UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE www.usip.

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SPECIAL REPORT 1200 17th Street NW • Washington, DC 20036 • 202.457.1700 • fax 202.429.6063

ABOUT THE REPORT Praveen Swami

At first glance, India and Pakistan today seem

Quickstep or Kadam Taal?

closer to peace than at any point in the past several
decades. The cease-fire that went into place along
the Line of Control in December 2003 has held;
terrorist violence in Jammu and Kashmir has been
in steady decline since the two nuclear-armed states
almost went to war in 2002; and both countries The Elusive Search for Peace in Jammu and Kashmir
have succeeded in sustaining a wide-ranging and
high-level dialogue process. All this appears to
suggest that conditions exist for resolution of one of
the world’s most intractable and bloody conflicts, the
India-Pakistan war over Jammu and Kashmir.
Yet the current détente process between India and
Summary
Pakistan suffers from the same structural infirmities
that led past peace initiatives to collapse. Instead • Since December 2003, India and Pakistan have maintained a successful cease-fire
of looking for a resolution of the grand historical along the militarily volatile Line of Control as part of a dialogue process that is
conflict in Jammu and Kashmir, peacemakers might addressing a wide range of disputes between the two nuclear-armed neighbors.
do well to focus on the problems of the state’s • A key component of the dialogue centers on the disputed region of Jammu and
peoples—thus building a base from which creative
democratic solutions might eventually emerge. Kashmir, of which both India and Pakistan control a part. (China holds a third part.)
Both states claim sovereignty over the entire region.
Praveen Swami is a Randolph Jennings Senior Fellow
at the United States Institute of Peace. A journalist with • The current round of India-Pakistan détente has led to some optimism that the
Frontline, a major Indian magazine, Swami has covered dispute over Jammu and Kashmir, one of the bloodiest conflicts in the world, could
the conflict in Jammu and Kashmir for more be ripe for resolution.
than a decade.
• Pakistan has recently advocated plans for what it believes is a workable final territorial
The views expressed in this report do not necessarily reflect solution to the problem—essentially, a partition of Jammu and Kashmir along ethnic-
those of the United States Institute of Peace, which does religious lines. India, however, has rejected these proposals, arguing that such a
not advocate specific policy positions
positions. partition is repugnant to its secular values and could lead to a worsening of tensions
elsewhere in South Asia.
• This dissonance in perceptions points to a larger set of problems in the dialogue
process, all of which could take several years, if not decades, to work through.
• A second dialogue track, between India and secessionist politicians in Jammu and
Kashmir, also appears to have reached stalemate.
• Although Pakistan has helped bring about a significant reduction in terrorist violence
SPECIAL REPORT 133 MARCH 2005
within Jammu and Kashmir, much of the infrastructure of terrorism is still intact—and
the possibility of crisis-inducing terrorist strikes remains.
CONTENTS • Stalemate between the main actors has meant that the peoples of Jammu and Kashmir
have yet to see any gains from the dialogue process and the India-Pakistan détente.
Introduction 2
• Rather than wait for a grand resolution of these complex issues, we need to find
A View of the Landscape 2
ways to deliver concrete gains to the peoples of Jammu and Kashmir—principally,
The India-Pakistan Dialogue Axis 4 though not exclusively, through a cessation of violence. Peacemaking may thus
The India-Kashmir Dialogue Axis 6 be better served by turning attention away from the “Kashmir problem” to the
Moving Peacemaking Forward 8 “problems of Kashmiris.”
 ABOUT THE INSTITUTE Introduction
The United States Institute of Peace is an
independent, nonpartisan federal institution “Spring will return to the beautiful Valley soon,” India’s former prime minister Atal
created by Congress to promote the prevention, Behari Vajpayee promised a Srinagar audience in April 2002, quoting a passage from
management, and peaceful resolution of interna- the Kashmiri poet Ghulam Ahmed Mehjoor, “the flowers will bloom again and the
tional conflicts. Established in 1984, the Institute nightingales will return, chirping.” More than two years later, it is beginning to look
meets its congressional mandate through an array like the end might indeed be in sight for one of the most bitterly fought conflicts
of programs, including research grants, fellow- in the world. Both India and Pakistan are engaged in negotiations, their borders are
ships, professional training, education programs quiet, and some counterterrorist military formations are being withdrawn from Jammu
