CASE DIGESTS IN LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS

KIMBERLY J. CACHO April 17, 2023

JD II Case Digest No. 3

THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION vs. JOSON, JR., in his capacity as former Administrator of the
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA)
G.R. No. 154674, May 27, 2004
CALLEJO, SR., J./En Banc

Doctrine: 
1. A person who meets all the requirements of the position including the appropriate civil service
eligibility shall be appointed to a position in the first and second levels. However, when the immediate
filling of a vacancy becomes necessary, taking into account the public interest, and a person with an
appropriate civil service eligibility is not actually and immediately available, a person without the
appropriate civil service eligibility but who meets the other requirements of the position may be
appointed. His appointment shall be temporary for a period of not more than twelve (12) months and he
may be replaced at any time with one who has an appropriate civil service eligibility. If the CSC approves
of such an appointment, the appointment is valid until disapproved. 

2. Attrition Law or Section 3 of Rep. Act No. 7430 will readily show that it applies only to appointments to
fill vacant position in a government office as a result of resignation, retirement, dismissal, death, or
transfer to another office of an officer or employee within five years from the approval of the law. Not
applicable to newly created position. 

3. The submission of the appointment beyond the prescribed period is not an impediment to its validity.
An appointment remains valid despite the non-compliance of the proper officials with the pertinent CSC
rules.

FACTS: 
In July 1, 1995, Felicisimo O. Joson, Jr., then Administrator of the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration (POEA) appointed Priscilla Ong as Executive Assistant IV in his office under a contractual
status.  The appointment was made after the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) thru
Director Miguel B. Doctor ] approved his request for the creation of a contractual position of Executive
Assistant IV at the Office of the POEA Administrator, effective not earlier than July 1, 1995.  

Subsequently, respondent Joson wrote the CSC requesting exemption from the rule requiring
appointees to confidential staff positions to meet the prescribed educational qualification. The
educational requirement for the position of Executive Assistant is a “Bachelor’s degree relevant to the
job” and Priscilla Ong was not a college degree holder.  

Acting upon this request, the petitioner CSC issued a resolution, approving the appointment of Ong
under a Coterminous Temporary status. 
However later on, Director Nelson Acebedo of the CSC National Capital Region (NCR) issued a post audit
report on the issuance of Ong’s appointment made on July 1, 1995, and invalidated the same. Also the
effectivity of Ong’s appointment was changed from July 1, 1995 to November 2, 1995. CSC also denied
the payment of her salary for services rendered for the period of July 1, 1995 to October 31, 1995 citing  
Rep. Act No. 7430 also known as the Attrition Law which, in part, states that no appointment shall be
made to fill up a vacancy unless an authority has been granted by it. 

CSC posited that the authority to fill the position was granted only on November 2, 1995 when it issued
CSC Resolution.  Thus, Joson Jr., as the appointing authority shall be personally liable for the payment
whose appointments have been disapproved for violation of pertinent laws. 

Furthermore, Ong's appointment was not included in the POEA's Report on Personnel Action (ROPA)
submitted to the petitioner for the month of July 1995 and was submitted only in November 1995. Such
belated report rendered the appointment in July ineffective.

ISSUES:   
1. Did the CA gravely erred in holding that Ong is entitled to the payment of her salaries from the
government?

2. Did the appointment of Ong violated the Attrition Law? 

3. Did the failure of the POEA to include Ong's appointment in its ROPA for July 1995 as required by CSC
Memorandum Circular No. 27, Series of 1994 invalidated her appointment? 

RULING: 
1.No. The CA did not err.. The records show that the position of Executive Assistant IV in the POEA
Administrator’s office was created with the approval of the DBM on July 1, 1995. This was pursuant to a
request made by the respondent for a position in his office under a contractual status. It is quite
apparent that the respondent intended the position for his confidential assistant, Priscilla Ong, whom he
considered efficient and competent on the job, albeit without a college degree. The respondent was
aware of the appointee’s lack of qualification which is precisely the reason why he requested for an
exemption from the requirements of the MC No. 38 s. 1993, particularly on the educational requirement
of appointees to confidential staff position which was granted by CSC on November 2, 1995 under a
coterminous temporary status.

The task of the petitioner is to insure that the appointee has all the qualifications for the position;
otherwise it disapproves the appointment. In this case, the petitioner approved the appointment of Ong
under a coterminous temporary status; coterminous, because the appointment shall only be during the
tenure of the appointing power; and temporary, because the appointee did not meet all the
requirements for the position. In approving the appointment of Ong, the petitioner took into account
the exigency and urgency of filling up the position of Executive Assistant, as embodied in the letter of
the respondent for exemption from MC No. 38.The appointment of Ong on July 1, 1995, is, therefore,
valid.

Section 10 of Rule V of the Omnibus Rules of the Civil Service Commission on the matter of
Appointments, viz: An appointment issued in accordance with pertinent laws and rules shall take effect
immediately upon its issuance by the appointing authority, and if the appointee has assumed the duties
of the position, he shall be entitled to receive his salary at once, without awaiting the approval of his
appointment by the Commission. The appointment shall remain effective until disapproved by the
Commission. In no case shall an appointment take effect earlier than the date of its issuance.

MC No. 38, s. 1993, likewise reads: “The effectivity of an appointment shall be the date of actual
assumption by the appointee but not earlier than the date of issuance of the appointment, which is the
date of signing by the appointing authority.”

2. No. Section 3 of Rep. Act No. 7430 will readily show that it applies only to appointments to fill vacant
position in a government office as a result of resignation, retirement, dismissal, death, or transfer to
another office of an officer or employee within five years from the approval of the law. Under the law,
attrition is defined as the reduction of personnel as a result of resignation, retirement, dismissal in
accordance with existing laws, death or transfer to another office.

The appointment of Ong to the position of the Executive Assistant IV in the Office of the respondent is
not covered by Rep. Act No. 7430 because Ong was appointed to a newly-created position as part of the
confidential/personal staff of the respondent. The position was approved by the DBM. The petitioner
attested the appointment as coterminous temporary. The position to which Ong was appointed was not
rendered vacant as a result of the resignation, retirement, dismissal, death or transfer of an employee to
another office, as provided by the law. Thus, the petitioner cannot argue that the respondent violated
the Attrition Law

3. No. Having been validly appointed to the position of Executive Assistant IV in the Office of the
respondent, SC held Ong is a de jure officer and not a de facto officer as held by the CA.   The inaction of
certain officials led to the non-compliance with the CSC requirement that appointments should be
included in the monthly report of personnel action (ROPA), which must be submitted in turn to the CSC.
The Court held that legitimate justifications excused the delayed observance of or the non-compliance
with the requirement. 

A de facto officer is one who is in possession of the office and discharging its duties under color of
authority.

By color of authority is meant that derived from an election or appointment, however irregular or
informal, so... that the incumbent is not a mere volunteer. The difference between the basis of the
authority of a de jure officer and that of a de facto officer is that one rests on right, the other on
reputation.

It may be likened to the difference between character and... reputation. One is the truth of a man, the
other is what is thought of him."... the color of authority, not the color of title that distinguishes an
officer de facto from a usurper.

It is the color of authority, not the color of title that distinguishes an officer de facto from a usurper.

Being a de jure officer, Ong is entitled to receive all the salaries and emoluments appertaining to the
position. 
Tuanda, et al vs. The Honorable Sandiganbayan et al
GR. No. 110544, October 17, 1995
Kapunan, J.

FACTS:
On February 9, 1989 Delia Estrellanes and Bartolome Binaohan were designated as industrial labor
sectoral representative and agricultural labor sectoral representative for the Sangguniang Bayan of
Jimalalud, Negros Oriental by DILG Secretary Santos. They both took their oath of office on February 16
and 17, 1989.

Then, petitioners filed a petition with the Office of the President for review and recall of said
designations. This was denied and enjoined Tuanda to recognize private sectoral representatives.
Estrallanes and Binaohan then filed a petition for mandamus with RTC Negros Oriental for recognition as
members of the Sangguniang Bayan. It was dismissed.

Thereafter,  petitioners filed an action with the Regional Trial Court of Dumaguete City to declare null
and void the designations of private respondents as sectoral representatives, docketed as Civil Case. 

Later, an information was filed to RTC Dumaguete City accusing Tuanda and others of taking advantage
of their official functions and unlawfully causing undue injury to Estrellanes and Binaohan.

Petitioners filed a motion with Sandiganbayan for suspension of the Criminal Case on the ground that a
prejudicial question exists. The RTC rendered a decision declaring null and void ab initio the designations
issued by DILG for violation of the provisions saying that the Sanggunian itself must make a
determination first of the number of sectors in the city/municipality to warrant representation.

Meanwhile, the Sandiganbayan has issued a resolution saying that the private respondents have
rendered such services and the said appointments enjoy the presumption of regularity; for these
reasons, the private respondents were entitled to the slaries attached to their office. Even if the RTC
later declare the appointments null and void, they would still be given salaries because of the period
they acted as representatives has made them a de facto officers.

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the resolution in view of the RTC nullification of the
appointments. But it was likewise denied along with the cancellation of their arraignment, instead
Sandiganbayan required Tuanda and the others to submit a written show cause why they should not be
cited for contempt of court for their failure to appear in court today for the arraignment.

Hence, this special civil action for certiorari and prohibition 

ISSUE: 
1. WON private respondents' designation as sectoral representatives were valid.
2. WON private respondents are entitled to compensation

RULING: 
1.No. The RTC is correct in rendering decision declaring null and void ab initio the designations issued by
the Department of Local Government to the private respondents as sectoral representatives for having
been done in violation of Section 146 (2) of B.P. Blg. 337, otherwise known as the Local Government
Code. 

B.P. Blg. 337 explicitly required that before the President (or the Secretary of the Department of Local
Government) may appoint members of the local legislative bodies to represent the Industrial and
Agricultural Labor Sectors, there must be a determination to be made by the Sanggunian itself that the
said sectors are of sufficient number in the city or municipality to warrant representation after
consultation with associations and persons belonging to the sector concerned.

For that matter, the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Local Government Code even prescribe
the time and manner by which such determination is to be conducted by the Sanggunian.

