FARS Training Manual 2nd Edition
FARS Training Manual 2nd Edition
Ronny J. Coleman is a 50+ year veteran of the fire service. He is the former Fire Marshal of the
State of California from 1992 to 1999, the past president of the Fire & Emergency Television
Network. He served as the Fire Chief in Fullerton and San Clemente, CA. He is a certified Fire
Chief and a Master Instructor in the California Fire Service Training and Education System. A
Companion Fellow of the Institution of Fire Engineers, he has an Associate's Degree in Fire
Science, a Bachelor's Degree in Political Science and a Master's Degree in Vocational Education.
Mario H. Trevino is also a 40-year fire service veteran. He has served as Fire Chief in Las Vegas,
NV, San Francisco, CA, and Bellevue, WA. He has spoken at many national and international fire
service educational venues, and continues to teach for a fire service degree program and the
National Fire Academy. He is a former President of the Metropolitan Fire Chiefs and has
testified before U.S. Congressional Committees on four occasions. He holds a Bachelor’s and a
Master’s degree, both in Public Administration, and completed a Harvard Fellowship in 1998.
He is a line-of-duty cancer survivor.
Acknowledgements
The authors gratefully acknowledge the input of the members of the Firefighter Air
Replenishment System Technical Advisory Group, who made this training manual possible:
Robert Marcucci, Don Anthony, Dave Parsons, Hugh Council, Jack Murphy, Jim Tidwell, Kate
Dargan, Mike Ridley and Ron Myers.
The authors would also like to recognize the many fire service professionals who have become
involved in the discussion of this technology. More than 100 individuals have received a copy of
this manual and have provided feedback. We would especially like to acknowledge the
contributions of Debra Hall, Jim Tidwell, Joe Rush, Joe Haney, Ron Spadafora, Mike Gagliano, Jeff
Seaton, Julius Cherry, Robert Matthews and Chuck Montgomery along with many others.
We also thank Rescue Air Systems, Inc., for underwriting the production and distribution of this
training manual and supplemental material.
by Ronny J. C
Dedication
This book is dedicated to the memory of Chief Don Anthony of the Los Angeles Fire Department.
He was a leader on the fire-ground, a visionary in the industry and a person who definitely made
a difference in everything he touched.
Chief Don Anthony was a living legend. He joined the Los Angeles Fire Department on
November 1, 1956 and retired July 6, 1997 as Deputy Chief of Operations. He died June 3, 2006.
Anthony’s crews were responsible for fighting multiple major emergencies. They included 62-
story First Interstate Bank Tower, Central Library Fire and numerous others. One of the greatest
compliments paid to him was reflected at his memorial service. He had a tendency to always
state to dispatch, “Chief Anthony on scene and in charge.” To the firefighters who heard that on
the radio, “it was a very reassuring sound knowing that one of the world’s most experienced and
respected fire officers was standing squarely behind them in their efforts.”
The published codes and standards governing safety technology are written to satisfy minimum
safety standards. As technology advances, existing codes may not necessarily representative
the state-of-the-art in fire safety technology. The authors of this book recommend that
jurisdictions adopting FARS codes thoroughly research the current technology and adapt it to
local needs. Best practices will often exceed the safety standards specified in existing code
language.
This manual has been developed to serve multiple purposes. It is part of a comprehensive effort
to distribute both general and technical information that can be used to adopt, adapt and use
the technology as part of a community's overall risk management program. The second reason is
to provide a training format for training officers, fire prevention personnel, building owners and
other interested parties who need access to a comprehensive document that explains the
overall system to the users.
1. Identify the four basic rights of firefighters based on the doctrine of self-contained
breathing apparatus (SCBA) usage.
2. Evaluate the risk profile in a community to determine its impact on the need to wear
SCBA and the need for adequate support systems.
3. Identify the importance of proper planning to mitigate specific risks where air supply is
an issue.
4. Identify the basic components of a firefighter air replenishment system (FARS).
5. Identify the use of model codes and standards to adopt the FARS by a community to
provide adequate support during high-risk scenarios.
6. Identify the processes used to adopt the FARS into the local code.
7. Identify the most frequently asked questions relative to the installation of the FARS.
8. Provide information that allows fire personnel to explore additional considerations
relative to fire safety in specialized risks.
This material has also been designed to provide partial fulfillment of the requirements of NFPA
1001 and 1021.
“The information provided can be used regardless of department size, if they have high rise or
not or special hazardous or a FARS. Rescue Air Systems is providing a community resource
which supports firefighter safety with knowledge provided by educated and experienced
professionals.”
Robert Marcucci, Retired Fire Chief, City of San Rafael
Firefighter safety was once an afterthought. Now it is one of top the priorities of the incident
commander and is expected to be top-of-mind for every person assigned to a combat role.
This manual has been prepared for use by fire chiefs, fire marshals, training officers and fire
officers at all levels. The goal of the manual is to provide new insights into a solution that is
designed to make fighting a fire in a complex structure more effective, more efficient and safer.
The manual is an explanation of a technology called the firefighter air replenishment system
(FARS). It is the blueprint for a lifeline of support for fighting fires in very special occupancies.
FARS is a system that is installed in buildings as a “standpipe for air.” It is a permanent fixture in
the building. It is not unlike a sprinkler system or the water standpipe. The FARS provides
firefighters with a safe and reliable source of air from the moment they arrive on the fire ground
until they are ready to wrap up and return to quarters.
This manual will provide the reader with background information on the context in which this
system is used and will give the reader a sense of the importance of this technology in the
reduction of loss of life and property.
This is not the old-fashioned way of doing things. It is a new and innovative way of getting the
job done. Because it is a new technology, it requires proactive effort on the part of the fire
service to see that it is properly adapted for use by fire departments whose jurisdictions include
complex structures.
I hope this manual provides you with an insight into a complicated problem and provides you
with a viable solution that is very easy to implement.
Ronny J. Coleman
Mario H. Trevino
Anthony J. Turiello
At one time, firefighters were simply encouraged to wear beards. When a situation demanded
they enter an area where breathing air was compromised, they were told to soak their beards in
water and cover their faces with bandanas. One might say that was the first filter-type mask.
Those improvised filter masks were used for a long time.
As firefighting technology evolved, there were other attempts to solve the problem of air
quality. Some involved some pretty weird equipment designs. Others were just variations on
the rudimentary filter mask. Interestingly, the
problem of respiratory protection also plagued
miners and other underground workers.
Eventually, technology was developed to protect
those mineworkers, but it was very crude at the
outset. The idea of respiratory protection evolved
into a design that combined some type of
respiratory protecting configuration with some
form of self-contained air supply. Once these
designs were found to be somewhat effective in
allowing people to function in dangerous
environments, they continued to evolve quite
rapidly.
Risk management has been considered the identification, assessment, and prioritization of risks
followed by coordinated and economical application of resources to minimize, monitor, and
control the probability and/or impact of unfortunate events. Risks can come from uncertainty in
financial markets, project failures, legal liabilities, credit risk, accidents, natural causes and
disasters as well as deliberate attacks from an adversary. Thus the phrase “taking a risk” has
come into our vocabulary. Whenever we ask firefighters to enter an atmosphere in which they
can be injured or killed, we are asking them to take a calculated risk. Calculated risks must be
based upon a set of guidelines or rules or they become ambiguous or dangerous. That would be
a downside risk.
Risk assessment is a part of the strategic planning process of modern fire agencies. By
identifying a specific risk, mitigation measures can be designed to reduce the risk to the level
that the fire agency can cope with successfully. Risk assessments of scenarios that involve the
use of breathing apparatus are relatively easy to complete. Risk mitigation that addresses the
use of breathing apparatus, therefore, requires that there is an option that allows the job to be
done safely. That involves a philosophical approach that gets more sophisticated over time.
Given the dangerous nature of firefighting, the protocol that allows a person to enter an
atmosphere in which breathing air is compromised requires something more than a few simple
rules. It requires a holistic approach that combines all of the elements that make up a
satisfactory body of knowledge to maximize the chance of survival for firefighters under all
conditions. This is called a doctrine.
In this manual, we identify the need for a comprehensive doctrine to inform the use of SCBA in
immediately dangerous to life and health (IDLH) atmospheres. This doctrine should encompass
the entire range of SCBA program activity. It’s not just about the equipment.
Phenomenon of IDLH
IDLH is defined by two different federal agencies. The US National Institute for Occupational
Safety and Health (NIOSH) defines IDLH as exposure to airborne contaminants that is "likely to
cause death or immediate or delayed permanent adverse health effects or prevent escape from
such an environment.” Examples include smoke or other poisonous gases at high
concentrations. OSHA regulation 1910.134(b) defines the term as "an atmosphere that poses an
immediate threat to life, would cause irreversible adverse health effects, or would impair an
individual's ability to escape from a dangerous atmosphere.”
Both provide a basis for the existence of a fire service program that is designed to assure that
firefighters entering these types of atmospheres are adequately protected. IDLH values are
often used to guide the selection of breathing apparatus technologies that are made available to
workers or firefighters in specific situations.
But what does that really mean? Is just having the right equipment enough? Or is success
equally dependent on the rules that determine when that equipment can be used? The answer
is that the doctrine of IDLH requires that an entire system be in place to assure that a firefighter
will emerge from an IDLH atmosphere in full health. This is the essence of a calculated risk.
The NIOSH definition does not include oxygen deficiency (below 19.5 percent) although an
atmosphere-supplying breathing apparatus is also required when that condition exists.
Examples of this might include high altitudes and unventilated, confined spaces.
The OSHA definition is arguably broad enough to include oxygen-deficient circumstances in the
absence of "airborne contaminants," as well as many other chemical, thermal, or pneumatic
hazards to life or health (e.g., pure helium, super-cooled or super-heated air, hyperbaric or
hypobaric or submerged chambers, etc.). It also uses the broader term "impair" rather than
"prevent" with respect to the ability to escape. For example, blinding but non-toxic smoke could
be considered IDLH under the OSHA definition if it would impair the ability to escape a
dangerous but not life-threatening atmosphere (such as tear gas).
The OSHA definition is part of a legal standard that is the minimum legal requirement to be
followed by users. These users or employers are encouraged to apply proper judgment to avoid
taking unnecessary risks, even if the only immediate hazard is reversible, such as temporary
pain, disorientation, nausea, or non-toxic contamination.
While this manual focuses on the United States, there is clearly evidence at the international
level that SCBA is used for this same purpose in every nation of the world. The difference is
whether or not there are statutory or regulatory requirements that mandate any or all of their
components.
To highlight the importance of this criterion for the fire service one only has to look at the
Standard for Fire Respiratory Protection Training. 1 It reads, “The use of SCBA shall always be
assumed to be in an atmosphere immediately dangerous to life or health (IDLH) because there is
no way to predetermine those hazardous conditions, concentrations of toxic materials, or
percentages of oxygen in air that exist in a fire environment during (salvage) operations or other
immediate emergency conditions involving spills or releases of chemicals or other toxic
materials.”
3. Fire crews properly led and supervised under these emergency conditions;
4. These same fire crews properly supported and operations sustained until the unsafe
conditions no longer exist.
These risk factors are likely to include, but not be limited to, structural fires, confined spaces,
hazardous materials leaks and perhaps even vehicular fires. However, this assessment should
go even further to determine specific sub-categories of simple risk, such as single-family
dwellings, multi-family dwellings, all the way through to special risks such as high-rise buildings,
tunnels, subways, underground vaults, and even mega-structures. The planning for every kind
of scenario that could result in the need to be properly protected by SCBA may significantly
impact training, leadership and support.
The Doctrine Model graphically illustrates the need for all four factors to be present to assure
that an adequate SCBA program exists to protect firefighters under all conditions. For example,
training for entering a single-family dwelling demands certain minimum requirements. But
attacking a fire on the 30th floor of a high-rise may demand different requirements in the
remaining three components beyond just having the right equipment. For example, there may
be different protocols for different types of emergencies, and there may be different logistical
requirements that are created by access and proximity to the problem.
This raises the issue of how often a department should re-evaluate its equipment to determine
its safe use. Today there are several standards that provide guidance in the area of SCBA.
NFPA Standards
The first is NFPA 1852: Standard on Selection, Care and Maintenance of Open-Circuit SCBA
(SCBA), 2013 edition. This standard specifies the minimum requirements for the selection, care,
and maintenance of open-circuit Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus (SCBA) and combination
SCBA/supplied air respirator (SAR) that are used for respiratory protection. The scope of this
document is focused on equipment used during emergency operations in environments where
the atmosphere is IDLH or could become oxygen deficient or IDLH.
Notably, this document states, “This standard shall not specify requirements for other
respiratory protection program components of the organization such as SCBA training,
appropriate use of SCBA for operations, and breathing air quality as these program components
are under the jurisdiction of other NFPA standards."
The second is Standard 1981 on Open-Circuit Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus (SCBA) for
Emergency Services, 2013 Edition. This standard specifies the minimum requirements for the
design, performance, testing and certification of new compressed breathing air open-circuit
SCBA and compressed breathing air combination open-circuit SCBA and supplied air respirators
(SCBA/SARs). It also addresses the requirements for the replacement parts, components and
accessories for these respirators. A very significant statement that is made in the scoping of this
document is as follows: “It shall be the responsibility of the persons and organizations that use
compliant SCBA and combination SCBA/SARs to establish safety and health practices and to
determine the applicability of regulatory limitations prior to use.” The document goes on to say,
”This standard shall not be construed as addressing all of the safety concerns, if any, associated
with the use of this standard by testing facilities. It shall be the responsibility of the persons and
organizations that use this standard to conduct testing of SCBA and combination SCBA/SARs to
establish safety and health practices and to determine the applicability of regulatory limitations
prior to using this standard for any designing, manufacturing, and testing.”
The next is standard 1404, 2013 Edition. This standard sets the training requirements for
firefighters who are wearing any type of SCBA.
The last example is NFPA 1989, 2013 Edition: Breathing Air Quality for Emergency Services
Respiratory Protection. This standard specifies the requirements for the breathing air quality
component of the respiratory protection program required by NFPA 1500, 2013 Edition: Fire
Department Occupational Safety and Health Program. The critical guidance provided helps
The overall impact of these standards on the real world is that at any point in time existing SCBA
may or may not be in compliance with the current standard. It is your responsibility to know
how non-compliance can impact operations on the fire ground.
Another standard that applies to this area is NFPA 1500, 2013 Edition. This standard recognizes
that SCBA practices cannot be taken for granted. It addresses the need for assuring that
equipment is inspected frequently and asserts that a fire agency has an obligation to conduct a
“risk assessment process that shall incorporate standard operating procedures to identify those
situations in 7.14.6 2.” In this case, the standard refers to having proper procedures to protect
firefighters when refilling cylinders under emergency conditions.
