. Five-man "Soviets," comprising dele-
gates of the INRA, members of the Rebel Army and representa-
tives of the agricultural and industrial unions (which the dictator-
ship was in the process of turning over to the Communist Party).
were constituted in each sugar mill.
People's Stores were then set up in the mills and plantations.
These were given a monopoly status and, since the workers were
paid in scrip, valid only in these stores, they were compelled to
buy there. The lCEA was turned over to a triumvirate of Com-
munist officials, on the pretext that it had failed to do its job, and
was in effect abolished.

THE NATURAL MARKET

Geography, climate, history and economic law make the United

States the natural market for Cuba. Ever since independence
was won from Spain. it was clear that Cuba's destiny as a free
nation would be linked with the Colossus of the North. A great
market a short distance from us was a stimulus for the vast and
intensive development of our tropical export agriculture, particu-
larly our sugar industry. In return, we enjoyed undeniable and
large advantages. Among these was the fact that the United
States suppliea most of our imports and provided investment
capital for our economic development, industrialization and di-
versification.
The brealdng of these deep-rooted traditions and close eco-
nomic and political ties, the ending of commercial relations with
a great neighbor capable of supplying all our wants cheaply, was
justified by the Communists as "liberating us from our slave mas-
ters." The alternative chosen was to tie Cuba completely to an
alien system, repugnant to our institutions and to our heritage of
freedom, economically rather primitive and involving an impossi-
ble economic relationship because of the thousands of miles of
 183 Th e Suga r lndustry: From Chaos to Stability
ocean and land separating us from the Soviet Union and from Red
China. This decision, dictated by Communist international politi.
cal aims, was a crime against the people of Cuba and treason to
the Cuban State. Had the interests of the Cuban people heen
considered at all, it would also have been an act of incredible
stupidity.
The rulers of Cuba have cut the nation off from the American
sugar market. The longer Castro and his Communists rule the
Island, the more probable it is that this loss will b e permanent. In
return, they hove negotiated barter deals with the U.S.S.B. How·
ever, this Soviet market for Cuban sugar exists merely as a politi·
cal expedient; it has no economic rationale and will probably
disappear in the course of a few years, leaving Cuba a bUghted
nation.
Even according to oHiciallNRA fi gures, Cuban sugar cane pro-
duction has suffered a disastrous decline, dropping from 48.0
million metric tons in 1958 to an estimat ed 37.4 million mctric
tons in 1963. The faU in sugar production is proportionately much
greater than that in cane since a large part of the latter is left to
rot in the fi elds by the incompetent INnA bureaucracy and its
discontented hordes of dragooned "volunteer" workers,
Writing in tlle New York Tim es for April 8, 1963, Ruby Hart
Phillips observed :
"Four years of Fidel Castro's Communist rule have brought vir-
tua1 economic ruin to the once relatively prosperous island of
Cuba. And the prospects for this year are even bleaker for the
Cuban people." Mrs. Phillips pointed out that five of Cuba's 161
sugar mills had been dismantled and cannibalized to prOvide
spare parts for the others.
The catastrophic decline in raw sugar production from over 5.5
million tons in Cuba's Jast year of freed om (1958) to about 3 mil-
lion tons in 1003 contributed to a worldwiue inflation of sugar
prices. With spot sugar selling at 15¢ a p ound OD international ex-
changes, the bene6ciaries from this windfa U were not the hard-
pressed people of Cuba, but rather their Russian masters who
had bought most of the crop at low agreed-upon prices,
 20
The Mining and Smelting Industries

To the country's four traditional mineral exports-copper, man-

ganese, iron and chrome-we added a fifth mineral during my first
Administration that was destined eventually to be the most im-
portant and promising of all, That mineral was nickel.
The discovery of rich nickel ore deposits in the northem part
of the province of Oriente was of vital importance to the demo-
cratic world in its conduct of global war and gave Cuba the op-
portunity to develop a new and most important industry at
Lengua de Pajato on the Bay of Levisa, With the full backing of
my Administration and Snancial resources furnished by the Cov-
ernment of President Franklin D. Roosevelt, a large-capacity
modern plant was built at Lengun de Fajaro. This brought life
and vigor to this small community which was soon to become
:m important production center.

NICARO

Construction of the Nicaro plant began in 1942. 11le plant ini-

tially cost $30,000,000. hut expansion and improvement of facili-
ties brought this Bgure up to $110,000,000. After the end of World
War II, the U. S. Goveroment suspended production.
It was obviOusly important to Cuba that this major industry,
which was then controlled by the Cuban Nickel Company, should
be reactivated. Law #509 of November 4, 1952 authorized the
company to make geological exploration of certain mining claims
 185 Th e Milling cmd Smelting Industries

located within Ihe National Park in the Sierra Crista] at Mayarl,

Oriente, to determine their nicKel and cobalt reserve.'i with a
view to possihle industrialization. C uban reserves of these miner-
als would he valuab le for those projects for hemispheric defense
with which I consistently cooperated.
On the first year of my second Administration, the old Nicaro
plant resumed operations, exporting 8,234 tons, worth $5,993,377,
of a product that had not moved in international trade at all be-
tween 1948 and 1951.
The Nicaro plant provided jobs for 2,800 Cubans and repre-
sented a contribution of at least $4,000,000 to the national
economy in wages and goods. Between 1944 and 1947, it had pro-
duced 82.5 million pounds of nicl:e1 oxide with a value of $17,000,-
000. Between 1952, when operations were resumed. and 1957,
we exported 224,621,700 pounds of nickel oxjde worth $84,887,310.

COBALT AND MOA BAY

In 1953, Mr. Lttngboume N. Williams, Presid ent of Freeport Sul-

phur Company, wrote me that their investigairms had conflrmed
the presence of more than 40 million tons of nickel ore, together
with considerflhle f"Ju nntities of cobalt ore, in the Moa Bay area.
They estimated a concentration of 29 pounds of nickel and 5 to 6
pounds of cobnlt per ton of ore.
After testing the efficiency of a ncw method of ore separation
at its Louisiana pilot plant, Freeport Sulphur organiZed. the Mon
Bay Minin!/: Company as an operating subsidiary under the facili-
ties granted by our Law of Industrial Stabilization. A $75,000,000
plant to extract and concentrate nickel and cobalt was built at
Moa Bay in nOlthem Oriente.
The completion of this plant made Cuba the second largest
nickel producer in tile world and the world's leading cobalt pro-
du cer.
In 1957, our nickel production reached the record high of al-
most 50 million pounds despite the intense waves of sabotage
and terrorism launched by the so-caUed rebels of the 26th of July.
One of the chief purposes of Castro am] his Communist masters
was to prevent th e Free \Vorld from receiving these supplies of
vital strategic metnls and of diverting them to tbe Soviet bloc. Ac-
cordingly, Castro enacted Law #617 of October 27, 1959, which
levied a punitive 25~ ad valorem tax on mineral exports. The
 186 The Growth and Decline of the Cuban Republic
Maa Bay Minmg Company complained th3t this talC made contin-
ued operation of the plan t impossible, but the Government ig-
nored it. As a result, the plant was shut d own in March 1960,
throwing 2,800 Cubans out of work. Later, ill August of that year,
it was confiscated.
The following month, an announcement was made in the
United States that Nicaro had also sh ut down. The Communist
regime offered to buy the plant for $5,386.000. It had cost $110,-
000,000. I n October, it was seized by Castro's militia. Soviet tech-
nicians under the direction of one Ivan Stigurin appeared almost
immediately. They boldly announced that tlie Soviet Union would
ship in all the ammonia and spare parts needed to put the plant
hack into production.
ConGscatory taxes and nationalization h ad achieved their pur-
pose-t o deprive the Free World of t wo minerals vital to its de--
fense and to turn these strategic materials over to the Soviets.
The following table shows the rise of Cuban mineral exports un-
der freedom aDd its decline when C astro took power:

Yea r Nickel Exporb T olal Mineral ExpolU

(in millions of dollatli )
1952 6.0 23.6
1954 12.8 29.9
1956 14.8 34.8
1958 19.5 44.2
1959 (Cash o) 9.0 15.9

S'IEEL INDUSTRY

Despite the handicap of lack of suitable fuel, we started a steel

industry in Cuba. W e attempted to overcome the seemingly in-
sunnountable barrier of absence of coking coal by using bagasse
from the cane crop.
Our firs t ste p was to produce pig iron and set up concentra-
tion plants that would enable us to export metal rather than are.
Simultaneously, we stopped the export of scrap steel, which had
run to millions of tons yearly.
BAND ES fina nced the Antilles Steel Company to build a steel
mill to produce an estimated 112,000 tons of sheets annually. Re-
public Steel Corporation contributed $2,000,000 to this venture.
We also cooperated in the establishment of a metal and alloys
 187 The Mining and Smelting Industries
plant, Metals and Al10ys Corporation of Cuba, and in the con~
struction of another plant to produce ingots from scrap metal.
This installation was to produce 24,000 tons of centrifugal tubing
-for aqueducts-using an exclusive Belgian foundry process. Its
corporate name was National Basic Metallurgical Corporation.

ATO:MIC ENERGY

A 10,000 kilowatt atomic reactor was installed in Pinar del Rio, a

region known for its cupriferous deposits of almost unlimited po·
tential. At the same time, we proceeded to build a nuclear re.-
search laboratory based on enriched uranium.
In 1956, Cuba displaced New Caledonia for the first time as
the world's second producer of nickel. With her five cobalt fields,
she attained first place in the world in production of this key
atomic~age metal. In the same year, Cuba joined the world's great
manganese exporters-Russia, India, South Africa, China and Bra~
zil. In 1957, she became the world's eighth largest producer of
chrome ore.

CEMENT AND OTHER INDUSTRIES

Until 1952, there was only one plant for Portland cement produc·
tion in Cuba. This had been built at Mariel by the International
Cement Corporation during the administration of President Zayas.
By 1958, two more were in operation: one in Santiago de Cuba
and the other in Artemisa in Pinar del Rio. Their raison d' #re
was to meet the enormous demand created both by the public
improvement projects of our Administration and by the private
building boom.
As this tremendous construction boom gathered momentum,
other industries sprang up to serve it, such as cement mixing
companics with large fleets of mixer trucks, stone quarries, ce·
ment block factories and numerous other enterprises, which
thrived largely due to the financial cooperation extended by the
economic organizations created under my Administration.
A $6,000,000 glass container plant was built by Owcns I11inois
Class Company. The ceramics industry showed promising growth
and Cuba was soon self-sufficient in bathroom tiles and various
fixtures.
Through CENCAM and BANFAIC, we gave preferential at~
 188 The Growth and Decline of the Cuban Republic
tention to the financing problems of small mining enterprises, par·
ticularly in the metallurgical zones of Las Villas and Oriente
provinces. In Santa Lucia, Pinar del Rio province, we aided in
the establishment of a sulphuric acid plant and recovery of lead,
gold and silver, using iron pyrites as a raw material. Of equal im-
portance was the contribution of the State to the development of
nitrogen, glycerin, acetate, plastics and aluminum products plants.
The bottled gas industry for home consumption expanded be-
yond expectations. By the end of 1958, there were no less than 20
producers of bottled gas in Havana alone, among them the Shell
Oil Company.

BLACK GOLD

In May 1954, an oil wen was drilled at Jatibonico, Camaguey,

which turned out to be such a big producer that it aroused a
great deal of interest on the part of Cuban capital in petrolerun
exploration and production.
Measures adopted by our Administration stimulated investors
and technicians. Costly drilling equipment was acquired and
turned over to the National Development Commission for deep
drilling operations. Applicants for this equipment had to wait in
line.
Attracted by the results at Jatibonico, several companies an·
nounced their intention to drill. By Law # 1526 of August 8,
1954, my Administration regulated the terms of cooperation with
oil prospectors. This Law to Stimulate Oil Drilling and Production
of Other Hydrocarbons facilitated the making of geological sur·
veys and the drilling of test wells. This policy was extended to
cover such other producing oil fields as Motembo, Jarahueca and
Bacuranao. It resulted in increasing the number of exploration
companies, in the course of three months, from 10 to 42.

OIL REFINmG

On November 2 of the same year, we promulgated Law #1758

which granted special20.year privileges for oil refineries, both for
those already in existence and for new ones.
The law was enthusiastically received. Esso, which had been
established in 1883 and was the oldest refinery in Cuba, invested
$30,000,000 in expanding and modernizing its Belot refinery in
 189 The Min ing and Smelting Industries
th e Havana htubor, increasing capacity to 35,000 banels a day.
Two new refi neries werc built. The Royal Dutch Shell refinery,
erected at a cost of $28,000,000 in H avana harbor, had a capacity
of 28,000 barrels per day. Texaco invested $35,000.000 in con-
struction of n refinery in Santiago de Cuba with capacity of 20,000
barrels daily. Thus, two great oil companies, that previously had
shipped refined products into the Cuban market, now became re~
finers and helped increase Cuban capacity from 20,000 to 83,000
barrels p er duy. This. of course, substantially increased industrial
employment and made a significant contribution to our national
income, industrial output and capital investment.
We also a ided in the installation of a small re6nery near the
Jarah ucca oi1 field, prOViding the enterprise with its building and
following procedures simi1ar to those we bad resorted to in Jati-
bonico, where we built the Petroleum Reseoreh Laboratory and
saw to it that th e heavy drilling equipment which the Govern-
ment had purchased was kept in constant operation.
This too was destroyed by the Communists. By early 1960,
the Castro regime owed vast sums to the oil companies.
In F ebruary, the Red regime Signed an agreement with the
Soviet Union whereby Cuba was to receive 10,000,000 tons of
crude oil in return for 5,000,000 tons of Cuban sugar. Previously,
most Cuban oil had been imported from Venezuela.
Communist pressure was exerted on the Texaco refinery to
make it take Russian oil However, due to the company's con-
tractual obligations, because of the Government's mounting d ebt
to it and because of the inferior quality of Soviet crude and the
damage it did to modern U.S. refining equipment, Texaco re-
fused. When the same proposition was made to Esso and Shell,
47 Soviet technicians were already in Havana. On receipt of a
negative reply, the refineries were summarily confiscated and
turned over to the Russians.
 21
Beaches, Hotels and Tourism

Just as autonomous administrative entities were created for pub-

lic improvement projects and to create, develop and maintain
philanthropic institutions and recreational and other community
projects, so decentralization was carried into other sectors of Gov-
ernment. By freeing these operations from red tape and enllst-
ing the cooperation of the private groups concerned. we achieved
promising results. These autonomous entities were never al-
lowed to disrupt the unity of the Stnte and certainly not to be-
come states within the State like the University of Havana or
the monstrous INRA of Castro.

TECHNOLOGICAL RESEARCH

Although a research laboratory had been created with BAN-

FAIC, primarily for investigations of minerals and other raw
materials, and another one at the National Development Com-
mission, we organized the Cuban I nstitute of Technological Re-
search (ICIT) under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Agricul-
ture. Its chief purpose was to do research in connection with
natural resources development.
In June 1952, in accordance with th e proposals of tIle Truslow
Mission of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Devel-
opment, we set up the National Economic Council which drew
up the organization plan for the entity that would later be known
as the lelT.
 191 Beach ~, Hotels and Touril'm
On December 28. 1953, we decided to e.'urnark part of the
proceeds from the bond issue for veterans' benefits, courts and
other projects to pay for the equipment of the autonomous Insti-
tute. A year later, by Law # 2117 of January 27, 1955, the Cuban
Institute was actually launched. At this time, the sugar situation
was such that it became imperative that we develop new sources
of national income and hence of employment.
The Institute was assigned an operating: capital of $500,000.
Agriculture and industry were represented on its board, espe-
cially the sugar industry, which, despite its importance, had
never had any laboratories other than those at the mills. The lab-
oratory of the Ministry of Agriculture, together with its new
building, was transferred to the Cuban Institute.

NATIONAL PLAr.."NING BOARD

This organization was created by Law # 2018 of January 27,

1955 as a "technical, consultant organization of the Executive De-
partment and to provide a scientific foundation for national eco-
nomic development and for the appraisal of land." It was to
draw up national and regional regulatory plans1 and also to study
improvement of communications and greater efficiency and econ-
omy in the use of land and the exploitation of natural resources.
Upon my recommendation, it began operations with a national
plan and then proceeded with a rlan for Greater Havana and
plans for the three tourist areas 0 greatest potential: Varadero,
Trinidad and the Isle of Pines.
A precondition for the elaboration of these plans was an ex-
tremely accurate map of the territory amI adjacent keys in addi-
tion to full demographic, economic and other data. This project
was very costly. The firs t task was to separate the mapping and
cadastral survey from the planning projects. To this end, we cre-
ated the Cuban Institute of Cartography and Cadastral Survey
( ICee ) by Law #2049 of February 5, 1955.
While the survey and cartographic work was in progress, the
National Planning Board completed the 6rst Pilot Plan of the
Island of Cuba, containing physical, geographic, social and eco-
nomic data basic to the activities of the nation. Using the topo-
graphical map of Creater Havana as its starting point, the Board
1 These regulatory plans defined the norms which economic development
should meet and the conditions it should comply with.
 192 The Growth and Decline of the Cuban Republic
proceeded with its regulatory plan. The area affected included
the neighboring towns of Marianao, Santiago de las Vegas, RegIa,
Guanabacoa and Santa Maria del Rosario.
The Isle of Pines had great potential sources of wealth and, due
to its natural beauty, unexcelled medicinal waters, historically
close connections with the United States and proximity to the na-
tion's capital, major possibilities as a tourist center. I was deter-
mined to have the Isle included in the plans for regional prog-
ress. Accordingly, I requested the Board to prepare a pilot plan
for this area that would coordinate all the projects of my Admin-
istration affecting the Isle of Pines, such as road systems, resi-
dential parks, hotel zones, tourist facilities, etc.
A project of no less importance comprised the Trinidad zone in
the province of Las Villas and was centered at the Topes de Col-
lantes Sanatorium. By the end of 1958, work was progressing on
the pilot plans for Santa Clara, Cienfuegos and Santiago de Cuba.

THE GREAT MAP

I was determined to have Cuba mapped in a scientific fashion.

The Organic Law of Cartography and Cadastral Survey provided,
in accordance with the Constitution, for the exact measurement
of the nation's territory and other topographic studies.
Use of most advanced geodetic and topographic procedures
and tridimensional aerial photographs, which showed precise,
reliable details, contributed promptness and economy to the task.
However, since the aerial photos available to the ICCC had all
been taken prior to 1953, we made an agreement with the U. S.
Army Map Service-through the Interamerican Geodetic Service
-to take new photos. At the same time, we contracted (on No-
vember 27th, 1956) with the Aero-Service Corporation of Amer-
ica for the completion of new topographic maps of Cuba within
a period of two years, to be printed in full color, with level
curves every ten meters on a 1:50,000 scale.
This entire gigantic project was completed on schedule. No
less than 324 sheets of the Great Map were made and sent to
Philadelphia for printing. For control purposes, a total of 2,345
stereoscopic models of the 115 flight lines of the air photos had to
be made, covering the entire territory and taken with photo-
grametric equipment.
This map. which was being printed in December 1958, pro-
 193 Beaches, Hotels and Tourism
vided exact datil on the geographic, topographic and other im-
portant features of the Island. The map presents the data neces-
sary for the sound development of our national resources, for
regional development projects and for equitable cadastral plan-
ning.

OTHER CARTOGRAPIDC WORKS

In addition to the Creat Map. the Ieee mapped Greater Ha-

vana in six {:oIors on a 1:2000 scale, Numerous offset copies were
made on the Institute's press. Thus, 9,000 copies of the Marianno
section were run off and used to number nnd name its streets.
nond maps were made of each province and of the Isle of Pines.
Hundreds of requests for aerial photos were made by both p ublic
entities and private enterprise, especially by groups interested in
petroleum discovery. Moreover. maps were printed for each lo-
cality in connection with the Census of Population. After complet-
ing the topographic map, the Icee started work in late 1958 on a
geological map of the country.

TOURISM

By Law #137 of June 12, 1952, we reorganized the National

Tourism Corporation and transformed it into the Cuban Institute
of Tourism. The main objective was to assist and stimulate pri-
vate enterprise and to eliminate red tape.
Without adequate facilities and access, the best tourist attrac-
tions arc worthless. We found that even in the capital, hotel facili-
ties were inadequate. In Havana, ",even old hotels had been torn
down; four were being turned into boarding houses and, of the
few that remained, eleven had closed down their restaurants.
Outside of H avana, only three provinces bad first class hotels. In
the main cities, the best hotels closed their restaurant facilities
to the general public, making them available to regular guests
only.
To make Cuba a tourist center ranking with the best in the
Americas was a titanic job. Nevertheless, the country possessed
exceptional possibilities: one hour flying time from Miami and
(our from New York and Mexico, natural beauty, a favorable cli-
mate, lush tropical beaches, romantic colonial cities, year·around
sunshine, health spas, unexcelled hunting and fishing, the striking
 194 The Growth and Decline of the Cuban Republic
beauty of our women and the traditional hospitality of our people.
We began by reviewing the regulations governing ticket agen·
cies and the work of guides and interpreters. Customs red tape
was minimized and travel barriers to tourists and transients from
the Americas were eliminated. Tourists from all American coun·
tries were allowed to visit Cuba for 29 days without a consular
visa (Law #1832 of December 10th, 1934). Red tape was elimi·
nated to allow them to bring their cars and drive them through.
out the Island. This was also done for private boats and aircraft.
Another law promoted the construction of inns and motels along
the highways and waterways, requiring a minimum area of 8,000
square meters at a distance of not less than 30 meters from the
highways (Law #813 of April 18, 1953). We enacted the Hotel
Law (#2074) granting tax exemptions to all new hotels, motels
and similar establishments providing tourist accommodations.
The results soon became apparent. A great flow of native and
foreign capital was directed into the tourist industry and this was
matched with government funds. Thirteen absolutely modern
hotels were built on first class locations to provide 2,258 rooms.
Some, like the Havana Hilton and the Havana Riviera, were given
direct financial assistance by Government. Between 1953 and
1958, the following hotels were built in Havana:

Hotel Number of Rooms

Havana Hilton 630
Havana Riviera 400
Capri 252
Copacabana 132
Havana Deauville 120
Vedado 120
St. John's 108
Commodore 100
Colina 80
Lido 68
Rosita 58
Caribbean 50
Siboney 40

By the end of 1958, Havana had 42 hotels with a total of 5,438

rooms as against 29 hotels with 3,180 rooms in 1952. Furthermore,
 195 Beache$, Hotel:. and Tourism
construction was about to begin on two others, one of them with
1,000 rooms at the waterfront in Vedado.
Hotds were also built in other Cuban cities. In Cienfuegos.
the Jagua Hotel-Motel; at Ciego de Avila, the C lego de Avila Ho-
tel; and on the Isle of Pines, the Mineral Springs, tne Creen River
on the bank of the Las Casas River and the Annex and the Santa
Fe. The boom in the hotel and tourist industry provided employ-
ment for every member of the Cuban Gastronomic Federation
and Hotel and nestaurant Employees' Union at top wages. All
this was destroyed at one sweep when Castro took power, con-
fiscated the hotels and turned them over to Communist agents
and Soviet military personnel.
During the five years immediately prior to the Revolution of
1952, Cuban tourists abroad spent $57.8 mi1lion more than for-
eign tourists spent in Cuba. During the last five years of my Ad-
ministration, this balance changed to $39.0 million in our favor.
The reversal occurred, not by impeding foreign travel by Cubans,
but by the positive step of almost tripling tourist expenditures in
Cuba. During 1958, 218,000 of the 308,000 tourists who came to
Cuba arrived from the United States.

BARLOVENTO

The Darlovento (Windward) Tourist Center, the only one of its

class in Cuba. was created not far from the capital, between the
neighboring Jaimanitas river and La Puntilla. 1t covered an area
of 600,000 square meters comprising a series of islets and penin-
sulas linked by bridges and separated from each other by canals
30 meters wide; a residential section with only one entrance and
with every lot directly on the navigable canals; some 596,000
square meters of land were reclaimed from coastal wastelands
by means of a hu ge dredging and reSIling project iD a swampy
area. The value of this was appraised at $8,100,000.

PANORA.P.flC mCHWAYS

The construction of panoramic highways of great tourist attrac-

tion, linking Cub an towns, otherwise practically isolated from
each other, by means of coastal roads linked to the Central
Highway, offered great possibilities for the development of new
industries. My Administration was not satisfied with the revamp-
 196 The Cwu;th and Decline of the Cuban Republic
ing, in the western portion of tbe Island, of the Northern Circuit
Highway from ?l.1ariel to Pinar del Rio. Thus, a super highway
W.:iS constructed fr om Havana to the port of Mariel, beginning at
Santa Fe.
Cuba's inter-American commitment to the Pan-American High-
wny, linking the Continent, had been completed with the new
highway from Pinar del Rio to the cove of La Fe, on the western
end of the Island. From there, the route would proceed by ferry
to the port of Juarez, in the Yucatan peninsula, where it would
merge with the Me,ucan section of the Pan-American Highway.
The three tunnels, two under the Ahnendares River and the
third under the harbor of Havana, relieved motor vehicle con-
gestion and ever-present traffic snarls and also contributed
greatly to the expansion of new urban areas tourism. The Pinar
del mo Nor th Circuit Highway, in addition to being the only
overland means of communication for four sugar mills, is also the
route leading to the Valley of Viii rues, an area of iDcomparable
beauty located near the famous San Vicente mineral springs of
sulphuric waters. It is also adjacent to Stone Age mounds that in-
trigue archaeologists. The entire region contains so much of inter-
es t that we had intended to turn it into 3. National Park.
In the same Province of Pinar del RJo there are other medicinal
baths of a thermal or sulphuriC nature which have attained world
fame. We restored them, put in modern facilities, embellished the
surroundings and improved access. Twenty-five bUildings were
constructed at the entrance to the town in order to house families
who had been evicted by eminent domain because of the project.
The medicinal baths of San Diego de los Banos soon became one
of Cuba's great attractions.
We built the Tourist Center of the Westem Mountains in an-
other pact of Pinar del Rio, Among its many natural attractions
were the internationally fam ous orchids growing wild at Soroa.
This region was linked to the Central Highway with a first-class
road. The project included construction of a 227-roorn hotel and
a number of attractive cabanas.

ISLE OF PINE S

Many projects were completed on the Isle of Pines. Named "is-

land of the Evangelist" by Columbus and "Treasure Island" by Cu-
ban tradition, it lncked access and we had to build several splen-
 197 Beaches, Hotels and Tou ri.s'm
did highways. The almost impassible road that linked S:mta Fe
with Nuevn Gerona had to be completely rebuilt. Private enter-
prise backed the Government in these projects and created nu-
merous new sources of employment.
L aw #2(171 of January 27, 1955 declared the Island and its ad-
jacent keys to be a tourist zone up to a distance of 15 nautical
miles to seaward. Since the Isle is famous for its abundance of
wild life, we installed the facilities necessary for hunting and fish.
ing. To stimulate its agricultural and ind ustrial development,
the Isle of Pines was turned into a free port zone. A found ation
was created for its afforestation.

THE WHITE \VA Y

Prior to March 1952, construction h ad begun on a superhighway,

chiefly for tourism, to be known as the White Way and to extend
from the nation's capital to the numerous beach resorts on the
north coast east of Havana as far as Guanabo. My Governm ent ex-
tended this highway all the way to Matanzas, passing through pic-
turesque Boca d e Jaruco. W e had to overcome great engineering
obstacles Wltil the road reached Dos Rios via La Cumbre. The
highway provides 0. colorful view of the ocean throughout and
skirts the lush va11ey of YumurL This scenic highway of more
than 70 miles considerably reduced the distance betwcen Havana
and Varadero Beach.

TIIE BLUE BEACH

D ue to its location, its extent, its fine, wh ite sand and the blue
transparency of its waters, Varadero is one of the most beautiful
benches in the world . Since it had tremendous p otentialities for
tourism, we created the Planning Commission of t he Varadero
Tourist Center by Law #2082 of January 27, 195.'5 to promote the
beach center and create the Varadcro Tou.rist Center Authority.
These organizations were vested with the powers necessary for
tbe fun development and urban improvement of C uba's Blue
Beach.
The Varndero Airport was promoted to international status and
its londing strips extended to 2,000 meters. Varadero w.IS pro-
vided with an aqueduct and a canal 1.'50 feet wide was dredged
to connect the Paso Malo Lagoon with the ocean on the north
 198 Th e Crou-ih and D ecline of the Cuban Republic
side. Another canal was dredged on the south side, to the estuary
of Cueva del Muerto in the Bay of C6.rdenas. The peninsula of
Hicacos, was turned into another island by the dredged canals.
The problellis that this project created for maritime and land
traffic were overcome by constructing a drawbridge with suffi-
cient central clearance-six meters above sea level-to allow
passage to 95% of all pleasure craft without raising the bridge.
When the dredging was completed. the L agoon became a yacht
basin and marioa for hundreds of yachts. It had a spacious build.
ing to house immigration and customs officials in addition to other
installations for yachtsmen and boat owners.
In December, 1958. an expressway from the drawbridge to the
tip of the Hicacos peninsula was neariog completion. All along the
route, there were protected mooring facilities f or aD types of
pleasure craft. The Chapel1in channels and its estuary were
linked by another canal 8,537 meters in length. The estuary itself
was continuously sprayed to destroy insects and larvae.
The eHects of this program were soon visible. Varadero be.
came the realization of the dreams of the Cuban people and pd.
vate investors showed increasing enthusiasm for its famous Playa
Azul (Blue Beach). Thus, private iDvestment in Varadero in·
creased from $245,000 in 1951 to $2,589,000 in 1956-a tenfold
advance.
 1
The Battle for Cuban Sovereignty

In this work, I deal primarily with economic and social develop-

ments and with the legislative work and constructive accomplish-
ment's of my various Administrations. This is chiefly a book about
laws and stones: laws that brought freedom within a framework
of order and social welfare wit:b.iD. a framework of free enterprise;
stones that rebuilt a nation.
None of this can be understood in a political vacuum. Acoord-
ingly, in the first chapters of this book, I shal) sketch the salient
political d evelopments in Cuba during the 1933-1959 era. In par-
tiCtllar, I propose to explain the rationale, necessity and underly-
ing d ynamic forces of our two Revolutions of 1933 and 1952.1
The Revolution of the 4th of September 1933 has been char-
acterized as second only to our Independence Day (May 20,
1902) as a m ilestone in Cuba's advance toward freedom, social
justice and order under the shield of law.
On the eve of this Revolution, Cuba was ruJed by President
Gerardo Machado, who had illegally usurped power in 1928 by
manipulating "his puppet Congress into extending his term in the
Presidency until 1935." 2 Emil Ludwig. the internationally famous
historian and biographer of Napoleon, Bismarck, the Borgias,
Kaiser Wilhelm II and many others, wrote :
1 I have covered this ground til. mort! detail in my Cuba Betrayed, Vantage
Press, New York, 1962. My personal role in these events is narrated with
facruu accuracy and in considerable det:til in Edmund A. Chester'" A
Sergeant Named Batilta, HeW')' Holt &: Company, New York. 1954..
2 Chester, op. cit., p • .26.
 4 The Growth and Decline of tll8 Cuban Republic
"On tbe pretext of wishing to complete ao ambitious public
works program which could not be finished in his fourwyear tenn,
he (Machado) devised a fonnula for maintaining himself in
power through an unconstitutional plOrogation of his powers.
From then on, a vigorous oppositional campaign raged, led by
the students of the University of Havana. The Government vainly
attempted to smother it by illegal and violent means. However,
each ne\v act of repression increased the unpopularity of Ma·
chado and the hostility toward his regime spread to certain mem·
b ers of the Armed Forces, who jOined secret organizations where
they conspired against the unconstitutional Covernment." 3
In addition to political repression. Cuba was suffering from the
ravages of a world depression which had about reached its nadir
by 1933. Cuba, in those days, depended for its livelihood on a
single crop-sugar. And in 1933, the value of our sugar exports to
the world had shrunk from an aU-time high of $1,022,300,000 in
1920 to $45,256,000 in 1933. In other words, our earnings from ex-
ports were less than a tenth of what they had been in the past.
The Cuban economy was in ruins and the Cuban people lived
through dark hours of unemployment, hardshJp, hunger and hope-
lessness.
A grave danger that we faced was that the triumph of the rev-
olutionary struggle against Machado would lead to a cycle of
chaos, disorder and civil war in which the nation would continue
on the downward spiral which had been started by political tyr-
anny and economic disaster. Moreover, the evil forces of com-
munism would do their utmost to spread chaos and intensify so-
cial conflict.
In this situation, we h ad every reason to fear United States in-
tervention under the Platt Amendment, aD intervention which
would not only do violence to our national sovereignty, but which
might again lead to the military occupation of our country by a
foreign power.'
.. Emil Ludwig, Bk!grafia de UrIO 1,{0, Editorial Cent.uro, S.A., Mexico D.F.,.
Mexico, 1948. Since the English venion reproduced here and elsewhere is
translated from the Spanish, which in tum was probably translated from
an original Cerman text, there may be discrepaudes between my text and
any American or Engli5h fldition that e.rlsts.
'The Platt Amendment, so-c:alled because it had been introduced by Sena-
tor Orville Flatt as an amendment to the Military AppropliatioWi Bill of
1901...()2, wu subsequently accepted by the Constitutional Convention of
Cuba :in order to avoid delay in the establishment of the RepubliC and was
 5 The Battle tor Cuban Sovereignty
Machado was forced to Bee the country by the combined ef-
forts of the revolutionary forces a..cd the pressure of Sumner
Welles, who had been sent to Cuba as the personal representative
of President Franklin D. Roosevelt to end the prevailing reign of
terror and establish a peaceful solution by mediation. Then, to
quote Emil Ludwig again:
"*The Republic lived through days of despair, in which its very
existence was threatened, to such an extent that it could n either
guarantee the physical safety of individuals and their families nor
the legal rights of institutions. F aced with this chaotic situation,
in which the Island fun ctioned as if it were an insane asylwn run
by its most uncontrollable inmates, on the early bours of Septem-
ber 4th, 23 days after the flight of Machado, the figure loomed on
the political horizon of an obscure sergeant stenographer, who
had connections with well-known civic figures and who enjoyed
a certain prestige among his companions. H e was Fulgencio Ba-
tista, a former peasant and railroad worker. He assembled the
soldiers in Camp Columbia and impressed upon them the neces-
sity of immediate action. Other sergeants and recruits of the dif-
ferent commands, together with some officers. obeyed the orders
of the modest stenographer, who. in this meeting and in othen
which occurred during the day, had assumed the role of com-
mander-in-chlef, assuming full responsibility for the movement
and gaining the respect of all of the subaJterns, the esteem of
many of his military superiors and. above all, the support and ap-
probation of tlle students. The military command, aloof from the
soldiery, had no conception of the seriousness of the hour and,
when it fin ally realized ft, the eloquent Sergeant Batista had al-
ready been carried by circumstances to a destiny which he him-
self had never expected.'"
Ludwig goes on to explain how the majority of the officers re-
fu sed to negotiate senSibly. "The sergeants, satisfied with the
triumph of tlle revolutionary movement," writes Chester, "h ad no
personal interests to appease. Their only desire was to see the

later incorporated as an a.ppendix to the Constitution of Cuba. It gave the

Unlled States Government the right to Intervene in the internal affairs of
Cuba in order to insure a government capable of protecting life and prop-
erty. It violated our na tional sovere ignty in lUniting OUl' power to obtain
foreign loans. In fact, it imposed upon us a trm1eeshlp under the nalian
whleh had helped m win our independence.
~ Luumg, op. cit., pp. 332-333.
 6 The Growth and Decline of the Cuban Republic
country returned to peace and normalcy as quickly as possible.
In other words, the sergeants, although they held the supreme
power in their hands at the time, were willing to allow the de-
posed officers the right to name the ClUef of Staff-the most im-
portant figure in any military organization, The only conditions in
the sergeants' oHer were that a military commission of Bve be
named to direct the work of reorganizing the Army and that the
commission be composed of two commissioned officers, Batista,
and two sergeants of the Revolution to be selected by the three.
All changes in command, all orders, all commissions and all new
regulations were to have the unanimous approval of the commis~
sian of Jive," $
The reasons for this generous offer were my recognition of the
perfectly Datural desire of the officers to regain a part of what
they had lost in the Revolution. The impotent Government of
Carlos Manuel de cespedes had been swept aside; we had
brought an end to the corrupt practices prevailing among the
high officers and we had ended the unjust treabnent and explOi-
tation of the enlisted men. We had risked our lives to end these
corrupt and evil practices and, while we would not tolerate their
reintroduction, we were not seeking personal power.
The still-necked officers refused to accept our terms. The pen-
tarchy, (that is to say, the directing committee of -five civilians
that was the Supreme Command of the Revolution), saw that
further discussion with them was useless. The pentarchy accord-
ingly promoted me from first sergeant to colonel and ordered me
to reorganize the armed forces in toto.
From that point on, I became the political authority in Cuba.
Emil Ludwig interviewed me and asked how I became the de
facto Chief of State.
"I told those around me that 1 was their colleague, but they
called me the Chief of the Revolution," I replied.!

REBun.DINC CtmA

My associates and I made the Revolution of the 4th of September

because the Republic had to be saved and because we had to
prove to the world that we were capable of managing our own
1\ Chester, op. cit., p. 70.
"1 Ludwig, op. cit., p. 340.
 7 The Battle lor Cuban Sovereignty
aHairs. And we did prove that. A program of the Revolution be-
gan to assume shape. Its cornerstones included the establishment
of the complete and unconditional independence of Cuba from
foreign nations; the defense of the rights of labor; a regime of
dignity and justice for the soldiers of the armed forces and, finally,
the reconstruction of the national economy.
The poverty of the people, the lack of funds in the Treasury
and the alarming collapse of authority caused us anxious hours.
Law and order had dissolved as soon as Machado was over~
thrown. s This was a situation in which we would have to move
with discretion and skill. but nonetheless swiftly and CDergeti~
cally.

FIClITING U.S. INTERVENTION

As dawn broke on the fateful day of September 4, 1933, rumors

were rife in the Cuban capital, but the American Ambassador
was unaware of what was about to happen.1I By 8:10 of the fol~
lOwing morning, however, Mr. Welles was able to telephone his
superior, Secretary of State Cordell Hull in Washington, and in~
form him that a successful revolution had broken out, that -...
all military officers have been removed and a sergeant named Ba~
tista has been installed as Chief of Staff ... This must have
N

8 Sergio Carh6, editor of La SemDntl, a great revolutionary and one of the

oulslandiog leaders in the struggle aga.lort Machado tyranny, re<:a1led
many years later: ''The demand of the hour, after the overthrow of the
tyranny, was the establishment of a sound authOrity. To do that, it was
necessary to reorganize the Army, in which there were ~till, despite the
public scandals and vigorous opposition of the young officers, many of the
i:l:esplsed figures who had served as assass hu and executioners for the pre-
vious (Machado) government. That is why the Anny did not havo the
moral force to clear the streets of shameful $pectades staged by maraud·
ers and the killers of porristfU (Machado secret police) , whose cheap ex~
hibltionism contrasted so 5harply with the heroic records of the true
revolutionaries who had faced death so many times in the difficult days
01 the fight agamn the tyrant." Quoted in Chester, op. cU., pp. 72-73.
II "'Phil told Ambassador Welles about the plot to overthtOW' the government
and was laughed at for h15 pains, , . Phil came back to the office much
r. 0voked. He remarked that U the Ambassador wouldn't listen he would
ave to take the consequences." Ruby Hart Phillips, C!.Iba: [,land of Parts-
din, McDowdl. Obolensky, New Yon.:. 1959, p. 51. "Phil" W lJ James
Doyle Phillip.!:. New fork Time, correspondent in Cuba and hWlband of
tho author. The diary entt)' from which Mrs. Pbi.1lips quoted wu dated
AUgWIt 20, 1933.
 8 The Growth and Decline of the Cuban Republic
been rather embarrassing for him as he had reported less than a
month previously that "the Army appears completely loyal to the
new government.'" 10
From then on, Welles technically ceased to be Ambassador and
became the Personal Representative of the President of the
United States. The leaders of the various revolutionary factions,
who had been involved in lengthy discussions with Welles on the
ways and means of stabilizing the weak de Cespedes regime
which they had set up barely 20 days previously, found it hard to
believe that new forces were firmly in control.
When I assumed direct command of the armed forces and
leadership of the Government, Ambassador Welles found the
situation even more confusing than before and asked his Govem-
ment to send more warships to Cuba. Accordingly, 29 naval ves-
sels were ordered to neighboring waters in early September;
Marine air squadrons were alerted; Marine infantry detachments
were assembled at Quantico, Virginia, and Port Everglades, Flor-
ida, and Marine pilots were ordered to be prepared to fly south
"on a moment's notice." 11
The next day, Welles reported to his Government:
"I believe that the situation js deteriorating fast. I had a meet-
ing with the political leaders of the Republic12 in which they ex-
pressed that they deemed it advisable for us to land !!lome troops.
It is my opinion that in that case part of them could be brought
to the American Embassy for protection and others to the Na-
tional Hotel. This does not mean that they would patrol or any-
thing of the sort. The trouble is that we have only fifty men avail-
able on board the MacFarland now in port. Please advise jf the
Richmond is arriving tomorrow ....
So serious did Welles deem the situation that barely an hour
later he sent a dispatch to Washington, urging that troops be
landed: "I consider that it is absolutely necessary to bring men
to the Embassy now, as we only have the protection of a few
police within the Embassy building. 1 don't know what will hap-
pen shortly if we don't have some men here."

10 Tha.t is to say, the de Cespedes regime. This dispatch, dated August 13.
is quoted in Chester, op. cit., p. 54.
1l Robert F. Smith, The United States and Cuba, Bookman Associates, New
York, 2d edition 1982, p. 150.
12 That is to say, the remnants of tha de Cespedes group and othel' elements
opposed to the pentarchy.
 9 The Battle for Cuban Sovereignty
Several days after those dispatches had been sent, Mr. WeUes
and I had a quiet and courteous conversation-a rarity in those
troubJed days. He revealed the concern of his Government that
the anarchy in the country would spread. Sugar mills were still
controlled by Communists in some areas. Communist agents were
stirring up the masses in the capital itself, threatening to raid
American properties and to seize the public utlJjties.
'10 view of this situation," Welles told me, "1 fear that the
forces of law and order may be unable to control the riots, 1£ they
break Out, and this would jeopardize the lives of the people ....
He went on to remind me that, under the Platt Amendment,
the Government of the United States was responsible for the per-
sonal safety of the people and their property. In expressing these
thoughts, Ambassador Welles avoided making any direct state-
ment about intervention. In this, he was faithfully interpreting
the policies of President Roosevelt and Secretary of State Hull, as
we now know ITom the published text of the dispatches between
HuD and Welles.

UPHOLDING NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY

In reply to this, I told Mr. Welles that our revolutionary move-

ment had heen prompted by a spirit of nationalism and a d emand
for full sovereignty. Our armed forces were undergOing reorgani-
zation, but, 1 assured him, they could aod would maintain law
and order. Moreover, we would see that the lives and property of
American nationals in Cuba would have the same protection that
would be aC(!orded to others. I reminded him that on September
4th the Civilian Revolutionary Junta had issued a declaration of
principles which contained a pledge to honor all treaties and in-
ternational agreements signed by Cuba with one exception.
That exception was the Platt Amendment. Moreover, any ap-
proach based on the Platt Amendment was out of the question.
Welles replied that the United States had no intention of inter-
vening. It merely sought to protect American lives and property.
He then revealed bis plan to land Marines for the sole purpose of
guarding North American properties and h omes and suggested
the possibility of establishing "neutral zones" to avoid friction.
These "neutral zones," he added, would consist of the houses and
hotels where American citizens lived. the offices. factories and
other enterprises which they owned and the estates and plants-
 ]0 The Growth and Decline of the Cuban Republic
tions which they possessed. He cited as examples the Cuban Tele-
phone Company, the Cuban Electric Company and several
ranches and plantations. In places where Americans lived in
widely scattered areas, he proposed that they be temporarily COD-
centrated in hotels which would then be made part of the "'neu-
tral zones."
I told him we would not even consider this fannu1a. It would
be most dangerous for both countries. It would provoke much
greater difficulties than those we were now facing. He was asking
us to acquiesce to military intervention.
We have faith in the Cuban people, I added. Since one of the
main objectives of the Revolution was the attainment of complete
sovereignty, we could never convince the people that they should
accept this elan, even if we desired to convince them. "The smalJ...
est landing. I emphasized, "would only result in great loss of life
and bring about the collapse of autflOrity.'"
In defining my attitude, ] reiterated our deep feelings of
friendship for the American people and stressed my desire that
the relations between our two countries be maintained on a per-
manent basis of mutual friendship and understanding.

TIlE GOOD NEICHBOR POlJCY

The impression I got was that Welles had not grasped the signifi-
cance of my remarks. He expressed his appreciation of my atti-
tude and said that it coincided with President Roosevelt's Cood
Neighbor Policy, adding that Cuba was of particular interest to
him because the United States had helped her win independence
and had promised to defend her sovereignty against foreign ag-
gression. Welles promised to report my views to his superiors and
wished me good luck.
The days that followed the 4th of September were extremely
tense for C uba and extremely confusing for W elles. Ever since
his arrival in Cuba four months earlier ( on May 7,1933 ), he had
been swamped with requests for interviews and had given myriad
reports, olten tendentious and erroneous. IS
IS 'Velles' ins tructions as mediator were
'"You will .. . regard u your chief objective the negotiation of a def-
inlte, detailed and binding understanding between the present Cuban
government ( that of Machado ), and the responsible leaden of the fac-
tions opposed to it, wmeb will lead to l truce in the present dangerous
 11 The Battle for Cuban Sovereignty
In the Cuban situation of 1933, our hopes for success rested on
the new armed forces that we were organizing, despite continu-
ous conspiracies which were breaking out at various points in the
Island. The Communists were also doing their ubnost to foster
chaos. As soon as the new "Army of the Sergeants" established
command posts in the key areas, Red plunderings and assaults
ceased. Later, the Communists again attempted to create chaos.
However, our revolutionary movement was a powerful social
force, led by dedicated men. It was dramatically symbolized in
La Semana. of Sergio Carb6 by three figures advancing arm in
arm: a soldier in uniform, a mechanic and a student.
Meanwhile, the supporters of the mediation negotiations in-
sisted. that the only possible solution was for me to resign. They
regarded me as unacceptable because I was a newcomer who had
climbed to supreme command of the nation from the humble
position of sergeant. However, de Cespedes fin ally conceded that
his Administration was incapable of restoring order and that my
associates and I were working with aU our might to bring the na-
tion back to peaceful and orderly paths. Moreover, he conceded
that we were effectively solving the vexatious problem of the de-
posed commissioned officers, who had refu sed our moderate
terms and had now taken over the National Hotel. where Sumner
Welles was temporarily staying.

