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Deontology and Kant

This document discusses deontology and Kantian ethics. It summarizes a common way that the distinction between teleological and deontological ethical theories is portrayed, with utilitarian theories representing teleology and Kant representing deontology. However, the summary notes that this portrayal risks excluding Kant from deontology. It then examines Kant's distinction between hypothetical and categorical imperatives to argue that his ethics should be considered deontological rather than a separate moral theory. The document suggests redrawing the teleology/deontology distinction to properly include Kant within deontology.

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0% found this document useful (0 votes)
94 views9 pages

Deontology and Kant

This document discusses deontology and Kantian ethics. It summarizes a common way that the distinction between teleological and deontological ethical theories is portrayed, with utilitarian theories representing teleology and Kant representing deontology. However, the summary notes that this portrayal risks excluding Kant from deontology. It then examines Kant's distinction between hypothetical and categorical imperatives to argue that his ethics should be considered deontological rather than a separate moral theory. The document suggests redrawing the teleology/deontology distinction to properly include Kant within deontology.

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DEONTOLOGY AND KANT

Author(s): Naomi KASHER


Source: Revue Internationale de Philosophie , 1978, Vol. 32, No. 126 (4), MARTIN BUBER
1878-1978 (1978), pp. 551-558
Published by: Revue Internationale de Philosophie

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DEONTOLOGY AND KANT

by Naomi KASHER

"There are doubtless plenty of distinctions, drawn in philosophy and ou


it, which still await adequate philosophical elucidation" (')• Often, s
distinctions take the form of a pair of contrasting expressions which "h
application to the same cases" (2). A philosophical elucidation is, the
attempt at rendering clearer and more insightful an intuitively given concep
cleavage.
The commonly drawn distinction between teleological and deontologic
ethical theories is clearly meant to mark an important, intuitively given diff
between two traditional kinds of ethical conception. Whereas Bentham, Mi
Moore have been taken to voice major variations on the teleological theme,
has been the prominent representative of deontology (3). In the present pape
point out a difficulty in current philosophical elucidations of the teleo
deontology distinction and suggest an improvement on them.

To get- an idea of the way the teleology/deontology distinction is all too


commonly portrayed in recent studies, consider, for example, P. W. Taylor's
standard summary of it :

A teleological theory holds that an action is morally right either if a


person's doing it brings about good consequences, or if the action is of a
kind which, if every one did it, would have good consequences. In either
case, ultimately it is the goodness 01 badness of the consequences of
actions that make them right or wrong. A deontological theory holds that
an action is right if it accords with a moral rule, wrong if it violates such a
rule. Moral rules are based 011 an ultimate principle of duty which, in
contrast to teleological ethics, does not specify an end or purpose whose
furtherance makes actions right (4).

(1) H. P. Grice and P. F. Strawson, 'In Defense of a Dogma', Philosophical Review 65


(1956), p. 141 ; also in : New Readings in Philosophical Analysis, eds. Herbert Feigl, Wilfrid
Sellars and Keith Lehrer (New York, Aplleton-Century-Croffts, 1972), p. 126.
(2) Ibid., p. 127.
(3) See, for example, P. H. Noweli.-Smith, Ethics (Baltimore, Penguin, 1954), p. 134.
(4) Paul W. Tayi or. Principles of Ethics (Encino and Belmont, California, Dickenson, 1975),
pp. 55f. Nowell-Smith suggested a similar way of drawing the distinction (Ibid., p. 133) :

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552 N. KASHER

It is easy to accommodate, for example, utilitarian views, such as


Bentham, Mill and Moore to the suggested presentation of teleo
surprisingly enough, it is not a far cry from the accompanying prese
deontology to an exclusion of Kant from membership in the deontolo
Since Kant's views have been considered as a paradigm of a deon
metaphysic of morals, such an exclusion would cast doubts on its own
Let us, then, have a close look at the latter matter.
A natural starting point is Kant's own distinction between hypothe
categorical imperatives. The former "declare a possible action to be p
necessary as a means to the attainment of something else that one wil
one may will)", while the latter would represent "an action as ob
necessary in itself apart from its relation to a further end" (5). Put diffe
hypothetical imperative .. . says only that an action is good for some p
other" (6) while a categorical imperative declares an action to be obj
necessary, without any resort to a further purpose.
Mary McClosky (7) testifies that common interpretations, according
the only 'ends' are individual purposs of individual agents, give the i
that "for Kant being pointless is not simply no hindrance to, but a n
condition for something's being categorically imperatival. Which is
lous" (8). Not daring to leave "categorical imperatives hanging in air",
puts forward another interpretation. Besides purposes of individual
means to which are prescribed by hypothetical imperatives, there ar
themselves', which Kant calls 'objective' as opposed to 'subjecti
Categorical imperatives are thus deprived of their apparent pointless
What are these objective ends which have come to the rescue? McC
suggestion carries an air of Scholasticism, hinging on the difference bet
colloquial usage of 'end' and the scholastic use of that term. Accord
latter, but not the former, "objects of value" can serve as ends. Objec
are, then, "things whose existence is in itself an end, and indeed an end
in its place we can put no other end to which they should serve sim

