CSC v. Joson Jr.

FACTS:
Joson, Jr., Administrator of the POEA, appointed Ong as Executive Assistant IV in his o ffice
under a contractual status. The DBM thru Dir. Doctor approved Joson’s request for the creation
of a contractual position. Subsequently, respondent Joson wrote the CSC requesting exemption
from the rule requiring appointees to confidential staff positions to meet the prescribed
educational qualification. Petitioner CSC approved the appointment of Ong under a Coterminous
Temporary status. Dir. Acebedo of the CSC NCR invalidated this. Considering the said
adjustment in the effectivity date of Ong's appointment, the respondent requested approval for
the payment of her salary. The petitioner denied the request. Citing the Attrition Law, no
appointment shall be made to fill up a vacancy unless an authority has been granted by it. The
respondent filed a motion for reconsideration. CSC said the Ong’s appointment was not included
in the POEA’s ROPA. Respondent moved for a clarification and asserted that the POEA’s failure
to include Ong’s appointment in its ROPA was justified because it was still the subject of a
request for exemption. This was denied. The CA ruled that Ong was considered a de facto
officer and is entitled to the payment of her salary.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Ong should be considered as a de facto or de jure officer.
RULING:
SC held that Ong is a de jure public officer. The inaction of certain officials led to the non-
compliance with the CSC requirement that appointments should be included in the
monthly report of personnel action (ROPA), which must be submitted in turn to the CSC.
The Court held that legitimate justifications excused the delayed observance of or the non-
compliance with the requirement.
Tuanda v. Sandiganbayan

FACTS:

Private respondents were designated by DILG Sec. Santos assectoral representatives for the
Sangguniang Bayan of Jimalalud, Negros Occidental.Pursuant to the designation, they took their
oath of office. Their designations wererecalled by the Office of the President. Mayor Tuanda
thus did not recognizerespondent as sectoral representatives. Mayor filed a case with the RTC to
declarethe designations null and void while respondents filed an information againstpetitioners in
the Sandiganbayan. Petitioners sought to suspend SB proceedings dueto a prejudicial question.
Relevant to our topic is the entitlement to back wages ofrespondents asde factoofficers. The
Court found that they werenotde factoofficerssince no de jure office existed. There was no de
jure office because thecircumstances to warrant representation by sectoral representatives under
the LocalGovernment Code had not yet arisen.
ISSUE:
Whether or not private respondent’s designation at sectoral representative is valid.
RULING:
NO. Private respondents insist that even if their designations are nullified, they are entitled to
compensation for actual services rendered. We disagree. As found by the trial court and as borne
out by the records, from the start, private respondents' designations as sectoral representatives
have been challenged by petitioners. They began with a petition filed with the Office of the
President copies of which were received by private respondents on 26 February 1989, barely
eight (8) days after they took their oath of office. Hence, private respondents' claim that they
have actually rendered services as sectoral representatives has not been established.
Finally, we find unmeritorious respondent Sandiganbayan's thesis that even in the event that
private respondents' designations are finally declared invalid, they may still be considered de
facto public officers entitled to compensation for services actually rendered.
Tayko v. Capistrano
FACTS:
This is a petition for a writ of prohibition enjoining the respondent judge from making
cognizance of certain civil and criminal election cases in which the petitioners are parties.
The ground upon which the petition rests may be reduced to three propositions.
(1) That the assignment of the Auxiliary Judge, Sixto de la Costa, to Dumaguete was made with
the understanding that the he was to hear and take cognizance of all election contests and
criminal causes for violation of the election law and that the respondent judge was to take
cognizance of the ordinary cases and that there was an understanding between them that this
arrangement was to be followed.
(2) That the respondent judge took great interest and an active part in the filing of the criminal
charges against the petitioners herein to the unjustifiable extent of appointing a deputy fiscal who
filed the proper informations when the regular provincial fiscal refused to file them for lack of
sufficient evidence.
(3) That the respondent judge is already over 65 years of age and has, therefore, automatically
ceased as judge of the Court of First Instance of Oriental Negros and that he is neither a judge de
jure nor de facto.
