Overview of The Encryption Features For VSP F Series and VSP G Series
Overview of The Encryption Features For VSP F Series and VSP G Series
The encryption features of the VSP F series and VSP G series provide hardware-based data-at-rest encryption for your
sensitive data.
• Hardware-based Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) encryption, using 256-bit keys in the XTS mode of
operation, is provided for open and mainframe systems.
• Encryption can be applied to some or all supported internal drives (HDD, SSD, FMD).
• Each encrypted internal drive is protected with a unique data encryption key.
• Encryption has negligible effects on I/O throughput or latency.
• Encryption requires little to no disruption of existing applications and infrastructure.
• Cryptographic erasure (media sanitization) of data is performed when an internal encrypted drive is removed from
the storage system.
In Encryption License Key, the encryption back-end director (EBED) encrypts data by using the data encryption key
allocated for each drive and then writes the data to the drive. When encrypted data is read, the EBED decrypts the data.
To use Encryption License Key, the software license key and EBEDs are required.
FMD Encryption License Key
In FMD Encryption License Key, the FMD-HDE drives generate and retain the media encryption keys and encrypt and
decrypt the data. The media encryption keys used by the FMD-HDE drives are encrypted internally, and they cannot be
viewed or output. After successful certification using a certification key, data can be written to and read from these
drives. To use FMD Encryption License Key, the software license key and FMD-HDE drives* are required.
*For information about availability of the FMD-HDE drives, contact your local sales representative.
The FMD Encryption License Key feature enables you to encrypt the data in accelerated compression-enabled parity
groups. The following table shows the combinations of encryption and accelerated compression that are supported.
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FMD Encryption License
Drive type Accelerated compression Encryption License Key
Key
• Software licenses for Encryption License Key and FMD Encryption License Key
• Data at-rest encryption
• Key management
• Software licenses
If you are using BED-based or controller-based encryption, the Encryption License Key software license must be
installed and valid (not expired). If you are using the FMD-HDE drives, the FMD Encryption License Key software
license is required. Note that an expired license can limit the operations that can be performed on an already
configured storage system. The Encryption software licenses are provided by Hitachi.
For Encryption License Key, the data at-rest encryption (DARE) functionality is implemented using cryptographic
hardware (chips), included as part of the encrypting back-end directors (EBEDs) for the VSP G1x00, VSP F1500,
VSP G/F700, and VSP G/F900 models. For the VSP G/F350 and VSP G/F370 models, the cryptographic hardware
is located on the encryption controller boards. The EBEDs or encryption controllers must be installed and
configured before DARE can be used. These hardware components encrypt and decrypt data as it is being written
to or read from the physical drives.
Enabling and disabling DARE is controlled at the parity group level (that is, all drives in a parity group are either
encrypting or non-encrypting). While it is possible to have both encrypting and non-encrypting parity groups
configured on an EBED, it is recommended to encrypt all parity groups on an EBED. It is also important to note that
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different spare drives are used for encrypting and non-encrypting parity groups.
The FMD-based DARE functionality is implemented using cryptographic hardware (chips) that reside on the FMD-
HDE drives themselves. The FMD-HDE drives encrypt and decrypt data as it is being written to or read from the
drives, and the drives must be installed and configured before DARE can be used.
As with Encryption License Key, FMD-based DARE is implemented at the parity group level. The FMD-HDE parity
groups can be configured on regular (nonencrypting) BEDs or EBEDs. When the FMD-HDE drives are configured
on an EBED, encryption and decryption are performed by the FMD-HDE drives. The spare drives for FMD-HDE
parity groups must be FMD-HDE drives.
• Key management
Data security provided by encryption is only as good as the generation, protection, and management of the keys
used in the encryption process. Further, encryption keys must be available when they are needed while being
protected from possible compromise (for example, unauthorized access or destruction). To address these issues
and meet a wide range of requirements associated with key management, the Encryption feature includes multiple
options associated with key management.
It is important to understand what keys the storage systems use and the roles these keys play in the DARE solution.
There is a hierarchy of keys that include:
◦ Data encryption keys (DEKs): Each encrypted internal drive is protected with a unique DEK that is used with
the AES-based encryption. AES-XTS uses a pair of keys, so each key used as a DEK is actually a pair of
256-bit keys.
◦ Certificate encryption keys (CEKs): Each EBED requires a key for the encryption of the certificate (registration
of the EBED) and a key to encrypt the DEKs stored on the EBED.
