The Greek Philosophical Vocabulary

The Greek
Philosophical
Vocabulary
J.O. Urmson

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“(\ulutfifi " ‘

W t- s
Duckworth
 Second impression 2001
First published in 1990 by
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© 1990 by J.O. Urmson

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ISBN 0 7156 2335 4

Printed in Great Britain by

Antony Rowe Ltd, Eastbourne
 IntrOduction

This book is designed to be an aid to students of ancient Greek

philosophy who have some, but not necessarily a profound,
knowledge of the Greek language. It contains five or six hundred
paragraphs, each aiming at providing useful information about
some word used by Greek philosophers. Each paragraph starts with
a Greek word, transliterated, in English alphabetical order.
Information about each word is given, so far as possible, in
quotations from the philosophers, all with a translation added. The
translations are all the author’s own; they are intended to be
helpful rather than literal, and sometimes contain extra,
explanatory, matter. These quotations are not merely illustrative;
they frequently contain the philosophers’ own statements about the
meaning and use of the word in question. The statements of Plato
or Aristotle, or, indeed, of any philosopher, about the meaning of
the words he uses are more valuable than those of others, even
though they do not always adhere to their own definitions. The
paragraphs are not designed to replace the lexicon, nor to discuss
adequately any philosophical theory, but merely to give such basic
philological and philosophical information as seems likely to be
most useful to most readers. _
Quotations range from the fifth century BC to the sixth century
AD. When one considers how much the English language has
changed in a period of similar length, one cannot but be impressed
by the homogeneity of philosophical Greek over that period. More
and more terms acquired technical uses, more and more abstract
nouns were coined, minor grammatical changes came about; but
such late writers as Syrianus and Simplicius knew the works of
Plato and Aristotle intimately, and Plato and Aristotle would have
read their works with some surprise, but no difficulty. It is often
said that the great changes in English and English spelling are to
be explained through conquest, the absence of printed books and

5
 Introduction

the like; but such factors seem to have had little effect on the Greek of
scholars.
One must, of course, be cautious about using a quotation from a
writer of one period as evidence for its meaning in the writings of a
philosopher of another period. But one should be Similarly wary
about such inferences from one philosopher to a contemporary, or
even from one passage to another by the same philosopher. The
usage of philosophers of all periods has often departed from their
own definitions and explanations. But the veneration of the neopla-
tonic writers for Plato and their respect for Aristotle led them to
adhere more closely to the usage of the fourth century BC than did
many philosophers at intervening times. So, for example, a state-
ment by Simplicius about the meaning ofa word in Aristotle is, while
not definitive, very likely to be correct. So, while quotations will
sometimes illustrate variation in use, mere difference in date is not
of overriding importance.

Conventions of transliteration
Most of the transliteration requires no explanation. But the
following points should be noted:

omega and eta have a circumflex accent, thus: 6, é

an i following a or é represents iota subscript
terminal alpha with iota subscript is written a'i
gamma is always transliterated as g; thus aggelos, not angelos
chi is transliterated as kh; words beginning with chi are under ‘k’

All words occur in the English alphabetical order. Thus words

beginning with a zeta come at the end of the book, and words
beginning with theta appear under ‘t’. This, like all transliteration,
is annoying, but seems the best policy. Without transliteration
most readers would not have been able to afford this book.

Abbreviations
The use of abbreviations has been kept to a minimum. Names of all
authors except Plato and Aristotle are written in full, as are names of
works rarely quoted in this book. Aristotle is written Ar., Plato P1.
 Introduction

Aristotle’s works
An. Po. - Analytica posteriora Posterior Analytics
An. Pr. Analytica priora Prior Analytics
Cat. Categoriae Categories
Col. De Coloribus On Colours
De An. De Anima 0n the Soul
De Gen. De Generatione et ' 0n coming to be and
et Cor. Corruptione passing away
De Int. De Interpretatione On Interpretation
De Juv. De Juventute 0n Youth
De Mem. De Memoria 0n Memory
E.E. Ethica Eudemia Eudemian Ethics
E.N. Ethica Nicomachea Nicomachean Ethics
Gen. An. De Generatione Animalium 0n Generation of
Animals
H.A. Historia Animalium _ Enquiry about
Animals
Met. Metaphysica Metaphysics
Part. An. De Partibus Animalium 0n the Parts of
Animals
Phys. Physica ' Physics
Pol. Politica Politics
Rhet. Rhetorica Rhetoric
S_.E. De Sophisticis Elenchis 0n Sophistical
Refutations
Top. Topica Topics
Other titles are given in full.

Plato’s works

Alcib. Alcibiades Alcibiades

Apol. Apologia Apology
Charm. Charmides Charmides
Clit. Clitophon Clitophon
Crat. Cratylus Cratylus
Def. Definitiones Definitions
Epistolae Letters
Euthyd. Euthydemus Euthydemus
Gorg. Gorgias Gorgias
Hip. Min. Hippias Minor Hippias Minor
 Introduction
Parm. Parmenides Parmenides
Phil. Philebus Philebus
Pol. Politicus The Statesman
Rep. Respublica (Politeia) Republic
Soph. Sophistes The Sophist
Theaet. , Theaetetus Theaetetus
Tim. Timaeus Timaeus
Other titles are given in full.

In general, the titles of works by other authors are either given in

full or are otherwise self-explanatory. Where an inexperienced
reader finds that this is not so, he could look up the author in the
list of authors and works at the beginning of the Greek lexicon of
Liddell and Scott as revised by H. Stuart Jones, which is referred to
in this book by the initials LSJ, as is usual. There he will find, for
example, that the work here called the Physics of Simplicius is
officially In Aristotelis Physica Commentaria ed. Diels, in volumes 9
and 10 of the Berlin edition of the Commentaria in Aristotelem
Graeca. Quotations from Proclus In Platonis Rem Publicam are
from Kroll’s Teubner edition. Quotations from his Elements of
Theology give the theorem number in Dodds’s edition, not page and
line as in Dodds’s index. Quotations from Plotinus are, inevitably,
from the Enneads. The initials OCT abbreviate Oxford Classical
texts; SVF abbreviate Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta, a collection
of Stoic texts edited by H. von Arnim.
When a further discussion of another word occurring in a
quotation may be helpful for the understanding of the principal
word, that word has been printed in bold. But the fact that a word is
not printed in bold does not mean that it has not its own individual
paragraph, but only that its meaning is not closely germane to the
matter under discussion.
 A
adiaphoros has two distinct applications. (1) To things that are
indistinguishable from each other, particularly members of the
same species: t’auton gar panton ton adiaphoron eidei genos — all
things indistinguishable in species are of the same genus (Ar. Top.
121b 17); adiaphoron d’hén adiaireton to eidos kata tén aisthésin —
things are indistinguishable whose species cannot be differentiated
by perception (Ar. Met. 1016a 18); see also Ar. Top. 121b 15. (2) Esp.
in neuter plural, to things that are indifferent as neither good nor
bad. This latter use is mainly Stoic: adiaphora d’einai legousi ta
metaxu tan agathén kai kakén — they [the Stoics] say that things
between good and bad are indifferent (Stobaeus 2.79.1 W); see also
Epictetus, Encheiridion 32. The Stoics also made a distinction
within these adiaphora: dikhos de legesthai adiaphora- hapax men
ta méte pros eudaimonian méte pros kakodaimonian sunergounta,
hos ekhei ploutos, doxa, hugieia, iskhus kai ta homoia. allés de
legesthai adiaphora ta méte hormés méte aphormés kinétika, has
ekhei to artias ekhein epi tés kephalés trikhas é perittas — things are
called indifferent in two ways; first those things that do not
contribute either to the good life or to wretchedness, as is the case
with wealth, reputation, health, strength and the like. In another
way things are called indifferent if they do not move to choice or
rejection, as is the case with having an even or odd number of hairs
on one’s head (Diogenes Laertius of the Stoics, Lives 7.104). But
also a distinction made by Epicureans, hugieian tisi men agathon,
tisi de adiaphoron — to some health is good, to some indifferent
(Vita Epicuri 120b). Not used by Plato in either sense.

adiastatos, adiastatés has two distinct applications. (1) Conti-

nuous, without distinction or interval: hola di’holén phoitonta
adiastatos — wholes interpenetrating without spatial interval
(Proclus, Elements of Theology 176); cf. Plotinus, Enneads 3.7.2 and
Damascius, De principiis 105, 370. More commonly (2) not
extended: enulés te to aiilon apotupoutai kai diastatés to

9
 adikein — agathos
adiastaton — [nature] copies the immaterial materially and extend-
edly the unextended (Proclus, Republic 177.18); eidé adiastata te kai
amerista - forms that are unextended and indivisible (Simplicius,
Physics 231.30). The contrary is diastatos. Not in Plato.

adikein, adikia, adikos: in a narrower sense, unjust, unfair: ho

t’adikos anisos kai to adikon anison — the unjust man is unfair and
injustice is unfairness (Ar. E.N. 1131a 10); in a wider sense,
unrighteous, contrary to accepted practice (nomos): ho paranomos
adikos — the lawbreaker is unrighteous (Ar. E.N. 1129b 11). The
contrary of adikos is dikaios, of adikein, dikaiopragein. Plato
appears notably to confuse these two senses in Republic 1. According
to Aristotle, one may adikein — behave in a way that is objectively
unfair to someone — without having the specific badness of character
that is adikia: estin adikounta mépo adikon einai — one may act
unjustly Without being an unjust person (Ar. E.N. 1134a 16). For
fuller discussion see dikaios.

aei: constantly used to mean ‘everlasting’, ‘for ever’, in distinction

from the timelessly eternal (aiénion): pros ton aei khronon —
throughout all time (Pl. Critias 112d). But it also means constantly,
over and over, on each occasion: ho to pleon ekhén aei — he who has
too much on each occasion (Ar. E.N. 1136b 26); hai hémas aei ek ton
kindunén sézousin — that over and over save us from dangers (Pl.
Gorg. 511b). aiei is a common alternative spelling.

aér: conventionally, air, but applied to any vapour, especially mist.

Anaximenes is said to have called it the basic material of the world;
in Empedocles, Aristotelian physics and most later Greek and
scholastic philosophy it is one of the four elements (stoikheia) or
simple bodies (hapla somata) in the sublunar region, lighter than
and above earth and water, heavier than and below fire. Of the four
basic characteristics ofbody, the moist (hugron), the dry (xéron), the
hot (thermon) and the cold (psukhron), it is the essentially hot and
damp, ho aér thermon kai hugron (Ar. De Gen. et Cor. 330b 4). It was
recognised that air, like other simple bodies, was rarely in a pure
state but, as mist contains air and water, mixed with another
element and thus composite (suntheton), not simple (haplon).

Iagathos: good. The highest term of commendation whether of what

is to be praised (epainetos) or what is to be prized (timios). In

10
 agathos
general use it can refer to good birth, bravery or other qualities
according to context when applied to persons. What is agathos has
excellence (areté‘). Sometimes moral: dikaion onta kai andreion kai
hosion, agathon andra einai teleés — being just and brave and pious
to be a completely good man (Pl. Gorg. 507C). Often with regard to
high capacity or achievement in other areas: ton de agathon eu te
kai kalés prattein ha an pratté‘i — the good man does what he does
well and finely (Gorg. 507C); agathos in argument (Pl. Hip. Min.
367C); agathos runner (Pl. Hip. Min. 373d); to make a man an
agathos citizen is to make him ‘most capable of acting and speaking
on the affairs of the city’ (Pl. Prot. 319a). This use can conflict with
use to indicate moral excellence. Thus at Gorg. 470e the agathos is
opposed to the unrighteous (adikos), but at Rep. 348d Thrasy-
machus says that the adikos is agathos, cynically rather than as an
abuse of language. In neuter singular to agathon is the ultimate
goal of man, as in E.N.,, Book 1, Ch. 2. In Rep. Books 6 and 7 auto to
agathon — the good itself — is the highest principle and the source of
being and understanding: touto toinun to tén aléteian parekhon
tois gignéskomenois kai téi gignéskonti tén dunamin apodon tén tou
agathou idean phathi einai — count that which provides its truth to
what is known and gives the faculty of knowing to the knower as
the form of the good (Pl. Rep. 508e). Aristotle famously denied the
Platonic form of the good and claimed in E.N., Book 1, Ch. 6 that
agathos was ambiguous; but his clearest account of the alleged
ambiguity is skopein de kai ta gené ton kata t’ounoma kate‘gorién, ei
t’auta estin epi pantén- ei gar mé t’auta, délon hoti homénumon to
legomenon, hoion to agathon en edesmati men to poiétikon hédonés,
en iatrikéi de to poiétikon hugieias, epi de téi psukhéi to poian einai,
hoion séphrona é andreion é dikaion- homoios de kai epi anthrépou.
eniakhou de to pote, hoion to en kairoi agathon- agathon gar legetai
to en téi kairoi. pollakis de to poson, hoion epi tou metriou- legetai
gar kai to metrion agathon. haste homénumon to agathon — but one
must inspect the types of category in which the word occurs, to see
if they are the same throughout. If they are not the same it is clear
that there is ambiguity. For example, the good is in eating that
which produces pleasure and in medicine that which produces
health; of the soul it is a quality, such as being temperate or brave
or just, and similarly of a person. Sometimes it is a time, as that
which is opportune is good, and often a quantity, as of the
moderate; for the moderate is also said to be good. So that ‘good’ is
ambiguous (Ar. Top. 107a 2). In neoplatonic theology the agathon is

11
 agnoein — aidos
equated with to hen, the supreme deity: to agathon toi heni t’auton
— the good is identical with the One (Proclus, Elements of‘Theology
13). For the distinction of agatha into things praised (epaineta) and
things prized (timia) see e.g. Ar. E.N., Book 1, Ch. 12. The usual
abstract noun for goodness is areté; the etymolOgically related
agathotés is late: hé‘ tou pro pantén henos agathotés — the goodness
of the One before all things (Syrianus, Metaphysics 59.13).

agnoein: to be ignorant; agnoia, ignorance. As in English, agnoia

can be simple unawareness, as the common man is unaware of the
world of forms in Plato, or as Aeschylus was ignorant that it was
forbidden to speak of the mysteries (Ar. E.N. 1111a 10); or it can be
mistaken opinion, as when the bad man is ignorant of how to
behave (Ar. E.N. 1110b 31). It is unclear in which, if either, of these
senses Plato says mé onti mén agnoian ex anagkés apodidomen —
we necessarily assign ignorance to that which is not (Pl. Rep. 478c).

agroikos: literally, one who lives in the country. Usually treated as

one who is boorish and uncouth as in the 4th of Theophrastus’
Characters; but in E.N. at 1104a .23 Aristotle takes the agroikos to
be typical of those who are insensible (anaisthétos) with regard to
bodily pleasures and thus lack temperance (sophrosuné).

a't'dios: in common use and generally in philosophy, everlasting,

temporally without beginning and end, as opposed both to what has
a beginning and end and to the atemporally eternal, which is called
aié‘nios. Thus ton mentoi arkhén ouk estin heteron aition atdic‘m
ousén — there is no further cause of first principles, which are
everlasting (Ar. Phys. 252b 4); the heavens (ouranos) are heis kai
at’dios — one and everlasting (Ar. De Caelo 283b 28); ouk ara
endekhetai sunekhé kinésin einai epi tés eutheias a’t'dion — there
cannot be an everlasting continuous motion in a Straight line (Ar.
Phys. 263a 3). But Plato Tim. 37d-e appears to use aidion as a
Synonym of aionion, contrasting the eternal reality (a'z'dion ousian)
with the temporal. Proclus, Elements of Theology 55, says that the
aionion and the temporal (kata khronon) are two kinds of the
a'z'dion. The noun is at‘dioté‘s (Ar. De Caelo 284a 1).

aidés: shame, bashfulness. Aristotle says it is not a disposition

(hexis) but an emotion (pathos) with physical manifestations (Ar.
E.N. 1128b 10). He says that it is not an excellence (areté) and

12
 aion — aisthésis
befits only the young. Plato also says that it is not always a good
thing: estin ara, hos eoiken, aides oak agathon kai agathon — so, as it
seems, shame is both not good and good (Pl. Charm. 160e if).

aién: generally, a life-span, or a long time: empeiria men gar poiei

ton aiona he‘mon poreuesthai kata tekhnén — experience makes our
life proceed in accordance with skill (Pl. Gorg. 448C); the heavens
have no end tou pantos aionos — through all time (Ar. De Caelo 283b
28). But in Plato’s metaphysics and in neoplatonism the aion is
timeless eternity: khronou tauta aiona mimoumenou — time imi-
tating eternity in these respects (Pl. Tim. 38a); panton ton aiénién
proilparkhai ho aién, kai panton ton kata khronon ho khronos
proilpheste‘ken — eternity precedes everything eternal and time
preceded everything temporal (Proclus,.Elements of Theology 53).

aionios: colloquially applied to anything lasting a long time. Thus

Plato writes methén aiénion — an everlasting drinking-party (Pl.
Rep. 363d). But it is strictly applied to the timelessly eternal. Thus
body and soul are indestructible (anolethra) but not aionia (P1. Laws
904a). pan to aiénion holon hama esti — everything eternal is a
simultaneous whole (Proclus, Elements of Theology 50). See aidios,
azon.

aiskhros: applied without any apparent thought of ambiguity both

to physical ugliness and to the morally base and shameful. Thus we
pity the ugly (aiskhrous), the small and the weak (P1. Prot. 323d).
But, also, the life of the male prostitute (P1. Gorg. 494e), flattery (Pl.
Gorg. 503a) and theft (P1. Gorg. 515e) are aiskhra, and it would have
been aiskhron for Achilles not to have avenged Patroclus’ death (Pl.
Apol. 28c). All deeds that are aiskhra are kaka, but it is not clear
whether all moral faults are aiskhra, or only, perhaps pre-
eminently, those that are sordid, base and shameful and thus
aesthetically repugnant. Thus the adikon (the unjust) and the
anosion (the impious) are listed alongside the aiskhron at Prot. 325d,
not as cases of it, and uncontrolled temper is less aiskhron than lack
of control of bodily appetites (Ar. E.N. 1149a 24-5). aiskhros is the
contrary ofhalos. ‘

aisthanesthai. See aisthésis.

aisthésis: sensation, perception; aisthanesthai: to sense, to per-

13
 aitéma — aithér

ceive; to aisthé‘ton: the object of perception; to aisthétérion: the

sense-organ. to aisthanesthai legomen dikhés- to te gar dunamei
akouon kai horén akouein kai horan legomen, k’an tukhéi katheudon,
kai to édé energoun — we use ‘perceive’ in two ways; for we say that
what is capable of hearing and seeing hears and sees, even if it
happens to be asleep, as well as the actual perceiver (Ar. De An. 417a
10); katholou de peri pasés aisthe‘seés dei labein hoti men hé aisthésis
esti to dektikon ton aisthétén eidén aneu tés hulés — generally
concerning all perception it must be understood that perception is
the reception of forms without matter (Ar. De An. 424a 17). Also
more loosely of any awareness: aisthometha geloioi ontes — we
perceive we are being laughable (P1. Theages 122C). Not only
perception in a narrow sense, but also emotions: hai men oun
aisthéseis ta toiade hémin ekhousin onomata, opseis te kai akoai kai .
osphréseis kai psukheis te kai kauseis kai hédonai ge dé kai lupai kai
epithumiai kai phoboi keklémenai, aperantoi men hai anénumoi,
pamplétheis de hai 6nomasmenai — such aisthéseis as the following
have names, being called sights and sounds and smells and cold and
heat and distress and pleasures and fears; the nameless are count-
less, but very many have names (Pl. Theaet: 156b). Aristotle distin-
guishes koina aisthéta (common sensibles) that are perceptible by
more than one sense, such as shape and motion from idia aisthéta
(proper sensibles) that are perceptible to only one sense, such as
colour and smell: to men [aisthéton] idion estin hekastés aisthéseés, to
de koinon pason — one kind of percept is private to each sense, the
other is common to all (Ar. De An. 418a 11). aisthésis may also be a
form of perception, a sense: hekasté men oun aisthésis tou
hupokeimenou aisthétou estin — each sense is of the sense-object
falling under it (Ar. De An. 426b 6).

aité‘ma: an assumption or postulate in logic or mathematics. In

Aristotle it is something provable that is aSsumed and used without
proof: ho an tis apodeikton on lambanéi kai khrétai mé deixas (Ar.
An. Post. 76b 33). In~Euclid it is a poStulate that certain construc-
tions can be made, or an axiom (the axiom of parallels is called an
aitéma). Non-technically, a demand: to dé turannikon aitéma to
poluthruléton — the often mentioned demand of tyrants [for a
bodyguard] (P1. Rep. 566b).

aithér: non-technically, the heavens or the sky. Identified by Empe-

docles and Anaxagoras with the outermost fire: Anaxagoras de

14
 aitia — akhéristos

katakhrétai téi onomati toutéi ou kalés- onomazei gar aithera anti

puros — Anaxagoras misuses this word, not well: for he says ‘ether’
instead of ‘fire’ (Ar. De Caelo 270b 24). In Plato’s Epinomis 981C it is
the fifth element, in addition to earth, water, air and fire. In
Aristotelian and neoplatonic cosmology the other four elements are
to be found in the sublunar region and the aether in the spheres of
the planets and in the outermost sphere of the fixed stars. Etherial
bodies are ungenerated (agennéta), indestructible (aphtharta) and
in everlasting circular motion. There is a full discussion in Ar. De
Caelo, Book 1, Ch. 3. See also Simplicius, Physics 594.27 if.

aitia (not to be confused with plural of aition). (1) Responsibility in

the moral sphere: aitia helomenou, theos anaitios — the
responsibility is his who chooses, god is not responsible (Pl. Rep.
617e). (2) Cause or explanation: hosoi men can mian tina legousin
aitian kai stoikheion hen — those who hold that there is some single
cause [of everything] and a single element (Ar. De An. 405b 17); tou
megistou agathou aitia té polei hé koinénia —‘ community is the
cause of the greatest good to the city (Pl. Rep. 464b).

aition: appears to be synonymous with aitia in its second sense. It

is traditionally translated ‘cause’, but ‘explanation’ is often more
idiomatic. Thus Aristotle’s ‘four causes’ are best understand as four
types of explanation: there is the material cause — ex hou gignetai —
the hulé‘, the material of which the thing is made; the formal cause
— to eidos - that explains what sort of thing it is; the efficient cause
— he arkhé tés metabolés — that tells what or who brought the thing
about; and the final cause, the telos, the end for which the thing
exists. These four causes are systematically listed and explained in
Physics, Book 2, Ch. 3. In later literature hulikon aition, eidikon
aition, poiétikon aition and telikon aition are commonly used to
refer to the material, formal, efficient and final causes respectively:
poiétikon esti aition kai eidikon kai telikon — there is an efficient
and a formal and a final cause (Syrianus, Met. 2.6). The different
kinds of aition are discussed in Ar. Met., Book 4, Ch. 2. Used thus as
a substantive, aition is derived from the adjective aitios,
responsible.

akhéristos: unseparated, inseparable. Used only once by Plato: ou

gar akhérista ge duo enoei, all’hen — for if they were undivided he
would have thought of them not as two, but one (Pl. Rep. 524C). In

15
 akinétos — akolastos

Aristotle, inseparable: akhorista pephukota kathaper en téi

periphereia't to kurton kai to koilon — naturally inseparable like the
convex and concave of a circumference (Ar. E.N. 1102a 30). But in
ne0platonic thought used mainly of eidé — forms — and other
intelligible entities taken as not separated or inseparable from that
in which they are present: ei oun ti kat’ousian estin akhériston, kai
kat’energeian homés é kai eti mallon akhoriston — so anything
inseparable [from body] in existence is equally or even more
inseparable in its activity (Proclus, Elements of Theology 16); kai
gar tén mathématikén ousian mesén legousi téi men katholou to
khériston ekhon tés hulés, téi de diastato‘i kai diakekrimenéi to
akhériston — for they also say that mathematical existence is
intermediate, being separable from matter as universal but, as
extended and distinct, inseparable (Simplicius, Physics 1).

akinétos: unchanging, usually with reference to change of place

and thus immovable or motionless: akinéton megalon en peirasi
desmon — motionless in the limits of mighty bonds (Parmenides, fr.
8). But ‘motionless’ is often, at best, unidiomatic. Thus to proton
kinoun akinéton auto (Ar. Met. 1012b 31), usually translated ‘the
prime mover is itself unmoved’ is better translated as ‘the prime
source of change is itself unchanging’; ton ta akinéta kinounton —
those Who try to change the unchanging (Pl. Theaet. 1813); pan ara é
akinéton estin é autokinéton é heterokinéton — everything is either
unchanging, self-changing or changed by something else (Proclus,
Elements of Theology 14). See kinésis.

akolastos: in Aristotelian ethics the person who exhibits the fault

of excess in relation to the excellence of séphrosuné, which is
excellence in respect of the pleasures of the body that involve the
sense of touch (haphé) and taste (geusis), notably food, drink and
sex; excessive indulgence in pleasures of sound and sight is not
included. It is frequently translated ‘self—indulgent’; akolasia is
self-indulgence: peri tas toiautas d’hédonas hé akolasia estin h6n
kai ta loipa 26a koinonei hautai d’eisin haphé kai geusis —
self-indulgence is concerned with such pleasures as other animals
share in, and these are touch and taste (Ar. E.N. 1118a 23-5). In
Aristotle the akratés has to be distinguished from the willingly
self-indulgent, since he acts unwillingly dia pathos: dio ho
akolastos kheirén tou akratous — therefore the self-indulgent man
is worse than the weak-willed (Ar. EN. 11503 30). Plato and other

16
 akolouthein — akrasia

philosophers also treat akolasia as opposed to séphrosune‘:

séphrosuné men eggignétai, akolasia de apallattétai — temperance
will enter [the soul] and self-indulgence be ended (Pl. Gorg. 504e
6-7); but Plato does not define it so narrowly or distinguish it from
. akrasia, see Rep. 431a-b. Etymologically akolastos is derived from
the verb kolazein, to punish, with a privative prefix, and can thus
mean less technically simply ‘badly brought up’. See Ar. E.N., Book
3, Chs 10-11 for general discussion.

akolouthein: in general, to follow in all senses. In logic it is the

general term for logical consequence: duoin men gar ontén
akolouthei euthus to hen einai - if there are two it follows
immediately that there is one (Ar. Cat- 14a 31). But the noun
akolouthésis means ‘sequence’: proteron de dokei to toiouton einai
aph’hou mé antistrephei hé tou einai akolouthésis — that thing
seems to be prior which precedes in irreversible sequence (Ar. Cat.
14a 34-5)-

akousios: translated variously as involuntary, unwilling, unin-

tended, contrary to intention. None of these is wholly satisfactory in
every context, but in Aristotle’s ethics ‘contrary to intention’ is
usually best. It is the contrary of hekousios, which presents the
same problem: to de di’agnoian oukh hekousion men hapan estin,
akousion de to epilupon kai en metameleia‘z‘ — acts done through
ignorance are all unintentional, the contrary to intention is
distressing and regretted (Ar. E.N. 1110b 18-19). The person who
performs acts that are akousia does so akén (not intending) and
akousiés (unintentionally). See E.N., Book 3, Ch. 1 for general
discussion. For the sense of ‘unwilling’ in adverbial form:
homologe‘sen kai mal’akontés — he agreed very unwillingly
(reluctantly) (Pl. Prot. 333b). '

akrasia: in Aristotle and later writers, lack of self-control, the

condition of being akratés. The verb is akrateuesthai — to lack, or
exhibit the lack of, self-control. Sometimes translated ‘incon-
tinence’. In Plato, except in spurious Definitions, used more loosely
and always written akrateia, as in Rep. 461b: meta deinés
akrateias gegonés — born in terrible licentiousness. In Aristotle
akrasia is the condition of the man who has right principles but
whose appetite leads him to act contrarily to them, whereas the
egkratés controls his appetite. Both the egkratés and the akratés

17
 akros — alloiésis

are to be distinguished from the agathos and the kakos who act well
or ill without internal conflict, though Plato does not make this sharp
distinction. ho akratés epithumon men prattei, proairoumenos d’ou —
the uncontrolled man acts in accordance with his appetite, not with
his choice (Ar. E.N. 1111b 13-14). akrasia proper is lack of self-
control with regard to the bodily pleasures of touch and taste; if
self-control is lacking in other spheres the term must be qualified:
hétton aiskhra akrasia hé tou thumou — an uncontrolled temper is
less disgraceful (Ar. E.N. 1149a 24).

akros: in general, an extreme: epi ta akra tés thalattés aphigmenos —

having arrived at the edge of the sea (Pl. Phaedo 109d). In formal
logic the akra are the extreme terms ofthe syllogism that appear also
in the conclusion, each of which is predicated of, or has predicated of
it, a middle term in the premisses. The meizon akron -— the major
term — is that en héi to meson estin, the elatton that which is hupo to
meson — contained in the middle term (Ar. An. Pr. 26a 21-3). The
names for the terms apparently derive from the fact that in the
syllogism in the first figure — if A is predicated of all B, and B is
predicated of all C, necessarilyA is predicated of all C — the middle
term appears between the others in the two premisses and the
extension of the major term A is greater than that of the minor term
C. In geometry and mathematics the extremes of lines and the
extreme terms in proportions are also termed akra.

aléthés: true; alétheia: truth; aléthés: truly; alé‘theuein: to tell the

truth. In line with its derivation from lanthanein with privative
prefix, aléthés has a wider use than the conventional translation
‘true’ would allow. It can have a sense rather like ‘non-deceptive’ and
thus be applied topersons and things: aléthés tis — a candid, truthful
person (Ar. E.N. 1108a 20); the gnéston (knowable) exceeds the
doxaston (object of opinion) in alétheia, is less deceptive (P1. Rep.
510a). In Plato the non-deceptive can be simply the real, genuine:
diéirésthai ale‘theia‘z‘ te kai mé, hos to doxaston pros to gnoston, houto
to homoiéthen pros to héi hamoiothe‘ — that the copy is distinguished
from the original in reality or not as the opinable to the known (Pl.
Rep. 510a). But ouden allo pephuke alétheuein é pseudesthai plén
phaseés kai apophaseés — nothing can properly be true or false save
assertion and denial (Syrianus, Metaphysics 78.27).

alloiésis: etymologically, ‘becoming allos — different’. In Aristotle

18
 alogos — amethektos
, and most later writers it has the technical sense of change in the
category of quality only, as opposed to changes in other categories
and to coming and ceasing to be: hé alloiésis kiné‘sis kata to poion —
it is qualitative change (Ar. De Caelo 270a 27). Plato also calls
alloiésis a kinésis: hotan skléron ek malakou gignétai, é tina
allé‘n alloiésin alloiétai, ara ouk axion heteron eidos phanai
kine‘seés? — when something becomes hard instead of soft, or
undergoes some other alteration, is it not right to call this another
type of change [in addition to motion]? (Pl. Theaet. 181d). The verb
is alloiousthai — to change qualitatively; the thing thus changed is
alloiétos. '

alogos: applies etymologically to that which is without logos. It can

mean both irrational — contrary or opposed to reason, or merely
non-rational. Thus in general use animals other than man can be
called aloga as being (reputedly) incapable of reasoning: ou gar
koinon hé proairesis kai t6n alogon, epithumia de kai thumos —
animals do not share in rational choice, but do in appetite and
anger (Ar. E.N. 1111b 12). In the sense of ‘non-rational’, applied
also to parts of the soul (Ar. E.N. 1117b 24) and to the aloga pathé of
men (Ar. E.N. 1111b 1). Frequently as ‘irrational’ with regard to
arguments and opinions: deinon kai alogon — a strange and
irrational [statement] (Pl. Theaet. 203d). Adverb alogés -
irrationally, ou dé alogos — not without reason (Pl. Rep. 439d). The
modern mathematical term ‘irrational’ derives from the application
of alogon to incommensurables: hé de geometria ti to alogon —
geometry [assumes] what the incommenSurable is (Ar. An. Po. 76b
9).

amerés: without parts, simple, indivisible. Derived from meros

with privative prefix: ouden tan sunekhon ameres — nothing
continuous is indivisible (Ar. Phys. 233b 32); the kinoun proton
(prime source of change) is ameres (Ar. Phys. 266a 10). ameristos
seems to be a synonym: mia tis idea ameristos sullabé — the syllable
[would be] an indivisible form (P1. Theaet. 205C).

amethektos: unparticipated. An important neoplatonic word, not

found in Plato but derived from his doctrine of the methexis,
participation, of sensible things in the intelligible eidé, forms.
Neoplatonic authors distinguished between intelligible entities in
the world of being in which nothing in the world of becoming

19
 anagein — anagké
participated, which are the amethekta, the unparticipated, and the
metekhomena, participated: pan to amethekton huphistésin aph’
heautou ta metekhomena, kai pasai hai metekhomenai hupostaseis
_ eis amethektous huparxeis anateinontai — all that is unparticipated
produces out of itself the participated, and all participated
substances reach up to existences not participated (Proclus,
Elements of Theology 23); pantakhou pro ton metekhontc‘m esti ta
metekhomena kai pro ton metekhomenon ta amethekta —
everywhere prior to the participants there are the participated, and
prior to the participated there are the unparticipated (Proclus,
Elements of Theology 53); has ekhei pros tén zéén ho aic‘m ho
amethektos, houtés ekhei pros psukhén ho prétos houtos khronos —
as the unparticipated eternity is related to life, so this primary time
stands towards the soul (Simplicius, Physics 784.34).

anagein: in general use, to bring (lead) up. It also has various

technical uses of a non-philosophical character. In logic it has the ,
technical sense of reduction of an argument in one figure of the
syllogism to another, or to put an argument into syllogistic form.
Thus one can anagein the second figure syllogism ‘if no P is M and
all S is M, then no S is P’ to the first figure by simple conversion of
the major premiss to ‘no M is P’: esti de kai anagein pantas tous
sullogismous eis tous en téi protoi skhémati katholou sullogismous —
it is possible to reduce all syllogisms to the universal syllogisms in
the first figure (Ar. An. Pr. 29b 1); tous ex hupotheseos sullogismous
ou peirateon anagein — one should not try to reduce hypothetical
arguments [to the figures of syllogism] (Ar. An. Pr. 50a 17).

anagké‘: is necessity of many different sorts; anagkaios: necessary;

anagkazein: necessitate. (1) Logical necessity and validity: aneu te
eikotén kai anagkaion apodeixeon — without likely and necessary
proofs (Pl. Tim. 40d); sullogismos de esti logos en h6i tethenton
tinon heteron ti ton keimenon ex anagkés sumbainei — a syllogism is
an argument in which, some things being premised, something
different follows of necessity (Ar. An. Pr. 24b 18); ct gar to A tini toi
B, kai to B tini t6i A anagké huparkhein — ifA belongs to some B it is
necessary that some B should belong to some A. (Ar. An. Pr. 25a
21). (2) Metaphysical necessity: esti en tois ousi ta men aei hosautos
ekhonta kai ex anagkés, ou tés kata to biaion legomenés all’hén
legomen téi mé endekhesthai allés — among things that are, some
are always the same and from necessity, not the sort of necessity

20
 anaisthésia — analuein

arising from force but that predicated of what cannot be otherwise

(Ar. Met. 1026b 27). (3) The necessity arising from force, compulsion:
ei de tis ta hédea kai ta kala phaié biaia einai (anagkazein gar exé
onta) — if somebody should say that pleasant and fine things were
forcible, since they compel from the outside (Ar. E.N. 1110b 9). (4)
Necessary as indispensible or minimum requirement: hé anagkaio-
tatépolis — the minimal city (Pl. Rep. 369d); hosa anagkaia é phusika
sumbainei tois anthrépois — things necessary or natural for men (Ar.
E.N. 1135b 21). Ar. Met., Book 4, Ch. 5 is on senses ofanagké.

anaisthésia, anaisthétos: (1) Lacking the power of perception or

sensation (from aisthésis with privative prefix): dia stereotéta
anaisthésian empoiousai — causing lack of sensation through their
density (Pl. Tim. 74e). (2) The defect of character of not enjoying food
and drink as required by and compatible with health: elleipontes de
peri tas hédonas ou panu gignontai . . . estésan de anaisthétoi — people
deficient with regard to these pleasures scarcely occur ... let them be
called insensitive (Ar. E.N. 1107b 7).

analogia, analogos, analogo‘s: (1) Proportion, proportionate, pro-

portionately. a:b::c:d is an analogia: kalousi de tén toiautén analo-
gian geometrikén hoi mathématikoi — mathematicians call such a
proportion geometrical (Ar. E.N. 1131b 14). (2) Analogy, analogous,
analogously. Used especially with regard to the meaning of terms: a
term B is applied analogously to C ifit is so applied because B stands
to C in the same relation as it does toA. Thus the term ‘foot’ is applied
analogously to the lowest extremity of a mountain since it is so
applied because the foot stands to the mountain in the same relation
as it does to a human being: é mallon kat’analogian? hos gar en
sémati opsis en psukhéi nous — or is [the use ofthe word ‘good’] rather
analogical? For intelligence is to the soul as sight to the body (Ar.
E.N. 1096b 28); en tais metaphorais legomenon tais analogon — used
in those metaphors made analogically (Ar. Rhet. 1408a 8). analogon
is the usual adverbial form as in the preceding quotation from the
Rhetoric; the form analogos occurs only in later writers. This notion
of analogy underlies that which became so important in later Chris-
tian theology.

analuein: non-technically, to undo. In logic, to reduce [an argument]

to one of the skhé‘mata, to put into logical form: tous gegenémenous
analuoimen eis ta proeirémena skhémata -— we may reduce [the

21
 analusis — anamnésis

arguments] constructed into the forementioned figures (Ar. An. Pr.

47a 4). Not in Plato. Also a form of mathematical analysis: analuein
ton eirémenon tropon hosper diagramma — to analyse in the way
stated as one does a diagram (Ar. E.N. 1112b 20). See analusis.

analusis: (1) Any sort of reductive analysis: ton stoikheién onton

stereén mekhri epipedén poieitai tén analusin — [Plato] makes the
reduction from the solid elements to planes (Ar. De Gen. et Cor. 329a
22. (2) Reduction to logical form: can d’en merei léphthéi to sterikon,
ouk estai analusis — if a particular negative premiss . be taken,
reduction to logical form is impossible (Ar. An. Pr. 51a 18). Not in
Plato.

analutika: as a noun, ‘logic’. It is the title of the two works that we

call the Prior and Posterior Analytics but Aristotle treats as one; it is
the analysis ofthe characteristics ofvalid arguments and part of the
organon or tool which Aristotle considered indispensable for accur-
ate thought: di’apaideusian ton analutikén touto drosin -— they do
this [sc. confuse metaphysics and epistemology] through not being
taught logic (Ar. Met. 1005b 4). analutikés: Ar. An. Post. 84a 8,
Simplicius, Physics 328.14. Not in Plato.

anamnésis: recollection, recall; anamimnéskesthai: to recall the

forgotten: legétai tis ek léthés eis anamnésin metaballein — someone
is said to change from forgetfulness to recollection (Simplicius,
Physics 839.23). Distinguished from mnémé (memory) which is not
to have forgotten. A work of Aristotle is entitled Peri Mnémés kai
Anamnéseés — ‘Concerning memory and recollection’: hotan analam-
banéi hén proteron eikhen epistémén é aisthésin é hou pote tén hexin
elegomen. mnémén, tout’esti kai tote to anamnéskesthai ton eiréme-
non ti -—, when one regains knowledge or perception or that the
possession ofwhich we called memory, that is then the recollection of
one of the things mentioned (Ar. De Mem. 451b 3). Especially in
Plato, recollection of things known before birth and forgotten, a
theory offered as an explanation of discovery of truth by pure
thought and thought of the inexperienced like the absolutely just
and absolutely equal: to de analambanein auton en hautoi epistémén
ouk anamimnéskesthai ‘estin? — is retrieving oneself knowledge in
oneselfnot to recollect? (P1.Meno 85d); hémin hé mathésis ouk allo ti
é anamnésis — for us learning is nothing other than remembering (P1.
Phaedo 72e); cf. Phaedo 92d 6.

22
 anarkhos - and

anarkhos. (1) In Plato and Aristotle, without government, anarchic:

hédeia politeia kai anarkhos —— [democracy is] a pleasant and
anarchic form ofstate (Pl. Rep. 558C). anarkhia, anarchy: hubrin kai
anarkhian — insolence and anarchy (Pl. Rep. 560 e); anarkhian
poiein — to bring about anarchy (Ar. Pol. 1272b 12). (2) Not in Plato
and Aristotle, without beginning: estin anarkhon apauston —
[reality] is Without beginning and without end (Parmenides, fr.
8.27); agenéton kai anarkhon — uncreated and without beginning
(Simplicius, Physics 1192.24).

andreia: etymologically, an abstract noun from anér — adult male —

meaning manliness and, especially, bravery; andreios: brave. Cf.
the Latin virtus from vir with similar original meaning. This sense
always remained central: kuriés dé legoit’an andreios ho peri ton
kalon thanaton adeés toiauta de malista ta kata polemon — the
central sense of ‘brave’ is ‘fearless concerning a glorious death’
which happen particularly in war (Ar. E.N. 1115a 32). The dialogue
in Plato’s Laches about andreia is mainly concerned with bravery in
war. But other types of bravery may be called andreia: oukh hé auté
séphrosuné gunaikos kai andros, oud’andreia — the temperance of a
woman and a man is not the same, nor their bravery (Ar. Pol. 1260a
22). The translations ‘courage’ and ‘courageous’ are common but less
- good; perhaps ‘brave’ has a greater suggestion of fearlessness,
‘courageous’ of endurance.

anisos: the contradictory of isos, with two meanings. (1) Unequal:

anisa tmémata — unequal segments (Pl. Rep. 509d). (2) Unfair: dokei
dé ho te paranomos adikos einai kai ho pleonektés kai anisos to
d’adikon to paranomon kai to anison — both the lawbreaker and he
who is grasping and unfair seem to be unjust ... and injustice is both‘
the unlawful and the unfair (Ar. E.N. 1129a 32).

ané: upwards, above: topou de eidé kai diaphorai to and kai katé kai
emprosthen kai opisthen kai dexion kai aristeron — the forms and
varieties of place are the above and below, in front and behind, and
right and left (Ar. Phys. 205b 31). In Aristotelian physics upwards is
a straight line from the centre ofthe earth, which is the middle ofthe
universe, to the sphere of the fixed stars: to de pros to eskhaton and —
[the limit of the universe] towards the extremity is the above (Ar.
Phys. 212a 27); eutheia d’hé and kai kat6° leg?) d’ano tén apo tou
mesou — upwards and downwards are in a straight line; I call

23
 antikeisthai — antiphasis
upwards that from the middle (Ar. De Caelo 268b 21). The six
directions listed above are called diastaseis.

antikeisthai: to be opposed or opposite to, particularly in logic. In

particular (a) one proposition may be opposed to another in two
ways: they may be enantia, contrary, as in ‘All A is B’ and ‘NoA is B’,
or they may constitute an antiphasis, a contradiction, as in ‘All A is
B’ and ‘Some A is not B’; and (b) a predicate may be opposed to
another as enantion, contrary, as are good and bad, right and wrong. _
But legetai de heteron heteréi antikeisthai tetrakhés, é hos to pros ti, é
hos ta enantia, é hos sterésis kai hexis, é hos kataphasis kai
apophasis — things are said to be opposite to each other in four ways
— as relatives [double and half], as contraries [good and bad], as
privation and possession [blindness and sight], or as affirmation and
negation (Ar. Cat. 11b 17). For contradictory and contrary proposi-
tions see also Ar. De Int. 17b 16 ff. Aristotle discusses the various
senses ofantikeisthai in Met., Book 4, Ch. 10.

antiparektasis: reciprocal coextension, interpenetration. See anti-

peristasis.

antiperistasis: in physics, the exchange of position by one body with

another or others. It is used to explain the possibility of movement in
a plenum and also, conjecturally, to explain movement biai' — by
force - as opposed to movementphusei: antiperistasis de estin, hotan
exothoumenou tinos sématos hupo sématos antallagé genétai' tén
topon — antiperistasis comes about when one body is pushed out by
another body and an exchange of places takes place (Simplicius,
Physics 1350.32); hé d’antiperistasis hama panta kineisthai poiei kai
kinein -— antiperistasis makes everything move and be moved at once
(Ar. Phys. 267a 18). The Stoic Chrysippus held that bodies could
occupy the same place, and introduced the notion of antiparektasis
or mutual penetration as an alternative to antiperistasis: mixin
d’einai duo é kai pleionc‘m somatén antiparektasin di’holén — mixture
is the mutual penetration of two or more bodies throughout each
other (Stobaeus 1.153.24).

antiphasis: contradiction; antiphatikés: contradictorily; kai esto

antiphasis touto, kataphasis kai apophasis hai antikeimenai — so
let a contradiction be this, an affirmation and negation opposed to
each other (Ar. De Int. 17a 33). See antikeisthai.

24
 antistrephein — apagégé
antistrephein: in logic, to be convertible; antistrophé: conversion.
Ross, in his note to Ar. An. Pr. 25a 6, distinguishes six uses of the
verb antistrephein in the Analytics. In particular, antistrophé is the
conversion, or the possibility of conversion, of a proposition by
exchange of position of its subject and predicate. The negative
propositions ‘No A is B’ and ‘Some A is not B’ and the particular
affirmative proposition ‘Some A is B’ may all be converted validly
without change of quantity, but ‘All A is B’ may be validly converted
only into the particular ‘Some B is A’: tén de katégorikén [protasin]
antistrephein men anagkaion ou mén katholou all’en merei — the
affirmative proposition is validly convertible, but not as a universal,
but in part (Ar. An. Pr. 25a 7). In traditional logic the valid conversion
from all to some is called conversion per accidens as distinct from
simple conversion.

aoristos: indeterminate, indefinite, undefined: mé toinun méd’ho

legomen einai paideian aoriston genétai — what we call education
must also not remain undefined (P1. Laws 643d); hé men oun
dunamis hos hulé katholou ousa kai aoristos tou katholou kai
aoristou estin — potentiality [of knowledge] as matter is universal
and indeterminate and of the universal and indeterminate (Ar. Met.
1087a 17); Anaximenés ... hetairos gegonos Anaximandrou mian
men kai autos tén hupokeimenén phésin hosper ekeinos, ouk aoriston
de hosper ekeinos all’hérismene‘n, aera legon autén — Anaximenes, a
companion of Anaximander, also says that the substance is single
like him, but not indeterminate like him but determinate, saying
- that it is air (Simplicius, Physics 24.28); panta men gar ta pléthé téi
heauton phusei aorista onta -— all manifolds being oftheir own nature
indeterminate (Proclus, Elements of Theology 117).

apagégé has two senses in logic. (1) apagogé eis to adunaton —

reductio ad impossibile in traditional logic — which is a way of
proving a syllogism not in the first figure when ordinary reduction to
the first figure (anagein) is impossible. Thus to prove that if no P is
M and some S is M then some S is not P, one argues that if all S is P
we have the first figure syllogism that if no P is M and all S is P then
no S is M, which contradicts the original minor premiss: see An. Pr.
29a 30 ff. (2) Substitution of a more probable premiss for another less
acceptable. The complicated methods and aims of this process are
described in An. Pr. , Book 2, Ch. 25. Plato uses the verb apagein, but
only in the non-technical sense of leading away.

25
 apatheia — apeiros
apatheia: used of people in the sense of being insensible to
something or other. We connect time with, among other things, tois
pathesi kai tais apatheiais — emotions and. absences of emotions
(Epicurus, Letter to Herodotus 73). It is common in the Stoics to
mean freedom from emotion. More widely, apatheia is not being
affected in any way and is applicable to anything animate or
inanimate, and also, by neoplatonics, to transcendent entities. In
this use it is commonly translated ‘impassivity’: tén khériste‘n
,ekeinén apatheian — the separate [from becoming] impassivity of
the transcendent (Proclus, Republic 2.118.22); poiétika kata dc to
skléron kai malakon pathous kai apatheias — producing passivity if
soft and impassivity if hard (Ar. Phys. 217b 25). See apathé‘s.

apathes: generally, with genitive, not subject to or inexperienced in

something: apatheis kakon — not subject to evils (Pl. Phaedrus
250C). In metaphysics, impassive, or impassible, in the technical
sense of being unaffected by other things: apatheis kai akinétoi
dokousin einai hai ideai tois legousin ideas einai — forms seem to be
impassive and unchanging to those who believe in them (Ar. Top.
148a 20); ho nous isos theioteron ti kai apathes estin — perhaps the
intelligence is something more divine and impassive (Ar. De An.
408b 29); to men homoion apathes phésin hupo tou homoiou —
[Xenophanes] says that the like is impassive to the like (Simplicius,
Physics 23.1); to de asomaton haplon on apathes estin — the
incorporeal, being simple, is impassible (Proclus, Elements of
Theology 80). In Aristotle’s Poetics it means that there is no
catastrophe: kai ou tragikon- apathes gar —- it is not tragic, for there
is no catastrophe (Ar. Poetics 1453b 39).

apeiros: lacking an end, boundary or limit, from peras, a bound,

with privative. Often translated as infinite. In particular used in
neuter singular to apeiron, the infinite, unlimited, boundless, or
indefinite, and, in the construction eis apeiron, without limit, ad
infinitum. Anaximander is said to hold that the basic stuff was to
apeiron, in the sense of being indefinite, and of no specific nature:
arkhén te kai stoikheion eiréke ton ontén to apeiron legei d’autén
méte hudér méte allo ti ton kaloumenén einai stoikheion, all’heteran
tina phusin apeiron — [Anaximander] said that the indefinite was
the principle and element of things he says that it is not water
nor any other of the things called elements but some other
indefinite nature (Simplicius, Physics 24.14); ei gar pan to on en

26
 aphairesis — aphthartos
topéi, délon hoti kai tou topou topos estai, kai touto eis apeiron —— for
if all that is is in a place it is clear that there will also be a place of
place and so without limit (Ar. Phys. 209a 25). This sense of apeiros
must not be confused with that in which it means ‘Without
experience’ as the opposite of empeiros, experienced, which is
common in Plato: anagké pantén apeiron gegonenai — he will
inevitably have become totally inexperienced (Pl. Gorg. 484c).

aphairesis: in general, taking away, removal: ton orthos dothentc‘m

aphairesis ouk estin — taking away legitimate gifts is not allowed
(Pl. Phil. 19e). Philosophically, abstraction, especially in the phrase
ex aphaireseés: (a) of mathematics, ho mathématikos peri ta ex
aphaireseos tén theérian poieitai° perielén gar ta aisthéta theérei
monon de leipei to poson kai to sunekhes — the mathematician
makes his study of things in abstraction; for he studies them
stripped of perceptible qualities leaving only quantity and
continuity (Ar. Met. 1061a 18), and (b) conceptually, to katholou hoi
men polloi kata to koinon noousi to en tois kata meros ex aphaireseés
autou psilén tén idiotéta lambanontes — people in general intuit the
universal by what is common in the particulars, taking the special
feature on its own by abstraction (Simplicius, Physics 18.5).

aph’henos: literally, from one thing. To be aph’henos is, in

Aristotle, one way in which two or more meanings of a term may be
different but related and not chance homénuma. The meanings of
a term are aph’henos if the others derive from one central meaning.
A standard example is that a place, a diet, a complexion etc. may all
be called healthy derivatively from the central case of a healthy
person. In E.N., having claimed that agathos has many senses, he
says that the senses may be related téi aph’henos einai é pros hen
hapanta suntelein — by being from a single case or from all
contributing to a single case (Ar. E.N. 1096b 27). Contributing to
and being from one case seem to be the same thing looked at from
different angles. See also the discussion in Ar. Met., Book 11, Chs
3-4. .

aphthartos: indestructible, from phtheirein, to destroy, with

privative. Not in Plato. Used usually in conjunction with agenétos,
without beginning: agenéton kai aphtharton — [the universe] is
without beginning and indestructible (Ar. De Caelo 270a 13); én gar
an aphtharta kai agenéta — they would be indestructible and

27
 aplanés — aponia
without beginning (Proclus, Elements of Theology 178). For Proclus
pasa psukhé anolethros kai aphthartos —— every soul is imperishable
and indestructible (op. cit. 187), since it is eternal and without
beginning. Christian writers used aphthartos less strictly of the
created human soul (e.g. St Paul, Epistle to the Romans 2:7).

aplanés: not wandering, fixed, has a special application in astron-

omy to both the fixed stars themselves and to the sphere of the fixed
stars: hos’aplané t6n astron — such of the stars as are fixed (Pl. Tim.
40b 4), p63 hé aplanés peri ekeino [to kentron] strephetai? — how does
the fixed sphere move round the centre? (Proclus, Republic 2.228).
The feminine hé aplanés, with or Without the noun sphaira, refers
normally to the sphere itself: ou gar dé kai hé aplanés — for the fixed
sphere also is not [in place] (Simplicius, Physics 482.20). Used of an
embryo by Plato: eupages aplanes hésukhaion te en métrai‘ — com-
pact, motionless and quiet in the womb (Pl. Laws 775C). Metaphori-
cally: touton . . . aplanés theoria — the undeviating awareness ofthese
things (Epicurus, To Menoeceus 128).

apodeiknunai, apodeixis, apodeiktikos: to prove, proof, demon-

strative. In technical contexts the terms are usually confined to strict
demonstrations, though they are sometimes used more loosely: ti an
tis ekhoi tekmérion apodeixai poteron katheudomen é egre-
goramen? — what indicator would one have to prove whether we are
asleep or awake? (Pl. Theaet. 158C). But by later writers arguments
from tekméria were not regarded as being strictly apodeixeis: délon
hoti tekmériodés estin hé gnosis he peri ton arkhon all’ouk apodeik-
tiké — it is clear that knowledge of first principles is based on
indicators and not demonstrative (Simplicius, Physics 18.23); hé
men gar apodeixis sullogismos tis, ho sullogismos de ou pas apo-
deixis — proofis a kind ofargument, but not every argument is a proof
(Ar. An. Pr. 25b 30); oute pasan epistémén apodeiktikén einai, alla
tén ton ameson anapodeikton — nor is all knowledge demonstrative,
since that of the immediate is undemonstrated (Ar. An. Po. 72b 19);
ek proteron dei tén apodeixin einai kai gné‘rimoteron — demon-
stration should be from the prior and better known (Ar. An. Po. 72b
26). The noun and verb are both common in Plato, but he does not use
apodeiktikos.

aponia: in earlier writers, laziness: hai rhathumiai kai hai aponiai

kai hai ameleiai — slackness, laziness and carelessness (Ar. Rhet.