Consequently, in cases where the Sanggunian concerned has not yet determined that the Industrial and
Agricultural Labor Sectors in their particular city or municipality are of sufficient number to warrant
representation, there will absolutely be no basis for the designation/appointments.

In the process of such inquiry as to the sufficiency in number of the sector concerned to warrant
representation, the Sanggunian is enjoined by law (B.P. Blg. 337) to consult with associations and
persons belonging to the sector concerned. Consultation with the sector concerned is made a pre-
requisite. This is so considering that those who belong to the said sector are the ones primarily
interested in being represented in the Sanggunian. In the same aforecited case, the Supreme Court
considers such prior determination by the Sanggunian itself (not by any other person or body) as a
condition sine qua non to a valid appointment or designation.

Since in the present case, there was total absence of the required prior determination by the
Sangguniang Bayan of Jimalalud, this Court cannot help but declare the designations of private
defendants as sectoral representatives null and void.

2. No. Private respondents are not entitled to compensation for actual services rendered. As found by
the trial court and as borne out by the records, from the start, private respondents' designations as
sectoral representatives have been challenged by petitioners. They began with a petition filed with the
Office of the President copies of which were received by private respondents on 26 February 1989,
barely eight (8) days after they took their oath of office. Hence, private respondents' claim that they
have actually rendered services as sectoral representatives has not been established.

The Court of Appeals uphold the trial court's decision declaring null and void private respondents'
designations as sectoral representatives for failure to comply with the provisions of the Local
Government Code (B.P. Blg. 337). Private respondents do not have any legal right to demand salaries,
per diems and other benefits. 

Finally, we find unmeritorious respondent Sandiganbayan's thesis that even in the event that private
respondents' designations are finally declared invalid, they may still be considered de facto public
officers entitled to compensation for services actually rendered.

The conditions and elements of de facto officership are the following:

1) There must be a de jure office;
2) There must be color of right or general acquiescence by the public; and
3) There must be actual physical possession of the office in good faith.

One can qualify as a de facto officer only if all the aforestated elements are present. There can be no de
facto officer where there is no de jure office, although there may be a de facto officer in a de jure office.

FELIPE TAYKO et al. vs.  NICOLAS CAPISTRANO et al.

G.R. No. 30188. October 2, 1928
OSTRAND, J.

Doctrine: A judge who is holding over in good faith and who successor has not been appointed, is a
judge de facto. The official acts of a de facto judge are as valid for all purposes as those of a de jure
judge so far as the public or third persons who are interested therein are concerned. The rule applies
both to civil and criminal matters.

FACTS:
This is a petition for a writ of prohibition enjoining the respondent judge from making cognizance of
certain civil and criminal election cases in which the petitioners are parties.

The ground upon which the petition rests may be reduced to three propositions.

(1) That the assignment of the Auxiliary Judge, Sixto de la Costa, to Dumaguete was made with the
understanding that the he was to hear and take cognizance of all election contests and criminal causes
for violation of the election law and that the respondent judge was to take cognizance of the ordinary
cases and that there was an understanding between them that this arrangement was to be followed.

(2) That the respondent judge took great interest and an active part in the filing of the criminal charges
against the petitioners herein to the unjustifiable extent of appointing a deputy fiscal who filed the
proper information when the regular provincial fiscal refused to file them for lack of sufficient evidence.

(3) That the respondent judge is already over 65 years of age and has, therefore, automatically ceased as
judge of the Court of First Instance of Oriental Negros and that he is neither a judge de jure nor de facto.

To this petition the respondents demur on the ground that the facts stated in that (1) none of the facts
alleged in the petition divest the respondent judge of his jurisdiction to take cognizance of the cases
referred to in the complaint, and (2) even admitting as true, for the sake of this demurrer, the facts
alleged in paragraph 7 of the petition, the respondent judge is still a de facto judge and his title to the
office and his jurisdiction to hear the cases referred to in the petition cannot be questioned by
prohibition, as this writ, even when directed against persons acting as judges, cannot be treated as a
substitute for quo warranto, or be rightfully called upon to perform any of the functions of that writ.

ISSUES:
WON the decision of a de facto judge is valid and binding.

RULING: 
Briefly defined, a de facto judge is one who exercises the duties of a judicial office under color of an
appointment or election thereto. He differs, on the one hand, from a mere usurper who undertakes to
act officially without any color of right, and on the other hand, from a judge de jure who is in all respects
legally appointed and qualified and whose term of office has not expired.

Applying the principles stated to the facts set forth in the petition before us, we cannot escape the
conclusion that, on the assumption that said facts are true, the respondent judge must be considered a
judge de facto. His term of office may have expired, but his successor has not been appointed, and as
good faith is presumed, he must be regarded as holding over in good faith. The contention of counsel for
the petitioners that the auxiliary judge present in the district must be considered the regular judge
seems obviously erroneous.

 Accordingly, it is a well-established principle, dating from the earliest period and repeatedly confirmed
by an unbroken current of decisions, that the official acts of a de facto judge are just as valid for all
purposes as those of a de jure judge, so far as the public or third persons who are interested therein are
concerned. The rule is the same in civil criminal cases. The principle is one founded in policy and
convenience, for the right of no one claiming a title or interest under or through the proceedings of an
officer having an apparent authority to act would be safe, if it were necessary in every case to examine
the legality of the title of such officer up to its original source, and the title or interest of such person
were held to be invalidated by some accidental defect or flaw in the appointment, election or
qualification of such officer, or in the rights of those from whom his appointment or election emanated;
nor could the supremacy of the laws be maintained, or their execution enforced, if the acts of the judge
having a colorable, but not a legal title, were to be deemed invalid. As in the case of judges of courts of
record, the acts of a justice de facto cannot be called in question in any suit to which he is not a party.
The official acts of a de facto justice cannot be attacked collaterally. An exception to the general rule
that the title of a person assuming to act as judge cannot be questioned in a suit before him is generally
recognized in the case of a special judge, and it is held that a party to an action before a special judge
may question his title to the office of a judge on the proceedings before him, and that the judgment will
be reversed on appeal, where proper exceptions are taken, if the person assuming to act as special
judge is not a judge de jure. The title of a de facto officer cannot be indirectly questioned in a
proceeding to obtain a writ of prohibition to prevent him from doing an official act nor in a suit to enjoin
the collection of a judgment rendered by him. Having at least colorable right to the office his title can be
determined only in a quo warranto proceeding or information in the nature of a quo warranto at suit of
the sovereign.

Rodriguez vs. Tan

91 Phil. 724, No. L-3913 August 7, 1952

DOCTRINE:

A senator who had been proclaimed and had assumed office, but was later on ousted as a result of an
election protest, is a de facto officer during the time he held the office of senator, and is entitled to the
compensation, emoluments and allowances which our Constitution provides for the position.

The emolument must go to the person who rendered service unless the contrary is provided.

FACTS:
Rodriguez claims that on December 30, 1947, defendant usurped the office of Senator of the Philippines,
and from that date until December 1949, he continuously collected the salaries, emoluments and
privileges attendant to that office amounting to P18,400; that protest having been filed by Rodriguez
against defendant, the Senate Electoral Tribunal on December 16, 1949, rendered judgment declaring
Rodriguez to have been duly elected to the office; and that by reason of such usurpation, Rodriguez
suffered damages in the amount of P35,524.55 for expenses he incurred in prosecuting the protest.
Rodriguez claims that, as defendant was found and by final judgment not to have been entitled to the
office of Senator, and, as such, he was during the time he discharged that office a mere de facto officer,
he should reimbursed to Rodriguez the salaries and emoluments he has received on the following
grounds: (1) because the salaries and emoluments follow and are inseparable from legal title to the
office and do not depend on whether the duties of the office are discharged or not; and (2) because such
a rule tends to curb election frauds and lessens the danger and frequency of usurpation or intrusion into
the office.

Defendant, on the other hand, contends that the rule invoked by Rodriguez, while sound and plausible
cannot be invoked in the present case, since it runs counter to the principle and rule long observed in
this jurisdiction to the effect that one who has been elected to an office, and has been proclaimed by the
corresponding authority, has a right to assume the office and discharge its functions notwithstanding the
protest filed against his election, and as a necessary consequence he has likewise the right to collect and
receive the salaries and emoluments thereunto appertaining as a compensation for the services he has
rendered.

ISSUE:

WON one who has been proclaimed, took the oath of office, and discharged the duties of Senator, can
be ordered to reimburse the salaries and emoluments he has received during his incumbency to another
who has been legally declared elected by the Senate Electoral Tribunal.

HELD:

The Court upheld the point of view of the defendant. While the Court is sympathetic to the rule
earnestly advocated by Rodriguez which holds that the salaries and emoluments should follow the legal
title to the office and should not depend on whether the duties of the office are discharged or not,
knowing that it is predicated on a policy designed to discourage the Commission of frauds and to lessen
the danger and frequency of usurpation or intrusion into the office which defeat the will of the people;

But an examination of the cases relied upon by Rodriguez, discloses that in some states, like Indiana,
New York, Michigan, California, Louisiana, Idaho, Missouri and Washington, the doctrine advocated is
premised on express statutory provisions which permit recovery of the damages sustained by reason of
usurpation, whereas in the rest the ruling is based on common law. Neither the English nor the American
common law is in force in these Islands, nor are the doctrines derived therefrom binding upon our
courts.

For us to follow the suggestion of Rodriguez would be to legislate by judicial ruling which is beyond the
province of this Court. Nor are we justified to follow a common law principle which runs counter to a
precedent long observed in this jurisdiction.
There is no question that Tan acted as a de facto officer during the time he held the office of Senator. He
was one of the candidates of the Liberal Party in the elections of November 11, 1947, and was
proclaimed as one of those who had been elected by the Commission on Elections, and thereafter he
took the oath of office and immediately entered into the performance of the duties of the position.
Having been thus duly proclaimed as Senator [by a competent authority] and having assumed office as
required by law, it cannot be disputed that Tan is entitled to the compensation, emoluments and
allowances which our Constitution provides for the position (Article VI, Section 14). This is simple justice.
The emolument must go to the person who rendered service unless the contrary is provided. There is no
averment in the complaint that he is linked with any irregularity vitiating his election. This is the policy
and the rule that has been followed consistently in this jurisdiction in connection with the positions held
by persons who had been elected thereto but were later ousted as a result of an election protest. The
right of the persons elected to compensation during their incumbency has always been recognized.

