SPECPRO List of Cases

1. Heirs of Teofilo Gubatan vs. CA GR. No. 150206, March 13, 2009
2. Heirs of Ypon vs. Ricaforte, GR No. July 8, 2013
3. Montañer v. Shari’a District Court GR No. 174975, January 20, 2009
4. Alan Joseph A. Sheker v. Estate of Alice O. Sheker GR No. 157912, Dec. 13, 2007
5. Alfredo HIlado , et. Al v. Court of Appeals GR No. 164108, May 8, 2009
6. Heirs of Maglasang vs. Manila Banking Corporation GR No. 171206, Sept. 23, 2013
7. Quiazon V. Belen, GR No. 189121, July 31, 2013
8. Saludo, Jr. vs American Express International, Inc. GR No. 159507, April 19, 2006
9. Uriate vs. CFI of Negros, 33 SCRA 252, 259
10. Philippine Savings Bank v. Lantin, 124 SCRA 483
11. Baltazar vs Laxa, GR No. 174489 April 11, 2012
12. Rebusquillo and Orosco v. Sps Gualvez GR No. 204029, June 4, 2014
13. Pascual v. Court of Appeals, 409 SCRA 105
14. Pacioles Jr. v. Chuatoco-Ching, GR No. 127920 August 9, 2005
15. Ancheta v. Guersey-Dalaygon, GR. No.139868, June 8, 2006
16. Suntay III v. Cojuangco-Suntay, GR No. 183053, October 10, 2012
17. Ocampo v. Ocampo et.al, GR No. 187879, July 5, 2010
18. Tan v. Gedorio, Jr. GR No. 166520, March 14, 2008
19. Ricardo Silverio Jr. v. Court of Appeals, GR No. 178933, September 16, 2009
20. Corazon Gregorio, et.al vs. Madarang, et.al GR No 185226, February 11, 2010
21. Republic vs. CA GR No. 143483, January 31, 2002
22. RCBC vs. Hi-Tri Development Corporation GR No. 192413 June 13, 2012
23. Francisco v. CA 127 SCRA. 371
24. Alamayri v. Pabale GR No. 151243, April 30 2008
25. Vancil vs. Belmes GR No. 132223 June 19, 2001
26. Dinah B. Tonog vs CA GR No. 122906, February 7, 2002
27. Joycelyn Gualberto v. Crisanto Rafaelito Gualberto, GR No. 156254, June 28 2005
28. Lozada v. Arroyo et. Al GR Nos. 184739-80, April 24, 2013
29. Oposa vs. Factoran GR No. 101083, July 30, 1993
30. Jackson v. Macalino, 416 SCRA 390

• The case digests will be submitted before the final exams. This will form part of the Class
Standing for the final grade computation.

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1. Heirs of Teofilo Gubatan vs. CA GR. No. 150206, March 13, 2009

Heirs of Teofilo Gabatan vs. CA, G.R. 150206, March 13, 2009

Facts

Lourdes Pacana filed a Complaint for Recovery of Property and Ownership and
Possession, alleging that she is the sole owner of a 1.1062 hectare land in Calinugan,
Balulang, CDO, identified as Lot 3095 C-5, having inherited it from her deceased mother
(Hermogena), which she claimed to be the only child of Juan Gabatan.

• the basis of Lourdes: The parents of the petitioners, Teofilo and his wife, were
mere administrators or Trustee of Juan Gabatan. Teofilo Gabatan was also the
brother of Juan Gabatan.
• When the trustee died, the petitioners took possession of the disputed land and
did not return to Lourdes and her mother despite demand to vacate the same.
The heirs of Teofilo denied that the mother of Lourdes, Hermogena, was the daughter of
Juan Gabatan; that Juan died single and without issue/children; and Lourdes’ complaint
has already prescribed and barred by laches.

RTC favored Lourdes Pacada.

CA affirmed RTC.

CA’s reason:

• that Lourdes’ claim of filiation with Juan Gabatan was established during the trial
(action for recovery)
• CA: a long line of jurisprudence established that the findings of the trial court are
entitled to great weight and are not disturbed except for cogent reasons, such as
when the findings are not supported by evidence. The CA gave weight to the
Deed of Absolute Sale executed where the mother of Lourdes, Hermogena, was
identified as an heir of Juan Gabatan.
Aggrieved, the heirs of Teofilo recoursed to the SC contending that CA committed
reversible errors, among them are: (a) that Lourdes is the sole and surviving heir of Juan

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Gabatan, the only child of a certain Hermogena “Gabatan” and that the latter is the only
child of Juan Gabatan.

Issue and Ruling

Was it proper for the RTC to declare the heirship of Lourdes?

No. Jurisprudence dictates that the determination of who the legal heirs of the deceased
are must be made in proper special proceedings and not in an ordinary suit for recovery
of ownership and possession of the property. Determination of ownership must take
precedence over the action for recovery of possession and ownership. A trial court
cannot make a declaration of heirship in a civil action because it can only be made in a
special proceeding. Rule 1 Sec. 3(c) provides that “a special proceeding (a special form
of civil action) is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a
particular fact.” It is therefore clear that the declaration of heirship can only be made in a
special proceeding since the petitioners are seeking to establish a status or right. (Court
quoted Litam v. Rivera, Juaquino v. Lourdes Reyes)

2. Heirs of Ypon vs. Ricaforte, GR No. July 8, 2013

Heirs of Magdaleno Ypon vs Ricaforte GR. No. 198680, July 8, 2013

Facts:

Petitioners filed a complaint for Cancellation of Title and Reconveyance with Damages
(subject complaint) against respondent. In their complaint, they alleged that Magdaleno
Ypon (Magdaleno) died intestate and childless, leaving behind parcels of land. Claiming
to be the sole heir of Magdaleno, Gaudioso, Respondent executed an Affidavit of Self-
Adjudication and caused the cancellation of the aforementioned certificates of title,
leading to their subsequent transfer in his name to the prejudice of petitioners who are
Magdaleno’s collateral relatives and successors-in-interest.

In his Answer, Respondent alleged that he is the lawful son of Magdaleno as evidenced
by: (a) his certificate of Live Birth; (b) two (2) letters from Polytechnic School; and (c) a

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certified true copy of his passport. Further, by way of affirmative defense, he claimed
that: (a) petitioners have no cause of action against him; (b) the complaint fails to state a
cause of action; and (c) the case is not prosecuted by the real parties-in-interest, as
there is no showing that the petitioners have been judicially declared as Magdaleno’s
lawful heirs.

The RTC issued an order, finding that the subject complaint failed to state a cause of
action against Gaudioso. It observed that while the plaintiffs therein had established
their relationship with Magdaleno in a previous special proceeding for the issuance of
letters of administration, this did not mean that they could already be considered as the
decedent’s compulsory heirs. Quite the contrary, Gaudioso satisfactorily established the
fact that he is Magdaleno’s son – and hence, his compulsory heir – through the
documentary evidence he submitted.

The plaintiffs therein filed a motion for reconsideration which was, however, denied.

Aggrieved, petitioners sought direct recourse to the SC through the instant petition.

Issue:

Whether the RTC’s dismissal of the case on the ground that the subject complaint failed
to state a cause of action was proper.

Held:

Yes, Jurisprudence dictates that the determination of who are the legal heirs of the
deceased must be made in the proper special proceedings in court, and not in an ordinary
suit for recovery of ownership and possession of property. This must take precedence
over the action for recovery of possession and ownership. The Court has consistently ruled
that the trial court cannot make a declaration of heirship in the civil action for the reason
that such a declaration can only be made in a special proceeding. Under Section 3, Rule
1 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court, a civil action is defined as one by which a party sues
another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a
wrong while a special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status,
a right, or a particular fact. It is then decisively clear that the declaration of heirship can
be made only in a special proceeding inasmuch as the petitioners here are seeking the
establishment of a status or right.
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Verily, while a court usually focuses on the complaint in determining whether the same
fails to state a cause of action, a court cannot disregard decisions material to the proper
appreciation of the questions before it. Thus, concordant with applicable jurisprudence,
since a determination of heirship cannot be made in an ordinary action for recovery of
ownership and/or possession, the dismissal of Civil Case was altogether proper.

3. Montañer v. Shari’a District Court GR No. 174975, January 20, 2009

Montañer vs. Shari’a District Court, et al Digest

G.R. 174975, January 20, 2009

Facts

After the death of Alejandro Montañer Sr., Liling and Almahleen, both muslims, filed a
“complaint” for the judicial partition of properties before the Shari’a District Court in
Marawi. They alleged Alejandro Sr was a Muslim, they are the first family, and requested
for the estimated value of the estate of the decedent. They prayed for partition of the
estate of the decedent and appointment of an administrator. Luiso Kho et al., filed a
motion to dismiss upon various grounds. Sharia Court dismissed but afterwards
reconsidered its order of dismissal and allowed Liling et al to adduce further evidence. In
its second order, it ordered the continuation of trial, pre-trial, among others.

Issue

Luisa Kho et al sought recourse before the Supreme Court, and one of the issues raised
was that (II) the Shari’a District Court did not acquire jurisdiction over the complaint of
Liling et al because the “Estates and Properties of the Late Alendro Sr.” is not a natural
or Juridical person with capacity to be sued.

Ruling

SC: The underlying presumption of Luisa Kho et al is an erroneous understanding of

special proceedings before the Sharia court – they presume that it is an ordinary civil
action against a deceased person. Part of it may be because of the designation of the
parties as plaintiffs or defendants and the case was denominated as a special civil action.

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 1. A petition for issuance of letters of administration is a petition to establish a
right or status
The proceedings before the Shari’a court for the issuance of letters of administration,
settlement, and distribution of the estates is a special proceeding. Rule 1, Sec. 3(c) of the
Rules of Court defines a special proceeding as “a remedy by which a party seeks to
establish a status, a right, or a particular fact”

In Musa v. Moson, the Court applied the rules on special proceedings for the settlement
of the estate of a deceased Muslim. When Liling et al filed a petition for the issuance of
letters of administration, etc, they sought to establish a special proceeding by seeking to
establish the fact of death of the decedent and later be recognized as the heirs (a status
or right).

2. In a special proceeding, there is no definite adverse party. has only one

definite party.
3. The estate is not sued for any cause of action because the purpose of the
settlement of the decedent is to determine all the assets of the estate, pay its
liabilities, and distribute the residual to those entitled to the same.

4. Alan Joseph A. Sheker v. Estate of Alice O. Sheker GR No. 157912, Dec. 13, 2007

Remedial Law Case Digest:

ALAN JOSEPH A. SHEKER, petitioner, vs. ESTATE OF ALICE O. SHEKER,

VICTORIA S. MEDINA-Administratrix, respondent.
[G.R. No. 157912. December 13, 2007.]

Facts:
The RTC admitted to probate the holographic will of Alice O. Sheker and thereafter issued
an order for all the creditors to file their respective claims against the estate. The petitioner
filed a contingent claim for the agent’s commission due him and reimbursement for
expenses incurred and/or to be incurred by the petitioner in the course of negotiating the
sale of said realties.