28
 apophansis — aporia
1370a 14). But it acquired a technical sense of freedom from distress
and pain (ponos being the most common medical term for the
distress ofthe sick): hé men gar ataraxia kai aponia katastématikai
eisin hédonai — freedom from mental and physical distress are
constitutive pleasures [and not such as involve change] (Epicurus,
fr. 1).

apophansis: a categorical pr0position: kataphasis de estin apo-

phansis tinos kata tinos. apophasis de estin apophansis tinos apo
tinos — an affirmation is a proposition affirming something of some-
thing. Negation is a proposition denying something of something
(Ar. De Int. 17a 25). Confusingly, there is an attested spelling of
apophansis as apophasis; LSJ gives Ar. Rhet. 1365b 27 as an
example of this, but the OCT has apophansis with many MSS.

apophantikos: categorical: esti de heis logos apophantikos é ho hen

de‘lén é ho sundesméi heis — a single categorical statement either
declares something single or what is single by conjunction (Ar. De
Int. 17a 16). apophantikos logos is a synonym ofapophansis: anagké
de panta logon apophantikon ek rhématos einai é ptoseos rhématos —
every propositional utterance must contain a verb or a tense of a verb
(Ar. De Int. 17a 11).

apophasis: negative proposition: phasin kai apophasin — affir-

mation and negation (Pl. Soph. 263e); hé apophasis logos apopha-
tikos — a negation is a negative statement (Ar. Cat. 12b 8). See
apophansis.

apophatikos: negative. See apophasis.

apoproégmenon: the contrary ofproégmenon, that which while not

properly counted as kakon, bad, one would none the less prefer to
avoid. A Stoic notion, applied to things exhibiting apaxia, disvalue:
ta men oun pollén ekhonta axian proégmena legesthai, ta de pollén
apaxian apoproégoumena —“those things having much value were
said [by Zeno] to be preferable, those having much disvalue to be
preferably absent (SVF).

aporia: literally, absence of a way through; a difficult terrain may be

aporos. In general use the noun and the verb aporein refer to not
knowing what to do: aporounti autoi erkhetai Prometheus — when

29
 apsukhos —— areté
[Epimetheus] did not know what to do Prometheus came (Pl. Prot.
321C). This sense isexplained by Aristotle in the Topics at 145b 16
ff. But usually in Aristotle and most later philosophy an aporia is a
puzzle arising from the difficulty of reconciling two or more
accepted or plausible beliefs. Aristotle believed the solution, or
dissolution, of such puzzles to be a main task of philosophy: dei
d’hésper epi ton allon, tithentas ta phainomena kai proton
diaporésantas houté deiknunai malista men panta ta endoxa peri
tauta ta pathé, ei de mé, ta pleista kai kuriotata' ean gar luétai te ta
duskheré kai kataleipétai ta endoxa, dedeigmenon an eié hikanés —
we must, as elsewhere, state the apparent facts and, having first
raised the aporiai, establish preferably all the received opinions
about these states, or, if not all, the majority and most important;
for if the difficulties are resolved and the received opinions remain,
that would be a sufficient proof (Ar. E.N. 1145b 2); aporéseie d’an tis
p68 hupolambanon orthés akrateuetai tis — one may raise the puzzle
about what sort of correct understanding is possessed by the
weak-willed (E.N. 1145b 21); ekhei de pollas aporias ti pote estin ho
topos — there are many puzzles about What place is (Ar. Phys. 208a
32). The quotation by LSJ 'of the definition in the Topics (145b 1) of
an aporia as isotés enantion logismon is misleading, since Aristotle
rejects it’ on the ground that one argument may have false
premisses.

apsukhos: inanimate: ean de apsukhon ti psukhés anthrépon

steréséi — if an inanimate object deprives a person of life (P1. -
Laws 873e); legomen dioristhai to empsukhon tou apsukhou toi
zén — we say that the animate is distinguished from the inanimate
by life (Ar. De An. 413a 20). In some non-philosophical literature
plants are treated as apsukha in distinguishing a vegetable from a
meat diet, but in philosophy only non-living matter is called
apsukhos.

areté: excellence or goodness of any kind. It is an abstract noun

connected with aristos, excellent; the equivalent abstract noun
agathotés from agathos is late and rare; areté is commonly
translated virtue, a transliteration of the Latin virtus, but neither
areté nor virtus means virtue, except in such archaising expressions
as ‘the virtues of the internal combustion engine’, where
‘excellences’ would be equivalent: oukoun kai areté dokei soi einai
hekastéi hoiper kai ergon ti prostetaktai? - do you not think that

30
 aristeros — arithmos

everything to which a function is assigned has an excellence? (Pl.

Rep. 353b); dendra pantodapa kallos hupsos te daimonion
hup’aretés tés gés ekhonta — having all kinds of trees fantastic in
beauty and height through the excellence of the soil (P1. Critias
117b); agathoi ontes pasan aretén — being good in respect of every
excellence (Pl. Laws 900d); adikia is an areté because it pays (Pl.
Rep. 3480); dittés dé tés aretés ousés, tés men dianoétikés, we de
éthikés — excellence [of human soul] being of two kinds, of
intelligence and of character (Ar. E.N. 1103a 14). The opposite of
areté is kakia. The translation of Aristotle’s account of eudaimonia
as energeia kat’aretén (E.N. 1098a 17) into ‘activity in accordance
with virtue’ is particularly unfortunate. kat’aretén is an adverbial
expression meaning ‘excellently’, and energeia kat’aretén is activity
excellently performed, whatever the as yet undetermined activity
may be.

aristeros: left, one of the six diastaseis, directions, recognised in

Aristotelian physics. See Ar. Phys. 205b 32 and and for details.

aristokratia: in general use, rule by what are called aristocrats in

ordinary English (Aristotle says that eugeneia estin arkhaios plutos
kai areté — good birth is ancient wealth and excellence (Ar. Pol.
1294a 21)). In strict philosophical use it is rule by the best, who are
the disinterestedly good and wise. Thus Plato says that rule by his
guardians would be aristokratia (P1. Rep. 445d). It is the aléthinén
kai prétén — the true and first type of aristocracy — based on areté
(Ar. Pol. 1294a 20, 24). This is correct etymologically, since the
aristos is one who has areté.

aristos: is grammatically treated. as the irregular superlative of

agathos; it means ‘excellent’ or ‘best’ and is applied to whosoever
and whatsoever has any areté‘. The supreme goal in life is to
ariston, the highest good (Ar. E.N. 1094a 22).

arithmos: number; arithmétiké‘: the science of number. Zero was

unknown as a number and one also was not counted as a number,
the first number being the duas — two. From the Pythagoreans, ton
arithmon nomizontes arkhén einai — who consider number to be the
first principle (Ar. Met. 986a15) -— number played a great part in
metaphysics, especially in Plato’s unwritten doctrines, involving
obscure distinctions of e.g. sumblétoi and asumblétoi — addible and

31
 arkhé — atelés

non-addible numbers. For these and other distinctions see Ar. Met.,
Book 13, Ch. 6. Numbers were written as letters of the alphabet,
which made calculation difficult and perhaps explains why Greek
geometry progressed so much more rapidly than arithmetic.

arkhé has a great number of meanings, but they can all be seen to
derive from the basic meaning of a beginning or starting point: kai
gar hé pégé kai hé kardia kai monas kai sémeion kai to hégoumenon
en polei arkhé legetai, tosouton allélon téi phusei diapheronta — a
spring, the heart, an individual, a point and the government are all
called arkhé, though they differ from each other so much in nature
(Simplicius, Physics 1097.2); hé auté moi arkhé estin ... héiper arti — I
start from where I started just now (P1.Prot. 318a); arkhé de ex hés
kai ha nundé elegomen panta értétai -— the basis also of all our recent
statements (Pl. Theaet. 156a); arkhé d’estin apodeixeos protasis
amesos- amesos de hés mé estin allé protera - the starting point of a
demonstration is an immediate premiss: it is immediate if there is
none prior to it (Ar. An. P0. 72a 7); protos autos arkhén onomasas to
hupokeimenon — [Anaximander] having first called substance the
first principle (Simplicius, Physics 150.23); hoti men eisin arkhai
diéristhai houtos. palin d’allén arkhén arxamenoi legémen — that
there are first principles is thus demonstrated. Now let us speak
making a fresh start (Ar. Phys. 192b 2); ei mé hé arkhe dia takheon
kateluthé — if the leadership (government) had not been speedily
dissolved (Pl. Apol. 32d). ‘

asématos: incorporeal: in a lyre hé men harmonia aoraton kai

asématon, kai pagkalon hauté d’hé lura kai hai khordai somata te
kai tou thnétou suggené — the tuning is invisible and incorporeal
and most beautiful, but the lyre itself and its strings are bodies and
akin to the mortal (P1.Phaedo 85e); ta gar asomata, kallista onta kai
megista — the incorporeal things that are the most beautiful and
greatest (Pl. Pol. 286a); hulén tén arkhén legousin, an te mian an te
pleious hupothosi, kai ean te soma ean te asématon touto tithosin —
who say' that the first principle is matter, whether they postulate one
or many and whether they suppose it to be body or incorporeal (Ar.
Met. 988a. 25); pasa psukhé‘ asomatos estin ousia kai kho‘risté
somatos — every soul is incorporeal and separable from body (Pro-
clus, Elements of Theology 186).

atelés; incomplete. Frequent in Plato in non-technical use, e.g. in

32
 athlios — aiilos
Rep. 4950 and d. In Aristotle being atelés is one of the marks that
distinguish a kinésis (change, process) from an energeia (activity):
hé te kinésis energeia men einai tis dokei, atele‘s de — change seems
to be a sort of activity, but incomplete (Ar. Phys. 201b 31). A kinésis
has an end outside it, as house-building, for example, has the
existence of a house as its end, and is so in itself atelés, whereas
metaphysical and aesthetic contemplation, for example, have no
ulterior telos, but are complete, being energeiai: ouden gar ateles
esti ton tés eudaimonias — no element in happiness is incomplete
(Ar. E.N. 1177b 25).

athlios: wretched, miserable, the contrary of .eudaimo‘n. Like

eudaimén, athlios refers to the value and worthwhileness of a
person’s life in general and not to a state of feeling in particular. To
call a man athlios is to say that his life is not worth living: athlios
men oudepote genoit’an ho eudaimén — the happy man could never
become wretched (Ar. E.N. 1101a 7); when asked whether the
unjustly killed is athlios Socrates replies hétton é ho apokteinus —
less than the killer (Pl. Gorg 469b). athliotés is wretchedness.

atomos: indivisible, from temnein, to cut, with privative. Used of

many things, either as being strictly indivisible in any way or as
being the smallest unit of its kind: ou gar khalepon anelein tas
atomous grammas — it is not difficult to dispose of indivisible lines
(Ar. Phys. 206a 1'7); nomoi gluku, noméi pikron, noméi thermon,
nomoi psukhron, nomoi khroié, eteéi de atoma kai kenon — sweet,
bitter, hot, cold and colour are conventional, in truth there are
atoms and the void (Democritus in Sextus Empiricus, Adversus
Mathematicos 7.135); in the plural ta atoma, with no substantive,
as in Democritus, the omitted noun being somata as in atoma
sémata legontas — saying that there are indivisible bodies (Ar. De
Caelo 303a 21); atomon gar to eidos — for the species is indivisible
(Ar. Met. 1034a 7).

aiilos: having no matter, from hulé, matter, with privative. Not to

be confused with the noun aulos which is the name (not of a flute
but) of any pipe or conduit and, most often in the philosophers, of
the double-reed ancestor of the oboe. Not in Plato and doubtfully
once in Aristotle, but common in later philosophy: kai to eidos dc to
enulon saphos oimai paradidosin en hois kai to Milan eidos —
[Plato] clearly teaches of the form in matter where he also does of

33
 autokinétos — autos

the matterless form (Simplicius, Physics 26.19); pasés merikés

psukhés to okhéma au‘lon esti — the vehicle of every particular soul
is immaterial (Proclus, Elements of Theology 208).

autokinétos: self-changing, self-moving: duo ontén arkhikon tés

kine‘seos, tou te akinétou kai tou autokinétou — there are two sources
of change, the unchanging and the self-changing (Simplicius,
Physics 1220.34); monos gar houtés hoion ti autokinéton einai —
only thus can a thing be self-changing (Ar. Phys. 258a 2). The
verbal form is customarily spelt as two words as in to auto hauto
kinoun — that which moves itself (Ar. Phys. 208a 6-7). The word
does not occur in Plato except in one papyrus fragment of the
Phaedrus where the codices read aeikinéton. The zoion — animal —
including man, the soul being responsible for the bodily motion,
was the commonrecipient of the adjective autokinétos: ti oun an eié
kata tautén tén kinésin autokinéton kuriés é to zoion? — what could
be self-changing strictly in this way except an animal? (Simplicius,
Physics 1249.22). For the translation ‘self—change’ as well as the
common ‘self-motion’, see kiné‘sis.

automatos: generally, of its own accord, spontaneous, automatic:

ean pou automatoi peritukhosin téi aretéi — if perhaps they might of
their own accord come upon excellence [without education] (P1.
Prot. 320a). Aristotle discusses how the notion fits in with his types
of explanation in Physics, Book 2: to men gar apo tukhés pan apo
t’automatou, touto d’ou pan apo tukhés — the chance is all
spontaneous, but not all the spontaneous is by chance (Ar. Phys.
197a 35); phaneron hoti en tois haplos heneka tou gignomenois,
hqtan mé tou sumbantos heneka genétai hon exo to aition, tote apo
tOu automatou legomen — it is clear that in the field of things that in
some way come about for something, if something comes about with
an external cause and not for the sake of what results, then we say
it happens spontaneously (Ar. Phys. 197b 18).

autos: himself, itself, as in the famous autos epha — [Pythagoras]

himself said it. Philosophically important in the form auto to +
neuter adjective: auto to ison - the equal itself (P1. Phaedo 74c);
auto to hen — the one itself (Pl. Parm. 143a). It is hard to determine
whether auto to ison as a form is a universal or a perfect
non-sensible particular. Thus in auta ta isa estin hoti anisa soi
ephané, é hé isotés anisotés? — have the equals themselves ever

34
 auxésis — baros

appeared unequal or equality inequality? — it has been disputed

whether auta ta anisa are two or more perfect particulars while
isotés is equality, or whether the phrase should be taken as a
hendiadys, with an explicative kai — the equals themselves, that is
equality. Sensibly equal things are said to elleipein kata tén
homoiotéta —- fail in likeness — to auta ta isa. Aristotle frequently
speaks (hostilely?) of to autoagathon (Ar. Met. 1099c 28), the
'autoanthrépos (Ar. E.N. 1096a 35), and even the autohekaston — the
so-and-so itself (Ar. E.N. 1096a 35) rather than of auto to agathon
and similarly.

auxésis: increase in size, the contrary being phthisis, decrease in

size. The verb is auxanein: auxanomené seléné — the waxing moon
'(Ar. De Caelo 291b 19); to auxanomenOn hapan auxanetai hupo
suggenous prosiontos — everything that increases does so by the
arrival of something of the same nature (Ar. De Caelo 270a 239).
auxésis is one of the three kinds of kinésis kata tapon, change of
place: phora, auxésis and, phthisis: tauté‘s de to men phora, to de
auxésis kai phthisis — of [change of place] there are locomotion and
increase and decrease (Ar. Phys. 211a 15); meizonos men pragmatos
kai elattonos metaxu auxésis kai phthisis, kai kaloumen houto to
men auxanesthai, to de phthinein — between a body being greater
and smaller there is increase and decrease, and we thus call the one
‘to increase’, the other ‘to decrease’ (P1.Phaedo 71c).

axiéma: an assumption or an axiom. Assumption: houtc‘) gar to te

anagkaion estai, kai to axiéma endoxon — thus necessity will be
achieved and the assumption ‘will become accepted belief (Ar. An.
Pr. 62a 13). Axiom: [arkhé amesos] hén anagké ekhein ton hotioun
mathésomenon, axiéma — [an immediate principle] that one must
have in order to acquire any knowledge is an axiom (Ar. An. P0. 72a
16); ta d’axiémata aut6n° peri panton gar adunaton apodeixin einai
— some of them are self-evident principles; for there cannot be proof
about everything (Ar. Met. 997a 8). Euclid’s axioms are called by
him koinai ennoiai and his postulates are aitémata. Not in Plato.

B
baros: weight; barus: heavy. The contraries are kouphotés,
lightness, and kouphos, light. Book 4 of Aristotle’s De Caelo is peri
de bareos kai kouphou, ti t’estin hekateron kai tis hé phusis autén —

35
 bathos -— bios
concerning the heavy and the light, what each is and what their
nature (Ar. De Caelo 307b 28). A thing may be said to be heavy
relative to another — pros heteron — or baruteron: baru de haplos to
kato kai pros to meson ,— the absolutely heavy is [what moves of its
own nature] downwards and towards the middle [of the universe]
(Ar. De Caelo, 3083 30). The views of the atomists about weight are
uncertain because of apparently conflicting evidence: kaitoi
baruteron ge kata tén huperokhén phésin einai Démokritos hekaston
ton adiaireton -- Democritus says that each of the indivisible bodies
is heavier in proportion to its excess [of bulk] (Ar. De Gen. et Cor.
326a 9); Démokritos ta préta phési sc’imata baros men ouk ekhein
— Democritus says that the primary bodies have no weight
(Aetius 1.3.18). On this problem, . see Kirk and Raven, The
Presocratic Philosophers, 414-15.

bathos: depth; bathus, deep: diasté‘mata tria, mékos kai platos

kai bathos, hois horizetai séma pan — three dimensions length,
breadth and depth, by which all body is defined (Ar. Phys. 209a 5);
megethous de to men eph’hen grammé, to de epi duo epipedon, to de
epi tria séma — of magnitudes the one-dimensional is a line, the
two-dimensional a plane, the three-dimensional a body (Ar. De
Caelo 268a 7). In transferred sense, e.g. kai moi ephané bathos ti
ekhein pantapasi gennaion — [Parmenides] seemed to me to have a
certain noble depth (Pl. Theaet. 184a).

bia: force; biaias, forcible; biazein, to force. bia can be used to

mean pressure of a non-physical kind in a non-technical context, as
when contrasted with hekén: médamés pros bian bouléthéis mallon
é hekén legein — not wishing to speak under pressure rather than
willingly (Pl. Phaedrus 236d). But in philosophical use it means
physical force: anagké gar é biaion einai tén kinésin é kata phusin —
the motion must either be forced or natural (Ar. De Caelo 300b 18).
In the ethical writings Aristotle gives as examples of akousia biai’ —
unintended because of violence — only physical force: biaion hou hé
arkhé exéthen — forcible where the source is external (E.N. 1110a 1).
bia is one form of anagké; thus biaias anagkés — necessity of a
forceful kind (Ar. De Caelo 284a 15).

bios: life, usually as a social rather than a merely biological

phenomenon, which is usually zo‘é‘. Thus Plutarch and Diogenes
Laertius wrote Bioi and not Z6ai. ton bion apolaustikon -— the life of

36
 blabé — bouleuesthai
pleasure (Ar. E.N. 1095b '17). Aristotle also speaks of the bios
politikos and the theére‘tikos bios. But there is no clear-cut distinct-
ion between bios and zéé. bios as life has a paroxytone accent; bios
with an oxytone accent is a bow.

blabé: harm; blaptein: to harm. In Book 5, Ch. 9 ofthe E.N. Aristotle

makes the distinction, important in all later jurisprudence, between
suffering harm (damnum) and suffering injustice (injuria); hence
the Latin tag damnum, non injuria, fit volenti. blaptetai men oun tis
hekén kai t’adika paskhei, adikeitai d’oudeis hekon — one is therefore
harmed with one’s consent and fares unjustly, but nobody who
consents suffers injustice (Ar. E.N. 1136b 5).

boulesthai: to wish; boulésis: wish, wishing; boulé‘tos: object of

wish. The nature ofboulésis is discussed by Aristotle in E.N., Book 3,
Ch. 2. Aristotle recognises three kinds of orexis, appetition: orexis
men gar epithumia kai thumos kai boulésis — appetition is either
desire [for the pleasant] or anger [seeking revenge] or rational wish
[for the good] (Ar. De An. 414b 2); haplés men kai kat’alétheian
bouléton einai t’agathon —- absolutely and truly, the good is the object
of wish (Ar. E.N. 1113a 24); unlike bouleusis, boulésis d’esti kai ton
adunatén - wish is also for the impossible (Ar. E.N. 1111b 22). Plato
uses the terms in a less technical way. -

bouleuesthai: to deliberate; bouleusis: deliberation. The use of

these concepts is carefully discussed in E.N., Book 3, Ch. 3.
bouleuometha de peri tan eph’hémin kai prakton — we deliberate
about things that are in our power and practicable (Ar. E.N. 1112a
30). bouleusis is a prerequisite ofproairesis ‘-— choice: hé proairesis an
eié bouleutiké‘ orexis ton eph’he‘min‘ — choice is a deliberative appe-
tition of things in our power (Ar. EN. 11133 10); bouleuometha d’ou
peri ton telén alla peri ton pros to telos — we do not deliberate about
success but about how to achieve it (Ar. E.N. 1112b 11).

C
There is no letter C. For words beginning with the Greek letter X
and words anglicised with a C, see under K.

37
 dei — démokratia

D
dei: it is needful, one needs, it is requisite, and similar expressions;
to dean: what is needed, requisite. There is no notion of logical
necessity or ethical obligation involved, unless contextually.
Logical necessity is anagké and ethical need is expressed by khré.

deilos, deilia: coward, cowardly, cowardice. Usually opposed to

andreios: he‘tton deilos andreiou — a coward is inferior to the brave
(Pl. Phaedrus 239a). In Aristotle, one of the two kakiai opposed to
the areté of andreia: ho de 'en téi men phobeisthai huperballén téi
de tharrein elleipén deilos —- he who is excessive in fear and deficient
in confidence is a coward (Ar. E.N. 1107b 3); enantion andreia
deilia'i —'bravery is the opposite of cowardice (P1.Prot. 360b).

deinos in general use has a variety of meanings corresponding very

roughly to those of ‘terrific’ or ‘formidable’, ranging through the
fearful and terrifying, the strange and the accomplished. In the
sense of frightening: ta deina gignéskein kai ta tharralea .— to
recognise the frightening and the heartening (P1. Laches 195e). In
philosophy it is sometimes used dyslogistically of the clever: hé de
dé apodeixis deinois men apistos, sophois de pisté — the proof will be
unconvincing to the clever, convincing to the wise (Pl. Phaedrus
245C). But frequently, where usually translated ‘clever’, ‘capable’
might be better, since it refers to executive ability: deinoi
makhesthai — capable fighters (Pl. Laches 191d); deinos eis tous
logous tous eis ta dikastéria — an able speaker in the law courts (P1.
Euthyd. 304d); deinotés is defined as executive ability by Aristotle:
esti dé dunamis hén kalousi deinotéta- hauté d’estin toiauté héste ta
pros ton hupotethenta skopon sunteinonta dunasthai tauta prattein
kai tugkhanein autou — there is a capacity that they call deinotés;
this capacity is such as to be capable-of doing the things necessary
to the proposed goal and to attain it (Ar. E.N. 1144a 23).

démokratia: democracy. Theoretically democracy was the direct

rule of the whole free populace (male), but it was thought of usually
as the rule of the manypoor rather than of the few rich, which was
oligarchy: esti démokratia men 'hotan hoi eleutheroi kai aporoi
pleious ontes kurioi tés arkhés 63in, oligarkhia d’hotan hoi plousioi
kai eugenesteroi oligoi ontes — a democracy is when the free and

38
 den — diairein

without substance are in the majority and have the rule in their
power, an oligarchy when the rich and better born and few have it
(Ar. Pol. 1290b 18). Plato was no admirer of democracy: démokratia
dé oimai gignetai hotan hoi penétes nikésantes tous men apokteinosi
ton heteron, tous de ekbalési, tois de loipois ex isou metadosi
politeias te kai arkhon, kai his to polu apo kle‘ron hai arkhai en
auté‘i gignontai — I think that there is democracy when the poor
conquer and kill some of the others, exile others, and give to the
rest an equal share in citizenship and offices, and generally in it
offices are gained by lot (Pl. Rep. 557a).

den: a word, not in LSJ, coined by Democritus forensically as an

opposite to ouden and as a synonym of on; presumably aimed at
Parmenides who held that to mé on .— that which is not — is a
meaningless expression: Démokritos prosagoreuei ton de
ousién hekastén tc‘n' te deni kai téi nastoi kai téi onti — Democritus
called each thing that exists a den or a solid or an entity
(Simplicius, De Caelo 295.1) The translation ‘hing’ has been
suggested as an opposite to ‘nothing’. ‘

diadokhos: successor. Plato’s Academy continued without inter-

ruption until its closure by Justinian in the sixth century AD. Thus
later heads are called diadokhoi. In book titles Proklou diadokhou
and Damaskiou diadokhou give the author.

diairein (in past tense, dielein), diairesis: to divide, division, used

in as many contexts in ' Greek as in English. In philoSOphy
particularly the logical division of a genus into species. In the
Phaedrus and the Sophist Plato speaks of a method of sunagoge‘ —
collection — and diairesis -— division —' as the supreme method of
philosophy: touton dé egoge autos te erastés, 6 Phaidre, ton
diaireseén kai sunagogén hina hoios te 6 legein kai phronein — and,
Phaedrus, I myself am a lover of divisions and collections in order to
become able to speak and think (Pl. Phaedrus 266b); ean me tis
kat’eidé te diaireisthai ta onta kai mia'i idea'z' dunatos é kath’hen
hekaston perilambanein, ou pot’estai tekhnikos logén peri kath’
hoson dunaton anthropoi — unless one is capable of dividing things
and subsuming each thing individually under a single form, one
will never become skilled in discussion to the limit of human
capacity (Pl. Phaedrus 273d); tés ton genén kat’eidé diaireseos
palaia tis argia — a long-standing laziness about dividing genera

39
 diakrinesthai — dialektiké
into species (Pl. Soph. 267d). Common in Aristotle’s logical Works in
a similar sense: esti gar he diairesis hoion asthenés sullogismos — a
division is a sort of weak argument (Ar. An. Pr. 46a 32). Also used of
distinguishing the meanings of terms: dielomenon auton posakhés
legetai to en toi horisméi apodothen — when’he has distinguished
how many senses there are of the term in the definition (Ar. Top.
139b 28).

diakrinesthai: separate; diakrisis: separation. The contrary of

sugkrinesthai, sugkrisis. Also distinguished from ekkrisis, which
is the separation out of something from a mixture: kai panta houto
diakrinesthai kai sugkrinesthai gignesthai te auta ex allé‘lon,
‘
genesis te einai hekastou eis alléla — everything thus separates and
mixes and these come from each other and each thing becomes
the others (Pl. Phaedo 71b); houté gar kai Démokritos kosmopoiei
kai Empedoklés kai Anaxagoras, hoi men sugkrinesthai kai
diakrinesthai ta atoma sémata kai ta tettara stoikheia legontes,
Anaxagoras de ekkrinesthai tas homoiomereias apo tou migmatos
legc‘m — that is how Democritus constructs the cosmos, and
Empedocles and Anaxagoras, the former saying that the atoms (D.)
and the four elements (E.) are conjoined and Anaxagoras that the
homoeomeries are. separated out from the mixture (Simplicius,
Physics 1120.20). Also used of conceptual discrimination: diakrinas
tén kath’hautén metabolén apo tés kata sumbebékos — having
distinguished essential from accidental (contingent) change
(Simplicius, Physics 804.13).

dialektiké, dialektikos: dialectic, dialectician, from the verb

dialegesthai, which normally retains its non-technical sense of
conversing. For the overriding importance of dialectic: hosper
.thrigkos tois mathémasin epano keitai — [dialectic] rests like a
c0ping stone on other studies (P1. Rep. 534e); alla mén to ge
dialektikon ouk alléi doseis hos eg’éimai, plén toi katheros te kai
dikaiés philosophounti — you will not, I think, give the title of
dialectician to anyone save to him who philosophises purely and
righteously (P1. Soph. 253e). But it is less clear what dialectic is; in
the earlier dialogues it seems to be the attempt to reach definitions
by conversational question and answer, as in Republic 532 ff: é kai
dialektikon kaleis ton logon hekastou lambanonta tés ousias? — do
you take the dialectician to be him who gets an account of the
nature of everything? (P1. Rep. 534b). But later the method of

40
 dianemein — diaphora
sunagége‘ and diairesis is identified as dialectic: tous dunamenous
touto dran (sc. sunagein kai diairein) ei men orthos é me‘prosagoreué,
theos oide, kalé oun mekhri toude dialektikous —— those who can
collect and divide, god knows whether I speak correctly or not, I have
so far called dialecticians (Pl. Phaedrus 266b). Aristotle distin-
guishes dialectical from scientific argument: dialektikos sullogismos
ho ex endoxon sullogizomenos — a dialectical argument is one argued
from accepted beliefs (Ar. Top. 100a 30); esti de protasis dialektiké
erotésis endoxos é pasin é tois pleistois é tois sophois — a dialectical
proposition is a proposal accepted either by all or by the majority or
by the learned (Ar. Top. 104a 9).

dianemein, dianemétikos, dianomé: distribute, distributive, dis-

tribution. Used in all natural contexts by both Plato and Aristotle.
Especially in Aristotle, ofone ofthe two kinds ofdikaiosuné en merei
—- justice as one particular excellence: to men gar dainemétikon
dikaion ton koinén aei kata tén analogian estin tén eirémenén —
justice distributive of common goods is always in accordance with
the [geometrical] proportion stated (Ar. E.N. 1131b 27). The other
variety of particular justice 1s to diorthotikon.

dianoia: intelligence, mind. Plato and Aristotle use the term some-
times in a general sense: [noséma] kata to séma é kata tén dianoian —-
a disease of body or mind (Pl. Laws 916a); ouden paskhontos tou
sématos alla mallon tés dianoias — nothing happening in the body
but rather in the mind (Ar. E.N. 1117b31). Of thought, including
practical thought: dianoia d’auté outhen kinei — thought itself ini-
tiates no change (Ar. E.N. 1139a 35); ho entos tés psukhés pros
hautén dialogos aneu phone‘s genomenos, tout’auto hémin epo-
nomasthé dianoia — the converse of the soul with itself, without
speech, is what we called thought (Pl. Soph. 263e). Sometimes, as in
has metaxu ti doxés kai nou tén dianoian ousan, which may mean
‘discursive knowledge is between immediate apprehension and falli-
ble opinion’ (P1. Rep. 511d), it seems to have a narrower meaning.
Also some specific thought or intention of an individual: [skopein]
pros tén dianoian tou nomothetou — look to the intention of the
lawgiver (Ar. Rhet. 1374b 13). The verb is dianoeisthai.

diaphora: difference, from the verb diapherein, to differ. Used

generally in obvious ways. The technical name in logic for the feature
which distinguishes one species within a genus. Thus to define any

41
 diaporein — diastatos
species is to give the genus and difference: if man is generically an
animal and the feature distinguishing him from all other animals is
his rationality, then the definition ‘rational animal’ uniquely defines
man among all other things. Informally anticipated by Plato: tén
diaphoran hekastou an lambanéis héi ton allén diapherei, logon, hos
phasi tines, lépséi — ifyou take the difference ofeach thing by which it
differs from other things you will, as some say, get its account
[definition] (P1. Theaet. 208d). Formally in Aristotle: dei gar ton
horizomenon eis to genos thenta tas diaphoras prosaptein — for the
definer must put things into their genus and add the differences (Ar.
Top. 139a 28); ch gar tou genous kai ton diaphorén ta eidé — species
come from the genus and the differences (Ar. Met. 1057b7). The
traditional Latin tag is that definition is per genus et differentiam.
The varieties of diaphora are discussed by Aristotle in Met., Book 4,
Ch. 9. -

diaporein: to go through the aporiai: dei préton diaporésantas

houté deiknunai malista men panta ta endoxa — one must first run
through the difficulties and then establish at best all the accepted
beliefs [when making a philosophical investigation] (Ar. EN. 1145b
2).

diastasis: interval, extension, direction, dimension; see diastatos,

diastéma, diistasthai. (1) As interval, he‘miholién de diastaseén kai
epitritén kai epogdoén genomenén — intervals of a half and 4:3 and an
eighth having come about (P1. Tim. 36a; see also 36b-d); also used of
musical intervals. (2) As extension: séma men gar estin to pantéi
ekhon diastasin — body is what hasextension in every way (Ar. Phys.
204b 20). (3) As direction: and e katé é en alléi tini diastasei ton hex —
up or down or in any of the six directions (Ar. Phys. 206a 6). (4) As
dimension, ei de mé séma esti to tas treis ekhon diastaseis, logou
dee‘sei' peisthénai gar ou rha'i'dion einai ti asématon treis ekhon
diastaseis — if the thing having the three dimensions is not a body,
that will need argument; for one is not easily convinced that there is
something incorporeal that has three dimensions (Simplicius,
Physics 531.9). The slide between senses (2), (3) and (4) can be seen in
such phrases as pasas gar ekhei tas diastaseis — it is extended in all
the directions or it has all the dimensions (Ar. De Caelo 268b 6).

diastatos: extended: on gar diastaton to periekhon — for what

contains them is not extended (Proclus, Elements of Theology 176);

42
 diastéma — diathesis
ton de asématon legonton, hoi men pantéi adiastaton, hoi de
diastaton legousi — of those who say that [place] is incorporeal,
some say that it is altogether unextended, others that it is extended
(Simplicius, Physics 601.16). Not in Plato or Aristotle, but common
in later writers.

diastéma: dimension, interval, sometimes translated extension. As

dimension: diasté‘mata men oun ekhei tria, mékos kai platos kai
bathos, hois horizetai séma pan - it [place] has then three
dimensions, length, breadth and depth, by which all body is defined
(Ar. Phys. 209a 4). As interval: en hekastéi diastémati — in each -
interval (Pl. Tim. 36a); é gar morphé é hulé, é diastéma ti to metaxu
ton eskhatén, é ta eskhata ei mé esti méden diastéma para to tou
eggignomenou sématos megethos — [place] is either form or matter
or some interval between the extremities [of a body] or the
extremities if there is no interval beyond the magnitude of the body
in it (Ar. Phys. 211b 7). Aristotle here and elsewhere entertains the
notion of the diastéma as something independent. Compare to de
diastéma touto hoi men peri Démokriton kai Epikouron kenon einai
legousin, haste pote men plérousthai sématos pote de kai kenon
apoleipeisthai, hoi de Platonikoi kai hoi Stoikoi einai men allo para
ta sémata phasin, aei de séma ekhein — this interval the followers of
Democritus and Epicurus say is void, so that it is sometimes filled
with a body and sometimes left empty, but the Platonists and the
Stoics say that it is something other than body but always contains
a body (Simplicius, Physics 571.27); en metakosmiéi, ho legomen
metaxu kosmén diastéma —- in the intercosmic, which is what we
call the interval between universes (Epicurus, To Pythocles 89.4). A
diastéma may be a one-dimensional distance, or a volume:
diastéma de lego ton grammén hou méden estin exé labein megethos
haptomenon ton grammén — I call the interval (length) of a line that
such that there is no magnitude joined to the line beyond it (Ar. De
Caelo 271b 30); ton megistou topou kai diastématos en héiper estin
ho ouranos — the greatest place and interval in which the heavens
are (Simplicius, Physics 576.19).

diathesis: condition: diapherei de hexis diatheseés téi polu

khronioteron einai — a dispositiOn differs from a condition by being
much longer-lasting (Ar. Cat. 8b 28); mnéme diathesis psukhés —
memory is a condition of the soul (Pl. Def. 414a). More especially,
the order or manner of arrangement: diathesis legetai tou ekhontos

43
 diathigé — dikaiosuné
meré taxis é kata topon, é kata dunamin, é kat’eidos — the
arrangement of what has parts, either spatially or potentially or in
form is called diathesis (Ar. Met. 1022b 1); ameinon diathesis tés
politeias — a better arrangement of the constitution (P1. Laws 710b);
tén men toioutén ou tén heuresin alla tén diathesin epaineton — of
such it is not the invention but the style that is to be praised (P1.
Phaedrus 236a). In pros tous aléthinous philosophous tén diathesin
(P1. Rep. 489a) attitude is the best translation — the attitude
towards true philosophers. The varieties of diathesis are discussed
by Aristotle in Met., Book 4, Ch. 19.

diathigé: a term meaning order, used by the atomists: diapherein

gar phasin to on rhusméi kai diathigéi kai tropéi monon. toutén de
ho men rhusmos skhéma estin, hé de diathigé taxis, hé de tropé
thesis. diapherei gar to de AN tou NA taxei — they say that what
is differs only in rhythm, touching and turning, of which rhythm is
shape, touching is arrangement and turning is position; for AN
differs from NA in arrangement (Ar. Met. 985b 15).

didaskein, didaskalia, didaktos: teach, teaching, taught. Apart

from frequent use in obvious ways, Plato often asks whether areté is
gained by teaching: ara didakton hé areté, é ou didakton
all’askéton, é oute askéton oude mathéton alla phusei paragignetai?
— is excellence taught, or not taught but acquired by training, or
neither acquired by training nor learnt, but something that comes
naturally? (Pl. Meno 70a). Aristotle answers that of two sorts of
areté: hé men dianoétiké to pleion ek didaskalia‘s ekhei kai tén
genesin kai auxésin hé de éthiké ex ethous perigignetai‘ —
excellence of intelligence is mostly acquired and increased by
teaching ... excellence of character by custom (Ar. E.N. 1103315).

dikaiosuné, dikaios, dikaiopragein: conventionally, justice, just,

act justly. The opposites are adikia, adikos, adikein. In fact
dikaiosuné and cognates have a wider sense, perhaps ‘righteous-
ness’, and a narrower sense of ‘fair dealing’. These senses are
explicitly distinguished by Aristotle: eoike de pleonakhés legesthai
hé dikaiosuné kai hé adikia — both seem to be used in different
senses (Ar. E.N. 1129a 26); dikaios estai ho te nomimos kai ho isos —
the dikaios will be both the law-abiding and the fair dealer (Ar.
E.N. 1129a 34); in the wider use: hauté men oun hé dikaiosuné areté
men esti teleia, all’oukh haplés, alla pros heteron — this sort of

44
 dikhotomein — diné
, dikaiosuné is complete excellence [of character] but not simply, but
in relation to other people (Ar. E.N. 1129b 26). Aristotle says that
dia to suneggus einai tén homonumian auton lanthanei — because
the two senses are closely connected the ambiguity escapes notice
(Ar. E.N. 1129a 27); thus when in the Republic Polemarchus offers
the definition to ta opheilomena hekastéi apodidonai dikaion esti —
giving to each man his due is just (Pl. Rep. 331e) — Socrates objects
that returning something to somebody who is insane might be
adikon; but it is clearly not unjust, but improper in some wider
sense. There is a full discussion of all aspects of dikaiosuné in E.N.,
Book 5, where dianemétiké and diorthé‘tiké justice are distin-
guished within dikaiosuné en merei — justice as a part of holé
dikaiosuné — the whole of righteousness. It is clear that the
standard legal accusation against Socrates, Sokratés adikei (Pl.
ApOl. 19b) was not an accusation of injustice in the narrow sense,
but of something wider, in his case of corrupting the young and
introducing strange gods.

dikhotomein, dikhotomia: (1) Cut in two: sématos dikhotométhen-

tos - the body having been cut in two (Ar. Problems 913b 31). (2)
Bisect: dikhotomésas tas tou trapeziou gonias — having bisected the
angles of the trapezium (Simplicius, Physics 62.25); ep’apeiron
einai tén dikhotomian tou apeirou.— the division of the unlimited is
without limit (Simplicius, Physics 1289.7). (3) Logical dichotomy: to
paranomon kai ennomon hekastén dikhotomei touton — being
lawless or law-abiding divides each of these [constitutions] into two
(Pl. Pol. 302e). Aristotle gives no formal account in his logical works
of traditional dichotomous division (e.g. of the class ofAs into B and
not-B); he regards it with contempt: eti sterései men anagkaion
diarein kai diairousin hoi dikhotomountes — also it is necessary for
users of dichotomous division todivide by negation and they do so
[but a negative characteristic cannot provide a diaphora for a
definition] (Ar. Gen. An. 642b 22); so to dikhotemnein téi men
adunaton téi de kenon eirétai — dichotomous division has been
declared in one way impossible and in another empty (Ar. Gen. An.
644b 20).

diné, dinos: vortex, whirl, a concept used by the atomists to explain

the joining together of atoms to form bodies: tés dinés aitias ousés
tés geneseos panton -— [Democritus said that] the vortex was the
cause of the coming to be of everything (Democritus, fr. 565); also of

45
 diorizein — doxa

rotation: tas de kinéseis autc‘m ouk adunaton men gignesthai kata

tén tou holou ouranou dinén — it is not impossible that [the rising of
the sun and moon] may be due to the revolution of the whole heaven
(Epicurus, To Pythocles 92.8). Simplicius tells us that Anaxagoras
explained the extreme position of fire and the centrality of earth
hoti dia ton dinon meson hé gé krateitai — since earth occupies the
middle because of the vortex (Simplicius, Physics 386.24).

diorizein, diorismos: to distinguish, define, distinction, definition:

diorieis oun autois akousia te kai hekousia adikémata? — will you
distinguish between intentional and unintentional wrongdoings?
(Pl. Laws 860e); peri energeias diorisémen ti te estin hé energeia —
concerning actuality, let us define what actuality is (Ar. Met. 1048a
26); hélios kai seléné eis diorismon kai phulakén arithmén
khronou gegonen - the sun and moon came into existence for the
distinction and maintenance of the measures of time (P1. Tim. 38c);
ho men tou pléthous ekei diorismos entautha diaspasmos gegonen —
the distinction of the manifold there [in the intelligible world] here
[in the sensible world] has become a dispersal (Simplicius, Physics
774.14).

diorthétikos: corrective. diorthétiké dikaiosuné, corrective justice,

is one of the two types distinguished by Aristotle, in which someone
who has gained unfairly restores the gain to him who lost: hen de to
en tois sunallagmasi diorthétike‘ — one [type ofjustice] is that which
is corrective in transactions (Ar. E.N. 1131a 1). See dianemétikos.

doxa, doxastos, doxazein: opinion, opinable, to opine. Particularly

in the Republic, Plato made a sharp distinction between the
intelligible world of forms of which gnésis, knowledge, was possible
and the perceptible world of becoming which is only doxastos. This
distinction was the basis of ne0p1atonism: ep’alloi ara tetaktai doxa
kai ep’alléi epistémé — opinion has one object and knowledge
another (Pl. Rep. 477b); oukoun ei to on gnoston, allo ti an doxaston
e to on eié? - surely, if what is is knowable, something other than
what is is opinable? (Pl. Rep. 478b); all’hen ge ti doxazei ho
doxazon? — but he who opines opines some object? (P1. Rep. 478b);
pan gar to on é aisthéton esti, kai dia touto doxaston, é ontos on, kai
dia touto noéton — everything that is is either perceptible and
therefore opinable, or true being, and therefore an object of intellect
(Proclus, Elements of Theology 123); hoti de allo to doxazein kai allo

46
 duas — é

ti to epistasthai edeixen en téi Theaite‘téi Sékrate‘s ex tou doxan men

kai aléthé kai pseudé einai, epistémén de monos aléthé — Socrates
showed in the Theaetetus that opining is one thing and knowing
another through opinion being both true and false, knowledge only
true (Simplicius, Physics 13.10).

, duas: dyad. The dyad was thought to be the first of numbers, one
not being a number, since not a plurality: prété ton arithmén he
duas — the dyad is the first of numbers (Ar. Met. 999a 8); ei de ge
hen monon estin, duas de mé estin, hapsis ouk an eié — if there is
only one and there is no dyad, there could be no connection (Pl.
Parm. 148b); ho gar arithmos estin ek tou henos kai tés duados tés
aoristou - number is from the one and the indefinite dyad (Ar. Met.
1081a 14). What the indefinite dyad is is uncertain and much
discussed. '

dunamis: generally, power, capacity: phésomen dunameis einai

genos ti ton ontén hais dé kai hémeis dunametha ha dunametha —
we shall say that powers are a kind of thing by which we are able to
do what we are able to do (Pl. Rep. 4770); dunameés d’eis ekeino
monon blepé eph’héi te estin kai ho apergazetai — in a power I look
only to its scope and to its results (P1. Rep. 477d). For Aristotle
dunamis is one of his arkhai — basic principles. It is potentiality as
distinct from entelekheia — actuality: hekaston gar tote legetai
hotan entelekheia'i éi, mallon é hotan dunamei — for each thing is
called what it is when it is in actuality, rather than when
potentially (Ar. Phys. 193b 8). It is also contrasted with energeia:
hotan oun eipémen ‘to ginomenon ex ontos gignetai’, ek tou dunamei
ontos phamen to energeiai‘ ginesthai 4 when we say ‘what becomes
comes from what is’, we say that what actually is comes from what
is potentially (Simplicius, Physics 241.3). The varieties of dunamis
are discussed by Aristotle in Met. , Book 4, Ch. 12.

