Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 100113 September 3, 1991

RENATO CAYETANO, petitioner,
vs.
CHRISTIAN MONSOD, HON. JOVITO R. SALONGA, COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENT, and HON.
GUILLERMO CARAGUE, in his capacity as Secretary of Budget and Management, respondents.

Renato L. Cayetano for and in his own behalf.

Sabina E. Acut, Jr. and Mylene Garcia-Albano co-counsel for petitioner.

PARAS, J.:

We are faced here with a controversy of far-reaching proportions. While ostensibly only legal issues are involved, the
Court's decision in this case would indubitably have a profound effect on the political aspect of our national existence.

The 1987 Constitution provides in Section 1 (1), Article IX-C:

There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and six Commissioners who shall be
natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age,
holders of a college degree, and must not have been candidates for any elective position in the immediately
preceding -elections. However, a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine
Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. (Emphasis supplied)

The aforequoted provision is patterned after Section l(l), Article XII-C of the 1973 Constitution which similarly
provides:

There shall be an independent Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and eight Commissioners who shall
be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age and
holders of a college degree. However, a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine
Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.' (Emphasis supplied)

Regrettably, however, there seems to be no jurisprudence as to what constitutes practice of law as a legal qualification
to an appointive office.

Black defines "practice of law" as:

The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of legal principles and technique to
serve the interest of another with his consent. It is not limited to appearing in court, or advising and assisting
in the conduct of litigation, but embraces the preparation of pleadings, and other papers incident to actions and
special proceedings, conveyancing, the preparation of legal instruments of all kinds, and the giving of all legal
advice to clients. It embraces all advice to clients and all actions taken for them in matters connected with the
law. An attorney engages in the practice of law by maintaining an office where he is held out to be-an
attorney, using a letterhead describing himself as an attorney, counseling clients in legal matters, negotiating
with opposing counsel about pending litigation, and fixing and collecting fees for services rendered by his
associate. (Black's Law Dictionary, 3rd ed.)

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. (Land Title Abstract and Trust Co. v. Dworken, 129
Ohio St. 23, 193 N.E. 650) A person is also considered to be in the practice of law when he:

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 ... for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising person, firms, associations or corporations as
to their rights under the law, or appears in a representative capacity as an advocate in proceedings pending or
prospective, before any court, commissioner, referee, board, body, committee, or commission constituted by
law or authorized to settle controversies and there, in such representative capacity performs any act or acts for
the purpose of obtaining or defending the rights of their clients under the law. Otherwise stated, one who, in a
representative capacity, engages in the business of advising clients as to their rights under the law, or while so
engaged performs any act or acts either in court or outside of court for that purpose, is engaged in the practice
of law. (State ex. rel. Mckittrick v..C.S. Dudley and Co., 102 S.W. 2d 895, 340 Mo. 852)

This Court in the case of Philippine Lawyers Association v.Agrava, (105 Phil. 173,176-177) stated:

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of
pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, the management of such actions and
proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to
clients, and all action taken for them in matters connected with the law incorporation services, assessment and
condemnation services contemplating an appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage,
enforcement of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in
attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law practice, as do the
preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the work done involves the determination by the trained
legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions. (5 Am. Jr. p. 262, 263). (Emphasis supplied)

Practice of law under modem conditions consists in no small part of work performed outside of any court and
having no immediate relation to proceedings in court. It embraces conveyancing, the giving of legal advice on
a large variety of subjects, and the preparation and execution of legal instruments covering an extensive field
of business and trust relations and other affairs. Although these transactions may have no direct connection
with court proceedings, they are always subject to become involved in litigation. They require in many aspects
a high degree of legal skill, a wide experience with men and affairs, and great capacity for adaptation to
difficult and complex situations. These customary functions of an attorney or counselor at law bear an
intimate relation to the administration of justice by the courts. No valid distinction, so far as concerns the
question set forth in the order, can be drawn between that part of the work of the lawyer which involves
appearance in court and that part which involves advice and drafting of instruments in his office. It is of
importance to the welfare of the public that these manifold customary functions be performed by persons
possessed of adequate learning and skill, of sound moral character, and acting at all times under the heavy
trust obligations to clients which rests upon all attorneys. (Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. 3
[1953 ed.] , p. 665-666, citing In re Opinion of the Justices [Mass.], 194 N.E. 313, quoted in Rhode Is. Bar
Assoc. v. Automobile Service Assoc. [R.I.] 179 A. 139,144). (Emphasis ours)

The University of the Philippines Law Center in conducting orientation briefing for new lawyers (1974-1975) listed
the dimensions of the practice of law in even broader terms as advocacy, counselling and public service.

One may be a practicing attorney in following any line of employment in the profession. If what he does
exacts knowledge of the law and is of a kind usual for attorneys engaging in the active practice of their
profession, and he follows some one or more lines of employment such as this he is a practicing attorney at
law within the meaning of the statute. (Barr v. Cardell, 155 NW 312)

Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure,
knowledge, training and experience. "To engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are
characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give notice or render any kind of service, which
device or service requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill." (111 ALR 23)

The following records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission show that it has adopted a liberal interpretation of the
term "practice of law."

MR. FOZ. Before we suspend the session, may I make a manifestation which I forgot to do during our review
of the provisions on the Commission on Audit. May I be allowed to make a very brief statement?

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir).

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 The Commissioner will please proceed.

MR. FOZ. This has to do with the qualifications of the members of the Commission on Audit. Among others,
the qualifications provided for by Section I is that "They must be Members of the Philippine Bar" — I am
quoting from the provision — "who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years".

To avoid any misunderstanding which would result in excluding members of the Bar who are now employed in the
COA or Commission on Audit, we would like to make the clarification that this provision on qualifications regarding
members of the Bar does not necessarily refer or involve actual practice of law outside the COA We have to interpret
this to mean that as long as the lawyers who are employed in the COA are using their legal knowledge or legal talent
in their respective work within COA, then they are qualified to be considered for appointment as members or
commissioners, even chairman, of the Commission on Audit.

This has been discussed by the Committee on Constitutional Commissions and Agencies and we deem it important to
take it up on the floor so that this interpretation may be made available whenever this provision on the qualifications
as regards members of the Philippine Bar engaging in the practice of law for at least ten years is taken up.

MR. OPLE. Will Commissioner Foz yield to just one question.

MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.

MR. OPLE. Is he, in effect, saying that service in the COA by a lawyer is equivalent to the requirement of a
law practice that is set forth in the Article on the Commission on Audit?

MR. FOZ. We must consider the fact that the work of COA, although it is auditing, will necessarily involve
legal work; it will involve legal work. And, therefore, lawyers who are employed in COA now would have the
necessary qualifications in accordance with the Provision on qualifications under our provisions on the
Commission on Audit. And, therefore, the answer is yes.

MR. OPLE. Yes. So that the construction given to this is that this is equivalent to the practice of law.

MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.

MR. OPLE. Thank you.

... ( Emphasis supplied)

Section 1(1), Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution, provides, among others, that the Chairman and two
Commissioners of the Commission on Audit (COA) should either be certified public accountants with not less than
ten years of auditing practice, or members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at
least ten years. (emphasis supplied)

Corollary to this is the term "private practitioner" and which is in many ways synonymous with the word "lawyer."
Today, although many lawyers do not engage in private practice, it is still a fact that the majority of lawyers are
private practitioners. (Gary Munneke, Opportunities in Law Careers [VGM Career Horizons: Illinois], [1986], p. 15).

At this point, it might be helpful to define private practice. The term, as commonly understood, means "an individual
or organization engaged in the business of delivering legal services." (Ibid.). Lawyers who practice alone are often
called "sole practitioners." Groups of lawyers are called "firms." The firm is usually a partnership and members of the
firm are the partners. Some firms may be organized as professional corporations and the members called shareholders.
In either case, the members of the firm are the experienced attorneys. In most firms, there are younger or more
inexperienced salaried attorneyscalled "associates." (Ibid.).

The test that defines law practice by looking to traditional areas of law practice is essentially tautologous, unhelpful
defining the practice of law as that which lawyers do. (Charles W. Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics [West Publishing
Co.: Minnesota, 1986], p. 593). The practice of law is defined as the performance of any acts . . . in or out of court,
commonly understood to be the practice of law. (State Bar Ass'n v. Connecticut Bank & Trust Co., 145 Conn. 222,
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140 A.2d 863, 870 [1958] [quoting Grievance Comm. v. Payne, 128 Conn. 325, 22 A.2d 623, 626 [1941]). Because
lawyers perform almost every function known in the commercial and governmental realm, such a definition would
obviously be too global to be workable.(Wolfram, op. cit.).

The appearance of a lawyer in litigation in behalf of a client is at once the most publicly familiar role for lawyers as
well as an uncommon role for the average lawyer. Most lawyers spend little time in courtrooms, and a large
percentage spend their entire practice without litigating a case. (Ibid., p. 593). Nonetheless, many lawyers do continue
to litigate and the litigating lawyer's role colors much of both the public image and the self perception of the legal
profession. (Ibid.).

In this regard thus, the dominance of litigation in the public mind reflects history, not reality. (Ibid.). Why is this so?
Recall that the late Alexander SyCip, a corporate lawyer, once articulated on the importance of a lawyer as a business
counselor in this wise: "Even today, there are still uninformed laymen whose concept of an attorney is one who
principally tries cases before the courts. The members of the bench and bar and the informed laymen such as
businessmen, know that in most developed societies today, substantially more legal work is transacted in law offices
than in the courtrooms. General practitioners of law who do both litigation and non-litigation work also know that in
most cases they find themselves spending more time doing what [is] loosely desccribe[d] as business counseling than
in trying cases. The business lawyer has been described as the planner, the diagnostician and the trial lawyer, the
surgeon. I[t] need not [be] stress[ed] that in law, as in medicine, surgery should be avoided where internal medicine
can be effective." (Business Star, "Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).

In the course of a working day the average general practitioner wig engage in a number of legal tasks, each involving
different legal doctrines, legal skills, legal processes, legal institutions, clients, and other interested parties. Even the
increasing numbers of lawyers in specialized practice wig usually perform at least some legal services outside their
specialty. And even within a narrow specialty such as tax practice, a lawyer will shift from one legal task or role such
as advice-giving to an importantly different one such as representing a client before an administrative agency.
(Wolfram, supra, p. 687).

By no means will most of this work involve litigation, unless the lawyer is one of the relatively rare types — a
litigator who specializes in this work to the exclusion of much else. Instead, the work will require the lawyer to have
mastered the full range of traditional lawyer skills of client counselling, advice-giving, document drafting, and
negotiation. And increasingly lawyers find that the new skills of evaluation and mediation are both effective for many
clients and a source of employment. (Ibid.).

Most lawyers will engage in non-litigation legal work or in litigation work that is constrained in very important ways,
at least theoretically, so as to remove from it some of the salient features of adversarial litigation. Of these special
roles, the most prominent is that of prosecutor. In some lawyers' work the constraints are imposed both by the nature
of the client and by the way in which the lawyer is organized into a social unit to perform that work. The most
common of these roles are those of corporate practice and government legal service. (Ibid.).

In several issues of the Business Star, a business daily, herein below quoted are emerging trends in corporate law
practice, a departure from the traditional concept of practice of law.

We are experiencing today what truly may be called a revolutionary transformation in corporate law practice.
Lawyers and other professional groups, in particular those members participating in various legal-policy
decisional contexts, are finding that understanding the major emerging trends in corporation law is
indispensable to intelligent decision-making.

Constructive adjustment to major corporate problems of today requires an accurate understanding of the
nature and implications of the corporate law research function accompanied by an accelerating rate of
information accumulation. The recognition of the need for such improved corporate legal policy formulation,
particularly "model-making" and "contingency planning," has impressed upon us the inadequacy of traditional
procedures in many decisional contexts.

In a complex legal problem the mass of information to be processed, the sorting and weighing of significant
conditional factors, the appraisal of major trends, the necessity of estimating the consequences of given
courses of action, and the need for fast decision and response in situations of acute danger have prompted the

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use of sophisticated concepts of information flow theory, operational analysis, automatic data processing, and
electronic computing equipment. Understandably, an improved decisional structure must stress the predictive
component of the policy-making process, wherein a "model", of the decisional context or a segment thereof is
developed to test projected alternative courses of action in terms of futuristic effects flowing therefrom.

Although members of the legal profession are regularly engaged in predicting and projecting the trends of the
law, the subject of corporate finance law has received relatively little organized and formalized attention in the
philosophy of advancing corporate legal education. Nonetheless, a cross-disciplinary approach to legal
research has become a vital necessity.

Certainly, the general orientation for productive contributions by those trained primarily in the law can be
improved through an early introduction to multi-variable decisional context and the various approaches for
handling such problems. Lawyers, particularly with either a master's or doctorate degree in business
administration or management, functioning at the legal policy level of decision-making now have some
appreciation for the concepts and analytical techniques of other professions which are currently engaged in
similar types of complex decision-making.

Truth to tell, many situations involving corporate finance problems would require the services of an astute
attorney because of the complex legal implications that arise from each and every necessary step in securing
and maintaining the business issue raised. (Business Star, "Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).

In our litigation-prone country, a corporate lawyer is assiduously referred to as the "abogado de campanilla."
He is the "big-time" lawyer, earning big money and with a clientele composed of the tycoons and magnates of
business and industry.

Despite the growing number of corporate lawyers, many people could not explain what it is that a corporate
lawyer does. For one, the number of attorneys employed by a single corporation will vary with the size and
type of the corporation. Many smaller and some large corporations farm out all their legal problems to private
law firms. Many others have in-house counsel only for certain matters. Other corporation have a staff large
enough to handle most legal problems in-house.

A corporate lawyer, for all intents and purposes, is a lawyer who handles the legal affairs of a corporation. His
areas of concern or jurisdiction may include, inter alia: corporate legal research, tax laws research, acting out
as corporate secretary (in board meetings), appearances in both courts and other adjudicatory agencies
(including the Securities and Exchange Commission), and in other capacities which require an ability to deal
with the law.

At any rate, a corporate lawyer may assume responsibilities other than the legal affairs of the business of the
corporation he is representing. These include such matters as determining policy and becoming involved in
management. ( Emphasis supplied.)

In a big company, for example, one may have a feeling of being isolated from the action, or not understanding
how one's work actually fits into the work of the orgarnization. This can be frustrating to someone who needs
to see the results of his work first hand. In short, a corporate lawyer is sometimes offered this fortune to be
more closely involved in the running of the business.

Moreover, a corporate lawyer's services may sometimes be engaged by a multinational corporation (MNC).
Some large MNCs provide one of the few opportunities available to corporate lawyers to enter the
international law field. After all, international law is practiced in a relatively small number of companies and
law firms. Because working in a foreign country is perceived by many as glamorous, tills is an area coveted
by corporate lawyers. In most cases, however, the overseas jobs go to experienced attorneys while the younger
attorneys do their "international practice" in law libraries. (Business Star, "Corporate Law Practice," May
25,1990, p. 4).

This brings us to the inevitable, i.e., the role of the lawyer in the realm of finance. To borrow the lines of
Harvard-educated lawyer Bruce Wassertein, to wit: "A bad lawyer is one who fails to spot problems, a good

5
lawyer is one who perceives the difficulties, and the excellent lawyer is one who surmounts them." (Business
Star, "Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).

Today, the study of corporate law practice direly needs a "shot in the arm," so to speak. No longer are we
talking of the traditional law teaching method of confining the subject study to the Corporation Code and the
Securities Code but an incursion as well into the intertwining modern management issues.

Such corporate legal management issues deal primarily with three (3) types of learning: (1) acquisition of
insights into current advances which are of particular significance to the corporate counsel; (2) an introduction
to usable disciplinary skins applicable to a corporate counsel's management responsibilities; and (3) a
devotion to the organization and management of the legal function itself.

These three subject areas may be thought of as intersecting circles, with a shared area linking them. Otherwise
known as "intersecting managerial jurisprudence," it forms a unifying theme for the corporate counsel's total
learning.

Some current advances in behavior and policy sciences affect the counsel's role. For that matter, the corporate
lawyer reviews the globalization process, including the resulting strategic repositioning that the firms he
provides counsel for are required to make, and the need to think about a corporation's; strategy at multiple
levels. The salience of the nation-state is being reduced as firms deal both with global multinational entities
and simultaneously with sub-national governmental units. Firms increasingly collaborate not only with public
entities but with each other — often with those who are competitors in other arenas.

Also, the nature of the lawyer's participation in decision-making within the corporation is rapidly changing.
The modem corporate lawyer has gained a new role as a stakeholder — in some cases participating in the
organization and operations of governance through participation on boards and other decision-making roles.
Often these new patterns develop alongside existing legal institutions and laws are perceived as barriers.
These trends are complicated as corporations organize for global operations. ( Emphasis supplied)

The practising lawyer of today is familiar as well with governmental policies toward the promotion and
management of technology. New collaborative arrangements for promoting specific technologies or
competitiveness more generally require approaches from industry that differ from older, more adversarial
relationships and traditional forms of seeking to influence governmental policies. And there are lessons to be
learned from other countries. In Europe, Esprit, Eureka and Race are examples of collaborative efforts
between governmental and business Japan's MITI is world famous. (Emphasis supplied)

Following the concept of boundary spanning, the office of the Corporate Counsel comprises a distinct group
within the managerial structure of all kinds of organizations. Effectiveness of both long-term and temporary
groups within organizations has been found to be related to indentifiable factors in the group-context
interaction such as the groups actively revising their knowledge of the environment coordinating work with
outsiders, promoting team achievements within the organization. In general, such external activities are better
predictors of team performance than internal group processes.

In a crisis situation, the legal managerial capabilities of the corporate lawyer vis-a-vis the managerial mettle
of corporations are challenged. Current research is seeking ways both to anticipate effective managerial
procedures and to understand relationships of financial liability and insurance considerations. (Emphasis
supplied)

Regarding the skills to apply by the corporate counsel, three factors are apropos:

First System Dynamics. The field of systems dynamics has been found an effective tool for new managerial
thinking regarding both planning and pressing immediate problems. An understanding of the role of feedback
loops, inventory levels, and rates of flow, enable users to simulate all sorts of systematic problems —
physical, economic, managerial, social, and psychological. New programming techniques now make the
system dynamics principles more accessible to managers — including corporate counsels. (Emphasis
supplied)

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 Second Decision Analysis. This enables users to make better decisions involving complexity and uncertainty.
In the context of a law department, it can be used to appraise the settlement value of litigation, aid in
negotiation settlement, and minimize the cost and risk involved in managing a portfolio of cases. (Emphasis
supplied)

Third Modeling for Negotiation Management. Computer-based models can be used directly by parties and
mediators in all lands of negotiations. All integrated set of such tools provide coherent and effective
negotiation support, including hands-on on instruction in these techniques. A simulation case of an
international joint venture may be used to illustrate the point.

[Be this as it may,] the organization and management of the legal function, concern three pointed areas of
consideration, thus:

Preventive Lawyering. Planning by lawyers requires special skills that comprise a major part of the general
counsel's responsibilities. They differ from those of remedial law. Preventive lawyering is concerned with
minimizing the risks of legal trouble and maximizing legal rights for such legal entities at that time when
transactional or similar facts are being considered and made.

Managerial Jurisprudence. This is the framework within which are undertaken those activities of the firm to
which legal consequences attach. It needs to be directly supportive of this nation's evolving economic and
organizational fabric as firms change to stay competitive in a global, interdependent environment. The
practice and theory of "law" is not adequate today to facilitate the relationships needed in trying to make a
global economy work.

Organization and Functioning of the Corporate Counsel's Office. The general counsel has emerged in the last
decade as one of the most vibrant subsets of the legal profession. The corporate counsel hear responsibility for
key aspects of the firm's strategic issues, including structuring its global operations, managing improved
relationships with an increasingly diversified body of employees, managing expanded liability exposure,
creating new and varied interactions with public decision-makers, coping internally with more complex make
or by decisions.

This whole exercise drives home the thesis that knowing corporate law is not enough to make one a good
general corporate counsel nor to give him a full sense of how the legal system shapes corporate activities. And
even if the corporate lawyer's aim is not the understand all of the law's effects on corporate activities, he must,
at the very least, also gain a working knowledge of the management issues if only to be able to grasp not only
the basic legal "constitution' or makeup of the modem corporation. "Business Star", "The Corporate Counsel,"
April 10, 1991, p. 4).

The challenge for lawyers (both of the bar and the bench) is to have more than a passing knowledge of
financial law affecting each aspect of their work. Yet, many would admit to ignorance of vast tracts of the
financial law territory. What transpires next is a dilemma of professional security: Will the lawyer admit
ignorance and risk opprobrium?; or will he feign understanding and risk exposure? (Business Star, "Corporate
Finance law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).

Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the position of Chairman of the
COMELEC in a letter received by the Secretariat of the Commission on Appointments on April 25, 1991. Petitioner
opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod does not possess the required qualification of having been engaged
in the practice of law for at least ten years.

On June 5, 1991, the Commission on Appointments confirmed the nomination of Monsod as Chairman of the
COMELEC. On June 18, 1991, he took his oath of office. On the same day, he assumed office as Chairman of the
COMELEC.

Challenging the validity of the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of Monsod's nomination, petitioner
as a citizen and taxpayer, filed the instant petition for certiorari and Prohibition praying that said confirmation and the
consequent appointment of Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections be declared null and void.

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Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar, having passed the bar examinations of 1960 with a grade of
86-55%. He has been a dues paying member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines since its inception in 1972-73. He
has also been paying his professional license fees as lawyer for more than ten years. (p. 124, Rollo)

After graduating from the College of Law (U.P.) and having hurdled the bar, Atty. Monsod worked in the law office of
his father. During his stint in the World Bank Group (1963-1970), Monsod worked as an operations officer for about
two years in Costa Rica and Panama, which involved getting acquainted with the laws of member-countries
negotiating loans and coordinating legal, economic, and project work of the Bank. Upon returning to the Philippines
in 1970, he worked with the Meralco Group, served as chief executive officer of an investment bank and subsequently
of a business conglomerate, and since 1986, has rendered services to various companies as a legal and economic
consultant or chief executive officer. As former Secretary-General (1986) and National Chairman (1987) of
NAMFREL. Monsod's work involved being knowledgeable in election law. He appeared for NAMFREL in its
accreditation hearings before the Comelec. In the field of advocacy, Monsod, in his personal capacity and as former
Co-Chairman of the Bishops Businessmen's Conference for Human Development, has worked with the under
privileged sectors, such as the farmer and urban poor groups, in initiating, lobbying for and engaging in affirmative
action for the agrarian reform law and lately the urban land reform bill. Monsod also made use of his legal
knowledge as a member of the Davide Commission, a quast judicial body, which conducted numerous hearings (1990)
and as a member of the Constitutional Commission (1986-1987), and Chairman of its Committee on Accountability of
Public Officers, for which he was cited by the President of the Commission, Justice Cecilia Muñoz-Palma for
"innumerable amendments to reconcile government functions with individual freedoms and public accountability and
the party-list system for the House of Representative. (pp. 128-129 Rollo) ( Emphasis supplied)

Just a word about the work of a negotiating team of which Atty. Monsod used to be a member.

