The Politics of Pakistan

_,,--

A CONSTITUTIONAL QUEST

RICHARD S. WHEELER

Cornell University Press

INDIAN O C E A N
ITHACA AND LONDON

SOUTH ASIA
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In memory of
INDIANA UNIVERSITY LIBRARY Herb Heidenreich

Copyright © 1970 by Cornell University

All rights reserved. Except for brief quotations in a re-
view, this book, or parts thereof, must not be reproduced
in any form without permission in writing from the pub-
lisher. For information address Cornell University Press,
124 Roberts Place, Ithaca, New York 14850.
First published z970

International Standard Book Number 0-8014-0589-0

Library of Congress Catalog Card Number 71-124728
PRINTED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
BY VAIL-BALLOU PRESS, INC.

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Foreword

Serious study of modern South Asia is a relatively recent

development in the United States. It began shortly after
World War II, and was made possible by opportunities for
language study and research in the region. Scholarly work on
current South Asian themes, however, rests upon older aca-
demic traditions that emphasized principally the philosophy,
religion, and classical literature of these ancient civilizations.
This series, "South Asian Political Systems," is addressed to
contemporary political problems, but is presented in the con-
text of institutions and value systems that were centuries in
the making.
Over the past quarter century, humanists and social scien-
tists in Asia, Europe, the United States, and elsewhere
throughout the world have worked together to study mod-
ern South Asian cultures. Their efforts have been encouraged
by a recognition of the importance of the rapid rise of na-
tionalism in Asia in the twentieth century, by the decline,
hastened by the war, of Western imperial systems, and by the
appearance of dozens of independent states since the found-
ing of the United Nations. Scholars were made increasingly
aware that the South Asian peoples were not anonymous
masses or abstract representatives of distant traditions. They
were, like us, concerned with their own political affairs, with
raising families, building houses, constructing industries, ed-
vii

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Foreword ix
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lar history and a unique set of values. Language transmits

ucating the young, and creating better societies. They were
culture, so one way to approach an unfamiliar culture is
nourished by their heritage, but they also struggled to devise
through the close study of language and literature. Knowl-
political institutions, economic processes, and social organiza-
edge of history, or of the arts, or of social organization offers
tions that were responsive to modern needs. And their needs
another path to understanding.
were, and continue to be, great.
The focus of this series is on political systems. Each author
It was an awareness of these realities that encouraged pri-
starts with a common organizational framework-brief his-
vate foundations and agencies of government to sponsor in-
tory, political dynamics, political structure, continuing prob-
tensive field work in South Asia, including firsthand observa-
lems-and weaves in unique factors. For India, a complex
tion of day-to-day life and opportunities to discover and use
federal organization of government and a varied and chang-
rare source material. India has received the most attention,
ing political party system require emphasis. For Pakistan,
in part because of its size and intrinsic importance, in part
the constitutional dilemma is the most crucial issue. For
because scholars have concentrated on teaching Indian lan-
Nepal and Afghanistan, monarchical traditions in conflict
guages, and research tends to be done where the languages
with pressures to modernize necessitate treatments that are
are understood. More and more the other countries of South
more historically oriented. Ceylon, too, has political prob-
Asia-Pakistan, Nepal, Ceylon, and Afghanistan-have be-
lems, especially ethnic and religious, not readily comparable
gun to attract scholarly attention. Whereas in the late 194o's
with others. Used together the books should provide excel-
one was hard pressed to find literature about the region, ex-
lent opportunities for comparison and contrast.
cept in journalistic accounts or in British imperial histories,
Professor Richard S. Wheeler, of Claremont Men's Col-
by the 197o's competent monographs and reliable periodicals
lege, has followed Pakistan's affairs closely-in both the
are abundantly available. Today one can draw from an im-
Eastern and Western sectors-since the early 195o's. His
pressive bibliography on South Asia, including a commend-
able list of political works. book presents a clear analysis of Pakistan's political system, a
It remains true, however, that recent South Asian studies subject that has received little attention heretofore. He has
have been largely monographic-books that examine narrow pin-pointed a central problem, emphasizing the difficulties of
themes in detail and that appeal to a small group of special- constitution-making that are continuing to be of concern to
the country's political leaders.
ists who happen to be concerned with these themes. There
are few broad guides to the politics of the countries of South
Asia. This series has been designed to fill part of the need. RICHARD L. p ARK
Ann Arbor, Michigan
One of the problems in writing introductory works is that
May I970
learning about a foreign culture is never a simple process.
Experience tells us that each political system is imbedded in
a broader social system, which in turn has roots in a particu-

~ii
 Preface

Anyone who attempts to analyze Pakistan's political sys-

tem is confronted with the overriding importance of consti-
tutional controversies in national politics. This study has
taken the search for constitutional consensus as a theme, in
hopes of making clear the nature of the problems that have
caused repeated crises and constitutional upheavals. At the
'tfme of writing Pakistan is again under martial law, with a
return to representative institutions and a new constitution
forecast for late 1970. I have been unable, therefore, to deal
with institutions and processes with the degree of finality
possible in regard to political systems in which consensus on
the form of executive and legislature and on the relations
between central and regional authorities has been confirmed
by time or by formal constitutional documents. I have sought
instead to give some sense of the experience of the past and
the alternatives available to those in Pakistan responsible for
working out a new constitutional formula, to provide a basis
for an understanding of whatever solutions are achieved in
the years ahead.

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Since the focus in this book is entirely on domestic con-
stitutional issues, I have made no attempt to deal directly
with Pakistan's foreign relations or with the Kashmir ques-
tion. Both of these topics deserve separate studies, and al-

I though of great importance they are in my view peripheral

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xii Preface Preface xiii

to the primary constitutional dilemmas to which I have ad- s1tion of martial law by President Iskander Mirza on the
dressed myself. Some consideration of Muslim India's links night of October 7, 1958; the termination of martial law by
with the rest of the Muslim world is inescapable in Chapter President Ayub Khan and the enforcement of the presiden-
1, in which I have presented the historical background es- tial Constitution on June 8, 1962; and the resignation of
sential for an understanding of how Pakistan came to be, President Ayub Khan on March 24, 1969, and the abrogation
and indeed to a degree the conflict between the Muslim of the 1962 Constitution and reimposition of martial law the
League and the Congress in British India foreshadowed the following day. Chapter 8 deals with this political process, the
difficult relations between the successor states. Chapter 2, interplay of parties, groups, and personalities, and attempts
in setting out the major social and economic characteristics an assessment in general terms of the future political pros-
of Pakistan, inevitably deals with some aspects of Pakistan's pects of Pakistan.
relations with India and with the United States and other My analysis has been written from the vantage point of
aid-giving powers. Building on the foundations laid in these late summer 1969. The martial-law government of President
first chapters, Chapters 3 to 5 proceed to distinguish the areas A. M. Yahya Khan has since taken a series of steps toward
of principal controversy and to indicate the elements both the establishment of a new constitutional system. On July
of continuity and of change in successive constitutional ar- 28, 1969, a Supreme Court judge from East Pakistan was ap-
rangements. pointed chief election commissioner, to prepare for national
Pakistan's political history since independence has been elections. On November 28, 1969, President Yahya Khan
one of tortuous and complicated maneuverings, with the announced that the West Pakistan province would be dis-
role of personalities often extremely important. Chapters 6 solved and that elections for a new National Assembly on
and 7 give a generally chronological survey of political events fae basis of one man, one vote (resulting in an East Pakistan
to which some readers may wish to refer at the outset. Never- majority) would be held on a common electoral roll on Octo-
theless, it may be well to indicate here the principal land- ---ber 5, 1970. On January 1, 1970, martial-law restrictions
marks in a most confusing landscape: the death of Qaid-i- were relaxed, and active campaigning began. On March 28,
Azam Mohammed Ali Jinnah, the founder of Pakistan, on 1970, President Yahya Khan announced that the National
September 11, 1948; the assassination of Prime Minister Assembly would have a total of 313 members: East Pakistan
Liaqat Ali Khan for unknown reasons by an Afghan on 162, plus 7 women; Punjab 82, plus 3 women; Sind 27, plus
October 16, 1951; the dismissal of Prime Minister Nazimud- ~6ne woman; Baluchistan 4, plus one woman; and the Fron-
din by Governor General Ghulam Mohammad on April 17, tier Province and tribal areas 25, plus one woman. The re-
1953; Ghulam Mohammad's dissolution of the Constituent constituted provinces in West Pakistan were to come into
Assembly on October 24, 1954; the promulgation of the Con- being on July 1, 1970, and provincial legislatures would be
stitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan on March 23, elected on October 22, 1970. Finally, the President laid down
1956; the abrogation of the 1956 Constitution and the impo- the basic principles to be enshrined in the new constitution:
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xiv Preface Preface xv

(1) Islamic ideology; (2) independence, territorial unity, and martial law in Pakistan because I feel that these terms are
national solidarity; (3) free and periodic elections on the full of misleading connotations that impede understanding
basis of population and direct adult franchise; (4) federalism, of the Pakistani situation.
with maximum provincial autonomy compatible with the I have made several visits to Britain and to Pakistan which
securing of adequate powers to the federal government to directly or indirectly have produced material for this study. I
discharge its responsibilities in external and internal affairs; am indebted to the Ford Foundation (now the Foreign Area
and (5) statutory provision for the removal of economic and Fellowship Program) for supporting my stay in London in
other disparities among the various provinces, to enable the 1957-58 and in East and West Pakistan in 1958-59, and
people of all regions to have a full share in national life. The to the United States Educational Foundation in Pakistan
National Assembly would have 120 days to adopt a new con- for a Fulbright research grant enabling me to spend seven
stitution according to these guidelines, finding satisfactory months in East Pakistan in 1965. Neither of these organiza-
solutions to the questions of Islam and federal-provincial re- tions bears any responsibility for the content of this book. I
lations, failing which it would be dissolved and another as- am grateful to many persons in Britain and in Pakistan for
sembly election would occur. their helpful insights, and for their assistance in my explora-
Several points of style should be noted. The problem of tion of various aspects of Pakistani administration, politics,
the spelling of Pakistani names is a difficult one. I have at- and government, past and present. In particular, four good
tempted to use the version of a name favored by the person friends, Ataul, Mashuk, Makhon, and Razia, by their hos-
concerned; thus "Chaudhri Muhammad Ali" in accordance pitality in Karachi and in Dacca over the years, have made
with the preference indicated in his book, rather than me feel truly at home in Pakistan, and have nourished my
"Chaudhri Mohamad Ali," which was the form commonly interest in things Pakistani. I wish to acknowledge the coop-
used when he was prime minister. I have departed from the eration of Mr. S. C. Sutton, C.B.E., and his staff in my suc-
standard practice in rejecting the forms "Quaid" and "Lia- cessive visits to the India Office Library in London; of the
quat" in the title Qaid-i-Azam and the name Liaqat Ali librarian of the former Constituent Assembly Library in
Khan. The elimination of the "u" is orthographically correct Karachi; of the secretaries and librarians of the Provincial
and indicates that the "q" is pronounced as "k." Diacritics Assembly libraries in Lahore and Dacca; and of Professor
in Arabic words have been eliminated throughout-thus Gerard Friters, then head of the Political Science Depart-
Quran instead of Qur'an. I have followed Pakistani practice ment in the University of the Panjab, Lahore, for access to
in my use of "government" to indicate President (or gov- theses written by students in his department.
ernor) and ministers, as distinguished both from the admin- I am deeply appreciative of the perceptive comments of
istrative bureaucracy and the legislature. I have also delib- my friend and colleague at Claremont Men's College, P.
erately avoided use of terms such as "dictatorship" and "mili- Edward Haley, who read most of the final draft, and of
tary coup" and their various combinations in dealing with Ronald N. Montaperto, then a graduate student at the Uni-

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xvi Preface

versity of Michigan, Ann Arbor, who was kind enough to

read, criticize, and discuss an earlier version. Richard L.
Park of the University of Michigan has suffered with me
through successive stages in the preparation of this book,
with appropriate and indispensable encouragement and crit-
icism. Many thanks are due, too, to the editorial staff of
Contents
Cornell University Press, whose sharp eyes have caught many
inconsistencies and whose attention to syntax has made some
of my sentences at least more comprehensible. Finally, in a Foreword, by Richard L. Park vii
study of this kind errors are inescapable, but I have done my Preface xi
utmost to minimize them. I particularly hope that Pakistanis Abbreviations XIX
will be indulgent in regard to my inadequate discussion of I. The Emergence of National Identity I
Islam. 2, Social and Economic Setting
37
RICHARD s. WHEELER 3· Constitutional Dilemmas 91
Claremont, California 4· Institutional Continuity 122
July z970 5· Institutional Experimentation 157
6. Parliamentary Politics: 1947-1958 208
7· Presidential Politics: 1958-1969 232
8. Political Forces and National Problems 284
Glossary
315
Selected Bibliography
317
Index
33 1
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 Tables Abbreviations

I. Population of Pakistan, 1961 39 ADC Agricultural Development Corporation; also EPADC,

2. Non-Muslim population of Pakistan, 1961 42 WPADC
Language and literacy, 1961 47 CML Council Muslim League
3. tj
Composition of Assemblies 169 COP Combined Opposition Parties ;J
4.
186 CSP Civil Service of Pakistan
5· Provincial revenues
DAG
DC
EBDO
KSP
Democratic Action Committee
Deputy Commissioner
Elective Bodies (Disqualification) Order
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Krishak Sramik party
Maps NAP National Awami party
NDF National Democratic Front i
South Asia frontispiece NIP
PER
Nizam-i-Islam party I
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East Pakistan, 1969 55 Pakistan Eastern Railway II

West Pakistan, 1969 PDM Pakistan Democratic Movement 11

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PDP Pakistan Democratic party
PIDC Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation; also
EPIDC, WPIDC
PPP Pakistan People's party
PWR Pakistan Western Railway
SDO Subdivisional Officer
WAPDA Water and Power Development Authority; also
EPWAPDA, WPWAPDA

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The Politics of Pakistan
A CONSTITUTIONAL QUEST

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1. The Emergence of
National Identity

Long accustomed to consider faith irrelevant to politics,

the international community was startled in August 1947 to
witness the birth of a state founded to provide a homeland
for a nationality defined primarily in terms of religious be-
lief. Pakistan seemed to be an anachronism in a twentieth-
century world dominated by secular ideologies, its very ex-
istence offensive not only to many in the neighboring Indian
Union, whose identity its creation had explicitly repudiated,
but to professed liberals in Europe and America as well. Al-
though the western world readily welcomed the establish-
ment of a state for a religious nationality in the Middle East,
the emergence of Pakistan was understood by few outside
South Asia and accepted by few outside the new state itself.
The roots of Pakistan were and are comprehensible only by
reference to the long and complex history of Islam in the
Indian subcontinent, and to the character of the faith itself.
A sense of separate identity is inherent in Islam, and the
challenges of the Indian environment to that identity elic-
ited responses that gradually shaped a distinctive political
community. This chapter will review the stages by which in
modern times that community was led to the realization of
a separate political destiny, concluding with the final achieve-
ment of the Pakistan demand. It may then be possible in

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2 The Politics of Pakistan Emergence of National Identi llj

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subsequent chapters to attempt to understand the problems ture. Constant recruitment in the Muslim lands to th, :1
that were and are posed by the aspiration to establish a state brought preachers and scholars as well as soldiers and ad- l1i
in which Muslims may order their lives in accordance with ministrators, enabling the Indian Muslim community to
the principles of their faith. The quest for a constitutional maintain its identity and even to spread the faith. The very
solution to those problems has absorbed much of the politi- success of proselytization created serious problems, for con-
cal energies of Pakistan in the years since the state was cre- verts brought with them into the fold of Islam many Hindu-
ated by the partition of the British Indian Empire. ist practices not in strict accord with the teachings of the
Quran. The most successful Muslim missionaries in India
Islam in the Indian Subcontinent were Sufi teachers, whose mystical and emotional interpreta-
Since its first arrival in force in the eleventh and twelfth tions of the faith with emphasis on a Way or Path to union
centuries, Islam has been the religion of a minority in the with the One bore great similarities to the teachings of the
Indian subcontinent. At first its adherents formed the ruling Hindu bhakti (devotional) movement. The danger lay in the
11
elite, a largely immigrant aristocracy of Turks, Afghans, Per- possibility Jhat the Sufi pirs (saints) and their followers- 11
sians, and Central Asians generally which was gradually re- "'----ofreh Hindus as well as Muslims_:might become so obsessed I
inforced by a native-born Muslim element. By the time the with the ritual demands of their orders as to lose sight of the 11
I;
British conquest in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries greater identification with the community of Islam. i
wrested power from Muslim hands, the community of Islam Preservation of the integrity of the faith has been an ever-
had become primarily an indigenous one. The ruling class
included numerous immigrants, but the mass of the Muslim
present problem in Islam because of its egalitarian and non-
hierarchic character. The teachings of Islam are simple:
II
population were ethnically Indian. Missionary activities, there is but one God; Muhammad, to whom God's word was 1:

forced conversions, intermarriage, and the inescapable mate- revealed in the Holy Quran, was the last of the Prophets; all IIi
rial influences of more than six centuries of Muslim rule had men are equal before God and must submit themselves to 1)

induced members of all classes to embrace Islam. The heavi- His will. From these few principles the mass of Islamic doc- i'

est concentrations of Muslims were in the north, most par- trine was evolved in the first four centuries of the Muslim
ticularly in the Indus valley and in the lower Ganges-Brah- era. After the death of the Prophet (A.D. 632) there was no
maputra delta. In these areas they outnumbered adherents of single authority to interpret God's will, so the responsibility
other religions, although they remained a minority of no devolved on the learned members of the community to read
more than 10 or 15 per cent in other parts of the subcon- the Quran and apply its message to human affairs. Gradually
tinent. the law, the Shariah, was developed: from the Quran, the
As a minority and, for long, alien faith in India, Islam was revelation of truth by God; from the Hadith (traditions), em-
faced with the continuing challenge to its separate existence bodying elaborations by the Prophet and his Companions
posed by the powerful absorptive influences of Hindu cul- and Followers of the principles enunciated in revelation; and

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 4 The Politics of Pakistan Emergence of National Identity 5
from the interpretations of the former two sources by the peror Akbar (1556-1605) and his descendant, Prince Dara
ulama, the learned, to apply their principles to the changing Shikoh. 1
needs of humanity. As differing interpretations were made, a Despite the best efforts of the ulama, demographic reali-
variety of sects and schools of law arose. All those who accept ties forced Islam to come to an adjustment with Hinduism.
the Sunnah (corpus of normative traditions) of the Prophet Muslims could not isolate themselves from their Hindu
and the first four elected khalifas are regarded as orthodox, neighbors; social contacts had their effects, and converts to
or Sunni. A major cleavage exists between them and the Islam were unable to divest themselves completely of their
smaller of the two great sects, the Shia, who regard the former social attitudes. The result was that caste restrictions,
Prophet's son-in-law and cousin Ali (the fourth khalifa) as saint worship, and magical beliefs appeared in the Muslim
his successor by divine right and therefore accept a different community. Islamic monotheism found its echoes in Hindu-
sunnah as the basis of their law. ism as well, and on the borderline of the two communities
Throughout the period of Muslim ascendancy in India there flourished sects which were as much the one as the
the first obligation felt by the orthodox Sunni ulama was to other. This blurring of the boundaries of the community
defend the integrity of the community from attack. The provoked the political reaction of the Emperor Aurangzeb
great expansion of Islam in the subcontinent came after the (1658-1707), whose efforts to reassert the requirements of
overthrow of the Abbaside Khilafat by the Mongols in 1258, the Shariah in a predominantly non-Muslim society helped
and many of the scholars and military adventurers who came to precipitate the collapse of the Mughal Empire. Of more
\ to India were refugees from political upheavals in Central ultimate political importance was the intellectual response
Asia. In insisting on adherence to the Shariah and emphasiz- of such ulama as Shah Waliullah of Delhi (1703-1762), who 1:

ing the communal aspects of religious observance, the ulama preached a return to practices sanctioned by the life of the 1111
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were seeking to preserve the integrity of the Islamic commu- Prophet but a tolerant interpretation of the Shariah in order I
nity in India despite its overthrow in the West. In the ab- to reconcile all schools of thought within the community. I,I
sence of the universal khalifa the Shariah itself, rationalized The outset of the British period in India, ending the era of
by the ulama to legitimize the political status quo of the day, Muslim rule in the subcontinent, therefore saw the first stir-
was the sole unifying bond linking Muslims and separating rings of the reform movement within Islam which sought to
them from nonbelievers. In India the heterodox practices of reassert the identity of the community against their neigh-
Sufi.ism and the occult mysteries of the Shia minority threat- bors of other faiths.
ened the universality of the law and with it the identity of
1 See Aziz Ahmad, Studies in Islamic Culture in the Indian Environ- 11::
Islam as a single faith distinct from the complex of beliefs ment (Oxford, 1964), ch. VI, for a consideration of Akbar's religious
described as Hinduism. Hence the insistence of the orthodox eclecticism, and ch. V for the bhakti movement and syncretism gener-
on the enforcement of conformity and their bitter opposi- ally.
tion to the syncretic tendencies of such as the Mughal Em-

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6 The Politics of Pakistan Emergence of National Identity 7
with efforts to organize the community to resist oppression
The British Impact on Indian Islam by the landlords and by the Company's authorities. A more
The overthrow of Muslim political power by the forces of overt and more formidable challenge to the Company's (and
the English East India Company between 1757 and 1857 pro- later the Crown's) government was presented by the suc-
foundly transformed the role of Islam in the subcontinent. cessors of Shah Waliullah in the Delhi area, principally Say-
The former Muslim ruling classes were dispossessed and, in yid Ahmad Barelvi (1786-1831). Preaching the need to re-
,Bengal, impoverished; alienated from their conquerors, they form Islam of its abuses by eliminating Hinduist practices,
withdrew into an isolation dominated by dreams of regaining Sayyid Ahmad also taught that India under British rule was
power. Scorning service under the new rulers, Muslims left dar-ul-harb ("the abode of war," as distinguished from dar-
the way clear for their former Hindu subordinates, who ul-lslam, "the abode of peace") and that the faithful must
quickly adapted to the new dispensation and flocked to the engage in jihad for the triumph of Islam. Since revolt against
service of the Company's administration. The final blows to the British power was impracticable, Sayyid Ahmad directed
old-school Muslim government servants were the abandon- his preaching in the first instance against the Sikh kingdom
ment of Persian as the official language in 1835 and the cessa- in Punjab, leading his followers from a base near Peshawar
tion some years later of the practice of appointing qadis to in Pathan territory. After Sayyid Ahmad's death in battle in
deal with offenses under Muslim law. With missionary in- 1831, his disciples maintained the colony of mujahidin (the
fluences increasing among the Company's servants, both Is- so-called Hindustani fanatics) in the mountainous area
lam and Hinduism were challenged philosophically by Chris- around the upper Indus until well into the twentieth cen-
tianity and the Whig morality of Victorian England. The tury.
response of Islam, already affected by the reformist teaching The Indian "Mutiny" of 1857 rallied Muslims in Awadh
of Shah Waliullah and his followers, was a puritan move- (modern Uttar Pradesh) and Bihar around the figure of the
ment to seek strength by purging the faith of Hindu in- titular Mughal emperor in Delhi in an effort to destroy the
fluences, rather than an attempt to come to terms with a con- infidel and regain lost power. Elsewhere, particularly in Pun-
temporary world dominated by British power. 2 jab and on the Afghan frontier, most Muslims remained
The so-called Indian Wahhabi movement, thus described loyal to the British and helped them to crush the revolt.
because of superficial similarities with the puritan doctrines However, because of the Muslim color given the revolt by
of the eighteenth-century Arab reformer Ibn Abd al Wah- the prominence of the emperor and the Awadh nobility, the
hab, included in fact two separate tendencies. In Bengal, British tended to blame the community as a whole and to -
peasant discontent in the early nineteenth century provided consider Muslims to be inherently untrustworthy. For their
a fertile field for reform preachers who combined puritanism part, the ulama and the aristocracy under their influence
2 On Waliullah and nineteenth-century "Wahhabism" see Freeland withdrew even more from contact with the rulers and all they
Abbott, Islam and Pakistan (Ithaca, 1968), ch. 3. represented. Increasingly alienated from a society changing

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8 The Politics of Pakistan Emergence of National Identity g
under the impact of western Christian ideas, the ulama community to the rising generations of Muslims, particularly
seemed unable to appreciate the need to rethink the theo- to the awakening upper middle classes of Punjab and the
logical and political position of the Muslims if the com- Northwestern Provinces (now Uttar Pradesh).
munity, no longer possessing political supremacy, were to During the 187o's Sir Syed's efforts at political reconcilia-
survive. tion bore fruit, and British officialdom began to adopt a 'lI,ji
The necessary leadership for the reform of Indian Islam more sympathetic attitude toward the Muslims. Thereafter
and the reconciliation of the community with the British Sir Syed was adamant in his insistence that Muslims should
was provided by Sir Syed Ahmad Khan (1817-1898). The abstain from any political activity that might endanger this
scion of a noble Delhi family, Syed Ahmad remained faithful rapprochement. In 1887 he urged his fellow Muslims to re-
to the British during the Mutiny. Recognizing that violent main aloof from the fledgling Indian National Congress
political action against the British was useless and that intel- (founded 1885), and to counter its attraction he and his col-
lectual rejection of European ideas was dangerous in that it leagues founded in 1888 the United Indian Patriotic Asso-
weakened the community's defenses, he resolved on a pro- ciation and in 1893 the Muhammadan Anglo-Oriental De-
gram of intellectual and educational reconstruction. This fence Association, to oppose political agitation among the
program involved three points: reconciliation with the gov- Muslims and to foster a spirit of loyalty to the Crown. Al-
ernment; adoption of the good in western ideas through though some Muslims did join the Congress, by and large Sir
English education; and abstention from politics for the fore- Syed's viewpoint prevailed so long as he lived.
seeable future. The creation of the Muslim-majority province of Eastern
Before Sir Syed's death, his goals for his community had Bengal and Assam by Lord Curzon in 1905 marked a politi-
been substantially achieved. He wrote a series of works ex- cal turning point for Sir Syed's followers and the Aligarh
plaining the Muslim role in the revolt of 1857 and seeking movement. Theretofore content to depend on the good will ~
to demonstrate the essential loyalty of Muslims to the British of the government for the protection of their interests, the
Crown. Through interpretation of the Bible and the Quran Muslims were prompted by the bitter opposition of the
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he sought to show the similarities between Islam and Chris- Hindus to the partition of Bengal to organize for defense of !I
tianity, and thereby to create a more sympathetic under- their gains. On October 1, 1906, a deputation of Muslim If!
standing between Muslims and British. Sir Syed placed great leaders organized by Sayyid Mahdi Ali (Nawab Muhsin ul-
emphasis on modern education; he founded in 1875 the
Muhammadan Anglo-Oriental College at Aligarh and in
Mulk), the secretary of the Aligarh college, and led by the
Aga Khan, waited upon Viceroy Lord Minto at Simla to re-
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1886 the All-India Muhammadan Educational Conference. quest, and receive assurances of, special representation for
The M.A.O. College and its intellectual adherents, consti- Muslims in future constitutional arrangements. The follow-
tuting the "Aligarh movement," disseminated Sir Syed's ing December the All-India Muhammadan Educational Con-
principles of social and intellectual uplift for the Muslim ference met in Dacca, the capital of Eastern Bengal and As-

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10 The Politics of Pakistan
Emergence of National Identity 11
sam, and at the close of its sessions the leaders remained in provision their politically unsophisticated community would
conference to found an All-India Muslim League. Although be unable to elect its representatives, and that unless the situ-
in doing so the Muslim leaders broke with Sir Syed's advice ation were corrected bitterness against the Hindu majority
to remain aloof from politics, the League in its early years would develop. Although the amount of separate represen-
was in fact an organized expression of his loyalism. Accord- tation provided the Muslims by the Indian Councils Act of
ing to the founding resolution, the League's purposes were: 1909 was not as great as the League had desired, the essence
a) to promote, among the Muslims of India, feelings of loyalty to of their demand was recognized in this first step toward the
the British Government, and to remove any misconception development of genuinely representative government in
that may arise as to the intention of Government with regard India.
to any of its measures;
b) to protect and advance the political rights and interests of the Impact of the Congress on the Muslim Community
Muslims of India, and to respectfully represent their needs The founding in 188 5 of the Indian National Congress to
and aspirations to the Government;
provide a forum for the expression of the political opinions
c) to prevent the rise, among the Muslims of India, of any feel-
and interests of all Indians without regard to religious or
ing of hostility towards other communities, without prejudice
to the other aforementioned objects of the League.3 communal affiliation posed an immediate challenge to the
awakening Muslim community. In seeking support from
The loyalism emphasized in the first of the Muslim Muslims as well as other Indians, the organizers of the Con-
League's purposes characterized its arguments in 1906-1908 in gress emphasized the common interests of the new middle
pressing successfully to the authorities in India and in Lon- classes. The principal Muslim organization then in existence,
don the demand that representation for the Muslims should Syed Ameer Ali's Calcutta-based Central National Muham-
be provided through separate communal electorates in the madan Association, expressed cautious approval of the first
forthcoming reforms of the Indian central and provincial meeting of the Congress but subsequently abstained from
legislatures. In this the League was following Sir Syed, who any involvement on the ground that the Congress program
as early as 1883 had rejected the principle of straightforward aiming at democratic majority rule would "lead to the politi-
election as a means of representation in India. The Muslims cal extinction of the Mohammedans." 4 Despite this judg-
contended that experience had shown that without special ment and the warnings of Sir Syed Ahmad Khan, educated
Muslims in the Presidency towns (Bombay, Madras, and
3 Enclosure to demiofficial letter no. 47, Government of Indian Home
Department, February 7, 1907, from Sir H. H. Risley to Sir Arthur
Calcutta) responded to the Congress appeal, identifying
Godley, Permanent Under Secretary of State for India (India Office themselves wholly with their non-Muslim colleagues. In Up-
Records, Judicial and Public Papers, 1907, vol. 796, file no. 614; un- per India support for the new organization came from Mus-
published Crown-copyright material transcribed by permission of the 4 Quoted in Ram Gopal, Indian Muslims: A Political History (r858-
Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs). r947) (London, 1959), p. 76.

'°'II!'
"' II'
 Emergence of National Identity 13
12 The Politics of Pakistan
world, were the traditionalists-represented theologically by
lims who were out of sympathy with the Aligarh movement the orthodox seminary at Deoband (founded in 1865)-who
and hence disinclined to follow Sir Syed's advice. N everthe- opposed the Aligarh movement. Repelled by Sir Syed's reli-
less, the Congress remained dispropartionately Hindu in gious and educational doctrines and by his political loyalism,
composition despite its efforts to achieve a national and non- they found in the Congress allies with whom to continue the
communal identity. struggle against the infidel ruler. Thus, paradoxically, tradi-
Although loyalty to the Crown remained a basic principle tionally oriented orthodox Muslims joined forces with Con-
of the Congress leadership throughout the thirty years of the gress nationalism, while the socially and educationally more
Moderate era (1885-1915), as a focus of opposition to the advanced members of the community tended to abstain or
status quo the organization soon attracted less conciliatory (after 1906) to support the Muslim League.
elements. During the 189o's pressures to give the Congress a After 1912 the broad categorization of politically con- :i
more popular base increased, and under the leadership of scious Muslims as either Congress nationalists or Aligarh- !l
B. G. Tilak (1856-1920) movements were launched that in i
~
movement loyalists began rapidly to break down. Despite the
time had the effect of encouraging Hindu revivalism and of loyalty of the Muslim League and the complete cooperation
challenging the liberal-constitutionalist assumptions of the of the community with the government in an era of unrest, ~
Moderate leaders. In the Hindu antipartition agitation in the repeated official declarations that the partition of Bengal
ri

Bengal, political and religious doctrines were blended in rev- ~

was a "settled fact" were negated by the king's Delhi procla-
olutionary terrorism directed against the government and its mation of December 1911. The abolition of the province of
Indian supporters, both Hindu and Muslim. In Punjab the Eastern Bengal and Assam with effect from March 31, 1912,
puritan Hindu reform teachings of the Arya Samaj (a reviv- embittered the loyalists, casting doubt on the government's
alist movement founded in 1875) similarly inspired anti- good faith and integrity and causing a reaction against Sir
Christian and anti-Muslim sentiments, and ultimately revolu- Syed's policies. At the same time, during the first two decades
tionary agitation. The association of these Hindu extremist of the twentieth century the alienation of the orthodox from
tendencies with the Congress alarmed many Muslims, partic- the British raj was given new emphasis by the spread of pan-
ularly those of the Aligarh movement, and contributed to Islamic ideas and an increasing concern among Indian Mus-
the decision to establish the Muslim League as a respectably lims for the political fortunes of the Turkish Empire. As
loyal political body. Turkey tottered under the attacks of Christian powers in the
As a center of opposition to the British raj, the militant Balkans and North Africa, she seemed to symbolize the fate
wing of the Congress attracted some elements in the Muslim of Islamic faith and culture. The sultan of Turkey was in-
community. In direct line of emotional and intellectual creasingly regarded as the khalifa of Islam, titular head of 11

descent from that section of the ulama who had supported the community, and threats to his status and powers elicited
the revolt of 1857 to assert the supremacy of Islam and who prompt emotional reactions in India. This sentiment affected
thereafter refused to accept the imperatives of ·a changed

't
 -~----------,
I.,!1
11
Emergence of National Identity 15
14 The Politics of Pakistan 11

not only the traditionalists but also followers of the Aligarh Muslim Congressmen, who reacted differently to the affair.
The boycott movement itself, calling for withdrawal of stu- I
n
movement, who found their loyalty to the British Crown- I
already shaken by the partition affair-severely strained as dents from schools and colleges, caused resentment among
Turkey passed from crisis to crisis at the hands of Britain's educated Muslims when Gandhi appealed for the closure of
European allies. The final complication was the outbreak Aligarh Muslim University and Islamia College in Lahore,
of war between Turkey and the British Empire in 1914, seeming to undo the work of Sir Syed. Gandhi's decision to
bringing ultimately defeat and the dissolution of the Turk- call off the movement in February 1922 was regarded as a
betrayal by ardent Khilafatists, who attempted to carry on
ish Empire. with ever-diminishing support until the futility of the move-
At the end of World War I pan-Islamic and nationalist
sentiments in India were united in the Gandhian noncooper- ment was demonstrated by the Turks' abolition of the Khila-
ation movement to force concessions from the British. Indian fat in March 1924. The Muslim feeling of depression and
Muslim concern for the fate of Turkey and the khalifa was frustration coincided with increasing Hindu-Muslim tension,
expressed in 1919 in the "Khilafat" campaign. At the sug-
gestion of M. K. Gandhi, the Khilafat committee adopted in
culminating in the break between Gandhi and the Khilafat
movement leaders Mohammed Ali and Shaukat Ali in II
I:
September 1924. ,,I•
May 1920 a program of mass action in the form of noncoop-
eration with the government and boycott of official institu-
tions. Subsequently the noncooperation movement was en-
The re-emergence of the Muslim League as an indepen-
dent political force in 1924 marked the end of an era of close
cooperation with and even subordination to the Congress.
I
I
dorsed by the Congress and the Muslim League, linking the
When the annulment of the partition of Bengal demon-
emotional Muslim pan-Islamic grievance with the postwar
nationalist demand for swaraj ("self-government") within strated the inadequacy of a policy of loyal dependence, the
younger and more nationalist Muslim leaders brought about
I
•I
h
11
one year. Enthusiastic Muslim participation in the noncoop-
ation movement gave the Congress for the first time a truly a change in the League's orientation. The League session of I
mass character and brought many Muslims firmly into the March 1913 adopted as its political objective "the attainment 11
:!
. . . of a system of self-government suitable to India." 6 Al-
Congress fold. 5 though a proposal to endorse the Congress objective of colo-
The Hindu-Muslim unity carefully constructed by Gandhi
under the aegis of the Congress-Khilafat alliance began to nial (i.e., dominion) self-government was passed over, the
collapse even before the termination of the noncooperation new creed alienated conservatives such as the Aga Khan, who
movement. The rebellion of the Moplahs (Muslim pea:sants) thereafter withdrew from the League. In subsequent years
in Kerala in July 1921 drove a wedge between Hindu and the League moved closer to the Congress, the two organiza-
tions holding their annual sessions at the same time and
5 Aziz Ahmad, op. cit., "Epilogue: Modern Separatism," especially
6 Sir Reginald Coupland, The Indian Problem (New York, 1944), I,
pp. 268-269 for the post-Khilafat residue of Muslim support for Con- 46.
gress.

'
16 The Politics of Pakistan Emergence of National Identity 17
locale from 1915 to 1920. This alliance was cemented in 1916 political agitation. Later that year, disapproving of the ir-
in the Lucknow Pact, in which the Congress for the first rational and anticonstitutional character of Gandhian mass
and only time accepted the Muslim claim for separate repre- action, he resigned from the Congress and withdrew from
sentation in legislative bodies, and the League, despite its active politics. Following the failure of the Khilafat and non-
past wariness of Congress palitics, joined in demanding con- cooperation movements and of the Gandhian experiment in
stitutional reforms and equality of status for India within Hindu-Muslim unity, Jinnah returned (in late 1923) to the
the Empire. The blurring of the lines between the two organ- central legislature and then to the platform of the Muslim
izations was encouraged by the Khilafat and noncooperation League, appealing for increased constitutional safeguards for
movements after 1919, and the League practically ceased to Muslims that would re-establish a sense of security and inter-
exist until the revival of communal tensions recalled Mus- communal harmony. For another ten years, despite conflicts
lims to their political exclusivity and the heritage of Sir and splits within the League, Jinnah struggled to gain ac-
Syed Ahmad Khan. ceptance of his views by the Muslims, in order to re-create,
The Muslim League's annual session of 1924 ushered in a on the basis of an agreement with Congress guaranteeing
quarter of a century of Muslim politics dominated by minority rights, the old Hindu-Muslim nationalist alliance
Mohammed Ali Jinnah (1876-1948). Jinnah, a Karachi-born for constitutional advance.
Bombay barrister, began his political career as private secre-
Constitutional Advance
tary to Dadabhai N aoroji, the Parsi "grand old man" of the
Congress. Strongly nationalist by conviction, Jinnah was also One consequence of the introduction of ministerial gov-
a dedicated constitutionalist, seeking to attain his goals ernment in the provinces under the Government of India
through the manipulation and transformation of existing Act of 1919 was to increase the demands for minority safe-
institutions. His first association with the Muslim League guards. The Act itself accepted the principle, laid down in
came in 1913 when he agreed to assist in the redefinition of the Morley-Minto reforms of 1909, of separate communal I
its aims; he subsequently became a member on the under- electorates for the legislatures and extended it (in various r:
tl
standing that his primary nationalist commitment was not provinces) to Sikhs, Europeans, Anglo-Indians, and Indian
to be compromised thereby. In 1916 Jinnah was president of Christians; the allocation of seats for the Muslims was made !
the session that endorsed the Lucknow Pact. He gave evi- in accordance with the principles agreed upon in the Luck-
dence in London, both as a member of the Imperial Legisla- now Pact of 1916. 7 The executive at the center remained :11
tive Council and as a nationalist, on the constitutional pro- substantially unchanged, with overriding powers vested in 1
:i
posals which eventuated in the Government of India Act of the governor general (viceroy) and his executive council, in- l
I::
,i
1919. Although he favored acceptance of the reforms em- cluding the power if necessary to bypass the now bicameral
bodied in the 1919 Act, he resigned in March 1920 from the
7 Ibid., p. 62.
Legislative Council to protest the government's repression of

' .\L
~1,
!
 Emergence of National Identity 19
18 The Politics of Pakistan
Indian legislature, but increased executive and legislative guards for minont1es in the Muslim provinces. Although
powers were devolved to the provinces. In a scheme known these proposals were accepted by the Madras Congress in
as "dyarchy," provincial responsibilities were divided be- December 1927, they were repudiated by the Hindu Maha-
tween "reserved" and "transferred" subjects, administered sabha (the principal Hindu communal organization) and by
by the governor in consultation respectively with appointed Muslims who refused to give up separate electorates under
executive councilors and elected ministers. This was in- any conditions.
tended to allow Indians a greater share in their government, The appointment of the Simon Commission by the British
but the participation of Indian ministers, necessarily drawn government in November 1927 initiated the process of con-
from one community or another, compromised the tradi- stitutional discussion that led both to the collapse of Jinnah's
tional neutrality of government and led to suspicions of com- efforts to build a new Congress-League alliance and to the
munal prejudice in administration. Minority community official acceptance of a federation as the next stage of India's
legislators soon realized that the demand for further exten- constitutional evolution. The lack of Indians on the Simon
li
sion of ministerial responsibility would result in provincial
governments dominated by the majority (whether Hindu
Commission outraged nationalist sentiment, and the Con-
gress resolved to boycott its proceedings. The Muslim
League split over the boycott issue, the Calcutta session un-
;
111
or Muslim) and presumably unsympathetic to the minority.
Accordingly, while demanding prompt and far-reaching der Jinnah adopting the Congress line, while the Lahore l
constitutional advance, the Lahore Muslim League session session appealed for cooperation. At this time Lord Birken-
in 1924, with Jinnah presiding, reaffirmed its insistence on head, Secretary of State for India, challenged Indian leaders
separate electorates and on the Lucknow Pact rule that no to produce constructive constitutional suggestions. In re-
bill or resolution affecting a community should be adopted sponse an All-Parties Conference, including the Jinnah sec-
if opposed by three-quarters of the representatives of that tion of the League in its first sessions, met and appointed a
community. Further, the session resolved that a federal sys- committee under Pandit Motilal Nehru to report on the
tem with "full and complete provincial autonomy" was essen- principles of a constitution for India. The League soon be-
tial for the protection of Muslim interests. In March 1927 a came apprehensive about the outcome and withdrew, and
meeting of Muslim leaders presided over by Jinnah elabo- consequently the Nehru Report was produced without its
rated this demand to include the separation of Muslim- participation.
majority Sind from Hindu-majority Bombay, reforms in The Muslim reaction to the Nehru Report was generally
Baluchistan and the North-West Frontier Province, and guar- negative, but the Jinnah faction of the League was deter-
antees of a Muslim legislative majority in Bengal and Pun- mined to try to persuade the overwhelmingly Hindu All-
jab. In return they agreed to accept a common electoral roll Parties Convention, meeting in Calcutta in late December
with a reservation of one-third of the seats in the central 1928, to modify the Report by accepting the 1927 Muslim
legislature for Muslims, and they promised reciprocal safe- proposals. Jinnah was the principal spokesman for the Mus-

I
. II
\I
 Emergence of National Identity 21
20 The Politics of Pakistan
lim League in the Convention, but his appeals for reconcilia- ter to be settled by an award of Prime Minister Ramsay Mac-
tion, generosity, and unity were in vain. The delegates, chal- Donald. Although the award (August 4, 1932) secured sepa-
lenging his right to speak for Indian Muslims, rejected all of rate electorates for Muslims and other communities, its dis-
his proposals, and Jinnah left Calcutta depressed and dis- proportionate allocation of legislative seats to minorities de-
8 prived Muslims of their majorities in Bengal and Punjab.
appointed: it was "the parting of the ways."
The old tensions within the Muslim community between The last conference (November-December 1932) again met
Indian nationalist and Muslim loyalist sentiments culmi- without the Congress, which had resumed its boycott, and
nated, after the Nehru Report fiasco, in disillusion and dis- without Jinnah, who, apparently disillusioned by the whole
integration. Jinnah attempted to bring about a reintegration course of events, had decided to abandon politics and settle
in England.
of the League on the basis of a formula known as the "Four-
teen Points," summarizing the Muslim demand for safe- The protracted constitution-making process culminated in
guards, a federal system, and-until Muslims should agree the Government of India Act of 1935. The Act was a federal
that their interests had been adequately secured-separate constitution, providing for government by responsible min-
electorates. However, the unification meeting on March 28, isters in the provinces and linking the provinces with the
1929, was unable to reach agreement between the various princely states under a central government still ultimately
factions and adjourned in failure, leaving the Muslims facing responsible to the Secretary of State for India in London.
the next stage of constitutional discussions in disarray. The reaction of Indian political parties was generally nega-
At the Round Table Conferences in London, convened tive, for not only did it fall short of responsible government
by the British government after the Simon Commission had at the center, but the goal of dominion status was not recog-
completed its work, the Muslim delegation was led by the nized even as an aspiration. The Congress rejected the new
Aga Khan and included the leaders of the various factions, constitution "imposed from outside" and determined to con-
among them Jinnah. In the absence of the Congress-then test the elections in the hope of "ending" the Act. The Mus-
involved in a second noncooperation movement-the first lim League, reunited since late 1933 under the leadership
conference (November 1930-January 1931) agreed that the of Jinnah-who had returned from England in answer to the
future constitution should be federal. Civil disobedience was appeals of his colleagues-disliked the Act because of the
suspended during 1931, and the second conference (Septem- restrictions on provincial autonomy imposed by the many
ber-December 1931) was attended by Gandhi as the sole reservations and special powers for the governors and the
spokesman of the Congress. His refusal to accept the minori- governor general. Both parties repudiated the federal part of
ties' demands for safeguards and separate electorates angered the constitution as "fundamentally bad" because of the large
minority leaders and forced the conference to leave the mat- voice it gave to the authoritarian Indian princes. Provincial
autonomy came into effect on April 1, 1937, but the federal
portion of the Act was never implemented because none of
s Hector Bolitho, Jinnah: Creator of Pakistan (London, 1954), p. 95.
I
l. ,,
,- 11
 Emergence of National Identity 23
22 The Politics of Pakistan
tier. After some hesitation over the question of the special
the princes agreed to accede to the federation. For that rea- powers of the governors, the Congress agreed to accept min-
son the central government continued to exist as constituted isterial office in July 1937. Emboldened by their strength and 1
by the 1919 Act until the transfer of power in 1947. the weakness of the League, Congress leaders decided against I
illf1
The Muslim League approached the provincial elections cooperation with the League, including within the one-party I':

of 1937 in a spirit of willingness to cooperate with the Con- governments formed in the seven Congress provinces only 11!
gress. At Bombay in April 1936 the League resolved to work Muslims who accepted the Congress creed. In so acting, the
the new constitution "for what it was worth," in accordance Congress reflected the view its president, Jawaharlal Nehru,
with Jinnah's view that constitutional agitation was the expressed in a public exchange with Jinnah in early 1937,
proper means to secure political change. The League elec- that "there are only two forces in India today-British im- I
tion manifesto outlined a social policy not greatly different perialism and the Congress representing Indian national-
from that of the Congress, and pledged League representa- ism." This refusal to take the League seriously brought the
tives to work for "democratic full self-government" in the inevitable response from Jinnah: "There is a third party in i,11
provinces and at the center, within a framework of safe- this country and that is the Muslims. We are not going to be
guards for the minorities. In contesting general elections for dictated to by anybody." 10 With that the Muslim League set
the first time, the League under Jinnah's leadership sought out on its separate course, determined to prove its right to i~
to bring together all Muslim factions so that their unified speak on behalf of Indian Muslims as an equal of the Con-
voice might be respected, and anticipated a policy of cooper- gress.
9
ation with the Congress "in the interests of India." Congress The two years following the Congress decision to spurn
responded to League overtures by informal "no contest" the League and to woo the Muslim masses directly saw the
agreements, particularly in the United Provinces, and put up League begin its transformation from a small coterie of up-
candidates for only 58 of the total of 482 Muslim seats.
When the election results were declared in February 1937,
per-middle-class politicians into a genuine popular move-
ment. At its session in Lucknow in October 1937 the League
·I 11
11
the Congress had won twenty-six Muslim seats (nineteen of turned its back on cooperation with the Congress and
them in the North-West Frontier Province) and a sweeping launched its own mass contact campaign. In the Congress 111
~
victory in the general constituencies, commanding pluralities provinces the hoisting of the Congress banner as the national
in Bombay, Assam, and the Frontier and winning comfort- flag on public buildings, the singing of "Bande Mataram"
ably in the Hindu-majority provinces. The League won only (the old Hindu nationalist song of Bengal antipartition days)
108 seats, losing to independents in the Muslim-minority as the national anthem, the quasi-religious veneration given
a,

provinces, to local parties in Bengal, Punjab, and Sind, and to pictures of Gandhi in the schools, the emphasis on Hindi
to the Congress-affiliated Khudai Khidmatgars in the Fron-
10 Gopal, op. cit., p. 251, and Khalid Bin Sayeed, Pakistan: The

\
Formative Phase (Karachi, 1960), p. 85.
9 A. A. Ravoof, Meet Mr. Jinnah (3d ed.; Lahore, 1955), p. 84. :11

