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Asean Beat
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The newly created government already faced a steep learning curve, with the peace process at stake.
Then the COVID-19 pandemic hit.
By Miyoko Taniguchi
Philippines President Rodrigo Duterte, center, and leader of the MILF Al Haj Murad Ebrahim, right, shake
hands during a ceremonial presentation of the signed “Organic Law for the Bangsamoro Autonomous
Region in Muslim Mindanao” at Malacanang Palace in Manila, Philippines Monday, Aug. 6, 2018.
The Bangsamoro Transition Authority (BTA), which exercises executive and legislative powers as the
interim regional government of the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM),
was officially inaugurated in March 2019. Six months later, interim BTA Chief Minister and concurrent
Chair of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) Ahod “Al Haj Murad” Ebrahim had come to the
conclusion that “Running a government is thrice more difficult than running a revolution.”
Indeed, the transformation of armed rebels into rulers/politicians and a revolutionary organization into
a form of government has been identified as one of the most critical factors in explaining the successful
transition from violence to sustainable peace in any post-conflict country. In other words, this difficulty
is not unique to the MILF.
Considering the complexity of conflict and violence in the region, including violent extremism, as seen in
the Marawi Siege in 2017 and in the clan feuds that impact local politics, as well as the previous
autonomous government’s weak governance, the interim government faces a big challenge in meeting
the demands of the underprivileged Bangsamoro people, who have been suffering oppression and
marginalization for almost 50 years. The BARMM (previously the ARMM) has long been the most
impoverished region in the Philippines, despite its high economic potential by virtue of its rich natural
resources. In addition, even prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, it had become apparent that the transition
of power and new political order in the region was causing violent polarization of (and even within)
diverse identity groups such as the MILF, the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), non-Islamized or
non-Moro Indigenous peoples, and local clans. Especially contentious were questions of land and natural
resources, and any forms of resource allocation of public goods and service.
More than one year of significant achievement has already passed since the official inauguration of the
BARMM in March 2019. Despite some transitional delays, the BTA has tried to institutionalize “moral
governance,” which has been made a priority in the government’s 12-point agendas under the interim
chief minister’s leadership. The government approved the Transition Plan and the Bangsamoro
Development Plan, which provide the basis for running the interim government during the transition
period (2019–2022). It has also established the BARMM Full Disclosure Policy Portal and the e-BARMM
system under the Ministry of Public Works, as well as installing an information dissemination system
that incorporates social media and radio through the Bureau of Public Information. The BTA also
launched a Bangsamoro Job Portal for new recruitment based on merit. Each of the above steps
represents efforts to combat corruption by ensuring accountability and transparency. It is fair to say that
most of these efforts were not observed under the MNLF-led ARMM regional government.
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Aside from the overwhelming tasks that any interim government must tackle during the transition
period, the COVID-19 pandemic is now impacting the region and the Philippines as a whole. The first
case in the BARMM was confirmed in a Lanao del Sur resident on March 11. As of August 12, there have
been 498 cases in total among the region’s population of more than 5 million, out of which 172 cases
are active. The BARMM has seen five reported COVID-19 deaths. The number of cases has risen since
the national government eased lockdown restrictions in June and allowed residents from the region who
had been stranded in Manila to return home. Although efforts are being made to quickly establish a
regional health care system, this measure might not be enough if the outbreak cannot be contained, as
can be seen in Metropolitan Manila.
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Given the above situation, it is too early to assess the effectiveness of the interim government’s
response to the COVID-19 pandemic. It can, however, be said that the way the government handles the
pandemic will determine its political legitimacy, especially in the transitional setting. Paradoxically, this
crisis can be viewed as a good opportunity for the interim government, as a strange coin, as it were, to
gain legitimacy. In this sense, the interim government seems to be performing fairly well thus far,
despite weak governance and a limited number of officials due to the ongoing recruitment process.