In a loan agreement, for instance, a negotiating panel acts as a team, and which is adequately constituted to
meet the various contingencies that arise during a negotiation. Besides top officials of the Borrower
concerned, there are the legal officer (such as the legal counsel), the finance manager, and an operations
officer (such as an official involved in negotiating the contracts) who comprise the members of the team.
(Guillermo V. Soliven, "Loan Negotiating Strategies for Developing Country Borrowers," Staff Paper No. 2,
Central Bank of the Philippines, Manila, 1982, p. 11). (Emphasis supplied)

After a fashion, the loan agreement is like a country's Constitution; it lays down the law as far as the loan
transaction is concerned. Thus, the meat of any Loan Agreement can be compartmentalized into five (5)
fundamental parts: (1) business terms; (2) borrower's representation; (3) conditions of closing; (4) covenants;
and (5) events of default. (Ibid., p. 13).

In the same vein, lawyers play an important role in any debt restructuring program. For aside from
performing the tasks of legislative drafting and legal advising, they score national development policies as key
factors in maintaining their countries' sovereignty. (Condensed from the work paper, entitled "Wanted:
Development Lawyers for Developing Nations," submitted by L. Michael Hager, regional legal adviser of the
United States Agency for International Development, during the Session on Law for the Development of
Nations at the Abidjan World Conference in Ivory Coast, sponsored by the World Peace Through Law Center
on August 26-31, 1973). ( Emphasis supplied)

Loan concessions and compromises, perhaps even more so than purely renegotiation policies, demand
expertise in the law of contracts, in legislation and agreement drafting and in renegotiation. Necessarily, a
sovereign lawyer may work with an international business specialist or an economist in the formulation of a
model loan agreement. Debt restructuring contract agreements contain such a mixture of technical language
that they should be carefully drafted and signed only with the advise of competent counsel in conjunction with
the guidance of adequate technical support personnel. (See International Law Aspects of the Philippine
External Debts, an unpublished dissertation, U.S.T. Graduate School of Law, 1987, p. 321). ( Emphasis
supplied)

A critical aspect of sovereign debt restructuring/contract construction is the set of terms and conditions which
determines the contractual remedies for a failure to perform one or more elements of the contract. A good
agreement must not only define the responsibilities of both parties, but must also state the recourse open to
either party when the other fails to discharge an obligation. For a compleat debt restructuring represents a

8
 devotion to that principle which in the ultimate analysis is sine qua non for foreign loan agreements-an
adherence to the rule of law in domestic and international affairs of whose kind U.S. Supreme Court Justice
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. once said: "They carry no banners, they beat no drums; but where they are, men
learn that bustle and bush are not the equal of quiet genius and serene mastery." (See Ricardo J. Romulo, "The
Role of Lawyers in Foreign Investments," Integrated Bar of the Philippine Journal, Vol. 15, Nos. 3 and 4,
Third and Fourth Quarters, 1977, p. 265).

Interpreted in the light of the various definitions of the term Practice of law". particularly the modern concept of law
practice, and taking into consideration the liberal construction intended by the framers of the Constitution, Atty.
Monsod's past work experiences as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a
lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both the rich and the poor — verily more than satisfy the
constitutional requirement — that he has been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.

Besides in the leading case of Luego v. Civil Service Commission, 143 SCRA 327, the Court said:

Appointment is an essentially discretionary power and must be performed by the officer in which it is vested
according to his best lights, the only condition being that the appointee should possess the qualifications
required by law. If he does, then the appointment cannot be faulted on the ground that there are others better
qualified who should have been preferred. This is a political question involving considerations of wisdom
which only the appointing authority can decide. (emphasis supplied)

No less emphatic was the Court in the case of (Central Bank v. Civil Service Commission, 171 SCRA 744) where it
stated:

It is well-settled that when the appointee is qualified, as in this case, and all the other legal requirements are
satisfied, the Commission has no alternative but to attest to the appointment in accordance with the Civil
Service Law. The Commission has no authority to revoke an appointment on the ground that another person is
more qualified for a particular position. It also has no authority to direct the appointment of a substitute of its
choice. To do so would be an encroachment on the discretion vested upon the appointing authority. An
appointment is essentially within the discretionary power of whomsoever it is vested, subject to the only
condition that the appointee should possess the qualifications required by law. ( Emphasis supplied)

The appointing process in a regular appointment as in the case at bar, consists of four (4) stages: (1) nomination; (2)
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments; (3) issuance of a commission (in the Philippines, upon submission
by the Commission on Appointments of its certificate of confirmation, the President issues the permanent
appointment; and (4) acceptance e.g., oath-taking, posting of bond, etc. . . . (Lacson v. Romero, No. L-3081, October
14, 1949; Gonzales, Law on Public Officers, p. 200)

The power of the Commission on Appointments to give its consent to the nomination of Monsod as Chairman of the
Commission on Elections is mandated by Section 1(2) Sub-Article C, Article IX of the Constitution which provides:

The Chairman and the Commisioners shall be appointed by the President with the consent of the Commission
on Appointments for a term of seven years without reappointment. Of those first appointed, three Members
shall hold office for seven years, two Members for five years, and the last Members for three years, without
reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired term of the predecessor. In no
case shall any Member be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity.

Anent Justice Teodoro Padilla's separate opinion, suffice it to say that his definition of the practice of law is
the traditional or stereotyped notion of law practice, as distinguished from the modern concept of the practice
of law, which modern connotation is exactly what was intended by the eminent framers of the 1987
Constitution. Moreover, Justice Padilla's definition would require generally a habitual law practice, perhaps
practised two or three times a week and would outlaw say, law practice once or twice a year for ten
consecutive years. Clearly, this is far from the constitutional intent.

Upon the other hand, the separate opinion of Justice Isagani Cruz states that in my written opinion, I made use of a
definition of law practice which really means nothing because the definition says that law practice " . . . is what people
ordinarily mean by the practice of law." True I cited the definition but only by way of sarcasm as evident from my
9
statement that the definition of law practice by "traditional areas of law practice is essentially tautologous" or defining
a phrase by means of the phrase itself that is being defined.

Justice Cruz goes on to say in substance that since the law covers almost all situations, most individuals, in making
use of the law, or in advising others on what the law means, are actually practicing law. In that sense, perhaps, but we
should not lose sight of the fact that Mr. Monsod is a lawyer, a member of the Philippine Bar, who has been practising
law for over ten years. This is different from the acts of persons practising law, without first becoming lawyers.

Justice Cruz also says that the Supreme Court can even disqualify an elected President of the Philippines, say, on the
ground that he lacks one or more qualifications. This matter, I greatly doubt. For one thing, how can an action or
petition be brought against the President? And even assuming that he is indeed disqualified, how can the action be
entertained since he is the incumbent President?

We now proceed:

The Commission on the basis of evidence submitted doling the public hearings on Monsod's confirmation, implicitly
determined that he possessed the necessary qualifications as required by law. The judgment rendered by the
Commission in the exercise of such an acknowledged power is beyond judicial interference except only upon a clear
showing of a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. (Art. VIII, Sec. 1 Constitution).
Thus, only where such grave abuse of discretion is clearly shown shall the Court interfere with the Commission's
judgment. In the instant case, there is no occasion for the exercise of the Court's corrective power, since no abuse,
much less a grave abuse of discretion, that would amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction and would warrant the
issuance of the writs prayed, for has been clearly shown.

Additionally, consider the following:

(1) If the Commission on Appointments rejects a nominee by the President, may the Supreme Court reverse
the Commission, and thus in effect confirm the appointment? Clearly, the answer is in the negative.

(2) In the same vein, may the Court reject the nominee, whom the Commission has confirmed? The answer is
likewise clear.

(3) If the United States Senate (which is the confirming body in the U.S. Congress) decides to confirm a
Presidential nominee, it would be incredible that the U.S. Supreme Court would still reverse the U.S. Senate.

Finally, one significant legal maxim is:

We must interpret not by the letter that killeth, but by the spirit that giveth life.

Take this hypothetical case of Samson and Delilah. Once, the procurator of Judea asked Delilah (who was Samson's
beloved) for help in capturing Samson. Delilah agreed on condition that —

No blade shall touch his skin;

No blood shall flow from his veins.

When Samson (his long hair cut by Delilah) was captured, the procurator placed an iron rod burning white-hot two or
three inches away from in front of Samson's eyes. This blinded the man. Upon hearing of what had happened to her
beloved, Delilah was beside herself with anger, and fuming with righteous fury, accused the procurator of reneging on
his word. The procurator calmly replied: "Did any blade touch his skin? Did any blood flow from his veins?" The
procurator was clearly relying on the letter, not the spirit of the agreement.

In view of the foregoing, this petition is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

10
Fernan, C.J., Griño-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.
Feliciano, J., I certify that he voted to dismiss the petition. (Fernan, C.J.)

Sarmiento, J., is on leave.

Regalado, and Davide, Jr., J., took no part.

Separate Opinions

NARVASA, J., concurring:

I concur with the decision of the majority written by Mr. Justice Paras, albeit only in the result; it does not appear to
me that there has been an adequate showing that the challenged determination by the Commission on Appointments-
that the appointment of respondent Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections should, on the basis of his
stated qualifications and after due assessment thereof, be confirmed-was attended by error so gross as to amount to
grave abuse of discretion and consequently merits nullification by this Court in accordance with the second paragraph
of Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution. I therefore vote to DENY the petition.

PADILLA, J., dissenting:

The records of this case will show that when the Court first deliberated on the Petition at bar, I voted not only to
require the respondents to comment on the Petition, but I was the sole vote for the issuance of a temporary restraining
order to enjoin respondent Monsod from assuming the position of COMELEC Chairman, while the Court deliberated
on his constitutional qualification for the office. My purpose in voting for a TRO was to prevent the inconvenience
and even embarrassment to all parties concerned were the Court to finally decide for respondent Monsod's
disqualification. Moreover, a reading of the Petition then in relation to established jurisprudence already
showed prima facie that respondent Monsod did not possess the needed qualification, that is, he had not engaged in
the practice of law for at least ten (10) years prior to his appointment as COMELEC Chairman.

After considering carefully respondent Monsod's comment, I am even more convinced that the constitutional
requirement of "practice of law for at least ten (10) years" has not been met.

The procedural barriers interposed by respondents deserve scant consideration because, ultimately, the core issue to be
resolved in this petition is the proper construal of the constitutional provision requiring a majority of the membership
of COMELEC, including the Chairman thereof to "have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10)
years." (Art. IX(C), Section 1(1), 1987 Constitution). Questions involving the construction of constitutional provisions
are best left to judicial resolution. As declared in Angara v. Electoral Commission, (63 Phil. 139) "upon the judicial
department is thrown the solemn and inescapable obligation of interpreting the Constitution and defining
constitutional boundaries."

The Constitution has imposed clear and specific standards for a COMELEC Chairman. Among these are that he must
have been "engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years." It is the bounden duty of this Court to ensure that
such standard is met and complied with.

What constitutes practice of law? As commonly understood, "practice" refers to the actual performance or
application of knowledge as distinguished from mere possession of knowledge; it connotes
an active, habitual, repeated or customary action.1 To "practice" law, or any profession for that matter, means, to
exercise or pursue an employment or profession actively, habitually, repeatedly or customarily.

Therefore, a doctor of medicine who is employed and is habitually performing the tasks of a nursing aide, cannot be
said to be in the "practice of medicine." A certified public accountant who works as a clerk, cannot be said to practice
his profession as an accountant. In the same way, a lawyer who is employed as a business executive or a corporate
manager, other than as head or attorney of a Legal Department of a corporation or a governmental agency, cannot be
said to be in the practice of law.

As aptly held by this Court in the case of People vs. Villanueva:2

11
 Practice is more than an isolated appearance for it consists in frequent or customary actions, a succession of
acts of the same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual exercise (State vs- Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864,
42 LRA, M.S. 768). Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of statute has been interpreted as customarily
or habitually holding one's self out to the public as a lawyer and demanding payment for such services (State
vs. Bryan, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644,647.) ... (emphasis supplied).

It is worth mentioning that the respondent Commission on Appointments in a Memorandum it prepared, enumerated
several factors determinative of whether a particular activity constitutes "practice of law." It states:

1. Habituality. The term "practice of law" implies customarily or habitually holding one's self out to the public
as a lawyer (People vs. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 citing State v. Boyen, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644) such as
when one sends a circular announcing the establishment of a law office for the general practice of law (U.S. v.
Ney Bosque, 8 Phil. 146), or when one takes the oath of office as a lawyer before a notary public, and files a
manifestation with the Supreme Court informing it of his intention to practice law in all courts in the country
(People v. De Luna, 102 Phil. 968).

Practice is more than an isolated appearance for it consists in frequent or customary action, a succession of
acts of the same kind. In other words, it is a habitual exercise (People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 citing State
v. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan, 864).

2. Compensation. Practice of law implies that one must have presented himself to be in the active and
continued practice of the legal profession and that his professional services are available to the public for
compensation, as a service of his livelihood or in consideration of his said services. (People v. Villanueva,
supra). Hence, charging for services such as preparation of documents involving the use of legal knowledge
and skill is within the term "practice of law" (Ernani Paño, Bar Reviewer in Legal and Judicial Ethics, 1988
ed., p. 8 citing People v. People's Stockyards State Bank, 176 N.B. 901) and, one who renders an opinion as to
the proper interpretation of a statute, and receives pay for it, is to that extent, practicing law (Martin, supra, p.
806 citing Mendelaun v. Gilbert and Barket Mfg. Co., 290 N.Y.S. 462) If compensation is expected, all advice
to clients and all action taken for them in matters connected with the law; are practicing law. (Elwood
Fitchette et al., v. Arthur C. Taylor, 94A-L.R. 356-359)

3. Application of law legal principle practice or procedure which calls for legal knowledge, training and
experience is within the term "practice of law". (Martin supra)

4. Attorney-client relationship. Engaging in the practice of law presupposes the existence of lawyer-client
relationship. Hence, where a lawyer undertakes an activity which requires knowledge of law but involves no
attorney-client relationship, such as teaching law or writing law books or articles, he cannot be said to be
engaged in the practice of his profession or a lawyer (Agpalo, Legal Ethics, 1989 ed., p. 30). 3

The above-enumerated factors would, I believe, be useful aids in determining whether or not respondent Monsod
meets the constitutional qualification of practice of law for at least ten (10) years at the time of his appointment as
COMELEC Chairman.

The following relevant questions may be asked:

1. Did respondent Monsod perform any of the tasks which are peculiar to the practice of law?

2. Did respondent perform such tasks customarily or habitually?

3. Assuming that he performed any of such tasks habitually, did he do so HABITUALLY FOR AT LEAST TEN (10)
YEARS prior to his appointment as COMELEC Chairman?

Given the employment or job history of respondent Monsod as appears from the records, I am persuaded that if ever
he did perform any of the tasks which constitute the practice of law, he did not do so HABITUALLY for at least ten
(10) years prior to his appointment as COMELEC Chairman.

12
While it may be granted that he performed tasks and activities which could be latitudinarianly considered activities
peculiar to the practice of law, like the drafting of legal documents and the rendering of legal opinion or advice, such
were isolated transactions or activities which do not qualify his past endeavors as "practice of law." To become
engaged in the practice of law, there must be a continuity, or a succession of acts. As observed by the Solicitor
General in People vs. Villanueva:4

Essentially, the word private practice of law implies that one must have presented himself to be in
the active and continued practice of the legal profession and that his professional services are available to the
public for a compensation, as a source of his livelihood or in consideration of his said services.

ACCORDINGLY, my vote is to GRANT the petition and to declare respondent Monsod as not qualified for the
position of COMELEC Chairman for not having engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years prior to his
appointment to such position.

CRUZ, J., dissenting:

I am sincerely impressed by the ponencia of my brother Paras but find I must dissent just the same. There are certain
points on which I must differ with him while of course respecting hisviewpoint.

To begin with, I do not think we are inhibited from examining the qualifications of the respondent simply because his
nomination has been confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. In my view, this is not a political question that
we are barred from resolving. Determination of the appointee's credentials is made on the basis of the established
facts, not the discretion of that body. Even if it were, the exercise of that discretion would still be subject to our
review.

In Luego, which is cited in the ponencia, what was involved was the discretion of the appointing authority
to choose between two claimants to the same office who both possessed the required qualifications. It was that kind of
discretion that we said could not be reviewed.

If a person elected by no less than the sovereign people may be ousted by this Court for lack of the required
qualifications, I see no reason why we cannot disqualified an appointee simply because he has passed the Commission
on Appointments.

Even the President of the Philippines may be declared ineligible by this Court in an appropriate proceeding
notwithstanding that he has been found acceptable by no less than the enfranchised citizenry. The reason is that what
we would be examining is not the wisdom of his election but whether or not he was qualified to be elected in the first
place.

Coming now to the qualifications of the private respondent, I fear that the ponencia may have been too sweeping in its
definition of the phrase "practice of law" as to render the qualification practically toothless. From the numerous
activities accepted as embraced in the term, I have the uncomfortable feeling that one does not even have to be a
lawyer to be engaged in the practice of law as long as his activities involve the application of some law, however
peripherally. The stock broker and the insurance adjuster and the realtor could come under the definition as they deal
with or give advice on matters that are likely "to become involved in litigation."

The lawyer is considered engaged in the practice of law even if his main occupation is another business and he
interprets and applies some law only as an incident of such business. That covers every company organized under the
Corporation Code and regulated by the SEC under P.D. 902-A. Considering the ramifications of the modern society,
there is hardly any activity that is not affected by some law or government regulation the businessman must know
about and observe. In fact, again going by the definition, a lawyer does not even have to be part of a business concern
to be considered a practitioner. He can be so deemed when, on his own, he rents a house or buys a car or consults a
doctor as these acts involve his knowledge and application of the laws regulating such transactions. If he operates a
public utility vehicle as his main source of livelihood, he would still be deemed engaged in the practice of law because
he must obey the Public Service Act and the rules and regulations of the Energy Regulatory Board.

The ponencia quotes an American decision defining the practice of law as the "performance of any acts ... in or out of
court, commonly understood to be the practice of law," which tells us absolutely nothing. The decision goes on to say
13
that "because lawyers perform almost every function known in the commercial and governmental realm, such a
definition would obviously be too global to be workable."

The effect of the definition given in the ponencia is to consider virtually every lawyer to be engaged in the practice of
law even if he does not earn his living, or at least part of it, as a lawyer. It is enough that his activities are incidentally
(even if only remotely) connected with some law, ordinance, or regulation. The possible exception is the lawyer
whose income is derived from teaching ballroom dancing or escorting wrinkled ladies with pubescent pretensions.

The respondent's credentials are impressive, to be sure, but they do not persuade me that he has been engaged in the
practice of law for ten years as required by the Constitution. It is conceded that he has been engaged in business and
finance, in which areas he has distinguished himself, but as an executive and economist and not as a practicing lawyer.
The plain fact is that he has occupied the various positions listed in his resume by virtue of his experience and prestige
as a businessman and not as an attorney-at-law whose principal attention is focused on the law. Even if it be argued
that he was acting as a lawyer when he lobbied in Congress for agrarian and urban reform, served in the NAMFREL
and the Constitutional Commission (together with non-lawyers like farmers and priests) and was a member of the
Davide Commission, he has not proved that his activities in these capacities extended over the prescribed 10-year
period of actual practice of the law. He is doubtless eminently qualified for many other positions worthy of his
abundant talents but not as Chairman of the Commission on Elections.

I have much admiration for respondent Monsod, no less than for Mr. Justice Paras, but I must regretfully vote to grant
the petition.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J., dissenting:

When this petition was filed, there was hope that engaging in the practice of law as a qualification for public office
would be settled one way or another in fairly definitive terms. Unfortunately, this was not the result.

Of the fourteen (14) member Court, 5 are of the view that Mr. Christian Monsod engaged in the practice of law (with
one of these 5 leaving his vote behind while on official leave but not expressing his clear stand on the matter); 4
categorically stating that he did not practice law; 2 voting in the result because there was no error so gross as to
amount to grave abuse of discretion; one of official leave with no instructions left behind on how he viewed the issue;
and 2 not taking part in the deliberations and the decision.

There are two key factors that make our task difficult. First is our reviewing the work of a constitutional Commission
on Appointments whose duty is precisely to look into the qualifications of persons appointed to high office. Even if
the Commission errs, we have no power to set aside error. We can look only into grave abuse of discretion or
whimsically and arbitrariness. Second is our belief that Mr. Monsod possesses superior qualifications in terms of
executive ability, proficiency in management, educational background, experience in international banking and
finance, and instant recognition by the public. His integrity and competence are not questioned by the petitioner. What
is before us is compliance with a specific requirement written into the Constitution.

Inspite of my high regard for Mr. Monsod, I cannot shirk my constitutional duty. He has never engaged in the practice
of law for even one year. He is a member of the bar but to say that he has practiced law is stretching the term beyond
rational limits.

A person may have passed the bar examinations. But if he has not dedicated his life to the law, if he has not engaged
in an activity where membership in the bar is a requirement I fail to see how he can claim to have been engaged in the
practice of law.

Engaging in the practice of law is a qualification not only for COMELEC chairman but also for appointment to the
Supreme Court and all lower courts. What kind of Judges or Justices will we have if there main occupation is selling
real estate, managing a business corporation, serving in fact-finding committee, working in media, or operating a farm
with no active involvement in the law, whether in Government or private practice, except that in one joyful moment in
the distant past, they happened to pass the bar examinations?

The Constitution uses the phrase "engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years." The deliberate choice of words
shows that the practice envisioned is active and regular, not isolated, occasional, accidental, intermittent, incidental,
14
seasonal, or extemporaneous. To be "engaged" in an activity for ten years requires committed participation in
something which is the result of one's decisive choice. It means that one is occupied and involved in the enterprise;
one is obliged or pledged to carry it out with intent and attention during the ten-year period.

I agree with the petitioner that based on the bio-data submitted by respondent Monsod to the Commission on
Appointments, the latter has not been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. In fact, if appears that Mr.
Monsod has never practiced law except for an alleged one year period after passing the bar examinations when he
worked in his father's law firm. Even then his law practice must have been extremely limited because he was also
working for M.A. and Ph. D. degrees in Economics at the University of Pennsylvania during that period. How could
he practice law in the United States while not a member of the Bar there?

