ARTICLE 36 FC – PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY (PI)

MARCOS V. MARCOS – [2000-10-19]

Important ruling: There is no requirement that the respondent should be examined by a

physician or a psychologist to be declared PI.

Quick summary: husband lost his job, not supporting the family, became abusive  failure of
wife to show that the alleged psychological incapacity is characterized by gravity, juridical
antecedence and incurability; and for her failure to observe the guidelines outlined in Molina.

BRENDA B. MARCOS, petitioner, vs. WILSON G. MARCOS, respondent.

PANGANIBAN, J.: Psychological incapacity, as a ground for declaring the nullity of a marriage, may
be established by the totality of evidence presented. There is no requirement, however, that
the respondent should be examined by a physician or a psychologist as a conditio sine
qua non for such declaration.

FACTS:

Earlier, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) had ruled thus:

"WHEREFORE, the marriage between petitioner Brenda B. Marcos and respondent Wilson G.
Marcos, solemnized on September 6, 1982 in Pasig City is declared null and void ab initio
pursuant to Art. 36 of the Family Code. The conjugal properties, if any, is dissolved [sic] in
accordance with Articles 126 and 129 of the same Code in relation to Articles 50, 51 and 52
relative to the delivery of the legitime of [the] parties' children. In the best interest and
welfare of the minor children, their custody is granted to petitioner subject to the visitation
rights of respondent.
"Upon finality of this Decision, furnish copy each to the Office of the Civil Registrar of Pasig
City where the marriage was solemnized, the National Census and Statistics Office, Manila and
the Register of Deeds of Mandaluyong City for their appropriate action consistent with this
Decision.
"SO ORDERED."

FACTS:
1. It was established during the trial that the parties were married twice:
(1) on September 6, 1982 which was solemnized by Judge Eriberto H. Espiritu at the
Municipal Court of Pasig; and
(2) on May 8, 1983 which was solemnized by Rev. Eduardo L. Eleazar, Command Chaplain, at
the Presidential Security Command Chapel in Malacañang Park, Manila
2. Out of their marriage, five (5) children were born
3. Appellant Wilson Marcos joined the AFP in 1973. Later on, he was transferred to the Presidential
Security Command in Malacañang during the Marcos Regime.
4. Appellee Brenda Marcos, on the other hand, joined the Women's Auxilliary Corps under the
Philippine Air Force in 1978. After the Edsa Revolution, both of them sought a discharge from the
military service.

History:
1. They first met sometime in 1980 when both of them were assigned at the Malacañang
Palace, she as an escort of Imee Marcos and he as a Presidential Guard of President
 Ferdinand Marcos. Through telephone conversations, they became acquainted and eventually
became sweethearts.
2. After their marriage on September 6, 1982, they resided at No. 1702 Daisy Street, Hulo
Bliss, Mandaluyong, a housing unit which she acquired from the Bliss Development
Corporation when she was still single.
3. After the downfall of President Marcos, he left the military service in 1987 and then engaged
in different business ventures that did not however prosper.
4. As a wife, she always urged him to look for work so that their children would see him, instead
of her, as the head of the family and a good provider. Due to his failure to engage in any
gainful employment, they would often quarrel and as a consequence, he would hit and
beat her. He would even force her to have sex with him despite her weariness. He would also
inflict physical harm on their children for a slight mistake and was so severe in the way he
chastised them.
5. Thus, for several times during their cohabitation, he would leave their house. In 1992, they
were already living separately.

All the while, she was engrossed in the business of selling "magic uling" and chickens. While she was
still in the military, she would first make deliveries early in the morning before going to Malacañang.
When she was discharged from the military service, she concentrated on her business. Then, she
became a supplier in the AFP until she was able to put up a trading and construction
company, NS Ness Trading and Construction Development Corporation.

