POLITICS AND ECONOMICS OF THE MIDDLE EAST

PAKISTAN’S STRATEGIC CULTURE

AND FOREIGN POLICY MAKING:

A STUDY OF PAKISTAN’S POST 9/11

AFGHAN POLICY CHANGE

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 POLITICS AND ECONOMICS
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 POLITICS AND ECONOMICS OF THE MIDDLE EAST

PAKISTAN’S STRATEGIC CULTURE

AND FOREIGN POLICY MAKING:

A STUDY OF PAKISTAN’S POST 9/11

AFGHAN POLICY CHANGE

IJAZ KHAN
DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
UNIVERSITY OF PESHAWAR

Nova Science Publishers, Inc.

New York
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LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CATALOGING-IN-PUBLICATION DATA

Khan, Ijaz.
Pakistan's strategic culture and foreign policy making / Ijaz khan.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN:  (eBook))
1. Pakistan--Foreign relations--Afghanistan. 2. Afghanistan--Foreign relations--Pakistan. 3.
Pakistan--Foreign relations. 4. Pakistan--Strategic aspects. 5. Strategic culture--Pakistan. I. Title.
DS383.5.A45K536 2012
327.5491--dc23
2011037421

Published by Nova Science Publishers, Inc. † New York

 CONTENTS

Glossary vii
Acronyms and Abbreviations xi
Introduction xiii
Chapter 1 Studying Pakistan’s Strategic Culture and Foreign Policy 1
Chapter 2 The Making of Pakistan’s Strategic Culture and Pro Taliban
Afghan Policy 15
Chapter 3 Pakistan’s Afghan Policy Shift: Response to the War on Terrorism 43
Chapter 4 Impact of Pakistan’s Changed Afghan Policy on the Region 63
Chapter 5 Pakistan’s Domestic Foreign Policy Debate in the Post
September 11 Era 83
Chapter 6 Conclusions: Towards a Changed Strategic Culture 113
Bibliography 133
Index 143
 GLOSSARY

Anarchy: the absence of an international authority.

Balance of power: an international system in which states enjoy relatively equal power,
states form alliances or make policies to counteract the acquisition of power by other
states, and no one state is able to dominate the international system.
Behavioural Approach: An approach to the study of politics or other social phenomena that
focuses on the actions and interactions among units by using scientific methods of
observation to include quantification of variables whenever possible. Accordingly,
behaviour can be described, explained, and predicted.
Belief system: the organised and integrated perceptions of individuals in a society, including
foreign policy decision–makers, often based on past history, that guide them to select
certain policies over others.
Bipolar: an international system with two major powers or two groups of states having
relatively equal power.
Bureaucratic politics: the model of foreign policy decision–making that posits that national
decisions are the outcomes of bargaining among bureaucratic groups having competing
interests; decisions reflect the relative strength of the individual bureaucratic players.
Complex Interdependence Theory: The term 'complex interdependence' defines
International relations as various, complex transnational connections resulting in
interdependencies between states and societies. Interdependence theorists noted that such
relations, particularly economic ones, were increasing; while the use of military force and
power balancing were decreasing but remained important.
Democratic peace: the classical theory that claims democratic states are least likely to wage
war against each other.
Dependency theory: derived from Marxism, an explanation of poverty and
underdevelopment in developing countries based on their historical dependence and
domination by rich countries.
Deterrence: the policy of maintaining a large military force and arsenal to discourage any
potential aggressor from taking actions; states commit themselves to punish an aggressor
state.
viii Ijaz Khan

Diplomacy: the practice of states trying to influence the behaviour of other states by
bargaining, negotiating, taking specific non – coercive actions or refraining from such
actions, or appealing to the public for support of a position.
Ethnic Nationalism: a form of nationalism that bases appeals for national action on common
culture, language, religion, shared history or myth of shared kinship and uses these
criteria to exclude people from the nation.
Hegemon: a dominant state that has a preponderance of power; often establishes and
enforces the rules and norms in the international system.
Historical or traditional realism: views realism as a licence to take any course of action
necessary to ensure political survival.
Imperialism: the policy and practice of extending the domination of one state over another
through territorial conquest or economic domination. In radical and Marxist political
philosophy, the final stage of expansion of the capitalist system.
International Political Economy: A method of analysis concerning the social, political and
economic arrangements affecting the global systems of production, exchange and
distribution, and the mix of values reflected therein. As an analytical method, political
economy is based on the assumption that what occurs in the economy reflects, and
affects, social and political power relations.
International society: the states and sub – state actors in the international system and the
institutions and norms that regulate their interaction; implies that these actors
communicate, sharing common interests and a common identity.
Irredentism: the demands of ethno nationalist groups to take political control of territory
historically or ethnically related to them by separating from their parent state or taking
territory from other states.
Legitimacy: the moral and legal right to rule, which is based on law, custom, heredity, or the
consent of the governed; with reference to a government, a state recognised by members
of the international community.
Liberalism: the theoretical perspective based on the assumption of the innate goodness of
the individual and the value of political institutions.
Multi–national corporations: (MNCs) private enterprises with production facilities, sales,
or activities in several states.
Multi–polar: an international system in which there are several states or great powers of
roughly equal strength or weight.
Nation–State: the entity formed when people sharing the same historical, cultural, or
linguistic roots form their own state with borders, a government, and international
recognition; trend began with French and American Revolutions.
Nation: A group of people who see themselves as distinct in their culture, history,
institutions, or collective principles and who aspire to self–rule.
National Interest: the interest of the state, most basically the protection of territory and
sovereignty; in realist thinking, the interest is a unitary one defined in terms of the
pursuit of power; in liberal thinking, there are many national interests; in radical
thinking, it is the interest of a ruling elite.
 Glossary ix

Nationalism: devotion and allegiance to the nation and the shared characteristics of its
peoples; used to motivate people to patriotic acts, sometimes leading a group to seek
dominance over another group.
Neo–liberal Institutionalism: a reinterpretation of liberalism that posits that even in an
anarchic international system, states will cooperate because of their continuous actions
with each other and because it is in their self–interest to do so; institutions provide the
framework for cooperative interactions.
Neo–realism: A systemic, balance of power theory in which states do not seek to maximise
power, but merely balance it. And because the international system is regarded as
anarchic and based on self–help, the most powerful units set the scene of action for
others as well as themselves. These major powers are referred to as poles; hence the
international system (or a regional subsystem), at a particular point in time, may be
characterised as uni – polar, bipolar or multi – polar.
Non-Governmental Organisations: private associations of individuals or groups that engage
in collective civic activities having bearing on the political space, across national
borders.
Normative: relating to ethical rules; in foreign policy and international affairs, standards
suggesting that a policy should be.
North: refers to the developed countries, mostly in the Northern Hemisphere, including
North America, the European countries, and Japan.
Organisational Politics: A foreign policy decision–making model that posits that national
decisions are the products of sub – national governmental organisations and units; the
procedures and processes of the organisation largely determine the policy; major changes
in policy are unlikely.
Pluralist model: a model of foreign policy decision–making that suggests that policy is
formed as a result of the bargaining among the various domestic sources of foreign
policy, including public opinion, private interest groups, and multinational corporations;
these interests are generally channelled through democratic institutions like legislatures
or persons holding elective positions.
Power: a relationship between two individuals, groups, or states in which one party has the
ability both to influence the other and to force outcomes that the other party may not
want.
Public Diplomacy: use of certain diplomatic methods to create a favourable image of the
state or its people; methods include, for example, goodwill tours, cultural and student
exchanges, and media presentations.
Rational Actor: in the realist assumption, an individual or state that uses logical reasoning
to select a policy; that is, it has a defined goal to achieve, considers a full range of
alternative strategies, and selects the policy that best achieves the goal.
Realism: a theory of international relations that emphasises states’ interest in accumulating
power to ensure security in an anarchic world; based on the notion that individuals are
power seeking and that states act in pursuit of their own national interest defined in terms
of power.
x Ijaz Khan

Regime: in international relations means an all–encompassing term that includes the rules,
norms, and procedures that are developed by states and international organisations out of
their common concerns and are used to organise common activities.
Sanctions: economic, diplomatic, and even coercive military force for enforcing a state’s
policy or legal obligations; (punishing a state).
Satisfice: in decision–making theory, the idea that states and their leaders settle for the
minimally acceptable solution, not the best possible outcome, in order to reach a
consensus and formulate a policy.
South: the developing countries of Africa, Latin America, and southern Asia, generally
located in the Southern Hemisphere.
Sovereignty: the authority of the state, based on recognition by other states and by non –
state actors, to govern matters within its own borders that affect its people, economy,
security, and form of government.
State: the organised political unit which has a geographic territory, a stable population, and a
government that is externally independent and has not come into existence in violations
of Public International Law.
Structural realism: sees realism as a permanent condition of conflict or the preparation for
future conflicts. Structural realism is further divided into two wings: those writers who
emphasise human nature as the structure (structural realism I) and those who believe that
anarchy is the structure which shapes and shoves the behaviour of states (structural
realism II).
Superpower: highest–power states as distinguished from other great powers; term coined
during the Cold War to refer to the United States and Soviet Union.
Talibanization: refers to the political process of, officially sanctioned, that is through
government policy or through the activities of non state entities, including political
parties and other associations, that transforms a Muslim society towards an extreme form
of Islamic principles. Alludes to the practices of Taliban government in Afghanistan,
1996 – November 2001.
Terrorism: the use of violence by groups or states to intimidate, cause fear, or punish their
victims to achieve political goals.
Track–two Diplomacy: unofficial overtures by private individuals or groups to try and
resolve an ongoing international crisis or civil war.
Transnationalism: Interactions and coalitions across state boundaries that involve such
diverse nongovernmental actors as multinational corporations and banks, church groups,
and terrorist networks. In some usages, transnationalism includes both nongovernmental
as well as transgovernmental links.
Uni–polar International System: an international system where there is only one great
power, commonly used to describe the post Cold War International system, in which
United States is the sole Super power with no matching balancer or balancing alliance.
Unitary actor: an assumption made by realists that the state speaks with one voice and has a
single national interest.
Universal Jurisdiction: a legal concept that permits states to claim legal authority beyond
their national territory for the purpose of punishing a particularly heinous criminal or
protecting human rights.
 ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AJ&K Azad (Free) Jammu and Kashmir [Pakistani controlled Kashmir]

ANP Awami National Party
CARs Central Asian Republics
CENTCOM United States Central Command
CENTO Central Treaty Organisation
CMLA Chief Martial Law Administrator
COAS Chief of Army Staff
DCC Cabinet Defense Committee
ECO Economic Cooperation Organisation
EEC European Economic Community
FATA Federally Administered Tribal Areas
GATT General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GATT General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GOC General Officer Commanding
ICRC International Committee of Red Cross
IDP Internally Displaced Person
IGO Intergovernmental Organisation
IMF International Monetary Fund
ISAF International Security Assistance Force (in Afghanistan)
ISI Inter Services Intelligence (Directorate of)
ISPR Inter Services Public Relations
JCSC Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee
JI Jamaat–e–Islami
JUI Jamiat–Ulema–e–Islam
JUP Jamiat–Ulema–e–Pakistan
LOC Line of Control
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NCCA Nuclear Command and Control Authority
NGO Non Governmental Organisation
NSC National Security Council
NWFP North West Frontier Province
xii Ijaz Khan

OIC Organisation of the Islamic Conference

OSCE Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PML–N Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz Sharif faction)
PPP Pakistan Peoples Party
RAW Research and Intelligence Wing (Israel’s intelligence Agency)
SAARC South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation
SEATO South East Asia Treaty Organisation
UNGA United Nations General Assembly
UNOCAL Union Oil Company of California
UNSC United Nations Security Council
WTO World Trade Organisation
 INTRODUCTION
That Pakistan, a nuclear state of one hundred and eighty million people, has become a
focus of international attention in post 9/11 International Relations is stating the obvious. A
question that is increasingly being asked is whether Pakistan is an ally or foe in the ‘War
against Terrorism’. It made a decision to support U.S. in its ‘War against Terrorism’
immediately after the tragedy of September 11, 2001 (9/11). The question persists due to
Pakistan’s distinction as the only state supporting Taliban at least till 9/11. Pakistan tried to
broker between U.S.A. and Taliban even after announcing support for and becoming an ally
in the ‘War against Terrorism’, apparently trying to save Taliban rule of Afghanistan minus
Osama and Al-qaeda. Pakistan continued diplomatic relations with Taliban for quite some
time even after declaration and commencement of attack on Taliban-ruled Afghanistan with
Pakistan’s active support through provision of various facilities as requested by the
International Coalition.
The Pakistani role in the ‘War against Terrorism’ related to Afghanistan, whether it is
action within Pakistan including Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), believed to
have become a sanctuary for forces fighting against International Coalition and Afghan
Government forces in Afghanistan, or support for them in Afghanistan, or against extremist
religious forces providing training or other kinds of support for terrorism in the rest of the
world is both criticized and appreciated. At best it is suspected. Suspected, mistrusted or
appreciated, everyone agrees Pakistan’s role to be crucial in the ‘War against Terrorism’ in
Afghanistan as well as Muslim religious militancy and extremism that breeds terrorism
elsewhere. The suspicion is fuelled both by the fact of a continued open expression of praise
for the bygone Taliban rule and a very discernible sympathy towards them even now, not just
in Islamist circles, but also in the Islamabad-based official intelligentsia as well as statements
of government officials.
There have been a number of studies on Pakistan in recent years. Hussain Haqqani1 and
Hasan Abbas2 have explained and described Pakistan’s drift towards extremism and
militarism with a clear and excellent grip on facts and concepts. Stephen Cohen3 made a

1
Haqqani., Hussain, Pakistan: Between Military and Mosque, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,
Washington, 2005
2
Abbas., Hasan, Pakistan’s Drift into Extremism – Allah, the Army and America’s War on Terrorism,
Pntagon Press, 2004
3
Cohen., Stephen, The Idea of Pakistan, Brookings Institution Press, Washington, 2004
xiv Ijaz Khan

good effort to help understand the state and idea of Pakistan as well as on the Pakistan Army.
Lawrence Ziring’s study of Pakistan is considered a must read for its balanced treatment of
Pakistan’s historical development and its politics4. Ayeha Siddiqua Agha5 has written in
depth about Pakistan’s military both recently and earlier, bringing to the fore many hitherto
known yet taboo subjects. Both her books look at the economic dimensions of military
control of the Pakistani state. Hasan Askari Rizvi6 has dealt with the role of military in
Pakistani politics with an unrivalled insight and understanding. Even if the works of Haqqani,
Abbas and Ayesha can be termed as very liberal treatments of their subjects, they still take a
unitary centrist viewpoint. These studies while covering different angles of their subject take
a unitary view of Pakistan considering it to be a rational actor. There have been a number of
other works highlighting various aspects of the ‘enigma called Pakistan’. Yet there is a need
to further look into this enigma.
They are mostly descriptive studies or analysis of decisions as if they were the only
options available. They mostly study what has been the policy and how it has been executed
or at most why they were taken. They at best treat the questions “What?” and “Why?” None
of them deals with the question of “How?” Even if most of them answer the question partially
and indirectly. It is how decisions are made that helps better understand a policy. It is argued
that decisions are made not taken. Those who finally announce the decisions have much less
role personally than is mostly realized even by those individuals themselves. The current
study is an attempt to answer the question of how Pakistani Foreign Policy is made.
To answer the question how, this study develops an understanding of the ‘Strategic
Culture’ of Pakistan. The essential ingredients of this ‘Strategic Culture’ are: India is the
source of security threats that has never accepted the creation of Pakistan and will do
everything possible to undo it; Islam is the basis for Pakistan’s existence and a useful
protection; United States, Peoples Republic of China and Saudi Arabia are states on whose
right side Pakistan must always be. By applying an adaptation of Prof. Karl Deutsch’s three
streams of information model, different inputs into the decision-making process, the gradual
development of a particular ‘Strategic Culture’, and mindset is traced. It is this ‘Strategic
Culture’, and a particular mindset that makes Pakistani Foreign Policy responses and not
some well thought out system of decision-making weighing different options. To be correct,
‘Strategic Culture’ develops and exists in every society, but that work in certain systems,
especially in democratic societies there is popular as well as educated and academic debate
and independent inputs and analysis of different policy responses to events or policies of
others. This is what makes democracy a better, even if admittedly not an ideal system of
decision-making. In Pakistan, policy responses come out of this mindset, with strong
individuals at particular times giving them some personal style.
This study using Pakistan’s Afgan policy decision after 9/11 helps in developing an
understanding of Pakistan’s foreign policy and role in the ‘War against Terrorism’, thus also
explaining why Pakistan’s role is still so controversial. Significantly, it is a non-centrist view

4
Ziring., Lawrence, Pakistan: at the Crosscurrent of History, Oxford University Press, 2003
5
Agha., Ayesha Sadiqua, Pakistan’s Arms Procurement and Military Build–up, 1979 – 1999; In Search of a
Policy, Sang–e–Meel Publications, Lahore, 2003. Military Incorporated: Inside Pakistan Military’s
Political Economy, Oxford University Press, Karachi, 2007
6
Rizvi., Hasan Rizvi, Military, State and Society in Pakistan, Lahore, Sang–e–Meel Publishers, 2003.
 Introduction xv

unlike most of the literature present or related to the subject of the study. It shows to those
interested in understanding Pakistan a view from the one of the pluralities of Pakistan and it
emphasizes that Pakistan is made of many. In that sense it claims to be a different look at
quite a popular subject today, that is the ‘War against Terrorism’ and Pakistan’s role in it. It
also in the process brings to the fore Pashtun politics, who straddle the Durand Line (Pakistan
Afghanistan Border), issues in Federally Administered Tribal Areas, Pakistan’s identity, as
well as democracy issues and the role of religion and military in Pakistan.
The study is divided into six chapters. Chapter one titled, “Studying Pakistan’s Strategic
Culture and Foreign Policy” lays down the theoretical basis for it. It provides the
understanding of Strategic Culture as used in the study. It explains the main postulate of the
decision-making approach to the study of Foreign Policy, which is the way decisions are
made determines what they are. Taking a pluralist view of human political organization at
various levels, the approach identifies multiple inputs into the decision-making process of a
country which are grouped under three broad headings; 1) Memory 2) External Environment
and 3) State’s domestic. It also develops a basic introduction to Pakistan’ foreign policy
decision-making system
Chapter two, titled “The Making of Pakistan’s Pro Taliban Afghan Policy: 1994-
Septemebr 2001” identifies the inputs into Pakistan’s foreign policy decision to support
Taliban when they emerged in 1994. The historical, external as well as domestic sources for
that particular choice are identified and studied. It is argued that the memory filled with a
threat perception from India, Afghanistan’s alliance with India since 1947 and its irredentist
claims over Pakistani territory, the postcolonial nature of the Pakistani State, its relations with
United States during the Cold War, combined with the more recent additions to the state
memory from Pakistan’s support to Afghan resistance in the 1980s to fill Pakistan’s memory
and make it perceive its relations with Afghanistan in a specific manner. The US, especially
International energy and routes politics, and the regional power game fought in Afghanistan
between Iran, Central Asia and India provided the external context and push for this
particular Pakistani decision. Pakistan’s internal power dynamics and an uneven institutional
growth which had resulted in control of Pakistani politics generally and its security policy
especially concerning Afghanistan, Kashmir and Nuclear programme by its Military. Another
significant feature of this development was the emergence and growth of a Military –
Religious groups nexus. All these various inputs combined in 1984 in the making of
Pakistan’s policy to support.
The third Chapter titled “Pakistan’s Afghan Policy Shift: Response to the War on
Terrorism” discusses making of the change in Pakistan’s pro – Taliban Afghan policy. This
Chapter describes in some detail the international system with United States at its center.
Then it goes on to discuss how Pakistan that had ignored the inputs from the International
system due to a stagnant domestic decision-making process inability to correctly see the
growing international intolerance of terrorism and thus its policy of continued support for
Taliban became unsustainable after 9/11. This chapter argues that due to the unbalanced
domestic decision-making process Pakistan landed in a the least maneuverable diplomatic
position and so had to yield to US pressure and take what has been described as a ‘U – Turn’.
The decision to become US ally in the ‘War against Terrorism’ was a result of external inputs
combining with those internal inputs that had been arguing for a change in Pakistan’s Afghan
xvi Ijaz Khan

policy, as well as the personality of President Gen. Musharraf worked together to out number
and balance those elements of the decision-making elite that wanted to continue with the
earlier policy.
Chapter four, titled “Impact of Pakistan’s Changed Afghan Policy on the Region”,
analyses the impact of Pakistan’s changed foreign policy on its regional environment. The
argument is that Pakistan’s changed decision has created a diplomatic room for it, however,
to get real and long term advantage from that room would depend on the the capability of its
diplomacy and foreign policy decision-making.
Chapter five, titled “Pakistan’s Domestic Foreign Policy Debate in the Post September 11
era” records and analyses the debate generated by Pakistan’s post 9/11 Afghan policy
decision. Three main divisions are identified 1) Pakistani Nationalists 2) Religious and 3)
Liberal. The chapter also identifies the implications of this policy change for Pakistan’s
decision-making process. This chapter also deals with the issues rising out of Pakistan’s post
9/11 Afghan Policy and addresses the issue of religious parties strenfthened showing in
general elections of 2002 as well as the situation in FATA.
Chapter six, which concludes the study is titled, “Conclusions: Towards a Changed
Strategic Culture”. This chapter concludes that the way decisions are taken do affect the
decisions. It is inputs that determine the outputs. Strategic Culture of Pakistan is a result of
inputs from a particular interpretation of history, an India centric view of the international
and regional environment and military dominance of decision-making. This chapter argues
that Strategic Culture is not permanent and unchangeable. It then identifies where and how to
change, the memory, deal with the external environment and reform the domestic decision-
making system. It identifies the need, for changes in education system /sylabi, thus correcting
the historical misperceptions and ideological induced distortions, for democratic decision-
making system based on the plural existance and a system of educated and independent
inputs and a pragmatic and proactive forward looking foreign policy.
Chapter 1

STUDYING PAKISTAN’S STRATEGIC

CULTURE AND FOREIGN POLICY

Theory provides coherence and direction to a study. The purpose of theory is to explain
why a particular phenomenon occurs. Foreign policy studies mostly try to answer the
questions “why” and “what”. Among many different ways to answer these questions, one
very significant method is trying to answer the question “how”. It is argued that the why and
what of foreign policy decisions are mainly dependent on how they are made. It is referred to
as the ‘Decision–Making Approach’. Most theories having originated and developed in the
west are based on and addresses, the experiences and needs of the developed western state.
Broadly speaking, the modern state also referred to as the ‘Westphalian State’ has similar
basic characteristics irrespective of location. However, people living within those states and
by those principles vary in history, culture, religion and outlook. Thus any student of
behaviour of any specific state, while using general IR theories, must keep the peculiarities of
the given state in view. They must also keep in sight the type of state, its developmental level
and cultural and historical ethos while applying a theory to it. This brings us to another
approach and that is the study of ‘strategic culture’ or ‘culturist approach’7. It is simply
argued that different states would react to the same set of events differently. Rationality is
relevant and what appears as a rational choice in one culture may seem totally irrational in
another. So, it is vital for understanding of behaviour of particular state to understand its
‘strategic culture’. There are many definitions of ‘strategic culture’, however, for the
purposes of this work being a policy study, Colin Gray’s treatment is considered more
appropriate, who writes, “modes of thought and action with respect to [force], derived from

7
Alastair Iain Johnston, “Thinking about Strategic Culture,” International Security 19, No. 4 1995, pp. 36–
39; Alastair Iain Johnston, Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Ming China,
Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1995; Peter J. Katzenstein, Cultural Norms and National
Security: Police and Military in Postwar Japan Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1996; Thomas
U. Berger, Cultures of Antimilitarism: National Security in Germany and Japan Baltimore, Md.: Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1998; Ken Booth and Russell Trood, eds., Strategic Cultures in the Asia-
Pacific Region New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1998; and John S. Duffield, World Power Forsaken:
Political Culture, International Institutions, and German Security Policy after Unification Stanford,
Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1998.
2 Ijaz Khan

perception of national historical experience, aspiration for self-characterization, and from

state-distinctive experiences.”8 Also a very relevant definition for our purposes is the one
given by Alastair Lain Johnston, “different predominant strategic preferences rooted in early
formative experiences of state, influenced to some degree by philosophical, political, cultural,
and cognitive characteristics of state and its elites.”9 Still more helpful is the definition given
by a Pakistani Political Scientist defines ‘Strategic Culture” as, a collectivity of beliefs,
norms, values and historical experiences of the dominant elite in a polity that influences their
understanding and interpretation of security issues and environment, and shapes their
responses to these.”10
This study of Pakistan’s foreign policy attempts to explain its subject through developing
an understanding of its strategic culture. That understanding is in turn developed through an
adaptation of Karl Deutsch’s (1912–1992)11 the three streams of inputs, or information as he
puts it, in foreign policy making.
According to Deutsch, Foreign Policy Decision–making is a continuous process of
“mixing, blending, analysing, and selective use of the contents of three separate streams of
information. One of these is the stream of messages from the outside world; the second is the
stream from the actor’s own system and resources; the third is the stream of messages
recalled from memory. Any autonomous (self governing) system, therefore, must contain
within itself three operative information–processing structures (we might say ‘receptors’,
‘channels,’ and the like) with which to do the job that combining and balancing these streams
require.”12 The external environment limits the whole domestic process based on memory and
the existing system. The essential function for successful foreign policy decision (successful
from the point of view of the state concerned) is a correct assessment of the limits available
in the international arena and the capability of the state of pursuing those decisions. A
contradiction between the internal decisional outcome and the limitations the international
system imposes, results in crisis and conflict, both within and without states. The crisis
Pakistan is faced with after the post 9/11 ‘Policy U–Turn’ is one glaring and very obvious
example of such a scenario.
“In the real world, neither a regime nor a whole state is a unitary actor unit. Both are
fluctuating, only partially stabilised patterns of individual human beings performing
interacting, often interdependent, and partially conflicting roles. Each individual is pursuing a
personal equilibrium, just as each responsible leader is trying to harmonise domestic with

8
Colin Gray, “National Styles in Strategy: The American Example,” International Security 6, no. 2, Fall
1981
9
Alastair Iain Johnston, "Thinking About Strategic Culture," International Security, 19, Spring 1995.
10
Askari Rizvi, “Pakistan’s Strategic Culture,” Chap 12 in South Asia in 2020: Future Strategic Balances and
Alliances Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2002, 307.
11
Prof. Dr. Karl. Deutsch taught International Relations at Massachusetts Institute of Technology before
joining Harvard as Professor of Government. He wrote extensively during his illustrious academic
career. Prof. Deutsch authored 14 books and hundreds of scholarly articles. His main books include
especially relevant to this study are, The Nerves of Government: Models of Political Communication
and Control Free Press, New York, 1963, and The Analysis of International Relations Prentice Hall,
New Jersey 1968.
12
Deutsch., 1968, p. 81.
 Studying Pakistan’s Strategic Culture and Foreign Policy 3

external changes, argue issues as she or he sees them, apply whatever leverages can be
brought into play, and look for help (allies) from what ever corner.”13

INPUTS IN THE DECISION–MAKING PROCESS OF PAKISTAN

This section introduces and explains the three inputs identified by Karl Deutsch or as he
puts it ‘streams of information’ in the decision–making system of Pakistan; a) Memory of
Historical Inputs b) the Inputs from International System, and c) Domestic Systemic Inputs
with reference to Pakistan.

Memory

According to Karl Deutsch,14 “Decision–making is a process of combining new

information with old memories. When an event is reported, requiring a response, the decision
maker starts with the information he already has. An important influence is the manner and
wordings used for the initial report, which in turn depends on the person of the reporter as
well as the institution he belongs to. This information is stored in different places. These
memories are stored in the minds of heads of states, high officials and ruling elites as well as
in the numerous minds of the members of the state’s politically relevant social strata. The
crucial framework or boundaries are provided by memories stored in the minds of the entire
population; in their cultural, ethical and social values and beliefs. These stores of words and
images and cultural and moral preferences may imply important biases and predispositions
toward certain kinds of responces to certain kinds of events. Predispositions, of which the
individuals concerned, may not often be aware until the moment of responding. These
memories are stored in papers, books, and files; in maps, in pictures, monuments, and
libraries; in diplomatic reports and policy memoranda; in staff plans for war; in the records of
governmental bureaus and of business organisations; in laws and in treaties. These historical
inputs determining the perceptions of the decision makers also influence who is at the
position of influencing the decision–making process more.”
Pakistani decision makers’ memories are filled by their recollection of the freedom
movement, which was more of an anti-Hindu than anti-British Colonial Movement. This
memory is shaped by the belief that Hindus had never accepted the partition of India in 1947,
and thus may do whatever to undo that. This fed the security threat perception from India.
This has led to the Military domination of decision-making in Pakistan.
The use of Islam by the Pakistani state establishment to mobilise opinion in favour of
Afghan resistance in the 1980s and then its use by the religious political parties to oppose the
decision of the government of Gen. Pervaiz Musharraf to join the ‘War Against Terrorism’ in
Afghanistan are some very obvious examples. The uses of human rights rhetoric by the

13
North., Robert C., War, Peace Survival: Global Politics and Conceptual Synthesis, Westview, San
Francisco, 1990, p. 83
14
Deutsch., 1968, p. 82–96.
4 Ijaz Khan

western countries, especially, United States or that of social and economic justice by the
Soviet bloc, during the cold war, are some of the examples that can be cited readily.
Memory both limits and guides the actions of states. States always, and it is natural of
them, attempt to popularise their decisions and find justifications in national interest as well
as on moral and the so–called ideological grounds. Normally a policy made through a process
of debate and open discussion reflecting a national consensus may not require a subsequent
decision that is inconsistent with decisions made in the past. However, if due to a variety of
reasons a state needs to change policy, then it becomes a much more difficult task. History is
for states as habits are for individuals. Just like an individual tends to repeat what he/she has
been doing over a period of time out of necessity, even when the necessity is no more, states
too find it easier and decision makers being human tend to pick responses they are familiar
with rather than trying something new.

Inputs from the International System

The understanding of the state as a complex and plural human organisation leads to
looking at the International System as that of ‘Complex Interdependence’ with multiple
channels of communication. “Multiple channels connect societies, including: informal ties
between governmental elites as well as formal foreign office arrangements: informal ties
among nongovernmental elites (face to face arrangements and through telecommunications);
and transnational organisations (such as multinational banks or corporations). These channels
can be summarised as interstate, trans–governmental and transnational relations.”15
International system is a function of state capabilities, actions, and interactions, and
strictly speaking, individual national leaders are the ultimate authoritative deciders and actors
on the international systemic level. These leaders, the national chief executives perform a
very crucial function i.e. the two-way linking of domestic and international events. States
through mutual interaction continuously shape and re–shape the International System, which
in turn constrains and influences the behaviour of individual states, influencing their foreign
policy decision–making process and final decisions.16 Pakistan link with that international
system was a leadership that mainly emigrated from the Hindu Majority areas of united India,
thus the fear of a Hindu majority played a vital role in shaping the Pakistani state’s
perceptions of India, Soviet Union and United States as well as the Muslim World.
Pakistan’s regional and international environment and the security threat perceptions
from India limited her options in 2001 to a deterministic level. On the one side Pakistan little
if any choice but to abandon Taliban on the other hand provided her with opportunities and a
bargaining power, both in 1978–79 and 2001. In 1978–79 Pakistan was able to reject the
initial offer economic aid from US and peanuts. In 2001 Pakistan has been able to use US for
relieving pressures on her southern borders with India as well as getting a reasonably good
aid package for her ailing economy.

15
Keohane., Robert O., Power and Interdependence, Little Brown, Boston, 1977, pp. 23 – 27 at 24.
16
North., Robert C., 1990 p. 102
 Studying Pakistan’s Strategic Culture and Foreign Policy 5

Inputs from the Domestic System

Decisions may be reached as victorious or compromise outcomes in a clash of virtually

independent, equal, and hostile actors (representing factions, interests, institutions, or
bureaucratic segments) in the decision–making process. Decisions may evolve as the
unconsciously coordinated outcomes of the activities of independent entities/groups with
separate spheres of influence. Decisions may be the final determinations of one heroic,
authoritative, or tyrannical sovereign who has received applications, petitions, and advice.
Decisions may be reached as the result of a coalition of chieftains, a collection of virtually
independent, equal, partly cooperative sovereignties, largely enough to override rivals
without serious clash. Or decisions may be reached as the result of an executive’s
construction of a consensus, an “executive Centreed ‘grand coalition of coalitions’: the later
patterns seem more likely to produce stable, adaptable, coherent policies than the former.”17
Decisions are a response to demands. These demands come from various sources.
Demands represent the interests of those making them. Hence, decisions are a response to
interests articulated by various interest groups. The descriptive question here is what groups
are articulating interests, voicing and transmitting these from the individual and private sector
of the political culture into the public sector of political life. These include: i) Individuals
ii) Anomic groups iii) Non–associational groups iv) Institutional groups v) Associational
groups and vi) Specialised mass–media structures.
Thus, one procedure for comparative study is to ask of each polity which kinds of actors
articulate interests, and which kinds have primacy in interest articulation? While a large
variety of groups and interests articulate their views on the same subject, only one, or more
probably a combination of, a compromise of some is successful and thus get converted into
authoritative policies. Each interest group faces a competition from other interests, new or
entrenched, active or potential, and the success of its demands depends on the total process of
interest aggregation, decision–making making, and implementation.18

i) Individual articulators are those who try to influence the decision makers at various
levels for personal and private interests. Those seemingly personal and private
interests may have bearings on larger policy issues, knowingly or unknowingly. This
is mostly but not exclusively, the case in less developed states, with
institutionalisation of political, bureaucratic or social values at an earlier stage.
ii) Anomic interest groups are unorganised mobs and riots, more or less spontaneous
expressions of grief or protest, quickly rising and usually quickly subsiding. It is, of
course, understandable that many riots and demonstrations, in reality, deliberately
provoked by organised groups. Particularly where elements of a society lack
organised groups or do not have adequate representation of their interests by such
groups, as are present, smouldering discontent may be sparked by an incident or by
the emergence of a leader and may suddenly explode in unpredictable and
uncontrollable ways. A case of reference may be, the emergence of Zulfiqar Ali

17
Wilkinson David O., Comparative Foreign Relations: Framework and Methods, Dickenson Publishing
Company, California, 1969, p. 115.
18
ibid. p. 115-117
6 Ijaz Khan

Bhutto19, on the Pakistani political scene in 1967, giving expression to popular

discontent with the rising prices, dictatorship, and the popular belief that President
Ayub Khan had lost the 1965 war with India on the negotiating table at Tashkent,20
which Pakistan had won, according to popular belief, on the battleground. That
popular movement had far reaching consequences for decision–making, as it
impacted both, the sociological and political map, of Pakistan tremendously.
iii) Non–associational Interest Groups are also distinguished like the anomic groups by
the absence of any specialised organisation. However, such groups differ from
anomic interest groups because they are based in commonly perceived interests of
race, language, religion, region, occupation, and class and even in kinship and
lineage. Examples include ethnic, regional, cultural, religious, sectarian, class, and
various occupational or professional groups. There may be some groups organised
on the basis of representing them, but all members may not belong to these groups.
Mutahida Qaumi Movement (United National Movement) (MQM) claims to
represent the interests of those immigrants who came to Pakistan after partition in
1947, does not have all members of that community as its members. The same can be
said of the various nationalist parties of various ethnic groups in Pakistan or for that
matter elsewhere. The point is that these organised ethnic groups are not the only
expression of the interests and attitudes of these communities. What is meant by
some shared influences arising out of belonging to one or other of these groups is the
influence of such belonging on the individual member’s views and attitudes. It is
practically impossible to organise the whole of these groups in associations. The
group may largely remain unorganised, and its interests only intermittently
articulated through individuals, anomic subgroups, informal delegations, and the
like. Gen. Fazle Haq, Martial Law Administrator and governor of North West
Frontier Province of Pakistan, was an important member of the ruling clique around
the military ruler Gen. Zia–Ul–Haq, opposed the construction of Kalabagh Dam.21
One explanation of his position is the fact of his being a member of the ethnic non–
associational interest group of Pashtuns. Additionally, he was member of the
geographic non–associational interest group, that is, he belonged to District Mardan,
one of the districts that might have been affected by the construction of the dam.

Institutional Interests Groups are found within such organisations as corporations,

legislatures, armies, and bureaucracies. Except for the degree of formal organisation, the
characteristics of these groups are somewhat like those of the face–to–face kinship and

19
Raza., Rafi, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and Pakistan: 1967-1977, Oxford University Press, Karachi, 1997, pp. 9-
13.
20
Soviet Union sponsored treaty of peace between Pakistani and Indian leaders at Tashkent after the 1965
war between the two neighbours.
21
Kalabagh Dam is a proposed Dam whose huge water reservoir may perceptions inundate the plain areas of
North West Frontier Province, especially Nowshera, Swabi, Mardan and Charssada districts, according
to the perceptions of most of the political parties based in these districts these areas would either drown
or become waterlogged due to rise of water level, and so are opposed to its construction. Awami
National Party (ANP) is in the forefront of opposition to the Dam. Read Ziauddin., M. ‘Kalabagh Dam -
its Economy, History and Politics’ Daily Dawn 24 July 2000
 Studying Pakistan’s Strategic Culture and Foreign Policy 7

lineage groups. Other networks of social interaction are used to provide an organisational
basis that can be pressed into service and may provide a common interest in articulating
demands in the political arena. Institutional interest groups, either as whole institutional
structures or as subgroups, are likely to be quite powerful because of resources and access
provided by their organisational basis. The tendency of governmental officials to expand their
organisations through the discovery of new problems and policies is common throughout the
world.
In authoritarian regimes, where other types of groups are more or less directly prohibited
or controlled by the central institutions, institutional groups become even more important. In
less developed political systems, where associational groups are limited in number or are
ineffective, a more prominent part is played by military groups, and powerful bureaucracies.
This specially is the case in the postcolonial states like Pakistan. The inability of the weak
civil society to effectively balance the power of the powerful, deeply entrenched colonial
bureaucracies, both civil and military has resulted into the near to total domination of the
decision–making process by these bureaucracies. In foreign policy generally, and in its
security aspects specially, military has a complete control over decision–making.22
Associational Interest groups include general purpose organisations that are political
parties and the specialised structures established specifically to represent specific groups, for
example, trade unions, ethnic associations, organisations for particular political causes, such
as women rights, human rights or civic reforms. They play an important role in influencing
the final outcomes of a decision–making process. Due to their organised nature and more
focussed goals, they have an advantage over larger unorganised non–associational groups.
Political parties’ role in decision–making varies according to the state one is looking at.
In states with mature and assertive civil societies they control or balance the state monopoly
of decision–making. They are the systemic tools for non–state inputs into the decision–
making process.23 Their role in decision–making, especially foreign policy decision–making
decreases when one is looking at a less developed state. Their status in the decision–making
process of a state reflects the state/society relations in a given state. Political parties at times
give direction and voice to anomic interest groups, especially in third world states. In
postcolonial states, where one or more of them had led the freedom struggle enjoy a special
status. However, due to the lesser level of maturity of civil society, this revolves more around
individual leaders. Their ability to match the controlling ability of the uniformed and non–
uniformed bureaucracy is greatly hampered. This results in an unbalanced and uneven growth
of state society relations.
There are various actors involved in any decision–making system. The role of these
actors varies from state to state. The bare structural models of most states may be similar to a
large extent. However, in substance there may be great variety. That variety is the result of
culture including political culture, historical experiences, belief systems and the international

22
Waseem Mohammad, ‘The Dialectics between Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy’, in Pakistan;
Nationalism without a Nation?, Editor Christophe Jafferlot, Manmohar, New Delhi, 2002, pp. 263-282
at p.264
23
Almond Gabriel A., & Powell G. Bingham., Comparative Politics, Little Brown New York, 1987. Also
read Wilkinson David O., Comparative Foreign Relations: Framework and Methods, Dickenson
Publishing Company, California, 1969.
8 Ijaz Khan

and regional environment. One needs an identification of those actors in the state system, and
their relative strengths and influence in the decision–making process, which varies from state
to state, to be able to correctly analyse the decisions and decision–making process of a given
state.

Understanding Pakistan’s Strategic Culture

The Pakistani State has its own peculiar strategic culture developed and shaped by its
history, religion, socioeconomic conditions, geography, demographic composition and its
international alignment with the West during the cold war, giving Pakistani foreign policy a
specific orientation and thus creating a response system. This particular international
alignment becoming a part of its memory, influencing the state society relations, has played
an important role in determining the relative strengths of inputs in the foreign policy
decision–making process of Pakistan. The formal institutions and processes are reflective of
these influences as, in fact, they are everywhere.

Memory
History, culture, religion, ethnic composition, socio–economic class divisions have an
impact on the growth of individual as well as group interest formation and aggregation. “As
conventional wisdom has it, the more democratic a political system is, the more its ruling
elite is influenced by public opinion, and, therefore, the more representative of national
aspirations is public policy. The typical examples of this model are drawn from Western
democracies. Conversely, the more authoritarian a State is, the greater is the concentration of
decision–making power in the hands of the ruling elite which is typically shielded from the
deterministic influence of the public opinion.”24 Due to Pakistan’s chequered constitutional
history punctuated by three military governments, the country’s memory has shaped the
system of decision–making in such a manner where policy input into the business of State
from public at large is somewhat limited. The feudal socio–economic structure of Pakistani
society has also contributed to the unbalanced decision–making process in Pakistan.
The way the British Government at Delhi perceived the role of Russia in terms of its
southward expansion in the context of the Asian geopolitical system, during the late
nineteenth century substantively influenced the worldview of the State of Pakistan after 1947.
On the eve of departure, the British argued that future Pakistan is ideally situated as a
bulwark against Soviet Communism. This argument strongly influenced the strategic thinking
of the emergent State. All this pointed to the continuity of the old institutional ways of
handling diplomatic issues without recourse to eliciting public opinion.25 The role of
religious slogans to popularise the movement for Pakistan, the threat perceptions from India
and the cold war alignment with United States of America has all combined to create a
certain outlook shaping the contours of Pakistan’s strategic culture.
Pakistan movement, more of an anti Hindu than anti colonial struggle, gave two basic
directions to Pakistan’s international posturing; balancing perceived Indian regional

24
Waseem Mohammad, 2002, pp. 263-282 at p.263
25
ibid. p. 278.
 Studying Pakistan’s Strategic Culture and Foreign Policy 9

hegemony and an identity based in religion. Religion has become a source of contradictory
pulls in pulling the interests of the State of Pakistan at times at odds with its so–called
ideological basis. These have become the two basic International postures and are the
essential deterministic ingredients of Pakistani state memory.
Becoming part of the Western Alliance System in the 1950s, then moving closer to
People’s Republic of China in the 1960s and the Muslim Middle East in the 1970s, was
essentially driven by the above mentioned historical inputs (memory). The same foreign
policy orientations helped in shaping Pakistan’s response to the Soviet intervention in
Afghanistan in 1979 and Pakistan’s support to Taliban after 1994.

International Inputs
A hostile India, an assertive and suspicious Iran, an unstable Afghanistan and a major
power, Peoples Republic of China that has been friendly, describe the regional environment
of Pakistan. United States of America, Peoples Republic of China and Saudi Arabia are the
main sources of external support Pakistan has looked at and also a real external influence on
Pakistani Foreign Policy decision–making process. Another significant source of external
influence has been the former Soviet Union and the Russian Federation after its break up (in
a negative sense). Proximity with Central Asia also makes it an attractive destination for
international oil and gas companies also needs to be taken into account to complete
Pakistan’s external environment.
Regional and international system has its own direct and indirect bearing on the
decision–making process of Pakistan. The changed and changing international systemic
processes termed generally as ‘globalisation’ means an increased significance of external
inputs and impact on the decision–making and decision makers.

Domestic Systemic Inputs

Institutionally, Pakistan can be divided into two broad groups; Military and non–
military. Military being a very closed, disciplined and organised body, consists of the three
normal divisions of Ground, Air and Naval forces. There are sub–divisions within all of these
three. Though many other sources of inputs do exist, due to lower level of maturity of
Pakistani civil society, the state apparatus strongly dominates decision-making. Within the
state structure military has clear dominant position. And within the Military, Intelligence
agencies have acquired a very strong role. “The ISI is like the CIA. The CIA is a developed
organisation in a developed state. The ISI is a developed organisation in an underdeveloped
state”26, results in its exaggerated role.
Civilian Bureacracy, the heir to the British colonial ‘Indian Civil Service’, also reffered
to as the ‘steel framework of the British empire’ enjoys a privileged status, and jealously
protects it. Despite attempts to tame it27, it has somehow survived with its elite status and
pivotal role in decision-making. Though it must be acknowledged, after 1947, it quickly

26
Yasmin., Samina, “Pakistan's Cautious foreign policy”, ‘Survival’ the International Institute of
Strategic Studies (IISS) Quarterly, London, Summer, 1994 p.132
27
Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto introduced widespread administrative reforms in the Civil Bureaucracy
in 1973 as well as sent home 1300 bureaucrats on corruption charges and President Gen. Musharraf
10 Ijaz Khan

accepted the upper hand of the military. This tendency and more important ability to maintain
its position has direct bearing on the overall administrative, constitutional, political and (un)
democratic development of Pakistan. In the post 9/11 era, when Federally Administered
Tribal Areas (FATA) have become a strategic battleground in the ‘War against Terrorism’, it
has been able to convince the military of the usefulness of the special colonial administrative
system for FATA. That system gives unchecked powers to Political Agent. This is despite sea
changes on ground and demands and proposals for change from many different quarters.28
Formally, Pakistan’s foreign policy establishment is represented by a Ministry of Foreign
affairs, headed by a political minister and administratively, by a bureaucrat, called Secretary,
ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Ministry has a number of directorates, each headed by a
director general, for countries, regions and issues. At all these levels there is supporting staff
and assistants, who also play an important role in the working of the ministry. As foreign
relations are not confined to the traditional issues of political relations between states alone,
therefore, other ministries dealing with other aspects of state activity also have an interest in
the working of the foreign ministry. Ministries of Defence, of Commerce and Trade and of
Petroleum are some with crucial role in the decisions and decision–making in foreign policy
areas. All these ministries have interests in foreign policy almost in all states; however, in
Pakistan the Defense Ministry plays a dominating role. However, interestingly and rather
peculiarly, one must also note, the ministry of Interior played a more conspicuous role in
Pakistan’s Afghan Policy when Maj. Gen. Naseerullah Babar, was the Interior Minister
(1993–1996). A special unit called Afghan Trade Cell was established in the ministry to deal
with Pakistan’s Afghan Policy that dealt with Afghanistan, more specifically Taliban in their
initial stages. Other ministries also may at times have serious stakes in foreign policy issues.
Besides these ministries, the military, its three branches, Army, Air force and Navy and a
number of intelligence agencies are important actors of the foreign policy making process.
The army and intelligence agencies, especially Inter Services Intelligence (ISI), have a very
pronounced and dominating role in the whole process.
Constitutionally speaking, the cabinet headed by the prime minister, has the final
authority over the foreign ministry, which is headed by the foreign minister. Parliament has a
very limited role in decision–making through the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs
(Both, National Assembly or the lower house and Senate, the upper house, has their own
separate committees). The 17th amendment to the Constitution provided for the creation of a
National Security Council and National Assembly through a bill established it on 7 April
2004.29 This council, which formalises the informal military input into decision–making at
the highest level is a new addition as of 2004. So, how it is going to play its role in decision–
making is yet to be seen. One thing is clear, being headed by the President rather than the
Prime Minister; it further reduces the powers of a directly elected prime minister and thus his
or her role in decision–making. There is no political culture of debating and questioning the
government on most foreign policy issues in the parliament, nor does the constitution provide
any controlling role to the parliament in the area of foreign relations. The cabinet may

introduced very fundamental changes in 2002 through introduction of the system of local government,
however, despite complaints, the bureaucracy remains deeply entrenched and privileged.
28
For more details read below the section of FATA in Chapter 5 below
29
Daily The News Islamabad, 8 April 2004
 Studying Pakistan’s Strategic Culture and Foreign Policy 11

undertake any international commitments, sign or ratify any treaty without any constitutional
requirements to inform the parliament, let alone seek its approval. However, the foreign
minister does give an overall foreign policy brief to the parliament, at least once a year.
Parliamentary groups may also raise some foreign policy issue that has caught the popular
eye. However, the parliament is largely uninvolved in foreign policy decision–making. A
very significant element of the weak parliamentary role is the lack of any debate on the
defence related parts of the annual budget, when it is presented to it for debate and approval.
The role of Individuals has been made more prominent by the feudal nature of Pakistani
society. Their ability to influence the final outcome of the decision–making process is more
pronounced than can be possible in states with developed institutional structures. History of
Pakistan’s foreign policy decision-making is replete with examples of strong individuals
leaving a larger than life imprint on the decisions. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, Zia–Ul–Haq and
Naseer Ullah Babar are some of the obvious examples.
Anomic groups do assert themselves on some of the more popular issues from time to
time, and limit the ability of the top decision makers to take some crucial decisions. Kashmir
or recognition of Israel are issues on which any policy innovation can face strong resistance.
However, when the decision makers have really felt pressed they have taken decisions in total
disregard for any popular opinion. Support for British during the Suez crisis in the 1950s or
the recent changes in Afghan or Kashmir policies can be cited as some of the examples. One
must quickly point out another explanation for the role of public opinion and the anomic
group interest articulation that may be created and controlled by the establishment itself. So
when they do not want to do something they can take the shelter of fear of public opposition.
The use of fear of popular opposition to sending troops to Iraq recently as one of the reasons
not to send troops there without UN mandate can be cited as glaring example of such a use or
abuse of public opinion. Similar is the excuse given when asked to do more in the ‘War
against Terrorism’.
The role of non–associational interest groups is significant, given, broadly speaking,
the weaknesses in the associational articulation of interests and policy positions of the civil
society. The impact of ethnic, provincial or sectarian identities as well as that of various
professional and class on stands their individual articulators may take at whichever level of
decision–making its members may be is important. The sectarian considerations do have an
impact on Pakistan’s relations with Iran and Saudi Arabia, while ethnic considerations have
left its imprint on Pakistan’s Afghan policy.
Society is divided both in vertical and parallel directions. Centre province divide is
supplemented and at times cress crossed by ethnic divide. Though 98% of the population is
Muslim, there are sectarian differences within Muslims. There is the divide between different
economic classes and interests. Dominated by agriculturists and feudal social structure, an
increasingly assertive urban middle class, and industrial and trading interests are making
themselves felt thus creating another contradiction. The civil society is represented by large
number of political parties, interest and cause based lobbies, (organised in Non Governmental
Organisations, Trade and other professional organisations, as well as in informal non
organised manner).
There is a nominal academic input into the process as well, as a few think tanks do exist
focusing on foreign policy issues. Besides, there are six Area Study Centres, six Departments
12 Ijaz Khan

of International Relations and one Department of Strategic Studies at various public sector
universities. Their relationship with and input in the policy making process is, however,
minimal. Lack of democratic culture and critical thinking and writing, a result of political
order justifying its existence by appeals to emotionalism and religious rhetoric with a false
sense of patriotism, forbids any fresh thinking in any policy area.
Political parties have generally a weaker position in the decision–making process in
Pakistan. This weakness is sustained and compounded by the absence of any significant role
for parliament in foreign policy decision–making, as it is parliament where they can assert
their control. However, role of some political parties, both as sources of inputs into the
decision–making process and more importantly as means of implementation of policy
decisions must be acknowledged. There are ethnic, regional, religious, secular societal groups
also active for influencing Pakistan’s foreign policy decisions. Though one must note, some
political parties at times do play a more important role, as is exemplified by Jamaat–e–Islami
(JI) (Islamic Party) and Jamiat–e–Ulema–e–Islam (JUI) (Party of the scholars of Islam,
[Muslim Clergy]), especially in Afghan policy.
The institutions involved in foreign policy decision–making in Pakistan are Army,
Intelligence Agencies, and Foreign Office. To a much lesser degree, one must acknowledge
the role of public opinion as expressed through political parties [in government or outside it]
and media. The role of research institutes and academia in provision of any real inputs into
decision–making process is negligible. Military and intelligence agencies by far dominate
this process of decision–making. The ability of the [military and intelligence] elite to
influence formation of public opinion further decreases the role of any civil society inputs
into the decision–making process. This particular structure of decision–making is the result of
historical growth of the postcolonial State of Pakistan in a particular manner. The
International and Regional Situation have reinforced this growth.