The professional life of the respondent follows:

1.15.1. Respondent Monsod's activities since his passing the Bar examinations in 1961 consist of the
following:

1. 1961-1963: M.A. in Economics (Ph. D. candidate), University of Pennsylvania

2. 1963-1970: World Bank Group — Economist, Industry Department; Operations, Latin American
Department; Division Chief, South Asia and Middle East, International Finance Corporation

3. 1970-1973: Meralco Group — Executive of various companies, i.e., Meralco Securities Corporation,
Philippine Petroleum Corporation, Philippine Electric Corporation

4. 1973-1976: Yujuico Group — President, Fil-Capital Development Corporation and affiliated companies

5. 1976-1978: Finaciera Manila — Chief Executive Officer

6. 1978-1986: Guevent Group of Companies — Chief Executive Officer

7. 1986-1987: Philippine Constitutional Commission — Member

8. 1989-1991: The Fact-Finding Commission on the December 1989 Coup Attempt — Member

9. Presently: Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer of the following companies:

a. ACE Container Philippines, Inc.

b. Dataprep, Philippines

c. Philippine SUNsystems Products, Inc.

d. Semirara Coal Corporation

e. CBL Timber Corporation

Member of the Board of the Following:

a. Engineering Construction Corporation of the Philippines

b. First Philippine Energy Corporation

c. First Philippine Holdings Corporation

d. First Philippine Industrial Corporation

15
 e. Graphic Atelier

f. Manila Electric Company

g. Philippine Commercial Capital, Inc.

h. Philippine Electric Corporation

i. Tarlac Reforestation and Environment Enterprises

j. Tolong Aquaculture Corporation

k. Visayan Aquaculture Corporation

l. Guimaras Aquaculture Corporation (Rollo, pp. 21-22)

There is nothing in the above bio-data which even remotely indicates that respondent Monsod has given the
law enough attention or a certain degree of commitment and participation as would support in all sincerity and candor
the claim of having engaged in its practice for at least ten years. Instead of working as a lawyer, he has lawyers
working for him. Instead of giving receiving that legal advice of legal services, he was the oneadvice and those
services as an executive but not as a lawyer.

The deliberations before the Commission on Appointments show an effort to equate "engaged in the practice of law"
with the use of legal knowledge in various fields of endeavor such as commerce, industry, civic work, blue ribbon
investigations, agrarian reform, etc. where such knowledge would be helpful.

I regret that I cannot join in playing fast and loose with a term, which even an ordinary layman accepts as having a
familiar and customary well-defined meaning. Every resident of this country who has reached the age of discernment
has to know, follow, or apply the law at various times in his life. Legal knowledge is useful if not necessary for the
business executive, legislator, mayor, barangay captain, teacher, policeman, farmer, fisherman, market vendor, and
student to name only a few. And yet, can these people honestly assert that as such, they are engaged in the practice of
law?

The Constitution requires having been "engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years." It is not satisfied with
having been "a member of the Philippine bar for at least ten years."

Some American courts have defined the practice of law, as follows:

The practice of law involves not only appearance in court in connection with litigation but also services
rendered out of court, and it includes the giving of advice or the rendering of any services requiring the use of
legal skill or knowledge, such as preparing a will, contract or other instrument, the legal effect of which, under
the facts and conditions involved, must be carefully determined. People ex rel. Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Tinkoff,
399 Ill. 282, 77 N.E.2d 693; People ex rel. Illinois State Bar Ass'n v. People's Stock Yards State Bank, 344 Ill.
462,176 N.E. 901, and cases cited.

It would be difficult, if not impossible to lay down a formula or definition of what constitutes the practice of
law. "Practicing law" has been defined as "Practicing as an attorney or counselor at law according to the laws
and customs of our courts, is the giving of advice or rendition of any sort of service by any person, firm or
corporation when the giving of such advice or rendition of such service requires the use of any degree of legal
knowledge or skill." Without adopting that definition, we referred to it as being substantially correct in People
ex rel. Illinois State Bar Ass'n v. People's Stock Yards State Bank, 344 Ill. 462,176 N.E. 901. (People v.
Schafer, 87 N.E. 2d 773, 776)

For one's actions to come within the purview of practice of law they should not only be activities peculiar to the work
of a lawyer, they should also be performed, habitually, frequently or customarily, to wit:

x x x           x x x          x x x
16
 Respondent's answers to questions propounded to him were rather evasive. He was asked whether or not he
ever prepared contracts for the parties in real-estate transactions where he was not the procuring agent. He
answered: "Very seldom." In answer to the question as to how many times he had prepared contracts for the
parties during the twenty-one years of his business, he said: "I have no Idea." When asked if it would be more
than half a dozen times his answer was I suppose. Asked if he did not recall making the statement to several
parties that he had prepared contracts in a large number of instances, he answered: "I don't recall exactly what
was said." When asked if he did not remember saying that he had made a practice of preparing deeds,
mortgages and contracts and charging a fee to the parties therefor in instances where he was not the broker in
the deal, he answered: "Well, I don't believe so, that is not a practice." Pressed further for an answer as to his
practice in preparing contracts and deeds for parties where he was not the broker, he finally answered: "I have
done about everything that is on the books as far as real estate is concerned."

x x x           x x x          x x x

Respondent takes the position that because he is a real-estate broker he has a lawful right to do any legal work
in connection with real-estate transactions, especially in drawing of real-estate contracts, deeds, mortgages,
notes and the like. There is no doubt but that he has engaged in these practices over the years and has charged
for his services in that connection. ... (People v. Schafer, 87 N.E. 2d 773)

x x x           x x x          x x x

... An attorney, in the most general sense, is a person designated or employed by another to act in his stead; an
agent; more especially, one of a class of persons authorized to appear and act for suitors or defendants in legal
proceedings. Strictly, these professional persons are attorneys at law, and non-professional agents are properly
styled "attorney's in fact;" but the single word is much used as meaning an attorney at law. A person may be
an attorney in facto for another, without being an attorney at law. Abb. Law Dict. "Attorney." A public
attorney, or attorney at law, says Webster, is an officer of a court of law, legally qualified to prosecute and
defend actions in such court on the retainer of clients. "The principal duties of an attorney are (1) to be true to
the court and to his client; (2) to manage the business of his client with care, skill, and integrity; (3) to keep
his client informed as to the state of his business; (4) to keep his secrets confided to him as such. ... His rights
are to be justly compensated for his services." Bouv. Law Dict. tit. "Attorney." The transitive verb "practice,"
as defined by Webster, means 'to do or perform frequently, customarily, or habitually; to perform by a
succession of acts, as, to practice gaming, ... to carry on in practice, or repeated action; to apply, as a theory,
to real life; to exercise, as a profession, trade, art. etc.; as, to practice law or medicine,' etc...." (State v.
Bryan, S.E. 522, 523; Emphasis supplied)

In this jurisdiction, we have ruled that the practice of law denotes frequency or a succession of acts. Thus, we stated in
the case of People v. Villanueva (14 SCRA 109 [1965]):

x x x           x x x          x x x

... Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary actions, a succession of acts of
the same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual exercise (State v. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42 LRA, M.S.
768). Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of statute has been interpreted as customarily or habitually holding
one's self out to the public, as a lawyer and demanding payment for such services. ... . (at p. 112)

It is to be noted that the Commission on Appointment itself recognizes habituality as a required component of the
meaning of practice of law in a Memorandum prepared and issued by it, to wit:

l. Habituality. The term 'practice of law' implies customarilyor habitually holding one's self out to the public
as a lawyer (People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 citing State v. Bryan, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644) such as when
one sends a circular announcing the establishment of a law office for the general practice of law (U.S. v. Noy
Bosque, 8 Phil. 146), or when one takes the oath of office as a lawyer before a notary public, and files a
manifestation with the Supreme Court informing it of his intention to practice law in all courts in the country
(People v. De Luna, 102 Phil. 968).

17
 Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary action, a succession of
acts of the same kind. In other words, it is a habitual exercise (People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 1 09 citing
State v. Cotner, 1 27, p. 1, 87 Kan, 864)." (Rollo, p. 115)

x x x           x x x          x x x

While the career as a businessman of respondent Monsod may have profited from his legal knowledge, the use of such
legal knowledge is incidental and consists of isolated activities which do not fall under the denomination of practice of
law. Admission to the practice of law was not required for membership in the Constitutional Commission or in the
Fact-Finding Commission on the 1989 Coup Attempt. Any specific legal activities which may have been assigned to
Mr. Monsod while a member may be likened to isolated transactions of foreign corporations in the Philippines which
do not categorize the foreign corporations as doing business in the Philippines. As in the practice of law, doing
business also should be active and continuous. Isolated business transactions or occasional, incidental and casual
transactions are not within the context of doing business. This was our ruling in the case of Antam Consolidated, Inc.
v. Court of appeals, 143 SCRA 288 [1986]).

Respondent Monsod, corporate executive, civic leader, and member of the Constitutional Commission may possess
the background, competence, integrity, and dedication, to qualify for such high offices as President, Vice-President,
Senator, Congressman or Governor but the Constitution in prescribing the specific qualification of having engaged in
the practice of law for at least ten (10) years for the position of COMELEC Chairman has ordered that he may not be
confirmed for that office. The Constitution charges the public respondents no less than this Court to obey its mandate.

I, therefore, believe that the Commission on Appointments committed grave abuse of discretion in confirming the
nomination of respondent Monsod as Chairman of the COMELEC.

I vote to GRANT the petition.

Bidin, J., dissent

Separate Opinions

NARVASA, J., concurring:

I concur with the decision of the majority written by Mr. Justice Paras, albeit only in the result; it does not appear to
me that there has been an adequate showing that the challenged determination by the Commission on Appointments-
that the appointment of respondent Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections should, on the basis of his
stated qualifications and after due assessment thereof, be confirmed-was attended by error so gross as to amount to
grave abuse of discretion and consequently merits nullification by this Court in accordance with the second paragraph
of Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution. I therefore vote to DENY the petition.

Melencio-Herrera, J., concur.

PADILLA, J., dissenting:

The records of this case will show that when the Court first deliberated on the Petition at bar, I voted not only to
require the respondents to comment on the Petition, but I was the sole vote for the issuance of a temporary restraining
order to enjoin respondent Monsod from assuming the position of COMELEC Chairman, while the Court deliberated
on his constitutional qualification for the office. My purpose in voting for a TRO was to prevent the inconvenience
and even embarrassment to all parties concerned were the Court to finally decide for respondent Monsod's
disqualification. Moreover, a reading of the Petition then in relation to established jurisprudence already
showed prima facie that respondent Monsod did not possess the needed qualification, that is, he had not engaged in
the practice of law for at least ten (10) years prior to his appointment as COMELEC Chairman.

After considering carefully respondent Monsod's comment, I am even more convinced that the constitutional
requirement of "practice of law for at least ten (10) years" has not been met.
18
The procedural barriers interposed by respondents deserve scant consideration because, ultimately, the core issue to be
resolved in this petition is the proper construal of the constitutional provision requiring a majority of the membership
of COMELEC, including the Chairman thereof to "have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10)
years." (Art. IX(C), Section 1(1), 1987 Constitution). Questions involving the construction of constitutional provisions
are best left to judicial resolution. As declared in Angara v. Electoral Commission, (63 Phil. 139) "upon the judicial
department is thrown the solemn and inescapable obligation of interpreting the Constitution and defining
constitutional boundaries."

The Constitution has imposed clear and specific standards for a COMELEC Chairman. Among these are that he must
have been "engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years." It is the bounden duty of this Court to ensure that
such standard is met and complied with.

What constitutes practice of law? As commonly understood, "practice" refers to the actual performance or
application of knowledge as distinguished from mere possession of knowledge; it connotes
an active, habitual, repeated or customary action.1 To "practice" law, or any profession for that matter, means, to
exercise or pursue an employment or profession actively, habitually, repeatedly or customarily.

Therefore, a doctor of medicine who is employed and is habitually performing the tasks of a nursing aide, cannot be
said to be in the "practice of medicine." A certified public accountant who works as a clerk, cannot be said to practice
his profession as an accountant. In the same way, a lawyer who is employed as a business executive or a corporate
manager, other than as head or attorney of a Legal Department of a corporation or a governmental agency, cannot be
said to be in the practice of law.

As aptly held by this Court in the case of People vs. Villanueva:2

Practice is more than an isolated appearance for it consists in frequent or customary actions, a succession of
acts of the same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual exercise (State vs- Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864,
42 LRA, M.S. 768). Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of statute has been interpreted as customarily
or habitually holding one's self out to the public as a lawyer and demanding payment for such services (State
vs. Bryan, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644,647.) ... (emphasis supplied).

It is worth mentioning that the respondent Commission on Appointments in a Memorandum it prepared, enumerated
several factors determinative of whether a particular activity constitutes "practice of law." It states:

1. Habituality. The term "practice of law" implies customarily or habitually holding one's self out to the public
as a lawyer (People vs. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 citing State v. Boyen, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644) such as
when one sends a circular announcing the establishment of a law office for the general practice of law (U.S. v.
Ney Bosque, 8 Phil. 146), or when one takes the oath of office as a lawyer before a notary public, and files a
manifestation with the Supreme Court informing it of his intention to practice law in all courts in the country
(People v. De Luna, 102 Phil. 968).

Practice is more than an isolated appearance for it consists in frequent or customary action, a succession of
acts of the same kind. In other words, it is a habitual exercise (People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 citing State
v. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan, 864).

2. Compensation. Practice of law implies that one must have presented himself to be in the active and
continued practice of the legal profession and that his professional services are available to the public for
compensation, as a service of his livelihood or in consideration of his said services. (People v. Villanueva,
supra). Hence, charging for services such as preparation of documents involving the use of legal knowledge
and skill is within the term "practice of law" (Ernani Paño, Bar Reviewer in Legal and Judicial Ethics, 1988
ed., p. 8 citing People v. People's Stockyards State Bank, 176 N.B. 901) and, one who renders an opinion as to
the proper interpretation of a statute, and receives pay for it, is to that extent, practicing law (Martin, supra, p.
806 citing Mendelaun v. Gilbert and Barket Mfg. Co., 290 N.Y.S. 462) If compensation is expected, all advice
to clients and all action taken for them in matters connected with the law; are practicing law. (Elwood
Fitchette et al., v. Arthur C. Taylor, 94A-L.R. 356-359)

19
 3. Application of law legal principle practice or procedure which calls for legal knowledge, training and
experience is within the term "practice of law". (Martin supra)

4. Attorney-client relationship. Engaging in the practice of law presupposes the existence of lawyer-client
relationship. Hence, where a lawyer undertakes an activity which requires knowledge of law but involves no
attorney-client relationship, such as teaching law or writing law books or articles, he cannot be said to be
engaged in the practice of his profession or a lawyer (Agpalo, Legal Ethics, 1989 ed., p. 30). 3

The above-enumerated factors would, I believe, be useful aids in determining whether or not respondent Monsod
meets the constitutional qualification of practice of law for at least ten (10) years at the time of his appointment as
COMELEC Chairman.

The following relevant questions may be asked:

1. Did respondent Monsod perform any of the tasks which are peculiar to the practice of law?

2. Did respondent perform such tasks customarily or habitually?

3. Assuming that he performed any of such tasks habitually, did he do so HABITUALLY FOR AT LEAST TEN (10)
YEARS prior to his appointment as COMELEC Chairman?

Given the employment or job history of respondent Monsod as appears from the records, I am persuaded that if ever
he did perform any of the tasks which constitute the practice of law, he did not do so HABITUALLY for at least ten
(10) years prior to his appointment as COMELEC Chairman.

While it may be granted that he performed tasks and activities which could be latitudinarianly considered activities
peculiar to the practice of law, like the drafting of legal documents and the rendering of legal opinion or advice, such
were isolated transactions or activities which do not qualify his past endeavors as "practice of law." To become
engaged in the practice of law, there must be a continuity, or a succession of acts. As observed by the Solicitor
General in People vs. Villanueva:4

Essentially, the word private practice of law implies that one must have presented himself to be in
the active and continued practice of the legal profession and that his professional services are available to the
public for a compensation, as a source of his livelihood or in consideration of his said services.

ACCORDINGLY, my vote is to GRANT the petition and to declare respondent Monsod as not qualified for the
position of COMELEC Chairman for not having engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years prior to his
appointment to such position.

CRUZ, J., dissenting:

I am sincerely impressed by the ponencia of my brother Paras but find I must dissent just the same. There are certain
points on which I must differ with him while of course respecting hisviewpoint.

To begin with, I do not think we are inhibited from examining the qualifications of the respondent simply because his
nomination has been confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. In my view, this is not a political question that
we are barred from resolving. Determination of the appointee's credentials is made on the basis of the established
facts, not the discretion of that body. Even if it were, the exercise of that discretion would still be subject to our
review.

In Luego, which is cited in the ponencia, what was involved was the discretion of the appointing authority
to choose between two claimants to the same office who both possessed the required qualifications. It was that kind of
discretion that we said could not be reviewed.

If a person elected by no less than the sovereign people may be ousted by this Court for lack of the required
qualifications, I see no reason why we cannot disqualified an appointee simply because he has passed the Commission
on Appointments.
20
Even the President of the Philippines may be declared ineligible by this Court in an appropriate proceeding
notwithstanding that he has been found acceptable by no less than the enfranchised citizenry. The reason is that what
we would be examining is not the wisdom of his election but whether or not he was qualified to be elected in the first
place.

Coming now to the qualifications of the private respondent, I fear that the ponencia may have been too sweeping in its
definition of the phrase "practice of law" as to render the qualification practically toothless. From the numerous
activities accepted as embraced in the term, I have the uncomfortable feeling that one does not even have to be a
lawyer to be engaged in the practice of law as long as his activities involve the application of some law, however
peripherally. The stock broker and the insurance adjuster and the realtor could come under the definition as they deal
with or give advice on matters that are likely "to become involved in litigation."

The lawyer is considered engaged in the practice of law even if his main occupation is another business and he
interprets and applies some law only as an incident of such business. That covers every company organized under the
Corporation Code and regulated by the SEC under P.D. 902-A. Considering the ramifications of the modern society,
there is hardly any activity that is not affected by some law or government regulation the businessman must know
about and observe. In fact, again going by the definition, a lawyer does not even have to be part of a business concern
to be considered a practitioner. He can be so deemed when, on his own, he rents a house or buys a car or consults a
doctor as these acts involve his knowledge and application of the laws regulating such transactions. If he operates a
public utility vehicle as his main source of livelihood, he would still be deemed engaged in the practice of law because
he must obey the Public Service Act and the rules and regulations of the Energy Regulatory Board.

The ponencia quotes an American decision defining the practice of law as the "performance of any acts . . . in or out
of court, commonly understood to be the practice of law," which tells us absolutely nothing. The decision goes on to
say that "because lawyers perform almost every function known in the commercial and governmental realm, such a
definition would obviously be too global to be workable."

The effect of the definition given in the ponencia is to consider virtually every lawyer to be engaged in the practice of
law even if he does not earn his living, or at least part of it, as a lawyer. It is enough that his activities are incidentally
(even if only remotely) connected with some law, ordinance, or regulation. The possible exception is the lawyer
whose income is derived from teaching ballroom dancing or escorting wrinkled ladies with pubescent pretensions.

The respondent's credentials are impressive, to be sure, but they do not persuade me that he has been engaged in the
practice of law for ten years as required by the Constitution. It is conceded that he has been engaged in business and
finance, in which areas he has distinguished himself, but as an executive and economist and not as a practicing lawyer.
The plain fact is that he has occupied the various positions listed in his resume by virtue of his experience and prestige
as a businessman and not as an attorney-at-law whose principal attention is focused on the law. Even if it be argued
that he was acting as a lawyer when he lobbied in Congress for agrarian and urban reform, served in the NAMFREL
and the Constitutional Commission (together with non-lawyers like farmers and priests) and was a member of the
Davide Commission, he has not proved that his activities in these capacities extended over the prescribed 10-year
period of actual practice of the law. He is doubtless eminently qualified for many other positions worthy of his
abundant talents but not as Chairman of the Commission on Elections.

I have much admiration for respondent Monsod, no less than for Mr. Justice Paras, but I must regretfully vote to grant
the petition.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J., dissenting:

When this petition was filed, there was hope that engaging in the practice of law as a qualification for public office
would be settled one way or another in fairly definitive terms. Unfortunately, this was not the result.

Of the fourteen (14) member Court, 5 are of the view that Mr. Christian Monsod engaged in the practice of law (with
one of these 5 leaving his vote behind while on official leave but not expressing his clear stand on the matter); 4
categorically stating that he did not practice law; 2 voting in the result because there was no error so gross as to
amount to grave abuse of discretion; one of official leave with no instructions left behind on how he viewed the issue;
and 2 not taking part in the deliberations and the decision.

21
There are two key factors that make our task difficult. First is our reviewing the work of a constitutional Commission
on Appointments whose duty is precisely to look into the qualifications of persons appointed to high office. Even if
the Commission errs, we have no power to set aside error. We can look only into grave abuse of discretion or
whimsically and arbitrariness. Second is our belief that Mr. Monsod possesses superior qualifications in terms of
executive ability, proficiency in management, educational background, experience in international banking and
finance, and instant recognition by the public. His integrity and competence are not questioned by the petitioner. What
is before us is compliance with a specific requirement written into the Constitution.

Inspite of my high regard for Mr. Monsod, I cannot shirk my constitutional duty. He has never engaged in the practice
of law for even one year. He is a member of the bar but to say that he has practiced law is stretching the term beyond
rational limits.

A person may have passed the bar examinations. But if he has not dedicated his life to the law, if he has not engaged
in an activity where membership in the bar is a requirement I fail to see how he can claim to have been engaged in the
practice of law.

Engaging in the practice of law is a qualification not only for COMELEC chairman but also for appointment to the
Supreme Court and all lower courts. What kind of Judges or Justices will we have if there main occupation is selling
real estate, managing a business corporation, serving in fact-finding committee, working in media, or operating a farm
with no active involvement in the law, whether in Government or private practice, except that in one joyful moment in
the distant past, they happened to pass the bar examinations?

The Constitution uses the phrase "engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years." The deliberate choice of words
shows that the practice envisioned is active and regular, not isolated, occasional, accidental, intermittent, incidental,
seasonal, or extemporaneous. To be "engaged" in an activity for ten years requires committed participation in
something which is the result of one's decisive choice. It means that one is occupied and involved in the enterprise;
one is obliged or pledged to carry it out with intent and attention during the ten-year period.

I agree with the petitioner that based on the bio-data submitted by respondent Monsod to the Commission on
Appointments, the latter has not been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. In fact, if appears that Mr.
Monsod has never practiced law except for an alleged one year period after passing the bar examinations when he
worked in his father's law firm. Even then his law practice must have been extremely limited because he was also
working for M.A. and Ph. D. degrees in Economics at the University of Pennsylvania during that period. How could
he practice law in the United States while not a member of the Bar there?

The professional life of the respondent follows:

1.15.1. Respondent Monsod's activities since his passing the Bar examinations in 1961 consist of the
following:

1. 1961-1963: M.A. in Economics (Ph. D. candidate), University of Pennsylvania

2. 1963-1970: World Bank Group — Economist, Industry Department; Operations, Latin American
Department; Division Chief, South Asia and Middle East, International Finance Corporation

3. 1970-1973: Meralco Group — Executive of various companies, i.e., Meralco Securities Corporation,
Philippine Petroleum Corporation, Philippine Electric Corporation

4. 1973-1976: Yujuico Group — President, Fil-Capital Development Corporation and affiliated companies

5. 1976-1978: Finaciera Manila — Chief Executive Officer

6. 1978-1986: Guevent Group of Companies — Chief Executive Officer

7. 1986-1987: Philippine Constitutional Commission — Member

8. 1989-1991: The Fact-Finding Commission on the December 1989 Coup Attempt — Member
22
 9. Presently: Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer of the following companies:

a. ACE Container Philippines, Inc.

b. Dataprep, Philippines

c. Philippine SUNsystems Products, Inc.

d. Semirara Coal Corporation

e. CBL Timber Corporation

Member of the Board of the Following:

a. Engineering Construction Corporation of the Philippines

b. First Philippine Energy Corporation

c. First Philippine Holdings Corporation

d. First Philippine Industrial Corporation

e. Graphic Atelier

f. Manila Electric Company

g. Philippine Commercial Capital, Inc.

h. Philippine Electric Corporation

i. Tarlac Reforestation and Environment Enterprises

j. Tolong Aquaculture Corporation

k. Visayan Aquaculture Corporation

l. Guimaras Aquaculture Corporation (Rollo, pp. 21-22)

There is nothing in the above bio-data which even remotely indicates that respondent Monsod has given the
law enough attention or a certain degree of commitment and participation as would support in all sincerity and candor
the claim of having engaged in its practice for at least ten years. Instead of working as a lawyer, he has lawyers
working for him. Instead of giving receiving that legal advice of legal services, he was the oneadvice and those
services as an executive but not as a lawyer.

