WILDVALLEY SHIPPING CO., LTD.

 petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and

PHILIPPINE PRESIDENT LINES INC., respondents. G.R. No. 119602, October 6,
2000

Facts: Philippines Roxas, a vessel owned by Philippine President Lines, Inc (Private
Respondent) arrived in Puerto Ordaz, Venezuela, to load iron ore. The Philippine
Roxas experienced some vibrations when it entered the San Roqued Channel. Shortly
afterwards, the vessel, again, experienced some vibrations. The Philippine Roxas had
apparently, already ran aground in the Orinoco River, thus obstructing the ingress and
egress of vessels.

As a result of the blockage, the Malandrinon, a vessel of herein petitioner was unable to
sail out of Puerto Ordaz on that day which resulted to petitioner filing a suit for damages
in RTC of Manila for damages in the form of unearned profits, and interest, plus
attorney’s fees, costs, and expenses of litigation.

The Court of Appeals rendered in favor of respondent disregarding the Venezuelan Law

Issue: Whether or not Venezuelan law is applicable to the case at bar

Ruling: No. It is well-settled that foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction
and our courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of them. Like any other fact,
they must be alleged and proved.

Nevertheless, we take note that these written laws were not proven in the manner
provided by Section 24 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, which states:

Sec. 24. Proof of official record. -- The record of public documents referred to in
paragraph (a) of Section 19, when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an
official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of
the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not kept in the
Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has the custody. If the office in which the
record is kept is in a foreign country, the certificate may be made by a secretary of the
embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent or by any
officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which
the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office."

The Reglamento General de la Ley de Pilotaje was published in the Gaceta Oficial of
the Republic of Venezuela. A photocopy of the Gaceta Oficial was presented in
evidence as an official publication of the Republic of Venezuela.
The Reglamento Para la Zona de Pilotaje No 1 del Orinoco is published in a book
issued by the Ministerio de Comunicaciones of Venezuela. Only a photocopy of the said
rules was likewise presented as evidence.
Both of these documents are considered in Philippine jurisprudence to be public
documents for they are the written official acts, or records of the official acts of the
sovereign authority, official bodies and tribunals, and public officers of Venezuela.

For a copy of a foreign public document to be admissible, the following requisites are
mandatory: (1) It must be attested by the officer having legal custody of the records or
by his deputy; and (2) It must be accompanied by a certificate by a secretary of the
embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consular or consular agent or foreign
service officer, and with the seal of his office. The latter requirement is not a mere
technicality but is intended to justify the giving of full faith and credit to the genuineness
of a document in a foreign country.

It is not enough that the Gaceta Oficial, or a book published by the Ministerio de
Comunicaciones of Venezuela, was presented as evidence with Captain Monzon
attesting it. It is also required by Section 24 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court that a
certificate that Captain Monzon, who attested the documents, is the officer who had
legal custody of those records made by a secretary of the embassy or legation, consul
general, consul, vice consul or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of
the Philippines stationed in Venezuela, and authenticated by the seal of his office
accompanying the copy of the public document. No such certificate could be found in
the records of the case. With respect to proof of written laws, parol proof is
objectionable, for the written law itself is the best evidence. According to the weight of
authority, when a foreign statute is involved, the best evidence rule requires that it be
proved by a duly authenticated copy of the statute.

Babcock v. Jackson 12 N.Y. 2d 473, 1963

Facts: Plaintiff Georgia Babcock and her friends, Mr. and Mrs. William Jackson, all
residents of Rochester, New York, left that city in Jackson's automobile, Babcock as
guest, for a week-end trip to Canada.

Some hours later, as Jackson was driving in the Province of Ontario, he apparently lost
control of the car; it went off the highway into an adjacent stone wall, and Babcock was
seriously injured.

Upon her return to New York, Babcock brought the present action against William
Jackson, alleging negligence on his part in operating his automobile.

At the time of the accident, there was in force in Ontario a statute providing that "the
owner or driver of a motor vehicle, other than a vehicle operated in the business of
carrying passengers for compensation, is not liable for any loss or damage resulting
from bodily injury to, or the death of any person being carried in ... the motor vehicle."
Even though no such bar is recognized under this State's substantive law of torts,
defendant Jackson moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the law of the
place where the accident occurred governs and that Ontario's guest statute barred
recovery.
The court at Special Term, agreeing with defendant, granted the motion, and the
Appellate Division affirmed the judgment of dismissal without opinion.

Issue: Whether or not the law of the place where the torts occurs invariably governs the
tort claim or other factors should be considered.

Ruling: The applicable choice of law rule should also reflect a consideration of other
factors relevant to the purposes served by the enforcement or denial of the remedy.
Comparison of the relative "contacts" and "interests" of New York and Ontario in the
action made it clear that the concern of New York was unquestionably greater and more
direct, and the interest of Ontario was at best minimal.

The "center of gravity" or "grouping of contacts" doctrine adopted by the court in

conflicts cases involving contracts impresses the court as affording the appropriate
approach for accommodating the competing interests in tort cases with multi-state
contacts. Justice, fairness, and the best practical result may best be achieved by giving
controlling effect to the law of the jurisdiction which, because of its relationship or
contact with the occurrence or the parties, has the greatest concern with the specific
issue raised in the litigation.

The merit of such a rule is that it gives to the place having the most interest in the
problem paramount control over the legal issues arising out of a particular factual
context and thereby allows the forum to apply the policy of the jurisdiction most
intimately concerned with the outcome of the particular litigation.

NORSE MANAGEMENT CO. (PTE) and PACIFIC SEAMEN SERVICES,

INC., petitioners, vs. NATIONAL SEAMEN BOARD, HON. CRESCENCIO M.
SIDDAYAO, OSCAR M. TORRES, REBENE C. CARRERA and RESTITUTA C.
ABORDO, respondents.
Facts: Napoleon B. Abordo, the deceased husband of private respondent Restituta C.
Abordo, was the Second Engineer of M.T. "Cherry Earl" when he died from an
apoplectic stroke in the course of his employment with petitioner NORSE
MANAGEMENT COMPANY (PTE). The M.T. "Cherry Earl" is a vessel of Singaporean
Registry. 
In her complaint for "death compensation benefits, accrued leave pay and time-off
allowances, funeral expenses, attorney's fees and other benefits and reliefs available in
connection with the death of Napoleon B. Abordo," filed before the National Seamen
Board, Restituta C. Abordo alleged that the amount of compensation due her from
petitioners Norse Management Co. (PTE) and Pacific Seamen Services, Inc., principal
and agent, respectively, should be based on the law where the vessel is registered.
On the other hand, petitioners contend that the law of Singapore should not be applied
in this case because the National Seamen Board cannot take judicial notice of the
Workmen's Insurance Law of Singapore. As an alternative, they offered to pay private
respondent Restituta C. Abordo the sum of P30,000.00 as death benefits based on the
Board's Memorandum Circular No. 25 which they claim should apply in this case.
Issue: Whether the law of Singapore ought to be applied in this case.
Ruling: YES. It is true that the law of Singapore was not alleged and proved in the
course of the hearing. And following Supreme Court decisions in a long line of cases
that a foreign law, being a matter of evidence, must be alleged and proved, the law of
Singapore ought not to be recognized in this case. But it is our considered opinion that
the jurisprudence on this matter was never meant to apply to cases before
administrative or quasi-judicial bodies such as the National Seamen Board. For well-
settled also is the rule that administrative and quasi-judicial bodies are not bound strictly
by technical rules. It has always been the policy of this Board, as enunciated in a long
line of cases, that in cases of valid claims for benefits on account of injury or death while
in the course of employment, the law of the country in which the vessel is registered
shall be considered. We see no reason to deviate from this well-considered policy.
Certainly not on technical grounds as movants herein would like us to.
Moreover, in the "Employment Agreement" between petitioners and the late Napoleon
B. Abordo, it is clear that compensation shall be paid under Philippine Law or the law of
registry of petitioners' vessel, whichever is greater. Since private respondent Restituta
C. Abordo was offered P30,000.00 only by the petitioners, Singapore law was properly
applied in this case.
Furthermore, Article 20, Labor Code of the Philippines, provides that the National
Seamen Board has original and exclusive jurisdiction over all matters or cases including
money claims, involving employer-employee relations, arising out of or by virtue of any
law or contracts involving Filipino seamen for overseas employment. Thus, it is safe to
assume that the Board is familiar with pertinent Singapore maritime laws relative to
workmen's compensation. Moreover, the Board may apply the rule on judicial notice
and, "in administrative proceedings, the technical rules of procedure — particularly of
evidence — applied in judicial trials, do not strictly apply.
Finally, Article IV of the Labor Code provides that "all doubts in the implementation and
interpretation of the provisions of this code, including its implementing rules and
resolved in favor of labor.

RESURRECCION SUZARA, CESAR DIMAANDAL, ANGELITO MENDOZA,

ANTONIO TANEDO AMORSOLO CABRERA, DOMINADOR SANTOS, ISIDRO
BRACIA, RAMON DE BELEN, ERNESTO SABADO, MARTIN MALABANAN,
ROMEO HUERTO and VITALIANO PANGUE, petitioners, vs. THE HON. JUDGE
ALFREDO L. BENIPAYO and MAGSAYSAY LINES, INC., respondents
G.R. No. 57999, 58143-53. August 15, 1989

Facts: Suzara et al entered into employment contracts with Magsaysay lines to work
aboard vessels owned/operated/manned by the latter for a period of 12 calendar
months and with different rating/position, salary, overtime pay and allowance. The
contracts were approved by the National Seamen Board (NSB).
Upon arrival at the port of Vancouver, Canada, demands for increase in wages were
made through the help of the International Transport Worker’s Federation (ITF), a
militant worldwide especially in Canada, Australia, Scandinavia, and various European
countries, interdicting foreign vessels and demanding wage increases for third world
seamen.

Wages were increased but complaints were filed by Magsaysay before the NSB. NSB
ordered the return of the additional wages paid for being obtained through violent
means and for lacking NSB approval. NLRC affirmed the order. Meanwhile, Magsaysay
filed estafa charges against the seamen.

Petitioners claimed before the NSB that contrary to the private respondent's allegations,
they did not commit any illegal act nor stage a strike while they were on board the
vessel; that the "Special Agreement" entered into in Vancouver to pay their salary
differentials is valid, having been executed after peaceful negotiations. Petitioners
further argued that the amounts they received were in accordance with the provision of
law, citing among others, Section 18, Rule VI, Book I of the Rules and Regulations
Implementing the Labor Code which provides that "the basic minimum salary of seamen
shall not be less than the prevailing minimum rates established by the International
Labor Organization (ILO) or those prevailing in the country whose flag the employing
vessel carries, which ever in higher . . . "; and that the "Agreement" executed in Nagoya,
Japan had been forced upon them and that intercalation's were made to make it appear
that they were merely trustees of the amounts they received in Vancouver.

On the other hand, the private respondent alleged that the petitioners breached their
employment contracts when they, acting in concert and with the active participations of
the ITF while the vessel was in Vancouver, staged an illegal strike and by means of
threats, coercion and intimidation compelled the owners of the vessel to pay to them
various sums.

The respondent NSB ruled that the petitioners were guilty of breach of contract because
despite subsisting and valid NSB approved employment contracts, the petitioners
sought the assistance of a third party (ITF) to demand from the private respondent
wages in accordance with the ITF rates, which rates are over and above their rates of
pay as appearing in their NSB approved contracts. In this petition, the seamen seek for
the reversal of the NLRC decision and the quashal of the complaints for estafa.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioners are entitled to the amounts they received from the
private respondent representing additional wages as determined in the special
agreement

Ruling: No. There is nothing in the record supporting the finding that the workers
resorted to violent means to obtain an increase in their wages.
There is nothing in the public and private respondents' pleadings, to support the
allegations that the petitioners used force and violence to secure the special agreement
signed in Vancouver, British Columbia. There was no need for any form of intimidation
coming from the Filipino seamen because the Canadian Brotherhood of Railways and
Transport Workers (CBRT), a strong Canadian labor union, backed by an international
labor federation was actually doing all the influencing not only on the ship-owners and
employers but also against third world seamen themselves who, by receiving lower
wages and cheaper accommodations, were threatening the employment and livelihood
of seamen from developed nations.

We cannot affirm the NSB and NLRC's finding that there was violence, physical or
otherwise employed by the petitioners in demanding for additional wages. The fact that
the petitioners placed placards on the gangway of their ship to show support for ITF's
demands for wage differentials for their own benefit and the resulting ITF's threatened
interdiction do not constitute violence. The petitioners were exercising their freedom of
speech and expressing sentiments in their hearts when they placed the placard "We
Want ITF Rates." Under the facts and circumstances of these petitions, we see no
reason to deprive the seamen of their right to freedom of expression guaranteed by the
Philippine Constitution and the fundamental law of Canada where they happened to
exercise it.

According to the case of Vir-Jen, it was ruled that “The form contracts approved by the
National Seamen Board are designed to protect Filipino seamen not foreign shipowners
who can take care of themselves. The standard forms embody the basic minimums
which must be incorporated as parts of the employment contract. (Section 15, Rule V,
Rules and Regulations Implementing the Labor Code). They are not collective
bargaining agreements or immutable contracts which the parties cannot improve upon
or modify in the course of the agreed period of time.”

It is impractical for the NSB to require the petitioners, caught in the middle of a labor
struggle between the ITF and owners of ocean-going vessels halfway around the world
in Vancouver, British Columbia to first secure the approval of the NSB in Manila before
signing an agreement which the employer was willing to sign.

It is noteworthy to emphasize that while the International Labor Organization (ILO) set
the minimum basic wage of able seamen at US$187.00 as early as October 1976, it
was only in 1979 that the respondent NSB issued Memo Circular No. 45, enjoining all
shipping companies to adopt the said minimum basic wage. It was correct for the
respondent NSB to state in its decision that when the petitioners entered into separate
contracts between 1977-1978, the monthly minimum basic wage for able seamen
ordered by NSB was still fixed at US$130.00. However, it is not the fault of the
petitioners that the NSB not only violated the Labor Code which created it and the Rules
and Regulations Implementing the Labor Code but also seeks to punish the seamen for
a shortcoming of NSB itself.
The NSB, Department of Labor and Employment and all its agencies exist primarily for
the workingman's interest and the nation as a whole. However, we find that the NSB
and NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in finding the petitioners guilty of using
intimidation and illegal means in breaching their contracts of employment and punishing
them for these alleged offenses.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby GRANTED. The decisions of the National
Seamen Board and National Labor Relations Commission in G. R. Nos. 64781-99 are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one is entered holding the petitioners not guilty
of the offenses for which they were charged.

Eastern Shipping vs POEA

Facts: On March 15, 1985, Vitaliano Saco, Chief officer of the M/V Eastern Polaris was
killed in an accident in Tokyo Japan. Saco’s widow sued for damages under E.O 707
and Memorandum Circular No. 2 of POEA.

The Petitioner, as owner of the vessel, argued that the complaint was cognizable not by
the POEA but by the Social Security System and should have been filed against the
State Insurance Fund. The POEA nevertheless assumed jurisdiction and after
considering the position papers of the parties ruled in favor of the complainant and
subsequently awarded the widow of Php 192,000.00 sum of money. The award
consisted of Php180,000.00 as death benefit and the additional 12 000 is for burial
expenses. The petitioner immediately came to Supreme Court prompting the Solicitor
General to move for dismissal on the ground of non-exhaustion of administrative
remedies.

Issue:
1) Whether or not, POEA has jurisdiction over the case.
2) Whether or not, Circular no. 2 is a violation of the non-delegation of legislative
power.
3) Whether or not POEA denied the petitioner of the due process of law.

