Notes Strike
Notes Strike
GLOBAL
THREAT
REPORT
2023 GLOBAL THRE AT REPORT CrowdStrike 2
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FOREWORD he latest edition of the CrowdStrike Global Threat Report comes at an important
time for protectors around the world. As organizations focus on managing remote
and hybrid teams, operationalizing years of digital transformation and navigating
an uncertain global economy, adversaries have become more sophisticated, relentless
and damaging in their attacks. As a result, a number of disruptive trends emerged in 2022
that threaten productivity and global stability.
The year started ominously as Russia’s deadly war of aggression in Ukraine brought about
a terrible human toll, threatened international order and put countless global organizations
at risk of spillover cyberattacks. At the same time, China state-nexus adversaries ramped up
their cyber espionage campaigns, and Iranian actors launched destructive “lock-and-leak”
operations using ransomware.
Even our wins on the security front were tempered by the adversaries’ ability to adapt.
Collaboration between the government and private sector dramatically improved, resulting
in the arrest and dismantling of some of the world’s most notorious ransomware gangs —
only to see splinter groups recalibrate and flourish.
Last year, CrowdStrike’s Global Threat Report highlighted that 80% of cyberattacks
leveraged identity-based techniques to compromise legitimate credentials and try to
evade detection. This year, the report shows adversaries are doubling down on stolen
credentials, with a 112% year-over-year increase in advertisements for access-broker
services identified in the criminal underground. Organizations armed with this knowledge
last year were able to harden their defenses and stay a step ahead of the adversary.
2023 GLOBAL THRE AT REPORT CrowdStrike 3
Other details and insight you’ll learn from this year’s report include:
How a new, emerging class of eCrime threat actors is using fileless attacks to
target high-profile organizations with devastating campaigns
Why adversaries are accelerating cloud exploitation and the tactics they’re using
to compromise cloud infrastructure
How adversaries have created a new “state of the art” for vulnerability exploitation
to sidestep patches and why the industry needs to demand more secure software
These are just a few of the critical takeaways from this year’s report that will help you
improve your business resilience and harden your security posture.
The report shows that security must parallel the slope of technology innovation.
As technology matures, security has to mature and match the innovation of the
technology running our organizations. The same thing can be said for the adversary.
With every innovation we achieve, we can expect the adversary to actively seek
ways to exploit it. From the cloud to Kubernetes, from AI to applications and more,
as technology gets more complex and provides tremendous operational gains,
security must evolve to protect the productivity we gain.
At CrowdStrike, our mission today is the same as when we started: to stop breaches
so our customers can move forward. Our focus is on delivering the platform, technology
and intelligence needed to keep you ahead of the adversary. This is why we’ve unified
and delivered critical protections like endpoint and extended detection and response
(EDR and XDR), identity threat protection, cloud security, vulnerability and risk
management, threat intelligence and much more — all from a single platform.
I hope you find this report instructive in how we can continue to work together to
protect the world from those who mean to do harm. Security starts with knowledge —
of the adversaries targeting us, their tactics and the vulnerabilities they’ll seek to exploit.
With that knowledge comes resolve, that together we can prevail.
George Kurtz
CrowdStrike CEO and Co-Founder
2023 GLOBAL THRE AT REPORT CrowdStrike 4
TABLE OF
CONTENTS 5 INTRODUCTION
7 NAMING CONVENTIONS
11 2022 THEMES
32 CONCLUSION
34 RECOMMENDATIONS
42 ABOUT CROWDSTRIKE
2023 GLOBAL THRE AT REPORT CrowdStrike 5
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INTRODUCTION he 2022 cyber threat landscape was defined by persistence, increased target
scope and relentless determination. As businesses began to ease pandemic-driven
operating environments and adjust to geopolitical shifts and growing economic
hardships, adversaries supporting nation-state, eCrime and hacktivist motivations started
2022 with a relentless show of effort that endured throughout the year.
Over the course of 2022, eCrime adversaries continued to prove their ability to adapt,
splinter, regroup and flourish in the face of defensive measures. After some of the biggest
and most notorious ransomware enterprise shutdowns, ransomware affiliates moved to new
ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) operations. Additionally, more than 2,500 advertisements
for access were identified across the criminal underground, representing a 112% increase
compared to 2021 and demonstrating a clear demand for access broker services.
CROWDSTRIKE While it’s clear adversaries were persistent in pursuit of their goals in 2022, the year
also demonstrated how relentless determination works both ways. CrowdStrike
INTELLIGENCE Intelligence began the year with a flying start, outpacing adversaries throughout
BEGAN TRACKING 2022 with expansive reporting that captured new developments in real time as well
as identified and tracked new adversaries. Over the course of the year, CrowdStrike
33
Intelligence began tracking 33 new adversaries, raising the total number of actors
tracked to over 200. While most CrowdStrike-tracked eCrime emanates from Eastern
Europe and Russia, CrowdStrike Intelligence continues to name new adversaries
operating from different regions, demonstrating the ubiquity of the threat. In 2022,
NEW ADVERSARIES, CrowdStrike Intelligence introduced its first Syria-nexus adversary, DEADEYE HAWK,
RAISING THE TOTAL which was formerly tracked as DEADEYE JACKAL.
