USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

STRATEGIC DECISIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

OF THE GERMAN ASSAULT ON NORWAY IN 1940

by

Colonel Steinar Amundsen

Norwegian Army

Captain Steven Nerheim

Project Adviser

This SRP is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the Master of Strategic Studies Degree.
The U.S. Army War College is accredited by the Commission on Higher Education of the Middle States
Association of Colleges and Schools, 3624 Market Street, Philadelphia, PA 19104, (215) 662-5606. The
Commission on Higher Education is an institutional accrediting agency recognized by the U.S. Secretary
of Education and the Council for Higher Education Accreditation.

The views expressed in this student academic research paper are those of the author and do not reflect
the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S.
Government.

U.S. Army War College

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ii
 ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: COL Steinar Amundsen

TITLE: Strategic decisions and implications of the German assault on Norway in 1940

FORMAT: Strategy Research Project

DATE: 16 May 2005 PAGES: 36 CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

The German attack on Norway in 1940 was a swift, ambitious and seemingly risky
undertaking. The German Navy’s operations were conducted in the teeth of the British Royal
Navy. The subsequent amphibious assaults employed very limited forces, spread thinly among
several objectives along the long Norwegian seaboard and in the deep Norwegian fjords.
Ultimately setting the preconditions for a long-term occupation of Norway, Weserübung was an
operational success and secured strategic advantages for Germany.
Dismissing one-dimensional theories on the decisions for and strategic implications of the
German attack on Norway, this paper discusses underlying factors in the German decision-
making process and the dynamics of the strategic factors that preceded the campaign. The
direct strategic effects of the campaign are assessed along with theories on indirect, long-term
strategic implications.
The paper suggests that the decision resulted from a process where personalities,
individual characters, power-plays, institution building and institutional cultures, parochial
interests and coincidence played into both decision-making and the crafting of strategic
assessments. While significant direct effects on operations in the Atlantic are attributable to the
invasion, the indirect and long-term implications were probably more significant.
Second- and third order implications included conceptual military development, political
prestige and the changed perception of German grand strategic might. The invasion also
reduced Germany’s marginal ability to influence other important theatres of war as resources
remained committed to Norway. More intriguingly, the success of Operation Weserübung
served to cement Hitler's dictatorship and to reinforce his increasingly autocratic leadership of
the German Armed Forces – with significant effect on the conduct of World War II.

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 TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT................................................................................................................................................iii
AKNOWLEDGEMENTS ............................................................................................................................vii
STRATEGIC DECISIONS AND IMPLICATIONS OF THE GERMAN ASSAULT ON NORWAY IN 1940 ....1
A PARADIGM FOR UNDERSTADING STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS ....................................1
QUESTIONABLE STRATEGIC MEANS AND GLOOMY OPERATIONAL RISKS ................2
STRATEGIC FACTORS ..................................................................................................................4
ACCESS TO THE ATLANTIC – BASES IN NORWAY................................................................4
GERMAN MILITARY BUILD-UP, SWEDISH IRON ORE AND NORWEGIAN WATERS.......5
GERMAN STRATEGIC OPTIONS IN THE FALL OF 1939........................................................6
GERMAN ASSESSMENTS AND THE ROAD TO WESERÜBUNG.........................................7
KEEPING THE NORWEGIAN OPTION ALIVE ............................................................................7
STRATEGIC DEVELOPMENTS AND OPERATIONAL PLANNING.........................................8
WESERÜBUNG – AFTER ALL ....................................................................................................11
ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGES AND LEADERSHIP ..............................................................12
THE HIGH COMMAND OF THE WEHRMACT ..........................................................................12
THE FÜHRER AND THE MILITARY – HITLER'S LEADERSHIP............................................13
STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS.......................................................................................................16
THE IMPACT OF WESERÜBUNG..............................................................................................16
INDIRECT AND LONG TERM EFFECTS ...................................................................................16
CONCLUDING REMARKS ...........................................................................................................18
ENDNOTES ..............................................................................................................................................19
BIBLIOGRAPHY.......................................................................................................................................27

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 AKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This SRP was initially intended to be about something entirely different. The idea to
examine the processes and decisions behind the German attack on Norway was handed to me
when the original thesis was aborted due to dire circumstances and my own folly alike.

A paper this magnitude should not be a hard thing to do. But, due to the circumstances
alluded to above, it was to me. This paper would simply not have been committed were it not
for Steffen. He came up with the initial idea for the topic, nursed the project along and
supported me when others would have not. Due to his leadership and loyalty I got a break that I
probably did not deserve, but nevertheless needed badly.

Also, I do not think that the paper would have been finished were it not for M, whose love
and stern demands kept me on a path of hard work at a time I was inclined to throw the project
to the ground.

I owe this paper – and much more - to Steffen and to M. They know who they are.

Thanks!

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 STRATEGIC DECISIONS AND IMPLICATIONS OF THE GERMAN ASSAULT ON NORWAY IN 1940

The German attack on Norway in April 1940 was a stunning operational success. A
complicated and daring plan was executed with surprise, speed and excellent coordination and
Norwegian defense forces were swiftly and decisively defeated. By seizing Norway, Germany
would effectively deny Great Britain control over Norwegian waters, secure ice-free harbors and
guarantee a year round flow of the Swedish iron ore vital to Germany’s industry and war effort. 1
Additionally, bases in Norway could provide advantageous basing for the German Navy for a
subsequent war against Great Britain.2 The strategic and operational arguments for invading
Norway seem logical and compelling. And, the iron ore transports were indeed secured and the
Germans certainly operated from Norwegian bases against Britain during the war. But is this
why the campaign came about? Were these effects the only implications of the campaign? Did
second and third order effects originate in the experience of the campaign and German
decision-making processes with substantial impact in later campaigns?
In addition to a discussion of strategic issues and a review of the developments and
assessments that made up the road to war on Norway, this paper offers glimpses into the
processes and underlying factors that affected German decision-making. Furthermore, it
suggests theories on how the campaign may have had second and third order effects on
strategy and the larger war effort. Thus, this paper is more about the processes that shaped the
German campaign in Norway and the implications of it than about the campaign itself. The
concurrent invasion of Denmark, though an integrated and supporting part of the German
campaign, will not be considered here.

A PARADIGM FOR UNDERSTADING STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS

Historians have often presented the assessed rationale for the German campaign in
Norway as a one-dimensional line of reasoning, building a post hoc logical explanation for the
decisions that were made. Similarly, the strategic implications of the assault and subsequent
occupation are commonly assessed in terms of the direct effect upon strategic means, ways or
ends, and quite commonly in terms of being of greater or lesser importance to the overall
conduct of the war.
The intricacies of strategic and operational planning, relating the complex fabric of
intelligence, command and control, logistics and tactics involved in continuous parallel planning
and execution at a number of levels creates a hardly comprehensible web of asymmetrical
factors. Thus, after- the-fact characterization of campaigns as successes or failures does not
help to reveal the real reasons for the turn of events, and neither promotes enhanced
comprehension nor provides lessons learned. Superficial analysis leads us along a very
dangerous path, as a successful campaign may be an improbable result of strategic and
operational decisions, plans and execution – or of any combination of these factors.
Strategic decisions are influenced not only by the logic of an ends-ways-and-means
deduction. Among the strategic leaders who influence decisions, responsibilities and agendas
operate beyond the immediate issue. Participants lead organizations and represent their
institutional cultures. Strategic leaders operate through interpersonal relationships where
processes and decisions are influenced by shifting alliances and interests, and in intra-group
relations subject to the power and personalities of individuals. Thus, simplistic judgments of
strategic decisions and their outcomes are futile.
This paper assumes and appreciates that there is no science or consistent methodology
capable of isolating and weighing each and every factor that played into the decision to attack
Norway or explain how and why the campaign came about. Envisioning the chaotic fabric of
interwoven strategic arguments, operational risks, institutional interests and the psychological
influence of individuals, this paper assumes that each of these factors, however subtle, may
substantially influence strategic decisions and outcomes.