To this petition the respondents demur on the ground that the facts stated in that (1) none of the
facts alleged in the petition divest the respondent judge of his jurisdiction to take cognizance of
the cases referred to in the complaint, and (2) even admitting as true, for the sake of this
demurrer, the facts alleged in paragraph 7 of the petition, the respondent judge is still a de
facto judge and his title to the office and his jurisdiction to hear the cases referred to in the
petition cannot be questioned by prohibition, as this writ, even when directed against persons
acting as judges, cannot be treated as a substitute for quo warranto, or be rightfully called upon
to perform any of the functions of that writ.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the decision of a de facto judge is valid and binding.
RULING:
YES. Briefly defined, a de facto judge is one who exercises the duties of a judicial office under
color of an appointment or election thereto. He differs, on the one hand, from a mere usurper
who undertakes to act officially without any color of right, and on the other hand, from a
judge de jure who is in all respects legally appointed and qualified and whose term of office has
not expired.
Applying the principles stated to the facts set forth in the petition before us, we cannot escape the
conclusion that, on the assumption that said facts are true, the respondent judge must be
considered a judge de facto. His term of office may have expired, but his successor has not been
appointed, and as good faith is presumed, he must be regarded as holding over in good faith. The
contention of counsel for the petitioners that the auxiliary judge present in the district must be
considered the regular judge seems obviously erroneous.
Rodriguez v. Tan
FACTS:
Rodriguez, Sr. claims that on December 30, 1947, Carlos Tan usurped the office of Senator of
the Philippines, and from that date until December 1949, he continuously collected the salaries,
emoluments, and privileges attendant to that office amounting to P18,400; that protest having
been filed by Rodriguez against Tan, the Senate Electoral Tribunal on December 16, 1949,
rendered judgment declaring Rodriguez to have been duly elected to the office; and that by
reason of such usurpation, Rodriguez suffered damages in the amount of P35,524.55 for
expenses he incurred in prosecuting the protest.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Tan can be ordered to reimburse the salaries and emoluments he has received
during his incumbency to Rodriguez who has been legally declared elected by the Senate
Electoral Tribunal.
RULING:
NO. Tan acted as a de facto officer during the time he held the office of Senator. He was one of
the candidates of the Liberal Party in the elections of November 11, 1947, and was proclaimed as
one of those who had been elected by the Commission on Elections, and thereafter he took the
oath of office and immediately entered into the performance of the duties of the position. Having
been thus duly proclaimed as Senator and having assumed office as required by law, it cannot be
disputed that Tan is entitled to the compensation, emoluments and allowances which our
Constitution provides for the position (article VI, section 14, 1935 Const.). The petition must
fail.
Regala v. CFI of Bataan
FACTS:
The appellant is accused for the crime of murder. He was informed of the lawsuit and pleaded
not guilty. The witnesses, according to her, were Cruz, Manalac and others. During the hearing,
the Provincial Prosecutor, instead of adducing his evidence, presented an amended complaint
including as defendants the witnesses named in the complaint, Cruz and Mañalac. In this second
lawsuit, it was alleged that between the appellant and his two co-defendants there was
conspiracy, confederation and mutual aid to commit the crime.
The appellant filed the notice of appeal against said order, and it was denied. Appellant filed a
motion for reconsideration that was denied. The appellant filed his original writ of certiorari
requesting that the orders of the Bataan Court of First Instance be annulled by this Court.
The appellant alleges that the judge's order denying the motion for reconsideration is null and
void because said judge acted without jurisdiction, since his appointment has not been approved
by the Appointments Committee, according to a newspaper published by the same. date. There is
no record in the records that the judge was aware of such disapproval before issuing his order,
contested as illegal. A judge who takes office before learning of the disapproval of his
appointment is a de facto judge. All of his official actions, as a de facto judge, are as valid for all
legal purposes and for all kinds of matters as those of a de jure judge.
The appellant and the dissidents argue that the judge, by allowing the inclusion of two
defendants and the addition of the words: "by conspiring, confederating and helping one another"
in the amended complaint, abused his discretion. The applicants in this writ of certiorari,
defendants in a murder complaint, allege that the court exceeded and abused its jurisdiction by
permitting amendment of the complaint.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the court abused its discretion.