1 ·,
 ......
~~~~~ ..................................................~~~~~~~~~~~
-.--.--

Emergence of National Identity 25

24 The Politics of Pakistan
at the expense of Urdu, plus other sorts of favoritism, fancied bay only in 1935, personalities rather than parties continued
or real, provided the basis for League charges of Congress to determine political alignments, and it was not until 1942
that a fairly stable League ministry was achieved. In the
"atrocities" against the Muslims. Muslim members of Con-
North-West Frontier Province, where the Congress had
gress cabinets were denounced as stooges, and the governors
managed to capture the Pathan peasant movement (the
and the governor general were attacked for failing to use
Khudai Khidmatgars of Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan), the
their reserved powers to protect the Muslims. The charge
that not only the economic position but the very existence League in 1937 was the landlords' party, as in the United
Provinces, facing an uphill struggle to gain popular support.
of the Muslim minority was threatened under Congress raj
found a ready response that was reflected at the polls: be- The growth of the League was demonstrated in by-election
victories from 1938 onward: twelve in Bengal, twelve in
tween January 1938 and September 1942 the Congress .won
Punjab, three in the Frontier, and one in Sind, while the
not a single Muslim by-election in the Muslim-minority
Congress secured only one Muslim seat in the Frontier and
provinces; the League won fourteen.11 one in Sind. 12
In the Muslim-majority provinces, where the League's
Like the experience of ministerial government after 1921,
electoral weakness had been most evident, its position was
provincial autonomy under the 1935 Act contributed to the
strengthened when provincial leaders endorsed the League
growing distrust between Muslims and Hindus. The inade-
at its Lucknow session. In those areas the threat of Hindu
quacy of safeguards and separate electorates had led Jinnah
domination was not so clear as in the Muslim-minority prov-
to the demand for a federal system, but events in 1937-1939
inces, and the traditional sense of communal identity was
showed that minorities within the provinces were still at the
less pressing. There, too, the economic grievances of the
mercy of the majority and indicated that in India as a whole
peasantry rather than the aspirations of the Muslim middle
class provided the basis for political action. In Punjab, Sir the Muslim provinces would be subject to a permanently
Sikandar Hayat Khan's Unionist party, an intercommunal Hindu-dominated central government. Jinnah refused to
alliance representing Muslim, Hindu, and Sikh rural inter- countenance such a development, and early in 1938 he de-
clared that the democratic parliamentary system of govern-
ests, won a firm majority in 1937. The Sikandar-Jinnah Pact,
ment was unsuited to India. 13 The following April, for the
bringing Muslim Unionists into the League, gave the League
a foothold in Punjab while preserving the autonomy of the first time secure in the knowledge that his ascendancy in the
Unionist ministry. In Bengal, A. K. Fazlul Huq's Krishak League was undisputed, he insisted that as a prerequisite for
Proja party, based on the peasantry of eastern Bengal, any attempted solution of the constitutional problem the
merged with the League to form a Muslim League coalition 12 Ibid.
ministry. In landlord-dominated Sind, separated from Born- 13 At the Muslim University Union, Aligarh, February 5, 1938. In
Jamil-ud-Din Ahmad, ed., Some Recent Speeches and Writings of Mr.
11 Coupland, op. cit., II, 333. Jinnah (5th ed.; Lahore, 1952), I, 41-49.

l
\
 -

Emergence of National Identity 27

The Politics of Pakistan
become widely accepted in Muslim League circles. In Octo-
ress must recognize that the League was the sole repre- ber of that year the Sind Provincial League session at Karachi
tive organization of the Muslims, of equal importance endorsed the principle of self-determination for both Hindus
itself.14 This the Congress refused to do, and the broad and Muslims, and recommended that the All-India Muslim
between the two was emphasized when the resignation League "devise a scheme of constitution under which the
e Congress ministries after the outbreak of war was wel- Muslims may attain full independence." 15
~d by Jinnah and celebrated with thanksgiving by the The logic of the conception of the Muslim community as
;ue on "Deliverance Day," December 22, 1939. a separate nation made partnership a short-lived doctrine. A
resolution of the League's working committee on September
Pakistan Demand 18, 1939, endorsed the objective of a free India, but declared
he concept of partnership between equals enunciated in that the consent and approval of the League was essential for
) embodied the age-old Muslim concern for the preserva- any future constitutional changes, and accordingly asked the
. of the separate identity of the community. Affirmed by government to "take into its confidence the Muslim League
Syed as the basis of his social and political teachings, which is the only organization that can speak on behalf of
slim separatism was inherent in the pan-Islamic orienta- Muslim India." 16 The deep-seated Muslim distrust of the
l of the orthodox leaders of the Khilafat movement, with Hindu majority and of the Congress gave rise during 1938-
ir concern for the fate of Islam in the modern world. The 1939 to a variety of proposals for the reorganization of the
tacles impeding the re-creation of an Islamic society within subcontinent to permit the Muslim nation to coexist with
>0litical order dominated by non-Muslims inspired the Hindudom in a loosely united India, but since Congress re-
!t-philosopher Sir Muhammad Iqbal, addressing the Mus- jected out of hand the very notion of Muslim nationhood,
l League session at Allahabad on December 29, 1930, to Muslims were driven to more uncompromising statements of
)pose the establishment of a unified Muslim state in the their case. In so doing Muslims realized that for them Indian
rthwest as part of a new federal India. Iqbal said that the nationhood no longer held any meaning, and therefore the
uslims had such distinct characteristics that they were a problem of agreement with the Congress had become irrele-
.tion. This concept was adopted during the Round Table vant. In January 1940 Jinnah elaborated the "two-nation
mferences by a group of young Muslims at Cambridge to theory" in the British journal Time and Tide, emphasizing
pport their advocacy of the creation of an entirely inde- the unworkability of parliamentary democratic institutions
:ndent Muslim state for which they coined the name when the people affected by them "represent two distinct
>akistan." This proposal was dismissed by Muslim political
15 Coupland, op. cit., II, 197. See also Aziz Ahmad, op. cit., pp. 271-
aders of the time, but by 1938 the "two-nation theory" had
275.
14 Letter from Jinnah to J. Nehru, April 12, 1938, cited in Bolitho, 16 Coupland, op. cit., II, 216.

l
~· cit., p. 117.
28 The Politics of Pakistan

and separate civilisations" with different moralities and Emergence of National Identity 29

values. 17 In February he told the press that the Muslims independence separately. After the termination of the ses-
would determine their own destiny, despite the British or sion pe replied to criticism from Congress and other quar-
the Congress, and at the Lahore session of the League in ters, explaining that while there was no question of migra-
March they proceeded to do so. tion en masse, exchange of population so far as practicable
On March 23, 1940, the Muslim League session at Lahore -would have to be considered. The purpose of partition was
formally adopted the goal of independence for the Muslim to free the Muslim-majority areas--only, since with or without
areas of India. -partidon the status of Muslim minorities would remain un-
--affect~d.. Jinnah belfr~ved that when "the present tension
Resolved that it is the considered view of this session of the All-
-cre.ated by the ambition of one community dominating over
India Muslim League that no constitutional plan would be work-.

/I
able in this country or acceptable to the Muslims unless it is de- the other and establishing supremacy over all the rest is
signed on the following basic principles, viz., that geographically ceased [sic], we shall find better understanding and goodwill
contiguous units are demarcated into regions which should be so -·cr~~~ed all round." 19 Therefore the minorities in both home-
constituted with such territorial readjmtments as may be neces- lands would find their position improved.
sary that the areas in which the Muslims are numerically in a -- Having adopted the goal of Pakistan-the name was soon
majority, as in the north-western and eastern zones of India, attached by critics to the "Muslim homeland"-Jinnah and
should be grouped to constitute "Independent States" in which the Muslim League set about consolidating their hold on
the constituent units shall be autonomous and sovereign. 1 s Muslim India. The Congress still commanded the support of
The Lahore Resolution made the break with the Congress individual nationalist Muslims such as Abul Kalam Azad
and Indian nationalism complete. In his presidential address (president of the Congress, 1940-1945) and o(tJ1.ose conserva-
to the session Jinnah reviewed the course of events since the tive religious elements who had consistently opposed the
advent of provincial autonomy, leading inexorably to the Aligarh movement and the Muslim League. In addition, the
conclusion that however well organized the Muslims might Khudai Khidmatgars in the Frontier maintained their alli-
be or however justified their dissenting views, they could mci~'V'fth the Congress, and the Punjab Unionist leaders
never prevail against the Hindu majority in India. He elabo- were at best lukewarm about the prospect of a partition that
rated once more the national differences between Muslims might destroy their province. Asserting the League's right
and Hindus, and declared that the only means to enable to be recognized as the sole voice of Muslim India, Jinnah
them to live in peace and justice was for the two to achieve and his working committee began to enforce a discipline
over provincial Leagues very similar to that unitary control
17 Jinnah's statement was republished in Jamil-ud-Din Ahmad, op.
exercised by the Congress "High Command" over Congress
cit., pp. 128-138_
18 Full text in A. B. Rajput, Muslim League, Yesterday and Today
provincial ministries before their resignations. External in-
(Lahore, 1948), pp. 79-80. 19 Statement on Lahore Resolution, in Jamil-ud-Din Ahmad,
pp. 183-187-
op. cit.,
28 The Politics of Pakistan Emergence of National Identity 29
and separate civilisations" with different moralities and independence separately. After the termination of the ses-
values.17 In February he told the press that the Muslims sion lie replied to criticism from Congress and other quar-
would determine their own destiny, despite the British or ters, explaining that while there was no question of migra-
the Congress, and at the Lahore session of the League in tion en masse, exchange of population so far as practicable
March they proceeded to do so. · would have to be considered. The purpose of partition was
On March 23, 1940, the Muslim League session at Lahore to free the Muslim-majority areas--only, since with or without
formally adopted the goal of independence for the Muslim ··partition. the status of Muslim minorities would remain un-
areas of India. affectid. · Jinnah beli~:ved that when "the present tension
Resolved that it is the considered view of this session of the All- created by the ambition of one community dominating over
India Muslim League that no constitutional plan would be work- the other and establishing supremacy over all the rest is
able in this country or acceptable to the Muslims unless it is de- . -ceased [sic], we shall find better understanding and goodwill
i
signed on the following basic principles, viz., that geographically ! ··created all round." 19 Therefore the minorities in both home-
contiguous units are demarcated into regions which should be so lands would find their position improved.
pi
jl
constituted with such territorial readjmtments as may be neces- I -- Having adopted the goal of Pakistan-the name was soon 11
t1
sary that the areas in which the Muslims are numerically in a attached by critics to the "Muslim homeland"-Jinnah and Ii
majority, as in the north-western and eastern zones of India,
should be grouped to constitute "Independent States" in which
the Muslim League set about consolidating their hold on I
Muslim India. The Congress still commanded the support of
the constituent units shall be autonomous and sovereign.ls
individual nationalist Muslims such as Abul Kalam Azad
The Lahore Resolution made the break with the Congress (president of the Congress, 1940-1945) and ohhose conserva-
and Indian nationalism complete. In his presidential address tive religious elements who had consistently opposed the
to the session Jinnah reviewed the course of events since the Aligarh movement and the Muslim League. In addition, the
advent of provincial autonomy, leading inexorably to the Khudai Khidmatgars in the Frontier maintained their alli-
conclusion that however well organized the Muslims might 'ince::·wlth th_e Co~gress, and the Punjab Unionist leaders
be or however justified their dissenting views, they could ~ere at best lukewarm about the prospect of a partition that
never prevail against the Hindu majority in India. He elabo- might destroy their province. Asserting the League's right
rated once more the national differences between Muslims to be recognized as the sole voice of Muslim India, Jinnah
and Hindus, and declared that the only means to enable and his working committee began to enforce a discipline
them to live in peace and justice was for the two to achieve over provincial Leagues very similar to that unitary control
17 Jinnah's statement was republished in Jamil-ud-Din Ahmad, op.
exercised by the Congress "High Command" over Congress
cit., pp. 128-138. provincial ministries before their resignations. External in-
18 Full text in A. B. Rajput, Muslim League, Yesterday and Today
10 Statement on Lahore Resolution, in Jamil-ud-Din Ahmad, op. cit.,
(Lahore, 1948), pp. 79-80. pp. 183-187.

1. I
i
',:II
30 The Politics of Pakistan Emergence of National Identity 31

terference was resented by some provincial leaders-princi- possible to form mm1stries. The League was able to gain
pally Fazlul Huq of Bengal, who broke with the League in British sympathy and to entrench itself politically and ad-
December 1941-but by virtue of his now great authority ministratively with this strategy, and Muslim loyalty during
over Muslims generally, Jinnah was able to insist on rigid the war-particularly during the Congress "Quit India"
obedience and gradually to establish loyal League ministries i:nov~lllellt in 1942-dramatized the divergent orientations
in province after province. Of all the proposed Pakistan ofj_I1.~-1~ag11e and the Congress more than any number of
provinces, only in Punjab did the League meet a reverse. In politic~} ~peeches could have done.
--·'"·---· .. '

April 1944 Premier Khizr Hayat Khan Tiwana refused t()

transform his cabinet into an orthodox Muslim League coali- The Transfer of Power
tion by accepting Jinnah's authority and therewith the Pakis- Throughout .. the. years of war and constitutional discus-
tan objective, which was anathema to his non-Muslim col- sions Jinnah was rigid and uncompromising in his insistence
leagues in the Unionist party. The League was therefore that the principle of partition be accepted. The League's ·1
forced into opposition, but over the next eighteen months it sweeping victory at the polls in December 1945 and the fol-
gradually won over the Unionist party's Muslim following. lowing January finally forced the British government to in- 111
!11
While the strength of the League was growing among the tervene by sending a three-man Cabinet Mission to attempt ·I
masses as well as in the provincial legislatures, Jinnah c~!I:ied to bring about a Congress-League agreement preserving the !
on a ceaseless campaign to secure recognition by the govern- unity of India. The Mission's twofold plan was published on
..ment. The outbreak of war in September 1939, and the Con- May 16, 1946, after a fruitless search for agreement, and al-
gress reaction thereto, offered Jinnah and the League an though it rejected the demand for partition the plan brought
opportunity they were quick to seize. Broadly, the Congress out once again the constitutionalist in Jinnah. On June 6
refused to cooperate in the war effort unless the British made the League, on Jinnah's advice, accepted the plan out of a
a declaration of India's independence and transferred real desire for a peaceful solution to the Indian problem, but
power to an Indian government responsible to a constituent stated that the ultimate objective of the Muslims continued
assembly, which would proceed to frame a constitution. In to be the attainment of Pakistan.
· contrast, Jinnah offered official Muslim League cooperation The essence of the Cabinet Mission Plan was the creation
and support of the war within the existing constitutional ar- of a three-tier constitution for India, with the provinces
rangements, provided that the League were recognized ·~~ th~ linked in two Muslim-majority groups (in the northwest:
only spokesman of the Muslim nation-with a consequent Baluchistan, the Frontier, Punjab, and Sind; in the north-
· veto on constitutional change-and were entrusted with east: Assam and Bengal) and one Hindu-majority group (the
commensurate governmental responsibilities. In the mean- remaining provinces) under a central government with mini-
time he acquiesced in the wholehearted cooperation of the mal powers. The long-term proposals were: ( 1) that the
provincial League organizations, where the latter found it provinces were to be represented in a Constituent Assembly

i
tll
32 The Politics of Pakistan Emergence of National Identity 33
l
made up of members elected by the provincial legislatures understanding with the Congress. The tradition of a life-
on the basis of one for every million inhabitants; and (2) that time was abandoned: "Never have we in the whole history
the representatives of the three groups would meet separately ofthe League done anything except by constitutional meth-
to draw up group constitutions by majority vote before meet- ods and constitutionalism. But now we are obliged and
ing in full assembly to work out a constitution for. all of forced into this position. This day we bid goodbye to con-
India. The short-term proposal was that the viceroy's execu- . stitutional methods." 20 Turning to the "tribunal of the
tive council was to be transformed into an interim govern- -Muslim nation," the League rejected the plan in all its
ment made up of members of the Indian parties in propor- aspects, called upon League members to renounce titles and
tions stated by the Cabinet Mission. The Congress disliked awards received from the government, and resolved on
the long-term proposals intensely, on the ground that Assam / j ~~irect action" to achieve Pakistan. For the first time the
and the Frontier, both Congress-ruled in 1946, should not be ! League could rely on mass support, for the general election
subjected to domination by Bengal and Punjab by being ...--;;,(had shown the solidity of its popular backing. The cry of ·iI
grouped against their will. Because grouping was an essential · 1 "lsfam in danger," to which the case for Pakistan had been
guarantee for the Muslims against the Hindu majority in reduced for mass consumption, had elicited an enthusiasm 1111

1!
India as a whole, the reservations and interpretations on this that could not in any case be limited by conference-table
11
point in the Congress working committee's eventual state- decisions, and "direct action" signaled the removal of consti- I·I
ment of June 25 accepting the long-term plan caused much tutionalist restraints on popular emotions. Although Jinnah
controversy. The climax came on July 10, when Congress declared that its purpose was to mobilize popular support for
president Jawaharlal Nehru told the press that the Constit- the leadership, Direct Action Day on August 16, 1946, was
uent Assembly would be sovereign and "unfettered" and marked by a communal holocaust in Calcutta, the capital of
therefore no grouping was likely. This, together with Viceroy Muslim League-ruled Bengal. The spread of communal
Lord Wavell's refusal to proceed to form a government after violence to other parts of India thereafter produced condi-
the Congress had rejected but the League had accepted the tions of near civil war, rendering unity impossible. 21
interim government scheme, led the League to a final and The complete collapse of intercommunal confidence was
bitter denunciation of the Congress, the plan, and the vice- in part occasioned by the circumstances in which an interim
roy. government was finally formed. The League's repudiation of
The meeting of the Muslim League Council in Bombay the Cabinet Mission Plan was followed on August 10, 1946,
on July 27-29, 1946, marked the destruction of the Cabinet by a Congress resolution accepting the plan (as interpreted
Mission Plan. After compromising the Pakistan demand in
20 Jinnah's remarks to the League Council, quoted in Ravoof, op.
order to achieve a peaceful solution of the political crisis, cit., p. 205.
Jinnah believed himself and the League to have been be- 21 See Ian Stephens, Pakistan (New York, 1963), chs. 7 and 8, for a
trayed by the British government in its desire to reach an clear and graphic account by an observer of the events of 1946.

1 11

ti
 T iii;
!
Emergence of National Identity 35
34 The Politics of Pakistan
On February 20, 1947, Prime Minister Attlee announced
•1
by the Congress) "in its entirety," whereupon Lord Wavell
invited Nehru to form a government. This apparent demis- the appointment of a new viceroy (Lord Mountbatten) and 1·

sion of power by the British into the hands of Congress anticipated a final transfer of power to one or more successor I
authorities in India by June 1948. The rush of events, how- 1111
sharpened the communal conflict, and a veritable "war of ! 11
rl
succession" broke out. Muslim "direct action" on August 16 ever, forced an acceleration of the program. Civil disobedi- I'

and later was a rejection of the projected Congress govern- enc~ _l~d by members of the Muslim League caused the fall 11
!1

ment of India. At the provincial level, it was intended to --~"{ Sir Khizr Hayat Khan Tiwana's Unionist-Congress min-
achieve de facto Pakistan by bolstering League ministries in "1stry)!1. P1:1njab on March 2, 1947, and soon made it evident
Bengal and Sind and overthrowing the Congress-backed gov- -that Dr. _I(han Sahib's Congress ministry in the Frontier
ernments of Punjab and the Frontier, where minority -p;~;i~ce no longer commanded popular support. Increased
and
·ant:1-
weightages had deprived the League of power, and of A~am.
/~!~~:_ _ <1 _s,!x~week delay, _during which Jinnah wr~~g__ !!?EI__
pro-Pakistan violence throughout the northwest was
rapidly undermining all constituted authority as Muslims
and non-Muslims struggled for position. The new viceroy,
!
!I
1Nehru the admission that the League was the "author.itaJiY.~-
1\irepresentativ~organiz_ati~nof an o.verwhelming majority 9f
who had taken office on March 22, concl~ded · that prompt
f
tlieMiisifois of India," 22 the League decided (on October
, 13) to join the interim government. No agreement with the I iE:.~!t.ion~a_"'gg -~ tr.~nsfer of power to two successor dominions
was th~ only solution. On June 3 in London and Delhi the
}fan for. . the t;~nsfer of. power was announced, ang.. .on... the
l
Congress had ·been ·reached, but Ji.nnah, still'"
convinced
i the value of constitutional activity, t~nt his five nomj~~s
of
.. --· -
I [following day Mountbatten revealed that it would take place
! 'in little more than two months, on August 15, 1947.
l_1.nto the viceroy's executive council, hoth to prevent the...CQn:_
gress from monopolizing the administration and to cax:r:.¥.OU i ' The Muslim League regarded the partition plan as a "com-
· the battle for Pakistan from within, The League stood fast promise" because it involved-at the insistence of the Con-
·on its rejection of the Cabinet Mission Plan and the Constit- gress-the partition of Bengal, Assam, and Punjab, pro-
uent Assembly, and League members of the government used ducing a "moth-eaten and mutilated Pakistan." Still, the
their positions to obstruct and to prevent any conventional League and the awakened masses of the Muslim-majority
transformation of the executive council into a cabinet (much areas had triumphed: referenda in the Sylhet district of
to Nehru's outrage). Th~ refusal of the League to pa:r:ticipate Assam and in the _North-West Frontier Province endorsed
, ' in the Constituent Assembly when it met on Decegi,ber 9, PakEtan, as did the provincial legislators of Sind, western
.; 1946, finally convinced the British government that the Mus- Punjab, and eastern Bengal, and later the rulers of ten small
.] liJAS c:;<,mld .not be forced to accept a solution based 011 the princely states. The Congress accepted partition regretfully
-to preclude.the possibility that princely declarations of inde-
· unity of the subcontinent.
pendence might bring further disintegration in the subcon-

l
22 Gopal, op. cit., p. 319. tinent, but cherished the hope and belief that the parting

[i

~11 1
36 The Politics of Pakistan ,111
!

would be short-lived. A new Constituent Assembly was

elected and met in Karachi on August 10, and at midnight
four days later, amid upheaval and slaughter in Punjab,
Pakistan came formally into being.
Seven short years after the adoption of the Lahore Resolu-
2. Social and
tion a separate state had been achieved. The emergence of
Muslim political separatism-the demand for separate repre-
Economic Setting
sentation, then minority safeguards, then provincial auton-
omy and federalism, ~11d finally a separate state_-:--ha~ oc-
curred well within an adult lifetime, and an entire popula- The task of creating a stable national political community
tion was confronted with the psychological adjustments of in Pakistan out of diverse fragments of the British Indian
the transition from minority to nationality. The Pakistan Empire has been complicated by geographic and cultural
movement had appealed to diverse aspirations among the considerations. East and West Pakistan are separated not
urban middle classes of the provinces that were to remain only by 1,000 miles of Indian territory but also, broadly, by
Indian, the rural aristocracy of the Indus valley, and the the difference between Southeast Asia and the Middle East.
peasant masses of eastern Bengal. There were, too, those East Pakistan (55,000 square miles) is a rice- and jute-growing
Muslims-both traditionalist and secularist-who did not delta segment of Southeast Asia, whose linguistically homo-
support the Pakistan idea at all, and also non-Muslims whose geneous people share cultural traits with their eastern neigh-
destinies had perforce been shaped by the surge of Muslim bors in Burma, Thailand, and Malaysia, and include a mi-
nationalism. This variegated people was to give institutional nority of non-Muslims numbering about one-fifth of the
1111
form to a new state, with a heritage from British India of total. West Pakistan, on the other hand, is a vast (310,000
parliamentary democracy and of autocracy, and at the same
time a heritage of repudiation of both of these. From such
square miles) land of arid hills and plains dependent on ir-
rigation works for the cultivation of wheat and cotton. The
I
l
diverse aspirations and traditions would be built a state and population is almost wholly Muslim and has much in com-
a society in which Islam would have definite meaning. mon culturally with the Muslim peoples to the west, but
includes speakers of several distinct languages. A further 11
'1

~
complication arises because of the demographic imbalance
between the two parts of the country: 55 per cent of the pop- I
ulation is crowded into East Pakistan, 15 per cent of the total ti
area. Population pressures thus add to the problems of eco-
nomic development in East Pakistan, compounding the
I strains inherent in cultural diversity with those arising from
37

l
i
38 The Politics of Pakistan Social and Economic Setting 39
the conflicting claims of geography and demography m estimated that the annual rate of increase had risen to 2.6
making political and economic decisions. per cent but would have been more than 3 per cent during
the Fourth Plan had there been no family planning program.
Demographic Context It is anticipated that the rate of increase will be 2.8 per cent
According to the 1961 census, Pakistan's population in per annum by 1975 and will then decline. ii
that year had reached 93.7 million (East Pakistan 50.8 and Although the rate of urban population growth is very
West Pakistan 42.9, as against 42.1 and 33.7 in 1951), and high, 86 per cent of the population is still rural. In this re- 11'.;
was growing at the unprecedented rate of 2.3 per cent per gard the difference between the two provinces is striking:
annum. The central government's Planning Commission be- East Pakistan is only 5.5 per cent urban, but West Pakistan's
lieves this to have been a slight undercount and estimates urban percentage is 22.5, reflecting its greater degree of in-
1959-60 totals at 53.9 million in East Pakistan and 45.0 mil- dustrialization. As the figures suggest, the largest cities are
lion in West Pakistan, projecting 70.2 and 57.2 million re- -In West Pakistan: Karachi (1.9 million), the leading port
spectively for 1969-70. 1 The population is very young; more and commercial center; Lahore (1.3 million), the capital of
than one-third is below the age of ten and well over half be- the province; Hyderabad (435,000) and Lyallpur (425,000),
low the conventional voting age of twenty-one. The figures
suggest that growth in the past decade has been faster in East Table r. Population of Pakistan, 1961
Pakistan than in West Pakistan. This is a reversal of the
Province and division Muslims Others Total
trend of previous years, perhaps attributable in part to de-
clining emigration from East Pakistan and in part to the East Pakistan 40,890,481 9,949,754 50,840,235
impact of birth-control ideas in the more advanced western - Chittagong 10,848,603 2,781,047 13,629,650
province. Family planning has been stressed in a high-prior- Dacca 12,669,746 2,623,850 15,293,596
Khulna 7,617,299 2,449,701 10,066,900
ity program since the beginning of the Third Five Year Plan
Rajshahi 9,754,833 2,095,256 11,850,089
(1965-1970) in an effort to halt and then reduce the rate of
West Pakistan 41,666,143 • 1,214,225. 42,880,378
increase, necessary if "future economic development is not
Baluchistan
to be submerged in a population explosion." 2 By 1968 it was
Kalat 523,723 7,170 530,893
Population statistics for the 1961 census are from Ministry of Home
1 Quetta 622,629 7,489 630,u8
& Kashmir Affairs (Home Affairs Division), Census of Pakistan: Popula- North-West Frontier
tion, r96r, Vol. 1: Pakistan (Karachi: Manager of Publications, n.d.). Dera Ismail Khan
The Planning Commission's estimates are from The Third Five Year Districts 726,234 1,312 727,546
Plan (r965-70) (rev. ed.; Karachi, 1967), pp. 19, 24. West Pakistan totals Agencies 478, 173. • 478,173
for 1961 exclude Azad Kashmir, Gilgit, and Baltistan. Malakand 1,536,766. • 1,536,766
2 "Socio-economic Objectives of the Fourth Five Year Plan," para. 26. Peshawar
Text published in Pakistan Times (Lahore), November 3 and 4, 1968. Districts 3,404,853 7,948 3,412,701
(hereafter cited as "Fourth Plan Objectives"). Agencies 1,423,000. • 1,423,000
I!!

/
.ti
40 The Politics of Pakistan Social and Economic Setting 41

trations are, apart from Karachi, in the northeastern Punjabi

Table I. (continued) districts and the Peshawar valley, with densities well over
500; in the vast Quetta and Kalat divisions, most districts
Province and division Muslims Others Total
have fewer than fifteen people per square mile.
Punjab THE MINORITIES
Bahawalpur 2,543,924 30,142 2,574,066
Lahore 6,101,300 347,275 6,448,575 The growth in the population shows wide variat10ns
Multan 6,540,911 62,013 6,602,924 among religious communities as well as between geographic
Rawalpindi 3,960,237 18,902 3,979,139 regions. Although the conviction that Muslims formed a
Sargodha 5,867,424 109,515 5,976,939 separate cultural nationality provided the basis for the crea-
Sind
tion of Pakistan, the demarcation of its boundaries included
Hyderabad
Karachi
2,808,033
2,073,214
482,923
61,656
3,290,956
2, 134,870 within its territory a large non-Muslim minority, and left ilj
Khairpur 3,055,732 77,980 3,133,712 many Muslims in India. The bloody communal upheaval in I
the subcontinent during the summer of 1947 brought 7.2
Source: Ministry of Home & Kashmir Affairs (Home Affairs Divi-
sion), Census of Pakistan: Population, zg6z, Vol. 2: East Pakistan million Muslim refugees into the country (mostly into West
(Karachi: Manager of Publications, 1964), Part II, Table 5; Vol. 3: Pakistan) by 1951 and sent a similar number of Hindus and
West Pakistan (Karachi: Manager of Publications, n.d.), Part II, Table Sikhs across the borders. Between the 1951 and 1961 censuses
5, and Part VI, Table 1. the proportion of non-Muslims fell further from 14.1 per
• Population figures for the tribal agencies in Peshawar, Dera Ismail cent to 11.9 per cent, partly from differences in fertility be-
Khan, and Malakand divisions are based on several methods of enu-
meration, including estimation. No effort was made in the census to
tween Muslims and Hindus, but largely because of con-
make a separate estimate of non-Muslims in these areas, whose num- tinued migrations to and from India. Because of tensions in
bers are negligible in any case. East Pakistan during the 196o's a further decline in the pro-
portion of non-Muslims by 1971 seems inevitable. Between
both industrial centers; three other cities over 200,000 and
five over 100,000. In East Pakistan only Dacca (556,000), the
1962 and 1965 more than 150,000 Muslims were expelled
from Assam, West Bengal, and Tripura, and others followed
them into East Pakistan in subsequent years. In the tension
I!
I i.ri

provincial capital, and Chittagong (364,000), the chief port,

exceed 200,000; with the exception of Narayanganj (the port that was generated there was renewed emigration of Hindus,
of Dacca) and Khulna, all other cities are smaller than 100,- and even of tribal Christians, mainly Garos, in 1964.3 Despite
000. Rural densities in East Pakistani districts (apart from professions of secularism in India and assurances in Pakistan
the exceptional Chittagong Hill Tracts, with only seventy- 3 Since Christians normally remain untouched by Hindu-Muslim
I
1:
1:
six persons per square mile) ranged in 1961 from 526 (Khulna) tensions, the attacks on Garo Christians in 1964 were the more tragic
to 1,768 (Dacca) persons per square mile, with an average in being completely unprecedented. Most of the Garos returned to 1:
1:
their homes during 1965.
of 922 in the province. In West Pakistan population concen- i:

~,1
 r
42 The Politics of Pakistan Social and Economic Setting 43

of the rights of non-Muslims in an Islamic state, minorities in West Pakistan, mainly in Lahore and Sargodha divisions,
II
in both countries continue to feel insecure. Outbreaks of where they registered a ten-year increase of 34.9 per cent; in
1

violence in either country are sufficient to renew the migra- East Pakistan the increase was nearly 40 per cent. In both 11
provinces Christianity has spread mainly at the expense of 'i
tions. :dj
The great majority of non-Muslims live in East Pakistan, Hinduism, particularly among the Scheduled Castes, al-
distributed throughout the province. From 1951 to 1961 the though in East Pakistan it has affected the Buddhist com-
Hindu community in East Pakistan increased by barely 1.5 munity in the Chittagong Hill Tracts and the animist tribal
per cent over the course of the decade, while the West Pakis- people of the Garo Hills in M ymensingh as well.
Formally non-Muslims have always had the same rights as
Table 2. Non-Muslim population of Pakistan, 1961 Muslim citizens in Pakistan, including the rights of political
participation and eligibility for government service. How-
Minority East Pakistan West Pakistan Total ever, most politically active Hindus and Sikhs opposed the
Scheduled Castes 4,993,046 418,011 5,411,o57 Pakistan movement, and after partition those who did not
Caste Hindus 4,386,623 203,794 4,590,417 migrate to India were discredited and suspect. Many East
Christians 148,903 583,884 732,787 Pakistan Hindus tried to maintain a foot in both camps,
Buddhists 373,867 2,445 376,312 sending their families to Calcutta while continuing to par-
Pars is 193 5,219 5,412
ticipate in Pakistan affairs. The bona fides of such people
Others 47,122 872 47,994
naturally were in doubt, and the periodic defection to India
Total 9,949,754 1,214,225 11,163,979
of prominent Hindu officials-for example, a Dacca High
Percentage of total population 19.6% 2.8% 11.9% Court judge in 1958 and the only Hindu member of the
Civil Service of Pakistan in 1961-seriously compromises
Source: Office of the Census Commissioner, Ministry of Home Affairs,
those who want to be accepted and regarded as loyal Paki-
Population Census of Pakistan, I96I, Census Bulletin No. 2 (Karachi,
Manager of Publications, 1961), Table 6.
stanis. Hindus have therefore not played a role in public life
commensurate with their numerical importance. Christians
tan Hindu population (mainly concentrated in Hyderabad are fully accepted and seem to have had little difficulty in
division) increased by 1.7 per cent annually. The only rea- making their mark: from 1955 to 1958 the Deputy Speaker
sonable explanation would seem to be an emigration of of the National Assembly was a Christian, as was the Chief
about two million Hindus during the decade from East Justice of Pakistan from 1960 to 1968; others hold responsi-
Pakistan. Over half of Pakistan's Hindus are members of ble posts in the military and public services. Since 1962 there
the so-called Scheduled Castes, formerly known as untouch- has been increasing political criticism of foreign Christian in-
ables and backward castes until under the 1935 Act they stitutions and influence, especially in West Pakistan. The
were "scheduled" for special treatment. Most Christians live tiny Parsi (Zoroastrian) community, as in India, plays a dis-

l I

,II'

i:
I!
 The Politics of Pakistan Social and Economic Setting 45
44
proportionately important role in the commercial and indus- on social as well as religious grounds. Because of their found-
trial life of the country. er's claim to prophethood, the Ahmadis have always been
regarded as heretics by orthodox Muslims. When the debate
THE MUSLIMS on the Islamic state was at its peak in 1951-1953, demands
The majority community is by no means monolithic. Al- were voiced that the Ahmadis be declared officially to be
though the Muslim population of the two provinces is fairly non-Muslims and hence excluded from the Muslim elector-
evenly balanced, it is of some political significance that there ate. The agitation was fostered by a coalition of traditionalist
are more Muslims in West Pakistan despite East Pakistan's and fundamentalist organizations of ulama, both Sunni and
larger total population. Most Muslims in both provinces are Shia, with the aim of overawing the government on the issue
Sunni, but there is an important Shia element in parts of of the Islamic constitution. Large-scale rioting and disorder
West Pakistan. Shia sects such as the Bohras, Khojas, and in West Pakistan culminated in the imposition of martial
other Ismaili followers of the Aga Khan are tightly knit and law in Lahore in March of 1953 and the complete suppres- [!

economically active communities, prominent among the new

industrial and commercial classes. Among the Sunni, the
Memons form an important mercantile community. Sufi in-
sion of the abortive Islamic coup.
The ease with which public opinion was aroused against
the Ahmadis is indicative both of the great influence of the
I
'!
fluence is particularly strong in the rural areas, the pirs and ulama and of the sensitivity of the Muslim population to I
other holy men wielding political and economic as well as allegations of heresy or un-Islamic behavior. Pakistani Islam i
spiritual power over the peasant masses. In the towns the is extremely conservative and would-be reformers-as Sir
most important division among the Sunni seems to be be-· Syed Ahmad learned by experience-must move cautiously.
tween the followers of the rival Deobandi and Barelvi schools Efforts to improve the status of women have been particu-
of ulama. Although there are occasional clashes between larly controversial since they touch the very heart of the so-
these groups, Sunni-Shia friction is more common and more ciety and affect practices followed by Muslims since the time
likely-especially on festal occasions such as Muharram (the of the Prophet. Muslim women played an active public role
anniversary of the martyrdom of the Prophet's grandson for the first time in the agitation of 1946-47, and after in-
Husain)-to break out in serious violence. dependence the All-Pakistan Women's Association was
The most heterodox and controversial Muslim sect is the formed by emancipated urban women to carry on the femi- I';
Ahmadi community, founded in Punjab at the end of the nist struggle. Partly in response to their pressures, President ii
f;
nineteenth century by Mirza Ghulam Ahmad (1839-1908), Ayub promulgated the Muslim Marriage and Family Laws '"
who claimed to be a new prophet and messiah. The Ahmadi Ordinance in 1961, imposing restrictions on polygamy and H
are analogous to the Mormons in Christendom, and like the divorce and reinforcing the inheritance rights of women and
Mormons they tend to be clannish and self-reliant, and ac- children. These changes were bitterly denounced and at-
cordingly arouse the dislike if not hostility of their neighbors tacked in the legislatures in 1962-63, and as vehemently de-

J
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46 The Politics of Pakistan

fended by women inside and outside the Assemblies. Al-

T Social and Economic Setting

consciousness of the linguistic differences between East and

47

though the ulama denounced the reform as un-Islamic, with West Pakistan and of their quite different literary heritages.
the President's support the modernist view won the day. Despite the fact that Bengali was-and is-the language
During the agitation preceding the reimposition of martial
Table 3. Language and literacy, 1961
law in 1969 the Family Laws Ordinance again became a sub-
ject of attack by the ulama and their supporters. East Pakistan West Pakistan •
%of Literacy %of Literacy
Language and Education popula- (in% of popula- (in% of
Language Speakers tion speakers) Speakers tion speakers)
The geographic and demographic peculiarities of Pakistan
are further complicated by linguistic diversities. In East Bengali 50,321,995 98.97% 16.05% 55,808 .14% 22.00%
Urdu 679,163 1.34% 66.06% 5,859,718 14.86% 70.12%
Pakistan ethnic differences are minimal and nearly everyone Punjabi (insignificant) 26,651,964 67.57% .27%
speaks Bengali, with dialect variations most noticeable in Pash to (insignificant) 3,526,944 8.94% 1.73%
Chittagong and Sylhet districts. In West Pakistan, there are Sindhi (insignificant) 5,583,680 14.16% 10.15%
English 426,256 .84 % 330.10% t 835,884 2.12% n9.16% t
several major ethnic groups with distinct languages. Al- Total pop-
though territorial distinctions cannot be precise, Punjabi (in- ulation 50,840,235 100.00% 17.60% 42,880,378 100.00% 13.60%
cluding its dialect variations) is spoken generally in the plain
Source: Adapted from Ministry of Home & Kashmir Affairs (Home Af-
and submontane region between the Sutlej and the Indus, fairs Division), Census of Pakistan: Population, I96I, Vol. 1: Pakistan
in Rawalpindi, Sargodha, Lahore, Multan, and Bahawalpm: (Karachi: Manager of Publications, n.d.), Section IV, pp. 32-39.
divisions. Sindhi is spoken in the lower Indus valley, on • West Pakistan language figures do not include inhabitants of the Tribal
Areas of the Frontier regions, estimated in 1961 at 3,437,939, at least 80%
both banks of the river, in Hyderabad and Khairpur divi- of whom speak Pashto; total Pashto speakers therefore would be around
sions. Pashto prevails west of the Indus along the Afghan 6.3 million.
border, in Peshawar and Dera Ismail Khan divisions and in t At p. IV-39 of the census volume cited, the Explanatory Notes remark
that English "is read and written by more people than can even speak it."
part of Quetta division. Baluchi, Brahui, and other lan-
Presumably persons who have studied English but either lack conversational
guages are found in the rest of Quetta, Kalat, and also in command of the language or who "do not commonly speak English" make
Hyderabad. Table 3 shows the relative importance of the up this total. The actual literacy figures for English are 1,407 ,087 in East
major languages in terms of numbers of speakers and also Pakistan and 996,012 in West Pakistan. The census definition of literacy
included those able to read and write or able to read with understanding
their varying significance as vehicles of literacy. Pashto is an only.
Iranian language, but Bengali, Urdu, Punjabi, and Sindhi
are rather closely related. Barriers have developed between of over half the population, after independence the federal
them, however, by virtue of the fact that Bengali uses a government proceeded to treat Urdu as the sole state lan-
Sanskrit-derived script while the others use modified versions guage, destined ultimately to replace English for all official
of the Arabic script. The spread of literacy therefore increases purposes. Urdu developed in northern India during the

J
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48 The Politics of Pakistan Social and Economic Setting 49

Mughal period and in the nineteenth century became the language," but this was suspect as a device for securing the
vehicle for the Muslim intellectual revival led by Sir Syed eventual supremacy of Urdu alone. The Bengali members of
Ahmad Khan. In due course it became the de facto language the second Constituent Assembly therefore forced the modi-
of the Pakistan movement, and in view of its strong links fication of the objectionable terminology, eliminating from
I
i
1,1

with the classic languages of Islam (Arabic and Persian) was the constitutional draft the references to a national language Ii::
11.1

and describing Urdu and Bengali as "state" rather than !I

regarded as the only possible official language of the new
Islamic state. Although Urdu was accepted as the lingua "official" languages. The Constitution of 1962 declared Ben-
franca for multilingual West Pakistan, the attempt to impose gali and Urdu to be the "national" languages of Pakistan,
it in unilingual East Pakistan evoked determined resistance. "but this article shall not be construed as preventing the use
After Jinnah's death (on September 11, 1948) removed his of any other language." Whatever the terminology, it is un-
great authority from the political scene, the already conten- thinkable that the equality of status of the two languages can 'II
it!
tious language question became a paramount issue, closely be departed from in the future. I

related to and symbolic of the Bengali demand for an equal Since independence, English has continued to be the de !!
if not dominant voice in national affairs. facto language of national unity, used for nearly all official
Part of the criticism that forced the withdrawal of the purposes by provincial and central governments. Although it
111:
interim report of the Basic Principles Committee in 1950. is spoken by only a tiny fraction of the population, that frac-
(seep. 97) was Bengali opposition to a clause declaring Urdu tion includes the political, administrative, commercial, and
to be the "State language." This opposition organized itself educational elites in both provinces. As a medium of written
as the "State language movement," to secure equality of communication English was far more important in 1969 than
status for Bengali and Urdu. On February 22, 1952, martyrs Urdu in East Pakistan or Bengali in West Pakistan. The
1111
to the cause died in police firing in Dacca, in riots precipi- 1962 Constitution provided that the use of English for offi-
tated by a public speech by Prime Minister Nazimuddin (a cial purposes would continue at least until 1972, when the IiI
Bengali) reaffirming that Urdu was to be the sole state lan- President was to appoint a commission to "examine and i!
ii
guage. Thereafter a sine qua non of political influence in report" on the question of its replacement. This study was :1
East Pakistan was ardent advocacy of the Bengali language anticipated by the martial-law regime in July 1969 when it ~
:1
demand, as the defeat of the Muslim League in the March announced a new educational and language policy. 4 English !
1954 provincial elections demonstrated. is to be replaced by Urdu and Bengali in the two provincial I
·1
The Bengali demand for language parity was conceded in governments by 1974 and in the central government by
Pakistan's first Constitution in 1956 and was confirmed in 197 5. All government servants are to acquire a working
that of 1962. In 1954 the Constituent Assembly accepted a knowledge of both languages by 1973. English is to cease to
formula recognizing Urdu and Bengali as "official" lan-
guages and urging the development of a "common national 4 Pakistan Times, July 4, 1969.

,11
 'illli'

II
!11
50 The Politics of Pakistan Social and Economic Setting 51 !rl

be the language of instruction at any educational level, but is already the medium of instruction in Punjabi areas.) In 111

i
will continue to be taught as an optional language. This an effort to eliminate illiteracy and to provide universal 11

change is intended to help break down the barriers between primary education by 1980, the new policy proposed a na- 11

the ruling elite and the mass of the population and so con- tional literacy corps to be conscripted from among students
tribute to national integration. However, it must be recog- aged from eighteen to twenty-two, to be sent after six months
nized that unless great care is taken the abandonment of training to teach in the rural areas for eighteen months. This
English in the universities and in the administration may program, which has been very successful in Iran, would also
seriously jeopardize interprovincial communication and dam- help deal with the immediate problem of some 200,000 edu-
age rather than further the integration of the country. cated unemployed (presumably holders of secondary and
The 1969 educational policy was intended to accomplish intermediate certificates).
social and political as well as educational purposes. It out- The present distribution of literacy and higher educational
lined measures for creating an integrated educational system attainments in different parts of Pakistan is of considerable
'1·-i

to help produce national consensus on the basis of Islamic political and economic significance. Within each province 111
I
there is much regional variation, but in general, in terms of l!'il
values, to prevent the development and perpetuation of /,
the population above five years of age, in East Pakistan in
privilege barriers restricting social mobility, and by empha-
1961 19.9 per cent could read and write, while in West Paki- I
sizing technical education to make the educational process
stan the figure was only 14.4 per cent. In urban areas the
I
\,
more suited to national needs. The malaise of the educa-
tional system, with its emphasis on rote and literary learning percentages were more than doubled, and literacy among
and its premium on English, has long been evident, and males was much higher than among females. In educational
student dissatisfaction was an important element in the· agi- terms the picture is quite different, for in East Pakistan there
tation against the Ayub government in 1968-69. The new is a very high rate of attrition in the primary schools and a
sharp drop in enrollment after grade four. In East Pakistan, il,,j
policy called for administrative reorganization of primary
and secondary education, increased availability of scholar- 71.6 per cent of those claiming to be literate had less than
ships on the basis of merit for the "quality" cadet colleges four years of schooling and fewer than 4 per cent had com-
and private secondary schools, the nationalization of foreign pleted secondary or higher education. In contrast, in West I!Ii1:1i
missionary institutions, and a great increase in the number Pakistan the respective proportions were 44.4 per cent and
of postsecondary technical and agricultural institutions. 12.4 per cent. West Pakistan made great educational progress
Urdu and Bengali were to be the languages of instruction at during the 195o's and in 1961 had nearly twice as many .·11

all stages, with Urdu a compulsory subject in East Pakistan matriculates and holders of intermediate qualifications as Ii
and Bengali in West Pakistan. (The implications for Sindhi East Pakistan, and well over twice as many persons with
and Pashto, which have been the languages of instruction in bachelors' and higher degrees. The number of university
their regions at the primary stage, were not explored. Urdu graduates in West Pakistan increased from 59,000 in 1951

\
 ·111
:i
52 The Politics of Pakistan Social and Economic Setting 53 1
,1
1,
to over 78,000 in 1961, but in East Pakistan decreased from and at all levels in university government. Finally, govern- 11
,,11
about 50,000 to about 35,000, in part because of the emigra- ment financial support for colleges and universities was to be 11

tion of educated Hindus and in part because some educated I!,,

channelled through independent university grants commis-
Bengalis now work and reside in West Pakistan. 5 These sions in each province, appointed by the governor from a
totals, which have considerably increased since 1961, indicate panel nominated by the universities. In financial terms, these
why West Pakistanis dominate the economy and administra- educational reforms would require an increase in educa- I,
1•'
tion and perhaps permit an understanding of the reason for tional expenditure from about 1.8 per cent of gross national
the general sense of frustration and desperation in East Paki- product in 1968-69 (Rs 100 crore) to about 3.6 per cent in
stan. 1975 (about Rs 200 crore) and 3.3 per cent in 1980 (Rs 320
The educational policy of July 1969 proposed, with the crore), which is more in line with the U.N.E.S.C.O. standard
replacement of the much-excoriated "University Ordinances" of roughly 4 per cent of G.N.P. in developing countries. 6
under which colleges and universities were administered, ex-
tensive changes to improve the status of teachers and to as- The Agricultural Economy
sure the independence of academic institutions. Of great im- After more than two decades of independence and exten-
portance to East Pakistan, private institutions were to be re- sive developmental efforts, agriculture remains the most im-
quired to conform to general standards in regard to instruc- portant segment of the economy of Pakistan, although by
tional facilities and staff salaries and benefits. There were in 1965 its contribution to the gross national product had de-
1969 some 500 colleges throughout the country, with a total clined to less than half. Eighty-five per cent of the population
of about 300,000 students. It was proposed to found five is dependent directly or indirectly on the nation's farms,
more universities in each province, for a total of ten in East with most of the remainder being concerned with service ac-
Pakistan and twelve in West Pakistan, three of them spe- tivities or processing the products of the land. Because of dif-
cializing in engineering and five in agriculture. A further ferences in climate, topography, and soil types between East
much-needed reform would provide for the election of both and West Pakistan, their crops and agricultural problems
the vice-chancellor (the administrative head) and the chan- vary, but in a fundamental sense the agriculturalists in both
cellor (the ceremonial head) of each university by that uni- parts of the country are faced with the same major concerns. ,1 :~

versity's representative organs. If implemented, this will end The control of rivers and water resources to permit year-
the era in which the chancellorship has always been com- round cultivation and to minimize flood damage is necessary II)
bined with the office of governor or head of state. The policy in both provinces, and in both cases this control requires
recommended that student unions be encouraged, with stu- agreement and cooperation with India, the upstream riparian.
dents represented in the management of schools and colleges Further, in both provinces problems of land tenure, of land-
5 Data in this paragraph from Census of Pakistan: Population, I96I, 6 Educational Policy Statement, ch. 7. Text published in Pakistan
Vol. 1, Pt. IV, ch. 4. Times, July 4, 1969.

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-,.

54 The Politics of Pakistan

lordism, and of fragmentation of holdings have presented

obstacles to the emergence of a productive and prosperous
agricultural community.

WATER RESOURCE CONTROL

East Pakistan. Water is a problem in East Pakistan pri-

marily because of its abundance, but also because of its mal-
distribution at certain seasons of the year. During the mon-
soon (June through September) much of the land is visited
by often-destructive floods, but in the remainder of the year
little rain falls. After the winter harvest in December and
January fields are dry and uncultivated unless irrigation is
available. In addition, since the slope of the land is only
about three inches per mile in the south, districts along the
Bay of Bengal are affected seriously by saline intrusion from
the tides. Water-control projects must, therefore, be con-
cerned with the reduction of flood damage to standing crops
and to property, the extension of irrigation facilities to per-
mit double and triple cropping during the dry season, and
the protection of the fields from the sea. Because the entire
Ganges-Brahmaputra delta is one interdependent system of
river distributaries, any plans for improvements in one sector
must consider repercussions elsewhere in the system. Since
January 1959 water control has been the responsibility of the i~
East Pakistan Water and Power Development Authority BAY OF Bf.°NC,~1,
(WAPDA), a semiautonomous statutory body.
Flood control is an especially difficult and politically con-
troversial problem. Most of the catchment area of the rivers
involved is outside East Pakistan, and more water flows 0 20 40 60

through the province than can be accommodated in river Scale in miles

channels. A series of commissions and internationally spon-
sored experts have studied the problem, noting the inade- EAST PAKISTAN, 1969

'
 --- ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

,,.,...

56 The Politics of Pakistan Social and Economic Setting 57

quacy of systematic hydrological knowledge of the province. reached a serious stage in 1969. One factor affecting India's
Although in 1964 WAPDA produced a flood-control master willingness to negotiate is Pakistan's projected Ganges bar- "I.,I
plan estimated to cost over $750 million and involving some rage near the Hardinge Bridge, which if no agreement is
6,000 miles of embankments, uncertainties remained con- ,.
reached could apparently be constructed so that the high
11!
cerning the capacity of river channels and the impact of em- pond level during the flood season would threaten both
bankment projects on the movement of flood waters. In 1966 Farakka itself and associated canals and dikes. Settlement of
the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development this dispute may also involve large-scale, internationally un-
became involved, and pending further studies a series of derwritten expenditures to ensure that the needs of both
smaller projects were taken up and data collection continued. Calcutta and the Khulna division are equitably met.
Loss of life, crops, and property in a series of eight devasta.t- The only water storage possibilities in East Pakistan are
ing floods since 1954 have brought demands that the govern- in the Chittagong Hill Tracts district. A multipurpose hy-
ment "solve" the flood problem and make the same sort of droelectric project was completed at Kaptai on the Karnafuli
ifi
economic and administrative effort that was so willingly de- River upstream of Chittagong in 1962. A similar project is 'I!·
voted to the Indus basin project in West Pakistan. The In- under consideration for the Sangu basin, south of the lij
ternational Bank's interest suggests that this may be possible Karnafuli, but the alternative interests of the tribal hill
in the future.
A related problem is that of the use of Ganges River wa-
people-some of whom have already been relocated from
the Kaptai lake area-and of timber preservation must be
I
ters. Since 1953 Pakistan has been developing the Ganges- weighed. Such hydroelectric projects are of greater industrial
Kobadak scheme, which is intended ultimately to irrigate than agricultural importance, but they permit flood control
some two million acres in the Khulna division with Ganges in the Chittagong area, and the power produced can be
water and to combine flood control with measures to combat utilized in pumping and drainage installations. Electrically
sea water intrusion in the south by building dikes and pol- powered tube wells, along with low-lift diesel pumps, are the
ders. The related coastal embankment project, to protect the basis of an irrigation program fostered by the Agricultural
low-lying Bay of Bengal coasts and islands, is expected to Development Corporation and the Academy for Rural De-
benefit some 2.2 million acres by 1970. The supply of water velopment at Comilla through the union councils to add to
for the Ganges-Kobadak project in the dry season is threat- the productive winter acreage and thus contribute to rural
ened by the construction in India of a barrage at Farakka on economic growth.
the Ganges, ten miles upstream of the East Pakistan border,
to divert water southward to reclaim the Calcutta port from West Pakistan. Development of the arid lands in the Indus
siltation. India refused to delay the project, scheduled for basin through modern irrigation works was begun over a
completion in 1970, in consideration of Pakistan's interests century ago. Since then, a succession of great canal projects
as lower riparian, but negotiations for a settlement finally and colonization schemes have transformed desert and scrub

,,
. ,I
I

I
I
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58 The Politics of Pakistan

jungle into productive and populous regions. The most

" I
I
Ii
easily accessible waters having been exploited during the
.11
nineteenth century, the great Triple Canal Project was com-
pleted in 1913-1915, bringing water from the Jhelum to the
Chenab, and from the Chenab across the Ravi to a new canal
system serving desert lands between the Ravi and the Sutlej.
Thereafter further headworks were built lower down on the
Sutlej, Ravi, and Chenab rivers, and more canals pushed AFGHANISTAN
into the deserts. In each successive area immigrant cultiva-
tors were settled in canal colonies whose prosperity became
proverbial in a few years.
The Indus itself was first harnessed by the Lloyd barrage 11
[!
at Sukkur in the present Khairpur division, bringing peren- !I
nial water supplies to existing inundation canals and open- fi
ing up new desert areas. Completed in 1932, the barrage
:1
transformed the face and economy of the lower Indus valley, ! ~
the annually cultivated area increasing gradually from 3.6 11!

to around 5.5 million acres over a period of thirty years. The

great success of the Sukkur barrage led to the construction
of others at Kotri below Hyderabad (completed in 1956), at
Taunsa in Multan division (completed in 1958), and at
INDIA
ij
!,
JJ

Guddu in the northern extremity of Khairpur division (com- :11

)Lj

pleted in 1962). Together these barrages will command some i:!l

'I
7.6 million culturable acres when the construction of canals
has been completed. The colonization of a further 1.5 mil-
lion acres of formerly desert land in the Thal, between the
0 40 80 120 160 200
Indus and the lower Jhelum and Chenab, was entrusted in
Scale in miles
1950 to the Thal Development Authority on the basis of
i!
waters drawn from the Jinnah barrage (completed in 1947)
on the Indus at Kalabagh in Sargodha division. WEST PAKISTAN, 1969
A consequence of the extension of irrigation has been the
increasingly serious menace of waterlogging and salinity,

'
-----~ .,
60 The Politics of Pakistan Social and Economic Setting 61

undermining the prosperity and productivity of the canal rights in the basin. India insisted on her ultimate intention
colonies. In the 193o's the danger became sufficiently serious of utilizing the entire flow of the three eastern rivers (Ravi,
to justify the expense of lining new canals to minimize seep- Beas, and Sutlej) for irrigation works within her own terri-
age. Seepage is only one factor, however. The canals them- tory. Pakistan protested and insisted on her legal right to
selves interrupt the natural drainage lines and cause the ac- continue to receive traditional supplies from those rivers,
cumulation of rain and flood waters and the rise of the water but in the meantime took up urgent construction of link
table. In some areas the rise of the water table toward the canals to bring water from the Chenab and Jhelum to the
surface brings up salts which adversely affect fertility; else- canals previously dependent on Indian headworks. Neverthe-
where, the lack of sufficient water on the land causes the less, the grave threat posed by Indian control of the three
deposition of salts on the surface through too rapid evapora- rivers, plus the upper Chenab in Indian-held Kashmir, re-
tion. In this case, leaching through the addition of large mained.
quantities of water to wash the salts down below root level Fortunately, in 1951 the International Bank offered to
is the principal method of reclamation. The application of assist the two countries in working out an economic settle-
11
so much water leads in turn to the danger of waterlogging ment of the waters dispute, and their effort finally succeeded I,
unless supplementary steps are taken to improve drainage. in 1960. The basis of the Indus Waters Treaty, signed in 11

A further obstacle to leaching has been the lack of adequate Karachi on September 19, 1960, after long and delicate ne-
water supplies, in the absence of storage reservoirs. gotiations, was the division of the resources of the basin. 11
The fundamental problems of water supply and drainage Pakistan was allotted exclusive use of the waters of the west-
in the Indus basin were compounded when in 1947 the Indo- ern rivers (Indus, Jhelum, and Chenab) except for limited
Pakistan frontier was drawn across the existing systems of traditional withdrawals by India in the upper reaches. India
rivers, barrages, and canals. 7 About eleven million irrigated was allotted exclusive use of the three eastern rivers, effec-
areas in Punjab fell to Pakistan, and more than five million tive at the latest in 1973, by which time replacement works
went to India. The upper reaches of the Ravi and Sutlej must be completed in Pakistan. These works include a sys-
rivers, including headworks commanding some 1.6 million tem of link canals, with a total length of nearly 400 miles, to
acres in Pakistan, remained in Indian territory. On April 1, carry about 14 million acre-feet of water annually from the
1948, Indian authorities cut off all supplies in canals crossing Indus and the Jhelum to the lower Ravi and Sutlej. To inte-
the border, opening a lengthy controversy concerning water grate these new canals into the earlier system, six new bar-
rages have been built and several existing barrages and
7 See Aloys A. Michel, The Indus Rivers: A Study of the Effects of
Partition (New Haven and London, 1967), which is an excellent study
canals remodeled. Finally, two huge reservoirs in the north-
of the problems of the Indus basin, including detailed analyses of ern mountains, at Mangla on the Jhelum (completed in
the Indus Basin Agreement and its implementation. 1967) and Tarbela on the Indus above Attock (estimated

i
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---~--·-

62 The Politics of Pakistan Social and Economic Setting 63

completion date 1976), will impound flood waters and per- In addition to its primary purpose of providing West Paki- I
mit the maintenance of adequate levels in the canals during stan with replacement irrigation works, the Indus basin 11

the dry season. project engendered other extremely valuable benefits. The !1!1

Because the cost of the undertaking was beyond the re- creation of the West Pakistan Water and Power Develop-
sources of Pakistan, the Indus Waters Treaty was supple- ment Authority (WAPDA) in 1958, to provide for the co-
mented by the Indus Basin Development Fund Agreement, ordinated and integrated development of the water and
creating an internationally supported fund administered by power resources of the province, was one of the factors con-
the International Bank. 8 Originally the fund totaled $893.5 tributing to the soundness of the Indus basin scheme ac-
million for works in Pakistan, including $376.7 million in cepted by the International Bank and underwritten by the
foreign exchange and the remainder in U.S.-held rupees, but Indus Basin Development Fund. W APDA designed the proj-
within two years the cost estimates were revised upward to ect to permit further development of the agricultural econ-
roughly $1800 million. There ensued a lengthy controversy omy rather than merely to secure a threatened status quo.
between the Bank and Pakistan concerning the inclusion of The preparation of an integrated scheme for irrigation re-
the Tarbela project, which the Bank questioned and Paki- quired also a systematic attack on the related problems of
stan insisted was essential to the Indus basin scheme. A sup- waterlogging and salinity, assisted after 1961 by the Revelle
plementary agreement was signed in early 1964, by which an panel appointed by President John F. Kennedy in connec-
additional $315 million in foreign exchange was subscribed tion with the U.S. aid program. The surveys and investiga-
for works excluding Tarbela, as a "final" contribution to the tions necessary greatly enlarged the body of knowledge of
fund. A further study of Tarbela was undertaken by the West Pakistan's hydrology, and resulted in an extensive and
Bank, however, and the project was finally approved in 1967, successful attack on waterlogging by means of tube wells to 11
.I
pump excess water back into the canals, and the discovery of
at an estimated cost of some $900 million. In March 1968 a
separate Tarbela Development Fund was established, includ- a vast usable ground-water reservoir underlying the northern lj
'·
ing a $324-million balance from the Indus Fund and a fur- portion of the basin. The great importance of Tarbela to the l;
ther international contribution of $174 million, with Paki- development of the basin lies in its ability to assure a de-
stan agreeing to pay all rupee costs from her own resources. pendable supply of surface water in the lower Indus valley
8 "The Indus Waters Settlement" (London: Reference Division, Cen-
in the dry season and to supply (along with Mangla) the
tral Office of Information, August 1960), Pamphlet R 4731; Michel, op. power demands of tube-well drainage and irrigation schemes,
cit., pp. 251-253, 310-312; S.S. Kirmani, "The Story of Tarbela," which by 1975 will amount to half of West Pakistan's energy
Pakistan Times Tarbela Supplement, November 4, 1968. The sub- requirement. This is partly attributable to the remarkable
scribers to the Indus Basin Development Fund were Australia, Canada, increase in the number of privately owned tube wells in-
Germany, New Zealand, United Kingdom, United States, and the
stalled in recent years. A final and not unimportant effect of
Bank; in the Tarbela Development Fund, France and Italy replaced
Australia, Germany, and New Zealand. the Indus basin project has been the economic and technical

!1
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,II
_ __:__..__ _ _ ----- --~~--~· s •• ----~--

64 The Politics of Pakistan Social and Economic Setting 65

impact of vast expenditures, the development of administra- zamindars rack-rented their tenants, so that by 1950 only
tive and technical infrastructures, and the creation of a pool about one-tenth of the total rent paid by the cultivators was
of trained personnel. received by the state as land revenue. The remainder was
appropriated by the zamindars and a host of intermediate
LAND TENURE tenure holders who had grown up by a process of subletting
The pattern of relationships governing the occupancy and and fragmentation of the right to collect rents. At the same
use of land is, in Pakistan's predominantly agricultural econ- time, the lack of direct contact between the state and the
omy, of the utmost economic and social importance. To- peasant prevented the former from acquiring any systematic
gether with natural factors, the size and nature of holdings knowledge of rural conditions and left the latter to be ex-
and the extent of ownership and tenancy determine the pat- ploited, economically and socially, by the frequently corrupt
tern of cultivation, the crops grown, the efficiency and pro- agents of the absentee tenure holders.
ductivity of agriculture, and, not least, the level of well-being By the beginning of the twentieth century the evils of the
of the rural population. Reconstruction of the agricultural Permanent Settlement had been recognized, but the first
sector in the interests of national economic and social ad- steps toward its elimination were not taken until the ap-
vance therefore demands the rationalization of landholdings pointment of the Land Revenue (Floud) Commission by the
in terms of size and the simplification of the relationships be- Bengal government in 1938. The Commission recommended
tween the cultivator and the state. in 1940 that the system should be abolished, but because of
the war and subsequent constitutional changes legislation
East Pakistan. For over 150 years land-tenure relationships was not proceeded with until after independence. Therefore
in most of what is now East Pakistan were governed by the when East Pakistan came into being, about 49,000 square
Bengal Permanent Settlement Regulation (I of 1793). This miles (91 per cent of the total area) were held under the
Regulation was intended to stabilize the revenue situation in Permanent Settlement; another 2,000 square miles (3.5 per
Bengal by fixing in perpetuity the land-revenue obligations cent) were held by proprietors and their tenants under tem-
of the existing proprietors and tenure holders. It gave legal porary settlement (subject to periodic revision); and about
sanctity to the ownership status of the zamindars (propri- 3,000 square miles (5.5 per cent) were held by the cultivators
etors), whatever their historical origins, and by so doing ef- directly as tenants of the state. 9
fectively swept away the traditional rights and interests of The Permanent Settlement was finally abolished under
the cultivators. The newly recognized proprietary rights of the terms of the East Bengal State Acquisition and Tenancy
the zamindars were subject only to the absolutely punctual Act, 1950. In brief, the Act provided for the acquisition of
payment of the assessment, which was fixed at ten-elevenths all intermediary rent-receiving interests with compensation
of the prevailing rent paid at that time by the cultivators. As 9 Dr. A. Farouk, "Land Reforms in East Pakistan," East Pakistan In-
prices rose during the succeeding century and a half, the formation, March 23, 1960, pp. 9-14.

i
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. II
tl
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66 The Politics of Pakistan Social and Economic Setting 67
to the persons affected, the limitation of the size of holdings, 125 acres), in accordance with the recommendations of the
the granting of security to the cultivator through the prepa- Mahmud Commission, in the belief that the higher limit
ration of records of rights, and the ultimate rationalization would permit the growth of a prosperous rural middle class.
of the land revenue through a new settlement. Operations According to the 1960 agricultural census, the average farm
proceeded very slowly until April 1956, when all rent-receiv- holding is 3.5 acres, but nearly two-thirds of the holdings fall
ing interests were acquired by official notification. The. im- below that standard. 12 About 61 per cent of the cultivators
mense task of implementation thus thrust suddenly upon an are reported as owners, most of the remainder owning part
inadequate administration, together wtih the problem of col- and renting part of their holdings. Legislation has been pro-
lecting rents directly from millions of tenants, completely posed to give some security to tenants, but the problem is
overburdened the machinery of government. Shortly after complicated by the need to protect the rights of those who
the imposition of martial law in 1958 the Land Revenue are obliged by circumstances to rent out their lands tempo-
(Mahmud) Commission was appointed to re-examine the rarily. The small size of most holdings is further complicated
problem. 10 On its recommendation, the revenue department in that about go per cent of them are fragmented. Consolida-
was reorganized and strengthened, and plans were made for tion and upgrading in size have apparently been determined
completing the assessment process by the end of 1962. The to be politically and socially impossible, in view of the popu-
Commission also recommended that to simplify the admin- lation pressures in East Pakistan. Limits of three and eight
istrative tasks as many as possible of the two million inter- acres on subsistence and economic holdings, introduced in
ests involved be compensated in cash rather than in forty- 1961 on the recommendation of the Mahmud Commission,
year bonds. By 1968, out of a total compensation of roughly were revoked in 1964, and a scheme for the consolidation of
Rs 360 million, Rs 2 10 million had been paid in cash and Rs holdings during the Second Five Year Plan (1960-1965) was I
10 million in bonds (to nonresidents).11 A long-term survey
and settlement operation is under way to put the entire land
abandoned on the advice of the Land Revenue Administra-
tion Enquiry Committee of 1962 that no such involuntary
Ii
;i
revenue administration on a sound footing. program be undertaken. 13
Land reform, in the sense of establishing permissible lim-
its for the size of holdings, was intended to be part of the West Pakistan. Because of its former division into several
State Acquisition scheme. In 1961 the State Acquisition and autonomous units, the Indus valley's problems of land ten-
Tenancy Act was amended to increase the maximum size ure and land reform have been in some respects more diffi-
of holdings from 100 to 375 standard bighas (approximately
12 Pakistan Census of Agriculture, z960, Vol. I: Final Report-East
Report summarized in East Pakistan Information, July 15, 1959,
10 Pakistan (Karachi: Agricultural Census Organization, 1962), pp. 26, 29,
pp. 6-7. 86.
11 Ministry of Finance, Economy of Pakistan, z948-68 (Islamabad, 13 Planning Commission, The Third Five Year Plan (z965-70), pp.
1968), p. 35· 409-410.

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68 The Politics of Pakistan Social and Economic Setting 69

cult of solution than those of Bengal. The details of the tions upon which the government might base a rational land-
revenue settlement varied from place to place, but in general tenure policy.
involved a reassessment roughly every thirty years (the Per- The West Pakistan Land Reforms Regulation was pro-
manent Settlement was never applied in West Pakistan mulgated by President Ayub Khan under martial law on
areas). The traditional modes of tenure evolved somewhat January 26, 1959. The reforms were intended to break the
differently in the several provinces and states, and far more political and social dominance of the landlord class without
than in East Pakistan the rural scene has been dominated by subverting its economic base, and so to bring about greater
vast disproportions in landholdings. According to the 1959 equality of opportunity and a more equitable distribution
Land Reforms Commission, 14 64 per cent of the landholders of rural incomes within the existing social order. The Regu-
owned five acres or less, and 53 per cent of the total acreage lation set maximum and minimum limits to the size of hold-
was in the hands of the 8 per cent with holdings larger than ings, provided for security of tenure for tenants, and abol- :11
twenty-five acres. In fact, some 6,000 owners-0.1 per cent of ished intermediate interests and jagirs (grants of the right to 'ii
fl
the total-controlled about 7.5 million of the 48.6 million collect land revenue). The implementation of the reforms
reported acres. In 1960, 42 per cent of all cultivators rented was entrusted to a five-member Land Commission, which ""ij
their entire holdings, and although the average farm size during 1959 proceeded to acquire all individual holdings in
was ten acres, nearly half of the holdings were less than five
acres. 15 The vast majority of tenants had no security at all,
excess, roughly, of 500 acres of irrigated or 1,000 acres of
nonirrigated land, and to transfer the resumed lands (total-
I
despite tenancy legislation adopted since independence. ing nearly 2.4 million acres) to some 200,000 tenants and
The need for large-scale alterations in the basis of land other peasant proprietors. The purchasers were to pay for
ownership as a means of dealing with the economic, social, their holdings over a twenty-five-year period, at a price well
and political problems of the countryside was recognized by below the market rate but sufficient to cover compensation to
the Muslim League Agrarian Reform Committee in 1949, the former owners, who were paid at graduated rates in
and also by the Planning Board in the First Five Year Plan. transferable, four-per cent, twenty-five-year bonds. By 1968
Landlord domination of the political parties and of the pro- so many purchasers had completed payment that over 70
vincial and central legislatures seemed to present insur- per cent of the total value of the bonds had already been
mountable obstacles to meaningful action. Not until the redeemed. 16 Since the owners affected by the reforms still
martial-law regime had set aside normal political pressures control some 4.8 million acres, whereas only about 4 per cent
was the nettle grasped, with the appointment on October 31, of the cultivators have had their status changed, the changes
1958, of a Land Reforms Commission to make recommenda- were clearly far from revolutionary.
14 West Pakistan, Land Reforms Commission, Report (Lahore, 1959).
More important to the agricultural economy and to the
15
Pakistan Census of Agriculture, z960, Vol. II: West Pakistan Re-
port 2 (Karachi: Agricultural Census Organization, 1964), pp. 4, 14. 16 Ministry of Finance, Economy of Pakistan, z948-68, p. 43.

,11
70 The Politics of Pakistan

ordinary cultivator are the provisions in regard to minimum

holdings, which apply to new lands being colonized as well
" Social and Economic Setting

mal husbandry, cooperatives, revenue, and (in West Paki-

stan) irrigation, the W APDA's, various agricultural credit
institutions, the Village AID (Agricultural-Industrial De-
71

as to the older cultivated areas. No holding larger than 64

acres in the Sindhi area and 50 acres elsewhere (an "eco- velopment) organization, and the new Basic Democracy
nomic holding") may be so subdivided as to eliminate the councils-and concluded that none of these were capable of
economic holding or to leave any sharer with less than 16 tackling adequately the task of providing the cultivator with
acres or 12.5 acres, respectively (a "subsistence holding"). No the "five firsts": better seed, fertilizers, plant protection, bet-
holding larger than a subsistence holding may be so sub- ter cultivation techniques, and credit facilities. On the Com-
divided as to leave any sharer with less than a subsistence mission's recommendation, an Agricultural Development
holding (including previously owned area). These restric- Corporation (ADC) was created in each province in 1961 to
tions are supplemented by legislation enacted in 1960 pro- undertake these tasks in an integrated manner. The Commis-
cl
viding for compulsory consolidation of holdings. Agricultural sion had intended that each ADC would take up project
1i
productivity and efficiency has been seriously compromised areas in different parts of its province until gradually the
in the past by the widespread disintegration of small hold- whole province was covered, permitting experimentation and ~
'11
also allowing for the growth of administrative capability by
I
ings through inheritance into scattered plots of land. The
consolidation program pools and redemarcates the lands in the ADC. In fact the development of the ADC's in the two
every village so that each cultivator has a compact block, up- provinces has been rather different.
graded where possible to subsistence or economic holdings The major efforts of the WPADC are concentrated in bar-
by the addition of state or other available land. By May 1968 rage colonization projects along the Indus: the Kotri, Guddu,
some 11.5 million acres out of a total of 30 million had been Taunsa, and Thal projects, plus a project for the reclamation
consolidated. Steps have also been taken to unify the tenure of eroded land in the Soan valley near Rawalpindi. Much of

Ii'!
laws and to simplify revenue procedure so that the cultiva- the work is routine colonization, building roads and canal
