This is a reproduction of a library book that was digitized

by Google as part of an ongoing effort to preserve the

information in books and make it universally accessible.

https://books.google.com
 .
чес

Phil. ap . 919

1
1

Y
s

<36629995690016

<36629995690016

Bayer. Staatsbibliothek
}
1
}
 LOGIC ;

OR,

. THE RIGHT USE OF REASON,

IN THE

ENQUIRY AFTER TRUTH ;

WITH A VARIETY OF

RULES TO GUARD AGAINST ERROR

IN THE

AFFAIRS OF RELIGION AND HUMAN LIFE, AS WELL AS IN

THE SCIENCES.

BY ISAAC WATTS, D.D.

A NEW EDITION, CORRECTED AND IMPROVED.

London :
PRINTED FOR C. AND J. RIVINGTON ; J. SCATCHERD ; J. COLLINGWOOD ;
LONGMAN, HURST, REES, ORME, AND CO.; J. AND A. ARCH ; J. RICHARDSON ;
J. MAWMAN ; J. BOOKER ; BALDWIN, CRADOCK, AND JOY ; G. AND W. B.
WHITTAKER ; T. HAMILTON ; HARDING AND LEPARD ; B. SAUNDERS ;
J. DUNCAN ; AND SIMPKIN AND MARSHALL.

1824.
Ph.op 919m

A
BIBLIOTHEC

REGLA

MONACENSIS .

57.6

G. WOODFALL, Printer, Angel Court, Skinner Street, London

 ΤΟ

SIR JOHN HARTOPP, BART.

SIR,

IT is fit the Public should receive, through your hands,

what was written originally for the assistance of your
younger studies, and was then presented to you.

It was by the repeated importunities of our learned

friend Mr. John Eames, that I was persuaded to revise
the Rudiments of Logic, and when I had once suffered
myself to begin the work, I was drawn still onward, far
beyond my first design, even to the neglect, or too long
delay, of other pressing and important demands that were
upon me.

It has been my endeavour to form every part of this

Treatise bothfor the instruction of students, to open their
way into the sciences, and for the more extensive and
general service of mankind, that the Gentleman and the
Christian might find their account in the perusal, as well
as the Scholar. I have therefore collected and proposed
the chiefprinciples and rules of right judgement in mat
ters of common and sacred importance, and pointed out
our most frequent mistakes and prejudices in the concerns
of life and religion, that we might better guard against
the springs of error, guilt, and sorrow, which surround
us in our state of mortality.
t
You know, Sir, the great design of this noble science
is to rescue our reasoning powers from their unhappy
slavery and darkness ; and thus, with all due submission
4 DEDICATION.

and deference, it offers an humble assistance to divine

revelation. Its chief business is to relieve the natural
weakness ofthe mind, by some better efforts of nature ; it
is to diffuse a light over the understanding in our inquiries
after truth, and not to furnish the tongue with debate and
controversy. True Logic is not that noisy thing that
deals all in dispute and wrangling, to which former ages
had debased and confined it ; yet its disciples must ac
knowledge also, that they are taught to vindicate and de
fend the truth, as well as to search it out. True Logic
doth not require a long detail of hard words to amuse
mankind, and to puff up the mind with empty sounds, and
a pride offalse learning ; yet some distinctions and terms
ofart are necessary to range every idea in its proper class,
and to keep our thoughts from confusion. The world is
now grown so wise, as not to suffer this valuable art to be
engrossed by the schools. In so polite and knowing an
age, every man of reason will covet some acquaintance
with Logic, since it renders its daily service to wisdom
.
and virtue, and to the affairs of common life, as well as
to the sciences.

I will not presume, Sir, that this little book is improved

since its first composure in proportion to the improvements
of your manly age. But when you shall please to review
it in your retired hours, perhaps you may refresh your
own memory in some ofthe early parts of learning : And
ifyou find all the additional Remarks and Rules made so
familiar to you already by your own observation, that
there is nothing new among them, it will be no unpleasing
reflection that you have so far anticipated the present zeal
and labour of,

SIR,

Your mostfaithful and obedient servant,

I. WATTS.

LONDON, AUG, 24, 1724.

 CONTENTS .

Page
THE Introduction, or general Scheme... .... 9

THE FIRST PART.

OF PERCEPTIONS AND IDeas.

CHAP. I.
Of the nature of ideas 16

CHAP. II.
Of the objects of perception.... 17
SECT. 1. Of Being in general ib.
2. Of Substances and their various kinds . 18
3. Of Modes and their various kinds ; and first of essen
tial and accidental Modes 23
4. The further divisions of Mode. 27
5. Ofthe Ten Categories. -Of Substance modified . 31
6. Of Not-Being.. ib.

CHAP. III.
Of the several sorts of perceptions or ideas... 33
SECT. 1. Of sensible, spiritual, and abstracted ideas.. ib.
2. Of simple and complex, compound and collective ideas 37
3. Of universal and particular ideas, real and imaginary 38
4. The division of ideas, with regard to their qualities ... 42
CHAP . IV .
Of words and their several divisions, together with the
advantage and danger of them. .... 48
SECT. 1. Ofwords in general, and their use. ib.
2. Of negative and positive terms ... 53
3. Of simple and complex terms .......... .... 55
4. Of words common and proper. ... 57
5. Of concrete and abstract terms ........ …………………. 58
6. Of univocal and equivocal words. ..... 59
7. Various kinds of equivocal words ........ 61
8. The origin or causes of equivocal words ....... 66
6 CONTENTS.

CHAP . V. Page
General directions relating to our ideas ....... 69
SECT. 1. Of acquiring a treasure ofideas .... ib.
2. Of retaining ideas in memory 71
3. Ofselecting useful ideas .......... 73
4. Of the government of our thoughts .. 74

2223
CHAP. VI.
Special rules to direct our conceptions of things .... 75
SECT. 1. Of gaining clear and distinct ideas … . . . . . . . . . . . 76
2. Ofthe definition of words or names 78
3. Directions concerning the definition of names .... 79
4. Of the definition of things . ... 92
5. Rules of definition of the thing.. .. 96
6. Observations concerning the definition of things ...... 99
7. Of a complete conception of things 106
8. Of division, and the rules of it 107
9. Of straction
a comprehensive conception of things, and of ab
...... 112
10. Ofthe extensive conception of things, and of distribu
tion.... ......... 115
11. Of an orderly conception ..... ............ 120
12. These five rules of conception exemplified... ……………………… ... 121
13. An illustration of these five rules, by similitudes .... ..... 123

THE SECOND PART.

OF JUDGEMENT AND PROPOSITION.

CHAP. I.
Of the nature of a proposition, and its several parts .. 128
CHAP. II.
Of the various kinds of propositions .... 131
SECT. 1. Of universal, particular, indefinite, and singular pro
positions . ..... ib.
2. Of affirmative and negative propositions ..... ... 138
3. Of the opposition and conversion of propositions . .... 140
4. Of pure and modal propositions ....... .. 143
5. Of single propositions, whether simple or complex . .... 145
6. Of compound propositions ........ ...... 147
7. Oftrue and false propositions .....
. 151
8. Of certain and dubious propositions, of knowledge and
opinion 154
9. Of sense, consciousness, intelligence, reason, faith, and
inspiration...... 157
 CONTENTS. 7

CHAP. III. Page

The springs offalse judgement, or the doctrine ofpre
judices .. 163
SECT. 1. Prejudices arising from things.. 165
2. Prejudices arising from words.. 171
3. Prejudices arising from ourselves... 174
4. Prejudices arising from other persons 187

CHAP. IV.
General directions to assist us in judging aright……………. 201
CHAP. V.
Special rules to direct us in judging of particular ob
jects . 216
SECT. 1. Principles and rules of judgement, concerning the ob
jects of sense ib.
2. Principles and rules ofjudgement, in matters of reason
and speculation ..... 219
3. Principles and rules ofjudgement in matters of mora
lity and religion . ............ 224
4. Principles and rules of judgement in matters of human
prudence ... . ........ 228
5. Principles and rules of judgement in matters of human
testimony .. 230
6. Principles and rules of judgement in matters of divine
testimony 234
7. Principles and rules of judging, concerning things past,
present, and to come, by the mere use of reason .. 237

THE THIRD PART.

OF REASONING AND SYLLOGISM.

CHAP. I.
Ofthe nature of a syllogism, and ofthe parts ofwhich
it is composed…………. 242
CHAP. II .
Ofthe various kinds of syllogisms, with particular rules
relating to them .. ......... 244
SECT. 1. Of universal and particular syllogisms, both negative
and affirmative... 245
2. Of plain simple syllogisms, and their rules ...... 246
3. Of the modes and figures of simple syllogisms 249
4. Of complex syllogisms 252
5. Of conjunctive syllogisms . 254
 8
CO CONTENTS.
Page
SECT. 6. Of compound syllogisms ...... ...... 259
7. Of the middle term, of common places or topics, and
invention of arguments ....... 262
8. Of several kinds of arguments and demonstrations .... 264

CHAP. III. •
The doctrine of sophisms ... 268
SECT. 1. Ofseveral kinds of sophisms and their solution ...... 269
2. Two general tests of true syllogisms, and methods of
solving all sophisms .... 276

CHAP. IV.
Some general rules to direct our reasoning 279

Lo
afte
THE FOURTH PART. I
the
OF METHOD. fello
I
CHAP. 1. com
The nature and kind of method .... 290
YOU

CHAP. II. acq

mu
....... 298
General and particular rules of method .......
ma
men
in t
tent
by
I

me
nec
in
bot
442
1

Powe
 2500

INTRODUCTION

AND

GENERAL SCHEME.

LOGIC is the art of using REASON * well in our inquiries

after truth, and the communication of it to others.
REASON* is the glory of human nature, and one of
the chief eminences whereby we are raised above our
fellow-creatures, the brutes, in this lower world.
Reason, as to the power and principles of it, is the
30 common gift of God to all men ; though all are not fa
voured with it by nature in an equal degree : but the
acquired improvements of it in different men, make a
much greater distinction between them than nature had
made. I could even venture to say, that the improve
ment of reason hath raised the learned and the prudent
in the European world, almost as much above the Hot
tentots, and other savages of Africa, as those savages are
by nature superior to the birds, the beasts, and the fishes.
Now the design of Logic is to teach us the right use
of our reason, or intellectual powers, and the improve
ment of them in ourselves and others ; this is not only
necessary in order to attain any competent knowledge
in the sciences, or the affairs of learning, but to govern
both the greater and the meaner actions of life. It is

* The word reason in this place is not confined to the mere faculty of rea
soning, or inferring one thing from another, but includes all the intellectual
powers of man.
B
10 INTRODUCTION.

the cultivation of our reason by which we are better en

abled to distinguish good from evil, as well as truth from
falsehood : and both these are matters of the highest im
portance, whether we regard this life, or the life to come.
The pursuit and acquisition of truth is of infinite con
cernment to mankind. Hereby we become acquainted
with the nature of things both in heaven and earth, and
their various relations to each other. It is by this means
we discover our duty to God and our fellow-creatures :
by this we arrive at the knowledge of natural religion,
and learn to confirm our faith in divine revelation, as
well as to understand what is revealed. Our wisdom ,
prudence, and piety, our present conduct and our future
hope, are all influenced by the use of our rational powers
in the search after truth.
There are several things that make it very necessary
that our reason should have some assistance in the ex
ercise or use of it.
The first is, the depth and difficulty of many truths,
and the weakness of our reason to see far into things at
once, and penetrate to the bottom of them. It was a, say
ing among the ancients, Veritas in puteo, " Truth lies
in a well " ; and, to carry on this metaphor, we may very
justly say, that Logic does, as it were, supply us with
steps whereby we may go down to reach the water ; or
it frames the links of a chain, whereby we may draw the
water up from the bottom. Thus, by the means of many
reasonings well connected together, philosophers in our
age have drawn a thousand truths out of the depths of
darkness, which our fathers were utterly unacquainted
with.
Another thing that makes it necessary for our rea
son to have some assistance given it, is the disguise and
false colours in which many things appear to us in this
present imperfect state. There are a thousand things
which are not in reality what they appear to be, and
that both in the natural and in the moral world ; so the
sun appears to be flat as a plate of silver, and to be less
 INTRODUCTION. 11

than twelve inches in diameter : the moon appears to be

as big as the sun, and the rainbow appears to be a large
substantial arch in the sky ; all which are in reality
gross falsehoods. So knavery puts on the face ofjustice,
hypocrisy and superstition wear the vizard of piety, de
ceit and evil are often clothed in the shapes and appear
ances of truth and goodness. Now Logic helps us to
strip off the outward disguise of things, and to behold
them, and judge of them in their own nature.
There is yet a farther proof that our intellectual or
rational powers need some assistance, and that is, be
cause they are so frail and fallible in the present state ;
we are imposed upon at home as well as abroad ; we are
deceived by our senses, by our imaginations, by our pas
sions and appetites, by the authority of men, by educa
tion and custom, &c. and we are led into frequent errors,
byjudging according to these false and flattering prin
ciples, rather than according to the nature of things.
Something of this frailty is owing to our very constitu
tion, man being compounded of flesh and spirit : some
thing of it arises from our infant state, and our grow
ing up by small degrees to manhood , so that we form
a thousand judgements before our reason is mature.
But there is still more of it owing to our original de
fection from God, and the foolish and evil dispositions
that are found in fallen man : so that one great part of
the design of Logic is to guard us against the delusive
influences of our meaner powers, to cure the mistakes
of immature judgement, and to raise us in some measure
from the ruins of our fall.
It is evident enough from all these things, that our
reason needs the assistance of art in our inquiries after
truth or duty ; and without some skill and diligence in
forming our judgements aright, we shall be led into fre
quent mistakes, both in matters of science, and in mat
ters of practice, and some of these mistakes may prove
fatal too .
The art ofLogic, even as it assists us to gain the know
B 2
12 INTRODUCTION .

edge of the sciences, leads us on toward virtue and

happiness; for all our speculative acquaintance with things
should be made subservient to our better conduct in the
civil and religious life. This is infinitely more valuable
than all speculations ; and a wise man will use them
chiefly for this better purpose.
All the good judgement and prudence that any man
exerts in his common concerns of life, without the ad
vantage of learning, is called natural Logic ; and it is
but a higher advancement, and a farther assistance of
our rational powers, that is designed by and expected
from this artificial Logic.
In order to attain this, we must inquire what are the
principal operations of the mind, which are put forth in
the exercise of our reason : and we shall find them to
be these four, namely, perception , judgement, argumenta
tion, and disposition.
Now the art of Logic is composed of those observa
tions and rules, which men have made about these four
operations of the mind, perception, judgement, reasoning,
and disposition, in order to assist and improve them.

I. Perception, conception, or apprehension, is the mere

simple contemplation of things offered to our minds,
without affirming or denying any thing concerning
them. So we conceive or think of a horse, a tree, high,
swift, slow, animal, time, motion, matter, mind, life, death,
&c. Theform under which these things appear to the
mind, or the result of our conception or apprehension ,
is called an idea.

II. Judgement is that operation of the mind, where

by we join two or more ideas together by one affirma
tion or negation ; that is, we either affirm or deny this
to be that. So this tree is high ; that horse is not swift ;
the mind of man is a thinking being ; mere matter has no
thought belonging to it ; God is just ; good men are often
miserable in this world ; a righteous governor will make a
 INTRODUCTION . 13

difference betwixt the evil and the good ; which sentences

are the effect of judgement, and are called propositions.

III. Argumentation or reasoning is that operation of

the mind, whereby we infer one thing, that is, one pro
position, from two or more propositions premised. Or
it is the drawing a conclusion, which before was either
unknown, or dark, or doubtful, from some propositions
which are more known and evident. So when we have
judged that matter cannot think, and that the mind of
man doth think, we then infer and conclude, that there
fore the mind of man is not matter:
So we judge that a just governor will make a difference
between the evil and the good ; we judge also that God is
ajust governor ; and from thence we conclude, that God
will make a difference between the evil and the good.
This argumentation may be carried on farther, thus,
God will one time or another make a difference between the
good and the evil ; but there is little or no difference made
in this world ; therefore there must be another world
wherein this difference shall be made.
These inferences or conclusions are the effects of rea
soning, and the three propositions taken all together are
called a syllogism or argument.

IV. Disposition is that operation of the mind, where

by we put the ideas, propositions, and arguments, which
we have formed concerning one subject, into such an or
der as is fittest to gain the clearest knowledge of it, to
retain it longest, and to explain it to others in the best
manner : or, in short, it is the ranging of our thoughts
in such order, as is best for our own and others' concep
tion and memory. The effect of this operation is called
method. This very description of the four operations of
the mind and their effects, in this order, is an instance or
example of method.
Now as the art of Logic assists our conceptions, so it
gives us a large and comprehensive view of the subjects
14 INTRODUCTION.

we inquire into, as well as a clear and distinct know

ledge of them. As it regulates our judgement and our
reasoning, so it secures us from mistakes, and gives us
a true and certain knowledge of things ; and as it fur
nishes us with method, so it makes our knowledge of
things both easy and regular, and guards our thoughts
from confusion.
Logic is divided into four parts, according to these
four operations of the mind, which it directs, and there
fore we shall treat of it in this order.
 THE

FIRST PART

OF

LOGIC.

OF PERCEPTION AND IDEAS.

THE first part of Logic contains observations and pre

cepts about the first operation of the mind, perception
or conception : and since all our knowledge, how wide
and large soever it grows, is founded upon our con
ceptions and ideas, here we shall consider,

1. The general nature ofthem.

.
2. The objects of our conception, or the archetypes or
patterns of these ideas.

3. The several divisions ofthem.

4. The words and terms whereby our ideas are expressed.
5. General directions about our ideas.

6. Special rules to direct our conceptions.

 16 LOGIC ; OR, THE [PART I.

CHAP. I.

OF THE NATURE OF IDEAS.

FIRST, the nature of conception or perception shall just

be mentioned, though this may seem to belong to an
other science rather than Logic.
Perception is that act of the mind (or, as some philo
sophers call it, rather a passion of impression) whereby
the mind becomes conscious of any thing. As when I feel
hunger, thirst, or cold, or heat ; when I see a horse, a
tree, or a man ; when I hear a human voice, or thunder,
I am conscious of these things ; this is called percep
tion. If I study, meditate, wish, or fear, I am conscious
of these inward acts also, and my mind perceives its
own thoughts, wishes, fears, &c.
An idea is generally defined a representation ofa thing
in the mind; it is a representation of something that
we have seen, felt, heard, &c. or been conscious of. That
notion or form of a horse, a tree, or a man, which is in
the mind, is called the idea of a horse, a tree, or a man.
That notion of hunger, cold, sound, colour, thought,
to wish, or fear, which is in the mind, is called the idea
of hunger, cold, sound, wish, &c.
It is not the outward object, or thing which is per
ceived, namely, the horse, the man, &c. nor is it the
very perception or sense and feeling, namely, of hunger,
or cold, &c. which is called the idea ; but it is the thing
as it exists in the mind by way of conception , or represen
tation that is properly called the idea, whether the ob
ject be present or absent.
As a horse, a man, a tree, are the outward objects of
our perception, and the outward archetypes or patterns

* Note. The words conception and perception are often used promiscuously,
as I have done here, because I could not embarrass a learner with too many
distinctions ; but if I were to distinguish them, I could say, perception is the
consciousness of an object when present ; conception is the forming the idea of
the object whether present or absent.
 CH. II. SECT. 1. ] RIGHT USE OF REASON. 17

of our ideas ; so our sensations of hunger, cold, &c. are

also inward archetypes, or patterns of our ideas : but
the notions or pictures of those things, as they are con
sidered, or conceived in the mind, are precisely the
ideas that we have to do with in Logic. To see a horse,
or to feel cold, is one thing ; to think of, and converse
about a man, a horse, hunger, or cold, is another.
Among all these ideas, such as represent bodies, are
generally called images, especially if the idea of shape
be included. Those inward representations which we
have of spirit, thought, love, hatred, cause, effect, &c. are
more pure and mental ideas, belonging more especially
to the mind, and carry nothing of shape or sense in
them.- But I shall have occasion to speak more parti
cularly of the original and distinction of ideas in the
third chapter. I proceed therefore now to consider the
objects of our ideas.

CHAP. II.

OF THE OBJECTS OF PERCEPTION.

SECT. I.
OF BEING IN GENERAL.

THE object of perception is that which is represented in

the idea, that which is the archetype or pattern, ac
cording to which the idea is formed ; and thus judge
ments, propositions, reasons, and long discourses, may all
become the objects of perception ; but in this place we
speak chiefly of the first and more simple objects of it,
before they are joined and formed into propositions or
discourses.
Every object of our idea is called a theme, whether
it be a being or not- being, for not-being may be proposed
to our thoughts, as well as that which has a real being.
B3
18 LOGIC ; OR, THE [ PART I.
But let us first treat of beings, and that in the largest
extent of the word.
A being is considered as possible, or as actual.
When it is considered as possible, it is said to have
an essence or nature ; such were all things before their
creation when it is considered as actual, then it is said
to have existence also ; such are all things which are
created, and God himself the Creator.
Essence therefore is but the very nature of any being,
whether it be actually existing or no. A rose in winter
has an essence, in summer it has existence also.
Note, There is but one being which includes exist
ence in the very essence of it, and that is God ; who
therefore actually exists by natural and eternal neces
sity : but the actual existence of every creature is very
distinct from its essence, for it may be, or may not be,
as God pleases.
Again, Every being is considered either as subsisting
in and by itself, and then it is called a substance; or it
subsists in and by another, and then it is called a mode
or manner of being. Though few writers allow mode to
be called a being in the same perfect sense as a substance
is ; and some modes have evidently more of real entity
or being than others, as will appear when we come to
treat of them. These things will furnish us with mat
ter for larger discourse in the following sections.

SECT. II.
OF SUBSTANCES AND THEIR VARIOUS KINDS.

A substance is a being which can subsist by itself, with

out dependence upon any other created being. The
notion of subsisting by itself gives occasion to logicians
to call it a substance. So a horse, a house, wood, stone,
water, fire, a spirit, a body, an angel, are called sub
stances, because they depend on nothing but God for
their existence.
CH. II. SECT. 2. ] RIGHT Use of reason. 19

It has been usual also in the description of substance

to add, it is that which is the subject of modes or ac
cidents ; a body is the substance or subject, its shape is
the mode.
But lest we be led into mistakes, let us here take no
tice, that when a substance is said to subsist without de
pendence upon another created being, all that we mean is,
that it cannot be annihilated, or utterly destroyed and
reduced to nothing, by any power inferior to that of our
Creator : though its present particular form, nature,
and properties may be altered and destroyed by many
inferior causes ; a horse may die and turn to dust ; wood
may be turned into fire, smoke, and ashes ; a house into
rubbish, and water into ice or vapour ; but the substance
or matter of which they are made still remains, though
the forms and shapes of it are altered. A body may
cease to be a house, or a horse, but it is a body still ; and
in this sense it depends only upon God for its existence.
Among substances some are thinking or conscious
beings, or have a power of thought, such as the mind of
man, God, angels. Some are extended, and solid, or im
penetrable ; that is, they have dimensions of length,
breadth, and depth, and have also a power of resistance,
or exclude every thing ofthe same kind from being in
the same place. This is the proper character of mat
ter or body.
As for the idea of space, whether it be void or full,
that is, a vacuum or a plenum, whether it be interspersed
among all bodies, or may be supposed to reach beyond
the bounds of the creation, it is an argument too long
and too hard to be disputed in this place what the na
ture of it is : it has been much debated whether it be
a real substance, or a mere conception of the mind,
whether it be the immensity of the divine nature, or
the mere order of co-existent being, whether it be the
manner of our conception of the distances of bodies,
or a mere nothing. Therefore I drop the mention of
it here, and refer the reader to the first essay among
the Philosophical Essays, by I. W. published 1733 .
20 LOGIC ; OR, THE [PART I.
Now, if we seclude space out of our consideration,
there will remain but two sorts of substances in the
world, that is, matter and mind ; or, as we otherwise
call them, body and spirit ; at least we have no ideas of
any other substances but these*.

* Because men have different ideas and notions of substances, I thought it

not proper entirely to omit all accounts of them, and therefore have thrown
them into the margin.
Some philosophers suppose that our acquaintance with matter or mindreaches
no farther than the mere properties of them, and that there is a sort of un
known being, which is the substance or the subject by which these properties of
solid extension and of cogitation are supported, and in which these properties
inhere or exist. But perhaps this notion rises only from our turning the mere
abstracted or logic notion of substances or self-subsisting into the notion of a
distinct physical or natural being, without any necessity. Solid extension seems
to me to be the very substance of matter, or of all bodies ; and a power of
thinking, which is always in act, seems to be the very substance of all spirits ;
for God himself is an intelligent, almighty power ; nor is there any need to
seek for any other secret and unknown being, or abstracted substance entirely
distinct from these, in order to support the several modes or properties of mat
ter or mind, for these two ideas are sufficient for that purpose ; therefore I ra
ther think these are substances.
It must be confest when we say, spirit is a thinking substance, and matter is
an extendedsolid substance, we are sometimes ready to imagine that extension and
solidity are but mere modes and properties of a certain substance or subject which
supports them, and which we call body ; and that a power of thinking is but a
mere mode and property of some unknown substance or subject which supports
it, and which we call spirit : but I rather take this to be a mere mistake,
which we are led into by the grammatical form and use of words ; and per
haps our logical way of thinking by substances and modes, as well as our gram
matical way of talking by substantives and adjectives, help to delude us into
the supposition.
However, that I may not be wanting to any of my readers, I would let them
know Mr. Locke's opinion, which has obtained much in the present age, and
it is this: " That our ideas of any particular substance is only such a combi
" nation of simple ideas as represents that thing as subsisting by itself, in
" which the supposed or confused idea of substance ( such as it is) is always
" ready to offer itself. It is a conjunction of ideas co-existing in such a
66 cause of their union, as makes the whole subject subsist by itself, though
"the cause of their union be unknown ; and our general idea of substance
" arises from the self-subsistence of this collection of ideas."
Now, if this notion of substance rest here, and be considered merely as an
unknown cause of the union of properties, it is much more easy to be ad
mitted ; but if we proceed to support a sort of real, substantial, distinct be
ing, different from solid quantity or extension in bodies, and different from a
power of thinking in spirits, in my opinion it is the introduction of a needless
scholastical notion into the real nature of things, and then fancying it to have
areal existence.
Mr. Locke in his Essay of Hum. Und. Book II. Chap 22. Sect. 2. seems to
ridicule this common idea of substance, which men have generally supposed to
CH. II . SECT. 2. ] RIGHT USE OF REASON. 21

Among substances some are called simple, some are

compound, whether the words be taken in a philosophi
cal or a vulgar sense.
Simple substances, in a philosophical sense, are either
spirits, which have no manner of composition in them,
and in this sense God is called a simple being ; or they
are the first principles of bodies, which are usually
called elements, of which all other bodies are compound :
elements are such substances as cannot be resolved, or
reduced, into two or more substances of different kinds.
The various sects of philosophers have attributed
the honour of this name to various things. The peri
patetics, or followers of Aristotle, made fire, air, earth,
and water, to be the four elements, of which all earthly
things were compounded ;. and they supposed the hea
vens to be a quintessence, or a fifth sort of body distinct
from all these : but since experimental philosophy and
mathematics have been better understood, this doctrine
has been abundantly refuted. The chemists make spi
rit, salt, sulphur, water, and earth, to be their five ele
ments, because they can reduce all terrestrial things to
these five : this seems to come nearer the truth ; though
they are not all agreed in this enumeration of elements.
In short, our modern philosophers generally supposed
matter or body to be one simple principle, or solid ex
tension, which, being diversified by its various shapes,
quantities, motions, and situations, makes all the va
rieties that are found in the universe ; and therefore they
make little use of the word element.
Compound substances are made up of two or more sim

be a sort of substratum distinct from all properties whatsoever, and to be the

support of all properties. Yet, in Book IV. Chap. 3. Sect. 6. he seems to sup
pose there may be some such unknown substratum, which may be capable of re
ceiving the properties both of matter and mind, namely, extension, solidity, and
cogitation; for he supposes it possible for God to add cogitation to that substance
which is corporeal, and thus to cause matter to think. If thisbe true, then spi
rits (for ought we know) may be corporal beings, or thinking bodies, which is a
doctrine too favourable to the mortality of the soul. But I leave these debates
to the philosophers of the age, and will not be too positive in my opinion of
this abstruse subject.
See more of this argument in Philosophical Essays, before cited, Essay 2.
22 LOGIC ; OR, THE [PART I.

ple substances ; so every thing in this whole material

creation, that can be reduced by the art of man into
two or more different principles or substances, is a com
pound body in the philosophical sense.
But, if we take the words simple and compound in a vul
gar sense, then also those are simple substances, which
are generally esteemed uniform in their natures . So every
herb is called a simple ; and every metal and mineral,
though the chemist perhaps may find all his several ele
ments in each of them. So a needle is a simple body,
being only made of steel ; but a sword or a knife is a
compound, because its haft or handle is made of mate
rials different from the blade. So the bark of Peru, or
the juice of sorrel, is a simple medicine ; but when the
apothecaries' art has mingled several simples together,
it becomes a compound, as diascordium or mithridate.
The terms of pure and mixt, when applied to bodies,
are much akin to simple and compound. So a guinea is
pure gold, if it has nothing but gold in it, without any
alloy, or baser metal ; but if any other mineral or me
tal be mingled with it, it is called a mixt substance or
body.
Substances are also divided into animate and inani
mate. Animate substances are either animal or vege
table* .
Some of the animated substances have various organi
cal or instrumental parts fitted for a variety of motions
from place to place, and a spring of life within them
selves, as beasts, birds, fishes, and insects ; these are called
animals. Other animated substances are called vegetables,
which have within themselves the principles of another
sort of life and growth, and of various productions of
leaves, flowers, and fruit, such as we see in plants, herbs,
and trees.
And there are other substances, which are called in

* Note, Vegetables as well as animals have gotten the name of animated

substances, because some of the antients supposed herbs and plants, beasts,
birds, &c. to have a sort of souls distinct from matter or body.
CH. 11. SECT. 3.] RIGHT USE OF REASON. 23

animate, because they have no sort of life in them, as

earth, stone, air, water, &c.
There is also one sort of substance or being, which
is compounded of body and mind, or a rational spirit
united to an animal ; such is mankind. Angels, or any
other beings of the spiritual and invisible world, who
have assumed visible shapes for a season , can hardly be
reckoned among this order of compound beings ; be
cause they drop their bodies, and divest themselves of
those visible shapes when their particular message is
performed, and thereby shew that these bodies do not
belong to their natures .

SECT . III.

OF MODES AND THEIR VARIOUS KINDS ; AND FIRST OF

ESSENTIAL AND ACCIDENTAL MOdes .

THE next sort of objects which are represented in our

ideas are called modes, or manners, of being*.
A mode is that which cannot subsist in and of itself,
but is always esteemed as belonging to, and subsisting
by the help of some substance, which, for that reason,
is called its subject. A mode must depend on that sub
stance for its very existence and being ; and that not
as a being depends on its cause (for so substances them
selves depend on God their Creator) ; but the very be
ing of a mode depends on some substance for its subject,
in which it is, or to which it belongs ; so motion, shape,
quantity, weight, are modes of body ; knowledge, wit,
folly, love, doubting, judging, are modes of the mind ;
for the one cannot subsist without body, and the other
cannot subsist without mind.

* Note, The term mode is by some authors applied chiefly to the relations
or relative manners of being. But in logical treatises it is often used in
a larger sense , and extends to all attributes whatsoever, and includes the
most essential and inward properties, as well as outward respects and re
lations, and reaches to actions themselves as well as manners of action.
 24 LOGIC ; OR, THE [PART I.
Modes have their several divisions, as well as sub
stances,
4.
I. Modes are either essential, or accidental.
An essential mode or attribute, is that which belongs
to the very nature or essence of the subject wherein it
is ; and the subject can never have the same nature
without it ; such is roundness in a bowl, hardness in a
stone, softness in water, vital motion in an animal, so
lidity in matter, thinking in a spirit ; for though that
piece of wood which is now a bowl may be made square,
yet if roundness be taken away, it is no longer a bowl ;
so that very flesh and bones, which is now an animal,
may be without life or inward motion ; but if all mo
tion be entirely gone, it is no longer an animal, but a
carcase : so, if a body of matter be divested of solidi
ty, it is a mere void space or nothing ; and if spirit be
entirely without thinking, I have no idea of any thing
that is left in it ; therefore so far as I am able to judge,
consciousness must be its essential attribute* : thus all the
perfections of God are called his attributes, for he can
not be without them.
An essential mode is either primary or secondary.
A primary essential mode is the first, or chief thing
that constitutes any being in its particular essence or
nature, and makes it to be that which it is, and distin
guishes it from all other beings ; this is called the dif
ference in the definition of things, of which hereafter :
so roundness is the primary essential mode, or the differ
ence of a bowl : the meeting of two lines is the primary
essential mode, or the difference of an angle : the per
pendicularity of these lines to each other is the differ
ence, or a right angle : solid extension is the primary
* Note, When I call solid extension an essential mode or attribute of matter,
and a power of thinking an essential mode or attribute of a spirit, I do it in
compliance with common forms of speech ; but perhaps in reality these are
the very essences or substances themselves, and the most substantial ideas that
we can frame of body and spirit, and have no need of any (we know not
what) substratum, or unintelligible substance to support them in their existence
of being.
CH. II. SECT. 3. ] RIGHT USE of reason. 25

attribute, or difference, of matter : consciousness, or at

least a power of thinking, is the difference, or primary
attribute of a spirit*, and to fear and love God is the
primary attribute of a pious man.
A secondary essential mode is any other attribute of a
thing, which is not of primary consideration : this is
called a property : sometimes indeed it goes toward
making up the essence, especially of a complex being,
so far as we were acquainted with it ; sometimes it de
pends upon, and follows from the essence of it, so vo
lubility, or aptness to roll, is the property of a bowl, and
is derived from its roundness. Mobility and figure or
shape are properties of matter ; and it is the property
of a pious man to love his neighbour.
An accidental mode, or an accident, is such a mode as
is not necessary to the being of a thing, for the subject
may be without it, and yet remain of the same nature
that it was before ; or, it is that mode which may be se
parated or abolished from its subject ; so smoothness or
roughness, blackness or whiteness, motion or rest are the
accidents of a bowl ; for these may be all changed, and
yet the body remain a bowl still : learning, justice, fol
ly, sickness, health, are the accidents of a man ; motion,
squareness, or any particular shape or size, are the acci
dents of body ; yet shape and size in general are essen
tial modes of it ; for a body must have some size or
shape, nor can it be without them : so hope, fear, wish
ing, assenting, and doubting, are accidents of the mind,
though thinking in general seems to be essential to it.
Here observe that the name of accident has been of
tentimes given by the old peripatetic philosophers to all
modes, whether essential or accidental; but the moderns
confine this word accident to the sense in which I have
described it.
Here it should be noted also, that though the word
property be limited sometimes in logical treatises, to the
secondary essential mode, yet it is used in common lan

* See notes in pages 23 and 24.

26 LOGIC ; OR, THE [ PART I ,
guage to signify these four sorts of modes ; of which
some are essential and some accidental.
(1.) Such as belong to every subject of that kind, but
not onlyto those subjects. So yellow colour and ductili
ty are properties of gold ; they belong to all gold, but
not only to gold ; for saffron is also yellow, and lead is
ductile.
(2.) Such as belong only to one kind of subject, but
not to every subject of that kind. So learning, reading,
and writing, are properties of human nature ; they be
long only to man, but not to all men .
(3. ) Such as belong to every subject of one kind, and
only to them, but not always. So speech or language is
a property of man, for it belongs to all men, and to men
only, but men are not always speaking.
(4. ) Such as belong to every subject of one kind, and
to them only and always. So shape and divisibility are
properties of body ; so omniscience and omnipotence are
properties of the divine nature ; for in this sense pro
perties and attributes are the same, and except in logi
cal treatises there is scarce any distinction made be
tween them. These are called propria quarto modo in
the schools, or properties of thefourth sort.
Note, Where there is any one property or essential at
tribute so superior to the rest, that it appears plainly that
all the rest are derived from it, and such as is sufficient
to give a full distinction of that subject from all other
subjects, this attribute or property is called the essential
difference, as is before declared ; and we commonly say,
the essence of the thing consists in it ; so the essence of
matter in general seems to consist in solidity, or solid
extension. But for the most part we are so much at a
loss in finding out the intimate essence of particular na
tural bodies, that we are forced to distinguish the essen
tial difference of most things by a combination of pro
perties. So a sparrow is a bird which has such coloured
feathers, and such a particular size, shape, and motion.
So wormwood is an herb which has such a leaf of such
a colour, and shape, and taste, and such a root, and
CH. II. SECT. 4. ] RIGHT USE OF REASON. 27

stalk. So beasts and fishes, minerals, metals, and works

of art sometimes, as well as of nature, are distinguished
by such a collection of properties.

a
SECT. IV.
THE FARTHER DIVISIONS OF MODE.

II. THE Second division of modes is into absolute and

relative. An absolute mode is that which belongs to its
subject, without respect to any other beings whatsoever :
but a relative mode is derived from the regard that one
being has to others. So roundness and smoothness are
the absolute modes of a bowl ; for if there were nothing
else existing in the whole creation, a bowl might be round
and smooth ; but greatness and smallness are relative
modes ; for the very ideas of them are derived merely
from the comparison of one being with others ; a bowl
of four inches diameter is very great, compared with one
of an inch and a half; but it is very small in compari
son of another bowl, whose diameter is eighteen or
twenty inches. Motion is the absolute mode of a body,
but swiftness or slowness are relative ideas ; for the mo
tion of a bowl, on a bowling-green, is swift, when com
pared with a snail ; and it is slow, when compared with
a cannon bullet.
These relative modes are largely treated of by some
logical and metaphysical writers under the name of rela
tion ; and these relations themselves are farther subdi
vided into such as arise from the nature of things, and
such as arise merely from the operations of our minds ;
one sort are called real relations, the other mental ; so
the likeness of one egg to another, is a real relation, be
cause it arises from the real nature of things ; for whe
ther there was any man or mind to conceive it or no,
one egg would be like another : but when we consider
an egg is a noun substantive in grammar, or as signified
by the letters e, g, g, these are mere mental relations,
28 LOGIC ; OR, THE [ PART I.
and derive their very nature from the mind of man.
These sort of relations are called by the schools entia
rationis, or second notions, which have no real being,
but by the operation of the mind.

III. The third division of modes shews us, they are

either intrinsical or extrinsical. Intrinsical modes are
conceived to be in the subject or substance, as when we
say a globe is round, or swift, rolling, or at rest : or when
we say, a man is tall, or learned, these are intrinsic
modes : but extrinsic modes are such as arise from some
thing that is not in the subject or substance itself: but
it is a manner of being, which some substances attain
by reason of something that is external or foreign to
the subject : as, this globe lies within two yards of the
wall ; or, this man is beloved or hated. Note, such sort
of modes, as this last example, are called external de
nominations.

IV. There is a fourth division much akin to this,

whereby modes are said to be inherent or adherent, that
is, proper or improper. Adherent or improper modes arise
from the joining of some accidental substance to the
chief subject, which yet may be separated from it ; so
when a bowl is wet, or a boy is clothed, these are adhe
rent modes ; for the water and the clothes are distinct
substances, which adhere to the bowl, or to the boy :
but when we say, the bowl is swift or round ; when we
say the boy is strong or witty, these are proper or inhe
rent modes, for they have a sort of in-being in the sub
stance itself, and do not arise from the addition of any
other substance to it.

V. Action and passion are modes or manners which

belong to the substances, and should not entirely be
omitted here . When a smith with a hammer strikes a
piece of iron, the hammer and the smith are both agents,
or subjects of action ; the one is the prime or supreme,
the other the subordinate : the iron is the patient, or
CH. 11. SECT. 4.] RIGHT USE OF REASON. 29

the subject of passion, in a philosophical sense, because

it receives the operation of the agent ; though this sense
of the words passion and patient differs much from the
vulgar meaning of them *.

VI. The sixth division of modes may be into physi

cal, i. e. natural, civil, moral, and supernatural. So when
we consider the apostle Paul, who was a little man, a
Roman by the privilege of his birth, a man of virtue or
honesty, and an inspired apostle ; his low stature is a
physical mode, his being a Roman is a civil privilege,
his honesty is a moral consideration, and his being in
spired is supernatural.

VII. Modes belong either to body or to spirit, or to

both. Modes of body belong only to matter or to cor
poral beings ; and these are shape, size, situation, or
place, &c. Modes of spirit belong only to minds ; such
are, knowledge, assent, dissent, doubting, reasoning, &c.
Modes which belong to both have been sometimes called
mixt modes, or human modes, for these are only found in
human nature, which is compounded both of body and
spirit ; such are sensation, imagination, passion, &c. in
all which there is a concurrence of the operations both
of mind and body, that is, of animal and intellectual
nature.
But the modes of body may be yet farther distin
guished. Some of them are primary modes or quali
ties, for they belong to bodies considered in themselves,
whether there were any man to take notice of them or
no ; such are those before-mentioned, namely, shape,
size, situation, &c. Secondary qualities, or modes, are such
ideas as we ascribe to bodies on account of the various
impressions which are made on the senses of men by
them, and these are called sensible qualities, which are

* Note, Agent signifies the doer, patient the sufferer, action is doing, passion is
suffering; agent and action have retained their original and philosophical sense ,
though patient and passion have acquired a very different meaning in common
language.
30 LOGIC ; OR, THE [PART I.

very numerous ; such are all colours, as red, green, blue,

&c.; such are all sounds, as sharp, shrill, loud, hoarse ; all
tastes, as sweet, bitter, sour ; all smells, whether pleasant,
offensive, or indifferent ; and all tactile qualities, or such
as effect the touch or feeling, namely, heat, cold, &c.
These are properly called secondary qualities, for though
we are ready to conceive them as existing in the very
bodies themselves which affect our senses, yet true phi
losophy has most undeniably proved, that all these are
really various ideas or perceptions excited in human
nature, by the different impressions that bodies make
upon our senses by their primary modes, that is, by
means of the different shape, size, motion , and posi
tion, of those little invisible parts that compose them.
Thence it follows, that a secondary quality, considered
as in the bodies themselves, is nothing else but a power
or aptitude to produce such sensations in us. See
Locke's Essay on the Understanding, Book II. Chap. 8.

VIII. I might add, in the last place, that as modes

belong to substances, so there are some also that are
but modes of other modes : for though they subsist in
and by the substance, as the original subject of them,
yet they are properly and directly attributed to some
mode of that substance. Motion is the mode of a body;
but the swiftness or slowness of it, or its direction to the
North or South, are but modes of motion. Walking is
the mode or manner of a man, or of a beast ; but walk
ing gracefully implies a manner or mode superadded to
that action. All comparative and superlative degrees
of any quality, are the modes of a mode, as swifter im
plies a greater measure of swiftness.
It would be too tedious here to run through all the
modes, accidents, and relations at large that belong to
various beings, and are copiously treated of in general
in the science called metaphysics, or more properly on
tology : they are also treated of in particular in those
sciences which have assumed them severally as their
proper subjects.
CH. II. SECT. 5, 6. ] RIGHT USE OF REASON. 31

SECT. V.

OF THE TEN CATEGORIES.- OF SUBSTANCE MODIFIED .

WE have thus given an account of the two chief objects

of our ideas, namely, substances and modes, and their
various kinds : and in these last Sections we have briefly
comprised the greatest part of what is necessary in the
famous ten ranks of being, called the ten predicaments,
or categories of Aristotle, on which there are endless
volumes of discourses formed by several of his follow
ers. But that the reader may not utterly be ignorant
of them, let him know the names are these : substance,
quantity, quality, relation , action, passion, where, when,
situation, and clothing. It would be mere loss of time .
to shew how loose, how injudicious, and even ridiculous,
is this ten -fold division of things ; and whatsoever far
ther relates to them, and which may tend to improve
useful knowledge, should be sought in ontology, and in
other sciences.
Besides substance and mode, some of the moderns
would have us consider the substance modified, as a dis
tinct object of our ideas : but I think there is nothing
more that need be said on this subject than this, namely,
There is some difference between a substance when it
is considered with all its modes about it, or clothed in
all its manners of existence, and when it is distinguished
from them, and considered naked without them .

SECT. VI.
OF NOT- BEING.

As being is divided into substance and mode, so we may

consider not-being with regard to both these.

1. Not-being is considered as excluding all substance,

and then all modes are also necessarily excluded, and
this we call pure nihility, or mere nothing.
32 LOGIC ; OR, THE [PART I.

This nothing is taken either in a vulgar or a philoso

phical sense; so we say, there is nothing in the cup, in a
vulgar sense, when we mean there is no liquor in it ; but
we cannot say there is nothing in the cup, in a strict phi
losophical sense, when there is air in it, and perhaps a
million of rays of light are there.

II. Not-being, as it has relation to modes or man

ners ofbeing, may be considered either as mere negation,
or as a privation.
A negation is the absence of that which does not na
turally belong to the thing we are speaking of, or which
has no right, obligation, or necessity to be present with
it ; as when we say a stone is inanimate, or blind, or deaf,
that is, it has no life nor sight, nor hearing ; or when
we say a carpenter or a fisherman is unlearned, these are
mere negations.
But a privation is the absence of what does naturally
belong to the things we are speaking of, or which ought
to be present with it ; as when a man or a horse is deaf, or
blind, or dead, or if a physician or a divine be unlearned,
these are called privations ; so the sinfulness of any hu
man action is said to be a privation ; for sin is that want
of conformity to the law of God, which ought to be
found in every action of man.
Note, there are some writers who make all sort of re
lative modes or relations, as well as all external denomi
nations, to be mere creatures of the mind, and entia ra
tionis, and then they rank them also under the general
head of not beings ; but it is my opinion, that whatso
ever may be determined concerning mere mental rela
tions and external denominations which seem to have
something less of entity or being in them, yet there are
many real relations, which ought not to be reduced to
so low a class ; such are the situation of bodies, their mu
tual distances, their particular proportions and measures,
the notion of fatherhood, brotherhood, sonship, &c., all
which are relative ideas. The very essence of virtue or
holiness consists in the conformity of our actions to the
 CH. III . SECT. 1.] RIGHT USE OF REASON. 33

rule of right reason, or the law of God : the nature and

essence of sincerity is the conformity of our words and
actions to our thoughts, all which are but mere relations ,
and, I think, we must not reduce such positive beings
as piety, and virtue, and truth, to the rank of non-enti
ties, which have nothing real in them, though sin (or ra
ther the sinfulness of an action ) may be properly called
a not-being, for it is a want of piety and virtue. This is
the most usual, and perhaps the justest way of repre
senting these matters.

CHAP. III .
D OF THE SEVERAL SORTS OF PERCEPTIONS OR IDEAS.
12
IDEAS may be divided with regard to their original,
their nature, their objects, and their qualities.

‫"ג‬
SECT. I.

OF SENSIBLE, SPIRITUAL, AND ABSTRACTED IDEAS.

THERE has been a great controversy about the original

of ideas, namely, whether any of our ideas are innate
or no, that is, born with us, and naturally belonging to
our minds. Mr. Locke utterly denies it ; others as
positively affirm it. Now, though this controversy may
P be compromised, by allowing that there is a sense,
wherein our first ideas of some things may be said to be
innate, as I have shewn in some remarks on Mr. Locke's
Essay (which have lain long by me), yet it does not be
long to this place and business to have that point de
0 bated at large, nor will it hinder our pursuit of the pre
sent work to pass it over in silence.
There is sufficient ground to say, that all our ideas,
with regard to their original, may be divided into three
sorts, namely, sensible, spiritual, and abstracted ideas.
C
34 LOGIC ; OR, THE [ PART I.

I. Sensible or corporeal ideas, are derived originally

from our senses, and from the communication which
the soul has with the animal body in this present state ;
such are the notions we frame of all colours, sounds,
tastes, figures or shapes, and motions ; for our senses,
being conversant about particular sensible objects, be
come the occasion of several distinct perceptions in the
mind, and thus we come by the ideas of yellow, white,
heat, cold, soft, hard, bitter, sweet, and all those which we
call sensible qualities. All the ideas which we have of
body and the sensible modes and properties that belong
to it, seem to be derived from sensation. ON
And however these may be treasured up in the me An
mory, and by the work of fancy may be increased, di
minished, compounded, divided, and diversified (which
we are ready to call our invention), yet they all derive
their first nature and being from something that has
been let into our minds by one or other of our senses.
If I think of a golden mountain, or a sea of liquid fire,
yet the single ideas of sea, fire, mountain, and gold, came
into my thoughts at first by sensation ; the mind has
only compounded them.

II. Spiritual * or intellectual ideas are those which we

gain by reflecting on the nature and actions of our own
souls, and turning our thoughts within ourselves, and
observing what is transacted in our own minds. Such
are the ideas we have of thought, assent, dissent, judging,
reason, knowledge, understanding, will, love, fear, hope.
By sensation the soul contemplates things, as it were,
out of itself, and gains corporeal representations or sen
sible ideas: by reflection the soul contemplates itself and
things within itself, and by this means it gains spiritual
ideas, or representations of things intellectual.
Here it may be noted, though the first original of
these two sorts of ideas, namely, sensible and spiritual,
may be entirely owing to these two principles, sensation R
* Here the word spiritual is used in a mere natural, and not in a religious
sense.
CH. 111. SECT. 1. ] RIGHT USE Of reason. 35

and reflection, yet the recollection and fresh excitation of

them may be owing to a thousand other occasions and
occurrences of life. We could never inform a man who
was born blind or deaf what we mean by the words yel
low, blue, red, or by the words loud or shrill, nor convey
any just ideas of these things to his mind, by all the
powers of language, unless he has experienced those
sensations of sound and colour ; nor could we ever gain
the ideas of thought, judgement, reason, doubting, hoping,
&c., by all the words that man could invent without
turning our thoughts inward upon the actions of our
own souls. Yet when once we have attained these ideas
by sensation and reflection, they may be excited afresh
by the use of names, words, signs, or by any thing else
that has been connected with them in our thoughts ; for
when two or more ideas have been associated together,
whether it be by custom, or accident, or design, the one
presently brings the other to mind.

III. Besides these two which we have named, there

is a third sort of ideas, which are commonly called ab
stracted ideas, because though the original ground or
occasion of them may be sensation, or reflection, or both ;
yet these ideas are framed by another act of the mind,
which we usually call abstraction. Now the word ab
straction signifies a withdrawing some parts of an idea
from other parts of it, by which means such abstracted
ideas are formed, as neither represent any thing corporeal
or spiritual, that is, any thing peculiar or proper to
mind or body. Now these are of two kinds.
Some of these abstracted ideas are the most absolute,
general and universal conceptions of things considered
in themselves, without respect to others, such as entity
or being, and not-being, essence, existence, act, power, sub
stance, mode, accident, &c.
The other sort of abstracted ideas is relative, as when
we compare several things together, and consider mere
ly the relations of one thing to another, entirely drop
ping the subject of those relations, whether they be cor
C 2
36 LOGIC ; OR, THE [PART I.

poreal or spiritual ; such are our ideas of cause, effect,

likeness, unlikeness, subject, object, identity, or sameness,
and contrariety, order, and other things which are treat
ed of in ontology.
Most of the terms of art, in several sciences may be
ranked under this head of abstracted ideas, as noun, pro
noun, verb, in grammar, and the several particles of
speech, as wherefore, therefore, when, how, although, how
soever, &c.; so connexions, transitions, similitudes, tropes,
and their various forms in rhetoric .
These abstracted ideas, whether absolute or relative,
cannot so properly be said to derive their immediate
complete and distinct original, either from sensation, or
reflection ; ( 1. ) Because the nature and the actions both
of body and spirit give us occasion to frame exactly
the same ideas of essence, mode, cause, effect, likeness,
contrariety, &c. Therefore these cannot be called either
sensible or spiritual ideas, for they are not exact repre
sentations either of the peculiar qualities or actions of
spirit or body : but seem to be a distinct kind of idea
framed in the mind, to represent our most general con
ceptions of things, or their relations to one another, with
out any regard to their natures, whether they be corpo
real or spiritual. And, ( 2. ) The same general ideas, of
cause and effect, likeness, &c. may be transferred to a
thousand other kinds of being, whether bodily or spiri
tual, beside those from whence we first derived them :
even those abstracted ideas, which might be first occa
sioned by bodies, may be as properly afterward attri
buted to spirits.
Now, though Mr. Locke supposes sensation and re
flection to be the only two springs of all ideas, and that
these two are sufficient to furnish our minds with all
that rich variety of ideas which we have ; yet abstraction
is certainly a different act of the mind, whence these
abstracted ideas have their original ; though perhaps
sensation or reflection may furnish us with all the first
objects and occasions whence these abstracted ideas are
excited and derived. Nor in this sense and view of
 CH. III . SECT. 2.] RIGHT USE OF REASON. 37

things, can I think Mr. Locke himself would deny my

representation of the original of abstracted ideas, nor
forbid them to stand for a distinct species.
Note, Though we have divided ideas in this chapter
into three sorts, namely, sensible, spiritual, and abs-.
tracted ; yet it may not be amiss just to take notice
here, that a man may be called a compound substance,
being made of body and mind, and the modes which
arise from this composition are called mixed modes, such
as sensation, passion, discourse, &c. so the ideas of this
substance, or being called men, and of these mixed
modes may be called mixed ideas, for they are not pro
perly and strictly spiritual, sensible, or abstracted. `See
a much larger account of every part of this chapter in
the Philosophical Essays, by I. W. Ess. 3, 4, &c.

SECT. II.

OF SIMPLE AND COMPLEX, COMPOUND AND COLLECTIVE

IDEAS.
IDEAS considered in their nature, are either simple or
complex.
A simple idea is one uniform idea which cannot be
divided or distinguished by the mind into two or more
ideas ; such are a multitude of our sensations, as the
idea of sweet, bitter, cold, heat, white, red, blue, hard,
soft, motion, rest, and perhaps extension, and duration :
· such are also many of our spiritual ideas ; such as
thought, will, wish, knowledge, &c.
A complex idea, is made by joining two or more sim
ple ideas together ; as a square, a triangle, a cube, a pen,
a table, reading, writing, truth, falsehood, a body, a man,
a horse, an angel, a heavy body, a swift horse, &c., every
thing that can be divided by the mind into two or more
ideas is called complex .
Complex ideas are are often considered as single and
distinct beings, though they may be made up of seve
ral simple ideas ; so a body, a spirit, a house, a tree, a
38 LOGIC ; OR, THE [PART 1.

flower -But when several of these ideas of a different

kind are joined together, which are wont to be consi
dered, as distinct single beings, this is called a compound
idea, whether these united ideas be simple or complex.
So a man is compounded of body and spirit, so mith
ridate is a compound medicine, because it is made of
many different ingredients : this I have shewn under the
doctrine of substances . And modes also may be com
pounded ; harmony is a compound idea made up of dif
ferent sounds united ; so several different virtues must be
united to make up the compounded idea or character,
either of a hero, or a saint.
But when many ideas of the same kind are joined
together, and united in one name, or under one view,
it is called a collective idea, so an army, or a parliament,
is a collection of men ; a dictionary, or nomenclatura, is
a collection of words ; a flock is a collection of sheep ;
aforest, or grove, a collection of trees : a heap is a col
lection of sand, or corn, or dust, &c. a city is a collec
tion of houses ; a nosegay is a collection of flowers ; a
month, or a year, is a collection of days ; and a thou
sand is a collection of units.
The precise difference between a compound and col
lective idea, is this, that a compound idea unites things of
a different kind, but a collective idea things of the same
kind : though this distinction in some cases is not accu
rately observed, and custom oftentimes uses the word
compound for collective.

SECT. III.

OF UNIVERSAL AND PARTICULAR IDEAS , REAL AND

IMAGINARY.

IDEAS, according to their objects, may first be divided

into particular or universal.
A particular idea is that which represents one thing
only.
Sometimes the one thing is represented in a loose and
CH . III. SECT. 3. ] RIGHT USE Of reason. 39

indeterminate manner, as when we say, some man, any

man, one man, another man ; some horse, any horse ; one
city, or another, which is called by the schools indivi
duum vagum.
Sometimes the particular idea represents one thing
in a determinate manner, and then it is called a singu
lar idea ; such as Bucephalus, or Alexander's horse,
Cicero the orator, Peter the apostle, the palace of Ver
sailles, this book, that river, the new forest, or the city of
London : that idea which represents one particular de
terminate thing to me, is called a singular idea, whether
it be simple, or complex, or compound.
The object of any particular idea, as well as the idea
itself, is sometimes called an individual ; so Peter is an
individual man, London is an individual city. So this
book, one horse, another horse, are all individuals ; though
the word individual is more usually limited to one sin
gular, certain, and determined object.
An universal idea is that which represents a common
nature agreeing to several particular things ; so a horse,
a man, or a book, are called universal ideas, because they
agree to all horses, men, or books.
And I think it not amiss to intimate, in this place,
that these universal ideas are formed by that act of the
mind which is called abstraction, that is, a withdrawing
some part of an idea from other parts of it : for when
singular ideas are first let into the mind by sensation or
reflection, then, in order to make them universal, we
leave out, or drop all those peculiar and determinate
characters, qualities, modes, or circumstances, which
belong merely to any particular individual being, and
by which it differs from other beings ; and we only con
template those properties of it, wherein it agrees with
other beings.
Though it must be confessed, that the name of abs
tracted ideas is sometimes attributed to universal ideas,.
both sensible and spiritual, yet this abstraction is not so
great as when we drop out of our idea every sensible or
spiritual representation, and retain nothing but the most
40 LOGIC ; OR, THE [ PART I.

general and absolute conceptions of things, or their mere

relations to one another, without any regard to their
particular natures, whether they be sensible or spiritual.
And it is to this kind of conceptions, we more properly
give the name of abstracted ideas, as in the first section
of this chapter.
A universal idea is either general or special.
A general idea is called by the schools a genus ; and
it is one common nature agreeing to several other com
mon natures. So animal is a genus, because it agrees
to a horse, lion, whale, butterfly, which are also common
ideas ; so fish is a genus, because it agrees to trout, her
ring, crab, which are common natures also.
A special idea is called by the schools a species : it
is one common nature that agrees to several singular
individual beings ; so horse is a special idea, or a species,
·
because it agrees to Bucephalus, Trott, and Snowball.
City is a special idea, for it agrees to London, Paris,
Bristol.

Note I. Some of these universals are genuses, if com

pared with less common natures ; and they are species,
if compared with natures more common. So bird is a
genus, if compared with eagle, sparrow, raven, which are
also common natures ; but it is a species, if compared
with the more general nature, animal. The same may
be said of fish, beast, &c.
This sort of universal ideas, which may either be
considered as a genus, or a species, is called subaltern :
but the highest genus, which is never a species, is called
the most general ; and the lowest species, which is never
a genus, is called the most special.
It may be observed here also, that that general na
ture or property wherein one thing agrees with most
other things is called its more remote genus : so substance
is the remote genus of bird or beast, because it agrees
not only to all kinds of animals, but also to things in
animate, as sun, stars, clouds, metals, stones, air, water,
&c.; but animal is the proximate or nearest genus ofbird,
 CH. III. SECT. 3. ] RIGHT USE OF REASON. 41

because it agrees to fewer other things. Those general

natures which stand between the nearest and most re
mote are called intermediate.
Note II. In universal ideas it is proper to consider
their comprehension and their extension* .
The comprehension of an idea regards all the essen
tial modes and properties of it ; so body in its compre
"
hension takes in solidity, figure, quantity, mobility, &c.
So a bowl, in its comprehension, includes roundness, volu
bility, &c.
> The extension of a universal idea regerds all the par
ticular kinds and single beings that are contained un
der it. So a body in its extension, includes sun, moon,
star, wood, iron, plant, animal, &c. which are several spe
cies, or individuals, under the general name of body.
So a bowl, in its extension, includes a wooden bowl, a
brass bowl, a white and black bowl, a heavy bowl, &c.
and all kinds of bowls, together with all the particular
individual bowls in the world.
Note, The comprehension of an idea is sometimes
taken in so large a sense, as not only to include the es
sential attributes, but all the properties, modes, and re
lations whatsoever, that belong to any being, as will
appear, Chap. VI.
This account of genus and species is part of that fa
mous doctrine of universals, which is taught in the
schools, with divers other formalities belonging to it ;
for it is in this place that they introduce difference,
which is the primary essential mode and property, or the
secondary essential mode, and accident or the accidental
mode ; and these they call the five predicables, because
every thing that is affirmed concerning any being must
be either the genus, the species, the difference, some pro
perty, some accident : but what farther is necessary to
be said concerning these things will be mentioned when
we treat of definition.
Having finished the doctrine of universal and parti
* Note, The word extension here is taken in a mere logical sense, and not in
a physical and mathematical sense.
с 3
42 LOGIC ; OR, THE [PART I.
ticular ideas, I should take notice of another division of
them, which also hath respect to their objects ; and that
is, they are either real or imaginary.
Real ideas are such as have a just foundation in na
ture, and have real objects or examples, which did, or
do, or may actually exist, according to the present state
and nature of things ; such are all our ideas of long,
broad, swift, slow, wood, iron, men, horses, thoughts, spirits,
a cruel master, a proud beggar, a man seven feet high.
Imaginary ideas, which are also called fantastical or
chimerical, are such as are made by enlarging, diminish
ing, uniting, dividing real ideas in the mind, in such a
manner, as no objects, or examples, did or ever will exist,
according to the present course of nature, though the
several parts of these ideas are borrowed from real ob
jects ; such are the conceptions we have of a centaur, a
satyr, a golden mountain, a flying horse, a dog without a
head, a bull less than a mouse, or a mouse as big as a bull,
and a man twentyfeet high.
Some of these fantastical ideas are possible, that is,
they are not utterly inconsistent in the nature of things ;
and therefore it is within the reach of divine power to
make such objects ; such are most of the instances al
ready given ; but impossibles carry an utter inconsistence
in the ideas which are joined ; such are self-active matter,
and infinite or eternal men, a pious man without honesty,
or heaven without holiness.