While older models of PASS devices required manual arming by firefighters prior to entering a
dangerous environment, the current application integrates the PASS device into the SCBA worn
by firefighters. The device automatically arms when the SCBA air supply is engaged or when the
SCBA is removed from its mounting bracket. These types of devices are powered by batteries,
are easily activated while wearing gloves, and are safe to operate in flammable or explosive
atmospheres.
When activated according to OSHA standards, which apply in the United States, the PASS device
emits a high-pitched audible alert of at least 95 decibels. On a fire ground, the sound of an
However, these design features have not erased the basic issue of firefighter safety and
accountability. This technology has not prevented events from injuring and killing firefighters.
That is why a truly comprehensive system requires several more components to create a safe
work environment.
Even at the smallest department level, there are several good training programs available for
firefighters. NFPA standards include minimum performance requirements at the entry level. 4
As an individual proceeds through his or her career and becomes a company officer and/or chief
officer, the wearing of a breathing apparatus under emergency conditions does not go away.
Yet most training programs are aimed almost entirely at entry-level firefighters. A truly
comprehensive program should incorporate every single person that may wear an SCBA under
any emergency condition. That could even apply to the fire chief. The best way to evaluate the
comprehensiveness of a department's training program is by examining rookie training. But a
comprehensive program should also include annual recurring training for all members of the
department. Fire officers need to know that to place their firefighters into a hazardous situation
without adequate training can result in violation of federal statutes.
One of the best examples of the holistic training approach is on the Firefighter’s Close Call
website; http://www.firefighterclosecalls.com. Their suggested drills provide an excellent
supplement to this manual. These drills are simple and can be used repeatedly over regular
intervals to maintain skill sets.
We’ve learned through experience that firefighting is a dangerous occupation. Aside from the
many hazards on the fireground, recent data indicates a high incidence of cancer among
4 NFPA 1404 Standard for Fire Service Respiratory Protection Training, 2013 Edition
The European Fire Service has gone so far as to create a sub-category of firefighter close calls
associated only with breathing apparatus scenarios. The site is provided by a German fire
organization. For more information, visit their website at http://www.atemschutzunfaelle.eu
The mission of the Fire Smoke Coalition is to focus attention and resources on the deadly and
life-long consequences of breathing fire smoke by teaching firefighters and first responders how
to prevent, protect, detect, diagnose and treat exposure to fire smoke.
A secondary source of excellent training material is available in the NIOSH reports, which detail
incidents in which firefighters have died wearing breathing apparatus. There are numerous case
studies that identify the strengths and weaknesses of SCBA training and education. For more
information, visit the NIOSH website at http://www.cdc.gov/niosh. Many of these documents
are referenced in the Bibliography.
5 SCBA Use and Medical Requirements, OSHA Respiratory Protection Regulations, n.d.
Contemporary textbooks on the subject of high-rise firefighting always emphasize the role of
command and control structure to assure a high level of firefighter safety during an event. Most
experts in this are well aware of the limitations created by the need to keep air supply flowing.
"One of the biggest factors that limit firefighting and rescue in a complex structure is having
enough replacement air cylinders at the staging area. The firefighter air replenishment system
eliminates that factor and allows them to operate much more effectively during fire suppression
and rescue." 6
6Glenn Corbett, Associate Professor of Fire Science, John Jay College of Criminal Justice, New York.
7Gagliano, Phillips, Jose, Bernocco, “Air Management for the Fire Service,” Fire Engineering, Pennwell
Publisher, 2008, Tulsa Oklahoma
Source: Williams-Bell, F.M., et al., "Air management and physiological responses during
simulated firefighting tasks in a high-rise structure," Applied Ergonomics (2009). Full report:
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/19683700
Record keeping and maintenance are just as important as any other element. For example, Fire
Chief John Buckman recently questioned whether or not fire departments were doing enough
maintenance at the fire station level. In his Sound Off article “Face Pieces Need Far Greater
Scrutiny,” Chief Buckman described an eight point checklist that should be exercised right down
at the fire station level on a frequent basis. 8
These methods can place huge demand on a fire department. Here is a quote from a report on
a major Los Angeles fire that graphically illustrates this point.
“A total of 383 Los Angeles City Fire Department members from 64 companies – nearly
one half of the on-duty force of the entire city – were involved in fighting the fire,
mounting an offensive attack via four stairways. This operation involved many unusual
challenges, but is most notable for the sheer magnitude of the fire and the fact that the
fire was successfully controlled by interior suppression efforts. To cover areas of the city
protected by units called to the fire, 20 companies from Los Angeles County and four
companies from surrounding jurisdictions were brought in under mutual aid
agreements.” 9
Firefighter Down
Lastly, the system has to be able to respond to what happens when a firefighter does go down
during an event. The increase in the use of RIC/RIT methods have improved upon the fire-
ground response when a firefighter is down. The use of a “mayday” signal is now in place in
many organizations. The doctrine of SCBA includes the idea that having to invoke these safety
protocols must be planned for as part of the staffing issues to address during any specific event.
8
Buckman, John, Face Pieces Need Far Great Scrutiny, Fire Chief Magazine, December, 2011
9Interstate Bank Building Fire, Los Angeles California, May 4, 1988, Technical Report Series, United
States Fire Administration.
Built-in Methods
The use of modern technology has provided an opportunity to sustain operations in some
structures through a standpipe for air. This is a system that supplies breathing air throughout a
building or confined space in the same fashion that water flow is now provided by a system of
pipes. The firefighter air replenishment system uses stainless steel tubing that is installed
throughout the structure. The end result is the ability to continuously provide a safe and
reliable source of air until conditions have been restored to normal.
All of this adds up to the fact that SCBA is not just a piece of equipment. It is an entire doctrine
of beliefs and protocols that needs to be reviewed and updated often and critically. On the next
page is list of questions that your agency should be asking itself to determine its level of belief in
the concept.
10
Morris, Chief Garry, Rules of Engagement for Firefighter Survival, IAFC Newsletter, January 2012.
1. Has your fire agency adopted all of the following NFPA Standards?
Check all that apply.
___ 1404
___ 1500
___ 1852
___ 1981
___ 1989
3. Are they all made by the same manufacturer? Yes ___ No ___
5. How many SCBA bottles does your department have in high-rise equipment rooms?
___Provide the number
6. Does the department have a maintenance program for those bottles kept by third
parties?
Yes ___ No ___
7. Does the department have written specifications on file for each SCBA that has been
purchased?
Yes___ No ___
8. Does that form identify the date of purchase? Yes ___ No___
9. Does the department have an equipment inventory and maintenance record for each
SCBA?
Yes ___ No___
10. Is one person in the agency designated as the department’s liaison on matters relating
to SCBAs?
Yes ___ No ___
If yes, provide name:
12. Does the department adopt minimum training requirements for all ranks that may be
required to enter an IDLH as part of their duties?
Yes ___ No ___
13. Has the department adopted an annual physical check up to assure all firefighters
conform to minimum health and physical requirements to wear SCBAs?
Yes ___ No ___
14. Has the department adopted a physical training exercise or fitness program to assure
physical capabilities when wearing SCBA? Yes ___ No ___
15. Has the department adopted a RIC/RIT process for entry into an IDLH atmosphere?
Yes ___ No ___
16. Has the department adopted accountability processes and procedures at all levels of fire
ground command?
Yes ___ No___
17. Does the fire training division utilize lessons learned from NIOSH and other response
systems in order to reduce errors or omissions?
Yes ___ No___
18. Does the training division participate in the Firefighter Close Calls program to identify
potential flaws in policy, process or procedure?
Yes ___ No___
19. Does the Fire Department utilize the Fire Smoke Coalition information in its training
Program?
Yes ___ No___
20. Has the department adopted an “All Out” policy and procedure to evacuate unsafe
conditions?
Yes ___ No___
23. Has the department adopted any form of “10 minute” rule for status checking of
companies engaged in interior fire suppression operations?
24. Has the department developed an adequate means of firefighter air replenishment so
that interior operations can be sustained until control is achieved?
25. Do these policies and procedures involve the need for mutual aid or outside resources
to be deployed? Yes ___ No___
26. Are the department’s resources subject to the same planning considerations in all of the
previous questions? Yes ___ No___
27. Does the fire department have an adopted policy, practice or procedure to evaluate or
critique all operations that require deployment of SCBAs and the activation of RIC/RIT
on any incident?
28. Does the fire department have an adopted policy, practices or procedure that requires
active pre-fire planning to be conducted on major risks that could require deep
penetration of fire crews wearing SCBA?
30. Does the fire department have a separate line item for the SCBA program?
31. Are technicians who work on repair and maintenance adequately trained and certified
by the manufacturer of the equipment?
33. Does the department have on file a current copy of NFPA 1981?
34. Does the Department have on file a current copy of NFPA 1989?
35. Does the department utilize any form of command exercise that deals with any of the
following scenarios? Check all that apply.
__ Buddy breathing
__ Actuality of RIC/RIT
__ Confined space
__ Disentanglement
36. Overall, how would you rate the proficiency of members of the department on wearing
SCBA under stressful emergency conditions?
37. Overall, how would you rate your department’s performance with the comprehensive
use of SCBA doctrine?
Leaders in the fire service have accepted the idea that every firefighter has the right to expect to
go home at the end of his or her tour of duty. As Fire Chief Jeff Meston of the Novato Fire
Protection District once stated,
"Every firefighter deserves a round trip, and to that end we must constantly remind ourselves
that the life of a firefighter is far more valuable than any forest or structure they may be asked
to protect.” (Meston, 2003)
If the leader of every organization assures that the first four rights are protected, the fifth one
will occur naturally.
The next chapter is on risk assessment. We know that fires will occur in the complex risks
described in the next chapter of this text. The purpose of doing risk assessment is to achieve
risk mitigation.
It makes sense to develop a plan for the eventuality of fires in complex risks now. That includes
the installation of a system that will assist the fire ground commander in overcoming the
logistical problem of supplying the large amount of air that is required to sustain operations in
these structures.
Beginning in the early 1900s, a new phenomenon started to emerge. At its incipiency it was
called a “skyscraper.” The image of buildings that went up into the clouds mesmerized society
and gave a whole new meaning to moving up.
In the book Skyscraper, Masterpieces of Architecture, 11 author Charles Sheppard described the
skyscraper as being the “modern world version of the equivalent of the pyramids and other
miracles of the past.” Many buildings that fell into the definition of skyscraper in those days
included the Sears Tower, the Empire State Building, and many others that went up as high as
100 stories.
Fire protection was not always an initial consideration in the design of these buildings. Granted,
stairwells were created so people could escape from them, and there was at least an initial
effort to put in standpipes so the water supply could be accessed at high levels, but these
skyscrapers eliminated the use of aerial apparatus because everything that was going to be
conducted in that building needed to be conducted on the interior.
While fire departments continue to insist that aerial apparatus are required for high-rise
buildings, the reality is that emergency personnel are no longer deployed there for the purpose
of rescuing people. They primarily are being deployed there so that there is adequate logistical
11 Sheppard, Charles, Skyscrapers, Master of Architects, Todtri Book Publishing, Sept, 1998
The modern skyscraper that has emerged since the mid-1980s and past the turn of this century
is not just tall; it is huge on the inside. Many of today's high-rise buildings contain more people
in a working environment than are found in many of our smaller towns and cities.
According to John R. Hall in 2005-2009, there was an average of 15,700 reported structure fires
in high-rise buildings per year. There were 53 civilian deaths, 546 civilian injuries, and 235
million dollars in direct property loss. 12
The Twin Towers at the World Trade Center were two classic examples of this type of building.
Prior to their destruction in the terrorist attack of September 11, 2001, these towers had among
the highest density of any occupation risk in New York City.
The same can be said about many other modern skyscrapers being built around the world.
There is seemingly a competition to see who can build the tallest and most exotic high-rise
building. Buildings are getting bigger and taller.
Horizontal High-Rises
Buildings are not just going higher and higher. They are going deeper and deeper and longer
and longer. There is a trend towards underground buildings that cover extremely large areas.
There are now sophisticated tunnels, subways and underground structures that link up many
buildings in metropolitan areas. Major tunnel structures occupy hundreds of miles of structural
protection needs that are hundreds of feet underground.
A fire in one such structure occurred in Los Angeles in July of 1990. A force of 150 firefighters
was required to cope with the blaze that burned out a subway tunnel beneath the Hollywood
Freeway. The fire added millions of dollars to the $1.5 billion cost of the first phase of the
subway project. Alleging a loss of $100,000 a day in interest alone, the project was heavily
impacted by the fire. 13 The Chicago Transit Authority was impacted by a similar blaze. The fire
endangered more than 1,000 people who were on subway vehicles that day. 14
I. J. Duckworth, writing for the 12th U.S./North American Mine Ventilation Symposium stated,
“Fires within tunnels and other underground structures represent an immediate and extreme
danger to life of the patrons using the facility.” He further noted, “It is the responsibility of the
operator to ensure that the safety systems and procedures are adequate to cope with the case
of a major fire.” 15
12 Hall, John R, Jr., High-Rise Building Fires, National Fire Protection Association, December 2011
13 Malnic, Eric, Fire under Freeway Subway Tunnel caves in, Jams Downtown Traffic. Highway 101
could be shut for weeks, LA Times, July 13, 1990
14 CTA Tunnel back up and running after derailment and fire, The Daily Journal, July 12, 2006
15 Duckworth, I. J. Fires in Vehicular tunnels, 12th U.S. North American Mine Ventilation Symposium
This attitude began to change after the 1988 First Interstate Bank Building fire in downtown Los
Angeles. Chief Fire Officer Don Anthony, the Incident Commander of that fire, was faced with
the monumental task of fighting the fire and simultaneously providing for the safety and
security of the firefighters. It resulted in one of the largest mobilizations of firefighters for a
single building fire in the history of the United States. It also resulted in the creation and
adoption of a much broader and more specific strategy and set of tactics.
The development of the strategy and tactics to cope with these vertical cities was an obvious
outcome given the lack of built-in fire protection devices. While the Interstate Bank Building
was equipped with a complete sprinkler system, the sprinkler system was out of service when
the fire occurred. The advantages of sprinklers were wasted. Given that the sprinklers were
non-functional, the firefighters had to give up the fire floor, initiate their attack and be sustained
in that attack for a lengthy period of time. This resulted in huge commitments to such things as
stairwell support and breathing apparatus replenishment.
As a result of a shift in strategy and tactics and the recognition of the logistical impact of fire
protection, the fire service started thinking in terms of changing the approach. Among the new
ideas was the concept of replacing some of the elevator shafts throughout high-rise buildings so
that the equipment wouldn’t have to be carried from the ground floor to height. But that was
found to be very expensive and reduced rentable floor space. Another version of this idea was
to build a room near the standpipe in which equipment would be stored. But this too had
complications and cost consequences.