CUNBOAT CRISIS

During these decisive moments, the mediators plotted to depose

me at a meeting with the rebeJlious officers. Ambassador Welles
was advised of this scheme and assured that it would succeed. He
sent a dispatch to the State Department, outlining this plot,
which had heen set for September 7th or some later date. The
reply he received from Secretary of State Hull rejected interven-
tion.
"We most emphatically deem," Hull informed him, "'that what-
ever promise was made or even only suggested with reference to
U.S. action (i.e. the landing of American troops) would be COD-
sidered a breach of neutrality in support of one faction over
others and that every attempt to form a government under such
political R~tatiOIl to COtItinue Ulltil such time as nRUonal elections can be
held {n cUba .. ," SecretRry of State to Appointed Ambassador In Cuba,
May I, 1933, NA. 7l1.37/178a (FR,1933-V:28.5).
 12 The Growth and Decline of the Cuban Republic
conditions would be Interpreted by the whole world, and par-
ticularly Latin America, as an artificial creation by the U. S. Gov-
ernment."
Because the Island was ringed with warships, many Cubans
believed that the United. States Government was about to
intervene. Professors, students, members of the provisional govern-
ment and supporters of the Revolution, who were gravely COD-
cerned with impending intervention, would continuously inter-
rupt me in my difficult tasks. Many Cubans fervently hoped that
the Marines would land. Their persistent efforts to bring ahout
the downfall of the pentarchy by any and all means made it nec-
essary for me to plan for our defense and keep our small Army.
still in process of reorganization, in a state of alert. At the same
time, we sent troops to protect American property and reaffirmed.
om desire to maintain good relations and close friendship with
our powerful neighbor; however, without sacrificing an iota of
our sovereignty and national independence.
Until November. we continued to attempt mediation with the
former officers, who used violent methods, including bombing my
house from the air. Rumors persisted that the United States
favored the ex-officers and that it would oppose our revolutionary
regime despite the Good Neighbor Policy.
On November 20th, Sumner Welles was recalled to Washing-
too to resume his duties as Assistant Secretary of State. This was
necessary because Secretary Hull was proceeding to the Pan
American Conference, meeting at Montevideo on December 3rd,
and Welles would serve as Acting Secretary during his absence.
Before he left Cuba, Welles let it be known that his opinion of
the revolutionary regune had become favorable. This was be-
cause of my refusal to allow gangs of radical students and work-
ers to seize the newspapers by violence. Welles stated that the
Cuban press was in favor of Batista. Eleven years later, in his
book, The Time for Decision, Welles endorsed the "Revolution of
the Sergeants'" and characterized me as an "extraordinarily bril-
liant figure."
Although he did not relish the firm attitude I took at all times
toward the Platt Amendment, Welles informed the State Depart-
ment during the last weeks of his mission in Cuba that I "seemed
to be the only person having authority'" and that this "was due
partly to his (my) etiective action against Co.aununists and ex-
treme radical elements."
 13 The Battle for Cuban SOf,creignty
On D ecember 18, 1933, Welles was replaced by career diplo-
mat Jefferson Caffery. Ambassador Caffery always respected Cu~
ban sovereignty and avoided interference in our internal affairs.
On January 14. 1934, Dr. Ram6n-Grau San Martin, whose pro-
visional Government had Dot been recognized by the United
States or by a majority of the other nations, resigned his office. He
was replaced by Carlos Hevia for a period of about 24 hours, who
was followed by Dr. Carlos Mendieta, a Medical Colonel of the
War of Independence, who took over the Government on Janu-
ary 16th by popular acclaim.
'flrree months later, the Platt Amendment was repealed by a
bilateral treaty signed in Washington on May 29, 1934. This not
only abrogated the treaty of May 22, 1903, hut modilied the right
of the United States to Jease naval and fueling stations, limiting
these privileges to part of Cuantanamo Bay.
After five years, Chester wrote, my attack on the Platt Amend·
ment had resulted in its repeal and Cuba had "gained full saver·
eignty for the first time in its history.'" It.
It Chestt:r, op. cit., p. 114.
 2
Reconstruction and Political Struggles

Small Communist groups sprouted up in Cuba in the early 19205

and in 1925 thar united to form the Communist Party of Cuba.
The first Genera Secretary of the Party was Nicanor McPartland,
who used the nom de gue"c of Julio Antonio Mella. He led a
political strike among the srodents at the University of Havana
and succeeded in provoking the Machado Government into clos-
ing that institution. Shortly thereafter, he was arrested and
charged with a bomb plot. Mella resorted to a hunger strike and
the Machado Government deported him to Mexico.
Mella became prominent in Red activities there and soon was
named General Secretary of the Mexican Communist Party. How-
ever, on January 10, 1929, the young Cuban agitator was shot
down in the streets and the crime was blamed on the dreaded
porri8tas of Machado. More modem historians of the murky ori-
gins of Latin American Communism (including two socialist
writers notorious for their sympathetic attitude toward Castro)
have attributed the crime to a certain Vittorio Vidali alias Carlos
Contreras alias Enzio Sarmiento, a man who served for two dec·
ades as an executioner for the Kremlin in Spain and Hispanic
America and who was then rewarded by leadership of the Com-
munists of Trieste. t
t The socialist historians in question are Robert ]. Alexander, Commt.lnbm
in lAId" America. Rutgers, New Brunswick, N. J., 1957. and Victor Alba,
Esquema his/orlco delcomtm.iwlo en Iberoorlwrlca, Ediciones Occidentale"
M~xico, D.F., 1937, p. 97.
 15 Reconstructwn and Political Struggles
Among the leading Communists grouped around Mella were:
Pablo de la Torriente Bran, Juan Marinello (later to become
Chainnan of the Party), Aureliano Sanchez Arango (who later
made a decisive break with the Reds) and Raul Roa Garcia
(who was to become Castro's first Minister of Foreign Affairs.)
Fabio Grobart, "the Russian," a Slavic Comintern agent of un·
known nationality and many aliases, was in charge of the Cuban
Communist Party from sometime in the 1920s until 1933. When
the Revolution of the 4th of September broke out, Grobart tried
to capitalize on the events by sending his goons out to provoke
riots and armed struggle. His cohorts seized and sovietized nu·
merous sugar mills and provoked bloody street struggles.2 With
the restoration of order and the beginnings of economic recovery,
these attempts were beaten back and communism suffered a
devastating defeat.
In the course of time, the Cuban political situation and the
growing international conflict enabled the Communist movement
to come out in the open. World War II made such democratic
powers as the United States, under the leadership of President
Franklin D. Roosevelt, associate with Russia to save the world
from the pressing totalitarian danger from Nazi Germany and her
allies.
Cuba had been a traditional ally of the United States. After the
attack on Pearl Harbor, we were one of the :!irst nations in the
New World to declare war on the Axis. As Soviet Russia had
been under massive Nazi assault for the previous six months, the
Cuban Communists naturally strongly supported my foreign and
domestic policies.
Despite the fact that Roosevelt too had jOined hands with
Stalin for a temporary common purpose, I was accused of the
most sinister intentions when the coalition of Government Parties
accepted the support of the Communist Party in 1939. When we
made the supreme decision to go to war on the side of the United
States, I invited the other anti-Nazi political parties to join with
me in the formation of a national government. In other words, on

:: During the brief period of four months when Dr. Grau San MartIn first oc-
cupied the Presidency (September la, 1933 to January 18, 1934), how-
ever, Communist activities flourished; there was substantial Red penetration
of the trade unions, and at the fourth congress of the National Confedera-
tion of Workers (CNOC), a Red delegate boasted about how "the first
soviet in Cuba" had been set up at his sugar mill.
 16 The Growth and Decline of the Cuban Republic
that occasion, when the stars and stripes and hammer and sickle
fought together aD the battle.Geld, a ha1t was called to ideological
differences in order to concentrate aD the defeat of the enemy.
In 1943, my associates and I brought Juan Marinello, titular
leader of the Cuban Communist Party, into the Cabinet. He was
a Minister without Portfolio and therefore had no deparhnental
responsibilities and was unable to lnBltrate his agents into the
Goverrunent. 8

FROM POWER TO EXILE

The accomplishments of my Administrations are discussed topi-

ca])y aud in d etail throughout the book. At the moment, I want
merely to indicate certain salient features of these years and, for
that purpose, 1 prefer to quote others than to try to evaluate my
own work.
Describing my first years of de facto power, Emil Ludwig
wrote:
"A man of the people and of the ReIds, who understood the
needs of the peasants, Batista, working through the National Cor-
poration of Public Assistance and the Center of Child Orienta-
tion, courageously faced the grave educational and public health
problems of Cuba. He established over a thousand schools, taught
by sergeant-teachers. who brought instruction to the most remote
parts of the Island. These civic-military schools Blled the gaps in
the incomplete work of the Ministry of Education. Moreover, a
group of doctors, dentists, teachers of trades, home economics
instructors and agronomists contributed to the vocational eduea·
tion and redemption of the peasant family, which had been for·
gotten by previous governments." 4.
One of the most important measures of this era was to rrDvide
Cuba with a new Constitution. All the political leaders 0 Cuba,
from Dr. Miguel Mariano G6mez, Ceneral Mario Carcia Menoeal
and Dr. Joaquin Martinez Saenz, on the right, to Dr. Juan Ma·
rilleDo and Blas Boca, on the extreme left, agreed to the holding

II A few years later, President Gabriel ConUln Videla of Chile brought

three Communists into his Cabinet. He gave them the portfolios of Com-
munications and Public Works, Agriculture and Lands and Colonhation.
He soon found that, in order to preYeDt them from taking ove!" his Gov·
ernmcnt, he had to oust them.
4 LudWig, op. al., p. 333.
 17 ReconstrucUon and Political Struggles
of elections. Even Dr. Ram6n Gran San Martin, who had been
engaged in oppositional activities, joined forces. As a result, a
Constituent Assembly was brought into being which formulated
a new Magna Carta for Cuba, the social and economic provisions
of which were among the most advanced in the world. This dem-
ocratic document became the supreme law of the land on Octo-
ber 10, 1940.
The elections of June 1, 1940, which brought me into the Presi-
dency, were absolutely free and fair. The economic situation of
the nation was distinctly unfavorable because of the flagging de-
mand for sugar, low sugar prices and the shipping and export
stringencies imposed by war. The United States, our main sugar
importer, bought about two million tons annually instead of four.
<In reality," wrote Emil Ludwig, "the last two years of his Ad~
ministration were years of genuinely constructive work, despite
Cuba's declaration of war on the Axis immediately after Pearl
Harbor, despite the shortage of shipping because of German sub~
marines which besieged the Island, and despite the fact that the
nation had to be partially mobilized to protect itself against spies
and sabotage." IS
In 1944, at the end of my four-year presidential term, Cuba
had new elections. Unlike those in many other Hispanic Ameri~
can countries, where frauds are habitually perpetrated by the
Administration so that it may continue in power, our elections
were completely honest. The electorate decided in favor of my
opponent, Dr. Ram6n Grau San Martin, and the decision of the
people was honestly and accurately certified by the Administra~
tion and the victory of the opposition conceded.
"I do not know whether Cuba will be a paradise again or blow
up with bombings and killings;" wrote Emil Ludwig, "but now
that there are no more political prisoners, persecuted and exiled
leaders, now that labor is organized and free enterprise flourishes,
it seems to me that Cuba is well on the road to that happy
state . . .
"As a foreigner, who was unacquainted with Grau San Martin
or with Carlos Saladrfgas, Batista's friend and fonner Premier, I
maintained a neutral position. I was in no position to determine
which candidate would better serve the country. By the after~
noon of the second day, it was all over. Batista had forbidden any
fraud in the voting, and thereby came away with a moral victory.
IS Ludwig, op. cit., p. 335.
 18 The Growth and Decline of the Cuban Republic
Cuba's reputation had never been higher and the European opin·
ion of Latin American elections had been profoundly changed.
In allowing his Prime Minister to be defeated at the polls, Ba·
tista rendered an incalculable service to the prestige of the entire
Continent. Yet this was an outcome he could have prevented by
violence, through the Army or by guile. For the first time in many
decades, it was proclaimed and written all over Europe: 'Yes,
there is a true democracy in America. The youngest of her Re-
publics has demonstrated this . . . The defeat of Batista was his
greatest victory," 6
When my Presidential term ended on October 10, 1944, I
toured South America at the invitation of its governments. This
gave me an opportunity to observe the political, economic and
social problems of our sister Republics and to exchange views
with political, business and labor leaders.
Upon my return, I bought a house in Daytona, Florida, and
lived there with my family. President Grau San Martin took
measures to prevent my return to Cuba. It seemed to me that this
was poor repayment for the eHorts I had made to ensure com-
plete honesty in the elections. Nor could I see how my presence
in my own country threatened his power, since, if I had wanted
to keep him from the Presidency, I could have refused to recog-
nize his election. However, in order to avoid shaming Cuba by
having it ostracize the leader of its 1933 Revolution, I went into
what I termed "voluntary exile" in the United States.

AUTENTICOS, GANGSTERS AND COMMUNISTS

The Grau San Martin Administration was in an awkward position

because it had won the Executive Power, but had lost out in Con-
gress. The Republican-Autentico coalition had been defeated in
all six Provinces in the elections for the House of Representa-
tives and had been defeated in the elections for the Senate in
four out of six: Pinar del Rio, Havana, Matanzas and Las Villas.
Consequently, the Cuban people were governed by one of the
most unstable regimes in their history. The Government was
weak because it lacked popular support, because it had no fixed
position on the great issues facing the nation and because it was
flagrantly corrupt and notorious for its illicit use of power. To
give an instance of the corruption of the Grau Administration, I
8 Ludwig, op. cit., pp. 213·214, 343-344.
 19 Reconstruction and Political Struggles
shall quote Ruby Hart Phillips' account of the investigation of
alleged embezzlement on the part of Grall by the Government of
his successor, Dr. Carlos Prio Socarras, in 1949:
"Auditors of the government continued to dig into the records.
Within a month, Dr. Grall was forced to appear before the Audi-
enda Court of Havana to hear charges that his government had
misappropriated $174,000,000. He pleaded not guilty. alleging
that all spending had been carried on legally . . .
"On July 4th, a group of gunmen invaded the court where the
case against fonner President Grall San Martin for misappropria-
tion of $174,000,000 was being investigated and stole all the docu-
ments of the proceedings. This was to become the famous Case
No. 82 against Grall, but it never came to trial and did not deter
Grall from running for President in 1954. No one was ever ar-
rested for the stealing of the documents and none of the docu-
ments was ever found." 7
Under the Grau Administration, the Presidential Palace began
to assume the appearance of a country club. Edmund Chester
wrote:
"Gangsterism was introduced to Cuba during the Grau regime
and there were indications that the government was protecting,
if not actually participating in, the hoodlumism which was car-
ried on through the island. One hundred and sixty-four persons
were assassinated during the Grau regime, and only a few of the
killers were ever apprehended. One of Grau's good friends, a
Cabinet Minister named Jose Aleman, accumulated one of the
world's largest forhmes in less time than it takes to count a mil-
lion pesos, and he did it all on his small salary as a Cabinet
Minister. At least that's what people were expected to believe.
Aleman not only made money fast, but he converted it into dol-
lars and got it out of Cuba just as fast." 8
A flagrant source of corruption, gangsterism and subversive
activities was the University of Havana. Its autonomy was guar-
anteed in the Cuban Constitution of 1940. The university police
force was responSible only to the Rector of the University and
the extreme theory was advanced that the institution enjoyed a
status equivalent to that of the Vatican in Italy. What the laws
actually proVided was that, during a serious disturbance of pub-
lic order, Congress could suspend the autonomy of the UniverSity,
1 Phillips, cp. cit., pp. 250, 253-254.
a Chester, op. cit., p. 213.
 20 The Growth ond Decline 0/ the Cuban Republic
whereupon the National Police and the Army could enter the
campus. Unless Congress took this action, however, the Univer-
sity precincts were barred to Cuhan law enforcement agencies.
'l1le University had become an assembly ground for hoodlums,
terrorists and murderers and for professionals of dubious stand-
ing. It was a discredit to its t\vo~hundred-year-old traditions. It
was no longer noted for scientific discoveries or technological con-
tributions of any sort. One of the main troubles was the lack of
aDl. rational restrictions on matriculation.
So inadequate are the entry requirements," Chester wrote,
-that it has been a simple matter for gangsters. political agita-
tors, especially CommWlists, and all sorts of undesirable elements
to enroll in the irutitution and get the benefits of the immuoltics
inherent in the semi-autonomous status of the University ...
The laxity in entry requirements has, over the years, resulted in
the enrollment of a number of middle-aged 'students' who have
absolutely no interest in schola.o;tic requirements. It has been said
facetiously, but perhaps truthfully, that Havana University has
the distinction of having more bald-headed students than any
university in the world." ~
The old Ahna Mater no longer was representative of Cuban
higher education. Some firteen other colleges and universities ap-
peared On the scen&--some of them governmental, others private.
These gave courses in modem science and technology which did
not exist at Havana UniverSity. Their student bodies were inter-
ested in education, not agitation.
As for the University or Havana, under the fnOuence or the
political elements who had infiltrated into its student body, it had
opposed all Cuban Governments ever since 1934. At the same
time, the "student leaders" sometimes established surreptitious
contacts with the very political leaders whom they overtly op-
posed in order to get "protection" OT for other reasons.
In some Western countries, the zeal to protect the rights of
labor has brought about such advanced labor legislation that
gangsters and professional criminals enter the trade unions, find-
ing this an area where they can steal, intimidate and kill with
impunity. In the case of democratic Cuba, our zeal for academic
freedom made us enact legislation which overprotected the Uni-
versity of Havana to such an extent that criminals, terrorists and

9 IbM., p. 123.
 21 Recon.nructlon and Political Struggles
Communists entered its student body in order to commit murders
and other crimes with impunity.

THE RED CONSPIRACY AGAIN

Meanwhile, the Cuban people were being softened up for the

great betrayal. The Russian Embassy swarmed with agitators,
propagandists, spies, couriers, organizers and secret agents. Ha-
vana and Mexico City were the headquarters for the Communist
conspiracy for the Northern sector of Latin America.10
Crau San Martin was succeeded by President Carlos Pdo So-
camis, also of the Auh~ntico Party. While making a show of op-
posing Communism. Prio actually favored and abetted it. He was
a member of Grau's Cabinet at the time that the Soviet secret
representative, Bashirov, planned operational details of the B0-
gota inSWTection of 1948, which suspended the Ninth Inter-
American Conference for several days, caused millions of dollars
of property damage, cost hundreds of lives and left Bogota look-
ing like a bombed city. The further purposes of this first formida-
ble display of Red power in the Americas had been to send the
delegates to the Inter-American Conference scurrying away for
their lives, to overthrow the democratic government of Colombia
and substitute a Red regime and to assassinate the chief of the
American d elegation, General of the Annies George C. Marshall.
Miss Frances Damon, Treaswcc of the World Federation of
Democratic Youth, a Communist front, arrived in Havana in
February 1948 under orders to create a hostile atmosphere among
the students, intellectuals and workers toward the Inter-Ameri-
caA Conference which was to meet in Colombia two months 1ater.
After visiting the Communist newspaper, HOY, and the Federa-
tion of University Students, she held a lengthy meeting with
Fidel Castro, Enrique Ovares, the Red student leader, AHredo
Guevara, and others. She then proceeded to the Soviet Embassy.
Basmrov also bad sessions with Castro, Damon and others on
the Bogota operation. His house was under photographic and
oth er surveillance and both Grau San Martin and Carlos Prio
Socarras were informed as to what was happening and what was
being planned.
Several days Jater, Fidel Castro was arrested at Havana Inter-
lQ Merico, Central America, the West Indies, those Republics of South
Al:nerica which border Oil the Caribbean Sea plus Ecuador and Peru.
 22 The Growth and Decline of the Cuban Republic
national Airport just as he was about to leave for Central America
and thence to Colombia. When searched, Communist literature
and a map of the city of Bogota with all strategic points marked
were found on his possession. He was arraigned before the same
judge who had unsuccessfully tried to hold him earlier for the
murder of the anti-communist youth leader, Manolo Castro. Be-
cause of powerful political pressures, Castro was released.H
Grau San Martin, with the knowledge of his Labor Minister,
Carlos Prio, pennitted Castro aod his group of student assassins
to leave for Bogota to carry out this terrorist action against a
friendly government. The Autentico Administration did even
more. Orders were given the Minister of Foreign Affairs aod the
Chief of Staff of the Air Force to send a military plane to Bo-
gobl. The Cuban Ambassador to the United States, Dr. Guillermo
Belt, who attended the Bogota conference, was instructed to pro-
vide Castro and his fellow Cuban gangsters with protection.
Thus, when the insurrection failed and when Castro and his ac-
complices were wanted by the Colombian authorities for subver-
sion and murder, they Hew back to Cuba in an official Cuban
plane and under the protection of the Cuban Government. Castro
boasted of this at the time in an interview he gave to the official
Communist newspaper of Cuba, Hoy.

RETURN TO POLITICAL UFE

As Grau San Martin's four-year term approached its end, the

President threw his support to Dr. Carlos Pdo Socarras. No was
the candidate of a minority faction of the Autlmtico Party and
Grau was able to impose him on the Autenticos only by resort to
an illegal strategem. 12 Allegedly, the main reason Presidential
support was given Frio is that the latter represented the BAGA,
one of the most corrupt cliques in the history of Cuba which had
embezzled untold millions of public funds. Is The anagram BAGA
stood for Bloc of Ram6n Grau San Martin and Jose Aleman.
11 It might be worth adding that this Communist agent, who would be ex-
tolled as a "liberator," a Lincoln of the Caribbean and a man destined to
bring justice to Cuba by a certain American foreign correspondent, had
been prosecuted for four murders by the time he reached the age of 25
and acquitted only because of political pressures.
12 See my Piedras y Leyes, Ediciones Botas, :Mexico City, 1961, pp. 24-25.
13 This charge was made by Dr. Pio Elliaide in his book, The Tragedy of
Cuba.
 23 Reconstruction and Political Struggles
The alliance between Gran and Prio rapidly disintegrated into
open enmity and soon each was publicly accusing the other of
misconduct and malversion of public funds. Meanwhile, a new
political movement appeared on the scene, the Orthodox Party,
led by Eduardo ChiMs. This group claimed that it was the real
representative of the Autentico movement and was seeking to re-
tum the latter to orthodox principles. An enormously accom-
plished orator, ChiMs inveighed against the flagrant corruption
and immorality of the Grau Administration over a weekly radio
program that became one of the most popular ones in Cuha.
Was ChiMs the man destined to cleanse OUf Augean Stables?
The crusade for honesty was urgently needed. However, in his
youth as a university student leader, Chibas had been a wild
revolutionary fanatic and an ultra-nationalist. He was a dema-
gogue and a firebrand. Probably because of medical reasons, his
was a highly unstable personality and his enemies went so far as
to claim that he was insane. \Vhile Chibas was not personally
either a Communist or sympathetic to communism, the powerful
movement which he was building became more and more seri-
ously infiltrated with Communists.
For my part, I had decided to retire permanently from politics.
As the 1948 elections neared, I was besieged by telephone caUs
and visitors, urging that my name appear on the ballot so that my
supporters could unite against the Administration and for the
slates of the Liberal and Democratic parties. Among those who
insistently urged that I do this was the distinguished surgeon and
Presidential candidate of the coalition, Dr. Ricardo Nunez Por-
tuonda. Dr. Carlos Saladrigas and others joined him in this re-
quest.
I felt that I could not refuse and allowed my name to be
entered as candidate for Senator from Las Villas Province. With
terrorism and gangsterism rife in Cuba, my friends urged me not
to campaign and thus run the risk of assassination. At first, I re-
fused, thinking this a cowardly course. Then my advisors pOinted
out that my murder would give the Administration a pretext to
suspend the elections and install a dictatorship. We were all con-
fident that, in fair elections, a majority of the Cuban people
would sweep out the Auh~ntico rascals and elect our distinguished
physician, Ricardo Nunez Portuondo.
The election was held on June 1, 1948. The campaign had
been extremely violent and our speakers and Party workers had
 .24 The Growth and Decline of the Cuban &ptJhlic
been subjected to physical violence by armed gangs. Moreover,
the opposition to the Autenticos was split. These factors enabled
Prl'o Socamis to win the Presidency, although as a minority candi-
date; he got only 451 of the vote.
Among the six opposition candidates for the Senate in Las
Villas Province, r received the largest number of votes. My vic-
tory demanded that I return to Cuba to serve in the Senate and
on November 19, 1948, I was accla.irned by an enonnous crowd
at the Jose Marti AiIport which accompanied me on foot and by
car in a vast procession to my house "Kuquine" near Havana.
The die had been cast and I was back in the maelstrom of public
and political liCe.
 22
The Highway Construction Program

In 1941, during my first Administration, we obtained a loan of

$25,000,000 from the Export-Import Dank to repair the Central
Highway and undertake other projects in the public interest. The
National D evelopment Commission (Comlsi6n de Fomento Na~
cional-CFN) was created to carry out these tasks and serve
other vital national needs.
The highway repair program was started with modem labor-
saving equipment. Sjmultaneously, we commenced building a net-
work of feeder and service roads. [0 1944, when my term of office
e"Pired, we left 1.086 kilometers of roads under construction or
under c.'(Jntract and 798 kilometers of completed roods. The aque-
ducts of Santiago de Cuba, Camugiicy and Holguin were also
under construction as was the Agabama River project, which was
designed to solve nnd did cventually solve the water problem of
the city of Santa Clara. capital of Las Villas. Six cold storage ware-
houses for farm produce had also been completed and were in
operation.
When] took p ower again in March 1952, I decided to proceed
with all the un6nished projects of the previous Autentico Admin-
istration. Many were of doubtful utility. However, since huge
sums had a1read y been invested, their completion seemed war-
ranted.. We fini shed them all, includin g particularly the tunnel
under the Almcndo..res River, upgrading standards and quality in
accordance with the importance of each project.
We decided to give priority to public improvements most ur·
 200 Th e Growth and Decline of the Cuban Republic
gently needed to stimulate agriculture, such as a network of in·
tersecting roads cri.sscrossing the entire country. We would also
strcss projects necessary to community renewal and business en·
terprise. Highways and service roads, silos and wharves, dredg-
ing projects, bridges and dams were among the wide variety of
tas1-s assigned t o the CFN.

CENTRAL lnCf{\\'AY

\-Vhen the Central Highway was first completed in May 1929, the
first signs of the Great Depression were being felt throughout the
country. Hard times were in store for us. Truck competition was
about to deal a staggering blow to the railroads which heretofore
had been the dominant medium for transportation between
provinces. During the crisis, the enormous potentia] of the High-
way bec:lme evident. Because of the burden of the sugar crisis,
accentuated by the Hawley-Smoot Tariff, however, this was more
prospect than reality.
The 1933 Revolution ushered in an era of economic recovery,
slow at 6rst. hut persistent and sure. TIle country was growing
rapidly in population. As the number, weight and speed. of mo-
tor vehicles were increasing even more rapidly, the Central High-
way soon proved inadequate for its purpose. Moreover, it was
being rapidly d estroyed and by 1952 deterioration was so ex-
tensive that some of its sections were almost impassable.
We did a thorough reconstruction job, replacing huge stretches
of roadbed and concrete and surface compound, rebuilding cul-
verts and shoulders. We had to eliminate surface cracks. cave-ins
and other damage. Almost total reconstruction of the sections
from Punta Brava to Pinar del Rio, from San Francisco de Paula
to Matanzas and from Santa Clara to Santa Rita in Oriente were
necessary as these had become hazardous to traffic.
Reconstruction of the Central Highway used 1,913,000 Ibs. of
steel bars, 117,150 square meters of reinforcement mesh. 79,600
cubic meters of 611. almost 5 million square meters of bituminous
concrete surfaCing. over a minion meters of shoulders and em-
bankment that h ad to be cleaned or repaired and many similar
items.
We also tackled the rroblem of highway intersections. We in~
traduced the c10verlea access system. first at the White Way.
 201 The Hlghwnlj Construction Program
later on the Varadero Tourist Highway and .Gunny on tlle Central
Highway itseU.

THE mCHWA Y ACHIEVEMENT

Connecting highways had been constructed which branched out

from the center of the Island to the ports. However, the ports
and the other towns on both coa~ts remained isolated from each
other. To solve this difficulty, we proceeded to carry out a gran-
diose project conceived in 1952-the construction of the North Cir-
cuit and South Circuit Highways.l These operations were almost
complete when the Reds took over at the beginning of 1959.
The total length of the Central Highway is 1.1SO km. The
highways built under my second Administration totalled 2,186
km. In addition, we built or rebuilt another 1,148 kilometers either
wholly or in part.
These figures do not include routine highway maintenance and
repair of thousand of additional miles of roads, many of them as-
phalt surfaced. When rebuilt roads are added, the total mileage
is 19.172 km. This work involved a vast amount of detailed engi-
neering operations: bridges had to be built to span riversj metal-
lic superstructures were replaced by concrete onesj highways
were reinforced to meet the stresses of heavier and faster vehicles
and ever-increasing traffic loads. The cave-ins that are such a
general problem on Latin America highways were practically
eradicated from. the Cuban road system.

REVITALIZING COMMUNITY INITIATIVE

The lethargy of community life in Cuba was the result of eco-

nomic factors and of excessive centralization. Practically all the
services that the municipalities should have tendered had been
left to the National Government. In view of the fact that such eg-
sentiallocal services as education, health and social welfare were
seriously deficient, we reverted to a procedure that had proved
most successful in my earlier Administration.
The municipalities of Cuba could hardly maintain a first-aid
station, build an aqueduct or improve the one they had, to say
nothing of undertaking such local improvements as setting up
1 See Piedrm Ij Leyel, op. cit., pp. 28Q..4, for details.
 202 The Grou,ih and Decline of the Cuban Republic
parks or paving their streets. Hygiene, police and schools also
came under the jurisdiction of the Central Govenunent.
Everything needed to be done, but the State could Dot do it all
witb its ordmary resources and alone. Under the circumstances,
the system of foundations seemed the best answer. The Govern~
ment would do its part if the citizens of each community put
their should ers to the wheel.
This approach, which had heen very successful under my first
Administration ,~ was discarded by the Autenticos. We restored,
revised and amplified it in 1952. This e"Pansion meant that lo-
cal public improvements became the responsibility of the citi-
zens of the localities, aided technically and financially by the
National Government.
We first created simple Foundations (or Service Roads (Law
#471 of October 24, 1952) , The provincial committees came
next. These coordinated local projects and strove to gear public
works activity in with employment need. After that, we created
Local Foundations for Urban Projects to carry out "municipal
projects, especiaUy self-supporting enterprises in the interests of
the communities." Both systems were under the general super-
vision of the National Executive Committee of Local, Urban and
Rural Foundations ( Comisi6n Ejecutiva Nacional de Patronatos
Locales, Urbanos y Cnmpesinos-CENPLUC).
We agreed to extend Government aid for Jocal service road
projects provided the roads d id not exceed 10 Ion. in leng th or
cost over $ 1,000 per kilometer and provided the local founda-
tions put up 3O'li of the cost. These private contributions were ac-
ceptable up to soo; in labor, building materials and use of
equipment. We defined local service roads as those connecting
agrarian, maritime or mining centers or rural crop centers within
the same municipallty to main highways.
If construction costs exceeded $1,000 per lan., private contribu-
tions would have to be 20% more in cash. If the road was built
by the municipality, the State's contribution would be 40$ of
project cost. Funds were obtained by the State from budget ap-
propriations and from the National Lottery.
2 As evidenced by thtl foundations of Pinal del Rio and Matanzas.
 203 The Highway Construction Program

REALIZED HOPES

Did the CENPLUC foundations live up to our expectations? Yes,

indeed, they were successful from the start. The countryside was
rapidly covered by a mesh of roads and the cities witnessed a
tremendous growth in their community projects, transforming
their appearance and improving the living conditions of their
inhabitants. The following figures speak for themselves:
-3,849 foundations were created, of whieh 2,642 were for serv-
ice roads and 1,207 for local urban projects. They carried out
$48.7 millions of projects.
-Some 15,594 km. of roads were built at a cost of $22.2 mil-
lions, of which the foundations contributed $8.5 millions and the
Government $13,8 millions.
-We built 4,411 city blocks of new streets, most of them with
culverts, sidewalks and drainage. This was the equivalent of
1,764,400 square meters and cost $26.5 millions, of which the
foundations contributed $16.9 millions.
-Ten towns were supplied with electric light and power.
-City halls were built in two towns; two seawalls, 26 public
parks, not to mention other public buildings and memorial land-
marks, were constructed.
The CENPLUC was unquestionably an institution worthy of
support and deserving even 'wider scope. It was one of our most
democratic institutions as it was deeply rooted in the people
from the outset. The people governed and directed it with com-
plete autonomy. It was an organization which relied on its own
resources and initiative (backed by Government contributions
and technical aid) and which had a proud record of accomplish-
ment for the benefit of many communities and a large backlog
of work in process. This institution, which was such a proud ex-
ample for the peoples of the Americas, was abolished as soon as
the vandals of the Sierra Maestra took power.
Instead, the Communists created the INRA, a bureacratic
monster, totalitarian and centrally directed. As early as January
26, 1959, less than one month after taking power, the Reds liqUi-
dated CENPLUC on the grounds that it "duplicated the func-
tions of a deparbnent of the Ministry of Public Works."
 204 l '}1fJ GTou:th aruJ. Decline of the Cuban Republic

PARKS AND GREE N AREAS

The National Parks and Green Areas Administration (ONPAV)

was born on April 2, 1955. It proceeded to provide our cities
with new parks and playgrounds, to build new promenades, to
repair and improve existing recreation areas and to concentrate
on improving recreational faciliti es for the children. ONPA V or-
ganized 94 foundations for the conservation and embellishment
of local parks.
At the National Park of Sierra del Cristal, more than 100,000
trees were planted and measuxes were taken to prevent indiscrim-
inate felling of the pines. A census of commemorative monuments
and historic landmarks was made to aid in their preservation.
More than thirty children's playgrounds were set up through the
country and equipped with recreational equipment Some 34
municipal parks were either built or completely rebuilt.
 23
Maritime, Rail and Air Transport

In 1933, the condition of our transport system was chaotic. The

oldest component, maritime transportation, was at a standstill.
Crushed by truck and air competition and burdened by unwise
regulations, the railroads were chronically in the fed and on the
verge of bankruptcy, The airlines, with a brilliant future, were
the prey of privileged gangs of grafters. Aviation was particu-
larly in need of government regulation and government financial
aid.

REGULATORY ORGANIZATIONS

In March 1952, we incorporated two key commissions into the

Ministry of Communications, placing them under a new Under-
secretary. Thus, a special department had been created to ban-
dIe transportation problems.
Later, in July 1953, we organized the National Transport Cor-
poration, the head of which was a member of the Cabinet with~
out portfolio. The duties and powers of the two commissions were
transferred to the new Corporation. The National Transport Cor~
poration was advised by a Technical Commission, representing
the public carriers and the trade unions.
Our first attempt to reorganize the transportation industry was
by Law #1486 of June 10, 1954. Through this act, we hoped to
curb the extensive illegal traffic and unlawful competition which
jeopardized the nation's carriers and the State's investment in
 206 The Growth and Decline of the Cuban Republic
them. The industry suffered from cut-rate pricing and cut·throat
competition.
Law #1486 was a painstaking approach to the task of com-
prehensive regulation of transportation. It set up uniform account-
ing systems, controlled rate differentials, established rules de-
signed to protect human life and conserve the highways and laid
the foundations for complete reorganization of the carriers, espe-
dally the trucking companies. Law #1553 took further strides in
these directions.

MARITIME TRAFFIC

[n Colonial days, there was a prosperous coasta1 shipping trade

behveen the main ports of Cuba due to the lack of rail communi-
cations between Las Villas and Oriente provinces. National in-
dependence, however. brought with it an expansion of the rail-
road network. Coastal shipping consequently declined, whi1e
ocean shipping thrived because of the sugar boom and the growth
of foreign trade.
Our geographical situation and our numerous excellent natural
harbors gave us spleudid prospects for the development of a
merchant marine, provided an adequate credit and financial sys-
tem was devised. One of the best instruments to attract capital
was the ship's mortgage. This device. established by Law #1420
of March 12, 1954, made the vessel collateral for loans. Since the
old Code of Commerce, adopted in Spain in 1885 and extended
to Cuba, did not cover this type of loan, we had to devise our
own rules and regulations in this area. The problem that we
faced and solved was to devise a system which would enable
shipowners to get credit on ship collateral and to enable creditors
to attach that collateral readily in case of loan default.1
Due to the expansion of our trade. continuous improvement in
wharves. warehouses and port facilities was necessary. Assigning
the two wharves at the Paula docks to the national merchant
marine laid the foundations {or this improvement. Construction

1 Orders for seh:ure or attachmeet of ship!, Issued by Cuban courts, had

proved diffiC\llt to obtain, cumbersome and a severe handicap to the busi-
» est of the owners. Law #1585 of August 4, 1954 changed the procedural
niles, created adequate methods of protection and custody and aJlowed the
vcssels to cont.W.ue in service while remaining lWder tho Jurisdiction of Cu-
ban courts.
 207 Maritime. Rail and Air TraMport
of a marine teoninal in Havana harbor with all necessary facili-
ties was another major step in this direction. The old terminals
of Tallapiedra, Haccndados and Atares dated back to Colonial
times, while at RegIa the obsolete buildings of the Dank of Com-
merce (also built in Colonial days) were still in use,
In addition to the Maritime Terminal of H avana, bu ilt at a cost
of $30 million, similar facilities were erected at Bahia Honda and
at Mariel, an exceUent auxiliary port for Havana. Others were
constructed at the Bay of Matanzas and the port of Cuayabal on
the south coast of the province of Camaguey to service important
sugar mills.
During my previous Administration, we had constructed the
gigantic Cardenas and Dubrocq wharves for the free port of
Matamas, created by Law # 490 of September 14, 1934. 2

THE DRYDOCK

Drydocks were not new to H avana. Years ago, there had b een a
small, Roatin g drydock operated early in the Republican era by
the Krajewski Pessant Corporation. When it disappeared ( for
reasons best known to that firm), all repairs and shipyard work
were done at the shops of Viuda nulz de G6.miz. L ater, this be.
came the Havana Marine Railways, Inc. My first Administration
bou ght these facilities to effect lugent repairs for the Cuban Navy.
This was th e cornerstone of the future Cuban Navy Shipyard.
Thcse drydock fa cilities h ad been sorely needed for a long t ime
as the port of Havana had almost the heaviest marine traffic in
the world. The project began to materialize with the technical
advice of n aval engineers from the United States and from OUf
own C uban Navy. Approved on January Z1, 1956 at a cost of
$10,000,000, the drydock wns designed to handle repairs of at
least 75% of the vessels calling at the port of Havana-namely,
those not over 475 feet long. The utility of the dryd vck from an
:: Other important harbor projects were completed by Texaco In Santiago de
Cuba, by Esso in the Marimelcna Estuary of Havana Bay, by Freeport Sul·
phur Company in Moo Bay and by the Cuban Nickel Company in the Bay
of Levisa. All were impnrtant marine terminals cBpable of handling deep.
draft merchau t ships with docks, wharves nnd, in many cases, seawalls. In
January 1957, we granted a concc;:ssion for the construction of a caU$Cway
OV<:t the ocean betwcco Caibarieo and its neighboring port, Cayo Franoes,
on the northern coast of the province of Las Villas, to meet the needs of
that large and growing region.
 208 The Growth and Decline of the Cuban Republic
economic point of view was shown by the fact that the Cuban
Navy had been spending over a million dollars yearly for major
ship repairs in U.S. YRfds.
Work was due to begin in 1959 on a shipyard at the port of
Mariel This was to cost $86,000,000. The project had been
studied exhaustively. On October 30, 1958. the Mariel Shipyard
Company was launched for the construction an d repair of ships
and for other work related to the shipping industry. Anglo-Cuban
investors were interested in the project which was to start with
$20,000,000 of operating capital, of which $15,000,000 would
have been proVided by government flnancing agencies and
$5,000,000 by the British investors.
Cuban contractors were to handle the work with the technical
assistance of British finns. The yard was to have had a shipbuild-
ing capacity of 125,000 tons, a capacity to build ships up to
14,000 tons and an initial output schedule of 25 vessels of 5,000
tons each. This shipyard project was complementary to the dry-
dock and both would have been geared into the development of
a Cuban heavy metals industry based on our abundant ore re-
sources.

RAILROADS

Cuba has the honor of being the first country in the Americas,
with the exception of the United States, to have built and oper-
ated a railroad. That memorable day in 1834 when the first Cu-
ban train puUed out of Havana bound for the town of Bejucal,
hauling passengers and cargo, is ODe of the highlights of our eco-
nomic history. Railr03ds were laid throughout the sugar and
coffee regions, linking mms and plantations with the nearest sea-
ports. Nevertheless, at the end of the Colonial era in 1898, Cuba's
railroad reached eastward only as far as Santa Clara and west-
ward only to Consolaci6n del Sur.
During the period of transition from Colony to Republic, the
railroad system, which had been created by British capital, was
consolidated. U.S. and Canadian capital financed a railroad sys-
tem linking Havana with Santiago de Cuba. This was intended
to stimulate agriculture and business throughout the eastern part
of the Island.s
a The United Railways 01 Havana, comprisl.ng the Havana Rallway, the Ma-
tan:;:as Railwsy and the Jucaro and Cardenas Railway in the early days of
 209 Maritime. Rail and Air Transport
In March 1952, Cuba had two railway systems. The United
Railways of H avana and RegIa Warehouses, Ltd., and the Con·
soli dated Railroads of Cuba. The .6rst ran from Cuane to Santa
Clara, the second from Santa Clara to Guantanamo.
When [ returned to power in 1952, I found ra ilroad transporta-
tion on the brink of chaos, especially the United Railways, which
had suffered an appalling shrinkage in passenger and height
revenues. The company was practically banlcrupt. We came to
its aid and began giving it funds on a temporary basis while trying
to work out a permanent solution. It was clear that the choice was
between government takeover and disappearance of the line.
Law #980 of July 24, 1953 solved this problem by State pur-
ch ase of the United Railways of Havana, together with the Ha-
vana Terminal Railroad, H avana's Centrn.1 Station, the Marianaa
and Havana Railroads. the Centra] Railway of Matlmzas and the
Cuban and International Express Company, for $20,000,000.
When the transaction was consummated, a joint enterprise was
created- the first of its kind in Cuba-under the corporate name
of Cuban Western Railroads with n capital of $30,000,000 for re-
organization and operations.
The road ahead was hard. Obstacles had to be overcome,
sacriSces borne and setbacks suffered. But we made progress . In
less than three years, the personnel cutbacks were eliminated.
W orkers, laid off, but held as a reserve manpower pool by agree.-
ment between the union and Government, were called back on
the job. Wage cuts were repealed and, in the end, the nation
again had a thriving railroad system. Reorganization costs had
been held down to a hare minimum. The assets bought for $20,-
000,000 were worth $70,000,000 five years later.

THE CONSOLIDATED RAILROADS

On a memorable day in July 1903, a golden spike was driven into a

railroad track at Capestany Farm near FalcOn in Las Villas. Cuba
had been spanned by rail from Havana to Santiago de Cuba. A
few days after this juncture, Don Tomas Estrada Palma, the first
the Reyublic, had later merged with the Western Railroad and the Cuban
Centra Railway. These In tum merged later with the Sagua and Caibarien
Railroads. The second system united the Coosolldated Railroads of Cuba
with the Cuban Railroad Compll1lY, the Northern Cuban Railroads and the
liDes nmning from Camagiiey to NuevJtas and from Cuantllnamo westward.
 210 The Growth and Decline of the Cuban Republic
President of the Republic, officinUy opened the railroad line that
spanned the long axis of the nation.
In the years that followed, the system was consolidated with
others in the eastern provinces, where colossal sugar mills had
been erected, several of them capab1e of processing over a mil.
lion bags of sugar each crop year. \Vh.ile the sugar tonnage was
satisfactory, there was a dangerous and eventually disastrous de-
cline in other revenues because of the competition of other types
of carriers.
The Consolidated Railroads faced a severe crisis in March 1952.
As of May 31st of that year, its losses totalled $1,550,000. This
made it impossible to maintain wage and salary levels. A wage-
cut proposal was su bmitted to government, which we referred to
a Cabinet committee. After exhaustive investigation, the com·
mittee rejected the wage cuts, but proposed certain readjust.
ments that temporarily reduced pay rates, but kep t employment
levels constant. Trus was authorized by Decree #1535 of June 8,
1955, Later, we were able to have the wages restored to their
previous level.

RAILROAD REORCANIZATION

We nationalized a vast rail network by purchase at a price satis·

factory to the sellers, 11lere had been no confiscation and no gov-
ernment pressure, Not a single sfockholder of the old British
company had been deprived of his rights to a proportionate share
of his investment even though the Company had paid no divi-
dends and fail ed to meet its mortgage payments over a number
of years, Nor was there any prospect that it would return to sol-
vency.
We did not pay the price initially asked for by the railroad,
because it seemed to us excessive. But we paid a fair price. Thus,
when we hoisted the national Hag on the mast at the H avana
Central Station, we had the satisfaction of knowing that it was
being done with honor. We would not have had it otherwise in
view of the fact that British resources and that illustrious British
subject, Mr. Stephenson, had helped Cuba over so many years.
After many years of lagging maintenance, both companies
needed total reconstruction of their track and modem locomo-
tives. The old iron horses had to be swapped for D iesels. But the
greater weight and speed of the new Diesels would mean im-
 211 Maritime, Rail and Air Transport
mediate replacement of ss.pound rails by lOO-pound or heavier
ones. We would also have to adopt new mechanized track main~
teDance methods. All these transitions were well advanced at the
time when the Communist hordes spread sabotage and terror,
death and destruction, through the Island, uprooting the railroad
system as one of their main activities.
Both companies acquired Diesels of up to 240,000 pounds and
1,600 horsepower. We hoped that Cuba would soon become the
first country in Latin America widl a completely Diesel railroad
system. Other improvements were the Budd motor coaches. serv·
fig fast, inter·urban timetables, and a vast number of new pas-
senger and freight cars of various models aod capacities.
In 1958, C uba was one of the leading countries in the Americas,
and even compared favorably with Europe, in respect to railroad
facilities. We had one kilometer of railroad traek [or every 8.08
kilometers of total area. We had 14,164 km. of track, 565 loco-
motives, 401 pasenger coaches, 104 box cars and over 10,000 flat
cars.'

