CASE NO.

1 – ALBURO
ALMAZAN V. SUERTE-FELIPE, A.C. 7184 – JURISDICTION OF A NOTARY
PUBLIC

FACTS: Atty. Marcelo B. Suerte-Felipe, a contemporary of the complainant Felipe

B. Almazan, Sr was sued unto IBP Commission for Bar Discipline for Gross
Negligence and Malpractice for notarizing the acknowledgment of the document
entitled “Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate of the Deceased Juliana P. Vda.
De Nieva. The complainant assails the respondent for not being commissioned as an
actual notary public in which the respondent dismissed by presenting his certification
as a notarial lawyer which by then it was discovered that his scope of jurisdiction
lies solely in the City of Pasig and the Municipalities of Taguig, Pateros, San Juan,
and Mandaluyong; Marikina was not specified in his Certificate of Commission for
Notary Public.

ISSUE: W/N Atty Felipe committed a mistake by misrepresentation?

RULING: YES. Albeit unintentional, he has committed a form of falsification of

records for notarizing a document that by his false pretence that he was executing a
notarial document in the jurisdiction of Marikina in which it was never really part of
his commissioned jurisdictions.
While seemingly appearing to be a harmless incident, respondent’s act of notarizing
documents in a place outside of or beyond the authority granted by his notarial
commission, partakes of malpractice of law and falsification.
Then, too, by making it appear that he is duly commissioned when he is not, he is, for
all legal intents and purposes, indulging in deliberate falsehood, which the lawyer’s
oath similarly proscribes. Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility
Sec. 11. Jurisdiction and Term – A person commissioned as notary public may
perform notarial acts in any place within the territorial jurisdiction of the commissioning
court for a period of two (2) years commencing the first day of January of the year in
which the commissioning court is made, unless either revoked or the notary public has
resigned under these Rules and the Rules of Court.

Said principle is equally echoed in the Notarial Law found in Chapter 12, Book V,
Volume I of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917, as amended, of which Section
240, Article II states:

Sec. 240. Territorial jurisdiction. – The jurisdiction of a notary public in a province shall
be co-extensive with the province. The jurisdiction of a notary public in the City of
Manila shall be co-extensive with said city. No notary shall possess authority to do any
notarial act beyond the limits of his jurisdiction.
MP: Under the Notarial Law, The purpose of jurisdictions assigned amongst the
Notary Publics is the equitable distribution of “workloads” such that it ensures that
 notarial lawyers are afforded sufficient volume of clients that they can provide their
legal service.

CASE NO. 3- Chua

Angeles v. Bagay, A.C. 8103, 3 December 2014

FACTS: Respondent was charged with alleged notarization of 18 documents at the time
he was out of the country from March 13, 2008 to April 8, 2008. These documents were
endorsed to the Provincial Legal Office by the Provincial Treasurer who had information
that they were notarized while respondent was outside the country attending the Prayer
and Life Workshop in Mexico.
Respondent claimed that he was not aware that those were documents notarized
using his name while he was out of the country. Upon his own inquiry, he found out that
the notarizations were done by his secretary and without his knowledge and authority.
Respondent submitted a position paper, to which he added that for 21 years that
he had been practicing law, he acted as a notary public without any blemish on record
dutifully minding the rules of the law profession and notarial practice.
ISSUE: Whether the notarization of documents by the secretary of respondent while he
was out of the country constituted negligence.
RULING: Yes, Finding respondent guilty of negligence in the performance of his notarial
duty which gave his office secretary the opportunity to abuse his prerogative authority as
notary public, the Investigating Commissioner recommended the immediate revocation
of respondent’s commission as notary public and his disqualification to be commissioned
as such for a period of two (2) years. The Court also SUSPENDS him from the practice
of law for three (3) months effective immediately, with a WARNING that the repetition of
a similar violation will be dealt with even more severely.

CHIONG - 4
RE: VIOLATION OF RULES ON NOTARIAL PRACTICE A.M. No. 09-6-1-SC, January
21, 2015
Facts:
The complaint was filed by the commissioned notaries public within and for the jurisdiction
of Lingayen, Pangasinan, namely, Atty. Butch Cardinal Torio, Atty. Nepthalie Pasiliao,
Atty. Dominique Evangelista, and Atty. Elizabeth C. Tugade before the Executive Judge
of the Regional Trial Court, Lingayen, Pangasinan against Atty. Juan C. Siapno, Jr. for
notarizing documents without a commission. The complainants alleged that Atty. Siapno
was maintaining a notarial office along Alvear Street East, Lingayen, Pangasinan, and
was performing notarial acts and practices in Lingayen, Natividad and Dagupan City
without the requisite notarial commission. They asserted that Atty. Siapno was never
commissioned as Notary Public for and within the jurisdiction of Lingayen, Natividad and
Dagupan City. Complainants also averred that Atty. Siapno had delegated his notarial
authority to his secretaries, Mina Bautista and Mary Ann Arenas , who wrote legal
instruments and signed the documents on his behalf.Erring lawyer’s defense: Atty. Siapno
denied the accusations and averred that the law office in Lingayen, Pangasinan, was not
his and that Bautista and Arenas were not his secretaries.
Issue:
W/N ATTY. Siapno violated the rules on notarial practice.
Ruling:
Yes, Atty. Siapno violated the rules on notarial practice. Under the rule, only persons who
are commissioned as notary public may perform notarial acts within the territorial
jurisdiction of the court which granted the commission. Clearly, Atty. Siapno could not
perform notarial functions in Lingayen, Natividad and Dagupan City of the Province of
Pangasinan since he was not commissioned in the said places to perform such act.
By performing notarial acts without the necessary commission from the court, Atty. Siapno
violated not only his oath to obey the laws particularly the Rules on Notarial Practice but
also Canons 1 and 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which proscribes all
lawyers from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct and directs
them to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession, at all times.

CASE NO. 5- Cruz

Notarial Duties
Relampagos v. Lagunay, A.C. 10703, 9 February 2015

Facts: Renato Relampagos alleged that Atty. Lagunay violated his oath as a lawyer and
a notary public when he notarized a Deed of Transfer in 1979 notwithstanding his
personal knowledge that the title to the subject land proceeded from a Free Patent under
which any transfer outside of the family of the patentee is prohibited for five years and
that Atty. Lagunay's wife, signed as an instrumental witness in the Deed of Transfer..
Moreover, he claimed that Atty. Lagunay actively advised and assisted his clients, the
other co-owners and their heirs, in retaining custody, administration and benefits of the
property, including the portion thereof which the complainant's mother had purchased in
1975, to his and his parents' prejudice.

Issue: Whether Atty. Lagunay’s acts violated the notarial rules

Ruling: As to Atty. Lagunay's wife, signing as an instrumental witness in the subject Deed
of Transfer, NO. Section 3(c) of Rule IV of A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC, the 2004 Rules on
Notarial Practice, provides that a notary public is disqualified from performing a notarial
act if he is a spouse, common-law partner, ancestor, descendant, or relative by affinity or
consanguinity of the principal within the fourth civil degree. The wife is not the principal
in the said instrument.
On the other hand, Section 4(a) of Rule IV enjoins a notary public from performing any
notarial act for any person if he knows or has good reason to believe that the notarial act
or transaction is unlawful. Atty. Lagunay notarized a deed of transfer of the subject lot of
which was a free patent lot still under the five-year restriction. He is warned that a
similar violation of the Notarial Rules will be dealt with more severely.

Conclusion: The disbarment complaint was dismissed in the absence of a prima facie
case against Atty. Lagunay since there was no proof that he knowingly abetted any
scheme to defraud the state or anyone else through the subsequent sale, transfer or lease
of the said land. Nonetheless, Atty. Urbano H. Lagunay is STERNLY WARNED that
another similar violation of the Rules on Notarial Practice will be dealt with more severely.