CONCLUSIONS

While studying the decision–making process of Pakistan, one must search for the loci of
the decision with more care and not take constitutional provisions or formal procedures at
their face value. The role of Army as an institution as much more than any formal
constitutional provisions is a statement that is obvious. However, that institutional role also
may not be enough, the personality of its chief at a given time may be more important; the
personality of its chief at the time General Zia–Ul–Haq attracts a closer look while studying
the use of religious extremists as policy tools in Afghanistan in the 1980s, especially their
ascendancy to partners in decision-making. One must try to take into account the individual
heads of institutions as well as the mutual balance of power between different sources of
input, which would vary from time to time and situation to situation. The centralized nature
of Pakistani state and the dominance of Army as an institution of both the state institutions
and civil society is another important feature and peculiar condition that became more
pronounced during the 1980s. Similarly Pashtun politics becomes more central when one is
looking at Pakistan Afghan policy making. For that the researcher must take cognizance of
the ethnic Pashtuns, of whatever political persuasions, within the institutional as well as
 Studying Pakistan’s Strategic Culture and Foreign Policy 13

political landscape of the state. Unlike the developed world, in Pakistan, like most of the third
world, the lack of institutionalization has to be understood. This requires a correct assessment
of the power co–relation of various interests; power centers, and individuals, institutional as
well as associational and non-associational interest groups. The role of history, that overall
filled the memory of state and society with a threat perception from India, and the religious
basis of the division of India has left a lasting and defining imprint, clearly showing itself in
Pakistan’s handling of its policy towards Afghans and Afghanistan. The India Centric Policy
that landed Pakistan in the US camp during the cold war helped in Pakistan’s easily filling in
the role of the frontline state against Soviet advances in Afghanistan that brought it on
Pakistan’s border and from Western point of view within the striking distance of Middle East
and Oil routes.
The institutions involved in foreign policy decision–making in Pakistan are Army,
Intelligence Agencies, and Foreign Office. To a much lesser degree, one must acknowledge
the role of public opinion as expressed through political parties [in government or outside it]
and media. The role of research institutes and academia in provision of any real inputs into
decision–making process is negligible. Military and intelligence agencies by far dominate
this process of decision–making. The ability of the [military and intelligence] elite to
influence formation of public opinion further decreases the role of any civil society inputs
into the decision–making process. This particular structure of decision–making is the result of
historical growth of the postcolonial State of Pakistan in a particular manner. The
International and Regional Situation have reinforced this growth.
According to Feroz, a Pakistani Army Officer turned academic, “The ascendance of the
military in Pakistan is a direct outcome of its security intensive environment. The Pakistan
military inherited the British tradition: subservient and answerable to the civilian masters,
while still playing a significant role in governance and security. After partition, unlike its
neighbour India, Pakistan's political and security structures took off on quite a different
trajectory. Save for the military, Pakistan never had robust state institutions. Based on its
historical experience over time, certain traits peculiar to the Pakistani nation are discernable.
Pakistanis are extremely proud of their history, culture and traditions. They are always eager
to compete with neighbours and accept challenges much greater than might be handled
objectively. They have a belief in their own self-righteousness. Pakistanis internally have a
penchant to confront state authority and generally distrust government. This is part of a
broader tendency to reject or express scepticism on face-value explanations. Pakistanis are
always searching for conspiracies. These traits, coupled with Pakistan's intrinsic national
insecurity, entwine to form images of self and others.”30
Colonial past, the mixing of local cultural heritage with Islamic religious identity, and the
feudal social structure has created the peculiarity called Pakistani state. Study of foreign
policy decision–making of Pakistan must take cognisance of these influences and inputs.
These factors have played a major role in the pre–eminence of military mind set and thus of
the armed forces as an institution in the decision–making system and keepers of the strategic
culture of this postcolonial state, sometimes referred to as the ‘garrison state’.

30
Khan, Feroz Hasan, “Comparative Strategic Culture: The Case of Pakistan”, Strategic Insights, Volume
IV, Issue 10 Oct 2005. http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/2005/Oct/khan2Oct05.asp
Chapter 2

THE MAKING OF PAKISTAN’S STRATEGIC

CULTURE AND PRO TALIBAN AFGHAN POLICY

Pakistan’s Afghan policy was based on support for Taliban from their emergence in
1994, till it had to be changed in the aftermath of the events of September 11, 2001.
Sympathy towards Taliban, at both the official and unofficial level, has persisted even after
President Gen. Musharraf announced Pakistan’s joining of the War Against Terrorism
declared by United States after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks against United States
of America.
This chapter answers the question how Pakistan’s pro Taliban Afghan policy was made
and sustained? It is argued here that the policy of supporting Taliban (1994–Sept. 2001) was
a logical development of Afghan policy Pakistan had been pursuing since 1947, based in its
strategic culture as it evolved and took a particular shape. The defining elements of
Pakistan’s strategic culture are an India centric threat perception, Islam as a tool of policy and
Military as the guardian of Pakistan’s existence. Based on it, Pakistan’s Afghan policy has
been simply to balance and counter Indian influence in Afghanistan and make Afghanistan
give up her claims over Pakistani territory. Pakistan adopted various Afghan religious groups
opposed to the Afghan government in 1974 and then in 1989 built further on that particular
adoption, to oppose the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. In 1994, this support shifted to
another religious group Taliban. This change was a tactical adjustment rather than a strategic
policy change.
The current chapter studies the making of the particular Pakistani ‘strategic culture’
resulting in the creation or adoption of and persistence of Pakistan’s pro–Taliban Afghan
policy by looking at the inputs from memory, external environment and the domestic system.
The nature of Pakistani state, the broad dominant non associational interests and perceptions
that resulted from the nature of Pakistani state, the role of individual decision makers,
institutional inputs and associational influences, and the regional and international inputs in
the decision–making system are identified and analysed. Within this broader context, the
evolution of Pakistan’s Afghan is studied focusing on Pakistan’s decision to support/prop up
Taliban in 1994 and its continuous support of them in the face of growing international
isolation; thus the persistence of sympathy towards them even after 2001 also becomes clear.
16 Ijaz Khan

PAKISTAN’S STRATEGIC CULTURE

“Politico-military policy-makers do not necessarily make a comprehensive net

assessment of threat based on reality, but often shape their security disposition by their image
of the situation.” This does not imply that security policy dispositions and responses are made
impulsively but in essence from a mix of realism, organizational dynamics, and a backdrop of
a relatively permanent strategic culture. Hasan-Askari Rizvi, a well-respected Pakistani
scholar has defined strategic culture as a collectivity of beliefs, norms, values and historical
experiences of the dominant elite in a polity that influences their understanding and
interpretation of security issues and environment, and shapes their responses to these.
Pakistan is a young nation-state, with a still evolving concept of itself and its role in the
world. In the world of states, it is a teenager—internally struggling with hormones, living in a
bad neighborhood, and still in the process of developing its strategic personality. It has a
well-defined “strategic enclave,” however, which directs the strategic dialogue in the country.
This group is dominated by the military in Pakistan, with the support of professional
bureaucrats, particularly those in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. These individuals are the
keepers of Pakistan’s strategic culture. Like most bureaucracies, they are slow to admit
mistakes, resistant to alternative worldviews, and tend to lean on organizational preferences
when faced with new situations that require change. These inertial forces in policy may give
Pakistan a greater consistency in strategic thought than might be expected given its often
turbulent domestic political situation.”31
Pakistan’s strategic culture is studied by looking at the nature of State and Society of
Pakistan, gradual growth of the role of religion and religious forces in Pakistan’s security
policy, domination of military, its early security issues and threat perceptions, and joining of
the American Camp during the Cold War. This particular strategic culture provided the
context and basis for Pakistan’s Afghan policy that found religious extremists as allies or
tools. The religious justification for its creation, the nature of Pakistan as a post–colonial
/neo–colonial and highly centralised state that defined civil society–state as well as Centre
province relations, threat perceptions from India which helped in military dominance and
neatly fitted Pakistan into the US camp during the cold war all left a clearly identifiable and
lasting mark. It is argued that this particular strategic culture explains a visible continuity in
Pakistan’s Foreign Policy and puts its Afghan policy in context rather than any strategic
planning or policy decisions resulting from either national debate or process.
Threatened by a larger and stronger neighbor, Pakistan had two choices, either capitulate
or stand up. Pakistan’s strategic culture dictated a policy of standing up to balance the threat
that it felt it cannot meet on its own. The choice Pakistan made dictated a policy of seeking
alliances and outside support for its balancing act. It sought that in USA, China and Muslim
countries as well as Islamic movements.32

31
ibid. Also read, Rizvi., Hasan Askari, “Pakistan’s Strategic Culture,” Chapter 12 in South Asia in 2020:
Future Strategic Balances and Alliances Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army
War College, 2002, 307.
32
Lavoy., Peter R., “Pakistan’s Strategic Culture: A Theoretical Excursion”, Strategic Insights, Volume IV,
Issue 10 October 2005.
 The Making of Pakistan’s Strategic Culture and Pro Taliban Afghan Policy 17

Nature of Pakistani State

Pakistan fits the description of a postcolonial state. Postcolonial states, by inheriting the
bureaucratic structures made and trained to suppress the civil society, continue to face the
dilemmas of a conflict over control between the civil society and the military and non
military bureaucracies.
In the case of Pakistan, as in the case of a number of other former colonies, they simply
underwent a process of adjustment and adaptation to the new realities of the world order
which included the Cold War, displacement of the European imperial powers by the strength
and leadership of the United States, the creation of the World Bank and the International
Monetary Fund (IMF), the rise of the giant multinational corporations and the ascendancy of
the liberal agenda of open trade and free markets. Pakistan at the end of British rule in South
Asia was faced with a number of historically specific conditions, which made it particularly
vulnerable to the embrace of the new world imperialism.
A small number of Muslim and British officers from the elite Indian Civil Service (ICS),
the so-called “steel frame” of the British Raj had opted to serve the newly installed
government in Karachi. Similarly, through the division of the colonial army Pakistan
inherited some manpower but little by way of skills, organisation and weaponry. Besides,
there was a severe shortage of funds to finance the administration of the new country, to
rehabilitate millions of refugees, and conduct other functions of the state. Yet it did not take
long for the colonial system of bureaucratic control and authoritarian centralism to reproduce
itself in the new state structure. A primary reason for this outcome was the weakness of the
available political organisation and its roots in the civil society.33
While this process of state formation was taking place, two major interrelated problems
on which there was some consensus between the politicians and bureaucrats, were being
defined and addressed as a top priority. One was the territorial defence of Pakistan and the
other had to do with economic development and industrialisation. The resolution of both
these problems had critical implications for the role of the bureaucracy and the military in the
state, and the dependence of the state on metropolitan capital and assistance versus self-
reliance.

Issues of identity

Pakistan is a state of contending identities. These contentions are operational at two

levels, both parallel and horizontal. At parallel level is the contention emerging from the
religious basis of its creation. There is a debate between those who consider Pakistani
identity to be basically religious, to be more precise, Islamic. They are countered by those
who though agreeing to Muslim identity of Pakistan, argue that being Muslim does not mean
Islamic. They point out to the essentially secular personality of leader of Pakistan movement,

33
Gardezi Hasan, ‘Making of the Neo-Colonial State in South Asia: The Pakistan Experience’ in
Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East, Vol. xvii No. 2 1997 p. 88. For an in
depth study of Pakistani State and its evolution read, Waseem. Mohammad, Politics and the State in
Pakistan, Progressive Publishers, Lahore, 1989.
18 Ijaz Khan

Mr. Mohammad Ali Jinnah. However, both are centrist positions and have found each other
as useful partners against the ethnic/national identity contentions. This has been true at least
till the Gen. Musharraf took over in 1999 generally and more specifically after the post 9/11
2001 change in Pakistani foreign policy. These centrist identities are turn challenged by
regional/provincial and ethnic identities, that include Pashtun, Baloch, Sindhi, Punjabi and
since 1980s the Muhajir (refugee, [refugees from India who came to Pakistan after 1947, not
the Afghan refugees). There are other identities contending for recognition along with these.
They include Saraikis in Punjab, and Barohis in Balochistan and Chitralis, and Hazarawals in
NWFP. The real debate and contest is between the centrist religious based (irrespective of the
debate between the Muslim Nationalist or Islamic fundamentalist stands) and these
ethnic/national contentions that in the opinion of this study has the real potential for a
fundamental change in Pakistan’s strategic culture, decision-making and democratic or
otherwise development. The state of Pakistan characterized by long direct military rules, and
continuous military control, lack of democratic political culture and an immature and weak
civil society had been pursuing a policy of creating a unitary religious based state national
identity of Pakistan by negating the existence of the multi ethnic and plural reality of the
society providing the basis and direction for its worldview.34
Central leadership of Pakistan mainly came from areas that were left on the Indian side of
the partition. More blood had been spilled during partition than for attainment of
independence. The Security perception of this new State was shaped by experiences of
freedom struggle. And for Pakistan freedom struggle was not just the struggle of the people
of India from the British rule, but more significant was the movement of avoiding being ruled
by the Hindu majority in a united and independent India. This religious undertone of Pakistan
movement based on the fears of a Hindu Majority provides the basic point of reference to
Pakistan’s foreign policy through out its existence. This also is the basic contradiction this
nation and state faces till today. Pakistani intellectuals are always at pains to somehow marry
secularism with religion.35 For Pakistani elite during the struggle for Pakistan, the real
opponent was not the British Imperial rule, but Indian National Congress, which they
perceived to represent Hindus. This has made religion to be a central component of State
identity, shaped attitudes and policies towards rest of the world, making India as the focus of
all policy debate.
According to a recent study of Pakistan, “From its very inception, the state of Pakistan
was thought to be more than a physical/legal entity that provided welfare, order, and justice
to its citizens. Pakistan was to be an extraordinary state—a homeland for Indian Muslims and
an ideological and political leader of the Islamic world. Providing a homeland to protect
Muslims—a minority community in British India —from the bigotry and intolerance of
India’s Hindu majority was important. The Pakistan movement also looked to the wider

34
Khan., Ijaz, “Contending Identities of Pakistan and The Issues of Democratic Governance” Journal of
Peace and Democracy in South Asia, Stockholm University Publication,
http://pdsajournal.com/journal%202006new/Ijaz%20Khan.pdf
35
For good articulation of this particular Pakistani predicament differentiating between Muslim nationalism
which is the basis for Pakistani Nationalism and Islamic theocratic identity read Alvi, Hamza. ‘Pakistan
and Islam: Ethnicity and Ideology; State and Ideology in the Middle East and Pakistan’, in Fred
Halliday and Hamza Alvi, (Ed.) ‘Monthly Review of Press’, New York, 1988
 The Making of Pakistan’s Strategic Culture and Pro Taliban Afghan Policy 19

Islamic world, however, and Pakistan’s leaders have been concerned about the fate of other
Muslim communities living under duress, stretching from Palestine to the Philippines. Both
the history and the future of Pakistan are rooted in this duality, a complex relationship
between Pakistan the state—a physically bounded territory with a legal and international
personality—and Pakistan the nation—mission–bound to serve as a beacon for oppressed or
backward Muslim communities elsewhere in the world. Other causes include an attempt to
create a truly Islamic state within Pakistan, one that would be guided by Islamic scriptures
and traditions.”36 Religion has played a vital role in Pakistan’s identity and world view.

Religion as Tool of Policy

To correctly asses the decision–making process of Pakistan and the evolution of its state
memory, it is important to dwell a little more on the relationship between the Pakistani State
and religious forces.37 This alliance between the two is not a new phenomenon or something
that just started with Gen. Zia–ul–Haq’s military regime in 1980s. Pakistani decision makers
have found religious extremists as natural choice for alliance/ usage as tools of foreign policy
due to a) Its own religious identity basis, b) Perception of India as a Hindu State, which has
not accepted Pakistan as an independent state deep down, c) United States also considered
Islamic forces as good allies during the cold war against atheist Soviet Union and d) the
centrist postcolonial State dominated by the military has always considered secular,
nationalist and democratic forces as a challenge to its hold over power.38 There is little that
the Islamic movements and parties do and say that the military–controlled state itself has not
supported. “From dawa (preaching) to jihad and from pilgrimages to interpretations of the
Sharia (Islamic Law), the state performs all the functions that are part of the religious
movements’ mandate. Mullahs and the military–dominated official machinery use the same
language and follow similar methodologies in the cause of Islam. Every government is
constitutionally obliged to do so. Instead of confrontation, the military has, therefore, often
favoured and promoted Islamic movements and causes. However, what an Islamic system
might mean in practical terms has been subject to sectarian interpretations and unending
intellectual debates over the last 55 years. Official adherence to vague notions of a religious
system has led to unresolved ‘political, cultural and ideological confusion’”.39 This ambiguity
served the purposes of a Westernised civilian–military bureaucracy. Strategic alliances with
the U.S., for instance, have resulted in political and economic rewards that advance both the
military’s institutional interests and its perceived national security needs. A pro–Western

36
Cohen. Stephen, The Nation and State of Pakistan’ in ‘The Washington Quarterly’ No. 25:3
Washington, Summer 2002, pp. 109 – 122 at 109.
37
MMA is the abbreviation for Muttahida Majlis–e–Amal (United Conference for Action) an alliance of
religious parties formed for the purpose of contesting the October 2002 general elections in Pakistan.
This alliance has formed government in North West Frontier Province (NWFP) and is also a partner in
the PML-Q Government of Balochistan.
38
For a comprehensive study of United States support for militant religious groups in Afghanistan read,
Cooly. John K., Unholy Wars: Afghanistan, America and International Terrorism, New Delhi, Penguin,
2001, pp.48-65.
39
Sayeed., Khalid bin, Western Dominance and Political Islam: Challenge and Response, Oxford
University Press, London, 1977, p. 126.
20 Ijaz Khan

foreign policy is justified domestically as accommodating “pro–Westernism in the

ideological framework of Pan–Islamism.”40 Moreover, the personal proclivities of military
leaders have determined the form and substance of Islamisation, as much as changes in the
regional and international environments.
Under Pakistan’s first military ruler, General Mohammad Ayub Khan (1958–69), the
military vowed to build a modern, pro–Western Islamic state that would serve as a bulwark
against Soviet communism. Although, religious parties disapproved of some of the
liberalising domestic programme of Gen. Mohd Ayub Khan, they shared with the military the
perception that viewed communism as the main threat to Islam. The military and mullahs
regarded Pakistanis who professed communism, socialism or secularism as their common
enemy.
Another general, Agha Mohammed Yahya Khan, who fought a war against East
Pakistan’s secession following the country’s first national elections in 1970, succeeded Gen.
Ayub Khan. The religious lobby, led by the Jamaat–I–Islami’s (JI) youth wings, actively
joined the war alongside Pakistani troops fighting their secular Bengali opponents. The
Razakars (Volunteer) force organised by the Pakistan Army was manned by these youth.41
The war resulted in Bangladesh’s independence after India intervened.
The military–mullah nexus expanded and gained strength during the next period of
martial law. There was a complete convergence of interests between the religious right and
Pakistan’s third military ruler, General Mohammed Zia–ul–Haq (1977–88). Their protest
movement created the conditions for his coup d’état. The military and the mullahs had a
common domestic enemy – the secular mainstream political parties. Zia’s personal
proclivities also matched those of his religious partners. Rigid interpretations of Islamic
injunctions and jurisprudence were introduced during Zia’s eleven years.42 During Zia era
(1977–1988) religious forces graduated to becoming partners in decision-making from their
earlier status as tools of policy. His legacy still haunts the state and society of Pakistan.

Formation of Security Threat Perceptions and Dominance of Military

The experiences of Pakistan movement and the tragic events of partition (discussed
above) became the basis of a strong perception that Indian leadership had not accepted the
division of the Sub–Continent and would not miss any opportunity to undo it. These
perceptions were strengthened by the annexation of Hyderabad, Junagardh and most of
Kashmir by India. The denial of what Pakistan considered to be its fair share in assets of
united India, was interpreted as a further indication of Indians plan to economically
strangulate the new state at birth.43 Thus security policy became the central concern which

40
Waseem Mohammed, ‘Military in the Power Structure of Pakistan, Unpublished Conference Paper, Jakarta
17-19 October 2000.
41
Niazi. A.A.K., The Betrayal of East Pakistan, Karachi, Oxford University Press, Karachi, 1998, pp. 78-79.
42
International Crisis Group Asia Report ‘Pakistan: The Mullahs and the Military’ N°49, 20 March 2003. pp.
2-3.
43
Jalal., Ayesha, The State of Martial Rule: The Origins of Pakistan’s Economy of Defence, Vanguard,
Lahore, 1991, pp. 25-48
 The Making of Pakistan’s Strategic Culture and Pro Taliban Afghan Policy 21

determined the content and contours of Pakistan’s foreign policy. Dominance of security
policy paved the way for military dominance of decision–making.
With this background Army started a gradual journey towards almost total domination of
other inputs into Pakistan’s decision–making process, especially security policy. The
domination of security concerns also led to the domination by security policy of overall
foreign policy. “The primary reason for military’s emergence as the most influential element
in defence decision–making lies in its significance in the country’s power politics. It assumed
the responsibility of guarding the Islamic ideological identity and frontiers of the country.
The threat perception from India, viewed as a Hindu power which cannot bear the existence
of an Islamic Pakistan, has provided a certain ideological justification to the argument that it
is only the military establishment that can provide security to this ideological state. Projection
of threat from India is fundamental to the survival of the Pakistani establishment that even
views internal insecurity as a continuation of the external threat. Islamabad has always
looked at the internal political turmoil as the doing of a ‘foreign hand’ (insinuating India). It
is in this back ground that Army has always kept the Kashmir issue on the hot burner.”44

Joining the American Camp

Desperately in need of external assistance to assure its very survival as a nation, Pakistan
had been actively courting the United States since independence. But those efforts initially
brought only frustration. The Korean War, and the broader fears about Western vulnerability
that it sparked within the upper ranks of the Truman administration, gave Pakistan's leaders
an opportunity to make a much more compelling case for a Pakistani–American connection.
They seized the opening with skill and tenacity. By pledging their willingness to cooperate
with Western – sponsored defense arrangements for the Middle East and contrasting their
unblinkered support for U.S. Cold War policies with India's defiant independence, Pakistan's
ruling elite managed to impress a growing number of American decision makers with the
possible benefits of an alliance with Pakistan.45
Under the leadership of Mohammed Ali Jinnah and Liaquat Ali Khan, the founding
Muslim League elite of Pakistan had consciously adopted a strong pro–Western orientation
as the cornerstone of the new state's foreign policy. Th e predominantly West Pakistani civil
bureaucracy and military establishment––fast emerging as rival power centres to the Muslim
League politicians fully supported that orientation. Pakistan's understandable preoccupation
with the Indian threat, the possibility of renewed fighting in Kashmir, the need to defend its
northern border in light of Afghanistan's irredentist claims to portions of the Northwest
Frontier province, pressing internal security imperatives, and the woefully inadequate
defence establishment inherited as its share of the partition settlement all combined to form a
national security dilemma of nightmarish proportions. Defence spending absorbed nearly
seventy percent of the central government's total revenue expenditures between 1948 and

44
Agha., Ayesha Sadiqua, Pakistan’s Arms Procurement and Military Buildup, 1979 – 1999; In Search of a
Policy, Sang – e – Meel Publications, Lahore, 2003, pp 55 – 78 at p.56.
45
Robert J. McMahon, The Cold War on the Periphery the United States, India and Pakistan Columbia
University Press, New York, 1994, pp. 124-156 at p.78
22 Ijaz Khan

1950, a burden that far exceeded Pakistan's modest financial resources and severely
handicapped its fledgling economic development efforts. Politicians, civil administrators, and
military officers agreed that Pakistan's multiple security and financial needs could be served
best by forging a bond with an external patron. Only one nation, they were convinced, had
the wherewithal to supply Pakistan with desperately needed economic and military assistance
and help guarantee its security from external attack.46
Pakistan thus became ‘the most allied ally’ of the United States in Asia. They signed the
Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement in May 1954. Pakistan acceded to South East Asia
Treaty Organisation in September (SEATO) 1954 and the Baghdad Pact [renamed as Central
Treaty Organisation (CENTO) after the Ba’athist revolution in Iraq in 1959] in September
1955. In March 1959 the two countries signed an Agreement of Cooperation (in military
affairs). The last one is not a formal treaty, but an executive agreement, which is still in force.
In July 1959, Pakistan permitted the United States to setup a surveillance and communication
facility near Peshawar. This was a significant concession in the days when spy satellites had
not been in vogue. Pakistan started receiving the much needed economic and military aid.
Thus Pakistan came out of the precarious situation it was since its creation in 1947. Pakistan
– US relations have continued with various intervals and levels of cooling off periods.47
Studying the details of these relations would be going out of the scope of this study.
However, the latest love affair started in 1979 with the start of Afghan Jihad against Soviet
Union and the cooling off started immediately after the withdrawal of Soviet Union from
Afghanistan in 1989. Both have re–found each other after the terrorists struck US targets in
2001.

PAKISTAN’S AFGHAN POLICY

Pakistan Afghan policy very logically fits into its foreign policy emanating from its
strategic culture based on threat perceptions from India and Islam in a centralized unitary
state structure. Pakistan had felt threatened by closer relations between India and
Afghanistan, backed by Soviet Union as well as suspicions of Pashtun ethnic aspirations.
Afghanistan have territorial claims against Pakistan, was the only state that opposed
Pakistan’s membership of UN in 1947 and welcomed Pashtuns, especially tribal Pashtuns
straddling along the Durand Line, challenging Pakistani authority. So, Pakistan’s Afghan
policy has always been aimed at settling the territorial / Durand Line issue with Afghanistan,
stays away from Pakistani Pashtuns and having a friendly government there which keeps a
distanced from India.

46
Jalal., Ayesha, 1991, pp. 60-78, 93-100; Also read Cohen., Stephen P., The Pakistan Army, Berkeley,
University of California Press, 1984, pp. 136-38
47
Read Rais Ahmad Khan, In Search of Peace and Security; Forty years of Pakistan-United States
Relations, (Ed.), Royal Press, Karachi. 1990.
 The Making of Pakistan’s Strategic Culture and Pro Taliban Afghan Policy 23

The Issue of Durand Line and Pashtunistan

Afghanistan in 1944 renounced48 the Durand Line Agreement49 with the British
Government, which had marked the boundary between the two states. Pakistan considered
itself to be the rightful successor to the British rights and duties in the territories that formed
Pakistan. Afghanistan laid claim to both North West Frontier Province and Balochistan. It
supported the demand for Pashtunistan, made by the Pashtun nationalist leadership of NWFP
on the eve of partition. Though Abdul Ghaffar Khan, (1890–1988) commonly known as
Bacha Khan among his Pashtun supporters, (also referred to as Frontier Gandhi, with
reverence by his supporters and as derogatory slur by his detractors) had clarified that
demand for Pashtunistan was not a demand for a separate independent state, but for
autonomy within Pakistan. On 3 and 4 September 1947 a grand meeting of Khudai
Khidmatgar Tehrik50 (‘in the service of God movement’) was held at Sardaryab (a small
village near the town of Charsada, NWFP) to decide their strategy as Pakistan had come into
being. The meeting through a resolution declared severance of their relations with All India
Congress and acceptance of Pakistan as their country. They also declared allegiance and
loyalty to the new state. The meeting further clarified their demand for Pashtunistan as an
autonomous province within the state of Pakistan. Abdul Ghaffar Khan clarified
“Pashtunistan would be an autonomous unit within Pakistan.”51 Abdul Ghafar Khan had
invited M. A Jinnah to visit Khudai Khidmatgar headquarters in Charssada after the first
meeting of Pakistan’s constituent Assembly (of which Abdul Ghafar Khan was a member)
was held in Karachi. Mr. Jinnah had accepted that invitation. However, when he was to visit
the Khuddai Khidmatgars, Khan Abdul Qayum Khan52 advised Mr. Jinnah not to visit
Khudai Khidmatgars as according to the Khudai Khidmatgar version of the story, the
rapprochement between the Abdul Ghafar Khan and Mr. Jinnah would result in the ouster
from power of Abdul Qayum Khan. In any case, the failure of Mr. Jinnah to arrive at the
venue where Khudai Khidmatgars were waiting for him is a point of history in relationship
between the Pashtun Nationalists and the State of Pakistan from which onwards they have
continuously gone downwards. Despite many ups and downs the mistrust between the two
sides has continued and had important consequences for Pakistan’s Afghan policy, as well as
democratic and secular development within Pakistan. This had implications for Pashtun

48
Ghaus Abdul Samad, “The Fall of Afghanistan: An insider’s Account”, Pergamon Brasseys, Washington
D.C., 1988, p. 66
49
Rasanayagam Angelo, Afghanistan A Modern History, London I. B. Taurin London, 2003, p. 29. See for
details Sir Algernon Durand, The Making of a Frontier Pall Mall., London, 1899. The Durand line is a
poorly marked 2,450 kilometer between Afghanistan and Pakistan. After being defeated in two wars
against Afghans, the British succeeded in 1893 in negotiating border between Afghanistan and British
India (now Pakistan). It is named after Sir Mortimer Durand, the foreign secretary of the Indian
government, who drew the line and signed it on behalf of the British India.
50
Khudai Khidmatgar Tehrik was the name of a social and political movement of Pashtuns led by Abdul
Ghaffar Khan. This movement became part of All India National Congress for the purpose of becoming
part of the anti colonial movement at a larger level, however, this movement had retained its own name.
51
Tendulkar., D. G., Abdul Ghaffar Khan; Faith is a Battle, Popular Prakashan Press, Bombay, 1967. p.451.
52
Khan Abdul Qayum Khan had been a member of Khudai Khidmatgars earlier, however, had left the
movement before partition and joined Muslim League. He had been made Chief Minister of NWFP by
government of Pakistan after it dismissal of the majority Congress government in NWFP after partition.
24 Ijaz Khan

politics in very fundamental ways. Pakistani State considering the secular Pashtun
(nationalist) of suspicious loyalty, found religious slogans and leadership as good
counterweight to them. This became more so during the Afghan Jihad. It also fitted well in
the over all process of increasing role of religious forces in Pakistan’s both domestic and
foreign policies.
Afghanistan and India became closer due to common misgivings towards Pakistan. For
the highly centralised state of Pakistan that was in the process of creating a national identity,
any talk of provincial rights and differences based on culture, language or ethnicity were
anathema. These were considered as negating the very basis of Pakistani nationhood, which
was based on religion and Urdu language. In case of Pashtuns, the sensitivity of the
establishment was more pronounced, due to Afghan claims over Durand Line, Afghan
friendship with India and Soviet Union and the Pashtun nationalist leadership being almost
wholly composed of former members of Indian National Congress.
Pakistan had never enjoyed good neighbourly relations with Afghanistan. The story of
Pak–Afghan relations fills the mind of an average Pakistani decision maker with mistrust. It
must be added quickly that this mistrust was mutual. There have been many ups and downs in
Pak–Afghan relations. The relations reached an all time low during the prime minister ship of
Sardar Daud in Afghanistan (1953–1963) in 1961, when Afghanistan broke off diplomatic
relations with Pakistan and Pakistan imposed a ban on transit facilities to the land locked
Afghanistan. The breakdown was brought by Afghanistan’s heightened activism in support of
Pashtunistan during Sardar Duad tenure. They were resumed in 1963 after the resignation of
Sardar Daud. However, to correct the historical record in correct perspective, Afghanistan
had remained neutral during all the military conflicts Pakistan had with India [1948, 1965,
1971], thus setting aside Pakistani apprehensions of having to worry about northern frontiers
in its conflicts on the southern borders.53
In the early 1970s, Pakistan had a democratically elected government of Zulfiqar Ali
Bhutto, which was at loggerheads with the provincial governments of North West Frontier
Province and Balochistan formed by Pashtun Nationalist party, National Awami (Peoples)
Party (NAP) in alliance with Jamiat–Ulema–e–Islam (JUI). In that background a coup d’ tat
in Afghanistan brought Sardar Daud to power. President Daud was a hardliner on the issue of
Durand Line. The domestic political scene also took dramatic turn at around the same time.
The federal government dismissed the provincial government of Balochistan. As both in
NWFP and Balochistan the government was of the National Awami Party [NAP] and its
allies, the provincial government of NWFP, headed by Maulana Mufti Mehmud of Jamiat – e
Ulema – Islam (JUI) resigned in protest. In parts of NWFP and Balochistan, armed resistance
started. NAP was banned; its leadership was jailed along with a large number of its
activists.54 The Government of Sardar Daud in Afghanistan supported the resistance. Some of
its activists and leaders [which included Ajmal Khattak, the central General Secretary of

53
Rasanayagam Angelo, 2003, pp. 27-37. For a detailed description of the Pashtunistan issue and Pak-
Afghan relations read Burke, S. M., and Ziring Lawrence, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy; An Historical
Analysis, Oxford University Press, Karachi, 1973, pp. 68-90. Also read Tendulkar., D. G., Abdul
Ghaffar Khan; Faith is a Battle, Popular Prakashan Press, Bombay, 1967. pp. 451-53.
54
Waseem. Mohammad, Politics and the State in Pakistan, Progressive Publishers, Lahore, 1989, pp. 330-
340.
 The Making of Pakistan’s Strategic Culture and Pro Taliban Afghan Policy 25

NAP] took refuge in Afghanistan. The Pakistani state was at its coercive best during that
time. It was in this background that some extremist religious leaders of Afghanistan55 who
were opposed to the secular and modernising policies of President Daud came to Peshawar.56
Gen. (Retd.) Naseer Ullah Babar57, who was governor of NWFP at the time, supervised this
emerging alliance between Afghan religious extremists and Pakistani state.58 Thus we had the
making of a policy that passing through the tumultuous 1980s culminated in the Pakistani
support of Taliban in Afghanistan in the second half of the decade of 1990. Pakistan’s pro
Taliban Afghan policy that started in 1994, discussed below, was an adjustment of its Afghan
policy of the 1980s.
The Pakistani decision makers mind set that believed in a strong centralised state and
mistrusted India or anything or any one having the remotest link with India, could not take
the secular Pashtun59 as an ally. Pakistan’s worries in Afghanistan were twofold; An
Afghanistan friendly with India would always be a source of threat during Pakistan’s conflict
with India,60 and the issue of Afghan claims over Pashtun majority territories of Pakistan61.
The secular Pashtun, mostly represented by the former Congress members, would from time
to time show resentment over division of Pashtuns by the Durand line, and had always
maintained good relations with the Afghan rulers.62 And thus was never on the right side of
the Pakistani establishment.

55
These leaders included most of the Mujahideen leadership that during the Afghan resistance to Soviet
Union in 1980s were to acquire international fame. They included Gulbadin Hekmatyar, Prof.
Burhanuddin Rabbani, and Ahmad Shah Masood. Read Rasanayagam Angelo, 2003, pp. 62-65.
56
Rubin Michael, “Who is Responsible for the Taliban?” in ‘Middle East Review of International Affairs’,
Vol. 6, No. 1 March 2002. pp. 3-4
57
The same Gen. Babar, himself a Pashtun, as home minister in the second Benazir Government 1993-96, is
credited with the Pakistan policy of creation/ support for the Taliban movement in 1994. Gen. Babar is
a leader of Pakistan Peoples Party, with secular political outlook, however, with strong anti NAP
political views.
58
Wirsing., Robert G., Pakistan’s Security Under Zia, 1977-88 Macmillan, London, 1991, p.30 Also
Girardet. Edward, Afghanistan: The Soviet War, St Martin's Press, New York, 1985, p.166.
59
Secular Pashtuns till the emergence of PPP in NWFP during the 1970s, meant Nationalist followers of
Abdul Wali Khan, son and political heir of Abdul Ghaffar Khan. To set the historical record straight
there were some minor secular forces outside the nationalist fold in the shape of rather extremist leftist
parties. One good example of such parties was the Mazdoor Kisan Party [Labour Tenant] led by Afzal
Bangash. This party also had at least a tacit support of the central government of PPP in the 1970s to
create trouble for the NAP-JUI government of NWFP. NAP and JUI were in opposition in the then
National Assembly.
60
This suspicious attitude had persisted despite the fact that during the three wars, 1948, 1965 and 1971,
between India and Pakistan, Afghanistan had followed a policy of strict neutrality.
61
Rubin., Barnett R., Fragmentation of Afghanistan: State Formation and Collapse in the International
System, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1995. pp 63-84
62
Grant M. Farr, “Afghan refugees in Pakistan: definitions, repatriation and ethnicity”, in Ewan W.
Anderson and Nancy Hatch Dupree (eds.), The Cultural Basis of Afghan Nationalism, Pinter Publishers,
New York, 1990, p 141.
26 Ijaz Khan

Pakistan’s Afghan Policy; the Mujahideen era; 1979–94:

The alliance between religious extremists and Pakistani establishment in foreign policy
arena really matured during the 1980s. As noted above, religious extremists were attractive to
even the secular Pakistani decision maker’s mind set as it had developed from 1947 onwards.
However, it was Gen. Zia–ul–Haq martial law and the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan that
really saw the maturing of what appeared to be a natural and lasting alliance. The
Talibanization of Pakistan foreign policy as well as domestic society and politics is really the
legacy of Gen. Zia and his team, supported by the United States, in the context of its cold war
priorities. The religious groups, during this period graduated from tools of foreign policy into
partners in decision-making (or at least they thought so and behaved as such till 9/11). During
that time, the military and its intelligence agencies, especially Inter Services Intelligence
Agency (ISI) took over almost exclusive control of foreign policy making, more specifically
Afghan policy.
Soviet Union’s intervention in Afghanistan in late 1979 suddenly changed the whole
geopolitical situation of the region. Pakistan had to make choices. What should be the
reaction? And equally important was the question; how to go about it? Pakistan had three
choices; a) To stay neutral, b) To support the Soviet Intervention and c) To oppose it.
Pakistan chose to oppose Soviet Intervention in Afghanistan. This choice posed certain basic
questions. How to oppose Soviet intervention? To what level Pakistan should take the
opposition? Pakistan had again alternatives; a) to oppose it at political level only, b) to
support the opposition more actively, i.e. is materially and c) who amongst the resistance
should get Pakistan’s support (The initial choice had to be made between a mix of nationalist,
pro Zahir Shah and other non religious forces and the religious groups some of whom were
already present in Pakistan). Pakistani decision makers chose option b) and chose the
religious groups to be a better bet. A decision was made to resist the Soviet Intervention
through providing material as well as political support to the religious Afghan resistance
forces within Afghanistan and taking up the issue on various international forums.63 Pakistan
agreed to become the frontline state in America’s [not so] covert policy in Afghanistan.64
Pakistan also became in forefront of raising the issue on international diplomatic forums. The
issue was taken to United Nations, where a special session of General Assembly adopted a
resolution65 condemning Soviet action and demanded its immediate withdrawal. Pakistan also
raised the issue at Organisation of Islamic Conference.

Mujahideen as Tools for Implementation of Pakistan’s Afghan Policy

Implementation of this policy choice required another very significant decision that had a
bearing on policy which would last for a very long time. That decision was of selection from
amongst the various religious resistance groups of any favourite or the support should be to

63
Shahi Agha., Pakistan’s Security and Foreign Policy, Lahore, Progressive Publishers, Lahore, 1988, pp. 1-
53.
64
Brzezinski, Zbignew. “Game Plan: A geo Strategic for the Conduct of the US – Soviet Contest”,. Farrar
and Straus, Boston, 1986.
 The Making of Pakistan’s Strategic Culture and Pro Taliban Afghan Policy 27

every one, with priority be determined by the strength of a group on ground. Pakistan decided
to have favourites based on considerations of its own interests, and both internal and external
considerations, as perceived by the decision makers of the time. Gulbadin Hekmatyar became
the favourite of Pakistani mangers of the Afghan Jihad and thus the major recipient of the aid
that started from different sources.66 The parties that emerged inside Afghanistan to resist the
Soviet intervention included both religious and secular. Among the secular ones was one very
important organisation called, Afghan Millat’ (Afghan Nation), a nationalist party and Shola–
I–Javed, a pro Chinese Communist party, as well as members of the royal family and their
supporters. There were seven major Islamic parties; Hizb–e–Islami led by Gulbadin
Hekmatyar, Islamic Union for the Liberation of Afghanistan led by Prof. Rasool Syyaf,
Harakat–Inqilab–i–Islam of Mohammad Nabi Mohammadi, Jamiat–e–Islami of Prof.
Burhanudin Rabbani (Which included Commander Ahmad Shah Massood), National Islamic
Front of Pir Syed Ahamd Gaillani Afghanistan and National Liberation Front of Prof
Sibghatullah Mojadedi.67 Pakistan was instrumental in making the Islamic parties form an
alliance in 1983. Pakistan also helped in their strengthening, as it controlled the international
aid flows. The non religious groups were totally ignored, rather actively discouraged by
Pakistan.68 Pakistan followed a clear policy of aiding only through the parties belonging to
the religious parties’ alliance. This policy meant no commander would get any support if he
is not member of one of these seven parties. Independent commanders had to choose one of
these even if they did not agree with any of the parties they joined.69 The consideration for
joining a party was the ability of the party to deliver foreign aid, not its ideology or
leadership. This contributed substantially to the strength of Gulbadin Hekmatyar’s party as it
was the largest recipient of international aid that came by the route of ISI. This policy
partially explains the reality of these parties strength as it depended on considerations other
than loyalty to the leadership or the party programme. This also helped in creating a
controlling role for the Pakistani institution given charge to manage the Afghan Jihad,
namely ISI.
Pakistan was under the martial law regime of Gen. Zia–Ul–Haq. In Iran, the monarchy
that had allied it to United States was soon toppled by a popular religious revolution that
considered United States as enemy number one. Pakistan was not receiving enough military
supplies which it needed to meet its security needs vis–a–vis India.70 The military regime of
Pakistan needed legitimacy. Soviet intervention in Afghanistan provided it with an
opportunity that it could not resist. The United States needed Pakistan to wage its Jihad
against Soviet Union in Afghanistan. Iran was also opposed to the Soviet Intervention but it
could not have been co opted to play the American game. Pakistan’s decision to become the
frontline state for American anti Soviet plans in Afghanistan was not the result of only

65
A/ES-6/7 GAOR, 6th emer. spec. sess., Suppl. No. 1.
66
Cooly. John K., 2001, p.62.
67
Yousaf., Mohammad and Adkin., Mark, The Bear Trap: Afghanistan’s Untold Story, Jang Publishers,
Lahore, 1992, pp. 41-43.
68
Barnett Rubin, Fragmentation of Afghanistan: State Formation and Collapse in the International System,
New Haven, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1995, pp.181, 198-199.
69
Yousaf Mohammad and Adkin Mark 1992. p. 40.
70
United States had imposed a ban on weapons supply to both Pakistan and India during the 1965 war
between the two countries.
28 Ijaz Khan

American pressure and Zia–ul–Haq’s need for international acceptance. Pakistan, as earlier
noted, had its own interests in Afghanistan. Pakistan considered this an opportunity to gain
enough influence inside Afghanistan a) to end the Durand Line and the Pashtunistan issue
forever71 b) to end Indian influence in Afghanistan and c) that it can serve its need for
‘strategic depth’72 [the possibility of this, however, became evident much later].
The choice of religious fundamentalists was made due to a number of factors, both
domestic and international. Conversely, the Pashtun nationalist was not the choice due to a
variety of very specific reasons. This was despite the fact that the mainstream nationalist
political party then National Democratic Party73 had welcomed Gen. Zia Ul Haq’s Martial
Law. Gen. Zia also freed all the nationalists jailed by Z. A. Bhutto. The nationalists at this
point were in a dilemma. Their dilemma was due to their sufferings at the hands of secular
Bhutto; they simply could not convince themselves of the political need to ignore that and see
the dangers posed by the fundamentalist friendly (if not outright fundamentalist itself)
government of Gen. Zia.74 A fundamental change had taken place in the make up of Pakistani
ruling class over the years. Pashtuns had gradually grown to become the junior partners of
Punjabis, the erstwhile rulers of Pakistan. This changed situation demanded a changed
attitude from the nationalists. However, the nationalist Pashtun and the Pakistani
establishment simply could not trust each other.
Pashtun nationalist leadership could not adjust itself to the changing situation due to a
variety of reasons. For one, Pashtun nationalist political leadership was not intellectually
ready to assume the new role of representing this new Pashtun interest in the changed power
configuration of Pakistani state. Their rural agrarian background simply reduced their
capability to change, much more than any ideological commitment or liking for the
communist government in Afghanistan. This inability to change was partly due to the
mistrust of Pakistani state that was not ready to trust them as well. This mutual mistrust,
result of personal as well as historical experiences on both sides, along with the personal
religious beliefs of Gen. Zia–ul–Haq played together in the making of Pakistani decision to
promote the religious elements from amongst the Afghan resistance groups. This fitted or at

71
Grant M. Farr, “Afghan refugees in Pakistan: definitions, repatriation and ethnicity”, in Ewan W.
Anderson and Nancy Hatch Dupree (Eds.), The Cultural Basis of Afghan Nationalism, Pinter Publishers,
New York, 1990, p.141
72
Quraishi., Ahmed M. “Strategic Depth Reviewed” Monthly, ‘Newsline’ Karachi, March 2002. pp.22 -
24.Also read, Ahmad., Eqbal, “What After Strategic Depth?” Daily ‘Dawn’, 23 August 1998.
73
The Pashtun nationalist political party, National Awami Party had been banned by Zulifqar Ali Bhutto’s
Government earlier in 1974, when its government in Balochistan was dismissed and the government of
NWFP had to resign. The main leadership was either jailed or had taken refuge in Afghanistan. At that
time these nationalists regrouped in a new party, named National Democratic Party, and asked an ethnic
Baluch from Punjab, Sardar Sherbaz Mazari to head it. Sardar Sherbaz Mazari was a nominal head. The
real leadership was in the hands of Begum Nasim Wali Khan (Wife of NAP’s jailed leader and Abdul
Ghaffar Khan’s son, Wali Khan). Wali Khan after release by Gen. Zia did not assume the leadership
officially, however, he had the real control, as NDP consisted wholly of his followers. Later in 1996
NDP and a number of left of Centre political parties merged together to form Awami National Parrty
(ANP). Khan Abdul Wali Khan was elected its central president.
74
This was one of the most important factors due to which the leftists within the fold of NAP did not go
along with NDP. Interview with Mukhtiar Bacha, leader of former Communist Party of Pakistan, which
was then working within the fold of NAP and then for a while ANP. His was one of the many other
leftist groups that had merged into ANP initially but left that party after a while as well.
 The Making of Pakistan’s Strategic Culture and Pro Taliban Afghan Policy 29

least did not conflict with the United States perceptions of the situation in Afghanistan and
methodology of dealing with Soviet Union. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA, the US
intelligence agency), which was responsible for on the ground implementation of US policy
of resisting Soviet Union in Afghanistan, carried out that responsibility with the assistance of
Pakistani intelligence agency, ISI.
Throughout the war against the communist government and Soviet forces in Afghanistan,
Pakistan asserted a mix of internal and external concerns. The ISI and Pakistan army sought
leverage against the hostile neighbour on its eastern border, India, by giving Pakistan
‘strategic depth’, a secure Afghan frontier permitting the concentration of Pakistani forces on
the Indian frontier and (after the war ended and Soviet Union collapsed) economic
advantages through stronger political and economic links to Central Asia. An Afghanistan
that facilitated those connections and provided Pakistan with a base to pursue its objectives in
Kashmir would give it greater security against India. Pakistani support for Pashtun parties in
Afghanistan helped solidify the position of Pashtuns in Pakistan’s military and civilian elites.
In addition, Pakistan promoted the emergence of a government in Afghanistan that would
reduce Pakistan’s own vulnerability to internal unrest by helping to contain the nationalist
aspirations of tribes whose territories straddle the Pakistani–Afghan border75. Further internal
considerations motivated Pakistan to direct most of the funding and support it received during
the Soviet intervention to Islamist groups. Specifically, Pakistan sought to avoid building up
the strength of Pashtun nationalist groups that might subsequently want to carve an
independent Pashtun state from Pakistani and Afghan territory. Pakistan also sought to quell
local support for Afghanistan’s ambitions of redrawing the Durand line. Thus, Pakistan came
to throw its support behind the Hizb–Islami of Gulbadin Hekmatyar, a Pashtun–dominated
group that espoused an Islamist rather than nationalist agenda. Because the U.S. granted
Pakistan wide discretion in channelling its covert assistance to the Mujahideen based in
Pakistan, Pakistan was able to give Hekmatyar the lion’s share.76
The Soviet forces left Afghanistan in 1989 as a result of Geneva accords signed in
1988.77 However, the Communist government of President Najibullah continued to hold on to

75
Tribal Areas of Pakistan, known as Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) inhabited by Pashtun
tribes are today scene to ‘War against Terrorism’ on Pakistani side. Divided into seven administrative
units called agencies include South and North Waziristan Agencies, where some Taliban and Al-qaeda
have taken refuge and are being used by them as safe heaven when the going gets tough in Afghanistan.
They have quite widespread support in the mainly two local tribes called Wazir and Masood. Pakistan
Army is engaged in counter insurgency operations in these two agencies currently. Today’s
Talibanization of these Pashtun tribes is a direct consequence of the policy of promoting religious forces
in these areas during the 1980s. Pakistan may have achieved at least one policy goal here that is denying
the secular Pashtun nationalist sympathy and support of these Pashtuns, however, what has been created
is probably much more a serious threat to Pakistan long term security. This is one, maybe extreme,
example of crisis of the Pakistani State in the wake of Pakistan’s changed Afghan Policy as a result of
International Inputs contradicting domestic inputs pushing for continuation of the pro Taliban Afghan
Policy.
76
Human Rights Watch Report, ‘Afghanistan: Crisis of Impunity, The Role of Pakistan, Russia and Iran in
Fuelling the War’ Vol. 13, No. 3 (C). Also available on the internet at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2001/
afghan2/, 2001
77
Far an in-depth and detailed study of the Geneva Accords read, Cordovez., Diego and Harrison., Selig, S.
Out of Afghanistan: The Inside Story of the Soviet Withdrawal, Oxford University Press, New York,
1995.
30 Ijaz Khan

power for another four years. Pakistan, with US approval78 continued to pursue policies that
denied any compromise between Najibullah’s government and the Mujahideen. Such a
compromise would have meant compromise on Pakistan’s objective of having relations with
the post Soviet Afghanistan to the level of it providing the strategic depth. In 1992, when the
government of President Najibullah fell, Pakistan cobbled an interim government of
Mujahideen which was headed by Prof. Sibghatullah Mujadidi for an initial period of four
months as a result of ‘Peshawar accord’.79 Prof. Mujadidi was a relatively weaker, albeit, a
moderate leader among the Mujahideen leaders. He was succeeded in accordance with the
‘Peshawar accord’ by Prof. Burhanudin Rabbani for a term of four months. The Pakistani
favourite Gulbadin Hekmatyar was to be the prime minister of the second interim setup under
Rabbani, however, he refused to take over his new assignment. Prof. Rabbani, in violation of
the Peshawar accord refused to surrender government after the expiry of four months period.
He instead, convened a meeting of a selected Shura, and got himself elected President of
Afghanistan. Pakistan did not like this and continued to call for implementation of the
Peshawar accord. Prof. Rabbani was seen in Islamabad as growing closer to both Iran and
India. This tilt sounded alarm bells in the policy making circles of Islamabad. The policy of
having a government in Afghanistan that would be closely allied to it appeared to be not
working.
It needs to be noted here that no Afghan government has ever accepted Pakistani dictates.
The fiercely independent spirited Afghans has shown that it was not just Zahir Shah or
nationalists with Indian or Soviet connections that were averse to Pakistani dominance, but
the Mujahideen also kept the tradition of maintaining Afghan independence alive. This was
so despite the fact that between 1992 and 2001, including that of Prof. Rabbani, all
governments that were formed in Kabul were with the blessing and support of Pakistani
State. As it would be shown later, even Taliban could not be made to act exactly as Pakistani
decision makers wanted them to.