SECT. IV.
THE DIVISION OF IDEAS , WITH REGARD TO THEIR
QUALITIES .

IDEAS, with regard to their qualities, afford us these se

veral divisions of them. 1. They are either clear and
distinct, or obscure and confused. 2. They are vulgar
or learned. 3. They are perfect or imperfect. 4. They
are true orfalse.
 CH. III. SECT. 4. ] RIGHT USE OF REASON. 43

I. Our ideas are either clear and distinct, or obscure

and confused.
Several writers have distinguished the clear ideas from
those that are distinct ; and the confused ideas from those
that are obscure ; and it must be acknowledged, there
may be some difference between them ; for it is the clear
ness of ideas for the most part makes them distinct : and
the obscurity of ideas is one thing that will always bring
a sort of confusion into them. Yet when these writers
come to talk largely upon this subject, and to explain
and adjust their meaning with great nicety, I have ge
nerally found that they did not keep up the distinction
they first designed, but they confound the one with the
other. I shall therefore treat of clear or distinct ideas,
as one and the same sort, and obscure or confused ideas,
as another.
A clear and distinct idea is that which represents the
object of the mind with full evidence and strength, and
plainly distinguishes it from all other objects whatsoever.
An obscure and confused idea represents the object
either so faintly, so imperfectly, or so mingled with
other ideas, that the object of it doth not appear plain
to the mind, nor purely in its own nature, nor suffici
ently distinguished from other things.
When we see the sea and sky nearer at hand, we have
a clear and distinct idea of each ; but when we lookfar
toward the horizon , especially in a misty day, our ideas
of both are but obscure and confused ; for we know not
which is the sea and which is sky. So when we look at
the colours of the rainbow, we have a clear idea of the
red, the blue, the green, in the middle of their several
arches, and a distinct idea too, while the eye fixes there;
but when we consider the border of those colours, they
so run into one another, that it renders their ideas con
fused and obscure. So the idea which we have of our
brother, or our friend, whom we see daily, is clear and
distinct ; but when the absence of many years has in
jured the idea, it becomes obscure and confused.
Notehere, that some of our ideas maybe very clear and
44 LOGIC ; OR, THE [ PART 1.

distinct in one respect, and very obscure and confused

in another. So when we speak of a chiliagonum, or a
figure of a thousand angels, we have a clear and distinct
rational idea of the number one thousand angels ; for
we can demonstrate various properties concerning it by
reason but the image or sensible idea, which we have
of the figure, is but confused and obscure ; for we can
not precisely distinguish it by fancy from the image of
a figure that has nine hundred angels, or nine hundred
and ninety. So when we speak of the infinite divisibi
lity of matter, we always keep in our minds a very clear
and distinct idea of division and divisibility. But after
we havemade a little progress in dividing, and come to
parts that are far too small for the reach of our senses,
then our ideas, or sensible images of these little bodies,
become obscure and indistinct, and the idea of infinite
is very obscure, imperfect, and confused.

II. Ideas are either vulgar, or learned. A vulgar idea

represents to us the most obvious and sensible appear
ances that are contained in the object of them : but a
learned idea penetrates farther into the nature, proper
ties, reasons, causes, and effects of things.- This is best
illustrated by some example .
It is a vulgar idea that we have of a rainbow, when T
we conceive a large arch in the clouds, made up of va
rious colours parallel to each other ; but it is a learned
idea which a philosopher has when he considers it as the
various reflections and refractions of sun-beams, in drops
of falling rair. So it is a vulgar idea which we have of
the colours ofsolid bodies, when we perceive them to be,
as it were, a red, or blue, or green tincture of the sur
face of those bodies : but it is a philosophical idea when
we consider the various colours to be nothing else but
different sensations excited in us by the variously re
fracted rays of light, reflected on our eyes in a different
manner, according to the different size, or shape, or si
tuation of the particles of which the surface of those
bodies are composed. It is a vulgar idea which we have
CH. III. SECT. 4. ] RIGHT USE OF REASON. 45

of a watch or clock, when we conceive of it as a pretty

instrument, made to shew us the hour of the day ; but
it is a learned idea which the watch-maker has of it who
knows all the several parts of it, the spring, the balance,
the chain, the wheels, their axles, &c. together with the
various connexions and adjustments ofeach part, whence
the exact and uniform motion of the index is derived ,
which points to the minute or the hour. So when a
common understanding reads Virgil's Eneid, he has
but a vulgar idea of that poem, yet his mind is natu
rally entertained with the story, and his ears with the
verse : but when a critic, or man who has skill in poesy,
reads it, he has a learned idea of its peculiar beauties,
he tastes and relishes a superior pleasure ; he admires
the Roman poet, and wishes he had known the Christian
Theology, which would have furnished him with nobler
materials and machines than all the heathen idols.
It is with a vulgar idea that the world beholds the
cartoons of Raphael at Hampton-court, and every one
feels his share of pleasure and entertainment : but a
painter contemplates the wonders of that Italian pen
cil, and sees a thousand beauties in them which the vul
gar eye neglected : his learned ideas give him a tran
scendent delight, and yet, at the same time, discover the
blemishes which the common gazer never observed.

III. Ideas are either perfect or imperfect, which are

otherwise called adequate or inadequate.
Those are adequate ideas which perfectly represent
their archetypes or objects. Inadequate ideas are but
a partial, or incomplete representation of those arche
types to which they are referred .
All our simple ideas are, in some sense, adequate or
perfect, because simple ideas, considered merely as our
first perceptions, have no parts in them
0 : so we may be
said to have a perfect idea of white, black, sweet, sour,
length, light, motion, rest, &c. We have also a perfect
idea of various figures, as a triangle, a square, a cylin
der, a cube, a sphere, which are complex ideas : but our
46 LOGIC ; OR, THE [ PART I.

idea or image of a figure of a thousand sides, our idea of

the city of London, or the powers of a loadstone, are
very imperfect, as well as all our ideas of infinite length
or breadth, infinite power, wisdom or duration ; for the
idea of infinite is endless and ever growing, and can
never be completed .
Note 1. When we have a perfect idea of any thing
in all its parts, it is called a complete idea ; when in all
its properties, it is called comprehensive. But when we
have but an inadequate and imperfect idea, we are only
said to apprehend it ; therefore we use the term appre
hension, when we speak of our knowledge of God, who
can never be comprehended by his creatures.
Note 2. Though there are a multitude of ideas which
may be called perfect, or adequate, in a vulgar sense ;
yet there are scarce any ideas which are adequate, com
prehensive, and complete in a philosophical sense : for
there is scarce any thing in the world that we know, as
to all the parts, and powers, and properties of it, in
perfection. Even so plain an idea as that of a triangle
has, perhaps, infinite properties belonging to it, of which
we know but a few. Who can tell what are the shapes
and positions of those particles, which cause all the
variety of colours that appear on the surface of things ?
Who knows what are the figures of the little cor
puscles that compose and distinguish different bodies ?
The ideas of brass, iron, gold, wood, stone, hyssop, and
rosemary, have an infinite variety of hidden mysteries
contained in the shape, size, motion, and position, of the
little particles of which they are composed ; and per
haps, also, infinite unknown properties and powers,
that may be derived from them. And if we arise to the
animal world, or the world of spirits, our knowledge of
them must be amazingly imperfect : when there is not
the leastgrain of sand, or empty space, but has too many
questions and difficulties belonging to it, for the wisest
philosopher upon earth to answer and resolve.

IV. Our ideas are either true or false ; for an idea

CH. III . SECT. 4.] RIGHT USE OF REASON. 47

being the representation of a thing in the mind, it must

be either a true or a false representation of it. If the
idea be conformable to the object or archetype of it, it
is a true idea ; if not, it is a false one. Sometimes our
ideas are referred to things really existing without us
as their archetypes. If I see bodies in their proper co
lours I have a true idea ; but when a man under the
jaundice sees all bodies yellow, he has a false idea of
them . So if we see the sun or moon rising or setting,
our ideas represent them bigger than when they were on
the meridian ; and in this sense it is a false idea, because
those heavenly bodies are all day and all night of the
same bigness. Or when I see a straight staff appear
crooked while it is half under the water, I say the water
gives me a false idea of it. Sometimes our ideas refer
to the ideas of other men, denoted by such a particu
lar word, as their archetypes : so when I hear a protes
tant use the words church and sacraments, if I under
stand by these words, a congregation offaithful men who
profess christianity, and the two ordinances, baptism and
the Lord's supper, I have a true idea of those words
in the common sense of protestants : but if the man who
speaks of them be a papist, he means the church of
Rome and the seven sacraments, and then I have a mis
taken idea of those words, as spoken by him, for he has
a different sense and meaning : and, in general, when
soever I mistake the sense of any speaker or writer, I
may be said to have a false idea of it.
Some think that truth or falsehood properly belongs
only to propositions, which shall be the subject of dis
course in the second part of Logic ; for, if we consider
ideas as mere impressions upon the mind, made by out
ward objects, those impressions will ever be conformable
to the laws of nature in such a case : the water will
make a stick appear crooked, and the horizontal air will
make the sun and moon appear bigger. And generally
where there is falsehood in ideas, there seems to be some
secret or latent proposition, whereby we judge falsely of
things : this is more obvious where we take up the words
48 LOGIC OR, THE [PART I,
of a writer or speaker in a mistaken sense, for we join
his words to our own ideas, which are different from
his. But after all, since ideas are pictures of things, it
cannot be very improper to pronounce them to be true
or false, according to their conformity or non- conformity
to their exemplars .

CHAP. IV.

OF WORDS AND THEIR SEVERAL DIVISIONS, TOGETHER

WITH THE ADVANTAGE AND DANGER OF THEM .

SECT. I.

OF WORDS IN GENERAL , AND THEIR USE.

THOUGH Our ideas are first acquired by the perception

of objects, or by various sensations and reflections, yet
we convey them to each other by the means of certain
sounds, or written marks, which we call words ; and a
great part of our knowledge is both obtained and com
municated by these means, which are called speech or
language.
But as we are led into the knowledge of things by
words, so we are oftentimes led into error, or mistake,
by the use or abuse of words also. And in order to
guard against such mistakes, as well as to promote our
improvements in knowledge, it is necessary to acquaint
ourselves a little with words and terms. We shall be
gin with these observations.
Observ. 1. Words (whether they are spoken or writ
ten) have no natural connexion with the ideas they are
designed to signify, nor with the things which are re
presented in those ideas. There is no manner of affi
nity between the sounds white in English, or blanc in
French, and that colour which we call by that name ;
nor have the letters, of which these words are com
CH. IV. SECT. 1. ] RIGHT USE OF REASON . 49

posed, any natural aptness to signify that colour rather

than red or green. Words and names therefore are mere
arbitrary signs invented by men to communicate their
thoughts or ideas to one another.
Observ. 2. If one single word were appointed to ex
press but one simple idea, and nothing else, as white,
black, sweet, sour, sharp, bitter, extension, duration, there
would be scarce any mistake about them.
But, alas ! it is a common unhappiness in language,
that different simple ideas are sometimes expressed by
the same word ; so the words sweet and sharp are applied
both to the objects of hearing and tasting, as we shall
see hereafter ; and this, perhaps, may be one cause or
foundation of obscurity and error arising from words..
Observ. 3. In communicating our complex ideas to
one another, if we could join as many peculiar and ap
propriated words together in one sound, as we join sim
ple ideas to make one complex one, we should seldom be
in danger of mistaking : when I express the taste of an
apple, which we call the bitter-sweet, none can mistake
what I mean.
Yet this sort of composition would make all language
a most tedious and unwieldy thing, since most of our
ideas are complex, and many of them have eight or ten
simple ideas in them ; so that the remedy would be
worse than the disease ; for what is now expressed in
one short word, as month, or year, would require two
lines to express it. It is necessary therefore, that sin
gle words be invented to express complex ideas, in order
to make language short and useful.
But here is our great infelicity, that when single words
signify complex ideas, one word can never distinctly ma
nifest all the parts of a complex idea ; and thereby it
will often happen, that one man includes more or less in
his idea, than another does, while he affixes the same
word to it. In this case there will be danger of mis
take between them, for they do not mean the same ob
ject though they use the same name. So, if one person
or nation, by the word year mean twelve months, of
50 LOGIC ; OR, THE [PART 1.

thirty days each, that is, three hundred and sixty days,
another intend a solar year of three hundred and sixty
five days, and a third mean a lunar year, or twelve lu
nar months, that is three hundred and fifty-four days,
there will be a great variation and error in their account
of things, unless they are well apprized of each other's
meaning beforehand. This is supposed to be the rea
son, why some ancient histories and prophecies, and ac
counts of chronology, are so hard to be adjusted. And
this is the true reason of so furious and endless debates
on many points in divinity ; the words church, worship,
idolatry, repentance, faith, election, merit, grace, and
many others which signify very complex ideas, are not
applied to include just the same simple ideas, and the
same number of them, by the various contending par
ties ; thence arise confusion and contest.
Observ. 4. Though a single name does not certainly
manifest to us all the parts of a complex idea, yet it must
be acknowledged, that in many of our complex ideas,
the single name may point out to us some chiefproperty
which belongs to the thing which the word signifies ;
especially when the word or name is traced up to its
original, through several languages from whence it is
borrowed. So an apostle signifies one who is sent forth.
But this tracing of a word to its original (which is
called etymology) is sometimes a very precarious and
uncertain thing : and , after all we have made but little
progress towards the attainment of the full meaning of
a complex idea, by knowing some one chief property of
it. We know but a small part of the notion of an
apostle, by knowing barely that he is sent forth.
Observ. 5. Many ( if not most) of our words which are
applied to moral and intellectual ideas, when traced up
to the original in the learned languages, will be found
to signify sensible and corporeal things : thus the words
apprehension, understanding, abstraction, invention, idea,
inference, prudence, religion, church, adoration, &c. have
all a corporeal signification in their original. The name
spirit itself signifies breath or air, in Latin, Greek, and
CH. IV. SECT. 1.] RIGHT USE of reason. 51

Hebrew : such is the poverty of all languages, they are

forced to use these names for incorporeal ideas, which
thing has a tendency to error and confusion.
Observ. 6. The last thing I shall mention that leads
us into many mistakes, is, the multitude of objects that
one name sometimes signifies : there is almost an infinite
variety of things and ideas both simple and complex,
beyond all the words that are invented in any language ;
thence it becomes almost necessary that one name should
signify several things. Let us but consider the two co
lours of yellow and blue, if they are mingled together
in any considerable proportion, they make a green ; now
there may be infinite differences of the proportions in
the mixture of yellow and blue ; and yet we have only
these three words, yellow, blue, and green, to signify all
of them, at least by one single term.
When I use the word shore, I may intend thereby a
coast of land near the sea, or a drain to carry off water,
or a prop to support a building ; and by the sound of
the word porter, who can tell whether I mean a man
who bears burthens, or a servant who waits at a nobleman's
gate? The world is fruitful in the invention of utensils
of life, and new characters and offices of men, yet names
entirely new are seldom invented ; therefore old names
are most necessarily used to signify new things, which
may occasion much confusion and error in the receiving
and communicating of knowledge.
Give me leave to propose one single instance, where
in all these notes shall be remarkably exemplified. It
is the word bishop, which in French is called evêque ;
upon which I would make these several observations.
1. That there is no natural connexion between the sa
cred office hereby signified, and the letters or sound
which signify this office ; for both these words evêque
and bishop signify the same office, though there is not
one letter alike in them ; nor have the letters which
compose the English or the French word any thing sa
cred belonging to them, more than the letters that com
pose the words king or soldier. 2. If the meaning of
52 LOGIC ; OR, THE [PART I.

a word could be learned by its derivation of etymology,

yet the original derivation of words is oftentimes very
dark and unsearchable ; for who would imagine that
each of these words are derived from the Latin Epis
copus, or the Greek Eдiσnoпos ? Yet in this instance, we
happen to know certainly the true derivation ; the
French being anciently writ evésque, is borrowed from
the first part of the Latin word ; and the old English
biscop from the middle of it. 3. The original Greek
word signifies an overlooker, or one who stands higher
than his fellows and overlooks them : it is a compound
word, that primarily signifies sensible ideas, translated
to signify or include several moral or intellectual ideas ;
therefore all will grant that the nature of the office can
never be known by the mere sound or sense of the
word overlooker. 4. I add, further, the word bishop or
episcopus, even when it is thus translated from a sensi
ble idea, to include several intellectual ideas, may yet
equally signify an overseer of the poor ; an inspector of
the customs : a surveyor of the highways ; a supervisor
of the excise, &c.: but by the consent of men, and the
language of scripture, it is appropriated to signify a sa
cred office of the church. 5. This very idea and name,
thus translated from things sensible, to signify a spiri
tual and sacred thing, contains but one property of it,
namely, one that has the oversight or care over others : but
it does not tell us whether it includes a care over one
church or many : over the laity or the clergy. 6. Thence
it follows, that those who, in the complex idea of the
word bishop, include an oversight over the clergy, or
over a whole diocese of people, a superiority to presby
ters, a distinct power of ordination, &c. must neces
sarily disagree with those who include in it only the
care of a single congregation. Thus, according to the
various opinions of men, this word signifies a pope, a
gallican bishop, a lutheran superintendant, an English
prelate, a pastor of a single assembly, or a presbyter or
elder. Thus they quarrel with each other perpetually ;
and it is well if any of them all have hit precisely the
CH . IV. SECT. 2. ] RIGHT USE of reason. 53

sense of the sacred writers, and include just the same

ideas in it, and no others.
I might make all the same remarks on the word
church or kirk, which is derived from Kugion oinos, or
the house ofthe Lord, contracted into Kyrioik, which
some suppose to signify an assembly of christians, some
take it for all the world that professes christianity, and
some make it to mean only the clergy ; and on these
accounts it has been the occasion of as many and as fu
rious controversies as the word bishop, which was men
tioned before.

SECT . II .
OF NEGATIVE AND POSITIVE TERMS.

FROM these and other considerations it will follow, that

ifwe would avoid error in our pursuit of knowledge, we
must take good heed to the use of words and terms, and
be acquainted with the various kinds ofthem.

I. Terms are either positive or negative.

Negative terms are such as have a little word or syl
lable of denying joined to them, according to the vari
ous idioms of every language, as unpleasant, imprudent,
immortal, irregular, ignorant, infinite, endless, lifeless,
deathless, nonsense, abyss, anonymous, where the prepo
sitions, un, im, in, non, a, an, and the termination less,
signify a negation, either in English, Latin, or Greek.
Positive terms are those which have no such negative
appendices belonging to them, as life, death, end, sense,
mortal.
But so unhappily are our words and ideas linked to
gether, that we can never know which are positive ideas,
and which are negative, by the word that is used to ex
press them, and that for these reasons ;
1st. There are some positive terms which are made
to signify a negative idea ; as dead is properly a thing
that is deprived of life ; blind implies a negation or pri
54 LOGIC ; OR, THE [ PART I.

vation of sight ; deaf a want of hearing ; dumb a denial

of speech .
2dly. There are also some negative terms which im
ply positive ideas, such as, immortal and deathless, which
signify ever-living, or a continuance in life : insolent sig
nifies rude and haughty : indemnify to keep safe ; and
infinite perhaps has a positive idea too, for it is an idea
ever growing ; and when it is applied to God it signi
fies his complete perfection.
3dly. There are both positive and negative terms, in
vented to signify the same, instead of contrary ideas ;
as unhappy and miserable, sinless and holy, pure and
undefiled, impure and filthy, unkind and cruel, irreli
gious and profane, unforgiving and revengeful, &c.; and
there is a great deal of beauty and convenience derived
to any language from this variety of expression ; though
sometimes it a little confounds our conceptions of being
and not-being, our positive and negative ideas.
4thly. I may add also that there are some words
which are negative in their original language, but seem
positive to an Englishman, because the negation is un
known ; an abyss, a place without a bottom ; anodyne,
an easing medicine ; amnesty, an unremembrance, or
general pardon ; anarchy, a state without government ;
anonymous, that is, nameless ; inept, that is, not fit ;
iniquity, that is, unrighteousness ; infant, one that can
not speak, namely, a child ; injurious, not doing justice
or right.
The way therefore to know whether any idea be ne
gative or not, is to consider whether it primarily imply
the absence of any positive being, or mode of being ; if
it doth, then it is a negation or negative idea ; otherwise
it is a positive one, whether the word that expresses it
be positive or negative . Yet after all, in many cases,
this is very hard to determine, as in amnesty, infinite,
abyss, which are originally relative terms, but they
signify pardon, &c. which seem to be positive. So
darkness, madness, clown, are positive terms, but they
imply the want of light, the want of reason, and the
CH. IV. SECT. 3. ] RIGHT USE OF REASON. 55

want of manners ; and perhaps these may be ranked

among the negative ideas.
Here note, that in the English tongue two negative
terms are equal to one positive, and signify the same
thing, as not unhappy signifies happy ; not immortal sig
nifies mortal ; he is no imprudent man, that is, he is a
man ofprudence : but the sense and force of the word,
in such a negative way of expression, seem to be a little
diminished.

SECT. III.
OF SINGLE AND COMPLEX TERMS .

II. TERMS are divided into simple or complex. A sim

ple term is one word, a complex term is when more words
are used to signify one thing.
Some terms are complex in words, but not in sense, such
as the second Emperor of Rome ; for it excites in our
minds only the idea of one man, namely, Augustus.
Some terms are complex in sense, but not in words ; so
when I say an army, a forest, I mean a multitude of men,
or trees ; and almost all our moral ideas, as well as
many of our natural ones, are expressed in this manner ;
religion, piety, loyalty, knavery, theft, include a variety
of ideas, in each term.
There are other terms which are complex both in
words and sense ; so when I say a fierce dog, or a pious
man, it excites an idea, not only of those two creatures,
but of their peculiar characters also.
Among the terms that are complex in sense but not in
words, we may reckon those simple terms which con
tain a primary and a secondary idea in them ; as when
I hear my neighbour speak that which is not true, and
I say to him, this is not true, or this is false, I only con
vey to him the naked idea of his error; this is the pri
mary idea: but if I say it is a lie, the word lie carries
also a secondary idea in it, for it implies both the false
hood of the speech, and my reproach and censure of
the speaker. On the other hand, if I say it is a mis
 56 . LOGIC ; OR, THE [ PART 1.

take, this carries also a secondary idea with it ; for it not

only refers to the falsehood of his speech, but includes
my tenderness and civility to him at the same time.
Another instance may be this ; when I use the words,
incest, adultery, and murder, I convey to another not
only the primary idea of those actions, but I include
also the secondary idea of their unlawfulness, and my
abhorrence of them.
Note, 1st. Hence it comes to pass, that among words
which signify the same principal ideas, some are clean
and decent, others unclean ; some chaste, others obscene ;
some are kind, others are affronting and reproachful,
because of the secondary idea which custom has affixed
to them. And it is the part of a wise man, when there
is a necessity of expressing any evil actions, to do it ei
ther by a word that has a secondary idea of kindness or
softness; or a word that carries with it an idea of rebuke
and severity, according as the case requires : so when
there is a necessity of expressing things unclean or ob
scene, a wise man will do it in the most decent language,
to excite as few uncleanly ideas as possible in the minds
of the hearers.
Note, 2dly. In the length of time, and by the power
of custom , words sometimes change their primary ideas,
as shall be declared, and sometimes they have changed
their secondary ideas, though the primary ideas may re
main : so words that were once chaste, by frequent use
grow obscene and uncleanly; and words that were once
honourable may, in the next generation, grow mean and
contemptible. So the word dame originally signified a
mistress of a family, who was a lady, and it is used still
in the English law to signify a lady ; but in common
use now-a-days it represents a farmer's wife, or a mis
tress of a family of the lower rank in the country. So
those words of Rabshakeh, Isai. xxxvi. 12. in our tran
slation (Eat their own dung, &c. ), were doubtless de
cent and clean language, when our translators wrote
them, above a hundred years ago. The word eat has
maintained its old secondary idea and inoffensive sense,
CH. IV. SECT. 4. ] RIGHT USE OF REASON. 57

to this day ; but the other word in that sentence has by

custom acquired a more uncleanly idea, and should
now rather be changed into a more decent term, and
so it should be read in public, unless it should be
*
thought more proper to omit the sentence •
For this reason it is, that the Jewish Rabbins have
supplied other chaste words in the margin of the He
brew Bible, where the words of the text, through time
and custom, are degenerated, so as to carry any base
and unclean secondary idea in them ; and they read the
word which is in the margin, which they call Keri, and
not that which was written in the text, which they call
Chetib.

SECT . IV.
OF WORDS COMMON AND PROPER.

III. WORDS and names are either common or proper.

Common names are such as stand for universal ideas, or
a whole rank of beings, whether general or special.
These are called appellatives ; so fish, bird, man, city,
river, are common names ; and so are trout, eel, lobster,
for they all agree to many individuals, and some of them
to many species: but Cicero, Virgil, Bucephalus, London,
Rome, Etna, the Thames, are proper names, for each
of them agrees only to one single being.
Note here, first, that a proper name may become in
some sense common, when it hath been given to several
beings of the same kind ; so Cæsar, which was the pro
per name of the first Emperor, Julius, became also a
common name to all the following Emperors. And
tea, which was the proper name of one sort of Indian
leaf, is now-a-days become a common name for many
infusions of herbs, or plants, in water ; as sage-tea, ale
hoof-tea, lemon-tea, &c. so Peter, Thomas, John, Wil
liam, may be reckoned common names also, because
* So in some places of the sacred historians, where it is written, every one
that pisseth against the wall, we should read, every male.
D
58 LOGIC ; OR, THE [PART I.
they are given to many persons, unless they are deter
mined to signify a single person at any particular time
or place.
Note, in the second place, that a common name may
become proper by custom, or by the time, or place, or
persons that use it ; as in Great Britain, when we say
the King, we mean our present rightful sovereign King
GEORGE, who now reigns ; when we speak of the Prince,
we intend his Royal Highness GEORGE Prince of
Wales : if we mention the city, when we are near Lon
don, we generally mean the city of London ; when in a
country town, we say the parson, or the esquire, all the
parish knows who are the single persons intended by
it ; so when we are speaking of the history of the New
Testament, and use the words Peter, Paul, John, we
mean those three apostles.
Note, in the third place, that any common name
whatsoever is made proper, by terms of particularity
added to it, as the common words pope, king, horse,
garden, book, knife, &c. are designed to signify a sin
gular idea, when we say, the present pope; the king of
Great Britain ; the horse that won the last plate at New
market; the royal garden at Kensington ; this book ; that
knife, &c.

SECT. V.
OF CONCRETE AND ABSTRACT TERMS .

IV. WORDS or terms are divided into abstract and

concrete.
Abstract terms signify the mode or quality of a be
ing, without any regard to the subject in which it is ;
as whiteness, roundness, length, breadth, wisdom, morta
lity, life, death.
Concrete terms, while they express the quality, do
also either express or imply, or refer to some subject
to which it belongs ; as white, round, long, broad, wise,
mortal, living, dead. But these are not always noun
 CH. IV. SECT. 6.] RIGHT USE OF REASON. 59

adjectives in a grammatical sense, for a fool, a knave,

a philosopher, and many other concretes, are substan
tives, as well as knavery, folly, and philosophy, which are
the abstract terms that belong to them.

SECT. VI.
OF UNIVOCAL AND EQUIVOCAL WORDS .

V. WORDS and terms are either univocal or equivocal.

Univocal words are such as signify but one idea, or at
least but one sort of thing ; equivocal words are such as
signify two or more different ideas, or different sorts of
objects. The words book, bible, fish, house, elephant, may
be called univocal words ; for I know not that they sig
nify any thing else but those ideas to which they are ge
nerally affixed ; but head is an equivocal word, for it
signifies the head of a nail, or of a pin, as well as of an
animal: nail is an equivocal word, it is used for the
nail of the hand, or foot, and for an iron nail to fasten
any thing. Post is equivocal, it is a piece oftimber, or a
swift messenger. A church is a religious assembly, or the
large fair building where they meet ; and sometimes the
same word means a synod of bishops ; or of presbyters,
and in some places it is the pope and a general council.
Here let it be noted, that when two or more words
signify the same thing, as wave and billow, mead and
meadow, they are usually called synonymous words ; but
it seems very strange, that words, which are directly
contrary to each other, should sometimes represent al
most the same ideas ; yet thus it is in some few in
stances ; a valuable or an invaluable blessing ; a shame
ful, or a shameless villain ; a thick skull, or a thin skull
ed fellow -a mere paper skull ; a man of a large con
science, little conscience, or no conscience ; a famous ras
cal, or an infamous one. So uncertain athing is human
language, whose foundation and support is custom !
As words signifying the same thing are called sy
D 2
60 LOGIC ; OR, THE [PART 1.

nonymous, so equivocal words, or those which signify se

veral things, are called homonymous, or ambiguous ; and
when persons use such ambiguous words, with a design
to deceive, it is called equivocation.
Our simple ideas, and especially the sensible qualities,
furnish us with a great variety of equivocal or ambiguous
words ; for these being the first, and most natural ideas
we have, we borrow some of their names, to signify
many other ideas, both simple and complex. The word
sweet expresses the pleasant perceptions of almost every
sense ; sugar is sweet, but it hath not the same sweet
anss as music ; nor hath music the sweetness of a rose ;
hed a sweet prospect differs from them all : nor yet
nave any of these the same sweetness as discourse, coun
sel, or meditation hath : yet the royal Psalmist saith of
a man, We took sweet counsel together; and of God, My
meditation ofhim shall be sweet. Bitter is also such an
equivocal word ; there is bitter wormwood, there are
bitter words, there are bitter enemies, and a bitter cold
morning. So there is a sharpness in vinegar, and there
is a sharpness in pain, in sorrow, and in reproach;
there is a sharp eye, a sharp wit, and a sharp sword;
but there is not one of these seven sharpnesses the same
as another of them, and a sharp east wind is different
from them all.
There are also verbs or words of action, which are
equivocal, as well as nouns or names. The words to
bear, to take, to come, to get, are sufficient instances
of it ; as when we say, to bear a burthen, to bear sorrow
or reproach, to bear a name, to bear a grudge, to bear
fruit, or to bear children ; the word bear is used in
very different senses : and so is the word get, when we
say, to get money, to get in, to get off, to get ready, to
get a stomach, and to get a cold, &c.
There is also a great deal of ambiguity in many ofthe
English particles ; as but, before, beside, with, without,
that, then, there, for, forth, above, about, &c. of which
grammars and dictionaries will sufficiently inform us.
CH. IV. SECT. 7. ] RIGHT USE of reason. 61

SECT. VII.
VARIOUS KINDS OF EQUIVOCAL WORDS.

It would be endless to run through all the varieties of

words and terms, which have different senses applied
to them ; I shall only mention therefore a few of the
most remarkable and most useful distinctions among
them.
1st. The first division of equivocal words lets us know
that some are equivocal only in their sound or pronun
ciation; others are equivocal only in writing, and others,
both in writing and in sound.
Words equivocal in sound only, are such as these : the
rein of a bridle, which hath the same sound with the
reign of a king, or a shower of rain ; but all three have
different letters, and distinct spelling. So might, or
strength, is equivocal in sound, but differs in writing
from mite, a little animal, or a small piece of money.
And the verb to write, has the same sound with wright
a workman, right or equity, and rite or ceremony ; but
it is spelled very differently in them all.
Words equivocal in writing only, are such as these :
to tear to pieces, has the same spelling with a tear : to
lead, or guide, has the same letters as lead, the metal :
and a bowl for recreation, is written the same way as a
bowl for drinking ; but the pronunciation for all these
is different.
But those words which are most commonly and justly
called equivocal, are such as are both written and pro
nounced the same way, and yet have different senses or
ideas belonging to them ; such are all the instances
which were given in the preceding section.
Among the words which are equivocal in sound only,
and not in writing, there is a large field for persons who
delight in jests and puns, in riddles and quibbles, to
sport themselves. This sort of words is also used by
wanton persons to convey lewd ideas, under the covert
of expressions capable of a chaste meaning, which are
62 LOGIC ; OR, THE [PART I.
called double entendres ; or when persons speak false
hood with a design to deceive, under the covert of truth.
Though it must be confessed, that all sorts of equivocal
words yield sufficient matter for such purposes.
There are many cases also, wherein an equivocal word
is used, for the sake of decency, to cover a foul idea : for
the most chaste and modest, and well-bred persons,
having sometimes a necessity to speak of the things
of nature, convey their ideas in the most inoffensive
language by this means. And indeed, the mere po
verty of all languages makes it necessary to use equi
vocal words upon many occasions, as the common writ
ings of men, and even the holy book of God, sufficiently
manifest.
2dly. Equivocal words are usually distinguished, ac
cording to their original, into such, whose various
senses arise from mere chance or accident, and such as
are made equivocal by design : as the word bear sig
nifies a shaggy beast, and it signifies also to bear or
carry a burthen; this seems to be the mere effect of
chance : but if I call my dog bear, because he is shaggy,
or call one of the northern constellations by that name,
from a fancied situation of the stars in the shape of that
animal, then it is by design that the word is made yet
further equivocal .
But because I think this common account of the
spring or origin of equivocal words is too slight and im
perfect, I shall reserve this subject to be treated of by
itself, and proceed to the third division.
3dly. Ambiguous, or equivocal words, are such as are
sometimes taken in a large and general sense, and some
times in a sense more strict and limited, and have differ
ent ideas affixed to them accordingly. Religion or vir
tue, taken in a large sense, includes both our duty to
God and our neighbour ; but in a more strict, limited ,
and proper sense, virtue signifies our duty towards men,
and religion our duty to God. Virtue may yet be taken
in the strictest sense, and then it signifies power or
courage, which is the sense of it in some places of the
CH. IV. SECT. 7. ] RIGHT USE OF REASON. 63

New Testament. So grace, taken in a large sense,

means the favour of God, and all the spiritual blessings
that proceed from it (which is a frequent sense of it in
the Bible), but in a limited sense it signifies the habit of
holiness wrought in us by divine favour, or a complex
idea of the christian virtues. It may also be taken in
the strictest sense ; and thus it signifies any single chris
tian virtue, as in 2 Cor. viii. 6, 7. where it is used for
liberality. So a city, in a strict and proper sense,
means the houses inclosed within the walls ; in a larger
sense, it reaches to all the suburbs.
This larger and stricter sense of a word is used in
almost all the sciences, as well as in theology, and in
common life. The word geography, taken in a strict
sense, signifies the knowledge of the circles of the earth
ly globe, and the situation of the various parts of the
earth ; when it is taken in a little larger sense, it includes
the knowledge of the seas also ; and in the largest sense
of all, it extends to the various customs, habits, and
governments of nations. When an astronomer uses the
word star in its proper and strict sense, it is applied
only to thefixed stars, but in a large sense, it includes
the planets also.
This equivocal sense of words belongs also to many
proper names : so Asia, taken in the largest sense, is
one quarter of the world ; in a more limited sense it
signifies Natolia, or the lesser Asia; but in the strictest
sense it means no more than one little province in Na
tolia, where stood the cities of Ephesus, Smyrna, Sardis,
&c. And this is the most frequent sense of it in the
New Testament. Flanders and Holland, in a strict
sense, are but two single provinces among the seventeen,
but in a large sense Holland includes seven of them,
and Flanders ten.
There are also some very common and little words
in all languages, that are used in a more extensive, or
more limited sense ; such as all, every, whatsoever, &c.
When the apostle says, all men have sinned, and all men
must die, all is taken in its most universal and extensive
sense, including all mankind, Rom. v. 12. When he ap
64 LOGIC ; OR, THE

points prayer to be made for all men, it appears by the

following verses, that he restrains the word all to sig
nify chiefly all ranks and degrees ofmen, 1 Tim. ii. 1 .
But when St. Paul says, I please all men in all things,
1 Cor. x. 33. the word all is exceedingly limited, for it
reaches no farther than that he pleased all those men
whom he conversed with in all things that were lawful.
4thly. Equivocal words are, in the fourth place, dis
tinguished by their literal or figurative sense. Words
are used in a proper or literal sense, when they are
designed to signify those ideas for which they were
originally made, or to which they are primarily and
generally annexed ; but they are used in a figurative
or tropical sense, when they are made to signify some
things, which onlybear either a reference or a resemblance
to the primary ideas of them. So when two princes ‫ر‬
contend by their armies, we say they are at war in a
proper sense ; but when we say there is a war betwixt
the winds and the waves in a storm, this is called figu
rative, and the peculiar figure is a metaphor. So when
the scripture says, Riches make themselves wings, andfly
away as an eagle towards heaven, the wings and the flight
of the eagle are proper expressions ; but when flight and
wings are applied to riches, it is only by way offigure and
metaphor. So when a man is said to repent, orlaugh, or
grieve, it is literally taken ; but when God is said to be
grieved, to repent, or laugh, &c. these are all figurative
expressions borrowed from a resemblance to mankind.
And when the words Job or Esther are used to signify
those very persons, it is the literal sense of them ; but
when they signify those two books of scripture, this is
afigurative sense. The names of Horace, Juvenal, and
Milton, are used in the same manner, either for books
or men.
When a word, which originally signifies any parti
cular idea or object, is attributed to several other ob
jects, not so much by way of resemblance, but rather on
the account of some evident reference or relation to the
original idea, this is sometimes peculiarly called an
analogical word ; so a sound or healthy pulse ; a sound
CH. IV. SECT. 7.] RIGHT USE OF REASON. 65

digestion ; sound sleep ; are all so called with reference

to a sound and healthy constitution ; but if you speak of
sound doctrine, or sound speech, this is by way of resem
blance to health ; and the words are metaphorical : yet
many times analogy and metaphor are used promiscu
ously in the same sense, and not distinguished.
Here, note, That the design of metaphorical lan
guage, and figures ofspeech, is not merely to represent
our ideas, but to represent them with vivacity, spirit,
affection, and power ; and though they often make a
deeper impression on the mind of the hearer, yet they
do as often lead him into a mistake, if they are used at
improper times and places. Therefore, where the de
sign of the speaker or writer is merely to explain, in
struct, and to lead into the knowledge of naked truth,
he ought for the most part to use plain and proper
words, ifthe language affords them, and not to deal much
in figurative speech. But this sort of terms is used very
profitably by poets and orators, whose business is to
move, and persuade, and work on the passions, as well
as on the understanding. Figures are also happily em
ployed in proverbial moral sayings by the wisest and the
best of men, to impress them deeper on the memory by
sensible images ; and they are often used for other va
luable purposes in the sacred writings.
5thly. I might adjoin another sort of equivocal words ;
as there are some which have a different meaning in
common language, from what they have in the sciences ;
the word passion signifies the receiving any action in a
large philosophical sense ; in a more limited philoso
phical sense, it signifies any of the affections of human
nature, as love, fear, joy, sorrow, &c. But the common
people confine it only to anger : so the word simple,
philosophically, signifies single, but vulgarly it is used
for foolish.
6thly. Other equivocal words are used sometimes in
an absolute sense, as when God is called perfect ; which
allows of no defect ; and sometimes in a comparative
sense, as good men are oftentimes called perfect in scrip
66 LOGIC ; OR, THE [PART 1.

ture, in comparison of those who are much inferior to

them in knowledge or holiness : but I have dwelt rather
too long upon this subject already, therefore I add no
more.

SECT. VIII.
THE ORIGIN OR CAUSES OF EQUIVOCAL WORDS.

Now, that we may become more skilful in guarding

ourselves and others against the danger of mistakes
which may arise from equivocal words, it may not be
amiss to conclude this chapter with a short account of
the various ways or means whereby a word changes its
signification, or acquires any new sense, and thus be
comes equivocal, especially if it keeps its old sense
also.
A
1. Mere chance sometimes gives the same word dif
ferent senses ; as the word light signifies a body that is
not heavy; and it also signifies the effect ofsun-beams,
or the medium whereby we see objects : this is merely ac 2
cidental, for there seems to be no connexion between
these two senses, nor any reason for them.
2. Error and mistake is another occasion of giving 18
various senses to the same word ; as when different
persons read the names of priest, bishop, church, easter, F.
&c. in the New Testament, they affix different ideas to
them, for want of acquaintance with the true meaning
of the sacred writer ; though it must be confessed,
these various senses, which might arise at first from
honest mistake, may be culpably supported and propa
gated by interest, ambition , prejudice, and a party-spirit
on any side.
3. Time and custom alters the meaning of words.
Knave heretofore signified a diligent servant ( Gnavus)
and a villain was an undertenant to the lord ofthe manor
(Villicus) ; but now both these words carry an idea of
wickedness and reproach to them. A ballad once sig
nified a solemn and sacred song, as well as one that is
CH . 11. SECT. 8. ] RIGHT USE OF REASON. 67

trivial, when Solomon's song was called the ballad of

ballads : but now it is applied to nothing but trifling
verse, or comical subjects.
4. Words change their sense by figures and meta
phors, which are derived from some real analogy or re
semblance between several things ; as when wings and
flight are applied to riches, it signifies only, that the
owner may as easily lose them, as he would lose a bird
who flew away with wings .
And I think under this head we may rank those words,
which signify different ideas, by a sort of an unaccount
able far-fetched analogy, or distant resemblance, thatfancy
has introduced between one thing and another ; as when
we say, the meat is green, when it is half-roasted : we
speak of airing linen by the fire, when we mean drying
or warming it : we call for round coals for the chimney,
when we mean large square ones : and we talk of the wing
of the rabbit, when we mean the fore-leg : the true rea
son of these appellations we leave to the critics.
5. Words also change their sense by the special oc
casion of using them , the peculiar manner ofpronuncia
tion, the sound of the voice, the motion ofthe face, or ges
tures ofthe body ; so, when an angry master says to his
servant, it is bravely done ! or you are a fine gentleman !
he means just the contrary ; namely, it is very ill done ;
you are a sorry fellow it is one way of giving a severe
reproach, for the words are spoken by way of sarcasm,
or irony.
6. Words are applied to various senses, by new ideas
appearing or arising faster than new words are framed.
So when gunpowder was found out, the word powder,
which before signified only dust, was made then to sig
nify that mixture or composition of nitre, charcoal, &c.
And the name canon, which before signified a law, or a
rule, is now also given to a great gun, which gives laws
to nations. So footboys, who had frequently the com
mon name of Jack given them, were kept to turn the
spit, or to pull off their master's boots ; but when instru
ments were invented for both those services, they were
68 LOGIC ; OR, THE [PART I.

both called jacks, though one was of iron, the other of

wood, and very different in their form.
7. Words alter their significations according to the
ideas of the various persons, sects, or parties, who use
them, as we have hinted before ; so when a papist uses
the word heretics, he generally means the protestants ;
when a protestant uses the word, he means any persons
who were wilfully (and perhaps contentiously) obstinate
in fundamental errors. When a Jew speaks of the true
religion, he means the institution of Moses ; when a
Turk mentions it, he intends the doctrine of Mahomet ;
but when a Christian makes use of it, he designs to sig
nify christianity, or the truths and precepts of the gospel.
8. Words have different significations according to
the book, writing, or discourse in which they stand. So
in a treatise of anatomy, a foot signifies that member in
the body of a man : but in a book of geometry or mensu
ration, it signifies twelve inches.
If I had room to exemplify most of these particulars
in one single word, I know not where to choose a fitter
than the word sound, which seems, as it were by chance,
to signify three distinct ideas, namely, healthy (from
sanus), as a sound body : noise (from sonus), as a shrill
sound ; and to sound the sea (perhaps from the French
sonde, a probe, or an instrument to find the depth of
water). From these three, which I may call original
senses, various derivative senses arise ; as sound sleep,
sound lungs, sound wind and limb, a sound heart, a sound
mind, sound doctrine, a sound divine, sound reason, a
sound cask, sound timber, a sound reproof, to beat one
soundly, to sound one's meaning or inclination, and a
sound, or narrow sea ; turn these all into Latin, and
the variety will appear plain.
I confess, some few of these which I have mentioned
as the different springs of equivocal words, may be re
duced in some cases to the same original : but it must
also be granted, that there may be other ways besides
these whereby a word comes to extend its signification,
to include various ideas, and become equivocal. And
CH. V.] RIGHT USE OF REASON. 69

though it is the business of a grammarian to pursue

these remarks with more variety and particularity, yet
it is also the work of a logician to give notice of these
things, lest darkness, confusion, and perplexity, be
brought into our conceptions by the means of words,
and thence our judgements and reasoning become er
roneous.

CHAP. V.

GENERAL DIRECTIONS RELATING TO OUR IDEAS.

Direction 1. FURNISH yourself with a rich variety of

ideas ; acquaint yourselves with things ancient and mo
dern ; things natural, civil, and religious ; things do
mestic and national ; things of your native land, and of
foreign countries ; things present, past, and future ;
and above all, be well acquainted with God and your
selves ; learn animal nature, and the workings of your
own spirits.
Such a general acquaintance with things will be of
very great advantage.
The first benefit of it is this : it will assist the use of
reason, in all its following operations ; it will teach you
to judge of things aright, to argue justly, and to metho
dise your thoughts with accuracy. When you shall find
several things akin to each other, and several different
from each other, agreeing in some part of their idea,
and disagreeing in other parts, you will range your ideas
in better order, you will be more easily led into a dis
tinct knowledge of things, and will obtain a rich store
of proper thoughts and arguments upon all occasions.
You will tell me, perhaps, that you design the study
of the law or divinity ; and what good can natural phi
losophy or mathematics do you, or any other science,
not directly subordinate to your chief design ? But let
it be considered, that all sciences have a sort of mutual
 70 LOGIC ; OR, THE [ PART I.

connexion ; and knowledge of all kinds fits the mind

to reason and judge better concerning any particular
subject. I have known a judge upon the bench betray
his ignorance, and appear a little confused in his senti
ments, about a case of suspected murder brought be
fore him, for want of some acquaintance with animal
nature and philosophy.
Another benefit of it is this : such a large and general
acquaintance with things will secure you from perpetual
admirations and surprises, and guard you against that
weakness of ignorant persons, who have never seen any
thing beyond the confines of their own dwelling, and
therefore they wonder at almost every thing they see ;
every thing beyond the smoke of their own chimney,
and the reach of their own windows, is new and strange
to them .
A third benefit of such a universal acquaintance with
things, is this ; it will keep you from being too positive, 1
and dogmatical, from an excess of credulity and unbelief,
that is, a readiness to believe, or to deny every thing at
first hearing ; when you shall have often seen, that
strange and uncommon things which often seemed in
credible, are found to be true ; and things very com 3
monly received as true, have been found false.
6
The way ofattaining such an extensive treasure ofideas,
is, with diligence to apply yourself to read the best books ;
converse with the most knowing and the wisest of men ;
and endeavour to improve by every person in whose
company you are ; suffer no hour to pass away in a lazy
idleness, an impertinent chattering, or useless trifles : vi
sit other cities and countries when you have seen your
own, under the care of one who can teach you to profit
by travelling, and to make wise observations ; indulge
ajust curiosity in seeing the wonders of art and nature ;
search into things yourselves, as well as learn them
from others ; be acquainted with men as well as books ;
learn all things as much as you can at first hand ; and
let as many of your ideas as possible be the representa
tions of things, and not merely the representations of
CH . V.] RIGHT USE OF REASON . 71

other men's ideas : thus your soul, like some noble

building, shall be richly furnished with original paint
ings, and not with mere copies.

Direct. II. Use the most proper methods to retain that

treasure ofideas which you have acquired ; for the mind
is ready to let many of them slip, unless some pains and
labour be taken to fix them upon the memory.
And more especially let those ideas be laid up and
preserved with the greatest care, which are most directly
suited, either to your eternal welfare, as a christian, or
to your particular station and profession in this life ; for
though the former rule recommends a universal ac
quaintance with things, yet it is but a more general and
superficial knowledge that is required or expected of
any man, in things which are utterly foreign to his own
business ; but it is necessary you should have a more
particular and accurate acquaintance with those things
that refer to your peculiar province and duty in this
life, or your happiness in another.
There are some persons who never arrive at any deep,
solid, or valuable knowledge in any science, or any bu
siness in life, because they are perpetually fluttering over
the surface of things, in a curious and wandering search
of infinite variety ; ever hearing, reading, or asking af
ter something new, but impatient of any labour to lay
up and preserve the ideas they have gained : their souls
may be compared to a looking glass, that wheresoever
you turn it, it receives the images of all objects, but re
tains none.
In order to preserve your treasure of ideas, and the
knowledge you have gained, pursue the following ad
vices, especially in your younger years.
1. Recollect every day the things you have seen, or heard,
or read, which may have made an addition to your un
derstanding read the writings of God and men with
diligence and perpetual reviews : be not fond of hasten
ing to a new book, or a new chapter, till you have well
fixed and established in your minds what was useful in
72 LOGIC ; OR, THE [PART I.

the last make use of your memory in this manner, and

you will sensibly experience a gradual improvement of
it, while you take care not to load it to excess.
2. Talk over the things which you have seen, heard, or
learnt, with some proper acquaintance. This will make
a fresh impression upon your niemory ; and if you have
no fellow-student at hand, none of equal rank with your
selves, tell it over to any ofyour acquaintance, where you
can do it with propriety and decency ; and whether they
learn any thing by it or no, your own repetition of it
will be an improvement to yourself: and this practice
also will furnish you with a variety of words, and copious
language to express your thoughts upon all occasions.
3. Commit to writing some of the most considerable
improvements which you daily make, at least such hints
as may recall them again to your mind, when perhaps
they are vanished and lost. And here I think Mr.
Locke's method of adversaria, or common-places, which
he describes in the end of the first volume of his post
humous works, is the best ; using no learned method at
all, setting down things as they occur, leaving a distinct
page for each subject, and making an index to the pages.
At the end of every week, or month, or year, you may
review your remarks, for these reasons : first, tojudge of
your own improvement : when you shall find that many
ofyour younger collections are either weak and trifling;
or if they are just and proper, yet they are grown now
so familiar to you, that you will thereby see your own
advancement in knowledge. And in the next place,
what remarks you find there worthy of your riper obser
vation, you may note with a marginal star, instead of
transcribing them, as being worthy of your second
year's review, when the others are neglected.
To shorten something of this labour, if the books
which you read are your own, mark with a pen or pen
cil, the most considerable things in them which you de
sire to remember. Thus you may read that book the
second time over with half the trouble, by your eye run
ning over the paragraphs which your pencil has noted.
CH. V.] RIGHT USE OF REASON. 73

It is but a very weak objection against this practice to

say, I shall spoil my book ; for I persuade myself that
you did not buy it as a bookseller to sell it again for gain,
but as a scholar, to improve your mind by it ; and if the
mind be improved, your advantage is abundant, though
your book yields less money to your executors *.

Direct. III. As you proceed both in learning and in

life, make a wise observation what are the ideas, what the
discourses and the parts ofknowledge that have been more
or less useful to yourselfor others. In our younger years,
while we are furnishing our minds with a treasure of
ideas, our experience is but small, and our judgement
weak ; it is therefore impossible at that age to determine
aright concerning the real advantage and usefulness of
many things we learn.- But when age and experience
have matured your judgement, then you will gradually
drop the more useless part of your younger furniture,
andbe more solicitous to retain that which is most neces
sary for your welfare in this life, or a better. Herebyyou
will come to make the same complaint that almost every
learned man has done after long experience in a study,
and in the affairs of human life and religion : Alas ! how
many hours, and days, and months have I lost in pursuing
some parts oflearning, and in reading some authors, which
have turned to no other account, but to inform me they were
not worthy my labour and pursuit ! Happy the man who
has a wise tutor to conduct him through all the sciences
in the first years of his study ; and who has a prudent
friend always at hand to point out to him, from expe
rience, how much of every science is worth his pursuit !
And happy the student that is so wise as to follow such
advice.

* Note, This advice of writing, marking, and reviewing your remarks, re

fers chiefly to those occasional notions you meet with either in reading or in
conversation; but when you are directly and professedly pursuing any subject
of knowledge in a good system in your younger years, the system is your com
mon-place-book, and must be entirely reviewed. The same may be said con
cerning any treatise which closely, succinctly, and accurately handles any par
ticular theme.
 74 LOGIC; OR, THE [ PART 1.
Direct. IV. Learn to acquire a government over your
ideas and your thoughts, that they may come when they are
called, and depart when they are bidden.- There are
some thoughts that arise and intrude upon us while we
shun them ; there are others that fly from us, when we
would hold and fix them.
If the ideas which you would willingly make the mat
ter of your present meditation are ready toflyfrom you,
you must be obstinate in the pursuit of them by a ha
bit offixed meditation ; you must keep your soul to the.
work, when it is ready to start aside every moment, unless
you will abandon yourself to be a slave to every wild ima
gination. It is a common, but it is an unhappy and a I
shameful thing, that every trifle that comes across the
senses or fancy should divert us, that a buzzing fly should
tease our spirits and scatter our best ideas : but we must
learn to be deaf to and regardless of other things, be
sides that which we make the present subject of our me 0
ditation : and in order to help a wandering and fickle
humour, it is proper to have a book or paper in our
hands, which has some proper hints of the subject that 0
we design to pursue. We must be resolute and labo
rious, and sometimes conflict with ourselves, if we would
be wise and learned.
Yet I would not be too severe in this rule : it must
be confessed there are seasons when the mind, or rather J
the brain, is over-tired orjaded with study or thinking;
or upon some other accounts animal nature may be lan
guid or cloudy, and unfit to assist the spirit ofmeditation ;
at such seasons (provided that they return not too often)
it is better sometimes to yield to the present indisposi
tion : for if nature entirely resist, nothing can be done
to the purpose, at least in that subject or science. Then
you may think it proper to give yourself up to some
hours of leisure and recreation, or useful idleness ; or if 1
not, then turn your thoughts to some other alluring sub
ject, and pore no longer upon the first, till some brighter
or more favourable moments arise. A student shall do
more in one hour, when all things concur to invite him
CH.VI. ] RIGHT USE OF REASON. 75

to any special study, than in four hours at a dull and

improper season.
I would also give the same advice, if some vain, or
worthless, or foolish idea, will crowd itself into your
thoughts ; and if you find that all your labour and wrest
ling cannot defend yourself from it, then divert the im
portunity of that which offends you by turning your
thoughts to some entertaining subject, that may amuse
you a little, and draw you off from the troublesome and
imposing guest ; and many a time also in such a case,
when the impertinent and intruding ideas would divert
from present duty, devotion and prayer have been very
successful to overcome such obstinate troublers of the
peace and profit of the soul.
If the natural genius and temper be too volatile, fickle,
and wandering, such persons ought in a more especial
manner to apply themselves to mathematical learning,
and to begin their studies with arithmetic and geometry;
wherein new truths continually arising to the mind, out
of the plainest and easiest principles, will allure the
thoughts with incredible pleasure in the pursuit : this
will give the student such a delightful taste of reason
ing, as will fix his attention to the single subject which
he pursues, and by degrees will cure the habitual levity
of his spirit : but let him not indulge and pursue these
so far, as to neglect the prime studies of his designed
profession.

CHAP. VI.

SPECIAL RULES TO DIRECT OUR CONCEPTIONS OF

THINGS.

A GREAT part of what has been already written is de

signed to lay a foundation for those rules which may
guide and regulate our conceptions ofthings : this is our
main business and design in the first part ofLogic. Now
76
LOGIC ; OR, THE [PART I.

if we can but direct our thoughts to a just and happy

manner in forming our ideas of things, the other opera
tions of the mind will not so easily be perverted ; be
cause most of our errors in judgement, and the weakness,
fallacy and mistakes of our argumentation, proceed from
the darkness, confusion, defect, or some other irregula
rity in our conceptions.
The rules to assist and direct our conceptions are
these :

1. Conceive ofthings clearlyand distinctly in their own

natures.
2. Conceive of things completely in all their parts.
3. Conceive of things comprehensively in all their pro
perties and relations.
31
4. Conceive of things extensively in all their kinds.
5. Conceive of things orderly, or in a proper method.
1

SECT. I.
OF GAINING CLEAR AND DISTINCT IDEAS.
M4
THE first rule is this, Seek after a clear and distinct con "
ception ofthings as they are in their own nature, and do
not content yourselves with obscure and confused ideas,
where clearer are to be attained.
There are some things indeed whereof distinct ideas
are scarce attainable, they seem to surpass the capacity
of the understanding in our present state ; such are the
notions of eternal, immense, infinite, whether this infinity
be applied to number, as an infinite multitude ; to quan
0
tity, as infinite length, or breadth ; to powers and per
fections, as strength, wisdom, or goodness, infinite, &c.
Though mathematicians in their way demonstrate seve
ral things in the doctrine of infinites, yet there are still
31
some insolvable difficulties that attend the ideas of infi
8
nity, when it is applied to mind or body ; and while it
CH. VI. SECT. 1.] RIGHT USE OF REASON. 77

is in reality but an idea ever growing, we cannot have so

clear and distinct a conception of it as to secure us from
mistakes in some of our reasoning about it.
There are many other things that belong to the ma
terial world, wherein the sharpest philosophers have
never yet arrived at clear and distinct ideas ; such as the
particular shape, situation, contexture, and motion ofthe
small particles of minerals, metals, plants, &c. whereby
their very natures and essences are distinguished from
each other. Nor have we either senses or instruments
sufficiently nice and accurate to find them out. There
are other things in the world of spirits wherein our ideas
are very dark and confused, such as their union with ani
mal nature, the way oftheir acting on material beings,
and their converse with each other. And though it is a
laudable ambition to search what may be known ofthese
matters, yet it is a vast hindrance to the enrichment of
our understandings if we spend too much of our time
and pains among infinites and unsearchables, and those
things for the investigation whereof we are not furnish
ed with proper faculties in the present state. -It is there
fore of great service to the true improvement of the
mind, to distinguish well between knowables and un
knowables.
As far as things are knowable by us, it is of excellent
use toaccustom ourselves to clear and distinct ideas. Now
among many other occasions of the darkness and mis
takes of our minds, there are these two things which
most remarkably bring confusion into our ideas.
1. That from our infancy we have had the ideas of
things so far connected with the ideas ofwords, that we
often mistake words for things, we mingle and confound
one with the other.
2. From our youngest years we have been ever ready
to consider things not so much in their own natures, as
in their various respects to ourselves, and chiefly to our
senses ; and we have also joined and mingled the ideas of
some things, with many other ideas, to which they were
not akin in their own natures.
 78 LOGIC ; OR, THE [PART I.

In order, therefore, to a clear and distinct knowledge

of things, we must unclothe them of all these relations
and mixtures, that we may contemplate them naked, and
in their own natures, and distinguish the subject that we
have in view from all other subjects whatsoever ; now to
perform this well, we must here consider the definition
of words, and the definition ofthings.

SECT. II.,
OF THE DEFINITION OF WORDS OR NAMES.

If we could conceive of things as angels and unbodied

spirits do, without involving them in those clouds which
words and language throw upon them, we should seldom
be in danger of such mistakes as are perpetually com
mitted by us in the present state ; and indeed it would
be of unknown advantage to us to accustom ourselves to
form ideas of things without words, that we might know
them in their own proper natures. But since we must
use words, both to learn and to communicate most of !
our notions, we should do it with just rules of caution.
I have already declared in part, how often and by what
means our words become the occasion of errors in our
conceptions of things. To remedy such inconveniences,
we must get an exact definition ofthe words we make use
of, that is, we must determine precisely the sense of our
words, which is called the definition of the name.
Now a definition ofthe name being only a declaration
in what sense the word is used, or what idea or object
we mean by it, this may be expressed by any one or
more of the properties, effects, or circumstances of that
object which do sufficiently distinguish it from other ob
T
jects : as if I were to tell what I mean by the word air,
I may say, it is that thin matter which we breathe in and
1
breathe out continually ; or it is that fluid in which the
birds fly a little above the earth ; or it is that invisible
matter which fills all places near the earth, or which im
CH. VI . SECT. 3. ] RIGHT USE OF REASON. 79

mediately encompasses the globe ofearth and water. So if

I would tell what I mean by light, I would say it is that
medium whereby we see the colours and shapes of things ;
or it is that which distinguishes the day from the night.
IfI were asked what I mean by religion, I would answer,
it is a collection of all our duties to God, if taken in a
strict and limited sense ; but if taken in a large sense,
it is a collection of all our duties both to God and man.
These are called the definitions of the name.
Note. In defining the name there is no necessity that
we should be acquainted with the intimate essence or na
ture of the thing ; for any manner of description that will
but sufficiently acquaint another person what we mean by
such a word, is a sufficient definition for the name. And
on this account a synonymous word, or a mere negation
of the contrary, a translation of the word into another
tongue, or a grammatical explication of it, is sometimes
sufficient for this purpose ; as, if one would know what
I mean by a sphere, I tell him it is a globe ; if he ask me
what is a triangle, it is that which has three angles ;
or an oval, is that which has the shape of an egg. Dark,
is that which has no light ; asthma is a difficulty ofbreath
ing; a diaphoretic medicine, or a sudorific, is something
that will provoke sweating; and an insolvent is a man that
cannot pay his debts.
Since it is the design of Logic, not only to assist us in
learningbut in teaching also, it is necessary that we should
be furnished with some particular directions relating to
the definition of names, both in teaching and learning.

SECT. III.
DIRECTIONS CONCERNING THE DEFINITION OF NAMES.

