NAME: DATE:

SECTION: SCORE:

ACTIVITY 1

PEOPLE vs. VALLEJO [G.R. No. 144656.July 16, 2002]

a. Summary of facts
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b. What are the issues raised/presented?

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c. What is the ruling of the court on these issues?

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 d. Do you agree with the decision? What part of the decision do you like best and
why? In case you don’t agree with the decision, what do you think would be the
right decision?
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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. FRANCISCO JUAN LARRANAGA et. al [ G.R. Nos.
138874-75, February 03, 2004 EN BANC]

a. Summary of facts
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b. What are the issues raised/presented?

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c. What is the ruling of the court on these issues?
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d. Do you agree with the decision? What part of the decision do you like best and
why? In case you don’t agree with the decision, what do you think would be the
right decision?
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 [G.R. No. 144656.July 16, 2002]

PEOPLE vs. VALLEJO

EN BANC

Gentlemen:

Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated JUL 16 2002.

            G.R. No. 144656 (People of the Philippines vs. Gerrico S. Vallejo.)

Accused-appellant Gerrico S. Vallejo moves for a reconsideration of the decision of the Court,
dated May 9, 2002, affirming the death sentence imposed on him by the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 88, Cavite City, for the rape-slay of a nine-year old child, Daisy D. Diolola, in Rosario,
Cavite on July 10, 1999.

Accused-appellant contends (1) that he was forced by policemen to produce his bloodstained
clothes and, therefore, such evidence is inadmissible; (2) that his oral confessions made to
Mayor Renato Abutan and Pet Byron Buan are inadmissible in evidence; (3) that Atty. Lupo
Leyva, who assisted him in the police investigation, was not an "independent counsel" as
required in Article III, section 12, par. (a) of the Constitution because Atty. Leyva was counsel
for the Office of the Municipal Mayor of Rosario, Cavite; (4) that the injuries sustained by
accused-appellant constitute evidence of torture to which he was subjected by policemen to
make him own up to the crime; and (5) that the DNA evidence presented by the prosecution is
unreliable, the DNA test being nothing but "junk science."

Most of the issues raised by accused-appellant have already been passed upon by this Court in
its decision. Nevertheless, they will be discussed again in view of the gravity of the offense of
which accused-appellant has been found guilty.

First. The allegation that accused-appellant was coerced by policemen to produce his
garments, on which were found bloodstains matching the blood found on the victim's clothing (t-
shirt, short pants, and panties), is belied by his own testimony that it was he who accompanied
the police to his house and pointed out to them the back portion of the house where the
garments were placed together with the other laundry (TSN, Gerrico Vallejo, February 28, 2000,
pp. 46-47). Nowhere in his testimony before the trial court did he claim that the policemen
forced him to produce said clothing. As the search was made with the consent of accused-
appellant, there was no need for a judicial warrant to make the items seized admissible in
evidence.

Second. As to the admissibility of the oral confessions, the evidence shows that when Mayor
Abutan questioned accused-appellant, the latter was not under custodial interrogation. Accused-
appellant freely and voluntarily made the confession. For the same reason, his oral confession
to NBI Forensic Biologist Pet Byron Buan is admissible considering that Mr. Buan was not an
investigator. The records show that Mr. Buan asked the questions, which accused-appellant
freely and spontaneously answered, out of mere personal curiosity. In accordance with the
decision in People vs. Andan, 269 SCRA 95 (1997) and People vs. Mantung, 310 SCRA 819
(1999), therefore, these confessions are admissible in evidence.
Third. Nor is accused-appellant's written confession (Exh. "N") to the police inadmissible in
evidence because Atty. Leyva was allegedly not an "independent counsel" within the meaning
of Article III, section 12, par. (a) of the Constitution. Atty. Leyva testified that he had been in the
private practice of law since 1986 after retiring from the Department of Foreign Affairs. He had
been a legal consultant of Mayor Abutan of Rosario, Cavite since July 1998 (TSN, Atty. Lupo
Leyva, September 10, 1999, pp. 5-6), but he was not in any way officially connected with the
office of the Municipal Mayor. His relationship with Mayor Abutan was purely private and
professional. What is more, it was accused-appellant who asked for the legal services of Atty.
Leyva. When asked by Mayor Abutan if he wanted his lawyer to assist him in the police
interrogation, accused-appellant answered in the affirmative.

