International Journal of Arts Humanities and Social Sciences Studies

Volume 7 Issue 7 ǁ July 2022

ISSN: 2582-1601
www.ijahss.com

Medical Care in the Management of the Lake Nyos Gas

Disaster Of 1986
Celine Dada Ngwang1, Richard Tantoh Talla2, Michael Kpughe Lang3
PhD Fellow, The University of Bamenda
The University of Bamenda

Abstract: This paper explores the humanitarian health crisis that was generated by the Lake Nyos Disaster and
examines how it was managed by the various actors that were involved. The disaster caused serious emergency
and long-term medical problems that were described by medical experts and disaster responders as a
humanitarian crisis. This came with the need to provide immediate and long-term medical care to the over
10,000 survivors that were evacuated from the disaster zone. With humanitarian medical aid obtained from
national and international humanitarian agencies, emergency medical care was provided to survivors in
hospitals and makeshift camps. The long-term medical needs of the survivors constituted part of the resettlement
scheme that was launched by the Cameroon Government. This explains why medical facilities were constructed
in all the sites were survivors were resettled. Using largely primary sources, this paper concludes that medical
care was at the centre of the management of the Lake Nyos Disaster, which in many ways ameliorated the
welfare of survivors in immediate and long-term basis despite the numerous difficulties that were encountered.

Keywords: Disaster, Lake Nyos, survivors, healthcare, Cameroon.

I. Introduction
In human history, crater lakes that resulted from volcanic eruptions have been a source of livelihood to
humans and animals and have scarcely been associated with natural disasters. Unexpectedly, Lake Nyos in the
North West Region of Cameroon, which had been a source of welfare for the Nyos people and neighboring
communities, released toxic gas on 21 August 1986. The carbon dioxide that was forced from the bottom of the
lake by a landslide devastated three villages in Menchum Division (Nyos, Chah and Su-Bum). It was the worst
natural calamity ever to strike Cameroon. Besides claiming the lives of about 1,700 people and destroying
property, the disaster displaced thousands of survivors (Tchuente, 1987: 42). This amounted to a humanitarian
crisis since critical assistance had to be provided to populations in need. The much needed humanitarian
assistance included immediate food, health care, shelter, clothing, water, sanitation and hygiene. The situation
was further compounded by the submission of scientists that the lake and its environs was still unsafe and that
there was a real possibility of a similar episode re-occurring. Consequently, the three villages and surrounding
hills (inhabited mostly by graziers) were declared „out of bounds‟ for habitation. This necessitated the
deployment of rehabilitation practices in the hope of returning displaced people to a new stable state. This
rehabilitation programme called for local, national and international humanitarian aid efforts peddled by both
Cameroonian and international actors.
Within the context of this massive rehabilitation program, resettlement camps were later constructed in
Yemngeh, Kumfutu, Buabua, Esu, Ukpwah, and Ipalim. Amazingly, this post-disaster rehabilitation scheme was
stalled by planning, implementation and coordination lapses. It is important to mention that the displaced people
still face myriad problems since the launching of the scheme in 1986. In addition to the resettlement scheme, a
degasification programme was launched in the hope of rendering the disaster zone suitable for habitation. As
this was/is ongoing, the unstable nature of the lake‟s banks was further identified as a potential source of a
similar explosion if nothing is done. Hence, the threat of renewed disaster remains high both from the slowed
degasification and landscape threats caused by the possibility of surrounding rocks collapsing into the lake as
well as its southern bank crushing into the nearby valley. Disturbingly, people are gradually returning to the
disaster zone due to numerous attractions. These are just a few of the daunting array of challenges that currently
confront the continued management of the Nyos disaster.

This was probably the worst natural calamity ever to strike Cameroon. The year 1986 was therefore a
turning point for the population of these ethnic communities whose wellbeing was unprecedentedly threatened
by the calamity. On the overall, the Nyos disaster was catastrophic for the local populations, leading to societal

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Medical Care in the Management of the Lake Nyos Gas Disaster of 1986

breakdown and extraordinary humanitarian need. Hence, effectively responding to this disaster was going to be
a very difficult task for the Government of Cameroon. The magnitude of the disaster and the mystery about its
origin caused it to be treated as an international concern. Apart from the need to quickly burry the decomposing
bodies and prevent the outbreak of an epidemic, there was also the responsibility of evacuating the 10,000
survivors to emergency relief camps and hospitals where their immediate needs had to be promptly met (Lang,
2018: 14). In light of what precedes, this paper explores the humanitarian health crisis that was generated by the
Lake Nyos Disaster and examines how it was managed by the various actors that were involved.

