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Trainee Reference Book
Basic Aviation Security Course
For Restricted Circulation
Published by
Bureau of Civil Aviation Security (BCAS)
Issue Date: 20th October 2014
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PREFACE
Civil aviation is a powerful force for progress in our modern global society. A healthy and growing
air transport system creates and supports millions of jobs worldwide. It forms part of the
economic lifeline of many countries. It is a catalyst for travel and tourism and the world's largest
industry. Beyond economics, air transport enriches the social and cultural fabric of society.
In recent years the aviation industry has seen the emergence of world‐wide attacks against the
safety and security of the travelling public, airports, aircraft and other persons working within the
aviation industry on and off airport and air navigation facilities.
The counter‐measures to these acts against civil aviation can be effective only as long as the
people responsible for protecting civil aviation against acts of unlawful interference receive
appropriate training to carry out their jobs efficiently and effectively.
This Trainee Reference Book has been developed by The Bureau of Civil Aviation Security(BCAS),
to enable trainees to acquire the necessary knowledge and skills to be better able to implement
Aviation Security preventive measures. This is in accordance with the appropriate National Civil
Aviation Security Program, Airport / Airline Security Programs and Aviation Security Standards and
Recommended Practices prescribed by ICAO.
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AVIATION SECURITY TRAINING PROGRAMME
International Legislations
Annex – 17
Standard3.1.7 From 1 July 2013, each Contracting State shall ensure the development
and implementation of training programmes and an instructor certification system in
accordance with the national civil aviation security programme.
Standard 3.4.2: Each Contracting State shall ensure that the persons implementing
security controls possess all competencies required to perform their duties and are
appropriately trained according to the requirements of the national civil aviation security
programme and that appropriate records are maintained up to date. Relevant standards of
performance shall be established and initial and periodic assessments shall be introduced
to maintain those standards.
Standard 3.4.3 Each Contracting State shall ensure that the persons carrying out screening
operations are certified according to the requirements of the national civil aviation
security programme to ensure that performance standards are consistently and are
reliably achieved.
National Legislations
Aviation Security Order / Circular
Order 12 / 2011 The objective of the National Civil Aviation Security Programme
(NCASP) is to safeguard Civil aviation operations against acts of
unlawful interference through regulations, practices and
procedures which take account of the safety regularly and
efficiency of flights.
Order 20/2011 The objective of the National Civil Aviation Security Training
Programme (NCASTP) is to provide a frame‐work for the selection
and training of staff involved in Aviation Security by stipulating the
various responsibilities for ensuring this all‐important activity.
Aviation Security Training Package (ASTP)
The Basic Aviation Security Training is based on the Aviation Security Training Package
(ASTP) issued by International Civil Aviation Organisation
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BASIC AVIATION SECURITY TRAINING PROGRAM
LIST OF MODULES
Module
Subject Page Number
No.
1 Opening Activities, Course Introduction And Administration 05 – 20
2 Overview of International Civil Aviation Security 21 – 44
3 Working At The Airport 45 – 53
4 Access Control – People 54 – 63
5 Access Control – Vehicles 64 – 72
6 Landside Security 73‐78
7 Recognition of Explosive Devices And Other Prohibited Articles 79‐95
8 Building and Area Search Procedure 96 – 102
9 Patrolling and Guarding 103 – 112
10 Screening and Searching of Passengers and Baggage 113 – 124
11 Conventional X‐Ray Equipment 125 – 133
12 Protection of Aircraft 134 – 138
13 Physical Inspection of Baggage 139 – 147
14 Carriage of arms and/or ammunition by air 148 – 155
15 Emergencies and Contingencies 156 – 169
16 Escorting People and Consignments 170 – 178
17 Protecting Aircraft Catering Uplift 179 – 182
18 Protecting Cargo, Mail and Courier 183 – 192
19 Behavior Detection 193‐200
20 Insider Threat 201‐206
21 Cyber Security 207‐213
22 Passenger Profiling and Security 214‐220
Attachments:‐
Annexure‐ A: Sample course schedule Annexure‐
B: Participant Profile
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Module‐1
Introduction to the Course
Module Objective
To understand the course objective, structure and methodology
To understand the Terminologies related to Aviation Security and Vital Installations
Act and rules related to AVSEC
To learn about the organisations involved in Aviation security and of the applicable legislation
followed for Civil Aviation
Need for Security Awareness
Teaching Methods
Slide Presentations
Lectures by certified instructors
Group discussions
Demonstrations
Role‐ playing and practical exercises
Site visits to the Airport
Tests and Homework
Overnight reading Assignments
Progress Tests
Mastery Test ( Written and Practical )
Course Objective:
After completion of this course, the trainees will be able to:
Understand the nature of the threats to civil aviation;
Understand civil aviation from an international, regional and national perspective
Work in and move around an airport safely;
Communicate and cooperate with other airport agencies;
Carry out access control duties to control the movement of people and vehicles ;
Guard and patrol airport operational facilities, vulnerable areas, and aircraft;
Recognize ‘Prohibited Articles’ including weapons and explosive and incendiary devices;
Understand the concepts of screening and searching passengers and baggage; and
Respond to security incidents or airport emergencies.
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Terminologies Related To AVSEC and Vital Installations at Airport
Terms that are defined in the International Civil Aviation Vocabulary (Doc 9713) and the
Annexes are used in accordance with the meanings and usages given therein. A wide
variety of terms are in use throughout the world to describe facilities, procedures and
concepts for airport operations and planning. As far as possible, the terms used in this
document are those which have the widest international use.
Accompanied hold baggage: Baggage which is accepted for carriage in the hold of an aircraft and which is
checked in by the passenger who is on board.
Acts of unlawful interference. These are acts or attempted acts such as to jeopardize the safety of civil
aviation, i.e., including but not limited to:
• unlawful seizure of aircraft
• destruction of an aircraft in service,
• hostage‐taking on board aircraft or on aerodromes,
• forcible intrusion on board an aircraft, at an airport or on the premises of an aeronautical facility,
• introduction on board an aircraft or at an airport of a weapon or hazardous device or material
intended for criminal purposes,
• use of an aircraft in service for the purpose of causing death, serious bodily injury, or serious damage
to property or the environment,
• communication of false information such as to jeopardize the safety of an aircraft in flight or on the
ground, of passengers, crew, ground personnel or the general public, at an airport or on the premises
of a civil aviation facility.
Aircraft: Any machine that can derive support in the atmosphere from the reactions of the air other than
the reactions of the air against the earth’s surface.
Aircraft in flight: An aircraft from the moment when all its external doors are closed following embarkation
until the moment when such doors are opened for disembarkation.
Aircraft in service: A parked aircraft which is under surveillance sufficient to detect unauthorized access.
Aircraft not in service: An aircraft that either is parked for a period of more than 12 hours or is not under
surveillance sufficient to detect unauthorized access.
Aircraft security check: An inspection of the interior of an aircraft to which passengers may have had
access and an inspection of the hold for the purposes of discovering suspicious objects, weapons,
explosives or other dangerous devices, articles and substances.
Aircraft security search: A thorough inspection of the interior and exterior of the aircraft for the purpose
of discovering suspicious objects, weapons, explosives or other dangerous devices, articles or substances.
Aerodrome: Any area in a Contracting State which is open for commercial aircraft operations.
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Airside: The movement area of an airport, adjacent terrain and buildings or portions thereof, access to
which is controlled.
Appropriate authority for aviation security: The authority designated by a State within its administration
to be responsible for the development, implementation and maintenance of the national civil aviation
security programme.
Apron: A defined area, on a land aerodrome, intended to accommodate aircraft for purposes of loading or
unloading passengers, mail or cargo, fuelling, parking or maintenance.
Annexure 17 (to the Chicago convention): Security specifications of the International Civil Aviation
Organization, applicable to all member states. The specifications are divided into Standards and
Recommended Practices (SARP’s).
Background check: A check of a person’s identity and previous experience, including, where legally
permissible, any criminal history, as part of the assessment of an individual’s suitability to implement a
security control and/or for unescorted access to a security restricted area.
Baggage: Personal property of passengers or crew carried on an aircraft by agreement with the operator.
Baggage Breakup Area: The area where all the arrival passenger’s bags are delivered to them.
Baggage sorting area: Space in which departure baggage is sorted into flight loads. (The area is also known
as Baggage Makeup Area)
Baggage storage area: Space in which checked/hold baggage is stored pending transport to aircraft and
space in which mishandled baggage may be held until forwarded, claimed or otherwise disposed of.
Behavior Detection (Profiling ) : Systematic observation of persons and baggage and questioning if
necessary to categorize them into two groups i.e. threatening and non‐threatening so that more attention
can be paid to the threatening category.
Bomb alert: A status of alert put in place by competent authorities to activate an intervention plan
intended to counter the possible consequences arising from a communicated threat, anonymous or
otherwise, or arising from the discovery of a suspect device or other suspect item on an aircraft, at an
airport or in any civil aviation facilities.
Bomb threat: A communicated threat, anonymous or otherwise, which suggests, or infers, whether true or
false that the safety of an aircraft in flight or on the ground, or any airport or civil aviation facility or any
person may be in danger from an explosive or other item or device.
Cabin baggage: Baggage intended for carriage in the cabin of an aircraft.
Cargo: Any property carried on an aircraft other than mail, stores and accompanied or mishandled
baggage.
Catering stores: All items, other than catering supplies, associated with passenger in‐flight services, for
example newspapers, magazines, headphones, audio and video tapes, pillows and blankets, and amenity
kits.
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Catering supplies: Food, beverages, other dry stores and associated equipment used on board an aircraft.
Check‐in: The process of reporting to an aircraft operator for acceptance on a particular flight.
Co‐mail: Abbreviation of aircraft operator company mail, shipped within the company’s network of
stations.
Co‐mat: Abbreviation of aircraft operator company materials, shipped within the company’s network of
stations.
Contingency plan: A “proactive” plan to include measures and procedures addressing various threat levels,
risk assessments and the associated security measures to be implemented, designed in order to anticipate
as well as prepare all concerned parties having roles and responsibilities in the event of an actual act of
unlawful interference.
Corporate aviation: The non‐commercial operation or use of aircraft by a company for the carriage of
passengers or goods as an aid to the conduct of company business, flown by a professional pilot employed
to fly the aircraft.
(Note that corporate aviation is a subset of general aviation.)
Courier service: An operation whereby shipments tendered by one or more shippers are transported as
the baggage of a courier passenger on board a scheduled aircraft operator service under normal passenger
hold baggage documentation.
Crew member: A person assigned by an operator to duty on an aircraft during a flight duty period.
Crisis management: Contingency measures implemented in response to increased threat levels as well as
implementation of measures and procedures in response to the emergencies to include acts of unlawful
interference.
Dangerous goods: Articles or substances which are capable of posing a risk to health, safety, property or
the environment and which are shown in the list of dangerous goods in the Technical Instructions or which
are classified according to those Instructions.
Deportee: A person who had legally been admitted to a State by its authorities or who had entered a State
illegally, and who at some later time is formally ordered by the competent authorities to leave that State.
Note. — The competent authorities may provide an escort for such persons.
Diplomatic pouch (bag): A shipping container having diplomatic immunity from search or seizure.
Disruptive passenger: A passenger who fails to respect the rules of conduct at an airport or on board an
aircraft or to follow the instructions of the airport staff or crew members and thereby disturbs the good
order and discipline at an airport or on board the aircraft.
Gate‐no Show: Passenger who has checked in (may have registered baggage), but not reported for
boarding.
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General aviation operation: An aircraft operation other than a commercial air transport operation or an
aerial work operation.
Hijacking:Any person who on board an aircraft in flight: (i) Unlawfully, by force or threat thereof, or by any
other form of intimidation, seizes, or exercises control of that aircraft, or attempts to perform any such act,
or (ii) is an accomplice of a person who performs or attempts to perform any such act, commits the
offence of hijacking that aircraft.
Identification cards: See Permits.
Inadmissible person: A person who is or will be refused admission to a State by its authorities. Such
persons normally have to be transported back to their State of departure, or to any other State where the
persons are admissible, by the aircraft operator on which they arrived. (See appropriate Standards in
Annex 9 — Facilitation, Chapter 5.)
Interline Passenger: Passenger who is transferred between aircraft of different air carriers during the
course of his journey.
In‐flight security officer: A person who is employed and trained by the government of the State of the
Operator or by the government of the State of registration to be deployed on an aircraft with the purpose
of protecting that aircraft and its occupants against acts of unlawful interference. This excludes persons
employed to provide exclusive personal protection for one or more specific people travelling on the
aircraft, such as personal bodyguards.
Interline baggage: Baggage of passengers subject to transfer from the aircraft of one operator to the
aircraft of another operator in the course of the passenger’s journey.
Isolation Bay: A designated parking bay at the airport far away from the main passenger terminal,
exclusively designed for the purpose of parking the affected aircraft in order to handle contingencies and
other threat situations.
LAGs: Liquids, aerosols and gels, in any volume, for sale at airport outlets (excluding food and beverages
for consumption in the airport premises and not intended for carriage into the aircraft passenger cabin) or
on board aircraft during the day(s) of the journey, either in the airside area or in a security‐restricted area.
Landside: That area of an airport and buildings to which both travelling passengers and the non‐travelling
public have unrestricted access. (See also Non‐restricted area.)
Mail: Dispatches of correspondence and other items tendered by and intended for delivery to postal
services in accordance with the rules of the Universal Postal Union (UPU).
Mishandled baggage: Baggage involuntarily, or inadvertently, separated from passengers or crew.
Movement area: That part of an aerodrome to be used for the take‐off, landing and taxiing of aircraft,
consisting of the maneuvering area and the apron(s).
Non‐restricted area: Areas of an airport to which the public have access or to which access is otherwise
unrestricted.
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Permits: A permit system consists of cards or other documentation issued to individual persons employed
on airports or who otherwise have need for authorized access to the airport, airside or security restricted
area. Its purpose is to identify the individual and facilitate access. Vehicle permits are issued and used for
similar purposes to allow vehicular access. Permits are sometimes referred to as airport identity cards or
passes.
Person with disabilities (with reduced mobility):Any person whose mobility is reduced due to a physical
incapacity (sensory or locomotor), an intellectual deficiency, age, illness or any other cause of disability
when using transport and whose situation needs special attention and the adaptation to the person’s
needs of the services made available to all passengers.
Pier: A corridor at, above or below ground level to connect aircraft stands to a passenger building
Pilot‐in‐command: The pilot responsible for the operation and safety of the aircraft during flight time.
Regulated agent: An agent, freight forwarder or any other entity who conducts business with an operator
and provides security controls that are accepted or required by the appropriate authority in respect of
cargo, courier and express parcels or mail.
Restricted articles: Articles which are, in the specific context of aviation security, defined as those articles,
devices or substances which may be used to commit an act of unlawful interference against civil aviation or
which may endanger the safety of the aircraft and its occupants, or installations and the public.
Sabotage: An act or omission, intended to cause malicious or wanton destruction of property, endangering
or resulting in unlawful interference with international civil aviation and its facilities.
Screening: The application of technical or other means which are intended to identify and/or detect
weapons, explosives or other dangerous devices, articles or substances which may be used to commit an
act of unlawful interference.
Security / Aviation Security: Safeguarding civil aviation against acts of unlawful interference. This objective
is achieved by a combination of measures and human and material resources.
Security equipment: Devices of a specialized nature for use, individually or as part of a system, in the
prevention or detection of acts of unlawful interference with civil aviation and its facilities.
Security programme: Written measures adopted to safeguard international civil aviation against acts of
unlawful interference.
Security Restricted Area: Those areas of the airside of an airport which are identified as priority risk areas
where in addition to access control, other security controls are applied. Such areas shall normally include,
inter alia, all commercial aviation passenger departure areas between the screening checkpoint and the
aircraft, the ramp, baggage make‐up areas, including those where aircraft are being brought into service
and screened baggage and cargo are present, cargo sheds, mail centres, airside catering and aircraft
cleaning premises.
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Security test: A covert or overt trial of an aviation security measure which simulates an attempt to commit
an unlawful act.
STEBs: Security tamper‐evident bags that should only be used for the sale of LAGs by airport outlets or on
board aircraft.
Sterile area: That area between any passenger inspection or screening control point and aircraft into which
access is strictly controlled. (Also known as Security restricted area.)
Terminal: The main building or group of buildings where the processing of commercial passengers and
freight and the boarding of aircraft occurs.
Transfer passengers/baggage: Passengers/baggage making direct connections between two different
flights.
Transit passengers: Passengers departing from an airport on the same flight as that on which they arrived.
Travel document: A passport or other official document of identity issued by a State or organization which
may be used by the rightful holder for international travel.
Unaccompanied baggage: Baggage that is transported as cargo and may or may not be carried on the
same aircraft with the person to whom it belongs.
Unclaimed baggage: Baggage that arrives at an airport and is not picked up or claimed by a passenger.
Unidentified baggage. Baggage at an airport, with or without a baggage tag, which is not picked up by or
identified with a passenger.
Unruly passengers: Persons who commit on board a civil aircraft, from the moment when the aircraft door
is closed prior to take‐off to the moment when it is reopened after landing, an act of:
• assault, intimidation, menace or wilful recklessness which endangers good order or the safety of
property or persons;
• assault, intimidation, menace or interference with a crew member in the performance of duties or
which lessens the ability to perform duties;
• wilful recklessness or damage to an aircraft, its equipment, or attendant structures and equipment
such as to endanger good order and safety of the aircraft or its occupants;
• communication of information which is known to be false, thereby endangering the safety of an
aircraft in flight;
• Disobedience of lawful commands or instructions for safe, orderly or efficient operations.
Vulnerable point: Any facility on or connected with an airport, which, if damaged or destroyed, would
seriously impair the functioning of the airport. Example ATC, Fuel storage area etc
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ABBREVIATIONS
1. AAI ‐ Airports Authority of India
2. AC – Aerodrome Committee
3. ACI ‐ Airport Council International
4. ACS ‐ Assistant Commissioner of Security
5. ACOS (CA) ‐ Additional Commissioner of Security Civil Aviation
6. AEP ‐ Aerodrome Entry Permit
7. APSC ‐ Airport Security Committee
8. APSU ‐ Airport Security Unit
9. ASG ‐ Aviation Security Group
10. ASTI – Aviation Security Training Institute
11. ASTP ‐ Aviation Security Training Package
12. AWB – Air Way Bill
13. AVSEC – Aviation Security
14. BBA – Baggage Break‐up Area
15. BCAS ‐ Bureau of Civil Aviation Security
16. BDDS ‐ Bomb Detection and Disposal Squad
17. BMA – Baggage Make‐up Area
18. BTAC ‐ Bomb Threat Assessment Committee
19. BTCP ‐ Bomb Threat Contingency Plan
20. BWAF ‐ Bomb Warning Assessment Form
21. CASO ‐ Chief Aerodrome Security Officer
22. CC – Central Committee
23. CCTV ‐ Close Circuit Television
24. CISF ‐ Central Industrial Security Force
25. CCS – Cabinet Committee on Security
26. COE ‐ Controller of Explosives
27. COSAH ‐ Committee of Secretaries on Aircraft Hijacking
28. COS(CA) ‐ Commissioner of Security (Civil Aviation)
29. CRPF – Central Reserve Police Force
30. CTP – Combined Test Piece
31. CLIP‐ Caller Line Identification Procedure
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32. DAW – Directorate of Air Worthiness
33. DCOS(CA) ‐ Deputy Commissioner of Security (Civil Aviation)
34. DFMD ‐ Door Frame Metal Detector
35. DGR – Dangerous Goods Regulation
36. DGCA ‐ Directorate General of Civil Aviation
37. EDDS ‐ Explosive Device Detection System
38. EDS ‐ Explosive Detection System
39. ETD ‐ Explosive Trace Detector
40. EVD ‐ Explosive Vapour Detector
41. HHMD – Hand Held Metal Detector
42. HUM ‐ Human Remains
43. IATA ‐ International Air Transport Association
44. ICAO ‐ International Civil Aviation Organisation
45. IED ‐ Improvised Explosive Device
46. IFSO – In‐flight Security Officer
47. LTPE ‐ Low Temperature Plastic Explosive
48. LAG’s ‐ Liquid Aerosols and Gels
49. MCA ‐ Ministry of Civil Aviation
50. MHA ‐ Ministry of Home Affairs
51. MANPADS ‐ Man Portable Air Defence System
52. MZDFMD ‐ Multi Zone Door Frame Metal Detector
53. NCASTP ‐ National Civil Aviation Security Training Programme
54. NCASQCP ‐ National Civil Aviation Security Quality Control Programme
55. NCASP ‐ National Civil Aviation Security Programme
56. NSG – National Security Guards
57. OTP – Operating Test Piece
58. PSO – Personal Security Officer
59. QRT – Quick Reaction Team
60. RDCOS(CA) – Regional Deputy Commissioner of Security (Civil Aviation)
61. SARP – Standards and Recommended Practices
62. SLPC – Secondary Ladder Point Checks
63. SOP – Standard Operating Procedure
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64. STP – Standardised Training Package
65. SPG – Special Protection Group
66. TIP – Threat Image Projection
67. UVSS ‐ Under Vehicle Search System
68. UVSM ‐ Under Vehicle Search Mirror
68. XBIS – X‐ray Baggage Inspection System
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Aircraft Acts and Rules of 1934 & 1937
Aircraft Acts of 1934
It extends to the whole of India and applies also‐
(a) To citizens of India wherever they may be;
(b) To, and to the persons on, aircraft registered in India wherever they may be;
(c) To, and to the persons on, aircraft registered outside India but for the time being in or over India; and.
(d) To an aircraft operated by a person who is not a citizen of India bus h as his principal place of business
or permanent residence in India.
Section 5 Power of Central Government to make rules for Civil Aviation
Section 5 A Power to issue directions (DGCA or any other officer empowered by Central Govt)
Section 10 Penalty for act in contravention of Rule made under Section 5 of the Aircraft Acts.
(2‐3 years imprisonment or fine uptoRs. 10 Lakhs or both)
Section 11 A Penalty for failure to comply with directions issued under section 5A (2 years
imprisonment or fine uptoRs. 10 Lakhs or both)
Section 11 B Penalty for failure to comply with direction issued under Section 9A (2 years
imprisonment or fine uptoRs. 10 Lakhs or both)
Aircraft Rules of 1937
The Aircraft Rules 1937, extends to the whole of India and apply also (unless the contrary intention
appears)‐
(a) To, and to persons on, aircraft registered in India wherever they may be, expect cases falling under
sub‐rule (4).
(b) To, and to persons on, all aircraft for the time being in or over India.
Rule 8 Carriage of arms, ammunitions, explosives, military stores etc.
Rule 8 A Security check of persons boarding aircraft at aerodrome
Rule 13 Photograph at aerodromes or from aircraft in‐flight.
Rule 24 Prohibition on consumption of intoxicating and psychoactive substances.
Rule 24 A Carriage of persons suffering from mental disorders or epilepsy in aircraft
Rule 24 B Carriage of prisoners in an aircraft
Rule 24 C Carriage of animals, birds and reptiles in aircraft
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Rule 90 Entry into Public Aerodromes (Access Control)
Inspection of aircrafts – (Empowers some of government officials authorized by
Rule 156 Central Government to enter aircraft for inspection, but are not exempted from
frisking/searching)
Rules 2003 Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Air.
The Aircraft (Security) Rule 2011
Rule 17 Disembarkation of Unruly Passenger
Rule 21 Security check before embarkation
Rule 22 Certification of Screeners
Rule 23 Prohibition on carriage of certain goods (in cabin baggage)
Rule 26 Deployment of staff (for security duties)
Rule 27 Security search of aircraft
Rule 28 Access control of aircraft
Rule 29 Locking of cockpit door
Rule 30 Deployment of IFSO
Rule 31 Security control for hold baggage
Rule 37 Security control for Cargo and Courier bags
Rule 40 Prohibition on carriage of certain goods (in cargo and courier)
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Role of Various Agencies in Aviation Security
Role of Airline Security
National legislations
Aviation (Security) Rules 2011
Part V Security Measures By Aircraft Operators
Aviation Security Order / Circular
Order 03/2009 Security functions to be carried out by Aircraft Operators
Order 05/2009 Norms for deployment of Airline Security staff for Security
functions (Recommendations by Shri Arun Mishra Committee)
Security functions to be carried out by Aircraft Operators
Security of Aircraft
Aircraft Search (Pre‐flight anti sabotage Checks)
Security of parked / idle aircraft.
Screening of Registered Baggage
For security and surveillance in BMA and for accompanying the screened baggage up to aircraft.
Security in Baggage break‐up area.
Screening and escorting of screened cargo / unaccompanied baggage
Secondary security checks.
Surveillance in departure hall
Security of catering items.
Security of Control Room (including bag tags, boarding cards, etc.)
Role of Aviation Security Group (ASG) / Airport Security Unit (APSU)
National legislations
Aviation (Security) Rules 2011
Rule 13 Aviation Security Group (ASG)
Rule 14 Duties of Chief Aerodrome Security Officer (CASO)
Aviation Security Order / Circular
Circular 10/2000 Induction of CISF in the airports for aviation security duties.
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CISF (Central Industrial Security Force)
CISF has been entrusted with security of airports in India. They are designated as
Aviation Security Group (ASG).
Wherever the State / Union Territory Police is responsible for security they are termed
as Airport Security Unit (APSU)
The In‐charge of CISF at an airport is designated as the Chief Aerodrome Security Officer
(CASO) and is responsible for enforcement of security measures at an airport.
Unit’s or Components of ASG/APSU
Intelligence and surveillance unit
Anti‐hijacking unit
Support unit
Protection unit
These units will perform following functions: Anti‐
hijacking unit:
Guarding of access control points to prevent unauthorized entry.
Pre‐embarkation checks of passengers and hand baggage.
Security of sterile area, apron and ramp policing
Guarding of aircraft on ground.
Protection Unit:
Protection of perimeter, ATC.
Carry out mobile and foot patrols.
Guarding of cargo complex.
Guarding of terminal buildings.
Cordoning of aircraft in case of in case of unlawful interference.
Intelligence and surveillance unit:
They will keep surveillance in terminal building, passenger lounge, security hold, apron and any other
area assigned by CASO.
Support Unit:
Control room which will work round the clock.
Administrative work.
The ASG’s BDDS unit is responsible for the following functions
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Detection and disposal of Explosive Devices.
Attending bomb threat calls of aircraft and terminal buildings
Handling of unclaimed and suspected baggage.
Disposal / Demolition of confirm threat / IED.
Store Explosive used in demolition of IEDs.
Participate in theBTAC.
Role of Airport Operator
National legislations
Aviation (Security) Rules 2011
Part II Security Measures at Aerodrome
NCASP 2011
Chapter 4.3.2 The AVSEC responsibilities of Airport Operators
AVSEC responsibilities of Airport Operators:
Convene the Aerodrome Committee meetings
Issuance of vehicle permits & ADP for access of vehicles in operational areas
Preparation of various Contingency Plans for the airport which is required to be approved by
Appropriate Authority.
Provision & maintenance of Perimeter / fencing, Perimeter road, perimeter lighting, apron, gates /
entry points, security hold area, frisking points/booth, Provision of Security Stamps, hand baggage
checking counter, isolated parking bay, Cooling pit etc
Provision & maintenance of electronic equipments / devices like X‐ray BIS, DFMD, HHMD for passenger
screening
Sign boards for educating the passengers / airport employees
Co‐ordination in the event of any contingency at the airport.
To conduct Airport Security Committee (APSC) meetings.
Inline Screening.(Wherever Applicable)
Airport Fire Services (AFS)
Air Traffic Services
All operational and administrative expenses of ASG/APSU
Issuance of Temporary airport entry passes
Appreciate the Need for Security Awareness
Security staff should learn how to recognise suspicious patterns of behaviour, while understanding the
importance of avoiding racial and ethnic stereotyping.
The following are examples of possible suspicious behaviours which may be an attempt at reconnaissance
or the beginning of an actual attack:
Unknown persons photographing procedures or facilities
Vehicles with personnel in them loitering and perhaps taking photographs or creating diagrams of
procedures or facilities
Unknown persons attempting to gain access to facilities
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Unknown contractors trying to gain access to facilities to repair, replace, service, or install equipment
Unexpected package drop offs or attempted drop offs
Unknown persons loitering in the vicinity of facilities for extended periods of time. These persons may
be attempting to plant explosive devices, observing how long it takes for someone to notice them and
take action or even be participating in suicide bomber activities.
Attempts to gain information about procedures:
Out‐of‐the‐ordinary telephone phone calls by unknown persons trying to ascertain security,
personnel, or standard operating procedures.
E‐mails from unknown sources attempting to obtain information regarding the facility, personnel,
or standard operating procedures
Unknown persons attempting to gain information about operations, aircraft, or facilities by walking
up to personnel or their families and engaging them in a conversation.
Unknown persons or individuals establishing unauthorised or unlicensed businesses or roadside food
stands either adjacent or in proximity to facilities. Street vendors attempting to sell merchandise to
passengers.
General aviation aircraft operating in close proximity to airport facilities or passenger aircraft when
they don’t normally do so.
Anti‐national sentiments being expressed by employees or vendors. Anti‐national pamphlets or flyers
distributed to employees or placed on windshields in parking lots.
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Module 2
Overview of International Civil Aviation Security
Module Objective:
Describe threats to Civil Aviation
Nuclear , Biological , Chemical and Radio‐active material threats
Sabotage of aircraft , airport and armed attack
Type of offender (mentally challenged / disgruntled employees, criminals, terrorist etc.)
Vulnerability of Civil Aviation operations
Unlawful seizure of aircraft
Aviation Security Convention
National Legislations
Regional Civil aviation Conference
Key responsibility of states and appropriate authority
NCASP / SOP
Teaching Methods
Slide Presentations
Lectures by certified instructors
Group discussions
Demonstrations
Role‐ playing and practical exercises
Overnight reading Assignments
Progress Tests
Mastery Test ( Written and Practical )
International Legislations
Annex 17
Standard 3.1.3 Each Contracting State shall keep under constant review the level
of threat to civil aviation within its territory, and establish and
implement policies and procedures to adjust relevant elements of
its National Civil Aviation Security Programme accordingly, based
upon a security risk assessment carried out by the relevant
national authorities
National Legislation
NCASP 2011
Chapter 12 Adjustment of programme
Aviation Security Order / Circular
Circular 01/2008 Categorization of Airports
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Primary Objective of Aviation Security
The primary objective of the Aviation Security is the safety and security of passengers, crew, ground
personnel, general public, airports, aviation installations and all other matters relating to safeguard against
acts of unlawful interference with civil aviation operations.
Aviation Security Principles
Civil Aviation shall operate from a Safe and Secure environment;
Develop and implement Legislation and procedures necessary to ensure a safe and secure
environment;
Security measures shall be consistent with Standards
Prosecute or extradite persons who carry out acts of unlawful interference
Nature of Threats
Conventional / Traditional threats to Civil Aviation
Sabotage of Aircraft
Sabotage of Airports
Hijacking of aircraft on the ground or in flight; and
Armed attacks on / off airport facilities.
TYPES / CHARACTERISTICS OF OFFENDERS
Mentally deranged persons / Psychotics
Persons seeking revenge ‐ Disgruntled employees /Dissatisfied passengers
Terrorists individuals and groups
Criminals individuals and groups
TERRORISM
Terrorism is an act of placing someone in extreme fear. It is the unlawful use of violence against the Public
to intimidate a Government.
Factors contributing to terrorism:
Religious factors
Economic conditions of a country
Natural disasters
Political factors
Social recognition
The supports needed by the terrorist organizations:
Financial support
Motivated manpower
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Support of Public
Arms & Ammunition
Media
Training
Who are the Terrorists?
Terrorists are generally people who feel alienated from society and have a grievance or regard
themselves as victims of an injustice.
Terrorists are devoted to their political or religious cause and do not regard their violent actions as
criminal.
Terrorists are ruthless and show no fear, pity or remorse.
Characteristics of Terrorists
Target specific individuals on an aircraft, such as Diplomats or VIPs
Engender fear of flying in the general public and disrupt normal life; and
Obtain the release of prisoners, perhaps from their own group
They operate in small groups or complex networks
They are usually well organized
Have access to necessary resources such as money, technical expertise, weapons, explosives and
sometimes supported by governments or States; and
Aims are political in nature
Characteristics of Criminals
Attacks on Civil Aviation by criminal groups or individuals are rare and their motivation is
Monetary gain or
Extortion
Personal gains
Difficult to classify
Unpredictable
New and Emerging Threats faced by Civil Aviation
Suicide Attack on the Airport/Aircraft Facilities
Use of Aircraft as a weapon of mass destruction
Use of Nuclear weapon, Radioactive Substances and Dangerous Goods.
Use of Chemical and Biological warfare
Air to air attack by Missile
Ground to Air attack by Missile (MANPADS)
Cyber Terrorism
Use of Magnetic System
Attack through the electronic system to misguide the air traffic communication.
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CBRN – chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear attack
Chemical warfare
Biological warfare
Radioactive substances
Nuclear weapons
A growing concern among security professionals is that terrorists will someday use CBRN materials, in an
attack against an unsuspecting public.
Chemical weapons are those that are effective because their chemical action can cause death, permanent
harm or temporary incapacity.
Some toxic chemicals, such as phosgene, hydrogen cyanide and tear gas, may be used for both civil and
peaceful, and hostile purposes. When they are used for hostile purposes, they are considered chemical
weapons.
Biological weapons are weapons that achieve their intended effects by infecting people with deliberate
release of dangerous bacteria, viruses or fungi, or biological toxins (e.g. Anthrax, Small pox, ricin, a natural
toxin occurring in plants).
Radiologicalweapon is designed to spread radioactive material such as uranium, plutonium etc with the
intent to kill and cause disruption upon a city or nation.
Nuclear: Death and injury caused from caused from the effects of an explosion that includes blinding light,
intense heat (thermal radiation), initial nuclear radiation, blast, fires started by the heat pulse, and
secondary fires caused by the destruction.
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Why is civil aviation considered as an attractive target?
Instant Publicity
Aircraft is mobile
Different nationalities on board
Aircraft can be easily taken in control
Aircraft itself can be used as a missile
Small amount of explosive is sufficient to cause huge damage to aircraft
Adverse impact on tourism thereby furthering the terrorist cause
Excellent Means of extortion
Economic damage to the country
Economic damage to the airline
Airline carry the flag of the nation
Large number of people in a confined area
Where can the threats come from?
Terrorist disguised as a passenger with the intent to hijack the plane
A terrorist may infiltrate a piece of luggage containing an explosive device directly onto the conveyor
belt
Using naïve passenger to infiltrate a bomb into their luggage
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Explosive device concealed at the check in area set to explode during the operations
Direct attack
Explosive device placed at the boarding gate area
Passenger used after check‐in
Interline passengers and baggage
Cargo/Courier infiltration
Catering infiltration
Airport employees
Terrorist disguised as an airport worker
Explosive device or weapon left on board to be used on the second leg of the flight
UNLAWFUL SEIZURE OF AIRCRAFT (HIJACKING)
What are the techniques used for hijacking?
In order to execute a hijack of an aircraft, the perpetrator must be able to coerce the pilot‐in‐command.
Therefore, it is necessary to:
• Smuggle weapons onto the aircraft (examples of how this has been done ranges from concealment in
toys to false prosthetics)
• Possible collusion with or bribery of airport or airline staff
• Armed assault. This has been has been used on several occasions
The types of weapons used vary and may include pistols, automatic weapons, explosive charges, knives, or
flammable material.
SABOTAGE
Sabotage techniques
Most sabotage devices targeted against aircraft are either explosive or incendiary devices and can even be
a combination of the two.
The saboteur needs to have access to the aircraft to plant the device or place the device on the aircraft
using passenger baggage, air cargo, catering or other stores loaded onto the aircraft prior to flight. The
most common means of infiltrating sabotage devices in the past have been:
Infiltration of device into baggage;
Collusion with airport or airline staff to place device on aircraft;
Subterfuge, use of an unsuspecting dupe
Sabotage of airports
Certain critical areas of an airport are vital to the continued operation of an airport, namely:
Runway
;
Passenger terminal buildings;
Navigational aids;
Electrical power supplies;
Air Traffic Control communications;
Aviation fuel storage;
Rescue and fire‐fighting services.
Any sabotage to the above facilities can seriously impair the functioning of the airport.
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Suicide bomber
While most successful saboteurs move away from the event of the device activation the suicidal saboteur
is ready to kill himself for the cause.
Whether a religious, political or nationalistic fanatic, these individuals or groups present a formidable
threat to today’s security measures.
These offenders may endeavor to achieve sabotage by:
• Carrying the device on their person; or
• Providing the means to have a device boarded through their checked baggage.
Historical Review of the past incidents
1 First hijacking in the world The first recorded aircraft hijack took place on February
21, 1931 in Lima, (Peru).
2 1969 Year of maximum Hijackings – 87 Aircrafts hijacked, 71
from Cuba.
3 First hijacking in India 30th Jan, 1971, Indian Airlines flight from Srinagar to
Jammu taken to Lahore.
4 Post First Hijacking in India Rule 8 A of Aircraft Rule 1937 was being implemented.
5 Second hijacking in India Indian Airlines Aircraft hijacked on 10th Sep, 1976,
Mumbai to Delhi taken to Lahore.
6 Post Second hijacking in India Shri B.D. Pandey committee was formed in 1976
7 18th Jan, 1978 Formation of DCAS as a cell under DGCA on the
recommendation of Shri B.D. Pandey Committee
nd
8 2 August, 1984 A Bomb Explosion at Chennai (Meenabakkam) airport.
9 Post Chennai Airport Explosion Bomb Threat Contingency Plan was Implemented.
10 23rd Jun, 1985 Sabotage of Air India aircraft Kanishka Tragedy over
Atlantic Ocean.
Explosion at Narita airport (Japan) during transfer of
baggage to Air India aircraft.
11 Post Kanishka Tragedy Justice B.N Kirpal, Commission was setup.
Following security measures were introduced
Identification of baggage‐Mandatory
Reconciliation of baggage was introduced
Re‐identification of registered baggage on
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interline station by passenger
Checking of baggage manually even after X‐ray
screening
Inspection of security arrangements of national
air‐carriers at foreign stations by BCAS officers
12 1st April, 1987 BCAS was formed as a Regulatory Authority on Civil
Aviation Security under MCA.
13 3rd May 1986 Sabotage of Air Lanka aircraft at Colombo airport.
Explosives send through tea consignment in cargo.
LTTE rebels bombed Air Lanka plane at Colombo airport,
killing 16 people
14 21st Dec 1988 Pan Am 103 incident resulted in death of 259 persons on
board aircraft, as well as 11 persons on the ground at
Lockerbie (Scotland).
15 Post Lockerbie Marking of Plastic Explosive for the purpose of detection.
th
16 24 Dec 1994 Air France aircraft seized at Algerian airport by four
persons dressed as airline staff ‐ three hostages killed.
Aircraft flown to Marseilles (France) where four hijackers
killed.
17 24th Dec 1999 Hijack of Indian Airlines (IC‐814) operating from
Kathmandu (Nepal) to Delhi (India). Finally taken to
Kandahar (Afghanistan)
18 Post Kandahar Incident Introduction of CISF as ASG in Feb 2000
Secondary Ladder point checks (SLPC) introduced in
January 2000
Introduction of Sky Marshals
Modernization / up gradation of electronic detection
devices
Preventing an Hijacked aircraft to take off from Indian
soil, once it lands
Review of contingency plans
19 06 Feb 2000 Ariana Afghan Airlines B‐727 was hijacked after take‐off
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from Kabul Airport and landed at stanstead Airport,
London.
The purpose of hijacking was asylum.
20 24 July 2001 Colombo Airport (Bandaranaike Airport) attack by LTTE.