"According to [teleological theories] the notions of duty, lightness and obl


supposed to be defined in terms of or in some other way dependent on the n
goodness and purpose, and ... according to [deontological theories] the
obligation is incapable of being analysed or made dependent in this way". Als
G. H. von Wright's presentation of the same distinction in Iiis The Varieties o
(London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1963), p. 156: "By an ethics <>f val
conveniently understand a view according to which value is fundamental and
somehow to be extracted from or established 011 the basis of value-consideration
ethics of duty again one may understand a view which regards duty (ought) as a
See also B. Gert, The MoraI Rules (New York, Harper, 1970), pp. 126-127.
(5) I. Kant, Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten, as translated by H. J. Paton
Harper, 1964), p. 82.
(6) Ibid.
(7) 'Kant's Kingdom of Ends', Philosophy 51 (1976), pp. 391-399.
(8) McCiosky, p. 392.

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DEONTOLOGY AND KANT 553

means" ('), i.e., for Kant, persons and only they. Persons serve as ob
in the sense that their existence limits the extent to which the realization of
other, subjective ends is morally appropriate. These objective ends "restrict
freedom of action".
Consequently, compliance with a categorical imperative does not prescribe
means for attaining prospective ends, because persons already exist, a fact
"which, be our ends what they may, must, as a law, constitute supreme limiting
condition of all subjective ends" (10). From this spring-board McClosky jumps to
the conclusion presendy under discussion, viz. that on her interpretation of
Kant's views in ethics he is "neither a deontologist nor a teleologist in the way
that he is in metaphysics neither a rationalist nor an empiricist" (").
McClosky does not provide any explicit delimitation of deontological and
teleological positions, but one may assume that for her the point at issue is
whether the theory under scrutiny gives a rationale for the limitation placed by
the categorical imperatives it propounds on the scope for an individual agent's
realization of his 'subjective ends'. In accordance with this way of putting the
point of the distinction, a deontologist "fails to give any rationale for [the
limitation]. Kant gives, a rationale for such limitation in terms of the 'absolute
worth' of other persons"!12), which excludes him from the realms of both
teleology and deontology. There seems nothing in Taylor's presentation of the
distinction to stop one from reaching such a conclusion. However, since Kant's
views have been regarded as the prime example of deontology, it seems
worthwhile trying to draw anew that distinction, in a way which will show Kant's
ethical views not to constitute a moral theory sui generis, but rather a
deontological theory sui juris.
Notice that McClosky's — and Taylor's — views rest on two assumptions
which will turn to be crucial. First, that if certain rules have some end then they
are not pointless, and, secondly, that if such rules are not pointless, then they are
means for furthering some purpose. Put together these assumptions lead one to
the conclusion that there is no more than one role which ends play in ethical
theories. However, as will be shown in the next section, this conclusion is wrong,
due to careless conflation of two logically different types of end-rule
relationships. An analysis of what went wrong in the assumptions will follow.

II

Deontological and teleological theories commend two logically different types


of social structure, which we dub 'games' and 'institutions', respectively, using
both terms in a broad sense. All these social structures are defined by public
systems of rules which specify rights, duties and roles, as well as other

(9) Kant, p. 96.


(10) Kant, p. 98.
(11) McClosky.p- 396.
(12) McClosky,p- 396.