DIRECT. I. Have a care of making use ofmere words, in

stead ofideas, that is, such words as have no meaning, no
definition belonging to them : do not always imagine that
there are ideas wheresoever there are names : for though
80 LOGIC ; OR THE [PART I
mankind hath so many millions of ideas, more than they
have names, yet so foolish and lavish are we, that too
often we use some words in mere waste, and have no
ideas for them ; or at least, our ideas are so exceedingly
shattered and confused, broken and blended, various and
unsettled, that they can signify nothing toward the im
provement of the understanding. You will find a great
deal of reason for this remark, if you read the Popish
Schoolmen, or the Mystic Divines.
Never rest satisfied therefore with mere words which
have no ideas belonging to them, or at least no settled and
determinate ideas. Deal not in such empty ware, whe
ther you are a learner or a teacher ; for hereby some
persons have made themselves rich in words, and learned 1
in their own esteem ; whereas in reality their understand
ings have been poor, and they have nothing.
Let me give, for instance, some of those writers or
talkers who deal much in the words nature, fate, luck,
chance, perfection, power, life, fortune, instinct, &c. and
that even in the most calm and instructive parts of their
discourse ; though neither they themselves nor their
hearers have any settled meaning under those words, and
'
thus they build up their reasonings, and infer what they
please, with an ambition of the name of learning, or of ATCThe14.
sublime elevations in religion ; whereas in truth, they do ind
but amuse themselves and their admirers with swelling C
words ofvanity, understanding neither what they say, nor
whereof they affirm. But this sort of talk was reproved
of old by the two chief apostles, St. Peter and St. Paul, 喇
1. Tim. i. 7. and 2. Pet. ii. 18.
When pretenders to philosophy or good sense grow
fond ofthis sort oflearning, they dazzle and confound their
weaker hearers, but fall under the neglect of the wise.
The Epicureans are guilty of this fault, when they
ascribe the formation of the world to chance ; the Aristo
telians, when they say, nature abhors a vacuum : the Stoics,
when they talk offate, which is superior to the gods : and
the gamesters, when they curse their ill- luck, or hope for
*
the favours offortune. Whereas, if they would tell us,
CH. VI. SECT. 3. ] RIGHT USE OF REASON. 81

that by the word nature they mean the properties ofany

being, or the order of things established at the creation ;
that by the word fate, they intended the decrees of God,
or the necessary connexion and influence of second causes
and effects : if by the word luck or chance they signify the
absolute negation of any determinate cause, or only their
ignorance ofany such cause, we should know how to con
verse with them, and to assent to, or dissent from their
opinions. But while they flutter in the dark, and make
a noise with words which have no fixed ideas, they talk
to the wind, and never can profit.
I would make this matter a little plainer still by in
stances borrowed from the peripatetic philosophy, which
was once taught in all the schools. The professor fan
cies he has assigned the true reason why all heavy bodies
tend downward, why amber will draw feathers or straws,
and the loadstone draw iron, when he tells you, that this
is done by certain gravitating and attractive qualities,
which proceed from the substantial forms of those va
rious bodies. He imagines that he has explained why the
loadstone's * North pole shall repel the north end of a
magnetic needle, and attract the south, when he affirms
that this is done by its sympathy with one end of it, and
its antipathy against the other end. Whereas in truth,
all these names of sympathy, antipathy, substantial forms,
and qualities, when they are put for the causes of these
effects in bodies, are but hard words, which only express
a learned and pompous ignorance of the true cause of
natural appearances ; and in this sense they are mere
words without ideas.
This will evidently appear, if one ask me, Why a
concave mirror or convex glass will burn wood in the sun
beams, or why a wedge will cleave it ? And I should tell
him, it is by an ustorious quality in the mirror or glass,
and by a cleaving power in the wedge arising from a cer
tain unknown substantialform in them , whence they de

Note. Some writers call that the South pole of a loadstone which at
tracts the South end of the needle ; but I choose to follow those who call itthe
North pole.
E
82 LOGIC ; OR, THE [PART I.

rive these qualities : or if he should ask me, why a clock

strikes, andpoints to the hour ? and I should say, it is by
an indicatingform and sonorific quality; whereas I ought
to tell him how the sun-beams are collected and united
by a burning-glass ; whence the mechanical force of a
wedge is derived ; and what are the wheels and springs,
the pointer, and hammer, and bell, whereby a clock gives
notice of the time, both to the eye and the ear. But
these ustorious and cleaving powers, sonorous and indi
cating forms and qualities, do either teach the inquirer
nothing at all but what he knew before, or they are mere
words without ideas *.
And there is many a man in the vulgar and in the
learned world, who imagines himself deeply skilled in
the controversies of divinity, whereas he has only fur In
nished himself with a parcel of scholastic or mystic words,
under some of which the authors themselves had no just 01
ideas ; and the learner, when he hears or pronounces
el
them, has scarce any idea at all. Such sort of words
sometimes have become matters of immortal contention,
as though the gospel could not stand without them ; and く
yet the zealot, perhaps, knows little more of them than
he does of Shibboleth, or Higgaion, Selah. Judges xii.
6. Psa. ix . 16.
Yet here I would lay down this caution, that there are
several objects of which we have not a clear and distinct
idea, much less an adequate or comprehensive one, and
yet we cannot call the names of these things, words with
* It may be objected here, " And what does the modern philosopher, with
" all his detail of mathematical numbers and diagrams, do more than this to t
" wards the solution of these difficulties ? Does he not describe gravity by a
" certain unknown force, whereby bodies tend downward to thecentre ? Hath he
found the certain and mechanical reason of attraction, magnetism, &c.?” I an 0
swer,That the moderns have found a thousand things by applying mathema
tics to natural philosophy, which the ancients were ignorant of; and when
they use any names of this kind, viz. gravitation, attraction, &c. they use
them only to signify that there are such effects and such causes, with a frequent
confession of their ignorance of the true springs of them : they do not pretend E
to make these words stand for the real causes of things, as though they thereby
assigned the true philosophical solution of these difficulties ; for in this sense
they will be words without ideas,whether in the mouth of an old philosopher or
a new one.
(
CH. VI. SECT. 3. ] RIGHT USE OF REASON. 83

out ideas ; such are the infinity and eternity of God him
self; the union of our own soul and body, the union ofthe
divine and human natures in Jesus Christ, the operation
ofthe Holy Spirit on the mind ofman, &c. These ought
not to be called words without ideas, for there is suffi
cient evidence for the reality and certainty of the exist
ence of their objects ; though there is some confusion in
our clearest conceptions of them; and our ideas of them,
though imperfect, are yet sufficient to converse about
then , so far as we have need, and to determine so much
as is necessary for our own faith and practice.

Direct. II. Do not suppose that the natures or essences

of things always differfrom one another, as much as their
names do. There are various purposes in human life,
for which we put very different names on the same thing,
or on things whose natures are near akin ; and thereby
oftentimes, by making a new nominal species, we are
ready to deceive ourselves with the idea of another real
species ofbeings ; and those, whose understandings are
led away with the mere sound of words, fancy the nature
of those things to be very different whose names are so,
and judge of them accordingly.
I may borrow a remarkable instance for my purpose
almost out of every garden, which contains a variety of
plants in it. Most or all plants agree in this, that they
have a root, a stalk, leaves, buds, blossoms and seeds : but
the gardener ranges them under very different names, as
though they were really different kinds of beings, merely
because of the different use and service to which they
are applied by men : as for instance, those plants whose
roots are eaten, shall appropriate the name of roots to
themselves ; such are carrots, turnips, radishes, &c. If
the leaves are of chief use to us, then we call them herbs,
as sage, mint, thyme; if the leaves are eaten raw, they
are termed salad, as lettuce, purslain ; if boiled, they be
come pot-herbs, as spinage, coleworts ; and some of those
plants, which are pot-herbs in one family, are salad in
another. If the buds are made our food, they are called
E 2
84 LOGIC ; OR, THE [PART I.

heads or tops ; so cabbage heads, heads of asparagus and

artichokes. If the blossom be of most importance, we call
it a flower ; such are daisies, tulips, and carnations, which
are the mere blossoms of those plants. If the husk or
seeds are eaten, they are called the fruits ofthe ground;
as peas, beans, strawberries, &c. If any part of the plant
be of known and common use to us in medicine, we call
it a physical herb ; as carduus, scurvy-grass ; but if we
count no part useful, we call it a weed, and throw it
out of the garden ; and yet, perhaps, our next neighbour
knows some valuable property and use of it ; he plants
it in his garden and gives it the title of an herb, or a
flower. You see here how small is the real distinction
31
of these several plants, considered in their general na
ture as the lesser vegetables : yet what very different ideas
we vulgarly form concerning them, making different
species of them, chiefly because of the different names
given them. 6
Now, when things are set in this clear light, it appears a
how ridiculous it would be for two persons to contend,
whether dandelion be an herb or a weed ; whether it be
a pot-herb or a salad ; when, by the custom or fancy of
different families, this one plant obtains all these names,
according to the several uses of it, and the value that is
put upon it.
Note here, that I find no manner of fault with the va +บ
riety of names which are given to several plants, accord
ing to the various uses we make of them. But I would
not have our judgements imposed upon hereby, to think
that these mere nominal species, viz. herbs, salad, and
weeds, become three really different species of beings, on
this account, that they have different names and uses.
But I proceed to other instances.
It has been the custom of mankind, when they have
been angry with any thing, to add a new ill name to it,
though the nature of the thing still abides the same. So
the papists call the protestants heretics : a profane person C
calls a man ofpiety, a precisian : and in the time of the
civil war in the last century, the royalists called the par
CH. VI . SECT. 3. ] RIGHT USE OF REASON. 85

liamentarians, fanatics, roundheads, and sectaries. And

they in requital called the royalists, malignants : but the
partisans on each side were really neither better nor
worse for these names.
It has also been a frequent practice, on the other hand,
to put new favourable names upon ill ideas, on purpose
to take off the odium of them. But, notwithstanding all
these flattering names and titles, a man of profuse gene
rosity is but a spendthrift ; a natural son is a bastard still ;
a gallant is an adulterer ; and alady of pleasure is a whore.

Direct. III. Take heed of believing the nature and es

sence oftwo or more things to be certainly the same, because
they may have the same name given them. -This has been
an unhappy and fatal occasion of a thousand mistakes in
the natural, in the civil, and in the religious affairs of
life, both amongst the vulgar and the learned. I shall
give two or three instances, chiefly in the matters ofna
tural philosophy, having hinted several dangers of this
kind relating to theology, in the foregoing discourse con
cerning equivocal words.
Our elder philosophers have generally made use of the
word soulto signify that principle whereby a plant grows,
and they call it the vegetable soul : the principle of the
animal motion of a brute has been likewise called a soul,
and we have been taught to name it the sensitive soul :
they have also given the name soul to that superior prin
ciple in man, whereby he thinks, judges, reasons, &c.;
and though they distinguish this by the honorable title
of the rational soul, yet, in common discourse and writ
ing, we leave out the words vegetative, sensitive, and ra
tional ; and make the word soul serve for all these prin
ciples : thence we are led early into this imagination ,
that there is a sort of spiritual being in plants and in
brutes, like that in men. Whereas, if we did but abstract
and separate these things from words, and compare the
cause of growth in a plant, with the cause of reasoning in
man (without the word soul), we should never think that
these two principles were at all like one another ; nor
86 LOGIC ; OR, THE [ PART I.

should we, perhaps, so easily and peremptorily conclude,

that brutes need an intelligent mind to perform their
animal actions.
Another instance may be the word LIFE, which, being
attributed to plants, to brutes, and to men, and in each
of them ascribed to the soul, has very easily betrayed us
from our infancy into this mistake, that the spirit or mind,
or thinking principle in man, is the spring ofvegetative
and animal life to his body : whereas it is evident, that,
if the spirit or thinking principle of man gave life to his
animal nature, the way to save men from dying would
not be to use medicines, but to persuade the spirit to
abide in the body.
I might derive a third instance from the word Heat,
which is used to signify the sensation we have when we
are near the fire, as well as the cause of that sensation,
which is in the fire itself; and thence we conclude from
our infancy, that there is a sort ofheat in thefire resem 1
bling our ownsensation , or the heat which wefeel : whereas G
in the fire there is nothing but little particles of matter,
of such particular shapes, size, situations, and motions,
as are fitted to impress such motion on our flesh or nerves
as excite the sense of heat. Now if this cause of our
sensation in the fire had been always called by a distinct a
name, perhaps we had not been so rooted in this mis
take, that the fire is hot with the same sort of heat that we
feel. This will appear with more evidence, when we
considerthat we are secure from the same mistake, where
there have been two different names allotted to our sen
sation, and to the cause ofit ; as, we do not say, pain
is in the fire that burns us, or in the knife that cuts and
wounds us ; for we call it burning in the fire, cutting in
the knife, and pain only when it is in ourselves.
Numerous instances of this kind might be derived
from the words sweet, sour, loud, shrill, and almost all
the sensible qualities, whose real natures we mistake from
our very infancy, and we are ready to suppose them to
be the same in us, and in the bodies that cause them ;
partly, because the words which signify our own sensa 0
CH. VI. SECT. 3. ] RIGHT USE OF REASON. 87

tions are applied also to signify those unknown shapes

and motions of the little corpuscles, which excite and
cause those sensations.

Direct. IV. In conversation or reading, be diligent to

find out the true sense, or distinct idea, which the speaker
or writer affixes to his words, and especially to those words
which are the chief subject of his discourse. As far as pos
sible, take heed, lest you put more or fewer ideas in one
word, than the person did when he wrote or spoke; and
endeavour that your ideas of every word may be the
same as his were : then you will judge better of what
he speaks or writes.
It is for want of this that men quarrel in the dark ;
and that there are so many contentions in the several sci
ences, and especially in divinity. Multitudes of them
arise from a mistake of the true sense or complete mean
ing in which words are used by the writer or speaker :
and hereby sometimes they seem to agree, when theyreally
differ in their sentiments ; and sometimes they seem to
differ, when they really agree. Let me give an instance
of both.
When one man by the word church shall understand
all that believe in Christ ; and another, bythe word church,
means only the church of Rome ; they may both assent
to this proposition, there is no salvation out ofthe church,
and yet their inward sentiments may be widely different.
Again, if one writer shall affirm , that virtue, added to
faith, is sufficient to make a christian, and another shall
as zealously deny this proposition, they seem to differ
widely in words, and yet perhaps they may both really
agree in sentiment : if by the word virtue, the affirmer
intends our whole duty to God and man ; and the denier,
by the word virtue, means only courage, or at most our
duty towards our neighbour, without including in the idea
of it, the duty which we owe to God.
Many such sort of contentions as these are, if traced
to their original, will be found to be mere logomachies,
or strifes and quarrels about names and words, and vain
88 LOGIC ; OR, THE [PART 1.
janglings, as the apostle calls them in his first letter of
advice to Timothy .
In order therefore to attain clear and distinct ideas of
what we read and hear, we must search the sense of
words ; we must consider what is their original and de
rivation in our own or foreign languages ; what is their
common sense amongst mankind, or in other authors,
especially such as wrote in the same country, in the same
age, about the same time, and upon the same subjects :
we must consider in what sense the same author uses
any particular word or phrase, and that when he is dis
coursing on the same matter, and especially about the
same parts or paragraphs of his writing : we must con
sider whether the word be used in a strict and limited,
or in a large and general sense ; whether in a literal, in
a figurative, or in a prophetic sense ; whether it has any
secondary idea annexed to it, besides the primary or chief
sense. We must inquire further, what is the scope and
design ofthe writer ; and what is the connexion ofthat
sentence with those that go before it, and those which
follow it . By these and other methods, we are to search
out the definition of names, that is, the true sense and
meaning in which any author or speaker uses any word,
which may be the chief subject of discourse, or may
carry any considerable importance in it.

Direct. V. When we communicate our notions to others,

merely with a design to inform and improve their know
ledge, let us, in the beginning of our discourse, take care
to adjust the definition ofnames, wheresoever there is need
of it ; that is, to determine plainly what we mean by the
chief words which are the subject ofour discourse ; and be
sure always to keep the same ideas, whensoever we use the
same words, unless we give due notice ofthe change. This
will have a very large and happy influence, in securing
not only others, but ourselves too, from confusion and
mistake ; for even writers and speakers themselves, for
want of due watchfulness, are ready to affix different
ideas to their own words, in different parts of their dis
CH. VI. SECT. 3. ] RIGHT USE OF REASON. 89

courses, and hereby bring perplexity into their own rea

sonings, and confound their hearers.
It is by an observation of this rule, that mathema
ticians have so happily secured themselves, and the
sciences which they have professed, from wrangling and
controversy ; because whensoever, in the progress of
their treatises, they have occasion to use a new and un
known word, they always define it, and tell in what sense
they shall take it ; and in many of their writings you find
a heap of definitions at the very beginning. Now if the
writers of natural philosophy and morality had used the
same accuracy and care, they had effectually secluded
a multitude of noisy and fruitless debates out of their se
veral provinces : nor had that sacred theme of divinity
been perplexed with so many intricate disputes, nor the
church of Christ been torn to pieces by so many sects
and factions, if the words grace, faith, righteousness, re
pentance, justification, worship, church, bishop, presbyter,
&c. had been well defined, and their significations ad
justed, as near as possible, by the use of those words in
the New Testament ; or at least, if every writer had told
us at first in what sense he would use those words.

Direct. VI. In your own studies, as well as in the com

munication ofyour thoughts to others merely for their in
formation, avoid ambiguous and equivocal terms as much
as possible. Do not use such words as have two or three
definitions ofthe name belonging to them ; that is , such
words as have two or three senses, where there is any
danger of mistake. Where your chief business is to in
form the judgement, and to explain a matter, rather than
to persuade or affect, be not fond of expressing your
selves in figurative language, when there are any proper
words that signify the same idea in their literal sense.
It is the ambiguity ofnames, as we have often said, that
brings almost infinite confusion into our conceptions of
things.
But where there is a necessity of using an ambiguous
word, there let double care be used in defining that word,
E 3
90 LOGIC ; OR, THE [ PART 1.
and declaring in what sense you take it. And be sure
to suffer no ambiguous word ever to come into your de
finitions.

Direct. VII. In communicating your notions, use every

word as near as possible in the same sense in which man
kind commonly use it ; or which writers that have gone be
fore you have usually affixed to it, upon condition that it
is freefrom ambiguity. Though names are in their ori
ginal merely arbitrary, yet we should always keep to the
established meaning of them, unless great necessity re
quires the alteration ; for when any word has been used
to signify an idea, that old idea will recur in the mind
when the word is heard or read, rather than any new
idea which we may fasten to it. And this is one reason
why the received definition of names should be changed
as little as possible.
But I add further, that though a word entirely new, t
introduced into a language, may be affixed to what idea a
you please, yet an old word ought never to be fixed to
an unaccustomed idea, without just and evident neces 8
sity, or without present or previous notice, lest we in
troduce thereby a licence for all manner of pernicious
equivocations and falsehood ; as for instance, when an
idle boy, who has not seen his book all the morning, shall
tell his master that he has learned his lesson, he can never
excuse himself by saying, that by the word lesson he
meant his breakfast, and by the word learn he meant
eating; surely this would be construed a downright lie,
and his fancied wit would hardly procure his pardon.
In using an ambiguous word, which has been used in
different senses, we may choose what we think the most
proper sense, as I have done, p. 81, in naming the poles
ofthe loadstone, north or south.
And when a word has been used in two or three senses,
and has made a great inroad to error, upon that account,
it is of good service to drop one or two of those senses,
and leave it only one remaining, and fix the other senses
or ideas to other words. So the modern philosophers,
CH. VI. SECT. 3. ] RIGHT USE OF REASON . 91

when they treat of the human soul, they call it the mind,
or mens humana, and leave the word anima, or soul, to
signify the principle oflife and motion in mere animal
beings.
So the poetJuvenal has long ago given us a hint ofthis
accuracy and distinction, when he says ofbrutes and men,

Indulsit mundi communis Conditor illis

Tantam animas ; nobis Animum quoque.—
Sat. ix. 134.

Exception. There is one case, wherein some of these

last rules concerning the definition of words, may be in
some measure dispensed with ; and that is, when strong
and rooted prejudice hath established some favourite
word or phrase, and long used it to express some mis
taken notion , or to unite some inconsistent ideas ; for
then it is sometimes much easier to lead the world into
truth, by indulging their fondness for a phrase, and by
assigning and applying new ideas and notions to their
favouriteword; andthis is much safer also than to awaken
all their passions by rejecting both their old words, and
phrases, and notions, and introducing all new at once ;
therefore we continue to say, there is heat in the fire,
there is coldness in ice, rather than invent new words to
express the powers which are in fire or ice, to excite
the sensation of heat or cold in us. For the same reason
some words and phrases which are less proper, may be
continued in theology, while people are led into clearer
ideas with much more ease and success, than if an at
tempt were made to change all their beloved forms of
speech.
In othercases, these logical directions should generally
be observed, and different names fixed to different ideas.
Here I cannot but take occasion to remark, that it is
a considerable advantage to any language to have a va
riety ofnew words introduced into it, that when in course
of time new objects and new ideas arise, there may be
new words and names assigned to them : and also where
one single name has sustained two or three ideas in time
92 LOGIC ; OR, THE [ PART.I.

past, these new words may remove the ambiguity by be

ing affixed to some of those ideas. This practice would,
by degrees, take away part of the uncertainty of lan
guage. And for this reason I cannot but congratulate
our English tongue, that it has been abundantly enriched
with the translation of words from all our neighbouring
nations, as well as from ancient languages, and these
words have been as it were enfranchised amongst us ;
for French, Latin, Greek, and German names will sig
nify English ideas, as well as words that are anciently
and entirely English.
It may not be amiss to mention in this place, that as
the determination of the particular sense in which any
word is used, is called the definition ofthe name, so the n
enumeration of the various senses of an equivocal word, 2.
is sometimes called the division or distinction of the name; W
and for this purpose good dictionaries are of excellent
use. CO
This distinction of the name or word is greatly neces 40
sary in argumentation or dispute ; when a fallacious
А
argument is used, he that answers it distinguishes the
several senses of some word or phrase in it, and shews
in what sense it is true, and in what sense it is evidently
false.

SECT. IV .

OF THE DEFINITION OF THINGS.

As there is much confusion introduced into our ideas,

by the means of those words to which they are affixed,
so the mingling our ideas with each other without cau
tion, is a further occasion whereby they become confused.
A court lady, born and bred up amongst pomp and equi
page, and the vain notions of birth and quality, constantly
joins and mixes all these with the idea of herself, and
she imagines these to be essential to her nature, and as it
were necessary to her being : thence she is tempted to
look upon menial servants, and the lowest rank of man
CH. VI . SECT. 4.] RIGHT USE OF REASON. 93

kind, as another species of beings, quite distinct from her

self. A plough-boy, that has never travelled beyond his
own village, and has seen nothing but thatched houses,
and his parish church, is naturally led to imagine that
thatch belongs to the very nature of a house, and that that
must be a church which is built of stone, and especially
if it has a spire upon it. A child whose uncle has been
excessive fond, and his schoolmaster very severe, easily
believes that fondness always belongs to uncles, and that
severity is essential to masters or instructors. He has
seen also soldiers with red coats, or ministers with long
black gowns, and therefore he persuades himself that
these garbs are essential to the characters, and that he is
not a minister who has not a long black gown, nor can
he be a soldier who is not dressed in red. It would be
well if all such mistakes ended with childhood .
It might be also subjoined , that our complex ideas be
come confused, not only by uniting or blending together
more simple or single ideas than really belong to them, as
in the instances just mentioned : but obscurity and con
fusion sometimes come upon our ideas also, for want of
unitinga sufficient number ofsingle ideas to make a com
plex one : so if I conceive of a leopard only as a spotted
beast, this does not distinguish it from a tiger or a lynx,
nor from many dogs or horses, which are spotted too ;
and therefore a leopard must have some more ideas
added to complete and distinguish it.
I grant that it is a large and free acquaintance with
the world, a watchful observation and diligent search
into the nature of things, that must fully correct this kind
of errors : the rules ofLogic are not sufficient to do it :
but yet the rules ofLogic may instruct us by what means
to distinguish one thing from another, and how to search
and mark out, as far as may be, the contents and limits
of the nature of distinct beings, and thus may give us
great assistance towards the remedy of these mistakes.
As the definition ofnames frees us from confusion which
words introduce, so the definition ofthings will in some
measure guard us against that confusion which mingled
94
. LOGIC ; OR, THE [PART I.

ideas have introduced : for as a definition ofthe name ex

plains what any word means, so a definition of the thing
explains what is the nature of that thing.
In order to form a definition of any thing, we must
put forth these three acts of the mind.
First, Compare the thing to be defined with other
things that are most like to itself, and see wherein its
essence or nature agrees with them : and this is called
the general nature or genus in a definition : so if you
would define what wine is, first compare it with other
things like itself, as cider, perry, &c. and you will find
it agrees essentially with them in this, that it is a sort
ofjuice.
Secondly, Consider the most remarkable and primary
attribute, property, or idea wherein this thing differs
from those other things that are most like it ; and that
is its essential or specific difference : so wine differs from
cider and perry, and all other juices, in that it is pressed a
from a grape. This may be called its special nature, 0
which distinguishes it from other juices.
Thirdly, Join the general and special nature together,
or (which is all one) the genus and the difference, and
these make up a definition. So the juice of a grape, or
juice pressed from grapes, is the definition of wine.
So if I would define what winter is, I consider first
wherein it agrees with other things which are most like
it, namely, summer, spring, autumn, and I find they are
all seasons ofthe year , therefore a season ofthe year is
the genus. Then I observe wherein it differs from these,
and that is in the shortness ofthe days ; for it is this
which does primarily distinguish it from other seasons;
therefore this may be called its special nature, or its dif
ference. Then by joining these together, I make a de
finition. Winter is that season of the year wherein the
days are shortest. I confess indeed this is but a ruder
definition of it, for to define it as an accurate astrono
mer, I must limit the days, hours, and minutes.
After the same manner, if we would explain or define
what the picture ofa manis, we consider first the genus
 CH. VI. SECT. 4. ] RIGHT USE OF REASON. 95

or general nature of it, which is a representation ; and

herein it agrees with many other things, as a statue, a
shadow, a print, a verbal description of a man, &c. Then
we consider wherein it differs from these, and we find
it differs from a verbal description, in that it is a repre
sentation to the eye, and not to the ear ; it differs from
a statue, in that it is a representation upon a flat surface,
and not in a solid figure : it differs from a shadow, in
12 that it is an abiding representation, and not a fleeting
one it differs from a print or draught, because it re
presents the colours by paint, as well as the shape ofthe
object, by delineation . Now so many, or rather so few
of these ideas put together, as are just sufficient to dis
tinguish a picture from all other representations, make up
its essential difference, or its special nature ; and all
these are included in its being painted on a plain surface.
Then join this to the genus, which is a representation ;
and thus you have the complete definition of the picture
of a man, namely, it is the representation of a man in
paint upon a surface (or a plane).
Here it must be observed, that when we speak of the
genus and difference as composing a definition, it must
be always understood that the nearest genus and the spe
cific difference are required.
The next general nature, or the nearest genus, must be
used in a definition, because it includes all the rest as
parts of its complex idea ; as, if I would define wine, I
must say, wine is ajuice, which is the nearest genus ; and
not say, wine is a liquid, which is a remote general na
ture ; or, wine is a substance, which is yet more remote,
for juice includes both substance and liquid. Besides,
neither of these two remote general natures would make
any distinction between wine and a thousand other sub
stances, or other liquids ; a remote genus leaves the thing
too much undistinguished .
The specific difference is that primary attribute which
distinguishes each species from one another, while they
stand ranked under the same general nature or genus.
$96 LOGIC ; OR, THE [PART I.

Though wine differs from other liquids, in that it is the

juice of a certain fruit, yet this is but a general or gene
ric difference, for it does not distinguish wine from cider
or perry; the specific difference of wine therefore is its
pressurefrom the grape ; as cider is pressed from apples,
and perry from pears.
In definitions also we must use the primary attri
bute that distinguishes the species or special nature, and
not attempt to define wine by its particular tastes, or ef
fects, or other properties, which are but secondary or con
sequential, when its pressure from the grape is the most
obvious and primary distinction of it from all other juices.
I confess in some cases it is not so easily known, which
is the primary idea that distinguishes one thing from an
other ; and therefore some would as soon define winter
by the coldness of the season, as by the shortness of the
days though the shortness of the days is doubtless the
most just, primary, and philosophical difference betwixt
that and the other seasons of the year, since winter days
are always shortest, but not always the coldest : I add
also, that the shortness of the days is one cause of the
coldness, but the cold is no cause of their shortness.
0
e
SECT. V.
RULES OF DEFINITION OF THE THING.

THE special rules of a good definition are these :

Rule I. A definition must be universal, or as some call

it adequate ; that is, it must agree to all the particular
species or individuals that are included under the same
idea ; so the juice of a grape agrees to all proper wines,
whether red, white, French, Spanish, Florence, &c.

Rule II. It must be proper and peculiar to the thing de

fined, and agree to that alone ; for it is the very design
CH. VÍ. SECT. 5. ] RIGHT USE OF REASON. 97

of a definition effectually to distinguish one thing from

all others : so the juice of a grape agrees to no other sub
stance, to no other liquid, to no other being but wine.
These two rules being observed, will always render a
definition reciprocal with the thing defined ; which is a
scholastic way of speaking, to signify that the definition
may be used in any sentence in the place ofthe thing de
fined ; or they may be mutually affirmed concerning
each other, or substituted in the room of each other.
Thejuice ofthe grape is wine, or wine is the juice ofthe
grape. And wheresoever the word wine is used, you
may put thejuice ofthe grape instead of it, except when
you consider wine rather as a word than a thing, or when
it is mentioned in such logical rules.

Rule III. A definition ought to be clear and plain ; for

the design of it is to lead us into the knowledge of the
thing defined .
Hence it will follow, that the words used in a defini
tion ought not to be doubtful, or equivocal and obscure,
but as plain and easy as the language will afford and
indeed it is a general rule concerning the definition both
of names and things, that no word should be used in
either of them, which has any darkness or difficulty in
it, unless it has been before explained or defined.
Hence it will follow also, that there are many things
which cannot well be defined either as to the name or the
thing, unless it be by synonymous words, or by a nega
tion ofthe contrary idea, &c. for learned men know not
how to make them more evident, or more intelligible,
than the ideas which every man has gained by the vulgar
methods of teaching. Such are the ideas of extension,
duration, thought, consciousness, and most of our simple
ideas, and particularly sensible qualities, as white, blue,
red, cold, heat, shrill, bitter, sour, &c.
We can say of duration, that it is a continuance in
being, or a not ceasing to be ; we can say of conscious
ness, that it is as it were a feeling within ourselves ;
we may say heat is that which is not cold ; or sour
98 LOGIC ; OR, THE [PART 1.
is that which is like vinegar ; or we may point to the
clear sky, and say that is blue. These are the vulgar me
thods of teaching the definitions of names, or meaning
of words. But there are some philosophers, whose at
tempts to define these things learnedly, have wrapt up
their ideas in greater darkness, and exposed themselves
to ridicule and contempt ; as when they define heat,
they say, it is qualitas, congregans homogenea et segre
gans heterogenea, that is, a quality gathering together
things of the same kind, and separating things of a dif
ferent kind. So they define white, a colour arisingfrom
the prevalency ofbrightness ; but every child knows hot
and white better without these definitions.
There are many other definitions given by the peri
patetic philosophers, which are very faulty by reason of
their obscurity; as motion is defined by them, the act ofa 01
being in power so far forth as it is in power. Time is the
measure or number of motion according to past, present, B
andfuture. The soul is the act of an organical natural 00
body, having life in power ; and several others of the
same stamp.
0
Rule IV. It is also commonly prescribed amongst the S
rules of definition, that it should be short, so that it must
have no tautology in it, nor any words superfluous. I con
fess, definitions ought to be expressed in as few words
as is consistent with a clear and just explication of the
nature of the thing defined, and a distinction of it from
all other things beside : but it is of much more import
ance, and far better, that a definition should explain
clearly the subject we treat of, though the words be many,
than to leave obscurities in the sentence, by confining
it within too narrow limits. So in the definition which
we have given of Logic, that it is the art ofusing reason
well in the search after truth, and the communication ofit
to others, it has indeed many words in it, but it could not
well be shorter. Art is the genus wherein it agrees with
rhetoric, poesy, arithmetic, wrestling, sailing, building, &c.
for all these are arts also : but the difference or special
CH. VI. SECT. 6. ] RIGHT USE OF REASON . 99

nature of it is drawn from its object, reason ; from the

act using it well, and from its too great ends and designs,
namely, the search after truth, and the communication of
it ; nor can it be justly described and explained in few
er ideas.

Rule V. If we add a fifth rule, it must be, that neither

the thing defined, nor a mere synonymous name, should make
a part ofthe definition, for this would be no explication
of the nature of the thing ; and a synonymous word at
best could only be a definition of the name.

SECT. VI .
OBSERVATIONS CONCERNING THE DEFINITION OF THINGS .

BEFORE I part with this subject, I must propose several

observations which relate to the definition of things.
1st. Observ. There is no need that in definitions we
should be confined to one single attribute or property, in
order to express the difference of the thing defined, for
sometimes the essential difference consists in two or three
ideas or attributes. So a grocer is a man who buys and
sells sugar, and plums, and spices for gain. A clock is an
engine with weights and wheels, and shews the hour ofthe
day both by pointing and striking : and if I were to de
fine a repeating clock, I must add another property,
namely, that it also repeats the hour. So that the true
and primary essential difference of some complex ideas
consisting in several distinct properties, cannot be well
expressed without conjunctive particles of speech.
2d. Observ. There is no need that definitions should
always be positive, for some things differ from others
merely by a defect of what others have ; as if a chair be
defined a seat for a single person with a back belonging to
it, then a stool is a seat for a single person without a back;
and a form is a seat for several persons without a back :
these are negative differences. So sin is want of con
100 LOGIC ; OR, THE [PART I.

formity to the law of God ; blindness is a want of sight :

a vagabond is a person without a home. Some ideas are
negative, and their definitions ought to be so too.
3d Observ. Some things may have two or more de
finitions, and each of them equally just and good ; as a
mile is the length of eight furlongs, or it is the third
part ofa league. Eternal is that which ever was and ever
shall be or it is that which has no beginning, and shall
have no end. Man * is usually defined a rational animal :
but it may be much better to define him a spirit united
to an animal ofsuch a shape, or an animal ofsuch a pecu
liar shape united to a spirit, or a being composed of such
an animal and a mind.
4th Observ. Where the essences of things are evi
dent, and clearly distinct from each other, there we
may be more exact and accurate in the definitions of
them : but where their essences approach near to each
other, the definition is more difficult. A bird may be
defined a feathered animal with wings, a ship may be de
fined a large hollow building made to pass over the sea
with sails : but ifyou ask me to define a bat, which is
between a bird and a beast, or to define a barge and hoy,
which are between a boat and a ship, it is much harder
to define them, or to adjust the bounds of their essence.
This is very evident in all monstrous births, and irregular
productions ofnature, as well as in many works of art,
which partake so much of one species and so much of
another, that we cannot tell under which species to rank
them, or how to determine their specific difference.
The several species of beings are seldom precisely li
mited in the nature of things by any certain and unal
terable bounds ; the essences of many things do not con
sist in indivisibility, or in one evident indivisible point,

* The common definition ofman, namely, a rational animal, is very faulty ;

1. Because the animal is not rational, the rationality of man arises from the
mind to which the animal is united. 2. Because if a spirit should be united to
a borse and make it a rational being, surely this would not be a man : it is
evident therefore that the peculiar shape must enter into the definition of a
man to render it just and perfect ; and for want of a full description thereof,
all our definitions are defective.
CH. VI. SECT. 6. ] RIGHT USE OF REASON. 101

as some have imagined ; but by various degrees they

approach nearer to, or differ more from, others that are
of a kindred nature. So ( as I have hinted before) in the
very middle of each of the arches of a rainbow, the co
lours ofgreen, yellow, and red, are sufficiently distin
guished ; but near the borders of the several arches they
run into one another, so that you hardly know how to
limit the colours, nor whether to call it red or yellow,
green or blue.
5th Observ. As the highest or chief genera, namely,
being and not-being, can never be defined, because there
is no genus superior to them ; so neither can single ideas
or individuals be well defined, because either they have
no essential differences from other individuals, or their
differences are not known ; and therefore individuals are
only to be described by their particular circumstances :
so King George is distinguished from all other men and
other kings, by describing him as thefirst king ofGreat
Britain, of the House of Brunswick ; and Westminster
Hall is described by its situation and its use, &c.
That individual bodies can hardly have any essential
difference, at least within the reach of our knowledge,
may be made thus to appear ; Methuselah, when he was
nine hundred and sixty years old, and perhaps worn
out with age and weakness, was the same person as when
he was in his full vigour of manhood, or when he was an
infant, newly born ; but how far was his body the same?
Who can tell whether there was any fibre of his flesh
or his bones that continued the same throughout his
whole life ? Or who can determine which were those
fibres ? The ship in which Sir Francis Drake sailed
round the world, might be new built, and refitted so
often, that few of the same timbers remained ; and who
can say whether it must be called the same ship or no ?
And what is its essential difference ? How shall we de
fine Sir Francis Drake's ship , or make a definition for
Methuselah ?
To this head belongs that most difficult question,
102 LOGIC ; OR, THE [ PART I.

What is the principle of individuation ? Or what is it

that makes any one thing the same as it was some time
before ? This is too large and laborious an inquiry to
dwell upon in this place : yet I cannot forbear to men
tion this hint, namely, since our own bodies must rise
at the Last Day for us to receive rewards or punish
ments in them, there may be perhaps some originalfi
bres of each human body, some stamina vitæ, or primeval
seed of life, which may remain unchanged through all
the stages of life, death , and the grave; these may become
the springs and principles of a resurrection, and suffi
cient to denominate it the same body. But if there be
any such constant and vital atoms which distinguish
every human body, they are known to God only.
6th Obsert. Where we cannot find out the essence
or essential difference of any species or kind of beings
that we would define, we must content ourselves with
a collection of such chiefparts or properties of it, as may
best explain it so far as it is known, and best distinguish
it from other things : so a marigold is aflower which hath
many long yellow leaves, round a little knot ofseeds in the
midst, with such a peculiar stalk, &c. So if we would de
fine silver, we say it is a white and hard metal, next in
weight to gold : if we would define an elder-tree, we
might say it is one among the lesser trees, whose younger
branches are soft and full ofpith, whose leaves arejagged
or indented, and of such a particular shape, and it bears
large clusters ofsmall black berries : so we must define
water, earth, stone, a lion, an eagle, a serpent, and the
greatest part of natural beings, by a collection of those
properties, which according to our observation distin
guish them from all other things. This is what Mr.
Locke calls nominal essences, and nominal definitions.
And indeed, since the essential differences of the various
natural beings or bodies round about us arise from a
peculiar shape, size, motion, and situation of the small
particles of which they are composed, and since we
have no sufficient method to inform us what these are,
CH. VI. SECT. 6. ] RIGHT USE OF REASON. 103

we must be contented with such a sort of definition of

the bodies they compose.
Here note, That this sort of definition, which is made
up of a mere collection of the most remarkable parts of
properties, is called an imperfect definition, or a descrip
tion ; whereas the definition is called perfect, when it is
composed of the essential difference, added to the ge
neral nature or genus.
7th Observ. The perfect definition of any being al
ways includes the definition of the name whereby it is
called, for it informs us ofthe sense or meaning of that
word, and shews us what idea that word is affixed to :
but the definition of the name does by no means include
a perfect definition of the thing ; for as we have said be
fore, a mere synonymous word, a negation of the con
trary, or the mention of any one or two distinguishing
properties of the thing, may be a sufficient definition of
the name. Yet in those cases where the essential dif
ference or essence ofa thing is unknown, there a defini
tion ofthe name by the chief properties, and a description
of the thing, are much the same.
And here I think it necessary to take notice of one
general sentiment, that seems to run through that ex
cellent performance, Mr. Locke's Essay on Human Un
derstanding, and that is, " That the essences of things
are utterly unknown to us, and therefore all our pre
tences to distinguish the essences of things, can reach
no further than mere nominal essences ; or a collection
of such properties as we know ; to some of which we
affix particular names, and others we bundle up, several
together, under one name : and that all our attempts to
rank beings into different kinds of species, can reach
no further than to make mere nominal species ; and
therefore our definitions of things are but mere nominal
descriptions or definitions of the name."
Now that we may do justice to this great author, we
ought to consider that he confines this sort ofdiscourse
only to the essence ofsimple ideas, and to the essence of
substances, as appears evident in the fourth and sixth
104 LOGIC ; OR, THE [ PART I.

chapters of his third book ; for he allows the names of

mixed modes always to signify the real essences oftheir
species, chap. V. and he acknowledges artificial things
to have real distinct species ; and that in the distinction
of their essence, there is generally less confusion and un
certainty than in natural, chap . VI . sect. 40, 41. though
it must be confessed, that he scarce makes any distinc
tion between the definition ofthe name and the definition
ofthe thing, as chap. IV. and sometimes the current of
his discourse decries the knowledge of essences in such
general terms, as may justly give occasion to mistake.
It must be granted, that the essence of most of our
simple ideas, and the greatest part of particular natural
substances, are much unknown to us ; and therefore the
essential difference of sensible qualities and of the va
rious kinds of bodies ( as I have said before) lie beyond
the reach of our understandings ; we know not what
makes the primary real inward distinctions between
red, green, sweet, sour, &c. between wood, iron, oil, stone,
fire, water, flesh, clay, in their general natures, nor do
we know what are the inward and prime distinctions
between all the particular kinds or species in the vege
table, animal, mineral, metallic, or liquid world of things.
See Philosoph. Essays, Essay xi. sect. 1 .
But still there is a very large field for the knowledge
ofthe essences of things, and for the use of perfect de
finitions amongst our complex ideas, the modal appear
ances and changes of nature, the works ofart, the matters
ofscience, and all the affairs of the civil, the moral, and
the religious life : and indeed it is of much more import
ance to all mankind , to have a better acquaintance with
the works of art for their own livelihood and daily use,
with the affairs of morality for their behaviour in this
world, and with the matters of religion, that they may
be prepared for the world to come, than to be able to
give a perfect definition of the works of nature.
If the particular essences of natural bodies are un
known to us, we may yet be good philosophers, good
artists, good neighbours, good subjects and good chris
CH. VI . SECT. 6. ] RIGHT USE OF REASON . 105

tians without that knowledge, and we have just reason

to be content .
Now that the essences of some of the modal appear
ances and changes in nature, as well as things ofart, science,
and morality, are sufficiently known to us to make perfect
definitions of them, will appear by the specimen of a few
definitions of these things.
Motion is a change of place. Swiftness is the passing
over a long space in a short time. A natural day is the
time of one alternate revolution of light and darkness,
or it is the duration of twenty-four hours. An eclipse
ofthe sun is a defect in the sun's transmission of light to
us by the moon interposing. Snow is congealed vapour.
Hail* is congealed rain. An island* is a piece of land
arising above the surrounding water. A hill * is an
*
elevated part of the earth, and a grove is a piece of
ground thick set with trees. A house is a building
made to dwell in. A cottage is a mean house in the
country. A supper is that meal which we make in the
evening. A triangle is a figure composed of three sides.
A gallon is a measure containing eight pints. A porter
is a man who carries burthens for hire. A king is the
chief ruler in a kingdom. Veracity is the conformity
of our words to our thoughts. Covetousness is an excess
ive love of money, or other possessions. Killing is the
taking away the life of an animal. Murder is the un
lawful killing of a man. Rhetoric is the art of speaking
in a manner fit to persuade. Natural philosophy is the
knowledge of the properties of bodies, and the various
effects of them, or it is the knowledge of the various ap
pearances in nature, and their causes ; and logic is the
art of using our reason well, &c.
Thus you see the essential differences of various be
ings may be known, and are borrowed from their qua
1
* Note, Island, bill, grove, are not designed here in their more remote and
substantial natures (if I may so express it), or as the matter ofthem is earth ;
for in this sense we know not their essence, but only as considered in their mo
dal appearances, whereby one part ofearth is distinguished from another. The
same may be said of snow , bail, &c.
F
106 LOGIC ; OR, THE [PART I

lities and properties, their causes, effects, objects, adjuncts,

ends, &c. and indeed as infinitely various as the essences
of things are, their definitions must needs have various
forms.
After all, it must be confessed that many logicians and
philosophers in former ages, have made too great a bus
tle about the exactness of their definitions of things, and
entered into long, fruitless controversies, and very ri
diculous debates in the several sciences, about adjusting
the logical formalities of every definition ; whereas that
sort of wrangling is now grown very justly contempti
ble, since it is agreed that true learning and the know
ledge of things depends much more upon a large ac
quaintance with their various properties, causes, effects,
subject, object, ends, and designs, than it does upon the
formal and scholastic niceties of genus and difference.

SECT. VII.
OF A COMPLETE CONCEPTION OF THINGS.

HAVING dwelt so long upon the first rule to direct our

conceptions, and given an account of the definition both
of names and things, in order to gain clear and distinct
ideas, we make haste now to the second rule to guide our
conceptions, and that is, conceive ofthings completely in
all their parts.
All parts have a reference to some whole : now there
is an old distinction which logical writers make of a
whole and its parts into four several kinds, and it may
be proper just to mention them here.
1. There is a metaphysical whole, when the essence ofa
thing is said to consist of two parts, the genus and the
difference, that is, the general and the special nature,
which being joined together make up a definition. This
has been the subject of the foregoing sections.
2. There is a mathematical whole, which is better call
ed integral, when the several parts which go to make
CH. VI. SECT. 8. ] RIGHT USE OF REASON. 107

up the whole are really distinct from one another, and

each of them may subsist apart. So the head, the limbs,
and the trunk, are the integral parts of an animal body;
so units are the integral parts ofany large number ; so these
discourses which I have written concerning perception,
judgement, reasoning, and disposition, are the four inte
gral parts of Logic. This sort of parts goes to make up
the completeness of any subject, and this is the chief and
most direct matter of our discourse in this section.
3. There is a physical or essential whole, which is usu
ally made to signify and include only the two essential
parts of man, body and soul : but I think the sense ofit
may better be altered, or at least enlarged, and so in
clude all the essential modes, attributes, or properties,
which are contained in the comprehension of any idea.
This shall be the subject of discourse under the third rule
to direct our conceptions.
想 4. There is a logical whole, which is also called an
universal ; and the parts of it are all the particular ideas
to which this universal nature extends. So a genus is a
whole, in respect of the several species which are its parts.
So the species is a whole, and all the individuals are the
parts of it. This shall be treated of in the fourth rule to
guide our conceptions.
At present we consider an idea as an integral whole,
and our second rule directs us to contemplate it in all its
parts : but this can only refer to complex ideas, for sim
ple ideas have no parts.

SECT. VIII .
OF DIVISION, AND THE RULES OF IT.

SINCE our minds are narrow in their capacity, and can

not survey the several parts of any complex being with
one single view, as God sees all things at once ; there
fore, we must, as it were, take it to pieces, and consider
of the parts separately, that we. may have a more com
plete conception of the whole. So if I would learn the
F2
 108 LOGIC; OR, THE [PART I.

nature of a watch ; the workman takes it to pieces and

shews me the spring, the wheels, the axles, the pinions,
the balance, the dial-plate, the pointer, the case, &c. and
describes each of these things to me apart, together with
their figures and their uses. If I would know what an
animal is, the anatomist considers the head, the trunk, the
limbs, the bowels, apart from each other, and gives me
distinct lectures upon each of them. So a kingdom is
divided into its several provinces ; a book into its several
chapters, and any science is divided according to the se
veral subjects of which it treats.
This is what we properly call the division of an idea,
which is an explication of the whole by its several parts, or
an enumeration of the several parts that go to compose
any whole idea, and to render it complete. And I think
when man is divided into body and soul, it properly
comes under this part of the doctrine of integral divi
sion, as well as when the mere body is divided into head,
trunk, and limbs : this division is sometimes called par
tition.
When any of the parts of any idea are yet further
divided, in order to a clear explication of the whole, this is
called subdivision ; as when a year is divided into months,
each month into days, and each day into hours, which
may also be further subdivided into minutes and seconds.
It is necessary, in order to the full explication of any
being, to consider each part, and the properties ofit, dis
tinct by itself, as well as in its relation to the whole : for
there are many properties that belong to the several
parts of a being which cannot properly be ascribed to
the whole, though these properties may fit each part for
its proper station, and as it stands in that relation to
the whole complex being : as in a house, the doors are
moveable, the rooms square, the ceilings white, the win
dows transparent, yet the house is neither moveable, nor
square, nor white, nor transparent.

The special Rules of a good Division are these :

I. Rule. Each part singly taken must contain less than
CH . VI . SECT. 8. ] RIGHT USE OF REASON. 109

the whole, but all the parts taken collectively (or together)
must contain neither more nor less than the whole. There
fore ifin discoursing ofa tree you divide it into the trunk
and leaves, it is an imperfect division, because the root
and the branches are needful to make up the whole. So
Logic would be ill divided into apprehension, judgement,
and reasoning ; for method is a considerable part of the
art which teaches us to use our reason right, and should
by no means be omitted.
Upon this account, in every division wherein we de
sign a perfect exactness, it is necessary to examine the
whole idea with diligence, lest we omit any part of it
through want of care ; though in some cases it is not
possible, and in others it is not necessary, that we should
descend to the minutest parts.

II. Rule. In all divisions we should first consider the

larger and more immediate parts ofthe subject, and not di
vide it at once into the more minute and remote parts. It
would by no means be proper to divide a kingdom first
into streets, and lanes, and fields ; but it must be first
divided into provinces or counties, then those counties may
be divided into towns, villages, fields, &c. and towns into
streets and lanes.

III. Rule. The several parts of a division ought to be

opposite, that is, one part ought not to contain another. It
would be a ridiculous division of an animal into head,
limbs, body, and brains, for the brains are contained in
the head.
Yet here it must be noted, that sometimes the subjects.
of any treatise, or the objects of any particular science,
may be properly and necessarily so divided, that the se
cond may include the first, and the third may include
the first and second, without offending against this rule,
because in the second or following parts of the science
or discourse, these objects are not considered in the same
manner as in the first ; as for instance, geometry, divides
its objects into lines, surfaces, and solids ; now though a
110 LOGIC ; OR, THE [PART I.
line be contained in a surface, or a solid, yet it is not
considered in a surface separate and alone, or as a mere
line, as it is in the first part of geometry, which treats of
lines. So Logic is rightly divided into conception, judge
ment, reasoning, and method. For though ideas or con
ceptions are contained in the following parts of Logic,
yet they are not there treated of as separate ideas, which
are the proper subject of the first part.

IV . Rule. Let not subdivisions be too numerous without

necessity for it is better many times to distinguish more
parts at once, if the subject will bear it, than to mince
the discourse by excessive dividing and subdividing. It
is preferable therefore in a treatise of geography, to say,
that in a city we will consider its walls, its gates, its
buildings, its streets, and lanes, than to divide it formally
first into the encompassing and the encompassed parts ; the
encompassing parts are the walls and gates ; the encom
passed parts include the ways and the buildings ; the
ways are the streets and the lanes ; buildings consist of
the foundations, and the superstructure, & c.
Too great a number of subdivisions has been affected
by some persons in sermons, treatises, instructions, & c.
under pretence ofgreater accuracy : but this sort of sub
tilties hath often caused great confusion to the under
standing, and sometimes more difficulty to the memory.
In these cases it is only a good judgement can deter
mine what subdivisions are useful.

V. Rule. Divide every subject according to the special

design you have in view. One and the same idea or sub
ject may be divided in very different manners, accord
ing to the different purposes we have in discoursing of
it. So if a printer were to consider the several parts of
a book, he must divide it into sheets, the sheets into pages,
the pages into lines, and the lines into letters. But a
grammarian divides a book into periods, sentences, and
words, or parts of speech, as noun, pronoun, verb, &c. A
logician considers a book as divided into chapters, sections,
CH. VI. SECT. 8. ] RIGHT USE of reason. 111

arguments, propositions, ideas ; and, with the help of on

tology, he divides the propositions into subject, object, pro
perty, relation, action, passion, cause, effect, &c. But it
would be very ridiculous for a logician to divide a book
into sheets, pages, and lines ; or for a printer to divide it
into nouns and pronouns, or into propositions, ideas, pro
perties, or causes.

VI. Rule. In all your divisions observe with greatest

exactness the nature of things. And here I am constrain
ed to make a subdivision of this rule into two very ne
cessary_particulars .
(1) Let the parts of your division be such as are pro
perly distinguished in nature. Do not divide asunder
those parts of the idea which are intimately united in
nature, nor unite those things into one part which na
ture has evidently disjoined : thus it would be very im
proper, in treating of an animal body, to divide it into
the superior and inferior halves ; for it would be hard to
say how much belongs by nature to the inferior half, and
how much to the superior.- Much more improper would
it be still to divide the animal into the right hand parts
and left handparts, which would bring greater confusion.
This would be as unnatural as if a man should cleave a
hazel-nut in halves through the husk, the shell, and the
kernel, at once, and say, a nut is divided into these two
parts : whereas nature leads plainly to the threefold dis
tinction of husk, shell, and kernel.
(2) Do not affect duplicities, nor triplicities, nor any
certain number ofparts in your division ofthings ; for we
know of no such certain number of parts which God the
creator has observed in forming all the varieties of his
creatures ; nor is there any uniform determined num
ber of parts in the various subjects of human art or
science ; yet some persons have disturbed the order of
nature, and abused their readers, by an affectation of
dichotomies, trichotomies, sevens, twelves, &c. Let the na
ture ofthe subject, considered together with the design
112 LOGIC ; OR, THE [Part 1.

which you have in view, always, determine the number

of parts into which you divide it.
After all, it must be confessed that an intimate know
ledge ofthings, and a judicious observation, will assist
in the business of division, as well as of definition, better
than too nice and curious an attention to the mere for
malities of logical writers, without a real acquaintance.
of things .

SECT. IX .
OF A COMPREHENSIVE CONCEPTION OF THINGS, AND OF
ABSTRACTION.
THE third rule to direct our conceptions, requires us to
conceive of things comprehensively. As we must survey
an object in all its parts to obtain a complete idea of it,
so we must consider it in all its modes, attributes, pro
a
perties and relations, in order to obtain a comprehensive 2
conception of it.
The comprehension of an idea, as it was explained
under the doctrine of universals, includes only the es
sential modes or attributes of that idea ; but in this place
the word is taken in a larger sense ; and implies also the
various occasional properties, accidental modes and re
lations.
The necessity of this rule is founded upon the same
reason as the former, namely, that our minds are nar
row and scanty in their capacities, and as they are not
able to consider all the parts of a complex idea at once,
so neither can they at once contemplate all the different
attributes and circumstances of it : we must therefore
consider things successively and gradually in their va
rious appearances and circumstances : as our natural
eye cannot at once behold the six sides of a die or cube,
nor take cognizance of all the points that are marked on
them, and therefore we turn up the sides successively
and thus survey and number the points that are marked
on each side, that we may know the whole.
 CH. VI. SECT. 9. ] RIGHT USE OF REASON. 113

In order to a comprehensive view of any idea, we must

first consider, whether the object ofit has an existence as
well as an essence ; whether it be a simple or complex
idea ; whether it be a substance or a mode ; if it be a
substance, then we must inquire what are the essential
modes ofit which are necessary to its nature, and what
are those properties or accidents of it which belong to it,
occasionally, or as it is placed in some particular cir
cumstances : we must view it in its internal and absolute
modes, and observe it in those various external relations
in which it stands to other beings : we must consider it
in its powers and capacities either to do or suffer : we
must trace it up to its various causes, whether supreme
or subordinate. We must descend to the variety of its
effects, and take notice of the several ends and designs
which are to be attained by it. We must conceive of
it as it is either an object or a subject, what are the things
that are akin to it, and what are the opposites or contra
ries of it ; for many things are to be known both by
their contrary and their kindred ideas.
If the thing we discourse of be a mere mode, we must
inquire whether it belongs to spirits or bodies ; whether
it be a physical or moral mode ; if moral, then we must
consider its relation to God, to our selves, to our neigh
bours ; its reference to this life, or the life to come. If it
be a virtue, we must seek what are the principles of it,
what are the rules of it, what are the tendencies of it, and
what are thefalse virtues that counterfeit it, and what are
the real vices that oppose it, what are the evils which at
tend the neglect of it, and what are the rewards of the
practice of it, both here and hereafter.
If the subject be historical, or a matter offact, we
may then inquire whether the action was done at all ;
whether it was done in such a manner, or by such persons
as is reported : at what time it was done ; in what place ;
by what motive, and for what design ; what is the evidence
of the fact, who are the witnesses : what is their character
and credibility ; what signs there are of such a fact; what
F 3
114 LOGIC ; OR, THE [PART I.

concurrent circumstances which may either support the

truth of it, or render it doubtful.
In order to make due inquiries into all these, and
many other particulars which go towards the complete
and comprehensive idea of any being, the science of on
tology is exceeding necessary. This is what was wont
to be called the first part ofmetaphysics in the peripatetic
schools. It treats of being in its most general nature, and
of all its affections and relations. I confess the old po
pish schoolmen have mingled a number of useless sub
tilties with this science ; they have exhausted their own
spirits and the spirits oftheir readers, in many laborious
and intricate trifles : and some of their writings have
been fruitful of names without ideas, which have done
much injury to the sacred study of divinity. Upon this
account many of the moderns have most unjustly aban
doned the whole science at once, and thrown abun
dance of contempt and raillery upon the very name of
metaphysics; but this contempt and censure is very un
reasonable, for this science, separated from some Aris
totelian fooleries, and scholastic subtilties, is so neces
sary to a distinct conception, solid judgement, and just
reasoning on many subjects, that sometimes it is intro
duced as a part of Logic, and not without reason . And
those, who utterly despise and ridicule it, either betray
their own ignorance, or will be supposed to make their
wit and banter a refuge and excuse for their own lazi
ness. Yet thus much I would add, that the later writers
of ontology, are generally the best on this account, be
cause they have left out much of the ancient jargon . See
the Brief Scheme of Ontology in the Philosophical Es
says, by I. Watts.
Here let it be noted , that it is neither useful, neces
sary, or possible, to run through all the modes, circum
stances, and relations of every subject we take in hand:
but in ontology we enumerate a great variety of them,
that so a judicious mind may choose what are those
circumstances, relations, and propertics, of any subject,
CH. VI. SECT. 10. ] RIGHT USE OF REASON. 115

which are most necessary to the present design of him

that speaks or writes, either to explain, to illustrate, or
to prove the point.
As we arrive at the complete knowledge of an idea in
all its parts, by that act of the mind which is called di
vision, so we come to a comprehensive conception of a
thing in its several properties and relations, by that act
of the mind which is called abstraction ; that is, we con
sider each single relation or property ofthe subject alone,
and thus we do as it were withdraw and separate it in our
minds both from the subject itself, as well as from other
properties and relations, in order to make a fuller ob
servation of it.
This act of abstraction is said to be twofold, either
precisive or negative.
Precisive abstraction is, when we consider those things
apart which cannot really exist apart ; as when we con
sider a mode, without considering its substance and sub
ject, or one essential mode without another. Negative ab
straction is, when we consider one thing separate from
another, which may also exist without it ; and when we
conceive of a subject without conceiving of its accidental
modes or relations ; or when we conceive of one accident
without thinking of another. If I think of reading or
writing without the express idea of some man, this is
precisive abstraction ; or if I think of the attraction of
iron, without the express idea of some particular mag
netic body. But when I think of a needle without an
idea of its sharpness, this is negative abstraction ; and it
is the same when I think of its sharpness without con
sidering its length.

SECT. X.
OF THE EXTENSIVE CONCEPTION OF THINGS, AND OF
DISTRIBUTION.

As the completeness of an idea refers to the several parts

that compose it, and the comprehension of an idea in
116 LOGIC ; OR, THE [PART I.

cludes its various properties, so the extension of an idea

denotes the various sorts or kinds of beings to which the
same idea belongs : and ifwe would be fully acquainted
with a subject, we must observe
This fourth rule to direct our conceptions, namely,
Conceive of things in all their extension ; that is , we must
search out the various species, or special natures which
are contained under it, as a genus or general nature. If
we would know the nature of an animal perfectly, we
must take cognizance of beasts, birds, fishes, and insects,
as well as men, all which are contained under the general N
nature and name of animal.
As an integral whole is distinguished into its several
parts by division ; so the word distribution is most pro
perly used when we distinguish an universal whole into
its several kinds or species : and perhaps it had been 10
better if this word had been always confined to this sig
nification ; though it must be confessed, that we fre LT
quently speak of the division of an idea into its several
kinds, as well as into its several parts. 00
The rules of a good distribution are much the same
with those which we have before applied to division,
which may be just repeated again in the briefest man D
ner, in order to give examples of them .

I. Rule. Each part singly taken must contain less than

the whole, but all the parts taken collectively, or toge
ther, must contain neither more nor less than the whole ;
or, as logicians sometimes express it, the parts ofthe di
vision ought to exhaust the whole thing which is divided.
So medicine is justly distributed into prophylactic, or the
art of preserving health ; and therapeutic, or the art of
restoring health ; for there is no other sort of medicine
besides these two. But men are not well distributed
into tall or short, for there are some of a middle stature.

II. Rule. In all distributions we should first consider

the larger and more immediate kinds or species, or ranks
of being, and not divide a thing at once into the more
CH. VI . SECT. 10. ] RIGHT use of reason. 117
minute and remote. A genus should not at once be di
vided into individuals, or even into the lowest species, if
there be a species superior. Thus it would be very im
proper to divide animal into trout, lobster, eel, dog, bear,
eagle, dove, worm, and butterfly, for these are inferior
kinds ; whereas animal ought first to be distributed into
man, beast, bird, fish, insect ; and then beast should be
distributed into dog, bear, &c. bird into eagle, dove, &c.
fish into trout, eel, lobster, &c.
It is irregular also to join any inferior species in the
same rank or order with the superior ; as if we should
distinguish animals into birds, bears, and oysters, &c. it
would be a ridiculous distribution .

III. Rule. The several parts of a distribution ought

to be opposite ; that is, one species or class of beings in
the same rank ofdivision, ought not to contain or include
another ; so men ought not to be divided into the rich,
the poor, the learned, and the tall ; for poor men may be
both learned and tall, and so may the rich.
But it will be objected, are not animated bodies rightly
distributed into vegetative and animal, or (as they are
usually called ) sensitive ? Now the sensitive contains the
vegetative nature in it, for animals grow as well as plants.
I answer, that in this, and all such distributions, the
word vegetative signifies merely vegetative ; and in this
sense vegetative will be sufficiently opposite to animal,
for it cannot be said of an animal, that it contains mere
vegetation in the idea of it.

IV. Rule. Let not subdivisions be too numerous,

without necessity ; therefore I think quantity is better
distinguished at once into a line, a surface, and a solid ;
than to say, as Ramus does, that quantity is either a line,
or a thing lined ; and a thing lined is either a surface or a
solid.