RULING:
NO. In our opinion, the court did not abuse its discretion. The amendment to the complaint was
merely formal. It does not affect or alter the nature of the crime, because, whether Bruno or
Cecilio caused the fatal wound, the crime would be the same. It also does not affect the extent of
the applicants' liability, since, alleging in the complaint that both defendants conspired and
helped each other to commit the crime, they would be liable to the same extent, whether one or
the other was the infringer. the wound that caused the death of the deceased. It is, therefore, a
purely formal amendment that does not substantially alter the complaint or affect the rights of the
defendants.
In addition, whether or not the judge acted in violation of the Rules was at most a procedural
error, and not an abuse of discretion, or an excess or lack of jurisdiction. Such an error, if it is in
reality, can be corrected on appeal, after the final sentence is handed down in the first instance,
and not in a writ of certiorari.
Lino Luna v. Rodriguez
FACTS:
An action based upon the alleged usurpation of a public office, that of governor of the Province
of Rizal, in which a demurrer was filed to the complaint. The question before us arises on the
issues framed by the demurrer. An election for the office of governor of the Province of Rizal
was held on the 6th day of June, 1916. At said election Jose Lino Luna, Eulogio Rodriguez and
Servando de los Angeles were candidates for said office. The election was closed, the votes cast
were counted, and a return was made by the inspectors of said municipalities to the provincial
board of Canvassers, who, after a canvass of said returns, proclaimed the following results:
Eulogies Rodriguez- 4321 votes
Jose Lino - 4,157
Servando de los Angeles - 3,576
It proclaimed Eulogio Rodriguez, having received a plurality of said votes, as duly elected
governor of said province. Jose Lino Luna presented a protest in the CFI and a new trial was
ordered. Additional evidence was adduced. Judge McMahon found that the inspectors in
Binangonan did not close the polls at 6 o’clock p.m., and that a large number of persons voted
after that time. The judge then directed that the total vote of Rodriguez be reduced, without
ascertaining how many had been cast for Rodriguez and how many for Luna.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the ballots cast after the hour fixed for closing is valid.
RULING:
YES. The ballots were valid. The law provides that “at all elections, the polls shall be open from
seven o’clock in the morning until six o’clock in the afternoon.” The polls should be open and
closed in strict accord with said provisions. Voters who do not appear and offer to vote within
the hours designated by the law should not be permitted to vote if the time for closing the polls
has arrived. Upon the other hand, if the voter is prevented, during the voting hours, from voting,
and is not permitted to vote by reason of the failure of the inspectors to do their duty, then,
certainly, in the absence of some fraud, neither such votes nor the entire vote of the precinct
should be annulled simply because some votes were cast after the regular hours. The ballot of the
innocent voter should not be annulled and he should not be deprived of his participation in the
affairs of his government when he was guilty of no illegal act or fraud. The election inspectors
should be held to comply strictly with the law. If they violate the law, they should be punished
and not the innocent voter.
Garchitorena v. Crescini
FACTS:
On the 6th day of June, 1916, an election was held for the office of the governor of the Province
of Ambos Camarines. After the close of said election the votes were canvassed, and on the 21st
day of June, 1916, the appellant was declared elected governor by the provincial board of
canvassers.
A protest against said election was duly filed on the 1st day of July, 1916, in the Court of First
Instance of said province by the appellee. Notice of said protest was duly given, issue was
joined, a trial was had, the respective parties were duly heard and presented their proof; that the
trial was closed, and the cause was finally submitted to the court for decision, and a decision was
filed with the clerk on the 27th day of April, 1917, notice of which was duly given to the parties
on the 30th day of April, 1917.
The contention of the appellant, as shown by his motion, is that at the time said decision was
filed with the clerk the judge who prepared and filed it was not a judge of the court, neither de
jure nor de facto.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the decision is valid.