A senator who had been proclaimed and had assumed office, but was later on ousted as a result of an
election protest, is a de facto officer during the time he held the office of senator, and is entitled to the
compensation, emoluments and allowances which our Constitution provides for the position. This is the
policy and the rule that has been followed consistently in this jurisdiction.

Where the Senate Electoral Tribunal chose to pass sub silentio, or ignored altogether, an important claim
for damages in connection with an election protest—a matter incident to the power and authority given
to the Tribunal by the Constitution, whose jurisdiction over election cases is ample and unlimited—the
clear implication is that it deemed it unjustified. This matter cannot be passed upon in another action for
recovery of said damages in accordance with the principle of res judicata.

The averment in a complaint that "defendant usurped the office of Senator of the Philippines" is a
conclusion of law—not a statement of fact—when the particular facts on which the alleged usurpation is
predicated are not set forth therein. Such averment cannot be deemed admitted by a motion to dismiss.

Regala, vs. Court of First Instance of Bataan

77 Phil. 684, No. L-781 Noviembre 29, 1946

[case in Spanish – case of Solis v. CA is similar to this case:]

DOCTRINE:

A de facto officer is one who is in possession of the office and is discharging its duties under color of
authority, and by color of authority is meant that derived from an election or appointment, however
irregular or informal, so that the incumbent is not a mere volunteer. If a person appointed to an office is
subsequently declared ineligible therefor, his presumably valid appointment will give him color of title
that will confer on him the status of a de facto officer.

A decision is void if promulgated after the judge who rendered it had permanently ceased to be judge of
the court where he sat in judgment.

Solis v. CA
ISSUE:

Whether or not a decision is void if promulgated after the judge who rendered it had permanently
ceased to be judge of the court where he sat in judgment.

HELD:

The Supreme Court declared the judgment void, “for it is now firmly established in our jurisprudence
that a decision is void if promulgated after the judge who rendered it had permanently ceased to be
judge of the court where he sat in judgment.”

To the argument that he should be considered a de facto judge, Justice J.B.L. Reyes said: “The main
ground upon which the Court of Appeals held the contested judgment of the Court of First Instance to be
valid is that ‘since the approval of Republic Act 1186, effective 20 June 1954, was not yet publicly or
generally known on 21 June 1954, Judge Leuterio should be considered as a judge de facto of said court
and the promulgation of his appealed decision on said date is valid and legally effective.” This is a
misapplication of the doctrine laid down in the very case cited by the Court of Appeals.

Lino Luna v. Rodriguez

37 Phil 186, G.R. No. L-12647 November 26, 1917

DOCTRINE:

In order that a judgment may be valid and have legal effect it must be (a) rendered by a court legally
constituted and in the actual exercise of judicial powers; and (b) rendered by a judge or judges legally
appointed or elected, duly qualified and actually acting either de jure or de facto. The absence of these
essentials renders a judgment a nullity.

It is an essential element to the validity of the acts of a de facto judge, that he is actually acting under
some color of right. If he has ceased to be judge by actually accepting and entering into some other office
and has actually entered upon the performance of the duties of the other office, it is difficult to
understand how he can still be considered as actually occupying and performing the duties of the office
which he had abandoned and vacated. An abandonment and a vacation of an office is inconsistent and
repugnant to the idea of actually continuing to perform the duties of such office.

There may be case, however, where the judge de jure has been appointed or elected to some other office
and has accepted said other office without actually entering upon the performance of the duties of the
other office and continues to act as judge. In such a case he will be considered as a judge de facto. If he
actually enters into the other office and commences the performance of the duties of the other office and
ceases to act as judge, then certainly he cannot be considered either a judge de jure or a judge de facto.

Both de jure and de facto officers must be in the actual exercise of the functions of the office of judge,
either by an absolute right or under a color of right. If at the time the opinion is promulgated as a
decision, he is not acting either under an absolute right to do so or under a color of right, then he is
neither a judge de jure nor de facto.

FACTS:

The provincial board of Canvassers for the 1916 (Gubernatorial) Election proclaimed Eulogio Rodriguez,
having received a plurality of votes, as duly elected governor of the Province of Rizal. Against said
proclamation, Jose Lino Luna presented a protest in the Court of First Instance. An answer was filed, and
a trial was had which closed on the 5th day of October, 1916, and the cause was submitted to the court
for decision.

The record shows that the opinion of the judge (Honorable Alberto Barreto) was signed by him on the
14th day of January, 1917, but was not filed with the clerk of the court until the 17th day of January,
1917. Notice of said opinion was given to the respective parties on the 17th day of January, 1917.

Appellant asserts that the judge who wrote the opinion was no longer a judge of the Court of First
Instance of the Province of Rizal at the time said opinion was filed with the clerk; that at 16th day of
January, 1917, which was the alleged real date of signing, the said Honorable Alberto Barretto had
already ceased to be judge of the Court of First Instance of the Eleventh Judicial District, inasmuch as he
had qualified for , and taken possession of, the position of Secretary of Finance of the Government of the
Philippine Islands.

ISSUE:

WON the judgement is null and void?

HELD:

YES. The rendition of a judgment or decree is the judicial act of a court in pronouncing its decision, as
distinguished from the ministerial act of the clerk in recording the same. The judgment is the act of the
court. The clerk records the judgment of the court, but does not thereby render the judgment. The
rendition of a judgment is necessarily a judicial act of a court.

If the opinion is properly filed with the clerk, all the essentials existing, then, of course, the mere failure
of the clerk to perform his purely ministerial duty cannot defeat said opinion from becoming the decision
of the court.

It is essential to the validity and conclusiveness of a judgment or decree that there should be some
judicial action, by the court, constituting a rendition of a judgement. It is also essential to the validity and
conclusiveness of a judgment or decree that there shall be a legally constituted judge or judges, either
de jure or de facto, at the time said judgment is rendered. It is also an essential element of the validity
and conclusiveness of a judgment or decree that it be rendered by a court in the exercise of judicial
power.

In order that a judgment may be valid and have legal effect it must be (a) rendered by a court legally
constituted and in the actual exercise of judicial powers; and (b) rendered by a judge or judges legally
appointed or elected, duly qualified and actually acting either de jure or de facto. The absence of these
essentials renders a judgment a nullity.

If there is no legal court there can be no legal judgment. The same is true if there is no judge. It is not
sufficient that there has been a judge of the court. There must be no one actually acting either de jure or
de facto.

It is an essential element to the validity of the acts of a de facto judge, that he is actually acting under
some color of right. If he has ceased to be judge by actually accepting and entering into some other
office and has actually entered upon the performance of the duties of the other office, it is difficult to
understand how he can still be considered as actually occupying and performing the duties of the office
which he had abandoned and vacated. An abandonment and a vacation of an office is inconsistent and
repugnant to the idea of actually continuing to perform the duties of such office.

There may be case, however, where the judge de jure has been appointed or elected to some other
office and has accepted said other office without actually entering upon the performance of the duties
of the other office and continues to act as judge. In such a case he will be considered as a judge de facto.
If he actually enters into the other office and commences the performance of the duties of the other
office and ceases to act as judge, then certainly he cannot be considered either a judge de jure or a judge
de facto.

GR: Inasmuch as the judge, who promulgated the decision and judgment, was neither a judge de jure nor
de facto at the particular time, said judgment is a nullity.

XPN: [Estoppel] There may be cases where an opinion is promulgated as the decision of the court after
the judge thereof has ceased to be judge. But as examination of such cases will generally show that the
parties had consented thereto and were, therefore, estopped from denying their legal effect.

A judge de jure is one who is exercising the office of a judge as a matter of right. He is an officer of the
law fully vested with all the powers and functions, conceded under the law to a judge which relate to the
administration of justice within the jurisdiction over which he presides.

A judge de facto is an officer who is not fully invested with all of the powers and duties conceded to
judges, but is exercising the office of judge under some color of right. A judge de facto may be said to be
one who has the reputation of being the officer he assumes to be yet is not a good officer in point of law,
that is, there exists some defect in his appointment or election and in his right to exercise judicial
functions at the particular time.

A judge de facto is one whose acts, though not those of a lawful officer, the law, upon principles of policy
and justice will hold valid so far as they involve the interest of the public and third persons, where the
duties of the office were exercised: (a) Without a known appointment or election, but under such
circumstances of reputation or acquiescence as were calculated to induce people, without inquiry, to
submit to or invoke his action, supposing him to be the officer he assumes to be; (b) under color of a
known or valid appointment or election, where the officer has failed to conform to some precedent
requirement or conditions, for example, a failure to take the oath of give a bond or similar defect; (c)
under color of a known election or appointment, void because the officer was not eligible, or because
there was a want of power in the electing or appointing body, or by reason of some defect or irregularity
in its exercise, such ineligibility, want of power or defect being unknown to the public; and (d) under
color of an election, or appointment, by or pursuant to a public unconstitutional law, before the same is
adjudged to be such.

Both de jure and de facto officers must be in the actual exercise of the functions of the office of judge,
either by an absolute right or under a color of right. If at the time the opinion is promulgated as a
decision, he is not acting either under an absolute right to do so or under a color of right, then he is
neither a judge de jure nor de facto.

In the present case the judge had ceased to be judge and was, at the time his opinion, outside of the
judicial department.

ANDRES GARCHITORENA v. MANUEL CRESCINI

G.R. No. L-12945, February 16, 1918

DOCTRINE: The judge who filed the decision cannot be considered a judge  de jure, for the reason that
another judge was actually acting in his place and stead and had been for nearly a month prior to the
promulgation of the decision in question on the 27th day of April, 1917. Neither can he be considered a
judge  de facto, for the reason that there was a  de jure  judge actually discharging the functions of the
office in question. There cannot be a  de facto  judge when there is a  de jure  judge in the actual
performance of the duties of the office. In order to be a  de facto  judge, he must still be acting under
some color of right. He cannot be actually acting under any color of the right when he has ceased to be
judge and has actually vacated the office by the acceptance of another office and by actually entering
upon the duties of the other office. 