NUMBER OF ACTORS CrowdStrike Intelligence continues to expand its threat landscape coverage beyond
TRACKED TO targeted intrusion, eCrime, hacktivist, vulnerability intelligence and mobile mission areas. In
200+
2022, CrowdStrike Intelligence increased support for cloud intelligence across all products
and will introduce threat intelligence coverage for industrial control systems in 2023.
1 MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of the MITRE Corporation
2023 GLOBAL THRE AT REPORT CrowdStrike 7
BUFFALO VIETNAM
HAWK SYRIA
JACKAL HACKTIVIST
KITTEN IRAN
LEOPARD PAKISTAN
LYNX GEORGIA
OCELOT COLOMBIA
SPIDER ECRIME
TIGER INDIA
WOLF TURKEY
2023 GLOBAL THRE AT REPORT CrowdStrike 8
THREAT
LANDSCAPE
OVERVIEW
2023 GLOBAL THRE AT REPORT CrowdStrike 9
84'
The CrowdStrike® Falcon OverWatch™ team measures breakout time — the
time an adversary takes to move laterally, from an initially compromised host
to another host within the victim environment. The average breakout time for
interactive eCrime intrusion activity declined from 98 minutes in 2021 to 84
minutes in 2022.
Initial Lateral By responding within the breakout time window, defenders can minimize the
Access Movement costs and other damages caused by attackers. Security teams are encouraged
to meet the 1-10-60 rule: detecting threats within the first minute, understanding
the threats within 10 minutes and responding within 60 minutes.
October
January
August
March
May
July
200
100
0
Professional Services
Telecommunications
Financial Services
Manufacturing
Government
Technology
Healthcare
Industrials
Academic
Retail
2023 GLOBAL THRE AT REPORT CrowdStrike 10
Adversaries Continued
to Move Beyond Malware
to Gain Initial Access and
Persistence
There was a continued shift away from malware use,
with malware-free activity accounting for 71% of all
detections in 2022 (up from 62% in 2021). This was
partly related to adversaries’ prolific abuse of valid
credentials to facilitate access and persistence in
victim environments. Another contributing factor was
the rate at which new vulnerabilities were disclosed
and the speed with which adversaries
were able to operationalize exploits.
71% 2022
62% 2021
51% 2020
40% 2019
39% 2018
50%
increase in interactive
Interactive Intrusions Gained Speed
and Momentum
Compared to 2021, CrowdStrike observed a 50% increase in the number of
intrusion campaigns interactive intrusion campaigns with accelerating activity into the fourth quarter.
In addition, the technology sector was the most frequently targeted vertical in which
Falcon OverWatch uncovered interactive intrusion activity in 2022. This reflects an
increase compared with the relative frequency of intrusions in the top 10 industry
verticals from the prior 12 months.
Technology 21.6%
Financial 8.4
Healthcare 8.3
Telecommunications 7.5
Retail 7.0
Manufacturing 6.0
Academic 5.5
Services 5.2
Government 5.0
Pharmaceutical 3.2
2023 GLOBAL THRE AT REPORT CrowdStrike 11
2022
THEMES
eCRIME ACTORS GAINED
NOTORIETY FOR HIGH-PROFILE
ATTACKS
eCrime actors constantly search for new ways to increase
revenue, and they often seek out novel techniques or tools
to expand their target reach or impact. Over the course of
2022, CrowdStrike Intelligence observed two newly named
adversaries — SLIPPY SPIDER and SCATTERED SPIDER —
pushing operational limits by targeting high-profile victims and
impacting associated employees, customers and partners.
SLIPPY
SPIDER
TARGETED TECHNOLOGY GIANTS
WITH DATA THEFT AND EXTORTION
In February and March 2022, SLIPPY SPIDER attracted significant attention in the
security community for a series of high-profile data theft and extortion incidents
targeting technology companies including Microsoft, Nvidia, Okta and Samsung. The
adversary used their public Telegram channels to leak data including victim source
code, employee credentials and PII. Although SLIPPY SPIDER made large ransom
demands in exchange for not leaking the stolen data, CrowdStrike Intelligence has no
evidence to suggest any of those demands were met. This targeting of high-profile
victims and the large volume of stolen and leaked data drew the focus of various law
enforcement operations in mid-2022.
Once they had the attention of law enforcement, SLIPPY SPIDER was likely not
sufficiently skilled or resourced to sustain their targeting and ultimately recover their
operations. CrowdStrike Intelligence has not observed SLIPPY SPIDER activity since
June 2022.
2 https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/double-trouble-ransomware-data-leak-extortion-part-1/
2023 GLOBAL THRE AT REPORT CrowdStrike 13
SCATTERED
SPIDER
USED SOCIAL ENGINEERING TO
OVERCOME MFA
Since at least March 2022, SCATTERED SPIDER has conducted targeted social
engineering campaigns primarily against firms specializing in customer relationship
management and business process outsourcing. The adversary primarily uses
phishing pages to capture authentication credentials for Okta, VPNs or edge devices,
and socially engineers users to share one-time password multifactor authentication
(MFA) codes or overwhelms them using MFA notification fatigue.