The deliberations before the Commission on Appointments show an effort to equate "engaged in the practice of law"
with the use of legal knowledge in various fields of endeavor such as commerce, industry, civic work, blue ribbon
investigations, agrarian reform, etc. where such knowledge would be helpful.

I regret that I cannot join in playing fast and loose with a term, which even an ordinary layman accepts as having a
familiar and customary well-defined meaning. Every resident of this country who has reached the age of discernment
has to know, follow, or apply the law at various times in his life. Legal knowledge is useful if not necessary for the
business executive, legislator, mayor, barangay captain, teacher, policeman, farmer, fisherman, market vendor, and
student to name only a few. And yet, can these people honestly assert that as such, they are engaged in the practice of
law?

23
The Constitution requires having been "engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years." It is not satisfied with
having been "a member of the Philippine bar for at least ten years."

Some American courts have defined the practice of law, as follows:

The practice of law involves not only appearance in court in connection with litigation but also services
rendered out of court, and it includes the giving of advice or the rendering of any services requiring the use of
legal skill or knowledge, such as preparing a will, contract or other instrument, the legal effect of which, under
the facts and conditions involved, must be carefully determined. People ex rel. Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Tinkoff,
399 Ill. 282, 77 N.E.2d 693; People ex rel. Illinois State Bar Ass'n v. People's Stock Yards State Bank, 344 Ill.
462,176 N.E. 901, and cases cited.

It would be difficult, if not impossible to lay down a formula or definition of what constitutes the practice of
law. "Practicing law" has been defined as "Practicing as an attorney or counselor at law according to the laws
and customs of our courts, is the giving of advice or rendition of any sort of service by any person, firm or
corporation when the giving of such advice or rendition of such service requires the use of any degree of legal
knowledge or skill." Without adopting that definition, we referred to it as being substantially correct in People
ex rel. Illinois State Bar Ass'n v. People's Stock Yards State Bank, 344 Ill. 462,176 N.E. 901. (People v.
Schafer, 87 N.E. 2d 773, 776)

For one's actions to come within the purview of practice of law they should not only be activities peculiar to the work
of a lawyer, they should also be performed, habitually, frequently or customarily, to wit:

x x x           x x x          x x x

Respondent's answers to questions propounded to him were rather evasive. He was asked whether or not he
ever prepared contracts for the parties in real-estate transactions where he was not the procuring agent. He
answered: "Very seldom." In answer to the question as to how many times he had prepared contracts for the
parties during the twenty-one years of his business, he said: "I have no Idea." When asked if it would be more
than half a dozen times his answer was I suppose. Asked if he did not recall making the statement to several
parties that he had prepared contracts in a large number of instances, he answered: "I don't recall exactly what
was said." When asked if he did not remember saying that he had made a practice of preparing deeds,
mortgages and contracts and charging a fee to the parties therefor in instances where he was not the broker in
the deal, he answered: "Well, I don't believe so, that is not a practice." Pressed further for an answer as to his
practice in preparing contracts and deeds for parties where he was not the broker, he finally answered: "I have
done about everything that is on the books as far as real estate is concerned."

x x x           x x x          x x x

Respondent takes the position that because he is a real-estate broker he has a lawful right to do any legal work
in connection with real-estate transactions, especially in drawing of real-estate contracts, deeds, mortgages,
notes and the like. There is no doubt but that he has engaged in these practices over the years and has charged
for his services in that connection. ... (People v. Schafer, 87 N.E. 2d 773)

x x x           x x x          x x x

... An attorney, in the most general sense, is a person designated or employed by another to act in his stead; an
agent; more especially, one of a class of persons authorized to appear and act for suitors or defendants in legal
proceedings. Strictly, these professional persons are attorneys at law, and non-professional agents are properly
styled "attorney's in fact;" but the single word is much used as meaning an attorney at law. A person may be
an attorney in facto for another, without being an attorney at law. Abb. Law Dict. "Attorney." A public
attorney, or attorney at law, says Webster, is an officer of a court of law, legally qualified to prosecute and
defend actions in such court on the retainer of clients. "The principal duties of an attorney are (1) to be true to
the court and to his client; (2) to manage the business of his client with care, skill, and integrity; (3) to keep
his client informed as to the state of his business; (4) to keep his secrets confided to him as such. ... His rights
are to be justly compensated for his services." Bouv. Law Dict. tit. "Attorney." The transitive verb "practice,"
as defined by Webster, means 'to do or perform frequently, customarily, or habitually; to perform by a
24
 succession of acts, as, to practice gaming, ... to carry on in practice, or repeated action; to apply, as a theory,
to real life; to exercise, as a profession, trade, art. etc.; as, to practice law or medicine,' etc...." (State v.
Bryan, S.E. 522, 523; Emphasis supplied)

In this jurisdiction, we have ruled that the practice of law denotes frequency or a succession of acts. Thus, we stated in
the case of People v. Villanueva (14 SCRA 109 [1965]):

x x x           x x x          x x x

... Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary actions, a succession of acts of
the same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual exercise (State v. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42 LRA, M.S.
768). Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of statute has been interpreted as customarily or habitually holding
one's self out to the public, as a lawyer and demanding payment for such services. ... . (at p. 112)

It is to be noted that the Commission on Appointment itself recognizes habituality as a required component of the
meaning of practice of law in a Memorandum prepared and issued by it, to wit:

l. Habituality. The term 'practice of law' implies customarilyor habitually holding one's self out to the public
as a lawyer (People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 citing State v. Bryan, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644) such as when
one sends a circular announcing the establishment of a law office for the general practice of law (U.S. v. Noy
Bosque, 8 Phil. 146), or when one takes the oath of office as a lawyer before a notary public, and files a
manifestation with the Supreme Court informing it of his intention to practice law in all courts in the country
(People v. De Luna, 102 Phil. 968).

Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary action, a succession of
acts of the same kind. In other words, it is a habitual exercise (People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 1 09 citing
State v. Cotner, 1 27, p. 1, 87 Kan, 864)." (Rollo, p. 115)

xxx xxx xxx

While the career as a businessman of respondent Monsod may have profited from his legal knowledge, the use of such
legal knowledge is incidental and consists of isolated activities which do not fall under the denomination of practice of
law. Admission to the practice of law was not required for membership in the Constitutional Commission or in the
Fact-Finding Commission on the 1989 Coup Attempt. Any specific legal activities which may have been assigned to
Mr. Monsod while a member may be likened to isolated transactions of foreign corporations in the Philippines which
do not categorize the foreign corporations as doing business in the Philippines. As in the practice of law, doing
business also should be active and continuous. Isolated business transactions or occasional, incidental and casual
transactions are not within the context of doing business. This was our ruling in the case of Antam Consolidated, Inc.
v. Court of appeals, 143 SCRA 288 [1986]).

Respondent Monsod, corporate executive, civic leader, and member of the Constitutional Commission may possess
the background, competence, integrity, and dedication, to qualify for such high offices as President, Vice-President,
Senator, Congressman or Governor but the Constitution in prescribing the specific qualification of having engaged in
the practice of law for at least ten (10) years for the position of COMELEC Chairman has ordered that he may not be
confirmed for that office. The Constitution charges the public respondents no less than this Court to obey its mandate.

I, therefore, believe that the Commission on Appointments committed grave abuse of discretion in confirming the
nomination of respondent Monsod as Chairman of the COMELEC.

I vote to GRANT the petition.

Bidin, J., dissent

25
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

A.M. No. 10-10-4-SC               June 7, 2011

Re: Letter of the UP Law Faculty entitled Restoring Integrity: A Statement by the Faculty of the University of
the Philippines College of Law on the Allegations of Plagiarism and Misrepresentation in the Supreme Court

RESOLUTION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

For disposition of the Court are the following:

26
 (a) the Motion for Reconsideration1 dated April 1, 2011 filed by respondent University of the Philippines (UP)
law professors Tristan A. Catindig and Carina C. Laforteza; and

(b) the Manifestation2 dated April 1, 2011 filed by respondents Dean Marvic M.V.F. Leonen and Prof.
Theodore O. Te.

In support of their Motion for Reconsideration, Professors Catindig and Laforteza relied on the following grounds:

GROUNDS

A. THIS PROCEEDING, WHILE OSTENSIBLY DOCKETED AS AN ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER, IS

PREMISED ON A FINDING OF INDIRECT CONTEMPT. ACCORDINGLY, WITH ALL DUE RESPECT,
THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE RESPONDENTS BREACHED THEIR
ETHICAL OBLIGATIONS WITHOUT OBSERVANCE OF THE DUE PROCESS SAFEGUARDS
GUARANTEED IN AN INDIRECT CONTEMPT PROCEEDING.

B. WITH DUE RESPECT, THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT (1) THE
PLAGIARISM AND MISREPRESENTATION ISSUES IN THE VINUYA CASE AND IN A.M. NO. 10-7-
17-SC HAVE NO RELATION TO THE RESTORING INTEGRITY STATEMENT AND THE SHOW
CAUSE RESOLUTION, AND THEREFORE (2) THE RESPONDENTS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO
ACCESS AND ADDRESS THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED IN A.M. NO. 10-7-17-SC, TO PRESENT
THEIR OWN EVIDENCE IN RESPECT OF THE PLAGIARISM AND MISREPRESENTATION ISSUES,
AND TO SUPPORT THEIR RESPONSE TO THE SHOW CAUSE RESOLUTION WITH SUCH
EVIDENCE.

C. WITH DUE RESPECT, THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE
RESPONDENTS ARE IN BREACH OF THEIR ETHICAL OBLIGATIONS FOR HAVING ISSUED THE
RESTORING INTEGRITY STATEMENT.3

In their Motion for Reconsideration, respondents pray that (a) the Court’s Decision dated March 8, 2011 be
reconsidered and set aside and the respondents’ Compliance dated November 18, 2010 be deemed satisfactory, and (b)
the Court expunge the reference in A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC to the respondents (i.e., "joined by some faculty members of
the University of the Philippines school of law") effectively finding them guilty of making false charges against
Associate Justice Mariano C. del Castillo (Justice Del Castillo). In the alternative, they pray that they be afforded their
full rights to due process and provided the full opportunity to present evidence on the matters subject of the Show
Cause Resolution dated October 19, 2010.4

Anent the first ground, Professors Catindig and Laforteza insist that, notwithstanding the docketing of this matter as
an administrative case, there was purportedly a finding that respondents were guilty of indirect contempt in view of
(1) the mention made in the Show Cause Resolution dated October 19, 2010 of In re Kelly, 5 a case involving a
contempt charge; and (2) the references to respondents’ "contumacious language" or "contumacious speech and
conduct" and to several authorities which dealt with contempt proceedings in the Decision dated March 8, 2011.

The shallowness of such argument is all too easily revealed. It is true that contumacious speech and conduct directed
against the courts done by any person, whether or not a member of the Bar, may be considered as indirect contempt
under Rule 71, Section 3 of the Rules of Court, to wit:

Sec. 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and hearing. – After a charge in writing has been filed, and an
opportunity given to the respondent to comment thereon within such period as may be fixed by the court and to be
heard by himself or counsel, a person guilty of any of the following acts may be punished for indirect contempt:

xxxx

(d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice.

A charge of indirect contempt, if proven in due proceedings, carry with it penal sanctions such as imprisonment or a
fine or both.6
27
The very same contumacious speech or conduct directed against a court or judicial officer, if committed by a member
of the Bar, may likewise subject the offender to disciplinary proceedings under the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which prescribes that lawyers observe and promote due respect for the courts. 7 In such disciplinary
cases, the sanctions are not penal but administrative such as, disbarment, suspension, reprimand or admonition.

Contrary to Professors Catindig and Laforteza’s theory, what established jurisprudence tells us is that the same
incident of contumacious speech and/or behavior directed against the Court on the part of a lawyer may be punishable
either as contempt or an ethical violation, or both in the discretion of the Court.

In Salcedo v. Hernandez,8 for the same act of filing in court a pleading with intemperate and offensive statements, the
concerned lawyer was found guilty of contempt and liable administratively. For this reason, two separate penalties
were imposed upon him, a fine (for the contempt charge) and reprimand (for his failure to observe his lawyerly duty to
give due respect to the Court).

The full case title9 of In re: Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen10 and the sanction imposed indubitably show that the
proceeding involved therein was disciplinary. Notwithstanding the fact that the Court in Almacen adverted to a few
principles and authorities involving contempt proceedings aside from jurisprudence on ethical responsibilities of
lawyers, Atty. Almacen was only meted out an administrative sanction (indefinite suspension from the practice of law)
and no penal sanction was imposed upon him. Indeed, in Almacen, the Court explicitly stated that whether or not
respondent lawyer could be held liable for contempt for his utterances and actuations was immaterial as the sole issue
in his disciplinary case concerns his professional identity, his sworn duty as a lawyer and his fitness as an officer of
the Court.11

Conversely, In re Vicente Sotto12 was purely a contempt proceeding. Nonetheless, the Court in that case saw fit to
remind Atty. Sotto that:

As a member of the bar and an officer of the courts Atty. Vicente Sotto, like any other, is in duty bound to uphold the
dignity and authority of this Court, to which he owes fidelity according to the oath he has taken as such attorney, and
not to promote distrust in the administration of justice. Respect to the courts guarantees the stability of other
institutions, which without such guaranty would be resting on a very shaky foundation. 13

Atty. Sotto was expressly found liable only for contempt and accordingly fined the amount of ₱1,000.00 payable
within 15 days from promulgation of judgment. The unmistakable reference to Atty. Sotto’s failure to observe his
ethical duties as a lawyer did not convert the action against him into a disciplinary proceeding. In fact, part of the
disposition of the case was to require Atty. Sotto to show cause, within the same period given for the payment of the
fine, why he should not be disbarred for his contemptuous statements against the Court published in a newspaper.

Similar to Salcedo, Zaldivar v. Sandiganbayan14 involved both contempt and disciplinary proceedings for the lawyer’s
act of making public statements to the media that were offensive and disrespectful of the Court and its members
relating to matters that were sub judice. This was evident in the May 2, 1988 Resolution of the Court which required
respondent lawyer to "explain in writing within ten (10) days from notice hereof, why he should not be punished for
contempt of court and/or subjected to administrative sanctions." 15 In Zaldivar, however, although the Court found that
respondent’s act constituted both contempt and gross misconduct as a member of the Bar, he was only
administratively sanctioned with an indefinite suspension from the practice of law.

The lesson imparted by the foregoing authorities is that, when the Court initiates contempt proceedings and/or
disciplinary proceedings against lawyers for intemperate and discourteous language and behavior directed at the
courts, the evil sought to be prevented is the same – the degradation of the courts and the loss of trust in the
administration of justice. For this reason, it is not unusual for the Court to cite authorities on bar discipline (involving
the duty to give due respect to the courts) in contempt cases against lawyers and vice versa.

Thus, when the Court chooses to institute an administrative case against a respondent lawyer, the mere citation or
discussion in the orders or decision in the administrative case of jurisprudence involving contempt proceedings does
not transform the action from a disciplinary proceeding to one for contempt. Respondents’ contrary position in their
motion for reconsideration is bereft of any rational merit. Had this Court opted to cite respondents for contempt of
court, which is punishable by imprisonment or fine, this Court would have initiated contempt proceedings in
accordance with the Rules of Court. Clearly, the Court did not opt to do so. We cannot see why respondents would

28
stubbornly cling to the notion that they were being cited for indirect contempt under the Show Cause Resolution when
there is no basis for such belief other than their own apparent misreading of the same.1avvphi1

With respect to the second ground offered for reconsideration of the Decision dated March 8, 2011, respondents
continue to insist on their theory, previously expounded in their Compliance, that the evidence and proceedings in
A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC was relevant to their own administrative case and thus, it was necessary for them to be granted
access to the evidence and records of that case in order to prove their own defenses in the present case. The Decision
already debunked at length the theory that if respondents are able to prove the bases for their "well founded" concerns
regarding the plagiarism charge against Justice Del Castillo, then they would be exonerated of the administrative
charges against them. It bears repeating here that what respondents have been required to explain was their
contumacious, intemperate and irresponsible language and/or conduct in the issuance of the Restoring Integrity
Statement, which most certainly cannot be justified by a belief, well-founded or not, that Justice Del Castillo and/or
his legal researcher committed plagiarism.

To dispel respondents’ misconception once and for all, it should be stressed that this Court did not call the attention of
respondents for having an opinion contrary to that of the Court in the plagiarism case against Justice Del Castillo.
Notably, even their co-respondent Prof. Raul T. Vasquez stood fast on his opinion regarding the plagiarism issue. Still,
he was able to simply relate to this Court how he came to sign the Restoring Integrity Statement and candidly
conceded that he may have failed to assess the effect of the language of the Statement. This straightforward and honest
explanation was found satisfactory despite the lack of reference to the evidence in A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC or the
holding of any formal trial-type evidentiary hearing, which respondents know fully well was not mandatory in
administrative proceedings. This circumstance belied respondents’ justification for seeking access to the evidence and
records of A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC and their assertion that they have in any way been denied their due process rights.
For the same reason that A.M. 10-7-17-SC and the present case are independent of each other, a passing mention of
respondent law professors in the Resolution dated February 8, 2011 in A.M. 10-7-17-SC is not proof that this Court
has found respondents guilty of falsely accusing Justice Del Castillo of plagiarism nor is it any prejudgment of the
present case. For if so, no one would be exonerated or none of the compliances would be found satisfactory in this
administrative case. Again, the case of Prof. Vasquez confirms that this Court duly considered respondents’
submissions in this case before coming to a decision.

To buttress their third ground for reconsideration, respondents mainly contend that the Court erred in taking the
"emphatic language" in the Statement in isolation from the other statements evidencing the good intentions of
respondents and calling for constructive action. Again, these arguments have been substantially addressed in the
Decision dated March 8, 2011 and there is no need to belabor these points here. Suffice it to say that respondents’
avowed noble motives have been given due weight and factored in the determination of the action taken with respect
to submissions of respondents.

In all, the Court finds that respondent Professors Catindig and Laforteza have offered no substantial arguments to
warrant a reconsideration of the Decision dated March 8, 2011 nor to justify the grant of the reliefs prayed for in their
motion.

As for the Manifestation dated April 1, 2011, Dean Leonen and Professor Te alleged that "they support the Motion for
Reconsideration which was filed by Respondents Professors Tristan Catindig and Caren Laforteza on April 1, 2011."
The rest of the assertions therein are mere restatements of arguments previously proffered in respondents’
compliances and have been extensively taken up in the Decision dated March 8, 2011.

Since the Manifestation, apart from being an expression of support for Professors Catindig and Laforteza’s motion for
reconsideration, did not raise any new matter nor pray for any affirmative relief, the Court resolves to merely note the
same.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court hereby RESOLVES to (a) DENY the Motion for Reconsideration
dated April 1, 2011 filed by respondent Professors Tristan A. Catindig and Carina C. Laforteza; and (b) NOTE the
Manifestation dated April 1, 2011 filed by Dean Marvic M.V.F. Leonen and Professor Theodore O. Te.

SO ORDERED.

29
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

ANTONIO T. CARPIO CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice Associate Justice

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ARTURO D. BRION DIOSDADO M. PERALTA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ROBERTO A. ABAD MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Associate Justice

EN BANC

B. M. No. 1036               June 10, 2003

DONNA MARIE S. AGUIRRE, Complainant,

vs.
EDWIN L. RANA, Respondent.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

Before one is admitted to the Philippine Bar, he must possess the requisite moral integrity for membership in the legal
profession. Possession of moral integrity is of greater importance than possession of legal learning. The practice of
law is a privilege bestowed only on the morally fit. A bar candidate who is morally unfit cannot practice law even if
he passes the bar examinations.
30
The Facts

Respondent Edwin L. Rana ("respondent") was among those who passed the 2000 Bar Examinations.

On 21 May 2001, one day before the scheduled mass oath-taking of successful bar examinees as members of the
Philippine Bar, complainant Donna Marie Aguirre ("complainant") filed against respondent a Petition for Denial of
Admission to the Bar. Complainant charged respondent with unauthorized practice of law, grave misconduct,
violation of law, and grave misrepresentation.

The Court allowed respondent to take his oath as a member of the Bar during the scheduled oath-taking on 22 May
2001 at the Philippine International Convention Center. However, the Court ruled that respondent could not sign the
Roll of Attorneys pending the resolution of the charge against him. Thus, respondent took the lawyer’s oath on the
scheduled date but has not signed the Roll of Attorneys up to now.

Complainant charges respondent for unauthorized practice of law and grave misconduct. Complainant alleges that
respondent, while not yet a lawyer, appeared as counsel for a candidate in the May 2001 elections before the
Municipal Board of Election Canvassers ("MBEC") of Mandaon, Masbate. Complainant further alleges that
respondent filed with the MBEC a pleading dated 19 May 2001 entitled Formal Objection to the Inclusion in the
Canvassing of Votes in Some Precincts for the Office of Vice-Mayor. In this pleading, respondent represented himself
as "counsel for and in behalf of Vice Mayoralty Candidate, George Bunan," and signed the pleading as counsel for
George Bunan ("Bunan").

On the charge of violation of law, complainant claims that respondent is a municipal government employee, being a
secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan of Mandaon, Masbate. As such, respondent is not allowed by law to act as
counsel for a client in any court or administrative body.

On the charge of grave misconduct and misrepresentation, complainant accuses respondent of acting as counsel for
vice mayoralty candidate George Bunan ("Bunan") without the latter engaging respondent’s services. Complainant
claims that respondent filed the pleading as a ploy to prevent the proclamation of the winning vice mayoralty
candidate.

On 22 May 2001, the Court issued a resolution allowing respondent to take the lawyer’s oath but disallowed him from
signing the Roll of Attorneys until he is cleared of the charges against him. In the same resolution, the Court required
respondent to comment on the complaint against him.

In his Comment, respondent admits that Bunan sought his "specific assistance" to represent him before the MBEC.
Respondent claims that "he decided to assist and advice Bunan, not as a lawyer but as a person who knows the law."
Respondent admits signing the 19 May 2001 pleading that objected to the inclusion of certain votes in the canvassing.
He explains, however, that he did not sign the pleading as a lawyer or represented himself as an "attorney" in the
pleading.

