Module 5:

I. Post-judgment Remedies
a. Motion for New Trial or
Reconsideration

Manila Memorial Park

Cemetery, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 137122,
November 15, 2000

FACTS
1. respondents filed an action for reconveyance and recovery of parcels of land against
petitioner
2. RTC dismissed the complaint for lack of merit and having been barred by the statute of
limitations and by laches
3. On July 4, 1983, respondents received the said decision
4. On July 19, 1983 (the last day of the prescribed fifteen-day period for appeal),
respondents filed a motion for new trial and/or reconsideration
5. RTC denied the said motion
6. On 07 December 1989, respondents filed a notice of appeal
7. On 11 December 1989, the trial court gave due course to the appeal
8. The records of the case, however, were not transmitted to the appellate court due to
missing transcript of stenographic notes
9. On 23 April 1996, the trial court required the parties to appear in conference. Almost a
year had lapsed but the missing stenographic notes were still not submitted to the trial
court
10. On 28 February 1997, respondents filed a motion for new trial for the retaking and
presentation of testimonial and documentary evidence on the ground that the
reconstitution of the missing stenographic notes was no longer possible considering that
the court stenographers who had transcribed the testimony of witnesses by then since
retired from the service, their whereabouts unknown.
11. petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the appeal and an opposition to the motion for new
trial filed by respondents contending that the appeal was filed out of time and that the
remedy for new trial could not be availed of since it was filed long after the reglementary
period to appeal had lapsed.
12. RTC denied the said motions on the ground that the final resolution of the case could not
be held in abeyance indefinitely nor could petitioner's motion to dismiss the appeal still
be entertained after their having waited for eight years before raising the issue.
13. CA affirmed RTC decision on the ground that petitioner was estopped by laches from
assailing the notice of appeal which had meanwhile been given due course by the trial
court
a. petitioner filed the motion to dismiss appeal after almost eight years the
respondent court gave due course to respondent's notice of appeal. Petitioner
 did not raise the issue of the timeliness of the appeal at the time the notice of
appeal was filed by respondents on December 7, 1989
b. During the conference on April 23, 1996 for the completion of the record,
petitioner remained silent on the issue. Instead, it voluntarily asked for time to
locate the missing transcript of records to be submitted to respondent court,
which petitioner never accomplished without explanation
c. It was only after respondents filed on February 28, 1997 a motion for new trial for
the retaking or presentation of testimonial evidence that petitioner started
questioning the appeal essayed by respondents

ISSUE
W/N the petitioner is estopped by laches to file a motion to dismiss the appeal

HELD
No.

MOTION TO DISMISS AN APPEAL

Petitioner could not be faulted for its failure to move for the dismissal of the appeal at an earlier
time acting upon the assumption, albeit erroneously, that the appeal was filed on time relying on
the order, dated 11 December 1989, of the trial court declaring that the notice of appeal had
been filed within the reglementary period.

Neither can the conduct of petitioner's counsel during the conference called by and held before
the trial court be regarded as a waiver of its right to contest the seasonableness of the appeal.

The legality of the appeal may be raised at any stage of the proceedings in the appellate court,
and the latter is not precluded from dismissing the petition on the ground of its being out of time.

PERFECTION OF AN APPEAL
● The perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period prescribed by law is not
only mandatory but jurisdictional upon the court a quo,
● and the failure to perfect that appeal renders its judgment final and executory
● Not being a natural right or a part of due process, but merely a statutory privilege, the
right to appeal may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with rules
provided therefor.

Section 3, Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure; thus:

Sec. 3. Period of Ordinary Appeal - The appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from
notice of the judgment or final order appealed from. Where a record on appeal is required, the
appellant shall file a notice of appeal and a record on appeal within thirty (30) days from notice
of the judgment or final order.
The period of appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion for new trial or reconsideration. No
motion for extension of time to file a motion for new trial or reconsideration shall be allowed.

If the motion for new trial or reconsideration is denied, the moving party has only the remaining
period from notice of denial within which to file a notice of appeal. No motion for extension of
time to file such a notice of appeal is neither required nor allowed.