QUESTIONABLE STRATEGIC MEANS AND GLOOMY OPERATIONAL RISKS

Operation Weserübung began as a surprise naval operation with several small groups of
ships in sequenced sailing order: small groups unable to support each other in the face of the
British Royal Navy. The Germans fully appreciated the superiority of the British Fleet and their
own naval shortcomings. Dismayed by the outbreak of war in September 1939, the
Commander-in-Chief (C-i-C) of the German Navy, Grossadmiral3 Erich Raeder stated that his
”…surface forces…are so inferior in number and strength to those of the British Fleet …that
they can do no more than show they know how to die gallantly.” 4 A plan was in place to build
up the rather small Kriegsmarine 5 to a level where it could take on the British Royal Navy and
add naval operations at the high seas to the German strategic tool-box. That plan, however,
projected a continuous build-up until at least 1944 before the estimated force-levels could be
reached.
Moreover, there was the ever-present challenge of the North Sea and the Arctic waters.
While the Gulf Stream keeps harbors open year-round along the entire Norwegian coast, it also
produces extremely rough seas and demanding conditions for naval operations.6 Additionally,
winter pack ice substantially decreases maneuver room in the Arctic seas and World War II
sailors, not benefiting from modern electronic systems, found navigation extremely difficult. 7

2
 The amphibious Weserübung employed less than 9000 German ground troops. Six
different groups would secure bridgeheads for landings at six different locations spread out
along almost the entire long seaboard and in the deep fjords of Norway. None of these six
assault units exceeded 2500 troops. Planning included the movement of an additional 54,000
troops and their supplies over the twelve days following the initial attack. 8 This was a scant
force to undertake such an ambitious operation, but the Germans did not expect a tough
Norwegian military defense.9
Norway, a young state and inexperienced in foreign affairs and strategy, had enjoyed a
long peace and had been relatively successful staying neutral in World War I - though having
had to strike an uneasy balance between the belligerents.10 Even though WWI had brought the
consequences of war to the Norwegians’ doorsteps, Norway let her defense capabilities dwindle
in the inter-war years.11 The scaling back of the Norwegian armed forces was dramatic and left
Norway with a tiny and poorly trained standing defense force, no strategic warning system, no
capability at the operational level and insufficient means of guarding her territorial integrity.
There were reserves and a mobilization system, but the reserves were poorly trained, heavy
weaponry scarce and the mobilization system had never been tested.12
However, in order to get to the ports for the landings the German convoys had to run
“…the gauntlets of the Norwegian coastal batteries…”13 Moreover, Norway did have a
mobilization system and six reserve brigades.14 Even with the most optimistic German
projections, which included an assessment that the brigades needed 12 days to be ready after
mobilization, at least an incidental Norwegian defense effort could not be ruled out. An
amphibious assault is extremely vulnerable to even light resistance at the initial landings. The
long odds attendant to even getting safely across the harsh North Sea in the teeth of the British
Navy and the prospect of landing small, lightly armed forces of limited fighting power at a
number of different places could quite understandably have discouraged German decision-
makers on tactical and operational grounds.
In late 1939, following the successes of the Anschluss15 and the campaign in Poland,
Germany’s immediate attention was on continental Europe. Every effort was made to avoid a
war with Great Britain. In light of Hitler’s ‘promise’ to the C-i-C of the Kriegsmarine, that such a
war would not occur before 1944 to enable the German Navy to grow to suitable size and
power, it is not surprising that Hitler and Raeder would later label the invasion of Norway “the
cheekiest operations in recent history.” As they would acknowledge, the operation broke “all the
rules of naval warfare”16.

3
 This begs the question: Having serious strategic challenges in continental Europe and, if
operating in the North Sea, certainly risking facing the British Navy, why chance a questionable
campaign in Norway in hazardous waters? Was the campaign important enough to offset these
risks? Was the operation a consistent part of German strategy resulting from a balanced
deliberation that included careful risk-reward assessment, or did other factors weigh in on that
decision? In either case, how did that decision-making process operate? How did the process
influence the planning and the final decision?

STRATEGIC FACTORS

ACCESS TO THE ATLANTIC – BASES IN NORWAY

The strategic importance of the Atlantic was nothing new to the Germans. Neither were
the strategic advantages of Norwegian bases, from which the Kriegsmarine would have the
freedom of action to operate in a potential naval strife with Britain. “The German Navy had long
had its eyes on the north. Germany had no access to the wide ocean, a geographical fact that
had been imprinted on the minds of its naval officers during the First World War.”17 Those vivid
WW-I experiences were not confined to the minds of the German naval officers, but concerned
German strategists alike. The Imperial Navy’s 18 considerable potential had been rendered
strategically inconsequential19 because the “German High Seas Fleet never reached the high
seas.”20 The British-enforced blockade in the Atlantic (running from Bergen to the Shetlands)
effectively restricted the German Navy to the land-locked southern part of the North Sea.21 The
German merchant fleet was similarly bottled up. The blockade eventually contributed to a
famine estimated to have cost 700,000 German lives.22 Moreover, though claiming neutrality,
the Norwegians had been forced to run their merchant fleet in allied service – explaining why
German U-boats sank half of the Norwegian merchant fleet. 23 The important German strategic
lesson learned was that Norwegian neutrality could be challenged and that Norway might yield
to pressure.
The German naval officer and naval theorist Wolfgang Wegener had argued as early as
1915 for a naval strategy to facilitate control over the Atlantic. He saw that control of the
Skagerak and newly acquired bases were necessary to allow the Navy to engage in and control
the Atlantic, and suggested an elaborate scheme of German bases in the Atlantic. More
specifically, he criticized the German naval strategy of lacking operational soundness and
strategic vision; waiting for a decisive battle in the North Sea while conceding to the British all of
the strategic and operational advantages. Wegener’s vision might make possible “the world
power position of the German Fleet.”24 His ideas may seem lofty given the known outcome of

4
WW I, but Wegener made his argument from a supposition that Germany might reach a
favorable position in the aftermath of the war and claimed that, until that war ended Germany
needed to “be ready to seize any opportunities.”25 He went on to point out that: “…nobody can
already know today what attitude the Nordic countries will take if the English ravishing at sea
further presses them.”26
Wegener’s theories reached many more when, as a Vice Admiral, he published his book
The Naval Strategy of the World War, “One of the few books Hitler ever read on naval
strategy…”27 The strategic concepts were basically unchanged from 1915, save that Norway
now “featured prominently in Wegener’s thinking.”28 His work was popular in the naval
community and his theories were used by military scholars. War-games conducted in the inter-
war years reinforced Wagener’s conclusions.29 This discussion also influenced Raeder: “…the
C-i-C of the navy was also caught up in the stream of expansionist and offensive ideas,
including the acquisition of bases that characterized this period.”30 Consequently, Raeder called
for more ‘Wegenerism’ in German naval strategy time and again over several years.31
Thus, compelling theories existed for a new naval strategy to support German interests
and future war objectives. These theories encompassed economic aspects and accounted both
the necessity of the free flow of strategic goods to Germany and the protection of the transports.
Argued over time by a respected theorist and naval leader and the C-i-C of the Kriegsmarine,
these theories matured through professional debate. The result was a sound concept,
potentially able to negate Germany’s difficult geographic position with a viable, ambitious naval
strategy for a war with Great Britain; and it included German bases at the Norwegian coast.
The naval side of the German military house included a movement for expansionist and
offensive naval concepts. Certainly, and not unimportantly, these ideas had been known to the
Führer and to the German military leadership long before planners were put to work on sketches
for a Norwegian campaign in the fall of 1939.