CASE NO. 6 – DARLUCIO

CRESCENCIANO M. PITOGO vs. ATTY. JOSELITO TROY SUELLO

FACTS:
Atty. Joselito Troy Suello (Suello) notarized the documents for the registration of the
motorcycle of Crescenciano M. Pitogo (Pitogo) which the latter purchased from Emcor,
Inc. Pitogo obtained a copy of the documents from the Land Transportation Office and
proceeded to Suello’s office to have the documents certified since these were important
in his pending civil case against Emcor, Inc. However, Suello ignored Pitogo’s request
and instead ordered his secretary to give Pitogo a copy of his notarial register.

Upon noticing that there were discrepancies between the notarized documents
and the entries in the notarial register, Pitogo filed an Affidavit-Complaint against Suello.
In the Affidavit-Complaint, Suello claimed that he certified the documents as true copies.
Later, in his Position Paper, he passed the blame to his secretary, claiming that it was his
secretary who certified Pitogo’s documents.

ISSUE:
Whether Suello is liable for negligence in keeping and maintaining his notarial register

HELD:
AFFIRMATIVE. Notarization is not an empty, meaningless, routinary act. It is invested
with such substantial public interest that only those who are qualified or authorized
may act as notaries public. Notarization converts a private document into a public
document, making that document admissible in evidence without further proof of its
authenticity. For this reason, notaries must observe with utmost care the basic
requirements in the performance of their duties. Otherwise, the confidence of the public
in the integrity of this form of conveyance would be undermined. Failure to properly record
entries in the notarial register is a ground for revocation of notarial commission.

When Atty. Suelo negligently failed to enter the details of the documents on his notarial
register, he cast doubt on the authenticity of the said documents and on the credibility of
the notarial register and the notarial process. He violated the law which requires lawyers
to promote respect for law and legal processes. Suello also appeared to have committed
a falsehood in the pleadings he submitted. Initially, Suello claimed that he
certified the documents as true copies. Later, he passed the blame to his secretary. This
violates the Code of Professional Responsibility, which prohibits lawyers from engaging
in dishonest and unlawful conduct.

The secretary cannot be held responsible for the erroneous entries in the notarial
register. The notarial commission is a license held personally by the notary public. It
cannot be further delegated. It is the notary public alone who is personally responsible
for the correctness of the entries in his or her notarial
register. Suello’s apparent regret may alleviate the injury done privately, but it does not
change the nature of the violation.

CASE NO.7 - FLORES

Heirs of Alilano v. Examen, A.C. 10132, 24 March 2015
Facts:
In this case, a complaint for disbarment was filed by the heirs of Pedro Alilano against
Attorney Roberto E. Examen to the IBP. The grounds for the complaint for disbarment for
misconduct and malpractice for falsifying documents which had violated the lawyer’s oath
and Canon 1, 10, 19 and Rules 1.01, 1.02, 10.01, 19.01.
The late Pedro Alilano and his late wife were the owners of the Original Certificate of Title
for a parcel of land in Paitan, Esperanza, Sultan Kudarat. The late Spouses Alilano had
executed an Absolute Deed of Sale in favor of Roman Examen and his wife Edna which
was notarized by Roman’s brother Attorney Roberto Examen. The Spouses Examen had
obtained the property in 1984. By 2002, the heirs of Alilano had filed a suit for recovery
of the land in RTC Sultan Kudarat against Spouses Examen. The Spouses Examen had
used the Absolute Deed of Sale as their defense.
The main basis for the suit from the heirs of Alilano was that Attorney Examen had
disregarded the rule when notarizing the Absolute Deed of Sale. The contentions of the
heirs was based on the ruling in Barreto v Cabreza which states, “the absolute deeds of
sale since a notary public is prohibited from notarizing a document when one of the parties
is a relative by consanguinity within the fourth civil degree or affinity within the second
civil degree.” The heirs of Alilano also asserted that
Attorney Examen had nortarized the cedula or residence certificate number with the
knowledge that the possession of such does not belong to his brother but to someone
named Florentino. Even Attorney Examen had stated that there were two witnesses
within that event but in reality there was none.
In the defense of Attorney Examen, he had mentioned that there was no prohibition within
the Administrative Code for a notary republic to be prohibited if one of the parties were
related by consanguinity or affinity. Attorney Examen contended that all was done in good
faith and that the secretary placing details without his personally examining the output is
valid. Also that using of another’s residential certificate is not a ground for disbarment
due to Rule 8(1) stating the prescription of misconduct to be within two years of the dated
act.
Issue: W/N Attorney Examen may be disbarred for misconduct and malpractice of
falsifying documents.
Ruling:
No, Attorney Examen was not disbarred but suspended from the practice of law for two
years also provided a stern warning of future infractions. Attorney Examen was to be held
liable for breach of the Notarial Law and for executing the false document of the Absolute
Deed of Sale. The NBI had taken into account of the fake signatures of the late
Spouses Alilano and that the Absolute Deed of Sale did belong to the heir
of Alilano named Florentina Pueblo.
Main Point:
The court had pointed out, “As a lawyer commissioned as a notary public, respondent
is mandated to discharge with fidelity the sacred duties appertaining to his office,
such duties being dictated by public policy and impressed with public
interest. Faithful observance and utmost respect for the legal solemnity of an oath in an
acknowledgment are sacrosanct. He cannot simply disregard the requirements and
solemnities of the Notarial Law.” Although Attorney Examen had pulled out the defense of
good faith, it cannot be appreciated for he had pushed all the blame to his
secretary which was in violation of Section 251, Chapter 11 of the Revised Administrative
Code.

CASE NO. 8- GENON

Notarial Duties (note the various ways by which the Notarial Rules are violated
Gimeno v. Zaide, A.C. 10303, 22 April 2015

MAINPOINT: The Notarial Practice Rules strictly requires a notary public to maintain only
one (1) active notarial register and ensure that the entries in it are chronologically
arranged. The “one active notarial register” rule is in place to deter a notary public from
assigning several notarial registers to different offices manned by assistants who perform
notarial services on his behalf. (Sec. 1, Rule 7)

FACTS: Joy A. Gimeno (Cimeno) filed a complaint with the IBP's Commission on Bar
Discipline, charging Atty. Zaide with: (1) usurpation of a notary public's office; (2)
falsification; (3) use of intemperate, offensive and abusive language; and (4) violation of
lawyer-client trust. In her complaint, Gimeno alleged that even before Atty. Zaide's
admission to the Bar and receipt of his notarial commission, he had notarized a partial
extrajudicial partition with deed of absolute sale on March 29, 2002. She also accused
Atty. Zaide of making false and irregular entries in his notarial registers. She noted that
Atty. Zaide violated Section 1(a) and 1(b), Rule VI of the Notarial Practice Rules when he
maintained several active notarial registers in different offices. On the alleged falsification
of his notarial entries, Atty. Zaide contended that he needed to simultaneously use several
notarial registers in his separate satellite offices in order to better cater to the needs of
his clients and accommodate their growing number. This explains the irregular and non-
sequential entries in his notarial registers.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Zaide violated Notarial Practice Rules.

RULING: YES. It is a clear violation. In these lights, we cannot accept Atty. Zaide’s
explanation that he needed to maintain several active notarial registers in separate offices
so he could accommodate the increasing number of his clients requiring his notarial
services. On the other hand, entries in a notarial register need to be in chronological
sequence in order to address and prevent the rampant practice of leaving blank spaces
in the notarial register to allow the antedating of notarizations.

This Court stresses that a notary public should not trivialize his functions as his powers
and duties are impressed with public interest. A notary public’s office is not merely an
income-generating venture. It is a public duty that each lawyer who has been privileged
to receive a notarial commission must faithfully and conscientiously perform. Atty. Zaide
should have been acutely aware of the requirements of his notarial commission. His
flagrant violation of Section 1, Rule VI of the Notarial Practice Rules is not merely a simple
and excusable negligence. It amounts to a clear violation of Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, which provides that “a lawyer [should] uphold the
constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal processes.”