21 Post Colombo Attack Raising of Perimeter wall to the prescribed height
Access control system strengthened
Security of parked aircraft at night
Modernization / up gradation of electronic detection
devices
22 11th September 2001 Attack by Al Qaida using 04 Aircrafts as a weapon of Mass
destruction in USA.
23 Post 11th Sept. Attack Strengthening of cockpit doors
Locking of cockpit doors
Implementation of strict pre‐embarkation security
checks
Deployment of sky marshals
Ban on steel / metallic cutlery with sharp edges.
24 22nd December 2001 Richard Reid (Shoe Bomber), a member of Al Qaeda,
boarded American Airlines from Paris to Miami.
Passenger was on Aerial suicide mission.
Shoe Scanning through XBIS was introduced.
Carriage of Lighters & Matchbox in the aircraft is
prohibited.
25 28th November 2002 Arkia Airlines (Israel) shot at by shoulder launched
surface‐to‐air missiles on departure from Mombassa,
Kenya.
26 August 2006 (Heathrow Airport Attempt to blow up 11 aircraft with the liquid explosive
Attack) TATP.
27 Post (Heathrow Airport) Restrictions on carriage of more than 100ml of liquid in
cabin baggage
28 January 2010 Moscow Airport
A passenger exploded himself in the Moscow airport
Attack
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29 Post Moscow Random screening at the entry gate of the terminal
building. Strengthening of security towards city side.
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Aviation Security Countermeasures
National regulations on Aviation Security shall comply with the specifications made in the international
conventions and in ICAO's Annex 17.
For example, training programmes, quality control programs, airport and airline security programs can
contribute to optimal aviation security on a national level.
The civil aviation industry has developed various countermeasures to counter the threats. These
countermeasures can be categorized as:
Legislativ
e
Technica
l
Physica
l
Legislative Measures
International Conventions (Legal Instruments)
International Conventions are International legal Instruments by which Contracting States affirm their
intention to enforce the terms and provisions contained in these Conventions.
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)
The Chicago Convention of 1944 on International Civil Aviation was instrumental in the
formation of International Civil Aviation Organization on 4th April 1947. The organisation
serves as a forum for cooperation in all fields of Civil Aviation among its 191 member
states. India became signatory to the Chicago Convention on 04th April 1947.
The ICAO is a specialised agency of the United Nations and is responsible to promote
safe and orderly development of International Civil Aviation throughout the world. It sets
standards and regulations necessary for Aviation safety, security, efficiency and
regularity, as well as for Aviation environmental protection.
ICAO has legislative powers by means of the SARPs provided by Annex 17. It also organises obligatory
security audits at States worldwide. The ICAO Security Manual contains guidelines on how to implement
the SARPs as provided by Annex 17.
International Conventions
Chicago Convention1944
The Chicago Convention, officially called the Convention on International Civil
Aviation, was signed on 7 December 1944. In 1947 it led to the establishment of
International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO).
The governments that signed this convention agreed on certain principles and
arrangements to allow a safe and orderly development of International Civil
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Aviation. Furthermore, this convention defines that international air transport services should be
established on the basis of equal opportunities.
This convention has 18 Annexes in total. The most important one concerning security issues is Annex 17,
containing a description of Standards and Recommended Practices that apply to aviation security.
Tokyo Convention 1963
The Tokyo Convention was established in 1963. The official name of the convention is the Convention on
Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft. The Tokyo convention only applies to
offences that are committed on board an aircraft in flight.
This convention focuses on offences that jeopardise:
The safety of the aircraft.
The safety of the persons on board the aircraft.
The good order on board the aircraft.
The penal code of the State of registry of the aircraft.
This convention grants certain rights to the pilot in Command (PIC), in order to ensure the safety and
order on board of his aircraft:
Restrain passengers when they cause problems.
Allow the crew to ask assistance from other passengers to overpower unruly passengers.
Disembark unruly passengers at the next port of call.
This convention also contains some obligations. The State of landing should:
Restore the control of the aircraft to the pilot in charge.
Allow the pilot in charge to disembark unruly passengers, disregarding the State's visa or immigration
requirements.
Take delivery of unruly passengers.
Take unruly passengers into police custody until the prosecution or extradition is accomplished.
The Hague Convention 1970
The official name of the Hague Convention, established in 1970, is the Convention
for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft. This convention made the
unlawful seizure of an aircraft (hijacking) an international offence.
The convention came into being following a year in which hijackings peeked: 73 acts
of unlawful seizure, mainly on flights from the USA to Cuba.
Contents of the Hague Convention
This convention obliges the States to:
Make the unlawful seizure of an aircraft punishable by severe penalties.
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Extradite or prosecute offenders without exception. Both the State of landing and the State of registry
of the aircraft can exercise jurisdiction over these offenders.
Restore the control of the aircraft to the pilot in charge, not allowing the aircraft to take off to another
destination while the offenders are still in control of the aircraft.
Report every occurrence to ICAO.
The Montreal Convention 1971
The official name of the Montreal Convention, established in 1971, is the Convention for the Suppression
of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation. The primary focus of this convention was the
sabotage of an aircraft.
This convention, established the term aircraft in service, A parked aircraft which is under surveillance
sufficient to detect unauthorized access.
In the early 70s, the number of acts of sabotage increased considerably. These acts of sabotage
were mainly aimed against Israeli targets.
Contents of the Montreal Convention
This convention defines the following offences:
Violence against a person on the aircraft.
Destroying or damaging the aircraft, thus endangering the safety of aircraft in flight.
Placing on board a device likely to endanger the safety of aircraft in flight.
Destroying or damaging air navigation facilities, likely to endanger the safety of aircraft in service.
Communicating false information, such as a bomb threat, likely to endanger the safety of
aircraft in flight.
This convention obliges the States to:
Make attempts and accomplices to offences also punishable by severe penalties.
Extradite or prosecute offenders without exception. Both the State of landing as the State of registry
of the aircraft can exercise jurisdiction over these offenders.
Take all practical measures, like pre‐board screening of passengers, in order to prevent offences.
Restore the control of the aircraft to the pilot in charge, not allowing the aircraft to take off to another
destination while the offenders are still in control of the aircraft.
Report every occurrence to ICAO.
Protocol to the Montreal Convention 1988
The official name of this protocol, added to the Montreal
Convention in 1988, is the Protocol for the Suppression of
Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International Civil
Aviation.
With this protocol, the definition of offences is broadened to all
unlawful acts against a person or an airport serving international
civil aviation, causing or likely to cause:
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Injury or death at an airport
The destruction or serious damage to the facilities of the airport
The destruction or serious damage to an aircraft not in service located in that airport
The disruption of the airport's services
This protocol was created following a series of attacks on international airports that occurred after the
creation of the Montreal Convention in 1971.
The Marking of Plastic Explosives Convention 1991 (MEX CONVENTION)
The official name of the Marking of Plastic Explosives Convention,
established in Montreal in 1991, is the Marking of Plastic Explosives
for the Purposes of Detection Convention. This convention focuses on
the detection of explosives.
By 1990, a series of explosions on board an aircraft had a taken place,
resulting in the loss of uncountable lives and the destruction of
multiple aircrafts. These explosions were most probably caused by bombs placed in checked baggage of
passengers who finally did not board the aircraft.
Contents of the Marking of Plastic Explosives Convention
This convention allows the use of existing vapour detection technology to detect plastic explosives.
Marking agents should be added to plastic explosives by the manufacturer.
This convention obliges the States to:
Prevent the production of unmarked explosives
Prevent the movement of unmarked explosives through their territory
National Legislations
Enactment of Acts in India to implement International Legal Instruments:‐
India is a signatory to all the above conventions. The terms and provisions of international conventions are
given legal backup in India by virtue of following Acts:‐
Tokyo Convention Act – 1975
Anti‐Hijacking Act 1982 and amended in 1994 again being amended in 2010
Suppression of Unlawful Acts against Safety of Civil Aviation Act, 1982 Amended in 1994
Other National laws related to implementation and enforcement of National Civil Aviation Security
Programme and other related matters are as under:‐
The Aircraft Act, 1934
The Aircraft Rules, 1937
The Aircraft (Carriage of Dangerous Goods) Rules 2003
The Aircraft (Security) Rules 2011
The Airport Authority of India Act. 1994
The Restricted Areas Act
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The Prohibited areas Act
The Immigration Act
The Explosive Act
Official Secret Act ‐ 1926
The Other Minor Acts connected with crimes against civil aviation and related matters.
Orders and regulations
o Gazette Notifications, AVSEC Orders, AVSEC Circulars and Directions issued by appropriate
authority to implement ‘National Civil Aviation Security Programme’.
o Airports Authority of India Regulations, 2000
Technical Measures
Annex 17
Annex 17 to the Chicago Convention was adopted in 1974 by the Council of ICAO. Its
purpose is to safeguard International Civil Aviation against acts of unlawful
interference.
Annex 17 contains Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs) that apply to
aviation security
STANDARD PRACTICE: ‐Specification necessary for the safety and regularity of
international air navigation. ICAO contracting states will conform in accordance with
the Chicago Convention. When they fail to do so, they are required to inform ICAO
about this. In Annex 17, standards always contain the word shall.
Examples of standard practice:
Pre‐embarkation security checks of passengers, crew, ground personnel
Screening of hold baggage’s
Background checks of personnel
Each contracting state must have a written NCASP
RECOMMENDED PRACTICE: Specification desirable for the interest of safety and regulatory of
international air navigation. ICAO contracting states will endeavour to conform in accordance with the
Chicago Convention. When a state does not comply with a Recommended Practice, they are invited to
inform ICAO about this. In annex 17, recommended practices always contain the word should.
Examples of recommended practice:
SLPC
Deployment of IFSO (Sky Marshals)
Use of Body scanners
Contracting states must notify ICAO about every difference to a standard.The Standards and
Recommended Practices are adopted and incorporated as Annexes to the Convention on International Civil
Aviation. There are 18 Annexure to the Chicago Convention
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Annex 17 deals with safe guarding civil Aviation against the act of unlawful interference. The first edition of
Annex 17 was being issued on 22nd March 1974 and the current edition (9th) was issued in March 2011 to
be implemented from 01st July 2011.
ICAO conducts Security Audit of each contacting state in order to review the compliance of Annex‐17.
Annex 17: Aviation Security.
Annex 18: The Safe Transport of Dangerous Goods by Air.
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ICAO Security Manual
The ICAO Security Manual for Safeguarding Civil Aviation against Acts of
Unlawful Interference, (Doc 8973) Restricted, is the principal guidance
document developed by ICAO to assist States in the implementation of the
technical specifications contained in Annex 17.
Director General of Civil Aviation (DGCA)
Directorate General of Civil Aviation is an attached office of the Ministry of Civil
Aviation.
The Directorate General of Civil Aviation is the regulatory body in the field of
Civil Aviation primarily dealing with safety issues. It is responsible for regulation
of air transport services to/from/within India and for enforcement of civil air
regulations, air safety and airworthiness standards. It also co‐ordinates all regulatory functions with
International Civil Aviation Organisation.
The headquarters are located in New Delhi with regional offices in the various parts of India.
Key Responsibilities of States and Appropriate Authority
International legislation
Annex 17
Standard 2.1.1 Each Contracting State shall have as its primary objective the
safety of passengers, crew, ground personnel and the general
public in all matters related to safeguarding against acts of
unlawful interference with civil aviation.
Standard 2.2.1 Each Contracting State shall apply the Standards and shall
endeavor to apply the Recommended Practices contained in
Annex 17 to International civil aviation operations.
Standard 2.2.2 Each Contracting State shall ensure that measures designed to
safeguard against acts of unlawful interference are applied to
domestic operations to the extent practicable, based upon a
security risk assessment carried out by the relevant national
authorities.
Standard 4.1.1 Each Contracting State shall establish measures to prevent
weapons, explosives or any other dangerous devices, articles or
substances, which may be used to commit an act of unlawful
interference, the carriage or bearing of which is not authorized,
from being introduced, by any means whatsoever, on board an
aircraft engaged in civil aviation.
National legislation
Aircrafts (Security Rules) 2011
NCASP 2011
Chapter 01 Primary Objective
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To meet the primary objective of the country the Government of
India has established a dedicated organization namely the Bureau
of Civil Aviation Security (BCAS) and is in existence since 01st April
1987.
The organization is headed by the Commissioner of Security
under the Ministry of Civil Aviation to develop and implement
regulations, practices and procedures to safeguard civil aviation
against acts of unlawful interference.
The Aircraft Security Rules 2011 provide legal structure and clearly
defines the responsibilities and methods of implementation.
CIVIL AVIATION SECURITY SET UP IN INDIA
International Legislation
Annex 17
Standard 2.1.2 Each Contracting State shall establish an organization and develop
and implement regulations, practices and procedures to safeguard
civil aviation against acts of unlawful interference taking into
account the safety, regularity and efficiency of flights.
Standard 2.1.3 Each Contracting State shall ensure that such an organization and
such regulations, practices and procedures:
a) Protect the safety of passengers, crew, ground personnel
and the general public in all matters related to
safeguarding against acts of unlawful interference with
civil aviation; and
b) are capable of responding rapidly to meet any increased
security threat.
History
The BCAS initially set up as Directorate of Civil Aviation Security (DCAS) on 18 Jan, 1978, as a cell under the
DGCA on the recommendation of the B D Pandey Committee, in the wake of the hijacking of Indian airlines
on the 10th Sept 1976.
The BCAS was organised into an independent organisation on 01st April 1987 under the Ministry of Civil
Aviation on the recommendation of Justice Kirpal Commission formed to investigate Kanishkatragedy .
BCAS is the regulatory authority for civil aviation security in India. It is headed by an officer of the rank of
Director General of Police and is designated as Commissioner of Security (Civil Aviation).
COSCA is the appropriate authority for implementation of Annexure‐17 to Chicago convention of
International Civil Aviation Organization.
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COSCA is responsible for the development, implementation and maintenance of NCASP.
COSCA, BCAS under powers conferred to him by Government of India through MCA notification number
1797 dt. 03rd July 1997 under section 5A of aircraft act 1934, has the authority to issue the AVSEC Orders
and Circulars.
Organisation chart of BCAS
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Roles / Functions / Duties /Responsibilities of BCAS
International Legislation
Annex 17
Standard 3.1.5 Each Contracting State shall establish a national aviation security
committee or similar arrangements for the purpose of
coordinating security activities between the departments,
agencies and other organizations of the State, airport and
aircraft operators, air traffic service providers and other entities
concerned with or responsible for the implementation of various
aspects of the national civil aviation security programme.
Laying down AVSEC norms in accordance with ICAO Annex‐17 to Chicago convention for Airport Operators,
Airline operators and their security agencies responsible for implementation AVSEC measures.
Monitoring the implementation of Security rules and regulations and carrying out survey of security needs.
Ensure that the persons implementing security controls are appropriately trained and possess all
competencies required to perform their duties.
Planning policy on civil aviation as per ICAO guidelines, to prepare contingency plan, to prepare NCASP and
formulation of Policies.
Coordination among different organizations on AVSEC matters.
Conducting surprise / dummy checks to test professional efficiency and alertness of security staff.
Conducting mock exercise to efficacy of contingency plan and operational preparedness of various
agencies.
Advising the Govt. of India on Security matters
Technical Evaluation of equipments used in aviation security.
Responsibilities of COSCA:
International Legislation
Annex 17
Standard 3.1.2 Each Contracting State shall designate and specify to ICAO an
appropriate authority within its administration to be responsible
for the development, implementation and maintenance of the
national civil aviation security programme.
Standard 3.1.4 Each Contracting State shall require the appropriate authority to
define and allocate tasks and coordinate activities between the
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departments, agencies and other organizations of the State,
airport and aircraft operators, air traffic service providers and
other entities concerned with or responsible for the
implementation of various aspects of the national civil aviation
security programme.
National legislation
Aircraft Security Rules 2011
Rule 03 Duties of COSCA
Responsibilities of COSCA
Establish, Develop, implement, maintain and review the NCASP, NCASTP, NCASQCP in India in
accordance with Annexure 17.
Issue necessary directions on AVSEC
Respond immediately to meet any increased security threat
Allocate the responsibilities and ensure coordination amongst various agencies responsible for
implementation of the various aspects of the NCASP.
Designate an authority at each aerodrome serving Civil Aviation who shall be responsible for
coordinating and implementation of security controls.
Establish Aerodrome Security Committee (APSC) at each aerodrome serving civil aviation for
coordinating the implementation of security controls and procedures as specified in the airport /
aerodrome security programme.
Arrange for security audit, test, survey and inspection to be conducted on a regular basis
National Civil Aviation Security Programme(NCASP)
International legislation
Annex 17
Standard 3.1.1 Each Contracting State shall establish and implement a written
national civil aviation security programme to safeguard civil
aviation operations against acts of unlawful interference, through
regulations practices and procedures which take into account the
safety, regularity and efficiency of flights.
National legislation
Aircraft Security Rules 2011
Rule 03 (i) Duties of COSCA
Develop, implement, maintain a NCASQCP to determine
compliance with and validate the effectiveness of its NCASP.
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National Civil Aviation Security Training programme (NCASTP)
International Legislation
Annex 17
Standard 3.1.6: Each Contracting State shall require the appropriate authority to ensure
the development and implementation of a National Training Programme
for personnel of all entities involved with or responsible for the
implementation of various aspects of the National Civil Aviation Security
Programme. This training programme shall be designed to ensure the
effectiveness of the national civil aviation security programme.
National legislation
Aircraft (Security) Rules 2011
Rule 03 (f) Duties of COSCA
Establish, develop and implement NCASTP
NCASP 2011
Chapter 09 Personnel
Chapter 9.2 AVSEC Training
Aviation Security Order / Circular
Order 20/2011 National Civil Aviation Security Training Programme
Establish, develop, and implement, a NCASTP for personnel of all entities involved with or responsible for
the implementation of various aspects of the NCASP which shall be designed to ensure the effectiveness of
the Security Programme.
Airport Security Programme
International Legislation
Annex 17 Standard 3.2.1:
Each Contracting State shall require each airport serving civil aviation to establish,
implement and maintain a written airport security programme appropriate to meet the
requirements of the national civil aviation security programme
National legislation
Aircraft (Security) Rules 2011
Rule 08 Aerodrome Security Programme
Aircraft Operators Security Programme
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International Legislation
National legislation
Aircraft (Security) Rules 2011
Rule 24 Security Programme
Every Aircraft Operator shall, with the approval of the
Commissioner, make and comply with aircraft operator Security
programme in accordance with the National Civil Aviation Security
Programme and any amended to such programme shall be made
after the approval of the Commissioner.
SOP’s / Aviation Security measures at Airports:
National legislation
Aviation Security Order / Circular
Circular01/2001 Aviation Security measures
Anti hijacking measures
Frisking of passengers and search of hand baggage
Armed support to frisking / searching staff
Escorting of passenger to aircraft
Apron and perimeter security
Security of catering items
Surveillance in Departure areas
Use of electronic aids‐DFMD,HHMD,XBIS,CCTV
Secondary Ladder Point Checks
Pre flight security checks / search of aircraft
Deployment of sky marshals
On the job supervision by airline staff
Anti sabotage measures
Screening and protection of registered baggage until loaded into aircraft hold
Identification / Reconciliation of registered baggage
Anti sabotage check of aircraft at originating station
Guarding of aircraft
Access control of aircraft
On the job supervision by airline staff
Security of air crew baggage / aircraft document bags / fuel
Security of catering items
Security of cargo, courier, human remains, postal mail, company stores
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Non acceptance of last minute items by passengers
Passengers to ensure they are aware of contents of their baggage’s
Measures against terrorist attacks
Guarding of aircraft and airport facilities
Apron / airport access control
Deployment of Quick Reaction Teams (QRT)
Perimeter wall of standard height
Perimeter road for patrolling
Perimeter lighting
Watch towers \ Patrolling‐ foot or mobile
Police stations in close proximity of airport
Efficient communication system
Security of personnel
Airport entry permit (AEP) / Airport Entry Card (AEC) issued after security vetting/background checks
Display of AEP/AEC to detect misuse
Frisking of all AEP/AEC holders before entry to airside
Never leave your baggage unattended
Never lend your uniform / AEP to others
Never accept a packet for carriage without screening
On the job supervision / surveillance
Always display a positive security attitude
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Module‐3
Working at the Airport
Module Objective
Describe and recognize the main features of an airport (Typical airport layout)
Locate all main airport and airline building and services on an airport
Visit to airport for familiarization
Specify the boundaries between non – restricted and restricted area of an airport
Move about an airport complying with the airport safety rules
Apply the rules of an airline / airport permit system
Post review of airport visit
Teaching Methods
Slide Presentations
Lectures by certified instructors
Group discussions
Demonstrations
Role‐ playing and practical exercises
Overnight reading Assignments
Progress Tests
Mastery Test ( Written and Practical )
International legislations
Annex 17
Standard 2.3 Security and facilitation.
Standard 3.2 Airport operations
Standard 4.2 Measures relating to access control
National legislations
Aircraft Rules 1937
Rule 90 Entry into public aerodromes
Aviation (Security) Rules 2011
Rule 18 Entries into Aerodrome
Rule 19 Entry into Security Restricted Area
NCASP
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Chapter 6.6.1 The Commissioner or any other officer authorized by him in this
behalf may issue the Airport Entry card / permits to the persons
working at the airport or visiting it for entry into the security
restricted areas of the airport in accordance with the AECs
guidelines issued and amended by the Commissioner from time to
time.
Aviation Security Order / Circular
Order 02/2008 Authorization for issue of Airport Entry Pass.
Order 04/2010 Issuance of Temporary Airport Entry Passes by the Airport
Operators under Rule‐90(1), Rule 90(3) and Rule 90 (4) of Aircraft
Rules 1937.
Arrival / Departure Areas Passenger check‐in and departure area
Passenger/baggage screening areas
Baggage make‐up area Arrival Hall / Baggage Claim Area
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Airport Administration Building Operations Building
Air Traffic Control Tower (ATC) Fuel storage area
Cargo Complex
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Maintenance area Air Navigation Aids
Catering Establishment
Airport safety rules ‐ moving about the airport
When moving about the airside areas of the airport either on foot or in a vehicle all security personnel:
MUST know the boundaries between airside, landside, SRA and Controlled areas.
MUST know the location and correct name of all airport buildings, services and aircraft operating
areas.
MUST maintain radio contact with the airport ground operations control (or ATC) when moving in the
vicinity of taxiways and runways.
MUST use vehicle hazard lights and wear a reflective safety vest.
MUST observe airport speed limits and comply with movement rules.
MUST follow prescribed vehicle routes on the apron and other aircraft manoeuvring surfaces.
MUST NOT stand, walk, move, park or drive close to an aircraft when the red revolving light on top
and below the aircraft is lit (shows that engines are running, or that start‐up, push‐back or towing is
about to take place).
MUST NOT park any vehicle in a dangerous location.
MUST NOT assume that it is safe to cross a taxiway or runway because it appears to be clear.
MUST NOT disobey ground control (or ATC) movement instructions.
MUST NOT cross a runway unless you have received clearance from ground control or ATC tower even
when responding to a security incident [does not apply if the runway is closed.
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AIRPORT PERMITS SYSTEMS:‐
The airport permit system is a set of rules which controls the access of people and vehicles to restricted
areas
Typical permit for PEOPLE should contain:
photograph of the holder
areas and validity
period of validity
name of permit holder
name of employer/agency/organization
permit serial number
Designation of the Holder
Name of the issuing organisation
The most usual types of airport permits are:
PERMANENT VISITOR such as diplomat or Protocol official from national or foreign diplomatic
mission(s)
TEMPORARY VISITOR
VEHICLE including airport authority, airlines, agencies, organizations
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EXAMPLES OF AIRPORT SRA PERMITS FOR PEOPLE
Photograph Airport Expiry Date Issuing Airport Expiry Date
of Holder Name dd/mm/yy Authority Name dd/mm/yy
(Colour and Logo Date & and Logo
coded Stamp
background) Name of Permit Holder Name of Permit Holder
Name of Employer Name of Employer
Agency/Organization Agency/Organization
Signature of Signature of Holder Signature Signature of Holder
Issuing of Issuing
Authority Authority
Permit Airport Area of Validity Permit Airport Area of Validity
Serial No. Serial No.
VISITOR SRA PERMIT
Issuing Airport Name Expiry Time
Authority and Logo and Date
Date, Stamp
& Signature
Visitor’s Name
Name of Visitor’s Sponsoring
Agency/Organization
Permit Serial Signature of Holder
No.
Airport Area TO BE ESCORTED AT ALL
to be visited TIMES BY SRA PERMIT
HOLDER WITHIN SRA
Height: 6.5cm Width: 8.5cm
(Area of Validity: Permits are to be colour coded.)
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The following types of Airport Entry Cards (AEC) are issued in India
Srl No Types of AEC Area of Access
01 For those persons whose duty warrants them to visit all areas of civil
Orange
airports/civil enclaves in India.
Orange ‘C’
For crew members of Indian registered airlines whose duty warrants them
to visit all areas of civil airports in India.
02 For persons whose duty warrants them to visit all areas of a specific
Purple
airports.
For persons whose duty warrants them to visit all areas of a specific airport
03 Navy Blue
except security hold area.
For persons whose duty warrants them to visit the operational area only, in
04 White
a specific airport, excluding SHA and terminal building.
For persons whose duty warrants them to visit the arrival or departure halls
05 Light Brown
of a specific airport.
These commercial passes may be issued to such persons whose duty
06 Light Green warrants them to visit one specific airport for passenger facilitation up to
check‐in area of departure side and up to visitor areas on arrival side.
These are issued to representatives of Courier companies whose duty
07 Light Green ‘C’ warrants them to visit one specific airport for up to check‐in area of
departure side and up to visitor areas on arrival side.
Note : Other permits
1. Transferable Passes will be valid with the identity card of the holder, issued by the organization
concerned.
2. Web based bar coded photo identity card for casual labour are issued to Casual workers who are
hired on daily wages.
3. Members of Parliament can enter Airport up to check in counters & arrival hall without an AEC, on
the basis of showing their ID Card.
Typical permit for VEHICLES should contain:
Registered number of vehicle
Name of organization
Area and validity
Period of validity
Access gates to be used
“AIRSIDE” safety status of vehicle
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EXAMPLES OF AIRPORT SRA PERMITS FOR VEHICLES
AIRPORT NAME EXPIRY DATE
AND LOGO DD/MM/YY
NAME OF APPROVED ‘AIRSIDE’
AGENCY/ORGANIZATION SAFETY STATUS
REGISTERED NUMBER
OF VEHICLE
PERMIT SERIAL ACCESS GATE/S
NUMBER
AREA OF
VALIDITY
LOGO
AND
AIRPORT
NAME
PERMIT
SERIAL NUMBER
NAME OF ‘AIRSIDE’
AGENCY/ APPROVED
ORGANIZATION SAFETY STATUS
REGISTERED NO. ACCESS GATE
OF VEHICLE
PERIOD OF VALIDITY AREA OF VALIDITY
Actual size.
(Area of Validity: Permits are to be colour coded)
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MODULE – 4
Access Control – People
Module Objectives
Understand the operations at a pedestrian security control checkpoint
List information to be recorded in an access control point
logbook
Be familiar with the use of Standard Operating Procedures
(SOPs)
Be aware of suspicious or unusual behaviour at access control
points.
Teaching Methods
Slide Presentations
Lectures by certified instructors
Group discussions
Demonstrations
Role‐ playing and practical exercises
Overnight reading Assignments
Progress Tests
Mastery Test ( Written and Practical )
What is Access Control?
Access control means the security procedure applied to ensure that only authorized persons, authorized
vehicles and authorized items carried by such persons or transported in such vehicles are allowed access
into the premises, area or zone being controlled.
International Legislation
Annexure 17
Standard 4.2.1 Each Contracting State shall ensure that the access to airside areas
at airports serving civil aviation is controlled in order to prevent
unauthorized entry.
Standard 4.2.2 Each Contracting State shall ensure that security restricted areas
are established at each airport serving civil aviation based upon a
security risk assessment carried out by the relevant national
authorities.
Standard 4.2.3 Each Contracting State shall ensure that identification systems are
established in respect of persons and vehicles in order to prevent
unauthorized access to airside areas and security restricted areas
Standard 4.2.5 Each Contracting State shall ensure that the movement of persons
and vehicles to and from the aircraft is supervised in security
restricted areas in order to prevent unauthorized access to
aircraft.
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Standard 4.2.6 Each Contracting State shall ensure that persons other than
passengers, together with items carried, being granted access to
security restricted areas are screened.
Recommended 4.2.8 Each Contracting State should ensure that identity documents
issued to aircraft crew members provide a harmonized and reliable
international basis for recognition and validation of
documentation to permit authorized access to airside and security
restricted areas by conforming to the relevant specifications set
forth in Doc 9303, Machine Readable Travel Documents.
National Legislation
Aircraft Rule 1937
Rule 90 Entry into public aerodromes –
(1) No person shall enter or be in the terminal building of any
Government aerodrome or public aerodrome or part of such building or
any other area in such aerodrome notified in this behalf by the Central
Government unless he holds an admission ticket issued by the
aerodrome operator or an entry pass issued by the Commissioner of
Security (Civil Aviation) or any person authorized by the Central
Government in this behalf.
(2) No person shall, without permission in writing, by general or special
order, of the Central Government or any officer authorized in this behalf –
(a) Enter or remain or cause any other person to enter or remain in the
Movement area
.
(b) Leave or throw or cause to be thrown any animal, bird or property or
object of any nature whatsoever in the Movement area.
(c) Permit any animal under his possession or control or otherwise to
stray in the Movement area; and
(d) perate any vehicle in the Movement area.
Aviation (Security) Rules 2011
Part III Aerodrome Access Control
NCASP
Chapter 6 Access Control Persons
6.4.1 No person shall enter or be in the terminal building of any licensed
aerodrome or part of such building or any other area, including the
movement area but excluding runway, unless he is a benefice passenger or
a crew member embarking, dis‐embarking or in transit or holds a valid
aerodrome entry permit issued by the Commissioner, provided that (a) the
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Airport Operator may permit visitors to certain areas of the terminal
building specially marked for the visitors.
6.4.2 All staff, including crew, together with items carried by them shall be
screened before being allowed access into security restricted areas. The
screening procedure shall ensure that no prohibited article is carried and
the methodology shall be the same as for screening of passengers and
hand baggage.
Aviation Security Order / Circular
Order 04/2010 Issuance of Temporary Airport Entry Passes by the Airport
Operators under Rule‐90(1), Rule 90(3) and Rule 90 (4) of Aircraft
Rules 1937.
Circular 14/2000 Entry to the airport
Circular 02/2009 Access control of Casual/Daily Labourers
Circular 18/2009 Courtesy to Members of Parliament at airports
Defence in Depth
Layers of security measures build upon each other to protect civil aviation operations. Therefore if one
layer fails or is deficient, another will hopefully prevent the act of unlawful interference.
These layers may consist of:
Security Restricted areas and Restricted areas
Airport identification permits for personnel and vehicles
Physical Security measures ( fences, gates, locks, patrols etc)
Detection systems for weapons and Explosives
The first line of defence is the integrity of the airport perimeter and landside / airside boundaries, while
other protective measures for Security Restricted Areas provide another layer.
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Purpose of Access Control
To control the movement of people and vehicles from landside (non‐security restricted areas) into airside
(controlled and security restricted areas)
Access Control Challenges
Size of the airport and boundary
Number of workers at an airport
The requirement for people and vehicles to have legitimate access to controlled and security restricted
areas for operational purposes
Airports are often 24‐hour per day operations
Access Control Points
Must be manned at all times they are open or in use, or otherwise locked or closed.
All persons working at the airport must use the SRA access points when entering SRA, (includes aircraft
crew and airline employees).
External Access Control Points
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Internal Access Control Points
Access Control Point for Staff
Access control system can be
Physical
o Controlled by security guard using equipment such as a turnstile for people and a drop‐arm
barrier for vehicles
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Automated Access Control Systems (AACS)
o Coded card (with or without PIN)
o Proximity card (RF) (with or without PIN)
o Biometric Systems.
o IRIS
o Face Geometry
Coded card Hand Geometry
IRIS Scan system
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Requiring Access for legitimate need
Airport Employees
Airline & Tenant Employees
Employees of other Airport Organizations( Police/customs/immigration)
National Government Representatives
Diplomatic Representatives
Emergency Services
Visitors
Passengers
Require valid boarding card and Travel Identification documents
Family and friends should NOT be allowed to accompany passengers into the Security Restricted
Area.
Access Control Point Equipment
Barriers, gates, turnstiles, etc.
Communication equipment, such as radio, telephone, etc.
Weapons & Explosive detection equipment e.g. metal detectors, x‐ray equipment , explosive trace
detection
Search equipment for vehicles, e.g., lights mirrors
Control point log/book and Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs)
Facilities (location and environmental conditions)
Contents of Access Control Point Log
Time control point was opened or handed over to a new shift
The status of check point equipment
Record of incidents at the control point
An inventory of items and/or equipment kept at the control point for its operation
Control Point Log Entry
Control point location
Details of incident to include:‐
o Name of visitor and serial number details of permits
o Registration number of vehicle
o Purpose of access
o Additional important details
o Details of who made the log entry
o Dates and times
o Nature of the incident
o Responding agencies etc.
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Recognizing behavior that may be suspicious
Unknown person without a permit.
Attempt to gain access to restricted area.
Carrying a parcel.
Circumstances not normal.
Incident can be called “suspicious”.
TYPICAL STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURE (SOP) FOR A SPECIFIC ACCESS CONTROL POINT, EITHER
WITHIN A BUILDING OR EXTERNAL, WILL INCLUDE THE FOLLOWING INSTRUCTIONS:‐
The security personnel on duty at an access control point must ensure that only authorized persons
and embarking passengers, properly documented, are allowed access into an airport restricted
and controlled area.
Security personnel shall check that all persons entering a controlled area are in possession and
displaying a valid airport identification permit.
Security staff will also check that embarking passengers are in possession of valid travel documents
including an airline boarding card which indicates the airline flight and passenger details.
In the event that any person gains or attempts to gain unauthorized access to an airport restricted
area, security personnel will endeavour to prevent such entry and will immediately notify the security
supervisor.
Details of all incidents will be recorded in the access control point log.
Note: This typical SOP is to be replaced by the local Standard Operating Procedures.
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EXAMPLE OF THE CONTENTS OF A TYPICAL CONTROL POINT LOG
CONTROL POINT LOCATION:
LOG ENTRY:
NAME OF VISITOR:
REGISTRATION NUMBER OF VEHICLE:
PURPOSE FOR ACCESS:
COMMENTS : _
LOG ENTRY MADE BY:
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ACCESS CONTROL ‐ PEOPLE
EXAMPLE ACCESS CONTROL POINT LOG
Checkpoint # …6….Incident log
Date Time Details of Incident Name & Initials
12 Dec 2008 15:30 Took over checkpoint 6 from D Shift. I Guard. All Mr. ABC
equipment listed in SOP accounted for and serviceable.
Comms check to security control. OK
12 Dec 2008 15:30 Took over checkpoint 6 from D Shift. I Guard Mr. ABC
12 Dec 2008 15:30 All equipment listed in SOP accounted for and serviceable.
Comms check to security control. OK
12 Dec 2008 16: 30 Visit to check point by B shift supervisor. All in order I Supervisor
12 Dec 2008 16: 30 Comms check to security control. OK
12 Dec 2008 17:43 A green Toyota car reg. AA ‐ A‐ 1234 approached Mr. ABC
checkpoint.
Driver requested directions to main cargo terminal. Driving
License MH – 02 – 12 ‐34567 Name G Driver.
Directions given as requested.
12 Dec 2008 18: 10 Handed over checkpoint to N I Guard Mr. ABC
12 Dec 2008 18: 10 Took over check point 6 from AN Other. All equipment N I Guard
listed in SOP accounted for and serviceable.
12 Dec 2008 18:30 Comms check to security control. OK N I Guard
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Module – 5
Access Control – Vehicles
Module Objectives
Verify that vehicle access control point equipment is in working order
Carry out control of vehicle access at vehicle access control point.
Carry out search of vehicles to detect prohibited articles.
Apply Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) for vehicles.
Describe the procedures for dealing with irregularities or security incidents
Teaching Methods
Slide Presentations
Lectures by certified instructors
Group discussions
Demonstrations
Role‐ playing and practical exercises
Overnight reading Assignments
Progress Tests
Mastery Test ( Written and Practical )
General Principles
Access to airside or Security Restricted Areas must be allowed only to those vehicles with a clear
operational requirement.
The admission of vehicles to airside areas should be restricted for reasons of security and safety
and to avoid congestion on aircraft movement areas
International Legislation
Annex 17
Standard 4.2.3 Each Contracting State shall ensure that identification systems
are established in respect of persons and vehicles in order to
prevent unauthorized access to airside areas and security
restricted areas
Standard 4.2.5 Each Contracting State shall ensure that the movement of
persons and vehicles to and from the aircraft is supervised in
security restricted areas in order to prevent unauthorized access
to aircraft.
Standard 4.2.7 Each Contracting State shall ensure that vehicles being granted
access to security restricted areas, together with items contained
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within them, are subject to screening or other appropriate
security.
National Legislation
Aircraft Rule 1937
Rule 90 Entry into public aerodromes
Aircraft (Security) Rules 2011
Rule 18.7 (c) Entry into aerodrome
No person shall:
Operate any vehicle without entry permit from the COSCA
in the movement area.
NCASP 2011
Chapter 6.5.1 Vehicle movement through gates from land side to airside shall be
controlled by Airport Security unit.
Chapter 6.5.3 Each authorizing agencies shall ensure that the drivers of vehicles
issued with restricted area vehicle permit are qualified to drive the
appropriate class of vehicle and have been given instructions in all
safety requirements for the operation of a vehicle in the airside.
Chapter 6.5.4 The aerodrome operator may issue aerodrome entry permit for
vehicles required to operate in the airside on operational,
emergency and maintenance purpose. The permit shall be specific
to the vehicle and affixed on it conspicuously. The vehicle permit
shall contain at a minimum :
Registration No. of vehicle.
Duration of permit.
Owner of vehicle.
Issuing authority.
Chapter 6.5.5 No person shall, without permission in writing by general or
special order of the Commissioner, operate any vehicle in the
movement area other than those vehicles which are engaged in
operational, maintenance or emergency duties.
Chapter 6.5.6 Ambulance and other emergency service vehicles requiring access
to airside may be permitted only after a temporary permit is
issued by the Aerodrome Operator.
Chapter 6.5.7 The Commissioner may authorize a person to use Airport
Operator’s vehicle or his own vehicle or any other vehicle with
“follow me” vehicle, if so required, for access to the airside on
protocol , health or security grounds.
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Chapter 6.5.8 All vehicles, occupants and supplies thereon to be conveyed to the
airside or other security restricted areas shall be admitted only
after having been inspected by the security staff to prevent
carriage of unauthorized firearms, explosives , explosive devices,
any dangerous goods, any other suspicious objects.
Aviation Security Order / Circular
Circular 36/2005 Access of vehicle up to the Tarmac on Security/ Medical and
Protocol ground
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Challenges
Size of the airport and boundary
Number of workers at an airport
Airports are often 24‐hour a day operations
The requirement for people and vehicles to have authorized access to controlled and security
restricted areas for operational purposes
Authorized Vehicles
Immigration and other Government Agencies
Airport/Airline vehicles
Emergency Services
Visitors
Vehicles may be required to be searched depending on the local AVSEC Programme
Special procedures for vehicles carrying aircraft crews, high value goods, prisoners and deportees
Access Control Point Equipment
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The security personnel taking over duty at an access control point should always make sure of the
operational status of the access point by checking that all equipment at the control post is in working
order.
Barriers, gates, turnstiles, etc.
