Orient Research Journal of Social Sciences ISSN Print 2616-7085

June, 2021, Vol.6, No. 1 [37-46] ISSN Online 2616-7093

Pakistan’s Joining of US –Sponsored Military Pacts and Nehru’s

Criticism
Dr. Ahmad Ejaz 1 Zia-Ul-Haq 2 Sana Farooq 3

1. Assistant Professor, Pakistan Study Centre, University of Punjab, Lahore, Punjab, Pakistan
2. Ph. D Scholar, Pakistan Study Centre, University of Punjab, Lahore, Punjab, Pakistan
3. Lecturer, Punjab Groups of Colleges, Lahore, Punjab, Pakistan
Abstract

The bilateral relations between United States and India have been significant since
beginning and developed progressively and finally took a shape of strategic and
nuclear partnership. Both sides’ divergent approaches of foreign policy did not harm
their bilateral relations. India became independent in the early years of the Cold
War period, when the aims of US foreign policy were mainly associated with strategy
of containment of communism and the threats arose from the Soviet bloc. The
government of Prime Minister Nehru (1947-64), adopted policy neutralism and
avoided to join the US-sponsored politics of alliances. The Indian view of peaceful
coexistence was based on 'Panchsheel Doctrine' which strengthened its non-aligned
status and its goals of foreign policy in regional setting that largely focused to attain
a prominent role in the area. Thus it is important to note that despite clash in
approaches and incompatibility of their foreign policies goals, the bilateral
relationship remained constant but discrepancy in their foreign policies priorities
became the foremost reason of estrangement in the initial years, which lasted till the
eruption of 1962 Sino-Indian War.

Key Words: Nehru’s Criticism, Pakistan, US –Sponsored Military Pacts

Introduction

India played an important role in the American economy. The American

business community viewed India as an area for trade and investment also.In April
1947, US government called for the elimination of problems that foreign companies
faced in India. The US government also announced that ‘no business further with
India, unless plans for nationalization were not dropped.’ Nehru saw many
advantages for India in a closer economic relationship with the United States. Under
the pressures of U.S. - sponsored Point Four program, the Indian government
surrendered some of the essential points of its economic policy. It discarded the
nationalization program. The American demand was for an end to the rule that 51 per
cent of the capital in some industries. The United States Secretary of Treasury stated
on August 9, 1949 that the 51 per cent rule was ‘a significant deterrent to American
investment abroad.’ The Indian government modified the 51 per cent rule to the
advantage of Washington. India signed the general Point Four Agreement with the
United States on December 28, 1950 (Aquinas, et. al. 1948). In 1951, the Government
of India approached the United States for a loan on easy terms for the purchase of two
million tons of grains from American stocks. Truman and the party leaders argued
their case on the ground that the Indian people were in distress and United States
should lend them a helping hand. They also stressed the fact that India was an
important democracy in Asia and this timely assistance would save India from
flirtations with communism.India persuaded the United States primarily for economic
ORJSS June 2021, Vol.6, No. 1

benefits. However, it did not offer to commit for military material and maintained that
it was neither part of the two blocs (Yaseen, et. al, 2021).

Nehru defined non-alignment as avoiding military alliance with any country.

He believed that joining one bloc or other would lessen India's chances for influence
in world affairs. Alliance was dangerous. India assumed to have good links with the
U. S. and the Communist bloc. Thus, it had become a main effort of Indian diplomacy
to convince the United States and its allies that its emphasis on state planning did not
mean a measure toward communism and further not to convince Russia and its allies
that its economic policy did not mean a drive towards capitalism or a threat to their
interests. Thus India persuaded both blocs to spread economic aid by ensuing a policy
of non-alignment (Morgenthau, 1959).

India could not join the American alliance on security grounds because such a
step might have forced communist China which was capable of overrunning India in
the event war. India's swift recognition of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, its
consent of China's forceful re-entry into Tibet in 1950, and its support of China 's
claim for a seat at the United Nations were manifestations of this decision, that the
establishment of better neighborhood (Aquinas, et. al. 1948).