THE BIG FIGHT: The 'straw that broke the camel's back' took place on October 16, 1994, when
they had a bitter quarrel. As they were already living separately, she did not want him to stay in
their house anymore. On that day, when she saw him in their house, she was so angry that
she lambasted him. He then turned violent, inflicting physical harm on her and even on her
mother who came to her aid. The following day, October 17, 1994, she and their children left the
house and sought refuge in her sister's house. On October 19, 1994, she submitted herself to
medical examination at the Mandaluyong Medical Center where her injuries were
diagnosed as contusions.

Sometime in August 1995, she together with her two sisters and driver, went to him at the Bliss unit
in Mandaluyong to look for their missing child, Niko. Upon seeing them, he got mad. After knowing
the reason for their unexpected presence, he ran after them with a samurai and even [beat]
her driver.

At the time of the filing of this case, she and their children were renting a house in Camella,
Parañaque, while the appellant was residing at the Bliss unit in Mandaluyong. In the case
study conducted by Social Worker Sonia C. Millan, the children described their father as cruel
and physically abusive to them.

The wife submitted herself to psychologist Natividad A. Dayan, Ph.D., for psychological evaluation
while the husband did not.

RTC: The court a quo found the appellant to be psychologically incapacitated to perform
his marital obligations mainly because of his failure to find work to support his family and
his violent attitude towards appellee and their children.
CA: Reversing the RTC, the CA held that psychological incapacity had not been established by the
totality of the evidence presented. It ratiocinated in this wise:

"Essential in a petition for annulment is the allegation of the root cause of the spouse's
psychological incapacity which should also be medically or clinically identified, sufficiently
proven by experts and clearly explained in the decision. – NO, hindi ito necessary. The incapacity
must be proven to be existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage and shown to be medically or
clinically permanent or incurable. It must also be grave enough to bring about the disability of the parties
to assume the essential obligations of marriage as set forth in Articles 68 to 71 and Articles 220 to 225 of
the Family Code and such non-complied marital obligations must similarly be alleged in the petition,
established by evidence and explained in the decision.
"In the case before us, the appellant was not subjected to any psychological or psychiatric evaluation.
The psychological findings about the appellant by psychiatrist Natividad Dayan were based only on the
interviews conducted with the appellee. Expert evidence by qualified psychiatrists and clinical
psychologists is essential if only to prove that the parties were or any one of them was mentally or
psychically ill to be truly incognitive of the marital obligations he or she was assuming, or as would make
him or her x x x unable to assume them. In fact, he offered testimonial evidence to show that he [was]
not psychologically incapacitated. The root cause of his supposed incapacity was not alleged in the
petition, nor medically or clinically identified as a psychological illness or sufficiently proven by an expert.
Similarly, there is no evidence at all that would show that the appellant was suffering from an incapacity
which [was] psychological or mental - not physical to the extent that he could not have known the
obligations he was assuming: that the incapacity [was] grave, ha[d] preceded the marriage and [was]
incurable."

Issues

In her Memorandum, Brenda presents for this Court's consideration the following issues:

I. Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals could set aside the findings by the
Regional Trial Court of psychological incapacity of a respondent in a Petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage simply because the respondent did not subject himself
to psychological evaluation.
II. Whether or not the totality of evidence presented and the demeanor of all the
witnesses should be the basis of the determination of the merits of the Petition.

SC RULING: We agree Brenda that the personal medical or psychological examination of his
husband is not a requirement for a declaration of psychological incapacity. Nevertheless, the totality
of the evidence she presented does not show such incapacity.

Preliminary Issue: Need for Personal Medical Examination – Is it required? NO.

Brenda contends that the testimonies and the results of various tests that were submitted to
determine respondent's psychological incapacity to perform the obligations of marriage should not
have been brushed aside by the Court of Appeals, simply because Wilson had not taken those tests
himself. She adds that the CA should have realized that under the circumstances, she had no choice
but to rely on other sources of information in order to determine the psychological capacity of
respondent, who had refused to submit himself to such tests.
In Republic v. CA and Molina, the guidelines governing the application and the interpretation of
psychological incapacity referred to in Article 36 of the Family Code were laid down by this Court as
follows:

1 The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any
doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage
and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution
and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution
devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It
decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of
the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be "protected" by the state. The Family Code
echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes their permanence,
inviolability and solidarity.