This led to another concept: a standpipe for air, which was similar to the water standpipe. A
water standpipe allows water at ground level to be pumped into a vertical pipe, which can then
be accessed by firefighters on the fire floor. This new concept borrowed from the water
standpipe concept to create a piping system for air. The purpose was to ensure that when
firefighters were on the fire floor, they had an adequate re-supply of the air they would need to
be able to remain in that dangerous atmosphere with a minimum of time lost when air tanks run
out.
Another issue emerged at the same time of this discussion: the issue of firefighter safety
became a key point in the discussions of both technology and tactics as part of risk assessment.
b) Proportion
Again, a tall building is not just about height but also about proportion. Many buildings
are not particularly high, but are slender enough to give the appearance of a tall
building, especially against low urban backgrounds. Conversely, there are numerous
big/large footprint buildings, which are quite tall, but their size/floor area rules them
out as being classed as a tall building.
Number of floors is not always an accurate measure for defining a tall building due to the
changing floor-to-floor height between differing buildings and functions (e.g., office versus
residential usage). But a building of 14 or more stories (or over 50 meters/165 feet in height)
could be used as a threshold for consideration as “tall building."
3. Height to Tip
Height is measured from the level of the lowest, significant, open-air, pedestrian
entrance to the highest point of the building, irrespective of material or function of the
highest element (i.e. including antennae, flagpoles, signage and other functional-
technical equipment).
Floor Number
The number of floors should include the ground floor level and be the number of main floors
above ground, including any significant mezzanine floors and major mechanical plant floors.
Mechanical mezzanines should not be included if they have a significantly smaller floor area
than the major floors below (e.g., the levels 4, 14, 24 etc. in Hong Kong).
Height Calculator
The CTBUH has developed a tall building height calculator to estimate the height of tall buildings
when only the number of floors is known.
Building Usage
What is the difference between a tall building and a telecommunications/observation tower?
A tall building can be classed as such (as opposed to telecommunications/observation tower)
and is eligible for the “tallest” lists if at least 50% of its height is occupied by usable floor area.
A mixed-use tall building contains two or more functions (or uses), where each of the functions
occupies a significant proportion of the tower’s total space. Support areas such as car parks and
mechanical plant space do not constitute mixed-use functions. Functions are denoted on
CTBUH “Tallest” lists in descending order, e.g., “hotel/office” indicates hotel function above
office function.
Structural Material
A steel tall building is defined as one where the main vertical and lateral structural elements and
floor systems are constructed from steel.
A concrete tall building is defined as one where the main vertical and lateral structural elements
and floor systems are constructed from concrete.
A composite tall building utilizes a combination of both steel and concrete acting compositely in
the main frame.
A mixed structure tall building is any building that utilizes distinct steel or concrete systems
above or below each other. There are two main types of mixed structural systems: a
steel/concrete tall building has a steel structural system located above a concrete structural
system, with the opposite true of a concrete/steel building.
Underground Buildings
Buildings are not just going higher in the sky. They are also going deeper underground. Building
underground provides architects and engineers with a unique set of challenges and obstacles.
Nevertheless, there is an array of different types of underground buildings being built, ranging
from power stations to complex business and industrial structures, many of which are among
the most spectacular architectural designs in the world. These buildings can cause some
significant challenges for firefighting operations unless local fire departments act to proactively
mitigate risk.
The following is a list of tunnel construction projects that have been completed in the recent
past. An event could occur in any of these facilities in the future.
• The Laerdal Tunnel in Norway is the world’s largest road tunnel. Its length is 24.4 km.
• The St. Gotthard Tunnel in Switzerland is about 10.5 miles long. The road track of the
tunnel was completed in 1980.
• The Zhongnanshan Tunnel is the longest two-tube tunnel in the world. It is also the
second longest road tunnel in the world. It opened on January 20, 2007. The cost to
build this tunnel was $410 million. The maximum embedded depth of the tunnel is 1,640
meters.
• The Arlberg Road Tunnel, with a length of 13,976 meters, is Austria’s longest road tunnel.
It was built in 1978. The tunnel is designed to accommodate 1,800 vehicles per hour.
• The Hsuehshan ("Snow Mountain") tunnel is the longest tunnel in Taiwan, located on the
Taipei – Yilan Freeway. A dedicated radio station broadcasts on two FM channels inside
the tunnel.
• The Frejus Road Tunnel, connecting France and Italy, is 8 miles long. It was opened for
traffic in 1980. It is one of the major Trans-Alpine transport routes.
• The Mont Blanc is a road tunnel in the Alps under the Mont Blanc Mountain, France/Italy.
It was completed in 1965. The Mont Blanc Tunnel is 7.25 miles long.
• At 11,428 meters in length, the Gudvangen Tunnel is Norway’s second longest road
tunnel. It was opened on December 1991.
• The Folgefonn Tunnel is 11 kilometers long. It is Norway’s third longest highway tunnel.
A journey that once took 4 hours now takes 10 minutes.
• The Kanetsu tunnel is about 11,010 meters long and is the longest road tunnel in Japan.
One of the distinctly different elements of shipboard firefighting is that ventilation is next to
impossible. These ships are compartmentalized to prevent sinking, and therefore are difficult to
provide vertical ventilation. The specific tactics that should be employed in shipboard
firefighting are found in NFPA 1405 (current edition), Guide for Land Based Firefighters Who
Respond to Marine Vessel Fires. This document provides guidance to train firefighters for
shipboard fires.
Experience has taught us that firefighters entering a ship to combat a fire often run out of air
before ever reaching the fire. Therefore, SCBA Management Practices are extremely important
to firefighter safety.
We have buildings that are classified as high-rise according to the building codes.
We have buildings that are not high-rise, but have very large floor areas and limited
access for firefighting purposes.
We have underground structures that present operational problems for access and
logistical support for firefighting operations.
Today’s fire service is being asked to do more with less. The firefighter air replenishment
system aids fire ground operations by increasing firefighter safety and effectiveness at a time
when adding staff and equipment is not a budgetary reality. Installing FARS can save lives, save
time and save money. Adopting the technology is a sound policy decision and will contribute
significantly to the level of service being provided in the community.
Contemporary safety practices have also been evolving. While firefighters have been wearing
breathing apparatus for almost 100 years there have been guidelines regarding when they
should be used to provide maximum safety. The mandatory wearing of adequate SCBA
equipment when operating in the presence of an IDLH is an absolute necessity for firefighter
safety today.
There are several NFPA Standards that establish the minimum respiratory protection and
functional requirements for SCBA used by emergency services personnel. The standard applies
to SCBA used during firefighting, rescue, contact with hazardous materials, terrorist incidents,
and similar operations where responders may encounter:
• Confined spaces
• Atmospheres that are unknown
• Atmospheres that are or could become IDLH
• Atmospheres that are or could become oxygen deficient
There are many innovations and changes that are coming to the world of SCBA that include, but
are not limited to:
• A new requirement that mandates that all SCBA for emergency services personnel
also be certified by NIOSH as CBRN (chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear)
SCBA
• A new requirement for enhanced voice communications
Not unlike a military operation in which combat troops are backed up by literally hundreds of
people behind the front lines, firefighters who are on the end of a nozzle are highly dependent
upon the logistical support that allows them to stay there safely. One of the most pressing
questions about fighting fires in complex environments is: how many people does it take to
support one firefighter who is attempting to control a fire?
When a firefighter enters the building wearing a breathing apparatus there is a finite amount of
time that will expire before he or she will need to have that cylinder replaced. Regardless of the
duration of the air supply in the cylinder itself, replacement will be a necessity at some point.
As one highly respected fire chief observed, for every 7 floors it requires a team of 4 firefighters
to support each 4-person team fighting the fire. The ratio gets worse as the building gets
taller—at the 14th floor, 8 firemen are required and by the 21st floor, 12 firemen are required
to support that one 4-person firefighting team.
The members of the support team are not fighting the fire but acting as "mules" (a name
firefighters apply to this unenviable role), carrying full SCBA cylinders up stairs and empty ones
back down so that the firefighters fighting the fire have constant access to breathable air. The
result is a higher risk to firefighter safety and an enormous waste of highly skilled professionals
with a reduced capacity to extinguish the fire.
There are other scenarios that present many of the same logistical
problems as high-rise fires. For example, a fire in a subway or
tunnel, or even a large shopping mall, is like a fire in a high-rise,
but on its side. The same thing might be said of fighting fires on
board ships like military vessels or cruise ships.
Most fire agencies have adopted the new high-pressure bottles that operate at 4500 psi. But not
all bottles on the fire-ground are operated at that same pressure. Mutual Aid companies may
18Williams-Bell, F.M., et al., “Air Management and Physiological Responses during Simulated Firefighting
Tasks in A High-Rise Structure,” Applied Ergonomics (2009), doi:10.1016 / j.apergo.2009.07.009
19 Gagliano, Mike, Phillips, Casey, Jose, Phillip Bernocco, Steve, Air Management for the Fire Service,
Pennwell Publishers, March 2008, ISBN: 978-1-59370-129-1. Approximately 520 pages.
The most current research on this topic clearly indicates that firefighters climbing stairs and
engaging in firefighting activities consume available air rapidly. In fact, it is not uncommon for a
firefighter to only receive 8 to 12 minutes of air on a 30-minute cylinder. What's more, the rate
of air consumption is such that a low air alarm in a 30-minute bottle can be activated in as little
as 9 minutes. “Thus, high-rise tasks performed at work rates self-selected by professional
firefighters as typical of their normal activities clearly demonstrate the need for aggressive air
management strategies to ensure the health and safety of all firefighters.” 20 This introduces an
interesting logistical problem. In order to keep firefighters supplied with adequate air, the
incident commander must have an aggressive plan for cylinder replacement. In simple fire
scenarios this may not be significant, but in complex fire scenarios it can require more resources
to merely keep the air supply constant than to handle the rest of the firefighting.
A large percentage of emergency personnel at an incident will be used for logistical support,
specifically to fill and transport air cylinders to and from the staging area thus using highly
trained firefighters to pack air bottles, instead of assisting with fire attack, search and rescue,
medical care and other critical logistical needs.
In the Williams-Bell article cited earlier, the authors developed their rationale based upon a 45-
story fire in the LaSalle Bank Building on December 6, 2004. In that event, firefighters had to
climb up 14 floors while breathing from their SCBAs. Smoke inhalation due to exhausting the air
supply was responsible for many of the 23 injuries that occurred in that fire.
20 Williams-Bell, F.M., et al., “Air Management and Physiological Responses during Simulated
Firefighting Tasks in A High-Rise Structure,” Applied Ergonomics (2009), doi:10.1016 /
j.apergo.2009.07.009
The Office of the Deputy Prime Minister in the UK recently released a report on this topic,
entitled Operational Physiological Capabilities of Firefighters: Literature Review and Research
Recommendations. 22 The report states that, “Central to all these objectives is the need to know
how long work can be sustained under a variety of operational conditions before performance
deteriorates significantly. Performance encompasses physical performance such as loss of
strength, slowing of movement and loss of manual dexterity, but also impairs decision–making
and risk assessment. In addition, consideration must be given to the possibility that the physical
and environmental demands may present a risk to the health and safety of operational staff.”
The report goes on to note that most all of the research on SCBA activity is based on work
performed in the 1950s and is dire need of updating. It suggests that the top priority of all
research in this area is to better quantify what we can expect from our firefighters operating
under these conditions. Interestingly, the task that was considered to be the most physically
demanding in one of the surveys was the task of carrying equipment upstairs in a high-rise
building. 23
Clearly, the report points to the air management problem facing the fire service and suggest
that innovative solutions are necessary to assure that firefighters are given the tools to do their
jobs under difficult conditions.
Problem Statement:
Whenever fires occur in high-rise buildings (or complex mega structures), it is important to have
air management strategies in place for firefighter safety and health and to simultaneously
minimize the number of firefighters required to maintain logistical support of breathing air
supply. If these systems are not present they can extend the time it takes to control the event
and increase losses in life and property.
Solution:
Provide firefighters with quick access to readily available air replenishment inside complex
structures via a firefighter air replenishment system (FARS).
21 Klem, Thomas J., Director, Fire Investigation Division, Fire Investigation Report, First Interstate
Bank Building Fire, Los Angeles California, May 4, 1988, National Fire Protection Association
22 Operational Physiological Capabilities of Firefighters: Literature Review and Research
The Result?
Precious minutes are saved that may make a difference between life and death of firefighters
and building occupants, and between financial ruin and survival for occupants, property owners
and the insurance companies.
The Design
The system is designed to be modular. It can be constructed to incorporate a fire department’s
air supply truck, or it may be designed with air storage cylinders within the building, and each
can be augmented with a breathing air compressor in the building to assure long-term
continuity of supply.
The FARS can meet any fire department’s operational needs. Each system delivers a safe and
reliable source of breathing air, in accordance with the following key components.
1. Exterior Mobile Air Connection (EMAC) - mounted on the exterior of the building or in a
remote lockable monument, the panel provides the mobile air truck operator with
access to the building-installed piping distribution system and immediate LED and Digital
Visual Display for air quality. This unit also provides the ability to remotely bypass the
air storage system.
3. Air fill panels or air fill stations – Permanently installed at strategic locations
throughout the structure, they are located within fire-rated rooms, closets or stairwells.
The panels and stations provide firefighters with the ability to quickly refill empty SCBA
cylinders with a safe and reliable source of breathing air within close proximity of the
incident. There are two types of fill stations. One version is called an emergency rapid
fill panel. The other is called a rupture containment fill station.
4. Air storage system – This system provides a series of air cylinders, booster pump and
other components permanently installed within a structure, which provides firefighters
with a safe and reliable source of on-site breathing air prior to the arrival of the mobile
air truck.
5. Air monitoring aystem – The air monitoring system assures continual and reliable
monitoring of the air quality within every component of the firefighter air
replenishment system. This system provides the arriving fire companies with an instant
ability to monitor the quality of the air within the system.
At the Fire
Firefighters who have entered the building to approach the fire now have access to fill stations.
These fill stations are staged throughout the building. Depending on local preference, the
number of floors between fill stations varies. Remember: there are two versions of the
interface where firefighters can fill their bottles. One version is called an emergency rapid fill
panel. The other is called a rupture containment fill station.
Figure 12 illustrates an emergency rapid fill panel, which provides for the direct refilling of the
firefighter’s breathing air cylinders by means of discharge outlets with RIC/UAC type connectors.
This system is designed to provide emergency air supply. This option is often chosen by fire
agencies that treat the fire building as an IDLH environment and want this capability. When this
option is chosen by an AHJ, it is recommended that the fire department provide written policy
on when and where this option is to be utilized.