tors will be better aware of their rights and obligations and distributaries and laying out villages and towns, but in these Ill
thus able to obtain more prompt redress of their grievances. areas an integrated approach to agricultural extension can i!

be applied, with features such as the Guddu project's "farm- i

AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTIVITY ers' service centers." Outside the Indus basin the most inno- ;]
I
,:1

In addition to changes and improvements in water supply

and land tenure, modernization of the agricultural economy
vative undertaking is the Small Dams Organization, to pro-
vide irrigation facilities in the hill areas and also retard ero-
II

requires technical inputs and changes in the cultivators' at- sion. EPADC project areas are principally the Ganges-Koba-
titudes. The Food and Agriculture Commission of 1960 re- dak project and the Chittagong Hill Tracts, with the pecu-
viewed the various agencies concerned with agricultural de- liar problems of the shifting cultivation economy of the
velopment-the provincial departments of agriculture, ani- tribal people. EPADC also has a special interest in encourag-

'
72 The Politics of Pakistan

ing mechanization, by experimenting with small power tillers

T Social and Economic Setting

rower to obtain and difficult for the lending agency to re-

73

and by fostering irrigation through low-lift pump schemes cover when repayment is due. The Credit Inquiry Commis-
(to get water onto the land from the rivers) and by encourag- sion established in 1959 recommended that such loans be
ing the installation of tube wells. In both provinces the eliminated; they were not, but in 1961 the Agricultural De-
ADC's are responsible for the import and production of velopment Bank (ADB), with broadly defined responsibilities
quality seeds for distribution and multiplication, and for the for rural lending, was formed by the merger of the Agricul-
import and sale of chemical fertilizers at highly subsidized tural Development Finance Corporation and the Agricul-
rates. Despite the hopes of the Food and Agriculture Commis- tural Bank. The ADB is somewhat limited from the small
sion, the direct provision of credit has remained outside the farmer's point of view by complicated procedures and secu-
scope of the ADC's. rity demands, and in consequence the noninstitutional
The problem of credit for the farmer is always present in moneylender continues to operate.
an agricultural economy. Almost by definition the subsis- The cooperative movement has, since early in the century, :j
tence cultivator lacks the capital necessary to prepare his been regarded as the ideal means for mobilizing rural eco- Ii
I'

land and plant his crop and to sustain him until the next nomic resources and freeing the cultivator from money- ··11
harvest, and must turn for support to landlord, local notable, lenders and mortgages. Generally, the cooperative movement 11

or neighbor. In East Pakistan the predominantly Hindu

landlord class was destroyed by partition and the State Ac-
in Pakistan consists of primary multipurpose societies
(mainly for credit and marketing) and secondary central
IIi
quisition legislation, and the minimal rural services they pro- societies, backed up by cooperative banks at the subdivision
vided collapsed; in West Pakistan the land reform of 1959 or district level and a provincial cooperative bank at the
concentrated attention on the need to provide alternative top, all supervised by the provincial cooperatives depart-
sources of credit and other services if the influence of the ment. Despite the best efforts of over half a century, coopera-
rural aristocracy was to be lessened and a more self-reliant tive principles have not taken hold in the context of a fac-
peasantry developed. The effort to modernize agriculture re- tion-ridden and individualistic society. Cooperatives have
quires increased investments by the farmer, and hence in- been ineffective, often functioning only on paper and sub-
creased credit must be made available. Moneylenders, whether ject to corruption and to exploitation for personal gain by
professionals, landlords, middlemen, or more affluent rela- dominant individuals and cliques. The improvement of the
tives of the borrower, provide ready loans but at terms that cooperative system has been endorsed by successive Five Year
usually reduce the borrower to a state of permanent indebt- Plans, and was assumed to be a necessary adjunct of the Vil-
edness. The principal institutional source of credit at reason- lage Agricultural-Industrial Development program, which
able terms has for many years been government loans through was inaugurated in 1953 with the objective of facilitating
the department of agriculture or revenue, but tedious bu- rural development by encouraging local cooperation and
reaucratic procedures make them both difficult for the bor- initiative in all fields. Although the program was relatively
I

l
\
 ----,.-----
74 The Politics of Pakistan Social and Economic Setting 75

successful and was expanding rapidly, with trained village

workers functioning as general extension agents, Village AID
had some conflicts with the regular government departments.
When the creation of the ADC's brought another agency into
(of which most of the officers are members). The central asso-
ciation provides managerial and technical support to the pri-
mary societies, conducts weekly training programs at the
TTDC with the thana departmental officers as teachers, and
II I
!

the agricultural field, the Village AID program was termi- experiments with new farming techniques at its demonstra-
nated and its functions and personnel were transferred to tion farm and with activities such as poultry or dairy projects.
departments such as health, agriculture, or cooperatives, or Besides channeling the regular small savings of members into
to the ADC's. The Village AID training institutes and the the association and supervising the utilization of loans by
two training and research academies at Peshawar and Comil- the farmers, the primary societies provide the constituency
la (renamed Pakistan Academies for Rural Development) for the training programs and thus speed acceptance of other-
were taken over by the provincial Basic Democracy depart- wise controversial activities such as the family planning and
ments. women's programs. Since it was launched at the end of 1961
In East Pakistan the Academy for Rural Development at the Comilla experiment has demonstrated that with careful
Comilla has shown not only that economically healthy co- and disciplined supervision significant savings can be mobi-
operatives are possible, but that they are an indispensable lized in a community of very small farmers, enabling them to
part of a program of agricultural modernization and social improve their economic situation and to free themselves from
change in the rural areas. 17 The Comilla system is character- the moneylender. It has also shown that cooperatives can be
ized by a complete functional integration of the cooperatives a means of overcoming the problems of fragmentation of
with the local administrative structure. Primary hamlet or holdings, and for introducing a series of mutually reinforcing
neighborhood agricultural societies that are small enough to innovations affecting all aspects of rural life. Since 1967 the
have a sense of mutual confidence and identity among the financial and administrative backing for this program, which
members are linked by a central association, which is located at the time covered eleven thanas, has been supplied by the
at the thana headquarters town in facilities-the Thana EPADC.
Training and Development Center-that are shared with In West Pakistan the closest counterpart to the Comilla
the thana officers of government departments (agriculture, cooperative and training program appears to be the WPADC
fisheries, animal husbandry, etc.) and with the thana council scheme begun in 1966 for "farmers' service centers" in the
new barrage colonization projects. 18 However, these are estab-
17 See Pakistan Academy for Rural Development, A New Rural Co- lished at the union council level serving roughly 1,200 to
operative System for Camilla Thana (Comilla, annually from 1961),
1,500 farmers, rather than at the tehsil (the equivalent of the
annual reports; The Camilla District Development Project (Comilla,
1964); An Evaluation Report on the Progress of the Seven Thana Pro- East Pakistan thana) level. The major focus of the farmers'
jects under the Camilla District Integrated Rural Development Pro- 18 Pakistan Times Agricultural Development Corporation Special
gramme (September I967) (Comilla, 1967). Supplement, October 21, 1968. I

·:ti..,I
I
76 The Politics of Pakistan
-T-- Social and Economic Setting 77
service center is a demonstration farm where all local crops remammg 400-odd. In West Pakistan, ethnic, geographic,
are grown using modern techniques, under the supervision and agricultural diversity is combined with strong hierarchi-
of a university graduate agricultural agent. The farm pro- cal social organization and great differences in wealth. Mea-
vides full-time training of a year's duration for about fifteen sures of innovation and change that are workable and effec-
farmers and supports the extension services conducted tive in a newly colonized tract without an established rural
throughout the union, thus integrating the technical knowl- hierarchy may be frustrated by vested interests and tradi-
edge of the union agent and his staff with the realities of tional authorities elsewhere, and agricultural or cooperative
local agricultural conditions. In addition to the farm, each patterns appropriate to one context may not be easily trans-
center has a consumer cooperative society, to supply seeds, ferable to other regions. West Pakistan is likely to require a
fertilizers, and implements, and also a veterinary dispensary variety of rural development patterns, although the basic
and a forest nursery. Although the cooperative credit element principles developed at Camilla and in the Guddu project
is absent in this program, and there is no counterpart to the would seem to be applicable anywhere. It should be borne in
hamlet primary societies in East Pakistan, the important mind that these programs benefit principally those who al-
principle of the interrelation between local experimentation, ready have some small landholdings and leave the landless
training, and practice is common to both schemes. It is pos- unaffected.
sible that in the future the tehsil may prove a convenient An important adjunct to the cooperative and rural devel-
level to link the activities in neighboring unions. opment efforts in the modernization of the agricultural econ-
The prospects for the effective expansion of the Camilla omy is the rural works program. This program, which origi-
and WP ADC schemes throughout the two parts of Pakistan nated in an experiment conducted by the Camilla Academy
are governed largely by the nature of the respective rural in 1961-62, has undertaken labor-intensive improvements in
societies. In East Pakistan prior to independence the domi- the rural infrastructure-roads, bridges and culverts, drains,
nant classes, both rural and urban, were high-caste Hindus. canals and embankments, besides community centers and
The social and political revolution accompanying and fol- schools-by the mobilization of labor through the local coun-
lowing partition and zamindari abolition eliminated the cils in the winter dry season. The scheme provides work dur-
Hindu establishment, leaving a nearly classless and predomi- ing the agricultural slack season for the laborers who are
nantly Muslim rural society in which status and influence de- little if at all benefited by the cooperative programs. Origi-
pend almost entirely upon relatively minor-and transitory nally financed from funds engendered by the sale of wheat
-economic differentiations. The rural vested interests provided by United States aid, the program, up to the end of
threatened by an egalitarian cooperative movement are rela- the Second Five Year Plan, expended in East Pakistan-
tively weak and few in number, and given the common cul- where it had been most successful-a total of Rs 453 million,
tural and agricultural characteristics of the province, the and some Rs 200 million in West Pakistan. The revised allo-
experience of a few thanas can be expected to apply in the cation for the Third Plan (1965-1970) was Rs 1200 million

11

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78 The Politics of Pakistan Social and Economic Setting 79

for East Pakistan and Rs 600 million for West Pakistan, but and the improved infrastructure for supplying seed and fer-
alteration in wheat-loan terms and financing difficulties in tilizer. By mid-1968 the hoped-for breakthrough in agricul-
connection with cooling relations with the United States led ture was evident, with an increase over 1967 of 15 per cent
to serious shortfalls in expenditures in 1965-1968: only Rs in rice production and 44.7 per cent in wheat, partly because
37 5 million in East and Rs 213.2 million in West Pakistan. of very favorable weather conditions but also because of ex-
Extensive small-scale irrigation works projected in East Paki- tensive use of new wheat strains in West Pakistan. A similar
stan for 1968-1970 under a rural irrigation program con- spurt in East Pakistan is anticipated early in the Fourth Plan
ceived by the Academy for Rural Development at Camilla, period with improved winter irrigation facilities as well as
as part of the drive for provincial self-sufficiency in rice, may suitable new rice strains. The Planning Commission must
make up part of this shortfall. now seriously consider the impact of agricultural surpluses
The remarkable success of the agricultural sector of the on national economic programs.
economy has been a notable achievement of the Second and
Third Five Year Plans. The Second Plan goal of a 21 per Planning and Industrial Development
cent increase in food crop production was surpassed, despite At independence, Pakistan inherited very little industry
a setback in 1962-63 because of adverse weather conditions apart from plants that processed food crops for domestic con-
which threatened over-all objectives of the Plan and drama- sumption and prepared cash crops for export. The two zones
tized the key importance of agriculture. The revised Third were suppliers of agricultural raw materials to areas that fell
Plan (March 1967) aimed at an additional increase of nearly to India and relied predominantly on those areas for finished
35 per cent in order to achieve the goal of self-sufficiency in goods. Known resources for industrial development were ex-
food grains in 1970. Only 13 per cent of the sum invested in tremely limited, particularly in deltaic East Pakistan. In
the public sector was allotted specifically to agriculture, but West Pakistan coal mines and a small oilfield were being ex-
the planners argued that investment in irrigation, power, ploited long before partition, and the possibilities for large-
and other related sectors made the share of agriculture much scale production of cement were evident. Subsequent explo-
higher. During the Second Plan, when the annual growth ration revealed additional reserves of coal, low-grade iron ore,
rate in agriculture was higher than 3.4 per cent, there were and other minerals in West Pakistan, and even in East Paki-
signs of a breakthrough in private agricultural investment in stan extensive but not easily exploitable coal reserves were
West Pakistan, particularly in the sinking of tube wells and discovered in the 196o's in the course of the search for oil.
the use of fertilizers. Among the factors that must be recog- Exploration added to the existing knowledge of oil reserves
nized here are the land reform of 1959 and subsequent con- in the Punjab area, but elsewhere it revealed not oil but vast
solidation measures, the impact of the investment and tech- reserves of gas in Quetta division and in Chittagong division
nological advances connected with the Indus basin project, in East Pakistan. Natural gas, providing fuel for thermal ;11

i
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So The Politics of Pakistan Social and Economic Setting 81

power stations and raw materials for the chemical and fertil- . began to lay the foundations of Pakistani industry, exploit-
izer industries, thus became a major component of industrial ing the cheap refugee labor and the seller's market to extract
development in both zones. maximum profits, which were reinvested in expanding enter-
The partition of the subcontinent drew an international prises.19
frontier between the suppliers and consumers of 1947, dis- The planning process began shortly after independence,
rupting the traditional pattern of commerce and communica- passing through a number of phases before the planners and
tions. Karachi became the sole inlet and outlet for the Indus their organization achieved their current high status. The
valley with the breaking of ties between the northwest and First Five Year Plan (1955-1960) was the result of the efforts
Delhi, but fortunately the North-Western (now Pakistan of the National Planning Board, established in 1953. Because
Western) Railway system was preserved substantially intact. of the low level of planning consciousness in the administra-
In Bengal, however, the new border cut across rivers and tion and the confusion of jurisdictions within the planning
rail lines, and severed the port and industrial complex of hierarchy, the period to be covered by the Plan was well
Calcutta from the hinterland. East Pakistan was left with under way before the publication of the draft Plan in May
only the small port of Chittagong in the extreme southeast, 1956. The Constitution of 1956 created a National Economic
and the disjointed fragments of a rail system-broad gauge Council, including representatives of the federal and provin-
in the western half of the province and meter gauge in the cial governments under the chairmanship of the prime min-
east-which now constitute the Pakistan Eastern Railway. ister, which approved the modified draft Plan in April 1957.
The task of building an integrated national economy out When the final version of the Plan was published in May
of two disparate segments of the former British Indian Em- 1958, it still had not received the formal approval of either
pire was seriously hampered by the flight of Hindu capital the federal or the provincial governments, although the Plan
and of skilled managerial and entrepreneurial personnel. In period was half over. The Plan called for a total investment
their place millions of Muslim peasants and petty artisans of about $2.3 billion, with greatest emphasis on industry,
poured into West Pakistan, overflowing from the countryside irrigation, and power. There was a general failure to attain
into the cities and placing an additional burden on the the goals set, largely because of political and administrative
weakened administration. Those few refugees who possessed weaknesses and lack of direction.
exploitable talents and resources were quickly absorbed into The experience of the First Plan period and the planning
public service or into commercial activities, filling some of orientation of the army contributed to a greater planning
the gaps left by the flight of the non-Muslims. The great consciousness, and changes in the planning hierarchy were
majority, without training or abilities, formed an impover- made under martial law and confirmed in the Constitution
ished and underemployed laboring class. Somehow the chaos 19 Gustav F. Papanek, Pakistan's Development: Social Goals and
of 1947 was surmounted, and gradually persons who legiti- Private Incentives (Cambridge, Mass., 1967), especially ch. II, "Robber
mately or otherwise gained control of productive resources Barons' Progress." 1;
I

I
I
·:,i
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 ..,...
I
82 The Politics of Pakistan Social and Economic Setting 83 Iii
'1

of 1962. Broad responsibility for the formulation of policy growth rate of the G.N.P. rose to 7.5 per cent, suggesting i
[I
and the approval of national plans was vested in the National further over-all increases by 1970, but the domestic turmoil
111
Economic Council (NEC), including the President as chair- of 1968-69 resulted in something of a setback, to 5.2 per n
:1
man, the governors, the Deputy Chairman of the Planning cent. The objective of the final year of the Plan is to reach
Commission, and central and provincial ministers concerned 6.5 per cent, the intended average annual increase for the
with development matters. Responsibility for current super- Plan period. 20 The total Plan expenditures were $5.2 billion
vision of policy and sanctioning of schemes lay with the during the Second Plan, and a projected $10.9 billion in the
executive committee of the NEC, under the chairmanship of Third.
the finance minister. These arrangements continued, with A major objective of the Second and Third Plans and of
appropriate personnel adjustments, after the reimposition of the long-range perspective plan for 1965-1985 is the achieve- II
martial law in 1969. The Planning Commission itself (before ment of balanced development in the two zones of Pakistan.
October 1958 the Planning Board) is attached to the Presi- In 1947 West Pakistan was economically more advanced than I
dent's Secretariat with the President as chairman, enhancing East Bengal and benefited from the influx of some im- II
the Commission's status and ensuring that its voice is heeded migrant skill and capital. Although the gross provincial · ·11
throughout the administration. The Deputy Chairman is the
operational chief. The Commission has a large staff of econ-
products of the two zones were still approximately the same
in 1949-50, the more favorable environment in West Paki- i
omists and other technical experts and wields growing in- stan encouraged both public and private investment, which ,1!
fluence in every ministry of the central government, and in turn improved the social and economic infrastructure of
under its encouragement the provincial planning depart- the region. Since opportunities were greater there, West
ments are becoming increasingly sophisticated. Pakistan received and benefited from foreign-aid projects,
Guided by the new planning structure, Pakistan's eco-
nomic performance during the 196o's won international rec-
and foreign exchange earned by East Pakistan's jute exports I
11
was consumed in imports for the expanding economy of the Ii·1
ognition. The Second Plan (1960-1965) considerably ex- western province. During the 195o's the gross provincial ··i!
ceeded its original objectives, and the Third Plan (1965- product in West Pakistan increased at the rate of 3.1 per cent 11

1970), despite international and domestic problems, con- annually, while in East Pakistan the rate was only 1.9 per
tinued the advance. From 1960 to 1968 the gross national cent-less than the population increase. In consequence, dis-
product increased by 55 per cent, agricultural production by parities in per capita income increased from 18 per cent in
40 per cent, and industrial production by 160 per cent; the 1951 to 29 per cent in 1960, with much larger differences in
changing structure of the economy was reflected by the de-
20 "Fourth Plan Objectives," para. 3; Economic Survey of Pakistan,
cline of the agricultural share in the G.N.P. from 53.2 per z967-68, reported in Dawn (Karachi), June 4, 1968; "Annual Develop- !I'
cent to 45.8 per cent, and the increase of the industrial share ment Plan" (for 1969-70), Pakistan Times, April 29, 1969; Economic
from 9.3 per cent to 12.2 per cent. In 1967-68 the annual Survey of Pakistan, z968-69, reported in Pakistan Times, June 23, 1969.

ii

'
 -__,,....--·

84 The Politics of Pakistan Social and Economic Setting 85

terms of purchasing power, and were increasing between proportionate allocations were, in calculating them the plan-
1959-60 and 1962-63 at the rate of 7.7 per cent annually. 21 ners left out of account the huge expenditures in West Paki-
These trends made the impoverishment of East Pakistan a stan on the Indus basin works and reclamation schemes,
grave political issue during the 195o's, increasing the pres- amounting to roughly $2 billion by 1970, which shift the
sures which evoked the military intervention of 1958. balance of total expenditure decisively in West Pakistan's
The terms of the Second Plan and of the Constitution of favor. By 1967-68, although the over-all East Pakistan eco-
1962, which obligated the National Economic Council to nomic growth rate during the Second and Third Plans had
end regional disparities in income with the least possible risen to 4.5 per cent, in West Pakistan it had risen to over
delay, indicated the response of the Ayub administration to 6 per cent, indicating that while the rate of increase in dis-
the problem of unbalanced national development. The Sec- parity had been reduced, the gap was still widening and was
ond Plan gave much greater emphasis to East Pakistan, in- unlikely to be closed by 1985. In 1967-68 the gross provincial
creasing the province's share of annual public sector invest- product of East Pakistan increased by more than 8 per cent
ment from 36 per cent in 1959-60 to over 50 per cent in because of a massive 9.5 per cent growth in the agricultural
1964-65. In absolute terms this was an increase in East Paki- sector, surpassing the rate in West Pakistan for the first time,
stan of nearly 220 per cent compared with 63 per cent in the but this favorable portent was clouded by a drop to 2.6 per
West. The perspective plan published in 1965 proposed to cent in 1968-69, largely caused by an agricultural setback
eliminate disparities entirely by 1985, and to quadruple the due to flood damage. In West Pakistan the rate declined
G.N.P. and double per capita income. During the Third much less, to 6.8 per cent. 23
Plan 54 per cent of all expenditures for development in the Official strategy for growth in East Pakistan has been based
public sector was allocated to East Pakistan, plus 66 per cent on two major assumptions: (1) a higher level of investment
of development loans from the central government and 51 in the public sector than in West Pakistan, involving a trans-
percent of project assistance. Net foreign-exchange alloca- fer of resources from West to East Pakistan, and the creation
tions (taking into account East Pakistan's exports, imports, of an adequate development infrastructure by government
and foreign assistance) rose from $119 million in 1960-61 to action, and (2) increased investment in the private sector.
over $210 million in 1966-67.22 Impressive as these increased Considerable success has been achieved under the first head, :1
in terms of transfer of resources through public investment
21 The problem is treated in considerable detail in Mahbub ul Haq,
The Strategy of Economic Planning: A Case Study of Pakistan (Karachi, and in infrastructural improvements both physical (trans-
Lahore, and Dacca, 1963), ch. 4; see also text of the "Report on Inter-
23 Economic Survey of Pakistan, r967-68, reported in Dawn, June 4,
regional and Intra-regional Disparities," published in the Pakistan
Times, December 19, 1967. 1968; "Annual Development Plan" (for 1969-70), Pakistan Times,
22 Planning Commission, The Third Five Year Plan (r965-70), pp.
April 29, 1969; abstract of Disparities Report for 1967-68, Pakistan
12, 126; "Fourth Plan Objectives," para. 33; "Report . . . on Dispari- Times, December 15, 1968; budget speech by Vice-Admiral S. M. Ahsan,
published in full in Pakistan Times, June 29, 1969,
ties," in Pakistan Times, December 19, 1967. ,
Ii'

,,1
 T

if
86 The Politics of Pakistan Social and Economic Setting 87
I
port, communications, power) and administrative (invest- · 1962 PIDC enterprises included production of cotton tex-
ment facilities, tax benefits), but the private sector has not tiles, sugar, ships, natural gas, and chemical fertilizers in each I
responded. In the mid-196os only 22 per cent of all private
investment was taking place in East Pakistan, a proportion
which reflects the activity of the private sector in West Paki-
province, plus jute goods, paper, and newsprint in East
Pakistan and woolens, paperboard, chemicals, cement, and
coal in West Pakistan. Partly because of the vast dimensions
1.

.I 1i
'
11

stan in both industry and agriculture, where private invest-

ment by farmers has played a most important role in recent
of these undertakings and partly to decentralize decision
making, in 1962 the PIDC was replaced by an Industrial
1
I ..i 1

progress. The Comilla cooperative system suggests a means Development Corporation in each province. With greatly in-
by which private investment may be mobilized in rural East creased investment in industry by the public sector in East
Pakistan with perhaps a similar effect. The Third Plan Pakistan under the Third Plan, EPIDC plays an even more
allocated 50 per cent of total private-sector investment to dominant role in the industrial economy of the province.
East Pakistan, but given the difficulties in attracting invest- Both EPIDC and WPIDC are involved in the petroleum in-
ment the political turmoil of 1968-69 assures a serious short- dustry in cooperation with private capital, and the country's
fall. first steel mill is EPIDC's 150,000-ton Chittagong project
Each Plan thus far has anticipated that about two-fifths of which began production in 1967. (Steel mills at Karachi and
total investment would be in the private sector, about half Kalabagh in West Pakistan remain in the planning stage.)
of that share in industry, and most of the remainder in hous- The corporations follow a policy of disinvestment whereby
ing and transport. Planning policy is officially described as successful concerns are transferred by sale to private hands-
"pragmatic" and oriented to a free economy, although the increasingly with special arrangements for the small-scale
long-term goal of planning is to create an "Islamic welfare investor-in order to free capital for new ventures. In 1964
state." Under the industrial policy statements of April 1948 indications of excessive concentrations of private wealth and
and February 1959, only munitions, hydroelectric power, economic power and the growth of monopolistic tendencies
railways, telecommunications, and nuclear energy have been in some industries led to criticism of the disinvestment policy
reserved exclusively to the public sector. The normal role of during the preparation of the Third Plan. Despite this, in-
the state is envisioned to be the provision of investment facil- creased difficulties in international financing of the public
ities and economic overheads in other fields, except that if sector in the mid-196o's made necessary additional reliance
the public interest requires it, or if private capital is not on the private sector to achieve industrial development ob-
forthcoming for essential industries, then the state may inter- jectives under the Plan.
vene. The Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation The change in the foreign-aid climate in 1965 posed un-
(PIDC) was founded in 1952 to promote the industrialization expected challenges to Pakistan's economic vitality. The
of East Pakistan in view of the paucity of private investment original Third Plan estimates called for 32 per cent of the
there, but it soon became active in West Pakistan as well. By financing from external sources, or roughly $3.8 billion. This

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Social and Economic Setting 89

88 The Politics of Pakistan
years. The following year (1968) consortium support was I
may be compared to the total amount of foreign debt con- renewed in recognition of the continued strength and prom- I
tracted by Pakistan from 1951 to December 1967: over $3.6 I
ise of the economy.
billion. From 1959-60 to 1967-68 foreign loans and credits The successes of economic development during the 196o's li
financed about 35 per cent of total developmental expendi- were the result of concentration on growth, physical invest-
,1

l'I
tures, and nearly half of total imports. The largest single ment, and exports, and the relative neglect of social invest- 1
subscriber to Pakistan's foreign-exchange needs has been the ment. The perspective plan for 1965-1985 set out as goals 11 !
1.i
United States, with a total (as of December 31, 1967) of a fourfold increase in gross national product, removal of :i::
nearly $3.6 billion in loans and grants, including Public Law economic disparity between East and West Pakistan, full
480 wheat loans; the International Bank has provided $804 employment, universal primary education, and elimination
million. 24 After the great success of the Second Plan there of dependence on foreign assistance. Progress was made on
was every expectation that the United States and other coun- the first and last of these, but the others "proved to be more
tries would provide enthusiastic support in the Aid-to-Paki- complex than originally envisioned." The Planning Com-
stan consortium. However, in the summer of 1965 President mission's outline of the socioeconomic objectives of the
Johnson, in an apparent show of displeasure at Pakistan's Fourth Plan admitted the impossibility of achieving all the
growing relations with China, obtained the indefinite post- objectives simultaneously and emphasized the necessity for
ponement of the consortium meeting, and in September war a "conscious and judicious" national choice among the con-
broke out with India. The war was brief, but resources were
flicting values involved.
diverted to defense needs, and further blows came in the I

form of natural calamities, necessitating the diversion of We must attain a rapid pace of development to eliminate poverty, i
I
I

foreign exchange for food imports. Supplementary resources but at the same time, the nation must preserve its moral and 1,-

for the Third Plan were found through a total of about $1.4 spiritual values and strive for the creation of a just and stable
!.1
society. Economic progress can give us more material goods but 1!
billion in additional taxation at home. Increased export !:;
would not necessarily give us happiness or contentment. An ade-
earnings (expected to be more than double the 1959-60 level quate balance between economic and social objectives is a difficult
:11
I
by 1969-70) and unforeseen assistance from other countries task but we must make a beginning for the evolution of a syn- J
(principally the Soviet bloc and China) helped to make up thesis.25
the foreign-exchange gap that resulted when the consortium
powers contributed little more than 60 per cent of the ex-
pected amounts in 1965-1967. In early 1967 a new order of
The Commission pointed out the failings of the develop-
ment process insofar as the ordinary Pakistani was concerned
Ii

priorities was announced, in the hope of making up in the -for example, in average income, diet, housing, education,
remainder of the Plan period the shortfalls of the first two and employment-whatever over-all growth rates might
24 Economic Survey of Pakistan, r967-68, reported in Dawn, June 4, 25 "Fourth Plan Objectives," para. 6.
1968; "Fourth Plan Objectives," para. 39.

'
 ,.....
go The Politics of Pakistan

show. "It is quite clear on the eve of the Fourth Plan that
the conflict between economic dynamism and social justice
has become fairly sharp." The Commission foresaw a much
greater emphasis in the Fourth Plan on equality of oppor-
tunity, a more equitable return to farmers and wage earners,
3. Constitutional
growing social services, and ending undue concentrations of
wealth and economic power. The inherent limitations im-
Dilemmas
posed by the present stage of Pakistan's economic develop-
ment-"we cannot distribute poverty"-led the Commission
to warn that the material rewards of the system must be sup- Although the transfer of power at midnight on August 14,
plemented by a "fair and just social system, a humane and 1947, was in a sense a revolutionary change, it took place
responsive administration and cheap and speedy justice." smoothly within the framework of the existing constitutional
The strains on the political system imposed by social as well arrangements. The Indian Independence Act of 1947 granted
as economic injustice were evident to all in late 1968. In the dominion status to India and Pakistan, each to be governed
Commission's view the attainment of a just society "will be in accordance with the federal scheme of the Government
possible only by a change in our present legal, administrative of India Act of 1935, with essential modifications. In each
and social system." The political and constitutional crisis of dominion a Constituent Assembly, elected by the provincial
1969 proved the Commission's diagnosis to have been pain- legislatures in the approximate ratio of one member per mil-
fully accurate. lion inhabitants, was empowered to adopt a new constitution
and to act in the interim as the federal legislature. In
Pakistan, Mohammed Ali Jinnah, the Qaid-i-Azam ("Great
Leader"), became governor general, the successor of the vice-
roy as the king's representative, but in his own view holding
office as the representative of his people. His principal lieu-
tenant, Nawabzada Liaqat Ali Khan, became his prime min-
ister, at the head of a cabinet constitutionally responsible to
the Constituent Assembly. Thus, as the result of historical
circumstances, Pakistan began its quest for an appropriate
national constitution as a secular, federal, and parliamentary
state.
Pakistan has been faced with two major constitutional
dilemmas in the years since independence. The terms of the
91

~11:
!
 ~ ·

92 The Politics of Pakistan

Constitutional Dilemmas 93 I
Independence Act preserved the federal constitutional order ,11
which had evolved painfully over many years, and with The Islamic-State Issue l

which political leaders and the politically aware were gener- 1

Since it concerns the very nature and purpose of the Paki-
ally familiar. The history of the Muslim League and of the
stani political community, the Islamic-state issue has been
Muslim separatist movement itself committed Pakistani po-
one of the two principal stumbling blocks impeding the
litical leaders to a federal structure, tempering an overriding
formation of a stable Pakistani polity. The status of non-
belief in Muslim unity with a recognition of the geographi-
M uslim minorities and the rights of the individual are in-
cal and cultural facts of provincial diversity. In addition, the
volved, in addition to the institutional forms and the ethos
League's dedication to constitutionalism, epitomized in Jin-
of the political system. How Islam is interpreted will deter-
nah's career, p~edisj=>osed the leaders to seek solutions within
mine whether Pakistan is to be a free society or a closed,
the democratic parliamentary tradition, avoiding a radical
conformist one. Apart from a small group of Western-edu-
break with the past. On the other hand, the very nature of
. cated secularists, Pakistani Muslims agree that Islam should
the Pakistan demand required that a new and Islamic con-
provide the philosophical (or ideological) foundations of the
stitutional order, reflecting the unity of the Muslim nation,
state. Unfortunately, the approaches to Islam differ widely,
be defined. During the seven-year struggle for independence
and the same individual may subscribe to differing and con-
little effort had been made to detail the constitutional, po-
flicting views at different times or even at the same time. 1
litical, or social implications of a Muslim-majority state. The
The traditionalist interpretation of Islam, propagated by
consequent ambiguity permitted Muslims holding widely
the ulama (principally those of the Deobandi school, through
differing views to join together, each sure that Pakistan
their organization, the Jamiat-ul-Ulama-i-Islam) is reaction-
would reflect his own aspirations. Although the vast majority
ary in dreaming of the establishment of social harmony by a
of these Muslims, simple and sophisticated alike, assumed
return to the practices of a mythical Golden Age. The com-
that the Pakistan won through their support of the Muslim
•· mitment of the ulama to Islam as an indivisible suprana-
League would be an "Islamic state," the task of defining this
tional community presided over by a khalifa and defended by
state in generally acceptable terms proved to be far from
strict adherence to the traditional schools of law interpreted
easy. The successive political and constitutional crises of the
by themselves caused them in earlier years to reject the
past twenty years have arisen from a continued lack of con-
Aligarh contention that the Indian Muslim community was
sensus on the role of Islam in the state (the "Islamic issue")
a society in itself. Their support of the Congress version of
and from the even more difficult problems of reconciling the
diverse interests of a geographically divided political com- 1 The ensuing discussion of traditionalist, fundamentalist, and mod-
munity (the "federal issue") in a democratic constitutional ernist approaches to Islam is based in part on Leonard Binder, Re-
order. ligion and Politics in Pakistan (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1961). There
are, of course, variations on these major themes, which are presented
here in a simplified form.

\
 Constitutional Dilemmas 95
94 The Politics of Pakistan
law must prevail unequivocally, and nonbelievers must be
Indian nationalism continued until the obvious success of
relegated to an inferior position.
the Muslim League in its campaign for Pakistan led increas-
The modernist view of the political meaning of Islam is,
ing numbers to change sides. In the final two years of the
broadly, that of the Aligarh movement. Sir Syed Ahmad
struggle, the influence and moral authority of the ulama over
Khan taught that Islam, science, and democratic values were
the masses were invaluable to the Muslim League in propa-
compatible; Ameer Ali and others elaborated the view that
gating the cry of "Islam in danger." In accepting the concept
democracy and Islam were identical, rejecting the claims of
of a geographically restricted Islamic society, however, the
the ulama to exclusive authority to interpret Islamic princi-
ulama continued to envision a political community headed
ples. The modernists insist that God speaks to each man
by a khalifa and guided by their own interpretations of the
through the Quran, without intermediaries; the individual
divine law. The Islamic state in this view, therefore, would
Muslim conscienc(!, not ecclesiastica_l authority, determines
vest political power solely in the hands of the Muslims and
the meaning of the Quran. To them Islamic principles are
would entrench the leading role of the ulama in the process
of implementing the requirements of the Shariah.
and
flexible" adaptable. to new conditions, an eternally valid
message, _c!y:r:ia:rn!c: rather than static. Pakistani political
The fundamentalist approach to the Islamic state seeks to
leaders have therefore argued that the Islamic state is demo-
deal with the moral and economic problems of modern man
cratic, its government based on consultation among equals
by strict adherence to the essential truths of the Quran. It
and respecting the individual conscience. According to Prime
differs from the traditionalist approach primarily in finding
Minister Liaqat Ali Khan "it means a State where the broth-
the basis of social and political organization in the Quran
erhood of Islam will prevail, where there is no minority or
and Sunnah rather than in the historical practice of the
Muslim community. It appeals to those who have been suffi-
~j?rfry ,md where human digO:ity and human equality will
..P.F~vail." 2 Such an Islamic state is morally Islamic, dedicated
ciently affected by modern education and ideas to scorn the
to justice, social welfare, and community responsibility, but
passive and obscurantist attitudes of the ulama yet believe
•· the institutions through which these purposes are achieved
that "true" Islam has definite ideological meaning, realizable
are determined by the requirements of the environment, not
and enforceable on mankind. The Jamaat-i-Islami Pakistan,
by divine decree.
following the rigidly constructed ideology propounded by its
To the controversy among the Muslims concerning the
amir, Maulana Abul Ala Maududi, is the foremost exemplar
constitutional implications of Islam was added in the early
of fundamentalism. The Jamaat conceives of a universal state
years the bitter opposition of the Hindu minority to any for-
under the sovereignty of God, in which the governing power
mal link between the state structure and religion. Pointing
vested in the community of believers is exercised in accord-
to disagreements between the proponents of various "Islamic
ance with the Shariah by an elected amir, whose interpreta-
tions are, in the final analysis, binding. This approach is sup- 2 Constituent Assembly (Legislature) of Pakistan, Debates (Karachi:
Manager of Publications), First Session, I, No. 5 (March 2, 1948), p. 136.
ported by those who believe that in an Islamic state divine
i

, I[
't 1
 1
96 The Politics of Pakistan Constitutional Dilemmas
II!
97
state" schemes, Hindu spokesmen protested that a dedication These paragraphs did not use the expression "Islamic state"
to Islam would permit any faction that gained the upper or "Islamic republic" but were sufficiently vague to win sup-
hand to impose its religious views on the entire society. The port from all Muslim factions. At a later stage, when efforts
result, they contended, would be at best a theocracy and at were made to give constitutional definition to these generali-
worst a totalitarian state ruled by an elite of "true believers." ties, Muslim modernists began to share non-Muslim mis-
The contention that in such a society non-Muslims would be givings.
second-class citizens, "hewers of wood and drawers of water,"
was elaborated with particular reference to the system of ISLAM IN THE CONSTITUTION OF I 956 ,•'I
separate communal electorates that many Muslims believed The question of the supremacy of the Holy Quran and
~
to be essential in an Islamic state. These arguments were ad- Sunnah and the prohibition of legislation repugnant to them
vanced at great length in the Constituent Assembly in 1949 has been an especially controversial issue. The interim report r

in the debate on Liaqat Ali Khan's Objectives Resolution, ·

of the fonstituent Assembly's Basic Principles Committee, i
but in vain. presented September 28, 1950, recommended that the Ob- 1

The Objectives Resolution, adopted by the Constituent

Assembly on March 12, 1949, set out the general principles
upon which the constitutional order was to be based. The
)\ jectives Resolution be included as one of the "Directive
Principles of State Policy" but advised that it would be im-
possible to make detailed provision for Islamic matters in a
I,.~
passages referring to Islam were as follows: -constitution. The resulting outcry from traditionalists and
In the name of Allah, the Beneficent, the Merciful: fundamentalists caused the report to be referred back to the
Whereas sovereignty over the entire universe belongs to God Committee. The final report reflected the increased tradition-
Almighty alone and the authority which he has delegated to the alist influence prevailing after Khwaja Nazimuddin had suc-
State of Pakistan through its people for being exercised within ceeded Liaqat Ali Khan in the prime ministership. It was
,1,i
the limits prescribed by Him is a sacred trust; presented on December 22, 1952, and recommended that ,I
This Constituent Assembly, representing the people of Pak-
istan, resolves to frame a Constitution for the sovereign inde-
pendent State of Pakistan; ...
boards of ulama be established to review impugned legisla-
tion. This, together with the recommendation that existing IJ
law should be brought into conformity with Islamic princi-
Wherein the principles of democracy, freedom, equality, toler-
ples and that the in junctions of the Quran and Sunnah be

i
ance and social justice as enunciated by Islam shall be fully ob-
served; codified, led to a further outcry of protest. Both modernists
Wherein the Muslims shall be enabled to order their lives in and secularists considered the proposals un-Islamic in seem-
the individual and collective spheres in accord with the teachings ing to recognize a priesthood and undemocratic in vesting
and requirements of Islam as set out in the Holy Quran and the powers of review in persons not responsible to the people.
Sunna; ...s Concern was also expressed for the economic consequences
3 Full text in Constituent Assembly of Pakistan, Debates, V, No. 1 of a rigid enforcement of the Quranic ban on interest. The
(March 7, 1949), p. 1. ultimate result-after Mohammed Ali of Bogra had sue-

l
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......;;.._.;:......;"-"----------'"'-------'-------:--------- -------

98 The Politics of Pakistan Constitutional Dilemmas 99

ceeded Nazimuddin as prime mm1ster in April 1953-was of the months of secularist dominance-argued openly
new official proposals to the Constituent Assembly, in which against the very attempt to define specific institutions as
the reference to codification was included among the "Direc- "Islamic." The disappearance of the political monopoly of
tive Principles of State Policy," fiscal matters were exempted the Muslim League contributed to the more open political
for a period of twenty-five years from the -provision prohibit- atmosphere and necessitated constant negotiation and com-
ing laws repugnant to the Quran and Sunnah, and the Su- promise between parties, all of which was reflected in the
preme Court was vested with power to rule on questions of Constitution enacted on February 29, 1956.
repugnancy. To allay the apprehensions of minority Muslim The knotty problem of the supremacy of the principles of
sects the phrase "Holy Quran and Sunnah" was to have the the Quran and Sunnah was dealt with simply by making no
appropriate sectarian meaning when applied to them. provision in the Constitution for the challenge of legislation
Supplementing the constitutional entrenchment of the ·- on the ground of repugnancy. Constitutionally, anything
Quran and Sunnah, the Constituent Assembly recommended approved by the legislature was by definition in accordance
in 1954 that Pakistan should be an "Islamic Republic" and with the principles of Islam. As a concession to the protago-
that the President should be a Muslim. Hindu members of nists of the Islamic constitution, the President was to ap-
the Assembly hotly opposed the first of these provisions, '-point a commission to make recommendations to the Na-
which they held to be emblematic of everything objection- tional Assembly in regard to the bringing of existing laws
able in the whole idea of an Islamic state, and then walked into conformity with the injunctions of Islam and to compile
out. The second provision was therefore opposed only by a a list of such injunctions as could be given legislative effect.
few Muslim members who felt it to be an unnecessary affront The creation of the commission was severely criticized by
to the minority communities. In general Muslims were satis- those who felt it to be as objectionable as the former boards
fied with the "Islamic" provisions of the constitutional draft: of ulama, but its recommendations were not to be binding
modernists felt that the most objectionable features of the · on the legislature and in any case could not affect the rights
original proposals had been eliminated, traditionalists envi- of minorities or "any provision of the Constitution." As a
sioned achieving their original objectives by securing the ap- corollary to its recognition of the right of the legislatures to
pointment of ulama to the Supreme Court, and fundamental- interpret the principles of Islam, the Constitution provided
t I

ists believed the draft to provide the basis for the propaga- for the establishment of an organization for Islamic research
tion and implementation of their dogmas. and teaching to "assist in the reconstruction of Muslim so-
The dissolution of the first Constituent Assembly in Octo- ciety on a truly Islamic basis." In recognition of previous
. her 1954, in connection with a crisis concerning the federal non-Muslim objections, no reference was made to the propa-
· issue, made it necessary to reopen the Islamic questions when gation of the teachings of Islam among the people.
constitutional debate was resumed in early 1956. For the first The only other Islamic provisions to arouse serious dis-
time, Muslims-encouraged by the changed political climate pute were those identifying Pakistan as an Islamic Republic

t
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100 The Politics of Pakistan Constitutional Dilemmas 101

and requiring that the President be a Muslim. As in 1953, pretation by qualified leaders chosen by the community. Be-
Hindu members insisted that such provisions negated the cause Islamic unity was based on knowledge of one truth,
democratic spirit of the Constitution and were repugnant to disagreement could derive only from error, which the faith-
the fundamental rights and equality of citizens. Muslim ful would seek to correct; parties, seeking to exploit and in-
critics pointed out the dangers of confusing the principles of stitutionalize disagreement, were therefore un-Islamic and
Islam with the constitution of a state, with the implication blasphemous. Leaders would be chosen on the basis not of
that matters not endorsed in it are in some sense un-Islamic party but of their reputations as Muslims and servants of the
and with the probable consequence of involving religion in community, by an electorate consisting of members of the
every political controversy. The preamble (based on the Ob- community only. The Muslim League became in this view
jectives Resolution) in fact softened the impact of the Islamic the organized expression of the community through the
dedication by referring to Jinnah's declaration that Pakistan Muslim electorate. Any other Muslim political party was by
"would be a democratic State based on Islamic principles of definition the result of error and was to be condemned.
social justice" and recognizing the people (not God, or the After the Pakistan demand had been articulated, the Mus-
Muslims) as the source of the Constitution. In this way, by lim League became the national movement, basing its appeal
qualifying and compromising the references to Islam, the
drafters sought to conciliate those elements who demanded
an Islamic constitution without giving them real power.
,I on the theory of the national incompatibility of Muslim and
Hindu ideals and values. The concepts of separate electorates
and separate representation for religious communities, there-
Final authority was left with the legislatures and the people, fore, were for many identified with the Pakistan movement.
who-whatever the Constitution might say-remained in Jinnah himself seems never to have taken a dogmatic view
the vast majority Muslim and oriented to Islamic values. of the matter, and certainly on occasions before indepen-
dence he had contemplated abandoning separate electorates
SEPARATE ELECTORATES
under appropriate conditions. His great speech to the Con-
One matter closely bound up with both traditional and stituent Assembly on August 11, 1947, suggests that he an-
fundamentalist conceptions of the Islamic state that was not ticipated that all communities would be politically equal in
dealt with in the Constitution of 1956 was the difficult ques- Pakistan.
tion of electorates. Separate electorates had been introduced
If you forget your past and work together in a spirit that every-
in 1909 on the insistence of the Muslim League as a political
one of you, no matter to what community he belongs, no matter
device to ensure the representation of the Muslim minority
what relations he had with you in the past, no matter what his
in British India. During the political struggle, separate elec- colour, caste or creed, is first, second and last a citizen of this
torates were gradually rationalized theologically in roughly State with equal rights, privileges and obligations, there will be
the following terms. The Muslim community was united by !i
no end to the progress you will make. . . . You are free; you 1:

belief in one God and one Law, which required only inter- are free to go to your temples, you are free to go to your mosques I'

Ii

-0o.1li
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Constitutional Dilemmas 103
102 The Politics of Pakistan

or to any other places of worship in this State of Pakistan. You national movement_.. They argued that separate electorates
may belong to any religion or caste or creed-that has nothing to weakened society both by encouraging pressures within the
do with the business of the State. . . . We are starting in the days Muslim community to expel the unorthodox (for example,
when there is no discrimination, no distinction between one the anti-Ahmadi movement of 1952-53) and by creating un-
community and another, no discrimination between one caste integrated blocs within the state-in effect, potential non-
or creed or another. We are starting with this fundamental prin- M uslim "Pakistans." Tliey insisted that separate electorates
ciple that we are all citizens and equal citizens of one State. . .. were undemocratic and un-Islamic, that a religious sanction
Now, I think we should keep that in front of us as our ideal and was being given to a political device, and that the Muslim
you will find that in course of time Hindus would cease to be League displayed a "colonial mentality" in forcing on the
Hindus and Muslims would cease to be Muslims, not in the re- minorities an arrangement they did not want. Actually some
ligious sense, because that is the personal faith of each individual,
non-Muslims-mainly Christians in West Pakistan and
but in the political sense as citizens of the State. 4
Scheduled Castes in East Pakistan-favored separate elec-
Whatever the Qaid-i-Azam's intentions in regard to sepa- torates as a means of preserving their political representa-
rate electorates in Pakistan, after his death strong pressures tion in an essentially communal society. Ca~e.H~11dus, the
were exerted to maintain and extend the principle of sepa- most vocal minority political spokesmen, adhered to the tra-
rate voting and representation. The initially successful Mus- ciit:T~nal congress view that separate electorates divided and
lim League argument was that Islam guaranteed and even ·· weakened the society and worked to the disadvantage of the
demanded the full self-expression of each community, minorities by making the government independent of and
through its own representatives; by ensuring this, separate indifferent to them.
electorates freed the smaller minority communities from The debate over separate electorates assumed practical
Hindu domination and also precluded the political use of political importance while the compromises that ultimately
religion in election campaigns. Furthermore, the argument resulted in the Constitution of 1956 were being hammered
insisted that a common electoral roll was contrary to the out. In 1950-1952 successive bills were enacted by the Con-
ideology of Pakistan and subversive of the integrity of the stituent Assembly over vehement Hindu opposition to pre-
Muslim community. Other Muslims, particularly members pare for adult-suffrage elections for the various provincial
of the Awami League party after 1955, rejected these con- legislatures. In addition to the Muslim electorate, these bills
tentions, along with the Muslim League's claim to be the provided for Christian and "general" electorates in parts of
West Pakistan and Christian, Buddhist, Scheduled Caste, and
4 Full text in Constituent Assembly of Pakistan, Debates, I, No. 2 "general" electorates in East Pakistan, each to return its own
(August 11, 1947), pp. 18-22. I have discussed at length the separate- representatives. In consequence, the East Pakistan Assembly
electorates issue, and the development of Jinnah's position thereon, in
my unpublished dissertation, "Government and Constitution-Making elected in March 1954 included 72 non-Muslims in a total
in Pakistan" (University of California, Berkeley, 1957), ch. 10. of 309. During the bitter political division within the ma-

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104 The Politics of Pakistan Constitutional Dilemmas 105

!IIr
jority community in 1955-1958, these non-Muslim legislators the ensuing election and then to amend the Constitution to
found themselves wooed from all sides. Far from being re- incorporate its views on Islamic and other matters. In Octo-
duced to political impotence by separate electorates, or quar- ber 1956 the Electorates Act provided for separate electorates
antined from influencing Muslim affairs, non-Muslims were for all elections in West Pakistan, and a single common elec-
in effect the arbiters of East Pakistani and of national poli- toral roll in East Pakistan, only to be amended in April 1957
tics, thus justifying the Awami League arguments during to extend the latter system throughout the country. There-
the constitutional debates for a common electoral roll: in after the possibility of further amendment following changes
the short run, a common electorate would obtain non- in the balance of political forces was never excluded, until
M uslim political support, and in the long run it would elim- the imposition of martial law terminated the struggle.
inate the unassimilated bloc within the provincial and na- During the Ayub years from 1958 to 1969 the electorates
tional legislatures. Nevertheless, in West Pakistan, where issue was for the most part quiescent. The Constitution Com-
there were only 10 non-Muslims in the 310-member Assem- mission appointed in early 1960 considered the matter and
bly of the integrated province, separate electorates were in- found persuasive the arguments in favor of separate elec-
sisted upon: non-Muslims were not a significant political torates to safeguard minority interests. Despite the evidence
force, and in any case they favored separate electorates, while of the great influence of separately elected minority members
the "Islamic" overtones of the issue provided a ready focus during 1955-1958, the Commission also held it to be not
for appeals to the overwhelmingly Muslim population. "safe" to adopt a common electorate while so many Hindus
Since in the Constituent Assembly it was impossible to remained "unreconciled" to the existence of Pakistan, and
agree whether in the future there should be separate elec- recommended accordingly. 5 Instead of accepting the Com-
torates or a common electoral roll for national and provincial mission's advice, President Ayub followed the precedent of
elections, the Constitution of 1956 left the matter undeter- the union council elections of late 1959 in making no pro-
mined, to be settled by ordinary legislation. Because to many vision in the Constitution of 1962 for separate voting either
East Pakistani leaders a common electoral roll was a neces- at the primary or the secondary level. Indirect elections made
sary concomitant to equal representation of East and West -- the issue seem less important, but their results confirmed the
Pakistan in the national legislature, while to important view that a common electoral roll would practically elimi-
groups in both provinces separate electorates were essential ~-nate non-Muslim representation in the legislatures. Non-
to an Islamic state, the political struggle over the principle Muslims in East Pakistan may have been content with voting
of electorate was as bitter as constitutional dogma could
5 Cabinet Secretariat, Report of the Constitution Commission, Pakis-
make it. Intergroup conflict increased as each party sought tan z96z (Karachi, 1962), pp. 71-76. The Commission reports that 40
to achieve supremacy in order to impose its electoral princi- per cent of the 6,269 responses to its questionnaire favored separate
ples on the country, hoping to win parliamentary control in electorates, while 55.1 per cent favored a joint electorate.

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106 The Politics of Pakistan Constitutional Dilemmas 107

influence only, but in West Pakistan Christian voices were Islam." This reference to repugnancy was elaborated by the
raised at the end of the Ayub era for reforms guaranteeing constitutional amendment of January 1964. In replacing the
them representation. "Principles of Law-making" with justiciable fundamental
rights, the amendment inserted into the chapter on "Princi-
ISLAM IN THE CONSTITUTION OF 1962 ples of Policy" the declaration that "no law shall be repug-
Part of the reason for the abrogation of the "Islamic" nant to the teachings and requirements of Islam as set out
Constitution of 1956 was the generals' disgust at what Presi- in the Holy Quran and Sunnah, and all existing laws shall
dent Iskander Mirza termed the "prostitution of Islam for be brought in conformity" therewith. The Advisory Council,
political ends." Martial law eliminated the Islamic trappings on a reference by the National Assembly or a Provincial As-
of the constitutional order, sweeping away the Islamic laws sembly, the President, or a governor, was to express its opin-
commission and the provisions concerning repugnancy. The ion on a question of repugnancy, but no authority was ob-
Constitution of 1962 minimized the overt Islamic provisions liged either to ask for advice or to follow it if asked and
and refrained from describing Pakistan as an "Islamic Re- given. In addition, the amendment required the Council to
public," although the preamble-a modification of the Ob- examine all existing laws "with a view to bringing them into
jectives Resolution of 1949-recognized the sovereignty of conformity with the teachings and requirements of Islam,"
Allah and made clear the dedication of the state to Islamic and to submit a report to the President before January 15 on
principles in accordance with the "will of the people." This its activities during the preceding year.
proved politically insufficient, and severe public criticism The Advisory Council of Islamic Ideology (which con-
made it necessary for President Ayub Khan to accept amend- tinued to exist after the imposition of martial law in 1969)
ments in January 1964 restoring more explicit constitutional is reminiscent of the abortive boards of ulama of the 1952
references to Islam, including the appellation "Islamic Re- proposals, although its membership and functions are more iti
public." broadly defined. The Council includes five to twelve persons I
Ii
111,
The principal innovation of the 1962 Constitution in mat- appointed by the President for three years, on the basis of s'I

ters Islamic was the creation of the Advisory Council of their "understanding and appreciation of Islam and of the ;·111:
I'
Islamic Ideology. Initially the Council was intended to make economic, political, legal and administrative problems of I.

recommendations on the means for enabling Muslims to Pakistan." Ordinarily among its membership have been
order their lives in accordance with the principles of Islam. judges, professors, and retired civil servants, besides ulama I
It was also to advise whether a law referred to it disregarded, representing different schools of thought. President Ayub I
violated, or otherwise was not in accord with the "Principles no doubt anticipated that such a body would interpret Islam ji11:
of Law-making," a constitutional chapter of hortatory legis- in practical Pakistani terms, partly because its diverse mem- :1

lative guidelines mainly concerning individual rights but in- bership would preclude agreement on extreme formulations
cluding the stipulation that "no law should be repugnant to of any sort. Although by 1969 several matters had been re-
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108 The Politics of Pakistan Constitutional Dilemmas 109

£erred to the Council by the central and West Pakistan au-

thorities-concerning, for example, the problems of interest,
power of the pirs and other holy men over the masses. The
funds realized by efficient administration are used to assist
'il
[I
prohibition, gambling, and family-law legislation-and al- in the modern and systematic training of imams and other ,I
though it had begun a review of the entire Pakistan code, its j;
mosque functionaries, to fit them for positive roles in their n
,,
views received little publicity. One exception which brought local communities. ,,
',ti'
public expression of shock was the Council's recommenda- With the collapse of the presidential system introduced by 11

tion that Quranic punishments by amputation of limbs for President Ayub Khan and the reintroduction of martial law,
certain crimes be enforced when Islamic moral and social the detailed constitutional arrangements in regard to Islam
principles had been re-established. 6 The Council thus earned are subject to change. It is clear that Pakistan will be de-
a certain amount of scorn from modernists, while more con- scribed in the future as an "Islamic Republic," that its Presi-
servative elements tend to discount its qualifications to serve dent will be a Muslim, and that constitutional provisions
as a "supreme court" of Islamic principles. will seek to forbid laws repugnant to the principles of Islam
Ii
Soon after he assumed power in 1958, President Ayub and to reconcile existing laws with those principles, through 11

made clear his belief that the moral basis of society must be the agency of an organization similar to the Advisory Coun-
provided by a realistic and scientific interpretation of Islam cil of Islamic Ideology or its predecessor Islamic laws com- ri
as a living faith. To that end, in September 1959 an Institute
of Islamic Research was established in Karachi, charged with
mission. The Institute of Islamic Research is likely to con-
tinue, either in its existing status or linked with a university,
·I 1:

the responsibility of defining and interpreting the teachings because despite controversy over some of its publications it
of Islam in a rational and liberal manner in the context of serves a genuine and valuable scholarly purpose. Similarly,
the modern world. Given formal sanction in the Constitution the auqaf departments have proved too useful to be elimi-
of 1962 and moved to Islamabad in 1965, the Institute is nated, although their activities are resented by traditionalists
loosely linked with similar scholarly institutions in Dacca, who consider them and the other official agencies to be tools
Karachi, and Lahore. In a sense the original theological and for un-Islamic "indoctrination" and attacks on the institu-
historical research undertaken at the Institute is supple- tions of the faith.
mented by educational and training programs sponsored by
provincial agencies. In both provinces, governmental depart- The Federal Issue
ments have been established to supervise and if need be to The relationship between East and West Pakistan has
administer Muslim shrines and charitable trusts (auqaf), to overshadowed all other questions in practical importance,
prevent corruption and misappropriation of funds, and, even the ideological one of the role of Islam. Two major
especially in West Pakistan, to end the social and political problems are involved: the voice of each zone of the country
in nationwide political institutions, and the distribution of
6 Pakistan Times (Lahore), February 19, 1966. powers between the central authority and the provinces. At

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110 The Politics of Pakistan
I Constitutional Dilemmas u 1
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I,
independence Pakistan was made up of fifteen separate en- responsible to a joint session of a federal legislature in which
tities: four governor's provinces (East Bengal, West Punjab, the lower house would have an East Pakistan majority by
.11
Sind, North-West Frontier), ten princely states (the Indus virtue of population and the upper a West Pakistan major-
plain states of Bahawalpur and Khairpur; the four Baluchi- ity through the equal representation of the units, with the
stan states of Kalat, Kharan, Mekran and Lasbela; and the , exact size of the two houses left unclear. These proposals be-
four Frontier states of Swat, Chitral, Dir, and Amb), and the ing entirely unacceptable in East Pakistan, in December
centrally administered chief commissioner's province of Ba- 1952 the Committee proposed a solution abandoning the
luchistan. Under the 1935 Act all of these except Baluchistan equality of units and providing equal representation for the
had theoretically an equal constitutional status as units of the two zones in each house, the cabinet to be responsible to the
federation. All were located in the economically more ad- lower. This scheme was disliked in both parts of the coun-
vanced western zone except East Bengal, which had a greater try, and gave way in October 1953 to the so-called "Moham- i
:1
population than all of West Pakistan in an area only one- med Ali formula," a compromise drawn up by the prime l

I
sixth as large. While West Pakistan leaders argued that each minister. This plan included elements of both previous
of the units should have an equal degree of autonomy and plans: a West Pakistan majority in the upper house was to
equal representation in a federal upper house, East Paki- be exactly balanced by an East Pakistan majority in the
stanis insisted that their isolated province was sui generis and
entitled to a greater degree of autonomy than was practicable
lower, and the cabinet was to be responsible to a joint ses-
sion; in addition controversial matters were to require pas-
·I
for the units of West Pakistan, and because of its population sage by a majority including at least 30 per cent of the mem-
was entitled to a majority voice in national affairs. The con- bers from each zone. In effect, this device created a disguised
stitutional debate until 1954 was the story of the gradual unicameral system, recognizing through parity that the Fed-
acceptance by West Pakistani leaders of the hard reality that eration of Pakistan consisted of two partners rather than
only by the integration of their rather artificially fragmented fifteen. The same was the effect of the emerging assumption
region into one could they justifiably expect an equal voice that prime minister and head of state had to be from differ-
in national affairs and an equal degree of autonomy with ent zones.
East Pakistan. Despite its realism, the "Mohammed Ali formula" did not
Although the integration of the western zone into one receive a warm reception in either part of the country. The
unit was suggested as early as 1948, local pride and, in the grouping of the units of West Pakistan for parliamentary
smaller units, jealousies and fears of the economically and purposes left unaffected their separate constitutional identi- ,,11
numerically dominant Punjabis made acceptance of the idea 1:j
ties and the difficult problem of the distribution of powers
a painful process of grudging concession. In September 1950 between the federation and the units. The constitutional
the interim report of the Basic Principles Committee pro- proposals perpetuated a fragmentation that would presum-
I
posed a federation of equal units, the federal cabinet being ably have enabled East Pakistan to dominate the national

-tiII
112 The Politics of Pakistan
1- Constitutional Dilemmas 113

scene, even without the parliamentary majority its spokes- stanis who regarded the scheme as a means of perpetuating
men continued to demand, by exploiting anti-Punjabi par- Punjabi domination over the entire country were also highly
ticularisms within West Pakistan. These considerations, by critical of it. Nevertheless, the bill was passed with only one
mid-1954, led many West Pakistanis (especially Punjabis) to West Pakistan member among those voting against it, other
endorse a "One Unit" plan for the integration of all the prov- critics from the new province abstaining. The unified West
inces and states. When added to the long-standing dissatis- Pakistan came into being on October 14, 1955, but opposi-
faction in East Pakistan with the work of the Constituent tion from the non-Punjabi areas continued, straining the
Assembly, the opposition to the constitutional proposals in political compromises of the Constitution of 1956.
West Pakistan produced a political crisis that culminated in
CONSTITUTIONAL PARITY
the dissolution of the Assembly by the governor general on
October 24, 1954. A month later the federal government an- According to spokesmen for East Pakistan's Awami League,
nounced its intention to bring about the integration of West their decision to accept parity between East and West Paki-
Pakistan in order to simplify the constitutional problems of stan in order to solve the federal problem was part of a bar-
representation and of distribution of powers. gain made in early 1955 prior to the election of the second
Although the original intention of the governor general Constituent Assembly. In that bargain East Pakistan agreed
and his ministers was to carry through the merger of West to the unification of West Pakistan and accepted equal repre-
Pakistan by executive order, decisions of the Federal Court sentation with the new province in the national legislature,
(see p. 137) in a series of cases arising out of the dissolution in return for West Pakistan's acceptance of a common elec-
of the Assembly made it clear that no action could be taken toral roll for all Pakistanis. Just as some West Pakistanis
without the approval of a new Constituent Assembly. The feared that the East might attempt to exploit the differences
merger plan was therefore delayed for consideration by an between Punjabis, Sindhis, and Pathans, East Pakistanis
feared that the West would seek to exclude their large non- l
Assembly elected in June 1955 on the basis of equal repre- 11

sentation of the two zones. To allay the fears of the smaller Muslim minority from the effective political community. i
units, the merger bill provided for Punjab to accept repre-
sentation of 40 per cent rather than 60 per cent in the new
provincial legislature, while decentralization of the admin-
Consequently, the merger of West Pakistan and the constitu-
tional provision of parity between the two provinces in the
National Assembly should have been followed by the merger
I
istration, guaranteed shares in the public services, and addi- of Muslims and non-Muslims into a single electorate. The i\l
1
tional public expenditures in non-Punjabi areas were prom- omission of specific provision in the Constitution of 1956 for 1
!
ised. Considerable opposition was expressed by members of a common electorate was, from the Awami League viewpoint,
the Constituent Assembly from Sind and the Frontier, both a betrayal of the parity agreement. With equal representation
to the principle of merger and to the political means used by of the two provinces, if separate electorates were enacted the
the federal government to obtain support for it. East Paki- Muslims of East Pakistan would have much smaller represen-

i
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,111
114 The Politics of Pakistan
I Constitutional Dilemmas 115

tation than the Muslims of West Pakistan, although their The presidential system under the martial law of 1958-
numbers were roughly the same. Instead of the majority 1962 and the Constitution of 1962 significantly modified
voice that they had demanded, they would have been re- some aspects of parity while confirming others. The funda-
duced to a minority under the guise of parliamentary parity. mental elements of the parity bargain were preserved: an in-
Having conceded parliamentary parity, East Pakistan de- tegrated West Pakistan, a common electorate, and equal rep-
manded full parity-an equal share-in the administration, resentation in the National Assembly. The constitutional
military services, and economic development. In all these commitment to parity in the public services was affirmed in
spheres West Pakistan was overwhelmingly predominant, the "Principles of Policy" and both the National Finance
and the deep-seated Bengali feeling of neglect or discrimina- Commission (NFC) and National Economic Council (NEC),
tion inspired insistence on specific guarantees that past omis- as well as the central and provincial governments, were ob-
sions would not be repeated and that immediate efforts to ligated to work toward the removal of economic disparities.
equalize the provinces in all spheres would be made. Because The President's cabinet and other national bodies-includ-
the lack of trained Bengali personnel for the public services ing the NFC, NEC, and the public service commission-were
could not be made up over night, it was possible in the Con- conventionally made up on the basis of parity. However, by
stitution only to recognize parity of participation as one of eliminating the distinction between head of state and head
the "Directive Principles of State Policy." Many East Paki- of government, the new system made impossible the conven-
stanis believed that complete regional autonomy including tional sharing of these two offices, and the concentration of
the division of national financial institutions, limiting the power in the hands of the President much reduced the sig-
federal government to defense, foreign affairs, and currency, nificance of parity in the composition of the cabinet. The
would enable their province to overcome its economic back- elimination of a formal federal distribution of powers also
wardness. The opposing view was that such a weakening of technically annulled provincial autonomy, making the pro-
the responsibilities of the center would confirm the economic vincial authorities creatures of the center. Although the
disparity between the two provinces by throwing East Paki- residuary powers left normally to the provinces gave them
stan back on its own inadequate resources. The Constituent greater practical legislative and executive autonomy than be-
Assembly compromised by including a distribution of pow- fore, the center retained power to legislate in the provincial
ers between the federation and the provinces very similar to sphere "in the national interest" and the governors were sub-
that in the 1935 Act, while placing several matters under ject to direction by the President. Hence it was possible for
joint federal-provincial control or in the hands of indepen- East Pakistanis to feel not only that they lacked a real voice
dent bodies. Under this arrangement, economic and admin- in the central government, but that their provincial govern-
istrative parity under the 1956 Constitution was very largely ment in its own sphere was subject to decision makers in
to be a function of the political consequences of parliamen- West Pakistan. In that context, "parity" seemed to have be-
tary parity. come a mockery.

,,1:,
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1

ll6 The Politics of Pakistan Constitutional Dilemmas u7

supposes that Pakistan is composed of two political commu-
PARITY CHALLENGED
'-nities -wit11 distinct identities and that bargaining between
Parity was a compromise bargain between political lead- .,__. them as equals must be the foundation of political life. This
ers of East and West Pakistan, and like all compromises was - ·view is inconsistent with the Pakistan movement's commit-
achieved at the cost of considerations held valuable on both '-ment to one political community governing its affairs in ac-
sides. West Pakistanis had originally been strongly opposed - ·cordance with the universal precepts of Islam, ideally in a
to treating East Pakistan as anything other than one among - unitary state. An Islamic state, based on belief in the equal-
several equally autonomous political units, regardless of pop- - ity of men before God, would seem to require equal repre-
ulation. Gradually the weakness of this position became evi- sentation of all, whether through separate or joint electorates,
dent, and it was concluded that the autonomy of the separate regardless of regional considerations. The East Pakistani case
units in West Pakistan would have to be sacrificed in order for a parliamentary majority was based on this straightfor-
to make possible the regional autonomy upon which East ward plea of one man one vote, and on the assumption that
Pakistan was insistent. East Pakistanis had originally de- political issues within the community would never simply
manded preponderant representation in the central govern- pit representatives from one region against those from an-
ment and a greater share of autonomy than the units in West other. In West Pakistan, perhaps because of the existence of
Pakistan, but ultimately they were led to abandon the former several distinct cultural groups, the political process was un-
and to agree to the integration of West Pakistan in order to derstood in terms of accommodation between groups, and the
achieve wider autonomy for their province. During the pe- possibility of one group dominating others. Hence although
riod when this process of accommodation· was unde~wa:y, the creation of "One Unit" signified the political acceptance
-""East Pakistan in fact held forty-four of the seventy-five s~ats of Islamic universalism with its implication of a unitary
in the Constituent Assembly (including thirteen non-Mus- state within West Pakistan, this was somewhat qualified by
lims), but this did not prevent the entrenchment and even the representational bias in the province in favor of non-
--rlle growth of disparities in administrative, economic, and Pun jabis. The demand that West Pakistan and East Pakistan
other fields. East Pakistani leaders therefore were willing to should be equally represented showed that West Pakistani
give up their parliamentary majority providing a common universalism extended only to that region, and was an indi-
electoral roll were adopted, in return for guarantees that in- cation of distrust and exclusivity of the sort that a federal
equalities in other aspects of national life would be elimi- structure is intended to accommodate through the autonomy
nated. of the federal units.
Although it made a great deal of sense in federal terms, Provincial autonomy also underwent a modification in the
the parity compromise involved the abandonment of the parity compromise. The Muslim League's commitment, in