After achieving initial access, SCATTERED SPIDER deploys a vast array of legitimate
remote monitoring and management tools or utilities such as PuTTY to maintain
persistent access. In one case, the adversary demonstrated fluency with lateral
movement and credential access across cloud-provider environments, including
harvesting credentials using instance metadata service. To evade detection, the
adversary has employed several different tools to bypass or terminate endpoint
security software.
SCATTERED SPIDER has gained attention due to the high-profile nature of their victims.
2023 GLOBAL THRE AT REPORT CrowdStrike 14
OF CLOUD EXPLOITATION
THE CONTINUED RISE
The CrowdStrike 2022 Global Threat Report predicted that cloud exploitation would
increase as more businesses moved operations to cloud environments and more
adversaries became “cloud-conscious” — a term referring to threat actors aware of the
ability to compromise cloud workloads and who use this knowledge to abuse features
unique to the cloud for their own purposes. Over the course of 2022, cloud exploitation
increased as expected: Observed cloud exploitation cases grew by 95%, and cases
involving cloud-conscious actors nearly tripled from 2021. This growth indicates a
larger trend of eCrime and nation-state actors adopting knowledge and tradecraft to
increasingly exploit cloud environments.
Tactics supporting data access also began moving toward exfiltration from information
repositories as well as cloud storage and local systems. Finally, in addition to previously
reported resource-hijacking impacts, CrowdStrike Intelligence observed actors
incorporating destructive actions such as account access removal, data destruction,
resource deletion and service stoppage.
CrowdStrike Intelligence
saw actors shift away from
the deactivation of antivirus
and firewall technologies,
as well as from log-
tampering efforts. Instead,
they were observed
seeking ways to modify
authentication processes
and attack identities.
2023 GLOBAL THRE AT REPORT CrowdStrike 15
TOP CLOUD-CONSCIOUS
TTPs OF 2022
INITIAL Throughout 2022, cloud-conscious actors primarily obtained initial access to the cloud
ACCESS by using existing, valid accounts, resetting passwords or placing webshells or reverse
shells for persistence after exploiting public-facing applications such as web servers.
Once on a machine, actors attempted to gain access primarily through credentials found
in files, but also via the cloud provider's instance metadata services (IMDSs).
Since workloads in the cloud are very dynamic and potentially short-lived, most actors
established persistence with valid cloud accounts they already possessed or for which
they were able to reset the password. Alternatively, if the actor obtained initial access
via a web server, they placed webshells or reverse shells on the compromised
machine for persistence.
DISCOVERY During initial environment discovery, actors primarily focused on cloud accounts — for
persistence and potential privilege escalation — as well as reachable network services,
but also searched for cloud permission groups, infrastructure and storage buckets.
LATERAL To move laterally inside a cloud environment, actors used protocols such as RDP, SSH and
MOVEMENT SMB; actors with console access also leveraged services such as EC2 instance connect
and the Systems Manager Session Manager to achieve this goal.
PRIVILEGE Actors escalated their privileges by gaining access to accounts with higher privileges,
ESCALATION either by finding credentials for these accounts or resetting credentials that already existed.
DEFENSE Actors tried to evade defenses by deactivating security products running inside virtual
EVASION machines. Other actors attempted to masquerade by choosing proxy exits close to
expected victim locations or naming newly created virtual machines according to
victims' naming scheme.
DATA To collect data, actors turned to local systems as well as internal information repositories
COLLECTION such as code repositories, SharePoint, internal tooling and databases.
IMPACT Despite industry reports claiming resource hijacking was the most common impact
technique used in 2022, the most ubiquitous impact technique was actually destructive,
with actors removing access to accounts, terminating services, destroying data and
deleting resources.
THE 2022
DISCOVERY, REDISCOVERY
AND CIRCUMVENTION VULNERABILITY
INTELLIGENCE
LANDSCAPE
CrowdStrike Intelligence saw actors consistently focus on previously established
attack vectors and components to achieve exploitation in 2022. There are two ways
adversaries can pursue this approach to exploit development following vulnerability
discovery. The actors can modify — or even reapply — the same exploit to target other
similarly vulnerable products. Alternatively, the discovery process can identify a potential
target and encourage actors to focus on these known vulnerable components, as well as
circumvent patching by exploring other exploit vectors (see Figure 3). This is particularly
true for edge devices, which are often vulnerable to various injection techniques and
arbitrary file-delivery exploits.
1. discovery 2. Rediscovery
Identify vulnerable JNDI Log4j2 Identify vulnerable Log4j2 libraries in other vendor
library components and develop products and tailor exploit for specific application
exploit for CVE-2021-44228
1. Discovery 2. Circumvention
Identify vulnerable Exchange server Bypass patches by targeting previously identified
proxy components and develop and vulnerable proxy components via multiple
remote unauthenticated exploits authenticated vectors
(ProxyShell and ProxyLogon)
Patch: Patch:
Authentication Autodiscover
Controls Requests
VULNERABILITY DISCOVERY
AND REDISCOVERY
The notorious and prolonged nature of Log4Shell exploitation was the most prominent
example of vulnerability discovery across numerous products in 2022. Log4Shell
exploitation was initially opportunistic in nature, with actors seeking vulnerable products
and targeting what they could find. However, variations of the exploit targeting other fields,
leveraging other protocols and using obfuscation techniques rapidly allowed for tailored
CVE-2021-44228 exploitation in other products where exploitation was not initially
achievable. Falcon Intelligence Recon observed continued CVE-2021-44228 discussions
among threat actors in the criminal underground during 2022, reflecting sustained
interest in Log4Shell exploitation (see Figure 4).