RULING:
NO. Considering the fact, that the judge, who filed the decision in question upon the 27th day of
April, 1917, had taken the oath of office as Director of Lands on the 31st day of March, 1917,
and began to draw his salary as such Director of Lands from the 28th day of March, 1917, in
relation with the fact that his successor was appointed and had entered upon the performance of
his duties as auxuliary judge on the 28th day of March, 1917, in substitution of the judge who
filed the said decision, and there being no law providing for two auxiliary judges of the Court of
First Instance of said province, we must conclude that, prior to the 27th day of April, 1917, said
judge had ceased to be auxiliary judge of said province and was, therefore, without authority to
promulgate decisions in said province. The judge who filed the decision cannot be considered a
judge de jure, for the reason that another judge was actually acting in his place and stead and had
been for nearly a month prior to the promulgation of the decision in question on the 27th day of
April, 1917. Neither can he be considered a judge de facto, for the reason that there was a de
jure judge actually discharging the functions of the office in question. There cannot be a de
facto judge when there is a de jure judge in the actual performance of the duties of the office. In
order to be a de facto judge he must still be acting under some color of right. He cannot be
actually acting under any color of the right when he has ceased to be judge and has actually
vacated the office by the acceptance of another office and by actually entering upon the duties of
the other office. A judgment rendered by a judge after he has ceased to be judge and who has
vacated his office, will be set aside on motion. Where the term of office of a judge has
terminated and his successor has qualified and he has ceased to act as judge his subsequent acts
in attempting to dispose of business left unfinished by him before the expiration of his term are
void.
Solis v. CA
FACTS:
Petitioner Gregorio Solis was found guilty of malversation of public funds. The judgment was
penned and signed by Hon. Leuterio.
RA 1186 which abolished all existing positions of Judges-at-large took effect without executive
approval. The defendants appeared before the court, this time the court was presided over by
Hon. Palacio, judge of another sala of the court and Palacio promulgated the judgment of Judge
Leuterio against the objections of herein petitioner.
Petitioner Solis appealed the judgment to the CA, he raised in issue and attached the validity of
the promulgation of the judgment of the lower court for having been made by another judge after
the incumbency of the judge who rendered it had ceased. The Solicitor General’s brief in the CA
agreed that the promulgation was illegal and void.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner is correct.
RULING:
YES.  The main ground upon which the CA held the contested judgment of the CFI to be valid is
that since the approval of RA 1186 was not yet publicly or generally known. Judge Leuterio
should be considered as a judge de facto of said court and the promulgation of his appealed
decision is valid and legally effective. This is a misapplication of the doctrine laid down in the
very case cited by the CA, a judge de facto was defined as one who has the reputation of being
the officer he assumes to be and yet is not a good officer in point of law because there exists
some defect in his appointment or his right to exercise judicial functions at the particular time,
but it is essential to the validity of the acts of a  de facto judge, that he is actually acting under
some color of right. In the present case Judge Leuterio did not actually act or perform or exercise
the duties of judge when his decision was promulgated as he had ceased to be one and the
decision was promulgated under another presiding judge.
Funa v. Agra
FACTS:
Petitioner alleges that Hon. Alberto C. Agra was appointed by the president to be the Acting
Secretary of Justice and that Agra was also subsequently appointed as Acting Solicitor General
in concurrent capacity. Respondent has a different story, he alleged that he was assigned to be
the Acting Solicitor General first then was subsequently assigned to be the Acting Secretary of
Justice. Agra also alleged that he relinquished his position as Acting Solicitor General but kept
performing his duties until his successor was appointed. Notwithstanding the conflict in the
versions of the parties, the fact that Agra has admitted to holding the two offices concurrently in
acting capacities is settled, which is sufficient for purposes of resolving the constitutional
question that petitioner raises herein. 
ISSUE:
Whether or not the designation of Agra as the Acting Secretary of Justice, concurrently with his
position of Acting Solicitor General, violate the constitutional prohibition against dual or
multiple offices for the Members of the Cabinet and their deputies.
