Chapter 2

Visualization and Progressive Schematization:

Framing the Issues

a2 b2 Take away b2 from a2

a b a a b

a+b
b
b a2 b2 = (a + b)(a b)

Fig. 2.1 A paper-and-scissors activity that models the difference of two squares

Something clicked in my head right this minute when we did

that. I like factoring and it’s nice to know why it makes sense
like that.
(Jackie, Grade 7, 12 years old).
We can build visual images on the basis of visual memories but
we can also use the recalled visual image to form a new image
we have never actually seen. Certainly, imagery is used in
everyday life, . . ., nevertheless imagery has to be considered as
a major medium of thought, as a mechanism of thinking relevant
to hypothesis generation. Some hypotheses naturally take a
pictorial form.
(Magnani, 2001, p. 98)
(C)asting the virtual into physicality forces the illusion to
withstand the light of day – to test its honesty. Experiencing a
physical object . . . is a different sense of apprehension of the
object . . . . Viewing the physical object, we have a more
integrated idea of the whole object.
(Dickson, 2002, p. 221)

Jackie (Cohort 2) was in seventh grade when she joined my Algebra 1 class to
participate in a yearlong teaching experiment involving various aspects of alge-
braic thinking at the middle school level. Her earlier mathematical experiences had
solidified for her the impression that mathematics was something that she merely

F.D. Rivera, Toward a Visually-Oriented School Mathematics Curriculum, 21

Mathematics Education Library 49, DOI 10.1007/978-94-007-0014-7_2,

C Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2011
22 2 Visualization and Progressive Schematization: Framing the Issues

Fig. 2.2 Algeblocks for one-

and two-variable polynomial
expressions (© ETA/
CuisenaireR , 2010,
http://www.etacuisenaire.com/
algeblocks/algeblocks.jsp)

followed on the basis of rules that occasionally made sense to her. Her comment
in the opening epigraph came early in the fall semester when our class was explor-
ing factoring simple polynomials initially from a visual perspective. In a follow-up
activity, when I asked the class whether it was possible to factor a sum of squares,
all of them said no and explained that there was no way of reconfiguring the totality
of two squares having two different dimensions into a single rectangle (i.e., with no
overlaps).
Later, when the students learned to use algeblocks (Fig. 2.2), a three-dimensional
version of algebra tiles, the manner in which they explained the process of factoring
simple quadratic trinomial and cubic binomial expressions reflected a firm grasp
of a visual strategy. For example, the responses of two Cohort 1 Grade students,
Cheska and Jamal, in Fig. 2.3 had them associating the task of factoring a simple
polynomial expression in terms of whether it was possible to reconfigure the relevant
algeblocks into a single rectangle whose dimensions represent the factors of the
given expression. Also, when I asked them to factor x3 + 2x2 , their initial approach
had them gathering algeblocks consisting of a cube and two squares and combining
them to form a cuboid with a square base x2 and a height of (x + 2). The visual
action allowed them to conclude the equivalent form x3 + 2x2 = x2 (x + 2).

1 Nature of Cognitive Activity and Cognitive Action

I have found it interesting to recast the cognitive actions of Jackie, Cheska, and
Jamal from a Peircean perspective – that is, interpreting their thinking and infer-
ring as matters that involve signs and sign activity, respectively, in relation to the
concept and process of factoring. The signs they used, as a matter of fact, convey
1 Nature of Cognitive Activity and Cognitive Action 23

Cheska:

Jamal:

Fig. 2.3 Responses of Cheska and Jamal in relation to the primeness of x2 + 2x + 2

the meaning and content of their experiences through an impressive appropriation

of both internal and external semiotic resources. Jamal and Cheska used their exter-
nally drawn knowledge of algeblocks to explain the nonfactorability of a quadratic
trinomial expression in terms of an internally derived diagram (Fig. 2.3). Jackie
was successful in factoring all binomials of the difference-of-squares type because
the paper-and-pencil activity in Fig. 2.1 helped her construct a canonical image
of a rectangle with dimensions corresponding to the factors of a difference of
squares.
The students’ cognitive actions could also be interpreted as exemplifying what
Magnani (2004) calls model-based reasoning that, at the very least, involves the
“construction and manipulation of various kinds of representations” (Magnani,
2004, p. 516), which includes visual representations. Central to scientific work, in
particular, conceptual change processes, Magnani (2004) notes how scientists fre-
quently engage in both theoretical (internal) and practical (external) activities that
allow them to gain a concrete experience of a phenomenon undergoing observa-
tion and analysis. However, the reasoning that accompanies the manipulations has
oftentimes been analyzed solely as an internal phenomenon with very little value
accorded to actions such as thinking through doing and/or thinking with the use of
external representations.
Recent empirical work in school mathematics education has also begun explor-
ing a similar modeling perspective. For example, central to instrumental genesis in
technology-mediated learning of mathematics is the acquisition of intended mathe-
matical knowledge as a consequence of learning more about (“instrumentation”) and
beyond (“instrumentalization”) the tools and their built-in functions (e.g., Rivera,
24 2 Visualization and Progressive Schematization: Framing the Issues

2005, 2007a; Trouche, 2003, 2005). Researchers who work in an emergent mod-
eling perspective ground initial mathematical activity in real or experientially real
settings, which provide learners with an opportunity to develop a “model of” some
(informal) intended mathematical knowledge that then becomes their basis in pro-
ducing a “model for” more (formal, general) mathematical concepts, processes,
and reasoning (e.g., Gravemeijer, Lehrer, van Oers, & Verschaffel, 2002; Stephan,
Bowers, Cobb, & Gravemeijer, 2003).
The following two related points below are worth noting early at this stage in
this book in light of how I situate the role of visualization in cognition involving
mathematical objects, concepts, and processes. First, cognitive activity is a dynamic
and distributed phenomenon, that is,

[it] is in fact the result of a complex interplay and simultaneous coevolution, in time, of the
states of mind, body, and external environment. Even if, of course, a large portion of the
complex environment of a thinking agent is internal, and consists in the proper software
composed of the knowledge base and of the inferential expertise of the individual, never-
theless a “real” cognitive system is composed by “distributed cognition” among people and
some “external” objects and technical artifacts.
(Magnani, 2004, p. 520)

One important implication of this distributed view on visualization in mathemat-

ical learning involves seeing “the cognitive system” as “instantiating the process
rather than cognition simpliciter,” that is, the product (Giere & Moffatt, 2003, p.
303).
Second, when a mathematician employs diagrams in his or her reasoning, the
visual process is part of this distributed epistemic phenomenon – that is,

a kind of epistemic negotiation between the sensory framework of the [mathematician]

and the external reality of the diagram. This process involves an external representation
consisting of written symbols and figures that for example are manipulated “by hand.” The
cognitive system is not merely the mind–brain of the person performing the [mathematical]
task, but the system consisting of the whole body (cognition is embodied) of the person
plus the external physical representation. In [mathematical] discovery the whole activity of
cognition is located in the system consisting of a human together with diagrams.
(Magnani, 2004, p. 520)

Thus, the term visualization as it is used in this book should not be viewed as a
thaumaturgical concept or a tool that is isolated and analyzed for the sole purpose of
developing and justifying an alternative mathematical practice distinct from current
institutional practices that continue to favor alphanumeric competence. I see it as
functioning within a distributed system that Magnani (2004) has clearly described
in the above two passages. Further, the dynamic nature of the system is compatible
with, and adaptive to, changes in representational competence or, in Freudenthal’s
(1981) words, progressive schematization.
In his August 1980 plenary address at the Fourth International Congress of
Mathematics Education, Freudenthal explained his idea of progressive schematiz-
ing, which I consider to be an integral element in any psychological account of
visual thinking in mathematics, in the following manner:
1 Nature of Cognitive Activity and Cognitive Action 25

The history of mathematics has been a learning process of progressive schematizing.

Youngsters need not repeat the history of mankind but they should not be expected either
to start at the very point where the preceding generation stopped. In a sense youngsters
should repeat history though not the one that actually took place but the one that would
have taken place if our ancestors had known what we are fortunate enough to know.
Schematizing should be seen as a psychological rather than a historical progression. . . . The
idea that mathematical language can and should be learned in such a way – by progressive
formalizing – seems even entirely absent in the whole didactical literature.
(Freudenthal, 1981, p. 140)

