2022 BAR REVIEW Pre-Week

Handout No. 3
CIVIL LAW

GENERAL PRINCIPLES / PRELIMINARY TITLE

When the foreign law, judgment or contract is contrary to a sound and established public policy
of the forum, the said foreign law, judgment or order shall not be applied. Article 15 of the Civil
Code will not apply.

Notwithstanding that the national law of respondent states that parents have no obligation to
support their children or that such obligation is not punishable by law, said law would still not
find applicability. When the foreign law, judgment or contract is contrary to a sound and
established public policy of the forum, the said foreign law, judgment or order shall not be
applied.

Further, prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for
their object public order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by
laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign
country. Del Socorro vs. Van Wilsem, G.R. No. 193707, December 10, 2014

Under the doctrine of forum non conveniens, “a court, in conflicts of law cases, may refuse
impositions on its jurisdiction where it is not the most ‘convenient’ or available forum and the
parties are not precluded from seeking remedies elsewhere.

The Supreme Court recognized the following situations as among those that may warrant a
court’s desistance from exercising jurisdiction:

1) The belief that the matter can be better tried and decided elsewhere, either because the
main aspects of the case transpired in a foreign jurisdiction or the material witnesses have
their residence there;
2) The belief that the nonresident plaintiff sought the forum, a practice known as forum
shopping, merely to secure procedural advantages or to convey or harass the defendant;
3) The unwillingness to extend local judicial facilities to nonresidents or aliens when the
docket may already be overcrowded;
4) The inadequacy of the local judicial machinery for effectuating the right sought to be
maintained; and
5) The difficulty of ascertaining foreign law. Saudi Arabian Airlines (SAUDIA) and Brenda J.
Betia v. Rebesencio, et al., G.R. No. 198587, January 14, 2015

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Elements of Abuse of Rights

1) there is a legal right or duty;

2) exercised in bad faith; and
3) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another. Padillo vs. Rural Bank of
Nabunturan, Inc., G.R. No. 199338 January 21, 2013

A person who knowingly and voluntarily exposes himself to danger cannot claim damages for
the resulting injury.

In Nikko Hotel Manila Garden v. Reyes, 452 SCRA 532 (2005), [we] ruled that a person who
knowingly and voluntarily exposes himself to danger cannot claim damages for the resulting
injury: “The doctrine of volenti non fit injuria (“to which a person assents is not esteemed in law
as injury”) refers to self-inflicted injury or to the consent to injury which precludes the recovery
of damages by one who has knowingly and voluntarily exposed himself to danger, even if he is
not negligent in doing so.” Polo S. Pantaleon v. American Express International, Inc., G.R. No.
174269, August 25, 2010

There is a material distinction between damages and injury—injury is the illegal invasion of a
legal right while damage is the loss, hurt, or harm which results from the injury; There can be
damage without injury in those instances in which the loss or harm was not the result of a
violation of a legal duty.

Injury is the illegal invasion of a legal right; damage is the loss, hurt, or harm which results from
the injury; and damages are the recompense or compensation awarded for the damage suffered.
Thus, there can be damage without injury in those instances in which the loss or harm was not
the result of a violation of a legal duty. In such cases, the consequences must be borne by the
injured person alone, the law affords no remedy for damages resulting from an act which does
not amount to a legal injury or wrong. These situations are often called damnum absque injuria.”
In other words, in order that a plaintiff may maintain an action for the injuries of which he
complains, he must establish that such injuries resulted from a breach of duty which the
defendant owed to the plaintiff—a concurrence of injury to the plaintiff and legal responsibility
by the person causing it. The underlying basis for the award of tort damages is the premise that
an individual was injured in contemplation of law. Thus, there must first be a breach of some
duty and the imposition of liability for that breach before damages may be awarded; and the
breach of such duty should be the proximate cause of the injury. Polo S. Pantaleon v. American
Express International, Inc., G.R. No. 174269, August 25, 2010

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In order that the law will give redress for an act causing damage, there must be damnum et
injuria that act must be not only hurtful, but wrongful.

In this jurisdiction, we adhere to the principle that injury alone does not give respondent the right
to recover damages, but it must also have a right of action for the legal wrong inflicted by
petitioners. The City of Bacolod, et al. v. Phuture Visions Co., Inc., G.R. No. 190289, January 17,
2018

Unjust Enrichment

Art. 22. Every person who through an act of performance by another, or any other means,
acquires or comes into possession of something at the expense of the latter without just or legal
ground, shall return the same to him.

The provision is expressed in the maxim: “MEMO CUM ALTERIUS DETER DETREMENTO PROTEST”
(No person should unjustly enrich himself at the expense of another). An action for recovery of
what has been paid without just cause has been designated as an accion in rem verso. Beumer
vs. Amores, G.R. No. 195670, December 3, 2012

The principle of unjust enrichment requires two (2) conditions: (1) that a person is benefited
without a valid basis or justification, and (2) that such benefit is derived at the expense of
another.

There is unjust enrichment ‘when a person unjustly retains a benefit to the loss of another, or
when a person retains money or property of another against the fundamental principles of
justice, equity and good conscience’. Rolando De Roca v. Eduardo Dabuyan, et al., G.R. No.
215281, March 5, 2018

The principle of unjust enrichment essentially contemplates payment when there is no duty to
pay, and the person who receives the payment has no right to receive it.

Unjust enrichment exists when a person unfairly retains a benefit to the loss of another, or when
a person retains money or property of another against the fundamental principles of justice,
equity, and good conscience. Georgia Osmeña-Jalandoni v. Carmen Encomienda, G.R. No.
205578, March 1, 2017

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Whoever pays for another may demand from the debtor what he has paid, except that if he
paid without the knowledge or against the will of the debtor, he can recover only insofar as the
payment has been beneficial to the debtor.

In this case, petitioner Jalandoni greatly benefited from the purportedly unauthorized payments
made by respondent. Thus, even if she asseverates that Encomienda’s payment of her household
bills was without her knowledge or against her will, she cannot deny the fact that the same still
inured to her benefit and Encomienda must therefore be consequently reimbursed for it. Also,
when Jalandoni learned about the payments, she did nothing to express her objection to or
repudiation of the same, within a reasonable time. Even when she claimed that she was prepared
with her own money, she still accepted the financial assistance and actually made use of it.

The debtor who knows that another has paid his obligation for him and who does not repudiate
it at any time, must corollarily pay the amount advanced by such third person. Georgia Osmeña-
Jalandoni v. Carmen Encomienda, G.R. No. 205578, March 1, 2017

The right to privacy under Article 26(1) of the Civil Code does not only extend to private
residential house but also covers business offices where the public are excluded therefrom and
only certain individuals are allowed to enter.

A business office is entitled to the same privacy when the public is excluded therefrom and only
such individuals as are allowed to enter may come in. Thus, an individual’s right to privacy under
Article 26(1) of the Civil Code should not be confined to his house or residence as it may extend
to places where he has the right to exclude the public or deny them access. The phrase “prying
into the privacy of another’s residence,” therefore, covers places, locations, or even situations
which an individual considers as private. And as long as his right is recognized by society, other
individuals may not infringe on his right to privacy. Spouses Hing vs. Choachuy, G.R. No. 179736,
June 26, 2013.

PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS

A married woman has an option but not a duty, to use the surname of the husband in any of
the ways provided using her maiden name once she is married because when a woman marries,
she does not change her name but only her civil status.

A married woman has an option, but not a duty, to use the surname of the husband in any of the
ways provided by Article 370 of the Civil Code. She is therefore allowed to use not only any of the

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three names provided in Article 370, but also her maiden name upon marriage. She is not
prohibited from continuously using her maiden name once she is married because when a
woman marries, she does not change her name but only her civil status. Further, this
interpretation is in consonance with the principle that surnames indicate descent. Maria Virginia
V. Remo v. The Honorable Secretary of Foreign Affairs, G.R. No. 169202, March 5, 2010

Love, though the ideal consideration in a marriage contract, is not the only valid cause for
marriage. Other considerations (such as the payment of $2,000 for the acquisition of American
citizenship) not precluded by law, may validly support a marriage.

In this case, respondent’s marriage is not at all analogous to a marriage in jest. Albios and Fringer
had an undeniable intention to be bound in order to create the very bond necessary to allow the
respondent to acquire American citizenship. Only a genuine consent to be married would allow
them to further their objective, considering that only a valid marriage can properly support an
application for citizenship. There was, thus, an apparent intention to enter into the actual
marriage status and to create a legal tie, albeit for a limited purpose. Genuine consent was,
therefore, clearly present.

The Court cannot declare such a marriage void in the event the parties fail to qualify for
immigration benefits, after they have availed of its benefits, or simply have no further use for it.
These unscrupulous individuals cannot be allowed to use the courts as instruments in their
fraudulent schemes. Albios already misused a judicial institution to enter into a marriage of
convenience; she should not be allowed to again abuse it to get herself out of an inconvenient
situation. Republic vs. Albios, G.R. No. 198780, October 16, 2013

Divorce, the legal dissolution of a lawful union for a cause arising after marriage, are of two
types: (1) absolute divorce or a vinculo matrimonii, which terminates the marriage, and (2)
limited divorce or a mensa et thoro, which suspends it and leaves the bond in full force.

In this jurisdiction, the following rules exist:

1) Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce; hence, our courts cannot grant it.
2) Consistent with Articles 15 and 17 of the New Civil Code, the marital bond between two
Filipinos cannot be dissolved even by an absolute divorce obtained abroad.
3) An absolute divorce obtained abroad by a couple, who are both aliens, may be recognized
in the Philippines, provided it is consistent with their respective national laws.

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4) In mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner, the former is allowed to contract
a subsequent marriage in case the absolute divorce is validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry. Republic v. Manalo, G.R. No. 221029, April
24, 2018

Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code can now be applied even if it is the Filipino spouse
who initiated the foreign divorce decree against his/her alien spouse. Accordingly, a Filipino
citizen has [now] the capacity to remarry under Philippine law after initiating a divorce
proceeding abroad and obtaining a favorable judgment against his or her alien spouse who is
capacitated to remarry.

Paragraph 2 of Article 26 speaks of "a divorce x x x validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry. " Based on a clear and plain reading of the provision, it only
requires that there be a divorce validly obtained abroad. The letter of the law does not demand
that the alien spouse should be the one who initiated the proceeding wherein the divorce decree
was granted. It does not distinguish whether the Filipino spouse is the petitioner or the
respondent in the foreign divorce proceeding. The Court is bound by the words of the statute;
neither can [We] put words in the mouths of the lawmakers. "The legislature is presumed to
know the meaning of the words, to have used words advisedly, and to have expressed its intent
by the use of such words as are found in the statute. Verba legis non est recedendum, or from
the words of a statute there should be no departure.

Assuming, for the sake of argument, that the word "obtained" should be interpreted to mean
that the divorce proceeding must be actually initiated by the alien spouse, still, the Court will not
follow the letter of the statute when to do so would depart from the true intent of the legislature
or would otherwise yield conclusions inconsistent with the general purpose of the act. Laws have
ends to achieve, and statutes should be so construed as not to defeat but to carry out such ends
and purposes. Republic v. Manalo, G.R. No. 221029, April 24, 2018

Foreign divorce decrees obtained to nullify marriages between a Filipino and an alien citizen
may already be recognized in this jurisdiction, regardless of who between the spouses initiated
the divorce; provided, of course, that the party petitioning for the recognition of such foreign
divorce decree - presumably the Filipino citizen - must prove the divorce as a fact and
demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it.

In this case, a plain reading of the RTC ruling shows that the denial of Luzviminda's petition to
have her foreign divorce decree recognized in this jurisdiction was anchored on the sole ground

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that she admittedly initiated the divorce proceedings which she, as a Filipino citizen, was not
allowed to do. In light of the doctrine laid down in Manalo, such ground relied upon by the RTC
had been rendered nugatory.

However, the Court cannot just order the grant of Luzviminda’s petition for recognition of the
foreign divorce decree, as Luzviminda has yet to prove the fact of her "Divorce by Agreement"
obtained in Nagoya City, Japan and its conformity with prevailing Japanese laws on divorce
Luzviminda Morisono v. Ryoji Morisono, et al., G.R. No. 226013, July 2, 2018

Second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code applies even if Filipino spouse gave consent
to the divorce obtained by his/her alien spouse.

The fact that it was the Filipino spouse who initiated the proceeding wherein the divorce decree
was granted should not affect the application nor remove him from the coverage of Paragraph 2
of Article 26 of the Family Code. The subject provision should not make a distinction for a Filipino
who initiated a foreign divorce proceeding is in the same place and in like circumstance as a
Filipino who is at the receiving end of an alien initiated proceeding. Stephen I. Juego-Sakai v.
Republic, G.R. No. 2244015, July 23, 2018

Since our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign laws and judgment, our law on evidence
requires that both the divorce decree and the national law of the alien must be alleged and
proven like any other fact.

In order for a divorce obtained abroad by the alien spouse to be recognized in our jurisdiction, it
must be shown that the divorce decree is valid according to the national law of the foreigner.
Both the divorce decree and the governing personal law of the alien spouse who obtained the
divorce must be proven. Since our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign laws and judgment,
our law on evidence requires that both the divorce decree and the national law of the alien must
be alleged and proven like any other fact. Medina vs. Koike, 798 SCRA 733, G.R. No. 215723 July
27, 2016

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Summary of relevant cases decided after the issuance of EO 227, involving the issue of the
effects of foreign divorce decree as discussed in J. Caguiao’s dissenting opinion in Republic vs.
Manalo (G.R. No. 221029, April 24, 2018):

Incidents of Action in
Case Incidents of Divorce Court's Resolution
the Philippines

The divorce decree is

binding on the
German spouse
pursuant to the
nationality principle.
Pilapil v. Ibay- German spouse filed Accordingly, the
Divorce obtained in
Somera (G.R. No. two (2) complaints German spouse lacks
Germany by German
80116, June 30, charging Filipino standing to file the
spouse
1989) spouse with adultery complaints as
"offended spouse",
having obtained the
divorce decree prior
to the filing of said
complaints.

The divorce
decree cannot be
recognized in the
Philippines since
Filipino husband
the Filipino wife
Divorce obtained in invokes the divorce obtained the
Republic v. Iyoy (G.R. the United States by decree secured by his same while still a
No. 152577, Filipino wife prior to Filipino wife as Filipino citizen,
September 21, 2005) her naturalization as additional ground to and was, at such
an American citizen grant his petition for time, bound by
declaration of nullity Philippine laws on
family rights and
duties, pursuant
to the nationality
principle.

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Incidents of Action in
Case Incidents of Divorce Court's Resolution
the Philippines

The effects of the

divorce decree must
be recognized in
favor of the Filipino
Republic vs. Divorce obtained in Filipino spouse
spouse pursuant to
Orbecido (G.R. No. the United States by sought enforcement
Article 26(2) of the
154380, October 5, naturalized American of divorce in the
Family Code.
2005) spouse Philippines
Accordingly, the
Filipino spouse
should be allowed to
re-marry.

The divorce decree is

American spouse binding on the
sought enforcement American spouse,
of the Joint Custody pursuant to the
Dacasin v. Dacasin Divorce obtained in Agreement he had nationality principle.
(G.R. No. 168785, the United States by executed with his Accordingly, he
February 5, 2010) Filipino spouse former Filipino wife, cannot be allowed to
which bore terms evade the same by
contrary to those in invoking the terms of
the divorce decree the Joint Custody
Agreement.