The executrix of the respondent moved for the dismissal of said money claim against the
estate on the grounds that the requisite docket fee, as prescribed by the Rules, had not
been paid; that the petitioner failed to attach a certification against non-forum shopping;
and that the petitioner failed to attach a written explanation as to why the money claim
was not filed and served personally.

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The RTC issued the assailed order dismissing without prejudice the money claim based
on the grounds advanced by the respondent.

The petitioner maintains that the RTC erred in strictly applying to a probate proceeding
the rules requiring a certification of non-forum shopping, a written explanation for non-
personal filing, and the payment of docket fees upon filing of the claim. Further, it insists
that Section 2, Rule 72 of the Rules of Court provides that rules in ordinary actions are
applicable to special proceedings only in a suppletory manner.

Issues:
• Did the RTC err in dismissing petitioner’s contingent money claim against
respondent estate for failure of petitioner to attach to his motion a certification
against non-forum shopping?
• Whether the rules in ordinary actions are can only be applied suppletorily
• Whether the non-payment of the docket fees be a ground of dismissal
• Whether or not written explanation of non-personal service of papers a ground
for dismissal
Rulings:
• The Court rules in the affirmative. The certification of non-forum shopping is
required only for complaints and other initiatory pleadings. The RTC erred in
ruling that a contingent money claim against the estate of a decedent is an
initiatory pleading. In the present case, the whole probate proceeding was
initiated upon the filing of the petition for allowance of the decedent’s will. Under
Sections 1 and 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court, after granting letters of
testamentary or of administration, all persons having money claims against the
decedent are mandated to file or notify the court and the estate administrator of
their respective money claims; otherwise, they would be barred, subject to
certain exceptions.
A money claim is only an incidental matter in the main action for the settlement of the
decedent’s estate; more so if the claim is contingent since the claimant cannot even
institute a separate action for a mere contingent claim. Hence, herein petitioner’s
contingent money claim, not being an initiatory pleading, does not require a certification
against non-forum shopping. Hence, certificate of non-forum shopping is not required.

• Section 2, Rule 72, Part II of the same Rules of Court provides:

Sec. 2. Applicability of rules of Civil Actions. — In the absence of special provisions, the
rules provided for in ordinary actions shall be, as far as practicable, applicable in special
proceedings.

Stated differently, special provisions under Part II of the Rules of Court govern special
proceedings; but in the absence of special provisions, the rules provided for in Part I of
the Rules governing ordinary civil actions shall be applicable to special proceedings, as
far as practicable.

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The word “practicable” is defined as: possible to practice or perform; capable of being put
into practice, done or accomplished. 4 This means that in the absence of special
provisions, rules in ordinary actions may be applied in special proceedings as much as
possible and where doing so would not pose an obstacle to said proceedings. Nowhere
in the Rules of Court does it categorically say that rules in ordinary actions are
inapplicable or merely suppletory to special proceedings. Provisions of the Rules of Court
requiring a certification of non-forum shopping for complaints and initiatory pleadings, a
written explanation for non-personal service and filing, and the payment of filing fees for
money claims against an estate would not in any way obstruct probate proceedings, thus,
they are applicable to special proceedings such as the settlement of the estate of a
deceased person as in the present case.

• Because the creditor’s claim is not initiatory. It is not a ground for dismissal,
because such filing fees constitute a lien on the judgment pursuant to Section
2, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, or the trial court may order the payment of
such filing fees within a reasonable time. After all, the trial court had already
assumed jurisdiction over the action for settlement of the estate. Clearly,
therefore, non-payment of filing fees for a money claim against the estate is not
one of the grounds for dismissing a money claim against the estate.

• In the present case, petitioner holds office in Salcedo Village, Makati City, while
counsel for respondent and the RTC which rendered the assailed orders are
both in Iligan City. The lower court should have taken judicial notice of the great
distance between said cities and realized that it is indeed not practicable to
serve and file the money claim personally. Thus, following Medina v. Court of
Appeals, the failure of petitioner to submit a written explanation why service has
not been done personally, may be considered as superfluous and the RTC
should have exercised its discretion under Section 11, Rule 13, not to dismiss
the money claim of petitioner, in the interest of substantial justice and purpose
of probate proceeding for speedy settlement of estate of deceased.
Takeaway: Special proceeding is applicable to establish the status or right of a party or a particular fact, or
any remedy other than ordinary suit in a court of justice. In this case, the special proceeding helped to
expedite the contingent money claims without the need to furnish the prerequisites in an ordinary action.

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5. Alfredo HIlado , et. Al v. Court of Appeals GR No. 164108, May 8, 2009

Alfredo Hilado et.al. vs. CA Digest

G.R. 164108

Facts

When Roberto Benedicto (RSB) died, his surviving spouse Julita filed and was granted by Manila
RTC the issuance of the letters of administration.

(Nota Bene by Jarre) RSB was appointed as an officer by F. Marcos Sr. for Nasutra and
Philsocom, lots of cases were filed against him, including this case filed by the sugar planters
mostly from Negros.

Julita was then ordered to submit a list of inventory of RSB’s estate and liabilities etc. In Sept.
2001, petitioners Hilado et al filed with the Manila RTC that they be furnished with all the copies
and orders pertaining to the intestate proceedings, disputing their personality to intervene.
Manila RTC denied Hilado’s motion, CA affirmed.

Hilado et al argued that their right to intervene is supported not by right of intervention but by
various rules on Special Proceedings.

Issue

Does Hilado et al have a right to intervene in the instant proceedings?

Ruling

No.

Although the Rules on Special Proceedings entitle “any interested persons” or “any persons
interested in the estate” to participate in varying capacities in the testate or intestate
proceedings, however, it appears that the claims against Benedicto were based on tort, as they
arose from his actions in connection with Philsucom, Nasutra, and Traders Royal Bank.

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Hence, Section 2 of Rule 72 applies. It states that “the rules for ordinary actions shall be
applicable in special proceedings.” Furthermore, Rule 19 Sec. 1, a rule on ordinary actions,
applies. It provides that “a person who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation x x x be
allowed to intervene in the action.” While this rule does not literally preclude Hilado et al, case
law consistently held that such interest “must be actual and material, direct and immediate,
and not simply contingent and expectant.” (Batama Farmers Coop vs. Hon. Rosal)

6. Heirs of Maglasang vs. Manila Banking Corporation GR No. 171206, Sept. 23, 2013

Claims against the estate – Claims covered

Heirs of Maglasang v. Manila Banking Corporation

G.R. No. 171206, September 23, 2013

FACTS:
Spouses Flaviano and Salud Maglasang (Sps.Maglasang) obtained a credit line from
respondent in the amount of ₱350,000.00 which was secured by a real estate mortgage executed
over seven of their properties. They availed of their credit line by securing loans in the amounts of
₱209,790.50 and ₱139,805.83 on October 24, 1975 and March 15, 1976, respectively, both of
which becoming due and demandable within a period of one year.

The probate court, issued a Notice to Creditors for the filing of money claims against
Flaviano’s estate. Accordingly, as one of the creditors of Flaviano, respondent notified the probate
court of its claim in the amount of ₱382,753.19.During the pendency of the intestate proceedings,
Edgar and Oscar were able to obtain several loans from respondent, secured by promissory notes
which they signed. In an order, the probate court terminated the proceedings with the surviving
heirs executing an extra-judicial partition of the properties of Flaviano’s estate. The loan
obligations owed by the estate to respondent, however, remained unsatisfied due to respondent’s
certification that Flaviano’s account was undergoing a restructuring. Nonetheless, the probate
court expressly recognized the rights of respondent under the mortgage and promissory notes
executed by the Sps. Maglasang, specifically, its "right to foreclose the same within the statutory
period." The RTC decided in favor of the respondent.
The petitioners elevated the case to the CA on appeal, contending, inter alia, that the
remedies available to respondent under Section 7, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court (Rules) are
alternative and exclusive, such that the election of one operates as a waiver or abandonment of the
others. Thus, when respondent filed its claim against the estate of Flaviano in the proceedings
before the probate court, it effectively abandoned its right to foreclose on the mortgage.The CA
denied the petitioners’ appeal and affirmed the RTC’s Decision.

ISSUE: Whether or not, after the respondent foreclosed the mortgage, the respondent may
still file a claim against the estate?

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RULING:

No. Claims against deceased persons should be filed during the settlement
proceedings of their estate. Such proceedings are primarily governed by special rules found
under Rules 73 to 90 of the Rules, although rules governing ordinary actions may, as far
as practicable, apply suppletorily. Among these special rules, Section 7, Rule 86 of the
Rules (Section 7, Rule86) provides the rule in dealing with secured claims against the
estate:

SEC. 7. Mortgage debt due from estate. – A creditor holding a claim against the
deceased secured by a mortgage or other collateral security, may abandon the security and
prosecute his claim in the manner provided in this rule, and share in the general distribution
of the assets of the estate; or he may foreclose his mortgage or realize upon his security, by
action in court, making the executor or administrator a party defendant, and if there is a
judgment for a deficiency, after the sale of the mortgaged premises, or the property
pledged, in the foreclosure or other proceeding to realize upon the security, he may claim
his deficiency judgment in the manner provided in the preceding section; or he may rely
upon his mortgage or other security alone, and foreclose the same at any time within the
period of the statute of limitations, and in that event he shall not be admitted as a creditor,
and shall receive no share in the distribution of the other assets of the estate; but nothing
herein contained shall prohibit the executor or administrator from redeeming the property
mortgaged or pledged, by paying the debt for which it is held as security, under the
direction of the court, if the court shall adjudged it to be for the best interest of the estate
that such redemption shall be made.

As the foregoing generally speaks of "a creditor holding a claim against the deceased secured by
a mortgage or other collateral security" as above-highlighted, it may be reasonably concluded that
the aforementioned section covers all secured claims, whether by mortgage or any other form of
collateral, which a creditor may enforce against the estate of the deceased debtor.
In our jurisdiction, the remedies available to the mortgage creditor are deemed alternative
and not cumulative. Notably, an election of one remedy operates as a waiver of the other. For this
purpose, a remedy is deemed chosen upon the filing of the suit for collection or upon the filing of
the complaint in an action for foreclosure of mortgage, pursuant to the provision of Rule 68 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. As to extrajudicial foreclosure, such remedy is deemed elected by
the mortgage creditor upon filing of the petition not with any court of justice but with the Office
of the Sheriff of the province where the sale is to be made, in accordance with the provisions of
Act No. 3135, as amended by Act No.4118.
In this case, respondent sought to extra-judicially foreclose the mortgage of the
properties previously belonging to Sps. Maglasang (and now, their estates) and, therefore,
availed of the third option. Lest it be misunderstood, it did not exercise the first option of
directly filing a claim against the estate, as petitioners assert, since it merely notified the
probate court of the outstanding amount of its claim against the estate of Flaviano and that
it was currently restructuring the account. Thus, having unequivocally opted to exercise
the third option of extra-judicial foreclosure under Section 7, Rule 86, respondent is now
precluded from filing a suit to recover any deficiency amount as earlier discussed.