FACTS: On the 6th day of June, 1916, an election was held for the office of the governor of the Province
of Ambos Camarines. After the close of said election, the votes were canvassed, and on the 21st day of
June, 1916, the appellant was declared elected governor by the provincial board of canvassers. A protest
against said election was duly filed on the 1st day of July, 1916, in the Court of First Instance of said
province by the appellee. Notice of said protest was duly given, issue was joined, a trial was had, the
respective parties were duly heard and presented their proof; that the trial was closed, and the cause
was finally submitted to the court for decision, and a decision was filed with the clerk on the 27th day of
April, 1917, notice of which was duly given to the parties on the 30th day of April, 1917.The contention
of the appellant, as shown by his motion, is that at the time said decision was filed with the clerk the
judge who prepared and filed it was not a judge of the court, neither de jure nor de facto. The facts
relating to that contention may be stated briefly as follows:1. That for some time prior to the 31st day of
March, 1917, the judge who filed said decision was one of the auxiliary judges of the Court of First
Instance of the Province of Amboe Camarines.2. That said judge, on the 31st day of March, 1917, having
theretofore (January 27, 1917) been appointed Director of the Bureau of Lands, took the oath of office
as Director of Lands.3. That Candelario Borja, having been appointed auxiliary judge of the Courts of
First Instance of the Fourth Group, including the Province of Ambos Camarines, took the oath of office
on the 16th day of March, 1917, and entered upon the performance of his duty as such auxiliary judge
of said province on the 28th day of March, 1917.

ISSUE: Whether or not the assailed decision was valid?

HELD: NO. Considering the fact, that the judge, who filed the decision in question upon the 27th day of
April, 1917, had taken the oath of office as Director of Lands on the 31st day of March, 1917, and began
to draw his salary as such Director of Lands from the 28th day of March, 1917, in relation with the fact
that his successor was appointed and had entered upon the performance of his duties as auxuliary judge
on the 28th day of March, 1917, in substitution of the judge who filed the said decision, and there being
no law providing for two auxiliary judges of the Court of First Instance of said province, we must
conclude that, prior to the 27th day of April, 1917, said judge had ceased to be auxiliary judge of said
province and was, therefore, without authority to promulgate decisions in said province. The judge who
filed the decision cannot be considered a judge de jure, for the reason that another judge was actually
acting in his place and stead and had been for nearly a month prior to the promulgation of the decision
in question on the 27th day of April, 1917. Neither can he be considered a judge de facto, for the reason
that there was a de jure judge actually discharging the functions of the office in question. There cannot
be a de facto judge when there is a de jure judge in the actual performance of the duties of the office. In
order to be a de facto judge, he must still be acting under some color of right. He cannot be actually
acting under any color of the right when he has ceased to be judge and has actually vacated the office by
the acceptance of another office and by actually entering upon the duties of the other office.  A
judgment rendered by a judge after he has ceased to be judge and who has vacated his office, will be set
aside on motion. Where the term of office of a judge has terminated and his successor has qualified and
he has ceased to act as judge his subsequent acts in attempting to dispose of business left unfinished by
him before the expiration of his term are void.

SOLIS V CA
GR NOS L-29777-83
DOCTRINE: “A decision is void if promulgated after the judge who rendered it had permanently ceased to
be a judge of the court where he sat in judgment”
FACTS:
Petition of Gregorio Solis for review on certiorari of the decision and orders rendered by respondent
Court of Appeals affirming his conviction by former Judge Jose N. Leuterio of the Court of First Instance
of Camarines Sur.

All the accused were summoned to appear for promulgation of the judgment on June 19, 1954, but no
court proceeding was had on that day, as the President of the Philippines had declared it a special public
holiday.
On June 20, 1954, RA No. 1186, which abolished all existing positions of Judges-at-Large, took effect
without Executive approval.
On June 21, 1954 the defendants appeared before the court; this time, the court was presided over by
Honorable Perfecto R. Palacio, judge of another sala of the court. Judge Palacio promulgated the
judgment of Judge Leuterio, against the objections of herein petitioner. Petitioner Solis appealed the
judgment to the Court of Appeals. Petitioner attacked the validity of the promulgation of the judgment
of the lower court, for having been made by another judge after the incumbency of the judge who
rendered it had ceased. 

ISSUE:
WON the promulgation of the judgment of the lower court was valid, for having been made by another
judge after the incumbency of the judge who rendered it had ceased (NO)
HELD:
NO. Upon the facts heretofore stated, the judgment of trial judge Jose N. Leuterio was promulgated (on
21 June 1954) one (1) day after his position as Judge-at-Large was abolished (on 20 June 1954) by
Republic Act 1186. The judgment is, therefore, void, for it is now firmly established in our jurisprudence
that a decision is void if promulgated after the judge who rendered it had permanently ceased to be a
judge of the court where he sat in judgment. Thus, a judgment is a nullity if it had been promulgated
after the judge had actually vacated the office and accepted another office; or when the term of office of
the judge has ended; or when he has left the Bench; or after the judge had vacated his post in view of
the abolition of his position as Judge-at-Large under Republic Act 1186; or after the cessation or
termination of his incumbency as such judge. 

Funa v. Agra
G.R. No. 191644, February 19, 2013

DOCTRINE: The primary functions of the Office of the Solicitor General are not related or necessary to
the primary functions of the Department of Justice.

FACTS:  Petitioner alleges that Hon. Alberto C. Agra was appointed by the president to be the Acting
Secretary of Justice and that Agra was also subsequently appointed as Acting Solicitor General in
concurrent capacity. Respondent has a different story, he alleged that he was assigned to be the Acting
Solicitor General first then was subsequently assigned to be the Acting Secretary of Justice. Agra also
alleged that he relinquished his position as Acting Solicitor General but kept performing his duties until
his successor was appointed. Notwithstanding the conflict in the versions of the parties, the fact that
Agra has admitted to holding the two offices concurrently in acting capacities is settled, which is
sufficient for purposes of resolving the constitutional question that petitioner raises herein. 

ISSUE:  Whether or not the designation of Agra as the Acting Secretary of Justice, concurrently with his
position of Acting Solicitor General, violate the constitutional prohibition against dual or multiple offices
for the Members of the Cabinet and their deputies?
DECISION:  Granted 

RULING: YES.  According to the Public Interest Center, Inc. v. Elma, the only two exceptions: (1) those
provided for under the Constitution, such as Section 3, Article VII, authorizing the Vice Presided to
become a member of the Cabinet; and (2) posts occupied by Executive officials specified in Section 13,
Article VII without additional compensation in ex officio capacities as provided by law and as requires by
the primary functions of the officials’ offices. The primary functions of the Office of the Solicitor General
are not related or necessary to the primary functions of the Department of Justice. Considering that the
nature and duties of the two offices are such as to render it improper, from considerations of public
policy, for one person to retain both, an incompatibility between the offices exists, further warranting
the declaration of Agra’s designation as the Acting Secretary of Justice, concurrently with his designation
as the Acting Solicitor General, to be void for being in violation of the express provisions of the
Constitution.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, AND THE MUNICIPALITY OF MASIU, LANAO DEL SUR, REPRESENTED BY
MAYOR NASSER P. PANGANDAMAN, JR., Petitioners, v. SAMAD M. UNDA, Respondent.
G.R. No. 213237, September 13, 2017

Doctrine:
An appointment to a position that is optional under the Local Government Code (LGC) but without the
corresponding appropriation by the relevant sanggunian is ineffectual.
Municipal governments have the discretion to appoint their MENROs.
Facts:
Outgoing Mayor Aminullah D. Arimao of the Municipality of Masiu, Lanao del Norte had appointed
respondent Samad M. Unda as the MENRO for the Municipality of Masiu, Lanao Del Sur on March 8,
2007. After the 2007 local elections, petitioner Nasser P. Pangandaman, Jr. assumed office as the newly-
elected Municipal Mayor of Masiu. He soon discovered that the LGU had not enacted any annual budget
for the years 2006 and 2007, and had operated on the basis of the reenacted 2005 annual budget; and
those nine municipal employees, including the respondent, had been midnight appointees whose
appointments had been based on a non-existing budget. Later on, he filed a petition for the annulment
of the appointments by the CSC.
On February 15, 2010, the CSCRO-ARMM upheld the respondent's appointment for having satisfied the
screening of the Personnel Screening Board (PSB) prior to the election ban.
Dissatisfied, the Municipality of Masiu, represented by Mayor Pangandaman, sought reconsideration,
but the motion was denied on June 2, 2010. Thus, the LGU appealed to the CSC.
The CSC disapproved the respondent's appointment because the position of MENRO was only newly
created under the 2006 annual budget that had not been approved, and because the respondent had
not passed the screening by the PSB. The LGU and the respondent moved for the partial reconsideration
of the decision, but the CSC denied.
Aggrieved, the respondent appealed to the CA.
The CA promulgated its now assailed decision reversing the CSC and reinstating the decision of the
CSCRO-ARMM. The CA pointed out that Section 443 and Section 484 of the LGC had created the position
of the MENRO, and, as such, the appointment of anyone as the MENRO would not be contingent on the
resolution by the LGU. Notably, this office or position does not only exist in municipalities but also in the
cities and provinces. Its creation does not depend on any Resolution issued by a local legislative body
such as Resolution No. 29 Series of 2005, but by a law duly enacted by Congress which is the Local
Government Code of 1991.