Starting in January 2022, a similar discovery and exploitation process across myriad
products unfolded in the context of the PwnKit exploit, which targeted the Polkit package
most Linux platforms use to manage permissions using privilege escalation vulnerability
CVE-2021-4034. While open-source projects are more likely to be impacted by
vulnerability exploitation issues, integrating vulnerable packages from external sources
also routinely contributed to proprietary software exploitation throughout 2022.
CVE-2021-44228 MENTIONS
80 FALCON INTELLIGENCE RECON DATA
60
40
20
0
September
December
November
February
October
January
August
March
June
April
May
July
A similar pattern emerged among a series of zero-day exploits associated with the
Windows Common Log File System (CLFS) driver observed between March and August
2022. Demonstrating their expertise, developers of the CVE-2022-37969 exploit
employed a technique to identify and bypass mitigations intended for an earlier CLFS
vulnerability (CVE-2022-24521).
2023 GLOBAL THRE AT REPORT CrowdStrike 19
LOOKING DEEPER
FALCON OVERWATCH
CASE STUDY
Unattributed Adversary Exploits Zoho ManageEngine Vulnerability
In late 2022, Falcon OverWatch notified an organization by saving it to a hidden directory, deleting several files
in the technology sector of an active hands-on intrusion. for anti-forensic purposes, and setting the display name
The unattributed adversary achieved code execution to Microsoft Network Management. The adversary then
through abuse of a vulnerability in the Zoho ManageEngine generated an account list and attempted to connect to
application. They used this capability to install and execute additional remote sessions on the host.
the ScreenConnect remote access tool, hiding this evidence
INITIAL ACCESS
The adversary exploited a vulnerability in
Zoho ManageEngine (CVE-2022-35405) to
EXECUTION
achieve execution on the host.
The adversary used both the Windows Command
Shell and PowerShell to execute commands. The
ScreenConnect agent, a remote administration tool,
was installed using an MSI file via MSIExec.
PERSISTENCE
The adversary followed on from their
exploitation of Zoho ManageEngine by
installing the ScreenConnect agent as a
Windows service, set to automatically start. DEFENSE EVASION
The adversary attempted to disguise the
ScreenConnect agent and evade defenses by
renaming the ScreenConnect service as "Microsoft
Network Management."
The ScreenConnect service was installed into a
hidden directory. The adversary deleted several files
on the host for anti-forensic purposes.
DISCOVERY
The adversary attempted to enumerate
collections of system information including the
current system owner and user.
LATERAL MOVEMENT
The adversary attempted to take over several
RDP sessions on the host via remote service
COMMAND AND CONTROL session hijacking and move laterally via RDP.
The adversary installed a copy of the ScreenConnect
agent to the victim host. They were also observed
sending a request using the Telegram API.
2023 GLOBAL THRE AT REPORT CrowdStrike 20
RUSSIAN CYBER
HIGH-EFFORT,
LIMITED RETURN
OPERATIONS ARE
SUPPORTING THE
WAR IN UKRAINE
The Russia-Ukraine war that began in 2022 has involved unprecedented use of cyber
capabilities sustained throughout the extended ongoing military campaign.
CrowdStrike Intelligence has observed a spectrum of Russia-nexus activity relating to
this conflict, including extensive intelligence collection activities, information operations
aiming to influence public sentiment and the deployment of destructive attacks against
government and commercial networks. These operations, set against a backdrop of
wide-ranging patriotic hacktivism aligned with Russian aims, often targeted Western
entities that Russian state-nexus adversaries currently seem unwilling to pursue.
While the Kremlin integrated cyber capabilities into its military campaigns well before
2022 — typically involving distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks — its 2022
activity demonstrates the extent to which Russia will use a wide variety of tools to achieve
its aims, with varying levels of success. Figure 5 depicts a high-level overview of how
Russia-nexus operational activity levels changed throughout 2022, categorized across
intelligence collection, IO and destructive motivations.
Adversaries such as Adversaries such as FANCY BEAR, EMBER BEAR, VOODOO BEAR, PRIMITIVE
FANCY BEAR, EMBER BEAR and GOSSAMER BEAR — as well as the RepeatingUmbra and LostPotential
activity clusters — were particularly active against Ukraine in 2022. Other unattributed
BEAR, VOODOO BEAR,
campaigns also targeted organizations and individuals in Ukraine, likely for intelligence-
PRIMITIVE BEAR and
gathering purposes. These typically employed credential phishing methodologies to gain
GOSSAMER BEAR — as
access to their targets’ email accounts.
well as the RepeatingUmbra
and LostPotential activity On January 14, 2022, prior to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, a steady stream of intelligence
clusters — have been collection activity performed against Ukrainian targets was supplemented by a series of
particularly active against disruptive and destructive EMBER BEAR operations that included website defacements
Ukraine this year. and WhisperGate wiper malware deployments. This campaign was highly likely intended
to degrade the Ukrainian government’s ability to operate as well as psychologically impact
Ukrainian citizens with the suggestion that Ukrainian authorities could not protect them
from the ensuing military campaign.