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7. Quiazon V. Belen, GR No. 189121, July 31, 2013

AMELIA GARCIA-QUIAZON, JENNETH QUIAZON and MARIA JENNIFER

QUIAZON
, Petitioners, vs.
MA. LOURDES BELEN, for and in behalf of MARIA LOURDES ELISE QUIAZON
, Respondent.
G.R. No. 189121 July 31, 2013
FACTS:
In 1994, Maria Lourdes Elise Quiazon (Elise), represented by her mother, Ma. Lourdes
Belen(Lourdes), filed a Petition for Letters of Administration before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Las Piñas City. In her Petition docketed as SP Proc. No. M-3957, Elise
claims that she is the natural child of Eliseo having been conceived and born at the time
when her parents were both capacitated to marry each other. Insisting on the legal
capacity of Eliseo and Lourdes to marry, Elise impugned the validity of
Eliseo’s
marriage to Amelia by claiming that it was bigamous for having been contracted during the
subsistence of the latter’s marriage with one Filipito Sandico (Filipito).
Claiming that the venue of the petition was improperly laid, Amelia, together with her
children,Jenneth and Jennifer, opposed the issuance of the letters of administration by
filing anOpposition/Motion to Dismiss. The petitioners asserted that as shown by his
Death Certificate, Eliseowas a resident of Capas, Tarlac and not of Las Piñas City, at
the time of his death. Pursuant to Section 1,Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court,
the petition for settlement of decedent’s estate should have been
filed in Capas, Tarlac and not in Las Piñas City.

ISSUE:
Was the venue of Elise’s petition improperly laid?

RULING:
NO. Under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of
administration of the estate of a decedent should be filed in the RTC of the province
where the decedent resides at the time of his death:
Sec. 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled.
–
If the decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an
alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his estate settled, in the
Court of First Instance now Regional Trial Court in the province in which he resides at the time of
his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance now Regional
Trial Court of any province in which he had estate. The court first taking cognizance of the
settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other
courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of residence of the
decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding, except in

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an appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the
record. (Emphasis supplied).
The term "resides" connotes "actual residence" as distinguished from "legal residence or
domicile." This term "resides," like the terms "residing" and "residence," is elastic and
should be interpreted in the light of the object or purpose of the statute or rule in which
it is employed.

8. Saludo, Jr. vs American Express International, Inc. GR No. 159507, April 19, 2006

Saludo v. American Express

G.R. NO. 159507

DATE OF PROMULGATION: April 19, 2006

FACTS
Aniceto G. Saludo, Jr. filed a complaint for damages against the American Express
International, Inc. for alleged wrongful dishonor of his AMEX credit card and
the supplementary card issued to his daughter. The dishonor of these AMEX
credit cards was allegedly unjustified as they resulted from respondents'
unilateral act of suspending petitioner Saludo's account for his failure to pay its balance.
In their answer, respondents specifically denied the allegations in the complaint.
Further, they raised the affirmative defenses of lack of cause of action and
improper venue. On the latter, respondents a v e r r e d t h a t t h e c o m p l a i n t
should be dismissed on the ground that venue was improperly laid
because none of the parties was a resident of Leyte.
T h e y a l l e g e d t h a t r e s p o n d e n t s w e r e n o t residents of Southern Leyte.
Moreover, notwithstanding the claim in his complaint, petitioner Saludo was not
allegedly a resident thereof as evidenced by the fact that his community tax certificate,
which
was presented when he executed the complaint's verification and cer
t i f i c a t i o n o f n o n - f o r u m shopping, was issued at Pasay City.

ISSUE/S
Whether venue was improperly laid because not one of the parties, including Saludo,
was a resident of Southern Leyte at the time of filing of the complaint

RULING
No.
The Court explained that the term "resides" as employed in the rule on venue on
personal actions filed with the courts of first instance means the place of abode,
whether permanent or temporary, of the plaintiff or the defendant, as distinguished from
"domicile" which denotes a fixed permanent residence to which, when absent, one has
the intention of returning. There is a difference between domicile and residence.
Residence is used to indicate a place of abode, whether permanent or temporary;
domicile denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when absent, one has the
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intention of returning. A man may have a residence in one place and a domicile in
another. Residence is not domicile, but domicile is residence coupled with the intention
to remain for an unlimited time.
It can be readily gleaned that the definition of "residence" for purposes of election law is
more stringent in that it is equated with the term "domicile." Hence, for the said purpose,
the term "residence" imports "not only an intention to reside in a fixed place but also
personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention."
When parsed, therefore, the term "residence" requires two elements:
(1) intention to reside in the particular place
; and
(2) personal or physical presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of
such intention.

9. Uriarte vs. CFI of Negros, 33 SCRA 252, 259

Case Digest
VICENTE URIARTE, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF NEGROS OCCIDENTAL
(12th Judicial District) THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA, BRANCH IV, JUAN URIARTE
ZAMACONA and HIGINIO URIARTE, respondents. 33 SCRA 252, Nos. L-21938-39 May 29, 1970

Facts. -
Juan Uriarte y Goite died in Spain and he left reasonable properties in the Philippines. Vicente Uriarte,
who is claiming to be the son and sole heir of the deceased, filed a petition for the intestate settlement of
the estate of the deceased in the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental. However, said petition was
opposed by the nephews of Juan stating that there is a valid will left by the deceased in Spain, a copy of
which is being requested. Then, the nephews filed a settlement of the estate in the court of Manila, on the
basis of the alleged will of the deceased. Vicente filed an opposition to the settlement of estate in the
court of Manila stating that the court of Negros Occidental has already acquired original jurisdiction over
the case. The opposition of Vicente was dismissed together with the intestate settlement in the CFI of
Negros. Hence, Vicente filed a petition for certiorari questioning the dismissal of the intestate settlement
in the CFI of Negros.

Issue. -
Whether or not the intestate settlement should be dismissed

Held.
The Supreme Court held that the dismissal of the intestate proceeding is proper. Under the Rules on the
settlement of estate of the deceased person, testate proceedings enjoy priority over intestate
proceedings. Therefore, in case intestate settlement was filed prior to the finding of the will of the
deceased, then the intestate proceedings shall be dismissed to give priority to the testate proceeding.

Doctrines learned.
–
(1)

Under the Judiciary Act of 1948 (Section 44, paragraph [4]), Courts of First Instance have original exclusive jurisdiction over "all
matters of probate," that is, over special proceedings for the settlement of the estate of deceased persons
—
whether they died testate or intestate. (2) The matter of venue, or the particular Court of First Instance where the special proceeding
should be commenced, is regulated by former Rule 75, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, now Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised

14
Rules of Court, which provides that the estate of a decedent inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen
or an alien, shall be in the Court of First Instance in the province in which he resided at the time of his death, and if he is an
inhabitant of a foreign country, the court of first instance of any province in which he had estate.(3) Testate proceedings enjoy
priority over intestate proceedings.(4) Where intestate proceedings had been commenced, the probate of will should be filed in
same court.(5) Question of acknowledgment as a natural child of testator may be presented to probate court.(6)

10. Philippine Savings Bank v. Lantin, 124 SCRA 483

PHILIPPINE SAVINGS BANK v. GREGORIO T. LANTIN, GR No. L-33929, 1983-09-02

Facts:
- A duplex-apartment house on a lot... at San Diego Street, Sampaloc, Manila, and owned by
the spouses Filomeno and Socorro Tabligan
The duplex-apartment house was built for the spouses by private respondent. Candido
Ramos, a duly licensed architect and building contractor, at a total cost of P32,927.00. The
spouses paid private respondent the sum of P7,139.00 only. Hence, the latter used his own
money, P25,788.50 in all, to finish the construction of the duplex-apartment.
Meanwhile,... the spouses Tabligan obtained from petitioner Philippine Savings Bank three
(3) loans in the total amount of P35,000.00, the purpose of which was to complete the
construction of the duplex-apartment. To secure payment of the loans, the spouses
executed... three (3) promissory notes and three (3) deeds of real estate mortgages over the
property subject matter of this litigation.
On December 19, 1966, the petitioner registered the December 16, 1966 deed of real
estate mortgage.
The subsequent mortgages of February 1, 1967, and February 28, 1967, were registered.
At the time of the registration of these mortgages, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 86195
was free from all liens and encumbrances.
The spouses failed to pay their monthly amortizations. As a result thereof, the petitioner
bank foreclosed the mortgages, and at the public auction held on July 23, 1969, was the
highest bidder.
Petitioner bank registered the certificate or sale issued in its favor.
Upon the other hand, the private respondent filed an action against the spouses to collect
the unpaid cost of the construction of the duplex-apartment.
During its pendency, the private respondent succeeded in obtaining the issuance of a writ of
preliminary attachment, and pursuant thereto, had the property in question... attached.

15
A decision was rendered in Civil Case No. 69228 in favor of the private respondent and
against the spouses. A writ of execution was accordingly issued but was returned
unsatisfied.
As the spouses did not have any properties to satisfy the judgment in Civil Case No. 69228,
the private respondent addressed a letter to the petitioner for the delivery to him (private
respondent) of his pro-rata share in the value of the duplex-apartment in... accordance with
Article 2242 of the Civil Code. The petitioner refused to pay the pro-rata value prompting
the private respondent to file the instant action.
Issue:
Whether or not the private respondent is entitled to claim a pro-rata share in the value of
the property in question
Ruling:
Concurrence of credits occurs when the same specific property of the debtor or all of his
property is subjected to the claims of several creditors. The concurrence of credits raises no
questions of consequence where... the value of the property or the value of all assets of the
debtor is sufficient to pay in full all the creditors. However, it becomes material when said
assets are insufficient for then some creditors of necessity will not be paid or... some
creditors will not obtain the full satisfaction of their claims. In this situation, the question of
preference will then arise, that is to say who of the creditors will be paid ahead of the others.
Under the system established by Article 2249 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, only taxes
and assessments upon immovable property enjoy absolute preference. All the remaining
specified classes of preferred creditors under Article 2242 enjoy no priority among
themselves. Their credits shall be satisfied pro-rata, i.e., in proportion to the amount of the
respective credits.
The bank could not have known of any contractor's lien because, as far as it was concerned,
it... financed the entire construction even if the stated purpose of the loans was only to
"complete" the construction.
Since the action filed by the private respondent is not one which can be considered as
"equivalent general liquidation" having the same import as an insolvency or settlement of the
decedent's estate proceeding, the well established principle must be applied, that a
purchaser... in good faith and for value takes registered land free from liens and
encumbrances other than statutory liens and those recorded in the Certificate of Title. It is
an admitted fact that at the time the deeds of real estate mortgage in favor of the...
petitioner bank were constituted, the transfer certificate of title of the spouses Tagliban was
free from any recorded lien and encumbrances, so that the only registered liens in the title
were deeds in favor of the petitioner.
Private respondent's claim must remain subordinate to the petitioner bank's title over the
property.

16
11. Baltazar vs Laxa, GR No. 174489 April 11, 2012

Baltazar v. Laxa, G.R. No. 174489, April 11, 2012.

DOCTRINE: The state of being forgetful does not necessarily make a person mentally unsound to render him unfit to

execute a Will.

[DEL CASTILLO, J.]