The divorce decree is

Naturalized American
binding on the
Divorce obtained in spouse sought
Bayot v. Court of naturalized American
the Dominican annulment of her
Appeals (G.R. Nos. spouse, pursuant to
Republic by marriage with her
155635 and 163979, the nationality
naturalized American Filipino spouse
November 7, 2008) principle.
spouse through a petition for
Accordingly, she is
annulment filed
left without any

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Incidents of Action in
Case Incidents of Divorce Court's Resolution
the Philippines
before the Regional cause of action
Trial Court (RTC) before the RTC, as a
petition for
annulment
presupposes a
subsisting marriage.

The effect of the

divorce decree issued
pursuant to Japanese
First husband (also a law may be
Japanese national) recognized in the
sought recognition of Philippines in order
the divorce obtained to affect the status of
Divorce obtained in
Fujiki v. by his Filipina wife the first husband,
Japan by Filipina wife
Marinay (G.R. No. against her second who, pursuant to the
against her second
196049, June 26, husband through a nationality principle,
husband, who is a
2013) Petition for Judicial is governed by
Japanese national
Recognition of Japanese law. Such
Foreign Judgment (or recognition is in line
Decree of Absolute with the Philippines'
Nullity of Marriage) public policy, which
filed before the RTC characterizes
bigamous marriages
as void ab initio.

The case was

Filipina wife sought remanded to the CA
Divorce jointly
Medina v. Koike to enforce the to allow Filipina wife
obtained in Japan by
(G.R. No. 215723, divorce in the to prove that the
Filipina wife and
July 27, 2016) Philippines through a divorce obtained
Japanese husband
Petition for Judicial abroad by her and
Recognition of her Japanese

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Incidents of Action in
Case Incidents of Divorce Court's Resolution
the Philippines
Foreign Divorce and husband is valid
Declaration of according to the
Capacity to Remarry latter's national law.
before the RTC.

Characteristics of Psychological Incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code.

1) be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary
duties required in a marriage;
2) have juridical antecedence, i.e., it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating
the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and
3) be incurable, or even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the
party involved. Republic vs. Romero II, G.R. Nos. 209180 and 209253, February 24, 2016;
Republic vs. De Gracia, G.R. No. 171557, February 12, 2014

The quantum of proof required in nullity cases is clear and convincing evidence.

The first Molina guideline reiterates the fundamental rule in evidence that one who asserts a
claim must prove it. Specifically, in psychological incapacity cases, it is the plaintiff-spouse who
proves the existence of psychological incapacity. Molina, [however], is silent on what quantum
of proof [that] is required in nullity cases. While there is opinion that a nullity case under Article
36 is like any civil case that requires preponderance of evidence, [we] now hold that the plaintiff-
spouse must prove his or her case with clear and convincing evidence. This is a quantum of proof
that requires more than preponderant evidence but less than proof beyond reasonable doubt.
The reason is that this jurisdiction follows the presumption of validity of marriages. xxx

As with any presumption, it can only be rebutted with clear and convincing evidence. Rosanna L.
Tan-Andal v. Mario Victor M. Andal, G.R. No. 196359, May 11, 2021

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Psychological incapacity is neither a mental incapacity nor a personality disorder that must be
proven through expert opinion.

[The Supreme] Court now categorically abandons the second Molina guideline. Psychological
incapacity is neither a mental incapacity nor a personality disorder that must be proven through
expert opinion. There must be proof, however, of the durable or enduring aspects of a person’s
personality, called “personality structure”, which manifests itself through clear acts of
dysfunctionality that undermines the family. The spouse’s personality structure must make it
impossible for him or her to understand and, more important, to comply with his or her essential
marital obligations.

Proof of these aspects of personality need not be given by an expert. Ordinary witnesses who
have been present in the life of the spouses before the latter contracted marriage may testify on
behaviors that they have consistently observed from the supposedly incapacitated spouse. From
there, the judge will decide if these behaviors are indicative of a true and serious incapacity to
assume the essential marital obligations. Rosanna L. Tan-Andal v. Mario Victor M. Andal, G.R.
No. 196359, May 11, 2021

A party to a nullity case is still required to prove juridical antecedence because it is an explicit
requirement of the law.

Article 36 is clear that psychological incapacity must be existing “at the time of the celebration”
of the marriage, “even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.” This
distinguishes psychological incapacity from divorce. Divorce severs a marital tie for causes,
psychological or otherwise, that may have developed after the marriage celebration. Rosanna L.
Tan-Andal v. Mario Victor M. Andal, G.R. No. 196359, May 11, 2021

Psychological incapacity contemplated in Article 36 of the Family Code is incurable, not in the
medical, but in the legal sense; hence, the third Molina guideline is amended accordingly.

This means that the incapacity is so enduring and persistent with respect to a specific partner,
and contemplates a situation where the couple’s respective personality structures are so
incompatible and antagonistic that the only result of the union would be the inevitable and
irreparable breakdown of the marriage. “[A]n undeniable pattern of such persisting failure [to be
a present, loving, faithful, respectful, and supportive spouse] must be established so as to
demonstrate that there is indeed a psychological anomaly or incongruity in the spouse relative
to the other.” Rosanna L. Tan-Andal v. Mario Victor M. Andal, G.R. No. 196359, May 11, 2021

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It is possible that the marriage is attended by psychological incapacity of one or both spouses,
with the incapacity manifested in ways that can be considered as grounds for legal separation.

That drug addiction is a ground for legal separation will not prevent [the] Court from voiding the
marriage in this case. A decree of legal separation entitles spouses to live separately from each
other without severing their marriage bond, but no legal conclusion is made as to whether the
marriage is valid. Therefore, it is possible that the marriage is attended by psychological
incapacity of one or both spouses, with the incapacity manifested in ways that can be considered
as grounds for legal separation. At any rate, so long as a party can demonstrate that the drug
abuse is a manifestation of psychological incapacity existing at the time of the marriage, this
should be enough to render the marriage void under Article 36 of the Family Code. Rosanna L.
Tan-Andal v. Mario Victor M. Andal, G.R. No. 196359, May 11, 2021

The existence or absence of the psychological incapacity shall be based strictly on the facts of
each case and not on a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations.

By the very nature of cases involving the application of Article 36, it is logical and understandable
to give weight to the expert opinions furnished by psychologists regarding the psychological
temperament of parties in order to determine the root cause, juridical antecedence, gravity and
incurability of the psychological incapacity. However, such opinions, while highly advisable, are
not conditions sine qua non in granting petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage.

At best, courts must treat such opinions as decisive but not indispensable evidence in
determining the merits of a given case. In fact, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to
sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical or psychological examination of
the person concerned need not be resorted to. The trial court, as in any other given case
presented before it, must always base its decision not solely on the expert opinions furnished by
the parties but also on the totality of evidence adduced in the course of the proceedings. Castillo
v. Republic, G.R. No. 214064, February 6, 2017

Requisites for Judicial Declaration of Presumptive Death

Under Article 41 of the Family Code, there are four (4) essential requisites for the declaration of
presumptive death:

1) that the absent spouse has been missing for four (4) consecutive years, OR two (2)
consecutive years if the disappearance occurred where there is danger of death under

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the circumstances laid down in Article 391 of the Civil Code (person on board a vessel lost
during a sea voyage, or an aeroplane which is missing, person in the armed forces who
has taken part in war, and person who has been in danger of death under other
circumstances);
2) that the present spouse wishes to remarry;
3) that the present spouse has a well-founded belief that the absentee is dead; and
4) that the present spouse files a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive
death of the absentee. Republic vs. Tampus, G.R. No. 214243, March 16, 2016

Legal Separation must [not] be tried before six months have elapsed since the filing of the
petition to provide the parties a “cooling-off” period.

Article 103 of the Civil Code, now Article 58 of the Family Code, further mandates that an action
for legal separation must “in no case be tried before six months shall have elapsed since the filing
of the petition,” obviously in order to provide the parties a “cooling-off’ period. In this interim,
the court should take steps toward getting the parties to reconcile. Enrico L. Pacete, et al. v. Hon.
Glicerio V. Carriaga, Jr., et al., G.R. No. 53880, March 17, 1994

No defaults in action for annulments of marriage or for legal separation.

The significance of the above substantive provisions of the law is further underscored by the
inclusion of the following provision in [formerly] Rule 18 of the Rules of Court: “SEC. 6. No defaults
in actions for annulments of marriage or for legal separation.—If the defendant in an action for
annulment of marriage or for legal separation fails to answer, the court shall order the
prosecuting attorney to investigate whether or not a collusion between the parties exists, and if
there is no collusion, to intervene for the State in order to see to it that the evidence submitted
is not fabricated.” Enrico L. Pacete, et al. v. Hon. Glicerio V. Carriaga, Jr., et al., G.R. No. 53880,
March 17, 1994

Article 198 of the Family Code provides that the obligation of mutual support between the
spouses ceases when a judgment declaring a marriage void becomes final and executory.

As the parties’ marriage was declared void on March 11, 2005, petitioner was only obliged to
support, after such date, their three children, Beatriz, Juliana and Margarita. According to the
petition, at the time the assailed Order of the RTC dated November 29, 2011 was issued, two of

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their three daughters already attained the age of majority. If such is the case, respondent ceased
to have the authority to claim support in their behalf. In increasing the amount of support due
from petitioner based on the needs of all three children, the RTC gravely abused its discretion.
Simon R. Paterno v. Dina Marie Lomongo Paterno, G.R. No. 213687, January 8, 2020

Judgment of support does not become final, and may be reduced or increased proportionately
according to the reduction or increase of the necessities of the recipient and the resources or
means of the person obliged to support.

Petitioner is not precluded from seeking the reduction of the amount of support he was obliged
to provide in the event that he can sufficiently prove that its reduction is warranted. After all,
judgment of support does not become final, and may be reduced or increased proportionately
according to the reduction or increase of the necessities of the recipient and the resources or
means of the person obliged to support. Simon R. Paterno v. Dina Marie Lomongo Paterno, G.R.
No. 213687, January 8, 2020

There is no presumption that the conjugal partnership is benefited when a spouse enters into a
contract of surety.

No presumption can be inferred from the fact that when the petitioner-husband/wife entered
into an accommodation agreement or a contract of surety, the conjugal partnership would
thereby be benefited. The private respondent was burdened to establish that such benefit
redounded to the conjugal partnership.

In this case, it is not apparent from the records that respondent BDO had established the benefit
to the conjugal partnership flowing from the surety agreement allegedly signed by Carmelita.
Thus, petitioner Eliseo’s claim over the subject property lodged with the RTC Pasig is proper, with
the latter correctly exercising jurisdiction thereon. Borlongan v. Banco De Oro (formerly
Equitable PCI Bank), G.R. Nos. 217617 and 218540, April 5, 2017

The property relations of parties to a void marriage is governed either by Article 147 or 148 of
the Family Code.

There is no quarrel that the marriage of the petitioner and the respondent had long been
declared an absolute nullity by reason of their psychological incapacity to perform their marital

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obligations to each other. The property relations of parties to a void marriage is governed either
by Article 147 or 148 of the Family Code. Since the petitioner and the respondent suffer no legal
impediment and exclusively lived with each other under a void marriage, their property relation
is one of co-ownership under Article 147 of the Family Code. The said provision finds application
in this case even if the parties were married before the Family Code took effect by express
provision of the Family Code on its retroactive effect for as long as it does not prejudice or impair
vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws. Simon R. Paterno v.
Dina Marie Lomongo Paterno, G.R. No. 213687, January 8, 2020

For as long as the property had been purchased, whether on installment, financing or other
mode of payment, during the period of cohabitation, the disputable presumption that they
have been obtained by the parties’ joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them
in equal shares, shall arise.

A reading of Article 147 of the Family Code would show that the provision did not make any
distinction or make any qualification in terms of the manner the property must be acquired
before the presumption of co-ownership shall apply. As such, the term “acquired” must be taken
in its ordinary acceptation. For as long as the property had been purchased, whether on
installment, financing or other mode of payment, during the period of cohabitation, the
disputable presumption that they have been obtained by the parties’ joint efforts, work or
industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares, shall arise. Simon R. Paterno v. Dina Marie
Lomongo Paterno, G.R. No. 213687, January 8, 2020

In the event that the respondent had not been able to contribute through her salary, income,
work or industry, but was able to show that she cared for and maintained the family and the
household, her efforts shall be deemed the equivalent of the contributions made by the
petitioner.

It must be borne in mind that the presumption that the properties are co-owned and thus must
be shared equally is not conclusive but merely disputable. The petitioner may rebut the
presumption by presenting proof that the properties, although acquired during the period of
their cohabitation, were not obtained through their joint efforts, work and industry. In such a
case, the properties shall belong solely to the petitioner. If the respondent is able to present
proof that she contributed through her salary, income, work or industry in the acquisition of the
properties, the parties’ share shall be in proportion to their contributions. Simon R. Paterno v.
Dina Marie Lomongo Paterno, G.R. No. 213687, January 8, 2020

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A family home is generally exempt from execution provided it was duly constituted as such.

In this case, petitioner Felicitas cannot conveniently claim that the subject property is her family
home, sans sufficient evidence proving her allegation. It is imperative that her claim must be
backed with evidence showing that the home was indeed (i) duly constituted as a family home,
(ii) constituted jointly by the husband and wife or by an unmarried head of a family, (iii) actually
resided in by the family (or any of the family home's beneficiaries), (iv) forms part of the
properties of the absolute community or the conjugal partnership, or of the exclusive properties
of either spouse with the latter's consent, or property of the unmarried head of the family, and
(v) at the time of its constitution, has an actual value of not exceeding Php 300,000.00 in urban
areas, and not exceeding Php 200,000.00 in rural areas. Felicitas Salazar v. Remedios Felias, G.R.
No. 213972, February 05, 2018

For a claim of filiation to succeed, it must be made within the period allowed, and supported
by the evidence required under the Family Code. A person who seeks to establish illegitimate
filiation after the death of a putative parent must do so via a (1) record of birth appearing in
the civil register or a (2) final judgment, or an (3) admission of legitimate filiation.

Even without a record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment, filiation may still
be established after the death of a putative parent through an admission of filiation in a public
document or a private handwritten instrument, signed by the parent concerned.

However, petitioners (Romeo Ara and William Garcia) did not present in evidence any admissions
of filiation.

An admission is an act, declaration, or omission of a party on a relevant fact, which may be used
in evidence against him. The evidence presented by petitioners such as group pictures with Josefa
and petitioners’ relatives, and testimonies do not show that Josefa is their mother. They do not
contain any acts, declarations, or omissions attributable directly to Josefa, much less ones
pertaining to her filiation with petitioners. Although petitioner Garcia’s Baptismal Certificate,
Certificate of Marriage, and Certificate of Live Birth obtained via late registration all state that
Josefa is his mother, they do not show any act, declaration, or omission on the part of Josefa.
Josefa did not participate in making any of them. Romeo F. Ara and William Garcia v. Dra. Fely
S. Pizarro, et al., G.R. No. 187273, February 15, 2017

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Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended by RA 9255, provides: Illegitimate children shall use
the surname and shall be under the parental authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to
support in conformity with this Code. However, illegitimate children may use the surname of
their father if their filiation has been expressly recognized by their father.

The right of choice as to what surname will be used belongs to the illegitimate child. The father,
although entitled by law to acknowledge the illegitimate child, has no right to unilaterally
choose what surname is to be adopted by the said illegitimate child.

The law is clear that illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental
authority of their mother. The use of the word "shall" underscores its mandatory character. The
discretion on the part of the illegitimate child to use the surname of the father is conditional
upon proof of compliance with RA 9255 and its IRR.