◦ Key encryption keys (KEKs): A single key, the KEK, is used to encrypt the CEKs that are stored in the system.
Managing these keys in a secure manner is a critical aspect of the Encryption License Key feature. This key
management functionality controls the full key lifecycle, including the generation, distribution, storage, backup/
recovery, rekeying, and destruction of keys. In addition, the design of this key management functionality includes
protections against key corruption (for example, integrity checks on keys) as well as key backups (both primary and
secondary).
After the key generation source (storage system or key management server) has been established in the initial
encryption setup, the initial set of keys is generated. The number of generated keys depends on the storage system
model. Any keys that are not assigned will be designated as free keys and will be available for use.
When encryption is enabled for a parity group, DEKs are automatically assigned to the drives in the parity group.
Similarly, when encryption is disabled, DEKs are automatically replaced (old DEKs are destroyed, and keys from
the free keys are assigned as new DEKs). You can combine this functionality with migrating data between parity
groups to accomplish rekeying of the DEKs.
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The key management can be configured in a stand-alone mode (integrated key management), or key management
can be configured to use third-party key management (external key management). When external key management
is leveraged, some or all the following functionality can be used:
◦ Initial and/or subsequent generation of keys used as CEKs and DEKs
◦ Generation and protection of KEKs
◦ Manual and automated backup of keys to a key management server (KMS)
◦ Restoration of keys from a key backup on a KMS
All communications with a KMS are performed using the OASIS Key Management Interoperability Protocol (KMIP)
version 1.0 over a mutually authenticated Transport Layer Security (TLS) version 1.2 connection. The TLS
authentication is performed using X.509 digital certificates for both the storage system and two cluster members of
the KMS.
In addition to using the KMS for certain transactions (for example, generation of keys, key backups, and key
recoveries), the storage systems can be configured to be dependent on the availability of the KMS. This
dependency is achieved by protecting the KEK on the KMS, which means that the storage system must retrieve the
KEK from the KMS as part of its boot-up sequence. If the KEK cannot be retrieved from the KMS, the storage
system will not fully boot. This configuration is reversible (that is, you can change back to integrated key
management) unless you configure the storage system in a special mode called KMIP-lock mode. When you
configure the storage system in KMIP-lock mode, local key generation is prevented and the configuration cannot be
changed back to allow local key generation.
Under a typical configuration, the storage systems store an encrypted copy of the CEKs and DEKs in shared
memory. A primary backup (encrypted) of these keys is also made on the flash memory of every EBED installed in
the storage system. When the storage system boots, the keys in shared memory are used unless they are missing
or corrupted, at which point one of the primary backups is used. This is the default behavior even when a KMS is
used to protect the KEK.
It is also possible to generate secondary backups of the keys either to a key file or on a KMS. Generating
secondary backups of the keys on a KMS is the only way to ensure that CEKs and DEKs are stored on a KMS.
These secondary key backups can be used to recover keys when the keys are not available in the storage system
(for example, when the storage system has been configured to purge all CEKs and DEKs at shutdown). If
secondary key backups will be used, it is important that they contain the current CEKs and DEKS, and this is
simplified with a KMS because secondary key backups are automatically performed after certain key operations (for
example, generating keys) and/or by leveraging regular (automated) key backups. Note that automatic key backups
have been optimized such that they are only performed when the CEKs and DEKs have changed.
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Item Specification
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Item Specification
encryption keys.
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Item Specification
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Item Specification
• Adding drives
To allocate data encryption keys or FMD-HDE certification keys, Encryption License Key uses one Free key, and
FMD Encryption License Key uses three Free keys. During this operation, media encryption keys are generated in
the FMD-HDE drives.
• Replacing drives
To change data encryption keys or FMD-HDE certification keys, Encryption License Key uses one Free key and
FMD Encryption License Key uses three Free keys for each drive. During this operation, media encryption keys are
generated in the FMD-HDE drives.
To change data encryption keys or FMD-HDE certification keys, Encryption License Key uses one Free key, and
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FMD Encryption License Key uses three Free keys for each drive in the parity group. During this operation, media
encryption keys are generated in the FMD-HDE drives.
VSP G1x00, VSP F1500: To replace an EBED, 4 Free keys are used as CEKs, and 2 Free keys are used to
register them.
VSP F700, VSP F900, VSP G700, VSP G900: To replace an EBED, 2 Free keys are used as CEKs, and 1 Free key
is used to register them.