Psychological operations escalated during February 2022, with multiple DDoS attacks
against Ukrainian government portals and financial institutions that likely aimed to exert
pressure on Ukrainian citizens by disrupting their ability to conduct routine activities such
as accessing banking services. Western government sources later attributed some of
these attacks to the GRU.
2023 GLOBAL THRE AT REPORT CrowdStrike 22
EMBER
BEAR
THE PUBLIC FACE OF
DESTRUCTIVE OPERATIONS
IN UKRAINE
Russian cyber activity during While the true impact of this early action against Ukrainian government and military
the second half of 2022 was communications remains unclear, it was felt beyond its borders. At least three internet
service providers across Europe were also affected by this disruption, resulting in outages
largely characterized by a
for thousands of customers and the disruption of wind turbine network communications
shift in focus to intelligence-
in parts of Germany.
collection operations,
likely indicating increasing
After an initial surge of activity in the first week of the war, Russia-nexus offensive cyber
Russian military and Kremlin operations continued at a highly elevated pace, although with a marked reduction in
requirements for situational capability and tooling variety. For example, the DoubleZero wiper was first deployed
awareness as their advances in mid-March 2022 but did not exhibit sophistication comparable to other destructive
into Ukraine stalled and malware deployed in Ukraine. This shift in quality suggests operations became more
reversed. tactical and opportunistic at this time, likely reflecting a lack of planning beyond the
Kremlin’s expectations of a short military conflict period.
Activity attributed to VOODOO BEAR was the exception to this reduction in operational
activity. This included CaddyWiper deployments that began on March 14, 2022, and
continued throughout the year, as well as attacks against the Ukrainian energy sector
using a new CrashOverride variant and a range of scripts designed to wipe Linux and
Solaris systems. These operations were highly likely more complex — though arguably
with little wide-ranging effect — and therefore required longer staging and execution
periods, illustrating the complexity of effectively leveraging cyber operations compared to
well-established kinetic military doctrine.
Russian cyber activity during the second half of 2022 was largely characterized by a shift
in focus to intelligence-collection operations, likely indicating increasing Russian military
and Kremlin requirements for situational awareness as their advances into Ukraine stalled
and reversed. Identified campaigns have included extensive efforts by FANCY BEAR,
PRIMITIVE BEAR and activity clusters RepeatingUmbra and LostPotential to conduct
spear-phishing and credential-phishing operations against Ukrainian targets.
At present, the overall impact of Russia’s cyber operations within the context of the
2022 Ukraine invasion is unclear. While Russia’s cyber capabilities have undoubtedly
contributed to Russia’s military campaign, they have also demonstrated inherent
wartime limitations. This is particularly true in the case of destructive attacks, which
frequently require extensive planning but are often less effective and enduring
when compared to their kinetic counterparts. In addition to the effects of significant
assistance Ukraine received from the international community, Russia’s operational
efficacy was also likely reduced due to Ukraine’s improved defensive capabilities since
Russia’s invasion of Crimea in 2014.
Attacks against core These factors have potentially influenced the course of Russian military strategy in
sectors such as energy, this conflict, diverging from public expectations of how cyber operations can support
telecommunications, modern warfare. Attacks against core sectors such as energy, telecommunications,
transportation and media have not been as extensive as predicted, likely indicating the
transportation and media
Kremlin expected a swift and decisive victory over Ukraine and planned to use these
have not been as extensive
functioning resources to keep Ukraine running under a new regime.
as predicted, likely indicating
the Kremlin expected a swift
Early concerns regarding significant collateral damage to international networks have
and decisive victory over also not been fully realized. Identified attacks have mostly been localized to Ukrainian
Ukraine and planned to use networks and have avoided using uncontrolled propagation mechanisms that might
these functioning resources spread across unintended sectors and regions. Despite this, currently unaffected
to keep Ukraine running sectors may experience future targeting as the war progresses and potentially
under a new regime. changes course.
2023 GLOBAL THRE AT REPORT CrowdStrike 25
CHINA-NEXUS
ESPIONAGE LANDSCAPE
DOMINATING THE
ADVERSARIES
SIGNIFICANTLY
INCREASED 2022
OPERATIONAL
SCALE
CrowdStrike Intelligence tracks and identifies China-nexus adversaries as the most
active targeted intrusion groups. In 2022, China-nexus adversaries — as well as actors
using TTPs consistent with China-nexus adversaries — were observed targeting nearly
all 39 global industry sectors and 20 geographic regions CrowdStrike Intelligence
tracks (Figure 6). These intrusions were likely intended to collect strategic intelligence,
compromise intellectual property and further the surveillance of targeted groups, all of
which are key Chinese Communist Party (CCP) intelligence goals.