AlITOBUSES MODERNOS

From 1950 to April 22, 1952, Autobuses Modernos, S. A., (AMSA)

received the sum of $17,722,885 from the State plus other benefits.
The company had been set up by the preceding Administration
as successor to the Havana Electric Railway Company, which in
turn was the successor to the Havana Urban Railway. The new
company was plagued by agitation and gangsteri sm, which had
been tolerated by the previous Autentico administration. The
transfer of its franchise had caused a Senate investigation of the
Autentico Minister of F inance. E ventually, the new firm , h e.o'l ded
by financi er William D. Pawley, became so much involved in dis-
putes and union d emands that Pawley quit in disgust.
Our Admillistration did its best to bring peace between feuding
factions tb at attempted to impose their will by violence. Many
of their leaders had long criminal records. By pursuing their strug-

' Of t;hi§ track, 5,099 kilometers were public carrier!!, 8,91 .5 kilometers wen;,
sugar plantation lines and 149 kilometers wer,;, privately owned lines. In
one year, 1955, for C%ample, the raliroods moved 29 million tons of
freight. Sugar haulage provided $23.1 millions of the totnl railfOad rev~
enues of $37.2 millions. Passenger traffio yielded $4.4 milllODS and miscella-
neous income $9.7 mtllions.
 212 The Growth and Dec1irw of the Cuban Republ~

gJe against the Government, they helped plunge Cuba into the
Red abyss. Nevertheless, the fact remained that, in order to sub-
sist without government aid and meet expenses with its own
income, Autobuses Modemos would have to be completely fe·
organized and its monthly dencit of $300,000 would have to be
substantially reduced at once.
The situation deteriorated and we found it necessary to take
drastic measures against the radicals who seemed determtned to
ruin the public transport system and destroy an important source
of employment. The measures we adopted consisted mainly of
repeated readjustments in pay scales and personnel.
These measures managed to keep the company afloat. How-
ever, its income was still insufficient to meet operating costs and
still less to service or liquidate the $500,000 loan it had obtained
from BANFAle.
Accordingly. Law #1821 of December 3, 1954 granted AMSA
a five-year indirect subsidy in the shape of complete exemption
from duties on rolling stock. parts and materials. This too was of
no avail
It was impossible to allow this situation to continue. On July 8,
1958, Congress enacted Law #36 designed to solve the AMSA
public transportation crisis. The liabilities of the company were
written off; all pending workers' claims were paid off and a
pledge was given to the labor unions that the buses would con-
tinue to operate. After the termination of government control of
AMSA, its stockholders transferred their assets to the Compaiiia
Financiera de Transporte for $6,174.091. assuming the obligation
to pay $2,134,94.9 in past-due notes and $400,000 in debts to the
unions.

O}.1NIBU5ES ALlADOS

The growth in the population and area of Greater Havana was

not paral!eled by the development of modern urban transporta-
tion facilities. It seemed that all the subsidies and exemptions we
had granted were not enough to meet the needs of the public.
Moreover, the relations between labor and management were
plagued by conBict.
Within the Omnibus Cooperative (Cooperativa de Omnibus
AJiados, S. A., COA ), there were irregularities d ue to the fact
that various g'roups of bus owners were operating under tempo-
 213 Maritime, Rail and Air Transporl
rary franchises that had been granted by different government
officials and which were not consistent us to requirements. We
enacted Law #908 of June 12. 1953 to bring order into this situa-
tion and regulate cooperatives engaged in intra-urban and inter-
urban transportation of passengers. The law illegalized monopoly
of routes as we believed that competition would benefit the pub-
lic. After compliance with basic requisites relating to financial
stability and public service, the carriers were given reg ular fran-
chises in exchange for the temporary ones they haa obtained
from the officials of the previous Administration. The law also
provided that 48.4% of the gross income of the cooperatives must
be disbursed as wages and salaries and 7i must go for such social
welfare purposes as paid vacations, workers' maternity and re-
tirement funds, etc. This was merely an application of the basic
principles of my Administration: to assist business enterprise,
protect labor and improve public service. e

AVIATION

In March 1953. we established the Ord er of National Merit in

Civil Aviation and proclaimed Civilian Pilots' Day. This was a
ttibute to the memory of the pioneers of Cubao aviation, Agus-
tin PaTU. and Domingo BasilIo. the two heroes of the historic
overseas Rights of 1913. one of them from Key West to Mariel,
the other from Key West to Havana. These 8ights followed
Bleriofs flight across the English Channel in 1909. At the same
time, we provided for duty-free import of airplanes for pleasure,
sport or educational purposes.
Cuba's Hyers have contributed to the milestones in the develop-
ment of American aviation. The history of air transportation could
Dot be written without a glance at Cuba, nor the history of a.i.r-
mail without reference to IJavana.
Law #59 of May 9, 1952 regulated civil aviation as to clear-
ance papers and other requisites for the arrival and departure of
passengers and cargo, bringing Cuban practice into conformity
with tlie 1944 International Convention on Civilian Aviation.
~ In 1958, 303 bus comp(lnies operated in Cuba with a total 4,459 vehicles,
of which 1,919 operaled in Havana (1,fl20 belonging to COA and 299 to
AMSA). At the lime of the Red takeover, we were planning to coordinate
rail and highway transportation. to build a single frc:Jght terminal in Ha-
vana and establish a piggy-back service,
 214 The Growth and Decline of the Cuban Republic
Law #tn7 of May 27, 1953 concerned visual aid to navigation
and Law #2137 of January 27, 1955 dealt with government
subsidy of airUnes.
The Campania Cubana de Aviaci6n (eCA), a successor to Pan
American Airways in Cuba, started operations in 1930 with
aruy 925 kilometers of flight (between Havana and Santiago de
Cuba). serviced by Ford-powered ai-motor planes. By 1958,
Cuban airlmes had expanded enough to show their colors in New
York, Florida, Mexico, Portugal and Spain. They flew 17,210 kilo-
meters on international routes. Besides Cubana, we had Aerovfas
Q. Cuba Aeropostal and Expreso Aereo, all thriving enterprises.
We built airports throughout the Island and stimulated private
flying and aerial crop dusting of farming areas.
The tremendous expansion that occurred was based on gener-
ous government financing of the airunes through BANFAle and
later BANDES during my second Administration. On the 28th
anniversary of Cubana Airlines (October 30, 1958), its fleet in-
cluded inler alia three 86-passenger Super C Constellations, four
Britannias with 94-passenger capacity and four 8I-passenger
Viscounts. For 1960, Cubana planned to add a Boeing 701-120
jet to its fleet, capable of carrying 125 passengers at a cruising
speed of 965 kilometers per hour. This ship would have £lawn
from H avana to New York in 2:49 hours and to Mexico in 2:29
hours. The abrupt and tragic end of this expansion program was
a great loss to Cuba.

CIVU.. AERONAUTICS COMMISSION

Because of the vJtal importance of air travel, we remganized the

old Civil Board of Aeronautics by Law #1104 of September 30,
1953. The following year (Law ;#:1862 of December 22, 1954),
we created the Civil Aeronautics Commission and assigned it the
task of ensuring that Cuban aviation complied with the recom-
mendations of tfte International Civil Aviation o.rganization.
The CAC was instrumental in general improvement of air
carrier regulation. Air travel between Cuba and the rest of the
world increased sub stantially after the 1952 Revolution and the
follOwing new international routes were authorized and opened
during 1952-58: Miami to Varadero, Santiago de Cuba to Miami,
Havana and Santiago de Cuba to Port-au-Prince and Ciudad
 215 Maritime, Rail and Air Transport
Trujillo, Havana to Mexico City, Santiago d e Cuba to Kingston,
Jamaica, and Havana to New York.
The CAe did a great deal to improve safety of takeoff and
landing, a vital necessity as traffic and aircraft speeds increased.
Radio beam towers were installed at the Santa Fe airport in H a-
vana and at the Cienfuegos and P unta Alegre (Camagil ey) air-
ports. These radio towers not only served as reference points.
but provided a 1ong-range guidance system.
The CAC also examined pilots and engineers and certified
those who proved qualified. It authorized the use of Ja ndillg strips
and airfields and registered aircraft. It saw that Hight routes were
verified, that the mechanical condition of aircraft was checked at
regular intervals and that the control towers at the airports were
properly operated.

ADtPORTS

We built airports at Santiago de Cuba and at the Sugar Mill "Los

Canas" near Guantauamo, at Sante F~, at Bauta, in Pinar del Rio,
one at Veradero and still another on the Isle of Pines. Work was
under way on the Santa Clara and Banes airports when the Reds
took power.
The San Julian airport in Guaue (Pinar del Rio), the Navy
airport at Mariel, the Air Force bases at Camp Columbia and at
San Antonio de los Banos, the Matanzas, Sancti Spm tus, Cien·
fuegos nnd Camagiiey airports were all enlarged, improved or
reorganized. Individuals and companies were encouraged to build
innumerable landing strips throughout the Island for business,
sport, crop dusting and other purposes.
The In ternational Airport at Rancho Boyero in H avana Prov-
ince was revamped. Among other things, a hotel for transients
was built adjacent to the field. Terrorist gangs bombed and
burned some of th e new installations, but this merely aroused
public anger without interrupting service for a moment. After
January 1959, nearly all the Cuban pilots and engineers were
driven into exile by the Communists.
To accommodate larger and larger passenger jets and continu-
ously expanding commercial aviation, in which Cuba would pIny
a major role because of h er geographical situation, we planned
to recondition the former military airport at San Antonio de los
 .216 The Growth and Decline 0/ the Cuban Republic
Banos, which had been built by the U. S. Government during
World War II and turned over to the Cuban Government there-
after. We built the Midday Expressway (Autopista del Media-
dia), a superhighway to serve what was to become our great
international airport of the future.

THE NATIONAL TRAFFIC COMMlSSION

This organization was created as a branch of the National Trans-

port Corporation to improve traffic conditions and reduce acci-
dents, thus saving lives and property. No solution to traffic
problems is possible without the cooperation of the public. Ac-
cordingly, we saw to it that the organizations concerned with
traffic problems and the appropriate municipal departments were
represented on the Board of Directors of the new entity.
Law #1774 of November 2, 1954 empowered the National
Traffic Commission to install traffic lights and road signs wherever
needed and to promulgate traffic and safety regulations. Local
committees were appointed in all municipalities with the mayors
as chainncn.
From the very beginning, the Commission adopted measures
which rapidly improved the situation. More than 600 automatic
lights were installed for motorists and pedestrians. An educational
campaign encouraged public cooperation.

THE PARKING METERS

The National Public Parking Organization ( ONEP) was created

by Law #2068 of January 27,1955 to solve the problem of over-
parking on the sb"eets of the cities, a situation that was deteriorat-
ing every day. After public bearings at which all interested
groups and individuals were heard, the ONEP proceeded vigor-
ously with the installation of parking meters. More than 5,000 of
these meters were installed by July 30, 1958. All taxi stands and
loading zones needed in the cities had been designated and
properly marked by that date.
The iD(''Orne which ONEP received from the parking meters
was divided equaUy among the National Police Retirement Fund,
the National Organization of Children's Dispensaries (ONDI),
the National Organiza tion of School and People's Dining Rooms
(ONCEP), the National Organization for the Administration of
 211 Maritime. Rail and Air Transport
Government Hospitals (ONAHE) and ONEP itself to defray ad~
ministrative costs.
The Communist movement of the 26th of July made the ONEP
one of the chief targets of its campaigns of abuse and defamation
and on January 1, 1959, the day of the Castro takeover, all the
parking meters in Havana were stolen or destroyed by vandals.
The Communists alleged that the meters destroyed the citizens'
inalienable right to use the streets. Of course, thinking people
realized that while individuals have the right to use the streets
for transportation, they are not entitled to occupy them inde.6~
nitely and, by so doing, exclude others from their use, Moreover,
the parking meter system had been installed only after protracted
public hearings at which everyone who wanted to express an
opinion was heard. And the system is general in the United States.
But reason was not the forte of the Reds, nor rational solutions
their purpose. They wished to find scapegoats, arouse hatred and
train the mob to destroy the nation's wealth and kill its construc-
tive elements.

AUTOMOBILES AND CUBAN PROSPERITY

Obviously, car registration is an excellent index of living stand-

ards and the Cuban figures for 1951-58 show the advances made
during my second Administration.

AUTOMOBILES AND TRUCKS IN CUBA

Type of Vehicle 1951 1958 increa86
Private cars 65,439 140,267 74,828
Taxis 18,204 18,886 682
Trucks 34,338 46,569 12,231
Public Buses ll 4,414 4,248 -166
All Other 1 1,781 2,286 505
TOTAL 124,176 212,256
---
88,080
6 The decljne in public buses was a result of the anarchy and gangster con-
trol of public administration during the era of Autentico power (1944-
1952). The buses were in such disrepair that many had to be cannibali2:ed
for spare parts.
7 School buses, hearses, etc., but excluding motorcyles. Official cars are not in-
cluded. During this period, the number of animal-drawn vehicles dropped
from 6,831 in 1951 to 3,652 in 1958.
 24
Public Housing and Slum Clearance

In 1952, we inherited a critical problem in the area of urban hous-

ing and urban rentals. Emergency laws had temporarily given
tenants security and seemingly solved the housing shortage. How-
ever, these laws were the source of new difficulties. Ever since
March 1949, a lagging building industry had aggravated the
housing shortage. Old buildings were rapidly deteriorating due to
inadequate maintenance and there was a consequent upward
pressure on rents.
The problem dated back to 1939 when the unsatisfactory eco-
nomic situation had driven urban reots beyond the means of
much of the urban working class. Accordingly. on March 23rd
of that year, city rents were frozen at the levels of July 1, 1937.
This freezing measure was extended later, on three separate oc-
cas ions: March 25, 194 1, September 22, 1941 and January 28,
1944, at which time it was finally decided to keep the rents
frozen at 1931 levels unUI six months after the end of World War
II.
We needed legislation that would contribute to the economic
upsurge of the nation. Our aims were to protect the interests of
people of modest means, but, at the same time, to stimulate in·
vestment in residential construction by restoring the profit incen-
tive. The continuing and rapid growth of both population and
urbanization made this a problem of ubnost urgency.l
I The problem W9 S further complicated by the fact that ~ny buildings un·
der rent control had been leased to business or industry.
 219 Public HOusing and Slum Clearance
We held publie meetings on the proposed legislation, encourag.
ing all interested parties to speak out. We wanted a law which
would benefit the groups most concerned and which would be
accepted by the people.

IN DEFENSE OF THE TENANT

After careful study, Law #440 of October 5, 1952 was enacted,

while simultaneously the Government was elaborating a plan to
set up au autonomous Or~anizatiOn to finance low·cost housing.
The new Jaw helped clar' a chaotic situation and had a stimu-
lating impact on residenti construction, It had provisions which
stayed eviction proceedings except for reasons clearly specified
in the statute. It gave priority rights to living space in new build-
ings to persons evicted by the demolition of the old ones on the
same sites.
This was later made more flexible by substituting a cash pay·
ment to the tenant who lost his apartment through demolition
-sometimes amounting to a few months' rent. The protection
against eviction was upheld sbictly, however. when the new
building was business or commercial. Furthermore, while the
new law established reasonable rents, it also granted tax and ad-
ministrative exemptions as an incentive to tbe building trades,
Rents were readjusted upward when new and improved premises
were constructed, It was also stipulated that rent payments must
entitle the tenant to certain basic services,
Rent reductions were decreed On dwellings built or licensed
subsequent to March 23, 1949 and the frozen rents were applied
to premises built prior to that date, For the beneBt of the poorer
classes, the rents on aU tenements and rooms in private houses
were cut 30% irrespective of the date when these premises had
been built,
One objective of this measure was to destroy a system of col-
lective and promiscuous tenements known in Cuba as sowres, The
rents were made so unattractive that nobody would build any
more of them, This was done even though government tax reve-
nues were adversely affected.
Tax: exemptions were granted, as a rule. on all construction
during the first two years after passage of the law, The period of
grace on evictions was lengthened and steps were taken to im·
prove enforcement. Later, Law #888 of June 2, 1952 amended
 220 The Growth and Decline of the Cuban Republic
the statute to give it greater flexibility and to mitigate the long
protracted litigations between landlords and tenants which were
so detrimental to both parties and to business in general.
When these landlord and tenant laws expired in 1958, we
again canvassed the groups most concerned and then requested
Congress to extend the laws for another year. Meanwhile, a
specially deSignated Cabinet committee would study the situa~
tion and try to come up with a more definitive statute that would
take into account the sturdy growth of private residential con~
struction.

COOPERATIVES

Law #407 of September 16, 1952, regulating cooperative apart-

ments and office buildings, provided a tremendous stimulus to
this sort of enterprise. The statute specified building code re-
quirements such as land area, access to the street, concrete foun-
dations, structural standards, staircases, basements, patios, gar-
dens, elevators, etc., and the way in which each apartment could
be used. The management of all cooperative buildings was to be
bound by the will of the majority and this was to be stated in the
bylaws of the cooperative. Between 1952 atul1958, $183,379,000
worth of cooperative bUildings, providing a total of 42,528 apart-
ments, were built in the province of Havana alone.

INSURED MORTGAGES

Law #750 of March 20, 1953 authorized a special department

of BANFAIC to issue mortgage insurance. Later, this work was
assigned to a special autonomous organization, the FHA (Fo-
menta de Hipotecas Aseguradas). After the 1954 election, the
three basic laws on housing were consolidated (Law #2066 of
January 27,1955) and the FHA was given $1,500,000 in working
capital.
The insured mortgage guaranteed the mortgagor full payment
of interest and principal as prOVided in the mortgage contract.
Only mortgages against homes already built or under construc-
tion were considered, though mortgage insurance was also made
available for additions and improvements and for professional,
commercial, industrial or agricultural buildings.
In the case of family dwellings, the insured principal was lim-
 221 Public Housing and Slum Clearance
ited to $16.000, the instrument being a first mortgage with monthly
payments covering interest and amortization. Loan applications
had to be made through approved credit institutions, subject to
examination by the N ationat Bank of Cuba. These institutions
handled the mortgages and serviced the accounts.
The FHA was authorized to issue Real Estate Bonds, backed
by a Cuarantee Fund of $2,000,000, also a Real Estate Fund
consisting of til e mortgages and property liens assigned FHA by
the insured mortgagors and a Sales and Amortization Fund.
The FHA was authorized to set up a Fund of lasured Mort-
gages, backed by mortgages to the extent of 10m, and to issue
bonds against this Fund with the sta tus of a national public issue.
This system provided easy payments and attractive tenns for
the public. Thousands of medium-income families were for the
first time able to realize their dream of owning their own homes.
Under the FHA plan, 9,577 homes were constructed . representing
a total investment of $78,928,000. The investment in these dwelf-
ings was as follows:

No. of Homes Varuation of DwdTings

1,044 Less than $4,000
2,545 $4,000 to $6,999
2,008 $7,000 to $9,999
2,175 $10,000 to $12,999
1,1 51 $13,000 to $15,999
654 Over $16,000

Thus, 58.5l{; of the homes purchased under the F HA plan

represented an investment of less than $10,000 and only 6.8$ of
the total were worth over $16,000. Some 34.7% were homes in
the middle $10,OOO·to-$16,OOO bracket.

PEASANTS' DWELLINGS

Th e road had been d eared for a building boom in the cities under
free enterprise and we were SImultaneously promoting urban
slum removal and public housing. The slums on the outskirts of
the cities were an eyesore and a disgrace. W e proceeded to re-
move them under Law #139 of June 11. 1952 to "provide hygi-
enic and comfortable dwellings for underprivileged groups un-
able to alford to buy or rent them."
 222 The Growth aful Decline of the Cuban Republic
Progress was also made in rlU'a1 housing. During its first year of
operations, the National Housing Commission (Comisi6n Nacional
de Viviendas-CNV) built more than 10,000 peasants' homes,
either directly or through Local Foundations for the Promotion
and Improvement of Peasants' H ouses. These were set up in all
the municipalities of the Republic and were dependcDt on the
CNV.
We banned farmhouses with sod floors and waived all charges
for building permits. All farm and ranch owners who provicfed
quarters for their men were ordered to comply with the stand.
ards of construction and hygiene provided in the law . While these
alterations were in progress, the tenants were exempted from
paying rent. No eviction proceedings were permitted during these
periods of alteration.
Income for this plan was provided by Law # 1005 of July 28,
1953, which levied an assessment on the net eamings of rural
property, but exempted all sugar mills and ranch owners who
were willing to build new housing or bring old hOUSing for their
workers up to the standards of the statute.
Our minimum standards were: concrete Hooring throughout,
sanitary toilets, enough bedrooms for the privacy ana convenience
of the entire family, fiber-cement roofing and drinking water out·
lets.
The National Housing Commission simultaneously laun ched a
campaign for the reconstruction of the typical bohio and, in less
tban four years, more than 50,000 of these peasant homes were
brought up to minimum standards of comfort and health.1
The reconstruction of the bohlos was started along the Central
Highway and intersecting roads, where materials could most
readily be moved to the work sites. By the end of 1958, we had
built some 8,000 new peasant homes, which were healthy and
comfortable, along the Highway.
When they seized power at the beginning of 1959, the Com-
munists did not besitate to take credit for this work and proudly
showed these rehabilitated bollios to foreign visitors as evidence
of their zeal to do something tangible for the common man. These
I The bohio ori ginally meant a Siboney Indian hut, consisting of one small
room, generally circular Md built of royal patm branches, joined with vines.
Palm fmnd s were used for roofing and packed dirt for the floors. This dwell.
Ing evolved in shape and size, but the basic characteristics remained the
5ume. The word itself is of Indian origill.
 223 Public Housing and Slum Clearance
Communist boasts were applied in fa ct to all of the 60,000 peasant
homes which had been reconditioned. rebuilt or constructed from
the ground up by the National Housing Commission under my
Administration.

DISASTER HOUSING

Naturally, we gave first priority to the housing of victims of nat-

ural calamities. My wife contributed a great deal of time and
energy to this program. She was always ready to visit the most
remote areas, if disaster had struck them, and did so even when
she was an expectant mother and without regard for her own
comfort or safety.
More than 2,000 houses, destroyed by a flood which ravaged
13 municipalities in the province of Matnnzas, were completely
modernized and rebuilt. In the town where I was born, Banes,
a model residential project was set up, beginning with 25 one-
family dwellin gs. TIle beneficiaries were people who had lost
their homes because of the flooding of the Banes River. In Jo-
babo (Victoria de las Tunas) in Oriente, 100 homes damaged or
destroyed by tornado were completely rebuilt. The same situa-
tion occurred in Cardenas in Matanzas and here again 100 dwell-
ings had to be reconstructed. Mong the Varadero-Cirdeoas High-
way, 20 new homes were built for underprivileged families. In
Moron, CamagUcy, when the port of Laguna de la Leche was
improved, we built a modem fishing village of 50 homes complete
with aqueduct, sewage system and wharves. In Vega Alta, Las
Villas, all of the homes destroyed by a tornado were rebuilt. __
Hurricane Hilda caused havoc in the Baracoa region of Oriente,
leaving thousands homeless. We repaired or rebuilt 5,100 stricken
homes and rushed emergency relief to victims of the storm.
Throughout the area, we built new houses in better locations,
nearer to access roads. Guantinamo, Palma Soriana, Remedios
and Caibarien were among the communities which benefitted
from this hOUSing program.

SLUM CLEARA:-lCE

In the nation's capital and in various other cities, there were

slum districts where vast numbers of people lived in overcrowded
conditions which stunted their physical and mental develop-
 224 The Crowth and Decline of the Cuban Republic
ment and constituted a threat to public health. Most of these
people had built their own shacks of salvaged materials and were
squatting on the land. For humanitarian reasons, i t was necessary
to eliminate these slums. And also for esthetic ones, since they
weTe eyesores.
Law # 130 coped with this problem. A census of the slum dis·
tricts was taken. Then we proceeded to eradicate the slum dwell·
ings and move their inhabitants to other areas, where job op-
portunities were beuer. Simultaneously, we provided retraining
lor the unemployed in farms and factories, giving them shelter
and food during the transitional period.
Through this program, 36 slwn districts were eliminated; their
shacks were torn down, and the 25,000 people aHected were 0(.
fered better Hving conditions elsewhere. They were relocated ac-
cording to family needs, experience and ability. In some cases,
they were given land nnd building materials; in others, they were
provided with the tools of their trade. The sick were hospitalized;
the children sent to nurseries and schools; the aged sometimes
sent to homes and asylums.
Thus, the slum program was solved. without protests by any of
the groups involved. The slum landlords contributed to the pro-
gram for humanitarian reasons and because it enhanced the
value of their land.

LOW COST HOUSING PROJECTS

Eight yenrs before I took power for the second time, President
Crau San Mart in had undertaken a low cost housing project in
the Aranguren residential subdivision. The project never got off
the ground and Dr. Grau's successor, Dr, Carlos Pdo made no at-
tempt whatsoever, during his entire term of office, to finish the
housing project .
My Administration decided to complete thc abandoned project
on a long term amortization basis. After having done so and de-
livered the first 700 homes to buyers, we proceeded to expand
the venture into a huge operation under the Social and Economic
Development Plan. Some I SO new buildings were constructed,
including two apartment houses with 54 units apiece. Ten more
were in process of construction when Castro took power. In addi-
tion, we built a school center there, the Bernardo Taro GOmez
H ome for the Aged and the Evangelina Cossio Day Nursery.
 225 Public Housing and Slum Clearance
Similar housing projects to the one at Havana were undertaken
in the provincial capitals: the Calero in Pinar del Rio, the Pefias
Altas in Matanzas, the Manuelita in Santa Clara, the Garrido in
Camagiiey and the Altura de Vista Alegre in Santiago de Cuba.
These new housing projects were of modern, functional design.
which pOinted the way for low-cost housing engineering and
architecture.

TIlE $50,000,000 PLAN

Cuba's international credit rating had become so good that a

group of U.S. capitalists offered to invest $50 million over a .6ve~
year period at an annual rate of $10 million. An agreement to
that effect was signed on November 20, 1958---exactly 41 days
before the ominous New Year of 1959-between the Berlanti
Construction Company and the National Housing Commission.
The project comprised a vast low cost hOUSing development of
not less than 1l,000 units, including both individual residences
and apartment houses. Thus, Cuba was to get additional foreign
investment for social purposes of $10,000,000 annually at an inter~
est rate not exceeding 2.5%. The funds were to be handled by
the National Bank of Cuba.
However, when the Communists took power, the plan was
abandoned immediately and the $10,000,000 on deposit with
Bandes was confiscated and later squandered on the so-called
agrarian reform.

SOLDIERS' DWELLINGS

After the Revolution of 1933, I began a housing project for service-

men. This was revived in 1952 by Law #816 of April 17th. The
Low Cost HOUSing Administration for Members of the Anned
Forces (OVEFA) was organized to work on this problem with
FHA facilities and an allocation of $500,000 annually from the
State.
OVEFA constructed and improved hundreds of homes for en-
listed men and commissioned officers. \Vhen thc Reds took power,
it had reserves on hand of $1,000,000 in the form of BANDES
bonds. It was one of the very first targets of Communist rapacity_
 226 The Growth and Decline of the Cuban Republic

SUMMARY

The 1953 population census included questions concerning hous-

ing. We found that there were 1,259,641 dwellings in Cuba,
which worked out to 4.6 people per housing unit in the country
and 3.8 in the notion's capital. It was evident that Cuba needed
no less than 50,000 new homes yearly to meet population growth.
Under the stimulus of laws which encouraged private initiative
and aided by a dynamic plan to reconstruct rural dwellings, we
hoped to solve this problem, which is common to most COWltries
in the modem world.
Between 1953 and 1958, some 56.124 homes were built in the
province of Havana alone worth $383,702,216, according to sta-
tistics of the National Association of Architects. Of these, 11,905
were individual residences and 42,508 were apartment units.
Some 1,651 were other types.
United States Ambassador Arthur Cardner testified as follows
on this matter before the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee
on August 27, 1960:
«And during the course of the time that I was there, the econ-
omy rose tremendously. The building boom was sensational. If
you had beeD in Havana years earlier, as I had, and then saw it
the day I left, you wouldn't recognize the city.
0<. • • I think that the real reason for it was the feeling of defi-

nite security that the Cubans themselves had, politically perhaps

not, but finaD clally, yes. And they felt that the time had finally
come when tlley CQuId begin investing money in Cuba, rather
than putting their money, as they had in previous years, in banks
in Switzerland and New York.":1
Total residential construction in Cuba amounted to $488,057,-
028 during the entire period 1952-1958, again according to the
architects' association. Only about a fifth of this was spent out~
side Havana Province.
The table that follows shows residential construction in Jb-
vana Province and in Cuba as a whole during the 1952-58 period.
2 Senate Internal Security Subcommittee, Communist Threat w the UnitlU!
Sta fe$ TlIrough the Canbboon, Hearing', 86th Congress, 2nd Scrsion, Part
9, August 27, 30, 1960, Government Printil'lg Office, Washington, D. C.,
p.664.
 2Z1 Public Housing and Slum Clearance
Total Total ..
ReridentWl llaouna Havana: Hooana ..
Year CQnrlruction ProvInce D welling' Aportmenf.r
(figures in millions of dollars)
1952 49.4 38.0 9.6 13.0
1953 62.7 51.1 ll .6 28.0
1054 74.1 60.3 11.7 35.6
1955 69.4 54.2 16. 2 29.6
1956 80.4 60.3 18.1 26.8
1957 77.9 58.3 19.4 23.2
1958 74.0 61.5 17.2 27.2
AVERACE 69.7 54.8 14.8 26.2
1959 33.6 20.4 7.3 4.9
There is little need to stress the thriving condition of the build-
ing industry and related industrial fields. Cement consumption
increased b y over a million b arrels from 3,015,901 barrels in 1953
to 4,456,473 in 1957. To meet increasing d emand, cement imports
rose to 1,519,879 barrels in 1955. However, as soon as the two
new plants in Santiago de Cuba and Artemisa started production,
imports fell off. By ) 957, they were only 540,685 bbls.
W e h ad to import 325,100 tons of steel reinforcing rods during
the seven-year p eriod. However, these average imports of 50,324
tons were cut to 21,951 tons in 1957 due to government assistance
to the n3scent Cuban steel industry. This involved a yearly saving
of over $2,000,000 in dollar exchange.
In 1959, the first year of Communist mle in Cuba, housing con-
struction fell by more than 50% in the nation and by about 60$
in Havana Province. A flourishing industry, that had provided
better h ousing for the p eople, that had embellished our cities
and that had offered employment for hundreds of thousands of
C ubans, had b cen virtually destroyed.
In 1960. the second year of Communist d omination in Cubo..
total cement consumption could be provisionally estimated at
about 3.6 million b arrels, a further decline from 1959, and about
21f below the 1951 leveJ.=! While this d ecrease is less pronounced
than th at sho",'11 for housing construction, the reason is that a
large portion of cement production was b eing deflected from
such socially b eneficial ptlrposes as hOUSing into militarization of
the nation as a Sovict satellite. Thus, the extent to wh ich Castro
S v. Alvarez, Diaz, op. cit., p. 1,561.
 228 Th e Growth and Decline of t1l8 Cuban Republic
and his Communists had wrecked the housing industry of the Is·
land was statistically masked.
What was really incredible about this sorry picture was the way
in which Commuoist propagandists, their agents, dupes and
pawns depicted the supposedly great progress Castro and his
Reds were making in the public housing Beld.
 25
The Government Building Program

In the 6rst days of the September 1933 Revolution, I conceived

the idea of a Plaza of the Republic, the central theme of which
would be a magnificent monument in marble and bronze COD-
secrated to the immortal glory of Jose Marti and surrounded by
govenunent buildings worthy of that nation of which he was the
apostle and mnrtyr.l
We gave priority to the plan for a palace to house the courts.
The Supreme Court, founded in 1899 by MiUtary Governor
John R Brooke-upon the recommendation of the Cuban jurist
Jose Antonio Gonzalez. Lanuza-had been domiciled for 30 years
in the Colonial building which had been its cradle. In 1929, it was
moved to another Colonial building. called the Palacio del Se-
gundo Cabo. which had been vacated by the Senate when the
National Capital was officially opened.
With time, the responsibilities of the Supreme Court increased.
There were more courtrooms and more judges. It no longer
served merely as an appellate tribunal and interpreter of the
t The March 1952 Government COTTUneIllorated the golden jub ilee of the Re-
pubJ;e ( 1902-1952) and the ccntennary of the birth of Marti (1953) and
that of tho patrlots, Juun Gu nlberto G6mez. Emilio Nunez and Martin Morua
Delgado. All the commissions oreated by law for these commemorations
were dissolved by the OJmmunist re gime although they had Dot completed
their tasks. In many jnmwce" path. public institutions, streets and avo-
DUe'S , which had been named by law or by municipal decisions for Cuban
patriots, had their names changed to those of various criminals in the serv-
Ice of International communism.
 230 The Growth and Decline of the Cuban Republic
constitutionality of laws. It was called upon to settle administra-
tive and socia] controversies and to serve as the head of the third
power of the State. 'I1le Supreme Court, among its other duties.
appointed the judges and officials of the courts.

TIrE PLAZA OF TIJE REPUBLIC

In late 1944. bids had already been opened on this project, but
my term of office was too close to its end to permit us to go ahead.
We froze the price of the land which the Government would
have to take over for the Plaza at $5.00 per square oora (0.836
square meters). This was possible because real estate was cheap
and construction activities were lagging in those days. This anti-
speculative measure guaranteed completion of the project at a
reasonable cost, but my Autentico successors promptly repealed
it.
Land sharks with close connections with high officials of the
new Administration bought up the land destined for the Plaza,
running its price up from $5.00 to $75.00 per square oora. Hence,
when I came back into power in March 1952, the enormous area
we had planned to devote to the PJaza had to be cut by two-
thi"k

THE PALACE OF JUSTICE

One of my first official acts in 1952 was to promu1gate Law #25

of April 24th for construction of the Palace of Justice. This law
stated that the higher and lower courts "are, as a rule, housed in
buildings which are unattractive, inadequate, poorly maintained
and unhygienic." By contrast, the other two powers of the State
were adequately housed: the Legislature in the National Capitol,
inaugurated in 1929, and the Chief Executive in the National
Palace, opened in 1920. We were duty-bound, it seemed to me,
to treat the Judiciary equally welP
2 In Cuba, e.lectoral procedure! were controned entirely by the Judiciary,
which was completely Independent of the Executive and Legislative pow-
ers. The Supreme Electoral Court cons.!sted of judges of the Supreme Court
and the HavlllIa Circillt Court of Appenls. It had j\llisdiction over all mat-
ters concerning politkal paz:ties and f!Olitical wues. Unde.r its supervision,
the municipal election boards prepared rosters of eligible voters, and issued
them voting cards, containing photog raphic and fingerprint identification.
These local bodies, chaired by judges appointed by the Supreme Electoral
 231 The Govcrnment Building Program
By Law # 1113 of October 2.0, 1953, the President was au-
thorized to issue $12,500,000 of obligations to construct buildings
for the judiciary: $10,000,000 for the Palace of Justice in Havana
and the remaining $2,500,000 to build or renovate courthouses
throughout the nation.
My co-workers and I had the privilege of form ally opening the
Palace of Justice Oll September 1, 1958, thus fulfilling a commit-
ment I had made 15 years previously. Cuban justice was lodged
for the Brst time in a mansion worthy of its dignity, a spacious,
modern building, austere in design and functional down to the
smallest detail.

NEW COURmousES

A new building was constructed for the Appellate Court, the

lower courts, the local electoral court and the other electoral
bodies of the judicial district of Holguin, one of the two that
comprise the province of Oriente, under the provisions of Law
# 1113 of 1953. W e built 48 courthouses for the lower courts of
one-third of the mUnicipalities of Cuba and also furnished and
equipped them.
Public opinion was well aware of the fact that my Administra-
tion was dedicated to the rrinciple of impartial justice witbout
regard to politics. Some 0 the judges who participated in the
activities of the Castro movement issued biased and clear1y in-
competent decisions, but my Government never took any action
against them beyond reporting their conduct to the investigative
d eparhnents of the Judiciary.s W e did Dot even demand that
Court, JIlJ.!Ulated election proccc.luril. counted the ballots and issued certifi·
cates of el ection. The Court also had jurisdiction over th e National Census
Bonrd, which counted, not only the population, but the voters. In Cuba,
voting was compulsory for <Ill men and women over 20.
3 Even in times when the wri t of habetu COfpt'$ was suspended by Collgte!lll,
tlle right to the writ was always at le.1st partJally upheld by the courts:.
Whcn the Marxists took power, however, the writ, wliich protects the life
and liberty of the clutens, was unscrupulously ignored and denied. This
Wa.! done with the assi5tance of the Professor of C riminal Law at the Uni-
versity of Havana, Dr. Jose Mit6 Cardona. nus man signed the Commu_
nist decrees which applied the death penalty for political offell5e~ and en_
forced the new criminal l<lws retroactively, thus UlIjustly punishing men,
5OJ'Dctim65 with death, for acts which had not bef:o. illegal when committed.
In doing these things, Professor Mir6 Cudona dented and contradicted the
p rinciples which he had taught his claS5e5 in law school for years.
 232 The Growth and Decline of the Cuban Repuhlil;
Judge Manuel Urrutia Lle6 be made accountable for his uo-
mistakably biased activities during the trial of the Castro broth-
ers.'"

TIlE PALACE OF COMMUNICATIONS

Other departments of the Government had to be rehoused. I

have already mentioned the work done in providing adequate
domiciles for the revenue collection offices, the postoffices and
other public service organizations. Law # 16 of December 20th,
1952 authorized the Executive Power to spend up to $3,000,000
for a Palace of Communications. To provide the necessary funds,
a special one-cent stamp was issued which had to be placed on
every item mailed.
By March 1952, construction had already been started, but the
new building did not harmonize with the other edi.6ces planned
for the Plaza of the Republic. Obviously we could not stop the
project for this reason. We decided to modify the design to make
the building less ungainly and more functional. Law # 1157 of
October 30, 1953 added $2,000,000 to the project and a $5,000,-
000 special bond issue was floated for the same purpose on It
medium-term basis.
The Palace was completed and in operation in 1957. In quality
of materials and workmanship and architectural deSign, it meas-
ured up to expectations. The old St. Francis Monastery, which
had been partially restored during my first Administration, was
turned into a Colonel Museum and exhibit of the culture and
artefacts of the extinct race of Siboney Indians. Ugly additions to
the monastery were removed and the dome, carried away by a
burricane a century before, was restored.

THE RURAL PDSTMAN

My first administration had introduced major reforms in the Cu-

ban communications system. We had created a postal savings sys-
'" Whtm Judge UrrutIa applied for retiremeDt, his request was promptly proc-
essed and granted. He was never molested oc persecuted. Moreover, when
he left Cuba to go into eKile, he continued to receive his retirement clleclcs
puDCluaJly. Later, rewarded with the Presidency of Cuba by his hieod,
Fidel Castro, he wa5 expelled contemptuoudy a few rnontlu later by the
despot whom he had protected from the bench in violation of his judicial
oatli of office.
 233 The Government Building Program
tern; inaugurated delivery of telegrams by telephone; introduced
the money order transmitted by telegraph; brought stamping
machines into the country and introduced self-addressed reply
envelopes and the international identity postal card.
In my second Administration, we brought postal service to
the rural areas. This task required mailmen of a special sort, will-
ing to travel over long routes and poor roads. But it contributed
to the national consciousness of rural Cubans and made farmers
and peasants better able to participate in the public life of the
Republic. Toward the end of my tenure of office, rural postmen
were serving 137,048 Cubans and covering 11,000 kilometers of
mail routes every day.

HOUSING THE ARMED FORCES

Prior to the Revolution of September 4, 1933, the armed forces of

the nation had been quartered in inadequate and unhealthy
buildings, most of them improVised and some erected during the
latter part of the 19th Century. Still others were temporary
wooden barracks which had been built during the U.S. military
occupation of 1899-1902.
We introduced Military Cities, the name given to the congeries
of buildings which housed regimental commands. These satisfied
the physical and morale standards to which the soldiers.
sailors and police who defend the nation and uphold law are en~
titled. Soon they sprang up all over the Republic.~
Among the projects completed during my second Administra~
tion were the Military City of Matanzas and the Naval District of
Oriente. Special attention was devoted to military airfields; land~
ing strips were lengthened and new hangars built. At Ciudad
Militar (the fonner Camp Columbia), the Chiefs of Staff were
given more spacious and adequate housing.
(\ The Communist demagogues under Fidel Castro attacked these military in~
stallations mercHessly. They proclaimed loudly that they were unnecessary
and promised to convert them into schools. Once he had seized power, the
Red chieftain claimcd that he had converted these garrisons into schools.
But if so, where had he lodged his Army? And if the children had heen
militarized and the school teachers forced into the ~filitia, it would seem
that the schools had been turned into barracks! By 1963 it became clear
that his real plan was to militarize childhood and the s~hooIs and to set
up an anned force, under Russian command, sufficiently strong to prevent
the people of Cuba from overthrowing his tyranny.
 234 The Growth and Decline of the Cuban Republio

REORGANIZATION

We amended drastically some of the basic laws governing the

organization and procedures of the Anned Forces. The Military
Penal Code (Law #1930 of 1955) incorporated the latest find-
ings of military penology. Law #2032 of 1955 revamped plead-
ing procedure before military tribunals. The Credit and Insurance
Fund of the Armed Forces (CASFA) was created by Law #1051
of 1958 to provide more prompt financial assistance to service-
men in need.
A completely new installation was built for the Anny and Navy
Club in Marianao Beach by authority of Decree #3852 of De-
cember 3, 1957. Financial means for this project were made
available in 1954 and the association, which would serve as a
liaison center between members of the three branches of the
military and between military men and civilians, was given om-
ciallegal status as the National Association of the Anned Forces
of Cuba.

THE NAVY

My second Administration provided the Navy with a new Or-

ganic Law (#647 of January 28,1953) which contained entirely
new provisions in such areas as protecting the security of mari-
time communication<; and coastal defense.
The Navy's functions were broadened in scope. For example,
Law # 1597 of August 4, 1954 spared the sands of our northem
beaches from indiscriminate dredging from the Canas! River to
Punta de Mulas on the peninsular of Hicacos. The Navy was also
charged with regulating the felling of trees on the six keys at the
entrance to the Bay of Cardenas. Both measures were designed to
protect Varadero Beach as a tourist attraction. Then there was
Law #1948 of January 25, 1955 which made all waters between
the mainland and the keys, prOvided the distance did not exceed
10 miles, "inland waterways."
Another improvement was to install a printing plant in the
Casa Blanca Naval Yard. This was so well equipped that it issued
the publications of the Technical Aid Program for the use of the
Navy and in addition was used by the United States Government
 235 TM Goocmment Building Program
to print military and training manuals for the use of the signatory
nations to the International Technical Aid Program.
During the early months of my second Administration, the
Navy printing plant turned out 130 publications with a total of
156,000 copies, distributed among seven countries. This did not
include thousands of training booklets for servicemen on such
military fields as electronics, radar, navigation, machinery and
artillery.
AdjOining the Naval Academy in Mariel, where we enlarged
the School for Officers of the Merchant Marine and gave it its
own building. a National Academy of Ship's Masters was set up
by Law # 1171 of October 30,1953. TIlls was to train ship's mas·
ters engaged in the coastal trade, fishing. sports fishing, etc., and
coastal pilots and machinist's mates. It was also designed to
stimulate the interest of the youth in all matters pertaining to
the sea. It contributed to developing national interest in the Cu-
ban merchant madne and in our oceanic industries. At La Do-
minica near Mariel, there was a school for stewards and cabin
boys. Finally, during my mst Administration. we had created a
Naval Sports Academy under the National Directorate of Sports
by Deaee #1454 of July 9,1938.
The growing popular interest in matters of the sea was ex-
pressed in 1953 by the organization of the SOciety of Friends of
the Sea, an organization that blossomed out all over Cuba and
which was helped financially by funds from the National Lottery.

NAVAL DUlLDLNGS

During the latter part of my mst Administration, a government

building, which had been purchased during World War II, was
aSSigned to the Navy as its headquarters. When I took power a
second time, I found that the project for a Navy Headquarters
was at a standstill. However, six months later. we bad the new
building finished aDd on September 4, 1952, the Navy Chief of
StaH was p ermanently installed in it. On the other side of the
A venida del Puerto, we built a dock for the Navy and Bnished
the part of the seawall that had been left undone-from the PUa
de Nephmo to the wharves of the Havana Doeks Corporation.
New buildings were erected and old ones renovated in the
southern Naval District Headquarters in Cienfuegos. In Santiago
 236 The Growth and Decline of the Cuban Republic
de Cuba, headquarters for the Naval District of Oriente. a mag-
nllicent new building was erected with shops, officers' quarters
aDd furnished houses for enlisted men on 4,500 square meters
of land. Part of the adjacent waterfront was filled in and the dock
was extended.
The concrete runways were extended at the Naval Air Base at
1\fariel. which we had bui1d in 1943; new hangars and ware-
houses were constructed aod the control tower was rebuilt. The
Casa Blanca Naval Arsenal in Havana was similarly improved.
In all, by the middle of 1958, the Naval construction program
h ad involved the erection of 36 new buildings: 14 in Havana
Province, 6 in Pinar del Rio, one in Matanzas, 3 in Las Villas, 4
in Camagiiey and 8 in Oriente. The new 10th of March Naval
Hospital had been completed and was scheduled for inaugura-
tion, but the Communists seized power.
Ever since the incorporation of the Lighthouse and Coastal
Lighting Service into the Navy by D ecree #226 of February 1,
1944, there had been steady improvement in maintenance, equip·
ment and the number of lighthouses, buoys and channel markers.
We concentrated on electric buoys because of their greater
efficiency and visibility. We installed them at the ports of Ca·
baDa and Maciel, at Nuevitas in Camagiiey and at Nipe, ManaU
and Puerto Padre in Oriente. The buoys of the northern coast-
from Manan to Daraeia- were totally renovated.