The use of the word “may” in Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended by RA 9255, readily
shows that an acknowledged illegitimate child is under no compulsion to use the surname of his
illegitimate father. The word “may” is permissive and operates to confer discretion upon the
illegitimate children. Barcelote vs. Republic of the Philippines, G.R. No. 222095, August 7, 2017

The act of the father in bearing his signature and thumb mark in an SSS E-1 form and in
indicating that a person named therein is his son and dependent is sufficient to establish
legitimate filiation.

In this case, as petitioner correctly argues, Alfredo Aguilar’s SSS Form E-1 satisfies the
requirement for proof of filiation and relationship to the Aguilar spouses under Article 172 of the
Family Code; by itself, said document constitutes an “admission of legitimate filiation in a public
document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned.” Aguillar vs.
Siasat, G.R. No. 200169, January 28, 2015

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ADOPTION

Who may adopt?

The following may adopt:

(a) Any Filipino citizen:

a. of legal age,
b. in possession of full civil capacity and legal rights,
c. of good moral character,
d. has not been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude,
e. emotionally and psychologically capable of caring for children,
f. at least sixteen (16) years older than the adoptee,
i. this requirement between the age of the adopter and adoptee may be
waived when the adopter is the biological parent of the adoptee, or is the
spouse of the adoptee's parent, and
g. who is in a position to support and care for his/her children in keeping with the
means of the family;

(b) Any alien possessing the same qualifications as above stated for Filipino nationals:
Provided:
a. That his/her country has diplomatic relations with the Republic of the Philippines,
b. That he/she has been living in the Philippines for at least three (3) continuous
years prior to the filing of the application for adoption and maintains such
residence until the adoption decree is entered (residency),
c. That he/she has been certified by his/her diplomatic or consular office or any
appropriate government agency that he/she has the legal capacity to adopt in
his/her country (certification), and
d. That his/her government allows the adoptee to enter his/her country as his/her
adopted son/daughter:

Provided, Further, That the requirements on residency and certification of the

alien's qualification to adopt in his/her country may be waived for the following:

(i) a former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative within the fourth
(4th) degree of consanguinity or affinity; or

(ii) one who seeks to adopt the legitimate son/daughter of his/her Filipino
spouse; or

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(iii) one who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt jointly with
his/her spouse a relative within the fourth (4th) degree of consanguinity
or affinity of the Filipino spouse; or

(c) The guardian with respect to the ward after the termination of the guardianship and
clearance of his/her financial accountabilities.

Husband and wife shall jointly adopt, except in the following cases:

(i) if one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate son/daughter of the other; or

(ii) if one spouse seeks to adopt his/her own illegitimate son/daughter: Provided,
However, that the other spouse has signified his/her consent thereto; or

(iii) if the spouses are legally separated from each other.

In case husband and wife jointly adopt, or one spouse adopts the illegitimate son/daughter of
the other, joint parental authority shall be exercised by the spouses. Section 7, RA 8552

Who may be adopted?

The following may be adopted:

(a) Any person below eighteen (18) years of age who has been administratively or judicially
declared available for adoption;

(b) The legitimate son/daughter of one spouse by the other spouse;

(c) An illegitimate son/daughter by a qualified adopter to improve his/her status to that of

legitimacy;

(d) A person of legal age if, prior to the adoption, said person has been consistently
considered and treated by the adopter(s) as his/her own child since minority;

(e) A child whose adoption has been previously rescinded; or

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(f) A child whose biological or adoptive parent(s) has died: Provided, That no proceedings
shall be initiated within six (6) months from the time of death of said parent(s). Section 8,
RA 8552

Rights of an adopted child

The adoptee shall be considered the legitimate son/daughter of the adopter(s) for all intents and
purposes and as such is entitled to all the rights and obligations provided by law to legitimate
sons/daughters born to them without discrimination of any kind. To this end, the adoptee is
entitled to love, guidance, and support in keeping with the means of the family. Section 17, RA
8552

Rescission, instances and effects

Grounds for Rescission of Adoption. – Upon petition of the adoptee, with the assistance of the
Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) if a minor or if over eighteen (18) years
of age but is incapacitated, as guardian/counsel, the adoption may be rescinded on any of the
following grounds committed by the adopter(s):

1) repeated physical and verbal maltreatment by the adopter(s) despite having undergone
counseling;
2) attempt on the life of the adoptee;
3) sexual assault or violence; or
4) abandonment and failure to comply with parental obligations.

Adoption, being in the best interest of the child, shall not be subject to rescission by the
adopter(s). However, the adopter(s) may disinherit the adoptee for causes provided in Article
919 of the Civil Code. Section 19, RA 8552

Effects of Rescission. – If the petition is granted, the parental authority of the adoptee's biological
parent(s), if known, or the legal custody of the DSWD shall be restored if the adoptee is still a
minor or incapacitated. The reciprocal rights and obligations of the adopter(s) and the adoptee
to each other shall be extinguished.

The court shall order the Civil Registrar to cancel the amended certificate of birth of the adoptee
and restore his/her original birth certificate.

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Succession rights shall revert to its status prior to adoption, but only as of the date of judgment
of judicial rescission. Vested rights acquired prior to judicial rescission shall be respected.

All the foregoing effects of rescission of adoption shall be without prejudice to the penalties
imposable under the Penal Code if the criminal acts are properly proven. Section 20, RA 8552

Inter-Country Adoption

“Inter-country adoption” refers to the socio-legal process of adopting a Filipino child by a

foreigner or a Filipino citizen permanently residing abroad where the petition is filed, the
supervised trial custody is undertaken, and the decree of adoption is issued outside the
Philippines. Section 3(a), RA 8043

When allowed

Inter-Country Adoption as the Last Resort. The Inter-Country Adoption Board (ICAB) shall ensure
that all possibilities for adoption of the child under the Family Code have been exhausted and
that inter-country adoption is in the best interest of the child. Towards this end, the Board shall
set up the guidelines to ensure that steps will be taken to place the child in the Philippines before
the child is placed for inter-country adoption: Provided, however, That the maximum number
that may be allowed for foreign adoption shall not exceed six hundred (600) a year for the first
five (5) years. Section 7, RA 8043

Who may adopt?

An alien or a Filipino citizen permanently residing abroad may file an application for inter-country
adoption of a Filipino child if he/she:

(a) is at least twenty-seven (27) years of age and at least sixteen (16) years older than the
child to be adopted, at the time of application unless the adopter is the parent by nature
of the child to be adopted or the spouse of such parent;
(b) if married, his/her spouse must jointly file for the adoption;
(c) has the capacity to act and assume all rights and responsibilities of parental authority
under his national laws, and has undergone the appropriate counseling from an
accredited counselor in his/her country;

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(d) has not been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude;

(e) is eligible to adopt under his/her national law;
(f) is in a position to provide the proper care and support and to give the necessary moral
values and example to all his children, including the child to be adopted;
(g) agrees to uphold the basic rights of the child as embodied under Philippine laws, the U.N.
Convention on the Rights of the Child, and to abide by the rules and regulations issued to
implement the provisions of this Act;
(h) comes from a country with whom the Philippines has diplomatic relations and whose
government maintains a similarly authorized and accredited agency and that adoption is
allowed under his/her national laws; and
(i) possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications provided herein and in
other applicable Philippine laws. (Section 9, RA 8043)

Who may be adopted?

Only a legally free child* may be the subject of inter-country adoption. In order that such child
may be considered for placement, the following documents must be submitted to the Board:

(a) Child study;

(b) Birth certificate/foundling certificate;
(c) Deed of voluntary commitment/decree of abandonment/death certificate of parents;
(d) Medical evaluation /history;
(e) Psychological evaluation, as necessary; and
(f) Recent photo of the child.

*Legally free child means a child who has been voluntarily or involuntarily committed to the
Department, in accordance with the Child and Youth Welfare Code. (Section 3(f), RA 8043)

NOTE: “Child” under RA 8552 is defined as a person below eighteen (18) years of age, whereas
under RA 8043, the same is defined as a person below fifteen (15) years of age unless sooner
emancipated by law.

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PARENTAL AUTHORITY

As a general rule, the father and the mother shall jointly exercise parental authority over the
persons of their common children. However, insofar as illegitimate children are concerned,
Article 176 of the Family Code states that illegitimate children shall be under the parental
authority of their mother.

Accordingly, mothers (such as petitioner Renalyn) are entitled to the sole parental authority of
their illegitimate children (such as Queenie), notwithstanding the father's recognition of the
child. In the exercise of that authority, mothers are consequently entitled to keep their
illegitimate children in their company, and the Court will not deprive them of custody, absent any
imperative cause showing the mother's unfitness to exercise such authority and care. Masbate,
et al. v. Relucio, G.R. No. 235498, July 30, 2018

Article 213 of the Family Code provides for the so-called “tender-age presumption”, stating that
"no child under seven (7) years of age shall be separated from the mother unless the court finds
compelling reasons to order otherwise.

According to jurisprudence, the following instances may constitute "compelling reasons" to wrest
away custody from a mother over her child although under seven (7) years of age: neglect,
abandonment, unemployment, immorality, habitual drunkenness, drug addiction, maltreatment
of the child, insanity or affliction with a communicable disease. Masbate, et al. v. Relucio, G.R.
No. 235498, July 30, 2018

SUCCESSION

The rights of succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent.

The operation of Article 777 occurs at the very moment of the decedent's death -the transmission
by succession occurs at the precise moment of death and, therefore, the heir is legally deemed
to have acquired ownership of his/her share in the inheritance at that very moment, "and not at
the time of declaration of heirs, or partition, or distribution."

Hence, the Court has held that the "[t]itle or rights to a deceased person's property are
immediately passed to his or her heirs upon death. The heirs' rights become vested without need
for them to be declared 'heirs. Dr. Nixon L. Treyes v. Antonio L. Larlar, et al., G.R. No. 232579,
September 8, 2020, J. CAGUIOA

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The attestation must state the number of pages used upon which the will is written. The
purpose of the law is to safeguard against possible interpolation or omission of one or some of
its pages and prevent any increase or decrease in the pages.

While Article 809 allows substantial compliance for defects in the form of the attestation clause,
[Richard] likewise failed in this respect. The statement in the Acknowledgment portion of the
subject last will and testament that it “consists of 7 pages including the page on which the
ratification and acknowledgment are written” cannot be deemed substantial compliance. The
will actually consists of 8 pages including its acknowledgment which discrepancy cannot be
explained by mere examination of the will itself but through the presentation of evidence
aliunde. Lopez vs. Lopez, G.R. No. 189984, November 12, 2012

The general rule is that in probate proceedings, the scope of the court’s inquiry is limited to
questions on the extrinsic validity of the will; the probate court will only determine the will’s
formal validity and due execution.

HOWEVER, this rule is not inflexible and absolute. It is not beyond the probate court’s jurisdiction
to pass upon the intrinsic validity of the will when so warranted by exceptional circumstances.
When practical considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of the will be passed upon even
before it is probated, the probate court should meet the issue.

In this case, the decedent’s will does not contain specific legacies or devices and Francisco’s
preterition annulled the institution of heirs. The annulment effectively caused the total
abrogation of the will, resulting in total intestacy of the inheritance. The decedent’s will, no
matter how valid it may appear extrinsically, is null and void. The conduct of separate
proceedings to determine the intrinsic validity of its testamentary provisions would be
superfluous. Morales vs. Olondriz, G.R. No. 198994, February 3, 2016

Preterition consists in the omission in the testator’s will of a compulsory heir in the direct line
or anyone of them either because they are not mentioned therein or although mentioned they
are neither instituted as heir nor expressly disinherited.

In order that there be preterition, it is essential that the heir must be totally omitted. Total
omission means that the omitted compulsory heir receives nothing under the will, whether as
heir, legatee or devisee, has received nothing by way of donation inter vivos or propter [nuptias],
and will receive nothing by way of intestate succession. Mayuga v. Atienza, G.R. No. 208197,
January 10, 2018

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Under the Civil Code, the preterition of a compulsory heir in the direct line shall annul the
institution of heirs, but the devises and legacies shall remain valid insofar as the legitimes are
not impaired.

Consequently, if a will does not institute any devisees or legatees, the preterition of a compulsory
heir in the direct line will result in total intestacy.

In this case, the decedent’s will evidently omitted respondent Francisco Olondriz as an heir,
legatee, or devisee. As the decedent’s illegitimate son, Francisco is a compulsory heir in the direct
line. Unless petitioner Morales could show otherwise, Francisco’s omission from the will leads to
the conclusion of his preterition. Iris Morales v. Ana Maria Olondriz, et al., G.R. No. 198994,
February 3, 2016

Unless there is a pending special proceeding for the settlement of the decedent's estate or for
the determination of heirship, the compulsory or intestate heirs may commence an ordinary
civil action to declare the nullity of a deed or instrument, and for recovery of property, or any
other action in the enforcement of their ownership rights acquired by virtue of succession,
without the necessity of a prior and separate judicial declaration of their status as such.

The ruling of the trial court shall only be in relation to the cause of action of the ordinary civil
action, i.e., the nullification of a deed or instrument, and recovery or reconveyance of property,
which ruling is binding only between and among the parties.

Accordingly, the rule laid down in Ypon, Yaptinchay, Portugal; Reyes, Heirs of Gabatan v. Court
of Appeals, and other similar cases, which requires a prior determination of heirship in a separate
special proceeding as a prerequisite before one can file an ordinary civil action to enforce
ownership rights acquired by virtue of succession, is abandoned. Dr. Nixon L. Treyes v. Antonio
L. Larlar, et al., G.R. No. 232579, September 8, 2020, J. CAGUIOA

Article 1001 states that brothers and sisters, or their children, who survive with the widow or
widower, shall be entitled to one-half of the inheritance, while the surviving spouse shall be
entitled to the other half.

Hence, subject to the required proof, without any need of prior judicial determination, the
private respondents siblings of Rosie, !!Y operation of law, are entitled to one-half of the
inheritance of the decedent. Thus, in filing their Complaint, they do not seek to have their right
as intestate heirs established, for the simple reason that it is the law that already establishes that

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right. What they seek is the enforcement and protection of the right granted to them under Aliicle
1001 in relation to Article 777 of the Civil Code by asking for the nullification of the Affidavits of
Self-Adjudication that disregard and violate their right as intestate heirs. Dr. Nixon L. Treyes v.
Antonio L. Larlar, et al., G.R. No. 232579, September 8, 2020, J. CAGUIOA

Under Article 992 of the Civil Code, an illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from
the legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother; in the same manner, such children
or relatives shall not inherit from the illegitimate child. This is otherwise known as the “Iron
Curtain Rule”.

In this case, respondent Anacleto could not inherit from Joaquina by right of representation of
Nicolas, the legitimate son of Joaquina. The right of representation is not available to illegitimate
descendants of legitimate children in the inheritance of a legitimate grandparent. Arado vs.
Alcoran, G.R. No. 163362, July 8, 2015

Partition of the inheritance may only be effected by (1) the heirs themselves extrajudicially, (2)
by the court in an ordinary action for partition, or in the course of administration proceedings,
(3) by the testator himself, and (4) by the third person designated by the testator.

To begin with, the laws governing the partition of inheritance draws basis from Article 777 of the
Civil Code, which states that the rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the
death of the decedent. As such, from that moment, the heirs, legatees, and devisees’
successional rights are vested, and they are considered to own in common the inheritance left
by the decedent.

Under the law, partition of the inheritance may only be effected by (1) the heirs themselves
extrajudicially, (2) by the court in an ordinary action for partition, or in the course of
administration proceedings, (3) by the testator himself, and (4) by the third person designated
by the testator.

A reading of the enumeration set above would reveal instances when the appointment of an
executor or administrator is dispensed with. One is through the execution of a public instrument
by the heirs in an extrajudicial settlement of the estate. Another, which is the focal point of this
case, is through the ordinary action of partition. Heirs of Ernesto Morales v. Astrid Morales
Agustin, G.R. No. 224849, June 6, 2018

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An heir to an inheritance could dispose of his/her hereditary rights to whomever he/she

chooses.