In alignment with Proclamation No. 922 issued by the Office of the President on March 9, which
declared a state of public health emergency, the Bangsamoro interim government set up a COVID-19
Inter-Agency Task Force (IATF) on March 13 as an emergency operation center in the BARMM. The task
force is composed of all ministers, offices, and agencies of the BARMM, including local government units
(LGUs). Immediately after the establishment of the IATF, the interim government distributed relief
assistance to residents affected by community quarantine and allotted 1.6 billion Philippine pesos ($32.7
million) to fight the pandemic. Out of that, 155 million pesos went to LGUs as quick response funds, thus
facilitating massive relief operations, such as providing medical supplies and personal protective
equipment to the island provinces and equipping COVID-19 referral hospitals across the region.
In addition, interim government initiatives have also strengthened the region’s COVID-19 health care
and pandemic containment systems. It is notable that in May, the national Department of Health issued
a license to the Cotabato Regional and Medical Center (CRMC) to operate the first ever testing
laboratory for COVID-19 in the region, joining 66 other centers in the country; the center was
established after the CRMC received funds (14.1 million pesos) from the interim government to procure
and upgrade medical and laboratory supplies to perform diagnostic testing. Furthermore, isolation
facilities have been constructed in the region under the Bangsamoro Ministry of Public Works to
accommodate the increasing number of locally-stranded individuals and returning overseas Filipino
workers. As of July 16, the government has facilitated the homecoming of 15,184 individuals from
Sabah, Malaysia.
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Despite the above-mentioned efforts and achievements, the interim government still faces challenges
ahead. Given the region’s fragile health care system and cramped living conditions, especially in
evacuation and transitory sites, coupled with the limited access to water, sanitation, and hygiene
facilities as well as to supplies and health care, the displaced, conflict-affected people in the region
remain the most at risk. Moreover, the socioeconomic impact should not be underestimated. The
Philippine Statistics Authority reported that this June, unemployment in the BARMM had
significantly increased to 29.8 percent, up from 8 percent last year. The pandemic’s socioeconomic
consequences might exacerbate the existing inequalities among the most at-risk groups, potentially
adding to social tensions and the polarization of identity groups, especially in the region’s conflict-
affected areas.
The government’s COVID-19 response has impacted the implementation of the Comprehensive
Agreement of the Bangsamoro, which was signed in 2014 between the Philippine government and the
MILF, especially with regard to the normalization process, which involves security issues (policing and
decommissioning of rebel fighters), a socioeconomic development program, confidence-building
measures, and transitional justice and reconciliation. The second phase of the decommissioning process
for 12,000 (out of 40,000) MILF combatants (35 percent) was completed only recently, in March 2020,
and the third phase will commence this year. Upon the assessment by the Third Party Monitoring Team,
the peace process will be concluded with an exit document, which will verify the full implementation of
the Comprehensive Agreement of the Bangsamoro, if agreed upon by both the Philippines government
and the MILF.
More specifically, the transition from the ARMM to the BARMM is set to reach completion after the first
group of legislators, consisting of 80 members of parliament, is elected in June 2022. With a delayed
transition process, partly due to COVID-19, the interim government must accelerate the formation of a
new organizational structure and new bureaucrats to effectively deliver services to the people; this
involves enacting six priority codes and hiring new officials, as stipulated in Republic Act 11054 (or the
Bangsamoro Organic Law). Loss of political legitimacy in the BARMM could destabilize the transition,
potentially triggering local politics and strengthening Islamic State-affiliated violent extremist groups,
which could create significant security gaps.
MILF Chairman Murad precisely articulated all the above points when he said, “Meeting the Moro
people’s expectations is the biggest challenge.” The way in which the interim government functions —
including its COVID-19 response during this already challenging transitional period — will be crucial to
unifying the fragmented Bangsamoro society and strengthening collaborative relations with the national
government toward sustainable peace in Mindanao. More importantly, it should be understood that the
stability and peace in Mindanao will have a direct impact on the whole Indo-Pacific region.
Dr. Miyoko Taniguchi is a senior advisor on Peacebuilding at the Japan International Cooperation Agency
(JICA). The views expressed above are the author’s own and do not reflect the views of the JICA.
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