The Indian government thought that policy of non-alignment would be the

best assurance for its security. Nehru had reflected this belief and caution in his
writings. when Pakistan entered the Western alliance in February 1954. He said: The
Cold War had reached South Asia, and the danger of attack from Pakistan became
evident. The United States decision to supply military aid to Pakistan created
anxieties in New Delhi (Muzaffar, et. al. 2018). Nehru said that defense alliances
openly aimed against some other country or countries and they wanted to maintain
peace through strength (Nuechterlein, 1976). Nehru's opposition to military coalitions
stemmed to a great extent from his understanding that these alliances troubled world
peace while threatening India's security (Yaseen, et. al. 2016).

After collapse of the Nationalist China, the ideal objective for the United
States was that India would serve as the anchor of American power in Asia. If this
image was partially strategic, it was also to a certain extent economic, supposing the
integration of Asia into American economy through India. The State Department
realized this in the context of the new offers of the Truman Administration to Nehru.

Contrasting Foreign Policies

The most evident difference between the external policies of India and the
United States was that India's foreign policy was non-aligned, while U.S. foreign
policy was based on a concept of military alliances for the purpose of containing
communism.

The United States had followed a strategy of isolationism for decades. It had
adopted and followed that policy of standoffishness throughout the nineteenth century
realizing its military and economic weakness (Aquinas, et. al. 1948). Indians said that
India’s policy of non-alignment also like U.S. policy of isolationism. India’s policy
was also to avoid involvement in conflicts.

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 Pakistan’s joining of US –sponsored Military Pacts and Nehru’s Criticism

The United States had entered into Military alliances with a number of
countries and established military bases in those areas. India primarily opposed such a
policy. In the pursuit of such a policy, the United States joined mutual defense pacts
with states like Australia, New Zealand, Philippines, Japan, South Korea and
Nationalist China, and Pakistan. As the success of the Communists in taking over
North Vietnam, the United States structured the SEATO in September 1954. It
encouraged the formation of the Baghdad Pact in 1955 without joining it. India
considered all these moves as fundamentally wrong.Despite having clashing foreign
policies, India consistently got economic aid from United States under Truman
doctrine. In case of Greece and Turkey, to keep them secure from Communist
influence, U.S. President Truman requested the US Congress for military and
economic aid. Truman promulgated the Truman Doctrine. Under this doctrine, the
President recommended a package of military aid worth $400 million for Greece and
Turkey. His request induced an encouraging response from the US Congress.
Congress passed an Act on 22 May 1947 allowing the US Administration to provide
military and economic aid to Greece and Turkey. It also authorized the President to
send military and civilian experts to advise the Greek and Turkish Governments.
India took benefit of emergency food under Truman doctrine.

After economic assistance of countries which were facing economic crisis

and threatened by expanding influence of communism, US launched the Eisenhower
Doctrine that was to provide a military support to countries vulnerable to
communism.

The Eisenhower Doctrine

The Suez Crisis of 1956-57 produced a situation which acted to be highly

favorable to communist intrusion or overt attack. President Dwight D. Eisenhower of
the United States was alarmed atthe possibility of a risk of a communist attack in the
Middle East region. President Eisenhower proposed the Congress on January 5 1957
a policy which was later known as Eisenhower Doctrine. He asked for right to operate
the armed forces of the United States in response to some request made by any nation
of the Middle East for security against aggression from Communist countries. He also
asked to use Mutual Security funds to extend economic or military support to those
countries. The Congress agreed to empower President. The main purpose of the
Eisenhower Doctrine was to meet the threats of communism. India severely criticized
US –sponsored collective security system and preferred a neutral approach. So
subsequently, India and U.S. relations moved in an opposite direction (Aquinas, et. al.
1948).