RISE OF TALIBAN AND PAKISTAN’S PRO TALIBAN AFGHAN POLICY

In midst of civil war, a total collapse of Afghan State, major international powers almost
forgetting it, thus making it an open field for regional states power play. Pakistan, Iran, India
and the Central Asian States all became players of the Afghan mess and competed or formed

78
Prior to her election Benazir and her party had campaigned for recognizing the PDPA government in
Kabul and seeking a political settlement of the Afghanistan conflict. But all that changed when Benazir
paid her maiden visit to Washington in June of 1989 and later to London as Prime Minister of Pakistan.
After her "very cordial" meeting with George Bush (senior), Benazir announced her total agreement
with the US president that Najibullah must resign as a precondition for any political settlement with
Afghanistan. In London Benazir was bluntly told by Margaret Thatcher that war in Afghanistan will
continue until complete ‘military victory’ was achieved. Weekly, ‘Manchester Guardian’, 16 July,
1989.
79
Peshawar Accord was signed in Peshawar on 25 April 1992, between the different Mujahideen parties to
form an interim government for Afghanistan after the fall of Najibullah. Full text available
‘http://www.institute-for-afghan-studies.org/Accords%20Treaties/peshawar_accord_1993.htm. Access
date 20 January 2004
 The Making of Pakistan’s Strategic Culture and Pro Taliban Afghan Policy 31

alliances through Afghan proxies. The emergence of the former Soviet Central Republics
with their energy riches brought some energy and extra regional interests in Afghanistan.
Pakistan considered the failure of achieving its policy objectives through the Mujahideen
group as a negation of its legitimate interests and looked for alternates to reverse the trends.
In this background the world saw emergence of Taliban and very quickly taking control of
most of Afghanistan. Pakistan saw in Taliban a perfect solution for its problems with
Afghanistan based on its India centric religious based strategic culture.

The International and Regional Context

After the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989 and its subsequent collapse a year
later, United States and the west’s interest in Afghanistan decreased, if the word diminished
would sound too strong. Barnett R. Rubin noted, “The entire international community had no
political strategy for Afghanistan from 1992 to 1994.”80 That is not the same as saying it was
forgotten, though one must acknowledge, in order of priorities, Afghanistan lost the centre
stage it had acquired in Western strategic thinking, during the 1980s. The attention of US and
the West had been attracted by the end of Communist control of Eastern Europe and the
breakdown of Soviet Union. However, its proximity with Central Asia and Iran meant it
could not be totally forgotten by the west. The west also had interests in Afghanistan in the
1990s as it had become the largest source for opium cultivation as well as a refuge for global
terrorists, a concern that had been on the rise much before the September 2001 terrorist
attacks on US, made it central. However, these interests were then, simply not considered in
the policy making circles of western capitals, compelling enough to maintain a policy backed
by enough resources towards peace in Afghanistan. As the out side (to the region) interest
decreased, regional interests increased. Pakistan, Iran, India, Turkey and the Central Asian
states became enmeshed in a new regional ‘great game’.
Pakistan had gained enormous influence in Afghan affairs during the 1980s. India
wanted to re–enter Afghanistan, or at least deny Pakistan the influence it had gained. Iran
wanted to oppose the increasing influence of United States in Central Asia and considered, i),
Afghanistan as its linkage to that region and ii), considered Pakistani influence as American
influence or very close to it. Central Asian States were wary of the religious colour of the
new post Soviet Afghanistan and looked with suspicion at Pakistani support for, first
Mujahideen and then Taliban. “Since the 1990s Pakistan has pursued interventionist policies
in Afghanistan to promote a wide range of objectives: to counter Afghan claims on Pakistan’s
Pashtun–majority areas, to gain access to the oil and gas resources of Central Asia via
Afghan territory, to undermine Iran’s influence in Southwest and Central Asia, to gain
strategic depth against India, and to recruit Afghan religious extremists as well as Taliban
trained Kashmiri and Pakistani militants for the insurgency in Kashmir.”81

80
Rubin., Barnett R., “U.S Policy in Afghanistan”, Muslim Politics Report, No.11 Jan. Feb. 1997, Council
on Foreign Relations, Washington D.C., no. 11., p. 2.
81
Rizvi, Hasan Askari, “Pakistan in 1998: The Policy Under Pressure”, Asian Survey, Vol. 39,No. 1
January/February 1999,p. 184
32 Ijaz Khan

There were some thoughts in some circles at least, that Central Asian republics being
Muslim, will provide Pakistan with an ability to play a role that can weave these new states
into a security arrangement with it, thus enhancing its prestige, strength and position
internationally as well as vis a vis India. Such overtures brought Pakistan into competition
with not just India but also other Muslim states, Iran and Turkey, who had their own policies
and goals in these republics. The three allies of the cold war thus broke out quite publicly in
Afghanistan. Thus one notes a convergence of policies between Iran, Turkey, India, most of
the Central Asian Republics, and Russia in Afghanistan, expressed through their common
support for the anti Taliban Northern alliance, leaving out Pakistan in isolation in support of
Taliban. USA also gradually drew towards that grouping till 9/11 made it make the final leap,
leaving Pakistan with neither much choice nor much time.
Despite the lowering of strategic significance of Afghanistan for US, it had maintained
an interest mainly if not solely due to its proximity to Central Asia and Iran. When Taliban
emerged in 1994, US had shown an interest in and sympathy towards them. US expected
Taliban to (a) stop Russian, and Iranian influences in Afghanistan82 (b) restore order to all of
Afghanistan (c) get rid of terrorist training camps (d) pave the way for the return of the
former King Zahir Shah (e) ‘most importantly, Taliban promised to open doors for the
construction of giant gas and oil pipelines from Central Asia down through Afghanistan to
Pakistan, thus avoiding Iran.83 However, the arrival of Osama Bin Laden and growing Human
Rights concerns had led to distancing between the United States and Taliban since 1996,
which almost completely broke after the 1998 US cruise missile attacks against terrorist
camps in Afghanistan.84

Energy Interests

The main International backer of Taliban appears to be International Oil interests rather
than the US government. UNOCAL (Union Oil Company of California), an American Oil
and Gas giant and its Saudi partner Delta were the real supporters of Taliban.85
Since the break down of Soviet Union, a new element had entered the regional politics
for control of Afghanistan and that was international oil interests. Afghanistan provided one
of the best alternate outlets to Central Asian oil. At this stage UNOCAL an American oil
giant entered the scene with interests in pumping out oil and gas from Turkmenistan through
Afghanistan to Pakistan and beyond. United States wanted end to Central Asian [the Central
Asian states also were interested in alternate outlets] reliance on Russian routes. However, in

82
Ahmed Samina, “The United States and Terrorism in Southwest Asia: September 11 and Beyond”,
International Security, Vol. 26,No. 3 Winter 2001/02, pp. 79–93 at pp. 83-84
83
Barnett R. Rubin, 1997. p. 6.
84
Mackenzie., Richard, The United States and The Taliban, in ibid 1998, pp. 90-103.
85
For details of the support Taliban received from UNOCAL and Delta, read Forsythe., Rosemarie, ‘The
Politics of Oil in The Caucasus and Central Asia, Adelphi paper no. 300, IISS London 1996. Mackenzie
Richard, ‘The United States and the Taliban, in Fundamentalism Reborn; Afghanistan and the Taliban
Maley Williams, (ed.) Vanguard Lahore, 1998, pp. 90 – 103 at p.98 -99.
 The Making of Pakistan’s Strategic Culture and Pro Taliban Afghan Policy 33

this search for alternates Iran was also to be avoided, for political and strategic considerations
rather than economic.86
The significance of oil and gas considerations in influencing US policy and by extension
that of Pakistan can be gauged from US Vice President Dick Cheney’s statement concerning
initial US policy towards Taliban, he remarked, "the good Lord didn't see fit to put oil and
gas only where there are democratically elected regimes friendly to the United States.
Occasionally we have to operate in places where, all things considered, one would not
normally choose to go. But, we go where the business is."87
These International and Regional inputs combined with the inputs from memory made
the ingredients of Pakistan’s decision to support Taliban in 1994, when they emerged in
1994.

Pakistan’s Domestic Processes and Influences in the Making of the Decision

to Support Taliban

Whether Taliban were the products of Pakistan or later adopted by it, is debatable.
However, going into that debate would take us away from our focus. It is beyond doubt that
Pakistan did support them as soon as they emerged. The decision fitted well with Pakistan’s
erstwhile developments as a State and society and with the international and regional geo–
strategic situation, the way it looked from Pakistan. Pakistani decision makers infatuated with
the idea of controlling Afghanistan combined with many other influences to adopt Taliban for
the purpose, when it was seen that Gulbadin Hekmatyar was unable to dislodge President
Rabbani from Kabul. In this section we see how the internal political and institutional as well
as individual influences made that choice in the overall external and historical context
explained above.
“In the 1980s Pakistan’s Afghan policy was conducted with the help of the Jamaat–e–
Islami (JI), the main rival of JUI inside Pakistan, and the Afghan Hezb–e–Islami, led by
Gulbadin Hekmatyar. For a decade the ISI’s connection with JI and Hezb were the
government’s main instrument of policy, which for example ensured that armaments from the
US and Arab Countries went largely to the Ghilzai Pashtun (Hekmatyar was also a Ghilzai
Pashto, though he came from Northern Afghanistan, where non Pashtuns form the majority)
warlords, who lived in central and north eastern Afghanistan. In comparison, the Durrani
Pashtuns, who dominated the south and Kandahar and who generally backed the return of the
former Afghan monarch Zahir Shah88, were largely ignored by the ISI and the American

86
Olcot. Martha Brill, “Pipeline and Pipe Dreams: Energy Development and Caspian Society”, ‘Journal of
International Affairs’, Fall 1999, 53, no. 1.p. 308.
87
Callari., Ron “Energy Interests, The U.S. Government, And The Post-Taliban Trans-Afghan Pipeline”
‘Central Asia - Caucasus Analysis’ an online journal of SAIS John Hopkins University,
http://www.kiddmillennium.com/Trans-Afghanpipeline.htm, 22 May, 2002
88
King Zahir Shah was never liked by Pakistan as his government was remembered as friendly to India as
well as closer to the Pashtun Nationalists of NWFP, and being the ruler responsible for revoking the
Durand Line Agreement between Afghanistan and British India, and initiator of all the problems
Pakistan had with Afghanistan since independence in 1947. In late 1980s there was a proposal for his
return, which Pakistan was apparently giving at least a thoughtful consideration, however, a statement
34 Ijaz Khan

CIA.”89 By 1994, it had become clear that Gulbadin Hekmatyar is not able to militarily oust
the government of Prof. Burhannudin Rabbani. By that time the differences between the
Rabbani government and Pakistan had become public. It was in this background that Taliban
suddenly emerged from Kandahar.

Institutional, Individual Associational and Non Associational Inputs

The lack of institutionalisation of decision–making in Pakistan makes it impossible to
look at the role of institutions, individuals, associations and non associational sources of
inputs separately. They intertwine, and mix with each other so profusely that this section
looks at their role collectively in an attempt to understand their role in correct context and
according to the relative strength of their influence on the final outcome.
The policy of support for Taliban were the joint working of Gen. Babar and Maulana
Fazal–ur–Rehman, who with the agreement of Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto acting on the
behest of Americans who wanted to take Afghan policy out of the hands of ISI. Added to this
were the political considerations of the new PPP government, which saw JI as a party
diametrically on the opposite side of its political orientations and a challenge to its political
strength. JUI on the other side had grown closer to it. ISI’s preference for Hekmatyar was not
liked by all these quarters and individuals due to his alignment with JI and thus by extension
with International Islamic extremism that was increasingly associated with terrorism.90 Even
if ISI was not involved with its creation or initial emergence or as a US Embassy report
claimed it opposed their emergence91, it quickly adopted them is evident from subsequent
events.92 Interestingly, JI was also not in favour of this change. Qazi Hussain Ahmad leader
of JI termed there emergence as a conspiracy hatched by United States and Britain.93
However, JI also changed its hostile attitude along the time ISI’s attitude changed. JI tried to
play role of a reconciliatory between Hekmatyar and Taliban unsuccessfully. JI however,
developed a cautious supportive attitude, hoping, and later developments proved them
correct, that once in power, with ISI support, these Taliban would not be able to stay away
from the international fundamentalist Islamic movement, of which JI was an integral part.94
Pakistani military had continued to control major foreign policy decisions throughout the
1990s is an assertion that can be made on sound and strong grounds. For Pakistani military

from India in support of his return put an end to it as far as Pakistan was concerned. President Zia
termed the Indian statement as a ‘kiss of death’ for any chance of King Zahir Shah’s return. Interviews
with Ilyas Khan, a well reputed journalist from Peshawar as well as Afrasiab Khattak, leader of ANP.
89
Rashid Ahmad., “Pakistan and Taliban” in Fundamentalism Reborn, Afghanistan and The Taliban, (ed),
William Maley, Vanguard, Lahore. 1998, p.74.
90
ibid. p. 76.
91
U.S. Embassy (Islamabad), Cable, ‘[Excised] Believe Pakistan is Backing Taliban,’ December 6, 1994.
92
ISI was directly involved in Taliban takeover of Kandahar in December 1994. U.S. Department of State,
Memorandum, titled "Developments in Afghanistan," December 5, 1994. According to Ahmad Rashid
ISI had bribed the governor of Kandahar, Naquib, not to resist the Taliban. The governor obliged.
Ahamd., Rashid, The Taliban: The Story of Afghan Warlords, Macmillan, London, p.39.
93
Rashid Ahmad, 1988 p. 81.
94
Discussions with JI workers in Peshawar, on 15 February 2004. In this assessment they proved to be more
correct than the United States or those Pashtun Nationalists [noted below] who considered Taliban
would remain localized or would eventually give up power to King Zahir Shah or at least gradually drift
towards moderation and accommodation of secular Pashtuns.
 The Making of Pakistan’s Strategic Culture and Pro Taliban Afghan Policy 35

Taliban were tools of a specific policy. That policy continued to be based on having a
government in Afghanistan that it controls, with which India has nothing to do, and provides
a peaceful, and secure access to Central Asia as well as put an end to the Durand Line issue.
The policy remained the same as it had been since at least 1979, with basis rooted in history
since 1947 and may be earlier. The only thing that changed was the instruments of
achievement of foreign policy goals.
In Pakistan, Benazir Bhutto had formed the federal government in 1993. Major Gen.
(Retd) Naseerullah Babar95 was made the home minister of her government. More
significantly, JUI–F was an ally of this government and Maulana Fazal–Ur–Rehman head of
the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the National Assembly. The foreign minister of her
government, Sardar Assef Ahmad Ali, belonged to a smaller faction of Pakistan Muslim
League, allied to her party’s government. The central role of Gen. Babar in the emergence of
Taliban and Pakistan’s all out support for them is an established fact of Pakistan’s history.
William Maley calls him the ‘godfather of Taliban’.96 Pakistani decision to support Taliban
was initially opposed by ISI, the agency that had been running Pakistan’s Afghan policy
during the 1980s and early 1990s. Due to US pressure to cleanse the ISI of its extremist
religious cadre, inducted into it during the 1980s, in 1993 a considerable number of officers
were removed from the intelligence agency. For much of 1994 ISI had retreated into a shell
as far as Afghanistan was concerned till the capture of Kandahar. Similarly, Foreign Ministry
of Pakistan was also sidelined as far as Afghanistan went. The interior ministry under Gen.
(Retd) Babar and PPP ally JUI spearheaded Pakistani support for Taliban and thus were both
conducting and making Pakistan Afghan policy decisions. Gen. Babar had established an
‘Afghan Trade Development Cell’ in the Interior Ministry. The cell was supposed to look
after development of trade interests with Afghanistan and Central Asia. Clearly that was the
job of Commerce ministry. The real function of this cell was to coordinate government
support for the Taliban. ISI’s non involvement if not all out opposition ended by December
1995, when Taliban attacked and took control of Kandhar. By that time, ISI had taken over
complete charge of Pakistan’s Taliban policy. ISI’s absence from Pakistan’s initial support
for Taliban should not be interpreted as Army having no role in, let alone opposition to
Pakistani decision to support Taliban. The Army under ethnic Pashtun Chief of Army Staff
General Waheed Kakar97 agreed and supported the government’s evolving pro Taliban
policy. By 1995 the view that Taliban were the only hope for Pakistan’s Afghan policy
prevailed both in the Military and ISI. From that time onwards, ISI and Military adopted the
Taliban till at least the fateful day of 9/11.98 This support had US blessing has also been
established.

95
It was the same Gen. Babar who was governor of NWFP in 1974, during the Prime Minister ship of
Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto.
96
Maley. William, The Afghanistan Wars, Palgrave, London, 2002. p. 229.
97
One should not read too much into the ethnic identity of Waheed Kakar, as Pakistan Army is very well
disciplined and highly institutionalized organization. Individuals groomed in its fold tend to forget their
earlier identities and cultural traits. The higher they go in it the more they become Army men and not
Pashtuns or Punjabis. Whatever, they would always strongly believe in the supremacy of the military
mind.
98
Ahmad Rashid, “Pakistan and Taliban”, in Maley William, editor, Fundamentalism Reborn, Afghanistan
and Taliban, Vanguard. Lahore, 1998, pp. 84-89.
36 Ijaz Khan

Within Pakistan, the transport interests, a growing young population of graduates of

Madrassas (Both Afghans and Pakistanis),99 a lucrative business of oil permits for individuals
with the right political connections all acted towards a specific outcome. Leader of Jamiat
Ulema Islam, (JUI–F) Maulana Fazal Ur Rehman had an increased influence inside
Afghanistan as a result of his party’s control of most of the Madrassas that were providing an
increasing number of recruits to various Afghan warring outfits. JUI–F was allied to the
government of Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto. JUI–F was one faction of the party that had
earlier been divided in two parts, after the death of Maulana Mufti Mehmood, father of
Maulana Fazal Ur Rehman. One faction was led by Maulana Fazal Rehman and the other by
Maulana Sami–ul–Haq, head of Haqqania100, a Madrassa that claims most of the Mujahideen
and later day Taliban as its students. Maulana Fazal Ur Rehman faction, however, lays claim
to wider electoral support as well as control of much more Madrassas and hence influence in
Afghan affairs.101
At this stage it is important to understand the relationship between JUI and NAP, which
would help in understanding later developments, one must understand the NAP JUI
relationship. Maulana Mufti Mehmud father of Maulana Fazal–ur–Rehman who was head of
the united JUI was Chief Minister of the NAP–JUI coalition government of NWFP in 1973–
4. Though they fought the 1970 general elections against each other, they formed an alliance
afterwards. The reason for this alliance was mainly as far as NAP was concerned to stop
Khan Abdul Qayum Khan102 from becoming Chief Minister of the province. The fact that JUI
was the heir to Jamiat–e–Ulema–e–Hind, a party that was allied with All India Congress
during the freedom movement, helped the two get closer. JUI had an anti colonial heritage
that was appreciated by the nationalists. JUI was also opposed to Jamaat–e–Islami, the party
of urban middle class religious fundamentalists, who were considered the real enemy by the
secular forces. Maulana Mufti Mehmud earned the respect of Pashtun nationalists, when he
resigned as chief minister in protest against the dismissal of NAP government in Balochistan.
This good will of the Pashtun nationalists that JUI earned explains to an extent the attitudes
of some nationalists, if not all, towards Taliban, in their initial period. However, there were
basic differences between the two, as both appealed to the rural based Pashtun, and NAP was
a secular while JUI was a religious party. During the 1980s JUI had drifted away from its
nationalist allies of the 1970s. The simple reason being the nationalists support or at least
sympathy (according to their critics’ confusion) towards the Communist regime in
Afghanistan and the JUI’s all out support for the Mujahideen, even if its role was initially
secondary to that of JI.

99
Madrassa is a Muslim religious seminary.
100
Situated in Ditrsict Nowshera of NWFP, it boasts to have among its graduates Mujahideen luminaries like
Jala Ud Di Haqqani.
101
Rashid., Ahmad,1998. p.76
102
Khan Abdul Qayyum Khan was an anathema to Pashtun nationalists. Starting his political career in All
India Congress as a partner of the Abdul Ghaffar Khan in the 1930s, he later joined Muslim League and
is largely held responsible by the Nationalists to have played the main role in foiling an understanding
between Mr. Jinnah and Abdul Ghaffar Khan in 1948. Failure of that rapprochement started a chain of
events that negatively influenced the relations of Pakistani state and Pashtun Nationalists for times to
come and from which they never recovered. Interview with Ajmal Khattak, leader of ANP dated 12
December 2003.
 The Making of Pakistan’s Strategic Culture and Pro Taliban Afghan Policy 37

The newly gained influence of JUI in Afghanistan through vast number of graduates of
religious madrassas in Afghan civil war had made it play a new role. Maj. Gen. (Retd) Naseer
Ullah Babar, a minister now in the PPP government in Islamabad, responsible for the original
coming of Mujahideen leaders to Pakistan that included Gulbadin Hekmatyar, was not happy
with the close association these leaders had with JI. JI was in strong opposition to the PPP
government. Gen. Babar, an ethnic Pashtun, and secular by political persuasion, was,
however, distrustful of the Pashtun nationalists as well. JUI, which was an ally of the
government of PPP, was ready to take over the dominant role, in Afghanistan, from its
political and religious rival JI. JUI having its roots in the rural Pashtuns, considered Awami
National Party (ANP)103 as competitor in that constituency. ANP after an initial alliance with
PPP, had broken away to become allied with Pakistan Muslim League (led by the industrialist
from Punjab, Mian Nawaz Sharif). The emergence of Taliban at such a juncture, even if one
accepts the argument of them being totally indigenous, fitted into Pakistani decision makers’
vision of Pakistani interests in Afghanistan.

Pashtun Nationalists and Taliban

One must quickly point out another interesting feature of this era. Although the makers
of the Pakistan policy to support Taliban were doing it with the exclusion of these Pashtun
nationalists, many among them [from both sides of the Durand Line, however, not the
mainstream parties that opposed them from beginning] were sympathetic towards Taliban.
They argued that the Taliban being traditional religious people, not connected to the Pan
Islamism of Hezb–I–Islami of Afghanistan or JI of Pakistan, coming from Kandahar104, and
not very educated in terms of running a modern state, and more importantly, almost wholly
being composed of Pashtuns would in the long run be beneficial to Pashtuns. They were
expecting that once the Taliban had ousted the Rabbani government, they would welcome
King Zahir Shah and other Afghan expatriates from Europe and North America, who would
have the required expertise to rebuild the states. Another interesting component of the
Taliban was some former Khalqis.105 The Pashtun nationalists were fast disillusioned when

103
ANP was formed in 1986, according to some at the behest of Afghan communists, who wanted to rival
the religious appeal of its opponents to Pashtun identity. A large number of leftist political parties from
all over Pakistan joined it, however, its leadership was given to Khan Abdul Wali Khan, the Pashtun
nationalist leader. Interview with Mukhtiar Bacha dated 15 January 2004.
104
At least one very prominent Pashtun nationalist remarked to this writer in 1995, that any movement that
emerges from Kandahar has historically been in the interest of Pashtuns. Taliban origin there thus
makes them in the interest of Pashtuns. This is confirmed by a number of Pashtun Nationalist activists in
personal interviews with this author including Abid Jan Dir, Zakir Hussain Batkhela and Sahib Shah
Sabir Sakha Kot, all in Malakand Division NWFP. A number of Pashtuns from Afghanistan at a
workshop at Area Study Centre, University of Peshawar, in September 2006, expressed their
expectations of the Taliban to give up government in Kabul to King Zahir Shah or other educated
Pashtuns, once they had taken control of Kabul. This was a failure of the liberal Pashtun Nationalist in
comprehending Pakistani Strategic Culture, which thrives on threat perceptions from India. King Zahir
Shah or Pashtun Nationalists from either side of the Durand Line, due to their past or in some cases
present connections with India, simply could not have gained anything out of a move supported by the
Pakistani military establishment.
105
Peoples Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) was divided into two factions, Parchamies and Khalqis,
named after the newspapers Parcham (Flag) and Khalq (people) both factions published, much before
the communist revolution of 1978. Khalq mainly consisted of Pashtuns, while Parcham membership was
38 Ijaz Khan

Taliban entered Kabul and the treatment106 they meted out to former President Najibullah,
who had taken refuge in the UN compound since 1992. In all fairness it must be pointed out
that not all Pashtun nationalists supported Taliban. ANP and PashtunKhwa Milli Awami
Party (PMAP) [Pro Pashtun National Peoples Party] led by Mahmud Khan Achakzai, mainly
based in the Pashtun areas of Balochistan had opposed the rise of Taliban from their
beginning in 1994.107

Continued Pakistani Support to Taliban till 9/11

Pakistan continued its support for Taliban till September 2001, even though most of the
original supporters of Taliban had gradually backed out. The extent and comprehensiveness
of this Pakistani support has been well illustrated by the Human Rights Watch:
Lined up with the Taliban is Pakistan, which has supported various factions within
Afghanistan since at least the 1970s. Official denials notwithstanding, Pakistan has provided
the Taliban with military advisers and logistical support during key battles, has bankrolled
the Taliban, has facilitated transhipment of arms, ammunition, and fuel through its territory,
and has openly encouraged the recruitment of Pakistanis to fight for the Taliban. In flagrant
violation of the U.N. sanctions imposed in December 2000, Pakistan has continued to permit
arms to cross its borders into Taliban–controlled territory. According to sources in
Afghanistan and Pakistan, in April and May 2001 up to thirty trucks were crossing the border
at Torkham daily en route to Jalalabad; at least some of these were carrying tank rounds,
artillery shells, and rocket–propelled grenades. Pakistani antipersonnel and anti–vehicle
mines have been found in Afghanistan. Observers interviewed by Human Rights Watch in
Afghanistan and Pakistan have also reported that Pakistani aircraft assisted with troop
rotations of Taliban forces during combat operations in late 2000 and that senior members of
Pakistan’s intelligence agency and army were involved in planning military operations. A
range of private and semi–private agencies in Pakistan has provided enormous support to the
Taliban with the full knowledge of government officials, even when their actions violated
Pakistani law. In addition, Saudi Arabia has provided funds and heavily subsidized fuel to the
Taliban, through Pakistan, while private actors and some officials benefit from the smuggling
that links these countries. The extent of outside support, particularly during the Taliban’s
northern offensive in late 2000, was noted by U.N. Secretary–General Kofi Annan in a
November 2000 report to the General Assembly.108
This policy of supporting Taliban was taking Pakistan towards an international as well as
regional isolation. The international community as well as regional states had increasing
become wary of Taliban policies, both domestic and foreign. Pakistani policy makers could

mainly non Pashtun. However, the ethnic basis of the divide was not absolute as President Najibullah
was a Parcham member, even though he was a Pashtun.
106
President Najibullah, was dragged out of UN compound and hanged to a pole in central Kabul, where his
dead body remained for three days. Daily, The News Islamabad, 27 September 1996.
107
Ahmad Rashid, 1998, pp. 81
108
Human Rights Watch Report ‘Afghanistan: Crisis of Impunity, The Role of Pakistan, Russia and Iran in
Fuelling the War’ Vol. 13, No. 3 (C). Also available on the internet at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2001/
afghan2, July 2001. accessed 20 January 2004.
 The Making of Pakistan’s Strategic Culture and Pro Taliban Afghan Policy 39

not convince themselves, to give up the opportunity that had almost been realised, to control
Afghanistan, to the exclusion of anyone else, especially India, and Iran. United States backed
out of supporting Taliban, when it was reported that the Osama Bin Laden had returned to
Afghanistan in 1996. In fact, he was one of the major financiers of Taliban. By 1988 this
distancing of US from Taliban turned into outright opposition, when evidence pointed
towards Osama Bin Laden in the case of destruction of its embassy in Tanzania and Kenya.
US missiles hit some alleged terrorist bases in Afghanistan and Sudan.109 UNOCAL, the
American oil giant, announced the abandoning of its plans to lay down oil and gas pipelines
from Turkmenistan to Pakistan and beyond, through Afghanistan.110 However, Pakistan
persisted with its policy of supporting Taliban, totally ignoring the international and regional
developments.
This policy was not affected by the changes of government in Islamabad. PPP’s
government had been dismissed in 1996, which means that Gen. Babar or for that matter,
JUI–F were no more in the government. JI remained in opposition to the new government of
Nawaz Sharif as well. In 1999, through a military coup, Gen. Pervaiz Musharraf took control
of the government of Pakistan. However, Pakistan’s Afghan policy of supporting Taliban
remained unaffected by these changes. Pakistani decision makers continued to view Taliban
rule in Afghanistan as the best possible means of its goals in Afghanistan. Despite differences
in approaches to domestic issues, even some international issues, this policy continued to
receive support from a large variety of opinion, not just fundamentalist political parties. This
included the JI, JUI, PML (from all its factions when it divided into pro and anti Nawaz
Sharif factions after the Oct 1999 coup) from the right of the Pakistani politics. Gen.
Naseerullah Babar of PPP continued to express strong support for Taliban,111 even as his
party, PPP, changed its stance from 1996 onwards.112 With a few exceptions most of the
intelligentsia, and for that matter not necessarily religious, was vocal in support of Taliban.113
Pashtun Nationalists changed their lukewarm attitude towards them, when Taliban hanged
Najibullah in 1996 and it also became clear that they would not relinquish power in favour
King Zahir Shah. To be fair one must acknowledge that political parties from rest of the
country that had either nationalistic, democratic or left of the Centre leanings also opposed

109
Daily ‘The News’, Islamabad, Aug. 21, 1998.
110
UNOCAL Statement: Suspension of activities related to proposed natural gas pipeline across Afghanistan
http://www.unocal.com/uclnews/98news/082198.htm, 21 August 1998. Accessed 20 June 2004
111
Maj Gen (retd) Naseerullah Babar continued to have sympathetic views towards Taliban even after 9/11.
He expressed deep resentment over the US attacks on Afghanistan and condemned Pakistan
government's support to them. He said it was very unfortunate that all efforts of Pakistan for the past 28
years were washed away by a decision of a "coward leader. He further commented that Pakistan’s
efforts and policy for the past more than 20 years has been totally abandoned and lost. "Daily Dawn
Karachi, 9 October 2001.
112
Statement by Pakistan People’s Party spokesman, “Pakistan Should Distance Itself from Taliban: PPP”,
Daily Dawn, Karachi September 14,2001
113
Support to Taliban from non religious circles was wide, especially in Punjab and Karachi, and has been
extensively published. While Pashtun members of Parliament which included Asfandyar Wali Khan and
Afzal Khan [then a federal minister]of ANP, Mahmud Khan Achakzai of PMAP as well Syed Abbas
Shah of Muslim League (an ethnic Pashtun) condemned Taliban treatment of Najibullah as well as their
policies, MP from Punjab Raja Afzal, Ijaz–ul–Haq (son of Gen. Zia Ul Haq) Sheikh Rashid and others
supported them. Read for details Daily, ‘Business Recorder’ Islamabad, 29 September 1996.
40 Ijaz Khan

the policy of supporting Taliban. To this list some Non Government Organisations also must
be added. They argued that support for Taliban in Afghanistan would not remain confined to
that state only. It would also promote Talibanization of Pakistani state and Society. They
were also wary of the influence on Pakistani state’s Kashmir policy, which was increasingly
being conducted in the style of Mujahideen resistance to Soviet Union during the 1980s. The
influence of such a policy on Pakistan–India relations was negative and alarming, they
argued.114 However, these arguments did not come from those having much influence in the
decision–making circles and so had no real impact on the final policy decisional outcomes.
The foreign office had also expressed reservations about continued support for Taliban,
including some individual voices of stronger opposition to the pro Taliban policy. However,
these were successfully countered by the very powerful ISI. Pakistan's Inter–Services
Intelligence (ISI) has not only successfully advocated that Pakistan recognise the Taliban as
Afghanistan's government, but also indicates that the ISI has warded off Pak Foreign
Ministry "attempts to close certain Madrassas (religious schools) in the tribal agencies and
near the Afghan border, which have been the spawning grounds for Taliban hard–liners."115

CONCLUSIONS

Pakistan’s Afghan Policy remained the same as it had matured in 1989, with minor
adjustments according to demands of changing times, experiences and opportunities. That
policy was simply to have a government in Afghanistan, which would be very close, (if one
wants to avoid calling it controlled by; officially it is referred to as ‘friendly government’) to
it. India must be kept away from Afghanistan at all costs. Durand Line issue must be buried
and as such Pashtun nationalists, especially the heirs to the political legacy of Abdul Ghaffar
Khan, should be kept away from any connection with those who have power in Kabul, which
has translated into support for non–secular and religious Pashtuns as tools for furthering
Pakistan’s Afghan policy. The continuation of this policy was due to the fact that no real
change had taken place in the decision–making process of Pakistani state. The essential
ingredients of the postcolonial state and military dominance of Pakistani state that sustained
the India centric foreign policy remained unchanged. A religious militarist mind set, still
dominant feudal societal relations, sustained the decision–making in which there was very
little, if any, room for independent inputs. Political governments along with the Foreign
Office bureaucracy have generally played a conformist role, with little if any role in
substantive policy making.116 Institutionally Army remained (and remains so to date)

114
Discussions with representatives of various Political Parities and Non Governmental Organisations
working for peace which included Political Parties Pakistan Awami Tehreek (Pakistan Peaples
Movement) mainly based in rural Sindh headed by Rassol Baksh Paleejo, Balochistan National
Movement and Pakistan National Party based in Balochistan, and Pakistan Labour Party and Pakistan
Sarailki Party based in Punjab. The NGOs include Pakistan Peace Coalition, Human Rights
Commission of Pakistan, Citizens Peace Committee Islamabad/Rawalpindi
115
U.S. Embassy (Islamabad) Cable, ‘Pakistan [Excised] On Afghanistan, HUA, Bin Laden,’ February 27,
1997.
116
Waseem Mohammad, 2002, p. 266
 The Making of Pakistan’s Strategic Culture and Pro Taliban Afghan Policy 41

dominant; rather its role was been further strengthened.117 In the post Zia elected
governments, the ISI appeared to have exercised a veto power in some crucial foreign policy
matters in the region.
It was in this background, that Pakistani decision makers were suddenly faced with a
radically different international and regional situation. On September 11 2001, terrorists
attacked the Twin Towers in New York and Pentagon, killing thousands in the process.
White house was also a target, however, the terrorists failed in hitting it. US quickly
determined the source to be from the sanctuary of Taliban ruled Afghanistan. This brought
two streams of information in Pakistan’s foreign policy decision-making, history and
domestic system into conflict with streams of information or inputs from its external
environment. It was in this background that Pakistan had very limited choices in the
aftermath of that fateful day, which are the subject of our next chapter.

117
For a thorough and in depth study of Military domination of Pakistani state and society read, Rizvi Hasan
Rizvi, Military, State and Society in Pakistan, Sang–e–Meel Publishers, Lahore, 2003.
Chapter 3

PAKISTAN’S AFGHAN POLICY SHIFT:

RESPONSE TO THE WAR ON TERRORISM

This chapter focuses on the making of the Pakistan’s Afghan policy shift as a result of
9/11, thus building on the preceding chapter that described and explained Pakistan’s Afghan
policy till September 2001. On that fateful day Pakistan’s pro Taliban Afghan policy stood in
direct conflict with the International Community led by United States of America. The focus
of this chapter is to identify how Pakistan chose the particular response that it did. Pakistan
decided to become part of the global alliance against terrorism woven by United States.
Consequently it changed its Afghan policy, at least as far as it was based on an all out support
for Taliban. This chapter argues that the policy shift was more a result of the top leadership
realising the impossibility of choosing any other option than going along with the
international coalition. The domestic opinion was at best divided about it. The opposition to
this change significantly came from part of the dominant sections of the state and society.
Important segments of the policy-making elite and significantly, the erstwhile allies, who had
gradually become partners, of the Pakistani state establishment, the religious groups opposed
this change. In this decision external factors and the top leadership, and the person of
President Musharraf were crucial to the final outcome. While the decision to support Taliban
after 1994, till 2001, was more a result of domestic processes and perceptions, which by and
large suited external inputs as well, the decision to change it after 9/11 was more a result of
external considerations and influences in contradiction with domestic sources. Accordingly
this chapter first explains the international system when 9/11 happened followed by the
regional environment. The chapter concludes with identification of the options that were
available to Pakistan in that international and regional environment and how Pakistan made
its choice? Thus identifying a contradiction in a response suggested by its strategic culture
and the decision it had to take. This contradiction, which still persists, has resulted in deep
polarization in Pakistani state and society; the persistence in the pro Taliban thrust of
Pakistan’s Strategic culture, sometimes results in actions and statements, that continue to fuel
allegations of Pakistan not fully cooperating in the ‘War against Terrorism’ or even of
Pakistan giving support to the Taliban.
44 Ijaz Khan

INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM

Taking a pluralist view of the international system this study views it as system of
interaction at multiple levels and through multiple channels with much less control by the
state with every passing day. The process of state erosion had started much earlier however,
received a boost from the end of cold war. The significance of the end of Cold War is more in
the weakening of statism rather than in the defeat of Communism or Soviet Union.
The erosion of state sovereignty in the wake of economic globalisation, and
technological revolution has meant not just the rise of an assertive global civil society with
focus on respect for human rights and rule of law and other issues of common interest to the
humanity, like peace, environmental degradation and development, but it has also facilitated
communications between a different type of non state actors as well, more significantly,
violent challengers to the international order, commonly referred to as terrorists, international
criminal mafias involved in illicit drug as well as weapons trade. Terrorism is not a new
phenomenon or a new challenge, however, its intensity, magnitude and level has reached a
higher stage, and so has the reaction to it. It needs to be emphasized that in the post 9/11 era
the fight between international terrorism and international society has become a core issue of
international relations, without fundamentally altering them.
The horrendous events of September 11, 2001, dramatic and devastating as they were, do
not point towards emergence of a totally new phenomenon. They brought home to many,
changes that were taking place already. Even terrorism as such was not a new phenomenon;
however, “the new age of terrorism began in 1993 with the first attempt to destroy the World
Trade Centre, followed by a conspiracy to kill 4,000 air travellers more or less
simultaneously by destroying 11 jumbo jets over pacific in 1995, the killing of 224 people in
east Africa {US} embassy bombings, which were meant to be a part of a still larger attack in
1998, the attempt to kill hundreds in simultaneous attacks in the US and Jordan around the
time of the Millennium, and the successful killing of thousands in New York, Washington
and Pennsylvania this year. It is not clear whether all these attacks were the work of Al–
Qaeda, but it is nearly certain that one or more of the conspirators in each of these cases
sojourned in Afghanistan and had contact with senior Al–Qaeda figures.”118 The point is,
while not questioning the magnitude of the September 11 events, the phenomenon behind the
events was not a new creation and similarly the reactions to it were also not totally new,
without any foundations in prior developments. The real significance of 9/11, as the day is
now commonly referred to, is that on that fateful day some long continuing processes reached
a certain culminating point. The conflict fault lines became clearer. Terrorism had by then
been long recognised the emerging challenge to world order and system of independent
states. The remaining super power of the post cold war world order, United States of
America, had long recognised the threat posed by it.119 The significance of 9/11 lies in the
fact that it intensified what was already in the process. It brought home the fact that

118
Simon Steven, & Benjamin Daniel, ‘The Terror, ‘Survival’, Vol. 42, no. 4, Winter 2001-02 p.5
119
Laura K. Donohue: In the Name of National Security: U.S. Counterterrorist Measures, 1960-2000. BCSIA
Discussion Paper 2001-6, ESDP Discussion Paper ESDP-2001-04, John F. Kennedy School of
Government, Harvard University, August 2001.
 Pakistan’s Afgan Policy Shift 45

international relations and society has changed, but the methods of its management have seen
no corresponding change.
A very defining characteristic of the post cold war world order is an ongoing controversy
over US unilateralism and the emphasis on rule of law and more assertiveness of international
organisations, like United Nations. There was a debate within the United States as well,
however, for our purposes more significant is the fact of a difference of perception between
United States and Western Europe on the issue. United States taking the view, becoming
more pronounced during the Republican Presidency, of unilateral US leadership of the world
and Western Europe, especially France, Germany and Russia taking the more multilateral
approach. The difference that has become very well known after the recent US war against
Saddam ruled Iraq and major European powers, with the exception of UK, is not something
new, rather the Iraq war only highlighted the simmering difference between the two sides of
the Atlantic. 9/11 had temporarily subdued these differences as there was no need for US
unilateral action, due to the almost unanimous support it received for its ‘War against
Terrorism’.

United States of America as the main architect of the International System

United States of America remained the sole super power after the end of Cold War, with
both military and economic global strength, interests and reach, and a political will to
demonstrate that. “Yet it was (prior to September 11 2001) uncertain as to how to exert this,
wavering between a multilateral approach, favoured by Clinton… and the unilateral, which is
not the same as isolationist, policy favoured by Bush. The signs of that unilateralism were
evident enough in the first few months: rejection of Kyoto, stalling on OECD regulation of
tax heavens, sliding out of chemical warfare conventions, national missile defense system,
and sneering at the UN, to name but a few.”120
A new sense of vulnerability in the West, [this sense is present in the rest of the world as
well however, the intensity may not be as much] especially in the United States, has emerged
in the wake of 9/11. If this is the kind of damage that could be done by a handful of people
willing to commit suicide, employing creative imagination but zero level primary technology,
what would be the impact of a really full–scale attack going chemical, biological or even
nuclear? The concept of “asymmetric”121 security threats moved in an instant from
abstraction to alarming reality. In America the shock of losing both the physical and
psychological protection of the geographic separation as well as super power status, has been
particularly acute, but the shock of 9/11 has been felt everywhere around the world. This is
certainly affecting the way governments behave toward each other.
The United States both due to being the direct target of 9/11 as well as being the sole
super power with global reach, capabilities, interests and willingness [a willingness that has

120
Halliday Fred., “A New Global Configuration” in Worlds in Collision: Terror and the Future of Global
Order, (Ed.) Booth., Ken and Dunne., Tim, Palgrave, New York, 2002 p.236.
121
Asymmetric threats refers to the threats posed to great powers by seemingly small and insignificant
powers or groups, unlike that posed by equal or apparently equal powers like the threat posed by Soviet
Union was during the cold war. The conflict between Terrorists and the US led alliance is the best and
current example.
46 Ijaz Khan

increased since 9/11] to act has emerged as the leading power in the ‘War against Terrorism’.
It was United States that declared ‘War on Terrorism’122 and is providing leadership for it,
both materially and politically. United States has thus come out with a strategy to deal with
global terrorism. Even before being presented as a coherent document, the outlines of the
strategy were visible. President Bush, while declaring ‘War on Terrorism’ outlined the basics
of US strategy. He underlined the significance of global alliance under US leadership mainly
dependent on American military might for the War against Terrorism’. He also emphasised
the non-military, political, social and economic aspects of the War. He clearly drew the lines,
leaving no room for neutrality, “I will put every nation on notice that these duties involve
more than sympathy or words. No nation can be neutral in this conflict, because no civilised
nation can be secure in a world threatened by terror.”123 The events of 9/11 received universal
condemnation, which quickly translated into support for the ‘War against Terrorism’ and
drew supporters not just from allies, in Europe or elsewhere, but states such as Peoples
Republic of China and Russia also gave support to the United States. The UN Security
Council resolutions124 on the subject reflected this global consensus. The immediate task or
the first stage of the ‘War against Terrorism’ to remove Taliban regime in Afghanistan,
accused of protecting Osama Bin Laden and a large number of terrorists from around the
world was achieved soon. In that war almost the whole world politically or materially
supported United States. The basics of a new US strategy later to be christened as the Bush
Doctrine were in place much earlier. Bush spelled out his vision of the world after 9/11 in a
speech125 before being presented as a coherent Doctrine and conceptual basis for US blue
print for the future. The National Strategy Report126 published later develops the theme in a
full-fledged strategic concept outlining the shape of things to come, or rather have already
started happening. That speech pointed towards the direction, United States intends to
construct the post 9/11 international system.
According to British Prime Minister Tony Blair, Terrorism “is an aftershock of the
mistakes made after 1989. Not in the simple sense that it was sustained by the West as part of
the Cold War effort – but in the deeper sense that the West combined triumphalism with a
failure to deliver change.”127 What Blair meant was that the post cold war international

122
President Bush Announced ‘War Against Terrorism’ in the President Address to the Joint Session of
Congress on 20 September, 2001. http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/pol/terror/01092051.htm Accessed 15
February 2004.
123
Remarks by the President Bush to the Warsaw Conference on Combating Terrorism, held 6 November
2001 in Turin Italy, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/11/20011106-2.html, Accessed
20 Feb, 2004.
124
Relevant UN Security Council Resolution are; S/RES/1377(2001) on the adoption of declaration on the
global effort to combat terrorism S/RES/1373(2001) on international cooperation to combat threats to
international peace and security caused by terrorist acts. For all the UN SC resolutions on Terrorism
visit. http://www.un.org/terrorism/sc.htm. accessed 25 Feb 2004.
125
Bush., George W., ‘Remarks by the President at 2002 Graduation Exercise of the United States Military
Academy, West Point, New York.’ Available at:
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/06/20020601-3.html Accessed 2 April 2004
126
‘The National Security Strategy of the United States of America’, White House, Washington D.C. 2002.
127
Leonard., Mark, “The Contours of a World Community” in Re-Ordering the World Edited by Mark
Leonard, The Foreign Policy Centre, London, 2002, p. x. Also read, Cooly. John K., Unholy Wars:
Afghanistan, America and International Terrorism, Penguin, New Delhi, 2001.
 Pakistan’s Afgan Policy Shift 47

system required a deeper and more comprehensive engagement form the western powers,
rather than withdrawal which can at least partially describe the developed states post cold war
policies towards the non western world generally and Afghanistan (and Pakistan)
specifically.
The mind set that ran the white house in 2001 did not come out suddenly with new ideas
and strategies. The ‘Defence planning guidance’ 1992 argued for more US military
engagement in world affairs; for unilateral use of force if necessary and more significantly an
active policy for not letting any state develop the capability of challenging US supremacy.128
Identification of terrorism as serious threat had been made much before 9/11.129 US
would use military force under the Bush–Cheney Presidency with Donald Rumsfeld as
Secretary of Defense relatively easier than their democratic predecessors was evident much
before 9/11. It was only a matter of time for the use of US military force in Afghanistan. In
fact such indications had been there for quite some time. US officials had been repeatedly
telling Pakistani decision makers of their seriousness of intent in this regard.130 Niaz A. Naik,
a former Pakistani Secretary of Foreign Affairs was told by some Americans much before
9/11 of US plans to attack Afghanistan.131 The ‘War against Terrorism’ in Afghanistan, could
begin soon after the September 11th attacks only because the CIA already had covert action
assets in the area; the prior efforts of the Clinton administration against Osama bin Laden
were essential in creating the instruments that made CIA Director George Tenet’s
presentation of a covert campaign plan to President Bush so persuasive.132
“Even before George W. Bush took over as President, his election campaign had
abundantly indicated that a Republican administration would pay careful attention to
managing the central challenge facing the United States: creating a durable preponderance
capable of warding off any threats that may issue from rising powers in the future. The
administration’s early months in office focused on slowly putting myriad pieces of this
strategy into place. These efforts, however, were violently eclipsed by the shocking events of
September 11, which shifted overnight President Bush’s focus on preserving U.S. primacy to
directing a new global war on terrorism. The ‘War against Terrorism’ became so

128
Dick Cheney the current Vice President was the Secretary of Defence in 1992 when his office, drafted the
1992 policy statement on America's mission in the post-Cold War era. Called the "Defense Planning
Guidance," it is an internal set of military guidelines that typically is prepared every few years by the
Defense Department. This policy guidance is distributed to military leaders and civilian Defense
Department heads to provide them with a geopolitical framework for assessing their force level and
budgetary needs. For details visit
http://articles.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m1111/is_1829_305/ai_92589441. accessed 20 May 2004.
129
Laura K. Donohue. ‘In the Name of National Security: U.S. Counterterrorist Measures, 1960-2000’.
BCSIA Discussion Paper 2001-6, ESDP Discussion Paper ESDP-2001-04, John F. Kennedy School of
Government, Harvard University, August 2001.
130
Judah Tim, “The Taliban Papers” Survival: The IISS Quarterly, London, vol. 44, no. 1, Spring 2002, pp
69-80 at p.69-70 Tim Judah’s article is based on a rare treasure of information that he got from Pakistani
embassy in Kabul, after the fall of Taliban.
131
Mr Naik told the BBC that at the meeting the US representatives told him that unless Bin Laden was
handed over swiftly America would take military action to kill or capture both Bin Laden and the
Taliban leader, Mullah Umar. http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/1550366.stm. Accessed
15 May 2004.
132
Bob Woodward and Dan Balz, “At Camp David, Advise and Dissent,” Daily ‘Washington Post’
Washington, January 31, 2002.
48 Ijaz Khan

encompassing that before long the administration’s initial focus on positioning the United
States to handle the challenges of global geo–politics had all but disappeared from public
view, to be replaced by a new, almost pervasive, emphasis on the ‘War against Terrorism’. In
reality, the situation was more complex. Although the rhetoric might have suggested that
winning the campaign against terrorism was the sole national objective, the administration
prosecuted this effort while simultaneously pursuing those issues critical to preserving
American primacy and maintenance of U.S. preponderance over the long term”133.
The International system on the eve of 9/11 was underwritten by US as the sole super
power with no serious or equal challengers, both in military terms and economic terms, with a
policy of unilateral engagement worldwide backed by US military hegemony and presence
around the globe. Most of the substance of ‘Bush Doctrine’ was already in place.
So, it was in such context that the world was asked to adjust accordingly. And in the
atmosphere of the immediate aftermath of 9/11 choices for the rest of the world were not
many. They were even less for Pakistan.