ISSUES:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred on a question of law in declaring petitioner's appointment as
valid and in accordance with law.
RULING:
Yes. A public office is created either by the Constitution, by law, or by authority of law.[28] The legal
basis for the appointment of the respondent as the MENRO of the Municipality of Masiu was Section
443 of the LGC, which provides:
SECTION 443 (B). Officials of the Municipal Government. –
In addition, thereto, the mayor may appoint a municipal administrator, a municipal legal officer, a
municipal agriculturist, a municipal environment and natural resources officer, a municipal social
welfare and development officer, a municipal architect, and a municipal information officer.
The CA opined that Section 443 and Section 484 of the LGC institutionalized the position of MENRO in
the LGUs; hence, no resolution of the Sangguniang Bayan was required to create the office. The CA was
correct in light of paragraphs (a) and (b) of Section 443 of the LGC expressly creating and identifying the
public offices of the municipalities.
Even so, the Municipality of Masiu was also justified in construing the appointment of the MENRO as
optional on its part. This is based on the usage in paragraph (b) of the term may, which means that the
Municipal Mayor has been given the discretion whether or not to appoint the MENRO and the other
officers of the municipality listed in the provision. It is a basic postulate of statutory construction that
the word may means a merely permissive act, and operates to confer upon a party discretion to do or
not to do the act. Indeed, the second paragraph of Section 484(a) of the LGC expressly states that the
appointment of the MENRO is optional on the part of the LGU.

ROBERTO R. MONROY, petitioner, vs.

HON. COURT OF APPEALS and FELIPE DEL ROSARIO, respondent.
G.R. No. L-23258 July 1, 1967
BENGZON, J.P., J.:
Doctrine:
"That the rightful incumbent of a public office may recover from an officer de facto the salary received by
the latter during the time of his wrongful tenure, even though he entered into the office in good faith and
under color of title"
It is far more cogently acknowledged that the de facto doctrine has been formulated, not for the
protection of the de facto officer principally, but rather for the protection of the public and individuals
who get involved in the official acts of persons discharging the duties of an office without being lawful
officers.
A de facto officer, not having good title, takes the salaries at his risk and must therefore account to the
de jure officer for whatever amount of salary he received during the period of his wrongful retention of
the public office.
Facts:
Petitioner Roberto Monroy was the incumbent Mayor of Navotas, Rizal. On September 15, 1961, his
certificate of candidacy as representative of the first district of Rizal in the forthcoming elections was
filed with the Commission on Elections but 3 days later, petitioner filed a letter withdrawing said
certificate of candidacy in which the said Commission approved the withdrawal. On September 21, 1961,
respondent Felipe del Rosario, then the vice-mayor of Navotas, took his oath of office as municipal
mayor on the theory that petitioner had forfeited the said office upon his filing of the certificate of
candidacy in question.
Upon these facts, the CFI of Rizal, held that (a) the former had ceased to be mayor of Navotas, Rizal; (b)
respondent del Rosario became municipal mayor upon his having assumed office as such on September
21, 1961; (c) petitioner must reimburse, as actual damages, the salaries to which respondent was
entitled as Mayor from September 21, 1961 up to the time he can reassume said office; and (d)
petitioner must pay respondent P1,000.00 as moral damages.
This judgment was, on appeal by petitioner to the Court of Appeals, affirmed in toto except for the
award of moral damages which was eliminated
Petitioner first argues that both the lower court and the Court of Appeals had done what they had no
jurisdiction to do which is to review a resolution of the Commission on Elections.

Issue:
Whether the petitioner is still entitled to his office.
Whether a de facto officer entitled to reimbursement.

Ruling:
The submission is without merit.
Petitioner’s withdrawal of certificate of candidacy did not restore petitioner to his former position. Sec.
27 of the Rev. Election Code providing that —
Any elective provincial, municipal or city official running for an office, other then the one which he is
actually holding, shall be considered resigned from his office from the moment of the filing of his
certificate of candidacy,"
makes the forfeiture automatic and permanently effective upon the filing of the certificate of for
another office. Only the moment and act of filing are considered. Once the certificate is filed, the seat is
forfeited forever and nothing save a new election or appointment can restore the ousted official. Thus,
as We had occasion to remark, through Justice J.B.L. Reyes, in Castro v. Gatuslao, 98 Phil, 94, 196:
x x x The wording of the law plainly indicates that only the date of filing of the certificate of candidacy
should be taken into account. The law does not make the forfeiture dependent upon future
contingencies, unforeseen and unforeseeable since the vacating is expressly made as of the moment of
the filing of the certificate of candidacy x x x . (Emphasis supplied)
Once filed, the permanent legal effects produced thereby remain even if the certificate itself be
subsequently withdrawn. Moreover, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals expressly found as a
fact that the certificate in question was filed with petitioner's knowledge and consent.
Petitioner would next maintain that respondent Court of Appeals likewise erred in affirming a lower
court judgment requiring petitioner to pay respondent Del Rosario by way of actual damages the
salaries he was allegedly entitled to receive from September 21, 1961, to the date of petitioner's
vacation of his office as mayor.
However, we agree with the Court of Appeals that the Rodriguez case is not applicable here for absence
of factual and legal similarities. The Rodriguez case involved a senator who had been proclaimed as duly
elected, assumed the office and was subsequently ousted as a result of an election contest. These
peculiar facts called for the application of an established precedent in this jurisdiction that the candidate
duly proclaimed must assume office notwithstanding a protest filed against him and can retain the
compensation paid during his incumbency. But the case at bar does not involve a proclaimed elective
official who will be ousted because of an election contest. The present case for injunction and quo
warranto involves the forfeiture of the office of municipal mayor by the incumbent occupant thereof
and the claim to that office by the vice-mayor because of the operation of Sec. 27 of the Rev. Election
Code. The established precedent invoked in the Rodriguez case cannot therefore be applied in this case.
It is the general rule then, i.e., "that the rightful incumbent of a public office may recover from an officer
de facto the salary received by the latter during the time of his wrongful tenure, even though he entered
into the office in good faith and under color of title" that applies in the present case. The resulting
hardship occasioned by the operation of this rule to the de facto officer who did actual work is
recognized; but it is far more cogently acknowledged that the de facto doctrine has been formulated,
not for the protection of the de facto officer principally, but rather for the protection of the public and
individuals who get involved in the official acts of persons discharging the duties of an office without
being lawful officers. The question of compensation involves different principles and concepts however.
Here, it is possession of title, not of the office, that is decisive. A de facto officer, not having good title,
takes the salaries at his risk and must therefore account to the de jure officer for whatever amount of
salary he received during the period of his wrongful retention of the public office.

Menzon v. Petilla
 197 SCRA 251

Facts:

In 1988, the DILG Secretary Luis Santos designated Vice-Governor Leopoldo E. Petilla as Acting Governor
of Leyte in view of the fact that no Governor had been proclaimed in the province of Leyte.
Subsequently, Santos also designated Aurelio D. Menzon, a senior member of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan to act as the Vice-Governor for the province of Leyte. Menzon then took his oath of office.
In 1989, the provincial administrator inquired from DILG Undersecretary Jacinto T. Rubillar, Jr., as to the
legality of the appointment of Menzon to act as the Vice-Governor of Leyte.
Rubillar, Jr. replied that since B.P. 337 has no provision relating to succession in the Office of the Vice-
Governor in case of a temporary vacancy, the appointment of Menzon as the temporary Vice- Governor
is not necessary since the Vice-Governor who is temporarily performing the functions of the Governor,
could concurrently assume the functions of both offices.
As a result of the foregoing, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan issued Resolution No. 505 where it
invalidated the appointment of Menzon as acting Vice-Governor of Leyte.
Menzon then wrote to Undersecretary Rubillar to clarify the opinion that the latter issued. Rubillar
replied that Menzon was merely designated to act as vice governor. He was not appointed to the post
since there was no vacancy of the office to speak of.
As a result of this clarificatory letter, the DILG Regional Director requested Governor Petilla that the
resolution issued by the Sanggunian be modified so that Menzon would be able receive his salary as vice
governor, if he was deprived of such. However, Petilla and the Sanggunian refused to correct Resolution
505 and correspondingly to pay the petitioner the emoluments attached to the Office of Vice-Governor.
It was at this instance that Menzon decided to file this petition to determine whether he is entitled to
the emoluments for his services rendered as designated acting vice‐governor. During the pendency of
this case, the issue on the governorship of Leyte was settled and Adelina Larrazabal was proclaimed
Governor of Leyte.

Issue: Whether or not there was a vacancy

Ruling:
Yes. The law on Public Officers is clear on the matter. There is no vacancy whenever the office is
occupied by a legally qualified incumbent. A sensu contrario, there is a vacancy when there is no person
lawfully authorized to assume and exercise at present the duties of the office.

In this case, it can be readily seen that the office of the Vice-Governor was left vacant when the duly
elected Vice-Governor Leopoldo Petilla was appointed Acting Governor. In the eyes of the law, the office
to which he was elected was left barren of a legally qualified person to exercise the duties of the office
of the Vice-Governor.

There is no showing that Leopoldo Petilla continued to simultaneously exercise the duties of the Vice-
Governor. The nature of the duties of a Provincial Governor call for a full-time occupant to discharge
them. More so when the vacancy is for an extended period. Precisely, it was
Petilla's automatic assumption to the acting Governorship that resulted in the vacancy in the office of
the Vice-Governor. The fact that the Secretary of Local Government was prompted to  appoint the
petitioner shows the need to fill up the position during the period it was vacant. The Department
Secretary had the discretion to ascertain whether or not the Provincial Governor should devote all his
time to that particular office. Moreover, it is doubtful if the Provincial Board, unilaterally acting, may
revoke an appointment made by a higher authority.

Issue: Whether or not the Secretary of Local Government has the authority to make temporary
appointments

Ruling:
The Local Government Code is silent on the mode of succession in the event of a temporary vacancy in
the Office of the Vice-Governor. However, the silence of the law must not be understood to convey that
a remedy in law is wanting.
The circumstances of the case reveal that there is indeed a necessity for the appointment of an acting
Vice-Governor. For about two years after the governatorial elections, there had been no de jure
permanent Governor for the province of Leyte, Governor Adelina Larrazabal, at that time, had not yet
been proclaimed due to a pending election case before the Commission on Elections.

The two-year interregnum which would result from the respondents' view of the law is disfavored as it
would cause disruptions and delays in the delivery of basic services to the people and in the proper
management of the affairs of the local government of Leyte. Definitely, it is incomprehensible that to
leave the situation without affording any remedy was ever intended by the Local Government Code.