THE VIA CUBA CANAL

One of the most important projects under consideration by my

Administration was the draining of the Zapata Swamp so as to use
its rich lands for new crops such as fig trees, ramie and kenaf and
to plant adjacent areas to rice and peanuts.
This vast agro ·industrial plan called for the construction of
factories, shops, silos and dams along the projected Via Cuba
Canal, which was to cut through the Island from a point east of
the Bay of Cardenns on the north coast to the Bay of Pigs in the
south coast in Las Villas Province.
This Canal would have saved ships between ports of North
and South America the more than 400 nautical mUes involved in
following the Cuban coasts to Cape San Antonio or the more
than 800 miles if one follows them to Punta de Maid. The ad·
vantages to ships not touching at Cuban ports would hnve been
 237 The Government Building Program
equally great and, in addition, the Canal would have provided
much greater navigational safety. Unfortunately, an effective cam-
paign of vilification of this project by the Communists managed
to prevent its being put into operation.
 26
Electric Power and Industrial
Development

Statistics on electric generating capacity and production and con-

sumption of electricity are universally accepted as indexes of a
nation's economic development and prosperity.
Population growth and the prosperity caused by the impact of
the Marshall Plan on sugar demand induced the Cuban Power
Company (CeE) to launch a $30,000,000 program to expand
capacity over the period 1948-1953.
When my Administration took office in 1952, we developed an
economic program which required an even greater expansion of
electric power production. Power capacity in 1951 had amounted
to 183,100 kilowatts. A second expansion program, amounting this
time to $75,000,000, was put into motion. This provided for
eleven new thermal power plants to boost capacity by 135,000
kilowatts. Of these, two, with a total capacity of 70,000 kilowatts,
were installed at RegIa; two others at Matanzas prOvided 30,000
kilowatts; two in Camagiicy 10,000; two at Santiago de Cuba
8,000 and one in Santa Clara 15,000.
By December 31, 1955, generating capacity had risen to 297,~
200 kilowatts. A third expansion program was then adopted, in~
volving an investment of $60,000,000 in generating facilities in
1956 and 1957. To these programs, the Government contributed
$36,000,000 through the Financiera Nacional and $24,000,000
was made available by the Export-Import Bank. As a result of
this vigorous investment program in greater generating capacity,
 239 Electric Power and Industrial Development
the power industry of Cuba had 352,300 kilowatts of capacity at
the end of 1957, almost twice the 183,100 kilowatts we had in·
herited from the Autentico administration.
When the Cuban Power Company was seized by the Com·
munists,! its expansion programs were discontinued; all the gains
of the workers were wiped out and the once powerful Federation
of Electrical Workers (FfPE) was pulverized.2
The following table shows electricity consumption in Cuba by
major uses and by years in millions of kilowatt hours.

ELECTRICITY CONSUMPTION'
(Millions of kwh)
Year Industrial Residential Commercial Goo't. Total
1941 89.1 55.9 66.8 103.6 315.4
1942 100.1 57.6 65.4 104.4 327.5
1943 107.6 61.1 67.5 103.5 339.7
1944 117.9 68.4 75.3 109.4 371.0
1945 138.5 77.9 86.0 117.9 420.3
1946 148.3 88.2 97.1 123.7 457.3
1947 140.1 103.8 111.3 130.7 489.9
1948 129.3 128.7 149.2 136.1 543.3
1949 130.8 149.0 165.7 140.1 555.6
1950 144.5 171.3 155.4 143.4 644.6
1951 155.9 203.5 213.6 133.8 716.8
1952 165.5 242.8 246.7 119.4 774.4
1953 175.5 281.2 273.1 121.4 551.2
1954 192.9 312.2 300.5 125.4 931.0
1955 214.7 348.6 334.1 126.5 1,023.9
1956 242.2 393.5 376.0 131.1 1,142.8
1957 270.9 443.9 428.0 139.1 1,281.9
1958 327.8 505.9 478.6 150.5 1,462.8
1 Cuban Power was by all odds the largest company on the Island. However,
some of the smaller companies in the provinces were completing new plants
with large capacity such as the one in SaIto del Hanabanilla in Las Villas
and the projects in La Habana del Este and Toa in Oriente.
2 The Communist regime also paralyzed the Hanabanilla, Toa and Havana del
Este power projects.
/! Data from the Cuban Power Company, published in Anuarios EstadisticOli
de Cuba of 1952 and 1956; Cuba Ec6mlca y Financiera, Editora Cultural
Cubana, S.A., Havana (Various 1958, 1959 and 1960 issue.'l). A..iBo Bee Un
Estudlo Sobre Cuba, op. cit., p. 1,170.
 240 The Growth and Decline of the Cuban Republic
Thus, during my second Administration, industrial and com-
mercial consumption of electricity doubled. residential consump-
tion increased somewhat more rapidly, while power use by gov-
ernment rose by only about a fourth. The number of consumers
of electricity increased from 259,978 in 1941 to 534,934 in 1951
and 732,413 in 1958.

THE TELEPHONE SYSTEM

In 1909, the Cuban Telephone Company was organized, replac-

ing the old Red Telet6nica de La HabaruJ. Even though costs
had increased considerably, the Company had never had a rate
increase. Consequently, it could not afford the expansion and
modernization of facIlities that the country so desperately needed.
The Company brought its problem to the Government. The ex-
pansion program caned for an investment of $85,000,000. The
capital was to be obtained through the issuance of mortgage
bonds but, at current rates, income would be insufficient to meet
interest and amortization payments.
The proposed increases would affect 143,000 telephone owners
{1957 6gures}. Accordingly, we put the Company's proposals be..
fate various commissions for study. My general policy was to re-
sist such Jncreases as long as possible because of my strong oppo-
sition to raising the cost of living. On the other hand, the economic
development of the country required. more and better telephone
service :md there were 45,000 persons wanting telephones and
unable to get them. This deficit, we estimated, would increase to
75,000 before 1960 unless something was done about the matter.
Arithmetical realities made it necessary to change the rate
structure. We authorized this by Law #2083 of February 8, 1955.
Then by Decree #945 of March 13, 1957, we eHected a modest
increase in rates applying only to new installations. To obtain the
$85,000,000 of capital needed, the Export.lmport Bank advanced
$17,500,000; the International Telephone and Telegraph Com-
pany put up $7,500,000 and Cuban capital bought $10,000,000 of
common stock. Standard Electric Company of Cuba proposed to
build a plant to produce telephone equipment in Santiago de las
Vegas. The program also called for installing the most modern
phone equipment, extending automatic service and opening tele-
phone exchanges in many communities which lacked them. TIlis
program was to be completed toward the end of 1960.
 241 Electric Power and IndrmrWl Development
By the end of 1958, some 26,362 n ew phones h ad been installed
and another 20,000 were to be installed next year. H owever,
with the annihilation of free enterprise by the Communists, this
expansion program naturally had to be abandoned.

INDUS1nIAL DEVELOPMENT

The industrialization of the n ation through the mobiliza tion of in~

vestment capital in order to increase output and employment was
the main purpose of the Plan of Social and Economic D evelop~
m ent. The Law of August 15, 1953 provided the means for this. In
the same year, the National Finance Corporation was of.l!ani:.r.oo.
This was part of the program which culmin ated in a $350,000,-
000 bond issue and the foundation of the Bank of EconomIc and
SOcial Development (BANDES).
This program was later t he target of Communist calumny. A
contemporary WTiter, who sided with my political enemies, refuted
these false charges as foll ows:
"'The entire program of industrial development through auton~
omous organizations suHered from the reiterated chan~e that
only a group of privileged interests benefitted from these financial
operations. This created an impression of abject corruption when,
as :1 matter of fact, not the slightest impropriety or mism a n ag e~
ment was ever proved against any official or member of the vari~
ous Boards of Directors of the autonomous entities . . .
..It was never explained to the people of Cuba that the funds
used in BANDES operations were not prim arily government
mODey, but private capital obtained by bond issues backed by the
projects being financed in accordance with strict regulations
and by the funds of BANDES in deposit in private banks . . .
"'No one considered tbe fact that the only possible way to de-
velop the national economy in a democratic system is to create
small property owners and new native businesses or else to stimu-
late 'a mixed economy' with joint venhues of domestic and for~
cign capital. It is as unproductive to leave the best opportunities
to foreign private enterprise as to base economic development on
the total socialization or a society.""
.. Dr. Alberto D ial!: Ma!VidaI. Dlarlo de 10 Marinl:l, February 25, 1961,
 242 The Crowth and Decline of the Cuban Republic

THE SCOPE OF FINANCIAL AID

The .figures which fonow cover only those operations which were
financed directly by BANDES, BANFAIC and the National
Finance Corporation or which were supported pursuant to spe-
ci.Gc laws furthering industrial development such as Law # 1531
and Law #1758 of November 2, 1954, covering oil refineries.
Thus, hundreds of projects, in which the Government created
new industries or brought about the expansion and modernization
of old ones, are not included. The period covered is from March
10, 1952 to D<oember 31, 1958,

FOOD JNDUS1'1UES (28 PLANTS):

Jams and Preserves (9) , Tomatoes (2), Puree
nnd Fruit Juices (2), Sausages (I), Chocolate
(I) , Cracl«" ( 1 ), Soybeans ( 1), Yeast ( 1 ),
Fodder (1), Rice Mills (3) , Wheat Flour Mills
( I ), Milk PasteurizaUonPlant (1). Butter and
Cheese Plant ( 4) $5,292,l?5O
SUGAR INDUSTRY ( 2 }.m.LS) : $2,000,000
CANE BYPflODUcrs (9 PLANTS):
Cellulose, Pulp and Newsprint (1), Compressed
Bagasse Boards and Insulators ( 1), Paper,
Cardboard, Bristol Board and Other Bagasse
Dy-products (1) , Corrugated Cardboard and
Insulators ( 1), P ulp and Fiber (2), Other By~
products (3) $33,825,000
AGlUCUL'nJRAL P ROCESSING (1) $833,400
PAP.f.:l\ AND ALLIED INDUS'lRIES (6 PLANI'S):
Containers (3) , Cardboard Boxes ( 1), Carbon
Paper (1) and Printsbops (1) $814,635
MINING ( 14oPEl\ATlONS):
Iron (3). Copper (3), Manganese (2), Gold
(3), Nickel ( 1) and Other Minerals (2) $77,258,450
METAUU'RCICAL ( 10 PLANTS ):
Steel (5), Steel Reinforcing Rods ( 1), Copper
Wire (1 ), Aluminum (1) , Sugar Cane Hauling
Ca" ( 1 ) and Other ( 1) $24,090,720
STONE, CEMENT AND CERAMICS (13 PLANTS):
 243 Electric Power and Industrial Deoolopmen:
Quarries ( 2) , Portland Cement (2). Concrete
(4). Shingles (1), Abrasives (1 ). Glass (1) ,
Ceramics (2) $14,774,500
Pt.."TROLEm1 AND PRODUcrs (7 PLANTs):
Research Laboratory (1), Lubricants (2), Re-
fineries (4) $94,333,500
PA~C PLANTS (2) $430,000
MonON PICTURE (3) $1 ,096,990
HIDES AND LEA'J'HER pnODucrs $1l1,500
LUMJ'ER Az,,"D WOOD PROD1.lCI'S $1,170,000
ELECI'RICI'rY AI\"IJ ELECTRlCAL INDUSTRIES(10):
Power Plants (3) , Expansion of Telephone Sys-
tem ( 1 ), Radios (1), Refrigerators ( 1), Air
Conditioners (1 ) Phonograph Records (2)
I

and Other ( 1) $267,290,000

CHEMICAL II\'DUSTlUES (13):
Fertilizer Plants (3), Pharmaceuticals (2),
Clues (1), Plastics (3), Phosphorus (1), Nitro-
gen (1), Glycerine (1) and Acetate (1) $33,876,000
TEXTn.E AND CLOTHl NG ( 13):
Socks and hosiery ( 4), Kenaf (3), Rayon (1),
Cordage (2), Brassieres (1 ), Fabrics ( 1) and
Olh", ( 1 ) $7,068,645
Rl1'2BER I NDUSTRIES (3 TIm: PLANTS) $7,000,000
INDUSTRIAL CITIES (2) $16,000,000
COlS'STRUGrlON INDt."STRY:
Buildings in Havllna (In-
cluding $78,298,000 for the
FHA ) $383,702,216
Buildings in the provinces $104,354,812
Low-Cost Housing $50,000,000

Total $538,057,028
T OtmIST CENTERS (3 ) $34,000,000
HOTELS AND MOTELS (4) $27,227,000
JUNES (5) $3,174,950
AVIATION $29,947,000
RAn-ROADS $47,290,000
TilUCKING $31,417,165
MAlUTIME TR4..NSI'ORT $19,568,000
 244 The Growth and Decline of the Cuban Republic
AGmCULTURAL LOANS:
Rice $39,9'79,200
Tobacco $1l,788,500
Coffee $9,790,800
Com $1,076,000
OTHER AGmCULTURAL CREDITS $52,576,500
LABOR UNIONS $1,045,650
OPERATING CAPITAL OF HANnES, Bcx::E &: BANFAIC $21,000,000
MARITIME INDUSTRIAL PROJECTS (12):
D'J'docks (I), Shipy",d, (I), Wharv., (2),
Warehouses (1), Fishing Terminal (1), Mari-
time Terminals (6) $161,560,820
AUTONOMOUS ORGANIZATIONS (LOANS AND
FINANCING) $14,815,140
AQUEDUcrS ( 29 ) $33,161,295
FOOD MARKETS ( 3 ) $1,543,465
TOLL HIGHWAYS (2) $40,000,000
TUNNELS (3) $55,212,290
COMMUNICATIONS: MICRO-WAVE $10,000,000
SCHOOL Bun.DINCS $20,000,000
T.REASURY AND POS'!' OFFICES $6,000,000
PALACE OF JUSTICE AND COURT HOUSES $14,400,000
PAUCE OF COMMUNICATIONS $5,000,000
MlNISTIlY OF STATE Bun.DINC $2,200,000
NATIONAL BANK OF CORA BUlLDING $15,000,000
NATIONAL LWRARY $58,000

CRAND TOTAL $1,834,733,688

Quantitatively, the main elements in this enormous credit and

investment program of $1,835,000,000 were the $538 million in-
vested in the construction industry, the $267 million put into
power plants, telephone systems and the electronics industry, the
$162 million in maritime projects and the $115 millions of agricul-
tural credits. This total does not include grants of $62,348,346
from the National Lottery to aid cultural, charitable and social
welfare institutions nor does it include the $48,650,552 contrib-
uted by CENPLUC for services to rural areas.
 245 Electric Power and Industrial Development

PRIVATE INITIATIVE

The mobilization of government funds for these projects gave a

massive stimulus to private enterprise. Without exaggeration,
I can say that this dynamic program of invesbnent was renovat-
ing the entire economy of the nation. No less than 300 enterprises
were directly benefitted. In many instances, the cooperation
given industry by the autonomous technical institutions resulted
in major improvements in production methods. In other instances,
the mere approval of a project by these autonomous entities was
considered sufficient reason by the private banking system to ap-
prove credit requests.
Cities and towns throughout the country were rapidly changing
their appearance. Cuban industry made steady progress. Ma-
chinery was modernized; capacity was expanded; business hori-
zons widened beyond the local market to accept the challenge of
international competition in the export trade. Cuban workman-
ship and quality standards measured up to this challenge.

BANDES
This organization operated on such a sound and conservative
basis that the problem of bad debts was minimized. BANDES
supplied 50% of the capital needed by approved enterprises and
projects, provided the other 50% was obtained privately and on
condition that BANDES retained the status of preferred creditor.
If a project was considered of major importance to the country,
but capable management was not available, BANDES would
proceed with it, while retaining the right to buyout the private
interests and take over at any time. In other cases, projects were
financed and then leased to private enterprise at a rent that cov-
ered interest and amortization of the loan plus a fair percentage
of the profits.
The operation of these institutions created tllousands of per-
manent jobs and contributed greatly to a rise in wage levels
which placed Cuba first in this respect in Latin America. Cuba
ranked first in Latin America and eighth in the world in the small-
ness of her percentage of unemployment. In addition, these oper-
ations were handled with scrupulous honesty, so much so that,
although over a billion dolIars was spent, the Communists, after
 246 The G1'owtl, and Dec/ine 0/ the Cuban Republic
four years in power, were unable to prove financial malfeasance
of any sort.
As these lines are written, I am far from my country and must
read the one-sided, derogatory and false reports about Cuba un-
der my administration released by some of the wire services.
These reports not only distort the truth, but reveal the appalling
ignorance prevailing abroad of the economic, social and cultural
adv811ces we were able to achieve in the Pearl of the Antilles.

DICTATORSDIP?

It has been said that dictatorship is the concentration of all pow-

ers in a single individual. Dictatorship flouts the classic divisions
of goverrunental power in order to place all of it in the hands of
the dictator. He commands, the rest obey.
In my two Administrations, I repeatedly waived powers vested
in my office in fa vor of autonomous institutions, directed by strong
and capable executives. My purpose was always to decentralize
executive power rather than to aggrandize it. I always insisted
that governmental power be vested in the people and not in me
and I strove at all times to share executive and administrative re-
sponsibility with the greatest Dumber of persons and organlza-
tions. Thus, I made it a rule never to make a decision without COIl-
suIting the interested parties.
In other words, my principles and practice were unalterably
opposed to the dictatorial centraUzation of power and in favor of
a broad plural power system, involVing cooperation of diverse in-
dividuals and interests for socially constructive goals. 'Ibis broad
sharing of the challenges and responsibilities of governmment is,
in my opinion, the essence of the democratic way of life.
 27
Rebuilding Havana

Ruby Hart Phillips, the fonner head of the New York Times Bu-
reau in Cuba and, at the time, a supporter of Fidel Castro, gave
a vivid and objective description of Havana in 1952 when I took
power.
"People became increasingly impatient," she wrote, "with the
slowness of the government to resolve problems which had ac-
cumulated over the years. The Frio government had started im-
provements in Havana, but nothiog had been terminated. Ha-
vana looked like a bombed-out city of Europe. Streets were torn
up. Low lying sections of the city were flooded every time it
rained due to lack of drainage. Mosquitoes and flies swanned
over the city and suburbs. Public works project's were started and
stopped. leaVing Havana more ugly and more in ruins than before
the projects had been undertaken. The Grau administration spent
four years on one roHe of the important highway stretching be-
tween Havana and the Jose Marti International Airport. The
Pdo governm ent finally did complete this.
"At last, in 1953, work began on projects in Havana." 1
Our Srst eHorts were directed at Snding a pennanent solution
to these conditions rather than some makeshift, temporary ex·
pedients. Thus, long before the end of my Administration, all the
old avenues, boulevards and traffic-burdened streets had been re·
built and solidly paved so they could withstand tropical rain·
1 Ruby Hart Phillips, Cuba, Island of Parados, McDowell, Obolensky, New
York, 1959, p. 264.
 248 The Crowth and Decline of the Cuban R.epublw
stonns and heavy traffic. Foundations, surfaces and drainage sys-
tems had to meet exacting standards. We applied this rule, not
merely to Havana, but to a1l other cities.
The tremendous and growing ,,-olume of vehicular traffic in the
city would make any outside observer assume that adequate
means of access and egress had been provided and that, specifi-
cally, wide. fast-moving access highways would have been built
to link the city to the great highway networks east of the capital.
Unfortunately, this was not the case.
Despite the fact that Havana was the great center of distribu-
tion and consumption of Cuba and an international tourist attrac-
tion as well, it had but one narrow, inadequate bridge-the Alcoy
Bridge-to handle the tremendous volume of inOowing and out-
going traffic with the east. This constituted a real bottleneck as
this b ridge was the sole nexus between the metropolis and the
Central Highway, at the time the only fi eans of communication
with the four provinces east of the capital. Traffic snarls were a
daily problem on the Alcoy Bridge.
By the end of my Administration, this problem had been com-
pletely solved, Havana had six spacious access highways to the
rest of the Island in addition to several inter-municipal highways.:!

CREAT AVENUES AND HIGHWAYS

When we reconstructed the Central Highway, we provided new

access routes into Havana: on the east, to San Francisco de Paula
(8 km.) and OD the west to Punta Brava (10 km.), in both cases
with cloverleaf intersections.
Then there was the Monumental Way. This magnificent high-
way, which was one of the best in the Americas, incorporated the
Avenida del Golfo, then merged into the White Way and pro-
ceeded through the tunnel under the Bay of Havana. Brilliantly
lighted, it haa no intersections or level crossings with other streets
or highways. This great artery was to give Impetus to the birth of
a Dew city-East Havana. Its historic importance was that it
traversed the area where a great battle was fought in the 18th

2 In my Pied,ar y UylJ$, op, clt"jP' 362-366, 1 give details of the street~

built, widened, reconstructed an repaired in Havana, Vedado and Mari-
anao,
 249 Rebuilding Haoona
century between British nod Spaniards for possession of Havana.
a battle which gave Cuba her commercial freedom.
The 16.7 km. Tunnel Highway, connecting the Monumental
Way with the Central Highway passed through the municipali-
ties of Gunabacoa and Santn Marfa del Rosario.
Another nexus highway, also 16.7 km. in length, linked Rancho
Boyeros Avenue with La Esperanza Sanatorium and thence with
the Central Highway.
The Great Barrandilla Boulevard nnd the Mid·Day Speedway
also made a major contribution to the problem of congestion of
traffic at the main access areas to the capital.

CO:MPLETION OF THE MALEC6N

The Malec6n, Havana's oceanfront drive, was begun in 1901 by

Genera1 Leonard Wood, the U. S. Military Governor of the Island.
The project was abandoned when it reached the inlet of San
Lazaro opposite the National Children's Home. Years later, Pres-
ident Machado extended the Maleoon to the point where he
erected a monument to the 5.5. Maine. My Administration
achieved the original plan of bringing the Malecon to the Almen-
dares River in two stages. In my Brst term, we brought it to G
Street in Vedado, where we had to stop construction because of
the wartime curbs on the use of construction materials for non·
essential purposes. In my second period of office, we brou~ht it to
the river. The Malec6n, when completed, was one of the most
beautiful oceanfront highways in the world.
The final lap in the project made It necessary for us to build
new streets and to demolish the old Sports Palace, built in 1944
at the foot of the Avenida de los Alcaldes. We had to construct a
second tunnel under the Almendares River to link the luxuriouS'
Fifth Avenue drive in Miramar with the Calzada del Vedado at
the historic landmark of Torre6n de la Chorrera, a coastal watch-
tower of the era of puacy. Tunneling under the river took sixteen
months.
The completion of the Malecon and the new lunnel made it
necessary to demolish the old Pate Bridge over the Almendares.
This had contributed much to the development of the great resi-
dential sections of the city and their magnificent mansions. Its
disappearance gave all of Havana a sense of loss.
 250 The Growth alld Decline 0/ the Cuban Republic
\Vhen the last section of the Malec6n was about to be officially
opened, violent storms swept the city and proved the solidity of
the Dew avenue.

WATER SHORTAGE

The city was plagued with a water shortage which had become
increasingly acute with the rapid rise in its population. Th e AI.
bear aqueduct and its Vento springs were quite inadequate.
During the Administration of President Machado in 1926, new
sources of water were discovered near the city at a place known
as Aguada del eura and a second aqueduct was started. How-
ever, Marianna, which was growing as rapidly as Havana. also
tapped this water source as did GuaDabacoa and RegIa.
The first step in a massive plan of attack was to reconstruct the
network of pipes aDd conduits, as old as the Albear aqueduct it-
self, which were costing the city losses of water running into mil-
lions of gallons daily. To finance this and to capture and develop
the new Cuenca Sur source of water, we Boated a $14,000,000
bond issue at 4$ interest, maturing in 22 years.
The Cuenca Sur had been chosen by Law # 1253 of Jan\lary
28, 1954 on the recommendation of both foreign and Cuban eo-
gineers. With the approval of the National Fioance Corporation,
the project went forward and wns completed on schedule. The
new wells huned out to be highly productive. They supplied the
city with 100,000,(1()() gallons of water daily and the shortage dis-
appeared.
The rapid growth of Marianao created a serious water shortage
for that city. A loao of $9,000,000 at ~% and 30 years maturity
was arranged with the National Finance Corporation. The new
water system was to tap the Cuenca del Ariguanabo and yield
30,000,000 gallons daily.
The development of East Havana, after the new tunnel had
been constructed under the Bay, again caused a water shortage.
The old Cuanabac03 aqueduct was insufficient. New sources were
found in the zones of Santa Maria del Rosario and San Jose
de las Lajas and Aguacate. By Law #2029 of 1955 and Decree
#862 or 1957, franchises were granted to tap these sources and
the National Finance Corporation was authorized to lend $3,200.-
000 at 4*1.
For the same reasons, the sprawling Guanabacoa city and
 251 Rebuilding Havana
beach resort Tan short of water. With financial aid from the Ad-
ministration, the wells at San Benigno were repaired and modem-
ized and distribution faci1ities were improved, thus solving the
problem.

THE HAVANA TUNNEL

This project was undertaken only after exbaustive study by ex-
perts-in particular American concerns with great experience in
this area. We had hoped that Cuban firms would be able to do
the job, but bids were received from only two firms: Raymond
Concrete Pile Compa ny of New York and the Societe des Grands
Travaux of Marseille.
Since the French finn was the lower bidder, it received the con-
tract. This did not prevent our political enemies hom spreading
rumors of corruption, but the low cost and high quality of the
completed project refuted them.
Construction work began in September 1955 and the project was
formally opened with brilliant ceremonies nnd blessed by Man-
uel Cardinal Arteaga y Betancourt on schedule on May 31, 1958.
The cost of the Tunnel was $35,000,000, but it did not cost tax-
payers a penny. The Government owned 1,810,328 square varas
of land on the eastern side of the Tunnel, which it had almost
sold in 1910 for 2 cents a square meter. When the Tunnel was
opened, the value of this land increased from $9,000,000 to a
much higher figure and, when the residential boom in East Ha·
vana got under way. the land rose in value to $300,000,000.
This Tunnel was: a brilliant engineering accomplishment and
the project had general public approval from its inception. The
Tunnel of Havana is the sole survivor of the wanton destruction
by INRA of the Greater East Havana Project.

TUNNELS UNDER nm ALMENDARES

]n 1952. there were only three land connections between Havana

and Marianao, and these were quite inadequate. Moreover. deep
sea fishing and yachting traffic had increased to a point which
made drawbridges impossible. Tunnels were the only solution.
We completed tbe Linea Tunnel, 75% of wbich had been con-
structed by the previous Administration, and built the Tunnel of
Calzada ncar the mouth of the river. TItis project also improved
 252 The Crowth and Decline of the Cuban Republic
the appearance of the banks of the Almendares River for both
native Havanans aDd tomists.

PORT I MPROV£M:ENT AND OTHER PROJEcrs

Three major projects were completed in the port of Havana: the

drydock, the fishing tenninal and the maritime tenninal. In addi-
tion, 427,150 square meters of the Marmilena inlet were dredged
to a depth of 3B feet. The 2,970 million cubic meters of bottom
dredged in this project were used to fill 585,000 square meters of
swamp, for which we built 5,700 meters of bulkheads. The re-
mainder of (he muck was pumped through a four km. pipeline to
the waste land of Playa del Chivo.
During the rainy season, sections of La Vibora were frequently
flooded. We added several kilometers of sewerage. In three years,
we build 14 kIn. of sewerage for the residential sections of La
Fernanda, Parraga, La Lira and Gavilan.

PUBLIC Btm..DINGS

The Plaza of the Republic inc1uded the monument to Jose Marti,

the Palace of Justice, the buildings of the Ministry of Communi-
cations, the Court of Accounts, the National Library, the Munic-
ipal Palace, the BANFAIC nnd the National Theatre. The Plaza
had splended avenues and was magni6cently landscaped.
My Administration furnished and enriched with works of art
the Palace oE Fine Arts and the National Museum. In additioD, we
built the follOWing:
The Sports City.
The National Center of Physical Education.
The Carlos III Market with an adjacent building for parking.
The Guanabllcoa Market.
The Treasury and Communications Department building in
Marianao.
The Municipal Palace of Marianno.
The bUilding for the Chiefs of Sta1£ of the Navy.
Building for the radio-motorized division of the National Police.
A building for the National School of Nurses.
Twelve school centers: four in the capital, four in Marianao,
three in Guannbacoa and one in RegIa.
Six Navy stations.
 253 Rebuilding Havana
A building for the Judicial Morgue and Bank of Human
Organs.
Two buildings for the laboratories of the ICIT and the
BANFAIC.

SOCIAL WELFARE

During my first Administration, despite limited financial re-

sources, we provided Greater Havana with the Aballi Children's
Hospital, the Anti"Polio Institute, the Children's Municipal Hos-
pital, the Military Hospital in Marianao and the Police Hospital in
Havana.
In my second Administration, we built, among others, the Na-
tional Hospital, the General Hospital of the ONDI, the Municipal
Clinical and Surgical Hospital, the Naval Hospital, the ONRI Hos-
pital, the Cristo de Limpias Home for the Mentally and Physically
Retarded and the new buildings for the Nuestra Sefiora de la
Mercedes and the Juan Bruno Zayas Radium Institute Hospitals.
We also erected a building for the Havana Nueva Day Nursery
in Vedado, a Hospital for the League Against Blindness (made
possible in considerable part because of donations made by Mrs.
Batista from her personal funds), improvements in the Curie Hos-
pital for cancer patients and an animal clinic for the Organization
of Mercy to Animals.

TIlE CONSTRUCTION BOOM

The three basic urban laws of my Administration were the Rent

Control Law, the law regulating cooperative ownership of real
property and the FHA law. These caused a great building boom
throughout the Island, especially in the nation's capital, and to
such an extent that in nve years the entire appearance of Cuba
was drastically changed. The city of Havana, which previously
had grown by spreading out horizontally, now grew verticalIy.
Skyscrapers began to rise everywhere. Some of them, like the
FOCSA Building in Vedado, which was 34 stories high, were
reminiscent of New York. Between 1952 and 1958, a total of 14,-
572 cooperatively owned aparbnent buildings were constructed
in Cuba.
 28
The War Against Christianity

During the latter part of my Administration, at a time when

Marxist-Leninist materiallsm was striving to undermine the re-
ligious faith of mankind, Cuba testiJied to her firm adherence to
the moral prlnciples of Christianity and to her faith in God. Thus,
conventions of Cubans meeting to draft a Dew Constitution for
the nation invoked the blessings of God in their preambles. And
it was no accident that Article 35 of the 1940 Constitution, upon
proclaiming the freedom of religion and the right to worship as
one pleases-principles which my Government invariably re-
spected- recognized Christian morality as the standard which
should govern all human relationships.

THE CHRIST OF HAVANA

It was in accordance with these sentiments that a monument to

Christ was built on the eastern side of Havana Harbor at the
highest point of La Cabana. Its conservation in perpetuity was
ensured by an autonomous foundation, amply endowed with cap-
ital by the Government and through private donations.
This monument was the realization of an aspiration which I
had had for a long time. When the 1954 elections were over, work
began. The sculptress was sent to Italy, after preliminary plan~
ning and deSign, where she undertook this colossal work of en~
ginooring, art and reverence. Finally, on the 24th of December
1958, just seven days before the triumph of the forces of the Anti-
Christ in Cuba, the statue of Our Savior was solemnly unveiled
 255 The War Against Christianity
in all its sacred splendor with the blessings of His Excellency,
Manuel Cardinal Arteaga. Brilliantly illuminated, the monument
to Christ could be seen from many parts of Havana and from miles
out to sea.
But then the Communist hordes descended on us. They came
disguised as believers in His mission, wearing beards as He did
and carrying rosaries and crucifixes. This was a sacrilegious
mockery. 'While the Communists spread hate and terror, dug
common graves with bulldozers and piled them with the
corpses of their innocent victims, hypnotized mobs of nonnally
peaceful people to demand blood and more blood and to scream
for the execution wall, imposed a death penalty that Cuba had
abolished, applied it retroactively to actions which had not been
offenses when committed, perverted the minds of children so that
they infonned on their parents and proceeded with a relentless
persecution of the Church, they found men of substance, not
merely in Cuba, but elsewhere, who extolled them, served as their
fawning apologists, called black white and tried to anesthetize
the human conscience.
There were even people who compared Castro to Sim6n Bolivar
and, for that matter, to the Christ. Thus slavery was equated with
freedom, murder with justice, evil with good, filth with cleanli-
ness, the liberation of peoples with their enslavement to a for-
eign despotism. In some instances, these propagandists were sim-
ply agents of the Communist conspiracy against mankind; in
others, they were motivated by resentment of those who were
not psychically crippled. In still other instances, we were deal-
ing with the shallow, glib politician, who confuses words with
thought and oratorical afHatus with truth. These men had the
right to applaud Castro and thus show the world their incapacity
to distinguish between human bondage and human freedom, but
they had no right to blacken and falsify the vision of Bolivar or
to invoke the authority of Christ for their love affair with in-
carnate evil.
It has always been my view that those who knowingly and
wiUingly serve as the apologists for crimes against humanity are
themselves gUilty of crimes against humanity.
 256 The Growth and Decline uf 1M Cllban Republic

A CEOUSTlAN PEOPLE

To deny Christ is to deny our dearest tradition, to deny life itself,

An essentially and profoundly Christian nation, Cuba saw some
of the pioneers of ber independence and the creators of her na-
tionality spring from the ranks of the clergy. In the Colonial era,
such outstanding Cuban clergymen as His Excellency, Don Santi-
ago Joseph Echevarria, the last Bishop of the Diocese of Cuba
before it was divided, governed the spiritual life of Cuba, Florida,
Louisiana and Jamaica with wisdom, virtue and intellectual merit.
Two Cuban clergymen sat among the deputies to the Courts of
Cadiz in 1810: Dr, Juan Bernardo O'Gavan and Felix Varela of
Havana, "the first to teach us how to think." In addition to being
a distinguished philosopher, Varela was a patriot who had a vi-
sion of independence and protection of the rights of the people.
Before his time, residents of Cuba were classi.6ed as peninsulars
and creoles. Whenever the word peninsular appeared, Varela
would write Span.iard and, when he saw the word creole, he
would write Cuban. Thus, he began to create our national con-
sciousness and served as precursor of the convulsive struggles for
independence of the 19th Century.
Other clergymen, such as Brother Jacinto Marfa Martinez,
fought equally well for human rights. When Bishop of Havana,
Brother Jacinto was expelled from his ruocese by Spanish volun-
teers because of his stern opposition to the despotic abuse of
power. l Then there was the group of Havana priests who were
banished to the island of Fernando Po in one of the most dra-
matic episodes of th e Ten Years' War. We should also remember
Father Batista who received Carlos Manuel de Cespedes, "'the
Father of the Republic of Cuba," under the pallium in 1868.
When Cuban independence was finally attained at the cost of
the sacrifice of such of its heroes as Fath er Guillermo Gonzalez
Arocha and Father Manuel Dobal, our 6rst Constitution was
based on Jose Marti's fonnulation of "triumphant love" and on its

1 The volunteer corps were organized by Spanish merchants during the War
of 1868 to help the garrisons in the forts, but they were rarely tlsed in com-
b:Jt. T hey 6red and hi red. the Captains General, as in the case of General
Arsenio Martinez Campos, during the early stages of the struggle. Their
passionate zeal caused many dramatic incidents, such as the hanging of
eight medical students In 1871.
 <JS/ The War AgaiMt Chrislianity

new banner was written his phrase "with all and for the good of
all." These precepts taught respect for the full dignity of man
and gave the nascent democracy a solid foundation of freedom.
And among these freedoms , was that of religion.
At the end of my second Administration in 1958, the Catholic
population of Cuba was estimated as 5,665,000 or 94.2% of the
totaL:! Our hierarchy comprised a Cardinal-Archbishop, two arch-
bishops and six bishops.
We had 723 priests: 240 of them diocesan and 483 religious;
815 churches and 210 parishes in 128 municipalities. There were
128 monasteries with 984 monks and 209 nunneries with 2,225
nuns. As for education, there were 130 Catholic boys' schools with
33,691 pupils and 194 Catholic girls' schools with 34,335 students.
Seventy-five charitable institutions helped 90,919 people.
Cuba had one priest for every 8,844 inhabitants, one church for
every 7,669 and one parish for every 29,762 Catholics. One of
every 92 Cubans received education at a Catholic school.

DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS

Late in 19"...9, when the Treaty of Letran was signed, ending the
anomalous political relationship between the Papacy and Italy,
a new state was born. It was the smallest in th e world in territory,
but the greatest in spiritual force for it contained. the Cathedral
of Peter with its Michelangelo dOOle and was the spiritual guide
of one-fifth of mankind.
Five years later, on my recommendation, Cuba established dip-
lomatic relations with the Vatican. Since then Havana has had a
Papal Nuncio and a Cuban Ambassador has represented us in
Vatican City.' This in no way changed the principle of separation
of Church and State proclaimed by Cuba's liberators. But this sep-
aration was not used as the pretext for the implacable hostility to
religion apparent in certain other states and the funds from the
National Lottery, for example, were made available impartially to
religious and lay institutions, benevolent organizations aDd civic
groups, irrespective of creed, race or origin.
2 These figures are from the 1961 Pontifical Yeorbook •
.s T he fil1t1: N uncio was Monsig nor Jorge Caruana. a mnn nf faultless behavior
woo was remembered with 9fFection. T he rIrSt Ambassador WlllI the Cuban
jOurnalist NiooL\s Rivero y Alunso, brother of the unforgettable "Pepin" Ri-
vero, managing editor of the Diario de la Marina.
 258 The Growth alld Decline of the Cuban Republic
These charitable grants, that ran into millions of daUars during
the 1934-44 revolutionary era, were again bestowed on a large
scale in 1952-58. Churches, schools, retreats, asylums, commu-
nities and clergymen received eoonomic aid. A score of Negroes'
clubs and associations were given improved Of new buildings.
Veterans' centers and Masonic lodges were subsidized. The Ca-
thedral of Havana was restored to its former glory; the Cathe-
dral of Matanzas was saved by reinforcing its foundations; the re-
construction of the Cathedral of Santiago de Cuba was started .
When the Lottery could not meet all of these demands. the CNAP
and PANADE. under my wife's guidance. came to the rescue,

THE GREAT PRECEPT

"Render therefore unto Caesar the things which be Caesar's and

unto God the things which be Coo's," t This great precept of
Christ correctly defines the relationship between Church and
State.
How then could anyone justify the conduct of those clergymen
who joined the cause of the enemies of the Republic and of the
Church itself? Propaganda and terror may have combined to
prevent some of them ftom seeing what was clear as daylight-
the cloven hoof of communism behind the fals e veneer of nation-
alism in the 26th of July Movement. But how cou ld priests justify
violating the sacred rules against murder and the use of the name
of God in vain?
The Communist terror, during the civil struggle, resulted in the
near destruction of the National Sanctuary of Our Lady of Char-
ity in El Cobre.1i This we qUickly rebuilt. Sacred images were
stolen, for instance, that of the Virgin of Regia and Saint Mark
the Evangelist in Artemisa.
The pious were sometimes deceived by the false promises of
Castro and his Communists. These included millions of dollars
for yearly "crusades," compulsory religious teaching in the public
schools, a brigade of chaplains, etc., etc. All of these pledges were
Widely publicized and many honest people were fooled. Satan
won his battle by promising "all of this shall be yours if you
kneel and worship me....
~ Luke , xx:21.
~ Built by my AdminislT3tion. Only a few gl3.!ls windows, Imported from Italy,
remained to be instilled in December 1958.
 259 The War Against Christianity

INTERVEh'TION BY THE IDERARCHY

'When the civil struggle became more intense, the hierarchy at-
tempted to mediate. I welcomed this effort as did the leaders of
those opposition political parties which favored an electoral solu-
tion to the crisis. However, Casb:o and his Reds rejected media-
tion in favor of the seizure of power by violence.
Washington then imposed an arms embargo on the legitimate
government of Cuba, an incxplicable move which made Com-
munist victory almost inevitable, After that, came the reign of
blood.
At the beginning of the era of circus b'ials, frenzied mobs and
firing squads, some Church dignitaries forgot that tbeir duty was
to follow the teach ings of the Gospels, condemn violence and
preach love among men. Instead, in their sermons and writings,
they justified the crimes and moral enormities of the traitor,6
First came the extermination of those Cubans who believed in
freedom and the decimation of the officer corps of the Armed
Forces. After our leadership had been truncated, the middle
class was destroyed and the proletarian cla sses enslaved. Then,
as the country was driven toward economic d isaster, it was sold
to Castro's Russian masters. When complete ruin had d escended
on Cuba, the regime showed its true face. waged war on the
Church and worked with might and guile to eradicate Chris-
tian morals and religiOUS faith from the conscience of the people.
Now the rosaries, which the Rebels had carried when they
came down from the mountains to deceive the people, were
thrown aside and the true face of the conqueror became visible.
With few exceptions, exceptions which the Cuban people will al-
ways remember, the princes of the Church, the priests and the
lay organizations which supported Christianity reacted as might
have been expected when the masks were discarded. From the
pulpits, on the streets, in the prisons, everywhere, they d e-
nounced the crimes and oppression of Cuba's Anti-Christ.
An old legend says that when Jupiter lit h is torches and the
rumbling of his arms thundered in the sky, it was a sign that the
sins of mankind h ad provoked his anger. And the legend seems
to have been true for a bolt of lightning descended upon the hier-
(I Who they were and what they said can be ascertained by reading the issues
of Bohemia in Cub!l, appearJ.ng subsequent to January 1, 1959.
 260 The Growth and Decline of the Guban Republic
atic head of the Christ of Havana, a premonition of the sorrows
and scourges that were to be visited upon the unhappy people of
Cuba.
Epilogue: Slavery and Its Apologists

My Administration was overthrown by force and violence exactly

54 days before the scheduled inauguration, on February 14, 1959,
of a President-elect who had been chosen by the Cuban people in
democratic elections and whose victory was acknowledged even
by his political opponents at the joint session of Congress at
which the ballots were counted. The victorious candidate was of
my political party. He was unacceptable to the Rebels in the
mountains because Dr. Andres Rivero Aguero was unwilling to
sell his country to the Soviet dictatorship.
The Administration of March 10, 1952 had been internationally
acknowledged as legitimate on two occasions: first, by the dip-
lomatic recognition of my Government by non-communist coun-
tries after the Revolution of the 10th of March and, second, upon
my inauguration on February 24, 1955 as the constitutionally
elected President of Cuba for a term of four years. On that latter
occasion, 51 nations sent their envoys extraordinary to attend the
solemn ceremonies and thus show their good will toward our new
Administration. Of course, no Communist countries were repre-
sented as, several years before, I had severed diplomatic relations
with the Soviet Union. The diplomatic envoys present represented
aU 19 Latin American nations, Canada, the United States, 19 Eu-
ropean countries (among them the Vatican), 10 Asian countries,
Egypt and Indonesia.

The extremist movements, which are carrying the plague of

 262 The Growth and Decline of tile Cuban Republic
violence through L atin America. which spread havoc and blood.
shed in the Far East, in Laos, in the Congo and elsewhere are
undoubtedly communist-dominated or communist-influenced .
Whenever eruptions of this sort occur, the long arm of the Krem-
lin is likely to be the moving force. Sometimes, the Reds act
directly and openly; on other occasions, they display their "neu-
tralist" face. In either case, their propaganda and action is ad-
justed to the peculiarities of the nation they seek to destroy. Their
purpose in every case is to weaken democracy and Western Civil-
ization and to make a contribution to the Soviet conquest of the
world.
The Communist propagandists show an extraordinary ability to
use the most effective media. Thus, they have friend s within the
great intem ational news agencies who lose no time in transmit-
ting any items that may further the cause. Any story. no matter
how wUmportnnt. will circle the globe in a matter of minutes if
it is grist to the mills of communism.
There were two incidents of this sort in Cuba during my sec-
ond Administration which were instructive. The first occurred sev-
eral years ngo. Clever agitators made a bet with some drunken
U. S. Marines that the latter would not dare to climb the statue
of Marti in Havana's Central Park. A team of press cameramen
suddenly appeared from nowhere and photographed this trivial
incident. Their picture was Hashed around the world with the
caption: "American Soldiers Desecrate the Statue of Cuban Patriot
Jose Marti." Obviously. the stage had been set in advance; the
bet was a ruse by the Communist instigators of the plot and the
purpose was to arouse popular anger against the United States.
Fortunately. the people of Cuba did not fall for it.
The second instance occurred when, in the midst of a resound-
ing propaganda campaign against my Administration, a certain
South American delegate to the United Nations proposed that a
telegram be sent to me as President, reques ting that a certain
"Rebel" be spared flOm the firin g squad. He was perhaps una-
ware that in those days the death penalty did not exist in Cuba.
Nevertheless, the "news" of this man about to be executed by
"tyranny" girdled the globe and had tbe desired effect.
The same impreuive tactic was repea ted when reporter Herbert
L. Matthews visited Cuba and secretly interviewed Castro in the
Sierra Maestra; when anarcho-communist banners of the 26th of
July Movement were displayed high on the Effiel Tower, mock-
 263 Slaoery and ltJ Apologists
ing the dedication of France to liberty; or when American and
Canadian civilians and Marines were kidnapped in Oriente to
blackmail the United States into declaring an arms embargo
against the legitimate government of Cuba.
The presence of a foreign hand can be sensed in everyone of
these "episodes." It is a lODg hand, the directing hrain of which
was ca rrying out a plot, not primarily against my Administration,
but rather against the free institutions of the Americas.
Well trained in mass psychology, the Reds have advanced ev-
erywhere by brainwashing, frightening the cowardly and im-
pressin g the ignorant. They are aware that the despotism which
strangles prostrate Poland, turns Hungary into a land of mar-
tyrs and imposes its system of blood and terror through Asia,
Africa and the Americas may well yrovoke a reaction from the
West and from the world in genera either because of solidarity
with the human cause or for purely political reasons.
• To minimize the possibility of a strong reaction of this sort, the
Reds constantly dope the masses with their slogans against war
and in favor of international peace. Within the great nations of
the West (the United States, England and France), they utilize
the so-called liberals to head their campaigns against the cold war.

