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CNS Assignment 1

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CNS Assignment 1

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bhargava ns
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Parpes are prfr fpals robbie brarsn afta nfo chontel Pe esbablte hed fr trp: Oe woke oi ae Fate. a OY fe dest’ Fable 1.2 Security Services (X.800) AUTHENTICATION ‘The assurance that the communicating entity is the one that it claims to be. Peer Entity Authentication Used in association with a logical connection to provide confidence in the identity of the entities connected Authentication In a connectionless transfer, provides assurance that the source of received data is as claimed. ACCESS CONTROL The prevention of unauthorized use of a resource (ie., this service controls who can have access to a resource, under what conditions access can occur, and what those accessing the resource are allowed to do). DATA CONFIDENTIALITY ‘The protection of data from unauthorized disclosure. Connection Confidentiality The protection of all user data on a connection Connectionless Confidentiality ‘The protection of all user data in a single data block. Selective-Field Confidentiality The confidentiality of selected fields within the user data on a connection or in a single data block. ‘Traffic-Flow Confidentiality ‘The protection of the information that might be derived from observation of traffic flows. DATA INTEGRITY “The assurance that data received are exactly as sent by anvauthorized entity (ie., contain no modi fication, insertion, deletion, or replay). Connection Integrity with Recovery Provides for the integrity of all user data on a connec. tion and detects any modification, insertion, deletion, or replay of any data within an entire data sequence, with recovery attempted. Connection Integrity without Recovery ‘As above, but provides only detection without recovery, Selective-Field Connection Integrity Provides for the integrity of selected fields within the user data of a data block transferred over a connec- tion and takes the form of determination of whether the selected fields have been modified, inserted, deleted, or replayed. Connectionless Integrity Provides for the integrity of a single connectionless data block and may take the form of detection of data modification. Additionally, a limited form of replay detection may be provided. Selective-Field Connectionless Integrity Provides for the integrity of selected fields within a single connectionless data block; takes the form of determination of whether the selected fields have been modified. NONREPUDIATION Provides protection against denial by one of the entities involved in a communication of having pat- ticipated in all or part of the communication. Nonrepudiation, Origin Proof that the message was sent by the specified party. Nonrepudiation, Destination Proof that the message was received by the specified party. Table 1.3. Security Mechanisms (X.800) SPECIFIC SECURITY MECHANISMS May be incorporated into the appropriate protocol layer in order to provide some of the OSI security services. Encipherment The use of mathematical algorithms to transform data into a form that is not readily intelligible. The transformation and subsequent recovery of the data depend on an algorithm and zero or more encryption keys. tal Signature Data appended to, or a cryptographic transformation of, a data unit that allows a recipient of the data unit to prove the source and integrity of the data unit and protect against forgery (e.g., by the recipient). Access Control A variety of mechanisms that enforce access rights to resources, Data Integrity A variety of mechanisms used to assure the integrity of a data unit or stream of data units. PERVASIVE SECURITY MECHANISMS Mechanisms that are not specific to any particular OSI security service or protocol layer. Trusted Functionality ‘That which is perceived to be correct with respect to some criteria (¢.g., as established by a security Policy). Security Label ‘The marking bound to a resource (which may be a data unit) that names or designates the security attri- butes of that resource, Event Detection Detection of security-relevant events. Security Audit Trail Data collected and potentially used to facilitate a security audit, which is an independent review and examination of system records and activities. Security Recovery Deals with requests from mechanisms, such as event