II. Understanding the Humanitarian Health Crisis

The Lake Nyos disasters killed close to 2000 people and displaced over 10.000 persons from their
homes. The nature of the disaster resulted in a serious health crisis. This disaster affected the health and
wellbeing of the survivors due to the immediate health consequences it caused (Tchuente, 1987). While some of
the survivors suffered from serious burns and other injuries, others were exposed to devastating diseases owing
to the collapse of the healthcare system and their displacement from the disaster area (Baxter et al, 1989, 443).
In the aftermath of the disaster, therefore, there was need for immediate and long term health responses in the
hope of ameliorating the livelihood of survivors. As a result of the disaster, health services in the area were shot
down while health facilities in neighboring towns such as Wum, Nkambe and Fundong were overwhelmed.

Taken together, the Lake Nyos Disaster caused significant health consequences, especially for the over
10,000 persons that were forced from their homes. In the context of this disaster, these displaced persons were in
need of timely healthcare in temporary camps were they were initially resettled. According to testimonies,
recorded by King et al, and those collected, survivors indicated that the perception and effects of the gas
changed with distance from the Lake. Survivors from Nyos and other localities within 3km from Lake described
experiencing no unusual odour or taste before losing consciousness. They described, fatigue, light-headedness,
warmth and confusion, before collapsing and lying unconscious for up to 36 hours. Carbon dioxide that escaped
from the lake was responsible for the numerous health problems that were faced by the survivors. Of the 10,000
survivors evacuated from the disaster zone, consciousness was lost for hours by about 1,000 persons. Most of
the survivors, especially those who were evacuated from Nyos and Chah complained of persistent cough,
difficulty with breathing, and haemoptysis.

The most common physical abnormalities seen on examination were erythema and various skin
changes that looked like burns. In fact, a vast majority of the survivors suffered from blistering or ulceration of
the skin though only a few had underlying muscle necrosis. Summarising these health problems, Baxter et al.
(1989: 442) explain that the respiratory difficulties, skin burns and other health problems were caused by
exposure to carbon dioxide that was forced from the bottom of the lake. To these health problems associated
with carbon dioxide should be added the collapse of the healthcare system in the area owing to the disaster.
These two situations created a humanitarian health crisis that necessitated the intervention of various actors.

III. Intervening Actors

An understanding of the operation mechanism that was put in place for the take-off of medical relief
response following the occurrence of the Lake Nyos Disaster is relevant to this study. It is capable of informing
the manner in which this immediate response unfolded along with its bearing on the survivors. Once a disaster
occurs, as already observed, the initial response involves the provision of emergency healthcare needs to the
affected population. As officials in Cameroon became aware of the dimensions of the disaster, especially the
health concerns it generated, preparations for swift and effective intervention were kick-started. Following an
emergency meeting at the presidency on 22 August and after a brief visit to the disaster site, the Cameroon
Government pleaded for international assistance with which to cope with the calamity (Lang, 2012: 7). This was
followed by the putting in place of a National Disaster Committee headed by Jean Marcel Mengueme. The
committee was commissioned to set up immediate priorities and to receive and manage emergency supplies for
such short-term tasks. Top on the agenda of the committee was how to identify and respond to the medical
emergencies of the survivors. It is important to mention that similar committees were created at the provincial
and divisional levels. In Menchum Division which was host to the disaster zone and where the short-term relief
response was needed, the Lake Nyos Divisional Committee (LNDC) was constituted. This type of preparation
accords credibility to Bang‟s observation that the administrative framework for managing disasters in Cameroon
constitutes an integral part of government administrative machinery (Bang, 2013).