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554 N. KASHER

ingredients of their spheres of activity. However, they are clearly separ


two classes according to which kind of an end, if any, the activity w
specified sphere is intended to be obtained or furthered. It is often th
the ends are external, in the sense that they are completely ex
independently of the system of rules which govern that sphere. In othe
ends are internal, in the sense that any attempt to express them mea
without any recourse to the system of rules which govern that sphere o
is bound to fail. When a sphere of activity is governed by such a system
in order to obtain or further an external end, we call it an 'institut
other rule-governed sphere of activity we call a 'game'. The activity in
case involves internal ends or no ends at all.
To get a better idea of the present concept of game, consider the garden
example of Chess. The player intends to win the game, that is to say, to
checkmate the opponent's king. Although the term 'win' has some colloquial
meanings, they do not render the expression 'to win a game of Chess'
meaningful ; without recourse to the system of rules which defines that sphere of
activity, i.e. without resort to the rules of Chess, a meaningful specification of
the ends of the game is impossible. The same holds for the ends entertained in
the less delicate sphere of activity, defined by the rules of boxing-matches. To
win the match is not to smite the opponent, but to strike him, according to the
regulations, so that he cannot rise to his feet to continue the fight, on time (").
Moving from the garden variety of games to less conspicuous examples, let us
mention ordinary rites, such as those which are carried out in order to satiate a
god or obey God's commandments. The full meaning of any expression which is
meant to specify such ends of religious activities is not given by the ordinary
readings of theses expressions, but only by resorting to the system of rules which
defines the ritual or governs the prescribed piety sphere. Indeed, each of the
Western religions enjoins its observers to follow the instructions of an
appropriate authority whose procedures and decisions determine the full
content of God's commandments and by that also the meaning of the standard
expression of the internal end, viz. 'to do God's will' or similar expressions such
as 'never to defy His commandments'.
Still another kind of example is provided by the realm of linguistic activity.
'The point or purpose of a description is that it is a representation of how
something is"(14). Clearly, these standard ends of the activity within the
linguistic game of describing, are not specifiable without obvious recourse to the
rules of the language which govern linguistic representation. It seems that
generally linguistic ativity has internal ends, but this view cannot be discussed
here.

(13) We ignore, for the sake of simplicity, regulations which specify who is the winner in
case none of the opponents knocked out the other.
(14) J. R. Searle, 'A Taxonomy of Illocutionary Acts', Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of
Science VII (Language, Mind and Knowledge), ed. K. Gunderson (Minneapolis, University of
Minnesota Press, 1975), p. 345.

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DEONTOLOGY AND KANT 555

The ends of a game should not be confused with two kinds of goals
related to the same activity. Even when Chess playing is good fun, th
result which the rules of the game require to attempt producing. A per
intend to be entertained by playing three rounds of Chess, b
entertainment is not the end of Chess playing but the end of spending
in playing three rounds of Chess. Similarly, the ends of educational
are not to educate the children engaged in playing them ; these were th
investing money and spending time in invention and promulgation of t
The rules of the games do not, obviously, govern these spheres of ac
ends of games, here under consideration, are only those specif
governing rules, within the governed sphere of activity.
Whereas games are characterized by not having external ends, instit
distinguished by having such ends, which are conceptually independ
related systems of rules. The official, ultimate ends of activities govern
regulations of an army, a health service or a police force, are all pr
respective organizations. Moreover, the latter draw their points fr
former, given ends. Naturally, it is not pointless to require that such s
rules, having external 'ends, will be well-organized, in the sense th
constitute effective means for attaining the given ends. Notice th
requisites for games would be utterly misdirected, since the relation
system of rules and its internal ends (in case it has ones) is not that wh
bear to their goal, but rather similar to that which holds between a def
and a system of definitions. It is impossible to sensibly compare the
which two games attain or further the same internal ends, because by
internal ends are not shared by different games (15).
Our distinction between games and institutions might remind one
distinction between regulative and constitutive rules, i.e. between th
regulate independently existing "forms of behavior" and those wh
merely regulate, but create or define new forms of behavior ("). It s
that the notion of a form of behavior is too vague to be used as a res
How is a form of behavior individuated ? How does a form of behavior exist
independently of some rules ? Could it exist independently of any rules ? Granted
that these and similar questions might be properly answered, it still seems that
the notions of internal and external ends provide a clearer starting point for
conceptual elucidation. Actually, an adequate analysis of the notion of form of
behavior should rest on a previous clarification of the roles played by ends and
rules involved in different types and forms of behavior (").

(15) Ways of playing might be compared, but then not the system of rules is under
consideration but different ways of employing it.
(16) J. R. Searle, Speech Acts (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1969), pp. 33-34.
(17) For a related criticism of Searle's presentation of the distinction between regulative
and constitutive rules, see G. J. Warnock, The Object of Morality (London, Methuen, 1971),
pp. 37-43. His criticism does not apply to our suggested distinctions.