V. Rule. Distribute every subject according to the

special design you have in view, so far as is necessary or
118 LOGIC ; OR, THE [PART I.

useful to your present inquiry. Thus a politician distri

butes mankind according to their civil characters into
the rulers and the ruled : and a physician divides them
into the sick or the healthy ; but a divine distributes them
into Turks, Heathens, Jews, or Christians.
Here note, That it is a very useless thing to distribute
any idea into such kinds or members as have no differ
ent properties to be spoken of; as it is mere trifling to
divide right angles into such whose legs are equal, and
whose legs are unequal, for as to the mere right angles,
they have no different properties.

VI. Rule. In all your distributions observe the nature

of things with great exactness ; and do not affect any
particular form of distribution, as some persons have
done, by dividing every genus into two species, or into
three species ; whereas nature is infinitely various, and
human affairs and human sciences, have as great a va
riety, nor is there any one form of distribution that will
exactly suit with all subjects.

Note, It is to this doctrine of distribution of a genus in

to its several species, we must also refer the distribution
of a cause according to its several effects, as some medi
cines are heating, some are cooling ; or an effect, when it
is distinguished by its causes ; asfaith is either built upon
divine testimony or human. It is to this head we refer
particular artificial bodies, when they are distinguished
according to the matter they are made of, as a statue is
either ofbrass, ofmarble, or wood, &c. and any other be
ings, when they are distinguished according to their end
and design, as the furniture of body or mind is eitherfor
ornament or use. To this head also we refer subjects when
they are divided according to their modes or accidents ;
as men are either merry, or grave, or sad ; and modes,
when they are divided by their subjects, as distempers be
long to the fluids, or to the solid parts ofthe animal.
It is also to this place we reduce the proposals of a
difficulty under its various cases, whether it be in specu
CH. VI. SECT. 10.] RIGHT USE OF REASON. 119

lation or practice : as, to shew the reason of sunbeams

burning wood, whether it be done by a convex glass or a
concave : or to shew the construction and mensuration of
triangles, whether you have two angles and a side given,
or two sides and an angle, or only three sides. Here it
is necessary to distribute or divide a difficulty in all its
cases, in order to gain a perfect knowledge ofthe subject
you contemplate.
It might be observed here, that logicians have some
times given a mark or sign to distinguish when it is an
integral whole, that is divided into its parts or members,
or when it is a genus, an universal whole, that is distri
buted into its species and individuals. The rule they give
is this : whensoever the whole idea can be directly and
properly affirmed of each part, as a bird is an animal, a
fish is an animal, Bucephalus is a horse, Peter is a man,
then it is a distribution of a genus into its species, or a
species into its individuals : but when the whole cannot
be thus directly affirmed concerning every part, then it
is a division of an integral into its several parts or mem
bers ; as we cannot say the head, the breast, the hand, or
the foot is an animal, but we say, the head is a part ofthe
animal, and the foot is another part.
This rule may hold true generally in corporeal beings,
or perhaps in all substances : but when we say thefear
of God is wisdom, and so is human civility ; criticism is
true learning, and so is philosophy ; to execute a murderer
isjustice, and to save and defend the innocent is justice too.
In these cases it is not so easily determined, whether an
integral whole be divided into its parts, or an universal
into its species : for the fear ofGod may be called either
one part, or one kind of wisdom : criticism is one part,
or one kind oflearning : and the execution ofa murderer
may be called a species ofjustice, as well as a part of it.
Nor indeed is it a matter of great importance to deter
mine this controversy.
 120 LOGIC ; OR, THE [PART L.

SECT. XI .
OF AN ORDERLY CONCEPTION OF THINGS.

THE last rule to direct our conceptions, is, that we should

rank and place them in a proper method and just order.
This is of necessary use to prevent confusion ; for as a
trader who never places his goods in his shop or ware
house in a regular order, nor keeps the accounts of his
buying and selling, paying and receiving, in a just me
thod, is in the utmost danger of plunging all his affairs
into confusion and ruin : so a student who is in the search
of truth, or an author or teacher who communicates
knowledge to others, will very much obstruct his design,
and confound his own mind or the minds ofhis hearers,
unless he range his ideas in just order.
If we would therefore become successful learners or
teachers, we must not conceive of things in a confused
heap, but dispose our ideas in some certain method, which
may be most easy and useful both for the understanding
and memory ; and be sure, as much as may be, to fol
low the nature ofthings, for which many rules might be
given, namely.

1. Conceive as much as you can of the essentials of

any subject, before you consider its accidentals.
2. Survey the first general parts and properties of any
subject, before you extend your thoughts to discourse of
the particular kinds or species of it.
3. Contemplate things first in their own simple na
tures, and afterwards view them in composition with other
things ; unless it be your present purpose to take a com
pound being to pieces, in order to find out, or to shew
the nature of it, by searching and discovering of what
simples it is composed.
4. Consider the absolute modes or affections of any be
ing as it is in itself, before you proceed to consider it re
latively, or to survey the various relations in which it
stands to other beings, & c.
CH. VI. SECT. 12.] RIGHT USE of reason. 121

Note, These rules chiefly belong to the method of in

struction which the learned call synthetic.
But in the regulation of our ideas, there is seldom an
absolute necessity that we should place them in this or
the other particular method : it is possible in some cases
that many methods may be equally good, that is, may
equally assist the understanding and the memory : to
frame a method exquisitely accurate, according to the
strict nature ofthings, and to maintain this accuracy from
the beginning to the end of a treatise, is a most rare and
difficult thing, if not impossible . But a larger account
of method would be very improper in this place, lest we
anticipate what belongs to the fourth part ofLogic.

SECT. XII.
THESE FIVE RULES OF CONCEPTION EXEMPLIFIED.

IT
It may be useful here to give a specimen ofthefive spe
cial rules to direct our conceptions, which have been the
chief subject of this long chapter, and represent them
practically at one view.
Suppose the theme of our discourse were the passions
of the mind.
1st, To gain a clear and distinct idea of passion, we
must define both the name and the thing.
To begin with the definition ofthe name. We are not
here to understand the word passion in its vulgar and
most limited sense, as it signifies merely anger or fury;
nor do we take it in its most extensive philosophical sense,
for the sustaining the action of an agent ; but in the more
limited philosophical sense, passions signify the various
affections ofthe mind, such as admiration, love, or hatred;
this is the definition of the name.
We proceed to the definition ofthe thing. Passion is
defined a sensation of some special commotion in animal
nature, occasioned by the mind's perception of some object
122 LOGIC ; OR, THE [PART 1.
suited to excite that commotion. Here the genus, or ge
neral nature of passion, is a sensation ofsome special com
motion in animal nature ; and herein it agrees with hun
ger, thirst, pain, &c. The essential difference of it is, that
this commotion arises from a thought or perception of the
mind, and hereby it is distinguished from hunger, thirst,
or pain.
2dly, We must conceive of it completely, or survey the
several parts that compose it. These are ( 1.), The mind's
perception ofsome object. (2. ), The consequent ruffle, or
special commotion of the nerves, and blood, and animal Pa
spirits. And (3. ), The sensation of this inward commotion.
3dly, We must consider it comprehensively, in its va
rious properties. The most essential attributes that make
up its nature have been already mentioned under the
foregoing heads . Some ofthe most considerable proper
C
ties that remain are these, namely, That passion belongs
to all mankind, in greater or lesser degrees : it is not con
stantly present with us, but upon some certain occasion :
it is appointed by our Creator for various useful ends and
purposes, namely, to give us vigour in the pursuit of what
is good and agreeable to us, or in the avoidance of what
is hurtful : it is very proper for our state of trial in this
world: it is not utterly to be rooted out of our nature, but
to be moderated and governed according to the rules ofvir
tue and religion, &c.
4thly, We must take cognizance of the various kinds 01
of it, which is called an extensive conception of it. Ifthe
object which the mind perceives be very uncommon, it
excites the passion of admiration : if the object appear

Since this was written, I have published a short treatise of the Passions, C
wherein I have so far varied from this definition as to call them sensible commo C
tions ofour whole nature, both soul and body, occasioned by the mind's perception of
some objects, &c. I made this alteration in the description of the passions in that
book chiefly to include, in a more explicit manner, the passions of desire and
aversion, which are acts of volition rather than sensations. Yet since some com
motions of animal nature attend all the passions, and since there is always a
sensation of these commotions , I shall not change the definition I have written
here; for this will agree to all the passions, whether they include any act
of volition or not ; nor indeed is the matter of any great importance. Nov. 17,
1728.
CH. VI . SECT. 13. ] RIGHT USE of reason. 123

agreeable, it raises love : if the agreeable object be absent

and attainable, it is desire : if likely to be attained, it ex
cites hope : if unattainable, despair : if it be present and
possessed, it is the passion ofjoy: iflost, it excites sorrow:
if the object be disagreeable, it causes in general hatred or
aversion : if it be absent, and yet we are in danger of it,
it raises our fear : if it be present, it is sorrow and sad
ness, &c.
5thly, All these things, and many more which go to
compose a treatise on this subject, must be placed in their
proper order : a slight specimen of which is exhibited in
this short account of passion, and which that admirable
author Descartes has treated of at large ; though, for
want of sufficient experiments and observations in na
tural philosophy, there are some few mistakes in his
account of animal nature.

SECT. XIII.

AN ILLUSTRATION OF THESE FIVE RULES BY SIMILI

TUDES.

THUS we have brought the first part of Logic to a con

clusion ; and it may not be improper here to represent
its excellencies (so far as we have gone) by general hints
of its chiefdesign and use, as well as by a various com
parison ofit to those instruments which mankind have in
ventedfortheir several conveniencies and improvements.
The design of Logic is not to furnish us with the per
ceiving faculty, but only to direct and assist us in the use
of it : it doth not give us the objects of our ideas, but
only casts such a light on those objects which nature fur
nishes us with, that they may be the more clearly and
distinctly known : it doth not add new parts or proper
ties to things, but it discovers the various parts, proper
ties, relations, and dependencies of one thing upon an
other, and by ranking all things under general and spe
cial heads, it renders the nature, or any of the proper
ties, powers, and uses of a thing, more easy to be found
124 LOGIC ; OR, THE [PART I.

out, when we seek in what rank of beings it lies, and

wherein it agrees with, and wherein it differs from others.
Ifany comparisons would illustrate this, it may be thus
represented.

I. When Logic assists us to attain a clear and distinct

conception of the nature of things by definition, it is like
those glasses whereby we behold such objects distinctly,
as, by reason of their smallness, or their great distance,
appear in confusion to the naked eye : so the telescope
discovers to us distant wonders in the heavens, and
shews the milky way, and the bright cloudy spots in a very
dark sky, to be a collection of little stars, which the eye
unassisted beholds in mingled confusion. So when bo
dies are too small for our sight to survey them distinctly,
then the microscope is at hand for our assistance, to shew
us all the limbs and features ofthe most minute animals,
with great clearness and distinction.

II. When we are taught by Logic to view a thing com

pletely in all its parts by the help of division, it has the
use of an anatomical knife, which dissects an animal body
and separates the veins, arteries, nerves, muscles, mem
branes, &c. and shews us the several parts which goto
the composition of a complete animal.

III. When Logic instructs us to survey an object com

prehensively in all the modes, properties, relations, faces,
and appearances of it, it is of the same use as a terres
trial globe, which, turning round on its axis, represents
to us all the variety of lands and seas, kingdoms and na
tions on the surface of the earth, in a very short succes
sion of time shews the situations and various relations
of them to each other, and gives a comprehensive view
of them in miniature.

IV. When this art teaches us to distribute any exten

sive idea into its different kinds ofspecies, it may be com
pared to the prismatic glass, that receives the sunbeams
or rays of light, which seem to be uniform when falling
upon it, but it separatesand distributes them into their
CH. VI . SECT. 13. ] RIGHT USE of reason. 125

different kinds and colours, and ranks them in their pro

per succession.
Or, if we descend to subdivisions and subordinate ranks
of being, then distribution may also be said to form the
resemblance of a natural tree, wherein the genus or ge
neral idea stands for the root or stock, and the several
kinds or species, and individuals, are distributed abroad,
and represented in their dependence and connexion, like
the several boughs, branches, and lesser shoots. For in
stance, let animal . be the root of a logical tree, the resem
blance is seen by mere inspection, though the root be
not placed at the bottom of the page.
(Philip
James
Man
Peter
Thomas, &c.
Trott.
Horse .. ..
Bayard, &c.
Squirrel
Lion
Beast. Mastiff.
Spaniel.
Dog
Greyhound.
Beagle, & c.
Bear, & c.
Animal Eagle
Lark

Bird. English.
Duck Muscovy.
Hook Bill, &c.
Goose, &c.
Trout
Fish Whale
Oyster, &c.
Wasp,
Flying .
Bee, & c.
Insect Worm.
Creeping .. .Ant.
Caterpillar, &c.
126 LOGIC ; OR, THE [PART I.
The same similitude will serve also to illustrate the di
vision and subdivision of an integral whole, into its seve
ral parts.
When Logic directs us to place all our ideas in a pro
per method, most convenient both for instruction and me
mory, it doth the same service as the cases of well-con
trived shelves in a large library, wherein folios, quartos,
octavos, and lesser volumes, are disposed in such exact
order under the particular heads of divinity, history, ma
thematics, ancient and miscellaneous learning, &c. that the
student knows where to find every book, and has them
all as it were within his command at once, because ofthe
exact order wherein they are placed .
The man who has such assistances as these at hand,
in order to manage his conceptions and regulate his ideas,
is well prepared to improve his knowledge, and to join
these ideas together in a regular manner by judgement,
which is the second operation of the mind, and will be
the subject of the second Part of Logic.
 THE

SECOND PART

OF

LOGIC .

OF JUDGEMENT AND PROPOSITION.

WHEN the mind has got acquaintance with things by

framing ideas of them, it proceeds to the next operation,
and that is, to compare these ideas together, and tojoin
them by affirmation, or disjoin them by negation, accord
ing as we find them to agree or disagree. This act of
the mind is called judgement : as when we have by per
ception obtained the ideas of Plato, a philosopher, man,
innocent, we form these judgements ; Plato was a philo
sopher; no man is innocent.
Some writers have asserted, that judgement consists in
a mereperception ofthe agreement or disagreement ofideas.
But I rather think there is an act of the will (at least in
most cases) necessary to form a judgement ; for though
we do perceive, or think we perceive ideas to agree or
disagree, yet we may sometimes refrain fromjudging or
assenting to the perception, for fear lest the perception
should not be sufficiently clear, and we should be mis
taken : and I am well assured at other times, that there
are multitudes of judgements formed, and a firm assent
given to ideas joined or disjoined , before there is any
clear perception whether they agree or disagree ; and
this is the reason of so manyfalse judgements or mistakes
128 LOGIC ; OR, THE [PART 11.

among men. Both these practices are a proof thatjudge

ment has something ofthe will in it, and does not merely
consist in perception, since we sometimes judge (though
unhappily) without perceiving, and sometimes we per
ceive without immediate judging.
As an idea is the result of our conception or appre
hension, so a proposition is the effect ofjudgement.- The
foregoing sentences, which are examples of the act of
judgement, are properly called, propositions ; Plato is a
philosopher, &c.

Here let us consider,

1. The general nature of a proposition, and the parts of

which it is composed.

2. The various divisions or kinds of propositions.

3. The springs offalse judgement, or the doctrine ofpre

judices.

4. General directions to assist us in judging aright.

5. Special rules to direct us in judging particular objects.

CHAP. I.

OF THE NATURE OF A PROPOSITION, AND ITS SEVERAL

PARTS.

A PROPOSITION is a sentence wherein two or more ideas

or terms are joined or disjoined by one affirmation or ne
gation, as Plato was a philosopher : every angle is formed
by two lines meeting : no man living on earth can be com
pletely happy. When there are ever so many ideas or
terms in the sentence, yet if they are joined or disjoined
CH. I.] RIGHT USE OF REASON. 129

merely by one single affirmation or negation, they are

properly called but one proposition, though they may be
resolved into several propositions which are implied
therein, as will appear hereafter.
In describing a proposition, I use the word terms as
well as ideas, because when mere ideas are joined in the
mind without words, it is rather called a judgement ; but
when clothed with words, it is called a proposition, even
though it be in the mind only, as well as when it is ex
pressed by speaking or writing.
There are three things which go to the nature and
constitution of a proposition, namely, the subject, the pre
dicate, and the copula.
The subject of a proposition is that concerning which
any thing is affirmed or denied : So Plato, angle, man
living on earth, are the subjects of the foregoing pro
positions.
The predicate is that which is affirmed or denied of
the subject : so philosopher is the predicate of the first
proposition; formed by two lines meeting, is the predi
cate of the second ; capable ofbeing completely happy, the
proper predicate ofthe third.
The subject and predicate of a proposition taken toge
ther, are called the matter of it ; for these are the ma
terials of which it is made.
The copula is the form of a proposition ; it represents
the act of the mind affirming or denying, and it is ex
pressed by the words, am, art, is, are, &c. or am not, art
not, is not, are not, &c.
It is not a thing of importance enough to create a dis
pute, whether the words, no, none, not, never, &c. which
disjoin the idea or terms in a negative proposition, shall
be called a part of the subject of the copula, or of the
predicate. Sometimes perhaps they may seem most na
turally to be included in one, and sometimes in another
of these, though a proposition is usually denominated
affirmative or negative from its copula, as hereafter.
Note 1. Where each of these parts of a proposition is
not expressed distinctly in so many words, yet they are all
G
 130 LOGIC ; OR, THE [PART II.

understood and implicitly contained therein ; as Socrates

disputed, is a complete proposition, for it signifies So
crates was disputing. So, I die, signifies, I am dying.
I can write, that is, I am able to write. -In Latin and
Greek, one single word is many times a complete pro
position.
Note 2. These words, am, art, is, &c. when they are
used alone without any other predicate, signify both
the act ofthe mind judging, which includes the copula,
and signify also actual existence, which is the predicate
of that proposition. So Rome is, signifies Rome is exist
ent : there are some strange monsters, that is, some strange
monsters are existent : Carthage is no more, that is, Car
thage has no being.
Note 3. The subject and predicate of a proposition,
are not always to be known and distinguished by the
placing of the words in the sentence, but by reflecting
duly on the sense of the words, and on the mind or de
sign ofthe speaker or writer : as if I say, in Africa there
are many lions, I mean many lions are existent in Africa :
many lions is the subject, and existent in Africa is the
predicate. It is proper for a philosopher to understand
geometry : here the word proper is the predicate, and all
the rest is the subject, except Is, the copula.
Note 4. The subject and predicate of a proposition
ought always to be two different ideas, or two different
terms ; for where both the terms and ideas are the same,
it is called an identical proposition, which is mere tri
fling, and cannot tend to promote knowledge ; such as, a
rule is a rule, or a good man is a good man.
But there are some propositions, wherein the terms of
the subject and predicate seem to be the same ; yet the
ideas are not the same ; nor can these be called pure
identical or trifling propositions ; such as home is home ;
that is, home is a convenient or delightful place ; Socrates
is Socrates still ; that is, the man Socrates is still a phi
losopher ; the hero was not a hero ; that is, the hero did
not shew his courage : what I have written I have written ;
that is, what I wrote I still approve, and will not alter it :
CH. II . SECT. I.] RIGHT USE OF REASON. 131

what is done, is done ; that is, it cannot be undone. It

may be easily observed in these propositions the term
is equivocal, for in the predicate it has a different idea .
from what it has in the subject.
There are also some propositions wherein the terms
of the subject and predicate differ, but the ideas are the
same ; and these are not merely identical or trifling pro
positions : as, impudent is shameless ; a billow is a wave ;
or fluctus (in Latin) is a wave ; a globe is a round body.
In these propositions either the words are explained by
a definition of the name, or the ideas by a definition of
the thing, and therefore they are by no means useless,
when formed for this purpose.

CHAP. II.

OF THE VARIOUS KINDS OF PROPOSITIONS.

PROPOSITIONS may be distributed into various kinds,

according to their subject, their copula, their predicate,
their nature or composition, their sense, and their evi
dence, which distributions will be explained in the fol
lowing sections.

SECT. I.

OF UNIVERSAL , PARTICULAR , INDEFINITE, AND SINGULAR

PROPOSITIONS.

PROPOSITIONS may be divided, according to their sub

ject, into universal and particular ; this is usually called
a division arising from the quantity.
A universal proposition is when the subject is taken
according to the whole of its extension : so if the sub
ject be a genus, or general nature, it includes all its
species or kinds : if the subject be a species, it includes
G 2
132 LOGIC ; OR, THE [ PART II.

all its individuals. This universality is usually signified

by these words, all, every, no, none, or the like ; as, all
men must die : no man is almighty : every creature had
a beginning.
A particular proposition is when the subject is not
taken according to its whole extension ; that is, when
the term is limited and restrained to some one or more
of those species or individuals whose general nature it
expresses, but reaches not to all; and this is usually
denoted by the words, some, many, afew, there are which,
&c. as, some birds can sing well : few men are truly wise :
there are parrots which will talk a hundred things.
Under the general name of universal propositions, we
may justly include those that are singular, and for the
most part those that are indefinite also.
A singular proposition is when the subject is a singular
or individual term or idea ; as, Descartes was an inge
nious philosopher : Sir Isaac Newton has far exceeded all
his predecessors: the palace at Hampton Court is a plea
sant dwelling : this day is very cold. The subject here
must be taken according to the whole of its extension,
because being an individual, in can extend only to one,
and must therefore be regulated by the laws of universal
propositions.
An indefinite proposition is when no note, either of
universality or particularity, is prefixed to a subject,
which is in its own nature general ; as a planet is ever
changing its place : angels are noble creatures. Now this
sort of proposition, especially when it describes the na
ture of things, is usually counted universal also, and it
supposes the subject to be taken in its whole extension :
for if there were any planet which did not change its
place, or an angel that were not a noble creature, these
propositions would not be strictly true.
Yet in order to secure us against mistakes in judging
of universal, particular, and indefinite propositions, it is
necessary to make these following remarks,

I. Concerning universal propositions.

CH. II . SECT. I.] RIGHT USE OF REASON. 133

Note 1. Universal terms may either denote a metaphy

sical, a physical, or a moral universality.
A metaphysical or mathematical universality, is when
all the particulars contained under any general idea
have the same predicate belonging to them without any
exception whatsoever ; or when the predicate is so es
sential to the universal subject, that it destroys the very
nature of the subject to be without it ; as, all circles have
a centre and circumference : all spirits in their own na
ture are immortal.
A physical or natural universality, is when, according
to the order and common course of nature, a predicate
agrees to all the subjects of that kind, though there may
be some accidental and preternatural exceptions ; as,
all men use words to express their thoughts, yet dumb per
sons are excepted, for they cannot speak. All beasts
havefourfeet, yet there may be some monster with five ;
or maimed, who have but three.
A moral universality, is when the predicate agrees to
the greatest part ofthe particulars which are contained
under the universal subject ; as, all negroes are stupid
creatures : all men are governed by affection rather than
by reason : all the old Romans loved their country : and
the scripture uses this language when St. Paul tells us,
The Cretes are always liars.
Now it is evident, that a special or singular conclu
sion cannot be inferred from a moral universality, nor
always and infallibly from a physical one, though it may
be always inferred from a universality which is meta
physical, without any danger or possibility of a mistake.
Let it be observed also, that usually we make little
or no distinction in common language, between a sub
ject that is physically or metaphysically universal.
Note 2. A universal term is sometimes taken collec
tively for all its particular ideas united together, and
sometimes distributively, meaning each of them single
and alone.
Instances of a collective universal are such as these :
all these apples willfill a bushel : all the hours of the night
134 LOGIC ; OR THE [ PART II.

are sufficientfor sleep : all the rules ofgrammar overload

the memory. In these propositions it is evident, that the
predicate belongs not to the individuals separately, but
to the whole collective idea ; for we cannot affirm the
same predicate if we change the word all into one, or
into every ; we cannot say one apple or every apple will
fill a bushel, &c. Now such a collective idea, when it be
comes the subject of a proposition, ought to be esteemed
as one single thing, and this renders the proposition sin
gular or indefinite, as we shall shew immediately.
A distributive universal will allow the word all to be
changed into every, or into one, and by this means is
distinguished from a collective.
Instances of a distributive universal are the most com
mon on every occasion ; as all men are mortal : every
man is a sinner, &c. But in this sort of universal there is
a distribution to be made, which follows in the remark.
Note 3. When a universal term is taken distributively,
sometimes it includes all the individuals contained in
its inferior species : as when I say every sickness has a
tendency to death ; I mean every individual sickness, as
well as every kind. But sometimes it includes no more
than merely each species or kind • ; as when the Evan
gelist says, Christ healed every disease, or every disease
was healed by Christ ; that is, every kind of disease. The
first of these, logicians call the distribution of a uni
versal in singula generum ; the last is a distribution in
genera singulorum. But either ofthem joined to the sub
ject renders a proposition universal.
Note 4. The universality of a subject is often re
strained by a part of the predicate ; as when we say, all
men learn wisdom by experience : the universal subject,
all men, is limited to signify only all those men who learned
wisdom. The scripture also uses this sort of language,
when it speaks of all men beingjustified by the righteous
ness ofone, Rom. v. 18. that is, all men who are justified
obtain it in this way.
Observe here, That not only a metaphysical or natural,
but a moral universality also, is oftentimes to be re
CH . II. SECT. I.] RIGHT USE OF REASON. 135

strained by a part of the predicate ; as when we say, all

the Dutch are good seamen : all the Italians are subtle po
liticians : that is, those among the Dutch that are sea
men are good seamen ; and those among the Italians
who are politicians, are subtle politicians, that is, they
are generally so.
Note 5. The universality of a term is many times re
strained by the particular time, place, circumstance, &c.
or the design of the speaker ; as, if we were in the city
of London, and say, all the weavers went to present their
petition ; we mean only all the weavers who dwell in the
city. So when it is said in the gospel, all men did mar
vel, Mark v. 20. it reaches only to all those men who
heard ofthe miracle of our Saviour.
Here also it should be observed, that a moral univer
sality is restrained by time, place, and other circum
stances, as well as a natural ; so that by these means
the word all sometimes does not extend to a tenth part
of those who at first might seem to be included in that
word.
One occasion of these difficulties and ambiguities that
belong to universal propositions, is the common humour
and temper of mankind , who generally have an inclina
tion to magnify their ideas, and to talk roundly and uni
versally concerning any thing they speak of; which has
introduced universal terms of speech into custom and
habit, in all nations, and all languages, more than na
ture or reason would dictate : yet when this custom is
introduced, it is not at all improper to use this sort of
language in solemn and sacred writings, as well as in
familiar discourse.

II. Remarks concerning indefinite propositions .

Note 1. Propositions carrying in them universal forms

of expression, may sometimes drop the note ofuniversa
lity, and become indefinite, and yet retain the same uni
versal sense, whether metaphysical, natural or moral :
whether collective or distributive.
 186 LOGIC ; OR, THE [PART II.

We may give instances of each of these.

Metaphysical ; as, a circle has a centre and circumfe
rence. Natural ; as, beasts have four feet. Moral ; as,
negroes are stupid creatures. Collective ; as, the apples
will fill a bushel. Distributive ; as, men are mortal.
Note 2. There are many cases wherein a collective idea
is expressed in a proposition by an indefinite term, and
that where it describes the nature or quality of the sub
ject, as well as when it declares some past matters of
fact ; as, fir-trees set in good order will give a charming
prospect : this must signify a collection of fir-trees, for
one makes no prospect. In matters of fact this is more
evident and frequent ; as, the Romans overcame the Gauls:
the robbers surrounded the coach : the wild geeseflew over 0
the Thames in theform ofa wedge. All these are col
lective subjects .
Note 3. In indefinite propositions the subject is often
restrained by the predicate, or by the special time, place,
or circumstances, as well as in propositions which are v
expressly universal ; as, the Chineses are ingenious silk
weavers ; that is, those Chineses which are silk- weavers
are ingenious at their work. The stars appear to us when
the twilight is gone ; this can signify no more than the
stars which are above our horizon.
Note 4. All these restrictions tend to reduce some in
definite propositions almost into particular, as will ap
pear under the next remarks.

III. Remarks concerning particular propositions.

Note 1. A particular proposition may sometimes be

expressed indefinitely, without any note of particularity
prefixed to the subject ; as, in times ofconfusion laws
are not executed : men of virtue are disgraced, and mur
• derers escape ; that is, some laws, some men ofvirtue, some
murderers: unless we should call this language a moral
universality, though I think it can hardly extend so far.
Note 2. The word some, a few, &c. though they gene
rally denote a proper particularity, yet sometimes they
CH. II. SECT. 1. ] RIGHT USE OF REASON. 137
express a collective idea ; as, some ofthe enemies beset the
general around : a few Greeks would beat a thousand
Indians .
I conclude this section with a few general remarks on
this subject, namely,

Gen. Rem. I. Since universal, indefinite, and parti

cular terms in the plural number may either be taken
in a collective or distributive sense, there is one short and
easy way to find when they are collective and when dis
tributive, namely, if the plural number may be changed
into the singular, that is, if the predicate will agree to
one single subject, it is a distributive idea ; if not, it is
collective.

Gen. Rem. II. Universal and particular terms in the

plural number ; such as, all, some, few, many, &c. when
they are taken in their distributive sense, represent se
veral single ideas ; and when they are thus affixed to
the subject of a proposition, render that proposition
universal or particular, according to the universality or
particularity of the terms affixed.

Gen. Rem. III. Universal and particular terms in the

plural number, taken in their collective sense, represent
generally one collective idea.
If this one collective idea be thus represented (whe
ther by universal or particular terms) as the subject of
a proposition, which describes the nature of a thing, it
properly makes either a singular or an indefinite propo
sition ; for the word all, some, a few, &c. do not then
denote the quantity of the proposition, but are esteemed
merely as terms which connect the individuals together
in order to compose one collective idea. Observe these
instances; all the sycamores in the garden would make a
large grove ; that is, this one collection of sycamores,
which is a single idea. Some ofthe sycamores in the gar
den would make a fine grove : sycamores would make a
noble grove in these last the subject is rather indefinite
G3
138 LOGIC ; OR, THE [PART II.

than singular. But it is very evident, that in each of

these propositions the predicate can only belong to a
collective idea, and therefore the subject must be es
teemed a collective.
Ifthis collective idea (whether represented by uni
versal or particular terms) be used in describing past mat
ters offact, then it is generally to be esteemed a singular
idea, and renders the proposition singular ; as, all the
soldiers ofAlexander made but a little army ; afew Mace
donians vanquished the large army of Darius ; some gre
nadiers in the camp plundered all the neighbouring towns.
Now we have shewn before, that if a proposition de
scribing the nature ofthings has an indefinite subject, it
is generally to be esteemed universal in its propositional
sense and if it has a singular subject, in its proposi
tional sense it is always ranked with universals.
After all, we must be forced to confess, that the lan
guage of mankind, and the idioms of speech, are so ex
ceeding various, that it is hard to reduce them to a few
rules ; and if we would gain a just and precise idea of
every universal particular, and indefinite expression , we
must not only consider the peculiar idiom of the lan
guage, but the time, the place, the occasion, the cir
cumstances of the matter spoken of, and thus penetrate
as far as possible into the design of the speaker or writer.

SECT. II.
OF AFFIRMATIVE AND NEGATIVE PROPOSITIONS.

WHEN a proposition is considered with regard to its co

pula, it may be divided into affirmative and negative ; for
it is the copula joins or disjoins the two ideas. Others
call this a division of propositions according to their
quality.
An affirmative proposition is when the idea of the pre
dicate is supposed to agree to the idea of the subject,
and is joined to it by the word is, or are, which is the
 CH. II. SECT. 2. ] RIGHT USE of reason. 139

copula : as, all men are sinners. But when the predicate
is not supposed to agree with the subject, and is disjoined
from it bythe particles is not, are not, &c. the proposi
tion is negative : as, man is not innocent ; or, no man is
innocent. In an affirmative proposition , we assert one
thing to belong to another, and, as it were, unite them
in thought and word : in negative propositions, we sepa
rate one thing from another, and deny their agreement.
It may seem something odd, that two ideas or termis
are said to be disjoined, as well as joined by a copula :
but if we can but suppose the negative particles do really
belong to the copula of negative propositions, it takes
away the harshness of the expression : and to make it
yet softer, we may consider that the predicate and sub
ject may be properly said to be joined, in a form ofwords
as a proposition, by connective particles in grammar or
Logic, though they are disjoined in their sense and sig
nification. Every youth, who has learned his grammar,
knows there are such words as disjunctive propositions.
Several things are worthy our notice on this subject.
Note 1st, As there are some terms, or words, and ideas,
(as I have shewn before) concerning which it is hard to
determine whether they are negative or positive, so there
are some propositions concerning which it may be diffi
cult to say, whether they affirm or deny : as, when we
say, Plato was no fool : Cicero was no unskilful orator :
Cæsar made no expedition to Muscovy : an oyster has no
part like an eel : it is not necessaryfor a physician to speak
French : and, for a physician to speak French is needless.
The sense of these propositions is very plain and easy,
though logicians might squabble perhaps a whole day,
whether they should rank them under the name of ne
gative or affirmative.
Note 2d, In Latin and English two negatives joined in
one sentence make an affirmative ; as when we declare
no man is not mortal : it is the same as though we said ,
man is mortal. But in Greek, and oftentimes in French,
two negatives make but a stronger denial.
140 LOGIC ; OR, THE [PART II.

Note 3d, If the mere negative term, not, be added to

the copula of an universal affirmative proposition, it re
duces it to a particular negative ; as, all men are not wise,
signifies the same as, some men are not wise.
Note 4th, In all affirmative propositions, the predicate
is taken in its whole comprehension ; that is, every es
sential part and attribute of it is affirmed concerning the
subject ; as when I say, a true christian is an honest man,
every thing that belongs to honesty is affirmed concern
ing a true christian.
Note 5th, In all negative propositions the predicate is
taken in its whole extension : that is, every species and
individual that is contained in the general idea of the
predicate, is utterly denied concerning the subject ; so
in this proposition, a spirit is not an animal, we exclude
all sorts and kinds, and particular animals whatsoever,
from the idea of a spirit.
From these two last remarks we may derive this in
ference, that we ought to attend to the entire compre
hension of our ideas, and to the universal extension of
them, as far as we have proper capacity for it, before we
grow too confident in our affirming or denying any thing
which may have the least darkness, doubt, or difficulty
attending it: it is the want of this attention that betrays
us into many mistakes.

SECT. III.

OF THE OPPOSITION AND CONVERSION OF PROPOSITIONS.

ANY two ideas being joined or disjoined in various forms

will afford us several propositions : all these may be dis
tinguished according to their quantity and their quality *

* The reader should remember here, that a proposition according to its

quantity is called universal or particular ; and according to its quality, it is
either affirmative or negative.
CH . II. SECT. 3. ] RIGHT USE OF REASON. 141

into four, which are marked or denoted by the letters,

A, E, I, O, thus :
A Universal Affirmative.
E Universal Negative .
denotes a
I Particular Affirmative.
O Particular Negative.
according to these old Latin rhymes :—

Asserit A, Negat E, verum generaliter Ambæ.

Asserit I, Negat O, sed particulariter Ambo.
This may be exemplified by these two ideas, a Vine
and a Tree.
A Every Vine is a Tree.
E No Vine is a Tree.
I Some Vine is a Tree.
O Some Vine is not a Tree.

The logicians of the schools have written many large

trifles concerning the opposition and conversion of propo
sitions. It will be sufficient here to give a few briefhints
of these things, that the learner may not be utterly igno
rant of them.
Propositions which are made of the same subject and
predicate, are said to be opposite, when that which is de
nied in one is affirmed in the other, either in whole or
in part, without any consideration whether the propo
sitions be true or no.
If they differ both in quantity and quality they are
called contradictory ; as,
A Every Vine is a
し
Tree. These can never be both true, or
O Some Vine is not both false at the same time.
a Tree. 1

If two universals differ in quality they are contraries ;

as,
A Every Vine is
a Tree. These can never be both true together,
E No Vine is a but they may be both false.
Tree.
 142 LOGIC ; OR, THE [PART II.

If two particular propositions differ in quality they 26

are subcontraries ; as,
I Some Vine is a 3
Tree. These may be both true together, but
O Some Vine is they can never be both false.
not a Tree. M
Both particular and universal propositions which A
agree in quality, but not in quantity, are called subal
tern, though these are not properly opposite ; as,
A Every Vine is a Tree. MA
4
I Some Vine is a Tree.
Or thus : -
E No Vine is a Tree.
O Some Vine is not a Tree.
The canons of subaltern propositions are usually reck
oned these three ; namely ( 1. ) , If a universal proposi
tion be true, the particular will be true also, but not on
V
the contrary. And ( 2. ), If a particular proposition be
false, the universal must be false too, but not on the con
trary. (3.) Subaltern propositions whether universal or
Ca
particular, may sometimes be both true and sometimes "‫له‬
both false.
The conversion of propositions, is when the subject
and predicate change their places with preservation of
the truth. This may be done with constant certainty in
all universal negatives and particular affirmatives ; as, no 0
spirit is an animal, may be converted, no animal is a spi
rit ; and, some tree is a vine, may be converted , some vine
is a tree. But there is more of formal trifling in this sort
of discourse than there is of solid improvement, because
this sort of conversion arises merely from the form of
words, as connected in a proposition, rather than from
the matter.
Yet it may be useful to observe, that there are some
propositions, which by reason of the ideas of matter of
which they are composed, may be converted with con
stant truth: such are those propositions whose predicate
is a nominal or real definition of the subject, or the dif
ference of it, or a property of the fourthi kind, or a su
CH. II. SECT. 4. ] RIGHT USE OF REASON. 143

perlative degree of any property or quality whatsoever ;

or in short, wheresoever the predicate and the subject
have exactly the same extension, or the same compre
hension ; as, every vine is a tree bearing grapes : and
every tree bearing grapes is a vine : religion is the truest
wisdom : and, the truest wisdom is religion : Julius Cæsar
was the first Emperor of Rome , and, the first Emperor
of Rome was Julius Cæsar. These are the propositions
which are properly convertible, and they are called re
ciprocal propositions.

SECT. IV.
OF PURE AND MODAL PROPOSITIONS .

ANOTHER division of propositions among the scholastic

writers, is into pure and modal. - This may be called ( for
distinction sake) a division according to the predicate.
When a proposition merely expresses that the predi
cate is connected with the subject, it is called a pure pro
position ; as, every true christian is an honest man. But
when it includes also the way and manner, wherein the
predicate is connected with the subject, it is called a mo
dal proposition ; as, when I say, it is necessary that a true
christian should be an honest man.
Logical writers generally make the modality of this
proposition to belong to the copula, because it shews the
manner ofthe connexion between the subject and predi
cate. But if the form of the sentence as a logical pro
position be duly considered, the mode itself is the very
predicate of the proposition , and it must run thus : that
a true christian should be an honest man is a necessary
thing, and then the whole primary proposition is includ
ed in the subject of the modal proposition.
There arefour modes of connecting the predicate with
the subject, which are usually reckoned up on this oc
casion, namely, necessity and contingency, which are two
144 LOGIC ; OR, THE [PART II.

opposites; possibility and impossibility, which are also op

posites ; as, it is necessary that a globe should be round :
that a globe made of wood or glass, is an unnecessary or
contingent thing : it is impossible that a globe should be
square : it is possible that a globe may be made of water.
With regard to the modal propositions which the
schools have introduced, I would make these two re
marks:

Remark 1. These propositions in English are formed

by the resolution of the words, must be, might not be, can
be, and cannot be, into those more explicate forms of a
logical copula and predicate, is necessary, is contingent,
is possible, is impossible : for, it is necessary that a globe
should be round, signifies no more than that a globe must
be round.

Remark 2. Let it be noted that this quadruple mo

dality is only an enumeration of the natural modes or
manners wherein the predicate is connected with the
subject : we might also describe several moral and civil
modes of connecting two ideas together, namely, lawful
ness and unlawfulness, conveniency and inconveniency, &c.
whence we may form such modal propositions as these :
it is unlawful for any person to kill an innocent man : it
is unlawful for christians to eat flesh in Lent : to tell all
that we think is inexpedient : for a man to be affable to his
neighbour is very convenient, &c.
There are several other modes of speaking whereby a
predicate is connected with a subject : such as, it is cer
tain, it is doubtful, it is probable, it is improbable, it is
agreed, it is granted, it is said by the ancients, it is writ
ten, &c. all which will form other kinds of modal pro
positions.
But whether the modality be natural, moral, &c. yet
in all these propositions it is the mode is the proper pre
dicate, and all the rest of the proposition, except the co
pula (or word is) belongs to the subject ; and thus they
CH. 11. SECT. 5. ] RIGHT USE of reason. 145

become pure propositions of a complex nature, of which

we shall treat in the next section ; so that there is no
great need of making modals of a distinct sort.
There are many little subtilties which the schools ac
quaint us with concerning the conversion and opposition
and equipollence of these modal propositions, suited to
the Latin or Greek tongues, rather than the English,
and fit to pass away the idle time of a student rather than
to enrich his understanding.

SECT . V.

OF SINGLE PROPOSITIONS , WHETHER SIMPLE OR COMPLEX.

WHEN We consider the nature of propositions together

with the formation of them, and the materials whereof
they are made, we divide them into single and compound.
A single proposition is that which has but one subject
and one predicate, but if it has more subjects, or more
predicates, it is called a compound proposition, and in
deed it contains two or more propositions in it.
A single proposition (which is also called categorical)
may be divided again into simple and complex *.
A purely simple proposition is that whose subject and
predicate are made up of single terms ; as, virtue is de
sirable: everypenitent is pardoned : no man is innocent.
When the subject or predicate, or both, are made up
of complex terms, it is called a complex proposition ; as,
every sincere penitent is pardoned : virtue is desirable for
its own sake : no man alive is perfectly innocent.
If the term which is added to the subject of a com
plex proposition be either essential or any way neces
sary to it, then it is called explicative, for it only explains
the subject ; as, every mortal man is a son of Adam. But

* As simple ideas are opposed to complex , and single ideas to compound, so

propositions are distinguished in the same manner : the English tongue, in this
respect, having some advantage above the learned languages, which have no
usual words to distinguish single from simple,
 146 LOGIC ; OR, THE [PART II.

if the term added to make up the complex subject does

not necessarily or constantly belong to it, then it is de
terminative, and limits the subject to a particular part
of its extension ; as, every pious man shall be happy. In
the first proposition the word mortal is merely explica
tive: inthe proposition the word pious is determinative.
Here note, that whatsoever may be affirmed or de
nied concerning any subject, with an explicative addi
tion, may be also affirmed or denied of that subject
without it, as we may boldly say, every man is a son of
Adam, as well as every mortal man : but it is not so
where the addition is determinative, for we cannot say,
every man shall be happy, though every pious man shall
be so .
In a complex proposition the predicate or subject is
sometimes made complex by the pronouns who, which,
whose, to whom , &c. which make another proposition ;
as, every man who is pious shall be saved : Julius, whose
surname was Cæsar, overcame Pompey : bodies, which
are transparent have many pores. - Here the whole pro ཏཱལ
position is called the primary or chief, and the additional
proposition is called an incident proposition. But it is still P
to be esteemed in this case merely as a part of the com
plex term ; and the truth or falsehood of the whole com
plex proposition is not to be judged by the truth or false
hood ofthe incident proposition, but by the connexion of
the whole subject with the predicate. For the incident
proposition may be false, and absurd, or impossible, and
yet the whole complex proposition may be true ; as, a
horse which has wings might fly over the Thames.
Besides this complexion which belongs to the subject or
predicate, logical writers used to say, there is a com
plexion which may fall upon the copula also ; but this I
have accounted for in the section concerning modal pro
positions ; and indeed it is not ofmuch importance whe
ther it were placed there or here.
CH. II. SECT. 6. ] RIGHT Use of reason. 147

SECT. VI.
OF COMPOUND PROPOSITIONS.

A COMPOUND proposition is made up oftwo or more sub

jects or predicates, or both ; and it contains in it two or
more propositions, which are either plainly expressed, or
concealed and implied.
The first sort of compound propositions are those where
in the composition is expressed and evident, and they are
distinguished into these six kinds, namely, copulative,
disjunctive, conditional, causal, relative and discretive.

I. Copulative propositions, are those which have more

subjects or predicates connected by affirmative or nega
tive conjunctions ; as riches and honour are temptations
to pride : Cæsar conquered the Gauls and the Britons :
neither gold nor jewels will purchase immortality. These
propositions are evidently compounded, for each ofthem
may be resolved into two propositions, namely, riches
are temptations to pride : and honour is a temptation to
pride ; and so the rest.
The truth of copulative propositions depends upon the
truth of all the parts of them ; for if Cæsar had conquer
ed the Gauls, and not the Britons, or the Britons, and
not the Gauls, the second copulative proposition had not
been true.
Here note, Those propositions which cannot be re
solved into two or more simple propositions, are not pro
perly copulative, though two or more ideas be connected
and coupled by such conjunctions, either in the subject
or predicate ; as, two and three make five : majesty and
meekness do not often meet : the sun, moon, and stars, are
not all to be seen at once. Such propositions are to be
esteemed merely complex, because the predicate cannot
be affirmed of each single subject, but only of all of them
together as a collective subject.

II. Disjunctive propositions, are when the parts are

148 LOGIC ; OR, THE [PART II.

disjoined or opposed to one another by disjunctive par

ticles ; as, it is either day or night : the weather is either
shining or rainy : quantity is either length, breadth, or
depth.
The truth ofdisjunctives depends on the necessary and
immediate opposition of the parts ; therefore only the
·
last of these examples is true ; but the two first are not
strictly true, because twilight is a medium between day
and night ; and dry cloudy weather is a medium between
shining and raining.

III. Conditional or hypothetical propositions, are those

whose parts are united by the conditional particle if; as,
if the sun be fixed, the earth must move : if there be nofire,
there will be no smoke.
Note, The first parts of these propositions, or that
wherein the condition is contained, is called the antece
dent, the other is called the consequent.
The truth of these propositions depends not at all on
the truth or falsehood of their two parts, but on the truth
of the connexion of them ; for each part of them may be
false, and yet the whole proposition true ; as ifthere be
no providence, there will be no future punishment.

IV. Causal propositions are, where two propositions

are joined by causal particles ; as, houses were not built
that they might be destroyed : Rehoboam was unhappy be
cause he followed evil counsel.
The truth of a causal proposition arises not from the
truth ofthe parts, but from the causal influence that the
one part of it has upon the other ; for both parts may
be true, yet the proposition false, if one part be not the
cause of the other.
Some logicians refer reduplicative propositions to this
place, as, men, considered as men, are rational creatures,
that is, because they are men,

V. Relative propositions have theirparts joined bysuch

particles, as express a relation or comparison ofone thing
CH. II. SECT. 6. ] RIGHT USE OF REASON . 149

to another ; as, when you are silent, I will speak : as

much as you are worth, so much shall you be esteemed : as
is the father, so is the son : where there is no tale-bearer,
contention will cease.
These are very much akin to conditional propositions,
and the truth of them depends upon the justness oftheir
connexion.

VI. Discretive propositions are such wherein various

and seemingly opposite judgements are made, whose va
riety or distinction is noted bythe particles, but, though,
yet, &c. as, travellers may change their climate, but not
their temper ; Job was patient, though his griefwas great.
The truth and goodness of a discretive proposition, de
pends on the truth of both parts, and their contradis
tinction to one another : for though both parts should
be true, yet if there be no seeming opposition between
them, it is a useless assertion, though we cannot call it
a false one ; as, Descartes was a philosopher, yet he was a
Frenchman : the Romans were valiant, but they spoke
Latin : both which propositions are ridiculous for want
of a seeming opposition between the parts.
Since we have declared wherein the truth and false
hood of these compound propositions consist, it is proper
also to give some intimations how any of these proposi
tions, when theyare false, may be opposed or contradicted.
All compound propositions, except copulatives and dis
cretives, are properly denied or contradicted when the
negative affects their conjunctive particles ; as, if the dis
junctive proposition asserts, it is either day or night : the
opponent says, it is not either day or night ; or, it is not
necessary that it should be either day or night : so the hy
pothetical proposition is denied, by saying, it does not
follow that the earth must move if the sun befixed.
A disjunctive proposition may be contradicted also by
denying all the parts ; as, it is neither day nor night.
And a causal proposition may be denied or opposed
indirectly and improperly, when either part of the propo
sition is denied ; and it must be false if either part be
150 LOGIC ; OR, THE [PART II.

false ; but the design of the proposition being to shew

the causal connexion of the two parts, each part is sup
posed to be true, and it is not properly contradicted as
a causal proposition, unless one part of it be denied to be
the cause ofthe other.
As for copulatives and discretives, because their truth
depends more on the truth of their parts, therefore these
may be opposed or denied, as many ways as the parts of
which they are composed may be denied ; so this copu
lative proposition, riches and honour are temptations to
pride, may be denied by saying, riches are not temptations,
though honour may be : or, honour is not a temptation,
though riches may be : or, neither riches nor honour are
temptations, &c.
So this discretive proposition, Job was patient, though
his grief was great, is denied by saying, Job was not pa
tient, though his grief was great : or, Job was patient, but
his grief was not great : or, Job was not patient, nor was
his griefgreat.
We proceed now to the second sort of compound pro
positions, namely, such whose composition is not expressed,
but latent or concealed ; yet a small attention will find
two propositions included in them. Such are these that
follow :

1. Exclusives ; as, the pious man alone is happy. It

is only Sir Isaac Newton could find out true philosophy.

2. Exceptives ; as, none ofthe ancients but Plato well

defended the soul's immortality. The Protestants worship
but one God.

3. Comparatives ; as, pain is the greatest affliction .

No Turk was fiercer than the Spaniards at Mexico.
Here note, that the comparative degree does not always
imply the positive ; as if I say, a fool is better than a
knave, this does not affirm that folly is good, but that it
is a less evil than knavery.

4. Inceptives and desitives, which relate to the begin

 CH. II. SECT. 7.] RIGHT USE OF REASON. 151

ning or ending of any thing ; as, the Latin tongue is not

yet forgotten. No man before Orpheus wrote Greek verse.
Peter, Czar of Muscovy, began to civilize his nation.
To these may be added continuatives ; as, Rome re
mains to this day, which includes at least two proposi
tions, namely, Rome was, and Rome is.

Here let other authors spend time and pains in giving

the precise definitions in all these sorts of propositions,
which may be as well understood by their names and ex
amples : here let them tell what their truth depends up
on, and how they are to be opposed or contradicted ;
but a moderate share of common sense, with a review
ofwhat is said on the former compounds, will suffice for
all these purposes, without the formality of rules.

SECT. VII.

OF TRUE AND FALSE PROPOSITIONS .

PROPOSITIONS are next to be considered according to

their sense or signification, and thus they are distributed
into true and false. A true proposition represents things
as they are in themselves ; but if things are represented
otherwise than they are in themselves, the proposition
is false.
Or we may describe them more particularly thus : a
true proposition joins those ideas and terms together
whose objects are joined and agree, or it disjoins those
ideas and terms, whose objects disagree, or are disjoin
ed ; as, every bird has wings : a brute is not immortal.
Afalse proposition joins those ideas or terms whose ob
jects disagree, or it disjoins those whose objects agree ;
as, birds have no wings ; brutes are immortal.
Note, It is impossible that the same proposition should
be both true and false at the same time, in the same sense,
and in the same respect ; because a proposition is but
the representation of the agreement or disagreement of
152 LOGIC ; OR, THE [PART II.

things now it is impossible that the same thing should be

and not be, or that the same thing should agree and not
agree, at the same time, and in the same respect. This is
a first principle of human knowledge.
Yet some propositions may seem to contradict one
another, though they may be both true, but in different
senses, or respects, or times ; as, man was immortal in
Paradise, and man was mortal in Paradise. But these
two propositions must be referred to different times ; as,
man before his fall was immortal, but at the fall he be
came mortal. So we may say now, man is mortal, or
man is immortal, if we take these propositions in differ
ent respects ; as, man is an immortal creature as to his
soul, but mortal as to his body. A great variety of dif
ficulties and seeming contradictions, both in holy scrip
ture and other writings, may be solved and explained
in this manner.
The most important question on this subject is this,
what is the criterion, or distinguishing mark of truth ?
How shall we know when a proposition is really true or
false? There are so many disguises of truth in the world,
so many false appearances of truth, that some sects have
declared there is no possibility of distinguishing truth
from falsehood ; and therefore they have abandoned all
pretences to knowledge, and maintain strenuously that
nothing is to be known.
The first men of this humour made themselves famous
in Greece by the name of Sceptics, that is seekers : they
were also called Academics, borrowing their name from
Academia, their school or place of study. They taught
that all things are uncertain, though they allowed that
some are more probable than others. After these arose
the sect of Pyrrhonics, so named from Pyrrho their mas
ter, who would not allow one proposition to be more pro
bable than another ; but professed that all things were
equally uncertain. Now all these men (as an ingenious
author expresses it), were rather to be called a sect of
liars than philosophers, and that censure is just for two
reasons : ( 1. ) Because they determined concerning every
CH. II. SECT. 7.] RIGHT USE of reason. 153

proposition that it was uncertain, and believed that as a

certain truth, while they professed there was nothing
certain, and that nothing could be determined concern
ing truth or falsehood ; and thus their very doctrine
gave itself the lie. ( 2. ) Because they judged and acted as
other men did in the common affairs of life ; they would
neither run into fire nor water, though they professed
ignorance and uncertainty, whether the one would burn,
or the other drown them.
There have been some in all ages who have too much
affected this humour, who dispute against every thing,
under pretence that truth has no certain mark to distin
guish it. Let us therefore inquire what is the general cri
terion oftruth ? And in order to this, it is proper to
consider what is the reason why we assent to those pro
positions which contain the most certain and indubi
table truths ; such as these, the whole is greater than a
part ; two and three make five.
The only reason why we believe these propositions to
be true, is because the ideas of the subjects and predi
cates appear with so much clearness and strength of
evidence to agree to each other, that the mind cannot
help discerning the agreement, and cannot doubt of the
truth of them, but is constrained to judge them true.
So when we compare the ideas of a circle and a triangle,
or the ideas of an oyster and a butterfly, we see such an
evident disagreement between them, that we are sure
that a butterfly is not an oyster ; nor is a triangle a circle.
There is nothing but the evidence of the agreement or
disagreement between two ideas, that makes us affirm
or deny the one or the other.
Now it will follow from hence, that a clear and dis
tinct perception, or full evidence of the agreement and
disagreement of our ideas to one another, or to things, is
a certain criterion of truth : for since our minds are of
such a make, that where the evidence is exceeding plain
and strong, we cannot withhold our assent ; we should
then be necessarily exposed to believe falsehood, if
complete evidence should be found in any propositions
H
 154 LOGIC ; OR, THE [PART II.

that are not true. But surely the God of perfect wis
dom, truth, and goodness, would never oblige his crea
tures to be thus deceived ; and therefore he would never
have constituted us of such a frame, as would render it
naturally impossible to guard against error.
Another consequence is naturally derived from the
former ; and that is, that the only reason why we fall
into mistake, is because we are impatient to form a
judgement of things before we have a clear and evident
perception of their agreement or disagreement ; and if
we will make haste to judge while our ideas are ob
scured or confused, or before we see whether they agree
or disagree, we shall plunge ourselves into perpetual
errors. See more on this subject in an Essay on the
Freedom of Will in God and Man : published in 1732,
Section 1. page 13.
Note. What is here asserted concerning the neces
2
sity of clear and distinct ideas, refers chiefly to propo
sitions which we form ourselves by our own powers; as
for propositions which we derive from the testimony of
others, they will be accounted for in Chap. IV.

SECT. VIII.

OF CERTAIN AND DUBIOUS PROPOSITIONS , OF KNOWLEDGE

AND OPINION.

SINCE we have found that evidence is the great criterion,

and the sure mark of truth ; this leads us directly to
consider propositions according to their evidence : and
here we must take notice both of the different degrees of
evidence, and the different kinds of it.
Propositions according to their different degrees of
evidence are distinguished into certain and dubious *.

It may be objected, that this certainty and uncertainty being only in the
mind, the division belongs to propositions rather according to the degrees of our
assent, than the degrees of evidence. But it may well be answered, that the
evidence here intended is that which appears so to the mind, and not the mere
evidence in the nature ofthings : besides (as we shall shew immediately) , the
CH. II . SECT. 8. ] RIGHT USE of reason. 155

Where the evidence of the agreement or disagree

ment of the ideas is so strong and plain, that we cannot
forbid nor delay our assent, the proposition is called cer
tain ; as, every circle hath a centre ; the world did not
create itself. An assent to such propositions is honoured
with the name of knowledge.
But when there is any obscurity upon the agreement
or disagreement ofthe ideas, so that the mind does not
clearly perceive it, and is not compelled to assent or
dissent, then the proposition, in a proper and philoso
phical sense, is called doubtful and uncertain ; as, the pla
nets are inhabited ; the souls of brutes are mere matter ;
the world will not stand a thousand years longer ; Dido
built the city of Carthage, &c. Such uncertain proposi
tions are called opinions.
When we consider ourselves as philosophers, or
searchers after truth, it would be well if we always sus
pended a full judgement or determination about any
thing, and made further inquiries, where this plain and
perfect evidence is wanting; but we are so prone of our·
selves to judge without full evidence, and in some cases
the necessity of action in the affairs of life, constrains
us to judge and determine upon a tolerable degree of
evidence, that we vulgarly call those propositions cer
tain, where we have but very little room or reason to
doubt of them, though the evidence be not complete
and resistless.
Certainty, according to the schools, is distinguished
into objective and subjective. Objective certainty, is when
the proposition is certainly true in itself; and subjective,
when we are certain of the truth of it. The one is in
things, the other is in our minds.
But let it be observed here, that every proposition
in itself is certainly true or certainlyfalse. For though
doubtfulness or uncertainty seems to be a medium be
tween certain truth and certain falsehood in our minds,

degree of assent ought to be exactly proportionable to the degree of evidence :

and therefore the difference is not great, whether propositions be called certain
or uncertain, according to the measure of evidence, or of assent.
H 2
 156 LOGIC ; OR, THE [PART II. '
7
yet there is no such medium in things themselves, no,
not even in future events : for now at this time it is
certain in itself, that Midsummer-day seven years hence
will be serene, or it is certain it will be cloudy, though
we are uncertain and utterly ignorant what sort of day
it will be : this certainty of distant futurities is known
to God only.
Uncertain or dubious propositions, that is, opinions,
are distinguished into probable or improbable.
When the evidence of any proposition is greater than
the evidence of the contrary, then it is a probable opi
nion: where the evidence and arguments are stronger
on the contrary side we call it improbable. But while
the arguments on either side seem to be equally strong,
and the evidence for and against any proposition ap
pears equal to the mind, then in common language we
call it a doubtful matter. We also call it a dubious or
E
doubtful proposition, when there are no arguments on
either side, as, next Christmas-day will be a very sharp
frost. And in general all those propositions are doubt
ful, wherein we can perceive no sufficient marks or evi
dences of truth or falsehood. In such a case, the mind
which is searching for truth ought to remain in a state
of doubt or suspense, until superior evidence on one side
or the other incline the balance of the judgement, and
determine the probability or certainty to the one side.
A great many propositions which we generally be
lieve or disbelieve in human affairs, or in the sciences,
have very various degrees of evidence, which yet arise
not to complete certainty, either of truth or falsehood.
Thus it comes to pass that there are such various and
almost infinite degrees of probability and improbability.
To a weak probability we should give a weak assent :
and a stronger assent is due where the evidence is
greater, and the matter more probable. If we propor
tion our assent in all things to the degrees of evidence, we
do the utmost that human nature is capable of in a ra
tional way to secure itself from error.
 CH. II. SECT. 9.] RIGHT USE OF REASON. 157

SECT. IX .

OF SENSE, CONSCIOUSNESS, INTELLIGENCE, REASON ,

FAITH, AND INSPIRATION.

AFTER we have considered the evidence of propositions

in the various degrees of it, we come to survey the se
veral kinds of evidence, or the different ways whereby
truth is let into the mind, and which produce accord
ingly several kinds of knowledge. We shall distribute
them into these six ; namely, sense, consciousness, intel
ligence, reason, faith, and inspiration ; and then distin
guish the propositions which are derived from them.

I. The evidence of sense is, when we frame a proposi

tion according to the dictates of any of our senses ; so
we judge that grass is green ; that a trumpet gives a
pleasant sound ; that fire burns wood : water is soft ; and
iron is hard ; for we have seen, heard, or felt all these.
It is upon this evidence of sense, that we know and be
lieve the daily occurrences in human life ; and almost
all the histories of mankind, that are written by eye or
ear-witnesses, are built upon this principle.
Under the evidence of sense we do not only include
that knowledge which is derived to us by our outward
senses of hearing, seeing, feeling, tasting, and smelling ;
but that also which is derived from the inward sensa
tions and appetites of hunger, thirst, ease, pleasure, pain,
weariness, rest, &c. and all those things which belong
to the body; as, hunger is a painful appetite ; light is
pleasant ; rest is sweet to the weary limbs.
Propositions which are built on this evidence may be
named sensible propositions, on the dictates of sense.

II. As we learn what belongs to the body by the evi

dence of sense, so we learn what belongs to the soul by
an inward consciousness, which may be called a sort of
internal feeling, or spiritual sensation of what passes in
the mind ; as, I think before I speak ; I desire large know
158 LOGIC ; OR, THE [PART II.

ledge ; I suspect my own practice ; I studied hard to-day ;

my conscience bears witness of my sincerity ; my soul hates
vain thoughts ; fear is an uneasy passion ; long medita
tion on one thing is tiresome.
Thus it appears that we obtain the knowledge of a
multitude of propositions, as well as of single ideas, by
those two principles which Mr. Locke calls sensation and
reflection : one of them is a sort of consciousness of what
affects the body, and the other is a consciousness of what
passes in the mind.
Propositions which are built on this internal con
sciousness, have yet no particular or distinguishing name
assigned to them.