Under the circumstances of this case and considering the silence of the Local Government Code, the
Court rules that, in order to obviate the dilemma resulting from an interregnum created by the vacancy,
the President, acting through her alter ego, the Secretary of Local Government, may remedy the
situation. We declare valid the temporary appointment extended to the petitioner to act as the Vice-
Governor. The exigencies of public service demanded nothing less than the immediate appointment of
an acting Vice-Governor.

The records show that it was primarily for this contingency that Undersecretary Jacinto Rubillar
corrected and reconsidered his previous position and acknowledged the need for an acting Vice-
Governor.

It may be noted that under Commonwealth Act No. 588 and the Revised Administrative Code of 1987,
the President is empowered to make temporary appointments in certain public offices, in case of any
vacancy that may occur. Albeit both laws deal only with the filling of vacancies in appointive positions.
However, in the absence of any contrary provision in the Local Government Code and in the best
interest of public service, we see no cogent reason why the procedure thus outlined by the two laws
may not be similarly applied in the present case. The respondents contend that the provincial  board is
the correct appointing power. This argument has no merit. As between the President who has
supervision over local governments as provided by law and the members of the  board who are junior to
the vice-governor, we have no problem ruling in favor of the President, until the law provides otherwise.

A vacancy creates an anomalous situation and finds no approbation under the law for it deprives
the constituents of their right of representation and governance in their own local government.

In a republican form of government, the majority rules through their chosen few, and if one of them is
incapacitated or absent, etc., the management of governmental affairs to that extent, may be
hampered. Necessarily, there will be a consequent delay in the delivery of basic services to the people of
Leyte if the Governor or the Vice-Governor is missing.

Whether or not the absence of a Vice-Governor would main or prejudice the province of Leyte, is for
higher officials to decide or, in proper cases, for the judiciary to adjudicate. As shown in this case where
for about two years there was only an acting Governor steering the leadership of the province of Leyte,
the urgency of filling the vacancy in the Office of the Vice-Governor to free the hands of the acting
Governor to handle provincial problems and to serve as the buffer in case something might happen to
the acting Governor becomes unquestionable. We do not have to dwell ourselves into the fact that
nothing happened to acting Governor Petilla during the two-year period. The contingency of having
simultaneous vacancies in both offices cannot just be set aside. It was best for Leyte to have a full-time
Governor and an acting Vice-Governor. Service to the public is the primary concern of those in the
government. It is a continuous duty unbridled by any political considerations.

The appointment of the petitioner, moreover, is in full accord with the intent behind the Local
Government Code. There is no question that Section 49 in connection with Section 52 of the Local
Government Code shows clearly the intent to provide for continuity in the performance of the duties of
the Vice-Governor.

The Local Government Code provides for the mode of succession in case of a permanent vacancy, viz:

Section 49:

In case a permanent vacancy arises when a Vice-Governor assumes the Office of the Governor, . . .
refuses to assume office, fails to qualify, dies, is removed from office, voluntary resigns or is otherwise
permanently incapacitated to discharge the functions of his office the sangguniang panlalawigan
member who obtained the highest number of votes in the election immediately preceding, . . . shall
assume the office for the unexpired term of the Vice-Governor. . . .

By virtue of the surroundings circumstance of this case, the mode of succession provided for permanent
vacancies may likewise be observed in case of a temporary vacancy in the same office. In this case, there
was a need to fill the vacancy. The petitioner is himself the member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan
who obtained the highest number of votes. The Department Secretary acted correctly in extending the
temporary appointment.

Issue: Whether or not Menzon is entitled to be paid the salary attached to the Office of the Vice
Governor

Held:  In view of the foregoing, the petitioner's right to be paid the salary attached to the Office of the
Vice Governor is indubitable. The compensation, however, to be remunerated to the petitioner, must
only be such additional compensation as, with his existing salary, shall not exceed the salary authorized
by law for the Office of the Vice-Governor.

Even granting that the President, acting through the Secretary of Local Government, possesses no power
to appoint the petitioner, at the very least, the petitioner is a de facto officer entitled to compensation.

There is no denying that the petitioner assumed the Office of the Vice-Governor under color of a known
appointment. As revealed by the records, the petitioner was appointed by no less than the alter ego of
the President, the Secretary of Local Government, after which he took his oath of office before Senator
Alberto Romulo in the Office of Department of Local Government Regional Director Res Salvatierra.

Concededly, the appointment has the color of validity. The respondents themselves acknowledged the
validity of the petitioner's appointment and dealt with him as such. It was only when the controversial
Resolution No. 505 was passed by the same persons who recognized him as the acting Vice-Governor
that the validity of the appointment of the petitioner was made an issue and the recognition withdrawn.

The petitioner, for a long period of time, exercised the duties attached to the Office of the Vice-
Governor. He was acclaimed as such by the people of Leyte. Upon the principle of public policy on which
the de facto doctrine is based and basic considerations of justice, it would be highly iniquitous to now
deny him the salary due him for the services he actually rendered as the acting Vice-Governor of the
province of Leyte.

Mendoza v. Allas
302 SCRA 623

Facts:
Petitioner Pedro Mendoza joined the Bureau of Customs in 1972. He was appointed Customs Service
Chief of the Customs Intelligence and Investigation Service (CIIS). In 1989, the position of Customs
Service Chief was reclassified by the Civil Service as “Director III” in accordance with Republic Act No.
6758 and National Compensation Circular No. 50. Petitioner’s position was thus categorized as “Director
III, CIIS” and he discharged the function and duties of said office.
On April 22, 1993, petitioner was temporarily designated as Acting District Collector, Collection District
X, Cagayan de Oro City. In his place, respondent Ray Allas was appointed as “Acting Director III” of the
CIIS. Despite petitioner’s new assignment as Acting District Collector, however, he continued to receive
the salary and benefits of the position of Director III.
In September 1994, petitioner received a letter from Deputy Customs Commissioner Cesar Z. Dario,
informing him of his termination from the Bureau of Customs, in view of respondent Allas’ appointment
as Director III by President Fidel V. Ramos.
On December 2, 1994, petitioner filed a petition for quo warranto against respondent Allas before the
RTC. The case was tried and a decision was rendered granting the petition. Respondent Allas appealed
to the CA. while the case was pending before said court, respondent Allas was promoted by President
Ramos to the position of Deputy Commissioner of Customs for Assessment and Operations. Because of
this promotion, Petitioner moved to dismiss respondent’s appeal as having been rendered moot and
academic. The Court of Appeals granted the motion and dismissed the case accordingly. Petitioner filed
with the court a quo a Motion for Execution of its decision. The court denied the motion on the ground
that the contested position vacated by respondent Allas was now being occupied by respondent
Godofredo Olores who was not a party to the quo warranto petition.
Petitioner filed a special civil action for certiorari and mandamus with the Court of Appeals questioning
the order of the trial court. The CA dismissed the petition. Hence, this recourse.
Issue:
Whether the Judgment in a Special Civil Action of Quo Warrant binds the Respondent’s successor in
Office.
Ruling:
No, Ordinarily, a judgment against a public officer in regard to a public right binds his successor in office.
This rule, however, is not applicable in quo warranto cases. A judgment in quo warranto does not bind
the respondent’s successor in office, even though such successor may trace his title to the same source.
This follows from the nature of the writ of quo warranto itself. It is never directed to an officer as such,
but always against the person — to determine whether he is constitutionally and legally authorized to
perform any act in, or exercise any function of the office to which he lays claim.
In the case at bar, the petition for quo warranto was filed by petitioner solely against respondent Allas.
What was threshed out before the trial court was the qualification and right of petitioner to the
contested position as against respondent Ray Allas, not against Godofredo Olores. The Court of Appeals
did not err in denying execution of the trial court’s decision.
JOSE CANTILLO, Petitioner, v.
HON. ABUNDIO Z. ARRIETA, Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Bukidnon, Branch II, et. al,
Respondents.
G.R. No. L-31444. November 13, 1974.
MAKALINTAL, J.:
Doctrine:
The infirmity of petitioner’s appointment was not mere absence of civil service eligibility but of
qualifications for the office. It affected therefore the very validity of such appointment, and precluded
the reinstatement he claimed after he was suspended. During his tenure he was at best only a de facto
officer and as such entitled to emoluments for actual services rendered.

Facts:
On October 6, 1962, the petitioner was originally appointed Temporary Municipal Policeman of the
municipality of Maramag, Bukidnon, took his oath of such office and served as such. On November 2,
1964, the petitioner was given another appointment as “Provisional” Municipal Policeman of the
municipality of Maramag, Bukidnon, where he took his oath.
On January 20, 1967, petitioner was given another provisional appointment as Municipal Policeman of
the municipality of Maramag, he took his oath of office by virtue thereof, acted and qualified as such,
the same to take effect on July 1, 1966. All of the appointments were attested by the Provincial
Treasurer and Commission on Civil Service.
At the time of petitioner’s original appointment of October 6, 1962, petitioner was 41 years of age and
was and is still a second year high school;
On October 16, 1967, petitioner was suspended from the service as such patrolman of the Police Force
of Maramag, Bukidnon, because of the filing of a criminal case against him for Infidelity in the Custody of
the Prisoner; that the petitioner was not arraigned in the above-entitled case;
On November 26, 1968, the Assistant Provincial Fiscal moved for the provisional dismissal of the case on
the ground of not having sufficient evidence to prove the guilt of the petitioner beyond reasonable
doubt and from the time of the dismissal, no more action has been taken against the petitioner.After the
dismissal of the case against the petitioner he presented oral and written request for reinstatement to
the service claiming for payment of his back salary corresponding to the time of his reinstatement and
payment of his back salary turned down by respondent.
After appropriate proceedings the court a quo dismissed the petition on October 14, 1969. Hence this
appeal.

