Performance Measurement and Management Control:

Contemporary Issues
Commonalities and Differences in Public and Private Sector Performance Management
Practices: A Literature Review
Jan van Helden Christoph Reichard
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 COMMONALITIES AND
DIFFERENCES IN PUBLIC AND
PRIVATE SECTOR PERFORMANCE
MANAGEMENT PRACTICES:
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A LITERATURE REVIEW

Jan van Helden and Christoph Reichard

ABSTRACT
Purpose An examination of the commonalities and differences between
performance management practices in the public and private sector.
Methodology/approach A literature review of 100 publications in
international academic journals over the last 20 years.
Findings The chapter develops a framework which links the dimen-
sions of the public/private-distinction (ownership, funding, control and
type of goals) to the design and use of performance management systems
(PMS). This framework subsequently informs a literature review, which
can be summarised as follows: Multi-dimensionality of the PMS is core
in both public and private sector organisations, but quite many private
sector papers point to a financial focus at the top of the PMS, while

Performance Measurement and Management Control: Contemporary Issues

Studies in Managerial and Financial Accounting, Volume 31, 309 351
Copyright r 2016 by Emerald Group Publishing Limited
All rights of reproduction in any form reserved
ISSN: 1479-3512/doi:10.1108/S1479-351220160000031010
309
 310 JAN VAN HELDEN AND CHRISTOPH REICHARD

public sector organisations show a broad variety of performance indicators,

including those on societally relevant goals. In addition, a link between the
PMS and strategies can be found in the public and the private sector, but
the match between different strategies and PMS design is more elaborated
in the private sector. These findings are largely in accordance with our
expectations. The review also finds support for the assumption that perfor-
mance information in public sector organisations is primarily used for
external accountability reasons, while internal managerial control is the
main purpose in private firms. The use of performance information is quite
intensive and mostly functional in both sectors, which does not meet our
expectations. Overall, the differences between performance management
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practices in the public and private sector are less stringent than expected.
Research limitations Due to limited evidence about the importance of
performance-related pay systems and no evidence about targeting in
both sectors, a more focused literature review on these issues would
be desirable.
Practical implications Mutual learning between both sectors, for
example the public sector can learn from the private sector on how to
link strategy to the PMS and the private sector can learn from the public
sector about serving a multitude of stakeholders in the PMS.
Originality/value A comprehensive review of performance manage-
ment practices in the public and private sector.
Keywords: Performance management; public sector; private sector;
literature review

INTRODUCTION
Performance management (PM) is an increasingly important research
domain. This is evident from literature reviews on management accounting
in the private sector (Lindquist & Smith, 2009; Scapens & Bromwich, 2010;
see also Stringer, 2007) and the public sector (Broadbent & Guthrie, 2008;
Goddard, 2010; van Helden, 2005). But also beyond accounting, PM is
a highly relevant research issue (for the public sector, Bouckaert &
Halligan, 2008; for the private sector, Neely, Gregory, & Platts, 1995).
Because of fundamental differences between the private and public sector it
 Commonalities and Differences in Public and Private Sector PM Practices 311

can be assumed that PM practices in these sectors will differ to some

extent. However, cross-sector research about PM practices is so far rather
limited, probably because of strong barriers between public and private sec-
tor management research (Andrews & Esteve, 2015). With our review we
intend to bridge the largely separate domains of public and private sector
performance management research.
Our goal is to explore the commonalities and differences in PM practices
between the public and private sector, as shown by publications in interna-
tional academic journals. A comparative study of PM in the two sectors is
relevant both from a theoretical and practical point of view. Theoretically
it is important to explore in what respects PM practices in the public and
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private sector differ, for example by explaining that the market orientation of
private sector organisations gives rise to other types of performance indica-
tors and other types of PM use than public sector organisations with their
focus on public service delivery and multiple stakeholders (cf. Brignall &
Modell, 2000). From a practical stance our review can point to issues of
mutual learning from experiences in both sectors. Strategically informed
performance management systems, for instance, will probably be more
developed in the private sector and research results about this phenomenon
may be an inspiration for the further development of such systems in the
public sector.
The chapter will proceed as follows. The next section explores the
differences between the public and private sector and the expected impli-
cations for PM in both sectors. The subsequent section introduces the
review design. Thereafter two sections follow, which respectively present
the findings of the review, and the conclusions and discussion of
these findings.

EXPLORING THE PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT

IMPLICATIONS OF PUBLIC-PRIVATE DIFFERENCES
Dimensions of Public-Private Differences

The academic debate on the public/private distinctions is endless and follows

quite different perspectives (Pesch, 2008). In their seminal article about
public and private organisations Perry and Rainey (1988) investigate various
aspects of the public/private differences coming from organisation theory,
economics and political sciences (see also Andrews, Boyne, & Walker, 2011;
 312 JAN VAN HELDEN AND CHRISTOPH REICHARD

Boyne, 2002; Hvidman & Andersen, 2013; Rainey & Bozeman, 2000). They
conclude that theoretically three dimensions are important. First, ownership:
public organisations are (at least partly) owned by government and their
ownership rights cannot be easily transferred among entities, which gives
rise to diffused risks, while private organisations are owned by shareholders,
who can easily transfer their property rights and thus are subject to clear
risks. Second, funding: public organisations are largely funded by taxes,
without a link between resource generation and resource consumption, while
this link is present in private organisations, which are funded by the revenues
earned by selling goods to the market. And third, control: public organisa-
tions are subject to polyarchy, which refers to control by multiple stake-
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holders (e.g. politicians and bureaucrats) at different levels of a politically

constituted hierarchy where control is mainly executed through rules
and directives. In contrast, private organisations are controlled by the
market, via selling goods and receiving sales revenues. Additionally, the
owners (shareholders) conduct strict control to ensure their shareholder
value. Ownership, funding and control as the demarcating characteris-
tics of public and private organisations are called the ‘dimensions of
publicness’, which emphasise that rather than a dichotomy between these
two types of organisations, there are varying extents of differences (see
Bozeman, 1987).
Perry and Rainey’s distinction between public and private organisations
is, however, not undisputed. Meier and O’Toole (2011), for example, assert
that the differences according to ownership, funding and control are often
mutually inconsistent. Consequently, organisations may be public on one
criterion (e.g. a public utility is owned by government) but private on other
criteria (in this case market funded and partly market controlled). That is
why these authors propose to make a distinction at a higher level of
abstraction, that is whether or not the organisation has a public purpose
(see the additional criterion of goal dissimilarities below).
Given that ownership, funding and control are seen as dimensions that
demarcate the private and public sector, their implications for managerial
issues have also been researched. Boyne (2002, pp. 99 103), for example,
reviews the literature on the relationships of these publicness dimensions
on organisational environment (such as complexity), organisational goals
(like multiplicity and vagueness), organisational structures (such as less
managerial autonomy and more bureaucracy) and managerial values
(such as the public service motivation). He only found some support
for more bureaucracy, lower managerial autonomy and less materialistic
 Commonalities and Differences in Public and Private Sector PM Practices 313

values of public managers. However, Boyne admits that his findings are
not conclusive, because the reviewed studies are suffering from con-
straints, such as an overrepresentation of US studies, a focus on owner-
ship (leaving funding and control aside) and an ignorance of control
variables. In addition, Andrews et al. (2011) examined the impact of the
public-private dimensions ownership, funding and control on organisa-
tional performance in terms of effectiveness, efficiency and equity. They
conclude that there is in general no clear evidence about these impacts
with the exception of some proof of public ownership affecting equity and
funding affecting efficiency.
We would like to suggest the types of goals in relation with the types of
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goods produced as an additionally relevant dimension, because it is not

covered by the above indicated dimensions (pointers for this dimension
can also be found in Bozeman & Bretschneider, 1994; Meier & O’Toole,
2011; Pesch, 2008). Public and private organisations differ fundamentally
with respect to their dominant goals. Public organisations as part of the
government system are focused on the ‘public interest’, on policy-related
goals and on accomplishing public welfare. Although they also have
to follow financial and efficiency-related targets (e.g. to balance revenues
and expenses), effectiveness in the sense of achieving policy outcomes
is generally their dominant aim. In contrast, for the private sector
profitable product or service delivery will be core.

Classifying Performance Management

In order to link differences between the public and private sector to PM

practices we will use two different sources for classifying such practices. The
first relates to the stages in the lifecycle of performance management, which
include design, implementation, use and assessment/evaluation (Johnsen,
2005; van Helden, Johnsen, & Vakkuri, 2012). In our review, we will concen-
trate on the two most important stages, which are PM design and use:

1. In the design stage, important decisions about the purposes, concept, pro-
cedures and tools of the Performance Management System (PMS) are
made. The concept of a PMS depends on its purpose (e.g. for budgeting,
internal steering or for rendering accountability) and will consequently be
designed accordingly. This will result in the linkage between the goals
of the organisation and performance indicators, in the respective types
 314 JAN VAN HELDEN AND CHRISTOPH REICHARD

(financial and non-financial) and in the number of performance indica-

tors. The application of certain PM frameworks, such as the Balanced
Scorecard (Kaplan & Norton, 1992) or the Performance Pyramid
(Lynch & Cross, 1991) is also part of the design stage.
2. In the use stage, the intensity and the way in which decision makers are
using performance information (PI) are relevant, for instance their style
of use (e.g. by using accounting numbers in a more rigid or flexible way;
Ter Bogt, 2003), and whether their use is mainly functional/rational or
symbolic (Modell, 2009).