In present history, we are certainly fortunate enough to witness, and benefit from,
theoretical and methodological advances in the cognitive science of visualization
and learning technologies that we now find ourselves in a much better position to
realize Freudenthal’s vision of a mathematical language that could be learned from a
visually oriented progressive formalization perspective. In this context, visualization
is framed within, and pursued as, an epistemological process that lies at the kernel
of a conceptual and developmental account of alphanumeric competence.
Following O’Halloran (2005) and Millar (1994), progressive schematizing
involves a complex conceptual evolution and coordination of, and convergence
among, systems of semiotic resources. Progression at the intra-semiotic level occurs
within mathematical language, mathematical symbols, and visual images, while pro-
gression at the inter-semiotic level occurs between and among the three systems.
Since each type of semiotic resource contains information and several resources
that together convey redundancy of the same information in varying form and con-
tent, progression is a marked indication that some type of convergence is occurring.
To take a case in point, Jackie, Cheska, and Jamal acquired their algebraic compe-
tence in factoring in a progressive manner by drawing on their visual experiences
with the algeblocks that provided them with the necessary “insight, understanding,
and thinking” before they finally transitioned to “rote, routines, drill, memorizing,
and algorithms” (Freudenthal, 1981, p. 140). Factoring on a quadrant mat with the
algeblocks contained sufficient visual structural information that enabled them to
construct an analogous symbolic structure, which they conveyed through a diagram.
Progressively, the diagram emerged as a symbolic (algebraic) process that could
then handle all cases of factoring involving quadratic trinomial squares.
Following Bakker (2007), the use of symbolic forms associated with procedures
basically signifies successful hypostasis and increased “structuring of thought”
(O’Halloran, 2005, p. 2). Further, familiarity with the relevant concepts does not
necessarily imply the absence of visualization. For example, Fig. 2.4a–c shows the
written work of Jackie, Cheska, and Jamal on three assessment tasks that were given
to them toward the end of a teaching experiment on factoring. Clearly, they fully
transitioned to a routinized algebraic strategy they hypostasized as tic-tac-toe that
reflected their structural experiences with the algeblocks. The tic-tac-toe strategy
is a coded symbolic knowledge in algebraic form; it exemplifies a diagram, a type
of visual spatial representation in which the symbols, expressions, and other related
inscriptions are positioned and combined in a particular way that makes sense within
some stipulated rule.
26 2 Visualization and Progressive Schematization: Framing the Issues

Fig. 2.4 a Ollie’s algebraic method on a factoring task. b Cheska’s algebraic method on a factoring
task. c Jamal’s algebraic method with no variables on a factoring task

In making visualization an integral element of progressive schematization in the

epistemology of school mathematics, I may have given the impression that I am
denying the possibility of different styles, abilities, preferences in learning, and cul-
tural variations in visual attention, thinking styles, and other perceptual processes
(cf. Mayer & Massa, 2003; Pylyshyn, 2006; Nisbett, Peng, Choi, & Norenzayan,
2001). Indeed, some learners are more verbal than visual, others more numerical
than pictorial, and still others preferring more abstract than concrete approaches.
In my Algebra 1 class, when I asked them to analyze the assessment task shown in
Fig. 2.5a at the end of a visual-driven teaching experiment on linear systems of equa-
tions and inequalities, about 44% suggested a visual approach (Fig. 2.5b) and about
56% offered a nonvisual (algebraic, numerical; Fig. 2.5c) solution. Hence, it is hard
to escape the ubiquity of the dual coding phenomenon – the verbal versus nonverbal
processing reality among individuals – that Paivio and his colleagues (e.g., Clark &
Campbell, 1991; Clark & Paivio, 1991; Paivio, 1986, 2006; Paivio & Desrochers,
1 Nature of Cognitive Activity and Cognitive Action 27

Consider the following linear system:

y = 2x − 3
y = 2x + n

a
For what value or values of n will the linear For what value or values of n will the linear
system have no solution? Explain. system have an infinite number of
solutions? Explain.
b

Fig. 2.5 a An end-of-a-unit Algebra 1 assessment task involving a linear system of equations in
two variables. b Kirk’s visual approach to the Fig. 1.5a task. c Earl’s numerical solution to the
Fig. 1.5a task

1980) have empirically demonstrated in various activities, linguistic, mathematical,

and otherwise.
The claim concerning the existence of dual coding reminded me of three things.
First, I had students like Dina (eighth grader, Cohort 1) who consistently used
a numerical approach to generalizing patterns from sixth through eighth grade.
In sixth grade, when she extended and obtained a generalization for the pattern
in Fig. 2.6a, she initially noticed how each succeeding stage after the first kept
28 2 Visualization and Progressive Schematization: Framing the Issues

increasing by two circles. In reconstructing the pattern on the table with actual chips
and extending it to include two additional stages (Fig. 2.6b), she apparently saw
nothing else (e.g., shape of the pattern) beyond the additive relationship. Her prefer-
ence in dealing with patterns numerically was, in fact, carried through all the 3 years
she was involved in our study. For example, Fig. 2.7 shows her written work on a

Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 3 Stage 4

Stage 1

Stage 2

Stage 3

Stage 4

Stage 6
Stage 5
Stage 7

Stage 8

Fig. 2.6 a T circle pattern. b Dina’s interpretation of the pattern in Fig. 2.6a in sixth grade
1 Nature of Cognitive Activity and Cognitive Action 29

Fig. 2.7 Dina’s written work on a linear pattern task in eighth grade

linear pattern in Grade 8. Her written response to item 1 in Fig. 2.7 conveys a surface
knowledge of the basic features of the pattern. In explaining her direct formula, C =
3P + 1, which she established numerically, she associated the coefficient 3 with the
constant addition of three circles and the constant, 1, to the “circle in the middle.”
Second, a neural basis for both dual coding in mathematics and visuospatial
processing relevant to various aspects of numerical calculations has now been
established following rigorous methodological protocols. The results provide very
interesting insights that enable us to understand the fundamental, genetic role of
visual thinking in mathematics. For example, a recent brain imaging study by Tang
et al. (2006) has shown that arithmetical processing in the brain appears to be
shaped by cultures. When the thinking processes of 12 adult Western participants
and 12 university Chinese students were compared in relation to a simple visually
30 2 Visualization and Progressive Schematization: Framing the Issues

presented arithmetical task that asked them to determine whether a third digit was
greater than the bigger one of the first two in a triplet of Arabic numbers, they actu-
ally found “differences in the brain representation of number processing between”
the two groups (p. 10776). On this particular task, the Chinese participants pro-
cessed visually, while the Western participants processed verbally. Tang et al. (2006)
hypothesized that the visual dominance in number processing among the Chinese
participants could be explained by their reading experiences in school, which
involve repeatedly learning Chinese characters, and their early experiences in using
an Abacus that activated the production of mental images that are all visual in form.
A recent review of research studies on the role of visuospatial processing in
various aspects that matter to arithmetical computing by de Hevia, Vallar, and
Girelli (2008) presents converging evidence that infers a “close relationship between
numerical abilities and visuospatial processes” (p. 1361). For example, individuals
have been documented to be relying on a spatial mental number line when com-
paring and obtaining differences of two numbers. The line, which research shows
appears to be oriented from left to right, assists subjects in dealing with numerical
quantities and their relationships and magnitudes at least in approximate (and not in
exact) terms. Certainly, with more cultural learning, the relevant spatial properties
are expected to further develop and undergo refinement. Beyond studies involving
the mental number line, de Hevia et al. (2008) also underscore the significant role of
visuospatial representations in memory and arithmetical problem solving. Findings
include the following: (1) learners tend to keep numbers in an active state by draw-
ing on some form of visuospatial support; (2) mathematical prodigies develop and
use internal visual calculators that become evident when they solve numerical tasks
that require complex computations; (3) individuals perform arithmetical procedures
(e.g., obtaining the product of multi-digit numbers) by coordinating their stored
arithmetical facts and their spatial image of the process relevant to the operation, a
view that refines earlier interpretations which trace the process to be primarily work-
ing within a language-based semantic network (e.g., verbal rote learning of facts).
Third, in their recent extensive review of research concerning the imagery
and spatial processes of blind and visually impaired individuals, Cattaneo et al.
(2008) clearly articulate what I interpret from research among nonblind learners
of mathematics to be a problematic aspect of the constitutive nature of the “visual
experience.” Cattaneo et al. write:

The perceptual limitations of the congenitally blind are reflected at a higher cognitive level,
probably because their cognitive mechanisms have developed by touch and hearing, which
only allow a sequential processing of information. As a consequence, cognitive function-
ing of blind individuals seems to be essentially organized in a “sequential” fashion. On
the contrary, vision – allowing the simultaneous perception of distinct images – facilitates
simultaneous processing at a higher cognitive level.
(Cattaneo et al., 2008, p. 1360)

One (pedagogical) concern about using visual thinking in mathematics as a cogni-

tive strategy deals with the issue of how to cope with the “simultaneous perception
of images,” which could be an overwhelming experience for nonblind learners.
From a practical standpoint, unlike alphanumeric representations that tend to bolster
2 Basic Elements and Tensions in a Visually Oriented School Mathematics Curriculum 31

some form of sequential learning, a visual approach to understanding mathemati-

cal objects, concepts, and processes necessitates extensive assistance in the zone of
proximal development. However, my own experiences with students like Jackie in
the opening epigraph provide me with sufficient empirical proof to say that encour-
aging visual thinking in mathematics is worth pursuing due to its positive effects
both in the short and the long haul.
Chapter 5 discusses the central role of visual thinking in the construction and
justification of simple and complex algebraic generalizations relative to linear and
nonlinear figural patterns. Chapter 7 addresses both physiological and sociocultural
dimensions of visual representation in mathematical knowledge acquisition. At this
stage, it simply suffices to say that while numerical-driven processes help students
fulfill aspects of school mathematical activity such as factoring and constructing a
direct formula, which may be institutionally sufficient (i.e., on the basis of the min-
imal competence required in state tests to be labeled mathematically proficient), the
absence of any visual-based processing might prevent many of them from tapping
onto their “natural” or “cultural” systems that would allow them to develop what
Freudenthal above considers to be valued noble acts of insights, understanding,
and thinking. Results of preinstructional clinical interviews with my Grade 2 stu-
dents, for example, indicate that young children seem to have an early visual-based
understanding of functions on the basis of their success in dealing with grade-level
appropriate visual growth-patterning tasks (Rivera, 2010c; see Rivera (2006) for a
brief synthesis of relevant work). If tapped effectively, the visual experience could
assist them in hypostasizing the symbolic meaning of functions early in their school
mathematics education. Here I am also reminded of Davydov (1990), who astutely
pointed out that alphanumeric expressions remain senseless entities unless they
are “placed under” a “real, object-oriented, sensorially given foundation” (p. 34).
Paivio (1971), in fact, has noted the flexible capacity of visual imagery in dealing
with several amounts of information at the same time, a view echoed by Cattaneo
et al. (2008) in the case of vision in neuropsychological terms.