As a matter of fact, disaster management in Cameroon is the duty of several agencies (government
ministries, national organs and local councils) in collaboration with humanitarian organizations and international
partners. At the time of the disaster, the emergency intervention plan which was initiated by government grew

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Medical Care in the Management of the Lake Nyos Gas Disaster of 1986

out of this administrative framework. Power was disseminated from the central administration (at the level of
the presidency and Ministry of Territorial Administration) through the provinces and Menchum Division where
the relief response was taking place. This explains why crisis committees were set up at the national, provincial
and divisional levels to manage the disaster (Lang, 2012: 7). Through this framework, we can now understand
the various actors that were involved in the immediate healthcare relief operations. They included the Ministry
of Territorial Administration through its national, provincial and divisional authorities, especially the Governor
of the North West Province and the Senior Divisional Officer for Menchum Division. Suffice it to mention that
other ministries were also associated in the relief response. The Christian churches in the area and the Wum
Rural Council also actively participated in the operations. This highly centralized framework with power and
resources largely emanating from the top, I argue, had huge injurious implications on the short-term emergency
relief response. This will become evident in the sections of the paper dealing with the provision of immediate
healthcare needs to survivors.

IV. Provision of Immediate Healthcare Needs

The gas that escaped from Lake Nyos affected the health of the survivors in multiple ways. Most of the
survivors sustained burns from the carbon dioxide along with the respiratory problems they faced. This created
the need of medical treatment of some of the displaced people. It was for this reason that most of the refugees
were evacuated to the government hospitals in Wum and Nkambe for examination and treatment. Others went to
mission hospitals such as Mbingo Baptist Hospital and the Catholic hospitals in Njinikom and Shishong. It was
the task of the government to respond to the emergency health needs of the survivors in these hospitals. But this
immediate medical relief response could not effectively take off probably because authorities were distracted by
the impending arrival of Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres (Simolowe, 1986: 8). Good enough, Peres‟ visit
aided the swift medical relief response. Just three hours before Peres was to make his flight from Tel Aviv to
Yaounde, the first reports of the gas disaster began to circulate outside Cameroon. Consequently, half a ton of
emergency medical supplies was promptly loaded onto the Prime Minister‟s Israeli air force along with a 17-
member army medical team headed by Colonel Michael Wierner.

A few days later, a full international relief effort was underway. The United States of America provided a
$250,000 US aid package, which included among other things medical supplies. Tons of medical supplies also
came from Britain, France, Canada, West Germany and Spain. This international medical relief aid along with
what was generated at home had to be managed by the National Disaster Committee. The medics dispatched by
Israel set up a medical unit at Nkambe which was attached to the Nkambe General Hospital (Dibussi, 2006).
The presence of these medics caused many survivors who had health problems to be evacuated to Nkambe for
proper medical attention. In all, 234 survivors were handled by the Israeli medical team in collaboration with the
Cameroonian doctors that were deployed to the area. As the evacuation was on-going, the Cameroon Army
provided medical aid during the first week at Chah and Su-Bum.

Some survivors were transported to Wum and Nkambe hospitals following proximity. Most survivors
from Cha and Nyos villages were evacuated to Wum and those from Subum to Nkambe. Some had earlier been
taken from Bafmeng to Njinikom hospital.

The majority of survivors that were transported to Wum and Nkambe hospitals were unconscious and
many others had skin lesions1. The medical team from Israel was of great help to doctors and patients in
Nkambe. It should be noted that nurses from surrounding villages were called up to reinforced the team in the
hospital for over two weeks

Dr Ngufor and Dr Pisoh shared the opinion that in this area cough and scabies were prevalent. They
envisaged diarrhoea and bronchiolitis as illnesses which in future will attack the survivors because of the carbon
dioxides inhaled. They also agreed that the local medical team could handle the situation effectively and what
they needed most were drugs. There was also a similar problem in Wum as webs, plasters, and antibiotics were
not enough. Doctors were therefore obliged to use personal money to buy drugs. For example Dr Pisoh of Wum 2
hospital is estimated to have spent more than 142 000CFA of his personal money to buy drugs.

In the Wum General Hospital, the team of medical doctors worked tirelessly to improve the health of the
survivors. But the medical relief workers could not do much during the first days after the disaster given that

1
Burns as a results of the heat produced by the Poisonous gas.
2
Cameroon Tribune No 3660, Tuesday 2 September 1986.2.
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Medical Care in the Management of the Lake Nyos Gas Disaster of 1986

government hospitals were selling their drugs from the pro-pharmacies.3 As a result, most of the affected people
could not receive immediate treatment at the Wum Hospital because they lacked the required money. Besides,
the work of the medics was bedevilled by overcrowding and insufficient medical supplies in spite the assistance
from international partners including the United Nations International Children Emergency Fund (UNICEF)
which had donated medical supplies desperately needed by children orphaned by the disaster. The overcrowded
hospital in Wum, as reported by its Director Dr. Pisoh, remained in dire need of antibiotics, cotton swabs,
plaster to cover burned skin and milk for the scores of children whose parents died in the cataclysmic event
(Simolowe, 1986: 10).