The second classification is based on a PM framework developed by

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Otley (1999, pp. 365 366) which has been used for structuring PM practices
(see also Stringer, 2007). This framework aims to integrate elements of
management and strategic control, wishes to broaden the organisational
goals beyond financials and claims to be holistic by highlighting the intercon-
nections between components. Otley’s framework (1999) distinguishes five
issues:1 (1) The objectives of the organisation; (2) The strategies and plans of
the organisation, including the way in which the related performances
are measured; (3) The target levels for the identified performance indicators;
(4) The rewards and penalties connected to the targeted performance levels;
(5) The information flows which enable learning from experience.
Our framework largely follows Otley’s framework, but we made two
adaptations. First, Otley’s fifth issue was disregarded because we see no
reasons for expecting differences between the public and private sector
concerning the information flows which enable learning. Second, we
included another fifth issue that addresses the way in which the PMS is
used, and which is derived from the public sector framework distinction
between design and use as its main stages (see above). Our framework com-
prises the following five issues:

1. The variety and types of goals which shape the performance manage-
ment system (design stage)
2. The extent to which the performance management system is strategy-
linked (design stage)
3. The target levels for the identified performance indicators (design stage)
4. The rewards for achieving the targeted performance levels (design and
use stage)
5. The type of use of performance information, especially its intensity and
functionality (use stage).
 Commonalities and Differences in Public and Private Sector PM Practices 315

Expected Performance Management Implications of

Public-Private Differences

Table 1 provides the expected linkages between the characteristics of public

and private sector organisations and performance management design and
use. It indicates that ownership differences between public and private sector
organisations are primarily an issue of varying ownership structures. While a
private firm usually has clear structures with shareholders as the dominant
group of actors and with prevailing financial interests, a public sector organi-
sation (PSO) is far more dispersed in its ownership structures and in its inter-
ests. This will result in unambiguous and clear goals in the private sector and
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in quite complex, often diverging and ambiguous goals in the public sector.
The implication for PM design is that a public sector PMS is more
complex than private sector systems. The clarity and unambiguousness of
profit-oriented goals in the private sector gives also rise to the expectation
that the PMS will be explicitly strategy-linked. In contrast, the expectation
for PSOs is that conflicts between multiple goals and a lack of goal clarity
may lead to a diffuse link between strategies and the PMS. The assumption
for the use stage is that PI is used in public sector organisations less inten-
sively, more accountability-oriented and in a more symbolic way due to
partly conflicting goals and a low involvement of stakeholders. In contrast,
a much higher stakeholder involvement is expected to contribute to a more
intensive and rational/functional information use in private sector organi-
sations (Brignall & Modell, 2000).
With regard to the dimension of goals, public and private organisations
are also differing remarkably. For PSOs effectiveness in the sense of achiev-
ing policy outcomes is generally the dominant goal, while for the private
sector profitable product or service delivery can be considered as the main
goal. These goal differences are expected to be reflected in the design and
use stage of a PMS. In addition, targeting and pay for performance systems
will be more developed in the private than the public sector, because
the goal-related performance indicators are relatively easier to measure in
the private than the public sector.
The public-private differences with regard to the funding dimension add
to the above presented PM-implications. Targeting and performance-based
rewarding are expected to be more developed in the private than the
public sector, because of stronger and more univocal external pressures and
of financial incentives. This reason also reinforces the above addressed
implication of ownership on PI use.
 Table 1. The Expected Implications of the Four Dimensions of Public/Private Differences

316
for Performance Management Design and Use Issues.
Dimensions Characteristics of the Implications for Performance Management Characteristics of the
Public Sector Private Sector
Public Private

Ownership Government as owner, Complex design to serve many Focused design with emphasis on Few or multiple owners
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dispersed ownership stakeholders financial aspects with mainly financial

rights and Link between strategy and PMS Link between strategy and PMS design interests, goal clarity
consequently diverging design diffuse and weak clear and strong
interests, lack of Use not intensive, mainly for Use intensive, mainly for steering and

JAN VAN HELDEN AND CHRISTOPH REICHARD

goal clarity accountability; partly symbolic controlling; mostly functional
Goals Effectiveness is main goal Performance indicators focus on Performance indicators focus on total Profitable service
societally relevant activities or profit or profit margins per product; delivery is main goal
services; poor measurability of good measurability of performance
performance
Performance-based pay systems more Performance-based pay systems more
difficult due to low measurability developed because outcomes are
of outcomes easier to measure
Funding Funding detached from Low pressure on operations High pressure on operations Funding through the
service delivery Targeting and performance-based Targeting and performance-based market
(tax revenues) reward systems weakly developed reward systems strongly developed (sales revenues)
Less intensive and mainly Intensive and mainly functional use
symbolic use
Control Control by multiple Complex design to serve diverging Focused design to serve Control by the market
stakeholders at stakeholder interests shareholder interests and by shareholders,
different layers, Targeting and performance-based Targeting and performance-based strong incentives
weak incentives reward systems weakly developed reward systems strongly developed
Use not intensive, mainly for Intensive use; use mainly functional
accountability; partly symbolic and for control

Table developed by the authors.

 Commonalities and Differences in Public and Private Sector PM Practices 317

Finally, the mode of control has some impact: because control in the
public sector has to serve multiple stakeholders and the related incentives
are rather weak, PM design is expected to be more complex than in the pri-
vate sector with its dominant group of shareholders. This again reinforces
the earlier indicated PM implication of the ownership dimension. In addi-
tion, the mode of control will be relatively more ‘hard’ in the private sector
and more ‘soft’ in the public sector. Hence, PI use will be more directed
at tight control or lose control/accountability respectively. For the same
reason, performance-related reward systems will be more important in the
private than the public sector.
Table 1 reveals that some of the public-private sector dimensions have
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similar impacts on PM. Both the ownership and the control dimension are
expected to lead to a complex PMS in the public sector and a simpler and
financially focused PMS in the private sector. In addition, the ownership,
funding and control dimensions give rise to less intensive and partly sym-
bolic PI use in the public sector and to more intensive as well as functional
use in the private sector.

REVIEW DESIGN
The literature review is based on the careful and detailed analysis of altogether
100 articles published in international peer-reviewed journals during the
period 1995 2014 (see Tranfield, Denyer, & Smart, 2003, for details on sys-
tematic reviewing). We selected articles offering sufficient empirical evidence
about PM; reflective papers or literature reviews were not included. We con-
centrated on more general issues of PM, disregarding specific issues in areas
like Information Technology or Human Resource Management. The selected
100 articles were 50 50 split between a public and private sector focus.
In order to test the outcome of the search procedure and the validity of
our assumptions, we undertook at first an exploratory search step. In this
stage, we selected 30 articles from Google Scholar. These 30 articles are part
of the total volume of 100 reviewed articles. The list was composed according
to quotation numbers by following the search term ‘performance manage-
ment’ and by indicating the search period 1995 2014. We choose this selec-
tion procedure as it covers a broad set of scientific journals, coming from
accounting, management, public administration and public management.
The findings of the exploratory review generally indicate that public and
private sector PM practices seem to be less different than originally assumed.
Consequently, we adjusted our original assumptions. In the next stage we
 318 JAN VAN HELDEN AND CHRISTOPH REICHARD

selected the subsequent 50 papers from the Web of Science data base,
because we considered the Web of Science as more reliable in identifying
academic articles (similar search terms and selection criteria were used as
in the first stage). In order to compare the review findings over time, we
decided to split the total search period 1995 2014 into four equal time slots.
The two above indicated stages of our search for relevant papers failed
to provide sufficient evidence about PI use. Therefore, we decided to
arrange a third and final stage in our search for papers, which exclusively
focused on PI use or equivalent search terms. This stage comprised
20 papers, which were selected from international top journals in public
administration and accounting.
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The Appendix presents the categorisations of these papers according to

the PM issues, as summarised in Table 1.

FINDINGS
This section presents the findings of our review. Empirical findings about
targeting are in both sectors so scarce that we cannot present sufficient
findings, leaving this issue for future investigations. Furthermore, our
intention to identify changes of PM practices over time in the reviewed arti-
cles did not lead to clear results. The presented evidence with regard to our
assumptions did not significantly differ across the four time slots.

Multi-Dimensionality or Financial Focus of the PMS Design

Our first assumption is that, although both public and private sector orga-
nisations are designing their PMS as a multidimensional system, private
organisations have a stronger focus on financial issues than PSOs. Our ori-
ginal assumption, based on the arguments summarised in Table 1, was that
multi-dimensionality of the PMS is expected to be found in the public
sector, while the PMS in the private sector would be financially oriented,
but a more nuanced assumption became apparent from our exploratory
review (see the section ‘Review Design’).

