White Paper - Defending Infrastructure
White Paper - Defending Infrastructure
Infrastructure –
Cybersecurity Threats
and Best Practices
Contents
Introduction 3
It is also essential to know that Microsoft can assist with other security needs beyond the scope of
this document. For example, this document covers modernizing the security operations centers
(SOCs), another relevant conversation on advanced security. We are standing by and prepared
to support business relationship with your organization.
Emergency Approval Process – Confirm existence • Just buying more tools does not equal better
of a streamlined emergency approval process for security.
handling rapid changes during an emergency/ • Buying tools without having time and skills to
incident (e.g., authority to judge/approve rapid use them is a waste and a distraction.
change proposals and provisions to capture changes • Enabling every log source will only drown
and feedback through process afterward). organizations in data, increasing the size of the
haystack instead of finding more needles.
Establish Clear Guidelines for Escalation • Placing security staff in a dual role with IT
– Document thresholds for when internal operations diminishes their effectiveness.
investigations should escalate to specialists and • Organizations can reduce the cost of an incident
external investigation teams. These can be based on by preparing staff and scheduling availability of
time spent, complexity, unknown malware, specific required resources.
adversary, etc. • Capturing lessons learned is critical to success,
as the same attackers and techniques can be
HALLMARKS OF A STRONG RESPONSE observed over and over again.
PROGRAM
ORGANIZATIONAL PREPAREDNESS SELF-
Because of the complexity of modern organizations, ASSESSMENT
the ideal response program will vary from industry
to industry and organization to organization. The These questions will help identify how ready the
general attributes of a strong incident response and organization is for a managing a major incident.
recovery program are:
CORE STRATEGY AND ALIGNMENT
Strongly integrated with:
• Business priorities and leadership • Does the organization have a good
• IT Operations understanding of its HVAs (processes, data,
• Business Continuity Management and Disaster hardware, identities)?
Recovery • Does the organization currently have enhanced
• Context from internal and external sources controls in place for its HVAs and most likely
avenues of attack?
Continuous learning culture and processes: • What are the high-probability attack vectors?
• Postmortems performed and lessons learned What attacker techniques are most likely to
integrated be used for aggressors to gain initial access
• Regular exercises and red team validation and then begin to attempt secondary levels of
attack to gain persistence or elevated levels of
Documentation: access?
• High level of familiarity with response • Can the organization measure the impact
framework by all stakeholders to business resources and reputation if not
• Detailed technical recovery instructions (or invested in preparation?
automation) for IT and Security Professionals
Because of how critical security hygiene issues have 3. Lateral Traversal / Securing Privileged Access-
become and how challenging it is for organizations to Mitigate ability to traverse (spread) using
follow the guidance and the multiple recommended impersonation and credential theft attacks.
practices, Microsoft is taking a fresh approach to 4. Attack Surface Reduction- Reduce critical risk
solving them. Microsoft is working actively with NIST, factors across all attack stages (prepare, enter,
the Center for Internet Security (CIS), Department of traverse, execute).
Homeland Security (DHS) National Cybersecurity
and Communications Integration Center (NCCIC) We recognize every organization has unique
(formerly US-CERT) , industry partners, and the challenges and investments in cybersecurity
cybersecurity community to jointly develop and (people and technology) and cannot possibly make
publish practical guides on critical hygiene and to every single recommendation a top nor immediate
implement reference solutions starting with these priority. Accordingly, we have broken down the
recommendations on rapid cyberattacks as related primary (default) recommendations for mitigating
to patch management. rapid cyberattacks into three buckets:
Recommended Mitigations (based on the effect 1. Quick wins: what Microsoft recommends
they have on mitigating risk): organizations accomplish in the first 30 days
2. Less than 90 days: what Microsoft recommends
1. Exploit Mitigation- Mitigate software organizations accomplish in the medium term
vulnerabilities that allow worms and attackers 3. Next quarter and beyond: what Microsoft
to enter and/or traverse an environment. recommends organizations accomplish in the
2. Business Continuity / Disaster Recovery (BC/ longer term.
DR)- Rapidly resume business operations after
a destructive attack.
Securing privileged access is a critical first step to the network and firewalls as the primary security
establishing security assurances for business assets perimeter, but the following two trends have
in a modern organization. The security of most or significantly diminished the effectiveness of
all business assets in an IT organization depends traditional approaches:
on the integrity of the privileged accounts used
to administer, manage, and develop these assets. • Organizations are hosting data and resources
Cyber-attackers often target these accounts and outside the traditional network boundary on
other elements of privileged access to gain access to mobile enterprise PCs, devices like mobile
data and systems using credential theft attacks like phones and tablets, cloud services, and bring
Pass-the-Hash and Pass-the-Ticket. your own devices (BYOD)
• Adversaries have demonstrated a consistent and
Protecting privileged access against determined ongoing ability to obtain access on workstations
adversaries requires you to take a complete and inside the network boundary through phishing
thoughtful approach to isolate these systems from and other web and email attacks.
risks.