FINAL AND EXECUTORY

● the court loses all jurisdiction over the case and
● it becomes the ministerial duty of the court concerned to order execution of the
judgment.
● vested rights are acquired by the winning party.

Just as the losing party has the right to file an appeal within the prescribed period, so also the
winning party has the correlative right to enjoy the finality of the resolution of the case

EXCEPTIONS (relaxation of rules on strict observance of reglementary periods)

1. In Ramos vs. Bagasao,[15] the Court excused the delay of four days in the filing of the
notice of appeal because the questioned decision of the trial court had been served
upon appellant Ramos at a time when her counsel of record was already dead. The new
counsel could only file the appeal four days after the presecribed reglementary period
was over.

2. In Republic vs. Court of Appeals,[16] the Court allowed the perfection of an appeal by
the Republic despite the delay of six days to prevent a gross miscarriage of justice since
the Republic stood to lose hundreds of hectares of land already titled in its name and
had since then been devoted for public purposes.

3. In Olacao vs. National Labor Relations Commission,[17] a tardy appeal was accepted
considering that the subject matter in issue had theretofore been judiciallly settled with
finality in another case, and a dismissal of the appeal would have had the effect of the
appellant being ordered twice to make the same reparation to the appellee.[18] These
instances indeed constituted exceptional circumstances that would hardly find parallel
elsewise.

• RAFAEL Dinglasan, Jr. v. Court of

Appeals, G.R. No. 145420,
September 19, 2006

FACTS
 1. Elmyra, Dinglasan and Antrom entered into a MOA whereby the parties agreed that
Antrom will extend credit accommodation in favor of Elmyra to finance its prawn
business.
2. As initial payment, Dinglasan issued a check
3. Upon presentment for payment with the drawee bank, however, the said check was
dishonored for insufficiency of funds.
4. RTC found Dinglasan guilty of Violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22
5. CA affirmed the RTC decision
6. Petitioner appealed to SC (Petition for Review on Certiorari)
7. SC denied the petition on 28 June 1999
8. The Resolution of this Court dated denying Dinglasan's Petition for Review became final
and executory on 14 October 1999 as evidenced by the Entry of Judgment
9. on 30 October 2000, filed the instant Petition for New Trial on the ground of the alleged
newly discovered evidence

affidavits of Ma. Elena Dinglasan, in her capacity as Executive Vice-President and Treasurer of
Elmyra, and Ma. Encarnacion Vda. De Dinglasan, the wife of Mariano Dinglasan, who, during
his lifetime, was the Cashier and Liaison Officer of the same company. These affidavits,
together with the transmittal letter dated 8 October 1985 attached to Solidbank Manager's
Check No. 002969 dated 3 October 1985 sent by Ma. Elena Dinglasan to Antrom, tends to
prove that Dinglasan made good of the check within five banking days from notice of dishonor.
He could not, therefore, be validly convicted of violating Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 for one of the
essential elements of the offense, that is, the drawer failed and refused to make good the said
check within five banking days from the notice of dishonor, is absent.

ISSUE
WHETHER OR NOT A NEW TRIAL OR REOPENING OF THE CASE BASED ON NEWLY
DISCOVERED EVIDENCE SHOULD BE ALLOWED.

HELD
No.

The transmittal letter dated 8 October 1985 was already offered as evidence in CA-G.R. CR No.
14138 and was even annexed to the Petition for Review filed before the Court of Appeals as
Annex "B." Thus, the letter dated 8 October 1985 is not newly discovered. It is an attempt to
raise again a defense which was already weighed by the appellate court.

MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL BASED ON NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE

Berry Rule
Sec 2, Rule 121
(a) the evidence was discovered after the trial;
(b) such evidence could not have been discovered and produced at the trial with reasonable
diligence; and
(c) that it is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative or impeaching, and is of such weight
that, if admitted, will probably change the judgment.