The Regional Context; United States, South Asia and Afghanistan

Understanding of the US relations with Pakistan and India and its policy towards Taliban
is vital for understanding the regional context for our study. South Asia had been one of the
lowest priority regions for United States. Afghanistan, after the end of cold war stood even
lower. The end of the Cold War changed US South Asia policy in three ways. First, the
Soviet Union was no longer the decisive factor in US formulation of its policy towards South
Asia; instead, Washington began to view the subcontinent from a regional perspective and
started to deal with India and Pakistan in a different manner. Second, US interests and threats
to these interests came from within, rather than from outside the region. Economic
liberalisation, nuclear non–proliferation, anti terrorism, narcotics trafficking control, and
promotion of democracy became the main US policy goals in South Asia.134 Third, in the late
1990s, the United States began to tilt toward India, as Washington and New Delhi turned
from ‘estranged democracies’ of the Cold War to ‘engaged democracies’ in the post–Cold
War era.135
The tilt was visible in the following. Firstly, the US developed a comprehensive and
institutionalised relationship with India, covering broad fields such as economic ties, political
dialogue and military exchanges. Secondly, the US adopted a policy on the Kashmir issue,
calling for respect of the Line of Control (LOC), advocating direct dialogue between India
and Pakistan, and opposing the use of force to resolve the dispute that was more favourable to
India. Thirdly, the US recognised India’s leading position in South Asia and its important

133
Tellis., Ashley J., and Wills., Michael (Editors), Strategic Asia 2004–05: Confronting Terrorism in the
Pursuit of Power, Sept 2004, National Bureau of Asian Research, Washington, pp 5-6.
134
Guihong Zhang, “US Security Policy towards South Asia after September 11 and its Implications for
China: A Chinese Perspective”, in ‘Strategic Analysis’ A Monthly Journal of the IDSA, New Delhi,
April-June 2003 Vol. XXVII No. 2. p. 89.
135
See Dennis Kux, “India and the United States: Estranged Democracies 1941–1991” in Kanti Bajpai and
Amitabh Mattoo, (Ed.), Engaged Democracies: India–US Relations in the 21st Century, Har Anand
Publications Pvt. Ltd.; New Delhi. 2000.
 Pakistan’s Afgan Policy Shift 49

role broadly, and began to collaborate more with New Delhi in international affairs. Fourthly,
India became the largest recipient in South Asia of US development and food aid136: US
assistance to India in financial year 2000 reached a total of $170 million, the second largest
amount in all of Asia (second only to Indonesia) and more than 45 times that of Pakistan’s
($3.78 million).137
US tilt towards India did mean ‘India first’, however, it must not be translated as ‘India
only’. Pakistan could not be and so was not ignored totally. US stressed restraint by both
sides; respect for the Line of Control; renewal of dialogue; and rejection of violence.
President Clinton in his South Asia tour of March 1999138 made it a point to stop in Pakistan;
however, briefly, to symbolise that US has not totally abandoned Pakistan. Clinton expressed
strong US opposition to terrorism throughout the region and pressed Pakistan to use its
influence with the Taliban in Afghanistan to curb terrorist training camps and to put an end to
their continued hosting of Osama bin Laden. A senior US official pointed out what Pakistan
needed: “It needs better governance. It needs to end its dangerous associations with extremist
groups in the region. It needs to demonstrate restraint, practically on the ground in Kashmir.
It needs to find ways to renew, broaden, and deepen dialogue with India. It needs to stay
away from adventures like Kargil. It needs to use its influence with the Taliban in
Afghanistan to end that war, to shut down terrorist training camps and to bring terrorists to
justice. It needs to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and demonstrate restraint in
developing weapons of mass destruction and the missiles to deliver them.”139
When George W. Bush became the newest resident of the White House in January 2001,
his Republican Administration continued the Clinton policy of engagement in South Asia,
with a special emphasis on US–India relations. The security field was the first beneficiary of
transforming US–Indian relations. The Bush Administration de–emphasised non–
proliferation as the sole determinant of US policy towards India and moved away from its
demands for India’s signing of the CTBT to a discussion of President Bush’s proposed ‘new
strategic framework.140
In July 2001, General Henry Shelton, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) became
the highest ranking US military official to visit India since 1998. Of particular significance
was the announcement about reviving the meetings of the Defence Policy Group (DPG), the
key institution providing overall direction to defence cooperation between the two countries.
In the week before September 11, 2001, US officials were readying a briefing for
congressional staff to inform them that the Bush Administration was preparing to suspend all

136
Guihong Zhang, 2003, pp. 88–103.
137
Lum, Thomas, ‘US Foreign Aid to East and South Asia: Selected Recipients’, Congress Research Service
Report for Congress, April 10, 2002. pp.19 -23.
http://www.fpc.state.gov/documents/organisation/9661.pdf. Accessed 29 May 2004
138
Details of President Clinton’s visit are available online at
http://usembassy.state.gov/islamabad/wwwhp009.html
139
Riedel, Bruce, ‘New Opportunities in US-South Asia Relations: An Assessment of President Clinton's
Visit to India’, CASI Occasional Paper, No.12, May 9, 2000.
140
Lee., Feinstein, ‘When Policy Priorities Converge: US Relations with India and Pakistan’ in ‘A New
Equation: U.S. Policy Toward India and Pakistan After September 11’, Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace Working Paper No. 27, May 2002, p. 5
50 Ijaz Khan

nuclear–related sanctions on India, while leaving in place many sanctions that limited US
assistance to Pakistan.141
While sharing many common interests with India, the United States encountered many
frictions in its relations with Pakistan. On the non–proliferation front, Pakistan refused to
suspend its missile programme or sign the Nuclear Non–Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the
CTBT unless India did so first. Moreover, Islamabad had close links with Islamic extremist
groups and provided active support for the Kashmir insurgency, which were based and
trained in Pakistan. Pakistan also backed the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and was one of
only three countries that formally recognised the regime. And lastly, Musharraf’s military
rule posed further problems; the US asked Islamabad to restore civil government and return
to democracy, but there was little progress made. As a result, before September 11, a
marginalised Pakistan had a low priority on Bush’s agenda.142
US policy towards Taliban changed from sympathy and understanding and expectations
of a role to promote its interests to a gradual distancing and then out right enmity over the
period of 1994 to 2000. The most public show of distancing between US and Taliban was the
US missiles hitting alleged terrorist camps in Afghanistan in August of that 1998. U.S had
been pursuing a policy of convincing every one, especially Pakistan and Taliban of their
serious and real intention to use military force, if Osama Bin Laden was not handed over and
terrorist camps closed inside Afghanistan.143 It was signal weakness of Pakistani decision-
making process not to realize that their honeymoon with Taliban can not continue forever.
They must act to change their game in Afghanistan before it was too late.

US and South Asia immediately after 9/11

The United States was quick in identifying and holding Osama Bin Laden and his Al–
Qaeda network as responsible for the terrorism of 9/11.144 Taliban ruled Afghanistan had
long been recognised as a sanctuary for international terrorism. The fact that Osama Bin
Laden was in the protection of the Taliban government meant the War against Terrorism
though global would start in Afghanistan. It needs no great mind to understand that the
geographic location of Afghanistan meant serious implications for its surroundings.
Afghanistan lying at the juncture of Central, South and West Asia meant that all these regions
would be impacted by the imminent war.
“The attacks on the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon turned US’ South Asia policy
temporarily upside down, bringing Pakistan to Centre stage and putting parts of the US–India
agenda on hold.”145 As South Asia scholar Stephen P. Cohen has said, no part of the world

141
ibid. p.7.
142
Guihong Zhang, 90
143
Rasanayagam Angelo, 2003, pp. 214-245.
144
Statement of Colin Powell, US Secretary of State. Daily, The News Islamabad, 13 September 2001. Also
read Washington Post, Washington D.C of the same date.
145
Schaffer, Teresita C., ‘The U.S. and South Asia: New Priorities, Familiar Interests’, Global Beat Issue
Brief, No. 66 at http://www.nyu.edu/globalbeat/pubs/ib66.html. Accessed on 15 May, 2004.
 Pakistan’s Afgan Policy Shift 51

was more affected by the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 than South Asia.146 The
United States quickly identified Osama Bin Laden and his Al–Qaeda organisation as
responsible for the tragedy. This meant Afghanistan under Taliban rule would be the target of
any campaign if it continued to refuse handing over of Al–Qaeda and closing down of
terrorist training camps. Pakistan at that time had remained the only State friendly and
supportive of Taliban.147 India found this as a golden opportunity. It had long been accusing
Pakistan to be a state sponsor of terrorism. India had been demanding from United States
much earlier to declare Pakistan as such. Now given the close relations Pakistan had with
Taliban, whose refusal to hand over Osama Bin Laden, meant they were to be considered as
equally responsible for being protectors and abettors of terrorists, meant Pakistan was also as
much responsible. India offered all out support to United States in its War against Terrorism.
It argued that war against terrorism would not be a real war against terrorism if it spares
Pakistan.148 Other States of the region, like those of rest of the world condemned Terrorism
and support for War against Terrorism. Regional states including Peoples Republic of China,
the five Central Asian States as well as Russia also supported United States in its new War.
Iran, however, though condemned terrorism and sympathised with US people, did not agree
to become part of any international effort led by United States.

The Regional Scenario on the eve of 9/11

Pakistan is part of both South Asia and West and Central Asia. Pakistan’s foreign policy
in both regions, however, has direct impact on each other. This is more so when one is
looking at Pakistan’s Afghan policy, due to the geographic location of Afghanistan.
Afghanistan and Iran connects Pakistan with Central and West Asia. The significant
geopolitics of the region that provided the regional context for Pakistan must take into
account Iran, the Central Asian republics, Peoples Republic of China and India in their
relations to Taliban ruled Afghanistan and the impact of Pakistani support for Taliban on
their relations with Pakistan. Due to centrality of India to Pakistan’s foreign policy, Pakistan
India relations on the eve of 9/11 must be taken into account. The study of the regional
context would not be complete without understanding the evolving US relations and policy
towards Pakistan and India, discussed above. This sub section would deal with studying this
regional context for and inputs into Pakistani decision of joining the US led War against
Terrorism in Afghanistan.

146
Cohen, Stephen P., India: Emerging Power, The Brookings Institution Press, Washington, DC. 2001, p.
xiii.
147
Besides Pakistan Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates were the only states who had recognized
Taliban government as the legitimate and legal government of Afghanistan. However, both of them
downgraded relations with Taliban, due to the activities of Osama Bin Laden, who remained in Taliban
protection.
148
To have an idea of how India jumped up on that occasion and continued to be in that state for a long time
look at the large numbers of articles published on the Web. Check these sites http://www.terrorism.
reallybites.com, <,http://www.armyinkashmir.org/articles/lindia.html.> http://www.kash miri-
pandit.org/elibrary/pakrole/experts.html , Date accessed 21 April 2003.
52 Ijaz Khan

Regional Great Game

A regional ‘great game’ was being played on the chessboard of Central Asia after the
dismemberment of Soviet Union. Central Asia’s significance lay in the vast Oil and Gas
reserves it held. Afghanistan was a central part of that game board. Taliban ruled Afghanistan
backed by Pakistan had become a move that was eliciting different responses from other
players. This game was seeing strange bedfellows. Islamic revolutionary Iran found common
cause with secular India, and an overlapping of interests with Russia and Tajikistan.
Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan standing a little aloof from the just mentioned
emerging grouping, shared the suspicions of Taliban with it. Turkey, though not formally a
part of the Central or South Asian region, was and remains an important player due to its
ethnic/racial connection with almost all of the Central Asian Republics. Turkey, despite its
historic suspicion of Russia and being not on very good relations with Iran, also found the
anti Taliban perceptions of the above mentioned states closer to its interests. Peoples
Republic of China, another very significant power that has within its fold parts of Central
Asian land mass (Xingjiang), had its own concerns about Taliban. They were mainly due to
the reported terrorist training of Chinese Muslim dissidents in training camps in Afghanistan.
It had (and still have) interests in Central Asian oil as well. Besides Pakistan, Turkmenistan
was the only neighbour from Central Asia that was ready to do business with Afghanistan
under Taliban. However, due to its (then) very close security relations with United States,
besides Russian interests, it could not go its separate way more than a certain limit. One must
quickly correct any impression of the emergence of a united front against Taliban in the
region. These states had their own differences and rivalries and so were far from making a
bloc. However, one point was common, and that was opposition to Taliban and more
significantly, Pakistan’s attempts to control Afghanistan in a manner that did not respond to
their concerns and interests.149 At minimum, no state in the region supported or shared
Pakistan’s pro Taliban Afghan policy. The various regional states, for different purposes
were wary of the Taliban and by extension did not consider Pakistani support for them as
friendly. In short, Pakistan’s pro Taliban Afghan policy was fast taking it on the road of
regional as well as international diplomatic isolation.

South Asia
In South Asia itself, tensions ran high between Pakistan and India. Both India and
Pakistan had gone nuclear in 1998. Kargil episode150 had put the two South Asian rivals on

149
Khan Ijaz, “The Taliban, Iran and Central Asia: A View from Peshawar”, in Monthly ‘Central Asia
Monitor’ No. 2. 1999. pp15-16.
150
In 1999 Pakistan and India fought a mini war on the heights of Indian held Kashmir. India accused
Pakistan of sending and occupying Indian posts on Kargil heights, which were normally left unguarded
during winters. The militants occupying Kargil heights withdrew after being ordered by Mian Nawaz
Sharif under direct US pressure. However, that episode started a process of heightened tensions between
the two neighbours. India suspended all contacts with Pakistan, till according to it all cross border
infiltration from Pakistan and ‘terrorism’ is ended by Pakistan. For an Indian perspective visit
http://www.rediff.com/news/kargil.htm. For an international perspective read Ashley J. Tellis, C.
Christine Fair, Jamison Jo Medby, 2000 ‘Limited Conflict Under the Nuclear Umbrella: Indian and
Pakistani Lessons from the Kargil Crisis’. Report prepared Rand for US government, 2002, Also
available at http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1450/. For a Pakistani perspective closer to the
military establishment, read Mazari., Mazari, The Kargil Conflict 1999, Mr. Books, Islamabad, 2003.
 Pakistan’s Afgan Policy Shift 53

collision path. That conflict remained contained due to, besides other factors, an immense
and direct US pressure and role.151 Kargil defined the relations between India and Pakistan
till much beyond 9/11.152 India refused to resume any dialogue till a total end to what it
termed cross border infiltration of terrorists, supported by Pakistani state and closure of all
terrorist training camps. India also refused any third party intervention in its disputes with
Pakistan. Pakistan on its part kept asking for third party mediation and the centrality of
Kashmir to her relations with India and intervention by third parties in helping to find
solution to its conflict with India. By September 2001, Pakistan was heading towards
international as well as regional isolation due to its support for Taliban. Iran as well as
Peoples Republic of China was not happy with Pakistan’s Afghan policy. To be fair one must
point out the fact that Pakistan’s persistence with the support for Taliban was also a result of
misinterpretation of signals coming from United States, which immediately after Republican
takeover of its Presidency revived contacts with Taliban.153

PAKISTANI DECISION TO BECOME ALLY IN

WAR AGAINST TERRORISM

Pakistani foreign policy managers were not oblivious to this unfavourable fallout of its
Afghan policy. Pakistan was trying to build bridges between Taliban and the international
community in general, and the Central Asian states, Iran and US more specifically. However,
Pakistani policy was of trying to gain concessions and recognition for Taliban rather than
joining their international detractors in condemning them or giving up support for them.
Pakistan had attempted to reconcile its policy with that of Iran by trying to remove
differences between the two neighbours.154 Pakistan also tried to convince Taliban of the
need to be mindful of US concerns about terrorism generally and Osama Bin Laden
specifically. Pakistan also tried to convince the Central Asia States not to be suspicious of

151
Riedel Bruce, ‘American Diplomacy and the 1999 Kargil Summit at Blair House’ Policy Paper Series
2002. Centre for the Advanced Study of India, University of Pennsylvania. 2002.
152
The tense relations continued till long after 9/11, when finally the ice was broken in January 2004, on the
occasion of South Asian Association for Cooperation summit meeting in Islamabad, which was attended
by Indian Prime Minister Atal Bahari Vajpai. More on this below in Chapter four.
153
The U.S. government contacted Taliban 30 times between 1996, when the Taliban took Kabul, and the
summer of 2001. The talks mainly Centred on US demands about Osama Bin Laden, however, US also
showed interests in development of Oil and Gas routes, Declassified US State Department Report, "U.S
Engagement with the Taliban on Usama Bin Laden", Secret, Circa July 16, 2001. As almost all these
contacts were made through Pakistan, might have given the impression to Pakistani decision makers
that if some how a way out is found on the row about Osama, US policy towards Taliban may change
and hence Pakistan may be able to protect Taliban.
154
Beg., Mirza Aslam, ‘Rising Afghan–Iran Tension: Paradigm of Conflict Resolution’,
http://www.friends.org.pk/Beg/rising_afghan.htm. Date accessed 15 June 2004. Gen. (Retd.) Mirza
Aslam Beg is a former Chief of Army Staff (1988–1992). He currently heads a think tank of which he is
also the founder. At the above Web cite are present his articles on different aspects of Pakistan’s
security and foreign policy.
54 Ijaz Khan

Taliban.155 However, Pakistan remained steadfast in its policy of support for Taliban
throughout. Pakistan had gradually become a spokesman for Taliban in international for a.
Pakistani advices to Taliban were of a friendly nature, the purpose being to protect them and
not change them in any substantial manner. Whether, Pakistan had not enough leverage with
Taliban to make them do or not do things that would be harmful for their survival without
being of any real significance or it was not willing to apply the leverage it had, is a question
that needs a separate detailed enquiry. The real point is Pakistan considered Taliban to be
their best bet in Afghanistan and it must do everything possible to convince the world that
Taliban excesses may be ignored, while at the same trying to convince Taliban not to
unnecessary annoy World opinion. The purpose was clear and that was to protect Taliban rule
in Afghanistan.
However, there were divisions within the policy makers at both policy making and
implementation level can be established from the excerpt below. On 18 19 January 2001, a
Pakistani Foreign Ministry Envoys Conference was held in Islamabad to discuss Afghanistan.
On 6 January, Arif Ayub, the Pakistani Ambassador to Kabul, submitted the paper he was to
give. He wrote that Pakistan had to recognise the adverse consequences of our policy of
supporting the Taliban. Foremost of these is the fact that the Taliban are perceived to be
supporting terrorists and their training camps in Afghanistan, thus posing a threat to the
international community particularly the regional countries including our close friends Saudi
Arabia and China.
According to Ambassador Ayub, the problem was that, neither the US uni–dimensional
Osama based policy of armed hostility and UN sanctions nor our policy of constructive
engagement has been able to have any effect upon the Taliban to adopt a moderate stand on
this issue. The visit of the head of the ISI to Mullah Omar he said, had led to the temporary
closure of two camps, but apart from that, the standard responses when this issue is raised are
firstly, the denial of the presence of foreign militants; secondly; the genuineness of their
cause in fighting against US and Russian imperialism and corrupt and unrepresentative
governments; and, thirdly, the adverse consequences on the Jihad in Kashmir in case the
militants are restrained a Pakistan specific argument for maintaining the status quo. He said
vigilance on our borders, porous though they are, needs to be increased in order to hinder
what seems to be a free crossing for the terrorists. Controls on the border crossing can in fact
be used as a bargaining point when discussing the issue with [the] Taliban. The activities of
Arab and other NGOs in Peshawar, Quetta and Karachi (e.g. the Al–Rasheed Trust) which
provide funds, safe havens and transit points for these terrorists also need to be monitored
and blocked. Given this nexus of terrorist networks it was surprising to note that the Ministry
of Interior had recently relaxed the entry of foreigners into Pakistan. This policy would have
to be reviewed so that our security concerns are adequately addressed. Ayub went on to
examine some of the real problems at the heart of Pakistan’s policy dilemmas concerning
Afghanistan. The Taliban, he said, found their roots in madrassas, or religious schools, in
Pakistan and faced with [the] Kashmir issue we used these same religious groups to wage a
proxy guerrilla war in the Indian occupied territories. Encouraged by the rise of the Taliban

155
For details of Pakistani efforts in this regard go to the Web site of Pakistan Foreign Office at
http://www.pakistan.gov.pk/foreignaffairs-division/policies/pak-fpolicy/pak-fpolicy.jsp.
 Pakistan’s Afgan Policy Shift 55

in Afghanistan their Pakistani compatriots are now envisioning the political control of
Pakistan. He went on to explain that the Jehadi factions operating in Kashmir, Afghanistan
and inside Pakistan see eye–to–eye with this objective. This also makes it difficult to have
selective criteria of distinguishing sectarian terrorists (about 100) from the mass of Pakistan
Taliban or Mujahideen (about 5000) in Afghanistan. It is important therefore to formulate a
balanced policy, which would accommodate our religious elites as well as cater for our
national interest and domestic security concerns and sustain this policy until the Taliban
hopefully undergo the natural moderating process and surpass their ideas of tribalised
fundamentalist Islam.
Ayub suggested, we have to highlight this particular point, that initiation of constructive
dialogue with the Taliban will help dilute their rigid beliefs whereas their total isolation will
further strengthen their radical policies and they will be encapsulated in their shell of
fundamentalism. Ashraf Jehangir Qazi, the Pakistani High Commissioner to India, who also
wrote a paper for the conference, thought a far more pro–active policy was required. He
noted that Salman Haider, the former Indian foreign secretary, had told him that it was very
obliging of Pakistan to have so completely isolated itself on the issue of Afghanistan but
added that, if somehow the OBL issue were resolved India’s current advantage over Pakistan
with respect to the situation in Afghanistan and, to an extent, Kashmir could turn out to be
very short–lived. Qazi told his audience that the issue of bin Laden and the fact that from
1996 97 reports that training camps were being set up in Afghanistan by the ISI and Pakistani
Jihadi Tanzimaat [Organisations] that were specifically meant to train Mujahideen for
Kashmir, had both alarmed India but also given it an opportunity to exploit western anxieties
concerning Islamic extremism. We seem merely to have substituted the Taliban, at first
reluctantly and now enthusiastically, for Hekmatyar. Because there was believed to be so
much domestic support for the Taliban in Pakistan, he said, we find practical reasons to
continue with policies that we know are never going to deliver and the eventual costs of
which we also know will be overwhelming. We often speak of the need to talk plainly to the
Taliban, to tell them to get their act together with respect to administering their country, to
find some mutually acceptable solution to the problem of OBL (Osama Bin Laden), to stop
providing safe havens for violent groups operating against countries with which we have
friendly relations [but] almost all our colleagues involved with Afghan affairs will
immediately tell us that neither the option of pressing the Taliban to modify some of their
more unacceptable policies or replacing them are open to us. They say that the Taliban
respond very little to persuasion and not at all to pressure. And they will add we cannot
abandon them either, because that would lead to a power vacuum in Afghanistan which
would be filled with anti–Pakistan elements. They would also argue that any withdrawal of
support from the Taliban would immediately lead to political unrest in Pakistan.
We have no choice but somehow to resolve the OBL problem before addressing any
other issue. With the help of US and other intelligence agencies irrefutable proof of OBL’s
abuse of the Taliban’s hospitality and his pledge to them that he would not plan any activities
from Afghan territory should be placed before Mullah Omar and his colleagues. The point
could then be made that he has also endangered the security interests of the Islamic Emirate
of Afghanistan and its closest ally, Pakistan. If the Taliban proved impervious to any
argument, Pakistan should explore the possibility of encouraging a more moderate faction
56 Ijaz Khan

within it.”156 The long excerpt shows a very important fact of foreign policy decision–making
in Pakistan. That is there are people in the establishment and especially foreign office who
are able to read correct into the probable future and give timely advice. The issue is that due
to military’s exclusive control of foreign policy decision–making, especially when it comes
to Afghanistan, the system fails the country and its interests.
It was in this general regional and international scenario that 9/11 happened. The region
as well as Pakistan had to adapt to the new situation. Due to the existing gulf between
Taliban ruled Afghanistan and most of the regional states, these states found no difficulty in
supporting the US led alliance getting ready to attack Taliban militarily. Peoples Republic of
China, the Central Asian Republics, Iran and India did not waste any time in supporting the
‘War against Terrorism’. Central Asian Republics and India offered logistical and political
support immediately. Peoples Republic of China supported the international effort politically.
Iran, however, while condemning the terrorist attacks against civilians kept its distance from
US led alliance. Pakistan had to take its decision in this general regional and international
environment.
The International and regional developments described above, especially since 9/11, put
Pakistan’s Afghan policy in direct conflict and contradiction to the International systemic
demands. “The 11 September terrorist attacks on the USA presented Pakistan with a stark
choice: either make common cause with Washington in its war against Osama bin Laden’s
Al–Qaeda network, based in Taliban controlled neighbouring Afghanistan, or persist with its
pro–Taliban Afghan policy and, as a consequence, suffer international condemnation from
guilt by association. Within 24 hours of being asked by Washington whether he would side
with the USA, President Gen Pervaiz Musharraf announced on 13 September that Pakistan
would lend its “unstinted co–operation” to the USA.”157 This was a fundamental change of
direction. Taliban, who had been considered the backbone of Pakistan’s Afghan policy, had
to be abandoned. Pakistani territory would be used for military strikes against them.
Additionally, Pakistan would do everything possible to stem out any extremist organisations
having links with Al–Qaeda or Taliban from within Pakistan.
Policy is both a set of goals to be achieved and the methods and means for its
implementation. Changes in means do have implications for change in policy. Taliban were a
tool of Pakistan’s foreign policy158 and as it had become untenable to keep them, they were
abandoned. International, regional as well as domestic institutional and individual inputs
worked in a particular manner to make this particular foreign policy choice.
On 12 September, in a meeting with Pakistani ambassador to US Dr. Maleeha Lodhi,
who was accompanied by ISI chief Gen. Mehmood, U.S Deputy Secretary of State Richard
Armitage conveyed U.S expected fullest cooperation from Pakistan in the unfolding U.S
reaction to the terrorist attacks of a day earlier.159 The same day Colin Powell, the US
Secretary of State, tells a news conference that the prime suspect is Saudi born Osama Bin

156
Tim., Judah, 2002, p.69 80.
157
Hussain Rifaat, “Pakistan walks a tightrope” Jane’s Weekly 19 October 2001.
158
Roy Olivier, “The Taliban: A Strategic Tool for Pakistan”, in Jaffrelot Christophe, (ED.) 2002, pp 149–
160.
159
Ibrahim., Samina, ‘Interview- Dr Maleeha Lodhi,; Former Ambassador to the United States’ Monthly
Newsline Karachi, July 2002, pp 21-25.
 Pakistan’s Afgan Policy Shift 57

Laden, who lives in Afghanistan under the protection of the Taliban. He further said, “We
thought it would be useful to point out to the Pakistani leadership at every level that we are
looking for and expecting their fullest cooperation.” He reiterated President Bush’s comment
that the US would not only go after terrorists responsible for Tuesday’s attacks, but also
against those who harbour terrorists. On September 13, Colin Powell talked to Gen
Musharraf on the telephone and Washington provided Pakistan with a list of “concrete
actions” that it expects Islamabad to take in connection with the action being contemplated
against those it believes are responsible for Tuesday’s attacks on New York and the
Pentagon. President George, the same day appreciated Pakistan’s offer of unstinted
cooperation in the fight against terrorism, reiterated by Gen Pervaiz Musharraf on
Wednesday night, but also said: “I would refer you to the statement that the Pakistani leader
made about his willingness to work with the US. We will see what that means, won’t we?”160
The phrasing of the president’s remark was interpreted as indicative of a persisting gap in
what Washington expects and the assurances it had received so far or at least reflecting a
certain uncertainty about the Pakistani response. The same day President Musharraf chaired
the meeting of corps commanders, which reviewed the situation and weighed options and the
shape of cooperation with US and made policy recommendations. On 14 September, Colin
Powell told the press, that US was awaiting Pakistan’s response161. On 15 September a
meeting of the cabinet and National Security Council was held. After that meeting, Foreign
minister Abdul Sattar announced that Pakistan would extend full cooperation to the
international community in its fight against terrorism without involving its forces in any
action beyond its geographical boundaries. The same day Secretary of State Colin Powell
confirmed that Pakistan had agreed to all US requests.162 Finally on, 19 September, Gen.
Musharraf in a televised address announced the full backing of US ‘War on Terrorism’ in
Afghanistan.
Pakistan relations with Taliban were not as smooth as Pakistan’s all out support for them
suggested, neither was Pakistani control of that regime as absolute as outsiders believed or
Pakistan apparently hoped. Throughout the run down to 9/11 as well as after it, Pakistan had
been playing the role of an emissary for both the Taliban and rest of the world, especially
United States. Pakistan realised, much before 9/11 that Taliban must give up Osama Bin
Laden and close down Terrorist training camps, or they would be in a serious trouble. The
dominant opinion in the decision–making circles was that Taliban are the best bet for
Pakistan, however, they must be made to realise that their persistence with some of their
extremist policies would make their survival difficult. Pakistan, even after 9/11, in an attempt
to salvage its shattered Afghan policy, continued to engage Taliban leadership in dialogue
about the need to give up Osama Bin Laden and close down terrorist training camps. On
September 17, ISI Director Lt. Gen. Mahmood Ahmed headed a six-man delegation that
visited Mullah Omar in Kandahar, Afghanistan. His mission was to convince Mullah Omar to
extradite bin Laden or face an immediate US attack.163 On September 28, Gen. Mahmood
returned to Afghanistan with a group of about 10 religious leaders. He talked with Mullah

160
Daily Dawn Karachi, 14 September, 2001.
161
Ibid.
162
ibid. 16 September 2001.
163
Daily The News, Islamabad, 18 September 2001
58 Ijaz Khan

Omar, who again refused to hand over Osama bin Laden.164 Pakistan though had announced
support for US in its war against terrorism in Afghanistan and had accepted to provide all
support, in case of actual attack against Afghanistan, had been trying to some how save the
Taliban regime. The purpose of attempts to convince Taliban to give up Osama and close
down terrorists was a clear understanding in Pakistani Afghan policy managers, that failure to
do so would mean end of Taliban rule. And that would mean the collapse of its long standing
Afghan policy. Pakistan’s foreign minister Abdul Sattar said, “We must not make the blunder
of trying to foist a government on the people of Afghanistan. We fear that any such decision
on the part of foreign powers to give assistance to one side or the other in Afghanistan is a
recipe for great disaster for the people of Afghanistan.”165 Pakistan’s over all policy
objectives did not change. Pakistan before finally dumping Taliban, tried its level best to
convince them of the reality of dangers to their survival if they persist in their refusal to give
up Osama Bin Laden.
Even after dumping Taliban, Pakistan has consistently tried to undermine the Northern
alliance, India’s increasing influence in Afghanistan. Pakistan opposed the domination by the
Northern Alliance of the post Taliban government of Afghanistan. Pakistan has tried to
salvage of what was left of its policy by supporting the representation of Pashtuns in the post
Taliban government of Afghanistan.166 The decision to support the United States War against
terrorism in Afghanistan was a U–Turn in the sense of abandoning Taliban, it was
culmination of a process that had started before 9/11 and there were different inputs into
making of that choice. However, the final push towards the policy shift was given by 9/11
and the person of Gen. Musharraf. Gen. Pervaiz Musharraf, who had started, since his take
over of power on 12 October 1999, a process of re–creating a Pakistan with the image of a
moderate Muslim State.167 Religious parties were, for the first time since Gen. Zia Ul Haq’s
imposition of Martial Law in 1977, distanced from decision–making circles. The feeling of
growing diplomatic isolation due to Pakistan’s close ties with Taliban, and the harmfulness of
un–hindered activities of various Jehadi groups was gradually being realised in a section of
the decision–making elite. International, especially American pressure for putting an end to
Pakistan’s extremist connections had also been pushing towards this change. In the end,
President’s Musharraf personal liberal mind set one can say that the existing opinion within
the state institutions, The fear of Talibanization of Pakistani state and society as a
consequence of Pakistan’s pro Taliban policy with strong signals from the changing
international system led by United States that had zero level tolerance for religious extremism

164
ibid, 29 September 2001
165
ibid 26 September 2001.
166
Read statements of Foreign Minister of Pakistan Abdul Sattar in Daily The News 26 September 2001.
Pakistan also tried to look for alternate Pashtun leadership, Anatol Lieven “Voices from the Region:
Interview with Qazi Mohammed Amin Waqad”
http://www.ceip.org/files/Publications/anatolwaqad.asp?from=pubtype. Accessed on 25 June 2004.
167
Various measures in this direction had already been taken. For our interest one must particularly note the
banning of two sectarian organisations Sipah-i-Muhammad and Lashkar-i-Jhangvi and putting on watch
the activities of two other organisations Sipah-i-Sahaba and Tehrik-i-Jafria daily The News Islamabad,
13 March 2001; Aslo read the declaration by President Musharraf’s of “stringent measures would be
taken to control religious extremists”. Daily Dawn Karachi, August 14, 2001. Earlier in March Pakistan
had closed down Taliban offices in Peshawar, Daily The News 22 March, Islamabad.
 Pakistan’s Afgan Policy Shift 59

specially when it breaded terrorism, made the change in Pakistan’s pro Taliban Afghan
policy.
Finally, the decision not to be on the wrong side of US in the expected US reaction was
taken by Gen. Musharraf immediately after the events of 9/11. He took this decision due to
the reduced position of manoeuvrability, he understood, Pakistan was in due to its pro
Taliban policy, and his personal liberal outlook. The President had already given his consent
to be on American side in the ‘War against Terrorism’ and had agreed to all the demands of
the US before it. Bob Woodward reports the surprise of US secretary of State to the
immediate agreement of President Musharraf to his demand for support including the total
acceptance of the list of specific demands.168 His meetings with opinion leaders and officials
within the framework of formal state bodies or outside it were more of an exercise in
enlisting support for his decision than making of the decision. President Musharraf met
various opinion leaders after making the decision, which including delegations of political
parties, religious leaders, representative of the Non governmental organisations, women and
Trade Union leaders.169 Even the meeting of the formation commanders, the highest military
decision–making body was convened after the decision had already been taken. President
Musharraf had already given his consent to becoming part of US led alliance. According to
one commentator, Powell was converting the converted with his now well know straight
speak ‘with us or against us’ with Gen. Musharraf on 12 September.170 This decision came
from the top downwards with some support present at the lower policy input level; however,
within the Pakistani decision-making elite, the person of Gen. Musharraf was decisive. There
was some disagreement within his close circle is supported from the general’s decision to
make very significant changes in the Army on the day US launched its strikes against
Taliban. To solidify his position in the army, Musharraf carried out a major reshuffle,
amounting to what observers described as an “internal coup” against old friends. On Sunday,
7 October 2001 of Lt Gen Muhammad Yousaf Khan and Lt Gen Muhammad Aziz Khan were
appointed as vice chief of the army staff and chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff committee
respectively. Gen. Muhammad Aziz, of Kashimiri origin, is known for his religious leanings.
The post he was elevated to is largely ceremonious and in fact removes the occupant from the
day-to-day affairs of the Army. By ordering the promotion of these generals, Musharraf
passed up two of his closest and extremely influential associates: head of the Inter–Services
Intelligence (ISI), Gen Ahmed Mahmoud, and former Deputy Chief of Army Staff, Gen.
Muzzafar Usmani. According to military tradition, the promotions were a hint to Mahmoud
and Usmani to resign, which they did. Mahmoud personally led a group of army officers
when they arrested former Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif after the coup led by
President Musharraf two years ago. Lt. Gen. Usmani controlled a military base, which
ensured the safe landing for an airplane carrying Musharraf back home where he would later
become president. Both generals were known for their pro–Taliban views and sympathised
with influential political Islamic groups. After 11 September, Mehmood visited Kandahar, in
Afghanistan, twice to try to persuade Taliban leader Mullah Mohamed Omar to force Bin
Laden out of Afghanistan. Gen. Mehmood, had modernist personal lifestyle, however, he

168
Woodward., Bob, Bush at War Simon and Schuster, Washington D.C., 2002, p.60
169
Daily The News, Islamabad, November 15, 16 and 19, 2001.
60 Ijaz Khan

strongly believed in Pakistan’s interests being tied with Taliban and control of Afghanistan.
One can put him closer to the hawkish Pakistani nationalist category171. Except for General
Yousaf, the other three generals disagreed with President Musharraf’s position on Pakistani
role in the ‘War against Terrorism’. 172

CONCLUSIONS

To conclude, Pakistan’s post 9/11 Afghan policy decision is very important from both
theoretical and practical perspectives. Theoretically, it was a decision that at first sight
appears to be giving primacy to external inputs to almost deterministic levels, thus one may
say it negates the basic premises of the decision–making approach, which basis its study of
foreign policy as essentially a domestic decision with some impact of the international. One
must understand the difference between international systemic influences and influences
coming from one or more external states and other interests and entities impacting the
behaviour of individual or institutional actors within a domestic decision–making process
towards some ends. The point to keep in mind is that these external influences whatever there
source and strength may be, has to influence domestic actors of the domestic decision–
making process at various levels.
The decision reflects the nature of Pakistani state and society, and reflects a decision–
making process that has developed in a particular manner. The international system did
provide choices. They were limited, was more due to Pakistan’s internal systemic problems
and paradoxes, rather than the preponderance of the international. As the discussion above
shows, there were signs of the impending demands of the international on the domestic to
give up its pro Taliban policy. Pakistan was forced to take an apparently abrupt decision due
to its systemic failure to take cognisance of the coming changes in international system,
misreading of intentions of US, and had become oblivious to many clear warnings, emanating
from different quarters including from within the Pakistani establishment. The monopoly of
military over other parts of the decision–making process had resulted in a lack of a debated
and educated assessment of Pakistan’s pro Taliban policy. Pakistan came under unbearable
pressure due to its very open support and closeness to Taliban. Pakistan’s position was
weakened further by its alleged ties with extremist groups and philosophies. It was due to that
connection that the International Community led by United States could tell Pakistan, ‘with
us or against us’, leaving Pakistan with not much of manoeuvrability. Most probably, if
Pakistan had not been the supporter of Taliban, Pakistan could have charted a third course,
that is staying out of the dividing lines drawn by United States. Further, Pakistan would have
been in a better bargaining position and may have got better terms for its partnership in the

170
Amir., Ayaz, Daily Dawn Karachi, 25 September 2001
171
For explanation Pakistani nationalist position go to Chapter Five of this study.
172
Lt. Gen. Aziz known for his fundamentalist religious views was promoted and made Chairman Joint
Chiefs of Staff Committee (JCSC), a largely ceremonious office; ISI chief Lt. Gen. Mehmud was retired
premature along with Lt. Gen. Usmani who was Deputy Chief of Army Staff. These changes were
clearly intended to remove any bottlenecks in implementing the Afghan policy shift. Read for details
reports filed by Kamran Khan in the Daily The News Islamabad of 8 and 9 October 2001.
 Pakistan’s Afgan Policy Shift 61

‘War against Terrorism’ both economically and politically. The decision–making dominated
by only one institution meant the consideration of only one aspect of the policy i.e. the
military aspect. The strict discipline of the military means the chief of Army Staff is the final
arbiter. One can see the personal impression of General Musharraf on the decision of
abandoning the pro Taliban policy as much as one can see the personal impression of General
Zia–ul–Haq on the Pakistan’s Afghan policy during the 1980s. The 1980s decision did not
create many fissures in the Pakistani state as that was in line with growth of Pakistani State in
a particular manner and its strategic culture. The decision of September 2001 on the other
hand has created a division in the decision–making elite and generated a debate as it has the
potential for making far-reaching changes in the elite composition of the state itself, as well
as its ideological and theoretical basis.
The lack of a system of decision–making in which the final outcome is the result of
compromises and agreements between different interests and institutions is evident from both
the policy of support for Taliban and the manner it was abandoned. There were historical
inputs in the decision as Pakistan had throughout its history been a very close ally of United
States with Armies of both the countries enjoying close relationship. The history of
Pakistan’s foreign policy has mainly been a balancing act; a story of continuous attempts to
balance the Indian threat. Even in the decision to give up it pro Taliban Afghan policy, India
played a role. Pakistani decision makers were cognizant of the Indian readiness to fill the gap
that may present itself if Pakistan had refused to change, and that would have meant an action
not just against Taliban. With India a full active partner the International anti Terrorism
coalition would have targeted Pakistan as well; thus India would have been in a position to
achieve its security goals vis a vis Pakistan in Kashmir as well as elsewhere. Full of many
ups and downs Pakistan has developed a perception that it must try to be on the right side of
United States. So Pakistan’s decision, despite appearing to be abrupt was not so much cut off
from its history. The decision highlights the lack of any system of decision–making. The
apparent abruptness and ‘U–Turn’ was, and some of the persisting hiccups are, more due to
Pakistan’s inability to shed the ideological baggage collected during course of its history,
especially during the Afghan Civil War of the 1980s.
Chapter 4

IMPACT OF PAKISTAN’S CHANGED

AFGHAN POLICY ON THE REGION

Pakistan’s post 9/11 Afghan Policy had a profound impact on its domestic as well as
regional environment. The impact on the domestic front has been made the subject of a
separate chapter that follows. This chapter identifies and analyses the impact of Pakistani
decision on Pakistan’s regional environment. Keeping in mind the focus of this Study that is
Pakistan’s Foreign Policy, this chapter studies those aspects of the impact having direct
consequences and significance for Pakistan.
Geographically speaking, Pakistan is a part of South Asia; however, political geography
places it in West and Central Asia as well. Analysing the impact of Pakistan’s post 9/11
Afghan policy means India, Afghanistan and Pakistan, takes the position of a centrality
around which other relations and impacts on other states of the region needs to be viewed.
The centrality of Pakistan in the South Asian conflagration is obvious. Geo–strategically
situated between Afghanistan and India and sharing lengthy borders with each (over 1,500
miles), Pakistan had related policies to formulate and roles to play. The question is the
acceptability of these policies to and their impact on its neighbours, particularly India.
This chapter analyses the impact of Pakistan’s post 9/11 Afghan policy taking Pakistan
as the nucleus of the region, due to the needs of the study, which focuses on Pakistani foreign
policy decision about its Afghan policy. India being the single most important consideration
in Pakistan’s security policy generally, as well as its Afghan policy, that makes it along with
Afghanistan, a central concern around which the rest of the region has to be considered. First
we look at the impact of the decision on Pakistan–India equation, then on to Pakistan–
Afghanistan relations. This is followed by a look at its impact on Iran, People’s Republic of
China and Central Asian Republics, in the overall context of the three countries forming the
main focus of the chapter.
The impact on the region can not be fully comprehended without noting the US policy
towards the region and its role in regional affairs, due to the fact that it is responsible for and
a direct player in most of the happenings in the region, especially in the post 9/11 era due to
its policies and status. In fact 9/11 catapulted South Asia to a much more significant strategic
status for US specially and broader international society generally. United States engaged
into the region much deeply having an impact on the regional issues and policies. As noted in
chapter three, US influence was the most significant input in the making of Pakistan’s post
64 Ijaz Khan

9/11 Afghan policy. This US enhanced interest and physical presence in the region,
apparently long term, prioritised the interests of the global over the regional. So US role is
noted and discussed while analysing the regional impact of the Pakistani decision.