THE BLACK LEGEND

My Government fought against tenor and communism in the in-

terests of the peace, progress and freedom of the people. We re-
spected the rights of all. We even commuted Cas tro's prison sen-
tence so he could seek political power via the polls rather than
through violence and terror. We Jeft no stone unturned in an ef-
fort to achieve the most for the Cuban people. We multiplied the
autonomous organizations so that a larger Dumber of Cubans
could take part in governmental responsibilities and work for the
promotion of social welfare. We never deprived anyone of his
property or his rights.
Legends of non-existent tortures and abominable persecutions
were ceaselessly spread and repeated by the Communists, their
agents and dupes . Rumors sprouted like mushrooms of mass as-
sassinations and summary trials that never took place. Propa-
ganda presented these baseless rumors as sober facts and even
went so far as to support them with the false testimony of in-
doctrinated physicians and intimidated lawyers.
 264 The Growth and Decline of tJ/.6 Cuban Republic
Wherever possible, the fog of confusion was spread over the
distinction between politica1 persecution and the legitimate duty
of the State to defend itself. The anned forces were obligated both
to obey the law and to enforce it. If they ever reacted with out·
bursts of violence, as has been charged, this was not because
they derived any morbid pleasure from physical assault, but be-
cause they were provoked. sometimes to the limits of human en-
durance, by the carefully contrived campaign of hatred, violence
and murder launched against Cuba by the forces of international
communism.
Was it meritorious to murder a soldier or policeman while he
was perfonning his duty to defend his country or to enforce the
laws? Should terrorists be praised when they threw bombs into
crowded places, tearing apart the bodies of workers, teachers,
govemment employees, women and, for that matter, children,
splattering blood, tissue and human organs in all directions?
Many Cubans paid with their lives for performing their duties as •
the citizens of a democratic regime. Some were murdered by the
Communists of Fidel Castro for voting at the polls; others for
even lesser reasons.
I wondered how it was possible for influential foreign corre-
spondents and shapers of public opinion in the Free World to re-
main silent when Cubans who defended law and order, iustice,
democracy and free ~nsti tu~on.s, pe!forming their duty in doing
so, were branded as war crmunals. 1 wondered how these pe0-
ple succeeded in closing their eyes, their ears and their mouths to
the massacres and frightful acts of persecution and cruelty which
characterized the Communist regime in Cuba from its very in-
ception. These men who denounced crimes that never occurred
and then explained away the enonnities that did occur at least
pretended to be spiritually part of Western Civilization. They
were ultra "liberals," to be sure, but they had seemed not to be
devoid of humatl decency.
Why wasn't at least a minimum of pity or ordinary Christian
feeling shown when a soldier, in the perfonnance of his swom
duty to protect his country, was murdered by an enemy who
wore no unifonn, lurked in ambush or attacked only from behind,
sometimes wearing women's clothes to do murder with impunity?
 265 Slavery and Its Apologists

cc ,.
THE SILENCE OF THE HUMANISTS

The revulsion of the civilized and Christian world to incredibly

long lists of assassinations, tortures and extortions by the Castro
regime has at last become general. It has taken years for this to
happen, but, as the proverb says, "Cod for a witness and time for
the truth."
The cold-blooded assassination of over a hundred innocent
Cubans by Raw Castro in the first days of Red victory (they
were machinegunned and toppled into bulldozed ditches) was
the first act of a carefully planned operation. The destruction of
the Anny and its villification by propaganda was essential to
the Communist plan of imposing a Red force commanded by
Russian officers. The Castro brothers shrewdly recognized that
the professional corps of officers and soldiers could not be cor-
rupt~ and would never acquiesce in the sale of their country to
a foreIgn power.
Thereafter, the creation of popular militias converted every
school into a garrison and placed the people at the mercy of
armed gangs of frustrated people with an uncontrollable lust for
plunder and blood.
Another virtue which was attributed to the self-styled '1ibera~
tors" was "honesty and efficient administration.'> Yet the man who
calls himself the Tropical Robespierre has never accounted for
eleven million dollars extorted by his revolutionary forces nor has
he ever attempted to account for the vast income of INRA to the
Court of Accounts, to which my Administration rcported in full
and in accordance with the Constitution and the laws. Nor has
he ever made this accounting directly to the people, either in
his marathon televised harangues or otherwise. As for the "effi-
ciency of the new Administration, the shortest answer is that
Cuba is in ruins, its economy destroyed, its political life under
as primitive a type of absolute personal rule as can be found in
modern history.
The native Cubans who mistook the bearded leader for a Moses
destined to lead them to the promised land, suffered in their
property and flesh the penalty for their error. At first, they
blamed the colossal blunder of "agrarian refonn" on inexperience.
They neglected to urge mercy for the men sent before firing
squads or to rot in filthy prisons by courts of illiterate and venge-.
 266 The Growth and Decline of the Cuban Republic
Eul representatives of the "revolution," Some would fustify their
moral inertia by confessing fear of being labeled "Batistianos";
others morbidly acquiesced; still others joined the mobs. The re-
actioD. came too late and was on a global scale only when the
corpses of innocent victims were piled high.
~lere were the national organizations of self-styled humani-
tarians? They kept silent during the reign of terror, closed their
eyes to the total violation of human rights, then joined the clamor
of denunciation from the safety of exile when it was fashionable
to do so. Many of them, still unrepentent enemies of democracy,
private property and personal freedom, were presented as heroes
of "Fidelismo without FideL" That is to say, endorsing the events
of the past, eliminating Castro individually and themselves sup-
planting him as the gravediggers of civilization in Cuba.
Thus, a p oUtical ideology arose that took under its banner a11
the frustrated and rejected neurotics, the reseotfullawyers with-
out clients, the doctors without patients and the vast ma ss of
drifting opportunists, the men without trades, professions or com-
petence. They were supported, while in ell:ile in the United
States, by g1lh men who felt sympathy for the mass of radic.'ll re-
sentment, frustration and incompetence that had been rejected
even by the Communist dictatorship. To gain an audience, this
new group repeated aU the old lies of the Communists. including
particularly the denial that Cuba, when free, had made great ad-
vances in science, culture, the arts, and social justice.

For over three years, the OAS was concerned about the con-
ditions of political prisoners in every American country except
Cuba.
The International Red Cross, which had previously been so re-
ceptive to the false charges of the outlaws of the Sierra Maes tro,
remained silent and inert while brutal violations of human rights
were perpelrated dally against the people of my unfortunate
country. Yet, under my Administration, the Red Cross had been
given every facility to investigate the charges leveled by the
Marxists, even when they were absurd and obviously designed to
impress the naIve and enrage the ignorant. The press is full of
the enormities perpetrated in Communist Cuba. How can the In-
ternational Red Cross reconcile its zeal of yesterday with its I.:al-
lous indifference of today?
 267 Slavery and Its Apologists

THE AMERICAN WlITTE PAPER ON CUBA

A 'White Paper on Cuba was published by the United States State

Department in April 1961, a few days before the disastrous and
half-hearted attempt of the Administration to overthrow the
Castro dictatorship by spending Cuban lives, while withholding
American arms and avoiding official responsibility.
The New York Times, which was exceptionally well-informed
concerning the inner workings of the New Frontier, reported as
follows on April 4, 1961 concerning its origins:
"According to informed sources here, the idea for the pam-
phlet was President Kennedy's. He has long been concerned at
the lack of popular understanding in Latin America of the United
States attitude toward the Castro regime ...
"The pamphlet was written largely by Mr. (Arthur M.) Schle-
singer with the cooperation of Richard Goodwin, a Presidential
assistant dealing with foreign aid,l and in consultation with the
State Department.
"However, according to these informants, President Kennedy
devoted many hours to the pamphlet, personally going over it
with Mr. Schlesinger."
The nature of this analysis of the Cuban tragedy can be gath-
ered by the following excerpts from a brilliant speech delivered
by Spruille Braden before the Cuban Chamber of Commerce in
the United States on May 17, 1961. A former U. S. Ambassador to
Argentina, Colombia and Cuba and at one time Assistant Secre-
tary of State for Latin American Affairs, Mr. Braden has a keen
understanding of the realities of inter-American aiIairs.
"'That abysmal ignorance in 'Vashington concerning this whole
Cuban situation endures, even at this late date, is clearly appar-
ent in the so-called White Paper issued by the Department of
State on April3rd.
''This document begins by giving approval, i.e., encouraging

1 Richard Nathan Goodwin was one of the most powerful White House ad-
visors on Latin American aHairs during the first years of the Kennedy Ad-
ministration. His qualifications for this job, so important to the security of
his co\mtry, wcre that he had never been to Latin America prior to 1961,
spoke no Spanish and was under thirty. However, he was from Harvard
and a socialist or a liberal cxtrcmi~t of one brand or another.
 268 T/w Growth and Decline of the Cuban Republic
what it calls the 'authentic and autonomous revolution of the
Americas; that is to promote more Fidelismo hut without Fidel.
For my part, ] prefer to see the sound evolutjoD of the Americas
without the violence, abuse aod waste inherent in all revolutions.
Nor do I consider it wise or proper for my government to advo-
cate 'authentic and autonomous revolutions' all over the Ameri-
can continents. This is an outright intervention which may prove
very costly and disastrous for everyone concerned, and especially
for the U.S.A.
"The State Department continues with an apocryphal history of
the Castro revolution, with many half truths and outright errors.
It is ignorant of the fact that the 26th of July Movement was a
child of the Buro del Caribe, which in turn was the off-spring of
the Comintem. It repeats the old faotasy about Fidel being a
'traitor to the revolution: His revolution was Communist-planned
and inspired from the beginning; he was a traitor to God and
country, but never to his Communist bosses and beliefs. It damns
Batista as a tyrant and impugns the honor and reputation of any-
one and everyone who even remotely bad been connected with
him. It implies that the Cuban nation as a whole, until the ad-
vent of Castro, suffered from want, lack of medical care, hOUSing
and other social needs. In an unbelievable display of ignorance,
it praises D avid Salvador, a notorious Communist, as fighting for
a free labor movement and childishly accepts Pardo Uada's ab-
surd allegation recently that he was anti-Communist ...
"As most of you know, Batista and I, as Ambassador during his
first term, had some pretty severe, head-on collisions. Clearly. I
am notjrejud iced in his favor. But. as a matter of Simple justice,
I shaul like to call certain facts to the attention of the authors of
the 'White Paper . . . To speak, as the White Paper does, of the
<rapacity of the leadership' and damn such splendid characters as
Saladrigas and hundreds of others like him. is calumny, cheap
demagoguery and a despicable act, unworthy of a responsible
government and foreign office.
'The White Paper's direct and implied animadversions as to
the poverty and bad economic conditions of Cuba, prior to the
coming of Castro, are inaccurate and evidence the socialistic
prejudices of its drafters.
"How false is the ricture drawn by the ~te Paper can be
shown by a few brie citations: Cuba, previous to 1959, enjoyed
 269 Sfaocry and l u Apologist.!

the largest per capita income of any Latin American republic.

Gross national income was $2,834,000,000 and bank clearings
$6,908,000,000 in 1958. There was a massive construction of has·
pitals, schools of all grades, houses for the poor and middle
class, highways and feeder roads. The standard of living was
rising; there were 4 to 5 persons for each radio, 13 to 18 for each
television set. aDd 39 to each automobile. I remember the long·
sharemen getting $27 per day even when I was in Cuba.
"Of course, there still existed much corruption, poverty and it·
literacy; and there was the perennial problem of 'cl tiempo
muerto' (the dead season ), Yet, right on Manhattan Island, not to
mention in the rest of the city. there are comparable conditions
of poverty, illiteracy. and crime. And a trip to the West Virginia,
Kentucky, and Tennessee hills may be edifying in respect to
bad rural conditions.
"To sum up. the White Paper is one of the most indefensible
documents I ever have seen issued by a presum ably responsible
foreign office. The best that can be said for it is that it displays
such ignorance and lack of understanding as to explain in con-
siderable measure the tragic bungling of the catastrophe in Bahia
de Cochinos."

NECLIGENCE OR TREASON?
T estifying before the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee on
June 12, 1961, former U. S. Ambassador to Mexico, Costa Rica
and EI Salvador Robert C. Hill testiSed that, in his judgment. the
New York Times and the State Department contributed to tho sei-
zure of Cuba by Castro and the Communists. lie added that in
May 1959 "the Russians tbemselves identified Raul Castro as a
Communist" in an official Communist document duly reported
by the U. S. Embassy in Moscow to tbe State D cpartment. 2 Mr.
Hill stated that this report was called to the attention of the De-
partment, but wa..~ evidelltly ignored. Hill noted that Ambassa-
dor to Cuba Enrl E. T. Smith was instructed by tbe State Depart-
ment to be briefed by Herbert L. Matthews of the New York
Tim es, who "has always been an enthusiastic supporter of Fidel
l! Displl t~h #666, Mlly 22, 19 59, "Soviet Altitude Toward Latin America,"
American Embassy, Moscow, to Department of State.
 270 The Growth and Decline of the Cuban Republic
Castro" 8 and added : '1ndividuals in the State D epnrtment and
individua1s in the New York Times put Ca.stro in power.'"
Mr. Hill and several other former United States Ambassadors
laid blame for decisions favorabJe to Castro and adverse to the
interests of the United States on a certain William Arthur Wie-
land, alias Montenegro, who was in charge of Caribbean and Mex-
ican affairs during the time tbat free Cuba was undermined, be-
trayed and destroyed. Hill testified concerning a session on board
an airplane with Dr. Milton Eisenhower, the brother of the Presi-
dent and an influential policy maker on Latin American affairs.
Ambassador Hill and his staff tried to warn Dr. Eisenhower of
the fact that Castro was a Communist or Communist tool. but
they were incessantly interrupted by Wieland. When Wieland
stated that "there is no evidence of Communist infiltration in
Cuba," Colonel Glawe, the U. S. Air Attache, retorted: ''You are
either a damn fool or a Communist" 6
Hill testiGed that, at a conference of American Ambassadors in
EI Salvador in 1959, Philip BonsaI, who had just been named U. S.
Ambassador to Cuba, insisted that nothing be put in the commu·
nigue which might seem critical of Fidel Castro as that "would
make bis (BonsaI's) job in Cuba very difficult." When Hill air
jected, BonsaI replied: '1f you cannot be a team player, why not
resign?" e
Hill also testified concerning the existence of II. pro-Castro
cell in the American Embassy in Havana and a "CIA representa-
tive in H avana who was pro-Castro."; He told U. S. Ambassador
to Cuba Earl E. T, Smith that he was sorry for him because:
"You nre assigned to Cuba to preside over the d ownfall of Ba·
tista. The decision has been made that Batista has to go. You
must be very careful." 8
Hill added that this decision had been made at a low bureau-
cratic level, not by top officials, but by subordinates. Nonetheless,
it was a firm decision and nobody entering the State Department
• U. S. Senate. Senate Internal Security Suix:ommittee, Hearlngl, Commu-
nist Thr8at to ,he United StatIM Through the CtI1ibbean, Pdrf 1 2, Ten/.
mrmy 01 Robert C. H iU, June 12, 1961, p. SIlS,
4lbiJ, p. 821.
~ Ibid, pp. 806-807.
"bid, pp. 816-817.
7 Ibid, p. 821.
• Ibid, p. 807.
 271 Slavery and Its Apologists
could be unaware of the fact that Castro's rise to power was be-
ing plotted. g Among other things, FBI officials in Mexico, who
were scnt there with the fun cooperation of the Mexican Govern-
ment, sent reports on the Communist connections of Castro and
his movement to the State Department. However, these reports
were sidetracked "at the desk level" and ''had not reached the
upper echelons of the State Department." III

CONCLUDING

Thus, the testimony of American Ambassadors who believe in

freedom and patriotism has helped reveal some of the machina-
tions of "ultra-liberals" and pro-Communists who, from the shelter
of the government departments they had infiltrated, managed
to make possible the creation of the first Soviet state in the New
World. Simultaneously, an audacious propaganda of lies was used
to brainwash the people. Despite Cuba's obvious prosperity and
advanced labor, educational and social welfare institutions, it
was alleged that her underdeveloped condition called for a revo-
lution.
This came as an unbelievable shock to those of us who love
peace, who have always worked for fair relations between men
and peoples, who strove to prOvide the homes of our neighbors
with the same happiness and security that we wanted for our
own homes, who battled continuously for better health, more
education and culture, and higher living standards for the peo-
ple, and who defended our nation's sovereignty and worked for
conditions of order and due process of law in which all men of
good will could live without fear. We found that everything we
had struggled for was swept aside in the savage chain of crimes
and moral enormities that followed that ominous New Year's
Day of 1959. In addition, we found ourselves and our life's work
villified as that of despots, killers and men indifferent to the
needs and welfare of the people.
\-Vhen he was contemplating the horrors of fratricidal war,
Abraham Lincoln once said his greatest consolation was his
knowledge that "even this shall pass." On another occasion he told
a wounded soldier, "Remember, Dick, to keep close to the peo-
g Ibid, p. 808.
III Ibid, p. 819.
 272 The Growth and Decline of the Cuban Republic
pIe-they are always right and will mislead no one," 11 A consola~
tion for us is the knowledge that, despite the cruelties of the Red
terror and the confusing and false propaganda of its agents. ad-
mirers and dupes, the common people of Cuba have a greatness
of capacity, comprehension and courage that their oppressors can-
not imagine.
The chains of slavery will nol for long bind a people which has
offered so many blood sacrifices (or its liberty.
Now I am finished. I have tried to give a factunl account of
the services which my associates and 1 performed. or tried to
perform. for our country. The purpose of this book has been to
present the Cuban story as it is in a setting of hard facts and
stubborn realities. 'flIe truth, like liberty against slavery and light
against darkness always and in the long run wins its battle against
lies and slander.
As Milton wrote in Areopagitica:
!'hough all the winds of doctrine were let loose to play upon
the earth, so Truth be in the field, we do injuriously by licensing
and prohibiting to misdoubt her strength, Let her and Falsehood
grapple; who ever knew Truth put to the wane, in a free and
open encounter,"
It cannot be otherwise in Cuba,
11Quoted in Carl Sandburg, Abrahom LifIColn; Tlw War Yecm, HatOO\l1't
Brace & Company, New York, 1939, Vol. III, p. 384.
 3
Rule by Gangsters

After I had been elected Senator without having campaigned for

the office, my constituents asked me to visit them in Santa Clara,
the Provincial capital of Las Villas. I was told that I would suffer
physical harm if I went there. The young men who organized my
reception had been beaten up and my life threatened.
The PrIO Administration had announced that any gathering in
my favor would be broken up, but nevertheless crowds lined the
road from the suburbs into the heart of the city. After an en·
thusiastic meeting, I returned to Havana with my party. On the
road back, we had to disann some of Prio's gangsters who had
been sent out to molest us.
"Prio inherited Grau's gangs," I wrote in Cuba Betrayed,1 "and
the security of his Government depended on them. They were
used for what were no longer mysterious bloody actions. Teen-
agers went around with pistols. They walked the streets with
arrogance and murdered their rivals in broad daylight."

GRAFT AND SMUGGLING

"When Prio took over the country on October 10, 1948," wrote
Chester, "'the people were crying for an honest and efficient ad-
ministration and he faced the greatest opportunity ever offered
a Cuban President. Had he taken advantage of it, he would have
become one of the great leaders of his day. But the government
1 Fulgencio Batista, Cuba Betrayed, Vantage Press, New York, 1962, p. 221.
 26 The Growth and Decline of the Cuban Republic
of PrtO was no better than the government of Crau, In fact. many
Cubans believe it was worse.
"The Prio administration was a government of 'deals', The func-
tions of government were important to a number of officials only
because they provided contacts for the transaction of private
deals which enriched them personally. The interests of the people
were subordinated to the self-interest of government fun ction-
aries, and the criterion in government seemed to be 'How much
can I get out of it?' instead of 1 5 this good for Cuba?' As a result,
aU sorts of illegitimate and semi-legitimate operations were car-
ried on with official tolerance, if not with official sponsorship.
"One of the most profitable sidelines, which eventually became
a major industry. was the smuggling racket. This illicit business
flourished, without official interference, during the days Carlos
Pdo occupied the Presidential Palace, aod if the men of the Prlo
government did not know of these operations, they were about
the only ones in Cuba who didn't.
i'he smuggling business had a violent effect on the nation's
economy and the effect was not good. In addition to the fact that
the goverrunent lost millions of dollars a year in import duties
and other revenues through this outlaw operation, the small mer-
chant, a vital factor in the nation's economy, was almost ruined.
Legitimate merchants, who paid aU import duties and other cus-
tOms fees, could not, of course, meet the consumer prices offered
by unscrupulous traders who dealt in smuggled goods upon
which no duties or fees had been paid.
"This particular racket must have been one of the largest con-
tributors to the great personal fortunes accumulated by ccrtain
Prio officials while drawing government salaries which were rela-
tively meager.
"'Gangsterism in all its fomls was practiced during the Prio
administration and the breakdown in governmental morality en-
couraged illicit activities outside the government. There were
shakedowns and chantages, killings and kidnappings, and little
or nothing was done to combat the lawless elements. The alann-
ing thing about the crimes was that their perpetrators were
young boys, youths who had fallen into criminal ways because
it seemed to b e the smart thing to do. hlo apparently did nothing
to discourage crime among these juveniles.
'The people of Cuba were to a great extent abandoned by the
government of Carlos PIio, and the inevitable result was a com·
 27 Rule bl] Gangsters
plete lack of public respect for his administration and for the men
who directed it." 2

INTIMIDATION

A few days after my return from Las Villas Province, I found that
the small estate on which I lived with my family was surrounded
by soldiers and Prio secret agents. Friends who came to visit me
were regularly stopped a few yards from the gate by these detec-
tives, interrogated and warned that, if I made any more public
appearances, I would be sorry. As the weeks passed, this surveil-
lance and intimidation became increasingly brazen. They even
had the effrontery to set up mortars which were aimed so they
could lob shells into my house.
The United Action Party was organized under my leadership.
It consisted of much of the membership of the Liberal and Dem-
ocratic Parties, which had originally supported Prio, but had be-
come disgusted with him. As soon as our new party was orga-
nized, its leaders and active workers became the target of Prio's
hoodlums who threatened them and their families with violence.
Despite this, I visited every municipality in Cuba and I found
that thousands of people always turned out to see and hear me.
The Cuban people refused to be browbeaten. As for us, we had
to organize defense squads as we could not address peaceful po-
litical assemblies without first fighting our way in and disarming
the political gangs of the Autentico Administration.
The first great test was the election for Mayor of Havana. The
Administration candidate was one of the President's brothers.
This man had been named Minister of Finance, a position for
which he was totally unqualified, and in that office had preSided
over an administration of open and unabashed embezzlement.
Private funds, belonging to retired and pensioned people and on
deposit at the Ministry of Finance had been looted. Some $42,-
000,000 was stolen from the Sugar Workers' Pension Fund alone.
The prospect of having this light-fingered politician Mayor of
Havana was unbearable. My United Action Party and the Ortho-
dox Party of Eduardo Chibfu; united on the candidacy of Nicolas
Castellanos for Mayor.
The Prio Administration struck back with terror and corrup-
tion. Our party workers were mauled and beaten up. On two oc-
2 Chester, ap. cit., pp. 216-218.
 28 Tl~e Growth and Decline of the Cuban Republic
casions, shots were fired at my car. To prevent us from nominat-
ing Castellanos, five of our delegates were kidnapped and three
others bribed. Nevertheless, we rounded up enough for a quorum
and placed our man on the ticket.
Despite the unprecedented use of illega1 pressure by the Ad-
ministration, Castellanos won the elections.

EMBEZZLEMENT AND CIJIB...ts

The scandals increased in scope snd magnitude. Under orders of
President Prio and his disreputable brother, the Minister of Fi-
nance, the tax collectors openly took bribes from dishonest busi-
nessmen to wink at tax evasion and tax fraud by the latter.
Perhaps the most flagrant scandal of aU was the incineration of
$47,000,000 of old, worn-out bank-notes. The Frio brothers ar-
ranged to have p ackages of old newspapers, cut to the right size,
substituted for the notes. This "burned money was then distrib-
uted among the henclunen and hatchetmcn of the President.
These scandals were vigorously denounced in the sensational
weekly broadcasts of Eddie Chibas over Station CMQ. Since the
truth about Frio and his gang was preposterous, Chibas couId
mix fact with rumor with impunity. He cliarged falsely, for exam-
ple, that President Prfo had Hown secretly to Merida in Yucatm
for conferences with leaders of the Caribbean Legion, a powerful
international organization of terror, subversion and revolution
which was dominated by Communists and Socialists. While this
specific statement was untrue, Prio did go to Cuatemala later, in
violation of the Cuban Constitution, to plot with the Communist
President of that country, Jacobo Arbenz.
On one occasion, Crubas accused Aureliano Sanchez Arango, a
founder of the Cuban Communist Party and Minister of Educa·
tion in Prio's Cabinet, of having acquired vast lumber tracts in
Central America and of making millions by smuggling these
woods into Cuban ports. Sanchez Arango called Cbibas a Jiar and
demanded that he produce proofs.
There were violent radio denunciations by both sides; rioting
broke out and two of CbibAS supporters were killed by police
gunfire.
Chibas promised to appear at his next broadcast with a valise
full of proofs of Sanchez Arango's venal activities. He did not
produce them, but his tirades became increasingly violent.
 29 Rule by Gangsters
While Chib3.s was gaining steadily in popularity through his
dramatic debates with Sanchez Arango, other leaders of his party
were seriously considering removing him as an unstable personal4
ity.
Finally. on August 5, 1951, Chibas told his vast radio audience
that he hoped the sacrifice of his life would arouse the Cuban na-
tion and stir its conscience. He shot himself in the broadcasting
studio, without realizing that he was already off the air. He died
a few days later.
Prio believed that the Orthodox Party was a flash in the pan
which would now disintegrate with Chibas' death. However, the
refonner and demagogue now appeared to the people as a martyr
and this gave a prestige to his party that put it in a unique posi-
tion. The people forgot, or had never known, that Chibas had
tried suicide before and that these previous attempts had had
nothing to do with corruption in high places.

pillo AND THE COMMUNISTS

Like other politicians before and since, Prio pretended to be

strongly anti-communist, whereas actually and in secret he fa-
vored them. It is true that he fought the Communists in the trade
unions and broke their control of the lahor movement. The reason
for this, however, was organizational; it was not a matter of ideol-
ogy and moral principle.
The Autenticos needed to control the trade unions in order to
consolidate their political power and in order to have jobs for
their henchmen. As for the Communists, they had become en-
'trenched during World War II when they supported my Ad-
ministration and worked tirelessly to help Allied (and therefore
Soviet) victory. The Grau Administration had been a minority in
the Legislature and therefore too weak to wage a war for control
of the unions.
The task, therefore, devolved on Prio. It became a duel be-
tween two men: Lazaro Pena, the veteran leader of Communist
labor, and Eusebio Mujal, an Autentico and a fonner member of
the leadership of the Communist Party. In this struggle, which
was waged on the issue of support for, or opposition to, com-
munism, victory went to the tougher leader. Mujal proved to be
a resourceful, intelligent and zealous leader of the labor move-
 30 The Growth and Decline of the Cuban Republic
ment. He continued in that capacity from the time when he won
his majority vote under Prio to 1959 when I left Cuba.
Prio's attitude toward international communism was very dif·
ferent. He was an enthusiastic supporter of the Caribbean Le·
gion, which worked day and night to overthrow resporudble
governments and install ultra-leftist ones. While the Legion had
its quota of "socialists," such as Jose Figueres in Costa Rica, it
was primarily an arm of the Kremlin and was backed by interna-
tional communism. With the blessings of President Frio, the So-
viet Embassy in Havana became a vast center of propaganda for
the entire Caribbean zone and the meeting place for Havana
University students with traveling Communist agents to plot
the destruction of Western democracy.
Appendix

AUTONOMOUS ORGANIZATIONS

Rice Stabilization Administration AEA

Coffee Purchase and Sale Administration AGVCAFE
Corn Stabilization Administration AEM
Cooperative Agency of Distribution and Supply ADASCA
Rural Credit Associations ACR
Cojimar Tourist Center ACETCO
Varadero Tourist Center ACETVA
Cuban Bank for Foreign Trade BCGE
Bank of Social and Economic Development BANDES
National Bank of Agricultural and Industrial De-
velopment BANFAIC
National Bank of Cuba BNC
National Garments Bank of Cuba BNGC
Credit and Insurance Funds of the Anned Forces CASFA
Child Guidance Center COl
Jose Marti Centenary Commission
General Emilio Nunez Centenary Commission
Juan GuaIberto Gomez Centenary Commission
Martin Morua Delgado Centenary Commission
Civil Aeronautics Commission CAG
National Executive Committee of Agricultural and
Mining Cooperatives CENCAM
 214 The Growth and Decline of the Cuban Republic
Executive Committee on Forest and Agro-Pecuarian
Restoration CEREFA
National Executive Committee of Local, Urban and
Rural Foundations CENPLUC
National Development Commission CFN
National Sports Commission CND
National HOUSing Commission CNV
Malaria Commission CdelaM.
National Commission for Public Beaches CNPP
Commission to Regulate the Shoe Industry CRIC
National Commission for Smallpox Vaccination CNVAV
Directing Council to Construct the Palace of Justice CDCPJ
Permanent Directing Council of the Archives of
Cuba CDPAC
National Economic Council CNE
National Council on Education and Culture CNEC
National Council for Tuberculosis CNT
National Corporation of Public Assistance CNAP
National Transport Commission CNTC
National Organization to Construct Toll Roads and
Bridges ENCOP
National Finance Corporation ONFC
Insured Mortgages Bank FHA
Depositors' Insurance Fund FDS
Home for the PhYSically and Mentally Handicapped HIFM
Cuban Institute of Cartography and Cadastral Sur-
vey ICCC
Cuban Sugar Stabilization Institute ICEA
Cuban Coffee Stabilization Instihtte ICECAFE
Cuban Statistical Institute ICE
Cuban Reinsurance Institute ICR
Cuban Institute of Tourism ICT
Cuban Institute of Technical Investigation ICIT
Military TechnolOgical Institute for the Youth IMJT
National Cardiological Institute INC
National Institute to Develop the Motion Picture
Industry INFIC
National Instihtte of Hygiene INH
National Institute of Fishing INP
Technical Institute of Rural Sanitation ITSR
National Planning Board JNP
 275 Autonomou.! Organizations
Autonomous Jurisdiction of Topes de Collantes JATC
National Organization for the Administration of
Government Hospitals O NAHE
National Organization of Mobile Public Libraries ONB AP
National Organization of School and People's Din·
iog Room s ONC EP
National Organization of Children's D ispensaries O ND!
National O rganization of Public Parking ONEP
National Parks and Green Areas Administration ONPAV
National Organization for the Rehabilitation of In·
valids ONRI
Low Cost Housing for Members of the Armed Forces OVE FA
Matanzas Airport Found ation PAM
F oundation for Aid to Children, Old, Destitute and
Sick Persons PANADE
Foundation for Children's Homes PACI
Administrative Foundation for the City of Balneario
de San Diego PECBSD
Foundation for the Veterans' Home PHV
Foundation for the E conomic Rehabilitation of Bar-
a"", PREB
F oundation fo r Fine Arts and National Museums PBAMN
Association for the Prophylaxis of Leprosy, Skin Dis-
eases and Syphilis PLE CS
First Hydroelectric Center of Cuba PRICHEC
National Society of Cuban Authors SNAC
Statistical Appendix

COMPARATIVE TABLES

TABLE 1, RANK OF LA TIN AM ERICAN COUNTRIES IN 24 INDEXES

OF ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL PROGRESS·
NumlXJr of Time, In.:
Pin t Second Third To,,"
/ian> C01Jntry Place Place p,- Placement,:
1 CUBA 9 3 12 24
2 Argentina 6 5 2 13
3 Uruguay 4 6 10
4 Venezuela 6 1 2 9
5 Mexico 4 2 6
6 Costa Rica 2 2 4
7 Dominican
Republic 1 2 3
8 Panama 2 2
9 Brazil 1 1
10 Paraguay 1 1
11 Chile 1 1
12 Colombia 1 1
13 Bolivia 1 1
14 Honduras 1 1
15 EI Salvador 1 1
TOTALS 26 25 27 78
• These 24 Indexes are shown in Tables 3-26 inclusive.
 277 Slati.Jticul Appendix

TABLE 2: RANK OF LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES IN 23 INDEXES

OF ECO::-JOMI C, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL PROGRESS·
Summation of Reciprocall
Hank Country of Rank in the 23 Series
1 CUBA 13.29
2 Argentina 10.09
3 Venezuela 8.08
4 Uruguay 7.21
5 Mexico 4.13
6 Cosra Rica 2.86
7 Panama 2.64
8 Chile 2.61
9 Brazil 2.57
10 Dominican Rep. 2.35
11 Colombia 1.64
12 Peru 1.14
• These 23 Indexes are shown in Tables 3·215 Inclusive. The method of scor-
*
ing is to count 1 for first place, for second place, ~ for thUd place aod
l/ntb for nth place.

(A) INTERNATIONAL COMPARISONS

TABLE 3: INCOME PER CAPITA IN' V. S, DOLLARS

Rank Latin American Country Year Income per Capito
1 Venezuela 1958 868
2 Costa Rica 1958 361
3 CUBA 1958 334
4 Chile 1958 291
5 Mexico 1958 260
6 Uruguay 1957 253
7 Panama 1958 246
8 Dominican Republic 1957 239
 278 The Growth and Decline at the Cuban Republic
TABLE 4, PERCENTACE OF TI.LITERA'IES TO TOTAL POPULATION
IN LATIN AMElUCA IN 1958 0

lW"'- Country Percent Illiterate

1 Argentina 8
2 Costa Rica 21
3 Chile 24
4 CUBA 24
5 Puerto Rico 26
6 Panama 28
7 Uruguay 35
8 Colombia 35
9 Mexico 38
10 Ecuador 44
11 Peru 50
12 Brazil 51
13 Dominican Republic 57
14 EI Salvador 58
15 Nicaragua eo
16 Paraguay eo
17 Venezuela eo
18 Honduras 65
19 Bolivia 69
20 Guatemala 72
21 Haiti 90
• Data from the United Nations Statistical Yearbook, 1959. The Communist
leader, Antonio Nuiiez Jimenez, claimed in 1959 that the Cuban illiteracy
rate was only 22.8%.

TABLE 5: PERCENTAGE OF NATIONAL INCOME DEVOTED TO PUBLIC

EDUCATION IN 1959·
Rank Country Percent
1 CUBA 3.41
2 Argentina 3.11
3 Costa Rica 3.1
4 Peru 3.1
5 Chile 2.6
6 Guatemala 2.3
7 Brazil 2.3\
8 Colombia 1.9\
• Pan American Union, America in Figura. 1960, Washington, D,C. The
comparable U.S. figure for 1957-58 was 4.3%,
f 1957-58. t 1959-60. § 1957.
 279 Statistical Appendix
TABLE 6: L"iIHABITANTS PER UNIVERSITY STITDENT (1958)"
Inhabitants
Rank Country per Student
I Argentina 135
2 Uruguay 199
3 CUBA 273
4 Mexico 334
5 Panama 387
6 Paraguay 496
7 Costa Rica 514
" UNESCO, Annuaire IntemationaZe d'Education. The comparable figures
are 61 for the United Stutes and 210 fo! Canada.

TABLE 7: INHABITANTS PER PHYSICIAN IN ACTIVE PRACTICE"

Rank Country No. Inhabitants Year

I Argentina 760 1956
2 Uruguay 860 1957
3 CUBA 1,000 1957
4 Venezuela 1,700 1957
5 Chile 1,900 1953
6 Mexico 1,900 1956
7 Paraguay 1,900 1957
8 Brazil 2,500 1954
• Pan American Union, America in Figures, 1960.

TABLE 8: MORTALITY RATE PER THOUSAND PERSO:"l"S (1958)"

Rnnk Country Mortality Rate Rank Country Mortality Rate
I CUBA 5.8 12 Peru 10.3
2 Uruguay 7.0 13 Para ua y 10.6
3 Bolivia t 7.7 14 8
Hon uras ILl
4 Venezuela 7.8 15 Mexico 1l.6
5 Argentina 8.1 16 El Salvador 11.7
6 Canada 8.1 17 Chile 12.1
7 Dominican Rep. 8.4 18 Colombia 12.8
8 Nicaragua 8.7 19 Ecuador 15.2
9 Costa rUca 9.0 20 Brazil 20.6
10 Panama 9.0 21 Guatemala 21.3
11 United States 9.4
• Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1960,
f Probably due pIimarily to underreporting.
 280 The Growth and Decline of the Cuban Republu:
TABLE 9; lNFLAnON IN LATIN AMERICA
(U.S. Department of Commerce data)
Percent Incua.re In
CQI1.S'Ilmer Goodt
Rlmk Counlry Pricer in 1958
1 CUBA 1.4
2 Dominican Republic 1.9
3 Honduras 2.9
4 Guatemala 3.3
5 Ecuador 3.5
6 Costa Rica 4.3
7 Venezuela 4.7
8 EI Salvador 5.9
9 Panama 6.2
10 Nicaragua 6.9
Jl Mexico 7.8
12 Uruguay 9.1
13 Colombia 9.6
14 Peru 12.4
15 Brazil 15.4
16 Argentina 19.8
17 Chile 35.7
18 Paraguay 43.8
19 Bolivia 63.0

TABLE 10, FOREIGN TRADE; VALUE OF IMPORTS IN

DOLLARS PER CAPITA (1958) '
RQlak Country Valuo of Import:
1 Venezuela 2,380
2 CUBA 1,320
3 Panama 1,042
4 Costa Rica 865
5 Argentina 590
6 Chile 550
7 Uruguay 537
8 Nicaragua 531
• Pan American Union, America in Figure:, 1960.
 281 Stati.st/cal Appendix
TABLE 11: COLD RESERVES PER CAPITA I N U .S. DOLLAl\S·

I Venezuela 156.5
2 Uruguay 73.0
3 CUBA 55.3
4 Panama 45.5
5 Costa Rica 17.4
6 Dominican Republic 15.1
7 E1 Salvador 14.5
8 Cuatemala 12.8
• Pan American Union, America in Figure", 1960.

TABLE 12: ?o:EWSPAPEns PUBLISHED PER THOUS AND INHABITANTS

( 1952-1958 ) '
Raltk COIIIVry Number of Unib YeOf
1 Uruguay 180 1958
2 Argentina 180 1958
3 CUBA 129 1956
4 Panama 124 1957
5 Venezuela 102 1956
6 Costa Rica 102 1956
7 Nicaragua 90 1951
8 Peru 76 1951
• Pan American Union, Am8rica in Figures, 1960.

TABLE 13: N~-WSPRTNT CONSUMPnON IN XTLOGRAMS PER CAPITA

(1958) '
1 Uruguay ILl
2 Argentina 8.5
3 CUBA 5.0
4 Venezuela 4.5
5 Chile 3.5
6 Brazil 3.2
7 Costa Rica 2.9
8 Mexico 2.4
• Pan American Union, America In Figure" 1960.
 282 The Growth and Decline of the Cuban Republic
TABLE 14: CONSUMPTION OF ELECrRICITY (IN KILOGRAMS OF
COAL EQUIVALENT PER CAPITA 1958)'"
Kg. Per Capita
R.'"
I
Country
Venezuela
pet Annum
2,458
2 Argentina 1,077
3 Mexico 813
4 Chile 757
5 CUBA 726
6 Uruguay 683
7 Panama 456
8 Colombia 446
• Pan American Union, America in FigurflS, 1960.

TABLE 15: TELEPHOI\'ES PER 100 INHABITANTS (1959)°

I Argentina 5,99
2 Uruguay 5.01
3 CUBA 2.62
4 Venezuela 2.47
5 Chile 2.25
6 Panama 2.37
7 Colombia 1.81
8 Brazil 1.46
• Pan American Union, America in Figures, 1960.

TABLE 16; AUI"OMOBILES PER THOUSAND INHABITANTS

(1957-58)'
I Venezuela 40.8
2 Argentina 31.8
3 CUBA 31.5
4 Panama 21.0
5 Mexico 19.5
6 Costa Rica 18.5
7 Chile 15.3
8 Brazil 11.8
• Pan American Union, America in Figures, 1960.
 283 Statistical Appendix
TABLE 17: NUMBER OF TELEVISION BROADCAST STAnONS (1957) ·
No. of Station,
1 CUBA 23
2 Mexico 12
3 Colombia 8
4 Brazil 6
5 Venezuela 4
6 Argentina 1
7 Dominican Republic 1
8 Uruguay 1
TOTAL
-56
• Pan American Union, America in FiguriJ#, 1960.

TABLE 18: TELEVlSfON' SETS PER 1,000 INHABITANTS (1959)-

1 CUBA 56
2 Venezuela 29
3 Argentina 19
4 Mexico 11
5 Brazil 13
a Colombia 10
1 Uruguay 5
8 Dominican Republic 5
• Pan American Union, America In Figu re" 1960.

TABLE 19: MOVIES: TICKETS SOLD PER CAPITA PER ANNUM:

(1958)'
1 CUBA 9.0
2 Mexico 8.5
3 Venezuela B.2
4 Brazil 5.3
5 EI Salvador 4.5
6 Colombia 4.1
7 Argentina 3.9
8 Guatemala 2.9
U.S.A. 12.5
• Pan American Unfon, America in Figures, 1960.
 284 The Growth and Decline of the Cuban Republic
TABLE 20: kILOMETERS OF RAILROAD TRACK PER THOUSAND
SQUARE KlLO}.1ETERS OF NATIONAL TERRlTORY
Railroad Track Area In Thsds. Km. of Track per
Country (Km . ) Sq. Km. M Km. of Area
Argentina 43,956 2,775 15.8
Brazil 37,967 8,510 4.5
CUBA 4,784 114 42.0
Mexico 23,300 1,968 11.9
Peru 4,023 1,284 3.1

TABLE 21: RADIO RECEIVERS PER THOUSAND INHABITANTS (LATE

19505) •
U.S.A. 925
United Kingdom 285
Germany (Federal Republic) 276
France 239
CUBA 176
Japan 159
Italy 126
U.S.S.R. 183
IN LATIN AMERICA:
1 Uruguay 261
2 CUBA 176
3 Argentina 158
4 Venezuela 126
5 Panama 124
6 Chile 99
7 Mexico 84
8 Brazil 76
9 Costa Rica 73
• UNESCO, Basic Facts and Figures, 1959.
 285 StatVitical Appendix
TABLE 22: INFANT MORTALITY IN LATIN AMERICA 1958: (DEATHS
DURING FIRST YEAR PER TIIOl]SAKD BIRTHS-SOURCE:
Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1960)
Rank Country Infant Mortality Rate
1 CUBA 37.6
2 Paraguay 55.3
3 Panama 57.9
4 Argentina 61.1
5 Honduras 64.4
6 Nicaragua 69.3
7 Uruguay 73.0
8 Dominican Republic 76.6
9 EI Salvador 79.3
10 Mexico 80.0
11 Peru 88.4
12 Costa Rica 89.0
13 Bolivia 90.7
14 Venezuela 91.2
15 Colombia 100.0

TABLE 23: AVERAGE SIZE OF FARMS IN CERTAIN LATIN AMERICAN

COUNTRIES (1958)
Average Size of Farms
Country in hectares
CUBA 56.7
United States 78.5
Mexico 82.0
Venezuela 335.0

TABLE 24: CALORIES CONSUMED PER PERSON PER DAY IN LATIN

AM:EJUCA IN 1958·
Rank Country Calories
1 Argentina 3,106
2 Uruguay 2,991
3 CUBA 2,682
4 Brazil 2,353
5 Chile 2,344
6 Peru 2,077
• Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations.
 286 Th e Growth and Decline of the Cuban Republio
TABLE 25, u.s. JNVESTME.'ITS IN LATIN AMERICA
(in millions of doUars)
lncrea.se or
Country or Arca 1956 / '58 Decline
All Latin America 7,059 8,730 1,671
1 Venezuela 1,829 2,722 893
2 Brazil 1,218 1,345 127
3 CUBA m 1,001 224
4 Mexico 690 781 91
5 Chile 676 736 60
6 Central AmerIca 630 737 107
7 Argentina 466 517 51
8 Peru 343 429 86
9 Colombia 298 289 - 9
All Other 132 173 41
Percent represented by
Cuba l1.1l% 11.5$ 13.4%

TABLE 26: HONtY AND BEESWAX

Rank Country Producticm Exports Consumption
(hiUUons of Pounds)
1 Argentine 62.1 30.9 11.2
2 :Mexico 28.6 22.0 6.6
3 CUBA 8.8 8.2 0.6
4 Cuatemala 5.1 4.6 0.5

TABLE 27: lUCHER EDUCATION STIJDENTS nIt THOUSAND

INHABITANTS, A W ORlJ) COMPARISON (1957~ 1958)·
Sfttdenl$ Students
Po~lat/on in in ffigher per Thousand
Country Mil iow (1957 ) EducatIon Inhabitants
U.S.A. 171.2 3,037,000 17.7
CUBA 6.4 86,500 13.5
U.S.s.R. 200.2 2,110,860 9.5
Japan 90.9 626,736 6.9
France 44.1 180,634 4.1
Italy 48.5 154,638 3.2
Germany 51.5 153,923 3.0
U.K. 51.5 96,128 1.9
.. UNESCO, op. cll.
 287 Statistical Appendix

TABLE 28: NEWSPRINT CONSQMP'I'lON PER CAPITA (LATE 195Os)·

Kg. of NeW8print
Consumed per Capita
country per Annum
U.S.A. 36.3
United Kingdom 20.0
France 10.6
'Vest Germany 8.0
Japan 6.0
CUBA 5.0
Italy 4.4
U.S.S.R. 1.6
.. UNESCO, op. cU.

TABLE 29: PIlYSICIAKS PER TIIOUSAr>.l> INHABITANTS, A WORLD

COMPARISON (LATE 1950s)"
Physiciall.! Population Physicians per
country (thousands) (millions) 1,000 Population
Italy (1958) 69.9 48.5 1.44
West Germany (1959) 72.8 51.5 1.41
United States (1958) 217.1 171.2 1.27
Japan (1960) 97.3 90.9 1.07
France (1959) 44.4 44.1 1.01
CUBA (l960)t 6.4 6.4 1.00
United Kingdom (1959) 42.5 51.5 0.83
.. Figures for physicians from Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1982,
pp. 935-938. Population data from UNESCO, op. cit.
f The ratio of physicians to population was e~actly the same in 1957.

(B) OTHER TABLES

TABLE 30: CONSTRUCTIO'" I'" CUBA (MILLIONS OF DOLLARS)"

Havana
Year Total Province Other
1952 49.4 38.0 11.4
1953 62.7 51.1 11.6
1954 74.1 60.3 13.9
1955 69.4 54.2 15.2
1956 80.4 60.3 20.1
 288 The Growth and Decline of the Cuban Republic
1957 77.9 58.3 19.7
1958 74.0 61.5 12.5
TOT"'" 488.1 383.7 104.4
Increase
1952-1957 28.5 ZO.3 8.3
• According to the National College of Architects.