These factors necessitate building a modern security
What are privileged accounts? perimeter out of authentication and authorization
identity controls in addition to the traditional
Privileged Accounts, like administrators of Active network perimeter strategy. A security perimeter
Directory Domain Services, have direct or indirect here is defined as a consistent set of controls
access to most or all assets in an IT organization. between assets and the threats to them. Privileged
Consequently, a compromise of these accounts accounts are effectively in control of this new security
would pose a significant business risk. perimeter so it’s critical to protect privileged access.
A “blue” path where a standard user account is used for non-privileged access to resources like email and web
browsing and day to day work are completed.
Note: Blue path items described later indicate broad environmental protections that extend beyond the
administrative accounts.
A “red” path where privileged access occurs on a hardened device to reduce the risk of phishing and other web
and email attacks.
The roadmap is designed to maximize the use of Microsoft technologies that you already have deployed,
take advantage of cloud technologies to enhance security, and integrate any 3rd party security tools you may
already have deployed.
To help separate internet risks (phishing attacks, To mitigate the risk of an adversary stealing a local
web browsing) from privileged access accounts, administrator account password hash from the
create a dedicated account for all personnel with local SAM database and abusing it to attack other
privileged access. Administrators should not be computers, organizations should ensure every
browsing the web, checking their email, and doing machine has a unique local administrator password.
day to day productivity tasks with highly privileged The Local Administrator Password Solution (LAPS)
accounts. More information on this can be found in tool can configure unique random passwords on
the section Separate administrative accounts of the each workstation and server store them in Active
reference document. Directory (AD) protected by an ACL. Only eligible
authorized users can read or request the reset of
Follow the guidance in the article Manage these local administrator account passwords. You
emergency access accounts in Azure AD to create can obtain the LAPS for use on workstations and
at least two emergency access accounts, with servers from the Microsoft Download Center.
permanently assigned administrator rights, in both
the on-premises AD and Azure AD environments. Additional guidance for operating an environment
These accounts are only for use when traditional with LAPS and PAWs can be found in the section
administrator accounts are unable to perform a Operational standards based on clean source
required task such as in the case of a disaster. principle.
As an initial security measure for those users with Azure Advanced Threat Protection (ATP) is a cloud-
Azure Active Directory and traditional on-premises based security solution that identifies, detects,
Active Directory administrative privileges, ensure and helps you investigate advanced threats,
they are using Windows 10 devices configured compromised identities, and malicious insider
with the Standards for a highly secure Windows 10 actions directed at the organization’s on-premises
device. Privileged administrator accounts should Active Directory environment.
not be members of the local administrator group of
the administrative workstations. Privilege elevation Phase 2: Significant incremental improvements
via User Access Control (UAC) can be utilized
when configuration changes to the workstations Phase 2 builds on the work done in phase 1 and is
is required. Additionally, the Windows 10 Security designed to be completed in approximately 90 days.
Baseline should be applied to the workstations to The steps of this stage are depicted in this diagram:
further harden the device.
1. Require Windows Hello for Business and MFA 2. Deploy PAW to all privileged identity access
account holders
Administrators can benefit from the ease of use
associated with Windows Hello for Business. Admins Continuing the process of separating privileged
can replace their complex passwords with strong accounts from threats found in email, web browsing,
two-factor authentication on their PCs. An attacker and other non-administrative tasks, organizations
must have both the device and the biometric info or should implement dedicated Privileged Access
PIN, it’s much more difficult to gain access without Workstations (PAW) for all personnel with privileged
the employee’s knowledge. More details about access to the organization’s information systems.
Windows Hello for Business and the path to roll Additional guidance for PAW deployment can be
out can be found in the article Windows Hello for found in the article Privileged Access Workstations.
Business Overview.
3. Just in time privileges
Enable multi-factor authentication (MFA) for the
organization’s administrator accounts in Azure To lower the exposure time of privileges and increase
AD using Azure MFA. At minimum enable the visibility into their use, provide privileges just in time
baseline protection conditional access policy (JIT) using an appropriate solution such as the ones
more information about Azure Multi-Factor below or other third-party solutions:
Authentication can be found in the article Deploy
cloud-based Azure Multi-Factor Authentication.
4. Enable Windows Defender Credential Guard 6. Azure ATP Lateral Movement Paths
Enabling Credential Guard helps to protect NTLM Ensure privileged access account holders are
password hashes, Kerberos Ticket Granting Tickets, using their PAW for administration only so that a
and credentials stored by applications as domain compromised non-privileged accounts cannot gain
credentials. This capability helps to prevent access to a privileged account via credential theft
credential theft attacks, such as Pass-the-Hash attacks, such as Pass-the-Hash or Pass-The-Ticket.
or Pass-The-Ticket by increasing the difficulty of Azure ATP Lateral Movement Paths (LMPs) provides
pivoting in the environment using stolen credentials. easy to understand reporting to identify where
Information on how Credential Guard works and privileged accounts may be open to compromise.
how to deploy can be found in the article Protect
derived domain credentials with Windows Defender Phase 3: Security improvement and sustainment
Credential Guard.