Berry v. State of Georgia

1st. That the evidence has come to his knowledge since the trial.
2d. That it was not owing to the want of due diligence that it did not come sooner.
3d. That it is so material that it would produce a different verdict, if the new trial were granted.
4th. That it is not cumulative only - viz; speaking to facts, in relation to which there was evidence
on the trial.
5th. That the affidavit of the witness himself should be produced, or its absence accounted for.
And
6th, a new trial will not be granted, if the only object of the testimony is to impeach the character
or credit of a witness.

● It should be emphasized that the applicant for new trial has the burden of showing that
the new evidence he seeks to present has complied with the requisites to justify the
holding of a new trial.
● The threshold question in resolving a motion for new trial based on newly discovered
evidence is whether the proferred evidence is in fact a "newly discovered evidence
which could not have been discovered by due diligence."
● The question of whether evidence is newly discovered has two aspects: a temporal one,
i.e., when was the evidence discovered, and a predictive one, i.e., when should or could
it have been discovered

• Flight Attendants and Stewards

Association of the Philippines v.
Philippine Airlines, Inc., G.R.
Nos. 178083 & A.M. No. 11-
10-1-SC (Resolution), March
13, 2018

PAL's Second Motion for Reconsideration

| of the Decision of July 22, 2008
| could be allowed in the higher interest of justice

b. Appeal - Appeals in general

1. Judgment and final orders
subject to appeal
2. Matters not appealable
3. Remedies against judgment
and orders which are not
appealable
4. Modes of appeal
5. Issues to be raised on appeal

a. Custodio v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. NO.
116100, 9 February 1996

FACTS
1. respondents filed an action before RTC for the grant of an easement of right of way
against the petitioners
2. RTC rendered in favor of the respondents
3. Respondents appealed to CA raising the sole issue of whether or not the lower court
erred in not awarding damages in their favor
4. CA affirmed the RTC decision
5. Petitioners filed a motion of reconsideration
6. CA denied the motion
7. Hence, this petition

ISSUES
W/N the ff. issues can be raised in the present appeal
1. w/n the grant of right of way to the respondents is proper
2. whether or not the award of damages is in order

HELD

1. No

With respect to the first issue, herein petitioners are already barred from raising the same.
Petitioners did not appeal from the decision of the court a quo granting private respondents the
right of way, hence they are presumed to be satisfied with the adjudication therein. With the
finality of the judgment of the trial court as to petitioners, the issue of propriety of the grant of
right of way has already been laid to rest.

For failure to appeal the decision of the trial court to the Court of Appeals, petitioners cannot
obtain any affirmative relief other than those granted in the decision of the trial court. That
decision of the court below has become final as against them and can no longer be reviewed,
much less reversed, by this Court. The rule in this jurisdiction is that whenever an appeal is
taken in a civil case, an appellee who has not himself appealed may not obtain from the
appellate court any affirmative relief other than what was granted in the decision of the lower
court. The appellee can only advance any argument that he may deem necessary to defeat the
appellant’s claim or to uphold the decision that is being disputed, and he can assign errors in his
brief if such is required to strengthen the views expressed by the court a quo. These assigned
errors, in turn, may be considered by the appellate court solely to maintain the appealed
decision on other grounds, but not for the purpose of reversing or modifying the judgment in the
appellee’s favor and giving him other affirmative reliefs.

2. Yes

However, with respect to the second issue, we agree with petitioners that the Court of Appeals
erred in awarding damages in favor of private respondents. The award of damages has no
substantial legal basis. A reading of the decision of the Court of Appeals will show that the
award of damages was based solely on the fact that the original plaintiff, Pacifico Mabasa,
incurred losses in the form of unrealized rentals when the tenants vacated the leased premises
by reason of the closure of the passageway.

b. Citytrust Banking Corp. v.

Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
92591, April 30, 1991

FACTS

ISSUE
The petitioner now assails the affirmation of the order of execution based on the trial court
judgment in spite of the modified judgment which reduced the liability of co-defendants to pay
private respondent

HELD

6. Period of appeal

a. Heirs of Albano v.
Spouses Ravanes, G.R.
No. 183645, July 20, 2016

FACTS
1. respondent-spouses filed a Complaint for Ejectment14 against petitioner
2. MeTC rendered in favor of respondents
3. RTC reversed MeTC decision
4. CA reinstated the Decision of the MeTC
5. On September 19, 2007, petitioners filed a Manifestation and Motion to Stay the
Execution of Judgment dated August 29, 2OO7
6. On February 20, 2008, CA denied petitioners' manifestation and motion
7. On February 22, 2008, petitioners received the copy of such resolution
8. On March 7, 2008, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution dated
February 20, 2008
9. The CA denied the Motion for Reconsideration in its Resolution dated July 7, 2008.
10. Hence, this petition for review.
ISSUE
W/N the period to appeal has already lapsed

HELD
Yes. CA has become final and executory and the court has lost the jurisdiction to entertain the
appeal

FIRST MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

Since the Manifestation and Motion to Stay Execution of Judgment is a motion for
reconsideration of the CA Decision, petitioners' receipt of the resolution denying it triggers the
running of the 15-day period within which to file an appeal. Petitioners received a copy of the
February 20, 2008 Resolution on February 22, 2008. Thus, counting 15 days from receipt,
petitioners had only until March 8, 2008 to file a petition for review.

SECOND MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

This motion for reconsideration partakes of the nature of a second motion for reconsideration as
it contained mere rehash of the arguments raised in their earlier Manifestation and Motion to
Stay Execution of Judgment, which we found previously to be their (first) motion for
reconsideration. Being a prohibited pleading, a second motion for reconsideration does not have
any legal effect and does not toll the running of the period to appeal

PERIOD TO APPEAL
● period to appeal should not be reckoned from the denial of a second motion for
reconsideration
● Reckoning the period from the denial of the second motion for reconsideration will result
in the same absurd situation where the courts will be obliged to issue orders or
resolutions denying a prohibited pleading in the first place
● An appeal is not a matter of right, but is one of sound judicial discretion. It may only be
availed of in the manner provided by the law and the rules.

b. Neypes v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 141524,
September 14, 2005

FRESH PERIOD TO APPEAL

A party-litigant may either file his notice of appeal within 15 days from receipt of the Regional
Trial Court's decision or file it within 15 days from receipt of the order (the "final order") denying
his motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration. Obviously, the new 15-day period may be
availed of only if either motion is filed; otherwise, the decision becomes final and executory after
the lapse of the original appeal period provided in Rule 41, Section 3.

c. Sumiran v. Spouses
Damaso, G.R. No. 162518,
August 19, 2009

FACTS
1. Petitioner filed a complaint for sum of money and damages with prayer for preliminary
attachment against respondents
2. RTC rendered in favor of the respondents
3. on March 8, 2003, petitioner received a copy of the decision
4. On March 6, 2003, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration
5. On May 9, 2003, the RTC issued an Order denying petitioner's motion for
reconsideration.
6. May 19, 2003, he received the copy of the resolution
7. On May 29, 2003, petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal for having been filed out of time
8. RTC dismissed the appeal
9. CA affirmed

ISSUE
W/N the "fresh period" rule could retroactively apply in cases where the period for appeal had
lapsed prior to 14 September 2005 when Neypes was promulgated

HELD
Yes.

Petitioner is entitled to a "fresh period" of 15 days counted from May 19, 2003, the date of
petitioner's receipt of the Order denying his motion for reconsideration of the RTC Decision
within which to file his notice of appeal.

Therefore, when he filed said notice on May 29, 2003, or only ten (10) days after receipt of the
Order denying his motion for reconsideration, his period to appeal had not yet lapsed.

PROCEDURAL LAWS
procedural laws may be given retroactive effect to actions pending and undetermined at the
time of their passage, there being no vested rights in the rules of procedure. Amendments to
procedural rules are procedural or remedial in character as they do not create new or remove
vested rights, but only operate in furtherance of the remedy or confirmation of rights already
existing.