Pakistan’s Joining of US – Sponsored Military Alliance and Nehru criticism

That time Pakistan was looking for assistance to strengthen its security.
Furthermore Pakistan had ideological differences with Soviet Union. Pakistani
leadership was sternly against communist aggressive designs for spreading
communism. Pakistan’s founders made request to the United States for aid to meet its
defense needs. Pakistan, due to its unique strategic location attracted the Americans
and they started bracketing Pakistan’s association for accomplishment of the US
global strategy of containment of Communism. Pakistan appeared as the front-line
state for the United States and other western allies (Muzaffar, et. al, 2017)
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The resemblances of interests and mutual need of each other brought these
unequal powers close. Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan paid visit to United States in
May 1950. This was greatly successful visit as it opened great vistas of the friendship.
Liaquat Ali declared that Pakistan was resolved to put all its weight to help for
stability in Asia. He added that stability in Asia is most vital for our freedom and
development for the maintenance of international peace’. The American policy
makers were inspired by Liaquat Ali Khan’s speech and acknowledged Pakistan as a
bulwark against the expansion of the Soviet influence. Saying his views in report to
the Congress, President Truman stated: Pakistan’s association would become a vital
factor for stability of the Near East region. Pakistan is also a valuable ally in South
Asia due to its strategic location in the Indian Ocean and its access Central Asia. The
United States provided economic assistance to Pakistan in 1952 as ‘defense support,’
being important in US security strategy for Asia. The aid was used by Pakistan to fill
its stocks of ammunition and spare parts.The United States provided economic
assistance to Pakistan in 1952 as ‘defense support,’ being important in US security
strategy for Asia. The aid was used by Pakistan to fill its stocks of ammunition and
spare parts. When Republicans came into power in 1953, a new defense policy called
“New Look” was announced. United States intended to avoid direct involvement in
other Korean-type operations in the new strategy. It also emphasized the
“enlargement of a arrangement of regional defense pacts and alliances”. United States
was determined to secure the free world from the extension of international
communism by firming the like-mined nation through economic and military aid with
its new plan.(Miller, 2007)

February 22, 1954, Pakistan made a formal appeal for military aid, and after
three days Eisenhower accepted Pakistan’s request and decided under Manual
Defense Assistance Program, to help Pakistan. A treaty of cooperation between
Pakistan and Turkey was to begin “the implementation of the ‘northern tier’ concept’,
was concluded as it empathized when the

U.S. National Security Council agreed over its judgment of providing

military aid to Pakistan. On April 2, 1954, this Turkey-Pakistan agreement was
signed in Karachi and in the subsequent month on May 19, the United States and
Pakistan also concluded a Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement. This was the First
defense treaty between the Unites States and Pakistan which marked the
commencement of a security alliance. In order to fortify Pakistan, the United States
agreed to enable Pakistan with equipment, material, services and other support for the
defense capabilities. Then, Pakistani leaders were fully pleased with the agreement as
they saw it as a guarantor of Pakistan’s security. Before concluding the pact, the
Prime Minister of Pakistan, Muhammad Ali, indicated that its adherence to the treaty
would enable Pakistan to guard its integrity and sovereignty.

Both India and Soviet Union were disturbed by the Pakistan’s military
agreement with the United States. This caused in rising a big hue and cry by India and
Soviet Union, but the cordial relationship.

Before becoming Prime Minister, Nehru said the country would stay ‘out of
entanglement in the power struggle with the belief that such was the best for India
and world peace as well’. Nehru added that there was ‘a great fear of American

40
 Pakistan’s joining of US –sponsored Military Pacts and Nehru’s Criticism

economic penetration’, but he believed that India would have to depend on the United
States for certain types of support’. Overall, he underscored India’s desire for friendly
relations with the United States.(“United States Treaties and Other International
Agreements,” 1962)

India expressed desire to have an independent foreign policy isolated from

the power blocs. The main American concern in Asia was related to the China's
Nationalist leader, Chiang Kai-shek, and the growing strength of his Chinese
Communist opponents. In India, in addition to his duties as Prime Minister, continued
as Foreign Minister. In his many speeches and writings on international issues over
the years, and especially in 1946 and 1947, Nehru had uttered the comprehensive out-
lines of the foreign policy India would follow.Nehru’s desired that Asia’s destiny
must be in Asian hands and that Europe played an educed role. Nehru visualized a
close partnership with China and its leader nationalist Chiang Kai-shek, a supporter
of Indian independence. Nehru desired that India should play an active role in world
affairs without joining either of the two power blocs. He preferred a policy of “non-
entanglement." Nehru believed, India would preserve its sovereignty, and freedom of
action, upsurge its international stature, and decrease the possibility that foreign
affairs would appear as a divisive domestic issue. In any case, as the strongest power
in South Asia, India did not need external support to bolster its foreign policy status
Nehru gave his thoughts on India’s foreign policy:

India wanted to avoid involvement with neither of the power blocs, but,
wished for warm relations with the both powers, Soviet Union and United States.
India disliked the undemocratic and authoritarian nature of the Soviet regime.