GERMAN MILITARY BUILD-UP, SWEDISH IRON ORE AND NORWEGIAN WATERS

Hitler was convinced of two major prerequisites to a future successful Third Reich. One
was self-sufficiency in strategic materials; the other was a prepared military machine. He
pushed these issues from the time that he came in power. In 1936 he issued a document that
“cast Germany in an apocalyptic struggle against bolshevism and worldwide Jewry - a struggle it
dare not lose, considering the result would lead … to another Versailles.”32 Hitler predicted the
annihilation of the German people if the country were to fail to meet his expectations, wailed at
the slow progress from 1933 to 1936, and demanded an increased effort toward the two

5
identified strategic prerequisites. Among the strategic materials he singled out was iron ore.
Hitler exhorted that with enough effort, Germany could be self-sufficient.33
Even after significant growth in German iron ore production, and the addition of almost 3
million more tons of ‘domestic’ ore by the 1938 Anschluss, by 1939 Germany was still
dependent upon imports. To an increasing degree through the late thirties, Germany was
specifically dependent upon Swedish iron ore. This had manifold reasons. German demand for
iron grew as a direct result of increased industrial production and military build-up. From 1935
to 1938, iron ore imports increased by more than 50%. As the favored Swedish ore had double
the iron content of other imported ores, it came to represent almost half of the German imports.
Despite a four-year plan to achieve independence from ore imports, German estimates
concluded that without Swedish ores carried through Norwegian waters, there would be a
critical import shortfall: a shortfall seriously damaging in wartime.34
During the warm parts of the year, Swedish iron ore could be transported down the Baltic.
But in winter, Swedish Baltic ports froze, forcing the routing of ore through Narvik. As the ore
could be transported safely almost all the way to Germany inside Norwegian territorial waters,
the winter route was secure so long as Norwegian neutrality was respected.35
Thus, in the autumn of 1939 Germany was increasingly dependent upon Swedish iron ore
to build up the military and to sustain it during war-time. The winter transport of iron ore
depended on the security of Norwegian territorial waters. Norwegian territorial waters, their
control, and there protection were important strategic issues for Germany.

GERMAN STRATEGIC OPTIONS IN THE FALL OF 1939

Despite Wegener’s visions and Raeder’s talks, Hitler initially showed little interest in the
Atlantic and Norway. Aware of the evolving allied formation and anticipating allied moves to
counter German expansion after the incorporation of Austria, three strategic options were given
special attention by the German leadership after the successful blitzkrieg in Poland.
At an October 2 naval conference, Raeder presented Oberkommando der Wehrmacht’s
(OKW) 36 options for future campaigns:
“1. Attempt a decision by operations on land in the west. Concentrate the entire
armament industry and war economy on the Army and the Air Force.
2. Attempt a decision by the ‘siege of Britain.’ Concentrate efforts on the most
speedy and large-scale expansion of the submarine arm and the aircraft
required for warfare against Britain. On land: Defense in the west.
3. Defense at sea and on land; delaying tactics.”37

As these alternatives indicate, German strategic deliberations were focused on France

and Great Britain. The first option, a German land offensive in the west, meant that the Navy

6
would receive little attention. Arguably, the rationale for a naval operation against Norway
would dwindle as it would be difficult to capitalize on an occupation of Norway unless means
were available to support an effective follow-on campaign from that country.
However, if the Germans were to choose the Great Britain option (option number two),
Norwegian bases would prove very handy. In a defensive strategy an argument could be made
for an operational naval offensive aiming at keeping the British from occupying Norway and/or to
threaten Norwegian territorial waters.

GERMAN ASSESSMENTS AND THE ROAD TO WESERÜBUNG

KEEPING THE NORWEGIAN OPTION ALIVE

Hitler seemed set on an offensive in continental Europe. Nevertheless, support for a
major land offensive lukewarm, with influential leaders hesitant and the Army establishment very
pessimistic, a strategic defense or a Siege of Britain still seemed feasible. Both options called
for significant naval contributions, but the Kriegsmarine was far from ready. The number of
submarines with the capability to operate effectively was too small. The number of subs was
projected to climb rapidly, but the lack of capable surface ships and suitable aircraft was far
more troubling. And the Navy would not be able to support any strategy for a major war without
an expanded operational base. Raeder fully recognized this predicament, but understood that
the Navy would be unable to support any likely future strategy, regardless of its state of
readiness, if it were to be locked in – like it was during WW I. Moreover, the Navy was likely to
be neglected if it could not present viable contributions to potential German military endeavors.
Thus, the day after his the presentation of strategic options to the Navy, he asked his staff
for estimates on acquisition of bases in Norway through diplomatic pressure or secured with a
military campaign. On October 5 Raeder approached the Army Chief of Staff to discuss
possible contributions in an effort to expand the operational base for the Navy and the Air Force,
to include an operation to seize and defend bases in Norway. The Army Chief was less than
thrilled. Even the naval staff was “far from enthusiastic”38 in its assessments of 9 October,
presenting serious objections to such an adventure any time soon because of the lack of
recourses.
The professional estimates did not encourage a grand naval operation and Hitler still
hoped to avoid, for a time, hostilities with Britain. His speech to the Reichstag39 on October 6
included an offer of peace to Great Britain and France. Nevertheless, he had decided on the
strategic priorities. On October 9, 1939 Hitler issued order to his military chiefs to speed up the
planning for operation Gelb.40 He directed a push to the northwestern coasts of France and the

7
Low Countries that would provide submarine-bases for a campaign against Great Britain.41 This
would, of course, still not alleviate the fundamental operational problem for the German Navy,
access to the open sea for future campaigns. This strategic direction gave priority to the Army
and the Air Force and left little room for ambitious naval operations and for the build-up of
sufficient high seas capabilities. As the Air Force was to support a ground offensive, aircraft
with the appropriate capabilities would be so prioritized at the expense of air support for naval
operations.42
Again, Raeder was quick on his feet. In a conference with Hitler on October 10, he
elucidated the naval limitations of the strategy and “pointed to the advantages of bases on the
Norwegian coast.”43 Hitler showed little enthusiasm, but “agreed to take the question of Norway
under consideration.”44 In late October the Germans had solid evidence that British ships had
loaded goods from Sweden and the Baltic nations at Narvik for shipment to Great Britain. This
brought the issues of strategic goods and British interests in Norway – the whole issue of
Norway for that matter – to the forefront with the German Navy staff. The Kriegsmarine
concluded that shipments from the Baltic nations to Britain via Sweden and Norway had
increased dramatically. The staff also muttered that the Kriegsmarine had little chance of
interdicting these transports because the British took full advantage of neutral Norwegian
waters. It also became clear to the Germans that in addition to facilitating future German
endeavors on the open seas, a Norwegian campaign would not only secure German imports of
crucial strategic goods; it could deprive them to Great Britain.45 This was not an insignificant
addition to Raeder’s argument for the Norway option, as a toll on crucial British imports would
support a siege of Britain and lead to a better strategic position.
These issues were not at the forefront of deliberations among the higher levels of German
leadership. Raeder, however, never gave up the Norwegian option. On November 26, he told
his staff that “he saw a danger, in the event of a German attack on the Netherlands, that Britain
might stage a surprise landing on the Norwegian coast and take possessions of a base there.” 46
Shortly after he repeated this message to Hitler and “stated that it was important to occupy
Norway.”47 Through December 1939 Raeder tirelessly kept the option of a campaign in Norway
alive. Moreover, he increasingly tied his arguments to assessments to British threats and
strategic vulnerabilities, which would become quite important.