from high school through graduate school, and Kashmir. Is peace, then, somewhere around the corner—or at least not too many
conferences and workshops, library services, and blocks away?
publications. The Institute’s Board of Directors is One metaphor, favored by optimists, for what is now under way is the proverbial
appointed by the President of the United States step forward; another, which might meet with the approval of pessimists, is the
and confirmed by the Senate. parade-ground technique of marching vigorously on one spot, known to both Indian
and Pakistani soldiers as the kkadam taal. This report examines the status of two related
BOARD OF DIRECTORS ongoing processes, the India-Pakistan détente and the efforts by India to engage
J. Robinson West (Chair), Chairman, PFC Energy, political secessionists within the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir. It looks at the
Washington, D.C. • María Otero (Vice Chair), President, prospects these twin processes have for ending one of the world’s most murderous
ACCION International, Boston, Mass. • Betty F. Bumpers, conflicts—one that has claimed almost forth thousand lives since 1988, one-third of
Founder and former President, Peace Links, Washington, them civilian. Although the current process of dialogue holds some reasons for hope,
D.C. • Holly J. Burkhalter, Advocacy Director, Physicians it suffers from the same structural infirmities that have led past initiatives to collapse.
for Human Rights, Washington, D.C. • Chester A. Crocker Crocker, Thus, a wholly new paradigm of peacemaking may be needed to secure abiding gains.
James R. Schlesinger Professor of Strategic Studies, School
of Foreign Service, Georgetown University • Laurie S.
Fulton, Partner, Williams and Connolly, Washington, A View of the Landscape
D.C. • Charles Horner, Senior Fellow, Hudson Institute,
Although it is easy to be pessimistic about the prospects of peace in Jammu and
Washington, D.C. • Stephen D. Krasner, Graham H. Stuart
Kashmir—cynics have had an alarming record of success in their prognosis—several
Professor of International Relations, Stanford University •
features of the current situation are in fact heartening.
Seymour Martin Lipset, Hazel Professor of Public Policy,
India-Pakistan dialogue has survived the coming to power of the United Progressive
George Mason University • Mora L. McLean, President,
Alliance government in New Delhi in 2004. Both countries have agreed to open a bus
Africa-America Institute, New York, N.Y. • Barbara W.
route from Srinagar, in Indian-administered Kashmir, to Muzaffarabad, on the Pakistan-
Snelling, former State Senator and former Lieutenant
administered side. Even though the service will initially be limited, the symbolic bridging
Governor, Shelburne, Vt.
of the Line of Control has generated great public enthusiasm. Dialogue is also under way
MEMBERS EX OFFICIO on issues ranging from watershed management to the activation of a railway line that
Arthur E. Dewey
Dewey, Assistant Secretary of State for would speed access between southern Punjab and the industrial hubs of western India.
Population, Refugees, and Migration • Michael M. Dunn, Meanwhile, the national security advisers for both India and Pakistan have maintained
Lieutenant General, U.S. Air Force; President, National regular contact, a process of covert diplomacy that has mirrored the public engagement
Defense University • Peter W. Rodman, Assistant between the two countries.
Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Second, violence within Jammu and Kashmir has been in steady decline since the
• Richard H. Solomon, President, United States India-Pakistan near war of 2002. Data from India’s Union Ministry of Home Affairs
Institute of Peace (nonvoting) show that the numbers of fatalities of both civilians and combatants, as well as the
overall numbers of violent acts carried out by jihadi groups, have fallen to levels
similar to those seen before the Kargil War of 1999, which started an escalatory
cycle (see figures 1 and 2). More important, the number of foreign terrorists, mainly
Pakistani nationals, killed by Indian forces has dropped to low levels. It is hard to
reliably quantify the level of infiltration by jihadi cadres across the Line of Control,
but the empirically demonstrated fact that fewer people, whether foreign or Indian
nationals, are being killed suggests that General Musharraf has at least partially
delivered on his 2002 promise to end cross-border terrorism.
It would be simplistic to give General Musharraf sole credit for the declining levels of
violence. The near war of 2002, provoked by a terrorist attack on India’s parliament by the
Jaish-e-Mohammad, a jihadi group, may have awakened Pakistan’s military establishment
to the perils of maintaining its subconventional offensive against India at the levels
2