Ruling:
1) Yes, POEA has jurisdiction of the case.
The Philippine Overseas Employment Administration was created under Executive
Order No. 797, promulgated on May 1, 1982, to promote and monitor the overseas
employment of Filipinos and to protect their rights. It replaced the National Seamen
Board created earlier under Article 20 of the Labor Code in 1974. Under Section 4(a) of
the said executive order, the POEA is vested with "original and exclusive jurisdiction
over all cases, including money claims, involving employee-employer relations arising
out of or by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino contract workers, including
seamen." These cases, according to the 1985 Rules and Regulations on Overseas
Employment issued by the POEA, include "claims for death, disability and other
benefits" arising out of such employment.
 2) Under the 1985 Rules and Regulations on Overseas Employment, overseas
employment is defined as "employment of a worker outside the Philippines,
including employment on board vessels plying international waters, covered by a
valid contract. A contract worker is described as "any person working or who has
worked overseas under a valid employment contract and shall include
seamen" or "any person working overseas or who has been employed by
another which may be a local employer, foreign employer, principal or partner
under a valid employment contract and shall include seamen." These definitions
clearly apply to Vitaliano Saco for it is not disputed that he died while under a
contract of employment with the petitioner and alongside the petitioner's vessel,
the M/V Eastern Polaris, while berthed in a foreign country. 
Memorandum Circular No. 2 is one such administrative regulation. The model contract
prescribed thereby has been applied in a significant number of the cases without
challenge by the employer. The power of the POEA (and before it the National Seamen
Board) in requiring the model contract is not unlimited as there is a sufficient standard
guiding the delegate in the exercise of the said authority. That standard is discoverable
in the executive order itself which, in creating the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration, mandated it to protect the rights of overseas Filipino workers to "fair and
equitable employment practices."

3) The petitioner performed at least two acts which constitute implied or tacit
recognition of the nature of Saco’s employment at the time of his death in 1985.
First, it’s submission of its shipping articles to the POEA for processing,
formalization and approval in the exercise of it’s regulatory power over overseas
employment (EO 797 7(7). Second, is the payment of contributions mandated by
law and regulations to the Welfare Fund Overseas Workers, which was created
by PD 1694 – “for the purpose of providing social and welfare services to Filipino
Overseas workers.”

MITSUI O.S.K. LINES LTD., represented by MAGSAYSAY AGENCIES,

INC., petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and LAVINE LOUNGEWEAR MFG.
CORP., respondents. G.R. No. 119571. March 11, 1998

Facts: Petitioner Mitsui O.S.K. Lines Ltd. is a foreign corporation represented in the
Philippines by its agent, Magsaysay Agencies. It entered into a contract of carriage
through Meister Transport, Inc., an international freight forwarder, with private
respondent Lavine Loungewear Manufacturing Corporation to transport goods of the
latter from Manila to Le Havre, France. Petitioner undertook to deliver the goods to
France 28 days from initial loading. On July 24, 1991, petitioner's vessel loaded private
respondent's container van for carriage at the said port of origin.

However, in Kaoshiung, Taiwan the goods were not transshipped immediately, with the
result that the shipment arrived in Le Havre only on November 14, 1991. The consignee
allegedly paid only half the value of the said goods on the ground that they did not arrive
in France until the "off season" in that country. The remaining half was allegedly
charged to the account of private respondent which in turn demanded payment from
petitioner through its agent.

As petitioner denied private respondent's claim, the latter filed a case in the Regional
Trial Court on April 14, 1992. In the original complaint, private respondent impleaded as
defendants Meister Transport, Inc. and Magsaysay Agencies, Inc., the latter as agent of
petitioner Mitsui O.S.K. Lines Ltd. On May 20, 1993, it amended its complaint by
impleading petitioner as defendant in lieu of its agent. The parties to the case thus
became private respondent as plaintiff, on one side, and Meister Transport Inc. and
petitioner Mitsui O.S.K. Lines Ltd. as represented by Magsaysay Agencies, Inc., as
defendants on the other.

Issue: whether an action for the value of goods which had been delivered to a party
other than the consignee is for "loss or damage" within the meaning of §3(6) of the
COGSA

Ruling: Section 3 provides:

(6) Unless notice of loss or damage and the general nature of such loss or damage be
given in writing to the carrier or his agent at the port of discharge or at the time of the
removal of the goods into the custody of the person entitled to delivery thereof under the
contract of carriage, such removal shall be prima facie evidence of the delivery by the
carrier of the goods as described in the bill of lading. If the loss or damage is not
apparent, the notice must be given within three days of the delivery.

Said notice of loss or damage may be endorsed upon the receipt for the goods given by
the person taking delivery thereof.

The notice in writing need not be given if the state of the goods has at the time of their
receipt been the subject of joint survey or inspection.

In any event the carrier and the ship shall be discharged from all liability in respect of
loss or damage unless suit is brought within one year after delivery of the goods or the
date when the goods should have been delivered: Provided, that, if a notice of loss or
damage, either apparent or concealed, is not given as provided for in this section, that
fact shall not affect or prejudice the right of the shipper to bring suit within one year after
the delivery of the goods or the date when the goods should have been delivered.

In the case of any actual or apprehended loss or damage, the carrier and the receiver
shall give all reasonable facilities to each other for inspecting and tallying the goods.

In Ang v. American Steamship Agencies, Inc., the question was whether an action for
the value of goods which had been delivered to a party other than the consignee is for
"loss or damage" within the meaning of §3(6) of the COGSA. It was held that there
was no loss because the goods had simply been misdelivered. "Loss" refers to the
deterioration or disappearance of goods. 
As defined in the Civil Code and as applied to Section 3(6), paragraph 4 of the Carriage
of Goods by Sea Act, "loss" contemplates merely a situation where no delivery at all
was made by the shipper of the goods because the same had perished, gone out of
commerce, or disappeared in such a way that their existence is unknown or they cannot
be recovered. 

Conformably with this concept of what constitutes "loss" or "damage," this Court held in
another case that the deterioration of goods due to delay in their transportation
constitutes "loss" or "damage" within the meaning of 3(6), so that as suit was not
brought within one year the action was barred:

Whatever damage or injury is suffered by the goods while in transit would result in loss
or damage to either the shipper or the consignee. As long as it is claimed, therefore, as
it is done here, that the losses or damages suffered by the shipper or consignee were
due to the arrival of the goods in damaged or deteriorated condition, the action is still
basically one for damage to the goods, and must be filed within the period of one year
from delivery or receipt, under the above-quoted provision of the Carriage of Goods by
Sea Act. 

But the Court allowed that —

There would be some merit in appellant's insistence that the damages suffered by him
as a result of the delay in the shipment of his cargo are not covered by the prescriptive
provision of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act above referred to, if such damages were
due, not to the deterioration and decay of the goods while in transit, but to other causes
independent of the condition of the cargo upon arrival, like a drop in their market
value . . . . 

The rationale behind limiting the said definitions to such parameters is not hard to find
or fathom. As this Court held in Ang:

Said one-year period of limitation is designed to meet the exigencies of maritime

hazards. In a case where the goods shipped were neither lost nor damaged in transit
but were, on the contrary, delivered in port to someone who claimed to be entitled
thereto, the situation is different, and the special need for the short period of limitation in
cases of loss or damage caused by maritime perils does not obtain. 

In the case at bar, there is neither deterioration nor disappearance nor destruction of
goods caused by the carrier's breach of contract. Whatever reduction there may have
been in the value of the goods is not due to their deterioration or disappearance
because they had been damaged in transit.

People vs. Wong Cheng 46 PHIL. 729

Facts: WONG CHENG (alias WONG CHUN), the appelle has been accused of having
illegally smoked opium, aboard the merchant vessel Changsa of English nationality
while said vessel was anchored in Manila Bay two and a half miles from the shores of
the city.

Attorney-General, the appellant, urges the revocation of the order of the Court of First
Instance of Manila sustaining the demurrer presented by the defendant. The demurrer
alleged lack of jurisdiction on the part of the lower court, which so held and dismissed
the case.

Issue: Whether the courts of the Philippines have jurisdiction over crime, like the one
herein involved, committed aboard merchant vessels anchored in our jurisdiction
waters.

Ruling: Yes, the courts of the Philippines have jurisdiction over crime, like the one
herein involved, committed aboard merchant vessels anchored in our jurisdiction
waters.

There are two fundamental rules on this particular matter in connection with
International Law; to wit, the French rule, according to which crimes committed aboard a
foreign merchant vessels should not be prosecuted in the courts of the country within
whose territorial jurisdiction they were committed, unless their commission affects the
peace and security of the territory; and the English rule, based on the territorial principle
and followed in the United States, according to which, crimes perpetrated under such
circumstances are in general triable in the courts of the country within territory they were
committed. Of these two rules, it is the last one that obtains in this jurisdiction, because
at present the theories and jurisprudence prevailing in the United States on this matter
are authority in the Philippines which is now a territory of the United States.

We have seen that the mere possession of opium aboard a foreign vessel in transit was
held by this court not triable by or courts, because it being the primary object of our
Opium Law to protect the inhabitants of the Philippines against the disastrous effects
entailed by the use of this drug, its mere possession in such a ship, without being used
in our territory, does not being about in the said territory those effects that our statute
contemplates avoiding. Hence such a mere possession is not considered a disturbance
of the public order.

But to smoke opium within our territorial limits, even though aboard a foreign merchant
ship, is certainly a breach of the public order here established, because it causes such
drug to produce its pernicious effects within our territory. It seriously contravenes the
purpose that our Legislature has in mind in enacting the aforesaid repressive statute.

The order appealed from is revoked and the cause ordered remanded to the court of
origin for further proceedings in accordance with law, without special findings as to
costs. So ordered.
NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, petitioner-appellant,  vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and DEVELOPMENT INSURANCE & SURETY
CORPORATION, respondents-appellees. No. L-49469 August 19, 1988

Facts: On September 13, 1962, a Memorandum of Agreement was entered into

between NDC and MCP wherein NDC appointed MCP as its agent to manage
and operate the vessel, 
“Doña Nati,” for and its behalf and account. 

On February 28, 1964, E. Philipp Corporation of New York loaded on board the vessel
"Dona Nati" at San Francisco, California, a total of 1,200 bales of American raw cotton
consigned to the order of Manila Banking Corporation, Manila and the People's Bank
and Trust Company acting for and in behalf of the Pan Asiatic Commercial Company,
Inc., who represents Riverside Mills Corporation. Also loaded on the same vessel at
Tokyo, Japan, were the cargo of Kyokuto Boekui, Kaisa, Ltd., consigned to the order of
Manila Banking Corporation consisting of 200 cartons of sodium lauryl sulfate and 10
cases of aluminum foil. 

On April 15, 1964, Doña Nati had a collision with a Japanese vessel, SS Yasushima
Maru, while it was en route to Manila. As a result of which, the loaded cargoes were
damaged and lost. Thus, Development Insurance and Safety Corporation (DISC) paid
as insurer the total amount of P364,915.86 to the consignees for the said cargoes. It
then filed an action of recovery of the said amount against NDC and MCP. The CFI of
Manila rendered a decision ordering MCP and NDC to pay jointly and solidarily to DISC
the sum of P364,915.86 together with interest and attorney’s fees. MCP and NDC
interposed an appeal to the CA. However, on November 17, 1968, the CA promulgated
a decision affirming in toto the decision of the trial court. In these petitions for certiorari,
NDC insists that the Carriage of the Goods by Sea Act
 should be the one applicable in the case at bar. It argues that the court erred in
applying 

Article 827 of the Code of Commerce in determining the liability of the companies for
loss of cargoes resulting from the collision of its vessel with the Japanese vessel which
occurred at Ise Bay, Japan or outside the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines.

Issue: Whether or not the Carriage of the Goods by Sea Act is applicable on the
present case.

Ruling: The main thrust of NDC's argument is to the effect that the Carriage of Goods
by Sea Act should apply to the case at bar and not the Civil Code or the Code of
Commerce. Under Section 4 (2) of said Act, the carrier is not responsible for the loss or
damage resulting from the "act, neglect or default of the master, mariner, pilot or the
servants of the carrier in the navigation or in the management of the ship." Thus, NDC
insists that based on the findings of the trial court which were adopted by the Court of
Appeals, both pilots of the colliding vessels were at fault and negligent, NDC would
have been relieved of liability under the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act. Instead, Article
287 of the Code of Commerce was applied and both NDC and MCP were ordered to
reimburse the insurance company for the amount the latter paid to the consignee as
earlier stated.

This issue has already been laid to rest by this Court of Eastern Shipping Lines Inc. v.
IAC (1 50 SCRA 469-470 [1987]) where it was held under similar circumstance "that the
law of the country to which the goods are to be transported governs the liability of the
common carrier in case of their loss, destruction or deterioration" (Article 1753, Civil
Code). Thus, the rule was specifically laid down that for cargoes transported from Japan
to the Philippines, the liability of the carrier is governed primarily by the Civil Code and
in all matters not regulated by said Code, the rights and obligations of common carrier
shall be governed by the Code of commerce and by laws (Article 1766, Civil Code).
Hence, the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, a special law, is merely suppletory to the
provision of the Civil Code. 

In the case at bar, it has been established that the goods in question are transported
from San Francisco, California and Tokyo, Japan to the Philippines and that they were
lost or due to a collision which was found to have been caused by the negligence or
fault of both captains of the colliding vessels. Under the above ruling, it is evident that
the laws of the Philippines will apply, and it is immaterial that the collision actually
occurred in foreign waters, such as Ise Bay, Japan.

Under Article 1733 of the Civil Code, common carriers from the nature of their business
and for reasons of public policy are bound to observe extraordinary diligence in the
vigilance over the goods and for the safety of the passengers transported by them
according to all circumstances of each case. Accordingly, under Article 1735 of the
same Code, in all other than those mentioned is Article 1734 thereof, the common
carrier shall be presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless it
proves that it has observed the extraordinary diligence required by law. 

AAA vs BBB G.R. No. 212448 January 11, 2018

Facts: Petitioner AAA and BBB were married on August 1, 2006 in Quezon City. Their
union produced two children: CCC and DDD. In May of 2007, BBB started working in
Singapore as a chef, where he acquired permanent resident status in September of
2008. AAA claimed that BBB sent little to no financial support, and only sporadically.
There were also allegations of virtual abandonment, mistreatment of her and their son
CCC, and physical and sexual violence. To make matters worse, BBB supposedly
started having an affair with a Singaporean woman named Lisel Mok with whom he
allegedly has been living in Singapore. Things came to a head on April 19, 2011 when
AAA and BBB had a violent altercation at a hotel room in Singapore during her visit with
their kids. The investigating prosecutor found sufficient basis to charge BBB with
causing AAA mental and emotional anguish through his alleged marital infidelity.
Accordingly, an Information was filed against BBB for violation of Section 5(i) of R.A.
No. 9262. On November 6, 2013, counsel of accused filed on behalf of BBB an
Omnibus Motion to Revive Case, Quash Information, Lift Hold Departure Order and
Warrant of Arrest. The RTC granted the motion to quash on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction and thereby dismissed the case. The RTC ruled that since BBB’s acts
complained of had occurred in Singapore, said Court enjoys no jurisdiction over the
offense charged, it having transpired outside the territorial jurisdiction of this Court.

Issue: Whether or not a complaint for psychological abuse under R.A. No. 9262 may be
filed within the Philippines if the illicit relationship is conducted abroad.

Ruling: YES. In Section 7 of R.A. No. 9262, venue undoubtedly pertains to jurisdiction.
As correctly pointed out by AAA, Section 7 provides that the case may be filed where
the crime or any of its elements was committed at the option of the complainant. While
the psychological violence as the means employed by the perpetrator is certainly an
indispensable element of the offense, equally essential also is the element of mental or
emotional anguish which is personal to the complainant. What may be gleaned from
Section 7 of R.A. No. 9262 is that the law contemplates that acts of violence against
women and their children may manifest as transitory or continuing crimes; x x x Thus, a
person charged with a continuing or transitory crime may be validly tried in any
municipality or territory where the offense was in part committed. We say that even if
the alleged extra marital affair causing the offended wife mental and emotional anguish
is committed abroad, the same does not place a prosecution under R.A. No. 9262
absolutely beyond the reach of Philippine courts.