PAKISTAN–INDIA RELATIONS

India saw an opportunity for its Pakistan policy in the events of 9/11 and the ‘War
against Terrorism’. Seeing in it opportunity to take a leap in the gradual growth of closer
relations between itself and US, India immediately after 9/11 offered complete support and
the use of its territory to the US before even the US had decided it may need foreign military
bases as it had yet to decide what form retaliation against terrorist will eventually take.
Expecting Pakistan not to abandon Taliban, hence to be in the path of US retaliatory action
against Taliban, India attempted to combine its problems with Pakistan over the
insurgency/freedom movement in Kashmir with the unfolding US ‘War against Terrorism’.
That war had found an immediate target in the shape of Afghanistan, which under Taliban
rule had become a sanctuary for global terrorism, more significantly for Osama Bin Laden
and his Al–Qaeda organisation, as well as Kashmiri militants, Chinese dissidents, Chechen
fighters and others from other parts of the world. Pakistan, widely known for its patronage of
Taliban, was presented as the natural target for any campaign against Taliban. India repeated
with increased emphasis on the linkage between cross border infiltration inside the Indian
held Kashmir emanating from Pakistan and the training camps for these infiltrators inside
Taliban ruled Afghanistan.173 “The situation, with Pakistan edging closer to the US and
becoming a frontline state in the ‘battle against terrorism,’ yielded a jingoistic media frenzy
in neighbouring India, and there was little doubt about who the ‘enemy’ in this attack was.
Official government spokesperson Nirupama Rao, stated, ‘Pakistan is trivialising the global
approach we are trying to build against terrorism.’ Even while US administration officials
and the American media tacitly acknowledged that bin Laden was largely a creation of US
policy in Afghanistan during the Soviet invasion of the country, Indian political expert on
South Asia, Dilip Hero emphatically maintained on CNN, ‘The Taliban is a creation of
Pakistan’s ISI, not the Americans’.”174
India had been, along with Russia, Iran and Central Asian Republics (CARs) supporters
of the anti Taliban Northern Alliance inside Afghanistan. To put facts into context, United
States of America was also gradually getting closer to that anti Taliban, regional as well as
Domestic (Afghan) grouping.175 Pakistan was on the opposite side of this emerging regional

173
Read leading Indian Newspapers from 12 September to 25 September to get an idea of the Indian attempts
to exploit the post 9/11 situation to link up Kashmir with Afghanistan. Specially Indian Prime Minister
Atal Bahari Vajpai Statement in which he categorically linked Pakistan with Al-Qaeda which was
according to him running training camps in Afghanistan for Kashmiri insurgents. Daily ‘The Hindu’ 13
September 2001
174
Khan., Sairah Irshad, ‘The War of Words’ Monthly Newsline, Karachi, October 2001, p. 18
175
On 26 May Thomas Pickering, the US Under secretary of State, through a meeting with Pakistani officials
conveyed to the Taliban and by implication to their backers in Pakistan, if Osama Bin Laden is not
handed over immediately and terrorist camps closed, May through UN or otherwise impose stricter
sanctions against Taliban. Afghanistan may be declared a terrorist state. Which will justify targeting of
 Impact of Pakistan’s Changed Afghan Policy on the Region 65

scenario. Pakistani decision to be part of the US led ‘War against Terrorism’ changed that
course to a large extent, if not totally. It was due to Pakistan’s changed policy after 9/11 that
this grouping became limited to be anti Taliban only.
Pakistan’s post 9/11 Afghan policy created new opportunities in India–Pakistan relations.
For the first time in their history of existence as independent states both found themselves on
the same side of a global security dividing fence. During cold war they were on opposite
sides; Pakistan being an ally of the United States and India closer to the Soviet Union and an
important player of the Non Aligned Movement (NAM). The most important determinant of
Pakistan being in the US camp was the Indian decision to be closer to Soviet Union.
Pakistan’s decision to join the ‘War Against Terrorism’ to a large extent was prompted by the
Indian considerations too. In fact, Indian threats were cited as one of the reasons by the
President Gen. Musharraf as justification and reason for Pakistan’s decision to become an
ally of US in a war that targeted its allies in Afghanistan, the Taliban.176
As noted earlier, the 9/11 terrorist attacks put a hold on the increasingly visible US tilt
towards India. The view that considered no more strategic significance for Pakistan suddenly
took a back seat, if not totally abandoned. In the week of September 10, 2001, U.S. officials
were preparing a brief for President Bush and later to be presented to the US Congress to
suspend all nuclear–related sanctions against India, while leaving in place many sanctions
that limited U.S. assistance to Pakistan. As it happened, that briefing was postponed and 12
days later the United States announced the lifting of sanctions on both India and Pakistan.177
The equal treatment came as something of a shock for India, and reportedly lobbyists for
India in Washington actually sought to block sanctions relief for Islamabad at a time when
Washington wanted to consolidate its alliance with Pakistan, now a front–line state in the war
against terrorism.178 A sample of this view appeared in a number of articles in United
States.179 “9/11 interrupted India’s dream to isolate Pakistan internationally. Indian
frustration intensified when Pakistan became a frontline state in the War against Terror.”180
Though India clamoured for immediate advantages, which apparently were denied to her,
it stood to benefit from already shifting balances in the region, which were driven further by

Taliban military assets, and even the person of Osama or Mulla Omar for Missile attack. Thomas
Pickering reportedly also gave indication that US may coordinate with Russia to carry out air strikes
against Taliban, making them incapable of resisting the forces of Ahmad Shah Masood. Judah., Tim,
2002, p.70. Also read, Khan., Ijaz, ‘The Taliban, Iran and Central Asia: A View from Peshawar’, in
‘Central Asia Monitor’ No. 2. 1999. pp.15-16.
176
See for details of President Musharraf’s Address to the Nation, Daily The News 20 September 2001.
177
Feinstein, Lee, ‘When Policy Priorities Converge: US Relations with India and Pakistan’ in ‘A New
Equation: U.S. Policy Toward India and Pakistan After September 11’. Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace Working Paper No. 27, May 2002, p. 7
178
“Why this Media Circus” Editorial, Daily Dawn Karachi, 26 September 2001.
179
On September 27, ‘The Wall Street Journal’, Washington D.C. wrote of the problems in turning to
Pakistan for help. Following the October 1 bombing of the Jammu & Kashmir State Assembly in
Srinagar, both ‘The New York Times’ New York and the ‘Washington Post’, Washington, the two are
among the top newspapers of the United States, restated the linkage between Taliban, Osama Bin Laden
and Pakistan. Writing in The Washington Post on October 3, Jim Hoagland says, “Washington knows
fully well that Pakistan actively supports Jaish-e-Mohammed and other guerrilla organisations that see
terror as the only effective tool they have against India.”
180
Ibrahim., Smaina, “Interview with Dr. Maleeha Lodhi; Pakistan’s former Ambassador to United States”
Monthly ‘Newsline’ September 2002. p.31
66 Ijaz Khan

the rout of the Taliban. For India, the longer term benefits included replacement of a hostile
regime in Afghanistan with a transitional government dominated by Northern Alliance forces
it had long supported; more realpolitik by Beijing in its relationship with India, and a global
focus on terrorism, which held out the possibility of curbing Pakistan’s support to anti–Indian
militancy. In that sense, closer U.S. relations with Pakistan were to benefit India in the long
run, as such relations puts US in a position to pressurise Pakistan for solving its problems
with India peacefully and puts a distance and breaking of relations, if they existed, between
militants and Pakistan.181

Pakistan India Peace Process

Pakistan, in order to get the full benefit of its post 9/11 changed Afghan policy needed
thaw in its relations with India. The inflammation of tensions on its Eastern border did not
suit Pakistan’s role as an ally of the US in the new geo–political situation of the region. The
need and support for that came from two mutually opposed corners; US as well as the
religious right. Pakistan argued with the US that it would not be able to fulfil its obligations
in the ‘War against Terrorism’ if it has to worry about its eastern borders. Pakistan was
expected to curtail the traditionally porous Durand Line (Pak Afghan Border) because
Taliban and Al–Qaeda fugitives and fighters are using the adjoining Pakistani tribal belt182 as
a safe heaven and a launching pad for attacks against the coalition and Afghan government
forces. Pakistan has deployed a large number of troops on Pak–Afghan border for this
purpose. Pakistan could not spare troops for this purpose if it was threatened by Indian troops
on its eastern border with India. Pakistani decision makers considered they could only take
full advantage of the strategic value of its location, if its relations with India do not remain as
dangerously hostile as they were. Peaceful relations, if not outright friendly, can go a long
way towards improving Pakistan’s bargaining power. Religious right and those from the
establishment who considered Pakistan’s alliance with US, especially in the ‘War Against
Terrorism’ as detrimental its national interest, considered Pakistan may not have to toe the
American line to the extent it is, if freed from worries about security threats from India.183 US
also considered Pak–India tensions as against the interests of the ‘War against Terrorism’.
Thus we see, despite many ups and downs a resumption of dialogue between the two
neighbours. A summit meeting held between Gen. Musharraf and Prime Minister Vajpai held
in Agra (14–16 July 2001) in great fanfare much before 9/11 had ended without achieving
any breakthrough in their bilateral relations. However, after much prodding from the US after
the 9/11, both sides returned to the negotiating table in January 2004 on the occasion of
repeatedly postponed (due to Indian Prime Minister’s refusal to come to Islamabad or to have

181
Buzan, Barry, ‘South Asia Moving Towards Transformation: Emergence of India as a Great Power’
‘International Studies’ 39, no. 1 2002, pp. 1–24.
182
Tribal Belt refers to the strip of territory, on the Pakistani side of the Durand line that inhabits Pashtun
tribes, with internal administrative independence.
183
Does it sound familiar? Remember Zia ul Haq’s cricket diplomacy, when he visited India to watch cricket
match between the two rivals in 1985, to defuse the rising tensions between them.
 Impact of Pakistan’s Changed Afghan Policy on the Region 67

any contact with the Pakistani military ruler) SAARC summit in Islamabad.184 Prime Minister
Vajpai after initial refusal for a separate summit with President Musharraf finally agreed to
it.185 Thus a process of normalisation has started amid both sides declaring the need to
address the Kashmir issue more seriously. US hand in this process of normalisation has been
acknowledged.186

Kashmir

Kashmir remains the stumbling block in establishing peace and stability as well as
erecting the coalition against terrorism in South Asia on sound footing, is a fact realised more
by the international community than ever. Washington has been well aware of the connection
of Pakistani–supported militants in Kashmir to Osama bin Laden and al-qaeda. Since the
bombings of U.S. embassies in East Africa in 1998, U.S. effort to enlist the Musharraf
government in the hunt for Osama Bin Laden overtook nuclear proliferation concerns as the
major issue in the bilateral relationship. US had also ignored Indian protestations at ignoring
its ‘war against terrorism’, which Indian leadership had tried to argue unsuccessfully was
against the same people that US had waged its war against. In the immediate aftermath of the
9/11, US temporarily set aside these concerns however, soon after the attack on Indian
parliament in December 2001. Pakistan had to clearly adjust its position on Kashmir
militancy.187 The change being more tactical than strategic, that is, Pakistan has moved away
from supporting militancy however, not from supporting Kashmiri struggle for independence
politically, in Kashmir has a positive impact for both India and Pakistan, even though it may
appear to be benefiting India more in the immediate. The peace process that has started
between the two nuclear powered South Asian neighbours is in the long term of interest of
both. Washington is playing a more active, if still discrete, role in moving India and Pakistan
towards that process. The outlines of what an ultimate Kashmir settlement might look like are
less important at this time than establishing a way to get there.
U.S. also sent a clear message to Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee; if there is a discernible
reduction in infiltration across the Line of Control by Pakistani–backed insurgents, India
must be prepared to reciprocate in tangible terms, including reducing deployed Indian troops
in the region as well as making a political level commitment to a process for addressing the
Kashmir dispute. US Assistant Secretary of State for South Asia Ms. Christina Rocca asked
India to patch up relations with Pakistan. She also urged Indians not to resent US Pakistan
relations. Saying that the US would stand by India in its battle against terrorism, Ms Rocca
said: “I can also reassure you that the issue of cross–border infiltration remains a very
important issue on our agenda with Pakistan.”188 This is a more balanced approach by the

184
Daily, Dawn 28 December 2003. Read for details Daily The News Islamabad as well as Daily Dawn
Karachi from 28 December till 10 January 2004.
185
Daily, ‘The Dawn’ 5 January 2004.
186
Read statement of M.P Bhandara a PML – Q MP. Daily, The News Islamabad, 14 May 2004.
187
On January 12 2002, President Musharraf announced a strong commitment to stop cross border
infiltration. He also announced the banning of militant organisations. See for transcript of the
Presidential address Daily The News Jan 13 2002.
188
Naqvi., Jawed, “Patch up with Pakistan, US tells India” Daily ‘Dawn’ Karachi, September 11 2003
68 Ijaz Khan

United States to Pak–India bilateral issues than may have been if Pakistan had been on the
other side of the ‘War against Terrorism’
Pakistan is gradually coming to understand that the new breed of insurgents in Kashmir
is very similar to the new breed that came to dominate Afghanistan and, now that Islamabad
has joined the U.S.–led fight against terrorism, these groups are no more Islamabad’s friends
than they are Washington’s. There are clear and visible signs of break up of relations, if there
were any, between Pakistani state institutions and militants.
Militants in both Afghanistan and Kashmir were unhappy with the changed Pakistani
policy. They understood that the changed Pakistani policy in Afghanistan have direct bearing
on and implications for, its Kashmir policy. While no amount of international pressure has
been able to deter Pakistani leadership from giving up it policy of support for the right of self
determination of Kashmiris on political level, the means to follow that policy has not remain
unaffected. The militants played on the initial Indian reaction by providing India with almost
convincing arguments in favour of alleged continuation of cross border infiltration. First in
October 2001, they struck at parliament house in Srinagar and then in December they really
hit at the heart of Indian political system by a terrorist attack against the Indian Parliament in
New Delhi. The result of this was an immediate escalation of tensions between the two
neighbours and now supposed allies in the ‘War against Terrorism’. A heavy deployment of
troops on Pakistan India borders followed among accusations of cross border infiltration and
violations of human rights in Indian held Kashmir. The pressure on Pakistan to make a clean
break from pro militant past increased tremendously. President Musharraf in Jan 2002
announced Pakistan’s decision to curb the alleged cross border infiltration.189 “Most of the
Islamic militant leaders viewed Pakistan’s move as a serious setback to the Kashmiri freedom
struggle against India. General Musharraf has now betrayed the Kashmiris after ditching the
Taliban in Afghanistan,” said a veteran militant. His feelings are shared by most Kashmiri
militants, who have depended for over a decade on the Pakistan army’s active support for
their cross–border guerrilla actions.”190

INDIA AND POST TALIBAN AFGHANISTAN

India made unilateral offer of support to US in its impending ‘War against Terrorism’
even before its announcement or US request for support, on the basis of its confidence that it
had shared interests with Washington over Taliban regime’s overthrow. When the Afghan
war was ‘won’ with unexpected ease in October 2001, Indian government leaders were
jubilant. The reasons for their jubilation were obvious; Northern Alliance, which had been
backed by Indians had emerged as the dominant Afghan group. Following up, in December,
at the Bonn conference, India played an active role for the Americans in cajoling Northern
Alliance groups to accept a certain calculus of power in Kabul for the post–Taliban era,
which, left to themselves, these groups were wary of. 191 India followed up by undertaking an

189
Fro details of President’s Musharraf televised address read daily ‘The News’ Islamabad, 13 January 2002.
190
Hussain., Zahid, “Mission Impossible” in Monthly ‘Newsline, Karachi. pp. 22-25 at 22
191
Daily ‘Indian Express’ 2 November 2001.
 Impact of Pakistan’s Changed Afghan Policy on the Region 69

unprecedented commitment of hundreds of millions of dollars for Afghanistan’s

reconstruction. India expanded its diplomatic presence to a historic level by opening
consulates in southern, south–eastern, western and northern regions of Afghanistan.192 All
this signalled India’s resolve to be a serious protagonist.
The Indian government played host to the families of important Northern Alliance
leaders when they were on the run due to the Taliban onslaught on their strongholds in
northern Afghanistan. Those leaders, back in power after the collapse of the Taliban regime
as a result of the US invasion of Afghanistan, are now returning the favour by helping India
to establish its foothold in their country. Among others, India had generously put up the
families of Mohammad Qasim Fahim, now the defence minister, foreign minister Dr
Abdullah and education minister Mohammad Yunis Qanuni, in New Delhi and looked after
their needs. Masood Khalili, the Afghan ambassador in India and an aide to late commander
Masood, is also grateful to New Delhi for going out of the way to help him in his hour of
need and espouse his group’s cause. He had shifted to India from Pakistan when relations
between the Northern Alliance and Islamabad turned hostile. Khalili is now the strongest
advocate of close ties between Kabul and New Delhi. Earlier, India had provided refuge to
slain Afghan president Dr Najibullah’s family; his wife and three daughters are still living in
New Delhi as guests of the Indian government. Most important Hamid Karzai himself has
strong relations with India and went to college there.193
The Indian diplomats have also cultivated friendship with certain important military
commanders including Hazrat Ali and his brother Kalan Mir, both based in Jalalabad near the
Pakistan border. Haji Zahir, son of the slain Afghan vice president Haji Abdul Qadeer also
based in Jalalabad has also developed friendly contacts with India. Most Afghan ministers
and senior government officials have by now paid visits to India.194 Above all, Karzai was
feted at the highest level during his visits to India and his trip arranged to his old alma mater
in Simla. The India–educated Karzai, who spent almost two decades as a refugee in the
Pakistani city of Quetta, is cautiously following a policy to keep his country out of Indo–Pak
disputes and is careful not to annoy the Indians while discussing the Kashmir issue.195
Acting smart, India has offered assistance to projects and sectors that are visible and
would have an immediate impact. It promised to provide three used airbuses to augment
Ariana Afghan Airlines’ depleted fleet and 192 passenger buses to ply in Afghan cities. Two
airbuses have already been pressed into service with an all–Afghan crew that received
training in India. The buses gifted by India made their way to Afghanistan via Pakistan and
are now plying on the roads of Kabul and Kandahar. The spacious, all–weather buses, made
in India, serve as a mobile advertisement of Indian generosity towards the Afghan people.196
The Indian government is also funding a school food programme under which lunch is
provided to the students. India is providing one million tonnes of wheat and a 100 million

192
“India Seeks Larger Role” Asia Times Online, http://www.atimes.com/ind-pak/CK28Df03.html.
Accessed 24 June 2004.
193
Yousafzai., Rahimullah, “Pakistan's loss in Afghanistan is India's gain” Daily ‘The News’ Islamabad 13
July 2003
194
ibid
195
Rajghatta., Chidanand, “India reads Afghan wicket correctly” Daily ‘The Times Of India’, New Delhi, 7
December, 2001.
70 Ijaz Khan

dollar grant for Afghanistan’s reconstruction. An additional 70 million dollars grant

announced during Karzai’s second visit to India in March would be used to build a strategic
highway connecting Dilaram in south–western Afghanistan to Zahidan and Chahbahar on the
Arabian Sea to give the landlocked nation access to maritime trade through Iran. A trade
agreement signed during the same visit offers up to 100 per cent tariff concessions on 38
Afghan exports to India. The two countries were hoping that the agreement would boost
trade, which shrank from 54.26 million dollars in 1999–2000 to 41.89 million dollars last
year. India attributed the reduction in trade to Pakistan inspired transit glitches.197
It has also offered help to develop civil aviation, transport, industry, health facilities,
educational institutions and agriculture. A satellite link between New Delhi and Kabul has
been established and Indian movies are back in demand in urban centres. Some 500 Afghans
are presently receiving training in India in policing, journalism, medicine and computer
science. Afghan Defence Minister Fahim’s earlier announcement seeking India’s help to
raise, train and arm a new Afghan national army clearly alarmed Pakistan. Younas Qanuni,
the current education minister who previously served as interior minister, also wanted India’s
involvement in reviving and training Afghanistan’s police. Better planning is also evident in
past Indian assistance to Afghanistan. Every Kabuli and many Afghans know about the Indira
Gandhi Children Hospital that was set up years ago in Kabul with Indian money. There
cannot be a better publicity for India than a hospital in a city with meagre health care
services.198
However, Pakistan’s post 9/11 Afghan policy is the only hindrance that has slowed if not
denied India, the advantageous position it felt itself in as a result of the ascendancy of the
Northern Alliance in the post Taliban Afghanistan. Thus an Indian commentator wrote, “It
(Pakistan) is very unhappy at the growing influence of India in Kabul. It wants to make the
Indian presence irrelevant. It is unfortunate that America seems to support Pakistan. It had the
gumption to ask India to lower its posture in Kabul”.199

Pakistan–India Rivalry in Afghanistan

Pakistan and India had competed for influence in Afghanistan since 1947. Pashtun
Nationalists within Pakistan had always found Afghan rulers friendly and supportive. That
friendly relationship continued till the overthrow of Dr. Najib’s government in 1992. It must
also be remembered that Pakistani Pashtun nationalists were part of the Indian National
Congress during the struggle against British Imperial rule in the subcontinent. Afghanistan
was the only state that had opposed Pakistan’s membership of United Nations in 1947.

196
Ibid.
197
Rashid., Ahmad, “Jockeying For Influence, Neighbours Undermine Afghan Pact”, http://www.eurasia
net.org/departments/insight/articles/ eav011503.shtml. Date accessed 15 June 2004.
198
For details of Indian aid and support given and offered at various times, read Daily ‘Times of India’ New
Delhi, of 8 May 2003, 13 December 2001. Also read Bahl., Taru, “Reconstructing Afghanistan”
‘Business Online’ Financial Daily from The Hindu group of Publications, New Delhi, 29 July, 2002
http://www.blonnet.com/life/2002/07/29/stories/2002072900160100.htm
199
Menon M.S.N., Daily ‘The Tribune’ New Delhi Friday, 17 January, 2003. Also read Naqvi., Jawad “US
tells India to lay off Afghanistan”, Daily ‘The Dawn’ Karachi, 9 October 2002.
 Impact of Pakistan’s Changed Afghan Policy on the Region 71

Afghanistan had traditional claims over the Pashtun and Baloch inhabited territory of
Pakistan. This claim suited well into the Indian strategic interests. A hostile Afghanistan in
the north meant Pakistan’s inability to concentrate on the security threat perceptions from
India, which lay on its south. Although Pashtun Nationalists had been denying their demand
for Pashtunistan meant independence from Pakistan or merger with Afghanistan.200 Their
relations with Afghan rulers and their Indian National Congress past made them suspect for
the centrist and authoritarian state of Pakistan. It must also be noted that Pakistani threat
perceptions also persisted despite the fact that Afghanistan had maintained strict neutrality in
all the Pak–India armed conflicts. Pakistan’s Afghan policy, at least since 1989 had been at
the minimum driven by the strategic denial of this Afghan connection to India and ideally to
have a control of that country to the extent that it can provide her with ‘strategic depth’.
Pakistan was able to achieve the minimum fully and the maximum also to a large extent.
However, 9/11 changed all that.
India returned to Afghanistan with strength and an apparent sense of triumphalism.
Pakistan has been suspicious of growing Indian presence in Afghanistan. Pakistan has tried
and in all probability will be trying, to minimize, if not totally obliterate Indian presence in
Afghanistan. Pakistani officials have openly opposed Indian Consulates in Kandhar and
Jalalabad. Pakistan’s Foreign Office spokesman accused India of using these consulates for
the purpose of spying and fomenting trouble in Pakistan.201
Rahimaullah Yousafzai, a well respected Peshawar based journalist with an unmatched
access to Afghanistan especially Taliban, wrote of Pakistani policy as a total disaster,
especially when contrasted with that of India. He writes, “Pakistan wasted its money on
unpopular, armed Afghan groups and their leaders. These warlords were in the pay of more
than one country and it wasn’t unusual for them to offer their services to the highest bidder.
Cash–strapped Pakistan cannot match the US, Russia, India and Iran when the warlords have
to be paid. As a result, Pakistan can now count only a few prominent Afghans as its friends.
Islamabad may have hosted a record number of three million Afghan refugees for more than
two decades and suffered the extended fallout of the Afghanistan conflict. But it failed to
build a hospital, college or road that could serve as a visible example of Pakistan’s generosity
towards Afghanistan. Instead, many Afghans associate Pakistan with the death and
destruction that became their fate over a period of more than two decades.”202 Rahimaullah
Yousafzai is, according to the findings of this study and interpretation of those findings,
exaggerating the Indian gains and Pakistani losses, though he is not totally out of sync with
the realities. One must note Pakistani decision makers are not totally oblivious to the Indian
advances, though there are limitations emanating from past policies and difficulties in
changing to deal effectively with changed situation in Afghanistan and the region.

200
Tendulkar., D.G., 1967, p.451.
201
Statement of Pakistan’s Foreign Office Spokesman, Daily ‘The Daily Times’ Lahore 2 August, 2003.
202
Yousafzai Rahimullah, “Pakistan's loss in Afghanistan is India's gain” Daily ‘The News’ Islamabad 13
July 2003.
72 Ijaz Khan

PAKISTAN–AFGHANISTAN RELATIONS

Pakistan’s relations with the post Taliban Afghanistan should not be viewed in
comparison with the way they were during the Taliban era. It must be kept in mind that they
could have been worse. If they are not, that can only be attributed to Pakistan’s post 9/11
policy change. The Northern Alliance that dominates Afghanistan after 9/11 considered
Pakistan as its enemy during the Taliban rule. Those memories continue to play a role in
Pakistan–Afghanistan relations; however, the dictates of geography are mellowing and
gradually may build a friendly relationship. Pakistan is still the best out let and inlet for
Afghanistan. Even India, for commercially viable transactions with Afghanistan and Central
Asia can benefit from Pakistani route. This fact of geography is bound to have its effect, if
given a chance by Pakistani decision makers who need to wait it out. Pakistan’s decision to
be on the side of US and thus by extension on the side same Hamid Karzai government
stands, has stopped the relations from being worse. With deft handling, especially of
curtailment of any terrorist support that anti Karzai and anti coalition forces may be getting
from the Pakistani side of the Durand Line Pakistan can improve its position much easily.
The actions of Pakistan government in Wazirisatan and the arrest and handing over to United
States of more than eight hundred wanted Al–Qaeda members are expected to play a positive
role in this regard. However, Pakistani inability to control in Federally Administered Tribal
Areas (FATA), which is being used by Taliban and Al-qaeda as a safe haven, is having a
negative impact on Pakistan’s relations with the Karzai administration.
In response to President Hamid Karzai’s visit to Pakistan on 8 February 2002, President
Musharraf paid a return visit to Afghanistan on 2 April. This visit was the first by any foreign
head of state to the post–Taliban Afghanistan. During the visit an agreement was signed and
a Joint Ministerial Commission to promote trade, economic activity and coordinate
reconstruction in Afghanistan was set up. The visit also marked renewed vows to fight
terrorism and start air traffic between the two countries. Also, a $10 million cheque as part of
the 100 million package was delivered to the Afghan government for reconstruction.203
Pakistan’s government is also taking steps to stop the re–entry into its own territory from
Afghanistan of goods that are exported after tax rebate through land route to the latter. These
steps result in curtailment of a list of items that can be taken to Afghanistan through Pakistan.
Such limitations have resulted Afghanistan accusing Pakistan of trying to control its economy
and trade and violate rights of Afghanistan as a landlocked state. However, the government
has allowed transit trade to Afghanistan from six additional places along the Pak–Afghan
border. Further the attempts to revive the Turkmenistan–Afghanistan–Pakistan pipeline are
also indicative of Pakistani efforts not to lose the initiative to India totally.
The demonstrations in Kabul against Pakistan and the many skirmishes on Pakistan
Afghanistan borders after the coming to power of Hamid Karzai government in
Afghanistan204 symbolise the failure of Pakistan’s post–1989 Afghan policy. The statements

203
Nuri., Maqsudul Hasan, “The Afghan Corridor: Prospects for Pak–CAR Relations, Post Taliban?”
‘Regional Studies’ Institute of Regional Affairs, Islamabad Vol. xx, No. 4 Autumn 2002, p. 35
204
Cheema., Pervaiz Iqbal, “Firings on the Durand Line” Daily ‘The News’ Islamabad, 3 August, 2003. Prof.
Dr. Cheema is a former Chairman of Department of International Relations, Quaid–e–Azam University,
Islamabad and currently heads the government owned think tank Institute of Policy Studies, Islamabad.
 Impact of Pakistan’s Changed Afghan Policy on the Region 73

of US ambassador to Afghanistan as well as some from other US military officials in

Afghanistan has compounded the distance between Pakistan and the post 9/11
Afghanistan.205 However, the strategic requirements of the ‘War against Terrorism’ have
pushed United States to put its diplomatic weight for keeping the relations between Pakistan
and Afghanistan from blowing out of hand. For that purpose a trilateral commission, which
includes representatives of United States, Afghanistan and Pakistan has been formed, which
looks into border issues between the two neighbours. Formation of a commission and US
becoming a part of it is a direct consequence of Pakistan’s post 9/11 Afghan policy. Mindful
of the US policy of keeping Pakistan on board, Karzai expressed hopes that trade ties with
Pakistan can soon be restored. “We have no preferences, no favourites, as long as
Afghanistan can benefit.206
At this juncture one must note another interesting feature of the Pakistan–India–
Afghanistan relations. A Pashtun nationalist delegation led by ANP central President and son
of Abdul Wali Khan led a goodwill visit to Kabul in November 2003.207 The delegation was
accorded a very warm welcome. Pashtun nationalists thus have also re–entered the politics of
Pak–Afghan relations after a long break. The policy of Pakistani establishment to keep them
out has taken a full circle. Pakistan can take advantage of this change if its decision makers
play their cards properly and remove the mistrust of the past.

THE IRAN FACTOR

Iran is an important neighbour of both Afghanistan and Pakistan. Iran and Pakistan had
been close allies during the cold war till the 1978 Islamic revolution in Iran. Both were part
of the US system of alliances to encircle Soviet Union in the 1950s208. The two along with
Turkey were also partners in a regional economic cooperation organisation; Regional
Cooperation for Development (RCD). Their relations had turned sour and the neighbours had
become suspicious of each other during the Afghan resistance to Soviet Intervention in the
1980s. Iran had gone from being the closest ally of the United States, to become a challenger
to United States policies and interests not just in the Gulf, but in the whole Muslim world.
Though both Pakistan and Iran opposed Soviet Intervention in Afghanistan, they disagreed in
a fundamental manner. Iran opposed any US role in Afghanistan. On the other hand, Pakistan

205
Former US ambassador to Afghanistan Zalme Khalilzad, has on more than one occasion accused Pakistan
of not cooperating fully with United States in ints War against Terrorism in Afghanistan. He even said
that US may consider using force against terrorists on Pakistani soil if Pakistan does not cooperate.
Daily ‘Washington Post’, Washington, April 6 2003. Also read the transcript of a report by British
Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) about the diplomatic row this statement generated at
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/3603885.stm
206
ibid.
207
Daily, ‘The Daily Times’ Lahore, 21 November 2003.
208
Both were members of the Central Treaty Organisation, a US sponsored anti Soviet military alliance
formed in 1956. Along with Turkey, these two formed Regional coop0eration Organisation (RCD) in
early 1960s. RCD became dormant after the revolution in Iran in 1979, however, these original three
members established a new Economic Cooperation Organisation (ECO) in 1985, which was later
expanded to include the new Central Asian Republics and Afghanistan.
74 Ijaz Khan

had happily accepted the status of a frontline state for the United States against Soviet Union
during the 1980s. Their mutual discord remained within a certain bound during the 1980s and
early 1990s. However, the rise of Taliban put the two neighbours in confrontational positions
in Afghanistan. Iran drew closer to India. Along with Central Asian Republics bordering
Afghanistan, India as well as Russia considered the rise of Taliban as a threat to its interests
including security. So along with these other regional states Iran supported the Northern
alliance against the Pakistan supported Taliban. The United States also had started drifting
closer to this anti Taliban regional configuration much before 9/11.
In the post 9/11 regional geopolitics, India and Iran have become further closer. The
height of their closeness is the signing of defence cooperation agreement between them in
January 2003. The agreement provides for wide ranging defence related cooperation between
the two. From Pakistan’s perspective, the most significant provision is the one providing for
granting India the use of bases in Iran in case of war between India and Pakistan. India
agreed to provide in return military equipment, training and maintenance; a. Warship repair
facilities will be constructed at Chahbahar (Iran), b. Maintenance and upgrades will be
provided for Iran’s Mig – 29s, t – 72s (Tanks), Infantry fighting vehicles and artillery pieces,
c. Anti–tank guided weapons will be sold to Iran, d. and In the longer term India hopes to sell
Iran, missile boats and submarine simulators209
This pact took both US and Pakistan by surprise. Pakistan did not publicly comment on
it, however, Pakistani information minister announced that Pakistan’s prime minister would
be visiting Iran on 15 of February.210 The visit never materialised. The United States had
declared Iran part of the axis of evil along with Saddam ruled Iraq and North Korea. How
military cooperation between India and Iran is going to influence long term strategy of
United States that views India as a strategic partner remains to be seen. United States, for the
time being, has chosen not to publicly comment on this development. The pact for India was
most probably more political and diplomatic rather than military. India was on the one side
telling the world generally and US particularly that it can still act independently and two,
showing its displeasure over US getting too close to Pakistan.
Iran in its own right has been active in increasing its influence and relations with
Afghanistan. Taking advantage of strained relations between Pakistan and post Taliban
Afghanistan, Iran has signed agreements, which have the potential of making Iran a transit
route for Afghanistan.
President Hamid Karzai is taking steps to establish landlocked Afghanistan as a trade hub
connecting the Middle East, Central Asia and Europe. Afghan authorities have reached trade
deals with Iran, India and the Central Asian states; all of which grant major concessions to
Afghan goods. The new direction Afghan trade is taking is ending Afghan dependence on
Pakistan, formerly Afghanistan’s principle trading partner and entry port for imports and
exports. However, economic decisions based on political considerations can not have a very

209
Report titled “Strategic Shift in South Asia” in ‘Jane’s Defence Weekly’ 29 January 2003.
210
Statement of Sheikh Rashid Ahmad, Pakistan’s Federal Information Minister, Daily, ‘The News’ 2
February 2003
 Impact of Pakistan’s Changed Afghan Policy on the Region 75

strong viability, especially in the post cold war era, where economics is the engine of political
moves. Pakistan’s geographical location still makes it the most economic outlet.211
In early January 2003, Afghan Commerce Minister Sayed Mustafa Kazemi signed a deal
with Iran that will give Afghan exporters the right to use the port of Chabahar (in Iran) with a
90 percent discount on port fees and a 50 percent discount on warehousing charges. In
addition, Afghan vehicles are to be allowed full transit rights on the Iranian road system. On
January 6, at another meeting in Tehran, India, Iran and Afghanistan signed an agreement to
give Indian goods heading for Central Asia and Afghanistan similar preferential treatment
and tariff reductions at Chabahar. India additionally agreed to finance the upgrading of the
road between the port and the Afghan border. “Chabahar is a new option for Afghanistan–
destined goods and, more importantly, goods for Central Asia can now travel via
Afghanistan,” says Kazemi.212
India and Iran have also signed a memorandum of understanding to build a railroad from
Chabahar to the Afghan border. Iranian officials say their aim is to develop Chabahar into a
major port for Afghanistan and Central Asia, while reserving the port of Bandar Abbas for
trade with Russia and Europe. “Chabahar opens up Central Asia to the Gulf and Afghanistan
becomes the hub,” says Saad Mohseni, director of Moby Capital Partners, a joint Australian–
Afghan investment house based in Melbourne and Kabul. “Both India and Iran are ready to
invest in the infrastructure to develop this trade route which will benefit Kabul.” 213
Iran will provide electricity to western Afghanistan and shoulder the $16.5 million cost
of the project. Meanwhile, Iran and Turkmenistan will also provide natural gas to Herat city.
In January alone the Afghan ministers of foreign affairs, education, commerce and women’s
affairs visited Tehran. Western diplomats in Kabul say the rapid expansion of Afghan–
Iranian relations was partly responsible for prompting US President George W. Bush’s
January 13 order designating Afghanistan as a preferential trading partner. The agreement
will enable Afghanistan to export 5,700 types of goods to the United States without being
subject to tariffs. The irony is that Afghan exports, including carpets and dried fruit, will
probably travel through Iran.214
Kabul’s improving ties with Tehran are causing some concern in Washington. Through
clever and robust diplomatic moves on the part of Iran, by tying its Afghan policy with India,
it has somehow diluted Washington’s objections to Afghan Iran growing relations.

211
Rashid., Ahmad, “Afghan-Pakistani Tension Prompts Kabul To Develop New Trade Routes” Daily ‘The
Daily Times’ Lahore, 26 January, 2003.
212
Daily ‘Dawn’ Karachi. 26 January, 2003
213
Ahmad., Rashid, “Afghan-Pakistani Tension Prompts Kabul To Develop New Trade Routes”
http://www.eurasianet.org/. Accessed 20 April 2004. Also reproduced by Daily ‘The Daily Times’
Lahore, 26 January, 2003. For details of various Treaties and agreements signed by Afghanistan, visit
http://www.eurasianet.org/loya.jirga/trade_agreements.shtml. Accessed on 20 May 2004.
214
Ibid.
76 Ijaz Khan

CENTRAL ASIAN REPUBLICS

Central Asian republics wary of the Taliban as well as Russian dominating presence
welcomed American forces arrival in the region. The United States have established military
bases in Central Asia, declaring in the clearest possible terms of its intentions to stay in the
region for a long term. It has acquired bases in Kyrghizia and Uzbekistan struck agreements
to use airfields in Tajikistan, set up bases in Afghanistan, and have secured Pakistani
permission for use of airfields in its fight against terrorism in Afghanistan. Russia and China
have expressed their concern about long term US presence in the region.215 The US military
build–up in the former Soviet republics of Central Asia is raising fears in Moscow that
Washington is exploiting the Afghan war to establish a permanent, armed foothold in the
region. The swift construction of US military bases has also alarmed Beijing, although the
central Asian states appear to be embracing the Americans to dilute Russian influence in
what Moscow views as its strategic backyard.216
Kabul is also moving swiftly to open trading routes in Central Asia. In late December
General Mohammed Daud, military commander of Kunduz in northeastern Afghanistan,
headed a trade delegation to neighbouring Tajikistan. Despite its lack of resources, Tajikistan
has agreed to provide electricity to Kunduz and reduce tariffs for Afghan goods transiting
Tajikistan. Dushanbe also offered 200 scholarships for Afghan students and pledged to build
more bridges across the Amu Darya River that divides the two countries. The Agha Khan
Foundation completed the first of five new bridges last November. Meanwhile General
Rashid Dostum, an influential northern warlord based in Mazar Sharif, negotiated a similar
deal with Uzbekistan. The deals call for greater trade, reduced tariffs and the provision of
electricity to Mazar Sharif.217

PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

People’s Republic of China, the sleeping giant of the region, sharing US concerns about
religious inspired terrorism emanating from Afghanistan, supported ‘US war on Terrorism’,
however, it is also conscious of the strategic implications of US long term military presence
in the region. Together with bases in Japan and South Korea, the new Central Asian bases
have the practical effect of encircling of China by the United States.
The Chinese had their own axe to grind against the Taliban ruled Afghanistan. Jane’s
Defense Weekly quoting sources in the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service, in a 30 May
report by the Russian news agency Interfax, reported, “a sabotage centre operating in
Kandahar [in southern Afghanistan] ... trains representatives of radical Uighur groups...in

215
Lapidus., Gail W. “Central Asia in Russian and American Foreign Policy after September 11, 2001”
Presentation from ‘Central Asia and Russia: Responses to the ‘War on Terrorism’’, a panel discussion
held at the University of California, Berkeley on October 29, 2001. http://socrates.berkeley.edu/~iseees/
10/29/2001 accessed 25 May 2004.
216
Traynor., Ian, “War in Afghanistan: Russia Edgy at America's Military Build-Up In Region” Daily ‘The
Guardian’ London, 10 January, 2002
217
Ahmad., Rashid, 20 January, 2003.
 Impact of Pakistan’s Changed Afghan Policy on the Region 77

addition to Chechens and people from Central Asia.” According to this report, the Muslim
extremists in Kandahar have developed a plan to establish an Islamic state in the Fergana
Valley, which runs through Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, “as a small enclave that
will expand with time.”218 Chinese embassy in Afghanistan re opened on February 6 2002
and is trying to get its share of the economic activities as result of Taliban ouster.
Pakistan’s President Musharraf visited China for consultation before announcing publicly
his government’s policy change towards Taliban. The policy change has resulted in removal
of a creeping irritant between the much celebrated friendship between the two neighbours.
The irritant was due to the reported existence of terrorist training camps in Afghanistan for
Chinese Muslim dissidents. Pakistan has the chance as a result of its changed policy to play a
role that can promote its interests in Central Asia as well as Afghanistan to balance Indian
moves against it, provided it uses its China connections deftly.

GEO–POLITICS OF OIL AND GAS PIPELINES

Afghanistan’s has best chance for attracting foreign capital rests with its strategic
location as a potential major transit route for Siberian and Central Asian oil and natural gas
exports to South and East Asia. Energy demand there will grow rapidly over coming years
and alternative supply sources to Middle East production will be welcomed from India and
Pakistan to Taiwan, South Korea and Japan.
Major oil and gas supply routes219 from western Siberia, the southern and northern
Caspian regions, and Uzbekistan conjunct in Turkmenistan and from there, supplies can pass
through Afghanistan to Pakistan, India and beyond. In 1997, six international energy
companies, with American UNOCAL in the lead, and the government of Turkmenistan
formed Central Asia Gas Pipeline, Ltd. (CentGas) to build a 790 mile (1,271 kilometer)
pipeline to link Turkmenistan (which has its own abundant proven natural gas reserves) with
Pakistan. The group also considered an extension of the line to the New Delhi area in
India.220
UNOCAL said at the time that the project could be the foundation for a new commerce
corridor for the region – the Silk Road for the 21st Century. For the obvious political reasons,
nothing became of the project and it was abandoned in 1998. Its revival is one of the positive
developments since 9/11, which became possible due to Pakistan’s changed policy.
The Centgas /UNOCAL project was to carry natural gas from the Dauletabad Field in
southeastern Turkmenistan (which has independently certified reserves of more then 25
trillion cubic feet (708 billion cubic meters and is one of the world’s largest) at a rate of up to
2 billion cubic feet per day (20 billion cubic meters per year). A 48–inch diameter pipeline
was to extend from the Afghanistan–Turkmenistan border, generally follow the Herat–to–
Kandahar Road through Afghanistan, cross the Pakistan border in the vicinity of Quetta, and

218
Jane’s Defense Weekly 13 /06 /2000
219
The statistics used in this section are based on information available at US Department of Energy
Website. http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/centasia.html#oil_pipelines
220
ibid.
78 Ijaz Khan

terminate in Multan, Pakistan, where it was to tie into an existing pipeline system.
Turkmenistan was to construct a pipeline to link with the CentGas line at the border and
stretch approximately 105 miles to Dauletabad. A potential 400 mile extension from Multan
to New Delhi was also under consideration. Estimated cost of the project was $1.9 billion for
the segment to Pakistan, and an additional $600 million for the extension to India. That
project had been dropped due to the continued security situation in Afghanistan and Taliban
policies. India and Iran were drawing plans for by passing Pakistan. However, in the post
Taliban era, that project has been revived. On December 27 2003, Pakistan, Turkmenistan
and Afghanistan signed the much awaited oil and gas pipeline framework agreement giving
final nod to go ahead with the project, which would provide first outlet to the hydrocarbon
rich Central Asian Republics. Turkmen President Saparmurat Niyazov, Prime Minister
Zafarullah Jamali and Afghan President Hamid Karzai signed the agreement on behalf of
their respective governments. The Asian Development Bank has already committed 1.5
billion US Dollars in technical assistance grant to support the feasibility studies and have
programmed one million US dollars more during the next year.221
The original pipeline project was limited just to the conveyance of natural gas. With
proper connecting lines from the Caspian regions and Western Siberia, oil would now be
conveyed in parallel pipelines and exported through port facilities on the Pakistan coast. The
market for both large amounts of oil and gas certainly exists in South and East Asia. And, of
course, the oil and gas reserves that it would draw on are huge: Proven natural gas reserves
within Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan equal more than 236 trillion
cubic feet. The region’s total oil reserves by most estimates are as high as 200 billion barrels
– comparable to those of the Persian Gulf region.222
The potential benefits to Afghanistan of centring economic reconstruction on a large
combined oil and gas pipeline project are very substantial. There is money to be made and
labour to be employed during construction (estimated to take two to three years). There
money to be made is estimated to $100 million per year, for the long–term foreseeable future.
Beyond that, commerce will spring up all along the construction route and
telecommunications lines can be laid along with the pipelines.
And as important as the pipeline project may be for economic reasons, its political–
strategic benefits may even be larger: It would closely tie together the long term economic
interests of Afghanistan with those of Russia, the Central Asian republics, Pakistan and India,
and all of Asia would have a major economic stake in a future stable Afghanistan. Asia. 223
Understanding its geopolitical aspects that Pakistan Energy Minister Usman Aminaddin said
his country was prepared to discuss setting aside differences with neighbouring India to
extend what he called the ‘first mega–project of the 21st century’. President Pervez

221
Daily, ‘The News’ Islamabad 27 December 2002.
222
http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/centasia.html#oil_pipelines.
223
Parpart., Uwe, “Reconstructing Afghanistan - on oil and gas”, ‘Asia Times Online’, November 24, 2001
http://www.atimes.com/c-asia/CK24Ag01.html. Accessed 20 May 2004.
 Impact of Pakistan’s Changed Afghan Policy on the Region 79

Musharraf has given his assurance... of the flow of hydrocarbons into the world market,
including India.224

CONCLUSIONS: IMPACT OF PAKISTAN’S DECISION

When analysing the post 9/11 regional geo–politics two decisions stand out for their
impact; one was the US decision for a long term presence in the region with military
campaign in Afghanistan as one part of it and public justification for it; the second was
Pakistan’s decision to be part of the international coalition against Terrorism. The coming of
US to the region was a consequence of 9/11 and different US interests in the region and
beyond. Discussing those would require much more space and would take us away from the
main object of the study generally as well as this specific Chapter. Pakistan’s decision, which
initially took the shape of provision of ground and logistic facilities on Pakistani territory for
US military and fighting against various terrorist formations and organisations inside
Pakistan had impacted the region in very fundamental ways. The US decision to come to the
region was not dependent on Pakistani cooperation. Though one must add quickly, it
facilitated US policy to an extent that US have looked away from a number of its policy
objectives on the region and changed some of its strategic thinking and plans for it. Pakistani
decision shaped the geo politics of the region in a manner like no other state’s decision did.
To put the point more clearly, decisions of the other states were not changes in their policies.
At the most they can be termed minor adjustments, which States have to make when ever
something new happens. But they were in line with their existing policies and did not depart
in any noticeable way from them.
Pakistani decision gave a specific colour and direction to post 9/11 geo political moves
of various regional and extra regional actors influencing the region. The United States
growing relations with India were put on hold. US is now more even handed in its
relationship with the Pakistan and India and used its relations with its two mutually
distrustful allies to overcome their differences. That US role for peace was a direct
consequence of Pakistan’s post 9/11 Afghan policy. US, despite complaints every now and
then, have been largely appreciative of Pakistani support in the ‘War against Terrorism’. If
this had not been the case, US almost certainly would have been pressing India for more
pressure on Pakistan. One must remember India offered the use of its bases and facilities to
the US for use in ‘War against Terrorism’ without even being asked for it. Indians had made
that offer clearly with the intentions that road to Kabul from Delhi passed through Islamabad.
So, if the US is to use force against Taliban, it has first to target Pakistan. To say the least
Pakistan’s decision to join the coalition against terrorism foiled such eventuality. Similarly,
India also came around to the negotiating table due the fact that Pakistani role in the US led
‘War Against Terrorism’ had become crucial.

224
Alexander’s Oil and Gas Connections a US based Energy consultancy group
http://www.gasandoil.com/goc/news/ntc24013.htm. A good source for information about international
energy issues.
80 Ijaz Khan

Pakistan could not have saved Taliban is a statement that can not be contested with valid
reason. US had the alternative to use its existing military bases and the new ones it built after
9/11 in Central Asia, even if it had avoided, for whatever reason, using the ones made
available by India. Let’s suppose US mindful of International Law had respected Pakistani
airspace and avoided violating of its airspace, which it had violated with impunity earlier in
1988225, to strike at terrorist targets in Afghanistan. Even if it had not bought the Indian
argument that considered Pakistan equally responsible for terrorism and avoided hitting
Pakistan, Pakistan still would have been totally out of the picture in a Northern Alliance
dominated Afghanistan. Pakistan post 9/11 Afghan policy has meant US has to take into
consideration Pakistan’s security interests while pursuing its policy towards Afghanistan and
the region. Consultations with Pakistan on the post Taliban political and administrative
reconstruction were due to Pakistan’s changed policy. Pakistan Afghanistan dispute over the
Durand line issue has also been contained due to US interest in it.
Pakistan also received a respectable amount of economic support, relaxation of both
nuclear and democracy related sanctions. Very important, US bought the Pakistani argument
in the nuclear proliferation scandal. In 2003, it came to be known that top Pakistani scientists
are involved in illegal sale of Nuclear Material and technology. Pakistani government blamed
it on personal greed of a few scientists and denied the involvement of government of Pakistan
or its armed forces at any level or at any time in the past. United States had no choice but to
accept Pakistani explanation, as it needed to keep Pakistan on its side in the War against
Terrorism.226 Pakistan has also got the status of Non NATO Ally status of the United States,
which means preferential treatment in procurement of weapons and defence related
consultations.227 Pakistan re–entry into the Commonwealth is positive fallout of Pakistan’s
decision to be on the right side of the International Coalition against Terrorism.228
The revived India Afghanistan link, rising of the Durand issue and the re–entry of the
Pashtun Nationalists on the Pakistan–Afghanistan and by extension India relations, may be
interpreted by some as meaning the return to the pre–1992 era? However, a deeper look
suggests a careful interpretation of the realities on ground. In the pre 1992 era United States
supported Pakistan’s stand generally in its relations with Afghanistan. However, India and
Soviet Union supported Afghanistan’s claims over Pakistani territory. There were limits to
US support, as it had no influence over Kabul. In the post 9/11 era United States has
influence on both sides of the Durand Line. This influence means the issue may be solved or
at least kept confined. The real strategic nightmare for Pakistan is not the Northern Alliance
domination of Afghanistan or Indian influence there. The real nightmare could have been if
US–India–Russia–Iran and the Central Asian Republics had been on the opposite side of
Pakistan’s stand on the Durand Line. United States policy of keeping Pakistan on board in the
‘War against Terrorism’ has given Pakistani voices much more weight than the ouster of

225
In 1988 US had struck with Missiles at alleged terrorist training camps in Sudan and Afghanistan. Those
hitting Afghanistan had crossed Pakistan with some even landing on Pakistani territory. US had not
sought permission from Pakistan for use of its airspace.
226
Hamid Zahid, “Sorry Saga of Nuclear Proliferation”, Daily ‘The Daily Times’ Lahore, 8 February 2004.
227
‘Status of non-NATO ally formalized’ Daily Dawn 17 June 2004.
 Impact of Pakistan’s Changed Afghan Policy on the Region 81

Taliban from Kabul would have meant, given Pakistan’s pre–9/11 Afghan policy of putting
all its eggs in the Taliban basket.
The revival of Turkmenistan–Afghanistan–Pakistan and beyond, Gas and Oil pipeline
project is a direct consequence of the changed Pakistan decision, having an impact on the
regional oil energy game with impact on the geo politics of the region. One, Pakistan would
have found it difficult to be get the advantages of its location only on the basis of economic
considerations if had been on the wrong side of the international coalition. This project will
have a positive impact on the economies of the region is obvious, it will have a political
impact is also very significant. By tying the economic interest of these regional countries, this
project has the potential of creating a vested interest in regional peace. Pakistan must
redouble its efforts to implement the proposal for Iran – India Gas pipeline through Pakistan.
That pipeline termed appropriately by Iranian President as the ‘pipeline of peace’ has the
potential of making Pakistan the centre of Oil and Gas routes in the region, thus increasing its
geo–political value.
It is Pakistani diplomacy that is failing to take full advantage of its location in a positive
sense. That inability is also a result of the dominant mind set and strategic culture that simply
cannot overcome India and find it difficult to give up the Islamic extremists as allies in the
policy preferences resulting from it. To conclude, Pakistan’s decision to be a part of the
International coalition against terrorism has made room for Pakistan’s diplomacy to seek the
protection of legitimate state interests in Afghanistan, of its rightful place in regional geo
politics and its security concerns emanating from India. How Pakistani diplomacy uses that
room would depend on a number of factors, on the specific policy initiatives it takes and
responses it chooses which are dependent how it makes those choices.

228
Daily ‘Dawn’ Karachi, 23 May 2004. Pakistan’s membership of Commonwealth was suspended in 1999,
when Gen. Pervaiz Musharraf staged a coup d’ tat against the government of Prime Minister Nawaz
Sharif.
Chapter 5

PAKISTAN’S DOMESTIC FOREIGN POLICY DEBATE

IN THE POST SEPTEMBER 11 ERA

The decision made by Pakistani decision makers to align Pakistan with the Untied States
in its war against terrorism had implications, which go far beyond the giving up of support
for Taliban. The decision required certain fundamental changes that go down to the very
basis of the development of the state and society of Pakistan. Support for Taliban was a result
of specific historical cultural and systemic forces, acting from both within and without the
state. Withdrawal of that support, rather taking a U–Turn, and going against them was
negation of that particular decision–making process, and the worldview generated by that
process. That specific worldview in turn sustained and helped in the development of
Pakistani decision–making processes and determined the relative strengths of various sources
of inputs in it. That decision generated a heated and serious debate about the very basis of the
state, its identity, direction and state society relations. This chapter records, interprets and
explains that debate. First, an introduction to the contending positions in the foreign policy
debate is made. They are divided into three broad groups. Before recording these contending
opinions and positions the chapter notes the announcement of Pakistan’s changed policy,
formally made by President Musharraf through a televised speech on 20 September 2001,
immediately followed by a look at President Musharraf’s televised address of 12 January
2002. The purpose of looking at the 12 January address along with the September 20 one is
due to the fact that the second address is a continuation, rather completion of the policy shift
announced in the earlier speech. It is by looking at them both together that the full domestic
implication of Pakistan’s policy change becomes clear. Then we look at the views of the
three main streams of opinion on the Pakistani decision, identified below. The chapter
concludes with identifying implications for decision–making of the debate and the changes
brought or sought to be brought by the decision under review. That includes analysis of
Government of Pakistan’s policy to follow the domestic aspects of its changed Afghan Policy
and its role in the ‘War against Terrorism’ inside Pakistan, the rise of MMA, and the conduct
of elections 2002.
84 Ijaz Khan

THE CONTENDING POSITIONS ON FOREIGN POLICY

Broadly speaking, the opinion within Pakistan revolved around three themes, each in turn
representing a specific world view: some supported it with the belief that it is just a change of
tools and as such would not affect the larger framework of Pakistan’s foreign policy
fundamentals and can be termed Pakistani Nationalists or in the terminology of political
science as centrists; those who opposed it as they considered this a fundamental policy
change, that would redirect Pakistan’s over all foreign as well as domestic policy and can be
grouped under the term of Fundamentalists or Religious Groups or in terms of political
science as rightists the extremists among them would be termed as reactionaries; and finally
those who supported it due to the very fact that it would change the fundamental directions of
Pakistani state, both in the internal as well as external policy contexts and can be grouped
under liberals with leanings towards the leftist position on the spectrum of political science
theoretical classification. These are broad divisions and should not be construed as implying
a very strict division. There are many sub divisions within these groups, as would become
clearer when we look at their positions separately, below.

THE PAKISTANI DECISION

United States under secretary of State Armitage put forth a list of demands to the then
Pakistani head of ISI Gen. Mahmood Ahmad the same day that terrorists struck at United
States of America, i.e. on 11, September 2001. US Secretary of State Collin Powell repeated
the set of demands to President Pervaiz Musharraf on 12 September.229 Pakistan announced
its decision to go along with United States the next day.230 Pakistan agreed to all the demands
made of it including a. to stop Al-qaeda operatives at Pakistan’s border, intercept arms
shipments through Pakistan and end all logistical support for Osama bin Laden, b. Blanket
over flight and landing rights, c. Access to Pakistan, naval bases, air bases and borders, d.
Immediate intelligence and immigration information, e. Condemn the Sept 11 attacks; f. curb
all domestic expression of support for terrorism against the United States, its friends and
allies, g. Cut off all shipments of fuel to the Taliban and stop Pakistani volunteers from going
into Afghanistan to join the Taliban, and h. Break diplomatic relations with the Taliban and
assist us to destroy (Osama) bin Laden and his Al-qaeda network to the surprise of US
Secretary of State, Colin Powell.231 After a process of consultations and discussions at
different levels Gen. Pervaiz Musharraf addressed the Nation taking them into confidence
about his decision to become ally in the ‘War Against Terrorism’ about to begin in
Afghanistan. The main points of his address were:
Giving the slogan, Pakistan first, meaning interests of the state of Pakistan must be given
priority over any other moral, ethical or ideological considerations.