Fourth. Accused-appellant contends that the external injuries found in his body during physical
examination, which were all minimal, proved his claim that he had been tortured. He adds that
"when hardened policemen beat and torture suspects into submission, they make it a point not
to leave any torture marks" (Motion for Reconsideration, p. 11). (Accused-appellant made this
allegation by way of refuting the statement in the decision in this case that if, as accused-
appellant claimed, his private parts had indeed been pricked with a needle and burned with a
lighted cigarette and- that he had been boxed and hit with a piece of wood (TSN, Gerrico
Vallejo, February 28, 2000, pp. 23-24), Dr. Vertido would have found more than mere abrasions
and hematoma on his left finger.) Accused-appellant does not explain, however, how so serious
an injury as those he claimed to have suffered could have left no telltale signs on his body. The
results of the examination would certainly have disclosed more serious and visible injuries than
those actually found. Mere allegation is not equivalent to proof.

Fifth. Accused-appellant questions the reliability of the DNA analysis done by the NBI in this
case. He calls the DNA testing in this country nothing but "junk science." This generalization
about the state of DNA science in the Philippines, like accused-appellant's fulmination against
"hardened policemen who leave no marks of torture" on their victims, is without any basis.

There is at the University of the Philippines, NSRI (Natural Sciences and Research Institute)
DNA Analysis Laboratory, which has been conducting DNA typing research and analysis since
1996. No one reading the scientific papers presented at the Third Convention and Seminar of
the Philippine Judges Association on June 11, 1999 can doubt the credibility of DNA tests done
in the Philippines. As pointed out by Dr. Saturnina C. Halos, then Supervisor, UPNSRI DNA
Analysis Laboratory, in her paper entitled "Current Trends in DNA Typing and Applications in
the Judicial System":

"The Philippines has now the facility and expertise in using DNA test by STR analysis for
identification and for paternity testing. It will be of tremendous help in declogging the courts of
civil cases involving paternity suits if DNA tests are accepted. DNA tests can also be used to
exonerate innocent individuals in rape cases and other violent crimes where human tissues are
left in scenes of crime. It is respectfully proposed that the justice system accept DNA tests as a
reliable investigative tool for forensic purposes." (The Court Systems Journal, vol. 4, p. 47
(1999))

There is another DNA testing laboratory at the National Bureau of Investigation. As NBI
Forensic Chemist Magsipoc testified, the combined use of human resources and machines
greatly minimize or eliminate the possibility of error in DNA testing (TSN, Aida Viloria-Magsipoc,
January 18, 2000, pp. 16, 30-31).
The foregoing considerations, taken together with the other circumstantial evidence pointed out
at pages 14 to 16 of the decision in this case, especially the DNA profile found in the vaginal
swabs taken from the victim which matched the DNA profile of accused-appellant, prove beyond
reasonable doubt accused-appellant's guilt.

WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration of accused-appellant Gerrico S. Vallejo is

DENIED with FINALITY for lack of merit.

The Court further Resolved to (a) NOTE the Letter dated 20 May 2002 of Dr. Maria Corazon A.
De Ungria, Head, DNA Analysis Laboratory, Natural Sciences Research Institute, University of
the Philippines, Diliman, Quezon City, and (b) GRANT her request that her research staff, Mr.
Chrisgel Ryan A. Cruz, be allowed access to the records of this case to be able to read and
photocopy its records and transcript of stenographic notes, considering the importance and
relevance of the decision of this case to the role of the DNA Laboratory in the administration of
justice.(Davide, Jr., C.J., on leave.)