STRATEGIC DEVELOPMENTS AND OPERATIONAL PLANNING

Raeder either guessed right or had excellent intelligence. Either way, his analyses were
spot on. Proposals for an intervention in Norway had been voiced in Britain for some time.

8
Interdicting the transport of iron ore from Sweden to Germany was enthusiastically advocated
by Churchill, who stated in late November that: “Nothing would be more deadly…to the German
war-making capacity, and to the life of the country” 48 than to stop the Swedish ore from reaching
Germany. 49
In Great Britain Churchill’s ideas, however strategically sound, were deemed politically
infeasible. British values and the relationship with Norway factored, but a far more important
argument against Churchill’s ideas centered in the relationship to the U.S., which could not be
jeopardized. A British violation of Norway would not likely be acceptable to the U.S., and getting
the Americans into an alliance was more important than anything else. However, the political
preconditions for British operations in Norwegian waters changed with the outbreak of the
Soviet-Finnish War on November 30, 1939. A small Nordic Country had been attacked by
Russia, and support to the Finns would probably offset the political incorrectness of naval
operations and uninvited shipping in Norwegian waters and harbors. German considerations
ran along the same lines. Allied support to the Finns was anticipated and “Allied intervention to
aid Finland could be expected to entail an occupation of Norwegian ports.”50
Raeder had made sure to bring Norway to Hitler’s attention time and again. However, it
may be that the importance of Norway emerged as a practical, urgent strategic concern to Hitler
for the first time with the outbreak of the Soviet-Finnish War. Only two weeks later Norway was
brought onto Hitler's agenda again. On December 14 and December 18, Hitler met with Vidkun
Quisling, the leader of the Norwegian political party Nasjonal Samling.51 Quisling warned Hitler
of Anglo-Norwegian collaboration and claimed that, despite declared Norwegian neutrality,
secret conspiracies between the British and the Norwegians were supported in the Norwegian
cabinet. Quisling also claimed a great following in Norway and that Norwegians would welcome
a German supported take-over of government by the Nasjonal Samling. This played on Hitler's
racial ideas of the importance of Nordic blood to the development of The Third Reich. These
meetings came about with the help of the German ideologist and political theorist Alfred
Rosenberg and, of course, with a push from Raeder. Quisling made sure to nurture the seed of
mistrust towards the Norwegian Government throughout the winter of 1939-1940. Hitler either
warmed the Norwegian issue or tired of being reminded of it. After his first meeting with Quisling
he ordered the OKW to “investigate how one can take possession of Norway.” 52
Grand strategic priorities left no room for a Navy build-up or for naval initiatives in the
Atlantic. The Norwegian issue had been driven to the point of a planning process at the OKW –
directed by the Führer.53 At this time Hitler probably remained unconvinced of the necessity for
an invasion. “It was obviously a largely theoretical exercise, as Hitler was empathic in his

9
insistence that he felt a neutral Norway was in Germany’s best interest.”54 Raeder ensured that
Hitler kept Norway on his mind when he “declared it essential that Norway not fall into British
hands”55 in late December 1939.
At the turn of the year the Norwegian Project was still indistinct, but the planning process
was soon to be thrown into high gear. On January 10 the initial OKW appreciation for a
Norwegian Campaign, called Studie Nord, was issued to the service staffs for planning.
Raeder’s staff, which had been looking into the Norwegian option for some time, took little time
flesh out an operational concept and the prerequisites for success. These conclusions were
later included in all planning stages, reflected all the landing sites eventually used, and
emphasized the overriding operational principle of surprise. A North Sea naval operation
against Norway could only succeed if the British sea control could be counterbalanced by
surprise. The other services unable to influence the planning before Hitler, on January 23,
“placed the planning for Norway firmly within the hands of the OKW.” 56 By this time Hitler had
obviously developed a closer interest and a personal approach to the Norwegian Campaign, as
this order included the note that “work on Studie ‘N’ would be continued under his [Hitler’s]
personal and immediate influence.”57 The order also included the codename Weserübung and
directed that planning be executed in a group that could form the core of an operations staff. 58
There were several reasons for Hitler's renewed interest and a number of arguments for
placing the operation exclusively in the hands of OKW. As Hitler had been anxious to launch
the land-offensive against France and the Low Countries operation for some time, planners had
repeatedly pointed to weather among the many preconditions. Then Gelb was effectively
postponed when information on the operation was compromised in spectacular circumstances.59
Before Gelb could be reassessed and launched there was ample time for the British to intervene
in Norway. The Norwegian contingency offered an opportunity for Britain and France to take the
initiative in the “phony war.”60 Keeping the planning for Weserübung at OKW, in a staff manned
with officers from all services, would both promote operational security and force the joint
planning processes instrumental for success in Norway. Hitler made the operation a personal
matter of Feldherr 61 Adolf Hitler by placing it with a small staff attached to the OKW but
reporting to himself.62
Hitler's interest in Weserübung was further boosted by the Altmark affair. The German
supply ship Altmark entered Norwegian waters on February 14, 1940 while returning to
Germany from a support mission in the South Atlantic. Altmark carried 303 captured British
seamen collected from the commerce raiders she supplied. Norwegian authorities may or may
not have had knowledge of this, for the Norwegian Navy made only a slapdash inspection of

10
Altmark and escorted her on toward Germany. The British had long since identified Altmark,
and launched a rescue operation, breeched Norwegian neutrality, boarded the ship, and killed a
number of German sailors. The British sailors were returned to England with considerable
propaganda gain. This incident indicated to Hitler that the British had no intention of honoring
Norwegian sovereignty and that Norway was not capable of enforcing her neutrality. Perhaps
even more importantly, the low-key Norwegian diplomatic complaints after the incident fed
allegations of a secret, high-level Anglo-Norwegian conspiracy that had been repeatedly
reported by Quisling.63
On February 21, Hitler received General Nicolaus von Falkenhorst, whom the chief of the
operations department of the OKW, General Alfred Jodl, had proposed as a suitable
commander for Weserübung. At this time Hitler had not only decided on the Campaign in
Norway but also decided that he would launch Weserübung before Gelb . He told Falkenhorst, “I
cannot and will not begin the offensive in the West before this affair has been settled.”64 During
the following month planning continued under the leadership of Falkenhorst but, apart from the
seizing of Denmark as a supporting operation, little was added to the overall concept already
prescribed by the Navy staff. Diligent planning eventually sorted out the countless logistical
issues and the complex problems of combining naval, air and ground operations. Weserübung
had evolved, in little more than three months, from a vague idea into a complex, joint
operation.65

WESERÜBUNG – AFTER ALL

Weserübung succeeded with very close margins. The British mined Norwegian waters on
April 8, the day before the main German trust into Norway, but too late to impede the German
ships which had been on their way for some time. There were incidental clashes at sea. Ships
were sunk by the Norwegian coastal artillery. But the campaign was largely successful, despite
an operational problem in the North, were the Norwegians put up stiff resistance and the Allied
counter-offensive whipped the Germans at Narvik. The Allies eventually withdrew because of a
greater concern for continental Europe when Hitler launched Gelb , and that problem resolved
too when the Norwegians capitulated in the north.
It is not intended to go into details of the campaign. The major point is that during the
execution of the campaign the Germans came close to failing. Had the timing been a little
different on either side, the German convoys may never have reached Norwegian ports. Had
the allies not withdrawn from the northern part of the theatre, the Germans may have been
forced out leaving the important iron ore port of Narvik in allied hands.66

11
 German strategic direction in the fall of 1939 did not support a campaign in Norway and
it was in Germany’s interest to honor Norwegian neutrality. Navy parochial interests kept the
contingency alive while changing strategic assessments, particularly as to the British intentions
and a number of other factors and coincidental incidents, as well as shrewd play by Raeder,
lead to Hitler's increasing interest in the project. Hence, the emergence of Weserübung was not
a logical consequence of consolidated strategic planning. It was the product of an inconsistent
process fed by isolated and sometimes contradictory interests, assumptions and events.

ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGES AND LEADERSHIP

THE HIGH COMMAND OF THE WEHRMACT

Had there not been an in place organization capable of supporting joint planning and
supporting Hitler’s ability to drive through ad-hoc strategic decisions despite resistance from
professionals and institutions, there would have been no Weserübung.
On January 30, 1933 General (Later Field-Marshall) Werner von Blomberg came into
office as the Reich Defense Minister and C-i-C of the Wehrmacht.”67 (He was War Minister from
March, 1935). Unlike his predecessors, who had carried out their political and administrative
duties and left the services at the top of the military organization, Blomberg set out to create and
integrate a military high command in his ministry. This unified command was to be superior to
the services and coordinate all military planning and operational activities. Moreover he
“maintained that he should be responsible for the co-ordinated direction, not only of military
operations, but also of the other weapons of ‘total war’ such as propaganda and economic
warfare, and even of civil defense throughout the public services.”68 Using the terms and
positions of current U.S. political-military organization, Blomberg would be the Secretary of
Defense, Chief of the Joint Staff – at a level higher than the service chiefs - and the (only)
combatant commander. He would also have the authority to direct all other departments and
agencies in matters of war. 69
Subtly but steadily Blomberg developed the organization of his ministry with the aim of
making it an effective military General Staff that could support his enhanced responsibilities and
authority.
The changes in command relations and the implicit infringement on military professional
virtues guarded by the services created tensions as early as 1934. The reorganization caused
upheaval that affected personal relationships and divided the army officers into one camp
suffused with Nazi zeal and another consisting of army “traditionalists.” Parochial interests
became evident and the service chiefs fought their loss of power. The Army wanted to remain

12
the chief bureau for waging war, to include economical matters. The Air Force was a young
and ambitious service, led by the powerful flamboyant, vain and rude Reichsmarshall for
aviation Herman Göring, who had distaste for staff. 70 The Navy, under Raeder – arguably the
shrewdest service chief - was fighting for a strategic role and institutional prominence.
Nevertheless, Blomberg would not be discouraged and continued confidently and defiantly on
his quest.
The new War department awarded the C-i-C unprecedented power. This position also
provided him both the opportunity and the power to influence policy, which Blomberg frequently
exercised with Hitler. 71 When Blomberg was forced from office, on February 4, 1938, Hitler
assumed the position of C-i-C of the Wehrmacht himself. At the same time “…the war ministry
was abolished.”72 Hitler then brought in General Keitel as chief of the new Oberkommando der
Wehermacht (OKW) – a man he could easily control and from whom he could expect no
dissent. Keitel took over Bloomberg’s headquarters intact.
The implications of these moves are staggering. The Head of State and the C-i-C had
merged into one person. There were no political or military institutional layers between Hitler
and military affairs and operations. Had there been limitations to Blomberg’s influence, there
were no boundaries to the Führer. Hitler now had a military headquarters and a chief who could
deal with the military establishment from an authoritative position with no interest other than to
support whatever Hitler wanted. The headquarters of the Führer and the headquarters of the
Armed Forces had been welded into one organization.

THE FÜHRER AND THE MILITARY – HITLER'S LEADERSHIP

Hitler seemed to have a love-hate relationship with the military. He took a keen interest in
military affairs, was well read and his knowledge spanned technical as well as strategic and
operational themes. He could also be very emotional about ‘his troops’ and wanted to be seen
as part of the Wehrmacht. The Führer was quite obviously drawn to the nobility of military
service and wanted to be associated with the Wehrmacht, while at the same time he was less
patient with the diligence and professional outlook of the Prussian military tradition and the Army
as such.73 Later in the war he commented on his dislike of the Army as a whole, blaming
Blomberg for the professional or cultural flaws of the organization: “all that goes back to the time
when Blomberg’s broad shoulders came between me and the Wehrmacht.” 74
In his dealing with the military, Hitler showed a sage grasp of organizational psychology,
powers of persuasion and a remarkable ability to win admiration, combined with a total absence
of moral boundaries, cunning opportunism and ruthless exploitation. His goal was apparently to

13
expand his power-base – indefinitely it seems. The Third Reich was to be built on two pillars;
the party and the Wehrmacht. By the time of World War II Hitler had complete control over the
party and straddled the official positions that made it possible to operate smoothly both
domestically and internationally. From 1938 he tightened the grip on the Armed Forces through
a series of personnel replacements and organizational changes, and the steady build-up of
Adolf Hitler as the mythic, infallible Feldherr.
Hitler showed little empathy and a lot of ruthless, manipulative abilities in the ways that he
rid himself of strong personalities and professionals as well as troublesome dissidents and
individuals not adequately submissive to the Führer. Blomberg, considered “one of the most
outstanding soldiers of the Prussian Army,” 75 had nursed Hitler through the fight between the SA
and the Army and the definite relegation of the SA to insignificance.76 He later developed the
OKW into the very foundation of Hitler’s commanding position of power. Nevertheless, when
the opportunity to get rid of Blomberg arose, Hitler took little time to take advantage of it. When
von Blomberg was caught up in an unfortunate romantic affair and a marriage that came under
heavy fire, he was forced to resign. C-i-C of the Luftwaffe Herman Göring, himself interested in
Blomberg’s posting, had a large hand in these intrigues.77 Soon thereafter, Hitler got rid of the
C-i-C of the Army. Generaloberst78 Freiherr Werner von Fritsch: “…a gifted and unbending
officer of the old school…”79 was the obvious candidate to succeed Bloomberg as Minister of
War and C-i-C of the Armed Forces. However, von Fritch had been hostile to the Nazi Party
and had from the beginning offered stiff resistance to Hitler’s military plans. He was framed by
the Chief of the SS and the police, Heinrich Himmler, and eventually had to stand trial on
charges of homosexual conduct. He was relieved well before the trial. The generals
complained audibly, and soon there were rumors of a coup. Shortly afterwards, sixteen more
generals were relieved and forty-four others transferred – all of whom were considered “less
than enthusiastic in their devotion to Nazism,…”80 Hitler simultaneously laundered the Foreign
Office, washing out the leader Neurath, and got rid of Schacht, the minister of economics.
The Führer also deliberately replaced strong leaders with compliant people who would
help him secure increasing power and influence for himself. When he brought in General Keitel
as the chief of the OKW, he consulted Blomberg and mentioned Keitel, whom he had seen in
Bloomberg’s office. Bloomberg’s response was: “Oh, Keitel; there’s no question of him; he’s
nothing but the man who runs my office.” 81 Hitler responded: “That’s exactly the man I’m
looking for.”82 General Warlimont, who served on the OKW staff, claimed that “General Keitel
had basically neither the ability nor the character to be military Chief of Staff to a man like Hitler
and he immediately and unresistingly allowed himself to be degraded to the position of Chef de