 Figure 1. Fatalities from Violence in Jammu and Kashmir, 1988–2004. Source: Data compiled by author from public and private sources.
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Figure 2. Incidents of Violence in Jammu and Kashmir, 1989–2004. Source: Data compiled by author from public and private sources.
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 witnessed after 1999. Alternatively, the enormous pressure brought to bear by the
United States during the crisis may have prompted rethinking in Islamabad. Furthermore,
India, aided by Israel and the United States, has made massive investments in new
counterterrorist technology, notably an electronic and physical fence along a large part
of the Line of Control. Any or all of these factors combined could account for the reduced
levels of violence. Whatever the truth, however, the fact is that violence has declined.
Third, Indian and Pakistani forces have successfully maintained a cease-fire that went
into effect along the Line of Control in December 2003. One of India’s long-standing
complaints was that Pakistani forces provided covering fire to infiltrating jihadi cadre.
This has ended. Although Indian officials say some infiltration continues, Pakistani troops
no longer seem actively involved in shielding it from interdiction. India’s recent efforts to
build public confidence in peacemaking have been helped by the reduction of hostilities
along the Line of Control, which has paved the way for the withdrawal of some troops
engaged in counterterrorist operations in Jammu and Kashmir. No figures are available
regarding how many troops India eventually intends to remove, but several thousand
soldiers are reported to have been moved out since November 2004.
Fourth, but by no means least important, India has set parameters for dialogue with
political entities within Jammu and Kashmir on the state’s future relationship with India.
During his November 2004 visit to Srinagar, Prime Minister Singh made clear that his
government was willing to pursue negotiations with both major secessionist political
groups: the centrist Kul Jamaat Hurriyat Conference, also known as the All Parties
Freedom Conference (APHC), and the hard-line Tehreek-i-Hurriyat (TH), also known as
the Movement for Freedom. New Delhi appears to center these discussions, as well as
a parallel track of negotiating with mainstream political parties in Jammu and Kashmir,
on widening federal autonomy for the states. Both the APHC and the TH have rejected
dialogue on autonomy, which falls well short of their demand for secession from India.
However, the important fact here is that N. N. Vohra, a retired bureaucrat who has served
the government of India in various capacities and now acts as its official interlocutor with
political groups in Jumma and Kashmi, finally has a clear mandate that can be brought
to the table.
Together, these four conditions suggest that the environment is favorable for
Rarely in recent years has there peacemaking. Rarely in recent years has there been a conjunction of regimes with a
stated commitment to dialogue, the willingness to scale back border tensions, the ability
been a conjunction of regimes
to reduce violence, and a vision of what political concessions can be made. Although the
with a stated commitment to necessary conditions for a dialogue have been met, however, the question of whether
these are sufficient to yield a meaningful outcome remains.
dialogue, the willingness to
scale back border tensions, the
ability to reduce violence, and a The India-Pakistan Dialogue Axis
vision of what political conces- As India-Pakistan dialogue proceeds, what are the prospects for both sides arriving at a
sions can be made. mutually acceptable vision of Jammu and Kashmir? Speaking at a dinner in Islamabad on
October 25, 2004, General Musharraf outlined the contours of new ideas for an eventual
resolution of the conflict over Jammu and Kashmir. Based on a partition of the state’s
territory, the ideas were greeted with considerable enthusiasm by some observers, who
saw it as a potentially decisive step forward.
In essence, General Musharraf In essence, General Musharraf advocated the division of the territory of the entire
pre-independence monarchical state of Jammu and Kashmir. A part of this territory is
advocated the division of now administered by India (Jammu and Kashmir), and another part is administered
the territory of the entire pre- by Pakistan (Azad Kashmir and the Northern Areas of Gilgit, Hunza, and Baltistan; a
part of the territory administered by Pakistan was unilaterally ceded by it to China). In
independence monarchical state Musharraf’s vision, the seven major constituent geographical units of the region would
of Jammu and Kashmir. be offered independence or joint control by India and Pakistan, or, alternatively, be
administered by the United Nations. Five of these units are in India—the Kashmir valley