TABLE 31: GAINFULLY EMPLOYED POPULATION OF CUBA (1958)

Category No. Percent
Agriculture, hunting & fishing 818,706 41.5
Mining and quarrying 9,618 0.5
Manufacturing 327,208 16.6
Construction 65,292 3.3
Public utilities 8,439 0.4
Commerce 232,323 11.7
Transport & communications 104,003 5.0
Service 395,904 20.1
Other 10,773 0.9
TOTAL 1,972,266 100.0

TABLE 32: CONSOLIDATED OPElIATIONS OF CUBAN BANKS

(Millions of Dollars)
Demand
Year Capital Savings Deposits Loans
1951 37.1 113.6 667.7 394.7
1952 41.7 141.2 656.0 461.1
1953 40.8 159.6 629.0 427.8
1954 45.4 178.6 635.0 466.1
1955 49.3 212.2 704.0 532.5
1956 01.0 293.5 948.0 66B.l
1957 74.2 395.8 1,089.9 784.5
1958 77.3 443.7 1,076.7 836.3
LVCREASE BETWEEN 1951 and 1958:
40.2 330.1 409.0 441.6

TABLE 33, HOSPITAL FACILITIES IN CUBA

HOspitah Beds
Built before 1933 36 6,893
1933 to 1944 18 6,732
 289 Statistical Appendix
1952 to 1958 43 7,516
TOTAL PUBLIC 97 21,141
TOTAL PUBLIC AND PRIVATE 35,000
NUMBER OF PERSONS PER HO SPITAL BED (1958)
CUBA 190
United Stat es 110·
• SwtistiaJl Abslra<:t of the
United SfatC3, 1982. In 1958, there were 1,578,.
000 hospital beds in the United States, serving 174,057,000 people.
TABLE 34, HIGH SCHOOLS, SPEClAL SCHOOLS AND UNIVERSITIES
Totallf1 Created by Created by
T ype of I flSHtution 1958 Bat~ta Others
Universities 13 9 4
H igh Schools 21 IS 6
Schools for T eacbers 19 11 8
H ome economics schools 14 8 6
Commercial schools 19 10 9
Art Schools 7 2 5
T echnical Schools 22 IS 7
Schools of Journalism, etc. 6 6 0
TOT ALS 121 76 45
P E"CE r-.T AGES I()()$ 63% 37%
TABLE 35, SUCAR PRICES , PRODUcrION AND EXPO"TS
Crop USA Price World Price Exporn
Y ear (Mils. Long Tons) , , ($ Mils. )
1954 4.75 4.93 3.49 431.5
1955 4.40 4.80 3.42 472.6
1956 4.60 4.86 3.31 523.2
1957 5.51 5.33 5. 12 645.0
1958 5.61 5.22 3.45 587,5
1959" 5.99 5.40 2.96 491.7
19631
• The Il:rst year of the Communist regime in Cuba.
f 1963 :=: 3 Mils. 0 1 so.
TABLE 36, l'(ATlONAL OWNERSIDP OF T H E SUGAR INDUSTRY
Cuoon A-filh U.S. A-IilLt Other OwrwrMllp
Year No. Pet. No. Pet. No. Pet.
1939 56 22,4% 66 55.1% 52 22.5%
1954 116 57.8$ 41 41.0% 4 1.2i
1958 121 62.H 36 36.7% 4 0.3%
 290 The Growth and Decline of the Cuban Republic
TABLE 37, SUGAR OUTPUT IN CUBA, U.S.A. • .u.."U U.S,S.1\.
Sugar Production in Thscu. Short Tons:
Year or period USA USSR CUBA
1935·1940 average 1,901 2,761 3,183
1950·1955 average 2,351 3,010 6,078
1955 /56 2,313 4,200 5,2.."9
1956/57 2,529 5,000 6,252
1957/58 2,735 5,800 6,372
1958/ 59 2,820 6,100 6,600
S'tT.MMARY OF LABOR LECISLA nON IN CUBA
1878 Law restricting child labor.
1909 Arteaga Law, requiring that wages be paid in legal tender,
not in scrip.
1910 Law authorizing construction of houses for worken.
1910 Regulating closing hours of stores.
1913 Commission to study an Employment and Social Security
Code.
1916 Worker's Compensation Law.
1921 Regulation of hours for banks and pharmacies.
1924 Labor commissions set up at Cuban ports.
1931 Establishment of an unemployment fund.
AFTER TIlE REVOLUTION OF SE~tBER 1933:
1933 Law requiring that 50% of every labor force be Cuban.
1933 Trade Union Law.
1934 Law protecting women workers.
1934 Law of collective labor agreements.
1934 Law establishing the right to paid vacation<;.
1934 Law protecting workers and employees against arbitrary
discharge.
1934 Law affirming the right to join unions and the right to strike,
1934 Eight-hour day law.
1934 Health and maternity protection for workers.
1934 Nationa l Minimum Wage Commission.
1935 Employment Exchanges Law.
1936 Superior Council on Social Security.
1936 Organization of an institute to retrain disabled. workers.
1936 National Institute of Prevention and Social Reforms.
1937 Central Board on Maternity and Healtb.
1941 Compulsory Arbitration Law.
 291 Statistical Appendix
1943 National Commission of Social Cooperation.
1945 Regulation of working hours in summer.
1948 Law requiring banks to close on Saturdays.
J948 Law on healtb standards in places of employment.
J952 Financing of Palace of Labor.
J953 Labor-Management Technical Committees.
J953 Compulsory payment of union dues provided by checkoff.
1955 Law eliminating Communists from the trade unions and
from public employment.

DURlNG THE FIRSr YEAR OF CASTRO co~n.{U!'l1JSM:

1959 Abolition of the right to organize unions.

1959 Strikes outlawed.
1959 Minimum wage laws repeaJed.
1959 Collective bargaining abolished.
1959 Right to job security terminated
1959 Paid vacations abolished.
1959 Compulsory work for the State instituted.
1959 Payment of wages in scrip authorized.

DISABILITY, OLD ACE, RETlREME1<.i AKD DEA nl llENEFITS

Number 0/ Fvnth lJenc/icimitl
Category in 19$8 In 1958
Workers 21 1,400,000
Professionals 20 8,000
Government employees 11 140,000
TOTAL 1,620,000
Percent of Cuban Jabor for oo insured. , , 90%
,
SOClAL SECOlUTY: CONSOLIDATED DATA FllOM 21 R.ETlRE..'IEST FUl\"DS
$ Mil/ionl
Collections in 1955 56,6
Collections in 1958 68,0
Increase 11.4
Consolidated Balance 1955 99,0
Expenditures 74,1
Contribution to Capital 14,9
Total Assets in 1955 212.2
 292 The Growth and Decline of the Cuban Republic
TRADE UN IONS IN CUBA: CO:sFEDERATION OF CUBAN WORttRS (ere)
Oct. 1944 Dec. 1958
Number of Industrial Unions 30 33
Number of Union Locals 1,560 2,490
No. of Collective Contracts in Force 2,624 7,638"
• Havana Pmvinec only.

TABLE 35: LATI~ AM£IUCAN' MONrTAnY I\ESERVES OF COLD ANI)

CONVERTIBLE FOREIGN EXCHANGE IN MILLIONS OF
DOLLARS
Count ry 1958 1960
I Venezuela 1,050 558
2 Brazil 465 428
3 CUBA 373 144
4 Mexico 372 393
5 Uruguay 205 213
6 Colombia 160 153
7 Argentina 129 658
TABLE 39, CUBA AS A MINERAL PRODUCER ( 1958)
cuba'lI l'oritkm in:
Mineral TheW(lrld America.r
Cobalt First First
Nickel Second Second
Chronium Eighth Second
Manganese Eighth Second
Copper Eleventh Sixth
Index

Aballl Hospital, 98 Autentico Party. 18-24, 29, 32-33,

ADASCA, 98, 158-159 31S, 38, 44, 65, 69, 80, 120, 130-
AEA (Rice Stabilization J. lS9-170 131, 166, 176-171, 199, 211, 230,
AEM (Com StabUizatJon), 167 247-248
Agramonte, Robert. 31, 41 Autohmes Modemos (AMSA), 211-
Agrarian Reform Program of Batista, 212
153 Automobiles, 217, 282
Agrarian RefonTI, National Institute Aviation, 213-215
of (INRA) . 75, 99, 157, 167, 171,
182-183, 190,204,260 BAGA, 22, 80
Agricultural eIperiment stations, 162- BANDES (Bank of Ecooomle and
164 Socia] Development), 132·133,
Airports, 215-216 146-147, Usl, 169, 186, 214, 241.
Alba, Victor, 14 '40
Aleman, Jose, 19 BANFAIC. 138, 145, 149, 158-1.59,
Alexander, Robert J.. 14 lee-167, 187-188, 190, 212, 242,
Alliegro, Anselmo, 32-33 25'
Bank of Economic and Social Devel-
Almendares Tunnels, 251-252
Alvarez Diaz, Jose, 63, 74, 134, 170 opment (BANDES), See BANDES
Ambrosio Grillo Hospital, 98 Bank of HUID:\n Organs, 97-98
American States, Organi:tation of "B:mb" of Health. 97-98
( 0A5 ),51,55,S8 Baquero, GastOn, 54
Amnesty, 42-43 Barlovtl nto Tourist Center, 195
Antilles Steel Company, 181 Ba rrero Eehevarda, E~ tebao, 78
Aqueducts and reservoirs, 250-251 Barrett, Clifford R., 62·63
Areopagitica, 272 Bashuov,21
Armed Forces, reorganh:ation of in Batista, Bfllisario, 114
1933,57 Batista, Fulgeneio, led 1933 Revo-
Anny and Navy C Lub, 234 lution, 5-7; and Platt Amendment,
Arte'ga, Manuel Cardinal, 255 9-13; becomes Chief of State, 6-8;
Atomic Energy, 181 negotiates with Sumner Welles, 9·
 294 Index:
13; and Communists, 15; and Emil Calixto Garcia National Hospital, 89,
Ludwig, 16; upholds democratic 106
election, 17-1B; first "exile" of, 1B, Caiories consumed, 2B5
22-24; elected Senator, 24; ap- Camara O'Reilly, Jose Ignacio, 113
proached by Pdo, 32-33; Ul'ges Campos Marguetti, Generoso, 44
Prio to avoid bloodshed, 33-34; Cancer, 105-106
tal:es power again (1952), 35-36; Carb6, Sergio, 7, 11
affinns support of U.S. against Caribbean Legion, 28, 30-31
communism, 37; from emergency Case #82, 19
powers toward free elections, 38- Castellanos, Nicolas, 27-28
42; again elected President of Castro, Fidel, 21-22, 32, 36, 38, 40-
Cuba, 41-42; amnesties political 41, 43, 45. 47--50, 54, 63, 69, 72,
prisoners, 42-43; and Consultative 74, 80, 104, 155-156, 166-167,
Council, 43--44; false charges of 189-190,217,228,247,255,258-
terrorism against, 47-49; at Pan- 259,262,264-265,267-271
ama Conference, 51-55; warns of Castro, Manolo, 22
Communist threat, 52-53; on inter- Castro, RaUl, 40, 43, 265
American economic and political Catholic ChUl'ch in Cuba, 256-260
co-operation, 53-55; and the ser- Cattle industry, 155-156, 170-173
geant-teachers, 77-7B; and Red CCA (Cuban Aviation Company),
textbooks, 83-84; and the press, 214-215
90-92 Cement, 187
Batista, Martha Fernandez de, 33, CENCAM (Agricultural and Mining
106, 115, 116, 223 Cooperatives), 156-157, 187-188
BCCE (Bank of Foreign Trade), CENPLUC (Local Foundations),
148-149 157,202-203,244
Belot Refinery, 1BB Central Board of Health and Mater_
Belt, Guillermo, 22 nity,64
Betancourt, R6mulo, 91 Central Highway, 200·201
Black legend, 263-264 CEREFA (Afforestation), 161
Blindness, aid to, 106 Cespedes, Carlos Manuel de, 6, 8, 11
Blood Bank, 97 CFN (National Development Com-
Blood Vessel Bank, 97 mission),l99
Bloodless Revolution, 31-37 Chadbourne Plan, 179
Blue Beach, 197-19B Chata, La, 32
Blue Highway, 158 Chester, Edmund A., 3-7, 13, 19-20,
BNC, Annual Reports of the, 140 25,36
Bogotazo, 21-22 Chibas, Eduardo, 23, 27-29, 31, 38,
Bohemia, 47-48 41
Bonsai, Philip, 270 Child Guidance Center (COL), 88-
Braden, Spruille, 103, 267-269 89
Brooke, John R., 229 Child Orientation, Center of, 16
Budget, Cuban, 123-124 Childrens' dispensaries, 114-115
Buro del Caribe, 268 Christ of Havana, 254-255, 259
Buses, 211-213 ChUl'ch Hierarchy and Castro Com-
munism, 258-259
Cabana, La, 32 Cinema, 283
CAC (Civil Aeronautics Commis- Civil Military Institutes, 79
sion),214-215 Civic Dialogues, 44-45
Caffery, Jefferson, 13 Civilian Pilots Day, 213
 295 Index
Civilia n RevolutJon.ary Junia, 9 Daughters of Charity of St. Vincent
CNAP ( Public Welfare Corpora- de Paul.ll7
tion), 11~111, 11 4, 258 Deaf-mutes, 89
Cobalt, 185-187 Depositors Jnsurance Fund, 139
Coffee, 148, 165·100 Destitute, aid to, 117
Collazo, Rosendo, 46 Viano de 10 Marino, 257
Collective Bargaining, 02-64, 66-67, Diesels, 210-211
69,71,73-76 Distribution and Supply, Coopera.
Columbia, Camp, 35-30 tive Agcncy of (ADASCA ). See
Communist Par~ of Cuba, begin- ADASCA
nings, 14-15: '~nvlets,'" 15: in cabi- Docton;, number of, 279
net, 15-16: and Bogotazo, 21-22; Dolores Bonet Cltnical Laboratory,
Fidel Cash\l as student agent of, Hl6
21-2.2; .and trade unions, 29-30, Dominguez Rold'n Hoopilal, 106
.and Prio. 30: and Moncada up- Dominican Republic. 50-51
rising. 40-4 1; and public educa- Dry dock, 207·208
tion, 82-83 DuBois, Jules, 51
Consolidated RailroaUs. 2009-211
Constitution of Cuba (liMO), 16-17 ECLA (Economic Commission for
Consullative CounciL 43·44 Latin America of the UN), 58
Conte Agiiero, Luis, 41, 46 Education, Commu.nist infiltration of.
Corn, 167 82-83
Corruption, 18-19, 22-23, 25-29, 79- Education, secondary, 85-86
BO Egg consumption, 173
Cotton, 163 Eight-hour Day. 69, 74-75
Crop loans, 159-100 Eisenhower, Dwight D., M
ere ( Cuban Co"federation of La- Eisenhower, Milton, 270
bor), 62, 71-72- Elections of 1948, 23-24
Cuba Bet,ayed. 3, 33 Elections of 1954, 41-42
C uban Clearing Chamber, 140-141 Election.'! of 1958, 45-47, 261
Cuban Confederation of Labor Electoral College, 39,41
(CTC), See erc Electoral Laws, 230·23 1
Cuban Infonnation Service, 47-49 Electoral Reform!, 38-40
Cuban Navy Shipyard, 207.208 Electricity consumption, 239~240,
Cuban Power Company (CCE), 282
238-240 Elizalde, Pio, 22
Cuban Revolutionary Party (PRe), Emergency Powers, 38
42 Esse Oil Comp:my, 188-189
Cuban Telephone Company, 240-241 Estrada Pahna, Tomas, 142, 209~210
Cuban Western Railrow, 209
Cuenca Sur, 145, 250 FAO ( Food and Agriculture Organi.
Culture and Museums, NaUonaJ In- za tion of the UN ), 58
stitute of, 90 Faf'l'l\S, sb:e of, 2S5
Curie H ospital of the League Against Federal Reserve Bank of New York,
Cancer, lOS 137
~ncy, 135-131, 141 Federal Reserve Board, 137
FHA, 220-221, 253
Dairy Industry, 171·172 Figueres, Jose, 30
Damon, Frances, 21 Finance Corporation (FNC), 145·
"Dance of the Millions," 174-175 146
 296 Index
F ine Arts, 90 Health, Unlvenity of, 93
Finlay, Carlos, 94 Heredia, Nicolh, 18
FUhing industry. 51·58, 149-151 , 207 Hermi nde.t, Melba. 41
Fishing, National lnstituleof ( l NP), Hernindez, ''Pipi,'' 50
1.')0 Hevia, Carlos, 13, 31 32
4

Fishing Terminal (Havana) , 150- Hill, Robert C., 269-271

151, 207 Hitler, Adolf, 102
Floating Debt, 134·13.5 Hospital Bech in Cuba, 104-105
Foreign Trade. 135 Hospitals, 1034109
Foreign Trade, Cuban Bank of Hotels, 1 94-1 9~
(ECCE) , 148·149 Hoy, 21-22
Fote!lt and Agro-Pecuarian Re!;tora- Hull, Cordell, 7, 9, 11
lion, Executive Committee on ''Humanists,'' .265
( CEREFA ), Sell CERErA
Freedom 01 the P,eu, 90-92 ICCC (Cartograpby and CadamaJ
Freeport SuJphur Company, 185 Survey ) ,191-193
ICEA, I82
ICECAFE (Coffee Stabilization).
Gainfull y employed In Cuba, 288
Gangsterism, 18-21,25-28,32·34 165--166
Garda Raynerl. Dr. JU$to, 44
ICIT ( Research) ,I90
Imports per Capita, 281
GATT, 58
Income per Capita, 211
Glass InduShy, 187
Income Tax, 124
Godoy Loret de Mola, Dr. Gast6n, Industria! Development under Ba4
44
tista, 241· 244
Gold Reserve, 137,281
Industrial Sta bilization Law, 185
GOmez, Jose Miguel. 142 Infant Mortality, 2.85
GOmez, Mig uel M., 142
Inflation, 280
Gonzilez Lanuu, Jose Antonio, 229
INH ( NationaJ Institute of H ygiene),
Couzaiez Mayo, Cristobal, 173
Good Neighbor Policy, 9-13
00
INP ( NatronaJ Institute of Fishing) ,
Goodwi n, Richard N9.than. 21fT
See Fishing, National Institute of
Grau San M&J11n, Ram6n, 13, 15-1 6,
INRA (Agrarian Reform Institute),
18-19, 21 -23, 25_26, 29, 39, 42,
See Agrarian Reform, National In-
65, 69, 80, 84, 168, 224, 247
stitute of (INRA)
Green Sugar, 179-180
International Bank, Report on Cuba,
Grobart, Fabio, 15
Gross National Product (GNP) 1424 57
Internatio nal Finance Corporation
143
Guanabacoa, 34, 192, 196
(IFC ),54-55
Internatio nal Red Cross, 2B6
Guevara, Ailredo, 21
Guevara, Ernesto ( CM ) , 41 Intervention, U.S. in Cuba, 4-13
intimidation of politica) opposition
Gunboat D iplomacy b:a Cuba, 8--11
( 1952), 21 28
4

Invalid Rehabilitation, 117-118

H avana, naffic conditions in, 2414 Isle of Pines. 41,192,196-197
24'
Havana Tumlel, 251 James, DanJel, 63
Havana, UnJversJty of, 19-22, 30, Japanese F isheries Experts, 15Q..151
100 JO.'Ie Marti Airport, 24
Hawley_Smoot Tariff, 115, 200 JOUl'llalUm, 90-92
 291 Index
Kennedy, John F., 267 Monetary Stabilization Fund, 136-
Kuquine,24 138
Monumental Way, 248-249
Labor Organizations in Cuba, 62, Morales, Vidal, 78
66-67,71-72,75.76 Mortality Rates, 219
Laredo Bru. Federico, 142. Mulal, Eusebio, 29
Lengua de Paiam, 184 Murphy, Gerald Lester, 51
Leprosy (PLECS). 98 Mutualistic Societies, 107-108
Lila Hidalgo Hospital, 97 Myth of the 20,000 Corpses, 47·49
Limones Sugar Central, 163
LincGln, Abraham. 271·272 Narona, Enrique Jose, 18
Literary, 218 National Bank of AgriCulture and
Livestock herds and Communists, Industrial Development (BAN-
155·156,171·113 FAIC), See BANFAIC
Living standards in Cuba, 62-63, 61- National Bank of Cuba (BNC), 138-
69,12-14 141, 143-144
Local, Urban and Rural Foundation, National Corporation for Public Wel-
National Executive Committee fare (CNAP), See CNAP Public
(CENPLUC) Soo CENPLUC Welfare Corporation
Local Foundations National Council on Tubexculosis,
Lottery, 106, 118, 120·121 98
Ludwig, Emil, 3, 5, 6, 16·17 National Economic Council, 125,
121·128,190
MacGaHey, Wyatt, 62-63 National Executive Commission of
Machado, Gerardo, 3-4, 14. 39, 106, Agriculture and Mining Coopera-
130,134, 142.,250 tives (CENCAM), See CENCAM
Magoon, Chas. E., 142. Agricultural and Mining Coopera-
Malaria, 93-94 tives
Malec6n, 249·250 National Finance Corporation
Manuel Maquez Sterling School, 91 (FNC), 145-146, 241-242, 250
Mapping Cuba, 191-193 National Hospital, 107
Mariel Naval Air Base, 236 National Housing Committee
Mariel Shipyard Company, 208 (CNV),222
Marinello, Juan, 15-16 National lncome, 142-143
Marrero, Professor Levy, 83 National Institute for Logopedics
Marshall Plan, 176,238 and Phonics, 89
Marti, Flowe!' of, 81 NationallDstitute of Hygiene (INH),
Marti, Jose, 256-251 Sec INH National Institute of
Matthews, Herbert L., 262, 269 Hygiene
McPortland, Nicanor, 14 National Institute of Reinsurance,
Meat Consumption, 171-112 145
Mella, Julio Antonio, 14-15 National Organization for the Ad~
Menocal, Mario G., 136, 142. ministration of Government Hos~
Merchant Marine, 206 pitals (ONAHE).105,217
Military Cities, 233 National Organization for the Reha·
Mills, C. Wright, 68-69 bilitation of Invalids (ONRI),
Milton, John, 212 117,118,253
Mir6 Cardona, Jose, 231 National Organization of Children's
Moa Bay Milling Company, 185·186 Dispensaries (ONDI), 114, 115,
Moncada Assault, 40-41 217,253
 298 Index
National PaIn and Creen Areas Ad- Parh,204.
ministration (ONl'AV). 204 ParI!, Agustin, 213
National Planning Board. 191 Pawley, William D., 211
National Public Parking Organization PIZO.'J, Felipe, 63
(ONEP), 216 Pefia.~o, 29,40
Na tional Traffic Commission, 216 People's Dining Rooms, 118-12.0
Na tional Transport Corporation, 2{)5 Perez Serantes, Monsignor Enrique,
Naval Buildings, 2.J.5.236 4.
Navea, Felipe, 46 Petroleum, 188
Navy, 234-236 Phillips, James Doyle, 97
Newspapen,281 Phillips, Ruby Hart, 7, 19, 36, 37,
Newsprint Con.m mption, 281 183,247
New Yo,k Timef, 103, 183 FJedflU IJ Uyu, 101, WI, 248
Nicaro, l 85 PLin for Social and Economic Devel-
Nickel, 184-181 opment, 132
Northern Circuit Highway, 196, 201 Platt Amendment, e, 13
Nufiez Jimenez, Antonio, 82 Plaza of the Republio, 229-230
Nuiiez Portuondo, Ricardo, 23 Polio, 96
Portela, Julio Cesar, 113
Omnibus Cooperative (COA). 212 Ports and Harbon, 126-127,252
Omnibuses Aliados, 212·213 Poultry,112-113
ONAHE (Government Hospital Ad- Power, decentralli:ation of, 246
ministration), 105 PRICHEC, 146
ONCEP (School and People's Dining Frio Socarm, Ca rlos, 19, 21, .22, 23-
Rooms),118-120 35, 45, 50-51, 57, 63, 65, 69, 74,
ONDI (National OrgnnIzation of 83-84,13 1,174,224 247
Children's Dispensaries ). llt-U6 Public Assistance, National Corpora-
ONEP (Parking organiution), 216- tion of eCNAP), 16
211 Public deht, 13()..134
ONPAV (Park Commission ), 204 Public education as percent of
ONRI (lnvalids),1l7-118 budget, 278
Ordoqui.loaquin,40
Organintion of Americ:m States Quintan3, Jorg6, 34
(OAS),266
Orthodo)t Party, 23, 21, 29, 31-34, Rabies, 95-96
38,44,46 Radios in Cuba, 284
Orthopewc surgery, 95 Railroad reorganhation, 210-211
Ovares, Enrique, 21 Rn.ilroads, 208-211, 284
Rancho Boyef'Oll Airport, 21
Palace of Communications, 232 Reforestation, 161
PaJace of Justice, 230 Religious Freedom in Cuba, 2St
PANADE, 116 Remos, Juan 1.. ~4
Panama Conference (1 9M), 51-55, Revolution of 4th of September 1933,
14. 3-8
Panama, Declaration of, 53-.54 Revolution of 1952, 31-37
PaD American Conference, 12, 51, 5J Rice, 151-158, 168·170
Pau American Highway, 196 JUee Stabiliza tion Administration
Pan American Sanitary Bureau, 94 (AEA),l69
Pardo Llada, J006, 32, 45 Rivero Aguero, Andr6s, 261
Parking meters, 216-217 Rivero Aguero, Nicolas, 46
 299 Index
Rivero, ··Pepin." 257 S\lgar indumy under communism,
Roo Garcia., RaUl. 15 182-183
Roca Bias, 40-41 Sugar mills, Cuban owne rship of, 182
Rockefeller Foundati on, 93 Sugar tax, 124
Roosevelt, Franklio D., 5, 9, 10, 15, Sugar Workers Union, 43
183 Sumiyosf M ortl, 150
Rosillo, Domin~o, 213 Supreme Court, 229-2.31
Rural Children s Homes. 78·79, 81
Rural credit, 1.58-160 Tabcmilla, Francisco, 50
Rural postmen, 232·233 Tariff, 12.5·126
Rural sanitation (ITSR), 93 Teaching mtsslons, 78, 81
Rural schools, 77·78 Technical Committee on Banking
and Currency Legislation. 13'7-138
Sagua la Grande, 157 Technical Institute of Rural Sanita-
Salad rigas, Carlos, 11,23,44 tion ( lTSR), 93
Salk. Jonas, 95 Technological Research, Cuban in-
Sandburg, Garl. 212 stitute of, 132
San Felipe Ranch, 155 Technical schools, 86·87
San Lui!;: de Jagua Hospital. 98 Telephones, 240·241, 282
Sanchez Arango, Aureliano, 15, 28, Television, 283
29,35,63,84 Tenant farmers, 154
Sanguily, Manuel, 18 Terrorism In Cuba (1953-59),45-41
Savings and loan nssoclaUons, 139· Terrorism in Cuba (1959- ),41.49
140 Texaco Co., 189
Schlesinger, Arthur M., Jr., 103, .261 The Time far Decision, 12
School lunches, 118·120 Tobacco, 148, 162·165
Schwartz. Ernest, 62 Topes de Collan tes Sanatorium, 99-
Semano, La, 7, 11 101
Sergeant-teachers, 71, 84. Tone, Carlos de la , 18
Sergeants' Up..wng, S-8 Toniente, Cosme de la, 45
Shell Oil Compatly, 181-189 Torriente Brau, Pablo de la, 15
Ship's mortgages, 206 Tourism, 193
Small mineo, 188 Trade agreements, 58-60
Small peasants, 154· 155 Trade, balance of, 128-129
Smallpox, 95 Trade unions, 30·31
Smith, Earl E. T., 144, 269 Treaties, 59-60
Smith, Robert]., 8 Trujillo, Rafael Leonidas, 50
Social security, 04·66 TuberculOSis, 98·101
South Circuit Highway, .201
Soybeans, 1~164 Unemployment, 10-7.2
Sports, 81-88 United Action Party, 27, 32
Squatters' rights. 154·155 United REl lhwys 01 Havana, 208-209
Steel ind ustry, 186-181 Uni versi ties and colleges, 89-90
Students' Dining Rooms, US-121 Univerllity autonomy, abuses of, 19-
Student terrori~m , 18-22- 21
Sugar, 148-149, 114·182 Univel"Sit y of Life, 79-81
Sugar hags, 180 Univel"Sity of Northern Oriente, 89
Sugar Coordination Law, 152, 116, University students, number of, 219,
180-181 288
Sugar Crop Restriction, 171·118 Urrutia LieD, Manuel, 43, 232
 300 Index
U.S. Department of Commerce, 143 Welles', Sumner, 7-13
U.S. investment in Cuba, 286 White Paper on Cuba, 103-104, 108-
U.S. Senate Internal Security Sub- 109,267-269
committee, 144 'White Streak, 169
White Way, 197
Varadero, 197_198 Williams, Langboume N., 185
Varela, F eIix, 256 Windward Tourist Center, 145-146
Vatican, 257 Wood, Leonard, 90, 249
Vega Vega, AnibaI, 46 World Health Organization, 95
Venta de Casanova Estate, 160 World Sugar Agreement, 179
Via Cuba Canal, 236-237 World War II, Cuba and, 15-17
Vidali, Vittorio (alias Carlos Contre-
ras),14 Yellow Fever, 94-95

Wages in Cuba, 62-63, 67-70, 72-74 Zayas, Alfredo, 142, 187

 4
Order Through Revolution

Several officers came to see me to ask me to assume command of

the Anned Forces and prevent the country from plunging into
complete chaos. When I talked to them, I learned that Prio had
gone secretly to Guatemala for his meeting with the Red Presi-
dent, Arbenz, and this disturbed me deeply. For the President to
have left Cuban soil without the consent of Congress was a viola-
tion of law and sufficient reason for his removal.
The officers proposed that we utilize Prio's ab5ence from Cuba
to take over the Presidency, but I replied that the forthcoming
elections would solve the problem peacefully and in accordance
with the Constitution.
A conspiratorial organization among the officers had been in
existence for over two years and had twice failed to overthrow
the Pdo Government. On one occasion, a group of officers learned
that the President planned a secret night visit to Army head-
quarters. They surrounded the building with three infantry com-
panies and a tank company and waited. One group, consisting
chiefly of his former students, wanted to install Dr. Roberto Agra-
monte, who had replaced Chibas as head of the Orthodox Party,
in the Presidency. Another group favored me. Since they could
not reach agreement, they decided to let Prio go. When the cor-
rupt President left headquarters, he had no realization of what
had almost happened.
The Presidential campaign took shape with three candidates:
Agramonte for the Orthodox Party, Carlos Hevia for the Au-
 32 The Growth and Decline of the Cuban Republic
tenticos and me for the United Action Party. As the electioneer.
ing proceeded. the atmosphere became increasingly violent.
Threats and rumoN fllled the air.
The Orthodox Party proclaimed repeatedly that, if their man
were elected. President Prio would be placed in La Cabana to
stand trial for his maDy illegal acts. Prio's corruptly acquired
wealth would be confiscated. Orthodox spokesmen announced
that their first act would be to close the ports and airports of Cuba
to fleeing politicians aDd officials. They stated that they would
form "'people's courts" to try and condemn Auh~ntico officials.
This not only bad the ring of Robespierre. but it suggested the
band of international communism. The agents of Moscow had
penetrated deeply into the Orthodox organization, although the
Reds did Qat control the party. In particular, the Orthodox
youth, swayed by such Communlsts as Fidel Castro, was strongly
sympathetic to the Kremlin cause. Among the more recognized
national leaders, Pardo Llada was outstanding as either a Com-
munist or a willing implement of the great conspiracy.
In February 1952. one of the officers whom I had dissuaded
from military uprising told me that PrIo had had a meeting with
the Army command and other ranldng officers at Camp Colum-
bia to cUscuss a plan to prevent the national elections. He said
that, jf I were elected, the Auteutico and Orthodox Parties would
unite against me and there would be civil war. If the Orthodox
candidate won, which he thought probable. a band of fanatics
would destroy Cuban institutions and the established order. As
far as the Aub~nticos were concerned, he thought that their candi-
date. Carlos Hevia, had such an unattractive personality that it
was unlikely that he could win. The meeting agreed to re-examine
the situation in April with a view to reaching a firm decision.
Shortly thereafter, Dr. Anselmo Alliegro. President of the United
Action Party in Oriente Province. came to me unannounced to
say that President Prfo had run into him. greeted him affection-
ately and had him come over to La Chata, Prio's villa. Over
coffee, Prio discussed the bleak situation which Cuba faced.
He told Alliegro that the Orthodox candidate would probab1y
wiD. This he found most disturbing because of tapped telephone
conversations in which leaders of the Orthodox Parry had spoken
frankly Bnd incautiously about their real intentions. He showed
his guest transcrIpts of these taped COQversations and it was p1ain
 33 Order Through R61)olution
that Agramonte and his people were deeply concerned with
wreaking vengeance on their opponents.
The elections were to be held JUDe 1st. One of the phone con·
versations revealed that the day after the election. the Orthodox
leaders, who asswned that they would be victorious, planned to
arouse the populace to fury and drive out the Autenticos. Presi-
dent Prio said that part of the plan was to steal his wife's jewels.
The Autentico Chief Executive added that it would be a great
stupidity to attempt this on June 2nd, but if the Orthodox candi-
date won and continued to whip up mob anger, he could get
away with it by inauguration day, which was October 10th.
Alliegro told Prio that, if the situation was that desperate, he
and the other Autenticos should join forces behind my candidacy.
On the contrary, Prio replied, there was nO bope of a Batista vic·
tory and therefore my people should step aside and back Hevia.
"If this added sup,port does not gain victory for Hevia," the Presi·
dent continued. 'there is nothing else for me to try but a coup
d'etat."
I told Alliegro how much I appreciated his reporting this to me,
adding that Prio was driving the country to the brink of ruin and
would destroy it if he persisted in his headstrong and mistaken
policy.
THE REMOS MISSION
Early one morning. my daughter, Mirtha. awakened me to say
that Dr. Juan J. Remos, a spokesman for Prio. wished to see me
urgently. I arranged to have a conference with him that evening.
Remos reportea what I already knew. Prio wns in despondency
bordering on black despair. He saw no improvement in the pros·
pects of his candidate and considered an Orthodox: Party victory.
with its modern version of the tumbrils, inevitable. If by April.
there was no improvement in Hevia's prospects. he would have to
carry out the coup d'etat.
In Cuba Betrayed, I describe my reaction to this proposal as
EoDows:
"r asked Remos to listen to me as an ordinary citizen and not as
an opposition leader or Presidential candidate. I wanted him to
carry my ideas to President Prlo. It seemed to me that the Ad·
ministration did not have the support of the people and that it
remained in power only through its constitutional legitimacy.
 34 The Growth and Decline 0/ the Cuban Republic
When Prio's term ended, he would no longer have the support of
the Anned Forces, even if the mJlitary leaders carried out the
coup. I explained the gravity of the situation and the violence of
the polit.ical campaign which was growing progressively worse.
II the Pl'esident carried out a coup d'etat, the people would rise-
and the Armed Forces would split. The Chiefs upon whom he de-
pended would not command attention in such a crisis. The Army
and the Navy would split into factions, and collapse. The Chiefs
would back up Pdo, but without forces or authority. The other
officers inclined toward the 'Orthodoxes' or toward Ole, and there
were even a handful who favored the Communist Party. For pa-
triotic reasons, for the weHare of all concerned, I would, as a
private citizen, advise President Prio not to commit this stupidity
which could only result in a wave of bloodshed and even in the
loss of his own life.
"Why were these messages carried to me personally? The only
reason that occurred to me was that I might surrender to his
wishes, as had some of my men. U the threat of Prio's gangs and
their attempts to break up our meetings had compelled me to
announce through the press that I preferred physica1 death to
moral death, how could Prio persist in thinking that he might
succeed?
"1 asked Remos to get in touch with me after giving Pdo my
opinion. Three days later, he gave me the answer: 'President
Frio has Dot changed his mind.'» 1

THE BLOODLESS REVOLUTION

When it became quite evident to Prio that I was not going to

aid his plan to plunge Cuba into civil war, the threats and vio-
lence against me and my party workers were st~ped up. There
was a plot to attack my home. I was threatened by the press and
on the radio. On March 3rd, I went to a meeting at Cuanabaooa
aware of the fact that Jorge Quintana, a Frio supporter, had
publicly declared that I must not be allowed to return from that
political rally alive. The threat strengthened the determination
of the people to protect us and, when we approached the meet-
ing. we found ourselves guarded by a crowd or about 30,000 sym-
pathizers, among them armed soldiers, sailors and policemen in
civilian dress and organized as an impromptu defense battalion.
lOp. clt., pp. 238-239.
 35 Order Through Reoolutum
At 2:43 A.M. of March 10, 1952, I entered Cate No.4 of Camp
Columbia and took command of the Armed Forces of Cuba. We
p1aced the Chiefs of the Army. Police, Navy and Camp Colum-
bia and the heads of the garrisons in Havana under temporary
detention in the homes of my foUowers, where they were treated
as guests. Other leading AutentiC05, among them Minister of Edu-
cation Sanchez Arango, were also arrested. As for President Frio,
there seemed to be no need to do anything to circumscribe his
activities since he was recovering from a late party at his country
estate. Most of his high officials bad been enjoying the cabarets
and these too could not be considered serious poUtical or mili-
tary dangers.
By nine in the moming, l was inIonned that there was shooting
at the Presidential Palace. Arriving there, I found that Prio had
recovored and gone there. One of his subordinates had lost his
head and fired on my emissary when the latter announced that I
had taken over the Government. Shortly thereafter, Pdo sought
and obtained asylum in the Mexican Embassy and then pro·
ceeded to Mexico.
The March 10th Revolution IuJd triumphed withemt spming a
single drop of blood. In fhit respecf" it was an exact replica of the
Revolution of tile Sergeants of 1933. In neither of these upheavals
had any lives been lost. Moreovet', in neUIlet' case had we im-
prisoned, executed or otlwrwise persecuted our political optXr
nents. It was my belief then, and it continues to be my belief to·
day, that a constructive revolution should nof exact vengeance of
its enemies, but should heal the wounds of strife witl~ magnanim.
ity and should endeavor to unite victors and defeated in work
for the benefit of the nation. 2

2 On the eve of the 1933 Revolution, I lold my forces:

"Each commissioned officer, each soldier, regardless of the offense be
may have suHercd or the abuses he might wish to avenge, must observe his
best behavior toward those who have \lntil today been his ~uperi ors and his
chiefs. Cuban soldiers are known to be goooJ and genewus and now more
than ever they have tho opportunity to conGrm this. This is the req\l ~t of
a oomrade. It is the order of the leader upon whom w!ll Iall the gravest
responsibilities in these moments of supreme decisions. Sergeants in charge
of units will be res(>Onsible lor the physical well-being and safety (If these
officers, who, fot the time being. will be limIer surveillance-hilt not UDder
arrest_in their quarteo;. The families of these officers are Cuban familiell
and whatever the gUilt of the officers may be, it does not by any means
taint thdr families. They deserve, and must have, our prot\.'C tion while the
 36 The Growth and Decline of the Cuban Republic
Later, Communist propaganda and the propaganda of Com·
munism's dupes would portray me as a bloodthirsty tyrant. Let
me point out simply and briefly that the desire to persecute and
lcill[s a deep-seated trait which almost always becomes visible in
a political leader very early In his career. Thus, the fact that
Fidel Castro committed four murders before he reached the age
of 25 was no accident and was a visible portent of the horrors to
come. In my case, by contrast, I avoided persecution and the
spilling of blood to the greatest extent possible during the 18
years when I dominated Cuba. This was both because of a belief
in justice as opposed to arbitrary violence and because I have a
profound personal aversion to bloodshed.
To return to the Revolution of the lOth of March 1952, its swift
and bloodless victory was testimony to the fact that neither the
Autentico Administration nor the Orthodox opposition com-
manded any deep allegiance in the hearts of the Cuban people.
To quote Mrs. Phillips again, both because she is a good observer
and because, at the time she wrote her book, she was strongly
opposed to my regime:
"'\\'ithin two hours, Batista had made himself ruler of Cuba.
Though he had support in other quarters. it was his popularity
with the military that had made such a lightning coup possible.
Thus, it came as a complete surprise to the people of Havana
when the radio stations began broadcasting that Ceneral Ful-
gencio Batista had taken control of the government 'in order to
save the country from chaotic conditions which endangered lives
and property: In a nationwide broadcast from Camp Columbia,
Batista told the people that President Prio Socarras had planned
to suspend the presidential elections aDd make himself a dictator.
He said, 'I have been forced to carry out this coup because of my
love for the people. I shall re-establish public order. 1 ask the co-
operation of all the people in Cuba in this task of peace and
cordiality. Shoulder to snoulder we must work for the spiritual
hannony of the great Cuban family.'
"'The streets of Havana, which had been filled with carnival
merrymakers the night before, were deserted. Detachments of
police and soldiers appeared in all sectors of the city and tanks
moved in to surround the Presidential Palace. Batista suspended

5ituation which we will facCl after tonight continues to exist." Quoted 10.
Chester. op. cit., p. 62.
 31 Orde1' Through Revolution
constitutional guarantees and canceled the elections scheduled
for June. He announced that all international treaties and pacts,
as weU as obligations assumed by Cuba with the United States,
would be respected and fulfilled. He said that if the United States
were attacked by or involved in a war with the Soviet Union,
Cuba would fight on the side of the A:mericaru. He promised pro-
tectiOl~ for all United States investments or such capital 03 might
make future investments in Cuba."·
s Phillips, op. cit., pp. 259·.260. MyemphiULs-F.B.
 5
Steps Toward Democracy

The seizure of power had been inevitable to avert an attempted

coup d'etat and civil war. There was not only President Pdo's
twisted scheme for a coup d'etat to worry about, but another con~
sideration. Regardless of who won the June lst elections, th ere
was reason to believe that Communist agitators and other mal-
contents would announce that the Aut~nlico Government bad
been defeated, would stir up the mobs and call them into the
streets . We might then face a Cuban edition of the 1948 Bogota-zo,
in other words, bombings, lootiDgs, burnings and killings that
would gut our capital city. bring us into international disrepute
and lead to a possible seizure of power by the extreme left. Addi-
tional reason to consider this prospect was that the student mur-
derer, Fidel Castro, h ad been sent to Bogota in 1948 by his Soviet
masters and had played an important and sinister role in that
holocaust. While he had been distrusted by Eduardo Chibas and
other lead ers of the Orthodox Party, Castro was prominent among
the wild Orthodox youth element and was a candidate for Con-
gress in the June elections.
After March 10, 1952, I felt it was necessary to limit the tima
and scope of the emergency powers that Howed from the blood-
less revolution. From the outset, I explained that I had no de-
sire to perpetuate myself in office. We prepared the means for a
smooth transition from the extraordinary regime to a normal
democratic one. Article 254 of the Constitutional Law enacted
on April 4th provided for general elections and required the
 39 Stepll Toward Democracy

Cabinet to specify within 60 days the offices to be 6Ued and their

length of tenure.
The Electoral College wns assigned the task of proposing revi-
sions in the Electoral Code and of promulgating regulations
based upon the Code. The impartiality of that 1943 Code could
scarcely be challenged by my opponents since it had governed
the 1944 elections in which my political group was defeated by
the Autenticos under Grau San Martin.
To give greater scope to political activity and to ensure that the
vote of the people would determine the Government, a Constitu-
tional Reform was drafted. This was to be submitted to referen-
dum at the time of the election with the understanding that, if
it should he d efeated, the 1940 Constitution would automatically
be reinstated upon the inauguration of the next President.
These procedures were closely parallel to those we had re.-
sorted to during the transition from the revolutionary regimes
arising out of the overthrow of the Machado Government to the
Administrations elected under the 1940 Constitution. During that
interim period, four electoral codes had been cnacted and three
Censuses carried out so that we would have a complete and ac-
curate roster of eligible voters. Our Revolution summoned the
people three times to vote for a President, Goveroors, Mayors,
Senators and Aldermen, five times for Congressmen and once for
delegates to a Constitutional Convention.
Within the time set by Jaw, the Government specified the elec-
tive offices to be filled. Law #105 of JUDe 2, 1952 defined the
procedures for the election of a President, a Vice President, a
Senate of 54 members, at least a third of wbom must represent
minOrity parties, a House of Representatives with one member
for every 45,000 inhabitants and also Covernors, Mayors and
Aldermen. 1
The E lectoral College submitted a proposed Electoral Code to
tbe Cabinet on schedule. The draft law strengthened our demo-
cratic institutions and, by making split-ticket voting impossible in
many instances, tended to make p arties aDd programs more im-
portant than the personalities of the individual candidates.
The realization of this transition was blocked by tho intolerance
of tbe opposition political organizations. which preferred to ab-
stain from the ejections to admitting the existence of the revoJu-
1 According to the 1\},53 Census, Cuba had over 6 million inhabitants, of
whom 2.870,678 were voters. Voting was compulsory.
 40 The Growth and Decline of the Cuban Republic
tionary government. Because of this intransigent attitude, we
were obliged to move the date of the proposed election forward
to 1954. While the motivation for abstention was the weU-fustiSed
fear by the opposition that it would be defeated at the pons, my
associates and I were determined to do everything possible to
have an electoral contest in which the voters would be free to
vote for the opposition parties as well as for our own.

TIlE MONCADA ASSAULT

The country was at pence; order reigned; the people enjoyed

complete liberty; there seemed to be general support of the
Government. At this time, in midsummer of 1953, the p eople of
Santiago de Cuba were enjoying the carnival and had little
thought of polittcs. In this atmosphere of peace, a sudden, un·
provoked surprise attack on the soldiers of the Moncada Barracks
in the city took place. The assault began in the early hours of
July 26, 1953, a Sunday when the troops were either enjoying the
carnival in the city or sleeping off their revelries.
The attack was Jed by Fidel and Raul Castro and other Com·
munists. It began with the assassination of sick men in their beds
in the hospital clinic adjOining the cllmp. Sentinels and soldiers
sleeping in their beds were also murdered, The troops fought
back, killed a number of their assailants and easily restored com·
plete control over the barracks.
Fidel Castro, the organizer of the attack, did not appear at the
scene of the fighting, Both during, and for several days after, the
murders. which he and his Communist superiors had planned, he
remained hidden in town. When it was safe to do so, he emerged
under the protection of MonSignor Enrique Perez Serantes, Arch·
bishop of Santiago de Cuba.
Orders were given to respect Castro's life. In accordance with
the democratic principles of my Administration, h e was tried in
an ordinary civifian court heCore independent judges, at least ODe
of whom was hostile to the regime.
At the time Castro arrived in Santiago to help plan the opera.
tiOD, eight of the top ranking leaders oC Cuban communism,
among them Lazaro Pena and Joaquin Ordoqui, slipped into
Santiago, Later, at the trial, they alleged that they bad come to
the city to celebrate the birthday oC their leader, Bias Roca. the
General Secretary of the Party. This was a transparent £alsifiea·
 41 Step' Toward Democracy
lion, both because BIM Boca Hved in Havana and because Com-
munist function aries are not sentimental enou~ to take a round
trip of over a thousand miles because of a birthday party. More.
over, the Party had been outlawed and its leaders had either lIed
abroad or were in hiding. Under these circumstances, they would
only have travelled to Santiago de Cuba for a most important
reason. That reason was to plan the attack on the Moncada Bar-
racks.
Castro was sentenced to 15 years in prison. He began to serve
his tenn on the Isle of Pines which, under his dictatorship, has
become the worst hell hole in the Western Hemisphere. Under
my Administration, however, Fidel Castro, as a political prisoner,
was given a p avilion to live in, the use of a jeep with chauHeur.
fuH access to whatever boob he chose to read and complete free~
dom to write whatever he wanted to.
In prison, Castro continued with his monstrous deception. 'Writ~
ing to Dr. Luis Conte Agiiero on December 12. 1953 from prison,
he observed: "Our triumph would have meant the immediate
rise of the Orthodox Party to power ... Speak to Dr. Agra-
monte,2 show him this letter, express to him our loyal senti~
ments .. ," To his Communist associates, Castro sang another
tune. On April 17, 1954, he wrote Melba Hernandez, one of those
who had used cold steel in the Moncada attack:
"Use guile and smUes with everyone. Follow the same tactics
we followed at the trial: defend our point of view without irritat~
iog anyone. Th ere will be more than enough time later to trample
all of the cockroaches together. Accept any help offered, but
remember to trust no onc . . "

RETURN TO THE BALLOT BOXES

The cowardly attack on the Moncada Barracks forced the Gov~

ernrnent to take exceptional measures and to suspend certain
guarantees as prOvided for in the Cuban Constitution. The elec-
tions had to be postponed, but the political parties could carry on
their activities at wiU.
To ensure complete fairness, we invited all the political parties
and factions to discuss the new Electoral Code which would gov~
ern the forth coming Presidential elections of November I, 1954.
A few hours before the polls were opened and at a time when
2 The successor to Chib4s as leader of the Orthodox Party.
 42 The Growth and Decline at the Cuban Republic
all the election boards had been named, Dr. Grau San Martin,
the candidate of the Cuban Revolutionary Party, requested a
postponement of the balIotting. The matter was debated on tele-
vision and radio. The Electoral College decided that Dr. Crau's
complaints were without foundation and it was generally real·
ized that he was concerned with obstructing the democratic proc-
ess for the simple reason that he had no chance of winning.
Grnu withdrew and ordered the candidates of his party to do
likewise. Nevertheless, the people went to the polls in droves. I
was elected President of Cuba for the second lime and, despite
their leader's directive, several Cuhan Revolutionary Party (PRe)
candidates were elected to Congress.
My inauguration in February 1954 as Constitutional President
of Cuba was attended by special envoys from 51 countries.' The
growth of Cuba's international prestige was clearly evident. For
our part, we maintained cordial relations with all the nations of
the world with the exceptiOD of the Communist countries.
At the end of eight years of persecution, four or which were
spent in exile, our second constitutional government began in an
aura of peace and. work. '!be fundamental objective was to carry
out a great program for economic and social development, ODe
which was already under way. I hored that Cuba would continue
to set an example in advanced socia legislation for the Americas.
The opposition was divided into two groups: those who fa-
vored attaining power through peaceful and constitutional means
and those who refused all compromise, abstained from the polls
and were prepared to use conspiracy, assassination. sabotage and
terror to win supreme power for themselves.