Very truly yours,

LUZVIMINDA D. PUNO
Clerk of Court
(Sgd.) MA. LUISA D. VILLARAMA
Asst. Clerk of Court
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. FRANCISCO JUAN LARRANAGA et. al [ G.R. Nos.
138874-75, February 03, 2004 EN BANC]

PER CURIAM

On the night of July 16, 1997, sisters Marijoy and Jacqueline Chiong, who lived in Cebu City,
failed to come home on the expected time. It was raining hard and Mrs. Thelma Chiong thought
her daughters were simply having difficulty getting a ride. Thus, she instructed her sons, Bruce
and Dennis, to fetch their sisters. They returned home without Marijoy and Jacqueline. Mrs.
Chiong was not able to sleep that night. Immediately, at 5:00 o’clock in the morning, her entire
family started the search for her daughters, but there was no trace of them. Thus, the family
sought the assistance of the police who continued the search. But still, they could not find
Marijoy and Jacqueline.
On July 19, 1996, upon hearing the news about the dead woman, Mrs. Chiong’s son Dennis
and other relatives proceeded to the Tupaz Funeral Parlor at Carcar, Cebu to see the body. It
was Marijoy dressed in the same orange shirt and maong pants she wore when she left home
on July 16, 1997.
On May 8, 1998, or after almost ten months, the mystery that engulfed the disappearance of
Marijoy and Jacqueline was resolved. Rusia, bothered by his conscience and recurrent
nightmares, admitted before the police having participated in the abduction of the sisters. He
agreed to re-enact the commission of the crimes.
On August 12, 1998, Rusia testified before the trial court how the crimes were committed and
identified all the appellants as the perpetrators. He declared that his conduit to Francisco Juan
Larrañaga was Rowen Adlawan whom he met together with brothers James Anthony and
James Andrew Uy five months before the commission of the crimes charged. He has known
Josman Aznar since 1991. He met Alberto Caño and Ariel Balansag only in the evening of July
16, 1997.
Or, July 15, 1997, while Rusia was loafing around at the Cebu Plaza Hotel, Cebu City, Rowen
approached him and arranged that they meet the following day at around 2:00 o’clock in the
afternoon. When they saw each other the next day, Rowen told him to stay put at the Ayala Mall
because they would have a “big happening” in the evening. All the while, he thought that
Rowen’s “big happening” meant group partying or scrounging. He thus lingered at the Ayala Mall
until the appointed time came.
At 10:30 in the evening, Rowen returned with Josman. They met Rusia at the back exit of the
Ayala Mall and told him to ride with them in a white car. Rusia noticed that a red car was
following them. Upon reaching Archbishop Reyes Avenue, same city, he saw two women
standing at the waiting shed. Rusia did not know yet that their names were Marijoy and
Jacqueline.
Josman stopped the white car in front of the waiting shed and he and Rowen approached and
invited Marijoy and Jacqueline to join them. But the sisters declined. Irked by the rejection,
Rowen grabbed Marijoy while Josman held Jacqueline and forced both girls to ride in the car.
Marijoy was the first one to get inside, followed by Rowen. Meanwhile, Josman pushed
Jacqueline inside and immediately drove the white car. Rusia sat on the front seat beside
Josman.
Fourteen (14) meters from the waiting shed, Jacqueline managed to get out of the car. Josman
chased her and brought her back into the car. Not taking anymore chances, Rowen elbowed
Jacqueline on the chest and punched Marijoy on the stomach, causing both girls to faint. Rowen
asked Rusia for the packaging tape under the latter’s seat and placed it on the girls’ mouths.
Rowen also handcuffed them jointly. The white and red cars then proceeded to Fuente Osmeña,
Cebu City.
At Fuente Osmeña, Josman parked the car near a Mercury Drug Store and urged Rusia to
inquire if a van that was parked nearby was for hire. A man who was around replied “no” so the
group immediately left. The two cars stopped again near Park Place Hotel where Rusia
negotiated to hire a van. But no van was available. Thus, the cars sped to a house in
Guadalupe, Cebu City known as the safehouse of the “Jozman Aznar Group” Thereupon,
Larrañaga, James Anthony and James Andrew got out of the red car.
Larrañaga, James Anthony and Rowen brought Marijoy to one of the rooms, while Rusia and
Josman led Jacqueline to another room. Josman then told Rusia to step out so Rusia stayed at
the living room with James Andrew. They remained in the house for fifteen (15) to twenty (20)
minutes. At that time, Rusia could hear Larrañaga, James Anthony, and Rowen giggling inside
the room.
Thereafter, the group brought Marijoy and Jacqueline back to the white car. Then the two cars
headed to the South Bus Terminal where they were able to hire a white van driven by Alberto.
Ariel was the conductor. James Andrew drove the white car, while the rest of the group boarded
the van. They traveled towards south of Cebu City, leaving the red car at the South Bus
Terminal.
Inside the van, Marijoy and Jacqueline were slowly gaining strength. James Anthony taped their
mouths anew and Rowen handcuffed them-together. Along the way, the van and the white car
stopped by a barbeque store. Rowen got off the van and bought barbeque and Tanduay rhum.
They proceeded to Tan-awan. Then they parked their vehicles near a precipice where they
drank and had a pot session. Later, they pulled Jacqueline out of the van and told her to dance
as they encircled her. She was pushed from one end of the circle to the other, ripping her
clothes in the process. Meanwhile, Josman told Larrañaga to start raping Marijoy who was left
inside the van. The latter did as told and after fifteen minutes emerged from the van saying,
“who wants next?” Rowen went in, followed by James Anthony, Alberto, the driver, and Ariel, the
conductor. Each spent a few minutes inside the van and afterwards came out smiling.
Then they carried Marijoy out of the van, after which Josman brought Jacqueline inside the
vehicle. Josman came out from the van after ten minutes, saying, “whoever wants next go
ahead and hurry up.” Rusia went inside the van and raped Jacqueline, followed by James
Andrew. At this instance, Marijoy was to breathe her last for upon Josman’s instruction, Rowen
and Ariel led her to the cliff and mercilessly pushed her into the ravine which was almost 150
meters deep.
As for Jacqueline, she was pulled out of the van and thrown to the ground. Able to gather a bit
of strength, she tried to run towards the road. The group boarded the van, followed her and
made fun of her by screaming, “run some more” There was a tricycle passing by. The group
brought Jacqueline inside the van. Rowen beat her until she passed out. The group then
headed back to Cebu City with James Andrew driving the white car. Rusia got off from the van
somewhere near the Ayala Center.