The NFPA Standard states that if a fire department utilizes the RIC/UAC fitting under field
conditions, the department should have a standard operating procedure for its utilization. It is
recommended that fire departments adopt the following policy statement:
“The top priority for this fire department is to prevent accidental exposure to firefighters
on products of combustion when fighting fires in which an IDLH occurs. For purposes of
definition of the conditions under which firefighters might be required to wear breathing
apparatus emphasis such be placed under those conditions in which products of
combustion exist within a confined space in which firefighters are required to take
action. For purposes of this discussion, we can define this as the 'hot zone.' The hot zone
is any area in which an incident command system has been established for the purpose
of conducting an attack and extinguishing a fire within a confined space. Firefighters are
authorized to utilize RIC/UAC fittings to replenish their breathing apparatus when they
reach undesirable levels of supply. These levels of supply are established in accordance
with the rules of air management.”
High-Pressure Tubing
Permanently installed stainless steel tubing is used to carry the compressed breathing air
throughout a structure. The air travels through the tubing distribution system to the fill panel or
fill station. This allows firefighters to safely and reliably refill their empty bottles at a panel or
station that is closest to the fire floor. The tubing in this system is kept under constant pressure
to ensure the immediate availability of air to firefighters and to prevent the potential for
contamination. The tubing ranges in size from 3/8” to 1/2” in diameter.
Isolation Valves
The FARS system is equipped with isolation valves so
that specific areas can be isolated if there is building
damage. A system isolation valve should be installed
downstream of each air fill station. The isolation valve
should be capable of being operated manually at the
Air Fill Station and remotely from the fire command
center.
The on-site storage system is permanently installed within the structure, usually at the ground
or basement level, within a lockable fire-rated room or closet. The on-site storage system
components deliver breathing air to the interior fill panels or fill stations through the
interconnected tubing system. Depending on the fire department’s requirements, this
component can cost-effectively provide anywhere between 50 and 250 SCBA refills without
mobile air support, with a set of 2 cylinders refilling in three minutes or less. A breathing air
compressor may be installed in conjunction with the air storage system to supplement extended
operations.
These systems provide first-arriving companies with an immediate and sustainable supply of air
that may be required for longer-duration incidents.
There are three quality control measurements that are essential for firefighter safety when
using the air within the system: pressure, carbon monoxide and moisture. Air analyzers sample
the air throughout the entire system to record precise information about the pressure, CO levels
and moisture content on a 24/7/365-day basis. The system can be monitored off-site via web-
based technology that displays printouts of the testing cycle to create third-party assurance of
air quality from a remote location.
Compressors
If the firefighter breathing air replenishment system installed in your jurisdiction does not
include an air storage system, this section is not applicable.
For safety purposes, all systems have a basic requirement of a few cylinders to be installed on
the system to keep it pressurized. The standard design for this includes two cylinders that
supply the system, both of which are open at all times. During periodic testing and the drawing
of air samples, it is possible for the pressure in the system to degrade. These two cylinders
would not offer a sufficient amount of refills for firefighters during an actual incident. They do
serve the purpose of keeping the system topped off.
High-pressure air systems do not leak when properly designed. However, when the system is
accessed periodically to conduct tests of air quality, small volumes of air are used to supply the
instruments. Depending upon how many test cycles are employed, over time the pressure in a
This is accomplished with the use of a high pressure air pump and a small compressor. Here is
how these two devices work to keep a reliable and consistent pressure in the system:
A high-pressure (mil-spec) pump is attached to the pressure side of the system. A switch is
provided that regulates a low-pressure setting and activates a low-pressure commercial grade
compressor. That compressor provides air to the high-pressure, low volume pump. It begins to
operate to restore the pressure.
The take-up air is filtered and subject to the same quality control issue as the air in the system.
The commercial grade compressor air does not mix with the take-up air. They are kept totally
isolated from each other.
Under emergency conditions, if the storage system is accessed and the MAU is connected to the
system, these compressors do not play a role. If the system is being accessed without an MAU
present, then they would begin to operate when the system pressure falls below the minimum.
Fire personnel are not required to perform any specific tasks to keep the compressor involved.
The entire function is automatic.
In the event that fire department specifications for their firefighting air systems includes the
requirement to have electrical supply available at filling stations, the installation must meet the
requirements of National Electrical Manufacturers Association (NEMA).
If the building Knox Box is more than 50 feet away from the EMAC, a separate lock box should
be provided at that specific location.
Generally, emergency rapid fill panels should be contained within the stairwell enclosure as
opposed to within the occupied space of the building. This is an area of refuge for firefighters
who are emerging from fire ground conditions. There is still a possibility of an IDLH in a stairwell
in spite of the location of the fire. There is documented proof that hot smoke results in a
distribution and mushrooming effect in stairwells, but that cold smoke also exhibits the
characteristics of transmitting toxic substances. Therefore, if the department opts to use
emergency refill stations, they should be contained within the two-hour enclosure of the
stairwell.
The spacing between floors is at the discretion of the local AHJ. It is dependent on the
operational procedures of the department, including the staff available to execute firefighting
operations during fires and other emergencies in occupancies of this type. The standard
practice has been to vary that spacing between 3-5 floors. The fire prevention bureau should
involve itself in discussions with the department's operations members to make this
determination in order to establish consistency between the requirement and actual use during
emergency operations.
The concept of the mobile air unit varies in different organizations of settings. Many fire
departments have converted utility vehicles for the purpose of bringing breathing apparatus
bottles to the scene of an emergency. Others have created customized firefighting apparatus
that not only bring bottles to the scene but also have an onboard compressor to continue the
replenishment process. Some departments have designed breathing apparatus trailers that are
used as an ancillary support vehicle. Regardless of what choice the local community makes, one
of the first determining factors in designing a FARS is the capabilities and reliability of the mobile
air unit.
A few major factors need to be analyzed before utilizing MAU equipment to support a FARS
system. The first is the type of air and vessels being carried on the vehicle. If the vehicle only
carries breathing apparatus bottles that can be exchanged, then it does not meet the minimum
requirements of a unit that would be required to support an in-building system. While there
may be some MAUs equipped with extremely large cascade systems, typically the number one
criterion for a vehicle to support these systems is that it be equipped with an on-board
compressor.
A second factor for evaluation is the MAU's capacity for refilling bottles. The fill stations have
specific requirements for both pressure and volume. That same pressure of volume must be
available in the MAU if it is going to be used as a sole source of ongoing supply.
Since those systems that are designed with an air storage system in place, this information is
easily calculated in advance. However, unless it is calculated for the MAU, the system will not
perform to its optimum capability.
A third factor for consideration is the development of a standard SOP for each organization that
has systems in place to assure that when the MAU arrives at the scene, it performs all of the
The EMAC is a lot like an exterior FDC for a standpipe or a sprinkler system. The fire service has
a lot of experience with positioning the FDCs so that the apparatus operator will be able to
quickly locate the water supply outlet. During the plan checking process, hydrant location and
FDCs are usually evaluated and identified so that the system can be supplied quickly and safely.
This same process should be applied to the EMAC.
The local AHJ has options for the location of the EMAC. Options include placing it on the
exterior of the building, making it part of a wall or some other external barrier or placing it in a
monument that is more remote from the building. The EMAC should be placed in a location
where the mobile air unit will have unobstructed access and the ability to provide breathing air
without having to roll out an extended hose lay. While many MAUs carry up to 300 feet of high-
pressure line, it is not optimal to have the MAU too far away from the connection. Nor should
the MAU be placed close to the building. It is very common to have broken glass and other
debris showering down from a high-rise during an emergency, compromising the functionality of
the MAU. In addition, products of combustion can also render certain locations inhospitable to
the MAU operator.
Clearly, the plan review process should include examining numerous factors affecting vehicle
placement. Additional factors may include assessing area wind patterns and identifying an
upwind location. The EMAC should not be in the proximity of FDCs and/or where hose lines will
be deployed, and the location should be uphill from the structure if the structure sits on hilly
terrain.
It should be noted that providing high-pressure air into the EMAC is not affected by the friction
loss phenomena we experience in pumping water. The location for the EMAC should be based
on a safe working environment for the MAU operator. Distance away from the building is a
secondary factor.
Another plan check consideration is an evaluation of the MAU’s onboard cascade system
capacity. The department should determine what expectations it has for the use of the cascade
to provide internal support. The failure of a compressor on board the MAU could present a
serious situation. If the building does not have an air storage system that meets the operational
expectations, then preplans should include an evaluation of the MAU's ability to meet all
operational demands.
Systems that are designed to rely entirely on a mobile air unit must closely coordinate the
installation of the system with the day-to-day operations of the MAU. This is absolutely
essential to ensure quality performance under fire ground conditions. For those entities that
have specified air storage systems on site and intend to back it up with an MAU, there are
similar considerations. All personnel should be familiar with the capacity of both of these
Preplanning
Modern fire suppression practices depend upon having good information on the location and
utilization of build in fire protection. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) has
provided excellent guidance in this area. 24 NFPA Standard 1031 recommends that emergency
planning and preparedness measures are in place and have been practiced by members of fire
departments. This task involves, making field observations, creating copies of emergency plans,
and records of exercises, so that the firefighters are better prepared to deal with emergencies
when they do occur. This is especially true when you have a FARS installed in a risk location.
The systems are designed to be robust and will perform under the most rugged of conditions,
but pre-planning should never be taken for granted. These preplans should be utilized when
conducting training exercises. Factory Mutual also strongly supports the concept of pre-fire
planning. 25 See Appendix 8 for the latest in pre-fire planning technology.
This concept has been termed “graceful degradation." Graceful degradation describes what
happens when minor problems are overlooked until they accumulate into a significant problem
that causes a system to fail. In preventing system failure, it is important to realize that some
problems have a greater impact on overall failure than others. For example, a blocked head on
a sprinkler in one location of a building is not nearly as critical as a faulty value that shuts off an
entire section of the sprinkler system. To prevent failure, certain components of the system
need to be inspected on an annual basis to ensure a high level of reliability when an emergency
occurs.
All fire protection systems operate under this concept. Whether it is sprinklers, fire alarms, fire
doors or other fire code requirements, the purpose behind periodic inspections is to assure
reliability at time of activation. While the fire code requires that annual inspections be
conducted, it does not specify who is going to do the inspections or the level of technical
competency required.
24
The Value of Pre-Incident Planning for Effective Emergency Management, TR-051, Federal
Emergency Management Agency
25 Pocket Guide To Pre-Fire Planning, current Edition, 2001, FM Global, Factory Mutual Insurance
The firefighter air replenishment system is different from other building installed fire systems
like sprinklers in terms of the consequences of a failure. If a sprinkler system does not function,
the fire will get larger and subsequently will require a higher level of fire suppression activity. If
an air replenishment system fails, a tremendous logistical challenge will face the department
that may not be easily addressed. The ramping up of a logistical challenge is the equivalent of
adding another alarm assignment to the management of an operation in which the fire system
has been disabled, damaged or removed from service.
Data from testing and maintenance on FARS reflects a high level of reliability and a low
frequency of major issues. Nonetheless, it is good practice to have these systems checked
quarterly for general maintenance and annually for overall system status.
These systems are designed so that third party testing laboratories can check air quality. Annual
inspections can be performed by qualified technicians.
Summary
The various components that make up a firefighter air replenishment system are not new to the
fire service. They are tools that have been in use for decades. The difference now is that they
are being integrated into the building infrastructure and are not waiting miles away from the
fire scene to be utilized. This system brings a totally new capability to the fire ground; the ability
to sustain a fire attack enabled by a reliable and adequate means of supplying air, assuring that
firefighters never run out air.
Overview
As we have demonstrated throughout this manual, fires in high-rise structures can place an
extraordinary burden on the fire service. When an actual fire occurs, all the tools and
equipment that are brought to the scene on fire apparatus are located exterior to the structure
at ground level. When operating on an emergency that is “at grade” this is not a problem.
It becomes an entirely different scenario when operations are somewhere “up there" as in a
high-rise, or “down there" as in a tunnel or subway. This has been proven many times in post-
fire analysis of such fires as the First Interstate Bank Building in Los Angeles, the One Meridian
Plaza Fire in Philadelphia and the Deutsche Bank Fire in New York. The logistical challenges of
fighting fires in complex structures have also been demonstrated in below grade operations
such as mines and tunnels.
In order to provide logistical support from the at-grade level access point to areas that are often
at considerable height or distance from the ground entrance, a large number of staffing
resources are consumed by the task of merely carrying equipment aloft. This problem has
grown from the challenge of carrying a few rolls of hose to a very complex undertaking that
involves breathing apparatus cylinders, lighting equipment, ventilation, forcible entry tools and
sometimes even portable generators.
Some fire departments facing these complex structures have been using specialized rooms to
store equipment. This practice goes back as far as the early 1960s and '70s. The idea was that
some equipment could be stored closer to the fire floor so that it is available when the
firefighters get there. These have been called fire equipment rooms or cache rooms. The terms
are interchangeable. In this chapter we are going to refer to them as fire equipment rooms for
consistency.
Certainly one of the most crucial components in the fire department’s pre-emergency incident
planning and design for complex structures is that of air replenishment for the life safety of its
firefighters. We will examine how both the fire equipment storage room and the firefighter air
replenishment system address this vital requirement, with a recommendation for what we
believe is the most efficient, effective and practical way to address this important safety
imperative.
FARS is a system of components that, as we will find, makes it unnecessary to store SCBA
cylinders within the building. Its installation also makes it unnecessary to carry a large number
of cylinders to elevated heights to replace exhausted cylinders.
In the last decade, more and more fire departments have been specifying the FARS to address
the key problem of fighting fires in these risks. The solution is the rapid refilling of breathing
apparatus cylinders at or near the incident without imposing a logistical requirement to replace
the cylinders. THIS IS A KEY POINT.
The number of cylinders that must be refilled when a fire occurs is directly linked to the number
of firefighters that are required to be wearing breathing apparatus. The standard number of
personnel required to fight a fire is determined by the department’s policies and procedures. It
is relatively predictable based upon standard response protocols, but the number varies from
agency to agency. It is impossible to come up with one number that fits every fire organization.
In general practice, it is agreed that the initial attack force required to combat a room and
contents fire requires at least 16 personnel. This has been repeatedly documented in the work
of the accreditation system. 27 Furthermore, the International Association of Firefighters has
Safe practices associated with air management and compliance with NFPA Standard 1404
suggest that fire crews operating within this type of risk management scenario will need a
constant and readily available air supply to sustain an attack. 30 If one multiplies the number of
firefighters (16) on the fire-ground and the number of cylinders required to sustain a one-hour
fire attack (6 per firefighter) 31, it results in a minimum requirement of 96 air cylinders to be
consumed within that timeframe.
In a typical 20-story building with fire equipment rooms located every five floors, an incident
occurring at level 10 would render two-thirds of the SCBA unavailable because they have been
pre-staged above the fire floor. The remaining available bottles would need to be hauled up
from the fifth floor to the staging area.
In a second scenario, if an incident were to occur on level 20, bottles would have to be hauled
up from level 5, level 10, and level 15 to the staging area, placing a heavy burden on firefighters.