His notarial commission, if existing, is hereby REVOKED, and he is declared

DISQUALIFIED from being commissioned as a notary public for a period of two (2) years.
He is also SUSPENDED for one (1) year from the practice of law.
 CASE NO. 9 - HALID
A.M. 08-11-7-SC, 10 SEPTEMBER 2009
RULE ON THE EXEMPTION FROM THE PAYMENT OF LEGAL FEES OF THE
CLIENTS OF THE NATIONAL LEGAL AID COMMITTEE (NCLA) AND OF THE
LEGAL AID OFFICES IN THE LOCAL CHAPTERS OF THE INTEGRATED BAR OF
THE PHILIPPINES (IBP)

ARTICLE I
Purpose
Section 1. Purpose. - This Rule is issued for the purpose of enforcing the right of free
access to courts by the poor guaranteed under Section 11, Article III of the Constitution.
It is intended to increase the access to justice by the poor by exempting from the payment
of legal fees incidental to instituting an action in court, as an original proceeding or on
appeal, qualified indigent clients of the NCLA and of the legal aid offices in local IBP
chapters nationwide.
ARTICLE II
Definition of Terms
Section 1. Definition of important terms. - For purposes of this Rule and as used
herein, the following terms shall be understood to be how they are defined under this
Section:
(a) "Developmental legal aid" means the rendition of legal services in public interest
causes involving overseas workers, fisherfolk, farmers, laborers, indigenous cultural
communities, women, children and other disadvantaged groups and marginalized
sectors;
(b) "Disinterested person" refers to the punong barangay having jurisdiction over the
place where an applicant for legal aid or client of the NCLA or chapter legal aid office
resides;
(c) "Falsity" refers to any material misrepresentation of fact or any fraudulent, deceitful,
false, wrong or misleading statement in the application or affidavits submitted to support
it or the affidavit of a disinterested person required to be submitted annually under this
Rule which may substantially affect the determination of the qualifications of the applicant
or the client under the means and merit tests;
(d) "Legal fees" refers to the legal fees imposed under Rule 141 of the Rules of Court as
a necessary incident of instituting an action in court either as an original proceeding or on
appeal. In particular, it includes filing or docket fees, appeal fees, fees for issuance of
provisional remedies, mediation fees, sheriff’s fees, stenographer’s fees (that is fees for
transcript of stenographic notes) and commissioner’s fees;
(e) "Means test" refers to the set of criteria used to determine whether the applicant is
one who has no money or property sufficient and available for food, shelter and basic
necessities for himself and his family;
(f) "Merit test" refers to the ascertainment of whether the applicant’s cause of action or
his defense is valid and whether the chances of establishing the same appear reasonable
and
(g) "Representative" refers to the person authorized to file an application for legal aid in
behalf of the applicant when the said applicant is prevented by a compelling reason from
personally filing his application. As a rule, it refers to the immediate family members of
the applicant. However, it may include any of the applicant’s relatives or any person or
concerned citizen of sufficient discretion who has first-hand knowledge of the personal
circumstances of the applicant as well as of the facts of the applicant’s case.
ARTICLE III
Coverage
Section 1. Persons qualified for exemption from payment of legal fees. - Persons
who shall enjoy the benefit of exemption from the payment of legal fees incidental to
instituting an action in court, as an original proceeding or on appeal, granted under this
Rule shall be limited only to clients of the NCLA and the chapter legal aid offices.
The said clients shall refer to those indigents qualified to receive free legal aid service
from the NCLA and the chapter legal aid offices. Their qualifications shall be determined
based on the tests provided in this Rule.
Section 2. Persons not covered by the Rule. - The following shall be disqualified from
the coverage of this Rule. Nor may they be accepted as clients by the NCLA and the
chapter legal aid offices.
(a) Juridical persons; except in cases covered by developmental legal aid or public
interest causes involving juridical entities which are non-stock, non-profit organizations,
non-governmental organizations and people’s organizations whose individual members
will pass the means test provided in this Rule;
(b) Persons who do not pass the means and merit tests;
(c) Parties already represented by a counsel de parte;
(d) Owners or lessors of residential lands or buildings with respect to the filing of collection
or unlawful detainer suits against their tenants and
(e) Persons who have been clients of the NCLA or chapter legal aid office previously in a
case where the NCLA or chapter legal aid office withdrew its representation because of
a falsity in the application or in any of the affidavits supporting the said application.
Section 3. Cases not covered by the Rule. - The NCLA and the chapter legal aid offices
shall not handle the following:
(a) Cases where conflicting interests will be represented by the NCLA and the chapter
legal aid offices and
(b) Prosecution of criminal cases in court.
ARTICLE IV
Tests of Indigency
Section 1. Tests for determining who may be clients of the NCLA and the legal aid
offices in local IBP chapters. - The NCLA or the chapter legal aid committee, as the
case may be, shall pass upon requests for legal aid by the combined application of the
means and merit tests and the consideration of other relevant factors provided for in the
following sections.
Section 2. Means test; exception. - (a) This test shall be based on the following criteria:
(i) the applicant and that of his immediate family must have a gross monthly income that
does not exceed an amount double the monthly minimum wage of an employee in the
place where the applicant resides and (ii) he does not own real property with a fair market
value as stated in the current tax declaration of more than Three Hundred Thousand
(P300,000.00) Pesos.
In this connection, the applicant shall execute an affidavit of indigency (printed at the back
of the application form) stating that he and his immediate family do not earn a gross
income abovementioned, nor own any real property with the fair value aforementioned,
supported by an affidavit of a disinterested person attesting to the truth of the applicant’s
affidavit. The latest income tax return and/or current tax declaration, if any, shall be
attached to the applicant’s affidavit.
(b) The means test shall not be applicable to applicants who fall under the developmental
legal aid program such as overseas workers, fisherfolk, farmers, laborers, indigenous
cultural communities, women, children and other disadvantaged groups.
Section 3. Merit test. - A case shall be considered meritorious if an assessment of the
law and evidence at hand discloses that the legal service will be in aid of justice or in the
furtherance thereof, taking into consideration the interests of the party and those of
society. A case fails this test if, after consideration of the law and evidence presented by
the applicant, it appears that it is intended merely to harass or injure the opposite party
or to work oppression or wrong.
Section 4. Other relevant factors that may be considered. - The effect of legal aid or
of the failure to render the same upon the rule of law, the proper administration of justice,
the public interest involved in a given case and the practice of law in the locality shall
likewise be considered.
ARTICLE V
Acceptance and Handling of Cases
Section 1. Procedure in accepting cases. - The following procedure shall be observed
in the acceptance of cases for purposes of this Rule:
(a) Filing of application - An application shall be made personally by the applicant, unless
there is a compelling reason which prevents him from doing so, in which case his
representative may apply for him. It shall adhere substantially to the form made for that
purpose. It shall be prepared and signed by the applicant or, in proper cases, his duly
authorized representative in at least three copies.
Applications for legal aid shall be filed with the NCLA or with the chapter legal aid
committee.
The NCLA shall, as much as possible, concentrate on cases of paramount importance or
national impact.
Requests received by the IBP National Office shall be referred by the NCLA to the proper
chapter legal aid committee of the locality where the cases have to be filed or are pending.
The chapter president and the chairman of the chapter’s legal aid committee shall be
advised of such referral.
(b) Interview - The applicant shall be interviewed by a member of the chapter legal aid
committee or any chapter member authorized by the chapter legal aid committee to
determine the applicant’s qualifications based on the means and merit tests and other
relevant factors. He shall also be required to submit copies of his latest income tax returns
and/or current tax declaration, if available, and execute an affidavit of indigency printed
at the back of the application form with the supporting affidavit of a disinterested person
attesting to the truth of the applicant’s affidavit.
After the interview, the applicant shall be informed that he can follow up the action on his
application after five (5) working days.
(c) Action on the application - The chapter legal aid committee shall pass upon every
request for legal aid and submit its recommendation to the chapter board of officers within
three (3) working days after the interview of the applicant. The basis of the
recommendation shall be stated.
The chapter board of officers shall review and act on the recommendation of the chapter
legal aid committee within two (2) working days from receipt thereof; Provided, however,
that in urgent matters requiring prompt or immediate action, the chapter’s executive
director of legal aid or whoever performs his functions may provisionally act on the
application, subject to review by the chapter legal aid committee and, thereafter, by the
chapter board of officers.
The action of the chapter board of officers on the application shall be final.
(d) Cases which may be provisionally accepted. - In the following cases, the NCLA or the
chapter legal aid office, through the chapter’s executive director of legal aid or whoever
performs his functions may accept cases provisionally pending verification of the
applicant’s indigency and an evaluation of the merit of his case.
(i) Where a warrant for the arrest of the applicant has been issued;
(ii) Where a pleading has to be filed immediately to avoid adverse effects to the applicant;
(iii) Where an appeal has to be urgently perfected or a petition for certiorari, prohibition or
mandamus filed has to be filed immediately; and
(iv) Other similar urgent cases.
(e) Assignment of control number - Upon approval of the chapter board of officers of a
person’s application and the applicant is found to be qualified for legal assistance, the
case shall be assigned a control number. The numbering shall be consecutive starting
from January to December of every year. The control number shall also indicate the
region and the chapter handling the case.
Example:

Region[18] Chapter Year Month Number

GM - Manila - 2009 - 03 - 099

(f) Issuance of a certification - After an application is approved and a control number duly
assigned, the chapter board of officers shall issue a certification that the person (that is,
the successful applicant) is a client of the NCLA or of the chapter legal aid office. The
certification shall bear the control number of the case and shall state the name of the
client and the nature of the judicial action subject of the legal aid of the NCLA or the legal
aid office of a local IBP chapter.
The certification shall be issued to the successful applicant free of charge.
Section 2. Assignment of cases. - After a case is given a control number, the chapter
board of officers shall refer it back to the chapter legal aid committee. The chapter legal
aid committee shall assign the case to any chapter member who is willing to handle the
case.
In case no chapter member has signified an intention to handle the case voluntarily, the
chapter legal aid committee shall refer the matter to the chapter board of officers together
with the names of at least three members who, in the chapter legal aid committee’s
discretion, may competently render legal aid on the matter. The chapter board of officers
shall appoint one chapter member from among the list of names submitted by the chapter
legal aid committee. The chapter member chosen may not refuse the appointment except
on the ground of conflict of interest or other equally compelling grounds as provided in
the Code of Professional Responsibility,[19] in which case the chapter board of officers
shall appoint his replacement from among the remaining names in the list previously
submitted by the chapter legal aid committee.
The chapter legal aid committee and the chapter board of officers shall take the necessary
measures to ensure that cases are well-distributed to chapter members.
Section 3. Policies and guidelines in the acceptance and handling of cases. - The
following policies and guidelines shall be observed in the acceptance and handling of
cases:
(a) First come, first served - Where both the complainant/plaintiff/petitioner and
defendant/ respondent apply for legal aid and both are qualified, the first to seek
assistance shall be given preference.
(b) Avoidance of conflict of interest - Where acceptance of a case will give rise to a conflict
of interest on the part of the chapter legal aid office, the applicant shall be duly informed
and advised to seek the services of a private counsel or another legal aid organization.
Where handling of the case will give rise to a conflict of interest on the part of the chapter
member assigned to the case, the client shall be duly informed and advised about it. The
handling lawyer shall also inform the chapter legal aid committee so that another chapter
member may be assigned to handle the case. For purposes of choosing the substitute
handling lawyer, the rule in the immediately preceding section shall be observed.
(c) Legal aid is purely gratuitous and honorary - No member of the chapter or member of
the staff of the NCLA or chapter legal aid office shall directly or indirectly demand or
request from an applicant or client any compensation, gift or present for legal aid services
being applied for or rendered.
(d) Same standard of conduct and equal treatment - A chapter member who is tasked to
handle a case accepted by the NCLA or by the chapter legal aid office shall observe the
same standard of conduct governing his relations with paying clients. He shall treat the
client of the NCLA or of the chapter legal aid office and the said client’s case in a manner
that is equal and similar to his treatment of a paying client and his case.
(e) Falsity in the application or in the affidavits - Any falsity in the application or in the
affidavit of indigency or in the affidavit of a disinterested person shall be sufficient cause
for the NCLA or chapter legal aid office to withdraw or terminate the legal aid. For this
purpose, the chapter board of officers shall authorize the handling lawyer to file the proper
manifestation of withdrawal of appearance of the chapter legal aid office in the case with
a motion for the dismissal of the complaint or action of the erring client. The court, after
hearing, shall approve the withdrawal of appearance and grant the motion, without
prejudice to whatever criminal liability may have been incurred.
Violation of this policy shall disqualify the erring client from availing of the benefits of this
Rule in the future.
(f) Statement in the initiatory pleading - To avail of the benefits of the Rule, the initiatory
pleading shall state as an essential preliminary allegation that (i) the party initiating the
action is a client of the NCLA or of the chapter legal aid office and therefore entitled to
exemption from the payment of legal fees under this Rule and (ii) a certified true copy of
the certification issued pursuant to Section 1(e), of this Article is attached or annexed to
the pleading.
Failure to make the statement shall be a ground for the dismissal of the action without
prejudice to its refiling.
The same rule shall apply in case the client, through the NCLA or chapter legal aid office,
files an appeal.
(g) Attachment of certification in initiatory pleading - A certified true copy of the certification
issued pursuant to Section 1(e), of this Article shall be attached as an annex to the
initiatory pleading.
Failure to attach a certified true copy of the said certification shall be a ground for the
dismissal of the action without prejudice to its refiling.
The same rule shall apply in case the client, through the NCLA or chapter legal aid office,
files an appeal.
(h) Signing of pleadings - All complaints, petitions, answers, replies, memoranda and
other important pleadings or motions to be filed in courts shall be signed by the handling
lawyer and co-signed by the chairperson or a member of the chapter legal aid committee,
or in urgent cases, by the executive director of legal aid or whoever performs his functions.
Ordinary motions such as motions for extension of time to file a pleading or for
postponement of hearing and manifestations may be signed by the handling lawyer alone.
(i) Motions for extension of time or for postponement - The filing of motions for extension
of time to file a pleading or for postponement of hearing shall be avoided as much as
possible as they cause delay to the case and prolong the proceedings.
(j) Transfer of cases - Transfer of cases from one handling lawyer to another shall be
affected only upon approval of the chapter legal aid committee.
Section 4. Decision to appeal. - (a) All appeals must be made on the request of the
client himself. For this purpose, the client shall be made to fill up a request to appeal.
(b) Only meritorious cases shall be appealed. If the handling lawyer, in consultation with
the chapter legal aid committee, finds that there is no merit to the appeal, the client should
be immediately informed thereof in writing and the record of the case turned over to him,
under proper receipt. If the client insists on appealing the case, the lawyer handling the
case should perfect the appeal before turning over the records of the case to him.
Section 5. Protection of private practice. - Utmost care shall be taken to ensure that
legal aid is neither availed of to the detriment of the private practice of law nor taken
advantage of by anyone for purely personal ends.
 ARTICLE VI
Withdrawal of Legal Aid and Termination of Exemption
Section 1. Withdrawal of legal aid. - The NCLA or the chapter legal aid committee may,
in justifiable instances as provided in the next Section, direct the handling lawyer to
withdraw representation of a client’s cause upon approval of the IBP Board of Governors
(in the case of the NCLA) or of the chapter board of officers (in the case of the chapter
legal aid committee) and through a proper motion filed in Court.
Section 2. Grounds for withdrawal of legal aid. - Withdrawal may be warranted in the
following situations:
(a) In a case that has been provisionally accepted, where it is subsequently ascertained
that the client is not qualified for legal aid;
(b) Where the client’s income or resources improve and he no longer qualifies for
continued assistance based on the means test. For this purpose, on or before January
15 every year, the client shall submit an affidavit of a disinterested person stating that the
client and his immediate family do not earn a gross income mentioned in Section 2, Article
V, nor own any real property with the fair market value mentioned in the same Section;
(c) When it is shown or found that the client committed a falsity in the application or in the
affidavits submitted to support the application;
(d) When the client subsequently engages a de parte counsel or is provided with a de
oficio counsel;
(e) When, despite proper advice from the handling lawyer, the client cannot be refrained
from doing things which the lawyer himself ought not do under the ethics of the legal
profession, particularly with reference to their conduct towards courts, judicial officers,
witnesses and litigants, or the client insists on having control of the trial, theory of the
case, or strategy in procedure which would tend to result in incalculable harm to the
interests of the client;
(f) When, despite notice from the handling lawyer, the client does not cooperate or
coordinate with the handling lawyer to the prejudice of the proper and effective rendition
of legal aid such as when the client fails to provide documents necessary to support his
case or unreasonably fails to attend hearings when his presence thereat is required; and
(g) When it becomes apparent that the representation of the client’s cause will result in a
representation of conflicting interests, as where the adverse party had previously
engaged the services of the NCLA or of the chapter legal aid office and the subject matter
of the litigation is directly related to the services previously rendered to the adverse party.
Section 3. Effect of withdrawal. - The court, after hearing, shall allow the NCLA or the
chapter legal aid office to withdraw if it is satisfied that the ground for such withdrawal
exists.
Except when the withdrawal is based on paragraphs (b), (d) and (g) of the immediately
preceding Section, the court shall also order the dismissal of the case. Such dismissal is
without prejudice to whatever criminal liability may have been incurred if the withdrawal
is based on paragraph (c) of the immediately preceding Section.
ARTICLE VII
Miscellaneous Provisions
Section 1. Lien on favorable judgment. - The amount of the docket and other lawful
fees which the client was exempted from paying shall be a lien on any judgment rendered
in the case favorable to the indigent, unless the court otherwise provides.
In case, attorney’s fees have been awarded to the client, the same shall belong to the
NCLA or to the chapter legal aid office that rendered the legal aid, as the case may be. It
shall form part of a special fund which shall be exclusively used to support the legal aid
program of the NCLA or the chapter legal aid office. In this connection, the chapter board
of officers shall report the receipt of attorney’s fees pursuant to this Section to the NCLA
within ten (10) days from receipt thereof. The NCLA shall, in turn, include the data on
attorney’s fees received by IBP chapters pursuant to this Section in its liquidation report
for the annual subsidy for legal aid.
Section 2. Duty of NCLA to prepare forms. - The NCLA shall prepare the standard
forms to be used in connection with this Rule. In particular, the NCLA shall prepare the
following standard forms: the application form, the affidavit of indigency, the supporting
affidavit of a disinterested person, the affidavit of a disinterested person required to be
submitted annually under Section 2(b), Article VI, the certification issued by the NCLA or
the chapter board of officers under Section 1(f), Article V and the request to appeal.
The said forms, except the certification, shall be in Filipino. Within sixty (60) days from
receipt of the forms from the NCLA, the chapter legal aid offices shall make translations
of the said forms in the dominant dialect used in their respective localities.
Section 3. Effect of Rule on right to bring suits in forma pauperis. - Nothing in this
Rule shall be considered to preclude those persons not covered either by this Rule or by
the exemption from the payment of legal fees granted to clients of the Public Attorney’s
Office under Section 16-D of RA 9406 to litigate in forma pauperis under Section 21, Rule
3 and Section 19 Rule 141 of the Rules of Court.
Section 4. Compliance with Rule on Mandatory Legal Aid Service. - Legal aid service
rendered by a lawyer under this Rule either as a handling lawyer or as an interviewer of
applicants under Section 1(b), Article IV hereof shall be credited for purposes of
compliance with the Rule on Mandatory Legal Aid Service.
The chairperson of the chapter legal aid office shall issue the certificate similar to that
issued by the Clerk of Court in Section 5(b) of the Rule on Mandatory Legal Aid Service.
 CASE NO. 10 – HAMISANI
Saburnido v. Madrono