Against the foregoing facts and circumstances, the appellants raised the defense of alibi
ISSUE: Are the appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt?
COURT’S RULING:
There is clear and overwhelming evidence that appellants, who are private individuals, forcibly
dragged Marijoy and Jacqueline into the white car, beat them so they would not be able to
resist, and held them captive against their will. In fact, Jacqueline attempted to free herself twice
from the clutches of appellants — the first was near the Ayala Center and the second was in
Tan-awan, Carcar — but both attempts failed. Marijoy was thrown to a deep ravine, resulting to
her death. Jacqueline, on the other hand, has remained missing until now.
Article 267, as amended, states that if the victim is killed or died as a consequence of the
detention, or is raped or subjected to torture or dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty shall
be imposed. This amendment introduced in our criminal statutes, the concept of ‘special
complex crime’ of kidnapping with murder or homicide. It effectively eliminated the distinction
drawn by the courts between those cases where the killing of the kidnapped victim was
purposely sought by the accused, and those where the killing of the victim was not deliberately
resorted to but was merely an afterthought. Consequently, the rule now is: Where the person
kidnapped is killed in the course of the detention, regardless of whether the killing was
purposely sought or was merely an afterthought, the kidnapping and murder or homicide can no
longer be complexed under Art. 48, nor be treated as separate crimes, but shall be punished as
a special complex crime under the last paragraph of Art. 267, as amended by RA No. 7659.”
The prosecution was able to prove that Marijoy was pushed to a ravine and died. Both girls
were raped by the gang. In committing the crimes, appellants subjected them to dehumanizing
acts. Dehumanization means deprivation of human qualities, such as compassion. From our
review of the evidence presented, we found the following dehumanizing acts committed by
appellants: (1) Marijoy and Jacqueline were handcuffed and their mouths mercilessly taped; (2)
they were beaten to severe weakness during their detention; (3) Jacqueline was made to dance
amidst the rough manners and lewd suggestions of the appellants; (4) she was taunted to run
and forcibly dragged to the van; and 5) until now, Jacqueline remains missing which aggravates
the Chiong family’s pain. All told, considering that the victims were raped, that Marijoy was killed
and that both victims were subjected to dehumanizing acts, the imposition of the death penalty
on the appellants is in order.
Thus, we hold that all the appellants are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the special complex
crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention with homicide and rape in Criminal Case No.
CBU-45303 wherein Marijoy is the victim; and simple kidnapping and serious illegal detention in
Criminal Case No. CBU-45304 wherein Jacqueline is the victim.
Anent Criminal Case No. CBU-45304 wherein Jacqueline is the victim, the penalty of reclusion
perpetua shall be imposed upon appellants considering that the above-mentioned component
offenses were not alleged in the Information as required under Sections 8 and 9, Rule 110 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Consistent with appellants’ right to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him, these attendant circumstances or component
offenses must be specifically pleaded or alleged with certainty in the information and proven
during the trial. Otherwise, they cannot give rise to a special complex crime, as in this case.
Hence, the crime committed is only simple kidnapping and serious illegal detention.
From the evidence of the prosecution, there is no doubt that all the appellants conspired in the
commission of the crimes charged. Their concerted actions point to their joint purpose and