FACTS
Paciencia was a 78-year-old spinster at the time she executed her will. The same was executed in the
house of a certain retired Judge Limpin, was read to Paciencia twice, was signed by her, and was attested
to by three credible witnesses. Petitioner Rosie Mateo, daughter of the first cousin of testatrix, testified that
the latter was “magulyan” or “forgetful” because she would sometimes leave her wallet in the kitchen then
start looking for it moments later.

Childless and without any brothers or sisters, Paciencia bequeathed all her properties to respondent
Lorenzo R. Laxa (Lorenzo) and his wife Corazon F. Laxa and their children Luna Lorella Laxa and Katherine
Ross Laxa. More than four years after the death of Paciencia or on April 27, 2000, Lorenzo filed a petition
with the RTC of Guagua, Pampanga for the probate of the Will of Paciencia and for the issuance of Letters
of Administration in his Favor.

Petitioners filed an Amended Opposition asking the RTC to deny the probate of Paciencia’s Will on the
following grounds: the Will was not executed and attested to in accordance with the requirements of the
law; that Paciencia was mentally incapable to make a Will at the time of its execution; that she was
forced to execute the Will under duress or influence of fear or threats; that the execution of the Will had
been procured by undue and improper pressure and influence by Lorenzo or by some other persons for his
benefit; that the signature of Paciencia on the Will was forged; that assuming the signature to be genuine,
it was obtained through fraud or trickery; and, that Paciencia did not intend the document to be her Will.

ISSUE
Whether or not forgetfulness is equivalent to being unsound mind, hence lack of testamentary capacity.

RULING
NO. The state of being forgetful does not necessarily make a person mentally unsound so as to render him
unfit to execute a will. Forgetfulness is not equivalent to being of unsound mind. Article 799 of the Civil
Code provides for the criteria for soundness of mind. In this case, apart from the testimony of Rosie
pertaining to Paciencia’s forgetfulness, there is no substantial evidence, medical or otherwise, that would
show that Paciencia was of unsound mind at the time of the execution of the will. The law presumes that
every person is of sound mind, in the absence of proof to the contrary.

17
A scrutiny of the Will discloses that [Paciencia] was aware of the nature of the document she executed.
She specially requested that the customs of her faith be observed upon her death.

It shall be sufficient if the testator was able at the time of making the will to know the nature of
the estate to be disposed of, the proper objects of his bounty, and the character of the
testamentary act.

12. Rebusquillo and Orosco v. Sps Gualvez GR No. 204029, June 4, 2014
Rebusquillo v Domingo (2014)

AVELINA ABARIENTOS REBUSQUILLO [substituted by her heirs, except Emelinda R.

Gualvez] and SALVADOR A. OROSCO, Petitioners, vs. SPS. DOMINGO and EMELINDA
REBUSQUILLO GUALVEZ and the CITY ASSESSOR OF LEGAZPI CITY, Respondents.
G.R. No. 204029, June 4, 2014

Doctrine:
An absolutely simulated or fictitious contract is void. A relative simulation, when it does not prejudice a
third person and is not intended for any purpose contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or
public policy binds the parties to their real agreement. (Art. 1346, NCC)

Facts:
Petitioner was one of the seven children of deceased, Eulalio Abarientos and Victoria Villareal.
Both of them died intestate. The deceased left a parcel of land in Legazpi City. In 2001,
respondent Emelinda (daughter of petitioner), made petitioner sign two documents. In 2003,
the petitioner discovered that the two documents were an affidavit of self-adjudication, and a
deed of absolute sale in favor of the respondent spouses. Petitioner then filed an action to
annul the two documents before the RTC. In the respondents’ answer, they admitted the
execution of the affidavit and deed, but they argued that it was with the consent of all the heirs
of Eulalio and Victoria, and that such was agreed to be done to facilitate the titling of the
property. Respondents further argued that the petitioner received the amount of Php 50,000
for the sale.

The RTC ruled in favor of the petitioner. The CA reversed the RTC’s decision and said that the
affidavit and the sale were valid.

Issue:
Whether or not the affidavit of self-adjudication and the sale are valid

Held:
No. The petition is granted. Both the affidavit and the deed of sale are void.

18
Ratio:
An Affidavit of Self-Adjudication is only proper when the affiant is the sole heir of the decedent.
(Sec. 1, Rule 74, ROC). As admitted by respondents, Avelina was not the sole heir of Eulalio. In
fact, as admitted by respondents, petitioner Salvador is one of the co-heirs by right of
representation of his mother. Without a doubt, Avelina had perjured herself when she declared
in the affidavit that she is the only daughter and sole heir of spouses Eulalio and Victoria. The
falsity of this claim renders her act of adjudicating to herself the inheritance left by her father
invalid.

In effect, Avelina was not in the right position to sell and transfer the absolute ownership of the
subject property to respondents. As she was not the sole heir of Eulalio and her Affidavit of
Self- Adjudication is void, the subject property is still subject to partition. Avelina, in fine, did
not have the absolute ownership of the subject property but only an aliquot portion. What she
could have transferred to respondents was only the ownership of such aliquot portion. It is
apparent from the admissions of respondents and the records of this case that Avelina had no
intention to transfer the ownership, of whatever extent, over the property to respondents.
Hence, the Deed of Absolute Sale is nothing more than a simulated contract.

The Civil Code provides:

Art. 1345. Simulation of a contract may be absolute or relative. The former takes place when
the parties do not intend to be bound at all; the latter, when the parties conceal their true
agreement.

Art. 1346. An absolutely simulated or fictitious contract is void. A relative simulation, when it
does not prejudice a third person and is not intended for any purpose contrary to law, morals,
good customs, public order or public policy binds the parties to their real agreement.

In the present case, respondents admitted that the purpose of the sale was to facilitate titling
and not the transfer of ownership.

SOURCE: PALS 2016 (Prepared by: Dean Ma. Soledad Deriquito-Mawis and the students of Lyceum of the
Philippines University)

19
13. Pascual v. Court of Appeals, 409 SCRA 105

SPOUSES RICARDO PASCUAL vs. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS:
Petitioner Consolacion and respondent Remedios are the niece and granddaughter, respectively,
of the late Canuto. Canuto and 11 other individuals, including his sister Catalina and his brother
Victoriano, were co-owners of a parcel of land in Tanza, Navotas, Metro Manila. The property,
known as Lot 2 of Plan Psu 13245, had an area of 9,347 square meters and was covered by Original
Certificate of Title No. 4207 issued by the Register of Deeds of Rizal. CATALINA, CANUTO,
and VICTORIANO each owned an aliquot 10/70 share or 1,335 square meters of Lot 2. On 26
September 1956, CANUTO and CONSOLACION executed a Kasulatan ng Bilihang Tuluyan[4]
(“KASULATAN”). Under the KASULATAN, CANUTO sold his 10/70 share in Lot 2 in favor of
CONSOLACION for P2,250.00. The KASULATAN, notarized by Notary Public.
CONSOLACION immediately took possession of Lot Nos. 2-A and 2-E. She later declared the
land for taxation purposes and paid the corresponding real estate taxes On 4 February 1988,
REMEDIOS filed a complaint against CONSOLACION and her spouse Ricardo Pascual in the
Regional Trial Court of Malabon, Branch 165, for “Annulment or Cancellation of Transfer
Certificate [of Title] and Damages.” REMEDIOS claimed that she is the owner of Lot Nos. 2-A
and 2-E because CATALINA devised these lots to her in CATALINA’s last will and testament.
Petitioners sought to dismiss the complaint on the ground of prescription. Petitioners claimed that
the basis of the action is fraud, and REMEDIOS should have filed the action within four years
from the registration of CONSOLACION’s title on 28 October 1968 and not some 19 years later
on 4 February 1988.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the action is barred by prescription..

RULING:

Yes. The action is already barred by prescription. The four-year prescriptive period relied upon
by the trial court applies only if the fraud does not give rise to an implied trust, and the action is to
annul a voidable contract under Article 1391 of the Civil Code. In such a case, the four-year
prescriptive period under Article 1391 begins to run from the time of discovery of the mistake,
violence, intimidation, undue influence or fraud. In the present case, REMEDIOS does not seek to
annul the KASULATAN. REMEDIOS does not assail the KASULATAN as a voidable contract.
In fact, REMEDIOS admits the validity of the sale of 1,335 square meters of land under the
KASULATAN. However, REMEDIOS alleges that the excess area of 1,335 meters is not part of
the sale under the KASULATAN. REMEDIOS seeks the removal of this excess area from TCT
No. (232252) 1321 that was issued to CONSOLACION. Consequently, REMEDIOS’ action is for
“Annulment or Cancellation of Transfer Certificate [of Title] and Damages.”[14] REMEDIOS’
action is based on an implied trust under Article 1456 since she claims that the inclusion of the
additional 1,335 square meters in TCT No. (232252) 1321 was without basis. In effect,
20
REMEDIOS asserts that CONSOLACION acquired the additional 1,335 square meters through
mistake or fraud and thus CONSOLACION should be considered a trustee of an implied trust for
the benefit of the rightful owner of the property. Clearly, the applicable prescriptive period is ten
years under Article 1144 and not four years under Articles 1389 and 1391. It is now well-settled
that the prescriptive period to recover property obtained by fraud or mistake, giving rise to an
implied trust under Article 1456 of the Civil Code, is ten years pursuant to Article 1144.[16] This
ten-year prescriptive period begins to run from the date the adverse party repudiates the implied
trust, which repudiation takes place when the adverse party registers the land. REMEDIOS filed
her complaint on 4 February 1988 or more than 19 years after CONSOLACION registered her title
over Lot Nos. 2-A and 2-E on 28 October 1968. Unquestionably, REMEDIOS filed the complaint
late thus warranting its dismissal. As the Court recently declared in Spouses Alfredo v. Spouses Borras,
[18] — Following Caro, [19] we have consistently held that an action for reconveyance based on an implied
trust prescribes in ten years. We went further by specifying the reference point of the ten-year prescriptive
period as the date of the registration of the deed or the issuance of the title.