2 Basic Elements and Tensions in a Visually Oriented School

Mathematics Curriculum

A thoroughgoing visually oriented school mathematics curriculum requires an

explanation. Traditionally, visual thinking has been associated with concrete rep-
resentations within a concrete-to-abstract continuum – that is, the visual or the
concrete phase assists in meaningful construction and appropriation leading to an
intended abstract knowledge in symbolic form. Figure 1.2a, b lists other binaries
associated with this continuum phenomenon. It is a fact that some mathematical
concepts (e.g., irrational and imaginary numbers) and processes (e.g., matrix mul-
tiplication) make sense only at the operative level in which they come to exist as a
result of having been constructed extensions at the abstract level. Dörfler (2008)
makes a useful distinction between referential and operative views of algebraic
notation. In the referential view, there is a close mapping between rules and sym-
bols and the arithmetical laws and experiences that govern them. In the operative
32 2 Visualization and Progressive Schematization: Framing the Issues

view, there is no immediate appeal to any numerical arithmetical experiences. In

the referential domain, letters are generalized numbers. In the operative domain,
they are primarily signs without a referent but are capable of being manipulated
according to agreed upon rules at the abstract level (Dörfler, 2008, pp. 144–145).
However, in this book, I take the position that the abstract phase in the contin-
uum need not convey the absence of a visual representation. A more productive view
involves the necessity of employing a different kind of seeing. In fact, many canoni-
cal forms and diagrams in almost all areas of mathematics are visual (hypostasized)
abstractions of generalized concepts.
Figure 2.8 is a diagram of two-triangular relationships that illustrates the taken-
as-shared view of a smooth transition from the visual to the abstract in the case of
all referential content but a more perilous transition in the case of most operative
content. In fact, much of school mathematics content operates within the solid,
referential triangle. The conceptual tension begins when an operative content moves
through the continuum in which some mathematical concepts and processes could
not be sufficiently captured and described in visual terms unless, of course, some
constraints are imposed on them.
For example, in my Algebra 1 class, √ I used the pebble arithmetic activity in
Fig. 2.9a to explain the irrationality of 2. Unfortunately, my students never settled
their doubt about the number being nonterminating and nonrepeating when alterna- √
tively represented by digits. While the activity in Fig. 2.9b convinced them that 2
was indeed a real number between 1 and 2 with an exact location on the number line
and
√ that it made sense to visually see, manipulate, and operate numbers that involve
2 and other irrational numbers for that matter, they were more interested in seeing
how one would go about constructing the alternative representation below.

1.41421356237309504880168872420969807856967187537694807317667973799073247
846210703885038753432764157273501384623091229702492483605585073721264412
149709993583141322266592750559275579995050115278206057147010955997160. . .

A follow-up activity we used in class involves finding the sum of the harmonic
series

∞
 1 1 1 1
=1+ + + + ··· .
n 2 3 4
n=1

Abstract
Visual

Referential Operative

Fig. 2.8 A two-triangular model of content in school mathematics

2 Basic Elements and Tensions in a Visually Oriented School Mathematics Curriculum 33

a Pebble Arithmetic Proof of the Irrationality of 2

An even number 2m means 2 horizontally aligned rows of m dots, say,

..... .....

A square array of 2m x 2m means 4 square arrays, each consisting of m x m dots. Hence, every
even square number is the sum of 4 square numbers.
..... .....
..... .....
..... .....
..... .....
..... .....
..... .....
..... .....
..... .....
..... .....
..... .....
An odd number 2m + 1 means 2 horizontally aligned rows of m dots plus an isolated dot, say,
..... . .....

A square array of (2m+1) x (2m+1) means 4 square arrays, each consisting of m x m dots, plus
4 groups of m dots, plus a central dot. Hence, every odd square number is odd (why?).
..... . .....
..... . .....
..... . .....
..... . .....
..... . .....
..... . .....
..... . .....
..... . .....
..... . .....
..... . .....
..... . .....
Hence, even squares are even and odd squares are odd. But every even square is a sum of
four squares. We are now ready to prove that 2 is an irrational number.

Proof:
a a2
If 2 = , (a, b ≠ 0 integers), then 2 = 2 or a2 = 2b2. So, a2 is twice another square number.
b b
Then there would have to be a smallest square number that is twice another square number
since there is no unending sequence of ever smaller square numbers. Let k2 be the smallest. So
k 2 = 2(h2).
Then k2 is an even square. So, there is some number n such thet
k 2 = 4(n2).
Also, h2 = 2(n2).
Since h2 is smaller that k2, it means that a smaller square number than k2 is twice another
square number, but this contradicts the assumption we made about k2 being the smallest.
Thus, there is no square number that is twise another.
b Exploring 2
1. Use a construction paper to outline a unit square. Then draw a diagonal to the square
and cut along the diagonal. What is the length of the diagonal?

2. Obtain a piece of adding-machine tape and draw a number line that is sufficient enough to
construct and label integers from –10 to 10. Then construct and label –9.5, –8.5,–7.5, …, 9.5.

3. Starting from 0, lay out the diagonal whose length is 2 on the number line. Estimate
the numerical value of 2 . Can the value be 1.5? Why or why not? Which number is it closest to?

4. Construct 2 2 , 3 2 , and 5 2 on the same number line. Estimate their values.

5. Construct 2 + 2 . Is it the same as 2 2 ? Explain.
2+ 2 2+ 2
6. Construct . Marian thinks that =1+ 2 . Is she correct? Why or why not?
2 2
√
Fig. 2.9 a Pebble arithmetic
√ proof of the irrationality of 2 (Giaquinto, 2007, pp. 139–141).
b Activity involving 2 (adapted from Coffey, 2001)
34 2 Visualization and Progressive Schematization: Framing the Issues

Fig. 2.10 Visual illustration

of the sum of the first four
terms of the harmonic series

∞
1 1
n
n=1

1 2 3 4

Initially, the students used a centimeter graphing paper and constructed the picture
shown in Fig. 2.10. Then they confirmed that each shaded rectangle had an area
corresponding to a term in the given harmonic series. Next I asked them to imagine
a train of shaded rectangles beyond the picture they drew. I had them estimating
the amount of paint they would need to cover the entire shaded area. With the aid
of a graphing calculator, they started adding the terms one by one. After verifying
on the basis of a sufficient number of terms that the series would yield no finite
sum, they began to realize the difference between everyday and mathematical ways
of seeing.
The above experience allowed my Algebra 1 students to develop the view
that visually drawn constructions of some mathematical objects, concepts, or pro-
cesses despite being incomplete in form could also effectively assist in developing
structural awareness (Mason, Stephens, & Watson, 2009) of the corresponding
abstract knowledge. While their totality (i.e., essence) could not be fully appre-
hended through the sensory modalities alone, what is actually being sought is
intellectual insight drawn from one’s emerging structural awareness as mediated
by the relevant visual representation. Certainly, having structural awareness drawn
from visual forms would allow learners to construct inferences about the corre-
sponding abstract object, concept, or process. This perspective should assist us in
moving beyond dichotomous thinking relative to the symbolic/visual hierarchy in
mathematics. Brown (1999) is certainly correct in pointing out that some math-
ematical knowledge could not be primarily derived from sense experiences, as
follows:

All measurement in the physical world works perfectly well with rational numbers. Letting
the standard meter stick be our unit, we can measure any length with whatever desired
accuracy our technical abilities will allow; but the accuracy will always be to some rational
number (some fraction of a meter). In other words, we could not discover irrational numbers
or incommensurable segments (i.e., lengths which are not ratios of integers) by physical
measurement. It is sometimes said that we learn 2 + 2 = 4 by counting apples and the like.
Perhaps experience plays a role√in grasping the elements of the natural numbers. But the
discovery of the irrationality of 2 was an intellectual achievement, not at all connected to
sense experience.
(Brown, 1999, pp. 5–6)
3 General Notion of Visualization in this Book 35

His basic point is reflected via the dashed side of the operative triangle shown in
Fig. 2.8, which symbolically conveys the treacherous path that characterizes the
movement from the visual to the abstract or, more appropriately, from our everyday
sense of the visual to the mathematically visual.
However, aiming for structural awareness allows us to engage in a more rec-
onciliatory interanimated discussion of the perceived divide between the visual
and the symbolic or, in Brown’s terms, between sense experience and intellectual
achievement. This move toward interanimation is derived from the work of Warren,
Ogonowski, and Pothier (2005), who also saw the need to move past what they
perceive to be dichotomies in modes of thinking in school science. They speak of
interanimation in terms of some creative coordination, that is,
[it] denotes a process whereby a person comes to regard one way of conceptualizing, rep-
resenting, and evaluating the world through the eyes of another, each characterized by its
own objects, meanings, and values. As such, it resists the strong temptation to dichotomize
modes of thinking or being.
(Warren et al., 2005, p. 142)

The move toward structural awareness is, thus, seen as being initially rooted in
visual experience and, yet, serves as a route in gaining a better access of the cor-
responding abstract knowledge as well. Its essence, Mason, Stephens, and Watson
(2009) note, lies in a learner’s “experience of generality, not a reinforcement of par-
ticularities” (p. 17) that enables him or her to find meaning in manipulating both
representational contexts in a simultaneous fashion.