4
and the Muslim-majority areas of Jammu, both of which lie north of the Chenab River;
the Shia-dominated Kargil area; the Hindu-majority areas of Jammu south of the Chenab
River; and Buddhist-majority Ladakh. The two other areas, Azad Kashmir and the Northern
Areas, both of which have a Muslim majority, are in Pakistan.
Musharraf’s ideas were summarily dismissed by India, despite the fact that they marked
a considerable departure from the traditional Pakistani claim to all the territory of Jammu
and Kashmir. Understanding India’s reaction to Musharraf’s plan is key to a coherent
appraisal of the future of détente between the two countries. The idea of partitioning
Jammu and Kashmir along ethnic-religious lines was first advocated in September 1950
by UN special representative for India and Pakistan Sir Owen Dixon, who suggested that
this could be brought about either through agreement between the two countries or by
plebiscite. Sensitive to the consequences of ethnic-religious partitions in South Asia—the
division of British India into the states of India and Pakistan had cost more than five
hundred thousand lives—the Dixon Plan, as it came to be known, was rejected out
of hand by India. Pakistan at first rejected the Dixon Plan, but the idea had gathered
some momentum in that country by the early 1960s. Partition is believed to have been
discussed in 1963 by the eminent Kashmir leader Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah and the
foreign minister who served the Pakistani military ruler Field Marshall Ayub Khan, Zulfikar
Ali Bhutto, who went on to become president of Pakistan.
Pakistan seems to have persuaded itself in recent years that India would, sooner or later,
come to accept the partition plan in some form or other. In 1999, Pakistan’s foreign minister,
Sartaj Aziz, called for a districtwide referendum on the future of Jammu and Kashmir, a
repackaging of the Dixon Plan that marked a sharp departure from the official position. Aziz’s
ideas were anticipated in a report by a New York–based organization, the Kashmir Study
Group, which argued for the creation of one or two new states from the Muslim-majority
areas of Jammu and Kashmir. Together, the Kashmir Study Group said, these would constitute
a “sovereign entity but one without an international personality.” The new state would have
its own legislature, flag, and gendarmerie, but its security would be jointly guaranteed by
India and Pakistan.
From the point of view of Pakistan, an ethnic-religious partition seems an eminently From the point of view of
reasonable solution to the conflict over Jammu and Kashmir. Pakistan came into existence
on the basis of the religious affiliation of the majority of its citizens, and advocates of
Pakistan, an ethnic-religious
partition-based solutions believe that the same principle should apply to Jammu and partition seems an eminently
Kashmir as well. Advocates of partition-based solutions, by some accounts, have found
reasonable solution to the con-
a sympathetic hearing from at least some elements within the U.S. State Department,
perhaps because the idea appears to offer a way out of a stalemate. Critics have noted flict over Jammu and Kashmir.
the impracticability of the idea, however. Nowhere in the world have two nuclear-armed
adversaries jointly guaranteed the security of a third state. Among other things, it is
unclear how disputes between the new entity and the two states bordering it, both of
which would have compelling security interests there, would be mediated.
India’s concerns, however, transcend the purely pragmatic—just as, for Pakistan, Jammu
and Kashmir is not simply a territorial issue, but a national project. For India, ideologically For India, ideologically
committed to a secular nation-state, the idea of an ethnic-religious partition is repugnant.
committed to a secular nation-
State-level leaders in Jammu and Kashmir, as well as senior figures in India’s central
government, have flatly rejected any movement in this direction, and no change in the state, the idea of an ethnic-
Indian position seems likely in the near future. Although General Musharraf was at pains
religious partition is repugnant.
to package his proposal as one founded on geography rather than ethnic-religious identity,
the fact is that the two coincide so closely as to render the distinction trivial. India is also
concerned about the long-term consequences any ethnic-religious partition might have for
the rest of the union. Should its sole Muslim-majority province secede on the basis of its
religious identity, the position of Hindu fundamentalist groups seeking to replace India’s
secular order with a state founded on theocratic principles would be strengthened.
The point here is simple: despite the illusion of forward momentum generated by
Musharraf’s new ideas (or not-so-new ideas), both India and Pakistan fundamentally