Public Sector
Not surprisingly all articles addressing this issue indicate a broad multi-
dimensionality of the established PMS. These PMSs are designed to collect
data concerning a multifaceted profile of ‘performance’, covering inputs,
 Commonalities and Differences in Public and Private Sector PM Practices 319

physical outputs, quality and outcomes (Amirkhanyan, 2010; Herranz,

2010; Holzer & Yang, 2004; Jennings & Hall, 2012; Kelly & Swindell,
2002; Kopczynski & Lombardo, 1999; McAdam, Hazlett, & Casey, 2005;
Moynihan, 2006; Osborne, Bovaird, Martin, Tricker & Waterston, 1995;
Verbeeten, 2008). Effectiveness in the sense of achieving certain policy out-
comes is in fact at the core of a public PMS. Several articles based on large
scale surveys confirm this picture (Berman & Wang, 2000; Julnes & Holzer,
2001; Kroll, 2014; Laegreid, Roness, & Rubecksen, 2006; Melkers &
Willoughby, 2005; Moynihan & Hawes, 2012). The majority of empirical
studies provides evidence from the local level, but there is also sufficient
evidence from the national und subnational level (Hyndman & Anderson,
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1998; Melkers & Willoughby, 1998). The presented results indicate that gov-
ernment organisations in fact have established PMSs which are designed to
inform regularly about various facets of organisational performance and par-
ticularly of accomplishing certain policy effects. Only few articles mostly
based on case studies indicate that financial targets are of greater rele-
vance, particularly in countries under a strong NPM-regime like the United
Kingdom (Hyndman & Anderson, 1995, 1998).
The following examples illustrate particularities of the multi-dimensionality
issue. Kloot and Martin (2000), for instance, found that Australian municipa-
lities developed performance indicators which can be related to the well-
known Balanced Scorecard perspectives, but that performance indicators in
the dimension of learning and innovation were largely absent. Laegreid et al.
(2006) showed that central government agencies in Norway focused their per-
formance indicators on inputs, activities and quantitative results (outputs),
while qualitative results and particularly societal effects seemed to be less rele-
vant. Finally, those studies which deal with policy-related PMSs indicate that
the applied performance indicators are covering not only various output and
outcome categories but also the costs of programme execution (Barnow,
2000; Heinrich, 1999, 2002).

Private Sector
Our review shows that many private sector papers (35 out of 50) address a
multidimensional PMS, but there is diverging evidence about the impor-
tance of financial indicators in the PMS. Eight papers explicitly confirm the
importance of financial indicators in the PMS. Kald and Nilsson (2000)
conducted a survey among business units of large private sector companies
in the Nordic countries. They found that financial measures were the most
important (e.g. profitability, cost effectiveness), followed by measures
of quality and service delivery, while measures of product development
 320 JAN VAN HELDEN AND CHRISTOPH REICHARD

and employee competences were the least important (see also Hudson,
Smart, & Bourne, 2000; Robinson, Sikes, & Weaver, 2010). In his survey
among manufacturing firms in Canada, Gosselin (2005) even found that
manufacturing firms continued to use financial performance measures, irre-
spective of recommendations from experts and academics to adopt
balanced scorecard or other types of integrated PMSs. Some other papers
more specifically address the relevance of certain financial performance
indicators. Bouwens and Van Lent (2007) found that accounting return
measures create proper incentives for managers with greater authority,
while disaggregated and nonfinancial measures are employed in response to
interdependencies among organisation units (see also Keating, 1997).
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Eight other papers also seem to support our assumption., They address
pyramidically structured PMSs in which often financial indicators are at
the top and other types of PIs at lower levels (Bhagwat & Sharma, 2007;
Björklund, Martinsen, & Abrahamsson, 2012; Homburg, Artz, & Wieseke,
2012; Kerssens-van Drongelen & Bilderbeek, 1999; Lockamy & Spencer,
1998; O’Sullivan & Abela, 2007; Rangone, 1996; Saranga & Moser, 2010).
However, there are also 14 papers that point to the importance of the
multi-dimensionality in the PMS, particularly by indicating that it contributes
to better organisational or managerial performance, which is not in accor-
dance with our expectations. Ittner, Larcker, and Randall (2003), for
instance, found that firms in the US financial sector, which are making more
extensive use of a broad set of financial and (particularly) non-financial
measures than other firms have higher measurement system satisfaction and
stock market returns. In a similar vein, Fawcett and Cooper (1998) showed
that higher performing firms in the logistics function in the United States and
Europe had more information available and placed greater emphasis on a
broad-based set of performance measures. de Leeuw and van den Berg (2011)
surveyed shop floor managers in production and distribution in the
Netherlands and found that there is a positive correlation between the num-
ber of performance management practices applied and performance improve-
ment, suggesting that it is not only which practices are applied but also how
many. There is also supporting evidence from case study research about the
importance of a multidimensional PMS in private firms (Kueng, 2000;
Lohman, Fortuin, & Wouters, 2004; Tadeu, de Oliveira, Ensslin, & Ensslin,
2011), as well as from experimental research (Tayler, 2010).
We thus see that the PMS in many private sector companies is multidimen-
sional, but there is also some evidence that the financial focus is particularly
relevant, either in the extent to which financial performance indicators are
seen as the most important, or because the top of a pyramidically structured
PMS is mostly financially orientated. However, there is also contesting
 Commonalities and Differences in Public and Private Sector PM Practices 321

evidence that in some studies the multi-dimensionality of the PMS is high-

lighted without giving specific attention to financials.

Comparison between Public and Private Sector

Our first assumption receives substantial support. Multi-dimensionality is in
fact a common feature in both the public and the private sector. Pure finan-
cially oriented PMSs are rare in private firms. Also as a result of experiences
with Balanced Scorecards, most corporations have tried to establish a PMS
with several dimensions. We also found that financials are more relevant for
top management level (so at the top of pyramidically structured PMSs) while
other dimensions of performance are more relevant at lower levels. In addition
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we have to acknowledge that the predominantly financial orientation of exter-

nal accounting systems in the private sector gives some room for a (partly)
non-financial focus in the PMS. And we finally can confirm that public sector
PMSs show a quite colourful picture of various performance dimensions,
from inputs, processes via quality issues to impacts and outcomes. Most
PMSs are clearly focused on the effectiveness of achieving policy objectives.

The Importance of Strategy in the PMS Design

Our second assumption is that PSOs are putting less importance in the
design of their PMS to link it to strategies than private firms do. Also this
assumption is less stringent than originally formulated; based on Table 1, a
diffuse and weak strategy-PSM link was assumed for the public sector and
a clear and strong link for the private sector, but the exploratory review
(see the section ‘Review Design’) gave rise to a more nuanced expectation.

Public Sector
In contrast to our expectation, there is more evidence for a quite direct link
between organisational strategies and the design of a PMS which also indi-
cates that the focus at strategic issues seems to be important for public man-
agers in the context of performance management. Eighteen of the reviewed
articles point to a more direct link between strategies and PMS, only five
articles observe a more diffuse or loose linkage between the two aspects.
However, the evidence of strategy orientation is pretty limited, because 54%
of all public sector articles don’t deal explicitly with this issue which limits
the informational value of the results. Several survey-based studies of perfor-
mance management emphasise that PMSs are considered as an important
tool for supporting strategic management (Melkers & Willoughby, 1998;
 322 JAN VAN HELDEN AND CHRISTOPH REICHARD

Poister & Streib, 1999; Walker, Damanpour, & Devece, 2011). In the public
sector, the strategy issue is often narrowly related to policies. Particularly at
the national level the overall aim of government activities is to accomplish
certain policy goals, for example in environmental, social or economic poli-
cies. Hence, governments establish a PMS to monitor the performance of
implemented policies, that is the operation of a welfare or health pro-
gramme, but also to evaluate the effects of such processes for the intended
target groups. Some of the selected articles deal with performance manage-
ment in such specific cases of policy programs (Barnow, 2000; Heinrich,
2002), where the strategy focus of the PMS is usually quite clear and obvious.
Only few papers provide some evidence of a more diffuse or underdeveloped
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link between PMS and strategies (Laegreid et al., 2006; Pollitt, 2006).
Generally, the drawn picture of a more or less clear strategic focus of perfor-
mance management may be a bit too positive in PSOs. Strategic planning and
management apart from policy formulation is still often somewhat ‘above
the clouds’ in many PSOs and the difficulties to link highly operative and rou-
tinely performance figures with more or less detached missions and strategies
are not easy to overcome (Poister & Streib, 2005).