This lack of medical supplies negatively affected the emergency health relief operation probably causing
the demise of some survivors in the hospitals. The desperate shortage of supplies may be attributed to the poor
management of the medical aid allotted by international partners. In its September 1986 edition, the News Week
reported how the Cameroon Army, with only a few transport planes, had a hard time handling the influx of
supplies. This poor management of the disaster was further attested by a Western diplomat in Yaounde in his
observation that the Cameroon Government had never faced a disaster of that capacity before (Cooper, 1986:
18). It is therefore a probability that some of the medical supplies got to the concerned hospitals late or were
diverted by self-serving officials and relief workers who were involved in the management of the disaster.
Reacting to the dilemmas of the survivors in the hospitals, Dr. Lyn Coene of the World Health Organisation
noted that “We heard that everything was here, that everything was completely organized, but in fact there is
nearly nothing.” 4 Another abnormality worth exposing is the fact that the Lake Nyos Disaster Committee
refused to take responsibility for illnesses that were not directly related to the disaster (Lang, 2012: 14). This
resulted in more hardship on the destitute survivors. On the overall, the medical relief operation in the
government hospitals was chequered.

V. Provision of Long-Term Medical Services

The provision of long-term medical care to survivors of the Lake Nyos Disaster was built into the
resettlement scheme that was initiated by the Cameroon Government. The prime objective of the programme
was to construct permanent resettlement sites and assist the survivors to re-establish normal lifestyles. This
emanated from the fact that many of the survivors had become wanderers in neighbouring villages and therefore
needed to be resettled permanently (Lang, 2012). In selecting and constructing resettlement sites, attention was
given to the long-term medical needs of survivors. This dictated the location of the sites as it was ensured that
these people be resettled in areas where they could easily access medical services. the construction of permanent
sites for the survivors commenced immediately after the International Conference on the Lake Nyos gas disaster
that was held in Yaounde from 18 to 20 March 1987. The conference participants made it abundantly clear that
the gas-affected site could not be inhabited in the short term. 5 Expert contractors from the ministries of
Fisheries, Animal Husbandry and Agriculture were selected to study sites for the permanent resettlement of
survivors. The initial construction funds for these sites were derived from the National Committee for the
Reception and Management of Relief Aid for the Lake Nyos Disaster victims. The first sites to be constructed
included Ipalim, Yemgeh, Kumfutu, Esu, Waidu, Kimbi and Bwabwa. 6

In addition to houses, other socio-economic infrastructural facilities were made available to victims in
the permanent resettlement villages. Some of the facilities were: Educational infrastructure, health infrastructure
and agricultural infrastructure. Schools were constructed in IPalim, Upkwa, Kumfutu, Bwabwa, Kimbi,
Kumfutu and Yemgeh just to name a few. Also, in some areas where s urvivors lived out of the resettlement
villages, schools were provided for them for example, in Ise, Imo and Funkuka 7. At the Yemngeh resettlement
site that was expected to receive close to 1,000 survivors, a health centre was constructed and equipped. It was
manned by a medical team employed by the Cameroon Government. Similar health units were constructed in
the eight other resettlement camps. These medical facilities have since the early 1990s been offering healthcare
services to the survivors of the Lake Nyos Disaster.

3
SAMSAB, Report by Father Frederick Ten Horn on the Nyos Disaster, 8 October 1986.
4
Ibid.
5
George W. Kling, Conclusions from Lake Nyos disaster(https://www.researchgate.net/publication/277474406
Conclusions from Lake Nyos disaster),201, Cameroon, 1987.
6
Marcel Ngwangwa, Management of the Lake Nyos, 49.
7
Interview with Samuel Geh aged50 victims, Wum, 23 January 2020.
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Medical Care in the Management of the Lake Nyos Gas Disaster of 1986