14. Pacioles Jr. v. Chuatoco-Ching, GR No. 127920 August 9, 2005

EMILIO B. PACIOLES v. MIGUELA CHUATOCO-CHING, GR NO. 127920, 2005-08-09

Facts:
Here, a husband and a mother of the deceased are locked in an acrimonious dispute over the estate of their loved one.

petition for review on certiorari filed by Emilio B. Pacioles, Jr... against Miguela Chuatoco-
Ching,... On March 13, 1992, Miguelita died intestate, leaving real properties with an
estimated value of P10.5 million, stock investments worth P518,783.00, bank deposits
amounting to P6.54 million, and interests in certain businesses. She was survived by her
husband, petitioner herein,... and their two minor children.
on August 20, 1992, petitioner filed with the RTC a verified petition[4] for the settlement of
Miguelita's estate. He prayed that (a) letters of administration be issued in his name, and (b)
that the net residue of... the estate be divided among the compulsory heirs.
Miguelita's mother, Miguela Chuatoco-Ching, herein respondent, filed an opposition,
specifically to petitioner's prayer for the issuance of letters of administration on the grounds
that (a) petitioner is incompetent and unfit to exercise the duties of an... administrator; and
(b) the bulk of Miguelita's estate is composed of "paraphernal properties." Respondent
prayed that the letters of administration be issued to her instead. Afterwards, she also filed a
motion for her... appointment as special administratrix.
Petitioner moved to strike out respondent's opposition, alleging that the latter has no direct
and material interest in the estate, she not being a compulsory heir

21
Respondent countered that she has direct and material interest in the estate because she
gave half of her inherited properties to Miguelita on condition that both of them "would
undertake whatever business endeavor they decided to, in the capacity of business...
partners."... respondent nominated her son Emmanuel Ching to act as special administrator.
On April 20, 1994, the intestate court issued an order appointing petitioner and Emmanuel
as joint regular administrators of the estate.[10] Both were issued letters of administration
after taking their oath and posting the requisite bond.
Consequently, Notice to Creditors was published in the issues of the Manila Standard on
September 12, 19, and 26, 1994. However, no claims were filed against the estate within the
period... petitioner submitted to the intestate court an inventory of Miguelita's estate.
Emmanuel did not submit an inventory.
the intestate court declared petitioner and his two minor children as the only compulsory
heirs of Miguelita.
petitioner filed with the intestate court an omnibus motion praying, among others, that an
Order be issued directing the: 1) payment of estate taxes; 2) partition and distribution of the
estate among the... declared heirs; and 3) payment of attorney's fees.
Respondent opposed petitioner's motion on the ground that the partition and distribution of
the estate is "premature and precipitate," considering that there is yet no determination
"whether the properties specified in the inventory are conjugal, paraphernal or... owned in a
joint venture."[14] Respondent claimed that she owns the bulk of Miguelita's estate as an
"heir and co-owner."
On January 17, 1996, the intestate court allowed the payment of the estate taxes and
attorney's fees but denied petitioner's prayer for partition and distribution of the estate,
holding that it is indeed "premature."
Forthwith, petitioner filed with the CA a petition for certiorari seeking to annul and set aside
the intestate court's Order dated January 17, 1996 and Resolution dated May 7, 1996 which
denied petitioner's prayer for partition and distribution of the... estate for being premature,
indicating that it (intestate court) will first resolve respondent's claim of ownership.
Issue:
May a trial court, acting as an intestate court, hear and pass upon questions of ownership
involving properties claimed to be part of the decedent's estate?
Ruling:
The general rule is that the jurisdiction of the trial court either as an intestate or a probate
court relates only to matters having to do with the settlement of the estate and probate of
will of deceased persons but does not extend to the determination of questions of...
ownership that arise during the proceedings. The patent rationale for this rule is that such
court exercises special and limited jurisdiction.
A well-recognized deviation to the rule is the principle that an intestate or a probate court
may hear and pass upon questions of ownership when its purpose is to determine whether

22
or not a property should be included in the inventory. In such situations the adjudication is...
merely incidental and provisional.
"x x x As a rule, the question of ownership is an extraneous matter which the probate court cannot resolve
with finality. Thus, for the purpose of determining whether a certain property should or should not be
included in the inventory of estate properties, the... probate court may pass upon the title thereto, but
such determination is provisional, not conclusive, and is subject to the final decision in a separate action to
resolve title."

The key consideration is that the purpose of the... intestate or probate court in hearing and
passing upon questions of ownership is merely to determine whether or not a property
should be included in the inventory. The facts of this case show that such was not the
purpose of the intestate court.
Respondent could have opposed petitioner's inventory and sought the exclusion of the
specific properties which she believed or considered to be hers. But instead of doing so, she
expressly adopted the inventory, taking exception only to the low valuation placed on... the
real estate properties.
It is apparent from the foregoing Resolution that the purpose of the hearing set by the
intestate court was actually to "determine the propriety of oppositor's (respondent's) claim."
Obviously, respondent's purpose here was not to obtain from the intestate court a ruling of
what properties should or should not be included in the inventory. She wanted something
else, i.e., to secure from the intestate court a final determination of her claim of... ownership
over properties comprising the bulk of Miguelita's estate.
Clearly, the RTC, acting as an intestate court, had overstepped its jurisdiction. Its proper
course should have been to maintain a hands-off stance on the matter.
Hence, respondent's recourse is to file a separate action with a court of general jurisdiction.
We reiterate that the question of ownership of properties alleged to be part of the estate
must be... submitted to the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its general jurisdiction.
The petition is GRANTED.

15. Ancheta v. Guersey-Dalaygon, GR. No.139868, June 8, 2006

Ancheta vs. Guersey-Dalaygon (GR No. 139868; June 8, 2006)

Facts:
American citizens, spouses Audrey O’Neill and W. Richard Guersey, were residents in the
Philippines for 30 years. They have an adopted daughter, Kyle Guersey Hill (Kyle). Audrey
died in 1979 leaving a will wherein she bequeathed her entire estate to Richard consisting
of her conjugal share in real estate in Forbes Park, a bank account, cash balance and shares
of stock in A/G Interiors.

23
Two years later, Richard married Candelaria Guersey-Dalaygon. Four years thereafter,
Richard died and left a will wherein he bequeathed his entire estate to Candelaria, except
for his shares in A/G, which he left to his adopted daughter. Audrey’s will was admitted to
probate in CFI Rizal. Inventory was taken on their conjugal properties. Ancheta, as the
administrator, filed for a partition of the first wife’s estate. The will was also admitted in a
court in her native land (Maryland).

Petitioner, as ancillary administrator in the court where Audrey’s will was admitted to
probate, filed a motion to declare Richard and Kyle as heirs of Audrey and a project of
partition of Audrey’s estate. The motion and project of partition were granted. Meanwhile,
the ancillary administrator with regards to Richard’s will also filed a project of partition,
leaving 2/5 of Richard’s undivided interest in the Forbes property was allocated to
respondent Candelaria, while 3/5 thereof was allocated to their three children. Respondent
opposed on the ground that under the law of the State of Maryland, where Richard was a
native of, a legacy passes to the legatee the entire interest of the testator in the property
subject to the legacy.

Issues:
1) Whether or not the properties in issue should be governed by the law where the
property is situated
2) Whether or not the decree of distribution may still be annulled.

Ruling:
1) Yes, properties in issue should be governed by the law where the property is situated.
However, since the first wife is a foreign national, the intrinsic validity of her will is
governed by her national law. The national law of the person who made the will shall
regulate whose succession is in consideration whatever the nature of the property and
regardless of the country where the property maybe found (Art 16 CC). The first wife’s
properties may be found in the Philippines, however the successional rights over those
properties are governed by the national law of the testator.

2) A decree of distribution of the estate of a deceased person vests the title to the land of
the estate in the distributees, which, if erroneous may be corrected by a timely appeal.
Once it becomes final, its binding effect is like any other judgment in rem.

However, in exceptional cases, a final decree of distribution of the estate may be set aside
for lack of jurisdiction or fraud. Further, in Ramon vs. Ortuzar, the Court ruled that a party
interested in a probate proceeding may have a final liquidation set aside when he is left out
by reason of circumstances beyond his control or through mistake or inadvertence not
imputable to negligence.

Petitioner’s failure to proficiently manage the distribution of Audrey’s estate according to

the terms of her will and as dictated by the applicable law amounted to extrinsic fraud.

24
16. Suntay III v. Cojuangco-Suntay, GR No. 183053, October 10, 2012

EMILIO A.M. SUNTAY III vs. ISABEL COJUANGCO-SUNTAY

G.R. No. 183053 October 10, 2012

FACTS: Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay (Cristina) died intestate on 4 June 1990. Cristina was survived
by her spouse, Dr. Federico Suntay (Federico) and five grandchildren: three legitimate
grandchildren, including herein respondent, Isabel; and two illegitimate grandchildren, including
petitioner Emilio III, all by Federico’s and Cristina’s only child, Emilio A. Suntay (Emilio I), who
predeceased his parents. After Cristina’s death, respondent Isabel, filed before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Malolos, Bulacan, a petition for the issuance of letters of administration over
Cristina’s estate. Federico, opposed the petition, and filed a Motion to Dismiss Isabel’s petition
for letters of administration on the ground that Isabel had no right of representation to the estate
of Cristina, she being an illegitimate grandchild of the latter as a result of Isabel’s parents’
marriage being declared null and void.

Undaunted by the set back, Federico nominated Emilio III to administer the decedent’s estate on
his behalf in the event letters of administration issues to Federico. Consequently, Emilio III filed
an Opposition-In-Intervention, echoing the allegations in his grandfather’s opposition, alleging
that Federico, or in his stead, Emilio III, was better equipped than respondent to administer and
manage the estate of the decedent, Cristina. Federico died. Almost a year thereafter or on 9
November 2001, the trial court rendered a decision appointing Emilio III as administrator of
decedent Cristina’s intestate estate. On appeal by certiorari, the Supreme Court in an earlier case
reversed and set aside the ruling of the appellate court. The Court decided to include Emilio III as
co-administrator of Cristina’s estate, giving weight to his interest in Federico’s estate.

ISSUE: Who between Emilio III and Isabel, is better qualified to act as administrator of the
decedent’s estate.

HELD: Isabel. The general rule in the appointment of administrator of the estate of a decedent is
laid down in Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court:

SEC. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. – If no executor is named in the will, or the
executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or a person dies intestate,
administration shall be granted:

(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or both, in the discretion of the
court, or to such person as such surviving husband or wife, or next of kin, requests to have appointed, if
competent and willing to serve;

(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or the person selected by them,
be incompetent or unwilling, or if the husband or widow, or next of kin, neglects for thirty (30) days after
the death of the person to apply for administration or to request that administration be granted to some
other person, it may be granted to one or more of the principal creditors, if competent and willing to
serve;

25
(c) If there is not such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be granted to such other person as
the court may select.

Textually, the rule lists a sequence to be observed, an order of preference, in the appointment
of an administrator. This order of preference, which categorically seeks out the surviving spouse,
the next of kin and the creditors in the appointment of an administrator, has been reinforced in
jurisprudence. The paramount consideration in the appointment of an administrator over the
estate of a decedent is the prospective administrator’s interest in the estate. This is the same
consideration which Section 6, Rule 78 takes into account in establishing the order of preference
in the appointment of administrator for the estate. The rationale behind the rule is that those
who will reap the benefit of a wise, speedy and economical administration of the estate, or, in
the alternative, suffer the consequences of waste, improvidence or mismanagement, have the
highest interest and most influential motive to administer the estate correctly. In all, given that
the rule speaks of an order of preference, the person to be appointed administrator of a
decedent’s estate must demonstrate not only an interest in the estate, but an interest therein
greater than any other candidate.

Given Isabel’s unassailable interest in the estate as one of the decedent’s legitimate
grandchildren and undoubted nearest "next of kin," the appointment of Emilio III as co-
administrator of the same estate, cannot be a demandable right. It is a matter left entirely to the
sound discretion of the Court and depends on the facts and the circumstances of the case.

Thus, we proceed to scrutinize the attendant facts and circumstances of this case even as we reiterate
Isabel’s and her sibling’s apparent greater interest in the estate of Cristina.

These considerations do not warrant the setting aside of the order of preference mapped out in Section
6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court. They compel that a choice be made of one over the other.