229
Daily The News Islamabad, 13 September 2001.
230
Daily The News Islamabad, 14 September 2001.
231
Woodward Bob, [2002], Bush At War Simon and Schuster Washington, pp 59-60.
 Pakistan’s Domestic Foreign Policy Debate in the Post September 11 Era 85

• Not to permit India to use that war against Pakistan

• Pakistan would be able to get international, especially US, better understanding of
its position on Kashmir and hence help in its solution.
• Protection of its strategic assets (Nuclear capability)
• Economic benefits

General Musharraf gave a very important basic and significant slogan, which can be
termed as forming the basis of Pakistan’s post 9/11 foreign policy that was ‘Pakistan First’.
The slogan of ‘Pakistan first’ have been interpreted as dissociating Pakistan from other
Muslim causes in other parts of the world; thus hitting at one of the basic elements of
Pakistani conscious, strategic culture and policies that considered it Pakistan’s manifest
destiny to espouse the Muslim causes; Islamic forces as tools of policy being a direct result of
that. Put in this manner it had very obvious domestic implications as well. Pakistan’s
expectations of economic benefits were realised to a reasonable extent; however, the other
three were not as simple as apparently Pakistani leadership considered they would be. It
achieved the purpose of denying India the opportunity to use War against Terrorism to settle
its own scores with Pakistan, at least in the short run. There is a debate on this point that is
discussed below. Pakistan’s expectations on Kashmir, if they were just for more international
and especially US interest, were broadly speaking correct, but if they were of support for its
position, both on the substance of the dispute and /or support for the means Pakistan had
adopted, then Pakistan was up for a surprise. If protection of strategic assets meant their
protection from some immediate military threat, then Pakistan achieved that; however, if it
meant the International Community would ignore Pakistan’s nuclear programme, policy, or
its management, then that perception has its detractors.
The US demands had two parts; one, immediate that were military and the other were
related to long term policy. The immediate military demands were met relatively easily.
Pakistan coordinated its Afghanistan policy with the US strategy of counter terrorism of the
use of military power and coercion. Three airports were made available to the US troops for
logistical, communication and emergency support for their military operations against the
Taliban in Afghanistan; the security agencies of Pakistan and the US exchanged information
on Afghanistan232; and Pakistan strengthened its security arrangements on Pakistan–
Afghanistan border. The long term policy related points of his speech, included, severing of
all contacts with extremist groups and fundamentalism and not permitting the use of Pakistani
territory as refuge by extremists. Both had long term implications for the very foundations
and world view of the state as well as required some administrative and constitutional
changes.
To understand the implications of 9/11 for Pakistan and Pakistani state’s response one
needs to look at President Musharraf’s address to the nation of 12 January 2002. That speech
came after ouster of Taliban from power, formation of a government headed by Hamid

232
Concerning exchange of information some doubts have been expressed. It has been reported that Pakistan
did not share fully its intelligence of Afghanistan with US. That may have been due to non cooperation
of some rogue individuals or non cooperation of ISI as an organisation, being the single most important
factor in Pakistan’s continued support for Taliban, when gradually other parts of the decision-making
elite started changing their views. Read Maley., William, 2003, p. 255-266
86 Ijaz Khan

Karzai, an ethnic Pashtun, but clearly dominated by the Northern Alliance, in Afghanistan
and the terrorist attacks on Indian parliament in December 2001. That speech must be
understood as a logical step of the Pakistan’s Afghan Policy change, addressing the broader
implications and requirements of that change in external policy at internal level. President
Musharraf outlined his commitments to eliminate extremism and jehadism from Pakistani
state and society. The highlights of his speech233 are:

Ever since I assumed office, I launched a campaign to rid the society of extremism,
violence and terrorism and strived to project Islam in its true perspective. First, in the
year 2000, I started interacting with the Taliban and counselled them to inculcate
tolerance and bring moderation in their ways. I also told them that those terrorists who
were involved in terrorist acts in Pakistan and seeking refuge in Afghanistan should be
returned to us. Unfortunately, we did not succeed. In year 2001, we sealed the Pak–
Afghan borders and I gave directions that no students of any Madrassa (religious
seminaries) should be allowed to cross into Afghanistan without relevant documents. Yet
little improvement occurred. The day of reckoning has come. Do we want Pakistan to
become a theocratic state? Do we believe that religious education alone is enough for
governance or do we want Pakistan to emerge as a progressive and dynamic Islamic
welfare state? The verdict of the masses is in favour of a progressive Islamic state. If any
Madrassa (religious school) is found indulging in extremism, subversion, militant activity
or possessing any types of weapons, it will be closed. All Madrassas will have to adopt
the new syllabi by the end of this year. We must check abuse of mosques and Madrassas
and they must not be used for spreading political and sectarian prejudices. The Kashmir
problem needs to be resolved by dialogue and peaceful means in accordance with the
wishes of the Kashmiri people and the UN resolutions. We have to find the solution of
this dispute. No organisation will be allowed to indulge in terrorism in the name of
Kashmir. We condemn the terrorist acts of September 11, October 1 [In Srinagar, on
state parliament] and December 13 [in Delhi, on Indian Parliament]. It is for the
government to take a position on international issues. Individuals, organisations and
political parties should restrict their activities to expression of their views. I request them
to express their views on international issues in an intellectual spirit and in a civilised
manner through force of argument.

President Musharraf address of 12 January really brought out the domestic component of
Pakistan’s post 9/11 Afghan policy change. He made it clear that the change can not be
confined to Afghanistan only, rather to Taliban only. The change has wider implications for
both domestic as well as foreign policy, underlining the connection between Pakistan’s
Kashmir policy and the now abandoned pro Taliban Afghan policy. This change also had far
reaching consequences for the identity and future of Pakistan. Pakistan has to make a choice
between being part of the International Society and attempt to solve problems facing it in that
system (the International Society) or challenge it from outside. Similarly, Pakistan must
choose between being a modern educated and responsible state providing for the well being
of its citizens or a fundamentalist extremist state threatening and being threatened by the
International Society. President Musharraf put his weight behind change and progress, thus
participating in the debate already underway after his initial decision to make Pakistan part of

233
For a full transcript of President Musharraf’s speech read Daily The News Islamabad, 13 January 2002
 Pakistan’s Domestic Foreign Policy Debate in the Post September 11 Era 87

the International Coalition against Terrorism. The choices were also a result of a decision that
contradicted the dictates of its strategic culture that found religious extremists as useful
tools/allies; pro Taliban Afghan policy being an expression of that.

PAKISTANI NATIONALISTS’ POSITION

Pakistani Nationalists would include all those who draw their conceptual basis from the
combination of secular image of Quaid–e–Azam Mohd Ali Jinnah, and the anti Hindu nature
of Pakistan movement, strong state centric theoretical approach, with centrist political
positions. The proponents of this view are present in the dominant section of Pakistani ruling
elites. In fact one can call it the establishment point of view. Pakistan People’s Party234
(PPP), both groups of Pakistan Muslim League (that is Nawaz group also called PML–N and
Qauid–e–Azam group which is the current governmental party also called PML–Q), General
Musharraf’s views also makes him closer to this group. Most of the civil and uniformed
bureaucracy can also be bracketed with this particular viewpoint. Islam based, mostly
government owned think tanks, as well as most of the academia in Punjab and the Capital
Islamabad along with some from the rest of the three provinces provide the intellectual basis
to this view.
The above broad list clearly indicates the existence of variations within this alignment.
There are some who can be termed as hawks, while others who are moderates, with some
leaning a little towards left as well as others tilted to the right. All of them normally have,
strong anti India views; a very strong commitment to the merger of whole of Kashmir with
Pakistan and consider nuclear capability and programme to be basic to Pakistan’s security
and survival, which must be pursued whatsoever. There are differences on the military’s right
to govern; however, they are mostly in favour of a strong military. In foreign policy this view
point holds, besides threat perception from India, friendship with People’s Republic of China
and good relations with USA [there are debates about this point] are considered very
important. A close relationship with the Muslim Middle East, especially the conservative
Arab States within that region, is also considered vital for Pakistan’s security requirements.
On Afghanistan, this view takes the Pakistani establishment view that sees Afghanistan
through the prism of its relations with India and concerns about Durand line. Their attitude is
shaped by Pakistani state’s relations with the Pashtun nationalists, who are viewed as anti
Pakistan, mostly having the background of alignment with All India Congress Party in the
pre–1947 era. For this view support for Taliban was not the policy rather they were a means
to achieving of certain foreign policy goals. Some from amongst them had started arguing for

234
Pakistan Peoples Party formed by Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto in 1968, is a party of centrist political positions
with clear tilt towards the left of Centre politics. It is currently headed by Benazir Bhutto, the daughter
of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto. Benazir Bhutto remained prime minister of Pakistan twice 1988 – 1991 and 1993
– 1997. Her government was dismissed on both occasions by the President prematurely. She is currently
running the affairs of her party from exile.
88 Ijaz Khan

withdrawing support for Taliban even before 9/11.235 Pakistan Peoples Party had voiced its
opposition to pro Taliban policy of Pakistan much earlier.236
In the wake of 9/11, as can be evidenced from Pervaiz Musharraf’s speech of 20
September as well as other statements and newspaper articles, this view considered giving up
of Taliban does not mean any real fundamental change in Pakistan’s Afghan policy or
broader foreign policy, specially towards India, on Kashmir and Nuclear programme. Despite
announcing support for the US led War against Terrorism, this view was behind the Pakistani
attempts to somehow de-link Taliban from Osama Bin Laden. The attempts by Pakistan to
convince the Taliban to accept US demands concerning Osama Bin Laden and other terrorists
were a manifestation of this viewpoint. Which believed Taliban were still the best bet for
Pakistan’s Afghan policy, which remained unchanged as far as goals went. Pakistan tried to
impress upon Americans not to support the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan, which was
considered to have links with India and Iran. Pakistan persisted with opposing Northern
Alliance to the day they entered Kabul. For example one very eminent Islamabad based
scholar wrote, “There are two visible contenders for power to fill the vacuum that withering
away of Taliban regime would cause. They are Northern Front and the former king Zahir
Shah. The Northern Front is a rag tag of commanders from the defeated communist army and
warlords from the minority ethnic community. There are serious doubts about their ability to
control the country or gain any allegiance from the majority Pashtun ethnic group. We should
not forget that they ruled Kabul and territories beyond that point for four years and made a
mess of everything. The surge in the international sentiment against the Taliban and the
likelihood of punitive military action against them has rekindled their hope of capturing
Kabul. They might, but that would not bring peace and stability to Afghanistan, as the civil
war that has already ethnic overtones will take definite ethnic character and endanger the
territorial unity of the country. If the Taliban have to be shown the door, a better and realistic
alternative lies in forming a broad based government in which all Afghan groups should have
representation.”237 Pakistan’s foreign minister Abdul Sattar while addressing a press
conference made public his concerns over reports that the Northern Front in Afghanistan was
seeking military assistance to fight the Taliban. He said, “Any decision on the part of any
foreign power to give assistance to one side or another would be a recipe for greater suffering
for the people of Afghanistan.”238 He said that Pakistan favours a national reconciliation in
Afghanistan as favouring one group would not serve the interest of Afghanistan.”239 A retired
Pakistan army general told a foreign journalist, “there has never been much real love lost for
the Taliban in most of the High Command, especially after they rejected our advice and
embarrassed us so badly over the past year, as in the case of the destruction of the statues. I
myself have always hated them and their allies here. They represent the absolute antithesis of
the Quaid–e–Azam’s [honorary title given to Mohammed Ali Jinnah, founder of Pakistan]

235
ibid. Judah Tim, 2002
236
“Pakistan Should Distance itself from Taliban: PPP”, Daily ‘Dawn’, Karachi September 14,2001
237
Rais., Rasul Baksh, “Fixing the politics of Afghanistan” Daily ‘The News’ Islamabad, 29 September,
2001. Prof. Dr. Rasul Baksh Rais is a former Director of the Area Study Centre (For North America)
Qaud–e–Azam University Islamabad.
238
Press Conference of Foreign Minister Abdul Sattar, Daily, The News Islamabad, 26 September, 2001.
239
ibid.
 Pakistan’s Domestic Foreign Policy Debate in the Post September 11 Era 89

vision of a modern secular state in which religion would provide only personal ethical
values.”240
The hard line faction or what can be termed as the hawkish Pakistani nationalists were
sceptic about President Musharraf’s decision to join War against terrorism. They were not
ready to accept the argument that this would improve Pakistan’s standing in the west or
would get much support vis–à–vis India, more specifically on Kashmir. This view considered
Taliban to be the best and only bet Pakistan had in Afghanistan and were not ready to accept
the arguments that support for them was no more tenable. A very articulate presentation of
this view was presented by Dr. Shirin Mazari,241 who wrote, “ … problem that continues for
Pakistan is the efforts by India to somehow throw Pakistan out of the loop of the anti terrorist
coalition. Since Agra (refers to the Musharraf–Vajpai summit of July 2001) India has been
suffering from a diplomatic trauma, which has only become more aggravated in the wake of
its failure to get Pakistan denounced as a terrorist state, following the events of September 11.
Instead, with Pakistan a critical player in the present international coalition against terrorism,
India has to watch from sidelines. (Realising that Kashmir liberation movement may also be
labelled as terrorism) it needs to be remembered that the Kashmiri Mujahideen struggle has
always targeted military targets or targets of the Indian state – never civilians. That has been
the pattern of the Indian security forces and the renegades in the pay of the Indian
government; India has managed to cover up its own links to the Northern Alliance [in
Afghanistan] and their acts of terror within Pakistan.So far, Pakistan is one of the few states
that has declared specifically the sort of support it is giving/going to give to the fight against
terrorism in the context of Afghanistan – barring Britain; even NATO states have not been so
specific. Yet questions are being constantly raised about the security of this commitment.
Doubts are being raised on all aspects of the Pakistani ruling elite. Now the US is trying to
use the occasion to try and infiltrate our nuclear planning on the pretext of ‘securing’ our
weapons. Against whom is the point? Our own people who may come to power at a future
date? Surely protection of our nuclear asset was a major factor in pushing the government so
forcefully into the anti–terrorist coalition in terms of Afghanistan. So how can we allow this
coalition to be the reason for giving access to all our nuclear plans and weapons?242
It does not reflect well on the US and its allies to continuously raise doubts in relation to
Pakistan and to create a fear psychosis relating to Pakistan. If our intent is always suspect,
there can be little basis for cooperation and a working partnership. [A warning!] The silent
majority, which has supported the stance of the government, is getting restless at the
insinuations and doubts being voiced by our supposed ‘allies’. Finally, Pakistan needs to be
more proactive in not only stressing that struggles for self–determination are a legitimate part
of international relations since self determination is a peremptory norm, but also that

240
Lieven Anatol, “Voices from the Region: Interview with Lt General (Retd.) Talat Masood, Pakistan
Army” http://www.ceip.org/files/Publications /anatolmasood. asp?from=pubtype. The interview was
conducted on 14 October 2001. Accessed 19 April 2004.
241
Dr. Shirin Mazari currently heads the government owned, Islamabad based think tank, Institute of
Strategic Studies and is a former Professor of International Relations Quaid–e–Azam University
Islamabad.
242
Mazari Shirin M. “Testing Times for Pakistan”, Daily The News Islamabad, 4 October, 2001
90 Ijaz Khan

terrorism should not be linked to any religion.”243 Sensing the implications of War on
Terrorism for Pakistani support for the ongoing Kashmiri struggle, especially its violent
content, Dr. Shirin Mazari argued elsewhere for the need to distinguish between terrorism
and the right of self determination (of Kashmiris).244

THE RELIGIOUS/FUNDAMENTALIST POSITION

This view is represented mainly by religious political parties. Most of them are currently
part of Mutahida Majlis–e–Amal (MMA). MMA include JI led by Qazi Hussain Ahmad,
Maulana Fazal Ur Rahman’s JUI–F, Maulana Samiul Haq's JUI–S, Maulana Shah Ahmad
Noorani's Jamiat–e–Ulema–e–Pakistan (JUP), Professor Sajid Mir's Jamiat Ahle Hadith, and
Allama Syed Sajid Naqvi's Tehrik–I–Islami. MMA components take active part in
mainstream political and electoral process. There are other parties and groups representing a
more extremist stand and a militant style. They include including Sipah–Sahaba (Army of the
companions of the Prophet), Jaish–e–Muhammad, Lashkar–e–Tayyabba, Tehrik–Nifaz–e–
Shari’iat–e–Mummadi (TNSM) (Movement for the implementation of Prophet’s
Mohammad’s [SM] system of governance), based in northern districts of NWFP, Hiz–ul–
Tehrir, a party that exists internationally, especially in the Central Asian Republics and many
other smaller religious groups and organisations. Tablighi Jama’at (Preachers Party) though
not a political party, loosely organised and active in spreading religious beliefs, practices and
values through word of mouth do provide, probably unintended support base to religious
political views and parties. Among them JI stands out for its more internationalist Islamic
approach, having connections with Gulbadin Hekmatyar in Afghanistan as well as Pan
Islamic movements and parties in rest of the Muslim Countries, and being closer to
Pakistan’s Afghan policy, at least, till the rise of Taliban, than any other party. JUI mainly
based having its main support base in rural NWFP and Pashtun areas of Balochistan, is a
party that became significant player in Pakistan’s Afghan policy with the rise of Taliban in
1994. The militant and extremist groups mentioned above had and may still maintain
reasonably good relations with Taliban of Afghanistan. TNSM openly recruited and sent
volunteers to fight along with the Taliban against US forces. Most of these parties had
formed Afghan Defence Council under the leadership of Maulana Sami–Ul–Haq head of his
own faction of JUI much before the 9/11, for support of and lobbying for Taliban government
in Afghanistan.
The religious groups, who had become very important partners of Pakistani foreign
policy making and implementation, remained in that position till President Musharraf
announced change of Pakistan’s pro Taliban policy after 9/11. Religious slogans and groups
were intended to be tools of Pakistan’s foreign policy, especially in Afghanistan and India.245
The personality of Gen. Zia – Ul – Haq,246 who was a deeply religious person, the

243
ibid
244
“Distinguishing terrorism from Self Determination”, Daily The New 27 September 2001.
245
Discussed in Chapter two above.
246
Cooley., John K. 2001, pp. 47-64
 Pakistan’s Domestic Foreign Policy Debate in the Post September 11 Era 91

requirements of maintaining Afghan resistance a holy Jihad, the religious basis of Pakistan’s
establishment [even if the original leaders of Pakistan movement were secular in their
politics] all played a role in ascendancy of extremist religious groups in Pakistani decision–
making.247 ISI was central to this relation between Pakistani establishment and these religious
groups. The personal role of Gen. Hamid Gul, director ISI (1988 – 1989) in this connection is
also important. The relationship between the two (Religious fundamentalists generally,
especially JI and Pakistani military establishment) is well recorded.248
They considered change of pro Taliban policy means a much more fundamental change,
both in Pakistan’s domestic as well as foreign policy. According to Qazi Hussain Ahmad,
“General Pervez Musharraf’s ‘Pakistan First’ policy had basically pushed the country into a
steadily growing crisis. First, Musharraf reversed his Afghan policy because of urging from
US President George Bush. Now, he was undertaking an operation against his own people in
the tribal areas to serve American interests, he added. He said a pro–Pakistan government had
existed in Afghanistan. But, he said, General Musharraf promised (sic provided) President
Bush air bases and intelligence support to dislodge the Taliban regime. Mr Ahmad said
General Musharraf was instrumental in converting the Line of Control into an international
border between India and Pakistan by starting a bus service between the two parts of
Kashmir. ‘What kind of travel documents would the Kashmiris living on both side of the Line
of Control possess?’ he asked. He added that General Musharraf changed the Kashmir policy
under American pressure and had started negotiations with India without solving the Kashmir
issue. ‘America wants to establish not only economic supremacy in the world, but also
cultural supremacy,’ he said. As America’s strategic partner, India wants the role of a mini–
super power in the region, he said. Mr Ahmad added that the United States wants drastic
changes in Pakistan’s educational curriculum to deprive students of an awareness of Islamic
culture.”249 Qazi Hussain Ahmad takes articulated the religious parties view point on the
implications of Pakistan changed Afghan policy very clearly. He understood and condemned
the change in Pakistan’s policy about Pan Islamism, Kashmir and very significantly the
government’s plans to change school syllabi. Such wide spread changes were expected to
drastically undo the progress made by the religious right during the Zia era (1977–1988).
Qazi Hussain Ahmad thus points out, what he considers the unwanted consequences of
Pakistan post 9/11 Afghan policy. That policy was not confined to just withdrawal of support
to Taliban, which may have been palatable, but was covering the whole spectrum of the
political and ideological makeup of Pakistan. Such a drastic fundamental change was
unacceptable to the religious right. They considered this change would have implications for
Pakistan’s Kashmir policy as well as nuclear capability. Further, the slogan of ‘Pakistan first’
meant severing of any links any one in Pakistan had with any Muslim causes anywhere.

247
Giles., Dorronsoro, “Pakistan and the Taliban: State Policy, Religious Networks and Political
Connections” in Pakistan: Nationalism without a Nation, Jaffrelot Christophe,(Ed). Manohar, New
Delhi, 2002, pp 161-178.
248
Cooly. John K., 2001, pp.48-65.
249
Qazi Hussain ahmad Chief of JI’s Press Conference, Daily Daily Times 26 February 2004
92 Ijaz Khan

THE LIBERAL VIEW

In the domain of Pakistan’s foreign policy, there exist other voices that for the purposes
of this research have been termed as liberal view. It has been termed as alternative because
with the probable exception of a few individuals, this view had not been part of the dominant
sections of Pakistani state or society. One can include a broad array of academics, some Non
governmental organisations (especially those involved with peace or human rights advocacy),
and most of the smaller nationalist as well as progressive parties (including former
Communists) with leanings to the left of the Centre of the Pakistani political spectrum. Like
the other two groups a variety of views on specifics do exist at individual level and between
associations within the broader view. This view is critical of the militarist postcolonial state
structure, committed to democratic values and human rights. On foreign policy issues they
advocate for peace with India believing dialogue to be the better way of solving disputes.
They opposed Gen. Zia’s Afghan policy, considering that would result in Talibanization of
Pakistani state and society.
This view broadly agreed with the post 9/11 Afghan policy of the government of Gen.
Musharraf as it was understood, it would not and cannot stop with withdrawal of support
from Taliban or even providing support to US against Taliban in Afghanistan. They
understood and supported the overall anti fundamentalist nature and requirements of
Pakistan’s policy shift. However, they tried and argued for ensuring respect for human rights
in the conduct of the ‘War against Terrorism’, with some voices opposed to the use of
military force. There was also a feeling that the West has conferred a new religious or Islamic
identity on all Muslims considering them a homogeneous group. Many groups feel frustrated
by the imposition of this new identity, as they do not support extremism (in the form of
terrorism or fundamentalism). They have been in conflict with the religious Right, as they do
not accept their version of Islam.
“The Muslim world, in general, and Pakistan, in particular, is gripped by an ideological
paradox that undermines the alignment of Muslim countries with the West in its war against
terrorism. Although the Muslim states, barring few exceptions, have had taken the path of
‘modernisation’– however contradictory that may have been – they face an ideologically
revivalist backlash that has become more pronounced after the cataclysm of September 11.
What is quite problematic is that even many of the ‘modernists’, in their populist anti–
American rhetoric, are inclined to join forces with the extreme religious right over what they
perceive as ‘principal enemy’. Ironically, they borrow their ideological arsenal from the
erstwhile East–West, Cold War divide while forging a ‘joint front against imperialism’ with
the clergy in its sacred war against the infidels, i.e. modern civilisation, in general, and US–
led West in particular. In what may turn out to be a very dangerous political gamble, or
opportunism, they take comfort in the untenable nature of the fundamentalist project while
becoming the tail of a most reactionary revivalism. The ideological paradox is so acute that
even many of the so–called organisations of civil society, the NGOs in particular, who are in
fact both the practitioners and beneficiaries of neo–liberalism, have also been swayed by
‘anti–imperialist’ populism. Not to mention the old time leftists who seek catharsis by
venting their frustrated anti–Americanism.
 Pakistan’s Domestic Foreign Policy Debate in the Post September 11 Era 93

As the ideological compromise breaks up between the clergy and the state wherever it
was tenuously sustained in the Muslim world, such as in Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Sudan,
the ideological paradox has become much more pronounced than the modernist authoritarian
countries, such as Turkey and Egypt, who had effectively separated the state from religion. In
the post–Cold War times, the clergy in the Muslim world has gone through a political
metamorphosis posing a serious threat to its benefactors of yesteryears, most importantly the
US, the Saudi monarchy and the Pakistani establishment. It has also added a very parochial
and divisive dimension to the causes of national liberation movements in the Muslim world,
such as of Palestinians and the Kashmiris, helping in fact the forces of occupation and
annexation.”250 A radical shift of policy is suggested. Pakistan first, the slogan given by
President Musharraf in his address to the Nation on 20 September is translated into a policy
of an enlightened self interest, which means Pakistan has to distance itself from commitments
it has no material means to pursue. More importantly, Pakistan must make a clear break from
its extremist friends, even if it insists on pursuing its Kashmir policy or support for national
liberation movements. These movements must pursue a political course of action if they want
to be supported by Pakistan.
M. B. Naqvi251 puts the liberal argument clearly and forcefully in this regard, terming it
as a ‘paradigm shift’. He writes, “Pakistan’s Afghan policy [pre 9/11] that yielded little other
than narcotics and Kalashnikovs; it too is in tatters. Taliban regime, the crowning glory of
Islamabad, seems doomed and Pakistan has been reduced to beseeching the US and rest of
the world for a few minister–ships for ‘moderate’ Taliban in the next supposedly broad based
government. The nine-year-old imperial sway over Afghanistan cost it dear. Iran was
alienated and China became wary, though not alienated, while rest of the world felt more or
less displeased.”252 He then goes on to argue for a change in Kashmir policy in accordance
with the ‘paradigm shift’, “Kashmiris have the right to live in whatever dispensation they
freely choose. We would support it. But it is no business of Pakistan to win Kashmiris their
rights for them. This undertaking got Pakistan governments into all manner of crises, wars
and forced them into unstoppable and ruinously expensive arms races with India. Let
Islamabad realise what is self–determination right: it is Kashmiris freedom and outsiders have
no role; it is Kashmiris freedom from India that they have to achieve for themselves. For
Pakistani state to engage in the struggle on their behalf would be seen by Kashmiris and
others as self-aggrandisement. A change is unavoidable because it has ended up in a blind
alley. The categorical imperative is: avoid war at all costs. This means strongly discouraging
insurgents in Kashmir from sing violent means. [Pakistan may continue political and
diplomatic support] Only gun running has to be avoided; it should have no direct role in
Kashmir. This should be followed up with a progressive military disengagement.”253

250
Alam., Imtiaz, “The Ideological Paradox”, Daily The News, Islamabad, 22 October, 2001. Mr. Imtiaz
alam, currently working as columnist with Daily ‘The News’, one of the largest English dailies in
Pakistan, has background of leftist and democratic activism, which landed him in jail during Gen. Zia’s
Martial Law in the 1980s.
251
M.B Naqvi writes regularly in Daily Dawn published from Karachi, being one of the oldest and well
reputed Dailies of Pakistan, is active participant of peace and democracy related activities of the Civil
Society
252
Naqvi., M. B., “Direction for the paradigm shift”, Daily The News Islamabad, 31 October 2001.
253
Ibid.
94 Ijaz Khan

The Pashtun secular nationalist parties faced a dilemma. They had opposed the Taliban
for long, even if some initially expected them to serve the cause of Pashtun nationalism. They
saw a chance of getting rid of religious extremists who had challenged their representative
character as well as their vision for a modern and secular Pashtun society. On the other side
they could not be seen supportive of a campaign that would have many Pashtun civilian
casualties. Their anti imperialist history and liberal political outlook made them oppose the
US military campaign. Mahmud Khan Achakzai254, a Pashtun nationalist leader from
Balochistan, had opposed the rise of Taliban from the time of their origin. In an interview in
the aftermath of 9/11 he said, “Sincerely condemning the horrible devastation of September
11, we should make very serious and honest efforts to stop an infinite war in this part of the
world. You can’t befool the world any more, he warned the powers that be to realise.
Supreme national interest demands that we should every thing to keep the US troops out of
this region. They wouldn’t leave just like that after setting in. letting the Afghan mechanism
work can avert the unimaginable. The mass of the people of Afghanistan have been made
hostage by external forces for the past two decades. They were never allowed to decide for
themselves. The forces two strong for them destroyed Afghanistan with the obsession of
implanting the government of their liking there. He went on to identify the responsibility of
US and Pakistan for the mess in Afghanistan. Achakzai suggested, the USA and others
should prod and help Afghans to rush for holding of Loya Jirga, the traditional and known
congregation of tribal elders of Afghanistan for making the crucial decisions in times of
national crisis.”255 Asfandyar Wali Khan, leader of Awami National Party, the nationalist
organisation mainly based in NWFP, supported the Pakistani government’s decision to
support US in the War against Terrorism.256 ANP, however, demanded a stop to the bombing
of Afghanistan when the war started and supported the convening of a Loya Jirga to solve the
resolve the issue.257 The nationalist opinion though opposed to the destruction caused to
Afghanistan, were clearly not supporting the Taliban. They also expected the post 9/11
Pakistan would not be dominated by religious extremism and would refrain from interfering
in Afghanistan in favour of religious groups that had Talibanised Pashtun society, both in
Afghanistan as well as Pakistan.258
The liberal opinion in Pakistan has been deeply divided since the takeover of Gen.
Musharraf in 1999. One view held that as Army was responsible for the non-liberal
development of Pakistani state and society, it is better poised to correct the situation and so,
must support the liberal agenda of the general. The other view held that Army is not the
institution that can liberalise or democratise the state and society. It was these debates and
expectations in mind when a commentator wrote, “what will happen to the deep polarisation
[reference is to the fundamentalist non fundamentalist divide] that has thrived in the Pakistani
society – a polarisation which has also reflected the tendency of the rulers to play both sides

254
Mehmud Khan Achakzai is head of Pashtunkhwa Milli Awami Party [Pro-Pashtun National Peoples Party
(PMAP)] mainly based in Pashtun areas of Balochistan. He also enjoys the distinction of being the only
Pashtun Nationalist elected to Pakistan national parliament in 2002.
255
Daily The News Islamabad, 21 September 2001.
256
Daily The Frontier Post Peshawar, 23 September 2001.
257
Daily ‘Dawn’ Karachi, 10 October 2001.
 Pakistan’s Domestic Foreign Policy Debate in the Post September 11 Era 95

and put off important decisions? A significant point to be made at this is that the road that the
present regime has chosen with its resolve to join the international alliance against terrorism
was always there and we did not take it. When General Musharraf took over about two years
ago and talked about Pakistan being at the crossroads, hopes were raised that he would make
the choice that was dictated by the Quaid’s vision of this country. But in spite of some
initiatives (or) gestures) that were considered liberal or socially liberating, the ‘jehadi’
passions were allowed to prevail. And we should have known that the consequences of this
default would be disastrous.
Is Pakistan now finally making a decision that it has deferred for so long, for whatever
reasons? It does seem that the policy of cooperating with the US in its forthcoming war
against terrorism will have a far reaching impact on our national policies. This is what the
liberal critics of the ruling establishment had always been demanding. [Pointing out the
dilemma of Pakistani liberal] However, this may not be the vindication be the vindication of
their faith in democracy and freedom because of the manner in which the policy change has
come. Ideally, Pakistan should have distanced itself from Taliban for the right reasons, after a
national debate on the conflict that has emerged between the religious militants and the
moderates.”259 Human Rights Commission of Pakistan [HRCP]260 supported the solution of
the Afghan issue through a Loya Jirga and opposed bombing of Afghanistan. It also opposed
continued Pakistani and other outside interference in Afghan affairs. Asma Jehangir, its
former chairperson and Afrasiab Khattak its chairman at the time, considered Pakistan to be
responsible for the distortion of Afghan culture by outside specially Pakistan through its
official support to fundamentalists and extremists.261 A large number of other Non
governmental Organisations also condemned the US bombings, favoured consultations and
dialogue to be a better method solving the mess created by the Taliban.262 Another
commentator from the liberal segment of the Pakistani political divide commented, “It goes
to General Musharraf’s credit, however, that he can accept new facts and ideas, and fashion
his behaviour in their light. A less mentally supple leader could have fallen a martyr to his
own rigidity. All the same, to begin with, when he became army chief, his ideology had GHQ
stamped all over it: with all the accompanying notions of jihad, Afghan depth and the
strategic space provided by our nuclear capability. That these notions have taken a battering
during the two years that he has been at the helm is obvious. Under the pressure of events, the
old certainty about these central governing concepts has all but disappeared. But General
Musharraf has taken these developments in his stride”263

258
Interviews with Afrasiab Khattak and Ajmal Khattak [no relation to each other] two nationalist leaders
from NWFP, belonging to ANP.
259
Salahuddin Ghazi, “Crisis of Pakistan”, Daily The News Islamabad, 18 September 2001.
260
Human Rights Commission of Pakistan is a prominent non governmental human rights advocacy
organisation.
261
Daily Dawn Karachi, 28 October, 2001.
262
Joint statement of 13 different NGOs which included the prestigious Islamabad based Sustainable
Development Policy Institute (SDPI) and Aurat (Woman) Foundation, Daily The News 13 October,
2001
263
Amir., Ayaz, “Joining the international mainstream”, Daily Dawn Karachi, 5 October 2001.
96 Ijaz Khan

GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN’S ACTIONS TO FURTHER THE POLICY

CHANGE AT DOMESTIC LEVEL

Pakistan’s changed policy and responsibility as an ally in the ‘War against Terrorism’
required some actions and adjustments inside Pakistan. The ‘War against Terrorism’ in
Afghanistan has a Pakistani component. Support for Taliban was not confined to state level
only. Various religious groups with or without state consent had links with and Supported
Taliban as well as Al-qaeda. Pakistan also had become a route for all international
connections of the various Islamist groups with Taliban ruled Afghanistan. Most of these
international groups had local Pakistani connections and bases. Moreover, contiguity with
Afghanistan, and the existence of the special administrative region, Federally Administered
Tribal Areas (FATA) with local autonomy on the Afghan–Pakistan border created another set
of problems, having a direct bearing on the operations in Afghanistan, both when Taliban
were holding to Power and now when they have been ousted, but are resisting. The domestic
leg of the post 9/11 Pakistani Afghan policy meant fighting its part of the ‘War against
Terrorism’ on its soil, throughout Pakistan as well as in FATA. Government of Pakistan have
acted on its part to play its part, creating or rather furthering the existing fissures in the
society as well as attracting both international appreciation and criticism.

GOP actions and policies in all of Pakistan

Pakistani policy in the aftermath of 9/11 has taken two categories; one are introduction of
reforms in different fields to address the issue of extremism and two, are those actions taken
against extremist and terrorist organizations and individuals. Pakistan banned some
organizations in January 2002 and have arrested and handed over to US more than 800
wanted terrorists, both Pakistanis and foreigners, or killed them. While lauded by some
within and quite a few internationally, these actions have also attracted criticism from
different quarters. The religious or non-religious right has accused the GOP for being too
submissive to the US and fighting the war of infidels against Islamic Mujahideen and
considers them a betrayal. These actions of the Government of Pakistan have also been
criticized by a section of liberal thought, on the basis of violations of basic human rights and
due process, thus undermining rule of law and injustice, thus furthering extremism rather than
eliminating it.
On domestic front, 9/11, both, US action in Afghanistan and Pakistani support for it
along with some of the resultant domestic policy initiative had resulted in formation of the
grand religious alliance, MMA. The elections held in 2002 saw the emergence of MMA as a
strong party in all of Pakistan, especially in NWFP and Balochistan, the two provinces
neighbouring Afghanistan. In NWFP it has formed a government and in Balochistan it is part
of the coalition government.
Success of MMA has been at the expense of secular mainstream parties generally
however, it has almost eliminated the Pashtun Nationalists from electoral politics. ANP could
not secure a singly seat of National Assembly, while PMAP was able to just clinch one from
Balochistan. ANP bagged 11 seats to MMA’s 38. In national Assembly, MMA got 60 seats
 Pakistan’s Domestic Foreign Policy Debate in the Post September 11 Era 97

to PPP’s 71, however, as some PPP members deserted it, MMA have been able to name its
leader Maulana Fazal Rehman as leader of opposition. It must be pointed out that in all
earlier elections the combined strength of the parties forming MMA had never been near this
number. Though elections to the 8 parliamentary seats from FATA are held on non party
basis, all the 8 elected are religious leaders and are closer to MMA. They replaced the
traditional Malik there. (More focused discussion on FATA follows)
On the face of it, these electoral results can be interpreted as meaning the rise of support
for extremism at popular level and the unpopularity of the post 9/11 Paakistan’s Afghan
policy in particular and role in ‘War against Terrorism’ in general. It can also be interpreted
as the rejection of secular nationalists by the Pashtuns of NWFP and Balochistan. It can also
mean that Pashtuns support for Taliban is on both sides of the Durand Line.
So, the Government of Gen. Musharraf has to deal with a growing popular extremist
challenge. International Community must understand the dilemma of the Government of
Pakistan while fulfilling its commitments in the ‘War against Terrorism’, and not push too
much on democracy, Kashmir or Nuclear issue. International Community must understand
and believe that Gen. Musharraf is there best bet, rather the only bet in Pakistan. The liberal
and secular alternate in the shape of PPP and PML (N) is corrupt and incompetent as well as
not popular enough to meet the challenge of the extreme religious right and deal with the
Talibanization of Pakistani society. As far as secular Pashtun nationalists are concerned, they
are no more relevant and do not represent the Pashtuns. Pashtuns are very religious people.
The world must believe ‘being Pashtuns means Taliban’. Moderate Taliban means moderate
Pashtuns and vice versa.
However, on closer examination such obvious understanding and interpretation does not
hold water and reveals many complexities. The various components of the strategic culture
that had resulted in Pakistani state’s pro Taliban Afghan policy had not been altered, even if
they had become under an intense stress after 9/11. While a certain level of popular sympathy
may be a reason for MMA’s electoral success, there are other factors that also account for it
and must not be ignored. The military and Mullah had a long standing overlapping of
interests and perceptions that viewed the secular democratic and centrist parties as well as
ethnic nationalists as a challenge to the ideological basis of the state of Pakistan. While
relations between them were strained and fractured as a result of the state’s role in ‘War
against Terrorism’, a certain strategic shared vision still persisted. Like argued earlier in this
chapter, the centrists had a strong element that considered the relationship with the religious
right must not be totally severed. They had tried to avert the total ouster of Taliban earlier by
trying to convince the US to wait and the Taliban to hand over Osama Bin Laden and meet
the other demands of US as well. Failing that Pakistan have continuously argued for
representation of ‘moderate Taliban’/ Pashtuns in the post Taliban Afghan government.
Pakistan has become a champion of Pashtun rights in Afghanistan. This not a changed
attitude or policy towards Pashtuns. This pro Pashtun policy must be read together with the
policy of promoting Pashtun identity as religious identity. Thus through Talibanization of
Pashtun politics on both sides of the Durand Line, Pakistan is continuing its policy of use
Religious forces as a tool of policy, both against the secular Pashtun, and Indian influences in
Afghanistan.
98 Ijaz Khan

Similarly, on Pakistan level, by keeping the leadership of the mainstream parties, Benazir
Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif, MMA has been facilitated to become the alternate. The
government of Gen. Musharraf has found MMA as representing opposition to be quite
helpful in more than one way. Except for the recent issue of the Bill on Women Protection,
the Government had backtracked on almost all reform initiatives, when confronted by the
MMA. The issues include, backing out on the issue of religious column in Passports and
Syllabi reform for general schools as well as Madrassas. In return MMA facilitated the
passing of a constitutional amendment legitimizing the General’ rule with more powers and
also supporting his continuation of remaining President and Chief of Army Staff at the same
time. By portraying MMA as the real challenge and the alternative to his rule, General
Musharraf has also been able to get international support for his rule and his style of
democratization process.

‘War against Terrorism’ in FATA

Pakistan’s conduct of ‘War against Terrorism’ in on its territory is more intense and real
FATA, thus requiring a separate treatment then rest of Pakistan. However, it has to be
understood in the context of overall Pakistani strategic culture and the mind set. The mind set
that has a special place for religious extremists explains, at least partially Pakistan’s treatment
of another uprising that it is facing, that of Balochs. While the State does not mince any
words or shirk from using extreme force against the Balochs, one notes reluctance when it
comes to use of force against pro Taliban elements.264

Introduction to FATA
Tribal Areas have a special constitutional status with its own legal and administrative
system. Constitutionally called Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), they are
directly administered by the federal government through governor of North West Frontier
Province (NWFP). Administratively, FATA is divided into seven political agencies viz
Bajaur, Mohmand, Khyber, Orakzai, Kurram, North and South Wazirstan, and six Frontier
Regions: Peshawar FR, Kohat FR, Bannu FR, D I Khan FR, Tank FR and Lakki Marwat FR.
The agencies of Khyber, Kurram, North and South Wazirstan that were created by the
British more than a century and a quarter ago and the other three agencies that were created
after the establishment of Pakistan, also follow the administrative system of the earlier
agencies. There are many tribes and sub tribes in the FATA, some of them partly spreading
into the adjoining settled districts as well as across the Durand line into Afghanistan. The
major tribes include Yusafzais in Malakand and Bajaur Agency; Mohmands in Mohmand
Agency; Afridis and Shinwaris in Khyber Agency, Peshawar and Kohat; Orakzais in Orakzai

264
This section on FATA draws heavily on a presentation made by the author on ‘Pakistan’s Strategy
towards FATA’ at a Conference organized by the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey California, in
September, 2006. Also read for a detailed treatment of FATA situation, International Crisis group’s
PAKISTAN’S TRIBAL AREAS: APPEASING THE MILITANTS, Asia Report No. 125, 11 December
2006.
 Pakistan’s Domestic Foreign Policy Debate in the Post September 11 Era 99

Agency; Turis and Bangash in Kurram Agency; Wazirs in North Waziristan Agency; and
Mahsuds in South Waziristan Agency.265
The state has a minimum presence, which is through the office of the Political Agent
(PA), who is both administrative and judicial authority, supported by a locally recruited
militia force called Khasadar force. Tribes are held collectively responsible for any violation
of the applicable law that is Frontier Crimes Regulations (FCR), enacted by the British
Punjab Government in 1872 and revised in 1887 and 1901. Before 1956, FCR covered the
whole of NWFP and Balochistan, but through an amendment, the settled districts of the
province were exempted from FCR. Similarly, while, FCR was abolished in 1973 in
Balochistan. However, the people of FATA are still governed by FCR.
Despite the introduction of adult franchise in 1997, the people of the Tribal Areas do not
yet enjoy political and legal rights as equal citizens of Pakistan. Article 25 of the 1973
Constitution declares that all citizens of Pakistan are equal before law; but this article is not
applicable to FATA, although under Article 1 of the Constitution FATA is part of the
territories of Pakistan. The two elections (1997 and 2002) following the introduction of adult
franchise in FATA were held on non-party basis. Despite the persistent demands by the
political parties and civil society organizations, political parties have not been allowed to
extend their activities in the Tribal Areas. Under Article 247 of the Constitution, federal
government enjoys absolute authority over the Tribal Areas. Under sub-section (7) of the
same Article, High Courts and Supreme Court of Pakistan are barred from exercising
jurisdiction over FATA. There is no system of appeal against the decisions of the PA.
Jirga (Council of Tribal Elders) is a traditional institution, adapted by the British
Colonial government, and has been used for all issues of governance including administration
of justice, resolution of disputes and other collective issues. Retained by Pakistan, this Jirga,
convened by Political agent consisting of not less than three Government recognised Maliks,
(tribal elders, not to be confused tribal chiefs, which are not present in the Pashtun tribal
system) is used for a multiplicity of governance related issues, including dealing with law and
order situation, as means of communication, as dispute resolution body, as a body to
determine responsibility for particular acts of omission or commission and as a body with
which when there is a need, to negotiate a deal, a treaty. Jirga is the means of communication
used by the two sides, the government and the people of FATA, to talk to each other.
In short, Pakistani State has limited its interference in the tribal area to the security of its
border posts, routes and government offices, and to check any influence Afghan government
may gain there, keeping in mind Afghan position on Durand Line and relationship with India.
It is the last factor that has been the over riding concern of Pakistan’s tribal policy. This can
be understood with reference to Pashtun nationalist politics, with its historic Afghan and
Indian connection, within the context of Pakistan’s strategic culture, which has India, Islam
and the military as constants and defining elements.
Pakistan accepted the autonomous character of FATA through the Instrument of
Accession signed by the Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the first Governor General of Pakistan and
leader of Pakistan movement, at the Bannu Tribal Jirga in January 1948. There was no

265
Government of Pakistan, 1998 Census Report of FATA, Census Publication No. 152, (Islamabad:
Population Census Organization, Statistics Division, March 2001), p. 1
100 Ijaz Khan

fundamental change in the policy of the government so far as administrative and political
structure of the Tribal Areas was concerned. The Government of Pakistan continued to deal
with local Maliks through the Political Agents instead of establishing contacts with the
people at grass-root levels. Although, Mr. Jinnah had expressed a desire for change, nothing
fundamental has been done in this regard.266

The Developments on Ground 2001–2006

After the fall of Taliban in Afghanistan, a number of Taliban and Al-qaeda (both Arabs
and some Central Asians) took refuge in tribal areas of Pakistan, joining some already present
there. It soon transpired that these elements are not using the tribal belt just for refuge and
asylum they are also using it for launching their resistance against US/NATO and Afghan
forces in Afghanistan. Additionally it was reported that many of the high leadership which
probably includes Osama Bin Laden himself, are hiding in these areas, it became imperative
for Pakistan to do something about it. GOP started a military intervention in the tribal areas.
At present there are about 70,000 Pakistan army troops deployed in FATA, in addition to the
tribal militia called Khasadar force.
Foreigners and Afghan Taliban were and are present in Mohmand Agency, Bajaur
Agency, in Dir and Chitral (the last two are not part of FATA). Rather, quite a few if not all
foreigners from Waziristan have (been) shifted to Dir, more specifically Bahrawar Banda on
Pak Afghan border in Dir. Similarly local Taliban are present in all agencies and recruits for
fighting alongside Afghan Taliban inside Afghanistan are drawn from all over Pakistan,
including Punjab and Sindh, not just FATA or NWFP. FATA is more important as a route
and safe haven for these various infiltrations from different sources. FATA has an
approximately 1400 kilometers long border with Afghanistan. It has mainly seven known
crossings while quite a number of unrecorded crossings, which are also known as smugglers’
routes. Traditionally, the tribal people have had relations with both Afghanistan and Pakistan.
They would have properties and businesses in both countries and move between the two
countries freely. This open border has facilitated illegal practices including smuggling of a
variety of goods including drugs and weapons. In the 1980s this porous border became the
route for international support for Afghan resistance to the Soviet Union and in the post 9/11
era it has become the route and safe haven for anti Karzai elements.