VI. Challenges of Medical Response Operations

The immediate relief response to medical problems generated by the Nyos disaster, as in most complex
emergencies, was challenging in many respects, with huge operational and programmatic problems growing out
of virtually negligible infrastructure, misuse of relief aid, the centralized and bureaucratic administrative system
and other unethical practices. Indeed, an examination of reports along with the review of minutes of meetings
and interviews with survivors themselves and general observations reveal a number of daunting challenges
which stalled the medical relief operations, especially the provision of emergency healthcare to survivors in
makeshift camps. The lack of critical infrastructure was one of the things that constrained emergency relief
operations after the occurrence of the Nyos disaster. At the time of the disaster, the state of the road linking
Nyos and Wum was deplorable. The road was passable only in a four-wheel drive vehicle. The road had been
neglected for so many years by the government. This poor state of the road network into and out of the disaster
area, as confirmed at that time by Nancy Cooper a reporter deployed by the News Week newspaper to cover the
disaster rendered relief efforts extremely difficult. She observed that heavy rain turned the unpaved tracks
around Lake Nyos into a soggy mess, slowing the arrival of medical relief workers to the area (Cooper, 1986:
19). Another foreign journalist dispatched by the Time newspaper, Jill Smolowe, reported that “the primitive
dirt tracks, which provide the only access to the hamlets for some 40 miles around, were muddled by pelting
rains.” (Simolowe, 1986: 10). Apart from stalling the swift arrival of relief workers, the poor state of the road
also slowed the evacuation of survivors to hospitals in Wum and Nkambe.

Besides, there was no telephone, radio or television network in the area to quickly communicate the
cataclysmic incident. Consequently, news of the disaster reached Wum about 24 hours after its occurrence
because those who first got the news had to trek for 45km from Nyos to Wum. This certainly delayed the
launching of emergency medical relief operations. To put it another way, the recue and evacuation of survivors
from the disaster zone were seriously constrained by the complete absence of communication network along
with the bad state of the road into the area. This placed the lives of many survivors at risk due to delays and
difficulties in evacuating the sick ones to hospitals. During field interviews, some of the survivors noted that
they had to trek to hospitals and relief camps in the absence of rescue and relief responders. 8 Worse still, the
road conditions made it difficult for medical supplies to be transported to the various camps. Hence, the grief of
the destitute population was aggravated by the lack of critical infrastructure.

Medical relief operations were also marred by the misuse of medical aid by some responders who were
able to exploit the assistance for their own benefit. There was persistent diversion and looting of relief aid
throughout the period of the emergency operations which lasted for three years. Indeed the embezzlement of
funds and resources destined for the survivors, as Bang notes, was a common phenomenon. He estimates that
over 50% of the entire aid destined to survivors was embezzled by government officials at the national,
provincial and divisional levels (Bang, 2013: 9). Such abuses of relief aid inevitably fuel the claims of those
who argue that corruption was a hallmark of the management of the disaster. Mbuh writes about corrupt
practices during the management of the Nyos disaster in these words:

They steal even blankets and milk destined for displaced people. The case of the bus
diverted to Colombe Football Club of Sangmelima is very glaring…. Many reports of how
fraud and theft took place were never investigated (Mbuh, 2005: 194).

Further credibility was added to these allegations by a 30 August 2005 report in the Cameroon Post which
stressed among other things that “the management of resources…was characterized by corruption and sheer
dishonesty as emergency needs destined for Nyos were being hawked in the streets of Yaounde.” Bang and Few
attribute this heightened fraud and theft during the relief operation phase of the Nyos disaster to the
administrative bottlenecks that was a hallmark of decision-making on the procurement and allocation of
emergency needs to the survivors (Bang & Few, 2012).

When the relief operations were ongoing, there was much talk about the misuse of aid as the national,
provincial and divisional committees were allegedly accused of diverting emergency supplies meant for the
survivors. In one of his reports, Father Ten Horn observed that these allegations resulted in the fear among
administrative officials of being accused of corruption and mismanagement of aid. This was common at the
level of the divisional committee in Menchum where much was done to give the perhaps false impression that
aid was administered scrupulously. In spite of this, allegations on the misuse of aid persisted, forcing the
administrative officials of the North West Province to use the good name and the trust enjoyed by the Christian
leaders in Wum, especially Father Ten Horn, to refute these allegations of corruption and mismanagement in the