1. The bitter estrangement and long-standing animosity between Isabel, on the one hand, and
Emilio III, on the other, traced back from the time their paternal grandparents were alive, which
can be characterized as adverse interest of some kind by, or hostility of, Emilio III to Isabel who is
immediately interested in the estate;

2. Corollary thereto, the seeming impossibility of Isabel and Emilio III working harmoniously as co-
administrators may result in prejudice to the decedent’s estate, ultimately delaying settlement
thereof; and

3. Emilio III, for all his claims of knowledge in the management of Cristina’s estate, has not looked
after the estate’s welfare and has acted to the damage and prejudice thereof.

The evidence reveals that Emilio III has turned out to be an unsuitable administrator of the estate.
Respondent Isabel points out that after Emilio III’s appointment as administrator of the subject
estate in 2001, he has not looked after the welfare of the subject estate and has actually acted
to the damage and prejudice thereof.

26
17. Ocampo v. Ocampo et.al, GR No. 187879, July 5, 2010

Ocampo vs Ocampo Case Digest

G.R. No. 187879 ; July 5, 2010

PRINCIPLE/S:
Special Proceedings
Special administrator
A special administrator is an officer of the court who is subject to its supervision and control, expected to
work for the best interest of the entire estate, with a view to its smooth administration and speedy settlement.
When appointed, he or she is not regarded as an agent or representative of the parties suggesting the
appointment. The principal object of the appointment of a temporary administrator is to preserve the estate
until it can pass to the hands of a person fully authorized to administer it for the benefit of creditors and
heirs, pursuant to Section 2 of Rule 80 of the Rules of Court.

Appointment of Special administrators is interlocutory

Reason: The appointment or removal of special administrators is discretionary.
Effect: May be assailed through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court

Removal of Special Administrator

Even if special administrators had already been appointed, once the probate court finds the appointees no
longer entitled to its confidence, it is justified in withdrawing the appointment and giving no valid effect
thereto

FACTS: Petitioners Dalisay et al. are the surviving wife and the children of Leonardo. Leonardo,
together with his siblings Renato and Erlinda (Respondents), jointly controlled, managed, and
administered the estate of their parents, Spouses Ocampo. Under such circumstance, Leonardo
had been receiving his share consisting of one-third (1/3) of the total income generated from the
properties of the estate. Subsequently, Leonardo died and he was survived by his wife and the
children (Petitioners Dalisay). When Leonardo died, respondents took possession, control and
management of the properties to the exclusion of petitioners and the petitioners no longer
received the 1/3 portion of Leonardo.

Petitioners then initiated a petition for intestate proceedings in the RTC. Respondents, in
their counter-petition prayed that they be appointed as special joint administrators of the estate
of their parents. RTC granted respondents’ counter-petition. Petitioners in their
Comment prayed that, in order to avoid further delay, letters of administration to serve as joint
administrators of the subject estate be issued to respondents and Dalisay. RTC appointed Dalisay
and Renato as special joint administrators of the estate of the deceased spouses. But RTC later
revoked the appointment of Dalisay as co-special administratrix and substituted her with
Erlinda. Petitioners filed a Motion to Terminate or Revoke the Special Administration. RTC
granted this and revoked and terminated the appointment of Renato and Erlinda as joint special
administrators and appointed Melinda as regular administratrix.

respondents filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court before the CA. CA
ruled that RTC gravely abused its discretion in revoking respondents’ appointment as joint special
administrators, and for appointing Melinda as regular administratrix without conducting a formal
hearing to determine her competency to assume such role. Hence, this instant petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court

ISSUE/S:

27
1)WON it was proper for the RTC to revoke the appointment of respondents as joint special
administrators
2) WON it was proper for the RTC to appoint Melinda as regular administrator

HELD:
1) YES. Selection or removal of special administrators is not governed by the rules regarding the
selection or removal of regular administrator. The probate court may appoint or remove special
administrators based on grounds other than those enumerated in the Rules at its
discretion. Selection or removal of special administrators is at the discretion of the court as long
as the discretion is exercised without grave abuse, and is based on reason, equity, justice, and
legal principles, interference by higher courts is unwarranted. Indeed, even if special
administrators had already been appointed, once the probate court finds the appointees no longer
entitled to its confidence, it is justified in withdrawing the appointment and giving no valid effect
thereto.

In this case, the RTC revoked respondents’ appointment as special administrators for failing to
post their administrators’ bond and to submit an inventory and accounting as required of them,
tantamount to failing to comply with its lawful orders. Hence, the revocation of respondents’
appointment as Special Administrator was proper.

2) NO. Sec. 1 to 6 Rule 78 of the Rules of Court contains the provision for the determination of
the person to be appointed as regular administrator. But in this case, the capacity, competency,
and legality of Melinda’s appointment as such was not properly objected to by respondents
despite being the next of kin to the decedent spouses, and was not threshed out by the RTC
acting as a probate court in accordance with the abovementioned Rules. Hence, Melinda’s
appointment as a regular administrator was not proper.

Melinda’s appointment is supposed to be revoked. However, having in mind the objective of

facilitating the settlement of the estate of Vicente and Maxima and posting of bond by Melinda,
with a view to putting an end to the squabbles of the heirs, Melinda’s appointment should be
converted into one of special administration.

18. Tan v. Gedorio, Jr. GR No. 166520, March 14, 2008

CASE DIGEST: AS RELATED TO RULE 80

CASE DIGEST UNDER RULE 80 (SECTION 1-3)

TAN vs. GEDORIO, JR.

G.R. No. 166520 March 14, 2008
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

28
FACTS:

• Gerardo Tan died leaving no will.

• Upon his death on Oct. 14, 2000, private respondents Rogelio Lim Suga
and Helen Tan Racoma, who were claiming to be the children of the
decedent moved for the appointment of their attorney-in-fact,
Romualdo Lim as special administrator.
• This was opposed by the petitioner Vilma Tan, Jake Tan and Geraldine
Tan, claiming that none of the respondents can be appointed since they
are not residing in the country, that Romualdo does not have the same
competence as Vilma Tan who was already acting as the de facto
administratrix of Gerardo’s estate, and that the nearest of kin, being one
of the legitimate children, is preferred in the choice of administrator
(claiming that the respondent were illegitimate children).
• The Court appointed Vilma Tan as the de facto administrator, however,
due to the fact that she did not comply with her duties as such, the court
granted Romualdo’s appointment as special administrator. Petitioners
appealed to the Court of Appeals and was denied, hence the petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
•
ISSUE: Whether or not the court erred in denying petitioner’s plea to be
given primacy in the administration of their father’s estate
•
HELD:
No. The order of preference of appointment in the appointment of a
regular administrator provision does not apply to the selection of a
special administrator. The order of preference which the petitioners
speak of under Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court for the next of kin
refers to the appointment of a regular administrator, and not of a special
administrator, as the appointment of the latter lies entirely in the
discretion of the court, and is not appealable. If petitioners really desire
to avail themselves of the order of preference, they should pursue the
appointment of a regular administrator and put to an end the delay
which necessitated the appointment of a special administrator.
The court was correct in granting the appointment of Romualdo as special
administrator since it was shown that Vilma was in remiss after failing to
follow the series of directives and extension given to her to account for the
estate.

29
19. Ricardo Silverio Jr. v. Court of Appeals, GR No. 178933, September 16, 2009

RICARDO S. SILVERIO, JR. Vs. VELASCO, JR., NACHURA, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, and
PERALTA, JJ. COURT OF APPEALS (Fifth Division) and NELIA S. SILVERIO-DEE,
Respondents.

Facts:
The instant controversy stemmed from the settlement of estate of the
deceased Beatriz Silverio. After her death, her surviving spouse, Ricardo Silverio,
Sr., filed an intestate proceeding for the settlement of her estate. On November
16, 2004, during the pendency of the case, Ricardo Silverio, Jr. filed a petition
to remove Ricardo C. Silverio, Sr. as the administrator of the subject estate. On
November 22, 2004, Edmundo S. Silverio also filed a comment/opposition for
the removal of Ricardo C. Silverio, Sr. as administrator of the estate and for the
appointment of a new administrator. On January 3, 2005, the RTC issued an
Order granting the petition and removing Ricardo Silverio, Sr. as administrator
of the estate, while appointing Ricardo Silverio, Jr. as the new administrator.

On February 4, 2005, Ricardo Silverio Jr. filed an Urgent Motion for an

Order Prohibiting Any Person to Occupy/Stay/Use Real Estate Properties
Involved in the Intestate Estate of the Late Beatriz Silverio, Without Authority
from this Honorable Court.

Then, on May 31, 2005, the RTC issued an Omnibus Order directing the
private respondent, among several orders of the court, to vacate the property at
No. 3, Intsia, Forbes Park, Makati City within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the
order.

Private respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was later

denied by the RTC. Consequently, the private respondent filed a Petition for
Certiorari and Prohibition (with TRO and Writ of Preliminary Injunction) with the
CA, and the latter annulled and set aside the order and notice to vacate issued
by the RTC.

Issue:

30
W/N the CA committed grave abuse of discretion when it annulled and set aside
the order and notice to vacate issued by the RTC ordering the private respondent
to leave the property in Forbes Park, Makati City because such occupancy
prevents the property from being sold in order to secure funds for the payment
of the taxes due.

Held:

In the instant case, Nelia Silverio-Dee appealed the May 31, 2005 Order of the
RTC on the ground that it ordered her to vacate the premises of the property
located at No. 3 Intsia Road, Forbes Park, Makati City. On that aspect the order
is not a final determination of the case or of the issue of distribution of the shares
of the heirs in the estate or their rights therein. It must be borne in mind that
until the estate is partitioned, each heir only has an inchoate right to the
properties of the estate, such that no heir may lay claim on a particular property.

Art. 1078 of the Civil Code provides that where there are two or more heirs, the
whole estate of the decedent is, before partition, owned in common by such heirs,
subject to the payment of the debts of the deceased. Under a co-ownership, the
ownership of an undivided thing or right belongs to different persons. Each co-
owner of property which is held pro indiviso exercises his rights over the whole
property and may use and enjoy the same with no other limitation than that he
shall not injure the interests of his co-owners. The underlying rationale is that
until a division is made, the respective share of each cannot be determined and
every co-owner exercises, together with his co-participants, joint ownership over
the pro indiviso property, in addition to his use and enjoyment of the same.

Under Rule 90, Sec. 1 of the Rules of Court, the properties of the estate shall
only be distributed after the payment of the debts, funeral charges, and other
expenses against the estate, except when authorized by the Court.

Once an action for the settlement of an estate is filed with the court, the
properties included therein are under the control of the intestate court. And not
even the administrator may take possession of any property that is part of the estate
without the prior authority of the Court.

31
 In the instant case, the purported authority of Nelia Silverio-Dee, which
she allegedly secured from Ricardo Silverio, Sr., was never approved by the
probate court. She, therefore, never had any real interest in the specific property
located at No. 3 Intsia Road, Forbes Park, Makati City.