5
 stand where they have for decades. The two states are far from having a shared vision
of the future for Jammu and Kashmir, something that could strain the sustainability of
the détente as it proceeds. Second, and perhaps more important, cross-border terrorism
has decreased, not ended. As such, it remains a part of Pakistan’s negotiating strategy,
a disturbing fact with potentially grave long-term consequences for the peace process
itself. It is also worth remembering that agreements, in themselves, are worth little.
India and Pakistan reached negotiated settlements in 1966 and 1973, after all; neither
prevented further bloodshed.

The India-Kashmir Dialogue Axis

If India and Pakistan still have some distance to travel to agreement on Jammu and
Kashmir, what about the second component of the peace process—the negotiations
between India and secessionists in its part of Jammu and Kashmir?
The status of talks between As things stand, the status of talks between India and secessionists in Jammu and
Kashmir induces less optimism than does the détente with Pakistan. Centrist APHC
India and secessionists in
elements held a single round of direct talks with the National Democratic Alliance regime
Jammu and Kashmir induces less of Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee but have since refused to continue the process.
There are several reasons. The most important APHC leader, Maulvi Umar Farooq, and
optimism than does the détente
his immediate family came under terrorist attack for defying jihadi injunctions not to
with Pakistan. negotiate with New Delhi. Because Maulvi Farooq as yet has no male heir, a factor of
enormous import to the clerical dynasty he represents, the threat of assassination is all
the more grave. Centrist leaders such as Maulvi Farooq are conscious of the potential
costs of peacemaking: both his father, Maulvi Mohammad Farooq, and another prominent
moderate, Abdul Gani Lone, were executed by jihadi groups opposed to their decision to
engage India in dialogue.
To persuade jihadi groups to withdraw their opposition, APHC leaders placed several
preconditions for talks with New Delhi, notably permission to visit Pakistan. New Delhi
has been reluctant to make such concessions for two major reasons. First, its principal
interest in the dialogue process within Jammu and Kashmir is to establish a track of
negotiation independent of Pakistan. To involve Pakistan, even symbolically, at the outset
of the dialogue would subvert the process itself. New Delhi is also reluctant to give the
impression of recognizing the APHC, which is just one of several pro-India secessionist
political organizations active in Jammu and Kashmir, as the sole spokesperson for all the
people in the state. Opponents of the APHC’s demands within the Indian establishment
argue that allowing the APHC to visit Pakistan would concede to the organization the de
facto status of the representative of a nation.
Pakistan has good reason to Pakistan has good reason to be less than delighted at the prospect of the political
process within Jammu and Kashmir actually succeeding. A negotiated settlement between
be less than delighted at the India and secessionists in Jammu and Kashmir would marginalize Pakistan, a fact that has
prospect of the political process provoked a predictable response from pro-Pakistan parties to the conflict. The United Jihad
Council, an Islamabad-based apex body made up of several organizations designated by
within Jammu and Kashmir
the United States of America as terrorist, has condemned centrists for even considering
actually succeeding. negotiations with New Delhi. So has Islamist leader Syed Ali Shah Geelani, who heads
the TH. Previously a member of the APHC, Geelani formed the TH to protest, among
other things, the decision of some moderate secessionists to contest the 2002 elections
in Jammu and Kashmir through proxy candidates. Even if the APHC or other centrist
secessionist groups engage New Delhi in dialogue and arrive at a settlement, therefore,
the opposition of terrorist groups and the TH make it unclear if this would achieve the aim
of peacemaking—an end to violence. Indeed, the Jamaat-ud-Dawa, the parent religious-
political organization of the Lashkar-e-Taiba, one of the largest terrorist groups in Jammu
and Kashmir, has opposed even General Musharraf’s partition idea, arguing in a recent issue
of its journal Voice of Islam that the proposal is a sign of “cowardice under pressure.”

6
 Jihadi threat is not the only factor at work. History suggests that political Jihadi threat is not the only
accommodation, while perhaps desirable, does not in itself secure an end to violence.
In November 2004, when Prime Minister Singh visited Srinagar for the first time, two
factor at work. History suggests
terrorists attempted to attack his rally with rocket-propelled grenade launchers. The that political accommodation
officer responsible for the police operation that prevented the attack, Javed Makhdoomi,
. . . does not in itself secure
was cited as a suspect in a 1966 counterterrorism investigation conducted by the force
he now commands. So was one of his contemporaries, the current Jammu and Kashmir an end to violence.
law minister, Muzzafar Beigh—and some figures who have occupied prominent positions
in earlier governments, like National Conference leader Bashir Ahmad Kitchloo. Since the
1950s, India has succeeded in co-opting pro-independence and pro-Pakistan elements;
author Manoj Joshi records that the 1966 suspects were brought on board through a
well-planned, if covert, process. The recruitment of dissidents to the ranks of the Indian
establishment did not stop the emergence of other terrorist groups in the 1970s and
1980s, however. In fact, one can argue that co-optation may have provided the promise
of impunity to those considering violence.
The closer the APHC and New Delhi come to reaching a deal, then, the more interest The closer the APHC and New
jihadi groups will have in sharpening their knives to slaughter the doves. Evidence that
momentum toward peace can, paradoxically, lead to an escalation in killing is not hard to
Delhi come to reaching a deal,
come by. Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee declared a unilateral cease-fire in 2000–2001 then, the more interest jihadi
in an effort to strengthen the hands of moderate elements in the Hizb-ul-Mujaheddin,
groups will have in sharpening
the largest terrorist group operating in Jammu and Kashmir. Its Pakistan-based leader,
Mohammad Yusuf Shah (better known by his nom de guerre, Syed Salahuddin), responded their knives to slaughter the
by sharply escalating attacks on both Indian forces and civilians and, in the end,
doves.
succeeded in forcing India to resume offensive military operations. A similar upsurge in
violence and political assassinations was recorded prior to the several elections held in
Jammu and Kashmir after 1995. Optimists saw these elections to the state’s legislature
and India’s parliament as elements of a normalization process that would lead to the
displacement of armed groups by political forces.
So far, neither APHC moderates nor the Indian establishment have found means to It is hard to see exactly what
break the impasse created by pressure from jihadi groups, and it is hard to see exactly
what might be done unless Pakistan acts to decisively strip terrorist groups of the might be done unless Pakistan
infrastructure that facilitates their violent operations. India, as it has often done in acts to decisively strip terrorist
the past, has responded to the stalemate by pumping in significant amounts of central
development aid in an effort to build a mass constituency for peace. The available
groups of the infrastructure
empirical evidence, however, does not affirm conventional wisdom that there is a causal that facilitates their violent
relationship between jihadi violence and economic deprivation. Contrary to popular
operations.
perception, the roots of the problem in Jammu and Kashmir do not appear to lie in
economic conditions. Jammu and Kashmir are among the most food-secure regions in
India and have the lowest percentage of population living below the poverty line of any
state in the union. Per capita central development aid since the mid-1990s, not including
reimbursements to the state government for security expenditure, is higher than for any
other state in India. Although economic development is indisputably a good thing, there
is no reason to believe that progress will in itself end violence—particularly because the
problem itself is not the consequence of deprivation. Indeed, scholar Sumit Ganguly has
pointed out that the rise of terrorism in the early 1980s may paradoxically have been the
consequence of growing affluence: the result of the frustrations of a new social class that
had both education and economic opportunity but that was denied political power. It is
worth noting, in this context, that although a decade and a half of violence have retarded
economic progress in Jammu and Kashmir, it has not generated the kinds of economic
devastation other conflicts of this kind have caused elsewhere in the world. Interestingly,
the state’s economic backbone, the agricultural sector, has grown steadily through the
years of carnage. The emphasis placed by Indian policymakers on economic development
as a conflict-resolution measure may risk being a means of avoiding addressing difficult
questions of politics and ideology.