EVERETT STEAMSHIP CORPORATION, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and

HERNANDEZ TRADING CO. INC. G.R. NO.

Facts: Hernandez Trading Co. Inc. (Hernandez) imported three crates of bus spare
parts marked as from its supplier, Maruman Trading Company, Ltd. (Maruman Trading),
a foreign corporation based in, Japan. The crates were shipped from Nagoya, Japan to
Manila on board ADELFA EVERETTE, a vessel owned by Everett Steamship Corp’s
principal, Everett Orient Lines. The said crates were covered by a Bill of Lading.
Upon arrival at the port of Manila, it was discovered that one crate was missing. This
was confirmed and admitted by Everett. Hernandez made a formal claim upon petitioner
for the value of the lost cargo amounting to 1,552,500.00 Yen. However, Everett offered
to pay only Y100,000.00 Yen, the maximum amount stipulated under Clause 18 of the
covering bill of lading which limits the liability of petitioner.

Hernandez rejected the offer and thereafter instituted a suit for collection, against
petitioner before the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, Branch 126.

RTC: RULED IN FAVOR OF HERNANDEZ TRADING. EVERETT LIABLE FOR THE

ACTUAL VALUE OF THE PROPERTY
CA: AFFIRMED THE RTC DECISION BUT DELETED THE AWARD OF ATTORNEYS
FEES

As to the amount of liability, no evidence appears on record to show that the appellee
(Hernandez Trading Co.) consented to the terms of the Bill of Lading. The shipper
named in the Bill of Lading is Maruman Trading Co., Ltd. whom the appellant (Everett
Steamship Corp.) contracted with for the transportation of the lost goods.

Even assuming arguendo that the shipper Maruman Trading Co., Ltd. accepted the
terms of the bill of lading when it delivered the cargo to the appellant, still it does not
necessarily follow that appellee Hernandez Trading Company as consignee is bound
thereby considering that the latter was never privy to the shipping contract.

Issue: Whether or not Hernandez, who is not a signatory to the bill of lading bound by
the stipulations thereof

Ruling: YES. Even if the consignee was not a signatory to the contract of carriage
between the shipper and the carrier, the consignee can still be bound by the contract.
The right of a party to recover for loss of a shipment consigned to him under a bill of
lading drawn up only by and between the shipper and the carrier, springs from either a
relation of agency that may exist between him and the shipper or consignor, or his
status as stranger in whose favor some stipulation is made in said contract, and who
becomes a party thereto when he demands fulfillment of that stipulation, in this case the
delivery of the goods or cargo shipped. In neither capacity can he assert personally, in
bar to any provision of the bill of lading. There can, therefore, be no doubt about the
validity and enforceability of freely- agreed-upon stipulations in a contract of carriage or
bill of lading limiting the liability of the carrier to an agreed valuation unless the shipper
declares a higher value and inserts it into said contract or bill.

When private respondent formally claimed reimbursement for the missing goods from
petitioner and subsequently filed a case against the latter based on the very same bill of
lading, it (private respondent) accepted the provisions of the contract and therebY made
itself a party thereto, or at least has come to court to enforce it Thus, private respondent
cannot now reject or disregard the carriers limited liability stipulation in the bill of lading.
In other words, private respondent is bound by the whole stipulations in the bill of lading
and must respect the same.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner v MARELYN TANEDO MANALO,

Respondent, April 24, 2018, G.R. No. 221029

Facts:
Marelyn Tanedo Manalo was married to a Japanese national. She later filed for divorce
against her husband, and a divorce decree was issued by a Japanese court.
In 2012, she sought the cancellation of the entry of marriage in the Civil Registry of San
Juan, Metro Manila by virtue of the said divorce decree. She later amended her petition
for the judicial recognition of the divorce decree.

RTC denied Marelyn's petition, arguing that the divorce obtained by Marelyn in Japan
should not be recognized. The RTC held that based on Article 15 of the New Civil Code,
the Philippine law "does not afford Filipinos the right to file for a divorce whether they
are in the country or living abroad, if they are married to Filipinos or to foreigners, or if
they celebrated their marriage in the Philippines or in another country" and that unless
Filipinos "are naturalized as citizens of another country, Philippine laws shall have
control over issues related to Filipinos' family rights and duties, together with the
determination of their condition and legal capacity to enter into contracts and civil
relations, inclusing marriages."

Upon appeal, the CA overturned RTC's ruling. CA held that Article 26 of the Family
Code of the Philippines (Family Code) is applicable even if it was Manalo who filed for
divorce against her Japanese husband because the decree may obtained makes the
latter no longer married to the former, capacitating him to remarry. As such,  it would be
height of injustice to consider Manelyn as still married to the Japanese national, who, in
turn, is no longer married to her and can legally have another wife.

OSG's motion for recommendation was denied by CA. Hence, the instant petition.

Issue: Whether or not a Filipino citizen have the capacity to remarry under Philippine
law after initiating a divorce proceeding abroad and obtaining a favorable judgment
against his or her alien spouse who is capacitated to remarry

Ruling: Yes. Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code provides that:

"a divorce x x x validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry."

Based on a clear and plain reading of the provision, it only requires that there be a
divorce validly obtained abroad. The letter of the law does not demand that the alien
spouse should be the one who initiated the proceeding wherein the divorce decree was
granted. It does not distinguish whether the Filipino spouse is the petitioner or the
respondent in the foreign divorce proceeding.

The purpose of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is to avoid the absurd situation where the
Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after a foreign divorce decree
that is effective in the country where it was rendered, is no longer married to the Filipino
spouse.

A Filipino who initiated a foreign divorce proceeding is in the same place and in like
circumstances as a Filipino who is at the receiving end of an alien-initiated proceeding.
Therefore, the subject provision should not make a distinction. In both instances, it is
extended as a means to recognize the residual effect of the foreign divorce decree on a
Filipinos whose marital ties to their alien spouses are severed by operations of their
alien spouses are severed by operation on the latter's national law.

In fact, there is no real and substantial difference between a Filipino who initiated a
foreign divorce proceeding and a Filipino who obtained a divorce decree upon the
instance of his or her alien spouse. In the eyes of the Philippine and foreign laws, both
are considered as Filipinos who have the same rights and obligations in an alien land.
The circumstances surrounding them are alike.

ALICE REYES VAN DORN, petitioner, vs. HON. MANUEL V. ROMILLO, JR., as

Presiding Judge of Branch CX, Regional Trial Court of the National Capital
Region Pasay City and RICHARD UPTON respondents. G.R. No. L-68470 October
8, 1985

Facts: Petitioner and private respondent Richard Upton were married in Hong Kong in
1972 and were divorced in Nevada, United States, in 1982. Private respondent filed
suit against petitioner before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City for accounting of
petitioner’s business, the Galleon Shop, alleging the same to be conjugal property.
Petitioner moved to dismiss on the basis of bar by previous judgment in the divorce
proceedings before the Nevada Court where private respondent acknowledged that
they had no conjugal property. The RTC denied the motion to dismiss on the ground
that the divorce proceedings had no effect on the case. Petitioner appealed.

Issue: Whether the divorce decree should be recognized in our jurisdiction.

Ruling: Yes. The Nevada District Court, which decreed the divorce, had obtained
jurisdiction over petitioner who appeared in person before the Court during the trial of
the case. It also obtained jurisdiction over private respondent who, giving his address as
No. 381 Bush Street, San Francisco, California, authorized his attorneys in the divorce
case, Karp & Gradt Ltd., to agree to the divorce on the ground of incompatibility in the
understanding that there were neither community property nor community obligations.
As explicitly stated in the Power of Attorney he executed in favor of the law firm of Karp
& Gradt Ltd., to represent him in the divorce proceedings.

There can be no question as to the validity of the Nevada divorce in any of the States of
the United States. The decree is binding on private respondent as an American citizen.
For instance, private respondent cannot sue petitioner, as her husband in any State of
the Union. What he is contending in this case is that the divorce is not valid and binding
in this jurisdiction, the same being contrary to local law and public policy.

It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code,
only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same
being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. However, aliens
may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they
are valid according to their national law. In this case, the divorce in Nevada released
private respondent from the marriage from the standards of American law, under which
divorces dissolves the marriage.

Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil v. Hon. Corona Ibay-Somera. G.R. No. 80116 June 30,
1989

Facts: Petitioner Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil, a Filipino citizen married private

respondent Erich Ekkehard Geiling, a German national on Sept. 7, 1979 at Federal
Republic of Germany. They lived together in Malate, Manila and had a child named
Isabella Pilapil Geiling. Unfortunately, after about three and a half years of marriage
such connubial disharmony eventuated in Erich initiating divorce proceeding against
Imelda in Germany. He claimed that there was failure of their marriage and that they
had been living apart since April 1982.

On the other hand, petitioner filed an action for legal separation before a trial court in
Manila on January 23, 1983.The decree of divorce was promulgated on January 15,
1986 on the ground of failure of marriage of the spouses. The custody of the child was
granted to the petitioner.

More than five months after the issuance of the divorce decree, Geiling filed two
complaints for adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila alleging that while still married to
Imelda, the latter had an affair with a certain William Chia as early as 1982 and another
man named Jesus Chua sometime in 1983.

Petitioner filed a petition asking to set aside the cases filed against her and be
dismissed. Thereafter, petitioner moved to defer her arraignment and to suspend further
proceedings. Justice Secretary Ordoñez issued a resolution directing to move for the
dismissal of the complaints against petitioner.

Issue: Whether or not private respondent Geiling can prosecute petitioner Pilapil on the
ground of adultery even though are no longer husband and wife as decree of divorce
was already issued.

Ruling: No. Geiling cannot prosecute petitioner Pilapil on the ground of adultery even
though are no longer husband and wife as decree of divorce was already issued.

The law specifically provided that in prosecution for adultery and concubinage, the
person who can legally file the complaint should be the offended spouse and nobody
else. While the State, as parens patriae, was added and vested by the 1985 Rules of
Criminal Procedure with the power to initiate the criminal action for a deceased or
incapacitated victim in the aforesaid offenses of seduction, abduction, rape and acts of
lasciviousness, in default of her parents, grandparents or guardian, such amendment
did not include the crimes of adultery and concubinage. In other words, only the
offended spouse, and no other, is authorized by law to initiate the action therefor.
Pursuant to Article 26 of the Family Code, where a marriage between a Filipino citizen
and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad
by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have
capacity to remarry under Philippine law. (As amended by Executive Order 227)

In the case at hand, it appeared that private respondent is the offended spouse, the
latter obtained a valid divorce in his country and said divorce and its legal effects may
be recognized in the Philippines in so far as he is concerned. Thus, under the same
consideration and rationale, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner
and has no legal standing to commence the adultery case under the imposture that he
was the offended spouse at the time he filed suit.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner v. CRASUS L. IYOY, respondent.

G.R. No. 152577 September 21, 2005

Facts: Crasus Iyoy married Fely on December 16, 1961 in Cebu City. They begot five
children. After the celebration of their marriage, respondent Crasus discovered that Fely
was “hot-tempered, a nagger and extravagant.” In 1984, Fely left the Philippines for the
United States of America (U.S.A.), leaving all of their five children to the care of
respondent Crasus. Sometime in 1985, respondent Crasus learned, through the letters
sent by Fely to their children, that Fely got married to an American, with whom she
eventually had a child. Fely had five visits in Cebu City but never met Crasus. Also, she
had been openly using the surname of her American husband in the Philippines and in
the USA. Crasus filed a declaration of nullity of marriage on March 25, 1997.

On her Answer, Fely alleged that while she did file for divorce from respondent Crasus,
she denied having herself sent a letter to respondent Crasus requesting him to sign the
enclosed divorce papers. After securing a divorce from respondent Crasus, Fely
married her American husband and acquired American citizenship. She argued that her
marriage to her American husband was legal because now being an American citizen,
her status shall be governed by the law of her present nationality. Fely also prayed that
the RTC declare her marriage to respondent Crasus null and void; and that respondent
Crasus be ordered to pay to Fely the P90,000.00 she advanced to him, with interest,
plus, moral and exemplary damages, attorney’s fees, and litigation expenses.

The Regional Trial Court declared the marriage of Crasus and Fely null and void ab
ignition on the ground of psychological incapacity. One factor considered by the RTC is
that Fely obtained a divorce decree in the United States of America and married another
man and has established another family of her own. Plaintiff is in an anomalous
situation, wherein he is married to a wife who is already married to another man in
another country. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision.

Issue:
1. Whether or not abandonment and sexual infidelity constitute psychological
incapacity.
2. Whether or not the divorce instituted by Fely abroad was valid.
Ruling:

1. The totality of evidence presented during the trial is insufficient to support the
finding of psychological incapacity of Fely. Using the guidelines established by
the cases of Santos, Molina and Marcos, this Court found that the totality of
evidence presented by respondent Crasus failed miserably to establish the
alleged psychological incapacity of his wife Fely; therefore, there is no basis for
declaring their marriage null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code of the
Philippines. Irreconcilable differences, conflicting personalities, emotional
immaturity and irresponsibility, physical abuse, habitual alcoholism, sexual
infidelity or perversion, and abandonment, by themselves, also do not warrant a
finding of psychological incapacity under the said Article.

2. As it is worded, Article 26, paragraph 2, refers to a special situation wherein one

of the couple getting married is a Filipino citizen and the other a foreigner at the
time the marriage was celebrated. By its plain and literal interpretation, the said
provision cannot be applied to the case of respondent Crasus and his wife Fely
because at the time Fely obtained her divorce, she was still a Filipino citizen.
Although the exact date was not established, Fely herself admitted in her Answer
filed before the RTC that she obtained a divorce from respondent Crasus
sometime after she left for the United States in 1984, after which she married her
American husband in 1985. In the same Answer, she alleged that she had been
an American citizen since 1988. At the time she filed for divorce, Fely was still a
Filipino citizen, and pursuant to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines, she was still bound by Philippine laws on family
rights and duties, status, condition, and legal capacity, even when she was
already living abroad. Philippine laws, then and even until now, do not allow and
recognize divorce between Filipino spouses. Thus, Fely could not have validly
obtained a divorce from respondent Crasus. The Supreme Court held that the
marriage of respondent Crasus L. Iyoy and Fely Ada Rosal-Iyoy remains valid
and subsisting.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 62539, dated 30 July 2001, affirming the Judgment of the
RTC of Cebu City, Branch 22, in Civil Case No. CEB-20077, dated 30 October 1998, is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

Llorente vs. CA and Llorente November 23, 2000

Facts: Lorenzo and petitioner Paula Llorente were married in Camarines Sur. Before
the outbreak of Pacific War, Lorenzo left for the US Navy while Paula stayed in their
conjugal home in Camarines Sur. Lorenzo was admitted to US citizenship and
certificate of naturalization was issued in his favor. When Lorenzo was allowed to visit
his wife in the Philippines, he discovered that his wife was pregnant and was “living in”
and having and adulterous relationship with his brother Ceferino. Lorenzo refused to
forgive Paula and the two drew a written which essentially shows that Paula admitted
her adulterous acts and that the couple agreed to Separate.
Lorenzo returned to US and filed a divorce which was granted. Lorenzo returned to
Philippines and married Alicia Llorente. Alicia had no knowledge of the first marriage
even if they resided in the same town as Paula, who did not disagree to the
cohabitation. Lorenzo and Alicia lived together for 25 years and blessed with 3 children.

Before Lorenzo died, he executed a will, which was pending before the probate court,
bequeathing all his property to Alicia and their 3 children. After Lorenzo died, Paula filed
with the same court a petition for letters of administration over Lorenzo’s estate in his
favor. Alicia filed as well.

RTC found the divorce decree granted Lorenzo is void and inapplicable on the
Philippines therefore marriage to Alicia is void. However, CA affirmed.

Issue: Whether or not the divorce decree was valid?

Ruling: Yes, the court acknowledges the divorce decree acquired by the late Lorenzo
Llorente abroad.

In Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. we held that owing to the nationality principle embodied in
Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against
absolute divorces, the same being considered contrary to our concept of public policy
and morality. In the same case, the Court ruled that aliens may obtain divorces abroad,
provided they are valid according to their national law.

Citing this landmark case, the Court held in Quita v. Court of Appeals, that once proven
that respondent was no longer a Filipino citizen when he obtained the divorce from
petitioner, the ruling in Van Dorn would become applicable and petitioner could "very
well lose her right to inherit" from him.

In Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera, we recognized the divorce obtained by the respondent in his

country, the Federal Republic of Germany. There, we stated that divorce and its legal
effects may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as respondent is concerned in view
of the nationality principle in our civil law on the status of persons.

For failing to apply these doctrines, the decision of the Court of Appeals must be
reversed. We hold that the divorce obtained by Lorenzo H. Llorente from his first wife
Paula was valid and recognized in this jurisdiction as a matter of comity. Now, the
effects of this divorce (as to the succession to the estate of the decedent) are matters
best left to the determination of the trial court.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,vs.CIPRIANO ORBECIDO

III, respondent.
Facts: On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M. Villanueva at the
United Church of Christ in the Philippines in Lam-an, Ozamis City. Their marriage was
blessed with a son and a daughter, Kristoffer Simbortriz V. Orbecido and Lady Kimberly
V. Orbecido.

In 1986, Cipriano's wife left for the United States bringing along their son Kristoffer. A
few years later, Cipriano discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an American
citizen.

Sometime in 2000, Cipriano learned from his son that his wife had obtained a divorce
decree and then married a certain Innocent Stanley. She, Stanley and her child by him
currently live at 5566 A. Walnut Grove Avenue, San Gabriel, California.

Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry invoking
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code. No opposition was filed. Finding merit in
the petition, the court granted the same. The Republic, herein petitioner, through the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), sought reconsideration but it was denied.

The OSG contends that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code is not applicable
to the instant case because it only applies to a valid mixed marriage; that is, a marriage
celebrated between a Filipino citizen and an alien. The proper remedy, according to the
OSG, is to file a petition for annulment or for legal separation. Furthermore, the OSG
argues there is no law that governs respondent's situation. The OSG posits that this is a
matter of legislation and not of judicial determination. 

For his part, respondent admits that Article 26 is not directly applicable to his case but
insists that when his naturalized alien wife obtained a divorce decree which capacitated
her to remarry, he is likewise capacitated by operation of law pursuant to Section 12,
Article II of the Constitution.

Issue: WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT CAN REMARRY UNDER ARTICLE 26 OF

THE FAMILY CODE 

Ruling: The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the
celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained
abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.

In this case, when Cipriano's wife was naturalized as an American citizen, there was still
a valid marriage that has been celebrated between her and Cipriano. As fate would
have it, the naturalized alien wife subsequently obtained a valid divorce capacitating her
to remarry. Clearly, the twin requisites for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26
are both present in this case. Thus Cipriano, the "divorced" Filipino spouse, should be
allowed to remarry.

We are also unable to sustain the OSG's theory that the proper remedy of the Filipino
spouse is to file either a petition for annulment or a petition for legal separation.
Annulment would be a long and tedious process, and in this particular case, not even
feasible, considering that the marriage of the parties appears to have all the badges of
validity. On the other hand, legal separation would not be a sufficient remedy for it
would not sever the marriage tie; hence, the legally separated Filipino spouse would still
remain married to the naturalized alien spouse.

However, we note that the records are bereft of competent evidence duly submitted by
respondent concerning the divorce decree and the naturalization of respondent's wife. It
is settled rule that one who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and mere
allegation is not evidence. 

Accordingly, for his plea to prosper, respondent herein must prove his allegation that his
wife was naturalized as an American citizen. Likewise, before a foreign divorce decree
can be recognized by our own courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a
fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it.  Such foreign law must
also be proved as our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. Like any other
fact, such laws must be alleged and proved. Furthermore, respondent must also show
that the divorce decree allows his former wife to remarry as specifically required in
Article 26. Otherwise, there would be no evidence sufficient to declare that he is
capacitated to enter into another marriage.

Nevertheless, we are unanimous in our holding that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of

the Family Code (E.O. No. 209, as amended by E.O. No. 227), should be interpreted to
allow a Filipino citizen, who has been divorced by a spouse who had acquired foreign
citizenship and remarried, also to remarry. However, considering that in the present
petition there is no sufficient evidence submitted and on record, we are unable to
declare, based on respondent's bare allegations that his wife, who was naturalized as
an American citizen, had obtained a divorce decree and had remarried an American,
that respondent is now capacitated to remarry. Such declaration could only be made
properly upon respondent's submission of the aforecited evidence in his favor.

Roehr vs. Rodgriguez. June 20, 2003

Facts: Petitioner Wolfgang O. Roehr, a German citizen and resident of Germany,

married private respondent Carmen Rodriguez, a Filipina, on December 11, 1980 in
Hamburg, Germany. Their marriage was subsequently ratified on February 14, 1981 in
Tayasan, Negros Oriental.4 Out of their union were born Carolynne and Alexandra
Kristine on November 18, 1981 and October 25, 1987, respectively.

On August 28, 1996, private respondent filed a petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City. On February 6, 1997,
petitioner filed a motion to dismiss but it was denied by the trial court.

Meanwhile, petitioner obtained a decree of divorce from the Court of First Instance of
Hamburg-Blankenese, promulgated on December 16, 1997. The decree also states that
the custody of children is granted to the father. In view of said decree, petitioner filed a
Second Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the action or suit as a decree of divorce had already been promulgated
dissolving the marriage of petitioner and private respondent. The motion to dismiss was
granted by RTC.

Private respondent moved to reconsider praying that the case proceed on the issues of
custody and distribution of properties. Petitioner opposed on the ground that there is
nothing to be done as marriage was dissolved by divorce decree. The RTC granted the
partial motion for reconsideration. Hence , this is the present appeal to Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether or not the RTC was correct in reopening the case to litigate the issue of
custody and distribution of assets despite the divorce between the parties?

Ruling: Yes. The RTC was correct in reopening the case to litigate the issue of custody
and distribution of assets despite the divorce between the parties.

In this case, the divorce decree issued by the German court dated December 16, 1997
has not been challenged by either of the parties. In fact, save for the issue of parental
custody, even the trial court recognized said decree to be valid and binding, thereby
endowing private respondent the capacity to remarry. Thus, the present controversy
mainly relates to the award of the custody of their two children, Carolynne and
Alexandra Kristine, to petitioner.

As a general rule, divorce decrees obtained by foreigners in other countries are

recognizable in our jurisdiction, but the legal effects thereof, e.g. on custody, care and
support of the children, must still be determined by our courts.23 Before our courts can
give the effect of res judicata to a foreign judgment, such as the award of custody to
petitioner by the German court, it must be shown that the parties opposed to the
judgment had been given ample opportunity to do so on grounds allowed under Rule
39, Section 50 of the Rules of Court.

It is essential that there should be an opportunity to challenge the foreign judgment, in

order for the court in this jurisdiction to properly determine its efficacy. In this
jurisdiction, our Rules of Court clearly provide that with respect to actions in personam,
as distinguished from actions in rem, a foreign judgment merely constitutes prima facie
evidence of the justness of the claim of a party and, as such, is subject to proof to the
contrary.

In the present case, it cannot be said that private respondent was given the opportunity
to challenge the judgment of the German court so that there is basis for declaring that
judgment as res judicata with regard to the rights of petitioner to have parental custody
of their two children. The proceedings in the German court were summary. As to what
was the extent of private respondent’s participation in the proceedings in the German
court, the records remain unclear. The divorce decree itself states that neither has she
commented on the proceedings25 nor has she given her opinion to the Social Services
Office.26 Unlike petitioner who was represented by two lawyers, private respondent had
no counsel to assist her in said proceedings.27 More importantly, the divorce judgment
was issued to petitioner by virtue of the German Civil Code provision to the effect that
when a couple lived separately for three years, the marriage is deemed irrefutably
dissolved. The decree did not touch on the issue as to who the offending spouse was.
Absent any finding that private respondent is unfit to obtain custody of the children, the
trial court was correct in setting the issue for hearing to determine the issue of parental
custody, care, support and education mindful of the best interests of the children. This is
in consonance with the provision in the Child and Youth Welfare Code that the child’s
welfare is always the paramount consideration in all questions concerning his care and
custody.

In sum, we find that respondent judge may proceed to determine the issue regarding
the custody of the two children born of the union between petitioner and private
respondent. Private respondent erred, however, in claiming cognizance to settle the
matter of property relations of the parties, which is not at issue.

GERBERT R. CORPUZ, Petitioner, vs. DAISYLYN TIROL STO. TOMAS and The

SOLICITOR GENERAL, Respondents.

Facts: Petitioner Gerbert R. Corpuz is a naturalized Canadian citizen who married

respondent Daisylyn Tirol Sto. Tomas but subsequently left for Canada due to work and
other professional commitments.

When he returned to the Philippines, he discovered that Sto. Tomas was already
romantically involved with another man. This brought about the filing of a petition for
divorce by Corpuz in Canada which was eventually granted by the Court Justice of
Windsor, Ontario, Canada.

A month later, the divorce decree took effect. Two years later, Corpuz has fallen in love
with another Filipina and wished to marry her. He went to Civil Registry Office of Pasig
City to register the Canadian divorce decree on his marriage certificate with Sto. Tomas.
However, despite the registration, an official of National Statistics Office informed
Corpuz that the former marriage still subsists under the Philippine law until there has
been a judicial recognition of the Canadian divorce decree by a competent judicial court
in view of NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982.

Consequently, he filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and/or

declaration of dissolution of marriage with the RTC. However, the RTC denied the
petition reasoning out that Corpuz cannot institute the action for judicial recognition of
the foreign divorce decree because he is a naturalized Canadian citizen. It was provided
further that Sto. Tomas was the proper party who can institute an action under the
principle of Article 26 of the Family Code which capacitates a Filipino citizen to remarry
in case the alien spouse obtains a foreign divorce decree. Hence, this petition.

Issue: Whether the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code grants aliens like
Corpuz the right to institute a petition for judicial recognition of a foreign divorce decree.
Ruling: Petition GRANTED. RTC Decision REVERSED.

The Supreme Court qualifies the above conclusion – i.e., that the second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code bestows no rights in favor of aliens -with the
complementary statement that this conclusion is not sufficient basis to dismiss Gerbert’s
petition before the RTC. In other words, the unavailability of the second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code to aliens does not necessarily strip Gerbert of legal
interest to petition the RTC for the recognition of his foreign divorce decree. 

The foreign divorce decree itself, after its authenticity and conformity with the alien’s
national law have been duly proven according to our rules of evidence, serves as a
presumptive evidence of right in favor of Gerbert, pursuant to Section 48, Rule 39 of the
Rules of Court which provides for the effect of foreign judgments. A remand, at the
same time, will allow other interested parties to oppose the foreign judgment and
overcome a petitioner’s presumptive evidence of aright by proving want of jurisdiction,
want of notice to a party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. Needless to
state, every precaution must be taken to ensure conformity with our laws before a
recognition is made, as the foreign judgment, once recognized, shall have the effect of
res judicata between the parties, as provided in Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of
Court.

Evidently, the Pasig City Civil Registry Office was aware of the requirement of a court
recognition, as it cited NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982, and Department of Justice
Opinion No. 181, series of 1982 – both of which required a final order from a competent
Philippine court before a foreign judgment, dissolving a marriage, can be registered in
the civil registry, but it, nonetheless, allowed the registration of the decree. For being
contrary to law, the registration of the foreign divorce decree without the requisite
judicial recognition is patently void and cannot produce any legal effect.

Another point we wish to draw attention to is that the recognition that the RTC may
extend to the Canadian divorce decree does not, by itself, authorize the cancellation of
the entry in the civil registry. A petition for recognition of a foreign judgment is not the
proper proceeding, contemplated under the Rules of Court, for the cancellation of
entries in the civil registry.
Article 412 of the Civil Code declares that "no entry in a civil register shall be changed
or corrected, without judicial order." The Rules of Court supplements Article 412 of the
Civil Code by specifically providing for a special remedial proceeding by which entries in
the civil registry may be judicially cancelled or corrected. Rule 108 of the Rules of Court
sets in detail the jurisdictional and procedural requirements that must be complied with
before a judgment, authorizing the cancellation or correction, may be annotated in the
civil registry. It also requires, among others, that the verified petition must be filed with
the RTC of the province where the corresponding civil registry is located; that the civil
registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest must be made parties to the
proceedings; and that the time and place for hearing must be published in a newspaper
of general circulation. As these basic jurisdictional requirements have not been met in
the present case, we cannot consider the petition Gerbert filed with the RTC as one filed
under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. 

We hasten to point out, however, that this ruling should not be construed as requiring
two separate proceedings for the registration of a foreign divorce decree in the civil
registry – one for recognition of the foreign decree and another specifically for
cancellation of the entry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. The recognition of the
foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the object of
special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to
establish the status or right of a party or a particular fact.

Moreover, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court can serve as the appropriate adversarial
proceeding by which the applicability of the foreign judgment can be measured and
tested in terms of jurisdictional infirmities, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or
clear mistake of law or fact.

Fujiki vs Marinay G.R. No. 196049 June 26, 2013

Facts: Minoru Fujiki, a Japanese national, married Maria Marinay in the Philippines in
2004. However, they eventually lost contact with each other. In 2008, Marinay married
Shinichi Maekara, another Japanese, without her prior marriage with Fujiki being
dissolved. Marinay allegedly suffered physical abuse from Maekara and so she left the
latter and reestablished her relationship with Fujiki.

Fujiki helped Marinay obtain a judgment from a family court in Japan which declared the
marriage between Marinay and Maekara void for being bigamous. Subsequently, Fujiki
filed a petition before the RTC titled “Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or
Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage)” and prayed that the Japanese Family Court
judgment be recognized in the Philippines and the subsequent marriage of Fujiki to
Maekera be declared void ab initio under Articles 35 (4) and 41 of the Family Code.

The RTC denied the petition stating that the petition was in gross violation of Rule on
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages
(AM No. 02-11-10-SC). It took the view that only “the husband or the wife”, in this case
either Maekara or Marinay, can file the petition to declare their marriage void, and not
Fujiki.

Issue:
(1) Whether or not AM No. 02-11-10-SC is applicable in this case.
(2) Whether or not Fujiki, a husband of a prior marriage, can file a petition to recognize
a foreign judgment nullifying the subsequent marriage between Marinay and
Maekera on the ground of bigamy.

Ruling:
1. No. A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply in a petition to recognize a foreign
judgment relating to the status of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of
 a foreign country. For Philippine courts to recognize a foreign judgment relating to
the status of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country, the
petitioner only needs to prove the foreign judgment as a fact under the Rules of
Court. Philippine courts cannot presume to know the foreign laws under which the
foreign judgment was rendered.
2. Yes. While the Philippines does not have a divorce law, Philippine courts may,
however, recognize a foreign divorce decree under the second paragraph of Article
26 of the Family Code, to capacitate a Filipino citizen to remarry when his or her
foreign spouse obtained a divorce decree abroad.

In this case, there is therefore no reason to disallow Fujiki to simply prove as a fact the
Japanese Family Court judgment nullifying the marriage between Marinay and Maekara
on the ground of bigamy. The Japanese Family Court judgment is fully consistent with
Philippine public policy, as bigamous marriages are declared void from the beginning
under Article 35 (4) of the Family Code.

