AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL - SCHRIEVER ESSAY AWARD

A Culture of Military Spacepower

Maj Kenneth Grosselin, USAF
Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed or implied in the Journal are those of the authors and should not be
construed as carrying the official sanction of the Department of Defense, Air Force, Air Education and Training
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D
uring a May 2019 exit interview with the national media, outgoing Sec-
retary of the Air Force Heather Wilson identified the development of a
war-­fighting culture as the most pressing challenge confronting the Air
Force space mission.1 This challenge persists despite a range of recent and his-
torical Air Force initiatives aimed at developing and strengthening an indepen-
dent space war-­fighting culture. In 2001, the US Space Commission recom-
mended the Air Force strengthen its military space culture through focused career
development, education, and training.2 This recommendation was the foundation
of the Air Force Space Command’s (AFSPC) Space Professional Development
Program and the Space100, -200, and -300 professional military education se-
quence.3 In 2002, the Air Force eliminated the phrase aerospace power from its
institutional lexicon, replacing it with the phrase air and space power. When de-
fending this decision, Gen John P. Jumper, the 17th USAF chief of staff, stated,
“[the Air Force] will respect the fact that space is its own culture, and that space
has its own principles.”4 In 2005, Gen Lance W. Lord, the 12th AFSPC com-
mander, authorized the wear of a space badge to “unify our USAF credentialed
space professional community under a single space badge—a recognizable, dis-
tinctive symbol of the unique and challenging space mission and those who exe-
cute it.”5 Most recently, Acting Secretary of the Air Force Matthew P. Donovan
advocated that a separate US Space Force within the Department of the Air Force
(DAF) would forge the unique culture required to unleash the power of space in
an age of great-­power competition.6 While important, all of these initiatives fail
to address the foundational impediment restraining the development of a space
war-­fighting culture within the Air Force. The first step toward establishing a
space war-­fighting culture is enshrining the purpose and identity of Air Force
space forces within basic doctrine centered around an independent and authorita-
tive formulation of military spacepower.
This article presents why and how the Air Force should use basic doctrine to
shape the purpose, identity, and culture of Air Force space forces. A brief survey
of organizational culture theory is followed by a discussion on how doctrinal
theories of military power shape the purpose, identity, and culture of land, mari-
time, and air forces. Next, this article will show how military spacepower doctrine

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 Grosselin

remains underdeveloped within Air Force basic doctrine. Finally, this article will
present the cornerstone principles of an independent framework for military
spacepower—national space interests, joint interdependence, and unique space
expertise—designed to set the conditions for a space war-­fighting culture to de-
velop and thrive. These recommendations are independent of any Congressional
action to reorganize US military space forces. Whether the AFSPC remains in
the Air Force or becomes the foundation of a separate military service, incorpo-
rating the three principles described here into capstone service doctrine is a criti-
cal element in the development of a space war-­fighting culture.

Shifting from a Servicing Culture to a War-­Fighting Culture

The foundations of the space servicing culture are well-­documented.7 In brief,
this culture arose to minimize disruptions to space services in the absence of a
credible threat to US space superiority following the end of the Cold War. The
uninterrupted delivery of space capabilities, such as missile warning and precision
navigation and timing (PNT), is so critical to the Joint Force that even the slight-
est disruption may result in mission failure. Without a credible threat to organize
against, the space community adopted a servicing culture similar to commercial
information service providers. Human error—not a thinking adversary—pre-
sented the largest and most probable threat to service delivery. In this environ-
ment, Air Force space operations were routinized to minimize the human element
and maximize service reliability. National policy reinforced this culture, declaring
space a sanctuary from attack and curtailing the culture required to protect and
defend space assets against a thinking adversary.8
The servicing culture is no longer appropriate for military space operations.
Emerging threats to US space superiority have invalidated the assumptions of the
space community’s servicing culture. The most recent National Security Strategy
formally and authoritatively declares space a war-­fighting domain and recognizes
the existence of credible threats to US space superiority.9 Building on this declara-
tion, Space Policy Directive-4 makes clear the organization, policies, doctrine, and
capabilities of the national security space community must evolve to defeat these
threats.10 The culture of Air Force space forces must also evolve, synchronized
with the guidance, intent, and policy directives of our national leadership.
Scrutinizing the academic definition of organizational culture demonstrates why
shifting from a space servicing culture to a space war-­fighting culture is an opera-
tional imperative for the Air Force. Organizational culture is defined as a group’s
shared approach to external adaption and internal integration problems.11 Culture
captures a group’s shared and accepted approach to the challenges of uncertainty,
problem solving, and innovation. In the interest of precision, it is worth noting that