On his employment as secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan, respondent claims that he submitted his resignation on 11
May 2001 which was allegedly accepted on the same date. He submitted a copy of the Certification of Receipt of
Revocable Resignation dated 28 May 2001 signed by Vice-Mayor Napoleon Relox. Respondent further claims that the
complaint is politically motivated considering that complainant is the daughter of Silvestre Aguirre, the losing
candidate for mayor of Mandaon, Masbate. Respondent prays that the complaint be dismissed for lack of merit and
that he be allowed to sign the Roll of Attorneys.

On 22 June 2001, complainant filed her Reply to respondent’s Comment and refuted the claim of respondent that his
appearance before the MBEC was only to extend specific assistance to Bunan. Complainant alleges that on 19 May
2001 Emily Estipona-Hao ("Estipona-Hao") filed a petition for proclamation as the winning candidate for mayor.
Respondent signed as counsel for Estipona-Hao in this petition. When respondent appeared as counsel before the
MBEC, complainant questioned his appearance on two grounds: (1) respondent had not taken his oath as a lawyer;
and (2) he was an employee of the government.

Respondent filed a Reply (Re: Reply to Respondent’s Comment) reiterating his claim that the instant administrative
case is "motivated mainly by political vendetta."
31
On 17 July 2001, the Court referred the case to the Office of the Bar Confidant ("OBC") for evaluation, report and
recommendation.

OBC’s Report and Recommendation

The OBC found that respondent indeed appeared before the MBEC as counsel for Bunan in the May 2001 elections.
The minutes of the MBEC proceedings show that respondent actively participated in the proceedings. The OBC
likewise found that respondent appeared in the MBEC proceedings even before he took the lawyer’s oath on 22 May
2001. The OBC believes that respondent’s misconduct casts a serious doubt on his moral fitness to be a member of the
Bar. The OBC also believes that respondent’s unauthorized practice of law is a ground to deny his admission to the
practice of law. The OBC therefore recommends that respondent be denied admission to the Philippine Bar.

On the other charges, OBC stated that complainant failed to cite a law which respondent allegedly violated when he
appeared as counsel for Bunan while he was a government employee. Respondent resigned as secretary and his
resignation was accepted. Likewise, respondent was authorized by Bunan to represent him before the MBEC.

The Court’s Ruling

We agree with the findings and conclusions of the OBC that respondent engaged in the unauthorized practice of law
and thus does not deserve admission to the Philippine Bar.

Respondent took his oath as lawyer on 22 May 2001. However, the records show that respondent appeared as counsel
for Bunan prior to 22 May 2001, before respondent took the lawyer’s oath. In the pleading entitled Formal Objection
to the Inclusion in the Canvassing of Votes in Some Precincts for the Office of Vice-Mayor dated 19 May 2001,
respondent signed as "counsel for George Bunan." In the first paragraph of the same pleading respondent stated that he
was the "(U)ndersigned Counsel for, and in behalf of Vice Mayoralty Candidate, GEORGE T. BUNAN." Bunan
himself wrote the MBEC on 14 May 2001 that he had "authorized Atty. Edwin L. Rana as his counsel to represent
him" before the MBEC and similar bodies.

On 14 May 2001, mayoralty candidate Emily Estipona-Hao also "retained" respondent as her counsel. On the same
date, 14 May 2001, Erly D. Hao informed the MBEC that "Atty. Edwin L. Rana has been authorized by REFORMA
LM-PPC as the legal counsel of the party and the candidate of the said party." Respondent himself wrote the MBEC
on 14 May 2001 that he was entering his "appearance as counsel for Mayoralty Candidate Emily Estipona-Hao and for
the REFORMA LM-PPC." On 19 May 2001, respondent signed as counsel for Estipona-Hao in the petition filed
before the MBEC praying for the proclamation of Estipona-Hao as the winning candidate for mayor of Mandaon,
Masbate.

All these happened even before respondent took the lawyer’s oath. Clearly, respondent engaged in the practice of law
without being a member of the Philippine Bar.

In Philippine Lawyers Association v. Agrava,1 the Court elucidated that:

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of
pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, the management of such actions and
proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveyancing. In general, all advice to
clients, and all action taken for them in matters connected with the law, incorporation services, assessment and
condemnation services contemplating an appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage,
enforcement of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in
attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law practice, as do the preparation
and drafting of legal instruments, where the work done involves the determination by the trained legal mind of the
legal effect of facts and conditions. (5 Am. Jur. p. 262, 263). (Italics supplied) x x x

In Cayetano v. Monsod,2 the Court held that "practice of law" means any activity, in or out of court, which requires
the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. To engage in the practice of law is to
perform acts which are usually performed by members of the legal profession. Generally, to practice law is to render
any kind of service which requires the use of legal knowledge or skill.

32
Verily, respondent was engaged in the practice of law when he appeared in the proceedings before the MBEC and
filed various pleadings, without license to do so. Evidence clearly supports the charge of unauthorized practice of law.
Respondent called himself "counsel" knowing fully well that he was not a member of the Bar. Having held himself out
as "counsel" knowing that he had no authority to practice law, respondent has shown moral unfitness to be a member
of the Philippine Bar.3

The right to practice law is not a natural or constitutional right but is a privilege. It is limited to persons of good moral
character with special qualifications duly ascertained and certified. The exercise of this privilege presupposes
possession of integrity, legal knowledge, educational attainment, and even public trust 4 since a lawyer is an officer of
the court. A bar candidate does not acquire the right to practice law simply by passing the bar examinations. The
practice of law is a privilege that can be withheld even from one who has passed the bar examinations, if the person
seeking admission had practiced law without a license. 5

The regulation of the practice of law is unquestionably strict. In Beltran, Jr. v. Abad,6 a candidate passed the bar
examinations but had not taken his oath and signed the Roll of Attorneys. He was held in contempt of court for
practicing law even before his admission to the Bar. Under Section 3 (e) of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, a person
who engages in the unauthorized practice of law is liable for indirect contempt of court. 7

True, respondent here passed the 2000 Bar Examinations and took the lawyer’s oath.1âwphi1 However, it is the
signing in the Roll of Attorneys that finally makes one a full-fledged lawyer. The fact that respondent passed the bar
examinations is immaterial. Passing the bar is not the only qualification to become an attorney-at-law. 8 Respondent
should know that two essential requisites for becoming a lawyer still had to be performed, namely: his lawyer’s oath
to be administered by this Court and his signature in the Roll of Attorneys. 9

On the charge of violation of law, complainant contends that the law does not allow respondent to act as counsel for a
private client in any court or administrative body since respondent is the secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan.

Respondent tendered his resignation as secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan prior to the acts complained of as
constituting unauthorized practice of law. In his letter dated 11 May 2001 addressed to Napoleon Relox, vice- mayor
and presiding officer of the Sangguniang Bayan, respondent stated that he was resigning "effective upon your
acceptance."10 Vice-Mayor Relox accepted respondent’s resignation effective 11 May 2001. 11 Thus, the evidence does
not support the charge that respondent acted as counsel for a client while serving as secretary of the Sangguniang
Bayan.

On the charge of grave misconduct and misrepresentation, evidence shows that Bunan indeed authorized respondent to
represent him as his counsel before the MBEC and similar bodies. While there was no misrepresentation, respondent
nonetheless had no authority to practice law.

WHEREFORE, respondent Edwin L. Rana is DENIED admission to the Philippine Bar.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Austria-
Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., and Azcuna, JJ., concur.

33
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

B.M. No. 2540               September 24, 2013

IN RE: PETITION TO SIGN IN THE ROLL OF ATTORNEYS
MICHAEL A. MEDADO, Petitioner.

RESOLUTION

SERENO, CJ.:

We resolve the instant Petition to Sign in the Roll of Attorneys filed by petitioner Michael A. Medado (Medado).

Medado graduated from the University of the Philippines with the degree of Bachelor of Laws in 1979 1 and passed the same
year's bar examinations with a general weighted average of 82.7. 2

On 7 May 1980, he took the Attorney’s Oath at the Philippine International Convention Center (PICC) together with the
successful bar examinees.3 He was scheduled to sign in the Roll of Attorneys on 13 May 1980,4 but he failed to do so on his
scheduled date, allegedly because he had misplaced the Notice to Sign the Roll of Attorneys 5 given by the Bar Office when
he went home to his province for a vacation.6

Several years later, while rummaging through his old college files, Medado found the Notice to Sign the Roll of Attorneys.
It was then that he realized that he had not signed in the roll, and that what he had signed at the entrance of the PICC was
probably just an attendance record.7

By the time Medado found the notice, he was already working. He stated that he was mainly doing corporate and taxation
work, and that he was not actively involved in litigation practice. Thus, he operated "under the mistaken belief that since he
had already taken the oath, the signing of the Roll of Attorneys was not as urgent, nor as crucial to his status as a

34
lawyer";8 and "the matter of signing in the Roll of Attorneys lost its urgency and compulsion, and was subsequently
forgotten."9

In 2005, when Medado attended Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) seminars, he was required to provide his
roll number in order for his MCLE compliances to be credited.10

Not having signed in the Roll of Attorneys, he was unable to provide his roll number.

About seven years later, or on 6 February 2012, Medado filed the instant Petition, praying that he be allowed to sign in the
Roll of Attorneys.11

The Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) conducted a clarificatory conference on the matter on 21 September 2012 12 and
submitted a Report and Recommendation to this Court on 4 February 2013.13 The OBC recommended that the instant
petition be denied for petitioner’s gross negligence, gross misconduct and utter lack of merit. 14 It explained that, based on
his answers during the clarificatory conference, petitioner could offer no valid justification for his negligence in signing in
the Roll of Attorneys.15

After a judicious review of the records, we grant Medado’s prayer in the instant petition, subject to the payment of a fine
and the imposition of a penalty equivalent to suspension from the practice of law.

At the outset, we note that not allowing Medado to sign in the Roll of Attorneys would be akin to imposing upon him the
ultimate penalty of disbarment, a penalty that we have reserved for the most serious ethical transgressions of members of
the Bar.

In this case, the records do not show that this action is warranted.

For one, petitioner demonstrated good faith and good moral character when he finally filed the instant Petition to Sign in the
Roll of Attorneys. We note that it was not a third party who called this Court’s attention to petitioner’s omission; rather, it
was Medado himself who acknowledged his own lapse, albeit after the passage of more than 30 years. When asked by the
Bar Confidant why it took him this long to file the instant petition, Medado very candidly replied:

Mahirap hong i-explain yan pero, yun bang at the time, what can you say? Takot ka kung anong mangyayari sa ‘yo, you
don’t know what’s gonna happen. At the same time, it’s a combination of apprehension and anxiety of what’s gonna
happen. And, finally it’s the right thing to do. I have to come here … sign the roll and take the oath as necessary. 16

For another, petitioner has not been subject to any action for disqualification from the practice of law, 17 which is more than
what we can say of other individuals who were successfully admitted as members of the Philippine Bar. For this Court, this
fact demonstrates that petitioner strove to adhere to the strict requirements of the ethics of the profession, and that he has
prima facie shown that he possesses the character required to be a member of the Philippine Bar.

Finally, Medado appears to have been a competent and able legal practitioner, having held various positions at the Laurel
Law Office,18 Petron, Petrophil Corporation, the Philippine National Oil Company, and the Energy Development
Corporation.19
All these demonstrate Medado’s worth to become a full-fledged member of the Philippine Bar.1âwphi1 While the practice
of law is not a right but a privilege,20 this Court will not unwarrantedly withhold this privilege from individuals who have
shown mental fitness and moral fiber to withstand the rigors of the profession.

That said, however, we cannot fully exculpate petitioner Medado from all liability for his years of inaction.

Petitioner has been engaged in the practice of law since 1980, a period spanning more than 30 years, without having signed
in the Roll of Attorneys.21 He justifies this behavior by characterizing his acts as "neither willful nor intentional but based on
a mistaken belief and an honest error of judgment."22

We disagree.

While an honest mistake of fact could be used to excuse a person from the legal consequences of his acts 23 as it negates
malice or evil motive,24 a mistake of law cannot be utilized as a lawful justification, because everyone is presumed to know
the law and its consequences.25 Ignorantia factiexcusat; ignorantia legis neminem excusat.

35
Applying these principles to the case at bar, Medado may have at first operated under an honest mistake of fact when he
thought that what he had signed at the PICC entrance before the oath-taking was already the Roll of Attorneys. However,
the moment he realized that what he had signed was merely an attendance record, he could no longer claim an honest
mistake of fact as a valid justification. At that point, Medado should have known that he was not a full-fledged member of
the Philippine Bar because of his failure to sign in the Roll of Attorneys, as it was the act of signing therein that would have
made him so.26 When, in spite of this knowledge, he chose to continue practicing law without taking the necessary steps to
complete all the requirements for admission to the Bar, he willfully engaged in the unauthorized practice of law.

Under the Rules of Court, the unauthorized practice of law by one’s assuming to be an attorney or officer of the court, and
acting as such without authority, may constitute indirect contempt of court,27 which is punishable by fine or imprisonment
or both.28 Such a finding, however, is in the nature of criminal contempt29 and must be reached after the filing of charges and
the conduct of hearings.30 In this case, while it appears quite clearly that petitioner committed indirect contempt of court by
knowingly engaging in unauthorized practice of law, we refrain from making any finding of liability for indirect contempt,
as no formal charge pertaining thereto has been filed against him.

Knowingly engaging in unauthorized practice of law likewise transgresses Canon 9 of 'the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which provides:

CANON 9 -A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, assist in the unauthorized practice of law.

While a reading of Canon 9 appears to merely prohibit lawyers from assisting in the unauthorized practice of law, the
unauthorized practice of law by the lawyer himself is subsumed under this provision, because at the heart of Canon 9 is the
lawyer's duty to prevent the unauthorized practice of law. This duty likewise applies to law students and Bar candidates. As
aspiring members of the Bar, they are bound to comport themselves in accordance with the ethical standards of the legal
profession.

Turning now to the applicable penalty, previous violations of Canon 9have warranted the penalty of suspension from the
practice of law.31 As Medado is not yet a full-fledged lawyer, we cannot suspend him from the practice of law. However, we
see it fit to impose upon him a penalty akin to suspension by allowing him to sign in the Roll of Attorneys one (1) year after
receipt of this Resolution. For his transgression of the prohibition against the unauthorized practice of law, we likewise see
it fit to fine him in the amount of ₱32,000. During the one year period, petitioner is warned that he is not allowed to engage
in the practice of law, and is sternly warned that doing any act that constitutes practice of law before he has signed in the
Roll of Attorneys will be dealt with severely by this Court.

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition to Sign in the Roll of Attorneys is hereby GRANTED. Petitioner Michael A. Medado is
ALLOWED to sign in the Roll of Attorneys ONE (1) YEAR after receipt of this Resolution. Petitioner is likewise
ORDERED to pay a FINE of ₱32,000 for his unauthorized practice of law. During the one year period, petitioner is NOT
ALLOWED to practice law, and is STERNLY WARNED that doing any act that constitutes practice of law before he has
signed in the Roll of Attorneys will be dealt will be severely by this Court.

Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the
Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.

SO ORDERED.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR., TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

(On leave) (On official leave)

ARTURO D. BRION* DIOSDADO M. PERALTA**

36
 Associate Justice Associate Justice

(On official leave)

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN**
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

(On leave)
ROBERTO A. ABAD
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.*
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

(On official leave)

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA**
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

BIENVENIDO L. REYES ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MARVIC MARIO VICTOR F. LEONEN

Associate Justice

EN BANC

July 12, 2016

A.C. No. 11316

PATRICK A. CARONAN, Complainant
vs.
RICHARD A. CARONAN a.k.a. "ATTY. PATRICK A. CARONAN," Respondent

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

For the Court's resolution is the Complaint-Affidavit1 filed by complainant Patrick A. Caronan (complainant), before
the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), against respondent "Atty.
Patrick A. Caronan," whose real name is allegedly Richard A. Caronan (respondent), for purportedly assuming
complainant's identity and falsely representing that the former has the required educational qualifications to take the
Bar Examinations and be admitted to the practice of law.

The Facts

37
Complainant and respondent are siblings born to Porferio2 R. Caronan, Jr. and Norma A. Caronan. Respondent is the
older of the two, having been born on February 7, 1975, while complainant was born on August 5, 1976. 3 Both of
them completed their secondary education at the Makati High School where complainant graduated in 1993 4 and
respondent in 1991.5 Upon his graduation, complainant enrolled at the University of Makati where he obtained a
degree in Business Administration in 1997.6 He started working thereafter as a Sales Associate for Philippine Seven
Corporation (PSC), the operator of 7-11 Convenience Stores. 7 In 2001, he married Myrna G. Tagpis with whom he has
two (2) daughters.8 Through the years, complainant rose from the ranks until, in 2009, he was promoted as a Store
Manager of the 7-11 Store in Muntinlupa.9

Meanwhile, upon graduating from high school, respondent enrolled at the Pamantasan ng Lungsod ng
Maynila (PLM), where he stayed for one (1) year before transferring to the Philippine Military Academy (PMA) in
1992.10 In 1993, he was discharged from the PMA and focused on helping their father in the family's car rental
business. In 1997, he moved to Nueva Vizcaya with his wife, Rosana, and their three (3) children. 11 Since then,
respondent never went back to school to earn a college degree. 12

In 1999, during a visit to his family in Metro Manila, respondent told complainant that the former had enrolled in a
law school in Nueva Vizcaya.13

Subsequently, in 2004, their mother informed complainant that respondent passed the Bar Examinations and that he
used complainant's name and college records from the University of Makati to enroll at St. Mary's University's
College of Law in Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya and take the Bar Examinations. 14 Complainant brushed these aside as
he did not anticipate any adverse consequences to him. 15

In 2006, complainant was able to confirm respondent's use of his name and identity when he saw the name "Patrick A.
Caronan" on the Certificate of Admission to the Bar displayed at the latter's office in Taguig City. 16 Nevertheless,
complainant did not confront respondent about it since he was pre-occupied with his job and had a family to support. 17

Sometime in May 2009, however, after his promotion as Store Manager, complainant was ordered to report to the
head office of PSC in Mandaluyong City where, upon arrival, he was informed that the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) was requesting his presence at its office in Taft Avenue, Manila, in relation to an investigation
involving respondent who, at that point, was using the name "Atty. Patrick A. Caronan." 18 Accordingly, on May 18,
2009, complainant appeared before the Anti-Fraud and Computer Crimes Division of the NBI where he was
interviewed and asked to identify documents including: (1) his and respondent's high school records; (2) his transcript
of records from the University of Makati; (3) Land Transportation Office's records showing his and respondent's
driver's licenses; (4) records from St. Mary's University showing that complainant's transcript of records from the
University of Makati and his Birth Certificate were submitted to St. Mary's University's College of Law; and (5)
Alumni Book of St. Mary's University showing respondent's photograph under the name "Patrick A.
Caronan."19 Complainant later learned that the reason why he was invited by the NBI was because of respondent's
involvement in a case for qualified theft and estafa filed by Mr. Joseph G. Agtarap (Agtarap), who was one of the
principal sponsors at respondent's wedding.20

Realizing that respondent had been using his name to perpetrate crimes and commit unlawful activities, complainant
took it upon himself to inform other people that he is the real "Patrick A. Caronan" and that respondent's real name is
Richard A. Caronan.21 However, problems relating to respondent's use of the name "Atty. Patrick A. Caronan"
continued to hound him. In July 2013, PSC received a letter from Quasha Ancheta Peña & Nolasco Law Offices
requesting that they be furnished with complainant's contact details or, in the alternative, schedule a meeting with him
to discuss certain matters concerning respondent. 22 On the other hand, a fellow church-member had also told him that
respondent who, using the name "Atty. Patrick A. Caronan," almost victimized his (church-member's)
relatives.23 Complainant also received a phone call from a certain Mrs. Loyda L. Reyes (Reyes), who narrated how
respondent tricked her into believing that he was authorized to sell a parcel of land in Taguig City when in fact, he
was not.24 Further, he learned that respondent was arrested for gun-running activities, illegal possession of explosives,
and violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang (BP) 22.25

Due to the controversies involving respondent's use of the name "Patrick A. Caronan," complainant developed a fear
for his own safety and security.26 He also became the subject of conversations among his colleagues, which eventually
forced him to resign from his job at PSC.27 Hence, complainant filed the present Complaint-Affidavit to stop
respondent's alleged use of the former's name and identity, and illegal practice of law. 28

38
In his Answer,29 respondent denied all the allegations against him and invoked res judicata as a defense. He
maintained that his identity can no longer be raised as an issue as it had already been resolved in CBD Case No. 09-
2362 where the IBP Board of Governors dismissed30 the administrative case31 filed by Agtarap against him, and which
case had already been declared closed and terminated by this Court in A.C. No. 10074. 32 Moreover, according to him,
complainant is being used by Reyes and her spouse, Brigadier General Joselito M. Reyes, to humiliate, disgrace,
malign, discredit, and harass him because he filed several administrative and criminal complaints against them before
the Ombudsman.33

On March 9, 2015, the IBP-CBD conducted the scheduled mandatory conference where both parties failed to
appear.34 Instead, respondent moved to reset the same on April 20, 2015. 35 On such date, however, both paiiies again
failed to appear, thereby prompting the IBP-CBD to issue an Order 36 directing them to file their respective position
papers. However, neither of the parties submitted any. 37

The IBP's Report and Recommendation

On June 15, 2015, IBP Investigating Commissioner Jose Villanueva Cabrera (Investigating Commissioner) issued his
Report and Recommendation,38 finding respondent guilty of illegally and falsely assuming complainant's name,
identity, and academic records.39 He observed that respondent failed to controvert all the allegations against him and
did not present any proof to prove his identity.40 On the other hand, complainant presented clear and overwhelming
evidence that he is the real "Patrick A. Caronan." 41

Further, he noted that respondent admitted that he and complainant are siblings when he disclosed upon his arrest on
August 31, 2012 that: (a) his parents are Porferio Ramos Caronan and Norma Atillo; and (b) he is married to Rosana
Halili-Caronan.42 However, based on the Marriage Certificate issued by the National Statistics Office (NSO), "Patrick
A. Caronan" is married to a certain "Myrna G. Tagpis," not to Rosana Halili-Caronan. 43

The Investigating Commissioner also drew attention to the fact that the photograph taken of respondent when he was
arrested as "Richard A. Caronan" on August 16, 2012 shows the same person as the one in the photograph in the IBP
records of "Atty. Patrick A. Caronan."44 These, according to the Investigating Commissioner, show that respondent
indeed assumed complainant's identity to study law and take the Bar Examinations. 45 Since respondent falsely
assumed the name, identity, and academic records of complainant and the real "Patrick A. Caronan" neither obtained
the bachelor of laws degree nor took the Bar Exams, the Investigating Commissioner recommended that the name
"Patrick A. Caronan" with Roll of Attorneys No. 49069 be dropped and stricken off the Roll of Attorneys. 46 He also
recommended that respondent and the name "Richard A. Caronan" be barred from being admitted as a member of the
Bar; and finally, for making a mockery of the judicial institution, the IBP was directed to institute appropriate actions
against respondent.47

On June 30, 2015, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XXI-2015-607, 48 adopting the Investigating
Commissioner's recommendation.

The Issues Before the Court

The issues in this case are whether or not the IBP erred in ordering that: (a) the name "Patrick A. Caronan" be stricken
off the Roll of Attorneys; and (b) the name "Richard A. Caronan" be barred from being admitted to the Bar.