3 General Notion of Visualization in this Book

In this book, I share the view that visualization is about “the many ways in which
pictures, visual images, and spatial metaphors influence our thinking1 ” (Reed, 2010,
p. 3). Hence, in its raw form, it could be either internal (mental images) or external
(diagrammatic and spatial representations) (see Lohse, Biolsi, Walker, & Rueler,
1994 for an interesting classification of visual representations). Reed articulates it
clearly when he insists that
[l]anguage is a marvelous tool for communication, but it is greatly overrated as a tool for
thought. . . . Much of comprehending language, for instance, depends on visual simulations
of words or on spatial metaphors that provide a foundation for conceptual understanding.
Sometimes we are conscious of visual thinking. At other times it works unconsciously
behind the scenes.
(Reed, 2010, p. 3)

1 Bees provide a nonhuman example of species that appear capable of distinguishing between
shapes and employing landmarks in tracing their route from some food source to their hive (Frisch,
1967).
36 2 Visualization and Progressive Schematization: Framing the Issues

However, as a tool for mathematical thinking, visualization has to take a much

stronger sense in order to be significant and powerful. As I have used it over the past
several years as a cognitive tool in helping my students learn mathematics better,
I see visualization as a type of representation that employs “visuospatial relations
in making inferences about corresponding conceptual relations” (Gattis & Holyoak,
1996, p. 231). Thus, I do not associate visual thinking in mathematics in static terms
as merely about seeing images or pictures for the sake of having a visual or a sense
experience in order to make mathematics learning fun. It is, more importantly, a
concept- or process-driven seeing with the mind’s eye.
Visualizing with the aid of, say, algeblocks, fraction strips, drawn pictures, and
other manipulatives requires going beyond acknowledging that certain alphanu-
meric expressions could be mapped onto particular concrete images or diagrams.
It also means employing it as a perceptual tool for exploring, sense making, con-
structing, and establishing the corresponding conceptual relations, “demonstrating
and searching for a justification” (Malaty, 2008), and theorizing. Figure 2.11a–c
provides examples of a bar representational approach in making sense of word prob-
lems involving percents. The examples have been drawn from several elementary
school mathematics texts that are currently being used in classrooms in Singapore,
the Netherlands, and Japan.2 The rectangles shown are relation-based diagrams that
convey particular meanings relevant to the problems being investigated. Another
example is shown in Fig. 2.12. Parker’s (2004) visual strategy in making sense
of percent increase and percent decrease problems in prealgebra allows students
to see relationships between various symbols (percent, numbers, terms associated
with percent) involved in solving a particular type of percent problems. Kennedy’s
(2000) work with several groups of at-risk high school students emphasizes the
need for them to see concrete-to-abstract and numerical-to-algebraic relationships
between various manipulative models in integers (chips), fractions (strips and pat-
tern blocks), percents and decimals (fraction strips), and the continuous number line.
A fourth example is shown in Fig. 2.13 drawn from my second-grade class, which
shows how they employed visual representations in making sense of, and establish-
ing the conceptual relations involved in, adding, subtracting with regrouping, and
multiplying whole numbers appropriate at their grade level.
The activity of theorizing in visualization means establishing conjectures and
mathematical explanations, including “making speculative and intuitive work”
(Jaffe & Quinn, 1993, p. 2) that in most cases might not be the same thing as estab-
lishing rigorous mathematics in which case the focus is on formal deductive proof.
Visual theorizing shares many of the characteristics associated with the notion of
theoretical – that is, according to Jaffe and Quinn (1993):

2 SeeNg and Lee (2009), Murata (2008), and van Galen, Feijs, Figueiredo, Gravemeijer, van
Herpen, and Keijzer (2008) for an explanation of the role of rectangular, tape, and strip diagrams in
Singapore, Japanese, and Dutch textbooks, respectively. I should note the interesting similarity in,
and convergence toward, the use of visual approaches in teaching word problems in mathematics
(more generally) in these countries.
3 General Notion of Visualization in this Book 37

Fig. 2.11 (continued)

38 2 Visualization and Progressive Schematization: Framing the Issues

A school increased its staff by 35%. If 108 On Labor Day, cell phone prices were
staff members were working after the marked down by 20%. The sale price of an
increase, how many were there originally? item was $300. What was the original price
Solution: of the item before the discount?
Let x be the original number of staff members Solution: Let x be the original price in dollars

Original Decrease Final Amount

Original Increase Final Amount

100 35 135 100 20 80

108 x y 300
x y
100 80
=
100 = 135 x 300
x 108 80x = 30000
135x = 10800 x = 375
x = 80
35 135 20 80
= =
y 108 y 300
y = 28 y = 75
Check: 80 + 28 = 108
Check: 375 – 75 = 300
There were 80 staff members prior to the The original price of a cell phone was $375
increase. before the 20% decrease.

Fig. 2.12 Examples of Parker’s (2004) unitary diagrams for solving percent increase and percent
decrease problems


Fig. 2.11 a Visual approach to percent problems using unitary diagrams in a US version of a
Singapore mathematics text (Curriculum Planning and Development Division, 2008, pp. 51 &
99; Copyright belongs to the government of the Republic of Singapore, c/o Ministry of Education,
Singapore, and has been reproduced with their permission). b Visual approach to a percent problem
using a bar diagram in a US version of a Netherlands mathematics text (Mathematics in Context,
2006, p. 23). c Visual approach to a percent problem using a tape diagram in a US version of a
Japanese mathematics text (Tokyo Shoseki, 2006, p. 66)
3 General Notion of Visualization in this Book 39

Campos’s Visual Subtraction with Regrouping Involving Two Two-Digit Whole Numbers

Lana’s Visual Addition with Regrouping Involving Two Three-Digit Whole Numbers

Eddie’s Visual Multiplication Involving Two Single-Digit Whole Numbers

Fig. 2.13 Grade 2 students’ visual approaches to adding, subtracting, and multiplying whole
numbers
40 2 Visualization and Progressive Schematization: Framing the Issues

The initial stages of mathematical discovery – namely, the intuitive and conjectural work,
like theoretical work in the sciences – involves speculations on the nature of reality beyond
established knowledge. Thus we borrow our name “theoretical” from this use in physics.
There is an older use of the word “theoretical” in mathematics, namely, to identify “pure”
rather than applied mathematics; this is a usage from the past which is no longer common
and which we do not adopt.
(Jaffe & Quinn, 1993, p. 2)

4 The Meaning of Representation in this Book

In using the term representation, I acknowledge the intricate relationship between

its narrow and broad meanings [in Piaget’s (1951) sense]. In a narrow sense, it
refers to symbols that render an internal experience in some intelligible external
form with the primary intent to communicate (“this expresses what I think I see”).
In a broad sense, it conveys one’s current worldview, that is, his or her interpreta-
tion of his or her experience of a phenomenon under investigation (“this is how I
see”; cf. Pylyshyn, 1973) or, more concisely in Leyton’s (2002) sense, “representa-
tion as explanation.” For Vergnaud (2009), it is “a dynamic activity . . . a functional
resource [that] organizes and regulates action and perception . . . [and is] a product
of action and perception” (p. 93). Goldin (2002) offers a functional definition, that
is, representation consists of inscriptions (or signs), rules for combining them, and
a structure that allows the rules to make sense. Visual thinking, then, as a type of
inference-based representation could be either personally drawn (i.e., based on indi-
vidual subjective images) or externally mediated (i.e., based on what is acquired
by the learner in a distributed context through acting with other learners and act-
ing on institutional artifacts such as manipulatives and graphing calculators that, by
their very nature, are loaded with intentional knowledge), or both. With more for-
mal learning and socially structured experiences, it is likely the case that personal
or subjective visualization and institutional ways of seeing will become integrated
and more aligned than separate.
To illustrate, Fig. 2.14a shows the visual representations in written form of Jackie
(Cohort 2, seventh grader) on a patterning task that I gave to my Algebra 1 class
twice, before and after a month-long teaching experiment on linear patterning and
generalization. With no external influence by way of formal instruction, she initially
perceived and visually constructed an oscillating pattern of short and long shapes of
V in which “every odd numbered stage . . . takes up 2 squares” and “every even
numbered stage . . . takes up 4 squares.” The pattern she visualized after the teach-
ing experiment reflects an appropriation of an externally derived visual experience,
which explains her choice of a linear pattern and her use of algebraic symbols in
which she conveyed her algebraic generalization. Figure 2.14b shows the visual rep-
resentations in written form of Arman (Grade 2) on two addition problems before
and after a 3-week teaching experiment on addition of whole numbers of up to three
digits long. Prior to the teaching experiment, he would employ a count-all visual
4 The Meaning of Representation in this Book 41