III. Intelligence relates chiefly to those abstracted

propositions which carry their own evidence with them,
and admit no doubt about them . Our perception of
this self-evidence in any proposition is called intelligence.
It is our knowledge of those first principles of truth
which are, as it were, wrought into the very nature and
make of our minds : they are so evident in themselves
to every man who attends to them, that they need no 0
proof. It is the prerogative and peculiar excellence of
these propositions, that they can scarce ever be proved C
or denied ; they cannot easily be proved, because there
is nothing supposed to be more clear or certain , from 6
which an argument may be drawn to prove them. They
cannot well be denied, because their own evidence is
so bright and convincing, that as soon as the terms are
understood, the mind necessarily assents ; such are
these, whatsoever acted hath a being ; nothing has no pro
perties ; a part is less than the whole ; nothing can be the
cause of itself.
These propositions are called axioms or maxims, or
first principles ; these are the very foundations of all
improved knowledge and reasonings, and on that ac
count these have been thought to be innate propositions,
or truths born with us.
Some suppose that a great part of the knowledge of
CH. II. SECT. 9. ] RIGHT USE of reason. 159

angels and human souls in the separate state is obtained

in this manner; namely, by such an immediate view of
things in their own nature, which is called intuition.

IV. Reasoning is the next sort of evidence, and that

is, when one truth is inferred or drawn from others by
natural and just methods of argument ; as, if there be
much light at midnight, I infer, it proceeds from the
moon ; because the sun is under the earth *. If I see
a cottage in a forest, I conclude, some man has been there
and built it. Or when I survey the heavens and earth,
this gives evidence to my reason, that there is a God who
made them.
The propositions which I believe upon this kind of
evidence, are called conclusions or rational truths ; and
the knowledge that we gain this way is properly called
science.
Yet let it be noted, that the word science is usually
applied to a whole body of regular or methodical ob
servations or propositions, which learned men have
formed concerning any subject of speculation, deriving
one truth from another by a train of arguments. If
this knowledge chiefly directs our practice, it is usually
called an art. And this is the most remarkable distinc
tion between an art and a science, namely, the one refers
chiefly to practice, the other to speculation. Natural phi
losophy, or physics, and ontology are sciences ; Logic and
rhetoric are called arts ; but mathematics include both
art and science ; for they have much of speculation, and
much of practice in them.
Observe here, That when the evidence of a proposi
tion derived from sense, consciousness, intelligence, or
reason, is firm and indubitable, it produces such assent
as we call a natural certainty.
V. When we derive the evidence of any proposition
from the testimony of others, it is called the evidence of
faith ; and this is a large part of our knowledge. Ten
* Ntoe. Since this book was written, we have had so many appearances of
the aurora borealis as reduces this inference only to a probability.
160 LOGIC ; OR, THE [PART II.

thousand things there are which we believe merely upon

the authority or credit of those who have spoken or
written of them. It is by this evidence that we know
there is such a country as China, and there was such a
man as Cicero, who dwelt in Rome. It is by this that
most of the transactions in human life are managed :
we know our parents and our kindred by this means,
we know the persons and laws of our present governors,
as well as things that are at a vast distance from us in
foreign nations, or in ancient ages.
According as the persons that inform us of any thing
are many or few, or more or less wise, and faithful, and
credible, so our faith is more or less firm or wavering,
and the proposition believed is either certain or doubtful ;
but in matters of faith, an exceeding great probability
is called a moral certainty.
Faith is generally distinguished into divine and hu
man, not with regard to the propositions that are be
lieved, but with regard to the testimony upon which we
believe them. When God reveals any thing to us, this e
gives us the evidence of divine faith ; but what man
only acquaints us with, produces a human faith in us ;
the one being built upon the word of man, arises but to
moral certainty ; but the other being founded on the
word of God, arises to an absolute and infallible as
surance, so far as we understand the meaning of this
word. This is called supernatural certainty.
Propositions which we believe upon the evidence of
human testimony, are called narratives, relations, re
ports, historical observations, &c. but such as are built
on divine testimony, are termed matters of revelation ;
and if they are of great importance in religion, they are
called articles offaith.
There are some propositions or parts of knowledge,
which are said to be derived from observation and expe
rience, that is, experience in ourselves, and the obser
vations we have made on other persons or things ; but
these are made up of some of the former springs of
knowledge joined together, namely, sense, consciousness,
CH. II. SECT. 9. ] RIGHT USE OF REASON. 161

reason, faith, &c. and therefore they are not reckoned a

distinct kind of evidence.

VI. Inspiration is a sort of evidence distinct from all

the former, and that is, when such an overpowering im
pression of any proposition is made upon the mind by
God himself, that gives a convincing and indubitable
evidence of the truth and divinity of it : so were the pro
phets and the apostles inspired *.
Sometimes God may have been pleased to make use of
the outward senses, or the inward workings of the ima
gination, of dreams, apparitions, visions, and voices, or
reasoning, or perhaps human narration, to convey divine
truths to the mind of the prophet ; but none of these
would be sufficient to deserve the name of inspiration,
without a superior or divine light and power attending
them .
This sort of evidence is also very distinct from what we
usually call divine faith ; for every common christian ex
ercises divine faith when he believes any proposition
which God has revealed in the Bible upon this account,
because God has said it, though it was by a train of rea
sonings that he was led to believe that this is the word
of God: whereas in the case of inspiration, the prophet
not only exercises divine faith, in believing what God re
veals, but he is under a superior heavenly impression,
light, and evidence, whereby he is assured that God re
veals it. This is the most eminent kind of supernatural
certainty.
Though persons might be assured of their own inspi
ration, by some peculiar and inexpressible consciousness of
this divine inspiration and evidence in their own spirits,
yet it is hard to make out this inspiration to others, and
to convince them of it, except by some antecedent or
consequent prophecies or miracles, or some public ap
pearances more than human .
The propositions which are attained by this sort of

* Note here, I speak chiefly of the highest kind of inspiration.

H 3
162 LOGIC ; OR, THE [PART II.

evidence are called inspired truths. This is divine reve

lation at first hand, and the dictates of God in an im
mediate manner, of which theological writers discourse
at large : but since it belongs only to a few favourites of
Heaven to be inspired, and not the bulk of mankind, it
is not necessary to speak more of it in a treatise of Lo
gic, which is designed for the general improvement of
human reason.
The various kinds of evidence upon which we believe
any proposition, afford us these three remarks :

Remark I. The same proposition may be known to us

by different kinds of evidence : that the whole is bigger
than a part is known by our senses, and it is known by
the self- evidence ofthe thing to our mind. That God
created the heavens and the earth is known to us by rea
son, and is known also by divine testimony offaith. ‫گل‬
)
Remark II. Among those various kinds of evidence, )]
some are generally stronger than others in their own na S
ture, and give a better ground for certainty. Inward C
consciousness and intelligence, as well as divine faith and
inspiration, usually carry much more force with them
than sense or humanfaith, which are often fallible; though
there are instances wherein human faith, sense, and rea
soning, lay a foundation also for complete assurance, and
leave no room for doubt.
Reason in its own nature would always lead us into the
truth in matters within its compass, if it were used aright,
or it would require us to suspend our judgement where
there is want of evidence. But it is our sloth, precipi
tancy, sense, passion, and many other things, that lead
our reason astray in this degenerate and imperfect state :
hence it comes to pass that we are guilty of so many er
rors in reasoning, especially about divine things, because
our reason either is busy to inquire, and resolved to de
termine about matters that are above our present reach;
or because we mingle many prejudices and secret in
fluences of sense, fancy, passion, inclination, &c. with our
CH. III.] RIGHT USE OF REASON. 163

exercises of reason, and judge and determine according

to their irregular instances.
Divinefaith would never admit of any controversies or
doubtings, if we were but assured that God had spoken,
and that we rightly understood his meaning.

Remark III . The greatest evidence and certainty of

any proposition does not depend upon the variety ofthe
ways or kinds of evidence, whereby it is known, but
rather upon the strength and degree of evidence, and
the clearness of that light in or by which it appears to
the mind. For a proposition that is known only one
way may be much more certain, and have stronger evi
dence, than another that is supposed to be known many
ways. Therefore these propositions, nothing has no pro
perties ; nothing can make itself; which are known only
by intelligence, are much surer and truer than this pro
position, the rainbow has real and inherent colours in it ;
or than this, the sun rolis round the earth ; though we
seem to know both these last by our senses, and by the
common testimony ofour neighbours. So any proposition
that is clearly evident to our own consciousness or divine
faith, is much more certain to us than a thousand of
others that have only the evidence of feeble and obscure
sensations, of mere probable reasonings and doubtful ar
guments, or the witness of fallible men, or even though
all these should join together .

CHAP. III.

THE SPRINGS OF FALSE JUDGEMENT ; OR, THE DOC

TRINE OF PREJUDICES.

INTRODUCTION.

In the end of the foregoing chapter, we have surveyed

the several sorts of evidence on which we build our as
164 LOGIC ; OR, THE [PART II.

sent to propositions. These are indeed the general

grounds upon which we form our judgements concern
ing things. What remains in this SECOND Part of
LOGIC, is to point out the several springs and causes of
our mistakes in judging, and to lay down some rules by
which we should conduct ourselves in passing a judge
ment on every thing that is proposed to us.
I confess many things which will be mentioned in
these following chapters, might be as well referred to the
THIRD PART OF LOGIC, where we shall treat of reason
ing and argument ; for most of our false judgements seem
to include a secret bad reasoning in them and while we S
shew the springs oferror, and the rules oftrue judgement,
we do at the same time discover which arguments are
fallacious, which reasonings are weak, and which are
just and strong. Yet since this is usually called ajudg
ing ill orjudging well, I think we may without any im
propriety treat of it here ; and this will lay a surer found
ation for all sorts of ratiocination and argument. 1
Rash judgements are called prejudices, and so are the
springs of them. This word in common life signifies an
ill opinion which we have conceived ofsome other person,
or some injury done to him. But when we use the word
in matters of science, it signifies a judgement that isform
ed concerning any person or thing before sufficient exami
nation 2 and generally we suppose it to mean a false
judgement or mistake : at least it is an opinion taken up
without solid reason for it, or an assent given to a pro
position before we have just evidence of the truth of it,
though the thing itself may happen to be true.
Sometimes these rash judgements are called preposses
sions ; whereby is meant, that some particular opinion
has possessed the mind, and engaged the assent, with
out sufficient search or evidence of the truth of it.
There is a vast variety of these prejudices and prepos
sessions, which attend mankind in every age and condi
tion of life ; they lay the foundations of many an error,
and many an unhappy practice, both in the affairs of re
ligion, and in our civil concernments, as well as in mat
CH. III. SECT. 1. ] RIGHT USE OF REASON. 165

ters of learning. It is necessary for a man who pur

sues truth to inquire into the springs of error, that as
far as possible he may rid himself of old prejudices, and
watch hourly against new ones.
The number of them is so great, and they are so in
terwoven with each other, as well as with the powers of
human nature, that it is sometimes hard to distinguish
them apart ; yet for method's sake we shall reduce them
to these four general heads, namely, prejudices arising
from things, or from words, from ourselves, or from other
persons : and after the description of each prejudice, we
shall propose one or more ways of curing it.

SECT. I.
PREJUDICES ARISING FROM THINGS.

THE first sort of prejudices are those which arise from

the things themselves about which we judge. But here let
it be observed, that there is nothing in the nature ofthings
that will necessarily lead us into error, if we do but use
our reason aright, and withhold our judgement till there
appears sufficient evidence of truth . But since we are
so unhappily prone to take advantage of every doubtful
appearance and circumstance of things to form a wrong
judgement, and plunge ourselves into mistake, therefore
it is proper to consider what there is in the things them
selves that may occasion our errors.

I. The obscurity ofsome truths, and the difficulty of

searching them out, is one occasion of rash and mistaken
judgement.
Some truths are difficult because they lie remote from
the first principles of knowledge, and want a long chain
ofargument to come at them: such are many of the deep
things of algebra and geometry, and some of the theo
rems and problems of most parts of the mathematics.
Many things also in natural philosophy are dark and in
166 LOGIC ; OR, THE [PART II.

tricate upon this account, because we cannot come at

any certain knowledge of them without the labour of
many and difficult, as well as chargeable experiments.
There are other truths which have great darkness upon
them, because we have no proper means or medium to
come at the knowledge of them . Though in our age
we have found out many of the deep things of nature by
the assistance of glasses and other instruments ; yet we
are not hitherto arrived at any sufficient methods to dis
cover the shape ofthose little particles of matter which
distinguish the several sapours, odours, and colours of bo
dies ; nor to find what sort of atoms compose liquids or
solids, and distinguish wood, minerals, metals, glass, stones,
&c. There is a darkness also lies upon the actions of
the intellectual or angelical world ; their manners of sub
sistence and agency, the power of spirits to move bodies,
and the union of our souls with this animal body ofours,
are much unknown to us on this account.
Now in many of these cases, a great part of mankind
is not content to be entirely ignorant ; but they rather
choose to form rash and hasty judgements, to guess at
things without just evidence, to believe something con
cerning them before they can know them ; and thereby
they fall into error.
This sort of prejudice, as well as most others, is cured
by patience and diligence in inquiry and reasoning, and
a suspension ofjudgement, till we have attained some pro
per mediums of knowledge, and till we see sufficient evi
dence ofthe truth .

II. The appearance ofthings in a disguise, is another

spring of prejudice, or rash judgement. The outside of
things, which first strikes us, is oftentimes different from
their inward nature ; and we are tempted to judge sud
denly according to outward appearances. If a picture
is daubed with many bright and glaring colours, the
vulgar eye admires it as an excellent piece : whereas
the same person judges very contemptuously ofsome ad
mirable design, sketched out only with a black pencil
CH. III. SECT. 1.] RIGHT USE OF REASON. 167

on a coarse paper, though by the hand of Raphael. So

the scholar spies the name of a new book in a public
newspaper ; he is charmed with the title, he purchases,
he reads with huge expectations, and finds it all trash
and impertinence : this is a prejudice derived from the
appearance ; we are too ready to judge that volume va
luable which had so good a frontispiece. The large
heap of encomiums and swelling words of assurance that
are bestowed on quack-medicines in public advertise
ments, tempt many a reader to judge them infallible, and
to use the pills or the plaister, with vast hope, and fre
quent disappointment.
We are tempted to form our judgement ofpersons as
well as things by these outward appearances. - Where
there is wealth, equipage and splendor, we are ready to
call that man happy ; but we see not the vexing dis
quietudes of his soul : and when we spy a person in rag
ged garments, we form a despicable opinion of him too
suddenly ; we can hardly think him either happy or wise,
our judgement is so strangely biassed by outward and
sensible things. It was through the power of this pre
judice that the Jews rejected our blessed Saviour ; they
could not suffer themselves to believe that the man who
appeared as the Son of a Carpenter was also the Son of
God. And because St. Paul was of little stature, a mean
presence, and his voice contemptible, some ofthe Co
rinthians were tempted to doubt whether he was inspired
or no.
This prejudice is cured by a longer acquaintance with
the world, and a just observation that things are sometimes
better and sometimes worse than they appear to be. We
ought therefore to restrain our excessive forwardness to
form our opinion of persons or things before we have
opportunity to search into them more perfectly. Remem
ber that a grey beard does not make a philosopher ; all is
not gold that glitters ; and a rough diamond may be worth
an immense sum.

III. A mixture of different qualities in the same thing,

 168 LOGIC ; OR, THE [PART II.

is another temptation to judge amiss. We are ready to be

carried away by that quality which strikes the first or
the strongest impressions upon us, and we judge of the
whole object according to that quality, regardless of all
the rest ; or sometimes we colour over all the other qua
lities with that one tincture, whether it be bad or good.
When we have just reason to admire a man for his
virtues, we are sometimes inclined not only to neglect
his weaknesses, but even to put a good colour upon them,
and to think them amiable. When we read a book that
has many excellent truths in it, and divine sentiments,
we are tempted to approve not only that whole book,
but even all the writings of that author. When a poet,
an orator, or a painter, has performed admirably in se
veral illustrious pieces, we sometimes also admire his
very errors, we mistake his blunders for beauties, and
are so ignorantly fond as to copy after them.
It is this prejudice that has rendered so many great
scholars perfect bigots, and incline them to defend Ho
mer or Horace, Livy, or Cicero, in their mistakes, and
vindicate all the follies of their favourite author. It is
this that tempts some great writers to support the say
ings of almost all the ancient fathers of the church, and
admire them even in their very reveries .
On the other hand, if an author has professed heretical
sentiments in religion, we throw our scorn upon every
thing he writes, we despise even his critical or mathe
matical learning, and will hardly allow him common
sense. If a poem has some blemish in it, there is a set
of false critics who decry it universally, and will allow
no beauties there.
This sort of prejudice is relieved by learning to dis
tinguish things well, and not to judge in the lump. There
is scarce any thing in the world of nature or art, in the
world of morality or religion, that is perfectly uniform .
There is a mixture of wisdom and folly, vice and virtue,
good and evil, both in men and things. We should
remember that some persons have great wit and little
judgement ; others are judicious, but not witty. Some
CH. 111. SECT. 1.] RIGHT USE OF REASON. 169

are good humoured without compliment ; others have all

the formalities of complaisance, but no good humour.
We ought to know that one man may be vicious and
learned, while another has virtue without learning. That
many a man thinks admirably well, who has a poor ut
terance ; while others have a charming manner ofspeech,
but their thoughts are trifling and impertinent. Some
are good neighbours, and courteous, and charitable to
ward men, who have no piety towards God ; others are
truly religious, but of morose natural tempers. Some
excellent sayings are found in very silly books, and some
silly thoughts appear in books of value. We should
neither praise or dispraise by wholesale, but separate the
good from the evil, and judge of them apart ; the accu
racy of a good judgement consists much in making such
distinctions.
Yet let it be noted too, that in common discourse we
usually denominate persons and things according to the
major part of their character. He is to be called a wise
man, who has but few follies : he is a good philosopher,
who knows much of nature, and for the most part rea
sons well in matters of human science : and that book
should be esteemed well written, which has more ofgood
sense in it than it has of impertinence.

IV. Though a thing be uniform in its own nature,

yet the different lights in which it may be placed, and the
different views in which it appears to us, will be ready to
excite in us mistaken judgements concerning it. Let an
erect cone be placed on a horizontal plane, at a great dis
tance from the eye, and it appears a plain triangle ; but
we shall judge that very cone to be nothing but a flat
circle, if its base be obverted towards us. Set a common
round plate a little obliquely before our eyes afar off, and
we shall think it an oval figure : but if the very edge of
it be turned towards us, we shall take it for a straight
line. So when we viewthe several folds of a changeable
silk, we pronounce this part red, and that yellow, because
170 LOGIC ; OR, THE [PART II.

of its different position to the light, though the silk laid

smooth in one light appears all of one colour.
When we survey the miseries of mankind, and think
of the sorrows of millions, both on earth and in hell, the
divine government has a terrible aspect, and we may be
tempted to think hardly even of God himself: but if we
view the profusion of his bounty and grace amongst his
creatures on earth, or the happy spirits in heaven, we
shall have so exalted an idea of his goodness as to forget
his vengeance. Some men dwell entirely upon the pro
mises of his gospel, and think him all mercy : others,
under a melancholy frame, dwell upon his terrors and
his threatenings, and are overwhelmed with the thoughts
of his severity and vengeance, as though there were no
mercy in him.
The true method of delivering ourselves from this 10
CO
prejudice, is to view a thing on all sides, to compare all
the various appearances of the same thing with one an h
other, and let each of them have its full weight in the ba
lance of our judgement, before we fully determine our 277
opinion. It was by this means that the modern astro
nomers came to find out that the planet Saturn hath a
flat broad circle round its globe, which is called its ring,
by observing the different appearances as a narrow or a
broader oval, or, as it sometimes seems to be, a straight
line, in the different parts ofits twenty-nine years' revo
lution through the ecliptic. And if we take the same
just and religious survey of the great and blessed God in
all the discoveries of his vengeance and his mercy, we
shall at last conclude him to be both just and good.

V. The casual association ofmany ofour ideas becomes

the spring of another prejudice or rash judgement, to
which we are sometimes exposed. If in our younger
years we have taken medicines that have been nauseous,
when any medicine whatsoever is afterwards proposed to
us under sickness, we immediately judge it nauseous : our
fancy has so closely joined these ideas together, that wẹ
CH. III. SECT. 2. ] RIGHT USE OF REASON. 171

know not how to separate them : then the stomach feels

the disgust, and perhaps refuses the only drug that can
preserve life. So a child who has been let blood joins
the ideas of pain and the surgeon together, and he hates
the sight of the surgeon, because he thinks of his pain :
or if he has drank a bitter potion, he conceives a bitter
idea of the cup which held it, and will drink nothing out
of that cup.
It is for the same reason that the bulk of the common
people are so superstitiously fond of the Psalms trans
lated by Hopkins and Sternhold, and think them sacred
and divine, because they have been now for more than
a hundred years bound up in the same covers with our
bibles.
The best relief against this prejudice of association is
to consider, whether there be any natural and necessary
connexion between those ideas which fancy, custom, or
chance hath thus joined together ; and if nature has not
joined them, let our judgement correct the folly of our
imagination, and separate these ideas again.

SECT. II.

PREJUDICES ARISING FROM WORDS.

OUR ideas and words are so linked together, that while

we judge of things according to words, we are led into se
veral mistakes. These may be distributed under two ge
neral heads, namely, such as arise from single words or
phrases, or such as arise from words joined in speech, and
composing a discourse.
I. The most imminent and remarkable errors, of the
first kind, are these three. ( 1. ) When our words are
insignificant, and have no ideas ; as when the mystical
`divines talk of the prayer ofsilence, the supernatural and
passive night of the soul, the vacuity of powers, the sus
pension of all thoughts : or (2. ) When our words are
equivocal, and signify two or more ideas, as the words,
172 LOGIC ; OR, THE [PART II.

law, light, flesh, spirit, righteousness, and many other

terms in scripture : or ( 3.) When two or three words
are synonymous, and signify one idea, as regeneration, and
new creation in the New Testament : both which mean
only a change ofthe heartfrom sin to holiness ; or, as the
Elector of Cologn and the Bishop ofCologn are two titles
of the same man.
These kind of phrases are the occasion of various mis
takes ; but none so unhappy as those in theology : for
both words without ideas, as well as synonymous and equi
vocal words, have been used and abused by the humours,
passions, interests, or by the real ignorance and weak -
ness ofmen, to beget terrible contests among christians.
But to relieve us under all those dangers, and to re
move these sorts ofprejudices which arise from single words SO
orphrases, I must remit the reader to Part I. Chap. IV. a
where I have treated about words, and to those direc
P
tions which I have given concerning the definition of m
names, Part I. Chap. VI. Sect. 3.
a

II. There is another sort of false judgements or mis

takes which we are exposed to by words, and that is when
they are joined in speech, and compose a discourse ; and
here we are in danger two ways.
The one is, when a man writes good sense, or speaks
much to the purpose, but he has not a happy and en
gaging manner of expression. Perhaps he uses coarse
and vulgar words, or old, obsolete, and unfashionable
language, or terms and phrases that are foreign, lati
nized, scholastic, very uncommon, and hard to be un
derstood: and this is still worse, if his sentences are long
and intricate, or the sound of them harsh and grating to
the ear. All these indeed are defects in style , and lead
some nice and unthinking hearers or readers into an ill
opinion ofall that such a person speaks or writes. Many
an excellent discourse of our forefathers has had abun
dance of contempt cast upon it by our modern pretend
ers to sense, for want of their distinguishing between the
language and the ideas.
CH. III. SECT. 2.1 RIGHT USE OF REASON. 173*

On the other hand, when a man ofeloquence speaks or

writes upon any subject, we are too ready to run into
his sentiments, being sweetly and insensibly drawn
by the smoothness of the harangue, and the pathetic
power ofhis language. Rhetoric will varnish every error,
so that it shall appear in the dress of truth, and put such
ornaments upon vice, as to make it look like virtue : it
is an art of wondrous and extensive influence ; it often
conceals, obscures, or overwhelms the truth, and places
sometimes a gross falsehood in a most alluring light.
The decency of action , the music of the voice, the har
mony ofthe periods, the beauty of the style, and all the
engaging airs of the speaker, have often charmed the
hearers into error, and persuaded them to approve what
soever is proposed in so agreeable a manner. A large
assembly stands exposed at once to the power of these
prejudices, and imbibes them all. So Cicero and De
mosthenes made the Romans and the Athenians believe
almost whatsoever they pleased.
The best defence against both these dangers, is to learn
the skill ( as much as possible) of separating our thoughts
and ideas from words and phrases, to judge of the things
in their own natures, and in their natural or just rela
tion to one another, abstracted from the use of lan
guage, and to maintain a steady and obstinate resolution,
to hearken to nothing but truth, in whatsoever style or
dress it appears .
Then we shall hear a sermon of pious and just sen
timents with esteem and reverence, though the preacher
has but an unpolished style, and many defects in the
manner of his delivery. Then we shall neglect and dis
regard all the flattering insinuations, whereby the orator
would make way for his own sentiments to take posses
sion of our souls, if he has not solid and instructive sense
equal to his language. Oratory is a happy talent when
it is rightly employed , to excite the passions to the prac
tice of virtue and piety ; but, to speak properly, this
art has nothing to do in the search after truth.
174 LOGIC ; OR, THE [PART II.

SECT. III .
PREJUDICE ARISING FROM OURSELVES .

NEITHER words nor things would so often lead us astray

from truth, if we had not within ourselves such springs
of error as these that follow :

I. Many errors are derived from our weakness ofrea

son, and incapacity to judge of things in our infant state.
These are called the prejudices of infancy. - We frame
early mistakes about the common objects which surround
us, and the common affairs of life : we fancy the nurse is
our best friend, because children receive from their
nurses their food and other conveniences of life. We
judge that books are very unpleasant things, because, per
haps, we have been driven to them by the Scourge. We
judge also that the sky touches the distant hills, because
we cannot inform ourselves better in childhood. We
believe the stars are not risen till the sun is set, because
we never see them by day. But some of these errors
may seem to be derived from the next spring.
The way to cure the prejudices of infancy is to distin
guish, as far as we can , which are those opinions which
we framed in perfect childhood ; to remember that at
that time our reason was incapable of forming a right
judgement, and to bring these propositions again to be
examined at the bar of mature reason.

II. Our senses give us many a false information of

things, and tempt us to judge amiss . This is called the
prejudice ofsense ; as when we suppose the sun and moon
to be flat bodies, and to be but a few inches broad, because
they appear so to the eye. Sense inclines us to judge
that air has no weight, because we do not feel it press
heavy upon us ; and we judge also by our senses that
cold and heat, sweet and sour, red and blue, & c. are such
real properties in the objects themselves, and exactly
like those sensations which they excite in us.
CH. III. SECT. 3. ] RIGHT USE OF REASON. 175

Note, Those mistakes of this sort which all mankind

drop and lose in their advancing age, are called mere
prejudices ofinfancy ; but those which abide with the
vulgar part of the world, and generally with all men, till
learning and philosophy cure them, more properly at
tain the name of prejudices of sense.
These prejudices are to be removed several ways. ( 1. )
By the assistance of one sense we cure the mistakes of
another; as when a stick thrust into the water seems crook
ed, we are prevented from judging it to be really so in
itself, for when we take it out of the water, both our sight
and our feeling agree and determine it to be straight.
(2.) The exercise of our reason, and an application to
mathematical and philosophical studies, cures many
other prejudices of sense, both with relation to the hea
venly and earthly bodies. (3.) We should remember
that our senses have often deceived us in various in
stances, that they give but a confused and imperfect re
presentation of things in many cases, that they often re
present falsely those very objects to which they seem to
be suited, such as shape, motion, size and situation, of
gross bodies, if they are but placed at a distance from
us : and as for the minute particles of which bodies are
composed, our senses cannot distinguish them. (4. ) We
should remember also, that one prime and original de
sign of our senses, is to inform us what various relations
the bodies that are round about us bear to our own ani
mal body, and to give us notice what is pleasant and use
ful, or what is painful and injurious to us ; but they are
not sufficient of themselves to lead us into a philosophi
cal acquaintance with the inward nature of things. It
must be confessed, it is by the assistance of the eye and
the ear especially (which are called the senses of disci
pline) that our minds are furnished with various parts
of knowledge, by reading, hearing, and observing things
divine and human ; yet reason ought always to accom
pany the exercise of our senses, whenever we would form
a just judgement of things proposed to our inquiry.
Here it is proper to observe also, that asthe weakness
176 LOGIC ; OR, THE [PART II.

ofreason in our infancy, and the dictates of our senses,

sometimes in advancing years, lead the wiser part of man
kind astray from truth ; so the meaner parts of our spe
cies, persons whose genius is very low, whose judgement
is always weak, who are ever indulging the dictates of
sense and humour, are but children of a larger size, they
stand exposed to everlasting mistakes in life, and live
and die in the midst of prejudices.

III. Imagination is another fruitful spring of false

judgements. Our imagination is nothing else but the va
rious appearances of our sensible ideas in the brain ,
where the soul frequently works in uniting, disjoining,
multiplying, magnifying, diminishing, and altering the
several shapes, colours, sounds, motions, words and
things, that have been communicated to us by the out
ward organs of sense. It is no wonder therefore iffancy
leads us into many mistakes, for it is but sense at second
hand. Whatever is strongly impressed upon the ima
gination, some persons believe to be true. -Some will
choose a particular number in a lottery, or lay a large
wager on a single chance of a die, and doubt not of suc
cess, because theirfancy feels so powerful an impression,
and assures them it will be prosperous. A thousand
pretended prophecies and inspirations, and all the freaks
ofenthusiasm, have been derived from this spring. Dreams
are nothing else but the deceptions of fancy: a delirium
is but a short wildness of the imagination ; and a settled
irregularity of fancy is distraction and madness.
One way to gain a victory over this unruly faculty, is
to set a watch upon it perpetually, and to bridle it in
all its extravagances ; never to believe any thing merely
because fancy dictates it, any more than I would believe
a midnight dream, nor to trustfancy any further than it
is attended with severe reason. It is a very useful and
entertaining power of human nature in matters of illus
tration, persuasion, oratory, poesy, wit, conversation, &c.
but in the calm inquiry after truth, and the final judge
ment of things, fancy should retire, and stand aside, un
CH. III. SECT. 3. ] RIGHT USE OF REASON. 177

less it be called in to explain or illustrate a difficult point

by a similitude.
Another method of deliverance from these prejudices
offancy, is to compare the ideas that arise in our ima
ginations with the real nature of things, as often as we
have occasion to judge concerning them ; and let calm
and sedate reason govern and determine our opinions,
though fancy should shew never so great a reluctance .
Fancy is the inferior faculty, and it ought to obey.

IV. The various passions or affections ofthe mind, are

numerous and endless springs of prejudice. They dis
guise every object they converse with, and put their own
colours upon it, and thus lead the judgement astray from
truth. It is love that makes the mother think her own
child the fairest, and will sometimes persuade us that a
blemish is a beauty. Hope and desire make an hour of
delay seem as long as two or three hours ; hope inclines
us to think there is nothing too difficult to be attempt
ed ; despair tells us that a brave attempt is mere rash
ness, and that every difficulty is insurmountable. Fear
makes us imagine that a bush shaken with the wind has
some savage beast in it, and multiplies the dangers that
attend our path ; but still there is a more unhappy ef
fect offear when it keeps millions of souls in slavery to
the errors of an established religion : what could per
suade the wise men and philosophers of a Popish coun
tryto believe the gross absurdities of the Romish church,
but the fear of torture or death, the galleys or the inqui
sition ? Sorrow and melancholy tempt us to think our cir
cumstances much more dismal than they are, that we
may have some excuse for mourning : and enty repre
sents the condition of our neighbour better than it is,
that there may be some pretence for her own vexation
and uneasiness . Anger, and wrath, and revenge, and all
those hateful passions, excite in us far worse ideas ofmen
than they deserve, and persuade us to believe all that is
ill of them. A detail of the evil influence of the affec
I
178 LOGIC ; OR, the [PART II.

tions ofthe mind upon our judgement, would make a

large volume.
The cure of these prejudices is attained by a con
stant jealousy of ourselves, and watchfulness over our
passions, that they may never interpose when we are call
ed to pass a judgement of any thing : and when our af
fections are warmly engaged, let us abstain from judg
ing. It would be also of great use to us to form our de
liberate judgements of persons and things in the calm
est and serenest hours of life, when the passions ofnature
are all silent, and the mind enjoys its most perfect.com
posure: and these judgements so formed should be trea
sured up in the mind, that we might have recourse to
them in hours of need. See many more sentiments and
directions relating to this subject, in my Doctrine ofthe
Passions. Second edition enlarged .

V. The fondness we have for SELF, and the relation

which other persons and things have to ourselves, furnish
us with another long list ofprejudices. This indeed might
be reduced to the passion ofself-love, but it is so copious
a head that I choose to name it as a distinct spring of
false judgements. We are generally ready to fancy every
thing of our own has something peculiarly valuable in it,
when indeed there is no other reason, but because it is
our own. Were we born among the gardens of Italy,
the rocks of Switzerland, or the ice and snows of Russia
and Sweden, still we should imagine peculiar excellences
in our native land. We conceive a good idea of the
town and village where we first breathed, and think the
better of a man for being born near us. We entertain
the best opinion of the persons of our own party, and
easily believe evil reports of persons of a different sect or
faction. Our own sex, our kindred, our houses, our very
names, seem to have something good and desirable in
them . We are ready to mingle all these with ourselves,
and cannot bear to have others think meanly of them.
So good an opinion have we of our own sentiments and
CH. 111. SECT. 3. ] RIGHT USE OF REASON. 179

practices, that it is very difficult to believe what a re

prover says of our conduct : and we are as ready to as
sent to all the language of flattery. We set up our own
opinions in religion and philosophy as the tests of ortho
doxy and truth ; and we are prone to judge every prac
tice of other men either a duty or a crime, which we think
would be a crime or a duty in us, though their circum
stances are vastly different from our own . This humour
prevails sometimes to such a degree, that we would make
our own taste and inclination the standard by which to
judge of every dish of meat that is set upon the table,
every book in a library, every employment, study, and
business of life, as well as every recreation.
It is from this evil principle ofsetting up selffor a model
what other men ought to be, that the antichristian spirit of
imposition and persecution had its original : though there
is no more reason for it than there was for the practice
of that tyrant who, having a bed fit for his own size, was
reported to stretch men of low stature upon the rack, till
they were drawn out to the length of his bed ; and some
add also, that he cut off the legs of all whom he found
too long for it.
It is also from a principle near akin to this, that we
pervert and strain the writings of many venerable au
thors, and especially the sacred books of scripture, to
make them speak our own sense. Through the influence
which our own schemes or hypotheses have upon the mind,
we sometimes become so sharp-sighted as to find these
schemes in those places of scripture where the holy writ
ers never thought of them, nor the Holy Spirit intended
them . At other times, this prejudice brings such a dim
ness upon the sight, that we cannot read any thing that
opposes our own scheme, though it be written as with
sunbeams, and in the plainest language ; and perhaps
we are in danger in such a case of winking a little against
the light.
Weought tobring our minds free, unbiassed , and teach
able, to learn our religion from the word of God ; but
we have generally formed all the lesser as well as the
1 2
 180 LOGIC ; OR, THE [PART II.
greater points of our religion beforehand, and then we
read the prophets and apostles only to pervert them to
confirm our own opinions. Were it not for this influ
ence of self, and a bigotry to our own tenets, we could
hardly imagine that so many strange, absurd, inconsist
ent, wicked, mischievous, and bloody principles, should
pretend to support and defend themselves by the Gospel
of Christ.
Every learned critic has his own hypothesis ; and if the
common text be not favourable to his opinion, a various
lection shall be made authentic. The text must be sup
posed to be defective or redundant, and the sense of it
shall be literal, or metaphorical, according as it best sup
ports his own scheme. Whole chapters or books shall
be added or left out of the sacred canon, or be turned in
to parables, by this influence. Luther knew not well how
to reconcile the epistle of St. James to the doctrine of
justification by faith alone, and so he could not allow it
to be divine. The Papists bring all the apocrypha into
their bible, and stamp divinity upon it ; for they can fancy
purgatory is there, and they find prayers for the dead.
But they leave out the second commandment, because itfor
bids the worship ofimages. Others suppose the Mosaic his
tory ofthe creation, and the fall of man, to be oriental or
naments, or a mere allegory, because the literal sense of
those three chapters of Genesis do not agree with their
theories. Even an honest plain hearted and unlearned
Christian is ready to find something in every chapter of
the bible to countenance his own private sentiments ;
but he loves those chapters best which speak his own
opinions plainest : this is a prejudice that sticks very
close to our natures ; the scholar is infested with it daily,
and the mechanic is not free.
Self has yet a further and a more pernicious influence
upon our understandings, and is an unhappy guide in
the search after truth. When our own inclination, or
our ease, our honour, or our profit, tempts us to the prac
tice of anything ofsuspected lawfulness, howdo we strain
our thoughts to find arguments for it, and persuade our
CH. III. SECT. 3. ] RIGHT USE OF REASON. 181

selves it is lawful ! We colour over iniquity and sinful

compliance with the names of virtue and innocence, or at
least of constraint and necessity.
All the different and opposite sentiments and practices
of mankind are too much influenced by this mean bri
bery, and give too just occasion for satirical writers to
say, that self-interest governs all mankind.
When the judge had awarded due damages to a per
son into whose field a neighbour's oxen had broke, it is
reported that he reversed his own sentence, when he
heard that the oxen which had done this mischief were
his own. Whether this be a history or a parable, it is
still a just representation of the wretched influence of
selfto corrupt the judgement.
One way to amend this prejudice is, to thrust selfso
far out ofthe question that it may have no manner of in
fluence whensoever we are called to judge and consider
the naked nature, truth, and justice of things. In mat
ters of equity between man and man, our Saviour has
taught us an effectual means of guarding against this
prejudice, and that is, to put my neighbour in the place
of myself, and myselfin the place of my neighbour, rather
than be bribed by this corrupt principle of self-love to
do injury to our neighbours. Thence arises that golden
rule of dealing with others as we would have others deal
with us.
In the judgement of truth and falsehood, right and
wrong, good and evil, we ought to consider that every
man has a SELF as well as we ; and that the tastes, pas
sions, inclinations, and interests of different men are
very different, and often contrary, and that they dictate
contrary things : unless therefore all manner of different
and contrary propositions could be true at once, self
can never be a just test or standard of truth and false
hood, good and evil.

VI. The tempers, humours, and peculiar turns ofthe

mind, whether they be natural or acquired, have a great
182 LOGIC ; OR, THE [PART II.

influence upon our judgement, and become the occasion

of many mistakes. Let us survey a few of them .
( 1.) Some persons are of an easy and credulous temper,
while others are perpetually discovering a spirit ofcon
tradiction.
The credulous man is ready to receive every thing for
truth , that has but a shadow of evidence ; every new
book that he reads, and every ingenious man with whom
he converses, has power enough to draw him into the
sentiments of the speaker or writer. He has so much
complaisance in him, or weakness of soul, that he is ready
to resign his own opinion to the first objection which he
hears, and to receive any sentiments of another that are
asserted with a positive air and much assurance. Thus
he is under a kind of necessity, through the indulgence
of this credulous humour, either to be often changing his
opinions, or to believe inconsistencies .
The man ofcontradiction is of a contrary humour, for
he stands ready to oppose every thing that is said : he
gives a slight attention to the reasons of other men , from
an inward scornful presumption that they have no
strength in them. When he reads or hears a discourse
different from his own sentiments, he does not give him
selfleave to consider whether that discourse may be true ;
but employs all his powers immediately to confute it. Your
great disputers, and your men ofcontroversy, are in con
tinual danger of this sort of prejudice : they contend
often for victory, and will maintain whatsoever they have
asserted, while truth is lost in the noise and tumult of
reciprocal contradictions ; and it frequently happens,
that a debate about opinions is turned into a mutual re
proach ofpersons.
The prejudice of credulity may in some measure be
cured, by learning to set a high value on truth, and by
taking more pains to attain it ; remembering that truth
oftentimes lies dark and deep, and requires us to dig for
it as hid treasure ; and that falsehood often puts on a fair
disguise, and therefore we should not yield up our judge
CH. III. SECT. 3. ] RIGHT USE OF REASON. 183

ment to every plausible appearance. It is no part of

civility or good breeding to part with truth, but to main
tain it with decency and candour.
A spirit ofcontradiction is so pedantic and hateful, that
a man should take much pains with himself to watch
against every instance of it : he should learn so much
good humour, at least, as never to oppose any thing with
out just and solid reason for it : he should abate some
degrees ofpride and moroseness, which are never-failing
ingredients in this sort of temper, and should seek after
so much honesty and conscience, as never to contend for
conquest or triumph ; but to review his own reasons, and
to read the arguments of his opponents ( if possible) with
an equal indifferency, and be glad to spy truth, and to
submit to it, though it appear on the opposite side .
(2.) There is another pair of prejudices derived from
two tempers of mind, near akin to those I have just men
tioned and these are the dogmatical and the sceptical
humour, that is, always positive, or always doubting.
By what means soever the dogmatist came by his opi
nions, whether by his senses or by his fancy, his education
or his own reading, yet he believes them all with the
same assurance that he does a mathematical truth ; he
has scarce any mere probabilities that belong to him ;
every thing with him is certain and infallible ; every
punctilio in religion is an article of his faith, and he an
swers all manner of objections by a sovereign contempt.
Persons of this temper are seldom to be convinced of
any mistake: a full assurance of their own notions makes
all the difficulties on their own side vanish so entirely,
that they think every point of their belief is written as
with sunbeams, and wonder any one should find a dif
ficulty in it. They are amazed that learned men should
make a controversy of what is to them so perspicuous and
indubitable. The lowest rank of people, both in learned
and in vulgar life, is very subject to this obstinacy.
Scepticism is a contrary prejudice. The dogmatist is
sure of every thing, and the sceptic believes nothing.
Perhaps he has found himself often mistaken in matters
184 LOGIC ; OR, THE [PART II.
of which he thought himself well assured in his younger
days, and therefore he is afraid to give assent to any
thing again. He sees so much show ofreason for every
opinion, and so many objections also arising against
every doctrine, that he is ready to throw off the belief
ofevery thing ; he renounces at once the pursuit oftruth,
and contents himself to say there is nothing certain. It is
well, if through the influence of such a temper he does
not cast away his religion as well as his philosophy, and
abandon himself to a profane course of life, regardless
of hell or heaven.
Both these prejudices last mentioned, though they are
so opposite to each other, yet they arise from the same
spring, and that is, impatience ofstudy, and want of dili
gent attention in the search of truth. The dogmatist is in
haste to believe something ; he cannot keep himselflong
enough in suspense, till some bright and convincing
evidence appear on one side, but throws himself casually
into the sentiments of one party or another, and then
he will bear no argument to the contrary. The sceptic
will not take pains to search things to the bottom , but
when he sees difficulties on both sides, resolves to be
lieve neither ofthem . Humility ofsoul, patience in study,
diligence in inquiry, with an honest zealfor truth, would
go a great way towards the cure of both these follies.
(3.) Another sort of temper that is very injurious to
a right judgement of things, is an inconstant, fickle,
changeable spirit, and a very uneven temper of mind.
When such persons are in one humour, they pass a
judgement ofthings agreeable to it ; when their humour
changes, they reverse their first judgement, and em
brace a new opinion . They have no steadiness of soul ;
they want firmness ofmind sufficient to establish them
selves in any truth, and are ready to change it for the
next alluring falsehood that is agreeable to their change
of humour. This fickleness is sometimes so mingled
with their very constitution by nature, or by distemper
ofbody, that a cloudy day and lowering sky shall strongly
incline them to form an opinion both of themselves,
 CH. 111. SECT. 3. ] RIGHT USE OF REASON. 185

and of persons and things round about them, quite

different from what they believe when the sun shines,
and the heavens are serene.
This sort of people ought to judge of things and per
sons in their most sedate, peaceful, and composed hours
of life, and reserve these judgements for their conduct
at more unhappy seasons.
(4.) Some persons have a violent and turgid manner
both of talking and thinking ; whatsoever they judge of,
it is always with a tincture of this vanity. They are
always in extremes, and pronounce concerning every
thing in the superlative. If they think a man to be
learned, he is the chiefscholar ofthe age : if another has
low parts, he is the greatest blockhead in nature : if they
approve any book on divine subjects, it is the best book
in the world, next to the bible : if they speak of a storm
of rain or hail, it is the most terrible storm that fell since
the creation: and a cold winter day is the coldest that
ever was known .
But the men of this swelling language ought to re
member, that nature has ten thousand moderate things
in it, and does not always deal in extremes as they do.
(5.) I think it may be called another sort of prejudice
derived from humour, when some men believe a doctrine
merely because it is ancient, and has been long believed ;
others are so fond of novelty, that nothing prevails upon
their assent so much as new thoughts and new notions.
Again, there are some who set a high esteem upon
every thing that is foreign and far-fetched ; therefore
China pictures are admired, how awkward soever ; others
value things the more for being of our own native
growth, invention, or manufacture, and these as much
despise foreign things.
Some men of letters and theology will not believe a
proposition even concerning a sublime subject, till every
thing mysterious, deep, and difficult is cut off from it,
though the scripture asserts it never so plainly ; others
are so fond of a mystery, and things incomprehensible,
that they would scarce believe the doctrine of the tri
I3
186 LOGIC ; OR, THE [PART II.

nity, if it could be explained ; they incline to that fool

ish rant of one of the ancients, credo quia impossibile est ;
" I believe it because it is impossible."
To cure these mistakes, remember that neither an
tique nor novel, foreign nor native, mysterious nor plain,
are certain characters either of truth or falsehood.
I might mention various other humours ofmen that
excite in them various prejudices, and lead them into
rash and mistaken judgements ; but these are sufficient
for a specimen.

VII . There are several other weaknesses which be

long to human nature whereby we are led into mistakes,
and indeed are rendered almost incapable of passing a
solid judgement in matters of great depth and difficulty.
Some have a native obscurity of perception (or shall I
call it a want of natural sagacity ? ), whereby they are
hindered from attaining clear and distinct ideas. Their
thoughts always seem to have something confused and
cloudy in them, and therefore they judge in the dark.
Some have a defect of memory, and then they are not
capable of comparing their prseent ideas with a great 1
variety of others, in order to secure themselves from
inconsistency in judgement. Others may have a memory
large enough, yet they are subject to the same errors
from a narrowness ofsoul, and such a fixation and con
finement ofthought to afew objects, that they scarce ever
take a survey of things wide enough to judge wisely and
well, and to secure themselves from all inconsistencies.
Though these are natural defects and weaknesses, yet
they may in some measure be relieved by labour, dili
gence, and a due attention to proper rules.
But among all the causes offalse judgement which are
within ourselves, I ought by no means to leave out that
universal and original spring of error, which we are in
formed of by the word of God ; and that is, the sin and
defection of our first parents ; whereby all our best na
tural powers both of mind and body are impaired, and
rendered very much inferior to what they were in a state
 CH. III. SECT. 4. ] RIGHT USE of reason. 187

of innocence. Our understanding is darkened, our me

mory contracted, our corrupt humours and passions are
grown predominant, our reason enfeebled, and various
disorders attend our constitution and animal nature,
whereby the mind is strangely imposed upon in its
judgement of things. Nor is there any perfect relief to
be expected on earth. There is no hope of ever reco
vering from these maladies but by a sincere return to God
in the ways of his own appointment, whereby we shall
be kept safe from all dangerous and pernicious errors
in matters of religion ; and though imperfections and
mistakes will hang about us in the present life, as the
effects of our original apostasy from God, yet we hope
for a full deliverance from them when we arrive at
heaven.

1
SECT. IV .

PREJUDICES ARISING FROM OTHER PERSONS.

WERE it not for the springs ofprejudice that are lurking

in ourselves, we should not be subject to so many mis
takes from the influence of others : but since our nature
is so susceptive of errors on all sides, it is fit we should
have hints and notices given us, how far other persons
may have power over us, and become the causes of our
false judgements. This might all be cast into one heap,
for they are near akin, and mingle with each other ; but
for distinction-sake let them be called the prejudices of
education, of custom, of authority, and such as arise from
the manner of proposal.
I. Those with whom our education is entrusted, may
lay the firstfoundation of many mistakes in our younger
years. How many fooleries and errors are instilled into
us by our nurses, our fellow- children, by servants or un
skilful teachers, which are not only maintained through
the following parts of life, but sometimes have a very
unhappy influence upon us ! We are taught that there
are goblins and bugbearsin the dark ; our young minds
188 LOGIC ; OR, THE [PART 11.

are crowded with the terrible ideas of ghosts appearing

upon every occasion, or with the pleasanter tales offairies
dancing at midnight. We learn to prophesy betimes, to
foretelfuturities by good or evil omens, and to presage ap
proaching death in a family by ravens and little worms,
which we therefore term a death watch. We are taught
to know beforehand, for a twelvemonth together, which
days ofthe week will be fair or foul, which will be lucky
or unlucky; nor is there any thing so silly, but may be
imposed upon our understandings in that early part of
life ; and these ridiculous stories abide with us too long,
and too far influence the weaker part of mankind.
We choose our particular sect and party in the civil,
the religious, and the learnedlife, by the influence of edu
cation. In the colleges of learning, some are for the
nominals, and some for the realists in the science of me
taphysics, because their tutors were devoted to these
parties. The old philosophy and the new have gained
thousands of partisans the same way: and every religion
has its infant votaries, who are born, live, and die in the
same faith, without examination of any article. The
Turks are taught early to believe in Mahomet ; the Jews
in Moses ; the heathen worship a multitude ofgods, under
the force of their education. And it would be well if
there were not millions of Christians, who have little
more to say for their religion , than that they were born
and bred up in it. The greatest part of the Christian
world can hardly give any reason why they believe the
bible to be the word of God, but because they have al
ways believed it, and they were taught so from their
infancy. As Jews, and Turks, and American heathens,
believe the most monstrous and incredible stories, be
cause they have been trained up amongst them, as ar
ticles of faith ; so the Papists believe their transubstan
tiation, and make no difficulty of assenting to impossi
bilities, since it is the current doctrine of their cate
chisms. By the same means the several sects and par
ties in Christianity believe all the strained interpretations
of scripture, by which they have been taught to support
CH . III . SECT . 4. ] RIGHT USE OF REASON. 189

their own tenets : they find nothing difficult in all the

absurd glosses and far-fetched senses that are sometimes
put upon the words of the sacred writers, because their
ears have been always accustomed to these glosses ; and
therefore they sit so smooth and easy upon their un
derstandings, that they know not how to admit the most
natural and easy interpretation in opposition to them.
In the same manner we are nursed up in many silly
and gross mistakes about domestic affairs, as well as in
matters of political concernment. It is upon the same
ground that children are trained up to be whigs and to
ries betimes ; and every one learns the distinguished term
ofhis own party, as the Papists learn to say their prayers
in Latin, without any meaning, reason, or devotion .
This sort of prejudice must be cured by calling all the
principles of our young years to the bar ofmore mature
reason, that we may judge of the things of nature and
political affairs by juster rules ofphilosophy and obser
vation : and even the matters of religion must be first
inquired into by reason and conscience, and when these
have led us to believe scripture to be the word of God,
then that becomes our sovereign guide, and reason and
-conscience must submit to receive its dictates.

II. The next prejudice which I shall mention, is that

which arises from the custom or fashion of those amongst
whom we live. Suppose we have freed ourselves from the
younger prejudices ofour education, yet we are in danger
of having our mind turned aside from truth by the in
fluence of general custom.
Our opinion ofmeats and drinks, ofgarments andforms
of salutation, are influenced much more by custom , than
by the eye, the ear, or the taste. Custom prevails even
over sense itself, and therefore no wonder if it prevails
over reason too. What is it but custom that renders
many ofthe mixtures offood and sauces elegant in Bri
tain, which would be awkward and nauseous to the in
habitants of China, and indeed were nauseous to us when
we first tasted them ? What but custom could make
190 LOGIC ; OR, THE [PART II.

those salutations polite in Muscovy which are ridiculous

in France or England ? We call ourselves indeed the
politer nations, but it is we who judge thus of ourselves :
and that fancied politeness is sometimes more owing to
custom than reason. Why are the forms of our present
garment counted beautiful, and those fashions of our an
cestors the matter of scoff and contempt, which in their
day were all decent and genteel ? It is custom that forms
our opinion ofdress, and reconciles us by degrees to those
habits which at first seemed very odd and monstrous.
It must be granted, there are some garments and habits
which have a natural congruity or incongruity, mo
desty or immodesty, decency or indecency, gaudery
or gravity ; though for the most part there is but little
reason in these affairs : but what little there is of rea·
son or natural decency, custom triumphs over it all . It
is almost impossible to persuade a gay lady that any
thing can be decent which is out of fashion : and it
were well if fashion stretched its powers no further
than the business of drapery and the fair sex.
The methods of our education are governed by cus
tom. It is custom, and not reason, that sends every boy
to learn the Roman poets, and begin a little acquaint
ance with Greek, before he is bound an apprentice
to a soap-boiler or leather-seller. It is custom alone
that teaches us Latin by the rules of a Latin-gram
mar ; a tedious and absurd method ! And what is it
but custom that has for past centuries confined the
brightest geniuses, even of the highest rank in the fe
male world, to the business of the needle only, and
secluded them most unmercifully from the pleasures of
knowledge, and the divine improvements of reason ?
But we begin to break all these chains, and reason
begins to dictate the education of youth. May the
growing age be learned and wise !
It is by the prejudice arising from our own customs,
that we judge of all other civil and religious forms
and practices. The rites and ceremonies of war and
peace in other nations, the forms of weddings and fune
CH. III . SECT. 4.] RIGHT USE OF REASON. 191

rals, the several ranks of magistracy, the trades and em

ployments of both sexes, the public and the domestic af
fairs of life, and almost every thing of foreign customs,
is judged irregular. It is all imagined to be unreason
able or unnatural, by those who have no other rule to
judge of nature and reason, but the customs of their
own country, or the little town where they dwell. Cus
tom is called a second nature, but we often mistake it for
nature itself.
Besides all this, there is a fashion in opinions, there is
a fashion in writing and printing, in style and language.
In our day it is the vogue of the nation, that parlia
ments may settle the succession of the crown, and that a peo
ple can make a king; in the last age this was a doctrine
akin to treason. Citations from the Latin poets were an
embellishment of style in the last century, and whole
pages in that day were covered with them ; it is now
forbidden by custom, and exposed by the name ofpedan
try; whereas in truth both these are extremes. Some
times our printed books shall abound in capitals, and
sometimes reject them all. Now we deal much in essays,
and most unreasonably despise systematic learning,
whereas our fathers had a just value for regularity and
systems ; then folios and quartos were the fashionable
sizes, as volumes in octavo are now. We are ever ready
to run into extremes, and yet custom still persuades
us that reason and nature are on our side.
This business of the fashion has a most powerful in
fluence on our judgements ; for it employs those two
strong engines of fear and shame to operate upon our
understanding with unhappy success. We are ashamed
to believe or profess an unfashionable opinion in philo
sophy, and a cowardly soul dares not so much as in
dulge a thought contrary to the established or fashion
able faith, nor act in opposition to custom, though it be
according to the dictates of reason.
I confess there is a respect due to mankind, which
should incline even the wisest of men to follow the inno
192 LOGIC ; OR, THE [PART II.

cent customs of their country in the outward practices of

civil life, and in some measure to submit to fashion in
all indifferent affairs, where reason and scripture make
no remonstrances against it. But the judgements ofthe
mind ought to be for ever free, and not biassed by the
customs or fashions of any age or nation whatsoever.
To deliver our understandings from this danger and
slavery, we should consider these three things :
1. That the greatest part of the civil customs of any
particular nation or age, spring from humour rather than
reason. Sometimes the humour of the prince prevails,
and sometimes the humour of the people. It is either
the great or the many who dictate the fashion, and these
have not always the highest reason on their side.
2. Consider also, that the customs of the same nation
in different ages, the customs of different nations in the
same age, and the customs of different towns and villages
in the same nation, are very various and contrary to each
other. The fashionable learning, language, sentiments,
and the rules of politeness, differ greatly in different
countries and ages of mankind : but truth and reason are
of a more uniform and steady nature, and do not change
with the fashion. Upon this account, to cure the pre
possessions which arise from custom, it is of excellent use
to travel, and see the customs of various countries, and
to read the travels of other men, and the history of past
ages, that every thing may not seem strange and uncouth
which is not practised within the limits of our own pa
rish, or in the narrow space of our own lifetime.
3. Consider yet again, how often we ourselves have
changed our own opinions concerning the decency, pro
priety, or congruity of several modes or practices in the
world, especially if we have lived to the age of thirty or
forty. Custom or fashion, even in all its changes, has
been ready to have some degree of ascendancy over our
understandings, and what at one time seemed decent, ap
pears obsolete and disagreeable afterward, when thefashion
changes. Let us learn therefore to abstract as much as
CH. III. SECT. 4. ] RIGHT USE OF REASON. 198

possible from custom and fashion, when we would pass a

judgement concerning the real value and intrinsic nature
of things .

III. The authority ofmen, is the spring ofanother rank

of prejudices.
Among these, the authority of our forefathers and an
cient authors is most remarkable. We pay deference to
the opinion of others, merely because they lived a thou
sand years before us ; and even the trifles and imperti
nences that have a mark of antiquity upon them, are re
verenced for this reason, because they came from the
ancients.
It is granted, that the ancients had many wise and
great men among them, and some of their writings which
time hath delivered down to us, are truly valuable : but
those writers lived rather in the infant state of the world;
and the philosophers, as well as the polite authors of our
age, are properly the elders, who have seen the mistakes
of the younger ages of mankind, and corrected them by
observation and experience.
Some borrow all their religion from the fathers ofthe
Christian church ; or from their synods or councils : but
he that will read Monsieur Daille on the use of the fa
thers, will find many reasons why they are by no means
fit to dictate our faith, since we have the gospel of Christ,
and the writings of the Apostles and Prophets, in our
own hands.
Some persons believe every thing that their kindred,
their parents, and their tutors believe. The veneration
and the love which they have for their ancestors, incline
them to swallow down all their opinions at once, without
examining what truth or falsehood there is in them.
Men take up their principles by inheritance, and defend
them as they would their estates, because they are born
heirs to them . I freely grant, that parents are appoint
ed by God and nature to teach us all the sentiments and
practices of our younger years ; and happy are those
whose parents lead them into the paths of wisdom and
194 LOGIC ; OR, THE [PART II.

truth ! I grant further, that when persons come to years

of discretion, and judge for themselves, they ought to
examine the opinions of their parents, with the greatest
modesty, and with a humble deference to their supe
rior character; they ought, in matters perfectly dubious,
to give the preference to their parents' advice, and always
to pay them the first respect, nor ever depart from their
opinions and practice, till reason and conscience make
it necessary. But after all, it is possible that parents
may be mistaken , and therefore reason and scripture
ought to be our final rules of determination in matters
that relate to this world, and that which is to come.
Sometimes afavourite author, or a writer ofgreat name,
drags a thousand followers after him in his own mistakes,
merely by the authority of his name and character. The 2
sentiments of Aristotle were imbibed and maintained by
all the schools in Europe for several centuries ; and a
citation from his writings was thought a sufficient proof 1
of any proposition. The great Descartes had also too
many implicit believers in the last age, though he him
self, in his philosophy, disclaims all such influence over
the minds of his readers. Calvin and Luther, in the
days of reformation from Popery, were learned and pi
´ous men, and there have been a succession of their dis
ciples even to this day, who pay too much reverence to
the words of their masters. There are others who re
nounce their authority, but give themselves up in too
servile a manner to the opinion and authority of other
masters, and follow as bad or worse guides in religion.
If only learned, and wise, and good men had influence
on the sentiments of others, it would be at least a more
excusable sort ofprejudice, and there would be some co
lour and shadow of reason for it : but that riches, ho
nours, and outward splendour should set up persons for
dictators to all the rest of mankind ; this is a most shame
ful invasion ofthe right ofour understandings on the one
hand, and as shameful a slavery of the soul on the other.
The poor man, or the labourer, too often believes such a
principle in politics, or in morality, and judges concern
CH. III. SECT. 4.] RIGHT USE OF REASON. 195

ing rights ofthe king and the people, just as his wealthy
neighbour does.- Half the parish follows the opinion of
the esquire, and the tenants of a manor fall into the sen
timents of their lord, especially if he lives amongst them.
How unreasonable, and yet how common is this !
As for principles of religion, we frequently find how
they are taken up and forsaken, changed and resumed
by the influence of princes. In all nations the priests
have much power also in dictating the religion ofthe peo
ple, but the princes dictate to them : and where there is
a great pomp and grandeur attending the priesthood in
any religion whatsoever, with so much the more reve
rence and stronger faith do the people believe whatever
they teach them : yet it is too often evident that riches,
and dominions, and high titles, in church or state, have no
manner of pretence to truth and certainty, wisdom and
goodness, above the rest of mortals, because these supe
riorities in this world are not always conferred accord
ing to merit.
I confess, where a man of wisdom and years, of obser
vation and experience, gives us his opinion and advice in
matters of the civil or the moral life ; reason tells us we
should pay a great attention to him, and it is probable,
he may be in the right. Where a man of long exercise
in piety speaks of practical religion, there is a due de
ference to be paid to his sentiments : and the same we
may say concerning an ingenious man long versed in any
art or science, he may justly expect due regard when he
speaks of his own affairs and proper business. But in
other things each of these may be ignorant enough, not
withstanding all their piety and years, and particular
skill : nor even in their own proper province are they to
be believed in every thing without reserve, and without
examination.
To free ourselves from these prejudices, it is sufficient
to remember, that there is no rank nor character among
mankind, which has any just pretence to sway the judge
ments of other men by their authority : for there have
been persons of the same rank and character who have
196 LOGIC ; OR, THE [PART II.

maintained different and contrary sentiments ; but all

these can never be true, and therefore the mere name or
reputation that any of them possesses, is not a sufficient
evidence of truth.
Shall we believe the ancients in philosophy ? But some
of the ancients were Stoics, some Peripatetics, some Pla
tonics, and some Epicureans, some Cynics, and some
Sceptics. Shall we judge of matters of the Christianfaith
by the fathers, or primitive writers for three or four hun
dred years after Christ ? But they often contradicted
one another, and themselves too ; and what is worse,
they sometimes contradicted the scripture itself. Now
among all these different and contrary sentiments in phi
losophy and religion, which of the ancients must we be
lieve, for we cannot believe them all ?
Again, To believe in all things as our predecessors
did, is the ready way to keep mankind in an everlasting
state of infancy, and to lay an eternal bar against all the
improvements of our reason and our happiness. Had
the present age of philosophers satisfied themselves with
the substantial forms and occult qualities of Aristotle, with
the solid spheres, eccentrics, and epicycles of Ptolemy, and
the ancient astronomers ; then the great Lord Bacon,
Copernicus and Descartes, with the greater Sir Isaac
Newton, Mr. Locke, and Mr. Boyle, had risen in our
world in vain. We must have blundered on still in suc
cessive generations among absurdities and thick dark
ness, and a hundred useful inventions for the happiness
of human life had never been known.
Thus it is in matters of philosophy and science. But,
you will say, shall not our own ancestors determine our
judgement in matters of civil or religious concernment ? If
they must, then the child of a heathen must believe that
heathenism is truth ; the son of a Papist must assent to
all the absurdities of Popery: the posterity of the Jews
and Socinians must for ever be Socinians and Jews ; and
a man whose father was of republican principles, must
make a succession of republicans in his family to the end
of the world. If we ought always to believe whatsoever
 CH. III. SECT. 4.] RIGHT USE OF REASON. 197

our parents, or our priests, or our princes believe, the in

habitants of China ought to worship their own idols, and
the savages of Africa ought to believe all the nonsense,
and practice the idolatry of their negro fathers and kings.
The British nation, when it was heathen, could never
have become Christian ; and when it was a slave to Rome,
it could never have been reformed.
Besides, let us consider, that the great God, our com
mon maker, has never given one man's understanding a
legal and rightful sovereignty to determine truths for
others, at least after they are past the state of childhood
or minority. No single persons, how learned and wise .
and great soever, or whatsoever natural, or civil, or ec
clesiastical relation he may have to us, can claim this do
minion over our faith. St. Paul the Apostle, in his pri
vate capacity, would not do it ; nor hath an inspired
man any such authority, until he makes his divine com
mission appear. Our Saviour himself tells the Jews, that
if he had not done such wondrous works among them, they
had not sinned in disbelieving his doctrines, and refusing
him for the Messiah. No bishop or presbyter, no synod
or council, no church or assembly of men, since the days
of inspiration, hath power derived to them from God,
to make creeds or articles of faith for us, and impose
them upon our understandings. We must all act ac
cording to the best of our own light, and the judgement
of our own consciences, using the best advantages which
Providence hath given us, with honest and impartial di
ligence to inquire and search out the truth : for every
one of us must give an account ofhimselfto God. To be
lieve as the church, or the court believes, is but a sorry and
a dangerous faith : this principle would make more hea
thens than Christians, and more Papists than Protestants ;
and perhaps lead more souls to hell than to heaven ; for
our Saviour himself has plainly told us, that if the blind
will be led by the blind they must both fall into the ditch.
Though there be so much danger of error arising from
the three prejudices last mentioned, yet before I dismiss
this head, I think it proper to take notice, that as edu
 198 LOGIC ; OR, THE [PART II.

cation, custom, and authority, are no sure evidences of

truth, so neither are they certain marks offalsehood ; for
reason and scripture may join to dictate the same things
which our parents, our nurses, our tutors, our friends,
and our country, believe and profess. Yet there appears
sometimes in our age, a pride and petulancy in youth,
zealous to cast off the sentiments of their fathers and
teachers, on purpose to shew that they carry none ofthe
prejudices of education and authority about them. They
indulge all manner of licentious opinions and practices,
from a vain pretence of asserting their liberty. But
alas ! this is but changing one prejudice for another ;
and sometimes it happens by this means, that they make
a sacrifice both of truth and virtue to the vile prejudices
of their pride and sensuality.