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556 N. KASHER

III

Applying our game vs. institution distinctions to ethics, we would claim that
according to teleological views morality is an institution, whereas according to deontological
positions morality is a game. Utilitarianism, Egoism, Perfectionism —all consider
the rules of morality to be means for effecting external ends, while Prichard and
Ross, for example, rejected such claims, maintaining that no external ends exist
for moral rules 08).
A position to show why Kant was a deontologist and McClosky mistaken in
granting him an intermediate position between deontologists and teleologists has
now been reached.
McClosky is right in claiming that "compliance with a categorical imperative
does not prescribe (rational) means to the achievement" of objective ends (").
There are no external ends which are intended to be obtained by compliance
with categorical imperatives and the latter never serve as means for obtaining
such ends. Furthermore, the existence of persons, who are all objective ends, is
not an independent purpose to be attained by obeying categorical imperatives,
since that existence restricts the means an individual agent may adopt in
furthering his subjective goals, but the restrictions imposed are not moral
maintainance orders. Kant's views are undoubtedly detached from any
teleological position.
However, McClosky is wrong in claiming that Kant gives an independent
rationale for the limitations imposed by categorical imperatives on the scope of an
individual agent's behavior. For that matter, consider Kant's categorical
imperative in the formula of the end in itself : "Act in such a way that you always
treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, never
simply as a means, but always at the same time as an end" (20). To be sure, this
"practical imperative" does not provide independent reasons for obeying moral
rules. "It is impossible to tell before the issue has already been decided on some
other standard which way of acting would be treating someone merely as means
to 'ends' he cannot himself share. The line of reasoning involved is not, as it
seems to be, This would be treating someone merely as a means ; therefore it is
wrong'. It is This would be wrong ; therefore it would be treating someone
merely as a means' " (JI).
Morality is here on a par with Chess. Checkmating the opponent's king is not
an independent rationale, but an internal end, completely specificable only with

(18) H. A. Prichard,'Does Moral Philosophy Rest on a Mistake Mind 21 (1912) ; also


in his Moral Obligation (Oxford, Clarendon Press, >949), pp. 1-17 in ig68 edition. W. D.
Ross, The Right and the Good (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1930).
(19) McClosky,p. 395.
(20) Kant, p. 96.
(21) Marcus G. Singer, Generalization in Ethics (New York, Atheneum, ig7i) p. 235.
Singer draws from this description of Kant's view a different conclusion.

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DEONTOLOGY AND KANT 557

explicit resort to the system of rules. Treating humanity never merely


but always also as an end is not an independent rationale, but also an
end, fully stated only within an ethical system, including, for exa
categorical imperative in the formula of universal law — "Act only
maxim through which you can at the same time will that it should
universal law" (22).
Although Kant's theory differs in some respects from that of J. L. S
they both share a most important logical feature, viz. they propound fo
neither an external end nor an independent rationale ; according t
them morality is what we called a 'game', which renders both
deontologists.
Now, having no ends at all or only internal ends is, in a sense, tantamount to
being pointless, but that should not be considered abusive. Some activities might
be taken to be pointless because they are utterly insignificant and extremely
worhtless, but this does not have to be the rule. Some normative systems resist
all attempts to be grounded on some external basis or independent point,
because there is nothing deeper than these systems themselves, nothing of more
paramount importance. The latter is the kind of pointlessness to be found at the
foundations of morality. "A categorical imperative would be one which re
presented an action as objectively necessary in itself apart from its relation to a
further end ... without reference to some purpose ,.."(24). People being ends
and not mere means is not further end or a additional purpose, but the gist of
the moral system, from a certain point of view ; it is an internal end. Answering
the sceptic's question 'Why should I be moral?' by pointing out that persons are
ends in themselves would not satisfy him, exactly for the same reasons that he
would not be content in his quetion 'Why should I play Chess?' being answered
by 'Because you ought to try to checkmate your opponent's king'.
In conclusion, let us point out the crucial confusion which led McClosky's
argument astray. We mentioned earlier two assumptions implicit in the common
presentations of the distinction between deontological and teleological views :
first, that if certain rules have some end, then they are not pointless, and
secondly, that if such rules are not pointless, they are means for furthering some
purpose. Thus, according to these assumptions, ethical systems of rules are
either pointless or means for furthering external ends. However, being aware of
the availability of a third possibility, viz. the possible existence of internal ends
defined by the governing rules, that form of drawing the distinction should be
rejected. Indeed, when internal ends are taken into account both assumptions
are no more defensible. McClosky has noticed that the second assumption
should be rejected, Kant's ethics serving as a counter — example, because

(22) Kant, p. 88.


(23) Morality and Purpose (London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1969). McClosky takes
Stocks' views to be typical of deontological positions.
(24) Kant, p. 82.

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558 N. KASHER

categorical imperatives are neither pointless or means for furthering


ends. Not realizing that ends might be given internally, McClosky seem
accepted the first assumption, and she uses it to conclude that since
categorical imperative has ends it is not pointless. However, it should b
now that this assumption also has to be rejected, leading Kant's ethics
the realm of deontology.

Tel-Aviv University.

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