AMNESTY

The times were not propitious for an amnesty of all political pris-
oners, but my supporters in Congress and I hoped that an act of
great clemency and generosity which opened the prison doors to
3 These special envoys were from : the Vatican, Fedeml Republic of Ger-
many, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Spain, Finland, F rance, United King-
dom, Greece, Netherlands, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, Norway, Sweden,
SWJtzerland, Portugal, Yugoslavia, Argentina, Bolivia, Braril, Canada, Co-
lombia, Costa Rica, Chile, Ecuador, El Salvador, United States, Guatemala,
H ajU, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Dominican
Republic, Uruguay, Venezuela, Cambodia, NaUooa.li~t China, Egypt, India,
Indonesia, IS1'ael, Japan. Lebanon, Pakistan and Thailand.
 43 Steps Toward Democracy
the terrorists might convince some of them to become normal hu-
man beings. to do something useful for society and to confine
their political opposition fo the channels prescribed by law.
The general amnesty was issued and the Castro brothers, among
others, were freed under it. After loudly announcing his intention
to repeat his treasonable attack on the State, Fidel Castro pro-
ceeded openly to Mexico to prepare there to carry out his pur-
pose.'

CONSULTATIVE COUNCIL

Although my Government had been invested with extraordinary

powers by the fact of revolution, I did not want to exercise the
legislative power without first hearing public opinion. Therefore,
as soon as the Revolution had consolidated its power, I created a
new organism, consisting of outstanding men and women who
represented the manifold activities of the nation. It was called the
Consultative Council and was composed of 80 members and 15
alternates.
Among other powers, it had the right to propose laws, to be
heard on basic matters of government and to intervene in fiscal
matters and international relations through its commissions and
its plenary sessions. All of its proposals, once they had been dis-
cussed and approved. were submitted to the Council of Ministers
for final action. The members of the Counci.l had the untram-
meled right to express their opinions and vote as their consciences
dictated. They enjoyed a protection tantamount to parliamentary
immunity.
The most important organizations of the nation were repre-
sented on the Council by their most rrOminent members. This
included, for example, the Presidents 0 the Associations of Sugar
Mill Owners and of Sugar Planters, the Secretary General of the
Cuban Confederation of Labor (CTC) and of the National Fed-
eration of Sugar Workers ( FNTA ) . the leaders of other federa-
tions and labor unions. agrarian leaders, veterans of the War of
• It is worth Doling th at the presiding judge at Castro·s trial. Manuel Urrutia,
had been so disaffected that be pcnnitted the accused to deliver an inter-
minable harangue, the content of which WIlS r.ure Marxism and the perora-
tion of whicb WilS plllgWrlzed from Adolf Hit er's speech to the court when
accused of treasnn aIter the Bierball Putsch of 1923. Urrutia even rendered
a dissenting opinion stating that the murder of the soldier~ at the Moncada
was a lawful act.
 44 The Growth and Decline of the Cuban Republic
Indepeudence, fanners, economists, landowners, industrialists,
former Ministers. legislators and mayors. No other deliberative
body ever represented the nation as weU.Ci
The Consultative Council was ca1led into session on 168 occa-
sions and there were only ten times when it was unable to meet
because of lack of a quorum. It met weekly in plenary session,
dedicating the rest of its time to the study by its many commis-
sions of the various projects placed before it. The constitutional
principle of not passing on any legislation without at least one re-
port from one of its commissions was strictly observed. Before
acting on its recommendations, the proposed legislation was dis-
cussed in bearings at which interested groups were heard. This
system, which was rigorously adhered to, assured that all inter-
ested groups would be able to state their case and, on occasion,
secure modifications before laws were enacted.'
The Council had four Presidents: Drs. Carlos Saladrigas Zayas,
Gast6n Godoy Loret de Mala, Justo Garda Rayneri and General
of the Armies of Liberation Generoso Campos Marquetti. Each
of these men left the Council in order to form part of the Cabinet.

THE CIVIC DIALOGUES

In the beginning of 1956, efforts were made to bring about an

agreement or fIlodu$ vivendi between the opposition and the
Government. Meetings were organized by the Society of Friends
of the Republic, composed of semi-neutrals and opponents of the
Administration: the Orthodox Party to which Castro belonged, the
Frio faction of the Autenticos, which favored conspiracy and
violence, and the Autlmticos of Grau who favored a solution at
the polls.

IS Of the 115 people on the Consultative Council over 11 period of tlme that
was analyxed, 14 wcre lawyers, 3 farmers, 1 tn archltect, 2 pilots, a banker,
a coffee grow~, 5 sugar cane plantas, 2 businessmen, a midwife, an ec0n-
omist, 2 students. a cattleman. a pharmacist, 9 wgar mm owners, 3n indus-
bialist, -4 engineers, an agricultural extension teacher, 3 politicians, <I doctors
of medici ne, 18 workers and labor leaders, 12 journalist" a teacher, a land.
owner,2 lawyer's aSSistants, 2 sociologil;~, 2 tobacco growers, 2 veternn9 of
the War 01 Independence, 3 former Cabinet Mtniste:s, 14 fonner Congress.
men and 1 former mayor.
II In some aspects, the Consultative Coundl did not replace Congress, nor
was the National Capitol used for its dcliberations. SenatoI9 and Congress.
men continued to draw salaries until the eKfirotJon of their terms of office.
 45 Steps Toward Democracy
These confereoces were called Civ:lc Dialogues. They were
presided over by the eighty-rear-old patrician, Cosme de la Tor-
nente, a Colonel of the War of IndependeDce. No agreement
could be reached because the radicals insisted. os their 6rst condi-
tion, that the Government resign. We did not reject this demand
out of hand, but proposed instead that a Constituent Assembly
with unlimited power be called to give the people the opportu-
nity to decide whether the Government should resign or serve
out its legal term until February 24. 1959. This counterproposal
was rejected by the extremists, possibly because they were intimi-
dated by Castro terrorists, and the discussions came to an end.
It is of some interest that, while Prio was negotiating at these
Civic Dialogues and simulating a desire for peace. his henchmen
made an attack on the Coicuria military camp in the city of
Matanzas.
Despite the failure of the Civic Dialogues, we did everything
in our power to help the opposition use legal and democratic
channels. For example, the National Revolutionary Movement
under Pardo Linda did not have enough registrations to qualify as
a legal party. To encourage lawful oppoSition, Law #1307 of
February 26, 1954 was passed so that it could qualify. However,
when Pardo Llada saw he would not have enough support to win
even a single seat for himself or his followers in the House of Rep-
resentatives, he left for Spain on funds belonging to his party and
then announced that he would return via the United States and
enter the election campaign. Actually, he proceeded from New
York to Venezuela, then appeared suddenly in the Sierra Maestra
and served as Fidel Castro's privileged radio propagandist until
1961. In the latter year, on arriving in Mexico on a mission for his
Government, he "deserted." The Mexican press was unanimously
hostile and labelled him "the Minister of Hate."

ELECTIONS OF NOVEMBER 1958

The elections of November 1958 were held under horribly un-
favorable conditions. With the consistent support of the United
States Government and a dominant sector of the American press,
the Castro movement was gaining strength by leaps and bounds.
The American arms embargo on my Government was generally
interpreted as a decision by Washington to support Castro's drive
for power. Under these conditions, the morally weak, the venal
 46 The Growth and Decline 0/ the Cuban Republic
and the opportunistic supported the bearded outlaw. When the
State Department allowed Casb'o's Communist bands to kidnap
American citizens without making any effective protest, a fur-
ther demoralization of those forces in Cuba which believed in
democracy and decency inevitably occurred.
A campaign of deceit and lies was unleashed by the men of the
Sierra Maestra. Since they were determined to seize power for
themselves with no competitors, it was necessary to their purpose
that the scheduled elections should either not take place or else
be discredited. Law #2 of the Sierra MaestTa imposed the death
penalty on all urban candidates in the election who refused to
withdraw their candidacy. 11tis death sentence could be im-
posed by members of the Rebel Army or by the so-called Castro
militia. It applied to opposition candidates (including the candi-
dates of what had supposedly been Castro's own political group.
the Orthodox Party) as well as to my supporters. This law was
nothing less than a general license to murder any Cuban who be-
lieved in democracy and good government enough to run for pub-
lic office.
Terrorist attacks increased. Coercion rose toward a zenith.
Communications. schools, courthouses and trade union centers
were demolished. Candidates, political leaders, party workers
and others were murdered in their homes or on their way to work.
To give a few examples from hundreds of cases: Nicolas Rivero
Aguero, brother of the Presidential candidate of the pro-govern-
ment forces, and also brother of Rebel leader Luis Conte AgUero,
was assassinated; Felipe Navea. Vice President of the National
Maritime Union, was killed in the presence of his Wife; the
teacher-candidate for Congress, Aoibal Vega Vega. was killed on
his doorstep; and cattleman Rosendo Collazo was murdered at
his ranch in the presence of his wife by a group of outlaws wear-
ing 26th of July annbaods and led by his form er foreman.
In spite of threats, bombings aDd murder. the election took
place on the announced date, November 3, 1958. Had it not been
for acts of violence that sacrificed men, women and children,
voting would have been normal. As it happened, from 72% to
75% of the normal number of voters cast their ballots. Since mu-
nicipal and local officers were also at stake, there was keen inter-
est in the results.
In 1958, under these conditions of intimidation and terror,
54.01$ of the eligible electorate voted. This compares with a
 47 Steps Toward Democracy
votcr turnout of about 60$ in recent Presidential elections in the
United States.

TIlE MYTIl OF TIlE 20,000 CORPSES

The real terrorists were those who threw bombs into police sta-
tions and crowded streetcars and who murdered candidates for
public office in order to destroy all democratic instirutions.
However, the Castro propaganda mill cleverly imputed its own
crimes to its victims. The forces of law and order beca.me the mur-
derers and sadists. These big lies were shrewdly disseminated by
a minority of U.S. publicists who, wittingly or unwittingly, served
the Communist cause with unswerving consistency and consum-
mate guLle.
A few days after he had seized power, Fidel Castro charged
my Government with having killed 20,000 Cubans. Even though
this figure was "patently ridieulous-and every informed person
in Cuba knew it-the tremendous surge of popular enthusiasm
for the new dictator swept over the voices of reason and unques-
tionably accepted Castro s macabre arithmetic." 1
There were many commonsense refutations of this audacious
lie. In the first days of Castro rule, the refugees from my regime
- voluntary expatriates-began to return from the United States.
There were less than two thousand of them. "Cuban jails were
emptied of political prisoners; and the total liberated did :not go
beyond several hundred, all in good condition, hale and weU-
fed ." 8
Moreover, every important leader of the Castro movement,
with the single ex(:eption of Ernesto ( Che) Guevara had at one
time or another been in the hands of the Cuban Police. These
former prisoners of Batista were living refutations of the Castro
propaganda, imputing atrocities and bestial tortures to my re-
gime. The plain and self-evident fact was that all of these former
prisoners were alive, healthy, unmutilated and untortured.
In January 1959, the weekly magazine, Bohemia, publJshed a
list of the supposed victims of the Batista regime. This magazine
was notorious for its fan atical partisanship of Castro and his
movement. Despite its unabashed propaganda, it had flourished
without hindrance in Batista Cuba. After Castro took power, how-
7 Cuban Information Seroice, editor Carlos Todd, No. 130, page 9.
8 Ibid.
 48 Tho Growth and Decline of the Cuban Republic
ever, the editors of Bohemia were driven into exile because they
had the decency to refuse to serve as pliant instruments of Soviet
tyranny.
Bohemid'8 list of victims consisted primarily of saboteurs and
terrorists who were killed in gun battles with the authorities or
else in immediate and passionate reprisal by soldiers and police-
men who were understandably emotional about seeing their
friends and comrades blown to bits. The second largest cate~
gory consisted of innocent bystanders who got killed in these
bombings and gun battles.
The most significant thing about the Bohemia total, which
was generally accepted as accurate at the time, was that it
amounted to slightly over 900 people. Not the 20,000 that Castro
alleged!
Let me compare the fictitious reign of terror of Batista with the
real reign of terror of Fidel Castro. The figures are those com-
piled by Carlos Todd.D
Some 10,717 people had been killed by Castro and his Commu-
nists up to June 1, 1963 as follows:
Executed by order of "Revolutionary Tribunals" 2,897
Executed without any trial whatsoever 4,245
Killed in action against Castro forces 2,962
Missing 613
TOTAL 10,717
By comparison, during the seven years of my second Adminis-
tration, there were no legal executions (because we had no d eath
sentence) nnd the number of Castro supporters and bystanders
killed otherwise is estimated by the hostile source, Boliemkl., at
about 900.
Todd estimated that 965,000 people (over 14$ of the Cuban
population ) had been arrested for political reasons at one time
or another and that 81,706 persons were in prisons, of whom 16.-
120 were in concentration camps and 2,146 in C-2 torture farms.
Over 6.6% of Cuba's population. 449.450 persons, left the is-
land since Castro took power. Of these, 2,7421eft secretly in small
boats and it is estimated that over 600 more were killed in the
attempt.
Of these refugees, 385,000 were in the United States, 42,000
D Ibid.
 49 Steps Toward Democracy
in Latin America, 21,000 in Europe and 1,450 scattered else~
where. An additional 3,401 gained asylum in foreign embassies.
Of these, 3,165 were given safe conduct out of the country, leav~
ing 236 still in the embassies. Castro agents frequently violated
the right of asylum, entered the embassies by force and murdered
the refugees.10
Some 230,000 Cubans on the Island had passports and visa
waivers, but could not get transport. Another 385,000 applied for
passports and visas. Thus, a conservative estimate would be that
1,067,000 Cubans-ahnost a sixth of the total population-had
left the country or were seeking to leave it.
These figures are necessarily incomplete and understatements
because not all the executions, murders, imprisonments and ship~
meots to concentration camps are known. Moreover, the proc-
esses at work are continuous. The mills of death continue to grind
throughout Cuba.
''The whole story of the crimes of the Castro regime will not be
known until Communism is ousted from the Island," Todd writes.
"'Perhaps it will never be known, for many lie dead and buried
without a single record of their demise. But Cuba, the burial
ground of thousands, the prison of millions, will go down in his-
tory as one of the most brutal examples of the bestial, tyrannical
system that is communism." 11
10 Todd's Bgures show that the victims of Castro terror are primarily humhle
people. He breaks down the 10,717 corpses as follows:
Military 3,462 Activists in Catholic ox
Workers 2,677 lay organizations 187
Peasants 2,473 Industrialists 71
Professionals 783 Property owners 63
Students 7ll Foreigners 62.
Small businessmen , 228
11 Ibid.
 6
Pan American Relations

One of the fundamental policies of the new government which

assumed power as a result of the coup d'etat of March 10, 1952
was to refrain scrupulously from intervention in the internal af-
fairs of other nations. Even under conditions of severe internal
emergency, I determined to uphold the right of asylum and to
act in strict accordance with our international agreements and the
dictates of the Constitution. We always interpreted the right of
asylum in a broad and generous fashion, as the diplomatic corps
can attest.
In 1956, the D ominican Government created a delicate situa-
tion for us. In contrast to our policy of non-intervention. the
Dominican dictatorship of General Rafael Leonidas Trujillo had
opened its doors to such Cuban insurrectionaries as Carlos Frio
Socarras and Fidel Castro, allowing them to use the Dominican
Republic as a b ase of operations. General Trujillo sought to jus-
tify this conduct by falsely alleging that the Chief of Sta ff of the
Cuban Army, General Francisco Tabernilla, had supplied arms to
his enemies. Since this prete:d: was not only false but incredible,
the Trujillo government spread the rumor that its hostile poticy
toward Cuba was a reprisal for the unfavorable comments of the
free press of my country concerning the assassination of "Pipi"
Hernandez, a Dominican labor leader, who had been killed in
the city of Havana. I believed this crime was the work of Domin-
 51 Pan American Relatians
iean agents, although diligent investigation by the Cuban police
failed to prove it. J
My Government requested the Organization of American States
to investigate the activities of the Dominican Government against
Cuba, describing them as unjust and arbitrary. The OAS probed
the affair and declared that the Dominican accusations were
completely without foundation.

PANAMA CONFERENCE

In July 1956, the President of Panama invited the Chiefs of State

of the 21 American Republics to a con£erence to celebrate the
l30tb 3Wliversary of the first Pan American meeting in 1826. [ ac-
cepted this invitation. Speaking to the Conference, [ said that our
problem was to consolidate the democratic institutions of the
Western Hemlsphere and that this could best be d one by setting
up a permanent organization, representing all the American
states, which would plan and encourage closer cooperation in
such fields as foreign trade, immigration, education, cultural prog-
ress and social reform. I emphasized that this effort would have
to be based on full mutual respect for the sovereignty of each of
the American Republics.
The Chiefs of State present at the Conference agreed that all of
us were aHected by the same problems and d angers. They con·
sidered that Inter-American economic cooperation to raise living
standards, develop new sources of wealth and employment, im-
prove public h ealth, increase the proportion of home OWDers
and advance wage scales would serve as an effective instrument
in the struggle against Communist totalitarianism. Progress to-
ward higher living standards, increasing output and new avenues

1 The comments of Ju tes Dubois in his laudatOIY and uncritical biography,

Fidel Castro (DobbS-Merrill, Indianapolis, 1959) are worth citing since his
is the testimony of a hostile witness. He refers to my "feud" with Trujillo
(p. 127) and adds that :l force of 120 Cuban exiles, many of whom bad
been recruited by agents of Carlos Prio, wt'TC flown into t he Dominican
capital and given intensive military training by om~rs of Trujillo's army
ond air force for the inVllslon of Cuba. Dubois adds: '·It was reported--al_
though defini ti ve confirm ation of this could never bo obtained--that Tru-
jillo wanted Gerald Lester Mmphy, au Am ~rican pilot from E ugene, Ore-
gon, to bomb Havana; when Murphy refused ho was fed to the sharks in
the Caribbean Sea." ( po 147)
 52 Tho Crowth and Declil16 of the Cuban Republic
of opporhlnity for all the people of the Americas was necessary
both to repel the Soviet attack and as a good in itself.
There was a good deal of sentiment, as there generally is at
such inter·American gatherings, in favor of U.S, loans and grants
as a means of bringing Latin America out of her economic
difficulties. My view was that more eouId be achieved by trade
and tariff agreements, measures to control the wild fluctuations
of the prices of primary products and other devices of this sort.
In the end, more would be achieved by these indirect means
since they would create an environment in which our peoples
could advance economically by their own efforts. ingenuity and
bard work.
Because of my concern as a man of the Americas, I decided to
take advantage of the excellent opportunity provided by this top-
level conference and try to alert my fellow citizeru of the West-
ern Hemisphere concerning the need for close cooperation to
preserve democratic institutions in the Americas. I used a press
conference as the vehicle for this. 'What I said there has subse-
quently assumed importance in the light of world developments.
Hence, I will reiterate the most important portions of my state-
ment:
-whether we like it or not, our way of life is in danger and it
would be folly to blind ourselves to realities. Certainly, facing
the issue of iDteroational communism is disagreeable for all of
us, because it involves recognition of the inSltration that has 0c-
curred among our peoples. Perhaps, for this reason, we are in-
clined to try to put olI until tomorrow the battle against this for-
midable threat. The moment has come, however, in which we
must face this problem . . . Cuba believes that the quicker we
do so and the sooner we take the n~essn.ry steps to avert the im-
pending catastrophe, the better it will be for the survival of all
the free nations. We can neither avoid nor evade the battle. Nor
can we remain apathetiC, for history teaches us that the apathy of
its intended victims has been one of the main weapons of com-
munism. The men of Moscow have always encouraged apathy
among the peoples they menace and in public opinion, for they
know that an apathetic people is an easy prey . . . Those of us
who have the privilege and the heavy duty of governing must
find means to eliminate poverty and misery, for it is on these
evils that totalitarian systems, alien to our traditions aod national
character, thrive.
 53 Pan American Relations
"'Let me say literally that, in the absence of open war, it is
hard to convince othel's of the full extent of the danger facing us.
Yet the dangers of cold war are equally real and deadly ...
Whether we choose to believe it or not, the fa ct is that interna-
tional communism has infiltrated key areas in the societies of
our respective countries . . . Communism has many fa ces and
uses many disguises. Its agents can be charming individuals to-
day in order to become e;I(ecutioners tomorrow. Their real objec-
tives never change." 2

THE DECLARATION OF PANAMA.

At a solemn session of the Conference, the Declaration of Presi-

dents was Signed. This is n document of great historic significance,
for it states cardinal principles on which the political institutions
of the New World partially rest. On this occasion, I indicated
that closer inter·American organization should be based on a just
social and economic order.
On the economic side, I urged that inter-American credit
institutions concentrate on helping the American Republics (par-
ticularly the underdeveloped ones) to speed up the develop-
ment of their own matel'ial resources . 'While covenants and inter·
national agreements would help, the chief impetus could not
COale from outside. It was the responsibility of the peoples of the
Americas to raise their own living standards and mobilize their
own productive resources . I added that our peoples love their
freedom. They have no desire for territorial expansion and they
will not allow others to interfere, directly or indirectly, with their
sovereignty.
These ideas, I thought, should help unite us and create closer
ties in the struggle against Marxism. They could also contribute
to creating a solid economic and social struch.J.re which would
prOVide a durable bulwark against the attacks of demagogues
and Communists.
To achieve these goals. we would have to encourage the in-
vesbnent of private and public capital, to correct major disequi-
2 Unfortunately, this warni:cg was not sufficiently heeded. The dauger of
Communist penetration was Ullderestimah.:d and, a! a resuIt, the enemy to-
da y works openly in the Americas with C ub:!. as its bastion in the Wcstcrn
Hemisphere. And the person whose imngo was presented to the world as
"charming" now has shown his troe faca II.S the executioner of his people.
 54 The Growth and Decline of tfw Cuban Republic
libria in international trade, to lead capital into socially produc-
tive channels, to eliminate double tax:ation on foreign investment,
to adopt sound monetary and tariff systems and not to neglect
conservation of our resources. I observed that anti-communism
by itself is not a program. Rather. the Americas needed a dy-
namic plan to serve the people, to assure progress and social
justice and to foster economic cooperation within the Hemi-
sphere. AU this must be based on general respect for the estalr
lished governments of the Americas and on equal treatment of
the large and the small.
I pointed out that the struggle against communism is complex
and that it is D Ot enough merely to achieve domestic prosperity.s
In referring to the Treaty of Mutual Assistance of Rio de Janeiro.
which condemns aggression against any American state, I again
stressed the menace of oommunism.4 I prayed that the D eclara-
tion we had just Signed would be a guide for the future and, to
quote Bolivar, "'Dot mere advice," ~

PRACTICAL :MEASURES

As a result of the Panama Conference, a commission of special

representatives of the American Chiefs of State was created to
propose concrete plans for economic, social and technical coop-
eration within the Pan American framework. At the Rio de
Janeiro meeting of the Ministers of Finance. the Cuban delega-
tion had expressed interest in achieving results in such basic
areas as economic development, commerce, prices and markets,
fis cal refonn and technical assistance. At that time, our delega-
tion had introduced a motion for an Inter-American Economic
Conference to study creation of a special fin ancial institution.
This would be "an effective instrument to promote employment
and advancing standards of living for the working class, to
! Cuba is an example. AltMugh It enjoyed unprecedented. prosperity and
spleDdid social welfare institutions ill 1957, its democratic regime fell vic-
tim to a vast Communist conspiracy.
4. Which treaty Castro repudiated In August 1960 for the original reason that
"his" Revolution had Dot signed it!
G In many articles ami editorials In the chief Cuban newspapers, favorable
comment WIlS made on these economic theses and the impression they made
on President Eisenhower .nd other Chiefs of State. Warm comments were
made in El Mundo, Alerta, Diorio de 16 !farina and Avat1C6 by such dis-
tinguished writers p,s Ram6n Vasconcelos und Cast6n Buquero.
 55 Pan American Relations

stabilize prices and expand markets, to devise noons for the

disposal of swpluses and, in fact. to establish a system of interna-
tional financing within the American economic system .... This mo-
tion was approved by the Rio de Janeiro meeting. At the Special
Conference held in Chile in February 1955, implementation of
this previous Cuhan motion was debated.
Following the Panama meeting of 1956, another Inter-American
Economic Conference was held in Buenos Aires in October 1957.
Here three moUoos were proposed by Cuba for the creation of
suitable H emisphere instruments for the economic and social
development of the Americas.' These motions were approved.
AI; a result of our Cuban initiative. the International Finance
Corporation (IFC) was established with a capital of $100,000,-
000. It became an institution which was primarily concerned with
making investments to finance private enterprise in government-
to-government lending. In fact, its modus operandi was similar
to that of the Bank for Economic and Social Development which
we had organized in Cuba. When the Charter of the IFC was
presented formally, Cuba was accorded by unanimous vote the
honor of being the first to sign as a recognition of our persevering
efforts to bring it to life.
"These were: <a) to malce technical cooperation II regular and continuous
activity; (b ) 10 study inflationary pressures, currency problems and balance
of payments d1seqwlibrhl., and (c ) to estimale the io...eslment needs of the
AmericaD RepubUcs and the means of meeting these annual needs.
 7
Maritime and Other Agreements

With the expansion of Cuban diplomatic activity, we proceeded

to reorganize the Ministry of Foreign AHairs and the Foreign
Service. Law #1619 of August 14. 1954 coordinated operations,
established badly needed technical departments and set up spe-
cialized groups to advise on foreign policy. In addition, urgently
needed increases in the pay and allowance of diplomatic person-
nel were granted.
Cuba participated in numerous international conferences held
by the United. Nations and the Organization of American States.
The Charter of the OAS had been .rigned in Bogota in 1948
in the midst of the tragic riots provoked by agitators in the serv-
ice of international communism (among whom were Fidel Castro
and a few other Cubans who would later inundate their country
with blood and betray it to a foreign power). My Covernment
ratified this Charter on August 8, 1952.
Cuba participated in the Atomic Energy Conference in Geneva.
Her delegation expressed hope that the peoples of the world
would agree on the peaceful use of this vast force for the benefit
of mankind.

THE RICHES OF TIlE SEA

AU tllat related to the maritime continental shelf, whether under

international or territorial waters, received my special attention.
I was concerned with the improvement of fishing and the <:00-
 57 Maritim e and OthCf' Agreements
servation of our live oceanic resources. In 1951, the year before
I took power, the International Bank in its Report on Cuba had
observed that, despite Cuba's favorable situation from the stand~
point of fisheries, she spent 48 million dollars a year importing
flsh and her "flshing industry is small and unorganized." 1
Accordingly, the BANFAIC:! had a Hoating refrigerator of half
a million pounds capacity constructed as Ii pilot operation in
1953. TIle {oHowing year the National Fishing Institute, which
was to do so much to improve fishing methods, was established
by Law # 1891. In Havana. we built a special fishing terminaF
that could handle 30 tons of fish every eight.hour shiH and that
had refrigerated storage space for a million pounds of fish.
Law # 1948 of January 27, 1955 proclaimed the waters between
the coast and the Cuban keys to be an inner sea. Cuhan jurisdic~'
tion was established there and in adjacent waters. As for the ex~
ploitation of fish in demersal waters, we urged that all interested
countries formulate, sign and collectively enforce international
treaties for the conservation of marine resources . This principle
was applied to shrimp fi shing in our relations with the United
States.

PAYMENT COVENANTS

\-Ve were determined to open and secure export markets for our
industry and to diverSify production by granting guarantees for
the development of new enterprises and industries. At the same-
time, we wished to avoid creating hothouse industries which
could not survive without continuous government subsidy. These
considerations motivated our approach to the problems of tariff
refonn. In our economic policies in the international sphere, our
aims were to maintain and expand markets, to further the inter~
nal economic development of Cuba and to be able to import our
needs at reasonable prices.
Accordingly, we concluded treaties and commercial payment
agreements which granted advantages to e:a:porters and at the
same time made it possible for Cuban products to compete-
abroad. We were detennined to maintain a basically free enter~
prise economy with safeguards and controls against abuse.
t Intemational Bank for RecollStructiQD and Development, Report on cub
(Trudow Report ), Baltimore, 1951, JOhn.l HopkiIui Press, p. 914,
2 Banco de Fomfmlo Agricola 6 Industrial de Cuba.
 58 The Growth and Decline of the CubQn Republic

THE BATI'LE FOR MARKETS

Difficult and often protracted negotiations at the United Nations

headquarters, in the OAS and in such subsidiary organizations as
the F AO, the ECLA and others brought beneficial results to
Cuba in the Belds of trade and national economy.
Despite surpluses which hung over world markets, we suc-
ceeded in maintaining our traditional markets. We used. the
trade agreement impJement to expand our international inter-
course and gain more favorable terms for Cuba. We succeeded in
expanding tobacco exports and made sure that our tariff readjust-
ments did not increase the cost of essential foods to the consumer.
Within the General Agreement on T.rade and Tariffs (CArr),
we worked to increase income and employment levels. We en-
couraged bilateral tariff negotiations to protect our rapidly in-
creasing family of new industries.

RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES

In 1954, my Government initiated talks with Washington to Bnd

an equitable solution to the problem of trade imbalance to the
disadvantage of Cuba. Trade statistics showed that Cuba's con-
cessions to the United States, particularly in respect to sugar,
were not balanced by compensatory advantages. During the pe-
riod 1950-54, 75% of our imports had come from the United
States and it was vitally important to us that our exports to that
country increase correspondingly. We were interested in agree-
ments which would assure the export position of Cuba in the
American market both in regard to sugar and other commodities.
With rapidly increasing population and the pressing need for
greater employment, Cuba had to develop her economy at a swift
tempo, progressively industriaHzing and diversifying her agricul-
ture.
To raise the economic level of the country, we initiated nego-
tiations for a treaty to eliminate the double t3J[ation imposed
upon American companies investing abroad. Thus, the £low of
American capital to Cuba would be stimulated, we boped,
through the prospect of greater net income.
In these varied negotiations, we secured agreements which re-
vised tariff schedules in our favor, assisted important national in-
 59 Maritime and Other Agreements
dustries and thus enabled them to increase output and employ.
ment.

TRADE EXPANSION

\Ve were determined to do our utmost to stimulate trade with rul

countries except those under Communist domination. The first
step was to reopen the Legation in Tokyo after the ratification of
our peace treaty with Japan on July 25, 1952 and the second to
create consular agencies in India, Iran, Ceylon, Japan (whose
Legation was later elevated to the rank of Embassy), Egypt, Is·
rael and Lebanon.
My Government concluded a Treaty on Commerce and Navi·
gation with the Federal Republic of Germany and commercial
agreements with Austria, Chile, Denmark, Spain, the United King·
dom, Israel, Iceland, Peru, Sweden, Switzerland and Japan.
In addition, Cuba showed her earnest desire to further interno.·
tional economic cooperation by signing a variety of international
treaties, conventions, pacts, covenants and instruments. a In this as

8 These International fns!1:um ents included: Ule basic agreement for the pro.
vision of technicalnssistanco to the United Nations of June 1952 and two
supplementary agreements Signed the same year;
the Con\-ention on Road Transport (Aogust6,l952);
the Convention for the S ~urity of Human Life on the High Seas (JUDe
7th, 1954);
Covenant for the PrcveDtion of the Crime of Genocide (Da:ember 9,
HISJ);
Convention On the Political Ri ghl~ of Women (March 31, 1953);
Protocol for the Regulation and Limitation o£ the Cultivation of the
Poppy, Internntlonal Traffie in and Use of Opium (March 31,1953);
By-laws of the Internationa l Agency for Atomic E nergy (November 2.0,
1956 ) ;
Covenant for the Protoc tion of Works of Art in tIle Event of Armed Con·
fiiet (:May 14, 1954);
CoveDant on jndu~trial and intellectual property rights, signed with
France (July 30, 1952 ) a nd with the F edera l Republic of Gennany
(Ja nuary 22, 1954 );
Universnl CQnvention on authors' rights (June 8, 1056) and an iuter_
American "'Dvenant on the same (November 29, 1955);
an Inter-American agreement on radio communication5 ( July 25,
HIS2: ) ;
International Convention on Tcleoonununications (December 22,1952);
Universal Postlll Convention (November 26,1952);
 60 The Growth and Decline of the Cuban Republic
in other matters, our purpose was both to increase the welfare of
the Cuban people and to make a Cuban contribution to interna-
tional understanding.
Ai:r Carrie:{" Covenant! with the United Stater, Spain, the United King-
dom IUId Mexico;
Passport and visa agreements with Denmark, Sweden and Belgium.
Among the many international instruments signed prior to MaTCh 10, 1952
and l atilied by my administration, the most important were the Charter of
the Organlzation of American States, the Treaty of Peace with Japan and
the International Sugar Agreement.
We also ratl6ed agreements with the United States on teclmkal and 000-
DOmic assistance which were subuQuenUy abrogated by Washington be-
cause of the homle attitude of the Castro dictatorship.
 8
Trade Unions and Labor Legislation

The Revolution of the 4th o( September 1933 marked the begin-

ning of a quarter of a century of continuous social progress in
which the role of the labor movement in Cuba waslrogressively
strengthened. Thanks to the measures adopted an the policies
pursued during this era, Cuban labor legislation became one of
the most advanced in the world and the Cuban trade union
movement one of the strongest and most independent in the
Americas.
This proud record of social advance during the two periods in
which I bore the rrimary responsibility for the government of
Cuba is a matter 0 readily ascertainable record. However, under
the influence of Communist propaganda. the West has been
propagandized into believing the contrary-namely, that my ad-
ministrations were reactionary in character and opposed to the
interests of tlle working people. This propaganda has gained cur-
rency and even authOrity by constant repetition. It has been in-
sidiously put into the mouths of ultra-liberals and of more or less
innocent dupes of world communism, so that today the big lie is
accepted as the literal truth and its illegitimate origin is entirely
forgotten. This serves to show that, when those who form public
opinion forget that they have the duty to investigate facts inde-
pendently, free institutions are in peril.
In view of this situation, 1 should like to quote a few American
authorities on the condition of labor in Batista Cuba. 1 have
chosen those who cannot by any stretch of the imagination be
 62 The Growth alld Decline of the Cuban Republic
1abelled "reactionary." Writing in 1954. Ernst Schwartz, Assistant
Secretary of the Inter~American Regional Organization and Exec-
utive Secretary. COmmittee on LaUn American Affairs, CIO,
pOinted out that the Cuban Confederation of Labor (eTC)
", .. has enabled the Cuban workers to set an example to oth~
ers of what can be achieved by lahor unity and strength. Wages
are far above those paid in many other parts of the Caribbean or,
for that matter, Latin America. In addition, the eight.bour work-
ing day fonns the basis for everyone of the collective contract<;
concluded by the CTC's affiliated organizations. Modern types of
social protection and insurance are provided in laws, public
statutes, or union contracts; while funds maintained and ad-
ministered in common by labor, employers, and the authorities
prOvide adequate means to put them into practice. nle sugar
workers union alone, to cite only one example, disposes of such,
a fund in the amount of half a billion dollars, and its insurance
covers medical attention, sickness, and accidents during and out
of work. The eTC, moreover, has taken up a place of full re-
sponsibility within the Cuban community as a whole, and at pres-
ent develops its own economic program to compensate for the
seasonal nabue of employment and production in the sugar in-
dustry. Today, the Confederation counts more than a million
members-with its 500,000 sugar workers constituting the most
powerful of the thirty-five national federations afEiliatea with and
representing every branch of indusoy and agriculture on the is-
land. The Confederation has drawn every fifth Cuban into its
ranks and has thus obtained a much higher numerical degree of
organization in proportion to population than, for example, the
much larger movement in the United States." 1
Commenting On the labor provisions of the Cuban Constitu-
tion of 1940, MacCaHey and Barnett point out in a recent book
that they incorporated much legislation which had already been
enacted during 1933-1940. The authors add:
''The right to work was declared to be 'an inalienable right of
the individual' and the maintenance of full employment a
national responSibility. Workers were guaranteed a mJnimum
daily wage; fair payment for riecework. to be made only in le-
gal tender; a maximum day 0 8 hours and a week of 44 hours;
1 Ernst Schwarz, "Some Observations on Labor Organization in the Can"b-
bean," The Caribbean: i ~ Ecanomy, edited by A.. Curtis Wilgus, Univer-
sity of Florida Press, CaiXlesville, 1954, p. 167.
 63 Trade Unions and Labor Legiskttion
and a month of annual paid vacation. Additional provisions lim-
ited the work to be required of minors and women. Social secu-
rity and protection against disability, old age and unemploy-
ment were guaranteed. Workers were granted the right to
organize and to strike," 2
Dr. Aureliano Sanchez Arango, the former Minister of Educa-
tion in the Prio administration and a man who has been inveter-
ately hostile to me, pointed out that, far from being a back-
ward and exploited country, Cuba, during the last year of my
administration, enjoyed a living standard "superior to that of the
Soviet Union itself," 3 Dr. Jose Alvarez Diaz, another fonner mem-
ber of Prio's Cabinet, pointed out that Cuba "had a standard of
living higher than almost all the American Republics, a large part
of the European continent, all the republics of Mrica, Asia and in
Oceania only New Zealand and Australia had a higher income."
Finally, Dr. Felipe Pazos, who was a covert supporter of the Cas-
tro movement under my Administration and was briefly Presi-
dent of the National Bank of Cuba under the Communist re-
gime, echoed the same theme as former Finance Minister Alvarez
Diaz, adding that the urban workers enjoyed higher living
standards "than the figures for average per capita income re-
flect . . ." t
In the sphere of labor legislation, some of the salient accom-
plishments of Cuban governments during the quarter century
between the government of Machado and the slave state of Cas-
tro were:
(1) Creation of a Ministry of Labor.
(2) The Nationality of Labor law, which required that in every
enterprise at least 50% of the employees and workers be Cubans
by birth.
(3) Establishment of a maximum work day of eight hours.
(4) Reorganization and strengthening of the Workmen's Com-
pensation Law.
(5) Creation of a National Minimum Wage Commission.
(6) Legislation guaranteeing collective bargaining, defining

Wyatt MacGaffey and Clifford R. Barnett, Cuba: its People, Its Society, its
.\I
CwttJre, a volume in the Sutvey of World Culture series, HRAF Press, New
Haven, 1962, p. 108.
S Quoted in Daniel James, Cuba: the First Soviet Satellite ill the Americas,
Avon, New York, 1961, p. 22.
t Ibid., p. 21.
 64 The Growth and Decline of the Cuban Republic
fair labor bargaining practices and protecting workers against ar~
bitrary and unjust dismissal.
(7) Legislation regulating and protecting trade unions.
(8) Establishment of the National Commission for Social Co~
-operation.
(9) Legislation stipulating paid vacations based on ODe month
yearly for every 11 years of service and guaranteeing paid sick
leave.
(10) Protection of and insurance for female workers.
(11) Legal guarantee of the right to srrike.
(12) Establishment of public employment offices.
(13) Protective legislation for juvenile workers,li
Our guiding principle was to ensure that labor should partie-
jpate proportionately in all increases in the value of production
I believe that the human factor is paramount in economics.
The social gains of the revolution of September 4, 1933 were
'Subsequently absorbed, consolidated and, in some instances,
strengthened by the 1940 Constitution.

SOCIAL SECURITY

Law #781 of December 28, 1934 was amplified as to scope by

the law of December 28, 1937, which brought into being a com-
prehensive insurance system to cover the maternity costs of fe-
male workers and of male workers' wives. This system was based
on very small contributions by workers and employers. Six months
after the establishment of the Central Board of Health and Mater-
nity, income from these contributions was almost $10,000,000.
With these funds available, we were able to start immediate
construction of a large maternity hospital in Havana with a ca-
pacity for 250 expectant mothers and another in Camaguey with
~ The corresponding legal instruments were: (1) Office of the Secretary, De-
cree #2142, October 13, 1933. (2) Nationalization decree, #2583, No-
vember 8, 1933. (3) Eight-hour day law, #1693, September 19, 1933.
(4) Workmen's Compensation decree, #223, January 31,1935. (5) Mini-
mum Wage Law, #727, November 30, 1934. (6) Collective Pacts, Law
#446, August 24, 1934, and as implementation decree #2605, April 13,
1938. (7) Trade Unions, Decree #2605, April 13, 1938. (8) Social Co-
operation, decree #827, March 13, 1943. (9) Paid Vacations Law, #40,
March 22,1935. (10) Workers' Maternity, Law of December 15, 1937.
(11) Strikes, Law #3, February 8,1934, (12) Employment Offices, Law
#148, May 7,1935 and (13) Child Labor, law #647, October 31,1947.
 65 Trade Unions and Labor Legislation
beds for 60. By the end of my term, over 100,000 mothers, either
female workers or workers' wives, had received benefits from
this project.
My administration worked assiduously and continuously to set
up a comprehensive system of social security and retirement
funds. In my first term, we created the retirement funds for
newspapermen, for bank employees and for sugar workers. This
last covered half a million Cubans who worked in all stages of the
cultivation, transportation and refining of sugar. We also set up a
retirement fund for the medical profession."
In my second period in the presidential office, we enacted re-
tirement laws for brewery worlCers, for workers in livestock agri-
culture, for construction workers, for chauffeurs and taxicab
drivers and for workers in the tannery and shoe making indus-
try. We established social security systems for nurses, stenog-
raphers, agricultural engineers, public school teachers, private
school teachers, agricultural extension teachers and foresters,
doctors of science, philosophy and letters and, in addition, gov-
ernors, mayors and aldermen.7
No less than 50 laws were promulgated between 1952 and
1958 to reorganize or reform the various retirement and social
security funds, consolidate their financial operations and ensure
that their beneficiaries received the pensions and annuities to
which they were entitled. This was particularly necessary in
those instances where the funds had been the target of frauds
and embezzlement perpetrated during the Aub~ntico adminis-
trations of Grau San Martin and Frio Socarras.
Supplementary legislation served to strengthen these funds, pro-
6 Journalists, law #172, August 23, 1935, and Social Security, law #1151,
October 27, 1935. Bank employees, Law of September 7, 1938. Sugar
Workers, Law #20, 1'.Iarch 21, 1941; amplified by Executive Dccree
#3383, November 16, 1943, and consolidated into the social security sys-
tem by law # 1159, January 25, 1955. Medical Profession, Law #2, Febru-
ary 20, 1943.
7 Brewery workers, law #710, February 27, 1953. Cattle industry, Law
#1634, August l4, 1954. Construction workers, Law #1538, July 27, 1954.
Chauffeurs and cab drivers, Law #8, October 7,1957. Shoe worken, Law
#1835, December 3, 1954. Social security funds for: Nurses, Law #464,
October 14, 1954. Stenographers, Law #1557. August 4,1954. Agricultural
Engineers, Law #2114, January 27, 1955. Public school teacners, Law
#10, December 21, 1955. Agricultural extension teachers and foresters,
Law #2132, January 27, 1955. Doctors in science and law, Law #2092,
sarno date. Governors, Law #14, December 10, 1956.
 66 The Growth and Decline of the Cuban Republic
vide guarantees against default and give financial solidity to the
several social security systems. Thus, Law #2061 of April 27,
1955, created the National Fund for Social Security to give
greater solvency to the system. Simultaneously, it provided for
the establishment of a governmental commission to prepare the
necessary draft legislation for the creation of a State Bank for So-
cial Security.
In one of the last years of our administration, 21 of these funds
collected $67,975,404 as against $56,637,851 in 1955. The total
income of the retirement and social security funds was $99,004,-
036. Deducting payment of benefits and administrative costs,
there was a net increase of reserves and capital surplus in
that year of $24,870,103. During the period 1952-1955, the in-
crement to reserves and capital surplus was $66,139,723 as
against total assets of $212,196,318. Because of the irregulari-
ties during previous regimes to which I have already alluded,
the funds owed the state $61,806,101 in 1955.