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 A Culture of Military Spacepower

organizational culture and organizational climate are different concepts. While

organizational culture defines an organization’s values when taking action, the term
organizational climate captures the shared experience of group members based on
accepted norms of behavior.12 While both culture and climate are important, this
article focuses on the development of a space war-­fighting culture.
Servicing cultures are system-­centric. These cultures approach the problems of
adaption and integration seeking to optimize the availability of a static system.
Human error and system reliability are the dominant sources of uncertainty that
servicing cultures coalesce to solve. A servicing culture values fault management,
standardization, and centralization as acceptable approaches to problem solving
and innovation. To minimize human error, dynamic decision making is discour-
aged in favor of routinized procedures and centralized tactical decision making.
War-­fighting cultures are adversary-­centric. Problems of external adaption are
defined by a thinking, competent, and lethal adversary who threatens American
interests. Problems of internal integration focus on the perpetual pursuit of combat
readiness. Problem solving starts with the assumption of a competent and lethal
adversary, and innovation seeks a relative advantage over that adversary. Victory
and defeat—not system availability—are the most important measures of effec-
tiveness. A war-­fighting culture fights through uncertainty in a dynamic environ-
ment by seizing the initiative through decentralized execution and the principles
of mission command. Shifting from a servicing culture to a war-­fighting culture
(fig. 1) implies certain behavior changes. Technicians become tacticians, schedulers
become mission planners, and system watch officers become battle managers.13 In
a war-­fighting culture, the imperative for victory engenders a tenacious fighting
spirit and the unbreakable resolve to outmaneuver and dominate an adversary.

Figure 1. Air Force space forces must shift from a servicing culture to a war-­fighting
culture
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 Grosselin

Purpose Shapes Identity; Identity Shapes Culture

With these definitions in mind, how should the Air Force proceed in develop-
ing a war-­fighting culture within its space community? The study of organiza-
tional culture theory reveals that a unifying culture can only emerge after a
group’s purpose and identity are clearly understood and broadly accepted.14 Pur-
pose captures the existential tasks a group is chartered to accomplish while iden-
tity captures how group members view their group relative to other groups. Stable
cultures emerge when a unifying purpose and group identity are broadly recog-
nized and understood. Thus, the connection between purpose, identity, and cul-
ture can be condensed into an axiomatic relationship: purpose shapes identity,
and identity drives culture (fig. 2).

Figure 2. Organizational purpose shapes identity, and identity drives culture

Across the US military, capstone doctrine—that is, basic doctrine in Air Force
parlance—provides the authoritative formulation of purpose and identity for mili-
tary forces. This authority makes capstone doctrine the most important encapsula-
tion of the beliefs, values, and assumptions that underpin military culture within
each branch of the armed forces. Army Doctrine Publication 1, The Army, cham-
pions the primacy of land power, delineates the Army’s contribution to national
security, and describes a professional warrior ethos rooted in seven common val-
ues.15 The Air Force’s Volume I, Basic Doctrine espouses the independence of air-
power and the air-­mindedness expertise unique to Airmen.16 Naval Doctrine
Publication (NDP) 1, Naval Warfare, anchors the purpose, identity, and core values
of US naval forces to the importance of American sea power.17 Marine Corps
Doctrine Publication (MCDP) 1-0, Marine Corps Operations, builds upon NDP 1
by emphasizing how maneuver warfare, mission command, and an enduring rela-
tionship with the Navy defines the rapid and expeditionary nature of Marines
Corps operations.18 Capstone doctrine is not culture. However, by authoritatively
defining service purpose, capstone doctrine shapes institutional identity, and hence,
culture. Furthermore, war fighters in every domain connect their purpose and
identity to an independent theory of military power: land power, airpower, and sea
power. A review of the history and evolution of Air Force basic doctrine reveals
that Air Force space forces lack a unified, independent, and authoritative formula-
tion of military spacepower from which to derive purpose and identity (fig. 3).

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 A Culture of Military Spacepower

Doctrine Purpose Identity

"Seapower has been and will continue to "We are the United States Navy and
be the critical foundation of national power United States Marine Corps, our Nation's
and prosperity and international prestige seapower—ready guardians of peace,
for the United States of America.: victorious in war."

"Landpower enables the Nation's leaders "Our Soldiers make the Army the most
to respond to security challenges in capable land force in the world, which in
definitive and decisive ways... Landpower turn maintains U.S. credibility and
protects our national interests, brings security."
order to chaos, and protects populations."