Phase 3 of the roadmap builds on the steps taken
5. Leaked credentials reporting in Phases 1 and 2 to strengthen the organization’s
security posture. Phase 3 is depicted visually in this
“Every day, Microsoft analyzes over 6.5 trillion diagram:
signals in order to identify emerging threats and
Harden the organization’s identity workloads 4. Leaked credentials - Force password reset
including Domains, Domain Controllers, ADFS, and
Azure AD Connect as compromising one of these Continue to enhance the organization’s security
systems could result in compromise of other systems posture by enabling Azure AD Identity Protection to
in the organization. The articles Reducing the Active automatically force password resets when passwords
Directory Attack Surface and Five steps to securing are suspected of compromise. The guidance found
your identity infrastructure provide guidance for in the article Use risk events to trigger Multi-Factor
securing the organization’s on-premises and hybrid Authentication and password changes explains how
identity environments. to enable this using a conditional access policy.
In conclusion
The bad guys never stop, so neither can organizations. This roadmap can help organizations protect against
currently known threats, but attackers will constantly evolve and shift. Microsoft recommends organizations
view security as an ongoing process focused on raising the cost and reducing the success rate of adversaries
targeting the environment.
While it is not the only part of the organization’s security program, securing privileged access is a critical
component of the organization’s overall security strategy.
There is a lot of pressure put on the security Our approach boils down to three things:
operations center. Many organizations rely on the
SOC to defend against all types of threats. In our Tooling: With the overabundance of security
experience working with other organizations and solutions in the market, Microsoft realized that we
their security operations teams, as well as managing need to focus on selecting the right tools for the
cybersecurity within Microsoft, we have observed right job - that enable automation of everything.
several key challenges for today’s SOC.
Culture: There is not enough credence put into the
#1 – Lack of organizational support. SOCs do not importance of working to create a strong culture in
operate in a vacuum. They must interact with every the security operations team. As many if not most
part of the organization which they are protecting organizations are understaffed and overwhelmed,
and all the employees in those parts of the business. getting clear on what the organization stands for,
Without an executive sponsor and support of the how it supports the organization’s strategies, and
SOC’s mission from the entire organization a SOC how people on the team are supposed to contribute
will be ineffective at protecting the business. are critical. This will reduce toil and let people focus
on the most important things.
#2 – Over-reliance on technology. Organizations
often spend most of their security budget on Metrics: A famous business thinker (Peter Drucker)
technology, resulting in improperly staffed/skilled once said, “If you can’t measure it, you can’t improve
operations teams. Staffing the proper skills is it.” There are a wealth of metrics that to choose -
required to achieve the goals of the organization. however, pick the right ones for your organization
Human analytical capability is required to detect - not all.
and respond to modern threats.
Tooling started with SIEM model
#3 – Tool overload. Organizations are overwhelmed
with an influx of tools, data, devices, user IDs, Microsoft used to operate a SIEM centric model
endpoints, etc. similar to most organizations and faced a natural set
of challenges with that model. The SOC referenced
#4 – Attackers never sleep. Outside the walls here is the Microsoft IT operations that is most
of these organizations are further challenges in comparable to SOCs in most organizations. At
attackers and how they operate. Attacker’s interests Microsoft, multiple teams work shoulder to shoulder
don’t align with our goals as a security operations in our CDOC facility to enable collaboration and
center. They are using an array of existing tools, and rapid intelligence sharing between teams protecting
when those are no longer useful, they’re willing to our other environment such as Azure and Office 365.
invest in new tools, but essentially, as organizational
environments become more complex, everything This SOC is cross platform and covers a significant
has become easier for attackers. Trying to keep up population of Linux, Mac, and non-Microsoft
with attackers based upon today’s approach isn’t software (from both acquisitions and organic use of
going to work. these technologies.
Microsoft Approach to Security Operations The challenges we experienced with this model are
similar to those reported by our customers running
As one would expect, Microsoft has a substantial in this SIEM centric model:
security operations footprint. Over the years, as we
have evolved into a cloud provider, our cybersecurity • Event Volume - High volume and growth (on
requirements have dramatically changed. We often the scale of 20 billion events a day currently)
get asked by customers to share our experiences exceeded the capacity of the SIEM to handle it.
modernizing our SOC. We thought it would be • Alert Overload – The static rulesets generated
helpful to focus on those learnings and how to apply excessive false positives that led to alert fatigue
in your organization. • Poor Investigation workflow – Investigation of
events using the SIEM was clunky and required
manual queries and manual switching to
different tools.
Today, Microsoft is focusing our tool architecture to optimize operations with both breadth (unified view) and
depth (specialized tooling) capabilities. Now that the Microsoft cloud native SIEM is available, we are operating
this technology in production as a pilot to accelerate transition to this technology. This is a bit simpler for us
as most of the SOC’s log analytics are already using the Azure Monitor technology that powers Azure Sentinel
(technology which was formerly known as Azure Log Analytics and Operations Management Suite (OMS)).
Our SOC analysts have also been contributing heavily to the Azure Sentinel community (queries, dashboards,
etc.) to share knowledge with our customers.
Some examples are for illustration only and are fictitious. No real association is intended or inferred.
This document does not provide you with any legal rights to any intellectual property in any Microsoft product. You may copy and use this
document for your internal, reference purposes.