LABOR ORGANIZATION

As a result of the revolution of September 4, 1933, workers were

absolutely free to organize unions and employers to organize
federations. The Confederation of Cuban Workers (GTC) was
legally recognized and endorsed by the Government after its
inauguration in 1940. The reason for this recognition was that
the erc embraced the overwhelming majority of the organized
workers of Cuba.
Our social policy was to strive to bring the interests of capital
and labor into harmony, to combat unemployment, attempt to se-
cure industrial stability and uninterrupted production operations
and thus contribute to raising the living standards of the working
people of Cuba.
Every demand for wage increases was given immediate at-
tention. The role of Government was to reconcile considera-
tions of social justice with financial realities.
W'hen we considered it beneficial to the domestic economy
and to national progress, we decreed wage increases. These in-
cluded two general raises of 10% and 20%, two special increases in
the sugar industry, the first for 25% and the second for 50%, and
special increases in the cases of the Hershey Railroad and the
Guantanamo and Western. The wages of nurses, waiters, drug-
 67 Trade Uniol1.J alld Labor Legislation
store employees, telephone workers, textile workers and other
groups were advanced and there was a wage increase in the
printing industry-all as a result of government action.
By fostering labor organization and introducing protective
legislation, the 4th of September Revolution and the 1940-44 ad-
ministration, which consolidated its gains, brought about a con-
tinuous, substantial and gratifying improvement in the working
and living conditions of Cuban labor. hotection of collective
bargaining and fostering of mediation developed a cooperative
association between workers and employers, reducing friction
between the two classes to a minimum.
By the end of 1958, 33 industrial federations and 2,490 labor
union locals were affiliated to the Confederation of Cuban
Workers and the Employers' Federation of Cuba had 11 national
federations and 2151oca1 ones. In Cuba, 1,500,000 workers. in a
total population of 6,500,000 were organized in union$-()ver
23% of the total. By contrast, in the United States in 1960, union-
ized labor constituted 17,400,000 Workers-only 21.4%of the to-
tal labor force and less than 10% of the total population:'l
During my second Administration, I worked to extend coIIec-
tive agreements, as they had proved to be an excellent instru-
ment for forestalling and resolving social conHicts. These labor
agreements had the force of law and violation of them by ei-
ther party was punished accordingly. At the close of 1958, some
7.638 collective agreements were in effect in the province of
Havana alone. There was Dot a single industrial area of signifi-
cance where collective agreements failed to play an important
role. The number of these pacts tripled between 1944, the year
which marked the end of my first period as President, and 1958,
the last year of my second term in that office.

'WAGE POLICIES

Our policy was to increase wages and revise mmlmum wage

scales upward with the economic development of the country
and to the extent th at business conditions permitted. In Febru-
ary 15, 1955, we increased basic pay to $85 a mouth in Creater
Havana, to $SO in other urban zoncs and to $75 in rurn1 areas.
These were merely minimum wages and many collective con-
s Figures on union organization in the United States from the New York
Tlm os, July 9, 1961.
 68 The Growth and Decline of the Cuban Republic
tracts in industry, commerce and agriculture provided for con·
siderably higher pay scales. Prior to this, the minimum wages in
force had been those established in 1944, during my first adminis-
tration-$60 for urban and $48 for agricultural workers.
While I was President, Cuhan wages were the highest in Latin
America. This was recognized by the workers themselves and
was a cause for proud boasts by their trade union organizations.
The Cuban Institute for the Stabilization of Sugar published the
follOWing revealing comparison of international wage rates in
1958, expressed in dollars:

DAILY WAGES IN 1958 (U.S. Doll",,)

Agricultural Industrial
1. Canada 7.18 1. United States 16.80
2. New Zealand 6.72 2. Canada 11.73
3. Australia 6.61 3. Sweden 8.10
4. United States 6.80 4. Switzerland 8.00
5. Sweden 5.47 5. New Zealand 6.72
6, Norway 4.38 6. Denmark 6.46
7. CUBA 3.00 7. Norway 6.10
8. Fed. Rep. Germany 2.57 8. CUBA 6.00
9. Ireland 2.25 9. Australia 5.82
10. Denmark 2.03 10. United Kingdom 5.75
11. Belgium 1.56 11. Belgium 4.72
12. France 1.32 12. Fed. Rep. Germany 4.13
13. Japan .90 13. France 3.26

'These figures show that the Cuban agricultural worker was bet.
ter paid than his German or Irish counterpart, earned more than
twice as much as the French rural worker and more than three
times as much as the Japanese. The Cuban urban worker earned
higher hourly pay than his fellow worker in England, Germany or
France.
These facts would not prevent writers sympathetic to Commu-
nism, such as the late Professor C. Wright Mills of Columbia Uni-
versity, from describing how the workers of Cuba were miserably
exploited and how they "squatted on the edge of the road . . .
in filthy huts," 9
Professor Mills spent three or four days in Castro Cuba, spoke
\I C. Wright Mills, Liden, Yankee!, McGraw-Hill, New York, 1960, pp. 13-14.
 69 Trade Unions and Labor Legi8lation
and understood hardly any Spanish and was subjected to continu~
ous propaganda by Fidel Castro and his Communist henchmen.
The thought that he was inadequately equipped either to judge
the Cuban situation, or to use it as a pretext for writing an hysteri-
cal hymn of hate against his country and its policies, apparently
did not occur to the Professor.
To foster the development of unionism, my administration eu-
acted legislation which insured payment of union dues by having
them automatically deducted from workers' payrolls. The op-
position assailed this measure. However, when it came to power
by the ballot in 1944, the AutenticQ Party retained the compul-
sory check-off. The funds deducted from workers' pay enve-
lopes, however, were diverted, under Grau San Martin and Prio
Socarras, for repression of labor organizations, spying on workers'
activities and persecution of the workers themselves.

THE EIGHT-HOUR DAY

Establishment of the eight-hour day, which was at the time one

of the most cherished goals of the workers everywhere, was
achieved by Cuba as one of the fruits of the Revolution of Septem-
ber 4, 1933. This was followed by the introduction of the "English
week"-44 hours work with pay for 48 hours.
Following the practice of the more progressive private insti-
tutions, we introduced the five-day week for government em-
ployees by closing on Saturday (Law #5 of October 27, 1955).
Wherever it was economically pOSSible, we encouraged the 6-by-8
formula, that is to say, a 6-hour work day with pay for 8 hours.

PAID VACATIONS

We introduced paid vacations as a matter of law in 1935. This

created 300,000 jobs, increasing the labor force of around 1,335,-
000 by 23%. However, in the last analysis, sharing the work does
not benefit labor or the nation. The fundamental solution is to
create and maintain a climate for vigorous economic advance.
Social welfare is not a substitute for production and growth.
Rather it is a value which can be realized only to the extent that
the nation succeeds in creating material wealth.
 10 The Growth and Decline of the Cuban Republic

TBE INTER.RUPTED PAlH

After March 1952, I concentrated on removing the impediments

to a healthy economic growth. It was clear that, if the basic
conditions were created for sound and diversified private invest-
ment in Cuba, both seasonal and chronic unemployment would
rapidly approach the vanishing point.
To this end, Il continuing, inflationary increase in wages had to
be braked and brought to a standstill. To do this successfully, I
believed it was necessary that the eHorts of all parties concerned
be directed toward the same national goals Bnd that the adjust-
ments occur in a climate of peace, mutual understanding and
justice. My presence at the head of the govenunent fortunately
made this smooth adjustment possible. The labor movement and
the workers of Cuba knew that I would not sacrifice the social
gains of the Revolution to expediency nor would I under any cir-
cumstances tamper with the rights which the workers had won
under my previous administration, particularly the right to strike
and the freedom of the trade unions. This was recognized by
the Cuban Confederation of Workers itself.lo

THE MYTH OF :MASS UNEMPLOYMENT

Communist propaganda claimed that an enomlOUS army of un-

employed weighed like a millstone on the Cuban economy during
my second Administration. This contention was as mendacious
and deliberately deceptive as the allegation that 20,000 persons
had been murdered during the Cuban civil struggle of 1956-1958.
The f(let is that, as a result of our constructive economic policies
and developm ent programs, Cuba had the lowest percentage of
unemployment in all Latin America during my second Adminis-
tration.
The facts about Cuban unemploym ent were clearly estab-
lished as a result of a series of statistical studies conducted by
technicians under the directions of the U.S. Bureau of the Census
and the International Labor Office. 'I1tis work was completed in
March 1958. Jt showed that the potentinl working population of
Cuba was 2,204,000 persons as compared with 2,059,659 re-
10 Manifesto of the CTC in Exile entitled "To tbe Public Opinion of Mexico
and America."
 71 Trade Unions and Labor Legislmion
ported by the 1953 Cuban Census. Our unemployment rate was
9.17% in 1956 and fell to 7.07% in 1958, the last year of my ad-
ministration. This was the lowest rate in Latin America at the
time.

NEVER BEFORE

No other country in the Americas had better organized, more

democratic, more united and more powerful trade unions than
Cuba in the late 195Os. The Confederation of Cuban Workers
united organized labor. Its strength derived from the devotion of
its members, the respect of employers and the support of the
Government. It was led by men from every political party and
group in Cuba, including those strongly opposed to me and my
administration. The single exception was the Communist Party,
which has no business in the labor movement because it pene-
trates it only in order to destroy it and condemn the workers to
slavery. Within the CTC and the individual trade union federa-
tions, the leadership was chosen by democratic elections in
which all non-communist parties and groups freely participated.
The conHicts between management and labor were almost
invariably resolved by conciliation and mediation after exhaus-
tive consideration of the claims of both sides. Thanks to this, we
had a minimum of strikes. Those strikes which did occur were set-
tled quickly and amicably. This was possible because labor dis-
putes were over economic matters. Despite the fact that the
Communists did everything to penetrate and weaken the labor
movement, including attempted intimidation of its leadership by
terrorist tactics, there were no political strikes. On three separate
occasions, the Communist conspiracy, working from its Cuban
command post in the Sierra Maestra, called the workers out in
general strikes. This occurred in August 1957 and in April and
October 1958. Even though the Reds murdered labor leaders who
resisted their plans, the Confederation of Cuban Workers re-
fused to support these general strikes and the workers ignored
the call of Castro and his Communist henchmen.

CASTRO'S WAR AGAINST LABOR

From the first moment of victory, the Castro movement pro-

ceeded to destroy the social achievements of the working class
 72 The Growth and Decline of the Cuban Republic
of Cuba and to make its democratically elected organizations
mere agencies of the emerging totalitarian state. The independ.
enee of the Cuban Confederation of Workers was totally de-
stroyed. Freely elected labor leaders were barred from their of-
fices. Some were furiously pursued and persecuted; others were
subjected to never-ending calumnies by the government-
controlled press; others were set upon by communist-led mobs;
others suffered long terms of imprisonment and still others met
death against the execution wall. Naturally, this persecution
reached its maxima in intensity where labor leaders known to be
hostile to communism were concerned. However, in one form or
another, it was levelled against all union officials and militants
who refused to become instruments of the police state. When a
labor leader was ousted from his post for political reasons, he was
almost invariably disqualified from trade union office for decades
to come.

THE ASSAULT ON WAGE STANDARDS

In the first Bush of victory, Castro announced a series of wage in-

creases which were more or less arbitrary. Then, as his eco-
nomic difficulties multiplied and the economy sickened, the dic-
tator reduced the real wages of the workers. Labor in public
utilities, transportation, financial instirutions and most industries
suffered.
The construction indusUy had been flourishing under my ad-
ministration. The Castro regime, however, imposed rent controls,
designed to expropriate the landlords. with the result that stagna-
tion and sudden unemployment struck the construction indusUy.
No less than 150,000 workers lost their jobs in the building trades
and more than 300,000 were affected by the repercussions of the
slump in collateral industries. All facets of the economy were ad-
versely affected despite the regime's attempts to shore up em-
ployment by artificial devices. In the restaurant industry, which
had known no unemployment at the end of 1958, the virtual dis-
appearance of tourism caused a 50% reduction in wages in the
months follOwing Castro's seizure of power.
ProgreSSive imposition of government controls deprived work-
ers of the right to strike, emasculated the trade unions, held down
wages and centralized wage determination in the hands of the
 73 Trade Unions and Labor Legislation
central government and its Communist bureaucracy. In August
1962, the Castro government promulgated a decree imposing
tighter controls on the wages of Cuban labor, imposing penalties
for tardiness and absenteeism which ranged from public repri~
mand or fine to transfer to distant and primitive places. The de~
cree demanded drastic curtailment of vacation time. Any varia-
tion in wage scales had to be approved by the Ministry of Labor.
Statistics on wages under Castro Communism are difficult to ob-
tain or interpret. The dictatorship no longer submits those eco-
nomic statistics to the United Nations which my Government,
and for that matter almost all non-communist Governments of
civilized nations, regularly submitted. The reason is obviously a
desire to conceal evidence of economic catastrophe and planned
impoverishment of the working people of Cuba. Moreover, the
presence of inflationary forces, the ra£~ depreciation of the peso
and the paucity of statistics make it . cult to derive real wages
from nominal wages.
Monthly payroll deductions were limited to three during my
second Administration: Workers' Maternity Insurance, union
dues and the contribution to the applicable retirement or social
security fund. These averaged 5.15% of wages. Under the new
Communist state, some 13.25% of the worker's pay is seized by
the State. These new levies do not prOVide the workers with any
compensatory advantages. They include: 5% of wages for the
so-called "People's Savings Certificates" or "Industrialization
Bonds'" and a 3% tax on personal income, which, under my Ad-
ministration, amounted to only 1% of wages or salaries in excess
of $200 per month. Actually. the deductions from workers' wages
are much higher, for "voluntary" contributions of a day's work
per month are exacted for such purposes as "equipment for the
agrarian reform,'" the "purchase of arms" and even for "cows and
pigs." These exactions, voluntary in name only, increase to almost
20% the proportion of wages which are confiscated at the
source.

SLAVERY

Barely a year after the seizure of power by the Communists,

Cuba's social conquests were merely a memory. Labor was regi-
mented; collective bargaining destroyed; working hours had been
 74 The Crowth ami Decline of the Cuban Republic
increased without any additional pay and arbitraIy exactions of
money and work were imposed at will.
My Covernment had been keenly aware of the problem the
worker faces of balancing his budget and, at the same time,
trying to buy a few special luxuries every year. To make this
possible. we saw that workers in both private and public enter-
prises got Christmas bonuses. We also saw to it that Jabor re-
ceived pay for differences between estimated and actual world
market prices for sugar. Moreover, there was a yearly payment
for sugar production above the established nonns. All of these
beneSts were withdrawn during the very first sugar harvest un-
der Communist rule. The reason given by Castro was so that "'in-
Bation would be avoided"- a cruel irony!
Dr. Jose R. Alvarez D(az, the Cuban economist who served as
Minister of Finance under Prio Socards and a source far from
friendly to me or my administration, made a careful estimate of
the worldng year under Batista and under Castro,
He found that in 1958, out of a year of 48 working weeks,
amounting to 2,496 work-haUl's, 208 hours corresponded to the 4-
hour allowancel l , 72 to sick leave, 190 to vacations, 68 to holidays
and 104 to summer vacations, This left a work-year of 1,854 hours.
Under Castro in 1962, the basic work-year of 48 weeks was still
2,496 hours, To this had to be added 312 hours of "voluntary'"
labor and 96 hours of "voluntary" labor at the end of the week,
making a total of 2,904 hours. From this, 190 hOlUS of vacations,
56 of holidays and 104 of summer holidays had to be deducted.
This left a work-year of 2,554 hours. In other words, under the
"proletarian dictatorship", the workers had to toil 38$ longerl 12

OTHER ABUSES AND OUTRAGES

The unemployed and even those at work were called upon to la-
bor without remuneration as "volunteers" under threat of being
considered counter-revolutionary with all the sinister conse-

11 That Js 10 say, the worker was paid for a 4B·hour week, but actually
worked only 44 hours.
12 Crupo Cubano de Investigaciolles Ecoll6micas de University of Miami (di-
rected by Jose R. Alvarez Din), Un E$fudio sabre Cuba, Unl versity of
Miami Press, Miami, 1963, p. 1,619.
 75 Trade Unions and Labor Legislation
quences that this may entail. This procedure, needless to say, was
copied from the U .S.S.n. and other Communist states.
The National Institute of Agrarian Reform (INRA) created
"cooperatives", which totally regimented the labor of the peasants
and made the promise of land reform a total mockery. The pay-
ments made to these peasant members of the "cooperatives"
were in scrip which had no value except at the People's Stores.
An old law, that of June 23, 1909, banned the payment of wages
in any medium except Cuban currency. Its purpose was to eo-
sure that the worker was free to spend his money wherever he
pleased. Thus, the Communists have hU'Iled back the clock of
Cuban history to conditions prevailing half a century ago.
Decree #798 of April 13, 1938 protected Cuban workers from
arbitrary or unjust discharge. It was a model of such legislation
and was strictly enforced. Under this precept, the worker was
entitled to a hearing before being discharged and could appeal,
as a last resort, to the Supreme Court.
Under Castro communism by contrast, Cuban workers can be
dismissed at will. If they are discharged because of the mcre ac-
cusation of counter-revolutionary tendencies, they lose all social
rights and are blacklisted. By contrast, the law of 1938 pro-
tected Cuban workers absolutely from dismissal on political or
religiOUS grounds.
Collective bargaining was abolished by the Castro government.
The new basic law of the Ministry of Labor places the workers un-
der the total domination of the state. Contracts, firing, change of
employment and all similar matters are under the absolute con-
trol of the Minister, a hard-core Communist. No Cuban can get
a job or change the one he has without the consent of the regime.
Merit, ability and seniority no longer count for anything.
To all this must be addcd the militarization of labor. The
Militia serve, not merely to train men and women in the usc of
arms, but also to indoctrinate the masses and prepare them
psychologically for the work of spying, betrayal of their fellow
workers and assault or murder of those who resist.
The leaders of the slave Cuban Confederation of Workers
wear the unifonn of the Militia. This is an organization which
has taken over the trade union federations and by means of pres-
sure and terror has imposed blind and abject obedience. The
fanner is transformed into a spy and hangman. During the bloody
 76 The Growth and Decline of the Cuban Republic
trials of 1961 and 1962, the heinous task of murdering Cuban pa-
triots was given to firing squads fonned of the Workers' Militia.
To Cuba's misfortune and that of the entire Western Hemi-
sphere, the transition from freedom to slavery, from prosperity
to dearth and progress to retrogression was achieved with
sinister thoroughness in the course of a few brief months.
 9
The Challenge of Public Education

At the time of the Revolution of September 1933, the public school

system in general and rural education in particular were in a
deplorable state. The statistics of illiteracy and ignorance were
appalling. The immense and immediate task that confronted us
was to bring education to the peasant masses so that they
could be equipped to improve their miserable living conditions.
For the successful accomplishment of this task, it was necessary
that we plan the operation very carefully and concentrate on
creating the sort of teacher who would blend the art of pedagogy
with the discipline and dedication of the soldier.
The state of the budget did not permit offering adequate sala-
ries and, under these conditions, the average schoolteacher
shunned the rural schools. Nevertheless, it was necessary to be-
gin and to approach the enormous task without fear of failure.
The objective, as stated by Law #620 of February 27, 1936
was "to bring elementary education to places where it had not
previously existed and where prospects for its establishment were
remote."
From the revitalized Revolutionary Army, we developed cadres
of sergeant-teachers. For the most part, these men had high
school diplomas, university degrees or at least a teacher's diploma.
They represented a real step forward in comparison with the
past. In 1899, when the Cuban public school system was initiated
under the United States military government. non-professional
 78 Th e Growth and Decline of tIle Cuban Republic
teachers had been appointed by Frye and Hanna and had set to
work without even the benefit of textbooks. l
The Rural Civic Schools, as these new elementary institutions
were called, spread quickly through the mountainous regions of
the island. At the end of my rust Administration in 1944, some
2,710 were in operation with an enrollment of 110,725 pupils.
As for elementary schooling in general, there were 11,376
schools in 1944, an increase of 3,172, or 38.6%, over 1933.
'-Vhen I assumed responsibility for the Cuban government, there
were 8,663 teachers; when I relinquished it in 1944, there were
12,189, an increase of 40.7%. As budgetary conditions permitted,
I saw to it that teachers' salaries were increased so as to aluact
the ablest people to this nationally vital task.

RURAL Ctm.DREN'5 HOMES

In addition to primary education, I thought it essential to prOvide

peasants' children with useful knowledge concerning their sur·
roundings. As part of the rural educational project, we there.
fore created secondary centers, which could be considered as
more advanced elementary schools, geared to the teaching of
trades in general and of scientific agriculture in particular. nis
new system was adapted to the realities of rural life. It made it
possible for the graduates of these schools to cultivate more ef-
fiCiently, increase crop yields and improve their housing.
We called. these centers, Rural Cbjldren's Homes. Forty of
them were established to serve additionally as headquarters of
the Rural Educational Missions and centers of the rural school
zones. Ea.ch zone was staffed with teachers in speCialized sub·
jects to give guidance to the rural school teachers. Each zone con·
tained hundreds of schools and prOvided medical assistance,
dentists, nurses, laboratory technicians, specialists in pedagogy,
agronomists, teachers of domestic science aDd of specialized
uades and skills. They were furnished with the equipment they
needed. In addition to the basic subjects of the rural educa·
tional system, physical education and sports were added.
The educational pattern in rural Cuba was supplemented by
1 However, excellent texts were prepared in short order due to the dedicated
work of Carlos de la Torre, Eiuique Jose Varona, Esteban Borrero Eche-
varria, NicoUs Heredia, Vidal Morales and Manuel Sanguily, pioneen in
education to whOlii the Cuban nation owes an eternal debt.
 79 The Challenge of Public Education
the establishment of a Rural Domestic Science School in the
province of Las Villas, that is to say, the geographical center of
the Republic, to prepare girls for their future careers as house·
wives in the countryside.

THE UNIVERSITY OF LIFE

At the apex of this organizational system were the Civil Military

Institutes, communities of education. At the end of my .first ad-
ministration, I left three of them blooming in the provinces of
Havana, Matanzas and Oriente, with a fourth under construction
in Pinar del Rio. Under their roofs, orphans of fanners, workers,
journalists and members of the armed forces, who had died pre.-
maturely, were housed as if in their own homes. 2
The .first Civic Military Institute opened its doors in 1938 in its
Ceiba del Agua campus near Havana. Here some 1,200 girls
and boys were comfortably installed, well fed and clothed,
given plenty of room for physical exercise and sports, with shops,
museums, libraries, excellent medical attention in a first·class has·
pital, and a competent teaching staff. Later, another 1,200 chil-
dren were taught similarly at the Holguin institute. The third
Institute was at Matanzas and the fourth was established for teen-
age girls in Las Villas.
During my first administration, this project trained hundreds
of young men and women, who were then returned to their
homes fully versed in some trade, to replace the deceased head of
the household or else they were returned, trained to become
good housewives.
Among the many institutions which we created in those days,
these poly technical centers and rural schools were, together with
the National Council on Tuberculosis, the projects in which I
personally was most deeply interested. As the Civic Military In-
stitutes developed in scope and in their human and social im-
plications, my colleagues and I thought of them increasingly as
"universities of life." Naturally, there were some shortcomings
and the inevitable criticism. In particular, I was reproached for
having provided too much comfort and luxury for the children of
poor parents.
Time was not kind to these institutions which combined
education with social assistance. When I relinquished office to
2 Law #707, March 30, 1936.
 80 The Growth and Decline of the Cuban Republic
the newly elected Grau San Marlin Administration, the purpose
for which they had been created was abandoned and they fell
victim to the Autentico embezzlers.' The pupils were chased out
of the schools, even though they were orphans protected by
special laws, and sent back to their poor homes uneducated. The
teachers, who had obtained their posts through competitive ex-
aminations and by merit, were summarily dismissed. The services
were disrupted; the buildings, gardens and workshops were left
untended; the workshops were looted; diScipline was destroyed;
competent personnel was replaced by political appointees; the
funds destined for the institutions were stolen.
This was to be the beginning of the scandals of the so-called
"typically Cuban government" of Dr. Grau San Martin. These cul-
minated with the outrages of the "BAGA" (the word was coined
from the initial letters of Bloque Aleman and Grau Alsina, re-
ferring to Minister of Education Jose Aleman, a prodigious
thief, and the Grau Alsina presidential family). The BAGA was
pennitted to remove funds from the National Treasury. Incredible
as it may seem, the Treasury was placed under the orders of the
Ministry of Education for that purpose. In this fashion, $174,-
000,000 was embezzled from special funds, pension and retire-
mentfunds.

EIGHT YEARS LATER

By decree #75 of President Gran of January 16, 1946, the Civic

Military Institutes were transformed into Polytechnical Teaching
Centers. When I took power on March 10, 1952, one of my
first acts was to change them back into the "'universities of life" of
which my associates and I had dreamed.
In 1952, one of my first aims was to restore the teaching and
welfare provisions and institutions of my first tenn of office. All
of my attempts to carry education to the far corners of the Repub-
lic had been virtually ignored by the two successor regimes of the
Autentico Party and the 1953 Population Census presented a
humiliating picture of the state of national education and culture.
My Administration began where it had left off in 1944. One of
'The members of the Cuban Revolutionary Party boastfully called them-
selves the Aublnticos, alleging that they were the authentic representatives.
of Marti's ideals.
 81 The Challenge of Public Education
OUT first enactments, Law #45 of May 2, 1952, enlarged the scope
of the system which had been initiated by Law #620 of 1936 and
establishcd, as a center for the new activities, a responsible or-
ganization. This was designed to give peasants' children special
training in primary and secondary schools together with Rural
Children's Homes. Again, there was the emphasis on better
fanning and practical skills and trade and, for the girls, on home
economics, hygiene and the practical problems of childbirth and
child care.
With the reconstruction of the Children's Homes, the rehabili~
tation job was launched. I saw to it that the original goals were
reinstated, that the venture was given adequate financial backing
and that inherited debts were promptly paid off. The stand-
ard of the Homes was raised to that of the Higher Elementary
Schools. Specialization in agriculture and rural industries was:
the watchword for the inland schools. For coastal people, we
added such skills as marine carpentry, commercial fishing tech-
niques and the mechanics of marine motors.
The Teaching Missions had increased from 44 in 1944 to 62
at the start of the 1952 school term. Some 41 rural units with a
new subsidiary service of 120 midwives were created for farm
mothers. Some 389 rural teachers were reinstated and 40 com-
pletely equipped clinical laboratories were put back into service.
The annual students' excursion of the Flower of Marti to the
Cuban capital from all isolated points on the Island was rein·
stated on May 19, 1952 and these trips were awarded as prizes
to the outstanding students in the rural schools.
Student museums and laboratories were created for the study
of nature, soils and seeds. Savings banks wcre opened for peas-
ants' children to inculcate habits of thrift. School canteens were
organized. ,",Ve stressed manual training, home economics, vegeta~
ble gardens, flower gardens, orchards to be tended by the stu-
dents and, above all, school libraries. In particular, we developed
mobile libraries with a total of 179,738 volumes.
The organization of parent teacher associations was encour-
aged to develop voluntary initiative in rural education and the
campaign against illiteracy. We tried to avoid excessive central~
ization and encouraged the rural teachers to use those methods
they knew best.
In the rural areas, we built a large number of school houses,
 82 The Growth and Decline of the Cuban Republic
with workshops and a dwelling for the teacher attached. In the
cities where none had previously existed, we started simultane·
ouslyand completed 40 secondary schools.
Of the rural schools built in my second administration, 557
were prefabricated of wood with cement-fiber roofs, 553 were
brick and 96 were of the "sugar-differential" type. The National
Housing Commission also had to rebuild or rehabilitate 54
rural schools destroyed by Hurricane Hilda.

COMMUNIST INFILTRATION

My Government placed a great deal of stress on reviewing the

educational system to adapt it to the spirit of the modem school
and to be continuously on guard in defense of the patriotic and
Christian traditions of the Cuhan people. This was particularly
the case in the textbook field.
One example is most illuminating. Because of the enormous
amount of work attached to the job of the Presidency, I had had
to leave most of the responsibilities for guiding our children to
my wife. I would make a point of taking a break: from my work
when they returned from school in the afternoons so I could chat
with them, since otherwise I might not have been able to see them
at all, for the obligations of my office generally claimed my time
until daybreak. These conversations would generally turn to
their school grades and I would often leaf through their text~
books.
One afternoon-I will never forget it-I found among their
books a text on the geography of Cuba, which they had been
given that day. I opened it naturally with a good deal of curiosity.
Some of the photographs and some of the passages in the text
amazed me.
That day, I went out to sea with a couple of experts on
shrimp fishing and I took the geography book along to review it.
I showed it to the shrimp specialists in the presence of an indus~
trialist friend. We all agreed that it was unadulterated Commu~
nist calumny. The author was, at that time, an unknown and
obscure character. Later, he would become notorious for his
criminal acts, his relentless cruelty and his numerous trips behind
the iron curtain. His name was Antonio Nunez Jimenez.
This book did not contain a single pleasant or edifying photo~
graph. It was filled with skilliul incitements to Communist sub.
 83 The ChaUenge (Jf Public Education
version d irected at the Cuban youth and farmers. In tracing the
history of the relations between the United Sta tes and Cuba, his-
tory was crudely falsified and our friendly neighbor was vilified
on all occasions.
This libel on our traditions, our aspirations and our history.
masquerading as a geography text, had been declared the official
text for the entire school system of Cuba by the preceding Au-
tentico Government of Carlos Frio Socarras. It was an example
of the perfidious manner in which Communist agents had been in-
filtrating the educational :field in order to poison the minds and
hearts of our chlIdreo and also an example of the apathetic at-
titudes of officials who were supposed to watch over the mental
and moral development of Cuban youth.
Needless to say, I immediately had this lying tract withdrawn
from the school system, but it was reinstated by the Red tyrant
as the official text as soon as he seized power. The outstanding
book by Professor Levy Marrero, used during my administration,
was burned at an auto da Ie by the Communist regime of Fidel
Castro.
Similarly, under Prlo Socarras, Russian propaganda DIms were
imported from Mexico. My administration banned them and the
Communist dictatorship reinstated them.
The physical wellbeing of the Cuban people was of as much
concern to my administration as their mental health. We created
special child ren's medical d ispensaries at the educational centers
with orthodontists for the correction of d ental malformations and
neuropsychiatrists to aid children with behavior problems. Sur·
veys were made by specialists in tuberculosis, intestinal parasite
infections and heart and eye diseases. During the epidemic of
Asian flu, doctors visited 607 schools with 114,968 pupils and
treated 34,302 children suspected of contamination. As a result,
only one death was reported.
To further the expansion of education, 3,028 teachers who had
been discharged b y the previous administration for reasons or
pretexts which had provoked controversy in the courtrooms and
in CongTess were reinstated and sent where they were most ur-
gently needed.·
'Ve formul ated a central plan covering kinderg:uten and school
construction, elementary and high school ten ching and cafeterias.
This plan furth er developed the start that hold been made in my
'Law #1020 of 1953 nnd Law #1321 of 1954.
 84 The Growth and Decline of the Cuban Republic
first administration. Some 91 of the educational centers were
left in operation, enabling them to contribute still further to the
great task of developing culture among the common people. Of
these 10 were in PiRar del IDo, 24 in Havana, 24 in Las Villas, 12
in Mantanzas, lZ in Oriente and 9 in Camaguey.

THE SERGEANT-TEACHER

An American writer, who is notorious for his Marxist ideology,

while discussin~ the Cuban situation, had the nerve to say that
"during Batista. s regime the teachers were Bred and for a while
the grade schools were placed in the hands of semi-illiterate ser-
geants.'" Considering the insignificance of the source and con-
cerned that by refuting Communist propaganda I might unin-
tentionally serve to spread it, I took no notice of this calumny at
the time it appeaxed.. At this juncture, however, it may be of in-
terest to compare the assertions of the leftwing writer with the
facts. No teachers were nred during my Administration. Far from
it, we reinstated thousands who had been dismissed during
the Prio regimo. Nor were the sergeant-teachers, the pioneers in
creating and running the rural schools, uneducated men. On the
contrary, the establishment of these schools in the remote comers
and mountains of the Island and the sell-sacrificing conduct of
those Cuban teachers who dedicated themselves to a ga1lant and
victorious fight for rural education are a bright page in the his-
tory of my country.
The Rural Education School "Jose Marti" served as a special
academy for £inal preparation of the rural school teacher, giving
him not onty the usual educational background, but the special
skills needed in the fann areas. This school was suppressed by a
Cuban Chief Executive conspicuous for his rcsenhnent and
apathy at about the time it graduated its first class of teachers.o
Its magniBcent building was then devoted to SOcially less impor-
tant purposes.
The Prio Covernment, which replaced that of Dr. Grau, came
with the passage of time to regret this mistake. In view of the
crisis which followed in the field of rural education, the Minister of
Education in the second Autentico administration, Ameliano
~ Carleton Benu, "The Cuban Revolution," Bohcmio, April 10, 1960.
'Executive Dt.'CIee #276 of President &m6n Grau San Martin, October 16,
1946.
 85 The ChaUenge of Public Education
Sanchez Arango, stated at a press conference that, instead of sup-
pressing the Rural Teachers' School, one should have been cre-
ated in every province of Cuba, as it was the ideal forge for the
type of teacher the nation needed. Law #65 of August 1958
finally reinstated tbe school.

SECONDARY EDUCATION

To improve public school teaching, we undertook a basic reor·

ganization of secondary education. Since Colonial times, the high
schools h ad always been in the capitals of the provinces. After
the 1933 Revolution, however, we founded 15 more of them in
other urban areas. 7 Between 1937 and 1958, enrollment in the
high schools advanced from 12,918 to 49,200, or almost four-fold.
In addition, 165 private high schools taught 36,282 additional
pupils. The number of high school teachers increased from 509
in 1933 to 1,361 in 1944.
By the beginning of 1958, there were 36 official centers of
higher studies in operation. All of these were state institutions
and were supported from the National Budget. These in·
cluded six teacher·training institutions,9 three schools for ldnder-
garten teachers,8 eight professional schools,10 five home economics
schools,ll three schools of journalism and the plnstic arts, I :! a school
of advertising at Havana, seven of arts and crafts,lS one of plastic
arts in Camllgiiey and the National School of Fingerprint Tech-
nicians established in Havana by Law #233 of June 6, 1952. In
addition, there was the School of Aeronautical Techniques at
the San Julian air base in Guane, Pinar del Rio, where aviation,

1 In Artemisa In Pillar del Rio Proyince; in Marianao, Cillnes, Vedado and

La Vibora in Havana Province; in Cardenas in MatanzlS; in Cienfuegos,
Remedios, Sagua la Crande and Sancti Spiritus ill Las Villas; in Mor6n and
Clego de Avila in Camagiley and, Bnally, at Cuantillamo, Holguin and
Manzanillo in Oriente Proyince.
9 At Cuanajay, Cienfuegot, Bayamo, Cuant!marno, Holguin a nd Manzamllo.
II At MatallZall and Cienluegos and in Pinar del Rio.
JO In Artemisa, Marianao, Cardenas, Col6n, Sagua la Grande , Manzanillo,
Moron and Victoria de las Tuuu.
11 At Sagua la Grande, SancU Spiritus, crego de Avila, Holguin and Cien-
fuegos.
12 At Matanzas, Santa Clara and Santiago de Cuba.
13 In Pinar del Rio, Artetnisa, SaneH Spixitus, Cienfuegos, Cruces, Camagtiey
and Bane!.
 86 The Growth arut Decline of the Guoo,., Republic
ground maintenance and all aspects of repair and overhaul were
taught in conjunction with U. S. experts.
Also there was a great deal of construction work. My first
administration installed the Havana Normal School in a splendid
building jn the old Arena Cristal in 1944 and my second term
saw completion of its installation and construction of an annex.
Four new buildings were erected for the Schools of Commerce.
Six of the seven normal schools to train kindergarten teachers
were founded when I was in the Presidency.
In 1958, Cuba had Il4 higher education institutions below uni-
versity level, that is to say, institutes, polytechrucal schools and
professional schools. Of these, 23 had been created prior to the
1933 flevolutioll; 32 were created during my 6rst eleven years of
power; 23 more were set up under the two Autentico administra-
tions and the last 36 were instituted after the Revolution of the
10th of March 1952. In other words, 68, or more than half of
these institutions, were created while I was in power ,14
In 1957, Cuban institutions of higher education below uni-
versity level trained 38,428 students. Of these, 13,494 were in
business and adminJstration, 7,772 were training to be teachers,
5,639 were concentrating OD technology, 3,882 in arts and crafts,
1,841 in home economics, 1,106 in the indusbial arts, 1.412 in
the plastic arts, 1.088 were studying to be kindergarten teachers,
903 were students of journalism, while the remnining 691 were
distributed among advertising (326). aviation (ISO), physical
education ( 130) and fingerprinting (55 ) .

ELECTRONICS

It was plain to me that Cuba would need a growing corps of

young men trained in electronics if she was to taKe full advantage
of the techniques of the age of mechanization, automation and
cybernetics. Accordingly. by Law #472 of October 11, 1952. we
set up the Technological Juvenile Military Institute for complete
education in electronics for 1,000 students of bOlh sexes, The stu-
dents were confined to children of members of the armed forces
14 In addition. 162 private high schools: were incorponted into the official
system and the degrees they granted were given official recognition. Regis-
tration In the high schools reached an all-fune peak. My colleagues and
I launched an extc nslve high school building plograrn and began to mtrG-
duee modern, functiona1 aIchitectllfe.
 81 TIw Challenge of Public Education
between 14 and 16 years old. The buildings of the military camp
that had been erected in Managua in World War II were con·
verted into a great schooling center with large classrooms and
facilities particularly adapted to the study of automobile me·
chanics and radio and television electronics.

SPORTS

In September 1933. the only official sports organization in Cuba

was the National Commission on Boxing and Wrestling which
had bcen founded in 1922. We reorganized this in 1934, gave it
an arena in the heart of the city (the Arena Crista}) and furth er
encouraged athletics by forming the Olympic Committee in 1937
and working for extensive Cuban participation in the forthcoming
Central American sports meet and in international Olympic can·
tests.
Executive Decree # 1454 created the National Sports Manage-
ment in 1938. By the end of my first term. Havana had a beauti-
ful Sports and Convention Palace, which served its purpose un-
til it h ad to be torn down to make way for a new extension of the
Maleron , the ocean boulevard.
I decided to do everything in my power to makc Cuha sports
conscious, to give Cuban athletes the support they needed to win
prestige and glory for themselves and their country in interna·
tional contests and to try to further the Creek ideal of tn.ens sana
in corpore sana.
We transformed the Management into a National CommissJon.
When I left Cuban public fjfe, we had a boxing academy and
the Civil Aviation and Naval Sports Acad emy . Hundreds of tro-
phies and medals bad been won by young Cubans. Moreover, we
had built a splendid sports city with ample space for athletic can·
tests of all sorts in a central location and overlooking an arena
that would go d own in our annals ilS one of the greatest achieve·
ments of Cuban architecture.
The new Sports Palace bad a domed roof without any support·
ing columns that permitted perfect visibility. Constructed with
all imaginable conveniences. even including hOUSing for visiting
foreign ntliletes, it had a seating capacity of 16,000. Olympic
swimming pools, baseball diamonds. basketbal1 courts and tracks
for athletic meets helped give the Sports City all that was needed.
for comprehensive athletic programs and contests.
 88 The Growtll and Decline of the Cuban Republic
This ambitious building program radiated out to the provinces.
Stadiums went up in Pinar del Rio, CODsolacl6n del Sur, Car-
denas, Camajuani, Cienfuegos, Esperanza, Placetas, Sancti Spir-
itus, Camagtiey, Mor6n, Ciego de Avila, Bayamo, Banes, Man-
zanillo and other places. For the Naval Sports Academy, we had
a building under construction on the eastern bank of the AI-
mendares River. Sports were encouraged by private initiative
and we pursued the policy of sending our athletes wherever they
could compete. The Cuban sailing team brought glory to Cuba in
European waters; our boxers and baseball players ranked with
the best; Havana became a center fot tlle great international
auto races. Year after year, attendance at sports events continued
to increase.

PHYSICAL EDUCATION

The Physical Education Administration was created by Law

#283 of August 4, 1952 to bring physical education into all the
schools. During my first administration, we built the Jose Marti
athletic center on a great expanse of land close to the sea with
an Olympic pool , athletic fields and playgrounds for children. It
was returned to us after eight years of Aub~ntico rule in such a
state of disrepair that it had to be entirely rebuilt. A similar, but
less ambitious, sporting center was built in the city of Matamas.
In the capital, we began construction of a complex of buildings
on the Avenue of Rancho Boyeros to house the headquarters of
the National Institute of Physical Education. This splendid con-
struction project was near completion when the Communists
took over Cuba. I should add that, in connection with out physi-
cal education program, we made sporting and athletic equipment
available to students all over the island.

CIDLD GUIDANCE

Prior to the 4th of September 1961, what we had in Cuba was,

not a reformatory, but a veritable children's prison. Here those
children were sent who had deviated from the straight and nar-
row path. Instead of being morally improved in this place, they
were trained to commit greater crimes.
After thoughtful consideration of the problem, my associates
and I founded the Child Guidance Center (COl), a veritable
 89 The Challenge of Public Education
school city w ith wen· ventilated classrooms, excellent workshop
and vegetable gardens. Here delinquent chiJdren were fe-edu-
cated and trained in the arts and trades.
Returning to power in March 1952, I found that the Center
had been sadly negl ected as to plant and equipment and that it
had also been morally corrupted. We set to work to renovate and
reorganize it. Three hundred new beds were installed in a circu-
lar dOlmitoryi machinery and tools were replaced in the looted
workshops; the hospit:d was renovated, and new teaching meth-
ods were introduced for the gUidance of the juvenile delinquents..

SCHOOLS Fon DEAF MUTES

An organiza tion which had been established to educate children

suffering from ear, voice and speech difficulties was transformed
into the National Institute faT Logopedics And Phonics by Law
#1380 of May 4, 1954. The teaching staffs of the National Deaf-
Mute School and the National Deaf-Mute Asylum were incor-
porated into the new Institute. Simultaneously, four schools were
organized for children suffering from these affiictions in Havana,
Matanzas, Santa Clara and Camagliey. All were operational by
1955.

UNIVERSITIES

One of the first acts of the Revolution of the 4th of September

1933 was to grant autonomy to the University of Havana. H Dur-
ing my first presidential term, I granted the University the Li-
manes sugar mill with its vast, highly fertile lands. The purpose
was not merely to eurich the University, but also to give it an.
adequate area of experimentation and an incentive to improve
the agricultural and industrial sugar production techniques of
the nation. The next step was to turn over the Calixto Garcia
National Hospital, which was given its own means of support. to
the University. 'l1Us was done by Decree #3610 of December
11,1943.
My government gave official recognition to the Western Uni-
versity and contributed to the establishment of a university at
Camagiiey and the University of Northern Oriente at Holguin. By
Decree #1575 of April 23. we improved the procedure,jl fo.r .itate
111 October 6, 1933.
 90 The Growth and Decline of tile Cuban Republic
e.'tamination and legal accreditation of graduates of private col-
leges, universities and centers of higher studies.
Under governmental encouragement, the Pontifical University
of St Thomas of Villanova was expanded; two other Catholic
colleges were established, that of Belen and of Saint John the
Baptist of La Salle, and also the Frotestant Candler College and
the lay College at Cienfuegos.

THE FINISIDNG TOUCH

The National l nstitute of Culture and Museums was created to

raise the standards of Cuban culture. The imposing and beautiful
Palace of Fine Arts, inaugurated by my administration on Decem-
ber 15, 1955, was the official headquarters of the Institute.
During the first two years that it was open to the public, its
historic, artistic and archaeolOgical exhibits were visited by 2IJ7,-
670 persons, of whom 61,796 were tourists, mostly from the
United States.
On the credit slde of the Revolution of the 4th of September
1933 was the erection of a magni£cent building for the National
Archives. This was opened toward the close of my first Adminis-
tration. During my second tenn in the Presidency, we built the
National Library, which blended the aesthetic and the functional
with outstanding success.16 Its shelves had space for four times its
270.000 catalogued volumes. MicroBlm and photostatic services
were instaIIed as well as bookbinding facilities and automatic
disinfection.

SO~fETHING ABOUT JOURNALISM

Let me add a few words and a few memories concerning journal-

ism. [ have always felt devoted to the members of this profession.
The es tablishment of schools and social security funds for news-
papennen was always a cause which I supported with enthusi.
asm. During my first Administration, I contributed to the enact-
16 Founded by General Leonard Wood In 1901, the National Library had
its first quarters in tho old Castillo de La Fuerza, to which it was returned
arttt some uncomfo n a ble years in the DO longer el(tant ArUUeJ:)' Work-
shop.!. The construction of the new borne for the Ub,aI)' was made possi'
ble by a modest levy on each bag of sugar produced (Law # 20 of
May .21,1941). My decree #1664 of Juno 12, 1957 turned the LIbrary
over to a foundation.
 91 The Challenge of Public Education
ment of the first retirement law for newspapennen. During my
second, this fund was expanded into a full social security system
with sound financial backing.
By Decree #1441 of 1942, the Professional School of Journal-
ism "Manuel Marquez Sterling" was created. Its faculty was kind
enough to accord me the honor of taking the first examination
and to bestow on me its :first diploma in journalism. My second
administration established schools of Journalism and the GraphiC
Arts in three provinces and provided funds for their maintenance.
Two laws, enacted in 1933, regulated the profession and licensed
its members.
Unavoidable duty made me adopt exceptJoDal measures, au-
thorized by the Constitution, during dire emergency. but we
never resorted to the measures provided by law against those
newspapermen who defamed me and my administration,1t
The consideration I gave to the press during the most critical
moments of Cuba's recent history is attested by facts, Thus, the
National Newspapermen's College of Cuba in exile, which is
affiliated to the Inter·American Federation of Professional News·
papermen's Organizations. admitted me to full membership in
that organization as a qualified newspaperman, by unanimous
vote of its Board of Directors at a meeting held in Miami, Florida,
on July 27, 1962.
]t is sufficient to take a qUick glance at what journalism and
the 'press were like in Cuba during the era of the 10th of March
Revolution and to see what they have become under the Com·
munist terror, Sin ce the Red regime was installed , the gentlemen
of the press have had to go into exile en masse and this necessity
applies also to those who were the most ardent and fanatical de-
fenders of Castroism.

17 SuspenSion of constitutional guarantees is authorized by Article 41 of the

1940 Constitutlon In cases of "grave di!;turbance of the social order or
pub1.ic peace" lind whenever necessary for "the repression of teT10rism or
gangsterism," Such suspension was a uthorized by executive decree subject
10 rat ilictltion by the Congress. Among the guaranties that could be SWi-
pended was lutide 33 regarding the free expression of thought. The adop-
tion of this measure, as III consequence of events that I did not provoke,
was the beginning of the propaganda which sought to depict me as a dic-
tator. Neverthek"Ss. it is a mt:asure enforced in many countries and under
much less complicated situations than that which Cuba faced as, for in-
stance, in Vellea:ucla. Despite this, the Venea:uelan government of R6mulo
Betancourt bas been called the "lighthouse of democracy."
 92 The Growth and Decline of the Cuban Republic
One glance at the Hst of active journalists in Cuba on January
1, 1959 shows how their ranks have since been thumed by im-
prisonment, cruel torture and death. Completely scornful of the
freedom of the press, the Communist despotism has forced the
journalists of Cuba to go into exile to save their integrity. The
Cuban journalists, and for that matter the foreign correspondents
who worked in Cuba, recall with painful nostalgia the time
when the Cuban press enjoyed days of freedom, dignity and
greatness.
 RED STAR OVER CUBA:
BATISTA.
The Russian Assault on the Western Hemisphere.
by Nathaniel Weyl
A former Cornrnunist l;lnd an expert on Latin America examines with
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policy on the massive, incontrovertible evidence that Fidel Castro was
not merely an implacable enemy of the United States, but a trusted
Soviet agent as far back as 1949. This is the shocking story of how a
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