The Court's Ruling

After a thorough evaluation of the records, the Court finds no cogent reason to disturb the findings and
recommendations of the IBP.

As correctly observed by the IBP, complainant has established by clear and overwhelming evidence that he is the real
"Patrick A. Caronan" and that respondent, whose real name is Richard A. Caronan, merely assumed the latter's name,
identity, and academic records to enroll at the St. Mary's University's College of Law, obtain a law degree, and take
the Bar Examinations.

As pointed out by the IBP, respondent admitted that he and complainant are siblings when he disclosed upon his arrest
on August 31, 2012 that his parents are Porferio Ramos Caronan and Norma Atillo. 49 Respondent himself also stated
39
that he is married to Rosana Halili-Caronan.50 This diverges from the official NSO records showing that "Patrick A.
Caronan" is married to Myrna G. Tagpis, not to Rosana Halili-Caronan. 51 Moreover, the photograph taken of
respondent when he was arrested as "Richard A. Caronan" on August 16, 2012 shows the same person as the one in
the photograph in the IBP records of "Atty. Patrick A. Caronan." 52 Meanwhile, complainant submitted numerous
documents showing that he is the real "Patrick A. Caronan," among which are: (a) his transcript of records from the
University of Makati bearing his photograph;53 (b) a copy of his high school yearbook with his photograph and the
name "Patrick A. Caronan" under it;54 and (c) NBI clearances obtained in 2010 and 2013. 55

To the Court's mind, the foregoing indubitably confirm that respondent falsely used complainant's name, identity, and
school records to gain admission to the Bar. Since complainant - the real "Patrick A. Caronan" - never took the Bar
Examinations, the IBP correctly recommended that the name "Patrick A. Caronan" be stricken off the Roll of
Attorneys.

The IBP was also correct in ordering that respondent, whose real name is "Richard A. Caronan," be barred from
admission to the Bar. Under Section 6, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, no applicant for admission to the Bar
Examination shall be admitted unless he had pursued and satisfactorily completed a pre-law course, VIZ.:

Section 6. Pre-Law. - No applicant for admission to the bar examination shall be admitted unless he presents a
certificate that he has satisfied the Secretary of Education that, before he began the study of law, he had pursued
and satisfactorily completed in an authorized and recognized university or college, requiring for admission thereto
the completion of a four-year high school course, the course of study prescribed therein for a bachelor's degree in
arts or sciences with any of the following subject as major or field of concentration: political science, logic, english,
spanish, history, and economics. (Emphases supplied)

In the case at hand, respondent never completed his college degree. While he enrolled at the PLM in 1991, he left a
year later and entered the PMA where he was discharged in 1993 without graduating. 56 Clearly, respondent has not
completed the requisite pre-law degree.

The Court does not discount the possibility that respondent may later on complete his college education and earn a law
degree under his real name.1âwphi1 However, his false assumption of his brother's name, identity, and educational
records renders him unfit for admission to the Bar. The practice of law, after all, is not a natural, absolute or
constitutional right to be granted to everyone who demands it. 57 Rather, it is a privilege limited to citizens of good
moral character.58 In In the Matter of the Disqualification of Bar Examinee Haron S. Meling in the 2002 Bar
Examinations and for Disciplinary Action as Member of the Philippine Shari 'a Bar, Atty. Froilan R. Melendrez, 59the
Court explained the essence of good moral character:

Good moral character is what a person really is, as distinguished from good reputation or from the opinion generally
entertained of him, the estimate in which he is held by the public in the place where he is known. Moral character is
not a subjective term but one which corresponds to objective reality. The standard of personal and professional
integrity is not satisfied by such conduct as it merely enables a person to escape the penalty of criminal law. Good
moral character includes at least common honesty.60 (Emphasis supplied)

Here, respondent exhibited his dishonesty and utter lack of moral fitness to be a member of the Bar when he assumed
the name, identity, and school records of his own brother and dragged the latter into controversies which eventually
caused him to fear for his safety and to resign from PSC where he had been working for years. Good moral character
is essential in those who would be lawyers.61 This is imperative in the nature of the office of a lawyer, the trust relation
which exists between him and his client, as well as between him and the court. 62

Finally, respondent made a mockery of the legal profession by pretending to have the necessary qualifications to be a
lawyer. He also tarnished the image of lawyers with his alleged unscrupulous activities, which resulted in the filing of
several criminal cases against him. Certainly, respondent and his acts do not have a place in the legal profession where
one of the primary duties of its members is to uphold its integrity and dignity. 63

WHEREFORE, respondent Richard A. Caronan a.k.a. "Atty. Patrick A. Caronan" (respondent) is found GUILTY of
falsely assuming the name, identity, and academic records of complainant Patrick A. Caronan (complainant) to obtain
a law degree and take the Bar Examinations. Accordingly, without prejudice to the filing of appropriate civil and/or
criminal cases, the Court hereby resolves that:

40
(1) the name "Patrick A. Caronan" with Roll of Attorneys No. 49069 is ordered DROPPED and STRICKEN
OFF the Roll of Attorneys;

(2) respondent is PROHIBITED from engaging in the practice of law or making any representations as a lawyer;

(3) respondent is BARRED from being admitted as a member of the Philippine Bar in the future;

(4) the Identification Cards issued by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines to respondent under the name "Atty. Patrick
A. Caronan" and the Mandatory Continuing Legal Education Certificates issued in such name
are CANCELLED and/or REVOKED; and

(5) the Office of the Court Administrator is ordered to CIRCULATE notices and POST in the bulletin boards of all
courts of the country a photograph of respondent with his real name, " Richard A. Caronan," with a warning that he is
not a member of the Philippine Bar and a statement of his false assumption of the name and identity of "Patrick A.
Caronan."

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the
Office of the Court Administrator.

SO ORDERED.

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice

ANTONIO T. CARPIO PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO ARTURO D. BRION

Associate Justice Associate Justice

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA LUCAS P. BERSAMIN

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice Associate Justice

On Official Leave On Official Leave

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA* BIENVENIDO L. REYES**
Associate Justice Associate Justice

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN

Associate Justice Associate Justice

FRANCIS H. JARDELEZA ALFREDO BENJAMIN S. CAGUIOA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

41
 THIRD DIVISION

AC No. 99-634            June 10, 2002

DOMINADOR P. BURBE, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. ALBERTO C. MAGULTA, respondent.

PANGANIBAN, J.:

After agreeing to take up the cause of a client, a lawyer owes fidelity to both cause and client, even if the client never
paid any fee for the attorney-client relationship. Lawyering is not a business; it is a profession in which duty to public
service, not money, is the primary consideration.

The Case

Before us is a Complaint for the disbarment or suspension or any other disciplinary action against Atty. Alberto C.
Magulta. Filed by Dominador P. Burbe with the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) on June 14, 1999, the Complaint is accompanied by a Sworn Statement alleging the following:

"x x x           x x x           x x x

"That in connection with my business, I was introduced to Atty. Alberto C. Magulta, sometime in September,
1998, in his office at the Respicio, Magulta and Adan Law Offices at 21-B Otero Building, Juan de la Cruz
St., Davao City, who agreed to legally represent me in a money claim and possible civil case against certain
parties for breach of contract;

"That consequent to such agreement, Atty. Alberto C. Magulta prepared for me the demand letter and some
other legal papers, for which services I have accordingly paid; inasmuch, however, that I failed to secure a
settlement of the dispute, Atty. Magulta suggested that I file the necessary complaint, which he subsequently

42
 drafted, copy of which is attached as Annex A, the filing fee whereof will require the amount of Twenty Five
Thousand Pesos (P25,000.00);

"That having the need to legally recover from the parties to be sued I, on January 4, 1999, deposited the
amount of P25,000.00 to Atty. Alberto C. Magulta, copy of the Receipt attached as Annex B, upon the
instruction that I needed the case filed immediately;

"That a week later, I was informed by Atty. Alberto C. Magulta that the complaint had already been filed in
court, and that I should receive notice of its progress;

"That in the months that followed, I waited for such notice from the court or from Atty. Magulta but there
seemed to be no progress in my case, such that I frequented his office to inquire, and he would repeatedly tell
me just to wait;

"That I had grown impatient on the case, considering that I am told to wait [every time] I asked; and in my last
visit to Atty. Magulta last May 25, 1999, he said that the court personnel had not yet acted on my case and, for
my satisfaction, he even brought me to the Hall of Justice Building at Ecoland, Davao City, at about 4:00
p.m., where he left me at the Office of the City Prosecutor at the ground floor of the building and told to wait
while he personally follows up the processes with the Clerk of Court; whereupon, within the hour, he came
back and told me that the Clerk of Court was absent on that day;

"That sensing I was being given the run-around by Atty. Magulta, I decided to go to the Office of the Clerk of
Court with my draft of Atty. Magulta's complaint to personally verify the progress of my case, and there told
that there was no record at all of a case filed by Atty. Alberto C. Magulta on my behalf, copy of the
Certification dated May 27, 1999, attached as Annex C;

"That feeling disgusted by the way I was lied to and treated, I confronted Atty. Alberto C. Magulta at his
office the following day, May 28, 1999, where he continued to lie to with the excuse that the delay was being
caused by the court personnel, and only when shown the certification did he admit that he has not at all filed
the complaint because he had spent the money for the filing fee for his own purpose; and to appease my
feelings, he offered to reimburse me by issuing two (2) checks, postdated June 1 and June 5, 1999, in the
amounts of P12,000.00 and P8,000.00, respectively, copies of which are attached as Annexes D and E;

"That for the inconvenience, treatment and deception I was made to suffer, I wish to complain Atty. Alberto
C. Magulta for misrepresentation, dishonesty and oppressive conduct;"

x x x           x x x           x x x.1

On August 6, 1999, pursuant to the July 22, 1999 Order of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, 2 respondent filed
his Answer3 vehemently denying the allegations of complainant "for being totally outrageous and baseless." The latter
had allegedly been introduced as a kumpadre of one of the former's law partners. After their meeting, complainant
requested him to draft a demand letter against Regwill Industries, Inc. -- a service for which the former never paid.
After Mr. Said Sayre, one of the business partners of complainant, replied to this letter, the latter requested that
another demand letter -- this time addressed to the former -- be drafted by respondent, who reluctantly agreed to do so.
Without informing the lawyer, complainant asked the process server of the former's law office to deliver the letter to
the addressee.

Aside from attending to the Regwill case which had required a three-hour meeting, respondent drafted a complaint
(which was only for the purpose of compelling the owner to settle the case) and prepared a compromise agreement. He
was also requested by complainant to do the following:

1. Write a demand letter addressed to Mr. Nelson Tan

2. Write a demand letter addressed to ALC Corporation

3. Draft a complaint against ALC Corporation

43
 4. Research on the Mandaue City property claimed by complainant's wife

All of these respondent did, but he was never paid for his services by complainant.

Respondent likewise said that without telling him why, complainant later on withdrew all the files pertinent to the
Regwill case. However, when no settlement was reached, the latter instructed him to draft a complaint for breach of
contract. Respondent, whose services had never been paid by complainant until this time, told the latter about his
acceptance and legal fees. When told that these fees amounted to P187,742 because the Regwill claim was almost P4
million, complainant promised to pay on installment basis.

On January 4, 1999, complainant gave the amount of P25,000 to respondent's secretary and told her that it was for the
filing fee of the Regwill case. When informed of the payment, the lawyer immediately called the attention of
complainant, informing the latter of the need to pay the acceptance and filing fees before the complaint could be filed.
Complainant was told that the amount he had paid was a deposit for the acceptance fee, and that he should give the
filing fee later.

Sometime in February 1999, complainant told respondent to suspend for the meantime the filing of the complaint
because the former might be paid by another company, the First Oriental Property Ventures, Inc., which had offered to
buy a parcel of land owned by Regwill Industries. The negotiations went on for two months, but the parties never
arrived at any agreement.

Sometime in May 1999, complainant again relayed to respondent his interest in filing the complaint. Respondent
reminded him once more of the acceptance fee. In response, complainant proposed that the complaint be filed first
before payment of respondent's acceptance and legal fees. When respondent refused, complainant demanded the return
of the P25,000. The lawyer returned the amount using his own personal checks because their law office was
undergoing extensive renovation at the time, and their office personnel were not reporting regularly. Respondent's
checks were accepted and encashed by complainant.

Respondent averred that he never inconvenienced, mistreated or deceived complainant, and if anyone had been
shortchanged by the undesirable events, it was he.

The IBP's Recommendation

In its Report and Recommendation dated March 8, 2000, the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP) opined as follows:

"x x x [I]t is evident that the P25,000 deposited by complainant with the Respicio Law Office was for the
filing fees of the Regwill complaint. With complainant's deposit of the filing fees for the Regwill complaint, a
corresponding obligation on the part of respondent was created and that was to file the Regwill complaint
within the time frame contemplated by his client, the complainant. The failure of respondent to fulfill this
obligation due to his misuse of the filing fees deposited by complainant, and his attempts to cover up this
misuse of funds of the client, which caused complainant additional damage and prejudice, constitutes highly
dishonest conduct on his part, unbecoming a member of the law profession. The subsequent reimbursement by
the respondent of part of the money deposited by complainant for filing fees, does not exculpate the
respondent for his misappropriation of said funds. Thus, to impress upon the respondent the gravity of his
offense, it is recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a period of one (1)
year."4

The Court's Ruling

We agree with the Commission's recommendation.

Main Issue:
Misappropriation of Client's Funds

Central to this case are the following alleged acts of respondent lawyer: (a) his non-filing of the Complaint on behalf
of his client and (b) his appropriation for himself of the money given for the filing fee.
44
Respondent claims that complainant did not give him the filing fee for the Regwill complaint; hence, the former's
failure to file the complaint in court. Also, respondent alleges that the amount delivered by complainant to his office
on January 4, 1999 was for attorney's fees and not for the filing fee.

We are not persuaded. Lawyers must exert their best efforts and ability in the prosecution or the defense of the client's
cause. They who perform that duty with diligence and candor not only protect the interests of the client, but also serve
the ends of justice. They do honor to the bar and help maintain the respect of the community for the legal
profession.5 Members of the bar must do nothing that may tend to lessen in any degree the confidence of the public in
the fidelity, the honesty, and integrity of the profession. 6

Respondent wants this Court to believe that no lawyer-client relationship existed between him and complainant,
because the latter never paid him for services rendered. The former adds that he only drafted the said documents as a
personal favor for the kumpadre of one of his partners.

We disagree. A lawyer-client relationship was established from the very first moment complainant asked respondent
for legal advice regarding the former's business. To constitute professional employment, it is not essential that the
client employed the attorney professionally on any previous occasion. It is not necessary that any retainer be paid,
promised, or charged; neither is it material that the attorney consulted did not afterward handle the case for which his
service had been sought.

If a person, in respect to business affairs or troubles of any kind, consults a lawyer with a view to obtaining
professional advice or assistance, and the attorney voluntarily permits or acquiesces with the consultation, then the
professional employment is established.7

Likewise, a lawyer-client relationship exists notwithstanding the close personal relationship between the lawyer and
the complainant or the nonpayment of the former's fees. 8 Hence, despite the fact that complainant was kumpadre of a
law partner of respondent, and that respondent dispensed legal advice to complainant as a personal favor to
the kumpadre, the lawyer was duty-bound to file the complaint he had agreed to prepare -- and had actually prepared
-- at the soonest possible time, in order to protect the client's interest. Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility provides that lawyers should not neglect legal matters entrusted to them.

This Court has likewise constantly held that once lawyers agree to take up the cause of a client, they owe fidelity to
such cause and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in them. 9 They owe entire devotion to the
interest of the client, warm zeal in the maintenance and the defense of the client's rights, and the exertion of their
utmost learning and abilities to the end that nothing be taken or withheld from the client, save by the rules of law
legally applied.10

Similarly unconvincing is the explanation of respondent that the receipt issued by his office to complainant on January
4, 1999 was erroneous. The IBP Report correctly noted that it was quite incredible for the office personnel of a law
firm to be prevailed upon by a client to issue a receipt erroneously indicating payment for something else. Moreover,
upon discovering the "mistake" -- if indeed it was one -- respondent should have immediately taken steps to correct
the error. He should have lost no time in calling complainant's attention to the matter and should have issued another
receipt indicating the correct purpose of the payment.

The Practice of Law -- a

Profession, Not a Business

In this day and age, members of the bar often forget that the practice of law is a profession and not a
business.11 Lawyering is not primarily meant to be a money-making venture, and law advocacy is not a capital that
necessarily yields profits.12 The gaining of a livelihood is not a professional but a secondary consideration. 13 Duty to
public service and to the administration of justice should be the primary consideration of lawyers, who must
subordinate their personal interests or what they owe to themselves. The practice of law is a noble calling in which
emolument is a byproduct, and the highest eminence may be attained without making much money. 14

In failing to apply to the filing fee the amount given by complainant -- as evidenced by the receipt issued by the law
office of respondent -- the latter also violated the rule that lawyers must be scrupulously careful in handling money

45
entrusted to them in their professional capacity. 15 Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states that
lawyers shall hold in trust all moneys of their clients and properties that may come into their possession.

Lawyers who convert the funds entrusted to them are in gross violation of professional ethics and are guilty of
betrayal of public confidence in the legal profession. 16 It may be true that they have a lien upon the client's funds,
documents and other papers that have lawfully come into their possession; that they may retain them until their lawful
fees and disbursements have been paid; and that they may apply such funds to the satisfaction of such fees and
disbursements. However, these considerations do not relieve them of their duty to promptly account for the moneys
they received. Their failure to do so constitutes professional misconduct. 17 In any event, they must still exert all effort
to protect their client's interest within the bounds of law.

If much is demanded from an attorney, it is because the entrusted privilege to practice law carries with it correlative
duties not only to the client but also to the court, to the bar, and to the public. 18 Respondent fell short of this standard
when he converted into his legal fees the filing fee entrusted to him by his client and thus failed to file the complaint
promptly. The fact that the former returned the amount does not exculpate him from his breach of duty.

On the other hand, we do not agree with complainant's plea to disbar respondent from the practice of law. The power
to disbar must be exercised with great caution. Only in a clear case of misconduct that seriously affects the standing
and the character of the bar will disbarment be imposed as a penalty. 19

WHEREFORE, Atty. Alberto C. Magulta is found guilty of violating Rules 16.01 and 18.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year,
effective upon his receipt of this Decision. Let copies be furnished all courts as well as the Office of the Bar
Confidant, which is instructed to include a copy in respondent's file.

SO ORDERED.

Puno, J.*, Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Carpio, JJ., concur.

46
 EN BANC

July 19, 2016

A.C. No. 6387

GABINO V. TOLENTINO and FLORDELIZA C. TOLENTINO, Complainants

vs.
ATTY. HENRY B. SO and ATTY. FERDINAND L.ANCHETA, Respondents

RESOLUTION

PERCURIAM, J.:

This resolves a disbarment case against respondent Atty. Henry B. So for neglect in handling a case, and respondent
Atty. Ferdinand L. Ancheta for extorting ₱200,000.00 from a client.

Complainant Flordeliza C. Tolentino was the defendant in Civil Case No. SC-2267 entitled "Benjamin Caballes v.
Flordeliza Caballes," a case involving recovery of possession of a parcel of land. 1 On June 24, 1991, Branch 26 of the
Regional Trial Court of Sta. Cruz, Laguna, rendered the Decision 2 against complainant Flordeliza ordering her to
vacate the land.

The case was appealed3 to the Court of Appeals through complainant Flordeliza's counsel, Atty. Edilberto U.
Coronado (Atty. Coronado). While the appeal was pending, Atty. Coronado was replaced by Atty. Henry B. So (Atty.
So), a lawyer of the Bureau of Agrarian Legal Assistance of the Department of Agrarian Reform. 4

Complainants Flordeliza and Gabino V. Tolentino, her husband, afterwards learned that the Court of Appeals
affirmed5 the Regional Trial Court Decision against complainant Flordeliza. Complainants contend that Atty. So did
not inform them nor take the necessary action to elevate the case to this Court. 6 Thus, they were compelled to secure
the legal services of Atty. Ferdinand L. Ancheta (Atty. Ancheta), whom they paid ₱30,000.00 as acceptance fee. 7

Atty. Ancheta allegedly promised them that there was still a remedy against the adverse Court of Appeals Decision,
and that he would file a "motion to reopen appeal case." 8 Atty. Ancheta also inveigled them to part with the amount of

47
₱200,000.00 purportedly to be used for making arrangements with tlie Justices of the Court of Appeals before whom
their case was pending.9

Initially, complainants did not agree to Atty. Ancheta's proposal because they did not have the money and it was
against the law.10 However, they eventually acceded when Atty. Ancheta told them that it was the only recourse they
had to obtain a favorable judgment.11

Hence, in January 2003, they deposited ₱200,000.00 to Atty. Ancheta's Bank Account No. 1221275656 with the
United Coconut Planters Bank.12

Complainants were surprised to learn that no "motion to reopen case" had been filed, 13 and the Court of Appeals
Decision had become final and executory.14

Hence, complainants sought to recover the amount of ₱200,000.00 from Atty. Ancheta. Through a letter dated
September 10, 200315 by their new counsel, complainants demanded for the return of the ₱200,000.00. However, Atty.
Ancheta did not heed their demand despite receipt of the letter.

On May 17, 2004, complainants filed their Sinumpaang Sakdal16 praying for the disbarment of Atty. So for neglect in
handling complainant Flordeliza's case, and Atty. Ancheta for defrauding them of the amount of ₱200,000.00.

Atty. So counters that he was no longer connected with the Bureau of Agrarian Legal Assistance of the Department of
Agrarian Reform when the Court of Appeals Decision was promulgated on July 16, 2001. 17 He alleges that he worked
at the Bureau from 1989 to 1997, and that he resigned to prepare for the elections in his hometown in Western
Samar.18 It was a procedure in the Bureau that once a handling lawyer resigns or retires, his or her cases are reassigned
to other lawyers of the Bureau.19

Atty. Ancheta did not file a comment despite due notice. Hence, in this Court's Resolution dated February 23,
2011,20 he was deemed to have waived his right to file a comment. This Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines for investigation, report, and recommendation. 21

On June 8, 2011, the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines directed the parties to
appear for mandatory conference at 10:00 a.m. on July 6, 2011. 22 However, on July 6, 2011, only Atty. So
appeared.23 Since there was no showing on record that complainants and Atty. Ancheta were notified, the mandatory
conference was reset to August 10, 2011 at 10:00 a.m.24

In the August 10, 2011 mandatory conference, complainant Flordeliza was represented by her daughter, Arlyn
Tolentino, together with counsel, Atty. Restituto Mendoza. 25 Arlyn Tolentino informed the Commission that
complainant Gabino V. Tolentino had already died. 26 Respondents did not appear despite due notice.27

Hence, the mandatory conference was terminated, and the parties were directed to submit their respective verified
position papers within a non-extendible period of 10 days from notice. After, the case would be submitted for report
and recommendation.28

On September 19, 2011, complainant Flordeliza filed as her position paper, a Motion for Adoption of the Pleadings
and their Annexes in this Case,29 including the relevant documents30 in Criminal Case No. SC-1191 (for estafa) against
Atty. Ancheta, which she filed.