This is because: [A]s a hereditary share in a decedent’s estate is transmitted or vested

immediately from the moment of the death of such causante or predecessor-in-interest, there is
no legal bar to a successor (with requisite contracting capacity) disposing of her or his hereditary
share immediately after such death, even if the actual extent of such share is not determined
until the subsequent liquidation of the estate. Further, this alienation by the heirs of their aliquot
portion of the inheritance is recognized by no less than the Civil Code. xxx Such alienation is
expressly recognized and provided for by Article 1088 of the present Civil Code: Art. 1088. Should
any of the heirs sell his hereditary rights to a stranger before the partition, any or all of the co-
heirs may be subrogated to the rights of the purchaser by reimbursing him for the price of the
sale, provided they do so within the period of one month from the time they were notified in
writing of the sale of the vendor. If a sale of a hereditary right can be made to a stranger, then a
fortiori sale thereof to a coheir could not be forbidden. Heirs of Ernesto Morales v. Astrid
Morales Agustin, G.R. No. 224849, June 6, 2018

Every act which is intended to put an end to indivision among co-heirs and legatees or devisees
is deemed to be a partition, although it should purport to be a sale, an exchange, a compromise,
or any other transaction.

Thus, an action for partition with regard to the inheritance of the heirs should conform to the
law governing the partition and distribution of the estate, and not only to the law governing
ordinary partition.

Particularly, according to Article 1078 of the Civil Code, where there are two or more heirs, the
whole estate of the decedent is owned in common by such heirs, subject to the payment of debts
of the deceased. Heirs of Ernesto Morales v. Astrid Morales Agustin, G.R. No. 224849, June 6,
2018

Collation. Article 1061 of the Civil Code requires the parties to collate the properties of the
decedent which they may have received by way of gratuitous title prior to the former’s death.

Article 1061. Every compulsory heir, who succeeds with other compulsory heirs, must bring into
the mass of the estate any property or right which he may have received from the decedent,
during the lifetime of the latter, by way of donation, or any other gratuitous title, in order that it

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may be computed in the determination of the legitime of each heir, and in the account of the
partition.

On the procedural aspect, the partition of the estate based on the successional rights of the heirs,
as herein mentioned, is required by Rule 74 of the Rules of Court (Summary Settlement of Estate)
to follow the rules on “ordinary action of partition.”

This pertains to Rule 69 (Partition), Section 13 of the same rules, which states that: Section 13.
Partition of personal property.—The provisions of this Rule shall apply to partitions of estates
composed of personal property, or of both real and personal property, insofar as the same may
be applicable.

Once legally partitioned, each heir is conferred with the exclusive ownership of the property,
which was adjudicated to him/her. Heirs of Ernesto Morales v. Astrid Morales Agustin, G.R. No.
224849, June 6, 2018

OBLIGATIONS

Under Article 1173 of the Civil Code, where it is not stipulated in the law or the contract, the
diligence required to comply with one’s obligations is commonly referred to as pater familias;
or, more specifically, as bonos pater familias or “a good father of a family.”

A good father of a family means a person of ordinary or average diligence. To determine the
prudence and diligence that must be required of all persons, [we] must use as basis the abstract
average standard corresponding to a normal orderly person. Anyone who uses diligence below
this standard is guilty of negligence. Philippine Steel Coating Corp. v. Eduard Quiñones, G.R. No.
194533, April 19, 2017

Resolution under Article 1191 of the Civil Code will not be permitted for a slight or casual
breach, but only for such substantial and fundamental violations as would defeat the very
object of the parties in making the agreement.

Resolution is defined as the “unmaking of a contract for a legally sufficient reason x.” Resolution
does not merely terminate the contract and release the parties from further obligations to each
other, but abrogates the contract from its inception and restores the parties to their original
positions as if no contract has been made.

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Consequently, mutual restitution, which entails the return of the benefits that each party may
have received as a result of the contract, is thus required. Ultimately, the question of whether a
breach of contract is substantial depends upon the attending circumstances. Buenviaje vs.
Salonga, G.R. No. 216023, October 5, 2016

Article 1198. Instances when the debtor loses the right to make use of the period in cases of
obligation with a period.

The debtor shall lose every right to make use of the period:

1) When after the obligation has been contracted, he becomes insolvent, unless he gives a
guaranty or security for the debt;
2) When he does not furnish to the creditor the guaranties or securities which he has
promised;
3) When by his own acts he has impaired said guaranties or securities after their
establishment, and when through a fortuitous event they disappear, unless he
immediately gives new ones equally satisfactory;
4) When the debtor violates any undertaking, in consideration of which the creditor agreed
to the period; and
5) When the debtor attempts to abscond. Development Bank of the Philippines v. Sta. Ines
Melale Forest Products Corp., et al. G.R. Nos. 193068 and 193099, February 1, 2017

As a general rule, the power to rescind an obligation must be invoked judicially and cannot be
exercised solely on a party’s own judgment that the other has committed a breach of the
obligation.

This is so because rescission of a contract will not be permitted for a slight or casual breach, but
only for such substantial and fundamental violations as would defeat the very object of the
parties in making the agreement. As a well-established exception, however, an injured party need
not resort to court action in order to rescind a contract when the contract itself provides that it
may be revoked or cancelled upon violation of its terms and conditions.

Where parties agree to a stipulation allowing extrajudicial rescission, no judicial decree is

necessary for rescission to take place; the extrajudicial rescission immediately releases the party
from its obligation under the contract, subject only to court reversal if found improper. Golden
Valley Exploration, Inc. vs. Pinkian Mining Company, G.R. No. 190080, June 11, 2014

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Novation is a mode of extinguishing an obligation by “changing its object or principal

conditions, substituting the person of the debtor or subrogating a third person in the rights of
the creditor.”

While novation, “which consists in substituting a new debtor in the place of the original one may
be made even without the knowledge or against the will of the latter, it must be with the consent
of the creditor.”

For novation to have legal effect, the creditor must expressly consent to the substitution of the
new debtor: It should be noted that in order to give novation its legal effect, the law requires
that the creditor should consent to the substitution of a new debtor. This consent must be given
expressly for the reason that, since novation extinguishes the personality of the first debtor who
is to be substituted by new one, it implies on the part of the creditor a waiver of the right that he
had before the novation, which waiver must be express under the principle that renuntiatio non
præsumitur, recognized by the law in declaring that a waiver of right may not be performed
unless the will to waive is indisputably shown by him who holds the right. Development Bank of
the Philippines v. Sta. Ines Melale Forest Products Corp., et al. G.R. Nos. 193068 and 193099,
February 1, 2017

Dation in payment extinguishes the obligation to the extent of the value of the thing delivered,
either as agreed upon by the parties or as may be proved, unless the parties by agreement —
express or implied, or by their silence — consider the thing as equivalent to the obligation, in
which case the obligation is totally extinguished.

In this case, the assignment was for the express purpose of “securing the payment of the
Line/Loan, interest and charges thereon.” Nowhere [in the deed] can it be reasonably deduced
that the collaterals assigned by [Milflores Cooperative] were intended to substitute the payment
of sum of money under the loan. It was an accessory obligation to secure the principal loan
obligation. The assignment, being intended to be a mere security rather than a satisfaction of
indebtedness, is not a dation in payment under Article 1245 and did not extinguish the loan
obligation. Sps. May and Johnny Villaluz Jr. v. Land Bank of the Philippines, et al., G.R. No.
192602, January 18, 2017

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An assignment of credit is an agreement by virtue of which the owner of a credit, known as the
assignor, by a legal cause - such as sale, dation in payment or exchange or donation - and
without need of the debtor's consent, transfers that credit and its accessory rights to another,
known as the assignee, who acquires the power to enforce it to the same extent as the assignor
could have enforced it against the debtor.

The obligations between assignor and assignee will depend upon the judicial relation which is the
basis of the assignment. An assignment will be construed in accordance with the rules of
construction governing contracts generally, the primary object being always to ascertain and
carry out the intention of the parties. This intention is to be derived from a consideration of the
whole instrument, all parts of which should be given effect, and is to be sought in the words and
language employed. UCPB v. Sps. Walter Uy and Lily Uy, G.R. No. 204039, January 10, 2018

CONTRACTS

Stages of Contracts – Negotiation, Perfection/Birth, and Consummation

Negotiation begins from the time the prospective contracting parties manifest their interest in
the contract and ends at the moment of their agreement.

Thereafter, perfection or birth of the contract takes place when the parties agree upon the
essential elements of the contract.

Finally, consummation occurs when the parties fulfill or perform the terms agreed upon in the
contract, culminating in the extinguishment thereof. Sagun vs. ANZ Global Services and
Operations (Manila), Inc., G.R. No. 220399, August 22, 2016

Contracts are binding between the parties, whether oral or written. The law is explicit that
contracts shall be obligatory in whatever form they may have been entered into, provided all
the essential requisites for their validity are present.

In case of loans between friends and relatives, the absence of acknowledgment receipts or
promissory notes is more natural and real. According to the Court, the existence of a contract of
loan cannot be denied merely because it was not reduced in writing. Surely, there can be a verbal
loan. Georgia Osmeña-Jalandoni v. Carmen Encomienda, G.R. No. 205578, March 1, 2017

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The principle of mutuality of contracts is found in Article 1308 of the New Civil Code, which
states that contracts must bind both contracting parties, and its validity or compliance cannot
be left to the will of one of them.

Any stipulation regarding the validity or compliance of the contract that is potestative or is left
solely to the will of one of the parties is invalid. This holds true not only as to the original terms
of the contract but also to its modifications. Consequently, any change in a contract must be
made with the consent of the contracting parties, and must be mutually agreed upon. Otherwise,
it has no binding effect.

Specifically, stipulations as to the payment of interest are subject to the principle of mutuality of
contracts. As a principal condition and an important component in contracts of loan, interest
rates are only allowed if agreed upon by express stipulation of the parties, and only when reduced
into writing. Any change (increase or decrease) to it must be mutually agreed upon, or it produces
no binding effect. Security Bank Corporation v. Sps. Rodrigo and Erlinda Mercado, G.R. Nos.
192934 and 197010, June 27, 2018

Requisites of a Stipulation Pour Autrui

1) there is a stipulation in favor of a third person;

2) the stipulation is a part, not the whole, of the contract;
3) the contracting parties clearly and deliberately conferred a favor to the third person —
the favor is not an incidental benefit;
4) the favor is unconditional and uncompensated;
5) the third person communicated his or her acceptance of the favor before its revocation;
and
6) the contracting parties do not represent, or are not authorized by, the third party.
Republic vs. Legal Heirs of Jose L. Africa, G.R. No. 205722, August 19, 2015; see also
Mamaril vs. The Boy Scout of the Philippines, G.R. No. 179382, January 14, 2013

Simulation takes place when the parties do not really want the contract they have executed to
produce the legal effects expressed by its wordings. Simulation or vices of declaration may be
either absolute or relative.

Article 1345 of the Civil Code distinguishes an absolute simulation from a relative one; while
Article 1346 discusses their effects, as follows:

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Art. 1345. Simulation of a contract may be absolute or relative. The former (absolute) takes place
when the parties do not intend to be bound at all; the latter (relatitve) when the parties conceal
their true agreement.

Art. 1346. An absolutely simulated or fictitious contract is void. A relative simulation, when it
does not prejudice a third person and is not intended for any purpose contrary to law, morals,
good customs, public order or public policy binds the parties to their agreement. Tanchuling vs.
Cantela, G.R. No. 209284, November 10, 2015

A contract of adhesion is one wherein one party imposes a ready-made form of contract on the
other.

It is a contract whereby almost all of its provisions are drafted by one party, with the participation
of the other party being limited to affixing his or her signature or “adhesion” to the contract.
However, contracts of adhesion are not invalid per se as they are binding as ordinary contracts.

While the Court has occasionally struck down contracts of adhesion as void, it did so when the
weaker party has been imposed upon in dealing with the dominant bargaining party and reduced
to the alternative of taking it or leaving it, completely deprived of the opportunity to bargain on
equal footing. Encarnacion Construction & Industrial Corporation vs. Phoenix Ready Mix
Concrete Development & Construction, Inc., G.R. No. 225402, September 4, 2017

Contracts of adhesion are not void per se. It is binding as any other ordinary contract and a party
who enters into it is free to reject the stipulations in its entirety. If the terms thereof are accepted
without objection, then the contract serves as the law between them. Mamaril vs. The Boy Scout
of the Philippines, G.R. No. 179382, January 14, 2013

Requisites of a Compromise Agreement

To be considered valid and binding between the contracting parties, a compromise agreement
must be:

1) not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, and public policy;
2) freely and intelligently executed by and between the parties; and
3) compliant with the requisites and principles of contracts. Philippine Transmarine
Carriers, Inc. vs. Pelagio, G.R. No. 211302, August 12, 2015

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TRUSTS

Trust is the right to the beneficial enjoyment of property, the legal title to which is vested in
another.

Trust is the right to the beneficial enjoyment of property, the legal title to which is vested in
another. It is a fiduciary relationship that obliges the trustee to deal with the property for the
benefit of the beneficiary. Trust relations between parties may either be express or implied. An
express trust is created by the intention of the trustor or of the parties, while an implied trust
comes into being by operation of law.

Express trusts are created by direct and positive acts of the parties, by some writing or deed, or
will, or by words either expressly or impliedly evincing an intention to create a trust. Go vs. Estate
of the Late Felisa Tamio de Buenaventura, G.R. No. 211972, July 22, 2015

There is an implied trust when a property is sold and the legal estate is granted to one party
but the price is paid by another for the purpose of having the beneficial interest of the property.

This is sometimes referred to as a purchase money resulting trust, the elements of which are: (a)
an actual payment of money, property or services, or an equivalent, constituting valuable
consideration; and (b) such consideration must be furnished by the alleged beneficiary of a
resulting trust. A trust, which derives its strength from the confidence one reposes on another
especially between families, does not lose that character simply because of what appears in a
legal document. Manuel L. Bautista, et al. v. Margarito L. Bautista, G.R. No. 202088, March 8,
2017

Wrongful registration gives occasion to the creation of an implied or constructive trust under
Article 1456 of the New Civil Code.

An action for reconveyance based on an implied trust generally prescribes in ten (10) years.
However, if the plaintiff remains in possession of the property, the prescriptive period to recover
title of possession does not run against him. In such case, his action is deemed in the nature of a
quieting of title, an action that is imprescriptible. Jose S. Ocampo v. Ricardo S. Ocampo, Sr., G.R.
No. 227894, July 5, 2017

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SALES

Article 1458 of the Civil Code describes a contract of sale as a transaction by which “one of the
contracting parties obligates himself to transfer the ownership of and to deliver a determinate
thing, and the other to pay therefore a price certain in money or its equivalent.”

The elements of a perfected contract of sale are the following: (1) the meeting of the minds of
the parties or their consent to a transfer of ownership in exchange for a price; (2) the determinate
object or subject matter of the contract; and (3) the price certain in money or its equivalent as
consideration for the sale. The absence of any of these elements renders a contract void. Agnes
Guison v. Heirs of Loreño Terry, et al., G.R. No. 191914, August 9, 2017

The law requires a definite agreement as to a “price certain”; otherwise, there is no true
meeting of the minds between the parties.

The price must be certain, otherwise there is no true consent between the parties. There can be
no sale without a price. Agnes Guison v. Heirs of Loreño Terry, et al., G.R. No. 191914, August
9, 2017

“Contract of Sale” and “Contract to Sell,” Distinguished.