cherished if somewhat contradictory political principles of the Lahore Resolution of 1940, to the creation of" 'Indepen-
Islamic universalism and provincial autonomy. Parity pre- dent States' in which the constituent units shall be autono-

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118 The Politics of Pakistan Constitutional Dilemmas ll9
mous and sovereign" was not only inconsistent with the uni- Since the intricate parity formula was entered into for the . :11,
versalism of Islam, but its devious terminology also produced attainment of particular ends by particular leaders and polit-
much subsequent confusion. The Muslim League legislators' ical forces, it came under fire as soon as any one of its ele-
convention presided over by Jinnah in Delhi in April 1946 ments resulted in a grievance. The integrated West Pakistan
made it quite clear that only one "sovereign independent was under attack from its conception, and its continuance in
State" of Pakistan, comprising two zones, was envisioned. 7 being was a lively political and constitutional issue within
Nevertheless, several factors combined to give the principle a year of its birth, even before its political and administrative
of autonomy the highest sanctity: the fact that autonomy workability could be fairly tested. The failure to provide for
from the center was a basic goal of the Muslim separatist a common electorate in the constitution bill in 1956 pro-
movement; the historical circumstances that created local voked the Awami League to renew demands in the Constitu-
vested interests with traditional demands against the center ent Assembly for majority representation for East Pakistan.
(especially in Bengal and the Frontier); and the linguistic The elimination of formal provincial autonomy by martial
and cultural rivalries between Bengalis, Punjabis, Sindhis, law and the Constitution of 1962 led once more to assertions
and Pathans. In due course the practical difficulties of deal- of the necessity of parliamentary federalism and the princi-
ing with regional problems in West Pakistan showed the arti- ple of autonomy in Pakistan's constitutional order. The in-
ficiality at least of the original multiplicity of autonomous ability of successive governments to redress the disparity be-
units, but integration and the vesting of provincial auton- tween East and West Pakistan became the most explosive of
omy in West Pakistan as a whole was opposed by those in issues. The sense of grievance in East Pakistan took ever
both parts of the country who regarded autonomy as an at- more emphatic political form, and was stated in demands for
tribute of major linguistic groups, not of geographic regions. the severe curtailment of central powers in a redefined fed-
The supersession of the "provincial autonomy" of Sindhis eral system, for the disintegration of West Pakistan, and,
and Pathans (and presumably of Punjabis) was opposed in finally, for the replacement of parliamentary parity by an
principle by East Pakistanis, who regarded it as an unaccept- East Pakistan majority.
able derogation from what they conceived to be the guaran-
tees enshrined in the Lahore Resolution. In practice, it was The Dilemmas Renewed
accepted in 1955-56 as part of the parity bargain in the The drive to reopen the constitutional issues once thought
interest of a larger definition of East Pakistan's autonomy, to settled returned Pakistan to the dilemmas with which she
which the universalist principles of majority rule subscribed began in 1947. Twenty years after the adoption of the Ob-
to in East Pakistan were also secondary. jectives Resolution, the political and constitutional questions
7 Text of the resolution, which was proposed by H. S. Suhrawardy, then dealt with so generally were still unanswered. The ten-
then premier of Bengal, in G. Allana, ed., Pakistan Movement: Historic sion between the universalism of Islam, which had created
Documents (Karachi, 1967), pp. 297-299. a Pakistani nation from the diverse raw material of Indian

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120 The Politics of Pakistan Constitutional Dilemmas

Muslims of many linguistic and racial backgrounds, and the the transfer of resources from prosperous to poorer regions .111:I
particularisms of geography and culture, continued un- to eliminate disparities and achieve the Islamic social justice
abated. Logically, the one offered the ideal of a unitary state, to which the Objectives Resolution referred. Abandonment
based on an ideology of religious commitment and indiffer- of parliamentary parity also must inevitably reopen the elec-
ent to cultural distinctions, the other the ideal of a league torates issue, with the likelihood that traditionalist and fun- I
11_11!I
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of linguistically defined, mutually exclusive nations indiffer- damentalist forces will renew the debate on Islamic issues. : ii
'

ent to religious belief. Between these extremes were the prac- In a broad sense Islam remains the source of ultimate i :1
tical possibilities of some accommodation of the Islamic com- values for the vast majority of the population. Islam pro-
mitment that gave birth to Pakistan with the facts of geo- vided the rallying point for mass support of the Pakistan ;
11

'i
graphic, cultural, and economic differences and their atten- movement and continues to be a powerful and evocative i
dant rivalries. factor in shaping national political and economic goals. The :I
Geographic realities require that there be some degree of sense of Islamic identity protects the Pakistani politici'I com--- i
political and administrative decentralization in Pakistan. ~-!!f_:~?~ __t.!_i·~~~?surdities of secular "political religions" 1 I
I
Parity provided a reasonable and practical formula, recon- observable elsewhere in Asia and Africa, with their political
ciling as far as possible the principles of unity and autonomy, aiviniffes and sacred autobiographical texts. Whatever the
and making possible the transfer of resources from one re- terms of the constitutional document, Islamic principles will
. gion to another by the central government. Its repudiation determine the moral tone of the polfrical order that finally
by East Pakistanis stems from political frustration at the con- emerges, transcending__!!ie traditional social codes of Pathan,
Tinued disparity between East and West Pakistan in nearly Punjabi, and Bengali. Despite its own internal schisms and
all aspects of national life more than a decade after the par- aoctrinal conflicts, Islam offers an ideal of unity and univer-
ity bargain was struck. Within West Pakistan, Pun jabis be- sality to overcome the local allegiances and centrifugal ten-
came the scapegoats for the varied political and economic dencies that beset Pakistan.
gTievances of Pathans, Sindhis, and others. The demand for
the disintegration of West Pakistan and for an East Pakistan
majority in the National Assembly was intended to over-
throw the alleged Punjabi domination of the country. The
proposed alternative to parity-maximizing East Pakistan's
autonomy by reducing the central authority to responsibility
for defense, foreign affairs, and little else-raises very serious
problems for the distribution of powers in a West Pakistan
reorganized into four linguistically defined units. Further,
such a maximization of autonomy would make very difficult
1:

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''tiII
 ..... ~i~Iii

Institutional Continuity 123

trative officer, now known throughout Pakistan as the deputy :1

commissioner (DC). Technically the modern DC, like his

I
predecessor of fifty or seventy-five years ago, is responsible for
all that goes on in his district and is the "father and mother"
4. Institutional of his people. He has preventive powers as a magistrate and :,
;1'
punitive powers in criminal matters as a judge, controls the
Continuity police, collects the land revenue, and supervises the adminis-
I
I

tration generally. The subdivisional officer (SDO) and tehsil-

dar in charge of portions of a district have comparable pow-
Throughout the years of struggle and conflict over the ers and responsibilities in their more limited jurisdictions,
major constitutional dilemmas, the institutions that most subject to the supervision of the DC. The latter, in turn, is
i
closely affected the people continued to function and to ful- guided and supervised by the commissioner of the division, I)II
fill the basic responsibilities of a political system. Change in a senior officer with primarily coordinative and appeal pow-
the administrative or judicial systems, or in local govern- ers, particularly for revenue matters. Commissioners, DC's,
fi
ment, came only gradually, and successive constitutions con- and field officers of other departments working in the dis-
firmed the arrangements existing at partition with at most tricts are responsible to the provincial government through ·I
slight modifications. Despite varying degrees of controversy a provincial secretariat headed by a chief secretary, which i
concerning the effectiveness and appropriateness of the in- formulates policy alternatives for the political authority and
herited structures in the circumstances of an independent transmits policy decisions to the field. The central secretariat
Pakistan, major constitutional issues arose only when signifi- plays an analogous role in regard to central functional de-
cant departures from the practices of British India were at- partments.
tempted. In consequence, the system continued to work In such a highly centralized system the problem of bureau-
smoothly in the absence of normal politics under martial law cratic inertia and red tape is a serious one. Paperwork has
in 1969, just as it had done from 1958 to 1962. become so important with the multiplication of government
activities that it is increasingly difficult for the territorial offi-
Civil Administration cer to "tour" and maintain contact with actual developments 11
l
The administrative structure of Pakistan continues to be within his jurisdiction. One remedy is to increase the num-
essentially colonial. In the course of the extension of British ber of districts and other jurisdictions, but this raises addi-
control over the subcontinent, the countryside was divided tional problems of finance and coordination. Further, in an
for purposes of revenue collection into districts, which in era of positive government, of technical specialization in
due course became the basic units for all administrative pur- operating departments, the interposition of generalist super-
poses. Each district is in the charge of a generalist adminis- visors athwart the lines of command, at the district and divi-
122 I
111
I]

,11
124 The Politics of Pakistan Institutional Continuity 125

sional levels and most importantly in the provincial and odically but with no result. In 1960 the Provincial Adminis-
central secretariats, can cause quite unwarranted and costly tration Commission recommended the partition of the dis-
delay. During the Ayub martial law of 1958-1962 efforts trict into three, but local "patriotism," among other things,
were made to decentralize decision making and to simplify blocked action until 1969. 1 One proposed solution is to make
the administrative process in both provinces (and in the cen- Mymensingh a division, with each of its six subdivisions
tral government) but to little apparent effect. raised to district status. Although the utility of the division
as an administrative entity has been challenged since before
EAST PAKISTAN independence, many officials feel that a considerable increase
The administration of Bengal was proverbial in British in the number of districts is necessary if the administrations
times for overcentralization, overregulation, lack of initia- are to be effective and responsive to the needs of a rapidly
tive, and delay. The districts were huge in population and, growing population.2 Dissatisfaction with the system that has
because of the terrain, physically difficult to administer, and prevailed thus far is reflected in the expressions of grievance
at the same time the provincial secretariat was inclined to against the provincial government in Rajshahi division and
deal directly and closely with the district authorities. Since occasional demands for a separate province of North Bengal.
independence, communications within the districts have im-
WEST PAKISTAN
proved but the general pattern of centralization of decision
making in the provincial capital remains unchanged. The The administrative diversity that characterized West Paki-
four present commissioner's divisions roughly correspond to stan at independence was somewhat lessened after integra-
the major geographic regions of the province: Dacca (cen- tion in 1955, but the unified province was still more varied
tral), Chittagong (eastern), Khulna (southwestern), and Raj- than East Pakistan. By region, the province included thir-
shahi (northern). They include (in 1969) nineteen districts, teen commissioner's divisions: Karachi, Hyderabad, and
which in turn comprise some sixty subdivisions, each in the Khairpur (incorporating the old Khairpur state) in Sind;
charge of an SDO. The smallest administrative jurisdiction, Multan, Bahawalpur (the former state), Lahore, Rawalpindi,
each under a circle officer, is the thana, of which there are and Sargodha in Punjab; Peshawar, Malakand, and Dera
over 400. Zamindari abolition forced the creation of a state 1 The report was not published, but its recommendations were made
hierarchy for revenue collection at the thana level for the public on June 29, 1960, and reported in the Pakistan Times, June 30,
first time, and the expansion of rural development activities July 1, 1960. On the Commission's recommendation, Khulna division
further increases the supervisorial burdens on the present was created by the partition of Rajshahi in 1960, Patuakhali district
district administrations. The huge Mymensingh district in was formed by the partition of Bakarganj in 1968, and in late 1969
Tangail district was carved out of Mymensingh.
Dacca division, with a 1961 population of over seven million, 2 I have discussed this in my monograph, Divisional Councils in East
presented an apparently intractable administrative problem: Pakistan, I960-I965: An Evaluation (South Asia Monograph Series, no.
for nearly a century proposals to divide it were made peri- 4; Durham, 1967).

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126 The Politics of Pakistan

r Institutional Continuity 127

Ismail Khan in the Frontier; and Quetta and Kalat (incor- place, but this was effected by regulations and standing or-
porating the former Baluchistan states) in Baluchistan. These ders that over time tended to become rigid and inflexible.
include a total of 46 districts divided into some 200 tehsils Further, the growth of central planning increased the num-
(in certain districts tehsils are ranked or grouped as subdivi- ber of controls, and necessary references to higher authori-
sions, but this jurisdiction does not have the same signifi- ties. The result seemed to confirm the predictions of the
cance as in East Pakistan). In Peshawar and Dera Ismail opponents of "One Unit," and increased the appeal of politi-
Khan divisions, besides the special tribal areas attached to cal groups demanding its disintegration. The vehemence of
the regular districts, there are five tribal agencies under po- the attacks on the West Pakistan administration in early
litical agents whose main concern is the preservation of peace 1969 led in mid-February to the appointment by the provin-
and security. The Malakand division, created in 1969, in- cial government of a committee under former Chief Justice
cludes one tribal agency and the former Frontier States of Fazle Akbar (an East Pakistani), to review the administrative
Dir, Swat, and Chitral. In addition to the tribal territories in problems arising out of integration and to make recommen-
these three divisions, extending along the border with Af- dations for remedying them. 3
ghanistan, parts of Quetta and Kalat and of one district of THE NATIONAL CAPITAL
Multan are also classified as "tribal areas." Central and
provincial laws do not apply in these areas unless specifically The capital of Pakistan is Islamabad, a new city on the
extended to them by the central government (or provincial northern outskirts of Rawalpindi in West Pakistan. Under
government, with the farmer's approval) with such modifica- the 1962 Constitution, Dacca in East Pakistan was designated
tions as may be appropriate. The long-term goal is the grad- the second capital and the seat of the National Assembly.
I
ual integration of these areas when social and economic con- Under the 1962 Constitution, both capital territories were .,I
ditions in them become stabilized and more similar to those within the administrative jurisdiction of the province con-
cerned, with no special autonomous status. The reintroduc- ij
prevailing in the districts, and from time to time small areas :1
are merged with adjoining districts. tion of a federal constitution will require that federal terri-
tories be demarcated. Until 1960 Karachi was the national
l
:1
At the time of the integration of West Pakistan much em-
capital, and a centrally administered territory from 1948 un- ;j
phasis was laid on the need for decentralization and for the
development of an orientation toward social welfare rather til 1961. The decision of the Ayub martial-law regime to
than toward law and order in the administration. This was a shift the capital and then to incorporate Karachi into West
response to fears that the affairs of the former provinces Pakistan was a source of grievance in East Pakistan. This re-
would suffer in an overcentralized and overburdened govern- sentment stemmed, in part, from the feeling that East Paki-
ment in distant Lahore, and that the government would be- stan had been deprived without compensation of an equity
3
come even more remote and indifferent to public needs. De- Pakistan Times, February 17, 1969. The creation of the Malakand
centralization of some powers to the divisional level took division was one consequence of the work of this committee. 11!:
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128 The Politics of Pakistan Institutional Continuity 129

built up in Karachi over twelve years, and in part from the paucity of senior Bengali CSP officers has necessitated the
effects on the West Pakistan economy of the huge investment filling of top posts with provincial service officers. Besides the i
of the central government in building Islamabad. Among CSP, the most prestigious all-Pakistan services are the for- 1:1
1

the East Pakistani demands in early 1969 was the transfer eign service, the police service, and the various finance ser-
vices.
I
!1
of the capital to Dacca, so that central government expendi-
tures could be channeled through the East Pakistani econ- In view of the great power and prestige of the central ser-
omy. However, because of the expenditures already made in vices, the matter of the equitable representation of the prov-
Islamabad it is unlikely that the capital will be shifted again. inces in them has been an important political factor in the
relations between East and West Pakistan. Bengali Muslims
THE PUBLIC SERVICES were very poorly represented in both all-India and provin-
Pakistan has retained the British Indian pattern of admin- cial services before independence, and consequently the new
istration by an elite corps of specially recruited public ser- Pakistani services were dominated by West Pakistanis (espe-
vices. The Civil Service of Pakistan (CSP) is the premier ser- cially Punjabis) and refugee Muslim officers from India. A
vice, in succession to the old Indian Civil Service (ICS), with quota system for recruitment to the central services was
a total strength that has increased gradually from slightly instituted, but the continued deficiency in numbers of Ben-
more than 100 in 1948 to 512 in 1968. At present young men galis made the question of parity in the services a matter of
are recruited into the CSP by examination at the rate of heated debate in 1956. Demands for ad hoc recruitment were
twenty-five to thirty-five each year, and undergo two years of rebuffed, and the government was willing to concede only the
training, primarily at the Civil Service Academy in Lahore constitutional pledge that "steps should be taken to achieve
but with short periods at other institutions including the parity" in the administration. Although this pledge was
Pakistan Academy for Rural Development at Camilla. The confirmed in the chapter on "Principles of Policy" in the
new CSP officer begins his career as an assistant at a district 1962 Constitution, its implementation was painfully slow
headquarters, usually in his home province. After demonstrat- from the point of view of East Pakistanis. By 1968 East Paki-
ing his ability he is given an independent post in a subdivi- stanis were 186 out of 512 in the CSP, 73 of 177 in the for-
sion and begins his upward move. CSP officers hold most of eign service, 82 of 21 o in the police service, 208 of 606 in
the posts of commissioner and DC, predominate in the key the various finance services, and 19 of 68 in the newly created
positions (secretary, joint secretary, deputy secretary) in the information service. 4 Apparently in response to the establish-
central and provincial secretariats, and hold some judicial ment of a National Assembly special committee on parity in
posts. The provinces have their own civil and judicial ser- 4
Statement by Khwaja Shahabuddin, minister of information, in the
vices, but their members can only exceptionally rise to the National Assembly on June 18, 1968 (Dawn, June 19, 1968). The fi-
heights that the CSP regards as normal career prospects. Such nance services included are: Taxation, Customs and Excise, Railway
exceptions have been evident in East Pakistan, where the Accounts, Audit and Accounts, and Military Accounts.

t
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130 The Politics of Pakistan

T Institutional Continuity

pointments, promotion, and discipline. To protect them

131

1968, the government, to speed the achievement of parity in

the central services, modified the quota system to assign 50 from political pressures, the commissioners (at least half of
per cent of the vacancies to East Pakistan and 30 per cent to whom must have been in the public service) have security
West Pakistan, retaining merit recruitment for the remain- of tenure for their three-year terms. Under the 1962 Con-
ing 20 per cent. 5 Under the new martial-law government in stitution each commission submitted an annual report for
1969, an equal number of East Pakistani secretaries to the presentation to the appropriate Assembly, indicating to what
central government were appointed for the first time, and degree its advice had or had not been accepted by the gov-
the first East Pakistani CSP officer became chief secretary ernment concerned.
(permanent head) of the provincial administration. This is Since the administrative structure and the elite services
an indication that East Pakistani officers recruited since inde- were developed in a prepolitical era, the bureaucracy is quite
pendence have now achieved sufficient seniority to attain the capable of running the country without politicians. It is not
most important and powerful administrative positions. an undue exaggeration to say that the dedication and esprit :\
The great powers vested in officialdom have made the ser- de corps of the public services enabled Pakistan to survive
vices for many years the subject of political attack and criti-
cism, and have at the same time made public service the most
desirable of careers. To protect the administration from the
the first chaotic months of post-partition confusion. There-
after, the services were called upon to run nonpolitical ad-
ministrations in the various provinces when they came suc- I
consequences of possible political interference or manipula-
tion, strong constitutional safeguards were developed during
the British period. These have been retained since indepen-
dence, although the 1962 Constitution slightly moderated
cessively under governor's rule (see p. 182). The traditional
administrator's scorn for meddlesome politicians could not
but be reinforced by the course of events, and in areas of
political weakness officers inevitably encroached on the pol-
I
them to make it easier to remove officials from service while icy maker's sphere of responsibility. The services would have
preserving the right of the accused to be heard and to appeal been more than human if some of their members had not on
against an injurious order. A central and two provincial pub- occasion yielded to political pressures or exploited their offi-
lic service commissions, appointed by the President and the cial positions for personal advantage. The martial-law re-
governors respectively, conduct examinations and advise the gime of 1958-1962, while completely freeing the administra-
executive on matters such as recruitment, qualifications, ap- tion from political tutelage, also tightened discipline and
punished or compulsorily retired many officers for corrup-
5 Reported in Pakistan News Digest (Karachi), March 15, 1969, p. 7. tion or malfeasance in office. The 1962 Constitution sought
Previously the So per cent was divided equally. The first 20 per cent of to strike a new balance between the bureaucracy and the
vacancies are filled by the names highest on the merit list, regardless of
political world by curtailing the privileges of the former
province; thereafter, provincial quotas must be filled no matter how
low on the merit list it is necessary to go, and regardless of the avail- while limiting the scope for pressures or "interference" by
ability of candidates of higher merit from elsewhere. the latter. The result was to decrease the bureaucracy's re-
I

l ·,
132 The Politics of Pakistan Institutional Continuity 1 33

sponsibility to the public, increase its dependence on its offi- selection based on merit. In complement to these changes,
cial superiors, and heighten the sense of political frustration the specialist departments would be freed from the supervi-
among those who felt that only through corruption could sion of the DC's and commissioners, who would lose their
the administration be successfully influenced. Hence the re- all-inclusive responsibilities to become coordinators of de-
turn of martial law in 1969 was accompanied by renewed velopment activities and guardians-through district and di-
calls for administrative housecleaning and reform, along visional administrative tribunals-of the rule of law. Finally,
with the familiar reliance on the services to carry on with the secretariat officers would cease to be policy makers and would
process of government in the meantime. become instead administrative assistants to the minister in
The major focus of challenge to the existing administra- charge, with no jurisdiction over executive departments.
tive system in Pakistan in 1969 was the report of the Pay and These proposals were so far-reaching that they were con-
Services Commission appointed by President Ayub in 1959 sidered impracticable and were not accepted by the central
under the chairmanship of A. R. Cornelius (Chief Justice of government, and the report remained unpublished until
Pakistan 1960-1968), a former ICS officer. 6 The Cornelius 1969. However, knowledge of the Cornelius recommenda-
Report severely criticized the elite "governing corporation" tions, especially their strictures on the competence of the
role of the CSP, monopolizing for administrative generalists CSP and the latter's questionable claim-given the vagaries
the most important posts in the regular administrative line of the quota recruitment system-to superiority over other
and increasingly in the new public corporations as well, to services, became widespread. In the agitation of early 1969
the exclusion of members of specialist services and of the the frustrations and sense of grievance of less privileged ele-
provincial civil services. The report recommended a revolu- ments in the bureaucracy joined with the long-standing an-
tionary reorganization of the administration to replace the tipathy to the CSP in political circles to produce a great out-
multitude of self-contained services by a functional hierarchy cry for the acceptance and implementation of the Cornelius
of seven inclusive classes, with provision for interclass pro- Report, and especially for the abolition of the CSP. It is not
motion on merit. The sixth class would include all officers likely that the report will be accepted in its entirety, but
of all specialties at the district and divisional levels and steps taken even before the imposition of martial law on
equivalent secretariat posts and would be designated the March 25, 1969, indicate that at least the complicated struc-
Civil Executive Service, and the seventh would be a Pakistan ture of services and classes will be simplified. The report's
Administrative Service including department heads, direc- insistence on the essential conflict between the authoritarian
tors of organizations, and the highest secretariat officers, with and aristocratic "good government" traditions of the ICS
6 The Commission's report was submitted in 1962, and finally made
and CSP and the egalitarian principles of democracy and
public in 1969. Pakistan, Pay and Services Commission, Report, r959- the rule of law upon which the state was founded, make its
r962 (Karachi, 1969). proposals especially persuasive.
I

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Institutional Continuity 135

134 The Politics of Pakistan
Acting on the premise that justice delayed is justice denied,
the Ayub martial-law regime utilized the newly created union
The Courts and the Law councils to institute a system of village courts. The Con-
From the British and Islamic traditions Pakistan has in- ciliation Courts Ordinance, 1961 (enforced from March 1,
herited a profound concern for justice and a great respect for 1962), empowers the chairman of a union and two members
those who dispense it. This has not prevented the corruption nominated by each of the parties to a dispute to sit as a con-
and manipulation of the judicial process, particularly at the ciliation court, to try to reach a settlement without lawyers
lower levels, in order to further personal interests and to or formal procedures. These courts are intended to deal with
ruin enemies. The adversary proceedings of the common law particular disputes within the over-all village setting, with
as embodied in the great Anglo-Indian codes of the nine-
the aim of eliminating the basic cause of conflict without de-
teenth century have very little relevance to the social en- lay or expense. The regular courts become involved only if
vironment of the vast majority of the population, and family conciliation fails or if the matter is so serious that a normal
and tribal obligations make nonsense of conventional proce- trial is required. Unfortunately the conciliation courts like
dures and rules of evidence. other institutions can be misused, their very informality and
Under the forms of law the greatest travesty of justice and fair- accessibility providing still another forum where false and
i
ness occurs. There are good grounds therefore for believing that harassing proceedings can be initiated.
in our conditions the whole elaborate machinery of English law For the rural population the DC in his capacity as district
is not suitable. The Magistrates keep on recording word for word i
magistrate has traditionally been the fount of justice. He and
the evidence of illiterate peasants and gentlemen of cities know- his subordinates, combining executive authority with powers III
ing full well that 90% of it is false. It is common knowledge of a criminal judge, were in earlier days able to redress griev- I:
1'11

that even if the events described had actually occurred, the eye- ,I
I ,1
ances and to deal with minor offenders with a minimum of
witnesses had not seen them. Even where the accused is guilty, it
is perjury which proved his guilt. False evidence is always in de- complication and delay. In the present day most judicial
mand, as much to prove what is true as it is to establish what is work is delegated to officers who are full-time judges, and
false. Against innocent and guilty alike it is equally necessary. 7 their courts suffer from the faults already described. Still, the
formal combination of executive and judicial functions is
These abuses are made possible in part by the slowness of open to abuse and can be used to oppress as well as to de-
the judicial process, which both facilitates tampering with fend. There has been a consistent demand for many years for
evidence and places ruinous financial burdens on litigants. the separation of the judiciary from the executive. A few
7 Dr. Nasim Hasan Shah, "Separation of Judiciary from Executive," steps were taken in that direction before 1958, but were
Pakistan Times, April 24, 1964, p. 6. The passage is almost word-for- later reversed. Additional powers were vested in the district
word that appearing in Sir Penderel Moon, Strangers in India (London, magistrate to supervise the conciliation courts, and in West
1944), p. 51. Dr. Shah was editor of the Pakistan Supreme Court Re- Pakistan under the Criminal Law Amendment Act of 1963
ports and is now (1969) a judge of the West Pakistan High Court. II
l :I

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....;... __.;. -----

136 The Politics of Pakistan Institutional Continuity 137

(repealed in 1969) he was empowered to refer certain "hei- the Supreme Court, is the district court for civil matters and
nous offences" to a tribunal which was not bound by normal the sessions court for serious criminal matters. The district
procedures, if he was of the opinion that justice would not be and sessions judge is usually a member of a provincial judi-
done in a regular court. In April 1969 the West Pakistan gov- cial service, but he may be a CSP officer. Judges of the High
ernment renewed efforts to provide sufficient officers so that Courts and of the Supreme Court are recruited directly from
it would be possible for judicial work to be handled entirely the bar or by promotion from lower courts. There are five
by magistrates with no executive responsibilities, and thus judges on the Supreme Court, about fifteen on the Dacca
to speed the disposal of criminal cases. High Court, and about twenty-five on the Lahore High
Although the failings of the present courts as dispensers of Court. They are appointed by the President in consultation
justice are generally recognized, efforts to simplify trial pro- with the Chief Justice of Pakistan and (where appropriate)
cedures have always been vigorously resisted by lawyers and the governor and Chief Justice of the province concerned,
politicians (most of whom have legal training). The legal and now serve until sixty-two on a High Court and until
profession is trained in the common law tradition, and its sixty-five on the Supreme Court. Constitutional arrange-
guiding values and precedents are found in the decisions of ments have always provided strict controls over the removal
English and Commonwealth courts. The spirit of the law as of judges for misconduct, and only one or two instances have
interpreted in Pakistan is overwhelmingly English, with ever occurred. The 1962 Constitution created a Supreme Ju-
emphasis on the "principles of natural justice" embodied in dicial Council, consisting of the three Chief Justices and the
common law procedures. Any departure from the common next two senior Supreme Court judges, whose recommenda-
law pattern will, it is contended, permit even greater abuses tion is necessary before a judge can be removed. Normally
and denial of the rights of the accused. The practical result is judges succeed to the chief justiceship in order of seniority.
to give more importance to the abstract "principles of jus- After retirement a judge cannot accept another official ap-
tice" than to the achievement of justice for the individual in pointment for two years, except to a judicial or quasi-judicial
Pakistan. post, and may not practice before the court of which he was
a member nor any court subordinate to it.
THE COURTS
The independence and stature of the judges has enabled id
The deficiencies of lower-court procedures have not af- them to play an extremely important role as the guardians
fected the reputation of the judiciary itself. The judges of
the higher courts have great prestige and status, and a "judi-
of constitutionalism and individual rights. In 1955 the Fed-
eral Court (the predecessor of the Supreme Court) in a series
il
cial investigation" of any sort of problem is universally re- of decisions based on English and Commonwealth precedent I!
spected and accepted. The basic judicial unit, from which ap- preserved the constitutional order of the 1935 Act from col-
peals are taken to the provincial High Court and thence to lapse and compelled the governor general to summon a new

1:
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90 1!J
1 38 The Politics of Pakistan
T Institutional Continuity 1 39

Constituent Assembly, after his invocation of the prerogative Court asserted its jurisdiction to rule unconstitutional an or-
of the Crown to dissolve the first Assembly. 8 Again in 1958 der of the President seeking to "adapt" constitutional pro-
the Supreme Court recognized the effect of the "revolution" visions, on the ground that it was an amendment, which he
of October 7 in abrogating the 1956 Constitution and replac- had no power to make. 10 Subsequently, in response to public
ing it with a new constitutional order and enabled the courts pressures, the Constitution was amended to restrict the pow-
to maintain their authority under martial law. 9 Thereafter ers of both legislative and executive branches by incorporat-
judicial interpretation defined and restricted the powers of ing justiciable fundamental rights. After some vicissitudes
martial-law tribunals and helped develop a martial-law ''con- these restrictions were again eliminated by the reimposition
stitutionalism." During this period the function of the courts of martial law on March 25, 1969, limiting the courts once
was to interpret existing law, to which all were subject unless again to the interpretation of existing law, which was bind-
and until the competent authority-the President-changed ing on all until altered by the President and Chief Martial
it. Law Administrator.
The original scheme of the 1962 Constitution was in-
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS
tended to continue unaltered the status of the courts as de-
fined under martial law. The independence of the judiciary The power of the Supreme Court and High Courts to pro-
was assured, even to the creation of the Supreme Judicial tect individual liberties has been limited for most of the ·•I
years since independence to upholding the "principles of Ii.,
Council to replace the National Assembly as the body re-
sponsible for recommending the removal of judges. The natural justice" in criminal appeals and asserting a broad
jurisdiction of the courts was limited to that expressly con- common law view of the rights of the subject in interpreting
ferred by the Constitution or law, and the power to declare a legislation. Apart from normal civil and criminal appellate
law unconstitutional on the ground that the legislature con- procedures, the major weapon used by the High Courts to
cerned had no power to enact it was specifically denied in check executive action has been the issue of writs, particu-
:
order to ensure that judicial intervention could not be in-
voked to prevent the execution of policies approved by the
national or provincial legislatures. In 1963 the Supreme
larly habeas corpus, but even this power was statutory rather
than constitutional until 1955. From March 1956 until Octo-
ber 1958, constitutionally specified fundamental rights lim-
ll;j
iii
1
:1
ited both executive and legislature, and an injured individ- I
s Federation of Pakistan v. Tamizuddin Khan [1955] 1 FCR 155; ual could go directly to the High Court or Supreme Court 11
Special Reference No. 1 of 1955 [1955] 1 FCR 439; Usif Patel v. The for relief through writ proceedings. The jurisdiction of the
Crown [1955] 1 FCR 360; Federation of Pakistan v. Ali Ahmad Hus-
sain Shah [1955] 1 FCR 566 (Federal Court Reports; Karachi, Manager
High Courts was so broadly stated in the 1956 Constitution l
:1
of Publications). 10 Fazlul Quader Choudhury v. Mohammed Abdul Haque, PLD :1
9 The State v. Dosso (1958), 2 PSCR 180 (Pakistan Supreme Court 1963 SC 486 (Pakistan Legal Decisions; Lahore, All-Pakistan Legal j!l
Reports; Karachi, Manager of Publications). Decisions).
I:

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'tr111
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140 The Politics of Pakistan Institutional Continuity 141

that the High Courts found themselves involved in a vast stantially the same terms as in the previous Constitution, a
number of cases relating to administrative matters such as broad range of rights on individuals or groups, subject in
promotion and discipline in government service, in addition most cases to "reasonable" restrictions in the public interest.
to cases dealing with personal freedom. In reaction, the mar- They included: security of person; freedom of movement,
tial-law system of 1958-1962 returned to the pre-1956 status assembly, association, speech, and religion; the right to prop-
quo by eliminating the fundamental rights, and simply em- erty; and guarantees against discrimination. The rights were
powered the Supreme Court and High Courts to issue writs enforceable through judicial review of legislation and execu-
of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto, and tive acts, and the individual could go directly to the High
certiorari-except against martial-law authorities-for the Court for an appropriate order (the Constitution referred in
enforcement of rights established under the ordinary law. Article 98 to "orders" rather than to the traditional writs)
The Constitution of 1962 provided, in Article 2, that "to to any public authority to protect his rights. Laws incon-
enjoy the protection of the law, and to be treated in accor- sistent with the fundamental rights were void, although at
dance with law, and only in accordance with law, is the in- the central government's insistence a special clause exempted
alienable right" of every individual in Pakistan. The as- from challenge a number of laws enacted since 1959 (includ-
sumption further spelled out in the article was that personal ing the West Pakistan Land Reforms Regulation of 1959
liberty is inherent, and that restrictions on it must be justified and Criminal Law Amendment Act of 1963, and the Muslim
by law. Initially the responsibility for preventing encroach- Marriage and Family Laws Ordinance). The rights were not
ments on personal liberties was entrusted to the legislatures, enforceable by the High Court in the tribal areas of West
guided by a series of "Principles of Law-making" defining Pakistan, where the Court under successive constitutions has
fundamental rights. The rule here was that once the political had no jurisdiction because normal law does not apply. The
decision was made through legislation that an encroachment chapter also provided that during an emergency the right to
on liberty was necessary, no challenge in the courts was pos- apply to the High Court for the enforcement of the funda-
sible. The intention of this provision was to prevent socially mental rights could be suspended.
desirable legislation from being thwarted by vested interests, These constitutional guarantees remained available in full
and to safeguard the land reforms and other reform measures only until September 6, 1965, with a brief return in the five
of the martial-law regime of 1958-1962. However, the polit- weeks prior to the reimposition of martial law in 1969.
ical commitment to the principle of judicially enforceable Under the emergency proclaimed during the conflict with
fundamental rights was so universal that President Ayub in India, only the guarantees against deprivation of life or
January 1964 accepted a constitutional amendment to restore liberty save in accordance with law, retrospective punish-
the jurisdiction of the courts as it had existed under the 1956 ment, discrimination, and untouchability, and of freedom of
Constitution. religion, language, and culture remained in force. Long after
The new fundamental rights chapter "conferred," in sub- the Tashkent Agreement of January 1966 had formally ter-

\
 The Politics of Pakistan Institutional Continuity 143
142

minated the conflict, political bitterness continued to in- cessive Pakistani governments, like the British Indian gov-
crease, owing to the perpetuation of the emergency and the ernment before them, have considered preventive powers
attendant deprivation of personal liberties under the sweep- indispensable in view of the volatile nature of the population
ing provisions of the Defence of Pakistan Ordinance and and the existence of elements against whom the normal puni-
Rules. Finally, in the face of the revolutionary upsurge that tive law would be ineffective. Preventive detention can easily
began in November 1968, President Ayub yielded and re- be abused for political purposes, and its use has always been
voked the proclamation. The jurisdiction that the courts attacked by parties out of power. A major basis of the attack
regained with the termination of the emergency on February on the emergency of 1965-1969 was the use of detention or
17, 1969, however, was largely nullified with the imposition restriction under the Defence of Pakistan Rules for purposes
of martial law. The Provisional Constitution Order of April unconnected with the ostensible reason for the emergency.
4, 1969, while confirming the jurisdiction of the courts, In order to check the executive, the review of detentions by
specifically abrogated all fundamental rights except the guar- an advisory board, ordinarily prescribed in the law itself,
antees against deprivation of life or liberty save in accor- became an obligation under the 1956 Constitution and was
dance with law, slavery or forced labor, discrimination, and confirmed in the 1962 Constitution. This provision, requir-
untouchability, and of freedom of religion, language, and ing that each case be reviewed within three months by a
culture. The ability of the High Courts-and, by appeal, the board consisting of a judge and a senior official, was un-
Supreme Court-to enforce these rights or others under the enforceable during the emergency. Under martial law in
ordinary law by means of Article 98 of the 1962 Constitution 1969 the requirement for board review was annulled, as it
was limited by the exclusion of the martial-law authorities was in 1958-1962. In any case, such review does not touch
from their jurisdiction.11 the problem of brief detentions of a few days or weeks which
can be politically or personally just as damaging as longer
Preventive Detention. By far the most important qualifica- imprisonment.
tion on fundamental rights, whether defined in a constitu- An arsenal of other preventive powers is also available to I

tional document or not, is the power vested in public author- public authorities for use under defined conditions subject
to review and challenge in the courts. The most commonly :j
ities to detain persons without trial. A variety of laws em- I
power the central and provincial governments respectively used is Section 144 of the Criminal Procedure Code, em-
to detain persons without trial in the interest, broadly de- powering the district magistrate to prohibit certain actions-
meetings or processions, for example-for up to two months. ·1
fined, of the security of Pakistan or of public safety. All sue- j
The security and public-safety laws permit a variety of pre- 'I
11 Text of the Provisional Constitution Order in Pakistan Times, ventive restrictions on movement, association, speech, and
:
J
April 5, 1969. An order published on June 30 reiterated the ouster of
publication. The Press and Publications Ordinances of 1963,
the jurisdiction of the courts, to eliminate any uncertainty (Pakistan
Times, July 1, 1969). consolidating previous press legislation, permit further con-

i:
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\!: I1,
-------- .,......,,, ~

144 The Politics of Pakistan Institutional Continuity 1 45

trols over the dissemination of printed matter. In view of the vestigation into the circumstances. If a situation is uncon-
ease with which violence and riot can be precipitated, there trollable by the civil authorities, the DC may call in the army
is no doubt about the need for preventive powers. That they to restore order. Occupying a position midway between the
are sometimes abused is unfortunate but probably ines- regular police and the army are the West Pakistan Rangers
capable. In 1956-58 and 1964-65, their exercise was subject and the East Pakistan Rifles, which are responsible for bor-
to judicial review to ensure that the orders concerned were der patrol and antismuggling activities. In the tribal areas,
"reasonable" in terms of the fundamental rights guarantees. locally raised levies and disciplined units such as the Khyber
Under martial law, the still-applicable guarantees of treat- Rifles combine police with defense functions. Since 1964 a
ment in accordance with law in Article 2 and in the first "Mujahid Force" has been created as a sort of home guard,
fundamental right of the 1962 Constitution, and the High to provide villagers with basic instruction in military proce-
Court jurisdiction to issue orders and directions under Arti- dures and the use of modern weapons.
cle 98, provide the courts with the means of ensuring at least il
The Pakistan army is the senior and most important of the
that actions taken are those contemplated by the law. The regular military services. The navy and air force are of high
I
extensive and effective use of their powers by the courts dur- quality but are relatively small. All three services are still 11
l1
ing the emergency of 1965-1969 to strike down government predominantly Punjabi and Pathan in composition, although
actions, despite the ostensibly unchallengeable authority of the air force and navy have a higher proportion (around 30
liii
the executive, demonstrates the vitality and resourcefulness per cent) of Bengalis than does the army (probably 5 to 10
of the judiciary in keeping strict rein on overzealous officials. per cent). Because the British Indian army recruited heavily
in the northern areas of modern West Pakistan (and Azad
"'
The Armed Forces Kashmir), that part of the country inherited a population 1
The use of armed force in support of the civil power is with a strong tradition of military service. Bengal, on the ii! ,·
always a latent possibility in Pakistan. The police themselves other hand, was considered "nonmartial" by the British, and
'!:I
are organized and trained on a semimilitary pattern, under the stereotype influences both Bengalis and West Pakistanis ,11.
:r1
the supreme control in each province of an inspector-general even today. Although East Pakistani soldiers distinguished 1
j
of police. The rank and file are recruited into the provincial themselves on the West Pakistan front in 1965, Bengali J
police service, but most officers are members of the elite youths normally do not think in terms of a military career.
Police Service of Pakistan. In the districts, the police, com- In 1948 an entirely Bengali unit, the Bengal Regiment, was
manded by a superintendent, are under the control of the formed, consisting by early 1969 of six battalions with an-
DC. In cases of riots or similar disturbances armed police can other four to be raised. Recruiting efforts in East Pakistan
be authorized by the DC or another magistrate to fire upon have been much criticized by Bengali politicians, but the
crowds. Such action is strictly controlled, must be justified army insists that despite the political outcry suitable volun-
by the officer ordering it, and is usually followed by an in- teers are not forthcoming, particularly educated youth for

,1
146 The Politics of Pakistan Institutional Continuity 147

the officer corps. 12 In 1969 the National Assembly was in- ties to the civil services and to the West Pakistani political
formed that physical standards had been relaxed to take ac- class.
count of the smaller stature of Bengali youth, and later in The military is in principle nonpolitical, its role being to
the year the martial-law regime announced that recruitment defend the country under the guidance of the government of
in East Pakistan would be doubled. the day, whatever its complexion. Still, the first overt chal-
The East Pakistani demand for an equitable share in the lenge to the constitutional system was an abortive plot by a
defense services was sharpened by the feeling of defenseless- few army officers in 1951, the so-called Rawalpindi conspir-
ness experienced in 1965. Military strategy has been to rely acy. Later, the political instability of the mid-195o's forced
on a strong force in West Pakistan to defend East Pakistan's the army increasingly into the position of providing a con-
interests by a thrust at Delhi, but this was shown to be com- tinuing stabilizing force. The ineffectiveness of the civil au-
pletely unsatisfactory from an East Pakistani point of view in thority contrasted sharply with army efficiency in suppressing
1965. Hence more vehement demands were made for greater the anti-Ahmadi disturbances in West Pakistan in 1953. The
r
mobilization of East Pakistani manpower and the construc- following year General Ayub, the commander in chief, sup-
tion of ordnance factories in the province. East Pakistanis ported the governor general's coup in dissolving the Constit-
have long demanded the transfer of naval headquarters to uent Assembly in the hope that a new start would be made,
Chittagong from Karachi, both for symbolic reasons and but he refused the latter's invitation to take over supreme
to counter some of the impact of defense spending concen- power and only reluctantly served as titular minister of de-
trated in the army establishments in northern West Paki- fense in the cabinet of 1954-55. 13 In late 1957 the army and
stan. navy were called upon to conduct the short-lived "Operation
In keeping with the British Indian tradition, the military Closed Door" against smuggling in East Pakistan, and expe-
services are completely professional. British influence, in rienced not only the sweet taste of their own effectiveness but
terms of regimental tradition and organization, is strong, but also the bitterness of frustration through political intrigue.
the alliance with the United States beginning in the mid- The imposition of martial law in 1958 was in large part a
1950 's provided Pakistan with much American equipment preventive action on the part of General Ayub and his col-
and advice, with consequent effects on training patterns. The leagues to stop the process of political decay before it could
officer corps is highly westernized and modern, and at the undermine the integrity of the army itself.
same time almost by definition is one of the most nationally- Having once played an overtly political role, the armed
conscious elements in the society. It has also been a very forces will never fully regain their former neutral status. The
homogeneous group, drawn predominantly from the land- fear that the military might be contaminated by political
holding classes of Punjabi and Pathan districts, with close power led to its withdrawal from administrative activities in
12 For example, the debate in the National Assembly on East Paki-
stani representation in the defense services, on June 22, 1963. 13 See Mohammed Ahmad, My Chief (Lahore, 1960), pp. i-5.
i

!
i

I
t
 -----~------------~- --- l

148 The Politics of Pakistan Institutional Continuity 1 49

late 1958, as soon as the martial-law regime was securely itself was encouraging the disorder of February and March
established, and officers who assumed political roles were in order to justify a return to martial law. It appears, how-
obliged to retire. Even so, the army remained the basis of ever, that President Ayub made every effort to reach a con-
the strength of the regime, and after 1962, opposition politi- stitutional solution, until at last he became convinced that
cians (particularly those from East Pakistan) were openly "all civil administrative and constitutional authority in the
suspicious of the military elite. The 1962 Constitution country has become ineffective" and that Pakistan's survival
sought to minimize nonmilitary considerations in defense as a state was jeopardized; "I am left with no option but to
matters by requiring that for a period of twenty years the step aside and leave it to the defence forces of Pakistan which
defense minister was to be a retired officer of the rank of today represents the only effective and legal instrument, to
lieutenant general or higher, if the President had not held take over full control of the affairs of this country." 14 In so
such a rank. President Ayub accordingly retained charge of doing, Ayub again placed the destiny of Pakistan in the 'i'
the ministry until October 1966, when he assigned it to the hands of a power structure in which East Pakistan had little "\l
retiring commander in chief of the navy, perhaps to strength- share, but the army commander in chief, General A. M. i
!,

en his links with that service. The 1965 war both increased Yahya Khan, had no alternative but to assume power "to
the prestige of the services and made them more controver- bring back sanity." Although General Yahya asserted that
sial by giving renewed political emphasis to national military they had "no political ambitions," he recognized that by de- i

policy in regard to East Pakistan. The so-called Agartala con- fault the armed forces of Pakistan had once more been vested
spiracy of 1968, in which Bengali military and civil person- with responsibility for the "creation of conditions conducive
nel were implicated in an alleged separatist plot, tended to to the establishment of a constitutional government." 15
pit the prestige of the service commands against the East
Pakistani critics of the Ayub constitutional system. In late Basic Democracy
1968, however, several retired officers, most notably the The system of Basic Democracies is an institutional in- j
former commander in chief of the air force, gave their sup- novation that Ayub hoped would be the basis of a stable I
port to the campaign for constitutional change. Pakistani constitutional government. The "Basic Democ- ',I
The initiative for the reimposition of martial law in 1969
apparently came from President Ayub. The military com-
racy" properly speaking is the union council, consisting of l
about ten to twelve elected members exercising local govern- !!j-
-

manders remained carefully out of the political controversy ment functions in a jurisdiction comprising about 10,000-
'

'
of 1968-69, except for the supply of forces to support the 12,000 people. Unions are grouped under councils in each i1
:·j
civil power against rioting when the anti-Ayub campaign '·1
14 President Ayub Khan's letter to General Yahya Khan, dated March
gained in intensity, but the political possibility of military
24, 1969, in Pakistan Times, March 26, 1969.
intervention was common talk. Some allegations appeared 15 Address to the nation by General A. M. Yahya Khan on March 26,
from opposition sources to the effect that the government 1969, in Pakistan Times, March 27, 1969,

,11:
 ---T-- -
f·
~I

150 The Politics of Pakistan Institutional Continuity 151

tehsil (in West Pakistan) or thana (in East Pakistan) as co-

ordinating bodies. Matters of broader interest are dealt with
in councils at the district and divisional levels. These coun-
elections for the nonofficial membership of the district and
divisional councils. I I
Under these arrangements all councils have been politi-
cils were first established after general elections in December cally affected even if not politically organized. The union
1959 and January 1960, under the terms of the Basic Democ- councils (4,032 in East Pakistan and 3,414 in West Pakistan),
racies Order of October 27, 1959. They were designed both made up of councilors returned by adult suffrage, each elect
to replace the former miscellany of local government bodies a chairman who is ex officio a member of the tehsil or thana
by a uniform and integrated pattern of institutions through- council. In small urban areas the equivalent of the union
out Pakistan, and to associate public representatives with the council is the town committee (222 in West Pakistan, 38 in
administration at all important levels. In the absence of East Pakistan), and larger urban areas include a number of
political parties under martial law, the Basic Democracy hier- union committees (810 and 216 respectively) whose elected
archy was intended to link the people with the government, chairmen along with official members comprise the munici- :I
providing a channel for the expression of grievances and a

I
pal committee (or municipal corporation, in Karachi and
means for social and political mobilization. Lahore) under an official chairman and elected vice-chair-
Political and constitutional developments between 1960 man. In 1965 provision was made for the election by each
and 1965 produced broad changes in the role and structure
of the Basic Democracies. They were originally envisioned as
urban body of special representatives for women, minorities, ·I
ii
and labor-social welfare, in the proportion of one additional
nonpolitical and locally oriented, so that community respon- representative to ten ordinary members; in 1968 this pro-
sibility could develop free of the extraneous influences that vision was extended to district and divisional councils as well.
had exploited and corrupted the previous union and district The chairmen of union councils, union committees, and
boards and municipalities. The transformation of local coun- town committees within the district elect the nonofficial
cilors into electors for the President and members of Assem- members of the district council, and the elected members of
blies under the 1962 Constitution compromised their local the district councils and of the municipal committees within
orientation, and the revival of political parties rang the death the division elect the nonofficial members of the divisional
knell for nonpartisanship in the unions. The original scheme council. Depending on population, there are between thirty
provided for varying proportions of appointed nonofficial and sixty elected members in both district and divisional
members in councils at all levels, in order to ensure the councils. Simultaneous membership in a district and a divi-
representation of interests such as minorities or women, or sional council is not permitted. The "Basic Democrats"
to make special local talent available to the council. Dislike elected in October-November 1964, having fulfilled their
of appointment was widespread, and the power was used electoral function, were installed as union councilors in East
cautiously; in 1962 the law was amended to eliminate ap- Pakistan in August 1965 and in West Pakistan (after a delay
pointments at all levels and to provide a system of indirect because of the war emergency) in January 1966. The higher

1, i
I
i
,11
 r

152 The Politics of Pakistan Institutional Continuity 153

councils were then elected in West Pakistan during spring regional interests, although it seems more successful in that
1966, but in East Pakistan legal proceedings delayed elec- regard in West Pakistan. The district council, under the DC
tions until October. In the West Pakistan tribal areas there and an elected vice-chairman, is much more important, with
are 112 union councils and 15 agency councils, established by definite statutory responsibilities and a large budget and
the political agent without formal elections. staff with which to implement them. Below the district, the
Local government in the conventional sense is primarily tehsil council under the tehsildar or the thana council under
the concern of the union councils and of the town and mu- the subdivisional officer was given a statutory coordinative role
nicipal committees. These bodies have taxing powers and without definite powers. In East Pakistan the rural works
definite responsibilities for local amenities and services. The program has given the thana council unexpected signifi-
district council can also tax, and is responsible for matters of cance. Under the de facto chairmanship of the circle officer
more than local significance, such as public health, water the thana council has proved to be an effective agency for
supply, and rural roads and bridges. Unions also have admin- the coordination and direction of development programs in
istrative duties in connection with agricultural and com- its dozen or so unions. As the experimental intensive devel-
munity development and the preservation of law and order. opment program begun at the Pakistan Academy for Rural
An increasingly important responsibility of the union coun- Development, Camilla, spreads throughout the province, the
cil is the implementation of the rural public works program, thana council will increasingly emerge as the key unit in the
which was initiated as a province-wide activity in East Paki- rural council structure.
stan in 1962-63 and in West Pakistan in 1963-64. This pro- An unusual feature of the Basic Democracy system has
gram has for the first time brought significant funds to the been the continuing emphasis on training and consultation.
rural areas, to be utilized in labor-intensive road building, Since the new institutions were expected to make possible
irrigation, and reclamation, and simple construction proj- a political, social, and economic renaissance in the country-
ects. The rural public works program was instrumental in side, every effort was made in 1960 and again in 1965-66 to
vitalizing the unions and, by making council membership smooth the way. An extensive training program sought to 1:1

important and desirable, heightening popular interest and orient all those concerned-officials as well as elected mem- l:11

involvement in the 1964 elections. bers-to the objectives and functions of the Basic Democ-
The higher councils all have official chairmen and include racies, the organization of the "nation-building" departments II

official members (not more than half the total) representing ii

of government, the purposes of economic planning (with
government departments at that level. The commissioner
presides over the divisional council, which provides a useful
special reference to the Five Year Plans), and the significance
of the rural development program. Since the completion of
I
forum for keeping officials and public representatives alike the initial training, there have been periodic district, divi- i,
informed about departmental activities. In East Pakistan it sional, and provincial conventions to permit further discus- I il
ii
has yet to become a vital institution for the expression of sion of progress and problems, to recommend changes, and 11

1
11

II

~~,'tl.iIl
I
I

l
,,11
i:
::
154 The Politics of Pakistan Institutional Continuity 1 55

to hear messages of encouragement from senior officials, tragically evident in early 1969 when in a sort of jacquerie
ministers, the governor or the President. Repeated high-level in parts of East Pakistan unpopular Basic Democrats were
statements and admonitions have reminded officialdom of attacked, their property was destroyed, and in some instances
the importance of the system and the need both to encour- they and their families were killed. The result of such attacks
age local initiative and to abstain from any sort of pressures and of the widespread political condemnation of the coun-
on the councilors. The regular meetings of the councils also cils because of the elite electoral role of the councilors under
provide training of a sort, familiarizing the members with the 1962 Constitution was the near collapse of the system and
the problems of government and acquainting them with the a decision by the East Pakistan government after the imposi-
rudiments of parliamentary procedure. tion of martial law to take the council structure under study.
The success of the union councils as institutions of local From its inception the Basic Democracy structure was crit-
government has been largely dependent on the character of icized for the very faults it had been introduced to alleviate,
the leadership they secure. With leadership that is too strong namely its involvement in national politics and consequent
they are unlikely to be democratic, but without strong exploitation for purposes other than local government.
leadership unions are likely to atrophy, particularly if faced There was little real quarrel with the local self-government
with an indifferent or hostile tehsildar or circle officer. The or administrative coordination functions of the various coun-
greater financial resources available to the unions, inclqding cils, although the originality of the system was denied. There
the rural works program funds, increased local interest in the had been, after all, union boards in Bengal since 1919 and
councils and made them characteristically the objects of district boards in most parts of the country since the 188o's;
struggle between rival factions. Most councilors are literate only the tehsil-thana and divisional councils, and the articu-
(99 per cent in East Pakistan in 1965, and probably around lated nature of the system, could be considered innovations.
80 per cent in West Pakistan), and the chairmen are gener- Political spokesmen firmly objected to the large official role
ally among the more prosperous in the community. Unfor- in the councils, particularly to official presiding officers of
tunately, one consequence of the regular association of the municipal and district councils where previously there had
Basic Democrats with officialdom and the constant attention been elected mayors and chairmen. Given the prestige and
to and flattery of them by the Ayub government was their authority of commissioners and DC's and even of their sub-
development of a castelike sense of self-importance. This was ordinates, the attitude of the official chairman makes the dif-
manifested in demands for various kinds of special privileges ference between vigor and passivity in the council concerned.
for chairmen or members generally, which attenuated the Even so, the frequent charge that official members constitute
sense of neighborly responsibility that was supposed to moti- a bloc with some kind of official "party line" to impose on
vate the entire system. Some councilors apparently also used nonofficial members seems exaggerated. On the whole, the
their positions blatantly for their own enrichment. That combination of officials and nonofficials has provided a link

1
antipathies did develop between councilors and public was between representative institutions and the district and divi-
 ,.,..--....
-----------~----·

156 The Politics of Pakistan 1'

sional administrative structure that will continue to be desir-
able so long as that structure remains unchanged.
The constitutional arrangements that emerge from martial
law are likely to confirm the council system for purposes of
local government and administrative coordination. Local
Institutional
5.
government functions must be carried out, and the councils
are sensible units and generally have been at least as effective
Experimentation
as the institutions they replaced. It is probable that direct
election to the district councils and to the municipalities will
be restored, and official membership will be confined to a The elaboration of an appropriate institutional distribu-
definite minority if not to an advisory capacity. Whether tion of political power in the Islamic constitutional order has
divisional councils will be retained is more questionable. continuously engaged the attention of the Pakistani political
Granted that there has been some corruption of councilors community. The pattern of executive and legislative institu-
and some manipulation by officials, the union council sys- tions and of central-provincial relations has been the sub-
tem has been successful in articulating rural interests inde- ject of constant experimentation and adjustment. Essentially
pendently of the urban political class, and in politicizing the. there has been a struggle between partially conflicting tradi-
remotest corners of the country. It did not satisfy the urban tions derived from British ideals and British Indian practice,
population, who were successful in making the Basic Demo- with some supplementary appeals to Islamic tradition. The
crats the scapegoats for the general ills and grievances of the ideal of parliamentary democracy-collegial government by
society. Although the result was the collapse of the constitu- ministers drawn from a technically unlimited "sovereign"

~
tional order based on the Basic Democracy structure, the parliament in a unitary state-derives from Britain. From
councils themselves have survived except in a few areas in the British Indian past Pakistan draws the tradition of con- ,,
East Pakistan. In the nonpolitical context of martial law, stitutionally limited institutions, with an independent and 'j
the councils, the administration, and the judiciary continue authoritarian single executive and a relatively weak legisla- IiI
to function, while solutions are being sought to the problem ture, in a pseudo-federal but ultimately centrally controlled 1
state. Despite differing features, both these traditions exalt

i
of the organization and distribution of political power.
the executive over the legislature and emphasize central
rather than local power.
Parliamentary democracy was engrafted onto the British
I
r/
Indian viceregal tradition in 194 7 in the interim constitu-
tional order defined by the Government of India Act of 1935
and the Independence Act of 194 7. The result was a curious
1 57

,,Ji

'
158 The Politics of Pakistan Institutional Experimentation
) 1 59

amalgam of federal, unitary, parliamentary, and viceregal

principles. The effort in the 1956 Constitution to legitimize The Central Government
parliamentary democracy and federalism and to counter the THE EXECUTIVE

evident strength of the unitary and viceregal traditions was From independence until October 1958 constitutional ar-
unsuccessful for two reasons. First, the Constitution perpetu- rangements in Pakistan, following the British parliamentary
ated the confusion over the ultimate locus of executive au- tradition, envisioned a purely titular role for the head of
thority, and, second, it did not prevent the political erosion state. Prior to March 23, 1956, this office was held by a gover-
of the federal distinction between center and provinces. In nor general appointed by the queen on the advice of the
1958 the martial-law regime attempted to re-establish unity prime minister of Pakistan. The republican Constitution of
of authority by returning to the viceregal tradition in a presi- 1956 replaced the governor general with a President, to be
dential and nonfederal system. The 1962 Constitution con- elected by the members of the National and Provincial
firmed the abandonment of parliamentary federalism, pro- Assemblies. Effective executive powers were to be exercised
d
viding an independent executive and unlimited central
powers. This decision was the result, according to President
by the prime minister, while the head of state, in whom
power was formally vested, was to reign but not to rule. The
i
Ayub Khan, of "mature and honest assessment of the lessons prime minister was to govern with the aid of ministerial col- i,·j
of our past, the experience of the last 3 Ji2 years and the re-. leagues drawn from and responsible to the Assembly, the ii
quirements of the future." 1 It was an attempt to respond to cabinet controlling through its parliamentary majority the i:
the experience of political instability under the parliamen- powers of the legislature as well as the executive. These rela-
tary system by emphasizing authority and unity. Ayub be- tionships, implicit in the modified Government of India Act
i~
G

lieved that the Constitution embodied "a blending of democ- of 1935, were spelled out in the Constitution of 1956 in I
racy with discipline, the true prerequisite to running a free
society with stable government and sound administration."
In fact, authority and discipline seemed to smother the sense
articles limiting the discretion of the President to the dis-
missal of the prime minister if he were satisfied that the lat-
ij;
I
ter "does not command the confidence" of a legislative ma- 1:
of democratic participation. The resulting frustration con- jority.
tributed to the collapse of the presidential system in 1969, Pakistan completely lacked the political and constitutional
ushering in another martial-law regime and foreshadowing tradition necessary to support an executive who would be
further constitutional adjustments. responsible to parliament. Under the Government of India
1 President Ayub's speech in promulgating the Constitution, March Act of 1919, which defined the central government until in-
1, 1962 (Pakistan Times, March 2, 1962). The next quotation in the dependence, the governor general of British India was a
text is also from this source. strong and independent executive, governing with the assis-
I

tance of councilors responsible to him rather than to the

I
~
,1
160 The Politics of Pakistan Institutional Experimentation 161

legislature. Even the 1935 Act, in ant1C1pating a federal lenge, and eighteen months later invoked the inherent
council of ministers drawn from the legislature, carefully re- powers of the Crown to dissolve the Constituent Assembly
tained special powers for the governor general. When this and reorganize Mohammed Ali's cabinet. lskander Mirza as
Act was adapted in 1947 to serve as the interim constitution governor general and for his first few months as provisional
of Pakistan, all specific references to discretion, individual president was checked by Prime Minister Chaudhri M uham-
judgment, and special responsibilities were eliminated, but mad Ali (1955-1956), another former professional adminis-
the basic pattern of the document remained unchanged. It trator, but made no secret of his impatience with politicians
was quite possible to assume, on reading the amended 1935 and his conviction that the executive should be independent
Act, that the governor general of Pakistan was, like his vice- of legislative majorities.
regal predecessors, to be the functioning head of the adminis- During the thirty months following the promulgation of
tration. Finally, so long as Pakistan retained the monarchical the republican Constitution on March 23, 1956, viceregal
constitution, the governor general was vested with the in- tradition gradually outweighed the limitations on the Presi-
determinate prerogative powers of the Crown. dent embodied in its letter and spirit. The result was the in- :
The viceregal background was reinforced by personality creasing involvement of President Mirza in the making and 111

I
considerations. The first governor general, Qaid-i-Azam Mo- unmaking of the cabinets of Prime Ministers H. S. Suhra-
hammed Ali Jinnah, brought to the office his tremendous. wardy (1956-57), I. I. Chundrigar (October-December 1957),
prestige as "Father of the Nation." So long as he lived, Jin- and Malik Feroz Khan Noon (1957-58), culminating in his
nah was, whether he wished to be or not, the real head of dismissal of the latter, abrogation of the Constitution, and
11
the central government, presiding-while his health permit- proclamation of martial law on October 7, 1958. Three

~
ted-over cabinet meetings and obliged by his ministers to weeks later Mirza was forced to resign and was succeeded by
make top-level decisions. The Qaid-i-Azam's immediate suc- General Mohammad Ayub Khan (President, 1958-1969), the
cessor, Khwaja Nazimuddin (1948-1951), a leading Bengali then commander in chief of the army and Chief Martial Law
II
politician, was content to conform to the conventional image Administrator. The confusion of authority in the dual execu-
of the dominion governor general, leaving political leader- tive was then terminated with the formal abolition of the
ship to Prime Minister Liaqat Ali Khan (1947-1951). Gover- office of prime minister. Ministers thereafter were appointed
nor Generals Ghulam Mohammad (1951-1955) and Iskander to advise the President in the discharge of his functions and
Mirza (1955-1958), on the other hand, were both profes- were responsible solely to him. This arrangement was
sional administrators who followed Jinnah's example in re- roughly comparable to the position of the viceroy and his
garding their office to have active responsibilities. Ghulam council before 1946, although the latter always had to deal
Mohammad dismissed Prime Minister Nazimuddin (1951- with a legislature while the martial-law regime did not.
1953) in April 1953 and appointed Mohammed Ali of Bogra The 1962 Constitution retained the independent presi-
(1953-1955) in his stead without significant political chal- dential executive, for which there was ample precedent in

'
 - ....... --·-----

162 The Politics of Pakistan

r !1
;;'.q
t,,

Institutional Experimentation 163

British Indian practice and in the classic Muslim amirate.
The President was required to be a Muslim, thirty-five years dent Ayub retained ministerial responsibility for the cabinet
of age and qualified for election to the National Assembly, secretariat and the President's secretariat, which were repre-
and was elected for a five-year term. The supreme command sented in the National Assembly by parliamentary secretaries.
of the armed forces was vested in him, and the executive The presidential system made it impossible to apply the
authority of the republic was to be exercised by him directly principle of parity of participation in the national executive.
or indirectly. The President was assisted by ministers in After Jinnah's death it had been conventionally agreed that
charge of cabinet portfolios, who served during his pleasure the offices of head of state and head of government under the
and were responsible to him alone. Ministerial office was con- parliamentary system should be shared between East and
stitutionally incompatible with membership in the National West Pakistan. This "zonal convention" was strained during
Assembly, but ministers were authorized to attend the As- the period of cabinet instability from August 1955 to Octo-
sembly and to speak in order to provide leadership and ber 1958 while Mirza was head of state, his successive prime
liaison between the President and the legislature. During the ministers including three from West Pakistan and one (Suh-
first year of the Constitution the distinction from the parlia- rawardy) from East Pakistan; Mirza himself was from an aris-
mentary system was blurred, because President Ayub was / tocratic West Bengal family but was born in Bombay and
prevailed upon in June 1962 to issue an order under the · was generally identified with West Pakistan. Since parlia-
transitional clause of the Constitution (Article 224-3) waiv- · mentary cabinets normally were formed on the basis of
ing the incompatibility rule. A majority of the central (and parity, each province was assured a full voice in political
provincial) ministers therefore retained seats in the Assem- decision making, subject of course to party considerations
blies, with an eye to the voting support each could bring to and to the allocation of portfolios. This was not true under
the government. This experiment in quasi parliamentarism the presidential system, for although parity was observed '!'.
was terminated in May 1963 when the Supreme Court ruled ministers were advisors only and decision making ultimately
was vested in one man: President Ayub, who was a Pathan
I~
that the adaptation was unconstitutional, and ministers then
:!
in office forfeited their Assembly seats. Most of President from West Pakistan. There was a symbolic retention of the
Ayub's subsequent ministerial appointments were made
from outside the Assembly; any legislators given cabinet
posts automatically ceased to be members of the Assembly
zonal convention in regard to the Speaker of the National
Assembly, who under the Constitution became Acting Presi-
dent in the absence or illness of the incumbent. The hollow- .~
I:,
11

concerned. A further link between the President's cabinet ness of this provision was demonstrated in early 1968 during
and the Assembly was provided by parliamentary secretaries, President Ayub's serious illness, when Speaker Abdul Jabbar If I

members of the Assembly appointed to assist ministers (or Khan was not permitted to exercise the role constitutionally ·i'
the President) in legislative business, one for each of the prescribed for him in that eventuality. ,,IJ.1
divisions into which the ministries were subdivided. Presi- The presidential system was successful in bringing govern-
mental stability and firm direction to policy, in great con-

,Ii'
-- ----.....-------~~- -r--·--
;~1
164 The Politics of Pakistan
Institutional Experimentation 165
trast to the last years of the parliamentary era. It was de- vilian ministers (including one retired general, a former am-
signed to free the government from the burden of constant bassador) was appointed. To enable the administration to be
concern with the preservation of a parliamentary majority carried on normally, President Yahya issued a Provisional
that had exhausted its predecessors, but its very stability
Constitution Order on April 4, preserving the distribution
made it seem remote and unresponsive to public pressures
of powers and functions under the 1962 Constitution subject
except when bargaining for the passage of government legis- to modification by the President and to his overriding powers
lation became necessary. To convinced parliamentarians, a
as Chief Martial Law Administrator under the proclamation
system in which ministers were not responsible to and con- of March 25.
trollable by the legislature was by definition undemocratic.
It meant nothing that they were responsible to an elected THE LEGISLATURE

President, for in the Pakistani context he inevitably was