Communication system, such as radio, telephone
Weapons & Explosive detection equipment e.g. metal detectors , explosive trace detection
Search for vehicles, e.g., lights, angled mirrors
Control point log/book and Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) including stop lists
Access Control Point Log
Time control point was opened or handed over to a new shift
The status of check point equipment
Record of incidents at the control point
Record visits to the control point by supervisors
Details of vehicles without passes
Details of vehicles admitted; ( depending on frequency and local SOP)
Typical Vehicle Permit
All motorized vehicles and equipment used on the airside in the vicinity of aircraft should be “safety
inspected” prior to the issue of an airside access permit. Permits for vehicles should contain the following
information:‐
Registration number of vehicle
Name of organization/agency
Area of validity
Period of validity
Designated access gate to be used
AIRSIDE safety status of vehicle
Examining Vehicle Permits
Vehicle number on permit matches actual vehicle registration number
Name of organization is correct and bona fide
Permit is valid and not expired
Permit valid for access point
Authorizing signature correct / bona fide.
Checks carried out on a vehicle before allowing it access to airside
Check vehicle permit for validity
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Check the vehicle for presence of any Restricted / Prohibited article
Only drivers having ADP are allowed to drive in the airside
Driver/occupants should have AEP
Frisk the driver/occupants
Check all items being carried in the vehicle
Search of a vehicle will require a trained vehicle searcher and specialist equipment, but effective checks
can be made by well briefed staff who may not have received formal training on detailed searching. Before
commencing a search of a vehicle, the searcher must have the authority to search and search for the
restricted article. The following search equipment should be available to conduct the search effectively:‐
Adequate lighting ( flashlight, torches and dragon light )
Under Vehicle Search System (UVSS)
Under Vehicle Search Mirror (UVSM), Mirrors on extended or telescopic handle.
Attention to be paid during searching a vehicle
The interior of the vehicle.
The trunk, boot or load carrying area .
The engine compartment.
The underside of the vehicle.
The roof of a vehicle
Any external apertures.
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Some vehicles such as those carrying bonded goods, high value cargo or in‐flight catering will often
be sealed.
The driver however is often in possession of a document that shows the number of the seal that
was affixed when the load area was sealed.
By ensuring that the serial number of the seal corresponds with that shown in the document and
shows no sign of being tampered with, access may be granted without further search or check.
To control the movement of vehicle at access point following equipments is required:‐
Physical Controls equipment Barriers in front of gate
Crash Rated Electro‐hydraulic Bollard System
Crash Rated Electro‐Hydraulic Tyre Killer
Crash Rated Electro‐Hydraulic Road Blocker
Communication system Radio /Telephone/Alarm
Search Equipment Under Vehicle Search Mirror (UVSM)
HHMD for checking of personnel
ETD/ EVD
Dragon Light
Flash Light
Under Vehicle Search System
Documentation Log book/Record book.
Other facilities Signs/Adequate lighting.
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Physical Controls equipment
Crash Rated Electro‐hydraulic Bollard System Crash Rated Electro‐Hydraulic Tyre Killer
Crash Rated Electro‐Hydraulic Road Blocker
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PROCEDURE FOR DEALING WITH SECURITY INCIDENTS / ATTEMPTS
The procedures for dealing with irregularities, or security incidents at an access control point. In case of
discovery of suspect explosive device
Do not touch the device
Do not open
Do not unwrap
Do not shake or handle
Do not turn or unscrew
Do not cut strings, etc.
Do not lift or remove covers
Notify a supervisor
Discovery of suspect person
Check for valid AEC, reason for entry
Frisk / search for suspect items
In case of any doubt Notify supervisor
GUIDELINES FOR THE CONTENTS OF A LOCAL STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURE (SOP) FOR DEALING
WITH A PROHIBITED OR “SUSPECT” ITEM DISCOVERED DURING SEARCH OF A VEHICLE.
Remain calm and polite.
Do not alarm vehicle driver.
Do not allow the vehicle to enter the airport.
Do not try to restrain the driver or use physical force.
Immediately notify supervisor.
NOTE: These guidelines are to be replaced with the local airport Standard Operating Procedures
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Module-6
Landside security
Security in the landside area is difficult to monitor and control due to public accessibility and the
limitations of implementing security measures, often over varied terrain or in some cases urban
settings immediately adjacent to airport properties. There are many obstacles to overcome while
keeping focused on terminal design, passenger throughput and the generation of revenues from
sources ranging from retail operations to golf courses. When considering basic requirements for
airport security, all landside area operations remain as vulnerable targets and yet basic tenets of
physical security are applicable. Improved technologies and prudent use of CCTV have been
considered for airport security in coordination with airport law enforcement, airport operations and
the cooperation of tenants.
The physical security measures and the operational security measures described in this chapter
shall be implemented to protect the landside, public areas of the airport.
The development and implementation of appropriate security measures shall be based on a security
risk assessment process carried out by the relevant authorities and/ or entities, in collaboration with
national and local authorities and the airport operator, to detect, deter and mitigate the risk in
landside areas.
Landside security measures should be adapted to the airport environment by States and relevant
entities, and implemented by the relevant local entities in accordance with national requirements.
These measures should be commensurate to the threat and risk, and should be described in the
Counter Terrorism Contingency Plan (CTCP).
Random Screening of passenger and baggage at entry gates on the basis of behavior detection and
risk assessment.
A coordinated approach - The Appropriate Authority, in coordination with all stakeholders
including law enforcement agencies (e.g. police, port authority and border control), aircraft
operators, security service providers, local public transport and retail representatives shall include
all concerned stakeholders when developing and implementing landside security measures.
Landside mitigation measures — key elements
Attacks on landside may be carried out on public areas of an airport where attackers may not need
to defeat the security measures normally in place prior to entering security restricted areas.
Potential modes of attack may include, but are not limited to, the following:
a) Person – Borne IED (PBIED) and MANPADS;
b) IED placed inside or near airport key points (non – suicide attack);
c) Armed assault at a public area of an airport;
d) Vehicle – Borne IED (VBIED) attacks and terminal ram-raiding; and
e) An attack by means of chemical, biological and/ or radiological agents.
Landside security arrangements:
It is necessary to ensure that security measures are established for landside areas to mitigate the
risk of and to prevent possible acts of unlawful interference in coordination with relevant
departments and agencies; and in accordance with risk assessments carried out by the relevant
authorities or entities. The following aspects will be implemented by airport operator, ASG (CISF/
State Police), State/ UT administration and other entities concerned;
a) The identification of landside/ airside barriers;
b) CTCP, the mock drill frequencies, participation and appropriate responsibilities of all
concerned for coordination of landside security measures between relevant departments,
agencies.
c) Airport – level training programmes to impart required security training for securing
landside areas.
d) Provision of physical security measures like check points/ barriers on the access road to
airport terminal and Bullet resistant equipment;
e) CCTV surveillance on the landside areas – coverage and recording system;
f) Security arrangements in the funnel area, particularly landing and take – off points;
g) Appropriate security measures for landside areas to mitigate the risk and to prevent
possible acts of unlawful interference in accordance with risk assessments carried out
by the relevant authorities.
Arrangements to mitigate the risk of vehicles being used to crash into the terminal building
with improvised explosive devices
(i) Manned vehicle inspection stations to control access in and around the airport terminal
during elevated threat levels are necessary at the airport to provide a location at a safe
distance in which to inspect vehicles that are approaching the airport terminal on the access
roadway. In some instances, vehicle inspection stations are also necessary at vehicle
parking locations if they are located within the proximity to the terminal building.
Consideration has been given to including the following features at vehicle inspection
stations:
(ii) Turnstiles roll gates, or vehicular crash barriers that will stop or impede “gate crashing”. A
sheltered checkpoint station has been provided on each vehicle gate to permit maximum
visibility over the immediate area of the gate and to provide easy access for the guard to
carry out inspecting duties.
(iii) Sufficient space has been provided to direct a person or vehicle to one side for
further inspection without blocking access for those following. Sufficient space has
also been provided for emergency vehicles and other pre-authorized vehicles to by-pass
the vehicle inspection stations.
(iv) Communications, including emergency and duress alarms, between any sheltered
security checkpoint station and the airport security services office, as well as a duress
alarm by which emergency assistance may be summoned shall be provided at the
vehicle entry points on the landside.
(v) Vehicle check system with License Plate Reader (LPR) have been installed on the approach
road to the terminals.
(vi) As per the BCAS Circular No. 2/2007 dated 14.2.2007, (Annexure- 11.1) Crash
Rated Electro hydraulic bollards have been installed on the approach road to the airport
terminals.
(vii) Armed personnel at alighting and boarding point shall be deployed by ASG.
Arrangements to protect and police the passenger drop-off and pick-up areas and terminal
frontages to prevent vehicles being left unattended
(i) Roads to the terminal shall allow for un-congested flow during peak hours so as to ensure
law enforcement personnel have the ability to effectively monitor and move vehicles.
(ii) Drop off and loading zones have been set as far away from the terminal as practical to
minimize the blast effects of a vehicle bomb. The use of moving sidewalks or access to
luggage carts to help Passengers Bridge the gap shall be essential.
(iii) Emergency Vehicle (Fire and Police) Parking / staging areas near the terminal,
potential inspection areas, and congested areas have been provided.
(iv) During periods of heightened security, it shall be ensured that vehicles cannot gain
access to the terminal by bypassing inspection area. It will also be ensured to evaluate the
ability
of the potential to “jump curbs”, travel across open landscaping, or drive the wrong way
down a road.
(v) In order to minimize traffic to the terminal, alternative routes to non-terminal based
operations, such as access to the Air Cargo operations, Rental Car agencies, hotels, etc.
have been provided. Clear signage and sufficient dedicated driving lanes to permit drivers
unfamiliar with the airport to find their destinations quickly and easily.
(vi) During periods of heightened security, exit points with alternate routes have been
provided to enable customers to choose other options or means to access the terminal
(such as buses or pedestrian). This will help in de-congestion and inspection
requirements. The security arrangement is vested with ASG.
(vii) CISF will ensure that No vehicle shall be left unattended at any point of time in front of
the terminal building. Immediately after drop-off and pick-up the vehicle shall be removed
from the frontage zone of the terminal.
(viii) It shall be the responsibility of CISF and local police to protect the passenger
drop-off
and pick-up areas and terminal frontages to prevent vehicles being left unattended which
can be used to commit an act of unlawful interference.
(ix) NAKAS on approach road of the airport terminals shall be established for
checking of vehicles at these points;
Surveillance and patrols of the public areas of the terminal:
Securing the public area from terrorist attack to provide safe and secure environment at the
airport is of paramount importance to ensure safety and security of general public, passengers,
employees and materials. The following tasks shall be carried by the concerned entities at the
airport for the purpose:-
a) Deployment of armed patrols on the city side of the terminals
b) Patrolling in the parking lots on city side of the airport terminals;
c) Backup support on city side of the Terminals through deployment of QRT to strengthen
protection level and to react in the event of any contingency;
d) Hand Free RT sets for Morcha/ pickets sentries for communication
e) Surveillance /Patrolling in General parking situated around 100 m away from the Terminals
f) Surveillance/ Patrolling in General parking lot
g) Surveillance /Patrolling in VIP parking lot
h) A dedicated road has been constructed for the movement of VIP Vehicles from and to
Terminals.
i) Only authorized VIP vehicles allowed parking in the VIP parking area by CISF,for which
the Airport Operator issue passes
j) VIP parking area will be secured by the ASG armed patrolling and barrier checking
k) Car parking area is situated at a distance of 100 meters (approx.) from the Terminal
building;
l) The vehicle check system installed at the entrance lane to Parking and it is under CCTV
surveillance.
m) Bullet Proof Morchas
n) The vehicles cleared from the road outside Terminals by local Traffic Police & assisted by
the ASG patrolling parties;
o) A component of CISF/ local police personnel shall be deployed for patrolling on the city
side.
p) Gypsies shall be provided for the QRT of ASG duly equipped with VHF sets;
q) Sufficient RT Sets shall be provided to the QRT of ASG;
r) 02 elevated concrete fortified Morchas / pickets , covered with cone type roofs & anti
grenade nets have been provided at entry naka to the terminals, departure and arrival
forecourt.
s) Hydraulic Bollards & Manual Tyre killers have been provided at all the roads leading to
terminals.
Procedures for the protection of tickets, boarding passes, baggage tags and other
documents
The following procedures shall be followed:
(i) Responsibility of checking of travel documents and establishing the bonafide of
passengers, their baggage and cargo consignment to be transported by air rests with the
aircraft operator.
(ii) Documentation: Tickets presented by passengers shall be examined to confirm they are
genuine, in date and appropriate to the intended flight and destination. Where there are
doubts about the validity of any document produced by a passenger, check-in is to be
discontinued until the matter has been resolved satisfactorily.
(iii) Passenger identity checks: Each passenger’s passport or identity document
shall be examined at check-in for normal security procedures, for immigration
obligations and for the prevention of fraud. The purpose of identity checks at check-in is
to:
(a) Establish the passport or identity document is genuine and that its period of
validity covers the period of the intended journey
(b) Confirm that the name on the booking matches the name on passport or ID
document
(c) Match the photograph in the passport or ID document with the passenger and
establish that any necessary visa are present (instructions on the checking of
visas are issued separately)
(d) When there is any doubt about a passenger's identity or the validity of
documents presented, check-in is to be discontinued until the doubt has been
cleared
(iv) Check-in documentation and equipment: It is the airport manager and
airport coordinator of the airline’s responsibility to ensure that access to baggage tags,
boarding
passes and ticket stocks - including those produced electronically – are limited to
authorized personnel and that they are strictly controlled to prevent unauthorized use.
Protection against illegal use is to be given to any relevant equipment (e.g. electronic
validates) where this has been installed.
(v) Each aircraft operator shall incorporate in its security programme where, when and how
identification and travel documents are checked with respect to originating, transfer and
transit passengers. Where applicable, mention should be made of the authority and
responsibility of handling agents under the provisions of national legislation and NCASP.
(vi) Off-airport check-in: Incase the airline resorts to off-airport check-in
procedures, security measures prescribed vide BCAS Circular No. 9/2005 dated
17.03.2005 placed at Annexure-4.13 will be adhered to.
Arrangements around the check-in facilities to protect passengers on flights deemed to be
of higher risk
(i) Suspicious activities of persons and passengers shall be kept under surveillance by
CCTV and CISF surveillance staff and prompt action shall be taken to check such
activities to prevent any unlawful interference at the airport.
(ii) The Aviation Security Group's armed personnel shall be deployed in the check-in area to
keep an eye on the movement of passengers and staff in that area and react to a situation.
(iii) The airlines will conduct profiling of passengers prior to check in and any
suspicion will be reported to ASG personnel.
(iv) The CASO in conjunction with the BCAS and local law enforcement agencies
shall undertake a comprehensive airport survey and vulnerability assessment and risk
shall
be identified and categorized according to the likelihood of their occurrence and severity
of the consequences if they occur. Based on the risk assessment, resources shall be
prioritized to strengthen adequate security arrangements.
(v) Finally a security counter measure threat matrix shall be developed in order to establish
standardized counter measures for each threat level that can be instantly and automatically
implemented when there is an increase threat level. In case decrease of threat level, the
enhanced security counter measures shall be removed.
Security awareness public announcements (e.g., warning passengers not to leave
articles unattended).
(i) Passengers and public awareness is very essential for effective implementation of civil
aviation security in the country. Therefore, frequent public announcement and display of
security signage shall done by the airport operator concerned as per the template circulated
vide BCAS Circular no. 22/2010 dated 1.12.2010 (Annexure- 11.2).
(ii) The passengers shall be advised not to leave the baggage unattended and also not to
touch any unidentified object. If any unidentified object is observed by the passengers,
employees, workers at the airport, they shall report the same to the nearest ASG personnel.
(iii)Signage about Police Post and Control Room details shall be displayed conspicuously on
the city side of the terminals of the airport and same is established by the Airport Operator.
Possible mitigating measures - Landside security measures should be proportionate to the risk
while remaining operationally sustainable in the long run in order to ensure a reasonable balance
between aviation security, safety and operational requirements, and passenger facilitation.
Ground procedures:
Missiles are easily transportable and can be operated from any open area, including the flat roof
of a building. Consequently, landing, and to a greater extent, take-off paths, which are frequently
over open terrain, are the areas from which attacks are likely to be launched. Contingency plans
should therefore include:
a) A requirement for detailed surveys of probable launch sites to be conducted from time to
time and for similar inspections to be carried out immediately prior to landing or take-off;
b) Surveillance of probable launch sites by irregularly scheduled security patrols;
c) Recruitment of local residents who can assist by immediately reporting any unusual or
suspicious activity;
d) Prior identification of high-risk flights for which special procedures will be required on
take-off and landing; and
e) Clearance of areas from which attacks may be launched so as to eliminate places of
concealment for launch sites.
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Module 07
Recognition of Explosive Devices and Offensive Weapons
Module Objective:
Define and classify Prohibited articles
Recognize prohibited articles
Recognize dangerous goods
List and identify the main components of improvised explosive and incendiary device
Describe security response on discovering a prohibited article
Teaching Methods
Slide Presentations
Lectures by certified instructors
Group discussions
Demonstrations
Role‐ playing and practical exercises
Overnight reading Assignments
Progress Tests
Mastery Test ( Written and Practical )
Legal framework
International legislation
Convention 1991 Montreal Convention on Marking of Plastic Explosives 1991
Annex 17
Standard 4.1.1 Each contracting State shall establish measures to prevent
weapons, explosives or any other dangerous devices, articles or
substances, which may be used to commit an act of unlawful
interference, the carriage or bearing of which is not authorised,
from being introduced, by any means whatsoever, on board an
aircraft engaged in civil aviation.
National Legislation
Aircraft Act 1934,
Section 10 Any person carrying explosives or dangerous goods in an aircraft
shall be punishable under Section 10 of Aircraft Act, 1934 with
imprisonment which may extend to two years and shall also be
liable to fine [which may extend to ten lakh rupees.]
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Aviation (Security) Rules 2011
Rule 20 Prohibition to carry weapon or explosive
Aviation Security Order / Circular
Order 05/ 2005 Permissible & Prohibited Items to be carried by the passenger
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Prohibited Articles
“Articles which are, in the context of aviation security, are defined as those articles, devices or substances
which may be used to endanger the safety of the aircraft and its occupants, or installations and the public”.
Prohibited articles are not allowed to be carried in the cabin of an aircraft, or taken into the Security
Prohibited Area of an airport, except by authorized persons who require them to undertake essential tasks.
Such essential tasks may concern the operation of airport, aircraft operation, engineering, airline/airport
catering facilities and restaurants. Authorized persons may include aircraft crew members who require the
prohibited item for the performance of normal in‐flight duties or as part of mandatory emergency/survival
or medical equipment.
Some Prohibited articles though prohibited from carriage in the cabin of an aircraft may be transported by
passengers in their hold baggage so long as the articles will not endanger the aircraft, are properly packed,
and are authorized for carriage by the airline operator concerned.
Persons tasked primarily with the detection of prohibited articles should also be aware that there are
certain articles or substances which are classified as “dangerous goods” by the ICAO Technical Instructions
for the Safe Transport of Dangerous Goods by Air. (Doc 9284).
Some or these articles and substances classified as prohibited articles will also fall under the classification
of dangerous goods. With the exception of a small number of permitted items, dangerous goods must not
be carried by passengers on their person or in their carry‐on baggage or hold baggage.
States may in reaction to intelligence about a particular threat also decide that other articles not normally
classified as Prohibited articles or described below should also be excluded from carriage by passengers or
any other person in the cabin of an aircraft or in hold baggage, or carried into the Security Prohibited Area
of an airport.
Handling of Prohibited Articles
In some States, many prohibited articles may be carried by the public legally, but could be used to commit
an act of unlawful interference or would endanger the safety of the aircraft when carried in the aircraft
passenger cabin, should be processed in one of the following ways:
Placed in the passengers hold baggage, unless the item would endanger the safety of the aircraft.
Confiscated and subsequently properly disposed of or destroyed.
Confiscated and kept in storage by the airport authorities or relevant aircraft operator for later return
to the passenger.
Removed and once properly prepared and packaged, transported in the hold of the aircraft for later
return to the passenger at his ticketed destination.
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Categories of Prohibited Articles
1 Weapons
2 Dangerous Articles
3 Dangerous substances
4 Explosives
Category ‐1: Weapons
EXAMPLES OF WEAPONS
Weapons are articles designed to kill, injure, immobilise or incapacitate a person.
Handguns, flare guns, blow guns and darts, electric dart guns, rifles, shotguns pellet guns, spear guns and
dart, knives with blades over 10 cms long mace, tear gas, liquids/powders in canisters or disguised as pens,
martial arts weapons, blades or spiked finger rings and wrist bands, sword canes and umbrella swords
Category 2 : Dangerous articles
Any article that can be used to threaten the safety of the aircraft.
Any article that can be used to threaten the safety of the aircraft Starter pistols, toy guns when carried by
an adult and if they are realistic when Carried by children, sharp pointed scissors and letter openers,
chisels ,ice picks, large Screwdrivers and knitting needles, pocket knives with blades over 4cm but less than
10cms.
Category 3 : Dangerous Substances
Substances which are capable of posing risk to the health of passengers and crew or the security / safety of
aircraft or property.
Flammable liquid fuel e.g. Petrol / gasoline, diesel, lighter fluid, alcohol, ethanol.
Gas & gas containers e.g. Butane, propane, acetylene, oxygen ‐ in large volume.
Non safety matches
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Turpentine & paint thinner
Acids and Alkalis e.g. spillable ‘wet’ batteries
Corrosive or Bleaching Substances ‐ e.g. mercury, chlorine
Radioactive material. ‐ e.g. Medicinal or commercial isotopes
Poisons
Infectious or biological hazardous material. ‐ e.g. infected blood, bacteria and viruses
Material capable of spontaneous ignition or combustion.
Fire extinguishers
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Additional Items Prohibited for Flights assessed at Higher Risk
A risk assessment made by individual member states may indicate that certain aircraft operations are at
higher risk of an act of unlawful interference being committed against them. In these circumstances
individual member states may wish to include one or more of the following items in the states’ list of
Prohibited articles which may not be carried on the person and within cabin or hold baggage as
appropriate.
Knitting needles
Knives with blades less than 6 cm
Metal cutlery
Scissors with blades less than 6 cm
Liquid Aerosol and Gels (LAG)‐ each item not exceeding 100ml, total 1litre allowed
Category 4: Explosives
Material that causes a sudden, almost instantaneous, release of gas, heat, and pressure, accompanied by
loud noise when subjected to a certain amount of shock, pressure, or temperature.
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The vast majority of explosives manufactured are lawfully used. The armed forces use propellants to
propel bullets, shells and rockets and explosives to destroy a target. Pyrotechnic materials are used in
signaling, in safety devices such as car air bags, and for entertainment in the form of fireworks and
theatrical pyrotechnics
Low explosives
For many years, black powder was the most common low explosive used throughout world. But black
powder or gun powder as it was commonly called, produced a large amount of smoke and was
dangerous to use.
Pyrotechnic materials and propellants are often known as low explosives. The main distinction between
these materials and high explosives is in the way that they produce their effect.
Pyrotechnics and propellants, when initiated by heat, rapidly change from a small volume solid or liquid to
a large volume of hot gases. Pyrotechnic materials and propellants are easily bought in the form of
matches, fireworks or firearms propellants or can be improvised. They are therefore commonly misused by
terrorists in incendiaries and blast bombs. The “pipe bomb” is usually a length of steel pipe with screw‐on
end caps, filled with a pyrotechnic material.
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High explosives
As far as explosives detection is concerned, most modern high explosives fall into several groups:
Nitro‐glycerinebased. Nitro‐glycerine based explosives consist of mixtures of the liquid explosives
nitro‐glycerine (NG) and ethylene glycol dinitrate (EGDN) with solid materials such as wood pulp which
reduce the sensitivity of the explosives to shock. Because they have a long history of industrial use they
are often called “commercial explosives”. Trade or generic names for Nitroglycerine explosives
include “Dynamite”, “Gelignite”, “Blasting Gelatine”, “Special Gel” and “Frangex”, and usually come
as paper‐ wrapped sticks.
TNTbased. TNT (trinitrotoluene) is a hard, yellowish white solid that can easily be melted and cast. For
this reason it has long been used to fill bombs and shells. It may be mixed with other explosives which
are not castable but more powerful. TNT is sometimes found as blocks and is often supplied in the
form of flakes. Terrorists have sometimes disguised TNT by casting it into ornaments and decoratively
painting them.
Plasticexplosives. Plastic explosives are usually mixtures of the powerful explosives RDX (cyclonite or
hexogen) or PETN (pentaerithritol tetra nitrate) with oil or grease, making a puttylike material. Plastic
explosives are easily moulded into any shape and have many military and industrial uses. They are
commonly used by terrorists. It is well known that a few hundred grammes of plastic explosives can
destroy an airliner. “C4”, “PE4” and “Semtex H” are well known plastic explosives.
Fuel/oxidantmixtures. Fuel/oxidant mixtures comprise something that burns, such as oil, and an
oxygen‐containing chemical which liberates oxygen quickly on heating, such as ammonium nitrate.
Many fuels (sugar, charcoal, sulphur and powdered aluminium to name but a few) and many oxidants
(most inorganic nitrates, chlorates, perchlorates and permanganates) will work. Mixtures of almost any
fuel with any oxidant will produce either a pyrotechnic or high explosive effect.
Most modern commercial explosives are fuel/oxidant mixtures. ANFO (ammonium nitrate and fuel oil) and
“Powergel” are examples. Some contain water and are known as “slurries”, “gels” and “emulsions”. They
often come packed in sausage‐like plastic tubes. Since many oxidants are common industrial or agricultural
chemicals, terrorists often produce their own fuel/oxidant mixtures, sometimes using them in large
quantities. These are often fuel/oxidant mixtures or mixtures of Nitroglycerine with nitro‐cellulose. They
may be used to propel munitions, to produce a blast effect if confined, in rockets, and for their illuminating
properties in flares.
LOW EXPLOSIVES HIGH EXPPLOSIVES
It burns It explodes
It does not require detonator It requires detonator
Magnitude of destruction is less Magnitude of destruction is more
Not safe to handle Safe to handle
Not safe to store Safe to store
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Needs confinement to explode Does not need confinement to explode
More Hygroscopic Less Hygroscopic
S.No Explosive Colour Physical Form
1 RDX White Crystalline
2 PETN White Crystalline
3 Sheet Expl White Flexible
4 C – 4 White Plastic/Puttylike substances
5 TNT Pale Yellow Block (Brick Shaped)
6 PEK Yellow Cartridge/plastic mass
7 Tetryl/CE Yellow Granular/Powder
8 Cordtex Chocolate / White / Orange Cord
9 LTPE Black Flexible/cartridge
10 Semtex Black/orange Slurry
11 Gun powder Black Granular
Pyrotechnic
S.No Explosive Colour Physical Form
1 Safety Fuse Dirty black Yarn/jute bounded
Civil Explosives
1 Gelatin Yellow Stick
2 Dynamites Yellow Cartridge wrapped in paper
3 ANFO Greenish Slurry with white crystal of AN
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Improvised Explosive Device (IED) Components
An IED is the explosive device designed, fabricated, placed and activated with an intention of causing
injury/death or to create panic and chaos amongst public or to cause intensive damage to property. IED’s
could be of any size and shape.
IED could be manufactured in any innocuous objects such as Brief case, Suitcase, Tiffin carrier, Sweet
packet, Gift item, Radio, Laptop computer, TV, VCR, Telephone, Cycle, Scooter, Car, Vehicle etc. It may be
operated electrically or mechanically and designed to explode while handling or by use of any delay
mechanism or remote control etc. Its components are :
• Explosive material (main charge)
• Detonator
• Power source
• Switch Mechanism
Explosive
To attack the aviation industry the terrorist will prefer using high explosive as it is safe to carry, small
quantity is sufficient to cause a huge damage, it is also easy to conceal.
Detonator
There are various devices used for initiating explosives and
connecting charges. These include detonators, fuses and shock
tube. A detonator is a small cylinder containing an initiating
explosive and, usually, a “booster” charge of high explosive. It is
used to initiate the detonation of high explosives. In blasting and
demolition, the detonator is normally stored separately from the
high explosives and inserted only when the charges are placed and
the area is evacuated.
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Non Electric detonators are open at one end. A fuse is inserted into the open end and the spark from
the fuse impinges on the initiating explosive and fires the detonator. The plain detonator is sometimes
used with percussion caps and other devices which can produce a flame. This is half filled and half empty
for inserting safety fuse.
Electricdetonators have wires emerging at one end. They are fired by passing an electric current
through the wires. In legitimate use this current is provided by a hand‐held device called an exploder.
In terrorist and criminal use, a battery together with an improvised electrical delay circuit (timer and
power unit or TPU) is commonly used to fire the detonator.
Power Sources
Power sources of bomb could be from normal batteries such as 1.5V, pencil and
torch cells, 6V, 9V etc. There are flat batteries, which can be used for letter
bombs. Latest batteries manufactured in pure plastic containers, which are
difficult to view in x‐ray machine.
IED Initiating Mechanism or Switches used in an IED
These are also known as Bomb Initiating Mechanism. It normally is based on four principles they employ
such as:
ANTI HANDLING
DELAYED
AMBIENT CONDITION
REMOTE CONTROL/ COMMAND
ANTI HANDLING
Anti Handling Bombs when it is inadvertently removed, lifted or opened it may explode.
Anti‐handling switches may vary from a small micro switch to improvised switch such as cloth‐peg or loop
made from normal electrical wire. It is otherwise called as “Victim operated switch”.
DELAYED
Delayed Bombs delay was achieved by normal clockwork mechanism like watch or timepiece. Delay can
also be used by chemicals cleverly concealed in ordinary objects and these chemicals when come in
contact with Improvised explosives causes fire or explosion. Chemicals such as sulphuric acid, cupric
chloride, nitric acid slowly eats away the metal, the breaking of metallic wire will trigger the firing
mechanism.
Ambient Condition Switches
The triggering mechanism is activated by environmental factors such as gas, smoke acoustic, barometric,
humidity, proximity, light, sound etc.
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Remote Control
Normal remote control bombs are activated by transmission of electromagnetic waves.
Type of Switches / Mechanism
Anti Handling Delayed Ambient Condition Remote Control
Pressure Clock Work Proximity Radio control
Pressure Release Electronic Timer Gas/ smoke sensitive FM Transmission
Pull PTD Timer Barometric/ humidity Command wire
Collapsing Circuit Thermal X‐ray sensitive Infra‐red beam
Tension Water Drip Infrared sensitive Laser
Vibratory Water Add Metal sensitive Cell phone
Lift Pyrotechnics Acoustic sensors Pager
Light / Dark sensitive Satellite Phones
EFFECTS OF EXPLOSION
a) Blast Effect
High pressure ‐Up to 40, 00,000 PSI.
Velocity of Detonation of TNT ‐25,000 KMPH.
b) Fragmentation
Speed of fragments may be up to 6000 KMPH.
c) Thermal
High Temperature of 3000 – 4000 0 C.
d) Translation
Bodies are lifted above ground level and thrown away.
e) Concussion
In the air a vacuum or suction effect is created behind the moving blast wave.
f) Earth and water shock
Damage takes place miles away.
g) Secondary effects
Fire, damage to building, vehicles etc
It is estimated that 50 PSI of pressure cause eardrum to rupture and 250 PSI of pressure applied on lungs
of a human being, can cause his death. The high pressure of 40 lakh pounds per square inch (PSI) and high
velocity of atmosphere moving at thousands of KMPH will cause death to anyone situated in the blast
zone. This is why we find many people are killed beyond recognition at the point of detonation.
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DIFFERENCE BETWEEN IED AND IID:
IED IID
Four components (Explosives , detonator , power Three components (Low Explosives , Initiator and
source and switch) Incendiary material)
It require detonator It does not requires detonator
Magnitude of destruction is more Magnitude of destruction is less
Requires triggering mechanism Required ignition mechanism
Difference between Improvised explosive device and Bomb.
BOMB IED
Service Explosives Improvised Explosives
Made by approved ordinance factory Made by Anti National elements(ANES)
Standard mechanism used Improvised mechanism used
Used by Army & Security forces (SFS) for safety & Used by ANES to kill innocent public & create
security of the country terror in public
Very difficult to diffuse as mechanism is not
Can be diffused easily as mechanism is known
known.
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Places of Concealment of Explosives
On the person – add examples
In cabin baggage
In hold baggage
In Cargo or Mail
In vehicles
Methods of Concealment
It can be Disguised, Dismantle & Camouflaged Disguised Dismantle (Self Loading Pistol Dismantled)
Explosives in Shaving Cream Tubes
Liquid Explosives in Whisky Or Wines Bottles
Explosives in Birth Day Cake
Blasting Gelatin Embedded in Chocolate
TNT Cast in Toy Shapes, Doll Head, animals, Wall Painting.
IED in false Bottom of Baggage.
Explosive Jacket.
Preparation Of Explosive From Local Material
Detonator Hidden In Pen, Calculators and Shoe Sole.
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ACTION ON DETECTION OF EXPLOSIVES
DO’s
Notify Supervisor
Evacuate men immediately to a safe distance.
Open all windows and doors
Place sand bags around the suspected object
Inform bomb disposal squad.
Inform fire brigade, hospital and ambulance.
Handle the package alone if you are duty bound to handle.
DONT’s
Do not touch
Do not pass any Metallic Objects
Do not throw Water
Do not open
Do not unwrap
Do not shake or handle
Do not turn or unscrew
Do not cut strings
Do not lift or remove covers
Modern Methods of Explosive Detection (EDDS & EDS)
The explosive detection system generally involves detection of explosives from head space by vapour,
trace particulate or bulk detection system which employs technology for detection and identification of
explosives.
Most explosives consist of organic compounds of carbon, nitrogen, hydrogen and oxygen
The explosive detector is designed to detect these organic compounds. When contraband has narcotics or
explosives are handled by a person it leaves microscopic particles behind the hand and clothes. The same
person if touches the handle of bag, zip or lock may harbour microscopic quantities of substances. These
microscopic substances can be detected with help of explosive vapour / trace detectors.
TYPES OF EXPLOSIVES DETECTORS:
ETD
EVD
Canine (Sniffer dog)
Principle of Explosive Vapor Detector (EVD) Operation :
The explosive vapor detectors are designed to capture vapor emitted from the explosive. Success of these
explosive vapor detectors depend upon sensitivity, selectivity, vapor concentrations and residence time in
which the bomb is concealed and placed in the environment.
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Working principle:
The gaseous samples enter an ionisation chamber where particles are ionised.
The explosive vapour traces collected are fed into the chamber, ionized and converted into electrically
charged molecules.
These molecules move at different speed, depending upon the molecular structure and size which help
in the identification of explosives.
Equipment collects vapor or particulate matter from surface contamination to detect a wide range of
explosives including plastic explosives. Samples are collected via hand vacuum for vapor or directly from
the surface by wiping it with trap material. Once the sample is collected either in the form of vapor or trace
from surface, then it is processed by placing it in an intensifier for analysis. The result is obtained instantly.
Principle of Explosives Trace Detectors Operation (ETD)
In this method, the particles/ traces of explosives are taken from surfaces. Collection of sample from
surface of bag is very important for better detection. A specialized paper disk known as sample trap is used
to wipe the contaminated surface and inserted into the desk top analyzer for analysis. The analyzer then
identifies the sample. Indication is given both audible and visual alarm. The analysis can be stored and
printed for any evidence.
ION track instrument has now developed another portable hand held detector working on the same
principle as vapour tracer2 i.e. ION Trap Mass Spectrometry. The equipment is developed with support of
US department of defense on behalf of TSA, customs service and cost guard. It is easy to use 5 button
keypad and LCD display. The instrument requires little operator training. The instrument is capable of
detecting microscopic quantities of explosives both in vapour and particulate mode.
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Advantages and Disadvantages of ETD / EVD
Advantages:
Portable
Auto‐calibrated.
Ready to operate in less than 10 seconds.
Constant adjustment of operating conditions in line with the changes in the atmosphere.
Disadvantages:
As a machine it may malfunction.
It may give false alarm.
Expensive
Only trained staff can operate.
Airtight materials will defeat sampling technique, vapour will not be available.
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Module 08
Building and Area Search Procedure
Module Objective
Describe building and search area procedure
List the three basic types of “sterile” passenger holding areas
Conduct a physical search of a holding area for prohibited items
Understand response action to deal with “suspect” items located in a holding area in accordance with
Standard Operating Procedures
Maintain the sterility of a holding area
Teaching Methods
Slide Presentations
Lectures by certified instructors
Group discussions
Demonstrations
Role‐ playing and practical exercises
Overnight reading Assignments
Progress Tests
Mastery Test ( Written and Practical )
International Legislations
Annex 17 Standard 5.1.3
Each Contracting State shall ensure that arrangements are made to investigate, render
safe and/or dispose of, if necessary, suspected dangerous devices or other potential
hazards at airports.
National Legislation
General Principles for Building and Area search
For searches to be effective they should be conducted systematically by staff familiar with the area
concerned. The main reason for this being that outside personnel will be unlikely to know the layout of the
aircraft or terminal building and the various places in which a device could be concealed and therefore will
not so easily be able to spot anything which is out of place or unfamiliar. Search plans should be prepared
in advance and staff trained to use them. A search Coordinator must be nominated to provide control of
the search process and if necessary take the decision to evacuate.
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Searches should be briefed on action to be initiated if suspicious object is found. When a suspect device is
discovered the possibility of secondary devices should not be discounted.
The use of hand‐held communications is useful for coordination of the search and is often the only way of
ensuring appropriate and speedy lifesaving procedures for search and evacuation. However, once a
suspect device has been located those using hand‐held communications should immediately move away
and ensure that they and anyone else in the area move outside the cordon as quickly as possible. Radios
should not be used to transmit within 25 metres of a suspect device.
Before starting the search, strict control of access must be implemented in the area being searched, this is
necessary to ensure devices are not introduced into the area once it has been cleared.
Effective and systematic searching takes time, if the warning received indicated a possible detonation time
for the device which will prevent a thorough search being conducted then the best and safest option is
evacuation of all personnel to a safe area and waiting for the arrival of specialist explosive disposal
personnel.
Sterile Holding Area concepts / Basic Screening plans:
• Decentralized, usually at the aircraft boarding gate
• Semi‐centralized, usually after the duty‐free shop area
• Centralized, usually before the duty‐free shop area
Decentralized
Screening Points at Boarding Gates
TERMINAL
1 2 3
Concourse Pier 4
7 6 5 Screening
Points
Boarding Gates
Screening of passengers is carried out immediately before boarding at the boarding gate, jet‐way or
terminal door leading directly to an aircraft or adjacent apron area. Passengers screening takes place when
the passenger boarding process begins.
• Requires screening point at each boarding gate
• Passengers screened immediately before boarding
• Staff/equipment must be available to handle optimum passenger load in limited time
• Screening point manned only when screening is in progress
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Semi-centralized
Screening Points at Holding Areas
Screening
Points
1 2 3
Mobile
Lounge
Concourse Pier
4
7 6 5
Boarding Gates
Screening of passengers is carried out at the entrance to an area designed to hold all passengers for a
particular flight. This holding area is secured (i.e. made “sterile”) by means of walls or suitable barriers,
together with controlled access points. The holding area may also be a vehicle designed to carry
passengers to a distant aircraft. Screening takes place as passengers arrive at the holding area and
passengers remain within the holding area until the boarding actually begins.
Centralized
Screening Point at Concourse
TERMINAL
1 2 3
Pier 4
7 6 5
Screening
Point Boarding Gates
Screening of passengers is carried out at the entrance to a concourse, finger or satellite containing several
gates, with no specific relationship to a particular flight. Screening can therefore take place a considerable
time before a particular flight is due to depart Passenger remain in the concourse area until a short time
before their flight commences.