d. Sumaway v. Urban Bank,

Inc., G.R. No. 142534,
June 27, 2006

e. San Lorenzo Ruiz Builders

and Developers Group,
Inc. v. Bayang, G.R. No.
194702, April 20, 2015

7. Perfection of appeal
a. Julian v. DBP, G.R. No.
174193, 7 December 201

FACTS

1. respondent filed an unlawful detainer case against the petitioners

2. Before writ of execution is carried out, petitioner filed for the cancellation of TCT in the
name of the respondent
3. During the course of proceedings, a series of postponements were made at the instance
of both parties due to an impending amicable settlement
4. RTC dismissed the case due to the failure of the petitioners and respondents to comply
with the order to submit a joint motion to dismiss the case
5. Petitioner timely filed a Notice of Appeal but failed to pay the docket and other lawful
fees
6. CA dismissed the appeal on the ground of his failure to pay the required fees due to
oversight and non-cognizance of the necessity to pay the said fees since his counsel did
not inform him of such requirement to pay

ISSUE
W/N the dismissal of the appeal is proper due to non-payment of docket fees within the
reglementary period is proper

HELD
Yes.

This Court finds this not to be logically true to human experience. It is unusual for petitioner's
counsel not to advice him of the required docket fees. More often than not, counsels are aware
of the docket fees required to be paid to the courts, and will ask clients for the said amount prior
to filing pleadings in court. This is so because counsels are not expected to shoulder or advance
payment for their clients.

Assuming arguendo that petitioner's counsel did not inform him of the requirement to pay the
docket fees to perfect the appeal, what we find incredible is that petitioner apparently failed to
communicate with his counsel after the filing of said appeal. This Court has repeatedly held that
"litigants, represented by counsel, should not expect that all they need to do is sit back, relax
and await the outcome of their case. "It is the duty of a party-litigant to be in contact with his
counsel from time to time in order to be informed of the progress of his case.
Moreover, the counsel's negligence binds petitioner and, for that reason alone the loss of his
remedy was caused by his own negligence.

Consequently, a relaxation of the rule cannot be granted

PAYMENT OF DOCKET FEES

payment of the full amount of docket fees within the prescribed period is both mandatory and
jurisdictional. [44] It is a condition sine qua non for the appeal to be perfected and only then can
a court acquire jurisdiction over the case. [45] The requirement of an appeal fee is not a mere
technicality of law or procedure and should not be undermined except for the most persuasive
of reasons. Non-observance would be tantamount to no appeal being filed thereby rendering the
challenged decision, resolution or order final and executory.

warrants only discretionary as opposed to automatic dismissal of the appeal

EXCEPTIONS (Incomplete payment)

Thus, the appellate court may extend the time for the payment of the docket fees if appellant is
able to show that there is a justifiable reason for his failure to pay the correct amount of docket
fees within the prescribed period, like fraud, accident, mistake, excusable negligence, or a
similar supervening casualty, without fault on the part of the appellant.

does not apply to present case as there was not payment at all

b. Regional Agrarian Reform

Adjudication Board v.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
165155, April 12, 2010

FACTS
1. Respondents are co-owners of lands being tilled by the petitioners
2. Petitioners did not pay the annual lease rentals
3. respondents filed a complaint for ejectment against petitioners before DARAB
4. DARAB- Regional Adjudicator rendered in favor of respondents
5. petitioners filed two separate notices of appeal
6. respondents filed a motion to dismiss the appeal
7. Regional Adjudicator gave due course to the appeals
8. CA rendered notices of appeal have no legal effect

ISSUE
Whether the Notices of Appeal dated February 28, 2003 and March 3, 2003 are "mere scraps of
paper" for failure to state the grounds relied upon for an appeal
HELD
No.

Both Notices of Appeal stated that the petitioners were appealing the decision "on the grounds
of questions of fact and of law," which we find sufficient statement of the ground for appeal
under Section 2(a), Rule XIII of the DARAB Rules. While the notices omitted to state that "the
decision would cause grave and irreparable damage and injury to the appellant," we find such
punctilious fidelity to the language of the DARAB Rules unnecessary. Surely by appealing the
Decision of the Regional Adjudicator, the petitioners were already manifesting that they will be
damaged by the assailed decision. Requiring a literal application of the rules when its purpose
has already been served is oppressive superfluity.