North and South Waziristan Agencies

The two separate agencies of North and South Waziristan are dealt with together as they
are strongly linked due tribal, political and social life. Three tribes, Wazirs mainly in North
Waziristan with some in Wana valley of South Waziristan, Mehsuds in South Waziristan and
Daurs in North Wazistan are the main inhabitants of the two agencies. Wazirs are sub divided
into two main braches; Uthmanzai and Ahmadzai. There are a number of smaller sub clans of
the two. Ahmadzais live in NWA, Wana valley of SWA and FR Bannu. While Uthmanzi
Wazirs live in NWA only.
When in 2003, under pressure from its allies in the ‘War against Terrorism’ GOP
demanded that all foreigners living in FATA (rather NWA) must either leave the country or

266
Ahmad, Waheed, ed. Quaid-e-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah: The Nation’s Voice, Vol.VII:, (Karachi:
Quaid-e-Azam Academy, 2003), pp346-349.
 Pakistan’s Domestic Foreign Policy Debate in the Post September 11 Era 101

register themselves with the GOP, the beginning of a series of events was witnessed also
heralding the real Talibanization of FATA, which today has reached its zenith and is having a
spill over into the adjoining settled districts of NWFP, with a potential of spreading to larger
areas. For reasons best known to GOP, only foreigners living in NWA were targeted ignoring
their presence in other agencies, mostly Mohmand Agency, Bajaur and the former princely
state of Dir and Chitral. We saw the emergence of Nek Mohammad from a sub clan of
Ahmadzai Wazirs, Gulikhel. After a lot of loss of life on both sides, the first truce agreement
with the insurgents in April 2004, known as Shakai agreement. That agreement was the first
truce between local tribes, insurgents or Taliban and GOP. All the subsequent agreements
and deals, written or unwritten, announced or unannounced followed the pattern set by it. The
deal provided a. Army troops will not interfere in the internal tribal affairs and will stay in
the cantonment areas, b. Local insurgents will not attack GOP personnel or equipment or
buildings. C. (According to GOP version) All foreigners will register themselves with the
government. The locals deny the existence of such a clause. They even denied the presence of
any foreigners. That deal was broken very soon, as the government insisted on registration of
foreigners and the Nek Mohammad and his friends mainly consisting of his sub tribe
Gulikhel of Ahmadzai Wazirs refused the presence of any foreigners and said even if there
were, we had never agreed to their registration. Nek Mohammad was target killed through a
remote device. The use of sophisticated methods in tracking and killing led many to believe
that US, rather than Pakistan Army had killed him. After some more skirmishes and deaths
and destruction, his successor Maulvi Abbas have reached an unannounced understanding
with the government under which Maulvi Abbas can run the affairs of his tribe without any
interference from the GOP, while he will not attack GOP positions. Both sides have not
mentioned foreigners and there is no talk of them any more at least as far as Gulikhels are
concerned.
However, after the death of Nek Mohammad the issue spread out of the Gulikhels,
Ahmadzais and Wazir tribe. Gradually over the past two years quite a few local Taliban
groups emerged in both the agencies, however, more significantly in South Waziristan
Agency, who clashed with Military forces at different times. They include groups led by
Hafiz Gul Bahadur, Maulana Sadiq Noor Maulana Abdul Khaliq, Baitullah Masud, Abullah
Wazir (a former Gauntanamao Bay internee) Maulvi Abbas. Though formally no political
party can function in FATA, Jamiat Ulema Islam (JUI-F) led by Maulana Fazal Rehman, part
of the Pakistani alliance of Religious parties, has gained a lot of ground and is quietly openly
involved in Waziristan politics. It was this party that played a major role in the recent Sept. 5
agreement. Cynics call it another example of a continued relationship between religious
forces and Pakistan Army.
Since April 2004 till the recent September 5 2006 agreement many repetitions with a
certain pattern can be noticed; military operations, peace deals (again some announced some
unannounced) and their violations all resulting in a continuous process of Talibanization of
both agencies. Abdullah being an educated person (having a master’s degree from DI Khan
University, with one brother a major in Pakistan Army and another, a College Lecturer of
economics) seems to be a bridge between Alqaeda and local Taliban. He uses modern
methods of propaganda, making videos of himself making fierce speeches and telling stories
of his mistreatment at Guantanamao Bay as well as other promotional Jehadi videos. He also
102 Ijaz Khan

is actively involved in recruitment of Jehadis for Tribal Areas itself as well as Afghanistan.
Others have varying degrees of relationship with Alqaeda and Afghan Taliban. They may at
times compete with each other, but overall they support each other when there is a need and
all support Afghan Taliban, foreigners/Aqaeda presence in FATA as well as the process of
Talibanization. One can not confirm a connection without any doubt; however, whenever
there are increased reported deaths of Taliban in Afghanistan, there are increased burials of
bodies with marks of violent death, in different parts of Waziristan.
Local Taliban have gradually become a parallel government, rather the only government.
Their rise has changed the internal governance of Waziristan radically. The traditional Jirga
or Maraka as it is called in Waziristan has been formally banned by the Taliban. Now in case
of any dispute the parties must seek intervention of Taliban representative in their village or
area. They perform the functions of police, administration of civic responsibilities, as well as
judiciary. Their governance style is the same as that of Taliban was when they ruled
Afghanistan. However, one local style remains, there is no one single central authority. They
are a number of scattered groups led by different local Maulvis or religious leaders. The
Taliban have made inroads into adjacent settled districts of Bannu and Dera Ismail Khan as
well. They have successfully banned Music stores, videos and in some areas Televisions as
well. Reference is to the adjacent settled areas, as far the agencies are concerned these items
and Computers are totally banned since the last two years.267
In the early months of 2006 the gradual increase in the area of influence of Taliban
reached a serious level. The Uthmanzai Wazirs took control of government departments (Non
Military) in Miran Shah, the main town of North Waziristan. This prompted a new military
operation. The GOP in the meanwhile appointed a new governor of NWFP, Lt. Gen. (Retd.)
Ali Mohammad Jan Orakzai, (himself a tribal, had remained Corps Commander of Peshawar,
responsible for the military deployment in Tribal Areas 2002). He initiated a dialogue
through formation of a tribal grand Jirga of 45 members drawn from all over the FATA. It
was this Jirga that has negotiated the current agreement of 5 September 2006. It has been
appreciated as a great achievement of the GOP in its drive against terrorism in FATA as its
part of the Global War on Terror. Some even went so far as calling it a model that may be
followed in Afghanistan. On the other side it has been criticized as total capitulation. A closer
look shows it to be no different than earlier agreements and understandings. It permits
Taliban to retain their administrative and political position; it permits them to retain their
weapons and returns to them what has been taken from them; it permits foreigners to remain
without any registration on promise of good conduct; it accepts the tribal demand for army
withdrawal from most areas including border posts; on the part of Taliban it provides that the
areas would not be used for activities against Karzai government in Afghanistan; the Taliban
will not attack government positions; The Taliban will stop target killing of pro government
Tribal Maliks; Taliban will not impose their lifestyle on others by force in the tribal areas;
and will also refrain from spreading their influence or what can be called Talibanization in
adjacent areas. The government has changed its position on the agreement more than once in
the two weeks that follows it. First it was called an agreement with local Taliban, then it was

267
Interviews with Zubair Masood, Lecturer, Faculty of Law, University of Peshawar, Tariq Khan,
Provincial coordinator, NWFP, Human rights Commission of Pakistan.
 Pakistan’s Domestic Foreign Policy Debate in the Post September 11 Era 103

called an agreement with Uthmanzai Wazirs (The GOP spokesperson wrongly called them
Uthmankhel) then the President called it an agreement with moderate Pashtuns, and finally
Governor of NWFP called it an agreement with the Jirga. The Governor also asserted that
there would be surgical use of force when and if needed, which means it is not a
comprehensive peace agreement with all local Taliban as was asserted in the beginning.268 In
the background of the status of Jirga what an agreement with it would mean has yet to be
seen. There have been at least two instances of murder of pro government Tribal Maliks since
September 05 and there have been bombing of video stores in the outskirts of Bannu.269
At the moment not very pronounced, but a simmering conflict between the locals and
foreigners is also seen.270 Maulana Sadiq Noor of JUI-F has publicly asked foreigners to
behave and not to interfere in local politics including militant activities against the GOP.
Does it mean the weakening of Alqaeda or the strengthening of Talibanization throughout
Pakistan through JUI-F I s question that will be answered by time only? Is this the result
President Musharraf had in mind when he talked of differentiating between Taliban and
Alqaeda while addressing the European parliament in September 2006? In the recent ongoing
tussle on the proposed Women protection bill, the JUI threatened that if MMA’s views on the
bill are not accommodated, besides other measures, the recent peace deal in Waziristan may
also be endangered.271 Such open contentions by politicalm parties like JUI also shows the
persistent ties of the so called religious political parties part of the mainstream Pakistani
politics and extremists / Terrorists or Taliban. Khalid Aziz, a former Chief Secretary of
NWFP, said in an interview recently that the developing situation in FATA would soon reach
a point when either the GOP has to ask US troops to intervene or give up the administration

268
According to Rahimullah Yousafzai writing in The News on Sunday, Islamabad, 17 Sept. 2006, titled,
“So Far So Good”, “North Waziristan's political agent Dr Fakhre Alam Irfan signed the peace
agreement on behalf of the federal government and the Governor of NWFP Lt Gen (Retd) Ali
Mohammad Jan Aurakzai, who played a key role in constituting and facilitating the Loya Jirga to
peacefully end the conflict in North Waziristan. On behalf of the militants, Mohammad Azad, Saifullah,
Ahmad Shahjehan, Mir Sharaf, Eid Niaz, Hafiz Amir Hamza and Azmat Ali signed the agreement.
Saifullah was representative of Hafiz Gul Bahadur, the head of the militants' shura. As an afterthought,
the government has been insisting that it signed the peace accord with the tribes of Utmanzai inhabiting
North Waziristan and not with the militants. In fact, the militants belong to the Utmanzai tribes. The
original text of the agreement read by Loya Jirga member Maulana Nek Zaman, the pro-JUI-F/MMA
MNA from North Waziristan and the most influential jirga member, made it clear that parties to the
peace accord were the political agent as representative of the Governor of NWFP and "the tribal elders
of North Waziristan and local mujahideen, Tulaba (students or Taliban) and Ulema of the Utmanzai
tribes.”
269
For various aspects of the September 05 agreement read, NWFP Bureau Report “Govt, N. Waziristan
Taliban enter Peace Agreement”, 'Pakistan Times' ttp://www.pakistantimes.net/2006/09/06/top10.htm.
Barbara Plett, “Analysis: Pakistan's deal with 'Taleban' BBC News, Islamabad,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/south_asia/5320692.stm. Khalid Aziz, “NWA accord: Return of the
Taliban”, http://www.statesman.com.pk/opinion/opin1.htm. Also read Rahimullah Yousafzai’s piece
from note no.7 above.
270
Recently two Uzbeks were killed by tribal youth when the Uzbeks asked them not to smoke Hashish.
Their bodies were then tied to pickup truck and dragged to the Madrassa of Maulana Sadiq Noor, who
objected to the treatment of the dead bodies not to the murder.
271
Behroz Khan, “Welcome No More”, The News on Sunday, 17 Sept. 2006.
104 Ijaz Khan

to Taliban.272 Apparently the policy of deals with Taliban (or as later claimed to be with local
elders) is giving it up to Taliban.

Other Agencies
As the situation in the remaining five agencies and FR regions is similar to each other
and at the moment has not resulted in serious violent breakdown, though it should not be
taken as if normalcy prevails there, and due to space limitations they would be dealt together.
The process of Talibanization had started much earlier throughout the tribal belt. There
were sporadic instances of religious groups rising in the 1990s in various agencies or parts of
them, however, a serious religious movement called Tehrik e Nifaz Shariat e Muhammadi
(TNSM, Movement for Implementation of Sharia of Muhammad) started in 199? In
Malakand Division, made up of the former princely states of Swat, Dir and Chitral, comprises
of both settled districts and provincially administered Tribal Area (PATA). Strictly speaking
Malakand Division is not part of FATA, however, due to a variety of reasons most of it, if not
all has quite similar features to FATA in terms of actual administration as well culture and
lifestyle. That movement spread throughout Malakand division and the adjacent Bajaur and
Mohmand Agency. They had become a force to reckon with and started implementing
policies, which later came to be known as Talibanization much before the Talibanization of
Afghanistan and Waziristsan agencies. Its leader Maulana Sufi Mohammad led thousands of
supporters drawn from all over FATA as well as settled districts of Pakistan to fight
alongside Taliban against US led International forces in 2001. After the ouster of Taliban,
Maulana Sufi Muhammad was arrested by Pakistani authorities while he was returning and is
still in jail. His movement, TNSM still lives on as a potent force. However, it is peaceful at
the moment. Though relatively peaceful should not be confused with inactive. It has seen its
share of violent uprisings at various intervals. It is active in a gradual process of
Talibanization in areas of its influence, which includes the whole of Malakand division and
the two agencies of Bajaur and Mohmand. Its connection with Afghan Taliban and as well as
Alqaeda is clear from the fact that when US missiles hit at a Bajaur Agency target, barely
missing Ayman Al Zawahiri on 13 January 2006 most of the 17 people killed belonged to
TNSM. Pakistani aircraft or missiles (some allege they were US) hit a religious seminary in
village Damadolla in Mohamand Agency on 30 October 2006, killing all 85 present there.
GOP alleged they had reliable information that they were trainee suicide bombers.273
Interestingly, the GOP had planned signing of an agreement with the militants on the pattern
of North Waziristan the same day. On 8 November 2006, 42 Army soldiers died as a result of
a suicide attack while they assembled for some training drill inside a military compound in an
Army Cantonment in Dargai, in Malakand Agency (it is provincially administered tribal area
PATA), neighboring Mohmand Agency.274
The village Darmoda in Mohmand Agency, where Zwahiri was reportedly hiding is the
centre of TNSM activities and its stronghold. It must also be interesting to note that Ayman
Al Zawahiri is married to a Mohmand woman who, with her children, lives with her father in
the border area between Bajaur Agency and Mohmand tribal regions. Pakistan had been

272
Intikhab Alam, “Flashpoint Frontier”, Monthly Herald, Karachi, June 2006.
273
http://www.dawn.com/2006/10/31/index.htm
274
http://paktribune.com/speakout/index.php?id=101
 Pakistan’s Domestic Foreign Policy Debate in the Post September 11 Era 105

asked by the Americans to help arrest four residents of the Bajaur Agency for allegedly
harboring some top Alqaeda leaders including Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri. That includes
Maulana Shoaib Mansoor, Maulvi Faqir Mohammad, Maulvi Mohammad Liaqat and
Himmayatullah Khan, who reportedly supervised the traveling of Zawahiri and his contingent
to the Damadola village of the Bajaur Agency on January 10 and led them out of the village
to a safe spot the same night. The last two named belong to TNSM, while the house that was
hit belonged to another TNSM member. Both Bajaur and Mohmand Agencies do have
Alqaeda hideouts; they may or may not include top leadership.275
Further north, in Dir where the TNSM originated, is located the village of Bhalowal,
where an existing population of Alqaeda is being augmented with new arrivals from
Waziristan in the wake of heat generated there. Gumlat in Dir, a very scenic valley with a
breath taking landscape, pine trees and a beautiful lake, that has the potential of becoming an
attractive tourist destination, in a different Pakistan, is also home to some Alqaeda leadership.
Khyber Agency near Peshawar where the best known and used Pak Afghan crossing of
Torkhum is located is scene to two mutually competitive religious movements. Due to
constraints of space we shall avoid going into the details of their mutual infighting which has
taken many lives, their activities have increased the pace of Talibanization and the resultant
weakening of Maliks and ban on music and videos can also be noticed here. Being hub of
commercial activities and an international route, the ban on music is not as successful as in
other agencies though.276 Orakzai agency is more quite though not totally immune to the
overall Talibanization process. Kurram Agency is a little different than other agencies with
presence of a sizeable population of Shias. Thus giving rise to a sectarian conflict not known
in other agencies. An understanding between Afghan Taliban and local Sunni forces exists
and both do support each other. Taliban supported local Sunnis against Shia in many of their
conflicts. Local Sunnis have also provided vital support to Taliban and Alqaeda, especially
their escape from Afghanistan in 2001.277
The issue of religious extremism and militancy in FATA is a complex issue involving
politics, religion, traditions, administrative and economic issues at various levels and within
the context of ‘Global War on Terrorism’. It may be physically isolated and may have been
kept politically and administratively isolated but politically it is not an isolated region. The
GOP policy towards the area is more reactive and status quo oriented lacking a strategic
thought or plan. It is firefighting with tools overtaken by events and history and thus we note
a spreading rather than elimination or even containment of the fire.
GOP is following a three pronged approach; military, administrative/political and
economic/social welfare. The avowed goals are 1. To stop use of FATA by insurgents from
Afghanistan or elsewhere as launching pad for their insurgency there. 2. To stop recruitment
of local Taliban sympathizers for infiltration into Afghanistan. 3. To evict or at least register
the foreigners living in FATA.
The Government of Pakistan policy of dealing with the post 9/11 situation in FATA is
based on maintaining status quo, which has changed radically. So, a more current way of

275
Amir Mir, “Bajaur airstrike : The story behind the scenes”, The Post, Islamabad, 22 February 2006,
276
For a detailed descriptive account of the Talibanization and terrorism in FATA and NWFP read, Intikhab
Alam, “Flashpoint Frontier”, Monthly Herald, Karachi, June 2006.
277
ibid.
106 Ijaz Khan

describing Pakistani policy would be that it aims at restoring a broken system. The military
component is supposed to provide a breathing space to the political/administrative process
which would be given sustenance and strength by the economic component. Theoretically
speaking this appears to be a sound approach. However, the way it is practiced raises doubts.
Militarily, while the present study would not go so far as agreeing with the allegations of a
conscious collaboration between Pakistan’s Army and the Taliban, certain reluctance can be
noticed by any objective observer. This reluctance comes from the mindset referred to above.
That mindset has always found religious forces and slogans as handy tools of policy, whether
dealing with nationalists within or India in the neighborhood. The re entry of India in a
position of influence in Afghanistan and the welcoming of Pashtun Nationalists in
Afghanistan has made Pakistani establishment understanding of the utility of religious forces
more important, so one sees a desire not to completely break up with these forces. Thus we
see a failure to provide the needed breathing space. This is at least partly true if not wholly.
The deeply entrenched civil bureaucracy of the postcolonial state structure of Pakistan is
also reluctant to permit any meaningful reform in the administrative system. After toying
with the ideas of extending the devolution plan to Tribal Areas, the GOP announced in March
2006 a plan to re vitalize the existing political agent system. The earlier initiated process of
reforming the FCR has been put on hold. The initiation of tribal agency councils with non
elected membership in 2005 was expected to start a gradual process of extending the local
government system to FATA. However, its gradual growth into fully developed democratic
system has become doubtful, with the announcement of the policy of strengthening the
existing system in March 2006. The system of Political Agents relied heavily on Jirga of
nominated Maliks. As presented earlier, that system has lost all credibility in most of FATA
and has been declared as impermissible in the two Waziristan agencies. Any talk of
permitting political parties in tribal areas is still anathema to people in power. The economic
and social welfare leg of the strategy has yet to result in any concrete and visible activity.
The bureaucracy argues that a system that has worked well for around 100 years can still
work; maybe with few adjustments. The political agency system was based on non
interference with the local affairs, which could be addressed by the tribal people in
accordance with their traditions and customs. However, the problem is that the local has
become international through the willing or unwilling participation of the locals, the geo
strategic significance of their location has made FATA part of interests beyond their
immediate concerns. This has drastically changed the nature of their activities, customs, and
more significantly the reach of their activities. So, a policy that is based on non interference
of local life, invariably results in influencing and being influenced by the outside world, in
the present and immediate context, the GWOT in Afghanistan
It must be understood that the situation in FATA is tied with Afghanistan and through
Afghanistan with the overall ‘War against Terrorism’ and extremism. Whatever policies GOP
adopts can not result in immediate change and peace or end to Talibanization only in FATA.
The change in FATA will come along the change in rest of its surroundings. However, the
GOP must pursue policies that will help in the long “War”. Those policies must be forward
looking. The vacuum created by breakdown of the old traditional system, both social and
administrative can not be filled by policies aimed at restoring what is no more. There is a
need for policies aimed at taking FATA and its people forward. One step in the right
 Pakistan’s Domestic Foreign Policy Debate in the Post September 11 Era 107

direction can be permission of Political Parties in FATA. The silent majority or the hidden
opponents of Talibanization will be stronger when they have support of nationwide political
parties. Even the religious people would have the option of joining mainstream religious
political parties thus having an option to pursue their religious political ideas more peacefully
and legitimately. Prohibition on political parties in actual means prohibition on non religious
parties as religious parties has made strong inroads through Madrassa.278 The strong presence
of JUI-F in Waziristan is an example in hand
The problem is that as it was stated above, there is no centralized Taliban authority or
leadership in the whole of one agency let alone FATA, so the question with whom have you
made a deal is vital. Tribal Jirga do not have much authority left. Deal with one group is not
binding on another. Expecting too much from the 5 September 2006 deal would be shutting
one’s eye from the reality on ground and the recent history of such deals. In the opinion of
the present study, the deal will have the same result as its predecessors; its breakdown has
already started and it will result in further consolidation of local Taliban. Making too much of
difference between local Taliban, Afghan Taliban or Alqaeda can not be a good policy based
on correct assessment of the ground situation. While for tactical and operational purposes one
may differentiate however, all three are connected and re enforce each other and so requires a
comprehensive approach. Also Taliban must not be confused with Pashtuns, while most
Taliban may be Pashtuns, most Pashtuns are not Taliban.
Conspiracy theories aside, Pakistan has done quite a lot in the overall ‘War against
Terrorism’ including in FATA. And one may appreciate some of the actions if one goes by
numbers of people arrested and killed, however, when one talks of strategy and long term
trends then one becomes doubtful. Like in most of the country, Pakistan cedes ground to
Talibanization of society with every success reported and every achievement hailed. The
policy or action and reactions that passes for Pakistan’s policy towards FATA is increasing
the pace of destruction of traditional lifestyles, however, as they (the actions and reactions)
are aimed at restoring what it is helping destroy, a strange dilemma results.279

IMPLICATIONS FOR PAKISTAN’S DOMESTIC DECISION–MAKING

This debate has far reaching implications for Pakistan’s domestic decision–making
should have become obvious to the reader by now. Their correct identification and
assessment is vital for Pakistan’s future. This section briefly identifies those implications. It
has;

1) Fractured, if not ended the Military Mullah Nexus

2) Pushed Pakistan towards a moderate and relatively liberal social and political order

278
Religious Seminaries. It is these schools whose students known as Taliban have given the name of
Taliban to the movement of Taliban. The Taliban movement originally started from these Madrassas
which remain its strongest source of recruitment
279
For a good study of Pakistan’s policy response to Terrorism, read Aarish Ullah Khan, “The Terrorist
Threat and the Policy Response in Pakistan”, SIPRI Policy Paper No. 11, Stockholm International Peace
Research Institute, September 2005.
108 Ijaz Khan

3) Given international acceptability and thus strength in domestic affairs to the military
establishment hence, it has implications for the return to democracy.
4) Increased polarization in Pakistani society and politics

One very obvious impact of Pakistani decision to abandon Taliban has been on the so–
called Military Mullah nexus that had developed over the years, especially in Pakistan’s
policy towards Afghanistan. The religious groups and parties that had grown closer to the
ruling elite, especially the military, and had gained a stronger say in decision–making process
of Pakistan has been fractured. The religious fundamentalist forces, especially JI and to some
extent JUI, that started as tools for Pakistani foreign policy in the 1970s, matured in 1980s to
the level of becoming, if not equal, at least junior partners in decision–making. Pakistan’s
post 9/11 Afghan policy as well as policy towards India including its support for Kashmir
policy (separation of Indian held Kashmir from India and merger with Pakistan through
force/ support for militancy there through religious groups) has undergone a fundamental
change. Pakistan has, or to be more careful started a process of, distancing itself from
militants and militancy.
The distancing of the religious right from the echelons of power has started a process of
liberalising and opening up of the society, which has implications for its education system
(including syllabi), social values as well as economic and political system. President
Musharraf’s announcement of pursuing a policy of ‘enlightened moderation’280 is indicative
of the direction in which Pakistani decision makers intend to take Pakistan. The apparent
liberal thrust of post 9/11 Pakistani rulers may sound welcome; however, it has its own
pitfalls, due mostly to how Pakistan is going about it.
President Musharraf’s decision to make Pakistan an ally of US in the global ‘War against
Terrorism’ has the most important implication for Pakistani decision–making as it has served
to make his personal rule acceptable to the international community. If one compares
President Clinton’s visit to Pakistan in 2000 with President Musharraf’s many visits to
Western Capitals and coming a large number of Western dignitaries to Islamabad, the point
that is being made would become clear. The lifting of democracy related sanctions and
Pakistan’s return to Commonwealth are some of the glaring examples of the acceptance of
Gen. Musharraf’s personal rule in Pakistan. By extension this means the strengthening of
Military’s position, especially in foreign policy decision–making. Thus negating the liberal
thrust noted above.
In all fairness one must acknowledge, the international community is still urging Pakistan
to democratise its governance; however, how he goes about it is largely ignored. The manner
in which Prime Minister Mir Zafar Ullah Khan Jamali was removed, a temporary new prime
minister, Chaudhry Shujaat Hussain was installed and a totally non political technocrat was

280
“Musharraf Urges Muslim World to Speed up Process of Restructuring OIC” President Musharraf’s
address to the International Seminar on "OIC Challenge and Response –Enlightened Moderation,"
organized by Government of Pakistan in Islamabad, Daily Dawn 3 June 2004. Read for a good
commentary on President Musharraf’s espousal of his concept of ‘Enlightened Moderation’, Syed.,
Anwar “Preaching moderation” Daily Dawn, Karachi, 27 June 2004.
 Pakistan’s Domestic Foreign Policy Debate in the Post September 11 Era 109

chosen tells a lot about the continued, rather strengthened control and the managed character
of Pakistani democracy.281

CONCLUSIONS

The debate in the wake of 9/11 about Pakistan foreign policy generally and towards
Afghanistan specifically reflects the tensions created by a decision that was not in line with
Pakistan’s ‘Strategic Culture’. It highlighted and sharpened the existing contradictions and
conflicts within the state and society, it did not create them. It gave some consolation to the
liberal critique of Pakistani state. It represents the various pulls and pushes that drive, have
been driving and will be driving Pakistan’s foreign policy. It really became the moment of
truth for Pakistan. The ‘ideological paradox’, as one commentator quoted above was out of
the genie. The three broad approaches that this study has identified represent only very broad
outlines of the policy divide. There were and are variations within them. At times an
association or individual identified with one approach would appear to be closer to views
from another approach. The differences were based on theoretical outlooks as well as
political expediency of the moment. The hard liners or Hawkish Pakistani nationalists
resisted the break up of establishment relations with the fundamentalists. They insisted on
limiting the spreading of the policy shift from Taliban to other elements of Pakistan’s foreign
policy, specially Kashmir and Nuclear programme. PML–Q, closer to the government of
General Musharraf, though supporting government’s position was one such associational
expression of this view in addition to some of the academics as well as newspaper columnists
quoted above. PML–N another associational expression of the same theoretical mind set,
opposed the governmental policy change, however, it did join the public protest of the
religious parties in any significant manner. PPP on the other hand unequivocally supported
the government policy and considered the drive against extremism to be in the national
interest of Pakistan. The liberal/ secular approach also had its divisions. There were
supporters of the governmental policy in completely and urged the government to continue
further on the road it has chosen. However, there were others who distanced themselves from
both the governmental position, due to US using force, as they considered that was resulting
in destruction of innocent life. They also were apprehensive about the negative implications
of the government’s half measures. They pressed for a complete ‘paradigm shift’ which was
natural and logical element of the policy of giving up support for Taliban. Any reluctance or
inhibition in that quarter would make the change meaningless and self defeating.
The decision was essentially that of the General Musharraf personally,282 with
consultation and support from his small inner circle. So can we call it ‘revolution from
above’? However, one must be careful, the last time the term was used for changes in a
country it ceased to exist soon after [Tariq Ali an eminent British Leftist of Pakistani origin
coined the term ‘Revolution from Above’ to describe Gorbachev’s reforms in the second half

281
Qaisar., Rashid A. “Mockery of Democracy”, Weekly The Independent, Lahore, Issue #, 03, Vol. No. 4,
08-14 July, 2004. p. 5.
282
Amir Ayaz, Daily Dawn Karachi. 22 November, 2001.
110 Ijaz Khan

of 1980s]. The need to take down the revolution fast should not be lost on anyone. The liberal
side of the policy debate understood the implications of the Afghan policy change “the holy
trinity of Pakistani national security – Kashmir, Afghanistan, nuclear weapons – all that still
remains intact is the notion of jihad in Kashmir. But does anyone seriously think this will
remain unaffected by current developments? As it is, the attack on the state assembly in
Srinagar has caused more dismay in Pakistan than even perhaps in India because at a time
when we are engaged in recasting our steps in Afghanistan, it gives India renewed
opportunity to beat Pakistan with the stick of ‘cross–border’ terrorism. Let us hope that in
Kashmir we make the right choices while the initiative is still with us, instead of waiting for
the time when choices are forced down our throat, as has happened in the case of our Taliban
policy.”283
For many years independent observers continued to point to the fallout of these flawed
policies. But the state had its own calculus to determine costs and benefits. Laws were
islamised on the basis of a literalist exegesis, syllabi were tempered with and distorted, the
official media were used to project a certain kind of worldview, and the ‘independent’
newspapers were either coerced or co–opted to do the same. In short, an environment was
created in which free thinking, inquiry and rationalism was put to the sword. The point is that
the state not only supported certain groups to push its policies outside but created an
environment inside which could get willing recruits for these groups to keep operating.
The events of September 11, 2001, have forced the state to change its orientation. But the
extremist forces it had encouraged both within itself and the society to do its Jehads are not
ready to give up. They consider it a great betrayal to change as required after 9/11. So the
state is not only up against its own erstwhile allies, it also has within itself cliques of people
who do not accept General Pervez Musharraf’s policy turnarounds. But even as General
Musharraf has affected his volt–face externally, he remains reluctant to go the whole length
as required to pursue that policy internally. This has created major contradictions; worse it
has stirred a hornet’s nest. The army still thinks it can run with the hare and hunt with the
hounds. Well, it can’t.
General Musharraf has an opportunity to get this country out of the morass into which his
predecessor General Zia–ul Haq had pushed it. He could use his unfettered power to that end.
Instead, he has chosen to pursue the unholy alliance with the religious elements and jihadi–
sectarian groups for purely very short term and limited ends. The sad part is even after
General Musharraf himself has been attacked and faced the threat of elimination, there does
not appear to be any understanding among his advisors of the contradictions built into the
system he has put in place. The biggest indication of internal threat to a country comes when

283
ibid 25 October, 2001
 Pakistan’s Domestic Foreign Policy Debate in the Post September 11 Era 111

its army is attacked.284 The war like situation of Waziristan is another indication of the fallout
of Pakistani foreign policy predicament.285
It is no coincidence that the two states that today face the gravest danger from extremist
terrorism are Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. Both have been allies in the cloak–and–dagger stuff
that started with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The House of Saud thought it could
bribe its way out of its troubles; the Pakistan army always thought it could not be threatened
by its own creation. Both were clearly wrong. Both, therefore, need to change their own
orientation.
The mullah–military nexus came into existence only in the eighties. Before that there was
a nexus between the military and the US. What good did that do Pakistan? What if after the
breaking of the mullah–military nexus, one of the good things to flow from the present
developments, Pakistan continues to mismanage its internal affairs secure in the knowledge
that American support and understanding would always be there to fall back upon. 286
If Pakistani decision makers want things to improve, they will have to get out of the
current one–step forward, two-step backwards approach. The issue is more internal than
external. Joining the international mainstream does not simply mean cutting links with the
Taliban and keeping in step with the Americans. The issue is more fundamental. It concerns
with the basic identity of the self and the world view generated by it. It is a question of a
basic change in the ‘Strategic Culture’ of Pakistan.

284
Corps Commander Karachi was attacked resulting in the death of 11 soldiers on very busy street of
Karachi in broad day light. The corps commander narrowly escaped the attack. While the attacks on the
President, bad as they are, may be taken as some of the un-wanted collaterals of being a President., the
attack on Corps Commander can only be interpreted as an attack on Pakistan Army. See for details ,
Daily ‘Dawn’ Karachi 11 June 2004.
285
There is an ongoing military campaign against foreign terrorists in South Waziristan, a federally
administered tribal Agency on Afghan border. These foreign terrorists are protected by some local
tribesmen. The military campaign started on 21 May 2004 and still continues with heavy casualties on
both sides. Daily The News Islamabad, 22 May 2004.
286
Amir Ayaz, “Joining the International Mainstream”, Daily Dawn, Karachi, 5 October 2001.
Chapter 6

CONCLUSIONS:
TOWARDS A CHANGED STRATEGIC CULTURE

The question is; can a country’s strategic culture be changed? And if it can change, then
how does a country go about it? This concluding chapter tries to answer this basic question of
the study; it is argued, had there been a different decision–making process determined by and
resulting in a different strategic culture, the choices Pakistan made after 9/11 might not have
been different, rather, Pakistan might not have found itself cornered as it found itself in the
wake of 9/11, with not many viable foreign policy choices. There is a qualitative difference in
the manner you make a choice. It do matter whether the choice you made is a result of a
conscious assessment of various options available or you had to make it as there was no other
choice. Even if there were other choices the most imminent one included ‘being sent back to
the stone age’. A choice made denying your free assessment of your interests’ has resulted in
polarization within and suspicions abroad.
This chapter identifies in the three sources of inputs, the areas where change and reform
is desirable and possible? It ends with some basic suggestions how to reform and create a
new culture that will result in policy choices to ensure the protection and well being of the
people of this state, at peace with itself and surroundings and a respectful place in the comity
of states; the primary objective of any foreign policy. Such a state will serve the immediate as
well as the strategic goals of a peaceful and stable, regional as well as world order.

DECISION–MAKING SYSTEM AND THE DECISION

If one accepts, and there seems to be a general consensus, that Pakistan had no other
choice but the choice it made. Further, this decision was dictated by Pakistan’s national
interest, then why Pakistan had to take it under US pressure? The question is not whether the
decision was in national interest or not. The real question is why Pakistan was not ready for
the situation arising out of 9/11. The argument that no one, not even US was ready for the
events of 9/11 misses the point. The weakness is not Pakistan’s inability to predict the events
of 9/11, but its inability to see the growing un–sustainability of continuing with the pro
Taliban Afghan policy in the face of growing global isolation of that regime. It is a basic
114 Ijaz Khan

principle of diplomacy that one should not permit oneself to be cornered. Pakistan’s pro
Taliban Afghan policy precisely did that; it cornered Pakistan. The argument in the dominant
section of Pakistani policy making circles that Pakistan’s decision to abandon Taliban was
dictated by its national interests, defines national interest in a very narrow sense; survival of
the state.
The decision to change Pakistan’s Afghan policy had broader implications. It required
changes in other policy areas as well. As the decision was not a result of a free domestic
decision–making process, its application according to its full implications has been gradual
and piece meal. Had the gradual pace been result of a conscious policy, one could have
understood it; however, it is either a result of reluctance or inability to change or both. That
reluctance is due to a lack of corresponding change in the perceptions of self and
surroundings. While the need for change may be felt and understood at the extreme top, there
is no evidence that it is shared by various layers and segments of the state and society,
especially in the dominant sections of the decision–making process. Change can not be
brought about through a few executive orders. It requires a political will, commitment and
very crucial an understanding of how to change. Pakistan faces hurdles in all these areas.
Pakistan persisted with its pro Taliban Afghan policy despite clear signs that it is
increasingly isolating her. This was so despite the fact that individuals from within the
establishment had pointed out the dangers it posed. To put it simply, such voices coming
from the foreign office were over–ruled by the military and its intelligence agency, ISI.287
The political government of the time lacked the will, power and understanding to direct
Pakistan’s foreign policy in any substantial manner. To put the record in its correct
perspective one must refer to the fact that one individual and for that matter a politician,
though he was a retired general, had more to do with the adoption of Taliban in the first
instance, ISI had adopted them later.288 However, that individual politician’s influence must
not be exaggerated. He was able to influence policy due to its approval by the military chief,
Gen. Abdul Waheed Kakar. Acknowledging the role of an individual politician in Afghan
policy and that also over the objections of ISI shows a more complex aspect of Pakistani
foreign policy decision–making. Without countering the argument and fact of military
dominance this study wants to highlight the personalised nature of decision–making in
Pakistan.
The government of Nawaz Sharif, that succeeded that of Benazir Bhutto in 1996 in
which Naseerullah Babar was the home minister and looking after the foreign policy of
Pakistan concerning Afghanistan, had no individual with a strong personality that had enough
strong views about Afghanistan, making its inability to influence decision–making in that
area becomes evident. Foreign office had lost foreign policy initiative to the military long
ago, and had become a much weaker player, if not a totally absent player, from policy
making, at least, as far as security policy went and more specifically Afghan and India policy.
Due to lack of a proper decision–making process, “Pakistan’s foreign Policy assumed the
form of a series of sporadic, intuitive, ad hoc actions, almost always reactive and driven by
events. The tendency to deal with individual issues in isolation rather than as parts of a

287
Judah., Tim, 2002.
288
Discussed in Chapter two above.
 Conclusions: Towards a Changed Strategic Culture 115

composite whole added to this policy incoherence.”289 If there had been a proper system of
decision–making with the foreign office professionals making foreign policy decisions as a
result of inputs from military, intelligence, and academic sources with an overall and real
political control expressing and representing the interests of civil society, one can safely
assert that there would have been no need for Pakistan to make the U–Turn after 9/11, as it
may never have adopted Taliban. Even if it had, it would have given them up much earlier.
Findings of this study do note the inputs coming from a variety of sources; however, the real
problem with decision–making is the lack of any balance between various sources of inputs.
That imbalance results in a lack of vision and ability to foresee and act and react
accordingly. Mostly Pakistan’s foreign policy has been reactive to various events and issues.
Within the overall frame work of control by the military, various individuals at times may
influence policy to an extent that has long term implications. In a casual remark the former
Foreign Secretary of Pakistan, Niaz A. Naik said of the making of foreign policy decisions
‘wherever they are made, they are not made in the foreign office of Pakistan.’290 Foreign
office has most of the time been the last place where policy making process is initiated,
developed or policies made.
President Musharraf correctly identified that Pakistan was at cross roads. He underlined
the need for a fundamental change of direction.291 That change of direction needs a basic re –
formulation of national self identity and interests and policies based on it. “The room to
manoeuvre that General Musharraf has so intelligently created is being constrained and
compromised either by fixation with erstwhile allies or apprehensions about an uncertain
future that carries big challenges and many a destabilising dangers. Of course it is not an easy
thing to order about turn when you have pushed your security apparatuses too far deep into
the Afghan quagmire on the side of Taliban and had, in a questionable sense, coalesced in the
paradigm of jihad the anarcho–syndicalist extremists imposed by superseding the imperatives
and interests of nation–state that, perhaps in turn found a palpable relief in capitulation
against the backdrop of international isolation and asymmetry in the balance of forces. Time
has come for many reversals in both ideological and strategic terms, but also in alignment of
forces without which we may end up the worse of both worlds.”292

REFORMING THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS

So the million dollar question is what to change, where to change and how to change?
The answer to what may be simple; change the way decisions are made. The second and third
question must however, be answered with care. There are two parts of any drive to change;
the larger societal and ideological or conceptual context and the specific organisational and
procedural. There are issues of identity and historical legacies that has to be overcome, which

289
Lodhi., Maleeha, “A foreign policy road map” Daily The News, 12 April, 1997. Dr. Maleeha Lodhi is
the current High Commissioner of Pakistan in United Kingdom and a former Ambassador to United
States of America.
290
Naik., Niaz A., in a private discussion with this author on April 20 2003, Peshawar.
291
President Gen. Musharraf’s address to the Nation, Daily The News, Islamabad. 13 January 2002.
292
Alam., Imtiaz, “After the Realignment”, Daily The News, 1 October, 2001.
116 Ijaz Khan

would provide the context for change. A conscious effort has to be made to change attitudes
and cultural values and belief system. A balanced decision is a result of a balance of power
between the various interests and pluralities that make up a state. It is important to have
political reforms that would lead to the strengthening of popular participation in decision–
making. Structural changes are required in the system. Structures are constructed with
specific goals and purposes in mind. Some states, for example Great Britain, have evolved
traditions and customs whose reliance on rules and laws is minimal. However, in the
postcolonial states, whose historical growth had been stunted by and distorted, needs to frame
specific rules, procedures and rules in accordance with how they want to progress and what
they want to change.
President Gen. Ayub Khan wrote in 1959 of the urgent need to find a concept which
would ‘weld the people into unity’ an answer which is comprehensive, tangible, arouses
spontaneous and consistent enthusiasm, and is workable in the light of the requirements of
modern life’ he further wrote that he had ‘not been able to find an effective answer so far’.293
Ironically, President General Zia Ul Haq found a particular interpretation of Islam, which cut
across national boundaries, making national interests subservient to a globalist agenda. That
policy landed Pakistan with having, right or wrong, an international perception of a state
from where a large number of terrorist activities were being exported. Pakistan’s becoming a
declared nuclear capable State with its nuclear detonations created a new scare in the
international community about chances of Pakistan’s nuclear capability falling into extremist
Pan–Islamist forces.
Conversely, General Musharraf has come up with the slogan of ‘Pakistan First’ to bring
home and reign in the unruly growth of perceived Pakistani interests and loyalties. Pakistan
has to make clear break from its past. Pakistani society must gear itself towards a national
state living in a world of States gradually moving towards a globalised economy which is
bound to pull along with it social values as well as politics. However, “Our foreign policy is
still trapped in old assumptions and in some ways we are still trying to preserve the fiction of
the old world even in the present phase of re–engagement with the United States. We still
remain addicted to old alliances. We should learn from the past and submit our foreign policy
to democratisation. What we need is openness, public debate and consensus–building leading
to a clear–eyed perception of our national priorities, limitations, and capabilities.”294 A
democratic dispensation is the most basic requirement for any change in the direction, i.e. a
liberal moderate direction, to be real and long term. The issue is of getting out the society
from the extremism it has plunged into as a result of past decisions, both in the arena of
foreign and domestic policies. “The fight against extremism will remain incomplete as long
as the army doesn’t accept responsibility for its part in pursuing policies which have given
Pakistan a bad name and the image of a country chaotic and dangerous. And it won’t be
complete as long as the army leadership does not realise that the real antidote to religious

293
Russell., Ralph, [2002], “Pakistan Islam and Progress” in The Post–Colonial State and Social
Transformation in India and Pakistan, Naseem S.M., & Nadvi., Khalid, (ED.) Oxford University Press.
Karachi, p. 314.
294
Hussain., Touqir, “The making of our foreign policy”, Daily Dawn. 24 / 09/ 2003.
 Conclusions: Towards a Changed Strategic Culture 117

extremism lies not in more presidential security but in the building of enduring political
institutions.”295
There is a need to institutionalise decision–making. Systems are not created in a day
through the simple procedure of making certain rules and regulations or issuing executive
orders. There is no need for erecting a complete structure of rules and regulations providing
for each and every situation. Just a few basic changes will suffice to change the direction
towards democratisation and institutionalisation of decision–making. For a very elaborate
system of rules and regulations may stifle individual initiative, a very basic ingredient of any
democratic system. Personalised decision–making and individual initiative are two different
phenomena. Personalised decision–making refers to the feudal style where individuals thinks
in term of self and does not feel any social or civic responsibility, Individual initiative means
the ability and right of individual not to conform to established social or political norms,
while being responsible to the society and not his/her person or his/her clan. This is more a
cultural trait and thus can not be instilled by mere change of or adoption of rules. They
evolve through a gradual process and are a result of historical experiences. However, states
having visionary leadership do not wait for history to decide but through imaginative moves
makes it moves in specific directions. Some basic decisions are taken consciously and one
then waits for some traditions to evolve to fill in the gaps and give life and meaning to
institutions and rules. A process of trial, error and correction always goes on. The process of
change in foreign policy decision–making process must address all three sources of inputs; 1)
Memory, 2) International System and 3) Domestic system.

Memory

Memory includes actual events and decisions taken about them as well as culture, history
and ideology which together form the basis for self identity and worldview. Any change must
begin with a new look at memory. Pakistan’s history needs both a re–interpretation and
correct and true presentation. People of this country are ignorant about truth, mostly, because
there has been a systematic campaign of disinformation over more than four decades. It
reached its peak under General Zia. In a recent work, a distinguished Pakistani historian,
K.K. Aziz296 has shown how thoroughly distorted is the presentation of our own past through
the re–writing of history in Pakistan. The people of Pakistan are entitled to know the truth.
The motives of those state authorities or others, in instigating and promoting this project of
systematic disinformation need to be examined and understood.

Identity
There is a continuous debate among Pakistani intellectuals as well as political circles
about the ideological basis of Pakistan. The Muslim identity, which provided the justification
and thrust to Pakistan movement forms the basis for the debate about identity of the people
and the state. On the one side are those who claim that Pakistan being the result of Muslim
movement for a homeland of their own where they can live their lives according to their

295
Amir.., Ayaz, “The end of Jihad Incorporated” daily Dawn Karachi 19 December 2003.
296
Aziz., K.K. The Murder of History in Pakistan, Vanguard, Lahore, 1993.
118 Ijaz Khan

religious prescriptions, Islam must determine its system of governance. This is logically
developed to put forward the demand to make Pakistan a theocratic State. Countering this
interpretation are those who consider that Pakistan movement was not a religious movement.
They say that it was a Muslim movement not Islamic movement. They talk of Muslim
nationalism and thus make an attempt to marry the secular concept of nationalism with a
religious basis for identity. Going into the details of the debate is out of context here as one, it
needs a lot of space and more important this study considers the purpose of the debate as
unwarranted, rather unhealthy for growth of a democratic and confident modern state. Both
sides take pains to present their viewpoints with the idea of firstly justifying the creation and
thus continued existence of Pakistan and secondly to propose how it should be governed.297
While accepting the need for continuously looking and interpreting and re–interpreting
history, it should be for the purpose of understanding how one is where one is in the present
and how best to go forward. The debate needs to be more academic than political. More
important, it must be understood that after more than half a century of existence as an
independent state, Pakistan need not justify its existence by justifying its creation. Existing
for more than half a century is enough of a justification for continued existence. Pakistanis
need not be apologetic about their country’s existence. Then it is not required by any law or
principle or custom that a state must always follow what its leadership or people wanted at
some point in their continuously evolving history. People change their decisions; find new
goals and objectives with changing times and circumstances and new knowledge and
understanding. It is the gravest mistake (even one can call it a crime) to distort history to
justify some goal or purpose that may seem attractive at some later point in history.

Pakistan First
It is important to correct the distortion of identity and extra territorial commitments and
loyalties infused in the society as well as the state institutions especially during the Zia era.
The slogan ‘Pakistan First’ given by President Musharraf requires serious and fundamental
changes in perceptions at various levels. Army needs to be addressed with priority.
Prof. Hasan A. Rizvi298 identifies four major developments during Zia years that had far
reaching implications for the role of Islam in the Army. First, Zia–ul–Haq used Islam and
conservative Islamic groups to legitimize his rule and encouraged Islamic conservatism and
orthodoxy in the Army. This fitted with the changes in the orientations of the new breed of
officers who came from middle to lower strata of the society, hailing from small towns and
urban areas with conservative religious values. Second, some of the Islamic groups were
allowed to make inroads into the Army, something of an anathema in the past. They included
the largely non political religious Tablighi Jamaat and the highly political Jamaat–e–Islami
(JI). The latter was favourable towards the person of Zia, as well as associated with the
regime through ISI in its Afghan policy. The JI with its overt Islamic political agenda
penetrated these institutions. Third the Islamic revolution in Iran (1979) had a profound

297
Read for a more detailed study of Pakistan’s identity predicament an article by the present author, Khan.,
Ijaz, “Contending Identities of Pakistan and The Issue of Democratic Governance”, Peace and
Democracy in South Asia, Volume 2, Numbers 1 & 43, 2006, http://www.pdsajournal.com
298
Rizvi., Hasan Askari, Military, State and Society in Pakistan, Lahore, Sang–e–Meel Publications, 2003
pp. 246-257.
 Conclusions: Towards a Changed Strategic Culture 119

impact on civilians as well as military circles in Pakistan, towards Islamic revivalism and
conservatism. Fourth Afghanistan experience reinforced Islamic zeal among Army personnel,
especially those working with the Afghan resistance groups. The coming of Islamic
volunteers from all over the Muslim world infused an Islamic internationalism among these
Army officers. The exit of Soviet Union in 1989 created a sense of euphoria among them and
the thinking of many Army personnel, including some senior officers, was frozen in the
Afghan experience. He further argues, as long as Islam is coupled with professionalism and
service discipline, it is a source of strength. However, whenever, the imperatives of military
professionalism are subordinated to extraneous considerations, no matter what is their source,
the military faces internal problems. The realisation of negative implications for the Army
and the state is not lost on the subsequent military leadership. Given the decisive role
Military plays in foreign policy making, such a mindset is bound to create difficulties and
hurdles in the path of change.
Beginning with Asif Nawaz Janjua (Army Chief August 1991–Jan 1993) and his
successors till the present (Musharraf 1997–till to date) began a process to push back the
politicised Islamic elements and re–assert professionalism. The process needs more serious
attention, is made obvious by the fact that the Army leadership could not be convinced by the
voices from within the establishment as well as outside it, to change its all out pro–Taliban
Afghan policy before 9/11. That persistence seemingly was a result of what Prof. Rizvi has
termed frozen attitudes. The public acknowledgment by President Gen. Musharraf299 of the
involvement of some low ranking military personnel in life attempts on his person also
reveals the persistence of Zia legacy within the Armed forces. The Army needs to look into
ways and means to correct the culture created by Zia in the within the Army. How it goes
about it must reflect a clear vision of what has to be un–learned and learned. Professionalism
has to return to the rank and file for any change to be meaningful and long lasting.

Education
For reforming memory of state and people, reforming the education system, especially
school syllabi, can be a starting point. A good study was carried out recently by an Islamabad
based NGO Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI), whose findings and
recommendations can form a good beginning. The report provides, “Pakistan’s public
education system has an important role in determining how successful we shall be in
achieving the goal of a progressive, moderate and democratic Pakistan. A key requirement is
that children must learn to understand and value this goal and cherish the values of
truthfulness, honesty, responsibility, equality, justice, and peace that go with it. The identity
and value system of children is strongly shaped by the national curricula and textbooks in
Social Studies, English, Urdu and Civics from Class I to Class XII. The responsibility for
designing them lies with the Curriculum Wing of the Ministry of Education and the
provincial Text Book Boards. However, a close analysis by a group of independent scholars
shows that for over two decades the curricula and the officially mandated textbooks in these
subjects have contained material that is directly contrary to the goals and values of a

299
Daily The News Islamabad 28 May, 2004.
120 Ijaz Khan

progressive, moderate and democratic Pakistan.”300 Syllabi has been specifically designed to
create a specific extremist religious sense of identity and instil in the minds of the growing
generations a particular world view, a world view that had justified the pursuance of the un–
sustainable foreign policy, as the people of Pakistan found out immediately after 9/11 and
Indian leadership mocked Pakistan’s reliability as a friend and ally.
Their study pointed out some of the more important problems in the text books to be;

• Inaccuracies of fact and omissions that serve to substantially distort the nature and
significance of actual events in our history.
• Insensitivity to the actually existing religious diversity of the nation
• Incitement to militancy and violence, including encouragement of Jehad and
Shahadat
• Perspectives that encourage prejudice, bigotry and discrimination towards fellow
citizens, especially women and religious minorities, and other nations.
• A glorification of war and the use of force
• Omission of concepts, events and material that could encourage critical self–
awareness among students
• Outdated and incoherent pedagogical practices that hinder the development of
interest and insight among students”301

The study explains, “The books on Social Studies systematically misrepresent events that
have happened over the past several decades of Pakistan’s history, including those which are
within living memory of many people. This history is narrated with distortions and omissions.
The causes, effects, and responsibility for key events are presented so as to leave a false
understanding of our national experience. A large part of the history of this region is also
simply omitted, making it difficult to properly interpret events, and narrowing the perspective
that should be open to students. Worse, the material is presented in a way that encourages the
student to marginalise and be hostile towards other social groups and people in the region”302.
This study can become an excellent basis for change in the syllabi, which will have a positive
impact on the future generations, and the political and social make up of the society. The
process of un–learning and learning for change can only start at the basic level. School is that
crucial level where the child learns its sense of right and wrong, of truth and lies and more
important, gets a sense of history which forms the basis of identity of self and world view.
That remains with the child throughout life and determines his/her attitudes, actions and
reactions.

300
Nayyar., A. H. & Salim., Ahmed, ‘The Subtle Subversion: The State of Curricula and Textbooks in
Pakistan ;Urdu, English, Social Studies and Civics’, A Project Report of Sustainable Development
Policy Institute, Islamabad (SDPI).
301
ibid
302
ibid.
 Conclusions: Towards a Changed Strategic Culture 121

International Systemic Inputs

International system is the sum of inputs from the various international actors that
include both state and non state actors. That international system in turn becomes a source of
inputs into the domestic decision–making processes of individual states. Separate
international actors also influence the behaviour of states for specific purposes at different
levels and with to varying degrees. The pluralist international order, with international
borders increasingly being rendered porous to the onslaught of capital, technology as well as
human beings international relations are no more confined to the behaviour of states.
Pakistan’ diplomacy to take advantage of this increasingly complex international system must
be ready to function at all these various levels and multiple channels.
The post 9/11 Pakistani foreign policy of becoming ally of the United States in the ‘War
against Terrorism’ has taken it to the position of centre stage from, that of an almost isolation.
The immediate benefit to Pakistan of this changed status has been better state to state
relations, primarily military to military relations with United States. The economic
improvement is more a result of aid and loans or writing off of some loans etc. However,
there has been a decrease in Pakistan’s interaction with rest of the world on societal level.
Hardly any business people or private citizens as tourists are coming this way. For the
benefits to be really beneficial long term and sustainable, to is important to create better
communications and relations with the non state international society which includes
international private business as well as the emerging very powerful international society.
Pakistan obviously does not have the power to change the international system as is the
case with most of the states acting on their own. Some elements of the international system
are relatively constant. Geographical situation is something which can not be changed. It may
change, however, if some geopolitical changes occur, like the demise of Soviet brought five
new Muslim States to the north of Pakistan in place of a generally hostile USSR. However,
such events are rare and states normally are expected to be ready when and if they happen,
devise strategies and policies accordingly. Generally Geography is taken to be a constant in
international relations. However, there are other areas where a state can play a role that suits
its interests more positively and influence the international system accordingly.
The various international interstate and non state processes, institutions and organisations
are significant tools for states to further their foreign policy goals as well as sources of inputs
in the stat’s decision–making process. Regional organisations like South Asia Regional
Cooperation Organisation (SAARC), Economic Cooperation Organisation (ECO), and
Organisation of Islamic Countries, of which Pakistan is a member, are significant fora which
need more active involvement from Pakistan. Their increased role in regional affairs can take
Pakistan measurably forward in following a more independent foreign policy globally.
Similarly United Nations is an organisation whose must not be belittled, as is the tendency in
some circles, especially after the US invasion of Iraq and its failure to do anything substantial
in the Kashmir dispute.
The significance of these international Inter–governmental Organisations lies in their role
to dilute unilateralism and promote respect for International Law and express world public
opinion. They provide a state with a means to reach out to the international community. A
state’s role in international organisation plays a crucial role in its international image. The
122 Ijaz Khan

significance of image in this era of open and public diplomacy can not be over emphasised.
In this regard, Pakistani policy makers need to take positions and be active in various popular
international concerns, even when they do not directly has a lot of interest for Pakistan.
Pakistan needs to create an image of a peaceful state on the side of upholding the rule of law
in international society. One good step that needs serious consideration can be Pakistan’s
becoming a member of the recently established International Criminal Court (ICC).
Citizens are now informed directly from international sources, particularly via global
television and, more recently, the Internet. It is no longer possible for governments to censor
or control in–flows or out–flows of information. This may help to build democracy in
traditionally closed countries – for example, by exposing dirty secrets such as human rights
abuses – but it also facilitates the entry of what might be considered undesirable information
such as pornography, racist propaganda, or even instructions on how to carry out terrorist
activities. Information technology has effectively eliminated the capacity of countries to keep
out foreign influences; ‘good’ or ‘bad’.
This increased access to information has a ‘democratising effect’ – politicising citizens
and often mobilising them into action – which in turn has significant implications for national
policy development processes. For example, citizens can use information about what
neighbouring governments are or are not doing, to challenge or pressure their own
governments.
Globalisation allows people to organise themselves more quickly and effectively across
national borders. Interest groups are increasingly organised internationally and capable of
influencing the policy debate in several countries at the same time. A prominent example is
Greenpeace, the environmental group formed in Canada in 1977, now an international
organisation with 40 offices in 30 countries and annual revenues of $US 130 million and a
staff of over 1,000. The recent Royal Dutch/Shell Brent Spar case illustrates the capacity of
such internationally organised interest groups to mobilise citizens and to create strategic
pressure simultaneously in multiple countries. The 1993 Rio Summit and the 1994 Cairo
Conference on Population Growth are examples of international forums where governments
were lobbied both by their own and by foreign interest groups. The world conference on
women in Beijing bore witness to the same phenomenon. Multi–level pressures on
governments to react – from national and foreign interest groups and from foreign
governments sometimes wielding to pressure from local interest groups – are becoming more
common and harder to resist.
Domestic interest groups are increasingly collaborating with foreign counterparts across
state boundaries. New communications technologies are allowing groups – linked by race,
religion or conviction – to overcome the barriers of physical distance. And because citizens
talk to each other, governments must as well. For example, the various civil society peace
groups working for peace in between India and Pakistan are having a positive influence on
the conduct of official state to state relations between the two neighbouring states.303
The global news media is another important international influence. It increasingly
defines international issues and events, which consequently demand immediate responses

303
Groups active in this endeavour include, Pakistan–India Peoples Forum for Peace and Development,
South Asia Partnership, Pakistan Peace Coalition.
 Conclusions: Towards a Changed Strategic Culture 123

from governments. Images of starving children or massacres, wherever they occur, are
projected into living–rooms around the world, shaping public opinion and demands.
Governments themselves are using the global media to influence global public opinion.
International relations and events are therefore more visible and transparent, have more
domestic policy ramifications, and involve the public more often. Consequently, the policy
process is more complex. Greater access to information and greater participation in policy
processes by an increasing range of policy actors make those processes and their outcomes
more legitimate, responsive and hence democratic.
Pakistani decision–making process must take cognisance of this, by now a not very new
facet of international relations. These Non state actors can become a good means of reaching
out to the societies of target states. A state with a positive and human international image in
the civil society has stronger position in international forums, whether they are about
security, trade or any other political or non political issues. This is an era of non formal
diplomacy. For Pakistan achieve the status of a moderate state and respected state, whose
stands receive attention, needs to be proactive, innovative and dynamic in its foreign policy.
To be able to do so, Pakistani decision–making process needs to be open for inputs from the
non formal and non state sector.