14
Bureau.”83 In his book Hitler’s Generals Walter Görlitz characterizes Keitel as “…no ‘homo
politicus; he did not possess any sound conviction and totally lacked inner sovereignty of
character…” and claims that “…Keitel was deeply impressed by the Führer,…”84 No question,
in Keitel Hitler had found a devoted and professionally unambitious messenger-boy. The chief
of the operations staff at the OKW, General Alfred Jodl, had an unfailing admiration for and
devotion to Hitler. He struck a special relationship with the Führer that outlived all strains and
was very much driven by the prerogatives awarded to him. Jodl was very effective in keeping
the Army out of important matters and keeping the powerful C-i-C of the Luftwaffe in check. 85
Simultaneously with Blomberg’s departure, Hitler cleansed the Foreign Office, replacing
Neurath with “the shallow and compliant Ribbentrop”86 and “The weakling Funk was formally
named as the successor Schacht as Minister of Economics.”87 Personnel replacements,
combined with Hitler’s self-appointment as the C-i-C and the abolishment of the War Ministry,
expanded Hitler's power-base dramatically. On February 5, the day after Hitler's self-
appointment, the headlines of the Voelkischer Boebachter88 described Hitler’s coup in one
sentence: “STRONGEST CONCENTRATION OF ALL POWERS IN THE FUEHRERS
HANDS”.89
The centralization of strategic powers and the OKW meant that Hitler could now move
rapidly, both strategically and operationally. The deliberate placing of compliant individuals in
key positions, while excluding professionals and dissidents, enabled him to play by ear and
make far-reaching ad-hoc decisions.90 This organizational framework was a prerequisite for the
following military campaigns and the successful operations in 1939 and 1940 would consolidate
Hitler’s power and his control of the military establishment.
On 24 April 1942, Hitler declared
“that there had been only two decisive events thus far in the entire war. While
many historians may well guess at least one of these, the German ‘defensive
battle’ outside Moscow during the previous winter, only a few would discern that
the other crucial event the Führer had in mind was the ‘Norwegian campaign of
1940’”91

This may lead one to think that Hitler had long planned to occupy Norway. As this paper
has concluded, this was of course not so. Underscoring the success of the Norwegian
campaign, Hitler was building on his reputation as a magical military mind and his power over
the military establishment. The way Weserübung was conceived, planned and executed – and
the fact that it was a success – further consolidated the organizational framework and promoted
Hitler as a Feldherr: Later in the war he would continue to change command relations and

15
assume command authority himself, and to interfere directly with the operational and tactical
directions in a detailed manner – way beyond his competency. 92

STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS

THE IMPACT OF WESERÜBUNG

Historians disagree on the direct military impact of Operation Weserübung on the war.
Mann and Jörgensen claim that the campaign and in particular the losses to the German Navy
during the assault, were of “crucial strategic implications for the rest of the war,” 93 chiefly due to
three factors. First, the operation denied the British possession of Norway and her territorial
waters. Second, the constant threat presented by the German Navy could not be ignored by the
British and their over-stretched Royal Navy was forced to guard the Bergen-Shetland line.
Thirdly, “the campaign had been achieved at limited cost and at no detriment to Plan Gelb – the
attack on France.”94 In the Official British History, T.K. Derry says that “…in particular, the North
Norway fjords provided the bases for deadly attacks by aircraft, submarines, and surface ships
against our [British] Murmansk convoys in 1942”95 and indicates that the Germans had
significant impact on the British Royal Navy’s operations in the Atlantic. 96
Claasen and Ziemke, on the other hand, state that the campaign had little impact on the
larger war. According to Claasen, German hopes to utilize Norwegian bases in the Battle of
Britain and the Atlantic Campaign were never realized owing to the absence of a coherent
maritime-air strategy Germany’s early failure to develop long-range reconnaissance and anti-
shipping aircraft.97
On the whole it seems a fair conclusion that Weserübung impacted the naval operations
in the North Sea and in particular limited the British Navy’s freedom of movement. German
strategic gains from operations in Norway, in themselves, probably influenced no direct change
in the course of the war. Germany simply had insufficient appropriate, open-ocean naval and
air resources to develop the full potential of the Norwegian bases.

INDIRECT AND LONG TERM EFFECTS

Operation Weserübung, absent an appropriate fleet, never enabled the Germans’ quest
for a new strategic role for the Kriegsmarine. However, there were other indirect and second-
and third order effects. The invasion of Norway clearly signaled that Germany would not allow
flaky commitments to neutrality where their interests were threatened. Weserübung
demonstrated Germany’s ability to project strategic power, showed that no country could count
on being rescued by the Allies, and earned prestige for Germany’s military capabilities. One

16
may argue that “...the campaign in the Low Countries and France provided similar arguments on
a far larges scale…”98 In the political strategic realm, Weserübung, together with Poland and
the subsequent blitzkrieg in the west, contributed to an aggressive strand of overwhelming
campaigns that bolstered Germany’s military prestige and strategic might. In this, Germany’s
first fight with the Western Allies, the impact of a failed Weserübung would likely have affected
Germany more negatively politically and psychologically that not having launched the campaign
at all. What would have been the effect on the preparations for and launching of Gelb , had
Weserübung failed?
The loss of many surface ships and transport aircraft not only rendered the Germans
unable to take advantage of the strategic outflanking position Norway provided them, but also
reduced German capabilities in other theatres.99 Festung Norwegen tied between 300,000 and
400,000 German troops throughout the war 100 - a force likely to have made a difference if
employed in elsewhere.
Professionally, the invasion of Norway was a showcase for joint operations. The landing
sites and initial operational objectives were secured by air-power alone, and Weserübung was a
‘first’ for several more inventive employments of tactical means. The experiences from the
Norwegian campaign added new concepts to the German operational and strategic ‘tool-
boxes.’101
Hitler’s statement that Norway “…would have to become an electrical center of northern
Europe,…”102 is in no way indicative of the German economic gains from the campaigns. The
substantial Norwegian merchant fleet slipped out of the Germans’ hands as the Norwegian exile
Government requisitioned its services in May 1940.103 The importance of the Swedish iron ore,
once at the heart of the strategic argument for denying the Brits control over Norwegian harbors
and waters, dwindled as Germany seized the Lorraine mines in the Gelb campaign. Imports of
ore from Sweden never came close to the requirements estimated prior to the war.104
The campaign most likely affected the German leadership both psychologically and
organizationally. Weserübung built on the success of the Polish campaign and consolidated
Hitler's enhanced leadership position after the ‘coup’ in 1938.105 Moreover, the high command
of the Wehrmacht proved successful time and again, which silenced professional objections
from the services and also any dissident that still had a voice. The decision-making process
provided a blue-print for later decisions made in the secluded environment that Hitler’s and the
OKW made up. This furnished an efficient set-up for swift strategic decisions, but at the same
one that lacked the full breadth of the professional input of the German military.