RULING:
YES. According to the Public Interest Center, Inc. v. Elma, the only two exceptions: (1) those
provided for under the Constitution, such as Section 3, Article VII, authorizing the Vice Presided
to become a member of the Cabinet; and (2) posts occupied by Executive officials specified in
Section 13, Article VII without additional compensation in ex officio capacities as provided by
law and as required by the primary functions of the officials’ offices. The primary functions of
the Office of the Solicitor General are not related or necessary to the primary functions of the
Department of Justice. Considering that the nature and duties of the two offices are such as to
render it improper, from considerations of public policy, for one person to retain both, an
incompatibility between the offices exists, further warranting the declaration of Agra’s
designation as the Acting Secretary of Justice, concurrently with his designation as the Acting
Solicitor General, to be void for being in violation of the express provisions of the Constitution.
CSC v. Unda
FACTS:
Outgoing Mayor Arimao had appointed respondent Unda as the MENRO on March 8, 2007.
After the 2007 local elections, petitioner Pangandaman, Jr. assumed office as the newly-elected
Municipal Mayor. He soon discovered that the LGU had not enacted any annual budget for the
years 2006 and 2007, and had operated on the basis of the reenacted 2005 annual budget; and
that nine municipal employees, including the respondent, had been midnight appointees whose
appointments had been based on a non-existing budget. Inasmuch as said appointees were not
reporting to work, Mayor Pangandaman ordered their salaries withheld. Later on, he filed a
petition for the annulment of the appointments by the CSC, and the case was referred to the
CSCRO-ARMM.
On February 15, 2010, the CSCRO-ARMM upheld the respondent's appointment for having
satisfied the screening of the PSB prior to the election ban. Dissatisfied, the Municipality
represented by Mayor Pangandaman, sought reconsideration, but the motion was denied. Thus,
the LGU appealed to the CSC.
On March 15, 2012, the CSC reversed the CSCRO-ARMM. The LGU and the respondent moved
for the partial reconsideration of the decision, but the CSC denied their respective motions.
Aggrieved, the respondent appealed to the CA. The CA reversed the CSC and reinstated the
decision of the CSCRO-ARMM. The CA denied the motions for reconsideration of the LGU and
the CSC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner’s appointment is valid and in accordance with law.
RULING:
YES. Municipal Governments have the discretion to appoint their MENROs. A public office is
created either by the Constitution, by law, or by authority of law. The legal basis for the
appointment of the respondent as the MENRO was Section 443 of the LGC.
There ought to be no question that the appointment of the respondent as the MENRO was but
optional on the part of the Municipality of Masiu, and that such appointment required the
concurrence of the Sangguniang Bayan, as well as the adoption of the appropriation ordinance to
fund the payment of his salaries and other emoluments.
The CA opined that Section 443 and Section 484 of the LGC institutionalized the position of
MENRO in the LGUs; hence, no resolution of the Sangguniang Bayan was required to create the
office. The CA was correct in light of paragraphs (a) and (b) of Section 443 of the LGC
expressly creating and identifying the public offices of the municipalities.
Even so, the Municipality of Masiu was also justified in construing the appointment of the
MENRO as optional on its part. This is based on the usage in paragraph (b) of the term may,
which means that the Municipal Mayor has been given the discretion whether or not to appoint
the MENRO and the other officers of the municipality listed in the provision. It is a basic
postulate of statutory construction that the word may means a merely permissive act, and
operates to confer upon a party discretion to do or not to do the act. Indeed, the second paragraph
of Section 484(a) of the LGC expressly states that the appointment of the MENRO is optional on
the part of the LGU.
Monroy v. CA
FACTS:
Roberto Monroy was the incumbent Mayor of Navotas, Rizal, when on September 15, 1961, his
certificate of candidacy as representative of the first district of Rizal in the forthcoming elections
was filed with the Comelec. Three days later, or on September 18, 1961, Monroy filed a letter
withdrawing said certificate of candidacy. The Comelec approved the withdrawal. But on
September 21, 1961, Felipe del Rosario, then the vice-mayor of Navotas, took his oath of office
as municipal mayor on the theory that petitioner had forfeited the said office upon his filing of
the certificate of candidacy in question.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Monroy cease to be mayor of Navotas, Rizal, after his certificate of candidacy
was filed on September 15, 1961.