The central legislature of Pakistan has under all constitu-
identified with the authoritarian and irremovable viceroys tional arrangements consisted of the head of state and a
of the past. Hence the insistence of the opponents of the single representative chamber. This unicameral legislative
Ayub Constitution on a return to a parliamentary responsi- __ body has inherited the practice and procedure of the old
ble executive, despite the drawbacks of the latter demon- __ _Indian central assembly and, more remotely, of the House of
strated in the disastrous political experience of the 195o's. Commons. The Indian parliamentary tradition was one
The presumably transitional martial-law regime of 1969 formed by a representative body confronted with an irremov-
retained the presidential executive of the 1962 Constitution able executive, in contrast to the House of Commons model
"for operational necessities." Full powers were assumed by
of a chamber upon whose favor the government's existence
General Yahya Khan in the capacity of Chief Martial Law depends. After independence the British style was cultivated,
Administrator when he proclaimed martial law upon Presi- in the pretense of legislative supremacy made under the
dent Ayub's resignation on March 25. On March 31, in order parliamentary constitutions in effect from 194 7 to 1958. The
to regularize his role as de facto head of state and govern- \ 1962 Constitution reverted to the separation of the legisla-
ment, General Yahya assumed the office of President. On . tiire from the executive familiar before independence. Dur-
April 3 he created a "council of administration" made up of . fog both periods the Assembly was effectively subordinated
the three Deputy Chief Martial Law Administrators (Lt. to the executive. While the parliamentary system prevailed,
General Abdul Hamid Khan, Vice-Admiral S. M. Ahsan, and the Assembly was controlled, in accordance with British con-
Air Marshal M. Nur Khan, the three service heads), to co- stitutional principles, by the cabinet, and for much of that
ordinate the work of the martial-law and civil administra- time the cabinet was dominated by the head of state. Under
tions. Initially the members of the council performed minis- the 1962 Constitution the Assembly was once more placed
terial functions as well, but in August 1969 a cabinet of ci- in a junior but independent position vis-a-vis a powerful

i
II
I

- Ir
,1
---
I
166 The Politics of Pakistan Institutional Experimentation 167 1l'11:I

head of state, but became even weaker than before because the Constitution were, because of the "zonal convention," 1
li
of its failure to exploit the potentialities inherent in its own East Pakistanis; 2 the successive senior Deputy Speakers were Ii
constitutional powers. from West Pakistan and the junior Deputy Speakers in turn
Before independence, when the central government was from East Pakistan. All of these posts were filled by unop-
not dependent on a legislative majority, it was established posed election in both 1962 and 1965 with the single excep-
that the Speaker should be an impartial chairman on the tion of the senior deputy speakership in 1962.
British model rather than an active politician as in the Under both the parliamentary and presidential systems
United States. The ideal continued to prevail from 1947 to Assembly business was arranged in the House of Commons
1958, although the presiding officers did not divorce them- fashion between the whips of the government and opposition
selves completely from party politics either before or after parties. Most of the time was taken up with official business,
the adoption of the 1956 Constitution. The Constitution of only about one day each week being left to private members.
1962 provided for the election by the Assembly of a Speaker The system of standing committees for various departments, 'Ii!"
and two Deputy Speakers, to hold office for the life of the dating from before independence, was retained even during
Assembly unless removed by an absolute majority vote. It the parliamentary years, although the committees were gen-
was an open question whether they could with propriety erally neglected and ineffective. After 1962 they were re-
involve themselves in political controversy in their private established and showed more life. From 1962 to 1969 there
capacities as individuals and members of the Assembly, al- were sixteen such committees, plus committees for rules of
though when in the chair they were expected to be "above procedure and privileges and for unspecified matters, all
party." Basically, Assembly procedures were those of the with three members from each province and the minister
House of Commons unless specifically altered by rule, and and parliamentary secretary for the department concerned.
the Speaker followed Commonwealth (including British In- In 1962 and again in 1965 the membership of the committees
dian) precedent in governing the house. The 1962 Constitu- was settled informally by the party whips (ensuring a ma-
tion, in an effort to strengthen the Speaker's hand, em- jority for the government party) so that elections were unan-
powered him to refer a case of "gross misconduct" by a mem- imous. The rules after 1962 provided for all bills to be re-
ber to the Supreme Court; a verdict of guilty would have ferred to the appropriate committee unless dealt with in all
deprived the member of his seat. Under both the republican stages on the floor of the house, but there was a tendency to
constitutions the Speaker occasionally served as Acting Presi-
dent during the President's absences abroad; under the 1962 2 With the exception of Qaid-i-Azam M. A. Jinnah, the first president

Constitution he was thus head of the government, which pre- (mainly titular-he presided only seven or eight times) of the Constit- Ii,,

sumably compromised his nonpartisan status in the eyes of uent Assembly, all other Speakers have been East Pakistanis: Tamizud-
din Khan (1948-1954), Abdul Wahab Khan (1955-1958), Tamizuddin
the opposition. On these occasions a Deputy Speaker served
Khan (re-elected 1962, died 1963), A. K. Fazlul Quader Choudhury
as Acting Speaker. All of the three Speakers elected under (1963-1965), Abdul Jabbar Khan (1965-1969).

\
168 The Politics of Pakistan
Institutional Experimentation 169
suspend the rules and follow the parliamentary-era practice The normal legislative term has been envisioned as five
of appointing ad hoc select committees including more mem- years, but no Assembly has yet served such a term. The first
bers. The Public Accounts Committee, recently including Constituent Assembly had no fixed term and was dissolved
ten members under the chairmanship of the finance minister, under the governor general's proclamation of emergency
was originally established in India in 1921 on the British after seven years, in 1954; the second, elected in 1955, be-
model to review the central government's accounts for any came the National Assembly under the 1956 Constitution
improprieties or illegalities, but was not able to establish a and was dissolved under martial law after three years, in
vigorous identity in Pakistan under either parliamentary or 1958; the National Assembly elected in 1962 served out its
presidential circumstances. The usual parliamentary privi- special short three-year term and was dissolved in 1965; its
leges, including freedom of speech and immunity from judi- successor was dissolved under martial law after less than four
cial process in committees and in the Assembly, were guar- years, in 1969.
anteed to members by all constitutions, subject to further
Table 4. Composition of Assemblies
elaboration by law.
The Assembly has normally met for at least two sessio11s
East Pakistan
each year, for a total of sixty to ninety working days. During West Pakistan
Assembly Non-
the parliamentary years, when the fiscal year began on April M uslims Muslims
Non-
1, there was a budget session in the spring and a second ses- Muslims Muslims Total
Constituent Assembly,
sion in the late fall. Under the 1962 Constitution the prac- 1947-54 31 13
tice was to have three annual sessions: in midsummer for the Cons tituen tjN a tional 29 2
75
budget (the fiscal year having been altered to begin on July Assembly, 1955-58 31
National Assembly, 9 38
1), in the late fall, and in the spring. The 1956 Constitution 2 80
1962-69
required at least one annual session in Dacca, which the 1962 78 * 78 *
Constitution designated the principal seat of the legislature. 156
* Including three women
Nevertheless, since the headquarters of the central govern-
ment was in Rawalpindi during the 196o's, the budget ses- The total membership of the successive central Assemblies
sion and one other were usually held there. Both the repub- has gradually increased, and since 1955 has been on the basis
lican constitutions provided that the Assembly should be of equal representation of East and West Pakistan. The
summoned and prorogued by the President. In addition, to small size of the two Constituent Assemblies (seventy-five and
give the Assembly control over its own meetings, the 1962 eighty) from 1947 to 1956 was further reduced and their
Constitution provided that a summons could be issued by effectiveness diminished by the practice of appointing mem-
the Speaker at the request of one-third of the members, and bers to executive posts such as ambassadorships and gover-
that such a session could not be prorogued by the President. norships, by the duplication of membership between na-

'
170 The Politics of Pakistan Institutional Experimentation 171

tional and provincial legislatures, by the fact that a propor- between the executive and the representative body. In both
tion of the members were central and provincial ministers, systems there is a formal separation between executive and
and by a general neglect to fill vacancies promptly. All this legislative authority, but the way in which the gap is bridged
suggested a contempt for the Assembly by the executive, determines the character of the system. In a parliamentary
which is apparently confirmed in that out of some fifty per- system executive power is vested in the head of state but is
sons given ministerial appointments prior to March 23, 1956, exercised by ministers who hold office because they com-
half (including two prime ministers) were not members of mand the support of a majority in the representative body
the Assembly at the time, and some remained as ministers and hence can obtain from it the finances necessary for the
for well over a year without being elected. This practice purposes of the government. Ministers combine the powers
ceased in 1956 because, with the holding by members of non- of the executive with those of the legislature, which is power-
ministerial executive appointments constitutionally forbid- less except to overthrow one set of ministers and replace
den, ministerial appointments had to be conserved for pa- them with another. Legislative procedures are structured to
tronage purposes to mobilize parliamentary majorities. Such maintain ministerial control, while permitting constant chal-
parliamentary "management," possible in a house of eighty, lenge and harassment to keep ministers sensitive to political
would have been impossible had there been elections under trends. If the political system cannot sustain majorities, min-
the 1956 Constitution, which prescribed a house of 300 plus istries will be unstable and government will become ineffec-
ten separately elected women. The 1962 Constitution com- tive, since the task of retaining office will eclipse the tasks of
promised on a house of 156, including six women, but sought governing. In a presidential system executive and legislative
to preclude the constant scramble for ministerial appoint- powers remain relatively distinct: the executive does not
ments by the incompatibility rule. By a constitutional control the representative body, and the latter cannot over-
amendment of December 1967 the National Assembly was to throw the former. The executive is secure in its tenure and
increase at the 1970 election to a total of 200 regularly can govern, but must bargain to create majorities in the
elected members, eight women, and a new special category representative body for the necessary legislation and finance.
of ten persons of professional or intellectual eminence to be Legislative procedures are structured to enable the repre-
elected by the Assembly itself. The special provision for non- sentative body to challenge the executive and if necessary to
M uslim representation in the two Constituent Assemblies defeat its policies since it cannot defeat the executive itself. !l
was not continued when election by territorial constituency It has already been suggested that after 1962 the general ,1i
i
was introduced in 1962, and no non-Muslims were elected pattern of legislative organization remained that in effect !

in that year or in 1965. under the parliamentary system. The President's ministers
were entitled to sit and speak in the Assembly, and a senior
LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE RELATIONS
minister was accepted as leader of the house and of the gov-
The critical distinction between a parliamentary and a ernment parliamentary party. A Leader of the Opposition
presidential system lies in the very different relationships was recognized, although the title was a hollow honor com-

'
172 The Politics of Pakistan
Institutional Experimentation 173
pared with its significance from 1955 to 1958, when its holder inal amounts were exceeded by more than 10 per cent.
was presumptive prime minister. A parliamentary Question Through these rather complex provisions the government
Hour on the British pattern, inherited from the preindepen- was sure of at least the amount of the previous year's bud-
dence Indian legislature, was a vigorous feature of the parlia- get, whatever its relations with the Assembly, and could con-
mentary era that was retained after 1962. Adjournment mo- fidently plan long-term projects. The negative aspect was
tions permitted more extensive criticism of the government, that the Assembly was deprived of its major weapon against
but were not even the symbolic threat to it that they had the government, although its absolute control over any in-
been before 1958. creases in expenditures was not a meaningless power in an
A major change in parliamentary procedure under the age of constantly increasing budgets. Tax measures con-
1962 Constitution dealt with financial matters. Under the tinued to require Assembly approval, but the retention of
parliamentary system, the Assembly's theoretical control over the requirement that all money bills and appropriations had
the budget provided the most important occasion for review to be recommended by the President precluded the sort of
of ministerial policy and for formal challenges to the cabinet, fiscal bargaining between legislature and executive charac-
although no central cabinet was ever defeated on the budget. teristic of the American system.
The Assembly did not at any time exercise any genuine con- The financial restrictions in the Constitution enraged
trol over appropriations and taxation, for votes were entirely those brought up in the tradition of the "sovereign" parlia-
on broader policy matters. The 1962 Constitution, having ment and were among the earliest points of attack on the
freed the government from dependence on an Assembly ma- presidential system. The provisions were a massive sign of
jority, sought to preclude the occurrence of a financial crisis distrust of the members of the Assembly, in that President
arising froJI?. the refusal of the Assembly to pass the budget. Ayub was afraid to risk a financial deadlock, and in retro-
The Constitution required the budget (presented by the fi- spect they must be judged a serious fault in the 1962 Con-
nance minister in June each year) to distinguish between
charged expenditure (salaries of the President, judges, officers
stitution. In 1966 the President agreed in principle to an
increase in the fiscal powers of the Assemblies, but no final
J
h
of the National Assembly, debt charges, and so forth), re- i
agreement was reached and no change was made. Even so, l
curring and other old expenditures, and new expenditures. the Assembly failed to make use of its existing powers, which
j
'I
The Assembly could debate but not vote on charged expen- would have enabled it to exercise genuine control over the 1
ditures and appropriations under old headings. Appropria- votable portions of the budget had it chosen to do so, in con-
tions for new expenditures (including increases of more than trast to the total abdication of fiscal powers by Assemblies
10 per cent under old headings) and for proposed expendi-
under the parliamentary system. Instead the Assembly per-
tures for projects extending over several years required As- mitted itself to be organized in such a fashion that it was
sembly approval. Such long-term appropriations did not subject to ministerial control and no more capable of form-
have to be voted again in subsequent years, unless the orig- ing its own judgments on matters presented to it than previ-

\Ii'
174 The Politics of Pakistan Institutional Experimentation 1 75
ous Assemblies. The powers of the Assembly in financial the executive and the legislature must be more complex in I
matters were less than was appropriate to an independent a presidential than in a parliamentary system. Only legisla-
and coequal legislature in a presidential system, but its weak- tion acceptable to the government can be passed in a parlia-
ness was more a function of party majorities and party con- mentary system, and the assent of the head of state follows as
trol than an institutional failing. a matter of course. The 1956 Constitution contained provi-
The myth of the "sovereign" parliament in Pakistan is sion for the repassage of a bill after the President had with-
traceable-apart from the British model-to the Constituent held assent, but it is difficult to conceive how the situation
Assembly of 1947-1956. Vested by the Indian Independence could have arisen without a change of ministers occurring.
Act with the authority to adopt a permanent constitution, Under the 1962 Constitution the President's assent was as-
the Assembly had unlimited legislative powers, despite the sumed unless within thirty days it was withheld or the bill
federal character of the interim constitution (the 1935 Act). returned for alterations. The President's negative could be
'i
Until the authoritative constitutional interpretations of the overridden by a two-thirds majority, except for constitu-
11
Federal Court in 1955, the Constituent Assembly was even tional amendments which required initial passage by two-

,,~
considered "sovereign" in the sense that it was believed that thirds and three-fourths to override. A bill repassed despite
its constitutional bills did not require the assent of the head the President's negative would become law unless within ten
of state to become law. That belief was struck down, al- days the President called for a referendum or dissolved the
though the Governor-General-in-Parliament was every bit Assembly, by either method referring the matter to the elec- (1

as "sovereign" as the Queen-in-Parliament in Britain and torate. Dissolution, of course, is a possible means of resolving
could enact laws on any subject whatever. The enactment of conflicts in a parliamentary system, and the dissolution of the
the 1956 Constitution imposed limits on the National As- Constituent Assembly in 1954 seems to fit into this category. '!
sembly in the form of fundamental rights guarantees, the
exclusive provincial list of powers, and special provisions
concerning constitutional amendments, but by faulty anal-
The referendum device was an innovation of the 1962 Con-
stitution and was never used. Since the result of a refer-
endum might still leave the President and the Assembly at
I',
i
ogy with the House of Commons it continued to be con- loggerheads, a new election would probably have been pref- !j
I
sidered "sovereign" in its supposed power to control the erable. Dissolution was intended to be a serious matter, re- I
1i
j
executive. By contrast, the National Assembly under the sorted to only after all other means of reconciliation had
1962 Constitution, even after the reintroduction of funda- failed, since with it the President's own term of office was to
mental rights, was subject to fewer restrictions on its power end, requiring him to seek re-election as well. It was possible
to make laws, but was considered "powerless" and not "sov- for the Assembly to move the impeachment of the President,
ereign" because the tenure of the executive was not subject in which case he was debarred from resorting to dissolution
to its support. while the motion was pending. Severe restrictions on im-
By the nature of things the resolution of conflicts between peachment motions-including the unseating of the movers

'
 176 The Politics of Pakistan Institutional Experimentation
77
1

if the resolution received the votes of fewer than half the has under successive constitutions been vested with even
members-were intended to preclude the frivolous abuse of greater legislative powers. Under the 1935 and 1956 parlia-
the procedure. A similar procedure for removal on medical mentary constitutions a proclamation of emergency removed
grounds existed but was not invoked during President all restrictions on central executive and legislative powers
Ayub's serious illness in 1968. The success of either an im- and by implication permitted the latter to be exercised by
peachment or a medical removal motion would have necessi- the head of state (through responsible ministers) by ordi-
tated an immediate presidential election, pending which the nance if the Assembly were not in session. The 1962 Consti-
Speaker would have been Acting President. tution set no limits to central executive and legislative
From British Indian constitutional arrangements Pakistan power, but since executive and legislature were no longer
retained the practice of vesting in the head of state the power interdependent it was thought necessary to permit the Presi-
to promulgate ordinances with the effect of acts of the central dent to issue ordinances during an emergency even if the
legislature. Such ordinances could be promulgated when the Assembly were in session. The Constitution (Article 30) em-
Assembly was dissolved or not in session, and were valid powered the President, if he were satisfied that a grave emer-
until six months from the date of promulgation or six weeks gency existed "(a) in which Pakistan, or any part of Pakistan,
after the next meeting of the Assembly, whichever period is (or is in imminent danger of being) threatened by war or
was shorter, unless sooner repealed or disapproved by the external aggression; or (b) in which the security or economic
Assembly. If approved by the Assembly the ordinance be- life of Pakistan is threatened by internal disturbances be-
came an act of the central legislature. The relevant provision yond the power of a Provincial Government to control," to
of the 1962 Constitution was interpreted to mean that the issue a proclamation of emergency which was to be laid be-
Assembly was limited to approval or disapproval without fore the National Assembly as soon as practicable. The As-
amendment. Under the 1935 and 1956 constitutions the As- sembly, which could be summoned by the Speaker if neces-
sembly had enjoyed the right to amend an ordinance in the sary, had no power to disapprove either the proclamation or
process of approving it, so in 1966 the 1962 Constitution was ordinances issued under it, but any such ordinance approved
; amended to restore that right. The ordinance power has been by the Assembly became an act of the central legislature. All
' very extensively used in Pakistan despite repeated promises other emergency ordinances, unless already repealed, were to
1
• from successive governments that it would be used sparingly. be automatically repealed with the revocation of the procla-
Both ministers ostensibly responsible to the Assembly and mation of emergency. Such an emergency was proclaimed on
the presidential executive independent of it have found it September 6, 1965, and under it the Defence of Pakistan
useful to enact legislation without the embarrassment of de- Ordinance vested the central government with sweeping
bate and then to present the Assembly at some later time additional powers to issue rules and regulations affecting
with a fait accompli. many aspects of national life. With the revocation of the
In case of national emergency the head of state in Pakistan proclamation on February 17, 1969, six ordinances were

,.

. 11
\1
 Institutional Experimentation 1•i
178 The Politics of Pakistan 1 79 I

issued to preserve for the central government powers assumed been able to challenge the government successfully. The first
during the emergency over matters such as enemy property, Constituent Assembly claimed to be independent of the gov-
requisition of land, and the supply of essential commodities. ernment but was actually manipulated by it, a9.d on the only , 111,
! !;

The imposition of martial law and the formal abrogation occ~~ion that a confrontation occurred the Assembly was 11
fl
of the existing constitution on two occasions has perforce ~;;~pt away by a resort to emergency power. The second As-
~e~bly was a vigorous forum of debate but was merely one
,1,, 11

resulted in the vesting of all legislative powers in the Presi- '

I
I

dent, in the absence of a representative body, for the dura- of several arenas of struggle between rival political forces,
tion of the extraconstitutional regime. During both periods both before and after the adoption of the Constitution of
of martial law the President's ordinance power under the 1956, and became so irrelevant to the governmental process
abrogated constitution, no longer bound by limits as to dura- that in 1958 it in turn was swept away by martial law. The
tion, has been the normal method of enacting legislation, Constitution of 1962 recognized the need for a representa-
exercised within the framework of existing institutions and tive body but sought to keep it at arm's length from the
subject to judicial review in this regard. Legislation of ex- --fevers of executive power in order to ensure both executive
traordinary import, setting aside normal procedures and the and legislative stability. Overwhelming government-party
rule of law, has been embodied in martial-law regulations _-majorities, particularly after 1965, made it impossible for the
and orders issued by or under the authority of the Chief Assembly to function adequately as a check on the executive,
Martial Law Administrator. Among these are, in addition to although bargaining was necessary for the passage of every
regulations of the nature of criminal law, regulations such as major piece of legislation. Deeply engrained parliamentary
the West Pakistan Land Reforms Regulation of 1959 and _ traditi<:>11s led members to compromise the constitutional in-
those in 1969 concerning tax evasion, corruption, and illegal -d~endence of the Assembly and thus to contribute to the
foreign exchange, which are not subject to judicial scrutiny -scfiilure of the balance of power envisioned in the Constitu-
except as provided by themselves. Legislation of constitu- tion.
tional import, affecting the administration of the affairs of the
state, has been enacted by the President in the form of or- Provincial Autonomy
ders, such as the Laws (Continuance in Force) Order of The definition of an appropriate relationship between the
October 10, 1958, and the Provisional Constitution Order of central government and the provinces has been a dominant
April 4, 1969, which are issued under the ultimate authority theme in constitutional politics in the subcontinent for many
of martial law and determine the jurisdiction of the courts. years. Devolution of power to the provinces was a stage in
( .· The pattern of executive-legislative relations in Pakistan the development of self-government during the British pe-
· has clearly been one in which the executive has retained the riod, and a federal demarcation between central and provin-
I
upper hand. Whether under parliamentary or presidential cial spheres was advanced as a means of minimizing the polit-
conditions, the legislature has never, since independence, ical consequences of distrust between Hindus and Muslims.

,1!
180 The Politics of Pakistan Institutional Experimentation 181

The Government of India Act of 1919 provided for the dev- ond Constituent Assembly the Awami League emphasized
olution of certain responsibilities to the provinces, while re- the entirely different character of the two "countries" of
taining overriding powers in the hands of the central govern- which Pakistan was composed and for which autonomy was
ment. The 1935 Act for the first time attempted to distin- sought, and attempted unsuccessfully to limit federal powers
guish definite federal and provincial spheres, with a third to defense, foreign affairs, and currency.11 The Constitution
area of concurrent jurisdiction. To provide for unforeseen made some concessions to the autonomy demand by creating
contingencies in the transition from a centralized to a fed- several special bodies to provide joint federal-provincial pol-
eral state, the federal government was empowered to issue di- icy control in economic matters but otherwise followed re-
rections to the provincial governments in regard to such markably closely the lists of the 1935 Act, partly to avoid the
matters as infectious diseases, the maintenance of strategic uncertainties of interpretation if federal powers were to be
communications, and the prevention "of any grave menace made in broad grants of defense and foreign affairs. Concur-
to the peace or tranquillity or economic life" of the country, rent powers were extended, but the principal addition to
and during an emergency provincial autonomy could be exclusive provincial powers was the control of land and
completely suspended. The 1956 Constitution followed the water surface transport, and even this was subject to federal
example of the 1935 Act, with modifications in the details of direction in regard to strategic communications.
the distribution of powers but the preservation in full of The 1962 Constitution set aside the problem of recon-
federal powers of direction and emergency control. ciling provincial autonomy with central controls by aban-
The substantive distribution of powers between the center doning formal federalism. It provided one exclusive central
and the provinces was a matter of intense controversy prior list of powers, including in general: defense, external affairs,
to the adoption of the Constitution of 1956. Under the 1935 external commerce, planning, fiscal and insurance matters,
Act only a few matters remained relatively free of federal air and sea navigation, posts and telecommunications, nu-
legislative control, among them education, local government, clear energy, gas and oil, elections, the Supreme Court and
:1

land and land tenure, and agriculture. Practically all other all-Pakistan services, and taxation. All other matters were 1}'.i
1

1'
11
matters could be affected by federal action in either the fed- normally left to the provinces, endowing them with a very
eral or concurrent lists of powers, leaving aside the overrid- large increase in practical autonomy. The center retained
ing powers of the central government under the Indian In- power to legislate concerning any matter whatever when the
dependence Act. Economic and social grievances in East "national interest" so required in relation to "(a) the security
Pakistan in the early 1950' s generated extreme dissatisfaction of Pakistan, including the economic and financial stability
with this state of affairs, and the Twenty-One Point Pro- of Pakistan; (b) planning or coordination; or (c) the achieve-
gramme of the United Front in the provincial election of ment of uniformity in respect of any matter in different parts
March 1954 included the demand for "complete regional 3 See, for example, the speech of Abul Mansur Ahmad in Constituent

autonomy according to the Lahore Resolution." In the sec- Assembly of Pakistan, Debates, I, No. 51 (January 16, 1956), p. 1825.

.L.. ,11
Iii
!
 I.I,.:
I
182 The Politics of Pakistan Institutional Experimentation 183
I
of Pakistan" (Article 131 ). The effect of this was to eliminate omy, whatever the constitutional terms may be. The finan-
the previous need for emergency powers to legislate in the cial arrangements under the 1962 Constitution did not de-
·1
II
provincial sphere. In case of conflict central law prevailed, part very far from the principles laid down in 1935 and 1956,
although no law could be challenged as ultra vires of the leg- but as implemented they provided greater financial resources
islature that adopted it. for the provinces. The most important tax sources were as-
Provincial executive authority under Pakistani constitu- signed to the center: customs, excises (except alcohol and
tional law extends to all matters not covered by the exclusive narcotics), corporation and income taxes, estate and succes-
central list. Under the 1962 Constitution exceptions could sion duties, sales taxes, terminal and transit fees, taxes on
be specified by central law, a device analogous to the execu- oil, gas, and nuclear energy. The remaining tax sources were
tive directions by the central government permissible under left to the provinces: land revenue, agricultural income tax,
laws in the concurrent lists of former constitutions. In 1962 stamp duties, excises on alcohol and narcotics, and taxes on
institutions and programs no longer included in the central professions (subject to maxima set by central law); the prov-
sphere were transferred to the provinces, the most notable inces could not impose taxes restricting interprovincial trade.
being the railways and the bifurcated Pakistan Industrial Because their independent tax sources were so inelastic, the
Development Corporation. Further executive responsibili- provinces were constitutionally entitled to a share in certain
ties within the central sphere could be delegated to the prov- central tax proceeds, on principles to be established periodi-
inces provided that the center paid the costs involved. The cally by a Finance Commission.
1962 Constitution did not provide special powers to the cen- The National Finance Commission prescribed in the 1962
tral government to issue directions, since the governors were Constitution had its antecedents in the Constitution of 1956,
subject at all times to the President's executive control. the Indian Constitution of 1950, and the provisions of the
These normal overriding powers ensured that if need be the 1935 Act regarding the allocation of resources. The Commis-
national government could step in without having to invoke sion, to be constituted by the President at least fifteen
a state of emergency or a suspension of the Constitution in a months before the end of each five-year plan period, was to
province, as had been so frequently the case before 1958 include the central and provincial finance ministers and such
under Section 92A of the 1935 Act and Article 193 of the others-presumably on the basis of provincial parity-as the
1956 Constitution. After 1958, coordination between central President might appoint after consulting the governors. Its
and provincial authorities was assured by the institution of primary function was to make recommendations for the dis-
the governors' conference, a periodic meeting attended by tribution of shared taxes and to lay down principles govern-
the President, governors, ministers, and senior officials, at ing the making of grants-in-aid by the center to the provinces
which high-level policy decisions were made. This body con- and the exercise of borrowing powers by all three govern-
tinued to function under martial law in 1969. ments.
Adequate finance is essential for effective political auton- The allocation of shared taxes was prescribed originally in

,1
 ----1
184 The Politics of Pakistan Institutional Experimentation 185

Pakistan by an award by Sir Jeremy Raisman in 1952 (replac- zones, which has been the basis for demands for greater au-
ing the Niemeyer Award of 1936).4 The Raisman terms tonomy for East Pakistan. East Pakistan's relative poverty
slightly favored West Pakistan, and were superseded in 1962 is indicated by the gap between her total revenues and those
by the recommendations of a commission appointed in De- of West Pakistan, although proportionately the difference is
cember 1961. These provided that 50 per cent of income and not as great as it once was (see Table 5). Especially striking
corporation tax receipts and 60 per cent (previously 50 per is the large proportion of East Pakistan's revenues con-
cent) of sales taxes and excises on tea, betel, and tobacco con- tributed by her share of central taxes; the inelasticity of pro-
stituted a pool to be divided between the provinces, while vincial tax sources generally is suggested by the gradual in-
100 per cent of the export duties on jute and cotton (previ- crease in the central contribution in both provinces. Central
ously 62.5 per cent of jute duties to East Pakistan alone) taxes are collected in overwhelming proportion in West
were assigned to the province of collection. The sales tax Pakistan: according to a statement in the National Assembly
share was divided 70 per cent on the basis of population and in 1968, collections of central taxes in East Pakistan were
30 per cent on incidence, and the remainder of the pool on only 15 per cent of the total in 1965-66, 17 per cent in 1966-
the basis of population (i.e., 54-46 in favor of East Pakistan). 67, and 18 per cent in 1967-68.5 This is appropriate in terms
The result in the first year (1962-63) was the increase of East of the differences in per capita income between the two
Pakistan's share from Rs 17.80 crores to Rs 36.06 crores, and zones and the higher cost of living in East Pakistan. In West
West Pakistan's share from Rs 26.66 crores to Rs 34.76 Pakistan per capita income was Rs 366 in 1959-60, increas-
crores. In 1964-65 the allocation was reviewed by the Na- ing to Rs 463 in 1966-67; the corresponding figures for East
tional Finance Commission and modified to provide a uni- Pakistan were Rs 278 and Rs 313-an increase of some 26
form provincial share of 65 per cent under all heads, the al- per cent in West Pakistan and only slightly more than 12
location between the provinces being made as before except per cent in East Pakistan. 6 The National Finance Commis-
that export duties were included in the 54-46 divisible pool. sion was constitutionally obligated to report to the President
This seems to have been intended to increase the emphasis six months before the end of each plan period on the prog-
in the provincial share on the more elastic income and sales ress-if any-made in removing disparities in per capita
tax revenues, which are bound to increase rapidly as indus- income, and to make recommendations concerning further
trialization proceeds. These allocations should be reviewed measures to be taken under the next plan. The Commission's
again by a commission in 1969-70. report and recommendations were supplied to the National
The Finance Commission's allocations were designed to Economic Council to aid it in the formulation of plans. The
transfer resources from West Pakistan to East Pakistan to continued increase in disparities, despite constitutional obli-
compensate for the economic imbalance between the two 5 Khan Abdus Sobur Khan, minister of communications, in the Na-
4Successive revenue awards are described in Ministry of Finance, tional Assembly on June 21, 1968 (Dawn, June 22, 1968).
6 Dawn, June 22, 1968.
Economy of Pakistan I948-68 (Islamabad, 1968), pp. 181-189.

~
\
 The Politics of Pakistan Institutional Experimentation 187
186
gations and planning efforts, caused increased political re- mally was expected to act on the advice of ministers responsi-
sentment in East Pakistan, but it also underlined the need ble to the Provincial Assembly. If a situation arose in which
for continued and greater transfer of resources from West normal procedures could not be followed, the central gov-
Pakistan. The contention that the adverse trend can be ernment retained powers under first Section 92A of the 1935
halted only through complete control by East Pakistan of its Act and later Article 193 of the 1956 Constitution to suspend
own economy, including trade policy and foreign exchange, parliamentary government in a province. On these occasions
seems ill-founded, particularly since East Pakistan's propor- the governor acted as sole executive, subject to the direction
tionate foreign-exchange earnings have now declined to less of the center. In East Pakistan governor's rule was in effect
than half of Pakistan's total. from May 1954 to June 1955, for brief periods in May and
August 1956 to surmount politically induced budget diffi-
Table 5. Provincial revenues culties, and again for two months in the summer of 1958. In
West Pakistan, governor's rule was in effect in Punjab from
Province 1950-5 1 1958-59 1962-63 1966-67
January 1949 to April 1951, in Sind from December 1951
East Pakistan to May 1953, and in the integrated province from March to
Total revenue • 18.20 52.28 74.52 124.70 July 1957. The North-West Frontier Province was the only
Proportion from province not to experience governor's rule at one time or
shared central
52.7%
another: even the princely state of Bahawalpur suffered the
revenues 36.7% 32.8% 49.5%
West Pakistan suspension of its constitution from November 1954 until the
Total revenue • 35.98 88.09 134.93 177-56 integration of West Pakistan.
Proportion from The relations between the governor and his ministers dur-
shared central ing the parliamentary era were further complicated by cen-
revenues 16.6% 22.1% 26.23% 35.75%
tral intervention in the cabinet-making process through both
Source: Economic Adviser to the Government of Pakistan, Pakistan constitutional and party channels. The governor was ap-
Economic Survey, I966--67 (Rawalpindi, Ministry of Finance, n.d.), pointed by the central government for an indefinite term
Tables 44-47. and could be replaced at any time if he proved unwilling to
=
• In crores of rupees (one crore 10,000,000). comply with central directions, formal or informal. Between
August 15, 1947, and the imposition of martial law on Octo-
THE PROVINCIAL EXECUTIVE ber 7, 1958, twenty different governors held office in the
The role of the provincial governor, like that of the Presi- various western provinces, and eleven in East Pakistan. The
dent, was transformed in 1958, in law if not in fact. Under extent of the manipulation of responsible government in
the federal arrangements of the 1935 Act and the 1956 Con- West Pakistan prior to integration is indicated by the fact
stitution, the governor was a formal head of state and nor- that on seven of the twelve occasions when a new premier

• ,1
188 The Politics of Pakistan Institutional Experimentation 189
took office in one of the provinces he was not at the time a active politician, Abdul Monem Khan, a loyal and shrewd if
member of the Provincial Assembly, and on only three occa- unpopular political boss. In West Pakistan Nawab Amir
sions, at most, had the previous premier left office volun- Mohammad Khan of Kalabagh, an old-school Punjab land-
tarily. During the integration period (1954-55) the gover- lord who served an unprecedented six years as governor, de-
nors of each of the provinces in West Pakistan dismissed a clared repeatedly that he was a government servant and
premier at central direction. From 1955 to 1958 the balance hence obligated to steer clear of party controversies and to
of political forces in both East and West Pakistan was so leave such matters to his ministers. In September 1966 he
close that the ruling central coalition of the day did not hesi- was replaced by Mohammed Musa, the retiring commander
tate to attempt to use the governors in support of their pro- in chief of the army, in circumstances suggesting that the
vincial allies. The principle of ministerial responsibility was President had concluded that the Nawab was too autocratic
therefore seriously compromised in the provinces before it and out of touch with political currents. In late March 1969,
was terminated by martial law. in connection with his concessions to the opposition in re-
After 1958 the governor was constitutionally an indepen- gard to constitutional change, President Ayub replaced Musa
dent executive, appointed by and responsible to the Presi- and Monem Khan with more politically acceptable figures
dent alone and serving at his pleasure. Under the 1962 Consti- (Yusuf Haroon, a Karachi businessman and politician, and
tution the governor was subject to the President's direction Dr. M. N. Huda, an economics professor and until then East
at all times, and accordingly there was no need for special Pakistan's finance minister), but they had scarcely taken of-
powers of central intervention in provincial affairs analo- fice when President Ayub's resignation and the imposition
gous to Section 92A or Article 193. During the period when of martial law terminated their tenure.
the executive power in the province was exercised under nor- In both provinces a primary consideration in the selection
mal conditions by responsible ministers, it was possible and of ministers has always been the balancing of regions and
even appropriate for the governor to be a civil servant or interests. From 1955 to 1958 this was further complicated by
other nonpolitical personality. Nevertheless fully half of the party coalition factors. In West Pakistan there has usually
persons appointed to governorships before 1958 were poli- been one woman minister, and in East Pakistan one non-
ticians with continuing partisan loyalties. Under the 1962 Muslim (in recent years a Buddhist). Under the 1962 Con-
i
Constitution it was appropriate that the governor share the stitution the rules concerning the qualifications and tenure ~
Ii
political views of the President and be a person of political of provincial ministers and parliamentary secretaries were I
!I
influence in his province. The latter consideration was em- the same, mutatis mutandis, as those applying to their coun-
phasized in the resignation of Ghulam Faruque, a lifetime terparts at the center. In addition, because of the President's
public servant, from the governorship of East Pakistan in ultimate responsibility for provincial affairs, the governor
October 1962 on the ground that he lacked the necessary was obliged to obtain his concurrence in the appointment
skills to mobilize and maintain substantial political support and removal of ministers. Constitutionally, all ministers and
for the government. Accordingly he was succeeded by an parliamentary secretaries were to leave office with the gov-

l i:

,11
--~--------------------------------

190 The Politics of Pakistan Institutional Experimentation 191

,ii
ernor who appointed them, to leave his successor free to cutta and Lahore, dating from the introduction of ministe-
construct a new team, but in fact cabinet changes ordinarily rial government in 192 1 if not from an earlier time. The
'I 1
1
'11
occurred after elections rather than at the time of a guberna- Bengal legislature had been bicameral, but after indepen- i!

torial appointment. dence the style in Pakistan, in the provinces as at the center,
After the proclamation of martial law, complete authority was a legislature consisting of one chamber and the head of
in the provinces was vested at first in Martial Law Admin- state. Under successive constitutions the provisions in regard
istrators, the commanding generals in each zone. The gov- to Assembly meetings, organization, and function and the
ernors and ministers ceased to hold office, and the Martial privileges of members have in the provinces been generally
Law Administrators were directed to perform the functions the same as those for the National Assembly. The Speaker
and exercise the powers of the governors under the 1962 and Deputy Speakers have had the same status and responsi-
Constitution and any other laws. A distinct departure from bilities, and Assembly procedure and practice in regard to
,;j
the practice of 1958-1962, when there was always a separate official and private members' business, standing and select 'r·Ii
governor and Martial Law Administrator in each province, committees (including a Public Accounts Committee), Ques-
Ji
this proved to be a transitional arrangement. On August 15, tion Hour, and adjournment motions, has paralleled Na- :11

1969, Air Marshal M. Nur Khan and Vice Admiral S. M.

Ahsan, members of the President's council of administra-
tion, were appointed governors of West and East Pakistan.
tional Assembly practice, with minor exceptions for local
tradition.
The size of the Provincial Assemblies has fluctuated, al-
I
Subject to the direction of the President, the provincial gov- though under the parity agreement the 1956 and 1962 Con-
ernment under martial law is carried out by the governor stitutions provided that the National and Provincial Assem-
through the official secretaries to government, in cooperation blies should all be of the same strength. After the provincial iHl
with the Martial Law Administrator. The latter is empow- general election in 1954 the East Pakistan Assembly included III
ered to legislate by means of martial-law regulations, but 309 members, 12 of them women; 69 regular seats and 3 ::1
ordinary legislation is enacted by means of the governor's women's seats were filled by non-Muslim electorates. In early 1 11
11

ordinance power. Under the 1962 Constitution (and previous 1956 an Assembly was elected indirectly for the new united
constitutions) this was analogous in all respects to the ordi- West Pakistan province by members of the legislatures of the
nance power of the President, and with the dissolution of the integrating units and of other bodies. The total membership
Provincial Assembly it became the normal means of legisla- was 3 1 o, with the reservation of 1 o seats for women and 1 o
tion, subject to no time limits. for non-Muslims since separate electorates were not practi-
cable. In order to weight the representation of the non-Pun-
THE PROVINCIAL LEGISLATURE jabi areas, the representation of the former Punjab in the
The legislatures of East Pakistan and West Pakistan were Provincial Assembly was limited to 40 per cent of the total
the heirs of the parliamentary tradition respectively of Cal- until 1970. The Constitution of 1956 confirmed this Iimita-

'
192 The Politics of Pakistan
Institutional Experimentation 193
tion on Punjabi representation and prescribed a strength of
disqualifications of members and was removed from the
310, including 10 separately elected women, for all three
chair by dubious procedures, and the Deputy Speaker died
Assemblies. These Assemblies were never elected, the East
after receiving an injury in a violent scene. It was this inci-
Pakistan Assembly of 1954 and the West Pakistan Assembly
dent that seems to have precipitated the imposition of mar-
of 1956 continuing to function until dissolved under martial tial law in 1958.
law in 1958. The 1962 Constitution reduced the prescribed
Under the presidential Constitution the Provincial Assem-
strength of the Assemblies to 155, including 5 women elected
blies were theoretically freed from executive control, but
by the regular members, and retained the limitation in West
like the National Assembly they failed to organize success-
Pakistan on Punjabi representation. There were no reserva-
fully as independent bodies. In East Pakistan in August 1962
tions for non-Muslims, but a few were elected in East Paki-
a session was summoned by the Speaker on the requisition of
stan. In 1967, in anticipation of the scheduled general elec-
members and an abortive effort was made-in part building
tion of 1970, the Constitution was amended to increase the
on the inappropriate attempts of the Speaker of 1955-1958-
strength of all three Assemblies to 200 regular members, 8
to assert the independent status of the Assembly under the 1,ti
women and 10 "eminent persons." This made it possible to i:1
1962 Constitution. There was no parallel in West Pakistan.
restore proportionate representation in the West Pakistan ··11
In both provinces the ministers, responsible to the governor
Assembly to the Punjabi area without reducing the number
and through him to the President, were permitted to assume 11

of members from the outlying regions. /1

The parliamentary collapse in the provinces between 1955

leading roles during the year (1962-63) when most ministers
were members of the Assemblies. The Assemblies functioned
I
and 1958 was largely attributable to the cumulative effects
successfully and adequately, in the basic sense of legislating, I
of the manipulation of parliamentary government by the
central authorities after independence. The governor and
questioning, and challenging the government, but did not I
Ii

the premier were active rivals for political ascendancy, and

depart from the pattern set by their predecessors. Legislative IIi
,1
and financial procedures were the same as in the National
very close political divisions encouraged a scramble for min-
Assembly, with provision for the referral to the President
isterial office among members of the Provincial Assemblies
and National Assembly of conflicts over the refusal of the
no different from that in the National Assembly. In general,
Assembly to pass or the refusal of the governor to assent to
parliamentary proceedings were more turbulent in the prov-
bills. Although conflict and disorder were not uncommon,
inces than in the National Assembly. In both provinces the
large government majorities precluded the need for such a
ministries evaded summoning the Assemblies for long pe-
referral, which in any case was not very satisfactory from the
riods while attempts were made to construct majorities, and
point of view of provincial autonomy. Still, the final solution
in both the Speakers became embroiled in political contro-
envisioned, if the National Assembly and the President were
versy. In East Pakistan in September 1958 the Speaker was
to back the governor in a dispute, was dissolution and refer-
the focus of a conflict with the provincial cabinet over the
ral to the electorate. If a new Assembly hostile to the gov-

'
1 94 The Politics of Pakistan Institutional Experimentation 1 95

ernor and hence to the President were elected, the latter cerns have been the definition of the electorate and the ex-
would have been obliged to change both governor and policy. tent of the legislative franchise. The former includes the
The extent of provincial autonomy has been consistently question of separate electorates (discussed in Chapter 3), de-
dependent more on policy than on formal constitutional bate over which recurred periodically in connection with
prescriptions. Until the enforcement of the 1956 Constitu- preparations for the first adult suffrage elections of Provin-
tion, the powers of the central government were unlimited, cial Assemblies (Punjab and the Frontier in 1951, Sind in
and even under that Constitution the formal central powers 1953, East Pakistan in 1954). Oddly enough, the question did
of supervision and direction, taken with the informal party not arise in regard to the indirect elections to the Constitu-
interrelationships, rendered the federal distinctions practi- ent Assembly, in which separately elected Muslim and non-
cally meaningless. The 1962 Constitution was forthright in Muslim members of the Provincial Assemblies voted to-
its recognition of overriding central powers, including the gether, with reservation of seats for non-Muslim candidates
subordination of the governors to the President's policy, but instead of some form of separate election. The debate was 1
:
f
through the device of the governors' conference that policy renewed in late 1955 when the legislation establishing West
was framed in consultation with key members of the provin- Pakistan provided indirect elections for the new Provincial
cial executive. This cooperative pseudo federalism offered, Assembly, utilizing electoral colleges consisting of members
t
institutionally at least, ample opportunity for provincial
views to be expressed and evaluated and to influence na-
of the Assemblies of the integrating units grouped by dis-
trict, and also provided common voting and reservation of
I
tional policy to recognize provincial needs. These needs, un- seats for non-Muslims. The apparent abandonment of the Ii
der the Constitution, should have been expressed by the principle of separation in a provincial election reopened the
Provincial Assembly as the sounding board of public opin- controversy, and it continued unabated under the 1956 Con-
ion. To the degree that the Assembly, like its counterpart at stitution until terminated by the imposition of martial law
the center, failed to do so effectively and to enforce a degree in 1958. Since that time the extent of the franchise has been ,j
1:1
of sensitive responsibility on the part of the government, the the chief focus of attention, with the matter broadened to ,11
!h,!I
fault lay in the realm of politics, or at most in the electoral include presidential as well as legislative elections.
j
system upon which public representation was based. The adoption of universal adult suffrage after indepen- ,!j

dence was considered symbolic of Pakistan's democratic as- :l')l

Elections pirations. Previously the right to vote had been limited to
Aspects of the electoral system have been the subject of persons with education, property, or other special qualifica- i!
intense controversy throughout the independent existence of tions. In keeping with democratic ideals, when new provin- ,,!i11:
Pakistan. In any political system the nature of the electoral cial elections fell due the franchise (formerly limited to !il
process determines the scope and meaning of participation about 14 per cent of the total population) was extended to I'
by the public in their government. In Pakistan the main con- all over the age of twenty-one. From 40 to 50 per cent of I!
!!;,,

I,,
li
1

11

,~I
 I
:l
196 The Politics of Pakistan Institutional Experimentation 197 rl
ii
the electorate participated in these elections, which were In justifying the imposition of martial law, General Ayub
\I
conducted by election commissioners under the authority Khan promised to "restore democracy but of the type that :1
of the provincial governments. According to the Electoral people can understand and work." 9 This pledge was elabo-
Reforms Commission report of March 1956, extensive mal- rated in the Basic Democracies system, which was founded
practices were common-faulty electoral rolls, "bogus" on the presumption that the right to vote can be genuine
voters, stuffed or broken ballot boxes, intimidation of candi- and meaningful only when related to the problems and hori-
dates and voters: "Threats, intimidation, terrorization and zons of the voter. In this view, in the absence of universal
victimization of the most diverse kinds became operative." 7 education, adult suffrage was appropriate only for the elec-
Similar conditions prevailed in local government elections, tion of local union councilors, since the mainly illiterate
which were described as "reprehensible election frauds, . . . voters could then judge between candidates on the basis of
enacted by the interplay of all the vicious, mean and abomi- personal knowledge and need not depend on party identifica-
nable forces unscrupulous human ingenuity can muster tion and slogans. The first such elections-on a common t1
up." 8 With some exceptions these abuses were not directly electoral roll-were held under martial law in December ~
attributable to the election administration, since in terms of 1959 and January 1960, free from political parties and from \i
sheer mechanics the elections were conducted on the whole
smoothly and fairly. The fault lay in the political context,
party-inspired official pressures; 69 per cent of the electorate
cast votes in contested constituencies for 144,284 candidates ~
the behavior of those seeking to manipulate a system based
on an overwhelmingly illiterate and unsophisticated elector-
ate in legislative constituencies including many tens of thou-
(17,394 were returned unopposed). 10 In February 1960
nearly 80,000 union councilors participated in a referendum
in which 95.6 per cent of the votes cast endorsed President
lI
sands of voters. Such an electorate was approachable only
through the grossest oversimplification of issues, and given
Ayub for a five-year term. This was recognized as an exercise
in the secret ballot and not an election, and suggested the i Ii
:1
the mutual hostility of Pakistani parties and factions this possibility that the councilors, by election the most responsi- !
meant emotional appeals most destructive of national unity ble representatives of the people, might serve under the
and of notions of decency and fair play. The result by 1958 forthcoming constitution as the national electorate.
was an oppressive atmosphere of disillusion and frustration, The Constitution of 1962 duly provided for the election
of alienation rather than responsiveness between the elected of the President and of the Assemblies and the conduct of
and the electors. referenda through an electoral college chosen by adult suf-
Ministry of Law, Report of the Electoral Reforms Commission
7 9 Address to the nation, October 8, 1958, in Field Marshal Moham-
(Karachi, 1956), para. So. mad Ayub Khan, Speeches and Statements, Vol. I, October 1958-June
s A. M. K. Leghari, CSP, Report on the Sargodha District Board Elec- 1959 (Karachi, n.d.), p. 3.
tions r952-53 (Lahore: Superintendent, Government Printing, Punjab, 10 Shahid Javed Burki, "The System of Basic Democracies: Its Struc-

1955), p. 55· ture," Pakistan Times, May 7, 1967.

,1
198 The Politics of Pakistan Institutional Experimentation 199

£rage for a five-year term. A minimum of 40,000 electors was into the legislative and presidential election process and also
prescribed for each province; each elector was required to as a means of reducing the size of the primary ward to its
be at least twenty-five years of age and a resident of his elec- original dimensions. The Electoral College Act was amended
toral ward. It was an essential part of the system that the to increase the college to 60,000 in each province for the
electors should become union councilors, and therefore election due in September 1969. With a national population
would be chosen by the voters on the basis of their ability to of more than 120 million, each elector was to represent ap-
act and hence to vote responsibly. The small wards for the proximately goo to 1,100 people and 450 to 550 voters, while
electoral college and small electorates in the Assembly con- the National and Provincial Assembly constituencies were to
stituencies were intended to permit that close relationship include respectively 600 and 300 electors.
between voter and candidate that President Ayub believed Under the 1962 Constitution presidential elections were
to be essential for the making of intelligent and independent to be held normally before the end of the incumbent's five-
choices. The system minimized the intermediary role of par- year term, or in the case of a midterm election (consequent
ties, reduced the cost to candidates and to the state, and eased upon death, resignation, impeachment, or dissolution of the
the task of administering elections. It also had the merit of National Assembly), within ninety days of the vacancy. If
eliminating the separate-electorates controversy and ensured "circumstances beyond the control" of the Election Commis-
parity between the provinces in presidential elections. Ini- sion-such as the death of a candidate just before the polling
tially the union councilors chosen in 1959-60 served as the date-prevented the deadline from being met, it was to be
electoral college, electing the National and Provincial As- extended for a maximum of four months. The Constitution
semblies before the end of martial law in April and May was amended in 1964 to advance the end of President Ayub's
1962 and filling subsequent vacancies in by-elections. The first term from August 7 to March 22, 1965, making it pos-
first Electoral College Act was adopted in 1964, and under sible for the new President to take office well before the end
its terms the general elections of 1964-65 took place in pri- of the financial year and thus to take responsibility for the
mary wards of roughly 600-800 voters and National and next year's budget. 11 The change was bitterly resisted by the
Provincial Assembly constituencies of 533 and 267 electors opposition on the ground that the new schedule would per-
respectively. The decision in 1967 to enlarge the three As- mit the newly elected President to influence the subsequent
semblies for the 1969-70 general elections necessitated an ex- election of the Assemblies. An individual who had been
pansion of the electoral college if legislative constituencies President for more than eight years was not to be eligible
were not to become derisorily small. Population increase had
inflated the basic elector-citizen ratio considerably beyond 11 The "referendum" of February 14, 1960, was considered to have
approved a five-year term for President Ayub. As promulgated, the
the rough 1: 1,000 upon which the Basic Democracy structure Constitution of 1962 slightly extended this by providing (Article 226)
was originally built, so expansion was justified both as a that his term should end three years and sixty days from the Constitu-
popularization of the structure to bring more people directly tion Day (June 8, 1962).

,1
 ~11
iI.
iIlj
200 The Politics of Pakistan I•
Institutional Experimentation 201
11
for re-election unless his candidacy were approved by a joint under both the 1956 and 1962 Constitutions. The chief elec-
sitting of the three Assemblies; this provision would have i
tion commissioner, under the 1962 Constitution, was ap- ,;Iii
come into play had events permitted President Ayub to con- pointed by the President for a three-year term, with constitu-
11

test the 1970 election. If there were more than three candi- tionally protected tenure, and was not to hold any other
dates other than the incumbent, such a joint sitting was official post for two years after leaving office. Before each
to select by secret ballot the three candidates entitled to con- election the President after consultation with the chief com-
test. In 1964 the opposition expressed fears that this might be II1issioner and the Chief Justices of the two High Courts ap-
abused to eliminate the chief opposition candidate. These pointed a judge from each province as member of the Com-
provisions were not to apply if one of the Provincial Assem- II1ission. Election authorities in each province appointed by
blies were currently dissolved. the chief commissioner were responsible for the preparation
Assembly elections were to be held within four months be- of electoral rolls, delimitation of wards, and other details in
fore the expiry of the normal term. In case of dissolution, connection with the election of members of the electoral
the National Assembly election was to occur "as soon as college. Other elections (and referenda) were conducted by
practicable" after the presidential election-in any case, soon the Commission itself.
enough that the new Assembly could meet within six months It was the duty of the Election Commission under Article
of the last meeting of the old. After a dissolution a Provincial 153 of the 1962 Constitution "to ensure that the election is
Assembly was to be elected within three months. Ordinary conducted honestly, justly, fairly and in accordance with the
members of the Assemblies were returned from single-mem- law and that corrupt practices are guarded against." Corrup-
ber constituencies. For the election of women members the tion and malpractices were possible under the indirect as
chief election commissioner divided each province into the well as the direct election system, the former being designed
appropriate number of provincial and national zones, and to secure a more informed electorate rather than necessarily
the regularly elected members of each Assembly then acted to eliminate corruption. Candidates for the electoral college
as electoral colleges to elect women from these zones. To qual- were required to provide their own ballot boxes (according
ify for election to an Assembly, an individual had to be a to prescribed specifications), and the voter deposited his bal-
citizen, at least twenty-five years of age, on the electoral roll, lot in the appropriate box, identified by a symbol, in privacy.
and not bankrupt, in government service, or otherwise dis- At legislative and presidential elections the electors marked
qualified. Candidacy for more than one constituency was for- their ballots in private and deposited them in one ballot
bidden, nor could a candidate be at the time President, gov- box in view of the polling officer. Election laws and rules de-
ernor, minister, or member of another Assembly. fined nomination and election procedures, corrupt and il-
To ensure that the electoral machinery could not be ma- legal practices; appeal procedures to decide disputes cul-
nipulated on behalf of the party in power, the conduct of minated in the Commission itself. Since there was a common
elections was the responsibility of an Election Commission electorate, the Electoral College Act (Section 61) declared

'
 ·Ii
~ !

202 The Politics of Pakistan Institutional Experimentation 203

it to be a corrupt practice to persuade "any person to vote, ary 2, 1965. President Ayub won re-election with a majority
or refrain from voting, on the ground that he belongs to a in both provinces (63 per cent of the votes cast); only 300
particular religion, community, race, caste, sect or tribe." of the 80,000 electors failed to vote.
Further protection for the candidate for an Assembly seat The legislative elections, for the National Assembly on
or for the presidency was embodied in the unusual constitu- March 21 and for the Provincial Assemblies on May 16,
tional requirement that all candidates be ensured equal op- aroused almost none of the popular interest evident earlier.
portunity to address the voters, and the voters the opportu- In West Pakistan sixteen persons were returned unopposed
nity to question each candidate "face to face." These "projec- to the National Assembly, and forty-seven to the Provincial
tion meetings" held under the auspices of the Election Com- Assembly, all of them Muslim League candidates or tribal
mission were intended to protect the independent or small. "independents"; in East Pakistan only two unopposed candi-
party candidate from being overwhelmed and silenced by dates were returned to each Assembly, all of them members
more powerful political interests. of the Muslim League. There was no lack of candidates in
The 1964-65 general election cycle provided the only full. the remaining constituencies: 407 for 132 National Assembly
scale testing of the two-tier Basic Democracy electoral sys- seats, 345 for 103 West Pakistan Assembly seats, and 666
tem. Because of the key importance of the presidency, the for 148 East Pakistan Assembly seats. Projection meetings
presidential campaign began before the electoral college organized by the regional election commissioners in consulta-
elections. Every effort was made by political parties to per- tion with district authorities were held in each constituency
suade voters to choose electors pledged to support one of the between four weeks and one week in advance of the polling
candidates, and public interest was very high. During late day. Opposition disunity increased the substantial advan-
October and early November of 1964, 40,000 members of the tages of the Muslim League as the party in power. Although
electoral college were elected in each province, 77 per cent many independents were elected, particularly to the Provin-
of the electorate in contested constituencies casting votes for cial Assemblies, most aligned themselves with the League. As
180,764 candidates (II,652 were returned unopposed). 12 a result, League nominees were returned unopposed to the
Local considerations rather than presidential election pledges women's seats in the National and West Pakistan Assemblies,
seem to have been decisive, although both the government and in East Pakistan they were elected by margins of at least
party and the opposition alliance claimed that their sup- two to one. Only in East Pakistan did the size of the opposi-
porters had won in a majority of wards. Intensive campaign- tion-about forty-even approach the proportion of the
ing by and on behalf of Ayub Khan and Miss Fatima Jinnah electoral college vote won by Miss Jinnah (36 per cent); in
for the opposition, including projection meetings to confront the National Assembly the opposition held only seventeen
the electors, culminated in the presidential polling on Janu- seats, and in West Pakistan a tiny band of five faced a gov-
ernment party 150 strong.
12 Election Commission, Report on General Elections in Pakistan
z964-65, I (Karachi, 1967), 67. The results of the elections confirmed the views of both

'ti
204 The Politics of Pakistan Institutional Experimentation 205

supporters and cnt1cs of the indirect election system. The had been deprived of a right they previously enjoyed. The
distribution of the electoral wards throughout the remotest democratic credentials of the Assemblies themselves were
reaches of Pakisan forced political campaigners to seek out challenged, further depreciating their status among those
the citizenry in every village, including the entire adult pop- who already believed the legislatures to be "powerless." In
ulation in a process of politicization. As intended, the mem- fact the National Assemblies elected during the 196o's were
bers of the electoral college proved to be cushioned from based on a broader and more direct franchise than the two
popular pressures aroused in the campaign and, voting ac- Constituent Assemblies. The 80,000 electors of 1962 and
cording to their own judgments (however formed), returned 1965 were easily accessible to their constituents, and in the
both President Ayub and majorities supporting him in all latter year were elected with their electoral function a defi-
three Assemblies. According to the opposition, the system nite issue. In contrast, the few hundred provincial legislators
distorted and flouted public opinion, and its results were of 1947 and 1955 were largely unknown and inaccessible to
achieved by corruption and the powerful influence on the the populations of their constituencies, and their elections had I
(I
electors of governors, commissioners, and DC's. The opposi- not had the remotest reference to the election of a future na-
tion's sense of frustration and rejection of the constitutional tional legislature. President Ayub's election after a nation- li
order was increased by the experience of the election and by
the consequent diminution of their voice in the National
and West Pakistan Assemblies. In President Ayub's view the
wide campaign by an electorate including 80,000 voters
made him far more representative than either his predeces-
sor, elected almost casually by the eighty members of the Na-
I
system proved its workability by permitting a vigorous ex-
pression of opposition sentiment while moderating the effect
of public passions on political institutions. The Muslim
tional Assembly in 1956, or the prime ministers of former
times. The single exercise of adult franchise in legislative
elections of dubious propriety in each of the provinces dur-
I!
League's electoral success was Pyrrhic, however, since it de-
creased the ability of the government to hear the voice of
the opposition within the system and increased the deter-
ing the 195o's could hardly have been a more significant ex-
perience to the illiterate rural voter than the two adult suf-
frage Basic Democracy elections of 1959 and 1964. On the
I:!

mination of the opposition to repudiate and destroy the con- contrary, the indirect election system freed the rural areas
stitutional order. from urban political domination and forced rural interests
The limitation of the legislative and presidential franchise to the fore. The attack on the indirect system stemmed pri-
to a predominantly rural electorate of local councilors was marily from the minority of literate voters who resented
one of the most severely criticized features of the constitu- their inability to participate directly in legislative elections
tional order devised by President Ayub Khan. Although the and lacked interest in local government. Their condemna-
Basic Democracy electoral system was based on universal adult tions of the system gradually began to take root when the
suffrage, denunciations of it with the cry for the "restoration elitist pretentions of the union councilors had begun to
of adult franchise" conveyed the impression that the people antagonize the ordinary citizens whom they represented.

i i.
~~

206 The Politics of Pakistan Institutional Experimentation 207

The alternative to the electoral college system was a return order of 1962 failed to preserve the stability it had been de-
to direct elections, with either universal adult suffrage or a signed to make possible. Essentially it was a political rather
restricted franchise. Two successive independent bodies than institutional failure, as indeed had been the case with
studied the franchise question, and although they agreed on the collapse of the parliamentary order of 194 7-1958. Despite
important points their conclusions differed. The Constitu- the carefully elaborated checks and balances between the ex-
tion Commission of 1961 and the Franchise Commission ap- ecutive and the Assemblies, at both central and provincial
pointed in 1962 agreed that the Assemblies and the President levels, a politically effective synthesis of the experience and
should be elected by the same electorate, and both were experimentation of the past was not realized. The institu-
skeptical of the suitability of the Basic Democrats to serve as tions themselves-executive, legislative, and electoral, cen-
an electoral college on the ground that they would be no tral and provincial-were technically workable and adequate
more intelligent or able than an adult suffrage electorate. to Pakistan's needs, but the will to work them was absent.
The Constitution Commission therefore recommended that The manipulation and corruption of elections and legisla-
elections be direct but that the franchise be limited by liter- tures under the parliamentary system had led to its collapse,
acy and property qualifications. The Franchise Commission's and according to the opposition the same devices were used
majority took an opposite approach and held that the trend under the presidential Constitution. Neither the governing
since 1919 had been for direct elections and a wider fran- nor the opposition parties appreciated the need for indepen-
chise, and that in view of the psychological expectations thus dent legislative organization, and under parliamentary dis-
created, direct elections by universal adult suffrage should be cipline the Assemblies could not perform their constitutional
adopted. The assertions in their report concerning the mean- function of checking the executive. The opposition parties
ing of the franchise and its implications in Pakistan were rejected the presidential system, and President Ayub failed
answered by counterassertions in a report by a special com- to bring into being a vigorous party committed to its preser-
mittee appointed by the law ministry. In the end, President vation. After more than two decades the wheel had gone
Ayub felt secure enough to reject the recommendations of full circle, and both politically and constitutionally Pakistan
the second Commission as he had those of the first in favor was as far from consensus in 1969 as she had been in 1947.
of his own convictions. In doing so he underestimated the
weight of the Franchise Commission's argument in regard
to psychological expectations. Regardless of the social and
political circumstances or the experience of the past, direct
universal adult suffrage had become a value in itself and a
symbol with which to conjure. In the hands of the opposi-
tion parties it became a fearsome weapon.
Under steady attack by its opponents, the constitutional

. I
,1
 Parliamentary Politics 209

based on shared values. The failure of the Muslim League to

impose its own value system on the diverse components of the
population during the first decade of independence reflected
the lack of agreement on values and purposes within the
6. Parliamentary Politics: party. Once Pakistan had been won the League's raison
d'etre disappeared, and before it could discover another Jin-
1947-1958 11ah's death deprived it of his great moral authority. In the
absence of agreed purpose or inspired leadership, the League
disintegrated and was succeeded by a constellation of parties
Continuing political instability has been an inescapable ( representing smaller societies, appealing to more limited
result of the Pakistani search for agreed constitutional for- , and accordingly more homogeneous segments of the national
mulas. Lack of political consensus has prevented agreement community. Although there was general agreement among
on constitutional solutions, which in turn are expected to party leaders that a parliamentary form of government was
resolve contradictory claims and to compensate for political desirable, their diverse political commitments precluded the
weaknesses. During the Pakistan movement the great major- consensus essential to its smooth working. The development
ity of Indian Muslims were united by the Muslim League in of this fragmented political system must be traced to permit
the overriding determination to achieve a Muslim state. The an understanding of the collapse of parliamentary govern-
peasant masses were aroused from their lethargy and mobil- ment in 1958 and the resort to a presidential solution.
ized for political action, while the traditional and modern
elites submerged their differences in the revolutionary fervor The Muslim League
of the struggle for independence. For the first year or two In 1947 the Muslim League was the organ of the Pakistan
after partition the elan and dedication of the Pakistan move- movement and had no challengers for national leadership.
ment imparted an impression of a greater degree of unity It was faced nevertheless with the difficult task of transform-
than actually existed. Gradually attentions returned to more ing itself from a national movement into a political party
mundane problems of existence, and considerations of social competing with other parties. During the struggle for Paki-
prestige, political or economic power, tribal or clan loyalties, stan the League had been overshadowed by Jinnah, its per-
sectarian or linguistic allegiances prevailed over any theoret- manent president and leader, whose integrity and political
ical recognition of broader national interests. Diversity ability made him a giant towering over his followers. Factions
rather than unity proved to be the dominant characteristic and interprovincial rivalries existed but were rendered harm-
of Pakistani politics. less by the great moral authority of the Qaid-i-Azam and his
The parliamentary system with which Pakistan began its dedication to the national cause. When at independence Jin-
independent career presupposed disciplined political parties nah became governor general and Liaqat Ali Khan ( 1896-
208

'
!110 The Politics of Pakistan Parliamentary Politics !Ill

1951), the longtime general secretary of the League, became erosion of the League's popularity, particularly in his own
prime minister, the League became a distinctly secondary province of East Pakistan. The nadir of the League's power
concern for them. Both men-Jinnah from Bombay, Liaqat was reached in 1953 when it was obliged to accept Moham-
from the old United Provinces-were above the provincial med Ali of Bogra (1909-1963) as its president when he was
or factional identifications that became the basis of Pakistani installed as prime minister by the governor general after the
politics. latter's dismissal of Nazimuddin. Mohammed Ali had been a
In February 1948 the League Council resolved to bar junior member of the last pre-independence Muslim League
members of the government from party office in order to government of Bengal, but had been abroad in the foreign
clarify the distinction between the parliamentary and organ- service since 1948. The subsequent rout of the League in the
izational leadership. The new leaders of the organization, East Bengal elections in March 1954 further discredited it
many of them emigres from India, lacked nationwide prestige and indicated Mohammed Ali's lack of political influence.
and were unable to maintain control over the League. Re- The governor general took the initiative once more on Oc-
sentment among the younger generation at the tendency of tober 24, 1954, with his dissolution of the League-dominated
the old guard to entrench itself in office led to factional Constituent Assembly, and reconstituted Mohammed Ali's
squabbles in the provinces and ultimately to desertions from cabinet to include non-Leaguers for the first time. Other
the party. In 1950 the ban on ministers holding party office parties then began to assert themselves, and in consequence
was rescinded, and Liaqat Ali Khan, who after Jinnah's the League won only thirty-three seats in the new eighty-
death had become the unchallenged political leader of the member Constituent Assembly in June 1955.
nation, became League president. His example was followed The end of the League's monopoly of power shocked the
in the provinces, and for the next six years the central and party into a reassertion of its independence. Demands for
provincial party presidencies were in effect perquisites of the organizational reform began to be heard during the presi-
appropriate heads of government. Although this eliminated dency of Mohammed Ali of Bogra in 1953-1955. The sep-
the evils of factional conflict between ministers and party aration of party from governmental office was accomplished
officials, it reduced the League to the status of a tool of the de facto in August 1955 when Chaudhri Muhammad Ali,