India had concerns that American economic power would in some way
impinge on her sovereignty. At the same time, India needed and desired US capital
goods to help the country's development.(William J. 1972) & Barnds, n.d.)

Divergent Approach on Kashmir Dispute

Quite apart from political considerations, Jawaharlal Nehru had a strong

emotional attachment to Kashmir, his family's homeland. Nehru termed the
American and British attitude on Kashmir, as ‘completely wrong. ’he charged, ‘The
U.S.A. and the U.K. have played a dirty role’. ‘the motives of the United State were
to get military and economic concessions in Pakistan.’

The US pressure in support of UNCIP progressively displeased New Delhi.

On 15 August 1949, reacting to charges India was not behaving in good faith and
manner on Kashmir dispute. Nehru called US Ambassador Loy Henderson, he was
"tired of receiving moral advice from the United States . . . . So far as Kashmir was
concerned he would not give an inch. He would hold his ground even if Kashmir,
India, and the whole world went to pieces.’(“United States Treaties and Other
International Agreements,” 1962)

Kashmir figured prominently in the official talks between US officials and

Prime Minister Nehru when he was on visit to the United States in October and
November 1949. After President Harry Truman raised the issue with Nehru during a
White House meeting, Nehru agreed on the importance of finding a solution.
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Secretary of State Acheson failed in a subsequent dialogue with Nehru to pin the
Indian leader down on specifics. An annoyed Acheson wrote, "I got a curious mixture
of a public speech and flashes of anger and deep displeasure for his opponents."
Nehru's main arguments according to Acheson were that the UN should not deal with
the merits of the dispute until the Pakistani forces withdrew from Kashmir, that a
plebiscite on the basis of a religious ideology. It would be catastrophic for the
stability of the subcontinent and that the Pakistanis had no legitimate claim to
Kashmir.

Chronic friction between Washington and New Delhi over Kashmir

inexorably had a adverse impact on bilateral relations as Nehru predicted. In October
1952, Nehru wrote G.L. Mehta, the Bombay businessman, he was appointed to
succeed Mr. Pandit as Ambassador to Washington, that India has told the State
Department "in the clear words that we consider, their attitude in this matter entirely
wrong and unfriendly to India and that this comes in the way of the growth of cordial
relations between In and America, that all of us desire, more than anything else.”

For Indians, the Kashmir question was a central and vital foreign policy issue
inevitably related with the traumatic partition of British India and the creation of
Pakistan.(Miller, 2007)

The United States looked at Kashmir quite differently. Washington viewed

the problem as a serious dispute between two states with which the United States had
friendly relations, but not as an question involving vital US interests. Kashmir also
acted to be the type of regional dispute that the United Nations should be able to
resolve, as India's original proposal for a plebiscite provided a basis for settlement.
The Concern in Washington was that in the absence of a settlement fighting would
again break out between India and Pakistan. Although at first Washington d took no
strong position on the merits, the United States sponsored the UN call for a plebiscite
and gradually became frustrated by Nehru's backsliding on this matter and by
incremental steps New Delhi took to properly incorporate Kashmir into the Indian
Union.

Difference on International Issues

Beside Kashmir, the United States and India were at odds on many foreign
policy questions unrelated to the Cold War. International control of atomic energy,
Palestine, and the creation of Israel, Indonesia, and Indo-China were issues on which
the two countries differed.

Despite disappointments over Pakistan-US alliance, Kashmir dispute and

differences on international issues, Nehru remained hopeful about relations with
Washington and US also continued economic cooperation with India. Democratic
and secular India expected the support of the United States. The United States as
leader of the democratic world expected that free and democratic India would back
the general thrust of US policy in dealing with the Soviet threat. Washington did not
welcome India's effort to follow a path between the Western democratic and
Communist totalitarian camps. Nehru warned that US arms to Pakistan would bring
the Cold War to the region, and would have "very far-reaching consequences on the

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 Pakistan’s joining of US –sponsored Military Pacts and Nehru’s Criticism

whole structure of things in. South Asia and especially in India and
Pakistan.”(“United States Treaties and Other International Agreements,” 1962)

Quite apart from annoyance over Pakistan’s membership, Nehru regarded

SEATO as “harmful to Asia as well as the cause of peace”. He commented, “ The
habit of the West to carry the “white man’s burden” in the East still continued, even
though conditions in the world and Asia have changed greatly.”