RULING:

YES. The withdrawal of his certificate of candidacy did not restore petitioner to his former
position. Sec. 27 of the Rev. Election Code which reads “Any elective provincial, municipal or
city official running for an office, other then the one which he is actually holding, shall be
considered resigned from his office from the moment of the filing of his certificate of candidacy”
makes the forfeiture automatic and permanently effective upon the filing of the certificate of for
another office. Only the moment and act of filing are considered. Once the certificate is filed, the
seat is forfeited forever and nothing save a new election or appointment can restore the ousted
official.
Cantillo v. Arrieta
FACTS:
October 1962: Jose Cantillo was originally appointed Temporary Municipal Policeman of
Maramag Bukidnon, took his oath and served as such. His appointment was attested to by the
Provincial Treasurer, and the Commissioner of Civil Service. At the time of his original
appointment, he was 41 years old and still only at second year high school.
November 1964: Petitioner was given another appointment in the same municipality, took his
oath, acted and qualified as such. However, this appointment was only “Provisional”. The same
was attested by the Provincial Treasurer and Commissioner of Civil Service.
January 1967: Petitioner was given another appointment, same municipality, took oath, acted and
qualified, attested to by Prov. Treasurer and Commissioner of Civil Service.
October 1967: Petitioner was suspended from the service due to filing of criminal charges for
Infidelity in the Custody of the Prisoner. The Provincial Fiscal moved for the dismissal of the
case due to insufficiency of evidence. After the dismissal, petitioner presented oral and written
request for reinstatement and claimed for payment of back salaries pursuant to Sec 4 of Republic
Act 557 stating that when a municipal policeman is charged and subsequently acquitted, he shall
be entitled to back wages.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Cantillo is entitled to back wages.
RULING:
NO. ection 9 of the same law enumerates the qualifications for municipal police, namely: not
less than 23 nor more than 33 years old; and completed high school. As to the first, he was
already 41 years old as of his first appointment and 46 years during his last appointment. As the
second, he only reached second year. These infirmities precluded the reinstatement; it was not
mere absence of civil service eligibility but of qualifications for the office.
Menzon v. Petilla
FACTS:
In 1988, the DILG Secretary Luis Santos designated Vice-Governor Leopoldo E. Petilla as
Acting Governor of Leyte in view of the fact that no Governor had been proclaimed in the
province of Leyte.Subsequently, Santos also designated Aurelio D. Menzon, a senior member of
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan to act as the Vice-Governor for the province of Leyte. Menzon
then took his oath of office.
In 1989, the provincial administrator inquired from DILG Undersecretary Jacinto T. Rubillar, Jr.,
as to the legality of the appointment of Menzon to act as the Vice-Governor of Leyte. Rubillar,
Jr. replied that since B.P. 337 has no provision relating to succession in the Office of the Vice-
Governor in case of a temporary vacancy, the appointment of Menzon as the temporary Vice-
Governor is not necessary since the Vice-Governor who is temporarily performing the functions
of the Governor, could concurrently assume the functions of both offices.
As a result of the foregoing, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan issued Resolution No. 505 where it
invalidated the appointment of Menzon as acting Vice-Governor of Leyte. Menzon then wrote to
Undersecretary Rubillar to clarify the opinion that the latter issued. Rubillar replied that Menzon
was merely designated to act as vice governor. He was not appointed to the post since there was
no vacancy of the office to speak of.
As a result of this clarificatory letter, the DILG Regional Director requested Governor Petilla
that the resolution issued by the Sanggunian be modified so that Menzon would be able receive
his salary as vice governor, if he was deprived of such. However, Petilla and the Sanggunian
refused to correct Resolution 505 and correspondingly to pay the petitioner the emoluments
attached to the Office of Vice-Governor.
It was at this instance that Menzon decided to file this petition to determine whether he is entitled
to the emoluments for his services rendered as designated acting vice‐governor. During the
pendency of this case, the issue on the governorship of Leyte was settled and Adelina Larrazabal
was proclaimed Governor of Leyte.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not there was a vacancy.
2. Whether or not the Secretary of Local Government had the authority to
designate the petitioner.