E
é: or. No problems, except that the e is occasionally what
grammarians call the e corrigentis, the corrective e, where a more
accurate expression replaces a less accurate one. Thus Aristotle,
referring to a situation where a kidnapped man is forcibly moved
from one place to another, says that the situation is such that
méden sumballetai ho prattén é ho paskhén (Ar. E.N. 1110a 2)

47
 egkratés — eidos
which does not mean, as some translations say, that nothing is
contributed by either the agent or the patient, but that the agent,
or, more accurately, the patient, contributes nothing.

egkratés: self—controlled, strong-willed, or, in old translations,

continent; egkrateia, self-control. Plato does not distinguish the
egkratés from the séphro‘n: sophrona onta kai egkraté auton
heautou — being temperate and self-controlled (Pl. Gorg. 491d). In
Aristotle being séphrén is incompatible with being egkrate‘s, since
the sophron has, but the egkratés has not, an epithumia,
non-rational appetite, to act in accordance with his proairesis —
rational choice: ouk esti d’oud’hé egkrateia areté — nor is self-control
an excellence (Ar. E.N. 1128b 33); ho d’egkratés eidos hoti phaulai
hai epithumiai ouk akolouthei dia ton logon — the self-controlled,
knowing that his desires are bad, does not follow them because of
reason (Ar. E.N. 1145b 13). But egkrateia, though imperfect, has
merit; the opposed defect is akrasia, lack of self-control. egkrateia
unqualified is in the sphere of bodily appetites, in other areas it is
qualified, as in egkratés thumou - having anger under control:
akrasia kai egkrateia esti monon peri haper akolasia kai
séphrosuné — weakness and strength of will [unqualified] are
concerned only with the same things as intemperance and
temperance (Ar. E.N. 1149a 21).

eidos has a variety of connected meanings, from the way a thing

looks (the word is etymologically connected with video), through its
shape or form, a species or kind of thing, to the intelligible form of
Platonism. As bodily appearance: houtos to eidos pagkalos estin -
he is so very beautiful in appearance (Pl. Charm. 154d). As the
bodily form itself: antepideiknunai to eidos apoduomenos — to strip
and display one’s body in turn (P1. Theaet. 162b). In Aristotle it is
sometimes form in a wider sense in contrast to hulé‘ — matter: eti hé
hulé esti dunamei hoti elthoi an eis to eidos — also matter is that
which potentially might come to be form (Ar. Met. 1050a 15). As a
kind, trité [idea] de enudrion eidos. — a third [type] was the aquatic
race (P1. Tim. 40a); ho boulomai legein to eidos — the sort of thing I
mean (P1. Rep. 477e). As species in the technical sense: ta de gené
diaireta eis eidé — the genera may be divided into species (Ar. Met.
999a 4). As the Platonic intelligible form, of which sensible things
are imperfect copies: tois horémenois eidesi proskhréntai ou peri
toutén dianooumenoi all’ekeinc‘m peri hois tauta eoiken — they make

48
 eikasia — einai

use of the visible kinds not thinking about them but about those
to which they are like (P1. Rep. 510d); touto toinun noéton men to
eidos elegon — it was of that intelligible form that I spoke (P1. Rep.
511a). For connection of the eidos with paradeigmata: estai de
pleio paradeigmata tou autou, hoste kai eidé —- there will be several
paradigms of the same thing, and therefore forms also (Ar. Met.
991a 27); ta men eidé tauta hosper paradeigmata hestanai en téi
phusei, ta de alla toutois proseikenai kai einai homoiomata — that
these forms stand in nature like paradigms and other things are
like them and copies (Pl. Parm. 132d). Some treat the Platonic form
as being a universal, rather than a perfect exemplar, but many of
the texts, such as those given here, do not support this. See also
autos and idea. '

eikasia is important mainly for its use by Plato in his simile of the
divided line in the Republic: kai toi teleutaiéi [tmémati] eikasian
[apodos] — and assign eikasia to the final section (Pl. Rep. 511e).
The objects in the final section are (here physical) eikones, images.
The precise meaning of eikasia is much disputed, but it seems to be
the attempt to gauge the nature of objects from awareness of their
images alone. eikén is common in neoplatonism with reference to
the doctrine that the sensible world is an image of the intelligible:
eikona dei tou aionos ton khronon [einai] — time must be an image of
eternity (Plotinus 3.7.11).

eikén. See eikasia.

einai: to be, to exist; to on: that which is, the rea1;-ousia: being,
essence. This verb caused great philosophical difficulty to the
Greeks and consequential difficulties for us. Much of the trouble
arises from the fact that one can say Platén esti — Plato exists — or
Platén esti philosophos — Plato is a philosopher — making use of the
same verb, whereas in English ‘Plato is’ is at best an unidiomatic
way of saying that he exists. This double use led some earlier Greek
philosophers to think that a sentence beginning Platén ouk esti
must deny the existence of Plato even if the next word is barbaros.
This leads to translation difficulties for us, as for instance with the
sentence ei ti phaneié hoion hama‘on te kai mé on, to toiouton
metaxu keisthai tou eilikrinos ontos kai tou pantos mé ontos (Pl.
Rep. 478d), which might be translated either as ‘if something
should appear such as both to have and not to have a certain

49
 eiréneia — ekei

predicate [we said that] such a thing would lie between being clearly
of that sort and not being so at all’ or as ‘if something should appear
such that it simultaneously exists and does not exist [we said that]
such a thing would lie between clearly existing and not existing at
all’. It was presumably these difficulties that led Parmenides to say
such things as khré to legein te noein t’eon emmenai- esti gar einai,
méden d’ouk estin — that of which one can speak and think must be:
for it is possible for it, but not for nothing, to be (Parmenides in
Simplicius, Physics 117.4). In an impersonal use esti frequently
means ‘it is possible’ as in estin adikounta me‘pé adikon einai — it is
possible to do what is unjust without being an unjust person (Ar.
N.E. 1134a 17), and in the quotation from Parmenides above. There
are also adverbial expressions such as estin hote, sometimes, and
estin hos, in some ways. See on, ousia.

eiréneia: dissimulation or affected ignorance, not irony. It was

regarded as bad: kataphronétikon gar hé eiréneia — for dissimulation
is supercilious (Ar. Rhet. 1379b 31). Thrasymachus refers to he
eiothuia eironeia Sékratous —- the accustomed affected ignorance of
Socrates (Pl. Rep. 337a) — as an accusation; ton men haploun
mimétén tina, ton de eirc‘mikon mimétén thésomen — we shall count
the one a sincere, the other a dissimulating imitator (Pl. Soph. 268a).
The verb is eironeuesthai: eironeuoiso kai panta mallon poiésois é
apokrinoio — you would affect ignorance and do anything rather than
answer (P1. Rep. 337a).

ekei: generally, there. In neoplatonic philosophy it is used to refer to

the intelligible world as distinct from the sensible world ofbecoming
which is enthade, here: saphos tou Platonos ousias tas ideas legontos
kai méde ta entautha sumbebékota hoion dikaiosunén kai séphro-
sunén kai epistémén sugkhorountos en alloi einai ekei — Plato clearly
says that the ideas are substances and does not agree that things like
justice and temperance and knowledge, that here belong to some-
thing, are there in something else (Simplicius, Physics 476.3). This
precise use is not in Plato himself, but he writes of the life of the soul
after death: eukhesthai ge pou tous theous exesti te kai khré tén
metoikésin tén enthende ekeise eutukhé genesthai - presumably it is
permissible and indeed proper to pray to the gods that our removal
from here to there will be fortunate (P1. Phaedo 117C). ta ekeina is
also used of the transcendent: pros tén khoriste‘n ekeinon apatheian
epairomena — aspiring to the separate impassibility of things there

50
 ekhein — eleutheriotés
(Proclus, Republic 2,118.22).

ekhein. As Aristotle says: to ekhein pollakhos legetai — it has many

meanings. None are specifically philosophical, but see the distinct-
ions made by Aristotle in Met. , Book 4, Ch. 23 and LSJ.

ekkrisis: in Anaxagoras, the separating out of the homoeomeries

from the original confusion; this is distinct from the sugkrisis and
diakrisis, conjunction and separation, that occur as individual
bodies come into or go out of existence: Anaxagoras de ekkrinesthai
tas homoiomereias apo tou migmatos leg6n° kai hé sugkrisis de kai hé
diakrisis kai hé ekkrisis kinéseis tines eisin — Anaxagoras says that
the homoeomeries are separated out from the mixture; and conjunc-
tion, separation, and separation out are all processes (Simplicius,
Physics 1120.22).

elegkhos: usually refutation, sometimes proof, but then normally in

an adversative situation: elegkhos esti tou Pittakou rhématos — it is a
refutation of the saying of Pittacus (Pl. Prot. 344b); khalepon de se
elegxai, 6 Sékrates — it is hard to refute you, Socrates (Pl. Gorg. 470d).
As proof: haste toutoi téi tropoi k’an tauta elegkhois, ei bouloio, hos
hapanta estin homoia allélois — so inthis way you could prove, if you
wanted to, that everything is like everything else (Pl. Prot. 331e).
Peri Sophistikon Elegkhon — ‘Concerning Sophistical Refutations’ —
is the title of one of Aristotle’s logical works; the phrase therein: tén
tou elegkhou agnoian (168a 18), was translated into Latin as
ignoratio elenchi, but Aristotle was referring to the whole variety of
ways in which refutations may go wrong, whereas the Latin phrase
is now used to mean ‘a logical fallacy consisting in disproving some
statement different from that advanced by an opponent’ (Shorter
OED); so it would be better to translate the Greek as ‘not under-
standing the nature of refutation’.

eleutheriotés: in a wide sense, behaviour suitable to an eleutheros —

a free man, but its important use in philosophy is in the sense of
liberality with regard to money: pros tén ton khre‘maton eleuther-
iotéta thaumastos — remarkable in regard to liberality with money
(P1. Theaet. 144d). It is one of the éthikai aretai, excellences of
character, discussed by Aristotle: dokei dé einai hé peri khrémata
mesotés —[1iberality] seems to be the mean with regard to money (Ar.
E.N. 1119b 22); hé asotia kai aneleutheria peri khrémata huperbolai

51
 elleipsis — empsukhos
kai elleipseis — lavishness and illiberality are excesses and
deficiencies about money (Ar. E.N. 1119b 27).

elleipsis: in general, any deficiency, the opposite being huperbolé‘,

excess: kai tis allé anaxia hédonéi pros lupén estin all’hé huperbolé
allé‘lén kai elleipsis? — what other demerit has pleasure with regard
to distress except their relative excess and deficiency? [i.e. pleasure
is bad only if it is relatively small and causes greater distress] (Pl.
Prot. 356a). In Aristotle’s ethics, éthiké areté, excellence of
character, is mesotés duo kakién, tés men kath’huperbolén, tés de
kat’elleipsin — a mean between two faults, one of excess, the other of
deficiency (Ar. E.N. 1107a 2); it is thus opposed in different ways to
an excellence and to a fault at the opposite extreme.

empeiros: experienced; empeiria: experience. Usually in a good

sense: dei prosekhein ton empeiron kai presbuteron é phrdnimon
tais anopodeiktais phasesi kai doxais oukh hétton ton apodeixeén-
dia gar to ekhein ek tés empeirias omma horésin orthos — one must
attend to the unproved sayings and beliefs of the experienced and
older or wise; for through their experience they have an eye and see
correctly .(Ar. E.N. 1143b 11). empeiria is also used, often
disapprovingly, of a practice denied to be a skill or craft because it
lacks a theory, as in Socrates’ attack on rhetoric: ouk estin tekhné
all’empeiria kai tribé‘ -— it is not a skill but a practice based on
experience (Pl. Gorg. 463b). Used especially of those who in
medicine rely on experience rather than scientific theory,
sometimes with disapproval: iatros ton tais empeiriais aneu logou
tén iatrikén metakheirizomen'on- — one of those physicians who on
the basis of experience take part in the medical craft without
rational basis (Pl. Laws 8570). But some physicians accepted the
name and called themselves empeirikoi — empiricists — in
opposition to the dogmatic and methodical schools of medicine, like
Sextus Empiricus, who was a sceptic in philosophy and an
empiricist in medicine.

empsukhos: having a soul, animate. Usually in neuter empsukhon,

empsukha, with soma, body, understood: legomen dioristhai to
empsukhon tou apsukhou toi zén kai ta phuomena panta dokei
zén — we say that the ensouled is distinguished from the soulless by
living and all things that grow seem to be alive (Ar. De An. 413a
21); empsukhon ekeino legetai to psukhés metekhon — that thing is

52
 enantios — endekhesthai
said to be ensouled that has a share in soul (Proclus, Elements of
Theology 188); hothen hé kinésis kai hou heneka kai has ousia ton
empsukhon sématén hé psukhé aitia — the soul is the efficient and
final and formal cause of ensouled bodies (Ar. De An. 415b 10); dei
legein tonde ton kosmon zéion empsukhon ennoun te — one must say
that this universe is an animal with a soul and intelligent (Pl. Tim.
30b). Thus all living things have souls in philosophical usage; but
with reference to foods vegetables are usually classed as apsukha:
apsukhén men ekhomenoi pantén, empsukhon de t’ounantion
pantén apekhomenoi —- partaking of all inanimate foods but
abstaining from all ensouled (Pl. Laws 782C).

enantios: in general, opposed in any way; in specialised

philosophical use, contrary. Contraries may be either propositions
' or kinds of thing. Contrary propositions, such as ‘All A is B’ and ‘No
A is B’, are distinct from contradictories, such as ‘All A is B’ and
‘Some A is not B’: ou gar esontai oudamos hai protaseis out’enantiai
out’antikeimenai — these propositions will in no way be either
contraries or contradictories (Ar. An. Po. 64a 18). To any kind of
thing only one other kind is contrary: heni hekastén ton enantion
hen monon est’enantion kai ou polla — to each contrary one thing
only is contrary and not many (Pl. Prot. 332C); this enabled
Aristotle to detect the pollakhos legomena, things named
ambiguously, by their havingapparently two contraries: toi oxei en
phonéi men enantion to burn, en ogkéi de to amblu- délon oun hoti to
enantion téi oxei pollakhos legetai — to the oxu in sound the contrary
is ‘deep’, in a mass it is ‘blunt’; so it is clear that the opposite of oxu
[and consequently oxu itself] is ambiguous [which is why in English '
we must in one case translate oxu as ‘high’, in the other as ‘sharp’].
Aristotle gives a fuller analysis of the uses ofenantios in Met. 1018a
20 ff. ' '

endekhesthai: to be possible. Aristotle says that the verb may be

used in wider or narrower senses of ‘possible’: pollakhos legetai to
endekhesthai- kai gar to anagkaion kai to mé anagkaion kai to
dunaton endekhesthai legomen — ‘to be possible’ is ambiguous; for it
may include the necessary or only the not necessary or only the
potential (Ar. An. Pr. 25a 27). But usually the endekhomena allos
ekhein — things that may be otherwise — are contrasted with the
necessary and invariable that are me endekhomena allos ekhein: to
de endekhomenon mé einai phtharton — that which may not exist is

53
 energeia — ennoia
perishable (Ar. Met. 1050b 12); [auto to on] oudamé oudamos
alloiosin oudemian endekhetai — [the real] never in any way allows of
any change (P1. Phaedo 78d); oute gegonen ho pas ouranos out’en-
dekhetai phtharénai — the whole heaven has neither come into
existence nor is capable ofceasing to exist (Ar. De Caelo 283b 26); esti
de tekhné pasa peri genesin kai to tekhnazein kai theérein hopés
genétai ti ton endekhomenon kai einai kai mé einai — every craft is
concerned with coming to be and contriving and thinking how to
bring into existence something that can either be or not be (Ar. E.N.
1140a 10); oudeis de bouleuetai peri ton mé endekhomenon allés
ekhein — nobody plans about things that cannot be otherwise (Ar.
E.N. 1139a 13).

energeia: in a general sense, activity. Plato does not use the word
but, non-technically, uses the adjective energos once: dikastas ener-
gous ontas — magistrates while in office (Pl. Laws 674b). Technically
it is usually opposed, as actuality, in a wider sense to dunamis,
potentiality, or, in a narrower sense, as activity, to kinésis, process:
esti dé energeia to huparkhein to pragma mé hosper legomen dun-
amei — actuality is the existence of a thing not in the way we call
potential (Ar. Met. 1048a 30); metaballei pan ek tou dunamei ontos
eis to energeia’z’ on, hoion ek leukou dunamei eis to energeia't' leukon —
everything changes from what it is potentially to what it is actually,
as from being potentially white to being actually white (Ar. Met.
1069b 15). The distinction between energeia and kinésis is explained
by Aristotle at Met. 1048b 18 ff. and further elucidated in the first
four chapters of ‘E.N., Book 10, Chs 1-4. An activity is complete in
itself at any time, so that hora't' hama kai heorake — one has seen as
soon as one sees (Ar. Met. 1048b 23); dokei gar hé men horasis
kath’hontinoun khronon teleion einai — for sight seems to to be
complete at any time (Ar. E.N. 1174a 14). But ou gar hama
oikodoméi kai 6ikodoméken — [building is a kinésis] for one has not
built [e.g. a temple] as soon as one is building it (Ar. Met. 1048b 30).
But Aristotle often speaks ofkinésis as a type ofenergeia: anagké ara
oikodomésin tén energeian einai, hé d’oikodomésis kinésis tis — so the
activity must be house-building; but house-building is a process (Ar.
Met. 1066a 5).

ennoéma. See ennoia. ’

ennoia, ennoein: a thought, to think of: am oukhi tauto dikaios

54
 entelekheia — enulos
legomen hoti anemnésthé hou tén ennoian elaben - do we not rightly
say that when somebody thinks of- something he recalls it? (P1.
Phaedo 73c). ennoia sometimes, and ennoéma normally, are more
specialised and should be translated ‘concept’: ou khoris tés ton
arithmon ennoias katalambanetai — it is not comprehended without
the concept of number (Sextus Empiricus, Adversus Mathematicos
7.101); ta gené kai ta eidé ennoémata estin — genera and species are
concepts [not realities] (Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism
2.219).

entelekheia: to de tés entelekheias onoma legetai men autou tou

Aristotelous idion- sémainei to eidos to energeiai’ on — entelekheia is
a word that is Aristotle’s own; it means the form that is actualised
(Simplicius, Physics 278.6). Usually translated as actuality or
perfection: to onoma energeia legetai kata to ergon kai sunteinei
pros tén entelekheian — the word energeia isused with reference to
the ergon [function] and it itself tends to the actuality (Ar. Met.
1050a 22); with reference to this passage (though he misprints
energeia as entelekheia) Ross says: ‘It appears that strictly speaking
energeia means activity or actualisation, while entelekheia means
the resulting actuality or perfection. For the mostpart Aristotle
treats the two words as synonyms’ (note to De An. 402a 26); psukhé
estin entelekheia hé prote‘ somatos phusikou dunamei zoén ekhontos
— soul is the first actuality of a natural body that potentially has life
(Ar. De An. 412a 27).

enthade: generally, here; technically, in neoplatonism, in the world

of becoming as opposed to ekei, the world of being: he? de ekei
sumphués holotés entautha diestosa sunekhés posotés enulos esti —
what is there [in the world of being] a compact whole here [in the
world of becoming] continually breaks apart as material quantity
(Simplicius, Physics 774.15). téide is often used, like enthade, of the
world of becoming by neoplatonists.

enulos: formed from en, in, and hulé, matter. It refers to immaterial
things, especially forms and souls, that are contained in matter; the
opposite is aiilos. Not in Plato and only once in Aristotle: ei d’houtos
ekhei, délon hoti ta pathé logoi enuloi eisin — if this is so it is clear
that emotions are thoughts in matter (Ar. De An. 403a 25); hé
enulos kai gennétiké psukhé — the soul engaged in matter and
becoming (Plotinus 2.3.17); ta enula eidé kai akhorista tés hulés —

55
 epagein — epainetos
forms that are in matter and inseparable from it (Simplicius, Physics
1.16); kai to eidos dc to enulon saphés oimai paradidosin en hois kai
to aiilon eidos '— and I think that he clearly teaches of the form in
matter where he also does of the immaterial form (Simplicius,
Physics 26.18). Ross, in his edition of De Anima, says that enulos
there (403a 25) means ‘containing a reference to matter’, which
would be quite different from its usual meaning.

epagein: generally, to lead on; ‘leading on’ is one non-technical use of

the noun epagégé‘. Philosophically, the central notion is that of
leading oneself or others to some general concept or some universal
truth from less general or particular cases falling under them; thus
one might conclude that all animals that chew the cud have cloven
hooves from observation of cows, deer, etc. The accepted translation
is induction, but epagégé‘ resembles only induction by simple enu-
meration among methods called inductive in modern times. epagein
autous epi ta mépé gignoskomena — lead them on to things not yet
known (Pl. Pol. 278a); epagégé hé apo ton kath’hekasta epi to
katholou ephodos — induction is the approach to the universal from
particular cases (Ar. Top. 105a 13); hé epagoge‘ ek tan kata meros —
induction is from the partial (Ar. An. Po. 81b 1); [khré] ei men peri
arkhés tinos ho logos di’epagége‘s autén pistousthai (tas gar arkhas
apo ton husteron anagké bebaiousthai) — one should, if the question
is about some principle, support it by induction (for first principles
must be confirmed by what is posterior to them) (Simplicius, Physics
1185.27); arkhai de apodeixeés kai ta phainomena ek tés enargous
aisthéseos kai ton kata meros kai halos hé epagégé kaloumené — for
the starting points of proof are what is apparent from plain percep-
tion and from partial cases, and generally so-called induction
(Simplicius, Physics 49.27). For a full investigation of Aristotle’s
usage see Ross’s commentary on Prior Analytics, Book 2, Ch. 23.

epainetos: praiseworthy; epainein: to praise; epainos: praise. These

require no comment except for Aristotle’s important distinction of
timia, things to be prized, from epaineta, things to be praised: epi-
skepsometha peri tés eudaimonias potera ton epainetén esti é mallon
ton timion — let us consider whether happiness is among things to be
praised or. rather things to be prized (Ar. E.N. 1101b 10). The con-
trary of epainetos is psektos, blameworthy. Desire for the kalon is
especially praiseworthy: hai epithumiai ton men kalon epainetai —
desires for fine things are praiseworthy (Ar. E.N. 1175b 28).

56
 ephesis —- epieikeia
ephesis: aim; ephiesthai: to aim. In Plato and Aristotle used of
peOple: to tou aristou ephiesthai — the striving for the best (Pl. Laws
864b); hé de tou telous ephesis ouk authairetos — the aimat the goal is
not self-chosen (Ar. EN. 1114b 6). But later used also of the
inanimate: ho gar estin orexis en tois empsukhois, touto en tois
. apsukhois phusikois de ephesis — for what is appetition in living
things is nisus in natural inanimate bodies (Simplicius, Physics
250.22); tén ephesin tés tou oikeiou topou katale‘pseés - the nisus to
take possession of its proper place (Simplicius, Physics 533.20).

epibolé: literally, throwing upon. It is an important but puzzling

term in the writings of Epicurus, especially in the phrase epibolé tés
dianoias, which seems to mean the projection of the intelligence
upon something and thus attention to it. eti te kata tas aisthéseis dei
panta té‘rein kai haplos kata tas parousas epibolas eite dianoias
eith’hotou dépou ton krite‘rién - we must keep all our investigations
in accord with our perceptions, and especially with the accompany-
ing projections of the intelligence or of any whatsoever of the
instruments of judgment (Epicurus, To Herodotus 38); epei to ge
theoroumenon pan é kat’epibolén lambanomenon téi dianoia'z' aléthes
estin — everything that we perceive 0r grasp by projection of the
intelligence is true (Epicurus, To Herodotus 62). Elsewhere with a
similar meaning: tén epibolén tés dianoias eis heterogenes — the
projection of the intelligence on the heterogeneous (Sextus Empi-
ricus, Adversus Mathematicos 3.54). In a less specialised sense: nun
legei kat’allén epibolén — he now discourses making a different
approach (Simplicius, Physics 1258.8).

epieikeia, epieikés: in a wider sense, worthiness, worthy; epieikés 6n

tén psukhén — being good in soul (Pl. Symp. 210b); ei mé panu phusei
eié epieikés — unless he be naturally very good (P1. Rep. 5380). The
contrary is phaulos, phaulotés, worthless(ness): diapherouson ton
energeién epeikeia'z‘ kai phaulotéti — the activities differing in worthi-
ness and worthlessness (Ar. E.N. 1175b 24). In a narrower sense,
epieikeia is a kind of fairness going beyond mere legality, sometimes
called equity: to epieikes dikaion men estin, ou to kata nomon de,
all’epanorthéma nomimou dikaiou héi elleipei dia tou katholou —
the equitable is just, not however legal justice, but a correction ofthe
legally just where the law is deficient through its generality (Ar.
E.N. 1137b 12). '

57
 epikhairekakia — epistémé
epikhairekakia: literally, rejoicing over misfortunes, in German
Schadenfreude. Most implausibly stated by Aristotle to be one of the
defects associated with nemesis, righteous indignation: nemesis de
mesotés phthonou kai epikhairekakias eisi de peri lupén kai hédonén
tas epi tois sumbainousi tois pelas ginomenas — righteous indig-
nation is a mean between envy and Schadenfreude; they are con-
cerned with distress and pleasure over the fortunes of neighbours
(Ar. E.N. 1108b 1).

epikheirein: in general, to attempt, to put one’s hand to a task. More

specifically, to argue tentatively: hoper arti epekheiroun — as I was
recently arguing (Pl. Theaet. 205a). In the logic of Aristotle and
works following it, an epikheiréma is a dialectical argument that
fails to have full probative force: esti de philosophéma men sullo-
gismos apodeiktikos, epikheiréma de sullogismos dialektikos - a
philosophism is a demonstrative argument, an epicheirema a dialec-
tical argument (Ar. Top. 162a 15).

epikheiré‘ma. See epikheirein.

epipedon: originally, a floor under foot, and so something of two

dimensions, a surface, a plane: megethous de to men eph’hen
gramme“, to de epi duo epipedon, to de epi tria soma — of magnitudes
the one-dimensional is a line, the two-dimensional a surface and the
three-dimensional a body (Ar. De Caelo 268a 7). As adjective, plane:
kata suntreis epipedous génias mian sterean g6nian poiei — where
three plane angles meet they make one solid angle (Pl. Tim. 54e). In
Plato and in geometrical Contexts the epipedon is always a plane, but
Aristotle sometimes uses it of any two-dimensional surface: dokei
epipedon ti einai kai hoion aggeion ho topos kai periekhon — place
seems to be a surface and like a vessel that contains (Ar. Phys. 212a
28). Compare the comment of Simplicius: dio kai auton [topon]
epipedon ekalesen, hos tan palaién pasan. epiphaneian epipedon
kalounton — so Aristotle called place also a plane, since of old they
called every surface a plane (Simplicius, PhySics 587 .18).

‘ epiphaneia: a surface. See epipedon.

epistémé: knowledge; epistasthai: to know; episté‘tos: known. In

general, used in the same contexts as the translations are in English,
by philosophers as well as others. But in strict philosophical use

58
 epistrephein, epistrophé
epistémé is possible only of the unchanging and necessary, the forms
in Plato and the mé endekhomena allos ekhein in Aristotle, and
similarly in their followers. That of which epistémé is impossible is
the object of doxa: ep’alléi tetaktai doxa kai ep’alloi epistémé
epistémé men epi toi onti pephuke — beliefis assigned to one thing and
knowledge to another knowledge is assigned to reality (Pl. Rep.
477b); enioi gar pisteuousin ouden hétton hois doxazousin é heteroi
hois epistantai — some people trust their beliefs no less than others
their knowledge (Ar. E.N. 1146b 29); pantes gar hupolambanomen,
ho epistametha méd’endekhesthai allés ekhein — for We all under-
stand that what we know is incapable of being otherwise (Ar. E.N.
1139b 19); ex anagkés ara esti to epistéton, ai’dion ara — what is
known is necessary and therefore everlasting (Ar. E.N. 1139b 23).
Aristotle holds that what is epistéton is provable, so first principles
are objects not ofepistémé but ofnous: tés arkhé‘s tou epistétou out’an
epistémé eié . . . leipetai noun einai ton arkhon — the basic principles of
knowledge are not known it remains that basic principles are
intuited (Ar. E.N. 1140b 33); kai tote legomen epistasthai hotan ta
aitia gnorisomen ton onton — only when we recognise the causes of
things do we say that we have knowledge (Proclus, Elements of
Theology 11).

epistrephein, epistrophé: to revert, reversion. These are key techni-

cal terms of neoplatonism. In neoplatonism everything comes into '
being by proodos from something that it resembles as an inferior
. copy, everything ultimately coming from the hen, the One; but being
inferior it has an orexis to epistrephein, revert, to that from which it
proceeds: pan to pro'ion apo tinos kat’ousian epistrephetai pros ekeino
aph’hou proeisin — anything that proceeds from anything reverts in
respect of its being upon that from which it proceeds (Proclus,
Elements of Theology 31); pasa epistrophé di’homoiotétos apoteleitai
ton epistrephomenon pros ho epistrephetai — all reversion is accom-
plished through a likeness of the reverting things to the goal of
reversion (Proclus, Elements of Theology 32); psukhé de kai ho
polutimétos nous apo tou menontos proeléluthe kai epestraptai pros
auto - soul and the much-valued intuition proceeded from the
unchanging and reverted to it (Simplicius, Physics 147 .9). The whole
doctrine arises from the account in the Timaeus of the demiurge
making the sensible world in the likeness of the intelligible world,
but inferior to it.

59
 epithumia — érema
epithumia: the non-rational appetite for pleasure, particularly the
simple bodily pleasures, such as eating, drinking and sex, which
man shares with other animals; epithumein: to desire; epithuméti-
kon: concerned with appetite. epithumia is distinguished from other
types oforexis, such as boulésis, by its non-rationality: to de hoi era'z'
te kai peinéi kai dipséi [hé psukhé] kai peri tas allas epithumias
eptoétai alogiston te kai epithumétikon, ple‘réseon tinon kai he‘donén
hetairon — that with which [the soul] lusts and hungers and thirsts
and is concerned with the other appetites is non-rational and appe-
titive, the companion ofcertain fillings and pleasures (Pl. Rep. 439d).
Parallel to Plato’s distinction of three elements in the soul Aristotle
distinguishes three kinds oforexis, which is appetition in the widest
sense: orexis men gar epithumia kai thumos kai boulésis —- appe-
tition is desire, and anger and rational wish (Ar. De An. 414b 2).
According to Aristotle all animals have some aisthésis — at least
haphé, touch: ei de aisthé‘sin, kai phantasian kai orexin- hopou men
gar aisthésis kai lupé kai hé‘doné‘, hopou de tauta ex anagkés kai
epithumia — if they have sensation they also have imagination and
appetition: for where there is sensation there is distress and pleas-
ure, and where there are these there is also desire (Ar. De An. 413b
22).

érema: gently; éremaios: gentle. Both used by Plato in a non-

technical sense: paramutheisthai auton kai peithein érema — encou-
rage him and persuade him gently (P1. Rep. 476e); éremaias men
lupas, éremaias de hédonas — mild distresses and mild pleasures (Pl.
Laws 734a). In natural philosophy the verb éremein applies to
anything not in motion: anagké é éremein é kineisthai pan — every-
thing is necessarily either at rest or in motion (Ar. Phys. 232a 12);
enantion gar éremia kinései — for rest is the contrary of motion (Ar.
Phys. 226b 15). But more strictly é‘remia applies only to things that
may be en kinései, in motion: on gar pan to akinéton éremei alla to
esterémenon kinéseos pephukos de kineisthai — for not everything
motionless is at rest, but that which is deprived of motion but
naturally moves (Ar. Phys. 221b‘12); héi gar hé kinésis huparkhei,
toutoi hé akinésia éremia — for in that to which motion belongs, its
lack of motion is rest (Ar. Phys. 202a 5). éremésis kai to éremizesthai
tén kinésis déloi tén ep’éremian — ‘coming to rest’ and ‘to come to rest’
mean the change towards rest (Simplicius, Physics 1001.24). The
lack of motion that is invariable is sometimes called moné: tén apo
kinéseés kai éremias exéirémenén monén - [Xenophanes calls] that

60
 ergon - eskhatos
which is exempt from motion and rest immobility (Simplicius,
Physics 23.14). The noun moné, immobility, should not be confused
with the feminine adjective moné, alone.

ergon: a task, a function, or a product, so work in the'widest sense. In

the sense of task or function: touto hekastou ergon ho an é monon ti é
kallista ton allén apergazetai - that is the task (function) of each
thing which either it alone can perform or performs better than
anything else (Pl. Rep. 353a); poteron oun tektonos men kai skuteos
estin erga tina kai praxeis, anthropou d’ouden estin, all’argon
pephuken? — have, then, the builder and the shoemaker certain
functions and pursuits, but man has none, but is without function?
(Ar. E.N. 1097b 28). In the sense of a product: en toutois beltié
pephuke ton energeién ta erga — in these, the works (products) are
more valuable than the activities (Ar. E.N. 1094a 5).

eris: strife, warfare, contention in a general sense. Used philosophi-

cally by Heraclitus to denote a cosmic principle: eidenai khré ton
polemon eonta xunon, kai dikén erin, kai ginomena panta kat’erin '
kai khreon — one should know that war is common and justice is
strife, and all things are produced by strife and necessity (Heracli-
tus, fr. 80); cf. Hérakleitos to antixoun sumpheron kai ek ton diapher-
onton kallistén harmonian, kai panta kat’erin ginesthai — Heraclitus
says that it is what opposes that helps and from different notes '
comes the fairest tune, and all things are produced by strife (Ar. E.N.
1155b 4).

eristiké is derived from eris and used to denote unscrupulous

argument for the sake of victory, in contrast to dialektiké‘, which
aims at truth. The eristikos argues in that way. The adverb is
eristikés. tén eristikén tekhnén aphorismenos — having set the
eristic skill on one side (Pl. Soph. 231e); oukoun dei peithesthai toutéi
toi eristikoi logoi — we should not trust this eristic argument (Pl.
Meno 81d); hotan phainétai sumperainesthai mé sumperainomenos,
ho kaleitai eristikos sullogismos — when [an argument] seems to
prove a conclusion but does not, which is called an eristic syllogism
(Ar. Top. 162b 3).

eskhatos: last, in all ordinary uses. It has three particular philos-

Ophical meanings. (1) The extremity of a body: en t’autoi gar ta
eskhata tou periekhontos kai tou periekhomenou — for the extremities

61
 ethos — éthos

of the surrounding bodies and the surrounded body are in the same
place (Ar. Phys. 211b 11); hémeis de to tou pantos eskhaton and
legomen — but we call the extremity of the universe above (Ar. De
Caelo 308a 21). '(2) The term that appears last in a syllogism as
written by Aristotle. Thus in ‘If S belongs to all M and M belongs to
all P then S belongs to all P’, P is the eskhaton: hotan oun horoi treis
houtos ekhosi pros allélous haste ton eskhaton en holoi einai toi mesoi
kai ton meson en holoi toi protoi é einai é mé einai, anagké‘ tan akrén
einai sullogismon teleion — so when three terms are so related that
the last term is Wholly in the middle and the middle is wholly in or
excluded from the first, the extremes must form a perfect syllogism
(Ar. An. Pr. 25b 32). (3) In neoplatonism, the lowest and last kind of
beings in the order of reality: panta gar exéptai tan theon, kai ta men -
ex allon, ta de ex allon prolampetai, kai hai seirai mekhri ton
eskhaton kathékousi — for all things depend on the gods, some being
irradiated by one god, some by another, and the series reaches down
to the last orders of being (Proclus, Elements of Theology 145).

ethos: habit, custom; ethizein: to accustom, to habituate. Sometimes

an ethos is a mere unthinking habit: hai miméseis, ean ek neén porro
diatelesosin, eis ethé te kai phusin kathistantai — mimicry, if it
continues for a time from youth onwards, turns into a habit and
becomes natural (Pl. Rep. 395d). But ethizein is often to accustom to
a policy or way of life rather than to imprint a habit: kai touto
ethizein, tou Hellénikou genous pheidesthai — to accustom [the
soldiers] to spare those of Greek race (P1. Rep. 469C); hoi gar
nomothetai tous politas ethizontes poiousin agathous — for the law-
givers make the citizens good by accustomisation (Ar. EN. 1103b 3).
We get used to behaving well, but our actions are governed by reason
not unthinking habit, according to Aristotle.

ethos: a way of life, a disposition, a character; éthikos: concerned

with character: pothen hama pra't‘on kai megalothumon e‘thos
heurésomen? — where might we find a disposition that is both gentle
and high-spirited? (Pl. Rep. 375c); diapherei d’ouden neos tén héli-
kian e to ethos nearos — there is no difference between one who is
young in years and one Who is childish in character (Ar. E.N. 1095a
6); peri proaireseos hepetai dielthein° oikeiotaton gar einai dokei téi
aretéi kai mallon ta éthé krinein ton praxeon — it follows to discuss
choice; for it seems to be very closely connected with excellence and
to distinguish characters better than actions do (Ar. E.N. 1111b 5).

62
 eudaimon — euesto

éthiké areté is excellence of character, not moral virtue: dittés tés

aretés ousés, tés men dianoétikés, tés de éthikés — excellence being of
two sorts, one of intelligence, the other of character (Ar. E.N. 1103a
14).

eudaimén comes from eu, well, and daimén, a divinity: eudaimonié

ouk yen boskémasin oikei oude en khruséz‘ psukhé oikétérion dai-
monos — eudaemonia does not reside in cattle or in gold; the soul is
the dwelling-place of the divinity (Democritus in Stobaeus, Anthol-
ogy 2.7.31). Traditionally translated as ‘happy’, but in general use
‘Well of might often do, since it can mean little more than econom-
ically prosperous. But usually in general use and always in philos-
ophy it is the adjective denoting the life that is most worth living or
the man who lives that life. eudaimonia is the state of such who live
that life. These terms never refer to a temporary state of conscious-
ness as ‘happy’ frequently does. ti to pantc‘m akrotaton ton praktén
agathon- onomati men oun skhedon hupo ton pleistén homologeitai-
tén gar eudaimonian kai hoi polloi kai hoi kharientes legousin, to de
eu zén kai to ea prattein t’auton hupOlambanousi toi eudaimonein —
as to what is the highest of attainable goods, in name it is agreed
upon by practically everybody; for both the many and the refined say
that it is eudaemonia, and understand living well and faring well to
be the same thing as being eudaemon (Ar. E.N. 1095a 16). One
cannot be counted eudaemon ifone is going to fall into misery later in
life, which is why oudena anthrépon eudaimonisteon heés an zéi,
kata Solona de khreon telos horan — one should call no man happy
while he is alive, but as Solon said, wait to see the end (Ar. E.N.
1100a 15). Thus eudaimonia is a quality of life, not an ingredient in
it: hé gar eudaimonia estin ek tinon agathon sugkeimene“ ou gar estin
allo ti khoris touton hé eudaimonia, alla tauta — for eudaemonia is
composed of certain goods; for eudaemonia is not something
different from these, but these (Ar. Magna Moralia 1184a 27). The
contrary of eudaimén may be kakodaimon, but it is more often
athlios. This view of eudaimonia is not especially Aristotelian:
meletan oun khré ta poiounta tén eudaimonian, ei per parousés autés
panta ekhomen, apousés de panta prattomen eis to tautén ekhein — so
one ought to study the things that make eudaemonia, since when it is
present we have everything and when it is absent we do everything
to gain it (Epicurus, To Menoeceus 122).

euesté: one of the words used by Democritus as a synonym of

63
 euthumia — gé
eudaimonia, and literally meaning well-being: telos d’einai tén
euthumian ... kath’hé‘n gale‘nés ... hé psukhé diagei ...; kalei d’autén
kai euesto — the end is to be of good heart through which the soul
lives calmly ...; he [Democritus] also calls it well-being (Diogenes
Laertius, Lives 9.45). '

euthumia: as euthumié, a synonym of eudaimonia in Democritus;

he wrote a work called Peri euthumiés. The adjective is euthumos,
cheerful, of good heart: ho men euthumos eis erga epipheromenos
dikaia kai nomima kai hupar kai onar khairei te kai errétai kai
anakédés estin — the man of good heart takes himself to right and
lawful deeds and rejoices both awake and asleep; he is strong and
free from care (Democritus in Stobaeus, Anthology 2.9.3). See euesté. '

exairein: in general use, to take out or remove. The perfect passive

participle exéirémenos can be used in that sense, as in kata mesén
tén meizo ton ne‘son exéirémenos hippodromos — a hippodrome carved
out in the middle of the bigger island (Pl. Critias 117c). But it is the
standard neoplatonic term meaning ‘transcendent’ and applied to
such things as are amethekta — unmixed with the transitory world of
becoming and thus kathara, pure: to men gar amethekton
exéirémenon ton metekhonton, apogenna't ta metekhesthai dun-
amena — for the unparticipated that transcends the participated,
generates things that can be participated (Proclus, Elements of
Theology 23); téi de amiktoi pros ta en topoi onta ousia'i' kai téi
exéirémenéi katharotéti oudamou estin — but by its mode of being
that is unmixed with what is in place, and by its transcendent purity,
it is nowhere (Proclus, Elements ofTheology 98); tén apo kine‘seos kai
é‘remias exéirémenén monén — its immobility that transcends motion
_ and rest (Simplicius, Physics 23.14). The adverb is exéirémenés,
trans’cendentally.

G
gé: earth, first named as one of the four basic elements, stoikheia in
Aristotle’s terminology, by Empedocles: houtos de ta men sématika
stoikheia poiei tettara, pur kai aera kai hudor kai gén —— he
[Empedocles] makes the bodily elements four, fire and air and
water and earth (Simplicius, Physics 25.21). Earth should be
understood to include all solids, as water is all liquids. These four
elements were accepted by most later philosophers: pur kai hudor

64
 genesis — genos
kai gén kai aera phusei panta einai kai ta meta tauta au somata —
[wise men] - say that fire and water and earth and air all exist
naturally and after them bodies in their turn (Pl. Laws 889b);
estin hekastou phora tis ton haplén somatén, hoion toi puri men and
téi de géi katé kai pros to meson — there is a natural locomotion for
each of the simple bodies, as upwards for fire and for the earth
downwards and towards the middle [ofthe universe] (Ar. Phys. 214b
13). he gé‘ is the earth as in English: tén mentoi idean tés gés hoian
pepeismai einai kai tous topous autés ouden me kéluei legein — there
is nothing to stop me saying what I believe to be the shape of the
earth and what, are its regions (Pl. Phaedo 108d).

genesis, gignesthai. (1) Birth, being born: prin kai genesthai hémas
- before we were even born (Pl. Phaedo 88a). (2) Becoming, to
become. Aristotle distinguishes absolute becoming (coming to be)
from becoming somehow: phamen gar ton manthanonta gignesthai
men epistémona, gignesthai d’haplos ou — for we say that he who
learns becomes learned, but not that he comes to be absolutely (Ar.
De Gen. et Cor. 318a 35). Sometimes the distinction is not heeded and
genesis covers all change: ti to on aei, genesin de ouk ekhon, kai ti to
gignomenon men aei, on de oudepote — what that is that ever is and
admits no becoming, and what the ever becoming that never is (P1.
Tim. 27d); oukoun ei men ousian anagkazei theasasthai, prosékei, ei
de genesin, ou prosékei — if [a study] compels him to contemplate
being, it is suitable, if becoming, unsuitable (Pl. Rep. 526e). Of
absolute gignesthai and genesis the contraries are phtheiresthai,
phthora, cease to be, ceasing to be: Peri geneseos kai phthoras — ‘On
Coming to be and Ceasing to be’ — is the title of a work of Aristotle.
alloiésis men estin hotan hupomenontos tou hupokeimenou, aisthé-
tou ontos, metaballéi en tois heautou pathesin hotan d’holon
metaballéi mé hupomenontos aisthétou tinos hos hupokeimenou tou
autou ... genesis édé to toiouton, tou de phthora — alteration is when a
substance that is perceptible remains, but changes its own features
but when the whole changes without anything perceptible
remaining as a substance of the same thing, such an event is coming
to be and the ceasing to be of the former thing (Ar. De Gen. et Cor.
319b 10). But he genesis hodos estin ek tou atelous eis to enantion
teleion — coming to be is the road from the imperfect to its contrary,
the perfect (Proclus, Elements of Theology 45).

genes: race, sex, genus, kind. As race: toi anthropeiéi genei — the

65‘
 gignéskein — gnérimos
human race (P1. Symp. 189d). As sex: misei tou gunaikeiou genous —
through hatred of the female sex (P1. Rep. 620a). As genus: genos
d’esti to kata pleionén kai diapherontén téi eidei en téi ti esti
katégoroumenon — genus is what is predicated of many things
differing in species in the category of substance (Ar. Top. 102a 31);
ho horismos ek genous kai diaphorén estin — a definition is by genus
and difference (Ar. Top. 103b 15); deuterai de ousiai legontai en hois
eidesin hai prétés ousiai legomenai huparkhousi, tauta te kai ta ton
eidén toutén gené — second substances are said to be the species to
which those called first substances belong, they and the genera of
these species (Ar. Cat. 2a 12). Further philosophically trivial
distinctions in Aristotle, Met. , Book 4, Ch. 28.

gignéskein: to know, to recognise; gnésis: knowledge; gnéstos:

knowable. tous men gar duo misthous gignéské — I recognise two of
the rewards (Pl. Rep. 347a); gnéthi sauton — know yourself (Pl. Prot.
343b). In Plato, frequently contrasted with doxa and its cognates:
estai gnéston kai doxaston to auto, é adunaton? — will the same
thing be the object of knowledge and belief, or is that impossible?
(Pl. Rep. 478a). The object ofgnésis is to on, reality: to men pantelés
0n pantelés gnéston — the fully real is the fully knowable (Pl. Rep.
477a); epi men téi onti gnésis én, agnésia d’ex anagkés epi mé onti —
knowledge was assigned to the real, so necessarily ignorance is of
the unreal (P1. Rep. 477a). Here, as often, it is hard to know
whether agnésia, like agnoia, is nescience or mistake, and whether
the unreal is the non-existent or the false. See einai.

gnémé may simply be an opinion of or judgment by any one: kata

gnémén tén emén — in my judgment (Pl. Soph. 225d); met’adikou
gnéme‘s krinein tas zémias — to determine the penalties with unjust
judgment (Pl. Laws 846b). In Aristotle, it is either a characteristic
of the phronimoi, the wise, defined by him as tou epieikous krisis
orthé, the correct judgment of the good man (Ar. E.N. 1143a 19), or
it is the judgment or maxim delivered by such a person, a gnomic
utterance such as gnéthi seauton, know yourself: esti de gnéme‘
apophansis katholou peri hosén hai praxeis eisi — a maxim is a
universal proposition about practical matters (Ar. Rhet. 1394a 21).

gnérimos comes from gnérizein, to recognise, and has two distinct

uses in philosophy. (1) In political theory, the gnérimoi are the
prominent or notable peOple, thought of as a political group.

66
 gnésis —- hairesis
Frequently joined with the euporoi, the wealthy: Solon tas
d’arkhas ek ton gnérimén kai tén euporén katestése pasas — Solon
constituted all the government posts from the prominent and the
wealthy (Ar. Pol. 1274a 18). (2) In logic and epistemology, the
gnérimon is what is evident, according to Aristotle in two contrast-
ing ways: protera d’esti kai gnérimotera dikhos- ou gar t’auton
proteron téi phusei kai pros hémas proteron, oude gnériméteron kai
hémin gnériméteron. legé de pros hémas men protera kai gnéri-
m6tera ta egguteron aisthéseés, haplés de protera kai gnérimétera ta
porréteron -— things are prior and more evident in two ways; for the
naturally prior and the prior for us are not the same, nor the more
evident and the more evident to us: I call prior and more evident to us
things nearer to the senses [particulars], and prior and more evident
without qualification, those furthest from them [universals] (Ar. An.
Po. 71b 33). A completed science would start from the haplés
gnérima; in trying to construct one we must work from the gnérima
hémin. So, in ethics, hémin arkteon apo ton hémin gnérimén — we
must start from what is evident to us (Ar. E.N. 1095b 3).

gnésis, gnéstos. See gigné‘skein.

grammé: a line: megethous dc to men eph’hen grammé, to de epi duo

epipedon, to d’epi tria soma — of magnitudes the one-dimensional is
‘ the line, the two-dimensional is the plane and the three-dimensional
a body (Ar. De Caelo 268a 7); phasi kinétheisan grammén epipedon
poiein, stigmén de grammén — they say a moving line makes a plane,
and a point a line (Ar. De An. 409a 4). '

H
hairesis comes from hairein, to take, and has the basic meaning of
taking and, in philosophy, of some sort of choice: té‘n hupo ton pollén
makaristén hairesin heilesthén -— they (dual) made the choice
praised by the many (Pl. Phaed. 256C); pasan hairesin kai phugén
epanagein epi tén tou sématos hugieian — to refer each choice and
avoidance to the health of the body (Epicurus, To Menoeceus 128).
In later writers only, a school or sect of philosophers: kata tén
dogmatikén hairesin — according to the dogmatic school (Sextus
Empiricus, Adversus Mathematicos 7.276); from this use comes the
word ‘heresy’.

67
 hamartanein - haplés
hamartanein: in Homer, usually physically to miss one’s mark,
with a spear, etc.; from that it acquired a more general sense of
making a mistake. This use is common in philosophy, and in it
oudeis hekén hamartanei — nobody makes mistakes intentionally —
is, as Socrates claimed, a truism not a paradox: kata ton akribé
logon oudeis ton de‘miourgon hamartanei — strictly speaking, a
craftsman does not make mistakes (Pl. Rep. 340e); eu isthi hoti
akontes hamartanomen — be sure that it is an unintentional
mistake (Pl. Rep. 336e); akrasia psegetai oukh has hamartia monon
alla kai hos kakia — weakness of will is censured not as a mere
mistake but as badness (Ar. E.N. 1148a 3); of injustices ta men
met’agnoias hamartémata estin — those involving ignorance are
mistakes (Ar. EN. 1135b 12). But the term acquired a use for
unforced error, or wrong-doing; anosiétata hamartémata hamar-
tanousi — they commit the most impious wrongs (Pl. Gorg. 525d).

hamartéma is defined by Aristotle as follows: ta men met’agnoias

hamartémata estin - [actions] done in ignorance [and therefore
akousia] are mistakes (Ar. E.N. 1135b 12). But, as in the case of
hamartanein, hamartéma acquired a sense of wrong action:
anosiotata hamartémata hamartanousi — they commit the most
impious wrongs (Pl. Gorg. 525d). In the Stoics hamartéma is the
Contrary of katorthéma — right-doing: hamartéma te to para ton
orthon logon prattomenon — a fault is something done contrary to
the right principle (8VF 500).

hamartia: basically, a mistake: epistémés ouk estin orthotés,

oude gar hamartia — knowledge cannot be correct, for it cannot be
mistaken (Ar. E.N. 1142b10). But, as in the case of hamartanein,
it can be wrong-doing: pragmata aniata kai porro probebékota
hamartias — matters that are incurable and far-gone in wrongness
(P1. Laws 660C). hamartia is often the subjective state of the person
who commits a hamarté‘ma.

haplés, the adverb from haplous, means ‘simply’ in various ways:

to d’haplés étoi to proton sémainei kath’hekaston katégorian tou
ontos, é to katholou kai to panta periekhon — ‘simply’ means either
that which is first in each category of being, or the universal and
that which includes everything (Ar. De Gen. et Cor. 317b 5); ouk
oida haplés houtés ei moi apokriteon estin hos — I don’t
know whether I should answer without qualification that (P1.

68
 haplous — hédoné
Prot. 351C); haplés men gar oudeis apoballei heké‘n — nobody
intentionally throws cargo overboard just like that [but might to
save a sinking ship] (Ar. E.N. 1110a 9). .

haplous: simple, with varying significance according to context:

étoi hapléi diégései é dia mime‘seos — either through simple
narration [including indirect speech] or by imitation [direct speech
impersonating others] (Pl. Rep. 392d); tauta men hapla kai
stoikheia, gén de kai pur kai hudor kai aera suntheta —
[Anaxagoras holds that homeomeries] are simple and elements,
but earth, fire, water and air are compounds (Ar. De Gen. et Cor.
314a 26); hapanta ta mikta somata ex hapantén sugkeitai ton
haplc‘m — all mixed bodies are composed of all the simple bodies
(Ar. De Gen. et Cor. 334b 31); oukh haploun eti touto erota'z's — you
are no longer asking a simple [as opposed to complex] question (Pl.
Gorg. 503a). Without qualification: ei én haploun to manian
kakon einai — if the view that madness is a bad thing was without
qualification (Pl. Phaedrus 244a).

hédesthai: to enjoy, to like, to be pleased, to take pleasure in. It

does not mean ‘have a pleasant feeling’ though it may be a feeling in
which one takes pleasure. It is often treated as a synonym of
khairein. Thus both hédesthai and khairein are frequently said to
be the contrary of lupeisthai, to dislike, to be distressed by. Also
khairein is often used in association with the noun hédoné‘ in
preference to hédesthai. Thus in Aristotle’s discussion of
temperance in E.N., Book 3, Ch. 10 he uses both khairein and
hédoné constantly, but never hédesthai. The word hédoné occurs
frequently in the surviving works of Epicurus, but hédesthai
apparently never. Plato frequently treats pleasure as a kinésis, a
process, which is attacked by Aristotle on the ground that, unlike a
process, hésthénai men gar esti takheos hédesthai ou — one may
become pleased quickly, but one cannot enjoy quickly (Ar. EN.
1 173a 35). . '

hédoné: pleasure, enjoyment, the opposite of lupé, dislike, distress.