Fig. 2.14 (continued) a Before

After
42 2 Visualization and Progressive Schematization: Framing the Issues

b Before

After

Fig. 2.14 a Jackie’s written work on a free construction task after a teaching experiment on linear
pattern generalization. b Arman’s before and after visuals involving addition of whole numbers

strategy when adding whole numbers. He would initially draw all the required cir-
cles (or sticks) on the basis of the numbers that were presented to him and then
would patiently count all of them together. After the teaching experiment, his com-
bined visual/symbolic strategy reflected his understanding of the central role of
place value and regrouping in the addition process. The solutions offered by Jackie
and Arman exemplify what I consider in this book to be visual (and much later
visuoalphanumeric) representations.
5 Three Fundamental Principles of Visualization 43

5 Three Fundamental Principles of Visualization

Visualization plays a fundamental role in any account of concept or process devel-
opment, including problem solving. The manner in which it is addressed, however,
depends on the role it plays in a particular theoretical paradigm, tradition, or orien-
tation. For example, while the perceptual basis of knowledge is central to empiricist
accounts, it is not so in the case of rationalist/nativist and historico-cultural tradi-
tions. Rationalist and nativist perspectives tend to have a taken-for-granted view of
visual images or impressions since the primary interest lies in articulating innate
structures that individuals are presumed to have at birth, which they use to acquire
more knowledge about their world. In the historico-cultural tradition, any meaning-
ful visualization, like all concepts, is cast in terms of its historically, socially, and
culturally constructed and negotiated nature.
In this section, the fundamental principles of visualization that I suggest, which I
have interpretively drawn from the general cognitive literature, are not aligned with
any particular tradition since the jury is still out about whether a single paradigm
could sufficiently characterize concept attainment within its stipulated rules and
principles. Nevertheless, there are some common principles on visual representation
that, albeit drawn from visual reasoning about everyday objects, are worth pursuing
in a developing theory of visualization in school mathematics. This section is also
meant for readers who are interested in how researchers outside of mathematics
education have pursued, investigated, and analyzed the phenomenon of visualization
with respect to objects and concepts that are not necessarily math related.
I should note that the last section in Chapter 3 revisits these same principles
with the goal of situating them within work done on visualization in relation to
mathematical cognitive activity. The need to have an extended discussion on these
same principles in Chapter 3 deals with the fact that visualizing about mathematical
objects, concepts, and processes is much harder than, and different from, visual-
izing about everyday objects, concepts, and processes. In the case of the former,
they are theoretically derived (e.g., finding the zeros of a quadratic function by the
quadratic formula), formal (e.g., variables and all definitions), and structurally com-
plex. Also, the mathematical tasks in which visualization is employed necessitate
a consideration of the intricate interconnectedness between and among the follow-
ing constructs: (1) actions of a learner (i.e., to interpret or to construct by way of
predicting, classifying, translating, or scaling); (2) situation (i.e., whether abstract
or contextualized); (3) variables (i.e., the data, whether concrete or abstract and dis-
crete or continuous, and the form, whether categorical, ordinal, interval, or ratio),
and; (4) focus (i.e., the location of attention) (cf. Lienhardt, Zaslavsky, & Stein,
1990).
We begin Chapter 3 with strong claims about the visual roots of mathematical
cognitive activity. Visual representations in mathematics are not simply personal
images or visual images-in-the-wild but convey explicit knowledge structures that
are constructed and negotiated in a lifeworld-dependent context. That is, the context
of visual representations is seen to operate within shared rules, habits of seeing, and
cultural practices. Further, the different kinds of visuals that are generated depend
44 2 Visualization and Progressive Schematization: Framing the Issues

on the type of activity that is pursued, which could be imaginal (e.g., appeal to intu-
ition), formational (e.g., concept or process development), or transformational (e.g.,
problem solving). Since all visual representations are conveyed through signs, we
discuss different types of mathematical objects. Also, since all visual representations
operate within rules and structures, we articulate the figural nature of the concepts
that allow the objects to exist. Section 5 in Chapter 3 revisits the meaning of visual
thinking but developed in the context of mathematics.
Principle of acquisition: Individuals abduce the intended meanings of visual
representations involving everyday objects through the use of one strategy or a
combination of two or more strategies. Some documented strategies include learned
pairings; manipulating their corresponding iconic representations; associating with
a relevant experience; and establishing relational structural similarities. Abduction
refers to the logic that “covers all the operations by which theories and conceptions
are engendered” (Peirce, 1957, p. 237). That is, it “consists in studying facts and
devising a theory to explain them” and “its only justification is that if we are ever
to understand things at all, it must be in that way” (Peirce, 1934, p. 90). Abduction,
in fact, plays a central role in the development of mathematical concepts, processes,
and representations since it is primarily concerned with developing and establishing
inferences about rules (Thagard, 1978), rules and their extensions in simultaneity
(Eco, 1983), and structures (Mason, Stephens, & Watson, 2009).
Gattis (2004) was particularly interested in how spatial representations acquire
their meanings, but many of her claims also apply to visual representations in the
general case. The meanings of symbols are oftentimes acquired through learned
pairings, which involves explicitly learning the relationship between script and
sound or between word and picture. Iconic symbols allow a mapping to take place
between the elements of the image and the icon, especially if there is a good fit
or an isomorphism between the icon or the physical model and the correspond-
ing referent. However, no new information could be obtained beyond what icons
represent because they represent an already existing object. Especially in the case
of everyday objects, icons depend on physical resemblance and are not generally
useful in representing abstract concepts such as “goodness.”
Among abstract concepts, associations with a relevant experience significantly
matter more than physical semblance. For example, children associate growth
graphically with a vertical line or express feelings of warm and cold by imag-
ining fire and ice, respectively. But association as a strategy itself could also be
deceiving and limited and could possibly lead to misconceptions especially in
cases when multiple mappings are possible or when counterintuitive concepts are
involved.
Similarities of relational structure involve establishing relationships “between
objects, relations between them, and relations between relations” (Gattis, 2004,
p. 592). For example, interpreting a given spatial representation such as a map
or a graph involves mapping “conceptual elements to spatial elements, conceptual
relations to spatial relations, and higher-order conceptual relations to higher-order
spatial relations” (Gattis, 2004, p. 592). Relational structure activates relevant cog-
nitive processes such as metaphorical and analogical reasoning, which capitalize on
5 Three Fundamental Principles of Visualization 45

similarities observed between and among objects, concepts, and relations. The nov-
elty of Gattis’s (2004) notion of relational structure stems from individuals’ typical
experiences with everyday diagrams in which only general meanings are available
and follow-up work is needed, which involves constructing and reasoning about
particular details. The details include establishing a mapping on three levels, that
is, object to object, relation to relation, and higher order relation to higher order
relation.
In Chapter 4, I discuss the mutually determining role of structured visual
representations and alphanumeric symbolization in the construction of visuoal-
phanumeric symbols. We begin the chapter by considering at least three types of
mathematical symbols – iconic, indexical, and symbolic – that appear to share many
of the same characteristics above that Gattis (2004) inferred in the case of every-
day objects and concepts. In the case of everyday and logic problems, Fig. 2.15 is
a schematic model that situates the use of visual imagery in the beginning phase
that is then carried through and progresses toward more verbal and other symbolic
forms. Certainly, it is easier to state a rule or express a relationship in verbal or
symbolic form. Further, the phenomenon of visual fading seems to occur in prob-
lem situations that are of the sequential reproduction type (i.e., sequential in the
sense that general principles have already been established and reproduced because
of the recognition of a familiar structure). However, the verbal or the symbolic
phase does not necessarily imply the absence of visual images. Such images, in
fact, basically support judgment, reasoning, and decision-making strategies. For
example, among chess masters, their verbal articulations represent “judgments on
more abstract representations of board positions” (Kaufmann, 1985, p. 62) without
needing to repeatedly employ specific visual strategies. Among expert soccer play-
ers (and coaches, in particular, who communicate with their players using slates

Verbal
(Simultaneous – Sequential)
Type of processing

Visual

Fig. 2.15 Schematic model

of visual–verbal (Reproductive – Productive)
representation (Kaufmann,
1985, p. 63) Level of Processing
46 2 Visualization and Progressive Schematization: Framing the Issues

or tablets), when presented with abstract representations of simulated visual soccer

scenes (i.e., concrete details were removed and crosses were used instead of play-
ers), they have been documented to make quick and effective (verbal) decisions
despite the absence of pertinent visual information (such as physical character-
istics and actions of players). Their expertise could be explained in terms of the
visual patterns and other relevant domain-specific knowledge that they have stored
in long-term memory (Poplu, Ripoll, Mavromatis, & Baratgin, 2008).
We offer a similar argument in the case of visuoalphanumeric symbols. Chapter 4
explores the different mathematical symbols in some detail, especially the contexts
in which they are used. Readers are introduced to the Wittgensteinian notion of
modes of signification that highlights the use of the same symbol (say, fractions
and variables) to convey different things. Throughout the chapter, we reinforce the
notion of progressive schematization in both intra- and inter-semiotic resources and
draw on many classroom instances in my middle and elementary school classes
for empirical evidence of salient points. In particular, I make a strong claim
about the necessity of transitioning from iconic and indexical representations and
actions to symbolic via psychological distancing (DeLoache, 2005) as a way of
supporting shifts that are needed in thinking from visual to abstract and from ref-
erential to operative (Fig. 2.8). One section provides an historical apercu of the
progressive evolution of symbolic thinking in algebra. The last section provides
the necessary context in understanding the ideas that are pursued in Chapter 5. In
this section, readers obtain an empirical account of the development of visuoal-
phanumeric symbols among my middle school participants who were involved in
a 3-year longitudinal design-driven research in pattern generalization activity. By
pattern generalization, I refer to actions of construction and justification of direct,
closed formulas relative to figural and numerical patterns (e.g., Figs. 2.6a, 2.7, and
2.14a, b).
In Chapter 5, readers are introduced to the meaning and significance of abductive
reasoning in induction and generalization processes. While the notion of abduction
is widely used in areas such as artificial intelligence, computer science, scientific
discovery, and, more recently, philosophy of science, there is very little work done
in cognitive science and mathematics education research that addresses abduction
as a tool for (causal) reasoning and understanding.3 Peirce writes:
How is it that man every came by any correct theories about nature? We know by induction
that man has correct theories; for they produce predictions that are fulfilled. But by what
process of thought were they ever brought to his mind?
(Peirce, 1995, p. 237)