Fredco Manufacturing Corporation v. President and Fellows of Harvard College

(G.R. No. 185917)

Facts: Petitioner Fredco Manufacturing filed a petition to cancel the registration of

respondent’s mark ‘Harvard Veritas Shield Symbol’ used in products such as bags and
t-shirts. Fredco alleges that the mark ‘Harvard’ was first used and registered by New
York Garments, a domestic corporation and its predecessor-in-interest, used in its
clothing articles. Respondent Harvard University on the other hand, alleges that it is the
lawful owner of the name and mark in numerous countries worldwide including in the
Philippines which was used in commerce as early as 1872. Respondent further contend
that it never authorized any person to use its name or mark in connection with any
goods in the Philippines. The IPO Bureau of Legal Affairs cancelled respondent’s
registration of the mark but only over the goods which are confusingly similar with that
of petitioner. IPO reversed the decision. CA affirmed.

Issue: Whether or not respondent’s trade name is infringed.

Ruling: YES. Fredco’s use of the mark “Harvard,” coupled with its claimed origin in
Cambridge, Massachusetts, obviously suggests a false connection with Harvard
University. On this ground alone, Fredco’s registration of the mark “Harvard” should
have been disallowed. Indisputably, Fredco does not have any affiliation or connection
with Harvard University, or even with Cambridge, Massachusetts. Fredco or its
predecessor New York Garments was not established in 1936, or in the U.S.A. as
indicated by Fredco in its oblong logo.
Under Philippine law, a trade name of a national of a State that is a party to the Paris
Convention, whether or not the trade name forms part of a trademark, is protected
“without the obligation of filing or registration.” “Harvard” is the trade name of the world
famous Harvard University, and it is also a trademark of Harvard University. Under
Article 8 of the Paris Convention, as well as Section 37 of R.A. No. 166, Harvard
University is entitled to protection in the Philippines of its trade name “Harvard” even
without registration of such trade name in the Philippines. This means that no
educational entity in the Philippines can use the trade name “Harvard” without the
consent of Harvard University. Likewise, no entity in the Philippines can claim, expressly
or impliedly through the use of the name and mark “Harvard,” that its products or
services are authorized, approved, or licensed by, or sourced from, Harvard University
without the latter’s consent.

Bank of America, NT & SA v. Litonjua

Facts: The Litonjuas (Eduardo and Aurelio), private respondents, were engaged in the
shipping business. They owned 2 vesselsthrough their company and deposited their
revenues with the petitioner banks in both Hongkong and UK. The respondents alleged
that the petitioner offered easy loans to help them acquire additional three (3) vessels
through their company. The operation and the funds were then placed under the control
of the petitioner while the possession of the vessels were left in the hands of persons
designated.

The said vessels were subsequently foreclosed when the business of respondents
declined. However, the bank as trustee failed to render an accounting of the incomes of
the said vessels. This prompted the Litonjuas to file a complaint. The petitioner bank
filed a motion to dismiss  on the ground of forum non conveniens and lack of cause of
action. The MD was denied by the lower court. The petitioner filed a petition for review
on certiorari with the CA. The Court of Appeals dismissed. It was treated by the CA as a
petition for certiorari.

Issue: Whether or not the case should have been dismissed on the ground of FNC

Ruling: NO. Whether a suit is to be dismissed on the ground of FNC depends largely
upon the facts of the case and is addressed to the sound discretion of the courts. The
following requisites must be met: 
- The Philippine court must be one to which the parties may conveniently resort to
- The Philippine courts is in the position to make intelligent decisions as to law and facts
- It has or likely have the power to enforce its decision.

As to the issue on forum shopping, the court held that there is no forum shopping due to
the pendency of the foreign action. Forum shopping exists where elements of litis
pendentia are present and where a final judgement is one case will amount to res
judicata in the other. Litis pendentia presuposses the existence of these elements;
identity of parties, identity of righs asserted and relief prayed for (founded on the same
acts) and the identity of the two cases is such that judgement in one case would amount
to res judicata in the other. 

Not all the elements for litis pendentia are present here. The petitioner failed to show
these as it merely mentioned that civil cases were filed in Hongkong and UK without
showing the identity of the rights asserted or reliefs sought, as well as the presence of
elements of res judicata should one of the case be adjudged.

Pioneer Concrete Philippines Inc v. Antonio D. Todaro (G.R. No. 154830)

Facts: Pioneer International Limited (PIL), an Australian company engaged in the

ready-mix concrete business, established herein petitioner PCPI to undertake its
business in the Philippines. PIL contacted respondent Todaro and asked if the latter is
available to join them in their intention to establish plant operations in the country to
which the latter agreed. Subsequently, PIL and Todaro came to an agreement wherein
the former consented to engage the services of the latter as consultant for 2-3 months,
after which he would be employed as manager of concrete operations should PIL
decide to invest in the Philippines. PIL started its operation however it refused to comply
with its undertaking to employ Todaro on a permanent basis. Respondent thus filed a
complaint for sum of money and damages against petitioner. Petitioner meanwhile
contends that the case should fall with the NLRC as the damages arose from an alleged
breach of employment contract. Both the trial court and CA ruled in favor of respondent.

Issue: Whether or not there is employer-employee relationship between PIL and

respondent.

Ruling: NO. In the present case, no employer-employee relationship exists between

petitioners and respondent. In fact, in his complaint, private respondent is not seeking
any relief under the Labor Code, but seeks payment of damages on account of
petitioners’ alleged breach of their obligation under their agreement to employ him. It is
settled that an action for breach of contractual obligation is intrinsically a civil dispute. In
the alternative, respondent seeks redress on the basis of the provisions of Articles 19
and 21 of the Civil Code. Hence, it is clear that the present action is within the realm of
civil law, and jurisdiction over it belongs to the regular courts.

PERKINS VS. ROXAS GR. 47517, June 27, 1941

Facts: July 5, 1938, respondent Eugene Perkins filed a complaint in the CFI- Manila
against the Benguet Consolidated Mining Company for the recovery of a sum consisting
of dividends which have been declared and made payable on shares of stock registered
in his name, payment of which was being withheld by the company, and for the
recognition of his right to the control and disposal of said shares to the exclusion of all
others. The company alleged, by way of defense that the withholding of plaintiff’s right
to the disposal and control of the shares was due to certain demands made with respect
to said shares by the petitioner Idonah Perkins, and by one Engelhard.
Eugene Perkins included in his modified complaint as parties defendants petitioner,
Idonah Perkins, and Engelhard. Eugene Perkins prayed that petitioner Idonah Perkins
and H. Engelhard be adjudged without interest in the shares of stock in question and
excluded from any claim they assert thereon. Summons by publication were served
upon the nonresident defendants Idonah Perkins and Engelhard. Engelhard filed his
answer. Petitioner filed her answer with a crosscomplaint in which she sets up a
judgment allegedly obtained by her against respondent Eugene Perkins, from the SC of
the State of New York, wherein it is declared that she is the sole legal owner and
entitled to the possession and control of the shares of stock in question with all the cash
dividends declared thereon by the Benguet Consolidated Mining Company.
Idonah Perkins filed a demurrer thereto on the ground that “the court has no jurisdiction
of the subject of the action,” because the alleged judgment of the SC of the State of
New York is res judicata. Petitioner’s demurrer was overruled, thus this petition.

Issue: WON in view of the alleged judgment entered in favor of the petitioner by the SC
of New York and which is claimed by her to be res judicata on all questions raised by
the respondent, Eugene Perkins, the local court has jurisdiction over the subject matter
of the action.

Ruling: By jurisdiction over the subject matter is meant the nature of the cause of action
and of the relief sought, and this is conferred by the sovereign authority which organizes
the court, and is to be sought for in general nature of its powers, or in authority specially
conferred. In the present case, the amended complaint filed by the respondent, Eugene
Perkins alleged calls for the adjudication of title to certain shares of stock of the Benguet
Consolidated Mining Company and the granting of affirmative reliefs, which fall within
the general jurisdiction of the CFI- Manila. Similarly CFI- Manila is empowered to
adjudicate the several demands contained in petitioner’s crosscomplaint.
Idonah Perkins in her crosscomplaint brought suit against Eugene Perkins and the
Benguet Consolidated Mining Company upon the alleged judgment of the SC of the
State of New York and asked the court below to render judgment enforcing that New
York judgment, and to issue execution thereon. This is a form of action recognized by
section 309 of the Code of Civil Procedure (now section 47, Rule 39, Rules of Court)
and which falls within the general jurisdiction of the CFI- Manila, to adjudicate, settle
and determine.

The petitioner expresses the fear that the respondent judge may render judgment
“annulling the final, subsisting, valid judgment rendered and entered in this petitioner’s
favor by the courts of the State of New York, which decision is res judicata on all the
questions constituting the subject matter of civil case” and argues on the assumption
that the respondent judge is without jurisdiction to take cognizance of the cause.
Whether or not the respondent judge in the course of the proceedings will give validity
and efficacy to the New York judgment set up by the petitioner in her cross-complaint is
a question that goes to the merits of the controversy and relates to the rights of the
parties as between each other, and not to the jurisdiction or power of the court. The test
of jurisdiction is whether or not the tribunal has power to enter upon the inquiry, not
whether its conclusion in the course of it is right or wrong. If its decision is erroneous, its
judgment can be reversed on appeal; but its determination of the question, which the
petitioner here anticipates and seeks to prevent, is the exercise by that court and the
rightful exercise of its jurisdiction. Petition denied.
MIJARES vs. RANADA
G.R. No. 139235, April 12, 2005

FACTS:
On 9 May 1991, a complaint was filed with the United States District Court (US
District Court), District of Hawaii, against the Estate of former Philippine President
Ferdinand E. Marcos (Marcos Estate). The action was brought forth by ten Filipino
citizens who each alleged having suffered human rights abuses such as arbitrary
detention, torture and rape in the hands of police or military forces during the Marcos
regime. The Alien Tort Act was invoked as basis for the US District Court's jurisdiction
over the complaint, as it involved a suit by aliens for tortious violations of international
law.  These plaintiffs brought the action on their own behalf and on behalf of a class of
similarly situated individuals, particularly consisting of all current civilian citizens of the
Philippines, their heirs and beneficiaries, who between 1972 and 1987 were tortured,
summarily executed or had disappeared while in the custody of military or paramilitary
groups. Plaintiffs alleged that the class consisted of approximately ten thousand
(10,000) members; hence, joinder of all these persons was impracticable.

The institution of a class action suit was warranted under Rule 23(a) and (b)(1)
(B) of the US Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the provisions of which were invoked by
the plaintiffs. Subsequently, the US District Court certified the case as a class action
and created three (3) sub-classes of torture, summary execution and disappearance
victims. Trial ensued, and subsequently a jury rendered a verdict and an award of
compensatory and exemplary damages in favor of the plaintiff class. Then, on 3
February 1995, the US District Court, presided by Judge Manuel L. Real, rendered a
Final Judgment (Final Judgment) awarding the plaintiff class a total of One Billion Nine
Hundred Sixty Four Million Five Thousand Eight Hundred Fifty Nine Dollars and Ninety
Cents ($1,964,005,859.90). The Final Judgment was eventually affirmed by the US
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in a decision rendered on 17 December 1996. 

On 20 May 1997, the present petitioners filed Complaint with the Regional Trial

Court, City of Makati (Makati RTC) for the enforcement of the Final Judgment. They
alleged that they are members of the plaintiff class in whose favor the US District Court
awarded damages. They argued that since the Marcos Estate failed to file a petition
for certiorari with the US Supreme Court after the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals had
affirmed the Final Judgment, the decision of the US District Court had become final and
executory, and hence should be recognized and enforced in the Philippines, pursuant
to Section 50, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court then in force.

On 5 February 1998, the Marcos Estate filed a motion to dismiss, raising, among
others, the non-payment of the correct filing fees. It alleged that petitioners had only
paid Four Hundred Ten Pesos (P410.00) as docket and filing fees, notwithstanding the
fact that they sought to enforce a monetary amount of damages in the amount of over
Two and a Quarter Billion US Dollars (US$2.25 Billion). The Marcos Estate
cited Supreme Court Circular No. 7, pertaining to the proper computation and payment
of docket fees. In response, the petitioners claimed that an action for the enforcement of
a foreign judgment is not capable of pecuniary estimation; hence, a filing fee of only
Four Hundred Ten Pesos (P410.00) was proper, pursuant to Section 7(c) of Rule 141. 

Petitioners submit that their action is incapable of pecuniary estimation as the

subject matter of the suit is the enforcement of a foreign judgment, and not an action for
the collection of a sum of money or recovery of damages

ISSUE:
Whether or not foreign judgements may be given effect here in the Philippines.

RULING:
Thus, respondent judge was in clear and serious error when he concluded that
the filing fees should be computed on the basis of the schematic table of Section 7(a),
as the action involved pertains to a claim against an estate based on judgment. What
provision, if any, then should apply in determining the filing fees for an action to
enforce a foreign judgment?
To resolve this question, a proper understanding is required on the nature and
effects of a foreign judgment in this jurisdiction.
The rules of comity, utility and convenience of nations have established a
usage among civilized states by which final judgments of foreign courts of competent
jurisdiction are reciprocally respected and rendered efficacious under certain
conditions that may vary in different countries. This principle was prominently affirmed
in the leading American case of Hilton v. Guyot  and expressly recognized in our
jurisprudence beginning with Ingenholl v. Walter E. Olsen & Co. The conditions
required by the Philippines for recognition and enforcement of a foreign judgment
were originally contained in Section 311 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which was
taken from the California Code of Civil Procedure which, in turn, was derived from the
California Act of March 11, 1872. Remarkably, the procedural rule now outlined in
Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Civil Procedure has remained unchanged down to
the last word in nearly a century. Section 48 states:
SEC. 48. Effect of foreign judgments. — The effect of a judgment of a
tribunal of a foreign country, having jurisdiction to pronounce the
judgment is as follows:
(a) In case of a judgment upon a specific thing, the judgment is
conclusive upon the title to the thing; 
(b) In case of a judgment against a person, the judgment is
presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their
successors in interest by a subsequent title;
 In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of
a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake
of law or fact.
There is an evident distinction between a foreign judgment in an action in
rem and one in personam. For an action in rem, the foreign judgment is deemed
conclusive upon the title to the thing, while in an action in personam, the foreign
judgment is presumptive, and not conclusive, of a right as between the parties and
their successors in interest by a subsequent title.  However, in both cases, the
foreign judgment is susceptible to impeachment in our local courts on the
grounds of want of jurisdiction or notice to the party,  collusion, fraud, or clear
mistake of law or fact. Thus, the party aggrieved by the foreign judgment is entitled
to defend against the enforcement of such decision in the local forum. It is essential
that there should be an opportunity to challenge the foreign judgment, in order for the
court in this jurisdiction to properly determine its efficacy. 
It is clear then that it is usually necessary for an action to be filed in order to
enforce a foreign judgment , even if such judgment has conclusive effect as in the
case of in rem actions, if only for the purpose of allowing the losing party an
opportunity to challenge the foreign judgment, and in order for the court to properly
determine its efficacy.  Consequently, the party attacking a foreign judgment has the
burden of overcoming the presumption of its validity.
The rules are silent as to what initiatory procedure must be undertaken in
order to enforce a foreign judgment in the Philippines. But there is no question
that the filing of a civil complaint is an appropriate measure for such purpose. A
civil action is one by which a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a
right, and clearly an action to enforce a foreign judgment is in essence a vindication of
a right prescinding either from a "conclusive judgment upon title" or the "presumptive
evidence of a right."  Absent perhaps a statutory grant of jurisdiction to a quasi-judicial
body, the claim for enforcement of judgment must be brought before the regular
courts. 
There is also consensus as to the requisites for recognition of a foreign
judgment and the defenses against the enforcement thereof. As earlier discussed, the
exceptions enumerated in Section 48, Rule 39 have remain unchanged since the time
they were adapted in this jurisdiction from long standing American rules. The
requisites and exceptions as delineated under Section 48 are but a restatement of
generally accepted principles of international law. Section 98 of The Restatement,
Second, Conflict of Laws, states that "a valid judgment rendered in a foreign nation
after a fair trial in a contested proceeding will be recognized in the United States," and
on its face, the term "valid" brings into play requirements such notions as valid
jurisdiction over the subject matter and parties.  Similarly, the notion that fraud or
collusion may preclude the enforcement of a foreign judgment finds affirmation with
foreign jurisprudence and commentators, as well as the doctrine that the foreign
judgment must not constitute "a clear mistake of law or fact." And finally, it has been
recognized that "public policy" as a defense to the recognition of judgments serves as
an umbrella for a variety of concerns in international practice which may lead to a
denial of recognition.
 The viability of the public policy defense against the enforcement of a foreign
judgment has been recognized in this jurisdiction. This defense allows for the
application of local standards in reviewing the foreign judgment, especially when such
judgment creates only a presumptive right, as it does in cases wherein the judgment is
against a person. 
This is a significant proposition, as it acknowledges that the procedure and
requisites outlined in Section 48, Rule 39 derive their efficacy not merely from the
procedural rule, but by virtue of the incorporation clause of the Constitution. Rules of
procedure are promulgated by the Supreme Court, and could very well be abrogated
or revised by the high court itself. Yet the Supreme Court is obliged, as are all State
components, to obey the laws of the land, including generally accepted principles of
international law which form part thereof, such as those ensuring the qualified
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments. 
Thus, relative to the enforcement of foreign judgments in the Philippines, it
emerges that there is a general right recognized within our body of laws, and affirmed
by the Constitution, to seek recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments, as well
as a right to defend against such enforcement on the grounds of want of jurisdiction,
want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
The preclusion of an action for enforcement of a foreign judgment in this
country merely due to an exorbitant assessment of docket fees is alien to generally
accepted practices and principles in international law. Indeed, there are grave
concerns in conditioning the amount of the filing fee on the pecuniary award or the
value of the property subject of the foreign decision. Such pecuniary award will almost
certainly be in foreign denomination, computed in accordance with the applicable laws
and standards of the forum.  The vagaries of inflation, as well as the relative low-
income capacity of the Filipino, to date may very well translate into an award virtually
unenforceable in this country, despite its integral validity, if the docket fees for the
enforcement thereof were predicated on the amount of the award sought to be
enforced. The theory adopted by respondent judge and the Marcos Estate may even
lead to absurdities, such as if applied to an award involving real property situated in
places such as the United States or Scandinavia where real property values are
inexorably high. We cannot very well require that the filing fee be computed based on
the value of the foreign property as determined by the standards of the country where
it is located.
OIL AND NATURAL GAS COMMISSION v. CA
G.R. No. 114323, July 23, 1998