In terms of firefighter safety, there is an issue of expectation that cannot be met. In the
preplanning of an event in this 20-story structure, firefighters cannot expect to have all 96 of the
bottles stored throughout the structure available to support their efforts. And those that are
available will have to be carried up manually to the fire floor.
When considering the complexities and variables associated with an emergency incident in a
complex structure, it becomes clear that pre-staging SCBA cylinders throughout a structure is
not ideal.
Cost
The increasing sophistication of building design—taller, deeper underground, wider, longer—
calls for equally sophisticated designs to address the possibility of an emergency incident. It is a
fact of life and one that must be approached sensibly and realistically, with life safety as the top
priority for both the occupants of these structures and those who respond to emergency
incidents within these structures. At the same time, consideration for practicality and cost
diminishment must be taken into account.
28 Report on Residential Fire ground Field Experiments, NIST Technical Note 1661, April 2010
29 NFPA Standard 1710, National Fire Protection Association, Quincy, Mass.
30 Gagliano, Phillips, Jose, Bernocco, Air Management for the Fire Service, Fire Engineering, 2008
31 See p. 34 IBID, In fact, it is not uncommon for a firefighter to only receive 8 to 12 minutes of air on a
30-minute cylinder. Further, the rate of air consumption is such that a low air alarm in a 30-minute
bottle can be activated in as little as 9 minutes. For simplicity, an average of 10 available minutes per
cylinder is used herein.
Based on the above-mentioned SCBA cylinder requirement analysis, it is estimated that the
construction and equipment cost for just one stand-alone fire equipment room could reach as
high as $47,000. This cost would be multiplied times the numbers of floors that would require a
fire equipment room. For purposes of comparison, we will use a 20-story building as an
example, and we will assume that the fire marshal has designated that a fire equipment room
be on every 5th floor. In this example, that would total 4 fire equipment rooms. In this example,
we will also assume that we would be using the fire equipment rooms in lieu of having FARS
system in place. This immediately raises the question on how many cylinders need to be stored
in the fire equipment room if there is no FARS to provide a refilling capacity. Critical task
analysis shows that you would need 96 cylinders to sustain a one-hour fire attack. Housing
these cylinders would require a much larger equipment room than would be required with FARS
in place.
Maintenance
Accepting responsibility for these air cylinders is an important decision for a department. That is
because once the cylinders are installed they must be maintained and serviced in perpetuity.
This is a matter of conformance with the NFPA, NIOSH, CGA and other standards.
NFPA Standard 1500 states, “In-service SCBA cylinders shall be stored fully charged.” 32 That
means that every cylinder placed into a fire equipment room is fully charged and ready to
function at all times. The assumption in this requirement is that these bottles are stored on a
vehicle or in a fire equipment room that is under the control of the fire service. Some
departments carry all of their reserve bottles on an Air Supply Unit. But in the case of fire
equipment rooms, air bottles are being stored in rooms that are, for the most part, under the
day-to-day supervision of the building owner and occupants.
This policy shifts the burden to the AHJ to maintain these cylinders in perpetuity. For example,
each cylinder must be given a 5-year hydrostatic test. This costs about $29 per cylinder. A 5-
year OSHA inspection is required for the safety of these bottles. The estimated cost to perform
this service is approximately $2,784.
Additional staffing costs are associated with this process for the AHJ. There must be a staff
commitment to collect and transport these air cylinders from the storage areas to a test site.
One could easily estimate that to remove and replace 96 air bottles it would take at least 3
hours of staff time. The personnel costs would be a variable, but modern hourly costs to have
fire personnel perform this task could be more than $900 per cycle.
Rentable Space
Fire equipment rooms also means a loss of rentable space to the building owner. Depending on
the number of floors on which these fire equipment rooms are required, the rentable space can
be severely eroded. This is not a long-term problem for the building developer and the
contractor. These costs are not going to be borne by them. The cost is going to fall on the long-
term owner and the occupants of the building to sustain the system.
The space taken up by the size of these rooms is actually a reduction in monthly income to the
eventual property owner of about $30 per square foot. For a 50-square-foot room, this is
$1,500 per month per room. 34 Annually, this is an $18,000 loss in rentable space per each floor
that contains a fire equipment room. If we consider that the average life of a building is 50
years, this represents a reduced income of $900,000 per floor that contains a fire equipment
room over the life of the structure. This is multiplied by the number of floors that have similar
fire equipment rooms; therefore, a typical 20-story building would require 4 fire equipment
rooms at a lifetime loss of $3,600,000.
In comparison, the base FARS for a building of similar size and complexity costs $195,000.
This does not result in any revenue loss of rentable square footage.
Our standard supports a much small equipment room (at 50 sq ft). The following table provides
a comparison:
Observations
The installation of a firefighter air replenishment system is designed to provide a life support
system for firefighters. The idea that firefighter equipment rooms are an equivalency to this
technology is not supported by the facts.
Although it may appear obvious to place firefighter equipment rooms in structures, it does not
overcome the major challenge of safely sustaining firefighting operations without taxing
The requirement to place a large number of air bottles in these rooms imposes a space
requirement and a cost that can be avoided by the appropriate use of the FARS. Air bottles are
bulky. They require specific maintenance. The FARS reduces the footprint required to achieve
the objective of sustaining 96 air bottle exchanges and significantly alters the negative financial
impact on the AHJ and makes it less expensive for the ultimate property owner.
FARS is more reliable than multiple sets of stored SCBAs scattered throughout an entire
structure, it is more manageable as a matter of maintenance and inventory and it is less likely to
have a long-term negative financial impact on the fire department after the system goes into
place. Consider communities that only have one or two risks that require this technology: the
policy of storing large numbers of cylinders in limited risks invites opportunity to have limited
observation and control over the safe use of the cylinders. In communities that have a large
number of potential risks where this technology applies, it is a prudent financial decision to keep
the long-term costs under control by installing FARS. While a developer may consider it to be
cheaper to install these air cylinders, the ultimate building owner will pay an ongoing price that
is not recoverable.
Still, there may be benefits to having non-SCBA equipment stored throughout the structure. If a
fire equipment storage room and its cache of equipment are not provided in a building, it may
be necessary for firefighters to locate and carry this equipment from the fire engines in the
parking lot up to fire attack personnel in the building. This effort would likely take a great
amount of time, and require numerous firefighters to carry this equipment into the building. If
firefighters are used to shuttle the equipment into the building, they are unable to perform
other important tasks and operations.
With a firefighter air replenishment system in place, the need for stored breathing air cylinders
is eliminated.
Firefighters cannot operate safely or effectively without a readily available supply of breathing
air replenishment. Only a firefighter air replenishment system can provide this. It is apparent
upon closer scrutiny that the placement of a firefighter air replenishment system that includes
well-planned fire equipment storage is the most effective way to provide optimum levels of life
safety support during an emergency incident in a complex structure.
16.16.20.4.1 General. Fire Department Equipment Storage Rooms shall be provided to store
required firefighting equipment and shall comply with the following:
1. All equipment storage rooms shall have a minimum of forty-eight (48)
square feet of floor space, with no dimension less than six (6) feet. Size
may be reduced when approved by the Fire Chief.
2. Ceiling height shall be a minimum of seven (7) feet, six (6) inches.
3. Rooms shall be locked with access limited to the Fire Department only.
Two keys per equipment room shall be stored in the key box (see
section 16.16.20.15) located on the exterior of the building adjacent to
the Fire Command Center. All equipment rooms shall be keyed alike.
4. Doors to the equipment storage room shall be identified with a
permanent sign stating “FIRE DEPARTMENT USE ONLY."
5. Stairway doors shall be identified to indicate the location of equipment
storage rooms in the following manner:
a. The stairway which is adjacent to equipment storage rooms shall
have an exterior sign on the first floor level, or Fire Department
entrance level, identifying the floors where rooms are located
adjacent to that stairway. These stairways shall have roof access.
b. At each floor level where equipment storage rooms are located,
signs shall be placed on the stairway side to identify that floor as an
equipment storage room location.
6. Shelves, cabinets and racks shall be installed as specified by the Fire
Department.
7. The door to the equipment room shall be a minimum three (3) feet wide
and six (6) feet, eight (8) inches tall.
8. Equipment room shall be equipped with lighting provided by both
normal AC power and a back-up power supply.
16.16.20.4.3. Required Equipment. Each Fire Department Equipment Storage Room shall
contain the following:
Note: This list may be modified by the Fire Department to reflect current
standards and specifications of fire department equipment.
2. Three (3) fifty-foot lengths of 2 – ½ inch hose
3. Three (3) fifty-foot lengths of 1 – ¾ inch hose
4. Six SCBA bottles
a. EXCEPTION: Mid-rise buildings shall have 18 SCBA bottles
5. One 2- ½ inch X 1- ½ inch-reducing fitting
6. One 2- ½ inch X 1- ½ inch X 1- ½ inch gated “Y” fitting
7. Two devices to plug fire sprinkler heads of each type/size of sprinkler head
present
8. Six door wedges
9. One fire phone handset and fire phone outlet
10. SCBA bottle fill station connected to the Fire Department Breathing Air
System
a. EXCEPTION: Not required for mid-rise buildings
11. One 1- ½ inch combination fire attack nozzle
12. Copy of current set of floor plans- Owner supplied
13. One complete Rapid Intervention Company (RIC) equipment bag
16.16.20.4.4 Purchase. The Fire Department will purchase all equipment listed in section
16.16.20.4.3 with the owner reimbursing the Fire Department for all costs of
equipment. When equipment is required to be replaced either by condition or
changing of specifications, the Fire Department will again purchase equipment
with the building owner/agent reimbursing the Fire Department for all costs.
16.16.20.4.5 Maintenance and Inspection. After initial approvals and certifications, the Fire
Department will maintain/inspect all equipment located in Fire Department
Equipment Storage Rooms. Costs of this service will be incorporated into the
fee for the required High-Rise Building Occupancy Permit.
There are currently over 70 U.S. cities in eight states that have adopted their own firefighter air
replenishment system ordinance. More than 400 buildings have already been equipped with
FARS. In the 2015 code cycle, FARS was adopted as Appendix L to the International Fire Code.
Those states that have local control over codes can adopt Appendix L as part of their fire
defense strategy. When is the best time to adopt Appendix L? It is when the building or specific
risk is in the early stages of planning. Although the system can be easily retrofitted into existing
structures, it is optimal if the system is incorporated into the original building design.
Figure 24 - Adopt Technology before the Problem is Built For purposes of this training
manual, this section is aimed at
the fire chief, fire marshal, and fire protection engineer position, although it is a practical value
to the operations and tactical personnel. Truly, the action of the fire department in proactively
seeking the adoption of this system is an essential element of ensuring future successes in
dealing with these types of risk. Failure to consider adoption and implementation by the fire
department literally removes this option from most scenarios where it should be applied and
that will create a gap in the mitigation strategy that will repeat itself for years.
Approaches to Adoption
There are many ways a fire agency can approach the adoption of FARS. One of the first things
that should be evaluated is what existing codes say about the use of the technology.
In those states that have adopted the International Fire Code, local jurisdictions should
determine which edition is adopted in their state. In some states that have local control, the
department may chose to adopt Appendix L of the 2015 International Fire Code (IFC). In other
states, Appendix F of the 2012 Uniform Plumbing Code (UPC) contains a document that was
developed to provide the framework for the adoption of FARS in areas where the UPC is
applicable.
In some states, local amendments allow the AHJ to seek its own amendment to codes. When
that environment exists, it is likely that department leadership is already familiar with the
process and it is unnecessary to spell out specific procedures.
It is important, however, to provide the reader with two specific items. The first is a generic
rationale for justification of a code amendment. The second is a model ordinance that can be
adopted for use by your department.
Justification
The fire service has a long track record of introducing new and innovative ways of resolving
specific fire problems through the local processes. Historically, they have had to do this because
model codes often overlook area-specific risks that don’t exist everywhere, necessitating a local
solution.
This phenomenon has resulted in local communities being on the vanguard of change. Examples
of this include key or lock box innovation, increased sprinkler protection and the work done in
the field of hazardous materials. All of these improvements were made locally before they
found their way into the model codes.
These amendments were justified based on the idea that local conditions create special
circumstances that require bold steps to resolve. These are called “findings of fact.” They are
generally limited to geographical, topographical and climatological findings.
A sample write-up for the justification of these findings of fact is as follows. Please see also
Appendix 3 – Model Ordinance.
“The City of (XXX) covers an area of (XXX) square miles. The city has a population of
(XXX), which results in a population density of (XXX) per square mile. In order to provide
fire protection to this geographic area, the city maintains a fire protection force that
provides (XXX) fire stations on a daily basis and has (XXX) number of firefighters on duty
on an average day. The topography of the city contains features that result in periodic
delays in response time; those include areas where streets are one-way, are affected by
waterways, bridges and other natural obstacles that effect response routes.
When any local event occurs, the fire department resources come from the closest fire
station to that site. If more resources are required, the department uses responding fire
companies from other neighborhoods to provide the staffing resources.
This can result in increasing the response time and decreasing the availability of
resources to protect the entire community should a secondary emergency occur.
Response time can increase to serve the remainder of the community because local
resources are stretched thin. In this situation, small fires can increase to significant
ones.”
Most often the indication of these risks is found in planning and development documents
instead of codes and ordinances. Frequently the primary indication of a need for such a system
is found in the more visionary aspects of community development. This is especially true with
redevelopment projects in major community infrastructure improvements such as
transportation or economic development projects.
The fire official that has conducted a risk assessment and has identified specific areas where
FARS is going to be a necessary tool also needs to make the code adoption a strategy planning
and perhaps even a standard of cover recommendation or goal and objective.
Summary
FARS is a technology that embodies the entire family of risk reduction tools. Just like a
standpipe system, a sprinkler system or even the alarm system, the FARS needs to be an up-
front consideration. Moving for the adoption of FARS is a proactive strategy to keep your
community and your firefighters safe.
1. It‘s faster. Trained firefighters are no longer used to shuttle air bottles to and from the
fire attack area; more firefighters are engaged in fighting the fire, rescuing occupants
and protecting property. With more personnel engaged in these operations, the
situation can be reduced to normal more quickly.
2. There is no cost to the fire department. The system is building-installed, so it does not
impact the fire department budget. It is less expensive than a firefighter equipment
room when all factors are considered, and both safer and more efficient than storing
SCBA cylinders within a structure.
3. The FARS dramatically increases firefighter safety. Firefighters are able to replenish
empty SCBA cylinders within the building, at or near the incident. The chance of a
firefighter depleting his/her air supply and suffering life-threatening consequences is
dramatically reduced.
This question is often brought up when discussing the use of Emergency Rapid Fill Stations.
Standards for such components as automatic pressure relief valves, pressure gauges and drain
Fire service personnel frequently work with high pressure. It is present in our breathing
apparatus, in our mobile air units or field support vehicles and in Firefighter Breathing Air
Replenishment Systems.