It often refers to pleasant feelings, since, as Aristotle says, eiléphasi
tén tou onomatos kléronomian hai somatikai hédonai — the bodily
pleasures have taken over the inheritance of the name (Ar. E.N.
1153b 33). tote gar hédonés khreian ekhomen, hotan ek tou mé.
pareinai tén hédonén algomen° hotan de mé algomen ouketi té‘s

69
 hekén —- henas
hédonés deometha. kai dia touto tén hédonén arkhén kai telos
legomen einai tou makariés zén — it is then that we have a need for
pleasure when we are distressed by the absence of pleasure; but
when we are not distressed we have no longer a need for pleasure.
That is why we say that pleasure is the beginning and end of a
blessed life (Epicurus, To Menoeceus 128). hédus, hédeia, hédu:
pleasant, enjoyable: ou gar potoi oud’apolauseis paidon kai
gunaikon ton hédun genna't bion — it is not drinking... nor the
enjoyment ofboys and women ... that make a life pleasant (Epicurus,
To Menoeceus 132). The adverb is hédeds: he‘deés xunontes allélois —
in pleasant companionship (Pl. Rep. 372b).

hekén, hekousion, hekousiés. (1) Intending, intended, intentio-

nally: epi tois hekousioisv epainén kai psogon gignomenon — praise
and blame are given to intended actions (E.N. 1109b 30); ho gar
di’agnoian praxas hotioun, méden ti duskherainén epi téi praxei,
hekén men on peprakhen, ho ge mé éidei, oud’au akén — he who does
something in ignorance of the facts and who is not troubled by what
he does has not acted intentionally, since he did not know he was
doing it, but also it is not contrary to his intention (Ar. E.N. 1110b
19). But (2) in some cases the correct translation must be ‘willing’, as
in médena ethelein hekonta arkhein — nobody is willing to rule (P1.
Rep. 346e). The common translation ‘voluntary’ is best avoided. The
contrary ofhekon is akén. -

hen: in general, simply the neuter singular of heis, one. But in

neoplatonic theology and metaphysics to hen is the One, identical
with to agathon, the good, from which everything else is derived and
on which everything else is dependent. to hen is, in a way, God, but
not a personal god. pan pléthos deuteron esti tou henos — every
manifold is posterior to the One; t’agathon toi heni t’auton - the Good
is identical with the One; to hen akinétés huphistésin — the One
creates without changing (Proclus, Elements of Theology 5, 13, 26).
Sometimes to autoen, the one itself, as in kai pan pléthos apo tou
autoenos — every manifold is from the One itself(Proclus, Elements of
Theology 5). Sometimes treated as indeclinable name: hen einai tou
hen parousia‘t — to be one by the presence of the One (Plotinus,
6.6.14). In Met, Book 4, Ch. 6 Aristotle discusses the conditions
under which a compound counts as hen, a unity.

henas: a henad in neoplatonic metaphysics: ei de ex hon to prétés

7O
 heniaios — hexis

héno‘menon henas — a henad if a member of the first unified group

(Proclus, Elements of Theology 6). Once in Plato at Philebus 15a,
where it appears to be a unit and equivalent to a monas.

heniaios: in neoplatonic theology, unitary, having the character of

being one: pas ho theios arithmos heniaios estin — the whole number
of the gods has the character of unity (Proclus, Elements of
Theology 113); hé gar henésis kai to metron kai ho horos
suggenestera tais heniaiais onta ton theén hupostasesi — for
unification and measure and limit are more akin to the unitary
substances of the gods (Simplicius, Physics 638.14).

hé‘no‘menon: a unified group in neoplatonic metaphysics: ei de mé

esti pléthos monon, étoi hénémenon estin é henas kai ei metekhon
tou henos, he‘némenon - if it is not a mere plurality it is either a
unified group or a henad; and it is a unified group if it partakes in
the One (Proclus, Elements of Theology 6).

henésis: in neoplatonic metaphysics, unification into a hen-

omenon: pan agathon henotikon esti ton metekhonton autou, kai
pasa henosis agathon - every good unifies things that partake of it,
and every unification is a good (Proclus, Elements of Theology 13).

henétikos: unifying. See henésis.

henoun: to unify. Used non-metaphysically by Aristotle: to lian

: henoun zétein tén polin — to try to unify the city overmuch (Ar. Pol.
1261b 10). Used metaphysically by neoplatonics mainly in the
perfect passive participle hé‘némenos. Not in Plato.

hexis. (1) In connection with the transitive use of ekhein, to have,

hexis is possession: tén ton hoplon hexin — the possession of arms
(Pl. Laws 6250); epistémés pou hexin phasin auto [to epistasthai]
einai — they say that [understanding] is the possession of
knowledge (Pl. Theaet. 197b); diapherei de i363 ou smikron en ktései
é en khrései to ariston hupolambanein, kai en hexei é energeia't —
perhaps it makes not a small difference whether we conceive of the
greatest good as lying in owning or using, that is, in possession or
activity (Ar. E.N. 1098b 31). (2) In connection with the intransitive
use of ekhein, as in such phrases as ou philosophés ekhein — not to
be philos0phically disposed (P1. Phaedo 91a), hexis as condition or

71
 holos — homénumos

disposition: hé ton somatén hexis oukh hupo hésukhias men kai

argias diollutai? — is not the condition ofbodies damaged by rest and
idleness? (Pl. Theaet. 153b); estin ara hé areté hexis proairetiké — so
excellence [of character] is a disposition concerning choice (Ar. E.N.
1106b 36).

holos: the whole, in contrast to the morion or meros, a part: eis to

auto pheretai to holon kai t0 morion — the whole and the part move
to the same place (Ar. De Caelo 270a 4). In the neuter singular, to
holon, it refers in physical contexts to the world as a whole: halos de
to peirasthai ta hapla sémata skhématizein alogon esti, proton men
hoti sumbésetai mé anaplérousthai to holon — in general it is
irrational to try to give shapes to the simple bodies, first because
the result will be that the world will not be filled up (Ar. De Caelo
306b 3). holés: in general, as above: tés kinéseés é tou khronou é
holés ton gignomenén kai phtheiromenon — the motion of time or of
things that come to be and pass away in general (Simplicius,
Physics 506.6).

homoiomereia: possession of like parts; homoiomerés: that which

is a like part or possesses like parts; from homoios, similar, and
meros, a part. Anaxagoras believed in an unlimited number of
sématikai arkhai, primary bodies: panta gar ta homoiomeré, hoion
hudor é pur é khrusos agenéta men einai kai aphtharta — for all the
like parts, such as water or fire or gold, are ungenerated and
indestructible (Simplicius, Physics 27.5); hapanta ta homoiomeré
kathaper hudor é pur h0ut6 gignesthai kai apollusthai phési
sugkrisei kai diakrisei monon — [Anaxagoras] says that all the
things with like parts such as water and fire come into being and
pass away only by conjunction and separation [of the like parts]
(Ar. Met. 984a 13). »

homénumos: in general, and very commonly in Plato, used of two

persons having the same name: ho men gar pappos te kai
homénumos emoi — my grandfather who has the same name as I
(Pl. Rep. 33Gb). Used technically in Aristotle and subsequent
philosophers: two different kinds of things are said to be
homonumoi, have the same name, when we should say that the
name ambiguously applies to different kinds of thing. Words are
homonyms, things are homénuma. Those kinds of things to which
the name applies in the same sense are sunénumoi, whilewords

72
 hoper — horizein
are synonyms. to gar manthanein homénumon, to te xunienai
khromenon téi epistéméi, kai to lambanein epistémén — manthanein
[to learn, to understand] is homonymously named, being to under-
stand, using knowledge, or to acquire knowledge (Ar. Top. 165b 32);
alla p63 dé legetai?ou gar eoike tois ge apo tukhés homénumois — how,
then, are things said [to be good]? For they do not seem like things
that just chance to have the same name (Ar. E.N. 1096b 26). See also
parénumos and aph’henos. The noun is homénumia: dia to suneg-
gus einai tén homénumian autén lanthanei — because the different
meanings of [dikaiosuné] are closely connected, the ambiguity
escapes notice (Ar. E.N. 1129a 26). The adverb is homénumés:
kaleitai kleis homonumés — kleis is named ambiguously [since it is a
key or a collar-bone] (Ar. E.N. 1129a 29). That which is named
homénumos also pollakhés legetai — is named in many ways.

hoper: the same, or of the same kind. Non-technically: skopei ei oun

sundokei hoper emoi — see whether you think the same as I (Pl. Prot
340b); hoper arti elegomen — as we were recently saying (Pl. Rep.
331e). Technically, explained by Aristotle: ta men ousian sémai-
nonta hoper ekeino é hoper ekeino ti _sémainei — what signifies the
substance signifies precisely what the thing is or what that thing is
ofwhich it is a part (Ar. An. Po. 83a 24); hopergar ti esti to ti én einai —
what precisely a thing is is its essence (Ar. Met. 1030a 3). For a fuller
account ofAristotle’s use of hoper see Ross’s note to Met. 1001a 26 in
his edition. hoper does not appear in LSJ nor in many indices,
presumably because of a preferencefor regarding it as two words ho
per.

horismos: etymologically, the setting of a horas, a boundary. (1)

Demarcation, way of distinguishing: akribés men oun en tois toiou-
tois ouk estin horismos, heos tinos hoi philoi — in such matters there
is no precise way of determining how far friends can remain friends
(Ar. E.N. 1159a 3). (2) Definition: ho men oun horismos ti esti déloi :-
so a definition displays what a thing is (Ar. An. Po. 91a 1); délon
toinun hoti monés tés ousias estin ho horismos — it is clear that a
definition is only of substance [and not of a thing’s other attributes,
quality, quantity, etc.] (Ar. Met. 1031a 1). There is a full discussion of
horismos in Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics, Book 2, Ch. 3.

horizein has a basic meaning of putting a horos, boundary, to

something, or distinguishing two or more things: tauta ... duo hémin

73
 horos — hos epi to polu
horistho eidé en psukhéi enonta — let these two elements in the soul
be distinguished for us (Pl. Rep. 439e). As definition: hoi tén
hédonén agathon horizomenoi — those who define good as the
pleasant (Pl. Rep. 5050); ta metra tés epistrophés horistai tois kata
tén proodon metrois — the measures of reversion are determined by . -
the measures of procession (Proclus, Elements of Theology 39);
panta men gar ta pléthé téi heauton phusei aorista onta dia to hen
horizetai — for all manifolds, that are of their own nature
indeterminate, are made determinate by the One (Proclus,
Elements of Theology 117).

horos. ( 1) Basically, a boundary, even a boundary stone: hos d’an

epergazétai ta tou geitonos, huperbainon tous horous — whoever
cultivates his neighbour’s property, crossing over the boundaries
(Pl. Laws 8430). (2) A standard, measure or criterion: aristokratias
horos areté, oligarkhias ploutos — the criterion [of eligibility to
govern] in an aristocracy is excellence, in an oligarchy wealth (Ar.
Pol. 1294a 10); homologia'z' themenoi horon eis tout’apoblepontes kai
anapherontes tén skepsin poiémetha — let us set a standard by
agreement and conduct our investigation looking towards it and
referring to it (Pl. Phaedrus 237d). (3) A term in logic: horon de kalo
eis hon dialuetai he“ protasis, hoion to te katégoroumenon kai to
kath’hou katégoreitai — I call a term that into which a proposition is
decomposed, such as the predicate and that which is given a
predicate [the subject] (Ar. An. Pr. 24b 16); ho men katholou ton
horon, ho d’en merei — one of the terms is universal [all or none], the
other is particular [some] (Ar. An. Pr. 26a 17). The Latin from
which the word ‘term’ is derived is terminus, which also means a
boundary stone. ('4) Very frequently, a definition: ouk ara houtos
horos esti dikaiosunés, aléthé te legein — so that is not the
definition of justice, to tell the truth etc. (P1. Rep. 331d); Horoi —
‘Definitions’ -— is the title of a spurious work ascribed to Plato, which
includes: horos- logos ek diaphoras kai genous — a definition is a
statement composed of difference and genus (P1. Def. 414d); esti
horos logos ho to ti én einai sémainon — a definition is a statement
signifying the essence (Ar. Top. 101b 39). In this use horos is a
synonym ofhorismos in one of its uses.

hos epi to polu: for the most part. Used non-technically by Plato:
lambanein en tais psukhais has epi to polu enantias doxas — receive
in their souls for the most part contrary opinions (Pl. Rep. 377b). In

74
 hudér — hugros
Aristotle it is used technically in the phrase ta hos epi to polu to
denote the class ofregularities that are not necessary and absolutely
invariable: epeidé horémen ta men aei hésautés gignomena, ta de hos
epi to polu, phaneron hoti oudeterou toutén aitia hé tukhé‘ legetai
oude ta apo tukhés, oute tou ex anagkés kai aei oute tou hos epi to polu
— since we see some things always happening in the same way, some
for the most part, it is clear that neither chance nor the results of
chance are said to be the explanation ofeither ofthese, neither of the
necessary nor of what happens for the most part (Ar. Phys. 196b 10);
ta gar ginomena phusei panta ginetai é aei hédi é hos epi to polu, to de
para to aei kai hos epi to polu apo t’automatou kai apo tukhés — what
happens naturally all happens always thus or for the most part;
what is other than always and for the most part is spontaneous and
from chance (Ar. De Gen. et Cor. 333b 6).

hudér: water. One of the four elements, earth, water, air and fire,
recognised by most philosophers after Empedocles as constituting
the sublunary region. All liquids were philosophically regarded as
water, though most were recognised to be impure. Of the four bodies
exhibiting some combination of hot or cold, wet or dry, water is the
wet and cold: to d’hudérpsukhron kai hugron -— water is cold and wet
(Ar. De Gen. et Cor. 330b 4). Earth and water are the lower pair, air
and fire the higher pair of the four elements: pur men gar kai aér tou
pros ton horon pheromenou, gé de kai hudér tou pres to meson — fire
and air belong to the pair that tends to the boundary [of the
universe], earth and water to that which tends to the middle (Ar. De
Gen. et Cor. 33Gb 32). De Generatione et Corruptione, Book 2, Ch. 3
contains an historical account of views on the elements of various
philosophers. See also aer.

hugros: moist, wet. A characteristic ofaér, air, and hudér, water, in

Aristotle’s physics: hugron de to aoriston oikeiéi horéi, euoristbn on,
xéron de to euoriston men oikeioi horoi, dusoriston de — the moist has
no natural boundaries, but is easily put in bounds [as in a vessel], but
the dry has natural bounds but is hard to put in bounds [since it
resists pressure] (Ar. De Gen. et Cor. 329b 30). xéros is the contrary
of hugros: legetai de xéron kai hugron pleonakhos. antikeitai gar
toi hugréi kai to xéron kai to pepégos — wet and dry are spoken of in
more ways than one For both the dry and the solidified are
contrary to the wet (Ar. De Gen. et Cor. 330a 12).

75
 hulé — huperousios
hulé: originally, wood, whether growing or timber: hosa hulé pros ta
ton tektonén diaponémata parekhetai - what wood supplies towards
the constructions of builders (Pl. Critias 114a). In Aristotelian and
neoplatonic physics, the matter that together with the form consti-
tutes a substantial reality and which has the capacity to receive
form: hé phusis dikhos, to te eidos kai hé hulé — nature is twofold,
form and matter (Ar. Phys. 194a 13); cf. Ar. Phys. 193a 29; ousiq hé te
hulé kai to eidos kai to ek toutén — reality is matter and form and that
which is composed of them (Ar. Met. 1035a 2); legé gar hulén to
proton hupokeimenon hekastéi ex hou gignetai ti enuparkhontos mé
kata sumbekékos — I call matter the immediate substrate of each
thing from which it comes when it is present not contingently (Ar.
Phys. 192a 31). Matter is one of the four Aristotelian causes or types
of explanation: hé hulé ton skeuastén ... his to ex hou aitia estin — the
material is the cause of artifacts as that from which they come (Ar.
Phys. 195b 17). hulé is also one of the arkhai or basic principles of
reality: heteran tén hulén kai to hupokeimenon — another [principle]
is the matter, i.e. thevsubstrate (Ar. Met. 983a 29). The adjective is
hulikos: peri de tés hulikés ousias — concerning material reality (Ar.
Met. 1044a 15).

huperbolé: excess, opposed to elleipsis, deficiency: pasan tén te

huperbolén kai tén elleipsin — every excess and deficiency (P1. Prot.
283c). In Aristotle’s ethics areté is a mean to which correspond two
kakiai, one of huperbolé, one of elleipsis: mesotés de duo kakién, tés
men kath’huperbolén, tés de kat’elleipsin — [excellence is] a mean
between two faults, one of excess, the other of deficiency (Ar. E.N.
1107a 2); tés men huperbolés kai tés elleipseos phtheirousés to eu, tés
de mesotétos séizouse‘s — excess and deficiency destroy the good, the
mean preserves it (Ar. E.N. 1106b 11).

huperousios: a neoplatonic word meaning ‘above being’. It is not

found in Plato, but derives from his statement ouk ousias ontos tou
agathou all’eti epekeina tés ousias presbeia‘t kai dunamei huperek-
hontos — the Good is not a being but transcends being in dignity and
power (Pl. Rep. 509b). A typical use of the word is eti de, ei to préton
huperousion, hapas de theos tés tou proton seiras estin héi theos,
huperousios hekastos an eié —- again, if the first principle transcend
being, then, since every god qua god is of the order of the first
principle, each must transcend being (Proclus, Elements of Theology
115). a

76
 huphesis —— hupokeimenon
huphesis: a neoplatonic word, not found in Plato, meaning ‘decline’
or ‘deterioration’: ta de di’huphesin kai tén eis pléthos ektasin allon
deitai ton mallon he‘némenén hina metaskhéi ton autoenadén ousén
— the rest because of their decline and their extension into
multiplicity require principles more unified if they are to
participate in a pure henad (Proclus, Elements of Theology 128).
See huphienai.

huphienai: a neoplatonic word, not used by Plato. Found mainly in

perfect passive participle hupheimenos, declined, deteriorated:
all’hoion hupheimené tis tou ontos hupostasis estin hé pepléthus-
mené — but that which has become manifold is like some
deteriorated existence of being (Simplicius, Physics 102.2). See
huphesis.

hupodokhé: non-technically, reception, as in xenon hupodokhés

allothen — the reception of foreigners from elsewhere (Pl. Laws
949e). Technically, in Plato and his commentators, the receptacle
underlying all the world of becoming: tén tou gegonotos horatou
kai pantés aisthétou métera kai hupodokhén, méte gen méte aera
méte pur méte hudér legomen all’anoraton eidos — let us not say
that the mother and receptacle of the whole visible and generally
perceptible world is either earth or air or fire orwater but an
invisible form (Pl. Tim 51a); en gar Timaiéi tén hulén pasés einai
geneseos hupodokhén hoion tithenén phésin — in the Timaeus
[Plato] says that matter is the receptacle of all becoming, like a
nurse (Simplicius, Physics 539.11).

hupokeimenon: the present participle of the verb hupokeisthai, to

underlie, meaning ‘that which underlies’: a person can be said to
hupokeisthai, to be subject, to a ruler (P1. Gorg. 510C). It has various
special senses, including matter, logical subject and substance. (1)
As matter: tén hulén kai to hupokeimenon — the matter, i.e. the
underlying (Ar. Met. 983a 29); dikhés hupokeitai, é tode ti on hosper
to zéion tois pathesin, é has hé hulé téi entelekheiai' — things underlie
in two ways, either as a particular thing, as an animal underlies its
experiences, or as the matter underlies the reality (Ar. Met. 1038b
5). (2) As substance: ta gar mathémata peri eidé estin- ou gar
kath’hupokeimenou tinos — arithmetic is about forms, for it is not
Concerned with any substance (Ar. An. Po. 79a 7); hapanta de tauta
legetai ousia hoti ou kath’hupokeimenou legetai, alla kata toutc‘m ta

77
 hupolambanein — hupothesis
alla — these are all called being, because they are not predicated of
anything else, but other things are predicated of them (Ar. Met.
1017b 13). (3) As logical subject: kath’hupokeimenou gar tou eidous
monon to genos legetai — of the species as subject only the genus is
predicated (Ar. Top. 127b 3).

hupolambanein (verb) and hupolépsis (noun), have a basic sense

of taking over. (1) In basic sense: en toutéi hupelabe Polemarkhos —
at that point Polemarchus took over [the discussion] (P1. Rep. 544b).
(2) To understand what is said: isés gar toi sou orthés legontos ego
ouk orthés hupolambané — perhaps you are speaking correctly and I
am not understanding you correctly (Pl. Gorg. 458e). (3) To
understand or mean something by a word: to khalepon touto isés
oukh houto Simonides hupelambanen — perhaps Simonides did not
understand the word ‘difficult’ in that way (Pl. Prot. 341a). (4)
Frequently in Aristotle, accepting as true: tés hupole‘pseos
diaphorai epistémé kai doxa kai phronésis — the varieties of
acceptation are knowledge, opinion and wisdom (Ar. De An. 427b
25); hé epistémé peri ton katholou estin hupolépsis — knowledge is a
conception concerning universals (Ar. E.N. 1140b 31). The noun
hupolépsis is used only in a non-philosophical sense by Plato.

hupostasis has a number of non-philosophical meanings, such as

‘sediment’ in medical contexts. Literally, it is ‘Standing under’, and
can refer to foundations of buildings. In later philosophy, especially
the neoplatonics, it is a synonym of ousia, being, substance,
existence: alloiései tén hupostasin ekeinoi parekhetai — by
alteration it provides. existence to that other, aph’heautou deuteras
hupostaseis parekhomenon — providing secondary substances from
itself (Proclus, Elements of Theology 27); tés phusikés hupostaseés
tés en metaboléi ousés — the natural world that is in change
(Simplicius, Physics 194.3); neoteroi ton philosophon anti tés ousias
téi lexei tés hupostaseos ekhrésanto — more recent philosophers used
the word hupostasis instead of ousia (Socrates, Ecclesiastical
History 3.7). ‘

hupothesis (noun) and hupotithesthai (verb), have the basic sense

of setting under. Philosophically (1) proposal, intention: hina su ta
sautou kata tén hupothesin hopos an bouléi perainéis — so that you
may do your part as you propose in the way you want (Pl. Gorg.
454C); hé hupothesis tés démokratikés politeias eleutheria — the

78
 idea

aim of a democratic constitution is freedom (Ar. Pol. 1317a 40). (2)

An hypothesis: ei orthé hé hupothesis én to psukhén harmonian
einai —- if the hypothesis that the soul is an attunement was correct
(Pl. Phaedo 94b); toi tautén tén hupothesin hupothemenéi — to him
who proposed this hypothesis (Pl. Soph. 244C). In Aristotle,
regularly, hypothesised existence: lego to einai ti é mé einai ti
hupothesis — I call it an hypothesis that something exists or does
not (Ar. An. Po. 72a 20). (3) Occasionally, the premisses of a
Syllogism: ton apodeixeon hai hupotheseis — the bases of
demonstrations (Ar. Met. 1013a 16). (4) An argument based on
hypotheses in the expression ex hupotheseés: ei de mé esti ta prota
eidenai oude ta ek toutén einai epistasthai haplés oude kuriés all-’ex
hupotheseos — if it is not possible to know the basic premisses, then
one cannot have scientific knowledge of their consequences without
qualification or properly, but only hypothetically (Ar. An. Po. 72b
14). The expressions ex hupotheseos and kath’hupothesin are very
common in the sceptical works of Sextus Empiricus in such
expressions as kath’hupothesin sugkhéré, ex hupotheseés lambano,
didémi kath’hupothesin — I admit, accept, grant, hypothetically.

I
idea comes from the same root as the Greek verb idein and the
Latin verb videre, both meaning ‘to see’. In its simplest,
non-technical use it refers to the visual aspect of anything: te‘n
d’oun idean panu kalos —- very beautiful to look at (P1. Prot. 315e).
More abstractly, it is a type or form or species: é tina allén ekheis
idean politeias? — or have you any other type of constitution? (Pl.
Rep. 544C). Technically, in Plato and his followers, it is the eternal
unchanging form in the world of being: hé tou agathou idea
megiston mathéma —- the form of the good is the greatest study (P1.
Rep. 505a); tasd’ ideas noeisthai men horasthai d’ou — the forms
are thought of but not seen (Pl. Rep. 507b). In later neoplatonic and
other theologically oriented philosophy the forms cease to be
independent: Clement of Alexandria glossed the idea as ennoéma
tou theou — a thought of God (Clement, Stromateis 5.3.16.3); see
also Plotinus 3.9.1 and Philo, De Opificio Mandi 4, where God is
said to make the eternal world of forms as a blueprint for creation.
In Plato the term idea seems to be a synonym of eidos. But Aristotle
used only the term eidos of form as a component of the sunolon of
matter and form. Also some neoplatonic writers appear to treat

79
 idios — isos

eidos as a term covering both the khériston and the akhériston, but
idea with special reference to the khoriston: tén men gar hulén topon
elege t6n enulon eidén hos hupodokhén auton, ta de eidé ta khorista
tés hulés étoi tas ideas elege mé einai en topoi — for [Plato] said that
matter was the place ofthe enmattered forms as their receptacle, but
he said that the forms that are separate from matter, or the ideas,
were not in a place (Simplicius, Physics 545.27).

idios: that which belongs exclusively to one person or thing. Thus

politically the idion is distinguished from the koinon, the public: ton
allon praxeon idion te kai koinon — other activities both private and
public (Pl. Laws 961b). It is also the exclusive: to tés dikaiosunés
idion ergon — the exclusive (special, specific) task ofjustice (Pl. Clit.
409d). The abstract noun is idiotés: kata tén idioté‘ta tc‘m praxeon
t’ounoma dikaiés eiléphen idion - [each science] has rightly received
a special name in accordance with its special function (P1. Pol. 305d).
In Aristotle idion receives a more technical and restricted sense,
being limited to that which is exclusive to a species but not part ofthe
essence; in this use it is translated as ‘property’, from the Latin
proprium: idion d’estin ho mé déloi men to ti én einai, monéi
d’huparkhei kai antikatégoreitai tou pragmatos — a property is what
does not show the essence but belongs only to and is convertibly
predicated of the subject matter (Ar. Top. 102a 18). Thus the term
‘property’ is here used more narrowly than in modern philosophical
usage.

isos, like its contradictory anisos, has three basic uses. (1) Of
numerical or quantitative equality: isou ontos tou khronou hon
katheudomen 6i egrégoramen — the time in which we sleep being
equal to that in whichwe are awake (Pl. Theaet. 158d). (2) Of
equality of rights and status: bouletai he‘ polis ex ison einai kai
homoion — a city needs to consist ofequal and similar people (Ar. Pol.
1295b 25). (3) Of fairness: ton mellonta dikastén ison esesthai — him
who is to become a fair judge (P1. Laws 9570); dikaios estai ho te
nomimos kai ho isos. to men dikaion am to nomimon kai to ison — the
law-abiding man and the fair man will be just. So justice is both the
lawful and the fair (Ar. E.N. 1129a 33). The abstract noun is isotés.
Thus (1) khronou isotés - equality of time (Pl. Phaedrus 240C); (2)
isotés philotéta apergazetai — equality brings about friendship (Pl.
Laws 757a). The verb isazein, to make equal, can be used in any of
these senses.

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 i868 — kakos

i368: the adverb from isos, can mean ‘equally’: i863 tou ellatonos
pleon elatton te tou meizonos — equally is more than the less and
less than the more (Pl. Epinomis 991a). But the term is used
constantly, especially by Aristotle, to indicate an element of doubt,
either because of insufficient proof or because of what Simplicius
calls philosophos eulabeia, philosophical caution, and may. be
translated as ‘perhaps’: touto d’estin i363 t’aléthes —— that is perhaps
the truth (Pl. Phaedo 67a); amphisbétountes prostitheasin aei to
i363 kai takha — when debating people always add ‘perhaps’ and
‘maybe’ (Pl. Apol. 31a); meta de tauta peri hédonés i363 hepetai
dielthein — after that it perhaps follows to discuss pleasure (Ar.
E.N. 1172a 16).

K
kakia: the contrary of areté. It is frequently translated ‘Vice’, as
areté is translated ‘virtue’, but ‘defect’, ‘fault’ or ‘badness’ is
preferable. Often, but not always, with reference to human
character: areté men ara, hos eoiken, hugieia te tis an eié kai kallos
kai euexia psukhés, kakia de nosos te kai aiskhos kai astheneia — so,
as it seems, excellence is some health and beauty and well-being of
the soul, but badness is disease and ugliness and weakness (Pl.
Rep. 444d); ton peri ta éthé pheukton tria estin eidé, kakia, akrasia,
thériotés — there are three types of character to be avoided, badness,
weakness and brutishness (Ar. E.N. 1145a 16). For bodily defects:
on monon d’hai tés psukhés kakiai hekousioi eisin, all’eniois kai hai
tou somatos — it is not only defects of the soul that are our own fault,
but in some cases those of the body (Ar. E.N. 1114a 22).

kakos has much the same spread of uses as the English ‘bad’. (1) Of
moral badness: kakos men gar hekon oudeis — nobody is
intentionally bad (Pl. Tim. 86d). (2) Of inefficiency: kakou mageirou
— a bad cook (P1. Phaedrus ‘265e); Aristotle notes the difference
between calling somebody simply bad and calling him had of a kind:
kakon iatron kai kakOn hupokritén, hon haplos ouk an eipoien
kakon — a bad doctor and a bad actor, whom one would not call bad
without qualification (Ar. E.N. 1148b 8). (3) Of evils that befall
people: eleeinos ho ta kaka ekhon — he is to be pitied who suffers
evils (Pl. Laws 731d). The adverb is kakés, badly. Two common
expressions are (1) kakos legein, to speak evil of: Ahina mé se hoi
agathoi kakés legosin — in order that the good may not speak evil of

81
 kalokagathia — kalos
you (Pl. Euthyd. 281e); (2) kakés poiein, to treat badly: kakés poiein
tous anthropous — to treat men badly (Pl. Meno 94e). This use must
be distinguished from kakopoiein, to do wrong: ei de mé, outheis
hautéi aitios tou kakopoiein — otherwise nobody will be responsible
for his wrong-doing (Ar. E.N. 1114b 3). kakos is the contrary of
agathos.

kalokagathia and kaloskagathos seem to be as near as Greek can

get to gentlemanliness and gentleman, in the old sense of someone
of gentle birth and breeding: khalepon téi alétheia'z' megalopsukhon
einai° ou gar hoion te aneu kalokagathias — it is hard to be
great-souled; for it is not possible without gentlemanliness (Ar.
E.N. 1124a 3); tous de pollous adunatein pros kalokagathian
protrepsasthai — to be unable to turn the generality of men into
gentlemen (Ar. E.N. 1179b 10); dia to mallon akolouthein paideian
kai eugeneian tois euporéterois. eti de dokousin ekhein hon heneken
hoi adikoi adikousin- hothen kai kalouskagathous kai gnorimous
toutous prosagoreuousin — because culture and good birth are found
rather in the wealthy. Also they seem to possess that for which
wrong-doers do wrong; which is why they call these men gentlemen
and notables (Ar. Pol. 1293b 37); hina hupo ton plousién te kai
kalén k’agathén legomenén en téi polei eleutherotheié — in order that
[the démos] might be freed from the rich and those called
gentlemen in the city (Pl. Rep. 569a). .

kalos has a width of use which makes it difficult to find any single
translation. Thus Diotima in the Symposium of Plato speaks of a
person being led apo ton kalon sématén epi ta kala epitédeumata,
kai apo ton epite‘duematén epi ta kala mathémata — from bodies to
occupations to studies all of which are called kala (Pl. Symp. 2110);
guné kalé kai eueidés — a beautiful and good-looking woman (Pl.
Crito 44a); to kalon telos tés aretés — the noble is the goal of
excellence (Ar. E.N. 1115b 12). Thus kalos seems to cover the
aesthetic and at least some morality, and not only these. In this it is
like its contrary aiskhros. If a single translation is needed, ‘fine’ is
perhaps. the best choice. In morality it seems to be the grand that is
called kalon, as the mean and base is called aiskhron. Thus the
brave man faced with death hupomenei tou kalou heneka — he
endures for the sake of the kalon (Ar. E.N. 1115b 11); to andreiés
kallion kai hairetéteron tou séphronos — acting bravely is finer and
more choiceworthy than acting temperately (Ar. Rhet. 1364b 35).

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 karteria — kataléptiké
Similarly the English ‘handsome’ is used both of personal looks and
of apologies. Aristotle at various places offers definitions and eluci-
dations: kalon men oun estin ho an di’hauto haireton on epaineton éi,
é ho an agathon on hédu éi — that is kalon which being in itself
choiceworthy is praiseworthy, or what, being good, is pleasant (Ar.
Rhet. 1366a 33); to kalon esti to prepon — the kalon is the fitting (Ar.
Top. 102a 6). The only sign that Aristotle gives of finding ambiguity
in kalon is: enantion toi kaloi téi men epi tou zoiou to aiskhron, toi
d’epi tés oikias to mokhthéron, hoste homénumon to kalon — the
aiskhron is the contrary of kalon in the case of animals, but
mokhthéron in the case of a house, so that kalon is ambiguous (Ar.
Top. 106a 20); to kalon to di’opseés é di’akoés hédu — the kalon is what
is pleasant to sight or hearing (Ar. Top. 146a 22); the kalon is
distinguished from the sumpheron, useful, and the hédu, pleasant,
at E.N. 104b 32. Some of these definitions are offered only as
examples, not as Aristotle’s settled view, but they illustrate the
width of coverage of the term. Plotinus shows some doubt regarding
the width of coverage: ara ge heni kai toi autoi kaléi ta panta é allo
men en somati to kallos, allo de en alléi? — are all things beautiful
with one and the same beauty, or is there one beauty in a body and
another in something else? (Plotinus 1.6.1). The noun is to kallos;
the adverb is kalés.

karteria: distinguished from egkrateia by Aristotle as being endur-

ance of distress as distinct from conquering the temptation of the
pleasant: antikeitai de téi men akratei ho egkratés, toi de malakéi ho
karterikos- to men gar karterein estin en toi antekhein, hé de
egkrateia en toi kratein — the strong-willed is opposed to the
weak-Willed, but the enduring to the soft. For to endure consists in
holding out, but strength of will in conquering (Ar. E.N. 1150a 32).

kataléptiké: a phantasia, perception or presentation is, in Stoic

thought, kataléptiké if it is one that seizes on the perceiver as
unmistakably veridical: phantasia kataléptiké estin hé apo tou
huparkhontos kai kat’auto to huparkhein enapomemagmené kai
enaposphragmené hopoia ouk an genoito apo mé huparkhontos — an
apprehensive presentation is one caused by an existing object in
accordance with that object and imaged and stamped in the subject,
such as could not be derived from a non-existent object (Sextus
Empiricus, Adversus Mathematicos 7.248). Cicero says of such
presentations that they are such quae propriam quandam haberent

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 kataphasis — katégorein
declarationem earum rerum quae viderentur (Cicero, Acad. Post.
1.41).

kataphasis: affirmation, a term introduced and defined by Aristotle:

kataphasis de estin apophansis tinos kata tinos. apophasis de estin
apophansis tinos apo tinos —— an affirmation is a statement affirming
one thing of another. A negation is a statement denying one thing of
another (Ar. De Int. 17a 25). It does not occur in Plato, except in the
spurious Definitions at 413c. The verb kataphanai, to affirm, is also
not found in Plato’s works. The noun and the verb became standard
terms in philosophy.

katasté‘ma: a specifically Epicurean word not used by Plato and

Aristotle. It is defined by Simplicius as diathesis tés psukhés — a
condition ofthe soul (Simplicius, 0n Epictetus 1 14d); to gar eustathes
sarkos katastéma kai to peri tautés piston elpisma tén akrotatén
kharan kai bebaiotatén ekhei tois epilogizesthai dunamenois — the
stable condition of well-being in the body and the sure hope of its
continuance holds the highest and surest joy for those who are able
to calculate it (Epicurus, fr. 11). Epicurus contrasts pleasures
arising from a calm condition, free from trouble, sometimes called
ataraxia and aponia, but also called katastematikai hédonai, with
those involving kinésis, change: he men gar ataraxia kai aponia
katastématikai eisin hédonai — for freedom from trouble of soul and
distress ofbody are pleasures of a condition (Epicurus, quoted in Vita
Epicuri 136); diapheretai de pros tous Kurénai’kous peri tés hédonés.
hoi men gar tén katastématikén ouk egkrinousi, monén de tén en
kinései — Epicurus differs from the Cyrenaics about pleasure; for
they do not admit pleasures of condition, but only that which
involves change (Vita Epicuri 136).

katé‘gorein: in Plato, usually has the common literary sense of

‘accuse’, but occasionally means merely ‘say’ or ‘judge’: saphestera
katégorei hoti touto houtos ekhei — he clearlyjudges this to be the case
(Pl. Phaedo 73c). In Aristotle and later philosophy the verb in the
passive has the meaning ‘to be predicated’ and the participial form to
katégoroumenon means ‘the prediCate’: horon de kalc‘) eis hon dialue-
tai hé protasis, hoion to te katégoroumenon kai to kath’hou katégorei-
tai — I call a term that into which a proposition is analysed, such as
' the predicate and that of which it is predicated (Ar. An. Pr. 24b 16).

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 katégoria — kath’hauto
katégoria: in Plato, has the ordinary literary meaning ‘accusation’:
en kate‘goria'i' te kai apologia'i' — in accusation and defence (Pl.
Phaedrus 267a). In Aristotle and later philosophy it means
‘category’. In the work called the Katégoriai Aristotle introduces the
ten categories in Ch. 4, but he does not there call them categories.
But in Topics, Book 1, Ch. 9 he writes: meta toinun tauta dei
diorisasthai ta gené ton katégorién esti de tauta, ton arithmon
deka, ti esti, poson, poion, pros ti, pou, pote, keisthai, ekhein, poiein,
paskhein — after that, one must distinguish the kinds of predicate ...
these are, ten in number, what it is (substanCe), quantity, quality,
relation, place, time, position, possession, action and passion (Ar.
Topics 103b 20). Examples of all these are given in Categories, Ch. 4.
The doctrine seems to be that each of these ten categories, or
ultimate predicates, tells what sort of thing that of which it is
predicated is, as being either a substance, or a quantity, or a quality,
etc. These are the only two places in which Aristotle lists as many as
ten categories; other lists are shorter.

katharsis: a term important in philosophy only as occurring in

Aristotle’s definition oftragedy: estin oun tragéidia mimésis praxeés
spoudaias kai teleias megethos ekhousés, hé‘dusmenéi logoi di’el-
eou kai phobou perainousa tén ton toioutén pathématénkatharsin —
so tragedy is a representation of some important action that is
complete and sizeable, in pleasing language by pity and fear
accomplishing purgation of such passions (Ar. Poetics 1449b 24). So
interpreted katharsis is a term borrowed from medicine. Some have
taken it to have the other sense of purification, as used with
reference to religious ceremonies of purification. For reasons for
preferring ‘purgation of ’, rather than ‘purification of ’ see Appendix
II to the edition ofthe Poetics by D.W. Lucas, Oxford, 1968.

kathékon: fitting. This is widely used, but is specially a Stoic term

derived from the verb kathékein, to be fitting. Peri tou kathékontos is
the title of a work by the Stoic Zeno. kathékonta men can einai hosa
logos hairei poiein — such things are fitting as reason chooses (SVF
3.495); ton de kathe‘konton ta men einai phasi teleia ha dé kai
katorthémata legesthai — of the fitting some they [the Stoics] assert
to be perfect and to be called perfections (SVF 3.494).

kath’hauto: means ‘as such’ or ‘in itself. It is distinguished from the

,kata sumbebé‘kos, which is traditionally, but unfortunately, trans-

85
 katholou — kata
lated as per accidens, or contingently; a better translation might be
derivatively. Thus an aircraft flies kath’hauto, the passengers kata
sumbebékos, but their flight is in no way an accidental occurrence:
eti ta men legetai kath’hauta posa, ta de kata sumbebé‘kos, hoion hé
men gramme“ poson ti kath’hauto, to de mousikon kata sumbebékos
— also some things are said to have size as such, others derivatively,
as a line has size in itself but a musical thing derivatively (Ar. Met.
1020a 16); esti kinoumenon to men energeia't, to de kata sumbebékos
— one thing moves as such, another derivatively (Ar. Phys. 211a 18).

katholou: universal. Both terms and propositions are said to be

universal. A universal term is opposed to the particular or
individual: pas gar logos kai pasa epistémé ton katholou kai ou ton
eskhatén — for every definition and every science is of the universal
and not of individuals (Ar. Met. 1059b 26); kata men ton logon ta
katholou protera, kata de t'én aisthésin ta kath’hekasta — according
to the rational account the universal is prior, but particulars are
prior in perception (Ar. Met. 1018b 33). These two quotations
illustrate the difficulty of translating logos. The universal
proposition, of the forms ‘All A is B’ and ‘No A is B’, is opposed to
particular propositions of the forms ‘Some A is B’ and ‘Some A is not
B’, and to indeterminate propositions of the forms ‘A is B’ and ‘A is
not B’: lego de katholou men to panti é médeni huparkhein, en merei
de to tini é‘ mé tini huparkhein, adioriston de to huparkhein é mé
huparkhein aneu tou katholou é kata meros — I call belonging to all
or none universal, belonging to or not belonging to some particular,
and belonging or not belonging without being universal or
particular indeterminate (Ar. An. Pr. 24a 18). The term katholou
does not occur in Plato’s works, but became a regular term of
philosophy after Aristotle: to men gar katholou hekastoi ton
sumplérountén auto epharmottei — for the universal fits each of the
things comprised under it (Simplicius, Physics 17.8).

katé: below, one of the six diastaseis, directions, recognised by

Aristotle. Its contrary is and, above. There is an absolute below in
the universe: lego d’ano men tén apo tou mesou, kata de tén epi to
meson — I call above that which is away from the middle of the
universe, below that which is towards the middle (Ar. De Caelo
284b 30). For both Plato and Aristotle weight is the tendency to be
below: to d’enantion pathos toutois baru kai kata — the contrary
condition to these is weight and being below (P1. Tim. 63d);

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 katorthéma — kenos

barutaton dc to pasin huphistamenon tois katé pheromenois — the

most heavy is that which is below everything that moves
downwards (Ar. De Caelo 269b 24). Apart from this universal
direction, only natural bodies have an objective above and below:
ouk en hapanti somati to and kai to katc‘) kai to dexion kai aristeron
kai to emprosthen kai opisthen zététeon, all’hosa ekhei kine‘seos
arkhén en autois, empsukha onta -— one should not look for an above
and below, right and left, in front and behind, in every body, but in
those which have the principle of change in themselves, being alive
(Ar. De Caelo 284b 30). Where we otherwise speak of these
directions, it is relatively: pros hémas epanapherontes — relating it
to ourselves (Ar. De Caelo 285a 2).

katorthéma: a noun from the verb katorthein, ‘to accomplish

successfully’. It was used by the Stoics of the elements in what they
regarded as the best life: ton de kathékontén ta men einai phasi
teleia ha dé kai katorthomata legesthai — [the Stoics] say that of
right actions some are perfect, and these are also called perfections .
(SVF 3.494); katorthémata men ta toiauta' phronein, sophronein,
dikaiopragein, khairein panth’hosa kata ton orthon logon
prattetai — perfections are such things as the following: wisdom,
temperance, justice, happiness all things that are done in
accordance with right reason (SVF 3.501).

keisthai: literally, ‘to lie’, is the name of one of the ten katégoriai
recognised by Aristotle. As such, the traditional translation is
‘posture’ or ‘position’: keisthai de hoion anakeitai, kathétai —
examples of posture are ‘is lying’, ‘is sitting’ (Ar. Cat. 2a 3). As the
quotations under katé show, it is hard to see how this category
applies to anything but living things like men. keisthai is omitted
by Aristotle in some shorter lists of categories.

kenos: empty, void. Apart from non-technical uses, as a neuter to

kenon is the name of alleged empty volumes of space. Aristotle, like
most ancient philosophers, thought that the whole sublunar sphere
was occupied by earth, air, fire and water, and all above by the
aether; but some, especially Democritus, Epicurus and their
followers, denied this: eteéi atoma kai kenon — in reality there are
atoms and void (Democritus, quoted in Sextus Empiricus 7.139)
Most of our knowledge of this theory is derived from Ar. Phys., Book
4, Chs 6-9. If Aristotle is right, it seems that for him and the

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 kentron — khairein

philosophers of whom he knew the kenon was ‘what occurs in the

diastémata, intervals, between bodies, and not a continuous space
part of which is occupied by bodies: dokei dé to kenon topos einai en
héi méden esti. toutou d’aition oti to on _séma oiontai einai, pan de
séma en topéi, kenon de en héi topéi méden esti séma — the void
seems to be a place in which there is nothing. This is because they
think that what is is body, but all body is in a place, but the void in
the place where there is no body (Ar. Phys. 213b 31). But Epicurus
speaks of it rather as being space that bodies may or may not
occupy: eite to kenon én horismenon, ouk an eikhe ta apeira sémata
hopou enesté — if the void were limited, the infinite bodies would not
have anywhere to be situated in (Epicurus, To 'Herodotus 42).
Aristotle devotes Book 4, Chs 7-9 of the Physics to arguments
designed to disprove the existence of void.

kentron: originally, a sharp-pointed goad, as in the proverb

khalepon pros kentra laktizein — it is hard to kick against the pricks
(Acts of the Apostles 26:14). From this the word came to mean the
sharp-pointed central arm of a pair of compasses, among other
things, and then the central point of the circle itself: estésan‘eis to
kentron égmenai hai AB — let the lines AB be drawn to the centre
(Ar. An. Pr. 41b 15). It was also used of the centre of a sphere: idoi
d’an tis epi tés sphairas malista tén diaphoran- ou gar t’auton
takhos esti ton te pros téi kentréi kai ton ektos — one may see this
difference especially in the case of a [revolving] sphere; for the parts
towards the centre do not have the same speed as those outside (Ar.
Phys. 24Gb 15). Finally, it came to be used of the centre of the
universe: to katétato an eié to meson tou pantos- touto d’esti to
kentron kai ta toutéi plésiazonta — the lowest point would be the
middle of the whole world; that is the central point and things close
to it (Simplicius, Physics 605.10).

khairein: to like, to enjoy, to take pleasure. Frequently with a

participle: hoti hai hopéi khaireis onomazc‘m — whatever and
however you like to name it (Pl. Symp. 212C). Often the contrary of
lupeisthai, to dislike or be distressed by, as is also hédesthai: en
toutois dé pasin é lupoumenous é khairontas — either distressed by
or taking pleasure in all these things (Pl. Rep. 6030). Thus
conjoined with hédoné: agathon einai phési to khairein pasi’zéiois
hai tén hédonén kai terpsin kai hosa tou genous esti toutou
sumphona — [Philebus] says that the good for all animals is

88
 khara — khoristos

enjoyment, pleasure, delight and everything conforming to that

kind (Pl. Philebus 11b). There is a use of the verb meaning ‘to say
farewell’ and hence an idiom where khaireto or khairein ean means
‘to leave on one side’: ta ton arkhaion peri metheisthé kai
khaireto — let us abandon and leave aside the affairs of those of old
(Pl. Laws 886d).

khara: pleasure, enjoyment, joy — the noun from khairein. In

Epicurus it is an active rather than katastématiké, calm, pleasure:
hé de khara kai hé euphrosuné kata kinésin energeiai blepontai —
but joy and exultation are considered as active pleasures involving
change (Vita Epicuri 136).

khéra: non-technically, country, or land in a non-nationalistic

sense: tés ton plésién khoras hémin apotméteon — we shall have to
cut off some of our neighbours’ land (Pl. Rep. 373d). More generally,
a place: auton kath’hauton en téi hautou khorai' dunait’an idein —
would be able to see [the sun] itself in its own place (Pl. Rep. 516b);
as hendiadys with topos: eiper esti somatos topos kai khora — if
there is a place and situation of a body (Ar. Phys. 209a 7).
Sometimes space, rather than place: en tini topéi kai katekhon
khoran - in some place and occupying space (P1. Tim. 52b).

khérismos: separation. Only non-technically in Plato: lusis kai

khorismos psukhés kai sématOs — the freeing and separation of the
soul from the body (Pl. Phaedo 67d). Sometimes, but rarely, the
separation of a form from its matter: toi men gar enuloi eidei
malista huparkhei to akhoriston- ho gar khorismos toutou phthora
toutou estin - being inseparable belongs especially to the form in
matter; for separation from the thing is its ceasing to be
(Simplicius, Physics 544.23). See khoristos. '

khéristos: separated, especially of forms on their own and not

elements in a sunolon of form and matter. The contradictory is
akhéristos. Not in Plato. ho men Sokratés ta katholou ou kh6rista
epoiei — Socrates did not treat universals as separate (Ar. Met.
1078b 30). In the neoplatonic tradition everything in the world of
being is khoriston from body. At least sometimes khoristos means
‘separable’ rather than ‘separate’: pasa psukhé asomatos estin ousia
kai khoristé somatos — every soul is an incorporeal substance and
separable from body (Proclus, Elements of Theology 186). Not in

89
 khorizein — kinésis
Plato, but to eidétikon aition saphés ho Platc‘m paradidosin on to.
khoriston monon tés hulés alla kai to akhériston — but Plato clearly
teaches a formal cause that is not only the one separate from
matter but also the unseparated (Simplicius, Physics 43.14).

khérizein: to separate: to khorizein hoti malista apo tou somatos

tén psukhén — to separate as far as possible the soul from the body
(P1. Phaedo 67c). Especially of treating the forms as independent
entities: hoi d’ekhérisan, kai ta toiauta ton ontén ideas
proségoreusan — but the others [the Platonists] separated
[universals] and called them the forms of things (Ar. Met. 1078b
31). See khéristos and akhéristos.

khronos: time. In Plato’s Timaeus and in neoplatonism, time is an

image or copy of eternity, just as perceptible things are images or
copies of the eternal forms: eiko d’epenoei kinéton tina aiénos
poiésai touton hon dé khronon anomakamen — [the demiurge]
designed to make a changing image of eternity that which we
have named ‘time’ (Pl. Tim. 37d). There is a full discussion of time
in Ar. Phys., Book 4, Chs 10 ff. touto gar estin ho khronos, arithmos
kine‘seés kata to proteron kai husteron — for that is time, the
measure of change with regard to earlier and later (Ar. Phys. 219b
1). en téi nun khronoi — at present (Pl. Philebus 35a).

kinein, kineisthai: to change, to move. See kinésis.

kiné‘sis: traditionally translated as ‘motion’, but, as will be clear,

‘change’ or ‘process’ would be better, since motion, or change of
place, is only one of the sorts of change the term covers; a difficulty
is that Greek has too many other terms that would also naturally
be translated as ‘change’, such as alloiosis and metabolé. Plato
recognised two sorts of kinésis. (1) Motion: ara kineisthai kaleis
hotan ti khéran ek khoras metaballéi é kai en toi autéi strephétai? —
do you call it change when something exchanges position for
position or also twists about in the same place? (2) Other changes:
hotan de éi men en toi autéi, géraskéi de, é melan ek leukou é skléron
ek malakou gignétai, é tina allén alloiosin alloiotai, ara ouk axion
heteron eidos phanai kinéseos? —- but when something is in the same
place, but grows old, or becomes black instead of white or hard
instead of soft or undergoes some other alteration, is it not right to
call this another kind of change? (Pl. Theaet. 18lc-d). Aristotle

9O
 kosmos

accepts this, adding also change of quantity: ei oun hai katégoriai

. diéiréntai ousia't', poiotéti, topéi, téi poiein kai paskhein, téi pros ti,
téi poséi, anagké treis einai kinéseis, poiou posou topou- kat’ousian
d’ou oude tou pros ti oude poiountos kai paskhontos — if then
the categories be distinguished as substance, quality, place, action
and passion, relation, quantity, it is necessary that there be three
changes, in quality, quantity and place; but not in substance, or in
relation, or in action and passion (Ar. Met. 1068a 8). genesis —
coming to be — and phthora — ceasing to be — are not kine‘seis since
they do not involve change in a continuing thing: adunaton tén
genesin kinésin einai oude dé hé phthora kinésis — coming to be
cannot be a kinésis and nor can ceasing to be (Ar. Met. 1067b 30
and 37). Increase and decrease in size — auxésis and phthisis — are
counted as changes of place by Aristotle, and so as kinéseis: tautés
[kinéseés kata topon] de to men phora, to de auxésis kai phthisis —,of
this [change of place] one sort is local motion, the other increase
and decrease (Ar. Phys. 211a 15). It is clear that the use of ‘change’
as a translation restricted to kinésis is artificial, but some
artificiality seems inescapable, since metabolé, alloiésis and kinésis
can all be naturally called change, while turning green, which is a
kinésis, is not naturally called a motion.
Aristotle also introduced a contrast between energeia and kinésis
that seems to have no connexion with the use considered above. It is
developed in Met. 1048b 18-35 and elsewhere. It is between doings
such that if someone is doing something he has done it, and those
where this is not so: hoion hora't hama kai heorake all’ou
manthanei kai memathéken — one has seen as soon as one sees, but
has not learnt as soon as one is learning (Ar. Met. 1048a 23). The
former doings, are energeiai, the latter kinéseis. kinéseis also take
time and come to an end when complete — when one has learnt
something, that learning ends of necessity — whereas one can look
at a thing for an indefinite period. It would seem that growing
bigger, for example, would be a kinésis as a type of change, but an
energeia rather than a kinésis, since it has no conceptually
necessary terminating point. Aristotle sometimes also treats
energeia as a genus of which kinésis is a species; for illustrative
quotations see energeia.

kosmos: generally, good order, a near synonym of taxis: méd’en

kosmoi méd’en taxei — neither in order nor arrangement (Pl. Laws
898b); tén de taxin kai ton kosmon para phusin — [Democritus

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 7 kouphos -— krinein
makes] arrangement and order unnatural (Ar. De Caelo 301a 10).
Hence, on the one hand, adornment (as in the English ‘cosmetic’):
peri ton gunaikeion kosmon — concerning female adornment (Pl. Rep.
373c). But also the ordered heavens, or the heavens and the universe
contained therein: ho pas ouranos é kosmos é kai allo ho ti pate
onomazomenos malista an dekhoito — the whole heaven or the
cosmos or whatever else it would prefer to be called (Pl. Tim. 28b); hé
de tou holou sustasis esti kosmos kai ouranos — the composition ofthe
whole is the cosmos and the heaven (Ar. De Caelo 280a 21). It is
sometimes hard to tell whether Aristotle is referring to the universe
as a whole or to the sphere ofthe fixed stars that contains it when he
uses the words kosmos and ouranos: phésin ho Alexandros dein
sémeiésasthai hoti mekhri nun téi tou ouranou onomati khrésamenos
epi tou kosmou pantos nun ton ouranon bouletai tén exétaté sphairan
tén ton aplanén legein — Alexander says that it is necessary to have
noted that up to now [Phys 212b 2] Aristotle has used the word
‘heaven’ of the whole of the cosmos but now wishes to speak of the
heaven as the outermost sphere of the fixed stars (Simplicius,
Physics 594.17). dei legein tonde ton kosmon zéion empsukhon
ennoun — one must say that this universe is a living, intelligent
animal (Pl. Tim. 30b).

kouphos: light. Both Plato and Aristotle regard lightness as a

natural disposition to be and, above: to ané kai to kouphon — the
above and the light (Pl. Crat. 423a); haplés men oun kouphon
legomen t0 and pheromenon kai pros to eskhaton pros allo de
kouphon kai kouphoteron, hou duoin ekhontén baros kai ton ogkon
ison katé pheretai thateron phusei thatton — we call something light
without qualification which moves upwards and towards the extre-
mity [of the universe] but relatively light, i.e. lighter, that than
which the other of two things having weight and equal bulk moves
more quickly downwards (Ar. De Caelo 308a 29). kouphos is the
contrary of barus. For Aristotle the planets and the fixed stars have
no weight or lightness, since they have no tendency to move either
and or katé.

krinein: to judge, in all senses of the word: krineis su to megiston

anthrépois agathon einai plouton? — do you judge (evaluate) wealth
to be the greatest good for man?.(Pl. Gorg. 452C); ho dikastés
krineté — let the juryman judge (P1. Laws 925a); to krinein to aléthes
te kai mé — to judge (distinguish) the true and false (Pl. Theaet. 150b).