20. Corazon Gregorio, et.al vs. Madarang, et.al GR No 185226, February 11, 2010

GR No. 185226 Gregorio vs Madarang

FACTS: Casimiro V. Madarang, Sr died intestate leaving real and personal properties.
He was survived by his wife Dolores and their five children, namely Casimiro, Jr.,
Corazon, Ramiro, and the petitioners Vicente and Jose. Dolores was appointed as the
administratrix and subsequently submitted an Inventory Report listing the properties of
the decedents estate but omitted six lots including Lot 829-B-4-B, the land in question.
She omitted the land in question for the reason that it was donated in favor to Vicente
during the lifetime of Casimiro.

ISSUE: Whether or not the exclusion of the property is proper

HELD: No, the exclusion is not proper. In cases of collation or advancement Article
1061 of the Civil Code expressly provides Every compulsory heir, who succeeds with
other compulsory heirs, must bring into the mass of the estate any property or right
which he may have received from the decedent, during the lifetime of the latter, by way
of donation, or any other gratuitous title, in order that it may be computed in the
determination of the legitime of each heir and in the account of partition. In relation to
which, Section 2, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court provides Questions as to advancement
to be determined. Questions as to advancement made, or alleged to have been made,
by the deceased to any heir may be heard and determined by the court having
jurisdiction of the estate proceedings; and the final order of the court thereon shall be
binding on the person raising the questions and on the heir.

Lot 829-B-4-B, which was alleged to have been donated by the decedent and his wife to
their son-respondent Vicente, should not be excluded from the inventory of the
properties of the decedent.

32
21. Republic vs. CA GR No. 143483, January 31, 2002

Republic of the Philippines vs Court of Appeals and Amada Solano

G.R. No. 143483 – 426 Phil. 177 – 375 SCRA 484 – Remedial Law – Special Proceedings – Rule 91; Escheat –
Escheat as a sovereign act; Prescriptive period to question judgment in an escheat case

Elizabeth Hankins died in 1985. Thereafter, the Republic filed a petition for escheat
against the estate (two parcels of land) of Hankins as it appeared that she died
intestate and without any heir. Amada Solano, through her husband, filed an
intervention averring that Hankins donated the properties to them. Their intervention
was not granted because they cannot present the Deeds of Donation. In 1989, the
petition was granted and the estate of Hankins was escheated in favor of the Republic.

In 1997, Solano went to the Court of Appeals to file a petition to have the judgment in
the RTC granting the escheat be annulled. Solano is now presenting the deeds of
donation which she just recently and finally found.

ISSUE: Whether or not Solano’s petition should prosper

HELD: No. Sec. 4, Rule 91 is clear that the prescriptive period to file a claim against the
escheated estate is five (5) years from the date of judgment.

But Art. 1144 of the Civil Code provides that actions accruing upon a judgment may be
brought within ten years from the judgment ?

Sec. 4, Rule 91 is an exception.

Is that fair?

Yes. Escheat is a proceeding, unlike that of succession or assignment, whereby the

state, by virtue of its sovereignty, steps in and claims the real or personal property of a
person who dies intestate leaving no heir. In the absence of a lawful owner, a property
is claimed by the state to forestall an open “invitation to self-service by the first
comers.” Since escheat is one of the incidents of sovereignty, the state may, and usually
does, prescribe the conditions and limits the time within which a claim to such property
may be made. The procedure by which the escheated property may be recovered is
generally prescribed by statue, and a time limit is imposed within which such action
must be brought. In this jurisdiction, claimants to an escheated property must file his
claim “within five (5) years from the date of such judgment” otherwise they may lose
them forever in a final judgment.

33
22. RCBC vs. Hi-Tri Development Corporation GR No. 192413 June 13, 2012

Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation vs Hi-Tri Development Corporation

G.R. No. 192413 June 13, 2012

Facts:

Luz Bakunawa and her husband Manuel, now deceased (Spouses Bakunawa) are registered
owners of six (6) parcels of land covered by TCT Nos. 324985 and 324986 of the Quezon City
Register of Deeds, and TCT Nos. 103724, 98827, 98828 and 98829 of the Marikina Register of
Deeds. These lots were sequestered by the Presidential Commission on Good Government
[(PCGG)]. Sometime in 1990, a certain Teresita Millan (Millan), through her representative, Jerry
Montemayor, offered to buy said lots for ₱6,724,085.71, with the promise that she will take care of
clearing whatever preliminary obstacles there may be to effect a completion of the sale. The
Spouses Bakunawa gave to Millan the Owners Copies of said TCTs and in turn, Millan made a
downpayment of ₱1,019,514.29 for the intended purchase. However, for one reason or another,
Millan was not able to clear said obstacles. As a result, the Spouses Bakunawa rescinded the sale
and offered to return to Millan her downpayment of ₱1,019,514.29. However, Millan refused to
accept back the ₱1,019,514.29 down[]payment. Consequently, the Spouses Bakunawa, through
their company, the Hi-Tri Development Corporation (Hi-Tri) took out on October 28, 1991, a
Managers Check from RCBC-Ermita in the amount of ₱1,019,514.29, payable to Millan’s company
Rosmil Realty and Development Corporation (Rosmil) c/o Teresita Millan and used this as one of
their basis for a complaint against Millan and Montemayor which they filed with the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 99. On January 31, 2003, during the pendency of the above
mentioned case and without the knowledge of [Hi-Tri and Spouses Bakunawa], RCBC reported
the ₱1,019,514.29-credit existing in favor of Rosmil to the Bureau of Treasury as among its
unclaimed balances as of January 31, 2003. Allegedly, a copy of the Sworn Statement executed by
Florentino N. Mendoza, Manager and Head of RCBCs Asset Management, Disbursement & Sundry
Department (AMDSD) was posted within the premises of RCBC-Ermita.

Issue:

Whether or not the escheat of the account in RCBC is proper

Held:

No. An ordinary check refers to a bill of exchange drawn by a depositor (drawer) on a bank
(drawee), requesting the latter to pay a person named therein (payee) or to the order of the payee
or to the bearer, a named sum of money. The issuance of the check does not of itself operate as an
assignment of any part of the funds in the bank to the credit of the drawer. Here, the bank
becomes liable only after it accepts or certifies the check. After the check is accepted for
payment, the bank would then debit the amount to be paid to the holder of the check from the
account of the depositor-drawer.

34
There are checks of a special type called managers or cashiers checks. These are bills of exchange
drawn by the banks manager or cashier, in the name of the bank, against the bank itself.
Typically, a managers or a cashiers check is procured from the bank by allocating a particular
amount of funds to be debited from the depositors account or by directly paying or depositing to
the bank the value of the check to be drawn. Since the bank issues the check in its name, with
itself as the drawee, the check is deemed accepted in advance. Ordinarily, the check becomes the
primary obligation of the issuing bank and constitutes its written promise to pay upon demand.

Nevertheless, the mere issuance of a managers check does not ipso facto work as an automatic
transfer of funds to the account of the payee. In case the procurer of the managers or cashiers
check retains custody of the instrument, does not tender it to the intended payee, or fails to
make an effective delivery, we find the following provision on undelivered instruments under the
Negotiable Instruments Law applicable:

Sec. 16. Delivery; when effectual; when presumed. Every contract on a negotiable instrument is
incomplete and revocable until delivery of the instrument for the purpose of giving effect
thereto. As between immediate parties and as regards a remote party other than a holder in due
course, the delivery, in order to be effectual, must be made either by or under the authority of the
party making, drawing, accepting, or indorsing, as the case may be; and, in such case, the delivery
may be shown to have been conditional, or for a special purpose only, and not for the purpose of
transferring the property in the instrument. But where the instrument is in the hands of a holder
in due course, a valid delivery thereof by all parties prior to him so as to make them liable to him
is conclusively presumed. And where the instrument is no longer in the possession of a party
whose signature appears thereon, a valid and intentional delivery by him is presumed until the
contrary is proved.

Since there was no delivery, presentment of the check to the bank for payment did not occur. An
order to debit the account of respondents was never made. In fact, petitioner confirms that the
Managers Check was never negotiated or presented for payment to its Ermita Branch, and that
the allocated fund is still held by the bank. As a result, the assigned fund is deemed to remain part
of the account of Hi-Tri, which procured the Managers Check. The doctrine that the deposit
represented by a managers check automatically passes to the payee is inapplicable, because the
instrument although accepted in advance remains undelivered. Hence, respondents should have
been informed that the deposit had been left inactive for more than 10 years, and that it may be
subjected to escheat proceedings if left unclaimed.

35
23. Francisco v. CA 127 SCRA. 371

G.R. No. L-57438 January 3, 1984

FELICIANO FRANCISCO,
petitioner,vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and PELAGIO FRANCISCO,
respondents.
Facts:
Petitioner is the duly appointed guardian of the incompetent Estefania San Pedro in Special
Proceedings of the CFI of Bulacan. Respondent Pelagio Francisco, claiming to be a first cousin of
Estefania San Pedro, together with two others, petitioned the court for the removal of petitioner and for
the appointment in his stead grounded on the failure of the guardian to submit an inventory of the
estate of his ward and to render an accounting. Respondent Judge also ordered the retirement of
petitioner on the ground of old age. Petitioner also contended that to grant execution pending appeal
would render petitioner's appeal moot and academic that "advanced age" was not one of the grounds
raised by private respondent in the court below; that the court
a quo
abuse its discretion in appointing respondent as guardian despite the fact that private respondent is
five (5) years older than petitioner.
Issue:
Whether or not the removal of petitioner as guardian of the ward on the ground of old
age is a good ground for the execution of the decision pending appeal
Held:
There is need for petitioner Feliciano Francisco to be retired from the guardianship over
the person and property of incompetent Estefania San Pedro. The conclusion reached
by the trial court about the "rather advanced age" of petitioner at 72 years old (petitioner
is now 76 years old) finding him unfit to continue the trust cannot be disturbed. As
correctly pointed out by the appellate court, this finds direct support in the delay of the
accounting and inventory made by petitioner. To sustain petitioner as guardian would,
therefore, be detrimental to the ward. While age alone is not a control criterion in
determining a person's fitness or qualification to be appointed or be retained as
guardian, it may be a factor for consideration.
Upon urgent and compelling reasons, execution pending appeal is a matter of sound discretion on the
part of the trial court. Inasmuch as the primary objective for the institution of guardianship is for the
protection of the ward, there is more than sufficient reason for the immediate execution of the lower
court's judgment for the replacement of the first guardian.

36
24. Alamayri v. Pabale GR No. 151243, April 30 2008

Almayri v. Pabale
G.R. No. 151243 April 30, 2008
Ponente: Chico-Nazario, J.:

FACTS:
1. Alamayri petitions the court for the setting aside of the CA decision.

2. Sesinando M. Fernando, representing S.M. Fernando Realty Corp filed an action for Specific
Performance with Damages (Civil Case) against Nelly Nave who owns a parcel of land which the
former alleged was the subject of a 'Kasunduan ng Pagbibilihan'. However, Nave allegedly reneged
on their agreement when she refused to accept the partial payment of Fernando. The said lot was
instead sold to the Pabale siblings.

3. Subsequently, the civil proceedings were suspended by virtue of guardianship proceedings. In June
1988, Nave was declared therein to be incompetent.