Issue:
Whether the petitioner is entitled to be reinstated and back wages.
Ruling:
The law in force when petitioner was extended his latest provisional appointment as municipal
policeman on January 20, 1967 was Republic Act No. 4864, otherwise known as the Police Act of 1966.
Section 9 thereof enumerates the general qualifications for appointment to a local police agency,
specifically requiring, inter alia, that the appointee be not less than twenty-three nor more than thirty-
three years of age, and in the case of an appointment in a municipal police force, that the appointee
must have at least completed high school. Considering that on October 6, 1962, when petitioner was
first appointed as temporary municipal policeman, he was already 41 years old, he was at least 46,
clearly 13 years over the maximum age qualification, when he was extended his latest provisional
appointment as municipal policeman on January 20, 1967. His having studied only up to second year in
high school, a couple of years short of the minimum educational requirement for the position to which
he had been appointed, merely accentuates further his lack of the qualifications required by law.
The infirmity of petitioner’s appointment was not mere absence of civil service eligibility but of
qualifications for the office. It affected therefore the very validity of such appointment, and precluded
the reinstatement he claimed after he was suspended. During his tenure he was at best only a de facto
officer and as such entitled to emoluments for actual services rendered. His provisional appointment did
not render nugatory the requirements of Section 9 of the Police Act of 1966 so as to give color of validity
to petitioner’s occupancy of the position.
In view of what has been stated above, we deem it unnecessary to resolve the issue of whether or not
the provisional dismissal of the criminal case filed against petitioner amounted to acquittal within the
meaning of Section 4 of Rep. Act No. 557, as reenacted in Section 16 of Rep. Act No. 4864, concerning
the payment of the salary during the period of suspension.
The decision appealed from is affirmed. No pronouncement as to costs.

Cuyegkeng v. Cruz

G.R. No. L-16263 July 26, 1960

Nature of Action:

A quo warranto proceeding against an appointed members of the Board of Medical Examiners.

Facts:

The petitioners were in the list of qualified physicians that were approved by the Executive Council of the
Philippine Medical Association of the provisions of section 13 of Republic Act No. 2382, to the President
for appointment as members of the Board of Medical Examiners. The President appointed 6 physicians, 5
of them were on the list aforementioned but the last, herein respondent, was not among the list
submitted by the council.

Petitioners filed a quo warranto alleging that herein respondent was unlawfully appointed to his public
office.
Issue:

Whether or not a recommended individual to a position for appointment has the right to file a quo
warranto to question an appointment to the said position.

Ruling:

No. The Court ruled that respondent has a good and valid right to his title on the grounds that one who
does not claim to be entitled to the office allegedly usurped or unlawfully held or exercised by another
cannot question his title by quo warranto. In the case at bar, petitioners do not claim to be entitled to
the office held by respondent herein. None of them has been appointed thereto and none of them may,
therefore, be placed in said office, regardless of the alleged flaws in respondent’s title thereto. They
merely assert a right to be appointed to said office.

Wherefore, the writ prayed for should be, as it is hereby, denied, with costs against petitioners. It is so
ordered.

Civil Service Commission v Saturnino Dela Cruz

G.R. No. 158737 August 31,2004

Nature of the Case:

Petition for quo warranto seeking the declaration of petitioner as the duly appointed Municipal Judge of
Guihulngan, Negros Oriental.

Facts:

Saturnino de la Cruz is an employee of the Air Transportation Office, DOTC, presently holding the
position of Chief Aviation Safety Division.

Saturnino was promotionally appointed to the said position on November 28, 1994, duly attested by the
Civil Service Commission (CSC). But prior thereto, he was a Check Pilot II in the Air Transportation Office
(ATO)

In a letter dated February 9, 1995, Annabella A. Calamba of the Aviation Security Division of the ATO
formally filed with the DOTC her protest against the promotional appointment of respondent as Chief
Aviation Safety Regulation Officer, claiming among others that respondent did not meet the four-year
supervisory requirement for said position.

On July 20,1995, then DOTC Secretary Jesus B. Garcia rendered a decision finding the protest without
merit.
Issue:

Whether or not Saturnino was short of the required number of years of work experience for the
contested position as of the date of issue of his appointment.

Ruling:

In Civil Service Commission Resolution No. 97-0191 dated January 9, 1997, it ruled thus:

"A careful evaluation of the qualifications of Josue reveals that he meets the education, training and
eligibility requirements of the position. Considering that Josue has already in his favor three (3) years
and eight (8) months experience as Senior Inspector up to the present, he has substantially satisfied the
four (4) years of experience required for the appointment as Chief Inspector.

Following petitioner’s line of reasoning, respondent is deemed to have satisfactorily complied with the
experience requirement for the contested position when he was designated Chief of the ATO Operations
Center and Acting Chief of the ATO Aviation Safety Division. Having held said positions from 1993 to the
present, respondent may be considered to have acquired the necessary experience for the position.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals setting aside
CSC Resolution No. 98-2970 and CSC Resolution No. 99-1451 is AFFIRMED. The appointment of
Saturnino de la Cruz as Chief Aviation Safety Regulation Officer is APPROVED.

DAVID AGUILA, EDITA BUENO, EVELITO ELENTO, RESURRECTION INTING, ANTONIO LIM and WILFREDO
CABARDO, Petitioners

vs. HON. MELACIO A. GENATO and DOMINADOR B. BORJE, Respondents

G.R. No. L – 55151, March 17, 1991

MELENCIO – HERRERA, J.:

Doctrine: Statutes governing the eligibility or qualifications for public office are generally regarded as
mandatory. This means that if a person was not qualified when he took office, or if he loses such
eligibility or qualifications during his tenure, he may be removed.

Facts:

David Aguila, one of the petitioners, is the Deputy Administrator of the National Electrification
Administration (NEA). Private respondent Dominador B. Borje, representing Ozamiz City's North District,
was elected Director of MOELCI II for a three-year term.
Section 21 of Presidential Decree No. 269 (second paragraph) and Section 3, Article IV of the By-laws of
MOELCI II also explicitly states:

Section 3. Qualifications. ... No person shall be eligible to become or to remain a Board member of the
Cooperative who:

(c) holds an elective office in the government above the level of a Barangay Captain

Private respondent filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of member of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of Ozamiz City in the local elections on January 4, 1980.

Following that, David Aguila issued a memorandum stating that all officials and employees of electric
cooperatives who run for public office, are elected, and take office are considered resigned. Aguila
invoked and contended that Section 21 of Presidential Decree No. 269 and the MOELCI By-laws were
violated. Borje triumphed in the elections. The other MOELC directors then attempted to enforce the
memorandum against Borje.

Borje filed a petition in court, challenging the memorandum. Respondent Borje contended that the
memorandum does not apply to him because he was already qualified when he assumed the
Directorship in MOELC and thus must be allowed to continue holding office.

Judge Genato agreed with Borje and issued a TRO to prevent MOELC from treating Borje as resigned.

Issue:

Whether Judge Genato's decision is correct.

Ruling:

No. The private respondent's argument that PD 269 (sec. 21) does not prohibit cooperative Board
members from continuing in their position prior to their election, and that "he is entitled, as Director, to
hold office for the term for which he is erected and until his successor is elected and qualified," is
untenable.

Eligibility for an office should be construed as continuing and must exist at the start of the term as well
as during occupancy of the office. The fact that private respondent was qualified at the time he assumed
the Directorship does not entitle him to continue holding office if he loses his qualification during his
tenure.

Private respondent was qualified to become a director of MOELCI II at the start of his term, but his
election as a member of Ozamiz City's Sangguniang Panglunsod, and subsequent assumption of office,
disqualified him from continuing as such.

ANTONIA A. YEE, PETITIONER-APPELLEE

vs. THE DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC SCHOOLS, The Division Superintendent od Schools of Antique, HON.
SECRETARY OF EDUCATION, and Hon. COMMISSIONER OF CIVIL SERVICE, RESPONDENTS-APPELLANTS.

G.R. NO. L – 16924, APRIL 29, 1963 Padilla, J.:

Doctrines:

1. Officers and employees constituting the unclassified service, teaching in public school is in the
classified service – a public function which may be performed by Filipino citizens only.

2. Upon marriage of a Filipino woman to a Chinese Citizen, her Philippines citizenship ceases, and for that
reason she is disqualified from holding any position in the teaching service.

FACTS:

The petitioner was a public-school teacher and a civil service eligible as a regular national teacher having
passed the Junior Teachers' (Regular) Examination. During the 19571958 school year, petitioner taught at
Buhang Elementary School in Buhang Hamtic, Antique.

Petitioner married Mr. Ng Foo alias Pio Chet Yee, a Chinese citizen, on August 10, 1957, and is still
considered a Chinese citizen.

Special Order No. 296, series of 1957, dated October 25, 1957, issued by the Division Superintendent of
Schools of Antique, pursuant to the 2nd indorsement of the Director of Public Schools dated October 14,
1957, deauthorizing the petitioner's continued service on account of Circular No. 40, series of 1947,
removed the petitioner from her teaching service on October 28, 1957. The petitioner did not file an
appeal with the Secretary of Education.

That prior to the effective date of the order of removal, the petitioner wrote a letter to the
Commissioner of Civil Service on October 25, 1957, and another letter to the Division Superintendent of
Schools of Antique on September 26, 1958, asking for reinstatement.

The respondents Division Superintendent of Schools and the Director of Public Schools submitted their
evidence in support of their motion to dismiss on her first letter, and which documents are attached,
wherein it appears that the Secretary of Education, in its 3rd indorsement dated March 17, 1958,
concurs with the Director of Public Schools' recommendation for denial of the petitioner's reinstatement
to the service, and that on August 26, 1958, in its 4th indorsement.

On October 11, 1958, the petitioner filed an original petition for mandamus against the Director of
Public Schools and the Division Superintendent of Schools as the stated respondents, but the Court
ordered the petitioner to join the Secretary of Education and the Commissioner of Civil Service as
additional respondents, which she did in her amended petition.

ISSUE: Whether the appellee's removal as a public-school teacher from the Buhang Elementary School in
Hamtic, Antique, was unlawful and whether she should be reinstated.

RULING:

NO. Her dismissal as a public-school teacher due to the loss of her Filipino citizenship is legal. Teaching in
a public school is classified service — a public function that can only be performed by Filipino citizens —
because it is not listed in section 671 of the Revised Administrative Code, which lists the officers and
employees who constitute the unclassified service. A citizen of the Philippines is required to apply for
admission to the civil service examination (section 675 of the Revised Administrative Code). And, once
he has qualified to be appointed to a civil service position and has been appointed to such position, he
must continue to be such citizen.