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PHYSICAL SEARCH OF A HOLDING AREA FOR PROHIBITED ITEMS
Initiation of a Search
The Coordinator can initiate a search by:
Sending a message to the search teams over a public address system. It should be coded to avoid
unnecessary disruption and alarm to the public;
Use of personal radios, pagers or mobile/cell phones; or
A telephone cascade system: the Coordinator rings, say, three members, who in turn each ring a
further three members and so on until all the teams have been alerted.
What searchers should look for?
It is difficult to give guidance to search teams about the appearance of suspect explosive devices as they
can be disguised in many ways.
Briefing of Searchers
Searchers should be briefed to
Look for unidentified objects or anything:
That should not be there
That cannot be accounted for
That is out of place
Do NOT TOUCH suspicious objects
Notify the Search Coordinator of progress of search and discovery of any suspicious objects.
Mark the location of suspicious object with a prominent object (but not touching the device)
Withdraw from the immediate area and await further instructions
Guidance for Searching Terminal Buildings
Search Plans
It is vital to have search plans prepared in advance, and staff trained in them. The objective is to make
sure that the whole terminal building is checked as quickly and effectively as possible.
Search plans must be readily available at all times, architect’s drawings, checked for accuracy and
appropriately adapted, are suitable for this purpose. Sufficient spare copies should be available for use
during search operations. Searchers and the Coordinator can then eliminate sections from the plan as they
are declared clear.
Search procedure /technique:‐
There are three types of search procedure/technique. Before searching an area, searcher first should
divide the area into three level.
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Search Sectors
The first step in preparing a search plan is to divide the terminal building into Sectors. The building may
already be segregated into various zones and therefore it may be convenient make these the sectors. Each
sector must be of manageable size for the number of searchers nominated to it. Remember that effective
and systematic searching takes time.
The sector may be one large room ‐ such as a check‐in area, concourse, baggage reclaim area , or perhaps
a number of small airline operations offices in an office suite. It is most important that cloakrooms, stairs,
corridors and lifts are included in the search plans and also car parks and other areas outside the building.
Search Teams
Search teams should be formed from staff nominated to search those areas with which they are most
familiar. Numbers required will depend upon the size of the search task. Reserves should be appointed in
case of absence. Staff should be trained and rehearsed.
Search Priorities
Those areas which are to be used as evacuation assembly areas, together with those areas where the
greatest number of the public or staff are likely to be vulnerable, should be searched first. Consider also,
as a priority, those public areas to which the perpetrator may have had easy access such as restrooms,
elevators, stairways and hallways. Those areas to which access is normally controlled may be searched last.
Do not overlook car parks, the outside area of the terminal building and the perimeter.
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How to Search
The conduct of searches will depend on local circumstances and local knowledge. The overriding principle
is that they should be conducted in a systematic and thorough manner so that no part is left unchecked.
The searchers need to practice, to get a feel for the logical progression through their area (whether it be in
a terminal building, baggage reclaim area or administrative or operations office suite) and the length of
time it will take.
With this in mind the method outlined in this typical example is of a Room Search in a sector, it should be
adapted to reflect the peculiarities of the actual area being searched.
Example Room Search
A search should begin at the entrance to the room.
Each searcher or team should first stand still and look around the room.
They should note the contents of the room and make a quick assessment of those areas that will need
special attention.
They should look for any unusual lights (including small light sources knows as Light Emitting Diodes
which are often used in the arming circuits of improvised explosive devices).
They should also listen carefully for any unusual noises ‐ particularly ticking or whirring sounds.
If anything unusual is seen, the searcher or team should alert the Coordinator who will decide whether to
evacuate the building.
If nothing unusual is seen, the search should begin.
The search should be conducted methodically, moving in one direction around the area to be searched. It
should be carried out in three sweeps.
The first sweep is to work around the edges of the room, taking in the walls from top to bottom and
the floor area immediately beneath the wall. Look inside fireplaces, behind curtains and window
blinds, behind and beside furniture around the edges of the room. The sweep should finish at the
doorway where it began.
The second sweep should take in the furniture and the floor. Furniture should not be removed but
drawers should be opened and searched and gaps in and under furniture should be explored. If the
floor covering shows signs of recent disturbance, it should be lifted.
The third sweep should cover the ceiling, if it is of a kind in which objects might be concealed. Start at
one corner and systematically search the whole surface.
After the search has been completed, and if nothing has been found, the Coordinator should be informed
immediately so that the sector can be marked ‘CLEAR’ on the search plans.
Searching should continue until the whole area has been cleared. Do not forget that secondary devices are
not unknown.
If a suspicious object is found follow the golden rules:
DO NOT TOUCH OR MOVE THE OBJECT.
If possible leave a distinctive marker near (not touching) the object.
Move away from the device to a designated control point, leaving lights on.
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Inform search team leader or Coordinator.
The Coordinator should implement the evacuation plan.
Stay at the control point and draw an accurate plan of the location of the suspicious package or device
for the assistance of the police and explosive disposal experts.
The person finding the object should be immediately available for interview by the police or security
services.
Don’t use more searcher than necessary.
Use 02 searcher per room or an area of 250 Sq.ft
Mark the area after searched
Don’t assume that only one device is planted
Don’t trust anything and don’t assume the face value of objects.
If the item detected is a weapon:
Immediately safeguard the item; and
Notify the search coordinator (supervisor).
If the item located is an explosive device or object that appears to be an explosive device:
Do not touch the object;
Mark the location; and
Notify the search coordinator (supervisor).
Record the following details in screening point log, when an item is found
Location of holding area
Time and date searched and by whom
Result of Search
Details of item(s) detected
Action taken on finding the item(s)/object(s)
Name of person notified of find
Time and date of notification
Action taken for safeguarding/disposal of item(s)/object(s)
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Module 09
Patrolling & Guarding
Module Objective:
Know the principle of Defence in Depth
Understand how physical barriers contribute to Defence in Depth
Describe how security patrols & guards fit into the concept of security
Know vulnerable areas in physical barriers at the local airport
Understand Standard Operating Procedures for dealing with signs of interference or intrusion of the
airport physical barriers
Comply with the airport regulations governing the airside movement of security vehicles
An overview of the legislation.
Teaching Methods
Slide Presentations
Lectures by certified instructors
Group discussions
Demonstrations
Role‐ playing and practical exercises
Overnight reading Assignments
Progress Tests
Mastery Test ( Written and Practical )
International Legislation
Annex 17
Standard 4.8 Each contracting State shall ensure that security measures in
landside areas are established to mitigate possible threats of act
of unlawful interference in accordance with a risk
assessment carried out by the relevant authorities
Standard 4.2.3 Each contracting state shall ensure that identification systems are
established in respect of persons and vehicles in order to prevent
unauthorised access to airside areas and security prohibited areas.
Identity shall be verified at designated checkpoints before access
is allowed access to airside areas and security prohibited areas.
National Legislation
Aircraft (Security) Rules 2011, Rule 6
Every aerodrome operator shall construct a perimeter wall around the aerodrome.
Aircraft (Security) Rules 2011, Rule 7
Provision of lighting, road for patrolling and observation pos
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Airports and aircraft are subject to attack. One of the security measures used to protect airport and
aircraft is by carrying out patrolling and guarding of aviation facilities. During increased threat conditions it
may be necessary to increase security of the airport terminal and restrict access to only those persons who
are actually travelling on a flight that day and authorized airport and airline personnel.
Basic Concept of Security
• DETER
Observable security infrastructure such as fences, lights, sensors and CCTV and the obvious presence
of well trained and technically skilled security personnel, contributes to this profile.
• DELAY
Security fences, anti‐climbing devices, installation security, and securing of the aircraft doors can
contribute to delay, sufficient to increase the likelihood of apprehension by security personnel, other
airport personnel
• DETECT
Preventing acts of unlawful interference by detecting. Detecting attempts by unauthorized persons to
gain access to aircraft, security restricted areas or controlled areas; detecting prohibited articles on
persons and baggage. Deployment of security personnel at static security posts or mobile security
patrols, may contribute to the detection process.
• RESPOND
Effective response to a security incident requires the availability of security personnel at short notice
to attend the scene of the occurrence within the time bought by the delay and detection systems in
place.
To deter an unlawful act against civil aviation requires the presentation of a security profile, sufficient to
persuade a would‐be perpetrator that the airport, airline or air cargo is a "hard target" and that there is a
high risk of failure and/or apprehension.
Defence in Depth
Defence in Depth (also referred to sometimes as layers of security) and that layers of security measures
build upon each other to protect aviation and operations. Therefore if one layer fails or is deficient, next is
designed to prevent the act of unlawful interference being successful.
These layers may consist of:
Security Restricted areas and Restricted areas
Airport identification permits for personnel and
vehicles
Physical Security measures ( fences, gates, locks, patrols
etc)
Detection systems for weapons and
Explosives
Principles of airport protection based on:
Controlling movement of people and
vehicles
Dividing airport into non‐restricted and restricted
areas
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Protecting airport with physical
barriers
Preventing penetration of airport
barriers
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NON RESTRICTED AND RESTRICTED AREA SEPARATION ACHIEVED BY:
Provision of physical barriers such as fences, use of buildings and natural obstacles
Limiting authorized access to controlled gates and designated access points
INTEGRITY OF BARRIER CARRYING OUT FOOT OR MOBILE PATROL:
Search guards protecting access points and vulnerable facilities, building and installations
Security personnel carrying out foot or mobile patrols
PHYSICAL BARRIERS
Objectives of Physical Barriers
Define area to be protected
Create physical and psychological deterrent
Delay intrusion and assist detection/apprehension
Provide controlled access points for people and vehicles
Elements of a Physical Barrier
Effective security fencing as per ICAO standard
Efficient security lighting
Limited access control points
Use of building, structures. natural barriers such as water, geographic terrain
Any access points must be protected
Integrity of barriers maintained by
Security guards protecting access points and vulnerable airport facilities, buildings and installations
Security personnel carrying out foot or mobile patrols
ADDITIONAL PROTECTION REQUIRED FOR:
Landside/airside storm sewers, ditches
protected by grilles, bars, railings
monitored by surveillance, patrols, inspections, anti‐intrusion alarm devices and additional lighting
In order to be effective physical barriers require guarding and patrolling by security personnel
Guarding is basically a static duty
Patrolling is a mobile function either by foot or in a vehicle
Increased threat situations require additional guards and patrols
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Security patrolling
OBJECTIVE OF SECURITY PATROLLING IS TO:
Deter and prevent unauthorized access
Detect attacks and attempted attacks against airport buildings, aircraft, installations
Ensure effectiveness of physical barriers (door, windows and openings)
Respond quickly to attacks and attempted attacks
SECURITY GUARDING
Objective Of Security Guarding Is To:
Protect vulnerable areas/vital airport facilities
Control movement of people/vehicles
Deter and prevent attacks against airport facilities
Vulnerable Points In Barriers Requiring Special Protection:
Places where natural barriers used as boundary
Waterways and storm sewers, service ducts
Buildings used to form part of boundary
Uncontrolled access points for vehicles (e.g. public roadways running through airport areas)
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Methods Used To Protect The Airport
Effective boundary fencing
Efficient security lighting
Controlled movement of people/vehicles
Buildings protected by physical means (door locks, window bars, alarm systems)
Vulnerable barrier points physically protected (landside/airside sewers, storm drains)
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Guidelines Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) #
Security Guard Duties
Dress
Security Guards assigned to patrol duties are to be dressed smartly in a clean uniform; a high standard of
personal appearance is required at all times. They are to ensure that their actions comply with the Security
Unit code of conduct and always present the [state name of airport] in a positive way.
Patrol Area
[Describe area to be patrolled e.g SRA Apron Area & Controlled Area]
Duration of duties
These duties are to be carried out during the hours of [state time frame – example 06:00 to 20:00hrs]
unless instructed otherwise by the Security Team Leader.
Duties to be performed
When on duty personnel are to:
Carry out a mobile / foot patrol of the area shown in the attached map.
Before starting patrol duties and using a vehicle carry out a search of the vehicle and immediate area
for Prohibited items.
Ensure the vehicle is serviceable and note any unserviceable equipment in the log book. If the vehicle
is considered dangerous to drive then it is not to be used and the situation reported to the team
leader.
Ensure that the vehicle has a serviceable orange anti‐collision light which is to be switched on when
the vehicle is moving within the SRA or controlled area.
Wear a high visibility jacket or vest at all times when operating the vehicle or moving around the SRA
or Controlled area on foot.
When on patrol carry out the following specific duties: examples
o Check [list specific buildings] for evidence of intrusion.
o Verify the security of aircraft on remote stands. [state location ]
o Patrol specific vulnerable areas [state location]in perimeter fencing.
o Check all cargo containers (ISO ‐ ULD) and cargo storage areas.
o Escort persons, aircraft as detailed by the Team Leader.
o Ensure all persons operating within the SRA are displaying a valid SRA pass.
The vehicle and all security equipment is to be operated properly as instructed during training. Any
break down or unserviceable equipment that occurs during the shift is to be reported in writing to the
security manager through the team leader.
Any unserviceable equipment or tasks not completed are to be briefed to the relief shift on take over.
Action on attempt of unauthorised access
If an unauthorized person attempts to gain access to the SRA or Controlled Area inform the duty team
leader and police by the quickest possible means then detain the person if possible.
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Rest and toilet breaks
Rest and toilet breaks are to be taken as notified by the Team Leader.
Communication
Communication from this post is to be made using the radio using the call‐sign. [ state radio call‐sign for
post ].
A communications check is to be carried out every 60 minutes with [ the central security control centre] to
ensure the communications equipment is serviceable.
Note: Communications check every 30 minutes during times of darkness.
Reporting procedures for security incidents
All security incidents and other occurrences, which may become the subject of a complaint or comment
about [state name of airport], are to be made both verbally and in writing according to the standard
security department report format and procedures.
The chain of command for reporting procedures is [state chain of command – example Security Team
Leader ‐ Deputy Security Manager – Security Manager.]
Airport Safety Rules
The attached safety rules are to followed by all security unit personnel whilst operating within the SRA and
Controlled areas of [state name of airport],
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Guidelines Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) #
Security Patrol Duties
Dress
Security Guards assigned to patrol duties are to be dressed smartly in a clean uniform; a high standard of
personal appearance is required at all times. They are to ensure that their actions comply with the Security
Unit code of conduct and always present the [state name of airport] in a positive way.
Patrol Area
[Describe area to be patrolled e.g SRA Apron Area & Controlled Area]
Duration of duties
These duties are to be carried out during the hours of [state time frame – example 06:00 to 20:00hrs]
unless instructed otherwise by the Security Team Leader.
Duties to be performed
When on duty personnel are to:
• Carry out a mobile / foot patrol of the area shown in the attached map.
• Before starting patrol duties and using a vehicle carry out a search of the vehicle and immediate area
for Prohibited items.
• Ensure the vehicle is serviceable and note any unserviceable equipment in the log book. If the vehicle
is considered dangerous to drive then it is not to be used and the situation reported to the team leader.
• Ensure that the vehicle has a serviceable orange anti‐collision light which is to be switched on when
the vehicle is moving within the SRA or controlled area.
• Wear a high visibility jacket or vest at all times when operating the vehicle or moving around the
SRA or Controlled area on foot.
• When on patrol carry out the following specific duties: examples
Check [list specific buildings] for evidence of intrusion.
Verify the security of aircraft on remote stands. [state location ]
Patrol specific vulnerable areas [state location] in perimeter fencing.
Check all cargo containers (ISO ‐ ULD) and cargo storage areas.
Escort persons, aircraft as detailed by the Team Leader.
Ensure all persons operating within the SRA are displaying a valid SRA pass.
• The vehicle and all security equipment is to be operated properly as instructed during training. Any
break down or unserviceable equipment that occurs during the shift is to be reported in writing to the
security manager through the team leader.
• Any unserviceable equipment or tasks not completed are to be briefed to the relief shift on take over.
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Action on attempt of unauthorised access
If an unauthorized person attempts to gain access to the SRA or Controlled Area inform the duty team
leader and police by the quickest possible means then detain the person if possible.
Rest and toilet breaks
Rest and toilet breaks are to be taken as notified by the Team Leader.
Communication
Communication from this post is to be made using the radio using the call‐sign. [state radio call‐sign for
post ].
A communications check is to be carried out every 60 minutes with [the central security control centre]
to ensure the communications equipment is serviceable.
Note: Communications check every 30 minutes during times of darkness.
Reporting procedures for security incidents
All security incidents and other occurrences, which may become the subject of a complaint or comment
About [state name of airport], are to be made both verbally and in writing according to the standard
security department report format and procedures.
The chain of command for reporting procedures is [state chain of command – example Security Team
Leader ‐ Deputy Security Manager – Security Manager.]
Airport Safety Rules
The attached safety rules are to followed by all security unit personnel whilst operating within the SRA
and Controlled areas of [state name of airport],
This SOP comes into force from / Date of Issue
Replaces SOP # dated **/**/**
(which is to be destroyed under secure conditions)
Name of Issuing Authority
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Airport Safety Rules
When moving about the airside areas of the airport either on foot or in a vehicle all personnel:
• MUST know the boundaries between airside, landside, SRA and Controlled areas.
• MUST know the location and correct name of all airport buildings, services and aircraft operating areas.
• MUST maintain radio contact with the airport ground operations control (or ATC) when moving in the
vicinity of taxiways and runways.
• MUST use vehicle hazard lights and wear a reflective vest.
• MUST observe airport speed limits and comply with movement rules.
• MUST follow prescribed vehicle routes on the apron and other aircraft maneuvering surfaces.
• MUST NOT stand, walk, move, park or drive close to an aircraft when the red revolving light on top and
below the aircraft is lit (shows that engines are running, or that start-up, push-back or towing is about to take
place).
• MUST NOT park any vehicle in a dangerous location.
• MUST NOT assume that it is safe to cross a taxiway or runway because it appears to be clear.
• MUST NOT disobey ground control (or ATC) movement instructions.
• MUST NOT cross a runway unless you have received clearance from ground control or ATC tower
even when responding to a security incident [does not apply if the runway is closed].
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Module – 10
Screening and Searching of Passengers
Module Objectives
The purpose of this module is to:
• Describe how access control procedures for Security Restricted Areas are applied to passengers and
their baggage
• Understand the procedures that apply to passenger screening areas and the use of Walk through
Metal Detectors. Know key elements of an effective search of passengers and baggage
• Describe procedures for discovery of restricted articles on passengers and in baggage
• Rough Metal Detectors & Hand Held Metal Detectors
• Be familiar with procedures for screening and searching of passengers and baggage according to local
Standard Operating Procedures
International Legislation
Annex 17
Standard 3.4.3 “Each Contracting State shall ensure that the persons carrying out
screening operations are certified according to the requirements
of the national civil aviation security programme to ensure that
performance standards are consistently and reliably achieved.”
Standard 4.4.1 “Each Contracting State shall establish measures to ensure that
originating passengers of commercial air transport operations and
their cabin baggage are screened prior to boarding an aircraft
departing from a security restricted area.”
Recommendation 2.3 “Each Contracting State should whenever possible arrange for the
security controls and procedures to cause a minimum of
interference with, or delay to the activities of, civil aviation
provided the effectiveness of these controls and procedures is not
compromised.”
National Legislation
Aircraft Rule 1937
Rule 8A Security Checks of persons boarding aircraft
The Aircraft (Security) Rules, 2011
Rule 21 Security Checks before Embarkation
Rule 23 Prohibition on carriage of certain goods
NCASP
Chapter 7.1 Screening of Passengers and carry‐on baggage
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Aviation Security Order / Circular
Circular 23/ 2005 Procedure for passenger & carryon baggage screening
Access Control Procedure And Passenger Screening
Sterile area is thearea between any passenger inspection or screening control point and aircraft into which
access is strictly controlled.
Passengers and their baggage are required to undergo pre embarkation checks before entering the Sterile
area, wherein they are screened (passenger frisking and baggage screening) so as to prevent prohibited
articles being carried aboard aircraft. The sterility of this area is maintained by searching, securing and
ensuring that any personnel or items other than the passengers entering the sterile area also undergo the
same type of security checks.
Pre embarkation check at an airport and maintaining the sterility of the SHA is the responsibility of the
state and is carried out by ASG / APSU.
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Levels of Search
There are various levels of search. The table below details the various types and the degree of intrusiveness.
Level of Search Remove Clothes? Touch Passenger? Comments
Level 1 No Yes This is a hand search of the outer levels of
the persons clothing (as worn and without
removing them) and a hand search of the
passenger’s body through that clothing.
It may involve the use of a Hand Held
Metal Detector (HHMD) to indicate items
which may have caused the Archway
Metal Detector to alarm.
Passengers may request a private search.
Level 2 Yes Yes Used after a level 1 search if suspicions
(outer layers till exist that the person may still be in
only) possession of a prohibited item, or there is
any other reason to search the person to a
greater depth than a level 1 search allows.
May also be used when person requests a
private search.
Carried out in private away from the view
of other persons / passengers. Requires
the persons consent and a witness of the
same sex as the person being searched.
Level 3 Yes Yes This level of search is usually only carried
out by personnel who have had specialist
training i.e Police or customs. It is carried
out on persons suspected of attempting to
or committing a crime.
It may involve the removal of all clothes
examination of body orifices and the use
of x-ray or other detection equipment.
It may also include detention of the
person and placing that person under
observation for a number of days to allow
the examination of body waste.
SEARCH PRINCIPLES
• All hand carried items must be screened and/or searched. Preferably pass through x‐ray equipment.
• It is important to adopt a systematic approach so that no part of the body, items of clothing or areas of
the bag are overlooked.
• Search should normally be carried out in open but should not be exposed to public view:
Classified or Private documents. Large amounts of currency, jewellery etc.
For female passengers privacy shall be maintained.
• Private search used when necessary to search in sufficient depth to establish if prohibited article is
present.
• Two searchers of the same sex as person being searched.
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• All indications of metal on the person by technical equipment must be resolved.
• Persons who cannot be cleared by normal screening process must be searched by hand.
• Any person who cannot be cleared by the total screening process must be denied access to the
security restricted area and/or not be allowed to board an aircraft.
Passenger Screening Locations (Refer Module 07 for details)
Sterile Holding Area concepts / Basic Screening plans:
• Decentralized, usually at the aircraft boarding gate
• Semi‐centralized, usually after the duty‐free shop area
• Centralized, usually before the duty‐free shop area
SCREENING POINT LAYOUT
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Departure Area Access Control
Passengers will require valid boarding pass and identification documents to enter security restricted areas
through the passenger search area.
Family and friends should NOT be allowed to accompany passengers into the Security Restricted Area.
Stages Involved In Passenger Inspection / Screening Process
Passenger Screening and physical search of passenger
X‐ray examination of baggage
Physical inspection of baggage
Searching and Securing Sterile holding area
Location No. 1
Direct passengers through walk‐through metal detector and ensure baggage loaded correctly on the X‐Ray
conveyor belt
Location No. 2
Monitor walk‐through metal detector and conduct check with hand‐held metal detector
Location No. 3
Observe X‐Ray monitor and identify items to be inspected
Location No. 4
Physically inspect items requiring attention
Location No. 5
Supervise busy screening point
Screening Checkpoint ManpowerAc 23/2005
Travel Document Checker / X‐ray Load officer
Passenger Searcher
X‐ray Officer (Operator)
Bag Controller
Bag Searchers / ETD Operators
Equipments required for Screening
Equipment designed to scan persons
o DFMD
o HHMD
o Body Scanners
Equipment designed to screen baggage
o X‐ray BIS
Equipment designed to detect explosives Trace detection
o Explosive Trace Detectors
o Explosive Vapour Detectors
Frisking booths
Search table
Room for discreet / consent search
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Disposal bins
Discreet alarm system
Communication devices – RT / Telephones
Security check stamp
Hand gloves
Screening Equipments Checks And Operating Procedure
HHMD
DFMD
Explosive detectors
Door Frame Metal Detector (DFMD)/ Walk Through Metal Detector (WTMD):
The DFMD also known as Walk Through Metal Detector is a screening
equipment which is used to detect metallic items carried by passenger on
person. It detects metallic items which weigh 30gms or above.
Operators Test Piece is used to check the serviceability of DFMD. DFMD gives
an audio and visual alarm.
Advantages:
Helps to identify metallic item
Gives a rough idea of the location of the metallic item
Faster way to check a passenger
Easy to operate
Safe for pregnant ladies, heart patient with pace makers.
Disadvantages:
Cannot detect IED or replicas of weapons made of non‐metallic material.
Detects the metallic items in a specified range only (above 30 gms)
Not portable
Expensive
False alarm
Hand Held Metal Detector (HHMD)
HHMD is used to detect the metallic items on a person’s body.
HHMD gives an audio and visual alarm.
It is safe for pregnant women and person with cardiac
pacemakers..
Pre operation checks :
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Switch on the HHMD and check battery is fully charged.
Move it on any metallic item on your body and ensure it is giving audio visual alarm.
• Check the HHMD before use
• Greet the passenger
• Ask passenger to remove all metal objects
• Ensure passenger to remove all metal objects
• Ask passenger to stand on platform
• Hold detector 2.5cm (1”) from passenger’s body, commence search as demonstrated
• Always use systematic method of search
• Do not touch the passenger with the detector.
Hand Search
Due to limitations of technical equipmentsadditional manual hand search of passengers by Reasoned
Selection may be required.
Advantage of hand search
Hand search of people or baggage has following advantages.
• No special equipment required
• Most senses may be used
• Direct interpretation
Limitations of hand search
It requires consent and co‐operation from person who is being hand searched;
Electrical, electronic or mechanical items will need to be examined by technical equipment such as x‐
ray or trace detection e.g. mobile phones, laptop computers, cameras etc.;
It can be time consuming compared to technical screening equipment when many passengers or bags
are involved;
Hand search is vulnerable to human failings such as bad habits, inconsistency, tiredness etc.; and
It can be unpleasant and unhygienic for the searcher.
Hand search of passengers is also known as Pat Down Search
There are two types of pat‐down searches.
Whole body pat‐down search.
Pat‐down search limited to the area of an alarm
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Security Procedures for Screening of Passengers with Special Needs and
Medical Condition
(Reference document AVSEC CIRCULAR 04/2014)
Persons with special needs:
Certain passengers who will require handling in a special manner when being processed through the
passenger screening checkpoint. These may include the following classes of person:
Babies in strollers and Children (will require consent of adult);
Pregnant women;
Differently able persons (physically challenged);
Passengers in wheelchairs;
Persons with medical conditions [limbs in plaster]; and
Passengers with religious reasons that effect how they are searched by hand
Screening of Wheelchair Passengers
1) When a passenger arrives at a screening point in a wheelchair / scooter, he/she must be
accompanied either by another travelling passenger or a representative of the airline before he
proceeds through security. The accompanying passenger or representative of the airline is
responsible for the passenger throughout the whole process of screening;
2) If a passenger arrives at a screening point in a wheelchair and he/she is not accompanied by
another travelling passenger or Jet Airways representative, the airline’s Customer Service should
be contacted for assistance;
3) At the screening point, depending upon the ability of the passenger to walk, he/she will be
requested to walk through the DFMD unaided. If he/she cannot walk, it is the responsibility of the
accompanying travelling passenger or airline representative to push the passenger in the
wheelchair unless it is self‐driven;
4) There may also be non‐travelling support personnel in attendance to board the aircraft and lift
the passenger into his / her seat. This support person must be accompanied.
5) If there is a requirement for the passenger to be lifted at the screening point, the support
person or the airline representative will perform the lifting for the passenger.
6) The support person will be escorted by an airline representative at the time of boarding/
disembarkation.
7) If the passenger can stand but cannot walk, he/she can be screened by undergoing a pat‐down
while he/she stands beside the wheelchair or scooter.
8) If a passenger cannot stand, he/she should be offered a chair for screening and subjected to a
pat‐down thereafter.
9) If there is an alarm by the DFMD, HHMD or other technology, the same must be resolved. If the
alarm cannot be resolved, the passenger will not be permitted beyond the checkpoint.
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10) The passenger’s wheelchair or scooter will be inspected, including the seat cushions and
any pouches/ pockets. It will be tested for traces of explosives. Removable pouches will be x‐ray
screened.
11) Any carry‐on bag or document with the wheelchair passenger shall be passed through
the x‐ray screening.
12) If a person objects to proceeding through the DFMD on justified medical or other ground,
he/she will be allowed passage through alternative way by the frisking officer and then subjected
to screening by pat down search and HHMD where permissible.
13) If a person refuses to undergo screening, the frisking officer will inform the supervisor,
who will direct what further action is to be taken. The concerned passenger will not be allowed
entry past the screening point.
14) Only when satisfied that a person is not carrying any prohibited or dangerous article, the
screening officer shall allow the person to proceed beyond the screening point.
Screening of Passenger with Prosthetics
1) During screening of prosthetics ASG/APSU may use X‐ray, ETD and visual check depending on
the circumstances.
2) The passenger should inform the ASG/APSU of the existence of a prosthetic, his or her ability
and of any need for assistance before screening begins. Passengers can use Notification Card to
communicate discreetly with security officers. However, showing this card or other medical
documentation will not exempt a passenger from additional screening when necessary.
3) Dignity and privacy of the passengers should be borne in mind during the entire process of
security screening. Where the officer needs to see the prosthetic, care should be taken against
exposing any sensitive areas. ASG/APSU will also use technology to test the prosthetic for traces of
explosive material. If explosive material is detected, the passenger will have to undergo additional
screening.
4) Passenger with prosthetics or braces/support appliances must be accompanied by an Jet
Airways representative, preferable of the same gender as the passenger.
5) The airline staff and any other accompanying person shall be frisked and checked before
allowing them access to the passenger with prosthetics at the screening point.
6) The passenger will first pass through the DFMD and necessary security checks.
7) The passenger should then be taken to a private screening point and made to sit comfortably.
He/she will receive additional screening including a pat‐down. If necessary, screening through ETD
trace will be adopted. While dealing with prosthetic device and during taking off and putting on of
clothes, privacy of the passenger should be maintained.
8) Screening of the prosthetic appliance will include x‐ray screening, ETD detection and visual
inspection. During visual inspection, care should be taken that sensitive parts are not exposed.
9) The screening in the private screening area will be carried out by two officials, one to handle the
HHMD and pat‐down and the other to inspect the prosthetics, braces and support appliance and
subject them to additional screening.
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Screening of Passengers who cannot remove Shoes, Medical Device or Bandages
1) Passengers who cannot remove their shoes due to a medical condition should inform the
supervisor, SHA before screening.
2) Passenger can be screened using DFMD and/or a whole body pat‐down.
3) The shoes may be subjected to additional screening like ETD, etc.
4) Passengers can be screened without disconnecting external medical devices and submitting
them for x‐ray. Such devices include Insulin pumps, Hearing aids, Cochlear implants, Spinal
stimulators, Bone growth stimulators and Ostomies.
5) Under most circumstances, a passenger can conduct a self‐pat‐down of these devices followed
by ETD screening of his/her hands.
6) The devices should also be physically checked against any outside interference in the
manufacturing.
7) Casts, braces and support appliances will be thoroughly inspected without exposing sensitive
areas as far as possible. ETD screening will also be used to test for traces of explosive materials,
where possible.
8) In case of bandages and/or dressing, while caution will be observed during pat‐down, it needs
to be ensured that the covered area is free of threat item. Metal detector, observation and self‐
pat‐down followed by ETD checks may suffice in most cases.
9) Passengers with metal implants will be subjected to a thorough pat‐down, and the metal alarm
should be resolved satisfactorily. The full body pat‐down should include the following :
a) It should concentrate on upper legs and torso;
b) Special attention should be given to the chest and abdomen areas of the body;
c) Particular focus should be on any skin surface abnormalities or wires or tubes exiting the body
that may be signs of an implanted device.
Ambulance Passengers
Due to exigencies of their exceptional medical conditions/illness, some passengers are directly
taken through the security gates to the aircraft for boarding. In such cases, as far as possible, the
Airport Operator should provide its own ambulance.
1) The passenger and all occupants of the vehicle should be subjected to a pre‐embarkation
security check at the security gate by the ASG/APSU staff under the supervision of an officer not
below the rank of an Inspector. The ambulance should be permitted to proceed to the aircraft only
after this check has been completed;
2) In case the ambulance is privately owned or hospital provided, it must be led by follow‐ me
vehicle of the airport operator. The ASG/APSU staff shall check to ensure that the vehicles do not
carry anything objectionable and are not being accompanied by unauthorized persons or persons
who have no need to be in the vehicles. Such ambulance will be escorted by ASG/APSU staff;
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3) All occupants of the vehicles, unless exempted, must be screened at the gate before allowing
entry into the airport;
4) The movement of the ambulance should be coordinated well in advance by the airline with
CASO and airport operator.
Screening of Medication and Associated Supplies
1) All medications and associated supplies (i.e. syringes, sharps disposal container, pens, infusers …
etc) are allowed through the checkpoint only after they have been screened.
2) Medication and related supplies are normally x‐rayed.
3) Passengers have the option of requesting a visual inspection of medications and associated
supplies with due reason.
4) Any medication that cannot be cleared visually must be submitted for x‐ray screening.
5) BCAS has issued detailed guidelines regarding carriage of liquids, aerosols and gel (LAGs) on
board vide AVSEC Circular No. 18/2006. Medically necessary LAGs are permitted in excess of 100
ml on need basis after they have been screened. These items are subject to additional screening
through visual inspection and ETD swipe, if necessary.
If a passenger has medically necessary LAGs, he or she needs to :
1) Limit the amount to what is reasonably necessary for the itinerary;
2) Separate these items from the other LAGs;
3) Declare the items; and,
4) Present these items for additional inspection on reaching the security check point.
X‐ray Screening of Respiratory Equipment
1) Supplemental oxygen and other respiratory related equipment are permitted through the
check‐point once they have been screened. This will be subject to DGCA regulations also.
2) If a passenger can disconnect from the oxygen, the oxygen container will undergo x‐ray
screening.
3) Passengers who cannot disconnect from respiratory equipment will be screened by undergoing
a pat‐down.
4) Respiratory equipment that is not x‐rayed will be visually and physically inspected, and will be
subject to ETD screening.
Special Category Passengers
There is another type of passenger known as Special Category passengers. These include:
Passengers with Diplomatic Status
VIPs
Potentially Disruptive Passengers‐
Persons in custody
Dangerous Prisoners and Persons Suffering from Mental Illness
Deportees
Diplomats and Diplomatic Pouches
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A passenger may be granted diplomatic immunity under the Vienna Convention, some States require that
such persons should be subjected to screening.
However, sealed diplomatic pouches in their possession must not be manually or physically searched. All
other carry‐on items shall be processed in the normal manner.
Searching Baggage (Reference Documents: Avsec Circular 23/2005 & 34/2005)
You should take the same methodical approach to searching bags as is required for searching people, but
bag search is easier in that close personal contact with the person or passenger is not necessary.
Because of the lack of personal contact with the passenger the bag searcher may be male or female,
irrespective of the sex of the owner of the bag.
Physical Inspection of Baggage required:
When an X-Ray examination has not been able to accurately determine the contents of baggage
When a prescribed percentage check of baggage is required
In the event of the breakdown of X-Ray equipment
As prescribed in local Standard Operating Procedures and conducted when higher level of threat exists
either locally or internationally
Sequence of Search
In outline, when you search a passenger's bag the correct sequence is:-
1. Start the search with the bag and it’s owner in front of you. During the search the bag must remain in the
view of the passenger.
2. Ask the passenger for permission to search the bag.
3. When given permission to search, ask the passenger to unlock and open the bag.
4. Turn the bag so that it faces you.
5. Check the outside appearance and construction of the bag for signs of interference or tampering that
might indicate the presence of an IED. Also check the contents of any outside pockets.
6. Check the contents and the inside of bag for prohibited items and dangerous goods.
7. On completion of your search, replace all the contents neatly, close and fasten the bag.
Return the Return the bag to the passenger and thank them for their cooperation.
Discovery of Explosive Device
• Remain calm
• Call supervisor covertly
• Supervisor to call for police assistance
Discovery of Weapon (Reference Document Avsec Circular 31/2005)
• Close the bag
• Remove it from passenger’s reach or
• Keep the bag within the x‐ray equipment tunnel.
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Module‐11
Conventional X‐Ray
Module Objectives
X‐ray Examination of Baggage – Introduction, Principles & Characteristics
Requirements of X‐ray Baggage Inspection System (XBIS)
Specifications of XBIS
Use of Combined Test Piece (CTP)
Threat Image Projection (TIP)
Switch on a typical x‐ray machine and operate it safely
Interpret images on an x‐ray monitor and identify items that may be prohibited or dangerous
Know the safety precautions to be followed when using or working around x‐ray equipment
Select Baggage for Physical Examination according to SOP
Teaching Methods
Slide Presentations
Lectures by certified instructors
Group discussions
Demonstrations
Role‐ playing and practical exercises
Overnight reading Assignments
Progress Tests
Mastery Test ( Written and Practical )
International Legislation
Annex 17
Standard 3.4.3 “Each Contracting State shall ensure that persons carrying out
screening operations are certified according to the requirements
of the national civil aviation security programme to ensure that
performance standards are consistently and reliably achieved.”
Standard 4.4.1 “Each Contracting State shall establish measures to ensure that
originating passengers of commercial air transport operations and
their cabin baggage are screened prior to boarding an aircraft
departing from a security restricted area.”
Standard 4.5.1 Each Contracting State shall establish measures to ensure that
originating hold baggage is screened prior to being loaded onto an
aircraft engaged in commercial air transport operations departing
from a security restricted area.
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Standard 4.5.4 Each Contracting State shall ensure that transfer hold baggage is
screened prior to being loaded onto an aircraft engaged in
commercial air transport operations, unless it has established a
validation process and continuously implements procedures, in
collaboration with the other Contracting State where appropriate,
to ensure that such hold baggage has been screened at the point
of origin and subsequently protected from unauthorized
interference from the originating airport to the departing aircraft
at the transfer airport.
Standard 4.6.1 Each Contracting State shall ensure that appropriate security
controls, including screening where practicable, are applied to
cargo and mail, prior to their being loaded onto an aircraft
engaged in passenger commercial air transport operations.
National Legislation
NCASP
7.1 Screening of Passengers and carry‐on baggage
7.7.3 Screening of hold baggage
7.8.1 to 7.8.3 Air cargo screening
Aviation Security Order / Circular
Circular 25/2004 Minimum Specification for X‐BIS
Circular 23/2005 Procedure for Passenger and carryon Baggage screening
Circular 34/2005 Procedure for screening of Hold Baggage
Circular 31/2006 Security Measures of Unaccompanied baggage
X‐ray Examination of Baggage – Introduction, Principles & Characteristics
X‐rays were invented by Wilhelm Conrad Roentgen, a German physicist when he was experimenting on
Cathode rays in 1895. The standard unit for measuring the quantity of ionizing radiation is ‘Roentgen’
denoted by ‘R’.
Principles of X‐ray System
If an x‐ray beam is projected on to a fluorescent screen, the coating on that screen will glow. When an
object is placed between the beam and the screen, the object will absorb some of the x‐ray, causing a
shadow to appear on the screen. Denser the object, darker will be the shadow.
Example: A revolver absorbs a high proportion of the x‐rays and will therefore case a dark shadow.
A hair dryer, although similar in shape, absorbs fewer x‐rays and so produces a lighter image.
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Main Properties of X‐rays
They are Invisible
Move in a straight line and at the speed of light
Cannot be deflected by means of a lens or prism
Pass through matter. The degree of penetration depends on the kind of matter and the energy of the
X‐ray concerned.