92
 krisis — lexis

krisis: judgment, in all senses ofthe word: peri tén ton dikaién krisin
— concerned with the judgment (distinction) of just acts (P1. Laws
948b); dia krisin adikon - because of an unjust judgment (verdict)
(Pl. Apol. 41b); ta de toiauta en tois kath’hekasta kai en téi aisthései
hé krisis — such matters are particular and judgment is a matter of
perception (Ar. E.N. 1109b 23).

kritérion: a norm by which krisis and to krinein are to be

determined, a canon of judgment. It is a notion important in both
Stoic and Epicurean thought: en toinun téi Kanoni legon estin ho
Epikouros kritéria tés alétheias einai tas aisthéseis kai prolépseis kai
ta pathé- hoi de Epikoureioi kai tas phantastikas epibolas tés
dianoias — in the Canon Epicurus says that the criteria of truth'are
the perceptions and concepts and the emotions; but the Epicureans
add the intuitive apprehensions of the mind (Vita Epicuri 31);
kritérion men legetai to te hoi krinesthai phasin huparxin kai
anuparxin kai to hoi prosekhontes bioumen — that is called the
criterion by which the Stoics say existence and non-existence are
judged and that by attention to which we live (Sextus Empiricus,
Outlines ofPyrrhonism 2.14).

kuklos: a circle or something circular. A circle in argument is defined

narrowly by Aristotle: to de kukléi kai ex alle‘lén deiknusthai esti to
dia tou sumperasmatos kai tou anapalin téi katégoriai‘ tén heteran
labonta protasin sumperanasthai tén loipén, hén elambanen en
thateroi sullogismoi — circular or reciprocal proof is the use of the
conclusion and the simple conversion of one premiss to demonstrate
the other premiss which one assumed in the previous argument (Ar.
An. Pr. 57a 17). Thus given an argument that if allA is B and all B is
C then allA is C, to argue that since all B isA and allA is C then all B
is C is circular.

L
lexis: in general, speech. In philosophy, lexis is sometimes diction
as opposed to content: kata de tén lexin asapheian poiei to hé toi
ho logos proskeimenon kai thélukon arthron téi arsenikéi
suntetagmenon — as regards diction, some unclarity is caused by the
‘hé’ adjoining ‘ho logos’, i.e. the feminine article joined with the
masculine (Simplicius, Physics 233.3); cf. Aspasius on EN. 122.27.

93
 logikos — logismos
logikos: basically, ‘concerned with logos — speech’, hence ‘rational’
or ‘intellectual’, as in homoiés de kai peri ton logikon aretc‘m —
similarly with regard to the intellectual excellences (Ar. E.N. 1108b
9); noun epistémén doxan aisthésin ex hon pasa tekhné kai epistémé
kai autoi logikoi esmen — intelligence, knowledge, belief and
perception, from which comes every skill and science and through
which we are rational (SVF 2.455). There is some difficulty in
understanding the term when used of argument: aporian hén
logikén kalei, é his ex endoxon proi'ousan é has ten logéi monoi to
pithanon ekhousan kai ouk apo tén pragmaton bebaioumenén é
logikén legei tén koinoteran kai ou prosekhé oude idian tou
prokeimenou oude ex oikeién arkhon — a problem that [Aristotle]
calls logical, either because it proceeds from accepted opinions, or
as having its persuasive power only in what is said and not as
confirmed by the data, or he calls logical that which is more
general and not closely connected with or special to the subject, nor
derived from closely associated premisses (Simplicius, Physics
440.21); to gar logikon hos koinon antidiastellein eiéthe téi oikeiéi
kai kata tén phusin tou pragmatos kai apodeiktikoi - [Aristotle]
was accustomed to contrast the logical, as general, with the closely
associated, i.e. what is concerned with the nature of the data and
demonstrative (Simplicius, Physics 476.28); dia logikoteron kai
akribesterén logon — by more logical and more precise arguments
(Ar. Met. 1080a 10); proslabén peri poia t’esti ta enthumémata kai
tinas ekhei diaphoras pros tous logikous sullogismous - adding a
knowledge of the sphere of enthymemes and their difference from
logical arguments (Ar. Rhet. 1355a 13).

logiké‘s: the adverb from logikos. Here also, Simplicius cannot

decide whether the question is one of strictness or of generality of
argument: proton men logikos eti epikheirei, toutesti pithanos kai
endoxés, kai eti koinoteran p63 kai dialektikoteron -— first [Aristotle]
argues logically, i.e. persuasively and from received opinion, and
also more generally and dialectically (Simplicius, Physics 476.25).

logismos: primarily, numerical calculation: logismoi kai ta peri

arithmous hen mathéma — calculations and numerical matters are
a single study (P1. Laws 817e). But also reasoning in general: kai
sémati men hémas genesei di’aisthéseés koinc‘mein, dia logismou de
psukhéi pros tén ontos ousian — in body we have a share in becoming
through perception, but by reasoning in soul we share in true being

94
 logistikos — logos
(Pl. Soph. 248a). Also the power of reasoning in general: ta de
megista kai kuriotata ho logismos dioike‘ke — reason has settled the
greatest and most important matters (Epicurus, Principal Doctrines
16). The related verb is logizesthai, which also has both the wider
and the narrower uses as to reason and to calculate.

logistikos: usually applied to matters of calculation, numbers and

arithmetic; hoi te phusei logistikoi eis panta ta mathémata hos epos
eipein oxeis phuontai — natural calculators are naturally quick at
practically speaking all studies (Pl. Rep. 526b). But also more
generally ‘rational’: hé men oun aisthétiké phantasia kai en tois
allois zoiois huparkhei, hé de bouleutiké‘ en tois logistikois — percep-
tual imagination is found also in other animals, but deliberative
imagination only in those that are rational (Ar. De An. 434a 6).

logos: the verbal noun from legein, ‘to speak’ or ‘to say’; its basic
meaning is ‘something said’. More specialised meanings are given in
LSJ under ten main heads, liberally subdivided, and occupy five and
a half columns. Many of these meanings are to be found in philos-
ophical writings. But one of the most important and characteristic
uses in philosophy might be translated ‘account’ and is concerned
with the giving of some account, explanation, definition of some kind
of thing: ho tou dikaiou logos — the account, definition, of the just (Pl.
Rep. 343a); esti d’horos men logos ho to ti én einai sémainon,
apodidotai de é logos anti onomatosé logos anti logou — a definition is
an account signifying the essential nature; either an account is
provided in place of a word or an account in place of an account (Ar.
Top. 101b 37); heteros gar ho kata tounoma logos auton — [ambigu-
ously named things] have a different account, definition, in relation
to their name (Ar. Top. 107a 20); anagké gar é to auto einai hekateron
kai hena logon amphoterén, é méden einai koinon — for either the two
are identical and share a common account (definition), or have
nothing in common (Proclus, Elements of Theology 18). Another
important use is one where the best translation is perhaps ‘reason’:
ouden khréma matén ginetai, alla panta ek logou te kai hup’anagkés
— nothing happens idly, but everything for a reason and from
necessity (Leucippus, fr. 2); epistémé kai ho orthos logos —
knowledge and right reason (P1. Phaedo 73a); to men alogon autés
einai to de logon ekhon — one part of [the soul] is without reason, the
other possesses it (Ar. EN. 1102a 28).

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 lupé — makarios
lupé, lupeisthai, lupéros: opposite of hédoné, hédesthai, hédus.
lupé is any emotionally unfavourable reaction, andincludes dislike,
distress, grief and pain, but is not to be identified with any of these,
and especially not with pain, though this is often given as the single
translation. Andronicus, in his book Peri Pathén — ‘On Emotions’ —
lists 25 varieties of lupé, including metameleia, regret, and oiktos,
pity. Similarly the lupéros, as the opposite of the hédus, is the
unpleasant, not specifically the painful, though pain is one among
many unpleasant things. hotan tis sterétheis lupéthéi dia tén khreian
— when someone deprived is distressed through his need (Pl.
Philebus 52b); stokhasetai tou mé lupein é sunédonein. eoike men gar
peri hédonas kai lupas einai tas en tais homiliais ginomenas — [the
friendly man] will aim at not causing distress or at sharing pleasure.
For he seems to be concerned with what is pleasant and unpleasant
in social life (Ar. E.N. 1126b 29); phtheirousi gar tas energeias hai
oikeiai lupai, hoion ei téi to graphein aédes kai epilupon é to
logizesthai — for dislike of activities destroys them, as if one finds
writing disagreeable and tedious, or calculation (Ar. E.N. 1175b 17).

lusis: in general, and always in Plato, freeing or liberation: lusis kai

khérismos psukhés apo sématos — freeing and separation of soul
from body (Pl. Phaedo 67d). In Aristotle and his successors it also has
the technical meaning ofsolving some aporia or difficulty hé gar lusis
tés aporias heuresis estin — for the solving of the problem is a
discovery (Ar. E.N. 1146b 6); ean gar luétai te ta duskheré kai
kataleipétai ta endoxa, dedeigmenon an eié hikanés — for if the
difficulties be dissolved and received Opinion remain, the matter
would be sufficiently demonstrated (Ar. E.N. 1145b 6).

M
maieutiké: obstetric: hé maieutike tekhné — midwifery. Socrates
maintained that he could help others to give birth to philosophical
ideas, but was himself barren: tés emés tekhnés maieutikés of my
-
obstetric skill (Pl. Theaet. 161e). The newly born is a maieuma of
the midwife: son men einai hoion neogenes paidion, emon de
maieuma — that it is, soto speak, yournew-born child, brought to
birth by me (P1. Theaet. 160e).

makarios: blessed, often conjoined with eudaimén: ho ge eu zén

makarios kai eudaimén — he who lives well is blessed and Well-off

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 mania — matén

(P1. Rep. 354a); tina tropon zéi ? athlion é makarion .9 — what sort oflife
does he lead? wretched or blessed? (P1. Rep. 571a); oude makarion
kai eudaimona mia hémera oud’oligos khronos - nor does one day or
a short time [make a man] blessed and well-off (Ar. E.N. 1098a 19).
Strictly the gods are makarioi, men only by similitude: tois men gar
theois hapas ho bios makarios, tois d’anthropois eph’hoson homoi-
6ma ti tés toiautés energeias huparkhei — for the gods, their whole
life is blessed, but for men only in so far as they exhibit some
simulacrum of such activity (Ar. E.N. 1178b 25). makarios:
blessedly; makarizein: to count blessed; makariotés: blessedness. It
is makarios that is translated ‘blessed’ in the Beatitudes.

mania: usually, madness in an ordinary medical sense. But, most

noticably in the Phaedrus, it is used by Plato of what he considers to
be irrational but in some way inspired: manias de ge eidé duo, tén
men hupo nose‘matén anthrépinén, tén de hupo theias exallagés ton
eiéthoton nomimon tés de theias tettarén theon tettara meré
dielomenoi, mousikén men epipnoian Apollénos thentes, Dionusou de
telestikén, Mousén d’au poiétikén, tettartén de Aphrodités kai Erétos
— [we say that] there are two sorts of madness, one caused by human
_ diseases, the other by divine dispensation from customary conven-
tions of the divine, we distinguished four parts caused by four
gods, music being the inspiration of Apollo, initiation that of Dio-
nysus, poetry that ofthe Muses, and the fourth that ofAphrodite and
Eros (Pl. Phaedrus 265a). mainesthai: to be mad; manikos: mad.

manthanein. (1) To learn. (2) To understand. to gar manthanein

homénumon, to te xunienai khrémenon téi epistéméi kai to lamb-
anein epistémén — manthanein has two senses, both to understand,
using knowledge, and to acquire knowledge (Ar. Top. 165b 32); epi
itekhne‘i manthanei, hos sophistés esomenos — he is learning profes-
sionally, as about to become a sophist (P1. Protag. 315a); to man-
thanein ouk epistémé esti lambanein toutou hou an tis manthanéi? —
is not learning the acquisition of knowledge of that which one is
learning? (Pl. Euthyd. 277b); ou manthaneis hos legé? — man-
thané — do you not understand what I mean? — I understand (P1.
Gorg. 447d).

matén. (1) In vain, fruitlessly: sémeion de to matén, hoti legetai hotan

mé genétai t6i heneka allou ekeino hou heneka, hoion ei to badisai
lapaxeés heneka estin, ei de mé egeneto badisanti, matén phamen

97
 mathéma — mathématikos
badisai kai hé badisis mataia — an indication is the word
‘fruitlessly’, which is used when something is for something else
that does not come about, e.g. if walking is for the sake of loosening
the bowels, but this did not happen when someone walked, we say
he walked fruitlessly and that the walking was fruitless (Ar. Phys.
197b 22). (2) Without reason, pointlessly: hina mé matén tharréséis
— lest you rejoice without reason (Pl. Theaet. 189d); eme de aitia't
matén - he accuses me without good reason (Pl. Alcib. 1.113c).

mathéma: in its basic sense, and nearly always in Plato’s works,

any. study which a person may manthanein, learn: ta ‘ paidén
mathémata — the studies of children (Pl. Tim. 26b); poia dé legeis
mathémata megista? — which do you say are the most important
studies? (Pl. Rep. 504a). But the term tended to be confined to the
mathematical sciences: eti dé toinun tois eleutherois esti tria
mathémata, logismoi men kai ta peri arithmous hen mathéma,
metriké de mékous kai epipedou kai bathous hos hen au deuteron,
triton de tés ton astron periodou — there are still three sciences for
free men, one science being calculations and the study of numbers,
another the measurement of lengths, areas and solids, a third
concerned with the rotation of the stars (P1. Laws 812e); ta
phusikétera ton mathématén, hoion optiké kai harmoniké kai
astronomia — the more natural of the sciences, such as optics,
harmonics and astronomy (Ar. Phys. 194a 8).

mathématikos occurs only once in Plato’s works, with the general

sense of one who is engaged in studies: ton de mathématikon é tina
allén sphodra meletén dianoia't katergazomenon — the student, or
anyone engaged in serious intellectual activity (Pl. Tim. 88b). Like
mathéma, mathe‘matikos has subsequently usually the sense of
‘mathematical’ as an adjective, ‘mathematician’ as a noun:
mathématikos men pais genoit’an, sophos d’é phusikos ou — a child
may become a mathematician, but not a sage or scientist (Ar. E.N.1
1142a 17); para ta aisthéta kai ta eidé ta mathématika ton
pragmatc‘m einai phési metaxu, diapheronta ton men aisthétén téi
a't'dia kai akinéta einai, tc‘m d’eidc‘m téi ta men poll’atta homoia
einai, to de eidos auto hen hekaston monon -— [Plato] said that in
addition to perceptible things and forms there were mathematical
entities in between, differing from sensible things by being
everlasting and unchanging, and from forms by being many alike
whereas each form is only one (Ar. Met. 987b 14). But the word

98
 megalopsukhia — meros
continued to have also a wider sense, and Sextus Empiricus’ work
Pros Mathématikous —— Adversus Mathematicos — for example, is a
general denial of the possibility of science of all kinds.

- megalopsukhia: greatness of soul; megalopsukhos: great-souled.

Rare and dyslogistic in Plato: hoi de euphémotatois onomasi
boulomenoi katonomazein hoi men megalopsukhous — of those who
wish to call them by the most charitable names, some call them
great-souled (P1.Alcib. 2.140c); dia tén megalopsukhian — touto gar
kalliston ton en aphrosunéi ge onomatén — through greatness of
soul — for that is the fairest of names for folly (Pl. Alcib. 2.150c).
Aristotle uses the word favourably and makes megalopsukhia one
of his excellences of character: dokei dé megalopsukhos einai ho
megalén hauton axién axios 6n- ho gar mé kat’axian auto poién
élithios — the great-souled seems to be he who estimates himself
highly, being estimable; for he who does so, not being worthy, is a
fool (Ar. E.N. 1123b 1). ‘

megethos: size, may apply to anything in any way measurable: tou

megethous tés kolaseés —- the size (severity) of the punishment
(P1. Laws 934b). Particularly of physical and geometrical
magnitudes: dia gar to en téi noései mé hupoleipein kai ho arithmos
dokei apeiros einai kai ta mathématika megethé kai to exé tou
ouranou — because they do not give out in thought, both number
and mathematical magnitudes and what is external to the heavens
seem to be infinite (Ar. Phys. 203b 23).

mékos: length: diastémata men oun ekhei tria, mékos kai platos kai
bathos — [place] has three dimensions, length, breadth and depth,
by which every body is determined (Ar. Phys. 209a 4); esti dc to men
and tau mékous arkhé, to de dexion tou platous, to de emprosthen
tou bathous — the above is the basis of length, to the right of
breadth, in front of depth (Ar. De Caelo 284a 24). Of time: apo
mékbus khronou — from length of time (Pl. Laws 676a). Of speeches:
hos humin phulaxei to mékos ton logon hekaterou — who will watch
over the length of the speeches of each of you (Pl. Prot. 338b).

meros: part, as opposed to holos, whole. Of time: mekhri tritou

merous horas — until the third part of the hour (P1. Laws 784a). Of
place: en tini merei tés poleés ,— in some part of the city (Pl. Rep.
460C). Abstractly: méd’en alloi médeni merei aretés husterountas —

99
 mesos -— mesotés

nor being behind in any other part (aspect) of excellence (Pl. Rep.
484d); en toutois gar tois logois diestéke to logon ekhon meros tés
psukhés pros to alogon — for these are the ratios in which the part of
‘
the soul that has reason stands towards the non-rational (Ar. EN.
1 138b 8). Adverbially en merei, in turn: hekaston en merei logon peri
Erfitos eipein — each in turn to make a speech about Eros (Pl. Symp.
214b). meros appears to be a synonym of morion. Ar. Met., Book 4,
Ch. 25 discusses meanings of the term. It is clear that the Greeks
used meros not only where we should say ‘part’, but also where
‘aspect’, ‘elemen ’, ‘component’, etc. would be more natural than
‘part’.

mes'os: in the middle. Geographically: en mesai tés gés — in the middle

of the earth. Abstractly: hé men hairesis houto gignomené meson an
ekhoi monarkhikés kai démokratikés politeias — such a method of
selection would provide a mean between a monarchic and a democra-
tic constitution (Pl. Laws 756e). As a noun in the neuter, to meson is
the mean, numerical or non-numerical: to ge meson ison ton eskhaton
apekhei — the mean is equidistant from the extremes; iséi gar
huperekhei te kai huperekhetai- touto de meson esti kata tén arithme-
tikén analogian — it exceeds and is exceeded by equal amounts; this
is in accordance with arithmetical proportion (Ar. E.N. 1106a 34); ei
de pollakhés legetai to meson ekhon, dioristeon to pas meson ekhon —
if ‘having a mean’ has different senses, one must distinguish how a
thing has a mean (Ar. Top. 149a 31). Abstractly: to meson huper-
phanias kai aneleutherias metadiokontes — pursuing the mean
between pride and meanness (Pl. Critias 112C); hai mesai hexeis pros
men tas elleipseis huperballousipros de tas huperbolas elleipousin en
-te tois pathesi kai tois praxesin — intermediate dispositions exceed in
relation to the deficient and are deficient in relation to the excessive
in both emotions and actions (Ar. E.N. 1108b 16); ho mesos aléthés tis
— the intermediate man is truthful (Ar. E.N. 1108a 20). In Aristotle’s
philosophy ofperception the meson is the medium between the object
perceived and the perceiver: aisthanometha ge pantén dia tou mesou
— we perceive everything through the medium (Ar. De An. 423b 7): in
Aristotelian logic to meson is the middle term in a syllogism by which
the subject and predicate terms of the conclusion are linked in the
premisses: aneu mesou sullogismos ou gignetai — there is no syllo-
gism without a middle term (Ar. An. Pr. 66a 28).

mesotés: intermediacy, an abstract noun derived from mesos, used

100’
 metabainein —— metaballein
especially in Aristotle’s doctrine of the mean: estin ara hé areté hexis
proairetiké en mesotéti ousa téi pros hémas — so excellence is a
disposition to choose in a mean relative to us (Ar. EN. 1 107b 36); peri
men oun phobous kai tharré andreia mesotés — so bravery is a mean
state concerning fear and confidence (Ar. E.N. 1107a 34). Also in
Aristotle’s doctrine of perception a sense organ must be in a mean
state in relation to what is perceived, as things, for example, feel hot
and cold only to a body that is less hot and less cold: tés aisthe‘seos
hoion mesotétos tinos ousés tés en tois aisthétois enantiéseos — the
" sense being as it were a mean state between the contraries among
sense-objects (Ar. De An. 424a 4). i '

metabainein: literally, to move to another place: metabainonta eis

heteron aei topon — continually moving to another place (P1. Laws
893d). The verb in to gar metabainbn topon ek topou — what changes
one place for another — seems in Simplicius to mean the same as
metaballein in phamen ta meré topon ek topou metaballein- we say
that the parts change one place for another (Simplicius, Physics
609.8 and 632.27). By transference, metabainei ek tés timarkhias
eis tén oligarkhian — it changes from timarchy into oligarchy (Pl.
Rep. 550d); ouk ara estin ex allou genous metabanta deixai, hoion to
geémetrikon arithmétikéi ... ex hon men oun hé apodeixis endekhetai
ta auta einai- hén de to genos heteron, hos per arithmétikés kai
geémetrike‘s, ouk esti tén arithmétikén apodeixin epharmosai epi ta
tois megethesi sumbebékota, ei mé ta megethé arithmoi eisi — it is not
possible to demonstrate moving from another genus, e.g. into
something geometrical from something arithmetiCal . . . the elements
of the proof may be the same, but where things are of a different
genus, like arithmetic and geometry, one cannot fit the arithmetical
demonstration to the attributes of magnitudes unless these magni-
tudes are numbers (Ar. An. Pr. 75a 37).

metaballein: to change. This appears to be a close synonym of

metabainein in many contexts; see the quotations from Simplicius
under metabainein, and compare metabainei ek tés timarkhias eis
ten oligarkhian — it changes from timarchy into oligarchy — with
héde malista eis oligarkhikon ek tou timokratikou ekeinou meta-
ballei — [a constitution]; chiefly changes from that timarchic type into
oligarchy in this way (Pl. Rep. 550d and 553a). For Aristotle’s
technical use see under metabolé‘.

101
 metabasis — metalambanein

metabasis: change, the verbal noun from metabainein: hé metaba-

sis ... eis ta zéia sunekhés estin — the change [from plants] to animals
is continuous (Ar. H.A. 588b 11); all’ekeino men délon, hos ouk estin
eis allo genos metabasis, hosper ek mékous eis epiphaneian — this is
clear, that there cannot be a move to another genus, as from a length
to a surface (Ar. De Caelo 26821 30).

metabolé: change: ton politeién genesis kai metabolé —- the coming

into being ofand change in constitutions (Pl. Laws 676C). In Aristotle
and, under his influence, in much later philosophy, metabolé became “
the most general word for change of all kinds, the principal distinct-
ion being between substantial change, such as genesis, coming to be,
and phthora, ceasing to be, on the one hand, and various types of
kiné‘sis on the other: metaballei gar aei to metaballon é kat’ousian é
kata poion é kata topon — what changes always changes either in
substance or in quality or in place (Ar. Phys. 200b 33); hotan men oun
en [logéi] éi hé metabolé‘ genesis estai é‘ phthora, hotan d’en tois
pathesi kai kata sumbebékos alloiésis — when the change is in the
account, it is coming or ceasing to be, but when in affections and
contingently, it is alteration (Ar. De Gen. et Cor. 317a 259).

metalambanein: to share in, in Platonic and neoplatonic metaphy-

sics: étoi holou tou eidous é merous hekaston to metalambanon
metalambanei — each thing that has a share either shares in the
whole form or a part of it (Pl. Parm. 131a); auto to kreitton to
meizonés agathou meteiléphos — the superior itself is that which has
a greater share of good (Proclus, Elements of Theology 12). Else-
where it frequently means ‘to take instead’; allo gar onoma
meteiléphen anti tés hédonés to agathon — for it has taken another
name, ‘good’, instead of ‘pleasure’ (P1. Prat. 3550). Especially in
Aristotelian logic, of substitution of problematic premisses in syllo-
gisms: ei gar to A kai to B téi C endekhetai mé huparkhein ean
metaléphthéi to ‘endekhetai huparkhein’palin estai to proton skhéma
dia tés antistrophés — ifA and B may not be present in C, if ‘may be
present’ be substituted there will again be the first figure by means of
conversion (Ar. An. Pr. 39a 20). Thus if all A may not be C and all B
may not be C, we may get afirst figure syllogism by substituting ‘all
A may be C’ and ‘all B may be C’, and then converting the latter to
yield the syllogism: if all A may be C and all C may be B, then all A
may be B. The noun is metalépsis: allé tis an metalépsis khoris
toutén genoito? — or could there be any other form of having a share

102
 metamelein — metaphusika
except these? (Pl. Parm. 131a).

metamelein: to regret, in relation to past actions, as being inex-

pedient, mistaken or wrongful. Only in the last-mentioned case is
the translation ‘repent’ very suitable. ekeinois men tote metamelei
hon an eu poiésésin — such men will then regret their good deeds (Pl.
Phaedrus 231C); oute nun moi metamelei houtés apologisamenéi —
nor do I now regret having so conducted my defence (P1.Apol. 38e).
The noun is metameleia: to en metameleia'i' — the deed regretted (Ar.
E.N. 1110b 23); metameleia te euthus tou pepragmenou gignétai —
there is immediate repentance of the action [unpremeditated
murder] (Pl. Laws 866e).

metapherein: to carry across, to transfer, used by Plato in a

transferred sense, but not in relation to metaphor: peri tou autou
men peri houper ego te kai su nun dialegometha, peri aretés,
metenénegmenon d’eis poiésin — on the same subject which you and I
are now discussing, excellence, but transferred to the subject of
poetry (P1. Prot. 339a); see also Pl. Tim. 26c.

metaphora: metaphor, not used by Plato. metaphora de estin ono-

matos allotriou epiphora é apo tou genous epi eidos é apo tou eidos epi
t0 genos, é apo tou eidous epi eidos é kata to analogon‘ — metaphor is
the introduction of a word belonging elsewhere, either from genus to
species, or from species to genus, or from species to‘species, or by
analogy (Ar. Poetics 1457b 7); examples given are néus de moi
héd’estéken — my ship is standing, 'muri’Odusseus esthla eorgen —
Odysseus did thousands of great deeds [‘thousands’ being the
specific for ‘very many’], khalkoi apo psukhén arusas — having drawn
off [vice ‘cut off] his life with the bronze [sword], erei toinun tén
phialén aspida Dionusou — he will call the cup the sword of Dionysus
[since the cup is to Dionysus as the sword is to Ares] (Ar. Poetics
1457b 21). It is clear that Aristotle’s use of metaphora is wider than
our use of ‘metaphor’.

metaphusika: metaphysics, does not occur in the earlier philoso-

phers and does not appear in LSJ. The title of Aristotle’s work on
what he called prote‘ philosophia and theologiké, Ta meta ta phusika,
was not used by Aristotle, but is said by Jaeger to be old and used by
the Peripatetics. It is thought to mean ‘the work coming after the

103
 metaxu — metekhein

Physics’ in some catalogue. See p. xxxii of Ross’s edition of the

Metaphysics.

metaxu: ‘between’, in all obvious senses. The only metaphysical use

in Plato is when he ascribes a state ofbeing metaxu ousias kai tou mé
einai — between being and not being (Pl. Rep. 479c) — to the objects of
belief. Whether this is a state between existence and non-existence
or between having and not having characteristics is not clear; see
einai. Aristotle also frequently ascribes to Plato a doctrine of
mathematical intermediates, but this doctrine does not, at least
explicitly, occur in Plato’s writings: eti de para ta aisthéta kai ta eidé
ta mathématika ton pragmatén einai phési metaxu, diapheronta ton
men aisthéton téi a'tdia kai akinéta einai, ton d’eidon toi ta men
poll’atta homoia einai to de eidos hen hekaston monon — also [Plato]
says that in addition to perceptible things and the forms there is a
class of mathematicals, differing from perceptible things by being
everlasting and unchanging and from forms by there being many of
each alike, whereas there is only one form of each thing (Ar. Met.
987b 14). See also Metaphysics 991b 29, 992b 16, 997b 2, etc.

metekhein: to participate [in]. This is a key word of neoplatonism,

since the lower orders of being are all said to proceed — proienai —
’ from and participate in the higher: panpléthos metekheipéi tou henos
— every manifold participates in unity (Proclus, Elements ofTheology
1). metekhomenos is the contrary ofamethektos: pan to amethekton
huphistésin aph’heautou ta metekhomena, kai pasai hai metekhome-
nai hupostaseis eis amethektous huparxeis anateinontai — everything
unparticipated produces from itself the participated, and all partici-
pated substances are derivative from unparticipated existences
(Proclus, Elements of Theology 23); in this usage metekhomenos is a
synonym of methektos, participated: ho methektos khronos — partici-
pated time (Simplicius, Physics 784.32). Plato uses the verb in many
ordinary contexts and sometimes ofreal existence: ousias meteskhen
— it had a share in being (P1. Parm. 143b); metaskhon tou ontos —
having a share in reality (Pl. Soph. 259a). But the verb was clearly
used in the Academy also of the relation of forms to particulars, as
Aristotle’s unfriendly comment bears witness: to de legein paradeig-
mata einai kai metekhein auton ta alla kenologein esti kai metapho-
ras legein poiétikas -, to say that there are patterns and that other ‘
' things participate in them is empty verbiage and poetic metaphor
(Ar. Met. 1079b 24). See also methexis and methektos.

104
 meteorologia — methektikos
meteérologia. See meteoros.

meteérologikos. See meteoros.

meteoros: normally, ‘up in the air?: blepén meteéros anothen — in the

air looking down from above (Pl. Theaet. 175d). In his
Meteo‘rologika Aristotle describes himself as studying ho pantes
hoi proteroi meteérologian ekaloun — what all previous writers
called meteorology; but Plato seems to use the term meteorologia
of abstruse physical speculation in general: pasai hosai megalai ton
tekhnon prosdeontai adoleskhias kai meteorologias phuseos peri —
all important arts need general talk and speculation about nature
(Pl. Phaedrus 270a); kinduneuousin hoi prétoi ta onomata
tithemenoi ou phauloi einai alla meteorologoi kai adoleskhai tines —
it would seem that those who first assigned names were not
insignificant but scientific and general speculators (Pl. Crat. 40 1b).
Epicurus regularly uses ta meteora to cover everything celestial: to
makarion en téi peri meteérén gnései entautha peptokenai kai en téi
tines phuseis hai theéroumenai kata ta meteéra tauta — the
blessedness of knowledge of celestial matters lies there and in
knowing the nature of the existences seen in these celestial
phenomena (Epicurus, Letter to Herodotus 78). Aristotle gives the
subject-matter of the Meteérologika as hosa sumbainei kata phusin
men ataktoteran mentoi tés tou prétou stoikheiou ton sématén, peri
ton geitnionta malista topon téi phora't ton astrc‘m hosa te
theiémen an aeros koina pathé kai hudatos- eti de gés hosa meré, kai
eidé kai pathé ton meron — what comes about naturally but in a less
orderly way than the first element of bodies, in the region that
closely adjoins the motion of the stars, and what we would treat
as the common features of air and water, andof the various parts of
the earth, and the kinds and features of its parts (Ar. Meteor., Book
1, Ch. 1). Aristotle goes on to specify the Causes of earthquakes and
' winds as included. It is clear that ta meteora are far more than
meteors and that ta meteorologika is far more than meteorology or
even events happening up in the air.

methektikos: participating. A rare word, not in Plato, used of the

relation of particulars to forms: hupotithetai hoti esti ton onté‘n ta
men eidé ta de methektika ton eidon —‘ [Socrates in the Phaedo]
assumes that of entities some are forms and others participants in
the forms (Ar. De Gen. et Cor. 335b 12). See also Ar. Phys. 209b 35.

105
 methek tos — methexis

An adjective formed from metekhein.

methektos: participated. Not in Plato, but later used to refer to the

possible relation of forms to particulars in the first place and then, in
neoplatonic thought, to the relation of a being of any higher grade to
one of a lower: kata de to anagkaion kai tas doxas tas peri autén, ei
esti methekta ta eidé, ton ousion anagkaion ideas einai monon — but
according to the need [of the theory] and the viewsheld about [the
forms], if the forms are participated there must be forms of substan-
ces alone (Ar. Met. 99Gb 27). As so often, it is hard to tell whether in
the foregoing there is any significance in the change from eide to
ideai. oute pasai psukhai metekh’ousi'nou tou methektou, all’hosoi
noeroteroi — nor do all souls participate in the participated intelli-
gence, but only the more intellective (Proclus, Elements of Theology
111). The contrary is amethektos.

methexis: participation. (1) A possible relation of particulars to

forms: emoige kataphainetai hode ekhein° ta men eidé tauta hosper
paradeigmata hestanai en téi phusei, ta de alla toutois eoikenai kai
einai homoiomata, kai hé methexis hauté tois allots gignesthai tén
eidon ouk allé tis é eikasthénai autois — the following seems to be the
case to me [Socrates]: those forms stand in nature as patterns, and
other things are like them and are likenesses of them, and this
participation by other things in the forms consists simply in their
being likened to them (Pl. Parm. 132d). Aristotle, perhaps surpris-
ingly, ascribes this interpretation of methexis to Plato himself:
houtos oun ta men toiauta ton ontén ideas proségoreuse, ta d’aisthéta
para tauta kai kata tauta legesthai panta- kata methexin gar einai ta
polla ton sunénumon. tén de methexin t’ounoma monon metebalen°
hoi men gar Puthagoreioi mimései ta onta einai tén arithmén,
Platén de methexei, t’ounoma metabalon — he [Plato] called such
things forms of things, and held that perceptible things were all
named in accordance with and because ofthem. For the many things
sharing the name do so by participation. But he merely changed to
the word ‘participation’; for the Pythagoreans say that things are by
imitation of numbers, but Plato by participation, merely changing
the word (Ar. Met. 987b 7). (2) In neoplatonic thought, the relation of
any entity of lower grade to an entity of higher grade: on gar an pou
tois men kata methexin agathois huparkhoi to meizon agathon, tois
de protos agathois to elatton — for the greater good could not belong to
things that are good by participation, but the lesser to the primarily

106
 metrein — mimeisthai
good (Proclus, Elements of Theology 122).

metrein: to measure: andri mé epistamenoi metrein — a man who

does not know how to measure (P1. Rep. 426d).

metrios: an adjective from metrein, meaning ‘Within measure’,

‘moderate’, ‘reasonable’: metrios khronos akmés ta eikosi eté gunaiki
— twenty years is a reasonable age for a woman to be mature (Pl. Rep.
460e); ekei skia t’estin kai pneuma metrion — there is shade there and
a moderate breeze (Pl. Phaedrus 229d); skopei ei soi metrios ho logos
has an phéi ... — consider whether the argument seems reasonable to
you that says (P1. Philebus 32a); to tén tou metriou phusin
huperballon kai huperballomenon hup’autés — what exceeds .or is
exceeded by what is reasonable (P1. Politicus 383e); megalopsukhou
de ... pros tous mesous metrion —. it is characteristic of the great-
souled to be moderate towards ordinary people (Ar. E.N. 1124b 29).

metrio‘s: reasonably, within measure: metrios gar moi dokeis eiréke-

nai — for you seem to me to have spoken reasonably (Pl. Politicus
385e).

metriotés: an abstract noun from metrios, meaning ‘moderation’:

kallous kai alétheias kai metriotétos peri legeis?— are you referring to
beauty and truth and moderation? (Pl. Philebus 65b).

metron: measure: phési gar pou ‘panton khrématon metron’

anthropon einai ‘tén men onton hos estin ton de mé onton hos ouk
estin’- for [Protagoras] says that man is ‘the measure of all things, of
things that are that they are and of things that are not that they are
not’ (Pl. Theaet. 152a); to meson ta auta metra ton eskhatén —- the
middle point which is the same distance from the extremes (P1. Tim.
62d); metra oinéra kai sitéra — measures of wine and grain (Ar. E.N.
1135a 1). There is a relatively specialised use meaning ‘metre’ in
verse (that was quantitative not accentual): en metroi hos poiétés é
aneu metrou hos idiotés — in metre like a poet or in prose like a
layman (P1. Phaedrus 258d); ouk hos kata ten mimésin poiétas alla
koinéi kata to metron prosagoreuontes — not calling them poets as
creating representations but lumping them together because of the
metre (Ar. Poetics 1447b 14).

mimeisthai: imitate, copy, and, in relation to arts, represent:

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 miméma — mimésis
oukoun to ge homoioun heauton alloi é kata phc‘mén é kata skhéma
mimeisthai estinpekeinon 6i an tis homoio? .— is not making oneself
like another either in voice or in posture to imitate him to whom
one is like? (Pl. Rep. 393C); ta men mimésetai tén proteran politeian,
ta de tén oligarkhian — in some ways it will imitate (resemble) the
previous constitution and in others oligarchy (P1. Rep. 547d);
mimountai hoi mimoumenoi prattontas — actors represent people
doing things (Ar. Poetics 1448a 1); pan to teleion eis apogennéseis
proeisin hon dunatai paragein, auto mimoumenon tén mian ton
holén arkhén — whatever is complete proceeds to generate those
things that it can produce, itself imitating the one originator of the
universe (Proclus, Elements of Theology 25). Metaphysically of the
relation of becoming to being: téi men genesthai sunapton tois
kheirosi, téi de aei mimoumenon tén aionion phusin — linked to
inferior things through coming to be‘, but imitating the eternal
nature by being everlasting (Proclus, Elements ofTheology 55).

mimé‘ma: a copy or imitation: touto ouk estin eti miméma all’auto to

aléthestaton ekeino — that is not an imitation any more but the
genuine article (Pl. Pol. 300e). Metaphysically, of the relation of
becoming to being: miméma de paradeigmatos deuteron genesin
ekhOn kai horaton — second, animitation of the pattern, generated
and visible (Pl. Tim. 48e). See mimeisthai, mimésis.

mimésis: imitation, representation: hé mimésis poiésis tis estin,

eidélc‘m mentoi phamen, all’ouk autén hekaston — imitation is a kind
of creation, but we say that it is of images and not of the things
themselves (P1. Soph. 265a). In Book 3 of the Republic Plato limits
mimésis in dramatic poetry to speaking in the person of a
character, in contrast to haplé diégésis, simple narration, of the
words of the poet, including indirect speech, but that restriction is
not found later in the Republic or elsewhere. In Poetics 1447a-b
Aristotle includes all that we should call the fine arts under
mimésis, including epic, tragedy, comedy, wind and string
instruments, colours and shapes (i.e. painting and sculpture):
tautas men oun lego tas diaphoras ton tekhnon en hois poiountai tén
mimésin - these I say are the differences in the arts in which there
is representation (Ar. Poetics 1147b 28). See mimeisthai, mimé‘ma
and Lucas, Aristotle Poetics, Appendix I. Also metaphysically of the
relation of forms to perceptibles: hoi men gar Puthagoreioi mimései
ta onta phasin einai ton arithmon, Platén de methexei, t’ounoma

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 mimnéskesthai — monas

metabalén — for the Pythagoreans say that things are by imitation

of numbers, but Plato by participation, changing the name (Ar. Met.
987b 11). .

mimnéskesthai: to remember. See mnémé and anamné‘sis.

mixis: mingling or mixing. In Empedocles the contrary of diallaxis,

separation, as one of the two principles of change: phusis oudenos
estin hapantén thne‘tén, oude tis oulomenou thanatoio teleuté alla
monon mixis te diallaxis te migentén esti, phusis d’epi tois
onomazetai anthrépoisin — there is no birth (coming to be) of
anything mortal (not divine), nor any end in destructive death
(annihilation), but there is only mingling and separation of the
mingled, for which men use the word ‘birth’ (Empedocles, fr. 8); esti
d’hé sugkrisis mixis — combination is mingling (Ar. De Gen. et Cor.
322b 8). Book 1, Ch. 10 of De Gen. et, Cor. is Aristotle’s formal
discussion of mixis, ending with the statement hé de mixis ton
mikton alloiothentén henosis - mingling is the unification of
things mixable after alteration. The verb is mignunai and things
mingled are mikhthenta. Outside physics, hé t6n he‘donc‘m kai
lupon mixis — the mingling of pleasure and distress (Pl. Philebus
49c); mixin aphrodision — copulation (Pl. Laws 836C).

mnémé: memory, distinguished from anamnésis, recollection, as

possession as opposed to recovery of awareness of the past:
phaneron hoti mnémoneuein esti mé nun anamnésthenta — it is
clearly possible to remember what at the moment is not recalled
(Ar. Peri Mnémés kai Anamne‘seés — ‘Concerning memory and
recollection’ — 450a 31); tou men parontos aisthésis, tou de mellontos
elpis, tou de genomenou mnémé — perception is of the present,
expectation of the future and memory of the past (Ar. De Mem. 449b
27).
.
monas: sometimes in Plato, oneness: oud’héi an arithmoi ti
eggenétai, perittos estai, ouk ero héi an perittotés all’hoi an monas —
as to what it is by whose presence in a number it will be odd, I shall
not say ‘oddness’ but ‘oneness’ (P1.Phaedo 105C). Usually, a unit, an
individual: ei mé monada mon‘ados hekastés ton murion médemian
allén allés diapherousan tis thései — unless one postulates every
single unit as in no way different from each of the countless others
(Pl. Phil. 56e). Of Pythagoreanism: délon hoti allo men estin hen

109
 moné — morion

hé arkhé ton pa-nton, allo de hen t0 téi duadi antikeimenon, ho kai

monada kalousin — it is clear that the One that is the originator of all
things is not the same as the one that is the contrary of the dyad,
which they [the Pythagoreans] also call a monad (Simplicius,
Physics 181.29).

moné: a verbal noun from menein, meaning absence of motion, rest,

remaining: peri monés kai exodou tés patridos — concerning
remaining in and leaving the homeland (Pl. Laws 856e); poteron
gar téi entautha monéi hé ek toutou é hé eis touto kiné‘sis antikeitai? —
is motion to or from a place the contrary ofrest there? (Ar. Phys. 229b
28). Aristotle appears to treat moné and éremia as synonyms: see
Physics 229b 28 and 230a 1. But Simplicius frequently. distinguishes
them: ofParmenides’ line, aei d’en t’autéi mimnei kinoumenon ouden
,— it remains always in the same place without motion — he says: ou
kata tén éremian tén antikeimenén téi kinései menein auto phésin,
alla kata tén apo kinéseés kai éremias exéirémenén monén —— he
[Parmenides] does not say that it is at rest meaning the absence of
motion that is contrary to motion, but meaning the motionlessness
that is exempt from both motion and its absence (Simplicius, Physics
23.13). Not to be confused with the feminine adjective moné, single.

monoeidés: in Plato, simple, used of things that have no parts or

distinguishable natures: é oun allé tis é hauté hé aitia tou monoeides
te kai ameriston auto einai — is there some other or is this the cause of
its [the syllable’s] being simple and indivisible? (P1. Theaet. 205d);
' tot’an tis idoi auté‘s tén aléthé phusin, eite polueidés é monoeidés —
then one might see its [the soul’s] true nature,whether it has many
forms or is simple (Pl. Rep. 612a). In Epicurus the adverb monoeidés
means ‘each kind separately’: iris gignetai ... é kata proskrisin idian
tou photos kai tou aeros, hé ta ton khromatén toutén idiémata poiései
eite panta eite monoeidos — the rainbow is caused or by a special
union of light and air, whichwill cause the special qualities of these
colours, whether all together or each kind separately (Epicurus,
Letter to Pythocles 109).

morion: a part. This seems to be a synonym ofmeros, except in such

idioms as en merei, in turn, to which there is no corresponding en
moriéi. Thus Plato speaks of a meros aretés — a part of excellence
(Rep. 484d), and says andreia pou morion aretés hen - bravery is no
doubt a part of excellence (Laws 696b).

110
 morphé — mousiké ‘
morphé: basically, shape: kata somatos morphén — in bodily shape
(P1.P_haedrus 271a); eggona mikra te‘n morphén — offspring of small
shape (Ar. Pol. 1335a 14). But in philosophy it is commonly used, by
Plato and by others, as asynonym of idea and eidos, meaning ‘form’
in a more general sense: he? enantia idea ekeinéi téi morphéi he“ an
touto apergazétai — the opposite form to that character which would
bring that about (Pl. Phaedo 104d). Aristotle frequently writes hé
morphé kai to eidos, apparently as an hendiadys: aition hos de to
hou heneka hé morphé kai to eidos — the cause as that for the sake
of which is the character and the form (Ar. De Gen. et Cor. 335b 6); to
eidos, é hotidépote khré kalein tén en téi aisthe‘téi morphén — the form,
or whatever else one should call the character of the perceptible
thing (Ar. Met. 1033b 6); lego de tén men hulén hoion ton khalkon, tén
de morphén to skhéma tés ideas, to de ek toutén ton andrianta to
sunolon — I call matter e.g. the bronze, form the visible shape, and
whole the statue composed of them (Ar. Met. 1029a 3).

mousiké: in its widest sense, the whole of the field of liberal studies
presided over by the Muses. As such it was used of the whole of the
mental side of education alongside gumnastiké — literally, what is
done naked, the physical side of education: hé men [paideia] epi
sémati gumnastiké, hé d’epi psukhéi mousiké — physical education
for the body, mental for the soul (Pl. Rep. 376e); has philosophias ...
ousés megistés mousikés — as philosophy ... being the greatest mental
study (Pl. Phaedo 61a). But in a more restricted sense it is music:
oukoun kai hé mousiké peri tén tan melon poiésin — is not music also
concerned with the making of songs (P1. Gorg. 449d); kai estin au
mousiké peri harmonian kai rhuthmén erotikon epistémé — further,
music is knowledge about making tunes and erotic rhythms (Pl.
Symp. 187c). The noun is mousikos, in both the wider and narrower
uses: andros genésomenou philosophou é philokalou é mousikou
tinos — a man who is to become a philosopher, or lover of beauty, or
educated (Pl. Phaedrus 248d); mousikos anér harmattomenos luran
— a musician tuning a lyre (P1. Rep. 349e). The adverb is mousikés:
houtoi gar hoi logoi amphoteroi ou panu mousikés legontai- ou gar
sunai’dousin oude sunarmottousin allélois — this pair of statements
does not seem to be very musically stated; for they do not go together
in harmony (Pl. Prot. 333a).