FACTS:
Oil and Natural Gas Commission is a foreign corporation in Government of India while
Pacific Cement Co is a Philippine corporation. Pacific was supposed to deliver more
than 4,000 metric tons of oil well cement to Bombay and Calcutta but because of a
dispute with the carrier, the shipment never reached the destination.

Despite payment by Oil and Natural, as well as repeated demands, Pacific does not
deliver the oil well cement.
During negotiations, the parties agreed that the Pacific will replace the oil well cement
but the items were not according to specifications.

Oil and Natural informed Pacific that they will submit the dispute to arbitration as
provided for in their contract.
The dispute was therefore submitted to arbitration. The arbitrator was Shri Malhotra, an
employee of Oil and Natural Gas who made decision in favor of Oil and Natural Gas.
The arbitral decision was confirmed by an Indian court.

Oil and Natural Gas filed a complaint in Pasig RTC for the enforcement of the foreign
which was opposed by Pacific. The Pasig RTC dismissed the complaint because the
foreign court had therefore, adopted no legal award which could be the source of an
enforceable right.

The CA affirmed the dismissal by the RTC. Aside from agreeing with the RTC that the
arbitral award was void, CA rendered that the judgement violated the constitutional
provision that no decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein
clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the judgement of the foreign court is enforceable in the Philippine
courts’ jurisdiction
2. Whether or not there is a requirement that the judicial proceedings where the
judgment was entered correspond to due process in your jurisdiction and, if so, how is
that requirement evaluated

RULING:

(1) Yes. The judgement of the foreign court may be enforceable in our jurisdiction.

The Supreme Court said that even in this jurisdiction, incorporation by reference is
allowed if only to avoid the cumbersome reproduction of the decision of the lower
courts, or portions thereof, in the decision of the higher court. This is particularly true
when the decision sought to be incorporated is a lengthy and thorough discussion of the
facts and conclusions arrived at, as in this case, where Award Paper No. 3/B-1 consists
of eighteen (18) single spaced pages

The recognition to be accorded a foreign judgment is not necessarily affected by the

fact that the procedure in the courts of the country in which such judgment was
rendered differs from that of the courts of the country in which the judgment is relied on.
The Supreme Court has held that matters of remedy and procedure are governed by
the lex fori or the internal law of the forum. Thus, if under the procedural rules of the
Civil Court of Dehra Dun, India, a valid judgment may be rendered by adopting the
arbitrators findings, then the same must be accorded respect. In the same vein, if the
procedure in the foreign court mandates that an Order of the Court becomes final and
executory upon failure to pay the necessary docket fees, then the courts in this
jurisdiction cannot invalidate the order of the foreign court simply because our rules
provide otherwise.

(2) No, there is no requirement.

Time and again this Court has held that the essence of due process is to be found in the
reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit any evidence one may have in support
of one's defense or stated otherwise, what is repugnant to due process is the denial of
opportunity to be heard. Thus, there is no violation of due process even if no hearing
was conducted, where the party was given a chance to explain his side of the
controversy and he waived his right to do so.

We cannot subscribe to the private respondent's claim that the foreign court violated its
right to due process when it failed to reply to its queries nor when the latter rejected its
objections for a clearly meritorious ground. The private respondent was afforded
sufficient opportunity to be heard. It was not incumbent upon the foreign court to reply to
the private respondent's written communication. On the contrary, a genuine concern for
its cause should have prompted the private respondent to ascertain with all due
diligence the correct amount of legal fees to be paid. The private respondent did not act
with prudence and diligence thus its plea that they were not accorded the right to
procedural due process cannot elicit either approval or sympathy from this Court.

A foreign judgment is presumed to be valid and binding in the country from which it
comes, until the contrary is shown. It is also proper to presume the regularity of the
proceedings and the giving of due notice therein.

Under Section 50, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, a judgment in an action in personam
of a tribunal of a foreign country having jurisdiction to pronounce the same is
presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors-in-interest
by a subsequent title. The judgment may, however, be assailed by evidence of want of
jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
Also, under Section 3 of Rule 131, a court, whether of the Philippines or elsewhere,
enjoys the presumption that it was acting in the lawful exercise of jurisdiction and has
regularly performed its official duty."

Consequently, the party attacking a foreign judgment (Pacific Cement) had the burden
of overcoming the presumption of its validity which it failed to do in the instant case. The
foreign judgment being valid, there is nothing else left to be done than to order its
enforcement, despite the fact that Oil and Natural Gas merely prays for, the remand of
the case to the RTC for further proceedings. As this Court has ruled on the validity and
enforceability of the said foreign judgment in this jurisdiction, further proceedings in the
RTC for the reception of evidence to prove otherwise are no longer necessary.

BPI SECURITIES CORP. v. GUEVARRA

752 SCRA 342

FACTS:
Petitioner, Ayala Corporation (Ayala), is known as a leading company in the Philippines
with numerous business ventures. Attributing to its corporate success, Ayala expanded
its enterprise and owned several other companies such as Ayala Investment and
Development Corporation (AIDC), Philsec Investment Corporation (PHILSEC), Ayala
International Finance Limited (AIFL) which eventually became BPI International Finance
Limited (BPI-IFL), and Athona Holdings (ATHONA).

In 1958, Respondent, Edgardo Guevara (Guevara), was hired by Ayala Corporation

(Ayala), who later assumed various executive posts under the company as Head of the
Legal Department, President, and Vice-President among others. As President of Ayala,
Guevara was tasked to resolve the outstanding debt of Ventura Ducat (Ducat), a
stockholder, amounting to USD 3 Million which threatened the company’s position in the
Makati Stock Exchange.

To pay off his loan, Ducat proposed to give off in exchange one of his properties in
Harris County, Texas, United Stated which he owned with Drago Daic (Daic), President
of 1488, Inc. (1488), a US-based corporation. The said property was allegedly
appraised at USD 2.8 million, as supported by both Ducat and Daic. Since the proposal
was endorsed by Guevara, Ayala agreed to the exchange of asset to settle Ducat’s
account.

Final negotiations proceeded as follows –

a) ATHONA bought Harris County property from 1488, Inc. for the price of USD
2,807,209.02;
b) PHILSEC and AIFL granted ATHONA a loan of USD 2.5 Million, which ATHONA
used as initial payment to purchase the property; and
c) ATHONA executed a promissory note in favor of 1488, Inc. in the sum of USD
307,209.02 to cover the remaining balance of the property.
It was also decided that PHILSEC and AIFL would release and transfer possession of
Ducat's stock portfolio to 1488, Inc. which would then become the new creditor of Ducat.

Unfortunately, as the real estate market in Texas became unpredictable, Ayala was not
able to sell off the Harris Country property, failing both to pay the remaining USD
307,000 and transferring Ducat’s stocks to 1488. In turn, 1488 filed a suit in the US
courts against Ayala for failure to render its obligations.

In response, Ayala also filed counterclaims against 1488 and Guevara alleging fraud,
negligence and conspiracy in declaring the overpriced appraisal value of the property.
However, both the US District Court and US Court of Appeals ruled in favor of Guevara
and 1488.
Despite the foreign ruling, Ayala refused to comply with the US courts verdict. As such,
Guevara instituted an action in the Philippine courts.

Both the Regional Trial Court (RTC) and Court of Appeals also rendered decision in
favor of Guevara’s claim to be paid USD 500,000 as was also previously ruled in the US
courts.

In its defense, Ayala asserted that the US courts committed a clear mistake of law and
fact in the issuance of its decision which is unenforceable in Philippine jurisdiction.
Ayala also stressed that Guevara, together with 1488, Ducat, and Daic, connived to
induce the former to agree to a fraudulent deal. Additionally, Ayala lamented that
Guevara endorsed the appraisal of the market value of the Harris County property
which was overvalued by more than 400%.

ISSUE:
Whether or not foreign judgments should be recognized and enforced under Philippine
jurisdiction.

RULING:
NO. In Mijares v. Rañada,33 the Court extensively discussed the underlying principles
for the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments in Philippine jurisdiction:
There is no obligatory rule derived from treaties or conventions that requires the
Philippines to recognize foreign judgments, or allow a procedure for the enforcement
thereof. However, generally accepted principles of international law, by virtue of the
incorporation clause of the Constitution, form part of the laws of the land even if they do
not derive from treaty obligations. The classical formulation in international law sees
those customary rules accepted as binding result from the combination two elements:
the established, widespread, and consistent practice on the part of States; and a
psychological element known as the opinion juris sive necessitates (opinion as to law or
necessity). Implicit in the latter element is a belief that the practice in question is
rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring it.

While the definite conceptual parameters of the recognition and enforcement of foreign
judgments have not been authoritatively established, the Court can assert with certainty
that such an undertaking is among those generally accepted principles of international
law. As earlier demonstrated, there is a widespread practice among states accepting in
principle the need for such recognition and enforcement, albeit subject to limitations of
varying degrees. The fact that there is no binding universal treaty governing the practice
is not indicative of a widespread rejection of the principle, but only a disagreement as to
the imposable specific rules governing the procedure for recognition and enforcement.

Aside from the widespread practice, it is indubitable that the procedure for recognition
and enforcement is embodied in the rules of law, whether statutory or jurisprudential,
adopted in various foreign jurisdictions. In the Philippines, this is evidenced primarily by
Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which has existed in its current form since the
early 1900s. Certainly, the Philippine legal system has long ago accepted into its
jurisprudence and procedural rules the viability of an action for enforcement of foreign
judgment, as well as the requisites for such valid enforcement, as derived from
internationally accepted doctrines. Again, there may be distinctions as to the rules
adopted by each particular state, but they all prescind from the premise that there is a
rule of law obliging states to allow for, however generally, the recognition and
enforcement of a foreign judgment. The bare principle, to our mind, has attained the
status of opinio juris in international practice.

This is a significant proposition, as it acknowledges that the procedure and requisites

outlined in Section 48, Rule 39 derive their efficacy not merely from the procedural rule,
but by virtue of the incorporation clause of the Constitution. Rules of procedure are
promulgated by the Supreme Court, and could very well be abrogated or revised by the
high court itself. Yet the Supreme Court is obliged, as are all State components, to obey
the laws of the land, including generally accepted principles of international law which
form part thereof, such as those ensuring the qualified recognition and enforcement of
foreign judgments. 

It is an established international legal principle that final judgments of foreign courts of

competent jurisdiction are reciprocally respected and rendered efficacious subject to
certain conditions that vary in different countries. In the Philippines, a judgment or final
order of a foreign tribunal cannot be enforced simply by execution. Such judgment or
order merely creates a right of action, and its non-satisfaction is the cause of action by
which a suit can be brought upon for its enforcement. An action for the enforcement of a
foreign judgment or final order in this jurisdiction is governed by Rule 39, Section 48 of
the Rules of Court, which provides:

SEC. 48. Effect of foreign judgments or final orders. - The effect of a judgment or final
order of a tribunal of a foreign country, having jurisdiction to render the judgment or final
order is as follows:

(a) In case of a judgment or final order upon a specific thing, the judgment or final order
is conclusive upon the title to the thing; and
(b) In case of a judgment or final order against a person, the judgment or final order is
presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest
by a subsequent title.
In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a want of
jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.

As the foregoing jurisprudence had established, recognition and enforcement of a

foreign judgment or final order requires only proof of fact of the said judgment or final
order. In an action in personam, as in the case at bar, the foreign judgment or final order
enjoys the disputable presumption of validity. It is the party attacking the foreign
judgment or final order that is tasked with the burden of overcoming its presumptive
validity. A foreign judgment or final order may only be repelled on grounds external to its
merits, particularly, want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or
clear mistake of law or fact.
The fact of a foreign final order in this case is not disputed. It was duly established by
evidence submitted to the RTC that the U.S. District Court issued an Order on March
13, 1990 in Civil Action No. H-86-440 ordering petitioner, AIFL, and ATHONA, to pay
respondent the sum of US$49,450.00 as sanction for filing a frivolous suit against
respondent, in violation of Rule 11 of the U.S. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The
said Order became final when its reinstatement in the Order dated December 31, 1991
of the U.S. District Court was no longer appealed by petitioner, AIFL, and/or ATHONA.

The Order dated March 13, 1990 of the U.S. District Court in Civil Action No. H-86-440
is presumptive evidence of the right of respondent to demand from petitioner the
payment of US$49,450.00 even in this jurisdiction. The next question then is whether
petitioner was able to discharge the burden of overcoming the presumptive validity of
said Order.