"Through airpower, the Air Force provides "Air Force doctrine presents airpower as
the versatile, wide-ranging means towards a unitary construct. The Air Force
achieving national objectives with the acknowledges the importance of the
ability to deter and respond immediately to space and cyberspace domains. However,
crises anywhere in the world." Air Force doctrine should address what
unifies Airmen."

Figure 3. Capstone doctrine sets conditions for organizational culture by providing the
authoritative formulation of the purpose and identity of military forces. Source: NDP-1,
Naval Warfare, March 2010; A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower (Washington, DC:
Department of the Navy, 2015); ADP-1, The Army, July 2017; and ADP 3-0, Operations, Vol. I, Basic
Doctrine, July 2017)

The Evolution of Spacepower Theory in Air Force Doctrine

The idea that airpower and spacepower are one and the same is almost as old as
the US space program itself. Gen Thomas D. White, the fourth chief of staff of
the Air Force, first expressed this idea in 1958, declaring “air and space are indivis-
ible” just one month after the first successful launch of a US satellite.19 The term
aerospace power consolidated airpower and space operations into a single frame-
work and became official Air Force doctrine in 1959 with the publication of Air
Force Manual (AFM) 1-2, United States Air Force Basic Doctrine. 20 For the next
47 years, Air Force basic doctrine would continue to use a unitary definition of
aerospace power, though small changes would be introduced. For example, the Air
Force introduced the term space force enhancement in 1979 and counterspace in
1982.21 Despite small changes and evolutions, during this period Air Force basic
doctrine viewed space operations as an element of aerospace power. Air Force
senior leaders succinctly expressed the unitary theory of aerospace power in a
2000 white paper. “Our Service views the flight domains of air and space as a
seamless operational medium. The environmental differences between air and
space do not separate the employment of aerospace power within them.”22

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 Grosselin

The aerospace power formulation lasted until 2002 when General Jumper re-
placed the term aerospace power with air and space power, noting that the legacy
term did not “give the proper respect to the culture and to the physical differences
that abide between the environment of air and the environment of space.”23 For
the first time in Air Force institutional history, airpower and spacepower were
viewed as separate theories of military power. Following this split, the Air Force
published Air Force Doctrine Document 2-2, Space Operations, in 2006. While
this served as the first full Air Force treatment of spacepower doctrine, the AFDD
2-2 framework still constrained spacepower as an enabler and force multiplier to
combat operations in other domains. 24
Air Force spacepower doctrine would be short-­lived. The Air Force abandoned
spacepower doctrine and returned to a unitary definition of airpower in 2011,
again placing space operations as part of the larger airpower framework.25 Today,
Air Force doctrine defines airpower as “the ability to project military power or
influence through the control and exploitation of air, space, and cyberspace to
achieve strategic, operational, or tactical objectives.”26 Conversely, Air Force doc-
trine does not include a formal theory of military spacepower in any official pub-
lication. Air Force Doctrine Annex 3-14 provides operational-­level doctrine for Air
Force space operations but does not include an independent formulation of mili-
tary spacepower and makes no attempt to deliberately shape the purpose and
identity of Air Force space forces.
In the absence of credible threats to US space superiority, the airpower-­centric
approach to space operations was an overwhelming success. This partnership ig-
nited an unprecedented level of cross-­domain synergies between air and space
capabilities. Space-­based PNT enabled the joint direct attack munition and trans-
formed the accuracy and lethality of joint fires. The integration of wideband satel-
lite communication onto air platforms permitted the development of a globally
integrated intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance architecture. Persistent
missile warning impacts strategic deterrence in every domain. In short, the
airpower-­centric approach to space operations that has been codified in Air Force
doctrine since 1959 has fundamentally transformed every joint function. This
transformation persists across the range of military operations and the entire
spectrum of conflict.
Despite these unprecedented synergies, interweaving space operations within
airpower doctrine reinforces three false equivalencies. First, a unitary approach to
airpower reinforces the false assumption that airpower and spacepower impact
national policy objectives through shared ways and means. Second, connecting
space operations as a subset of airpower falsely assumes that the same principles
guide the application of airpower and spacepower in a military context. Third, this

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approach presupposes that the airmindedness perspective of military power is the

optimal perspective for military space forces. These assumptions are more than
semantic. They underpin the very purpose and identity of military space forces.
Accepting these assumptions without an independent theory of spacepower un-
dermines the formation of purpose, identity, and culture within Air Force space
forces and unnecessarily inhibits the impact military space operations can have on
national policy objectives. Because of the strong connection between purpose,
identity, and culture, Air Force efforts to cultivate a space war-­fighting culture
must start with the acceptance and publication of an authoritative formulation of
independent military spacepower doctrine.