In a contract of sale, title to the property passes to the buyer upon delivery of the thing sold. In
contrast, in a contract to sell, ownership does not pass to the prospective buyer until full payment
of the purchase price. The title of the property remains with the prospective seller.

In a contract of sale, the nonpayment of the purchase price is a resolutory condition that entitles
the seller to rescind the sale. In a contract to sell, the payment of the purchase price is a positive
suspensive condition that gives rise to the prospective seller’s obligation to convey title.
However, nonpayment is not a breach of contract but “an event that prevents the obligation of
the vendor to convey title from becoming effective.” The contract would be deemed terminated
or cancelled, and the parties stand “as if the conditional obligation had never existed. Victoria N.
Racelis v. Sps. Germil and Rebecca Javier, G.R. No. 189609, January 29, 2018

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“Contract to Sell” and “Conditional Contract of Sale,” Distinguished.

In a contract to sell, the fulfillment of the suspensive condition will not automatically transfer
ownership to the buyer although the property may have been previously delivered to him. The
prospective seller still has to convey title to the prospective buyer by entering into a contract of
absolute sale.

On the other hand, in a conditional contract of sale, the fulfillment of the suspensive condition
renders the sale absolute and the previous delivery of the property has the effect of automatically
transferring the seller’s ownership or title to the property to the buyer. Ventura vs. Heirs of
Spouses Eustacio T. Endaya, G.R. No. 190016, October 2, 2013

Where both the area and the boundaries of the immovable are declared in a sale of real estate
for a lump sum, the area covered within the boundaries of the immovable prevails over the
stated area.

The vendor is obliged to deliver all that is included within the boundaries regardless of whether
the actual area is more than what was specified in the contract of sale; and he/she shall do so
without a corresponding increase in the contract price. This is particularly true when the stated
area is qualified to be approximate only, such as when the words “more or less” were used.
Dasmariñas T. Arcaina, et al. v. Noemi L. Ingram, G.R. No. 196444, February 15, 2017

In a lump sum contract, a vendor is generally obligated to deliver all the land covered within
the boundaries, regardless of whether the real area should be greater or smaller than that
recited in the deed.

However, in case there is conflict between the area actually covered by the boundaries and the
estimated area stated in the contract of sale, he/she shall do so only when the excess or
deficiency between the former and the latter is reasonable. Dasmariñas T. Arcaina, et al. v.
Noemi L. Ingram, G.R. No. 196444, February 15, 2017

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The sale (or encumbrance) of conjugal property without the consent of the husband was not
merely voidable but void; hence, it could not be ratified.

In this case, the falsity of the SPA could not be cured even if respondent Magtanggol later on
informed petitioner Delfin of the mortgage transaction and of the proceedings leading to the
property’s foreclosure, consolidation of title, and issuance of a new title.

A void contract is equivalent to nothing and is absolutely wanting in civil effects; it cannot be
validated either by ratification or prescription. Delfin Domingo Dadis v. Sps. Magtanggol De
Guzman, et al., G.R. No. 206008, June 7, 2017

Article 1505 of the Civil Code instructs that “where goods are sold by a person who is not the
owner thereof, and who does not sell them under authority or with the consent of the owner,
the buyer acquires no better title to the goods than the seller had, unless the owner of the
goods is by his conduct precluded from denying the seller’s authority to sell.

By virtue of Article 1505, the true owners of the goods are definitely not legally precluded from
claiming the ownership of their actual properties. Delfin C. Gonzales, Jr. v. Magdaleno M. Peña,
G.R. No. 214303, January 30, 2017

A warranty is a collateral undertaking in a sale of either real or personal property, express or

implied; that if the property sold does not possess certain incidents or qualities, the purchaser
may either consider the sale void or claim damages for breach of warranty.

A warranty may either be express or implied. An express warranty pertains to any affirmation of
fact or any promise by the seller relating to the thing, the natural tendency of which is to induce
the buyer to purchase the same. It includes all warranties derived from the language of the
contract, so long as the language is express — it may take the form of an affirmation, a promise
or a representation. On the other hand, an implied warranty is one which the law derives by
application or inference from the nature of transaction or the relative situation or circumstances
of the parties, irrespective of any intention of the seller to create it.

In other words, an express warranty is different from an implied warranty in that the former is
found within the very language of the contract while the latter is by operation of law. Pilipinas
Makro, Inc. v. Coco Charcoal Philippines, Inc., et al., G.R. No. 196419, October 4, 2017

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The term “procuring cause,” in describing a broker’s activity, refers to a cause originating a
series of events which, without break in their continuity, results in the accomplishment of the
prime objective of employing the broker — to produce a purchaser ready, willing and able to
buy real estate on the owner’s terms.

To be regarded as the procuring cause of a sale, a broker’s efforts must have been the foundation
of the negotiations which subsequently resulted in a sale. “The broker must be the efficient agent
or the procuring cause of the sale. The means employed by him and his efforts must result in the
sale. He must find the purchaser, and the sale must proceed from his efforts acting as broker.”

When there is a close, proximate and causal connection between the agent’s efforts and the sale
of the property, the agents are entitled to their commission. Ma. Lorena Ticong v. Manuel A.
Malim, et al., G.R. Nos. 220785 & 222887, March 1, 2017

The rule on double sale applies only when there are two perfected “Contracts of Sale”. If there
is only one valid sale and another contract to sell where full payment has never been made, the
rule on double sales under Article 1544 of the Civil Code does not apply.

Since failure to pay the price in full in a contract to sell renders the same ineffective and without
force and effect, then there is no sale to speak of. Hence, there is no second sale to be considered.
As between the parties to this case, there could be no double sale which would justify the
application of Article 1544. Petitioners failed to pay the purchase price in full, while defendant
Aquino did, and thereafter she was able to register her purchase and obtain a new certificate of
title in her name. As far as the Court is concerned, there is only one sale - and that is, the one in
defendant Aquino's favor. Since there is only one valid sale, the rule on double sales under Article
1544 of the Civil Code does not apply. Spouses Domingo vs. Manzano and Aquino, G.R. No.
201883, November 16, 2016

The principle of primus tempore, potior jure (first in time, stronger in right) gains greater
significance in case of a double sale of immovable property.

The Court has consistently ruled that ownership of an immovable property which is the subject
of a double sale shall be transferred: (1) to the person acquiring it who in good faith first recorded
it in the Registry of Property; (2) in default thereof, to the person who in good faith was first in
possession; and (3) in default thereof, to the person who presents the oldest title, provided there
is good faith.

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The requirement of the law then is two-fold: acquisition in good faith and registration in good
faith. Good faith must concur with the registration — that is, the registrant must have no
knowledge of the defect or lack of title of his vendor or must not have been aware of facts which
should have put him upon such inquiry and investigation as might be necessary to acquaint him
with the defects in the title of his vendor. If it is shown that a buyer was in bad faith, the alleged
registration they have made amounted to no registration at all. Spring Homes Subdivision Co.,
Inc., et al. v. Sps. Pedro Tablada, Jr. and Zenaida Tablada, G.R. No. 200009, January 23, 2017

Knowledge gained by the first buyer of the second sale cannot defeat the first buyer’s rights
except only as provided by law, as in cases where the second buyer first registers in good faith
the second sale ahead of the first.

Such knowledge of the first buyer does bar her from availing of her rights under the law, among
them, first her purchase as against the second buyer. But conversely, knowledge gained by the
second buyer of the first sale defeats his rights even if he is first to register the second sale, since
such knowledge taints his prior registration with bad faith. Spring Homes Subdivision Co., Inc.,
et al. v. Sps. Pedro Tablada, Jr. and Zenaida Tablada, G.R. No. 200009, January 23, 2017

The sale of conjugal property by a spouse without the other’s consent is void.

All subsequent transferees of the conjugal property acquire no rights whatsoever from the
conjugal property’s unauthorized sale. A contract conveying conjugal properties entered into by
the husband without the wife’s consent may be annulled entirely.

In Bucoy v. Paulino, 23 SCRA 248 (1968): As the statute now stands, the right of the wife is
directed at “the annulment of any contract,” referring to real property of the conjugal
partnership entered into by the husband “without her consent.” The plain meaning attached to
the plain language of the law is that the contract, in its entirety, executed by the husband without
the wife’s consent, may be annulled by the wife. Melinda M. Malabanan v. Francisco
Malabanan, Jr., et al. G.R. No. 187225, March 6, 2019

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In a sale with right to repurchase (pacto de retro), the title and ownership of the property sold
are immediately vested in the vendee, subject to the resolutory condition of repurchase by the
vendor within the stipulated period.

The right of repurchase agreed upon is one of conventional redemption governed by Article 1601,
in relation to Article 1616, of the New Civil Code. This right is separate and distinct from the legal
redemption granted to co-owners under Article 1620 of the New Civil Code. More importantly,
the right to repurchase is separate from the title or ownership over the property subject of the
sale with pacto de retro. Heirs of Roger Jarque v. Marcial Jarque, et al., G.R. No. 196733,
November 21, 2018

A contract where the vendor/mortgagor remains in physical possession as lessee or otherwise

has been held to be an equitable mortgage.

An equitable mortgage has been defined as one which although lacking in some formality, or
form or words, or other requisites demanded by a statute, nevertheless reveals the intention of
the parties to charge real property as security for a debt, there being no impossibility nor
anything contrary to law in this intent.

In determining the nature of a contract, the Court is not bound by the title or name given to it by
the parties, but by their intention, as shown not necessarily by the terminology used in the
contract but by their conduct, words, actions and deeds prior to, during and immediately after
executing the agreement. Sps. George and Mercedes Gallent v. Juan G. Velasquez, G.R. Nos.
203949 & 205071, April 6, 2016

An assignment of credit has been defined as an agreement by virtue of which the owner of a
credit, known as the assignor, by a legal cause - such as sale, dation in payment or exchange or
donation - and without need of the debtor's consent, transfers that credit and its accessory
rights to another, known as the assignee, who acquires the power to enforce it to the same
extent as the assignor could have enforced it against the debtor.

The obligations between assignor and assignee will depend upon the judicial relation which is the
basis of the assignment. An assignment will be construed in accordance with the rules of
construction governing contracts generally, the primary object being always to ascertain and
carry out the intention of the parties. This intention is to be derived from a consideration of the
whole instrument, all parts of which should be given effect, and is to be sought in the words and
language employed. UCPB v. Sps. Walter Uy and Lily Uy, G.R. No. 204039, January 10, 2018

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When a person assigns his credit to another person, the latter is deemed subrogated to the
rights as well as to the obligations of the former.

Accordingly, an assignee cannot acquire greater rights than those pertaining to the assignor. The
general rule is that an assignee of a non-negotiable chose in action acquires no greater right than
what was possessed by his assignor and simply stands into the shoes of the latter. Fort Bonifacio
Development Corporation vs. Fong, G.R. No. 209370, March 25, 2015

LEASE

Being a consensual contract, a lease is perfected at the moment there is a meeting of the minds
upon the thing and the cause or consideration which are to constitute the contract.

Thereafter, the lessor is obliged to deliver the thing which is the object of the contract in such a
condition as to render it fit for the use intended, and the lessee is obliged to use the thing leased
as a diligent father of a family, devoting it to the use stipulated or that which may be inferred
from the nature of the thing leased. Hilltop Market Fish Vendors’ Association, Inc. v. Hon.
Braulio Yaranon, et al., G.R. No. 188057, July 12, 2017

The act of parking a vehicle in a garage, upon payment of a fixed amount, is a lease.

It has been ruled that where a customer simply pays a fee, parks his car in any available space in
the lot, locks the car and takes the key with him, the possession and control of the car -necessary
elements in bailment- do not pass to the parking lot operator, hence, the contractual relationship
between the parties is one of lease. Mamaril vs. The Boy Scout of the Philippines, G.R. No.
179382, January 14, 2013

Article 1658 of the Civil Code allows a lessee to postpone the payment of rent if the lessor fails
to either (1) “make the necessary repairs” on the property or (2) “maintain the lessee in
peaceful and adequate enjoyment of the property leased.”

This provision implements the obligation imposed on lessors under Article 1654(3) - to maintain
the lessee in the peaceful and adequate enjoyment of the lease for the entire duration of the
contract - of the Civil Code. The failure to maintain the lessee in the peaceful and adequate
enjoyment of the property leased does not contemplate all acts of disturbance. Lessees may

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suspend the payment of rent under Article 1658 of the Civil Code only if their legal possession is
disrupted. Victoria N. Racelis v. Sps. Germil and Rebecca Javier, G.R. No. 189609, January 29,
2018

PARTNERSHIP

The perfection and validity of a contract of partnership brings about the creation of a juridical
person separate and distinct from the individuals comprising the partnership.

Thus, Article 1768 of the Civil Code provides: The partnership has a juridical personality separate
and distinct from that of each of the partners, even in case of failure to comply with the
requirements of Article 1772, first paragraph.

It is this juridical personality that allows a partnership to enter into business transactions to fulfill
its purposes. Article 46 of the Civil Code provides that "juridical persons may acquire and possess
property of all kinds, as well as incur obligations and bring civil or criminal actions, in conformity
with the laws and regulations of their organization". Aniceto G. Saludo, Jr. v. PNB, G.R. No.
193138, August 20, 2018

Partners in a partnership may decide to place a limit on their individual accountability.

The law, in its wisdom, recognized the possibility that partners in a partnership may decide to
place a limit on their individual accountability. Consequently, to protect third persons dealing
with the partnership, the law provides a rule, embodied in Article 1816 of the Civil Code, which
states: Art. 1816. All partners, including industrial ones, shall be liable pro rata with all their
property and after all the partnership assets have been exhausted, for the contract which may
be entered into in the name and for the account of the partnership, under its signature and by a
person authorized to act for the partnership. However, any partner may enter into a separate
obligation to perform a partnership contract.

The foregoing provision does not prevent partners from agreeing to limit their liability, but such
agreement may only be valid as among them. Aniceto G. Saludo, Jr. v. PNB, G.R. No. 193138,
August 20, 2018

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AGENCY

In a contract of agency, “a person binds himself to render some service or to do something in

representation or on behalf of another, with the consent or authority of the latter.”

Furthermore, Article 1884 of the Civil Code provides that “the agent is bound by his acceptance
to carry out the agency, and is liable for the damages which, through his nonperformance, the
principal may suffer.” International Exchange Bank, now Union Bank of the Philippines v. Sps.
Jerome and Quinnie Briones, et al., G.R. No. 205657, March 29, 2017

While a contract of agency is generally revocable at will as it is primarily based on trust and
confidence, Article 1927 of the Civil Code provides the instances when an agency becomes
irrevocable.

Article 1927. An agency cannot be revoked if a bilateral contract depends upon it, or if it is the
means of fulfilling an obligation already contracted, or if a partner is appointed manager of a
partnership in the contract of partnership and his removal from the management is unjustifiable.
A bilateral contract that depends upon the agency is considered an agency coupled with an
interest, making it an exception to the general rule of revocability at will. When an agency is
established for both the principal and the agent, an agency coupled with an interest is created
and the principal cannot revoke the agency at will. International Exchange Bank, now Union
Bank of the Philippines v. Sps. Jerome and Quinnie Briones, et al., G.R. No. 205657, March 29,
2017

The basis of agency is representation and the same may be constituted expressly or impliedly.

In an implied agency, the principal can be bound by the acts of the implied agent. The same is
true with an oral agency.