When the first BED is replaced with an EBED, one data encryption key (DEK) is assigned to all drives except for the
FMD-HDE drives in the storage system. The number of Free keys to be used for each replacement from BED to
EBED is as follows:
◦ Number of Free keys used as CEK: 4
◦ Number of Free keys used as KEKs for registering certification keys: 2
• Replacing controllers
VSP G350, VSP G370, VSP F350, VSP F370: 2 Free keys are used as CEKs, and 1 Free key is used to register
them.
VSP G700, VSP G900; VSP F700, VSP F900: No Free keys are used as CEKs, and no Free keys are used to
register them.
• Updating CEKs
VSP G1x00, VSP F1500: 4 Free keys for each EBED (32 Free keys per storage system) are needed to change
CEKs. This is the value when the maximum number of EBEDs are installed.
VSP G350, VSP G370, VSP F350, VSP F370: 2 Free keys for each controller (4 Free keys per storage system) are
needed to change CEKs.
VSP G700, VSP F700: 2 Free keys for each EBED (8 Free keys per storage system) are needed to change CEKs.
VSP G900, VSP F900: 2 Free keys for each EBED (16 Free keys per storage system) are needed to change CEKs.
Three Free keys for each FMD-HDE drive (1,728 Free keys per storage system) are needed to change PINs. This
is the value when the maximum number of FMD-HDE drives are installed.
For details about audit logging and audit log events, see the Hitachi Audit Log User Guide.
When a key management server is not used, an automatic backup is not performed, and you must manually back up the
encryption keys.
• If the key management server is used but you do not enable the regular backup option, the encryption keys are
backed up automatically after they are created.
• If the key management server is not used, you must perform manual backups, especially immediately after you
create encryption keys.
At the specified time for a regular backup, the regular backup operation is queued as a task. You can verify queued
tasks in the Tasks window. If other tasks are already in the queue, the regular backup will not start until after the other
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tasks already in the queue are complete. Because of this, the time that the regular backup begins might be different from
the time you specified. In addition, if the key management server has the latest backup, the regular backup task is
skipped because it is not necessary to back up the same encryption keys again.
At the specified time for a regular backup, if the previous regular backup has not yet been performed because another
queued task is still in progress, a second regular backup task is not added to the task queue, and only the first regular
backup is performed. For example, if you specify 00:00 and 02:00 for regular backups, and a task started before 00:00
completes at 03:00, the 02:00 regular backup is not queued, and only the regular backup for 00:00 is performed at
03:00.
Note
• When the SVP stops, regular backup operations are not performed. After the SVP is restarted, regular backups will
resume queueing as a task.
• During a regular backup, your service representative cannot perform SVP operations or maintenance of the storage
system. If a regular backup will occur during planned maintenance, you can revise the regular backup schedule or
cancel the regular backup task temporarily.
You should verify, on a regular basis, that regular backups are being performed successfully. You can verify the regular
backup task results in the Tasks window. To view details about a regular backup task, you must have the System
Administrator (System Resource Management) role, or you must be logged in as the designated regular backup user.
You can also verify the regular backup task results in the audit log. The audit log records the regular backup user name
for the regular backup tasks.
Note
• If a regular backup task is skipped (for example, because the key management server already has the latest
backup), the skipped task is not output to the Tasks window or to the audit log.
• If a necessary regular backup task is not performed, the task is regarded as failed. You can check the details of the
failed task in the audit log.
If you want to discontinue regular backups, you can disable the Enable Encryption Key Regular Backup to Key
Management Server option in the Edit Encryption Environmental Settings window.
Managing the number of backed up encryption keys
A regular backup deletes the old encryption key. Because of this, the number of encryption keys to be backed up
regularly is always one. In the same way as manually backed up keys, the status of a regular backup encryption key can
be viewed, and the key itself can be restored or deleted.
NoteWhen you manually back up encryption keys, the old keys are not deleted. The number of keys that can be backed
up on a key management server is limited. Make sure to delete unnecessary keys from the key management server
whenever possible.
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1. If you will use a key management server, configure the key management server first. Several configuration tasks
must be performed on the key management server before you can perform the initial configuration of the
Encryption License Key and FMD Encryption License Key software.
For instructions, see Installing the Encryption License Key and FMD Encryption License Key software.
3. Configure the encryption environmental settings on the storage system.
For instructions, see Enabling encryption on a parity group that does not contain pool volumes.
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