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 neikos — noein

N
neikos: a poetical word, meaning strife, used by Empedocles of one
of his principles of change: allote men philotéti sunerkhomen’eis hen
hapanta, allote d’au dikh’hekasta phoreumena neikeos ekhthei —
sometimes coming together all into one through'love, sometimes
being borne asunder by the enmity of strife (Empedocles, fr. 17 in
Simplicius, Physics 158.1). But Aristotle, in criticism of Empe-
docles, objected: pollakhou goun autoi he men philia diakrinei, to de
neikos sugkrinei - at least in many places he [Empedocles] has love
separating and strife bringing together (Ar. Met. 985a 24-).

nemesis: anger or resentment at wrong-doing, particularly that

involving self-assertion, or undeserved prosperity. The nemesé-
tikos is he who is so angry, he who deserves censure is nemesétos,
and the verb is nemesan: nemesési te malista au tois eis orphana
kai érema hubrizousi — they will be especially angry with those who
abuse orphans and waifs (Pl. Laws 9270); oude nemeséton heneka
toutou hupéretein kai douleuein kai erastéi kai panti anthrépéi —
nor can one blame him who for this [gaining wisdom] serves and
slaves for a lover or any man (Pl. Euthyd. 282b); nemesis de mesotés
phthonou kai epikhairekakias, eisi de peri lupén kai hédonén tas epi
tois sumbainousi tois pelas ginomenois' ho men gar nemesétikOs
lupeitai epi tois anaxiés eu prattousin — righteous indignation is a
- mean between envy and rejoicing in the misfortune of others, and
these are concerned with the distress and pleasure that come to
neighbours; for the righteously indignant is distressed about
unworthy people faring well (Ar. E.N. 1108b 1).

noein: like noéma, noeros, noésis, noé‘tos and nous, has shades of
meaning varying from the everyday use to the highly technical. The
verb may refer to any kind of thought at one extreme and to only
the highest intellectual intuition at the other. Non-technically: toi
onti khrusea khalkeion diameibesthai noeis — in fact you are
thinking of exchanging gold for bronze (P1. Symp. 219a); to tés
psukhés hode noei — think of the state of the soul in this way (P1.
Rep. 508d); to gar auto noein estin te kai einai — it is the same thing
for thought and for being [here the verbs are datives; the
translation ‘thought and being are the same thing’ is implausible,
the meaning is that only what is can be thought of] (Parmenides, fr.

1 1.2
 noéma — noésis

2). Technically, ofintellectual intuition: tas d’au ideas noeisthai men

horasthai d’ou — the forms are intelligible but invisible (Pl. Rep.
50%).

noéma: a thought or concept: ta men oun onomata auta kai ta

rhémata eoike t6i aneu suntheseos kai diaireseés noémati — nOuns
and verbs by themselves are like a concept without combination and
separation (Ar. De Int. 16a 14); mé ton eidén hekaston touton éi
noéma — perhaps each of these forms is a thought [and not an
independent reality] (P1. Parm. 132b). There was a saying hama
noémati sumbainein — to be as quick as thought: hé genesis ton
eidolén hama téi noémati sumbainei — images come to be as quickly
as thought (Epicurus, Letter to, Herodotus 48); hama téi noémati
touto sumbainein — that happens as quickly as thought (SeXtus
Empiricus, Adversus Mathematicos 5.56).

noeros: commonly translated ‘intellectual’, but since it is always

used ofthat which thinks and not ofthe subject-matter, ‘intellective’,
used by Dodds, is better: aisthe‘tikoteron kai noeréteron to leptoteron
haima — thinner blood is more perceptive and more intellective (Ar.
Part. An. 648a 3); tas noeras ousias pantos exéirésthai sématos kai téi
ousia’t kai téi energeia't eirétai halos — it is well said [by Philoponus]
that intellective beings altogether transcend the body in both
essence and in activity (Simplicius, Physics 1198.28); noes hoi men
ousiai autoteleis, hoi de noerai tines teleiotétes — some intellects are
self-complete substances, others are intellective perfections (Pro-
clus, Elements of Theology 64; nous does not occur in the plural, as
here, in Plato or Aristotle). See nous and noein.

noésis: thought, in wider and narrower senses: to de zén horizontai

tots zéiois dunamei aisthe‘seés, anthropois d’aisthe‘seés é noe‘seés — life
is defined for animals as capacity for perception and for men of
perception or thought (Ar. E.N. 1170a 16); areskei oun kalein
sunamphotera d’ekeina [epistémé and dianoia] noésin —- it is satisfac- '
tory to call science and reasoning, taken together, thought (Pl. Rep.
533e); oute doxa estin auton oute epistémé kai dianoia oute noésis —
there is neither opinion nor science with reasoning nor intellection of
them [gods] (Proclus, Elements of Theology 123). For Proclus noésis
is pure intuitive apprehension, whereas epistémé kai dianoia is
discursive. See noein, noétos and nous.

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 noétos — nomos ~

noétos: that which is the object of noésis, thought, specifically that

which can be thought ofbut not perceived, the intelligible: noéta atta
kai asémata eidé biazomenoi tén aléthinén ousian einai — forcing
[them to admit] that certain intelligible and incorporeal forms are
the true reality (Pl. Soph. 246b); dunamei p63 esti ta noéta ho nous —
potentially in a way, intuitive reason is its objects (Ar. De An. 429b
30); é aisthe‘ta' ta onta é noéta — what is is either perceptible or
intelligible (Ar. De An. 427a 26).

nomikos: legal: en toioutois éthesi tethraphthe nomikois su te kai

hode — you and he were both brought up in legal institutions of this
kind (P1. Laws 6254a). In Aristotle, legal as opposed to moral or '
natural: tou de politikou dikaiou to men phusikon esti to de nomikon,
. phusikon men to pantakhou tén autén ekhon dunamin, kai ou téi
dokein é mé, nomikon de ho ex'arkhés men ouden diapherei houtos é
allés, hotan de théntai, diapherei — of civil justice, part is natural,
part positive; the natural is what has everywhere the same force and
is not a matter of opinion, the positive is what initially mayrun in
this or that way, indifferently, but, when it is laid down, matters (Ar.
E.N. 1134b 18). ‘

nomimos. ( 1) He who is obedient to law and custom: paronomos

doxei gegonenai ek nomimou — he will seem to have become a
law-breaker instead oflaw-abiding (Pl. Rep 539a); dikaios estai ho te
nomimos kai ho i303 — the just man will be [ambiguously] both the
law-abiding man and the fair man (Ar. E.N. 1129a 33). (2) In neuter
plural, the accepted beliefs: ta ton pollén nomima kalou te peri kai
tén allén — the accepted beliefs ofthe many about beauty and the rest
(Pl. Rep. 479d).

nomizein: to believe. This has no technical use, but it is important to

distinguish two uses. (1) To believe that something is the case: kai
autos ara nomizé einai theous — I too believe that there are gods (Pl.
Apol 26c). (2) Especially in the present participle passive, ta
nomizomena are recognised rules, procedures, etc.: ai‘santas ton .
theon kai t’alla ta nomizomena — having sung a hymn and carried out
the other Observances [libations, etc.] (P1. Symp. 176a); ti oun allo
namos eié, 6 Sékrates, all’é ta nomizomena? — what else is law,
Socrates, than the Observances? (Pl. Minos 313d).

nomos has a wide variety of connected uses, referring to written law,

114
 nous

customary law, custom in general, convention: tithemenous de

toioutous nomous, kai tous agraphous kai tous gegrammenous —
having laid down such laws, both unwritten and written (Ar. Pol.
1319b 40); tithetai tous nomous hekasté hé arkhé pros to hautéi
sumpheron — each government makes the laws in its own interest
(P1. Rep. 3389); makhesthai khré ton démon huper tou nomou
hasper teikheos — the people should fight for the law as for their city
wall (Heraclitus, fr. 44); ho nomos turannos 6n ton anthrépén
polla para tén phusin biazetai — custom that is a tyrant over men
makes them do many things contrary to nature (Pl. Protagoras
337d); doxéi de monon kai nomoi aiskhron - disgraceful only by
opinion andconvention (P1. Rep. 364a); ta de kala kai ta dikaia
pollén ekhei diaphoran kai planén haste dokein nomoi monon einai,
phusei de mé - what is fine and just permits of much difference and
variety, so as to seem merely conventional and not natural (Ar.
E.N. 1094b 14); nomoi khroié, eteéi de atoma kai kenon —
colour is by convention; really there are atoms and the void
(Democritus, fr. 9).

nous, plural noes. (1) Intelligence in general: haplos men gar oudeis
apoballetai hekon, epi sotéria'z' d’hautou kai ton loipén hapantes
noun ekhontes — no one simply jettisons his cargo intentionally, but
to save themselves and their crew all intelligent men would (Ar.
EN. 1110a 9). (2) Immediate aWareness, intuition: ho nous ton
eskhaténep’amphotera, kai gar ton proton horon kai tén'eskhatén
nous esti kai ou logos — intuition is of the extremes in both
directions; for intuition, not discursive reason, is both of the basic
terms and of particulars (Ar. E.N. 1143b 5). (3) Intuitive intellect,
intuitive reason, concerned with noéta only: to men gar epistéton
apodeikton ... leipetai noun einai ton arkhon — scientific knowledge
is demonstrated so it remains that intuitive reason is of basic
principles (Ar. E.N. 1140b 35, 1141a 7). Plato also distinguished
nous from" dianoia — discursive reason: dianoian de‘ kalein moi
dokeis tén tan geometrikon te kai té ton toiouton hexin all’ou noun,
has metaxu ti doxés te kai nou tén dianoian ousan — you seem to me
to call the condition of geometers and the like dianoia rather than
nous, treating dianoia as being between opinion and intuitive
reason (P1. Rep. 511d). Aristotle regards nous as independent of the
body and thus immune from destruction on the death of the body:
ho de nous eoiken eggignesthai ousia tis ousa kai ou phtheiresthai —
intuitive reason seems to enter into us as a substance and not to

115
 nun - oligarkhia
perish (Ar. De An. 408b 18). Aristotle, like Plato, does not use nous in
the plural; such phrases as ho theos kai ho nous (Ar. E.N. 1096a 24)
may be plausibly translated as ‘god, i.e. intuitive reason’, which is
unitary and a divine element present in all men; phaneron hoti kai
orekton pasi nous kai proeisi panta apo nou, kai pas ho kosmos apo
nou tén ousian ekhei — it is clear that reason is-the goal of all things
and that everything proceeds from reason and that the whole
universe has its being from reason (Proclus, Elements of Theology
34). .

nun: now. This has a variety ofuses. (1) hén su nun legeis -— which you
now speak of (P1. Phaedo 77a). (2) kathaper nun eipes — as you just
said (P1. Soph. 241d). (3) nun de epeidé ouk etheleis - but as it is, since
you are unwilling (P1. Prot. 335C). (4) As adjective: kata ton nun dé
logon '— according to the present argument (Pl. Soph. 256C). (5)
ouranon nun ou ton kosmon legei — [Aristotle] is not calling the
universe the heavens at this point (Simplicius, Physics 594.7). (6)
With article, as a noun: to de nun ou meros ... ho de khronos ou dokei
sugkeisthai ek ton nun — an instant is not a part [oftime] ... time does
not seem to be composed of instants (Ar. Phys. 218a 6); peri tou nun
tou te kuriés kai tou en platei legomenou '— concerning the present
both in its strict sense [as an instant] and in a wide sense
(Simplicius, Physics 747 .33).

O
oikonomia: everything concerned with the running of a household,
which Aristotle in the Politics divides into the relation of master
and slave, of husband and wife and of parent ,and child, adding
money-making as a fourth ingredient only. The oikonomos runs a
household and the oikonomikos is the person skilled in so doing.
oikonomia hetera andros kai gunaikos‘ tou men gar ktasthai tés de
phulattein ergon — household management is different for a man
and a woman; for his job is to obtain and hers to guard (Ar. Pol.
1277b 24). It is belittled by Plato; his guardians are to keep to
themselves; otherwise oikonomoi te kai georgoi anti phulakén
esontai — they will be housekeepers and farmers instead of
guardians (P1. Rep. 417a). Oikonomikos is the title of an interesting
little work by Xenophon on managing a household.

oligarkhia: called by Plato tén apo timématon politeian en héi

116
 on ‘— onar

r hoi men plousioi arkhousin, penéti d’ou metestin arkhés — a consti-

tution based on rateable property in which the rich rule, and the poor
man has no share in rule (Pl. Rep. 550C). Aristotle distinguishes
different forms ofoligarchy, e.g. heteron eidos oligarkhias hotan pais
anti patros eisiéi - another variety of oligarchy is when son enters
[government] to replace father (Ar. Pol. 1292b 4); tén gar aristo-
kratian tés oligarkhias eidos titheasi — they treat aristocracy as a
form of oligarchy (Ar. Pol. 1290a 16).

on: to on, in the widest sense, is everything that is and, as such, is

contrasted with to mé on, that which is not; in a narrower use to on,
sometimes called for clarity to ontés on, the really real, is unchang-
ing and imperishable~ and eternal, and is contrasted with the
gignomenon that is changing and perishable. In the dispute between
Parmenides and the atomists it is hard to doubt that to mé on as the
non-existent is confused with empty space: oute gar an gnoiés to ge
mé on on garanuston — you cannot know that which is not; it is
impossible (Parmenides, fr. 2); ouden gar estin ‘é estai allo parex tou
eontos — nothing other than what is either is or will be (Parmenides,
fr. 8). But Simplicius reports Leucippus as saying ouden mallon to on
e to mé on huparkhein — there is that which is no more than that
which is not (Simplicius, Physics 28.12); here to mé on seems to be
the kenon, void; cf. the den of Democritus. In the narrower use, to
men pantelos on pantelos gnoston — the completely real is completely
knowable (Pl. Rep. 477a); ei gar panta ta onta tou agathou ephietai,
dé‘lon hoti to protos agathon epekeina esti ton onton —- for ifeverything
that is aims at the good, it is clear that the primary good transcends
things that are (Proclus, Elements of Theology 8); to gar houtos on
proteron téi phusei tOu gignomeno‘u esti — that which is in this
[narrow] way is prior in its nature to the becoming (Simplicius,
Physics 1337.4).

onar: with an article, ‘a dream’: akoue dé t’emon onar — listen to

my dream (P1. Charm. 173a). Adverbially, it means ‘dreaming’ and is
contrasted with hupar, awake. Plato consistently uses the distinct-
ion between onar and hupar as a metaphor for the distinction
between living in awareness only ofthe world ofgenesis, change, and
the philosopher’s awareness ofto ontés on, true reality: onar é hupar
dokei soi zen .9 — does he seem to you to live a dreaming or Waking life?
(P1. Rep. 476C); horomen hos oneiréttousi men peri to on, hupar de
adunaton autais idein heés an — we see how they dream about

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 onoma — orthos

reality and cannot be awake and see until (Pl. Rep. 533C).

onoma: in a wide sense, a word: emoi gar dokei tais men tou
somatos taxesin onoma einai hugieinon -— for it seems to me that the
word for bodily regimes is ‘healthy’ (Pl. Gorg. 504d); onoma ara
estin miméma phone‘s ekeinou ho mimeitai kai onomazei ho
mimoumenos téi phone‘i ho an mimétai — a word is a vocal
representation of that which he who vocally represents represents
and names what he represents (P1. Crat. 423b). But it is most
_ commonly used of a noun as distinct from a verb. Of a proper name:
autéi poteron Kratulos téi alétheiai' onoma — whether Cratylus is
really his name (P1. Crat. 383b). Of nouns in general: lexo toinun soi
'logon suntheis pragma praxei di’onomatos kai rhématos
‘Theaitétos kathétai’ — I will make a statement to you by joining
together a thing and an action by means of a noun and a verb
‘Theaetetus is sitting’ (Pl. Soph. 262e); onoma men oun esti phone
sémantiké kata sunthékén aneu khronou, hés méden meros esti
sémantikon kekhérismenon — a noun is a spoken sound with
conventional significance, without time [unlike the rhé‘ma, verb,
which is tensed], of which no part is separately significant (Ar. De
Int. 16a 19). Rather surprisingly, Aristotle adds to de Philonos é
Philéni kai hosa tosauta ouk onomata alla ptoseis onomatos — ‘of
Philo’ and ‘to Philo’ and. the like are not nouns but cases of nouns
(Ar. De Int. 16b 1). Later writers distinguished the proper name as
kurion onoma from the common noun as proségorikon onoma.

organon: an instrument, tool or organ: organa hosa peri georgian —

instruments used in, farming (Pl. Rep. 370d); ho men di’organén
ekélei anthrépous — [Marsyas] soothed people with musical
instruments (Pl. Symp. 215C); organa de kai ta ton phutén meré,
alla pantelés hapla — the parts of plants are also organs, but
extremely simple (Ar. De An. 412b 1). The 10g'ical works of Aristotle
are known collectively as To Organon — ‘The Instrument’ [of
accurate thought] — though there is no Aristotelian authority for
the name: he. lagiké pragmateia organou khéran ekhei en
philosophia'i — logical matters have the place of a tool in philos0phy
(Alexander ofAphrodisias, Topics 74.29).

orthos: right, upright, in a variety of uses. ( 1) Physically upright:

hestés orthos — standing upright (Pl. Laws 665e). (2) Geometrically:
mian men orthén ekhontos hekaterou gonian, tas de oxeias —

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 ouranos — ousia

[triangles] each having one right angle and the others acute (Pl.
Tim. 53d). (3) Ethically upright: ho orthos nomothetés — the upright
lawgiver (Pl. Laws 660a). (4) Correct, right as not mistaken: to de
meson estin hos ho orthos logos legei — but the mean is as the
correct account (reason) says (Ar. E.N. 1138b 20),. The noun
orthotés is used mainly in this last way: onomatos orthotés estin
hauté hétis endeixetai hoion esti to pragma — the rightness of a
name is such that the name will display the nature of the object (Pl.
Crat. 428e); délon hoti orthotés tis hé euboulia estin — it is clear that
good deliberation is a way ofbeing correct (Ar. EN. 1 142b 8).

ouranos: in a basic sense, the heavens (though always in the

singular in classical Greek). But Aristotle, from whom derives most
discussion of the heavens, knowingly uses the term in different
senses. In Peri Ouranou — De Caelo — ‘On the Heavens’ — he writes:
hena men tropon ouranon legomen té‘n ousian tén tés eskhatés tou
pantos periphoras allon d’au tropon to sunekhes séma téi
eskhatéi periphora'i tou pantos en hoi seléné kai hélios kai enia ton '
astrén eti de allo‘s legomen ouranon to periekhomenon soma hupo
tés eskhatés periphoras- to gar holon kai to pan eiothamen legein
ouranon — in one way we call the substance of the outermost
periphery of the whole the heavens but in another way the body
that is continuous with the outermost periphery of the whole, in'
which is the moon and the sun and some of the stars and still in
another way we so call the body that is contained by the outermost
periphery; for we are accustomed to call the all and the whole the
heavens (Ar. De Caelo 278b 11, 16, 18). This could cause difficulties:
ho men Alexandros ouranon legesthai nun phési ou ton aplanén
sphairan oude to theion soma monon alla ton kosmon panta —
Alexander says that what is called the heavens now is not the
sphere of the fixed stars [first sense], [nor only the divine body
[sense two] but the whole universe [sense three] (Simplicius,
Physics 593.7). It is clear from the above that both to pan and ho
kosmos are used as synonyms of each other and of ouranos. The
adjective is ouranios: ouranion theon genos — the heavenly race of
gods (Pl. Tim. 39e).

ousia: an abstract noun connected with the verb einai (present

participle feminine ousa). Non-technically, p0ssessions: tén hautou
labonta ousian apienai — to go away taking his own goods with him
(Pl. Laws 85Gb). Philosophically, nature, essence, substance, being:

119
 oxus

é hekastéi ton onomatén toutén hupokeitai tis idios ousia — whether

some special nature underlies each of these words [i.e. has each a
specific sense] (P1.Prot. 349b ‘9; geneseos kai ousias peri — concerning
becoming and being (P1. Soph. 232C); pros tén ontos ousian hén aei
kata t’auta hésautés ekhein phate — in relation to the true being
which you say always remains in every way the same (Pl. Soph.
248a). Aristotle in the Categories distinguishes two sorts of ousia,
substance: tén kata médemian sumplokén legomenén hekaston é
ousian sémainei é poson é poion ... — each uncombined term signifies
either substance [what it is] or quantity [how large] or quality [of
what sort] (Ar. Cat. 1b 25); ousia d’estin hé kuriotata te kai prétés
kai malista legomené hé méte kath’hupokeimenou tinos legetai,
mét’en hupokeimenéi tini estin, hoion ho tis anthrépos é ho tis hippos.
deuterai d’ousiai legontai en hois eidesin hai protés ousiai legomenai
huparkhousi, tauta te kai ta ton eidén touton gené — the what is
basically, primarily and especially called substance is that which is
neither predicated ofa subject nor is in a subject, such as a particular
man or a particular horse. Those things are called second substances
that are the species in which occur the first substances and those
that are the genera of these species (Ar. Cat. 2a 11). But Aristotle
also says oute to katholou ousia oute to genos — neither the universal
nor the genus is substance (Ar. Met. 1042a 21), and this is repeated
more elaborately at Met. 1035b 29.

oxus has a set ofconnected uses. It can be used of an acute accent, an

acute pain, an acute angle: mian men orthén ekhontos hekaterou
gonian, tas de oxeias — each [triangle] having one right and two acute
angles (P1. Tim. 53d); acute senses: opsis ... hémin oxutaté ton dia ton
sématén erkhetai aisthéseon — sight is the sharpest of the bodily
senses (Pl. Phaedrus 250d); a hasty person: Polos de hode neos tis esti
kai oxus — Polus here is young and hasty (Pl. Gorg. 463e); a vivid
pleasure: oxuteran ekheis eipein hédonén tés peri ta aphrodisia — can
you mention a more Vivid pleaSure than that of sex (Pl. Rep. 403a);
quick learners: hoi te oxeis kai agkhinoi — the sharp and quick-
witted (P1. Theaet. 144a). Of a high note: has hoion te oxutatén kai
barutatén khordén poiein — to make the string as high or as low as
possible (P1. Phaedrus 268d). Aristotle noted that oxus was used in
different senses: toi oxei en phonéi men. enantion to baru, en ogkoi de
t0 amblu — in sound the low is the contrary to the oxus [high], in
masses the blunt [as opposed to sharp] (Ar. Top. 106a 13).

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 paideia — paradeigma

P
paideia: education. The traditional education was in mousiké
(chiefly literature and song) and gumnastiké‘: tis oun hé paideia? é'
khalepon heurein beltié tés hupo tou pollou khronou héuré‘menés?
estin de pou he men epi sémasi gumnastiké, he de epi psukhéi
mousiké — What education shall we give them? Is it not difficult to
find a better than that found over the ages? That is gymnastic for
the body and arts for the mind (Pl. Rep. 376e). It is the education
received rather than the process, which is paideusis: paideusis
paideias paradosis — education is the handing on of culture (Pl. Def.
416); hekastos de krinei kalés ha gignéskei kai toutén estin agathos
krités, kath’hekaston men ara ho pepaideumenos, haplés d’ho peri
pan pepaideumenos - each man judges well on matters he
understands, and is a good judge on those matters, on special topics
the expert and generally the man of universal education (Ar. E.N.
1094b 27). ' -

pan: to pan is the totality of things, or the universe. Aristotle'tends ‘

to use ouranos, kosmos and to pan as interchangeable: para de to
pan kai holon ouden estin exé tou pantos, ‘kai dia touto en téi
ouranéi panta, ho gar ouranos to pan isés — there is nothing outside
the totality beyond the totality and the whole, and therefore
everything is within the heavens, for the heavens are perhaps the
totality (Ar. Phys. 212a 16); poteron noun aition kai phusin einai
toude tou pantos — whether intelligence is the cause and nature
of this totality [the universe] (Ar. Phys. 198a 13).

paradeigma: either an exemplar, a paradigm, after which other

things of the same name are so called, or an example or illustration.
( 1) Exemplar, paradigm: en ouranéi i363 paradeigma anakeitai téi
boulomenéi horan — perhaps a paradigm [of the perfect city] is laid
up in heaven for him who wishes to see it (Pl. Rep. 592b); ta eidé
tauta hosper paradeigmata hestanai en téi phusei — that these forms
stand in nature as something like paradigms (Pl. Parm. 132d). (2)
Example, illustration: prosékei paradeigmati tois allois
gignesthai hina alloi horéntes paskhonta ha an paskhéi phoboume-
noi beltious gignéntai — it is fitting that he should become an
example to others in order that others may see him suffering what
he suffers and in fear become better (Pl. Gorg. 525b); paradeigma

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 paradoxos — paragein
ton amphorea oinou parathemenos —— using the jar of wine as an
illustration (Simplicius, Physics 555.12); smikron labe paradeigma
kai panta eiséi ha boulomai — take a small illustration and you will
understand all that I mean (Pl. Theaet. 154C).

paradoxos: basically, what is contrary to accepted opinion. It may,

however, be accepted by the speaker: ededoiké houté paradoxon
logon legein — I [Socrates] was afraid to present an account so
contrary to opinion [but will now do so] (Pl. Rep. 472a). It may be
merely surprising: kaitoi erotikou ontos kai akratous ou paradoxon
. tén mousikén spoudazesthai — since he was amorous and lacked
self-control it is not surprising that [Achilles] was fond of music
(Sextus Empiricus, Adversus Mathematicos 6.25). But sometimes
an unacceptable paradox: thesis estin hupolépsis paradoxos ton
gnérimén kata philosophian hoion ouk estin antilegein — a thesis is a
paradoxical opinion of well-known philosophers, such as that
contradiction is impossible [as Antisthenes said] (Ar. Top. 104b 19).
Later philosophers introduced paradoxologein, to utter paradoxes,
and paradoxologia — the , uttering of paradoxes: saphesteron
epénegke paradeigma paradoxologias kai hama oikeioteron ho
Aristotelés eipén ‘é hos ei tis hena anthrépon to on legoi’ esti de
kai allos tropos ho mé monon apophantikés‘paradoxologon alla kai
sullogizesthai dokén hoioi tines eisin hoi sophistikoi paralogis-
moi — Aristotle added a clearer example of a paradox saying ‘or if
someone said that an individual man was reality’ but there is
also another kind where the propounding of the paradox does not
merely make a statement but also seems to argue like some of
the SOphistic fallacies (Simplicius, Physics 50.24).

paragein has a variety of uses in classical Greek. (1) To bring

forward, to instance: martura paragomenos 'te‘n ton thérién phusin
— bringing forward as evidence the nature of wild beasts (Pl. Laws
836C); hos en tragéidia'i' paragomena prosépa — like characters
brought on in a tragedy (Simplicius, Physics 1015.10). (2) To lead
astray: méte hémas pseudesi paragein en logéi é en ergoi — nor lead
us astray with falsehoods in word or in deed (P1. Rep. 383a). (3) Of
verbal derivation: oud’ ho andrias xulon alla paragetai xulinos
kai khalkous‘ all’ou khalkos — and the statue is not wood but is
derivatively called wooden, and not bronze but brazen (Ar. Met.
1033a 17). But in neoplatonic philosophy the verb paragein is used
technically of the creation or production of some lower grade of

122
 paraktikos — paranomein
reality by a higher grade and the higher grade was said to be
paraktikos, productive or creative, an adjective not used by Plato
and Aristotle: pan to paraktikon allou kreitton esti tés tou
paragomenou phuseés — everything productive of another is
superior to the nature of that which is produced (Proclus, Elements
. of Theology 7); to de heautonparagon heautéi tou einai paraktikon
huparkhon — that which creates itself being creative of its own
existence (Proclus, Elements of Theology 40); homologén ta amesos
hupo theou paragomena hoion einai kai ton kosmon nomizei méte
dia geneseés méte dia khronikés parataseo‘s huphistasthai —
agreeing that the things directly created by god, as he [Philoponus]
believes is the case even with the universe, exist neither through
coming to be nor through [in the course of] temporal duration
(Simplicius, Physics 1146.17). '

paraktikos. See paragein.

paralogismos: a faulty argument, but not necessarily thrOugh

formal defects. It may be through such material faults as
ambiguity: ton de exé tés lexeés paralogismén eidé estin hepta —
there are seven types of faulty argument that arise apart from
diction [i.e. what are traditionally called material fallacies] (Ar.
S.E. 166b 21). The maker of such arguments is paralogistikos: ou
gar estai paralogistikos ex horismenou tinos genous arkhén, alla
peri pan genos estai ho eristikos — the eristic man [who aims at
victory, not truth] will not argue fallaciously from some limited
kind of premises, but in all areas (Ar. S.E. 172b 3). To use fallacious
arguments is paralogizesthai: khrésimon de kai pros to mé
paralogisthénai kai pros to paralogisasthai — [awareness of
ambiguity] is useful both in order not to suffer from fallacies and
also in order to use them (Ar. Top. 108a 26). A fallacious argument
is paralogos: sumbainei amphoteros atopon kai paralogon —‘ the
result in both cases is absurd and fallacious (Ar. De An. 411a 14).
None of these terms is found in Plato’s works.

paranomein: to act contrary to nomos: paranomounta kai

adikounta — acting lawlessly and wrongly (Pl. Rep. 338e). He who
so acts is paranomos, lawless, and is the contrary of the nomimos
or ennomos: paranomos doxei gegonenai ek nomimou — he will
seem to have become lawless from being law-abiding (P1. Rep.
539a); to paranomon kai ennomon — the legal and illegal (P1. Pol.

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 paratasis — parénumos
302e); dokei dé ho te paranomos adikos einai kai ho pleonektés kai
anisos — both the lawless man and the grasping and unfair man
seem to be unjust (Ar. E.N. 1129a 32).

paratasis: extension, usually in time as duration, but sometimes

spatial. The word does not occur in Plato, but became very common
in later, especially neoplatonic, philosophy. It is a noun from
parateinein, to stretch alongside, or simply to stretch out: para tén
dotheisan autou grammén parateinanta — stretching it out
alongside the given line (Pl. Meno 87a). The verb is used of literary
Works: para dunamin parateinontes ton muthon —- stretching out
the story beyond their capability (Ar. Poetics 1451b 38). paratasis
as of temporal duration: oukh hama ara holon estin, en téi
skidnamenéi tés khronikés parataseés on — it is not a simultaneous
whole, being in the dispersal of temporal duration (Proclus,
Elements of Theology 50); on gar dunametha téi aidiéi paratasei
su'mparateinein tén noésin — we cannot extend our thought through
everlasting duration (Simplicius, Physics 461.25); paratasis
khroniké and paratasis en khronoi are very common expressions in
later philosophy, both meaning ‘temporal duration’. Spatially: ton
trién toutén hex gignesthai parataseis anc‘) kai kata en aristerai‘
kai en dexia'i prosé kai opiSthé — from these three [dimensions]
six directions result — above and below, to right and to left and in
front and behind (Sextus Empiricus, Adversus Mathematicos 3.19).
These directions are called diastaseis by Aristotle.

parénumos: is used strictly of a term that is formed from another

by giving it a new termination: parénuma de legetai hosa apo tinos
diapheronta téi ptései tén kata t’ounoma proségorian ekhei, hoion
apo tés grammatikés ho grammatikos kai apo tés andreias ho
andreias — things are paronyms [derivatively named] that get their
name from some other by having a different termination, as a
grammarian from ‘grammar’ and a brave man from ‘bravery’ (Ar.
Cat. 1a 12); poiotétes men eisin hai eirémenai, poia de ta kata tautas
paronumés legomena é hopésoun allés ap’autén. epi men oun ton
pleistc‘m kai skhedon epi pantén parénumos legetai, hoion apo tés
leukotés leukos kai — qualities are those listed; things have a
quality that are named from them paronymously or in some other
way. In most and virtually all cases they are named paronymously,
as white from whiteness and (Ar. Cat. 10a 28). Plato uses the
noun parénumion, a derived name, in this way of the sophist:

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 parousia — paskhein
mimétés d’on tou sophou délon hoti paronumion autou ti lépsetai —
being an imitator of the wise it is clear that he will take a name
derived from him (Pl. Soph. 268C). But Plato also uses the term
paronumion of a term used in a derivative sense: anagkaion ge mén
kai toutois [dikaion, ison] paronumioisi pote proskhrésthai polin
hapasan — it is however necessary for every state to treat even these
[the just and the fair] in a derivative way (Pl. Laws 757d). The words
paronumos and parc‘mumos do not occur in Plato. See also suno-
numos, homonumos.

parousia: presence, derived from the verb pareinai, which is used

non-technically by Plato: ep’auto ge toi touto paresmen - it is for that
precisely that we are present (Pl. Gorg. 447b); hé nun parousa
hémera — the present day (Pl. Laws 683C). parousia is one of the
terms used by Plato of the relation of immanent form to particular:
ouk allo ti poiei auto kalon é hé ekeinou tou kalou eite parousia eite
koinonia é — nothing makes it fine other than the presence or
communion or of that fine itself (Pl. Phaedo 100d); dikaiosunés
hexei kai parousia't' toiautén auton hekastén gignesthai - by the
possession and presence ofjustice each of [the souls] becomes such
(P1. Soph. 247a); auto d’einai to agathon hot huparkhei to te protoi
einai ton agathon kai to aitioi téi parousia't tois allots tou agatha
einai — [the Platonists say that] it is the good itself that is both the
first of all goods and the cause byits presence of other things being
good (Ar. E.E. 1217b 3). In neoplatonism the presence of any higher
reality: hupomenei tén tou henos parousian ouk onta hoper hen —
they are subject to the presence ofthe One, not being themselves one
unqualified (Proclus, Elements ofTheology 3).

paskhein: the opposite both ofpoiein, to do, to make, and ofprattein,

to act. According to context it can be translated ‘undergo’, ‘suffer’,
‘experience’, and often ‘X paskhei Y’ is best translated as ‘Y happens
to X’: hoion an poiéi to poioun toiouton to paskhon paskhein - that to
which it happens undergoes the same as what that which is active
does (Pl. Gorg. 476C); en héi méden sumballetai ho pratton é ho
paskhon — where the agent, or rather he to whom it happens,
contributes nothing (Ar. E.N. 1110a 2); é-allo hédu paskhonta autoi
toi somati — or experiencing some other pleasure in the body itself
(Pl. Prot. 337c). Often ofsuffering evils: dikaiotat’an hotioun paskhoi
- he would justly suffer anything whatsoever (P1. Pol. 128d). -
Abstractly and atemporally: hoion kai hé trias peponthe — as is the

125
 pathéma — pathos '
case with the number three (Pl. Phaedo 1030). See also pathos and
pathéma. _

pathéma appears to be a synonym for most, though not all, uses of

pathos. Thus eleos and phobos, called pathé in E.N., are called
pathémata in Ar. Poetics 1449b 27, and hédonés héttasthai, being
overcome by pleasure, is called by Plato a pathéma at Prot. 353a
and a pathos at Prot. 352a. Plato frequently writes pathéma é
poiéma — suffering or doing - as at Soph. 248b.

pathos: the internal accusative ofpaskhein. It is what happens to

anything that undergoes, suffers, or'experiences anything: pathos
legetai hena men tropon poiotés kath’hén alloiousthai endekhetai,
hoion to leukon kai to melan kai hosa toiauta- hena de hai touton
energeiai kai alloioseis édé, eti toutén mallon hai blaberai alloioseis
kai kinéseis, kai malista hai lupérai blabai- eti ta megethé ton
sumphoron kai lupe‘ron pathé legetai — a pathos is (1) a quality by
which it is possible to be changed, such as white and black and the
like; (2) the actual occurrence of such changes; (3) of these, in
particular, harmful alterations and changes, especially harms that
distress; (4) also extremes of misfortune and distress 'are called
pathé (Ar. Met. 1022b 15). geometria peri ta sumbebékota pathé tois
megethesi — geometry [is] about the features that may characterise
magnitudes (Ar. Rhet. ' 1355b 29); erotomenos to hosion hoti
pot’estin, tén men ousian moi autou ou boulesthai délosai, pathos de
to peri autou legein, hoti peponthe — when asked what the holy is
you seem not to wish to reveal to me its essence but to tell me of one
of the qualities that it has [being loved by the gods] (Pl. Euth. 11a);
ho estin autois to pathos ho phasin hupo ton hédonén héttasthai —
what this experience is that they call being overcome by pleasures
(Pl. Prot. 352a); prosaptein hekastoi ton hamartémato‘n tén axian
tou pathous te kai praxeos — to attach to each offence the penalty
merited by the wrong as suffered and committed (P1. Laws 876d);
skopén kai ta peri ton ouranon te kai gé‘n pathé - examining also the
things that happen to the heavens and the earth (Pl. Phaedo 96c).
In psychological matters the pathé are what were traditionally
_ called the passions of the soul, but which might be better called
emotions: lego de pathé men epithumian orgén phobon tharsos
phthonon kharan philian misos pothon zélon eleon, holos hois
hepetai hédoné é lupé — I call emotions appetite, anger, fear,
confidence, envy, joy, friendliness, hatred, longing, emulation, pity

‘ 126
 peira — perainein
and, in general, what is accompanied by pleasure or distress (Ar.
E.N. 1105b 22). pathos also has a semi-technical use in literary
criticism: duo men oun tou muthou meré taut’esti, peripeteia kai
anagnorisis triton de pathos pathos de esti praxis phthartiké é
odunéra — these, reversal and recognition, are two elements in the
plot; suffering is a third ... suffering is some action that is
destructive or painful (Ar. Poetics 1452b 9); cf. Poetics 1453b 18.

peira: a test: megisté peira dialektikés phuseés kai mé — the

greatest test of what is and what is not a dialectical nature (P1. Rep.
537C); tés alétheias kai he‘mén autén peiran lambanontes — making
a test of truth and of ourselves (Pl. Prot. 348a). See peirasthai,
peirastiké. ' -

peirasthai has its usual meanings of try, attempt, etc., in

philosophy. But the use meaning ‘to test’ is relevant to the technical
term peirastiké: peirometha ara ti legeis — let us test whether you
are right (P1. Phaedo 95b).

peirastiké: probing, testing: esti dé ton en toi dialegesthai logon

tettara gene“, didaskalioi kai dialektikoi kai peirastikoi kai eristikoi
. peirastikoi d’hoi ek ton dokounton t6i apokrinomenoi kai
anagkaién eidenai tOi prospoioumenoi ekhein tén epistémén — in
question-and-answer discussions there are four kinds, didactic,
dialectical, peirastic and eristic the peirastic are those starting
from the Opinions of the answerer that are needed to be known by
one who pretends to have knowledge (Ar. S.E. 165a 38); he“ gar
peirastiké esti dialektiké tis kai theorei ou ton eidota alla ton
agnoounta kai prospoioumenon — peirastic is a type of dialectic and
examines not him who knows but the ignorant who claims
knowledge (Ar. S.E. 171b 4). Diogenes Laertius tells us that such
dialogues as Plato’s Euthyphro were classified as peirastic
(Diogenes Laertius, Lives of the Philosophers 3.58). peirastikos
means ‘testing’: see peira, peirasthai.

perainein: to bound or limit; peras: a limit or boundary: hotan

méden éi peras tou kakou — when there is no limit to evil (P1.
Phaedrus 254b); t0 gar kakon tou apeirou hos hoi Puthagoreioi
eikazon, to de agathon tou peperasmenou — for evil is of the
unlimited, as the Pythagoreans speculated, but the good is of that
which is bounded (Ar. E.N. 1106b 29). Of a spatial limit: to tou

127
 peras — phainesthai
periekhontos peras akinéton préton, tout’esti ho topos — the
immediate motionless limit of the container, that is place (Ar. Phys.
2123 20); meros gar p63 hé epiphaneia hé men hos peras tou
peperasmenou somatos — for the surface is a sort of part, in one way
as the limit of the bounded body (Simplicius, Physics 610.9).

peras. See perainein.

periekhein: to surround or contain: to ge periekhon peras an eié —

what contains should be a limit (Pl. Parm. 145a). The term is
important for its role in Aristotle’s definition of tapas, place: to tou
periekhontos peras akinéton proton, tout’estin ho topos — so that the
immediate motionless boundary of the container, that is place (Ar.
Phys. 212a 20). Simplicius found difficulties in this definition: kata
poion oun sémainomenon periokhés periekhein legomen ton topon —
in what sense of containment are we saying that place contains?
(Simplicius, Physics 604.17). The noun is periokhé, as in the above
quotation.

periokhé: containment, as in the quotations under periekhein. It

may also mean ‘compass’ as in hé ektos periokhé — the external
compass [of a body] (Ar. Col. 797b 22). Also kosmos esti periokhé tis
ouranou — a universe is a circumscribed area of the heavens
(Epicurus 2.88). Epicurus allowed many universes at different
areas of the heavens.

perittos (adjective); perittos (adverb). There are three distinct uses.

(1) Excessive: hé peritté hauté epimeleia tou somatos — that
' excessive care of the body (Pl. Rep. 407b). (2) Elegant: kompsos men
eirétai kai perittos —- it is cleverly and elegantly expressed (Ar. De
Caelo 290b 14). (3) Odd, as opposed to even: ei en téi tou perittou kai
artiou hairesei hémin én hé sote‘ria — if our safety rested on our
selection of odd and even (Pl. Prot. 356e).

phainein. See phainesthai.

phainesthai has two closely connected uses that can only be

distinguished by reference to context. On the one hand, it is to
appear with an implicit contrast with being the case. On the other,
it is to be plain to see, literally or metaphorically. This holds also of
the verbal noun to phainomenon, which is what is apparent. The

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 phanai -— phantasia
English verb ‘appear’ and the adjective ‘apparent’ exhibit the same
ambiguity. The sense of transitively making visible or intran-
sitively becoming visible are regular in the active verb phainein:
takh’an empodion genomenon auto phéneié to zétoumenon —
perhaps the thing we are seeking would appear right before us (Pl.
Theat. 200e). hoi dikhade dioikhthentes phainontai endothen‘
agalmata ekhontes theén — [Silenuses] that, when opened up, can be
seen to contain statues of gods (P1. Symp. 215b); hos g’emoi
phainetai — as it seems to me at least (Pl. Prot. 324d). The same
contrast in ta phainomena: houtos men can ho logos amphisbétai
tois phainomenois enargés — this statement [that there is no
weakness of will] is plainly at odds with the phenomena (Ar. E.N.
1145b 27); hé de boulésis dokei de tois men t’agathou einai, tois de
tou phainomenou agathou — wish seems to some to be for the
good and to others to be for the apparently good (Ar. E.N. 1113a 15);
eoike d’ho te logos tois phainomenois marturein kai ta phainomena
téi logéi — the argument seems to Support observation, and
observation the argument (Ar. De 0a0 270b 3). Atranslation of ta
phainomena as ‘the apparent facts’ often seems best to preserve the
ambiguity.

phanai (1st person singular present is phémi): usually to assert or

affirm, not merely to say something; also ou phanai is not to fail to
say something but to deny; phanai te-kai aparneisthai — to assert
and to deny (Pl. Theaet. 165a); ho d’ouk ephé — but he denied it (Pl.
Prat. 317d). But also of other speech acts: poién, phaien an i363,
he‘donén — ‘of which pleasures?’ they may say (P1. Philebus 63c).

phantasia, phantasma: imagination, mental image. Sometimes

used neutrally of immaterial phenomena, usually mental,
sometimes, particularly in Plato, pejoratively of mere imagination
and its figments. Neutrally: dianoia te kai doxa kai phantasia
tauta ge pseudé te kai aléthé panth’he‘mén en tais psukhais
eggignetai — thought, opinion and imagination all these enter
into our souls both true and false (P1. Soph. 263d); phantasia gar
heteron kai aisthéseos kai dianoias, hauté te ou gignetai aneu
aisthéseos kai aneu tautés ouk estin hupolépsis — imagination is
different from both perception and thinking, and imagination does
not occur without perception, and without imagination there is no
conception (Ar. De An. 427b 14); oudepote noei aneu phantasmatos
hé psukhé — the soul never thinks without a mental image (Ar. De

129
 philein — philosophia 1
An. 431a 16). Pejoratively: phantasmatos é alétheias ousa mimésis
— being a copy of a phantom or a reality (Pl. Rep. 598b). Of a
non-mental image: ta en tois hudasi phantasmata — images in
water (P1. Rep. 510a). But in contrast with that: paraplé‘sia
sumbainei ta phantasmata tois en tois hudasin eidélois — mental
images are akin to images in water (Ar. De Divin. 464b 9).

. philein, philésis, philétos, philia, philos. philein is to like or love a

person or thing, without sexual implications: philésis is the love,
liking or affection felt for a person or thing that is philétos, its
object. philos, as an adjective, is of anything that is liked or loved,
but as a noun it is of a person; the personal relationship ofphiloi is
philia. dokei gar ou pan phileisthai alla to philéton- touto d’einai
agathon é hédu é khrésimon trién d’ontén di’ha philousin, epi
men téi ton apsukhén philései ou legetai philia — not everything
seems to be loved, but only the lovable, and that seems to be the
good, the pleasant and the useful there being three reasons for
loving, the love for the inanimate is not called friendship (Ar. E.N. ‘
1155b 18); tria dé ta tés philias eidé, isarithma tois philétois -— there
are three types of friendship, equal in number to the lovable [true
friendship, business friendship and partnership in pleasure] (Ar.
E.N. 1156a 7); isotés philotéta apergazetai — equality brings about
amity (Pl. Laws 757a). In the philosophy of Empedocles philoté‘s is
the principle opposed to neikos, strife, that brings about union of
elements: allote men philotéti sunerkhomen’eis hen hapanta, allote
d’au dikh’hekasta phoreumena neikeos ekhthei — sometimes coming
together in one in friendship, at others being carried apart by the
enmity of strife (Empedocles in Simplicius, Physics 158.7). Though
used in the above translations, ‘love’ is clearly not always the right
word: a business associate is a philos and thus philétos, but not as
such loved and lovable.

philosophia, philosophos: philosophy, philosopher. Pythagoras is

said to have coined the term philosophos: hoi men andrapododeis,
ephé, phuontai doxés kai pleonexias thératai, hoi de philosophoi tés
alétheias — he [Pythagoras] said that the slavish naturally pursue
glory and riches, but philosophers the truth (Diogenes Laertius
8.8); philosophia ktésis epistémés — philosophy is the acquisition of
knowledge (P1. Euthyd. 258d); to ge philomathes kai philosophon
t’auton — the love of learning and love of wisdom are the same (Pl.
Rep. 376b); theén oudeis philosophei oud’epithumei sophos

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 pheresthai — phora
genesthaz‘ esti gar — none ofthe gods is a lover ofwisdom or desires to
become wise; for he is (P1. Symp. 203e); ei de esti tis ousia akinétos
hauté protera kai philosophia prote‘ — if there is some changeless
substance, that is prior and [the subject matter of] first philosophy
(Ar. Met. 1026a 29). Aristotle always called metaphysics either prété
philosophia or theologiké: treis an eien philosophiai theére‘tikai,
mathématiké, phusiké, theologiké — there would be three branches
of theoretical philosophy, mathematical, natural and theological
(Ar. Met. 1026a 18). The translation ‘love of wisdom’ is conventional;
‘love of knowledge’ or, better, ‘love of understanding’ would be more
accurate. ‘Wisdom’ is, .in standard English, applied to practical
matters (wise plans, precautions, policies, investors, parents, etc.),
whereas sophia is theoretical. philosophos is also used as an
adjective, philosophical: meta philosophon logén — using philosophi-
cal arguments (P1.Phaedrus 257b).

pheresthai. See phora.

phobeisthai, phobos, phoberos: to fear, fear, fearful. Like ‘fear’ in

English, phobos and phobeisthai are used in Greek both with regard
to the merely kakon and with regard to the phoberon. Thus we say ‘I
fear (am afraid) he is not at home’, a state of affairs not normally
terrifying, and ‘he is afraid to go out at night’, which he presumably
does find terrifying. (1) Fear ofthe kakon: prosdokian tina legé kakou
touto eite phobon eite deos kaleite — I call that a certain expectation of
evil, whether you name it fear or dread (Pl. Prot. 358d); ton phobon
horizontai prosdokian kakou — men define fear as expectation of evil
(Ar. E.N. 1159a 9); mallon de kai phobésometha mé‘ ti miasma éi pros
hieron ta toiauta apo ton oikeion pherein — we shall rather be afraid
that there should be some pollution in bringing such things taken
from relations to a holy place (Pl. Rep. 470a). (2) Fear of the
phoberon: orthai hai trikhes histantai hupo phobou - their hair
stands on end through terror (Pl. Ion 535C); ho de toi phobeisthai
huperballon deilos — the excessively fearful man is a coward (Ar.
E.N. 1115b 34); phoboumetha délon hoti ta phobera — we are
manifestly afraid of the frightening (Ar. E.N. 1115a 8). The opposite
of phobos is said to be tharros: tharros kai phobon, aphrOne xum-
boulé — confidence and fear, a pair of unwise counsellors (P1. Tim.
69d).

phora: carrying;pheresthai: to be carried. In non-philosophical uses:

131
 phronésis
dia phoras pséphon aph’hieron pheronta — by bringing the votes
from sacred places (Pl. Laws 948d); metaphorically: apo de
thaumastés elpidos 6ikhomén pheromenos — I went, carried away
by a remarkable hope (Pl. Phaedo 98b). In technical use with regard
to mechanics phora is local motion, and pheresthai is to be moved,
or move, locally: tén ton astron phoran — the motion of the stars (P1.
Gorg. 451C); in widest use in Aristotle: pasa de kinésis hosé kata
topon, hén kaloumen phoran, é eutheia é kukléi é ek toutén mikté —
every change of place, which we call local motion, is either in a
straight line or in a circle or is a mixture of the two (Ar. De Caelo
268b 17). But elsewhere restrictions are imposed: ,legetai ge tauta
pheresthai mona kuriés hotan mé eph’hautois éi to sténai tois
metaballousi ton topon kai hosa mé auta hauta kinei kata topon —
only those things are properly said to be moved locally where it is .
not in the power of the things that change their place to be
stationary, i.e. those things that do not move themselves from place
to place (Ar. Phys. 226a 35); this restriction is disregarded at times:
hapan dé to pheromenon é huph’heautou kinétai é hup’allou (Ar.
Phys. 243a 11). A similar restriction is imposed in the Topics:
outh’hé kata topon metabolé pasa phora. hé gar badisis ou dokei
phora einai. skhedon gar hé phora epi tén akousiés topon ek topou
metaballontén legetai, kathaper epi ton apsukhén sumbainei — Nor
is all change of place locomotion. For walking does not seem to be
locomotion. ‘Locomotion’ is used, roughly, when things move
involuntarily from place to place, as is the case with inanimate
objects (Ar. Top. 122b 32). Simplicius reports a quite different
restriction suggested by Alexander of Aphrodisias: dio ou kata
phoran alla kata periphoran hé kinésis — therefore the motion [of
the heavens] is not locomotion but peripheral motion (Simplicius,
Physics 593.20).

phronésis: basically, thought or understanding: tou logou d’eontos

xunou, zéousin hoi polloi hos idian ekhontes phronésin — though
3 reason is common to all, men live as though they had a private
understanding (Heraclitus, fr. 2). The word is normally used by both
Plato and Aristotle of practical wisdom, sagacity, prudence, as is the
adjective phronimos: phronimos eis hupodématon ergasian — an
intelligent cobbler (Pl. Alcib. 1.125a); phronimos te kai agathos ho
adikos — the unjust man is wise and good (P1. Rep. 349d); kallistés tés
phronéseos hé peri tas ton poleon te kai oike‘seon diakosméseis — the
fairest Wisdom is that concerned with the ordering of cities and

132
 phthora
habitations (P1. Symp. 209a); dokei dé phronimou einai to dunasthai
kalés bouleuesthai peri ta hautoi agatha kai sumpheronta — it seems
to be a mark of the practically wise man that he is able to deliberate
well about what is to his advantage (Ar E.N. 1140a 25); phronésis
d’estin areté dianoias kath’hén eu bouleuesthai dunantai peri
agathén kai kakén ton eire‘menon eis eudaimonian — wisdom is an
excellence of the intelligence by which men are able to deliberate
well about the aforementioned goods and evils with a view to
well-being (Ar. Rhet. 1366b 20). This is subsequently the usual use:
philosophias timiéteron huparkhei phronésis didaskousa hos ouk
estin hédeés zén aneu tou phronimés — wisdom is to be more highly
valued than philosophy since it teaches us that one cannot live
pleasantly unless one lives wisely (Epicurus, To Menoeceus 132). But
both Plato and Aristotle occasionally use phronésis of theoretical
excellence, where we would expect sophia: houté dé gegenémenos
pros to logéi kai phronései perilépton kai kata t’auta ekhon dedé-
miourgétai — having thus come about, [the world of forms] was
constructed to be grasped by reason and wisdom, and to be unchang-
ing (Pl. Tim. 29a); ho men philosophos bouletai peri phronésin einai
kai tén theorian tén peri té‘n alétheian — the philosopher wishes to be
concerned with thought and the contemplation concerning the truth
(Ar. E.E. 1215b 1); hoi men gar tén phronésin megiston einai phasin
agathon, hoi de tén aretén, hoi de tén hédonén — some say that
phronésis is the greatest good, others that it is excellence of char-
acter, and others that it is pleasure (Ar. E.E. 1214a 32). phronésis is
closer to the English ‘wisdom’ than is sophia.

phthora: destruction or ceasing to be. In philosophy it refers to the

ceasing to exist of a substance, the contrary being genesis, which is
the coming into existence of a substance. In Aristotle both are
usually distinct from change of all kinds in a continuing substance,
though in Physics 3.1 kinésis seems exceptionally to include Substan-
tial change. genomenéi panti phthora estin — everything that has
come to be ceases to be (Pl. Rep. 546a); peri geneseos kai phthoras tén
aitian diapragmateuesthai —— to work out the cause of coming to be
and ceasing to be (Pl. Phaedo 95e). Peri geneseés kai phthoras is the
title of a work of Aristotle’s, whose Latin title is De generatione et
corruptione, which has a misleading sound to English speakers.
Aristotle’s basic problems are how there can be any coming into
existence and ceasing to exist if matter is everlasting, and how they
can be distinguished from mere alloiésis, alteration.