Domestic System

Confining ourselves to foreign policy decision–making there are a few steps that
Pakistan can take to put it on the right track.

• Correcting the balance between various state institutions that are relevant to
Foreign Policy.
• A system of independent inputs
• Over all Political Control

Correcting the balance between various state institutions that are relevant to Foreign Policy
Pakistan has had a chequered political history. Its system of governance has oscillated
between democracy and martial law rule for the last 53 years. For half the country's history
Pakistan has been administered directly by military generals and for the remaining period the
military exerted influence over civilian political set–ups from behind the scenes. While the
continuing state of hostility with India afforded the armed forces a bigger role in Pakistan,
administrative incompetence of the civilian elite and lop–sided development of state
institutions provide the ‘raison d'etre’ for military's role in domestic political matters.304
Management of Foreign Policy is a professional job and there are supposed to be
professionals specially trained to manage it. A foreign policy professional in this context is
one who is empowered by the community to influence or take decisions on its behalf in the

304
Alavi., Hamza, “Authoritarianism and Legitimation of State Power in Pakistan” ‘Sangat’ Internat
Magazine http://ourworld.compuserve.com/ homepages/sangat/Power.htm. Accessed on 20 April 2004
124 Ijaz Khan

international arena305. It is primarily the function of Foreign office to make and carry out
foreign policy. Primacy, however, should not be interpreted as exclusivity. The interest of
other state agencies and departments in foreign affairs that relate to their fields is natural and
needed. The job of the foreign office is to coordinate and look into the various options that
may be available to satisfy as much as possible all of them. Symbolically the first step in this
direction can be to hold interdepartmental meetings on foreign policy related issues in the
Foreign Office.
The Army has dominated rather controlled almost exclusively Pakistan’s foreign policy
for too long. Its high time Army gives up that status. The argument for civilian supremacy in
the affairs of the State was put by Qauid–e–Azam in the clearest possible words, when he
addressing the armed forces, “Don’t forget that you in armed forces are the servants of the
people. You do not make the national policy. It is we, the civilians, who decide the issues and
it is our duty to carry out those tasks (with) which you are entrusted.”306 For any real change
to be possible this saying of the father of the nation must be put to practice. However, “In
states undergoing democratisation, it is important to distinguish between civilian control of
armed forces, and their democratic control. Civilian control is a necessary element of
democratic control but on its own it is not sufficient. Indeed, democratic models of civil
military relations entail much more than the simple maximisation of civilian power over the
armed forces. They also involve the effective governance of the defence sector in a
framework of clear constitutional responsibilities and transparency. This in turn relates to
four key areas: first, legally defined institutional responsibilities and relationship, which
place the armed forces under clear civilian control; second, the de–politicisation of armed
forces and removal of their influence in domestic politics; third, mechanisms for the
effective, transparent and accountable implementation of defence policy and the defence
budget; and finally, the wider engagement of civil society in defence matter.”307

A system of independent and expert inputs in foreign policy making process

It is important to make formal and informal provisions for independent expert inputs in
the foreign policy decision–making system. The expert can perform three functions in the
policymaking process; the provision of alternatives, management of information, and
criticism.
As regards the provision of alternatives, it is in the nature of an academic discipline –
particularly a social science discipline – that there are different ways of viewing its subject.
International Relations look at the world from different approaches, with many variations. In
this sense, what the academic community can do is to explore the international environment
unencumbered by the imperatives of action or power and provide alternative explanations of
facts and policy responses. It matters little that some of these might be considered

305
Webb Keith “Academics And Professionals In International Relations: A British Perception” Kent Papers,
http://www.kent.ac.uk/politics/research/ kentpapers/webb5.html Accessed 9 May 2004.
306
Khan., M. Asghar, “Quaid-i-Azam on Soldier and Politics”, Defence Journal, Karachi, vol. 4, no. 11,
1978, p. 10. M. Asghar Khan is a former Chief of Pakistani Air force and leader of a political party
Tehrik–e–Istiqlal (Persistent Movement) of Pakistan.
307
Edmunds Timothy ‘Democratic and Civilian Control of Armed Forces The Adelphi Papers, October
2003, vol. 360, issue. 1, p. 13. Adelphi papers are published International Institute of Strategic Studies,
London a liberal International Relations think tank.
 Conclusions: Towards a Changed Strategic Culture 125

‘unrealistic’ (that in any case will depend upon a point of view) but (what matters is) that
they can successfully counter pose a view against any particular normality or orthodoxy.
Management of information is the second area where an expert can be helpful. Decision
maker is frequently overwhelmed by information, more so in this age of communications
revolution. The problem is not information in ‘bits and pieces’ about the world, but the
structuring of information in a meaningful way. While the academic will rarely be able to
compete with the professional in terms of information about what happened yesterday, but he
is better placed to put what happened yesterday into an historical socio–political context. And
thus interpret information better. Thirdly, the value of criticism, argument and debate to
understanding has long been recognised. Within the arena of international relations
academics are observers trained in criticism and a resource to be utilised.308
In short the academic can give a theoretical coherence to the technical details of policy
and help the practitioner evolve a long term policy rather than reacting to issues and
situations on ad hoc basis. A more lively interaction between the two can help the practitioner
to be ready whatever turn a situation may take and be rarely surprised and taken unaware.
The universities in the developed world have acted as the breeding ground for fresh ideas
and have been the home to various think tanks. In almost all democratic countries of Europe
there has been a long history of the interaction of the practitioner with the academic world
whereby both provided feedback and guidance to each other. Contrast this with the nose–in–
the–air attitude of personnel Pakistani state institutions who in line with their imperial
history, often ape the style of British and now increasingly United States However, they have
never thought it fit to develop a working relationship with their academic community, which
is one of the important basis for the finesse, insight and vision of the practitioner in the West.
There is a need to develop working relations between the researcher and the practitioner. A
more frequent exchange of ideas, both formally and informally may be evolved.
A system for induction of experts from non state sector into the foreign policy
establishment at different levels of its hierarchy may be evolved. These experts can come
from Academia, Civil Society Organisations, Business, Media and other relevant fields. This
will insert fresh blood and fresh ideas into the decision–making, thus breaking out of an
institutional lethargy and freeze that is natural to develop in institutions over time.

Overall Political Control

The need for an overall political control of all policy making including foreign policy
needs no emphasis. Prime minister as head of the executive controls the overall foreign
policy establishment. He has the authority to make the final decisions concerning policy
issues. But that is not, as pointed out earlier, the same as political control of the foreign
policy making.

Empowering the Parliament

Parliament must be given real powers in matters of foreign policy. To start with through
a constitutional amendment all international treaties must be made subject to the approval of
parliament. Parliament may also be given some role, if not the authority, to appoint higher
officers on various diplomatic and related posts. One probable method can be all foreign

308
Keith., Webb, 2004.
126 Ijaz Khan

ambassadorial level appointees must go through a public scrutiny by the foreign affairs
committees of Senate and the National Assembly. Most importantly, parliament must be able
to discuss and control all aspects of the budget that is concerned with any part of foreign
policy. Current practice of not discussing the defense spending in the parliament is a practice
that has to be given up. It is through open discussion of the defense spending in the
parliament that the civil society can have a real control of the state and the existing lop sided
development of state and society relations in favour of the military can be corrected.309 It is
the control of the purse that can give public control any creditability and substance.

The Role of Political Parties

Political parties310 are the central characters of any democratic state and society. It is
through them that the civil society exercises overall control of the state structure. Their role
in any change is crucial. However, political parties stand discredited in Pakistan is a
statement that would find very few, if any detractors. They have failed to successfully
represent the civil society in the affairs of the state and to balance the control of decision–
making enjoyed by the Military – Civil bureaucracy. Accusations of corruption,
incompetence, and being mainly family controlled and owned are common. Whatever the
strengths or shortcomings of political parties, they play a central role in democratic systems.
In fact, there is no example of a modern, healthy democracy without political parties.
Political parties play several critical roles: parties help aggregate interests in diverse societies,
parties help develop compromise and consensus on national policies and legislation, and
parties literally help forming governments and legislatures. For any system of democratic
decision–making the role of political parties is crucial. For political parties to play their role,
their modernisation and reform is basic. A modern political party must be democratic in its
own structure and decision–making, its finances and accounts must be transparent and open
to public audit, and very crucial its leadership and activists must be well aware of the various
issues confronting the state and society as well as responsible to the general public.
Modern Political parties must have a system of information gathering and response
development. The party in government or the one or more in the opposition must have their
own, independent sources of information and analysis, within and/or without their party
structures which are continuously concentrating on various foreign policy issues. So when the
political leadership is presented an issue by the state functionaries, they having a perspective
of their own, are ready with knowledge of available alternatives. When a civilian political
head of a ministry i.e. a minister is presented an issue for a decision, the way it is presented
plays an almost deterministic role in the decision supposedly taken by the minister. The
bureaucrat presenting the case would naturally present it in a manner that reflects his/her
personal biases and understanding as well as his institutional interests. The political minister
is not normally an expert of the subject he is taking decision about, nor is he supposed to be.

309
Read Agha., Aysha Siddiqa, 2003, for an excellent treatment of the negative repercussions of the lack of
any public accountability on defense spending. Also read her latest work Military Inc. 2007 for the
economic stakes of Pakistani military in Pakistani economy that has developed due to non
\ccountability.
310
Diamond., Larry and Gunther., Richard, Political Parties and Democracy John Hopkins University Press,
Maryland, 2001.
 Conclusions: Towards a Changed Strategic Culture 127

Further more, he or she busy in political and ceremonial matters, never has time for in depth
study of the issues confronting his ministry. Thus, most of the time the actual decision is
made by the bureaucracy, though the political head carries the illusion of making the
decision. This is true even of the most developed states of the world. For example, in a pre –
election televised interview President Bush failed to identify President Musharraf. However,
the deficiency is covered by individual civilian experts, academic and research institutions. In
a developed state the political head does not only rely on bureaucratic file that is put up
before him. He/She has a set of alternatives from his team of experts and reports from his
party think tanks as well. Thus, equipped with this alternative set/s of options, he/she is in a
better position to decide and pose questions to the bureaucrat that may be missing from the
official file, intentionally or un–intentionally. Similarly, the parties not in the government
also are able to counter governmental decisions, make suggestions or provide alternate
solutions in a more educated and informed manner, when they have access to expert opinion
and studies carried out by their own experts and think tanks. It is important for political
parties to play a serious role in running the affairs of the state, and have real control of the
most crucial part of state functions i.e. foreign policy, they must have think tanks and
research institutions of their own. These institutions must be staffed and administered by
whole time researchers rather than party activists. These research institutions which broadly
are oriented towards the ideological and theoretical positions of the political parties must be
more professional than political.
These institutions in turn can have academic and research relations and contacts with
universities and other academic institutions as well. Pakistani decision makers need to think
of finding some mode of getting the educated involved in political and administrative setup
of this country. This will go a long way in changing political parties and the decision–making
process for the better.

Civil Society Groups

The role of Civil Society groups or Non Governmental Organisations is very crucial in
the development of a culture of popular control of decision–making and democratic
institution building. They bring out the views and interests of specific disadvantaged
segments of the society, like Women, Children, and rural poor as well as broader concerns of
the society like environmental and human rights issues, thus, making the decision makers
take cognisance of popular concerns. More important is their educating impact. Through their
activism they bring to light and attention issues that concern people, though due to lack of a
mature civic culture do not receive enough public attention and interest.
There is a need to develop mutually supportive relations between political parties and
civil society groups, which those working in both sectors must realise. Civil society groups
help to organise and articulate various interests in a society. In essence, civil society helps
provide part of the ‘demand side’ in politics. At the same time, political parties provide the
‘supply side.’ That is, parties help turn citizen interests and demands into policies and laws. If
civil society groups lobby for change, it is critical that political parties are able to respond. If
parties cannot help meeting these demands then there is a danger that citizens may become
frustrated and reject democracy as a political system. Signs of which can noticed in Pakistan,
if one looks around.
128 Ijaz Khan

Feudal attitudes
However, the real hurdle in changing the nature of Pakistan’s politics and state society
relations is the dominant feudal character of its society. The personalised style of decision–
making and structure and politics of political parties is the persistence of feudal mind set. Be
that a populist like Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, with his feudal social background and Oxford
education or Mian Nawaz Sharif, with his mediocre local education and urban industrial class
basis, the style and attitudes had remained feudal and personalised. Despite almost a half–
century of independence, Pakistan’s political system remains inadequately institutionalised
and highly personalised. The country has alternated between long periods of military rule and
unstable civilian governments controlled by a small elite of landed and tribal families, while
the rural peasantry continues to be dominated by powerful feudal families, the urban middle
class and working class remain small, weak, poorly organised and subordinated to an
autocratic, centralized state. Pakistani political system is confronted by endemic violence and
powerful primordial loyalties that have to dominate all policy disputes. The profile presented
is not palatable, but it can not be white–washed through platitudes or ignored through
ostrich–like mentality. Acceptance is the basic pre–requisite for a detached perception of the
dialectical forces that throttle our political culture to be able to initiate structural
transformations that promise hope and opportunity.311 Attempts to change the role of civil
society, political parties and create a balance between state and society must address the issue
of attitudinal change. It is the nature of feudal mind set to be conservative and resistant to
change.
Change of feudal attitudes is the basic requirement for any change to be meaningful.
However, one change in attitudes or social values can not be legislated. It is a process which
is tied with progress in socio economic fields. Changes in educational level, syllabi,
economic basis and opening up of the political arena can help in accelerating the pace of
change in attitudes and creation of more professionalism in decision–making.

Political Education; towards a mature and responsible civil society

There is a need for the political education of the general public. Though probably most of
the populace might never be interested in most of the foreign policy issues, however, some or
more of them being interested in some of them. It is important that those who are interested
are not just permitted but actively encouraged to be involved in a process of continuous
debate. To make this debate more educated and better informed, it is important to encourage
research and debate not just in state owned universities and research institutions, but also
welcome and encourage the establishment of independent research centres or think tanks, as
they are called. It must be pointed out that it is the responsibility of the academia not to wait,
but play its due role by carrying out socially responsible and needed research, without
waiting for invitations to do so. For it is their job not to just disseminate, but also to create
and generate knowledge. This would not only enhance the political control of the decision–
making, but will also help the government become more free to take even at times hard
decisions, that may be necessitated by international environment and national interest.

311
Rahman S. M., “Viceregal Style of Governance”, ‘Defense Journal’ Karachi,
http://www.defencejournal.com April 1988. p. 59.
 Conclusions: Towards a Changed Strategic Culture 129

Right to Know
The legislation providing access to information must be made meaningful. After a delay
of two years, the government of Pakistan announced rules and procedures for the practical
implementation of the Freedom of Information Ordinance 2002.312 These rules and
procedures further limit and almost kill the purpose and object of the legislation. The
legislation itself is much less than ideal. The need is of procedures that just not make
information available but really facilitate people, especially researchers and academics,
requiring and searching for information. The state must fund and/or support collection/
indexing of de–classified information and its publication, thus, making it available to the
interested public. Making of strenuous and complicated procedures defeats the purpose.
While one realises and accepts that there are always some pieces of information which may
be termed as of a nature that may harm state interests, determination of such nature needs to
be done judiciously and in a liberal fashion. The paramount purpose of any such exercise
must be to safeguard national interest and not protect individuals. The idea is to welcome and
encourage a more educated and informed public debate on foreign policy issues, getting
wider public inputs in the decision–making. It is very important to hold the decision makers
accountable. It needs to be underscored that a more informed citizenry is a source of strength
not hurdle. The elitist and exclusive approach to foreign policy is the remnant of the
feudal and authoritarian era. The modern democratic approach depends on open debates and
public inputs.

A CONCEPTUAL BASIS FOR CHANGE

An understanding of the human political society as a plurality makes the conceptual basis
for these directional pointers. As pointed out in chapter one of this study, International
Relations function in a multi channel process of connections between both formal and
informal interests, organised or not organised. The revolution in communication technology
is bringing sea changes to the international arena. Globalisation is having its own impact as
well as being an outcome of these technological leaps forward and economic progress. The
significance of changes that have come and are coming in the form and content of
international elations must be reflected in the structure of state institution/s dealing with
foreign policy.
One starts by making a few basic rules and then waits for the gradual evolution of sound,
responsible and accountable individual as well as institutional behaviour based on respect for
Rule of Law. It is tradition and political culture that give substance to the skeleton erected by
rules. The role of visionary leadership can not be overlooked while suggesting changes. It is a
visionary and responsible leadership that sets the tone for the future evolution of state and
society. George Washington (Although he could have been re–elected as he was the leader of
the freedom movement of USA, as well as physically was in perfect health) by refusing to be
elected for the third term as President of United States made such a strong tradition that was
respected by subsequent Presidents as if it was a law, till the middle of the 20th century.

312
S.R.O. 514 (1)/2004. http://www.infopak.gov.pk/public/ govt/freedom_of_information_rules_2004.htm
130 Ijaz Khan

Similar traditions have been set in the present world by Nelson Mandela of South Africa. He
announced retirement from active politics at the height of popularity and while he was in
good health. Those at the leadership level must make traditions through examples such as
these that may be emulated by ordinary members of the society.
There is a need for specific structural reforms. However, that is specialised field and
requires a deeper study. Going into that will be out of context here. There is a need to carry
out that specific study focusing on the structural and organisational aspects of reforms and
changes. The specific structural reforms need to address the requirement of making the
decision makers more responsive to society and have systems of independent inputs as well
as the capacity for dealing with the informal processes.

SUMMING UP

“There exists a symbiotic relationship between the foreign policy of every country and
between two specific factors; the geo–strategic context (regional and global) within which a
country is located and the domestic compulsions of a country which include governance
issues and economic constraints that exists. Depending on the economic strength, the military
power and the leadership of a country, a country's foreign policy to a varying degree impacts
upon these two elements and vice versa the foreign policy is influenced by these two
elements. A dynamic connectivity is in fact constantly at work between foreign policy,
governance and the geo–strategic environment. Autonomy, admittedly of varying degrees, is
therefore available to all states to make their choices on the foreign policy. Their choices
therefore define regional and global geo–strategic environments. Today however the supra–
state actors like the United Nations, the IMF, World Bank, UNCTAD as well as sub–state
actors including multi–nationals, NGOs, various shades of liberation movements,
transnational militant movements and the media also define the geo–strategic
environment.”313
The changed Afghan policy to be real and meaningful requires changes in the overall
understanding of Pakistani state’s world view. The strategic culture that resulted in the pre
9/11 Afghan policy and the manner it had to be changed demands a thorough assessment.
This study found that a thorough and fundamental change in self identity as well as world
view is required. Afghanistan is Pakistan’s neighbour and will remain so. Pakistan and
Afghanistan share state interests that if permitted to determine relations between the two, can
become the basis for a sustainable and long term friendly relationship. For such a
development Pakistan has to undergo a fundamental change in its strategic culture.
Geography has put Pakistan at an advantage vis a vis India as far as Afghanistan is
concerned. Pakistan by denying that fact to play its role and insistence on controlling
Afghanistan is pushing Afghanistan towards India. Thus the autocratic militarist and non
democratic domestic policy setup has created a mind set that simply is unabale to let history
take its course and people and their real interests determine. In the current Pakistani strategic

313
Zehra., Nasim, “Foreign Policy and Crisis of Governance”, ‘Defence Journal’, Karachi, March 2000, p.4.
 Conclusions: Towards a Changed Strategic Culture 131

culture peace is not a choice. That has to be fundamentally changed. A plural democratic
Pakistan is the only way towards that change.
Democratic decision–making is not just about voting and majority deciding but is more
about debate, competition and compromise between various pluralities that make up any
given state. Pakistan is a multi–ethnic federal state, which must be reflected in its decision–
making processes. Foreign Policy of a modern democratic state reflects the broad consensus
of the society. If one looks at the opinions and debates about Foreign Policy issues in
democratic setups, and for that matter not just in the developed West, one would see a broad
consensus on foreign policy issues, with minor debates about details and difference of
opinion taken as giving strength to the national policy outcomes by providing options and
thus maneuverability. Pakistani academia, media or political circles that are not controlled by
the state does not reflect any such consensus. The reason for lack of a broad consensus, rather
a continuously growing polarization on very fundamental issues of security, is the fact that is
visible to any student of Pakistan. One very important factor contributing to such a state of
affairs is that decisions are not a result of open national debates and compromises, no sense
of participation among peripheral groups or sections of the society as well as ethnic
minorities, so mostly they do not reflect national aspirations. A successful foreign policy
must be coherent and backed by all segments of societal opinion. The more people participate
in a decision, they develop a sense of belonging, a sense of loyalty to the policy, and thus
they develop a cogent interest in it. That gives vision, direction, coherence and durability to
policy. A proper system of policy making is a basic requirement of any successful policy.
That system must be democratic providing for participation in decision-making to all its
various ethnic and other divisions is no more a question open for debate, though, how to go
about it is a question that must be debated continuously.
A democratic, forward looking and stable Pakistan is in the interest of its people, its
immediate neighborhood and the World at large. It must also be understood that such a
Pakistan is possible only when it accepts its plural existence and identity.314 The changes
required for such a Pakistan is essentially a domestic Pakistani issue. However, in the
globalized World, there is nothing purely domestic or purely international. So, Pakistan needs
and must be given an international support, push and shown some understanding for its
difficulties on its path to change (if and when it starts traveling on it).

314
Far detailed treatment of the relaqtionship between Pakistan’s identity crisis and democratic governance
read, Khan., Ijaz, “Contending Identities of Pakistan and the Issue of Democratic Governance”, ‘Peace
and Democracy in South Asia’, Vol. 2 Nos 1 & 2,
http://pdsajournal.org/journal%202006new/Ijaz%20Khan.pdf
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5. “Jammu & Kashmir State Assembly in Srinagar attacked by terrorists”, [2001] ‘The
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President Musharraf’s address to the International Seminar on "OIC Challenge and
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140 Ijaz Khan

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cooperate” [2003] Statement of US ambassador to Afghanistan Zalme Khalilzad, Daily
‘Washington Post’, Washington, 6 April.
12. “Why this Media Circus” [2001] Editorial, Daily ‘Dawn’ Karachi, 26 September.
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October, 2001.
16. Amir Ayaz, [2001] “Joining the international mainstream”, Daily ‘The Dawn’ Karachi,
5 October 2001.
17. Amir Ayaz, [2001] Daily ‘The Dawn’ Karachi, 25 September
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December.
19. Bahari Vajpai links Pakistan with Al–Qaeda” [2001] Daily ‘The Hindu’ 13 September.
20. Cheema., Pervaiz Iqbal, [2003] “Firings on the Durand Line” Daily ‘The News’
Islamabad, 3 August.
21. Hamid Zahid, [2004] “Sorry Saga of Nuclear Proliferation”, Daily ‘The Daily Times’
Lahore, 8 February.
22. Hoagland., Jim “Pakistan still Supports Terrorists in Kashmir” [2001] The Washington
Post, October 3, 2001
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September.
24. Joint statement of 13 different NGOs, which included the prestigious Islamabad based
Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI) and Aurat (Woman) Foundation, on
‘War Against Terrorism’ [2001] Daily ‘The News’ 13 October.
25. Lodhi., Maleeha, “A foreign policy road map” Daily “The News “ 12 April, 1997.
26. Mazari Shirin M., [2001] “Testing Times for Pakistan”, Daily ‘The News’ Islamabad, 4
October.
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‘The News’ 27 September.
28. Menon M.S.N [2003] “India’s Afghan Policy” Daily ‘The Tribune’ New Delhi Friday,
17 January.
29. Mir., Hamid, [2002] “Pipeline Police in Afghanistan “, Daily ‘The News’ 13
September.
30. Naqvi., Jawad, [2002] “US tells India to lay off Afghanistan”, Daily ‘The Dawn’
Karachi, 9 October.
31. Naqvi., Jawed, [2003] “Patch up with Pakistan, US tells India” Daily ‘Dawn’ Karachi,
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35. Qaisar., Rashid A., [2004] “Mockery of Democracy”, Weekly ‘The Independent’,
Issue #, 03, Vol. No. 4, 08–14 July.
36. Rais., Rasul Baksh, [2001] “Fixing the politics of Afghanistan” Daily ‘The News’
Islamabad, 29 September.
37. Rajghatta., Chidanand, [2001]“India reads Afghan wicket correctly” Daily ‘The Times
Of India’, New Delhi, 7 December.
38. Rashid., Ahmad, [2003] “Afghan–Pakistani Tension Prompts Kabul To Develop New
Trade Routes” Daily ‘The Daily Times’ Lahore, 26 January.
39. Rashid., Ahmad, [2003] “Afghan–Pakistani Tension Prompts Kabul To Develop New
Trade Routes”, Daily ‘The Daily Times’ Lahore, 26 January.
40. Rashid., Ahmad, [2003] “Afghan–Pakistani Tension Prompts Kabul To Develop New
Trade Routes”, Daily ‘The Daily Times’ Lahore, 26 January.
41. Salahuddin Ghazi, [2001] “Crisis of Pakistan”, Daily ‘The News’ Islamabad, 18
September 2001.
42. Statement of Pakistan’s Foreign Office Spokesman, [2003] Daily ‘The Daily Times’
Lahore 2 August.
43. Syed., Anwar, [2004] “Preaching moderation” Daily ‘Dawn’, Karachi, 27 June.
44. Traynor., Ian, [2002] “War in Afghanistan: Russia Edgy At America's Military Build–
Up In Region” Daily ‘The Guardian’ London, 10 January.
45. Yousafzai Rahimullah, [2003] “Pakistan's loss in Afghanistan is India's gain” Daily
‘The News’ Islamabad 13 July.
46. Yousafzai., Rahimullah, [2003] “Pakistan's loss in Afghanistan is India's gain” Daily
‘The News’ Islamabad 13 July.
47. Ziauddin., M.,[2000] ‘Kalabagh dam – its economy, history and politics’ Daily Dawn
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49. Hussain., Zahid, [2003] “Mission Impossible” in Monthly ‘Newsline, Karachi.
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ambassador to United States” Monthly ‘Newsline’ September.
51. Khan., Sairah Irshad, [2001] “The War of Words” Monthly ‘Newsline’, Karachi,
October.
52. “Problems in turning to Pakistan for Help” [2001] Daily ‘The Wall Street Journal’,
Washington D.C. 27 September.
53. “India Seeks Larger Role” [2004] Weekly ‘Asia Times’ Online,
http://www.atimes.com/ind–pak/CK28Df03.
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 INDEX

aspiration, 2
A
assertiveness, 45
assessment, 2, 13, 16, 34, 60, 107, 113, 130
academics, 92, 109, 125, 129
assets, 20, 47, 65, 85
access, 7, 31, 34, 70, 71, 89, 123, 127, 129
assignment, 30
accommodation, 34
assumptions, 116
accountability, 126
asylum, 100
achievement, 34, 102, 107
asymmetry, 115
activism, 24, 93, 127
attacks, 15, 31, 32, 39, 44, 47, 50, 56, 65, 66, 84, 86,
adaptation, viii, 2, 17
110
adjustment, 15, 17, 25
attention, vii, 31, 47, 119, 123, 127
administrators, 22
attitudes, 6, 18, 36, 116, 119, 120, 128
advocacy, 92, 95
authority, vii, x, 10, 13, 22, 98, 99, 102, 107, 125
Africa, x, 17, 44, 67, 137
autonomy, 23, 96
age, 44, 113, 125
awareness, 91, 120
agent, 99, 102, 106
aggregation, 5, 8
agrarian, 28 B
agriculture, 70
airports, 85 backlash, 92
Al-qaeda, vii, 29, 72, 84, 96, 133 baggage, 61
alternative(s), ix, 16, 26, 77, 79, 88, 92, 98, 124, 126, Bangladesh, 20
127 banks, x, 4
ambiguity, 19 bargaining, vii, viii, ix, 4, 54, 60, 66
antithesis, 88 barriers, 122
appointees, 126 Beijing, 66, 76, 122
argument, x, 8, 21, 37, 54, 55, 79, 80, 86, 89, 93, belief systems, 7
113, 114, 124, 125 beliefs, 2, 3, 16, 55
armed conflict, 71 bilateral relations, 67
armed forces, 14, 80, 123, 124 binding, 107
arrest, 72, 104 birth, 20
articulation, 5, 11, 18 blood, 18, 125
Asia, x, 1, 17, 20, 22, 31, 32, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, border crossing, 54
65, 69, 75, 76, 78, 98, 135, 137, 139, 141 breakdown, 24, 31, 103, 106, 107
144 Index

breathing, 105 conspiracy, 34, 44

breeding, 125 constraints, 105, 130
Britain, 34, 89 construction, 5, 6, 32, 76, 78
buildings, 101 contiguity, 96
bureaucracy, 7, 9, 17, 19, 21, 40, 87, 106, 126, 127 continuity, 8, 16
business organisation, 3 control, viii, ix, 7, 12, 17, 18, 26, 28, 31, 32, 34, 35,
37, 38, 39, 44, 48, 52, 54, 55, 57, 58, 59, 71, 72,
88, 102, 108, 115, 122, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128
C
convergence, 20, 32
conviction, 122
calculus, 68, 110
cooling, 22
capitalist system, viii
corporations, viii, 4, 6
catharsis, 92
corruption, 9, 126
cell, 35
costs, 40, 55, 93, 110
centralism, 17
covering, viii, 48, 91
certainty, 95
credibility, 106
channels, 2, 4, 44, 121
credit, 95
children, 104, 119, 122
creep, 77
civil society, 7, 9, 11, 12, 13, 16, 17, 18, 44, 92, 99,
crime, 118
115, 122, 123, 124, 126, 127, 128
critical thinking, 12
civil war, x, 30, 36, 61, 88, 136
criticism, 96, 124, 125
classes, 11
cultivation, 31
classification, 84
cultural heritage, 13
closure, 53, 54
cultural values, 116
coercion, 85
culture, viii, 1, 2, 5, 7, 8, 10, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 18,
coherence, 1, 125, 131
22, 24, 31, 43, 61, 81, 85, 87, 91, 95, 97, 98, 99,
cold war, 4, 8, 13, 16, 19, 26, 32, 44, 45, 46, 48, 65,
104, 113, 117, 119, 127, 128, 129, 130
73, 75
curriculum, 91
collaboration, 105
colonial heritage, 36
commerce, 75, 77, 78 D
communication, 4, 22, 85, 99, 129
communism, 20 dailies, 93
community, viii, 6, 18, 31, 38, 53, 54, 57, 67, 88, danger, 110, 127
108, 116, 121, 123, 124, 125 death(s), 33, 35, 71, 101, 110
competition, 5, 31, 131 defense, 21, 45, 126
competitor, 37 deficiency, 127
components, 90, 97 definition, 2
composition, 8, 61 demand, 23, 59, 70, 71, 77, 102, 118, 122, 127
concentration, 8, 29 denial, 20, 54, 71
concrete, 56, 106 desire, 99, 106
confidence, 68, 84 destruction, 38, 71, 88, 94, 101, 107, 109
configuration, 28, 74 developed countries, ix
conflict, x, 2, 17, 25, 28, 29, 40, 43, 44, 45, 46, 52, developing countries, vii, x
56, 71, 92, 95, 103, 105 development, 15, 17, 22, 35, 44, 49, 83, 94, 120,
confrontation, 19 122, 123, 126, 127
confusion, 19, 36 devolution, 106
connectivity, 130 disaster, 58, 71
consensus, x, 4, 5, 17, 46, 113, 116, 126, 131 discipline, 60, 119, 124
consent, viii, 58, 96 discrimination, 120
consolidation, 107 discussions, 84
 Index 145

displacement, 17 expertise, 37
disposition, 16 exports, 70, 74, 75, 77
disseminate, 128 extremism, vii, 34, 55, 58, 86, 92, 94, 96, 97, 105,
distortions, x, 120 106, 109, 116
distribution, viii
diversity, 120
F
division, 13, 17, 20, 25, 53, 61, 84, 104
domestic policy, 84, 96, 123, 130
facilitated communication, 44
dominance, ix, x, 12, 16, 21, 30, 40, 114
failure, 23, 30, 37, 46, 57, 60, 72, 89, 106, 121
doors, 32
fairness, 37, 108
dream, 65
faith, 95
drugs, 100
family, 27, 69, 126
due process, 96
fear(s), x, 4, 11, 18, 21, 58, 76, 89
dumping, 58
federal government, 24, 34, 98, 99, 102
durability, 131
feedback, 125
duties, 23, 46
feelings, 68
feet, 77, 78
E finance, 17, 75
financial resources, 22
economic activity, 72 fixation, 115
economic cooperation, 73 flight, 84
economic development, 17, 22 focusing, 12, 15, 130
economic globalisation, 44 food, 49, 70
economics, 75, 101 forgetting, 30
elders, 94, 99, 103 France, 45
election, 29, 47, 127 franchise, 99
electricity, 75, 76 freedom, 3, 7, 18, 36, 64, 68, 93, 95, 129
emergence, ix, 5, 15, 21, 25, 29, 30, 34, 35, 37, 44, friends, 53, 54, 59, 68, 71, 84, 93, 101
52, 96, 100 friendship, 24, 69, 77, 87
encouragement, 120 frustration, 21, 65
energy, ix, 30, 77, 78, 80 fuel, 38, 43, 84
engagement, 46, 47, 48, 49, 54, 116, 124 funding, 29, 70
enthusiasm, 116 funds, 17, 38, 54
environment, x, 2, 4, 7, 9, 13, 16, 43, 56, 63, 110,
124, 128, 130
G
environmental degradation, 44
equality, 119
general election, x, 19, 36
equilibrium, 2
geography, 8, 63, 72
equipment, 74, 101
gestures, 95
erosion, 44
gifted, 69
ethnic groups, 6
global terrorism, 46, 64
ethnicity, 24, 25, 28
goals, x, 7, 32, 34, 39, 48, 56, 61, 87, 88, 105, 113,
euphoria, 119
116, 118, 119, 121
Europe, xiv, 37, 45, 46, 74, 75, 125
government policy, x, 109
evil, 74
grass, 99
evolution, 15, 18, 19, 129
greed, 80
exclusion, 37, 38
grief, 5
excuse, 11
grouping, 32, 52, 65
exercise, 59, 129
expenditures, 21
146 Index

groups, vii, viii, ix, x, ix, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11, 12, 15, induction, 125
19, 26, 28, 29, 43, 45, 49, 50, 54, 55, 58, 59, 60, industrialisation, 17
68, 71, 76, 83, 84, 85, 87, 88, 90, 92, 94, 96, 101, industry, 70
102, 103, 108, 110, 118, 122, 127, 131 infinite, 94
growth, ix, 7, 8, 12, 13, 16, 61, 64, 106, 116, 118 inflammation, 66
guardian, 15 infrastructure, 75
guidance, 47, 125 inhibition, 109
guidelines, 47 initiation, 55, 106
guilt, 56 innovation, 11
input, 8, 10, 12, 59, 64
insecurity, 13, 21
H
insight, viii, 70, 120, 125
institution building, 127
hands, 8, 28, 34
institutionalisation, 5, 34, 117
harm, 129
institutions, viii, ix, 5, 7, 8, 12, 13, 34, 58, 61, 68,
health, 70, 129
117, 118, 121, 123, 125, 127, 128
health care, 70
instruments, 34, 47
heat, 105
intelligence, xiv, 10, 12, 13, 26, 28, 35, 38, 55, 84,
hegemony, 8, 48
85, 91, 114, 115
height, 74, 130
intensity, 44, 45
heredity, viii
intentions, 60, 75, 79
hip, 28, 67, 126
interaction(s), viii, vii, ix, 4, 6, 44, 121, 125
honesty, 119
interdependence, vii
host, 69
interest groups, ix, 5, 6, 7, 11, 13, 122
hostility, 54, 123
interference, 95, 99, 101, 106
hub, 74, 75, 105
internet, 29, 38, 138, 139
human rights, x, 3, 7, 44, 68, 92, 95, 96, 122, 127
interpretation, x, 2, 16, 71, 80, 97, 116, 117, 118
humanity, 44
intervention, 9, 15, 26, 27, 29, 53, 100, 102
hydrocarbons, 78
interview, 88, 94, 103, 127
investment, 75
I isolation, 15, 32, 38, 52, 53, 55, 58, 114, 115, 121

identification, 7, 43, 107

identity, viii, ix, 8, 13, 17, 18, 19, 21, 35, 37, 83, 86, J
92, 97, 111, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 130,
Japan, ix, 1, 76, 77
131
jihad, 19, 95, 109, 115
ideology, 27, 95, 117
Jordan, 44
illusion, 127
journalism, 70
images, 3, 13
judiciary, 102
imagination, 45
jurisdiction, 99
immigrants, 6
justice, 4, 18, 49, 99, 119
immigration, 84
justification, 16, 21, 65, 79, 117, 118
imperialism, 17, 54, 92
implementation, 5, 12, 28, 30, 54, 56, 90, 124, 129
imports, 74 K
increased access, 122
independence, 18, 20, 21, 30, 33, 66, 67, 71, 128 Kazakhstan, 52, 78
indexing, 129 Kenya, 38
indication, 20, 65, 110 killing, 40, 44, 101, 102, 104
indigenous, 37 Kyrgyzstan, 52, 76
 Index 147

Middle East, 9, 13, 17, 18, 21, 25, 74, 77, 87, 135,
L
137, 138
militarism, viii
labour, 78
minorities, 120, 131
land, 24, 52, 72
minority, 18, 88
language, viii, 6, 19, 24
mixing, 2, 13
laws, 3, 116, 127
MMA, 19, 83, 90, 96, 97, 103
leadership, 4, 17, 18, 20, 21, 23, 24, 25, 27, 28, 37,
models, 7, 124
43, 45, 46, 56, 57, 58, 67, 68, 85, 90, 97, 100,
moderates, 87, 95
104, 105, 107, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 126, 129,
modernisation, 92, 126
130
money, 70, 71, 78
learning, 120
monopoly, 7, 60
legislation, 126, 129
motives, 117
lethargy, 125
movement, 3, 6, 8, 17, 18, 20, 23, 25, 34, 36, 37, 64,
liberalisation, 48
87, 89, 90, 99, 104, 107, 117, 129
liberalism, ix, 92
multinational corporations, ix, x, 17
liberation, 89, 93, 130
multiplicity, 99
lifestyle, 102, 104
murder, 103
likelihood, 88
music, 105
linkage, 31, 64, 65
links, x, 29, 38, 50, 56, 88, 89, 91, 96, 111, 140
loans, 121 N
lobbying, 90
lobbyists, 65 narcotics, 48, 93
local government, 9, 106 nation, viii, ix, 13, 16, 18, 19, 21, 22, 46, 70, 85,
location, 1, 50, 51, 66, 75, 77, 80, 81, 106 115, 120, 124
logical reasoning, ix national action, viii
long run, 37, 66 national curricula, 119
love, 22, 88 national identity, 18, 24
loyalty, 23, 27, 131 national interests, viii, 114, 116
lying, 50 National Party, xiii, 6, 37, 39, 94
national security, 19, 21, 109
National Security Council, xiv, 10, 57
M
nationalism, viii, 18, 94, 118
NATO, xiv, 80, 89, 100, 140
machinery, 19
natural gas, 38, 75, 77, 78
management, 44, 85, 124
negotiating, viii, 6, 23, 67, 79
manpower, 17
network, 50, 56, 84
market(s), 17, 78
newspapers, 37, 65, 110
martial law, 20, 26, 27, 123
NGOs, 40, 54, 92, 95, 130, 140
measures, 58, 103, 109
North America, ix, 37, 88
media, ix, 5, 12, 13, 64, 110, 122, 130, 131
North Korea, 74
mediation, 53
nuclear program, 85
membership, 22, 37, 71, 80, 106, 140
nuclear weapons, 109
memory, ix, x, 2, 3, 8, 9, 13, 15, 19, 33, 117, 119,
nucleus, 63
120
men, 35
messages, 2 O
metamorphosis, 93
middle class, 11, 36, 128 occupied territories, 54
OECD, 45
148 Index

oil, 9, 31, 32, 35, 38, 52, 77, 78, 80 probability, 71

omission, 99 production, viii, 77
openness, 116 professionalism, 119, 128
opportunism, 92 proliferation, 48, 49, 50, 67, 80
organization(s), ix, 35, 96, 99 propaganda, 101, 122
orientation, 8, 21, 110, 111 psychosis, 89
public education, 119
public opinion, ix, 8, 11, 12, 13, 121, 123
P
public policy, 8
public sector, 5, 12
Pacific, 1, 134
paradigm shift, 93, 109, 141
Parliament, 10, 39, 68, 86, 125 R
partition, 3, 6, 13, 18, 20, 21, 23
partnership, 60, 89 race, 6, 122
patriotism, 12 range, ix, 31, 38, 123
peace process, 67 realism, viii, ix, x, 16
Pentagon, 40, 50, 57 reality, 5, 16, 18, 27, 45, 48, 58, 107
perception(s), vii, ix, 2, 3, 4, 6, 8, 13, 15, 16, 18, 20, receptors, 2
21, 22, 28, 37, 43, 45, 52, 61, 71, 85, 87, 97, 114, recognition, viii, x, 11, 18, 53
116, 118, 128 reconcile, 53
permit, 38, 85, 106, 114 reconciliation, 88
Persian Gulf, 78 reconstruction, 69, 70, 72, 78, 80
personal life, 59 reduction, 67, 70
personality, x, 12, 16, 17, 19, 90, 114 reforms, 7, 9, 96, 109, 116, 130
persuasion, 36, 55 refugees, 17, 18, 25, 28, 71
Philippines, 19 regulation(s), 45, 117
planning, 38, 47, 70, 89 rejection, 45, 49, 97
plurality, 129 relationship, ix, 12, 19, 23, 36, 48, 61, 66, 70, 72, 79,
polarization, 43, 107, 113, 131 87, 91, 97, 99, 101, 124, 125, 130
police, 70, 102 relaxation, 80
poor, 127 reliability, 120
population, x, 3, 11, 35, 105 religion, viii, ix, 1, 6, 8, 16, 18, 24, 88, 89, 93, 105,
populism, 92 122
posture, 70 religious beliefs, 28, 90
poverty, vii repair, 74
power, vii, viii, ix, x, ix, 4, 7, 8, 9, 12, 19, 21, 23, 24, repetitions, 101
28, 29, 30, 34, 39, 40, 44, 45, 48, 52, 55, 58, 66, replacement, 66
68, 69, 72, 85, 88, 89, 91, 106, 108, 110, 114, Republican, 45, 47, 49, 53
116, 121, 124, 130 resentment, 25, 39
preference, 34 reserves, 51, 77, 78
preferential treatment, 75, 80 resistance, ix, 3, 11, 24, 25, 26, 28, 39, 73, 90, 100,
prejudice, 120 119
president, 28, 30, 57, 59, 69 resolution, 17, 23, 26, 99
pressure, x, 27, 35, 52, 55, 58, 60, 68, 79, 91, 95, resources, 2, 7, 31, 76
100, 113, 122 retaliation, 64
prestige, 31 retirement, 130
prices, 6 returns, 102
primacy, 5, 47, 60 rewards, 19
private enterprises, viii rhetoric, 3, 12, 48, 92
private sector, 5 rigidity, 95
 Index 149

rotations, 38 statistics, 77
rule of law, 44, 45, 96, 122 steel, 9, 17
strategic planning, 16
strategies, ix, 47, 121
S
streams, viii, 2, 3, 40, 83
strength, vii, viii, 17, 20, 26, 29, 31, 34, 45, 60, 71,
sabotage, 76
96, 105, 107, 119, 129, 130, 131
sample, 65
stress, 97
sanctions, 38, 49, 54, 65, 80, 108
stretching, 19
satellite, 70
strikes, 56, 59, 65
Saudi Arabia, viii, 9, 11, 38, 51, 54, 93, 110
structural reforms, 130
scandal, 80
structural transformations, 128
scepticism, 13
structuring, 125
school, 40, 54, 70, 86, 91, 98, 107, 119
students, 36, 70, 76, 86, 91, 103, 107, 120
scores, 85
subgroups, 6, 7
search, 12, 32
Sudan, 38, 79, 93
searching, 13, 129
suffering, 88, 89
Secretary of Defense, 47
suicide, 45, 104
secularism, 18, 20
summer, 53
security, ix, x, viii, ix, 2, 3, 4, 7, 13, 16, 20, 21, 27,
supply, 22, 27, 77, 127
29, 31, 45, 46, 49, 52, 53, 54, 55, 61, 63, 65, 66,
surprise, 59, 74, 84, 85
71, 74, 77, 80, 81, 85, 87, 89, 99, 114, 115, 117,
surveillance, 22
123, 131
survival, viii, 21, 54, 57, 87, 114
sensitivity, 24
sustainability, 113
separation, 45, 108
sympathy, vii, 15, 29, 32, 36, 46, 50, 97
series, 100, 114
systems, viii, 7, 126, 130
shape, 4, 15, 16, 25, 46, 57, 64, 79, 97
shaping, 4, 8, 9, 123
sharing, viii, 50, 63, 76 T
shelter, 11
shock, 45, 65 takeover, 34, 53, 94
short run, 85 tanks, 12, 87, 125, 127, 128
shortage, 17 targets, 22, 79, 89
sign(s), 10, 45, 49, 50, 60, 68, 114 tariff, 70, 75
signals, 53, 58 technical assistance, 78
sites, 51 technological revolution, 44
skeleton, 129 technology, 45, 80, 121, 122, 129
skills, 17 telecommunications, 4, 78
smoke, 103 telephone, 56
smuggling, 38, 100 television, 122
society, vii, viii, x, viii, 5, 7, 8, 11, 13, 17, 18, 20, tenure, 24
26, 33, 40, 43, 44, 58, 60, 63, 83, 86, 92, 94, 96, territory, viii, x, ix, 15, 19, 29, 31, 38, 55, 56, 64, 66,
97, 107, 108, 109, 110, 114, 116, 117, 118, 120, 71, 72, 79, 80, 85, 98
121, 122, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131 textbooks, 119
soil, 73, 96, 140 theory, vii, ix, x, 1
sovereignty, viii, 44 thinking, viii, 8, 12, 31, 79, 110, 119
spectrum, 84, 91, 92 threat(s), viii, ix, 3, 4, 8, 13, 15, 16, 20, 21, 22, 25,
speech, 46, 83, 85, 86, 88 29, 37, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 54, 61, 65, 66, 71, 74,
stability, 67, 88 85, 87, 93, 110
stages, 10 time, ix, vii, 4, 11, 12, 13, 24, 25, 26, 28, 32, 33, 34,
standards, ix 35, 44, 47, 51, 56, 58, 65, 67, 74, 76, 77, 80, 92,
150 Index

94, 95, 98, 103, 109, 114, 115, 122, 124, 125, values, viii, 2, 3, 5, 16, 88, 90, 92, 108, 116, 118,
126, 127 119, 128
total revenue, 21 variables, vii
tracking, 101 vehicles, 74, 75
trade, 7, 17, 35, 44, 70, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 123 venue, 23
trade agreement, 70 victims, x
trade union, 7 village, 23, 102, 104, 105
trading, 11, 74, 75, 76 violence, x, 49, 86, 120, 128
tradition, 13, 30, 59, 129 vision, 37, 46, 88, 94, 95, 97, 115, 119, 125, 131
traffic, 72 voice, x, 7
training, vii, 32, 49, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 57, 64, 69, voicing, 5
70, 74, 77, 79, 104 voting, 131
traits, 13, 35 vulnerability, 21, 29, 45
trajectory, 13
transactions, 72
W
transnationalism, x
transparency, 124
weakness, 12, 17, 50, 113
transport, 35, 70
weapons, 27, 44, 49, 74, 80, 86, 89, 100, 102
trauma, 89
weapons of mass destruction, 49
treaties, 3, 125
welfare, 18, 86
trees, 105
welfare state, 86
trend, viii
western countries, 4
trial, 117
wheat, 70
tribes, 29, 66, 98, 100, 101, 103
winning, 48
trust, 28
withdrawal, 22, 26, 31, 47, 55, 91, 92, 102
Turkey, 31, 52, 73, 93
women, 7, 59, 75, 120, 122
Turkmenistan, 32, 38, 52, 72, 75, 77, 78, 80
workers, 34
worldview, 8, 18, 110, 117
U worry, 24, 66
writing, 12, 102, 117, 121
uncertainty, 57
unilateralism, 45, 121
universities, 12, 125, 127, 128
urban areas, 118
urban centres, 70

vacuum, 55, 88, 106