Private Sector
The link between the firm’s strategy and the design of the PMS is important
in the reviewed papers; 35 out of 50 papers are addressing this issue, some
as one of the design principles in addition to others, but there are also
papers for which the strategy-PMS link is core. We concentrate on the
latter groups of papers in this section.
Based on a survey of strategic business units of industrial organisations
in Australia, Chenhall (2005) found support for the assertion that a
strategy-linked PMS will lead to better organisational outcomes. In his
study of Canadian manufacturing firms Gosselin (2005) found that a
defender strategy often leads to a neglect of customer and sales measures,
while a prospector strategy leads to a more frequent inclusion of employee
measures. Supporting evidence for the importance of the firm’s strategy
in designing a PMS comes from other, mainly case study research
(Atkinson, Waterhouse, & Wells, 1997; Bititci, Turner, & Begemann,
2000; Björklund et al., 2012; Flapper, Fortuin, & Stoop, 1996; de Haas &
Kleingeld, 1999; Rangone, 1996; Van Veen-Dirks, 2010).
There is also research about the reverse link between strategy and the
PMS, indicating that the way in which the PMS is used impacts the formu-
lation or re-formulation of the firm’s strategy. Henri (2006b), for instance,
examined the impact of different types of PMS use on capabilities for
 Commonalities and Differences in Public and Private Sector PM Practices 323

strategic choices. His study about manufacturing firms and business units
in Canada found that an interactive use of PMS fosters the capabilities for
selecting strategic priorities and stimulating dialogue, while the diagnostic
use of PMS exerts negative pressure on these capabilities by creating con-
straints to ensure compliance with orders.
In addition, some studies highlight the complexities in linking the com-
pany’s strategy to the PMS. Bourne, Mils, Wilcox, Neely, and Platts (2000)
examined the adoption of a PMS in a field study of mid-size companies in the
United Kingdom and found that an insufficiently concrete strategy was a main
factor for a failing PMS. Bhagwat and Sharma’s (2007) case study research of
mid-size companies in India suggests that finding causal relationships between
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performance measures and the translation of long-term goals into adequate

performance measures were often hindrances for finding a link between strat-
egy and PMS (see similarly Artz, Homburg, & Rajab, 2012; Forslund &
Jonsson, 2007; Harrison & New, 2002; Hudson et al., 2000; Lillis, 2002).
In general three observations can be made. First, the firm’s strategy is a
main driver for the design of a PMS. Second, there is also a reverse link,
which indicates that the way in which the PMS is used can impact the
firm’s strategy. Finally, difficulties are highlighted in developing strategi-
cally relevant performance indicators, particularly due to an insufficiently
clearly formulated strategy.

Comparison between Public and Private Sector

Our second assumption can be confirmed with regard to the private sector, but
the public sector findings are more ambiguous than expected. The link between
an existing corporate strategy and the established PMS is usually quite strin-
gent and clear in the private sector, which corroborates our expectations. The
interrelations go in both directions: strategy impacts on the composition of the
PMS but also the other way round: certain performance data re-affects existing
strategies and contributes to their adjustment. Interestingly, the link between
strategies and PMSs in the public sector is stronger than expected, which is
particularly the case at the local level but also in central government agencies
responsible for specific policies. However, public sector evidence does not give
many pointers for links between specific strategies and the PMS.

The Importance of Performance-Based Reward System

At third, we assume that performance-based reward systems are less devel-

oped in PSOs than in private firms (derived from Table 1).
 324 JAN VAN HELDEN AND CHRISTOPH REICHARD

Public Sector
The reviewed articles don’t provide much evidence about the role of mone-
tary rewards in the context of performance management. About three quar-
ters of the articles do not deal with this issue at all. This may be seen as an
indication that such reward concepts are not very relevant in the public
sector. However, among the 13 articles addressing the reward issue, a
majority of nine papers assesses existing performance-related reward sys-
tems as quite developed. Poister and Streib (1999) for instance emphasise a
strong impact of performance measures on performance pay for employees.
In a quite critical assessment of performance management practices in the
area of social services in Florida, Soss, Fording, and Schram (2011)
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describe a strongly developed system of performance pay for well-perform-

ing service providers and identify several critical effects of it (e.g. gaming
and data manipulation). Similar performance bonuses play a role in other
social policy programs in the United States, for example to reward private
service providers in the federal Job Training Partnership Act for excellent
performance (Heinrich, 1999). Finally, Kelman and Friedman (2009) pre-
sent a specific case where attractive monetary rewards are promised for
extraordinary performance (short waiting time for emergency patients in
English hospitals) and where they do not observe quality reductions or other
unexpected side effects. By summarising the results concerning our third
assumption, we can say that performance management initiatives in the
public sector are not frequently coupled with monetary reward systems.
This tendency has to be judged in the context of general experiences with
performance-related pay (PRP) in the public sector. Although PRP became
more attractive and fashionable in the government sphere during the NPM-
reforms, there is widespread experience and evidence about its limitations.
PRP does only work under quite restrictive conditions which rarely apply in
practice (OECD, 2005; Weibel, Rost, & Osterloh, 2010). A more cautious
linkage of performance management and PRP is therefore advisable.

Private Sector
Also with regard to private corporations there is limited evidence about
performance-based rewarding in the reviewed papers. In six papers this
theme is core to the research, and an additional five papers suggest that
performance-based pay systems are not used.
Some studies provide evidence for the importance of performance-
related pay (PRP) systems, at least under certain conditions. Moers (2006),
for instance, found that the higher the quality of overall financial measures
(such as ROI), the better the delegation problem can be solved by using
 Commonalities and Differences in Public and Private Sector PM Practices 325

these measures for incentivising agents. Bouwens and van Lent (2007)
showed that accounting return measures are used to create the proper
incentives for managers with greater authority, while disaggregated and
nonfinancial measures are employed in response to interdependencies.
However, some other studies are more sceptical about performance-
related pay systems. Van Veen-Dirks (2010) found that more importance is
attached to both financial and non-financial performance measures for the
periodic evaluation than for variable rewards. Ittner, Larcker, and Meyer
(2003) were even more critical in their study about a balanced scorecard
bonus plan adopted by a major financial services firm in the United States.
This study found that there was much subjectivity in the scorecard-based
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rewarding, which allowed superiors, among others, to place most of the

weight on financial measures, to incorporate factors other than the score-
card measures and to change evaluation criteria from quarter to quarter.
Some other papers adopted a more specific focus. Maas and van
Rinsum (2013) found that participants in an experimental setting are
more likely to overstate their performance for rewarding purposes if this
increases the monetary payoff of their peers. So, dishonesty is mitigated
when it negatively impacts the bonuses that peers get. Scott and Tiessen
(1999) examined performance measurement and managerial teams in
Canadian private and public firms and found among others that team per-
formance is enhanced when team performance is given a greater weight in
compensation.
There are also some papers which indicate that PRP-systems are not
developed or, when developed, not used. A survey about R&D managers
shows, for example, that rather than PRP-systems, more traditional reward
systems based on seniority were used (Kerssens-van Drongelen &
Bilderbeek, 1999); similar findings were noted in a Scandinavian study by
Kald and Nilsson (2000), in a Dutch study (de Leeuw & van den Berg, 2011)
and in a study about three Indian companies (Bhagwat & Sharma, 2007).
All in all we see that the evidence about PRP-systems is limited and
ambiguous: only 11 out of 50 papers address this issue and come to contra-
dictory findings.

Comparison between Public and Private Sector

We don’t have a clear and definite result with regard to our third assump-
tion. On the public side we can confirm it: monetary rewards are indeed
not very relevant in connection with a PMS. The results of the private
sector are ambiguous and the existing evidence is limited. We see a need for
further research.
 326 JAN VAN HELDEN AND CHRISTOPH REICHARD

The Purpose, Type and Intensity of Use of Performance Information

Fourthly, we assume that PSOs are using PI more for accountability pur-
poses, while private firms use it mainly for control purposes. Additionally,
we assume that PSOs are using PI not very intensively and often only for
symbolic reasons. In contrast, private organisations use PI more intensively
and also in a more functional way. These assumptions are based on the
arguments as summarised in Table 1.

Public Sector
Although only some articles deal explicitly with the purposes of PI use,
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there are indeed some indications that external control and rendering
accountability are relevant in the public sector, for example in connection
to political bodies, to oversight authorities or to citizens (Barnow, 2000;
Hyndman & Anderson, 1995; Moynihan & Pandey, 2010; Saliterer &
Korac, 2013; Soss et al., 2011). This is in line with our expectations and it
seems plausible: PSOs are part of the political-administrative system and
an element of often complex accountability chains. Accountability towards
democratically legitimised authorities and lastly towards citizens is an
important obligation of a PSO (Bovens, Goodin, & Schillemans, 2014).
Hence, performance measures should contribute to render accountability
(Moynihan & Hawes, 2012, p. 96). On the other side, several articles empha-
sise internal decision-making and control as main purposes of PMSs (Askim,
2007; Julnes & Holzer, 2001; Poister & Streib, 1999; Taylor, 2011). In the
period of ambitious (new) public management reforms, such a purpose of
performance management was certainly appropriate, even if the opportunities
to measure performance were limited and the sometimes contradictory and
soft control mechanisms of multiple stakeholders hindered such controls.
The review results, however, do not confirm our expectations concerning
type and intensity of PI use. There is quite some evidence that the intensity
of PI use in PSOs is comparatively high and that the type of PI use can be
classified as more functional (e.g. the following survey-based articles:
Askim, 2007; Kroll, 2014; Melkers & Willoughby, 2005; Poister & Streib,
1999; Streib & Poister, 1999; Walker et al., 2011; see also Ammons &
Rivenbark, 2008; Micheli & Neely, 2010; Modell, 2001; contrasting evi-
dence comes from McKevitt & Lawton, 1995; Wang & Berman, 2000).
There is also evidence that the intensity of use much depends on the type of
use, wherein rational or purposeful use is related to higher intensity of use
(Cave, Hanney, & Henkel, 1995; Greitens & Ernita, 2010; Moynihan &
Lavertu, 2012; Moynihan, Pandey, & Wright, 2012; Speklé & Verbeeten,
 Commonalities and Differences in Public and Private Sector PM Practices 327

2014). Another issue of the reviewed research are different categories of PI

users. Apart from managers, the specific user interests of politicians have
found considerable interest. Here, the results are ambiguous: while some
authors found that politicians are quite interested in using PI (Askim, 2007;
Saliterer & Korac, 2013), others came to opposite observations (Ter Bogt,
2004). At large, the whole issue of PI use is highly complex, as various fac-
tors are influencing the type and intensity of PI use within a PSO (e.g. tasks,
structures, culture, leadership, individual features of the users etc.; Kroll,
2014; Saliterer & Korac, 2013; Ter Bogt, 2004). PI use is also beyond our
review one of the major research topics in actual public management
research. After dealing with the design and the implementation of PMSs,
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the focus of attention has moved towards the practice and use of the PMS
(Grossi, Reichard, & Ruggiero, 2016; Moynihan & Pandey, 2010; Raudla,
2012; Van Dooren & Van de Walle, 2008; van Helden & Reichard, 2013).