FACTS:
This is an administrative complaint for disbarment of respondent, Atty. Florante
Madrono, file by spouses Venustiano and Rosalia Saburnido.
Complainants allege that respondent has been harassing them by filing
numerous complaints against them, in addition to committing acts of dishonesty.
Complainant Venustiano Saburnido is a member of the Philippine National Police
stationed at Balingasag, Misamis Oriental, while his wife Rosalia is a public school
teacher. Respondent is a former judge of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Balingasag-
Lagonglong, Misamis
Oriental. Previous to this administrative case, complainants also filed three
administrative cases against the respondent: (1) charges of grave threats and acts
unbecoming a member of the judiciary against respondent; (2) respondent granted and
reduced bail in a criminal case without prior notice to the prosecution; (3) respondent, in
whose court certain confiscated
smuggled goods were deposited, allowed other persons to take the
goods but did not issue the corresponding memorandum receipts. Respondent
was found guilty on these charges and his retirement benefits were forfeited.
After sometime the respondent lawyer then filed numerous complaints
against the petitioners, to which they allege that this is already a form of
harassment or a way of getting back to them.

ISSUE:
WON the multiple cases file by the respondent lawyer against the petitioners is a ground
for his disbarment.

RULING:
No. The Court finds that suspension from the practice of law is sufficient to
discipline the respondent. A lawyer’s act of filing multiple complaints against the
complainants reflects on his fitness to be a member of the legal profession. Respondent’s
act of filing multiple complaints against herein complainants reflects on his fitness to be a
member of the legal profession. His act evinces vindictiveness, a decidedly undesirable
trait whether in a lawyer or another individual, as complainants were instrumental in
respondent’s dismissal from the judiciary. We see in respondent’s tenacity in pursuing
several cases against complainants not the persistence of one who has been grievously
wronged but the obstinacy of one who is trying to exact revenge.

Rule 1.03- A lawyer shall not, for any corrupt motive or interest, encourage any sui or
proceeding or delay any man’s cause.
 CASE NO. 11 – JAAFAR
CASTANEDA vs. AGO
G.R. No. L-28546 July 30, 1975