Professional Services
Energy Consulting
Pharmaceutical
Manufacturing
Government
Technology
Healthcare
Aerospace
Real Estate
Academic
Financial
Insurance
Defense
Dissident
Nuclear
Military
Energy
Media
Legal
NGO
NORTHERN EUROPE
WESTERN EUROPE
EASTERN EUROPE
SOUTHEAST ASIA
NORTH AMERICA
SOUTH AMERICA
CENTRAL ASIA
WEST AFRICA
MIDDLE EAST
SOUTH ASIA
EAST ASIA
OCEANIA
EUROPE
AFRICA
SECTORS BY COUNTRY
NORTH AMERICA OCEANIA AFRICA
NGO, Government, Defense, Academic, Energy, Academic, Nuclear, Government, Government, Financial, Telecommunications,
Healthcare, Aerospace, Financial, Legal, Telecommunications, Healthcare, Financial, Healthcare
Technology, Insurance, Industrials & Engineering, Manufacturing, Aerospace, Technology
MIDDLE EAST
Pharmaceutical, Telecommunications,
EASTERN EUROPE Government, Energy Consulting, Professional
Manufacturing
Government, Financial, Telecommunications, Services, Technology
EAST ASIA Healthcare, Academic, Aerospace, Defense,
CENTRAL ASIA
Media, Technology, Dissident, Defense, Dissident, Military
Government
Academic, Telecommunications, Real Estate,
Financial, Government, Legal, Nuclear, Aerospace SOUTH AMERICA WESTERN EUROPE
Government, Financial, Telecommunications, Government
SOUTH ASIA
Technology, Academic, Nuclear, Energy
Defense, Dissident, Government, Healthcare, WEST AFRICA
Technology, Financial, Academic, Energy Government
NORTHERN EUROPE
Consulting, Professional Services,
Industrials & Engineering, Telecommunications,
Telecommunications, Aerospace, Military
Manufacturing, Healthcare, Insurance, Financial,
SOUTHEAST ASIA Technology
Healthcare, Defense, Dissident,
Telecommunications, Energy, Government, EUROPE
Academic, Nuclear, Military, Aerospace, NGO Government, Financial, Healthcare, Technology
TARGE T REGION
TA I WA N
CrowdStrike Intelligence observed China-nexus adversaries overwhelmingly
CrowdStrike Intelligence
target Taiwan-based technology organizations during 2022, which is consistent
observed China-
with the likely economic espionage mission associated with China-nexus actors
nexus adversaries
in support of CCP goals for technologic independence and dominance. These
overwhelmingly target operations may also support the CCP’s desire for cross-strait unification with
Taiwan-based technology Taiwan through governmental or military means. Despite inflammatory anti-
organizations during 2022, Western rhetoric and subsequent large-scale Chinese military drills in the Taiwan
which is consistent with the Strait in response to a high-level state visit in mid-2022 by U.S. Speaker of the
likely economic espionage House Nancy Pelosi, CrowdStrike Intelligence did not observe an increase
mission associated with in Taiwan-focused China-nexus targeting activity. However, CrowdStrike
China-nexus actors in Intelligence did observe a direct increase in Chinese-affiliated nationalist
support of CCP goals for hacktivist activity targeting Taiwanese organizations with web defacements and
technologic independence DDoS attacks during this time frame.
and dominance.
2023 GLOBAL THRE AT REPORT CrowdStrike 28
Zero-day exploits were most commonly observed in intrusions targeting North American
Zero-day exploits
organizations in 2022; China-nexus adversaries used zero-day exploits to compromise
were most commonly
entities in the aerospace, legal and academic sectors. Additional zero-day exploits
observed in intrusions
delivered using weaponized Microsoft Office documents were observed likely targeting
targeting North American the Philippines defense sector, Nepalese telecommunications sector and Russian
organizations in 2022; government sectors; these are also suspected to have targeted groups associated with
China-nexus adversaries Tibetan independence movements.
used zero-day exploits to
compromise entities in Enterprise software continued to be a high-priority target for China-nexus adversaries
the aerospace, legal and in 2022. In this time frame, China-nexus adversaries identified and exploited zero-day
academic sectors. vulnerabilities in the following products: CITRIX ADC and Citrix Gateway (CVE-2022-
27518), Microsoft Exchange Server and the Microsoft Support Diagnostic Tool (CVE-
2022-41040 and CVE-2022-41082), and Atlassian Confluence Server and Confluence
Data Center (CVE-2022-26134).
LOOKING DEEPER
FALCON OVERWATCH
CASE STUDY
ETHEREAL PANDA Deploys SoftEther VPN Post Web Service Compromise
Falcon OverWatch identified a suspected ETHEREAL Falcon OverWatch quickly notified the targeted organization
PANDA actor performing malicious interactive activity of the active intrusion attempt, and the organization began
beginning with a likely exploitation of an Apache Tomcat remediation efforts, including updating credentials and
instance. The adversary pivoted to an exposed SQL Server patching vulnerabilities to stop the intrusion and prevent
and ran further enumeration commands. Other notable re-entry.
activity included attempts to dump credentials, using both
ProcDump and Mimikatz.
INITIAL ACCESS
The adversary gained access to the
Windows-based host likely by exploiting an
PERSISTENCE
Apache Tomcat web service.
Later, the actor was also observed running The actor created new services for their SoftEther
enumeration commands under an externally VPN binaries and set the services to automatically
accessible sqlservr.exe instance. start for persistence.