4. The lower court declared the nullity of the two sale agreements on the ground that Nave was found
incompetent since 1980. The Pabale siblings intervened. The Court of Appeals granted the appeals
of both Fernando and the Pabale siblings and upheld the validity of the Deed of Sale executed by
Nelly Nave dated February 20, 1984. Hence this petition.

5. Petitioner alleged that since Nave was judicially determined to be an incompetent, all contracts that
she subsequently entered into should be declared null and void.

Issue: Whether or not the declaration of incompetency constitutes res judicata

RULING: No. There was no identity of parties and issues between the special proceeding on the
guardianship of Nave and the civil case. The decision on the former on her incompetency should not
therefore bar by conclusiveness of judgement the finding in the latter case (civil case) that Nave was
competent and had capacity when she entered into the contract of sale over the subject lot in favor of
the Pabale siblings.

The Court expounded on the difference between the two rules on res judicata, namely; 1) bar by
previous judgment, and 2) conclusiveness of judgement. Bar by previous judgement means that
the judgement in the first case will bar the second case due to the identity of parties, subject-matter,
and cause of action. While a bar by virtue of conclusiveness of judgement bars the re-litigation in a
second case of a fact or question already settled in a previous case. Hence, even if there is identity of
parties, but no identity of causes of action, the first judgement can be conclusive only as to those
matters actually controverted and determined and not as to matters merely involved.

37
25. Vancil vs. Belmes GR No. 132223 June 19, 2001

Vancil v Belmes (G.R 132223)

FACTS:

Petitioner, Bonifacia Vancil, is the mother of Reeder C. Vancil, a Navy serviceman of the United
States of America who died in the said country on December 22, 1986. During his lifetime,
Reeder had two children named Valerie and Vincent by his common-law wife, Helen G. Belmes.

Sometime in May 1987, Bonifacia Vancil commenced before the RTC of Cebu City a
guardianship proceedings over the persons and properties of minors Valerie and Vincent. At the
time, Valerie was only 6 years old while Vincent was 2 years old. Petitioner was appointed legal
and judicial guardian over the persons and estate of Valerie Vancil and Vincent Vancil Jr.

On August 13, 1987, the natural mother of the minors, Helen Belmes, submitted an opposition
to the subject guardianship proceedings asseverating that she had already filed a similar
petition for guardianship before the RTC of Pagadian City.

On October 12, 1988, the trial court rejected and denied Belmes’ motion to remove and/or to
disqualify Bonifacia as guardian of Valerie and Vincent Jr. and instead ordered petitioner to
enter the office and perform her duties as such guardian upon the posting of a bond of
P50,000.00. On appeal, the CA rendered its decision reversing the RTC.

ISSUE:

Who between the mother and grandmother of minor Vincent should be his guardian

RULING:

The respondent, being the natural mother of the minor, has the preferential right over
that of petitioner to be his guardian. This ruling finds support in Article 211 of the Family Code
which provides:

“Art. 211. The father and the mother shall jointly exercise parental authority over the persons of
their common children. In case of disagreement, the father’s decision shall prevail, unless there
is a judicial order to the contrary.”

Petitioner, as the surviving grandparent, can exercise substitute parental authority only in case
of death, absence or unsuitability of respondent. Considering that respondent is very much alive
and has exercised continuously parental authority over Vincent, petitioner has to prove, in
asserting her right to be the minor’s guardian, respondent’s unsuitability. Petitioner, however,
has not proffered convincing evidence showing that respondent is not suited to be the guardian
of Vincent. Petitioner merely insists that respondent is morally unfit as guardian of Valerie
considering that her (respondent’s) live-in partner raped Valerie several times. But Valerie,
being now of major age, is no longer a subject of this guardianship proceeding.

38
26. Dinah B. Tonog vs CA GR No. 122906, February 7, 2002

Tonog vs. Court of Appeals Case Digest

Facts:

Dinah B. Tonog gave birth to Gardin Faith Tonog, her illegitimate daughter with Edgar V.
Daguimol. The two cohabited for a time and lived with Edgar's parents and sister. A year after,
Dinah left for the USA where she found work as a registered nurse. Gardin was left in the care
of her father and paternal grandparents.

Edgar later filed a petition for guardianship over Gardin. The court granted the petition and
appointed Edgar as the legal guardian.

Dinah filed a petition for relief from judgment. The trial court set aside its original judgment
and allowed Dinah to file her opposition to Edgar's petition. Meanwhile, the court issued a
resolution granting Dinah's motion for custody over Gardin. Dinah moved for the immediate
execution of the resolution.

Edgar filed a petition for certiorari before the CA. The CA let Gardin remain in the custody of
Edgar until otherwise adjudged.

Dinah appealed to the Supreme Court, contending that she is entitled to the custody of
Gardin, as a matter of law. First, as the mother of Gardin Faith, the law confers parental
authority upon her as the mother of the illegitimate minor. Second, Gardin cannot be
separated from her since she had not, as of then, attained the age of seven.

Issue:

Who is entitled to the temporary custody of the child pending the guardianship proceeding?

Held:

In custody disputes, it is axiomatic that the paramount criterion is the welfare and well-being
of the child.

In the case at bar, we are being asked to rule on the temporary custody of the minor, Gardin
Faith, since it appears that the proceedings for guardianship before the trial court have not
been terminated, and no pronouncement has been made as to who should have
final custody of the minor. Bearing in mind that the welfare of the said minor as the
controlling factor, we find that the appellate court did not err in allowing her father to retain
in the meantime parental custody over her. Meanwhile, the child should not be wrenched
from her familiar surroundings, and thrust into a strange environment away from the people
and places to which she had apparently formed an attachment.

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Moreover, whether a mother is a fit parent for her child is a question of fact to be properly
entertained in the special proceedings before the trial court. It should be recalled that in a
petition for review on certiorari, we rule only on questions of law. We are not in the best
position to assess the parties’ respective merits vis-à-vis their opposing claims for custody.
Yet another sound reason is that inasmuch as the age of the minor, Gardin Faith, has now
exceeded the statutory bar of seven years, a fortiori, her preference and opinion must first be
sought in the choice of which parent should have the custody over her person.

For the present and until finally adjudged, temporary custody of the subject minor should
remain with her father, the private respondent herein pending final judgment of the trial
court. (Dinah B. Tonog vs. Court of Appeals and Edgar V. Daguimol, G.R. No.
122906, February 7, 2002)

27. Joycelyn Gualberto v. Crisanto Rafaelito Gualberto, GR No. 156254, June 28 2005

Joycelyn Gualberto vs Crisanto Gualberto

G R . N o . 1 5 4 9 9 4 J u n e 2 8 , 2 0 0 5

FACTS:
This is a consolidated case and the court considered two appeals by former husband
and wife. Crisanto filed before the RTC a petition for declaration of nullity of
his marriage to Joycelyn with an ancillary prayer for custody pendente lite of their
almost 4-year-old son, whom Joycelyn allegedly took away with her form the conjugal
home and his school. Despite the efforts exerted by him, he has failed to see his child and
the child are at present staying with the former’s step-father. A person
was commissioned by Crisanto to conduct surveillance on Joycelyn and concluded that
she is having a lesbian relations with another person in Cebu City. Also, the findings
was corroborated with the house helper and stated the mother does not care for the
child and saw her slapping the child. The court then awards custody, of the minor, to
Crisanto when Joycelyn failed to appear at the court proceedings and the
abovementioned evidence. A hearing of motion filed by Joycelyn to lift the award of custody
pendente lite of the child was set but Joycelyn did not allegedly present any evidence to support
her motion. However, the judge allegedly issued an order and awarded the custody of the
child to Joycelyn. The two parties submitted different motions. At the next instance, the CA
annulled the second court order on procedural ground and returned custody
to Crisanto until Joycelyn’s motion was decided again. In the current case,
bothpetitioned the SC against the Court of Appeal’s ruling.
ISSUE:

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Whether or not the Court of Appeal violated Article 213 of the Family Code
when it awarded custody of the child to Crisanto
RULING:
Yes. The general rule that children under seven years of age shall not be separated
from their mother finds its raison d'etre in the basic need of minor children for their
mother's loving care. There is express statutory recognition that, as a general
rule, a mother is to be preferred in awarding custody of children under the age of
seven. The caveat in Article 213 of the Family Code cannot be ignored, except when the court
finds cause to order otherwise.
Article 213 of the Family Code 31 provides:
"ART. 213. In case of separation of the parents, parental authority shall be exercised by
the parent designated by the court. The court shall take into account
all relevant considerations, especially the choice of the child over seven years of age, unless the
parent chosen is unfit. No child under seven years of age shall be separated from the
mother, unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise."
Here, Crisanto cites immorality due to alleged lesbian relations as the
compelling reason to deprive Joycelyn of custody. But sexual preference
or moral laxity alone does not prove parental neglect or incompetence. To
deprive the wife of custody, the husband must clearly establish that her moral
lapses have had an adverse effect on the welfare of the child or have distracted the
offending spouse from exercising proper parental care.

28. Lozada v. Arroyo et. Al GR Nos. 184739-80, April 24, 2013

FACTS:

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ISSUE:

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RULING:

DOCTRINE

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29. Oposa vs. Factoran GR No. 101083, July 30, 1993

Oposa vs Factoran

Natural and Environmental Laws; Constitutional Law: Intergenerational Responsibility

GR No. 101083; July 30 1993

FACTS:

A taxpayer’s class suit was filed by minors Juan Antonio Oposa, et al., representing their
generation and generations yet unborn, and represented by their parents against Fulgencio
Factoran Jr., Secretary of DENR. They prayed that judgment be rendered ordering the
defendant, his agents, representatives and other persons acting in his behalf to:

1. Cancel all existing Timber Licensing Agreements (TLA) in the country;

2. Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing, or appraising

new TLAs;

and granting the plaintiffs “such other reliefs just and equitable under the premises.” They
alleged that they have a clear and constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology and
are entitled to protection by the State in its capacity as parens patriae. Furthermore, they claim
that the act of the defendant in allowing TLA holders to cut and deforest the remaining forests
constitutes a misappropriation and/or impairment of the natural resources property he holds in
trust for the benefit of the plaintiff minors and succeeding generations.

The defendant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the following grounds:

1. Plaintiffs have no cause of action against him;

2. The issue raised by the plaintiffs is a political question which properly pertains to
the legislative or executive branches of the government.

ISSUE:

Do the petitioner-minors have a cause of action in filing a class suit to “prevent the
misappropriation or impairment of Philippine rainforests?”

HELD:

Yes. Petitioner-minors assert that they represent their generation as well as generations to
come. The Supreme Court ruled that they can, for themselves, for others of their generation,
and for the succeeding generations, file a class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of
succeeding generations is based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as
the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right considers the “rhythm
and harmony of nature” which indispensably include, inter alia, the judicious disposition,
utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the country’s forest, mineral, land, waters,

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fisheries, wildlife, offshore areas and other natural resources to the end that their exploration,
development, and utilization be equitably accessible to the present as well as the future
generations.

Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and
harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the
minor’s assertion of their right to a sound environment constitutes at the same time, the
performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the generations to come.

30. Jackson v. Macalino, 416 SCRA 390

The petition is DISMISSED.

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