17
 Perhaps even more significantly, Hitler's direct involvement in the campaign in Poland,
Weserübung and Gelb, and the successes of those operations, proved professional Prussian
staff estimates wrong and established Hitler as the Feldherr that he wanted to be. Hitler's
added self-confidence and his growing image as a genius made it increasingly difficult for the
rest of the leadership to reason with him. Throughout the war he would continue to change
command relations and assume command authority himself, as well as interfering directly with
the operational and tactical directions in a detailed manner – way beyond his competency. This
would lead to disastrous decisions later on in the war.106

CONCLUDING REMARKS
There were probably sound strategic arguments for a German campaign in Norway,
although the decision to launch it could not be directly derived from the grand strategic priorities
of the day. However, a number of interests, personalities and coincidental factors affected the
dynamic process that made up the preconditions for the decision to launch the campaign. Had
not Raeder had a long-lasting investment in the project, the operation would probably never
have taken place – and in any case there would not have been a solid navy planning-process to
draw from. Had not Blomberg patiently and persistently built the OKW, it is highly unlikely that
Hitler could have pushed this or later decisions through in the way that he did. Had not von
Blomberg married the wrong woman... The list goes on and on, and indicates only that the
underlying preconditions for the decision-process may have had as much impact on the
decision as the decision-making process itself.
Arguably the most intriguing aspect of this paper is the interrelation between Hitler's
strategic leadership before the war, his decision to undertake Weserübung, and how the
success of that campaign both helped Hitler consolidate his dictatorship and his increasingly
autocratic leadership of the Wehrmacht. This would allow him to drive the war way beyond the
point of any hope for German victory, leading ultimately to a decisive allied victory.

WORD COUNT=7859

18
 ENDNOTES
1
See Adam R.A. Claasen, Hitler’s Northern War - The Luftwaffe’s Ill-Fated Campaign,
1940-1945 (Lawrence, KA: University Press of Kansas, 2001), 7-10. It is well documented that
the continuous flow of Swedish iron ore to Germany via Norwegian waters was a strategic
interest that played into German military strategic deliberations on Norway and Scandinavia.
Adam R.A. Claasen concludes that Hitler was certainly interested in the Swedish iron ore, but
he also underscores the allied deliberations as to interdict the transportation of iron ore to
Germany.
2
William L. Shirer, The Rise and Fall of The Third Reich; A History of Nazi Germany (New
York, NY: Simon and Schuster, 1960), 673. General Walter Warlimont, who was on the
German Supreme Command, offers an inside story of the German decision-makers’
assessments and discussions on the matter. See therefore also Walter Warlimont, Inside
Hitler’s Headquarters 1939-45 , trans. R.H. Barry (Novato, CA: Presidio, 1991), 66-81.
3
Grossadmiral (Grand Admiral) was the naval version of the highest military rank in the
German Armed Forces at the time and was equal to Admiral of the Fleet or a five-star Admiral in
British or American terms.
4
The Fuehrer conferences on Naval Affairs, 1939-1945. (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute
Press, 1990), pp. 37-38; quoted in Chris Mann & Christer Jörgensen, Hitler’s Arctic War – The
German Campaigns in Norway, Finland and the USSR 1940-1045 . (New York, NY: Thomas
Dunne Books/St Martin’s Press, 2003), 35.
5
The Kriegsmarine was the German term for the German Navy.
6
See Chris Mann & Christer Jörgensen, Hitler’s Arctic War – The German Campaigns in
Norway, Finland and the USSR 1940-1045 (New York, NY: Thomas Dunne Books/St Martin’s
Press, 2003), 9: “The residue of the warm air carried North on the Gulf Stream collides with
cold winds blowing southwards from the North Pole. Mixed with the earth’s rotation, this
produces large depressions, which in turn produce ferocious gales. The huge waves produced
when they break on ships turn to ice in the freezing air. The ships pitch and roll and take on
‘green water’, which often freezes in contact with cold steel. It builds up into heavy
encrustations of thick ice. The accumulations adds to the ships top weight, which causes the
ship to consume more oil or coal in her bunkers, thus reducing bottom weight. So stability is
reduced and the risk of capsizing is increased. More mundanely, yet no less importantly for the
comfort of the crews, conditions aboard, particularly on small ships such as destroyers, the most
important combat vessels in the seas in World War II, were miserable given the cold, damp and
perpetual motion caused by the high seas”
7
Ibid., 9. Proximity to the North Pole caused a significant misdirection on magnetic
compasses. Navigation instruments were affected by the cold, the ice and the damp conditions
– and their use was made difficult by mist and generally difficult weather conditions.
8
Different sources offer similar numbers and facts about the campaign, as most of them
directly or indirectly rely on original, German military reports. See for example Claasen, 42-44.
9
Ibid., 44.

19
 10
The Scandinavians had enjoyed peace since the Napoleonic Wars - apart from the very
short war between Denmark and Germany in 1866. At the outbreak of WW I, Norway had just
emerged from a five hundred year junior partner relationship in unions with the other
Scandinavian countries; first with Denmark until the conclusion of the Napoleonic Wars, then
with Sweden until 1905.
11
Ibid., 2. Norway was in no way oblivious to the multi-dimensional devastation of the WW I
attrition. Beyond the terrible national and personal or experiences and the human suffering
inflicted upon the participants of the war, WWI had also taken a serious toll on the Norwegian
merchant fleet, which was reduced by about 50% by attacks from German U-boats. In the inter-
war years however, Norway put all her faith in the League of Nations and a new, international
order where peace and independence would be secured by the rule of law. Norway therefore
had neither the need nor the intention of backing up her sovereignty with a serious military
capability.
12
Ibid., 45; The Army was reduced from some 3750 officers and regulars to only 470. The
compulsory national service, which provided both the basic training for Norwegian soldiers and
the foundation for the mobilization system, demanded only 84 days of training, which was
insufficient to train capable soldiers, much less capable units and formations. Field exercises in
formations had been cancelled due to the lack of funds. The Royal Norwegian Navy had only
63 war-ships against the needs of a 2600-kilometer coastline. Most of these ships were
obsolete and of no operational value in a fight with ships at the cutting edge of technology of the
time. See also Mann & Jörgensen, 11. There was no Air Force to be reckoned with at all.
Astonishingly, Norway actually bought aircraft from Italy in 1932 “…not due to their quality but
because they could be paid for with dried fish.”
13
David Irving, Hitler’s War. (New York, NY: The Viking Press, 1977), 96-97.
14
See Claasen, 45.
15
The Anschluss (incorporation) is a term used for the German incorporation of Austria as a
part of the Third Reich.
16
Irving, 271.
17
Shirer, 673.
18
The Imperial Navy is a term for the German Navy of WW I.
19
See Claasen, 4. The German Navy won a tactical victory in the battle of Jutland, where a
number of British ships were sunk, but that led to no strategic advantage.
20
Shirer, 673.
21
In some atlases the Atlantic outside the Norwegian Coast is called the Norwegian Sea,
while the ocean in between continental Europe, Norway and Great Britain is called the North
Sea. Other maps also name the Atlantic outside the Norwegian coast the North Sea. In this
paper the Norwegian Sea and the northern part of the North Sea are used interchangeably.
(The Norwegians usually refer to the ocean outside the Norwegian coast as the North Sea).