Impair or destroy living cells
X‐rays wavelengths are extremely short, only 1/10,000 that of light rays.
X‐rays are produced when electrons, travelling at high speed collide with matter.
Requirements of X‐ray BIS
Any equipment that we would use at our airports to help us perform our work in a better manner has to
satisfy certain requirements. As per BCAS the X‐ray machine should satisfy the following requirements :
A high detection rate
An un equivocal differentiation between hazardous and non‐hazardous substances has to be ensured.
Low false alarm rate
Inspection of entire bag as well as partial bag areas
Integrated image device
Detection category of small amounts even below ICAO/TSA standard
Throughput up to 300 bags per hour for Hold Baggage and 150 pieces per hour for Cargo
Safety Measures in an X‐ray BIS
Although X‐ray machines may vary in type and manufacture, there are certain inbuilt safety features
provided by the manufacturer of XBIS.
Low X‐ray Dose ‐ Radiation emitted from the x‐ray system shall not exceed an exposure of 0.1 mR/hr
at any point 5 cms outside the external surface
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Lead Curtains ‐ Lead curtains prevent scattered X‐rays from escaping out of the tunnel
Lead Shielding ‐ Lead shielding in the unit prevents the emission of scattered x‐rays independent of
the covering panels. This ensures safe operation even with external panels removed.
Interlocks ‐ If an attempt is made to generate X‐rays with a critical panel missing an interlock will sense
this and prevent X‐rays from being generated.
Film Safe:
Low X‐ray Dosage
Constant speed of conveyor belt
Fan beam geometry
Use of Combined Test Piece (CTP)
CTP is a test kit to check the performance of X‐ray BIS as per BCAS specifications.
CTP is to be used as a quick routine test carried out daily to ensure that equipment is working properly and
satisfactory image is obtained. The results of the tests should be recorded. The CTP should be placed on
the belt and passed through the belt at least once in a day before the baggage is screened or after the X‐
Ray equipment is switched on to ensure that the equipment is working properly.
A record of the tests conducted should be maintained for a period of One Year.
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Threat Image Projection (TIP)
Threat image projection is a software programme that is installed on modern X‐ray machines. It projects
fictional images of threat articles (gun/knife/IED) within X‐ray image of a real bag under examination
Standard Operating Procedure (SOP)
Deployment of manpower at X‐ray BIS:
Each X – BIS requires to be manned by four‐trained personal per shift:
01 – Load Officer
1 – X‐ray Officer
2 – Officer for manualhand search of baggage / explosive detection test
The load officer must be positioned at the ‘input’ end of the X‐Ray machine to enable him to observe and
assist with the flow of persons proceeding through the screening process. He also profiles the passengers.
He will ensure that bags are placed correctly on the conveyor with a distance of 1 feet or 30 cms between
two bags.
X‐ray officer will operate the XBIS. He will study the X‐ray image and examine contents of each bag. If any
unauthorized articles are present, or if there is doubt as to the contents of the bag, the bag will be referred
for manual hand search and/or explosive detection test.
In case of any doubt in the X‐ray image or presence of Prohibited article other than IED or where a physical
check of bag is required the search officer will examine the bag physically. Physical check may be limited to
the area of alarm or it can be conducted on the entire bag. In case there is a suspicion about presence of
Explosive then EVD/ETD should be used on the bag.
The X‐ray operator function will be performed in rotation so that any one person does not monitor X – ray
image for more than 20 minutes at one stretch and resume only after 40 minutes.
Stock of security band / sticker should be kept in secured conditions under the custody of designated
official who will be held responsible if these are found lying unsecured.
“Do's” & Don’ts for screeners
List of “Do's” for screeners
DO check conveyor belt before operating
equipment;
DO check X‐Ray chamber before operating
equipment;
DO make sure leaded curtains are not
damaged;
DO check leaded curtains are hanging straight down; and
DO check exterior of X‐Ray for loose
wires/connections.
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List of “Don’ts” for screeners
DO NOT reach into the chamber when X‐Ray is on;
DO NOT allow passengers to reach inside the chamber for their baggage;
DO NOT allow any person to loiter in the area to observe the screening process;
DO NOT allow children to play with the leaded curtains or touch the conveyor belt; and
DO NOT place objects such as coffee, plants and bottles on top of the X‐Ray machine.
Following log books / registers / files shall be maintained at each X – BIS as detailed below: ‐
a. X – Ray BIS maintenance register –It will contain the details of maintenance work done on XBIS.
b. Dangerous goods register ‐ Details of dangerous goods detected or not permitted to be carried or
permitted to be carried in safe condition will be entered.
Components and Switches of a typical X‐ray BIS X‐
BIS Components
X‐ray Generator
Monitor
Key Board
Lead Coated Curtains
Emergency Stop Buttons
Inspection Tunnel
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Interpretation of Image
The X‐ray Operator interprets the images presented on the X-Ray monitor, by viewing the monitor and
identifying any item that appears to be suspect or prohibited, such as a knife.
The objects inside a bag are displayed in 03 colours. Orange colour is given to all organic items. Green
colour to medium heavy metals. Blue colour to heavy metals. Items through which X‐ray cannot penetrate
are shown as opaque.
The correct interpretation of the X-Ray image is crucial and requires a high degree of skill, which can only
be contained through training and experience.
Categorization of Bags:
On interpretation of the X‐ray image the bags can be categorised as
SAFE
SUSPECT
THREAT
If the X-Ray operator cannot identify an item or has any doubt about an object, the bag will be subjected for
physical examination.
Advantages and Disadvantages of X‐ray BIS X‐
Ray Screening – Advantages
Less manpower
engaged
Film
safe
Does not cause any hazard to food and
drugs
Time
saving
Convenience to
passengers
X‐Ray Screening – Disadvantages / Limitations
Cost of
equipment
Lack of penetration of X‐rays makes it difficult to screen dense items
Human factor is
vulnerable
Operator skills lost if not used
regularly
High maintenance
cost
Computed Tomography X‐ray
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It is one of the most efficient automated explosive detection systems in
the world today. It provides high resolution 3D images of the entire bag.
The CT technique provides maximum sensitivity and accuracy for material
detection and identification and can be used to specifically to identify
explosives.
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In‐line Baggage Screening System for Hold Baggage Screening
Inline hold baggage handling system (HBS) is a multi level X‐Ray screening system and has been installed at
various international airports. The inline hold baggage handling system (HBS) has been integrated with
airport baggage handling in order to provide complete hold baggage processing and screening system
There are various levels of search in an In Line Screening Systems.
Level 1
Level 1 screening is to be undertaken by a high speed multi view / computer sliced X‐ray machine with
automatic explosives detection facilities. The decision is to be fully automatic and the operator
intervention is only required in start‐up and shut down procedures. Un‐cleared baggage will go to Level 2,
and cleared bags will proceed to the baggage make‐up area.
Level 2
Level 2 screening is remote workstation(s) whereby operator(s) can analyze the image generated by the
Level 1 X‐ray machine. The workstation is equipped with enhanced imaging / manipulation systems to
assist operator to diagnoses the screened image.
The conveying system allows 15‐20 seconds to for an operator to analyse the images.
Cleared bags shall proceed to the baggage makeup area. Any bag not cleared within a pre‐determined time
by the level 2 operators, are considered ‘time‐outs’ and automatically forwarded to level 3. In addition any
miss tracked bags on the conveying system are defaulted to the level 3 area.
Any bag considered suspect by the operator are to be flagged and rejected by operator, these will
automatically go to Level 3.
Level 3
All bags at level 3 will be checked by an advanced stand alone X‐ray BIS. The un‐cleared / suspected bags
will be further checked with latest explosive trace detectors. Cleared bags will be sent to BMA.
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Level 4
All un‐cleared / suspected bags at level 3 are reunited with their owners for further inspection and
interview. This process is normally manual and should be done in a safe area outside the boundaries of the
baggage handling system.
Any bag that is still deemed to be suspect after passenger interview, or if the passenger cannot be located,
are normally handled according to the BCAS instructions till arrival of explosives experts. Bomb detection
and disposal squad shall be summoned where available or the bag shall be shifted to cooling off pit.
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Module 12
Protection and Search of Parked Aircraft
Module Objectives:
Understand the need for protection of parked aircraft.
Explain security procedures used to protect unattended aircraft.
Describe the reasons for aircraft security checks and searches / aircraft access points.
Define the types and timing of aircraft security checks and searches
Describe appropriate action to be taken if aircraft security measures are compromised.
Teaching Methods
Slide Presentations
Lectures by certified instructors
Group discussions
Demonstrations
Role‐ playing and practical exercises
Overnight reading Assignments
Progress Tests
Mastery Test ( Written and Practical )
International Legislation
Annex 17
Standard 4.3.1 Each Contracting State shall ensure that aircraft security checks of
originating aircraft engaged in commercial air transport
movements are performed or an aircraft security search is carried
out. The determination of whether it is an aircraft security check
or a search that is appropriate shall be based upon a security risk
assessment carried out by the relevant national authorities.
Standard 4.3.2 Each Contracting State shall ensure that measures are taken to
ensure that any items left behind by passengers disembarking
from transit flights are removed from the aircraft or otherwise
dealt with appropriately before departure of an aircraft engaged in
commercial flights.
Standard 4.3.3 Each Contracting State shall require its commercial air transport
operators to take measures as appropriate to ensure that during
flight unauthorized persons are prevented from entering the flight
crew compartment.
National Legislation
Aviation (Security) Rules 2011
Rule 27 Security Search of an Aircraft
NCASP
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Chapter 6.6 Protection of Aircraft
Aviation Security Order / Circular
Order 05/2009 Norms for deployment of Security Personnel
Circular 26/2006 Pre Flight Security Checks
Responsibility of protecting aircraft lies with the aircraft operator (airline).
The Security Principle Defense in Depth
Levels or layers of security measures build upon each other to protect aircraft and airline operations
First line of defense is the integrity of the airport perimeter and landside / airside boundaries
Security Restricted Area measures provide another layer
Security staff operating in immediate proximity of aircraft or patrolling the apron provide another layer
Crew and other airline staff on board the aircraft provide another layer.
PROTECTION OF AIRCRAFT
Procedures for normal conditions
Aircraft crew and maintenance staff to challenge and identify all persons attempting to board the
aircraft to ensure only authorized people allowed on board.
Where security staff are operating in the on or around the aircraft they should identify all persons
approaching, or attempting to access the aircraft or any part thereof
SRA pass holders are obligated to challenge persons without appropriate identification on display while
in the SRA or attempting to board an aircraft
Aircraft not in service should have all access points secured, access stairs or passenger loading bridges
removed. Stairs left near aircraft should be immobilized.
Procedure for Increased threat condition
Increased threat situation requires the airline concerned to coordinate all security measures and
ensure procedures and measures are properly implemented.
Dedicated point guards in close proximity to each aircraft
Increased frequent random foot or mobile security patrols
Additional portable security lighting and backup power supply.
Control of Access to the aircraft
During periods of increased threat, security staff must be positioned to observe, challenge, identify
and authorize access.
Check the credentials of all persons seeking access to the immediate vicinity or to the interior of the
aircraft and confirming that each has a legitimate requirement for that access
Search persons, bags, tools and cleaning equipment to ensure they do not conceal weapons, explosives
and/or their components.
Detect and/or deter unauthorized access, and report to the captain, airline representatives or security
authorities any attempted or unauthorized access and /or discovery of suspect or prohibited items.
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Airline Procedures for Unattended Aircraft
Aircraft are parked in a well‐lit area
The area should be easily observed
All external doors must be closed
Aircraft should be parked away from fences or buildings to prevent easy access
Access stairs, passenger loading bridges and hold loading equipment must be removed from the
vicinity of the aircraft and immobilized
Guarding Duties
Establish the integrity of the aircraft upon taking up duty
Search for suspect explosive devices in immediate area.
Challenge all persons approaching aircraft
Check authorization of persons claiming a need to access the aircraft
Make visual inspection of the exterior
Aircraft Intrusion
A Security Search of aircraft must be conducted
Carried out by airline personnel or security staff who are properly trained for aircraft type
In accordance with airline’s specific procedures
Aircraft Security Checks / Searches
Why must an aircraft search be carried out?
There are legal and business reasons for carrying out aircraft searches
What should the Searchers look for?
That should not be there / out of place
That cannot be accounted for
When to search?
There are 4 instances when searches are usually conducted:
Pre‐flight;
Transit Flight;
Post flight; and
When the Aircraft is under increased threat.
Guidelines for Pre Flight Security Check
The search should normally be carried out just prior to the time that the aircraft is taken into service.
Regular search of aircraft for suspect explosive devices and weapons shall be conducted prior to
commencing each flight. A similar search will be required when an aircraft is suspected of being the
target of an act of unlawful interference.
Aircraft operators shall conduct pre‐flight security checks only after all maintenance and cleaning staff
have vacated the aircraft and prior to passengers embarking;
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Flight and cabin crew, besides engineering and security staff, may conduct these checks provided they
are adequately trained.
A security checklist shall be use by airlines staff during such pre flight security checks.
Aircraft operators shall ensure that an aircraft is protected from unauthorized interference from the
time the aircraft search or check has commenced until the aircraft departs.
Guidelines on Pre Flight Security Check for Transit Flights
Searches for Transit Flights are necessary when:
Passengers disembark at the transit station.
Any catering supplies or stores are loaded.
Passengers remaining on board must identify their belongings before the search commences.
If no passengers disembark, remain in a sterile area and access is limited to persons authorized and
supervised by the airline or its handling agent, no search may be required
Guidelines on Pre Flight Security Check for Post Flights
Post‐flight searches are usually conducted of the areas to which passengers may have had access to
ensure that nothing is left on board that may cause a hazard to the aircraft.
When an aircraft that has disembarked passengers and has had a post‐flight search it may not need to
be searched again before departure provided that access has been controlled throughout the time it is
on the ground. (local procedures will apply)
When the Aircraft is under increased threat
Apply SOP
Note: The Security Supervisor shall ensure that the Aircraft Release certificate is signed by all the
concerned departments and signature is obtained from the Commander of the flight.
A copy of the signed aircraft release certificate shall be kept for record with the security department, and
will be put up for scrutiny during checks and audit by the BCAS officers.
Responsibility for Searches
Searches are to be conducted by the staff members most familiar with the area they are searching,
therefore:
Flight crew and designated airline engineer staff are usually responsible for searching all those areas that
have a direct bearing on the safe operation of the aircraft including:
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Aircraft cockpit; Wheel bays;
Exterior of the aircraft and control surfaces;
Engine nacelles; and
Technical areas.
Cabin Crew and/or trained Security staff are usually responsible for searching the interior of the aircraft
including:
Passenger cabins;
Seats;
Baggage storage lockers
Lavatories / WC;
Galleys; and
Other areas such as the baggage hold A Checklist should be employed and samples will be provided
later in module.
Action on locating a SUSPECT ITEM
Action by Searcher:
Do not touch
Notify supervisor
Evacuate Aircraft
Remember description of object/item
Mark area where object item is located
Action by supervisor:
Inform airline manager
Inform crew if already on board
Inform airport manager(Airport Opertaor)
Inform BDDS
Add Aircraft Search Check List
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MODULE 13
Physical Inspection of Baggage
Module Objectives
Search of various types of carry‐on baggage in presence of passenger physically
Recognize prohibited and dangerous items that may be camouflaged, contained or hidden in carry‐on
baggage with specific concerns relating to electronic items
SOP to deal with prohibited and dangerous items detected in baggage
Behaviour of search team personnel / selection of bags for physical search and techniques
Teaching Methods
Slide Presentations
Lectures by certified instructors
Group discussions
Demonstrations
Role‐ playing and practical exercises
Overnight reading Assignments
Progress Tests
Mastery Test ( Written and Practical )
International Legislations
Annex 17
Standard 4.4.1 Each Contracting State shall establish measures to ensure that
originating passengers of commercial air transport operations and
their cabin baggage are screened prior to boarding an aircraft
departing from a security restricted area.
National Legislation
Aircraft Rule 1937
Rule 8A
Aviation (Security) Rules 2011
Rule 14 (iv) Duties of CASO
Screening of passenger and their hand baggage
Rule 21 Security Check before Embarkation
NCASP 2011
Chapter 7.1.9 Screening of Hand Baggage
Aviation Security Order / Circular
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Order 05/2005 Permissible & Prohibited Items to be carried by the passenger
Circular 19/2003 Physical checks of hand baggage
Circular 21/2004, Use of hand gloves for frisking passages and physical check of their
baggage
Circular 23/2005 Procedure for passenger & carryon baggage screening
Circular 31/2005 Procedure to deal with detect of arms & ammunition
Circular 34 / 2005 Procedure for Screening of Hold Baggage
Technical equipment used for the screening of persons and baggage has limitations. Walk‐through metal
detectors and hand‐held metal detectors, for example, cannot detect non‐metallic weapons and explosives
and even conventional X‐ray equipment has difficulty in imaging or defining explosive material effectively.
To compensate for such limitations or to introduce a random element into the selection process, an
additional manual hand search of passengers and cabin baggage is required after being screened by
technical means.
Reasoned selection means that the selection is based on the X‐ray image, concentrating the effort on those
bags most likely to conceal a prohibited item.
Random selection should be used for hand searching one out of every ten bags. You should take the same
methodical approach to searching bags as is required for searching people.
Cabin baggage of a female passenger will be searched by a female screener only.
Cardinal Rules
Courtesy
Tact and
Caution
Method for Hand Search
In the interest of effective security and passenger facilitation, a manual search of the baggage should be
conducted in accordance with the following basic guidelines:
a) The physical inspection of cabin baggage should always be carried out in thepresence of the
person presenting it;
b) Ask the passenger for permission to search the bag. When given permission to search, ask the
passenger to unlock and open the bag. Turn the bag so that it faces you.
c) Baggage should be opened, and examined to ensure that there is no falsebottom. A straightedge
gauge‐rule, rod or other device should be used to establishwhether there is a significant
discrepancy in external and internal measurements.
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d) Particular attention should be paid to the lining, trim, seams, rims, studs, zipfasteners, locks,
hinges, wheels and handles to identify signs of tampering or repairwhich may indicate the
concealment of a prohibited article;
e) The contents of the bag should be removed layer by layer, each being examineduntil the bag is
empty. The empty bag should then be lifted by hand and assessed forbalance and empty weight. If
there is suspicion that the bag is not of uniform weight,or not of a weight consistent with being
empty, the bag itself should be examined forconcealment of prohibited items, if necessary, it
should be screened by X‐ray;
f) Electrical items that might conceal a firearm, weapon or explosive device (e.g.razors, calculators,
radios, clocks, cameras, personal stereos and their cassettes)should be examined to ensure they
have not been tampered with, or of the expectedweight, are balanced and have no additional
batteries. If necessary an item should bescreened by X‐ray to ensure that it has no additional
power source or that there is noorganic material within what should be an inorganic shell;
g) Articles such as vacuum flasks, books, umbrellas and crutches should beexamined in sufficient
depth, by X‐ray if necessary, to establish their bonafides;
h) Attention should be given to the contents of containers and bottles capable ofholding volatile
liquids. Liquids shall be rejected when there are grounds for suspectingthat they may be used to
commit an unlawful act;
i) Screener should examine for greasy stains and small holes in the exterior of thecase and for the
smell of almonds, nail polish, glue, perfume or other masking vapours,which might indicate the
presence of explosives;
j) While checking the hand baggage physically, it should be ensured by thescreener that the hand
baggage are repacked properly in the presence of the passengers and their belongings are not left
around or tampered with.
k) It shall also beensured that hand baggage of female passengers are checked by a female
screeneronly;
The Passenger must be present and the Bag Must Be Kept In View of the Passenger .
Why?
There are two reasons for this:‐
To prevent any accusation of the planting a prohibited item which is found during the search.
If you find a prohibited item such as a weapon, explosive or incendiary material, or even an IED, this will
need to be proved in court. If the bag is removed from the sight of the passenger, it could be difficult to
rebut a charge of the item being planted, or to disprove a claim of innocence by the passenger.
To prevent any accusation of theft from the baggage.
If the bag is lost to sight, and the passenger claims that you had stolen some item from the bag, it could
be difficult to disprove this claim. Even if the accusation could not be supported by evidence, suspicion
could be damaging to both you and your employers reputation.
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There are three reasons for asking the passenger to unlock the bag.
It emphasises the fact that you have been given permission to search.
It offers you some protection against activating a non‐terrorist security protection system: activating
an alarm system (in a courier security bag), a self‐ destruct mechanism, or a spoiler dye spray built into
the locking mechanism.
It offers you some protection against activating a terrorist anti‐handling device. The owner of the bag
is unlikely to open it, if the owner knows it will endanger him/her.
During the search, withdraw from non essential social contact with the passenger, remain polite, but
discourage small talk. A terrorist may try to distract you:‐
by offering to help you in your search
by keeping up a stream of distracting conversation or talk
by trying to establish a positive rapport with you or try to annoy you with the aim of making you carry
out a less thorough search.
Consider wearing surgical/ disposable gloves when you are searching. There are two reasons for wearing
gloves. First, they can help to make any search more impersonal and secondly, they offer you some
protection.
Before Opening the Bag
Check the construction of the bag for signs of interference or tampering that might indicate the presence
of an IED.
Is the balance of the bag right for its size and shape? Does the bag feel lopsided? Also at this time check all
outside pockets.
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4
2
3 2
3
1
2
When you examine the outside of the bag look for these things:‐
1. Are there signs of tampering with, or repair to the outside of the bag?
Look for any loose wires, studs or rings which could be a safety‐switch for an IED. Small holes
through which an IED could be armed by pushing a thin rod e.g. a knitting needle through the shell
of the bag.
2. Have the handles been changed or altered?
3. Are all screws, nuts, and rivets used in the construction of the bag the originals or have they been
replaced with other types or altered in some way?
4. Does the bag have more locks than is normal for the type of bag?
Open the Bag
When the bag is opened, is there a strong smell, e.g. acid, almonds, nail polish, glue, aftershave or
scent, which might hide the smell of explosive or incendiary material?
Look at the lining of the bag:‐
Is the lining original? Has the lining been repaired? Are there traces of glue?
Some explosives leave greasy marks. Are there signs of handling on the fabric of the lining? Are there
oil stains on the lining?
Feel the lining. Is there a difference, in texture and feel, of any part of the bag?
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If while checking the bag you find something that does not seem quite right about the bag structure,
you should empty the bag completely and have the bag passed through the x‐ray machine again. Tell
the x‐ray operator what you suspect and the areas to inspect more closely.
Are there any signs of a false bottom?
Make a check on the bag for a false bottom. Use a straight edged rod to check internal and external
measurements. There should not be excessive thickness.
Search Principles
• All hand carried items must be screened and/or searched preferably passed through x‐ray
equipment
• It is important to adopt a systematic approach so that no part of the body, items of clothing or areas
of the bag are overlooked
• Search should normally be carried out in open but should not expose to public view:
– Classified or Private documents.
– Large amounts of currency.
– Valuable items. ( jewellery etc.)
• Private search used when necessary to search in sufficient depth to establish if prohibited article is
present.
• 2 searchers of the same sex as person being searched required.
• All indications of metal on the person by technical equipment must be resolved
• Persons who can not be cleared by normal screening process must be searched by hand.
Check the contents of the bag for an IED or weapon.
Throughout your search of the bag contents, remain cool and disassociated from the passenger. Do not
make any verbal comment on the contents, either in admiration or disgust. Your complimentary
comments on an expensive item of clothing or electronic item are just as uncalled‐for as less
complimentary remarks you might make on the state of any soiled clothing.
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Start your search of the bag contents by feeling round the outer edge of the contents. Make sure that you
reach right into the corners of the bag and right down to the bottom.
You will find that, by using your fingertips, the contents of the bag will separate into definite layers. Feel
between these layers and press them firmly from above and below searching for hidden items.
Certain bags such as duffle type bags or where the size and contents of the bag makes a layer search
impossible will need to be emptied and the contents searched before being replaced in the bag.
If you find rolled up clothing or soiled clothing from the bag, unroll and unwrap the clothing discreetly, an
innocent passenger will not thank you for airing ‘dirty linen’ in public.
Attention should be given to the contents of containers and containers capable of holding liquids. Liquids
shall be rejected when there are grounds for suspecting that they may be used to commit an unlawful act.
Remember only limited amounts of liquids are allowed in cabin baggage.
Items that could conceal an IED, e.g. a pair of binoculars, a vacuum flask, a book which might be hollowed
out, collapsible umbrella, a camera, a soft toy which seems unusually heavy, an aerosol which dents easily
(because it is no longer pressurised) , remove it from the bag and examine it closely. When examining the
item be careful. Accidental damage to an expensive camera or similar item can be caused quite easily.
If, when checking an item, you find something not seem quite right, you should have that item passed
through the x‐ray machine again. Remember to tell the x‐ray operator what you suspect about the item.
You should pay special attention to any electrical or electronic items which could be used to conceal an
IED. For example:‐
Personal electronic equipment. (Laptop
computers)
Calculators
Radios
Clocks
Personal music
equipment.
Battery powered
cameras
The best option for all electrical and electronic items is to pass them through x‐ray equipment or to use
trace detection equipment.
Simply turning on an electrical item either using it’s own power source or external electrical outlet is not
satisfactory since the fact that an item appears to function does not mean it has not been tampered with
or conceals an IED.
When a person requests hand search of a computer, Video camera or similar articles, the articles must be
examined by following means :‐
(i) That the equipment being searched operates satisfactory and,
(ii) There is no sign of the case being tempered with or modified including case holding screw damage
and,
(iii) The behavior of the passenger does not give cause for concern and ,
(iv) There is no other reason to be concerned as to the items or its contains.
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On completion of your search, close and fasten the bag, then return it to the passenger.
The passenger should leave the search area:‐
With the impression that you were thorough and efficient in your
search.
If you are cursory in your inspection, and skimp the search, the passenger may well wonder just why you
did bother searching in the first instance and how safe it is to travel.
Without cause for
complaint.
If you carry out the search impartially, without emotion other than politeness, and hand the bag
back in the same order as you found it, then even the most unreasonable passenger will find it
difficult to fault you.
Standard Operating Procedure
Cabin baggage of a female passenger will be searched by a female screener only.
10% of hold baggage will be physically searched at random after screening by X‐ray BIS.
In case of cabin baggage 20 % of bags will be searched at random after screening by X‐ray BIS.
25% to 30% during alerts
Procedure When a Prohibited or Dangerous Article is found During Screening:
The dangerous goods and prohibited articles shall not be allowed for carriage on persons or in cabin
baggage on board an aircraft. These will be seized by the screening officer. However, if the screening
officer suspects that a person was trying to carry such items on board with the intention to commit an act
of unlawful interference with aviation, the screener will inform his supervisor, who will take further action,
as deemed appropriate.
Different procedure will apply for weapons found on the person and those detected in cabin baggage.
Detection of explosive devices in cabin baggage may dictate yet another different response.
It is important for the searcher to remain calm and not cause a panic among other passengers, which may
make the situation worse.The searcher’s supervisor should be summoned covertly and should in turn take
action to summon assistance from the local policing authority.
The discovery of a weapon in passenger’s cabin baggage may be dealt with by simply closing the bag and
removing it from the passenger’s reach. If the item is confirmed as a suspect explosive device DO NOT
TOUCH IT but carry out standard suspect explosive device procedures.
In the case of a weapon or explosive device being detected during the screening process, the relevant
person shall be handed over to local police for further action.
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Procedure for Carriage of Arms and ammunition
On person or in hand baggage:
PSO’s of VVIP’s
can carry weapon in unloaded condition in the cabin baggage. The weapon and ammunition should be
kept separately.
SPG’s when accompanying SPG Protectee
Can carry weapon in unloaded condition in the cabin baggage. The weapon and ammunition should be
kept separately.
Sky Marshals
Can carry weapon on board aircraft. They should possess the Weapon Authorization Card issued by
BCAS and id card issued by NSG. They travel as per scheduled given by BCAS and are issued with
Orange AEP. They need to undergo Breath Analysis test conducted by respective airline medical
department at the originating station.
In registered baggage:
PSO’s of VIP’s
Can carry weapon in registered baggage. Should produce valid identity card and duty slip / movement
order authorizing them to carry specific weapons and ammunition while on bonafide duty traveling by
air.
Dignitaries of high risk category
Can carry authorized weapon and ammunition in registered baggage.
Any person on bonafide duty
Can carry weapon in registered baggage. Should produce valid identity card and travel order
authorizing them to carry specific weapons and ammunition while on bonafide duty traveling by air.
Bonafide passenger holding valid license
As per the existing instructions, one licensed firearm (revolver/pistol/shot gun) and/ or 50
cartridges are allowed to be carried by a passenger in his/her hold baggage.
Passenger has to declare carriage of weapon to the airline and fill up a Weapon Declaration Form.
The airline station manager authorizes the carriage of weapon.
The passengers license will be checked for expiry date, area of jurisdiction, weapon number, make
and model number, number of cartridges allowed etc.
The weapon and ammunition is stowed in area inaccessible to the passengers and crew members
during the flight. In case of an aircraft that does not have separate cargo holds the airline should
inform passengers that the weapons cannot be allowed for carriage in registered baggage of
passenger. However if the weapon and ammunition is required to be carried necessary
arrangements for a securely locked, tamper proof container for keeping registered baggage
containing weapon / ammunition shall be made by the aircraft operator. Keys of such container to
be handed over to pilot.
Basic AvSec/BCAS/2014 Secret
Module 14
HANDLING OF FIREARMS FOR CARRIAGE BY AUTHORISED PASSENGERS
Procedure for carriage of licensed arms/ ammunition in hold baggage:
In exercise of powers conferred by Section 5 A of the Aircraft Act, 1934, delegated to him vide
Government of India, Ministry of Civil Aviation Notification No. 1797 dated 03rd July 1997,
the Director General, Bureau of Civil Aviation Security for the purpose of security and safety
of aircraft operations, directs that an air passenger, who intends to carry in his checked in
baggage his weapon/ ammunition having valid license or when he carries such goods under the
authority of persons employed by the police or by the Army, Navy or Air Force of the Union
or under the authority of the Central Government, shall declare in writing to the airline operator
concerned about the weapon/ ammunition carried by him in his checked in baggage subject to
conditions laid down in Rule 8 of Aircraft Rules 1937 and directions issued by DGCA vide
Permit No. 1555-AA/2017 and File No. 8/95/2005-IR dated 28.12.2017.
In exercise of the powers under Rule 8 of the Aircraft Rules, 1937:
Station Managers/ Airport Managers of all airlines are permitted to allow the carriage
of one licensed fire arm and/ or fifty cartridges belonging to a bonafide passenger,
provided that:
o The passenger carrying firearms and/ or ammunition is in possession of valid
license in accordance with The Arms Act, 1959. In the case of a foreign national
checking of documents like permission from Government of India and the
Government of the concerned country for carriage of firearms and/ or
ammunition by air.
o A passenger can carry his authorized or licensed fire-arm and/ or ammunition
in his accompanied hold baggage, after declaring it to the check-in staff of the
airline operator if screening of hold baggage is done after the check-in process,
or to the screener at the security check point if the screening is done prior to
check in process.
o If the passenger does not have a hold baggage, the firearm is stored inside a
locked container that is placed in a tamper – proof stowage receptacle in the
baggage compartment, and is inaccessible to unauthorized persons on the
ground or during flight.
o On declaration by the passenger, the check-in staff or security screener, as the
case may be, will refer the passenger to security supervisor of the airline
operator.
o The security supervisor will ask the passenger to fill and sign a prescribed form
for carriage of arms/ammunition. The supervisor will verify all the relevant
documents to ensure that the weapon is licensed or authorized in the name of
the passenger concerned.
o The Station Manager/ Airport Manager shall verify all the relevant documents
to ensure that the arms and/ or ammunition are licensed in the name of the
passenger concerned.
o The arms and/ or ammunition shall be carried only in the registered baggage of
the passenger
o The registered baggage containing arms and/ or ammunition shall be carried
only in aircraft having separate cargo holds so as not to be accessible to
passenger.
o The arms and/ or ammunition are so packed, protected and secured so as to
avoid the possibility of their being a source of danger.
o Ammunition is transported separately from the firearm in a suitable container,
is placed in the aircraft baggage compartment, and is inaccessible to
unauthorized persons on the ground or during flight.
o Ammunition for personal firearms is carried as hold baggage, in accordance
with ICAO DOC 9284 and the Aircraft (Carriage of Dangerous Goods) Rules,
2003.
o The firearm should be unloaded and, if necessary, dismantled based on threat
perception.
o Fire-arm will be checked by a trained staff of the airline operator or Aviation
Security Group to ensure that it is not loaded.
o The fire-arm will be carried in a hard sided container which must be locked.
o Transported ammunition must be securely packed in fibre (such as cardboard),
wood or metal boxes or other packaging specially designed to carry small
amounts of ammunition.
o Fire - arm magazines/ clips do not satisfy the packaging requirement unless they
provide a complete and secure enclosure of the ammunition.
o The ammunition may also be located in the same hard sided case as the fire-
arm, as long as it is properly packed as described above.
o The nature of the goods is clearly and conspicuously marked on the package
containing them.
o Black powder and percussion caps used with black powder type fire-arms are
not permitted in cabin baggage as well as in hold baggage.
o The baggage containing fire-arm and/or ammunition will not be conveyed to
baggage make-up area through the conveyor belt. After the baggage has been
subjected to prescribed security controls and cleared, the security staff of the
concerned airline operator will escort it till it is loaded onto the aircraft hold.
o The registered baggage containing fire – arm and/ or ammunition shall be
handed over to the passenger at the destination only in the arrival hall and not
on the tarmac.
In order to streamline the procedure for carriage of weapons and ammunition by Personal
Security Officers (PSOs) of VVIPs /VIPs and/ or persons / passengers, and to prevent
unauthorized carriage of weapons, explosives or any other dangerous devices within India
which may be used to commit an act of unlawful interference on an aircraft engaged in civil
aviation operations, operating to and from civil airports in India, the following instructions are
issued for compliance by all concerned:-
VVIPs like President , Vice President , Prime Minister and SPG protectees:
o Permission has been granted by the Central Government to their Personal Security
Officers for carriage of authorised weapons and ammunitions by them on board an
aircraft while travelling with these vvips / protectees by air.
o The above Personal Security Officers shall carry their weapons and ammunition on
their person or in their hand baggage in fully unloaded condition ie. Weapon and
ammunition shall be kept separately.
o SPG Personnel are hereby permitted to carry
One Pistol with 60 cartridges; and
One Sub Machine Gun/ Assault Rifle with 150 cartridges.
In Flight Security Officers (IFSOs):
In order to provide adequate security coverage to aircrafts registered in India and engaged in
civil aviation operations to and from all civil airports in India, permission has been granted by
the Central Government to Sky Marshals, while on duty in such aircraft, for carriage of
weapons and ammunition on board such an aircraft.
o The Sky Marshals shall be in possession of their Identity Cards and authorisation,
issued by Director General, BCAS from time to time, for carriage of weapons and
ammunition on board an aircraft.
o Station Manager / Airport Manager of the concerned airlines shall ensure that the pilot-
in-command is notified as to the number of armed persons and their seat allocation on
board the aircraft.
PSO(s) of other VIP / dignitary of high risk category:
Whenever allowed by the government of India to accompany such a VIP/ dignitary during his/
her journey by air or any person on bonafide duty with weapon and ammunition while
travelling by air shall carry the authorised weapons and ammunition in his/ her registered
baggage only in the manner specified below:
o The Personal Security Officers or the persons on duty mentioned in para above shall
carry with them their valid Identity Cards and Duty Slips / Movement Orders
authorizing them to carry specific weapons and ammunition while on bonafide duty
travelling by air and shall produce the same to the Airport / Airlines Security
Officers/ Manager.
o Chief Airport Security Officer of Aviation Security Group (ASG)/ Incharge Airport
Security Unit shall check the Identity Card and Duty Slip/ Movement Order of the
PSOs of VVIP/ SPG protectees and shall ensure their genuineness.
o Concerned Airlines Security Manager / Officer shall check the Identity Card and
Duty Slip/ Movement Order of the PSOs and persons mentioned above and shall
ensure their genuineness.
In the case of regular passengers the Station Manager/ Airport Managers of all airlines are
authorized to allow carriage of only one (repeat one) licenced revolver or pistol or shotgun
and fifty cartridges belonging to a bonafide passenger.
The following conditions (shall be strictly followed) for carriage of weapons and ammunition
in the Registered Baggage by a bonafide passenger, PSOs or VIPs or any dignitary or high risk
category or any person who has been allowed to carry his weapon and ammunition on duty
while travelling by air. Henceforth such categories of persons have been referred to as
passengers:-
o Such a passenger shall declare the carriage of his/ her authorized/ licensed weapon
and ammunition to the concerned air carrier in writing on the prescribed form to be
provided by the airlines operator before security check of his / her Registered
Baggage. Original copy of such declaration shall be retained at the Boarding
Station, second copy shall be kept in the flight’s file and third copy shall be given
to the passenger.
o Prior to acceptance of weapon and ammunition from a bonafide passenger having
valid license or authorisation issued by the competent authority as mentioned above,
the concerned airlines operator shall ensure that the carriage of weapons and
ammunition in Registered Baggage of such a passenger is allowed only when an
authorised and duly qualified person of the airlines has determined that the weapon
is not loaded.
o The Station Manager / Airport Manager of the concerned airlines shall verify all the
relevant documents to ensure that the weapon(s) and ammunition is / are licensed /
authorised in the name of the passenger concerned and shall ensure that only
authorised number (s) of weapon and ammunition are allowed in the Registered
Baggage.
o The weapons and ammunition shall be stowed in an area that is inaccessible to any
person including air crew while the aircraft is in flight and shall not be carried in
the cockpit or retained by a member of the crew. Therefore, the weapons and
ammunition shall be carried only in the Registered Baggage of the passenger and
such baggage shall be stored in a securely locked, tamper-proof container which
shall be located in the baggage compartment of aircraft or in aircraft having separate
cargo holds so as not accessible to passengers.
o In case an aircraft does not have separate cargo / baggage hold for safe and secure
storage of a securely locked, tamper-proof container for keeping passengers
Registered Baggage containing their authorized weapons and ammunitions,
concerned airlines shall be responsible to inform their passengers not to carry arms
and ammunition with them as the same shall not be allowed to be carried in the
Registered Baggage in such an aircraft. However, if weapons/ ammunition are
required to be carried in such an aircraft which does not have cargo / baggage hold,
necessary arrangements for a securely locked , tamper-proof container for keeping
Registered Baggage containing authorized weapons / ammunition shall be made by
the aircraft owner /airlines operator and key of such container shall be handed over
to the Pilot. The Registered Baggage shall be handed over to the concerned person/
passenger at destination in the arrival hall only.
o The above procedures are also applicable to Private Aircraft owners and their body
guards carrying weapons also.
o At foreign airports, where Indian Airlines and Air India operate, the discretion to
permit the carriage of personal weapon and ammunition in the Registered Baggage
will vest with the Airport Manager of the concerned airlines in consultation with
the Airlines Security Officer if available. In all such cases, the passenger shall carry
valid documents and also subject to the provision that such carriage do not violate
the local / national laws, rules and regulations.
o The above instructions shall be subject to any further restrictions applicable in
countries of transit and destination.