government and blurred the distinction between state and the newly elected leader of the Muslim League Assembly
party. party, succeeded in forming a coalition cabinet. Mohammed
The decline of the League became evident after the assas- Ali of Bogra, the former prime minister, subsequently re-
sination of Liaqat Ali Khan at Rawalpindi on October 16, signed from the League presidency, and the post was left
1951. Khwaja Nazimuddin (1894-1964), the next prime unfilled until January 1956. In a constitutional revision, the
minister and president of the League, lacked sufficient force League Council then reimposed the ban on ministers holding
of character for his dual role. Confronted by mounting eco- party office.
nomic and social problems, he was unable to prevent the The new president, Sardar Abdur Rab Nishtar of Pesha-

'
212 The Politics of Pakistan Parliamentary Politics 213

war (1899-1958), moved to reassert the control of the party pered by the responsibilities of power, to mobilize popular
organization over League ministers and parliamentary par- support. After Nishtar's sudden death the League Council in
ties. In East Pakistan this presented little difficulty since the March 1958 elected Khan Abdul Qaiyum Khan (premier of
the North-West Frontier Province from 1947 to 1953) to be
·I ii,l
League held only ten seats in the Provincial Assembly and Ii
li
had been in opposition since 1954. In West Pakistan the its new president. Qaiyum, a bitter opponent of Dr. Khan
League continued to control all the provinces and states until Sahib and of President Iskander Mirza, sought to recreate
the integration in October 1955. An interim ministry in- the atmosphere of 1947 by renewing old cries on "Islamic"
cluding League leaders from the former units was then issues, equating opposition to the League or to separate elec-
formed under the nonparty leadership of Dr. Khan Sahib torates with opposition to Pakistan itself, and defending the
(1882-1958), the former Congress premier of the Frontier "One Unit" policy. The bitterness of his denunciations of
Province. After the indirect elections for the new West Paki- other parties-particularly the Republicans-in late summer
stan Assembly in January 1956 had returned a League major- of 1958 heightened tensions, and his threats of "bloody revo-
ity, Nishtar directed the Leaguers to form a parliamentary lution" undoubtedly contributed to the decision of the gen-
party and to elect a new leader if Dr. Khan Sahib refused to erals to suspend the normal political process.
join. Since Prime Minister Chaudhri Muhammad Ali and
THE REPUBLICAN PARTY
other top Leaguers had promised that Dr. Khan Sahib's
ministry would be supported on a nonpartisan basis, con- The split in the West Pakistan Muslim League in spring
siderable dissension ensued within the League between the 1956 resulted in the formation of the Republican party to
supporters of Nishtar and those who stood by the commit- support the provincial cabinet of Dr. Khan Sahib. To his
ment to Dr. Khan Sahib. The result was the resignation of banner rallied Leaguers who felt that the League had vio-
the former from the provincial ministry and the expulsion of lated a pledge in opposing him, factions-especially in Sind
the latter faction from the party. The League thereupon (in and the Frontier-personally opposed to the current League
April 1956) found itself in opposition in both provinces and leadership, and remnants of the old Punjab Unionist and
began to lose strength at the center. Frontier Congress parties. With the patronage of office Dr.
During the last two years of the parliamentary era the Khan Sahib was also able to lure to his side individuals who
League was in the political wilderness, in opposition-apart might otherwise have remained faithful to the League. Since
from the ephemeral Chundrigar coalition of October-Decem- most of the leading advocates of the integration of West Pak-
ber 1957-at the center as well as in the provinces. In early istan stayed with the Muslim League, the Republican party
September 1956 tensions between N ishtar and Chaudhri attracted many opponents of the "One Unit" policy despite
Muhammad Ali led the Prime Minister to resign from office the fact that Dr. Khan Sahib had been appointed premier
and from the party. The League was excluded from the new particularly to consolidate the new province. By means of
coalition cabinet, and therafter, anticipating elections under ' constitutional and political maneuvering, including the im-
the Constitution of 1956, campaigned vigorously, unham-

1 position of governor's rule under Article 193 from March

'
 Iiii
214 The Politics of Pakistan
Parliamentary Politics 215
until July 1957, the Republicans remained in power until
the imposition of martial law by President Mirza, although ine social protest and the political ambitions of frustrated
it is doubtful whether they ever had significant popular Muslim Leaguers. H. S. Suhrawardy, the head of an ousted
support. Bengal Muslim League faction,2 and Maulana Abdul Hamid :1
I
The increase in Republican strength in the National As- Khan Bhashani, demagogic leader of the old Assam Muslim !l:i
!

sembly during 1956 and 1957 gave the new party a decisive League, brought together the principal groups of the organ-
voice in the formation of cabinets at the center. After the izationally dispossessed, and around them rallied the varied
fall of Chaudhri Muhammad Ali's Muslim League coalition forces of discontent with the provincial Muslim League and
in September 1956, the Republicans joined in a coalition ministry under Nurul Amin (premier of East Pakistan, 1948-
with the Awami League under H. S. Suhrawardy (1893- 1954). Suhrawardy assumed the national leadership and
1963). When the latter publicly criticized the Republican Bhashani was elected president of the party in East Pakistan.
leadership for being opportunist in their support of an anti- The Bengali language demand became the emotional rally-
"One Unit" resolution in the Provincial Assembly, they with- ing cry against the Muslim League, and was elevated to the
drew from the coalition in pique, causing Suhrawardy's fall level of a sacred cause when demonstrators were killed in
police firing in Dacca in early 1952.
in October 1957. Reversing themselves immediately, the Re- 11 The formation of the All-Pakistan Jinnah-Awami Muslim
publicans agreed to shelve the "One Unit" question until ffi
~:..I

after the anticipated general election, and supported the short-

.',,;
t(
League (JAML) at Lahore in December 1952 linked the East
·~
lived Muslim League coalition led by I. I. Chundrigar (1897- Pakistan party with opposition groups in West Pakistan.
1960). This anomalous alliance ended when the Republicans Under Suhrawardy's auspices dissident factions in the Fron-
broke with the League over the electorates issue in Decem- tier Province and Punjab joined forces to form the JAML,
ber. By that time the Republicans, with twenty-one seats, appealing to refugees and other discontented and dissatisfied I
were the largest party in the Assembly, and they formed a
Department of Political Science, University of the Panjab, Lahore, in
,I
coalition under Malik Feroz Khan Noon (a pre-indepen- :1
1958: Mohammed Khurshid Alam, "The East Pakistan Awami 1 Ii
dence Unionist, and from 1953-1955 Muslim League premier
League"; Mohammed Afzal Bajwa, "The National Awami Party"; !ij
of Punjab), which remained in power with Awami League Mohammed Aslam Noori, "The Organization and Working of a Politi- !I
support until unseated by the proclamation of martial law cal Party: The Awami League." ii
in October 1958.

The Awami League 1

2 Suhrawardy was premier of Bengal in 1946-47 but lost standing
with the League by considering the idea of an independent united
Bengal and therefore was excluded from power in the new province of
East Bengal. He was elected to the Constituent Assembly but retained
I .I
!
The East Pakistan Awami ("People's") Muslim League his residence in Calcutta after partition to work for communal peace.
was founded in Dacca in June 1949, representing both genu- In 1948 he was unseated from the Assembly on the ground that he
1 For information on the early years of the Awami League I am in-
was not a resident of Pakistan. Accordingly when he moved perma-
I nently to Pakistan he became a natural focus for opposition to the
debted to the following unpublished M.A. theses submitted in the
.ii Muslim League establishment.
.......
'
 :1
1

'j
!l'!l
216 The Politics of Pakistan Parliamentary Politics 217
I'
delayed. A convention of those loyal to Suhrawardy and the !I
elements in the community. Despite Suhrawardy's campaign-
ing, the JAML won only 32 of 197 seats in the Punjab elec- noncommunal orientation of the party was held in Lahore in 11
!,!l
tions of March 1951, and only 4 of 97 seats in the Frontier May 1958 and a constitution for the West Pakistan Awami
election the succeeding November. In order to strengthen League was adopted, but little could be done in terms of the
the party on a national basis, the Lahore convention brought construction of a party organization before martial law inter-
into the alliance the East Pakistan Awami Muslim League vened.
and the Sind Awami Mahaz (which later managed to win When the manifesto adopted by the Lahore convention in
7 of the 111 seats in the Sind elections of April 1953). The December 1952 failed to deal with the language and other
convention adopted a manifesto pledging the party to democ- issues, the East Pakistan Awami Muslim League drafted its
racy and "the eternal injunctions of Islam," outlining a hazy own manifesto for the coming provincial elections. Published
economic program, and denouncing the Muslim League's in- in November 1953, it demanded, among other things, com-
tolerance and proclivity to identify the state, party, and gov- plete provincial autonomy, the recognition of Bengali as a
ti
ernment; issues that might cause dissension were carefully state language, the nationalization of the jute industry, guar-
avoided. antees for civil and political liberties, and the abolition of fl
The high-sounding phrases of the manifesto did not bridge landlordism. The following month this manifesto became the
the gap between the various components of the party. Pres- basis of the Twenty-One Point Programme adopted by a 11!

sure from East Pakistan for declarations on language and

provincial autonomy evoked resistance in West Pakistan,
United Front linking the Awami Muslim League with other
anti-Muslim League parties for the purpose of fighting the
i
where the attitudes of Awami Muslim Leaguers did not differ March 1954 elections.
significantly from those of the Muslim League. During 1953, THE KRISHAK SRAMIK PARTY (KSP)
friction between Suhrawardy and the party leader in Punjab
led to the latter's return to the Muslim League and the con- The principal ally of the Awami Muslim League in the
sequent loss by the Awami Muslim League of most of its formation of the United Front was the Krishak Sramik
Punjabi strength. Thereafter the party tended to become the ("Peasants and Workers") party of A. K. Fazlul Huq (1872- II)
voice of non-Punjabi interests, and in 1955 Awami fragments 1962). Fazlul Huq, the first important political figure to
in Sind and the Frontier continued to oppose the "One Unit" emerge from the Muslim middle classes of eastern Bengal,
policy even after the national leadership had decided to ac- built his entire career on his unmatched ability to appear as
cept the fait accompli. Another disruptive factor was the the champion of the exploited common man. Although he
communal question, precipitated by the decision of the East moved the Pakistan resolution in 1940, he revolted against
Pakistan party in 1955 to open its membership to non- League discipline in December 1941 and accordingly found
Muslims. This caused secessions in both parts of the country, himself isolated when the Pakistan movement swept toward
and in West Pakistan efforts at reorganization were further i victory. By the time of partition he had made peace with the

~
t
218 The Politics of Pakistan Parliamentary Politics 219

League and was elected to the Constituent Assembly, but he siderable disarray. The political situation was further com-
remained politically inactive while his old rival Nazimuddin plicated in October by the governor general's dissolution of
served as premier of East Pakistan and then as governor the Constituent Assembly, which initially at least was wel-
general. In 1951 Nazimuddin's successor as premier in Dacca, comed by the United Front. Suhrawardy and his followers
Nurul Amin, sought to heal the breach with Fazlul Huq by saw in the situation the possibilities of a short cut to political
appointing him advocate general. With the growth of popu- power and the speedy adoption of a constitution embodying
lar discontent Fazlul Huq resigned office to offer himself the East Pakistan demands. Accordingly in December 1954,
again as a focus of opposition to the Muslim League, and in after some bargaining, he joined Mohammed Ali's new cab-
September 1953 he founded the KSP. In order to increase inet as law minister. When it became clear that Suhrawardy
the likelihood of electoral success, he and Suhrawardy-long- had agreed to support a policy of unifying West Pakistan
time antagonists now linked by the common adversity of op- and enacting by decree a new constitution based on parity
position-formed the United Front, combining the farmer's of East and West, the KSP-led United Front (in April 1955)
great popular appeal with the organization of the Awami formally "disowned" him and suspended him and his princi-
Muslim League. pal Awami Muslim League lieutenants from the Front for
The United Front victory at the polls-it won 223 of 237 betraying the democratic principles underlying the Twenty-
Muslim seats-was followed very soon by the disintegration One Point Programme. In the subsequent Constituent As-
of the alliance. The repudiation of the Muslim League by sembly elections the United Front won sixteen seats and the
the East Pakistan electorate led the Front's leaders to demand Awami League, by now a noncommunal party, won thirteen.
the resignation of the Muslim League central government The political ferment in mid-1955 resulted in an alliance
and the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly, so that a between the KSP and the Muslim League, partially based on
new Assembly and government responsive to the Twenty- both parties' dislike of the increasingly noncommunal orien-
One Point Programme might be chosen. Since Suhrawardy tation of the Awami League. Parliamentary government was
envisioned himself as the next prime minister, the task of restored in Dacca in June with a KSP-led ministry, and in
forming a new ministry in Dacca was entrusted to Fazlul August Fazlul Huq himself joined the new coalition under
f Chaudhri Muhammad Ali in Karachi. Suhrawardy became
Huq. Disagreement between the Awami Muslim League and
the KSP over the composition of the provincial cabinet was
I leader of the opposition, and Mohammed Ali of Bogra, who
soon evident, and the continuing political uncertainty was fifteen months before had called Fazlul Huq a "traitor," once
accompanied by an apparent breakdown in law and order. again became ambassador in Washington. After successfully
When the central government under Mohammed Ali of delivering adequate Bengali support to pass the constitution
Bogra intervened on May 30, dismissing the Fazlul Huq bill, Fazlul Huq went to East Pakistan in March 1956 as
ministry and imposing governor's rule under Section 92A of governor in order to bolster the KSP position there. The
the 1935 Act, the United Front forces were already in con-
-~\,
.....
struggle to mobilize a legislative majority in East Pakistan

t
220 The Politics of Pakistan Parliamentary Politics 221

was fierce, and political and constitutional propnet1es were form ministries both in Karachi and in Dacca and was faced
not greatly respected. Finally the KSP premier (A. H. Sarkar, for the first time with the responsibilities of power. The par-
1895-1969) resigned at the end of August 1956 rather than liamentary leaders (Suhrawardy and Ataur Rahman Khan)
meet the Assembly as directed by the prime minister. There- were obliged to modify Awami League dogma on matters
after the KSP disintegrated into factions, each struggling for such as the demand for provincial autonomy and an indepen-
political preferment on its own, some quite successfully. dent foreign policy, in order to conform to political realities
Fazlul Huq himself was dismissed from the office of governor and the views of their coalition partners. Prime Minister
on April 1, 1958, for attempting to intervene on behalf of his Suhrawardy was committed to the "One Unit" policy as the
party. He was then free to return to active politics, but the basis of constitutional equality between East and West, and
imposition of martial law forestalled any new plans he may contended that the Constitution secured "98 per cent" pro-
have had and his subsequent death precluded any revival of vincial autonomy. Serious conflict with the party militants,
his party. who regarded the Twenty-One Point Programme and the
other party commitments as immutable pledges to the elec-
THE EAST PAKISTAN AWAMI LEAGUE
torate, ended in a split between Suhrawardy and Bhashani on
The emergence of the East Pakistan Awami League as a the foreign policy and autonomy issues. At the Kagmari
national political force in its own right during 1955 occurred Awami League conference in February 1957 Suhrawardy's
in a context of struggle for ascendancy with its erstwhile foreign policy resolution endorsing the alliance system was
allies, particularly the KSP. Both parties' attempts to ensure approved, and in consequence Bhashani and the Left re-
majorities in the Provincial Assembly, in anticipation of an signed from the party.
ultimate return to ministerial government, forced both to The prize for which the political battle raged in 1956-1958
bid for the support of minor parties and most particularly of was the possession of office during the anticipated general
the seventy-two non-Muslim members. In April 1955, on the elections. National and provincial patronage was used to
!l
proposal of Maulana Bhashani, the East Pakistan Awami maintain the precarious majority of Ataur Rahman Khan's I!
,
League opened its membership to non-Muslims. While this Awami League ministry in Dacca, for even after Suhrawardy's i,
action won the party the favor of many non-Muslims, it alien- fall in October 1957 the dependence of the central govern- ~
ated Muslims in East Pakistan who took seriously the original ment coalition on Awami support (apart from the brief !
United Front dedication to the Islamic-state idea, and in Chundrigar interlude) ensured that central powers would 1

effect destroyed the party in West Pakistan. The Awami be used where necessary to preserve the provincial ministry.
League thus became a noncommunal Bengali party, pledged The struggle became so bitter that in September 1958 the
to joint electorates and representative democracy and op- East Pakistan Assembly literally became a battleground, and
posed to any identification of Islam with the state. I the Deputy Speaker was fatally injured while in the chair.
In September 1956 the Awami League was called upon to
¥l Although the tragedy marked the complete breakdown of
i.
~
,1I
1
 ------------------------ri ii

I
I
.I
Parliamentary Politics 223 1]
222 The Politics of Pakistan 11

Pakistan. The president and other officers and most of the

the parliamentary system, the Republican-led central govern-
working committee were to be elected by the national coun- i
ment was unable to intervene because of its dependence on i\i
cil, itself elected by the two regional councils. Pending party
the Awami League, which at that very time was negotiating to
elections all powers were vested in an organizing committee
accept central ministerial office. The process of quarrelling
with Bhashani as president.
over the allocation of portfolios continued through the end of
In West Pakistan the NAP regional organization was based
September, culminating on October 7 in the announcement
on six minor parties which had combined in December 1956
of the new distribution by Prime Minister Feroz Khan Noon.
to form the Pakistan National party, with Khan Abdul
Later that same day the last act of the tragedy-or farce-
Ghaffar Khan, the "Frontier Gandhi," as president. Ghaffar
was played when the new Awami League ministers resigned
Khan had opposed the creation of Pakistan and in 1947 de-
in dissatisfaction. A few hours later martial law was pro-
manded instead an independent Pakhtun (Pathan) state;
claimed.
after independence he advocated a linguistically based auton-
omous Pakhtun province. Because his activities seemed to
The National Awami Party
support the agitation sponsored by Afghanistan for the crea-
The National Awami party (NAP) was founded at a con- tion of a separate "Pakhtunistan," he was imprisoned from
vention in Dacca in July 1957. It was an alliance of leftist September 1948 until January 1954 despite the fact that he
and provincialist groups from all parts of Pakistan, com- was a member of the Constituent Assembly. After his release
mitted to complete provincial autonomy, the disintegration he revived his old party, the Khudai Khidmatgars ("Servants
of West Pakistan, and an independent and nonaligned for- of God") or Redshirts, and actively opposed the integration
eign policy. The principal organizers were Maulana Bhashani of West Pakistan. When the NAP was founded the Redshirts
and his fellow seceders from the Awami League. They were became its Frontier branch, with one of Ghaffar Khan's lieu-
joined by the Ganatantri Dal, the other major leftist compo- tenants as president. In neighboring Quetta division, Khan
nent of the original United Front, a communist-influenced Abdus Samad Khan Achakzai, the local proponent of Pakh-
party founded by radical intellectuals and peasant leaders in tunistan, transformed his Wrore Pashtoon into a NAP pro-
December 1952.3 These two groups provided the basis of the vincial branch, while the Baluchi nationalist Ustaman Gul
East Pakistan NAP, of which Bhashani became president led by Agha Abdul Karim Khan (a member of the ruling
and Mahmud Ali (of the Ganatantri Dal) general secretary. family of Kalat) became the Kalat NAP.
In keeping with the founders' concern for provincial rights, A genuinely leftist tone was evident in the Sindhi and
the constitution provided that the national organs of the Punjabi branches of the NAP. The Punjab organization was
party were to be established on the basis of East-West parity, based on the Azad Pakistan party (APP) founded in 1952 by
with separate organizations in the former provinces of West Mian Iftikharuddin (d. 1962), the wealthy publisher (until
3 Bajwa, op. cit., p. 8. The thesis includes the NAP constitution and 1959) of the Pakistan Times of Lahore. Iftikharuddin was
an appendix on the Redshirt movement.
I

• ,1
224 The Politics of Pakistan Parliamentary Politics 225

an intellectual socialist who left the Congress for the Muslim drawn, the NAP was in a position of potentially great influ-
League in 1946, served briefly in the Punjab cabinet in 1947, ence. In West Pakistan NAP groups were willing to support
then broke with the League in 1948 and sat as a radical in either the Muslim League or the Republicans provided they
dependent in the Constituent Assembly until he organized would agree to break up the integrated province, thus intensi-
his own party. The heyday of the APP was in its first year, fying the struggle for majorities in the Provincial Assembly.
when it boasted three members of the Constituent Assembly. In East Pakistan reversals of position by NAP members led
By the end of 1953 two of them had returned to the Muslim in June 1958 to a political crisis in which the Awami League
League, and six months later the party split over the question government was succeeded briefly by a KSP government and
of communist influence. 4 Although Iftikharuddin was active then by the imposition of governor's rule for two months be-
in the creation of the NAP, because of his ill health the lead- fore the Awami League returned to office. Their role in
ership of the party in Punjab was assumed by Mahmud Ali contributing to the breakdown of the national political order
Qasuri, a prominent Lahore lawyer who was also general was presumably one of the reasons for the arrest of the princi-
secretary of the West Pakistan regional organization. The pal NAP leaders-Bhashani, Ghaffar Khan, Achakzai, Abdul
Sindhi NAP was built of the factions that had supported the Karim, and G. M. Syed-as "antinational" elements immedi-
Jinnah-Awami Muslim League in 1952-53: the Sind Hari ately after the imposition of martial law.
Committee, a radical peasant movement, and the Sind Awami
Mahaz led by G. M. Syed. Syed is a wealthy former Muslim The Nizam-i-Islam Party
Leaguer who lost out in the power struggle in 1946 and later The growing anti-Muslim League opm10n in East Paki-
moved into opposition to become the most vocal of Sindhi stan in the early 195o's had its conservative expression in the
provincial is ts. Nizam-i-Islam ("Rule of Islam") party (NIP). The failure of
During 1957-58 the NAP was one of the most unstable ele- the ulama to secure government acceptance of their demand
ments on the political scene. Nationalization of industry, ab- for action against the Ahmadi sect in 1953 and the conse-
olition of landlordism, and increased state social intervention quent reassertion of modernist opinion in the Muslim League
were inconsistent with the goals of autonomy and decentral- convinced some East Pakistan ulama that their religious or-
f
ization cherished particularly by the wealthy provincialist ganizations were insufficient to propagate their views. The
leaders in West Pakistan. The various NAP components re- most important of these was the Jamiat-ul-Ulama-i-Islam
tained their own commitments and in some cases their sepa- ("Society of Ulama of Islam"), the principal organ of the or-
rate organizations, and in West Pakistan their provincialist thodox Deobandi school, founded in 1945 with the secession
territorial aspirations were often in conflict. In both prov- of pro-Muslim League ulama from the Congress-oriented
inces, with the lines between opposing coalitions fairly evenly Jamiat-ul-Ulama-i-Hind ("Society of Ulama of India"). The
4 Ibid., p. 10, and Dilshad Najmuddin, "Political Parties in Pakistan" other major orthodox faction, the even more traditional Ba-
(unpub. M.A. thesis, University of the Panjab, Lahore, 1955), p. 131. reilly school, formed the J amiat-ul-Ulama-i-Pakistan ("Society

f
I
,1I
-~ I
'.l
226 The Politics of Pakistan Parliamentary Politics 227 I
11
of Ulama of Pakistan") in 1948. Both were patronized by the sponsibility. After resigning from the Muslim League in
\1
Muslim League and the government because of their ability September 1956, Muhammad Ali gave more extreme expres- i.l
to command the respect of the common man, but the politi- sion to his religious and political views, and in December
cians had little sympathy with or understanding for their
1957 he founded his own party. In April 1958 he joined
views. With the encouragement of the Jamiat-ul-Ulama-i- forces with the NIP, which by then had broken with the KSP
Islam, the Nizam-i-Islam party was formed to contest the over the electorates issues. The manifesto of the new NIP en-
1954 provincial elections. Fazlul Huq made a ten-point agree- dorsed separate electorates, the unity of West Pakistan, agrar-
ment 5 with the NIP pledging the United Front to the two. ian reforms, and the achievement of a "progressive democra-
nation theory, to an Islamic constitution based on the Holy tic welfare state" based on an Islamic social order as defined
Quran and Sunnah, to an acceptance of the authority of the in the Holy Quran and Sunnah.
Jamiat-ul-Ulama-i-Islam in the interpretation of the Shariah,
and in general to the application of the spirit of these pledges Jamaat-i-Islami Pakistan
in all the Front's activities. The NIP hoped by participating The Nizam-i-Islam party was a religiously based political Jli
I
:11
'i
in the United Front to increase the political strength of the party pledged to implement a traditionalist view of the re- Ii
traditionalist Islamic-state demand. When the Awami League quirements of Islam through the secular political process; I1.
abandoned the agreement and became the champion of joint the Jamaat-i-Islami, on the other hand, was in origin a "move- i
r
electorates and secularism, the NIP supported Chaudhri Mu- ment" with the ultimate aim of replacing the political process
hammad Ali's Muslim League-KSP coalition with its three with a divinely regulated Islamic order. 6 It was founded in
votes in order to secure the adoption of the "Islamic" Consti- 1941 by the self-educated but extremely able Maulana Abul
tution of 1956. Ala Maududi, aiming to "base and organize the entire hu-
fl
The NIP commitment to the Islamic provisions of the
1956 Constitution was reinforced when Chaudhri Muham-
man life in all its varied aspects . . . on the principle of sub-
mission and obedience to God Almighty and the guidance and
I
11

mad Ali, the Punjabi "father" of the Constitution, became instructions of His Apostles." This goal required the propa-
111

leader of the party. Originally a career administrator, Mu- gation of the reformed faith to nonbelievers in order to create
hammad Ali had been co-opted into the Muslim League lead- a universal society based on the clear-cut injunctions of
ership after the death of Liaqat Ali Khan. As prime minister Maududi's fundamentalist interpretation of Islam. The Ja-
he refused to be bound by the decisions of the League organ- maat opposed the Pakistan movement on the ground that it
i,1
ization, in deference to his coalition and parliamentary re- was inherently incapable of producing an "Islamic state"
5 Signed on December 28, 1953, according to a statement made in the
since the leadership was in Maududi's terms immoral and un-
Constituent Assembly by Mohammed Ali of Bogra, July 17, 1954. Con- Islamic and since the creation of a separate nation-state would
stituent Assembly (Legislature) of Pakistan, Debates, Thirteenth Ses- 6 Mohammed Amin, "Jamaat-e-Islami Pakistan" (unpub. M.A. thesis,
sion, I, No. 26, p. 1501. University of the Panjab, Lahore, 1958). See also Chapter 3, p. 94.

t
 --------------------------------------111111111r '!
,,'I'

'I.
228 The Politics of Pakistan Parliamentary Politics 229
,I11
deny the universality of the Quranic message. After 1947 of its former oppos1t10n to the Pakistan movement. The if'I
,I
Maududi adapted his thinking to the changed circumstances, United Progressive party (UPP) appeared in 1955 with the l:i!ii
and the Jamaat began its work for the establishment in Paki- disintegration of the United Front. Both of these parties were I,:
stan of a constitutional order based on the Shariah. mainly supported by caste Hindus. In the competitive politi-
The Jamaat's program for the creation of an Islamic order cal situation in 1955-1958 the PNC and UPP, with initially
involved four tasks: the purification of Islam of its accretions; four and two members respectively in the Constituent Assem-
the search for righteous and honest people and their training; bly, were able to bargain with the major parties on behalf of
the reform of the society along Islamic lines; and the reform non-Muslim interests and participated in successive central
of the government and the national leadership through con- and provincial coalitions. The Scheduled Caste Federation
stitutional means. The first two of these were tackled directly functioned as a political party in East Pakistan until 1958,
by Maududi's exposition of the faith and the proselytizing its members in the Assemblies frequently allied with the
activities of the Jamaat. The remaining two objectives re- Muslim League. After 1955 non-Muslims were welcomed as
quired the Jamaat to engage in the political game, and so full members by the Awami League and later by the NAP,
gradually to turn the course of events in the desired direction. and at least two non-Muslims in the central Assembly joined
Maududi was jailed in 1948-1950 on charges of "seditious" the Republican party. In West Pakistan, politically inclined
activities among the refugees, and again in 1953-54 in con- non-Muslims usually found it wise to become associate mem-
nection with the Jamaat's role in the West Pakistan anti- bers of the Muslim League. Other minority organizations
Ahmadi disturbances. These experiences made him a fervent generally functioned as pressure groups, although Christian
1'
advocate of democratic liberties and of an independent judi- organizations in West Pakistan supported candidates in pro- 1,

ciary to enforce them. The J amaat was less affected than other vincial elections. II'
parties by the imposition of martial law in 1958, since its 1]

nonpolitical auxiliaries continued their activities and Mau- Politics Suspended I1!

lana Maududi merely assumed the more conventional role of The bitter struggle between the political parties and the .ii
i
the religious scholar. gradual collapse of parliamentary decencies produced a palpa- 'i
ble atmosphere of political malaise in 1958. Every group had 'l
,,]
Non-Muslim Parties betrayed its professed principles at one time or another, and
Prior to 1958 several non-Muslim political parties were in none could trust the bona fides of its opponents. The attempt 1i
the field. The Pakistan National Congress (PNC) was the
rump in East Pakistan of the pre-independence Indian Na-
of the Muslim League to use Islam as a unifying force without
having any positive conception of its moral implications in
Ii I

tional Congress. Although it was the major parliamentary the modern world proved to be divisive, provoking non-
opposition in the first Constituent Assembly and in the East M uslims and Muslim factions alike into extreme statements
Pakistan Assembly until 1954, it could not escape the stigma of their own demands. The rise of parties appealing to ethnic

.\!II
230 The Politics of Pakistan Parliamentary Politics 231

rather than religious communities in turn provoked those brought Pakistan on the verge of ruination will rig the elec-
who were committed, on secular or Islamic grounds, to the tions for their own ends. They will come back more revengeful,
because, I am sure, that the elections will be contested, mainly,
survival of Pakistan as a unified political community and
on personal, regional and sectarian basis. When they return,
state. The elections scheduled under the 1956 Constitution they will use the same methods which have made a tragic farce
were awaited as a means of delivery from a most unsatisfac- of democracy and are the main causes of the present wide-
tory situation, yet no party was willing to contemplate any spread frustration in the country. However much the adminis-
other in the seat of power at election time. On October 7, tration may try, I am convinced, judging by shifting loyalties
1958 the political tension was suddenly broken by the impo- and the ceaseless and unscrupulous scramble for office, that elec-
sition of martial law and the abolition of all political parties. tion will neither be free nor fair. They will not solve our
President Iskander Mirza's martial-law proclamation was a difficulties. 7
vitriolic denunciation of Pakistani politicians. In it he al- Citing the danger of disintegration and his duty to preserve
luded to his own role in the preceding years. Mirza has been the integrity of Pakistan, President Mirza claimed to inter-
~
much criticized and blamed for his alleged political manipu- vene on behalf of the "masses, finer men than whom it is
lations and interventions. He made no secret of his scorn difficult to imagine," against the "traitors and political ad- 11

for politicians or of his skepticism concerning the workability venturers." Ultimately a new constitution "more suitable to II
JI
of parliamentary democracy in Pakistan. He was enabled- the genius of the Muslim people" would be devised. What (1
J
or called upon-to play a political role by the very party future role he envisioned for political parties he did not say.
weakness that caused him to doubt the suitability of the par-
7 Proclamation of the President dated October 7, 1958, and published
liamentary system in Pakistan conditions. He was the scape-
in Dawn (Karachi), October 8, 1958.
goat for party failings even before October 7, 1958, and has ,J
11
been since. Mirza expressed the view that a "vast majority"
11\
of the people had lost confidence in the existing system of
Iii
government, and that they were "dangerously resentful" of :11

their treatment by the political leaders. His evaluation of !:i

Pakistani parties was black, suggesting little hope for parlia-
mentary democracy.
The mentality of the political parties has sunk so low that I
am unable any longer to believe that elections will improve il,
the present chaotic internal situation and enable us to form a t;
strong and stable Government capable of dealing with the in-
numerable and complex problems facing us today. We cannot
get men from the moon. The same group of people who have
i
i

\
 Presidential Politics 233

stand over and apart from the contending forces in society

may stem from Islamic concepts of the unity of the commu-
nity of the faithful under a rightly guided judge and inter-
preter of the divine Law. It was manifested before martial law
7. Presidential Politics: in the assertion in some Muslim League circles that the League
as the national movement and custodian of the "ideology of
1958-1969 Pakistan" ought to have a permanent monopoly of office.
Non-League elements naturally were hostile to this claim, as
were almost all politicians to the martial-law arrangements
Pakistan inherited from the colonial era a dichotomy be- that deprived them of a function in society.
tween "government" and "politics" that was reflected in the The Constitution of 1962 attempted to compromise in re-
mutual dislike of the bureaucrat and the politician. Men of turning to the normal bargaining process of democratic poli- 1
:1 1

the latter sort achieved Pakistan through the mobilization of tics while keeping the executive independent of it as a sort of :I
j,I1
mass emotions and aspirations, but it was the dedication to Gaullist arbiter. Some politicians accepted the new system, Ii
ll
duty of the former that enabled the new state to survive. but others felt that it did not permit them full political self-
When in the years after independence politicians seemed to expression. They remained unreconciled and alienated from 1111

I,
lack the skills necessary to work the machinery of govern- the constitutional order, and directed an unrelenting attack i
ment, individuals from the ranks of the bureaucracy- on it. The political process from 1962 to 1969 accordingly
Ghulam Mohammad, Iskander Mirza, Chaudhri Muhammad functioned on two levels: one concerned with the pursuit of
Ali-perforce assumed political leadership. While the Mus- interests and the achievement of demands, the other with
lim League increasingly asserted its identity with Pakistan, forcing changes in the system. By 1969 the attack on the system
and hence its right to control the government, its internal succeeded in preventing it from responding to political de-
failings and lack of purpose caused it to lose the respect of mands and brought about its collapse.
and be manipulated by the public services. The military and
civil services were further disenchanted by the unscrupulous Revival of Political Parties
struggle for office between the League and newer political The 1962 Constitution was, according to President Ayub,
groupings from 1955 to 1958, and ultimately they intervened designed to combine national unity with local autonomy in
to preserve the state by setting aside the conflicting political a system characterized by a free exchange of ideas without
forces. Thereafter from 1958 to 1962 the services attempted the "disruptive" presence of political parties. The citizen was
under martial law to pursue the national interest without the to participate in the political process by the election of his
overt conflicts of party politics. The wide acceptance in Paki- local union councilor on the basis of merit and abilities; the
stan of the belief that the government ought somehow to 80,000 councilors in turn formed the electorate for the As-
232 'I'I:
11

,11
~
iJ

f, . il
~j; lj
J] 234 The Politics of Pakistan Presidential Politics 235
i
semblies and the President and were to choose on the basis of misconduct under the Constitution, until the end of his pe-
the ability and reputation of the candidates. Parties were for- riod of disqualification for office; or (3) had been dismissed ,1il
I,!
bidden to participate in the electoral process unless author- from the service of Pakistan, until five years had elapsed. A
ized by law. This system received a trial in the legislative fourth provision debarred any person who had been disquali-
elections of April-May 1962, but most of the members elected fied from holding public office until December 31, 1966,
by it demanded a return to conventional politics and political under the Elective Bodies (Disqualification) Order, 1959
parties. Accordingly, in mid-July a government-sponsored bill (EBDO). This last category was of great importance since it
authorizing the formation of parties was passed by the new included about 100 former ministers and leading politicians
National Assembly. (the EBDOnians) who either had been found guilty of gross
In recognition of the disintegrative tendencies inherent in misconduct in office by a tribunal or had "retired" from pub-
Pakistan's complex society, the Political Parties Act defined lic life rather than face a tribunal.
the limits within which parties could function legitimately.1 Because the first six months of its life revealed the Parties
Parties established "with the object of propagating any opin- Act to have a number of loopholes, it was amended in Janu- i
ion, or acting in a manner, prejudicial to the Islamic ideol-
ogy, integrity or security of Pakistan" and "foreign-aided"
ary 1963. The term "political party" was redefined to include
a "group or combination of persons who are operating for ~
1!

parties were prohibited. The Supreme Court, on a reference the purpose of propagating any political opinion or indulg-
ing in any other political activity." Furthermore, persons dis-
I'I
made by the central government, was to determine whether
a party fell within one of these categories. Such a party was qualified under the Act were forbidden even to "associate" i
to be automatically dissolved and its officers disqualified from
election to an Assembly for five years. With the hope of cur-
themselves with any party, and the central government was
empowered to direct such persons to refrain from addressing
!!
tailing the scope for opportunism, the Parties Act provided
that an individual elected to an Assembly as a party candidate
was to forfeit his seat if he withdrew from that party. Further,
meetings or issuing press statements for up to six months.
These changes were introduced to bring the restrictions of
the Act definitely to bear on a number of EBDOnians who
Iti
i
in an effort to raise the standard of probity of party leader- refused to accept the intent of the disqualifications and en- ilJl
ships, the Act debarred persons who had betrayed the public gaged in political activity without formal membership in a
trust in one form or another from serving as party members "party" as originally defined.
or officers. These included any person who ( 1) had been con- After the adoption of the Political Parties Act, President
victed of an offense and sentenced to at least two years' impri- Ayub hoped that political leaders would profit from the ex-
sonment, until five years after the expiry of his sentence; (2) perience of the past and would seek to form new political or-
had been removed from office as a minister or governor for ganizations appropriate to the new circumstances. This im-
1 Text reproduced in Muhammad Rafi Anwar, Presidential Govern-
plied acceptance of the changes since 1958 and the develop-
ment in Pakistan (Lahore, 1967), App. III, pp. 332-334. ment of parties that looked forward rather than backward.

\
_ . . . . . . - - . .

236 The Politics of Pakistan Presidential Politics 237

Ayub's reluctance to offer himself as a focus for a party to tion. The convention, in Karachi in early September 1962,
support his political ideas and program left a near-vacuum was attended by members of all factions, including some erst-
into which very many old politicians but very few new ideas while Republicans, but its legitimacy was challenged by the
rushed. The uncertainty of Ayub's supporters concerning the EBDOnians who convened the old League Council (last
role he should play-whether "in" politics or "above" them elected in 1950) in Dacca in October. A third group of East
-made it possible for the opponents of the new system to Pakistan Leaguers opposed the revival of the party at all and
pose as champions of democracy against autocracy. Instead of backed the National Democratic Front when it appeared. A
new parties dealing with national problems, the EBDOnians period of unedifying factional confusion followed, all too
and their allies attempted to prevent the establishment of similar to pre-1958 politics, with each group claiming to rep-
any parties at all so long as any restrictions on political ac- resent genuine League opinion and seeking to lure support
tivity remained. When Ayub committed himself to the Mus- away from the others.
lim League as the vehicle of his philosophy this attempt to
!i
stifle the political process failed and other parties began The Council Muslim League. For some months the major Ii
11
gradually to resume activity. Their overriding goal was not challenge to the reorganization of the Muslim League under- !l.
to function within the new system but, singly and in succes- taken at the Karachi convention was offered by the EBDOn- i
11
sive alliances, to combat and destroy it. ian former party oligarchs and their allies. In an effort to i

THE MUSLIM LEAGUE

preserve their control over the party they resuscitated the
former League Council and prevailed upon the venerable I
The interregnum of 1958-1962 eliminated the Republican Khwaja Nazimuddin to emerge from retirement to become I
party from the scene but also destroyed whatever unity the
Muslim League had enjoyed just before martial law. Most
League president in succession to the EBDOnian Qaiyum.
Thereafter the Council Muslim League (CML) did its ut-
!1!

of the front-rank leaders of the League-including its last most to gain support by attacking the "undemocratic" Con- II
:!
president, Qaiyum-were disqualified under EBDO; of those stitution and the Political Parties Act. Its efforts to reorgan-
who were not, some opposed the new constitutional order ize and recruit new members were hampered by its lack of
while others had accepted ministerial office. The issue was any constructive policy and by the ineffective and factional
·111
clear: was the Muslim League to become the party of the character of its leadership. The transformation of the con- l'i
"revolution" of 1958, or was it to commit itself to a restora-
tion of the parliamentary system? Since the EBDOnians and
ventionist faction into a full-fledged governing party led in-
creasing numbers of Council Leaguers to conclude that they
I
their allies controlled the old League organization, the minis- had backed the wrong side, and in 1963-64 the party was
ters and others who accepted the new Constitution sum- repeatedly weakened by desertions. In anticipation of the
moned a convention for a complete reconstruction of the 1964-65 elections the CML joined forces with the other op-
party, in order to mobilize support for their political posi- position parties, but Nazimuddin's death in October 1964

'
238 The Politics of Pakistan Presidential Politics 239
left it leaderless at a crucial time. Renewed vigor was brought as party president, in fact reflected factional adjustments
to the party after the expiry of the EBDO restrictions, in among rival bosses rather than open contests. Local leagues
the person of Mian Mumtaz Muhammad Khan Daultana chosen on this basis lacked rapport with the local political
(premier of Punjab, 1951-1953), but his election as party situation, and in 1965 for the Assembly elections many such
president in early 1967 signalled a new outbreak of factional leagues secured the adoption as official party candidates of
dissension. Under his leadership the CML joined with the individuals who had little genuine constituency support.
other opposition parties in the anti-Ayub coalitions of 1967 The defeat by independents-most of whom subsequently
and 1969. aligned themselves with the League-of over 100 League
candidates for seats in the three Assemblies indicated serious
Party Organization. A key factor in the calculations of the inadequacies in the functioning of local party units and the
conventionists was the assumption that President Ayub, need for further reorganization.
despite his oft-repeated distaste for political parties, would In April 1966, after a year's gestation, a new party consti- fl
eventually join them. Ayub's opposition to parties stemmed tution was promulgated by Ayub as president of the League. 3 1
Ji
from his conviction that they served only to undermine Paki- It provided a unified structure for the party throughout Paki- Ii
1
stan's precarious national unity. He refused to offer himself stan, based on the enrollment of primary members in Union
as a focus for an "establishment" party or to involve himself Muslim Leagues in each union council area. (Non-Muslims i
111!

in the political fray but indicated his willingness to cooper- could be enrolled as "associate members.") The membership
ate with-and perhaps join-a "broad-based nationalistic fee was one rupee for five years, the term of all party bodies
political party" if one could be formed. 2 On May 21, 1963, and officeholders, chosen to correspond with the term of the Ba-
presumably convinced that the Muslim League was under- sic Democracies and Assemblies under the 1962 Constitution.
taking a genuine reorganization and was attracting wide- According to the party constitution, each Union Muslim
spread popular support, Ayub joined the party in each prov- League was to have an elected council, a small working com-
ince as an ordinary member, and on the following December mittee, a chairman, and four officeholders. At higher levels
24 was elected League president by the newly constituted there were Muslim League councils in the thanas, subdivi-
Council in Dacca. He urged that the Pakistan Muslim sions, and districts in East Pakistan and in the tehsils, dis-
League (PML) organization be structured to parallel the tricts, and divisions in West Pakistan. The councils at the
Basic Democracy institutions, but in fact the "new" League second and third tiers were made up of officeholders from the
of 1963 departed only in detail from the hierarchical pattern tier below, but the fourth-tier councils included in addition 1

of the pre-1958 era. It was all too evident that the League eleven elected representatives, ten persons co-opted to repre-
"election" of 1963, which ended in the acclamation of Ayub sent special interests (including associate members), and, ex

2 Pakistan Times, July 21, 1962. 3 Text in Pakistan Times, April 8 and 9, 1966.

't
240 The Politics of Pakistan Presidential Politics 241

officio, all elected Muslim League members of representative Basic Democracies and the 1962 Constitution of Pakistan, and
bodies at that level. Cities of over 200,000 were to have sep- was meant to mesh the political structure closely with na-
arate two-tier organizations based on union leagues and were tional institutions. The president "shall exercise all the power
represented directly in the Provincial Muslim League Coun- inherent in his office"; his appointment power specifically
cil in East Pakistan and the appropriate Divisional Muslim secured his control over the national "high command," and
League Council in West Pakistan. The provincial councils he had a veto over the composition of the provincial execu-
included the chairmen and secretaries from the tier below, tives. The decisions of the national and provincial League
200 members elected from that tier, and thirty co-opted rep- Councils and working committees were binding on all lower
resentatives of special interests. The Pakistan Muslim League tiers. While Ayub was head of both the party and the govern-
Council included the presidents and secretaries of the two ment the ties between the two were close, and the disruptive
provincial Muslim Leagues and of the Islamabad Muslim conflict that plagued the League in 1956 was precluded. Until
League (which was independent of the West Pakistan organ- the imposition of martial law the highest officers in the na-
ization), 200 elected members (100 from East Pakistan, 93 tional and provincial organizations were usually ministers,
from West Pakistan, and 7 from Islamabad), and 25 per cent and the working committees were dominated by ministers
of the total number nominated by the president to represent and legislators. In each of the three Assemblies the leader of
special interests. Although provincial party presidents and the League parliamentary party was a minister. Thus decisions
other officeholders were elected by their councils, the provin- reached at governmental level could be enforced-within the
cial president appointed his working committee with the con- limits of the politically possible-both on the organization
currence of the president of the Pakistan Muslim League, and on the parliamentary parties.
and the latter appointed all national officers as well as his Central and provincial parliamentary boards were pre-
1
thirty-member working committee. Holders of provincial and scribed by the party constitution to deal with elections and : 11
1,
national offices and members of working committees were ex the legislative side of party life. While the Assemblies ex- 11

officio members of the appropriate council. Prior to the impo- isted, the provincial boards consisted of the president of the i
1,)j
sition of martial law in 1969 Muslim League governors, cen- provincial League, twelve members chosen by him in consul- 'I

~
tral and provincial ministers, and members of the National tation with the president of the national League, and the !I
~
Assembly were ex officio members of both the national and leader of the Assembly party. They were supervised by the :i

their provincial councils, and members of Provincial Assem- central board, consisting of the president of the League,
blies were ex officio members of the latter council. The first twelve others chosen by him, and the leader of the party in
election under this constitution culminated in the re-election the National Assembly. The main functions of the boards
of Ayub as League president by the Pakistan Muslim League were to choose party candidates for elections and to "exercise
Council in Dacca in February 1969. general control" over the appropriate Assembly party, with
The party constitution had obvious parallels with both the the central board serving as a court of appeal from the pro-

'\IIII
- - _T_ .
242 The Politics of Pakistan Presidential Politics 243

vincial boards. In February 1965 thirty-seven Leaguers were position to his policies, Ayub said that the concept of an op-
expelled from the party by the central board for filing nomi- position was not reconcilable with Islamic politics, which
nation papers to oppose official party candidates in the Na- envisioned a unified party of the faithful. However, since the ;;
tional Assembly election, and many more were expelled for conventional democratic notion of an opposition had been H
,,:1
similar offenses in the provincial elections. Any lesson in accepted in Pakistan, he said it had to be recognized as legiti-
party discipline was lost when expellees and others who had mate, although it should be "constructive." 4 Thus while iii
defeated the official candidates were permitted after the elec- Ayub did not deny his critics their right to organize, it is clear
tion to rejoin the party. Potentially, discipline over members that he regarded them for the most part as "disruptionists"
elected as party candidates was strengthened by the provision of whom the people should beware.
in the Parties Act requiring such a member to forfeit his seat The Muslim League was committed to Ayub's philosophy
if he left his party, but this did not affect individuals elected of unity, stability, and hard work as exemplified in the poli-
as independents, who freely deserted the League in February cies of his government. The League manifesto published in
and March of 1969. In February 1969 action was initiated March 1964 declared that the party "stands for a simple, ,.t1l
against several Muslim League members who had crossed the austere and hard life." Ayub cautioned Leaguers to leave ap-
floor in the National Assembly and West Pakistan Assembly, peals "to the baser emotion of the people" to other parties
but the dissolution of the Assemblies occurred before their and take up the more difficult task of appealing to their "cold
seats could be declared vacant. logic and sound reason" in the task of national development. 5
The manifesto endorsed the presidential constitution, in-
Party Effectiveness. Under President Ayub's leadership the direct elections, the system of Basic Democracies, and the
Muslim League once more claimed the mantle of the national preservation of the united province of West Pakistan, and
movement. While he had earlier appealed for support on a
nonparty basis, Ayub now appealed to all patriotic citizens to
outlined realistic objectives in the progress toward the devel-
opment of a welfare state. Just before the presidential election !,I
"unite, work and achieve" in the League. He identified the on January 2, 1965, Ayub issued a personal manifesto outlin- I
League with the people, with patriotism, and with Islam, but ing his beliefs and the objectives he would strive for in the 'I',,'
he also welcomed non-Muslims into the party and warned next five years if elected. 6 In it he repeated his belief in de-
that if the League should lose contact with the people he mocracy "based on pragmatism rather than dogmatism" and
would sever relations with it. By making the League all-
inclusive he apparently hoped to eliminate the evils, as he
in a "Welfare State where basic necessities are available for ;1
saw them, of the party system and to reinforce national unity. 4 Speech at Rawalpindi, March 13, 1964 (Pakistan Times, March 14,
1964).
Other parties he called parochial and regional, living on
5 Speech at Rawalpindi, March 15, 1964 (Pakistan Times, March 16,
slogans and resolutions rather than realism and work. Criti- 1964).
cizing the "negative" and "destructive" character of the op- 6 Pakistan News Digest (Karachi), February 1, 1965.
I i

!'
~ I

I
-~
i:
tll'
 ,11
I

111
Presidential Politics 245
244 The Politics of Pakistan l
I,
rather than men, party elections were by compromise and !I
all" with complete equality of opportunity. He maintained
the need for "self-reliance" and "practical realism" rather arrangement and were not open contests, party discipline II
was flouted and loyalty ignored, and communications be- !I
than "doctrinaire" attitudes in dealing with national prob-
lems. He promised a variety of measures, to improve the eco- tween the leadership and party workers, youth, and women
nomic condition of the ordinary citizen, to associate the were practically nonexistent. 7 Party members were not in-
people further in the administration of their affairs, to 1 volved in the making of policies, which were formulated by
achieve parity and balanced growth throughout the country, l
I
official agencies without reference to party opinion. The im-
portant responsibility of any political party to serve as a
to encourage cultural integration, and "to provide full pro-
tection and safeguards to minorities in Pakistan and to ensure means of communicating popular feelings, desires, and
for them equal opportunities, rights and privileges," among grievances to the leadership, especially if that leadership oc-
other points. In closing he urged patience, faith, moderation cupies government office, was almost completely neglected.
("Reform ~hould be undertaken in a missionary and not in a The League's lack of genuine local strength and appeal thus f1
made it impossible for Ayub and those who believed with i
,,
vainglorious spirit. The objective should be to produce a I l1
him in the value of the presidential constitution to present . ~
better arrangement rather than to destroy an existing arrange-
ment"), national outlook, and hard work ("Empty slogans any effective popular defense against the attacks of the op-
and fond hopes will get us nowhere"). This manifesto became
the basic political commitment of Ayub's government and of
position parties.
II
THE OPPOSITION
his supporters in the Muslim League, and its principles were 'I
reflected clearly in the "Aims and Objects" of the party con- The National Democratic Front. Upon the withdrawal of
I
stitution of 1966. martial law and the resumption of political activity, the 11
•I
ghost of the East Pakistan United Front walked again, arm-
Despite the elaborate formal party structure and Ayub's
emphasis on the need for popular support, the Muslim in-arm with its former enemy, Nurul Amin of the Muslim
League. In a statement issued on June 24, 1962, the latter
I,I
il
League failed to become a live and vigorous party. Ayub's I:
!l
essential disbelief in parties led him to attempt to speak di- and eight leaders of the Awami League, the KSP, and other
rectly to the people-his presidential manifesto did not refer components of the erstwhile United Front proclaimed their
to the party even once-and to deal with them through the opposition to the "undemocratic" Constitution, demanding II,
official channels of the administration. The Muslim League another Constituent Assembly elected by adult franchise to
became simply a device to maintain government control of adopt another constitution based on federal and parliamentary JI
I
:·l

the Assemblies and to recognize and reward the govern- principles. The statement of the "Dacca Nine" became the ba- H
ment's supporters. According to an extremely frank report sis for a campaign against the Constitution, political restric-
by a West Pakistan Assembly party committee, the enroll-
7 Pakistan Times, February 6, 1969.
ment of members was largely bogus and based on money j

~
,1
 T
1(,

246 The Politics of Pakistan Presidential Politics 247

tions generally, and the Political Parties Act in particular. revived parties (Awami League, National Awami party, and
Since many of the leading figures were EBDOnians-includ- CML) and members of the former Republican party and of
ing Suhrawardy, who joined them in August upon his release the then banned Jamaat-i-Islami. The Front was described
from detention-the alliance resolved not to re-establish po- as a "democratic movement," not a "political party," with a
litical parties but to create a "people's front" to force Presi- program confined solely to constitutional reform. 8 Its com-
dent Ayub to yield to the "popular demand." By early Oc- ponent parties continued to function in the Assemblies and
tober the National Democratic Front had emerged, under elsewhere on the basis of their differing policies, and within
Suhrawardy's leadership, as a movement without formal or- a year the NDF as such had disappeared. In East Pakistan
ganization and not, ostensibly, a party. an NDF committee was formed in early March 1964 under
After initial successes in arousing public enthusiasm and the chairmanship of Nurul Amin on the basis of the non-
interest, the NDF began to encounter difficulties and its in- revival of parties. By this time the East Pakistan NDF had
ternal incompatibilities asserted themselves. The decision been "reduced to the dregs of all the original participants" fj

of both the (conventionist) Muslim League and the CML to and was described as the "Nothing Doing Front." 9 t
resume organized activity made leaders of other former i
parties extremely reluctant to submerge their identity in a The Awami League. When the attempt to create a Na- ij
heterogeneous alliance indefinitely and to lose contact with tional Democratic party collapsed, the demand for revival of 1,11

their own supporters. A severe blow was the amendment of the Awami League became irresistible. In both provinces
the Parties Act to make it apply clearly to the NDF and to
silence Suhrawardy and other EBDOnians. In late sum-
mer of 1963 there was an abortive attempt, largely in-
the working committees announced the revival of their or-
ganizations during January 1964. In East Pakistan there was
a split between the majority and a nonrevivalist faction led
I
:!
irl
spired by Awami Leaguers, to merge the supporters of the by the EBDOnian former premier, Ataur Rahman Khan,
former Awami League, National Awami party, and KSP into who remained loyal to Nurul Amin's NDF. The view that 'f!,11
a National Democratic party to supersede the Front. The a working party organization was necessary for the effectual I:Ii"'i!,i
f1h
idea failed partly because of the insistence of some NDF prosecution of a political program carried the day, and all 'li,j
l's
stalwarts on keeping their policy against party revival but local branches were directed to resume activity.
mainly because of differences between Suhrawardy and the The major task of the Awami League was to re-establish
':lj
NAP leadership. its popular roots after an interval of more than five years. 1
The death of Suhrawardy in December 1963 left the rap- In West Pakistan there never had been a thorough enroll-
idly disintegrating NDF without a leader of national stature. ment of members and establishment of local committees.
Thereafter, developments in the two provinces proceeded In East Pakistan in 1958 there were said to be 1.8 million
separately. In January 1964 the West Pakistan NDF was s Pakistan Times, January 22, 1964.
I
formally established, under a council representing three 9 Pakistan Times, March 5, 1964.

l
...... ,1
248 The Politics of Pakistan
T Presidential Politics 249
•I

one-anna members and a province-wide hierarchy of local, The National Awami Party. Initially the NAP supported
city, and district committees, culminating in a provincial the alliance led by the "Dacca Nine" in demanding the re-
council which elected the president and party officers. 10 The moval of all political restrictions and the convening of an-
council was usually dominated by the working committee other Constituent Assembly, in view of the continued de-
of twelve officers and twenty-five others selected by the presi- tention of its major leaders and of many political workers
dent. Since all these bodies and officers were elected for two- in the Peshawar area who had been imprisoned in 1961 for
year terms, their replacement was long overdue. New officers violating the martial law ban on political activity. When
were elected in both provinces in 1964, and the central lead- Bhashani was released from restriction on November 3, 1962,
ership was reconstituted. A West Pakistani, Nawabzada after a brief hunger strike, the NAP began to move in the
N asrullah Khan, was chosen president and head of the cen- direction of revived party activity despite its professed sup-
tral organizing committee to emphasize the "national" char- port of NDF nonrevivalist slogans. At the end of December
acter of the party despite its weakness in West Pakistan. Bhashani revived his Krishak Samiti ("Peasants' Society"),
The platform of the East Pakistan Awami League led by an auxiliary of the NAP, as a means of launching an agita-
Sheikh Mujibur Rehman was indicated in resolutions of its tion for "the restoration of full democracy." Its demands
working committee in January 1964. These repeated the included measures relating to rural economic grievances, an
demands of 1954 for complete regional autonomy and full independent foreign policy, and withdrawal from the Cen-
parity in terms of economic investment, distribution of gov- tral and Southeast Asia treaty organizations, in addition to
ernment posts, and so on. Other resolutions opposed deten- the constitutional complaint. Although B:hashani and the
tion without trial, called for the elimination of all political West Pakistan leadership of the NAP felt that the prolonged
restrictions, and demanded the dissolution of the province of adherence to the nonrevivalist position had damaged the op- 1:

West Pakistan. Finally, and most important, the working position cause, a strong element in the East Pakistan NAP ,1!1

committee demanded "a full democratic Constitution recog- led by the general secretary (Mahmud Ali, one of the "Dacca
I1'
,I
nizing the supremacy of the Parliament to which the repre- Nine") insisted on loyalty to the NDF. The formal revival
sentatives shall be elected directly by the people on the basis of the party on February 29, 1964, therefore, caused a break
of adult franchise and wherein full autonomy of East and with the Mahmud Ali group.
West Pakistan shall be guaranteed." 11 The program of the revived NAP was outlined by the or-
ganizing committee at Dacca in September 1963. It hoped
10 See Mohammed Aslam Noori, "The Organization and Working of
for cooperation with other parties on a Pakistan-wide basis
a Political Party: The Awami League," and Mohammed Khurshid
for the achievement of a democratic constitution based on
Alam, "The East Pakistan Awami League" (unpub. M.A. theses, De-
partment of Political Science, University of the Panjab, Lahore, 1958). the sovereignty of the people and direct elections. As before
11 Pakistan Times, January 27, 1964. 1958, this meant full provincial autonomy with a subfedera-
tion in ·west Pakistan, with only powers of defense, currency,

Ji..
't
- i:i,
250 The Politics of Pakistan

and foreign affairs vested in the center. An "independent,

T Presidential Politics

fluence in West Pakistan was never very great, except in

251 I
,

nonaligned and neutral" foreign policy and the withdrawal trade union circles immediately after independence. How-
of Pakistan from military pacts was demanded. Other points ever, by mid-1954 the Azad Pakistan party, later to become
included guarantees for civil and political liberties, economic one of the constituents of the NAP, was thoroughly infil-
parity between the provinces, nationalization of key indus- trated and thus rendered "anti-national, Communist and un-
tries, and the elimination of local taxes. Party elections were democratic." 13 Martial law imposed some limits on commu-
held in July 1965 in both provinces. In Lahore Mahmud Ali nist activities after 1958, but in 1961 it was reported that the
Qasuri-who had been recently elected president of the West Communist party of India was undertaking the revival of
Pakistan High Court Bar Association-was chosen president the party in East Pakistan, where there were said to be nearly
by the West Pakistan general council, along with other offi- 2,000 active Communists. 14
cers, a twenty-member working committee, and delegates to In July 1965 the Dacca session of the national council of ,,,
the national council session in Dacca. In Dacca Maulana the NAP called for the withdrawal of the ban on the Com- ,
Bhashani was re-elected president of the East Pakistan NAP. munist party. By 1967 the NAP was divided into identifiable
I
~
The national council of the party then met for the first time "pro-Moscow" and "pro-Peking" wings, the latter in the
since the founding session in 1957, and besides re-electing ascendancy. In repudiating the Pakistan Democratic Move- I
Bhashani as president, elected two vice-presidents (one from
each province), other officers, and twenty members of the
ment, the opposition alliance formed in May 1967, the work-
ing committees of the East Pakistan NAP and of the central !
executive committee (the president appoints ten others). NAP endorsed a united front "based on an anti-imperialist,
After the end of martial law in 1962, communist influence anti-feudal and anti-capitalist struggle," but derived from
in the NAP became increasingly evident. Communists had the "unity of the people" as against "unity of parties and I
participated in the United Front in East Pakistan in 1954
both directly and through fronts such as the Ganatantri Dal,
returning at least ten Communists and roughly fifty party- i
leaders," and declared that the "struggle for democratic
rights and the struggle against imperialist domination are
indivisible." 15 In other words, like the Communist party of
I
J!
ij
liners to the Provincial Assembly. 12 The communist threat India in the early 195o's, the NAP called for a Maoist alli- !
was one justification given for central government interven- ance of all classes in opposition to the government, while l
1
tion in East Pakistan in May 1954, and six weeks later the supporting those aspects of its foreign policy which contrib- !
I
Communist party was banned throughout the country. With uted to closer relations between Pakistan and the "Socialist I

the subsequent disintegration of the United Front, commu- countries." In 1968 the NAP split into rival parties, one I•i
nist elements supported Bhashani's Awami League and in
13 Dilshad Najmuddin, "Political Parties in Pakistan" (unpub. M.A.
due course assisted at the birth of the NAP. Communist in- thesis, University of the Panjab, Lahore, 1955), p. 131.
12 Richard L. Park, "East Bengal: Pakistan's Troubled Province," 14 Pakistan Times, April 24, 1961.
r
Far Eastern Survey, XXIII, No. 5 (May 1954), p. 73. 15 Pakistan Times, May 19 and May 23, 1967.

ti
252 The Politics of Pakistan Presidential Politics 253
("pro-Peking") led by Bhashani and the other ("pro-Mos- mended amendments to restore the Islamic prov1s10ns of
cow") led by Khan Abdul Wali Khan, son of Abdul Ghaffar 1956, provide for direct elections, and make the fundamental
Khan. rights justiciable. He linked the "restoration of democracy"
with the survival of Islam, criticizing martial law, the 1962
Nizam-i-Islam Party. Although extremely critical of the Constitution, and the Ayub government in terms which sug-
abrogation of the 1956 Constitution, the NIP adopted a rela- gested that Ayub and his Constitution were at best indiffer-
tively pragmatic approach to the post-martial law political ent to Islam. These attempts to place loyalty to Islam in con-
situation. The party was revived with little delay, for in view tradistinction to loyalty to the existing constitutional order
of their experience with the United Front and their obvious elicited from President Ayub a series of warnings to the
policy differences with both the Awami League and the public not to be misled by "those who exploit religion to
NAP, NIP leaders preferred to cooperate with other groups seize political power." rn
,,
on a selective basis rather than submerge themselves in the Maududi's religious absolutism poses a fundamental chal- I
nonrevivalist NDF. The party's demand for a more Islamic lenge to the sort of liberal social ordf'r to which most other i li
and democratic constitution was detailed at a convention in . politically significant elements in the society are professedly 1:l
,II
Dacca in January 1963. The NIP indicated willingness to committed. The Jamaat is an elitist organization, its mem- 11,

accept the presidential system if the new Constitution were

amended to provide direct elections on the basis of adult
bership (in 1962 totaling 1,367) limited to Muslims who after
probation and investigation have been found thoroughly
I
:i)
iij
franchise for both the President and the Assemblies, in- committed and loyal.17 These are the leaders, the hard-core
creased financial powers for the latter, and justiciable funda- activists who set the tone of the movement and in theory
mental rights. It also demanded the restoration of the Islamic share in determining its policy. In a second category, under 1,,
provisions of the 1956 Constitution, and maintained its com-
mitment to the unity of West Pakistan and to the develop-
less severe discipline yet with definite obligations to fulfill,
are the associates (30,337 in March 1958), of whom about
I
!1
ment of an Islamic social order. 10,000 are active workers for the Jamaat. In a third category ti
i]
are the sympathizers, who support its activities financially
]amaat-i-Islami Pakistan. When the Parties Act became and otherwise without formal affiliation with the J amaat as
law the Jamaat was summoned into open activity without such. Operating through medical and social welfare centers,
delay or controversy and immediately joined the chorus of educational and labor organizations, and the weekly open
those demanding the "restoration of democracy." The pur-
pose of this was to permit an appeal to a mass electorate, 16 For example, in his November 1 address to the nation (Pakistan

which Maududi was confident could be manipulated by Times, November 2, 1963).

17 Organizational details in these paragraphs are derived largely from
means of religious slogans. Maududi did not support the de- Mohammed Amin, "Jamaat-e-Islami Pakistan" (unpub. M.A. thesis,
mand for still another constitution, but instead recom- University of the Panjab, Lahore, 1958).

.
t:11
'
~-·

Presidential Politics 255

254 The Politics of Pakistan

meetings of local jamaats, the movement reaches many thou. lowed precedent, and Maududi and the entire top leadership
sands of persons each year. The J amaat' s systematic dogmas of the J amaat were placed under preventive detention. The
have a considerable appeal to the urban lower middle class simultaneous attempt to ban the party as an "unlawful asso-
and to Urdu-educated students and professional men. Much ciation" under the Criminal Law Amendment Act of 1908
of the Jamaat's recruitment is through its student auxiliary, was overturned by the Supreme Court in September 1964 as
the Jamiat-ul-Tulaba, which has been active in student agi- j!. an unreasonable infringement of the freedom of association
tations throughout the 196o's. It is patterned after the parent guaranteed by the Constitution. Shortly thereafter the West
organization in terms of categories of membership, and has Pakistan High Court, on a habeas corpus petition, ordered
branches in colleges throughout the country. Reputedly the release of Maududi and his colleagues. With these deci-
more than 50 per cent of the Jamaat's members are "highly sions the J amaat resumed its activities, since the government
educated" -an extraordinary proportion indeed in a society seemed unwilling to attempt to proceed against it by refer-
such as that of Pakistan. ence to the Supreme Court under the Political Parties Act
Maududi's supremacy in the movement is unchallenge- on the grounds of its alleged disruptive and subversive ac-
able, since he is the source of the interpretation of Islam to tivities.
which all members are by definition committed. He has been
re-elected amir by the membership periodically since the or- The Combined Opposition Parties and
ganization was founded (in 1962 he received 99.7 per cent of the I965 Elections
the vote cast). The amir chooses a working committee of The Parties Act failed to prevent the reappearance of the
twelve and appoints other officers and the heads of the twelve pre-1958 political parties under the old leadership. Although
territorial divisions (only one of them is in East Pakistan) of the situation called for united opposition action, the first ef-
the Jamaat. The Majlis-i-Shura, the central council of fifty, fort to join forces against the government-the National
is elected by the membership by proportional representation ! Democratic Front-collapsed in a welter of personal and pol-
from each division. There are also district and local jamaats, , icy disagreements. The separate parties then reappeared, but
each with its elected amir and council. Maududi's writings I apart from the Jamaat (and possibly the East Pakistan Awami
and statements are accepted by all as authoritative, and mem- League) none of them made serious efforts to create or re-
bers and others influenced by the Jamaat try to guide their create a broadly based organization or to relate its activities
lives accordingly and to spread the message further. to the actual needs and problems of the public it claimed to
Successive governments in Pakistan have regarded the represent. Prior to 1958 the importance and power of politi-
Jamaat as a threat which cannot be adequately met by politi- cal leaders was based precisely on the lack of any real links
cal means, in view of its authoritarian and allegedly conspira- with the people which might have served to limit or restrict
torial organization and its reliance on divine sanctions to their freedom of action by imposing a degree of responsi-
achieve its ends. In January ,964 the Ayub government f o l - . bility. Emotional appeals through slogans and public meet-

t
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256 The Politics of Pakistan Presidential Politics 257

ings provided the appearance of strength without the embar- liamentary constitution. Miss Jinnah, the "mother of the na-
rassment of responsibility for programs or policies. tion," was the only figure upon whom the essentially incom-
The only element in common among the diverse groups patible opposition parties could agree-and that because of
of the opposition prior to the 196 5 elections was a sense of her promise to hand over power to them if elected. The
frustration born of their alienation from the existing con- parties hoped that the magic of her name would sway the
stitutional order. They disagreed among themselves on the voters and that they would ride to power on her skirts, al-
role of Islam in the state, the system of electorates, the unity though some had serious reservations about the propriety
of West Pakistan, economic policy, and foreign policy-in of a woman candidate for head of state.
short, on every issue of importance. Their inability to com- Even during the presidential election campaign the vari-
promise on a common and politically practicable program ous parties barely preserved the pretense of alliance. Strug-
made it possible for Ayub's government to outmaneuver gles for position, apparent prior to the electoral college elec-
them repeatedly. By sponsoring the Parties Act and the addi- tion in October-November 1964, continued. The result was
tion of fundamental rights and Islamic provisions to the Con- that the rival claims of popular support persuaded both the
stitution, Ayub's supporters pre-empted the role of liberal- COP and President Ayub himself that Miss Jinnah's strength
izers of the political system and deprived the opposition of was greater than in fact it was. After the shock of defeat in
their major grounds for joint action. Although the latter the presidential election, the COP was torn by conflicting
were able to force additional liberalization of successive gov- counsels in regard to the Assembly elections. The decision
ernment measures, their collective lack of political effective- to contest precipitated new battles over strategy and candi-
ness was shown by their repeated defeats in by-elections dur- dates. In East Pakistan the NAP split with the COP and put
ing 1963-64. With the approach of the 1964-65 elections the up its own candidates for the National Assembly, while the
need for a new basis of opposition cooperation against the NDF, which stood for partyless unity, allied itself with the
League became manifest. COP. In the Provincial Assembly election the position was
In July 1964 an alliance, soon to be designated the "Com- reversed: the NAP again formed part of the COP list of
ii;
bined Opposition Parties" (COP), was formed by the Awami candidates, while the NDF contested separately. In West
League, NAP, CML, NIP, and the Jamaat-i-Islami. Their Pakistan (where the NDF had ceased to exist) the COP
H
:!
program, in essence, was the "restoration of democracy" in rather petulantly withdrew from the Provincial Assembly
the form of a return to the parliamentary system of govern- contest, excusing its failure in the National Assembly elec-
ment based on direct elections; other matters were covered tion by accusing the government of twisting the voters with
by generalities and left to the future. Their standard-bearer "terror and temptation."
to challenge Ayub for the presidency was Miss Fatima Jinnah The results of the elections confirmed the hopes of Presi-
(1893-1967), the sister of the Qaid-i-Azam, who in September dent Ayub and the fears of the opposition. The mass enthu-
1964 agreed to emerge from retirement to stand as a non- siasm with which Miss Jinnah was received on her campaign
partisan candidate, pledged to resign after restoring the par- tours was translated into only 46 per cent of the votes in
i

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Presidential Politics 259
I
258 The Politics of Pakistan :1
i
East Pakistan and a meager 26 per cent in West Pakistan. It
is an arguable question how much of this enthusiasm and The Pakistan Democratic Movement (PDM)
support was attributable to her-or her brother's-name and Following their electoral failure in 1965 the opposition 'i
how much to conscious support for her political views. In parties were once more in disarray. The international ten-
!Ii
any case her popularity was not transferable, and the elec- sions climaxing in the September War with India caused
tors made their own decisions in the Assembly elections de- all Pakistanis to forget their differences for a time, but the
spite party pressures, although in some instances these de- "morning after" brought renewed disagreements. In West
cisions may have been secured by corruption or official influ- Pakistan, opposition parties sought to make political capital
ences. The internal divisions among the opposition groups out of the widespread and violently expressed popular dis-
provoked the contempt of the electors and by presenting a appointment with the Tashkent Agreement, while in East
multitude of candidates permitted the return of Muslim Pakistan-where there was some retrospective horror at the
League candidates in some constituencies on a minority poll. dangers to which the province had been exposed because of ii

Kashmir-the opposition generally welcomed it. The isola- [!

Finally, the COP-NDF record of denunciation and denigra- jl