ASIAVEST MERCHANT BANKERS (M) BERHAD vs. CA and PNCC

G.R. No. 110263, July 20, 2001

FACTS:
Petitioner Asiavest Merchant Bankers (M) Berhad is a corporation organized
under the laws of Malaysia while private respondent Philippine National Construction
Corporation is a corporation duly incorporated and existing under Philippine laws.  
Petitioner initiated a suit for collection against private respondent, then known as
Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines, before the High Court of
Malaya in Kuala Lumpur entitled “Asiavest Merchant Bankers (M) Berhad v. Asiavest
CDCP Sdn. Bhd. and Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines.”
Petitioner sought to recover the indemnity of the performance bond it had put up
in favor of private respondent to guarantee the completion of the Felda Project and the
nonpayment of the loan it extended to Asiavest-CDCP Sdn. Bhd. for the completion of
Paloh Hanai and Kuantan By Pass; Project.
The High Court of Malaya (Commercial Division) rendered judgment in favor of
the petitioner and against the private respondent. Following unsuccessful attempts to
secure payment from private respondent under the judgment, petitioner initiated the
complaint before RTC of Pasig, Metro Manila, to enforce the judgment of the High Court
of Malaya.
Private respondent sought the dismissal of the case via a Motion to Dismiss,
contending that the alleged judgment of the High Court of Malaya should be denied
recognition or enforcement since on in face, it is tainted with want of jurisdiction, want of
notice to private respondent, collusion and/or fraud, and there is a clear mistake of law
or fact. Dismissal was, however, denied by the trial court considering that the grounds
relied upon are not the proper grounds in a motion to dismiss under Rule 16 of the
Revised Rules of Court. 
Subsequently, private respondent filed its Answer with Compulsory Counter
claim’s and therein raised the grounds it brought up in its motion to dismiss. In its Reply
filed, the petitioner contended that the High Court of Malaya acquired jurisdiction over
the person of private respondent by its voluntary submission the court’s jurisdiction
through its appointed counsel. Furthermore, private respondent’s counsel waived any
and all objections to the High Court’s jurisdiction in a pleading filed before the court.  
In due time, the trial court rendered its decision dismissing petitioner’s complaint.
Petitioner interposed an appeal with the Court of Appeals, but the appellate court
dismissed the same and affirmed the decision of the trial court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in denying recognition and enforcement to the Malaysian
Court judgment.

RULING:
YES. Generally, in the absence of a special compact, no sovereign is bound to
give effect within its dominion to a judgment rendered by a tribunal of another country;
however, the rules of comity, utility and convenience of nations have established a
usage among civilized states by which final judgments of foreign courts of competent
jurisdiction are reciprocally respected and rendered efficacious under certain conditions
that may vary in different countries.
In this jurisdiction, a valid judgment rendered by a foreign tribunal may be
recognized insofar as the immediate parties and the underlying cause of action are
concerned so long as it is convincingly shown that there has been an opportunity for a
full and fair hearing before a court of competent jurisdiction; that the trial upon regular
proceedings has been conducted, following due citation or voluntary appearance of the
defendant and under a system of jurisprudence likely to secure an impartial
administration of justice; and that there is nothing to indicate either a prejudice in court
and in the system of laws under which it is sitting or fraud in procuring the judgment.
A foreign judgment is presumed to be valid and binding in the country from which
it comes, until a contrary showing, on the basis of a presumption of regularity of
proceedings and the giving of due notice in the foreign forum Under Section 50(b), Rule
39 of the Revised Rules of Court, which was the governing law at the time the instant
case was decided by the trial court and respondent appellate court, a judgment, against
a person, of a tribunal of a foreign country having jurisdiction to pronounce the same is
presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest
by a subsequent title. The judgment may, however, be assailed by evidence of want of
jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. In
addition, under Section 3(n), Rule 131 of the Revised Rules of Court, a court, whether in
the Philippines or elsewhere, enjoys the presumption that it was acting in the lawful
exercise of its jurisdiction. Hence, once the authenticity of the foreign judgment is
proved, the party attacking a foreign judgment, is tasked with the burden of overcoming
its presumptive validity. 
In the instant case, petitioner sufficiently established the existence of the money
judgment of the High Court of Malaya by the evidence it offered. Petitioner’s sole
witness, testified to the effect that he is in active practice of the law profession in
Malaysia; that he was connected with Skrine and Company as Legal Assistant up to
1981; that private respondent, then known as Construction and Development
Corporation of the Philippines, was sued by his client, Asiavest Merchant Bankers (M)
Berhad, in Kuala Lumpur; that the writ of summons were served on March 17, 1983 at
the registered office of private respondent and on March 21, 1983 on Cora S. Deala, a
financial planning officer of private respondent for Southeast Asia operations; that upon
the filing of the case, Messrs. Allen and Gledhill, Advocates and Solicitors, with address
at 24th Floor, UMBC Building, Jalan Sulaiman, Kuala Lumpur, entered their conditional
appearance for private respondent questioning the regularity of the service of the writ of
summons but subsequently withdrew the same when it realized that the writ was
properly served; that because private respondent failed to file a statement of defense
within two (2) weeks, petitioner filed an application for summary judgment and
submitted affidavits and documentary evidence in support of its claim; that the matter
was then heard before the High Court of Kuala Lumpur in a series of dates where
private respondent was represented by counsel; and that the end result of all these
proceedings is the judgment sought to be enforced.  
In addition to the said testimonial evidence, petitioner also offered the
documentary evidence to support their claim.  
Having thus proven, through the foregoing evidence, the existence and
authenticity of the foreign judgment, said foreign judgment enjoys presumptive validity
and the burden then fell upon the party who disputes its validity, herein private
respondent, to prove otherwise. However, private respondent failed to sufficiently
discharge the burden that fell upon it – to prove by clear and convincing evidence the
grounds which it relied upon to prevent enforcement of the Malaysian High Court
judgment.

PHILSEC INVESTMENT et al vs.CA et al

G.R. No. 103493 June 19, 1997

FACTS:
Private respondent Ventura O. Ducat obtained separate loans from petitioners Ayala
and Philsec in the sum of US$2,500,000.00, secured by shares of stock owned by
Ducat with a market value of P14,088,995.00. In order to facilitate the payment of the
loans, private respondent 1488, Inc., through its president, private respondent Drago
Daic, assumed Ducat’s obligation under an Agreement, dated January 27, 1983,
whereby 1488, Inc. executed a Warranty Deed with Vendor’s Lien by which it sold to
petitioner Athona Holdings, N.V. (hereafter called ATHONA) a parcel of land in Harris
County, Texas, U.S.A., for US$2,807,209.02, while PHILSEC and AYALA extended a
loan to ATHONA in the amount of US$2,500,000.00 as initial payment of the purchase
price. The balance of US$307,209.02 was to be paid by means of a promissory note
executed by ATHONA in favor of 1488, Inc. Subsequently, upon their receipt of the
US$2,500,000.00 from 1488, Inc., PHILSEC and AYALA released Ducat from his
indebtedness and delivered to 1488, Inc. all the shares of stock in their possession
belonging to Ducat.

As ATHONA failed to pay the interest on the balance of US$307,209.02, the entire
amount covered by the note became due and demandable.

Private respondent 1488, Inc. sued petitioners PHILSEC, AYALA, and ATHONA in the
United States for payment of the balance of US$307,209.02 and for damages for
breach of contract and for fraud allegedly perpetrated by petitioners in misrepresenting
the marketability of the shares of stock delivered to 1488, Inc. under the
Agreement. Originally instituted in the United States District Court of Texas, 165th
Judicial District, where it was docketed as Case No. 85-57746, the venue of the action
was later transferred to the United States District Court for the Southern District of
Texas, where 1488, Inc. filed an amended complaint, reiterating its allegations in the
original complaint.

While Civil Case No. H-86-440 was pending in the United States, petitioners filed a
complaint “For Sum of Money with Damages and Writ of Preliminary Attachment”
against private respondents in the Regional Trial Court of Makati, where it was docketed
as Civil Case No. 16563. The complaint reiterated the allegation of petitioners in their
respective counterclaims in Civil Action No. H-86-440 of the United States District Court
of Southern Texas that private respondents committed fraud by selling the property at a
price 400 percent more than its true value of US$800,000.00. Petitioners claimed that,
as a result of private respondents’ fraudulent misrepresentations, ATHONA, PHILSEC,
and AYALA were induced to enter into the Agreement and to purchase the Houston
property. Petitioners prayed that private respondents be ordered to return to ATHONA
the excess payment of US$1,700,000.00 and to pay damages. On April 20, 1987, the
trial court issued a writ of preliminary attachment against the real and personal
properties of private respondents.

Private respondent Ducat moved to dismiss Civil Case No. 16563 on the grounds of (1)
litis pendentia, vis-a-vis Civil Action No. H-86-440 filed by 1488, Inc. and Daic in the
U.S., (2) forum non conveniens, and (3) failure of petitioners PHILSEC and BPI-IFL to
state a cause of action. Ducat contended that the alleged overpricing of the property
prejudiced only petitioner ATHONA, as buyer, but not PHILSEC and BPI-IFL which
were not parties to the sale and whose only participation was to extend financial
accommodation to ATHONA under a separate loan agreement.

The trial court granted Ducat’s motion to dismiss, stating that “the evidentiary
requirements of the controversy may be more suitably tried before the forum of the litis
pendentia in the U.S., under the principle in private international law of forum non
conveniens,” even as it noted that Ducat was not a party in the U.S. case.

A separate hearing was held with regard to 1488, Inc. and Daic’s motion to dismiss. On
March 9, 1988, the trial court 3 granted the motion to dismiss filed by 1488, Inc. and
Daic on the ground plaintiff ATHONA is the subject matter of the pending case in the
United States District Court which, under the doctrine of forum non conveniens, is the
better (if not exclusive) forum to litigate matters needed to determine the assessment
and/or fluctuations of the fair market value of real estate situated in Houston, Texas,
U.S.A.

The Court of Appeals also held that Civil Case No. 16563 was an action in personam for
the recovery of a sum of money for alleged tortious acts, so that service of summons by
publication did not vest the trial court with jurisdiction over 1488, Inc. and Drago Daic.
The dismissal of Civil Case No. 16563 on the ground of forum non conveniens was
likewise affirmed by the Court of Appeals on the ground that the case can be better tried
and decided by the U.S. court:

The U.S. case and the case at bar arose from only one main transaction, and involve
foreign elements, to wit: 2) the seller, 1488 Inc. is a non-resident foreign corporation; 3)
although the buyer, Athona Holdings, a foreign corporation which does not claim to be
doing business in the Philippines, is wholly owned by Philsec, a domestic corporation,
Athona Holdings is also owned by BPI-IFL, also a foreign corporation; 4) the Warranty
Deed was executed in Texas, U.S.A.

It is important to note in connection with the first point that while the present case was
pending in the Court of Appeals, the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Texas rendered judgment 5 in the case before it. The judgment, which was in
favor of private respondents, was affirmed on appeal by the Circuit Court of Appeals.

ISSUE:
Whether Civil Case No. 16536 is barred by the judgment of the U.S. court.

RULING:
Decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and Civil Case No. 16563 is
REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Makati for consolidation with Civil Case No.
92-1070 and for further proceedings in accordance with this decision.

Jurisdiction, with respect to actions in personam, as distinguished from actions in rem, a

foreign judgment merely constitutes prima facie evidence of
the justness of the claim of a party and, as such, is subject to proof to the contrary. 9
Rule 39, §50 provides:
Sec. 50. Effect of foreign judgments. — The effect of a judgment of a tribunal of a
foreign country, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment is as follows:

(b) In case of a judgment against a person, the judgment is presumptive evidence of a

right as between the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title; but
the judgment may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the
party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.

It was error therefore for the Court of Appeals to summarily rule that petitioners ’ action
is barred by the principle of res judicata. Petitioners in fact questioned the jurisdiction of
the U.S. court over their persons, but their claim was brushed aside by both the trial
court and the Court of Appeals.

In this case, the trial court abstained from taking jurisdiction solely on the basis of the
pleadings filed by private respondents in connection with the motion to dismiss. It failed
to consider that one of the plaintiffs (PHILSEC) is a domestic corporation and one of the
defendants (Ventura Ducat) is a Filipino, and that it was the extinguishment of the
latter’s debt which was the object of the transaction under litigation. The trial court
arbitrarily dismissed the case even after finding that Ducat was not a party in the U.S.
case.

It was error we think for the Court of Appeals and the trial court to hold that jurisdiction
over 1488, Inc. and Daic could not be obtained because this is an action in personam
and summons were served by extraterritorial service. Rule 14, §17 on extraterritorial
service provides that service of summons on a non-resident defendant may be effected
out of the Philippines by leave of Court where, among others, “the property of the
defendant has been attached within the Philippines.” 18 It is not disputed that the
properties, real and personal, of the private respondents had been attached prior to
service of summons under the Order of the trial court dated April 20, 1987.

MARCOS JR. V. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

671 SCRA 280

FACTS
On 25 April 2012, the Supreme Court rendered a Decision affirming the 2 April
2009 Decision of the Sandiganbayan and declaring all the assets of Arelma, S.A., an
entity created by the late Ferdinand E. Marcos, forfeited in favor of the Republic of the
Philippines. The anti-graft court found that the totality of assets and properties acquired
by the Marcos spouses was manifestly and grossly disproportionate to their aggregate
salaries as public officials, and that petitioners were unable to overturn the prima facie
presumption of ill-gotten wealth, pursuant to Section 2 of Republic Act No. (RA) 1379.
Petitioners seek reconsideration of the denial of their petition.
Among else, Petitioner Marcos, Jr. implores to the Court to revisit and reverse
our earlier ruling in the Swiss Deposits Decision and argues that the pronouncements in
that case are contrary to law and its basic tenets. The Court in that case allegedly
applied a lenient standard for the Republic, but a strict one for the Marcoses. He finds
fault in the ruling therein which was grounded on public policy and the ultimate goal of
the forfeiture law, arguing that public policy is better served if the Court gave more
importance to the substantive rights of the Marcoses.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Petitioner may still question the findings of Sandiganbayan in
Civil Case No. 0141.

RULING:
NO. In accordance with the principle of immutability of judgments, petitioners can
no longer use the present forum to assail the ruling in the Swiss Deposits Decision,
which has become final and executory. Aside from the fact that the method employed
by petitioner is improper and redundant, we also find no cogent reason to revisit the
factual findings of the Sandiganbayan in Civil Case No. 0141, which this Court in the
Swiss Deposits Decision found to be thorough and convincing. In the first place, using a
Rule 45 Petition to question a judgment that has already become final is improper,
especially when it seeks reconsideration of factual issues, such as the earnings of the
late President from 1940 to 1965 and the existence of real properties that petitioners
claim were auctioned off to pay the taxes. Secondly, petitioners never raised the
existence of these earnings and real properties at the outset and never mentioned these
alleged other incomes by way of defense in their Answer. In their Answer, and even in
their subsequent pleadings, they merely made general denials of the allegations without
stating facts admissible in evidence at the hearing. As will be discussed later, both the
Sandiganbayan and the Supreme Court found that the Marcoses' unsupported denials
of matters patently and necessarily within their knowledge were inexcusable, and that a
trial would have served no purpose at all.
Thus, for the final time, we soundly reiterate that the Republic was able to
establish the prima facie presumption that the assets and properties acquired by the
Marcoses were manifestly and patently disproportionate to their aggregate salaries as
public officials. The Republic presented further evidence that they had bigger deposits
beyond their lawful incomes, foremost of which were the Swiss accounts deposited in
the names of five foundations spirited away by the couple to different countries.
Petitioners herein thus failed to overturn this presumption when they merely presented
vague denials and pleaded "lack of sufficient knowledge" in their Answer.
In any case, petitioners may no longer question the findings of the
Sandiganbayan affirmed by the Supreme Court in the Swiss Deposits Decision, as
these issues have long become the "law of the case" in the original Petition for
Forfeiture. As held in Philippine Coconut Producers Federation, Inc. (COCOFED) v.
Republic:
Law of the case . . . is a term applied to an established rule that when an
appellate court passes on a question and remands the case to the lower court for
further proceedings, the question there settled becomes the law of the case upon
subsequent appeal. It means that whatever is once irrevocably established as
the controlling legal rule or decision between the same parties in the same case
continues to be the law of the case, . . . so long as the facts on which such
decision was predicated continue to be the facts of the case before the court.

Otherwise put, the principle means that questions of law that have been
previously raised and disposed of in the proceedings shall be controlling in succeeding
instances where the same legal question is raised, provided that the facts on which the
legal issue was predicated continue to be the facts of the case before the court.
In the case at bar, the same legal issues are being raised by petitioners. In fact,
petitioner Marcos Jr. admits outright that what he seeks is a reversal of the issues
identical to those already decided by the Court in the Swiss Deposits Decision. He may
not resuscitate, via another petition for review, the same issues long laid to rest and
established as the law of the case.