Atty. So filed his Position Paper31 on September 15, 2011. Atty. Ancheta did not file any position paper. 32

The Commission on Bar Discipline recommended33 that Atty. So be absolved of the charge against him for
insufficiency of evidence.34 As to Atty. Ancheta, the Commission found him guilty of serious misconduct and deceit
and recommended his disbarment.35

In the Resolution36 dated December 14, 2014, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors adopted and
approved the findings and recommendations of the Investigating Commissioner.

48
On January 11, 2016, the Board of Governors transmitted its Resolution to this Court for final action, pursuant to Rule
139-B of the Rules of Court.37

This Court accepts and adopts the findings of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors.

The Integrated Bar of the Philippines correctly absolved Atty. So of the charge of negligence in the performance of his
duties as counsel of complainant Flordeliza.

Complainants fault Atty. So for failing to inform them about the Court of Appeals Decision and for not taking the
necessary steps to elevate their case to this Court. 38 However, it is undisputed that Atty. So was no longer employed at
the Bureau of Agrarian Legal Assistance when the Court of Appeals Decision was rendered on July 16, 2001. Atty. So
had resigned in 1997, four (4) years before the Decision was promulgated. 39

Atty. So handled the appeal of complainant Flordeliza in his capacity as a government-employed legal officer of the
Bureau of Agrarian Legal Assistance of the Department of Agrarian Reform. In his Notice of Appearance 40 dated
August 11, 1993 and Motion to Admit Additional Evidence41 dated November 22, 1993 filed before the Court of
Appeals, Atty. So affixed his signature under the representation of the Bureau of Agrarian Legal Assistance.

Atty. So's appearance for complainant Flordeliza may be likened to that of a lawyer assigned to handle a case for a
private law firm's client. If the counsel resigns, _the firm is simply bound to provide a replacement. 42 Similarly, upon
Atty. So's resignation, the Director of the Bureau merely reassigned his case assignment to other lawyers in the Bureau
even without complainants' consent.

It would have been prudent for Atty. So to have informed complainants about his resignation and the eventual
reassignment of their case to another lawyer, although this was not required. Still, Atty. So's omission is not of such
gravity that would warrant his disbarment or suspension. The serious consequences of disbarment or suspension
should follow only where there is a clear preponderance of evidence of the respondent's misconduct affecting his
standing and moral character as an officer of the court and member of the bar. 43

On the other hand, complainants were not entirely blameless. Had complainants been indeed vigilant in protecting
their rights, they should have followed up on the status of their appeal; thus, they would have been informed of Atty.
So's resignation. Atty. So resigned four (4) years before the Court of Appeals Decision was promulgated. 44 Thus,
complainants had ample time to engage the services of a new lawyer to safeguard their interests if they chose to do so.
A party cannot blame his or her counsel for negligence when he or she is guilty of neglect. 45

II

The same conclusion cannot be made with regards Atty. Ancheta. We agree with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines'
recommendation that he should be disbarred.

Atty. Ancheta's repeated failure to comply with several of this Court's Resolutions requiring him to comment on the
complaint lends credence to complainants' allegations. It manifests his tacit admission. Hence, we resolve this case on
the basis of complainants' Sinumpaang Sakdal and its Annexes.

It was established by the evidence on record that (1) Atty. Ancheta received the acceptance fee of ₱30,000.00 on
December 9, 2002;46 and (2) complainants deposited on January 17, 200347 the amount of ₱200,000.00 to Atty.
Ancheta's bank account. Atty. Ancheta made false promises to complainants that something could still be done with
complainant Flordeliza's case despite the Court of Appeals Decision having already attained finality on September 22,
2001.48 Worse, he proposed bribing the Justices of the Court of Appeals in order to solve their legal dilemma.

Atty. Ancheta should have very well known that a decision that has attained finality is no longer open for reversal and
should be respected.49 A lawyer's duty to assist in the speedy administration of justice 50 demands recognition that at a
definite time, issues must be laid to rest and litigation ended. 51 As such, Ancheta should have advised complainants to
accept the judgment of the Court of Appeals and accord respect to the just claim of the opposite party. He should have
tempered his clients' propensity to litigate and save them from additional expense in pursuing their contemplated
49
action. Instead, he gave them confident assurances that the case could still be reopened and even furnished them a
copy of his prepared "motion to reopen case." Despite his representation that he would file the motion, however, he
did not do so.52

Atty. Ancheta's deceit and evasion of duty is manifest. He accepted the case though he knew the futility of an appeal.
Despite receipt of the ₱30,000.00 acceptance fee, he did not act on his client's case. Moreover, he prevailed upon
complainants to give him ₱200,000.00 purportedly to be used to bribe the Justices of the Court of Appeals in order to
secure a favorable ruling, palpably showing that he himself was unconvinced of the merits of the case. "A lawyer shall
not, for any corrupt motive or interest, encourage any suit or proceeding or delay any man's cause." 53 Atty. Ancheta's
misconduct betrays his lack of appreciation that the practice of law is a profession, not a money-making trade. 54

As a servant of the law, Atty. Ancheta's primary duty was to obey the laws and promote respect for the law and legal
processes.55Corollary to this duty is his obligation to abstain from dishonest or deceitful conduct, 56 as well as from
"activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system." 57 Atty. Ancheta's advice
involving corruption of judicial officers tramps the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and the judicial system
and adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law.

Complainants eventually found out about his duplicity and demanded for the return of their money. 58 Still, Atty.
Ancheta did not return the ₱200,000.00 and the ₱30,000.00 despite his failure to render any legal service to his
clients..59

Atty. Ancheta breached the following duties embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility:

CANON 7 - A LA WYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL
PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR.

....

CANON 15 -A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND LOYALTY IN ALL HIS DEALINGS
AND TRANSACTIONS WITH HIS CLIENTS.

....

Rule 15.05. - A lawyer, when advising his client, shall give a candid and honest opinion on the merits and probable
results of the client's case, neither overstating nor understating the prospects of the case.

Rule 15.06. - A lawyer shall not state or imply that he is able to influence any public official, tribunal or legislative
body.

Rule 15.07. - A lawyer shall impress upon his client compliance with the laws and the principles of fairness.

....

CANON 16 -A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND PROPERTIES OF HIS CLIENT THAT
MAY COME INTO HIS POSSESSION.

Rule 16.01. - A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the client.

....

Rule 16.03. - A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or upon demand ....

....

CANON 17 - A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT AND HE SHALL BE MINDFUL
OF THE TRUST AND CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM.

50
CANON 18 - A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.

....

Rule 18.03. - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith
shall render him liable.

A lawyer "must at no time be wanting in probity and moral fiber, which are not only conditions precedent to his
entrance to the Bar but are likewise essential demands for his continued membership therein." 60 Atty. Ancheta's deceit
in dealing with his clients constitutes gross professional misconduct 61 and violates his oath, thus justifying his
disbarment under Rule 138, Section 2762 of the Rules of Court.

Furthermore, his failure to heed the following Resolutions of the Court despite notice aggravates his misconduct:

(1) Resolution63 dated June 21, 2004, requiring him to comment on the complaint;

(2) Resolution64 dated October 16, 2006, directing him to show cause why he should not be disciplinarily dealt
with or held in contempt for failure to comply with the June 21, 2004 Resolution;

(3) Resolution65 dated January 21, 2009, imposing upon him the penalty of ₱l,000.00 for failure to comply
with the June 21, 2004 and October 16, 2006 Resolutions;

(4) Resolution66 dated January 27, 2010, imposing an additional fine of ₱2,000.00 or a penalty of
imprisonment of 10 days for failure to comply with the January 21, 2009 Resolution; and

(5) Resolution67 dated January 12, 2011, ordering his arrest and directing the National Bureau of Investigation
to arrest and detain him for five (5) days and until he complied with the previous Resolutions.

Atty. Ancheta's cavalier attitude in repeatedly ignoring the orders of this Court constitutes utter disrespect of the
judicial institution. His conduct shows a high degree of irresponsibility and betrays a recalcitrant flaw in his character.
Indeed, his continued indifference to this Court's orders constitutes willful disobedience of the lawful orders of this
Court, which, under Rule 138, Section 2768 of the Rules of Court, is in itself a sufficient cause for suspension or
disbarment.

The maintenance of a high standard of legal proficiency, honesty, and fair dealing 69 is a prerequisite to making the bar
an effective instrument in the proper administration of justice. 70 Any member, therefore, who fails to live up to the
exacting standards of integrity and morality exposes himself or herself to administrative liability. 71

Atty. Ancheta's violations show that he is unfit to discharge the duties of a member of the legal
profession.1âwphi1 Hence, he should be disbarred.72

WHEREFORE, the complaint against respondent Atty. Henry B. So is DISMISSED for insufficiency of evidence.

On the other hand, this Court finds respondent Atty. Ferdinand L. Ancheta GUILTY of gross misconduct in violation
of the Lawyer's Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility and hereby DISBARS him from the practice of law.
The Office of the Bar Confidant is DIRECTED to remove the name of Ferdinand L. Ancheta from the Roll of
Attorneys.

Respondent Ancheta is ORDERED to return to complainants Gabino V. Tolentino and Flordeliza C. Tolentino,
within 30 days from receipt of this Resolution, the total amount of ₱230,000.00, with legal interest at 12% per
annum from the date of demand on September 10, 2003 to June 30, 2013, and at 6% per annum from July 1, 2013
until full payment. Respondent Ancheta is further DIRECTED to submit to this Court proof of payment of the
amount within 10 days from payment.

Let copies of this Resolution be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and
the Office of the Court Administrator for dissemination to all courts in the country.

This Resolution takes effect immediately.

51
SO ORDERED.

WE CONCUR:

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice

ANTONIO T. CARPIO PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice

On Leave
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
ARTURO D. BRION*
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA LUCAS P. BERSAMIN

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice Associate Justice

On Official Leave
BIENVENIDO L. REYES
JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA**
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN

Associate Justice Associate Justice

FRANCIS H. JARDELEZA ALFREDO BENJAMIN S. CAGUIOA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

52
 EN BANC

[ G.R. No. 230642, September 10, 2019 ]

OSCAR B. PIMENTEL, ERROL B. COMAFAY, JR., RENE B. GOROSPE, EDWIN R. SANDOVAL,

VICTORIA B. LOANZON, ELGIN MICHAEL C. PEREZ, ARNOLD E. CACHO, AL CONRAD B.
ESPALDON, ED VINCENT S. ALBANO, LEIGHTON R. SIAZON, ARIANNE C. ARTUGUE, CLARABEL
ANNE R. LACSINA, KRISTINE JANE R. LIU, ALYANNA MARL C. BUENVIAJE, IANA PATRICIA
DULA T. NICOLAS, IRENE A. TOLENTINO AND AUREA I. GRUYAL, PETITIONERS, VS. LEGAL
EDUCATION BOARD, AS REPRESENTED BY ITS CHAIRPERSON, HON. EMERSON B. AQUENDE,
AND LEB MEMBER HON. ZENAIDA N. ELEPAÑO, RESPONDENTS;

ATTYS. ANTHONY D. BENGZON, FERDINAND M. NEGRE, MICHAEL Z. UNTALAN; JONATHAN Q.

PEREZ, SAMANTHA WESLEY K. ROSALES, ERIKA M. ALFONSO, KRYS VALEN O. MARTINEZ,
RYAN CEAZAR P. ROMANO, AND KENNETH C. VARONA, RESPONDENTS-IN-INTERVENTION;

APRIL D. CABALLERO, JEREY C. CASTARDO, MC WELLROE P. BRINGAS, RHUFFY D. FEDERE,

CONRAD THEODORE A. MATUTINO AND NUMEROUS OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED, ST.
THOMAS MORE SCHOOL OF LAW AND BUSINESS, INC., REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT
RODOLFO C. RAPISTA, FOR HIMSELF AND AS FOUNDER, DEAN AND PROFESSOR, OF THE
COLLEGE OF LAW, JUDY MARIE RAPISTA-TAN, LYNNART WALFORD A. TAN, IAN M. ENTERINA,
NEIL JOHN VILLARICO AS LAW PROFESSORS AND AS CONCERNED CITIZENS, PETITIONERS-
INTERVENORS;

[G.R. No. 242954]

FRANCIS JOSE LEAN L. ABAYATA,GRETCHEN M. VASQUEZ, SHEENAH S. ILUSTRISMO, RALPH

LOUIE SALAÑO, AIREEN MONICA B. GUZMAN, DELFINO ODIAS, DARYL DELA CRUZ, CLAIRE
SUICO, AIVIE S. PESCADERO, NIÑA CHRISTINE DELA PAZ, SHEMARK K. QUENIAHAN, AL JAY T.
MEJOS, ROCELLYN L. DAÑO,* MICHAEL ADOLFO, RONALD A. ATIG, LYNNETTE C. LUMAYAG,
MARY CHRIS LAGERA, TIMOTHY B. FRANCISCO, SHEILA MARIE C. DANDAN, MADELINE C.
DELA PEÑA, DARLIN R. VILLAMOR, LORENZANA L. LLORICO, AND JAN IVAN M. SANTAMARIA,
PETITIONERS, VS. HON. SALVADOR MEDIALDEA, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, AND LEGAL
EDUCATION BOARD, HEREIN REPRESENTED BY ITS CHAIRPERSON, EMERSON B. AQUENDE,
RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

REYES, J. JR., J.:

On the principal grounds of encroachment upon the rule-making power of the Court concerning the practice of law,
violation of institutional academic freedom and violation of a law school aspirant's right to education, these
53
consolidated Petitions for Prohibition (G.R. No. 230642) and Certiorari and Prohibition (G.R. No. 242954) under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court assail as unconstitutional Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7662,1 or the Legal Education Reform Act
of 1993, which created the Legal Education Board (LEB). On the same principal grounds, these petitions also
particularly seek to declare as unconstitutional the LEB issuances establishing and implementing the nationwide law
school aptitude test known as the Philippine Law School Admission Test or the PhiLSAT.

The Antecedents

Prompted by clamors for the improvement of the system of legal education on account of the poor performance of law
students and law schools in the bar examinations,2 the Congress, on December 23, 1993, passed into law R.A. No.
7662 with the following policy statement:

SEC. 2. Declaration of Policies. - It is hereby declared the policy of the State to uplift the standards of legal education
in order to prepare law students for advocacy, counselling, problem-solving, and decision-making, to infuse in them
the ethics of the legal profession; to impress on them the importance, nobility and dignity of the legal profession as an
equal and indispensable partner of the Bench in the administration of justice and to develop social competence.

Towards this end, the State shall undertake appropriate reforms in the legal education system, require proper selection
of law students, maintain quality among law schools, and require legal apprenticeship and continuing legal education.

R.A. No. 7662 identifies the general and specific objectives of legal education in this manner:

SEC. 3. General and Specific Objective of Legal Education. -

(a) Legal education in the Philippines is geared to attain the following objectives:

(1) to prepare students for the practice of law;

(2) to increase awareness among members of the legal profession of the needs of the poor, deprived
and oppressed sectors of society;

(3) to train persons for leadership;

(4) to contribute towards the promotion and advancement of justice and the improvement of its
administration, the legal system and legal institutions in the light of the historical and contemporary
development of law in the Philippines and in other countries.

(b) Legal education shall aim to accomplish the following specific objectives:

(1) to impart among law students a broad knowledge of law and its various fields and of legal
institutions;

(2) to enhance their legal research abilities to enable them to analyze, articulate and apply the law
effectively, as well as to allow them to have a holistic approach to legal problems and Issues;

(3) to prepare law students for advocacy, [counseling], problem-solving and decision-making, and to
develop their ability to deal with recognized legal problems of the present and the future;

(4) to develop competence in any field of law as is necessary for gainful employment or sufficient as a
foundation for future training beyond the basic professional degree, and to develop in them the desire
and capacity for continuing study and self improvement;

(5) to inculcate in them the ethics and responsibilities of the legal profession; and

(6) to produce lawyers who conscientiously pursue the lofty goals of their profession and to fully
adhere to its ethical norms.

54
For these purposes, R.A. No. 7662 created the LEB, an executive agency which was made separate from the
Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS), but attached thereto solely for budgetary purposes and
administrative support.3 The Chairman and regular members of the LEB are to be appointed by the President for a
term of five years, without reappointment, from a list of at least three nominees prepared, with prior authorization
from the Court, by the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC).4

Section 7 of R.A. No. 7662 enumerates the powers and functions of the LEB as follows:

SEC. 7. Powers and Functions. - For the purpose of achieving the objectives of this Act, the Board shall have the
following powers and functions:

(a) to administer the legal education system in the country in a manner consistent with the provisions
of this Act;

(b) to supervise the law schools in the country, consistent with its powers and functions as herein
enumerated;

(c) to set the standards of accreditation for law schools taking into account, among others, the size of
enrollment, the qualifications of the members of the faculty, the library and other facilities, without
encroaching upon the academic freedom of institutions of higher learning;

(d) to accredit law schools that meet the standards of accreditation;

(e) to prescribe minimum standards for law admission and minimum qualifications and compensation
to faculty members;

(f) to prescribe the basic curricula for the course of study aligned to the requirements for admission to
the Bar, law practice and social consciousness, and such other courses of study as may be prescribed
by the law schools and colleges under the different levels of accreditation status;

(g) to establish a law practice internship as a requirement for taking the Bar which a law student shall
undergo with any duly accredited private or public law office or firm or legal assistance group
anytime during the law course for a specific period that the Board may decide, but not to exceed a
total of twelve (12) months. For this purpose, the Board shall prescribe the necessary guidelines for
such accreditation and the specifications of such internship which shall include the actual work of a
new member of the Bar[;]

(h) to adopt a system of continuing legal education. For this purpose, the Board may provide for the
mandatory attendance of practicing lawyers in such courses and for such duration as the Board may
deem necessary; and

(i) to perform such other functions and prescribe such rules and regulations necessary for the
attainment of the policies and objectives of this Act.

On the matter of accreditation of law schools, R.A. No. 7662 further elaborates:

SEC. 8. Accreditation of Law Schools. - Educational institutions may not operate a law school unless accredited by
the Board. Accreditation of law schools may be granted only to educational institutions recognized by the
Government.

SEC. 9. Withdrawal or Downgrading of Accreditation. - The [LEB] may withdraw or downgrade the accreditation
status of a law school if it fails to maintain the standards set for its accreditation status.

SEC. 10. Effectivity of Withdrawal or Downgrading of Accreditation. - The withdrawal or downgrading of

accreditation status shall be effective after the lapse of the semester or trimester following the receipt by the school of
the notice of withdrawal or downgrading unless, in the meantime, the school meets and/or upgrades the standards or
corrects the deficiencies upon which the withdrawal or downgrading of the accreditation status is based.
55
Bar Matter No. 979-B
Re: Legal Education

In July 2001, the Court's Committee on Legal Education and Bar Matters (CLEBM), through its Chairperson, Justice
Jose C. Vitug, noted several objectionable provisions of R.A. No. 7662 which "go beyond the ambit of education of
aspiring lawyers and into the sphere of education of persons duly licensed to practice the law profession."5

In particular, the CLEBM observed:

x x x [U]nder the declaration of policies in Section 2 of [R.A. No. 7662, the State "shall x x x require apprenticeship
and continuing legal education." The concept of continuing legal education encompasses education not only of law
students but also of members of the legal profession. [This] implies that the [LEB] shall have jurisdiction over the
education of persons who have finished the law course and are already licensed to practice law[, in violation of the
Supreme Court's power over the Integrated Bar of the Philippines].

x x x Section 3 provides as one of the objectives of legal education increasing "awareness among members of the legal
profession of the needs of the poor, deprived and oppressed sectors of the society." Such objective should not find a
place in the law that primarily aims to upgrade the standard of schools of ·law as they perform the task of educating
aspiring lawyers. Section 5, paragraph 5 of Article VIII of the Constitution also provides that the Supreme Court shall
have the power to promulgate rules on "legal assistance to the underprivileged" and hence, implementation of [R.A.
No. 7662 might give rise to infringement of a constitutionally mandated power.

x x x [Section 7(e) giving the LEB the power to prescribe minimum standards for law admission and Section 7(h)
giving the LEB the power to adopt a system of continuing legal education and for this purpose, the LEB may provide
for the mandatory attendance of practicing lawyers in such courses and for such duration as the LEB may deem
necessary] encroach upon the Supreme Court's powers under Section 5, paragraph 5 of Article VIII of the
Constitution. Aside from its power over the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Supreme Court is constitutionally
mandated to promulgate rules concerning admission to the practice of law.6

While the CLEBM saw the need for the LEB to oversee the system of legal education, it cautioned that the law's
objectionable provisions, for reasons above-cited, must be removed.7

Relative to the foregoing observations, the CLEBM proposed the following amendments to R.A. No. 7662:

SEC. 2. Declaration of Policies. - It is hereby declared the policy of the State to uplift the standards of legal education
in order to prepare law students for advocacy, counseling, problem-solving, and decision-making; to infuse in them
the ethics of the legal profession; to impress upon them the importance, nobility and dignity of the legal profession as
an equal and indispensable partner of the Bench in the administration of justice; and, to develop socially-committed
lawyers with integrity and competence.

Towards this end, the State shall undertake appropriate reforms in the legal education system, require proper selection
of law students, provide for legal apprenticeship, and maintain quality among law schools.

xxxx

SEC. 3. General and Specific Objectives of Legal Education. x x x

xxxx

2.) to increase awareness among law students of the needs of the poor, deprived and oppressed sectors of society;

xxxx

SEC. 7. Power and functions. - x x x

(a) to regulate the legal education system in accordance with its powers and functions herein
enumerated;
56
 (b) to establish standards of accreditation for law schools, consistent with academic freedom and
pursuant to the declaration of policy set forth in Section 2 hereof;

(c) to accredit law schools that meet the standards of accreditation;

(d) to prescribe minimum standards for admission to law schools including a system of law aptitude
examination;

(e) to provide for minimum qualifications for faculty members of law schools;

(f) to prescribe guidelines for law practice internship which the law schools may establish as part of
the curriculum; and

(g) to perform such other administrative functions as may be necessary for the attainment of the
policies and objectives of this Act.8 (Underscoring supplied)

xxxx

In a Resolution9 dated September 4, 2001, the Court approved the CLEBM's explanatory note and draft amendments
to R.A. No. 7662. The Senate and the House of Representatives were formally furnished with a copy of said
Resolution. This, notwithstanding, R.A. No. 7662 remained unaltered.

LEB Issuances

In 2003, the Court issued a resolution authorizing the JBC to commence the nomination process for the members of
the LEB. In 2009, the LEB was constituted with the appointment of Retired Court of Appeals Justice Hilarion L.
Aquino as the first Chairperson and followed by the appointment of LEB members, namely, Dean Eulogia M. Cueva,
Justice Eloy R. Bello, Jr., Dean Venicio S. Flores and Commission on Higher Education (CHED) Director Felizardo
Y. Francisco. Despite the passage of the enabling law in 1993, the LEB became fully operational only in June 2010.

Acting pursuant to its authority to prescribe the minimum standards for law schools, the LEB issued Memorandum
Order No. 1, Series of 2011 (LEBMO No. 1-2011) providing for the Policies and Standards of Legal Education and
Manual of Regulation for Law Schools.