Catastrophic failures are surprisingly rare, considering the vast numbers of SCBAs that are in the
field. The routine use of these systems is a daily, if not hourly event in many fire agencies. The
few catastrophic failures that have occurred were caused by the rupture of vessels that had
been exposed to an extreme violation, such as being run over by a vehicle, or being dropped
from a great height. In some cases, improper inspection and exposure to corrosive cleaning
agents have been blamed.
Catastrophic failure is not just about the cylinder. The catastrophic failure of an SCBA can also
be the result of the sudden and unanticipated failure of any component that makes up an SCBA
ensemble. If that failure occurs in a hostile environment, it hinders the wearer from being able
to escape the situation. Most common failures involve face piece lens failure, harness failure
and regulator failure. Of course, simply running out of air is also considered a catastrophic
failure.
Due to the nature of the hazards faced by firefighter and rescue personnel using SCBA, the
occurrence of any of these failures during operations in an IDLH environment could result in
serious injury or death.
The primary defense against all catastrophic failures is in testing and certification of all of the
components of a delivery system. A combination of the standards of the industry and the
enforcement of good maintenance practices has resulted in an extremely low level of risk to the
individual firefighter. The only exception to that is the last scenario mentioned in the previous
paragraph: running out of air.
Research conducted by SCBA manufacturers has resulted in very durable equipment. The
incorporation of new material into the design and construction of equipment has reduced
catastrophic failure to an extremely low level. However, it remains the responsibility of the users
of these systems to properly test and maintain their equipment in accordance with the
manufacturer’s recommendations to sustain the equipment's safety record.
USFA – TR – 099 35, dated November, 2001, provides evidence of this. The report states, “there
have been several well-documented incidents during the past ten years where SCBA failure may
have been a contributing factor in the deaths or injuries of firefighters.” However, in their
summary of the eight incidents that were identified, the summary does not include the
catastrophic failure of a cylinder on the back of a firefighter. For a more thorough explanation of
the issues and causes surrounding these failures, please refer to the document cited. This list of
causes is not ranked in order of priority, but failure to use the hardware reliability (SCBAs) unit
itself and low order failures are at the top of the list. The report listed other reasons for failure
of SCBAs, including poor operator training, insufficient preventative maintenance, failure to
meet upgrade requirements and pushing the limits of the apparatus.
35
Special Report: Prevention of Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus Failures, US Fire
Administration/Technical Support Series, USFA-TR-088 November 2001
In the installation of these systems, property owners are advised to maintain proper inspection
cycles and conduct appropriate maintenance on a regular basis. Fire prevention bureaus are
encouraged to have routine inspection of these systems to ensure that maintenance is
conducted. This is not much different than the protocol we have for fire alarms and fire
sprinkler systems. While systems are installed in accordance with one standard, they are
maintained on an ongoing basis by frequent inspection and maintenance by third parties.
As of the printing of the second edition of this manual, the International Code Council (ICC) is
discussing amendments to the Building and Fire Codes that will include the use of these systems
in future editions of those codes.
Many communities have adopted their own code. A model ordinance has been provided in the
Appendix 3 of this manual for your reference.
But if there is any single thing that all of these people will agree on is that the loss of their time,
energy, and effort from a catastrophic fire diminishes their legacy.
Sir Christopher Wren, the King of England after the Great Fire of 1666, wrote about this back in
the 15th century. Wren states in strongly worded passages that fire protection needs to be a
key factor in preserving the work of the architect, engineer and builder.
Much has changed in the world since 1666, but it is unlikely that anyone who produces a
building of great significance wishes to see it reduced to rubble because of a missing
component.
Many fire professionals recognize the unfortunate reality that the curriculum and course
offerings that prepare people to be architects, civil engineers or builders provide little or no
insight into fire protection strategies. As a result, there can sometimes be conflicts or confusion
over fire code requirements in complex structures.
In Irwin Allen’s classic disaster movie “The Towering Inferno,” there is a line that epitomizes this
relationship. It occurs between Steve McQueen, portraying the Chief Fire Officer who controls
the fire, and Paul Newman, who plays the architect. In response to an expression of thanks
from the architect, McQueen retorts, “Yeah, well, the next time you build one of these, call us
first!”
The architect has an agenda. The engineer has an agenda. The building owner has an agenda.
So does the fire prevention and building code enforcer. There is only one stakeholder missing
from that table: the ultimate occupants of that structure.
Given these various agendas, there is always a possibility of conflict when one agenda is
contradicting another.
Viewed from another perspective, each of these parties also has an interest.
Government Buildings
Why should these systems be installed in government buildings that create a demand on the fire
service, but pay no taxes?
When a state government or a federal agency builds a structure, they are exempt from paying
local property taxes. For most AHJs this is not a serious problem because there are so few
government buildings. The exceptions are those areas where the state or federal government is
highly concentrated. In the case of a state, this is most often in major cities, the capital and
surrounding areas. In the case of the federal government, it can be in major metropolitan areas
where federal agencies are concentrated.
State and federal buildings put pressure on local governments to provide fire protection
resources to protect a property that provides no revenue to support those services. Given the
last few decades this has resulted in the federal government advancing the use of model codes
to parallel the use of model codes by local government. Nonetheless, there is a gap between
the requirements to reduce risks as a part of local fire protection policy and the practices of the
federal and state agencies.
Installation of FARS, therefore, is a practice that reduces the risk of a serious event by increasing
the productivity and efficiency of the local department when called upon to react to an event.
This is flawed reasoning from the standpoint of providing a system approach to building
protection. Let’s start with why sprinklers are in a building. No self-respecting fire professional
today would consider allowing a high-rise building to be constructed without them. The reason
is outrageously simple. A properly designed and installed sprinkler system puts a fire control
device within feet of any potential ignition within a building, and when properly maintained and
supplied when a fire occurs, prevents a small fire from becoming a big one.
You will note in that description that there are caveats and considerations. There are reasons
for that. Sprinklers are not a fire prevention device. They are a fire control device. It is entirely
conceivable that even under the most desirable conditions a fire can occur that is not entirely
extinguished. This can happen for many reasons. One reason is that a fire can be partially
protected by some conditions in the structure that prevent total extinguishment by fire systems.
It is very possible to have a fire under control, yet still producing products of combustion that
can result in an IDLH atmosphere. An atmosphere that is classified as immediately dangerous to
life and health triggers a requirement in OSHA that says that fire suppression forces must be
adequately protected from those toxic products.
Sprinklers are absolutely essential to keep small fires from becoming large fires, but they still
require the manual firefighting force to go to the area, even port of origin, and conduct salvage,
overhaul and in some cases fire extinguishment. Sprinklers do not eliminate IDLH atmospheres,
or allow for air replenishment. Adequate area resources like FARS are absolutely essential to
protect the health and well being of the firefighter sent to conduct final control.
This presents a justification for two separate components to make up a total solution. The taller
the building, the more these two systems contribute to an effective and efficient solution.
Fire attack is all about spread and weight of the resources being applied to a specific fire event.
When attack is slowed, damage increases. When resources are limited, damage increases.
Fire attack with a sprinkler improves the likelihood that fire damage can be reduced, but the
weight of the manual fire suppression effort may determine the overall losses for smoke and
water damage.
Given that a structure is equipped with a sprinkler system, the availability of FARS in the building
allows an incident commander to deploy his initial attack resources as rapidly as possible, with
limited concern about logistical support in the first operation period of an event. Ventilation,
salvage and overhaul can be initiated faster. The sprinkler system and reconnaissance of true
fire conditions are expedited.
In summary, no competent fire officer today wants to see a high-rise that is not equipped with a
sprinkler system. No competent fire ground officer is going to put his or her resources into
harm’s way unless the attack is sustained. The only way this can be achieved in a professional
manner is to have both a sprinkler system and FARS in place.
Fire Chiefs and Fire Marshals have also been discussing how to use elevators for occupant
removal for years. Recent code efforts have focused on the idea that there are two solutions.
The first is having a third stairwell. The other is to use the elevators. Then in the midst of this
discussion there was the recognition that an elevator dedicated to firefighters might be a viable
option. Current discussion of this concept has resulted in a decision to let this be a local option.
These elevators have been characterized as Occupant Evacuation Elevators (OEE), or Occupant
Emergency Operations (OEO). Lastly they have been labeled Fire Operations Elevators (FOE).
Among the various items discussed about the FOE concept is the idea of designing elevators to
be more accommodating for emergency medical services. In essence, this consideration has to
do with gurney configuration. This issue is like comparing apples to oranges for the purposes of
planning. The elevator issue does not have anything to do with the need for a firefighter air
replenishment system. And the use of the firefighter air replenishment system has no impact on
the subject of occupant evacuation or firefighting access.
The concept of elevators in buildings goes all the way back to the Roman Empire. Crudely
fashioned, and with limited technology, early buildings contained a mechanism that allowed
parties to negotiate entering and leaving buildings.
Historically, however, elevators have not been considered an asset in fire control. There have
been instances where passengers and even firefighters have become casualties in those
elevators because of a lack of specific CC controls. This was especially true when elevators
lacked fire department control overrides and did not have a mechanism that prevented them
from going to a fire floor. That was later overcome by innovation and design.
For most of its lifetime, the elevator has not been considered a viable fire exit. Almost everyone
has seen the plaque on the wall of an elevator corridor that states, “In the event of fire DO NOT
use this elevator. Go to the closest stairwell and leave by that route.”
But building evacuation via the stairwell has not always gone smoothly, sometimes creating a
proverbial traffic jam. While hundreds if not thousands of people are attempting to exit a
building via a stairwell, that same stairwell is being used by the fire crews to get to the fire floor.
Classic and dramatic photos of this scenario occurred during the World Trade Center event on
September 11, 2001.
Now, elevator manufacturers are questioning that limitation and are proposing that with new
technology, elevators could be used to process evacuees.
There are two changes being discussed that will affect this scenario. The first is to change
protocol to allow elevators to be part of evacuation – which means that fire departments will be
unlikely to have access to them early on in an event. The second is to design an elevator
dedicated solely for fire department operations.
It has been suggested that if the elevator is available to fire crews, then it eliminates the need
for a FARS.
On the contrary, the elevator is not there for ferrying air bottles. It is designed for the transition
of personnel to conduct fire suppression operations. Having the elevator serve as a mechanical
device to move bottles does not reduce the misuse of skilled personnel, who still must be
dedicated to the task of shuttling air bottles (in this case, to and from personnel to the elevator,
then to and from the elevator to a mobile air truck). A fire-dedicated elevator puts more people
in the suppression mode and creates even more demand for a consistently available source of
air supply.
No one can deny the desirability of elevator control. But to have it serve as a ferry for air bottles
removes its value as a tactical deployment device. Its use as an air bottle train does not result in
rapid re-supply. It merely provides an alternative method of improving the supply to another
area in the building. Staffing resources will still be consumed in the process of loading and
unloading.
These two technologies are not equivalencies. Elevators and FARS do not resolve the same
problem. They both exist to address separate tasks.
Going back to the early days of breathing air operation, the concept of stored air was not even
possible. Most breathing apparatus at the turn of the century consisted of a filter mask.
When SCBA did appear it was adopted as part of the attack inventory, but there was no
possibility of refilling bottles within the building because compressor technology wasn’t
portable.
This is not to say that there was not concern over replenishment of air. From a standpoint of
protecting occupants there were some pretty crazy schemes suggested. They included putting
hoses into vertical shafts, including plumbing chases so that fresh air could be brought into
trapped occupants. The fire service, however, lived with the idea that bottles had to be
replaced through a manual, almost bucket brigade approach, where entire crews were
dispatched to fires just to shuttle bottles to the fire floor.
An early adoption of technology occurred when departments were finally able to put
compressors on vehicles and drive them to the scene. Unfortunately, this did not relieve crews
from the task of hauling the bottles to a staging area within the building.
The fires in the 1960s and '70s put new emphasis on logistics and incident commanders placed
emphasis on requesting enough fire companies to sustain interior attacks. It was staffing
intensive.
There were several attempts to overcome the logistical problem. There was the creation of the
bottle caddy system, which allowed one firefighter to take many bottles aloft using an elevator.
Unfortunately, there were issues with these solutions. Among these were problems with the
caddy vehicle location and availability, and the issue of elevator security.
Anthony Turiello, the founder of Rescue Air Systems, began his design efforts in the early 1990s.
No one else had taken this particular technological direction. While there were discussions of
the concept of a standpipe for air, no one ever built one to function.
Concurrent with the development of this technology has been the increased interest in air
management technology and concern for firefighter safety. The solution is elegant, simple and
addresses the use of technology to provide a reliable and consistent solution for a modern fire
agency to adopt.
Rigid code language and specifications have been developed that govern the qualifications for
system designers, engineers and installers. Specifications have also been developed that govern
the installation and acceptance procedures, which include testing and certification.
Recognizing the value and widespread usage of the system, NFPA, OSHA, ANSI and IAPMO are
developing the Codes, Standards and Regulations that will govern the design, installation and
testing of FARS.
“L104.15 Air monitoring system. An approved air monitoring system shall be provided. The
system shall automatically monitor air quality, moisture and pressure on a continual basis. The
air monitoring system shall be equipped with not less than two content analyzers capable of
detecting carbon monoxide, carbon dioxide, nitrogen, oxygen, moisture and hydrocarbons.”
The system is monitored via the building’s fire alarm system and panel as a supervisory signal.
FARS can also be monitored around the clock by the private sector via web-based monitoring.
Should any air quality readings exceed IFC 2015 Appendix L or NFPA 1989 requirements, signals
In addition, the system is equipped with isolation valves that allow firefighters to isolate the
system remotely from the Fire Command Center or manually at any of the fill panels.
“L106.1 Periodic inspection, testing and maintenance. A FARS shall be continuously maintained
in an operative condition and shall be inspected not less than annually. Not less than quarterly,
an air sample shall be taken from the system and tested to verify compliance with NFPA 1989.
The laboratory test results shall be maintained on site and readily available for review by the fire
code official.”
Summary
It is common knowledge in the fire service that air replenishment is one of the most labor-
intensive logistical operations facing firefighters during a fire in a high-rise building or other
complex structure. FARS is the only solution that is engineered to provide a high quality, safe air
management process. If a large percentage of firefighters are required to do nothing more than
move air cylinders to a staging area and not perform fire attack, the effectiveness of the fire
brigade is limited to the amount of resources they can quickly aggregate to overcome that
problem.
Trained personnel who would be moving air cylinders from the staging area can otherwise be
used for fire attack, rescue operations, ventilation, evacuation, search and rescue, lobby control
and other critical tasks. By installing the FARS, fire departments can increase firefighter safety
and maximize their existing resources.
The firefighter air replenishment system saves time, saves resources and saves lives. In the end
it reduces the loss of life and property.