In this chapter, we focus on patterns such as Fig. 2.6a and address the primary
dilemma of how to develop reasonable abductive inferences (i.e., rules) and, con-
sequently, algebraic generalizations on the basis of limited information (i.e., the

3 Thagard’s (2010) recent theorizing concerning this topic involves understanding the implications
of embodied abduction, which involves “the use of multimodal representations” (p. 1). Embodied
abduction is inferred in many sections of this book.
5 Three Fundamental Principles of Visualization 47

known stages in any pattern) that apply to the unknown stages (i.e., extensions).
Since patterns are structures, in this chapter, we provide a visually drawn empirical
account of progressive evolution of structural thinking and generalization involv-
ing patterns in both figural and numerical forms. We clarify what and how we
mean by patterns and further explore Peirce’s notion of abductive reasoning or,
simply, abduction. We then justify a stronger claim in which accounts of progres-
sive formalization, schematization, symbolization, and mathematization all involve
accounts of progressive abductions. In two sections, we distinguish between entry-
level abductions and later or mature abductions that produce visuoalphanumeric
representations. We also discuss constraints and difficulties in making abductive
transitions, which have implications in the content and quality of structural thinking
and generalization. We close the chapter by considering how visuoalphanumeric
representations in Algebra 1 and structured visual thinking at the elementary
level could support hypostatic abstraction and growth in functional thinking and
understanding.
Principle of reasoning: Many problem solvers employ imagistic reasoning in
organizing their thoughts and as an alternative to purely symbolic or linguistic
forms of reasoning. Imagistic reasoning oftentimes leads to meaningful associa-
tions, analogies, inferences, and relational structures. Yip (1991) observes that
professional engineers, physicists, scientists, and mathematicians sometimes expe-
rience difficulty in verbally articulating their “intuitive grasp” of a problem situation
but then still manage to convey their thoughts through graphs and visual, analogue,
and diagrammatic representations. Nersessian (1994), Buchwald (1989), Kaufmann
and Helstrup (1988), and Miller’s (1997) engaging description of Einstein’s propen-
sity for visual thinking in various aspects of his scientific achievements all provide
us with accounts of great scientists, mathematicians, and inventors who employed
imagery (e.g., visual, nonvisual such as spatial, etc.) and visual analogies primar-
ily in their process of discovery. For example, Hadamard, French mathematician,
frequently employed visual imagery “when matters became too complex” (quoted
in Kaufmann & Helstrup, 1988, p. 114). Einstein employed visual images in
developing a thought experiment that played a central role in his special theory
of relativity (Miller, 1997, p. 61). Buchwald’s (1989) historical account of the
wave theory of light in the 1830s includes a discussion of the significant role
of drawings in Augustin Fresnel’s polarization experiments. Inventors like Edison
employed heuristics that were hinged on a visual process that “manipulate(d) both
a device-like conception (mental model) and a set of physical artifacts (mechanical
representations) in order to create a new object” (Carlson & Gorman, 1990, p. 417).
Even in less dramatic cases, the comprehensive review of Kaufmann and Helstrup
(1988) and the case studies developed by Nersessian (1994) show convergence in
the use of imagery in problem solving among people of various abilities. Pinker
(1990) also notes that in cases involving quantitative information, most people pre-
fer to process them using graphic forms of representation than other nonpictorial
means such as tables of numbers and lists of propositions.
Antonietti, Cerana, and Scafidi (1994) also share the above views on the general
effectiveness of images in various contexts, especially the flexible power of images
48 2 Visualization and Progressive Schematization: Framing the Issues

and their ability to assist people avoid the unnecessary use of procedures. However,
they are also quick to point out that
imagery is useful when subjects are aware of the goal, that is, when the free production
of mental images is oriented toward a specific endpoint. Imagery flows produced without
frames of reference . . . can generalize in a wide range of directions so it is probable that
subjects can follow an unproductive line of thinking.
(Antonietti et al., 1994, p. 188)

In everyday life, we face choices about whether to use visual representations

when, say, we are confronted with directions that have been expressed in words
such as the one shown in Fig. 2.16. It is, as Reed (2010) points out, a spatial task
that could be dealt with either verbally (by memorizing the steps) or visually (by
forming a mental map image). The use of visual strategies in communication, dis-
covery, problem solving, and interpretation exemplifies what I refer to as imagistic
reasoning. Following the manner in which Gattis (2002) defines spatial reasoning,
imagistic reasoning is the internal or external use of visual representations, such as
impressions and diagrams, to reason. In the case of internally drawn images, indi-
viduals outsource them through diagrams and/or gestures that convey some intended
meaning. Externally drawn images include physical models such as diagrams, pic-
tures, and other concrete semiotic resources such as manipulatives and imaging
software whose meanings have been constructed on the basis of rules that enabled
their reification.
Imagistic reasoning can also be about the nature and content of the visual itself.
However, it is the conceptual content of the visual representation that really matters.
In employing imagistic reasoning, individuals need to establish a valid and consis-
tent mapping between the visual representation and the corresponding concept and
then use the mapping to construct and justify inferences about a possible conceptual
relationship by manipulating what could be observed from the visual representation.
Four results in the general cognitive literature are worth pointing out in light of
their implications to visualization and mathematics.

1: Start out going SOUTHWEST on E REED ST toward S 8TH ST.

2: Merge onto I-280 N via the ramp on the LEFT.
3: Take the BIRD AVE exit.
4: Take the BIRD AVE ramp.
5: Turn RIGHT onto BIRD AVE.
6: BIRD AVE becomes S MONTGOMERY ST/CA-82.
7: Turn LEFT onto PARK AVE.
8: Turn RIGHT onto LAUREL GROVE LN.
9: End on this street.

Fig. 2.16 Example of a mapquest direction to travel by car from location A to B

5 Three Fundamental Principles of Visualization 49

First, on matters involving nonspatial concepts such as time, age, and rate, Gattis
(2002) observed that the spatial reasoning of young children (ages 6 and 7 years old)
with little to no formal experiences in graphing appears to be “influenced by general
constraints in reasoning” and “these constraints precede the learning of graphing
[and more formal] conventions” (p. 1175).
Second, children’s knowledge acquisition processes involving everyday objects
involve marked transitions in orientation from (within and across) object properties
to object relationships (see, e.g., Gentner, 1983; Markman and Gentner, 2000).
Third, Antonietti’s (1999) investigation into college students’ use of visual rep-
resentations in various tasks (logical, mathematical, geometrical, and practical)
illustrates the view in which usefulness of imagery appears to be task dependent.
That is, an individual’s choice of using a visual representation seems to depend on
how he or she discerns the nature of the task. For example, if a task is perceived
to be involving numbers, like Dina in my study, who consistently approached every
pattern generalization task numerically, then he or she is likely to use a numerical
method without “tak(ing) advantage of possible intuitions suggested by visualiza-
tion” (Antonietti, 1999, p. 409). Antonietti also notes how students tend to perceive
visuals as helpful in dealing with situations that involve concrete situations but not
so in cases of abstract and conceptual problems.
Fourth, even when diagrams or pictures are shown with text, their level of com-
plexity and realism influences the content and quality of knowledge and comprehen-
sion that are acquired by individuals (Butcher, 2006). For example, more detailed,
schematic diagrams (e.g., Venn diagrams or the figural patterns in Chapter 5)
are much harder to deal with than are iconic and simplified diagrams. What is at
issue is the level of abstraction (i.e., transparency of relations) that is involved in
both picture types.
In Chapter 6, I analyze the relationship between visual thinking and diagram-
matic reasoning. Diagrammatic reasoning is viewed as a type of imagistic reasoning
that individual learners employ in establishing necessary mathematical knowledge.
It involves distributed actions of manipulating, discerning, interpreting, and infer-
ring relations on diagrams. A typical example is shown in Fig. 2.17, which shows
two diagrams in a school geometry text curriculum that have all the required infor-
mation needed to establish their deductive proofs. Talking about ancient Greek
mathematics and mathematicians, Netz (1999) refers to diagrams as “the metonym
of [their] mathematics” (p. 12), where diagrams and their corresponding proposi-
tions and proofs all convey the same meaning. In Chapter 6, however, we pursue
purposefully constructed diagrams in school algebra and number sense such as those
shown in Figs. 2.11a-c and 2.12 in order to demonstrate their significant role in pro-
viding students with structured images of symbolic forms and perhaps, more impor-
tantly, in “set(ting) up a world of reference” (Netz, 1999, p. 31) that allows them to
see the necessary conceptual relations. Readers are also referred back to examples
in previous chapters to establish the view that progressive diagrammatization can
support progressions in formalization, schematization, and mathematization of the
corresponding alphanumeric forms. Diagrams are, thus, seen beyond their typical
50 2 Visualization and Progressive Schematization: Framing the Issues

1. Let M be the midpoint of the side AB of an equilateral triangle ABC. Let N be a point on BC
such that MN BC. Prove that BC = 4BN.