IV. There is another tribe ofprejudices which are near

akin to those of authority, and that is when we receive
a doctrine because of the manner in which it is proposed
to us by others. I have already mentioned the powerful
influence that oratory and fine words have to insinuate a
false opinion, and sometimes truth is refused, and suf
fers contempt in the lips of a wise man, for want of the
charms of language : but there are several other manners
ofproposals, whereby mistaken sentiments are power
fully conveyed into the mind.
Some persons are easily persuaded to believe what an
other dictates with a positive air, and a great degree of
assurance they feel the overbearing force of a confident
dictator, especially if he be of a superior rank or cha
racter to themselves.
Some are quickly convinced of the truth of any doc
trine, when he that proposes it puts on all the airs of
piety, and makes solemn appeals to heaven, and protesta
tions of the truth ofit : the pious mind of a weaker Chris
tian, is ready to receive any thing that is pronounced
with such an awful solemnity.
It is a prejudice near akin to this , when a humble soul
is frighted into any particular . sentiments of religion,
CH. III . SECT. 4. ] RIGHT Use of reason. 199

because a man of great name or character pronounces

heresy upon the contrary sentiments, casts the disbeliever
out of the church, and forbids him the gates of heaven.
Others are allured into particular opinions by gentler
practices on the understanding : not only the soft tem
pers of mankind, but even hardy and rugged souls, are
sometimes led away captives to error by the soft air of
address, and the sweet and engaging methods of persua
sion and kindness.
I grant where natural or revealed religion plainly dic
tate to us the infinite and everlasting importance of any
sacred doctrine, it cannot be improper to use any of
these methods, to persuade men to receive and obey the
the truth, after we have given sufficient reason and ar
gument to convince their understandings. Yet all these
methods, considered in themselves, have been often used
to convey falsehood into the soul as well as truth ; and
if we build our faith merely upon these foundations,
without regard to the evidence of truth, and the strength
of argument, our belief is but the effect ofprejudice : for
neither the positive, the awful or solemn, the terrible or
the gentle methods of address, carry any certain evidence
with them that truth lies on that side.
There is another manner of proposing our own opi
nion, or rather opposing the opinions of others, which
demands a mention here, and that is when persons make
a jest serve instead of an argument ; when they refute
what they call error by a turn of wit, and answer every
objection against their own sentiments, by casting a sneer
upon the objector. These scoffers practise with success
upon weak and cowardly spirits : such as have not been
well established in religion or morality, have been laugh
ed out of the best principles by a confident buffoon ; they
have yielded up their opinions to a witty banter, and sold
their faith and religion for ajest.
There is no way to cure these evils in such a degene
rate world as we live in, but by learning to distinguish
well between the substance ofany doctrine, and the man
ner of address, either in proposing, attacking, or defend
200 LOGIC ; OR, THE [PART II.

ing it ; and then by setting a just and severe guard of

reason and conscience over all the exercises of ourjudge
ment, resolving to yield to nothing but the convincing
evidence of truth, religiously obeying the light of reason
in matters of pure reason, and the dictates of revelation
in things that relate to our faith.
Thus we have taken a brief survey of some of the in
finite varieties ofprejudice that attend mankind on every
side in the present state, and the dangers of error or of
rash judgement we are perpetually exposed to in this
life: this chapter shall conclude with one remark, and
one piece of advice.
The remark is this. The same opinion, whetherfalse
or true, may be dictated by many prejudices at the same
time ; for, as I hinted before, prejudice may happen to
dictate truth sometimes as well as error. But where two
or more prejudices oppose one another, as it often hap
pens, the stronger prevails and gains the assent : yet
how seldom does reason interpose with sufficient power
to get the ascendant of them all, as it ought to do !
The advicefollows, namely, Since we find such a swarm
ofprejudices attending us both within and without; since
we feel the weakness of our reason, the frailty of our
natures, and our insufficiency to guard ourselves from
error upon this account, it is not at all unbecoming the
character of a logician or a philosopher, together with the
advice already given, to direct every person in his search
after truth to make his daily addresses to heaven, and
implore the God of truth to lead him into all truth, and
to ask wisdom ofhim who giveth liberally to them that ask
it, and upbraideth us not with our own follies.
Such a devout practice will be an excellent prepara
tive for the best improvement of all the directions and
rules proposed in the two following chapters.
CH. IV.] RIGHT USE OF REASON. 201

CHAP. IV .

GENERAL DIRECTIONS TO ASSIST US IN JUDGING ARIGHT.

THE chief design of the art of Logic is to assist us in

forming a true judgement of things ; a fewproper obser
vations for this end have been dropped occasionally in
some of the foregoing chapters ; yet it is necessary to
mention them again in this place, that we may have a
more complete and simultaneous view of the general di
rections which are necessary in order to judge aright. A
multitude of advices may be framed for this purpose ;
the chief of them may, for order's sake, be reduced to
the following heads.

I. Direction. When we consider ourselves as philo

sophers, or searchers after truth, we should examine all
our old opinions afresh, and inquire what was the ground
of them, and whether our assent were built on just evi
dence ; and then we should cast off all those judgements
which wereformed heretofore withoue due examination . A
man in pursuit of knowledge should throw off all those
prejudices which he had imbibed in time past, and guard
against all the springs of error, mentioned in the pre
ceding chapter, with the utmost watchfulness for the
time to come.
Observe here, That this rule of casting away all our
former prejudicate opinions and sentiments, is not pro
posed to any of us to be practised at once, considered
as men ofbusiness or religion, as friends or neighbours, as
fathers or sons, as magistrates, subjects, or Christians ;
but merely as philosophers and searchers after truth : and
though it may be well presumed that many of our judge
ments, both true and false, together with the practices
built thereon in the natural, the civil, and the religious
life, were formed without sufficient evidence ; yet an
universal rejection of all these might destroy at once our
Κ
202 LOGIC ; OR, THE [PART 11.

present sense and practice of duty with regard to God,

ourselves, and our fellow-creatures. Mankind would be
hereby thrown into such a state of doubting and indif
ference, that it would be too long ere they recovered any
principles of virtue or religion by a train of reasonings.
Besides the common affairs of human life often de
mand a much speedier determination, and we must many
times act upon present probabilities : the bulk of man
kind have not time and leisure, and advantages suffi
cient to begin all their knowledge anew, and to build
up every single opinion and practice afresh, upon the
justest grounds of evidence.
Yet let it be observed also, that so far as any person is
capable of forming and correcting his notions, and his
rules of conduct in the natural, civil, and religious life,
by the strict rules of Logic ; and so far as he hath time
and capacity to view his old opinions, to re-examine all
those which are any ways doubtful, and to determine
nothing without just evidence, he is likely to become so
much the wiser and the happier man, and if divine grace
assist him, so much the better Christian. And though
this cannot be done all at once, yet it may be done by
prudent steps and degrees, till our whole set of opinions
and principles be in time corrected and reformed, or at
least established upon juster foundations.

II. Direct. Endeavour that all your ideas ofthose objects,

concerning whichyou pass anyjudgement, be clear and dis
tinct, complete, comprehensive, extensive, and orderly, as
far as you have occasion to judge concerning them. This
is the substance of the last chapter of the first part of
Logic. The rules which direct our conceptions must be
reviewed, if we would form our judgements aright. But
if we will make haste to judge at all adventures, while
our ideas are dark and confused, and very imperfect, we
shall be in danger of running into many mistakes. This
is like a person who would pretend to give the sum
total of a large account in arithmetic, without surveying
CH. IV.] RIGHT USE OF REASON. 203

all the particulars ; or as a painter, who professes to

draw a fair and distinct landskip in the twilight, when
he can hardly distinguish a house from a tree.
Observe here, That this direction does not require us
to gain clear, distinct, complete ideas of things in all
their parts, powers, and qualities, in an absolute sense ;
for this belongs to God alone, and is impossible for us
to attain : but it is expressed in a relative or limited
sense ; that is, our ideas should be clear, distinct, and
comprehensive, &c. at least so far as we have occasion
at that time to judge concerning them. We may form
many true and certain judgements concerning God, an
gels, animals, man, heaven, hell, &c. by those partial
and very imperfect conceptions of them to which we
have attained, if we judge no further concerning them
than our conceptions reach.
We may have a clear and distinct idea of the ex
istence of many things in nature, and affirm that they
do exist, though our ideas of their intimate essences and
causes, their relations and manners of action, are very
confused and obscure . We may judge well concerning
several properties of any being , though other properties
are unknown ; for perhaps we know not all the proper
ties of any being whatsoever .
Sometimes we have clear ideas of the absolute pro
perties ofan object ; and we may judge of them with cer
tainty, while the relative properties are very obscure and
unknown to us. So we may have a clear and just idea
of the area of a parallelogram, without knowing what
relation it bears to the area of a triangle, or a polygon ;
I may know the length of the diameter of a circle, with
out knowing what proportion it has to the circumference.
There are other things, whose external relative pro
perties, with respect to each other, or whose relation to
us, we know better than their own inward and absolute
properties, or their essential distinguishing attributes.
We perceive clearly, thatfire will warm or burn us, and
will evaporate water; and that water will allay our thirst,
or quench the fire, though we know not the inward dis
K 2
204 LOGIC ; OR, THE [PART II.

tinguishing particles, or prime essential properties offire

or water. We may know the King and Lord Chancellor,
and affirm many things of them in their legal characters
though we can have but a confused idea of their persons
or natural features, ifwe have never seen their faces. So
the scripture has revealed God himself to us, as our
Creator, Preserver, Redeemer, and Sanctifier, and as the
object ofour worship, in clearer ideas than it has revealed
many other abstruse questions which may be raised
about his own divine essence or substance, his immensity
or omnipresence.
This therefore is the general observation in order to
guide our judgements, that we should not allow ourselves
to form a judgement concerning things further than our
clear and distinct ideas reach, and then we are not in
danger of error.
But there is one considerable objection against this rule,
which is necessary to be answered ; and there is one just
and reasonable exception, which is as needful to be men
tioned.
The objection is this : may we not judge safely con
cerning some total or complete ideas, when we have a
clear perception only of some parts or properties ofthem?
May we not affirm, that all that is in God is eternal, ' or
that all his unknown attributes are infinite, though we
have so very imperfect an idea of God, eternity, and in
finity? Again, may we not safely judge of particular
objects, whose idea is obscure, by a clear idea of the ge
neral ? May I not affirm, that every unknown species of
animals has inward springs of motion, because I have a
clear idea that these inward springs belong to an animal
in general ?
Answer. All those supposed unknown parts, properties,
or species, are clearly and distinctly perceived to be con
nected with or contained in the known parts, properties,
or general ideas, which we suppose to be clear and dis
tinct as far as we judge of them and as we have no
particular idea of those unknown divine attributes, or un
known species of animals ; so there is nothing particular
CH. IV. ] RIGHT USE OF REASON. 205

affirmed concerning them beyond what belongs to the

general idea of divine attributes or animals, with which
I clearly and distinctly perceive them to be connected.
It may be illustrated in this manner. Suppose a long
chain lies before me, whose nearest links I see are iron
rings, and I see them fastened to a post near me, but
the most distant links lie beyond the reach of my sight,
so that I know not whether they are oval or round, brass
or iron : now I may boldly affirm, the whole length ofthis
chain is fastened to the post, for I have a clear idea that
the nearest links are thus fastened, and a clear idea that
the distant links are connected with the nearest, ifI can
draw the whole chain by one link.
Or thus : If two known ideas, A and B, are evidently
joined or agree, and if C unknown be included in A,
and also D unknown be included in B, then I may af
firm that C and D are joined and agree : for I have a
clear perception of the union of the two known ideas A
and B ; and also a clear perception of the connexion of
the unknown ideas with the known. So that clear and
distinct ideas must still abide as a general necessary
qualification, in order to form a right judgement : and
indeed it is upon this foot that all ratiocination is built,
and the conclusions are thus formed, which deduce
things unknown from things known.
Yet it seems to me, that there is one just limitation
or exception to this general rule ofjudgement, as built on
clear and distinct ideas, and it is this :
Exception. In matters ofmere testimony, whether hu
man or divine, there is not always a necessity of clear and
distinct ideas of the things which are believed. Though
the evidence of propositions, which are entirely formed
by ourselves, depends on the clearness and distinctness
of those ideas of which they are composed, and on our
own clear perception of their agreement or disagree
ment, yet we may justly assent to propositions formed
by others, when we have neither a very clear conception
in ourselves of the two ideas contained in the words,
nor how they agree or disagree : provided always, that
206 LOGIC ; OR, THE [PART II.
we have a clear and sufficient evidence of the credibi
lity ofthe persons who inform us.
Thus when we read in scripture the great doctrines
of the Deity of Christ, ofthe union of the divine and hu
man natures in him, of the divine agency of the blessed
Spirit, that the Son is the brightness ofhis Father's glory,
that all things were created by him and for him, that the
Son shall give up his kingdom to the Father, and that God
shall be all in all ; we may safely believe them : for
though our ideas of these objects themselves are not
sufficiently clear, distinct, and perfect, for our own minds
to form these judgements or propositions concerning
them, yet we have a clear and distinct perception of
God's revealing them, or that they are contained in
scripture ; and this is sufficient evidence to determine
our assent.
The same thing holds true, in some measure, where
credible human testimony assures us of some propositions,
while we have no sufficient ideas of the subject and pre
dicate of them to determine our assent. So when an
honest and learned mathematician assures a ploughman
that the three angles ofa triangle are equal to two right
angles, or that the square of the hypothenuse of a right
angled triangle is equal to the sum of the squares of the
two sides ; the ploughman, who has but confused ideas
of these things, may firmly and safely believe these pro
positions, upon the same ground, because he has evi
dence of the skill and faithfulness of his informer* .

* Perhaps some may object against this representation of things, and say,
that " We cannot properly be said to believe a proposition any further than we
ourselves have ideas under the terms : therefore if we have no ideas under the
terms, we believe nothing but the connexion of words or sounds ; and if ' we
have but obscure and inadequate ideas under the terms, then we partly believe
a connexion of things and partly a connexion of sounds. But that we cannot
properly be said to believe the proposition, for our faith can never go beyond
our ideas .
Now to set this matter in a clear light. I suppose that every proposition
which is proposed to my assent, is a sentence made up of terms which have
some ideas under them known or unknown to me. I confess, if I believe there
are no ideas at all under the terms, and there is nothing meant by them, then
indeed, with regard to me, it is the merejoining ofsounds: but if, for instance,
a ploughman has credible information from an honest and skilful mathema
CH. IV.] RIGHT USE OF REASON. 207

III. Direction. When you have obtained as clear

and comprehensive ideas as is needful, both of the sub

tician, that an ellipsis is made by the section ofa cone, he believes the proposi
tion or he believes the sentence is true, as it is made up of terms which his
informant understands, though the ideas be unknown to him, that is, he be
lieves there are some ideas which his informant has under these words which
are really connected. And, I think, this may justly be called believing the pro
position, for it is a belief of something more than the mere joining of sounds ;
it is a belief ofthe real connexion of some unknown ideas belonging to those
sounds, and inthis sense a man may be said to believe the truth ofa proposition
which he doth not understand at all.
With more reason still may we be said to believe the proposition upon cre
dible testimony if we have some sort of ideas under the terms, though they
are but partial, or inadequate and obscure ; such as divine answers were given
by Urim and Thummim; for since it is purely upon testimony we believe the
known parts of the ideas signified by those words to be connected, upon the
same testimony we may also believe all the unknown parts of the ideas signi
fied by those words to be connected, namely because our informant is knowing
and faithful. And in this sense we mayjustly be said to believe a proposition
ofscripture entirely, which we understand but very imperfectly, because God
who reveals it is knowing and faithful in perfection.
And indeed, unless this representation ofthe matter be allowed, there are
but very few propositions in the world , even in human things, to which we can
give an entire assent, or which we may be said either to know, or to believe,
because there is scarce any thing on earth of which we have an adequate and
most perfect idea. And it is evident, that in divine things there is scarce any
thing which we could either know or believe without this allowance : for
though reason and revelation join to inform me that God is boly, how exceed
ing inadequate are my ideas of God, and of his boliness ! Yet I may boldly and
entirely assent to this whole proposition, since I am sure that every known and
unknown idea signified by the term God, is connected with the ideas of the
term boliness, because reason partly informs me, but especially because the di
vine testimony which has connected them is certainly credible.
I might argue upon this head perhaps more forcibly from the doctrine of
God's incomprehensibleness. If we could believe nothing but what we have
ideas of, it would be impossible for us to believe that God is incomprehensible:
for this implies in it a belief that there are some unknown ideas belonging to
the nature of God ; therefore we do both believe and profess that something
concerning unknown ideas, when we believe and profess that God is incompre
hensible.
I persuade myself that most of those very persons who object against my
representation of things, will yet readily confess, they believe all the proposi
tions in scripture, rather than declare they do not believe several ofthem; though
they must acknowledge that several of them are far above their understanding,
or that they have scarce any ideas of the true sense of them ; and therefore
where propositions derived from credible testimony are made up of dark or in
adequate ideas, I think it is much more proper to say, we believe them than
that we do not believe them, lest we cut off a multitude of the propositions of
the Bible from our assent of faith.
Yet let it be observed here, that when we believe a proposition on mere
testimony, of which we have no ideas at all, we can only be said to give a
208 LOGIC ; OR, THE [PART II.

ject and predicate of a proposition, then compare those

ideas of the subject and predicate together with the utmost
attention, and observe how far they agree, and wherein
they differ : whether the proposition may be affirmed ab
solutely or relatively, whether in whole or in part, whe
ther universally or particularly, and then under what
particular limitations. Turn these ideas about in your
mind, and take a view of them on all sides, just as a
mason would do to see whether two hewn stones exactly
suit each other in every part, and are fit to be joined in
erecting a carved or fluted pillar.
Compare the whole subject with the whole predicate
in their several parts : take heed in this matter that you
neither add to nor diminish the ideas contained in the
subject or in the predicate ; for such an inadvertence or
mistake will expose you to great error in judgement.

IV. Direction. Search for evidence oftruth with dili

gence and honesty, and be heartily ready to receive evidence,
whetherfor agreement or disagreement of ideas.
Search with diligence ; spare no labour in searching
for the truth in due proportion to the importance of
the proposition. Read the best authors who have writ

general implicit assent to the truth of that proposition, without any particular
knowledge of, or explicit assent to the special truth contained in that proposition :
and this our implicit assent is of very little use, unless it be to testify our belief
of the knowledge and veracity of him that informs us.
Asour ideas of a proposition are more or less clear and adequate, as well as
just and proper, so we do explicitly assent more or less to the particular truth
contained in that proposition ; and our assent hereby becomes more or less
useful for the increase of our knowledge, or the direction of our practice.
When divine testimony plainly proposes to our faith such a proposition
whereof we have but obscure, doubtful, and inadequate ideas, we are bound
implicitly to believe the truth of it, as expressed in those terms, in order to
show our submission to God who revealed it, as a God of perfect knowledge
and veracity but it is our duty to use all proper methods to obtain a further
and explicit knowledge of the particular truth contained in the proposition, if
we would improve by it either in knowledge or virtue. All necessary rules of
grammar and criticism should be employed to find out the very ideas that be
long to those words, and which were designed by the divine speaker or writer.
Though we may believe the truth of a proposition which we do not understand,
yettrwe
be ue. should endeavour to understand every proposition which we believe to
CH. IV.] RIGHT USE OF REASON. 209

on that subject ; consult your wise and learned friends

in conversation ; and be not unwilling to borrow hints
toward your improvement from the meanest person, nor
to receive any glimpse of light from the most unlearned.
Diligence and humility is the way to thrive in the riches
of the understanding, as well as in gold or silver.
Search carefully for the evidence of truth and dig for
wisdom asfor hid treasure.
Search with a steady honesty of soul, and a sincere
impartiality to find the truth. Watch against every
temptation that might bribe your judgement or warp it
aside from truth. Do not indulge yourself to wish any
unexamined proposition were true or false. A wish often
perverts the judgement, and tempts the mind strangely
to believe upon slight evidence whatsoever we wish to
be true or false.

V. Direction. Since the evidence of the agreement or

disagreement of two ideas is the ground of our assent to
any proposition, or the great criterion of truth ; there
fore we should suspend our judgement and neither affirm
nor deny till this evidence appear.
This direction is different from the second : for though
the evidence of the agreement or disagreement of the two
ideas most times depends on the clearness and distinct
ness of the ideas themselves, yet it does not always arise
thence. Testimony may be a sufficient evidence of the
agreement or disagreement of two obscure ideas, as we
have seen just before in the exception under the second
direction. Therefore, though we are not universally
and in all cases bound to suspend our judgement, till
our ideas of the objects themselves are clear and distinct,
yet we must always suspend our judgement, and with
hold our assent to, or denial of any proposition, till
some just evidence appear of its truth or falsehood. It'
is an impatience of doubt and suspense, a rashness and
precipitance of judgement, and hastiness to believe'
something on one side or the other, that plunges us'
into many errors .
K 8
210 LOGIC ; OR, THE [PART II.

This direction to delay and suspend our assent is

more particularly necessary to be observed when such
propositions offer themselves to us as are supported
by education, authority, custom, inclination, interest, or
other powerful prejudices ; for our judgement is led
away insensibly to believe all that they dictate ; and
where prejudices and dangers of error are multiplied,
we should set the stricter guard upon our assent.
Yet remember the caution or limitation here which
I gave under the first direction, namely, that this is
not to be too strictly applied to matters of daily prac
tice, either in human life or religion ; but when we con
sider ourselves as philosophers, or searchers after truth,
we should always withhold our assent where there is not
just evidence: and as far and as fast as we can, in a due
consistence with our daily necessary duties, we should
also reform and adjust all our principles and practices
both in religion and the civil life by these rules.

VI. Direction. We must judge of every proposition

by those proper and peculiar mediums or means, whereby
the evidence of it is to be obtained, whether it be sense,
consciousness, intelligence, reason, or testimony. All our
faculties and powers are to be employed in judging of
their proper objects.
If we judge of sounds, colours, odours, sapors, the
smoothness, roughness, softness, or hardness ofbodies, it
must be done by the use of our senses : but then we
must take heed that our senses are well disposed, as
shall be shewn afterward.
And since our senses in their various exercises are in
some cases liable to be deceived, and more especially
when by our eyes or ears we judge of the figure, quantity,
distance, and position of objects that are afar off, we
ought to call our reason into the assistance of our
senses, and correct the errors of one sense by the help
of another.
It is by the powers of sense and reason joined to
gether, that we must judge philosophically of the in
 CH. IV.] RIGHT USE OF REASON. 211

ward nature, the secret properties and powers, the causes

and effects, the relations and propositions of a thousand
corporeal objects which surround us on earth, or are
placed at a distance in the heavens. If a man, on the
one hand, confine himself only to sensible experiments,
and do not exercise reason upon them, he may sur
prise himself and others with strange appearances, and
learn to entertain the world with sights and shows, but
will never become a philosopher and, on the other
*
hand, if a man imprison himself in his closet, and em
ploy the most exquisite powers of reason to find out the
nature of things in the corporeal world without the use
of his senses, and the practice of experiments, he will
frame to himself a scheme of chimeras instead of true
philosophy. Hence came the invention of substantial
forms and qualities, of materia prima and privation,
with all the insignificant names used by the peripatetic
writers ; and it was for want of more experiments that
the great Descartes failed in several parts of his philo
sophical writings.
In the abstracted and speculative parts of the mathe
matics, which treat of quantity and number, the faculty
of reason must be chiefly employed to perceive the
relation of various qualities, and draw certain and use
ful conclusions ; but it wants the assistance of sense also
to be acquainted with lines, angles, andfigures ; and in
practical mathematics our senses have still greater em
ployment.
If we would judge of the pure properties and actions
of the mind, of the nature of spirits, their various per
ceptions and powers, we must not inquire of our eyes
and our ears, nor the images or shapes laid up in the
brain, but we must have recourse to our own conscious
ness of what passes within our own mind.
If we are to pass a judgement upon any thing that
relates to spirits in a state of union with animal nature,
and the mixed properties of sensation, fancy, appetite,
passion, pleasure, and pain, which arise thence, we must
consult our own sensations, and the other powers which
212 LOGIC ; OR, THE [PART II.
we find in ourselves considered as men or creatures
made up of a mind and an animal, and by just reason
ings deduce proper consequences, and improve our
knowledge in these subjects.
If we have occasion to judge concerning matters
done in past ages, or in distant countries, and where we
ourselves cannot be present, the powers of sense and
reason, for the most part, are not sufficient to inform
us, and we must therefore have recourse to the testi
mony of others and this is either divine or human.
In matters of mere human prudence, we shall find the
greatest advantage by making wise observations on our
own conduct, and the conduct of others, and a survey
of the events attending such conduct. Experience in
this case is equal to a natural sagacity, or rather su
perior. A treasure of observations and experiences col
lected by wise men, is of admirable service here ; and
perhaps there is nothing in the world of this kind
equal to the sacred Book of Proverbs, even if we look
on it as a mere human writing.
In questions of natural religion, we must exercise the
faculty of reason which God has given us ; and since
he has been pleased to afford us his word, we should
confirm and improve, or correct our reasoning on this
subject by the divine assistance of the Bible.
In matters of revealed religion, that is, Christianity,
Judaism, &c. which we should never have known by
the light of nature, the word of God is our only foun
dation and chief light ; though here our reason must
be used both to find out the true meaning of God in
his word, and to derive just inferences from what God
has written, as well as to judge of the credentials where
by divine testimony is distinguished from mere human
testimony, or from imposture.
As divine revelation can never contradict right reason,
for they are two great lights given us by our Creator
*
for our conduct ; so reason ought by no means to
assume to itself a power to contradict divine revelation.
Though revelation be not contrary to reason, yet
CH . IV. ] RIGHT USE OF REASON. 213

there are four classes wherein matters of revelation may

be said to rise above, or go beyond our reason.
1. When revelation asserts two things of which we have
clear ideas, to be joined, whose connexion or agreement
is not discoverable by reason ; as when scripture informs
us, that the dead shall rise, that the earth shall be burnt
up, and the Man Jesus Christ shall return from heaven,
none ofthe things could ever be found out or proved by
reason.
2. When revelation affirms any proposition, while
reason has no clear and distinct idea of the subject, or of
the predicate ; as God created all things by Jesus Christ :
by the Urim and Thummim God gave forth divine
oracles. The predicate of each of these propositions is
to us an obscure idea, for we know not what was the
peculiar agency of Jesus Christ, when God the Father
created the world by him ; nor have we any clear and
certain conception what the Urim and Thummim were,
nor how God gave answers to his people by them.
3. When revelation, in plain and express language,
declares some doctrine which our reason at present knows
not with evidence and certainty, how or in what sense to
reconcile to some of its own principles ; as, that the
Child Jesus is the mighty God, Isa. ix . 6. which propo
sition carries a seeming opposition to the unity and
spirituality of the Godhead, which are principles of
reason.
4. When two propositions or doctrines are plainly
asserted by divine revelation, which our reason at pre
sent knows not how or in what sense, with evidence and
certainty, to reconcile with one another ; as, the Father
is the only true God, John xvii . 3. and yet Christ is
over all, God blessedfor ever, Rom . ix. 5.
Now divine revelation having declared all these pro
positions, reason is bound to receive them, because it
cannot prove them to be utterly inconsistent or impos
sible, though the ideas of them may be obscure, though
we ourselves see not the rational connexion of them,
and though we know not certainly how to reconcile
214 LOGIC ; OR, THE [PART II.

them . In these cases reason must submit to faith, that

is, we are bound to believe what God asserts, and wait
till he shall clear up that which seems dark and difficult,
and till the mysteries offaith shall be further explained
to us, either in this world or in the world to come ?
and reason itself dictates the submission .

VII. Direction. It is very useful to have some general

principles of truth settled in the mind, whose evidence is
great and obvious, that they may be always ready at
hand to assist us injudging of the great variety of things
which occur. These may be called first notions, or fun
damental principles ; for though many of them are de
duced from each other, yet most or all of them may be
called principles, when compared with a thousand other
judgements which we form under the regulation and in
fluence of these primary propositions .
Every art and science, as well as the affairs of civil
life and religion, have peculiar principles of this kind
belonging to them. There are metaphysical, physical,
mathematical, political, economical, medicinal, theologi
cal, moral, and prudential principles of judgement. It
would be too tedious to give a specimen of them all in
this place. Those which are of the most universal use
to us, both as men and as Christians, may be found in
the following chapter among the rules ofjudgement about
particular objects.

VIII. Direction. Let the degrees of your assent to

everyproposition bear an exact proportion to the different
degrees of evidence. Remember this is one of the great
est principles of wisdom that man can arrive at in this
world, and the best human security against dangerous
mistakes in speculation or practice.
In the nature of things, of which our knowledge is
made up, there is infinite variety in their degrees ofevi

* See something more on this subject, Direct. II. preceding, and Chap. V.
Sect. 6.
CH. IV.] RIGHT USE OF REASON . 215

dence . And as God hath given our minds a power to

suspend their assent till the evidence be plain, so we
have a power to receive things which are proposed to us
with a stronger or weaker belief in infinite variety of
degrees, proportionable to their evidence. I believe that
the planets are inhabited, and I believe that the earth rolls
among them yearly round the sun : but I do not believe
both these propositions with an equal firmness of assent,
because the arguments for the latter are drawn from
mathematical observations : but the arguments for the
former are but probable conjectures and moral reasonings.
Yet neither do I believe either of these propositions so
firmly as I do that the earth is about twenty-four thou
sand miles round, because the mathematical proof of this
is much easier, plainer, and stronger. And yet further,
when I say that the earth was created by the power ofGod,
I have still a more infallible assurance of this than of
all the rest, because reason and scripture join to assure
me of it.

IX . Direction. Keep your mind always open to receive

truth, and never set limits to your own improvement. Be
ready always to hear what may be objected even against
your favourite opinions, and those which have had longer
possession of your assent. And if there should be any
new and uncontrollable evidence brought against these
old or beloved sentiments, do not wink your eyes fast
against the light, but part with any thing for the sake
of truth : remember when you overcome an error you
gain truth ; the victory is on your side, and the ad
vantage is all your own.
I confess, those grand principles ofbeliefand practice,
which universally influence our conduct, both with re
gard to this life and the life to come, should be sup
posed to be well settled in the first years of our studies :
such as, the existence and providence ofGod, the truth of
Christianity, the authority of scripture, the great rules of
morality, &c. We should avoid alight fluttering genius,
ever ready to change our foundations, and to be carried
216 LOGIC; OR, THE [PART II.

about with every wind of doctrine. To guard against

which inconvenience, we should labour with earnest di
ligence and fervent prayer, that our most fundamental
and important points of belief and practice may be
established upon just grounds of reason and scripture,
when we come to years of discretion, and fit to judge
for ourselves in such important points. Yet since it is
possible that the folly or prejudices of younger years
may have established persons in some mistaken senti
ments, even in very important matters, we should al
ways hold ourselves ready to receive any new advantage
toward the correction or improvement even of our es
tablished principles, as well as opinions of lesser moment.

CHAP. V.

SPECIAL RULES TO DIRECT US IN JUDGING OF

PARTICULAR OBJECTS.

IT would be endless to run through all those particular

objects concerning which we have occasion to pass a
judgement at one time or another. Things ofthe most
frequent occurrences, of the widest extent, and ofthe
greatest importance, are the objects and exercises of
sense, of reason, and speculation , the matters of morality,
religion, and prudence ; ofhuman and divine testimony,
together with the essays of reasoning upon things past
and future. Special rules relating to all these will be
the subject of the following sections.

SECT. I.
PRINCIPLES AND RULES OF JUDGEMENT CONCERNING THE
OBJECTS OF SENSE.

THOUGH Our senses are sometimes liable to be deceived,

yet when they are rightly disposed, and fitly exercised
CH. V. SECT. 1. ] RIGHT USE OF REASON . 217

about their proper objects, with the just assistance of

reason, they give us sufficient evidence of truth .
This may be proved by an argument drawn from
the wisdom, goodness, andfaithfulness ofGod our Creator.
It was he gave us our senses, and he would not make us
of such a constitution as to be liable to perpetual de
ception, and unavoidable error in using these faculties
of sense in the best manner we are capable of, about
those very things which are the proper objects of them.
This may be proved also by the ill consequences that
wouldfollow from the supposition of the contrary. If we
could have no certainty of the dictates of our senses, we
could never be sure of any ofthe common affairs and
occurrences of life. Men could not transact any oftheir
civil or moral concerns with any certainty ofjustice ; nor
indeed could we eat or drink, walk or move, with safety.
Our senses direct us in all these.
Again, the matters of religion depend in some mea
sure upon the certainty of the dictates of sense : for
faith comes by hearing ; and it is to our senses that God
appeals in working miracles to prove his own revelation.
Now if when our eyes and ears, and other organs of
sense, are rightly disposed and exercised about their
proper objects, they were always liable to be deceived,
there could be no knowledge of the gospel, no proof of
divine revelation by visions, voices, or miracles.
Our senses will discover things near us and round
about us, which are necessary for our present state, with
sufficient exactness ; and things distant also, so far as
they relate to our necessary use of them.
Nor is there need of any more accurate rules for the
use of our senses in the judgement of all the common
affairs of life, or even of miraculous and divine opera
tions, than the vulgar part of mankind are sufficiently
acquainted with by nature, and by their own daily ob
servations.
But if we would express these rules in a more exact
manner how tojudge by the dictates of our senses, they
should be represented thus :
218 LOGIC ; OR, THE [PART II.

1. We must take care that the organs ofour senses be

rightly disposed, and not under the power of any dis
temper or considerable decay ; as for instance, that our
eyes are not tinctured with the jaundice, when we would
judge of colours, lest we pronounce them all yellow : that
our hands are not burning in a fever, nor benumbed
with frost or the palsy, when we would judge ofthe heat
or coldness of any object : that our palate be not vitiated
by any disease, or by some other improper taste, when
we would judge of the true taste of any solid or liquid.
This direction relates to all our senses, but the follow
ing rules chiefly refer to our sight.
2. We must observe whether the object be at a proper
distance; for if it be too near or too far off, our eyes
will not sufficiently distinguish many things which are
properly the objects of sight : and therefore (if possible)
we must make nearer approaches to the object, or re
move farther from it, till we have obtained that due
distance which gives us the clearest perception.
3. We must not employ our sight to take a full survey
at once of objects that are too largefor it: but we must
view them by parts, and then judge of the whole : nor
must our senses judge of objects too small, for some
things which appear through glasses to be really and
distinctly existent, are either utterly invisible, or greatly
confused, when we would judge of them by the naked
eye.
4. We must place ourselves in such a position toward
the object, or place the object in such a position toward
our eye, as may give us the clearest representation ofit;
for a different position greatly alters the appearance of
the shape of bodies ; and for this reason we should
change the position both of the eye and the object in
some cases, that by viewing the object in several ap
pearances, we may pass a more complete and certain
judgement concerning it.
5. We must consider what the medium is by which ob
jects are represented to our senses ; whether it be thinner
or thicker ; whether it be air or vapour, or water or glass,
CH. V. SECT. 2. ] RIGHT USE OF REASON. 219

&c. whether it be duly enlightened or dusky ; whether

it reflect or refract, or only transmit the appearance of
the object; and whether it be tinctured with any parti
cular colour : whether it be moving or at rest.
6. We must sometimes use other helps to assist our
senses ; and if we make use ofglasses, we must make all
just allowances for the thickness or thinness ofthem, for
the clearness or dulness, for the smoothness or rough
ness, for the plainness, the convexity or concavity of
them, and for the distance at which these glasses are
placed from the eye, or from the object (or from one
another, if there be two or more glasses used), and all
this according to the rules of art. The same sort of cau
tion should be used also in mediums which assist the
hearing, such as speaking- trumpets, hearing-trumpets, &c.
7. If the object may be proposed to more senses than
one, let us call in the assistance of some other senses to
examine it, and this will increase the evidence of what
one sense dictates. For example ; our ear may assist our
eye in judging of the distance of bodies, which are both
visible and sonorous, as an exploded cannon, or a cloud
charged with thunder. Ourfeeling may assist our sight
in judging of the kind, the shape, situation, or distance
ofbodies that are near at hand, as whether a garment be
silk or stuff, &c. So if I both see, hear, and embrace my
friend, I am sure he is present.
8. We should also make several trials, at some distant
times, and in different circumstances, comparing former
experiments with later, and our own observations with
those of other persons.
It is by such methods as these that modern philosophy
has been so greatly improved by the use of sensible ex
periments.

SECT . II .
PRINCIPLES AND RULES OF JUDGEMENT IN MATTERS OF
REASON AND SPECULATION.
It is by reason we judge both in matters of speculation
and practice ; there are peculiar rules which relate to
 220 LOGIC ; OR, THE [PART II.

things practical, whether they be matters of religion, mo

rality, or prudence: yet many things in this section may
be applied to particular inquiries and matters offaith,
though it chiefly relates to knowledge, or speculations of
reason. 1
1. Whatsoever clear ideas we can join together with
out inconsistency, are to be counted possible, because
Almighty Power can make whatsoever we can conceive.
2. From the mere possibility of a thing we cannot in
fer its actual existence ; nor from the non-existence of it
can we infer its impossibility.
Note, The idea of God seems to claim an exemption
from this general rule ; for if he be possible, he cer
tainly exists, because the very idea includes eternity,
and he cannot begin to be: ifhe exist not, he is impos
sible, for the very same reason.
3. Whatsoever is evidently contained in the idea of
any thing, may be affirmed of that thing with certainty.
Reason is contained in the idea of a man ; and existence
is contained in the idea of God; and therefore we may
affirm God exists, and man is reasonable.
4. It is impossible that the same thing should be, and
not be at the same time, and in the same respect. Thence
it follows, that two contradictory ideas cannot be joined
in thesame part of the same subject, at the same time, and
in the same respects : or, that two contradictory proposi
tions can never be both true.
5. The more we converse with any subject in its va
rious properties, the better knowledge of it we are likely
to attain and by frequent and repeated inquiries and
experiments, reasonings, and conversations about it, we
confirm our true judgements of that thing, and correct
our former mistakes.
6. Yet after our utmost inquiries, we can never be as
sured by reason, that we know all the powers and pro
perties of any finite being.
7. If finite beings are not adequately known by us,
much less the things infinite: for it is of the nature of a
finite mind not to be able to comprehend what is infinite.
 CH. V. SECT. 2. ] RIGHT USE OF REASON. 221

8. We may judge and argue very justly and certainly

concerning infinites, in some parts of them, or so far as
our ideas reach, though the infinity of them hath some
thing incomprehensible in it. And this is built on the
general rule following, namely :
9. Whatsoever is sufficiently clear and evident, ought
not to be denied, though there are other things belong
ing to the same subject, which cannot be comprehended .
I may affirm many things with certainty concerning hu
man souls, their union with bodies, concerning the divi
sibility of matter, and the attributes ofGod, though many
other things relating to them are all darkness to us.
10. If any opinion proposed has either no arguments,
or equal arguments for and against it, we must remain
in perfect suspense about it, till convincing evidence
appear on one side.
11. Where present necessity of action does not con
strain us to determine, we should not immediately yield
up our assent to mere probable arguments, without a due
reserve, if we have any reasonable hope of obtaining
greater light and evidence on one side or the other ; for
when the balance of the judgement once resigns its equi
librium or neutrality to a mere probable argument, it is
too ready to settle itself on that side, so that the mind
.
will not easily change that judgement, though bright and
strong evidence appear afterwards on the other side.
12. Of two opinions, if one has unanswerable diffi
culties attending it, we must not reject it immediately,
till we examine whether the contrary opinion has not
difficulties as unanswerable.
13. If each opinion has objections against it which we
cannot answer or reconcile, we should rather embrace
that which has the least difficulties in it, and which has
the best arguments to support it : and let our assent
bear proportion to the superior evidence.
14. If any doctrine hath very strong and sufficient
-light and evidence to command our assent, we should
not reject it because there is an objection or two against
it which we are not able to answer ; for upon this foot
 222 LOGIC ; OR, THE [PART II.

a common Christian would be baffled out of every

article of his faith, and must renounce even the dictates
of his reason and his senses ; and the most learned man
perhaps would hold but very few of them fast : for some
objections which attend the sacred doctrine of the eter
nity and the omnipresence of God, and the philosophi
cal doctrines of light, atoms, space, motion, &c. are hard
ly solvable to this day.
15. Where two extremes are proposed, either in
matters of speculation or practice, and neither of them
has certain and convincing evidence, it is generally safest
to take the middle way. Moderation is more likely to
come near the truth than doubtful extremes. This is an
excellent rule to judge of the characters and value of
the greatest part of persons and things ; for nature sel
dom deals in superlatives. It is a good rule also by
which to form our judgement in many speculative con
troversies ; a reconciling medium in such cases doth
often best secure truth as well as peace.
16. When two different propositions have each a
very strong and cogent evidence, and do not plainly ap
pear inconsistent, we may believe both of them, though
we cannot at present see the way to reconcile them .
Reason, as well as our own consciousness, assures us,
that the will ofman isfree, and that multitudes ofhuman
actions are in that respect contingent ; and yet reason and
scripture assure us, that God foreknows them all, and
this implies a certain fatality. Now though learned
men have not to this day hit on any so clear and happy
method as is desired to reconcile these propositions,
yet since we do not see a plain inconsistency in them,
we justly believe them both, because their evidence is
great.
17. Let us not therefore too suddenly determine in
difficult matters, that two things are utterly inconsistent ;
for there are many propositions which may appear in
consistent at first, and yet afterwards we find their con
sistency, and the way of reconciling them may be made
plaín and easy : as also, there are other propositions
CH. V. SECT. 2. ] RIGHT USE OF REASON. 223

which may appear consistent at first, but after due ex

amination we find their inconsistency.
18. For the same reason we should not call those
difficulties utterly insolvable, or those objections unan
swerable, which we are not presently able to answer :
time and diligence may give further light.
19. In short, if we will secure ourselves from error,
we should not be too frequent or hasty in asserting the
certain consistency or inconsistency, the absolute univer
sality, necessity, or impossibility of things, where there
is not the brightest evidence. He is but a young and
raw philosopher, who, when he sees two particular
ideas evidently agree, immediately asserts them to agree
universally, to agree necessarily, and that it is impossi
ble it should be otherwise. Or when he sees evidently
that two particular ideas happen to disagree, he pre
sently asserts their constant and natural inconsistency,
their utter impossibility of agreement, and calls every
thing contrary to his opinion absurdity and nonsense.
A true philosopher will affirm or deny with much cau
tion and modesty, unless he has thoroughly examined
and found the evidence of every part of his assertion
exceeding plain.
20. Let us have a care of building our assurance of
any important point of doctrine upon one single argu
ment, if there are more to be obtained. We should
not slight and reject all other arguments which sup
port the same doctrine, lest, if our favourite argument
should be refuted and fail us, we should be tempted to
abandon that important principle of truth . Ithink this
was a very culpable practice in Descartes and some of
his followers, who, when he had found out the argu
ment for the existence of God, derived from the idea of
a most perfect and self- existent being, he seemed to de
spise and abandon all other arguments against atheism .
21. If we happen to have our chiefarguments for any
opinion refuted, we should not immediately give up the
opinion itself; for perhaps it may be a truth still, and
we may find it to be justly supported by other argu
224 LOGIC ; OR, THE [PART II.

ments, which we might once think weaker, or perhaps

by new arguments which we knew not before.
22. We ought to esteem that to be sufficient evidence
ofa proposition, where both the kind and theforce of the
arguments or proofs, are as great as the nature of the
thing admits, and as the necessity or exigence of the
case requires. So if we have a credible and certain testi
mony that Christ rose from the dead, it is enough ; we
are not to expect mathematical or ocular demonstration
for it, at least in our day.
23. Though we should seek what proofs may be at
tained of any proposition, and we should receive any
number of arguments which are just and evident for the
confirmation of the same truth, yet we must not judge
of the truth of any proposition by the number of argu
ments which are brought to support it, but by the 7
strength and weight of them : a building will stand firmer
and longer on four large pillars of marble than on ten
of sand, or earth, or timber.
24. Yet where certain evidence is not to be found or
expected, a considerable number of probable arguments
carry great weight with them even in matters of specu
lation. That is a probable hypothesis in philosophy or
in theology which goes farthest toward the solution of
many difficult questions arising on any subject.

SECT. III.
PRINCIPLES AND RULES OF JUDGEMENT IN MATTERS OF
MORALITY AND RELIGION.

HERE it may be proper in the first place to mention a

- few definitions of words or terms.
By matters of morality and religion, I mean those
things which relate to our duty to God, ourselves, or
our fellow creatures.
Moral good, or virtue, or holiness, is an action or
temper conformable to the rule of our duty. Moral
CH. V. SECT. 3.] RIGHT USE Of reason. 225

evil, or vice, or sin, is an action or temper unconform

able to the rule of our duty, or a neglect to fulfil it.
Note. The words vice, or virtue, chiefly imply the re
lation of our actions to men and this world. Sin and
holiness, rather imply their relation to God and the
other world.
Natural good is that which gives us pleasure or satis
faction. Natural evil is that which gives us pain or grief.
Happiness consists in the attainment of the highest
and most lasting natural good. Misery consists in suf
fering the highest and most lasting natural evil ; that
is, in short, heaven or hell.
Though this be a just account of perfect happiness
and perfect misery, yet wheresoever pain overbalances
pleasure, there is a degree of misery ; and wheresoever
pleasure overbalances pain there is a degree of happiness.
I proceed now to lay down some principles and rules
ofjudgement in matters of morality and religion.
1. The will of our Maker, whether discovered by
reason or revelation, carries the highest authority with
it, and is therefore the highest rule ofduty to intelligent
creatures ; a conformity or nonconformity to it deter
mines their actions to be morally good or evil.
2. Whatsoever is really an immediate duty toward
ourselves, or toward our fellow creatures, is more re
motely a duty to God ; and therefore in the practice of
it we should have an eye to the will of God as our rule,
and to his glory as our end.
3. Our wise and gracious Creator has closely united
our duty and our happiness together ; and has connect
ed sin, or vice, and punishment ; that is, he has or
dained that the highest natural good and evil should
have a close connexion with moral good and evil, and
that both in the nature of things, and by his own posi
tive appointment.
4. Conscience should seek all due information, in
order to determine what is duty, and what is sin, be
cause happiness and misery depend upon it.
L
 226 LOGIC ; OR, THE [PART II.
5. On this account our inclination to present temporal
good, and our aversion to present temporal evil, must
be wisely overbalanced by the consideration of future
and eternal good and evil, that is, happiness or misery.
And for this reason we should not omit a duty or com
mit a sin, to gain any temporal good, or to avoid any
temporal evil.
6. Though our natural reason in a state of innocence
might be sufficient to find out those duties which were
necessary for an innocent creature, in order to abide in
the favour of his Maker, yet in afallen state, our natu
ral reason is by no means sufficient to find out all that
is necessary to restore a sinful creature to the divine
favour.
7. Therefore God hath condescended, in various
ages of mankind, to reveal to sinful men what he re
quires of them in order to their restoration, and has
appointed in his word some peculiar matters of faith
and practice, in order to their salvation. This is called
revealed religion , as the things knowable concerning
God and our duty by the light of nature, are called
natural religion.
8. There are also many parts of morality, and natural
religion, or many natural duties relating to God, to
ourselves, and to our neighbours, which would be ex
ceeding difficult and tedious for the bulk of mankind
to find out and determine by natural reason ; therefore
it has pleased God, in this sacred book of divine reve
lation, to express the most necessary duties of this kind 1
in a very plain and easy manner, and make them intel
ligible to souls of the lowest capacity; or they may be
very easily derived thence by the use of reason.
9. As there are some duties much more necessary and
more important than others are, so every duty requires
our application to understand and practise it, in pro
portion to its necessity and importance.
10. Where two duties seem to stand in opposition
to each other, and we cannot practise both, the less
CH. V. SECT. 3. ] RIGHT USE OF REASON. 227

must give way to the greater, and the omission of the

less is not sinful. So ceremonial laws give way to moral :
God will have mercy and not sacrifice.
11. In duties of natural religion, we may judge of
the different degrees of their necessity and importance
by reason, according to their greater or more apparent
tendency to the honour of God, and the good of men :
but in matters of revealed religion, it is only divine.
revelation can certainly inform us what is most neces
sary and most important ; yet we may be assisted also
in that search by the exercises of reason.
12. In actions wherein there may be some scruple
about the duty or lawfulness of them, we should choose
always the safest side, and abstain as far as we can
from the practice of things whose lawfulness we suspect.
13. Points of the greatest importance in human life,
or in religion, are generally the most evident, both in
the nature of things, and in the word of God ; and
where points of faith or practice are exceeding difficult
to find out, they cannot be exceeding important. This
proposition may be proved by the goodness and faith
fulness of God, as well as by experience and observation.
14. In some of the outward practices and forms of
religion, as well as human affairs, there is frequently
a present necessity of speedy action one way or another :
in such a case, having surveyed arguments on both
sides, as far as our time and circumstances admit, we
must guide our practice by those reasons which appear
most probable, and seem at that time to overbalance the
rest ; yet always reserving room to admit further light
and evidence, when such occurrences return again. It
is a preponderation of circumstantial arguments that must
determine our actions in a thousand occurrences.
15. We may also determine upon probable arguments
where the matter is of small consequence, and would not
answer the trouble of seeking after certainty. Life and
time are more precious than to have a large share of
them laid out in scrupulous inquiries, whether smoking
tobacco, or wearing a periwig, be lawful or no .
L2
 228 LOGIC ; OR, THE [ PART II.
16. In affairs of greater importance, and which may
have a long, lasting, and extensive influence on our
future conduct or happiness, we should not take up with
probabilities, if certainty may be attained.- Where there
is any doubt on the mind, in such cases, we should call
in the assistance of all manner of circumstances, reasons,
motives, consequences on all sides : we must wait longer,
and with earnest request seek human and divine advice
before we fully determine our judgement and our prac
tice ; according to the old Roman sentence, Quod statu
endum est semel, deliberandum est diu. We should be
long in considering what we must determine once for all.

SECT. IV.
PRINCIPLES AND RULES OF JUDGEMENT IN MATTERS OF
HUMAN PRUDENCE.

THE great design of prudence, as distinct from morality

and religion, is to determine and manage every affair
with decency, and to the best advantage.
That is decent, which is agreeable to our state, con
dition, or circumstances, whether it be in behaviour,
discourse, or action.
That is advantageous, which attains the most and best
purposes, and avoids the most and greatest inconve
niences.
As there is infinite variety in the circumstances ofper
sons, things, action, times, and places, so we must be fur
nished with such general rules as are accommodable to
all this variety by a wise judgement and discretion : for
what is an act of consummate prudence in some times,
places, and circumstances, would be consummate folly in
others. Now these rules may be ranged in the follow
ing manner.
1. Our regard to persons or things should be go
verned by the degrees ofconcernment we have with them,
the relation we have to them, or the expectation we have
from them. These should be the measures by which
CH. V. SECT. 4. ] RIGHT USE OF REASON. 229

we should proportion our diligence and application in

any thing that relates to them.
2. We should always consider whether the thing we
pursue be attainable ; whether it be worthy our pursuit ;
whether it be worthy of the degree of pursuit, whether it
be worthy of the means used, in order to attain it. This
rule is necessary both in matters of knowledge, and mat
ters of practice.
3. When the advantages and disadvantages, conve
niences and inconveniences of any action are balanced to
gether, we must finally determine on that side which has
the superior weight ; and the sooner in things which are
necessarily and speedily to be done or determined.
4. If advantages and disadvantages in their own na
ture are equal, then those which are most certain or
likely as to the event, should turn the scale of our judge
ment, and determine our practice.
5. Where the improbabilities of success or advantage
are greater than the probabilities, it is not prudence to
act or venture, if the action may be attended with dan
ger or loss equal to the proposed gain . It is proper to
inquire whether this be not the case in almost all lot
teries; for they that hold stakes will certainly secure
part to themselves : and only the remainder being di
vided into prizes, must render the improbability ofgain
to each adventurer greater than the probability.
6. We should not despise or neglect any real ad
vantage, and abandon the pursuit of it, though we can
not attain all the advantages that we desire. This would
be to act like children, who are fond of something which
strikes their fancy most, and sullen and regardless of
every thing else, ifthey are not humoured in that fancy.
7. Though a general knowledge of things be useful in
science and in human life, yet we should content our
selves with a more superficial knowledge ofthose things
which have the least relation to our chiefend and design.
8. This rule holds good also in matters of business and
practice, as well as in matters of knowledge ; and there
fore we should not grasp at every thing, lest in the end we
attain nothing. Persons that either by an inconsistency
 230 LOGIC ; OR, THE [PART 11.
of temper, or by a vain ambition, will pursue every sort
of art and science, study and business, seldom grow ex
cellent in any one of them: and projectors who form
twenty schemes, seldom use sufficient application to fi
nish one of them, or make it turn to good account.
9. Take heed of delaying and trifling amongst the
means instead of reaching at the end. Take heed ofwast
ing a life in mere speculative studies, which is called to
action and employment : dwell not too long in philoso
phical, mathematical, or grammatical parts of learning,
when your chief design is law, physic, or divinity. Do
not spend the day in gathering flowers by the way side,
lest night come upon you before you arrive at your
journey's end, and then you will not reach it.
10. Where the case and circumstances of wise and good
men resemble our own case and circumstances, we may
borrow a great deal of instruction towards our prudent
conduct from their example : as well as in all cases we
may learn much from their conversation and advice.
11. After all other rules remember this, that mere spe
culation in matters ofhuman prudence can never be a per
fect director, without experience and observation. We
may be content therefore in our younger years to com
mit some unavoidable mistakes in point of prudence,
and we shall see mistakes enow in the conduct of others,
both which ought to be treasured up amongst our use
ful observations, in order to teach us better judgement
for time to come. Sometimes the mistakes, imprudences,
and follies, which ourselves or others have been guilty
of, give us brighter and more effectual lessons of pru
dence, than the wisest counsels, and the fairest examples
could ever have done.

SECT . V.
PRINCIPLES AND RULES OF JUDGEMENT IN MATTERS OF
HUMAN TESTIMONY.
THE evidence of human testimony is not so proper to lead
us into the knowledge of the essence and inward nature
CH. V. SECT. 5. ] RIGHT USE OF REASON. 231

of things, as to acquaint us with the existence of things,

and to inform us of matters offact both past and pre
sent. And though there be a great deal of fallibility in
the testimony of men, yet there are some things we may
be almost as certain of, as that the sun shines, or that five
twenties make a hundred. Who is there at London that
knows any thing of the world, but believes there is such
a city as Paris in France ; that the Pope dwells at Rome ;
that Julius Cæsar was an Emperor ; or that Luther had
a great hand in the Reformation ?
If we observe the following rules, we may arrive at
such a certainty in many things of human testimony, as
that it is morally impossible we should be deceived, that
is, we may obtain a moral certainty.
1. Let us consider whether the thing reported be in
itself possible ; if not, it can never be credible, whoso
ever relates it.
2. Consider further whether it be probable, whether
there are any concurring circumstances to prove it, be
side the mere testimony ofthe person that relates it. I
confess, ifthese last conditions are wanting, the thing
may be true, but then it ought to have the stronger tes
timony to support it.
. 3. Consider whether the person who relates it be ca
pable ofknowing the truth ; whether he be a skilful judge
in such matters, if it be a business of art, or a nice ap
pearance in nature, or some curious experiment in phi
losophy. But if it be a mere occurrence in life, a plain,
sensible matter of fact, it is enough to inquire whether
he who relates it were an eye or ear-witness, or whether
he himself had it only by hearsay, or can trace it up to
the original.
4. Consider whether the narrator be honest andfaith
ful, as well as skilful ; whether he hath no bias upon his
mind, no peculiar gain or profit by believing or report
ing it, no interest or principle which might warp his own
belief aside from truth ; or which might tempt him to
prevaricate, to speak falsely, or to give a representation
a little different from the naked truth of things. In
232 LOGIC ; OR, THE [PART 11.
short, whether there be no occasion of suspicion concern
ing this report.
5. Consider whether several persons agree together in
the report of this matter; and if so, then whether these
persons who join together in their testimony, might not
be supposed to combine together in a falsehood. Whe
ther they are persons of sufficient skill, probity, and cre
dit. It might be also inquired, whether they are of dif
ferent nations, sects, parties, opinions, or interests. For
the more divided they are in all these, the more likely
is their report to be true, ifthey agree together in their
account of the same thing ; and especially if they per
sist in it without wavering.
6. Consider further, whether the report were capable
ofbeing easily refuted at first, if it had not been true ; if
so, this confirms the testimony.
7. Inquire yet again, whether there has been a con
stant uniform tradition and belief of this matter, from the
very first age or time when the thing was transacted,
without any reasonable doubts or contradictions. Or,
8. If any part of it hath been doubted by any consi
derable persons, whether it has been searched out and af
terwards confirmed, by having all the scruples and doubts
removed. In either of these cases the testimony be
comes more firm and credible.
9. Inquire, on the other hand, whether there are any
considerable objections remaining against the belief of that
proposition so attested . Whether there be any thing very
improbable in the thing itself. Whether any concurrent
circumstances seem to oppose it. Whether any person
or persons give a positive and plain testimony against it.
Whether they are equally skilful and equallyfaithful as
those who assert it. Whether there be as many or more
in number, and whether they might have any secret bias
or influence on them to contradict it.
10. Sometimes the entire silence ofa thing may have
something of weight towards the decision of a doubtful
point of history, or a matter of human faith, namely,
where the fact is pretended to be public, if the persons
 CH. V. SECT. 5.] RIGHT USE OF REASON. 233

who are silent about it were skilful to observe, and could

not but know such an occurrence : if they were engaged
by principle or by interest to have declared it : if they
had fair opportunity to speak of it : and these things
may tend to make a matter suspicious, if it be not very
well attested by positive proof.
11. Remember that in some reports there are more
marks offalsehood than of truth, and in others there are
more marks of truth than offalsehood. By a comparison
of all these things together, and putting every argument
on one side and the other into the balance, we must
form as good a judgement as we can which side pre
ponderates ; and give a strong or a feeble assent or dis
sent, or withhold our judgement entirely, according to
greater or lesser evidence, according to more plain or du
bious marks of truth or falsehood.
12, Observe, that in matters of human testimony there
is oftentimes a greater mixture of truth andfalsehood in
the report itself: some parts of the story may be per
fectly true, and some utterly false; and some may have
such a blended confusion of circumstances, which are a
little warpt aside from the truth , and misrepresented,
that there is need of good skill and accuracy to form a
judgement concerning them, and determine which part
is true, and which is false. The whole report is not to
be believed, because some parts are indubitably true, nor
the whole to be rejected, because some parts are as evi
dent falsehoods.
We may draw two remarkable observations from this
section.