In many cases, busy vehicle owners selling their vehicles actually leave them, together with all
the documents of title, spare keys, and deeds of sale signed in blank, with secondhand car traders
they know and trust, in order for the latter to display these vehicles for actual viewing and
inspection by prospective buyers at their lots, warehouses, garages, or showrooms, and to enable
the traders to facilitate sales on-the-spot, as-is-where-is, without having to inconvenience the
owners with random viewings and inspections of their vehicles. For this kind of arrangement, an
agency relationship is created between the vehicle owners, as principals, and the car traders, as
agents. William Anghian Siy v. Alvin Tomlin, G.R. No. 205998, April 24, 2017

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The law creates a presumption that an agent has the power to appoint a substitute.

The consequence of the presumption is that, upon valid appointment of a substitute by the agent,
there ipso jure arises an agency relationship between the principal and the substitute, i.e., the
substitute becomes the agent of the principal. As a result, the principal is bound by the acts of
the substitute as if these acts had been performed by the principal’s appointed agent.
Concomitantly, the substitute assumes an agent’s obligations to act within the scope of authority,
to act in accordance with the principal’s instructions, and to carry out the agency, among others.

In order to make the presumption inoperative and relieve himself from its effects, it is incumbent
upon the principal to prohibit the agent from appointing a substitute. Sps. May and Johnny
Villaluz v. Land Bank of the Philippines, G.R. No. 192602, January 18, 2017

CREDIT TRANSACTIONS

LOAN

Article 1956. No interest shall be due unless it has been expressly stipulated in writing.

It is fundamental that for monetary interest to be due, there must be an express written
agreement therefor. In this relation, case law states that the lack of a written stipulation to pay
interest on the loaned amount bars a creditor from charging monetary interest and the collection
of interest without any stipulation therefor in writing is prohibited by law. Odiamar vs. Valencia,
G.R. No. 213582, June 28, 2016

Stipulations as to the payment of interest are subject to the principle of mutuality of contracts.

As a principal condition and an important component in contracts of loan, interest rates are only
allowed if agreed upon by express stipulation of the parties, and only when reduced into writing.
Any change to it must be mutually agreed upon, or it produces no binding effect.

The same treatment is given to stipulations that give one party the unbridled discretion, without
the conformity of the other, to increase the rate of interest notwithstanding the inclusion of a
similar discretion to decrease it. Security Bank Corporation v. Sps. Rodrigo and Erlinda Mercado,
G.R. Nos. 192934 and 197010, June 27, 2018

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The six percent (6%) legal interest shall be applied prospectively, thus, the twelve percent (12%)
legal interest shall continue to be applied on judgments that have become final and executory
prior to July 1, 2013.

In this case, the CA erred in imposing twelve percent (12%) interest on the total monetary awards
computed from the date of illegal dismissal, or on February 2, 2012, until the finality of judgment.
Since the instant case has not attained finality before July 1, 2013, the correct imposable interest
for the total awards is six percent (6%) from the finality of this judgment until their full satisfaction
based on the prevailing jurisprudence. Transglobal Maritime Agency, Inc., et al. v. Vicente D.
Chua, Jr., G.R. No. 222430, August 30, 2017

Credit card arrangements are simple loan arrangements between the card issuer and the
cardholder.

Simply put, every credit card transaction involves three contracts, namely: (a) the sales contract
between the credit cardholder and the merchant or the business establishment which accepted
the credit card; (b) the loan agreement between the credit card issuer and the credit cardholder;
and lastly, (c) the promise to pay between the credit card issuer and the merchant or business
establishment. Bankard, Inc. v. Luz P. Alarte, G.R. No. 202573, April 19, 2017

DEPOSIT

A deposit is constituted from the moment a person receives a thing belonging to another, with
the obligation of safely keeping it and of returning the same. If the safekeeping of the thing
delivered is not the principal purpose of the contract, there is no deposit but some other
contract.

The document which embodies the contract states that the US$3,000.00 was received by the
bank for safekeeping. The subsequent acts of the parties also show that the intent of the parties
was really for the bank to safely keep the dollars and to return it to Zshornack at a later time.
Thus, Zshornack demanded the return of the money on May 10, 1976, or over five months later.
The above arrangement is that contract defined under Article 1962, New Civil Code, which reads:
Art. 1962. A deposit is constituted from the moment a person receives a thing belonging to
another, with the obligation of safely keeping it and for returning the same. If the safekeeping of
the thing delivered is not the principal purpose of the contract, there is no deposit but some
other contract. Bank of the Philippine Islands v. The Intermediate Appellate Court and Rizaldy
T. Zshornack, No. L-66826, August 19, 1988

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GUARANTY and SURETYSHIP

Guaranty v. Surety

While Article 1280 specifically pertains to a guarantor, the provision nonetheless applies to a
surety. Contracts of guaranty and surety are closely related in the sense that in both, “there is a
promise to answer for the debt or default of another”. The difference lies in that “a guarantor is
the insurer of the solvency of the debtor and thus binds himself to pay if the principal is unable
to pay while a surety is the insurer of the debt, and he obligates himself to pay if the principal
does not pay”. FGU Insurance Corporation v. Sps. Floro and Eufemia Roxas, G.R. Nos. 189526
and 189656, August 9, 2017

A performance bond is a kind of suretyship agreement. It is “designed to afford the project

owner security that the contractor, will faithfully comply with the requirements of the contract
and make good [on the] damages sustained by the project owner in case of the contractor’s
failure to so perform.

Liability under a surety bond is “limited to the amount of the bond” and is determined strictly in
accordance with the particular terms and conditions set out in this bond. It is, thus, necessary to
look into the actual terms of the performance bond. FGU Insurance Corporation v. Sps. Floro and
Eufemia Roxas, G.R. Nos. 189526 and 189656, August 9, 2017

Although the contract of a surety is in essence secondary only to a valid principal obligation,
his liability to the creditor is direct, primary and absolute; he becomes liable for the debt and
duty of another although he possesses no direct or personal interest over the obligations nor
does he receive any benefit therefrom.

A contract of suretyship effectively binds the surety as a solidary debtor. A surety is considered
in law as being the same party as the debtor in relation to whatever is adjudged touching the
obligation of the latter, and their liabilities are interwoven as to be inseparable. Trade and
Investment Development Corporation of the Philippines (Formerly Philippine Export and
Foreign Loan Guarantee Corporation) vs. Asia Paces Corporation, G.R. No. 187403, February
12, 2014; see also Go Tong Electrical Supply Co., Inc. vs. BPI Family Savings Bank, Inc., G.R. No.
187487, June 29, 2015

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QUASI-CONTRACTS

Under Article 2142 of the Civil Code, “[c]ertain lawful, voluntary and unilateral acts give rise to
the juridical relation of quasi-contract to the end that no one shall be unjustly enriched or
benefited at the expense of another.”

There is unjust enrichment ‘when a person unjustly retains a benefit to the loss of another, or
when a person retains money or property of another against the fundamental principles of
justice, equity and good conscience.’

The principle of unjust enrichment requires two conditions: (1) that a person is benefited without
a valid basis or justification, and (2) that such benefit is derived at the expense of another. The
main objective of the principle against unjust enrichment is to prevent one from enriching himself
at the expense of another without just cause or consideration. American Power Corporation, et
al. v. Jason Yu Lim, G.R. No. 214291, January 11, 2018

In order to establish the application of solutio indebiti in a given situation, two (2) conditions
must concur: (1) a payment is made when there exists no binding relation between the payor
who has no duty to pay, and the person who received the payment, and (2) the payment is
made through mistake, and not through liberality or some other cause.

Articl 2154. If something is received when there is no right to demand it, and it was unduly
delivered through mistake, the obligation to return it arises.

The quasi-contract of solutio indebiti harks back to the ancient principle that no one shall enrich
himself unjustly at the expense of another. Domestic Petroleum Retailer Corporation v. Manila
International Airport Authority, G.R. No. 210641, March 27, 2019

ANTICHRESIS

Elements of Antichresis

Antichresis involves an express agreement between parties whereby:

1) the creditor will have possession of the debtor’s real property given as security;
2) such creditor will apply the fruits of the said property to the interest owed by the debtor,
if any, then to the principal amount;

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3) the creditor retains enjoyment of such property until the debtor has totally paid what he
owes; and
4) should the obligation be duly paid, then the contract is automatically extinguished
proceeding from the accessory character of the agreement. Reyes vs. Heirs of Benjamin
Malance, G.R. No. 219071, August 24, 2016

For the contract of antichresis to be valid, Article 2134 of the Civil Code requires that the amount
of the principal and of the interest shall be specified in writing; otherwise the contract of
antichresis shall be void. Bangis vs. Heirs of Serafin and Salud Adolfo, G.R. No. 190875, June 13,
2012

REAL ESTATE MORTGAGE

Mortgage is but an accessory agreement and is distinct from the principal contract of loan.

Where the mortgage was not valid, the principal obligation that the mortgage guaranteed was
not thereby rendered null and void. The liability of the debtor under the principal contract of the
loan subsisted despite the illegality of the REM. Boston Equity Resources, Inc. et al. v. Edgardo
D. Del Rosario, G.R. No. 193228, November 27, 2017

While a real estate mortgage may exceptionally secure future loans or advancements, these
future debts must be specifically described in the mortgage contract. An obligation is not
secured by a mortgage unless it comes fairly within the terms of the mortgage contract.

A dragnet clause is a stipulation in a real estate mortgage contract that extends the coverage of
a mortgage to advances or loans other than those already obtained or specified in the contract.

Where there are several advances, however, a mortgage containing a dragnet clause will not be
extended to cover future advances, unless the document evidencing the subsequent advance
refers to the mortgage as providing security therefor or unless there are clear and supportive
evidence to the contrary. This is especially true in this case where the advances were not only
several but were covered by different sub-facilities. Paradigm Development Corporation of the
Philippines v. Bank of the Philippine Islands, G.R. No. 191174, June 7, 2017

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TORTS AND DAMAGES

Elements of Quasi-delicts

1) an act or omission;
2) the presence of fault or negligence in the performance or nonperformance of the act;
3) injury;
4) a causal connection between the negligent act and the injury; and
5) no preexisting contractual relation. St. Martin Polyclinic, Inc. vs. LWV Construction
Corporation, G.R. No. 217426, December 4, 2017

Actions based on contractual negligence and actions based on quasi-delicts differ in terms of
conditions, defenses, and proof. They generally cannot coexist.

Once a breach of contract is proved, the defendant is presumed negligent and must prove not
being at fault. In a quasi-delict, however, the complaining party has the burden of proving the
other party’s negligence.

In quasi-delict, negligence is direct, substantive and independent, while in breach of contract,

negligence is merely incidental to the performance of the contractual obligation; there is a
preexisting contract or obligation. In quasi-delict, the defense of “good father of a family” is a
complete and proper defense insofar as parents, guardians and employers are concerned, while
in breach of contract, such is not a complete and proper defense in the selection and supervision
of employees. In quasi-delict, there is no presumption of negligence and it is incumbent upon the
injured party to prove the negligence of the defendant, otherwise, the former’s complaint will be
dismissed, while in breach of contract, negligence is presumed so long as it can be proved that
there was breach of the contract and the burden is on the defendant to prove that there was no
negligence in the carrying out of the terms of the contract; the rule of respondeat superior is
followed. Orient Freight International, Inc. v. Keihin-Everett Forwarding Company, Inc., G.R. No.
191937, August 9, 2017

However, there are instances, when Article 2176 may apply even when there is a preexisting
contractual relation. A party may still commit a tort or quasi-delict against another, despite the
existence of a contract between them.

If a contracting party’s act that breaches the contract would have given rise to an
extracontractual liability had there been no contract, the contract would be deemed breached

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by a tort, and the party may be held liable under Article 2176 and its related provisions. Orient
Freight International, Inc. v. Keihin-Everett Forwarding Company, Inc., G.R. No. 191937, August
9, 2017

The doctrine of assumption of risk means that one who voluntarily exposes himself to an
obvious, known and appreciated danger assumes the risk of injury that may result therefrom.

It rests on the fact that the person injured has consented to relieve the defendant of an obligation
of conduct toward him and to take his chance of injury from a known risk, and whether the
former has exercised proper caution or not is immaterial.

In other words, it is based on voluntary consent, express or implied, to accept danger of a known
and appreciated risk; it may sometimes include acceptance of risk arising from the defendant’s
negligence, but one does not ordinarily assume risk of any negligence which he does not know
and appreciate. As a defense in negligence cases, therefore, the doctrine requires the
concurrence of three elements, namely: (1) the plaintiff must know that the risk is present; (2)
he must further understand its nature; and (3) his choice to incur it must be free and voluntary.
Romulo Abrogar, et al. v. Cosmos Bottling Company, Inc., et al., G.R. No. 164749, March 15,
2017

As a general rule, one is only responsible for his own act or omission as laid down in Article
2176 of the Civil Code. The law, however, provides for exceptions when it makes certain persons
liable for the act or omission of another.

One exception is an employer who is made vicariously liable for the tort committed by his
employee under paragraph 5 of Article 2180. The law makes him vicariously liable on the basis of
the civil law principle of paterfamilias for failure to exercise due care and vigilance over the acts
of one's subordinates to prevent damage to another. John E.R. Reyes, et al. v. Orico Doctolero,
et al., G.R. No. 185597, August 2, 2017

However, the above rule is applicable only if there is an employer-employee relationship.

This employer-employee relationship cannot be presumed but must be sufficiently proven by the
plaintiff. The plaintiff must also show that the employee was acting within the scope of his
assigned task when the tort complained of was committed. It is only then that the defendant, as

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employer, may find it necessary to interpose the defense of due diligence in the selection and
supervision of employees. John E.R. Reyes, et al. v. Orico Doctolero, et al., G.R. No. 185597,
August 2, 2017

Under Article 2180, an employer may be held liable for the negligence of its employees based
on its responsibility under a relationship of patria potestas.

The liability of the employer under this provision is “direct and immediate; it is not conditioned
upon a prior recourse against the negligent employee or a prior showing of the insolvency of that
employee.” The employer may only be relieved of responsibility upon a showing that it exercised
the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of its employees. The
rule is that once negligence of the employee is shown, the burden is on the employer to
overcome the presumption of negligence on the latter’s part by proving observance of the
required diligence. Our Lady of Lourdes Hospital v. Spouses Romeo and Regina Capanzana, G.R.
No. 189218, March 22, 2017

A corporation is not as a rule entitled to moral damages because, not being a natural person,
it cannot experience physical suffering or such sentiments as wounded feelings, serious anxiety,
mental anguish and moral shock. The only exception to this rule is where the corporation has a
good reputation that is debased, resulting in its social humiliation.

Be that as it may, as explained in the very recent case of Noell Whessoe, Inc. v. Independent
Testing Consultants, Inc., 884 SCRA 524 (2018), the Court held that “[c]laims for moral damages
must have sufficient factual basis, either in the evidence presented or in the factual findings of
the lower courts. Chevron Philippines, Inc. v. Leo Z. Mendoza, G.R. Nos. 211533 and 212071,
June 19, 2019, J. CAGUIOA

Even when a claimant is compelled to litigate with third persons or to incur expenses to protect
his rights, still attorney’s fees may not be awarded where no sufficient showing of bad faith
could be reflected in a party’s persistence in a case other than an erroneous conviction of the
righteousness of his cause.

As to attorney’s fees, the general rule is that the same cannot be recovered as part of damages
because of the policy that no premium should be placed on the right to litigate. They are not to
be awarded every time a party wins a suit. The power of the court to award attorney’s fees under

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Article 2208 of the Civil Code demands factual, legal, and equitable justification. Buenviaje vs.
Salonga, G.R. No. 216023, October 5, 2016

The matter of attorney’s fees cannot be mentioned only in the dispositive portion of the
decision. They must be clearly explained and justified by the trial court in the body of its
decision.