A M B

2. Let P be a point outside a circle . Let A be a point on such that AP is tangent to . Let
BC be a chord of with C nearer to P than B such that BC || AP. Let the lines BP and CP meet
again at K and L, respectively. Let line KL meet AP at point M. Prove that M is the midpoint
of AP.

A M

P
K
B
C

Fig. 2.17 Two examples of geometric diagrams (Bautista & Garces, 2010)

meaning as signs that externalize conceptual relations to fulfilling a mediating role

in knowledge acquisition and development (cf. Stjernfelt, 2007).
Chapter 6 begins with a summary of cognitive issues relevant to the role of
the human visual system in diagrammatic activity such as our ability to discern
relationships in diagrams, the interpretive nature of seeing, and our predisposi-
tion to recall facts simply by recalling a diagram. Then we deal with fundamental
issues of existence and universality of diagrams that are always surfaced in any
account of diagrammatic activity in mathematics. We also discuss pedagogical
issues surrounding presented versus generated diagrams. In the last two sections,
we discuss different types of diagrams, address issues surrounding progressive dia-
grammatization, and explore the role of diagrammatic reasoning in mathematical
reasoning.
6 Context-Based Visual Representations 51

Principle of individuation: While an individual’s ability to visually represent

is influenced by one’s visual system, it is also influenced by socially constituted
practices. Finke (1980) notes that while it is true that constructing images depend
on the knowledge and expectations individuals have about a target object or an
event, they also process them at varying levels of their visual system, some of
which operate independently of those knowledge and expectations. But socially
or culturally drawn visual practices exist, including recent visual-based tech-
nologies that cause particular groups to share similar visual representations and
strategies.
Thus, the visual images individuals construct have physiological, social, and cul-
tural origins, which “our adopted modes of representation guide our seeing itself”
(Wartofsky, 1978, p. 22). An empirical demonstration of this multigroundedness of
visualizing is seen in new and emerging technological tools that enable individuals
to have shared visual experiences, in effect, becoming inseparably intertwined with
their own visual images.

6 Context-Based Visual Representations

The principle of individuation has led me to consider the two issues in Chapter 7,
which focuses on blind-specific issues and cultural influences relevant to visual
attention, thinking, and performance. General, neuropsychological studies on non-
mathematical tasks done by Farah (1988), Bavelier, Dye, and Hauser (2006), and
Ward and Meijer (2010) empirically demonstrate some capacity for visual imagery
in the case of blind individuals (and “both better and worse visual skills” among
deaf individuals). There is, in fact, converging evidence drawn from a variety of
neuroimaging studies that also support this finding (see, e.g., Cattaneo et al. 2008
for a comprehensive review). For example, Ward and Meijer document the visual-
like experiences of their two blind participants when information was routed via an
auditory sensory substitution device. Recent neuroimaging results also show that
damages in particular visual pathways affect particular aspects of visual imagery
(shape, color, location, etc.; cf. Jeannerod & Jacob, 2004; Kosslyn, Ganis, &
Thompson, 2001). However, the production of (visual-like) images is still possi-
ble and could be seen as “the end product of a series of constructive processes
using different sources of information rather than mere copies of a perceptual input”
(Cattaneo et al., 2008, p. 1347). Thus, it is interesting to determine the nature and
content of representations that learners with varying levels of visual impairments
develop as they acquire knowledge of objects, concepts, and processes in light of
constraints in their physical systems that affect the way they perceive and engage
in imagistic reasoning. One important implication that could be drawn from these
studies involves understanding the epistemic significance of a sensuous dimension
to learning, which capitalizes on multisensory convergence.
Also, since much of learning mathematics involves a process of guided partic-
ipation, it is interesting to determine how individual visual representations could
be influenced by one’s own cultural practices (cf. Solomon, 1989). Crafter and
52 2 Visualization and Progressive Schematization: Framing the Issues

de Abreu (2010) note that every representation of (mathematical) knowledge “has

a double character . . . the representation of something (and therefore a cultural
tool) and of someone (and therefore seen as associated to specific social groups”
(p. 105). More generally, “conventions,” Bishop (1979) writes, “are of course
learnt, as are the reasons for needing them, and the relationship between the pic-
tures and the reality that are conventionalizing” (p. 138). Miller (1990) makes
similar claims relative to the more fundamental matter of assigning images to
pictures. He notes the significance and robustness of “the convention of repre-
sentation” – that is, “it’s our understanding of the convention” that “allows us to
assign the role of image to a given configuration of pigment” (p. 2). Mishra, Singh,
and Dasen (2009) provide a nice example of the influence of conventionalizing
in visual representing in the context of Indian folks who live in different geo-
graphical locations. The authors claim that “the choice of a particular frame of
reference in language or cognition is encouraged by ecological conditions and is
reinforced by cultural practices of the given populations” (p. 388). Folks in rural
Nepal use the Himalayas as their reference point unlike their counterparts in the
Indian villages of the Gangetic plains who rely on an absolute frame and some
local landmarks and those in urban cities such as Varanasi who use a combined
egocentric–geocentric frame. Gooding’s reflections on “seeing biologically, see-
ing culturally, and seeing naturally” in scientific work might provide interesting
inroads concerning the role of cultural constructions of visual representations in
mathematical concepts, objects, and processes. Gooding writes:
There is an important difference between what appears to us naturally on the basis of innate
perceptual and cognitive functions (what humans can see naturally) and what is made to
appear natural on the basis of conventions that engage our innate capacities and learned
cultural preferences (what there is to see, according to science).
(Gooding, 2004, p. 557)

The point, of course, is not to set up a pernicious dichotomy but to acknowledge

the complicit functioning of both “common cognitive capacities” and “cultural con-
ventions” in the construction of visual representations, whether internal or external,
including the structures (syntactic aspect) and meanings (semantic aspect) that are
associated with them and render the character of being objective. Further, Gooding
poignantly articulates:
The objectivity of the relationship between an image and what it depicts cannot be defined
independently of the context in which that relationship is constructed and used. . . . It is
plausible to suppose that the effectiveness of a graphical convention depends on how well it
promotes the engagement of cognitive capacities that are not culture-specific by cognitive
skills that reflect local cultural conventions and preferences. This engagement is a cogni-
tive process mediated by cultural resources and social conventions and expectations. The
widespread use of a method of representation highlights the particular human cognitive
capacities that cultural conventions make use of.
(Gooding, 2004, p. 559)

While Tucker’s (2006) interest is in understanding the role of visualization in sci-

entific discourse, her suggestions below seem applicable in mathematics, which we
pursue in some detail in Chapter 7:
7 Forms and Levels of Visual Representations 53

I suggest that one way to advance the study of the role of visualizations in science involves
looking further at the social formation of communities of collecting and exchanging pic-
tures and understanding the historical (and increasingly institutionalized) mechanisms that
developed for framing some as “scientific” and some as “unscientific” objects. . . . Assessing
the history of scientific enterprises and responses to them compels us to look closely at the
social histories of individual images, including where they survive today and how and why
they came to be there.
(Tucker, 2006, p. 113)

The two complex issues that are pursued in Chapter 7 have much to inform
us about cultural and neurophysiological factors that influence the performance of
visual thinking in mathematical learning. Readers should be forewarned that the
findings discussed in this chapter have been drawn from investigations conducted
by experts in these fields, which certainly influenced various aspects of my own
research study that I have reported in the previous chapters. We begin the chapter
with a very interesting interpretive sociohistorical account that explains subtle dif-
ferences in visual attention and construction of concepts among students in diverse
classrooms. We also discuss the theory-laden and socialized nature of scientific
knowledge construction. Then we talk about accounts of differences in the way
mathematical objects and their images are perceived, captured, and interpreted as
a consequence of sociocultural modes of seeing that influence the nature and type
of mathematical content that is valued and produced. We also present a materialist
view of objects in mathematics, which sees visual forms of mathematical knowl-
edge as evocations of shared social and cultural feelings and practices. We then
give a cultural account of the nature of mathematical proofs in terms of particular
ontological perceptions of objects that influence the manner in which truths and the
empirical world are constructed. The remaining sections limn findings from research
conducted with individuals that have visual impediments at varying levels. We dis-
cuss perspectives drawn from a few studies that describe the nature of their image
construction and processing. The main point that is addressed deals with the need
to broaden our prevailing understanding of the sources and nature of visual rep-
resentations to include all aspects of our sensory modalities (i.e., auditory, haptic,
kinesthetic and, in some cases, olfactory) that provide redundant information and
need to converge and overlap in knowledge acquisition processes (Millar, 1994). We
close the chapter with a discussion on the significant role of multimodality learning
in mathematics.

