Deontology and Kant
Deontology and Kant
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Philosophie
by Naomi KASHER
means" ('), i.e., for Kant, persons and only they. Persons serve as ob
in the sense that their existence limits the extent to which the realization of
other, subjective ends is morally appropriate. These objective ends "restrict
freedom of action".
Consequently, compliance with a categorical imperative does not prescribe
means for attaining prospective ends, because persons already exist, a fact
"which, be our ends what they may, must, as a law, constitute supreme limiting
condition of all subjective ends" (10). From this spring-board McClosky jumps to
the conclusion presendy under discussion, viz. that on her interpretation of
Kant's views in ethics he is "neither a deontologist nor a teleologist in the way
that he is in metaphysics neither a rationalist nor an empiricist" (").
McClosky does not provide any explicit delimitation of deontological and
teleological positions, but one may assume that for her the point at issue is
whether the theory under scrutiny gives a rationale for the limitation placed by
the categorical imperatives it propounds on the scope for an individual agent's
realization of his 'subjective ends'. In accordance with this way of putting the
point of the distinction, a deontologist "fails to give any rationale for [the
limitation]. Kant gives, a rationale for such limitation in terms of the 'absolute
worth' of other persons"!12), which excludes him from the realms of both
teleology and deontology. There seems nothing in Taylor's presentation of the
distinction to stop one from reaching such a conclusion. However, since Kant's
views have been regarded as the prime example of deontology, it seems
worthwhile trying to draw anew that distinction, in a way which will show Kant's
ethical views not to constitute a moral theory sui generis, but rather a
deontological theory sui juris.
Notice that McClosky's — and Taylor's — views rest on two assumptions
which will turn to be crucial. First, that if certain rules have some end then they
are not pointless, and, secondly, that if such rules are not pointless, then they are
means for furthering some purpose. Put together these assumptions lead one to
the conclusion that there is no more than one role which ends play in ethical
theories. However, as will be shown in the next section, this conclusion is wrong,
due to careless conflation of two logically different types of end-rule
relationships. An analysis of what went wrong in the assumptions will follow.
II
(13) We ignore, for the sake of simplicity, regulations which specify who is the winner in
case none of the opponents knocked out the other.
(14) J. R. Searle, 'A Taxonomy of Illocutionary Acts', Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of
Science VII (Language, Mind and Knowledge), ed. K. Gunderson (Minneapolis, University of
Minnesota Press, 1975), p. 345.
The ends of a game should not be confused with two kinds of goals
related to the same activity. Even when Chess playing is good fun, th
result which the rules of the game require to attempt producing. A per
intend to be entertained by playing three rounds of Chess, b
entertainment is not the end of Chess playing but the end of spending
in playing three rounds of Chess. Similarly, the ends of educational
are not to educate the children engaged in playing them ; these were th
investing money and spending time in invention and promulgation of t
The rules of the games do not, obviously, govern these spheres of ac
ends of games, here under consideration, are only those specif
governing rules, within the governed sphere of activity.
Whereas games are characterized by not having external ends, instit
distinguished by having such ends, which are conceptually independ
related systems of rules. The official, ultimate ends of activities govern
regulations of an army, a health service or a police force, are all pr
respective organizations. Moreover, the latter draw their points fr
former, given ends. Naturally, it is not pointless to require that such s
rules, having external 'ends, will be well-organized, in the sense th
constitute effective means for attaining the given ends. Notice th
requisites for games would be utterly misdirected, since the relation
system of rules and its internal ends (in case it has ones) is not that wh
bear to their goal, but rather similar to that which holds between a def
and a system of definitions. It is impossible to sensibly compare the
which two games attain or further the same internal ends, because by
internal ends are not shared by different games (15).
Our distinction between games and institutions might remind one
distinction between regulative and constitutive rules, i.e. between th
regulate independently existing "forms of behavior" and those wh
merely regulate, but create or define new forms of behavior ("). It s
that the notion of a form of behavior is too vague to be used as a res
How is a form of behavior individuated ? How does a form of behavior exist
independently of some rules ? Could it exist independently of any rules ? Granted
that these and similar questions might be properly answered, it still seems that
the notions of internal and external ends provide a clearer starting point for
conceptual elucidation. Actually, an adequate analysis of the notion of form of
behavior should rest on a previous clarification of the roles played by ends and
rules involved in different types and forms of behavior (").
(15) Ways of playing might be compared, but then not the system of rules is under
consideration but different ways of employing it.
(16) J. R. Searle, Speech Acts (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1969), pp. 33-34.
(17) For a related criticism of Searle's presentation of the distinction between regulative
and constitutive rules, see G. J. Warnock, The Object of Morality (London, Methuen, 1971),
pp. 37-43. His criticism does not apply to our suggested distinctions.
III
Applying our game vs. institution distinctions to ethics, we would claim that
according to teleological views morality is an institution, whereas according to deontological
positions morality is a game. Utilitarianism, Egoism, Perfectionism —all consider
the rules of morality to be means for effecting external ends, while Prichard and
Ross, for example, rejected such claims, maintaining that no external ends exist
for moral rules 08).
A position to show why Kant was a deontologist and McClosky mistaken in
granting him an intermediate position between deontologists and teleologists has
now been reached.
McClosky is right in claiming that "compliance with a categorical imperative
does not prescribe (rational) means to the achievement" of objective ends (").
There are no external ends which are intended to be obtained by compliance
with categorical imperatives and the latter never serve as means for obtaining
such ends. Furthermore, the existence of persons, who are all objective ends, is
not an independent purpose to be attained by obeying categorical imperatives,
since that existence restricts the means an individual agent may adopt in
furthering his subjective goals, but the restrictions imposed are not moral
maintainance orders. Kant's views are undoubtedly detached from any
teleological position.
However, McClosky is wrong in claiming that Kant gives an independent
rationale for the limitations imposed by categorical imperatives on the scope of an
individual agent's behavior. For that matter, consider Kant's categorical
imperative in the formula of the end in itself : "Act in such a way that you always
treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, never
simply as a means, but always at the same time as an end" (20). To be sure, this
"practical imperative" does not provide independent reasons for obeying moral
rules. "It is impossible to tell before the issue has already been decided on some
other standard which way of acting would be treating someone merely as means
to 'ends' he cannot himself share. The line of reasoning involved is not, as it
seems to be, This would be treating someone merely as a means ; therefore it is
wrong'. It is This would be wrong ; therefore it would be treating someone
merely as a means' " (JI).
Morality is here on a par with Chess. Checkmating the opponent's king is not
an independent rationale, but an internal end, completely specificable only with
Tel-Aviv University.