RULING:
1. YES. The law on Public Officers is clear on the matter. There is no vacancy whenever the
office is occupied by a legally qualified incumbent. A sensu contrario, there is a vacancy when
there is no person lawfully authorized to assume and exercise at present the duties of the office.
Applying the definition of vacancy to this case, it can be readily seen that the office of the Vice-
Governor was left vacant when the duly elected Vice-Governor Leopoldo Petilla was appointed
Acting Governor. In the eyes of the law, the office to which he was elected was left barren of a
legally qualified person to exercise the duties of the office of the Vice-Governor. There is no
satisfactory showing that Petilla, notwithstanding his succession to the Office of the Governor,
continued to simultaneously exercise theduties of the Vice-Governor. The nature of the duties of
a Provincial Governor call for a full-time occupant to discharge them. More so when the vacancy
is for an extended period. Precisely, it was Petilla's automatic assumption to the acting
Governorship that resulted in the vacancy in the office of the Vice-Governor. The fact that the
Secretary of Local Government was prompted to appoint the petitioner shows the need to fill up
the position during the period it was vacant. The Department Secretary had the discretion to
ascertain whether or not the Provincial Governor should devote all his time to that particular
office. Moreover, it is doubtful if the Provincial Board, unilaterally acting, may revoke an
appointment made by a higher authority.
2. YES. The Local Government Code is silent on the mode of succession in the event of a
temporary vacancy in the Office of the Vice-Governor. However, the silence of the law must not
be understood to convey that a remedy in law is wanting. The circumstances of the case reveal
that there is indeed a necessity for the appointment of an acting Vice-Governor. For about two
years after the governatorial elections, there had been no de jure permanent Governor for the
province of Leyte, Governor Adelina Larrazabal, at that time, had not yet been proclaimed due to
a pending election case before the Commission on Elections. The two-year interregnum which
would result from the respondents' view of the law is disfavored as it would cause disruptions
and delays in the delivery of basic services to the people and in the proper management of the
affairs of the local government of Leyte. Definitely, it is incomprehensible that to leave the
situation without affording any remedy was ever intended by the Local Government Code. Under
the circumstances of this case and considering the silence of the Local Government Code, the
Court rules that, in order to obviate the dilemma resulting from an interregnum created by the
vacancy, the President, acting through her alter ego, the Secretary of Local Government, may
remedy the situation. We declare valid the temporary appointment extended to the petitioner to
act as the Vice-Governor. The exigencies of public service demanded nothing less than the
immediate appointment of an acting Vice- Governor. It may be noted that under Commonwealth
Act No. 588 and the Revised Administrative Code of 1987, the President is empowered to make
temporary appointments in certain public offices, in case of any vacancy that may occur. Albeit
both laws deal only with the filling of vacancies in appointive positions. However, in the absence
of any contrary provision in the Local Government Code and in the best interest of public
service, we see no cogent reason why the procedure thus outlined by the two laws may not be
similarly applied in the present case. The respondents contend that the provincial board is the
correct appointing power. This argument has no merit. As between the President who has
supervision over local governments as provided by law and the members of the board who are
junior to the vice-governor, we have no problem ruling in favor of the President, until the law
provides otherwise. A vacancy creates an anomalous situation and finds no approbation under
the law for it deprives the constituents of their right of representation and governance in their
own local government. In a republican form of government, the majority rules through their
chosen few, and if one of them is incapacitated or absent, etc., the management of governmental
affairs to that extent, may be hampered. Necessarily, there will be a consequent delay in the
delivery of basic services to the people of Leyte if the Governor or the Vice-Governor is missing.
The appointment of the petitioner, moreover, is in full accord with the intent behind the Local
Government Code. There is no question that Section 49 in connection with Section 52 of the
Local Government Code shows clearly the intent to provide for continuity in the performance of
the duties of theVice-Governor.By virtue of the surroundings circumstance of this case, the mode
of succession provided forpermanent vacancies may likewise be observed in case of a temporary
vacancy in the same office. In thiscase, there was a need to fill the vacancy. The petitioner is
himself the member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan who obtained the highest number of votes.