The actor was also observed setting IFEO registry
keys for a sethc.exe accessibility binary to perform
a Sticky Keys authentication bypass.
DEFENSE EVASION
The actor deployed their SoftEther VPN binary
named as conhost.exe to avoid suspicion
through masquerading. DISCOVERY
The actor also named their Godzilla JSP The actor attempted to enumerate several resources
webshells and other files as of information on the compromised host, including
legitimate names to evade defenses. the system owner/user information, the network
connections and network configuration of the host,
as well as currently running services.
CROWDSTRIKE
eCRIME
INDEX
2023 GLOBAL THRE AT REPORT CrowdStrike 31
BITWISE SPIDER’s LockBit The CrowdStrike® eCrime Index (ECX) tracks activity across multiple segments of the
RaaS remained the most eCrime ecosystem, including botnet and spam activity, and calculates the total number
prolific BGH operation in of observed ransomware victims. Overall, the 2022 ECX exhibited trends similar to those
2022 — the adversary’s observed in 2021 (Figure 7), with a peak occurring across March and April 2022.
affiliates posted more than
800 victim organizations to One of the most prominent factors that likely affected the ECX during this peak was
the LockBit DLS in 2022. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Several eCrime actors increased activity at this time,
including SALTY SPIDER and SCULLY SPIDER, which launched DDoS attacks, and other
eCrime actors that used the invasion as a theme for social engineering lures. Additionally,
CrowdStrike Intelligence identified a significant increase in access broker activity across
2022, with HERMIT SPIDER’s PrivateLoader distributing more than 900 unique payloads
at its peak in March 2022.
Another significant fluctuation was observed in 2022, this time in September, potentially
attributed to increases in corporate access advertisements and BGH victims published
to dedicated leak sites. Other prominent events in September 2022 included a new
MALLARD SPIDER QakBot version release, frequent Shindig activity and the BITWISE
SPIDER LockBit 3.0 leak.
Despite these increases, the overall ECX value in 2022 was lower than in 2021. Two major
eCrime adversaries suffered hits to their daily operations: WIZARD SPIDER closed their
Conti RaaS following a series of damaging leaks, and HERMIT SPIDER ceased their
PrivateLoader operations, significantly impacting ECX factors such as BGH victims and
malware distribution throughout the remainder of 2022.
CrowdStrike Intelligence assesses these setbacks are only temporary and ECX values will
likely return to 2021 values or higher during 2023. This assessment is made with moderate
confidence, as BGH and enabling adversaries such as COMPASS SPIDER, LILY SPIDER,
BRAIN SPIDER and Black Basta continue to emerge. Established adversaries such as
BITWISE SPIDER, ALPHA SPIDER and MALLARD SPIDER continue to make significant
malware maintenance efforts. Additionally, despite losing affiliates, WIZARD SPIDER’s core
members have remained active and will likely return in some capacity. Lastly, adversaries
continue to adjust their TTPs — for example, BGH operations increased data extortion
intrusions without using ransomware — which may affect the ECX in 2023.
80
60
40
20
0
September
December
November
February
October
January
August
March
June
April
May
July
I
n 2022, CrowdStrike Intelligence observed adversaries across the targeted intrusion,
CONCLUSION
eCrime and hacktivist landscapes operating with relentless determination to meet
their goals. These adversaries continued to seek novel ways to bypass security
measures to conduct successful initial infections, impede analysis by researchers
and refine tried-and-tested techniques.
As global enterprises make changes to thwart eCrime operators, adversaries will likely
extend their reach using novel techniques such as increased social engineering and
direct engagement with the victim, as seen in 2022. The threat to the increasingly popular
cryptocurrency market will continue, with operational tempo likely fluctuating in line with
cryptocurrency values. Formjacking will continue as a credible threat, allowing eCrime
actors to steal, sell and/or make use of victim PII.
Most targeted intrusion activity identified in 2022 was driven by traditional espionage
motivations, despite the window into what cyber operations can look like during wartime,
provided by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. This reflects a broader reality: As a tool of state
power, malicious cyber activity remains most effective in roles traditionally associated
with intelligence operations, including niche efforts such as deniable disruption,
information operations and currency generation. CrowdStrike Intelligence assesses that
targeted intrusion adversaries will continue to predominantly present data theft threats to
the vast majority of sectors and geographies in 2023. However, Russian and Iranian state-
Big game hunting will nexus adversaries will continue to present outsized threats of disruptive or destructive
very likely remain the activity in connection to geopolitical developments, while North Korean adversaries
will remain the state-nexus threat in relation to currency theft. The scale and scope of
primary eCrime threat to
China-nexus targeted intrusion activity is unlikely to contract in 2023, as cyber espionage
organizations across the
remains a critical instrument to support the CCP’s strategic and economic ambitions.
majority of geographical
regions and industry
sectors in 2023.
2023 GLOBAL THRE AT REPORT CrowdStrike 33
Mobile-based social engineering techniques in intrusion attempts will also likely increase
in the coming year, particularly with the publicity and success of adversaries such as
SCATTERED SPIDER potentially enticing other threat actors to try similar TTPs.