The Units of Armed forces/ para-military forces while traveling on duty by a civil
commercial flight in domestic sectors within India may be allowed by the concerned aircraft
operator to carry their service fire-arms and ammunition in hold baggage subject to the
following conditions:-
o The Unit Commander or his authorized representative must submit to the Chief Airport
Security Officer and to the station In-charge of concerned airlines security the Unit’s
official travel orders and an inventory of weapons and ammunition being transported.
o The Unit commander must declare in writing the weapons & ammunition to the airline
operator.
o Weapon must be unloaded and collectively secured in a crate and banded or
individually locked in a hard-sided case.
o Ammunition must also be securely packed in fibre (such as cardboard), wood or metal
boxes or other packaging specifically designed to carry small amounts of ammunition.
o The Unit commander must certify to the station in-charge of the airlines security at the
airport that the weapons are unloaded.
o Live grenades, mines, bombs, explosives, black powder and percussion caps used with
black powder type fire-arms, tear gas shells and munitions and other dangerous goods/
devices shall not be allowed on board the aircraft (neither in Cabin nor in Hold
baggage), without specific written permission from Director General of Civil Aviation,
Govt. of India.
Carriage of licensed firearm and / or ammunition by a sportsperson while traveling by
air.
As per the existing instructions, one licensed firearm and/ or 50 cartridges are allowed to be
carried by a passenger in his/ her hold baggage. If a sportsperson is traveling by air in domestic
sectors to participate in some shooting event within India for which he/ she is required to carry
more than one licensed firearms and/ or more than 50 cartridges, such sportsperson may be
allowed by the concerned aircraft operator to carry the required number of licensed firearms
and/ or ammunition in his hold baggage subject to the following conditions: -
The sportsperson must declare orally or in writing about carriage of the firearms and/
or ammunition and will produce the following documents at the security check point of
hold baggage for inspection by the screener of concerned aircraft operator:
o Valid license/ authorization of fire arms and ammunition;
o Evidence of identity which can be established by a photo identity card issued
by a government agency or the sponsoring sports club.
o Bonafide for carriage of arms and ammunitions on the basis of a written
document issued by the president or secretary of the sports club sponsoring him/
her for the shooting event.
The fire-arm must be unloaded.
The fire-arm must be carried in a hard-sided container.
The container must be locked.
Transported ammunition must be securely packed in fibre (such as cardboard), wood
or metal boxes or other packaging specially designed to carry small amounts of
ammunition.
Fire -arm magazines/clips do not satisfy the packaging requirement unless they provide
a complete and secure enclosure of the ammunition.
The ammunition may also be located in the same hard sided case as the fire- arm, as
long as it is properly packed as described above.
Black powder and percussion caps used with black powder type fire arms are not
permitted neither in cabin nor hold baggage.
Authorization for carriage of firearms and ammunition by the sports persons in an
aircraft shall be obtained from DGCA in accordance with provisions of the Aircraft
(Carriage of Dangerous Goods) Rules 2003.
Procedure for dealing with cases wherein arms and/ or ammunition are detected during
screening of a passenger or his baggage.
In exercise of powers conferred by Section 5A of the Aircraft Act, 1934, delegated vide
Government of India, Ministry of Civil Aviation, Notification No. 1797 dated July 3, 1997 and
Rule 3 (b) of the Aircraft (Security) Rules, 2011, to the Commissioner of Security (Civil
Aviation), hereinafter known as Director General, BCAS, for the purpose of securing aircraft
operations and civil airports in India, directs that the following procedure shall be followed for
dealing with cases wherein arms and/ or ammunition are detected during screening of a
passenger or his baggage.
There may be following possibilities regarding carriage of arms and ammunition together or
separately:
Arms and/ or ammunition are detected in the registered baggage of a passenger at the
time of X-ray screening and the passenger has failed to declare the same to the Airlines
Security staff as required under the Aircraft (Carriage of Dangerous Goods) Rules 2003.
Arms and/ or ammunition are detected in the hand baggage or on the person of a
passenger at the time of frisking / x-ray screening of hand baggage in the Security
Restricted Area (SRA) or at the ladder point.
Course of Action:
Authorized arms and/ or ammunition are allowed to be carried only in the hold of an aircraft.
Even if the arms and/ or ammunition are detected in the hand baggage or on person with valid
license/ authorization, the carriage of the same shall be allowed in the hold baggage only and
the following course of action shall be followed by the ASG (CISF/ State Police)/ Airline
operator/ Airport operator (wherever ILBS installed), as the case may be, to deal with the
situations as mentioned in paras above:
If the passenger is having a valid license with him, the ASG (CISF/ State Police)/
Airline operator/ Airport operator security staff, as the case may be, shall examine the
weapon physically to see that it is unloaded and packed as per the prescribed norms,
obtain declaration from the passenger as required under the Aircraft (Carriage of
Dangerous Goods) Rules 2003 and thereafter allow him to proceed for check-in etc.
There is no need to detain the passenger. However, a complaint shall be made about the
incident to the Director General, DGCA for necessary action at their end under the
Aircraft (Carriage of Dangerous Goods) Rules 2003. Local police shall also be
informed.
If the passenger does not have a valid arms license with him at that time but claims to
possess the same, he cannot be allowed to proceed. The passenger shall be detained and
handed over to local police for necessary legal action in this regard.
If the passenger claims that he is a serving Police/ Defence Services/ Central Armed
Forces personnel and is entitled to carry his service arms and ammunition, the ASG
(CISF/ State Police)/ Airline operator / Airport operator security staff shall confirm his
identity through a valid photo identity card issued by the Department/ Ministry
concerned and movement order/ authority slip. If his identity and bona fides are beyond
doubt, the ASG (CISF/ State Police)/ Airline operator/ Airport operator security staff
can obtain necessary declaration from him as required under the Aircraft (Carriage of
Dangerous Goods) Rules 2003 and thereafter allow him to proceed for check-in etc.
There is no need to detain the passenger. However, a complaint shall be made about the
incident to the Director General, DGCA for necessary action at their end under the
Aircraft (Carriage of Dangerous Goods) Rules 2003. Local police shall also be
informed and a copy of such complaint shall also be forwarded to the controlling
authority of such person.
In case the passenger neither has a valid arms license with him nor claims to possess
the same, the ASG (CISF/ State Police)/ Airline operator / Airport operator security
staff shall hand him over to the local police along with the arms and ammunition with
a complaint about the incident for taking necessary legal action under the Arms Act
1959 and Aircraft Act 1934 and the rules framed there under.
The instant AVSEC Circular will get governed by The Arms Act, 1959 and The Arms Rules,
1962 as amended from time to time.
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MODULE – 15
EMERGENCIES & CONTINGENCIES
Module Objective
List the different types of emergency/ emergencies involving aircraft / airport and response
Describe typical response to a bomb threat involving an aircraft / airport/Facility
Describe the procedure for searching an area in respect to a bomb threat
Specify the action to be taken when a suspect item is located.
Contingency plan to deal with unlawful interference
Teaching Methods
Slide Presentations
Lectures by certified instructors
Group discussions
Demonstrations
Role‐ playing and practical exercises
Overnight reading Assignments
Progress Tests
Mastery Test ( Written and Practical )
International Legislations
Annex 17
Standard 5.1.4 Each Contracting State shall ensure that contingency plans are
developed and resources made available to safeguard civil aviation
against acts of unlawful interference. The contingency plans shall
be tested on a regular basis.
Standard 5.1.5 Each Contracting State shall ensure that authorized and suitably
trained personnel are readily available for deployment at its
airports serving civil aviation to assist in dealing with suspected, or
actual, cases of unlawful interference with civil aviation.
Standard 5.3.1 Each Contracting State concerned with an act of unlawful
interference shall provide ICAO with all pertinent information
concerning the security aspects of the act of unlawful interference
as soon as practicable after the act is resolved.
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Standard 3.4.8 Each Contracting State concerned with an act of unlawful
interference shall require its appropriate authority to re‐evaluate
security controls and procedures and in a timely fashion take
action necessary to remedy weaknesses so as to prevent
recurrence. These actions shall be shared with ICAO.
National Legislation
The Aircraft (Security) Rules, 2011
Rule 10 Handling of unattended or suspect baggage
Rule 16 Contingency Plan
Rule 45 Reporting of Security Accidents or Incidents to the COSCA
NCASP
Chapter 10 Management of response to acts of unlawful interference
Aviation Security Order / Circular
Order 17/2011 Bomb Threat Contingency Plan
Order 19/2011 Contingency Plan for handling hijacked aircraft
Circular 21/2010 Prompt Communication of incidents
TYPES OF AIRPORT EMERGENCIES
Emergencies involving aircraft. These include:
Incidents involving‐Aircraft on airport
Incidents ‐Aircraft off airport
Incident‐Aircraft in flight
Incident‐Aircraft on ground
Sabotage, including bomb threat
Unlawful seizure
Emergencies not involving aircraft. include:
Fire
Sabotage, including bomb threat at airport
Natural disaster
Terrorist attack of ATC/terminal building
Terrorist attack of airport
Breakdown of runway
Emergencies at airport(fire, collapse of airport building
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Medical emergencies. These include:
Collapsed person
Sudden death
Industrial accidents
Delivery of newborn
Communicable disease alert
Collective food poisoning.
Bomb threat can be received to any aircraft which is on ground or in flight,at any airport ,vital installation,
or any civil aviation facility like ATC, cargo facility, navigational aid area or any person. The call received can
be genuine, politically motivated hoax, malicious call to disturb safe operation of flight .Bomb threat is also
conveyed byany helpful person who informs concerned airline or airport agencies regarding bomb threat,
which he overheard or came to know, etc.
Bomb Threat Calls are made by
Terrorist in order to check the efficiency of airport security.
Mentally ill, practical jokers or those who want to play prank.
Late / Disgruntle passenger can give malicious bomb threat call to civil aviation.
Whenever we receivea bomb threat call for any aircraft or any civil aviation facility, there are four phases
of handling that bomb threat
Receipt
Report
Risk Assessment
Response
Bomb Threat and its response
Action in case of Bomb Threat Call:
Considering that the safety of lives / property under circumstances of a bomb threat is directly linked to
the prompt and appropriate decision of the BTAC, it shall be the moral obligation on the part of senior
most officials within each agency to attend the BTAC whenever possible. However, also considering that
the senior most official within each agency may not be present at the airport round the clock due to the
nature of official duty / routine work performed, the next senior most official within such agency
authorized as alternate member of BTAC may attend the BTAC.
We often get hoax calls at airport Analysis of these calls reveals that such calls are given by delayed
passengers, those who has been denied seats by airlines, drunken people, trickster, media crazy people,
jilted lovers, dismissed or suspended employees, love birds, competitors, politically motivated people etc.
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In case if you ask these callers about the details of bomb or reason for bombing, their name, place or
telephone number etc they will immediately put the receiver down.
It is therefore suggested that telephone operators, Control room staff etc are to be trained to ask following
questions:‐
Where is the bomb?
When will it go off?
What does it look like?
What type of device is used?
Who are you?
Why are you doing this?
Actions on Receiving a Bomb Threat Call
Remain calm
Ensure caller ID has registered calling number and note it down
Switch ON voice recording facility(if it is not automatic)
Allow the caller to complete his conversation first without interruption.
Note exact time of call
Try to prolong call (if possible) with leading questions to assess the geniality of call
Alert colleagues and supervisors who can also listen to conversation and alert security
Observe callers sex, voice, language, approx age, background noise etc.
Note actual words and Record other details
Do not restore the hand set on the cradle switch until calling number is properly noted
Inform all details to supervisor
Supervisor to interview the receiver of threat call in order to complete the bomb threat report form (BTRF)
and relay the information without delay to the BTAC coordinator.
Other information to be reported by the recipient of a Bomb Threat Call
The background noise from where the call is been made
Identification of gender
Exact time of call
Actual wording
Approximate age
The response to the above questions and background details will help the bomb threat assessment
committee members to evaluate the call to “SPECIFIC” or “NON SPECIFIC”
As per BCAS instruction all operational telephone must have caller ID. Officers should check the
serviceability of caller ID frequently.
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Actions to be taken by the Aircraft Operator
On receipt of the call the air carrier will take immediate actions as under after verifying the genuininty of
the call received and confirming from the person who actually received the call. Exact words heard should
be repeated so that the BTAC can take a decision on categorizing the call .
Rush to attend the BTAC meeting after leaving instructions to next senior official to execute actions given
as under
(a) Where passengers have fully/partially boarded, quickly disembark such passengers/ crew in an
orderly manner with hand baggage and bring them back to SHA through departure hall for further
action.
(b) Ask crew and ground staff on board / in cargo hold to look for and report any unidentified article
before they themselves finally disembark due to bomb threat. (The crew and ground staff should be
cautioned not to touch, open or attempt to remove any unclaimed article/device but report to the
coordinator).
(c) Ask airline Engineers / staff to keep aircraft in ready to tow position for removal to Isolation
Bay/Area in case BTAC declares the threat call as specific
(d) Identify passenger’s joining the check in Queue after receipt of bomb threat call and refer such
passengers to Airport Security for inquiry/investigation.
(e) Mobilize sufficient staff even if it is recess / relief time to ensure their availability to empty aircraft
holds and to layout all unloaded baggage/stores for their anti‐sabotage check as required under
specific/ non specific threat.
(f) Actively participate in the evaluation of threat by BTAC and in deciding follow up actions.
(g) Move to the aircraft under threat and get the tasks performed from the staff as decided in the BTAC
and in a coordinated manner with other agencies.
Evaluation of Call
The Bomb Threat Assessment Committee (BTAC) shall be established at each airport in India in accordance
with the Bomb Threat Contingency Plan notified by the BCAS vide AVSEC Order 17/2011:
The Bomb Threat Assessment Committee (BTAC)
Bomb Threat Assessment Committee shall consist of the following officials with respective status as
mentioned against each:‐
No Officials Agency Status
(a) Airport Director or Airport Operator Co‐ordinator
Director operations or his representative
(b) CASO or his representative ASG Member
(Not below the rank of (CISF or State Police)
Deputy Commandant)
(c) Security Manager / Aircraft Operator Member
Station Manager
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(d) Watch Supervisory ATC Member
Officer (WSO)
(e) Airworthiness Officer DGCA Member
(f) Representative of local police State Police Member
(g) Officer I/C BDDS ASG/State Police/ Member
NSG (where ever located)
(h) FRRO/Asst FRRO * Immigration Member
(i) Deputy Commandant * Customs Member
* (Should be present in case threat relates to international terminal, international airlines or import/export
cargo terminal)
(j) COE or his representative BCAS Observer
(Wherever located)
(k) RDCOS or his representative BCAS Observer
(Wherever located)
EVALUATION OF THREAT CALL
The BTAC uses the “Bomb Warning Assessment Form (BWAF) as a guideline for systematic and scientific
evaluation of the Bomb Threat Call.
The procedure of building of an assessment system to lead the bomb warning assessors to a logical
conclusion to classify the threat is called as POSITIVE TARGET IDENTIFICATION (PTI)
Accordingly the call is classified as under:‐
SPECIFIC THREAT :A warning where the threat permits identification of a specific target, or where the caller
has positively identified himself or the organization involved and is judged credible.
The BTAC evaluates the call based on the information given by the caller and threat perception. The call is
evaluated as “Specific”, if the information is of serious and elaborate nature.
NON SPECIFFIC THREAT: A warning that can be related to one or more targets but where there is doubt
about its credibility or about the effectiveness of the existing counter measures.
The call is evaluated as “Non Specific”; if the call is of general nature such as there is a bomb in the evening
flight ‘or’ flight going to Mumbai has a bomb.
HOAX CALL: A warning that may not identify a target or a specific group of targets or which otherwise lacks
credibility.
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Action in case of Specific Bomb Threat Call
The aircraft will be shifted to isolated parking bay.
ASG/APSU will cordon the aircraft from a safe distance of 50m and control the movement of
unauthorized people.
Deploy airline security staff at ladder point to frisk/check belongings of all authorised persons
entering isolation bay / affected aircraft.
Airline (GSD) will ensure sufficient loaders, bus trolleys are available for speedy off loading.
All registered baggage, cargo; unaccompanied baggage will be off loaded and kept 100 meters away
from aircraft. The registered baggage will be line up properly for re‐identification by passengers
(with sufficient gap for dogs to move around and also for movement of passengers during re‐
identification) unclaimed baggage to be opened / kept in cooling off pit by BDDS.
Offload Catering items/ bonded stores and place them in the catering vehicle. Catering vehicle to be
parked 100 meters away from the aircraft and searched.
First aid kits and Engineering stores to be subjected to thorough search. First aid kit may be opened
and resealed by BDDS if doctors are not available for resealing.
Detail and ensure that senior airline officials from Security, Flight Crew, Engineer, Catering Cargo,
Commercial, GSD, etc. with sufficient staff are available to assist anti sabotage check.
Thorough search of aircraft will be conducted by BDDS, Airline Engineers, Airline Security, ASG/APSU,
Airworthiness Officer, etc. They work as a team and conduct aircraft search with checklist.
Prevent refuelling of aircraft till completion of anti‐ sabotage check of aircraft.
Cargo, unaccompanied baggage, mail will not be reloaded unless it is X‐rayed or sniffed by dog. It will
be kept in a protected area.
Re‐ issue of fresh boarding cards and hand baggage tags to passengers who have deplaned and
brought back to departure hall.
Crowding of too many employees and parking of vehicles near aircraft to be avoided.
Radios should not be used to transmit within 25 metres of a suspect device.
Agencies carrying out search will sign a completion certificate and which is given to ATC by airline.
Rescreen passengers and their 100% hand baggage check by airport security and hold crew/
passengers in security hold until clearance is received from the coordinator from isolation bay.
Deploy sufficient staff to cross check baggage tag numbers on hold baggage, with counterfoils held
with crew/ passengers and ensure proper and uniform marking of identified hold baggage.
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Upon receiving clearance from coordinator at isolation bay, arrange to escort crew in airline coaches
to isolation bay. Ensure crew alights from bus at a safe distance of 100 M and after identification of
hold baggage, crew proceed towards aircraft for secondary ladder point frisking /100% hand baggage
check by airline security before boarding the aircraft.
Gets clearance for passenger boarding from the crew
Arrange to escort passengers in airline coaches (one coach at a time) to isolation bay. Ensure
passengers alight at a safe distance of 100 M and not more than 10 passengers at a time should
proceed with their baggage coupons/boarding pass to identify their hold baggage without carrying
their hand baggage.
Upon identification of hold baggage, ensure that crew / passengers proceed to aircraft under airline
escort and do not loiter on airside.
Secondary ladder point frisking /100% physical hand baggage check by airline.
Ensure that only identified hold baggage is reloaded in baggage containers for loading into the
aircraft.
Ensure that hold baggage containers are not released for loading in cargo hold until passengers /
baggage reconciliation is done and head count of passengers in aircraft matches with those checked
in and number of boarding card stubs collected at the ladder point.
Make efforts to track the passenger of hold baggage which remain unidentified from details of
passenger on baggage tag and through announcement inside aircraft.
Note: Under no circumstance will unidentified baggage be taken inside the aircraft for identification
by the passenger or baggage loaded on aircraft with verbal reconciliation arrived on board between
the passengers and airline staff).
Report details of baggage finally left unidentified, to the coordinator.
Detail a security officer to accompany BDDS when unidentified baggage is decided to be moved to
explosive disposal area.
Suspend loading of unaccompanied / rush tag baggage.
Cargo, mail, courier, catering, bonded stores, medical / first aid boxes, company stores etc, which
is searched/checked/cleared by anti‐sabotage check team only will be loaded in the aircraft.
If any of the above mentioned stores cannot be searched / checked / cleared the same will not be
loaded on the aircraft. Such stores will be further subjected to 24 hrs cooling off under airline
arrangement and shall be subjected to a thorough screening/physical check.
Execute any additional security measure as directed by coordinator / BTAC.
Arrange to get clearance certificate and get the same signed off by airline engineer, airline security,
ASG, airworthiness (DGCA), BDDS, coordinator and hand over one copy of the same to coordinator
for giving RT/telephone clearance to ATC. Thereafter, hand over one copy each to ATC, BDDS and
other agencies for their record.
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Action of Non‐specific threat call to an aircraft
Action in case of Non‐Specific Call By Co‐ordinator
Inform every agency and ask them to search their own area and report.
Get confirmation from all about the search having been completed.
Request BDDS and DGCA to stand‐by near aircraft / building under threat until search is over and
clearance certificate is signed by all agencies.
By Air Carrier
Alert staff at X ‐ ray.
Carry out inspection of aircraft.
Look for suspected baggage.
Increase physical inspection of registered baggage / mail / cargo.
Proper baggage identification by passengers and crew.
Ground engineering to carry out scheduled anti sabotage checks.
Ensure proper Gate‐ No‐ show.
Thoroughly screen air mail.
Suspend airlift of unaccompanied baggage and rush tag baggage.
Frisk staff / passengers at ladder point.
Proper passenger baggage reconciliation.
Search of Aircraft under non specific Bomb Threat
Airlines Security and Airlines agencies will carry out search of aircraft under Non Specific Bomb
Threat.
Coordinator, Air carrier and ASG will ensure action as prescribed for their individual agencies as per
Bomb Warning Assessment Form (BWAF).
Airline will organize clearance certificate and obtain signatures of all official agencies involved in
search.
Coordinator after ensuring that all officials/agencies have signed the clearance certificate, will
convey the clearance to ATC for release of aircraft.
BDDS, fire tender and Ambulance must remain stand by near the aircraft until clearance is conveyed
to ATC by the coordinator.
Threat to terminal building
Action on specific threat to terminal building
Coordinator will make continuous announcement on central PA system and in different languages
for evacuation of the terminal building.
Announcement made should be deliberate and tactful so as to avoid panic ex. “due to security
reasons all passengers/staff are requested to evacuate the terminal building and proceed to safe
holding area.”
All heads of airlines, agencies and departments should evacuate their passengers/staff quietly to the
pre designated safe assembly areas.
Passengers who are not security checked will evacuate to city side.
Passengers/staff in Security Hold will evacuate to airside.
All heads of airlines, agencies and departments will ensure to hold back few staff who are thoroughly
familiar with their work area for subsequent search.
All passengers/staff will carry their baggage/personal belongings with them.
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Staff will leave all doors and windows open and switch off AC’s/unwanted lights.
Coordinator will ensure to switch off central AC.
Coordinator will ensure to open all Emergency doors.
Unclaimed suspect article if spotted during search shall not be handled but reported to BDDS.
Action on non‐specific threat to terminal building
Evacuation of terminal building not required
All heads of airlines, agencies & departments should inform their staff of the received bomb threat
Search of terminal building to be undertaken by airlines, agencies & departments in their respective
work areas
Search of common areas to be undertaken by coordinator through his care takers, cleaners & watch
and ward staff.
Upon locating an unclaimed article during search, the terminal building will be evacuated as in the
case of a specific area.
Unclaimed article if located will not be handled but reported to BDDS
The contents of the Bomb Threat contingency plan are as follows.
Airport Director designated as coordinator
Establishment of Bomb Threat Control room
Evaluation of call by Bomb Threat Assessment Committee guided by Bomb Warning Assessment
Form (BWAF)
Questioning Technique
Duties and Responsibilities of various agencies bat airport such as AAI, ASG / APSU, Airlines, BDDS,
DGCA, Customs and Immigration.
Search Procedure
Evacuation of building under threat.
Procedure to deal with unidentified / suspected baggage.
Bomb Threat Review Committee (BTRC)
To ensure installation / working of necessary infrastructure and smooth implementation of bomb threat
contingency plan each airport is required to constitute a BTRC. The committee will meet once in three
months.
Action to be taken on finding Suspect Explosive Device
All airports are required to have dedicated BDDS and dog squads. The BDDS should be well equipped with
necessary manpower and equipment to deal with any type of threat.
The four generic steps to be taken by BDDS on finding a suspicious item during a search is as under :
CONFIRM that the item found actually look like a suspicious item and needs attention of security
CLEAR the area by evacuating all persons including search teams to a safe distance of 100 meters
CORDON the area to prevent anyone gaining access to the suspect item
CONTROL the situation until specialised staff arrive and take command
Counters measures for Bomb Incidents at Airports
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Installation of caller ID (CLIP)
Give wide publicity in local newspaper if caller is identified.
Prompt evaluation of call with help of BWAF
Training of employees
Conduct periodical mock up exercise
Up gradation of EDS / EDDS.
Centralized monitoring of CCTV by APSU, Customs, Immigration
Installation of EVD / ETD
Contingency plan to handle aircraft hijack situation
Contingencies related to unlawful seizure of aircraft:
For Hijacking / Forcible seizure of aircraft on ground, a contingency may arise in one of the following
forms:‐
An aircraft registered in India may be hijacked either within India or abroad and may land in one of the
airports in India or abroad.
A foreign registered aircraft may be hijacked while in India and may land in India or abroad.
A foreign registered aircraft hijacked in some other country may land in India or in one of the
neighbouring countries, such as Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Myanmar, China, Nepal, Pakistan, Bhutan,
Male and Sri Lanka, raising the possibility of its take‐off and likely landing in India.
Management Occurrences
To deal with acts of interference with Civil Aviation, the following Group/ Committee have been
established:
Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) ‐ Apex Body
Committee of Secretaries on Aircraft Hijack (COSAH) ‐ Advisory Role
Central Committee (CC) ‐ Executive Authority/ Command
Aerodrome Committee (AC) ‐ Operational Command
Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS)
The CCS is an apex body headed by the Prime Minister, which decides policies and takes decisions on
strategic issues like response to hijacker’s demands involving national security, foreign policy, political
implications, strategy / approach to negotiations, forcible termination of hijack etc. It will be advised by
COSAH for this purpose. Minister of Civil Aviation would also be included in the CCS for management of
aircraft hijack situations. The composition of the CCS is as under:
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Committee of Secretaries on Aircraft Hijack (COSAH)
The COSAH is an advisory body, which deliberates on the problems arising out of the contingency. It will
brief and advise CCS about developments and decisions to be taken, and communicate Govt. decisions /
directions/ guidance to the CC. The composition of the COSAH is as under:
Central Committee (CC)
The CC is the executive authority responsible for dealing with the contingency of hijacking, forcible seizure
of the aircraft on ground or any other acts of unlawful interference with civil aviation.
Director General, Civil Aviation (DGCA) – Chairman
Commissioner of Security (CA) (BCAS) ‐ Convener
The Central Committee shall manage the contingency situation till it is terminated. It is empowered to deal
with the situation in all respects and take appropriate decisions on its own on the basis of the guidelines of
the COSAH. They will maintain a panel of negotiators, psychiatrists and linguists.
It shall guide the Aerodrome Committee (AC) for handling the situation on ground including negotiations
with the hijackers /terrorists and /or forcible termination of Hijack in the light of the policy guidelines laid‐
down by COSAH / CCS.
Aerodrome Committee (AC)
The AC is established at every airport and shall be activated on the occurrence of the emergency at the
affected airport. The composition of the AC depends upon the situation of the airport i.e. at State capital,
district headquarters, outside the district headquarters, defence controlled airports and international
airports as given in the Contingency Plan.
The AC of the affected airport shall meet at a place earmarked as Control Room or in ATC building in room
close to the ATC or in the ATC itself. It shall assemble immediately on receipt of information of a
contingency and take appropriate steps as described in the functions of the AC. The control room of the AC
should have a couple of independent telephone lines, hotline to the Police Control Room / Police Station
and RT facility.
Members of Aerodrome Committee:
Home Secretary of the State/ District Collector / District Magistrate Chairman
Airport Director/ Dy. GM / Sr. Manager Convener
In‐charge Airport, AAI / Airport Management
Representative from R&AW (on arrival)
A senior most executive of the affected airline
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Contingency Plan – For Indian Registered Aircraft
The National Contingency Plan for various contingencies is prepared by the BCAS. Each airport is required
to develop the under mentioned contingency plans for managing any acts of Unlawful Interference. The
same is required to be approved by the BCAS
Bomb Threat Contingency Plan
Hijack Threat Contingency Plan
Counter Terrorist Contingency Plan
Airport Emergency Plan
The Airport Management will take the following actions for a hijacked aircraft:
On landing, the aircraft is to be directed to the designated isolated aircraft parking position. Aircraft will
not be allowed to take off unless its departure is necessitated by the overriding duty to protect human life.
The aircraft may be immobilized by:
Positioning of vehicles / fire tenders on runway
Deflating tyres
Putting of lights of runway / taxi track
Aircraft Operators Responsibilities:
On receipt of threat Call the receiver will immediately inform his / her supervisor. The Supervisor will in
turn inform the Airport Director / Office / senior most person of airport management: The following
actions will be taken by the aircraft operator:
For Flights not yet boarded
Interiors of pax cabin to be checked.
100% manual checks of hand baggage.
100% physical frisking of pax / crew.
Access control.
Frisking of all personnel entering the aircraft.
Maintenance of ladder point register.
Pax reporting after hijack call to be questioned by Aviation Security Group.
For Flights in the process of boarding
Pax to be deplaned with Hand baggage if already boarded
Interiors of pax cabin to be checked
100% manual checks of hand baggage
100% physical frisking of pax / crew
Access control
Frisking of all personnel entering the aircraft
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Maintenance of ladder point register
Pax reporting after hijack call to be questioned by Aviation Security Group
Pax headcount to be taken
No need to offload baggage / cargo etc.
Pax should not have access to registered baggage
Security measures to be supervised by senior most security staff
For aircrafts in‐flight
No action to be taken (as per addendum this wording is deleted)
Security measures to be reviewed
Set up Reception centre
Documents related to flight to be sealed
Pax manifest at reception centre
Assistance to be provided
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Module‐16
Escorting People and Consignment
Module Objective
Escort disruptive / inadmissible / deportees in the restricted areas of an airport
Escort consignments over a predetermined route.
Maintain radio communication with security control centre
Apply contingency plans for emergencies involving disruptive/inadmissible/ deportees and
consignments under escort.
Primary reason for escorting typical categories of people requiring escort.
Teaching Methods
Slide Presentations
Lectures by certified instructors
Group discussions
Demonstrations
Role‐ playing and practical exercises
Overnight reading Assignments
Progress Tests
Mastery Test ( Written and Practical )
International Legislations
Annex 17
Standard 4.7.1 Each Contracting State shall develop requirements for air carriers
for the carriage of potentially disruptive passengers who are
obliged to travel because they have been the subject of judicial or
administrative proceedings.
Standard 4.7.3 Each Contracting State shall ensure that the aircraft operator and
the pilot‐in‐command are informed when passengers are obliged
to travel because they have been the subject of judicial or
administrative proceedings, in order that appropriate security
controls can be applied.
National Legislation
Aircraft (Security) Rules 2011,
Rule 17 Procedures of disembarkation of unruly passengers.
NCASP
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Chapter 7.6 Carriage of prisoners / person under judicial custody /
Administrative control.
Aviation Security Order / Circular
Order 08/2011 Instructions to handle potentially disruptive passengers.
Order 08/2010 Deployment of In‐flight Security Officers (IFSOs) – Sky Marshals
Circular 42/2005 Instructions for carriage of prisoners / person under judicial
custody / administrative control.
Typical categories of people requiring escort:
Authorised visitors
Deportees and inadmissible passenger
Medical patients and accompanying personnel
Persons in custody
VIPs.
The primary responsibility for the movement of people is that of the agency as mentioned below.
Deportee / Inadmissible pax‐ Immigrations
Persons in custody ‐ Law enforcement Officer
Medical Pax ‐ Airline
VVIP / VIPs ‐ Personal Security officers
Disruptive / Unruly Passenger
POLICY FOR UNRULY PASSENGER
Unruly passengers – Persons who commit on board a civil aircraft, from the moment when the aircraft
door is closed prior to take‐off to the moment when it is reopened after landing ,an act of :
Assault, intimidation, menace or wilful recklessness which endangers good order or the safety of
property or persons;
Assault, intimidation, menace or interference with a crew member in the performance of duties or
which lessens the ability to perform duties;
Wilful recklessness or damage to an aircraft, its equipment ,or attendant structures and equipment
such as to endanger good order and safely of the aircraft or its occupants;
Communication of information which is known to be false, there endangering the safely of an aircraft
in flight;
Disobedience of lawful commands or instructions for safe, orderly or efficient operations.
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Who is considered as a disruptive and unruly passenger?
The passenger who creates or has the potential to create disturbance either on board the aircraft or on
ground and in the process could endanger the safety of the aircraft, fellow passengers, crew members,
airline staff or property thereby hampering the operations.
Although such incidents are small as compared to number passengers we carry, it must be recognized that
some of these disruptive and unruly passengers have the potential to jeopardize the safety and security of
our operations.
Besides other factors, the following are the main causes for a passenger becoming unruly,
Excessive drinking
Nicotine starvation due to smoking restriction
Resentment of authority.
Unreasonable high expectations
Flying phobia and
Travelling in crowded environment for extended time.
Passenger Disturbance Threat Level:
Level 1‐ Disruptive behavior (Suspicious or verbally threatening).
Level 2‐ Physically abusive behavior.
Level 3‐ Life threatening behavior.
Level 4‐ Attempted or actual breach of the flight crew compartment.
Unruly passengers are the concern of airline staff involved in one of the many activities of a flight
operation. It begins at check‐in and ends at the arrival of a flight at the destination. It is therefore
necessary to have a coherent policy and procedures for all services involved, be it on ground and in the air.
Procedure on ground:
Staff should at all the times be observant during check‐in/lounge/boarding of any unusual passenger
behaviour, if noticed the same should be promptly brought to the notice of the immediate supervisor.
If the station manager/Duty manager considers him unfit to fly and safety risk he/she should be denied
boarding.
Also offload the baggage of said passenger.
Procedure in air:
Oral warning to be given to the passenger by senior crew member and also remove any alcohol.
A printed warning letter by the commander to be issued to the unruly passenger by the In‐flight
Manager.
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If passenger becomes too violent to be controlled, a restraint should be used on the passenger until the
passenger is handed over to the Law Enforcement Authorities on landing into the next station of arrival.
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PERSONS IN CUSTODY‐ Carriage of Prisoners
The following general guidance material refers to persons in lawful custody i.e. persons under arrest or
convicted criminals under escort.
Procedure:
No aircraft operator shall allow a prisoner and escorting officers as passengers unless prior permission
is obtained from the BCAS by the concerned policing authority that is responsible for transportation of
such prisoner with escorts by air.
The policing authority requiring transportation of a prisoner by air shall send their request in writing to
the Commissioner/Regional Dy Commissioner of Security(CA),BCAS at least 7(seven) days in advance.
The policing authority responsible for carriage of a prisoner by air shall indicate classification of such
prisoner as dangerous or otherwise in their application addressed to BCAS.
A prisoner should not be transported on board an aircraft unless escorted by one or more policing
authority officers.
Policing authority officers or other authorized persons should notify a responsible representative of
the operator well before the date it is proposed to transport a prisoner or as soon as practicable in an
emergency, the identity of the person being escorted, the flight on which transportation has been
arranged, and whether or not the escorted person is considered dangerous.
Escorting officers shall ensure that a prisoner does not carry contraband, weapons, matches or other
potentially dangerous items.
Escorts shall be equipped with adequate restraining devices to be used in the event they determine
that restraint is necessary .Under normal circumstances a prisoner should not be shackled to any part
of the aircraft, including seats, tables etc.
Escorts shall not carry arms, mace, teargas or similar incapacitating gas generating devices or any
dangerous goods /prohibited items specified by the BCAS on board the aircraft. Weapon and
ammunition if any may be allowed in registered baggage as per instructions in force.
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Escorts shall adequately identify themselves to security personnel, security check points, flight
attendants and pilot in command.
Any other security personnel and passengers authorized to carry firearms on board the aircraft should
be made aware of the transportation of a prisoner and escorts and their location.
A prisoner along with escorts should be boarded before all other passengers and disembarked after all
other passengers have left the aircraft.
They should be seated as far as to the rear of the passenger cabin as is possible but not in a lounge
area or next to /directly across from an exit.
They should only be seated in a row for two or more seats and at least one escort should sit between
the escorted person and any aisle.
They should be accompanied at all times and kept under surveillance including visits to the lavatory.
No intoxicating beverage shall be served to escorts or prisoner while on board the aircraft.
Prisoner may be served food at the discretion of escorts by should not be provided with metal utensils
or a knife.
Aircraft operator should not accept a prisoner and escort(s) as passengers unless concurrence has
been obtained in advance from the BCAS and other operators that may be involved en route and at the
intended final destination. In such cases sufficient advance notification must be given to operator so
that prior agreements can be obtained.
Dangerous Prisoners
At least two escorts should be required for each prisoner considered dangerous by the escorting agency or
in the judgment of a responsible representative of the operator. Not more than one such prisoner and
escorts should be carried on any one flight.
Persons suffering from mental illness
A person suffering from mental illness that is deemed to be a threat to the safety of a flight may be
accepted for transportation if accompanied by an attendant physically capable of coping with untoward
actions by that person during the flight and skilled in administering sedatives as required and authorized by
an appropriate doctor. If a mentally disturb person requires sedation prior to departure each portion of
the flight should last no longer than the effective duration of the sedative administered. The aircraft
operator, on the advice of representatives of the operators medical and security staffs, as appropriate,
should be permitted to deny boarding to such a person.
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Deportees
A person who had legally been admitted to a State by its authorities or who had entered a State illegally,
and who at some later time is formally ordered by the competent authorities to leave that State.
Each request for transportation should be evaluated and the operators consulted to determine if the
person is threat to the safety of the flight or if additional measures such as escorts are necessary.
The administrative and financial arrangements for removal of such persons are the responsibility of the
government ordering the deportation.
The primary responsibility of escorting a deportee is of immigration Law Enforcement Agency of the
deporting country
Refusal Room TO BE ADDED
Inadmissible persons (sometimes referred to as “refusals’’).
A person who is or will be refused admission to a State by its authorities. Such persons normally have to be
transported back to their State of departure, or to any other State where the persons are admissible, by
the aircraft operator on which they arrived.
Procedure for Inflight Security Officers (IFSOs) traveling on board aircraft
Inflight Security Officers also known as Sky Marshals are deployed for the purpose of securing the safety of
aircraft operation. In India the National Security Guards (NSG) are specially selected and trained, taking
into account the safety and security aspects on board an aircraft and they are deployed according to the
threat assessment of the Competent Authority.
Salient features
Travel as per flight schedule given by BCAS
AEP / AEC all airports
Medical certificate‐company doctor of the airline
Briefing of crew prior to departure carried out by IFSO.
Weapon authorization Card (WAC) issued by BCAS
Travel documents (Tickets)
All documents verified by ASG Incharge and processed through by the concerned airline security.
Staff carrying out Secondary Security Checks are informed by the security incharge
Cockpit Crew informed on number of IFSOs and seats
Under no circumstances the presence of Sky Marshals shall be revealed his identity to anyone else on
board.
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Typical consignments requiring security escort
Valuable cargo and mail
Diplomatic Bags / Mail
Dangerous goods
Vulnerable cargo during high threat situations
Registered baggage
Catering.
PRIMARY responsibility for movement of consignment will be that of the airline or agency involved.
SECURITY is responsible to assist airline/police/other agency for the safe movement of the consignment.
Procedure for Escorting Consignment:‐
Responsible agency for escorting of consignment should ensure that:
• The movement is planned in advance
• The consignment and escort proceed along a pre‐determined route
• The route is varied from consignment to consignment
Register Baggage / Accompanied Baggage
Personal Property of passengers or crew for which the sole custody is taken by the aircraft operator &
claim tagged is issued.
Categories of baggage required escort
Bags Containing Arms / Ammunition
Bags Containing High value items
Baggage o f VVIP ’s
Any baggage which has weapon in it will be escorted in restricted area. The following people are
authorised to carry weapon in their register baggage.
1. PSO’s of VIP
2. PSO’s of High Risk Dignitaries
3. Any person on bonafide duty
4. Passenger having valid license
When such persons are traveling with weapon, they will declare the weapon and ammunition prior to
screening of the passenger register baggage in prescribed format given by the aircraft carrier. Original copy
of the form will be retained by aircraft operator at boarding station, second copy will be kept in flight file
and third copy will be given to passenger. Duly authorized person of concerned airline will determine the
weapon is in unloaded condition, to transport that weapon in register baggage of passenger, before
acceptance of the weapon baggage. The weapon and ammunition will loaded in such area of aircraft which
is not accessible to any person including crew from passenger cabin. In any aircraft where hold is accessible
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from passenger cabin a separate compartment / container will be created by the aircraft operator to carry
weapon on board of such aircraft.