Private Sector
The use of PI is a far less addressed theme than its design; it is core in only
15 out of 50 papers. It is striking that many private sector papers do not
explicitly study PI use, but link design characteristics, mediated through
certain contingencies, to managerial or organisational performance (such
as Bourne, Neely, Platts, & Mills, 2002; Hall, 2008, 2011; Homburg et al.,
2012; Hudson et al., 2000; Kerssens-van Drongelen & Cook, 1997;
O’Sullivan & Abela, 2007; Scott & Tiessen, 1999).
The type of PI use is core in several studies, although there is not much
coherence (e.g. feedback vs. feedforward control or evaluation vs. rewarding,
or coercive vs. enabling; cf. Grafton, Lillis, & Widener, 2010; Henri, 2006b;
Van Veen-Dirks, 2010; Wouters & Wilderom, 2008). In addition, some stu-
dies are concerned with the impact of culture and leadership style on PI use
(cf. Bititci, Mendibil, Nudurupati, Garengo, & Turner, 2006; Henri, 2006a;
Jansen, 2011). Some other studies focus on the impact of financial PI on
short-term versus long-term orientation and delegation opportunities.
Abernethy, Bouwens, and van Lent (2013) found that the use of accounting
return measures contributes to a more long-term focus. Moers (2006) found
that the use of high quality financial measures contributes to delegation of
decision rights to lower layers in the organisation (Bouwens & van Lent,
2007, presented similar findings). There are also studies that point to the user
impact of the quality of performance indicators or the way they are presented
(cf. Cardinaels & van Veen-Dirks, 2010; Jordan & Messner, 2012).
The overall conclusion is that PI use in private firms is primarily for con-
trol and not for accountability purposes, which supports our assumption.
 328 JAN VAN HELDEN AND CHRISTOPH REICHARD

However, the findings indicate that control is a too broad construct,

because the reviewed studies indicate a more sophisticated spectrum of
types of use, such as interactive versus diagnostic; decision-facilitating
versus feedback and feedforward; coercive versus enabling and evaluation
versus rewarding use. These diverging types of use can be dependent
upon various contingencies, such as strategy, culture and leadership style.
The issue of either symbolic or functional PI use does not play a role in
private sector performance management research. Generally, the PMS is
perceived as being functional, which is indicative in about 60% of the private
sector papers (see Williams & Seaman, 2002). Evidence about the intensity
of PI use is not always available, but if so (in about half of the private sector
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papers), intensity of use is high. This all corroborates our assumption.

Comparison between Public and Private Sector

We can partly confirm our fourth assumption. PI is used in PSOs primarily
for external accountability reasons, while in private firms it is predomi-
nantly used for internal managerial control. However, in contrast to our
expectation, PI use is similarly intensive and functional in the public sector
as in private firms.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

Our research aim was to study whether the general differences between
public and private sector organisations can be re-identified in the area of
performance measurement and management. Our assumption was that
these differences would be mirrored in this specific area. However, our
comprehensive literature review of 100 articles is confirming our expecta-
tions only to some extent. While we found some support for our first two
assumptions, the other two assumptions could only be partly confirmed
and to some extent the results were ambiguous. Generally, we can say that
public and private PM are as assumed diverging in some respects, but
the differences are less strict and obvious than expected. We may therefore
ask whether the general public/private differences are indeed as distinct and
unambiguous as assumed in prior debates. If we shortly go back to the
initial debate on these differences (e.g. to the presented four dimensions
in the section ‘Exploring the Performance Management Implications of
Public-Private Differences’) and take notice of the more recent empirical
literature about such differences (Andrews et al., 2011; Boyne, 2002), there
are arguments that these differences are less obvious and not very striking.
 Commonalities and Differences in Public and Private Sector PM Practices 329

The reality of public and private organisations is much more complex

and diverse than assumed in the quite fundamental theoretical and ideal
type-based assumptions about public/private distinctions. Particularly in
the wide-ranging public sector the degree of ‘publicness’ of organisations is
remarkably varying (Antonsen & Jørgensen, 1997). Furthermore, with the
NPM-reforms of the two last decades, public organisations have
converged at least with regard to their management styles to some
extent to private organisations. Thus, differences between both sectors
have decreased.
The observed moderate divergences of PM between public and private
sector organisations can be justified from different theoretical backgrounds.
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The limited differences of the PMS design with regard to the underlying
performance focus are the result of the following developments in both
sectors. Despite the still strong role of the shareholder value, it is widely
accepted in private sector management that successful (performance) man-
agement needs to focus on multiple goals and dimensions. Not the least
with the success of the Balanced Scorecard, the multi-dimensionality of PM
became a widely accepted practice in private management. Consequently,
private PM became more multidimensional over time. On the other side,
efficiency orientation and of cost consciousness became increasingly impor-
tant in the public sector in the last two decades. This happened primarily
because of the strong and permanent fiscal pressure on most government
institutions. Additionally the strengthening of financial transparency of
PSOs as a result of new accounting and reporting concepts and of bench-
marking exercises contributed to this change. Government organisations in
several countries came under pressure to submit regularly PI to the public,
for example in connection with publicly accessible benchmarking circles or
league tables. Furthermore, the diffusion of PM in the public sector was
stimulated because governments often established mandatory PMSs to
force their agencies or municipalities to report regularly about certain key
performance indicators (e.g. in the United Kingdom or Australia).
Our findings may also give rise to a more fundamental reflection about
the performance management implications of differences between the
public and private sector. First, the multi-dimensionality of the PMS seems
to rely on a diverging reasoning in both sectors. In the public sector it is
related to serving a diversity of interests, while in the private sector it
is mainly a response to the inappropriateness of exclusively financials for
controlling organisations. Although the achievement of financial results
is what ultimately matters in the private sector, a suitable guidance for
improving these financial results requires non-financial indicators (on for
 330 JAN VAN HELDEN AND CHRISTOPH REICHARD

example, product quality, customer satisfaction and employee skills).

Second, the need for goal-driven performance indicators is relevant in both
sectors, but a strategic positioning of the organisation is more important in
the private than the public sector. This is due to two mutually reinforcing
factors: the competitive pressure for ‘standing out’ in comparison with
competitors, and the discretion to make choices about ‘how to stand out’
(on low costs, on product diversity etc.). These reasons are making the link
between strategy and PMS more urgent in the private than the public
sector. Public sector organisations are often legally constrained in the
choice for activities and services, which are mostly supplied under monopo-
listic conditions. This can make a strategy-driven PMS less important.
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Third, PMS use is not only more functional and less symbolic in the private
sector, a functional use may also require a broader spectrum of purposes
for use, such as monitoring, learning and rewarding, for enabling private
firms to respond to competitive pressures.
The increasing relevance of PM can also be seen from an institutionalist
point of view. The implementation of PMSs was given a high rank on the
reform agenda in the last two decades in the public sector, but it was also
an important management issue in the private sector. Consequently, PM
became ‘fashionable’ in both sectors; it followed the reform-mainstream
and was recommended by management-gurus and consultants. Thus, the
dissemination and practice of PMSs was also a result of mimetic behaviour
of the managers in both sectors (isomorphism). However, we have to be
also somewhat sceptical with regard to the generally quite positive state-
ments on PM practices public managers made in the various studies of our
literature review: As most reported evidence is relying on survey-based stu-
dies, it can be assumed that the respondents showed some kind of appropri-
ate behaviour. Performance management was perceived as a contemporary
concept of public management and managers most probably showed a
positive attitude towards PM and responded ‘appropriately’ to questions
about, for example the intensity of PI use (see also critical comments of
Ammons, 1995, to such a methodological bias). Fashion does not only
regard practice but also research. Our review is about PM practices as appar-
ent from academic research. This can differ from actual PM practices,
because some research themes are ‘en vogue’, for example, about the impor-
tance of strategically informed PMSs in private sector research or an overem-
phasis of studies on result-oriented PMSs in the public sector due to NPM.
In the public sector, the raise of PM benefited particularly from the NPM-
reforms in the 1990s and early 2000s. PM usually was a core element of these
reforms. Its acceptance and practice was to some extent also supported
 Commonalities and Differences in Public and Private Sector PM Practices 331

by other NPM-based reform elements, for example by Management by

Objectives or by PRP-concepts, but above all by the underlying NPM-reform
doctrine of a performance-oriented management style (Bouckaert & Halligan,
2008). After the general acceptance and incorporation of PMSs in many
PSOs, the intensity of PI use increased over time, because professionals and
managers became more and more acquainted and experienced with perfor-
mance measurement and management. They learned to formulate targets, to
measure efficiency and effectiveness, to report such measures to various stake-
holders and to monitor performance developments.
From a more generic perspective, we are convinced that the comparative
analysis of the PM practices in the public and the private sector has consid-
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erable benefits. It is an attempt to shed some light on the different aspects