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"One of the biggest factors that limit firefighting and rescue in a complex structure is
having enough replacement air cylinders at the staging area. The firefighter air system
eliminates that factor and allows them to operate much more effectively during fire
suppression and rescue."
—GLENN CORBETT, Associate Professor of Fire Science, John Jay College of Criminal Justice, New York
The following is an overview of the First Interstate Fire of 1988, Los Angeles, California:
The 262 m high, 62-story office tower was the tallest building built in Los Angeles, USA, in 1973.
The tower was known as the United California Bank building until 1981, when United California
Bank changed its name to First Interstate Bank (FIB). The tower was later renamed 707 Wilshire
Tower in 1996 and became Aon Center in 2003.
The tower has a structural steel frame with lightweight concrete slab on profiled steel deck. A
typical floor measures 37.8 m by 56.1 m, providing about 1,626 m2 of tenant area per floor
around a central service core that contains the lift and staircase shafts. The external cladding
system was made of glass and aluminum.
The fire protection system installed in the FIB Building at the time of the fire is summarized as
follows:
Damage
The total burnout of four-and-a-half floors did not cause damage to the main structural
members due to a good application of sprayed fire protection on all steelwork. There was only
minor damage to one secondary beam and a small number of floor decks.
• Virtually all external cladding from the 12th to 16th floors was destroyed and fell to the
ground.
• The heat of the fire caused some aluminum alloy valves in the occupant hose cabinets to
fail, creating water leaks and causing water damage on floors below the fire.
The property loss was estimated at over $200 million, excluding the business interruption loss.
The main factors leading to the rapid growth of the fire and the upward spread to five floors
included:
The open-plan floors with large quantity of combustible office contents without any internal fire
barriers contributed to quick fire growth within a fire floor. In addition, the gaps between the
external cladding and the floors were not fire stopped and the fire easily spread to floors above.
Without the effective fire fighting on the 16th floor by the fire brigade, the fire could have spread
to all floors above.
In fact, minor fire spreads also occurred through the floor service openings for electricity and
communications. This highlights the importance of applying effective fire stopping system to all
floor and wall openings to ensure the effectiveness of fire compartmentalization.
It was also shown that if fire protection to structural members is adequately designed and
applied with quality control, fire damage to fire exposed members will be minimized and
structural collapse can be prevented.
2. Dedicated elevators for fire personnel and evacuation (ASME A17.1 Safety Codes for
Elevators).
3. Arrangements of means of egress found in both NFPA 101 and NFPA 5000 (possible
increase from 44 inches minimum in stair, two exiting options that are diagonal from
each other).
4. Separation of large open areas one hour construction for the reducing fire loading per
floor.
5. Fire dampers being installed to allow for HVAC ducting to fall away from fire dampers.
Ducting must be installed to allow for release from the fire damper and to control the
spread fire of vertically between floors.
1. Fire Evacuation Strategies -- While NFPA 101 and NFPA 5000 establish minimum criteria
for the design of egress from high-rise buildings. We must provide safeguards for
5. Inspection of Fire Proof Materials -- NFPA calls for readily accessible fire resistive
assemblies to be visually inspected. Recommendations under consideration are for a 5-
year independent report and findings to be submitted to the AHJ for approval.
7. Exit Width -- Exit width must increase in areas that serve 2000 or more to 56 inches and
not minimum 44 inches.
8. Photo luminescent Markings -- ASTM E2072 #3 and ASTM 2030 #4 Proposal to require
photo luminescent marking in stairs.
10. Area of Refuge/Rescue Assistance -- ADAAG is current seeking further code changes for
persons left behind with disabilities in the current environment on fire resistive
construction and sprinklers. Several devices are currently being reviewed such as
supplemental stair descending devices and dedicated elevators. ADAAG has formed
several committees to look into all purposed code changes and alternate means of
protection.
When the initial news reports of this fire emerged, attention focused on how a modern, fire-
resistive high-rise in a major metropolitan city with a well-staffed, well-equipped fire
department could be so heavily damaged by fire. The answer is rather simple—fire
departments alone cannot expect or be expected to provide the level of fire protection that
modern high-rises demand. The protection must be built-in.
Three firefighters from Engine Company 11 died on the 28th floor when they became
disoriented and their SCBAs ran out of air.
The three firefighters who died were attempting to ventilate the center stair tower. They
radioed a request for help stating that they were on the 30th floor. After extensive search and
rescue efforts, their bodies were later found on the 28th floor. They had exhausted all of their
air supply and could not escape to reach fresh air. At the time of their deaths, the 28th floor
was not burning but had an extremely heavy smoke condition.
Firefighters were forced to hand carry all suppression equipment including SCBA replacement
cylinders up the stairs to the staging area that was established on the 20th floor. In addition,
personnel had to climb at least 20 floors to relieve fellow firefighters and attack crews,
increasing the time required for relief forces to arrive. This was a problem for the duration of
the incident as each relief crew was already tired from the long climb before they could take
over suppression duties from the crews that were previously committed.
An eight-member search team became disoriented and ran out of air in the mechanical area on
the 38th floor, while trying to find an exit to the roof. They were rescued by a team that landed
on the roof and transported them back to ground level by helicopter.
Prior to being assigned to this task, the crew had walked up to the fire area wearing their full
protective clothing and SCBAs and carrying extra equipment. It is believed that they started out
with full SCBA cylinders, but it is not known if they became disoriented from the heavy smoke in
the stairway, encountered trouble with heat build-up, or were exhausted by the effort of
climbing 28 floors. Some combination of these factors could have caused their predicament.
Unfortunately, even after breaking the window they did not find relief from the smoke
conditions, which were extremely heavy in that part of the building.
When Engine 11’s crew reported their predicament, the priority changed to attempting to
locate and rescue the trapped firefighters. Unfortunately, these efforts were in vain and nearly
proved tragic when the eight firefighters conducting search and rescue operations became
disoriented and ran out of air in the 38th floor mechanical room and nearly perished while
trying to locate a roof exit. The rescue of these members was extremely fortunate in a situation
that could have resulted in an even greater tragedy.
The Cook County Medical Examiner's Office confirmed that a woman died in the fire. She was
identified as Beata Bihl, according to Steven Levy, the building's manager.
Fire officials say the elderly woman who died was in the unit where the fire started, and
firefighters found her near the door, apparently trying to make an escape. This report was
taken from http://www.firefighterclosecalls.comw.
On January 20, 2005, a 39-year-old male career Captain died after he ran out of air, became
disoriented, and then collapsed at a residential structure fire. The Captain and another
firefighter entered the structure with a hand line to search for and extinguish the fire. While
searching in the basement, the victim removed his regulator for 1 to 2 minutes to see if he could
distinguish the location and cause of the fire by smell. While searching on the main floor of the
structure, the firefighter’s low air alarm sounded and the Captain directed the firefighter to exit
and have another firefighter working outside take his place. The Captain and the second
firefighter went to the second floor without the hand line to continue searching for the fire.
Within a couple of minutes, the Captain’s low air alarm sounded. The Captain and the
firefighter became disoriented and could not find their way out of the structure. The Captain
made repeated calls over his radio for assistance but he was not on the fire ground channel.
The second firefighter "buddy breathed" with the Captain until the Captain became
36 Italics added
NIOSH Recommendations
NIOSH investigators concluded that, to minimize the risk of similar occurrences, fire
departments should:
1. Enforce standard operating procedures (SOPs) for structural fire fighting, including the
use of SCBA, ventilation, and radio communications;
2. Ensure that the Incident Commander completes a size-up of the incident and
continuously evaluates the risk versus benefit when determining whether the operation
will be offensive or defensive;
4. Use defensive fire fighting tactics when adequate apparatus and equipment for
offensive operations are not available;
7. Ensure those firefighters who enter hazardous areas, e.g., burning or suspected unsafe
structures, are equipped with two-way communications with Incident Command;
9. Ensure that a Rapid Intervention Team is in place before conditions become unsafe;
10. Use guidelines/ropes securely attached to permanent objects and/or a bright, narrow-
beamed light at all entry portals to a structure to guide firefighters during emergency
egress;
11. Use evacuation signals when command personnel decide that all firefighters should be
evacuated from a burning building or other hazardous area;
12. Train firefighters on actions to take while waiting to be rescued if they become lost or
trapped inside a structure. Additionally, municipalities should establish dispatch centers
that are integrated with fire response functions.
The following is a description of a subway fire that occurred in Daegu, South Korea, on 18
February 2003. Daegu, also known as Taegu, is an inland city located about 300 km southeast
from Seoul, the capital of South Korea.
A subway train was set on fire with gasoline, destroying two trains and causing large casualties
of 192 deaths and 148 injuries at Jungangno Station.
The Station
The Daegu Metropolitan Subway Line No. 1 was made of reinforced concrete and had an
operational distance of 25.9 km between Daegok and Ansim with 30 stations. In total, the line
has 4.15 km long of bored tunnel and 23.45 km long of box section constructed by the cut-and-
cover method.
The incident station, Jungangno Station, is located at the downtown of Daegu, which is one of
the busiest stations. The subway station was a reinforced concrete structure with three
basements as shown in Figure 1. They are:
• Basement B1 (floor area = 3847 m²) contains the concourse. An underground shopping
mall perpendicular to the station is extended into the central section of the basement.
• Basement B2 (4589 m²) contains the concourse and office room.
• Basement B3 (2004 m²) was the fire floor and contains two platforms of 169 m long with
two tracks in between.
37Ingason,Haukur and Lönnermark , Anders , Unique Metro Tunnel Fire Tests Conducted in
SwedenSocial Media Tools, SP Technical Research Institute of Sweden, Department of Fire
Technology
The fire protection systems at the time of the 2003 fire was as follows:
Compartmentation
• Basements B1 and B2 each had two smoke barriers made of 5 m
high hanging walls to divide the large area into three
compartmentation areas
• A fire shuttle doubling as an access control point was installed
across the entire width of the opening to the shopping area at
Basement B1
Fire detection systems All basements had the following fire detection systems:
• Automatic fire detectors (except B3)
• Smoke detectors
• Fire alarms
The Fire
On February 18, 2003, a subway train was set on fire by a mentally ill patient at Jungangno
Station in Daegu, South Korea. The fire quickly spread to all six coaches of the train within 2
minutes due to the highly flammable interior of the train. The seats, flooring and advertisement
boards were not made of fire proof materials but composed of flammable fiberglass,
carbonated vinyl and polyethylene. The fire had also spread to another train in the opposite
direction which stopped alongside, killing all the passengers trapped in it.
The complete burning of a total of 12 subway coaches generated intense heat and poisonous
smoke filled the entire station. The platform had no sprinklers and no one attempted to fight
the fire. The temperature of the platform on Basement B3 quickly raised to 1000 degrees C,
burning down the facilities, signposts and ceiling of the platform. The fire then spread to the B2
concourse and the ticket punching stand.
In the early minutes after the fire ignition, the fire detection systems had shut down the power
supply in the station and closed down all smoke barriers at B1 and B2. The fire shutters installed
at the entrance of the shopping mall passage at B1 were also closed. Ironically, this
compartmentation effectively worked to concentrate the heat and smoke at the central section
of B2, causing large casualties (see Figure 1).
Before the train entered the station, a mentally ill man, 56, had set a fire on the fifth coach with
two cartons of gasoline, about 4 litres, with the intention of committing suicide.
The arsonist escaped along with many passengers when the train stopped at the station.
The fire alarm was activated but ignored by the officials in the Machine and Equipment Control
Center.
09:55 The fire rapidly spread to all six coaches within 2 minutes.
Train 1080 in the opposite direction left Daegu Station and headed towards Jungangno Station.
09:57 Train 1080 stopped alongside Train 1079 which was on fire, about 1.3 m away. The
platform level was full of smoke from the fire of Train 1079. The doors of Train 1080 opened
briefly and closed immediately by the driver to prevent the smoke coming into the coaches.
Power supply to Train 1080 was shut down by fire detection system.
09:59 – 10:03 The driver of Train 1080 was waiting for re-supply of power and the order of his
superior, not letting the passengers to evacuate. The driver fled the train without opening the
doors of passenger coaches. The fire spread to the train and consequently killed 79 passengers
who were trapped.
13:30 The fire was extinguished. However, because of the toxic smoke, the rescue was
commenced around 15:30 hours to recover the dead bodies.
The Damage
The subway station did not suffer major structural damage in the fire except for the spalling of
the tunnel roof above the central portion of Train 1080, exposing two layers of steel
reinforcement. The non-structural damage included the complete destruction of the platform
basement and the smoke contamination throughout the station. In addition, two subway trains
with a total of 12 passenger coaches were completely destroyed.
Analysis
It was an unusual practice to allow easily flammable materials for the interior of mass rapid
transit vehicles. The flammable seats and flooring in the Daegu Subway trains let to a very rapid
fire growth and fire spread. The dense dark and poisonous smoke generated by the burning of
the plastic materials blocked the escape way of the victims, incapacitated their mobility and
ultimately a lot of them suffocated.
The worst part is that the emergency and fire control systems of the subway station did not
work properly at the time of the fire. The inquiry into the fire event showed that the key control
officials of the station were guilty of professional negligence.
This event highlighted the importance of enough safety training of the operators of public
transports.
After this tragedy, the Korean government promised to enhance the fire safety to all subway
systems in the country. All passenger trains must use fire proof materials in the interiors.
However, it was reported that, except the Daegu Subway, the replacement of the flammable
interiors to fire proof materials progressed slowly in other subway systems in Korea due to the
budget constraints.
Central Tower San Francisco April 18, 1906 Burned in the aftermath of
No data
the 1906 San Francisco
earthquake
Empire State
New York City July 28, 1945 14 Plane crash
Building
40 Wall Street New York City May 20, 1946 5 Plane crash
Winecoff December 7, Deadliest hotel fire in U.S.