A War Fighter’s Conception of Military Spacepower

While the Air Force lacks an institutional theory of military spacepower, a
multitude of proposed spacepower frameworks exist. These theories date back to
1958 when Donald Cox and Michael Stoiko published the book Spacepower:
What it Means to You.27 Since this initial publication, David E. Lupton, Peter L.
Hays, Brig Gen Simon P. Worden and Maj John E. Shaw, James E. Oberg, M. V.
Smith, Everett C. Dolman, and John J. Klein have all made important contribu-
tions. 28 The Air Force can draw heavily on these sources when formulating an
institutional theory of military spacepower within its basic doctrine; however, the
final formulation must accentuate three themes to set conditions for a space war-­
fighting culture. These themes are: vital national space interests, joint interdepen-
dence, and unique space expertise. Taken together, these three principles would be
institutional recognition that Air Force space forces are expert practitioners of an
independent discipline of military power unique to the space domain. This pur-
pose, in turn, shapes the identity of Air Force space forces as coequals with the
war fighters responsible for military power in the air, maritime and land domains.
Theme 1: Space is vital to national power and prosperity. First, Air Force
doctrine must differentiate between national spacepower and military spacepower
in a way that captures the vital role military space forces play in securing national
interests. Maritime doctrine provides an appropriate analogy for this distinction.
While the term naval power represents military power at sea, sea power describes
the totality of a nation’s use of the maritime domain in pursuit of national power
and prosperity.29 Borrowing this construct, national spacepower is defined here as
the totality of a nation’s use of the space domain in pursuit of national power and
prosperity. This construct recognizes that space is a conduit of national power
through which diplomatic power, economic power, information power, and mili-
tary power can be generated, applied, and exploited. In this regard, space is no
different than the land, maritime, air, and cyberspace domains. Thus, national

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 Grosselin

spacepower includes political, economic, information, and military elements. As

one element of national spacepower, military spacepower is defined here as a na-
tion’s ability to accomplish military objectives through the control and exploita-
tion of the space domain.
Distinguishing between national spacepower and military spacepower recog-
nizes that a grand space strategy amplifies all four instruments of national power:
diplomacy, economy, information, and military. Space exploration strengthens dip-
lomatic power by conferring national prestige and generating opportunities for
peaceful multinational cooperation. The commercial space industry is a rapidly
growing segment of the US economy with limitless potential. Information derived
from space-­based remote sensing is the core of US global information dominance.
Because the elements of national spacepower are mutually reinforcing, unified ac-
tion with civil, commercial, and intelligence community space programs is an im-
portant attribute of the proper employment of military spacepower. US military
spacepower must reflect the nation’s political, economic, information, and military
interests. To solidify purpose and identity, Air Force space forces must appreciate
these other elements of national spacepower and understand military spacepower’s
unique role securing vital national interests in the space domain.
Theme 2: Military space forces are an interdependent element of the Joint
Force. Military space forces are the practitioners of military spacepower. Security,
deterrence, and violent competition are the hallmarks of a war-­fighting force.
Military space forces are no different. They shape the security environment, deter
aggression, and apply lethal and nonlethal force in space, from space, and through
space. They perform these tasks as an interdependent element of the joint team.
Joint Publication 1 defines joint interdependence as “the purposeful reliance by
one Service on another Service’s capabilities to maximize complementary and
reinforcing effects of both.”30 Joint interdependence implies that space operations
are no longer an auxiliary adjunct to air, land, maritime, and cyberspace opera-
tions. Military spacepower is an obligatory component of modern Information
Age warfare. Capabilities as fundamental as precision attack, maneuver warfare,
strategic warning, and global power projection presuppose the Joint Force’s ability
to control and exploit the space domain. Without access to space capabilities,
joint operations would devolve into the Industrial Age warfare of the early twen-
tieth century, characterized by the mass concentration of force-­on-­force violence
and indiscriminate destruction.31 Military spacepower doctrine must recognize
this distinction and elevate terminology that reflects the indispensable role space
plays in joint operations. For example, the doctrinal term space force enhancement
connotes an incremental improvement in capability while space support to opera-
tions does not capture the true interdependencies between space and the war-­