Observ. I. How certain is the truth of the Christian

religion, and particularly of the resurrection of Christ,
which is a matter of fact on which Christianity is built!
We have almost all the concurrent evidences that can
be derived from human testimony joining to confirm this
glorious truth. The fact is not impossible ; concurrent
circumstances cast a favourable aspect on it; it was fore
told by one who wrought miracles ; and therefore not
L3
234 LOGIC ; OR, THE [PART II.
unlikely, nor unexpected . The apostles and first dis
ciples were eye and ear-witnesses, for they conversed
with their risen Lord ; they were the most plain, honest
men in themselves ; the temptations of worldly interests
did rather discourage their belief and report of it : they
all agree in this matter, though they were men of dif
ferent characters ; Pharisees, and Fishermen, and Pub
licans, men ofJudea and Galilee, and perhaps some Hea
thens, who were early converted : the thing might easily
have been disproved if it were false; it hath been con
veyed by constant tradition and writing down to our
times; those who at first doubted, were afterwards con
vinced by certainproofs ; nor have any pretended to give
any proof of the contrary, but merely denied the fact
with impudence, in opposition to all these evidences.
Observ. II. How weak is the faith which is due to
a multitude of things in ancient human history ! For
though many of these criteria, or marks of credibility,
are found plainly in the more general and public facts,
yet as to a multitude ofparticular facts and circumstances,
how deficient are they in such evidence as should de
mand our assent ! Perhaps there is nothing that ever
was done in all past ages, and which was not a public
fact, so well attested as the resurrection of Christ.

SECT. VI .
PRINCIPLES AND RULES OF JUDGEMENT IN MATTERS OF
DIVINE TESTIMONY.

As human testimony acquaints us with matters offact,

both past and present, which lie beyond the reach of
our own personal notice ; so divine testimony is suited to
inform us both of the nature of things, as well as matters
offact, and ofthings future, as well as present or past.
Whatsoever is dictated to us by God himself, or by
men who are divinely inspired, must be believed with
full assurance. Reason demands us to believe whatso
ever divine revelation dictates ; for God is perfectly wise,
CH. V. SECT. 6. ] RIGHT USE OF REASON. 235

and cannot be deceived ; he is faithful and good, and will

not deceive his creatures : and when reason has found
out the certain marks or credentials of divine testimony
to belong to any proposition , there remains then no fur
ther inquiry to be made, but only to find out the true
sense and meaning of that which God has revealed, for
reason itself demands the belief of it.
Now divine testimony or revelation requires these fol
lowing credentials :
1. That the propositions or doctrines revealed be not
inconsistent with reason : for intelligent creatures can
never be bound to believe real inconsistencies. There
fore we are sure the popish doctrine of transubstantia
tion is not a matter of divine revelation , because it is
contrary to all our senses and our reason, even in their
proper exercises.
God can dictate nothing but what is worthy of him
self, and agreeable to his own nature and divine perfec
tions. Now many of these perfections are discoverable
by the light of reason, and whatsoever is inconsistent
with these perfections, cannot be a divine revelation. ,
But let it be noted, that in matters ofpractice towards
our fellow-creatures, God may command us to act in a
manner contrary to what reason would direct antece
dent to that command. So Abraham was commanded
to offer up his son a sacrifice : the Israelites were ordered
to borrow ofthe Egyptians without paying them , and
to plunder and slay the inhabitants of Canaan : because
God has a sovereign right to all things, and can with
equity dispossess his creatures of life, and every thing
which he has given them, and especially such sinful crea
tures as mankind ; and he can appoint whom he pleases
to be the instruments of this just dispossession or de
privation . So that these divine commands are not really
inconsistent with right reason ; for whatsoever is so, can
not be believed where that inconsistency appears.
2. Upon the same account the whole doctrine ofreve
lation must be consistent with itself; every part of it must
be consistent with each other ; and though in points of
236 LOGIC ; OR, THE [PART II.

practice latter revelation may repeal or cancel former di

vine laws, yet in matters ofbelief, no latter revelation can
be inconsistent with what has been heretofore revealed.
3. Divine revelation must be confirmed by some di
vine and supernatural appearances, some extraordinary
signs or tokens, visions, voices, or miracles wrought, or
prophecies fulfilled . There must be some demonstra
tions of the presence and power of God, superior to all
the powers of nature, or the settled connexion which
God as Creator has established among his creatures in
this visible world.
4. If there are any such extraordinary and wonder
ful appearances and operations brought to contest with,
or to oppose divine revelation, there must and always
will be such a superiority on the side of that revelation
which is truly divine, as to manifest that God is there.
This was the case when the Egyptian sorcerers contend
ed with Moses. But the wonders which Moses wrought,
did so far transcend the power of the Magicians, as
made them confess, It was thefinger ofGod.
5. These divine appearances or attestations to revela
tion must be either known to ourselves, by our own per
sonal observation of them, or they must be sufficiently
attested by others, according to the principles and rules
by which matters of human faith are to be judged in the
foregoing section.
Some of those who lived in the nations and ages
where miracles were wrought, were eye and ear-wit
nesses of the truth and divinity of the revelation ; but
we who live in these distant ages, must have them de
rived down to us by just and incontestible history and
tradition. We also, even in these distant times, may see
the accomplishment of some ancient predictions, and
thereby obtain that advantage toward the confirmation
of our faith in divine revelation, beyond what those per
sons enjoyed who lived when the predictions were pro
nounced.
6. There is another very considerable confirmation
of divine testimony ; and that is, when the doctrines
CH. V. SECT. 7.] RIGHT USE OF REASON. 237

themselves, either on the publication or the belief of

them, produce supernatural effects. Such were the
miraculous powers which were communicated to be
lievers in the first ages of Christianity, the conversion of
Jews or Gentiles, the amazing success ofthe gospel of
Christ, without human aid, and in opposition to a thou
sand impediments ; its power in changing the hearts
and lives of ignorant and vicious heathens, and wicked
and profane creatures in all nations, and filling them
with a spirit of virtue, piety, and goodness. - Whereso
ever persons have found this effect in their own hearts,
wrought by a belief of the Gospel of Christ, they have
a witness in themselves of the truth of it, and abundant
reason to believe it divine.
Of the difference between reason and revelation, and
in what sense the latter is superior, see more in Chap. II.
Sect. 9. and Chap. IV. Direct. 6.

SECT. VII.
PRINCIPLES AND RULES OF JUDGING CONCERNING THINGS
PAST, PRESENT , AND TO COME, BY THE MERE USE OF
REASON.

THOUGH we attain the greatest assurance of things past

and future by divine faith, and learn many matters of
fact, both past and present, by human faith, yet reason
also may in a good degree assist us to judge of matters
of fact, both past, present, and to come, by the following
principles.
1. There is a system of beings round about us, of
which we ourselves are a part, which we call the world,
and in this world there is a course of nature, or a settled
order of causes, effects, antecedents, concomitants, conse
quences, &c. from which the Author of Nature doth not
vary but upon very important occasions.
2. Where antecedents, concomitants, and consequents,
causes and effects, signs and things signified, subjects and
adjuncts, are necessarily connected with each other, we
 238 LOGIC ; OR, THE [PART II.
may infer the causes from the effects, and effects from
causes, the antecedents from the consequents, as well
as consequents from antecedents, &c. and thereby be
pretty certain of many things both past, present, and to
come. It is by this principle that astronomers can tell
what day and hour the sun and moon were eclipsed five
hundred years ago, and predict all future eclipses as long
as the world shall stand. They can tell precisely at
what minute the sun rises or sets this day at Pequin in
China, or what altitudes the dog-star had at midnight or
mid-noon in Rome, on the day when Julius Cæsar was
slain. Gardeners upon the same principle can foretel
the months when every plant will be in bloom, and the
ploughman knows the weeks of harvest : we are sure, if
there be a chicken, there was an egg ; if there be a rain
bow, we are certain it rains not far off; if we behold a
tree growing on the earth, we know it has naturally a
root under ground.
3. Where there is a necessary connexion between
causes and effects, antecedents and consequents, signs and
things signified, we know also that like causes will have
like effects, and proportionable causes will have propor
tionable effects, contrary causes will have contrary effects ;
and observing men may form many judgements by the
rules of similitude and proportion, where the causes,
effects, &c. are not entirely the same.
4. Where there is but a probable and uncertain con
nexion between antecedents, concomitants, and conse
quents, we can give but a conjecture, or a probable de
termination. If the clouds gather, or the weather-glass
sinks, we suppose it will rain : if a man spit blood fre
quently with coughing, we suppose his lungs are hurt : if
very dangerous symptoms appear, we expect his death .
5. Where causes operate freely, with a liberty of in
difference to this or the contrary, there we cannot cer
tainly know what the effects will be : for it seems to be
contingent, and the certain knowledge of it belongs only
to God. This is the case in the greatest part of human
actions.
CH . V. SECT. 7. ] RIGHT USE OF REASON. 239

6. Yet wise men, by a just observation of human

nature, will give very probable conjectures in this matter,
also concerning things past, or things future, because
human nature in all ages and nations has such a con
formity to itself. By a knowledge of the tempers of men,
and their present circumstances, we may be able to give
a happy guess what their conduct will be, and what will
be the event, by an observation of the like cases in
former times. This made the Emperor Marcus Anto
ninus to say, " By looking back into history, and con
" sidering the fate and revolutions of governments you
" will be able to form a guess, and almost prophesy
" upon the future. For things past, present, and to
" come, are strangely uniform, and of a colour, and are
" commonly cast in the same mould . So that upon the
" matter, forty years of human life may serve for a
" sample of ten thousand ." Collier's Antoninus, Book
VII. Sect. 50.
7. There are also some other principles of judging
concerning the past actions of men in former ages, be
sides books, histories, and traditions, which are the me
diums of conveying human testimony ; as we may infer
the skill and magnificence of the ancients by some frag
ments of their statues, and ruins of their buildings. We
know what Roman legions came into Great Britain, by
numbers of bricks dug out of the earth in some parts of
the island, with the marks of some particular legion
upon them, which must have been employed there in
brick-making. We rectify some mistakes in history by
statues, coins, old altars, utensils ofwar, &c. We con
firm or disprove some pretended traditions and histori
cal writings, by medals, images, pictures, urns, &c.
Thus I have gone through all those particular objects
of our judgement which I first proposed, and have laid
down principles and rules by which we may safely con
duct ourselves therein. There is a variety of other ob
jects, concerning which we are occasionally called to
pass a judgement, namely, the characters ofpersons, the
value and worth of things, the sense and meaning ofpar
240 LOGIC ; OR, THE [ PART II.
ticular writers, matters ofwit, oratory, poesy, matters of
equity in judicial courts, matters of traffic and commerce
between man and man, which would be endless to enu
merate. But if the general and special rules ofjudge
ment, which have been mentioned in these two last
chapters, are treasured up in the mind, and wrought
into the very temper of our souls in our younger years,
they will lay a foundation for just and regular judge
ment concerning a thousand special occurrences in the
religious, civil, and learned life,
 THE

THIRD PART

OF

LOGIC .

ON REASONING AND SYLLOGISM.

As the first work of the mind is perception, whereby

our ideas are framed, and the second isjudgement, which
joins or disjoins our ideas, and forms a proposition, so
the third operation of the mind is reasoning, which joins
several propositions together, and makes a syllogism,
that is, an argument whereby we are wont to infer some
thing that is less known, from truths which are more
evident.

In treating of this subject, let us consider more par

ticularly :

1. The nature of a syllogism, and the parts of which

it is composed.

2. The several kinds of syllogisms, with particular

rules relating to them.

3. The doctrine of sophisms, or false reasoning, to

gether with the means of avoiding them, and the manner
ofsolving or answering them.

4. Some general rules to direct our reasoning.

 242 LOGIC ; OR, the [PART III.

CHAP. I.

OF THE NATURE OF A SYLLOGISM AND THE PARTS OF

WHICH IT IS COMPOSED.

Ir the mere perception and comparison of two ideas

would always show us whether they agree or disagree ;
then all rational propositions would be matters of intelli
gence, or first principles, and there would be no use of
reasoning, or drawing any consequences. It is the narrow
ness of the human mind which introduces the necessity
of reasoning. When we are unable to judge of the truth
or falsehood of a proposition in an immediate manner,
by the mere contemplation of its subject and predicate,
we are then constrained to use a medium, and to com
pare each of them with some third idea, that by seeing
how far they agree or disagree with it, we may be able
to judge how far they agree or disagree among them
selves : as, ifthere are two lines, A and B, and I know
not whether they are equal or no, I take a third line C,
or an inch, and apply it to each of them ; if it agree
with them both, then I infer that A and B are equal :
but if it agree with one and not with the other, then I
conclude A and B are unequal : if it agree with neither
ofthem, there can be no comparison.
So if the question be, whether God must be worship
ped, we seek a third idea, suppose the idea of a Creator,
and say,

Our Creator must be worshipped.

God is our Creator.
Therefore God must be worshipped.
The comparison of this third idea, with the two dis
tinct parts of the question, usually requires two propo
sitions, which are called the premises : the third propo
sition which is drawn from them is the conclusion, wherein
the question itself is answered, and the subject and pre
dicate joined either in the negative or the affirmative.
CH. I. ] RIGHT USE OF REASON. 243

Thefoundation of all affirmative conclusions is laid in

this general truth, that so far as two proposed ideas agree
to any third idea, they agree also among themselves .
The character of Creator agrees to God, and worship
agrees to a Creator, therefore worship agrees to God.
The foundation ofall negative conclusions is this, that
where one of the two proposed ideas agrees with the
third idea, and the other disagrees with it, they must
needs disagree so far also with one another ; as, if no
sinners are happy, and if angels are happy, then angels
are not sinners.
Thus it appears what is the strict and just notion of
a syllogism : it is a sentence or argument made up of
three propositions, so disposed as that the last is ne
cessarily inferred from those which go before, as in the
instances which have been just mentioned.
In the constitution of a syllogism two things may be
considered, viz. the matter and the form of it.
The matter of which a syllogism is made up, is three
propositions ; and these three propositions are made up
of three ideas or terms variously joined.
The three terms are called the remote matter of a syl
logism ; and the three propositions the proxime or im
mediate matter of it.
The three terms are named the major, the minor, and
the middle.
The predicate of the conclusion is called the major
term, because it is generally of a larger extension than
the minor term, or the subject. The major and minor
terms, are called the extremes.
The middle term is the third idea invented and dis
posed in two propositions, in such a manner as to show
the connexion between the major and minor term in the
conclusion ; for which reason the middle term itself is
sometimes called the argument.
That proposition which contains the predicate of the
conclusion, connected with the middle term, is usually
called the major proposition, whereas the minor proposi
244 LOGIC ; OR, the [ PART III.
tion connects the middle term with the subject of the
conclusion, and is sometimes called the assumption.
Note. This exact distinction of the several parts of
a syllogism, and of the major and minor terms con
nected with the middle term in the major and minor pro
positions, does chiefly belong to simple or categorical
syllogisms, of which we shall speak in the next chapter,
though all syllogisms whatsoever have something ana
logical to it.
Note further. That the major proposition is generally
placed first, and the minor second, and the conclusion
in the last place, where the syllogism is regularly com
posed and represented.
The form of a syllogism is the framing and disposing
of the premises according to art, or just principles of
reasoning, and the regular inference of the conclusion
from them .
The act ofreasoning, or inferring one thing from an
other, is generally expressed and known by the particle
therefore, when the argument is formed according to the
rules of art; though in common discourse or writing,
such causal particles as for, because, manifest the act of
reasoning as well as the illative particles then and there
fore : and wheresoever any of these words are used,
there is a perfect syllogism expressed or implied, though
perhaps the three propositions do not appear, or are
not placed in regular form.

CHAP. II.

OF THE VARIOUS KINDS OF SYLLOGISMS, WITH PARTICU

LAR RULES RELATING TO THEM.

SYLLOGISMS are divided into various kinds, either ac

cording to the question which is proved by them, accord
ing to the nature and composition of them, or according
to the middle term, which is used to prove the question.
CH . II . SECT. 1.] RIGHT USE OF REASON. 245

SECT. I.

OF UNIVERSAL AND PARTICULAR SYLLOGISMS, BOTH

NEGATIVE AND AFFIRMATIVE.

ACCORDING to the question which is to be proved, so

syllogisms are divided into universal affirmative, univer
sal negative, particular affirmative, and particular nega
tive. This is often called a division of syllogisms drawn
from the conclusion ; for so many sorts of conclusions
there may be, which are marked with the letters A, E,
I, O.
In an universal affirmative syllogism, one idea is proved
universally to agree with another, and may be univer
sally affirmed of it ; as, every sin deserves death ; every
unlawful wish is a sin ; therefore every unlawful wish de
serves death.
In an universal negative syllogism, one idea is proved
to disagree with another idea universally, and may be
thus denied of it ; as, no injustice can be pleasing to God ;
all persecution for the sake of conscience is injustice ;
therefore, no persecution for conscience sake can be pleas
ing to God.
Particular affirmative, and particular negative syllo
gisms, may be easily understood by what is said of uni
versals, and there will be sufficient examples given of all
these in the next section.
The general principle upon which those universal and
particular syllogisms are founded , is this, Whatsoever
is affirmed or denied universally of any idea, may be
affirmed or denied of all the particular kinds or beings
which are contained in the extension of that universal
idea. So the desert of death is affirmed universally of
sin, and an unlawful wish is one particular kind of sin
which is contained in the universal idea of sin, therefore
the desert of death may be affirmed concerning an un
lawful wish. And so of the rest.
Note, In the doctrine of syllogisms, a singular and
an indefinite proposition are ranked among universals,
as was before observed in the doctrine of propositions.
246 LOGIC ; OR, THE [PART III.

SECT. II.

OF PLAIN SIMPLE SYLLOGISMS , AND THEIR RULES.

THE next division of syllogisms is into single and com

pound. This is drawn from the nature and composition
of them .
Single syllogisms are made up of three propositions :
compound syllogisms contain more than three proposi
tions, and may be formed into two or more syllogisms.
Single syllogisms, for distinction's sake, may be di
vided into simple, complex *, and conjunctive.
Those are properly called simple or categorical syllo
gisms, which are made up of three plain, single, or cate
gorical propositions, wherein the middle term is evident
ly and regularlyjoined with one part of the question in
the major proposition, and with the other in the minor,
whence there follows a plain single conclusion ; as, every
human virtue is to be sought with diligence ; prudence is a
human virtue; therefore prudence is to be sought diligently.
Note, Though the terms of propositions may be com
plex, yet where the composition of the whole argument
is thus plain, simple, and regular, it is properly called a
simple syllogism, since the complexion does not belong to
the syllogistic form of it.
Simple syllogisms have several rules belonging to them,
which, being observed, will generally secure us from false
inferences: but these rules being founded on four gene
ral axioms, it is necessary to mention these axioms be
forehand, for the use of those who will enter into the
speculative reason of all these rules.

Axiom 1. Particular propositions are contained in

universals, and may be inferred from them ; but uni
versals are not contained in particulars, nor can be in
ferred from them.

As ideas and propositions are divided into single and compound, and single
are subdivided into simple and complex ; so there are the same divisions and
subdivisions applied to syllogisms.
 CH. II. SECT. 2.] RIGHT USE of reason. 247

Axiom 2. In all universal propositions, the subject is

universal : in all particular propositions, the subject is
particular.
Axiom 3. In all affirmative propositions, the predicate
has no greater extension than the subject ; for its exten
sion is restrained by the subject, and therefore it is al
ways to be esteemed as a particular idea. It is by mere
accident, if it ever be taken universally, and cannot hap
pen but in such universal or singular propositions as
are reciprocal.
Axiom 4. The predicate of a negative proposition is
always taken universally, for in its whole extension it is
denied of the subject. If we say no stone is vegetable, we
deny all sorts of vegetation concerning stone.

The Rules of simple, regular Syllogisms, are these :

Rule I. The middle term must not be taken twice parti

cularly, but once at least universally. For if the middle
term be taken for two different parts or kinds of the
same universal idea, then the subject of the conclusion
is compared with one of these parts, and the predicate
with another part, and this will never show whether that
subject and predicate agree or disagree: there will then
be four distinct terms in the syllogism, and the two parts
of the question will not be compared with the same third
idea ; as if I say, some men are pious, and some men are
robbers, I can never infer that some robbers are pious, for
the middle term men being taken twice particularly, it
is not the same men who are spoken of in the major and
minor propositions.

Rule II. The terms in the conclusions must never be

taken more universally than they are in the premises. The
reason is derived from the first axiom, that generals can
never be inferred from particulars.

Rule III. A negative conclusion cannot be proved by

two affirmative premises. For when the two terms ofthe
248 LOGIC ; OR, THE [PART III.

conclusion are united or agree to the middle term, it

does not follow by any means that they disagree from
one another.

Rule IV. If one ofthe premises be negative, the con

clusion must be negative. For if the middle term be de
nied of either part of the conclusion, it may show that
the terms of the conclusion disagree, but it can never
show that they agree.

Rule V. Ifeither ofthe premises be particular, the con

clusion must be particular. This may be proved for the
most part from the first axiom.
These two last rules are sometimes united in this sin
gle sentence. The conclusion always follows the weaker
part of the premises. Now negatives and particulars are
counted inferior to affirmatives and universals.

Rule VI. From two negative premises nothing can be

concluded. For they separate the middle term both from
the subject and predicate of the conclusion, and when
two ideas disagree to a third, we cannot infer that they
either agree or disagree with each other.
Yet where the negative is a part of the middle term,
the two premises may look like negatives according . to
the words, but one of them is affirmative in sense ; as,
What has no thought cannot reason ; but a worm has no
thought ; therefore a worm cannot reason. The minor
proposition does really affirm the middle term concern
ing the subject, namely, a worm is what has no thought,
and thus it is properly in this syllogism an affirmative
proposition.
Rule VII. From two particular premises nothing can
be concluded. This rule depends chiefly on the first
axiom .
A more laborious and accurate proof of these rules,
and the derivation of every part of them in all possible
cases from the foregoing axioms, require so much time,
and are of so little importance to assist the right use of
 CH . 11. SECT. 2. ] RIGHT USE OF REASON. 249

reason, that it is needless to insist longer upon them

here. See all this done ingeniously in the Logic called
the Art of Thinking, Part III. Chap. III, &c.

SECT. II.
OF THE MOODS AND FIGURES OF SIMPLE SYLLOGISMS.

SIMPLE syllogisms are adorned and surrounded in the

common books of Logic with a variety of inventions
about moods and figures, wherein by the artificial con
texture of the letters A, E, I, and Ŏ men have endea
voured to transform Logic, or the Art ofReasoning, into
a sort of mechanism, and to teach boys to syllogise, or
frame arguments and refute them, without any real in
ward knowledge of the question. This is almost in the
same manner as school-boys have been taught perhaps
in their trifling years to compose Latin verses, that is, by
certain tables and squares, with a variety of letters in
them, wherein by counting every sixth, seventh, or eighth
letter certain Latin words should be framed in the form
of hexameters or pentameters ; and this may be done by
those who know nothing of Latin or of verses.
I confess some of these logical subtleties have much
more use than those versifying tables, and there is much
ingenuity discovered in determining the precise number
of syllogisms that may be formed in every figure, and
giving the reasons of them ; yet the light of nature, a
good judgement, and due consideration of things, tend
more to true reasoning than all the trappings of mood s
and figures.
But lest this book be charged with too great defects
and imperfections, it may be proper to give short hints
of that which some logicians have spent so much time
and paper upon .
All the possible compositions of three ofthe letters,
A, E, I, O, to make three propositions amount to sixty
four; but fifty-four of them are excluded from forming
M
250 LOGIC ; OR, THE [PART III.

true syllogisms by the seven rules in the foregoing sec

tion: the remaining ten are variously diversified by fi
gures and moods into fourteen syllogisms.
The figure of a syllogism is the proper disposition of
the middle term with the parts ofthe question.
A mood is the regular determination of propositions
according to their quantity and quality, that is, their
universal or particular affirmation or negation ; which
are signified by certain artificial words wherein the con
´sonants are neglected, and these four vowels, A, E, I, 0,
are only regarded.
There are generally counted threefigures.
In thefirst of them the middle term is the subject of
the major proposition, and the predicate of the minor.
This contains four moods, called, Barbara, Celarent,
Darii, Ferio. And it is the excellency of this figure,
that all sorts of questions or conclusions may be proved
by it, whether A, E, I, or O, that is, universal or parti
cular, affirmative or negative ; as,

Bar-Every wicked man is truly miserable ;

ba-All tyrants are wicked men ;
ra.Therefore all tyrants are truly miserable.

Ce-He that's always in fear is not happy;

la-Covetous men are always in fear ;
rent.Therefore covetous men are not happy.

Da-Whatsoever furthers our salvation is good for us;

ri-Some afflictions further our salvation ;
i.Therefore some afflictions are good for us.

Fe-Nothing that must be repented of is truly desir

ri-Some pleasures must be repented of; [able,
o.Therefore there are some pleasures which are
not truly desirable.

In the second figure the middle term is the predicate

of both the premises ; this contains four moods, namely,
CH. II . SECT. 2. ] RIGHT USE OF REASON. 251

Cesare, Camestres, Festino, Baroco, and it admits only

of negative conclusions ; as,
Ce-No liar is fit to be believed ;
sa-Every good Christian is fit to be believed:
re. Therefore no good Christian is a liar.

The reader may easily form examples of the rest.

The third figure requires that the middle term be the

subject of both the premises. It has six moods, namely,
Darapti, Felapton, Disamis, Datisi, Bocardo, Ferison ;
and it admits only of particular conclusions ; as,

Da-Whosoever loves God shall be saved ;

rap-All the lovers of God have their imperfections :
ti.Therefore some who have imperfections shall be
saved.

I leave the readers to form examples ofthe rest.

The moods ofthese three figures are comprised in

foar Latin verses .

Barbara, Celarent, Darii, Ferio, quoque primæ.

Cesare, Camestres, Festino, Baroco, secundæ.
Tertia Darepti, sibi vindicat, atque Felapton.
Adjungens Disamis, Datisi, Bocardo, Ferison.

The special rules of the three figures are these:

In the firstfigure the major proposition must always

be universal, and the minor affirmative.
In the secondfigure also the major must be universal,
and one ofthe premises, together with the conclusion,
must be negative .
In the thirdfigure the minor must be affirmative, and
the conclusion always particular.
There is also a fourthfigure, wherein the middle term
is predicated in the major proposition, and subjected in
the minor: but this is a very indirect and oblique man
M2
 252 LOGIC ; OR, THE [ PART III.

ner of concluding, and is never used in the sciences, nor

in human life, and therefore I call it useless. Some lo
gicians will allow it to be nothing else but a mere in
version of the first figure ; the moods of it, namely, Ba
ralipton, or Barbari, Calentes, Dibatis, Fespamo, Fresi
som, are not worthy to be explained by one example.

SECT. IV.
OF COMPLEX SYLLOGISMS.

It is not the mere use of complex terms in a syllogism

that gives it this name, though one of the terms is usually
complex , but those are properly called complex syllogisms,
in which the middle term is not connected with the
whole subject, or the whole predicate in two distinct pro
positions, but is intermingled and compared with them
by parts, or in a more confused manner, in different
forms of speech ; as,

The sun is a senseless being;

The Persians worshipped the sun;
Therefore the Persians worshipped a senseless being.
Here the predicate of the conclusion is worshipped a
senseless being, part of which is joined with the middle
term sun in the major proposition, and the other part
in the minor.
Though this sort of argument is confessed to be en
tangled or confused, and irregular, if examined by the
rules of simple syllogisms ; yet there is a great variety of 1
arguments used in books of learning, and in common
life, whose consequence is strong and evident, and which
must be ranked under this head ; as,
I. Exclusive propositions will form a complex argu
ment : as, pious men are the onlyfavourites ofHeaven; true
Christians arefavourites ofHeaven ; therefore true Chris
tians are pious men. Or thus, hypocrites are not pious
men; therefore hypocrites are not favourites ofHeaven.
CH. II. SECT. 4. ] RIGHT USE OF REASON. 253

II. Exceptive propositions will make such complex

syllogisms; as, none but physicians came to the consulta
tion ; the nurse is no physician ; therefore the nurse came
not to the consultation.

III. Or, comparative propositions ; as, knowledge is bet

ter than riches; virtue is better than knowledge ; therefore
virtue is better than riches : or thus, a dove willfly a mile
in a minute; a swallowflies swifter than a dove; therefore
a swallow will flymore than a mile in a minute.

IV. Or, inceptive and desitive propositions: as, thefogs

vanish as the sun rises ; but thefogs have not yet begun to
vanish; therefore the sun is not yet risen.

V. Or, modal propositions ; as, it is necessary that a

General understand the art of war ; but Caius does not
understand the art ofwar; therefore it is necessary Caius
should not be a General. Or thus, A total eclipse ofthe
sun would cause darkness at noon ; it is possible that the
moon at that time may totally eclipse the sun ; therefore it
is possible that the moon may cause darkness at noon.
Besides all these, there is a great number of complex
syllogisms which can hardly be reduced under any par
ticular titles, because the forms of human language are
so exceeding various ; as,
Christianity requires us to believe what the Apostles
wrote; St. Paul is an Apostle ; therefore Christianityre -
quires us to believe what St. Paul wrote.
No human artist can make an animal ; afly or a worm
is an animal ; therefore no human artist can make afly
or a worm.
The father always lived in London ; the son always
lived with the father ; therefore the son always lived in
London.
The blossom soon follows thefull bud; this pear-tree
hath many full buds ; therefore it will shortly have many
blossoms .
One hailstone never falls alone ; but a hailstonefell just
now ; therefore others fell with it.
254 LOGIC ; OR, THE [PART JIL

Thunder seldom comes without lightning ; but it thun

dered yesterday; therefore probably it lightened also.
Moses wrote before the Trojan war; the first Greek
historians wrote after the Trojan war ; therefore thefirst
Greek historian wrote after Moses * .
Now the force of all these arguments is so evident and
conclusive, that though the form of the syllogism be ne
ver so irregular, yet we are sure the inferences are just
and true ; for the premises, according to the reason of
things, do really contain the conclusion that is deducedfrom
them, which is a never-failing test of a true syllogism,
as shall be shewn hereafter.
The truth of most of these complex syllogisms may also
be made to appear, if needful, by reducing them either
to regular, simple syllogisms, or to some of the conjunc
live syllogisms, which are described in the next section.
I will give an instance only in the first, and leave the
rest to exercise the ingenuity of the reader.
The first argument may be reduced to a syllogism in
Barbara, thus,
The sun is a senseless being;
What the Persians worship is the sun ;
Therefore what the Persians worship is a senseless
being. Though the conclusive force of this argument is
evident without the reduction.

SECT. V.
OF CONJUNCTIVE SYLLOGISMS.

THOSE are called conjunctive syllogisms, wherein one of

the premises, namely the major, has distinct parts, which
are joined by a conjunction, or some such particle of
speech. Most times the major or minor, or both, are
explicitly compoundpropositions : and generally the major
Perhaps some of these syllogisms may be reduced to those which I call con
nexive afterwards ; but it is of little moment to what species they belong ; for
it is not any formal set of rules, so much as the evidence and force of reason,
that must determine the truth or falsehood of all such syllogisms.
CH . II. SECT. 5. ] RIGHT USE OF REASON. 255

proposition is made up of two distinct parts or propo

sitions, in such a manner, as that by the assertion of one
in the minor, the other is either asserted or denied in the
conclusion: or, by the denial of one in the minor, the
other is either asserted or denied in the conclusion. It
is hardly possible indeed to fit any short definition to
include all the kinds of them; but the chief amongst
them are the conditional syllogism, the disjunctive, the
relative, and the connexive.

I. The conditional or hypothetical syllogism, is that

whose major or minor, or both, are conditional propo
sitions; as, If there be a God, the world is governed by
Providence; but there is a God ; therefore the world is
governed by Providence.
These syllogisms admit two sorts of true argumenta
tion, whether the major is conditional.
1. When the antecedent is asserted in the minor, that
the consequent may be asserted in the conclusion ;
such is the preceding example. This is called arguing
from the position ofthe antecedent to the position ofthe
consequent.
2. When the consequent is contradicted in the minor
proposition, that the antecedent may be contradicted in
the conclusion ; as, If atheists are in the right, then the
world exists without a cause ; but the world does not exist
without a cause ; therefore atheists are not in the right.
This is called arguing from the removing of the conse
quent to the removing ofthe antecedent.
To remove the antecedent or consequent here, does
not merely signify the denial of it, but the contradiction
of it, for the mere denial of it by a contrary proposition
will not make a true syllogism, as appears thus : Ifevery
creature be reasonable, every brute is reasonable ; but no
brute is reasonable ; therefore no creature is reasonable.
Whereas, ifyou say in the minor, but every brute is not
reasonable, then it would follow truly in the conclusion ,
therefore every creature is not reasonable.
When the antecedent or consequent are negative pro
 256 LOGIC ; OR, THE [PART III.
positions, they are removed by an affirmative ; as, If
there be no God, then the world does not discover creating
wisdom ; but the world does discover creating wisdom ;
therefore there is a God. In this instance the conse
quent is removed or contradicted in the minor, that the
antecedent may be contradicted in the conclusion. So
in this argument of St. Paul, 1 Cor. xv. Ifthe dead rise
not, Christ died in vain ; but Christ did not die in vain ;
therefore the dead shall rise.
There are also two sorts of false arguing, namely, ( 1. )
From the removing ofthe antecedent to the removing ofthe
consequent; or, (2.) From the position ofthe consequent, to
the position of the antecedent. Examples of these are
easily framed ; as,
(1.) Ifa minister were a prince he must be honoured;
but a minister is not a prince ;
Therefore he must not be honoured.
(2.) Ifa minister were a prince, he must be honoured ;
but a minister must be honoured ;
Therefore he is a prince.
Who sees not the ridiculous falsehood of both these
syllogisms ?

Observ. I. Ifthe subject of the antecedent and the con

sequent be the same, then the hypothetical syllogism may
be turned into a categorical one: as, IfCæsar be a king,
he must be honoured; but Cæsar is a king , therefore, &c.
This may be changed thus, Every king must be honoured;
but Cæsar is a king; therefore, &c.

Observ. II. Ifthe major proposition only be conditional,

the conclusion is categorical: but ifthe minor or both be
conditional, the conclusion is also conditional ; as, The
worshippers ofimages are idolaters ; if the Papists wor
ship a crucifix, they are worshippers of an image; there
fore if the Papists worship a crucifix, they are idolaters.
But this sort of syllogisms should be avoided as much
as possible in disputation, because they greatly embar
rass a cause. The syllogisms, whose major only is hy
CH. II. SECT. 5. ] RIGHT USE OF REASON. 257

pothetical, are very frequent, and used with great ad

vantage.
II. A disjunctive syllogism is when the major proposi
tion is disjunctive; as, The earth moves in a circle or an
ellipsis ; but it does not move in a circle ; therefore it moves
in an ellipsis.
A disjunctive syllogism may have many members or
parts ; thus, it is either spring, summer, autumn, or win
ter; but it is not spring, autumn, or winter ; therefore it
is summer.
The true method of arguing here, isfrom the assertion
ofone, to the denial ofthe rest, or from the denial ofone
or more, tothe assertion of what remains ; but the major
should be so framed, that the several parts of it cannot
be true together, though one of them is evidently true.
III. A relative syllogism requires the major proposi
tion to be relative ; as, Where Christ is, there shall his
servants be; but Christ is in heaven ; therefore his ser
vants shall be there also. Or, As is the captain, so are
his soldiers ; but the captain is a coward; therefore his
soldiers are so too.
Arguments that relate to the doctrine of proportion,
must be referred to this head ; as, As two are to four, so
are three to six , but two make the half offour ; therefore
three make the half ofsix.
Besides these, there is another sort of syllogism which
is very natural and common, and yet authors take very
little notice of it, call it by an improper name, and de
scribe it very defectively ; and that is,
IV. A connexive syllogism. This some have called co
pulative, but it does by no means require the major to
be a copulative nor a compound proposition (according
to the definition given of it, Part II. Chap. II. Sect. 6. ),
but it requires that two or more ideas be so connected,
either inthe complex subject or predicate of the major,
that if one of them be affirmed or denied in the minor,
common sense will naturally shew us what will be the
consequence. It would be very tedious and useless to
M 3
258 LOGIC ; OR, THE [PART III.
!
frame particular rules about them, as will appear by the
following examples, which are very various, and yet may
be further multiplied .
(1. ) Meekness and humility always go together ; Moses
was a man ofmeekness ; therefore Moses was also hum
ble. Or we may form this minor, Pharaoh was no hum
ble man ; therefore he was not meek.
(2.) No man can serve God and Mammon ; the covetous
man serves Mammon ; therefore he cannot serve God. Or
the minor may run thus, the true Christian serves God,
therefore he does not serve Mammon.
(3.) Genius must join with study to make a great man ;
Florino has genius, but he cannot study ; therefore Flo
rino will never be a great man. Or thus, Quintus studies
hard, but has no genius ; therefore Quintus will never be
a great man.
(4.) Gulo cannot make a dinner without flesh andfish ;
there was nofish to be gotten to-day ; therefore Gulo this
day cannot make a dinner.
(5.) London and Paris are in different latitudes ; the
latitude of London is 514 degrees ; therefore this cannot
be the latitude of Paris.
(6.) Joseph and Benjamin had one mother ; Rachel
was the mother of Joseph ; therefore she was Benjamin's
mother too.
(7.) Thefather and the son are ofequal stature ; thefa
ther is six feet high ; therefore the son is six feet high also.
(8.) Pride is inconsistent with innocence ; angels have
innocence ; therefore they have no pride. Or thus, devils
have pride; therefore they have not innocence.
I might multiply other instances of these connexive
syllogisms, by bringing in all sorts of exceptive, exclusive,
comparative, and modal propositions into the composi
tion ofthem ; for all these may be wrought into conjunc
tive, as well as into simple syllogisms, and thereby we
may render them compler. But it would waste time and
paper without equal profit.
Concerning these various kinds of conjunctive syllo
gisms, take these two observations .
 CH. II. SECT. 6 ] RIGHT USE OF REASON. 259

Observ. I. Most of them may be transformed into ca

·tegorical syllogisms, by those who have a mind to prove
the truth of them that way; or they may be easily con
verted into each other by changing the forms of speech.

Observ. 2. These conjunctive syllogisms are seldom de

ficient or faulty in the form of them; for such a defi
cience would be discovered at first glance, generally by
common reason, without any artificial rules of Logic :
the chief care therefore is to see that the major propo
sition be true, upon which the whole force of the argu
ment usually depends.

SECT. VI.
OF COMPOUND SYLLOGISMS.

WE properly call those compound syllogisms, which are

made of two or more single syllogisms, and may be re
solved into them. The chief kinds are these ; epichi
rema, dilemma, prosyllogismus, and sorites.
I. Epichirema is a syllogism which contains the proof
of the major or minor, or both, before it draws the con
clusion. This is often used in writing, in public speeches,
and in common conversation ; that so each part of the
discourse may be confirmed and put out of doubt, as it
moves on toward the conclusion which was chiefly de
signed. Take this instance :
Sickness may be goodfor us ; for it weans usfrom the
pleasures oflife, and makes us think of dying;
But we are uneasy under sickness , which appears by our
impatience, complaints, groanings, &c.
Therefore we are uneasy sometimes under that which is
good for us.
Another instance you may see in Cicero's oration in
defence of Milo, who had slain Clodius. His major pro
position is, that it is lawful for one man to kill another
who lies in wait to kill him ; which he proves from the
custom of nations, from natural equity, examples, & c. his
260 LOGIC ; OR, THE [PART 111.
minor is, that Clodius laid wait for Milo ; which he
proves by his arms, guards, &c. and then infers the con
clusion, that it was lawful for Milo to kill Clodius.

II. A Dilemma is an argument which divides the whole

into all its parts or members by a disjunctive proposition,
and then infers something concerning each part which
is finally inferred concerning the whole. Instances of
this are frequent ; as, In this life we must either obey our
vicious inclinations, or resist them : To obey them, will
bring sin and sorrow ; to resist them is laborious andpain
ful: therefore we cannot be perfectly free from sorrow or
pain in this life.
A dilemma becomes faulty or ineffectual three ways :
First, when the members of the division are not well
opposed, or not fully enumerated ; for then the major is
false. Secondly, When what is asserted concerning each
part is not just ; for then the minor is not true. Thirdly,
When it may be retorted with equal force upon him who
utters it.
There was a famous ancient instance of this case,
wherein a dilemma was retorted. Euathlus promised
Protagoras a reward when he had taught him the art of
pleading, and it was to be paid the first day that he
gained any cause in the court. After a considerable
time Protagoras goes to law with Euathlus for the re
ward, and uses this dilemma : Either the cause willgo on
my side, or on yours : if the cause goes on my side, you
must pay me according to the sentence of thejudge : ifthe
cause goes on your side, you must pay me according to your
bargain : Therefore, whether the cause goes for me or
against me, you must pay me the reward. But Euathlus
retorted this dilemma thus ; Either I shall gain the cause
or lose it : if I gain the cause, then nothing will be due to
you according to the sentence of the judge : But if I lose
the cause, nothing will be due to you according to my bar
gain : therefore, whether I lose or gain the cause, I will
not pay you, for nothing will be due to you.
Note 1. A dilemma is usually described as though it
CH. II , SECT. 6. ] RIGHT USE OF REASON . 261

always proved the absurdity, inconvenience, or unrea

sonableness of some opinion or practice ; and this is the
most common design of it : but it is plain, that it may
also be used to prove the truth or advantage of any
thing proposed ; as, In heaven we shall either have de
sires, or not : if we have no desires, then we have full sa
tisfaction ; if we have desires, they shall be satisfied as
fast as they rise ; therefore in heaven we shall be com
pletely satisfied.
Note 2. This sort of argument may be composed of
three or more members, and may be called a trilemma.

III. A prosyllogism is when two or more syllogisms

are so connected together, that the conclusion of the
former is the major or the minor of the following ; as
blood cannot think ; but the soul of man thinks ; there
fore the soul of man is not blood ; but the soul of a brute
is his blood, according to the scripture ; therefore the
soul of man is different from the soul of a brute. See
another instance in the Introduction to this Treatise,
p. 5.

IV. A sorites is when several middle terms are chosen

to connect one another successively in several proposi
tions, till the last proposition connects its predicate with
the first subject . Thus, All men of revenge have their
souls often uneasy ; uneasy souls are a plague to them
selves; now to be one's own plague is folly in the extreme ;
therefore all men of revenge are extreme fools.
The Apostle Rom. viii. 29, gives us an instance of
this sort of argument, if it were reduced to exact form :
Whom he foreknew, those he predestinated ; whom he pre
destinated he called ; whom he called he justified ; whom
he justified he glorified ; therefore whom he foreknew he
glorified.
To these syllogisms it may not be improper to add
induction, which is, when from several particular propo
sitions we infer one general ; as, The doctrine of the So
cinians cannot be proved from the Gospels, it cannot be
262 LOGIC; OR, THE [PART IIL

proved from the Acts of the Apostles, it cannot be proved

from the Epistles, nor the Book of Revelation ; therefore
it cannot be proved from the New Testament.
Note, This sort of argument is often defective, be
cause there is not due care taken to enumerate all the
particulars on which the conclusion should depend .
All these four kinds of syllogisms in this section may
be called redundant, because they have more than three
propositions. But there is one sort of syllogism which
is defective, and is called an enthymem, because only the
conclusion with one of the premises is expressed, while
the other is supposed and reserved in the mind : Thus,
There is no true religion without good morals : therefore
a knave cannot be truly religious : Or thus, It is our duty
to love our neighbours as ourselves ; therefore there are
but few who perform their duty.
Note, This is the most common sort of argument
amongst mankind, both in writing and in speaking ; for
it would take up too much time, and too much retard
the discourse, to draw out all the arguments in mood
and figure. Besides, mankind love to have so much
compliment paid to their understandings, as to suppose
that they know the major or minor, which is suppressed
and implied, when you pronounce the other premise
and the conclusion.
If there be any debate about this argument, the syllo
gism must be completed in order to try its force and
goodness, by adding the absent propositions,

SECT. VII .
OF THE MIDDLE TERM, OF COMMON PLACES OR TOPICS,
AND INVENTION OF ARGUMENTS.

THE next division of syllogisms is according to the mid

dle term, which is made use of in the proof of any pro
position. Now the middle term (as we have hinted be
fore) is often called argument, because the force of the
CH. III . SECT. 7. ] RIGHT USE OF REASON. 263

syllogism depends upon it. We must take a little delay

here to treat briefly of the doctrine of topics, or places
whence middle terms or arguments are drawn.
All arts and sciences have some general subjects which
belong to them, which are called topics or common places ;
because middle terms are borrowed, and arguments de
rived from them for the proof of the various proposi
tions which we have occasion to discourse of. The topics
of grammar, are etymology, noun, verb, construction, sig
nification, &c. The topics of logic, are genus, species,
difference, property, definition, division, &c. The topics
of ontology, or metaphysics, are cause, effect, action, pas
sion, identity, opposition, subject, adjunct, sign, &c. The
topics of morality, or ethics, are law, sin, duty, autho
rity, freedom of will, command, threatening, reward, pu
nishment, &c. The topics of theology, are God, Christ,
faith, hope, worship, salvation, &c.
To these several topics there belong particular obser
vations, axioms, canons, or rules*, which are laid down
in their proper sciences ; as,
Grammar hath such canons, namely, Words in a dif
ferent construction obtain a different sense. Words derived
from the same primitive may probably have some affinity
in their original meaning, &c.
Canons in Logic are such as these, Every part of a
division singly taken must contain less than the whole. A
definition must be peculiar and proper to the thing defined.
Whatever is affirmed or denied of the genus, may be af
firmed or denied of the species, &c.
Metaphysical canons are such as these, Final causes
belong only to intelligent agents. If a natural and neces
sary cause operate, the effect willfollow, &c. and there are
large catalogues of many more in each distinct science.
Now it has been the custom of those who teach Logic
or Rhetoric, to direct their disciples when they want an
argument, to consult the several topics which are suited

* A canon is a proposition declaring some property of the subject, which is

not expressed in the definition or division of it.
264 LOGIC ; OR, THE [PART 111.
to their subject or discourse, and to rummage over the
definitions, divisions, and canons, that belong to each
topic. This is called the invention of an argument : and
it is taught with much solemnity in some schools.
I grant there may be good use of this practice for
persons of a lower genius, when they are to compose
any discourse for the public ; or for those of superior
parts, to refresh their memory, and revive their acquaint
ance with a subject which has been long absent from
their thoughts, or when their natural spirits labour under
indisposition and languor ; but when a man of mode
rate sagacity has made himself master of his theme by
just diligence and inquiry, he has seldom need to run
knocking at the doors of all the topics that he may fur
nish himself with argument or matter of speaking : and
indeed it is only a man of sense and judgement that can
use common places or topics well ; for amongst this va
riety he only knows what is fit to be left out, as well as
what is fit to be spoken .
By some logical writers this business of topics and in
vention is treated of in such a manner with mathemati
cal figures and diagrams, filled with the barbarous tech
nical words, Napcas, Nipcis, Ropcos, Nosrop, &c. as
though an ignorant lad were to be led mechanically in
certain artificial harnesses and trammels to find out ar
guments to prove or refute any proposition whatsoever,
without any rational knowledge of the ideas. Now there
is no need to throw words of contempt on such a prac
tice ; the very description of it carries reproof and ridi
cule in abundance.

SECT. VIII.
OF SEVERAL KINDS OF ARGUMENTS AND DEMON
STRATIONS.
WE proceed now to the division of syllogisms accord
ing to the middle term ; and in this part of our treatise
the syllogisms themselves are properly called arguments,
and are thus distributed ,
 CH. II. SECT. 8. ] RIGHT USE of reason. 265

I. Arguments are called grammatical, logical, meta

physical, physical, moral, mechanical, theological, &c. ac
cording to the art, science, or subject, whence the mid
dle term or topic is borrowed. Thus, if we prove that
no man should steal from his neighbour, because the scrip
ture forbids it, this is a theological argument ; if we
prove it from the laws of the land, it is political : but if
we prove it from the principles of reason and equity, the
argument is moral.

II. Arguments are either certain and evident, or

doubtful and merely probable.
Probable arguments are those whose conclusions are
proved by some probable medium ; as, This hill was
once a church-yard, or a field of battle, because there are
many human bones found here. This is not a certain ar
gument, for human bones might have been conveyed
there some other way.
Evident and certain arguments are called demonstra
tions; for they prove their conclusions by clear mediums
and undoubted principles ; and they are generally di
vided into these two sorts.
1. Demonstrations à priori, which prove the effect
by its necessary cause ; as, I prove the scripture is infal
libly true, because it is the word of God, who cannot lie.
2. Demonstrations à posteriori, which infer the cause
from its necessary effect : as, I infer there hath been the
hand of some artificer here, because I find a curious fi
gure. Or, I infer there is a God, from the works of his
wisdom in the invisible world.
The last ofthese is called demonstratio roũ örı, because
it proves only the existence of a thing ; the first is
named demonstratio Tou díori, because it shews also the
cause of existence.
But Note, That though these two sorts of arguments
are most peculiarly called demonstrations, yet generally
any strong and convincing argument obtains that name;
and it is the custom of mathematicians to call all their
266 LOGIC ; OR, THE [PART III.
arguments demonstrations, from what medium soever
they derive them.

III. Arguments are divided into artificial and inar

tificial.
An artificial argument is taken from the nature and
circumstances of the things ; and if the argument be
strong, it produces a natural certainty ; as, The world
was first created by God, because nothing can create
itself.
An inartificial argument is the testimony of another ;
and this is called original, when our information pro
ceeds immediately from the persons concerned, or from
eye or ear-witnesses of a fact : it is called tradition,
when it is delivered by the report of others.
We have taken notice before, that testimony is either
divine or human. If the human testimony be strong,
it produces a moral certainty ; but divine testimony pro
duces a supernatural certainty, which is far superior.
Note, Arguments taken from human testimony, as well
as from laws and rules of equity, are called moral ; and
indeed the same name is also applied to every sort of
argument which is drawn from the free actions of God,
or the contingent actions of men, wherein we cannot arise
to a natural certainty, but content ourselves with a high
degree of probability, which in many cases is scarce in
ferior to natural certainty.

IV. Arguments are either direct or indirect. It is a

direct argument, where the middle term is such as proves
the question itself, and infers that very proposition ,
which wasthe matter of inquiry. An indirect or oblique
argument, proves or refutes some other proposition, and
thereby makes the thing inquired appear to be true by
plain consequence.
Several arguments are called indirect : as ( 1.), When
some contradictory proposition is proved to be false, im
probable or impossible : or when upon supposition of
CH . II. SECT. 8. ] RIGHT USE OF REASON. 267

the falsehood, or denial of the original proposition,

some absurdity is inferred . This is called a proof per
impossibile, or a reductio ad absurdum. ( 2.) When some
other proposition is proved to be true which is less pro
bable, and thence it follows that the original proposi
tion is true, because it is more probable. This is an ar
gument ex minus probabili ad magis. (3.) When any
other proposition is proved, upon which it was before
agreed to yield the original question . This is an argu
ment ex concesso.

V. There is yet another rank of arguments which

have Latin names ; their true distinction is derived from
the topics or middle terms which are used in them,
though they are called an address to our judgement, our
faith, our ignorance, our profession, our modesty, and
our passions.
1. If an argument be taken from the nature or exist
ence of things, and addressed to the reason of man
kind, it is called argumentum ad judicium.
2. When it is borrowed from some convincing tes
timony, it is argumentum ad fidem, an address to our
faith.
3. When it is drawn from any insufficient medium
whatsoever, and yet the opposer has not skill to refute
or answer it, this is argumentum ad ignorantiam, an ad
dress to our ignorance.
4. When it is built upon the professed principles or
opinions of the person with whom we argue, whether
the opinions be true or false, it is named argumentum ad
hominem, an address to our professed principles. St. Paul
often uses this argument when he reasons with the Jews,
and when he says, I speak as a man.
5. When the argument is fetched from the senti
ments of some wise, great, or good men, whose autho
rity we reverence and hardly dare oppose, it is called
argumentum ad verecundiam, an address to our modesty.
6. I add finally, When an argument is borrowed
from any topics which are suited to engage the inclina
268 LOGIC ; OR, THE [PART III.

tions and passions of the hearers on the side of the

speaker, rather than to convince the judgement, this is
argumentum ad passiones, an address to the passions ; or
if it be made publicly, it is called ad populum, or an ap
peal to the people.
After all these divisions of syllogisms or arguments
arising from the middle term, there is one distinction
proper to be mentioned which arises from the premises.
An argument is called uniform, when both the premises
are derived from the same spring of knowledge, whe
ther it be sense, reason, consciousness, human faith, or
divine faith : but when the two premises are derived
from different springs of knowledge, it is called a mixed
argument.
Whether the conclusion must be called human or di
vine, when one or both premises are matters of divine
faith, but the conclusion is drawn by human reason, I
leave to be disputed and determined in the schools of
theology.
Thus the second chapter is finished, and a particular
account given of all the chief kinds of syllogisms or ar
guments which are made use of among men, or treated
of in Logic, together with special rules for the forma
tion of them, as far as is necessary.
If a syllogism agrees with the rules which are given
for the construction and regulation of it, it is called a
true argument : if it disagrees with these rules, it is a
paralogism or false argument : but when a false argu
ment puts on the face and appearance of a true one,
then it is properly called a sophism or fallacy, which
shall be the subject of the next chapter.

CHAP. III.

THE DOCTRINE OF SOPHISMS.

FROM truth nothing can really follow but what is true :

whensoever therefore we find a false conclusion drawn
CH . III . SECT. 1. ] RIGHT USE OF REASON. 269

from premises which seem to be true, there must be

some fault in the deduction or inference ; or else one of
the premises is not true in the sense in which it is used
in that argument.
When an argument carries the face of truth with it,
and yet leads us into mistake, it is a sophism ; and there
is some need of a particular description of these falla
cious arguments, that we may with more ease and readi
ness detect and solve them.

SECT. I.
OF SEVERAL KINDS OF SOPHISMS, AND THEIR SOLUTION.
As the rules of right judgement, and ofgood ratiocination,
often coincide with each other, so the doctrine ofpreju
dices, which are treated of in the Second part of Logic,
has anticipated a great deal of what might be said on
the subject of sophisms ; yet I shall mention the most re
markable springs offalse argumentation, which are re
duced by logicians to some of the following heads.
I. The first sort of sophism is called ignoratio elenchi,
or a mistake of the question; that is, when something
else is proved which has neither any necessary con
nexion or consistency with the thing inquired, and con
sequently gives no determination to the inquiry, though
it may seem at first sight to determine the question; as,
if any should conclude that St. Paul was not a native
Jew, by proving that he was born a Roman ; or if they
should pretend to determine that he was neither Roman
nor Jew, by proving that he was born at Tarsus in Ci
licia : these sophisms are refuted by shewing that all
these three may be true ; for he was born of Jewish pa
rents in the city of Tarsus, and by some peculiar privi
lege granted to his parents, or his native city, he was
born a denizen of Rome. Thus there is neither of these
three characters of the apostle inconsistent with each
other, and therefore the proving one of them true does
not refute the others.
270 LOGIC ; OR, THE [PART III.

Or ifthe question be proposed, Whether excess ofwine

can be hurtful to him that drinks it, and the sophister
should prove that it revives his spirits, it exhilirates his
soul, it gives a man courage, and makes him strong and
active, and then he takes it for granted that he has
proved his point.
Butthe respondent may easily shew, that though wine
may do all this, yet it may be finally hurtful both to the
soul and body of him that drinks it to excess.
Disputers when they grow warm, are ready to run into
this fallacy ; they dress up the opinion of their adversary
as they please, and ascribe sentiments to him which he
doth not acknowledge ; and when they have with a great
deal of pomp attacked and confounded these images of
straw of their own making, they triumph over their ad
versary as though they had utterly confuted his opinion.
It is a fallacy of the same kind which a disputant is
guilty of, when he finds that his adversary is too hard
for him, and that he cannot fairly prove the question
first proposed; he then with slyness and subtlety turns
the discourse aside to some other kindred point which
he can prove, and exults in that new argument wherein
his opponent never contradicted him.
The way to prevent this fallacy is by keeping the eye
fixed on the precise point of dispute, and neither wan
dering from it ourselves, nor suffering our antagonist to
wander from it, or substitute any thing else in its room.

II. The next sophism is called petitio principii, or a

supposition ofwhat is not granted ; that is, when any pro
position is proved by the same proposition in other
words, or by something that is equally uncertain and
disputed as if any one undertake to prove that the hu
man soul is extended through all the parts ofthe body, be
cause it resides in every member which is but the same
thing in other words. Or, if a Papist should pretend
to prove that his religion is the only Catholic religion ; and
is derived from Christ and his apostles, because it agrees
with the doctrine of all the fathers ofthe church, all the
CH . III . SECT. 1.] RIGHT USE of reason. 271

holy martyrs, and all the Christian world throughout all

ages : whereas this is the great point in contest, whether
their religion does agree with that of all the ancients
and the primitive Christians, or no.

III. That sort of fallacy which is called a circle, is

very near akin to the petitio principii ; as when one of
the premises in a syllogism is questioned and opposed,
and we intend to prove it by the conclusion : or, when
in a train of syllogisms we prove the last by recurring
to what was the conclusion of the first. The Papists
are famous at this sort of fallacy; when they prove the
scripture to be the word ofGod by the authority or infal
lible testimony oftheir church ; and when they are called
to shew the infallible authority oftheir church, they pre
tend to prove it by the scripture.
IV. The next kind of sophism is called non causâ pro
causâ, or the assignation ofa false cause. This the peri
patetic philosophers were guilty of continually, when
they told us that certain beings, which they called sub
stantial forms, were the springs of colour, motion, vege
tation, and the various operations of natural beings in
the animate and inanimate world; when they inform us
that nature was terribly afraid ofa vacuum ; and that this
was the cause why the water would not fall out of a long
tube if it was turned upside down : the moderns as well
as the ancients fall often into this fallacy, when they po
sitively assign the reasons of natural appearances, with
out sufficient experiments to prove them.
Astrologers are overrun with this sort of fallacies, and
they cheat the people grossly by pretending to tellfor
tunes, and to deduce the cause of the various occur
rences in the lives of men from the various positions of
the stars and planets, which they call aspects.
When comets and eclipses ofthe sun and moon are con
strued to signify the fate of princes, the revolution of
states, famine, wars and calamities of all kinds, it is a
fallacy that belongs to this rank of sophisms.
There is scarce any thing more common in human
 272 LOGIC ; OR, THE [PART III.
life than this sort of deceitful argument. If any two ac
cidental events happen to concur, one is presently made
the cause of the other. If Titius wronged his neighbour
of a guinea, and in six months after hefell down and broke
his leg, weak men will impute it to the divine vengeance
on Titius for his former injustice. This sophism was
found also in the early days of the world : for when holy
Job was surrounded with uncommon miseries, his own
friends inferred, that he was a most keinous criminal, and
charged him with aggravated guilt as the cause ofhis ca
lamities; though God himself by a voice from heaven
solved this uncharitable sophism, and cleared his ser
vant Job ofthat charge.
How frequent is it among men to impute crimes to
wrong persons? We too often charge that upon the
wicked contrivance and premeditated malice of a neigh
bour, which arose merely from ignorance, or from an
unguarded temper. And on the other hand, when we
have a mind to excuse ourselves, we practise the same so
phism, and charge that upon our inadvertence or our ig
norance, which perhaps was designed wickedness. What
is really done by a necessity of circumstances, we some
times impute to choice. And again, we charge that
upon necessity which was really desired and chosen.
Sometimes a person acts out of judgement, in oppo
sition to his inclination ; another person perhaps acts the
same thing out of inclination, and against his judge
ment. It is hard for us to determine with assurance
what are the inward springs and secret causes of every
man's conduct ; and therefore we should be cautious
and slow in passing a judgement where the case is not
exceeding evident : and if we should mistake, let it ra
ther be on the charitable. than on the censorious side.
It is the same sophism that charges mathematical learn
ing with leading the minds of men to scepticism and infi
delity, and as unjustly accuses the new philosophy ofpav
ing the way to heresy and schism. Thus the reformation
from Popery has been charged with the murder and blood
of millions, which in truth is to be imputed to the ty
CH. III . SECT. 1.] RIGHT USE of reason. 273

ranny oftheprinces and the priests, who would not suffer

the people to reform their sentiments and their prac
tices according to the word of God . Thus Christianity
in the primitive ages was charged by the heathens with
all the calamities which befel the Roman empire, because
the Christians renounced the heathen gods and idols.
The way to relieve ourselves from those sophisms
and to secure ourselves from the danger of falling into
them, is an honest and diligent inquiry into the real na
ture and causes of things, with a constant watchfulness
against all those prejudices that might warp the judge
ment aside from truth in that inquiry.

V. The next is called fallacia-accidentis or a sophism

wherein we pronounce concerning the nature and essen
tial properties of any subject according to something
which is merely accidental to it. This is akin to the
former, and is also very frequent in human life. So if
opium or the Peruvian bark has been used imprudently
or unsuccessfully, whereby the patient has received in
jury, some weaker people absolutely pronounce against
the use of the bark or opium upon all occasions whatso
ever, and are ready to call them poison. So wine has
been the accidental occasion of drunkenness and quarrels ;
learning and printing may have been the accidental
cause of sedition in a state ; the reading of the Bible, by
accident, has been abused to promote heresies or de
structive errors ; and for these reasons they have all been
pronounced evil things. Mahomet forbade his followers
the use of wine ; the Turks discourage learning in their
dominions ; and the Papists forbid the scripture to be
read by the Laity*. But how very unreasonable are
these inferences, and these prohibitions which are built
upon them !