7
 Part of the problem seems to be a failure by Indian policymakers to understand the
limitations of their peacemaking paradigm. Writing in 1966, the home minister of Jammu
and Kashmir, D. P. Dhar, noted that
Pakistan’s attempt to build up a movement of espionage and subversion inside the
State of Jammu and Kashmir continues to be an unabated and undeterred menace.
. . . While the administrative machinery in general and the law and order machinery
in particular have to continue to be vigilant and alert, we also have to take an
urgent political view of the situation. In Kashmir, we have to seek and strive for
the emotional enlistment of the people with the rest of the country.
Prime Minister Vajpayee or Prime Minister Singh could have authored much the same
text. “Emotional enlistment” has, variously, meant the co-optation of dissident formations
What is not clear is whether and the large-scale dissemination of economic aid. What is not clear is whether the current
dialogue with secessionists has any greater structural purpose than merely winning over a
the current dialogue with section of dissidents and throwing money at the state’s people—something that has done
secessionists has any greater precious little to halt the bloodshed in Jammu and Kashmir over the years.
The point here is not that dialogue, economic aid, or political accommodation are bad
structural purpose than merely
things. It is, instead, to suggest that although these instruments are means to achieve
winning over a section of certain ends, policymakers must also be acutely conscious of what they cannot achieve.
dissidents and throwing money
at the state’s people.
Moving Peacemaking Forward
Where, then, does the peace process stand?
Making peace is at best a protracted process. Whether Pakistan will be willing to wait
the course or to accept a solution that falls short of its expectations is still unclear—and
is likely to remain so for some time to come. Given the pressures that have been brought
Musharraf . . . may see a to bear on General Musharraf by Islamist groups, he may see a resumption of full-scale
jihad in Jammu and Kashmir as a means of deflecting the attention of those opposed to
resumption of full-scale jihad in his pro–United States stance and of rebuilding his religious legitimacy. Although he has
Jammu and Kashmir as a means cut back on cross-border infiltration, General Musharraf has so far shown a disturbing
unwillingness to actually dismantle the infrastructure of terror. Media reports from
of deflecting the attention of
Pakistan suggest that organizations such as the Lashkar-e-Taiba—designated as terrorist
those opposed to his pro–United by the United States and charged with some of the worst atrocities against civilians in
Jammu and Kashmir—remain free to recruit personnel and raise funds; evidence has even
States stance.
surfaced that some of its cadres have begun to operate in Iraq.
With its eyes focused firmly on Afghanistan and the Middle East, the United States
has so far shown little enthusiasm to push General Musharraf to end the activities of such
groups—a policy that could end up undermining another key policy goal, a stable South
Asia. No great imagination is needed to envision the consequences of a large-scale
rrge-scale
ge-scale act of
terrorism; the military crisis of 2002 made these clear to even the most obtuse observer.
In the short term, the United States needs to ensure that Pakistan moves toward shutting
down terrorist organizations, rather than merely containing their activities. The U.S.
record on this count is far from heartening. Pakistan is reported to have promised U.S.
envoy Richard Gates as early as 1990 that it would shut down terrorist training camps.
It did not. Similar commitments made by General Musharraf in 2002 have yet to be met.
As Pakistan’s principal source As Pakistan’s principal source of aid, the United States could impress upon Pakistan that
violence can no longer be used as a negotiating tool—and that the principal beneficiary
of aid, the United States could of efforts to end violence would not be the Indian state, which has demonstrated its
impress upon Pakistan that ability to wage an endless war of attrition. Those who would gain most from an end to
violence would be ordinary residents of Jammu and Kashmir, the principal victims of a
violence can no longer be used
war waged in their name.
as a negotiating tool. Over the longer run, U.S. policymakers need to consider seriously whether their
traditional modes of intervention in South Asia have yielded desirable outcomes. It may