8
Interview Ntang Jonas, 76 years, Nyos Disaster Survivor, Buabua Resettlement Camp, 14 October 2014.
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Medical Care in the Management of the Lake Nyos Gas Disaster of 1986

official media by co-opting them in a round-table conference with the Governor and Senior Divisional Officers
of the province, which was broadcast on the national radio. 9 But the overall observation may be that the lack of
clear accountability and lack of clarity regarding who was responsible for the aid at the national, provincial,
divisional and relief camp levels resulted in aid diversion and looting. Besides, there was little or no
accountability to the affected populations in the camps. In fact, there was lack of communication, consistent
messaging and feedback to the survivors about relief situations. Hence, some of the groups that were involved in
emergency relief actions during the Nyos disaster failed to conform to the ethics of working with a traumatized
people. In the course of their work, some of the relief workers used the disaster as an opportunity to cart away
relief aid. It is even alleged that many people who were in no way affected by the disaster colluded with relief
workers to register and obtain relief aid. No wonder the survivors I interviewed labeled such relief workers and
fraudulent administrative officials as „wolves in sheep‟s clothing‟. 10

The centralized and bureaucratic administrative system which characterized the emergency relief phase
of the Nyos disaster adversely affected the pace at which relief workers responded to the medical needs of the
affected populations. As a matter of fact, this complicated administrative process caused confusion and the
duplication of functions, stalling rescue and relief operations. It was indeed difficult for financial and material
resources required for immediate response to reach the survivors due to administrative bottlenecks in the system
from the National Committee through the Provincial Committee to the Divisional Committee. It emerged from
reports and minutes of meetings that there was a too high-handed approach from Yaounde, which took little
notice of local advice and expertise. Consequently, the National Commission which was headed by Jean Marcel
Mengueme quite often took decisions that did not reflect the realities on the ground. In addition, expedient
solutions to problems such as medical supply shortages that were raised by the coordinators of camps could not
be easily provided. On many occasions, coordinators of camps received assurances from the committee with
regard to matters they brought to its attention, but it always took weeks or months before action was taken, if at
all. This explains why the Catholic Church maintained a critical stand towards the efforts that were made by the
National Committee.11

The authorities of the church who were co-opted in the management of the disaster declared that there
was general lack of efficiency and coordination. They attributed this to the divisional commission‟s lack of
influence on decisions taken at the provincial and national levels despite its familiarity with local conditions.
This represents a weakness of the highly centralized disaster management system that was put in place shortly
after the occurrence of the Nyos disaster. There was an alleged minimal cooperation between the SDO of
Menchum, Fai Yengo Francis and the Governor of the North West Region who headed the divisional and
provincial disaster committees respectively. This amounted to misunderstandings, aid delivery delays, and the
injurious duplication of functions. 12 What generally emerges from the foregoing challenges is the obvious
conclusion that it was extremely difficult for the responders to effectively achieve relief objectives in the context
of such dilemmas. Indeed, the coming into play of this plethora of challenges caused rescue and relief operations
to be so inherently flawed that it failed to result in some of the benefits that were intended.

VII. Conclusion
This paper has examined the centrality of medical care in the management of the healthcare crisis that
was generated by the Lake Nyos Disaster. The disaster caused serious emergency and long-term medical
problems that were described by medical experts and disaster responders as a humanitarian crisis. This came
with the need to provide immediate and long-term medical care to the over 10,000 survivors that were evacuated
from the disaster zone. With humanitarian medical aid obtained from national and international humanitarian
agencies, as shown in the study, emergency medical care was provided to survivors in hospitals and makeshift
camps. The long-term medical needs of the survivors constituted part of the resettlement scheme that was
launched by the Cameroon Government. This explains why medical facilities were constructed in all the sites
were survivors were resettled. The paper submits that medical care was at the centre of the management of the
Lake Nyos Disaster, which in many ways ameliorated the welfare of survivors in immediate and long-term basis
despite the numerous difficulties that were encountered.

9
SAMSAB, Report by Father Frederick Ten Horn on the Lake Nyos Disaster from August 1986 to August
1987.
10
Interview with Ntang Jonas; Interview with Aneng Marcel, 68 Years, Kumfutu Resettlement Camp, 12
October 2014.
11
SAMSAB, Report by Father Frederick Ten Horn on the Lake Nyos Disaster from August 1986 to August
1987.
12
Ibid.
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Medical Care in the Management of the Lake Nyos Gas Disaster of 1986

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