FACTS
In 1955, the petitioners Venancio Castañeda and Nicetas Henson filed a replevin suit
against Pastor Ago in the Court of First Instance of Manila to recover certain machineries
(civil case 27251). Ago failed to redeem, and on April 17, 1964 the sheriff executed the
final deed of sale in favor of the vendees Castañeda and Henson. Upon their petition, the
Court of First Instance of Manila issued a writ of possession to the properties.
However, on May 2, 1964 Pastor Ago, now joined by his wife, Lourdes Yu Ago, as his co-
plaintiff, filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Quezon City (civil case Q-7986)
to annul the sheriff's sale.
The Court of First Instance of Quezon City issued an ex parte writ of preliminary injunction
restraining the petitioners, the Register of Deeds and the sheriff of Quezon City, from
registering the latter's final deed of sale, from cancelling the respondents' certificates of
title and issuing new ones to the petitioners and from carrying out any writ of possession.
While the battle on the matter of the lifting and restoring of the restraining order was being
fought in the Quezon City court, the Agos filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with
this Court under date of May 26, 1966. The Court found no merit in the petition and
dismissed it. The Court of Appeals also dismissed the petition. The respondents then
appealed to this Court. The Court dismissed the petition in a minute resolution on
February 8, 1967. The Ago spouses repaired once more to the Court of Appeals where
they filed another petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction.
Failing to obtain reconsideration, the petitioners Castañeda and Henson filed the present
petition for review of the aforesaid decision.
ISSUE
Whether or not the respondents Agos, abetted by their lawyer Jose M. Luison, have
misused legal remedies and prostituted the judicial process to thwart the satisfaction of
the judgment.
RULING
Yes. Despite the pendency in the trial court of the complaint for the annulment of the
sheriff's sale (civil case Q-7986), elementary justice demands that the petitioners,
long denied the fruits of their victory in the replevin suit, must now enjoy them, for, the
respondents Agos, abetted by their lawyer Jose M. Luison, have misused legal remedies
and prostituted the judicial process to thwart the satisfaction of the judgment, to the
extended prejudice of the petitioners. The respondents, with the assistance of counsel,
maneuvered for fourteen (14) years to doggedly resist execution of the judgment thru
manifold tactics in and from one court to another (5 times in the Supreme Court).
The Court condemn the attitude of the respondents and their counsel who,
Far from viewing courts as sanctuaries for those who seek justice, have tried to use them
to subvert the very ends of justice.
Forgetting his sacred mission as a sworn public servant and his exalted position as an
officer of the court, Atty. Luison has allowed himself to become an instigator of
controversy and a predator of conflict instead of a mediator for concord and a conciliator
for compromise, a virtuoso of technicality in the conduct of litigation instead of a true
exponent of the primacy of truth and moral justice.
NOTES:
However, on May 2, 1964 Pastor Ago, now joined by his wife, Lourdes Yu Ago, as his co-
plaintiff, filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Quezon City (civil case Q-
7986) to annul the sheriff's sale on the ground that the obligation of Pastor Ago upon
which judgment was rendered against him in the replevin suit was his personal obligation,
and that Lourdes Yu Ago's one-half share in their conjugal residential house and lots
which were levied upon and sold by the sheriff could not legally be reached for the
satisfaction of the judgment.
A counsel's assertiveness in espousing with candour and honesty his client's cause
must be encouraged and is to be commended; what we do not and cannot countenance
is a lawyer's insistence despite the patent futility of his client's position, as in the case at
bar. It is the duty of a counsel to advise his client, ordinarily a layman to the intricacies
and vagaries of the law, on the merit or lack of merit of his case. If he finds that his client's
cause is defenseless, then it is his bounden duty to advise the latter to acquiesce and
submit, rather than traverse the incontrovertible. A lawyer must resist the whims and
caprices of his client, and temper his clients propensity to litigate. A lawyer's oath to
uphold the cause of justice is superior to his duty to his client; its primacy is indisputable

CASE NO. 13 – LIM

JUDGE MARIBETH MANAHAN vs. ATTY. RODOLFO FLORES
A.C. No. 8954, November 13, 2013

FACTS: Atty. Flores was the counsel for the defendant

in a civil case before the sala of Judge Manahan. During the preliminary conference,
Atty. Flores entered his appearance and was given time to file a Pre-Trial Brief. Later,
Atty. Flores filed his Pre-Trial Brief but without proof of MCLE compliance hence it was
expunged from the records without prejudice to the filing of another Pre-Trial Brief
containing the required MCLE compliance, however, Atty. Flores asked for ten (10) days
to submit proof.

The preliminary conference was set several times and Atty. Flores was given
several occasions to submit the brief with the proper MCLE compliance. On the final
instance, instead of submitting the promised proof of MCLE compliance, Atty. Flores filed
a letter stating that he was no longer representing the defendant. Such was stated in what
was deemed as intemperate language.

ISSUE: Whether Atty. Flores is guilty of disrespect to court orders.

RULING: YES. Court orders are to be respected not because the judges who issue them
should be respected, but because of the respect and consideration that should be
extended to the judicial branch of the Government.

Atty. Flores failed to obey the trial court’s order to submit proof of his MCLE
compliance notwithstanding the several opportunities given him. Furthermore, he used
intemperate language in his pleadings and dealing with the court. As an officer of the
court, he must be circumspect in his language and should have abstained from
scandalous, offensive or menacing language or behavior before the court.

CASE NO. 14 Musa

MARIA CONSOLACION RIVERA-PASCUAL v. SPOUSES MARILYN LIM and
GEORGE LIM and the REGISTRY OF DEEDS OF VALENZUELA CITY

Subject of the present controversy is a parcel of land with an approximate area of 4.4
hectares and located at Bignay, Valenzuela City. The property is covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. V-73892, registered in the names of George and Marilyn Lim
(Spouses Lim).
On September 8, 2004, Maria Consolacion Rivera-Pascual (Consolacion) filed before the
Office of the Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (RARAD) for Region IV-A a petition
to be recognized as a tenant of a property located at Bignay, Valenzuela City
against Danilo Deato (Deato). At that time, the property, which has an approximate area
of 4.4 hectares, was covered by TCT No. 24759 under Deato’s name. During the
pendency of the petition, Deato sold the property to Spouses Lim. The sale was
registered on December 21, 2004 leading to the issuance of TCT No. V-73892 in favor of
Spouses Lim. Considering this development, Consolacion filed a motion on March 3,
2005 to implead Spouses Lim as respondents. The petition was granted
by the Regional Adjudicator Conchita Miñas.

On appeal, the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) issued a

Decision12 on February 18, 2009 reversing RA Miñas’ Decision. On April 13,
2009, Consolacion moved for reconsideration, which the DARAB denied in a
Resolution dated for being filed out of time. Consolacion filed a petition for review under
Rule 43 of the Rules of Court with the CA. The CA did not give due course to the petition
due to the following technical grounds: a) failure of counsel to indicate in the petition his
MCLE Certificate of Compliance or Exemption Number and b)
the jurat of Consolacion’s verification and certification against non-forum-shopping failed
to indicate any competent evidence of Consolacion’s identity apart from her community
tax certificate.

Issue: WON the petition should be denied due to the unexplained failure to comply with
basic procedural requirements of the Rules of Court.
Held: Yes, the petition should be denied. Consolacion and her counsel claimed
inadvertence and negligence but they did not explain the circumstances thereof. Absent
valid and compelling reasons, the requested leniency and liberality in the observance of
procedural rules appears to be an afterthought, hence, cannot be granted. The CA saw
no compelling need meriting the relaxation of the rules. Neither did the Court see any.
The Court is aware of the exceptional cases where technicalities were liberally
construed. However, in these cases, outright dismissal is rendered unjust by the
presence of a satisfactory and persuasive explanation. The parties therein who prayed
for liberal interpretation were able to hurdle that heavy burden of proving that they deserve
an exceptional treatment. It was never the Court’s intent “to forge a bastion for erring
litigants to violate the rules with impunity.”
This Court will not condone a cavalier attitude towards procedural rules. It is the duty of
every member of the bar to comply with these rules. They are not at liberty to seek
exceptions should they fail to observe these rules and rationalize their omission by
harking on liberal construction. While it is the negligence of Consolacion's counsel that
led to this unfortunate result, she is bound by such.

CASE NO. 15 - OCENA

Collantes v. Renomeron (200 SCRA 584)

FACTS: This complaint for disbarment is relative to the administrative case filed by
Atty.  Collantes, house counsel for V& G Better Homes Subdivision, Inc. (V&G), against
Atty. Renomeron, Register of Deeds of Tacloban City, for the latter’s irregular actuations
with regard to the application of V&G for registration of 163 pro forma Deed of Absolute
Sale with Assignment (in favor of GSIS) of lots in its subdivision.

Although V&G complied with the desired requirements, Renomeron suspended the
registration of the documents with certain “special conditions” between them, which was
that V&G should provide him with weekly round trip ticket from Tacloban to Manila plus
P2,000.00 as pocket money per trip, or, in lieu thereof, the sale of respondent’s Quezon
City house and lot by V&G or GSIS representatives.

Eventually, respondent formally denied the registration of the documents. He himself

elevated the question on the registrability of the said documents to
Administrator Bonifacio (of the National Land Titles and Deeds Registration
Administration-NLTDRA). The Administrator then resolved in favor of the registrability of
the documents. Despite the resolution of the Administrator, the respondent still refused
the registration thereof but demanded from the parties interested the submission of
additional requirements not adverted in his previous denial.