tion of the Basic Democracy system had placed them in an tion and apparent defenselessness of East Pakistan during 1:
t!
impossible position when they were obliged to appeal to the the conflict had its aftereffects, and dissatisfaction was ex- '!
newly elected Basic Democrats for their votes. pressed over the state of defense preparedness in the prov- I
!'

The actual postelection strength of the opposition parties ince. In February 1966 Sheikh Mujibur Rehman, president
remained unclear until the Assemblies had met and the al- of the East Pakistan Awami League, put forward a "Six-
legiance of the independents was determined. Three of the Point Demand" calling for a federal form of government "on
sixteen National Assembly independents joined the fourteen the basis of the Lahore Resolution of 1940," with the federal
COP members in opposition. The United Parliamentary government deprived of taxing powers and limited to re-
party led by Nurul Amin (NDF), official leader of the op- sponsibility for foreign affairs and defense, and separate fiscal
position, included four other members of the NDF, five from and monetary policies, external trade accounts, and terri-
the Awami League, and four from the CML; the three NAP torial forces for each federating state. President Ayub re-
members remained separate. In West Pakistan only one COP acted strongly, warning in speeches during March that the
candidate was elected, from the CML; he was joined in op- "evil designs" of "certain individuals" would be "nipped in l>i

position by four of the fifty independents. In East Pakistan the bud," and (speaking in East Pakistan) that if necessary I
I
eleven Awami Leaguers, four members of the NAP, three Pakistan would face a civil war to preserve its unity. 18 Ayub's
from the NDF, three from the CML, one from the Jamaat-i- tactless threat of force and the arrest of Mujibur Rehman
Islami, and one from the NIP comprised the core of the 18 See Ayub's address to the nation on March 1, 1966 (Pakistan
opposition; they were joined by roughly twenty of the sixty Times, March 2, 1966) and speeches in East Pakistan reported in the
independents. issues of March 20 and March 21, 1966.

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260 The Politics of Pakistan Presidential Politics 261

!
I 11

'!11i
under the Defence of Pakistan Rules did not deter the East parity; and (8) points 2 through 7 to be incorporated into 111
Pakistan Awami League from adopting the six points as its the 1956 Constitution by the parliamentary National As- !II
program in June. Other opposition parties were critical of sembly as a first order of business after its election. By con- !

Mujibur Rehman's demands, but the end result was the re- fining their manifesto to constitutional and parity questions-
sumption of the opposition debate on the bases of joint and by using sufficiently cryptic language-the drafters
action. hoped to satisfy the whole political spectrum from the pro-
An opposition conference in Dacca in April 1967 con- vincialist Left of the East Pakistan Awami League to the
cluded with the formation of the Pakistan Democratic Move- centralist and right-wing elements in the CML, NIP, and
ment. East Pakistan Awami League representatives accepted Jamaat, including both the advocates of the disintegration of
an expansion of the six points to eight, which leaders of West Pakistan and the proponents of its unity, and the sup-
the NDF, CML, NIP, Jamaat-i-Islami, and West Pakistan porters and opponents of the 1956 Constitution. Economic
Awami League agreed to endorse. The "Eight Point Pro- matters and foreign policy were mentioned only in vague
gramme" 19 called for: ( 1) a parliamentary federal form of and innocuous terms in the accompanying press commu-
government with direct elections by adult franchise, funda- nique in order not to cause divisions over nationalization
mental rights, free press, and an independent judiciary on and the military pacts.
the basis of the 1956 Constitution; (2) federal powers limited Although intended to provide a unifying common plat-
to defense, foreign affairs, currency and federal finance, and form for opposition groups in both provinces, the creation
interprovincial communications and trade; (3) full regional of the PDM resulted in further splits in both the Awami
autonomy with residuary powers vested "in Governments as League and the NAP. Despite the selection of Awami League
established by the Constitution in the two Wings"; (4) re- chief Nasrullah Khan to be PDM president, the militant j
Ii
moval of economic disparity within ten years, with foreign wing of the East Pakistan Awami League regarded the PDM
exchange at the disposal of the province earning it; (5) cur- program to be a negation of the original six points and re- 111
I,,
rency, banking, foreign exchange, foreign trade and inter- fused to participate. By a process of expulsion and counter- '!1
wing trade and communications to be managed by a board expulsion in August 1967, the Awami League divided into
elected on the basis of parity by members of the National the anti-PDM "Six Point" Awami League headed by Mujibur
Assembly from the two wings; (6) parity in all central ser- Rehman and the pro-PDM "Nasrullah group" Awami 'II
1:1
I ~

vices, including autonomous bodies and the Supreme Court, League, both claiming to be all-Pakistan organizations. The !,,
within ten years; (7) parity in defense fighting and fire power NAP had been excluded from the PDM conference, reflect-
in the two wings, transfer of naval headquarters to East Paki- ing both the increased rightist influence in the other parties, ii'
stan, and constitution of a defense council on the basis of particularly in West Pakistan, and the further leftward drift
of the NAP under Bhashani's leadership. Immediately after
19 Reported in the Pakistan Times, May 3, 1967. the PDM was formed, the NAP condemned it for sidestep-

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"'' ": I

262 The Politics of Pakistan , 1:: Presidential Politics 263 :::l

ping the major issues of the day-foreign affairs (the de- I took on the aura of a persecution, made a martyr of Mujibur ii
mand for a nonaligned foreign policy and withdrawal from I Rehman, and provided a dramatic focus in Dacca for the i Ii
military pacts), economic affairs (nationalization of industry, j autonomy demand of the Six Point Awami League. Shortly j'l
banks, and foreign trade), national unity (regional auton- after the discovery of the "conspiracy" President Ayub fell
omy, the dissolution of West Pakistan, and the achievement seriously ill, but although he was incapacitated for several
of the people's "real demands"), and civil liberties (ending weeks the constitutional provisions providing that his func-
the emergency and all "repressive" laws)-and for defending tions should be assumed by the Speaker as Acting President
the "semifeudal, semicolonial socioeconomic order now exist- were ignored. Pakistan was in effect without a chief execu-
ing in Pakistan." 20 Bhashani rebuffed pressures from the tive for more than two months, revealing the dependence of
"right-wing leftists" for an accommodation at least with the the presidential Constitution on the person of President
Six Point Awami League, apparently because the latter gave Ayub and causing open speculation on the stability of the ,,
insufficient recognition to national unity. Tensions contin- system. ,!'I
I!
ued, and in early 1968 the NAP split in both provinces; the A further stimulus to the opposition was provided by the
leftist wing under Bhashani became dominant in East Paki- juxtaposition of the continuing state of emergency and the ,ij
stan, and the rightist wing under Wali Khan and Mahmud , year-long celebrations (October 1967 to October 1968) of the
1
Ali Qasuri dominated in West Pakistan. accomplishments of the Ayub administration in its ten years II
During 1968 several factors combined to transform the in office. The retention by the government as election year
political situation for the divided and faction-ridden opposi- approached of extraordinary powers enabling it to impose
tion. In January 1968 the government announced the dis- restrictions on political activity did not harmonize well with II
covery of a conspiracy to bring about the secession of East the constant stream of official praise for the effectiveness of
Pakistan with Indian aid. A total of thirty-five accused per- the Basic Democracies and the stability of the presidential
sons-including Sheikh Mujibur Rehman, three CSP offi- system. Throughout the year the public heard much of eco- 111
:1:1
cers, and several middle-ranking naval and army officers- nomic achievements during the "Decade of Development," ':i
i!
were implicated in the "Agartala conspiracy case," which while the personal economic lot of many was far from happy.
went to trial in Dacca in June before a special tribunal pre- The claims of political and economic progress advanced in
sided over by S. A. Rahman, former Chief Justice of Paki- the torrent of speeches, statements, and occasions generated
stan. Whatever the truth of the charges, their triviality and an air of apparent official complacency that increasingly an-
the incompetence of the alleged conspirators as revealed in gered citizens who could see around them the shortcom-
the prosecution brief made the trial seem unnecessary; cer- ings of the administration. The ineffectiveness of the Muslim
tainly it was a grave political blunder. 21 To the public it League as a channel of communication left the government
20 Reported in the Pakistan Times, May 23, 1967. isolated and, relying ever more heavily on official rather than
21 The prosecution brief and the names of the accused were pub- political structures, apparently unaware of increasing public
lished in Dawn, June 20 and 21, 1968. disquiet.
i/

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264 The Politics of Pakistan Presidential Poli tics 265

Bhutto had the peculiar authority of one so recently a mem-

Democratic Action Committee (DAG) ber of the governing establishment, and he carefully culti·
Symptomatic of the changing political climate was the ap. vated the student community, to whom-bored with or in- I
pearance of new political figures in the opposition. Foremost different to the existing political spectrum-his party had I

among these was Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, the wealthy Sindhi the attraction of novelty. The PDM and other opposition
aristocrat who had served in Ayub's cabinet from October parties were skeptical and suspicious, although during 1968
1958 until June 1966, for the last three and a half years in Bhutto and his supporters were subjected to increasing offi·
charge of the foreign ministry. Bhutto had been the archi- cial and Muslim League harassment.
tect of the confrontation with India that culminated in the The sudden outbreak of violence involving students in
September War of 1965 and, disapproving strongly of the West Pakistan in early November 1968 marked a new phase
Tashkent Agreement which restored the earlier status quo in the opposition campaign. The perpetual student unrest,
in Kashmir, was forced to leave the government in June perhaps fanned by the events earlier in the year in Berlin
1966. Having broken with Ayub on this issue, Bhutto pro. and Paris, intersected with Bhutto's campaign to rally sup·
ceeded to discover that the government he had served for port in anticipation of the 1969 presidential elections. Equiv-
more than seven years was based on coercion, oppression, ocal and rhetorical allusions to violence and bloodshed in
and misrule. 22 In mid-1967 he assumed the mantle of a Bhutto's attacks on the government, which might have been
prophet of democracy and began to denounce the system that commonplace and ignored if uttered by a less prominent
he had defended stoutly until immediately before his de. personality, contributed to the students' sense of alienation
parture from office. His attacks on the Tashkent settlement from authority. On November 7 student protest in Rawal-
and hints of betrayal and secret agreements both elicited a pindi at the confiscation by the police a few days earlier of
wide response in West Pakistan and alarmed Ayub and his goods purchased by students at the smugglers' bazaar in
colleagues, who preferred that book to remain closed. In Landikotal in the Khyber Pass coincided with Bhutto's ar-
November 1967, instead of aligning himself with one of the rival in the city. Clashes with the police escalated, until fir-
existing opposition parties, Bhutto founded the Pakistan ing occurred in which a student was killed. In the next
People's party (PPP), professedly both Islamic and socialist. few days protest demonstrations and processions occurred
throughout West Pakistan, resulting inevitably in further
22 Bhutto himself makes it quite clear, in his affidavit before the High violence, and on November 10 at a Muslim League mass
Court in Lahore in connection with a habeas corpus petition against meeting in Peshawar a youth attempted to assassinate Presi-
his detention, that his disagreement with Ayub came solely over the dent Ayub. This was the logical result of the overidentifica-
issue of the conduct of the September War and the subsequent Tash·
kent Agreement, not over the domestic policies or behavior of the
tion of the system with Ayub, which had been emphasized
government or its constitutional base (text in Pakistan Times, Feb· during his illness in the previous spring. The government's
ruary 6, 1969). response was the arrest under the Defence of Pakistan Rules

~J I
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"..

266 The Politics of Pakistan Presidential Politics 267

of the "preachers of violence"-Bhutto, Wali Khan of the In early January 1969 the opposition forces once more un-
NAP, and leading members of their respective parties. Assur. dertook the task of devising a basis of agreement among all
ances were promptly given that student grievances would be parties for the ensuing election year. Since 1967 the hostility
met, and on December 1 Ayub announced concessions in re. between the PDM, committed to the restoration of the 1956
gard to examinations, degree standards, eligibility for admis- constitution as a first step, and the Six Point Awami League, "
11,

sion, and elimination of the much disliked provision in the pledged in effect to the creation of a confederal Pakistan, had i'1!

University Ordinances for the forfeiture of degrees as a~ been confirmed on the issue of the unity both of West Paki- I:
11,1

punishment for certain offenses. Nevertheless, activist stu. ,, stan and of the country as a whole. The split in the NAP had
dents in both provinces continued to organize and present,, somewhat clarified the alignment of the Left, bringing under
further demands for educational and political concessions. Bhashani's banner the revolutionary socialist elements aim-
The arrests and violence of November threw the students!' ing at nationalization and social revolution throughout Paki-

I;"i
into the antigovernment campaign, the leadership of which stan, while the Wali Khan party brought together the ethni-
became ever more diverse. On November 17 Air Marshall cally defined provincialist groups, both social democratic and 'fl

Asghar Khan, who had retired as commander in chief of the1 traditional-not to say feudal. Unlike the former, the latter ~I;
air force in summer 1965, announced his entry into politics) NAP was inclined to affiliate with the PDM, but the issue I'

denouncing the government for suppressing democratic val. of the compatibility of Wali Khan's commitment to "Pakh-
ues and liberties, particularly by the maintenance of the, tunistan" with national territorial integrity prevented agree- !!j"
emergency. Asghar Khan's unimpeachable integrity and mili- ment. The PPP added a complication to the political equa- !

tary background made him a formidable addition to the op- tion in that its "Islamic socialist" professions antagonized the i,,
position. S. M. Murshed, former Chief Justice of East Paki-
stan, stepped onto the political stage a few days later, en-·
PDM, particularly the Jamaat, and were only slowly and
with skepticism accepted by Bhashani's NAP. Broadly, there !
!j
visioning himself as a possible presidential candidate. In early was appearing a distinction-not yet a polarization-be- 11
'i
December they were joined by the retired Lt. General Azam tween the Islamic Right and a socialist or "Islamic socialist"
Khan, a former colleague of Ayub who had gained great l Left, with the Six Point Awami League more or less at the
popularity as governor of East Pakistan in 1960-1962. The center. From the Right, the remainder of the spectrum cov-
independents attracted public enthusiasm and were wel- . ered the PDM (the Jamaat, NIP, CML, NDF, and the Nas-
comed by the more conservative parties, especially in Wesd~ rullah Awami League), and the independents; proceeding
Pakistan, but because of their lack of specific policy commit- .! toward the Left were the Wali Khan NAP, the PPP, and the
ments they were regarded with suspicion by the two NAP's i Bhashani NAP. On the autonomy issue the Six Point Awami
and the Six Point Awami League. Their role, therefore, be- League and the Wali Khan NAP took the most extreme
came yet another matter of disagreement hampering the anticentrist positions. Only the Bhashani NAP clearly ad-
effort to forge a larger alliance against the government. vocated boycott of the elections and a mass movement to

,1[
i
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'
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268 The Politics of Pakistan Presidential Politics 269
bring about a complete social, economic, and political change chise, (3) an end to the state of emergency, (4) the repeal of
in the country. To the "leader-studded" PDM and the Wali "black laws" including detention laws, (5) release of political
Khan NAP an election boycott was a means of constitutional prisoners including Mujibur Rehman and Bhutto, (6) the
bargaining, adopted primarily because of the impossibility withdrawal of preventive orders under Section 144 of the
of agreement on an opposition presidential candidate. De- Criminal Procedure Code, (7) the restoration to labor of the
spite his revolutionary rhetoric, PPP chief Bhutto showed right to strike, and (8) the withdrawal of all press restrictions
himself to be essentially a constitutionalist and was willing and the return of Progressive Papers, Limited (the Pakistan
to challenge Ayub on his own ground by contesting the Times), to its original owners. 23 This compromise formula- ,
presidential election, in unilateral defiance of the opposition tion omitted reference to the contentious questions of the ;11·
,

consensus. 1956 Constitution, regional autonomy, and "One Unit" and

After lengthy and delicate negotiations in Dacca the birth avoided all social and economic matters. Because of the latter
of the Democratic Action Committee was announced on omission, Bhashani's NAP (which had not participated in
January 8, 1969. The participating organizations were the the negotiations) did not join, although Bhashani approved
Jamaat, NIP, CML, NDF, Nasrullah Awami League, Wali the DAC boycott decision. The PPP, with Bhutto still in
Khan NAP, Six Point Awami League, and the orthodox detention, remained committed to his presidential candidacy
Jamiat-ul-Ulama-i-Islam. The participation of this last body, and independent political action. The DAC manifesto ended
a principal sponsor of the NIP at its founding, indicated the with a pledge to launch "a relentless non-violent, organized
political reactivization of Muslim religious organizations for and disciplined mass movement for the early, speedy and
the first time since 1953. Asghar Khan and other indepen- complete realisation" of its objectives.
dents supported the DAC without formally participating in The mass upsurge sparked by the DAC in mid-January
it. In an extravagantly phrased manifesto, the DAC de- was neither nonviolent nor disciplined and soon generated
nounced the "autocratic and oppressive one-man dictator- its own momentum based on pent-up social and economic
ship" which "maintains its oppressive power and operates on grievances. A DAC protest day on January 17 began a chain
the basis of widespread detention of political leaders, on a of events that led to police firing in Dacca and the death of
totally unjustified continuation of a state of emergency and a student on January 20, and thereafter to steadily escalating
on a monstrous and ever-increasing imposition of arbitrary violence throughout Pakistan. Student-called protest hartals
laws taking away basic rights and civil liberties," and called (strikes) on January 24 resulted in more violence and the
for a boycott of the scheduled elections at all stages. To bring use of the army in support of the police in Dacca and, during
about the establishment of "full and complete democracy in the ensuing week, in Karachi, Lahore, and other cities, with 11:1
Pakistan and to restore complete political power to the peo- lji
,,J
23Text of the manifesto, from which the quotations in this para- 1,]
ple," the DAC set out eight points: ( 1) a federal parliamen-
graph are taken, in Pakistan Times, January 9, 1969. See page 295 in I!
tary system of government, (2) direct elections by adult £ran- regard to Progressive Papers, Limited.
'i

,11
 270 The Politics of Pakistan Presidential Politics 271

further casualties and destruction of public and private prop- cessive concessions in an effort to get the conference started.
erty. Student grievances concerning fees, examinations, and Bhutto and other prisoners under the Defence of Pakistan
restrictions on student political activity under the University Regulations were released on February 14, the emergency was
Ordinances were supplemented by demands for investigation ended effective February 17, and invitations to the conference
of police conduct, compensation for victims of firing, and were sent to all leaders, including Bhutto, Bhashani, Asghar,
release of the arrested. These were fully endorsed by the and other independents. On February 21 Ayub announced his
legal profession, long the mainstay of the opposition, through "final and irrevocable" decision not to be a candidate at the
bar association resolutions and processions. Beginning on presidential election, in an effort to prove his sincerity and
January 18 with a province-wide demonstration in West break the deadlock. The next day the Agartala conspiracy
1t Pakistan by doctors, other groups-engineers, journalists, case was withdrawn, and Mujibur Rehman and other ac-
postmen, clerks-began increasingly to take to the streets cused were released.
11:I
11
with economic demands. The ulama, who became involved The primary constitutional objectives of the opposition-
ill
after a procession at the end of Ramzan, the Muslim fasting a return to parliamentary federalism and direct adult fran- i
month, on December 20 was roughly handled by the police, , chise-having been implicitly conceded in the President's 1'
' II
were represented in the DAC by the Jamiat-ul-Ulama-i-
Islam. After police pursued rioters into a Karachi mosque
on January 24, denunciations of the "un-Islamic" policies of
statement of February 21, the various parties and leaders fell
out once more. Bhashani consistently maintained his oppo-
sition to a leaders' conference on the valid ground that bar-
I
the government, including the provincial auqaf departments gaining among politicians could only effect a redistribution
and the family laws legislation, became more widespread. At of power and office among the elite and would not solve the
the same time, tensions between the Islamic Right and the genuine social and economic problems of ordinary peasants
socialist Left became more evident. and workers, which had given the mass impetus to the agita-
President Ayub's announcement on February 1 of his will- tion. Bhutto seemed to agree and, expressing suspicion of
ingness to meet opposition leaders to discuss constitutional the motives of the DAC leaders, advocated the resignation
changes "in the larger interest of the people" was greeted of Ayub and his governors and the election of a new Assem-
with relief by DAC leaders. It signified the beginning of the bly to deal with contentious issues. The DAC and indepen-
end for the Ayub system, but the situation was already pass- dent leaders were eager to settle by negotiation as many of
ing beyond the control of the party leaders, whose behavior the outstanding issues as possible and to secure a smooth
was increasingly influenced by mob pressures. Amid continu- transfer of power to a new representative system, but their
ing conflict between urban mobs and the police and army, differences proved too great. The PDM parties generally fa-
a growing number of resignations by Basic Democrats, and vored the restoration of the 1956 Constitution, which presup-
more and more statements by Muslim Leaguers favoring the posed the West Pakistan unit and East-West parity. Mujibur
opposition's constitutional demands, the President made sue- Rehman, supported by his Awami League, opposed the 1956

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272 The Politics of Pakistan Presidential Politics 273

Constitution and, in effect resuming his party's constitu- prerequisite for a round-table conference. 25 While Mujibur
tional demands of 1955, dropped a bombshell by repudiating Rehman agreed to participate in the conference, both Bhutto
parliamentary parity, until then unchallenged in the de- and Bhashani inveighed against negotiation and warned
mands of the various parties. 24 The demand for the dissolu- against efforts to frustrate the "people's demands." Amid 'I
tion of "One Unit," previously voiced primarily by the East ,:II
constant demonstrations and a growing plague of strikes and
Pakistan parties and Wali Khan's NAP, was taken up by a gheraos ("lock-ins"), Bhashani's advocacy of fundamental hI
I!
I
multitude of voices in West Pakistan, with unrestrained and economic and social changes based on "Islamic socialism"
conflicting territorial claims for separate provinces and was expressed in provocative terms. He denied preaching
states. Even in East Pakistan demands were advanced for a violence and blamed the government for any that occurred,
separate province for relatively neglected north Bengal. The but he said that those who opposed the "people" would "not
extent of federal powers, and hence of provincial (or re- be spared" and would be "wiped out," and on one occasion
gional) autonomy, was another area of disagreement between even warned industrialists that the people would "slit their
the Awami League and the PDM parties. Ayub shared the throats and eat them up." 26 Bhutto echoed Bhashani's call
view that the conference (March 10-12) had no mandate to for Islamic socialism in somewhat more guarded terms, and ·.,!_:
'I
!1.
resolve these questions, and on March 13 he announced that in the prevailing highly charged emotional atmosphere both
the Constitution would be amended to restore a parliamen- .I PPP and NAP supporters were involved in street fights with
tary federal system based on direct elections and that all
other issues would be left to a newly elected National Assem- 25The so-called eleven points of the East Pakistan Students' All-Party ii'
11·
bly. This announcement was hailed as a success for the DAC, Cormnit.tee of Action were: (1) fourteen ~emand~ relating to educati?n;
. h was th ereupon d.1sso1ve d b y N asru11 a h Kh an.
wh 1c (2) parliamentary democracy on the basis of umversal adult franchise;
· . .
. . . . . . . (3) a: federal form of government and sovereign legislature; b: federal
The d1smtegrat10n of both political and public authonty powers to be confined to defense, foreign policy, and currency; (4) sub-
during February and March was not halted by the results of federation of Baluchistan, N.-W.F.P., and Sind with regional autonomy
the conference. By early February student organizations- 1 for each unit; (5) nationalization of banks, insurance companies, and
particularly the East Pakistan Students' All-Party Committee j all big industries; (6) reduction in rates of taxes on peasants; (7) fa_ir ),
.
O f A ct10n- a
· d th e m1
h d seize
. .
· ·t·1a t"1ve, opposmg
· nego t.1a t"ion
.
1 wages and bonus for workers; (8) flood-control measures for East Pak1s-
. .
tan; (9) withdrawal of all emergency laws, secunty acts, and other pro-
l
,j
between the oppos1t10n and the government. Both Bhasham hibitive orders; (10) withdrawal from SEATO, CENTO, and Pakistan- l
and, after his release, Mujibur Rehman added to their own
party demands the eleven educational, political, and eco-
nomic demands of the East Pakistan students, the acceptance
U.S. military pacts; and (u) release of all political prisoners including
those under the Agartala conspiracy case. These demands and those of
the PDM, DAC, Six Point Awami League, PPP, NAP (Bhashani), and
I i
,i
i
of which was advanced (by the students and Bhashani) as a N~P (Wali Khan) were conveniently published together in the Pakistan
. Times, February 25, 1969.
2
4 S~eaking in Dacca on February 23, shortly after his release (Pakis- ·1.-.
:_ . 26 Speaking on arrival at Lahore, March 8, 1969 (Pakistan Times,
tan Times, February 24, 1969). 1 March g, 1969; also reported in The Times [London], March 10, 1969). !I!:
11

ii
i
. Ii
\i!i
i'
.........

Presidential Politics 275

274 The Politics of Pakistan
I
followers of Maududi's antisocialist Jamaat. Nor were politi- I
cal leaders spared, for Bhashani himself was attacked in a
Martial Law and the Future of the Parties ill
Political parties were not abolished by the proclamation of i
.,
train in West Pakistan, apparently by young supporters of
Maududi, 27 and in Dacca the general secretary of the PDM, martial law of March 25, 1969, nor by the subsequent mar-
Mahmud Ali, was kidnapped and forced to withdraw re- tial-law regulations. 31 Meetings and processions were for-
marks critical of Mujibur Rehman. 28 By mid-March violence bidden except by permission of martial law authorities
against non-Sindhis had broken out in Sind, and in East (MLR 2 1 ), and strikes, lock-outs, and agitations in industries
Pakistan a jacquerie of murder and burning began to sweep or educational institutions were prohibited (MLR 18).
across north Bengal. The local administration, weak at best, Spoken or written criticism of the imposition or operation
lost its will to function when Ayub abdicated, and its func- of martial law (MLR 6), and the dissemination of "reports
tionaries were terrified and helpless before the mob frenzy. on provincial, sectarian and linguistic basis calculated to-
These developments, together with the burning of the houses wards territorial or administrative dismemberment of Paki-
stan" (MLR 19) were punishable by ten and fourteen years 'i
ii
of ministers during February, gave grim meaning to the East
Pakistan students' earlier ultimatum to Basic Democrats and imprisonment. Subject to these restrictions, which were jus-
tified as necessary to permit a period of quiet in which pas-
l
members of the Assemblies to resign by May 3. 29 Bhashani's 1!
repudiation of the results of the conference, and the Six sions could cool, parties continued to function. Unlike Mirza ill
Point Awami League's determination to continue a "relent- and Ayub in 1958, Yahya Khan made no blanket condemna- jj
less struggle" for its goals fed the unrest. Alarm over the tion of parties or politicians nor did he claim to have a solu- ..
tion to the constitutional problem. His responsibility, he ·1
breakdown of law and order was expressed both by govern-
ment and opposition, each blaming the other for the dete-
riorating situation. It was in this context, with PDM leaders
said, was to tackle immediate economic and administrative
problems and help to create an atmosphere of mutual trust
!
I

accusing Bhutto and Bhashani of inciting the young and and good will. Iill~
!

leading the country into anarchy, 30 that President Ayub con- Such an atmosphere will help in producing national consensus :;111:1,,
cluded that it would be impossible for the Assembly to meet 1'1
on the basis of which a system should be established to satisfy
and for a constitutional transition to take place. He therefore all sections of the people and at the same time safeguard the ]
resigned and handed the country over to the army. integrity of the country. We as soldiers have assumed the re- I;1
sponsibility of creating such an atmosphere. That is the maxi-
27 Pakistan Times, March 15 and 16, 1969. 11
mum that we can hope to achieve. The responsibility of recon-
28 Pakistan Times, March 25, 1969. structing healthy political life in the country must be assumed
29 Pakistan Times, March 1, 1969.
31 Texts of the proclamation and of the martial law regulations
30 In a public meeting at Lahore, March 23, 1969 (Pakistan Times,
(MLR), in Pakistan Times, March 26, 1969.
March 25, 1969).
I

~.

,l
r
--"---"'"--'-'-------------·-------

r�',
.
.
The Politics of Pakistan Presidential Politics 277
and honourably discharged by the people themselves. .The com.
Bhashani was a genuine man of the people with widespread
munity cannot and must not evade this responsibility.32
support, particularly in north Bengal, and was a fervent
According to Yahya it was essential for the parties to work :Muslim with a socialism derived from Quranic egalitarian­
out a consensus on political conduct and behavior before f ull ism. His demagogy was an emotional utopianism for the
political activity could be resumed, and to reach general masses, an anticonstitutionalist appeal for the solution of the
agreement on the basis of a new constitutional system, but he problems of the down-trodden by an immediate transforma­
could not tell them what to do.33 He also let it be known that tion of society through nationalization and expropriation.
a reduction in the number of parties would facilitate a re­ Experience had shown him that elections changed nothing,
turn to normalcy. and he both demanded a boycott and threatened that if any­
The imposition of martial law brought great relief to the one attempted to participate in elections "we will burn his
ordinary population, surfeited with five months of disruption house and crush him." 36 Bhashani's Islamic utopianism had
of daily life, violence, intimidation, and terror, but it could mass appeal in West Pakistan but his supporters there mainly
not have been welcomed across the entire political spectrum. derived their socialism from Marx rather than Muhammad.
On the left, Bhutto and Bhashani had warned on the eve of Bhutto, the elegant product of Berkeley and Oxford, derived
martial law that attempts to "betray" the people and to "sub­ his socialism and his demagogy from a careful sensing of the
vert" their cause would not be allowed to succeed. 34 They political winds, having discovered the appeal of a complex
must have regarded the imposition of martial law as such an of socialism, Islam, and nationalism to the students of West
attempt, although they had been demanding Ayub's resigna­ Pakistan. He had little following in East Pakistan. Through­
tion and the establishment of an interim government. Co­ out his career as an opposition politician he was carefully
operation between their two parties had been pledged in an equivocal in his language, refraining from overcommitment,
all but meaningless pact signed in mid-March, of which only and unlike Bhashani was by inclination a constitutionalist,
the last of the three points had any substance. The points convinced of the utility of elections whether direct or in­
called "for the establishment of democracy of the people on direct. His statements in the summer of 1969 showed a re­
the basis of the recognized demands of the people," "for the turn to more thoughtful and pragmatic analysis, and he went
establishment of socialism in conformity with the ideology so far as to praise the martial-law authorities for laying down
of Pakistan," and for the elimination of foreign influence the condition that parties must work for the integrity of
and withdrawal from military pacts.35 The octogenarian Pakistan and the glory of Islam.37 A leftist alliance between
32 Statement to the press, April 10, 1969 (Pakistan Times, April 11, 36 Speaking to workers at Landhi, Karachi, on March 17, 1969 (Paki­
1969). stan Times, March 18, 1969). Subsequently, after the imposition of
33 Pakistan Times, April 30, 1969. martial law, Bhashani seemed to be willing to participate in elections
34 Pakistan Times, March 25, 1969. if held.
35 Pakistan Times, March 11, 1969.
37 Pakistan Times, Jnne 11, 1969.
 ----------------------------14i I
Ii
I;
i

278 The Politics of Pakistan Presidential Politics 279

Bhutto and Bhashani can only be tactical, to disintegrate Dacca, and of the legislature at Islamabad; procedures of the
when it becomes necessary to pass from generalities to partic. Political Parties Act in regard to crossing the floor to be in-
ular problems. corporated in the constitution, with further provision that
Sheikh Mujibur Rehman's Awami League found its hopes expulsion from or failure to vote with his party shall deprive
for the realization of its constitutional demands postponed a member of his seat; preventive detention to be prohibited;
indefinitely by the return to military rule. As had been the and a State Bank consisting of two separate regional banks
case when the Awami League first appeared on the national with responsibility for foreign exchange and movement of ,ll!j
scene after the election of 1954, its leaders publicly insisted capital. A hint of further negotiation was contained in the '!

II
that their party pledges were immutable: "We are fighting report that the questions of the location of the federal cap-
for the people's rights. We cannot sacrifice them." 38 Hence ital, federal taxation power, and separate foreign exchange
after the round-table conference of March 10-12, 1969, Mu- and trade dealings were adjustable. No reference was made
jibur Rehman insisted that the party would continue a "re- to the role of Islam. The Awami League contended that by 11
lentless struggle" to achieve its goals. In fact the six points of accepting this constitutional framework the aspirations and ,1~
"
1966 were modified by Mujibur Rehman's endorsement of needs of all parts of Pakistan would be met, and the country Ii
11
the students' eleven points, and on March 24 the official would be unified and strengthened rather than weakened.
Awami League proposals showed some flexibility. 39 These On the basis of this program the Awami League can prob- 11!
called for: a federation of two states of East and West Paki- ;I
I ably maintain its strength in East Pakistan and build alli-
stan, the latter being organized as a subfederation of four ances with elements at least of the Wali Khan NAP and of
provinces, with each province and state and the federation the former Nasrullah Awami League faction in West Paki-
to have a parliamentary responsible government; all legisla- stan. i
tures to be elected directly on the basis of population except The strongest expressions of approval of martial law came I
the West Pakistan Assembly, which would be elected by the from the Muslim League segment of the political spectrum, 'II!,,,,
I
,11
four provincial legislatures of the subfederation; federal which was glad to have the demagogy of Bhutto and Bha- I'
!l
powers to be limited to defense, foreign affairs (including shani stopped. 40 Ayub continued to be president of the PML,
citizenship, aliens, and so on), currency, public debt and although the legality of his election to that post was chal-
property of the federation, and salaries of federal officials; a lenged by an East Pakistan faction. On May 14 a new work-
National Finance Commission of six from each state to make ing committee and slate of party officers was announced, on
levies for federal purposes on the two state governments; seat the basis of parity between East and West Pakistan. These
of the federal government and Supreme Court to be in included two vice-presidents from each wing, but both the
as Sheikh Mujibur Rehman, at Lahore, February 24, 1969 (Pakistan 40 See statements by, among others, Abul Quasem, general secretary
Times, February 25, 1969). of the CML, and Syed Hassan Mahmud of the PML, in Pakistan
39 Pakistan Times, March 25, 1969.
I Times, March 27, 1969.

JL
'ti
 -1:
'

1
I
280 The Politics of Pakistan Presidential Politics 281

secretary-general and the treasurer were from West Pakistan. sixteen-member committee. The party's general objectives
Leaders of the CML faction, dissident members of the PML were to ensure the integrity of the country and the political
and Khan Abdul Qaiyum Khan, who in March had an-' and economic rights of the people of all parts of Pakistan,
nounced the formation of the Qaid-i-Azam Muslim League, and to uphold democratic and traditional Islamic values of
were involved in tentative political discussions during the life. In regard to provincial autonomy, the party was com-
summer of 1969. A reunification of the trifurcated Muslim mitted to the terms of the PDM program; the "One Unit"
League may eventuate, providing Qaiyum's demand for the question was to be decided in consultation with the people
abandonment of "One Unit" and parity and the CML com- of the smaller regions of West Pakistan. For the restoration
mitment to the 1956 Constitution can be reconciled with the of normalcy, the PDP advocated a return to the 1956 Con-
i
views of Ayub's supporters. Such a Muslim League, backed stitution. A convention to organize the party and approve a
by the full party treasury acquired under Ayub and a more manifesto was held in August 1969 in Dacca.
authentic enrollment of members than had yet been at- During the anti-Ayub agitation the Jamaat-i-Islami's na-
tempted, could become once more a significant political tional political influence became once more a source of con-
force. troversy. The Jamaat's organization and dedicated workers
The more conservative minor parties of the DAC were the made it the most important component of the PDM, and
first to act seriously on the problem of reducing the number through the Jamiat-ul-Tulaba it was actively involved in the
of political parties. On March 13 Asghar Khan had an- organization of student protest. The Jamaat aroused some
nounced the formation of the Justice party, dedicated to criticism by its opposition to Chinese communism, unpopu-
unity, Islamic values, and the "basic human needs of the lar in the pro-China climate in Pakistan during the 196o's,
poor masses." Organizational activity was forestalled by the and was accused of being pro-American. The Jamaat was the 111,

imposition of martial law, which Asghar could not have ap-

proved in view of his strong statements against the possibility
in the preceding weeks. 41 After lengthy negotiations and con-
source of an antisocialist campaign that resulted, at the
height of the agitation against the Ayub government, in vio-
lent confrontations between partisans of the J amaat and of
I ";,
11
~ :;
sultations, on June 24, 1969, the Pakistan Democratic party the PPP and NAP. Despite the Jamaat's attacks on socialism, j
(PDP), rich in leaders but short on followers, was founded in its economic reform program of 1969 called for nationaliza-
Dacca with the encouragement of Maududi. 42 It united the tion of "basic and key industries" with worker ownership, a
NDF, the Nasrullah Awami League, the NIP, and the Jus- minimum wage of Rs 150 per month, the acquisition of land-
tice party, all of which were dissolved in the none too confi- holdings above 200 acres with fair compensation and the sale
dent hope that their memberships would accept merger into of the acquired land to the cultivators, and the abolition of
the new party. Nurul Amin was elected convenor, with a interest and speculation to "cut away the root of capital-
41 For example, on March 10, 1969 (Pakistan Times, March 11,
ism." 43 This was necessary, according to the Jamaat, to make
1969).

,L.
42 Pakistan Times, June 25, 1969.
43 Pakistan Times, March 23, 1969.

,,1 I
 ,.., I
I II
282 The Politics of Pakistan Presidential Politics 283 !I
!I
possible a free economy and the growth of democracy. Out- many political leaders but rejected by Bhashani and Mujibur I!
lines of reforms in other aspects of national life in conformity Rehman, among others. Even its supporters had reservations ·!I
with Islam were promised in an all-inclusive manifesto. and expected that it would be immediately altered by a new
The meaning of democracy to the Jamaat was questioned National Assembly. The basic and always interlinked issues
after Maududi issued in June 1969 a draft code of ethics for of parity and "One Unit" and the controversy over the dis-
political behavior. 44 He proposed, in general, courtesy and tribution of powers between the federal and provincial gov-
mutual respect for each other's activities among parties, each ernments would therefore dominate in any general election.
pledging not to abuse the opportunities of office for party Some opinion favored the imposition of a constitutional
purposes if elected. The code sought to forbid resort to "un- framework by President Yahya Khan, who hinted at the pos-
democratic and revolutionary" methods, particularly-in sibility in emphasizing that these constitutional disputes
clear reference to Bhashani-forcibly preventing people could not be allowed to become points of electoral conflict.
from participating in the election process. More arguable In late July 1969 political restrictions were relaxed to permit
and controversial, it declared that "nobody is entitled to do party meetings and conventions (but not public meetings or
or say anything repugnant to the ideology of Pakistan i.e. processions), so that the search for political accommodation
Islamic democratic order of life and the solidarity of Paki- could proceed. 46 The popular strength of the differing view-
stan" and stipulated that "no party which does not believe points remained uncertain, with at least nine parties remain-
in the Islamic basis or oneness and solidarity of Pakistan, or ing in the field: the Jamaat, PDP, three Muslim Leagues, the
wants to establish any other system against the democratic Awami League, the PPP, and two NAP's. The Jamaat and
will of our people, should be allowed to take part in the elec- Bhashani's NAP, in their very different ways, were alike in
tions." In view of the Jamaat's elitist political theory and its showing primary concern for social and economic issues and
conception of an Islamic state in which non-Muslims would the reconstruction of society on the basis of Islam, although
have a special status, there is reason to question the implica- only the former offered a genuine program. The other
tions of the terms "Islamic democratic order" and "demo- parties, from Bhutto and Wali Khan on the Left to the PDP
cratic will of our people" when used by the Jamaat. 45 on the Right were primarily concerned with the manipula-
The process of constructing a political consensus based on tion of political institutions and only secondarily with their
the "integrity of Pakistan and the glory of Islam" revealed differing socioeconomic programs and interpretations of
continuing disagreement on basic issues. The restoration in Islam.
some manner of the 1956 Constitution was advocated by 46 Address to the nation by President Yahya Khan, July 28, 1969
(Pakistan Times, July 29, 1969; see also the New York Times of the
44Pakistan Times, June 15, 1969.
same date).
45See letter to the editor, Pakistan Times, June 20, 1969, from Malik
Mohammed Jafar: "Does the Maulana really believe in democracy, in
any known or conceivable sense of the word?" l!i
J
!
11!
i
,11 !
 l
il
Political Forces and National Problems 285
11
11
tonomous bureaucracies-the W APDA's, PIDC's, and the
like-in order to remove additional matters from immediate 11

"party-political" influence. On the whole the system has ..ii

Political Forces
8. worked well enough, but it has broken down when the ac-
cumulation of conflicting demands upon which the party in
and National Problems power has been unwilling or unable to commit itself has
overtaxed the ability of the bureaucracy to find solutions.
A breakdown of the political system resulting in the dis-
placement of "politics" by "government" has occurred on
Along with the continued constitutional controversy and three occasions in Pakistan's first twenty-two years, each time
institutional instability, a political process that must now be under circumstances more grave than the last. On each occa-
regarded as normal has developed in Pakistan. In somewhat sion a nonpolitical (or at least nonparty) leadership based on
oversimplified terms, three major features in this process the permanent public services, military and civil, has made
stand out. First, political parties have concentrated their at- the necessary policy and structural changes to enable the
tention on ideology and constitutional formulas to the prac- bureaucracy to deal with the most pressing demands on the
tical exclusion of all else. Second, the parties have concerned system and to facilitate a return to party politics. The first
themselves with substantive social and economic issues and such breakdown, following the economic crisis of 1953-54,
have made policy commitments only when resisting or ex- did not lead to a constitutional collapse because Pakistan's
ploiting the pressures which aggrieved interests have directed dominion constitution was sufficiently flexible to absorb the
against those in office. Third, the day-to-day resolution of the consequences of the governor general's proclamation of
conflicting demands advanced by interest groups has been emergency and dismissal of both ministers and Assembly. ij
left to the bureaucracy. The distinction traditionally made Political life was not suspended, and under the compulsion
in the subcontinent between government and politics, be-
tween the realm of rules, regulations, and decisions affecting
• of the Federal Court a new Constituent Assembly was
elected which with little delay produced the 1956 Constitu-
'I
ri
rl

'rl
the ordinary lives of the people and the realm of debate tion, cutting the link with the British Crown but retaining
about form and procedure, has been confirmed. The latter the federal parliamentary pattern. In 1958 the recurrence of I
is deemed the proper concern of parties and the former the
responsibility of professional administrators, subject to more
political blockages in the parliamentary system led to a sec-
ond breakdown, but in the changed context it was necessary
'l :
or less random "political" intervention by ministers acting for President Mirza to invoke martial law and to abrogate
to modify established procedures in response to particular- the Constitution in order to displace the cabinet and parlia-
istic pressures. There has been an evident tendency to en- ment. After ousting Mirza, Ayub attempted to use martial
I
large the sphere of the administrator by the creation of au-
284

·~I

......
j
law to lay the groundwork for a new pattern of institu-

t
 ··--~--·- -
286 The Politics of Pakistan Political Forces and National Problems 287
·1:1
,:1

tions. The 1962 Constitution sought to provide a workable law and the creation of a separate system of military courts ::1
[1
alternative to the parliamentary system, bypassing the parties and review procedures to deal with most offenses against 11
'!

and linking the presidential executive directly with the peo- martial-law regulations. The differences between the two
ple. With the resumption of party politics, the new institu- martial-law regimes arise from the changed circumstances.
tions, like the old, proved unable to provide effective chan- In the political collapse of 1958 the "One Unit" and elec-
nels between the political leadership and social and economic torates questions were the only constitutional issues directly
interests. Like its predecessors, Ayub's government lost its involved, and army intervention was genuinely welcomed. In
ability to assess the political significance of interest group 1969 so grave was the political and constitutional breakdown
demands and to respond appropriately. 1 Political and consti- that all constitutional issues were open, and army interven-
tutional disintegration was halted by the second imposition tion was regarded in some quarters as the last act of vested
of martial law and the abrogation of Pakistan's third Con- interests to forestall the revolution. The 1969 regime had
stitution. the advantage of the precedents of 1958-1962 in formulating
The resort to martial law to surmount political and con- its measures, but it also had the disadvantage of a popula-
stitutional crises has come as a natural extension of the ear- tion experienced in living with martial law and hence not as
lier use of proclamations of emergency for that purpose. awed as in 1958. Accordingly it was obliged to be more
Martial law in 1958 and again in 1969 was said to provide severe in its enforcement of martial-law regulations than its
"cover" for the administration, a pseudo-constitutional au- predecessor had been 2 and was less tolerant of judicial chal-
thority both for normal legislation and for fundamental lenge or review of the actions of martial-law authorities or
changes in the constitutional order. Martial-law regulations tribunals.
have aimed at preventing any challenge to the regime and Despite the unpleasant connotations of the term "martial ]11

law," the principal significance of its imposition, both in 11

have also been used to enact ex post facto legislation for the
most part relating to matters such as corruption and smug- i 2 The punishments prescribed for offenses under martial-law regula-
l,11

gling. The jurisdiction of the courts has been altered only tions both in 1958 and 1969 included death, imprisonment up to four- i!
!'
to the extent inherent in the abrogation of the former basic teen years, whipping, fine, and/or forfeiture of property. To the best
1 of my knowledge the death penalty was invoked only against persons
Cf. Gabriel Almond's comment in his foreword to Myron Weiner's ·J..
convicted of crimes such as kidnaping and rape, which were punish-
The Politics of Scarcity (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962),
able under martial-law regulations. One close observer of the Ayub lj'"
p. x: " . . . governmental and bureaucratic elites, overwhelmed by the I
I
martial-law regime was of the opinion that its lack of severity and
problems of economic development and the scarcity of resources avail-
readiness to pardon persons convicted of martial-law offenses was a
able to them, inevitably acquire a technocratic and antipolitical frame 1:1
major failing. See Herbert Feldman, Revolution in Pakistan: A Study
of mind. Particularistic demands of whatever kind are denied legiti-
of the Martial Law Administration (London, 1967). In 1969 relatively
macy. As a consequence, interest groups either become captives of the
long prison sentences, heavy fines, and forfeiture of property were fre-
government and bureaucracy and lose much of their followings or are
quently reported in the press.
alienated from the political system."

. I
~ ....
,11
 ,1
II
Ii
288 The Politics of Pakistan Political Forces and National Problems 289 j
:1
1958 and in 1969, was the replacement of a party leadership some of these organizations put up candidates in elections. It !i
,
11
with one stemming initially from the military services. In is still the case that most of the myriad economic, social, cul-
each instance the original proclamation and a subsequent tural, and religious organizations in the country would feel II
presidential order were recognized by the courts as interim their annual (or more frequent) conferences to be incom-
constitutional instruments, confirming or altering the powers plete without the usual barrage of political resolutions in
and functions of public authorities. In no real sense was addition to those dealing with their more particular griev-
there direct rule by the army, although for the first four ances. These conferences would also be incomplete without
j,
months of the Yahya Khan regime there were no civilian the presence of a high official on the platform to respond to ::!
ministers or governors. Under the watchful guidance of the the views put forward by the organization. Some interest rI:;
military policy makers, the bureaucracy continued in both groups have no identifiable partisan leanings or affiliations, I

periods to receive and respond to the demands and pressures some have links with political parties, and still others occa- I:11
of social and economic interests, drawing on traditions sionally function as parties. The method of action varies, fi
11

formed long before the arrival of politicians in the seats of from the submission of a memorandum or the organization 111
1'tl
power. Structurally the martial-law regimes have been reviv- of a deputation, through the public meeting, to the street '~

als from a viceregal past, without even the feeble legislatures procession and demonstration, to the riot. At this stage, espe-
of the nineteenth century. Ayub's presidential Constitution cially when the issue is an emotional or religious one such as Ii
i!,11
1

was in spirit a return to the 1919 Act, beginning a new pro- the Bengali language movement or the anti-Ahmadi agita-
cess of political education while retaining a fairly free hand tion, political parties are often involved in the formation of
for the administration to deal with the conflicting demands "action committees" or "fronts" to keep up the pressure on i
on the system, unhampered by "politics." Its failure poses for the authority concerned. All of these techniques, combining ·'1·1·11
Yahya Khan the same problem of reforging a link between interest-group and party action, were utilized in the anti- 11

the politician's world of form and procedure and that of the Ayub agitation of November 1968 to March 1969. Interest 11

groups were subjected to the same restrictions as political :I

administrator responding to the daily needs of the increas- Iil
ingly vocal and demanding interests that make up the society. parties under martial law in 1969, with the general curtail-
ment of freedom of expression.
Interest Groups Although it is fairly easy to distinguish the major power
The distinction between political parties and interest structures and pressure groups, it is rather more difficult to
groups is sometimes difficult to make in Pakistan. Long be- evaluate their influence and effectiveness in achieving their
fore independence, organizations of all sorts had adopted the demands. Broadly, groups seeking to influence policy may be
practice of expressing their views on the political and social categorized as "modern" or "traditional" with reference to
issues of the day, and because of the system of representing the manner in which their constituencies are defined. The
interests (labor, landlords, commerce) in the legislatures civil and military services, the legal profession, the student

. 'II
\!
290 The Politics of Pakistan
Political Forces and National Problems 291
community, and urban economic interests-both labor and
and so on-are powerful forces linked closely to the adminis-
management-may be described as modern forces in that
trative bureaucracy but with independent identities and in-
participation in them is largely voluntary. Religious, ethnic,
terests akin to those of the rising industrial families. Retiring
and landlord groupings are traditional in the sense that
members of the public services often move into management
membership in them is usually a matter of birth rather than
positions in private industry. The concern of corporate enter-
choice. Forces in the former category tend to be highly insti-
prise, both public and private, for stability and ordered prog-
tutionalized while the latter groups rely to a greater extent
ress aligns it further in sympathy with the administrative
on more casual and unstructured patterns of action. The line
elite.
cannot be drawn with precision, for there are one or two
Economic interests of the private sector are represented in
quite sophisticated religious organizations, while student
one all-Pakistan association, the Federation of Chambers of
activities, for example, are relatively anarchic. Political
Commerce and Industry (FCCI), organized by direction of
parties normally seek to enlist the support of as many of ,ti
the Ayub martial-law government to consolidate a multitude 'I

these groups as possible and in turn are subject to pressures "

of earlier bodies. In 1961 it included eight regional chambers ii
by them.
In Pakistan the public services constitute political interests
of commerce and forty-one specialized, nationally organized I1~
trade and industrial associations, established under statutory
of unique importance. As a body the Civil Service of Paki-
provisions to ensure that each is representative of its industry i
stan, acting through the CSP Association, is the most power-
and responsibly run and to prevent fragmentation by faction-
ful, as the struggle over the Cornelius Report has shown.
alism. The FCCI is the principal channel of communica-
Other professional organizations of civil servants made them- I

tion between business and government. It nominates man-

selves felt in the agitation of early 1969 in public attacks on
agement representatives on industrial courts and labor ad-
CSP dominance. Not only are officials key channels through
which outside interests apply pressures to the appropriate
visory bodies, and on the central and provincial govern- II
ments' advisory councils for commerce, labor, and natural ,:
decision makers, but through the exercise of their official 'I
resources. These councils associate private enterprise with I
responsibility committed officers can legitimately advance ":,
)I

representatives of public corporations and the bureaucracy

particular policies or programs. From this derives the great :1
in formulating policy, drafting legislation, and evaluating ~
importance of equitable regional representation in the cen-
current arrangements.
tral superior services. The economic needs of East Pakistan
Industrial labor is organizationally weak despite govern-
have been vigorously argued by the growing number of East
ment encouragement of the All-Pakistan Confederation of
Pakistani officials and technical specialists in the Planning
Labour (APCOL), consisting of the East Pakistan and West
Commission and elsewhere with considerably more success
Pakistan Federations of Labour. Only a small proportion of
than by politicians in Assemblies and party meetings. The
the work force belongs to unions, factional strife and schism is
great public corporations-the PIDC's, WAPDA's, ADC's,
common, and many "national" unions are not affiliated with

,.1.,,
'
 1
292 The Politics of Pakistan Political Forces and National Problems 293
APCOL. The lack of unity arises from the poverty, illiteracy, for many of the difficulties of the country, and sought to re-
and lack of sophistication of the workers, the hostility of duce their influence by increasing the use of special tribunals
many employers, and the ineffectiveness in the past of gov- from which lawyers were barred and by eliminating justici-
ernment machinery intended to safeguard workers' interests. able fundamental rights. In return, most lawyers were hostile
Until 1969 industrial courts for the settlement of registration to the 1962 Constitution and predisposed to support opposi-
and recognition disputes or labor-management disputes after tion views. An increasing tendency for bar associations to
the failure of compulsory arbitration were so dilatory as adopt political resolutions in 1968 carried with it the danger
practically to eliminate the right to strike, leaving the that the bar as such-and, indirectly, the courts-would be
workers to the mercy of management with no alternative but identified with a particular political viewpoint, with far-
illegal strikes and political protests. Although the unions reaching implications for the coherence and integrity of the
have generally remained free of specific party alignments, profession. A related problem was noted by the retiring and
political exploitation has been common because many labor incoming Chief Justices of Pakistan in November 1968,
H
leaders are primarily politicians, usually middle-class lawyers, namely the tendency of judges to make speeches "on every
"
holding office in a multiplicity of tiny unions. Among politi- conceivable occasion" and so to obtain undesirable notoriety, ~
cal parties the NAP's and the Jamaat-i-Islami have been the detracting from their neutrality and possibly compromising !

most active in the labor field, the latter linking religious with
economic grievances. Government efforts to limit the propor-
them in regard to subsequently justiciable social or political
issues. 3 ~
tion of outsiders among union officers have been criticized as The student community has had a tradition of activism
restrictions on the freedom of association recognized in ILO extending from the Khilafat and noncooperation move-
conventions. Trade union views are expressed to govern- ments of the 192o's through the Pakistan movement of the
ment and management in the central government's labor 194o's. By definition literate, young, and vigorous, students
standing committee and the Tripartite Labour Conference, are keenly aware of the rights that citizens in a democracy
and in the provincial governments' labor advisory boards. should enjoy, and of the limitations of the society around
The legal profession has always played a leading role in them. In addition, overcrowding in the colleges and univer-
the politics of the subcontinent. Its members have imbibed sities, stereotyped teaching, language problems, lack of li-
through their training a thoroughly Western and individual- brary and study facilities, and the expense of books and fees,
ist political and social philosophy, and a predisposition to have been major and constant difficulties contributing to
challenge the claims of constituted authority. In general they student discontent. Concentrated in major cities, often bored
are committed to the principles of British parliamentary con- s The quoted phrase is from the retirement address of Chief Justice
stitutionalism, supported the Constituent Assembly's claim Fazle Akbar, reported in the Pakistan Times, November 16, 1968; re-
to supremacy in 1954-55, and opposed the overthrow of the lated comments by Chief Justice Hamoodur Rahman were reported
1956 Constitution by Mirza. Ayub tended to blame lawyers in an interview, Pakistan Times, November 17, 1968. i,

I
I
i
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 ..,.
~ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -..... 1

294 The Politics of Pakistan Political Forces and National Problems 295

and eager for extracurricular diversions, students provide academic interests of the students suffer when academic in-
ready material for demonstrations and protests. Some of stitutions are closed and irretrievable time is lost. I
these are spontaneous expressions of feeling on political Closely allied to the student and legal communities is the 11
l
issues, some arise out of valid academic grievances, and most press, which shares their commitment to the ideals of democ- ,,ii
ii
are exploited for political purposes. The leading student role racy with an added professional concern for freedom of -i

in the agitation of 1968-69 was the result of an explosive speech and expression. The press has had to contend with a
combination of all three factors. number of handicaps, including poor communications and
:1:1
A major shortcoming of the political system is the lack of newsgathering facilities, scarcity and high cost of newsprint, 11
regular and established channels through which students can and poor wages and working conditions for journalists. Wage 111!
express their views directly to the provincial and central boards established under 1960 legislation have improved the I

governments. Occasionally a minister or a senior official will newspaperman's lot, but in doing so have added to the eco- 11:i
address a student conference and will hear opinions and com- nomic burdens of the newspaper managements. The eco-
plaints on diverse subjects. Rather than making a serious nomic weakness of many papers has made them unduly sub-
assessment of their problems, the normal government re- ject to pressures from private backers or, more commonly,
sponse to student unrest is to advise them to concentrate from governments by their granting or withdrawal of ad-
on study and not to be "led astray." This attitude is made vertising. In 1959 Progressive Papers, Limited, publishers of
the easier because student organizations, like organizations the Pakistan Times and other periodicals, was expropriated
in other segments of the society, are usually weak and fac- by the martial-law regime under the Security of Pakistan
tion-ridden and hence unable to speak persuasively in a Act, on the ground of its subordination to foreign (Soviet)
united voice in the interest of the student community. The interests, and sold at auction. 4 After the termination of mar-
Muslim League's failure to establish healthy links with the tial law a National Press Trust (NPT) was established in
student community during the 196o's allowed the govern- 1964 by a group of businessmen with implicit central govern-
ment's case to go undefended and left the field open for ment support, to provide a sound economic basis for the pub-
II :,, 11
dedicated opposition groups such as the Jamiat-ul-Tulaba. lication of newspapers devoted to "national progress and
Once student unrest had moved into the streets, the authori- solidarity." The NPT was much criticized by the opposition,
ties were compelled to stand firm for "law and order," with and its acquisition of, among others, the Morning News of
disastrous results when police firing and loss of life occurred.
As had been the case in the anti-Muslim League movement 4 Progressive Papers, Limited, was owned by Mian Iftikharuddin, a
wealthy member of a well-connected Punjabi political family, who died
in East Pakistan in the early 195o's, the government was
in 1962, and his son Arif Iftikhar. Both father and son were prominent
made to appear oppressive and tyrannical and the entire stu- in the NAP, which was deprived of a powerful organ by the enforced
dent community was mobilized in a campaign for "democ- sale. A useful review of the press in Pakistan during and after the Ayub
racy." Whatever the political result of such agitations, the martial law is contained in Feldman, op. cit., App. VI, pp. 226-230. ,11!:

~I
 ili(

Political Forces and National Problems 297

296 The Politics of Pakistan i''!
Pakistan Observer of Dacca continued a vehement opposi- ,,:11
I•

Dacca and Karachi and Progressive Papers was regarded as a 'i

tion to the Ayub government throughout the post-1962
front for government control. I,,!
period. i!
In fact the press in Pakistan is not government-controlled,
Politically inspired official action against the press is not
if that is taken to mean that the papers are sycophantic and
the only important threat to press freedom. The law of con-
publish only what the government wants them to publish.
tempt of court is very strict and imposes severe limitations
Government control over the publication of books and pa-
on reporting and comment. Legislatures have been extremely
pers in the subcontinent has always been concerned with the
sensitive to press criticism, on the ground that the repre-
problem of the impact of misleading or distorted reporting
sentatives of the people should be above challenge. The 1963
in a largely illiterate society which highly esteems the written
ordinances were in part elicited by the government's desire
word. The registration of presses has been prescribed for
to prevent partial and misleading reports of legislative and
many years, with provision for security deposits to ensure
court proceedings and other official materials by requiring
financial responsibility and to prevent scurrility. Various
publication in full. This formidable requirement was later
other restrictions are possible under the Criminal Procedure ti
relaxed to require merely that reporting be "fair and reason-
Code and the preventive laws dealing with public order, and !I
ably correct." Since 1963 the press has policed itself through
these restrictions are subject to challenge in the courts. When 11:i
[II
a "court of honor" which hears complaints of unethical con-
the Press and Publications Ordinances were promulgated in 11
duct brought against papers by government or offended in-
1963 a principal reason for the nationwide protest organized ti
dividuals or interests. A grave menace to freedom has been
by the Council of Pakistan Newspaper Editors and the Paki-
mob intimidation, particularly by students displeased with
stan Federal Union of Journalists was a clause providing that
newspaper policies. Recent examples were the burning of
appeals against restrictive action by the government should
NPT newspaper premises in Dacca on January 24 and of a
be heard by a special tribunal rather than by the regular
Lahore paper on January 27, 1969. Party-inspired campaigns ,,;j
courts. The government was forced to yield to the extent of
of intimidation against individual journalists have also oc-
providing opportunity for a hearing before action could be
curred.5 Despite these difficulties, the Pakistani press, on its
taken. Restrictive powers can be used to intimidate and have
own initiative or inspired by an indignant letter to the editor,
been invoked by past governments to silence particular pa-
can be both enterprising and muckraking. At its best, in :1
pers, but to do so on a large scale is self-defeating and merely :1
Dawn, the Pakistan Times, and the Urdu Nawa-i-Waqt, it
provokes opposition. Prior to 1969 the only period of sub- 11!
can be very good indeed and at its worst no worse than I
stantive restrictions on reporting of matters of political in-
scandal sheets known elsewhere in the world.
terest was under martial law from 1958 to 1962, and at least
In a sense the military-as in Western countries, an ex-
during the first years the press fully supported the regime.
5 See resolution of the Pakistan Federal Union of Journalists, re-
Actions against certain papers during the emergency of
ported in Pakistan Times, July 5, 1969.
1965-1969 did not intimidate the press at large, and the

,11
 - ~ -
~1
298 The Politics of Pakistan Political Forces and National Problems 299
tremely powerful interest in itself-provides a link between delicate balancing of tribal interrelationships in the Fron-
the modernizing and traditional forces in the society. Army tier. These groups dominated the legislatures prior to 1958,
recruitment patterns in West Pakistan have developed inti- in the style of eighteenth-century England. Socioeconomic
mate links over generations with the rural areas and with developments over the succeeding decade brought about im-
particular clans and families. The army (and to a different portant changes in the context of politics, with a rapid in-
extent the other services) is a socializing and modernizing crease in industrialization and urbanization, the land reform
force, providing basic literacy and technical and leadership of 1959 and the subsequent agricultural revolution, and the
training to the men and maintaining contact with them politicization of the villages through the Basic Democracy
after retirement through regimental reunions and ex-service- system. The great families remain influential, but future
men' s economic development schemes. Land allotments to trends will be toward the decline in effectiveness of the old
retired commissioned and noncommissioned officers are in- ties of blood and economic obligation and their replacement
tended to provide energetic and stable leadership in newly by more personal and local alliances such as have long existed "I1
colonized barrage areas. in East Pakistan.
In West Pakistan the traditional authority structure has East Pakistan has never in modern times had a social struc- I
i1·
w
,1
been a network of landlords, clan and tribal chiefs, and ture like West Pakistan's, and with the elimination of the :1,
religious leaders-the pirs and custodians of shrines. Often zamindari system the dominant rural class disappeared. Ben- IiI:.
these categories overlapped. The Punjab Unionist party was gali politics has been in overwhelming degree the preserve of
11
built on an alliance of rural potentates against the urban urban lawyers and teachers from "respectable" middle-class
middle class, while politics in Sind could be described as a families, connected by marriage, college ties, and local patri-
struggle between rival "feudal" factions, in several important otism based on their home district or even subdivision. Lo-
i'
instances led by religious figures. In the Frontier, politics
was essentially a struggle between greater and lesser khans,
cally influential peasant families with ties to members of the
political class link the latter with factions in the rural areas.
Ii
1:11

with the non-Muslim urban interest thrown into the balance The Basic Democracy system and rural economic change is i
prior to independence. After partition and the influx of altering the relationships between the rural petty notables, 1111
:I
refugees from India the situation began to change in Punjab who dominate the unions, and the urban political class, j
and Sind because of the new urban concentrations without themselves now challenged by the town proletariat. It may ti

loyalties to the established territorial magnates. Muslim

League politics-and Republican, in due course-were still
built on alliances and rivalries of Legharis, Daultanas, Qizil-
well be that as West Pakistan moves from a feudal to a more
personal style of localized political relationships, East Paki-
stan will move from the latter to something akin to a bargain-
iI
•I
,i
bashes, Langarials, Tiwanas, and other families and tribes ing system between different classes. ;I
in Punjab, of Talpurs and Khosos, pirs and makhdums in A further dimension of political action is the appeal
11!
Sind, of Mazaris, Bugtis, and Maris in Baluchistan, and the based on ethnic identity. This underlay the Bengali-language

l . II:
<i!:
 ~11
\iii

300 The Politics of Pakistan Political Forces and National Problems 301
:1
movement and also the East Pakistan autonomy drive, with Shia, and Ismaili community organizations, are concerned
the latter's stated and unstated antipathies to non-Bengalis more directly with social welfare and education but could li
in the administration and in the business world. In times of under appropriate circumstances become politically in- l
political stress non-Bengalis, especially the Urdu-speaking volved. The debate concerning the compatibility of socialism
Bihari immigrant laboring class, have been a vulnerable and Islam that developed in 1969 foreshadows a new con-
scapegoat for popular frustrations. In West Pakistan the troversy on the meaning of the Islamic state, one that could
anti-"One Unit" agitation in the non-Punjabi areas is es- violently disrupt the community and force a general taking
sentially based on ethnic exclusivity. In Sind in 1969 it took of sides.
the form of vigilante action to drive out non-Sindhi settlers ii
in the barrage areas, particularly Pathans and Punjabis, who The Political Process: From Martial Law to Martial Law I'
I

were considered to have deprived the Sindhi landless of their In the interplay of parties and social and economic forces I,
Ii
birthright. A more constructive use of the ethnic appeal is in the Pakistani political process, ideological and personal
11:i
seen in the societies founded to foster regional languages and threads are closely interwoven. As yet party politics concerns :I
literature, dance, and music, which act as pressure groups in
educational and cultural matters and which sometimes come
only a fairly small although growing proportion of the popu-
lation. The great majority are concerned with the conditions
i
into conflict with orthodox Islamic groups. of their livelihood and with securing justice from the local
11
Finally, religious interests must be reckoned with politi- administration, and have little interest in or comprehension iii
cally. Christian, Hindu, and Buddhist organizations are now of the form and policies of governments. Political ideologies
primarily concerned with educational and cultural matters, influence an elite, but personal ties extend throughout the
and with the defense of community interests against Islamic society, affecting every interest group, and the ideologies are
extremists. Apart from the Jamaat-i-Islami, Muslim religious important insofar as they are reinforced by personal relation-
organizations have not been politically prominent since the ships. Because ideologies are seldom consistent and Pakistani
failure of the anti-Ahmadi movement in 1953 deprived them leaders seldom rigid in their adherence to them, alliances of ;;
I'
of credibility and respectability. The two principal organiza- expediency including both parties and organized interests 1t.!;
,I
tions of ulama, the Jamiat-ul-Ulama-i-Islam and the Jamiat- occur from time to time when leaders believe circumstances j
i
ul-Ulama-i-Pakistan, retained influence in the rural areas, to be sufficiently compelling. Pakistani parties have typically ,l
l
which continue to be intensely conservative and strongly in- been limited to a class of self-designated "leaders" and "polit-
fluenced by local saints and mosque functionaries. By their ical workers" whose alliances in power or in opposition have l
participation in the anti-Ayub agitation of 1969 the Jamiats little relevance to the actual interests of the ordinary citizens
regained a measure of political prestige among the urban who are recruited to serve, as in a stage army, in the proces-
and more educated population. Other Islamic societies, for sions and meetings that constitute the political struggle.
example the Anjuman-i-Himayyat-i-Islam and the Ahmadi, Much the same can be said for many formal interest-group

't
302 The Politics of Pakistan Political Forces and National Problems 303

organizations, with all-Pakistan pretensions and a handful of tion of his views in accordance with political realities. His I
members. Genuine mass support is won by the ability of a dependence on official and sychophantic information pre- 111

Jinnah or an Ayub to inspire public confidence-and the lat- vented him from appreciating the changes that had followed '.I
11:i
ter did do so in his early years in office-or by the ability of upon the reforms enacted between 1958 and 1962. Taking
!I
a Fazlul Huq or a Bhashani to exploit popular grievances advantage of the immobilization of vested interests, the Ayub
against authority. The mobilization of interests and the con- martial-law regime had appointed a series of investigating
struction of personal alliances, not large-scale ideological commissions to study obvious national problems. A greater
conversion, is the key to effective political action. or lesser degree of reform had followed in many spheres:
The upheaval that overthrew the Ayub system was a mani- agriculture, land tenure, public administration and finance,
festation of dissatisfaction among a wide variety of interests education and labor relations. This dose of very moderate
and only in part the result of the political leadership of the revolution facilitated the rapid economic development of the
opposition parties. Despite their continuous agitation since 196o's, in consequence of which new stresses and strains ap-
1962 over the issues of parliamentary government, adult peared. New vested interests developed, and the Ayub gov-
franchise, and provincial autonomy, the politicians had little ernment, having given high priority to economic growth,
impact until social and economic grievances produced a tended to regard demands for further change as "disruption-
general atmosphere of discontent. Even so, only when the is t," to be disregarded or, if possible, suppressed. Thus, for
grievances of the offended interests began to be expressed in- example, labor and university legislation was utilized to re-
dependently in the streets did the agitation take on real sub- strict the activities of workers and students rather than to
stance. The government's loss of touch with popular feeling serve their interests.
resulted in part from the hierarchical nature of the system, By 1969 the Pakistan that in 1958 had welcomed the end I
11
which imprisoned Ayub within the bureaucracy, in part of party politics and the advent of a forceful government had
from the failings of the Muslim League, which deprived him undergone many changes. The relative stagnation of the
of alternative channels of information, and in part from his 195o's was followed by rapid economic growth, but the dis- 11
estrangement from the political opposition, which prevented tribution of the rewards of greater national wealth was far
1:1
his heeding and evaluating their criticisms correctly. In these from even. The distance between poor and rich became more
circumstances, the centralization of powers and independence evident, with a larger, more affluent upper middle class and :/
of the executive under the 1962 Constitution, designed to increasing concentration of wealth and economic power in
avoid the confusion and delay of the parliamentary system, relatively few hands-the "twenty families" so often at-
:j
made it both unresponsive and inflexible. tacked from political platforms. The interprovincial dispar- ,1

The inflexibility of the presidential system was paradox- ities disclosed in economic statistics were obvious to the j
,i!
ical, considering Ayub's explicit recognition that constitu- casual observer moving from Karachi or Lahore to Dacca. i;

l
tions must be subject to change and his repeated modifica- Within East Pakistan far-reaching improvements in adminis- :I11:
:I
!Ii
11

~dI
I
I

i
304 The Politics of Pakistan Political Forces and National Problems 305
I

tration and communications laid the groundwork for growth, tive laws by the government was, in a political sense, ineffec- !I
but devastating floods and cyclones year after year had dis- tive and merely antagonized further segments of the popula-
t1II
astrous effects on the province's economy and on the lives of tion. As a result, demands for the elimination of preventive
millions of Bengali cultivators. The resulting sense of despair detention and other restrictive laws were prominent in the