Eisenhower gave his approval but again expressed concern about the Indian
reaction. He directed that "every possible public and private means at ur j disposal be
used to ease the effects of our action on India.”

For Washington, the main consideration was relatively simple: through arms
to Pakistan, the United States thought it was taking an important step in advancing the
policy of containment of Communism by strengthening the chain of collective
security arrangements around the borders of the Soviet Union. In the administration's
eyes, as reflected in NSC 5409, the action strengthened the defense of the region
against the Communist threat and was not intended to make Pakistan the dominant
state in South Asia.The United States gained in Pakistan a new ally in the Cold War,
a Muslim country with a proud military tradition and, on paper at least, a substantial
number of fighting troops that, would be available for the defense of the oil-rich
Persian Gulf.

Although Washington recognized Pakistan's primary motivation was to

strengthen itself against India, the US leadership believed Pakistan was also
concerned about the threat of Communism. The Pakistanis pointedly played up their
alleged worries about the danger from the Soviet bloc in talking with American
officials.(“United States Treaties and Other International Agreements,” 1962)Neither
Byroade nor John Foster Dulles were Concerned that US arms would upset the South
Asia power balance. Because India was far stronger than its neighbor, the small
amount of arms then contemplated, NSC 5409 projected only $10 million annually,
could hardly present a credible military threat to India.

Nehru strongly opposed military alliances in Asia, but especially in South

Asia. In his view, "the fact that Pakistan aligns itself completely with one of the great
military blocs necessarily makes it subservient to the policy of that
bloc."(Nuechterlein, 1976)He saw a "loss of Pakistan's freedom and that country's
becoming progressively a satellite of the United States."(Aquinas, St. Thomas.
Summa Theologica., 1948)The amount of aid concerned Nehru less than the
qualitative change from the arms decision. "Pakistan," he stated, "will become
definitely lined up with the Western powers and , a region of cold war now and
shooting war perhaps later” (Aquinas, et. al. 1948).

Nehru thought that the United States, in deciding to give arms to Pakistan,
was in part motivated by its opposition to Indian neutralism. Until 1954, the Indian
leader hoped to develop an area of peace, a region that stood apart from the two
Power blocs, based loosely on the Arab-Asian group of independent states then
emerging from colonialism. Burma, Indonesia, and Egypt were, in Nehru's view,
leaning in this direction. By accepting US military aid, Pakistan, whose foreign policy

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ORJSS June 2021, Vol.6, No. 1

Until then was mainly concerned with the Kashmir issue, “breaks up this Arab-Asian
group and enlarges the possible area of war.

The final derailment came after the arms aid decision. Nehru warned the
Pakistanis that they could not have it both ways: US arms would be regarded as an
unfriendly act in India and the whole issue of Kashmir would change. Mohammed
Ali replied that a military alliance with the United States had nothing to do with
India, although he told US News and World Report that Pakistan's enhanced military
strength would improve the prospects for a Kashmir solution.

Once the arms decision was firm, Nehru carried out his threat to toughen
India's stance on Kashmir. The bilateral discussions collapsed. Within the year, the
Indians were refusing to talk about a plebiscite as a way to settle the dispute.Since
then, New Delhi's position has remained that the people of Kashmir had spoken for
India by electing the constituent assembly and Kashmiris wanted.

In November and December 1955, Communist Party General Secretary

Nikita Khrushchev and Premier Nikolai Bulganin paid a reciprocal state visit to India.
They toured the country for almost a month, receiving an enormously warm welcome
wherever they went. What was popularly called "the B & K show" because of the
colorful antics of Khrushchev—reached its high point on 9 December in Srinagar, the
capital of Kashmir. To the delight of his hosts, Khrushchev dropped Soviet neutrality
on Kashmir to proclaim support for India's position. The Russians seconded the
Indian view that the ratification of Kashmir's accession by the state's constituent
assembly was proof that the people of Kashmir had already expressed their will at the
ballot box.