It must be stressed that the purpose of the notice of appeal is not to detail one's objections
regarding the appealed decision; that is the purpose of the appellants' memorandum. In the
context of a DARAB case, the notice of appeal serves only to inform the tribunal or officer that
rendered the appealed decision (i.e., the Regional Adjudicator) of the timeliness of the appeal
and of the general reason for the appeal, and to prepare the records thereof for transmission to
the appellate body (i.e., the DARAB). Petitioners' Notices of Appeal contain everything that is
necessary to serve these purposes.

DARAB APPEAL
Rule XIII
APPEALS

Section 1. Appeal to the Board. a) An appeal may be taken from an order, resolution or decision
of the Adjudicator to the Board by either of the parties or both, orally or in writing, within a period
of fifteen (15) days from the receipt of the order, resolution or decision appealed from, and
serving a copy thereof on the adverse party, if the appeal is in writing.

b) An oral appeal shall be reduced into writing by the Adjudicator to be signed by the appellant,
and a copy thereof shall be served upon the adverse party within ten (10) days from the taking
of the oral appeal.

Section 2. Grounds. The aggrieved party may appeal to the Board from a final order, resolution
or decision of the Adjudicator on any of the following grounds:

a) That errors in the findings of fact or conclusions of laws were committed which, if not
corrected, would cause grave and irreparable damage and injury to the appellant;

b) That there is a grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Adjudicator; or

c) That the order, resolution or decision is obtained through fraud or coercion.

xxx

Section 5. Requisites and Perfection of the Appeal. a) The Notice of Appeal shall be filed within
the reglementary period as provided for in Section 1 of this Rule. It shall state the date when the
appellant received the order or judgment appealed from and the proof of service of the notice to
the adverse party; and

b) An appeal fee of Five Hundred Pesos (P500.00) shall be paid by the appellant within the
reglementary period to the DAR Cashier where the Office of the Adjudicators is situated. x x x

8. Residual Jurisdiction
a. Fernandez v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 131094, 16
May 2005

FACTS
1. Respondent filed an unlawful detainer case against the petitioner
2. MeTc dismissed the Complaint for lack of sufficient cause of action
3. RTC reversed MeTC decision and Fernandez to pay rental arrearages, attorney's fees,
litigation expenses and costs
4. On 28 June 1994, Fernandez received a copy of the decision.
5. On 12 July 1994 or 14 days after receipt of the decision, he filed a Motion for
Reconsideration.
6. On 29 November 1994, Fernandez received an order denying his motion for
reconsideration.
7. On 01 December 1994, Fernandez filed with the Court of Appeals a Motion for Extension
of Time to File Petition for Review which was granted.
8. On 09 December 1994, Fernandez filed a Motion for New Trial before RTC
9. RTC denied the Motion for New Trial. It explained that when Fernandez went to the
Court of Appeals and filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File Petition for Review, and
the Court of Appeals accordingly acted on the same by granting the extension sought,
jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals over the parties and the subject matter had already
attached

ISSUE
WHETHER OR NOT THE MERE FILING BY PETITIONER OF A MOTION FOR EXTENSION
OF TIME TO FILE PETITION FOR REVIEW (WHICH INTENTION [sic] WAS LATER
WITHDRAWN), AUTOMATICALLY DIVESTED THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT (RTC) OF ITS
JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE, AS TO ENTERTAIN A MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL

HELD
Yes. Fernandez's motion for new trial was filed out of time and the period to appeal cannot be
extended
He filed a motion for reconsideration fourteen (14) days after receipt of the decision. The motion
was denied and he had only the remaining one (1) day to file a motion for new trial which day
fell on 01 December 1994. Since 30 November 1994 was a holiday, Fernandez had up to 01
December 1994 to file the motion for new trial. Extant from the records, instead of a motion for
new trial, he filed before the Court of Appeals on 01 December 1994 the motion for extension of
time to file petition for review. Thereafter, and pending the resolution of his motion before the
Court of Appeals, Fernandez went back to the RTC and filed on 09 December 1994 a motion for
new trial.

MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL

The motion for new trial suspends the running of the period to appeal but does not extend the
time within which an appeal must be perfected

MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME TO FILE A MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL

● The fifteen (15)-day period for filing a motion for new trial cannot be extended.
● motions for extension of time to file a motion for new trial or reconsideration may be filed
only in connection with cases pending before the Supreme Court. No such motion may
be filed before any lower courts

RESIDUAL JURISDICTION
The residual jurisdiction of the trial court is available at a stage in which the court is normally
deemed to have lost jurisdiction over the case or the subject matter involved in the appeal. This
stage is reached upon the perfection of the appeals by the parties or upon the approval of the
records on appeal, but prior to the transmittal of the original records or the records on appeal

RTC
The appellate jurisdiction of the trial court is to be juxtaposed with its residual jurisdiction as set
forth in Rule 42, Section 8(a), 3rd paragraph of the Rules of Court. Before the Court of Appeals
gives due course to a Petition for Review, the RTC retains jurisdiction for specified instances
enumerated therein, to wit:
(1) To issue orders for the protection and preservation of the rights of the parties which do not
involve any matter litigated by the appeal, such as, the appointment of a receiver, and the
issuance of writs of preliminary attachment or preliminary injunction.

(2) To approve compromises.

(3) To permit appeals of indigent litigants.

(4) To order execution pending appeal in accordance with section 2 of Rule 39.

(5) To allow withdrawal of the appeal.[40]

9. Appeal from judgment or final
orders of the MTC, MeTC,
MTC in cities, MCTC

10. Appeal from judgments or final

orders of the RTC
Ordinary Appeal Cases (Rules
40-41):

1. Encarnacion v. Amigo,
G.R. No. 169793, 15
September 2006

FACTS
1. Petitioner filed an ejectment case against the petitioner before the MTC
2. MTC rendered in favor of the petitioner
3. RTC dismissed the case on the ground that MTC had no jurisdiction over the case

ISSUE
W/N RTC should dismiss the case

HELD
No. The case is remanded to RTC for further proceedings

The RTC should have taken cognizance of the case. If the case is tried on the merits by the
Municipal Court without jurisdiction over the subject matter, the RTC on appeal may no longer
dismiss the case if it has original jurisdiction thereof. Moreover, the RTC shall no longer try the
case on the merits, but shall decide the case on the basis of the evidence presented in the
lower court, without prejudice to the admission of the amended pleadings and additional
evidence in the interest of justice.

APPEAL TO RTC
Section 8, Rule 40 of the Rules of Court provides:

dismissal without trial on merits

SECTION 8. Appeal from orders dismissing case without trial; lack of jurisdiction. - If an appeal
is taken from an order of the lower court dismissing the case without a trial on the merits, the
Regional Trial Court may affirm or reverse it, as the case may be.
In case of affirmance and the ground of dismissal is lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter,
the Regional Trial Court, if it has jurisdiction thereover, shall try the case on the merits as if the
case was originally filed with it. In case of reversal, the case shall be remanded for further
proceedings.
Trial on merits
If the case was tried on the merits by the lower court without jurisdiction over the subject matter,
the Regional Trial Court on appeal shall not dismiss the case if it has original jurisdiction thereof,
but shall decide the case in accordance with the preceding section, without prejudice to the
admission of amended pleadings and additional evidence in the interest of justice.

2. Canlas v. Tubil G.R. No.

184285, 25 September
2009

Petition for Review Rule 42

Cases:

1. Ross Rica Sales v. Ong,

G.R. No. 132197, 16
August 2005

FACTS
1. petitioners filed a complaint for ejectment against the respondents
2. MTC rendered in favor of the petitioners
3. RTC affirmed MTC decision
4. On 28 April 1995, respondents received a copy of the decision
5. On 8 May 1997, respondents filed a notice of appeal.
6. On May 9, 1987, they filed a motion for reconsideration.
7. On 23 June 1997, the RTC issued an Order which concurrently
a. gave due course to respondents' notice of appeal filed on 8 May 1997;
b. denied their motion for reconsideration dated 9 May 1997 (declared that the
Motion for Reconsideration was barred by the filing of the Notice of Appeal), and
c. granted petitioners' motion for immediate execution pending appeal.
8. On 24 July 1997, respondents filed with the Court of Appeals their motion for an
additional period of ten (10) days within which to file their Petition for Review.
9. On 30 July 1997, respondents filed with the Court of Appeals their Petition for Review

ISSUE
W/N the petition for review was filed w/in the reglementary period

HELD
Yes.