and frustration in East Pakistan at the inability of govern- agitation for constitutional change.
ment to "do something" was paralleled in both provinces by One remarkable aspect of the attack on the presidential
mounting dissatisfaction in the new industrial cities among system in the anti-Ayub campaign was the great value at-
workers caught between the pressures of low wages for long tached to the principles of parliamentary democracy. Agita-
hours and rising prices for poor goods. The Basic Democracy tions elsewhere in the developing world, and youth move-
councils proved inadequate to mediate these pressures to the ments in the parliamentary democracies of the West, are con-
administration, since in urban areas the union committees temptuous of parliament and seek its overthrow. In Pakistan
were rootless and ineffective and in the rural areas they the entire spectrum of opposition parties, with the possible
tended to be dominated by the more prosperous villagers. exception of the Jamaat-i-Islami on the right and Bhashani's
However, the very existence of the 1962 constitutional order NAP on the left, seem committed in principle to representa-
brought about changes in the political context. The Basic tive parliamentary democracy. Despite Ayub's plea for a pat-
Democracy and presidential elections contributed to the tern of institutions based on indigenous circumstances and
politicization of the country, as did, in an unanticipated needs, the educated elite seems to regard British parliamen-
way, the sustained and vocal opposition to the presidential tary democracy as an ideal from which any departure is to be
system maintained by persons of prestige and stature. regretted. The experience of 1947-1958 shows that unmodi-
:
Despite the abuse and rhetoric of the opposition, the Gaul- fied British parliamentarism does not correspond with politi- i
list presidential system under Ayub was not a dictatorship cal and social reality in Pakistan; the experience of 1962-
1969 suggests that a presidential system does not permit an
in any but a pejorative sense. The freedom with which the
opposition attacked the government, both verbally and phys- adequate sense of political participation and tends to isolate
!'1i,Il
'11
ically, was refutation in itself of such charges. The emergency the President. Some compromise arrangements, profiting 11 111
,,I
,,1
of 1965-1969, with the vast powers it gave the executive, from the lessons of both periods on these and other constitu-
tional issues, would seem to be in order.
i
was unable to prevent the agitation that ultimately caused i
The lack of constitutional consensus in March 1969 was
Ayub to resign. Even apart from the question of justiciable
fundamental rights, the Constitution (specifically Article 98) Ayub's justification for inviting the army to assume power. I
was interpreted by the High Courts and Supreme Court to The administrative collapse brought on by the avalanche of
permit closer judicial scrutiny of official action than had demands for wage increases and structural changes in many
been possible ever before, and this jurisdiction was exercised economic and social institutions could not be dealt with un-
by the courts throughout the emergency. The use of restric- less the constitutional controversy were ended. This Yahya

'
306 The Politics of Pakistan Political Forces and National Problems 3°7
Khan accomplished, by imposing martial law to freeze the given by the economic policies of the Ayub government, re-
constitutional situation while immediate problems were re- sulting in an increasing identification of the government with
solved. As had been the case in 1958, measures to deal with big business. In a direct attack on this pattern, the new govern- !lfi
corruption and tax evasion and to screen government ser- ment published draft legislation providing for the regulation 1111
vants for improperly acquired wealth were among the first of the securities market and for the creation of a Monopoly
martial-law regulations and orders. Some senior officials were Control Authority to prevent "concentration of economic
retired, and committees were appointed to study administra- power, growth of monopolies and unfair trade practices." 7
tive matters such as financial procedures, the decentraliza- The immediate interests of the working class were dealt with in
tion of West Pakistan, and the organization of the police. a new labor policy, formulated after tripartite discussions with
The first major full-scale policy statement was that on educa- labor and management representatives and published on July
ional reform and reorganization (see Chapter 2), issued on 5, 1969. 8 The new policy, which recognized that "the worker
11
July 3, 1969, along with draft legislation. By dealing compre- has not had a fair deal in the past," set minimum monthly
ij
hensively with the educational system the regime intended wages for unskilled labor at Rs 115 to Rs 140 (an increase of
Ji
to bring it into line with the egalitarian social principles of about 30 per cent), guaranteed the right of workers-including
Islam and at the same time to eliminate the major causes of government employees-to join unions and reduced the !J
student discontent and thus to detach them from the forces number of essential services in which strikes were forbidden, I!'j

of unrest. provided a new conciliation and arbitration procedure, and

Responding to the evident social and political strains established a labor welfare fund supported by government
caused by the rapid economic growth of the preceding years, and private employers to finance housing and other services.
the martial-law regime also introduced measures to increase Finally, the central and provincial· budgets for 1969-70 in-
the emphasis on the equitable distribution of wealth. Ac- creased social-sector expenditures and introduced tax changes
cording to one source, in 195g-at the start of the era of ex- benefiting consumers and encouraging investment in East
pansion under Ayub-thirty families controlled industry Pakistan, which was allotted 53 per cent of all development
contributing 3 per cent of the gross domestic product; fifteen expenditures. Whether the martial-law authorities would
families owned three-quarters of the shares in all banks and also undertake further land reform measures in West Paki-
insurance companies. 6 Free rein to these tendencies had been stan, for example by lowering the maximum holding to 250
acres, remained to be seen.
6 Gustav F. Papanek, Pakistan's Development: Social Goals and Pri- The Yahya Khan martial-law regime of 1969 was pro-
vate Incentives (Cambridge, Mass., 1967), pp. 67-72. According to a fessedly more temporary and less interested in new political
report in the Pakistan Times, June 21, 1969, alluding to statements by
Dr. Mahbubul Huq of the Planning Commission, the "twenty families"
or constitutional directions than the Ayub regime of 1958.
owned 60 per cent of all major manufacturing industry and controlled 7 Texts in Pakistan Times, July 1, 1969.
an even larger proportion of other sectors of the economy. s Pakistan Times, July 6, 1969.
I
l \
 1
308 The Politics of Pakistan
Political Forces and National Problems
3°9
Its principal concern was the solution of immediate social have insisted on perfection in terms of a party ideology, and
and economic problems in such a way as to defuse them po- the result has been continual agitation and institutional un-
litically and permit an approach to constitutional issues in a certainty. Many groups cherish the conviction that once
calmer atmosphere. The nature of the problem facing the enlightened by the appropriate ideology the entire popula-
country was stated as follows: tion will rally together, leaving only the "enemies of Islam,"
No basic constitutional changes could however be enforced by "disruptionists," or "anti-people" elements beyond the pale.
decree. While electoral preparations go on, the political parties, This tendency may be derived in part from the Islamic
instead of hurling vituperatives at one another, should be per- ideal of unity of belief and action, translated into the politi-
suaded to get together to reach consensus on a fresh or amended cal sphere and accepted even by those who are only nomi-
Constitution answering the requirements of party discipline, gov- nally Muslims. It has been true of the Muslim League and
ernmental stability and social justice. A durable constitution is of groups as diverse as the Jamaat-i-Islami and the Commu-
not imposed by one region upon another or by one faction upon nists, while every successive opposition formation has arro-
the entire country; it must embody the largest measure of agree- gated to itself the sole right to speak for "the people." Far
ment among people's chosen representatives on a system of gov-
from uniting the various political forces, this one-party ideal
ernment emerging from the national background and reflecting
divides them further, for each envisions a different constitu-
national priorities. The task should brook no further delay.
There can be no illusion about where this country can be landed tional order based on its own ideology. Parties not in power i~
by party strife, political vacuum, perpetual framing and abroga- seek not to advance alternative policies but to alter the con-
tion of Constitutions, and the establishment of Martial Law as stitutional framework to their own advantage. Those in
the normal pattern of administration.9 power regard their critics with suspicion and refuse to credit
them with either honesty or sincerity. Since each group be-
The Constitutional Future: Is Martial Law Normal? lieves itself to have a monopoly of virtue, cooperation is al-
The quest for constitutional consensus in Pakistan is se- most as difficult between groups in the opposition as between
verely handicapped by the desire for instant solutions, for the opposition and the party in power. I:
111'

panaceas-a favorite political term-for the ills of society. Despite the apparent emphasis on ideological commit- I
i,-
Alone among political leaders of the post-Jinnah era, Ayub ment-or perhaps because of it-Pakistani parties are ex-
Khan refused to deal in absolute answers and infallible in- tremely dependent on personal allegiances. Even the Jamaat,
stitutions, insisting that problem solving requires time, pa- with its rigid ideological base, would collapse without
tience, and the adjustment of theories to social and political Maududi. The Muslim League was strong and factionalism
realities, and appealing to reason rather than emotion. Others suppressed under Jinnah, less so under Liaqat, and then i!il
disintegrated under his successors. The United Front of East 11:
9 Abdul Majid, "The Test of the Merger Pudding," Pakistan Times, Pakistan was the creation of Fazlul Huq, Suhrawardy, and
July 3, 1969. i1
Bhashani and fell apart when they disagreed. The NDF, 11i
di

l .
i!l
11:
iJ
1:
\[I1 I
 r i

310 The Politics of Pakistan Political Forces and National Problems 311
COP, PDM, and DAC have all been alliances based on mo- traditional mores of Indo-Islamic society in their particular
mentarily compatible personalities and their individual fol- Bengali, Sindhi, Punjabi, or Pathan manifestations. Between
lowings. The Awami League and the NAP have always the dominant elite and the traditional mass is the indefinite
claimed to be popular parties, but personal rivalries more but large and growing bloc of those who, under the influence
than doctrinal differences have caused successive schisms. of the Western impact, have been shaken away from the
The post-1962 Muslim League was transformed from a col- traditional system and are no longer subject to its sanctions,
lection of factions into a united party by the leadership of but who still cannot be said either to share the values of
Ayub, and began to disintegrate when he lost his grip on Western democracy or to have agreed upon an effective
power. The CML was from the start a monument to the per- Islamic value structure. None of these various elements in the
sonal interests of its leaders, and like it the PDP was the society can fully understand what motivates the others, nor
creation of leaders who were unable even to command the can the moral sanctions of one control the conduct of mem-
ii
loyalty of all factions of their former parties. In short, per- bers of another in the social or in the political sphere. The i ,1
sonality clashes compound the ideological fragmentation of preservation of formal democratic institutions therefore rests I Ii
the political community. on a very precarious base.
The basic weakness in Pakistan has been the lack of a The importance of the Islamic issue in the political and
firm set of shared values in the society. Democracy is a sys- constitutional debate is that it seeks to come to grips with
tem under which the members of a society have freedom of the basic problem of consensus. Unfortunately Islam has
choice: freedom to choose between alternative courses of proved to be a divisive rather than an integrating force, in
action or solutions to problems, and accordingly freedom of that various schools of thought have been advanced in ways
discussion upon which to base the choice. In turn, free dis- that have led to further alienation and antagonism between
cussion implies agreement on the legitimacy of differing groups. The recently awakened controversy concerning Is- I.,
viewpoints, and agreement by the minority to accept the lam and socialism is an example, although the debate could I'
:
decisions of the majority as their own and to attempt to prove to be healthy and constructive if it were possible to
11
change them only through further discussion. All this pre- keep it within reasonable bounds. The educational policy
supposes common values, a framework of things that are of the martial-law regime in 1969, in putting renewed em- il
"done" and things that are "not done" which will restrain phasis on Islam as a vehicle of national integration and in jU
persons from abusing their power-be it economic, social, or moving to diminish the hitherto powerful influence of for-
political-to curtail freedom of discussion and choice or to eign Christian institutions, recognizes the critical impor- I
'j
set aside the decisions of the society. The impact of modern tance of the schools in closing the gaps in a society in which 1
education has created a ruling elite with at least an academic 45 per cent of the population is below fifteen years of age.
familiarity with and commitment to the moral values of lib· The lack of consensus is revealed most graphically in the
eral democracy, but the mass of the people adhere to the I
federal issue. Demands for separate provincial entities in i

_l j

~11: I
312 The Politics of Pakistan Political Forces and National Problems 31 3
West Pakistan and for virtually unlimited autonomy for sumption that a system he regarded as unworkable by Hindus
East Pakistan reveal a deep sense of mutual distrust, which and Muslims together would be workable by Muslims alone
is particularly evident in the inflexible stand of the Awami has not received much substantiation in the Pakistani experi-
League since 1954 on the question of limiting federal pow- ence. Parliamentary government permits a broader sense of
ers to defense, foreign affairs, and currency. East Pakistani participation than is possible in a single-executive presiden-
fears and demands have been dogmatized with an ideological tial system, but only if there is sufficient party stability to
justification by reference to the Lahore Resolution of 1940, maintain an effective cabinet in office for significant periods.
although it seems clear that the latter was superseded by the Unless a remarkable conversion to pragmatism occurs, it
reference in the Delhi Resolution of 1946 to one united does not seem that there will be a political consensus upon
Pakistan. Awami League demands for the elimination of which a stable party system can be built or an effective repre-
federal taxation powers do not seem consistent with the sentative government can function.
League's declared objective of a strong and united Pakistan. In the absence of agreement, the only alternative is the
The repudiation of parity by East Pakistanis and their in- imposition of a political consensus. In principle the agency
sistence on the dissolution of West Pakistan are further indi- for such an imposition could be a powerful party or political
cations of distrust, which seem sure to be countered by a movement, a foreign power by means of conquest, or an
renewal of the electorates controversy and the argument over internal force of some kind. The lack of the first up until the
the merits of a bicameral legislature to guard against a re- present time has already been made clear, and the second is
gionally biased parliamentary majority. by definition beyond the limits of domestic politics. The
The insistence of Pakistani politicians on the restoration third of these possibilities has become a reality in Pakistan.
of a parliamentary system poses grave problems for the so- Preventive and restrictive powers are essentially instruments
ciety, since agreement among political leaders goes no fur- for the imposition of limits-a legally defined consensus-
ther. The system of parliamentary democracy developed in on the behavior of individuals or groups within the society
England works on the basis of conventions and understand- who do not accept or recognize the established legal norms.
ings, the agreement of gentlemen that public business will Emergency powers apply the same principle to situations in
be conducted in a particular way and that gentlemen may which the political and institutional norms embodied in the
disagree yet still work in the public interest. Such agreement Constitution are threatened. Pakistan's political system has
has not existed in Pakistan; in the past the conventions im- in effect recognized martial law as an acceptable, if not yet
ported from Britain have been overthrown and the morality normal, extension of emergency powers for the purpose of
of gentlemen abandoned, and disagreement has been re- overcoming constitutional deadlocks in the transition from
garded as sedition or worse. Prior to independence Muslim one stage of development to the next. By an implicit negative
leaders were skeptical about the suitability of parliamentary consensus, most elements in the society appear to rely upon
democracy in the subcontinent, and Jinnah's apparent pre- the professional and nonpolitical services to follow the tradi-

Ii,
,al
',~,1
 T~---·--------·-- - - ~-
314 The Politics of Pakistan

tions of their colonial predecessors and to enforce the broad

limits within which political controversy, consistent with the
integrity of the state, may proceed. Ayub imposed such a
consensus under a very mild martial-law regime and intro-
duced a Constitution intended to embrace both unity and
diversity, hoping it would provide stability and permit a
Glossary
broad agreement to evolve through the Basic Democracies.
The circumstances of the collapse of the presidential system ,1;i

indicated that in 1969 the society was still not sufficiently

coherent to be able to work out its problems within a given anna: one-sixteenth of a rupee.
constitutional order. Yahya Khan cannot avoid the obliga- barrage: a structure that obstructs river flow to divert water for
tion of laying down ground rules for the future, although the irrigation purposes, differing from a dam in not creating a
reservoir.
difficulties of imposing constitutional solutions on an awak-
bhakti: worship, adoration; devotionalism.
ening populace are mounting. bigha: an East Pakistan land measure; one-third of an acre.
crore: ten million.
Hadith: an anecdote or tradition concerning the Prophet or his
Companions; also, the body of such anecdotes or traditions.
imam: one who leads the prayer.
jihad: holy war; to exert one's self "in the path of Allah."
khilafat: caliphate; rule by a caliph (khalifa).
makhdum: a holy man (see pir).
mujahid: one who participates in jihad.
pir: a holy man or saint, usually a Sufi.
i
polder: a tract of submerged land reclaimed by the use of dikes :·111

and dams.
qadi: a Muslim judge.
Quran: God's revelation to the Prophet Muhammad; the Koran.
raj: rule or government.
Shariah: the law of Islam.
Shia: the smaller of the two major sects of Islam; originally, the
followers of Ali, the Prophet's cousin and son-in-law.
Sufi: a follower of one of the mystic schools of thought within
Sunni Islam.
1115

,11'
 .,.
316 Glossary
Sunnah: exemplary or normative tradition and practice of the
Prophet and the orthodox community.
Sunni: orthodox Islam; the larger of the two major sects.
tehsil: a revenue jurisdiction; in West Pakistan, the principal
administrative unit below the district.
thana: a police jurisdiction; in East Pakistan, the lowest general Selected Bibliography
territorial administrative unit.
ulama: those who are learned in the law of Islam; singular, alim.
waqf: a charitable trust established under Islamic law; plural,
auqaf. Indian Islam and the Pakistan Movement
zamindar: in East Pakistan prior to the enactment of State Ac- Abbott, Freeland. Islam and Pakistan. Ithaca: Cornell University
quisition legislation in 1951, one of a class of landholders re- Press, 1968. A survey of intellectual trends and reform move-
sponsible for the collection of land revenue and its payment ments in British India and modern Pakistan.
directly to the state; in West Pakistan, a peasant proprietor. Afzal, M. Rafique, ed. Selected Speeches and Statements of the
Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah (r9II-34 and r947-48). il
Lahore: Research Society of Pakistan, University of the Pun-
Ii
u
I'
jab, 1966. Includes materials not contained in Jamil-ud-Din ij
Ahmad's collection. !1
i'
Aga Khan, His Highness the. The Memoirs of Aga Khan: World
i
Enough and Time. London: Cassell, 1954. The autobiography l
of one of the founders of the Muslim League. 11!
Ahmad, Aziz. Studies in Islamic Culture in the Indian Environ- I
,1
ment. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1964. An indispensable study I'
of the cultural interaction between Islam and Hinduism. 11
!
- - . Islamic Modernism in India and Pakistan, r857-r964. Lon- I'
I J/j
don: Oxford University Press, 1967. A technical analysis of
trends in Islam since 1857, a good complement to Abbott's
study.
Ahmad, Jamil-ud-Din, ed. Some Recent Speeches and Writings of
Mr. Jinnah. Lahore: Shaikh Muhammad Ashraf. Vol. I, 5th
ed., 1952. Vol. II, 1947.
Albiruni, A. H. Makers of Pakistan and Modern Muslim India.
Lahore: Shaikh Muhammad Ashraf, 1950. Short biographical
sketches of Muslim leaders from Sir Syed Ahmad Khan to
Liaqat Ali Khan.

~
s11

-tiIi
 -T
318 Bibliography Bibliography 31 9

Ali, Chaudhri Muhammad. The Emergence of Pakistan. New Murray, 1954. A readable but superficial biography of Pak-
York and London: Columbia University Press, 1967. An au- istan's founder.
thoritative account of the circumstances of partition by the Campbell-Johnson, Alan. Mission with Mountbatten. London:
senior Muslim official involved, who was later secretary-general Robert Hale, 1951. A day-by-day record by Mountbatten's press
of the government of Pakistan and (1955-56) prime minister. attache critical of the part played by the Muslim League.
Allana, G., ed. Pakistan Movement: Historic Documents. Karachi: Coupland, Sir Reginald. The Indian Problem. New York: Oxford
Department of International Relations, University of Karachi, University Press, 1944. Published originally in England in three
1967. Includes letters, statements, and documents from 1882 to volumes: I, The Indian Problem, I833-I935 (1942); II, Indian
1947· Politics, I936-I942 (1943); III, The Future of India (1943). An
- - . Quaid-e-Azam Jinnah: The Story of a Nation. Lahore: indispensable survey of Indian political history, especially valu-
Ferozsons, 1967. Includes much hitherto unpublished informa- able for the period 1936-1943.
tion, especially on Jinnah's early life and family background. - - . India: A Re-statement. London: Oxford University Press,
Ambedkar, B. R. Pakistan; or, The Partition of India. 3d ed. 1945. A summary of the preceding work, brought up to the end
Bombay: Thacker, 1946. The demand for Pakistan as seen by of the war.
the leader of India's untouchables. Dar, Bashir Ahmad. Religious Thought of Sayyid Ahmad Khan.
Ameer Ali, Syed. The Spirit of Islam. London: Christophers, Lahore: Institute of Islamic Culture, 1957. A Pakistani study
1922. The classic modernist statement of Islam as a liberal and of the life and work of Sir Syed Ahmad Khan.
progressive faith. De Bary, William T., ed. Sources of Indian Tradition. New York:
Ashraf, Muhammad, comp. Cabinet Mission and After. Lahore: Columbia University Press, 1958. Especially relevant are sec-
Shaikh Muhammad Ashraf, 1946. Letters and documents cover- tions by P. Hardy, "Islam in Medieval India," and Dr. I. H.
ing negotiations leading up to the formation of the interim Qureshi, "The Muslim Revival."
government by Congress in 1946, from the Pakistani viewpoint. Faruqi, Ziya-ul-Hasan. The Deoband School and the Demand for
Aziz, K. K. Britain and Muslim India. London: Heinemann, Pakistan. London: Asia Publishing House, 1963. A careful
1963. Traces factors and agencies involved in the formation of analysis of those strands of Indian Muslim opinion which op-
public opinion in Britain on Muslim India and the Pakistan posed the creation of Pakistan.
movement. Gibb, Sir Hamilton. Mohammedanism: An Historical Survey.
Baljon, J. M. S. The Reforms and Religious Ideas of Sir Sayyid New York: New American Library, 1955. A brief study of the
Ahmad Khan. 2d ed. Lahore: Orientalia, 1958. A short but meaning of Islam by a leading authority.
thorough study of the life and contributions of the father of Gopal, Ram. Indian Muslims: A Political History (I858-I947).
the Aligarh movement and the Muslim revival. London: Asia Publishing House, 1959. A Hindu account of the
Birdwood, Christopher Bromhead, Baron. A Continent Experi- Muslim separatist movement, including much valuable infor-
ments. London: Skeffington, 1946. A British officer's sympa- mation.
thetic and understanding picture of the political situation in Hasan, K. Sarwar, ed. The Transfer of Power. Documents on the
India at the close of the second world war. Foreign Relations of Pakistan. Karachi: Pakistan Institute of :

Bolitho, Hector. Jinnah: Creator of Pakistan. London: John International Affairs, 1966. 1

1 \

~11
 --~-, -,
320 Bibliography Bibliography 321

Hobson, H. V. The Great Divide: Britain-India-Pakistan. Lon- by a senior Indian civil servant who was close to the center of
don: Hutchinson, 1969. An admirable account, by a former power.
constitutional adviser to Viceroy Lord Linlithgow, of the polit- Moon, Sir Penderel. Strangers in India. London: Faber and Faber,
ical and constitutional developments culminating in the parti- 1944. An excellent little book reviewing the problems of India
tion of the Indian Empire, using the Mountbatten papers. through the eyes of a young civil servant and commended by
Hollister, John. The Shi'a of India. London: Luzac, 1953. Al- former President Ayub Khan for its insights. ':j
though written before independence, this work contains much - - . Divide and Quit. London: Chatto and Windus, 1961. An
information of value concerning Shia groups of great impor- account of the genesis of Pakistan and its consequences in the ·II
tance in Pakistan. partition disturbances in Bahawalpur state in 1947. 'I

Hunter, Sir William W. The Indian Musalmans. Reprinted from Mosley, Leonard. The Last Days of the British Raj. London: I
3d ed., 1876. Calcutta: Comrade Publishers, 1945. A classic Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1961. A critique of the transfer of
work, essential for the understanding of the growth of Muslim power in which Mountbatten loses some luster-a good anti-
separatist sentiment.
Iqbal, Sir Muhammad. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought
dote for Alan Campbell-Johnson's adulation.
Pirzada, Syed Sharifuddin. Evolution of Pakistan. Lahore: All-
'i
r
I
in Islam. Lahore: Shaikh Muhammad Ashraf, 1954. A reprint Pakistan Legal Decisions, 1963. A historical survey of Muslim
of lectures delivered in 1926 by one who is now considered the separatism by a former attorney general and foreign minister,
philosopher of the Pakistan movement. with extensive quotations from documents and letters.
Ispahani, M.A. H. Qaid-e-Azam Jinnah as I Knew Him. Karachi: - - . Quaid-e-Azam Jinnah's Correspondence. 2d ed. Karachi:
Forward Publications, 1966. Essentially an account of Jinnah's Guild Publishing House, 1966. Letters to and from various
leadership after 1937, with particular reference to the interrela- British and Indo-Pakistani public figures from 1918 to 1948.
tionships between all-India and Bengal politics. Qureshi, I. H. The Muslim Community in the Inda-Pakistan
Khaliquzzaman, Choudhry. Pathway to Pakistan. Lahore: Long- Subcontinent, 6zo-z947: A Brief Historical Analysis. The
mans, Pakistan Branch, 1961. The memoirs of the former Hague: Mouton, 1962. A landmark work, which should be read
leader of the Muslim League in the United Provinces, giving as background for the following book.
an inside view of the Pakistan movement. - - . The Struggle for Pakistan. Karachi: University of Karachi
Lumby, E. W. R. The Transfer of Power in India. London: Allen Press, 1965. A recapitulation by a scholar involved in the
and Unwin, 1954. A British scholar's analysis of the events growth of Muslim separatism during the twentieth century,
leading up to 1947, somewhat shorter in length than V. P. relying on published sources and on his own knowledge.
Menon's account. Rajput, A. B. Muslim League, Yesterday and Today. Lahore:
Malik, Hafeez. Moslem Nationalism in India and Pakistan. Wash- Shaikh Muhammad Ashraf, 1948. A rather poor account of the
ington: Public Affairs Press, 1963. A useful, although not pro- Muslim League from 1906, with emphasis on the Cabinet Mis-
found, history of the Indian Muslim community from the be- sion period.
ginnings. Ravoof, A. A. Meet Mr. Jinnah. 3d ed. Lahore: Shaikh Muham-
Menon, V. P. The Transfer of Power in India. Princeton: Prince- mad Ashraf, 1955. Jinnah's career up to 1946, as written by a
ton University Press, 1957. A detailed record from 1939 to 1947

J disciple.

ti!
11
:11
1
.........--- ,., ~

322 Bibliography Bibliography 323

Saiyid, Matlubul Hasan. Mohammad Ali Jinnah. 2d ed. Lahore: Princeton University Press, 1966. An excellent short analysis of
Shaikh Muhammad Ashraf, 1953. A political biography of the the views of the founder of the Jamaat-i-Islami Pakistan.
Qaid-i-Azam, much the best available. Ahmad, Mohammad. My Chief. Lahore: Longmans, Green, Pak-
Sayeed, Khalid Bin. Pakistan: The Formative Phase, I857-I948. istan Branch, 1960. A short biography of President Ayub Khan
2d ed. London: Oxford University Press, 1968. An excellent by his former private secretary, recounting General Ayub's re-
study by a Canadian political scientist, emphasizing the Pak- lations with Governor General Ghulam Mohammad.
istan movement from 1940 until Jinnah's death. Ahmad, Munir. Legislatures in Pakistan, I947-58. Lahore: De-
Sen, Sachin. The Birth of Pakistan. Calcutta: General Printers partment of Political Science, University of the Panjab, 1960.
and Publishers, 1955. The origins of Muslim separatism and A thorough analysis by a Pakistani student of the inner work-
the development of the Pakistan movement. ings of the national and provincial legislatures.
Smith, W. Cantwell. Modern Islam in India. London: Gollancz, Ahmad, Mushtaq. Government and Politics in Pakistan. 2d ed.
1946. An excellent analysis of Muslim social and political Karachi: Pakistan Publishing House, 1963. An excellent survey
thought written when the author held Marxist views. of Pakistan politics both before and after martial law, includ-
Stephens, Ian. Pakistan. New York: Praeger, 1963. A valuable ing tabular appendixes on the various legislatures.
survey and evaluation of the events of 1946-1948, including Anwar, Muhammad Rafi. Presidential Governme,:it in Pakistan.
the Punjab slaughter and the Kashmir conflict, by one sympa- Lahore: Caravan Book House, 1967. A textbook study of the
thetic to the Pakistani view. 1962 constitutional order.
Symonds, Richard. The Making of Pakistan. London: Faber and Binder, Leonard. Religion and Politics in Pakistan. Berkeley and
Faber, 1950. A good introduction to modern Pakistan. Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1961. A detailed
Titus, Murray. Indian Islam. London: Oxford University Press, study of the religious factor in the working of the first Constitu-
1930. A survey of intellectual and religious movements in ent Assembly, including the role of Maududi and the Jamaat-i-
Indian Islam. Islami.
Tuker, Sir Francis. While Memory Serves. London: Cassell, 1950. Calder, Grace. "Constitutional Debates in Pakistan," Muslim
The Calcutta riots and communal troubles in eastern India as World, XLVI (January, April, and July, 1956). An easily acces-
seen by the last British General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, sible summary of the activities of the second Constituent As-
Eastern Command. sembly.
Waheed-uz-Zaman. Towards Pakistan. Lahore: Publishers United, Callard, Keith. Pakistan: A Political Study. New York: Macmil-
1964. A scholarly study of the years 1928-1940. lan, 1958. This is still the best over-all study of Pakistan politics
Wasti, S. R. Lord Minto and the Indian Nationalist Movement. during the first decade easily available in the United States.
Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1964. A thorough and objective study Choudhury, G. W. Constitutional Development in Pakistan. La- i
:11
of a critical period for Indian Muslims, including the founding hore: Longmans, Pakistan Branch, 1959. An analysis of the
of the Muslim League. constitutional issues as dealt with by the Constituent Assem-
blies and embodied in the 1956 Constitution. i,,
Politics and Constitution-Making - - . Democracy in Pakistan. Dacca: Green Book House, 1964. A
I'
Adams, Charles J. "The Ideology of Mawlana Mawdudi." In survey of the trials and tribulations of democratic institutions 1!
11
D. E. Smith, ed., South Asian Politics and Religion. Princeton: in Pakistan by a leading political scientist at Dacca University.

.i Ii
1

~11
-------··
324 Bibliography Bibliography 325

Feldman, Herbert. A Constitution for Pakistan. Karachi: Oxford Maududi, Syed Abul Ala. Islamic Law and Constitution. Karachi:
University Press, 1956. An account of the political crises of Jamaat-e-Islami Publications, 1955. This and the following
1953-1955. item are pamphlets giving the fundamentalist ideology of the
- - . Revolution in Pakistan: A Study of the Martial Law Ad- J amaat-i-Islami.
ministration. London: Oxford University Press, 1967. A careful - - . Political Theory of Islam. Lahore: Markazi Maktaba
and occasionally witty account of the martial law period, 1958- J amaat-i-Islami Pakistan, n.d.
1962. Misra, K. P., M. V. Lakhi, and V. Narain. Pakistan's Search for
Gledhill, Alan. Pakistan: The Development of Its Laws and Con- Constitutional Consensus. New Delhi: Impex India, 1967. A
stitution. 2d ed. London: Stevens, 1967. An exhaustive legal study of the 1964-65 elections, based on a careful reading of the
study. Pakistani press; includes various party manifestoes as appen-
Jennings, Sir Ivor. Constitutional Problems in Pakistan. Cam- dixes.
bridge, England: The University Press, 1957. The texts of the Pakistan, Cabinet Secretariat. Report of the Constitution Com-
Federal Court's constitutional decisions of 1955, with an ex- mission, Pakistan I96I. Karachi: Manager of Publications,
planatory essay. 1962.
Jinnah, M. A. Quaid-i-Azam Mahomed Ali Jinnah: Speeches as Pakistan, Election Commission. Pakistan General Elections, I962.
Governor-General of Pakistan, I947-48. Karachi: Pakistan Pub- Karachi: Manager of Publications, 1963.
lishers, n.d. - - . Report on General Elections in Pakistan I964-65. Karachi:
Kayani, M. R. Not the Whole Truth. Lahore: Pakistan Writers' Manager of Publications. Vol. I (Report), 1967. Vol. II (Ap-
Cooperative Society, 1963. This is a partial collection of the pendixes), 1968.
witty and provocative speeches of the late Chief Justice of the Pakistan, Ministry of Law. The Constitution of the Islamic Re-
West Pakistan High Court, exploring the problems of liberty public of Pakistan. Karachi: Manager of Publications, 1956.
and authority under martial law. - - . Report of the Electoral Reforms Commission. Karachi:
- - . Half Truths. Lahore: Pakistan Writers' Cooperative Soci- Manager of Publications, 1956.
ety, 1968. Addresses to the West Pakistan CSP Association. - - . The Constitution of the Republic of Pakistan. Karachi:
Khan, Major General Fazal Muqeem. The Story of the Pakistan Manager of Publications, 1962.
Army. 2d ed. Lahore: Oxford University Press, 1964. An excel- - - . Report of the Franchise Commission. Karachi: Manager of
lent account of the civil and military role of the army, report- Publications, 1963.
ing in detail the events of October, 1958. - - . An Analysis of the Report of the Franchise Commission.
Khan, Field Marshal Mohammad Ayub. Speeches and Statements. Karachi: Department of Films and Publications, 1964.
Annual volumes from June 1959. Karachi: Pakistan Publica- Pirzada, Syed Sharifuddin. Fundamental Rights and Constitu-
tions. tional Remedies in Pakistan. Lahore: All-Pakistan Legal De-
- - . Friends Not Masters. London: Oxford University Press, cisions, 1966. An analysis of the provisions of the 1962 Consti-
1967. A political autobiography indispensable for anyone who tution relating to fundamental rights with relevant judicial I

wants to understand Pakistan and its domestic and foreign precedents.

policies under President Ayub Khan.

j
Punjab, Province of the. Report of the Court of Inquiry Consti-
I
,11
 -,
326 Bibliography Bibliography 327
tuted under Punjab Act II of I954 to Enquire into the Punjab York: Columbia University Press, 1963. An account of the inte-
Disturbances of I953· Lahore: Superintendent, Government gration of the princely states in West Pakistan.
Printing, 1954. Known as the Munir Report, this document Williams, L. F. R. The State of Pakistan. Rev. ed. London: Faber
provides invaluable insights into the relationships between and Faber, 1966. A sympathetic survey of Pakistani problems,
politics and the maintenance of order in Pakistan. especially valuable for the martial-law period and the inaugu-
Qureshi, I. H. Pakistan: An Islamic Democracy. Lahore: Institute ration of the Basic Democracies.
of Islamic Culture, n.d. An essay on the meaning of the Islamic
state by one of Pakistan's leading modernist scholars. Public Administration, Development, and Planning
Sayeed, Khalid Bin. "The Jamaat-i-Islami Movement in Pak- Ahmad, Munir. The Civil Servant in Pakistan. Karachi, Lahore,
istan." Pacific Affairs, XXX (March 1957). and Dacca: Oxford University Press, 1964. An attitudinal and
- - . Pakistan: The Formative Phase. Karachi: Pakistan Publish- behavioral survey of public servants in the Lahore area.
ing House, 1960. A solid study of Pakistani politics under Ahmad, Nafis. An Economic Geography of East Pakistan. 2d ed.
Liaqat Ali Khan, with reference to the background of the Pak- London: Oxford University Press, 1968. A valuable study of
istan movement and to the subsequent political breakdown. the economic and social setting of East Pakistan.
Not to be confused with the second edition (listed in the first Andrus, J. Russell, and A. F. Mohammed. Trade, Finance, and
section of this bibliography), which concludes in 1948. Development in Pakistan. London: Oxford University Press,
- - . The Political System of Pakistan. Boston: Houghton Mif- 1966.
flin, 1967. The latest general survey of Pakistan politics, a Braibanti, Ralph. Research on the Bureaucracy of Pakistan.
worthy successor to Callard's study. Durham: Duke University Press, 1966. Indispensable for the
Schuler, E. A. and K. R. Public Opinion and Constitution Mak- student of Pakistan's higher bureaucracy and public services.
ing in Pakistan, I958-I962. East Lansing: Michigan State Uni- Bureau of National Reconstruction and Pakistan Academy for
versity Press, 1967. A survey, based on press reports primarily Rural Development. An Analysis of the Working of Basic
from Dawn (Karachi) and the Pakistan Observer (Dacca), of Democracy Institutions in East Pakistan. Comilla: Pakistan
the muted constitutional debate under martial law. Academy for Rural Development, 1963. Investigates the work-
Sharma, M. S. M. Peeps into Pakistan. Patna: Pustak Bhandar, ings of union, thana, and district councils during the first two
1954. An emigre Hindu writes with bitterness of politics in years.
Karachi. Choudhuri, M. A. The Civil Service in Pakistan. Dacca: Na-
Smith, W. Cantwell. Islam in Modern History. Princeton: Prince- tional Institute of Public Administration, 1963. An exhaustive
ton University Press, 1957. See especially chapter 5, "Pakistan: study of the organization and training of the Civil Service of
Islamic State." Pakistan.
Suleri, Z. A. Politicians and Ayub. Lahore: Lion Art Press, 1964. Davis, Kingsley. The Population of India and Pakistan. Prince-
A review of the disintegration and reconstruction of Pakistani ton: Princeton University Press, 1951. A demographic study
politics under Ayub by a leading Pakistani journalist sympa- based on the 1941 census. I
thetic to the presidential system. Huq, Mahbub ul. The Strategy of Economic Planning: A Case !
Wilcox, Wayne. Pakistan: The Integration of a Nation. New Study of Pakistan. Karachi, Lahore, and Dacca: Oxford Uni-
I
. 1

i,l~,11
11.
"
 ~-1
328 Bibliography

versity Press, 1963. An outstandingly readable study by the

l ! Bibliography

Projects under the Camilla District Integrated Rural De-

329

chief of the perspective planning division of the Planning velopment Programme (September z967). 1967.
Commission. Pakistan, Ministry of Finance. Economy of Pakistan z948-68.
Inayatullah. Basic Democracy, District Administration, and De- Islamabad: Department of Films and Publications, 1968.
velopment. Peshawar: Pakistan Academy for Rural Develop- Pakistan, National Planning Board. The First Five Year Plan,
ment, n.d. A study of local councils in West Pakistan based on z955-60. Karachi: Manager of Publications, 1958.
survey interviews with elected members and officials. Pakistan, Pay and Services Commission. Report, z959-z962.
- - . Bureaucracy and Development in Pakistan. Peshawar: Pak- Karachi: Manager of Publications, 1969. Known as the
istan Academy for Rural Development, 1963. A collection of Cornelius Report, the Commission's controversial recommen-
papers dealing with various aspects of administration in Pak- dations for administrative reform became an important public
istan, including important studies of the CSP by Ralph Brai- issue in connection with the overthrow of President Ayub
banti and M.A. Choudhuri. Khan.
Karim, Nazmul. Changing Society in India and Pakistan. Dacca: Pakistan, Planning Commission. The Second Five Year Plan
Oxford University Press, 1956. A sociological study of Bengali ( z960-65). Karachi: Manager of Publications, 1960.
society. - - . The Third Five Year Plan (z965-70). Karachi: Manager of
Mahmood, Afzal. Law and Principles of Local Government in Publications, 1965; rev. ed., 1967.
Pakistan: Basic Democracies. Separate West Pakistan and East Papanek, Gustav F. Pakistan's Development: Social Goals and
Pakistan editions. Lahore: All-Pakistan Legal Decisions, 1964. Private Incentives. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University
Annotated editions of Basic Democracy legislation, including Press, 1967. A study of the role of private enterprise generally
rules and standing orders. and of particular entrepreneurial groups in the rapid growth
Maron, Stanley, ed. Pakistan: Society and Culture. New Haven: since the 195o's.
Human Relations Area Files, 1957. A collection of essays con- Qureshi, I. H. The Pakistani Way of Life. London: Heinemann,
cerning various social groups. 1956. An introduction to the history and culture of Pakistan.
Michel, Aloys A. The Indus Rivers: A Study of the Effects of Rahim, S. A. Communications and Personal Influence in an East
Partition. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, Pakistan Village. Comilla: Pakistan Academy for Rural De-
1967. An extremely thorough study of the development prob- velopment, 1965. An excellent brief analysis showing the inter-
lems of the Indus basin. linkages between traditional and modern influence roles.
Pakistan Academy for Rural Development publications: Rahman, A. T. R. Basic Democracies at the Grass Roots.
A New Rural Cooperative System for Camilla Thana. Annual Comilla: Pakistan Academy for Rural Development, 1962. A
reports since 1961. first-rate study of three union councils in the Comilla area.
The Camilla Rural Administration Experiment. Annual Re- Rashid, Haroun Er. East Pakistan: A Systematic Regional Geog-
ports since 1962-63. raphy and Its Development Planning Aspects. Lahore: Sh. lj
The Camilla District Development Project. 1964. Ghulam Ali and Sons, 1965. An excellent study by a young l
The Works Programme in Camilla: A Case Study. 1966. CSP officer, quite different from Nafis Ahmad's economic geog-
An Evaluation Report on the Progress of the Seven Thana I:
raphy. 1:
I;
!:

,,1:
 --1 I

330 Bibliography

Tayyeb, A. Pakistan: A Political Geography. London: Oxford

University Press, 1966. A review of national problems, includ-
ing the East Pakistan demand for autonomy, from the point of
view of Pakistan's geographic situation.
Tepper, Eliot. Changing Patterns of Administration in Rural
Index
11
East Pakistan. Asian Studies Center Occasional Paper No. 5.
·11
East Lansing: Asian Studies Center, Michigan State University, ,1
1966. A thorough survey of the evolution of departmental ad- :1
:I
ministration and local government institutions since the mid- Academy for Rural Development: NIP, 226-227; as prime minister, i
nineteenth century. Comilla, 57, 74-78, ui8, 153; Pesha- 161, 211, 212, 219-220, 232
war, 74 Ali, Mahmud, 222,249,274
Waterston, A. Planning in Pakistan. Baltimore: Economic Plan- Achakzai, Khan Abdul Hamid Khan, Ali, Syed Ameer, 11, 95
ning Institute, International Bank for Reconstruction and De- 223, 225 Aligarh movement, 8, 12-14, 29, 93,
administration, 122-133; in East Pak- 95; Aligarh college and university,
velopment, 1963. A study of the evolution of the Pakistani
istan, 124-125, 128-130; reform in, 8, 15, 25n
planning structure. 132-133; in West Pakistan, u15- All-India Muhammadan Educational
West Pakistan, Land Reforms Commission. Report. Lahore: 127, 129-130, 135-136, 306; see also Conference, 8-g
parity; public services All-Pakistan Confederation of La-
Superintendent, Government Printing, 1959. bour (APCOL), 291-292
Advisory Council of Islamic Ideol-
Wheeler, Richard S. Divisional Councils in East Pakistan, z960- ogy, 106-109 All-Parties Conference (1928), 19-20
z965: An Evaluation. South Asia Monograph Series, no. 4. Afghanistan, 46, 223 Amb, 110
Aga Khan, g, 15, 20, 44 Amin, Nurul: and Muslim League,
Durham: Duke University, 1967. An analysis of the working of 215, 218; and NDF, 245, 247, 258;
Agartala conspiracy case, 148, 262,
the highest Basic Democracy tier in East Pakistan. 271, 273n and PDP, 280
agitation against Ayub in 1968-69, armed forces, 144-149, 232, 259, 289;
86, go, 133, 148-149, 264-274, 289, air force, 145, 147-148, 164; army,
300; see also students 145-149, 164, 269-270, 288, 298;
agricultural development, 53, 70-79, navy, 145-148, 164, 26o; see also
82, 85; Agricultural Development martial law; police
Bank, 73; see also Agricultural Arya Samaj, u
Development Corporation; rural Assam, 22, 31-32, 35, 41, 215
works program Attlee, Clement R., 35
Agricultural Development Corpora- Awami League: East Pakistan
tion (ADC), 71-72, 74-77, 290; Awami Muslim League of 1949-
EPADC, 57, 71-72, 75; WPADC, 1955, 214-220, 312; East Pakistan
7 1, 75-76 Awami League of 1955-1958, 102,
Ahmad, Abul Mansur, 181n 104, 113, 119, 181, 220-222, 225,
Ahmad, Mirza Ghulam, 44-45, 300; 226, 229, 247-248, 250; East Paki-
agitation against, 103, 147, 225, stan Awami League from 1962, 245-
248, 252, 255, 258-261; "Nasrullah
·1I
228, 289, 300
111
Ahsan, S. M., 85, 164, 190 group" Awami League, 261, 267-
:11
Akbar, Fazle, 127, 293n 268, 279, 280; "Six Point" Awami 11
Ali, Chaudhri Muhammad: and League, 261-263, 266-268, 271-272,
I!
33 1 11

i
1!
i!

'
' 111
332 Index Index 333
Awami League (cont.) Bogra, Mohammed Ali of, 97, u 1, cities, see urban areas also electorates, separate; provin-
273n, 274, 278-279, 283, 310, 312; 211; as prime minister, 160-161, Civil Service of Pakistan, 43, 128- cial autonomy
West Pakistan Awami League, 218-219, 226n 130, 132-133, 137' 290 Constitution of 1962, 106, 286;
216-217, 220, 247, 256, 260 Bohras, 44 Combined Opposition Parties (COP), amendment of, 106-107, 139-140,
Azad, Maulana Abul Kalam, 29 Britain in India, 5-10, 12-14, 19-21, 255-258, 310 170, 175-176, 192, 199, 272; and
Azad Pakistan party, 223-224, 251; 30-35, 179 Comilla, see Academy for Rural De- armed forces, 148; federalism in,
see also National Awami party British influences: administrative, 122, velopment 115, 158, 181; Islam in, 106-108,
124, 128, 130; executive, 143, 159- commissioner, divisional, 123, 128, 253, 256; parity in, 115, 129, 191;
Bahawalpur: division, 40, 46; state, 160, 162, 176; judicial, 134, 136- 133, 152, 155, 204 and political process, 233, 236, 241;
110, 125, 187 137; legislative, 36, 157, 165-168, committees, legislative, 167, 168, 191; see also elections; President of
Baluchi, 46 172, 174, 292, 305, 312; military, Public Accounts Committee, 168 Pakistan
Baluchistan, 18, 39, 110, 126, 273n; 145-146 communalism: in British India, 12, Constitution Commission of 1960,
see also Kalat; Quetta Buddhists, 43, 103, 189, 300; see also 14-18, 24; and Pakistani politics, 105, 206
Barelvi, Sayyid Ahmad, 7 minorities in Pakistan 103, 216-217, 219; and partition, cooperatives, 73-77, 86; see also
barrages: on Ganges, 56; in Indus budget, see finance 29, 33-34, 36, 41-42; see also elec- Academy for Rural Development,
basin, 58, 61, 71, 75, 298; see also bureaucracy, see administration; pub- torates, separate Comilla
flood control lic services Communist party, 250-251, 309; see Cornelius, Alvin R., 132; report of,
Basic Democracies, 149-156, 197-198; business interest, 288, 290, 291, 303, also National Awami party on services, 132-133, 290
Basic Democracies Order of 1959, 3°7 community, see Muslim community Council of Pakistan Newspaper Edi-
150; and Muslim League, 238-241, concurrent powers, 180, 181, 182 tors, 296
243; opposition to, 258, 270, 274; cabinet, see ministers consensus, search for, 208-209, 275- courts, 134-139; judges of, 123, 128,
political role of, 263, 314; and Cabinet Mission, 31-34 276, 282-283, 305, 308-314 135-137; jurisdiction of, 138·142,
rural change, 71, 74, 153, 299, 304; capital, national, 127-128, 278-279 Constituent Assembly of India, 31- 142n, 178, 286; political indepen-
see also electoral college Central National Muhammadan As- 32, 34 dence of, 293; see also funda-
Basic Principles Committee, 48, 97, sociation, 11 Constituent Assembly of Pakistan mental rights; High Courts; Su-
110, 111 Chief Martial Law Administrator, (first), 36, 91, 167n, 174, 205; and preme Court
13engal, 64-66, 124, 155; partition of 139, 161, 164, 165, 178; Deputies, constitutional issues, 48, 96-98, credit, rural, 72-73; see also Agri-
1905-1912, 9, 12, 23; partition of 164; Martial Law Administrators, 103-104; dissolution of, 98, 112, cultural Development Corpora-
1946-47, 33-35, 215n; representa- 190; see also President of Pakistan 138, 147, 161, 169, 175, 179, 211, tion; cooperatives
tion in, 18, 21-22, 24-25; see also China, 88, 281 218-219, 285, 292; Jinnah's address Criminal Law Amendment Act of
East Pakistan Chitral, 110, 126 to, 101-102; members of, 116, 169, 1908, 255
Bengali, see languages Chittagong: city, 40, 57, 80, 87, 146; 215n, 218, 223-224; opposition in, Criminal Law Amendment Act of
Bengalis, see ethnic groups district, 46, 57; division, 39, 79, 224, 228 1963, 135-136, 141
Bhashani, Maulana Abdul Hamid 124 Constituent Assembly of Pakistan Crown, 7-8, 12, 14; constitutional
Khan: and anti-Ayub agitation, Chittagong Hill Tracts, 40, 43, 57, (second), 112-113, 138, 169, 195, role of, 138, 160-161, 265
269, 271-274, 276-279, 282-283, 302, 71 205, 211, 219, 285; and Constitu-
305, 309; and Awami League, 215, Choudhury, A. K. Fazlul Quader, tion of 1956, 49, 112, 114, 119, 181;
220, 221; and NAP, 222, 225, 249, 167n parties in, 179, 211, 219, 226, 229 Dacca, 39, 124; as capital, 9, 40, 127-
250, 261; and "pro-Peking" NAP, Christians, 41-43; in British India, Constitution of 1956, 99, 100, 161, 128, 168, 278-279; police firing in,
252, 262, 267 6, 8, 12, 17; influence of, in Pak- 179, 180, 226, 285; abrogation of, 48, 215, 269
Bhutto, Zulfikar Ali, 264-265, 268, istan, 229, 300, 311; and separate 106, 138, 161, 252, 285, 292; fed- Daultana, Mian Mumtaz Muham-
276-279, 283; detention of, 266, 269, electorates, 103, 106; see also mi- eralism in, 158, 180, 181, 194; mad Khan, 238
271; and leaders' conference, 271, norities in Pakistan Islam in, 97-100, 253; parity in, Decade of Development, 263
273-274; see also Pakistan People's Chundrigar, I. I., 161, 212, 214, 221 114, 129, 191; restoration of, 260- Defence of Pakistan Ordinance and
party circle officer, 124, 153-154 261, 267, 269, 271-272, 280-282; see Rules, 142, 143, 177; arrests un- I

l
ic
,,11
I
 334 Index Index 335
l I'
I'
I'
Defence of Pakistan (cont.) 163, 187-188; sense of grievance in, Elective Bodies (Disqualification) Or- 171, 174-175, 177, 179; in presi-
der, 259-26o, 262, 265-266, 269, der of 1959 (EBDO), 235, 238; dential system, 162, 164-166, 170-
I[
48, 84, 114-115, 118, 127, 180, 185-
271; see also emergency, state of; 186, 304; see also elections; parity; EBDOnians, 235-237, 246-247 179; in provinces, 192-193 11
preventive powers Provincial Assemblies electoral college, 150, 197-199, 201-
Delhi Resolution, u8, 312 East Pakistan Rifles, 145 202, 233-234; Electoral College Act,
I!
Democratic Action Committee, 268- Eastern Bengal and Assam, 9, 13, 15 198-199, 201; indirect elections factionalism, 208, 229-231, 298-299,
l
272, 273n, 280, 310 economic policy, 81, 89-90, 305-307; and, 155, 204-206; see also Basic 309-310; in Muslim League, 209- !
deputy commissioner (DC), 123, 128, of Ayub government, 84, 89-90, Democracies; Election Commis- 210, 236-237, 239, 244-245; in ,Ii
133, 144-145, 204; and Basic De- 303, 306; as political issue, 216, sion; franchise, adult other parties, 213, 215-216, 220,
mocracies, 153, 155; as district 217' 224, 243-244, 249-250, 256, Electoral Reforms Commission, 196 261-262 '
i
magistrate, 123, 135, 143 259-260, 262, 269-273, 273n, 280- electoral roll, common, 102, 104-105, family planning, 38-39, 75 'ii
Dera Ismail Khan, 39, 46, 125-126 281, 304; see also disparity, regional 117, 197, 220; and parity, 113, 115- farmers' service centers, 71, 73-77, 86
Dir, 110, 126 education, 49-51, 89; and Islam, 99, 116; see also electorates, separate Faruque, Ghulam, 188 :
Direct Action Day, 33 108, 109, 306; policy toward, in electorates, separate, in British In- Fazlul Huq, Abul Kasem, 24, 30;
Directive Principles of State Policy, 1969, 50-53, 306, 3u; Sir Syed Ah- dia, u, 17, 21, 25; Congress view and Krishak Sramik party, 217- :1
98, 114 mad Khan and, 8, 13; see also of, 16, 18, 20, 103; Muslim League 220, 226, 302, 309
disparity, regional, 83-86, 89, u9- literacy; students advocacy of, 10, 18, 20, 36, 100- Federal Court, see Supreme Court
121, 185-186, 260, 303; and Con- Eight Point Programme, 260-261; see 101 federal issue, 92, 109-121; see also
stitution of 1962, 84, u5; see also also Pakistan Democratic Move- electorates, separate, in Pakistan, federalism; parity; West Pakistan,
economic policy; parity ment 100-105, 113, 191, 195, 287, 312; integration of
dissolution, power of, 175, 193; see Election Commission, 199, 200-202; and Islamic state, 96, 100-101, 104, federalism: and constitutional debate,
also Constituent Assembly of Pak- chief commissioner, 200, 201; re- 117; and Muslim sects, 45, 103; 1950-1955, 110-111, 116-117, 119;
istan (first), dissolution of gional commissioners, 201, 203 and parity, 113, 121; party views and independence movement, 18,
distribution of powers: limitations of elections, 194-207; in British India, on, 101-103, 213-214, 226-227, 256, 20-22, 25, 36, 92, 179; opposition
center, 114, 120, 180-181, 248-250, 22, 24-25, 31, 33; Constituent As- 287; see also electoral roll, com- demand for, 245, 259-260, 268, 271-
259-263, 273n, 278, 312; in parlia- sembly, 36, 112, 169, 195, 205, 2u, mon; minorities in Pakistan 272, 273n, 278; see also distribu-
mentary constitutions, 110, 114, 219; district and divisional coun- emergency, state of, 176-177, 180, tion of powers; parity; provincial
180-181, 283; in presidential con- cil, 152, 156; legislative (1962), 167, 182, 286, 313; in 1954, 169, 179, autonomy; and individual consti-
stitution, 115, 165, 181-182 170, 198, 234; presidential (1960, 285; in 1965-1969, 141-144, 177- tutions
districts, 122-126, 128, 132-133, 144; 1965), 197, 199, 200, 202-205, 243, 178, 262-263, 266, 268-269, 271, Federation of Chambers of Com-
local government in, 150-153, 155- 256-258, 304; projected, under 1956 273n, 296, 304; see also governor's merce and Industry (FCCI), 291
156; party organization in, 239- Constitution, 105, 170, 212, 230- rule; preventive powers finance: Assembly procedures for,
240 231; provincial, in East Pakistan, English, 47, 49-50 172-174, 193, 252; and Islam, 97-
divisions, 123-126, 131-133; councils 48, 103, 180, 191-192, 195, 2ll, ethnic groups, 46, 113, 117-uS, 120- 98; as political issue, 114, 250, 259-
in, 150-152, 155-156; party organi- 217, 250, 278; provincial, in West 121, 229-230, 290, 298, 300; Ben- 26o, 273n, 278; taxes and revenue
zation in, 239-240
dominion status, 21, 91, 285
dyarchy, 18
Pakistan, 191-192, 195, 212, 216,
229; provisions for, in 1962 Con-
stitution, 105, 150, 175-176, 197-
galis, 114, 118, 121, 129, 145-146,
220, 300, 311; Biharis, 300; Path-
ans, 112-u3, 118, 120-121, 145, 223,
sharing, 181-186; see also public
services
Five Year Plans, 183, 185; First
I
202, 233-234; scheduled (196g- 300, 311; Punjabis, 110, 112-113, (1955-1960), 68, 81; Second (196o-
70), 170, 192, 198-200, 265, 267- 118, 120-121, 129, 145, 192, 311; 1965), 77, 82-86; Third (1965- J
East Bengal, see East Pakistan 268, 271; union council (1959), Sindhfa, 112-u3, 118, 120-121, 300, 1970), 38, 77-78, 82-88; Fourth
i
East India Company, 6-7
East Pakistan, 37, 54, 76, uo, 299;
and armed forces, 145-148, 146n;
105, 150, 197, 205; union and
legislative (1964---65), 151-152, 170,
198, 202-205, 237, 239, 242, 256-
311; see also languages; tribal
areas
executive council, 17, 32, 34
(1970-1975), 39, 79, 89-90; Perspec-
tive Plan (1965-1985), 83-84, 89;
see also planning; Planning Com-
,
:i

regionalism in, 124-125, 272; rela- 258, 304; see also electorates, sep- executive-legislative relations: in par- mission
tions with center, 110-113, 115, arate; franchise, adult liamentary system, 159, 165, 169- flood control, 54-57, 60, 62, 85, 273n,

,,Ii
 l I
336 Index Index 337
flood control (cont.) 180-181; as interim constitution, India, republic of, 183; migrations to 252-253, 270, 282-283; principles
304; see also barrages; Indus basin 137, 157, 159, 174, 285; and prov- and from, 41-43; war with (1965), of, 95-100, 106-109, 121, 3n; sects
development project inces, 183, 186; see also governor's 88, 141, 146, 148, 259, 264; and in, 4, 44-45, 98; teachings of, 3-4,
Food and Agriculture Commission rule water resource control, 53-54, 56- 121, 3u; universalism in, 94, n6·
of 1960, 70-7'1. governor, 82, 107, 130; in British 57, 60-61; see also Agartala con- u7, u9-120, 227; see also elec-
foreign aid, 87-89; and economic India, 18, 21, 23; central direction spiracy case; Indus basin develop- torates, separate; Muslim com-
disparity, 83-84; and Indus basin of, 115, 182, 187-188, 190; under ment project munity in Pakistan
project, 62-63; see also United 1962 Constitution, 188-190, 193- Indian Councils Act of 1909, 11, 17 Islamabad, 108, 127-128, 240
States 194; of East Pakistan, 187-190, 219- Indian Independence Act of 1947, Islamic law, 3-5, 93-94, 226, 228, 233; ,·

foreign policy, 256, 261, 273n, 281; 220, 266; under parliamentary con- 91-92, 157, 174, 180 see also Islam
Awami League and, 221; National stitutions, 186-188, 192; political Indian National Congress, 19-25; and Islamic laws commission, 99, 106, 109
Awami party and, 222, 249-251, role of, 188-189, 192, 204, 240, 271; Muslim separatism, 23, 26-29; Mus- Islamic republic, 98-100, 106
262, 276; see also distribution of of West Pakistan, 187-190; see also lim support for, 9, 11-17, 29, 93; Islamic state, 45, 92-98; see also elec-
powers governor's rule and partition plan, 31-35 torates, separate; minorities in Pak-
franchise, adult: controversy over, governor general, 91, 159-161, 174; Indus basin, So; development pro- istan
243, 245, 248-249, 252-253, 256, of British India, 17, 21, 160; and ject, 56, 6o-63, 78, 85; rivers of, Ismailis, 44, 301
260, 268, 271-272, 273n, 278, 302; Constituent Assembly, 112, 137- 46, 58, 60-61; see also Indus Waters
and direct elections, 195-196; and 138, 147, 169, 211, 219, 285; and Treaty; land reform, West Pakis- Jamaat-i-Islami Pakistan, 94, 227-
indirect elections, 197-198, 201- Nazimuddin, 160, 211, 285; and tan 228, 305, 309; and anti-Ayub agi-
202, 204-206; see also elections; West Pakistan, 112 Indus Waters Treaty, 61-62; Indus tation, 235, 256, 258, 26o-261, 267-
electoral college; electorates, sep- governor's rule, 180, 182, 187-188; Basin Development Fund, 62, 62n, 268, 274; banning of, 247, 254-255;
arate public services and, 131; use of, 63; Tarbela Development Fund, and labor, 292; and political ac-
Franchise Commission, 206 187, 213-214, 218, 225 62n; see also Indus basin develop- tion, 228, 252-254, 256, 258, 281-
fundamental rights: common law governors' conference, 182, 194 ment project 283, 300
and, 134-136, 139; constitutional, industrial development, 79-90; and Jamiat-ul-Tulaba, 254, 281, 294; see
106-107, 139-142, 144, 174, 256, habeas corpus, see High Courts and private investment, 85-87; success also Jamaat-i-Islami Pakistan
293, 304; in Islamic state, 93, 100; writ jurisdiction in, 82-83, 303, 306-307; see also Jamiat-ul-Ulama-i-Islam, 93, 225-226,
under martial law, 140, 142; as Hadith, see Islamic law foreign aid 268, 270, 300; see also ulama
political issue, 217, 228, 250, 252- Haroon, Yusuf, 189 Institute of Islamic Research, 108- Jamiat-ul-Ulama-i-Pakistan, 225, 300;
253, 256, 260, 262, 266, 268-269, High Courts, 136-137; Chief Justices 109 see also ulama I
273; see also courts; preventive of, 137, 201, 266; and writ juris- interest groups, 229, 284, 286, 288- Jinnah, Fatima, 202-203, 256-257 J.
powers diction, 139-142, 144, 255, 264n, 303; see also business; labor; stu- Jinnah, Mohammed Ali, 16-17, 18-23,
dents; and other interests 25-26; and Constituent Assembly,
11
304; see also fundamental rights 111
Ganatantri Dal, 222, 250; see also Hindu Mahasabha, 19 interim government, 32-34 101-102, 167n; and constitutional- p·
National Awami party Hinduism, 4-5, 12 International Bank for Reconstruc- ism, 16, 31, 33-34, 92; death, 48,
Gandhi, Mohandas K., 14-15, 20, 23 Hindus, 6, 12, 41, 52, So; in Pakistan, tion and Development, 56, 61-63, 163, 209-210; and democracy, 100,
Ganges River, 56-57; Ganges-Brah- 42-43, 229, 300; relations with 88 101-102; as governor general, 91,
maputra delta, 54; Ganges-Koba- Muslims, 9-12, 14-15, 17, 19-20, Iqbal, Sir Muhammad, 26 160, 209; as leader, 209, 302, 309;
dak project, 56, 71 23-24, 27-28; see also minorities in irrigation: East Pakistan, 54, 56-57, and parliamentary government for
Garos, 41, 43 Pakistan 72, 78-79; West Pakistan, 57-63, 71 India, 25, 27-28, 312-313; and par-
Government of India Act of 1919, Huda, Dr. M. N., 189 Islam: and constitutional debate, 92- tition, 28-34, uS, 209; and sep-
16-17, 22, 159, 180, 288 Hyderabad: city, 39, 58; division, 40, 101, 106-109; political exploitation arate electorates, 18, 20, 25, 101-
ii
Government of India Act of 1935, 42, 46, 125 of, by Muslim League, 101, 213, 102 !i
25, 42; and central government, 229-230, 233, 242-243, 283, by other Jinnah-Awami Muslim League, 215- 1!1
160, 176-177, 182, 187; federal Iftikharuddin, Mian, 223-224, 295n parties, 216, 220, 256, 277, 280-281, 216, 224; see also Awami League i!
scheme of, 21, 91, 110, 114, 174, income, per capita, 83-84, 185 283, by religious parties, 226-228, Justice party, 280 11'
11
11!
'11
i
II
11

i11!
338 Index
Index 339
Kalabagh, Nawab Amir Mohammed 1969 martial law, 148-149, 305; land revenue (cont.) sition of, 161, 187, 195, 213, 222,
Khan of, 189 and Muslim League, 238-245, 279, 64-66, 124, Floud Commission, 65, 230, 285; and interest groups, 291;
Kalat: division, 39, 41, 46, 126, 223; 280, 310; and opposition, 243, Mahmud Commission, 66, Land and Islam, 106; and judicial sys-
state, 110; see also Baluchistan 246, 259, 264, 266, 270-272; and Revenue Administration Enquiry tem, 135, 138, 140, 143, 286-287,
Kaptai, 57 parties, 207, 233, 235, 236, 238; Committee, 67, State Acquisition 287n; legislation under, 178, 286;
Karachi: city, 39, So, 127-128; divi- and reform, 45-46, 69, 132, 303; and Tenancy Act, 65-66, 72; in and national capital, 127; and par-
sion, 40, 125 see also martial law, 1958-1962; West Pakistan, 68; see also finance; ties, 214, 217, 220, 225, 228, 230-
Karnafuli River, 57 President of Pakistan land reform 233, 236, 249-252; and press, 295-
Kashmir, 38n, 259, 264 Khan, Mohammed Azam, 266 landlords, 24-25, 36, 68, 72, 288, 290; 296; and reforms, 66, 68-69, 81,
Khairpur: division, 40, 46, 58, 125; Khan, Nawabzada Liaqat Ali, 91, East Pakistan, 53-54, 64-65, 72, 76, 140-141, 303; termination of, 245,
state, 110, 125 160, 209-210, 226, 309; and Islamic 299; West Pakistan, 53-54, 67-69, 250; see also Khan, Mohammad
khalifa, 4, 13, 93 matters, 95, 97 77, 146, 298-299 Ayub; President of Pakistan
Khan, Abdul Hamid, 164 Khan, Nawabzada Nasrullah, 248, languages: national, official and state, martial law, 1969: and administra-
Khan, Abdul Jabbar, 163, 167n 261, 272; see also Awami League 48-49; Baluchi, 46; Bengali, 46-50, tion, 122, 130, 132, 164-165, 182,
Khan, Abdul Monem, 189 Khan, Sir Sikandar Hayat, 24 movement for state language, 48, 190, 286-288; and army, 146; and
Khan, Abdul Wahab, 167n Khan, Sir Syed Ahmad, 8-9, 15, 45, 215-217, 289, 299-300; Brahui, 46; Assemblies, 169; and Basic Democ-
Khan, Agha Abdul Karim, 223, 225 48, 95; political views of, 9-11, 13, English, 47, 49-50; Pashto, 46-47, racies, 155; and constitutional
Khan, Agha Mohammad Yahya, 149, 16, 26 50; Punjabi, 46-47, 51; Sindhi, 46- change, 305-308; and economy, 82,
164; as President, 164-165, 288, Khan, Tamizuddin, 167n 47, 50; Urdu, 24, 46-50 305-307; and education, 49-51, 311;
305-307, 314; views of, 275-276, Khan Sahib, Dr., 35, 212-213 Lasbela, 110 imposition of, 46, 109, 133, 141,
283; see also martial law, 1969 Kharan, 110 Laws (Continuance in Force) Order 148-149, 158, 189, 274-275, 286; and
Khan, Asghar, 266, 268, 271, 28o Khilafat movement, 14-17, 26, 293 of 1958, 178 Islam, 107, 277; and judicial sys-
Khan, Ataur Rahman, 221, 247 Khojas, 44 lawyers, 136, 270, 289, 292-293, 299 tem, 139, 141-143, 286-287, 28711;
Khan, Khan Abdul Ghaffar, 25, 223, Khudai Khidmatgars, 22, 25, 29, legislature: central, 165-170, see also and legislation, 178, 190, 286; and
225, 252; see also Khudai Khidmat- 213, 223; see also National Awami Constituent Assembly and National parties, 240-241, 275-277, 279-280,
gars party Assembly; provincial, 190-194, see 288; see also Khan, Agha Mo-
Khan, Khan Abdul Qaiyum, 213, Khulna: city, 40; division, 39, 56-57, also Provincial Assemblies; bicam- hammad Yahya
236, 280 124, 125n eral proposals for, uo-1u, 191, martial law regulations, 178, 190,
Khan, Khan Abdul Wali, 252, 262, Krishak Proja party, 24 312 275, 286-287, 287n, 306
266, 267, 283; see also National Krishak Sramik party, 217-220, 225- literacy, 46-47, 50-51 Maududi, Maulana Abul Ala, 94,
Awami party, "pro-Moscow" fac- 227, 245; see also United Front Lucknow Pact, 16-18 227-228, 252-255, 274, 280, 282,
tion of 309; see also Jamaat-i-Islami Paki-
Khan, Khan Abdus Sobur, 185n labor, 288, 290-292, 303, 307 MacDonald, Ramsay, 21 stan
Khan, M. Nur, 164, 190 Lahore: city, 39, 45; division, 40, 43, Mahdi Ali, Sayyid (Nawab Muhsin Mekran, 110
Khan, Mohammad Ayub, 163, 164, 46, 125 ul-Mulk), 9 Memons, 44
176, 263, 265, 274, 276, 304; and Lahore Resolution, 28, 36, 117, 217; Mahmud, Syed Hassan, 279n ministers: central, 162, 170, and head
Assemblies, 162-163, 173; and Bas- Awami League and, 180, 259, 312 Malakand division, 39-40, 126, 127n of state, 159-164, 171, and legisla-
ic Democracies, 149, 154, 197; and land reform, 68, 217, 224, 227, 281; Mangla dam, 61-63 ture, 91, 111, 159, 165, 171, 177,
1962 Constitution, 158, 288, 302, East Pakistan, 66-67, 75; West martial law, concept of, 286, 308, and parties, 210-212, 236, 240-241;
307, 314; and economy, 84, 263, Pakistan, 67-70, 72, 140, 299, Land 3 1 3-3 1 4 provincial, 18, 21, 23-25, 29-30, 34,
306-307; and elections, 105, 197- Reforms Commission (1959), 68, martial law, 1953 (Lahore), 45 in East Pakistan, 189, 192-193,
200, 202-205, 256-257; and fun- Land Reforms Regulation, 69-70, martial law, 1958-1962: and ad- 218-221, 225, and governor, 189-
damental rights, 140, 292-293; and 141, 178, Muslim League Agrarian ministration, 122, 124, 131, 286- 190, 193, and legislature, 187-188,
governors, 188-189; leading role Reform Committee, 68; see also 288; and army, 147-148; and dis- and parties, 210, 212-213, 221, 240-
of, 163, 302, 308; and 1958 mar- land revenue solution of Assemblies, 169, 179, 241, in West Pakistan, 189, 192,
tial law, 147, 161, 275, 285; and land revenue, 123; in East Pakistan, 192; and elections, 197-198; impo- 212, 224
I

11

,,11
['

l
---
340 Index Index 341
minorities in British India, 20-24; Muslim League, in British India, 10, National Awami party (cont.) see also elections, union and legis-
Muslim League and safeguards 12-13; and Congress, 14-17, 22-25; 262, 266-268, 272-273, 279; "pro- lative (1964-65); and names of po-
for, 10, 18, 22, 36; see also elec- and federalism, 18-21, 36, 92; and Peking" faction of, 251-252, 262, litical groups
torates, separate, in British India partition plan, 31-35; and sepa- 266-267, 269, 273, 305; in West ordinances, 176-178, 190
minorities in Pakistan, 37, 39-43, ratism, 23, 25-31, 94, 100-101, 117- Pakistan, 223-225, 250-251, 262; see
244; and the Islamic state, 42, 93, 118, 208, 217; see also Jinnah, also Bhashani, Maulana A. H. K. Pakhtunistan, 223, 267; see also
95-96, 98, 100; Jinnah's views on, Mohammed Ali National Democratic Front, 237, Khudai Khidmatgars
101-102; in legislatures, 103-105, Muslim League, in Pakistan: alli- 245-247, 249, 252, 255, 309; and Pakistan: demand for, 1, 26-29, 92;
116, 170, 191-192, 195, 220, 228- ances of, 219, 226, 229; Council opposition alliances, 257-258, 260, ideology of, 93, 102, 233, 276, 282,
229; in local councils, 150-151; in faction of (CML), 237-238, 246-247, 267-268, 280 see also Islam; movement for, 48,
public life, 189, 216, 220, 228-229, 256, 258, 260-261, 267-268, 280, 283, National Economic Council, 81-82, 94, 217, 227, and Muslim com-
239, 242; see also electorates, 310; effectiveness of, 244-245, 263, 84, 115, 185 munity, 101, 117, 121, 208, 293,
separate, in Pakistan 294, 302; and opposition, 214-215, National Finance Commission, 115, and non-Muslims, 43, 228-229
Mirza, lskander, 161, 163, 213, 232; 217-218, 224-225, 227, 229, 245, 183-185, 278 Pakistan Democratic Movement, 251,
and marital law, 1958, 106, 161, 265, 270; organization of, 209-213, National Press Trust, 295, 297; see 259-263, 265, 281, 310; and Demo-
214, 230-231, 275, 285, 292 236-242, 246, 279-280, 298, 309-310; also press cratic Action Committee, 267-268,
Mohammad, Ghulam, 160, 232; see policies of, 236, 242-244, 283; poli- Nazimuddin, Khwaja, 237; as gov- 271, 274, 273n
also governor general, and Con- tical monopoly of, 99, 102-103, 211, ernor general, 160, 218; as prime Pakistan Democratic party, 280-281,
stituent Assembly 216, 232-233, 242, 309; Qaid-i-Azam minister, 48, 97-98, 16o, 211 282, 310
Mohammed Ali formula, 111; see faction of (QML), 280, 283; see Nehru, Jawaharlal, 23, 26n, 32, 34 Pakistan Federal Union of Journal-
also distribution of powers also Islam, political exploitation Nehru, Pandit Motilal, 19; constitu- ists, 296-297
Moplah rebellion, 14-15 of; Khan, Mohammad Ayub tional report by, 19-20 Pakistan Industrial Development
Mountbatten of Burma, Earl, 35 Muslim Marriage and Family Laws Niemeyer Award, 184 Corporation (PIDC), 86-87, 182,
Muhammad, prophet of Islam, 3-5, Ordinance, 45-46, 108, 141, 270 Nishtar, Sardar Abdur Rab, 212-213 285, 290; EPIDC, 87; WPIDC, 87
44, 277 Mutiny of 1857, Indian, 7-8, 12 Nizam-i-Islam party, 225-227; after Pakistan National Congress, 228-229
Multan division, 40, 46, 58, 125 Mymensingh, 43, 124-125 1962, 252, 256, 258, 260-261, 267- Pakistan National party, 223; see
Murshed, S. M., 266 268, 280 also National Awami party
Musa, Mohammed, 189 National Assembly, 169-170, 192, 239; noncooperation movements, 14-17, 20- Pakistan People's party, 264-265,
Muslim community in British India: and Islam, 99, 107; and parity, 21, 293 273, 281, 283; and Democratic Ac-
attitude toward Congress, 9, 11-16, 115, 120, 129; parties in, 179, Noon, Malik Feroz Khan, 161, 214, tion Committee, 267-269; see also
22-24, 26-27; "loyalism," 8-10, 13- 204, 214, 229, 240-242, 244, 258; 222 Bhutto, Zulfikar Ali
15, 20; non-Muslim influences on, powers of, 174, 193-194, 207; pro- North-West Frontier Province, 39- parity, 115, 117, 120-121, 163, 198;
3-9; pan-Islamic ideas, 13-15, 26; cedures of, 165-168, 171-178, 191- 40, 110, 125-126; and center, 118, in administration, 114-115, 129-
separate identity and political 192; and proposed constitutional 187; and integration of West 130, 248, 260; in armed services,
unity, 1-5, 9-11, 18, 22-24, 26-30, change, 271-272, 274, 283; and Pakistan, 112, 118, 216, 223, 273n; 114, 146, 260; in economic develop-
36, 93, 100-101 public services, 131, 138; see also and partition, 31-32, 34-35; politics ment, 114-115, 183, 244, 248, 250,
Muslim community in Pakistan: elections; executive-legislative re- in, before 1947, 18, 22, 25, 29, 212; 260; and electorates, 104, 113-116,
fundamentalist views, 93n, 94, 97- lations politics in, after 1947, 213, 215- 119, 121; and interprovincial rela-
98, 100, 121, 227-228; modernist National Awami party: communist 216, 223, 298-299 tions, 110-114, 116-118, 129; in
views, 93n, 95, 98, 108, 208, 225; influence in, 222, 224, 250-252; in legislatures, 104, 110-121, 169, 219,
reforms in, 45-46, 108-110, 228; East Pakistan, 222, 225, 249-250, Objectives Resolution, 96, 100, 106, 260-261, 271-272, 283, 312; in par-
secularist views in, 36, 93, 97, 99; 257-258, 262; before martial law 119, 121 ties, 222, 240, 279; see also dis-
traditionalist views, 36, 93-94, 97- (1958), 222-225, 229, 295n; after One Unit, see West Pakistan, inte- parity, regional; West Pakistan,
98, I 00, 109, 121, 208, 226-227; martial law (1962), 246, 249-252, gration of integration of
unity of, 92, 102, 117, 121, 208, 256-258, 261-262, 281, 283, 292, 309; opposition: in Islam, 243; in legi~la- parliamentary secretaries, 162, 189,
230, 233, 282, 309; see also Islam "pro-Moscow" faction of, 251-252, tures, 166-167, 171, 207, 219. 158; 267

'~\
342 Index Index 343
parliamentary system, 91-92, 157-158, of, 233-238, 245-247, 249, 252, 255, preventive powers (cont.) vices, 129n; foreign service, 129;
285, 292, 312; in British India, 21, 286; see also names of individual Criminal Procedure Code, 143, lack of Bengalis in, n4, 128-130;
25, 27, 165; demand for restora· parties 269, 296; and Security of Pakistan and politics, 130-132, 232, 284-285,
tion of, 236, 245, 256-257, 268, Political Parties Act of 1962, 234- Act, 295; see also Defence of Paki- 289-291, 313-314; provincial, 129-
271-272, 273n, 278, 302, 305; and 235, 237, 242, 246, 252, 255, 279 stan Ordinance and Rules; emer- 130, 132; see also administration;
executive, 159, 162-164, 176-177; population, 38-43 gency, state of; fundamental rights, parity
and legislature, 165, 167-168, 170- premier, provincial, 192, 210; of as political issue Punjab, British India, 7, 9, 12, 45;
175, 178-179; and parliamentary Bengal, 24, 30, u8n, 215n; of East prime minister, 159-161, 170, 172, 181, Muslim representation in, 12, 21-
sovereignty, 173-174, 248, 273n,
292; parties in, 208-209, 229-231,
Pakistan, 215, 218, 220-221; of
Frontier, 35, 212-213; of Punjab,
205; see also zonal convention;
names of prime ministers
22, 24-25; and partition, 29-32, 34-
36
I
··1
313; in provinces, 187-188, 190- 24, 30, 35, 214, 238; of West Paki- princely states, 21, 35, no Punjab, Pakistan, 40-41, 51, 79, 110, '
192, 221-222 stan, 187-188, 212-213 Principles of Law-making, 106-107, 125; governor's rule in, 187; and
Parsis, 42-43 President of Pakistan, 82, 107, 148, 140 integration of West Pakistan, 110,
partition, 29, 31, 35, 72, 76; and 162, 305; appointments by, 49, 99, Principles of Policy, 107, u5, 129 l12, n8, 191-192; political groups
economy, 79-80 130, 137, 183, 201-202; and Assem- Prophet, 3-5, 44, 277 in, 45, 213, 215-216, 223-224, 298
Pashto, 46-47, 50 blies, 162, 168, 173, 175-178, 200; Provincial Administration Commis- Punjabi, 46-47, 51
Pathans, see ethnic groups and governors, 182, 188-190, 193- sion of 196o, 125 Punjabis, see ethnic groups
Pay and Services Commission Re- 194; under martial law, 161, 164- Provincial Assemblies, 107, 131, 190-
port, 132-133, 290 165, 178, 190; and ministers, 161- 194, 207; dissolution of, 190, 193, Qaid-i-Azam, see Jinnah, Mohammed
peasants, 24-25, 208, 222, 224, 249; 164, 171; Muslim, 98, 100, 109, 200, 242; in East Pakistan, 103, Ali
in East Pakistan, 6-7, 36, 64-67, 162; powers of, u5, 138-139, 159, 191-192, 203, 212, 250, political Qasuri, Mahmud Ali, 224, 250, 262
299; in West Pakistan, 44, 68-70, 161-162, 164-165; see also elections; conflict in, 192-193, 219-221, 225, Quasem, Abu!, 279n
72, 80 Khan, Agha Mohammad Yahya; 228, 258; Muslim League organi- Quetta division, 39, 41, 46, 79, 126;
Permanent Settlement, 64-65, 68; see Khan, Mohammad Ayub; Mirza, zation in, 240-241, 244; and respon- political groups in, 223; see also
also land revenue, in East Pakistan Iskander sible government, 186-188, 192; in Baluchistan
Peshawar, 7, 39-41, 46, 126 presidential system, 161-162, 164-165, West Pakistan, 103-104, u2, 191- Quran and Sunnah, 3-4, 8, 94-96,
pirs, 3, 44, 109, 298 286, 288; and Assembly, 167-168, 192, 195, 203, political conflict in, 277; and Constitution of 1956,
planning, 81-90, 153; see also eco- 170-171, 173-175, 193; collapse of, 212-213, 225, 242, 244-245, 247, 258; 97-99, 226-227; and Constitution
nomic policy; Five Year Plans; 158, 232, 314; inflexibility of, 163- see also elections; names of prov- of 1962, 107-108; and Jamaat-i-
Planning Commission 164, 302-304, 314; and parity, u5, inces Islami, 94, 228; see also Islam I

Planning Board, see Planning Com- 163; and parties, 207, 243, 245, 252; provincial autonomy, 18, 21, 25, 28, I·
mission 36, u7-u8; and central direction, I
and stability, 209, 263, 286; see Rahman, Hamoodur, 293n F
Planning Commission, 38, 68, 79, also Constitution of 1962; execu- 180-182, 187-190, 194; constitu- Rahman, S. A., 262 ll
89-90, 290, 306n; role of, 81-82; tive-legislative relations; viceroy, tional definition of, n5, u9, 179- railways, 80, 182 l1
see also Five Year Plans executive tradition of 183, 193-194, 221; and parity, no, Raisman, Sir Jeremy, 184
police, 123, 129, 144, 306; firing by, press, 295-297; Press and Publica- u6-u8, 120-121; as political issue, Rajshahi division, 39, 124-125
48, 215, 265, 269-270, 294 tions Ordinances, 143-144, 296, uo, u6, n8-120, 217, 221-224, Rawalpindi: city, 168; division, 40, 1
political agent, 126, 152 297; Progressive Papers, Limited, 267-269, 272-273, 281, 302; see also 46, 125 1,
distribution of powers; parity;
political parties, 209, 229-230, 284-
285, 301-302, 309; and Basic Demo-
cracies, 150, 197-198; code of be-
223, 269, 295; restrictions on, 143-
144, 296; see also fundamental
rights; preventive powers
West Pakistan, integration of
Provisional Constitution Order of
Rawalpindi conspiracy case, 147
referendum, 35, 175, 197, 201
refugees, 41-42, 80, 129, 300; in poli-
I1
11

havior, 282; and ideology, 282, 284, preventive powers, 123, 142-144, 296- 1969, 142, 165, 178 tics, 215, 228, 298
I'-
301-302, 309-310; and interest 297, 313; and detention laws, 142- public service commission, 115, 130- Rehman, Shaikh Mujibur, 248, 259,
groups, 288-290; in Islam, 101; 143, 248, 268-269, 273n, 279, 305; 131 262-263, 269, 271; political de-
and martial law, 275-276, 283; detention under, 223, 225, 228, public services, 128-133, 181: corrup- mands of, 271-274, 278, 283; see
Mirza's view of, 230-231; revival 246, 249, 255; and Section 144, tion in, 131-132, 306; finana- In· also A wami League
,

,.
' 1
344 Index Index 345
religion: as organized interest, 229, Sindhi, 46-47, 50 Tarbela dam, 61-63
77, 88; and Indus basin project,
290, 300-301; political use of, 95, Sindhis, see ethnic groups Tashkent Agreement, 141, 259, 264 62, 62n, 63; Pakistan's military I

100, 102, 104, 106, 253; see also Six-Point Demand, 259-261, 273, tehsildar, 123, 153-154
alliances with, 146, 221-222, 250, i,
electorates, separate; Islam; names 278; see also Awami League tehsils, 75-76, 126, 239; councils in,
261-262, 273n, 276, 281; see also i
of Muslim religious parties socialism, 267, 270, 274, 276-277, 281; 150-151, 153-155 foreign policy 11

representation, see electorates, sepa- and Islam, 264, 267, 270, 273, 277, Thal Development Authority, 58
universities, 50-53, 266, 270; Univer-
"n
rate; parity 301, 3u; see also National Awami Thana Training and Development sity Ordinances, 52, 266, 270; see II
Republican party, 213-214, 222, 225, party Center, 74 also students
229, 237, 247, 298 Speaker: as Acting President, 163, thanas, 74-76, 124, 239; councils in, urban areas, 39-40; local government
repugnancy of laws to Quran and 166, 176, 263; Deputy Speakers, 74, 150-151, 153, 155 in, 150-152, 155; social unrest in,
Sunnah, 97-99, 106-107, 109; see 43, 166-167, 191, 193, 221; of Na- Tiwana, Sir Khizr Hayat Khan, 30, 269-270, 304
also Islam tional Assembly, 166-167, 167n, 168, 35 Urdu, 24, 46-50
round table conference, 1969, 70-72, 177; of Provincial Assemblies, 191- tribal areas, 47, 126, 152; agencies, Ustaman Gui, 223; see also National
274, 278 193 40, 126; law enforcement in, 141, Awami party
Round Table Conferences, 1930- State Acquisition, see land revenue, 145; tribal loyalties in, 134, 208,
1932, 20-21, 26 in East Pakistan 298-299; see also Chittagong Hill
State language movement, see lan- Tracts; North-West Frontier Prov- viceroy, 17, 29; executive council of,
rural works program, 77, 152-154
guages, Bengali ince 17, 32, 34; executive tradition of,
Triple Canal Project, 58 157-158, 160-161, 164, 288; see also
salinity, 54-56, 58-60, 63; see also students, 289-290, 293-295, 303, 306;
Turkey, 13-15 governor general; interim govern-
irrigation and antigovernment agitation, 50,
Twenty-One Point Programme, 180, ment; presidential system
Sargodha division, 40, 43, 46, 58, 254, 265-266, 269-270, 272-274, 277,
217-219, 221; see also United Front Village AID (Agricultural-Industrial
125 281, 294; East Pakistan Students'
two-nation theory, 26-28, 101 Development) organization, 71-73
Sarkar, A.H., 220 All-Party Committee of Action,
Scheduled Castes, 42-43, 103, 229; 272, 273n; and press, 297
see also Hindus; minorities in subdivisional officer (SDO), 123-124, Wahhabi movement, 7-8; see also
Pakistan 1 53 ulama, 4-5, 7-8, 46; advisory func- Muslim community in British In-
secretariat, 123-124, 128, 132; cab- subdivisions, 123-125, 128, 239 tion of, 97-99, 107; Barelvi school dia
inet, 163; chief secretary, 123, 130; Sufiism, 3-4, 44 of, 44, 225-226; Deobandi school Waliullah, Shah, 5-7
President's, 163 Suhrawardy, Hussain Shaheed, 246; of, 12-13, 44, 93, 225; political ac- Water and Power Development Au-
Shahabuddin, Khwaja, 129n and Awami League, 215-219, 309; tivity of, 45, 225-226, 270, 300; thority (WAPDA), 71, 285, 290;
Shariat, see Islamic law premier of Bengal, u8n, 215n; traditionalist and fundamentalist EPWAPDA, 54-56; WPWAPDA, 63
Shia Muslims, 4, 44-45, 301 prime minister, 161, 163, 214, 221 views among, 93-95 Wavell, Earl, 32, 34
Sikandar-Jinnah Pact, 24 Sunnah, see Quran and Sunnah union councils, 75, 135, 149-152, 154, West Pakistan: and armed forces,
Sikhs, 7, 17, 24, 41, 43 Sunni Muslims, 4, 44-45 156, 239; union boards, 155; see 145-147; integration of, 125-127,
Simon Commission, 19-20 Supreme Court, 98, 137, 166, 181; also Basic Democracies; electoral 187, 212, 249, 256, 269, 278, 283,
Sind, 40, 70, uo, 125, 187; and inte- Chief Justices of, 43, 127, 132, 137, college 287, opposition to, 112-113, 118-
gration of West Pakistan, u2, u8, 262, 293n; and judicial review, Unionist party, 24, 29-30, 35, 213- 120, 127, 213-214, 216, 222-225,
216, 273n, 300; and partition, 27, ll2, 137-139, 162, 174, 255, 285, 214, 298 248, 261-262, 272, 273n, 278, 280-
31, 34, 35; political groups in, 213, 304; and political parties, 234, United Front, 180, 217-220, 229, 245, 281, 300, 312, support for, 110,
216, 223-224, 274, 298; pre-inde- 255, 260, 278; see also fundamen- 309; and National Awami party, 112-u3, 116-117, 188, 213, 219, 221,
pendence politics in, 18, 22, 24, 25 tal rights 222, 250; and Nizam-i-Islam party, 227, 243, 252, 26!, 271; regional
Sind Awami Mahaz, 216, 224; see Supreme Judicial Council, 137-138 226, 252; see also Awami League; diversity of, 37, 46, 77, 111-113,
also National Awami party Swat, 110, 126 Krishak Sramik party 118, 120, 125-126, 272, 298, 300;
Sind Hari Committee, 224; see also Syed, G. M., 224-225 United Progressive party, 229 relations with center, 110-113, 115,
National Awami party Sylhet, 35, 46 United States: and economic aid, 163, 187-189; see also distribution

'
346 Index
West Pakistan (cont.) Wrore Pashtoon, 223; see also Na-
of powers; elections; parity; pro- tional Awami party
vincial autonomy
West Pakistan Rangers, 145
women, 45-46, 51, 75; All-Pakistan zamindari abolition, see land reve-
Women's Association, 45; in public nue, in East Pakistan
office, 46, 150-151, 170, 189, 191- zamindars, see landlords
192, 200, 203, 257 zonal convention, 111, 115, 163, 167

The Politics of Pakistan

A Constitutional Quest

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