of PM design and use in the two sectors and to link the so far quite isolated
scientific communities studying PM in each sector without taking much
notice of developments in the neighbouring sector. Such intersectoral
knowledge may be important from an academic point for the two so far
quite isolated communities of PM-researchers (see also Andrews & Esteve,
2015, for the general situation of research in generic management and
Public Administration). The literature review for example points to various
areas of PM-research in the two sectors that require further exploration,
for example studies of the type and intensity of PI use in private sector
research or the strategy-link of PMSs in the public sector.
However, we can also derive some themes of mutual learning between
the two sectors from our review, for both research and practice. Research
in the public sector, for instance, can learn from private sector research
how to model the effects of PMS design on organisational performance,
although it will be relatively more complicated to identify the effects on
organisational performance in the public sector. The public sector can also
learn from the private sector about how to link strategy more explicitly to
the PMS, especially by investigating the match between different strategies
(prospector, defender etc.) and PMS design, which could be appropriate
for those organisations that have some discretion in their market and
services portfolio. This is a research theme but also an issue with direct rele-
vance for practice. This also regards a final theme: how the private sector
can learn from public sector PMS about adequately addressing multiple
stakeholders with providing PI, also with regard to external accountability
purposes (e.g. in the context of increasing relevance of corporate social
responsibilities of private firms).
The presented findings of our review have some limitations. The most
challenging question is whether 100 articles are sufficient for investigating
 332 JAN VAN HELDEN AND CHRISTOPH REICHARD

commonalities and differences in PM practices between both sectors.

A relevant criterion for answering this question is the extent of saturation
in the review findings; put differently, if some additional papers are col-
lected, does this change the findings? Regarding the goals of the PMS and
the strategy-PMS link, saturation of our finding was apparent, because our
conclusions about these PM issues did not change after we broadened our
selection of papers from 80 to 100. However, regarding the other PM issues
(PI use, and especially targeting and pay for performance systems) we can-
not provide proof for saturation of findings. So, the latter observation is a
major limitation of our review.
In addition, a large part of selected public sector articles is dealing with
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quite specific issues of PM and does not provide much empirical evidence
about the design and use of a PMS (Barnow & Heinrich, 2010; Dacombe,
2011; Moynihan, 2005; Moynihan & Panday, 2005). Consequently, our
findings concerning particularities of public sector PMS have to be based
on a quite limited number of content-rich articles. This is the disadvantage
of following a strict selection procedure of choosing only articles under the
search terms performance management and measurement according to
their quotation-related position in the data bases.
Another limitation of the selected public sector articles is the strong and
one-sided regional focus of most articles on the United States. As articles in
the highly ranked US journals (like Public Administration Review) are quite
often quoted by the large group of American academics, they show up at the
top of scientific data bases, because these bases only disclose frequently cited
articles in highly ranked journals. This bias largely excludes articles from
authors of other countries which results in regionally quite narrow and spe-
cific results (see similar observations by Van de Walle & Van Delft, 2015).
Interestingly, this is not the case in the private sphere. Here we observe that
high-ranking journals in Accounting or in Operations Management are
attracting scholars from North America, Europe and Australia.
A final limitation is related to the variation of organisations within each
sector: We intended to analyse not only ‘pure public’ and ‘pure private’
organisations but also the intermediary variants between them, for example
state-owned enterprises, variants of public-private partnerships or private
non-profit organisations operating for the government. We assumed that
PMSs in organisations with varying degrees of publicness would differ
(Antonsen & Jørgensen, 1997; Bozeman, 1987). Additionally, we analysed
the selected articles with regard to the dominant organisational layer (top
or intermediate management, operative functions) where a PMS is prac-
tised, as we assumed that performance measures might be different at these
 Commonalities and Differences in Public and Private Sector PM Practices 333

layers. And finally, we took a closer look on the type of organisation

(e.g. in the public sector central government and municipal organisations
or in the private sector manufacturing and service-oriented firms) as we
assumed that such types may use different types of performance indicators.
The reviewed articles, however, did not provide sufficient evidence about
these analytical features. Such differentiation is thus the task of more in-
depth future research.
Although we acknowledge several limitations of our review, as far as we
know, this is the first review that develops a framework about public-
private sector differences in performance management practices, which is
subsequently used in a review of 100 articles from well-respected interna-
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tional journals and which provides evidence of some of these differences.

NOTE
1. At a later stage this framework has been extended to 12 issues; see Ferreira
and Otley (2009). Originally, Otley formulated these five issues as questions. They
were shortened and simplified by the authors. For similar criteria for structuring a
PMS see also Hvidman and Andersen (2013).

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
The authors are grateful to Henk ter Bogt for his comments on the explora-
tory version of their chapter.

REFERENCES
This list of references includes both the 100 papers of the literature review and other refer-
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reviewed papers are listed and categorized in the Appendix.

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Askim, J. (2007). How do politicians use performance information? An analysis of the
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 APPENDIX

Classifications of the Reviewed Papers According to Various Public-Private Related Aspects of Performance Management.
Author(s) Journal, Design: Multi- Design: Strategy-Link Goals: Targeting: Less Monetary Rewards: PMS Use: Less or PMS Use: Mainly Organisational Organisation
Year Dimensional Diffuse or Direct Effectiveness or or Less or More Intensive Symbolic Layer Type
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versus Financial Market-Oriented Strongly Strongly Developed or Functional

Developed

Public Sector
1995 1999
Ammons PAR, 1995 Multidimensional NA Effectiveness NA NA Less intensive NA Top Public pure
(and partly (intermunicipal
efficiency) comparison)
Cave, Hanney PMM, 1995 Multidimensional NA Both Developed Quite developed Quite intensive Functional Top (whole Public pure
and Henkel (target (budgetary universities)
figures) incentives)
Heinrich JPART, 1999 Multidimensional Quite direct Effectiveness NA Quite relevant Intensive Functional Top (whole provider Unclear (perhaps
organisations) public and
NPO entities)
Hyndman FAM, 1995 Multidimensional NA Effectiveness NA NA Intensive Functional Whole agency Public pure
and Anderson
Hyndman PMM, 1998 Multidimensional Quite Direct Effectiveness Quite developed NA NA NA Top Public pure
and Anderson and efficiency
Kopczynski PAR, 1999 Multidimensional NA Effectiveness NA NA NA NA Top Public pure
and Lombardo (intermunicipal
comparison)
MvKevitt PMM, 1995 NA NA NA NA NA NA To some extent NA Public pure
and Lawron symbolic
(indirectly)
Melkers PAR, 1998 Multidimensional Quite direct Effectiveness NA Less developed NA NA Top Public pure
and Willoughby
Osborne et al. FAM, 1995 Multidimensional Quite direct Effectiveness NA NA NA NA NA NA
(programme level)
Poster and Streib PAR, 1999 Multidimensional Quite direct Effectiveness NA Less developed Quite intensive More functional Various layers in Public pure
municipalities
 Appendix. (Continued )
Author(s) Journal, Design: Multi- Design: Strategy-Link Goals: Targeting: Less Monetary Rewards: PMS Use: Less or PMS Use: Mainly Organisational Organisation
Year Dimensional Diffuse or Direct Effectiveness or or Less or More Intensive Symbolic Layer Type
versus Financial Market-Oriented Strongly Strongly Developed or Functional
Developed