8
be oversimplifying it to say that these interventions have consisted of providing economic
and military incentives to Pakistan to alleviate its anxieties about the threat it believes its
powerful eastern neighbor poses to its existence as a nation-state. Yet the core idea seems
to be that alleviating Pakistan’s security concerns will lead it to a more accommodative
position. Decades of such incentives have done little to take the edge off Pakistan’s anxieties
about India. Indeed, the existence of what looks like a blank check from the United States
could encourage irresponsible behavior and perpetuate the existence of militarist elements
in Pakistan that have a vested interest in continued hostilities with India. In a larger
sense, the assumption widespread in Washington that third-party intervention, albeit
one conducted behind the scenes, will help break the India-Pakistan deadlock could also
use some careful examination. This assumption is founded on the experience of the 2002
crisis, but one could argue that conventional military deterrence, or the threat of nuclear
escalation, had a more important role in preventing war than international diplomacy did.
The jury is still out on these questions, but history gives no reason for comfort in the
usefulness of diplomacy: UN intervention failed to break the India-Pakistan deadlock in
1947–48; the Soviet Union could not bring about a breakthrough during the talks that took
place after the 1965 war; years of quiet U.S. intervention since the late 1980s have failed
to stave off a succession of near-calamitous crises.
I have no alternate prescription for the things the United States should be doing.
Instead, I would make the somewhat heretical proposal that this might be a good time TThis might be a good time
not to be searching for grand solutions, a good time to stop looking for one-shot cures. A
decade and a half of seemingly uninterrupted crisis have generated a policymaking climate
not to be searching for grand
in which activity and meaningful activity are often conflated. Part of the reason why the solutions, a good time to stop
problem has proved so resistant to resolution is the search for a deus ex machina, a device
looking for one-shot cures.
that will lead a centuries-long history of violence to an instant happy conclusion. It may
be useful for policymakers to stop talking about one single Kashmir problem that can be
resolved through some free-floating exercise of pure reason. What we call the Kashmir What we call the Kashmir
problem is in fact several problems, for which Jammu and Kashmir is only a stage. Among
other things, the problem involves irreconcilable ideas about the basis of nationhood, a
problem is in fact several
crisis of religious and ethnic identity, and the still far-from-spent forces that led to the problems, for which Jammu
partition of India. For jihadi groups and their supporters in Pakistan’s establishment, the
and Kashmir is only a stage.
war in Jammu and Kashmir is merely part of an ever-larger war, one between Islam and
unbelief. And, thanks to the involvement of both public and covert organizations with
deep purses, the Kashmir problem is also an enterprise: a tawdry business in which there
is substantial profit for several actors.
What, then, might an alternate road map look like? The sad truth is that an abiding The sad truth is that an abiding
resolution to the conflict over Jammu and Kashmir may have to wait until India and Pakistan
are able to reinvent their relationship, to re-imagine it free of the trauma of partition—a
resolution to the conflict over
process that could take generations. In the meantime, peacemakers might do well to focus Jammu and Kashmir may have
their energies on the problems of Kashmiris—or the many heterogeneous peoples of Jammu
to wait until India and Pakistan
and Kashmir—rather than the problem of Kashmir. In some sense, the grand geopolitical
narrative called the conflict in Kashmir, on which the world has for decades lavished its are able to reinvent their
diplomatic energies, has displaced the lived experiences of those who form its core. For
relationship.
parents who must shop on Srinagar’s streets or send their children to school in Sopore, what
the world calls the Kashmir problem is the lived experience of grenades and gunfire. For
the people of Jammu and Kashmir, who have had to live with incessant violence and the
hardship it brings for fifteen years, sustaining the reduction of violence seen since 2001
may be more important than anything else. Ensuring that the everyday lives of ordinary
people become more secure must be a cardinal objective of peacemaking.
For this to occur, however, all parties must understand that dialogue is merely a
process—one that does not guarantee any particular outcome. If the contours of a final
resolution do not appear clear today, however, there are things that could be done to
improve the everyday lives of the peoples of Jammu and Kashmir on both sides of the Line
of Control. For one, the United States needs to persuade Pakistan to deepen the process