The award of attorney’s fees is improper because the RTC-Pasig automatically awarded the same
in the dispositive portion of its decision without stating the factual or legal basis therefor in the
body of the decision. The award of attorney’s fees is the exception rather than the general rule.
As such, it is necessary for the trial court to make findings of fact and law that would bring the
case within the exception and justify the grant of such award. Municipality of Cainta v. City of
Pasig and Uniwide Sales Warehouse Club, Inc., G.R. Nos. 176703 and 176721, June 28, 2017

Article 2229 provides that exemplary damages may be imposed "by way of example or
correction for the public good, in addition to the moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory
damages." In case of breach of contracts, they are awarded only if the guilty party acted in a
wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner.

In this case, the Court finds that petitioner indeed acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless,
oppressive or malevolent manner when it refused to release the deposits of respondents without
any legal basis.

Banking industry is impressed with public interest. As such, "the highest degree of diligence is
expected, and high standards of integrity and performance are even required of it." It must
therefore "treat the accounts of its depositors with meticulous care and always to have in mind
the fiduciary nature of its relationship with them.” For failing to do this, an award of exemplary
damages is justified to set an example. Metrobank vs. Yo Yuk To G.R. No. 183204, January 13,
2014

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Article 2231 of the Civil Code stipulates that exemplary damages are to be awarded in cases of
quasi-delict if the defendant acted with gross negligence.

Gross negligence is the absence of care or diligence as to amount to a reckless disregard of the
safety of persons or property; it evinces a thoughtless disregard of consequences without
exerting any effort to avoid them.

Indeed, the failure of Intergames to adopt the basic precautionary measures for the safety of the
minor participants like Rommel was in reckless disregard of their safety. Conduct is reckless when
it is an extreme departure from ordinary care, in a situation in which a high degree of danger is
apparent; it must be more than any mere mistake resulting from inexperience, excitement, or
confusion, and more than mere thoughtlessness or inadvertence, or simple inattention. Romulo
Abrogar, et al. v. Cosmos Bottling Company, Inc., et al., G.R. No. 164749, March 15, 2017

PROPERTY

The Civil Code makes it clear that patrimonial property of the State may be acquired by private
persons through prescription.

This is brought about by Article 1113, which states that all things which are within the commerce
of man are susceptible to prescription, and that property of the State or any of its subdivisions
not patrimonial in character shall not be the object of prescription.

Nonetheless, this does not necessarily mean that when a piece of land is declared alienable and
disposable part of the public domain, it can already be acquired by prescription. In Heirs of Mario
Malabanan v. Republic (587 SCRA 172, 2009), the Supreme Court ruled that declaration of
alienability and disposability is not enough — there must be an express declaration that the
public dominion property is no longer intended for public service or the development of the
national wealth or that the property has been converted into patrimonial. Republic v. Rovency
Realty and Development Corp., G.R. No. 190817, January 10, 2018

Buyer in Good Faith

A purchaser in good faith is one who buys the property of another without notice that some other
person has a right to, or an interest in, such property and pays a full and fair price for the same
at the time of such purchase, or before he has notice of some other person’s claim or interest in

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the property. Go vs. Estate of the Late Felisa Tamio de Buenaventura, G.R. No. 211972, July 22,
2015

Whenever both the landowner and the builder/planter/sower are in good faith (or in bad faith,
pursuant to 548 of the Civil Code), the landowner is given two (2) options under Article 448 of
the Civil Code.

The landowner is given two (2) options under Article 448 of the Civil Code, namely:

1) he may appropriate the improvements for himself after reimbursing the buyer (the
builder in good faith) the necessary and useful expenses under Articles 546 and 548 of
the Civil Code; or
2) he may sell the land to the buyer, unless its value is considerably more than that of the
improvements, in which case, the buyer shall pay reasonable rent. Dinglasan-Delos
Santos vs. Abejon, G.R. No. 215820, March 20, 2017

To be deemed a builder in good faith, it is essential that a person asserts title to the land on
which he builds, i.e., that he be a possessor in concept of owner, and that he be unaware that
there exists in his title or mode of acquisition any flaw which invalidates it.

Good faith is an intangible and abstract quality with no technical meaning or statutory definition,
and it encompasses, among other things, an honest belief, the absence of malice and the absence
of design to defraud or to seek an unconscionable advantage. It implies honesty of intention, and
freedom from knowledge of circumstances which ought to put the holder upon inquiry. Heirs of
Victorino Sarili, The vs. Lagrosa, G.R. No. 193517, January 15, 2014

In order that an action for quieting of title may prosper, the plaintiff must have legal or
equitable title to, or interest in, the property which is the subject matter of the action.

While legal title denotes registered ownership, equitable title means beneficial ownership. In the
absence of such legal or equitable title, or interest, there is no cloud to be prevented or removed.
Likewise, the plaintiff must show that the deed, claim, encumbrance, or proceeding that
purportedly casts a cloud on their title is in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie
appearance of validity or legal efficacy. Josephine Delos Reyes, et al. v. Municipality of Kalibo,
Aklan, et al. G.R. No. 214587, February 26, 2018

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Equitable title is defined as a title derived through a valid contract or relation, and based on
recognized equitable principles, or the right in the party, to whom it belongs, to have the legal
title transferred to him.

In order that a plaintiff may draw to himself an equitable title, he must show that the one from
whom he derives his right had himself a right to transfer. Josephine Delos Reyes, et al. v.
Municipality of Kalibo, Aklan, et al. G.R. No. 214587, February 26, 2018

Accretion is the process whereby the soil is deposited along the banks of rivers. The deposit of
soil, to be considered accretion, must be: (a) gradual and imperceptible; (b) made through the
effects of the current of the water; and (c) taking place on land adjacent to the banks of rivers.
It is settled that an accretion does not automatically become registered land just because the
lot that receives such accretion is covered by a Torrens Title.

Ownership of a piece of land is one thing; registration under the Torrens system of that
ownership is another. Ownership over the accretion received by the land adjoining a river is
governed by the Civil Code; imprescriptibility of registered land is provided in the registration
law.

Registration under the Land Registration and Cadastral Act does not vest or give title to the land,
but merely confirms and, thereafter, protects the title already possessed by the owner, making
it imprescriptible by occupation of third parties. But to obtain this protection, the land must be
placed under the operation of the registration laws, wherein certain judicial procedures have
been provided. Josephine Delos Reyes, et al. v. Municipality of Kalibo, Aklan, et al. G.R. No.
214587, February 26, 2018

An action for reconveyance is a legal and equitable remedy that seeks to transfer or reconvey
property, wrongfully registered in another person’s name, to its rightful owner: To warrant
reconveyance of the land, the plaintiff must allege and prove, among others, ownership of the
land in dispute and the defendant’s erroneous, fraudulent or wrongful registration of the
property.

The following requisites must concur: (1) the action must be brought in the name of a person
claiming ownership or dominical right over the land registered in the name of the defendant; (2)
the registration of the land in the name of the defendant was procured through fraud or other
illegal means; (3) the property has not yet passed to an innocent purchaser for value; and (4) the
action is filed after the certificate of title had already become final and incontrovertible but within

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four years from the discovery of the fraud, or not later than ten (10) years in the case of an
implied trust. Fe Yabut, et al. v. Romeo Alcantara, G.R. No. 200349, March 6, 2017

When the action for reconveyance is based on an implied or constructive trust, the prescriptive
period is ten (10) years, or it is imprescriptible if the movant is in the actual, continuous and
peaceful possession of the property involved. On the other hand, when the action for
reconveyance is based on a void deed or contract the action is imprescriptible under Article
1410 of the New Civil Code.

As long as the land wrongfully registered under the Torrens system is still in the name of the
person who caused such registration, an action in personam will lie to compel him to reconvey
the property to the real owner. Sps. Yu Hwa Ping and Mary Gaw v. Ayala Land, Inc., G.R. Nos.
173120 & 173141, July 26, 2017

Registering a piece of land under the Torrens System does not create or vest title because
registration is not a mode of acquiring ownership.

Accordingly, if the inclusion of the land in the earlier registered title was a result of a mistake,
then the latter registered title will prevail. The ratio decidendi of this exception is to prevent a
title that was earlier registered, which erroneously contained a parcel of land that should not
have been included, from defeating a title that was later registered but is legitimately entitled to
the said land.

A certificate of title is merely an evidence of ownership or title over the particular property
described therein. Sps. Yu Hwa Ping and Mary Gaw v. Ayala Land, Inc., G.R. Nos. 173120 &
173141, July 26, 2017

A partition is the separation, division, and assignment of a thing held in common among those
to whom it may belong. Every act intended to put an end to indivision among co-heirs is deemed
to be a partition.

On general principle, independent and in spite of the statute of frauds, courts of equity have
enforced oral partition when it has been completely or partly performed. xxx Regardless of
whether a parol partition or agreement to partition is valid and enforceable at law, equity will in
proper cases, where the parol partition has actually been consummated by the taking of

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possession in severalty and the exercise of ownership by the parties of the respective portions
set off to each, recognize and enforce such parol partition and the rights of the parties
thereunder. A parol partition may also be sustained on the ground that the parties thereto have
acquiesced in and ratified the partition by taking possession in severalty, exercising acts of
ownership with respect thereto, or otherwise recognizing the existence of the partition. Heirs of
Roger Jarque v. Marcial Jarque, et al., G.R. No. 196733, November 21, 2018

In actions for partition, the court cannot properly issue an order to divide the property, unless
it first makes a determination as to the existence of co-ownership.

The court must initially settle the issue of ownership, which is the first stage in an action for
partition. Therefore, until and unless this issue of co-ownership is definitely and finally resolved,
it would be premature to effect a partition of the disputed properties. Divinagracia vs. Parilla,
G.R. No. 196750, March 11, 2015

Although tax declarations or realty tax payment of property are not conclusive evidence of
ownership, they are good indicia of possession in the concept of owner, for no one in his right
mind would be paying taxes for a property that is not in his actual or constructive possession.

They constitute evidence of great weight in support of the claim of title of ownership by
prescription when considered with the actual possession of the property by the applicant.
Jenestor B. Caldito, et al. v. Isagani V. Obado, et al., G.R. No. 181596, January 30, 2017

However, any person who claims ownership by virtue of tax declarations must also prove that
he has been in actual possession of the property.

Thus, proof that the property involved had been declared for taxation purposes for a certain
period of time, does not constitute proof of possession, nor is it proof of ownership, in the
absence of the claimant’s actual possession of said property. In the case at bar, the petitioners
[Peraltas] failed to adequately prove their possession and that of their predecessors-in-interest.
Josephine Delos Reyes, et al. v. Municipality of Kalibo, Aklan, et al. G.R. No. 214587, February
26, 2018

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Usufruct, in essence, is nothing else but the right to enjoy another's property.

While this right to enjoy the property of another temporarily includes both the jus utendi and the
jus fruendi, the owner retains the jus disponendi or the power to alienate the same.

In this case, having only the usufruct over the property, Servanda (usufructuary) may only sell
her right of usufruct over, and not the title to, Lot No. 2560. Necessarily, her successors may
acquire only such rights. Heirs of Roger Jarque v. Marcial Jarque, et al., G.R. No. 196733,
November 21, 2018

Requisites of Easement of Right-of-Way

An entitlement to the easement of right-of-way requires that the following requisites must be
met:

1) The dominant estate is surrounded by other immovables and has no adequate outlet to
a public highway (Art. 649, par. 1);
2) There is payment of proper indemnity (Art. 649, par. 1);
3) The isolation is not due to the acts of the proprietor of the dominant estate (Art. 649, last
par.); and
4) The right-of-way claimed is at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate; and insofar
as consistent with this rule, where the distance from the dominant estate to a public
highway may be the shortest (Art. 650). Sps. Larry and Rosarita Williams v. Rainero A.
Zerda, G.R. No. 207146, March 15, 2017

The criterion of least prejudice to the servient estate must prevail over the criterion of shortest
distance although this is a matter of judicial appreciation.

In other words, where the easement may be established on any of several tenements
surrounding the dominant estate, the one where the way is shortest and will cause the least
damage should be chosen. If having these two (2) circumstances do not concur in a single
tenement, the way which will cause the least damage should be used, even if it will not be the
shortest.” Sps. Larry and Rosarita Williams v. Rainero A. Zerda, G.R. No. 207146, March 15,
2017

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In easement of right of way, there is no alienation of the land occupied. This only reinforces the
concept that the payment of indemnity is merely for the use of the right of way and not for its
alienation.

Payment of the value of the land for permanent use of the easement does not mean an alienation
of the land occupied. In fact, under the law and unlike in purchase of a property, should the right
of way no longer be necessary because the owner of the dominant estate has joined it to another
abutting on a public highway, and the servient estate demands that the easement be
extinguished, the value of the property received by the servient estate by way of indemnity shall
be returned in full to the dominant estate. This only reinforces the concept that the payment of
indemnity is merely for the use of the right of way and not for its alienation. De Guzman vs.
Filinvest Development Corporation, G.R. No. 191710, January 14, 2015

Classifications of Nuisance

A nuisance may either be:

1) a public nuisance (or one which “affects a community or neighborhood or any

considerable number of persons, although the extent of the annoyance, danger or
damage upon individuals may be unequal”); or
2) a private nuisance (or one “that is not included in the foregoing definition”, or, as case
law puts it, one which “violates only private rights and produces damages to but one or a
few persons”).

Jurisprudence further classifies nuisances in relation to their legal susceptibility to summary

abatement (i.e., corrective action without prior judicial permission). In this regard, a nuisance
may either be:

1) a nuisance per se (or one which “affects the immediate safety of persons and property
and may be summarily abated under the undefined law of necessity”); or
2) a nuisance per accidens (or that which “depends upon certain conditions and
circumstances, and its existence being a question of fact, it cannot be abated without due
hearing thereon in a tribunal authorized to decide whether such a thing does in law
constitute a nuisance.”) Rana vs. Wong, G.R. No. 192862, June 30, 2014

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A nuisance per accidens is one which depends upon certain conditions and circumstances, and
its existence being a question of fact, it cannot be abated without due hearing thereon in a
tribunal authorized to decide whether such a thing does in law constitute a nuisance.

It requires a determination of such circumstances as to warrant the abatement of the nuisance.

That can only be done with reasonable notice to the person alleged to be maintaining or doing
the same of the time and place of hearing before a tribunal authorized to decide whether such a
thing or act does in law constitute a nuisance per accidens. In other words, it requires a proper
appreciation of evidence before a court or tribunal rules that the property being maintained is a
nuisance per accidens. North Greenhills Association, Inc. v. Atty. Narciso Morales, G.R. No.
222821, August 9, 2017

A donation is an act of liberality whereby a person disposes a thing or right gratuitously in favor
of another, who, in turn, accepts it. Like any other contract, agreement between the parties
must exist.

Consent in contracts presupposes the following requisites: (1) it should be intelligent or with an
exact notion of the matter to which it refers; (2) it should be free; and (3) it should be
spontaneous. The parties’ intention must be clear and the attendance of a vice of consent, like
any contract, renders the donation voidable.

In order for a donation of property to be valid, what is crucial is the donor’s capacity to give
consent at the time of the donation. Lydia Lavarez, et al. v. Angeles Guevarra, et al. G.R. No.
206103, March 29, 2017

When the law requires that a contract be in some form to be valid, such requirement is absolute
and indispensable; its non-observance renders the contract void and of no effect. One such law
is Article 749 of the Civil Code.