But due to safety of VVIPs / SPG Protectee, Personnel Security Officers of VVIPs and SPG protectee are
allowed to carry unloaded weapon in passenger cabin of the aircraft when they are escorting the
concerned VVIP’s and SPG protectee.
Also the security of register baggage is primary responsibility of concerned aircraft operator. The SOP for
securing any register baggage from any unauthorized access will include the following points.
• Screening of registered baggage
• Sealing of registered baggage after screening
• Safeguarding of baggage after screening
• Escorting baggage from point of sealing to point of loading onto the aircraft
• Ensuring that seals are intact at point of loading
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Module‐17
Protecting Aircraft Catering Uplift
Module Objective
Describe the need for security checks of catering uplift
Explain typical methods for protection of catering facilities equipments and uplift
Describe a system for sealing catering containers
Inspection of HLV before entering operational area.
Teaching Methods
Slide Presentations
Lectures by certified instructors
Group discussions
Demonstrations
Role‐ playing and practical exercises
Overnight reading Assignments
Progress Tests
Mastery Test ( Written and Practical )
International Legislation
Annex – 17
Standard 4.6.5 Each Contracting State shall ensure that catering, stores and
supplies intended for carriage on passenger commercial flights are
subjected to appropriate security controls and thereafter
protected until loaded onto the aircraft.
Standard 4.6.6 Each Contracting State shall ensure that merchandise and supplies
introduced into security restricted areas are subject to appropriate
security controls, which may include screening.
National Legislations
Aviation (Security) Rules 2011
Part VII – Catering Supplies & Stores
Rule 43 Catering Supplies
Rule 44 Supply of other stores
NCASP
Chapter 4.13 Catering Establishments
Aviation Security Order / Circular
Order 07/2004 Catering Security
Order 13 /2011 Security Programme of Catering Companies
Circular 25/2006 Security controls for catering supplies.
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Security Controls by the Caterer
Officer to supervise Security Controls
Premises secured
Access control
Personnel employed for preparation and delivery of catering supplies – regular employee and should
have undergone Security Awareness Training
Deliveries of Raw material and equipment to be X‐rayed or physically checked
Chilling rooms and refrigerators under strict control
Catering carts should have proper locking systems
Security certificate for each consignment to be loaded in aircraft
HLV’s should be securable
No airline operator shall accept any catering items for loading in the aircraft unless a written contract is
signed between both the agencies (Air operator & the caterer)
Stages of Catering Security
1. Preparation
2. Pre‐Setting
3. Hi‐lift/ Transportation
1. Preparation Stage 2. Pre‐Setting
3. Hi‐lift/ Transportation
Role of Airline Security
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The airline security personnel will be present at the catering facility to closely supervise the
preparation, packing, pre‐setting of the catering uplift and while placing them into the meal carts /
containers.
They will ensure that no unauthorized personnel have access to the catering uplift.
All security checked / cleared catering uplift will be sealed prior to loading into the hi‐lift van/ vehicle.
Hi‐lift van / vehicle will be checked for any prohibited and dangerous item prior to loading of the
security cleared catering uplift
The HLV should be properly maintained and the rolling shutters on both sides should have provision
for locking arrangements and during an operation the shutters should be locked and sealed.
The transportation of the catering uplift from the catering facility to the airport /aircraft shall be done
under escort and strict supervision by the airline security officials/ catering officials.
While transferring the catering uplift from the HLV to the aircraft, airline security official shall check
the seals affixed at catering facility for any traces of tampering and then handover the same to the
cabin crew.
All security stickers/ seals will be kept under safe custody at all times and a proper record of the
security seals used for sealing the catering uplift and HLV will be maintained. Record to be maintained
for a minimum of 07 Days.
Systematic Search of a Food Trolley
Search under the food trolley and check locks.
Open both ends of the trolleys and look for anything unusual inside the trolley.
Check the trays for unusual weight.
Search the top part of the trolley namely the ice tray.
Seal the trolley once it has been security cleared.
Security Controls for Newspapers and Cleaning supplies etc
Newspapers, magazines, cleaning stores and supplies or any other item for loading in the aircraft has to be
subjected to the following security controls:‐
The stores and supplies have been obtained from an establishment with whom the air operator has a
written contract for the purpose;
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The stores and supplies have been searched by hand or X‐ray screened to prevent the introduction of
any prohibited article;
Before allowing access to the aircraft, the cleaning staff shall be frisked and all the articles carried by
them checked properly by the airline operator; and
Any other security controls prescribed by the Commissioner.
Response to Tampering Of Security Seals/ Stickers
Inform the supervisor immediately
Carry out a thorough check of the HLV, catering uplift for any suspicious items
Record the incident.
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Module‐18
Protecting Cargo, Mail and Courier
Module Objective
Define airline responsibility for acceptance of cargo and mail consignments.
Describe typical airline security procedures for protecting cargo and mail consignments after
acceptance.
Explain the physical security measures and access control for cargo and mail facilities.
Conduct a physical search of a sterile cargo area for prohibited items and deal with suspect items as
per SOP.
Maintain sterility of cargo SHA.
Teaching Methods
Slide Presentations
Lectures by certified instructors
Group discussions
Demonstrations
Role‐ playing and practical exercises
Overnight reading Assignments
Progress Tests
Mastery Test ( Written and Practical )
International Legislation
Annex 17
4.6 Measures relating to cargo, mail and other goods
National Legislations
The Aircraft (Security) Rules 2011
Rule 35 Carriage of cargo, mail, catering items and other stores
Part –VI Cargo, courier bags, mail and regulated agent
Rule 37 Security control for cargo & courier bag
Rule 38 Registration of Courier agency
Rule 39 Identification or reconciliation of the accompanied courier bags
Rule 40 Prohibition on carriage of certain goods
NCASP 2011
Chapter 7.8 Air Cargo & Mail
Aviation Security Order / Circular
Circular 08/2008 Comprehensive security procedures in respect of cargo, express
cargo, mail and courier bags
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Order 01/2010 & Security of Cargo Complex at airports in the country
05/2010
Order 01/2006 Security measures for Air Cargo
Order 06/2005 Consignment Security Declaration
Circular 20/2004 Security of Courier bags & unaccompanied consignments by
courier companies
Order 01/2009 Regulated Agent cargo security programme
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Definition:
“Any property carried on board an aircraft other than mail, stores and accompanied or mishandled
baggage.” Is termed as Air Cargo
Types of Cargo
General Cargo
Perishable Cargo (PER)
Valuable Cargo (VAL)
Live animals (AVI)
Diplomatic mail (DIP)
Company Stores ( Comail / Comat)
Human Remains (HUM)
Transshipment Cargo
Express cargo / parcel
Consignments that are treated as cargo
Courie
r
Postal mail
Transportation of Air Cargo
Air cargo may be transported by air, both on passenger and cargo-only aircraft. Many large airlines have
very few cargo-only aircraft in comparison to the size of their fleet. Air cargo may also be transport by
truck/haulier on a pre or post flight sector, depending on regional or national legislation.
Transportation of Air Cargo involves operations at three levels:
Consigners (individual or companies) who send items of cargo by air,
Agents who provide a link between consigners and airlines;
Airlines, which carry the Cargo.
How cargo moves
Why is cargo vulnerable / attractive target for terrorist attacks?
Volume carried increasing – Aircraft is seen as fastest mode of transportation
Cargo system well known
Able to target specific flights
Difficult to screen – Nature and size of cargo
Low risk to terrorist – cannot be identified after the attacks.
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Need For Cargo Security:
Security standards throughout the civil aviation industry have improved over the years and that the
potential terrorist has had to adjust accordingly, choosing a softer (more vulnerable) point of attack.
Preventive Security
A degree of security can be achieved by a number of complimentary measures including but not limited to:
• Prevention of explosive devices being placed into consignments at source;
• The maintenance of the security of consignments once declared secure; and
• The devotion of maximum effort to screening cargo consignments whose security cannot be readily
determined.
Known & Unknown Cargo
“known cargo” is defined as:
a cargo consignment received from a regulated agent or known consignor to which appropriate security
controls have been applied; or
a consignment of unknown cargo which has been subjected to appropriate security controls
“Unknown Cargo” is defined as:
A Cargo consignment received from an unknown consignor will be considered unknown cargo, which must
be subjected to appropriate security controls. Known cargo can also be considered unknown cargo, if
security of the consignment was not maintained after security controls had been applied.
Cargo Acceptance Procedures:
Visual inspection of consignment to establish evidence of tampering
Check of shipping documentation
Establishing the identity of the consignor/ person delivering
Protecting the consignment from unlawful interference from the time of acceptance
Consignment security declaration form to be filled by the consignor delivering the goods.
Protection of Cargo
Cargo and mail to be carried on an aircraft are protected from unauthorized interference from the
point security controls are applied until departure of the aircraft.
Before cargo is loaded into the aircraft, aircraft operator’s security, staff to ensure that no cargo
consignment is allowed unless it has passed through the prescribed security control.
After security check of the cargo consignments, security sticker to be pasted / affixed.
Security measures as mentioned above shall be specifically indicated in the cargo manifest which
should signed by Airlines Security & APSU/ASG before it is loaded in the aircraft.
Methods for Screening Cargo:
Profiling
o Visual Checks of cargo including document checks
Screen by X‐ray
o For prohibited / objectionable items
Search by Hand
o In case X‐ray Machine is not available / cannot be x‐ray screened due to size etc.
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o Cargo which is segregated from X‐ray BIS must be physically examined to confirm that it is not
hazardous
o While the physical check is being carried out and if the security staff notices some explosive
material with allied gadgets, it should not be further examined. Such items must be segregated
and immediate superior must be informed.
Cooling Off
o In case X‐ray & physical checks is not possible then the cargo is required to be cooled off and
adequate entry in register for the same is to be made. Cooling off may also be required on the
cargo consignment which is doubtful. Such consignment is left for 24 hrs cooling off on ground,
before it is sent to the aircraft. If this cargo contains an IED with time/delay mechanism it
explodes on the ground, thus ensuring the aircraft is safe.
NOTE: This will only be resorted to when all the other tests mentioned above could not be carried out or
still doubt exists in the mind of the security staff, even after carrying out the test, that the consignment
could be dangerous.
Use of ETD / EVD ‐ As per regulation
Metal detectors
Flight Simulation chamber (Decompression Chamber)
o Flight simulation chamber is specially designed to
simulate / reproduce the changes in physical conditions
encountered in an aircraft in flight on the ground itself.
e.g. pressure , temperature, movement and altitude thus
reducing the risk of attacks in the air. Explosive if present
in a bag will get triggered on ground itself thus saving
the passengers and aircraft.
Security Control of Normal / General Cargo (As per Avsec Circular 08/2008)
Cargo can be security cleared by
- X-Ray Screening
- Physical Checking
- If not cleared by above two methods then to be cooled off for 24 Hours.
Apart from the above security measures staff will also ensure following aspects:
- Affixing of prescribed security sticker on the cleared consignments
- Prescribed Security Declaration from Cargo Agent
- Manifest indicating Security control against each consignment
- Protection of security cleared cargo
- Escorting of cargo consignment.
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Security Measures for carriage of Dead bodies/human Cremated Remains
Following security controls will be applied by the aircraft operator for carriage of dead body/Human/
Crematal.
Station Manager/Station Security Manager of the Aircraft Operator will examine and validate
accompanying documents as below:‐
In case of movement from a station within India
Death Certificate from a competent Medical Authority;
Embalming Certificate by the Hospital/competent Authority;
Permission by the local Police Authorities for carrying dead body/human remains;
Any document like Driving licence or Passport or any other Photo ID Card issued by a Govt./semi‐
Govt. agency to establish identity of the deceased.
In case of transportation from a Foreign Station
Death Certificate from a competent Medical Authority;
Embalming Certificate by the Hospital/competent Authority;
Certificate by the local Police Authority for carriage of dead body/human remains;
Permission from the Indian Mission for carriage;
Copies of cancelled passport of the deceased.
1. Identity of the relative/person who accompanies the dead body/human remains shall be established.
2. In case no relative/person accompanies the dead body/human remains the consignment will be
screened through X‐ray, to ensure that it does not contain any prohibited/dangerous item.
3. In the absence of X‐ray machine at a particular station, dead body/human remains shall be inspected
visually by a responsible employee of the aircraft operator to ensure that the consignment has dead
body/human remains only and nothing else which may endanger safety of the flight.
Security Measures for Mail
Security Controls for Mail bags by Postal Authorities will be as
under:
The acceptance, processing and handling of mail to be carried by
air shall be done by regular and duly trained staff of the Postal
authorities
Letters or parcels weighing less than 200 grams
These may not be X‐ray screened or may not be subjected to cooling off period.
A Certificate to the effect that the postal bag does not contain any letter or parcel which weighs
more than 200 grams, shall be obtained by the airline operator from the Postal authorities.
Airline Operator will ensure that the postal bags with suspected sign of tampering en‐route shall be
segregated and subjected to additional security controls; and
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If the suspicious bag cannot be checked physically it shall not be accepted for carriage.
Letters or parcels weighing 200 grams and above
Duties of the postal authorities
The postal authorities will screen the postal mail bags by X‐ray machine at their premises.
If X‐ray machine is not available, the mail shall be subjected to cooling off for at least 24 hours.
The Postal authorities shall issue a Certificate to the airline operator certifying that the security
measures have been fully complied with and the mail or speed post, as the case may be, does not
contain any prohibited item.
Airline duties
(a) The mail is handled by the regular and duly trained staff of the airline operator;
(b) The security staff of the airline operator shall check the condition of the mail bags and
accompanied security certificate(s) as specified in these rules. Postal bags with suspected sign
of tampering en‐route shall be segregated and subjected to additional security controls; and
(c) The airline operator shall x‐ray screen all the mail bags.
(d) In case of suspicious on such baggage shall be checked physically in the presence of an official of
the postal authority. If the suspicious bag cannot be checked physically due to one reason or the
other, the same shall not be accepted by Aircraft Operator.
(e) If any prohibited article is detected during screening of mail/ speed post, the aircraft operator
shall withhold such mail initiate legal action.
Diplomatic mail bag (Reference Avsec Order 05/2002)
The following points must be verified while accepting
diplomatic mail bag:
Visible external marks of their character
Contain only diplomatic documents or articles intended
for official use.
Name and address of the consignee as well as that of
the Foreign Diplomatic Mission / Consular Post a
sender.
Security Controls for Diplomatic Bag:
1. Diplomatic bags to be transported as cargo / registered baggage
Screened by X‐ray
In case of serious doubts / suspicion about the contents of these bags, the matter shall be brought to
the notice of the Protocol Division of the Ministry of External Affairs who would take appropriate
action.
Such suspicious baggage shall not be transported until and unless the doubts are cleared to the
satisfaction of security staff.
2. Diplomatic bags carried as hand baggage
Diplomatic Bags carried as hand baggage is exempted from Security Checks
Concerned courier / person will be allowed to go till the boarding gate to hand over / receive the
diplomatic bag
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Pre‐embarkation security checks shall be carried out on the person accompanying the diplomatic bags
and other bags carried by him should be security checked
The holder of a diplomatic bag must submit a certificate by concerned diplomatic mission stating that
the packages constituting the diplomatic bag do not contain any substance which would be dangerous
and harmful to the aircraft or its passengers.
Courier and Express Consignments
For acceptance of courier loads by an airline:
The courier company has been duly registered with the airline operator; and
It has established and implemented a security programme approved by the Appropriate Authority.
The airline will ensure that :
the consignment has been handed over personally by a responsible person of the organisation;
Consignment is accompanied by a Courier Certificate from the authorized signatory of such
organisation.
The courier bag has been properly marked externally to facilitate identification with the relevant courier;
The courier to whom such bag belongs has checked-in for the flight on which it is to be carried ;
If a courier checked-in for a flight is not on board the aircraft, his bags shall be off-loaded from the
aircraft and shall not be carried on that flight.
Security Measures
- Screening through x-ray
- Each baggage/ bag being viewed from two different angles and
- 15 % Physical check on continuous random basis.
Unaccompanied courier bags shall be treated as express cargo and shall be subjected to the same
security controls as specified for express cargo.
If any prohibited article is detected during the course of screening, such consignment shall not be
allowed to be loaded into the aircraft and legal action initiated against the consignor.
After application of the prescribed security controls, sterility of the cargo/ express cargo/ courier bags
etc, whether inside or outside the aerodrome premises, shall be maintained until such time that these are
placed on board aircraft. The screened items shall not be left unguarded at any stage until departure of
the aircraft.
Tamper-proof security stickers bearing serial number and date shall be affixed on the screened cargo/
express cargo/ courier bags, indicating clearly the type of security controls applied to them.
Security Controls for Trans‐shipment cargo
Trans-shipment cargo is a consignment of Cargo originating from an airport within or outside India which
arrives at an aircraft operator / Regulated Air Cargo agent’s premises in India, with a valid flight number for
carriage on another flight from any airport in India.
For cargo originating from India for a foreign station:
- Consignment Security Declaration
- All security measures to be followed as originating cargo
- Escorted till aircraft
For bonded cargo transiting at an Indian airport for further transportation to a foreign station:
- Appropriate documentation will be examined and confirmed as accurate.
- Escorted to departure aircraft
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For cargo originating from a foreign station:
- Appropriate documentation will be examined and confirmed as accurate.
- In case of any discrepancy in the documentation, this will be resolved and a record made of the
discrepancies.
- In case the discrepancies remain unresolved, the consignment will be treated as Unknown Cargo and
screened accordingly.
- Escorted to departure aircraft
- In case the bonded / transhipment cargo moves through landside, it will be treated as originating cargo
and screened accordingly.
Security Measures for Perishable Cargo:
Articles Which Are Liable To Deteriorate Or Perish Due To Changes In
Climate, Altitude, Temperature Or Any Other Normal Exposure Inherent To
Carriage Of Cargo By Air, Or Length Of Time Etc.
Security Measures
Security Declaration by the consignor
X‐ray Screening
Physical Checks
EDS
Security measures for Company mail (Comail) and Company material (Comat)
Comail:
Aircraft operator company mail, shippedwithin the company’s network of
stations.
Comat:
Aircraft operator company materials, shipped within the company’s
network of stations.
Security Measures
Security Declaration by concerned department signed by a responsible person
X‐ray Screening or
Physical Checks
Note: Comail / Comat containing Dangerous Goods to be referred to personnel qualified in handling
Dangerous Goods for carriage.
Security Measures for Live animals (AVI)
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Live animals may be carried as Cargo or as registered baggage. Adequate
security measures needs to be carried out for transportation of the same.
Certificate from Veterinary Doctor – if carried as registered baggage
Cage / Box to be examined
o Physical / X‐ray
Items attached to the body of animal to be examined
Live Animals not to be put through X‐ray
Security of Cargo Complex at airports
Entry/Exit to Cargo Complex and Sterile Area beyond cargo screening points at the airports shall be
guarded by ASG / APSU at all airports.
All airport operators to create a Sterile Hold Area in the Cargo Complex at airports by erecting concrete
walls or wire mesh.
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Module‐19
Behavior Detection and Security Environment
Module Objective
Passenger behavior detection ,Baggage & documents profiling
Safety regulation for person and vehicle movement in the operational area
Improving attitude of security staff for pax interface
VVIP security – laid down procedure
Teaching Methods
Slide Presentations
Lectures by certified instructors
Group discussions
Demonstrations
Role‐ playing and practical exercises
Overnight reading Assignments
Progress Tests
Mastery Test ( Written and Practical )
International Legislation
Annex 17
National Legislation
NCASP 2011
Chapter 7.7.8.2(i) Passenger Profiling
Aviation Security Order / Circular
Order 06/2009 Exemption from Pre‐embarkation security checks at civil airports
Circular 36/2005 Access Of Vehicles UptoThe Tarmac Area Of The Civil Airports In
The Country On Protocol/ Medical / Security Grounds
Not applicable
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Behavior detection ( profiling ) is described as a systematic observation to categorize each passenger by
creating a short biographical character sketch to study certain characteristic personal manner or attitude,
in order to decide whether the passenger is a threat to the airline or not.
Behavior detection ( profiling )is done to detect the following:
A terrorist with intent to harm the airline
A terrorist with intent to cause damage to the terminal building, aircraft etc.
Asylum seekers
criminal
s
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Detection of fraudulent travel documents
Traffickers of drugs, contraband and
Behavior detection ( Profiling ) is carried out on
Passenge
r
‐Alone
‐Family
‐Group
Baggag
e
‐Carry On Baggage
‐Hold Baggage
‐Other items.
Travel documents
o Passport (expired; forged; alterations; etc.)
o Visa;
o Ticket (last minute purchase; one way ticket; uneconomical routing; etc)
Detection depends on the effectiveness of the “Behavior detection ( Profiling ) Process” because of the fact
that most individual(s) involved orin the process of doing illegal activities are unable to speak the truth
and may present fraudulent documents in order to mask their true intentions and identity.
Equipment or tools used forBehavior detection ( Profiling ):
X‐BI
S
Explosive detectors
Metal detectors
Machine to check passport
Ultra violet light
Biometrics ( Iris Scan; facial recognition; voice recognition; hand geometry; finger print)
Five Steps for Behavior detection ( Profiling )
The Interviewing process
Threat assessment
Visual profile of potential terrorist
Profiling (Manual or Automatic –CAPPS)
Passenger appearance and behaviour – Suspicious signs(do not take any one sign in isolation but there
should be a minimum of three suspicious signs)
A passenger who is a possible threat may be identified by the following suspicious signs:
Sweating Shaky voice
Nervousness Stammering
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No eye contact Deep sighs
Fumbling Grinds teeth
Curiosity Un‐cooperating
Gestures Undue interests in security procedures
Face turns pale or white Contact with other passengers through signals
Shivering Cannot open his bag
Biting lips First pax
Biting nails Last pax
Restless Inability to answer a question or reluctance
Baggage (Check‐in / Hand baggage) – Suspicious signs
The baggage of a passenger who is a possible threat may also provide signs for
suspicion. These may be:
Profile of passenger does not matching to the type of baggage
Baggage not matching with profession as declared
Baggage not matching with class of travel or duration of trip.
Baggage contents are confusing – not matching travel requirements.
Passenger not having the baggage keys or does not know how to open the baggage
Name on the baggage does not match with the name on the ticket
Passenger carrying weapons, explosives , prohibited articles &Dangerous goods
Documents ‐ Suspicious Signs in
The travel documents of a passenger may also provide signs for suspicion.
The signs may be:
Last minute purchase of ticket
One way ticket
Unusual / uneconomical routing of the ticketed
Ticket appears to beCorrected forged or stolen
Passport appears to be forged, altered or otherwise invalid
Name on the passport does not match with the name on ticket
Personal identification information does not match with that on Passport
Passenger not familiar with the details in travel documents
Passenger originating from a suspicious country
Passenger’s nationality does not matches with his / her profile
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Questions asked about the baggage while profiling
Is it your baggage?
Did you pack it yourself?
Do you know the contents?
Was the bag in your custody throughout?
Are you carrying any electronic / electrical goods?
Did you accept any gift / packets etc from any other person?
Action to be taken in case a suspicious passenger is detected
Keep surveillance on the passenger (preferable electronic)
Inform Supervisor
Check baggage thoroughly
Ask questions
Verify documents
Inform ASG
Frisk thoroughly
COURTESY AND BEHAVIOUR
Courtesy and Behaviour at the airport:
Image of the organization
Satisfied customer is the best goodwill promoter
High Profile personnel travel through airport
Larger Media publicity
Personal Presentation:
Good Appearance
Posture / gesture while dealing with the passenger.
Clothing – pressed, neat and clean (good turnout)
Facial expression / body language
Good and effective communication skills.
Conversation with passenger‐ Fresh breath, voice tone /voice modulation
Right staff at right place at the right time.
Passenger Profile:
VVIPs/ VIPs / CIPs
Diplomats
Business Traveler
Celebrities
Tourists
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Group travelers
Airline / airport employees
Families
Emergency Traveler
Students
Unaccompanied Minors
Why does a passenger get upset?
A passenger may get upset for a wide range of reasons from personal to impersonal. Sometimes their
anger is justified, sometimes not. Some of the reasons are as under:
Already upset at someone / something/ somewhere
Tired, stressed, frustrated.
Travel expectations have not been met. e.g Seat allocation; meal request;
Feels nothing is right for him
Feels unpleasant attitude
Effects of courtesy and behaviour:
Professional competency / survival
Recommendation of high level
Good reputation of security staff
Confidence of passenger on security staff
Image of airlines in comparison to other
DOS AND DONTS:
D O’s
Positive Attitude
Well conversation
Smiling face
Honesty
Cooperation with the passenger
D ON”T’s
Don’t chew, eat during dealing with passenger
Don’t give wrong information
Don’t relax during duty
Don’t irritate on the behavior of pax.
Don’t lose temper
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VVIP / VIP SECURITY PROCEDURES
Certain categories of VVIP/VIPs while travelling by air through
the civilian airports in the country are exempted from security
checks as per the directions issued by the regulatory
authorities from time to time.
Exemption from pre‐embarkation security checks at civil airports.
The Bureau of Civil aviation security vide their circular has exempted the following VVIPs / VIPs from pre
embarkation security checks all civil airports in the country.
The pre embarkation checks involve screening of passengers and their carryon /hand baggage at the
security hold area by the APSU/ASG and the secondary ladder point checks carried out by the aircraft
operator prior to boarding.
As per BCAS AVSEC Order 06/2009, following are the categories of personnel who are exempted from
pre‐embarkation security checks.
1. President
2. Vice
President
3. Prime
Minister
4. Governors of
States
5. Former
Presidents
6. Former
Vice‐President
7. Chief Justice of
India,
8. Speaker of
LokSabha
9. Union Ministers of Cabinet rank
10.Chief Ministers of States
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11. Deputy Chief Ministers of States
12. Deputy Chairman, Planning
Commission
13. Leader of Opposition in
LokSabha&RajyaSabha
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14. Holders of Bharat Ratna
Decoration
15. Ambassadors of foreign countries, Charge D’ Affairs and High Commissioners and their
spouses
16. Judges of Supreme
Court
17. Chief Election
Commissioner
18. Comptroller & Auditor General of
India
19. Deputy Chairman RajyaSabha& Deputy Speaker of
LokSabha
20. Minister of State of the Union Council of Ministers
21.Attorney General of India
22. Cabinet Secretary
23. Lt. Governors of Union
Territories
24. Chiefs of staffs holding the rank of full General or equivalent rank
25. Chief Justices of the High
Courts
26. Chief Ministers of Union
Territories
27. Deputy Chief Ministers of Union
Territories
28. Visiting Foreign dignitaries of the same status as at Sl. Nos. 1 to 4,7,8,9 above
29. His Holiness the Dalai
Lama
30. SPG
Protectees
31. Shri Robert Vadra, while travelling with SPG
Protectees
32. Spouse of the president of India is exempted from pre‐embarkation security checks at all civil airports
even when he/she is not accompanying the president.
33. Former Prime Minister of India are also exempted from pre‐embarkation checks at all civilian airports
in the country.
It is reiterated that except the categories specified above, all other categories of passengers, travelling by
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air through the civilian airports in the country, are to be subjected to pre‐embarkation security checks
without making any exception in any particular case.
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Module 20
Contents: Insider Threat
o Definition of Threat in Civil Aviation
o Types of Threats in Civil Aviation
o Definition of Insider Threat
o Potential Candidates of Insider Threat
o Examples of Acts of Unlawful Interference
o Factors that make Insider Threat a Challenge
o Mitigation Measures against Insider Threat
Definition of a Threat in Civil Aviation
Something or a situation that poses a risk or a likelihood of danger or jeopardy to the safety of Civil
Aviation – is a Threat
Types of Threats to Civil Aviation
o Sabotage of aircraft/airport
o Unlawful seizure of aircraft
o Destruction of airport facilities, NAV Aids
o Communication of false information in order to jeopardize the safety of civil aviation
o Use of aircraft in service to cause death or destruction to property and facilities
o Cyber threats
o Insider threats
o MANPADS
Insider Threat: The issue and position
There is growing concern in today’s world that an isolated few of those personnel we employ within our
own operations could turn out to be the very people who target our industry and leave us vulnerable to
an attack. Insider threats can take a wide variety of forms. They can be the sharing of sensitive procedures,
attacks on information systems, smuggling goods or people into security restricted areas etc. If there is a
way to cause damage or extract personal or financial gain, there is a vulnerability to an insider threat.
DG, BCAS wishes to raise awareness among its different stake holder involved in civil aviation operations
about the insider threat and proposes guidelines to establish an operator insider policy. The core elements
of such a policy should: ‐
o Include the governance structure, including the roles and responsibilities of those involved.
o Consider the development of a risk assessment for relevant staff roles.
o Lay down the basis for establishing a contingency plan with appropriate mitigation measures
Background information
An insider is a person who exploits, or has intention to exploit, their role or knowledge for unauthorized
purposes. They may be full or part‐time permanent employees, individuals on attachment or secondment,
contractors, consultants, agency staff or temporary staff. To reduce this threat BCAS wishes to assist its
stake holders in developing, implementing and enhancing their insider threat risk identification and
mitigation as part of the operator’s security program, through the provision of simplistic guidance to
enable operators to develop their own strategies. The guidance will focus on awareness and
understanding, highlighting a number of areas where operators can focus attention to minimize exposure
to the risk, as part of their Operator’s Security Programme. The operator’s insider threat risk program is a
critical component of each stake holder’s Security Programme. The intent of this initiative is to enable
these programs to be as effective and efficient as possible for both the operator and the regulators (where
required), by provision of guidance of a cohesive structure to link in their threat and risk assessments.
Definition of Insider Threat
“A malicious threat to civil aviation that comes from within the industry, airport or airline etc. stakeholders,
such as employees, former employees, contractors or business associates, who have inside information
concerning the organization's security practices, data and ICT systems”.
The new and emerging threats against civil aviation has become more worrisome because of the way and
manner at which the laydown mitigating measures are being bye passed which cannot effortlessly be
achieved without the connivance of “an insider” that is airport workers.
Although the provisions of Annex 17 Standard 4.2.6 ‘Each Contracting State shall ensure that persons
other than passengers, together with items carried, prior to entry into airport security restricted areas
serving international civil aviation operations, are subjected to screening and security controls’, however
there are still gaps that could not be measured through screening such as intent and collusion.
THE TRUTH ABOUT INSIDER THREAT
Insider vulnerabilities represented a real concern that need to be addressed, particularly in view of all the
other measures that had been put in place to mitigate the threats from passengers, cargo, hold and hand
baggage at our airports.
It should be noted that airport personnel that have the right of entry to security restricted areas can be
infiltrated by the “bad guys” to perpetrate gruesome acts of unlawful interference. In retrospect, recent
sabotage in Charm‐el‐Sheikh in the Sinai Peninsula, Egypt and the one involving Diallo Airlines in
Mogadishu, Somalia seems to be an insider factors.
Perpetrators of unlawful acts often look for the weakest link in the security chain of defence of which
airport employees could be one, as they have detailed knowledge of the operational procedures and
weaknesses of the system which could be easily exploited by any disgruntled elements to perpetrate the
acts of unlawful interference.
Potential Candidates of Insider Threat
o Airport staff
o Stakeholder Airport Based Employees
o Security Officers/ screeners
o Law Enforcement Agents
o Aircraft Crew Members
o Disgruntled dismissed employees
Note: The potential candidates of Insider Threat are different from persons who are considered as a threat
to Civil Aviation e.g.
o Terrorists
o People with revengeful Motives
o Criminals
o Mentally Challenged Persons
Examples of Acts of Unlawful Interference:
o 27th June 1976 – Hijacked Air France Airbus A300 flight AF139 from Athens with 248 passengers
flown to Entebbe.
o 13th Oct 1977 – Hijacked Lufthansa Boeing B737‐ 200 Adv flight LH181 flown to Mogadishu
o 28th Feb 1982 – Hijacked Air Tanzania plane with 90 pax flown to Stansted, UK
o 3rd Dec 1984 – Hijacked Kuwait Airways B747 Flt KU221 to Karachi diverted to Teheran
o 5th April 1988 – Hijacked Kuwait Airways B747 Flt KU422 from Bangkok to Kuwait
o 28th November 2002 – Mombasa 2 simultaneous MANPADS (SA‐7 missile) attack on an Israeli
Arkia Airlines B757 jet during take‐off
o Malaysia Airline MH380 from Kuala Lumpur (Still missing)
Factors that make Insider Threat a Challenge
o PTSD – Post Trauma Stress Disorder
o Benefit of doubt for authorized personnel
o Identity theft
o Vastness of airport
o Advancement in Technology
Objectives for Managing the Insider Threat
The objectives for developing an insider threat risk‐based approach within an operator’s Security
Programme is to:
a) Provide assistance to stake holders in developing their programs
b) Provide guidance on the industry’s proactive approach to addressing the insider threat. The
insider threat security risk management programme should be developed with the following
principles in mind:
o Be security outcomes focused
o Mainly focus on only those security measures under the management, influence and/or control
of the operator
o Reflect current operator responsibilities
o Position the insider threat risk management within the Security Programme structure, so that it
becomes a part of the compliance assurance process.
o Take a proactive approach to addressing the insider threat.
o Provide a common approach, strategy and roadmap to strengthen the aviation system’s resilience
against the insider threat.
c) Insider Threat Policy
Operators will need to define their policy to ensure that the operator has the appropriate
procedures and processes in place to effectively manage the Insider threat. The operator will need
to decide if the insider policy is to focus on terror related activity or if it will cover the full range
of activities that could damage the company financially or the company’s reputation such as the
involvement of significant fraud. The governance structure, including the roles and responsibilities
of those involved, should be documented within the policy.
The policy should consider: ‐
o The development of a risk assessment for relevant staff roles where exposure to risk has
the potential to create significant damage to the operator.
o Insider risks to be assessed by covering scenarios considered as reasonably likely and the
mitigation for such scenarios can be explored and implemented.
o Assessing the nature and magnitude of the risk and implementing appropriate measures
to manage the risk.
o The policy should clearly show what measures are required by the operator dependent
on the risk provided by the role.
o Handling the insider cases at an early stage, by a member of staff, an authority, or,
another third party.
MITIGATING INSIDERS’ THREAT: Proposed Solution
o Proactive approach to reporting suspicious activities
o Pre‐employment background checks: Comprehensive background check of all personnel selected
for hiring/ employment at the airport should be carried out by the relevant State’s security
agencies base on the risk assessment. The policy should focus on preventing the recruitment of a
person who is not able to provide a background check which is compliant with the operator’s
requirements. Criminal records, detailed review of employment history, travel history, correct
identification etc. can provide a reasonable picture of a potential employee. Operators should
have a process to ensure that all new entrant staff complete the requirements of the vetting
process prior to employment. These measures may be varied depending on the level of risk that
is posed by the person’s role and the access to the operator’s sensitive areas.
o In addition, re‐vetting of airport workers such as the cleaners, duty free shop personnel, catering
staff and concessionaire need to be carried out frequently to mitigate collusion to commit acts of
unlawful interference.
o Practical vetting techniques
o Spot and Stop measures: Operators should consider what measures exist to identify an insider at
the earliest stage and to stop or deter him.
SPOT measures: measures aim to identify behaviors or activities of concern, and to identify any
changing or suspicious behavior patterns that might help to detect a potential insider.
STOP measures: should aim to prevent or deter an insider from exploiting, or intending to exploit
their role for unauthorized purposes.
Due to changing circumstances in their lives, every person may potentially become vulnerable to
being an insider, and if so, their attitudes or behaviors are significantly affected. Such
circumstances range from stressful personal crises to deliberate targeting and recruitment by
malicious third parties. Circumstances leading to vulnerability might be subtle and difficult to
recognize. However the reality would suggest that most such circumstances are caused by
financial difficulty, undue pressure from peers and family, perceptions of unfairness at work, or,
other inducement or coercion from third parties.
Identifying an insider is challenging. It depends heavily on other staff to report concerns about an
individual and bring them to the attention of management.
The strength of SPOT measures will need to be considered by the operator and can be influenced
by effective line management of personnel and the degree of effective supervision and team
work. Unusual behavior is more likely to be noticed where management, supervision and
teamwork is stronger. Operators will need to consider how the overall mitigation delivers the best
it can for a remote workforce.
The operator should consider the effectiveness of its reporting processes in regards to whether
they are suitable for an employee whistleblowing on a fellow employee’s behavior or where they
have genuine concerns about an employee’s intent. Reporting methods that are run by contracted
organizations external to the operator can be considered as they enable the reporter to be
anonymous, although this is not always beneficial if the investigation highlights a genuine case.
Where operators manage contractors, they may, as part of procurement activity, at least seek to
be assured that the supplier has considered the insider risk, and is encouraged to deploy similar
mitigation where appropriate or possible.
o Communication and Awareness Measures: One of the most effective elements in mitigating any
insider risk is the awareness of the insider threat element amongst senior management and staff.
For staff this awareness can be part of their vigilance when conducting everyday routines and
ensuring that company processes are applied consistently to prevent or at least restrict actions
by insiders. Awareness and attentiveness are an essential layer against the insider threat. The
operator should consider the provision of relevant levels of training on the insider threat to key
staff groups, which can be tailored to roles as required. Internal communications play an
important part in supporting the security culture, and the insider threat should be included in
such communication plans.
o Risk management for your workforce: Adopt a risk management approach to selecting your
workforce and allocating resources
o Allocating resources to create a professional recruitment and vetting program
o Voice stress analysis, psychometric testing, and other technical aids for evaluating a candidate
o Unpredictability methods of screening should be adopted for airport workers in way that it will
be difficult to thwart by the would‐be perpetrators.
o Evaluation of the remuneration of airport workers to determine if commensurate with the work
environment and to access essential needs of life (such as food and water).
o Prompt payment of airport workers’ salaries/wages and other incentives to motivate the total
commitment of airport workers without any compromise.
o Constant dialogue between staff and employers to address any area that may instigate distrust
and lack of confidence.
o Response to insider activity: Where an insider has been potentially identified, either through
those measures applied by an operator or when advised by the authorities, an assessment of the
action required should be made.
Clearly, those of high concern, and in a high risk role, should draw an immediate and stronger
response, given the industry operates to a very high safety and security standard. These are
difficult scenarios and it is quite possible that at the early stages the employee may have not
actually infringed or broken any rules, but some level of concern exists. The response should
include determining if there is a case to answer. Following these sensitive investigations
subsequent investigation may be required before notifying the staff member concerned. The
outcome of such investigations could involve a return to existing duties, a restriction of existing
duties, or permitting the individual to seek an alternative permanent position within the roles that
the operator offers recognizing a lower exposure to the concerns or even termination of
employment.
Operators should be cognizant that many apparent breaches of security have simple and possibly
innocent explanations and that where possible the employee should be given the opportunity to
explain their actions, but the matter should be dealt with promptly.
Any evidence of a criminal offence should be reported to the police at the earliest opportunity
and where prosecution is a possibility, the collection of evidence should be governed by the legal
requirements regarding the admissibility of information in court.
In circumstances where the information is provided to the authorities the operator will need to
ensure it has the appropriate policy on how to manage the consequences of a disclosure of
information regarding an employee, depending on the legislation involved.
o Governance: Within the insider threat policy the operator should consider identifying a summary
of the roles and responsibilities of relevant departments.