2 The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be:

(a) medically or clinically identified,

(b) alleged in the complaint,
(c) sufficiently proven by experts and
(d) clearly explained in the decision.

Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological - not physical,
although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince
the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent
that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them,
could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need
be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem
generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its
incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists
and clinical psychologists.

3 The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the
marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged
their "I do's." The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the
illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.

4 Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or

incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other
spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such
incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to
those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence,
a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to
cure them but may not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her
own children as an essential obligation of marriage.

5 Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to
assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characterological peculiarities,
mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The
illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty,
much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the
person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates
the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to
marriage.
 6 The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of
the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and
225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied
marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in
the text of the decision.

7 Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic

Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great
respect by our courts. It is clear that Article 36 was taken by the Family Code Revision
Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, which became effective in 1983
and which provides:
“The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable to assume
the essential obligations of marriage due to causes of psychological nature."

Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our civil laws
with the religious faith of our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization,
great persuasive weight should be given to decisions of such appellate tribunal. Ideally -
subject to our law on evidence what is decreed as canonically invalid should also be decreed
civilly void.

This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and purpose of the Family Code
provision, contemporaneous religious interpretation is to be given persuasive effect. Here, the
State and the Church - while remaining independent, separate and apart from each other -
shall walk together in synodal cadence towards the same goal of protecting and cherishing
marriage and the family as the inviolable base of the nation.

8 The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor
General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the
Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating
therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The
Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such
certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution
of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor
vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.

The guidelines incorporate the three basic requirements earlier mandated by the Court in Santos v.
Court of Appeals: "psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity (b)
juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability."

The foregoing guidelines do not require that a physician examine the person to be
declared psychologically incapacitated. In fact, the root cause may be "medically or
clinically identified."

 What is important is the presence of evidence that can adequately establish the party's
psychological condition. For indeed, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a
finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the person concerned need
not be resorted to.
Main Issue: Totality of Evidence Presented – Was the evidence enough? NO.

The main question, then, is whether the totality of the evidence presented in the present
case -- including the testimonies of petitioner, the common children, petitioner's sister
and the social worker -- was enough to sustain a finding that respondent was
psychologically incapacitated.

We rule in the negative. Although this Court is sufficiently convinced that Wilson failed to provide
material support to the family and may have resorted to physical abuse and abandonment, the
totality of his acts does not lead to a conclusion of psychological incapacity on his part.
There is absolutely no showing that his "defects" were already present at the inception of the
marriage or that they are incurable.

Verily, the behavior of Wilson can be attributed to the fact that he had lost his job and was
not gainfully employed for a period of more than six years. It was during this period that he
became intermittently drunk, failed to give material and moral support, and even left the family
home.
Thus, his alleged psychological illness was traced only to said period and not to the
inception of the marriage. Equally important, there is no evidence showing that his
condition is incurable, especially now that he is gainfully employed as a taxi driver.

Article 36 of the Family Code, we stress, is not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the
marital bond at the time the causes therefor manifest themselves. It refers to a serious
psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so
grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the
matrimonial bond one is about to assume. These marital obligations are those provided under
Articles 68 to 71, 220, 221 and 225 of the Family Code.

Neither is Article 36 to be equated with legal separation, in which the grounds need not be rooted in
psychological incapacity but on physical violence, moral pressure, moral corruption, civil interdiction,
drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity, abandonment and the like. At best, the
evidence presented by petitioner refers only to grounds for legal separation, not for declaring a
marriage void.

Because Article 36 has been abused as a convenient divorce law, this Court laid down the procedural
requirements for its invocation in Molina. Petitioner, however, has not faithfully observed them.

In sum, this Court cannot declare the dissolution of the marriage for failure of petitioner to show
that the alleged psychological incapacity is characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence and
incurability; and for her failure to observe the guidelines outlined in Molina.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and assailed Decision AFFIRMED, except that portion
requiring personal medical examination as a conditio sine qua non to a finding of psychological
incapacity. No costs.