Since the unlawful detainer case was filed with the MTC and affirmed by the RTC, petitioners
should have filed a Petition for Review with the Court of Appeals and not a Notice of Appeal with
the RTC. However, we consider this to have been remedied by the timely filing of the Motion for
Reconsideration on the following day. Section 3, Rule 50 of the Rules of Court allows the
withdrawal of appeal at any time, as a matter of right, before the filing of the appellee's brief.
Applying this rule contextually, the filing of the Motion for Reconsideration may be deemed as
an effective withdrawal of the defective Notice of Appeal.

Perforce, the period of appeal was tolled by the Motion for Reconsideration and started to run
again from the receipt of the order denying the Motion for Reconsideration. A Motion for
Additional Time to File the Petition was likewise filed with the Court of Appeals. Counting fifteen
(15) days from receipt of the denial of the Motion for Reconsideration and the ten (10)-day
request for additional period, it is clear that respondents filed their Petition for Review on time.

2. LBP v. Court of Appeals,

G.R. No. 190660, 11
August 2011

3. Macawiwili Gold Mining

and Development Co.,
Inc. v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 115104, October
12, 1998

4. Anderson v. Ho, G.R. No.

172590, 7 January 2013

5. Heirs of Garcia I v.
Municipality of Iba,
Zambales, G.R. No.
162217, July 22, 2015

6. Intramuros Administration
v. Offshore Construction
Development Co., G.R.
No. 196795, March 7,
2018

11. Appeal to the Court of Appeals

12. Appeal from judgments or final
orders of the CA
13. Petition for Review Rule 45

14. Rule 45 vs. Rule 65; Question

of Law v. Question of Fact
a. Republic v. Mercadera,
G.R. No. 186027,
December 8, 2010

b. Asian Terminals, Inc. v.

Simon Enterprises, Inc.,
G.R. No. 177116,
February 27, 2013

c. Maza v. Turla, G.R. No.

187094, February 15, 2017

d. Philippine Bank of
Communications v. Court
of Appeals, G.R. No.
218901, February 15, 2017

e. Mackay v. Angeles, G.R.

No. 144230 (Resolution),
September 30, 2003

15. Appeal from judgments or final

orders of the Sandibanbayan

16. Appeal from judgments or final

orders of the CTA

17. Review from judgments or

final orders of the COA

18. Review from judgments or

final orders of the COMELEC

19. Review from judgments or

final orders of the CSC

20. Review from judgments or

final orders of the Ombudsman

21. Review from judgments or

final orders of the NLRC

22. Review from judgments or

final orders of quasi-judicial
agencies

Petition for Review Rule 43

Cases:

1. Fabian v. Desierto, G.R.

No. 129742, September
16, 1998

2. Lanting v. Ombudsman,
G.R. No. 141426, May 6,
2005

3. St. Martin Funeral Home

v. NLRC, G.R. No.
130866, September 16,
1998

4. Alcaraz v. Gonzales, G.R.

No. 164715, 20 September
2006

c. Relief from judgments, orders and

other proceedings

• Purcon v. MRM Philippines,

G.R. No. 182718, 26 September
2008

• Valencia v. Court of Appeals,

G.R. No. 119118, February 19,
2001

• Gomez v. Montalban, G.R. No.

174414, 14 March 2008

• Victory Liner v. Malinias, G.R.

No. 151170, 29 May 2007

• Madarang v. Spouses Morales,

G.R. No. 199283, June 9, 2014

d. Annulment of judgments or final

orders and resolutions

• Republic v. De Castro, G.R. No.

189724, 7 February 2011

• Victory Liner v. Malinias, G.R.

No, 151170, 29 May 2007

• Islamic Da'wah Council of the

Philippines v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 80892, September 29,
1989

e. Collateral attack of judgments