Streib and Poister ARPA, 1999 Multidimensional NA Effectiveness NA NA Quite intensive Mainly functional Several layers (in Public pure
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municipalities)
2000 2004
Barnow JPAM, 2000 Multidimensional Quite direct Effectiveness NA Quite developed Quite intensive Mainly functional NA NA
(programme level)
Berman and Wang PAR, 2000 Multidimensional NA Effectiveness NA NA Less intensive NA Top and department Public pure
Griffiths AJPA, 2003 Multidimensional Partly direct Effectiveness NA NA NA NA Whole organisations Public pure
Heinrich PAR, 2002 Multidimensional Quite direct Effectiveness Quite developed Quite developed NA NA Whole organisations NA
Holzer and Yang IRAS, 2004 Multidimensional NA Effectiveness NA NA NA NA NA Public pure
Julnes and Holzer PAR, 2001 Multidimensional less important Effectiveness NA NA Less intensive to some Top Public pure
extent symbolic
Kelly and Swindell PAR, 2002 Multidimensional NA Effectiveness NA NA NA NA Whole municipality Public pure
Kloot and Martin MAR, 2000 Multidimensional Quite direct Effectiveness Partly Less developed NA NA Whole municipality Public pure
developed
Modell MAR, 2001 Multidimensional Diffuse Unclear NA Less developed Quite intensive Functional One single Public pure
(much organisation
efficiency) (hospital)
Ter Bogt FAM, 2004 Multidimensional NA Effectiveness NA NA Less intensive NA Whole municipality Public pure
Wang and Berman JPART, 2000 Multidimensional NA Effectiveness NA NA Less intensive NA Top and departments Public pure
2005 2009
Ammons PAR, 2008 Multidimensional NA Effectiveness NA NA More intensive NA Whole municipalities Public pure
and Rivenbark and departments
Askim IRAS 2007 Multidimensional NA Effectiveness NA NA More intensive More functional Whole municipality Public pure
Kelman JPART, 2009 Multidimensional NA NA Very important Strongly developed Very intensive Functional One unit (A&E) from Pure public
and Friedman and all English
developed hospitals
Laegreid, Roness FAM, 2006 Multidimensional More diffuse Effectiveness Rather Less developed Less intensive Somewhat Whole agency Public pure
and Rubecksen developed symbolic
McAdam, Hazlett IJPSM, 2005 Multidimensional Diffuse NA NA NA NA NA One single Public pure
and Casey department
Melkers PAR, 2005 Multidimensional Diffuse Effectiveness NA To some Quite intensive More functional Whole municipality Public pure
and Willoughby extent developed
Moynihan PAR, 2005 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA Whole organisations Public pure
Moynihan PAR, 2006 Multidimensional NA Effectiveness NA NA NA NA Whole agencies Public pure
 Moynihan JPART, 2005 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA Whole agencies Public pure
and Pandey
Pollitt JPART, 2006 Multidimensional More diffuse Effectiveness Mixed (partly Mixed (partly Not very intensive Partly symbolic Whole agencies Public pure
well well developed)
developed)
Verbeeten AAAJ, 2008 Multidimensional NA Effectiveness NA NA NA NA Whole agencies Public pure
2010 2014
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Amirkhanyan PAR, 2010 Multidimensional NA Effectiveness NA NA NA NA Whole organisations NPOs and for-
profit
organisations
Barnow and Heinrich PAR, 2010 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA Whole organisations Public pure
Dacombe PMM, 2011 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA Whole organisations NPOs
Greitens and Ernita PPMR, 2010 Multidimensional direct Effectiveness NA NA Intensive Functional Programme level Public pure
Herranz ARPA, 2010 Multidimensional NA Primarily NA NA NA NA Whole organisations NPO, public and
effectiveness plus networks for-profit
organisations
Jennings and Hall JPART, 2012 Multidimensional NA Effectiveness NA NA Diffuse NA Whole agency Public pure
Kroll IPMJ, 2014 Multidimensional NA Effectiveness NA NA More intensive More functional Mid level of Public pure
municipalities
Micheli and Neely PAR, 2010 Multidimensional Direct Effectiveness Very developed NA Intensive Unclear Whole organisations Public pure
(more at all
symbolic?) government levels
Moynihan PAR, 2012 Multidimensional NA Effectiveness NA NA More intensive More functional Top level Public pure
and Hawes
Moynihan PAR, 2012 Multidimensional Quite direct Effectiveness NA NA Much variation More functional Different layers Public pure
and Lavertu
Moynihan JPART, 2010 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA Whole municipalities Public pure
and Pandey
Moynihan et al. Governance Multidimensional NA Effectiveness NA NA NA More functional Whole organisation Public
2012 and nonprofits
Saliterer and Korac CPA, 2013 Multidimensional NA Effectiveness NA NA NA More functional Whole municipality Public pure
Soss, Fording JPART, 2011 Multidimensional Quite Direct Effectiveness Well developed Strongly developed More intensive Functional (with Whole organisations NPOs and for-
and Schram dysfunctional profit
side effects) organisations
Speklé MAR, 2014 Multidimensional NA Effectiveness NA NA Varying Other purposes Organisational unit Public pure
and Verbeeten
Taylor PA, 2011 Multidimensional NA Effectiveness NA NA NA NA Whole agencies Public pure
Walker, JPART, 2011 Multidimensional Quite direct Effectiveness Well developed NA More intensive Functional Whole municipalities Public pure
Damanpour
and Devece
 Appendix. (Continued )
Author(s) Journal, Design: Multi- Design: Strategy-Link Goals: Targeting: Less Monetary Rewards: PMS Use: Less or PMS Use: Mainly Organisational Organisation
Year Dimensional Diffuse or Direct Effectiveness or or Less or More Intensive Symbolic Layer Type
versus Financial Market-Oriented Strongly Strongly Developed or Functional
Developed

Private Sector
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1995 1999
Atkinson, SMR, 1997 Multidimensional Strategy link direct Market-oriented NA NA NA NA, Higher layer, Private: both
Waterhouse implicitly firm layer manufacturing
and Wells functional and service
Fawcett IMM, 1998 Multidimensional Direct link Both NA NA NA Functional Diverging, firms, Private:
and Cooper processes, service,
interorganisational logistics
Flapper, Fortuin IJOPM, 1996 Multidimensional Linked to strategy Both NA NA NA NA Lowest, project Private: service
and Stoop
De Haas MAR, 1999 Multidimensional Strategy-linked Market-oriented NA NA NA NA Diverging, Private: service
and Kleingeld management team
and unit level
Keating JAE, 1997 Financial NA Market-oriented NA NA NA functional Middle, divisions Private:
manufacturing
and service
Kerssens-van R&DM, 1997 Multidimensional Not explicitly Multiple purposes Important NA NA Implicitly Diverging, individual, Private:
Drongelen Cook addressed but goal functional, team, department, manufacturing
alignment symbolic use overall and service
is important not addressed organisation
Kerssens-van R&DM, 1999 Multidimensional Not explicitly Multi-purposes but NA In general not Quite intensive use Implicitly Diverging, individual, Private:
Drongelen, addressed but goal customer focus developed, functional, team, department, manufacturing
and Bilderbeek alignment is crucial, so traditional symbolic use overall and service
is important market reward systems not addressed organisation
orientation based
on seniority
Lockamy IJPR, 1998 Multidimensional Link with production Both NA NA Intensive Functional Diverging, firm and Private:
and Spencer and financial, strategy plant level manufacturing
linking locally is important
relevant
production
indicators to
overall financial
performance
 Rangone IJOPM, 1996 Multidimensional Direct link Both NA NA NA NA Middle layer of Private:
with strategy factories in manufacturing
manufacturing
firm
Scott and Tiessen AOS, 1998 Multidimensional NA Both Included Strong, related to NA NA, Lowest, teams within Public: pure and
through team implicitly departments hybrid; private:
team performance functional man.
members And service
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participation
2000 2004
Bititci, Turner IJOPM, 2000 Multidimensional, Strong link between Both Targeting for NA NA NA Diverging Private:
and Begemann including strategically further manufacturing
linkages between relevant goals and development and service
performance PMS, including (how targets
domains and dynamics have to
business units, due to be revised)
and how PMS changing internal
can be revised or external
factors
Bourne, Mils, IJOPM, 2000 Multidimensional Design and update of Both Quite developed NA NA NA Higher, firm level Private:
Wilcox, Neely PM systems and part of manufacturing
and Platts aligned to strategy the update and service
process
Bourne, Neely, IJOPM, 2002 Multidimensional Links between Both NA NA Highlighting factors NA Diverging Private:
Platts and Mills strategy and PMS contributing to manufacturing
should be close but PMS success,
this is also a main e.g. Top
factor why a management
PMS fails commitment and
cost-benefit
of PMS
Harrison and New JORS, 2002 Multidimensional Strategy-PMS link Both NA NA Intensive use for NA Middle, SBU Private:
was core but part of the survey manufacturing
absent in
many companies
 Appendix. (Continued )
Author(s) Journal, Design: Multi- Design: Strategy-Link Goals: Targeting: Less Monetary Rewards: PMS Use: Less or PMS Use: Mainly Organisational Organisation
Year Dimensional Diffuse or Direct Effectiveness or or Less or More Intensive Symbolic Layer Type
versus Financial Market-Oriented Strongly Strongly Developed or Functional
Developed

Hudson, Smart IJOPM, 2000 Multidimensional Strategy links Both NA NA NA (implicitly NA Highest, firm Private:
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and Bourne (expanded important but addressed via manufacturing

through SME difficult to perspectives and service
application; accomplish due to for use)
traditionally resource
finance constraints and
dominant, but unclear concrete
extensions to perspectives
quality and time for use
are important)
Ittner, Larcker TAR, 2003 Multidimensional, BSC is linked with Both Developed, for Strongly developed Intensive Functional with Diverging, within Private: service
and Meyer BSC type system firm’s strategy each in subjective negative one firm
criterion bonus system side effects
target
established
Ittner, Larcker AOS, 2003 Multidimensional, Strategy link of PMS Both NA NA Intensive use, NA, implicitly Highest, firm Private: service
and Randall financial and is core aligned to PMS functional
non-financial characteristics
Kald and Nilsson EMJ, 2000 Financial indicators PM system strongly Goals are NA PM systems are used PM use quite PM use seems to Middle, business Private:
most important strategy-linked mainly market for rewarding, intensive mainly be manufacturing
but pm design but less at primarily and service
also includes important managerial levels functional
non-financial purpose
Kueng TQM, 2000 Multidimensional goal-related Both (seems NA (only NA NA NA Highest, firm Private:
(seems obvious obvious for indicated, manufacturing
for process- process- not and service
related PMS) related PMS) elaborated)
Lillis AOS, 2002 Multidimensional, Strong, diverging Both NA NA Intensive via solving Implicitly Middle, BU layer Private:
BSC type of PMS strategy-PMS links tensions between functional manufacturing
pi domains
Lohman, Fortuin EJOR, 2004 Multidimensional, Llnk Strategy-PMS Both Developed NA Intensive, specific Functional Various layers in Private:
and Wouters BSC type for user type supply chain manufacturing
and service
 Williams MAR, 2002 NA NA NA NA NA Intensive when task Functional Middle, departments Private:
and Seaman complexity and in small m manufacturing
variability is high and service
2005 2009
Bhagwat CIE, 2007 Multidimensional Important, although Both NA NA NA NA Diverging Private:
and Sharma difficult to develop manufacturing
Bititci, Mendibil, IJOPM, 2006 Multidimensional, NA NA NA NA Use is core, Functional Highest layer Private:
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Nudurupati, although core interdepend-dent manufacturing