7 Forms and Levels of Visual Representations

Are visual representations necessarily visual? In the case of externally drawn visual
representations such as manipulatives, diagrams, and images drawn from a graph-
ing calculator, the answer is perhaps obvious. But the answer is not definite in the
case of internally drawn images. In fact, cognitive science has not settled this issue
and research investigations in this area address more fundamental, and certainly
more difficult, questions such as the nature of representations that underlie mental
54 2 Visualization and Progressive Schematization: Framing the Issues

imagery in neuroscientific terms. Despite the unsettling fact, I take the convergent
view of Chambers (1993), who claims that images are neither propositional nor pic-
torial but both, that is, “images are meaningful representations, that is, descriptive
information must accompany depictive information” (p. 79).
In mathematics, visual representations in the mind are seen as visual simu-
lations of the relevant objects, (numerical) processes, and relationships among
objects. This reminds of a situation in my Algebra 1 class when my students
tried to understand
√ and remember the process of deriving the quadratic formula
x = (−b ± b2 − 4ac)/2a to obtain the roots of the equation ax2 +bx+c=0, where
a, b, and c are real numbers and a = 0. While they could recall the formula by
singing, a mnemonic strategy they acquired from the Internet, some of them ini-
tially understood and eventually remembered the derivation process by visualizing
a reenactment of the process as it is applied on a particular example (see Fig. 3.12).
Hence, the modality of visual images in mathematics could also be seen as being
meaningful in Chambers’s (1993) sense, that is, they are neither figural/geometric
nor numerical/algorithmic in form but could be both. More broadly, visual thinking
in mathematics encompasses the use of all types of symbols from personally con-
structed images and signs to alphanumeric expressions to diagrams that all convey
meanings that are used to reason.
In Chapter 8, I discuss a progressive modeling view on visualization – the travel-
ing theory proposed in this book – in relation to the development and understanding
of mathematical objects, concepts, and processes on the basis of the two-triangular
structure shown in Fig. 2.8. The traveling theory articulates the necessity of pro-
gressions in visualization from the referential to the operative. Consequently, visual
forms evolve as well from personally constructed images to visual representations
to what I refer to as visuoalphanumeric representations. The structures of such rep-
resentations, in fact, should convey the same power as their symbolic counterparts
that are routed in solely alphanumeric terms. As I have noted in the Introduction, an
effective visual process in mathematics enables personal or subjective visual images
to evolve into more structured visual representations (in Goldin’s (2002) sense)
before fully transitioning into visuoalphanumeric representations. The term visuoal-
phanumeric conveys the interanimated symmetric reversal phenomenon of seeing
the visual in the symbolic and the symbolic in the visual, a product of heterogenous
inference drawn from several sources.
Also embedded in the progressive model is the notion of structural awareness that
enables learners to use their visual representations in constructing and experiencing
generality and (hypostasized) abstraction and in connecting intended mathemati-
cal properties in their own mathematical thinking. Figure 2.18 is a diagram of
the progressive model that I extrapolate in further detail in this particular chap-
ter. Briefly, visual thinking in mathematics takes places initially at the referential
phase in which mathematical knowledge is seen as generalizations and (hyposta-
sized) abstractions of arithmetical relationships. Visuals are employed that allow
individuals to easily recognize relationships that are instantiated by and through the
images. With more learning, the circle of individuation, acquisition, and reasoning
7 Forms and Levels of Visual Representations 55

Operative Phase
COMMUNITY
.
.
.

Acquisition

Individuation Referential Phase ...

Reasoning

Progressive Schematization

INDIVIDUAL

Fig. 2.18 A epistemological model of visual thinking in mathematics

grows in sophistication, leading to more formal types and specific forms of visual
representations at the operative phase.
The concentric circles in Fig. 2.18 incorporate, and visually convey, progres-
sive schematization in terms of local generalizations and (hypostasized) abstractions
that eventually reach a global state at the operative level. That is, once something
is generalized or abstracted from an object, an event, a process, or a relation,
it then becomes the basis that supports a later generalization or (hypostasized)
abstraction, and then again. Visual thinking is also seen initially as an individual
affair through the construction of subjective images that later evolves as a result of
frequent interactions with the community (in particular, the classroom). The com-
munity imposes its own practices at various levels of the epigenetic cycle, which is
then appropriated and internalized in varying degrees. However, despite the social
influence, individual learners interpretively reproduce4 what they find meaning-
ful to appropriate and internalize and so in some cases manage to retain some of

4 Throughout this book, I emphasize the need to reconcile between individual construction and
sociocultural practices. Corsaro’s (1992) notion of interpretive reproduction is an approach that
“stresses both the innovative and creative aspects of” every individual learner’s “participation in
society and the fact that” he or she “both contribute to and are affected by processes of social
reproduction” (Corsaro, Molinari, & Brown Rosier, 2002, p. 323).
56 2 Visualization and Progressive Schematization: Framing the Issues

Fig. 2.19 Arman’s count-all addition using circles only

Fig. 2.20 Arman’s visual

addition approach using
sticks and dots

their own impressions as a consequence of individuation. The overlapping regions

are meant to convey negotiated visual practices that evolve over time, while the
nonoverlapping regions represent practices that are kept at the individual and com-
munity levels. For example, it is common among children to be in possession of
mnemonic visual strategies or unintended knowledge (misconceptions, mispercep-
tions, etc.) that reflect variations in the established rules or personal constructions
with distinct uses that are in most cases at odds with the institutional practices of the
community.

8 Instructional Implications
Without a doubt, the hallmark of school mathematics is its symbol system so pre-
cise, economical, and universal that it bears little semblance to ordinary language
systems in whatever cultural context. “The grammar of mathematical symbolism,”
O’Halloran (2005) points out, is “based on a range of condensatory strategies which
facilitate rankshift for the rearrangement of relations” (p. 131). This explains why
9 Overview of Chapter 3 57

prevailing institutional practices and major stakeholders in school mathematics put

premium in alphanumeric proficiency over visually oriented approaches to learning
objects, concepts, and processes. Alphanumeric symbols capture the essence of an
object, a concept, or a process in some dynamic and observable semiotic form that
can withstand the critique of ambiguity and the messiness and arbitrariness of sub-
jective impressions and experiences that are oftentimes foreshadowed in most visual
representations.
In bridging internal and external phenomena, Bruner (1968) has suggested his
widely accepted representational stages of enactive, iconic, and symbolic phases,
which could be interpreted as a model of progressive schematization of visualiza-
tion in mathematical learning. At the very least, visual representations exhibit all of
Bruner’s stages in a more dynamic manner at varying levels of use. Gestural activity,
for example, is an enactive moment in which, say, a hand conveys a certain visual
image that could be symbolic. The enactive stage is the domain of visible actions,
while the iconic stage maps an internally constructed image to a relevant exter-
nal representation. The symbolic stage is the phase of (hypostasized) abstraction
that involves internalizing conceptual relations and formally naming them, which
underlie all visually grounded sign systems (cf. Bruner, 1990).
While the intent in Chapter 8 is to explain Fig. 2.18 as an epistemological
model that situates visualizing activity in mathematics in a much larger context
of progressive schematization, instructional implications have also been embed-
ded in the discussion. The final section in the chapter articulates the need for a
more “pleasurable” approach to teaching and learning school mathematics, a kind
of sensuous articulation of the “pleasures” that can be derived from developing
visuoalphanumeric representations in school mathematics.

9 Overview of Chapter 3

In Chapter 3, I explain the contexts of important terms we use throughout the book.
In doing so, readers obtain a more cohesive account of visual representations in
school mathematics and gain insights into how progressive schematization could be
achieved in a systematic manner. While such representations may initially emerge
as personally constructed images and images-in-the-wild, performing visual actions
within particular structures and customary ways of thinking allow such subjectively
drawn images to transform into more meaningful structured representations. To take
a case in point, Arman (Grade 2, 7 years old) initially added the two numbers sup-
plied in the word problem in Fig. 2.14b visually by drawing circles and counting
all. Later, when he learned to perceive whole numbers in terms of place value,
his pictures transitioned formally that allowed him to visually add more efficiently
using sticks and squares, as shown in Fig. 2.14b. How he developed such images
and the corresponding visuoalphanumeric method is the subject of mathematical
cognitive activity, which is rooted in explicit knowledge that is as much visual as it
is symbolic.
58 2 Visualization and Progressive Schematization: Framing the Issues

Three contexts – imaginal, formational, and transformational – of mathematical

cognitive activity are discussed in some detail. The basic purpose is to show the
encompassing role of progressive schematizing in these contexts. Since we define
representations in terms of the coordination between and among signs, rules, and
structures, we make an analogous characterization of mathematical cognitive activ-
ity, that is, it basically consists of objects and the concepts that load them with
meaning and value. Mathematical objects are categorized into several types with
their visual essences explained in terms of their crucial role in depicting general
representations, in hypothesis generation (i.e., visual abduction), and in developing
structural awareness. Consequently, the nature of conceptualizing, and concepts for
that matter, is rooted visually.
The last two sections address what I mean by, including principles that sup-
port, visual thinking in school mathematics. Both sections offer a refinement of the
general ideas that have been raised and explored in Sections 3 and 4 in this chapter.