The Department Secretary acted correctly in extending the temporary appointment. In view of
the foregoing, the petitioner's right to be paid the salary attached to the Office of the Vice
Governor is indubitable. The compensation, however, to be remunerated to the petitioner,
following the example in Commonwealth Act No. 588 and the Revised Administrative Code,
and pursuant to the proscription against double compensation must only be such additional
compensation as, with his existing salary, shall not exceed the salary authorized by law for the
Office of the Vice-Governor. And finally, even granting that the President, acting through the
Secretary of Local Government, possesses no power to appoint the petitioner, at the very least,
the petitioner is a de facto officer entitled to compensation. There is no denying that the
petitioner assumed the Office of the Vice- Governor under color of a known appointment. As
revealed by the records, the petitioner was appointed by no less than the alter ego of the
President, the Secretary of Local Government, after which he took his oath of office before
Senator Alberto Romulo in the Office of Department of Local Government Regional Director
Res Salvatierra. Concededly, the appointment has the color of validity. The respondents
themselves acknowledged the validity of the petitioner's appointment and dealt with him as such.
It was only when the controversial Resolution No. 505 was passed by the same persons who
recognized him as the acting Vice-Governor that the validity of the appointment of the petitioner
was made an issue and the recognition withdrawn. The petitioner, for a long period of time,
exercised the duties attached to the Office of the Vice-Governor. He was acclaimed as such by
the people of Leyte. Upon the principle of public policy on which the de facto doctrine is based
and basic considerations of justice, it would be highly iniquitous to now deny him the salary due
him for the services he actually rendered as the acting Vice-Governor of the province of Leyte.
Mendoza v. Allas
FACTS:
Petitioner became part of the Bureau of Customs in 1972, and received promotions until he
became Director III of the Customs Intelligence and Investigation Service. In 1993, he was
temporarily designated as Acting District Collector, while respondent was temporarily appointed
to take his old position. In 1994, a letter was sent to petitioner, stating that he is terminated from
the services of the Bureau of Customs. He filed a petition for quo warranto against Allas, which
the court granted. Allas appealed, but became moot and academic when Allas was appointed as
Deputy Commissioner of Customs Assessment and Operations. When Mendoza filed for motion
for execution of its decision, it was denied because Godofredo Olores was appointed to take his
old position. CA affirmed the decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a petition for quo warranto extends to the position claimed.
RULING:
NO. A petition for quo warranto is a proceeding to determine the right of a person to use or
exercise of a franchise or office and to oust the holder from its enjoyment, if his claim is not
well-founded, or if he has forfeited his right to enjoy the privilege. A judgment in quo warranto
does not bind the successor in office, even though the successor’s title comes from the same
source. It is always directed to a person, in this case, Allas. Olores had never become part of the
case; hence the decision cannot extend to him. Since Mendoza has reached the age of retirement,
he cannot be reappointed. Neither can he claim from Allas his back wages, nor compel the
Bureau of Customs to pay said back wages.
Cuyegkeng v. Cruz
FACTS:
Among the 12 nominees for the Board of Medical Examiners, only 6 were shortlisted by
the President, which includes Dr. Pedro Cruz, a government physician. The petitioners,
who are among the nominees cut by the president, prayed for two causes of action. The first,
being that any one of them is qualified for the position and that Dr. Cruz’s appointment be
rendered illegal, thus null and void. While the second, prays for a writ of preliminary injunction,
ceasing, desisting and refraining the respondent from assuming and performing the role of Board
Medical Examiner, and for the respondent to pay for the costs of this suit.The petition for
preliminary injunction was dismissed. The Council of Philippine Medical Association,
and incorporated association intervened enjoining the petitioners in their prayer for relief.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners’ have valid causes of action.
RULING:
NO. The Court Ruled that Respondent has a good and valid right to his title on the grounds that
one who does not claim to be entitled to the office allegedly usurped or unlawfully held
or exercised by another cannot question his title by quo warranto. This suggests that
petitioners have no cause of action against the respondent. While the intervenors have no right to
question the title of respondent. Hence, the petition for quo warranto has no merit.