Atlanta 119
Hotel 1946 history
1 New York
New York City August 5, 1970 2
Plaza
Taeyongak hotel fire,
Taeyongak Seoul December 25, 163 deadliest hotel fire in
Hotel 1971 history
Joelma February 1,
São Paulo 179–189 Joelma Fire
Building 1974
One World February 13, 0
New York City
Trade Center 1975
Campbell
Campbell Shopping
Shopping Kuala Lumpur April 8, 1976 1
Complex fire
Complex
Bank Kuala Lumpur November 4,
Bumiputra 1980
MGM Grand November 21,
Las Vegas 84 MGM Grand Fire
Hotel 1980
Las Vegas Las Vegas February 10, 8 Arson
Hilton 1981
Torre Santa Occurred when carpet
Santiago March 21, 1981 11
María glue ignited during carpet
installation.[1]
Al Rasheed Plane crash-Suicide by F-4
Baghdad July 21, 1982 1
Hotel Phantom during Iran-Iraq
War
Northwestern November 25– Minneapolis Thanksgiving
Minneapolis 0
National Bank 26, 1982 Day fire
First
Interstate Los Angeles May 4, 1988 1 First Interstate Tower Fire
Tower
Peachtree Atlanta June 30, 1989 1
25th Building
One Meridian
February 23– 3
Plaza Philadelphia
24, 1991
Twenty-eight 68 mm and
Al Rasheed December 26,
Baghdad 85 mm Katyusha rockets
Hotel 2003 1
were fired at and struck
the hotel
Parque
Central October 17, Damage to 34th-44th
0
Complex East Caracas 2004 floors
Tower
February 12,
Windsor Partially collapsed;
Madrid 2005 0
Tower subsequently demolished
Shanghai
World August 14, Occurred on 40th floor
Shanghai 0
Financial 2007 during construction
Center
Occurred during
Deutsche August 18, deconstruction,
New York City 2
Bank Building 2007 demolished due to
damage from
the September 11 attacks
Monte Carlo
January 25,
Resort and Las Vegas Fire affecting top six floors
2008 0
Casino
Al Tayer
Sharjah April 28, 2012 0
Tower
Grozny-City
Grozny April 3, 2013 0
Towers
Lotus Park
Building Mumbai July 18, 2014 1
February 21,
The Marina Dubai At least 7 people were
2015 0
Torch injured.
Unnamed
See 2015 Baku residence
Highrise Baku May 19, 2015 16
building fire
On November 21, 1980, 85 people were killed and more than 700 were injured as a result a
hotel fire at the MGM Grand Hotel in Las Vegas. It was the second largest life-loss hotel fire in
United States history. For an additional exercise involving hotel fires visit the following websites
for information on the MGM Grand hotel fire.
http://fire.co.clark.nv.us/(S(m520db55dxes02afnhrqdaza))/MGM.aspx
www.nfpa.org/assets/files/Press%20Room/LasVegasMGMGrand.pdf
http://www.reviewjournal.com/news/mgmfire
The eBICard will also enable the building owner and their emergency preparedness to
be more in-line with the Homeland Security for “Ready Business Program” as it pertains to:
OSHA Standards for Emergency Preparedness: NFPA 1600: Standard on Disaster/Emergency
Management and Business Continuity Programs (2010 Edition) and the International Fire Code
(2006 Edition) FC Section 404 - Fire Safety and Evacuation Plans.
An eBICard consist of: Building Information and Statistics; Transportation Modes such as
Stair Risers and Elevator Banks; Fire Protection Systems; Firefighter Air Replenishment Systems
(FARS); Hazardous Materials; Communications; Ventilation and Utility Systems; Temporary
Considerations & Fire Protection System Impairments; and Building Emergency Contact
Information. The card also features quick Vertical Building Views for: Floor Level Identifications;
Transportation Modes and HVAC systems; and highlights a Base Building Floor Plan View for:
Primary & Secondary Entrances; Transportation Modes & FARS; Four (4) sides of building and
exposures; FDC Connections; Utility Chases, etc.
Other unique eBICard applications include: First Responder Administration; Hazardous Materials
with links to the NFPA 704 Placard system; MSDSs, and current local weather conditions; Blue-
Line Dispatch that highlights building information for the initial 1st Due Units on a Goggle map
inter-phase. The Fire Department has the capability to develop Field Operations Guide that is
specific to the building as it pertains to: Special Task Force Units; Safety & Precautions and
Special Instructions for Engine and Ladder Operations; and a citywide (Goggle Map) tracking
system aspect for all eBICard buildings and hazardous materials.
eBIC Preparedness Solutions is the “Last Tactical Mile for Building Intelligence”
Reference:
New Codes and Standards Influence Future Tactics: Fire Engineering Magazine, January 2012.
Authors: Jack J. Murphy and Sean DeCrane
Above the Fire Floor – A 1¾ inch attack line staffed by two firefighters and taken above the fire
in multi-story buildings to prevent fire expansion. This line is also used externally to protect
nearby structures from igniting due to radiant heat. In situations where the heat release is great
or structures are built close together, a 3-inch line or deluge gun is used. The use of 3-inch lines
doubles the staffing requirement.
Air Fill Panels - Permanently installed devices placed at strategic locations throughout the
structure, they are usually located within fire-rated rooms, closets or stairwells. The panels
provide firefighters with the ability to quickly refill empty SCBA cylinders through the use of
RIC/UAC connectors with a safe and reliable source of breathing air within close proximity of the
incident.
Air Fill Station – Permanently installed devices placed at strategic locations throughout the
structure, they are usually located within fire-rated rooms or closets adjacent to stairwells. The
stations provide firefighters with the ability to quickly refill empty SCBA cylinders with a safe and
reliable source of breathing air within certified rupture-proof containment.
Air Monitoring System - The air monitoring system is a component of FARS that is designed to
sample air within the piping and the stored air system to assure that contamination of that air
supply never occurs. In essence every portion of the system that contains air is tested. The
system is always under pressure. Therefore, if any attempt is made to get into the air supply it
will set off a low-pressure alarm. The cycle for testing the air can be set at almost any interval
the local fire department desires. It can be as long as a week or a month, or as short as an hour
or a day. In addition, the testing of this system can be assured by connecting the outputs of the
test to a remote location. For example, the test results can be remotely connected to the fire
department alarm center, or to a local security desk within the structure. Printouts can be
obtained of the testing cycle and departmental air technicians can monitor the process remotely
also.
Attack Line – A 1¾ inch hose that produces 150 GPM and is usually handled by a minimum of
two firefighters, or a 3-inch hose that produces 250 GPM handled by two or three firefighters.
Each engine carries asset of attack lines pre-connected to the pump, one folded on the hose
bed, and a special pack designed to be carried into high-rise buildings.
The selection of attack line for a given situation depends on the type of structure, the distance
to the seat of the fire, and the stage of the fire. The pre-connected lines are the fastest to use
but are limited to fires within 200 feet of the pumper. When attack lines are needed beyond
this limit, the hose bed or high-rise lines are used. A 3-inch attack line will be used when the fire
has passed the flashover stage and threatens an unburned portion of the structure.
Automatic Closing Doors – Doors leading into stairwells are required to be self-closing, self-
latching, and fire-rated. This reduces the probability of smoke and flame entering the
evacuation route(s).
Back-up Line – A 1¾ inch or 3-inch line that is taken in behind the attack crew to provide cover
in case the fire overwhelms them or a problem develops with the attack line. Back-up lines
require a minimum of two firefighters per 1 ¾ inch line. A 3-inch line is used for back up when
the fire is one that could grow rapidly if not stopped by the attack line.
BC – Battalion Chief
Brinell Hardness Test – A method that applies a pre-determined test load (F) to a carbide ball of
fixed diameter (D), which is held for a predetermined time method and then removed. This
results in an impression that can be measured. This measurement indicates the level of
hardness in the tested material. It is one of several definitions of hardness in materials science.
Building Class Definitions – For the purposes of comparison, office space is grouped into three
classes in accordance with one of two alternative bases; metropolitan and international. These
classes represent a subjective quality rating of buildings, which indicates the competitive ability
of each building to attract similar types of tenants. A combination of factors including rent,
building finishes, system standards and efficiency, building amenities, location/accessibility and
market perception are used as relative measures. The metropolitan base is for use within an
office space market and the international bases are for use primarily by investors among many
metropolitan markets.
Building amenities include services that are helpful to either office workers or office tenants and
whose presence is a convenience within a building or building complex. Examples include food
facilities, copying services, express mail collection, physical fitness centers or childcare centers.
As a rule, amenities are those services provided within a building. The term also includes such
issues as the quality of materials used, hardware and finishes, architectural design and detailing
and elevator system performance. Services that are available readily to all buildings in a market,
such as access to a subway system or proximity to a park or shopping center are usually
reflected in the quality of the office market and therefore all buildings are affected. The class of
a specific building may be affected by proximity only to the degree that proximity distinguishes
the building (favorably or unfavorably) from other buildings n the market.
The purpose of the rating system is to encourage standardization of discussion concerning office
markets, including individual buildings and to encourage the reporting of office market
conditions that differentiate among the classes. Nevertheless, BOMA International does not
recommend the publishing of a classification rating for individual properties.
Cache Room – A room where fire equipment is stored for use by firefighters. A cache room
usually has an inventory of equipment that is consistent with local needs and is determined by
the AHJ. Also known as Firefighter Equipment Rooms.
Elevator Recall – Upon activation of the fire alarm system, elevators are recalled to the building
lobby. Elevators are not to be used during a fire evacuation because elevators may fail and trap
occupants or the elevator shafts may act as chimneys, allowing smoke to travel up the shaft and
injure occupants.
Emergency Generator – On-site diesel engine generator is required in case of power loss.
Generator will run for a minimum of two-hours to power the fire and life safety systems.
EMS/Rehabilitation – At least one firefighter will establish a treatment and rehabilitation sector
in preparation for any victims found and any firefighters who are injured or physically drained.
This latter event is a common occurrence during summers.
Engine Company – The basic response unit of fire departments. It is a vehicle that carries water,
hose and a pump to discharge water. It is staffed with a crew to carry out basic firefighting
tasks.
Exits – All high-rises have at least two exit stairwells, entered into through self-closing fire-rated
doors. At least one of these stairwells will exit to the outside of the building.
Fire Alarm System – An automatic fire alarm system that will automatically initiate evacuation
of the building at the earliest phase of a fire. The fire alarm system will sound on the floor of the
fire, one floor below, and two floors above through the use of loud horns/strobe lights, and a
pre-recorded message to alert the occupants of a fire and to provide directions on how and
where to evacuate. Minimum state codes for residential mid-rise buildings would require the
same detection equipment, but would not selectively alert floors nor would voice instructions
be delivered. A fire alarm system for mid-rise office buildings is required by minimum state
codes, but it is only required to send an alarm signal to a monitoring company that then notifies
the Dispatch Center. It will not initiate the evacuation of the building.
Fire Command Center – A Fire Command Center is a minimum ten foot (100 square feet) room
located on the ground floor of a mid-rise building that will allow fire commanders to effectively
and efficiently control fire and life safety systems as well as direct fire attack operations. This
room will house controls for systems such as the fire alarm system, fire pump and generator
controls (if applicable), and ventilation systems. The Fire Command Center will also contain a
table, dry erase board, building plans, and the means to communicate with fire crews. The
room itself is served by the building HVAC system and is made of two-hour fire resistant
construction.
Fire Department Air Connection Panel – A panel mounted on the exterior of a building or in a
remote lockable monument to allow a mobile air supply unit operator with access to the
building-installed air piping distribution system. Also known as EMAC.
General Alarm System – Fire alarm sounds on all floors of the building. All occupants evacuate
to the designated outside meeting place. This system is found in older high-rise buildings.
HVAC System – Normal operations are shut down during alarm situations to limit spread of
smoke throughout the building.
Incident Command – An officer assigned to remain outside of the structure to coordinate the
attack, evaluate results, redirect the attack, arrange for more resources, and monitor conditions
that might jeopardize crew safety.
Initiating Device(s) – Initiates fire alarm signal. Examples: smoke detectors, heat detectors,
sprinkler flow switch, manual pull station.
K Bottle - A bottle of compressed gas. The K references a specific wet volume of 49.9L.
Ladder Operations – At least one and preferably two firefighters set up the aerial ladder to
provide access to the roof of the structure when vertical ventilation is performed.
Portable Fire Extinguishers – Required to be installed and serviced at least once a year by a
person certified by the Fire Marshal’s Office. Portable fire extinguishers are designed to put out
small contained fires and should only be used by trained persons after 911 has been called and
evacuation of the immediate area has begun.
Pump Operator – One firefighter assigned to deliver water under the correct pressure to the
attack, standpipes, sprinklers, back up, and exposure lines, monitor the pressure changes caused
by changing flows on each line, and ensure that water hammer does not endanger any of the
hose line crews. This firefighter also completes the hose hookups to the correct discharges and
the water supply hookup to the intake. The pump operator can sometimes make the hydrant
hookup alone if the pumper is near a hydrant, but the hydrant spacing for moderate risk fires
normally precludes this.
Rapid Intervention Crew – A minimum of two firefighters equipped with SCBA and available
near the entry point to go into the structure, perform search and rescue, or serve as a backup
crew if something goes wrong. This critical task was required by OSHA as of October 1998.
Known as RIC.
Safety Officer – One firefighter dedicated to the exterior of the structure with the sole
responsibility of firefighter and scene safety.
Search and Rescue – A minimum of two firefighters assigned to search for and remove living
victims while the attack crew moves between the victims and the fire to stop it from advancing
to them. A two-person crew is normally sufficient for most moderate risk structures, but
additional crews are required in multistory buildings or structures with people who are not
capable of self-preservation.
Sectional Valve – A valve installed in the tubing that allows fire crews to shut off any portion of
the system that is further downstream or higher in the building when the system is damaged.
Shaft Pressurization – Component of the HVAC system that, upon alarm, pumps air into
stairwell and elevator shafts to create a high-pressure atmosphere. Pressurization inhibits
smoke spread; thus helping keep evacuation routes free of smoke.
Signaling Device – Alerts building occupants to the alarm. Audible and visual alarms may signal
on all floors (general alarm system) or only on floors in the immediate vicinity of fire (zoned
alarm system). Examples: alarm horns, strobe lights.
Sprinkler Systems – Sprinkler systems are designed to extinguish fires while relatively small.
Each sprinkler head discharges separately once the heat in the room has melted the shunt, thus
allowing water to flow.
Standpipes – Water pipe in high-rise stairwells that supply water for firefighting operations,
sprinklers and tenant hose lines.
Tempered Glass – Windows designated by a white dot in the lower third of the window are
installed for Fire Department use to vent smoke and heat from the floor. When broken, the
glass breaks into many small pieces, instead of into large dangerous shards.
Tenant Fire Hose – Tenant fire hoses are installed to provide another tool for trained building
staff to extinguish small fires.
Utilities – At least one firefighter to secure natural gas, electrical supply, and other utilities to
the affected structure. Utilities must be secured before interior firefighters can start to open a
concealed space such as an attic or a wall.
Ventilation must be closely timed with the fire attack. If it is performed too soon, the fire will
receive additional oxygen and grow. If performed too late, the attack crew cannot push the fire
in the desired direction. Instead, the gases and smoke will be forced back toward the
firefighters and their entry point endangering them as well as any victims and unburned
property they are protecting.
Voice Alarm – System used for emergency announcements during alarm conditions. Messages
can be either programmed as an automatic function of the fire alarm system or can be read by
the Fire Safety Director during emergency situations.
Zoned Alarm System – Fire alarm systems programmed to signal alarm on a controlled number
of floors. Zoned alarm systems provide for controlled evacuation of building occupants.
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Please check http://rescueair.com for more information on FARS and Appendix L, including case
studies, news items and more.
Periodic updates to this manual will be mad on an on-going basis. The most current edition of
the training manual can be found at http://rescueair.com/education-and-training.