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 phuein —phusis
phuein: to generate, give birth to: hosa gé phuei — the fruits of the
earth (Pl. Rep. 621a). In the perfect form, pephukenai, it means ‘to
be naturally’ or ‘it is the nature of: pephukeh hé pterou dunamis to
embrithes and agein — it is the nature of the wing to carry the heavy
upwards (Pl. Phaedrus 246d); ou gar phusei hekastéi pephukenai
onoma ouden oudeni —' no name belongs naturally to anything
whatsoever (Pl. Crat. 384d); pephuke de ek gnoriméterén hémin hé
hodos kai saphesterén epi ta saphestera téi phusei kai gnorimotera -
the route is naturally from things that are more obvious and clearer
to us to things that are clear and more obvious in their nature (Ar.
Phys. 184a 16).

phusikos: concerned with phusis, nature; dedeiktai proteron en tois

phusikois — it was previously demonstrated in the Physics [as
Aristotle’s basic work on nature is misleadingly called]; kathaper
ton phusikén kaloumenén phési tis — as one of the so-called students
of nature says (Epicurus, To Pythocles 90); tén ton allén phusikén
proble‘matén katharsin -— the clearing up of the remaining problems
about nature (Epicurus, To Pythocles 86). Not in Plato. ho phusikos
is a student of nature or a natural scientist, rather than specifically
a physicist.

phusiologein, phusiologia, phusiologos: to treat of nature

(phusis), the treatment of nature, he who treats of nature: peri
panton phusiologountes — treating of nature in general (Ar. Met.
988b 26); tois neosti phusiologias gnésiou geuomenois — for those
who are newly tasting genuine natural science (Epicurus, To
Pythocles 85); enioi ton phusiologon hen hupothemenoi to on - some
natural scientists who suppose that reality is unitary (Ar. Met.
986b 14). Aristotle frequently calls the pre-Socratic philosophers
phusiologoi. None of these words occur in Plato.

phusis: either the nature of something — phusis tinos — or,

absolutely, nature as opposed to the conventional, artificial, etc. ,
With genitive: kai gunaikos ara kai andros hé auté phusis eis
phulakén poleés — surely the nature of both women and men is the
same for guarding the city (Pl. Rep. 456a); metekhein tés tou
philokhrématou phuseos — to share the nature of the acquisitive (Pl.
Rep. 549b); tén ton blepharon phusis — the nature of eyelids (P1.
Tim. 45b). Absolutely: peri hou saphesteron en tois peri phuseés
eirékamen — as we have said more clearly in the book on nature [one

134
 pistis — pleonakhos
of Aristotle’s names for what we call the Physics, or a part thereof]
(Ar. Phys. 986b 30); hés ousés tés phuseés arkhés tinos kai aitias tou
kineisthai kai éremein — as nature’s being some principle and cause
of change and rest (Ar. Phys. 192b 21). In various contrasts: ha
phusei men ouk esti kala nomoi de — that are not fine by nature, but
by convention (Pl. Gorg. 482e); é phusei é tekhnéi — either by nature
or by art (Pl. Rep. 381a); pephuke de ek ton gnorimoteron hémin hé
hodos kai saphesteron epi ta saphestera téi phusei kai gnorimétera —
the route is from things that are more obvious and clear to us to those
that are naturally clearer and more obvious (Ar. Phys. 184a 16).
Plato usually uses the word of the nature of a thing, but peri phuseos
kai ton meteérén astronomika tina dierétan — to discuss certain
astronomical issues about nature and celestial phenomena (P1. Prat.
3150). There is a general discussion of the concept ofphusis in Ar.
Met., Book 4, Ch. 4.

pistis has two meanings in addition to various non-philosophical

uses. (1) Belief: du’eston t6 peri theon agonte eis pistin — there are two
things leading to beliefabout the gods (Pl. Laws 966d); tén te apistian
kai tén pistin — disbelief and belief (Ar. Phys. 213a 15). pistis is the
name given by Socrates to the third segment of the line in the
Republic: toi tritéi pistin apodos — give [the name] belief to the
third [segment] (Pl. Rep. 511e). (2) A less than demonstrative proof:
hikané de pistis kai ek tés epagégé‘s — the proof from induction is
sufficient (Ar. An. Po. 90b 14); ton de pisteon hai men atekhnoi eisin, .
hai d’entekhnoi — of proofs [in law courts] some are non-technical,
others are technical [depending on the resources of rhetoric] (Ar.
Rhet. 1355b 35).

platos: breadth: diastémata men can ekhei tria, mé‘kos kai platos
kai bathos — it [place] has three dimensions, length and breadth and
depth (Ar. Phys. 209a 5). For the adverb plateos, see platus.

platus: broad. It has a figurative as well as a physical use. Physi-

cally: platutaton ton tou kheilous kuklon ekhein — to have the circle of
the rim widest (Pl. Rep. 616e). Figuratively: peri tou nun tou te
kuriés kai tou en platei legomenou — concerning the ‘now’ both in
its strict and in its broad senses (Simplicius, Physics 747.30). The
adverb plateos is also used figuratively.

pleonakhés: in various ways or senses: epei de to auto pleonakhos

135
 pleonektein — poiein
legetai — since ‘the same’ is used in various ways (Ar. An. Po. 89a
28); délon d’hoti pleonakhés tou philotoioutou legomenou ouk epi to
auto pheromen aei to philotimon — since ‘the lover of so-and-so’ is
used in various senses, it is clear that we do not always use ‘lover of
honour’ in the same way (Ar. E.N. 1125b 14). Not in Plato.

pleonektein, pleonektés, pleonexia: to be greedy, greedy, greedi-

ness: dokei dé ho te paranomos adikos einai kai ho pleonektés — both
the lawless man and the greedy seem to be wrong-doers (Ar. E.N.
1129a 32); pleonektei kai autos é kharitos é timorias — he himself is
greedy for favour or revenge (Ar. E.N. 1137a 1); ep’autophéroi oun
laboimen an ton dikaion téi adikéi eis t’auton ionta dia tén
pleonexian - we would catch the just man in the act, becoming the
same as the unjust through greed (P1. Rep. 359C).

pléré‘s: full. Ordinarily as in English: tén khéran pléré naupégé-

Simon xulén — the country full of wood fit for ship-building (P1. Laws .
706b); odunés plérés - full of pain (Pl. Theaet. 210). Also a technical
term of the early atomists: Leukippos de kai ho hetairos autou
Démokritos stoikheia men to pléres kai to kenon einai phasi —
Leucippus and his colleague Democritus say that the elements are
the full and the void (Ar. Met. 985b 5); arkhas etheto to pléres kai to
kenon, hon to men on to de mé on ekalei — [Democritus] posited as
principles the full and the void, of which he called the first that
which is, and the other that which is not (Simplicius, Physics
28.16). Aristotle discusses and attacks this theory in Physics, Book
4, Chs 6-9.

pléthos: multitude, manifold. Ordinarily as in English: hé tou

pléthous arkhé — the rule of the mob (P1. Pol. 291d); pléthos apeiron
ton ontén —. an unlimited multitude of existents (P1.Parm. 144a). In
neoplatonism, a manifold, as opposed to the unitary and simple:
pan pléthos metekhei péi tou henos — every manifold participates in
a way in the one (Proclus, Elements of Theology 1); p63 oun
diakrisis kai pléthos ephané? — how then did separation and the
manifold appear? (Damascius, First Principles 2 Ruelle).

poiein, poiéma, poiésis, poiétés, poiétikos: to make, a thing made,

making, a maker, concerned with making. (1)In their widest use
these terms are used of any doing or making, like Latin facere and
French faire. (2) In a narrower use they are used of making as

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 poios
distinguished from doing. (3) In their narrowest use they are used
specifically of poetry and its composition. (1) eite poiématén eite
pathe‘maton — whether things done or things suffered (Pl. Rep.
437b); é oukh houté poieis pros tous kalous? — or is not that how you
behave to the good-looking? (P1. Rep. 474d). (2) tou d’endekhomenou
allés ekhein esti ti kai poiéton kai prakton- heteron d’esti poiésis kai
praxis — in the sphere of the variable there is the made and the
done: but making and doing are different (Ar. E.N. 1140a 1); klinés
poiétés — the maker of a bed (Pl. Rep. 597d); poiétén kai patera toude
tou pantos — the maker and father of this universe (P1. Tim. 28c);
hai hupo pasais tais tekhnais ergasia poiéseis eisi kai hoi toutén
démiourgoi pantes poiétai apo de pasés tés poie‘seos hen morion
aphoristhen to peri tén mousikén kai ta metra téi tou holou onomati
prosagoreuetai — the works of all skills are creations and the
workmen who make them are all creators but from all creation
one part, cut off, which is concerned with music and metre is called
by the name that belongs to all (P1. Symp. 205C); poiétikén ...pasan
ephamen einai dunamin hétis an' aitia gignétai tois mé ousin
husteron gignesthai — we said that the whole of making was a power
which can cause that which is not to come subsequently to be (P1.
Soph. 265b). (3) peri ton poie‘matén hon pepoiékas — concerning
the poems you have composed (P1. Phaedo 60c); poiein eis ta paidika
— compose poems to my boy-love (Pl. Lysis 205a); peri poiétikés
autés te kai ton eidon autés — concerning poetry itself and its species
(Ar. Poetics 1447a 8): poiétiké is in the feminine because tekhné is
understood. poiésis is either the composing of the poem, as in hé tés
tragoidias poiésis — the composition of tragedy (Pl. Gorg. 502b), or
the poem itself, as in peri hon Homéros tén poiésin pepoiken — about
which Homer composed his poetry (P1. Ion . 531d). In classical
Scottish usage a poet was called a maker (rhyming with ‘hacker’).

poios, poiotés: of what sort, ‘of-what-sort-ness’ i.e. quality. The

word poiotés was apparently coined by Plato: to de poioun poion ti
all’ou poiotéta. i363 oun hé ‘poiote‘s’ hama allokoton te phainetai
onoma kai ou manthaneis athroon legomenon — what acts is
something of a sort and not a quality. Perhaps ‘quality’ seems a
disagreeable word that you do not understand used out of context
(P1. Theaet. 182a); poiotéta de legé kath’hén poioi tines einai
legontai- esti de hé poiotés ton pleonakhés legomenon — I call a
quality that through which things are called of a sort; but ‘quality’
has many senses (Ar. Cat. 8b 25). poion, or poiotés, is one of the ten

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 polis — politikos
categories listed by Aristotle in his Categories. For the list see Cat.
1b 25 ff. There is a general discussion ofpoiotés in Ar. Met., Book 4,
Ch. 14. In the quotation from the Theaetetus above, the OCT has
hathroon, presumably as a misprint.

polis: (1) A city as opposed to countryside and villages. (2) A

city-state, including countryside and villages. (1) peritheousi tois
Dionusiois oute ton kata poleis oute ton kata kémas apoleipomenoi —
they run around, not missing any Dionysia either in the cities or in
the villages (Pl. Rep. 475d). (2) he ek pleionén komén koinonia
teleios polis — the complete city is a community of several villages
(Ar. Pol. 1252b 27; ta té‘s poleés dunatétatos kai prattein kai
legein — most capable of acting and speaking on affairs of state (P1.
Prot. 319a).

politeia: generally, the constitution of any polis: to skhéma tés

politeias — the form of the constitution (Pl. Rep. 501a); hosai de to
spheteron monon ton arkhontén hémartémenai pasai kai parek-
baseis ton orthén politeiéne those [that look to the interest] of the
rulers alone are flawed departures from the correct constitutions
(Ar. Pol. 1279a 19). But Aristotle also called his preferred form of
government politeia, or constitutional government: téi kaloumenéi
politeiai’ — so-called polity (Ar. Pol. 1295a 33).

polités (fem. politis): a full member of a polis: hé gar polis politOn ti

pléthos estin — for the state is a collection of citizens (Ar. Pol. 1274b
41); pantas tous politas kai tas politidas — all the citizens, male and
female (Pl. Laws 8140). Various qualifications for citizenship are
discussed by Aristotle in Pol. 1275a 1 ff.

politeuesthai: to conduct the affairs of the city, or for them to be

conducted: suggignéskousin Ahémin te kai ekeinois hosoi he‘mén
eggus politeuontai — they forgive us and those who conduct their
civic affairs like us .(Pl. Rep. 568b); hontina pote tropon oiei dein
politeuesthai en hémin — in what way you think that we should
conduct our political affairs (Pl. Gorg. 515b). ,

politikos: concerned with running a city, whether a person, a life, a

skill or a book: politikos- episte‘mén poleés kataskeués — a
statesman: one who is knowledgable about the structure of the
state (pseudo-P1. Def. 415C); Politikos — ‘the Statesman’ — is the title
of a Platonic dialogue; Politika — ‘the Politics’ — is the title of a work

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 pollakhos — posos
of Aristotle; treis gar eisi malista hoi proukhontes, ho te nun
eirémenos, kai ho politikos kai tritos ho theérétikos — there are three
most prominent [ways of life], the one just mentioned [pleasure],
that concerned with the state, and thirdly the contemplative (Ar.
E.N. 1095b 17); edoxe hémin hé politiké kai hé basiliké tekhné hé
auté — it seemed to us that the skills ofa statesman and ofa king were
the same (Pl. Euthyd. 291C).

pollakhés: in many ways: to men hamartanein pollakhés estin to

de katorthoun monakhés — one can be wrong in many ways but
right only in one (Ar. E.N. 1106b 29); pollakhés to poiein legetai —
‘make’ has many senses (Ar. E.N. 1136b 29); to on legetai pollakhos
kathaper dielometha proteron en tois peri tou posakhos — ‘being’ has
many senses, as we earlier distinguished them in the discussion of
how many senses [various terms had] (Ar. Met. 1028a 10). Not in
Plato, but he uses pollakhéi, which normally means ‘in many places
or parts’, also as pollakhos is used: geloion gar an eiépollakhéi — for it
would be laughable in many ways (Pl. Theaet. 158e).

ponéria, like the adjective poné‘ros, is hard to distinguish from

kakia, mokhthéria and aiskhos. Etymologically, and in early Greek,
it is connected with ponos, harsh and grievous labour. In Plato, at
least, ifwe are to attempt to refine on ‘bad’, perhaps ‘ill-condition(ed)’
is as good as any other translation; it should be noted that he always
contrasts ponéros with khréstos, not with agathos: peri ton khréstc‘m
sitién kai ponérén — concerning healthy and unhealthy foods (Pl.
Gorg. 464d); é khréston auto genesthai é ponéron - it [the body]
becomes healthy or diseased (Pl. Prot. 313a); hé somatos ponéria
nosos ousa — the ill-condition of the body being disease (Pl. Rep.
6090); kholeia de podon oukhi ponéria? — is not lameness of the feet
an ill-condition? (P1. Hip. Min. 374c). For other examples ofponéria
as disease, see Hip. Min. 374d, Prot. 326C, Tim. 86d. ponéras doxas
kai khréstas — sound and unsound opinions (Pl. Philebus 40e). hoi
ponéroi kai akhre‘stoi (Pl. Laws 950b) seems to be a hendiadys,
meaning ‘worthless people’. Aristotle treats ponéros as a close
synonym of mokhthéros; he says that oudeis hekon ponéros — no one
is intentionally bad — is false, since he de mokhthéria hekousion —
wickedness is intentional - is true (Ar. E.N. 1113b 15).

poses as an interrogative means ‘how big’, ‘hOw much’: posc‘m an eié

podon to holon? — how many feet is the whole? (Pl. Meno 82c); posou

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 posotés — praktikos
didaskei? —' what are his tuition fees? (P1.Apol. 20b). Aristotle uses
the interrogative as the name of the category of quantity (Ar. Cat.
1b 26). In the neuter singular to poson can be a particular quantity:
poson ti gar on, hoposon an éi tosouton holon anagkaion auto einai —
for since it is a quantity, of whatever size it may be it must be a
whole of that size (Pl. Soph. 245d). See posotés.

posotés: quantity. Not used by Plato, though he coined poiotés. Not

used by Aristotle in the Categories, where the name of the category
of quantity is poson, but in the plural ta de alla legetai onta tot tou
houtés ontos ta men posotétes einai ta de poiotétes — but the
others are called existences by being quantities or qualities [etc.] of
that which exists in this way [as a substance] (Ar. Met. 1028a 18).
Later: hoi de toutou agnoountes, tén posotéta tou khronou akribes —
those who do not know the exact time (Sextus Empiricus, Adversus
Mathematicos 5.58). See posOs.

pothein, pathos: to long (longing) for the absent, like Latin

desiderium: kai mén pothos au kaleitai [ho himeros] sémainon ou
parontos einai alla tou allothi pou ontos kai apontos — and
[yearning] is also called longing, signifying that it is of what is not
present but is somewhere else and abSent (Pl. Crat. 420a). But
Andronicus distinguishes it. from himeros: himeros de epithumia
philou apontos homilias- pothos de epithumia kata erota apontos —
yearning is a desire for the companionship of an absent friend:
longing is an erotic desire for the absent (Andronicus, Peri pathon
4, in SVF 3.397). Thus Plato speaks ofpothou kentron — the spur of
longing — and of tas en téi neotéti hédonas pothountes — longing for
the pleasures of youth (Pl. Rep. 573a and 329a). But also in
abstract: eti pothei, ephé, hé apokrisis erotésin toiande — the answer,
[Diotima] said, presupposes a [missing] question of the following
sort (Pl. Symp. 204d). '

praktikos, praktos, prattein, praxis have a wide variety of uses, all

concerned with the sphere of action. Distinguished from speech: ta
prakhthenta kai tekhthenta — things done and said (Pl. Phaedrus
241a). Distinguished from being acted on: méden sumballetai ho
prattén é ho paskhon — nothing is contributed by the agent or,
rather, him to whom it happens (Ar. E.N. 1110a 2). Distinguished
from making: poiésis kai praxis heteron — making and doing are a
different matter (Ar. E.N. 1140a 16). But prattein may be either to

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 proagein — proaireisthai
act or to fare, as in episte‘monés an prattontes eu an prattoimen kai
eudaimonoimen —- if we acted intelligently we should fare well and
be well off (P1. Charm. 173d). Compare to de eu zén kai to en
prattein t’auton hupolambanousi téi eudaimonein — they take living
well and faring well to be the same thing as well-being (Ar. E.N.
1095a 19). Here the common translation of en prattein as ‘do well’ is
wrong, unless ‘do well’ is used as in ‘he is doing well in his
profession’; compare nomoi ou touto melei, hopos hen ti genos en
polei diapherontés eu praxei — it is not the concern of the law to
ensure that one class in the state should fare especially well (P1.
Rep. 519e). praxis is concerned with particulars: prakta ta
kath’hekasta — things done are particular, praktikos ho phronimos
— the wise man is concerned with action (Ar. E.N. 1147a 3, 1146a 8).
There is an idiomatic use ofprattesthai in which it means ‘to make
a monetary charge’: ei tinos akékoate hos ego paideuein epikheiro _
anthropous kai khrémata prattomai — if you have heard from
somebody that I try to educate people and charge a fee (Pl. Apol.
19d).

proagein: to bring forward, to lead on, to persuade, in non-technical

use. The only philosophical use of importance is of the perfect
passive participle proé‘gmenon. The proégmenon in Stoic philos-
ophy is that which though not good, being adiaphoron, indifferent,
like wealth and health, is none the less preferred. The contrary is
the apoproégmenon, which is undesirable but not, in Stoic ethics, a
kakon, bad: proégmenon ho adiaphoron on eklegometha — the
preferred that which though indifferent we select (Zeno in SVF
1.48).

proaireisthai: to choose; proairesis: choice; proairetiké: involving

choice; proairetos: chosen: ar’ouk en hekastéi téi proairesei
proairoumetha tine ho orthés ekhei kaleisthai amphotera — do we
not in each choice choose a pair that can be correctly called ‘both’?
(Pl. Parm. 143C); tous te gar bebaiotatous kai tous andreiotatous
' proaireteon — for we should choose the most reliable and the bravest
(Pl. Rep. 535a). There is a study ofproairesis in E.N., Book 3, Ch. 2;
the following quotations are all from that work: hé proairesis dé
hekousion men phainetai, ou t’auton de, all’epi pleon t0 hekousion -—
choice seems to be intentional, but not the same as it, since the
intended is wider (1111b 7); to de hekousion ou pan proaireton — but
not all the intended is chosen (1112a 14); kai proairesei men

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 probléma — proienai
epithumia enantioutai — and appetite opposes choice (1111b 16);
proelomenoi men hosa probouleusamenoi —— having chosen what we
had planned in advance (1135b 10); estin ara hé areté hexis
proairetiké —— excellence [of character] is a disposition to choose
(1106b 36); praxeés men oun arkhé proairesis — so choice is a source
of action (1139a 31).

probléma: a verbal noun from proballein, to throw in front, used

physically in that way by Plato: tén de sarka probolé‘n men
kaumatén, probléma de kheiménén — [the demiurge made] flesh as
a shield against heat and a protection against the cold (Pl. Tim.
74b). Generally in philosophy a problem, as in English: problémasi
ara khrémenoi hosper geémetrian houté kai astronomian
metimen — we approach astronomy as we do geometry, with
problems (Pl. Rep. 530a). Aristotle has a narrower, technical use:
diapherei de to prObléma kai hé protasis téi tropéi. houto men gar
rhéthentos ‘ara to “zéion pezon dipoun” horismos estin anthropou ?’
protasis gignetai- ean de ‘poteron to “zéion pezon dipoun”
horismos estin anthrépou é ou’, probléma gignetai — a problem and a
proposition differ in their form. Thus, if one says ‘Is “two-footed
animal” the definition of a man?’ we have a proposition: but if
one says ‘Is “two-footed animal” the definition of a-man or is it not?’,
we have a problem (Ar. Top. 101b 29).

proégmenon: preferred. See proagein.

proienai: non-technically, to proceed or go on: proi’thi ge eti eis

t’oumprosthen — keep going on forwards, then (Pl. Gorg. 497a);
protontos de édé tou khronou — as time is already getting on (P1.
Phaedrus 255a). There is an important technical use in
neoplatonism, Where proienai is always translated ‘proceed’, in
which lower orders of being are said to proceed from higher. The
following quotations from Proclus’ Elements of Theology give the
bare gist of the doctrine: panta ta onta proeisin apo mias aitias tés
protés — all existences proceed from the single first cause (21); pasa
taxis apo monados arkhomené proeisin eis plé‘thos — every order
proceeds from a monad to a manifold (24); pan to apo tinos
paragomenon amesés menei te en toi paragonti kai proeisin
ap’autou — everything produced from something remains immedi-
ately in the producer and proceeds from it (33). Also: akolouthon epi
toutois an eié zétein ei proeisi ti ap’ekeinou eis ta met’auto kai

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 proodos — pros ti
hotioun — it follows to examine whether anything whatever proceeds
from it [the one] into that which is after it (Damascius, First
Principles 1.66 Ruelle). But Plotinus also uses proienai non-
technically: esti de kai proiousi pros to and apo tés aisthéseos kai
epitédeumata kala kai praxeis — for those who proceed upwards from
perception there are fine occupations and actions (Plotinus 1.6.1).

proo'dos: procession, used by neoplatonists as a noun correlative

with proienai: tis houtos esti opsimathés hos agnoein hoti kata tén
aph’henos proo'don apo tés ai’diou ousias hé geneté proeisin — who is
so uninformed as not to know that in the procession from the one
created substance proceeds from the everlasting? (Simplicius,
Physics 1133.9). Not in Plato.

propeteia: impetuosity, impulsiveness; propetés: impetuous, impul-

sive, unreflecting; propetés, impulsively, without thinking. akrasias
de to men propeteia to de astheneia — one sort of acrasia is impetuo-
sity, the other weakness (Ar. E.N. 1150b 19); malista d’hoi oxeis kai
melagkholikoi tén propeté akrasian eisin akrateis — the keen and
excitable are especially liable to the impetuous form of acrasia (Ar.
E.N. 1150b 25); mé propetos apokrinomenoi ptaisomen — lest we
stumble by answering without thought (Pl. Phil. 45a).

pros hen: in relation to a single thing. Aristotle, in addition to

sunonuma — things of the same sort with a single name — and
homonuma — things of a different sort with the same name, recog-
nises things that, though different, share the same name because
they contribute to a single central case: oude gar iatrikon séma kai
ergon kai skeuos legetai oute homénumos oute kath’hen alla pros hen
— nor are the patient, the treatment and the implement called
medical either homonymously or as the same, but as contributing to
the one end (Ar. Met. 1030b 2); all’ara ge toi aph’henos einai é pros
hen hapanta suntelein? — or [are good things so called] through
having a single source or all contributing to one end? (Ar. E.N. 1096b
27). aph’henos and pros hen seem to be the same phenomenon
differently viewed, as being dependent on or contributing to a central
case.

pros ti: the name given by Aristotle to the category of relation in his
list of katégoriai: ton kata médemian sumplokén legomenon hekas-
ton étoi ousian sémainei é poson é poion é pros ti é — each

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 protasis — psukhé
uncombined termr signifies either a substance or a quantity or a
quality or a relation or (Ar. Cat. 1b 25); pros ti de ta toiauta
legetai hosa auta haper estin heterc‘m einai legetai, é hopésoun allés
pros heteron — such things are said to be relative that are said to be
what they are by being of other things, or in some way related to
something else (Ar. Cat. 6a 37). '

protasis: a proposition. Not in Plato. protasis men oun esti logos

kataphatikos é apophatikos tinos kata tinos — a proposition, then, is
an utterance that affirms or denies something of something (Ar. An.
Pr. 24a 16). ‘A is B’ is an assertoric proposition, but propositions
may also be apodeictic or problematic: antistrephousi hai kata to
endekhesthai protaseis — problematic propositions are convertible
(Ar. An. Pr. 33b 2). A problematic proposition is such as endekhetai
anthrépon genesthai leukon — it is possible for a man to become
white (Ar. An. Pr. 30b 37). Aristotle also calls interrogatives
propositions: ara ge to zoion genos tou anthropou? protasis gignetai
— ‘Is “animal” the genus of man?’ is a proposition (Ar. Top. 101b 29).
In logical contexts protasis often refers to a premiss: ek pseudén
d’aléthes esti sullogizesthai kai amphoteron ton protaseén pseudon
onton kai tés mias — it is possible to draw a true conclusion from
falsehoods, both when both premisses are false and when one is (Ar.
An. Pr. 53b 26). '

pseudés: false, mistaken; pseudomai: to be mistaken; pseudos: a

falsehood, a mistake. In a suitable context the falsehood may be
deliberate and so a lie, but this is rarely the case in philosophy:
amathian ara to toionde legete, to pseudé ekhein doxan kai
epseusthai peri ton pragmaton ton pollou axic‘m? -— do you say that
ignorance is like this — to have a false belief and to be mistaken
about matters of importance? (P1. Prat. 3580); to gar ta mé onta
doxazein é legein tout’esti pou to pseudos — to think or say what is
not is presumably what a falsehood [mistake] is (P1. .Soph. 2600).
Something may also be called pseudés if it is deceptive or spurious:
poteron alétheis tautas tas lupas te kai hédonas é pseudeis einai
lexomen? — shall we say that such forms of distress are genuine or
bogus? (P1. Philebus 360).

psukhé: usually translated ‘soul’; it is better to stick to this dummy

translation than to use such substitutes as ‘mind’, which in some
contet (the mind of a vegetable) may be absurd. A minimum

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 psukhros
statement to which all philosophers would have agreed is hé psukhé
de touto héi zémen — soul is that. in virtue of which we are alive (Ar.
De An. 414a 12). Anything that is alive has a soul: kath’hekaston
zététeon tis hekastou psukhé, hoion tis phutou kai tis anthropou é
thériou — we must examine each kind to find what kind of soul it has,
e.g. a plant or a man or a wild animal (Ar. De An. 414b 32); eis thériou
bion anthropine‘ psukhé aphikneitai - a man’s soul takes over the life
of a beast [in reincarnation] (Pl. Phaedrus 249b). The soul is
sometimes thought to be a separate entity in the body and immortal:
ex anagkés agenéton kai athanaton psukhé an eié‘ — it is necessary
that the soul be uncreated and immortal (Pl. Phaedrus 246a); pasa
psukhé asématos estin ousia kai khéristé — every soul is an incor-
poreal substance and separable (Proclus, Elements ofTheology 186).
Or the soul is regarded as separate but mortal: hé psukhé séma esti
leptomeres par’holon to athroisma paresparmenon dialuomenou
. tou holou athroismatos he psukhé diaspeiretai — the soul is a body
with fine parts that is spread throughout the structure when the
whole structure is dissolved the soul is dispersed (Epicurus, To
Herodotus 63 and 66). Or the soul is regarded as neither a separate
entity nor immortal: ei oun tugkhanei hé psukhé ousa harmonia tis
délon hoti hotan khalasthéi to soma he‘mén ametrés tén men
psukhén anagké euthus huparkhei apolélenai — ifthen the soul turns
out to be some attunement [of the body], it is clear that when our
body is unduly relaxed it is necessary that the soul should perish
at once (Pl. Phaedo 86c). Aristotle’s influential View is that
anagkaion ara tén psukhén ousian einai hos eidos sématos phusikou
dunamei zoe‘n ekhontos - so it is necessary that the soul should have
its nature as the form of a natural body that is potentially alive; ei
gar én ho ophthalmos zéion psukhé an eié autou hé opsis -— for if the
eye were an animal sight would be its soul; hoti men oun ouk estin he
psukhé khéristé tou somatos ouk adélon — so it is not unclear that
the soul is not separable from the body (Ar. De An. 412a 19, 412b 17,
413a 3). There is clearly a tension in the works of such philosophers
as Plato between the view of the soul as responsible for all manifest-
ations of life, including anger and appetite in the Republic, and also
including animal life, and the View that it is a rational, directive
entity, temporarily lodged in a body, from whose appetites it longs to
be free, as sometimes in the Phaedo and the Phaedrus.

psnkhros: cold. One of the four elementary qualities of body in

Aristotle’s physical theory, together with the thermon, hugron and

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 ptésis — rhein
xéron — the warm, the wet and the dry: to d’hudér psukhron kai
hugron, hé de gé psukhron kai xéron — water is the cold and moist,
earth is the cold and dry (Ar. De Gen. et Cor. 330b 5).

ptésis: literally, a fall: hosper en ptosei kubén — as in the fall of dice

(Pl. Rep. 6040). Of words, the ptésis is the termination, including
such things as case, adverbs etc.: parénuma de legetai hosa apo
tinos diapheronta téi ptései tén kata t’ounoma proségorian ekhei,
hoion apo tés grammatikés ho grammatikos - paronyms are said to
be things named after something but differing in termination, as a
grammarian is named after grammar (Ar. Cat. 1a 12). Also in logic
of the mood of ' syllogisms: en pleiosi skhémasi kai dia pleionon
ptéseén — in many figures and in many moods (Ar. An. Pr. 42b 30).

pur: fire. One of the four elements generally accepted after

Empedocles. But Heraclitus, followed by the Stoics, had given it a
pre-eminence: kosmon tonde oute tis theén oute anthrépén epoiésen,
all’én aei kai estin kai estai, pur aeizoon, haptomenon metra kai
aposbennumenon metra — the universe was made by no god or man,
but always was, is and will be, an everlasting fire kindling and
being quenched in turn (Heraclitus in Clement, Strémateis
5.104.1). In Aristotle’s universe the four elements are all in the
sublunar sphere, fire being the outermost, and all move naturally
to their proper place: ei gar estin hekastou phora tis ton haplén
sématén phusei, hoion téi puri men and — for if there is some
natural local motion of each of the simple bodies, as upwards for fire
(Ar. Phys. 214b 13). to men gar pur thermon kai xéron — for fire is
hot and dry (Ar. De Gen. et Cor. 330b 2)‘: this distinguishes it from
the other elements, aér, gé and hudér, that are either cold or moist,
or both.

R
rhein: to flow: potamous ex ton hupsélén rheontas — rivers
flowing from high places (Pl. Laws 682C); ton rheonta kh‘ronon — the
time that flows (Simplicius, Physics 1163.2). Importantly, of the
doctrine attributed to the Pythagoreans, Heraclitus and Cratylus
by Plato, and to Plato also by Aristotle, that everything is in a
continual state of flux, which is clearly the genesis of the
neoplatonic, and perhaps Platonic, doctrine that the perceptible
world is one of genesis — becoming — in contrast with the world of

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 rhéma — rhe‘tér

being: hos ionton hapantén aei kai rheonton — that everything is in

process and flowing (P1. Crat. 439C); ek neou te gar sunéthés
genomenos proton Kratuloi kai tais Hérakleiteiois doxais, hos
hapanton ton aisthe‘ton aei rheonton tauta men kai husteron
houtos hupelaben — for [Plato] having become familiar when still
young with Cratylus and the Heraclitean opinions, that all
perceptible things were in everlasting flux he continued to hold
this opinion on this matter (Ar. Met. 987a 32).

rhéma: basically, any verbal expression exceeding a word (onoma):

tou kallous ton onomaton kai rhématén - the beauty of the words
and expressions (Pl. Symp. 189b); hina anti rhématos [Dii philos]
onoma [Diphilos] genétai —'- in order that instead of an expression
[loved by Zeus] we may have a name [Diphilus] (Pl. Crat. 399C);
all’oiStha hou moi dokei einai to rhéma to phanai dikaion einai
tous philous ophelein tous d’ekhthrous blaptein? — do you know to
whom I attribute the statement that it is just to help friends and
harm enemies? (Pl. Rep. 336a). Sometimes, words as opposed to
thought: ean tis rhémati hamartéi — if someone makes a verbal slip
(Pl. Gorg. 489b); médeis oun pros to rhéma blepon enantiousthai
nomizeto tous philosophous —. so let nobody, looking at the words,
think that the philosophers are disagreeing (Simplicius, Physics
1155.20). rhéma also has a more specific sense in which it is a verb
and onoma a noun: rhéma de esti to prossémainon khronon, hou
meros ouden sémainei khéris, kai estin aei ton kath’heterou
legomenon sémeion. lego d’hoti prossémainei khronon hoion hugieia
men onoma, to de hugiainei rhéma- to de oukh hugiainei esté
aoriston rhéma° to hugiainen e to hugianei ou rhéma, alla ptosis
rhématos — a verb is that which also indicates time, of which no part
is independently meaningful, and which alaways means something
that is said of something else. I say that it also indicates time, as,
- for example, ‘health’ is a noun but ‘is healthy’ is a verb; but let us
call ‘is not healthy’ an indefinite verb; ‘was healthy’ or ‘will be
healthy’ is not a verb but a declension of a verb (Ar. De Int. 16b 6);
suntheis pragma praxei di’onomatos kai rhématos — combining deed
with doing by means of a noun and verb (Pl. Soph. 262e).

rhé‘tér: an orator; rhétoriké: rhetoric; rhétorikos: versed in

rhetoric: hoi rhétores hotan legosin en toi déméi — the orators when
they speak in public (Pl. Euthyd. 284b); hé rhétoriké an eié tekhné
psukhagogia tis dia logon — rhetoric is an art of influencing souls by

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 rhusmos — sémainein

means of words (P1. Phaedrus 261a). Aristotle, like many others of

his time, wrote a textbook on the art of rhetoric, giving the
definition est6 dé hé‘ rhétoriké dunamis peri hekaston tou theore‘sai
to endekhomenon pithanon — let us say that rhetoric is the power to
see that which is capable of persuading on each matter (Ar. Rhet.
1355b 25). rhétorikos gar me epikheireis elegkhein — you are trying
to refute me in rhetorical fashion (Pl. Gorg. 471e). hé rhétoriké is
feminine because tekhné is understood.

rhusmos: an Ionic version of rhuthmos, used by Democritus to

mean ‘shape’; he wrote a book called Peri ton diapheronton
rhusmén —- ‘On different shapes’ (Democritus, fr. 5). diapherein gar
phasin to on rhusméi kai diathigéi kai tropéi monon toutén de
ho men rhusmos skhéma estin — for they [the atomists] say that
what is differs only in rhythm and touch and turning of these
rhythm is shape (Ar. Met. 985b 15).

rhuthmos: in philosophy, rhythm: téi tés kinéseos taxei rhuthmos

onoma eié —— the name for the ordering of change is rhythm (Pl.
Laws 665a); to melos ek trib‘n esti sugkeimenon, logou te kai
harmonias kai rhuthmou — song is composed of three elements,
words, melody and rhythm (Pl. Rep. 398d); k’an tais eirémenais
tekhnais hapasai men poiountai tén mimésin en rhuthméi kai logoi
kai harmonia'z‘, toutois d’é‘ khéris é memigmenois- hoion harmoniai'
men kai rhuthméi khromenai monon hé te aulé‘tike‘ kai hé
kitharistiké‘ autéi de téi rhuthméi khoris harmonias hé ton
orkhéstén — in the aforesaid arts all achieve representation in
rhythm, words and melody, using them all together or separately:
e.g. oboe-playing and harping use melody and rhythm alone
while the art of dancing employs just rhythm on its own (Ar. Poetics
1447a 21). See rhusmos.

S
sé‘mainein: to signify, to show, to mean. Of a person: mé
séménantos sou hoti boulei auto tethnanai — if you have not
signified that you wish it to be dead (Pl. Phaedo 62c). Of an
argument: has ho logos sémainei — as the argument shows (Pl.
Gorg. 511b). Of a word: ho gar anax kai ho hektér skhedon ti t’auton
sémainei — for ‘ruler’ and ‘holder’ mean more or less the same (Pl.
Crat. 393a). Absolutely: [onoma dipoun] to men ek sémainontos kai

148
 sémeiousthai

asémou plén ouk en onomati sémainontos kai asémou — one sort of

[dysyllabic name] consists of a meaningful and a meaningless
component, except that within the name they are not meaningful
and meaningless (Ar. Poetics 1457a 31).

sémeiousthai: to be a sign; sémeion: a sign: to eiéthos sémeion to

daimonion — the usual divine sign (Pl. Theages 129b); hekastoi ton
onton sémeion te kai onoma poion — making a sign and name for
each thing that is (Pl. Crat. 427c); hoion ho kéros tou daktulou aneu
tou sidérou kai tou khrousou dekhetai to sémeion - as the wax
receives the sign on the ring without the iron and the gold (Ar. De
An. 424a 19). In addition to these and other non-technical uses
there are three that are technical. ( 1) In Aristotle’s logic:
enthuméma de esti sullogismos ex eikoton é se‘meic‘m sémeion
bouletai einai protasis apodeiktiké‘ é anagkaia é endoxos ean men
oun hé mia lekhthéi protasis, sémeion gignetai monon, ean de kai hé
hetera prosléphthéi, sullogismos — an enthymeme is an argument
from probabilities or from signs a sign is the sort of probative
proposition that is either necessary or commonly received if the
one premiss is stated we have merely a sign, if the other is added, a
syllogism (Ar. An. Pr. 70a 10) [thus ‘the ambitious are generous, so
Pittacus is generous’ would be an enthymeme, which would become
a syllogism if ‘Pittacus is ambitious’ were added]. Aristotle does not
always use sémeion in this way: thus in De Anima (421a 18) the
alleged fact that people with an acute sense of touch are cleverer
than those without it is given as a sémeion that it is because of a
good sense of touch that men are more intelligent than other
animals. (2) In later, notably Epicurean and Stoic, philosophy, a
sémeion is some perceptible state of affairs that is used as a sign of
the imperceptible: sémeia d’epi ton en tois meteorois sunteloumenon
pherein ton par’hémin tina phainomenon, ha theoreitai héi
huparkhei, kai ou ta en meteorois phainomena — we have signs of
the happenings in the heavens from some of the phenomena here
about us, such that we can see how they come about, as is not the
case with heavenly phenomena (Epicurus, To Pythocles 87); kapnon
idontes Lse‘meioutai pur — when we have seen smoke, that is a sign of
fire (Sextus Empiricus, Outlines ofPyrrhonism 2.102). (3) A point in
space: ou gar hé auté estin hé apo tou A lambanomené periphereia
kai he‘ apo tou B kai tou G kai ton allon hekastou sémeion — for the
circumference beginning from A is not the same as that from B and
that from G and from the other points of each (Ar. Phys. 240b 1); a

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 skepsis —— skhéma
point in time: eti ti mallon epi téide téi sémeiéi aei on proteron
ephtharé é mé on apeiron egeneto — still more, does something
everlasting before cease to exist at this moment or, not having
existed, become endless? (Ar. De Caelo 283a 11).

skepsis: enquiry, investigation; skeptesthai: to enquire, to investi-

gate; skeptikos: concerned with or inclined to investigation, with
special reference to the sceptical philosophers: apetés men mesté hé
dia ton ommaton skepsis — investigation using the eyes is full of
illusion (Pl. Phaedo 83a); peri gar toi tou megistou hé skepsis — our
investigation is concerning the most important matter (Pl. Rep.
578C); kai eu mala skepsamenos apokrinou — consider well before you
reply (Pl. Gorg. 496C). hé skeptiké agégé — the sceptical procedure —
was directed by the Sceptics against the alleged dogmatism without
grounds of e.g. Platonism and Stoicism. They advocated skepsis —
undogmatic investigation - and epokhé — suspension of judgment:
apoleipetai ta hupo ton stoikén pros tous apo tés skepseés legomena
para meros kai hupo ton skeptikon pros ekeinous legesthai — it
remains for the attacks by the Stoics on the Sceptics to be made in
their turn by the Sceptics on the Stoics (Sextus Empiricus, Adversus
Mathematicos 7.433); hoi apo tés skepseés was used as a synonym for
hoi skeptikoi. skepsis never means ‘disbelief ’.

skhéma: shape, form: estc‘) hémin touto skhéma ho monon ton

ontén tugkhanei khrémati aei hepomenon — let . . . shape be for us that
which alone among what is always follows on colour (Pl. Meno 75b);
tén autén tou skhématos morphén — shape is the same as form (Ar.
Part. An. 640b 34). In transferred senses: basileias skhéma — the
characteristic form of a kingdom (Ar. E.N. 1160b 25); ta tés
kéméidias skhémata - the forms of comedy (Ar. Poetics 1448b 36);
muthou skhéma ekhon — having the form of a myth (P1. Tim. 22c).
Logically, the figures ofthe syllogism: esti de kai anagein pantas tous
sullogismous eis tous en- téi protéi skhémati katholou sullogismous —
it is also possible to reduce all syllogisms to the universal syllogisms
in the first figure (Ar. An. Pr. 29b 1). skhéma and the verb skhé- '
matizesthai are also used of a false appearance: prothura men kai
skhéma aretés — a facade and appearance of excellence (P1. Rep.
365C); oukh hupo skhématizesthai tou erontos all’ale‘thos touto
peponthotos — not a pretending lover but one who really experiences
it (P1. Phaedrus 255a).

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 skopos — sophia
skopos: a target, goal or end aimed at, to which one looks (the root is
as in skopein, to look at). The central case of the bowman aiming at
his target is never lost from view: houtos emoige dokei ho skopos
einai pros hon bleponta dei zén — this seems to me to be the target
with an eye on which one ought to live (Pl. Gorg. 507d); hoion toxotén
hienta parallaxai tou skopou kai hamartein — like an archer to shoot
and pass the target and miss it (Pl. Theaet. 194a); esti tis skopos pros
hon apoblepon ho ton logon ekhén epiteinei kai aniésin — there is a
certain target with an eye on which he who understands [literally]
tightens and relaxes his bow-string, i.e. adjusts his activities (Ar.
E.N. 1138b 22).

séma: in Homer, always a dead body ofman or animal. In philos0phy

the term is extended to include, first, living bodies and then all
three-dimensional solids. (1) As opposed to psukhé: to soma estin
hémin séma — our body is a tomb (P1. Gorg. 493a); hai kata to séma
hédonai — bodily pleasures (Pl. Rep. 328d); panton sématén epekeina
estin hépsukhés ousia - the nature ofthe soul is superior to all bodies
(Proclus, Elements ofTheology 20). (2) Ofphysical objects in general:
ei gar esti somatos logos epipedé‘i horismenon, ouk an eié séma
apeiron — if the account of a body is that which is bounded by a
surface, there will not be an infinite body (Ar. Phys. 204b 5); mékos
kai platos kai bathos, hois horizetai soma pan — length, breadth and
depth, by which every body is defined (Ar. Phys. 209a 4). (3)
Mathematical solid: mékos de grammé, platos de epiphaneia, bathos
de soma — a line has length, a surface breadth and a body depth (Ar.
Met. 1020a 13). '

sématikos: bodily (as opposed to psukhikos — psychical) or corporeal

(as opposed toasématos — incorporeal): ta d’egkomia tc‘m ergon kai
ton sématikon kai ton psukhikon — encomia are for deeds, whether
physical or psychical (Ar. E.N. 1101b 33); die‘ire‘sthésan dé hai
psukhikai kai hai sématikai [hédonai] — the psychic pleasures must
be distinguished from the bodily (Ar. ETN. 1117b 28); diapherontai
de peri ton arkhon malista men hoi somatikas poiountes tois
asomatous — those who make the first principles corporeal differ
especially from those who make them incorporeal (Ar. De An. 404b
30).

sophia: skill, intellectual excellence; sophos: skilful, excellent in

intelligence. These terms are often translated as ‘wisdom’ and ‘wise’,

151
 sophistés .— sophistikos
but, except in translated phrases such as ‘the seven wise men’,
‘wisdom’ and ‘wise’, have, in English, a practical reference (see
phronésis), whereas sophia and sophos are usually theoretical in
reference. Generally, and sometimes in philosophy, the terms are
applied to skill in a craft: entautha men can outhen allo
sémainontes tén sophian é hoti areté tekhnés estin — in such contexts
we mean nothing by sophia other than excellence in a skill (Ar. E.N.
1141a 11); oukoun hé éniokheia sophia estin — surely driving is a
skill (P1. Laches 123d). Of philosophical insight: eié an hé sophia
nous kai epistémé — intellectual excellence is intuitive and
discursive understanding (Ar. E.N. 1141a 17); Anaxagoran kai
Thalén kai tous toioutous sophous men phronimous d’ou phasin
einai, hotan idésin agnoountas ta sumpheronta heautois — men call
Anaxagoras and Thales and the like intellectually excellent but not
wise, when they see that they do not know what is to their
advantage (Ar. E.N. 1141b 3).

sophistés: a sophist. Originally simply a man of high scientific

attainments — the seven wise men were called sophistai. Those who
taught professionally were the purveyors of higher education in
fifth-century Greece. Plato disapproved of their taking payment for
teaching and philosophically thought that they did not truly know ‘
about what they taught. Some, like Protagoras and Gorgias in the
dialogues named after them, are treated with a certain respect,
even if defeated in argument; others, like Thrasymachus in the
Republic and Polus in the Gorgias, are presumptuous fools; still
others, like those in the Euthydemus, are tricksters with words,
arguing for victory. These last came‘ to be regarded, unjustly, as
typical, as the word ‘sophistical’ suggests: ouk an aiskhunoio eis
tous Hellénas sauton sophistén parekhon? — would you not be
ashamed to present yourself to the Greeks as a sophist? (Pl. Prot.
312a); neon kai plousién emmisthos théreutés — [the sophist is] one
who preys for money on the young and the rich (Pl. Soph. 231d).
Neutrally: kalousi tautén diametron hoi sophistai — the
professors call this line a diameter (P1. Meno 85b). See sophistikos.

sophistikos: neutrally, of a sophist; pejoratively, sophistical.