RECOMMENDATIONS
FIVE STEPS
TO BE PREPARED
01
Gain Visibility into Your Security Gaps
An organization is only secure if every asset is protected. It’s impossible to protect what
you don’t know about. As adversaries continue to weaponize and target vulnerabilities,
security teams should prioritize visibility and enforcing of IT hygiene across the entire
enterprise asset inventory. The CrowdStrike Falcon platform delivers deep visibility and
protection of your assets (endpoints, identities, cloud, data) so you can catalog your
assets, understand their risk level and ensure they’re protected.
With the advent of accelerated cloud migration, enterprises have expanded their digital
footprint and their attack surface, introducing a tsunami of unknown exposed assets.
External attack surface monitoring (EASM) solutions provide an outside-in view of the
enterprise, enabling organizations to identify areas of exposure and close security gaps.
02
Prioritize Identity Protection
The increase in malware-free attacks, social engineering and similar attempts to obtain
access/credentials has made it clear that a traditional endpoint-only solution is not
enough. Integrated identity protection with tight correlation across endpoints, identity
and data is essential. Conditional risk-based access policies are required to reduce MFA
burden and fatigue for legitimate users. CISA’s Shields Up initiative specifically urges
organizations to enforce MFA, as well as to identify and quickly assess unexpected or
unusual network behavior. Find solutions that not only help organizations extend MFA
into legacy and unmanaged systems — both of which are prone to attacks — but also
provide immediate detection and real-time prevention of lateral movement, suspicious
behavior, misuse of service accounts and more.
2023 GLOBAL THRE AT REPORT CrowdStrike 35
03
Prioritize Cloud Protection
04
Know Your Adversary
Do you know your adversaries? Check out the CrowdStrike Adversary Universe to learn
more about the actors dominating today’s threat landscape and learn which are most
likely to target your organization.
05
Practice Makes Perfect
While technology is clearly critical in the fight to detect and stop intrusions, security
teams are the crucial link in the chain to stop breaches. For security teams, practice
makes perfect. Encourage an environment that routinely performs tabletop exercises
and red/blue teaming to identify gaps and eliminate weaknesses in your cybersecurity
practices and response. And security teams shouldn’t be the only ones practicing —
initiate user-awareness programs to combat the continued threat of phishing and related
social engineering techniques.
2023 GLOBAL THRE AT REPORT CrowdStrike 36
AND SERVICES
CROWDSTRIKE PRODUCTS
Thre at Intelligence
CROWDSTRIKE FALCON® INTELLIGENCE | AUTOMATED THREAT
INTELLIGENCE
Enriches the events and incidents detected by the CrowdStrike Falcon® platform,
automating intelligence so security operations teams can make better, faster decisions
Cloud Securit y
CROWDSTRIKE FALCON® CLOUD WORKLOAD PROTECTION (CWP)
Provides comprehensive breach protection across private, public, hybrid and multi-cloud
environments, allowing customers to rapidly adopt and secure technology across any
workload
Incident Response for Cloud
Cloud Security Assessment
Cloud Compromise Assessment
Red Team / Blue Team Exercise for Cloud
Falcon Operational Support Services for Cloud Security
2023 GLOBAL THRE AT REPORT CrowdStrike 39
Identit y Protection
CROWDSTRIKE FALCON® IDENTITY THREAT DETECTION
Delivers the industry’s best real-time, identity-based attack detection and prevention,
incorporating behavioral, risk, identity and hundreds of other analytics to stop credential
compromise and identity store attacks
Identity Security Assessment
Falcon Operational Support Services for Identity Protection
Observabilit y
CROWDSTRIKE FALCON® LOGSCALE | LOG MANAGEMENT
Purpose-built for large-scale logging and real-time analysis of all of your data, metrics and
traces, providing live observability for organizations of all sizes
CrowdStrike Services
CROWDSTRIKE SERVICES | IR AND ADVISORY SERVICES
Delivers incident response, technical assessments, training, and advisory services that
help you prepare to defend against advanced threats, respond to widespread attacks,
and enhance your cybersecurity practices and controls
PREPARE:
ADVISORY SERVICES
Helps you prepare to defend against sophisticated threat actors with real-life
simulation exercises
Tabletop Exercise
Adversary Emulation Exercise
Red Team / Blue Team Exercise
Penetration Testing
RESPOND:
BREACH SERVICES
Helps you stop breaches, investigate incidents, and recover from attacks with speed
and surgical precision
Incident Response (DFIR)
Endpoint Recovery
Compromise Assessment
Adversarial Exposure Assessment
Network Security Monitoring
FORTIFY:
ADVISORY SERVICES
Helps you enhance your cybersecurity posture with actionable recommendations to
fortify your defenses
Cybersecurity Maturity Assessment
Technical Risk Assessment
Cloud Security Assessment
Identity Security Assessment
Security Operations Center Assessment
Security Program In Depth Assessment
Cybersecurity Enhancement Program
ABOUT
CrowdStrike (Nasdaq: CRWD), a global cybersecurity leader, has redefined
modern security with the world’s most advanced cloud-native platform for
protecting critical areas of enterprise risk-endpoints and cloud workloads,
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CrowdStrike
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