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fighting forces in other domains. Such terms cast space as an auxiliary adjunct to
joint operations. Instead, the term global information mobility should replace these
legacy terms as a more accurate description of the vital interdependent effects
capabilities like satellite communications and PNT provide to the Joint Force.
At the same time, joint interdependence implies that operations in the air, land,
maritime, and cyberspace domains are critical to gaining and maintaining space
superiority. Space systems consist of three segments: ground, link, and space. This
makes military spacepower inherently multidomain and necessitates support from
military forces in the other domains to secure space superiority. For example,
maritime standoff strike capabilities can support space superiority by neutralizing
adversary satellite command and control nodes. In pursuit of true joint interde-
pendence, military spacepower doctrine must prepare space forces to operate side-­
by-­side with war fighters in other domains in both supporting and supported
roles. Thus, emphasizing joint interdependence reinforces a coequal identity with
war fighters in the other domains.
Theme 3: Military spacepower demands a unique expertise. This third theme
emphasizes that military spacepower is a unique form of military power. Because
military operations in the space domain are distinct from operations in other
domains, the successful application of military spacepower demands war fighters
with an intuitive understanding of the domain. Referred to as space mastery, this
intuition must encompass the entire space environment. 32 In addition to the
physics and engineering of space flight, space mastery also includes a predictive
understanding of the interests and behaviors of civil, commercial, and foreign
space actors. The unique nature of the space domain demands war fighters with
space mastery who are deliberately developed in the conduct and application of
military spacepower.
An intuitive understanding of the domain is an important component of a
war-­fighting culture. MCDP 1, Warfighting, pinpoints speed and focus as univer-
sal determinants of combat power.33 Based on Col John Boyd’s Observe, Orient,
Decide, and Act (OODA) loop, under this formulation speed represents the rapid-
ity of action while focus represents the convergence of effects on an objective.34
Space domain intuition enhances the speed and focus of military spacepower by
allowing space war fighters to observe, orient, and decide faster than their adver-
saries. Developing space war fighters with an intuitive understanding of the do-
main requires deliberate professional development over time. Air Force basic
doctrine must recognize this imperative by formally acknowledging the distinc-
tions between airpower expertise and military spacepower expertise.

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 Grosselin

Conclusion
The widespread acceptance of a new idea in an organization takes time. But the
process always benefits from an authoritative formulation that defines the shape,
structure, and implied values of the new idea. Publishing a new idea through
formal organizational channels advances the permanence of a concept and pro-
vides a point of departure for future innovations.
Publishing an independent theory of military spacepower as formal Air Force
basic doctrine is the first step toward ensuring military spacepower is broadly
understood and accepted across the DAF. Doctrine is not culture. But by publish-
ing and adhering to an authoritative theory of military spacepower, the Air Force
can set the conditions for a space war-­fighting culture to develop. Under the
framework for military spacepower presented here, Air Force space forces are
practitioners of an independent discipline of military power unique to the space
domain. This purpose, in turn, shapes their identity as coequals with the other war
fighters responsible for military power in the air, maritime, and land domains.
With purpose and identity solidified, other initiatives aimed at cultivating a space
war-­fighting culture will take root and flourish. 

Maj Kenneth Grosselin, USAF

Major Grosselin (BS, USAFA; PhD, Pardee RAND Graduate School) is a space weapons officer and an Air Force
Fellow assigned to Georgetown University for Intermediate Developmental Education.

Notes
1. Oriana Pawlyk, “Outgoing SecAF Worries About Developing Service Culture at New
Space Force,” Military.com, 16 May 2019, https://www.military.com/.
2.  Rumsfeld et al., Commission to Assess United States National Security Space Management and
Organization (Washington DC: Central Intelligence Agency Printing and Photography Group,
2001), 42.
3.  Trisha Schmalz, “Space Professional Development Program Readies Better Space Cadre,”
Air Force Space Command, 15 September 2006, https://www.afspc.af.mil/.
4.  Gen John P. Jumper, “A Word from the Chief: Why ‘Air and Space’?,” Air & Space Power
Journal (ASPJ) XVI, no. 3 (Fall 2002): 5, https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/aspj/.
5.  TSgt Jennifer Thibault, “New Space Badge Wear Begins Today,” Air Force Space Command,
1 November 2005, https://archive.is/.
6.  Acting Secretary of the Air Force Matthew P. Donovan, “Unleashing the Power of Space: The
Case for a Separate U.S. Space Force,” War on the Rocks, 1 August 2019, https://warontherocks.com/.
7.  Miller et al., Space Cadre Personnel Review Report: Developing our Space Cadre for a Warfight-
ing Domain, 15 August 2018.