A change in citizenship, whether voluntary or by operation of law, disqualifies him from continuing to
hold the civil service position for which he qualified and was appointed. As a result of her marriage on 10
August 1957 to Ng Foo alias Pio Chet Yee, a Chinese citizen, the appellee ceased to be a Filipino citizen,
and she is no longer qualified to continue holding the civil service position for which she qualified and
was appointed.

MENDOZA vs. LAXINA, SR.

GR No. 146875, July 14, 2003
Ynares-Santiago, J.

DOCTRINE:

An oath of office is a qualifying requirement for a public office; a prerequisite to the full
investiture with the office. It is only when the public officer has satisfied the prerequisite of oath that his
right to enter into the position becomes plenary and complete. However, once proclaimed and duly
sworn in office, a public officer is entitled to assume office and to exercise the functions thereof.

FACTS:

On May 27, 1997, Laxina took his oath and thereafter assumed office as the duly proclaimed and elected
barangay captain of Brgy. Batasan Hills, Quezon City, in the 1997 Barangay Elections. Meanwhile, Roque
Fermo, his rival candidate, filed an election protest with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 40. On January 18, 1999, Fermo was declared as the winner in the Barangay Elections.
Respondent vacated the position and relinquished the same to Fermo. Thereafter, Laxina filed a petition
with the COMELEC questioning the January 20, 1999 order of the trial court.

The COMELEC issued a writ of execution directing Fermo to vacate the office of Barangay Chairman of
Barangay Batasan Hills. Fermo refused to vacate the premises of the barangay hall of Batasan Hills.
Laxina and his staff started discharging their functions and holding office at the SK-Hall of Batasan Hills.
Laxina took his oath of office as Barangay Captain of Batasan Hills, Quezon City.

Petitioner barangay councilors filed with the Quezon City Council a complaint for violation of the anti-
graft and corrupt practices act and falsification of legislative documents against respondent and all other
barangay officials who signed the questioned resolution and payroll. They contended that defendants
made it appear in the payroll that he and his appointees rendered services starting November 8, 1999
when, in truth, they commenced to serve only on November 17, 1999 after respondent took his oath
and assumed the office of barangay chairman.
Petitioners argued that respondent failed to exhaust administrative remedies and the trial court has no
jurisdiction over the case because appeals from the decision of the City Council should be brought to the
Office of the President. The Quezon City Council found Laxina guilty of grave misconduct and suspended
him for two months. RTC reversed the ruling of the City Council.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not respondent failed to exhaust all the administrative remedies available to him.

2. Whether or not the taking of an oath of office by a duly proclaimed but subsequently unseated local
elective official a condition sine qua non to the validity of his re-assumption in office.

HELD:

1. Yes. Under Section 68 of the LGC, an appeal shall not prevent a decision from being final and
executory. The respondent shall be considered as having been placed under preventive suspension
during the pendency of an appeal in the event that he wins such appeal. In the event the appeal results
in an exoneration, he shall be paid his salary and such other emoluments during the pendency of the
appeal.

Before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the court, it is a pre-condition that he should have
availed of all the means of administrative processes afforded him. The doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies calls for resort first to the appropriate administrative authorities in the
resolution of a controversy falling under their jurisdiction before the same may be elevated to the
courts of justice for review. Non-observance of the doctrine results in lack of a cause of action, which is
one of the grounds allowed by the Rules of Court for the dismissal of the complaint.

2. No. The re-taking of his oath of office on November 16, 1999 was a mere formality considering that
his oath taken on May 27, 1997 operated as a full investiture on him of the rights of the office. Hence,
the taking anew of his oath of office as Barangay Captain of Batasan Hills, Quezon City was not a
condition sine qua non to the validity of his re-assumption in office and to the exercise of the functions
thereof. The pendency of an election protest is not sufficient basis to enjoin him from assuming office or
from discharging his functions. Laxina was proclaimed as the winner in the 1997 Barangay Elections in
Batasan Hills, Quezon City; he took his oath on May 27, 1997 and thereafter assumed office. He is
therefore vested with all the rights to discharge the functions of his office. Laxina exercised the powers
and functions thereof at the SK-Hall of Batasan Hills, Quezon City starting October 28, 1999 when the
writ of execution ordering Fermo to desist from performing the function of the Office of Barangay
Captain was served.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by SOLICITOR GENERAL JOSE C. CALIDA

Vs. ABS-CBN CORPORATION

GR No. 251358, February 10, 2020

DOCTRINE:

A forfeiture of a franchise will have to be declared in a direct proceeding for the purpose brought
by the State because a franchise is granted by law and its unlawful exercise is primarily a concern of the
Government. Quo warranto is specifically available as a remedy if it is thought that a corporation has
offended against its corporate charter or misused its franchise.

FACTS:

On June 14, 1950, Congress passed RA No. 511 granting Bolinao Electronics Corporation a temporary
permit to construct, maintain, and operate stations for international telecommunication and stations for
television in the Philippines. In 1952, BEC adopted the business name Alto Broadcasting System (ABS)
and launched as the country’s first television broadcast in 1953.

On June 16, 1955, Congress passed RA No. 1343 granting Manila Chronicle a permit to construct,
maintain, and operate radio broadcasting stations and stations for television in the Philippines. In 1957,
Chronicle Broadcasting (CBN) owned by Don Eugenio Lopez, Jr. acquired ABS. In 1967, the operations of
ABS and CBN were integrated, and the corporate name was changed to ABS-CBN Corporation.

On June 21, 1969, Congress approved RA No 5730 granting ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation a
franchise to construct, maintain and operate station for international telecommunications and stations
for television, and RA No. 5731, franchise to construct, maintain and operate radio broadcasting stations
in the Philippines both for a period of fifty years. In 1995, Congress passed RA No. 7966 granting ABS-
CBN its legislative franchise with a term of twenty-five years.

On October 15, 2010, ABS-CBN Corporation acquired PCCI Equities, Inc. its subscription rights over
250,000 shares in Sapientis Holding Corporation and became a wholly-owned subsidiary of ABS-
CBN. On March 5, 2015, ABS-CBN Corporation entered into a merger with its wholly-owned subsidiaries,
which included Sapientis.

In the meantime, ABS-CBN Convergence, Inc. signed a five-year network sharing agreement with Globe
Telecom in 2013, in which it created a new telephone brand, the ABS-CBN Mobile. It had its own prepaid
and postpaid voice, SMS, and mobile broadband services. The network sharing deal was approved by the
NTC on June 7, 2013.

The SEC issued a Certificate of Filing Amended Articles of Incorporation in favor of ABS-CBN Convergence
and uses Multi-Media Telephony’s franchise without congressional approval. To this date, ABS-CBN
Convergence has not publicly offered any of its outstanding capital stock to any securities exchange
within the Philippines.

In its Amended Annual Report for 2012 submitted to the Sec, ABS-CBN Corporation disclosed that it had
invested or advanced 49% of equity interest or ownership in Amcara, which ABS-CBN Corporation
considers as one of its subsidiaries. It also revealed that the remaining carrying value of investments in
Amacra amounted to P41 million as of December 31, 2012 and 2011.
In 2015, ABS-CBN Corporation officially introduced and launched a digital broadcasting business called
ABS-CBN TV Plus, which distributes digital set-top boxes with premium and free-to-air digital channels
(such as the ABS-CBN Kapamilya Network, and pay-per-view services) to selected areas in the
Philippines. Thereafter, in March 2016, ABS-CBN Corporation launched a pay-per-view channel in ABS-
CBN TV plus, the Kapamilya Box Office (KBO). The Filipinos may choose to access to access premium
content from their television sets that can be currently activated through SMS for a fee of P30.00 to
P99.00.

On April 1, 2015, ABS-CBN Corporation wrote a letter to NTC informing the latter of its plan to offer free-
to-air viewers and those who will purchase the ABS-CBN TV Plus the option to watch the Pacquiao-
Mayweather Match live through pay-per-view on Digital Terrestrial TV (DTT) for P2,500.00. Under Sec 3
of RA No. 7966, the respondent is required to secure prior authority from NTC before it uses any
frequency in the television or radio spectrum.

In a letter dated April 28, 2015, NTC directed ABS-CBN Corporation “to refrain from offering any pay
television service in its DTT trials until such time that the Commission has come up with appropriate
guidelines for the same.” Nevertheless, without NTC issuing any guidelines and ABS-CBN Corporation
securing any permit, on April 18, 2016, ABS-CBN offered live viewing, offered pay-per-view boxing
through KBO, advertised Holy Week Special, and concerts aired live on the same channel.

As of February 2019, despite the absence of any permit from NTC and guidelines on conditional access,
the KBO Channel inveigled 1.2 million unique TV Plus consumers to register in the service.

ISSUE:

Is Quo Warranto the proper remedy to forfeit the franchise of Respondents ABS-CBN Corporation and
ABS-CBN Convergence, Inc. for gross violation of their franchises.

RULING:

Yes. Under Sec 1 of Rule 66 of the Rules of Court, “an action for the usurpation of a public office, position
or franchise may be brought in the name of the Republic of the Philippines against a person who usurps,
intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises public office, position or franchise. The special civil action
of quo warranto is prerogative writ by which the Government can call upon any person to show by what
warrant he holds a public office or exercises a public franchise.

The franchises of ABS-CBN Corporation and ABS-CBN Convergence have to be revoked for the gross
violations they have committed. A forfeiture of a franchise will have to be declared in a direct proceeding
for the purpose brought by the State because a franchise is granted by law and its unlawful exercise is
primarily a concern of the Government. Quo warranto is specifically available as a remedy if it is thought
that a corporation has offended against its corporate charter or misused its franchise.

It is beyond cavil that a “franchise” is a “special privilege.” As a grant of the government, not only is a
franchise a “special” privilege; it is also a privilege of “public concern”. As a public concern, a franchise
has likewise been held to be “reserved for public control and administration” either by the government
directly, or through state agents, subject to rules and regulations attached with the exercise of the
powers of the franchise.
Thus, the Government, represented by the Solicitor General, may file this petition for quo warranto to
obtain a judicial declaration that respondents committed an unlawful exercise of their franchises, and
should therefore forfeit them.