VI. The next sophism borders upon the former ; and

that is, when we argue from that which is true in parti
* This is arguing from a moral universality, which admits of some exceptions,
in the same manner as may be urged from metaphysical or a natural universality,
which admits of no exception .
N
274 LOGIC ; OR, THE [PART III.

cular circumstances, to prove the same thing true abso

lutely, simply, and abstracted from all circumstances; this
is called in the schools a sophism, a dicto secundum quid
ad dictum simpliciter ; as, That which is bought in the
shambles is eaten for dinner; raw meat is bought in the
shambles ; therefore raw meat is eaten for dinner. Or thus,
Livy writes fables and improbabilities when he describes
prodigies and omens ; therefore Livy's Roman History is
never to be believed in any thing. Or thus, There may be 1
some mistake of transcribers in some part of scripture;
therefore scripture alone is not a safe guidefor ourfaith.
This sort of sophism has its reverse also ; as when we
argue from that which is true simply and absolutely to
prove the same thing true in all particular circumstances
whatsoever*; as if a traitor should argue from the sixth
commandment, Thou shalt not kill a man, to prove that D
F
he himselfought not to be hanged: or if a madman should
tell me, I ought not to withhold his sword from him, be
cause no man ought to withhold the property ofanother.
These two last species of sophisms are easily solved, by
shewing the difference betwixt things in their absolute
nature, and the same thing surrounded with peculiar
circumstances, and considered in regard to special times,
places, persons, and occasions; or by shewing the dif
ference between a moral and a metaphysical universality,
and that the proposition will hold good in one case, but
not in the other.

VII. The sophisms of composition and division come

next to be mentioned.
The sophism of composition is when we infer any thing
concerning ideas in a compounded sense, which is only
true in a divided sense. And when it is said in the gospel
that Christ made the blind to see, and the deafto hear, and
the lame to walk, we ought not to infer hence that Christ
performed contradictions ; but those who were blind be
fore, were made to see, and those who were deafbefore,
#
See preceding note.
CH. III . SECT. 1. ] RIGHT USE OF REASON. 275

were made to hear, &c. So when the scripture assures

us, the worst of sinners may be saved ; it signifies only,
that they who have been the worst of sinners may repent
and be saved, not that they shall be saved in their sins.
Or ifany one should argue thus, Two and three are even
and odd: five are two and three; therefore five are even
and odd. Here that is very falsely inferred concerning
two or three in union , which is only true of them divided.
The sophism of division is when we infer the same
thing concerning ideas in a divided sense, which is only
true in a compounded sense ; as, if we should pretend to
prove that every soldier in the Grecian army put an hun
dred thousand Persians toflight, because the Grecian sol
diers did so. Or if a man should argue thus, five is one
number; two and three are five ; therefore two and three
are one number.
This sort of sophisms is committed when the word all
is taken in a collective and a distributive sense, without
a due distinction ; as if any one should reason thus ; All
the musical instruments ofthe Jewish temple made a noble
concert ; the harp was a musical instrument of the Jewish
temple ; therefore the harp made a noble concert. Here
the word all in the major is collective, whereas such a
conclusion requires that the word all should be distri
butive.
.
It is the same fallacy when the universal word all or
no refers to species in one proposition, and to individuals
in another ; as, All animals were in Noah's ark ; there
fore no animals perished in the flood : whereas in the pre
mise all animals signifies every kind of animals, which
does not exclude or deny the drowning of a thousand
individuals.

VIII. The last sort of sophisms arises from our abuse

of the ambiguity of words, which is the largest and most
extensive kind of fallacy ; and indeed several of the
former fallacies might be reduced to this head.
When the words or phrases are plainly equivocal, they
are called sophisms of equivocation ; as, if we should ar
N 2
 276 LOGIC ; OR, THE [PART III.

gue thus : He that sends forth a book into the light, de

sires it to be read; he that throws a book into thefire, sends
it into the light ; therefore he that throws a book into the
fire, desires it to be read.
This sophism, as well as the foregoing, and all of the
like nature, are solved by shewing the different senses
of the words, terms or phrases. Here light in the major
proposition signifies the public view of the world ; in the
minor it signifies the brightness offlame and fire ; and
therefore the syllogism has four terms, or rather it has
no middle term, and proves nothing.
But where such gross equivocations and ambiguities ap
pear in arguments, there is little danger of imposing upon
ourselves or others. The greatest danger and which we
are perpetually exposed to in reasoning, is, where the
two senses or significations of one term are near akin,
and not plainly distinguished, and yet they are really
sufficiently different in their sense to lead us into great
mistakes, if we are not watchful. And indeed the great
est part of controversies in the sacred or civil life, arise
from the different senses that are put upon words, and
the different ideas which are included in them ; as have
been shewn at large in the first part of Logic, Chap. IV.
which treats of words and terms.
There is after all these, another sort ofsophism which
is wont to be called an imperfect enumeration or afalse
induction, when from a few experiments or observations
men infer general theorems and universal propositions.
But this is sufficiently noticed in the foregoing chapter,
where we treated of that sort of syllogism which is call
ed induction.

SECT. II .
TWO GENERAL TESTS OF TRUE SYLLOGISMS , AND ME→
THODS OF SOLVING ALL SOPHISMS.

BESIDES the special description of true syllogisms and

sophisms already given, and the rules by which the one
are framed, and the other refuted, there are these two
 CH. III. SECT. 2.] RIGHT USE OF REASON. 277

general methods of reducing all syllogisms whatsoever

to a test of their truth or falsehood.
• I. The first is, that the premises must, at least impli
citly, contain the conclusion ; or thus, one of the premises
must contain the conclusion, and the other must shew that
the conclusion is contained in it. The reason of this rule
is this: when any proposition is offered to be proved, it is
necessary to find another proposition which confirms it,
which may be called the containing proposition : but be
cause the second must not contain the first in an express
manner, and in the same words * , therefore it is neces
sary that a third or ostensive proposition be found out,
to shew that the second proposition contains the first,
which was to be proved. Let us make an experiment
of this syllogism : Whosoever is a slave to his natural in
clinations is miserable ; the wicked man is a slave to his
natural inclinations ; therefore the wicked man is miser
able. Here it is evident that the major proposition con
tains the conclusion ; for under the general character of
a slave to natural inclinations, a wicked man is contained
or included, and the minor proposition declares it ;
whence the conclusion is evidently deduced, that the
wicked man is miserable.
In many affirmative syllogisms we may suppose either
the major or the minor to contain the conclusion, and
the other to shew it ; for there is no great difference .
But in negative syllogisms it is the negative proposition
that contains the conclusion , and the affirmative propo
sition shews it, as, every wise man masters his passion ;
no angry man masters his passion ; therefore no angry
man is wise. Here it is more natural to suppose the mi
nor to be the containing proposition ; it is the minor im
plicitly denies wisdom concerning an angry man, be
cause mastering the passions is included in wisdom, and
the major shews it.
It is confessed that conditional and disjunctive major propositions do ex
pressly contain all that is in the conclusion ; but then it is not in a certain and
conclusive manner, but only in a dubious form of speech, and mingled with other
terms; and therefore it is not the same express proposition.
278 LOGIC ; OR, THE [PART III.

Note, This rule may be applied to complex and con

junctive, as well as simple syllogisms, and is adapted to
shew the truth or falsehood of any of them .

II. The second is this ; As the terms in every syllogism

are usually repeated twice, so they must be taken precisely
in the same sense in both places : for the greatest part of
mistakes that arise in forming syllogisms, is derived from
some little difference in the sense of one ofthe terms in
the two parts of the syllogism wherein it is used. Let
us consider the following sophisms :
1. It is a sin to kill a man ; a murderer is a man ; there
fore it is a sin to kill a murderer. Here the word kill în
the first proposition signifies to kill unjustly, or without
law ; in the conclusion it is taken absolutely for putting
a man to death in general, and therefore the inference is
not good.
2. What Iam, you are not ; but Iam a man , therefore
you are not a man. This is a relative syllogism : but if it
be reduced to a regular categorical form, it will appear
there is ambiguity in the terms, thus : What I am, is a
man: you are not what I am ; therefore you are not a man.
Here what I am in the major proposition is taken spe
cially for my nature; but in the minor proposition the
same words are taken individually for my person ; there
fore the inference must be false, for the syllogism does
not take the term what I am both times in the same
sense.
3. He that says you are an animal, says true ; but he
that says you are a goose, says you are an animal ; there
fore he that says you are a goose, says true. In the major
proposition the word animal is the predicate of an inci
dental proposition ; which incidental proposition being
affirmative, renders the predicate of it particular, ac
cording to Chap. II. Sect. 2. Axiom 3. and consequently
the word animal there signifies only human animality.
In the major proposition the word animal, for the same
reason, signifies the animality of a goose ; whereby it
becomes an ambiguous term, and unfit to build the con
CH. IV.] RIGHT USE OF REASON. 279

clusion upon. Or, if you say the word animal in the

minor is taken for human animality, then the minor is
evidently false.
It is from this last general test of syllogisms, that we
derive the custom of the respondent in answering the
arguments of the opponent, which is to distinguish upon
the major or minor proposition , and declare which term
is used in two senses, and in what sense the proposition
may be true, and in what sense it is false.

CHAP. IV.

SOME GENERAL RULES TO DIRECT OUR REASONING.

Most ofthe general and special directions given to form

our judgements aright in the preceding part of Logic
might be rehearsed here ; for the judgements which we
pass upon things are generally built on some secret rea
soning or argument by which the proposition is supposed
to be proved. But there may be yet some further as
sistances given to our reasoning powers in their search
after truth, and an observation of the following rules
will be of great importance for that end .

RULE I. Accustom yourselves to clear and distinct ideas,

to evident propositions, to strong and convincing argu
ments. Converse much with those friends, and those
books, and those parts of learning, where you meet with
the greatest clearness of thought, and force of reason
ing. The mathematical sciences, and particularly arith
metic, geometry, and mechanics, abound with these ad
vantages : and if there were nothing valuable in them
for the uses of human life, yet the very speculative parts
of this sort of learning are well worth our study ; for by
perpetual examples they teach us to conceive with clear
ness, to connect our ideas and propositions in a train
of dependence, to reason with strength and demonstra
tion, and to distinguish between truth and falsehood.
280 LOGIC ; OR, THE [PART III.

Something of these sciences should be studied by every

man who pretends to learning, and that, as Mr. Locke
expresses it, not so much to make us mathematicians, asto
make us reasonable creatures.
We should gain such a familiarity with evidence of
perception and force of reasoning, and get such a habit
of discerning clear truths, that the mind may be soon
offended with obscurity and confusion : then we shall, as
it were, naturally and with ease restrain our minds from
rasn judgement, before we attain just evidence of the
proposition which is offered to us : and we shall with
the same ease, and, as it were, naturally seize and em
brace every truth that is proposed with just evidence.
This habit of conceiving clearly, ofjudgingjustly, and
of reasoning well, is not to be attained merely by the
happiness of constitution, the brightness of genius, the
best natural parts, or the best collection of logical pre
cepts. It is custom and practice that must form and es
tablish this habit. We must apply ourselves to it till
we perform all this readily, and without reflecting on
rules. A coherent thinker, and a strict reasoner, is not
to be made at once by a set of rules, any more than a
good painter or musician may be formed extempore, by
an excellent lecture on music or painting. It is of in
finite importance therefore in our younger years, to be
taught both the value and the practice of conceiving
clearly and reasoning right ; for when we are grown up
to the middle of life, or past it, it is no wonder that we
should not learn good reasoning, any more than that an
ignorant clown should not be able to learn fine language,
dancing, or a courtly behaviour, when his rustic airs
have grown up with him till the age of forty.
For want of this care, some persons ofrank and edu
cation dwell all their days among obscure ideas ; they
conceive and judge always in confusion, they take weak
arguments for demonstration, they are led away with
the disguises and shadows of truth. Now if such per
sons happen to have a bright imagination, a volubility
of speech, and a copiousness of language, they not only
 CH . IV. ] RIGHT USE OF REASON. 281

impose many errors upon their own understandings,

but they stamp the image of their own mistakes upon
their neighbours also, and spread their errors abroad.
It is a matter ofjust lamentation and pity to consider
the weakness of the common multitude of mankind in this
respect, how they receive any thing into their assent
upon the most trifling grounds. True reasoning hath
very little share in forming their opinions. They resist
the most convincing arguments by an obstinate adhe
rence to their prejudices, and believe the most impro
bable things with the greatest assurance. They talk of
the abstrusest mysteries, and determine upon them with
the utmost confidence, and without just evidence either
from reason or revelation . A confused heap of dark and
inconsistent ideas make up a good part of their know
ledge in matters of philosophy as well as religion, having
never been taught the use and value of clear and just
reasoning.
Yet it must be still confessed that there are some mys
teries in religion, both natural and revealed, as well as
some abstruse points in philosophy, wherein the wise as
well as the unwise must be content with obscure ideas.
There are several things , especially relating to the in
visible world, which are unsearchable in our present
state, and therefore we must believe what revelation
plainly dictates, though the ideas may be obscure .
Reason itself demands this of us ; but we should seek
for the brightest evidence both of ideas, and of the con
nexion of them wheresoever it is attainable.

RULE II. Enlarge your general acquaintance with

things daily, in order to attain a richfurniture oftopics,
or middle terms, whereby those propositions which occur
may be either proved or disproved ; but especially medi
tate and inquire with great diligence and exactness into
the nature, properties, circumstances, and relations ofthe
particular subject about which you judge or argue. Con
sider its causes, effects, consequences, adjuncts, oppo
sites, signs, &c. so far as is needful to your present pur
N3
282 LOGIC ; OR, THE [PART III.

pose. You should survey a question round about, and

on all sides, and extend your views as far as possible, to
every thing that has a connexion with it. This practice
has many advantages in it ; as,
1. It will be a means to suggest to your mind proper
topics for argument about any proposition that relates
to the same subject.
2. It will enable you with greater readiness and just
ness of thought to give an answer to any sudden ques
tion upon that subject, whether it arises in your own
mind, or is proposed by others.
3. This will instruct you to give a plainer and speedier
solution of any difficulties that may attend the theme
of your discourse, and to refute the objections of those
who have espoused a contrary opinion.
4. By such a large survey of the whole subject in all
its properties and relations, you will be better secured
from inconsistencies, that is, from asserting or denying
any thing in one place, which contradicts what you have
asserted or denied in another : and to attain these ends,
an extensiveness of understanding , and a large memory,
are of unspeakable service.
One would be ready to wonder sometimes how easily
and wise and learned men are led into assertions
great
in some parts of the same treatise, which are found to
be scarce consistent with what they have asserted in other
places : but the true reason is, the narrowness ofthe mind
of man, that it cannot take in all the innumerable pro
perties and relations of one subject with a single view ;
and therefore whilst they are intent on one particular
part of their theme, they bend all their force of thought
to prove or disprove some proposition that relates to that
part, without a sufficient attention to the consequences
which may flow from it, and which may unhappily af
fect another part of the same subject ; and by this means
they are sometimes led to say things which are inconsist
ent. In such a case, the great dealers in dispute and
controversy take pleasure to cast nonsense and self-con
tradiction on their antagonist with huge and hateful re
 CH . IV. ] RIGHT USE OF REASON. 283

proaches. For my part, I rather choose to pity human

nature, whose necessary narrowness of understanding
exposes us all to some degrees of this frailty. But the
most extensive survey possible of our whole subject is
the best remedy against it. It is our judging and ar
guing upon a partial view of things, that exposes us to
mistakes, and pushes us into absurdities, or at least to
the very borders of them.

RULE III. In searching the knowledge of things, al

ways keep the precise point of the present question in your
eye. Take heed that you add nothing to it while you are
arguing, nor omit any part of it. Watch carefully, lest
any new ideas slide in to mingle themselves either with
the subject or the predicate. See that the question be
not altered by the ambiguity of any word taken in dif
ferent senses ; nor lest any secret prejudices of your
own, or the sophistical arts of others, cheat your under
standing, by changing the question, or shuffling in any
thing else in its room .
And for this end it is useful to keep the precise mat
ter of inquiry as simple as may be, and disengaged from
a complication of ideas which do not necessarily belong
to it. By admitting a complication of ideas, and taking
too many things at once into one question, the mind
is sometimes dazzled and bewildered, and the truth is
lost in such a variety and confusion of ideas ; whereas
by limiting and narrowing the question , you take a fuller
survey ofthe whole of it.
By keeping the single point of inquiry in our con
stant view, we shall be secured from sudden, rash, and
impertinent responses and determinations, which some
have obtruded instead of solutions and solid answers,
before they perfectly knew the questions.

RULE IV. When you have exactly considered the pre

cise point of inquiry, or what is unknown in the question,
then consider what, and how much you know already of
this question, or of the ideas and terms of which it is com
284 LOGIC ; OR, THE [PART III.

posed. It is by a comparison ofthe known and unknown

parts of the question together, that you find what re
ference the part known hath unto, or what connexion it
hath with the thing that is sought : those ideas, whereby
the known and unknown parts of the question are con
nected, will furnish you with middle terms or argu
`ments whereby the things proposed may be proved or
disproved .
In this part of your work, namely, comparing ideas to
gether, take due time, and be not too hasty to come to a
determination, especially in points of importance. Some
men when they see a little agreement or disagreement
between ideas, they presume a great deal, and so jump
into the conclusion. This is a short way to fancy, opi
nion, and conceit, but a most unsafe and uncertain way
to true knowledge and wisdom.

RULE V. In choosing your middle terms or arguments

toprove any question, always take such topics as are surest
and least fallible, and which carry the greatest evidence
and strength with them. Be not so solicitous about the
number, as the weight of your arguments, especially in
proving any proposition which admits of natural cer
tainty, or of complete demonstration. Many times we do
injury to a cause by dwelling upon trifling arguments.
We amuse our hearers with uncertainties, by multiply
ing the number of feeble reasonings, before we mention
those which are more substantial, conclusive, and con
vincing. And too often we yield up our own assent to
mere probable arguments, where certain proofs may
be obtained .
Yet it must be confessed there are many cases wherein
the growing number of probable arguments increases the
degree of probability, and gives a great and sufficient
confirmation to the truth which is sought ; as,
( 1. ) When we are inquiring the true sense of any
word or phrase, we are more confirmed in the signifi
cation of it, by finding the same expression so used in
several authors, or in several places of the same author.
CH . IV. ] RIGHT USE OF REASON. 285

(2. ) When we are searching out the true meaning or

opinion of any writer, or inquiring into a sacred doc
trine of scripture, we come to a surer determination of
the truth by several distinct places wherein the same
thing is expressed or plainly implied ; because it is not
so probable that an honest skilful reader should mistake
the meaning of the writer in many places, as he may in
one or two.
(3. ) When we would prove the importance of any
scriptural doctrine or duty, the multitude of texts,
wherein it is repeated and inculcated upon the reader,
seems naturally to instruct us that it is a matter of
greater importance, than other things which are but
slightly or singly mentioned in the Bible.
(4.) In searching out matters of fact in times past,
or in distant places, in which case moral evidence is suf
ficient, and moral certainty is the utmost which can be
attained, here we derive a greater assurance of the truth
of it by a number of persons, or a multitude of circum
stances concurring to bear witness to it.
(5.) From many experiments in natural philosophy,
we more safely infer a general theorem, than we can
from one or two.
(6. ) In matters which require present practice, both
sacred and civil, we must content ourselves oftentimes
with a mere preponderation of probable reasons or ar
guments. Where there are several reasons on each
side, for and against a thing that is to be done or omit
ted, a small argument added to the heap mayjustly turn
the balance on one side, and determine the judgement,
as I have noted in the Second Part of Logic.
To conclude ; a growing acquaintance with matters
of learning, and a daily improvement of our under
standings in affairs human and divine, will best teach
us to judge and distinguish in what cases the number
of arguments adds to their weight and force. It is only
experience can fully inform us when we must be deter
mined by probable topics, and when we must seek and
expect demonstrations.
 286 LOGIC ; OR, THE [PART III.

RULE VI. Prove your conclusion ( as far as possible)

by some propositions that are in themselves more plain,
evident and certain, than the conclusion : or at least such
as are more known, and more intelligible to the person
whom you would convince. If we neglect this rule, we
shall endeavour to enlighten that which is obscure by
something equally or more obscure, and to confirm that
which is doubtful by something equally or more uncer
tain. Common sense dictates to all men, that it is im
possible to establish any truth, and to convince others
of it, but by something that is better known to them .
than that truth is.

RULE VII. Labour in all your arguings to enlighten

the understanding, as well as to conquer and captivate the
judgement. Argue in such a manner as may give a
natural, distinct, and solid knowledge of things to your
hearers, as well as to force their assent by a mere proof
of the question. Now to attain this end, the chieftopic
or medium ofyour demonstration should be fetched, as
much as possible, from the nature of the thing to be
proved, or from those things which are most naturally
connected with it.
Geometricians sometimes break this rule without ne
cessity, two ways, namely,
1. When they prove one proposition only by shew
ing what absurdities will follow if the contradictory pro
position be supposed or admitted. This is called re
ductio ad absurdum * , or demonstratio per impossibile.
As for instance, when they prove all the radii of a circle
to be equal, by supposing one radius to be longer or
shorter than another, and then shewing what absurd
consequences will follow. This, I confess, forces the

* Note. This rule chiefly refers to the establishment of some truth, rather
than to the refutation of error. It is a very common and useful way of arguing,
to refute a false proposition , by shewing what evident falsehood or absurdity
will follow from it : for what proposition soever is really absurd and false
does effectually prove that principle to be false from which it is derived ; so
that this way ofrefuting an error is not so usually called reductio ad absurdum.
CH. IV. ] RIGHT USE OF REASON. 287

assent, but it does not enlighten the mind, by shewing

the true reason and cause why all radii are equal, which
is derived from the very construction of a circle: for
since a circle is formed by fixing one end of a straight
line in the centre, and moving the other end round
(or, which is all one, by compasses kept open to a cer
tain extent), it follows evidently that every part of the
circumference being thus described must be equally dis
tant from the centre, and therefore the radii, which are
lines from the centre to the circumference, must be all
equal.
2. Geometricians forget this rule, when they heap up
many far- fetched lines, figures, and proportions, to prove
some plain, simple, and obvious proposition. This is
called a demonstratio per aliena et remota, or an argu
ment from unnatural and remote mediums : as if, in
order to prove the radii of a circle are all equal, I should
make several triangles and squares about the circle, and
then from some properties and propositions of squares
and triangles prove that the radii of a circle are equal.
Yet it must be confessed, that sometimes such ques
tions happen, that it is hardly possible to prove them
by direct arguments drawn from the nature of things, &c.
and then it may not only be lawful but necessary to use
indirect proofs, and arguments drawn from remote me
diums, or from the absurdity ofthe contradictory suppo
sitions.
Such indirect and remote arguments may also be
sometimes used to confirm a proposition which has been
before proved by arguments more direct and immediate.

RULE VIII . Though arguments should give light to

the subject, as well as constrain the assent, yet you
must learn to distinguish well between an explication and
an argument, and neither impose upon yourselves, nor
suffer yourselves to be imposed upon by others, by mistak
ing a mere illustration for a convincing reason.
Axioms themselves , or self- evident propositions, may
 288 LOGIC ; OR, THE [PART III .

want an explication or illustration, though they are not

to be proved by reasoning.
Similitudes and allusions have oftentimes a very happy
influence to explain some difficult truth, and to render
the idea of it familiar and easy. Where the resem
blance is just and accurate, the influence of a simile may
proceed so far as to shew the possibility of the thing in
question, but similitudes must not be taken as a solid
proof of the truth or existence of those things to which
they have a resemblance. A too great deference paid to
similitudes, or an utter rejection of them, seem to be two
extremes, and ought to be avoided. The late inge
nious Mr. Locke, even in his inquiries after truth , makes
great use of similes for frequent illustration, and is very
happy in the invention of them , though he warns us
also lest we mistake them for conclusive arguments.
Yet let it be noted here, that a parable or a simili
tude used by any author, may give a sufficient proof of
the true sense and meaning of that author, provided
that we draw not this similitude beyond the scope and
design for which it was brought ; as when our Saviour
affirms, Rev. iii . 3. I will come on thee as a thief; this
will plainly prove that he describes the unexpectedness of
his appearance, though it is by no means to be drawn
to signify any injustice in his design.

RULE IX. In your whole course ofreasoning keep your

mind sincerely intent on the pursuit of truth ; and follow
solid argument wheresoever it leads you. Let not a party
spirit, nor any passion or prejudice whatsoever, stop or
avert the current of your reasoning in quest of true
knowledge .
When you are inquiring therefore into any subject,
maintain a due regard to the arguments and objections
on both sides of a question. Consider, compare, and
balance them well, before you determine for one side.
It is a frequent, but a very faulty practice, to hunt after
arguments only to make good one side of a question,
CH. IV.] RIGHT USE OF REASON. 289

and entirely to neglect and refuse those which favour

the other side. If we have not given a due weight to
arguments on both sides, we do but wilfully misguide
our judgement, and abuse our reason, by forbidding its
search after truth. When we espouse opinions by a
secret bias on the mind, through the influences offear,
hope, honour, credit, interest, or any other prejudice, and
then seek arguments only to support those opinions, we
have neither done our duty to God nor to ourselves ;
and it is a matter of mere chance if we stumble upon
truth in our way to ease and preferment. The power of
reasoning was given us by our Maker for this very end,
to pursue truth ; and we abuse one of his richest gifts,
if we basely yield it up to be led astray by any of the
meaner powers of nature, or the perishing interests of
this life. Reason itself, if honestly obeyed, will lead us
to receive the divine revelation of the gospel, where it
is duly proposed, and this will shew us the path of life
everlasting .
 THE

FOURTH PART

OF

LOGIC . i

OF DISPOSITION AND METHOD.

Ir is not merely a clear and distinct idea, a well- formed

proposition, or ajust argument, that is sufficient to search
out and communicate the knowledge of a subject. There
must be a variety and series of them disposed in a due
manner, in order to attain this end : and therefore it is
the design of the last part of Logic, to teach us the art
ofmethod. It is that must secure our thoughts from that
confusion, darkness, and mistake, which unavoidably
attend the meditations and discourses even ofthe bright
est genius who despises the rules of it.

I. We shall here consider the nature of method, and

the several kinds ofit.

II. Lay down the general rules ofmethod, with a few

particulars under them.

CHAP. I.
OF THE NATURE OF METHOD, AND THE SEVERAL KINDS
OF IT; NAMELY, NATURAL AND ARBITRARY, SYN
THETIC AND ANALYTIC.

METHOD, taken in the largest sense, implies the pla

cing of several things, or performing several operations, in
CH. 1.] RIGHT USE OF REASON . 291
such an order as is most convenient to attain some end
proposed : and in this sense it is applied to all the works
of nature and art, to all the divine affairs of creation
and providence ; and to the artifices, schemes, contri
vances and practices of mankind, whether in natural,
civil, or sacred affairs. #
Now this orderly disposition of things includes the
ideas of prior, posterior and simultaneous ; of superior,
inferior, and equal ; of beginning, end, and middle, &c .
which are described more particularly among the gene
ral affections of beings, in ontology.
But in Logic method is usually taken in a more
limited sense, and the nature of it is thus described :
Method is the disposition of a variety of thoughts on any
subject, in such order as may best serve to find out un
·known truths, to explain and confirm truths that are
known, or to fix them in the memory.
It is distributed into two general kinds, namely,
natural and arbitrary.
Natural method is that which observes the order of
nature, and proceeds in such a manner, as that the
knowledge of the things which follow, depends in a
great measure on the things which go before, and this,
is twofold, viz.: Synthetic and analytic, which are some
times called synthesis and analysis *.

* The word analysis has three or four senses, which it may not be improper
to take notice of here.
I. It signifies the general and particular heads of a discourse, with their
mutual connexions, both co-ordinate and subordinate, drawn out by way of
abstract into one or more tables, which are frequently placed like an index at
the beginning or end of a book.
2. It signifies the resolving of a discourse into its various subjects and argu
ments, as when any writing of the ancient prophets is resolved into the pro
phetical, historical, doctrinal, and practical parts of it ; it is said to be analysed
in general. When a sentence is distinguished into the nouns, the verbs, pro
nouns, adverbs, and other particles of speech which compose it, then it is said
to be analysed grammatically. When the same sentence is distinguished into
subject and predicate, proposition, argument, act, object, cause, effect, adjunct,
opposite, &c. then it is analysed logically and metaphysically. This last is what
is chiefly meant in the theological schools, when they speak of analysing a text
of scripture.
3. Analysis signifies particularly the science of Algebra, wherein a question
 292 LOGIC ; OR, THE [PART IV.

Synthetic method is that which begins with the parts *,

and leads onward to the knowledge of the whole ; it
begins with the most simple principles, and general
truths, and proceeds by degrees to that which is drawn
from them, or compounded of them : and therefore it
is called the method of composition .
Analytic method takes the whole compound as it finds
it, whether it be a species or an individual, and leads
us into the knowledge of it, by resolving it into its first
principles or parts, its generic nature, and its special
properties ; and therefore it is called the method of
resolution.
As synthetic method is generally used in teaching the
sciences after they are invented, so analytic is most
practised in finding out things unknown. -Though it
must be confessed, that both methods are sometimes
employed to find out truth and to communicate it.
If we know the parts of any subject easier and better
than the whole, we consider the parts distinctly, and
by putting them together, we come to the knowledge
of the whole. So in grammar, we learn first to know
letters, we join them to make syllables, out of syllables
we compose words, and out of words we make sentences
and discourses. So the physician and apothecary knows
the nature and powers of his simples, namely, his drugs,
his herbs, his minerals, &c . and putting them together,
and considering their several virtues, he finds what will
be the nature and powers ofthe bolus, or any compound
medicine : this is the synthetic method. 1

being proposed, one or more letters as x, y, z, or vowels, as a, e, i, &c. are

made use of to signify the unknown number, which being intermingled with
several known numbers in the question , is at last, by the rules of art, sepa
rated or released from that entanglement, and its particular value is found out
by shewing its equation, or equality to some known number.
4. It signifies analytical method, as here explained in Logic.
* Note. It is confessed that synthesis often begins with the genus, and pro
ceeds tothe species and individuals. But the genus or generic nature is then con
sidered only as a physical or essential part of the species, though it be some
times called an universal or logical whole. Thus synthetic method maintains its
own description still, for it begins with the parts, and proceeds to the zubole,
which is composed of them,
CH. 1.] RIGHT USE OF REASON. 293

But if we are better acquainted with the whole than

we are with particular parts, then we divide or resolve
the whole into its parts, and thereby gain a distinct
knowledge of them. So in vulgar life we learn in the
gross what plants or minerals are ; and then by chemis
try we gain the knowledge of salt, sulphur, spirit, water,
earth, which are the principles of them. So we are
first acquainted with the whole body of an animal, and
then byanatomy, or dissection, we come to learn all the
inward and outward parts of it. This is the analytic
method.
According to this most general and obvious idea of
synthetic and analytic method, they differ from each
other as the way which leads up from a valley to a moun
tain differs from itself, considered as it leads down from
the mountain to the valley ; or as St. Matthew and St.
Luke prove Christ to be the son of Abraham ; Luke finds
it out by analysis, rising from Christ to his ancestors ;
Matthew teaches it in the synthetic method, beginning
from Abraham, and showing that Christ is found among
his posterity. Therefore it is a usual thing in the sci- ›
ences, when we have by analysis found out a truth, we
use the synthetic method to explain and deliver it, and
prove it to be true.
In this easy view of things, these two kinds of method
may be preserved conspicuously, and entirely distinct ;
but the subjects of knowledge being infinite, and the
ways whereby we arrive at this knowledge being almost
infinitely various, it is very difficult, and almost im
possible, always to maintain the precise distinction be
tween these two methods.
This will evidently appear in the following observa
tions :

Observ. 1. Analytic method being used chiefly to find

out things unknown, it is not limited or confined merely
to begin with some whole subject, and proceed to the
knowledge of its parts, but it takes its rise sometimes
from any single part or property, or from any thing
294 LOGIC ; OR, THE [PART IV.

whatsoever that belongs to a subject which happens to

be first and most easily known, and thereby inquires
into the more abstruse and unknown parts, properties,
causes, effects, and modes of it, whether absolute or
relative as for instance,
( 1. ) Analysis finds out causes by their effects. So in
the speculative part of natural philosophy, when we ob
serve light, colours, motions, hardness, softness, and other
properties and powers of bodies, or any of the common
or uncommon appearances of things either on earth or
in heaven, we search out the causes of them. So by the
various creatures we find out the Creator, and learn his
wisdom, power, and goodness.
(2.) It finds out effects by their causes. So the prac
tical and mechanical part of natural philosophy considers
such powers of motion, as the wind, the fire, and the
water, &c. and then contrives what uses they may be
applied to, and what will be their effects in order to
make mills and engines of various kinds .
(S. ) It finds out the general and special nature of a
thing by considering the various attributes of the indi
viduals, and observing what is common and what is
proper, what is accidental, and what is essential. So
by surveying the colour, the shape, motion, rest, place,
solidity, extension of bodies, we come to find that the
nature ofa body in general is solid extension ; because all
other qualities of bodies are changeable, but this belongs
to all bodies, and it endures through all changes, and
because this is proper to body alone, and agrees not to
any thing else ; and it is the foundation of all other
properties.
(4.) It finds out the remaining properties or parts of
a thing, by having some parts or properties given. So
the area of a triangle is found by knowing the height
and the base. So by having two sides, and an angle of
a triangle given, we find the remaining side and angles.
So when we know cogitation is the prime attribute of a
spirit, we infer its immateriality, and thence its immort
ality.
CH . I.] RIGHT USE OF REASON. 295

(5.) Analysis finds the means necessary to attain a

proposed end, by having the end first assigned. So in
moral, political, economical affairs, having proposed the
government of self, a family, a society, or a nation, in
order to their best interests, we consider and search out
what are the proper laws, rules, and means to effect it.
So in the practices of artificers, and the manufacturers
of various kinds, the end being proposed, as making
cloth, houses, ships, &c. we find out ways of composing
these things for the several uses of human life. But the
putting any of these means in execution to attain the
end, is synthetic method.
Many other particulars might be represented to shew
the various forms of analytic method, whereby truth is
found out, and some of them come very near to syn
thetic, so as hardly to be distinguished.

Observ. II. Not only the investigation of truth, but

the communication of it also is often practised in such
a method, as neither agrees precisely to synthetic or
analytic. Some sciences, if you consider the whole of
them in general, are treated in synthetic order ; so phy
sics or natural philosophy begins usually with an ac
count of the general nature and properties of matter or
bodies, and by degrees descends to consider the par
ticular species of bodies with their powers and proper
ties ; yet it is very evident, that when philosophers come
to particular plants and animals, then by chemistry and
anatomy they analyse or resolve those bodies in their
several constituent parts. On the other hand, Logic is
begun in analytic method : the whole is divided into its
integral parts, according to the four operations of the
mind ; yet here and there synthetic method is used in.
the particular branches of it, for it treats of ideas in
general first, and then descends to the several species
of them ; it teaches us how propositions are made up
ofideas and syllogisms of propositions, which is the order
of composition.
096 * LOGIC ; OR, THE [PART V.

The ancient scholastic writers have taken a great deal

of pains, and engaged in useless disputes about these
two methods, and after all have not been able to give
such an account of them as to keep them entirely dis
tinct from each other, neither in the theory nor in the
practice. Some of the moderns have avoided this con
fusion in some measure, by confining themselves.to de
scribe almost nothing else but the synthetic and analytic
methods of Geometricians and Algebraists, whereby they
have too much narrowed the nature and rules of method,
as though every thing were to be treated in mathematical
forms.
Upon the whole, I conclude, that neither of these
two methods should be too scrupulously and supersti
tiously pursued, either in the invention or in the com
munication of knowledge. It is enough, if the order of
nature be but observed in making the knowledge of
things following depend on the knowledge of the things
which go before. Oftentimes a mixed method will be
found most effectual for these purposes ; and indeed a
wise and judicious prospect of our main end and design
must regulate all method whatsoever.
Here the rules ofnatural method ought to be proposed,
(whether it be analytic or synthetic, or mixed) ; but it
is proper first to give some account of arbitrary method,
lest it be thrust at too great a distance from the first
mention of it.
Arbitrary method leaves the order of nature, and ac
commodates itself to many purposes ; such as, to trea
sure up things, and retain them in memory ; to ha
rangue and persuade mankind to any practice in the
religious or the civil life ; or to delight, amuse, or en
tertain the mind.
As for the assistance of the memory, in most things a
natural order has an happy influence ; for reason itself
deducing one thing from another, greatly assists the
memory by the natural connexion and mutual depend
ence of things. But there are various other methods
CH . I.] RIGHT USE OF REASON . 297

which mankind have made use of for this purpose, and

indeed there are some subjects that can hardly be re
duced to analysis or synthesis.
In reading or writing history, some follow the order
of the governors of a nation, and dispose every trans
action under their particular reigns : so the sacred
books of Kings and Chronicles are written. Some write
in annals or journals, and make a new chapter of every
year. Some put all those transactions together which
relate to one subject ; that is, all the affairs of one war,
one league, one confederacy, one council, &c. though it
asted many years, and under many rulers.
So in writing the lives of men, which is called bio
graphy, some authors follow the tract of their years,
and place every thing in the precise order of time
when it occurred : others throw the temper and cha
racter of the persons, their private life, their public sta
tions, their personal occurrences, their domestic conduct,
their speeches, their books or writings, their sickness and
death into so many distinct chapters.
In chronology some writers make their epochas to be
gin all with one letter : so in the book called Ductor
Historicus, the periods all begin with C; as creation,
catechysm, or deluge, Chaldean empire, Cyrus, Christ,
Constantine, &c. Some divide their accounts of time
according to the four great monarchies ; Assyrian, Per
sian, Grecian and Roman. Others think it serves the
memory best to divide all their subjects into the remark
able number of sevens ; so Prideaux has written an
Introduction to History. And there is a book of di
vinity called Fasciculus Controversarium, by an author
of the same name, written in the same method, where
in every controversy has seven questions belonging to
it ; though the order of nature seems to be too much
neglected by a confinement to this septenary number.·
Those writers and speakers, whose chiefbusiness is to
amuse or delight, to allure, terrify, or persuade man
kind, do not confine themselves to any natural order, but
in a cryptical or hidden method, adapt every thing to
298 LOGIC ; OR, THE [ PART IV.
their designed ends. Sometimes they omit those things
which might injure their design, or grow tedious to their
hearers, though they seem to have a necessary relation
to the point in hand : sometimes they add those things
which have no great reference to the subject, but are
suited to allure or refresh the mind and the ear. They
dilate sometimes, and flourish long upon little incidents,
and they skip over, and but lightly touch the drier part
of the theme. They place the first things last, and the
last thing first, with wondrous art, and yet so manage
it as to conceal their artifice, and lead the senses and
passions oftheir hearers into a pleasing and powerful
captivity.
It is chiefly poesy and oratory that require the prac
tice of this kind of arbitrary method : they omit things
essential which are not beautiful, they insert little need
less circumstances, and beautiful digressions, they in
vert times and actions, in order to place every thing in
the most affecting light, and for this end in their prac
tice they neglect all logicalforms; yet good acquaintance
with theforms of Logic and natural method is of admir
able use to those who would attain these arts in perfec
tion. Hereby they will be able to range their own
thoughts in such a method and scheme, as to take a
more large and comprehensive survey of their subject
and design in all the parts of it ; and bythis means they
will better judge what to choose and what to refuse ;
and how to dress and manage the whole scene before
them, so as to attain their own ends with greater glory
and success.

CHAP. II .

THE RULES OF METHOD, GENERAL'AND PARTICULAR.

THE general requisites of true method in the pursuit or

communication ofknowledge, may be all comprised un
der the following heads. It must be ( 1. ) Safe. ( 2. ) Plain
CH . II.] RIGHT USE OF REASON. 299

and easy. (3. ) Distinct. ( 4.) Full, or without defect. (5.)

Short, or without superfluity. ( 6. ) Proper to the subject
and the design. (7.) Connected.
RULE I. Among all the qualifications of a good me
thod, there is none more necessary and important than
that it should be safe and secure from error ; and to this
end these four particular or special directions should be
observed.
1. Use great care and circumspection in laying thefound
ation of your discourse, or your scheme of thoughts upon
any subject. Those propositions which are to stand as
first principles, and on which the whole argument de
pends, must be viewed on all sides with the utmost ac
curacy, lest an error being admitted there should diffuse
itself through the whole subject. See therefore that
your general definitions or descriptions are as accurate as
the nature of the thing will bear : see that your general
divisions and distributions be just and exact, according
to the rules given in the first part of Logic : see that
your axioms be sufficiently evident, so as to demand the
assent of those that examine them with due attention :
see that your first and more immediate consequencesfrom
these principles be well drawn ; and take the same care
of all other propositions that have a powerful and spread
ing influence through the several parts ofyour discourse .
For want of this care sometimes a large treatise has .
been written by a long deduction of consequences from
one or two doubtful principles, which principles have
been effectually refuted in a few lines, and thus the whole,
treatise has been destroyed at once : so the largest and
fairest building sinks and tumbles to the ground, if the
foundations and corner stones of it are feeble and insuf
ficient.
2. It is a very advisable thing that your primary and
fundamental propositions be not only evident and true, but
they should be made a little familiar to the mind by dwell
ing upon them before you proceed further. By this means
you will gain so full an acquaintance with them, that
o 2
300 LOGIC ; OR, THE [PART IV.

you may draw consequences from them with much more

freedom, with greater variety, brighter evidence, and
with a firmer certainty, than if you have but a slight
and sudden view of them.
3. As you proceed in the connexion of your argu
ments, see that your ground be made firm in every step.
See that every link of your chain of reasoning be strong
and good: for if but one link be feeble and doubtful, the
whole chain of arguments feels the weakness of it, and
lies exposed to every objector, and the original question
remains undetermined.
4. Draw up all your propositions and arguments with
so much caution, and express your ideas with such a just
limitation, as may preclude or anticipate any objections.
Yet remember this is only to be done as far as it is pos
sible, without too much entangling the question, or in
troducing complicated ideas and obscuring the sense.
But if such a cautious and limited dress of the question
should render the idea too much complicated, or the
sense obscure, then it is better to keep the argument
more simple, clear and easy to be understood, and af
terwards mention the objections distinctly in their full
strength, and give a distinct answer to them .

RULE II. Let your method be plain and easy, so that

your hearers or readers, as well as yourself, may run
through it without embarrassment, and may take a clear
and comprehensive view ofthe whole scheme. To this
end the following particular directions will be useful :
1. Begin always with those things which are best known
and most obvious, whereby the mind may have no difficulty
orfatigue, and proceed by regular and easy steps to things
that are more difficult. And as far as possible, let not
the understanding, or the proof of any of your positions,
depend on the positions that follow, but always on those
which go before. It is a matter of wonder that in so
knowing an age as this, there should be so many per
sons offering violence daily to this rule, by teaching the
CH. II.] RIGHT USE OF REASON. 301

Latin language by a grammar written in Latin, which

method seems to require a perfect knowledge of an un
known tongue, in order to learn the first rudiments of it.
2. Do not affect excessive haste in learning or teaching
any science, nor hurry at once into the midst of it, lest you
be too soon involved in several new and strange ideas
and propositions, which cannot be well understood with
out a longer and closer attention to those which go be
fore. Such sort of speed is but a waste of time, and will
constrain you to take many steps backward again, if you
would arrive at a regular and complete knowledge of
the subject.
3. Be notfond ofcrowding too many thoughts and rea
sonings into one sentence or paragraph, beyond the appre
hension or capacity ofyour readers or hearers.
There are some persons of a good genius, and a ca
pacious mind, who write and speak very obscurely upon
this account ; they affect a long train of dependencies
before they come to a period; they imagine that they
can never fill their page with too much sense ; but they
little think how they bury their own best ideas in the
crowd, and render them in a manner invisible and use
less to the greatest part of mankind. Such men may be
great scholars, yet they are but poor teachers.
4. For the same reason, avoid too many subdivisions.
Contrive your scheme of thoughts in such a manner as
may finish your whole argument with as few inferior
branchings as reason will admit ; and let them be such
as are obvious and open to the understanding , that they
may come within one single view of the mind. This will
not only assist the understanding to receive, but it will
aid the memory also to retain truth; whereas a discourse
cut out into a vast multitude of gradual subordinations
has many inconveniences in it; it gives pain to the mind
and memory, in surveying and retaining the scheme of
discourse, and exposes the unskilful hearers to mingle
the superior and inferior particulars together; it leads
them into a thick wood instead of open daylight, and
places them in a labyrinth, instead of a plain path,
302 LOGIC ; OR, THE [PART IV.
5. Give all diligence in your younger years to obtain a
clear and easy way of expressing your conceptions, that
your words, as fast as you utter them, may stamp your
own ideas exactly on the mind of the hearer. This is
a most happy talent for the conveyance of truth, and an
excellent security against mistakes and needless contro
versies.

RULE III. Let your method be distinct, and without the

perplexing mixture ofthings that ought to be kept sepa
rate, and this will be easily practised by four directions.
1. Do not bring unnecessary heterogeneous * matter into
your discourse on any subject ; that is, do not mingle an
argument on one subject with matters that relate en
tirely to another, but just so far as is necessary to give
a clearer knowledge of the subject in hand. Examples
in Logic may be borrowed from any of the sciences to
illustrate the rules : but long interpositions of natural
philosophy, of the imagination and passions, of agency of
spirits united to bodies, &c. break the thread of dis
course, and perplex the subject.
2. Let every complicated theme or idea be divided into
its distinct single parts, asfar as the nature of the subject
and your present design require it. Though you must not
abound in needless subdivisions, yet something of this
work is very necessary ; and it is a good judgement alone
can dictate how far to proceed in it, and when to stop.
Compound ideas must be reduced to a simple form,
in order to understand them well. You may easily mas
ter that subject in all the parts of it by a regular suc 1
cession, which would confound the understanding to
survey them at once. So we come to the knowledge of
a very perplex diagram in geometry, or a complicated ma
chine in mechanics, by having it parcelled out to us into
its several parts and principles, according to this and
the foregoing rule of method.
3. Call every idea, proposition and argument to its pro 1

* Things of one kind are called homogeneous, things of different kinds are
heterogeneous.
CH . II.] RIGHT USE OF REASON. 303

per class, and keep eachpart ofthe subject in its own place.
Put those things altogether that belong to one part
of property, one consideration or view of your subject.
This will prevent needless repetitions, and keep you
from intermixing things which are different. We must
maintain this distinction of things and places if we
would be safe from error. It is confusion that leads us
into endless mistakes, which naturally arise from a va
riety of ideas ill-joined , sorted , or ill-disposed. It is one
great use of method, that a multitude of thoughts and
propositions may be so distinctly ranged in their proper
situations, that the mind may not be overwhelmed with
a confused attention to them all at once, nor be dis
tracted with their variety, nor be tempted to unite things
which ought to be separated, nor to disjoin things which
should be united.
4. Inthepartition ofyour discourse into distinct heads,
take heed that your particulars do not interfere with the
general, nor with each other. Think it is not enough that
you make use of distinct expressions in each particular,
but take care that the ideas be distinct also. It is mere
foolery to multiply distinct particulars in treating of
things where the difference of your particulars lies only
in names and words.
t
RULE IV. The method of treating a subject should be
plenary orfull, so that nothing may be wanting; nothing
which is necessary or proper should be omitted.
When you are called to explain a subject, do not pass
by, nor skip over any thing in it which is very difficult
or obscure.
When you enumerate the parts or the properties ofany
subject, do it in a complete and comprehensive manner.
When you are asserting or proving any truth, see that
every doubtful or disputable part of the argument be
well supported and confirmed.
Ifyou are to illustrate or argue a point of difficulty,
be not too scanty of words, but rather become a little
copious and diffusive in your language : set the truth
304 LOGIC ; OR, THE [PART IV.

before the reader in several lights, turn the various sides

of it to view, in order to give a full idea and firm evi
dence ofthe proposition .
When you are drawing up a narrative of any matter
offact, see that no important circumstance be omitted.
When you propose the solution of any difficulty, con
sider all the various cases wherein it can happen, and
shew how they may be solved.
In short, let your enumerations, your divisions and
distributions of things be so accurate, that no needful
part or idea may be left out.
This fulness of method does not require that every
thing should be said which can be said upon any sub
ject; for this would make each single science endless :
but you should say every thing which is necessary to the
design in view, and which has a proper and direct ten 9
dency to this end ; always proportioning the amplitude
of your matter, and the fulness ofyour discourse to your
great design, to the length of your time, to the conve
nience, delight and profit of your hearers.

RULE V. As your method must be full without defi

ciency, so it must be short, or without superfluity. The
fulness of a discourse enlarges our knowledge, and the
well-concerted brevity saves our time. In order to ob
serve this rule, it will be enough to point out the chief
of those superfluities or redundancies, which some per
sons are guilty of in their discourses, with a due caution
against them.
1. Avoid all needless repetitions of the same thing in
different parts of your discourse. It must be confessed 1
there are several cases wherein a review of the same
foregoing proposition is needful to explain or prove se
veral of the following positions; but let your method be
so contrived, as far as possible, that it may occasion the
fewest rehearsals of the same thing ; for it is not grate
ful to the hearers without evident necessity.
2. Have a care of tedious prolixity, or drawing out
anypart ofyour discourse to an unnecessary and tiresome
CH . 11.] RIGHT USE OF REASON. 305

length. It is much more honourable for an instructor,

an orator, a pleader, or a preacher, that his hearers
should say, I was afraid he would have done, than that
they should be tempted to shew signs of uneasiness, and
long for the conclusion.
Besides, there is another inconvenience in it; when
you affect to amplify on the former branches of a dis
course, you will often lay a necessity upon yourself of
contracting the latter and most useful parts of it, and
perhaps prevent yourself in the most important part of
your design. Many a preacher has been guilty of this
fault in former days, nor is the present age without some
instances of this weakness.
3. Do not multiply explications where there is no diffi
culty, or darkness, or danger of mistake. Be not fond of
tracing every word of your theme through all the gram
matical, the logical, and metaphysical characters and re
lations of it; nor shew your critical learning in spread
ing abroad the various senses ofa word, and the various
origin of those senses, the etymology of terms, the synon
ymous and the paronymous or kindred names, &c. where
the chief point of discourse does not at all require it.
You would laugh at a pedant, who professing to explain
the Athanasian Creed, should acquaint you that Atha
nasius is derived from a Greek word, which signifies im
mortality, and that the same word ' Alavaria, signifies
also the herb tansy.
There are some persons so fond of their learned dis
tinctions, that they will shew their subtlety by distin
guishing where there is no difference : and the same silly
affectation will introduce distinctions upon every occur
rence, and bring three or four negatives upon every sub
ject of discourse; first to declare what it is not, and then
what it is; whereas such negatives ought never to be
mentioned where there is no apparent danger of mis
take. How ridiculous would that writer be, who, if he
were speaking of the Nicene Creed, should declare ne
gatively, ( 1. ) That he did not mean the doctrine which
the inhabitants ofNice believed, nor, (2. ) A Creed written
306 LOGIC ; OR, THE [PART IV.

by them, but, (3. ) Positively a Creed composed by several

Christian bishops met together in the city of Nice; The
positive is sufficient here, and the two negatives are im
pertinent.
4. Be not fond of proving those things which need no
proof; such as self-evident propositions and truths uni
versally confessed, or such as are entirely agreed to and 1
granted by our opponents. It is this vain affectation of
proving every thing that has led geometricians to form
useless and intricate demonstrations to support some
theorems which are sufficiently evident to the eye by in
spection, or to the mind by the first mention ofthem ;
and it is the same humour that reigns sometimes in the
pulpit, and spends half the sermon in proving some ge
neral truth which is never disputed or doubted, and
thereby robs the auditory of more useful entertainment.
5. As there are some things so evidently true, that
they want no proof, so there are others so evidentlyfalse
that they want no refutation. It is mere trifling, and a
waste of our precious moments, to invent and raise such
objections as no man would ever make in earnest, and
that merely for the sake of answering and solving them :
This breaks in notoriously upon the due brevity of me
thod.
6. Avoid in general all learned forms, all trappings of
art, and ceremonies of the schools, where there is no need
of them. It is reported concerning the late Czar of
Muscovy, that when he first acquainted himselfwith ma
thematical learning, he practised all the rules of circum
vallation, and contravallation, at the siege of a town in
Livonia ; and by the length of those formalities he lost
the opportunity of taking the town.
7. " Do not suffer every occasional and incidental
thought to carry you away into a long parenthesis, and
thus to stretch out your discourse, and divert you from
the point in hand." In the pursuit of your subject, if
any useful thought occur which belongs to some other
theme, note it down for the sake of your memory on
some other paper, and lay it by in reserve for its pro
CH. 11.] RIGHT USE OF REASON. 307

per place and season ; but let it not incorporate itself

with your present theme, nor draw off your mind from
your main business, though it should be ever so invit
ing. A man who walks directly but slowly towards his
journey's end, will arrive thither much sooner than his
neighbour, who runs into every crooked turning which
he meets, and wanders aside to gaze at every thing that
strikes his eyes by the way, or to gather every gaudy
flower that grows by the side of the road.
To sum up all; " There is an happy medium to be
observed in our method, so that the brevity may not
render the sense obscure, nor the argument feeble, nor
our knowledge merely superficial : and on the other
hand, that the fulness and copiousness of our method
may not waste the time, tire the learner, or fill the mind
with trifles and impertinences ."
The copious and the contracted way of writing have
each their peculiar advantages. There is a proper use
to be made of large paraphrases, and full, particular,
and diffusive explications and arguments ; these are fittest
for those who design to be acquainted thoroughly with
every part ofthe subject. There is also a use of shorter
hints, abstracts, and compendiums, to instruct those who
seek only a slight and general knowledge, as well as to
refresh the memory of those who have learned the
science already, and gone through a larger scheme.
But it is a gross abuse of these various methods of in
struction, when a person has read a mere compendium
or epitome of any science, and he vainly imagines that
he understands the whole science. So one boy may be
come a philosopher by reading over the mere dry defi
nitions and divisions of Scheibler's Compendium of Peri
pateticism : So another may boast that he understands
anatomy, because he has seen a skeleton ; and a third
profess himself a learned divine, when he can repeat the
Apostles' creed.

RULE VI. " Take care that your method be proper

308 LOGIC ; OR, THE [PART IV.

to the subject in hand, proper to your present design, as

well as proper to the age and place wherein you dwell."
1. Let your method be proper to the subject. All
sciences must not be learned or taught in one method .
Morality, and theology, metaphysics and logic, will not be
easily and happily reduced into a strict mathematical
method : Those who have tried, have found much in
convenience therein.
Some things have more need to be explained than to
be proved; as axioms, or self-evident propositions ; and
indeed all the first great principles, the chief and most
important doctrines both of natural and revealed reli
gion; for when the sense of them is clearly explained,
they appear so evident in the light of nature or scripture,
that they want no other proof. There are other things
that stand in need of proof, as well as explication, as
many mathematical theorems, and several deep contro
versies in morality and divinity. There are yet other
sorts of subjects which want rather to be warmly im
pressed upon the mind by fervent exhortations, and stand
in more need of this than they do either of proof or ex
plication; such are the most general, plain, and obvious
duties ofpiety towards God, and love towards men, with
the government ofall our inclinations and passions. Now
these several subjects ought to be treated in a different
manner and method.
Again, There are some subjects in the same treatise
which are more useful and necessary than others, and
some parts of a subject which are eminently and chiefly
designed by a writer or speaker : true method will teach
us to dwell longer upon these themes, and to lay out
more thought and labour upon them ; whereas the same
art of method will teach us to cut short those things
which are used only to introduce our main subject, and
to stand as scaffolding merely to aid the structure of our
discourse. It will teach us also to content ourselves
with brief hints of those matters which are merely occa
sional and incidental.
CH . II.] RIGHT USE OF REASON. 809

2. Your method must be adjusted by your design , for

ifyou treat of the same subject with two different views
and designs, you will find it necessary to use different
methods. Suppose the doctrine ofthe sacred Trinity were
your theme, and you were to read a lecture to young
students on that subject, or if you designed a treatise for
the conviction of learned men, you would pursue a very
different method from that which would be proper to
regulate a practical discourse, or a sermon to instruct
common Christians merely in the pious improvement of
this doctrine, and awaken them to the duties which are
derived thence.
In short, we must not first lay down certain and pre
cise rules of method, and resolve to confine the matter
we discourse of to that particular form and order of to
pics ; but we must well consider, and study the subject
of our discourse thoroughly, and take a just survey of
our present design, and these will give sufficient hints
of the particular form and order in which we should han
dle it, provided that we are moderately skilled in the
general laws of method and order.
Yet let it be noted here, that neither the subject nor
matter of a discourse, nor the particular design of it, can
so precisely determine the method, as to leave no room
for liberty and variety. The very same theme may be
handled, and that also with the same design, in several
different methods, among which it is hard to say which
is the best. In writing a system of divinity, some begin
with the scriptures, and thence deduce all other doc
trines and duties . Some begin with the Being of God
and his Attributes, so far as he is known by the light of
nature, and then proceed to the doctrines of revelation.
Some distinguish the whole subject into the Credenda
and Agenda, that is, things to be believed, and things to be
done. Some think it best to explain the whole Christian
religion by an historical detail of all the discoveries which
God has made ofhimself to this lower world, beginning at
the Creation in the first Chapter of Genesis, and so
proceeding onward according to the Narrative of the
310 LOGIC ; OR, THE [ PART IV.
Old and New Testament. And there are others that
endeavour to include the whole of religion under these
four heads, namely, The Apostles' Creed, the Lord's
Prayer, the Ten Commandments, and the Two Sacra
ments ; though I cannot but think this is the least ac
curate of any. The same variety may be allowed in
treating other subjects; this very Treatise of Logic is an
instance of it, whose method differs very considerably
from any others which I have seen, as they differ also
greatly from one another, though several of them are
confessed to be well written.
3. Though a just view of our subject and our design
may dictate proper rules of natural method, yet there
must be some little deference paid to the custom ofthe
age wherein we live, and to the humour and genius of
our readers or hearers ; which if we utterly reject and
disdain, our performances will fail of the desired success,
even though we may have followed the just rules of me
thod. I will mention but this one instance : In the
former century it was frequent with learned men to di
vide their theme or subject into a great multitude of
co-ordinate members or parts, they abounded also in the
forms of logic and distinction, and indulged numerous
ranks of subordination. Now though we ought not to
abandon the rules ofjust method and division, in order
to comport with the modish writers in our age who have
renounced them, yet it is prudent to pay so much re
spect to the custom of the age, as to use these forms of
division with due moderation, and not affect to multiply
them in such a manner, as to give an early and needless
disgust to the generality of our present readers. The
same may be said concerning various other methods of
conduct in the affairs of learning, as well as the affairs
of life, wherein we must indulge a little to custom : and
yet we must by no means suffer ourselves so far to be
imposed upon and governed by it, as to neglect those
rules of method which are necessary for the safe, easy,
andcomplete inquiry into truth, or the ready and effectual
communication of it to others.
CH . II . ] RIGHT USE OF REASON. 311

RULE VII. The last requisite of method is, that the

parts of a discourse should be well connected ; and these
three short directions will suffice for this purpose.
1. " Keep your main end and design ever in view,
and let all the parts of your discourse have a tendency
towards it, and as far as possible make that tendency
visible all the way." Otherwise the readers or hearers
will have reason to wonder for what end this or that
particular was introduced.
2. " Let the mutual relation and dependence of the
several branches of your discourse be so just and evi
dent, that every part may naturally lead onward to the
next, without any huge chasms or breaks, which inter
rupt and deform the scheme." The connexion of truth
should arise and appear in their successive rank and
order, as the several parts of a fine prospect ascend just
behind each other, in their natural and regular eleva
tions and distances, and invite the eye to climb onward
with constant pleasure till it reach the sky. Whatso
ever horrid beauty a precipice or a cataract may add to
the prospect of a country, yet such sort of hideous and
abrupt appearances in a scene of reasoning are real
blemishes and not beauties. When the reader is passing
over such a treatise, he often finds a wide vacancy, and
makes an uneasy stop, and knows not how to transport
his thoughts over to the next particular, for want of
some clue or connecting idea to lay hold of it.
3. " Acquaint yourself with all the proper and de
cent forms of transition from one part of a discourse to
another, and practise them as occasion offers." Where
the ideas, propositions and arguments, are happily dis
posed, and well connected, the truth indeed is secure ;
but it renders the discourse much more agreeable, when
proper and graceful expression joins the parts of it to
gether in so entertaining a manner, that the reader
knows not how to leave off till he hath arrived at the
end.
These are the general and most important rules oftrue
METHOD ; and though they belong chiefly to the commu
 Fas
312 LOGIC ; OR, THE RIGHT USE OF REASON.

nication of knowledge, yet an early and thorough ac

quaintance with them will be of considerable use toward
the pursuit and attainment of it.
Those persons who have never any occasion to com
municate knowledge by writing or by public discourses,
may also with great advantage pursue these rules ofme
thod, that they may learn to judge with justice and ac
curacy concerning the performances of others. And
besides, a good acquaintance with method will greatly
assist every one in ranging, disposing and managing all
human affairs.
The particular means or method for a farther improve
ment of the understanding, are very various, such as
meditation, reading, conversing, disputing by speech or by
writing, question and answer, &c. And in each of these
practices some special forms may be observed, and special
rules may be given to facilitate and secure our inquiries
after truth. But this would require a little volume by
itself, and a treatise of Logic has always been esteemed
sufficiently complete without it.

THE END.
1

G. Woodfall, Printer,
Angel Court, Skinner Street, London.

1
ር
 z Steckeler
chbinderel
Höchstädt/Do.