handling and management functions, and takes recovery actions. SPECIFIC SECURITY MECHANISMS Authentication Exchange ‘A mechanism intended to ensure the identity of an entity by means of information exchange. Traffic Padding The insertion of bits into gaps in a data stream to frustrate traffic analysis attempts, Routing Control Enables selection of particular physically secure routes for certain data and allows routing changes, especially when a breach of security is suspected, Notarization The use of a trusted third party to assure certain properties of a data exchange. os ioc Ep aspecks come: tes Plagiedeen ft fo_ptce 65a oe "Os cecal neponenks sit 2 (©) foo of Yh the. meg . ny uid bre ‘On cbt j_needt-d; Fon. t05 nsthi oiehre bul? 2. slave} tafo fa oy " there are HI basic hasks. th: Pers a; aio Securt ty SOVvice oF n. ‘Algorithm. \ 2 enbeaie sect tofo ban Biba ane ifthe! pith i oeaop “methods- for distributton. 4 ches ate acreb. fodo. gos Pe) peobeol 1 be 5001 toes b | Mele Pepe of eecurtiy siga’ Pr pe re _ —Figere. 4.< TB ge he AY Discuss at aby mode) of egret Eocnplh> ! yolth neat ragon, | A a yenmebrte en eypiten Scheme has 67 tng redients | hex b: thee the actgtog fnbellf ie wat a dala that tb fed. Inlo. the cael a8 input — Trusted third party (eg., arbiter, distributer of secret information) Sender Recipient Information channel ‘Sccurity-related Security-related transformation i transformation il Secret Secret information information Opponent Figure 1.5 Model for Network Security | = ony pion ts Un Ho tla, performs varrfous Bertil ites 4 Panslotmabtons on the Week 46 Plat nbext- * Goexet keys 7 EE 1s \albo" an: Yp to. te te pov thn. | = s hy 1S as Yahi indeperabnt. os ae ofthe. algorfibm. ' Cipherbext: Sco at PS the Sevombled. resoag pra ass depend a panda an te, PTL. siediele aya Lat 5 The. cf Pphevtext _ 9s_an_apy parently Phelan as. Py: Blane, hs. tp Hon Al age fs “yy J dhe “eroryphtin_a vilhm TWP fr_ as Pome St ee = maa oT + 5k Pr. = y, " Faguce id TB % Problems: “age eh gM en Cipher, Pape, He, Ipegtoue aye 223 Secret key shared by Secret key shared by sender and recipient er Encryption algorithm Decryption algorithm iors: (eg., AES) (reverse of encryption algorithm) Figure 3.1 Simplified Model of Symmetric Encryption. =P potis a brief nole on broreposition Technigue ‘ypbograp [matl fence] ’ a A tes Tha ne kend of map 4 13 achteved she Ke ricg Sore Sort of wr taditon on He letters.” Thts technique. ¥2 5 vederrtd 10 a5: a “Fyangposttfon cipher. | * Tre kinds | (2 Rael Pence 2 Plarnt ext rotten dovon as sage of di —_— _k ead of a6 sequence OF ro.28:. he - cote me_adker =e PT Do - _ Vg ul ee LD hy |: ee EL i oe GO. 3 sajhe vO, | oT 6- MMTETEFEEAR Sunday tc, : Week 46, * NOVEMBER | WO Rovs- column | = Lovpie rncecage In ntceg gla; seo1e by 08 ead dhe rai Column Poon, odes . wDoader el pokenteita ae = tgs “Meek me afl : Frege te ‘he a: b Be 4 : i Pn “ms ope te wa bm 7 om aviat Fe 2 ood tor pat et gage tl! Pe gk OO OM garish Beis Ger h “A Pe BARTFZEEEMMT | . key i- 4 38 £4 & ‘W @ art Bs or8 obfon Fees hs Tes Ae ga @ Orci 81 aya BPOF . Co rp.my$ sans oe an ny eT fe REM TET AZMEPE _ B\jorthe 4 a neab _dlagvam 4 oy plat DES shes Epen cigbrin theo jae rks oe, B yp ten in Figured, nF TB * thet awe 2 fo oe he. aka dont (DPR ep Be: ws aD » KAY ‘PL es pela: bi 64 bide. bet Ht ‘ x —{—_ LE: othe _ai Hy cris tng OF phe Pr eraoved te 3 phases | 2006 / 64-bit plaintext 64-bit key 64-bit ciphertext Figure 4.5. General Depiction of DES Encryption Algorithm wre) 6u bite PT passes thu an tnitfal perrutalley thal vearvenged the bil to produce the ‘Perenited top foput (DIG Younds of Same Sun? rohtch_pnvelves — Pumubalton # supstfhubion sfoncrs 2O/p_of He last Yound consishs Of 6h bits tab ave a func? of He yp PT + dhe ke bey > The left 4 sight halves oe He ofp: are. _6roapped 10 produce 2 esd (thé preoutput 1s pased’ thru te perentabiin LrP?] Phat 8S Inverse a # Inf tal’ peYmutalto> Func? rohith produces 64-bib oT, Rs hk hard portions Shows fp oy 90. 2cbtch Ps crstol 56-bit sothtay nal ey fe passed Aru. a petmulabtor func" ermutatton foner 15 tre Same. for cach 29h, noord bub a PFE. Subp. be productd Coz of He repeated chtfts 0 Ihe iy bths, Abe) ths OF DES Sage of $6 -Bib keys ' ie Nabe Of the Dis al ovithm, , Thing ablacks +) Oxp ene differents Sobebtbutfon. nen Bbbe btutten Tech nfgues Honea ae 5 babel ge =e atogle. cf a is oi. —platn_a “pat bo. cipher ) Sopuk bo. 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