NORTHWEST ORIENT AIRLINES, INC. vs. CA

Facts:  Northwest Airlines and Sharp, through its Japan branch, entered into an
International Passenger Sales Agency Agreement, whereby the former authorized the
latter to sell its air transportation tickets. Unable to remit the proceeds of the ticket sales
made by defendant on behalf of the plaintiff under the said agreement, plaintiff sued
defendant in Tokyo, Japan, for collection of the unremitted proceeds of the ticket sales,
with claim for damages.
After the two attempts of service were unsuccessful, the judge of the Tokyo District
Court decided to have the complaint and the writs of summons served at the head office
of the defendant in Manila. The Director of the Tokyo District Court requested the
Supreme Court of Japan to serve the summons through diplomatic channels upon the
defendant’s head office in Manila.
On August 28, 1980, defendant received from Deputy Balingit the writ of summons.
Despite receipt of the same, defendant failed to appear at the scheduled hearing. Thus,
the Tokyo Court proceeded to hear the plaintiff’s complaint and, rendered judgment
ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of 83,158,195 Yen and damages for
delay. Defendant  received from Deputy Sheriff Balingit copy of the judgment.
Defendant not having appealed the judgment, the same became final and executory.
Plaintiff was unable to execute the decision in Japan, hence, a suit for enforcement of
the judgment was filed by plaintiff before the Regional Trial Court of Manila Branch 54.
Defendant filed its answer averring that the judgment of the Japanese Court: (1) the
foreign judgment sought to be enforced is null and void for want of jurisdiction and (2)
the said judgment is contrary to Philippine law and public policy and rendered without
due process of law.
Issue: Whether a Japanese court can acquire jurisdiction over a Philippine Corporation
doing business in Japan by serving summons through diplomatic channels on the
Philippine corporation at its principal office in Manila after prior attempts to serve
summons in Japan had failed.
Ruling: YES
A foreign judgment is presumed to be valid and binding in the country from which it
comes, until the contrary is shown. It is also proper to presume the regularity of the
proceedings and the giving of due notice therein. The judgment may, however, be
assailed by evidence of want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud,
or clear mistake of law or fact. Being the party challenging the judgment rendered by the
Japanese court, SHARP had the duty to demonstrate the invalidity of such judgment. It
was then incumbent upon SHARP to present evidence as to what that Japanese
procedural law is and to show that under it, the assailed extraterritorial service is invalid.
It did not. Accordingly, the presumption of validity and regularity of the service of
summons and the decision thereafter rendered by the Japanese court must stand.
Section 14, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court provides that if the defendant is a foreign
corporation doing business in the Philippines, service may be made: (1) on its resident
agent designated in accordance with law for that purpose, or, (2) if there is no such
resident agent, on the government official designated by law to that effect; or (3) on any
of its officers or agents within the Philippines.
Where the corporation has no such agent, service shall be made on the government
official designated by law, to wit: (a) the Insurance Commissioner in the case of a
foreign insurance company; (b) the Superintendent of Banks, in the case of a foreign
banking corporation; and (c) the Securities and Exchange Commission, in the case of
other foreign corporations duly licensed to do business in the Philippines.
Nowhere in its pleadings did SHARP profess to having had a resident agent authorized
to receive court processes in Japan.

WRIGHT vs CA G.R. No. 113213

Facts: Petitioner, an Australian Citizen, was sought by Australian authorities for
indictable crimes in his country. Extradition proceedings were filed against him which
ordered the deportation of petitioner. Said decision was sustained by the Court of
Appeals; hence, petitioner came herein by way of review on certiorari, to set aside the
order of deportation, contending that the provision of the Treaty giving retroactive effect
to the extradition treaty amounts to an ex post facto law which violates Section 21 of
Article VI of the Constitution.
Issue: Can extradition treaty be applied retroactively?
Ruling: NO. Early commentators understood ex post facto laws to include all laws of
retrospective application, whether civil or criminal. However, Chief Justice Salmon P.
Chase, citing Blackstone, The Federalist and other early U.S. state constitutions in
Calder vs. Bull concluded that the concept was limited only to penal and criminal
statutes.
 As conceived under our Constitution, ex post facto laws are
1) statutes that make an act punishable as a crime when such act was not an offense
when committed; 2) laws which, while not creating new offenses, aggravate the
seriousness of a crime; 3) statutes which prescribes greater punishment for a crime
already committed; or, 4) laws which alter the rules of evidence so as to make it
substantially easier to convict a defendant.
“Applying the constitutional principle, the (Court) has held that the prohibition applies
only to criminal legislation which affects the substantial rights of the accused.” This
being so, there is no absolutely no merit in petitioner’s contention that the ruling of the
lower court sustaining the Treaty’s retroactive application with respect to offenses
committed prior to the Treaty’s coming into force and effect, violates the Constitutional
prohibition against ex post facto laws. As the Court of Appeals correctly concluded, the
Treaty is neither a piece of criminal legislation nor a criminal procedural statute. “It
merely provides for the extradition of persons wanted for prosecution of an offense or a
crime which offense or crime was already committed or consummated at the time the
treaty was ratified.”
NORSE MANAGEMENT CO. (PTE) v. NATIONAL SEAMEN BOARDG.R. No. L-
54204, September 30, 1982
Facts: Napoleon Abordo, the deceased husband of private respondent Restituta
Abordo, died from an apoplectic stroke in the course of his employment with petitioner
NORSE MANAGEMENT. The M.T. "Cherry Earl," where he is an engineer, is a vessel
of Singaporean Registry. In her complaint for compensation and reliefs available in
connection with the death of Napoleon Abordo," filed before the National Seamen
Board, Restitute alleged that the amount of compensation due her from petitioners
Norse Management and Pacific Seamen Services, Inc., principal and agent,
respectively, should be based on the law where the vessel is registered. On the other
hand, petitioners contend that the law of Singapore should not be applied in this case
because the National Seamen Board cannot take judicial notice of the Workmen's
Insurance Lawof Singapore.
Issue: Whether or not the law of Singapore ought to be applied in the case.
Ruling: Yes. The "Employment Agreement" between Norse Management and the late
Napoleon Abordo states that, in the event of illness or injury to Employee arising out
ofand in the course of his employment and not due to his own willful misconduct and
occurring whilst on board, the EMPLOYER will provide employee with free medical
attention and until EMPLOYEE's arrival at his point of origin; and if such illness or injury
incapacitates the EMPLOYEE compensation shall be paid to employee in
accordancewith and subject to the limitations of the Workmen's Compensation Act of
the Republic of the Philippines or the Workmen's Insurance Law of registry of the vessel
whichever is greater. In the aforementioned "Employment Agreement" between
petitioners and the late Napoleon B. Abordo, it is clear that compensation shall be paid
under Philippine Lawor the law of registry of petitioners' vessel, whichever is greater.
Since private respondent Restituta C. Abordo was offered P30,000.00 only by the
petitioners, Singapore law was properly applied in this case. The National Seamen
Board is justified in taking judicial notice of and in applying that law

Secretary of Justice v. Lantion, G.R. No. 139465, [January 18, 2000], 379 PHIL 165-
251
Facts: The United States Government, on June 17, 1999, through Department of
Foreign Affairs U. S. Note Verbale No. 0522, requested the Philippine Government for
the extradition of Mark Jimenez, herein private respondent, to the United States. The
request was forwarded the following day by the Secretary of Foreign Affairs to the
Department of Justice (DOJ). Pending evaluation of the extradition documents by the
DOJ, private respondent requested for copies of the official extradition request and all
pertinent documents and the holding in abeyance of the proceedings. When his request
was denied for being premature, private respondent resorted to an action
for mandamus, certiorari and prohibition. The trial court issued an order maintaining and
enjoining the DOJ from conducting further proceedings, hence, the instant petition. 
Issue: Would private respondent’s entitlement to notice and hearing during the
evaluation stage of the proceedings constitute a breach of the legal duties of the
Philippine Government under the RP-Extradition Treaty?
Ruling: First and foremost, let us categorically say that this is not the proper time to
pass upon the constitutionality of the provisions of the RP-US Extradition Treaty nor the
Extradition Law implementing the same. We limit ourselves only to the effect of the
grant of the basic rights of notice and hearing to private respondent on foreign relations.
The rule of pacta sunt servanda, one of the oldest and most fundamental maxims of
international law, requires the parties to a treaty to keep their agreement therein in good
faith. The observance of our country’s legal duties under a treaty is also compelled by
Section 2, Article II of the Constitution which provides that “[t]he Philippines renounces
war as an instrument of national policy, adopts the generally accepted principles of
international law as part of the law of the land, and adheres to the policyof peace,
equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity with all nations.” Under the doctrine of
incorporation, rules of international law form part of the law of the land and no further
legislative action is needed to make such rules applicable in the domestic sphere
(Salonga & Yap, Public International Law, 1992 ed., p. 12).
 The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals (or local courts)
are confronted with situations in which there appears to be a conflict between a rule of
international law and the provisions of the constitution or statute of the local state.
Efforts should first be exerted to harmonize them, so as to give effect to both since it is
to be presumed that municipal law was enacted with proper regard for the generally
accepted principles of international law in observance of the Incorporation Clause in the
above-cited constitutional provision (Cruz, Philippine Political Law, 1996 ed., p. 55). In a
situation, however, where the conflict is irreconcilable and a choice has to be made
between a rule of international law and municipal law, jurisprudence dictates that
municipal law should be upheld by the municipal courts
In the case at bar, is there really a conflict between international law and municipal or
national law? En contrarious, these two components of the law of the land are not pitted
against each other. There is no occasion to choose which of the two should be upheld.
Instead, we see a void in the provisions of the RP-US Extradition Treaty, as
implemented by Presidential Decree No. 1069, as regards the basic due process rights
of a prospective extraditee at the evaluation stage of extradition proceedings. From the
procedures earlier abstracted, after the filing of the extradition petition and during the
judicial determination of the propriety of extradition, the rights ofnotice and hearing are
clearly granted to the prospective extraditee. However, prior thereto, the law is silent as
to these rights. Reference to the U.S. extradition procedures also manifests this silence.
Petitioner interprets this silence as unavailability of these rights. Consequently, he
describes the evaluation procedure as an “ex parte technical assessment” of the
sufficiency of the extradition request and the supporting documents.
We disagree.
In the absence of a law or principle of law, we must apply the rules of fair play. An
application of the basic twin due process rights of notice and hearing will not go against
the treaty or the implementing law. Neither the Treaty nor the Extradition Law precludes
these rights from a prospective extraditee. Similarly, American jurisprudence and
procedures on extradition pose no proscription. In fact, in interstate extradition
proceedings as explained above, the prospective extraditee may even request for
copies of the extradition documents from the governor of the asylum state, and if he
does, his right to be supplied the same becomes a demandable right (35 C.J.S. 410).
The basic principles of administrative law instruct us that “the essence of due process in
administrative proceedings is an opportunity to explain one’s side or an opportunity to
seek reconsideration of the actions or ruling complained of (Mirano vs. NLRC, 270
SCRA 96 [1997]; Padilla vs. NLRC, 273 SCRA 457 [1997]; PLDT vs. NLRC,276 SCRA
1 [1997]; Helpmate, Inc. vs. NLRC, 276 SCRA 315 [1997]; Aquinas School vs.
Magnaye, 278 SCRA 602 [1997]; Jamer vs. NLRC, 278 SCRA 632 [1997]). In essence,
procedural due process refers to the method or manner by which the law is enforced
(Corona vs. United Harbor Pilots Association of the Phils., 283 SCRA 31 [1997]). This
Court will not tolerate the least disregard of constitutional guarantees in the enforcement
of a law or treaty. Petitioner’s fears that the Requesting State may have valid objections
to the Requested State’s non-performance of its commitments under the Extradition
Treaty are insubstantial and should not be given paramount consideration. 
How then do we implement the RP-US Extradition Treaty? Do we limit ourselves to the
four corners of Presidential Decree No. 1069?
Said summary dismissal proceedings are also non-litigious in nature, yet we upheld the
due process rights of the respondent.
In the case at bar, private respondent does not only face a clear and present danger of
loss of property or employment, but of liberty itself, which may eventually lead to his
forcible banishment to a foreign land. The convergence of petitioner’s favorable action
on the extradition request and the deprivation of private respondent’s liberty is easily
comprehensible.
We have ruled time and again that this Court’s equity jurisdiction, which is aptly
described as “justice outside legality,” may be availed of only in the absence of, and
never against, statutory law or judicial pronouncements (Smith Bell & Co., Inc. vs. Court
of Appeals, 267 SCRA 530 [1997]; David-Chan vs. Court of Appeals, 268 SCRA 677
[1997]). The constitutional issue in the case at bar does not even call for “justice outside
legality,” since private respondent’s due process rights, although not guaranteed by
statute or by treaty, are protected by constitutional guarantees. We would not be true to
the organic law of the land if we choose strict construction over guarantees against the
deprivation of liberty. That would not be in keeping with the principles of democracy on
which our Constitution is premised.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the instant petition is hereby
DISMISSED for lack of merit. Petitioner is ordered to furnish private respondent copies
ofthe extradition request and its supporting papers, and to grant him a reasonable
period within which to file his comment with supporting evidence. The incidents in Civil
Case No. 99-94684 having been rendered moot and academic by this decision, the
same is hereby ordered dismissed.
INTERNATIONAL CATHOLIC MIGRATION COMMISSION vs CALLEJA G.R. No.
85750, September 28, 1990
Facts: ICMC was one of those accredited by the Philippine Government to operate the
refugee processing center in Morong, Bataan. It was incorporated in New York, USA, at
the request of the Holy See, as a non-profit agency involved in international
humanitarian and voluntary work.
IRRI on the other hand was intended to be an autonomous, philanthropic, tax-free, non-
profit, non-stock organization designed to carry out the principal objective of conducting
“basic research on the rice plant, on all phases of rice production, management,
distribution and utilization with a view to attaining nutritive and economic advantage or
benefit for the people of Asia and other major rice-growing areas through improvement
in quality and quantity of rice.”
The labor organizations in each of the above-mentioned agencies filed a petition for
certification election, which was opposed by both, invoking diplomatic immunity.
Issue: Are the claim of immunity by the ICMC and the IRRI from the application of
Philippine labor laws valid?
Ruling: YES
There are basically three propositions underlying the grant of international immunities to
international organizations. These principles, contained in the ILO Memorandum are
stated thus:
1) international institutions should have a status which protects them against control or
interference by any one government in the performance of functions for the effective
discharge of which they are responsible to democratically constituted international
bodies in which all the nations concerned are represented;
2) no country should derive any national financial advantage by levying fiscal charges
on common international funds; and
3) the international organization should, as a collectivity of States members, be
accorded the facilities for the conduct of its official business customarily extended to
each other by its individual member States.
The theory behind all three propositions is said to be essentially institutional in
character. “It is not concerned with the status, dignity or privileges of individuals, but
with the elements of functional independence necessary to free international institutions
from national control and to enable them to discharge their responsibilities impartially on
behalf of all their members. The raison d’etre for these immunities is the assurance of
unimpeded performance of their functions by the agencies concerned.
ICMC’s and IRRI’s immunity from local jurisdiction by no means deprives labor of its
basic rights, which are guaranteed by our Constitution.
For, ICMC employees are not without recourse whenever there are disputes to be
settled. Section 31 of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the
Specialized Agencies of the United Nations provides that “each specialized agency shall
make provision for appropriate modes of settlement of: (a) disputes arising out of
contracts or other disputes of private character to which the specialized agency is a
party.” Moreover, pursuant to Article IV of the Memorandum of Agreement between
ICMC the the Philippine Government, whenever there is any abuse of privilege by
ICMC, the Government is free to withdraw the privileges and immunities accorded.
Neither are the employees of IRRI without remedy in case of dispute with management
as, in fact, there had been organized a forum for better management-employee
relationship as evidenced by the formation of the Council of IRRI Employees and
Management (CIEM) wherein “both management and employees were and still are
represented for purposes of maintaining mutual and beneficial cooperation between
IRRI and its employees.”