Module 21
Cyber Threat
Protection of critical aviation information and communication technology systems
The civil aviation operation environment is changing rapidly and significantly with an increasing
use of data and the deployment of new and interconnected technologies and communication
systems, shifting from manual processes to more efficient automated processes, communications
and storage, in order to enhance security and facilitation. The aviation sector is therefore
increasingly reliant on the availability of information, communications and control systems, as
well as on the integrity and confidentiality of data. Each stakeholder in the aviation system at the
Airport should therefore, identified its critical aviation information systems and implement
protective measures using a risk assessment methodology, followed by the essential measures to
mitigate vulnerabilities and, when necessary, to respond appropriately to an incident.
The threat posed by deliberate cyber – attacks on civil aviation is rapidly and continuously
evolving. Threat actors might be focused on disruption of business continuity, theft or wilful
destruction of information for political or financial gain or other motivations. Furthermore, cyber-
attacks not specifically aimed at the aviation industry may also cause widespread disruption in
aviation activities. In both instances, cyber threats can easily evolve to affect critical civil aviation
systems worldwide.
Governance and responsibilities:
States, governments, Airport Operator, and relevant entities should work collaboratively towards
the development of an effective and coordinated framework for civil aviation stakeholders working
at the airport to address the challenges of cyber threats, and increase the resilience of the global
aviation system to cyber threats that may jeopardize the safety of civil aviation operation at the
airport. The confidentiality, integrity and availability of all Information and Technology systems
of the airport shall be maintained.
Civil aviation industry operators, including aircraft and aerodrome operators, air traffic service
provider and other relevant entities responsible for implementation of NCASP, shall identify and
develop appropriate measures in order to protect the confidentiality, integrity and availability of
critical information and communication technology systems and data used for civil aviation
operations, which may include, but are not limited to:
i. Access control and alarm monitoring systems;
ii. Departure control systems;
iii. Passenger and baggage reconciliation systems;
iv. Screening systems and/or explosive detection systems, whether networked or operating
in a standalone configuration;
v. Regulated agent and/or known consignor (cargo supply chain) databases;
vi. Air traffic management systems;
vii. Aircraft operator reservation and passenger check-in systems;
viii. Closed-circuit television surveillance systems; and
ix. Security command, control and dispatch systems.
Consequently, Airport Operator should consider its aviation operation and its related processes,
functions and activities as “critical infrastructure” in regard to public safety, economic
advancement, and the promotion of free trade and international commerce. In doing so, the airport
operator shall:
a) Identify the threats and risks from possible cyber incidents to civil aviation operations and
critical systems and data, and the serious consequences that can arise from such incidents;
b) Define the responsibilities of the airport operator with regard to cyber security in civil
aviation;
c) Encourage the development of a common understanding among different cells of the
airport operations regarding cyber threats and risks, and of common criteria to determine
the criticality of the assets and systems that need to be protected;
d) Encourage coordination with regard to aviation cyber security strategies, policies, and
plans, as well as sharing of information to help identify critical vulnerabilities that need to
be addressed;
e) Develop mechanisms, nationally and internationally, for the systematic sharing of
information on cyber threats, incidents, trends and mitigation efforts;
f) Based on a common understanding of cyber threats and risks, adopt a flexible, risk-based
approach to protecting critical aviation systems at the airport through the implementation
of cyber security management systems;
g) Encourage a robust all-around cyber security culture within airport network.
h) Determine legal consequences for activities that compromise aviation safety by exploiting
cyber vulnerabilities;
i) Promote the development and implementation of international standards, strategies and
best practices on the protection of critical information and communications technology
systems used for civil aviation purposes from interference that may jeopardize the safety
of civil aviation operation at the airport; and
j) Establish policies and allocate resources when needed to ensure that, for critical aviation
systems:
i) System architectures are secure by design;
ii) Systems are resilient;
iii) Methods for data transfer are secured, ensuring integrity and confidentiality of data;
iv) System monitoring, incident detection and reporting methods are implemented; and
v) Forensic analysis of cyber incidents is carried out.
Identification
DG, BCAS shall define criteria for identification of critical information systems. An information
system is considered to be critical when it contains or uses sensitive or privacy data and/or assets;
or its operation is indispensable for the safe and secure operation and availability of aviation
activities. The identification of critical systems should be conducted through classification of all
data and/or assets according to a predefined data policy or classification, and the development of
a business impact analysis on the criticality for each of the individual system.
Airport Operator, ATS, aircraft operators, communications service providers, ground handling
agents, maintenance, repair and overhaul service providers, and Security service providers should
identify additional critical data and information systems software and hardware used in their
operation, which may include, but are not limited to:
a) Systems and data identified as critical from an aviation safety perspective, such as:
i) Air traffic management systems;
ii) Departure control systems;
iii) Communication, navigation and other safety-critical systems of an aircraft;
iv) Aircraft command, control and dispatch systems;
b) Systems and data identified as critical from an aviation security perspective, such as:
i) Regulated agent and/or known consignor databases;
ii) Access control and alarm monitoring systems;
iii) Closed-circuit television surveillance systems;
iv) Passenger and baggage reconciliation systems; and
v) Screening systems and/or explosive detection systems, whether networked or
operating in a stand-alone configuration;
c) Systems and data identified as critical from an aviation facilitation perspective, such as:
i) Aircraft operator reservation and passenger check-in systems;
ii) Flight information display systems;
iii) Baggage handling and monitoring systems; and
iv) Border crossing and customs systems.
While determining critical system and data, a holistic risk assessments shall be carried out on full
list of assets to ensure that a comprehensive risk picture is available and potential gaps and
vulnerabilities in appropriate protection levels are not created.
An assessment mechanism shall be established to ensure that the external entities providing
systems has a secure-by-design systems, applications and support. Industry partners should either
develop their own mechanism to develop security product evaluation standards which can be
applied to systems, software and applications, or use an established tool such as international
standard for computer security certification.
Risk Assessment
When applying security considerations in airport design, it will be necessary to conduct an airport
threat and risk assessment. The Airport Operator shall be responsible to ensure threat and risk
assessments of a particular airport and shall approach the Director General, BCAS well in time.
Keeping this aspect in view the design of the airport will be flexible enough to adapt to future
security requirements. The sooner proper resources are allocated to threat and risk assessment of
the airport, the better additional requirements will be smoothly implemented without major, and
costly, restructuring. Knowing, even at the design stage, the strengths and weaknesses of an airport
as regards potential terrorist attacks is essential decision making information. Following factors
shall be taken into account in the risk assessment methodology for establishing the priorities and
frequency of national quality control activities:
a) Threat assessment and risk management;
b) Extent of airport operations;
c) Frequency and volume of aircraft operations;
d) Volume of cargo and mail or catering operations;
e) Likelihood of an act of unlawful interference or presence of high-risk aircraft operators or
flights;
f) Outcome of previous monitoring activities carried out by the appropriate authority, as well
as activities by regional or international organizations such as ICAO;
g) History of compliance with national requirements by the airport or aircraft operator, or any
other regulated entity;
h) Findings of internal quality control measures, whenever they are required;
i) New and emerging needs in the field of aviation security, such as
i) To mitigate possible attacks against aircraft with Man-Portable Air Defense
Systems (MANPADS) and other weapons representing a similar threat to aircraft
at or near an airport;
ii) Cyber threats.
j) Reports of any security occurrences from the previous year;
k) Information regarding significant modifications during the previous year in terms of airport
layout or operation, aircraft operations, security equipment, etc.; and
l) A request from an airport or aircraft operator, or any other entity involved in the
implementation of security measures.
The protection of critical aviation information and communication technology systems (including
their hardware and software) and data shall be included in risk assessment processes established
by the relevant authorities as well as at the operator levels. A continuous vulnerability and
interdependency assessments of their critical aviation systems, shall be conducted to establish
measures to mitigate potential cyber-attacks, and verify the implementation of such measures as
part of the regular compliance monitoring activities carried out by BCAS.
Each cyber security risk analysis authority will determine its own organizational security vision,
mission, scope and policies in line with national regulations, policies and guidance. The operator’s
governance considerations should include:
a) The identification of information security roles and responsibilities for internal staff and
external partners;
b) The development of organizational strategic and tactical planning necessary to carry out
an effective cyber security programme;
c) Adoption of a cyber-security framework established either by the appropriate authority or
an international standard (e.g. ISO 27001);
d) Development of a process for establishing and enforcing organizational policies and
procedures which support both cyber security activities and, ultimately, the operational
activities of the organization;
e) A process that ensures that the organization and its critical service providers and operators
have an established mechanism for providing support at all times;
f) The development of incident management, disaster recovery and business continuity
planning; and
g) Prioritization of the necessary funding for establishing and maintaining a secure cyber
environment.
Impact Assessment
Impact assessment shall be carried out for the appraisal of the positive and negative effects of the
introduction of new and/or modified mitigation measures on the existing aviation security systems
and on all relevant stakeholders taking an active part in those systems keeping in view aircraft and
airport operation and the security, safety and facilitation of passengers and goods.
Impact assessment shall be done every time new and/or modified security measures are designed
and preferably prior to their being implemented in order to adequately identify the effects of such
measures on, among other things, daily operations, costs, the performance of staff and the desired
outcomes (e.g., the capacity of the measures in mitigating the risks associated with particular
threats, the effect on the flow of passengers, and the passengers’ experience, where appropriate).
Assessments should be proportionate and appropriate to the nature of what is being assessed.
This process may not be carried out when rapid action is required by Appropriate Authority and
operators to combat new and urgent threats. In such cases, a shorter, more concise impact
assessment should be considered by all parties involved, especially when prompt decision-making
is required. In cases of extreme urgency, DG, BCAS shall decide to proceed to implement urgent
security measures first in the interests of protecting civil aviation before carrying out a formal
impact assessment. Appropriate Authority may also consider conducting impact assessments when
decreasing security measures.
To achieve sustainability in aviation security, stake holders shall provide necessary resources (e.g.
financial, existing and new staff/manpower and equipment) necessary to implement new and/or
modified measures are in balance with the expected outcomes of these measures.
When conducting an impact assessment, DG, BCAS should engage in a consultative process with
all stakeholders involved with a view to:
a) Facilitate the dialogue between all parties involved;
b) Appraise the current status of their aviation security systems; and
c) Anticipate potential challenges and negative effects resulting from the implementation of
new and/or modified measures (from a security perspective, as well as operational and
economic perspectives).
Impact assessments should therefore appraise changes in all relevant areas including, but not
limited to:
a) Effectiveness (e.g. the security value of a proposal in mitigating risk);
b) International and communication considerations (e.g. media, public, multilateral
agreements and international trade);
c) Wider economic considerations (e.g. trade, employment, financial, industrial relations);
d) Operations (e.g. efficiency, throughput, equipment and infrastructure, staff and training
requirements);
e) Facilitation (e.g. privacy concerns, passenger experience, border control);
f) Aviation security systems in place (e.g. interconnected entities, shared responsibilities and
bilateral/multilateral agreements);
g) Technology (e.g. detection standards, hardware, software, availability, alarm resolution
and maintenance);
h) Health and safety (e.g. handling of dangerous goods);
i) Environment (e.g. disposal of prohibited items); and
j) Costs (e.g. procurement, recruitment, implementation and security fees).
The drafting of regulatory changes and/or proposals for the implementation of new and/or
modified security measures should only be carried out following a thorough analysis of the results
of impact assessments.
Detection
The Service provider shall ensure the following for detection, protection and maintaining
electronic records:
a) IT Data Center: Firewall to cover risky user activity by identifying anomalous behavior.
b) Investigate suspicious user activity
c) Reduce risk and real-time user notifications and blocking
d) Anonymize user data to protect employee and outsourced privacy and meet regulations.
e) IT Policy for external drive.
f) Networks used for critical aviation information and communication technology systems
and data are physically and/or logically separated into zones based on function, use and
security levels. Where these critical aviation information systems require connectivity to
other operational systems, these connections should be minimized to the extent practicable.
If separation is not possible, connection and access should be monitored at all times.
Appropriate policies and practices should be in place to reduce the number of connections
to the minimum required.
Protection
There should be appropriate provisions for the protection of critical information and
communication technology systems (including their hardware and software) and data, against
cyber-attacks and interference, in relevant national programmes. The programme shall envisage
measure to:
a) Protect the systems and data against unauthorized access, modification and use;
b) Prevent lack of availability and integrity due to flaws in software compilation and/or
misuse of configurations; and
c) Prevent tampering with the systems and their data.
Response: Planning and Readiness
Risk response includes the development of a comprehensive approach to reducing or eliminating
the vulnerabilities identified, as well as the techniques of risk avoidance, mitigation, transfer and
acceptance. Continual review of risk mitigation efforts is an essential element in a cyber security
risk management programme and shall include, to a minimum the following:-
a) Hacking: an illegal intrusion into a computer system and/or network
b) Denial of service attack:
i. Act of criminal who floods the bandwidth of the victims network
ii. Spam mail in the mail box depriving access of the services
c) Virus dissemination which includes malicious software that attaches itself to other software
(virus, worms, Trojan horse, web jacking, e-mail bombing etc.)
d) Computer vandalism by damaging or destroying data rather than stealing and/or
transmitting virus
e) Cyber terrorism: Use of internet based attacks in terrorism activities. Technology savvy
terrorists are using 512-bit encryption which is impossible to decrypt
f) Software piracy: Theft of software through the illegal copying of genuine programme.
Distribution of products intended to pass for the original.
Reporting
Any act or breach in the protection of the confidentiality, integrity and availability of critical
information and communications technology systems and data used for civil aviation purposes
from interference that may jeopardize the safety of civil aviation shall be immediately reported to
the DG, BCAS by the concerned entity.
Analysis
As and when any act of cyber threat is noticed, it should be immediately reported and analyzed. It
may have resulted maliciously or inadvertently.
a) Malicious threat has Common Goals and includes Sabotage, Intellectual property theft,
Espionage and Fraud.
b) Inadvertent threat results due to situations caused by Human error, Bad judgment, Phishing,
Malware, Unintentional aiding and abetting, Stolen credentials Convenience
During any quality control activities, including audits, inspections and tests conducted by BCAS,
the following shall be monitored:
a) Hardware and software supply chain security;
b) Disaster, emergency and contingency plans;
c) Security reviews and audits;
d) Interdependencies with critical services supply chain; and
e) Systems configuration control and management.
Module 22
Standard Operating Procedure for screening of Passengers with Special Needs
and Medical Conditions
Bureau of Civil Aviation Security has issued procedure for screening of passengers and carry
– on baggage vide Circular No.23/ 2005. The procedure for screening of persons with special
needs including differently – abled passengers and passengers with medical condition has been
described in the said circular. The following Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) is laid down
in the following paragraphs, prescribing the guidelines for screening of such passengers and
devices, appliances and carry – ons pertaining to them.
Applicability:
The provisions contained in this SOP shall be applicable to the following:
a) All Indian airlines/ carriers engaged in scheduled and non – scheduled air transport
services both domestic and international;
b) All foreign airlines/ carriers engaged in scheduled air transport operating to and from
Indian territory;
c) All airport operators, including private/ Joint Ventures, within Indian territory;
d) Aviation Security Group (CISF/ State Police) deployed at airports.
Definitions:
a) Person with disability: Person with disability means any individual who has a physical
or mental impairment that, on a permanent or temporary basis, substantially limits one
or more major life activities, has a record of such impairment, or is regarded as having
such impairment.
Note:
i. Physical or mental impairment means:
o Any physiological disorder or condition, cosmetic disfigurement or anatomical
loss affecting one or more of the following bodily systems, neurological,
musculoskeletal, special sense organs, respiratory including speech organs,
cardio – vascular, reproductive, digestive, genito – urinary, hemic and
lymphatic, skin and endocrine; or
o Any mental or psychological disorder, such as mental retardation, organic brain
syndrome, emotional or mental illness, and specific learning disabilities.
The term physical or mental impairment includes, but is not limited to, such
diseases and conditions as orthopaedic, visual, speech and hearing impairments,
cerebral palsy, epilepsy, muscular dystrophy, multiple sclerosis, cancer, heart
disease, diabetes, mental retardation, emotional illness, autism, drug addiction,
alcoholism and geriatric disabilities.
ii. Major life activities means functions such as caring for one's self, performing
manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning and
working.
iii. Has a record of such impairment means has a history of, or has been classified,
or misclassified, as having a mental or physical impairment that substantially
limits one or more major life activities.
b) Person with reduced mobility (PRM): A person with reduced mobility (PRM) means
any person whose mobility when using transport is reduced due to any physical
disability (sensory or locomotor permanent or temporary), intellectual disability or
impairment, or any other cause of disability, or age, and whose situation needs
appropriate attention and the adaptation to his or her particular needs of the service
made available to all passengers.
c) Incapacitated passengers: Incapacitated passengers are those with physical or mental
disability or with a medical condition, who require individual attention or assistance on
emplaning/deplaning during flight and during ground handling which is normally not
extended to other passengers.
General:
1) All airport operators should make special arrangements to facilitate screening of
persons with special needs as above so that the process is carried out efficiently keeping
the dignity and privacy of the passenger in mind while ensuring adequate level of
screening. This will include provision of suitable enclosed space for private screening
of passengers covered in this SOP.
2) The airport management/representative of air carrier shall provide wheel chairs and
render necessary assistance to facilitate the movement of the persons with special needs,
when required. However, they would normally be directly taken to the aircraft, except
in case of ambulance passengers.
3) While thorough checking is essential and the directives under AVSEC circular No.
23/2005 will be followed in letter and spirit, courtesy and attention to privacy and
dignity will be invariably observed.
4) In the case of a passenger having difficulty in walking or standing, the way his or her
screening is conducted will depend on his or her level of ability/disability.
5) If a passenger has difficulty standing or waiting in line due to a disability or a medical
condition, he/ she should duly inform the screening personnel who will assist in
directing the passenger either to front of the queue or to a separate line. Passengers
should be encouraged to indicate brief details of their disability at the time of booking
of the ticket itself and in case of such prior information, airlines and security staff shall
make advance preparation for such passengers.
6) Medical documentation is helpful but not essential.
7) Canes, crutches and other devices which can be separated from the passengers should
be subjected to x ray screening.
8) Wherever testing is done for detection of explosives, in addition to ETD, help of dog
squad may be taken as per need. However, sensitivity of passenger and religious
considerations may be kept in mind.
9) The procedure laid down herein is not exhaustive, and therefore, in the situations/
circumstances not exclusively dealt with in this SOP, common sense of the screener
shall prevail depending upon the situation, circumstances and condition of the
passenger. For example, special procedure may be devised for persons with autism,
Down Syndrome etc. TI1eparamount importance is to ensure aviation security and at
the same time safeguarding dignity of the passengers and preserving privacy.
Screening of passengers who use wheel chair or scooters (i.e., self driven wheel chair):
1) When a passenger arrives at a screening point in a wheel chair / scooter, he/she must be
accompanied either by another travelling passenger or an airline representative
(including GHA of the airline) before he proceeds through security. The accompanying
passenger or the airline representative is responsible for the passenger throughout the
whole process of screening.
2) If a passenger arrives at a screening point in a wheelchair and he/she is not accompanied
by another travelling passenger or an airline representative, the airline's Customer
Service should be contacted for assistance.
3) At the screening point, depending upon the ability of the passenger to walk, he/she will
be requested to walk through the DFMD unaided. If he/she cannot walk, it is the
responsibility of the accompanying travelling passenger or the airline representative to
push the passenger in the wheelchair unless it is self - driven.
4) At the screening point, depending upon the ability of the passenger to walk, he/she will
be requested to walk through the DFMD unaided. If he/she cannot walk, it is the
responsibility of the accompanying travelling passenger or the airline representative to
push the passenger in the wheelchair unless it is self - driven.
5) If there is a requirement for the passenger to be lifted at the screening point, the support
person or the airline representative will perform the lifting for the passenger.
6) The support person will be escorted by an Airline representative at the time of boarding/
disembarkation.
7) If the passenger can stand but cannot walk, he/ she can be screened by undergoing a
pat-down while he/she stands beside the wheelchair or scooter.
8) If ~ passenger cannot stand, he/she should be offered a chair for screening and subjected
to a pat-down thereafter.
9) If there is an alarm by the DFMD, HHMD or other technology, the same must be
resolved. If the alarm cannot be resolved, the passenger will not be permitted beyond
the checkpoint.
10) The passenger's wheelchair or scooter will be inspected, including the seat cushions and
any pouches/ pockets. It will be tested for traces of explosives. Removable pouches will
be x-ray screened.
11) Any carry - on bag or document with the wheelchair passenger shall be passed through
the x-ray screening.
12) If a person objects to proceeding through the DFMD on justified medical or other
ground, he/ she will be allowed passage through alternative way by the frisking officer
and then subjected to screening by pat down search and HHMD where permissible.
13) If a person refuses to undergo screening, the frisking officer will inform the supervisor,
who will direct what further action is to be taken. The concerned passenger will not be
allowed entry past the screening point.
14) Only when satisfied that a person is not carrying any prohibited or dangerous article,
the screening officer shall allow the person to proceed beyond the screening point.
Screening of passengers with prosthetics:
1) During the screening of prosthetics ASG (CISF/ State Police) may use visual check,
ETD and X-ray screening depending on the circumstances of each case. This passenger
needs to be handled with sensitivity.
2) The passenger with prosthetics or braces/ support appliances will inform the airline
concerned and must be accompanied by an airline representative, preferably of the same
gender as that of passenger.
3) The passenger should inform the ASG (CISF/ State Police) of the existence of a
prosthetic part before the screening begins.
4) The staff of airline and any other accompanying person shall be frisked and checked
before allowing them access to the passenger with prosthetics at the screening point.
5) The passenger will first pass through the DFMD and necessary security checks.
6) A prosthetic appliance which does not have any foam padding cover under which any
weapon/ explosive can be concealed and in which the steel rod of the appliance is
clearly visible.may be screened by visual inspection and ETD checks only, without
removing it. However, in rare cases where there is sufficient justification including
profiling of the passenger, X-Ray screening may be resorted to. The justification for
subjecting a prosthetic limb to X-Ray screening shall be recorded by the screener in a
register. During visual inspection, care should be taken that sensitive parts are not
exposed.
7) Screening of prosthetic appliance covered with foam padding (in which the steel rod of
the appliance is not visible) shall include visual inspection, ETD checks and X-ray
screening. X-ray screening of such appliances in which a weapon could be concealed
under the foam padding will be done in all cases unless it can be physically checked to
ensure that no weapon is concealed inside the padding.
8) If X-Ray screening of the prosthetic limb is required, such passenger should be taken
to a private screening point and made to sit comfortably for taking off his/ her prosthetic
limb. While dealing with prosthetic device and during removing and wearing clothes,
privacy of the passenger should be maintained along with the proper log entry.
9) If screening of the prosthetic limb is required, then the screening in the private screening
area will be carried out by two officials, one to handle HHMD and pat-down and the
other to inspect the prosthetics, braces and support appliance and subject them to
additional screening.
Screening of passengers who cannot remove shoes, medical device or bandages:
1) Passengers who cannot remove their shoes due to a medical condition should inform
the supervisor, SHA before screening.
2) Passenger can be screened using DFMD and/ or a whole - body pat - down.
3) The shoes may be subjected to additional screening like ETD, etc.
4) Passengers can be screened without disconnecting external medical devices and
submitting them for x-ray. Such devices include:
a) Insulin pumps
b) Hearing aids
c) Cochlear implants
d) Spinal stimulators
e) Bone growth stimulators
f) Ostomies
5) Under most circumstances, a passenger can conduct a self-pat-down of these devices
followed by ETD screening of his/ her hands.
6) The devices should also be physically checked against any outside interference in the
manufacturing.
7) Casts, braces and support appliances will be thoroughly inspected without exposing
sensitive areas as far as possible. ETD screening will also be used to test for traces of
explosive materials, where possible.
8) In case of bandages and/ or dressing, while caution will be observed during pat-down,
it needs to be ensured that the covered area is free of threat item. Metal detector,
observation and self-pat-down followed by ETD checks may suffice in most cases.
9) Passengers with metal implants will be subjected to a thorough pat-down, and the metal
alarm should be resolved satisfactorily. The full body pat down should include the
following:
a) It should concentrate on upper legs and torso.
b) Special attention should be given to the chest and abdomen areas of the body.
c) Particular focus should be on any skin surface abnormalities or wires or tubes
exiting the body that may be signs of an implanted device.
10) In accordance with BCAS Memo. No. CAS – 3 (32)/ 2009/ DIV - III B (SA Kolkata)
dt 5.9.2010, all airport operators shall display a board near SHA in a prominent way
stating that DFMD/ HHMD are safe for pacemaker and for pregnant ladies.
Screening of passengers with Service Animals:
If the passenger has a service animal, the instructions issued by AVSEC circular no. 6/ 2001
shall be implemented. If the service animal is permitted to be carried on board the following
instructions shall be followed:
1) The animal must be wearing a harness, vest or other identifier that it is a service animal.
2) The passenger must maintain control of the animal at all times.
3) He or she should not be separated from the service animal.
4) The screening officer should ask for permission of the passenger before touching the
animal.
5) Service animals are screened using walk through metal detector followed by a pat
down. There are three options:
a) The service animal goes first and the passenger follows holding the leash.
b) The passenger goes first holding the leash and the service animal follows.
c) The passenger and the service animal go together.
6) Regardless of who goes through the metal detector first, the screening officer will
perform a physical inspection of the animal and its belongings (collar, harness, leash,
backpack, vest, etc.). The belongings will not be removed from the animal.
7) The passenger should not make contact with service animal (other than maintain control
of the leash) until the animal has been cleared.
8) Medication for serving animals will be subjected to x - ray and other screening, if
required, separately. These also should be separated from other items in the passenger
carry-on.
Ambulance passenger:
1) Due to exigencies of their exceptional medical conditions illness, some passengers are
directly taken through the security gates to the aircraft for boarding.
2) In such cases, as far as possible, the airport operator airline should provide its own
ambulance.
3) The passenger and all occupants of the vehicle should be subjected to a pre -
embarkation security check at the security gate by the ASG (CISF/ State Police) staff
under the supervision of an officer not below the rank of an Inspector. The ambulance
should be permitted to proceed to the aircraft only after this check has been completed.
4) In case the ambulance is privately owned or hospital provided, it must be led by follow
- me vehicle of the airport operator. The ASG (CISF/ State Police) staff shall check to
ensure that the vehicles do not carry anything objectionable and are not being
accompanied by unauthorized persons or persons who have no need to be in the
vehicles. Such ambulance will be escorted by ASG (CISF/ State Police) staff.
5) All occupants of the vehicles, unless exempted, must be screened at the gate before
allowing entry into the airport.
6) The movement of the ambulance should be coordinated well in advance by the airline
operator with CASO and airport operator.
Screening of medication and associated supplies:
1) All medications and associated supplies (i.e., syringes, sharps disposal container, pens,
infusers etc.) are allowed through the checkpoint only after they have been screened.
2) Medication and related supplies are normally x - rayed.
3) Passengers have the option of requesting a visual inspection of medications and
associated supplies with due reason.
4) Any medication that cannot be cleared visually must be submitted for x – ray screening.
5) BCAS has issued detailed guidelines regarding carriage of liquids, aerosols and gel
(LAGs) on board vide AVSEC Circular No. 18/2006. Medically necessary LAGs are
permitted in excess of 100 m1 on need basis after they have been screened. These items
are subject to additional screening through visual inspection and ETD swipe, if
necessary.
6) If a passenger has medically necessary LAGs, he or she needs to:
a) Limit the amount to what is reasonably necessary for the itinerary;
b) Separate these items from the other LAGs;
c) Declare the items; and,
d) Present these items for additional inspection on reaching the security check
point.
X Ray Screening of respiratory equipment:
1) Supplemental oxygen and other respiratory related equipment are permitted through the
checkpoint once they have been screened. This is subject to DGCA regulations also.
2) If a passenger can disconnect from the oxygen, the oxygen container will undergo x -
ray screening.
3) Passengers who cannot disconnect from respiratory equipment will be screened by
undergoing a pat - down.
4) Respiratory equipment that is not x – rayed will be visually and physically inspected,
and will be subject to ETD screening.
COURSE SCHEDULE (BASIC AVSEC)
SESSION DAY 1 DAY 2 DAY 3
MODULE -1
ONE Opening address and Course
Objective PROGRESS TEST PROGRESS TEST
1000-1045 Registration for Course
MODULE -2 MODULE -3
Introduction to the course, Overview of International Civil Working at the airport – moving
TWO
Trainees Profile and Course Aviation Security, International about the airport / ADP and
Syllabus Conventions and Protocols on safety rules, Airport Permit System
1050-1135
Civil Aviation for persons and vehicles
Visit to Domestic Airport-moving
Industry Counter measures about the operational area,
THREE Terminologies related to
(Legislative/ Technical and complying with airport safety rules,
AVSEC
Physical) recognizing suspicious activity and
1145 – 1230
corrective action
Visit to Domestic Airport-Locate all
FOUR Terminologies related to Categories of Countermeasures
main airport and airline buildings
AVSEC during implementation
and services on an airport
1235 - 1320
Visit to Domestic airport for
FIVE Terminologies related to Civil Aviation Security set up in familiarization – Specify the
AVSEC India boundaries between non-restricted
1400 – 1445 and restricted areas of an airport
Vulnerability of Civil Aviation
Visit to Domestic airport for
SIX 1455- Operations, Nature of Threat to familiarization – Specify the
Acts and Rules related to AVSEC
Civil Aviation & its boundaries between non-restricted
in India
1540 Countermeasures and restricted areas of an airport
SEVEN Role of Airline Security/ ASG Key responsibilities of States and
Visit to Catering Unit
in AVSEC Appropriate Authority
1545 – 1630
Need for Security Awareness & Scope Visit to cargo complex-procedure
MODULE -3
EIGHT for the career in the field of AVSEC regarding Cargo, mail, diplomatic bag
Working at the airport – airport layout
Instructor's Name : Instructor's Name : Instructor's Name :
1635-1720
COURSE SCHEDULE/STP123 (BASIC) Page 1 of 4
DAY 6
SESSION DAY 4 DAY 5
MODULE-10
Screening and searching of
ONE Passengers and Baggage.
PROGRESS TEST PROGRESS TEST Passenger Screening – the need,
1000-1045 Screening Point layout, basic
screening systems, equipment
used for search/ screening.
Stages involved in the Passenger
inspection/ Screening Process.
MODULE-4 Functions of each member of the
Access Control – People MODULE-7 inspection/ searching team.
TWO Threat caused by Unauthorized Recognition of Prohibited Articles/
Access, Access Control Points – Restricted articles, Explosives and Passenger Screening -
1050-1135 recognize unusual behavior at Kinds of Mechanisms Controlling flow of passengers
access control points from DFMD and searching
passengers with HHMD/ PAT
Down Search. (Frisking -
demonstration and group
practice).
Equipment and Local Access
Recognition of improvised
THREE Control Points, Operational status SOP for dealing with Passengers
explosives, incendiary devices,
of Access Control Points. Right to with special needs (AVSEC
weapons and dangerous object –
1145 – 1230 search and Security Awareness CIRCULAR 04/2014).
Theory and practical demonstration
FOUR Places and Methods of Concealment. SOP for dealing with Passengers
SOPs for Access Control. Access
Modern methods of Explosives with special needs (AVSEC
Control Point Log book.
1235 - 1320 Detection. CIRCULAR 04/2014).
MODULE-5
MODULE-8
Access control for vehicles
Building and Area Search Procedure
MODULE-11
FIVE Boundary penetration, control Conventional X-ray –
Sterile area concept, Passenger
points and equipment. Vehicular Introduction, Principles,
mixing. Types of Sterile Passenger
1400 – 1445 Permit System & Vehicle/ Characteristics, Safety measures,
Holding Area Concepts. Searching &
Ambulance Search and its Requirements of XBIS.
securing SHA
occupants.
Methods of protecting the
airside/landside barrier, Sterility of SHA. Specifications of X-BIS, Pre –
vulnerable points at airport. SOP Search of SHA – General principle operational check of X-BIS,
SIX
for dealing with signs of and briefing of searcher. Discovery Combined Test Piece, Switches
interference / intrusion of the and dealing with suspicious/ of a typical X-BIS and its safe
1455-1540
airport physical barrier, Safety prohibited items during the search as operation
regulation for person and vehicle per SOP.
movement in the operational area
Interpretation of X-Ray Imaging
MODULE-6 MODULE-9
and Analysis, Threat Image
SEVEN Landside Security – Concept. Patrolling and Guarding – Principles
Projection, Identify items that
Measures on ground, scope, of Defense, Need for patrolling,
may be prohibited or dangerous/
1545 – 1630 responsibilities, threats & identify vulnerable facilities at an
Items which may present
vulnerabilities airport.
difficulties during screening.
Enhanced security measures in SOP, Relevant AVSEC Circulars and
Elements involved in the airside/ landside
landside and various physical barrier. Methods of protecting the airside/ AVSEC Orders on use of X-BIS,
EIGHT measures used in Landside for landside barrier. SOP for dealing with signs Practical Operation of X-BIS (Computer
securing the landside area. of interference / intrusion of the airport Based Training)
1635-1720 Instructor's Name : physical barrier. Instructor's Name :
Instructor's Name :
COURSE SCHEDULE/STP123 (BASIC) Page 2 of 4
SESSION DAY 7 DAY 8 DAY 9
ONE
PROGRESS TEST PROGRESS TEST PROGRESS TEST
1000-1045
MODULE -16
MODULE-14 Escorting People and
TWO Carriage of arms and/ or ammunition Consignments – Primary reason
for escorting typical categories of
by air – Legislation for acceptance of
PROGRESS TEST
carriage of arms and/ or ammunition people requiring escort, Escort
1050-1135
by air, Personnel authorized to carry Disruptive/ Inadmissible/
arms and/ or ammunition Deportee in the restricted area
Declaration in writing for carriage of
Escort Consignments over a
arms and/ or ammunition given by
predetermined routes,
MODULE-12 the passenger, security controls
Maintaining radio
THREE Aircraft protection – principles. applied for the safe carriage of arms
communication with security
Responsibility of security and/ or ammunition by air, Procedure
control center, Application of
1145 – 1230 personnel relating to protection of for dealing with cases wherein un-
Contingency plans for
parked aircraft declared arms and/ or ammunition is
emergencies involving escorting
detected during screening of a
people and consignments
passenger or his/ her baggage
MODULE-17
Protection of parked aircraft and MODULE-15 Protecting Aircraft Catering
FOUR respective SOPs, SOP for Emergencies and Contingencies – uplift – Need for securing
protection of parked aircrafts Types of emergencies and response. catering uplift, Typical methods
1235 - 1320 during increased threats. for protection of catering
facilities & catering uplift
Bomb threat - Typical response to a
Reasons for aircraft security
Bomb Threat involving an aircraft/
FIVE checks and searches, Aircraft
airport. Procedure for searching an Inspection of HLV before
access points, Types / Timings of
area in response to a Bomb Threat. entering operational area.
1400 – 1445 aircraft security checks and
Response on detection of suspect
searches.
item
MODULE-13
Physical inspection of baggage – MODULE-18
Introduction and principles, Protecting Cargo, Mail and
SIX Recognize prohibited items and Courier – Vulnerability of Cargo
dangerous items that may be Bomb threat Contingency plan Operations, Airline responsibility
1455-1540 camouflaged, concealed or for acceptance of cargo & Mail
disguised in carryon baggage with consignments.
specific concerns relating to
electronic items.
Search methods, team concept.
Behavior of search team
Security Control after
SEVEN Response by an airline security in acceptance, Physical Security
personnel/ selection of bags for
case of a Hijack Threat Measures and Access Control for
1545 – 1630 physical search and search Cargo & Mail facilities.
techniques.
Search of various types of carryon
baggage. SOP to deal with
prohibited and dangerous items
detected in baggage.
Contingency plan to deal Maintaining sterility of SHA.
Demonstration on conducting a
EIGHT with unlawful seizure of an Search of Sterile Cargo area for
search of a baggage
aircraft prohibited items and deal with
Instructor's Name :-
1635-1720 Instructor's Name :- suspect items as per SOP.
Instructor's Name :-
COURSE SCHEDULE/STP123 (BASIC) Page 3 of 4
SESSION DAY 10 DAY 11 DAY 12
ONE
PROGRESS TEST REVISION PROGRESS TEST
1000-1045
MODULE -19
Behavior Detection
MODULE -22
TWO Characteristics, Purpose,
Passenger Profiling and Security
Support that Behavior detection REVISION
Environment – Passenger and
1050-1135 provides the security mission,
document profiling.
Multi – Layer protection with
Behavior Detection
Improving attitude of security
THREE Proactive threat assessment,
staff for passenger interface,
When & how can we detect PROGRESS TEST Courtesy and behavior
1145 – 1230 behavior, Types of passenger
Suspicious signs – Appearance
FOUR
& Behavior, Baggage & VVIP Security – Laid down
Documentation, Common lying PROGRESS TEST procedure.
1235 - 1320
gestures
MODULE -21
Cyber Security – Protection of
FIVE Positive signs, Action to be critical aviation information &
taken in case of suspicious communication technology REVISION
1400 – 1445 passenger is detected. system, governance and
responsibilities
MODULE -20
Insider Threat – Concept of
SIX
Threat (recap), Insider Threat –
Identification of critical
information system, Risk PROGRESS TEST
Concept, Categories of people
1455-1540 assessment, impact assessment
who can be a potential insider
threat
Factors that make an insider
SEVEN Risk response: Planning and
threat a challenge in civil PROGRESS TEST
1545 – 1630 aviation
readiness
Risk Mitigation against FeedbackClosing ceremony
from participants, Interaction
Insider Threat PROGRESS TEST
EIGHT with participants & Evaluate the
Instructor's Name :- Instructor's Name :- training activities of the course.
1635-1720 Instructor's Name :-
Tea Break : 1135-1145 and 1445-1455.
Lunch : 1320-1400
Break : 05 minutes after every period
Day 13th of the course schedule: FINAL MASTERY TEST conducted by BCAS
COURSE SCHEDULE/STP123 (BASIC) Page 4 of 4
Basic Aviation Security Page 187 of 196 SECRET
Handout
MODULE 18
CLOSING ACTIVITY
Assessment of the trainees will be carried out by Bureau of Civil Aviation Security through examination
conducted at the end of the course.
A feedback shall be taken from participants by respective ASTI’s on the feedback form provided by along
with the STP.
Basic AvSec/BCAS/2014 Secret
Basic Aviation Security Page 192 of 196 SECRET
Handout
ANNEXURE – B
PARTICIPANT PROFILE
NAME
DESIGNATION
BASE
WORKING SINCE
BRIEF DESCRIPTION
OF PRESENT JOB
PREVIOUS WORK
EXPERIENCE
EDUCATIONAL
QUALIFICATION
HOBBIES/ INTERESTS
OUTSIDE OF WORK
GOAL IN LIFE
EXPECTATION FROM
THIS COURSE
Basic AvSec/BCAS/2014 Secret
Basic Aviation Security Page 193 of 196 SECRET
Handout
ANNEXURE – C
FEEDBACK FORM
Name of the Course:
Name of the Trainer:
Training Date: / _/
Weighted
Average
Programme Content These faces describe your feelings
Out of 5, the
least score is 1
Length of training
Relevance of topics covered
Quality of documentation provided
Basic AvSec/BCAS/2014 Secret
Basic Aviation Security Page 194 of 196 SECRET
Handout
Was the flow of contents logical
Final Validation
Instructor & Venue’s Feedback
Instructor created a learning environment
Instructor maintained a good energy level
Did the Instructor encourage participation
Was the training facility conducive to learning
Arrangements of food/ Venue/ Training aids
Was there anything you found difficult to understand?
Basic AvSec/BCAS/2014 Secret
Basic Aviation Security Page 195 of 196 SECRET
Handout
Recommendations to my other Colleagues to attend the training course
Overall Score
Name of the Trainee (Optional) :
Basic AvSec/BCAS/2014 Secret
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