ISSUE:
1. Whether the respondent, as a lawyer, may also be disciplined by the Court for his
malfeasance as a public official.
2. Whether the Code of Professional Responsibility applies to government service in
the discharge of official tasks.
RULING:
1. Yes, a lawyer’s misconduct as a public official also constitutes a violation of his
oath as a lawyer. The lawyer’s oath imposes upon every lawyer the duty to delay no
man for money or malice. The lawyer’s oath is a source of obligations and its violation
is a ground for his suspension, disbarment or other disciplinary action.
2. Yes, the Code of Professional Responsibility applies to government service in the
discharge of their official tasks (Canon 6). The Code forbids a lawyer to engage in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct (Rule 1.01, Code of Professional
Responsibility), or delay any man’s cause “for any corrupt motive or interest” (Rule
1.03).

16 REYES
Lawyers in Government Service
OCA vs. Ladaga

FACTS: The Court Administrator Justice Alfredo Benipayo filed an administrative

complaint against respondent Atty. Misael Ladaga for violating Section 7(b)(2) of RA 6713
or the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees, which
prohibits civil servants from engaging in the private practice of their profession.

Atty. Ladaga appeared as pro bono counsel for his cousin, Narcisa Ladaga, in a criminal
case for falsification of public documents filed by Lisa Andres. He admitted that he did
such without prior authorization but with the defense that he and his cousin were “close
blood cousins” who belong to a “powerless family” from the impoverished town of Bacaug,
Surigao del Norte. On the other hand, Lisa Andres was a member of a powerful family. It
was also claimed that the criminal case was filed by Lisa to “seek vengeance” because
Narcisa and Lisa’s husband had an illicit affair and begot 3 children. The birth certificate
of the first child is the subject of the charge. He also claimed that his appearances were
covered by leave applications approved by the presiding judge.

ISSUE: Whether Atty. Ladaga appeared as counsel for his cousin without prior
authorization.

RULING: YES. However, it should be clarified that “private practice” of a profession,

specifically the law profession in this case, which is prohibited, does not pertain to an
isolated court appearance; rather, it contemplates a succession of acts of the same nature
habitually or customarily holding one's self to the public as a lawyer. Practice of law to fall
within the prohibition of statute has been interpreted as customarily or habitually holding
one's self out to the public, as a lawyer and demanding payment for such services. The
appearance as counsel on one occasion is not conclusive as determinative of
engagement in the private practice of law.

Nonetheless, while Atty. Ladaga’s isolated court appearances did not amount to a private
practice of law, he failed to obtain a written permission therefor from the head of the
Department. It is true that he filed leave applications corresponding to the dates he
appeared in court. However, he failed to obtain a prior permission from the head of the
Department. The presiding judge of the court to which respondent is assigned is not the
head of the Department contemplated by law.

CONCLUSION: Respondent Atty. Misael Ladaga is hereby REPRIMANDED with a stern

warning that any repetition of such act would be dealt with more severely.

CASE NO. 17 - SABTALUH

PIMENTEL VS. FABROS
A.C. NO. 4517, SEPTEMBER 11, 2006

FACTS:
Atty. Vitallano C. Fabros and Pacifico Paas were the chairman and vice chairman
respectively, of the provincial board of canvassers, Province of Isabela (PBC-Isabela) in
the 1995 elections. They were charged for unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct in relation to the discharge of their duties by then Senator Aquilino Pimentel. The
complainant alleged that the Statement of Votes per Municipality prepared and certified
to be true and correct by the respondent was actually fraudulent statements which contain
false and untrue entries. The votes for the candidates Enrile, Honasan and Mitra were
padded and increased by some 27,755, 10,000 and 7,000, respectively. Atty. Fabros
contends that the canvassing was made in public view and he wilfully read the votes as
reflected in the certificate of canvass.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondents should be guilty of misconduct for the counterfeit of the
Statement of Votes.

RULING:
Yes. The records reflect the discrepancy between the questioned certificate of canvass
and the statement of votes of the Province of Isabela. As chairman and vice-chairman of
PBC-Isabela, respondents were mandated to receive the municipal/city certificates of
canvass, and to canvass them for the votes. Moreover, simply affixing their signatures for
the purpose of identifying the document, the vouches the correctness of their contents.
Even if they had no participation of misdeed. As public officers, respondents failed to live
up to the high degree of excellence, professionalism, intelligence and skill required of
them. As lawyers, they were found to have engaged in unlawful, dishonest, immoral and
deceitful conduct. They also violated their oath as officers of the court to foist no falsehood
on anyone.

CASE NO. 18 - SALINAS

Lahm v. Mayor
Facts:
On 5 September 2006, a certain David Edward Toze filed a complaint for illegal dismissal
before the Labor Arbitration Branch of the National Labor Relations Commission against
the members of the Board of Trustees of the International School, Manila. The case was
raffled to the sala of the respondent, Labor Arbiter Jovencio Ll. Mayor, Jr. During the
proceedings, Toze filed a Verified Motion for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining
Order and/or Preliminary Injunction, to which the complainants, Martin Lahm III and
James P. Concepcion, opposed. Thereafter, the respondent issued an Order directing
the parties in the said case to maintain the status quo ante, which consequently reinstated
Toze to his former position as superintendent of the International School Manila. Despite
the complainants’ motion for an early resolution of their motion to dismiss the said case,
respondent maintained his Order. Thus, the complaint praying for the respondent’s
disbarment for alleged gross misconduct and violation of lawyer’s oath.
Issue: Whether the respondent guilty for the gross misconduct and violation of lawyer’s
oath?
Ruling: Yes. The Supreme Court concurred with the conclusion of the Investigating
Commissioner of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline that respondent guilty for the
gross misconduct and violation of lawyer’s oath. Gross misconduct is any inexcusable,
shameful or flagrant unlawful conduct on the part of a person concerned with the
administration of justice; i.e., conduct prejudicial to the rights of the parties or to the right
determination of the cause. The motive behind this conduct is generally a premeditated,
obstinate or intentional purpose.
Under the 2005 Rules of Procedure of the NLRC, the labor arbiters no longer have the
authority to issue writs of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining orders.
However, the respondent, in violation of the said rule, vehemently insist that he has the
authority to issue writs of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order.
Further, the unfounded insistence of the respondent on his supposed authority to issue
writs of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order, taken together with the
delay in the resolution of the said motion for reconsideration, would clearly show that the
respondent deliberately intended to cause prejudice to the complainants.
In stubbornly insisting that he has the authority to issue writs of preliminary injunction
and/or temporary restraining order contrary to the clear import of the 2005 Rules of
Procedure of the NLRC, the respondent violated Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which mandates lawyers to obey the laws of the land and promote respect
for law and legal processes.

CASE NO.19 - SALVADOR

People vs. Pineda
B. To the Society; Duty of Prosecutors

Facts: On the night of July 29, 1965, the occupants of the home of the spouses Teof ilo
Mendoza and Valeriana Bontilao de Mendoza in Puga-an, City of Iligan, were asleep. It
was then that guns (rifle, caliber 22) and paliuntod (homemade gun) were fired in rapid
succession from outside the house. Teofilo Mendoza fell dead. Thereafter, defendants
below destroyed the door of the house, entered therein, and let loose several shots killing
Neceforo Mendoza, Epifania Mendoza and Marcelo Mendoza—all minor children of the
couple—and wounding Valeriana Bontilao de Mendoza.

The City Fiscal balked at the foregoing order, sought reconsideration thereof, upon the
ground that "more than one gun was used, more than one shot was fired and more than
one victim was killed." The defense opposed. On May 31, 1966, respondent Judge denied
the motion to reconsider. He took the position that the acts complained of "stemmed out
of a series of continuing acts on the part of the accused, not by different and separate
sets of shots, moved by one impulse and should therefore be treated as one crime though
the series of shots killed more than one victim;" and that only one information for multiple
murder should be filed, to "obviate the necessity of trying five cases instead of one."

Issue: Whether the act constituted by the fiscal violates the CPR.