Pejoratively: peri de ton sophistikén elegkhén kai ton phainomenén
men elegkhon, ontén de paralogismén all ouk elegkhon —- concerning
sophistical arguments and apparent arguments that are para-
logisms and not arguments (Ar. S.E. 164a 20); esti gar hé sophistiké

‘ 152
 séphrén — sphaira
phainomené sophia ousa d’ou, kai ho sophistés khrématistés, apo
phainomenés sophias all’ouk ousés — for the sophistic art is an
apparent and not a real intellectual excellence and the sophist is a
businessman called from his apparent but unreal intellectual
excellence (Ar. S.E. 165a 22). Neutrally: tén sophistikén tekhnén -
the art of the sophist ( P1.Prot. 310d). See sophistés.

séphrén: temperate; séphronein: to be temperate; séphronés:

temperately; séphrosuné: temperance. These are standard, but
dummy, translations; the use of the terms can be found from the
following quotations. (1) ho men mainetai, ho de sophronei — the one
is mad, the other of sound mind (P1. Phaedrus 244a); this use is
uncommon in philosophy. (2) hé séphrosune‘ to peri tés
epithumias mé eptoésthai all’oligorés ekhein kai kosmiés —
temperance is to be unconcerned about appetite, but to treat it with
sober contempt (Pl. Phaedo 68c); mesOtés esti peri hédonas hé
séphrosuné peri de tas sématikas eié an hé séphrosune‘, ou pasas
de oude tautas peri tas toiautas d’hédonas hé séphrosuné kai he
akolasia hén kai ta loipa zéia koinonei hautai d’eisin haphé kai
geusis — temperance is a mean concerning pleasures but
temperance is concerned with the bodily pleasures, and not all of
these but temperance and intemperance are about those
pleasures that are shared with other animals and these are [the
pleasures of] touch and taste (Ar. E.N. 1179b 25, 1118a 1, 1118a
23). So sophrosuné is a mean state with regard to such pleasures as
those of eating, drinking and sex.

sphaira: non-technically, a ball: hésper sphairan ekdexamenos ton

logon: taking over the argument like a ball [thrown from one person
to another] (Pl. Euthyd. 277b); eukuklou sphairés enaligkion ogkoi
— [reality is] like the bulk of a well-rounded ball (Parmenides in
Simplicius, Physics 146.16). Technically, a sphere. (1) Mathemati-
cally: proteron an eié ton skhématon ho kuklos hosautés de kai
sphaira ton stereén — first among [plane] figures is the circle:
similarly the sphere among solids (Ar. De Caelo 286b 24). (2)
Astronomically: tou pantos ouranou sphairoeidous ontos — the
whole heaven being spherical (Pl. Tim. 62d); hé aplanés sphaira
tén planémenén sphairon tés tou Kronou sphairas -— the sphere Of
the fixed stars the planetary spheres the sphere of Saturn
(Simplicius, Physics 588.7, 589.30, 589.18). It appears from De
Caelo 287a 4 ff. that Aristotle conceived of the outermost sphere of

153
 stasis — stereos

the fixed stars as occupying the whole volume of space from its
outer surface to the sphere of Saturn, which occupied the next ’
volume of space, and so on through the rest of the spheres until
finally the sublunary sphere was the volume from the moon to the
earth’s surface: ta de katé haptetai tés epané sphairas — for what is
below touches the sphere above (De Caelo 287a 8). But Simplicius, ,
and apparently others, believed that each sphere was solid to the
centre so as to interpenetrate, as is clear from Simplicius, Physics
643.18 ff. There were eight generally recognised spheres, those of
the fixed stars, the sun, the moon, and the five known planets,
Kronos (Saturn), Zeus (Jupiter), Arés (Mars), Aphrodité (Venus),
Hermes (Mercury).

stasis: etymologically related to histanai, to stand, this has a

variety of meanings. (1) Status, position: en téi kallioni stasei einai
— to be in the better position (Pl. Phaedrus 253d). (2) As contrary of
kinésis, unchangingness: hé de stasis apophasis tou ienai bouletai
einai — being stationary is the negation of going (Pl. Crat. 426d);
toutén men gar hekaston en heautéi arkhén ekhei kine‘seés kai
staseos — each of these [natural objects] has the principle of
changing or not changing in itself (Ar. Phys. 192b 14); polloi oun kai
ou mia he kinésis hon estin éremia metaxu, haste ei tis kinésis stasei
dialambanetai ou mia oude sunekhés - there are many changes and
not one when rest intervenes, so that if some change is interrupted
by a pause it is not single nor continuous (Ar. Phys. 228b 4). This
last quotation raises the question whether stasis and éremia are
synonyms. They appear to be so in Aristotle, but Simplicius says
all’ou pasa stasis éremia estin, all’hé meta kinésin — but not all
changelessness is rest, but only that after change (Physics 264.26).
Plotinus also applies the term stasis to changelessness in the
intelligible world in Enneads 6.3.27. (3) Politically, civil strife: epi
téi tou oikeiou ekhthra'i stasis keklétai — the name ‘stasis’ is given
to enmity with one’s own people (P1. Rep. 47Ob); he“ de penia stasin
empoiei kai kakourgian — poverty breeds civil strife and crime (Ar.
Pol. 1265b 12).

stereos: hard, solid. (1) Non-technically: hairésesthai kusi polemein

stereois kai iskhnois — to be about to choose to fight against hard
and lean dogs (Pl. Rep. 422d); touto édé stereéteron kai ouketi
rha'idion ekhein hoti tis eipéi - that is already harder and it is
no longer easy to know what one should say (P1. Rep. 348e). (2)

154
 sterésis — stoikheion

Technically (a) mathematically: trigona de isopleura sunistamena

tettara kata treis epipedous mian sterean ganian poiei — four isosceles
triangles adjoining each other in three planes make one solid angle;
(b) physically: kai gar epipeda kai sterea ekhei ta phusika sémata kai
méké kai stigmas peri hon skopei ho mathématikos — for natural
bodies contain planes and solids and the lengths and points that the
mathematician studies (Ar. Phys. 193b 23). '

steré‘sis: privation, lack, etymologically connected with steresthai:

to lack, be deprived of: eiper sterometha epistémés — if we are
deprived of understanding (P1. Theaet. 196e). Apart from obvious
non-technical uses, as in sterésis de estin aisthéseés ho thanatos —
death is the privation of perception (Epicurus, To Menoeceus 124),
sterésis, together With hule, matter, and eidos, form, is one of the
three primitive concepts used by Aristotle for explaining kinésis,
change. Thus, to use his example, when a non-musical man becomes
musical, the man who is, in this context, the hupokeimenon (sub-
strate) gains the eidos of musicality instead ofsterésis, being the sort
of thing that has the dunamis (potentiality) to become musical.
phamen gignesthai men méthen haplos ek mé ontos, p63 mentoi
gignesthai ek mé ontos hoion kata sumbebékos, ek gar tés stere‘seés —
we say that nothing comes to exist simply out ofthe non-existent, but
comes into being in a qualified way, for it does so from privation (Ar.
Phys. 191b 13); hémeis gar tén hulén kai sterésin heteron phamen
einai — for we say that matter and privation are different (Ar. Phys.
192a 3).

stoa: a porch. From their practice of meeting in the stoa poikilé, the
decorated porch, at Athens, certain philosophers centred on Zeno
became known as the Sté'ikoi or simply the Stoa or, very commonly,
hoi apo tés stoas — those from the porch. In English, the Stoics used to
be known as the Porch at one time. hoi apo tés ‘stoas ekhontai tésde tés
diaireseos — those from the porch adopt this division [of the parts of
philosophy] (Sextus Empiricus, Adversus Mathematicos 7.16); eien
d’an kai hoi Sté'z'koi tautés tés doxés — this [the conflagration] would
be the opinion of the Stoics (Simplicius, Physics 480.28). I

stoikheion: a primitive element in any kind of system. (1) A letter of

the alphabet: stoikheion phone‘s phone“ asunthetos — a letter is an
uncompounded sound in a sound [a syllable] (pseudo-Pl. Def. 414e);
eikositessaron toinun stoikheion onton tés eggrammatou phénés —

155
 suggignéskein — sugkrinein
there being twenty-four letters of written sound (Sextus Empiricus,
Adversus Mathematicos 1.100). (2) In nature: legomen arkhas auta
tithemenoi stoikheia tou pantos — we call them principles, positing
them as elements of the universe (Pl. Tim. 48b); ta hos en hulés eidei
legomena stoikheia tettara protos eipen — [Empedocles] first stated
. the four elements of the material sort (Ar. Met. 985a 32). (3) In
demonstration: hai gar protai apodeixeis kai en pleiosin apodeixesin
enuparkhousai, hautai stoikheia ton apodeixeén legontai — for the
primitive proofs that occur in many proofs are called the elements of
proofs (Ar. Met. 1014a 26). The Stoikheia — ‘Elements’ — ofEuclid and
other geometers are so called in this last use.

suggignéskein: to pardon. See suggnémé.

suggnémé: frequently, pardon or forgiveness, as suggignéskein is to

pardon or forgive and suggnémonikos is forgiving: ton akousién
suggnomén ekhein — to pardon the unintended (Pl. Phaedrus 233C);
epi men tois hekousiois epainén kai psogc‘m gignomenon, epi de tois
akousiois suggnome‘ — praise and blame being bestowed on the
intended, but pardon for the contrary to intention (Ar. E.N. 1109b
32); suggignoske moi — forgive me (Pl. Phaedrus 230d). But some-
times it is rather understanding of what might seem at first sight to
require censure or forgiveness, but in the circumstances is proper: hé
de suggnome‘ gnémé esti kritiké tou epieikous orthé — understanding
is the correct critical judgmentof the equitable man (Ar. EN. 1 143a
23); epieikes kai suggnomon — equitable and understanding (Pl.
Laws 757d); ho epeidan idéis te kai akouséis tina suggnéme‘n hexeis
hoti eikotés ara oknoun te kai ededoiké houto paradoxon logon legein
— when you see and hear it you will gain a certain understanding that
I reasonably hesitated and feared to say something so paradoxical
(P1. Rep. 472a).

sugkrinein: to combine; sugkrisis: combination. Mainly used in

natural philosophy in accounts of the nature of change: hoi men
sugkrinesthai kai diakrinesthai ta atoma somata kai ta tettara
stoikheia legontes, Anaxagoras de ekkrinesthai tas homoiomereias
apo tou migmatos legén — some saying that the atoms [Democritus]
and the four elements [Empedocles] were combined and separated,
but Anaxagoras that~ the homeomeries were extruded from the
mixture (Simplicius, Physics 1 120.20); sugkrinetai gar kai diakrine-
tai kai ta anaisthéta somata — for imperceptible bodies also are

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 sullogismos — sumbebékos
combined and separated (Simplicius, Physics 1095.4); ta men
sugkrinonta, ta de diakrinonta —— combining some things and
separating others (Pl. Tim. 67d); puknosis de kai manosis sugkrisis
kai diakrisis - condensation and rarefaction are combination and
separation (Ar. Phys. 260b 11). But sugkrisis is also comparison: tén
amphoin poioumenos sugkrisin — making a comparison of the two
(Simplicius, Physics 35.14).

sullogismos: argument; sullogistikos: argumentative; sullo-

gizesthai: to argue. Generally applicable to any ratiocination; drosi
tauta agnoountes autén hekasta, ou sullogizontai — they do these
things being ignorant of these matters, and do not take thought (Pl.
Laws 670C); sullogisai dé koinéi met’emou ti hé‘min sumbainei ek
ton homologoumenén — think out with me where we stand on the
basis of what we have agreed on (P1. Gorg. 498C). In a narrower use,
the syllogism as in Aristotle’s logical works: estai sullogistiké men
protasis haplés kataphasis é apophasis tinos kata tinos,
sullogismos de esti logos en héi tithenton tinc‘m heteron ti ton
keimenén ex anagkés sumbainei — a simple syllogistic premiss is an
affirmatiOn or negation of something of something else, and a
syllogism is an utterance in which, certain things being posited,
something other than the posited necessarily results (Ar. An. Pr.
24a 28); pas sullogismos estin dia trién horon monon, toutou
d’ontos délon hos kai ek duo protaseén kai ou pleionon — every
syllogism contains only three terms, and, this being so, it is clear
that it contains two premisses and not more (Ar. An. Pr. 42a 31).
Aristotle also recognised practical syllogisms of which the
conclusion was a decision to act or the act itself and the premisses
were of the general form ‘An A is needed and this is an A’; hoi gar
sullogismoi ton prakton arkhén ekhontes eisin epeidé toionde to telos
kai to ariston — practical syllogisms have the major premiss: ‘a
thing of this kind is the goal and the best’ (Ar. E.N. 1144a 81).

sumbainein: to come about, to follow, to result. See sumbebékos.

sumbebékos is the perfect participle of sumbainein. Non-

technically, in Plato: ta emoi sumbebékota — the things that
happened to me (Pl. Apol. 32a). In Aristotle it is a technical term,
traditionally and unsatisfactorily transliterated as ‘accident” from
the Latin ‘accidens’, which is something that happens and not an
accident. sumbebé‘kota are features of a thing that do not belong to

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 sumperasma — sunagein
it necessarily or from the thing’s own nature (kath’hauto), but
which simply happen to be present as a matter of fact. sumbebékota
are present kata sumbebékos and not kath’hauto: kath’hauta d’hosa
huparkhei te en téi ti estin, hoion trigonoi grammé kai hosois ton
huparkhontc‘m autois auta en toi logoi enuparkhousi toi ti esti
délounti, hoion to euthu huparkhei gramméi kai to peripheres
hosa de médeterés huparkhei sumbebékota hoion to mousikon é
leukon t6i zéiéi — ‘as such’ are what belong to the definition, as a line
is part of the definition of a triangle and to such things as
themselves figure in the definition 0f the things that belong to
them, as straight and circular belong to a line but such things as
belong in neither of these ways are happenings, such as the
presence of musicality or whiteness in an animal (Ar. An. Po. 73a
34); to sumbebékos gar endekhetai mé huparkhein — for what
happens may possibly not occur (Ar. An. Po. 75a 19). But sometimes
Aristotle uses sumbebékos more generally of predicates, including
the kath’hauto: sumbebékos kath’hauto - inhering as such (Ar.
Phys. 203b 33).

sumperasma: the conclusion of an argument, a technical term of

logic not found in Plato. ouk estai sumperasma out’anagkaion
outh’huparkhon einai, mé léphtheisés anagkaias é huparkhousés
protaseés — there will not be either an apodeictic [S is necessarily P]
or an assertoric [S is P] conclusion unless an apodeictic or
assertoric premiss is provided (Ar. An. Pr. 32a 13); entautha d’ek
ton duo protaseén to sumperasma gignetai hé praxis — there [in the
sullogismos ton prakton] the conclusion from the two premisses
becomes an action (Ar. De Motu Animalium 701a 12).

sunagein: to collect; sunago‘gé‘: the action of collecting. Non-

technically: sunaxomen tas te numphas kai tous numphious — we
shall bring together the brides and the bridegrooms (Pl. Rep. 459e).
Also used as a technical term by Plato, particularly in the Sophist
and the Phaedrus, where the contrary of sunagoge‘ is diairesis,
division: touton dé egoge autos te erastés, a Phaidre, ton diaireseon
kai sunagégon — I am myself, Phaedrus, a lover of these divisions
and collections (Pl. Phaedrus 26Gb). Collection appears to be
bringing together under a single genus a variety of things which are
then to be divided formally into species and sub-species: eis mian te
idean sunoronta agein ta pollakhéi diesparmena — to survey under
one form things that are scattered in many areas (P1. Phaedrus

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 sunaktikos — sunaptein
265d). In Aristotle and in later philosophy sunagein is often to draw
a conclusion: endekhetai de sullogizesthai kai sunagein ta men ek
sullelogismené‘n proteron, ta d’ex asullogistén men, deomenén de
sullogismou — it is possible to argue and draw a conclusion either
from things previously argued or from things not argued for but
needing argument (Ar. Rhet. 1357a 7); dunaton esti ek tou te ‘ei
hémera esti phés estin’ kai ‘alla mén hémera estin’ sunagesthai tén
epiphoran to ‘phés estin’ — it is possible from ‘if it is day it is light’
and ‘but it is day’ to conclude the consequent ‘it is light’ (Sextus
Empiricus, Adversus Mathematicos 8.228). From this use of
sunagein comes the adjective sunaktikos, conclusive: tan de logén
hoi men sunaktikoi, hoi de ou — some arguments are conclusive,
others not (Sextus Empiricus, Adversus Mathematicos 8.303).

sunaktikos. See sunagein.

sunaptein (perfect passive participle sunémmenos): to join

together, to unite, and, intransitively, to be connected with:
sunaptén arthron arthréi — joining limb to limb (Pl. Tim. 75d);
hosper ek mias koruphés sune‘mmené — like two joined together
from one head (Pl. Phaedo 60b); téi de katholou kai t6i genei kai hai
ideai sunaptousin — the ideas also unite with the universal and the
genus (Ar. Met. 1042a 15). The most important use is of the perfect
passive sunémmenon to mean ‘hypothetical proposition’ in later
writers. The usual name for the antecedent ‘Ifp’ is to hégoumenon,
and for the consequent ‘then q’ to hepomenon or to légon. In a
hypothetical argument of the form ‘Ifp then q, but p, therefore q’ [or
‘but not q, therefore not p’] the second premiss is called hé
proslépsis: ei adunaton topon apeiron einai, en topoi de pan séma,
adunaton apeiron einai séma. alla mén to hégoumenon, to ara
hepomenon. kai to men sunémmenon kataskeuazein hos prodélon
paréke, tén de proslépsin tén legousan ‘alla adunaton‘ topon apeiron’
tithési — if it is impossible for place to be boundless and every body
is in a place, it is impossible for there to be an unbounded body. But
the antecedent is true, so the consequent is true. But [Aristotle]
omitted setting out the hypothetical, as being utterly obvious, but
he includes the further premiss that says ‘but it is impossible for
place to be boundless’ (Simplicius, Physics 489.31); en gar tois
sunémmenois tote hugiés hé kata antistrophén akolouthia hotan to
antikeimenon tou hepomenon labontes epenegkémen to tou
hégoumenou antikeimenon — for in hypotheticals the sequence by

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 sunekheia — sunesis

conversion is sound when we take the opposite of the consequent

and conclude to the opposite of the antecedent [i.e. If ‘If p then q’,
then ‘If not-q then not-p’ is sound] (Simplicius, Physics 104.30); ton
de en téi sune‘mmenéi axiomatén to meta ton ‘ei’ é ton ‘eiper’
sundesmon tetagmenon hégoumenon te kai proton kaleitai to de
loipon légon te kai deuteron — of the propositions in a hypothetical
we call the one coming after the conjunction ‘if ’ or ‘if in fact’ the
antecedent and the first, and the other one is called the consequent
and the second (Sextus Empiricus, Adversus Mathematicos 8.110).
Sometimes the term sunémmenon seems to be applied to the
' consequent only: kai to men sunémmenon aléthes did to axioma —
and the consequent is true because of the proposition [=
antecedent] being true (Simplicius, Physics 171.21).

sunekheia: continuity; sunekhés: continuously; sunekhé‘s: conti-

nuous; from the verb sunekhein, to hold together. Non-technically:
polemos aei pasi dia biou sunekhés esti — there is always a
continuous war for all throughout life (Pl. Laws 625e); ex onomatén
men monon sunekhés legomenén ouk esti pate logos — there is never
a sentence from a continuous string of nouns on their own (Pl. Soph.
262a). Technically, as opposed to diéiré‘menon, discrete: legé de
sunekhes hotan t’auto genétai kai hen to hekaterou peras hois
haptontai kai sunekhontai — I call that continuous when the
boundary of each at which they touch and are held together
becomes one (Ar. Met. 1069a 5); dikhés gar legetai kai to mékos kai
ho khronos apeiron, kai holds pan to sunekhes, étoi kata diairesin é
tois eskhatois — both length and time, and everything whatsoever
that is continuous, are called infinites in two senses, either as
divisible, or at their extremities (Ar. Phys. 233a 24); koinénia kai
sunekheia kai tautotés — community, continuity and identity
(Proclus, Elements ofTheology 21).

sunesis: intelligence in practical matters; sunetos, intelligent, is

not found in Plato. phoboumenoi tous pepaideumenous mé
sunesei kreittous genéntai — fearing the educated, lest they
become superior by their intelligence (Pl. Phaedrus 232C); sophian
men kai sunesin kai phronésin dianoétikas — intellect, intelligence
and wisdom are mental [excellences] (Ar. E.N. 1103a 5); oute gar
peri ton aei ontén kai akinétc‘m hé sunesis estin oute peri ton
gignomenon hotououn, alla peri hon aporéseien an tis kai
bouleusaito - for intelligence is not concerned with the everlasting

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 sunolos — sunonumos

and unchanging or about anything whatsoever that changes, but

concerned with things about which one may be puzzled and plan (Ar.
EN. 1143a 4); esti de kai hé sunesis kai hé eusunesia kath’has
legomen sunetous kai eusunetous — there is also intelligence and good
intelligence, through which we call people intelligent and of good
intelligence (Ar. E.N. 1142b 34).

sunolos: whole. Non-technically: khoreia ge mén orkhésis te kai oidé

to xunolon estin — choir-training is as a whole dancing and song (Pl.
Laws 654b); tés peri ta phuta xunolés tekhnés — the whole skill
regarding plants (Pl. Pol. 299d). The neuter substantive to sunolon
is a technical term in Aristotle for the individual thing composed of
hulé and eidos, matter and form: zététeon poteron esti ti para to
sunolon. legé de to sunolon hotan katégoréthéi ti tés hulés - we must
examine whether there is anything beyond the composite Whole. I
call something a composite whole when something is predicated of
matter (Ar. Met. 995b 32); lego de tén men hulén hoion ton khalkon,
tén de morphén to skhéma tés ideas to de ek toutOn, ton andrianta, to
sunolon — I call matter such as the bronze, and form the shape
informing it, but the thing composed of these, the statue, I call the
composite whole (Ar. Met. 1029a 3).

sunénumos. (1) Applied to things, univocal. Things are univocal if

they have the same name and also the same definition, as distin-
guished from homénuma, equivocal things having the same name
but different definitions, parénuma, things related as are the
referents of nouns, verbs, etc. with the same root, such as ‘race’ and
‘racer’, things named as serving or derived from a central case, called
aph’henos or pros hen, and things named kat’analogian, such as
the foot of a man and of a mountain: sunonuma de legetai hon to te
onoma koinon kai ho kata t’ounoma logos tés ousias ho autos, hoion
zoion ho te anthropos kai ho bous - things are called univocal whose
name is common and the account ofthe essence corresponding to the
name is the same, as man and an ox are both animals (Ar. Cat. 1a 5).
Adverbially: sunénumés legetai — are spoken of univocally (Ar. Cat.
3b 9). (2) Applied to words, synonymous as in English: tan d’ono-
maton khrésimoi toi poiétéi sunonumiai. [ego de kuria te kai
sunonuma hoion to poreuesthai kai to badizein - synonymities of
words are useful to the poet. I call genuine synonyms cases such as
‘travel’ and ‘journey’ (Ar. Rhet. 1404b 39); holon gar kai pan

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 taxis — tekhné

sunénumon — ‘whole’ and ‘all’ are synonyms (Sextus Empiricus,

Adversus Mathematicos 1.314).

T
taxis covers all kinds of arrangement in the abstract, and various
concrete arrangements. Frequently, in non-technical use, a
battle-line: ton liponta taxin é hopla apobalonta — him who left the
line of battle or threw away his arms (Pl. Rep. 468a). Technically,
one of the three kinds of arrangement of atoms in Democritus,
called by him diathigé‘: hé de diathigé taxis diapherei gar to de
AN tou NA — diathigé is arrangement for AN differs from NA (Ar.
Met. 985b 17). Also political order: kata tén taxin tou nomou —
according to the legal constitution (P1. Laws 925b). Of good order
generally: pleiston de logou aphistatai oukh hoper nomou te kai
taxeés — is not that which is further from law and good order
furthest from reason? (Pl. Rep. 587a). Particularly of . the
orderliness of nature: ouden ge atakton ton phusei kai kata phusin.
hé gar phusis aitia pasin taxeés — nothing natural or in accordance
with nature is disordered. For nature is the cause of orderliness for
all things (Ar. Phys. 252a 4); pan hoson én horaton paralabén oukh
hésukhian agon alla kinoumenon plémmelos kai ataktos eis taxin
auto égagen ek tés ataxias — taking over everything visible that was
not at rest but changing discordantly and without order, [God]
reduced it to order from disorder (Pl. Tim- 30a); taxeés edeéthé
topikés — stood in need of ordering in place (Simplicius, Physics
773.22).

tekhné: art, skill, craft, as distinguished from both nature and mere
tribé‘, practice; tekhnikos is a possessor of such skill and tekhnéma
a product of such skill: epei oudemia oute tekhné estin hétis ou
meta logou poiétiké hexis estin, oude toiauté hé ou tekhné, tauton an
eié tekhné kai hexis meta logou aléthous poiétiké - since there is no
skill that is not a rational creative disposition, nor any such that is
not a skill, skill must be a creative disposition with a true rationale
(Ar. EN. 1140a 6); ton peri ta démiourgika tekhnémata
diaponounton — those working at commercial crafts (Pl. Laws
846d). Particularly rhetoric: tekhnés rhétorikés — the art of rhetoric
(P1. Phaedrus 270b); hoi peri tous logous tekhnikoi prospoioumenoi
einai — those who claim to be skilled in the use of speech (Pl.
Phaedrus 273a); ouk esti tekhné all’atekhnos tribé — [rhetoric] is not

162
 tekmérion — teleios

a skill but an unskilled knack (P1. Phaedrus 273a). Works on the art
of rhetoric, of which Aristotle’s was not the first, were called
tekhnai: hoi tas tekhnas ton logén suntithentes — the authors of
‘Arts of Speaking’ (Ar. Rhet. 1354a 12).

tekmérion: a sign; and tekmairesthai: to infer through a sign:

oistha hothen tekmairomai — do you know what sign I rely on? (P1.
Rep. 433b); apaideusias mega tekmérion — a clear sign of lack of
education (Pl. Rep. 405b). The term was given a narrower sense by
Aristotle, so that only those sémeia, indications, that were
universally reliable could be called tekméria, as having milk is a
sign that a woman has given birth: ton de sémeion to men houtos '
ekhei hos ton kath’hekaston ti pros to katholou to men anagkaion
tekmérion — of indications one kind is such as a particular in
relation to the universal that which is necessary is a sign (Ar.
Rhet. 1357b 1); to gar tekmérion to eidenai poioun phasin einai —
they call that a sign that is productive of knowledge (Ar. An. Po. 70b
. 2); délon hoti tekme‘riédés estin hé gnésis hé peri ton arkhon, all’ouk
apodeiktiké — it is clear that the knowledge of first principles is
based on signs and not on demonstration (Simplicius, Physics
18.28).

teleios (= teleos): complete; teleié‘sis: completion; teleiotés:

completeness; teleioun: to complete; telesiourgos: completing;
telikos: final [of completion]; telos: end. A telos may be merely an
end-point: sunaptei téi arkhéi to telos — it links its end to its
beginning (Proclus, Elements of Theology 33); but it may be an
end-point that is the aim of action, and thus a goal or a success: hé
men boulésis tou telous esti mallon - wish is rather for a success
(Ar. E.N. 1111b 26). Similarly the teleios may be merely the
complete or the perfect: teleionlegetai hen men how mé estin exo to
labein kai to kat’aretén kai to en mé ekhon huperbolén pros to
genos — ‘teleion’ is ( 1) that of which not even one part is missing
and (2) that which in excellence and merit has nothing exceeding it
of its kind (Ar. Met. 1021b 12). (1) tén telean adikian — complete
injustice (Pl. Rep. 384b); eti d’en bioi teleioi — also in a complete life
(Ar. E.N. 1098a 18). (2) anendees de on teleion esti, teleion de on
ekhei telos kai ouk estin ateleuton, telos de ekhon peras ekhei kai
horon -— lacking nothing it is complete, and being complete it has a
final point, and having a final point it has a limit and bounds [the
unlimited being a bad condition for neoplatonists] (Simplicius,

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 telos — theologiké
Physics 30.11); hédisté hé teleiotaté — the most perfect [perception] is
the most pleasant (Ar. E.N. 1174b 21). So teleioun is not usually
merely to bring to an end but rather to perfect: teleioi de tén
energeian hé hédoné — pleasure perfects the activity (Ar. E.N. 1174b
23); teleiotheisi tois toioutois paideidi kai he‘likidi — when such men
have been perfected by education and growing up (Pl. Rep. 487a).
Similarly teleiosis is making complete in the sense of perfect: ton eis
tén teleiosin agomenén tés phuseés — of things leading to the
perfection of its nature (Ar. E.N. 1153a 12). Similarly with telikos,
telesiourgos and teleioté‘s: telikos an eié topos hos sunektikos kai
telesiourgos kai peripoiétikos tés hekastou teleioté‘tos — place must
have a goal as holding together and completing and caring for the
perfection ofeach thing (Simplicius, Physics 600.32). That ofthe four
causes which Aristotle called to hou heneka — that for the sake of
which, the final cause — is often called the telikon aition in later
writings: saphés to telikon aition tou Platénos prosthentos - Plato
having clearly added the finalcause (Simplicius, Physics 26.15).

telos: end, success. See teleios.

theologein, theologos. Not in Plato. Alexander accurately describes

Aristotle’s use of these terms: theologous de legei tous peri theon
epaggellomeno'us legein, h6n én Home‘ros kai Orpheus kai Hésiodos —
[Aristotle] calls theologians those who claim to tell about the gods,
such as Homer, Orpheus and Hesiod (Alexander, Meteorologica
66.13). They gave a mythological account ofthe creation of the world
and the like, as the forerunners of the phusikoi, the natural
scientists: hoi men can peri Hésiodon, kai pantes hosoi theologoi —
the associates of Hesiod and all the theologians (Ar. Met. 1000a 9);
protons th'eologésantas Okeanon te gar kai Téthun epoiésan tés
geneseés pateras — the first theologians they made Ocean and
Tethys the fathers of coming-to-be (Ar. Met. 983b 29). ‘

theologia occurs once in Plato, at Rep. 379a, where it is said by LSJ

to mean ‘the science of things divine’ and by Ross ‘rational theology’
(ad Met. 1026a19). But the word occurs in a discussion of censorship
of poets, and, in particular, of what they may say about the gods in
their plays; it seems to mean merely ‘talk about gods’. The LSJ sense
becomes common later.

theologiké. Aristotle twice calls theologiké what we call metaphysics

164
 theérein — theos
and what he called elsewhere prété philosophia, first philosophy
(Met. 1026a 14-22 and 1064b 3). It is concerned with the aidion kai
akinéton kai khériston — the everlasting and unchanging and
separate [from the world of change] (Ar. Met. 1026a 11), since for
Aristotle everything above the sublunary sphere had this character ‘
and was, as such, divine: tria gené ton theére‘tikén episte‘mc‘m esti,
phusiké, mathématiké, theologiké — there are three kinds of
theoretical sciences, natural, mathematical and metaphysical (Ar.
Met. 1064b 3).

theorem: to contemplate, visually or mentally; theérétikos:

contemplative, theoretical; theéria: (1) a spectacle or ceremony,
usually with religious associations; (2) contemplation; theo‘ros: a
spectator or contemplator. (1) ton eis tous Hellénas koinéi thusién
kai theérién — the common sacrifices and ceremonies for the Greeks
(Pl. Laws 947a). (2) theérous polemou tous paidas poiein — to make
the children spectators of war (Pl. Rep. 467c); auton noései all’ouk
ommasi theorein — to contemplate it with the mind and not the eyes
(Pl. Rep. 529b); theéria pantos men khronou, pasés de ousias —
contemplation 'of all time and all being (Pl. Rep. 486a); eié an hé
eudaimonia theoria tis — well-being must be a kind of
contemplation (Ar. E.N. 1178b 2); he tou theou energeia . .
theérétike‘ an eié — the activity of God must be contemplative (Ar.
E.N. 1178b 22); hotan te theore‘i anagké hama phantasma ti
theérein — when a man contemplates he must at the same time
contemplate an image (Ar. De An. 432a 8); ton theére‘tikén
epistémén — of the theoretical sciences (Ar. Met. 1064b 3).

theos: god. Those ancient philosophers who took seriously the

concept of god in their philosophy and made use of the concept of a
first cause tended not to call such a first cause by the name theos,
but quite frequently recognised a number of theoi not thought of in
this way, but as something more like the angels and saints of
Christianity. Thus Plato wrote of auto to agathon, the good itself,
as epekeina tés ousias, beyond being, and the cause of being; this
autoagathon, was identified by the neoplatonists with what they
called to hen, from which the gods proceeded (see proienai) like
everything else. Aristotle identified his supreme being with
self-contemplative nous (self-contemplative since contemplation of
the best is superior to contemplation of anything else).
Anthropomorphic gods were early rejected: all’ei kheiras ekhon boes

165
 theourgia — thesis
hippoi t’ée leontes/ é grapsai kheiressi kai erga telein haper andres/
hippoi men th’hippoisi boes de te bousin homoias/ kai ke theén ideas
egraphon kai sémat’epoioun/ toiauth’hoion per k’autoi demas eikhon '
hekastoi — but if oxen and horses or lions had hands, or could draw
with their hands and do the works that men can do, horses would
draw the forms of the gods like horses and oxen like oxen, and they
would make their bodies like their own (Xenophanes, fr. 15).

theourgia: the art of the theourgos, he who is able to call up and

bring about the epiphany of gods. The art is no doubt old, but the
words are not used by Plato and Aristotle. Many neoplatonists
practised it: p63 hai autophaneiai gignontai ton theén, phainome-
non tote men , atupotén phétén, tote de tetupomenon- mé gar
prosemenoi tauta tén hieratikén holén anatrepomen kai ta erga ton
theourgon — how do the epiphanies of the gods come about, when
they, appear sometimes as formless lights and sometimes as having
a form? For if we do not admit theSe we overthrow all the priestly
function and the works of the theurgists (Proclus, 0n the Republic
1.37.9). See Dodds, The Greeks and the Irrational, Appendix II,
‘Theurgy’. -

thermos: hot; thermainein: to heat; thermantikos: heating;

thermotés: heat. psukhonta kai thermainonta — things that heat
and cool (Pl. Tim. 46d); to tés psukhés meta tou somatos
thermantikon oinos — wine, the thing that warms the soul together
with the body (Pl. Tim. 60d); ou gar thermotétos ergon psukhein —
it is not the function of heat to make cold (P1. Rep. 335d). In
Aristotelian physics to thermon is one of the four primary states,
together with to psukhron, to xeron and to hugron, that in pairs
(suzeuxeis) characterise the four primary elements pur, aér, hudér
and gé‘: to men gar pur thermon kai xeron, ho d’aér thermon kai
hugron — for fire is hot and dry and air hot and moist (Ar. De Gen. et
Cor. 33Gb 2). '

thesis has three main uses in philosophy, as well as others in

metrics etc. (1) Physical position and positioning: eis plinthon kai
lithon thesin — for the positioning of bricks and stones (Pl. Rep.
33b); diapherei gar to de Z tou N thesei [in this quotation the Z
and N as in codices; but see Ross’s text and note ad loc.] — for Z and
N differ in position (Ar. Met. 985b 18); to men gar aphorismon kai
metron einai theseos ton topon halos oimai legetai — I think it is well -

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 thrasutés — thumos
said that place is the demarcation and measure of position
(Simplicius, Physics 644.14). (2) The laying down of laws and the
like: ton epi nomén thesin iontén —- those who approach law-giving
(P1. Laws 690d). (3a) Any thesis maintained, whether sound or not:
kai peri tou ekhthrou de hé auté‘ thesis — and [I maintain] the same
thesis about an enemy (P1. Rep. 335a). (3b) (Always in Aristotle) a
paradoxical thesis: thesis de estin hupolépsis paradoxos — a thesis is
a paradoxical notion (Ar. Top. 104b 19); ton de houté zénta oudeis
an eudaimoniseien ei mé thesin diaphulattén — nobody would call
happy one living such a life unless in defence of a paradox (Ar. E.N.
1096a 1); amesou d’arkhés sullogistikés thesin men legé hén mé esti
deixai méd’anagké ekhein ton mathésomenon ti, hén d’anagké
ekhein ton hotioun mathésomenon axiéma — of immediate
syllogistic starting-points I call that a thesis which cannot be
proved and which one does not need to know to learn anything, and
what one needs to know I call an axiom (Ar. An. Po. 72a 14).

thrasutés: rashness; thrasus: rash: tauta ha su kaleis andreia

ego thrasea kalc‘) — those things you call brave I call rash (Pl. Laches
197b); ho de t6i tharrein huperballén peri ta phobera thrasus — he
who exceeds in confidence concerning things fearful is rash (Ar.
E.N. 1115b 28); thrasutetos te kai deilias — of rashness and
cowardice (Pl. Tim. 87a).

thumoeidés. See thumos.

thumos: anger; thumousthai: to be angry. In Homer thumos

appears to be, among other things, any strong emotion, including
anger, but also strong desire. Similarly in Heraclitus (fr. 85) thuméi
makhesthai khalepon seems to mean ‘it is hard to fight against
one’s heart’s desire’. But in Plato, Aristotle and later authors, at
least, thumos seems to mean ‘anger’: hoi en thumoi prakhthentes
phonoi — murders committed in anger (Pl. Laws 867d); aiskhién hé
peri epithumias akrasia tés peri ton thumon — weakness with
regard to appetites is more shameful than that with regard to anger
(Ar. E.N. 1149b 24). Proclus gives the same definition of thumos —
touto gar ergon thumou t0 antilupe‘seés oregesthai — it is the
function of anger to seek for retaliatory suffering (0n the Republic
1.208.17) — as Aristotle gives of orgé at De An. 403a 30. But there
are problems: if thumos is mere anger, like orgé, (1) why is
weakness about anger less shameful than weakness about

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 ti esti — timan

appetite? (2) why is thumos singled out as a separate type of orexis

alongside boulésis and epithumia as in orexis men gar epithumia
kai thumos kai boulésis (Ar. De An. 414b 2)? (3) why is orgé not said
to be a synonym of thumos? and (4) why is the thumoeides regarded
in the Republic as a desirable element in the soul and the state, as
in to thumoeides epikouron téi logistikéi phusei —- the irascible (‘?)
element is the natural ally of the rational element (Pl. Rep. 441a)?
It would appear that the notions of thumos and to thumoeides carry
with them some notion of manliness, spiritedness and sense of
honour, not present in orgé, which is why to thumoeides is often
translated ‘the spirited element’. Perhaps this is counted as a
different form of orexis because both boulésis and epithumia seek
the agent’s satisfaction, whereas thumos seeks the harm of the
enemy, not the good of the agent; but, if so, this is surely not the
only non-self-regarding form of motivation.

ti esti: in a question, a request for a definition. Socrates in the

Gorgias has great difficulty in getting an answer to the question ti
esti touto ton onton, peri ho houtoi hoi logoi eisin hois hé rhetoriké
khrétai — what of all things is it that these discourses are about that
rhetoric uses (Pl. Gorg. 451d), rather than accounts ofpoia tis — the
characteristics of — rhetoric. horismos men gar tou ti esti kai ousias
— for definition is of what a thing is and its essence (Ar. An. P0. 90b
30); ta gené ton katégorién esti de tauta ton arithmon deka, ti
esti, poson, poion — the basic kinds of predicates these are ten
in number, telling what a thing is, how big it is, what it is like
(Ar. Top. 103b 20). Since the answer to ti esti? gives the essence of a
thing or its nature, to ti esti was used as a substantive equivalent
to he“ ousia: kai to ti esti kai to ei estin aporon phanésetai — both the
nature and also the existence [of place] 'will appear problematic
(Simplicius, Physics 529.10).

timan, time, timios have a variety of uses, all connected with the
notion of value. (1) Honour (a) as in ‘honours list’: ton déreén te kai
timon heneka — for the sake of the rewards and honours (P1. Rep.
361C); (b) as attitude: theion gar agathon pou timé — honour is a
divine good (P1. Laws 727a); theoi timioi en téi polei -— gods
honoured in the city (Pl. Laws 829d); pas timato tous heautou '
gennétoras — let everyone honour his parents (Pl. Laws 932a9). (2)
Value as price: sphaira gar hé kallisté é lékuthos megaloprepeian
ekhei paidikou dérou, hé de toutou timé mikron kai aneleutheron —

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 timokratia — topos
for a beautiful ball or a bottle is a magnificent gift to a child, but the
cost is slight and trivial (Ar. E.N. 1123a 14). (3) Value as being worth
having and to be prized: episkepsémetha peri tés eudaimonias potera
tén epainetén estin é mallon ton timion — let us consider whether
eudaimonia is something to be praised or to be prized (Ar. E.N.
1101b 10); timiéteron epistémé orthés doxés esti -— knowledge is
something more valuable than correct opinion (Pl. Meno 98a);
homoias phésin hapasas einai kai timéteas ex isou — he says that all
[pleasures] are alike and to be valued equally (Pl. Rep. 561C).

timokratia, timokratikos: timocracy, timocratic. Uncommon, but

used differently by Plato and Aristotle. In Plato timokratia is the
first and the least bad perversion of his ideal state, and results from
the auxiliaries taking control: peirémetha legein tina tropon
timokratia genoit’an ex aristokratias — let us try to say how timocracy
might arise from aristocracy [the rule ofthe best] (P1. Rep. 545C); the
timocratic man is axié'n arkhein ... apo ergén polemikc‘m — claiming a
right to rule on the basis of military deeds (P1. Rep. 949a). In
Aristotle timocracy is where political power is based on wealth: eisi
d’hai men politeiai basileia te kai aristokratia- trité de apo timéma-
tan, hén timokratian legein oikeion phainetai, politeian d’eiéthasin
hoi pleistoi kalein — constitutions are kingship, and aristocracy; a
third is based on financial assessment, which it seems appropriate to
call timocracy, though most people are used to calling it polity (Ar.
Pol. 1160a 33); parekbasis ... ek de timokratias eis démokratian — the
perversion of timocracy is rule of the mob (Ar. Pol. 1160b 16).

topos: place, not space, which is a possible translation of khora in

some contexts. hou d’an euanthés te kai euéde‘s topos éi — where there
is a place with beautiful flowers and scents (Pl. Symp. 196b); ekhei de
pollas aporias ti pot’estin ho topos — the nature of place raises many
puzzles (Ar. Phys. 208a 32). Aristotle deals with these puzzles in
Physics, Book 4, Chs 2-5. He comes to the conclusion that to tou
periekhontos peras akinéton proton, tout’estin ho topos — place is the
immediate unmoving limit of the container (Ar. Phys. 212a 20).
Simplicius and others found this puzzling and rejected it: to men gar
aphorismon kai metron einai theseés ton topon halos oimai legetai — I
think that it is well said that place is the delimitation and measure of
position (Simplicius, Physics 644.14). Metaphorically: tén eis ton
noéton topon tés psukhés anodon — the upward journey of the soul to
the intelligible place (Pl. Rep. 517b).

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 tragikos — tukhé
tragikos: tragic; tragik‘és: in the manner of tragedy; tragéidia:
tragedy: tous tés tragikés poiéseés haptomenous — those who
embark on the composition of tragedy (Pl. Rep. 602b); tragikos
kinduneuo legein — perhaps I am using the language of tragedy (P1.
Rep. 413b); ho Euripides tragikétatos ge ton poiétén phainetai —
Euripides seems the most tragic of the poets [i.e. who most arouses
fear and pity] (Ar. Poetics 1153a 29). Tragedy is defined by
Aristotle: estin oun tragéidia mimésis praxeés spoudaias kai
teleias, megethos ekhousés, hédusmenéi logoi khéris hekastéi tén
eidén en tois moriois, dréntén kai ou di’apaggelias, di’eleou kai
phobou perainousa tén ton toioutén pathématon katharsin — so
tragedy is the representation of a noble and complete transaction,
having size, with language made pleasing appropriately to each
part, through action and not narrative, and through fear and pity
accomplishing the purgation of [?from] such emotions (Ar. Poetics
1149b 24). Metaphorically: téi tou biou sumpaséi tragéidia'i' kai
k6m6idiai’ — the whole tragi-comedy of life (Pl. Phil. 50b).

tribé‘: literally, rubbing. In both Plato and Aristotle it is repeated

practice as opposed to skill: mé tribéi monon kai empeiria?) alla
tekhnéi — not by mere practice and experience, but by skill (Pl.
Phaedrus 27Gb); atekhnos esti tis empeiria kai tribé — [forensic
rhetoric] is an unskilled practice based on experience (Pl. Laws
938a). Aristotle says that before he created formal logic peri de tou
sullogizesthai pantelés ouden eikhomen proteron allo legein, all’é
tribéi zétountes polun khronon eponoumen — concerning argument
we had nothing previous to report, but spent much labour on
unmethodical search (Ar. SE. 184b 1).

tropé: literally, turning, has astronomical uses (as in ‘trOpics’) and

rhetorical uses (as in ‘trope’). The term was used by Democritus as
a synonym of thesis: hé de tropé thesis — tropé is position (Ar. Met.
985b 17).

tukhé: more often to be translated as luck (good or bad), or fortune,

than as chance, and, when it is well translated as chance, it usually
means rather ‘not for any reason’ than ‘causeless’: esti d’heneka tou
hosa te apo dianoias an prakhtheié kai hosa apo phuseés. ta dé
toiauta hotan kata sumbebékos genétai apo tukhés phamen einai —
what is done by design and what happens naturally has some
purpose. Things of a similar character that just happen we say

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 turannein -— xéros

happen by chance (Ar. Phys. 19Gb 22). Thus if I want to meet you and
might well have designed to do so, if I now meet you accidentally that
is apo tukhés. Aristotle thinks that this is the normal and correct use
of the term and that it is’a confusion to think that tukhé implies
absence of cause: enioi gar kai ei estin [hé tukhé] é mé aporousin.
ouden gar dé gignesthai apo tukhés phasin, alla panton einai ti aition
horismenon — for some people even are in doubt Whether there is
such a thing [as chance]. For they say that nothing happens by
chance, but there is a definite cause of everything (Ar. Phys. 195b
36). But, Aristotle holds, to say we met by chance is not to deny that
there is any explanation of how we came to be in the same place.
Luck, chance and fortune can be good or bad: met’agathés tukhés —
with good luck (P1. Phaedrus 265c; theia'z’ tini tukhéi — by some divine
chance (P1.Ep. 327e); hé men gar tukhé kai to apo tukhés estin hosois
kaito eutukhésai an huparxeien kai holds praxis — for chance and by
chance occur where there can be good fortune and in the Whole field
of action (Ar. Phys. 197b 1). '

turannein: to exercise tyranny; turannikos: tyrannical; turanni-

kos: tyrannically; turannis: tyranny; turannos: tyrant. hotan méte
kata nomous méte kata ethé prattéi tis heis arkhon mc‘m ou tote ton
toiouton turannon kléteon .9 — when some sole ruler acts in accordance
neither with law nor with custom should we not then call such a
person a tyrant? (Pl. Pol. 301c); hé men gar turannis esti monarkhia
pros to sumpheron to tan monarkhountos — for tyranny is sole rule
aimed at the advantage of the sole ruler (Ar. Pol. 1279b 5); to poiein
turannounta hoti an epithuméi — tyrannically to do Whatever he
wants (Pl. Laws 661b). Metaphorically: tén tou thumou kai
epithumién en psukhéi turannida — the tyranny of anger and
appetites in the soul (Pl. Laws 863e).

X
xéros: dry: to men gar pur thermon kai xéron hé de gé‘ psukhron
kai xéron — for fire is hot and dry but earth is cold and dry (Ar. De
Gen. et Cor. 33Gb 3). For the general theory of the four elements and
the hot, cold, dry and liquid see Ar. De Gen. et Cor. 2.2-3. legetai de
xéron kai hugron pleonakhos antikeitai gar toi xe‘réi kai to hugron
kai to dieron, kai palin toi hugroi kai to xéron kai to pepégos — ‘dry’
and ‘liquid (wet)’ have more than one use; for both liquid and wet
are opposed to dry, and, again, both dry and solidified are opposed

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 zén — zétein

to liquid (Ar. De Gen. et Cor. 330a 12). Aristotle explains dieros:

dieron men esti to ekhon allo tina hugrotéta epipolés — wet is having
some alien superficial liquid (Ar. De Gen. et Cor. 330a 16).

Z
zén: to live; zéé: life. Notwithstanding English derivatives, zée‘ is;
rather biological life while bios is more concerned with the history
and way of life of persons. Thus biographers like Diogenes Laertius
and Plutarch wrote Bioi, not Zéai. But, as is shown by, for example,
Aristotle’s statement that eudaimonia means the same as eu zén
kai eu prattein — to live and fare well (E.N. 1095a 19) — this
distinction should not be taken as very rigid. pan zén ekhei
psukhén — eveything that lives has a soul (Ar. De Juv. 470a 19);
zoe‘n de legomen tén di’hautou trophén te kai auxésin kai phthisin —
we call life the self-caused nutrition, growth and decay (Ar. De An.
412a 14); legomen diéristhai to empsukhon tou apsukhou téi zén
— we say thatthe animate is demarcated from the inanimate by
life (Ar. De An. 413a 20); ti d’au to zén? ou psukhés ergon einai? —
again, what is life? Is it not the work of the soul? (Pl. Rep. 353d).
See also zéion.

zé‘tein: to search for, investigate; zété‘sis: search, investigation;

zé‘tétés: searcher, investigator; zété‘tikos: enquiring, investigative.
Non-technically: ei khruson ezétoumen — if we were searching for
gold (Pl. Rep. 336e); hosper an ei zétois tis didaskalos tou hellénizein
— as if you were to enquire for a teacher of Greek (Pl. Prot. 327e).
Technically zétésis is, for many philosophers, the usual name for
philosophical investigation: en téi peri to dikaion zétései — in the
investigation about justice (P1. Rep. 336e); pros tén tou kalou te kai
agathou zétésin — towards our search for the fine and the good (Pl.
Rep. , 531C); sugkheei tén philosophon zétésin — he throws
philosophical enquiry into confusion (Sextus Empiricus, Adversus
Mathematicos 8.372). Aristotle distinguished practical from
theoretical zétésis: phainetai hé men zétésis ou pasa einai bouleusis
hoion hai mathématikai. he de bouleutiké pasa zétésis — not all
investigation appears to be deliberation, as, for example,
mathematics. But all deliberation is investigation (Ar. E.N. 1112b
21); Damaskios ho ek Damaskou philosophos anér ze‘tikétatos —
Damascius, the philosopher from Damascus, a man most given to
research (Simplicius, Physics 624.38).

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 zéion

zéé. See zén.

zéion is one of Aristotle’s stock examples of homonymity, since both

an animal and a picture is a zoion: hoion'zéion ho te anthropos kai
to gegrammenon — as both a man and a portrait is a zoion (Ar. Cat.
1a 2). While both plants and animals have zéé, only animals are
zéia: ta gar phuta zé‘i men, ouk ekhei d’aisthésin, toi de
aisthanesthai to zoion pros to mé zoion diorizomen — for plants are
alive, but they do not have sensation, While we differentiate an
animal from What is not an animal by sensation (Ar. De Juv. 467b
23); tonde ton kosmon zéion empsukhon ennoun te genesthai —
this universe came to be as an ensouled and intelligent animal (P1.
Tim. 30b).

173