Art. 749. In order that the donation of an immovable may be valid, it must be made in a public
document, specifying therein the property donated and the value of the charges which the donee
must satisfy. The acceptance may be made in the same deed of donation or in a separate public
document, but it shall not take effect unless it is done during the lifetime of the donor. If the
acceptance is made in a separate instrument, the donor shall be notified thereof in an authentic
form, and this step shall be noted in both instruments. xxx Thus, donation of real property, which
is a solemn contract, is void without the formalities specified in the foregoing provision. Article
749 of the Civil Code requires that donation of real property must be made in a public instrument

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to be valid. Heirs of Jose Mariano and Helen S. Mariano, et al. v. City of Naga, G.R. No. 197743,
March 12, 2018

Requisites of a valid donation of an immovable property

In order that a donation of an immovable property be valid, the following elements must be
present:

1) the essential reduction of the patrimony of the donor;

2) the increase in the patrimony of the donee;
3) the intent to do an act of liberality or animus donandi;
4) the donation must be contained in a public document; and
5) that the acceptance thereof be made in the same deed or in a separate public instrument;
if acceptance is made in a separate instrument, the donor must be notified thereof in an
authentic form, to be noted in both instruments. The Missionary Sisters of Our Lady of
Fatima (Peach Sisters of Laguna), et al. v. Amando V. Alzona, et al., G.R. No. 224307,
August 06, 2018

Under Article 737 of the Civil Code, "the donor's capacity shall be determined as of the time of
the making of the donation." By analogy, the legal capacity or the personality of the donee, or
the authority of the latter's representative, in certain cases, is determined at the time of
acceptance of the donation.

Article 738, in relation to Article 745, of the Civil Code provides that all those who are not
specifically disqualified by law may accept donations either personally or through an authorized
representative with a special power of attorney for the purpose or with a general and sufficient
power.

In this case, the Court finds that for the purpose of accepting the donation, the petitioner [Peach
Sisters of Laguna], which at the time of the donation is a corporation by estoppel, is deemed
vested with personality to accept, and Mother Concepcion is clothed with authority to act on the
latter's behalf. The Missionary Sisters of Our Lady of Fatima (Peach Sisters of Laguna), et al. v.
Amando V. Alzona, et al., G.R. No. 224307, August 06, 2018

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An automatic revocation clause in [onerous] donations is valid. Such clause is governed by law
on contracts.

The Supreme Court has affirmed the validity of an automatic revocation clause in donations in
the case of De Luna v. Abrigo (181 SCRA 150, 1990). The Court explained the nature of automatic
revocation clauses by first identifying the three categories of donation.

A donation may be simple, remuneratory or onerous. A donation is simple when the cause is the
donor’s pure liberality. It is remuneratory when the donor “gives something to reward past or
future services or because of future charges or burdens, when the value of said services, burdens
or charges is less than the value of the donation.” A donation is onerous when it is “subject to
burdens, charges, or future services equal (or more) in value than that of the thing donated.” The
Court found that the donation in De Luna was onerous as it required the donee to build a chapel,
a nursery, and a kindergarten. The Court then went on to explain that an onerous donation is
governed by the law on contracts and not by the law on donations. It is within this context that
the Court found an automatic revocation clause as valid. Province of Camarines Sur v. Bodega
Glassware, G.R. No. 194199, March 22, 2017

An automatic rescission clause effectively rescinds the contract upon breach without need of
any judicial declaration.

Article 1306 of the Civil Code allows the parties “to establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and
conditions as they may deem convenient, provided they are not contrary to law, morals, good
customs, public order or public policy.” In contracts law, parties may agree to give one or both of
them the right to rescind a contract unilaterally. This is akin to an automatic revocation clause in
an onerous donation. The jurisprudence on automatic rescission in the field of contracts law
therefore applies in an automatic revocation clause. Province of Camarines Sur v. Bodega
Glassware, G.R. No. 194199, March 22, 2017

A donation cannot be forced: it cannot arise from compulsion, be borne by a requirement, or

otherwise be impelled by a mandate imposed upon the donor by forces that are external to him
or her.

A donation is, by definition, “an act of liberality.” Article 725 of the Civil Code provides: Donation
is an act of liberality whereby a person disposes gratuitously of a thing or right in favor of another,
who accepts it. To be considered a donation, an act of conveyance must necessarily proceed

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freely from the donor’s own, unrestrained volition. Republic v. Sps. Francisco and Carmelita
Llamas, G.R. No. 194190, January 25, 2017

Section 31’s compulsion to donate (and concomitant compulsion to accept) cannot be sustained
as valid. Not only does it run afoul of basic legal concepts; it also fails to withstand the more
elementary test of logic and common sense.

In jurisprudence, animus donandi (that is, the intent to do an act of liberality) is an indispensable
element of a valid donation, along with the reduction of the donor’s patrimony and the
corresponding increase in the donee’s patrimony. Republic v. Sps. Francisco and Carmelita
Llamas, G.R. No. 194190, January 25, 2017

Article 1108(4) of the Civil Code expressly provides that prescription does not run against the
State and its subdivisions.

This rule has been consistently adhered to in a long line of cases involving reversion of public
lands, where it is often repeated that when the government is the real party-in- interest, and it
is proceeding mainly to assert its own right to recover its own property, there can, as a rule, be
no defense grounded on laches or prescription.

This rule applies, regardless of the nature of the government property. Article 1108(4) does not
distinguish between real or personal properties of the State. Jose S. Ramiscal, Jr. v. Commission
on Audit, G.R. No. 213716, October 10, 2017

Only private lands that have been acquired by prescription under existing laws may be the
subject of applications for registration under Section 14(2) of PD No. 1529.

The starting point of the Court’s evaluation must, therefore, be whether the property involved
falls within the scope of the paragraph. Under the Civil Code, all things within human commerce
are generally susceptible of prescription. Properties of the public dominion, or those owned by
the State, are expressly excluded by law from this general rule, unless they are proven to be
patrimonial in character.

Only private property can be acquired by prescription. Property of public dominion is outside the
commerce of man. It cannot be the object of prescription because prescription does not run

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against the State in its sovereign capacity. However, when property of public dominion is no
longer intended for public use or for public service, it becomes part of the patrimonial property
of the State. When this happens, the property is withdrawn from public dominion and becomes
property of private ownership, albeit still owned by the State. The property is now brought within
the commerce of man and becomes susceptible to the concepts of legal possession and
prescription. Republic v. Rosario L. Nicolas, G.R. No. 181435, October 2, 2017

Acquisitive prescription is a mode of acquiring ownership of a real or immovable property by

possessor through the requisite lapse of time.

In order to ripen into ownership, possession must be in the concept of an owner, public, peaceful
and uninterrupted. The possession contemplated as foundation for prescriptive right must be
one under claim of title or adverse to or in prescription. On this note, acquisitive prescription
may either be extraordinary, which requires uninterrupted adverse possession for 30 years, or
ordinary, which requires possession in good faith and with a just title for a period of ten (10)
years. Aurelia Narcise, et al. v. Valbueco, Inc., G.R. No. 196888, July 19, 2017

Other names for acquisitive prescription are adverse possession and usucapion. Ordinary
acquisitive prescription requires possession of things in good faith and with just title for a
period of ten (10) years, while extraordinary acquisitive prescription requires uninterrupted
adverse possession of thirty (30) years, without need of title or of good faith.

Possession is in good faith when there is a reasonable belief that the person from whom the thing
is received has been the owner thereof and could thereby transmit his ownership. There is just
title when the adverse claimant comes into possession of the property through any of the modes
recognized by law for the acquisition of ownership or other real rights, but the grantor is neither
the owner nor in a position to transmit the right. Heirs of Spouses Corazon P. De Guzman and
Fortunato De Guzman vs. Heirs of Marceliano Bandong, G.R. No. 215454, August 9, 2017

A check is subject to prescription of actions upon a written contract.

Article 1144 of the Civil Code provides: The following actions must be brought within ten (10)
years from the time the right of action accrues: 1) Upon a written contract; 2) Upon an obligation
created by law; 3) Upon a judgment.

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Barring any extrajudicial or judicial demand that may toll the 10-year prescription period and any
evidence which may indicate any other time when the obligation to pay is due, the cause of action
based on a check is reckoned from the date indicated on the check. If the check is undated,
however, as in the present petition, the cause of action is reckoned from the date of the issuance
of the check. Benjamin Evangelista v. Screenex, Inc., G.R. No. 211564, November 20, 2017

LAND TITLES AND DEEDS

An action by the registered owner to recover a real property registered under the Torrens
System does not prescribe.

An action to recover possession of a registered land never prescribes in view of the provision of
Sec. 44 of Act No. 496 to the effect that no title to registered land in derogation of that of a
registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse possession. The rule on
imprescriptibly of registered lands not only applies to the registered owner but extends to the
heirs of the registered owner as well. Carmen Aledro-Runa v. Lead Export and Agro-
Development Corp., G.R. No. 225896, July 23, 2018

Likewise, an action to recover registered land covered by the Torrens System may not generally
be barred by laches.

Laches is a principle based on equity and may not prevail against a specific provision of law,
because equity, which has been defined as "justice outside legality," is applied in the absence of
and not against statutory law or rules of procedure. Carmen Aledro-Runa v. Lead Export and
Agro-Development Corp., G.R. No. 225896, July 23, 2018

The constitutional ban against foreigners applies only to ownership of Philippine land and not
to the improvements built thereon.

Precisely, it is the Constitution itself which demarcates the rights of citizens and non-citizens in
owning Philippine land. To be sure, the constitutional ban against foreigners applies only to
ownership of Philippine land and not to the improvements built thereon, such as the two (2)
houses standing on Lots 1 and 2142 which were properly declared to be co-owned by the parties
subject to partition. Beumer vs. Amores, G.R. No. 195670, December 3, 2012

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When the action for reconveyance is based on an implied or constructive trust, the prescriptive
period is ten (10) years, or it is imprescriptible if the movant is in the actual, continuous and
peaceful possession of the property involved. On the other hand, when the action for
reconveyance is based on a void deed or contract the action is imprescriptible under Article
1410 of the New Civil Code.

As long as the land wrongfully registered under the Torrens system is still in the name of the
person who caused such registration, an action in personam will lie to compel him to reconvey
the property to the real owner. Sps. Yu Hwa Ping and Mary Gaw v. Ayala Land, Inc., G.R. Nos.
173120 & 173141, July 26, 2017

Registering a piece of land under the Torrens System does not create or vest title because
registration is not a mode of acquiring ownership.

Accordingly, if the inclusion of the land in the earlier registered title was a result of a mistake,
then the latter registered title will prevail. The ratio decidendi of this exception is to prevent a
title that was earlier registered, which erroneously contained a parcel of land that should not
have been included, from defeating a title that was later registered but is legitimately entitled to
the said land.

A certificate of title is merely an evidence of ownership or title over the particular property
described therein. Sps. Yu Hwa Ping and Mary Gaw v. Ayala Land, Inc., G.R. Nos. 173120 &
173141, July 26, 2017

An adverse claim serves as a notice to third persons that any transaction regarding the disputed
land is subject to the outcome of the dispute.

An adverse claim is a type of involuntary dealing designed to protect the interest of a person over
a piece of real property by apprising third persons that there is a controversy over the ownership
of the land. It seeks to preserve and protect the right of the adverse claimant during the pendency
of the controversy, where registration of such interest or right is not otherwise provided for by
the Property Registration Decree.

Before a notice of adverse claim is registered, it must be shown that there is no other provision
in law for the registration of the claimant’s alleged right in the property. Logarta vs. Mangahis,
G.R. No. 213568, July 5, 2016

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A certificate of title serves as evidence of an indefeasible and incontrovertible title to the

property in favor of the person whose name appears therein and that a person who has a
Torrens title over a land is entitled to the possession thereof.

Thus, as against the registered owner and the holder of an unregistered deed of sale, it is the
former who has a better right to possess. In this case, it is the petitioner who, being an heir of
the registered owner Segundo, acquires a better right of possession over the parcels of land
covered by the subject OCTs. Carmen Aledro-Runa v. Lead Export and Agro-Development Corp.,
G.R. No. 225896, July 23, 2018

The correctness or incorrectness of the entries in a party’s certificate of title covering a

particular property does not directly translate to the validity or invalidity of said party’s
ownership or title to the property.

As the Court clarified in Heirs of Clemente Ermac v. Heirs of Vicente Ermac, 403 SCRA 291 (2003):
[O]wnership is not the same as a certificate of title. Registering a piece of land under the Torrens
System does not create or vest title, because registration is not a mode of acquiring ownership.
A certificate of title is merely an evidence of ownership or title over the particular property
described therein. Its issuance in favor of a particular person does not foreclose the possibility
that the real property may be co-owned with persons not named in the certificate, or that it may
be held in trust for another person by the registered owner. IVQ Landholdings, Inc. v. Euben
Barbosa, G.R. No. 193156, September 26, 2018

An action or proceeding is deemed to be an attack on a certificate of title when its objective is

to nullify the same, thereby challenging the judgment pursuant to which the certificate of title
was decreed.

Corollary thereto, it is a well-known doctrine that the issue as to whether the certificate of title
was procured by falsification or fraud can only be raised in an action expressly instituted for such
purpose. It is a well-known doctrine that the issue as to whether [the certificate of] title was
procured by falsification or fraud can only be raised in an action expressly instituted for the
purpose.

A Torrens title can be attacked only for fraud, within one year after the date of the issuance of
the decree of registration. Such attack must be direct, and not by a collateral proceeding. The
title represented by the certificate cannot be changed, altered, modified, enlarged, or diminished
in a collateral proceeding. The certificate of title serves as evidence of an indefeasible title to the

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property in favor of the person whose name appears therein. Bagayas vs. Bagayas, G.R. Nos.
187308 and 187517, September 18, 2013

Even if the procurement of a certificate of title was tainted with fraud and misrepresentation,
such defective title may be the source of a completely legal and valid title in the hands of an
innocent purchaser for value.

Where innocent third persons, relying on the correctness of the certificate of title thus issued,
acquire rights over the property, the court cannot disregard such rights and order the total
cancellation of the certificate. The effect of such an outright cancellation would be to impair
public confidence in the certificate of title, for everyone dealing with property registered under
the Torrens system would have to inquire in every instance whether the title has been regularly
or irregularly issued. Heirs of Victorino Sarili, The vs. Lagrosa, G.R. No. 193517, January 15, 2014

A reconstitution of title proceeding involves only the re-issuance of a new certificate of title lost
or destroyed in its original form and condition.

These findings should not be taken as an adjudication on the ownership of the subject lands. They
are but determinations of whether or not the certificate of title sought to be reconstituted is
authentic, genuine, and in force and effect at the time it was lost or destroyed, which, based on
case law, are central to resolving petitions for reconstitution of title. Clearly, a reconstitution of
title proceeding involves only the re-issuance of a new certificate of title lost or destroyed in its
original form and condition. In this light, the court does not pass upon the ownership of the land
covered by the lost or destroyed certificate, as the said matter should be threshed out in a
separate proceeding for the purpose. Luriz vs. Republic, G.R. No. 208948, February 24, 2016

The service of notice of the petition for reconstitution filed under Republic Act (RA) No. 26 to
the occupants of the property, owners of the adjoining properties, and all persons who may
have any interest in the property is not required if the petition is based on the owner’s duplicate
certificate of title or on that of the co-owner’s, mortgagee’s, or lessee’s.

It was evident from respondent’s own pleadings filed with the courts that its purported rights to
the property were nonexistent, having for their basis a title that was issued upon property that
was already previously registered in the name of another. Indeed, respondent has no conceivable
right to the property, having for its basis a void title that came after the same property was

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already transferred to and owned by another — in this case, the petitioners’ predecessor-in-
interest Basilio Aquino. As for the sufficiency of the petition for reconstitution, the Court agrees
with petitioners’ argument that, since the source of reconstitution is the owner’s duplicate copy,
there is no need to give notice to other parties. Virgilia T. Aquino, et al. v. Estate of Tomas B.
Aguirre, G.R. No. 232060, January 14, 2019

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