Ruling: No. A prosecuting attorney, by the nature of his office, is under no compulsion to
file a particular criminal information where he is not convinced that he has evidence to
prop up the averments thereof, or that the evidence at hand points to a different
conclusion. This is not to discount the possibility of the commission of abuses on the part
of the prosecutor. But we must have to recognize that a prosecuting attorney should not
be unduly compelled to work against his conviction. In case of doubt, we should give him
the benefit thereof.
Main point: A prosecution attorney, by the nature of his office, is under no compulsion to
file a particular information where he is not convinced that he has evidence to prop up the
averments thereof, or that the evidence on hand points to a different conclusion. His
discretion cannot be controlled by the offended party. In a clash of views between the
judge who did not investigate and the fiscal who did, or between the fiscal and offended
party or the defendant, those of the fiscal's should normally prevail.

CASE NO. 24 - chua

In re Avecilla, A.C. 6683

FACTS: Respondent sent a letter to then Chief Justice Davide, requesting that they be
furnished several documents 6 relative to the expenditure of the Judiciary Development
Fund (JDF). In order to show that they have interest in the JDF enough to be informed
of how it was being spent, the respondent and Mr. Biraogo claimed that they made
contributions to the said fund by way of the docket and legal fees they paid as petitioners
in G.R No. 72954.
Chief Justice Davide instructed Atty. Dimaisip, then Chief of the JRO, to forward
the rollo of G.R. No. 72954 for the purpose of verifying the claim of the respondent.
Following a diligent search for the rollo of G.R. No. 72954, Atty. Dimaisip apprised Chief
Justice Davide that the subject rollo could not be found in the archives. Resorting to the
tracer card of G.R. No. 72954, Atty. Dimaisip discovered that the subject rollo had been
borrowed from the JRO on 13 September 1991 but, unfortunately, was never since
returned. The tracer card named the respondent, although acting through a certain Atty.
Banzon, as the borrower of the subject rollo.
Upon investigation, it was found out that at the time the rollo of G.R. No. 72954
was borrowed from the JRO, the respondent was employed with the Supreme Court as
a member of the legal staff of retired Justice Gancayco. Ostensibly, it was by virtue of his
confidential employment that the respondent was able to gain access to the rollo of G.R.
No. 72954.
ISSUE: Whether the respondent violated CPR canon 6.02
RULING: Yes, The act of the respondent in borrowing a rollo for unofficial business entails
the employment of deceit not becoming a member of the bar. It presupposes the use of
misrepresentation and, to a certain extent, even abuse of position on the part of the
respondent because the lending of rollos are, as a matter of policy, only limited to official
purposes.

Main point: Rule 6.02 - A lawyer in the government service shall not use his public
position to promote or advance his private interests, nor allow the latter to interfere with
his public duties.

25. Chiong
Query of Atty. Karen M. Silverio-Buffe A.M. No. 08-6-352-RTC August 19, 2009
Facts:
Atty. Karen M. Silverio-Buffe, a former clerk of court of Branch 81 of Romblon, addressed
a letter-query to the Office of the Court Administrator. It was related to Section 7(b)(2) of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6713 or the “Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public
Officials and Employees”, which prohibits public officials and employees from engaging
during their incumbency “in the private practice of their profession unless authorized by
the Constitution or law, provided, that such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with
their official functions.” Atty. Buffe questioned the provision giving preferential treatment
to incumbent public officials and employees as regards private practice, while non-
incumbents, according to the last paragraph of Section 7 of RA 6713, cannot practice
their profession in connection with any matter before the office they used to be with for a
period of one year after resignation, retirement or separation from public office. Such
question was due to the fact that, within one year after her resignation from her position,
she engaged in the private practice of law by appearing as private counsel in several
cases before RTC-Branch 81 of Romblon. After review, the Court found that Atty. Buffe
misinterpreted the law. The confusion lay in the use of the term “such practice” after the
phrase "provided that" and the notion that incumbent public officials and employees are
absolutely permitted to the practice of their profession. By a thorough analysis of the
provision, the Court pointed out the limitation that only those authorized by the
Constitution or law and those that do not conflict or tend to conflict with their official
functions are allowed.
Issue:
Did Atty. Buffe, as a lawyer, violate the rules governing the practice of law by means of
her actions?

Ruling:
Yes, the Court found Atty. Buffe guilty of professional misconduct and was fined. She was
also sternly warned that repetition of the violation shall be dealt with more severely. As
ruled by the Court, by acting in a manner that R.A. No. 6713brands as "unlawful," Atty.
Buffe contravened Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. In
addition, by failing to live up to her lawyer’s oath, she also violated Canon 7 of the same
Code.
Although there was the absence of any formal charge against and/or formal investigation
of an errant lawyer, it did not preclude the Court from immediately exercising its
disciplining authority, as long as the errant lawyer or judge has been given the opportunity
to be heard. In this case, Atty. Buffe has been afforded the opportunity to be heard on the
present matter through her letter-query and Manifestation filed before this Court

26 Cruz
Duty not to accept employment after government service
 PNB v. Cedo, 243 SCRA 1 (1995)

Facts: Atty. Telesforo Cedo is the former AVP of the Asset Management Group of PNB,
who is now the counsel of Milagros Ong Siy in a case against PNB. Complainant-bank
charged Atty Cedo with violation of CPR 6.03, which states that: A lawyer shall not, after
leaving government service, accept engagement or employment in connection with any
matter in which he had intervened while in said service. PNB stated that while Atty Cedo
was still employed in their bank, he participated in arranging sale of steel sheets in favor
of Mrs. Ong Siy. He even noted the gate passes issued by his subordinate, Mr. Emmanuel
Elefan, in favor of Mrs. Ong Siy authorizing the pull-out of the steel sheets from the DMC
Man Division Compound. Similarly, Atty. Cedo already appeared as a counsel for Mr.
Elefan in an administrative case against PNB, but was disqualified by the Civil Service
Commission. Atty. Cedo also became the counsel of Ponciano and Eufemia Almeda
against PNB as they were represented by the law firm of which Cedo is one of the Senior
Partners. PNB added that while Atty Cedo was still with them, he intervened in the
handling of the loan account of the spouses. Respondent’s DEFENSE: Ong Siy case: He
appeared as counsel for Mrs. Ong Siy but only with respect to the execution pending
appeal of the RTC decision. He did not participate in the litigation of the case before the
trial court. Almeda case: He never appeared as counsel for them. Only Atty. Pedro Ferrer
of the said law firm handled the case. He also added that the law firm was not of a general
partnership. They are only using the name to designate a law firm maintained by lawyers,
who although not partners, maintain one office as well as one clerical and supporting
staff. They handle their cases independently and individually
Issue: Whether Atty. Cedo was guilty of violating CPR 6.03
Ruling: Yes. Findings are the ff: Ong Siy case: He was the counsel through the law firm
and was fined by the court in the amount of P1,000 for forum shopping. Almeda case:
Atty Pedro Singson of PNB attested that in one of the hearings, Atty. Cedo was present
although he did not enter his appearance, and was dictating to Atty. Ferrer what to say
and argue before the court. He also admitted in one of the hearings that he was the
partner of Atty Ferrer. IBP recommended suspension from the practice for 3 years. Cedo
violated Rule 15.02 of the CPR, since the clients secrets and confidential records and
information are exposed to the other lawyers and staff members at all times.There also
was a deliberate intent to devise ways and means to attract as clients former borrowers
of PNB since he was in the best position to see the legal weaknesses of PNB. He
sacrificed ethics in consideration of money. It is unprofessional to represent conflicting
interests, except by express conflicting consent of all concerned given after a full
disclosure of the facts.The foregoing disquisition on conflicting interest applies with
equal force and effect to respondent in the case at bar. Having been an executive
of complainant bank, respondent now seeks to litigate as counsel for the opposite
side, a case against his former employer involving a transaction which he formerly
handled while still an employee of complainant, in violation of Canon 6 of the
Canons of Professional Ethics on adverse influence and conflicting interests.
Conclusion: Court resolves to SUSPEND respondent ATTY. TELESFORO S. CEDO
from the practice of law for THREE (3) YEARS