9
 of military de-escalation by making clear that the use of violence as a medium of political
dialogue is unacceptable. Both India and Pakistan need to allow space for a genuine
dialogue on greater political autonomy for the regions of Jammu and Kashmir under
their control, rather than seeing dialogue as an instrument through which their eventual
territorial goals can be realized or obstructed. A wide-ranging dialogue on autonomy
would give meaning and content to democracy on both sides of the Line of Control.
Collaboration on economic issues is also possible between the two states. In the wake of
the December 2003 cease-fire, small-scale barter-based commerce spontaneously erupted
along some parts of the Line of Control. Authorities brought this short-lived border
enterprise to a quick end, but it served to illustrate the potential that exists. At a larger
level, fruit and nuts from Jammu and Kashmir have a market in Pakistan, while grain,
cloth, and meat products can flow the other way. In several areas, collaborative use of
watersheds would benefit villagers on both sides of the Line of Control. Such interaction
would not jeopardize the final territorial claims of either country, but would help develop
a grassroots interest in peace. I am not proposing that trade or political dialogue would
constitute a resolution of the problem in Jammu and Kashmir; rather, that they might
help create conditions from which a resolution could emerge.
One could argue that all these ideas—and others similar to them—are palliatives.
In the absence of a cure, though, it seems unreasonable to refuse symptomatic relief.
It is also true that even small steps forward involve difficult issues. India and Pakistan
both seem to wish to allow greater freedom of movement across the Line of Control, yet
negotiations to enable such movement are stalled because of concerns in both countries
about the sovereignty implications of the travel documents that will be used to make
Pessimism must be tempered the journey. Pessimism must be tempered by the very fact that there is some sign of
movement, however small. General Musharraf’s new plans may have been intended to
by the very fact that there is prepare his audience at home for less than what official propaganda has promised for
some sign of movement, generations. The distance that has been traversed is evident from the fact that in 1950
the governor general of Pakistan, Khwaja Nizamuddin, thundered that “Pakistan would
however small.
remain incomplete until the whole of Kashmir is liberated.” The prime minister of the
Pakistan-administered province of Azad Kashmir in turn asserted that the dispute “will
be decided only on the battlefield.”
No politician can, with any No politician can, with any seriousness, suggest that war is any longer an option. Yet,
prisoners of their own paradigms, both sides seem unable to move forward. Responses in
seriousness, suggest that both countries to an ongoing dispute over a hydroelectric project on the Chenab River
war is any longer an option. are instructive. In early 2005, Pakistan moved the World Band for the appointment of an
arbitrator, claiming India was being intransigent on the question. In India, the Pakistani
Yet, prisoners of their own
decision was widely seen as a sinister ruse to force third-party intervention in Jammu
paradigms, both sides seem and Kashmir. Some commentators in Pakistan, conversely, claimed the dam threatened
Pakistan‘s irrigation networks, and threw out dark hints of the threat of nuclear war.
unable to move forward.
Little public discourse took place in either country on the details of what is, after all,
a technical dispute over river-water usage. Both sides were reluctant to give ground,
believing it would compromise their positions on India-Pakistan relations in general and
Jammu and Kasmir in particular. Both countries urgently need to find ways to break down
their dispute into discrete, bite-sized chunks—or risk adding another chapter of failed
peacemaking to their tragic history.

10
The Kashmir Region

11
 For more information on this topic, see
our website (www.usip.org), which has an
Of Related Interest
online edition of this report containing Several other publications from the United States Institute of Peace address issues that
links to related websites, as well as addi- relate to the conflict in Kashmir and relations between India and Pakistan. Note: Most of
tional information on the subject. our reports can be downloaded from our website at www.usip.org/pubs.html.

Recent Institute reports include:

India and Pakistan Engagement: Prospects for Breakthrough or Breakdown? (Special
Report, January 2005)
The Political Economy of the Kashmir Conflict: Opportunities for Economic Peacebuilding
and for U.S. Policy, by Wajahat Habibullah (Special Report, June 2004)

To obtain an Institute report (available free of charge), write United States Institute of
Peace, 1200 17th Street NW, Suite 200, Washington, DC 20036-3011; call (202) 429-3832;
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Recent books from USIP Press include:

Grasping the Nettle: Analyzing Cases of Intractable Conflict, edited by Chester A. Crocker,
Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela Aall (January 2005)
Taming Intractable Conflicts: Mediation in the Hardest Cases, by Chester A. Crocker, Fen
Osler Hampson, and Pamela Aall (July 2004)

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