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 A Culture of Military Spacepower

8.  Peter L. Hays, Struggling Towards Space Doctrine: U.S. Military Space Plans, Programs, and
Perspectives During the Cold War, thesis presented to the faculty of the Fletcher School of Law and
Diplomacy, May 1994, 212.
9.  National Security Strategy of the United States of America, December 2017, 27, https://www
.whitehouse.gov/.
10.  Office of the Press Secretary, The Office of the President of the United States, Space Policy
Directive—4, “Establishment of the United States Space Force,” 19 February 2019.
11.  Office of the Press Secretary, “Establishment of the United States Space Force.”
12.  Andrew Neal, Mark A. Griffin, and Peter M. Hart, “The Impact of Organizational Climate
on Safety Climate and Individual Behavior,” Safety Science 34, no. 1–3 (2000): 99–109.
13.  Lt Col Casey Beard, Transforming Technicians into Tacticians, Air Force Public Affairs, 13
September 2019, https://www.schriever.af.mil/.
14.  Edgar H. Schein with Peter Schein, Organizational Culture and Leadership (Hoboken, NJ:
Wiley, 2017), 127.
15.  United States Army Training and Doctrine Command, Army Doctrine Publication 1, The
Army, July 2019, v.
16.  Curtis E. LeMay Center for Doctrine Development and Education, Volume I, Basic Doc-
trine, 14 October 2011, https://doctrine.af.mil/.
17.  Department of the Navy, Naval Doctrine Publication 1, Naval Warfare, March 2010.
18.  United States Marine Corps, Marine Corps Doctrine Publication 1-0, Marine Corps Op-
erations, 26 July 2017.
19.  Gen Thomas D. White, “Air and Space are Indivisible,” Air Force Magazine, September
2008, http://www.airforcemag.com/.
20.  Air Force Manual 1-2, United States Air Force Basic Doctrine, 1 December 1959, 6.
21.  Air Force Manual 1-1, USAF Basic Doctrine, 1979 and Air Force Manual 1-6, Military
Space Doctrine, 15 October 1982.
22.  Department of the Air Force, The Aerospace Force: Defending America in the 21st Century
(Washington, DC: Headquarters United States Air Force, 2000), 1.
23.  Gen Jumper, “A Word from the Chief,” ASPJ, 5.
24.  Air Force Doctrine Document 2-2, Space Operations, 27 November 2006.
25.  Air Force Public Affairs, “Air Force Updates Doctrine Documents,” Air Force News Service,
16 November 2011, https://www.af.mil/.
26.  Curtis E. LeMay Center for Doctrine Development and Education, Volume I, Basic Doc-
trine, 27 February 2015, 22, https://www.doctrine.af.mil/.
27.  Donald Cox and Michael Stoiko, Spacepower: What it Means to You (Philadelphia, PA: John
C. Winston Company, 1958).
28.  David E. Lupton, On Space Warfare: A Space Power Doctrine (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air Uni-
versity Press [AUP], June 1988); Peter L. Hays et al., eds., Spacepower for a New Millennium: Space
and US National Security (New York, NY: McGraw-­Hill, 2000); Maj John E. Shaw and Brig Gen
Simon P. Worden, Whither Space Power? Forging a Strategy for the New Century (Maxwell AFB,
AL: AUP, 2002); James E. Oberg, Space Power Theory (Maxwell AFB, AL: AUP, 2002); M. V.
Smith, Ten Propositions Regarding Spacepower (Maxwell AFB, AL: AUP, 2002); Everett C. Dol-
man, Astropolitik (New York, NY: Frank Cass Publishers, 2002); and John J. Klein, Space Warfare:
Strategy, Principles, and Policy (New York, NY: Routeledge, 2006).
29.  Milan N. Vego, “On Naval Power,” Joint Force Quarterly 50, no. 3 (2008): 8.

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 Grosselin

30.  Vego, “On Naval Power,” I-2.

31.  Casey Beard, Information Control: Preserving the Advantage (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air Uni-
versity, 2015), 43–60.
32. Beard, Information Control: Preserving the Advantage (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University,
2015), 43–60 and; Miller et al., Space Cadre Personnel Review Report, 26.
33.  Department of the Navy, Marine Corps Doctrine Publication 1, Warfighting, 4 April 2018,
2–19, https://www.marines.mil/.
34.  Department of the Navy, Marine Corps Doctrine Publication 1, Warfighting.

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