Khrushchev's policy change boosted the Soviet Union's popularity in India. If

Pakistan could count on the United States for support, India now had a powerful
friend of its own. The Soviet shift also had the practical advantage of making it
harder for the United Nations to reengage itself actively in efforts to settle the
Kashmir dispute. India could henceforth rely on a Soviet veto to block Security
Council moves which New Delhi opposed(Aquinas, et. al. 1948).

Khrushchev and Bulganin offered India economic aid as well as support on

Kashmir and Goa. The Soviets agreed to build a million ton public sector steel mill
financed by a $112 million low-interest loan and to provide other economic
assistance for industrial development during the Second Indian Five Year Plan, which
was slated to commence in 1956. At the same time, Moscow and New Delhi
expanded cultural and educational exchanges and increased trade with India.

Washington watched the Bulganin and Khrushchev visit uneasiness. Quite

apart from annoyance over Pakistan’s membership, Nehru regarded SEATO as
“harmful to Asia as well as the cause of peace”. He commented, “ The habit of the
West to carry the “white man’s burden” in the East still continued, even though
conditions in the world and Asia have changed greatly”(Morgenthau, 1959).

Although tough on communism at home, Nehru pursued closer relations with

Communist China, as well as the Soviet Union. In the summer of 1954, China's
Premier Chou En-lai visited New Delhi, where he succeeded in easing Indian worries
44
 Pakistan’s joining of US –sponsored Military Pacts and Nehru’s Criticism

about Chinese policy toward Tibet. The upshot was a new Sino-Indian agreement, in
which India relinquished the special privileges it inherited from the British in Tibet.
The preamble contained the so-called Five Principles—in Hindi, Panch Sheel. These
concepts of non-interference and mutual respect, al-though not in themselves new or
earth-shaking, soon gained wide recognition as the articulation of the desire of Asians
to shape their relationships on Asian terms rather than simply reiterating the language
of Western statecraft.Nehru hoped the accord would ensure peace along the
Himalayan frontiers, ushering in a long period of friendship between India and China,
The era of "Hindi-Chini bhai bhai" lasted, however, only five years—until the
Himalayan border dispute became a matter of public knowledge in 1959.

Dwight Eisenhower was unhappy about the downturn in Indo-US relations.

Eisenhower was less antagonistic towards India .

Conclusion

Indian government under premiership of Nehru put India on policy of non-

alignment, presenting a neutral posture of country based of Punj Sheel, (five
principles) of friend ship. Thus Nehru, despite having a good relationship with United
States, criticized US policy of security alignment to protect the US interests in Asia,
constituting a bulwark against Communist powers. On the other hand when Pakistan
joined US- sponsored security pacts, India lashed out Pakistan act. Nehru said that
Pakistan by joining this security alliance had brought Cold War controversies to
South Asia. But if we explore the reasons of Pakistan’s adherence towards SEATO
and CENTO and other bilateral security agreements, we find that it was India that
created reasons for Pakistan to join the US-sponsored security alliance. Since creation
of Pakistan, India posed security threats to Pakistan. Consequently Pakistan eastern
and western boarders were not secured. So in such a threatened environment, a week
Pakistan which was not as much as strong to defend its borders in case of a military
adventure. On eastern border, India itself had been making violent intentions and on
western border, India had manipulated situation with help of government of
Afghanistan that was against the creation of Pakistan and subsequently opposed the
entry of Pakistan to United Nations. Thus it was obligatory for Pakistan at that time to
get support of some international power to strengthen its military power. Moreover
India and Afghanistan were enjoying open support from Soviet Union, a violent
communist power hat also had not accepted creation of Pakistan.

So these security reasons had led Pakistan to have a tilt towards western
countries and that afterwardwas proved as a right decision of Pakistan. Pakistan was
labeled as a ‘most allied ally of America in Asia’ and got military, economic and
diplomatic support that placed Pakistan in a comparatively strong position, enabling it
to face security challenges.

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