Garengo to research upon
and Turner organisational
culture and
management style
Bouwens and JAR, 2007 Financial PIs NA Market-oriented NA One of the purposes Implicitly intensive Implicitly Middle, Private:
van Lent dominant, but of PMS intensive divisional layer manufacturing
BU and service
interdependence
leads to multi-
dimensionality
Chenhall AOS, 2005 Multidimensional Strategy linkages to Both NA NA NA NA Middle, division layer Private:
(with various PMS are core to manufacturing
components, organisational
that is strategy- success but also
operational, mediated by
customer organisational
orientation and learning and
supplier manufacturing
orientation) alignment
Forslund IJPDLM, Multidimensional A lack of a joint Both Developed, NA NA NA Diverging, both firm Private:
and Jonsson 2007 strategy of the although and business-unit manufacturing
chain links is an difficult to
obstacle for a accomplish
dyadic pm as a joint
effort of
chain links
Gosselin IJPPM, 2005 Financial indicators Defender-prospector Financial NA NA NA NA Highest, firm Private:
still dominant, strategy related to indicators manufacturing
multidimensional types of strongly
systems less used performance market-oriented
indicators
 Appendix. (Continued )
Author(s) Journal, Design: Multi- Design: Strategy-Link Goals: Targeting: Less Monetary Rewards: PMS Use: Less or PMS Use: Mainly Organisational Organisation
Year Dimensional Diffuse or Direct Effectiveness or or Less or More Intensive Symbolic Layer Type
versus Financial Market-Oriented Strongly Strongly Developed or Functional
Developed

Hall AOS, 2008 Multidimensional, PMS linked to Both NA NA NA NA Middle, BU layer Private:
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related to various strategy and manufacturing

aspects of value chain
operations
and goals
Henri AOS, 2006 Multidimensional, Strategy link stronger Both NA NA Intensive, but for Symbolic use Highest, firm Private:
but especially for flexibility than diverging more likely for manufacturing
regarding control based firms purposes related control
variations in to control- focused firms
PI diversity flexibility values
Henri AOS, 2006 NA Implicitly through NA NA NA Use is core, Functional Diverging, highest Private:
capabilities that especially and BU layer manufacturing
increase diagnostic and
competitiveness interactive use
O’Sullivan JM, 2007 Multidimensional, NA Both NA NA NA Functional Middle, Private:
and Abela covering various marketing function manufacturing
aspects of the
marketing
function
Moers TAR Superiority of high NA Market-oriented NA Developed with high Implicitly intensive Functional Middle, division layer Private:
quality financial quality PIs manufacturing
PIs, such as ROI and services
Wouters AOS, 2008 Multidimensional Some link to strategy Both Developed as NA Intensive use is core, Functional Diverging, middle Private: service
and Wilderom for serving local but mainly to part of but not and lower layer (logistics
managerial needs what is design explicitly assessed function)
locally relevant process
2010 2014
Abernethy, CAR, 2013 Comparison of NA Both NA NA Implicitly intensive Implicitly Middle, bu layer Private:
Bouwens and financial and functional manufacturing
van Lent multidimensional and service
PIs
 Artz, Homburg AOS, 2012 Implicitly Link strong Implicitly both NA NA Intensive for Functional Highest layer Private:
and Rajab multidimensional depending facilitating and manufacturing
on strategy accountability and service
Björklund, SCM, 2012 Multidimensional, Direct link Both, NA NA NA NA Diverging, especially Private:
Martinsen and both environmental various actors in manufacturing
Abrahamsson environmental and financial the supply chain and service
and financial
Cardinaels and Van AOS, 2010 Multidimensional, NA (although BSC Both Developed NA Implicitly intensive Implicitly Middle, bus Private: services
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Veen-Dirks BSC or assumes link (scores on or functional in retailing

unformatted with strategy) above target)
Grafton, Lillis AOS, 2010 Broad sets of Feed-forward control Both NA NA Indications of Overlaps of Middle, division Private:
and Widener performance of decision- intensive use performance manufacturing
measures, both facilitating PM is measures for and service
financial and positively decision-
non-financial associated with the facilitating and
firm’s ability to evaluation,
identify new contributes to
strategic pm use
capabilities for control
Hall MAR, 2011 Multidimensional NA NA NA NA NA NA Middle, SBU Private:
manufacturing
Homburg, Artz JM, 2012 Multidimensional Link important Both NA NA NA NA Highest, firm Private:
and Wieseke manufacturing
and service
Jansen MAR, 2013 Multidimensional, Link through BSC NA Developed, via NA Varying across cases Mainly functional, Highest and second Private:
but financials perspectives above and one case (dealer) layer manufacturing
are important under symbolic and service
average
scores
Jordan AOS, 2012 Multidimensional, Strong link through both Developed with Implicit attention to Intensive, diverging Functional Middle, Private:
and Messner key PIs of lean strategy various pay for emphasis divisional layer manufacturing
lean strategy extents performance (enabling
of tightness vs. coercive)
Leeuw, de and JOM, 2011 Multidimensional Direct link of PIs Both Developed Investigated but Intensive Functional Low, shop floor layer Private:
Van den Berg with strategy not influential of production and manufacturing
distribution and service
 Appendix. (Continued )
Author(s) Journal, Design: Multi- Design: Strategy-Link Goals: Targeting: Less Monetary Rewards: PMS Use: Less or PMS Use: Mainly Organisational Organisation
Year Dimensional Diffuse or Direct Effectiveness or or Less or More Intensive Symbolic Layer Type
versus Financial Market-Oriented Strongly Strongly Developed or Functional
Developed

Maas and JAR, 2013 Financial NA Market-oriented Addressed: Strongly developed Implicitly intensive Functional Middle, peers Private:
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van Rinsum performing for rewarding with bonuses anonymous

better than firm
peers
pays out
Robinson, Sikes TAR, 2010 Financial Link implicitly Market-oriented NA NA NA Implicitly Middle layer, i.e. Private:
and Weaver important through functional Department layer manufacturing
product lines and and service
decentralisation
Saranga and Moser EJOS, 2010 Multidimensional, NA Implicitly DAE provides NA NA NA, implicitly Highest, firm layer Private:
but ultimately market-oriented benchmarks functional manufacturing
linking PIs to for becoming
corporate relatively
performance, a more
financial efficient
indicator
Tadeu, de Oliveira, MD, 2011 Multidimensional, Values attached to Both NA NA NA Functional, aiding Diverging, that is Private:
Ensslin covering various criteria can be project stakeholders at manufacturing
and Ensslin criteria for linked to strategy selection various layers
project
assessment
Tayler TAR, 2010 Multidimensional, Direct link, core Both NA NA NA NA, although Highest, firm layer Private; not given
i.e. BSC to research core is how
BSC
information is
biased by
managerial
preferences, so
not only
functional use
 Veen-Dirks, van AOS, 2010 Multidimensional, Direct link with Both NA Monetary rewarding Implicitly intensive Implicitly Middle, i.e. managers Private:
but financial and importance of important but functional manufacturing
non-financial different pi types depending on
strategy,
interdependence
and complexity

Notes: NA = not applicable.

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Abbreviations of journals:
Public sector: AAAJ = Accounting Auditing & Accountability Journal; AJPA = American Journal of Public Administration; ARPA = American Review of Public Administration; CPA = Critical Perspectives of
Accounting; FAM = Financial Accountability and Management; IJPSM = International Journal of Public Sector Management; IPMJ = International Public Management Journal; IRAS = International Review of
Administrative Sciences; JPAM = Journal of Policy Analysis and Management; JPART = Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory; PA = Public Administration; PAR = Public Administration Review;
PMM = Public Money and Management; PPMR = Public Performance and Management Review.
Private sector: AOS = Accounting Organizations & Society; CAR = Contemporary Accounting Research; CIE = Computer & Industrial Engineering; EJOR = European Journal of Operational Research; EMJ =
European Management Journal; IJOPM = International Journal of Operations & Production Management; IJPR = International Journal of Production Research; IJPDLM = International Journal of Physical
Distribution & Logistics Management; IJPPM = International Journal of Productivity and Performance Management; IMM = Industrial Marketing Management; JAR = Journal of Accounting Research; JAE = Journal
of Accounting and Economics; JM = Journal of Marketing; JOM = Journal of Operations Management; JORS = Journal of the Operational Research Society; MAR = Management Accounting Research; MD =
Management Decision; SCM = Supply Chain Management An International Journal; SMR = Sloan Management Review; R&DM = R&D Management; TAR = The Accounting Review; TQM = Total Quality
Management.
Some accounting journals, especially AAAJ, CPA and MAR publish both public and private sector research.