Speed As A Control Factor of Intelligence Measured
Speed As A Control Factor of Intelligence Measured
Typical correlations between single ECTs (elementary cognitive tasks) and IQ are moderate, ranging from -0.2
to -0.4 (Jensen 1998, Sheppard 2007) but increase dramatically when tests are carried out using a battery of
ECTs or if the complexity of the ECTs increases by using competing tasks (Fogarty & Stankov 1995) or dual
tasks (Jensen 1998), although the ECTs bear no resemblance to conventional psychometric tests. Jensen
explains that the reason that a battery of ECTs correlate higher with g, is due to the fact that the “global” speed
component is cumulative to the battery with every ECT added to the test battery, while the unique non-
cognitive speed component for each ECT is only added once. This is analogous to adding various items in a
conventional IQ test, which increases the test correlations with other tests. With respect to speed of processing
between high and low ability groups, the RT difference between High IQ subjects and Low IQ subjects are in
ways that are seemingly paradoxical. A small percentage of the fastest RTs of low IQ subjects are almost as
fast as the fastest RTs of High IQ subjects and faster that the median RTs of the High IQ subjects (Jensen
1998). But where they differ most is in the longest RTs produced. The High IQ subjects almost never produce
any RTs that are as slow as most of the RTs produced by the Low IQ subjects. More importantly, it is the
differences in longer RTs that are highly correlated with IQ and not the shortest RTs as observed by Larson et
al. (1990) and Krantzler (1992).
Fig 1- “The worst performance rule”: The RT data from the original experiment by Larson and Alderton (1990, Table 4) were divided into
16 bands, the mean of which was correlated with g. Mean RT from the slowest bands correlates more strongly with g than the mean RT
from the fastest bands.
Vernon and Kantor (1986) predicted an increase in correlations between speed of processing and reasoning
from timed to untimed conditions. They reasoned that if time constraints are relaxed for reasoning tasks (which
correlates highly with WM) the correlations between speed of processing and reasoning should be higher since
the measure under untimed conditions will contain more speed variance, due to the fact that under untimed
conditions the subjects are able to work through all of the items in a test, and the higher ability subjects will be
able to solve the hardest items (not usually possible under timed conditions), thereby introducing more
variance in scores. The opposing hypothesis to this is that under timed conditions the more able will be able to
go through more items, with a higher percentage of correct responses, since they will work faster and more
accurately through the items compared to the slower subjects. So placing time constraints will increase the
correlations between speed of processing and speeded reasoning. Wilhelm et al. (2001), sets out to test this
hypothesis by using 367 high school students. Test instruments using reasoning and processing speed
subtests were obtained from the Berlin Model of Intelligence Test (BIS-4) of which were divided into 2 groups
of reasoning tests and 1 group of speed test. The subjects were divided into 6 groups, of which all were tested
on both groups of reasoning tests under timed and untimed conditions and 4 groups worked on the speed of
processing tests. The correlations between tests taken by all 6 groups are summarized in table 4, reproduced
below;
The correlations between speed of processing and speeded reasoning is higher than that between speed of
processing and un-speeded reasoning which runs counter to what was hypothesized by Vernon & Kantor
based on the concept of a speed dependent WM, although the relatively lower correlations are still significant
enough that a speed dependent WM cannot be dismissed outright.
A re-analysis of the data was carried out, this time with the response latencies calibrated according to ability of
the subjects. The scores were divided into 3 ability groups for each of the Gf and Gc items with the results on
table 4 re-tabulated below;
Table 4:Mean correct response latencies (SD) for ability groups, with item difficulty calibrated for ability.
Gf Items Gc Items
Ability
Easy Mid-Easy Medium Hard Easy Mid-Easy Medium Hard
latency latency latency latency latency latency latency latency
(ms) (ms) (ms) (ms) (ms) (ms) (ms) (ms)
12470 28820 33982 40409 8530 9711 11285 12068
1
(3162) (10456) (11666) (19884) (1731) (1878) (2703) (3211)
24845 32565 53384 56856 9457 11007 11983 14081
2
(8966) (8325) (20174) (21867) (2066) (3206) (2871) (4776)
31355 35861 57428 69627 9186 10834 11628 13256
3
(7931) (10961) (17898) (28932) (2025) (2879) (3583) (3728)
Note: Statistics reported for Gf item difficulties are with participants grouped according to Gf ability; statistics
reported for Gc item difficulties are with participants grouped according to Gc ability. Response
latencies are in ms. 1 = below average, 2 = average, 3 = above average.
For the Gf items, the latencies increase from easy to difficult items across ability groups with the highest
latencies for the highest ability group. The latencies are highest for the high ability group even for the easiest
items. For the Gc items the latencies increase from easy to the hardest items with the highest latencies
demonstrated among the average group. The latencies are much higher in general for the Gf items compared
to the Gc items. What is obvious from the results are i) the data does not suggest that the subjects higher on
Gf and Gc are faster on the easy items nor does data suggest that ii) the difference in latencies reduces the
more difficult the items become. This pattern or rather the rank order of latencies with respect to item difficulty
still holds, although to a much lesser extent for the Gc items. An important point to note is that the difficulty of
the items used for the higher ability group are harder than that for the lower ability group, and hence what can
be correctly concluded is that the high ability group uses more time for each increment in difficulty of the items,
compared to the low ability group. The findings are different from that showed in table 2, where the high ability
subjects (on both Gf and Gc items) are faster on the easy items. It would seem evident from this study, that the
speed of information processing or the reciprocal measure i.e. the magnitude of the latencies are mediated by
item difficulty and when calibrated for ability, are dependent on the ability level of the subjects. Also the results
of this study, seemingly provides conclusions that run counter to what other studies have indicated with faster
processing speed for higher ability subjects. Interestingly, in testing how mental speed relates to real-world
criteria such as school performance, Rindermann & Neubauer (2002) with their structural equation models
obtained correlations of school performance (on 271 students between years 9 to 11) with IQ of 0.5,
processing speed and school performance of 0.35 (0.39 for high ability subjects compared to 0.26 for average
ability subjects). They concluded that although processing speed can “index” performance such as school
grades and cognitive abilities, it cannot substitute psychometric intelligence or g since the correlations between
school performance and speed of processing cannot be as high as that between school performance and IQ.
It seems then that the differences in general ability is more pronounced when measured using more complex
cognitive operations and tasks and that IQ tests are still a more reliable measure of cognitive ability compared
to applying an apparent common index graded along a single continuum of measurement, speed.
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