20
 22
Claasen, 4-5.
23
See note 11.
24
Kriegstagebuch der Seekriegsleitung, 1. Abteilung (Wilmington, Del.: Scholarly
Resources in cooperation with the U.S. Naval Historical Center, 1984), 2 october 1939; quoted
in Claasen, 4. The quote originates from Wolfgang Wegener’s personal notes of 1915.
25
Ibid. This quote also originates from Wolfgang Wegener’s personal notes of 1915.
26
Ibid. This quote also originates from Wolfgang Wegener’s personal notes of 1915.
27
Mann & Jörgensen, 34.
28
Claasen, 4-5.
29
Ibid., 5-6.
30
Ibid., 5-6.
31
Ibid., 6.
32
Ibid., 7.
33
Shirer, 7-10.
34
Claasen, 8-10.
35
See Earl F. Ziemke, “The German Decision to Invade Norway and Denmark,” in
Command Decisions, ed. Kent Robert Greenfield (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of
Military History, United States Army, 1960), 50.
36
The Oberkommando der Wehrmacht was the German term for the Supreme Command
of the German Armed Forces. From this on called the OKW.
37
Earl F. Ziemke, The German Northern Theatre of Operations 1940-1945, part one: The
Campaigns in Norway and Denmark. Undated and unpublished reprint by the United States
Naval War College/Joint Military Operations Department from Department of the Army Pamphlet
20-271. (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 1959), 4.
38
Ibid., 5.
39
The Reichstag was the German Parliament.
40
Operation Gelb (Yellow) was the plan for a land offensive westwards on the European
continent.
41
See Irving, 34.

21
 42
Less quotations annotated, the past three paragraphs have been based on information
from Mann & Jörgensen, 33-34 as well as Irving, 96-97, and Ziemke, The German Northern
Theatre of Operations 1940-1945, part one, 2-7.
43
Ziemke, “The German Decision to Invade Norway and Denmark,” 53.
44
Ibid.
45
See Claasen,13-14.
46
Ziemke, op.cit., 54.
47
Ibid.
48
C.J.M. Goulter, A forgotten Offensive: Royal Air Force Coastal Command’s Anti-
Shipping Campaign, 1940-1945. (London: Frank Cass, 1995),116; quoted in Claasen,15.
49
Ziemke, op.cit., 2-14.
50
Claasen, 56.
51
Nasjonal Samling (National Gathering) was the Norwegian Nationalist-Socialist Party,
and a bleach replica of its more famous German champion standard-bearer for fascist
movements in Europe.
52
Ziemke, op.cit., 49-72. Claasen claims that the order was of December 13, 1939. See
Claasen, 15.
53
See Ziemke, op.cit., 55.
54
Mann & Jörgensen, 35.
55
Ziemke, op.cit., 55.
56
Claasen, 27.
57
Ibid.
58
Ibid., 28.
59
Ibid. Despite standing orders, a German Luftwaffe major had carried with him secret
papers on Operation Gelb on his way to Cologne. Due to bad weather the aircraft strayed over
Belgian territory and was eventually forced to make an emergency landing in Belgium. Major
Hellmuth Reinberger never managed to destroy the papers completely before he was captured.
60
The winter of 1939-1940 was called the “phony war” because although Great Britain and
France had declared war on Germany, there was continued diplomacy and political rhetoric
rather than fighting and battles.
61
Feldherr is a German term used for a field commander of stature.

22
 62
Ibid., 27-29.
63
The last two paragraphs were supported by information from Mann & Jörgensen, 36 and
Claasen, 84-85. The Germans knew that Sven Hagelin, a member of the Norwegian
government, was Quisling’s man. This may have given reports on Norwegian government
matters more prominence with the Germans.
64
Adolf Hitler; quoted in Claasen, 28.
65
Claasen, 36-61.
66
Hitler, who followed the campaign closely, became very emotional and wanted to pull
General Dietel’s forces out of the Narvik area when they were in a bad situation, but was
calmed down by Jodl.
67
Walter Görlitz, “Blomberg,” in Hitler’s Generals – Authoritative Portraits of the Men Who
Waged Hitler’s War, ed. Correlli Barnet. (New York, NY: Quill/William Morrow, 1989), 129-137.
68
Warlimont, 6.
69
Ibid, 6-9.
70
Ibid., 6-29 and Shirer, 309-321. Herman Göring was the highest ranking military in
Germany, but at the same time subordinate to the OKW, but as Minister for Aviation he was
Keitel’s equal. Additionally, he was no. 2 after Hitler in the Nazi party, and enjoyed a close
relationship with the Führer. The ambitious Göring no doubt wanted the appointment as the
War Minister after Blomberg, which was likely the reason why he became involved in the ‘von
Blomberg Affair’.
71
See Warlimont, 9-10.
72
Walther Görlitz, “Keitel, Jodl and Warlimont,” in Hitler’s Generals – Authoritative Portraits
of the Men Who Waged Hitler’s War, ed. Correlli Barnet. (New York, NY: Quill/William Morrow,
1989), 148.
73
See for example Irving, 10; 44-80.
74
Warlimont, 10.
75
Görlitz, “Blomberg,” 129.
76
Ibid, 132-134. The SA (Sturmabteilung – Assault unit) was the paramilitary Nazi Party
Army, which in 1933 consisted of 400,000 men.
77
See Shirer, 311-314. A widower for some time, von Blomberg caught romantic interest in
his secretary, whom he later married. Hence, the aristocratic von Blomberg married below his
standing. The marriage was blessed by Hitler, who was one of the principal witnessed during
the wedding. Later it became evident that the new Mrs. Von Blomberg had a record with the
police and had apparently been a prostitute. The officer corps demanded his resignation and
Hitler felt that he had been made look like a fool, having been a witness for von Blomberg.

23
 78
Generaloberst (Colonel General) was the second highest Army rank, below Field
Marshall.
79
Ibid., 314.
80
Ibid., 319.
81
Werner von Blomberg; quoted in Warlimont, 13.
82
Adolf Hitler; quoted in Warlimont, 13.
83
See Warlimont, 13.
84
Görlitz, “Keitel, Jodl and Warlimont,” 144.
85
See Warlimont, 6-65.
86
Shirer, 319.
87
The past 3 paragraphs, less quotations annotated specifically, were based on Shirer,
309-321.
88
The Voelkischer Boebachter (The Peoples’ Observer or The Common Observer) was the
leading daily Nazi newspaper.
89
Voelkischer Boebachter, February 5, 1938; quoted in Shirer, 320.
90
See Warlimont, 22-40.
91
H. Picker, ed., Hitlers Tischgesräche im Führerhauptquartier. (Berlin, Germany:
Ullstein,1993); quoted in Claasen, 1.
92
See Warlimont, 218; 263; 515; 521-564
93
See Mann & Jörgensen, 61;117-118; 210.
94
Ibid, 188.
95
T.K Derry, “The Campaign in Norway,” in History of the Second World War, ed. J.R.M
Butler (London, UK: United Kingdom Military Series, 1952), 229; available from
<http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/UN/UK/UK-NWE-Norway/>; Internet; Accessed 1 April-30 April
2005.
96
Ibid., 229-246.
97
See Claasen, 250-268.
98
T.K Derry, 230.
99
See Mann & Jörgensen, 34;188.

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 100
The number varies with different sources, and the number likely varied throughout the
war. See for example Mann & Jörgensen, 200.
101
See Claasen, 250-268.
102
Adolf Hitler; quoted in Claasen, 141.
103
See T.K Derry, 229.
104
Ibid. See also Claasen, 8-10. Germany imported nine million tons from Sweden in 1938
and estimates had showed that the need for imports would rise with the increasing needs of the
German industry. Swedish records show that only 600,000 tons left Narvik for Germany in
1941, “rising to a rate of 1,800,000 tons per annum in the early months of 1943, after which
exports fell off again until the end of the war.”
105
See pages 13-15 in this paper.
106
See Warlimont, Irving and Shirer, who all portray Hitler. My characterizations are based
on the reading of those three books.

25
26
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