community of intent. Well settled is the rule that in conspiracy, direct proof of a previous
agreement to commit a crime is not necessary. It may be deduced from the mode and manner
by which the offense was perpetrated, or inferred from the acts of the accused themselves when
such point to a joint design and community of interest. Otherwise stated, it may be shown by the
conduct of the accused before, during, and after the commission of the crime. Appellants’
actions showed that they have the same objective to kidnap and detain the Chiong sisters.
Rowen and Josman grabbed Marijoy and Jacqueline from the vicinity of Ayala Center.
Larrañaga, James Andrew and James Anthony who were riding a red car served as back-up of
Rowen and Josman. Together in a convoy, they proceeded to Fuente Osmeña to hire a van,
and thereafter, to the safehouse of the “Jozman Aznar Group” in Guadalupe, Cebu where they
initially molested Marijoy and Jacqueline. They headed to the South Bus Terminal where they
hired the white van driven by Alberto, with Ariel as the conductor. Except for James Andrew who
drove the white car, all appellants boarded the white van where they held Marijoy and
Jacqueline captive. In the van, James Anthony taped their mouths and Rowen handcuffed them
together. They drank and had a pot session at Tan-awan. They encircled Jacqueline and
ordered her to dance, pushing her and ripping her clothes in the process. Meanwhile, Larrañaga
raped Marijoy, followed by Rowen, James Anthony, Alberto, and Ariel. On other hand, Josman
and James Andrew raped Jacqueline. Upon Josman’s order, Rowen and Ariel led Marijoy to the
cliff and pushed her. After leaving Tan-awan, they taunted Jacqueline to run for her life. And
when Rusia got off from the van near Ayala Center, the appellants jointly headed back to Cebu
City.
Appellants attempted to establish their defense of alibi through the testimonies of relatives and
friends who obviously wanted them exculpated of the crimes charged. Naturally, we cannot but
cast an eye of suspicion on their testimonies. In People vs. Ching we ruled that it is but natural,
although morally unfair, for a close relative to give weight to blood ties and close relationship in
times of dire needs especially when a criminal case is involved.
Rusia positively identified the appellants. The settled rule is that positive identification of an
accused by credible witnesses as the perpetrator of the crime demolishes alibi, the much
abused sanctuary of felons. Rusia’s testimony was corroborated by several disinterested
witnesses who also identified the appellants. Most of them are neither friends, relatives nor
acquaintances of the victims’ family. As we reviewed closely the transcript of stenographic
notes, we could not discern any motive on their part why they should testify falsely against the
appellants. In the same vein, it is improbable that the prosecution would tirelessly go through
the rigors of litigation just to destroy innocent lives.
Meanwhile, appellants argue that the prosecution failed to prove that the body found at the foot
of a deep ravine in Tan-awan, Carcar was that of Marijoy. We are not convinced. Rusia testified
that Josman instructed Rowen “to get rid” of Marijoy and that following such instruction, Rowen
and Ariel pushed her into the deep ravine. Furthermore, Inspector Edgardo Lenizo, a fingerprint
expert, testified that the fingerprints of the corpse matched those of Marijoy. The packaging tape
and the handcuff found on the dead body were the same items placed on Marijoy and
Jacqueline while they were being detained. The body had the same clothes worn by Marijoy on
the day she was abducted. The members of the Chiong family personally identified the corpse
to be that of Marijoy which they eventually buried. They erected commemorative markers at the
ravine, cemetery and every place which mattered to Marijoy. Indeed, there is overwhelming and
convincing evidence that it was the body of Marijoy that was found in the ravine.