Since then, the LEB had issued several orders, circulars, resolutions, and other issuances which are made available
through their website:

A. Orders

Number Title/Subject
LEBMO No. 2 Additional Rules in the Operation of the Law
Program
LEBMO No. 3-2016 Policies, Standards and, Guidelines for the
Accreditation of Law Schools to Offer and Operate
Refresher Courses
LEBMO No. 4-2016 Supplemental to [LEBMO] No. 3, Series of 2016
LEBMO No. 5-2016 Guidelines for the [Prerequisite] Subjects in the
Basic Law Courses
LEBMO No. 6-2016 Reportorial Requirements for Law Schools
LEBMO No. 7-2016 Policies and Regulations for the Administration of
a Nationwide Uniform Law School Admission Test
for Applicants to the Basic Law Courses in All
57
 Law Schools in the Country
LEBMO No. 8-2016 Policies, Guidelines and Procedures Governing
Increases in Tuition and Other School Fees, and,
Introduction of New Fees by Higher, Education
Institutions for the Law Program
LEBMO No. 9-2017 Policies and Guidelines on the Conferment of
Honorary Doctor of Laws Degrees
LEBMO No. 10-2017 Guidelines on the Adoption of Academic/School
Calendar
LEBMO No. 11-2017 Additional Transition Provisions to [LEBMO] No.
7, Series of 2016, on PhiLSAT
LEBMO No. 12-2018 LEB Service/Transaction Fees
LEBMO No. 13-2018 Guidelines in the Conduct of Summer Classes
LEBMO No. 14-2018 Policy and Regulations in Offering Elective
Subjects
LEBMO No. 15-2018 Validation of the Licenses of, and the Law
Curriculum/Curricula for the Basic Law Courses in
use by Law Schools and Graduate Schools of Law
LEBMO No. 16-2018 Policies, Standards and Guidelines for the
Academic Law Libraries of Law Schools
LEBMO No. 17-2018 Supplemental Regulations on the Minimum
Academic Requirement of Master of Laws Degree
for Deans and Law Professors/Lecturers/Instructors
in Law Schools
LEBMO No. 18-2018 Guidelines on Cancellation or Suspension of
Classes in All Law Schools
LEBMO No. 19-2018 Migration of the Basic Law Course to Juris Doctor
LEBMO No. 20-2019 Discretionary Admission in the AY 2019-2020 of
Examinees Who Rated Below the Cut-off/Passing
Score but Not Less than 45% in the Philippine Law
School Admission Test Administered on April 7,
2019

B. Memorandum Circulars

Number Title/Subject
LEBMC No. 1 New Regulatory Issuances
LEBMC No. 2 Submission of Schedule of Tuition and Other
School Fees
LEBMC No. 3 Submission of Law School Information Report
LEBMC No. 4 Reminder to Submit Duly Accomplished LSIR
Form
LEBMC No. 5 Offering of the Refresher Course for AY 2017-

58
 2018
LEBMC No. 6 Applications for LEB Certification Numbers
LEBMC No. 7 Application of Transitory Provision Under
[LEBMO] No. 7 Series of 2017 and [LEBMO] No.
11, Series of 2017 in the Admission of Freshmen
Law Students in Basic Law Courses in Academic
Year 2017-2018
LEBMC No. 8 Guidelines for Compliance with the Reportorial
Requirements Under [LEBMO] No. 7, Series of
2016 for Purposes of the Academic Year 2017-
2018
LEBMC No. 9 Observance of Law Day and Philippine National
Law Week
LEBMC No. 10 September 21, 2017 Suspension of Classes
LEBMC No. 11 Law Schools Authorized to Offer the Refresher
Course in the Academic Year 2016-2017
LEBMC No. 12 Law Schools Authorized to Offer the Refresher
Course in the Academic Year 2017-2018
LEBMC No. 13 Legal Research Seminar of the Philippine Group of
Law Librarians on April 4-6, 2018
LEBMC No. 14 CSC Memorandum Circular No. 22, s.2016
LEBMC No. 15 Law Schools Authorized to Offer the Refresher
Course in the Academic Year 2018-2019
LEBMC No. 16 Clarification to [LEBMO] No. 3, Series of 2016
LEBMC No. 17 Updated List of Law Schools Authorized to Offer
the Refresher Course in the Academic Year 2018-
2019
LEBMC No. 18 PHILSAT Eligibility Requirement for Freshmen in
the Academic Year 2018-2019
LEBMC No. 19 Guidelines for the Limited Conditional
Admission/Enrollment in the 1st Semester of the
Academic Year 2018-2019 Allowed for Those
Who Have Not Taken the PhiLSAT
LEBMC No. 20 Updated List of Law Schools Authorized to Offer
the Refresher Course in the Academic Year 2018-
2019
LEBMC No. 21 Adjustments/Corrections to the Requirements for
Law Schools to be Qualified to Conditionally
Admit/Enroll Freshmen Law Students in AY 2018-
2019
LEBMC No. 22 Advisory on who should take the September 23,
2018 PhiLSAT
LEBMC No. 23 Collection of the PhiLSAT Certificate of
Eligibility/Exemption by Law Schools from
Applicants for Admission
59
 LEBMC No. 24 Observance of the Philippine National Law Week
LEBMC No. 25 Competition Law
LEBMC No. 26 Scholarship Opportunity for Graduate Studies for
Law Deans, Faculty Members and Law Graduates
with the 2020-2021 Philippine Fulbright Graduate
Student Program
LEBMC No. 27 Advisory on April 7, 2019 PhiLSAT and
Conditional [Enrollment] for Incoming
Freshmen/1st Year Law Students
LEBMC No. 28 April 25-26, 2019 Competition Law Training
Program
LEBMC No. 29 Detailed Guidelines for Conditional Enrollment
Permit Application
LEBMC No. 30 Law Schools Authorized to Offer Refresher Course
in AY 2019-2020
LEBMC No. 31 Law Schools Authorized to Offer Refresher Course
in AY 2019-2020
LEBMC No. 40 Reminders concerning Conditionally Enrolled
Freshmen Law Students in AY 2019-2020

C. Resolutions and Other Issuances

Number Title/Subject
Resolution No. 16 Reportorial Requirement for Law Schools with
Small Students Population
Resolution No.7, Series of 2010 Declaring a 3-Year Moratorium in the Opening of
New Law Schools
Resolution No. 8, Series of 2010 Administrative Sanctions
Resolution No. 2011-21 A Resolution Providing for Supplementary Rules
to the Provisions of LEBMO No. 1 in regard to
Curriculum and Degrees Ad Eundem
Resolution No. 2012-02 A Resolution Eliminating the Requirement of
Special, Orders for Graduates of the Basic Law
Degrees and Graduate Law Degrees and Replacing
them with a Per Law School Certification
Approved by the Legal Education Board
Resolution No. 2013-01 Ethical Standards of Conduct for Law Professors
Resolution No. 2014-02 Prescribing Rules on the Ll.M. Staggered
Compliance Schedule and the Exemption from the
Ll.M. Requirement
Resolution No. 2015-08 Prescribing the Policy and Rules in the
Establishment of a Legal Aid Clinic in Law
Schools
Order Annual Law Publication Requirements

60
 Chairman Memorandum Restorative Justice to be Added as Elective Subject

          

The PhiLSAT under LEBMO No.

7-2016, LEBMO No. 11-2017,
LEBMC No. 18-2018, and related
issuances

As above-enumerated, among the orders issued by the LEB was Memorandum Order No. 7, Series of 2016 (LEBMO
No. 7-2016) pursuant to its power to "prescribe the minimum standards for law admission" under Section 7(e) of R.A.
No. 7662.

The policy and rationale of LEBMO No. 7-2016 is to improve the quality of legal education by requiring all those
seeking admission to the basic law course to take and pass a nationwide uniform law school admission test, known as
the PhiLSAT.10

The PhiLSAT is essentially an aptitude test measuring the examinee's communications and language proficiency,
critical thinking, verbal and quantitative reasoning.11 It was designed to measure the academic potential of the
examinee to pursue the study of law.12 Exempted from the PhiLSAT requirement were honor graduates who were
granted professional civil service eligibility and who are enrolling within two years from their college graduation.13

Synthesizing, the key provisions of LEBMO No. 7-2016 are as follows:

(1) The policy and rationale of requiring PhiLSAT is to improve the quality of legal education. The PhiLSAT
shall be administered under the control and supervision of the LEB;14

(2) The PhiLSAT is an aptitude test that measures the academic potential of the examinee to pursue the study
of law;15

(3) A qualified examinee is either a graduate of a four-year bachelor's degree; expecting to graduate with a
four-year bachelor's degree at the end of the academic year when the PhiLSAT was administered; or a
graduate from foreign higher education institutions with a degree equivalent to a four-year bachelor's degree.
There is no limit as to the number of times a qualified examinee may take the PhiLSAT;16

(4) The LEB may designate an independent third-party testing administrator;17

(5) The PhiLSAT shall be administered at least once a year, on or before April 16, in testing centers;18

(6) The testing fee shall not exceed the amount of P1,500.00 per examination;19

(7) The cut-off or passing score shall be 55% correct answers, or such percentile score as may be prescribed
by the LEB;20

(8) Those who passed shall be issued a Certificate of Eligibility while those who failed shall be issued a
Certificate of Grade;21

(9) Passing the PhiLSAT is required for admission to any law school. No applicant shall be admitted for
enrollment as a first year student in the basic law course leading to a degree of either Bachelor of Laws or
Juris Doctor unless he has passed the PhiLSAT taken within two years before the start of the study;22

(10) Honor graduates granted professional civil service eligibility who are enrolling within two years from
college graduation are exempted from taking and passing the PhiLSAT for purposes of admission to the basic
law course;23

61
 (11) Law schools, in the exercise of academic freedom, can prescribe additional requirements for
admission;24

(12) Law schools shall submit to LEB reports of first year students admitted and enrolled, and their PhiLSAT
scores, as well as the subjects enrolled and the final grades received by every first year student;25

(13) Beginning academic year 2018-2019, the general average requirement (not less than 80% or 2.5) for
admission to basic law course under Section 23 of LEBMO No. 1-2011 is removed;26

(14) In academic year 2017-2018, the PhiLSAT passing score shall not be enforced and the law schools shall
have the discretion to admit in the basic law course, applicants who scored less than 55% in the PhiLSAT,
provided that the law dean shall submit a justification for the admission and the required report;27 and

(15) Law schools, in violation of LEBMO No. 7-2016, shall be administratively sanctioned as prescribed in
Section 3228 of LEBMO No. 2-201329 and/or fined up to P10,000.00.30

Effective for the academic year 2017 to 2018, no applicant to law school was allowed admission without having taken
and passed the PhiLSAT. The first PhiLSAT examination was held on April 16, 2017 in seven pilot sites: Baguio City,
Metro Manila, Legazpi City, Cebu City, Iloilo City, Davao City, and Cagayan de Oro. A total of 6,575 out of 8,074
examinees passed the first-ever PhiLSAT. For the first PhiLSAT, the passing grade was adjusted by the LEB from
55% to 45% by way of consideration.

Since the PhiLSAT was implemented for the first time and considering further that there were applicants who failed to
take the PhiLSAT because of the inclement weather last April 16, 2017, the LEB issued Memorandum Order No. 11,
Series of 2017 (LEBMO No. 11-2017).

Under LEBMO No. 11-2017, those who failed to take the first PhiLSAT were allowed to be admitted to law schools
for the first semester of academic year 2017 to 2018 for justifiable or meritorious reasons and conditioned under the
following terms:

2. Conditions - x x x

a. The student shall take the next scheduled PhiLSAT;

b. If the student fails to take the next scheduled PhiLSAT for any reason, his/her conditional
admission in the law school shall be automatically revoked and barred from enrolling in the following
semester;

c. If the student takes the next scheduled PhiLSAT but scores below the passing or cut-off score,
his/her conditional admission shall also be revoked and barred from enrolling in the following
semester, unless the law school expressly admits him/her in the exercise of the discretion given under
Section/Paragraph 14 of LEBMO No. 7, Series of 2016, subject to the requirements of the same
provision;

d. The student whose conditional admission and enrol[l]ment is subsequently revoked shall not be
entitled to the reversal of the school fees assessed and/or refund of the school fees paid; and

e. The student shall execute under oath, and file with his/her application for a Permit for Conditional
Admission/Enrol[l]ment, an UNDERTAKING expressly agreeing to the foregoing conditions.31

The conditional admission and enrollment under LEBMO No. 11-2017 and the transitory provision provided in
LEBMO No. 7-2016 were subsequently clarified by the LEB through its Memorandum Circular No. 7, Series of
2017 (LEBMC No. 7-2017).

On September 24, 2017 and April 8, 2018, the second and third PhiLSATs were respectively held.

62
On October 26, 2017, the LEB issued a Memorandum reminding law schools, law students, and other interested
persons that the passing of the PhiLSAT is required to be eligible for admission/enrollment in the basic law course for
academic year 2017 to 2018. It was also therein clarified that the discretion given to law schools to admit those who
failed the PhiLSAT during the initial year of implementation is only up to the second semester of academic year 2017-
2018.

Because of the confusion as to whether conditional admission for academic year 2018 to 2019 may still be allowed,
the LEB issued Memorandum Circular No. 18, Series of 2018 (LEBMC No. 18-2018). Under LEBMC No. 18-2018, it
was clarified that the conditional admission was permitted only in academic year 2017 to 2018 as part of the transition
adjustments in the initial year of the PhiLSAT implementation. As such, by virtue of LEBMC No. 18-2018, the
conditional admission of students previously allowed under LEBMO No. 11-2017 was discontinued.

Nevertheless, on July 25, 2018, the LEB issued Memorandum Circular No. 19, Series of 2018 (LEBMC No. 19-2018)
allowing limited conditional admission/enrollment in the first semester of academic year 2018 to 2019 for those
applicants who have never previously taken the PhiLSAT. Those who have taken the PhiLSAT and scored below the
cut-off score were disqualified. In addition, only those law schools with a passing rate of not less than 25%, are
updated in the reportorial requirement and signified its intention to conditionally admit applicants were allowed to do
so. The limited enrollment was subject to the condition that the admitted student shall take and pass the next PhiLSAT
on September 23, 2018, otherwise the conditional enrollment shall be nullified. Non-compliance with said circular
was considered a violation of the minimum standards for the law program for which law schools may be
administratively penalized.

The fourth PhiLSAT then pushed through on September 23, 2018.

The Petitions

Days before the scheduled conduct of the first-ever PhiLSAT on April 16, 2017, petitioners Oscar B. Pimentel
(Pimentel), Errol B. Comafay (Comafay), Rene B. Gorospe (Gorospe), Edwin R. Sandoval (Sandoval), Victoria B.
Loanzon (Loanzon), Elgin Michael C. Perez (Perez), Arnold E. Cacho (Cacho), Al Conrad B. Espaldon (Espaldon)
and Ed Vincent S. Albano (Albano) [as citizens, lawyers, taxpayers and law professors], with their co-petitioners
Leighton R. Siazon (Siazon), Arianne C. Artugue (Artugue), Clarabel Anne R. Lacsina (Lacsina) and Kristine Jane R.
Liu (Liu) [as citizens, lawyers and taxpayers], Alyanna Mari C. Buenviaje (Buenviaje) and Iana Patricia Dula T.
Nicolas (Nicolas) [as citizens intending to take up law] and Irene A. Tolentino (Tolentino) and Aurea I. Gruyal
(Gruyal) [as citizens and taxpayers] filed their Petition for Prohibition,32 docketed as G.R. No. 230642, principally
seeking that R.A. No. 7662 be declared unconstitutional and that the creation of the LEB be invalidated together with
all its issuances, most especially the PhiLSAT, for encroaching upon the rule-making power of the Court concerning
admissions to the practice of law;33 They prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) to prevent
the LEB from conducting the PhiLSAT.

Respondents-in-intervention Attys. Anthony D. Bengzon (Bengzon), Ferdinand M. Negre (Negre), Michael Z.

Untalan (Untalan), Jonathan Q. Perez (Perez), Samantha Wesley K. Rosales (Rosales), Erika M. Alfonso (Alfonso),
Krys Valen O. Martinez (Martinez), Ryan Ceazar P. Romano (Romano), and Kenneth C. Varona (Varona) [as citizens
and lawyers] moved to intervene and prayed for the dismissal of the Petition for Prohibition.34

On February 12, 2018, petitioners-in-intervention April D. Caballero (Caballero), Jerey C. Castardo (Castardo), MC
Wellroe P. Bringas (Bringas), Rhuffy D. Federe (Federe) and Conrad Theodore A. Matutino (Matutino) [as graduates
of four-year college course and applicants as first year law students], St. Thomas More School of Law and Business,
Inc., [as an educational stock corporation] and Rodolfo C. Rapista (Rapista), Judy Marie Rapista-Tan (Rapista-Tan),
Lynnart Walford A. Tan (Tan), Ian M. Enterina (Enterina) and Neil John Villarico (Villarico) [as citizens and law
professors] intervened and joined the Petition for Prohibition of Pimentel, et al., seeking to declare R.A. No. 7662 and
the PhiLSAT as unconstitutional.35

Thereafter, a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, docketed as G.R. No. 242954, was filed by petitioners Francis
Jose Lean L. Abayata (Abayata), Gretchen M. Vasquez (Vasquez), Sheenah S. Ilustrismo (Ilustrismo), Ralph Louie
Salaño (Solaño), Aireen Monica B. Guzman (Guzman) and Delfino Odias (Odias) [as law students who failed to pass
the PhiLSAT], Daryl Dela Cruz (Dela Cruz), Claire Suico (Suico), Aivie S. Pescadero (Pescadero), Niña Christine
Dela Paz (Dela Paz), Shemark K. Queniahan (Queniahan), Al Jay T. Mejos (Mejos), Rocellyn L. Daño (Daño),

63
Michael Adolfo (Adolfo), Ronald A. Atig (Atig), Lynette C. Lumayag (Lumayag), Mary Chris Lagera (Lagera),
Timothy B. Francisco (Francisco), Sheila Marie C. Dandan (Dandan), Madeline C. Dela Peña (Dela Peña), Darlin R.
Villamor (Villamor), Lorenzana Llorico (Llorico) and Jan Ivan M. Santamaria (Santamaria) [as current law students
who failed to take the PhiLSAT] seeking to invalidate R.A. No. 7662 or, in the alternative, to declare as
unconstitutional the PhiLSAT. They also sought the issuance of a TRO to defer the holding of the aptitude test.36

These Petitions were later on consolidated by the Court and oral arguments thereon were held on March 5, 2019.

Temporary Restraining Order

On March 12, 2019, the Court issued a TRO37 enjoining the LEB from implementing LEBMC No. 18-2018 and, thus,
allowing those who have not taken the PhiLSAT prior to the academic year 2018 to 2019, or who have taken the
PhiLSAT, but did not pass, or who are honor graduates in college with no PhiLSAT Exemption Certificate, or honor
graduates with expired PhiLSAT Exemption Certificates to conditionally enroll as incoming freshmen law students for
the academic year 2019 to 2020 under the same terms as LEBMO No. 11-2017.

Subsequently, the LEB issued Memorandum Circular No. 27, Series of 2019 (LEBMC No. 27-2019) stating that the
PhiLSAT scheduled on April 7, 2019 will proceed and reiterated the requirements that must be complied with for the
conditional enrollment for the academic year 2019 to 2020.

The Parties' Arguments

In G.R. No. 230642

Petitioners in G.R. No. 230642 argue that R.A. No. 7662 and the PhiLSAT are offensive to the Court's power to
regulate and supervise the legal profession pursuant to Section 5(5), Article VIII38 of the Constitution and that the
Congress cannot create an administrative office that exercises the Court's power over the practice of law. They also
argue that R.A. No. 7662 gives the JBC additional functions to vet nominees for the LEB in violation of Section 8(5),
Article VIII39 of the Constitution.

In their Memorandum, petitioners also question the constitutionality of the LEB's powers under Section 7(c)40 and
7(e)41 to prescribe the qualifications and compensation of faculty members and Section 7(h)42 on the LEB's power to
adopt a system of continuing legal education as being repugnant to the Court's rule-making power concerning the
practice of law. They also argue that the PhiLSAT violates the academic freedom of law schools and the right to
education.

Petitioners-in-intervention meanwhile contend that the PhiLSAT violates the right to liberty and pursuit of happiness
of the student-applicants. They posit that the PhiLSAT violates the equal protection clause as it is an arbitrary form of
classification not based on substantial distinctions. They also argue that the PhiLSAT violates the right of all citizens
to quality and accessible education, violates academic freedom, and is an unfair academic requirement. It is also their
position that the PhiLSAT violates due process as it interferes with the right of every person to select a profession or
course of study. They also argue that R.A. No. 7662 constitutes undue delegation of legislative powers.

In G.R. No. 242954

Petitioners in G.R. No. 242954 argue that certiorari and prohibition are proper remedies either under the expanded or
traditional jurisdiction of the Court. They also invoke the doctrine of transcendental importance.

Substantively, they contend that R.A. No. 7662, specifically Section 3(a)(2)43 on the objective of legal education to
increase awareness among members of the legal profession, Section 7(e) on law admission, 7(g)44 on law practice
internship, and 7(h) on adopting a system of continuing legal education, and the declaration of policy on continuing
legal education45 infringe upon the power of the Court to regulate admission to the practice of law. They profess that
they are not against the conduct of law school admission test per se, only that the LEB cannot impose the PhiLSAT as
the power to do so allegedly belongs to the Court.46

64
It is also their contention that the PhiLSAT violates academic freedom as it interferes with the law school's exercise of
freedom to choose who to admit. According to them, the LEB cannot issue penal regulations, and the consequent
forfeiture of school fees and the ban on enrollment for those who failed to pass the PhiLSAT violate due process.

The Comments

Procedurally, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), representing the LEB, argues that certiorari and prohibition
are not proper to assail the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7662 either under the traditional or expanded concept of
judicial power. For the OSG, R.A. No. 7662 was enacted pursuant to the State's power to regulate all educational
institutions, and as such, there could be no grave abuse of discretion. It also claims that the Congress is an
indispensable party to the petitions.

Substantively, the OSG contends that the Court's power to regulate admission to the practice of law does not include
regulation of legal education. It also defends Section 7(e) on the LEB's power to prescribe minimum standards for law
admission as referring to admission to law schools; Section 7(g) on the LEB's power to establish a law practice
internship as pertaining to the law school curriculum which is within the power of the LEB to regulate; and 7(h) on the
LEB's power to adopt a system of continuing legal education as being limited to the training of lawyer-
professors.47 Anent the argument that R.A. No. 7662 gives the JBC additional functions not assigned to it by the
Court, the OSG points out that the Court had actually authorized the JBC to process the applications for membership
to the LEB making this a non-issue.

In defending the validity of the PhiLSAT, the OSG advances the argument that the PhiLSAT is the minimum standard
for entrance to law schools prescribed by the LEB pursuant to the State's power to regulate education. The OSG urges
that the PhiLSAT is no different from the National Medical Admission Test (NMAT) which the Court already upheld
as a valid exercise of police power in the seminal case of Tablarin v. Gutierrez.48

It is also the position of the OSG that neither the PhiLSAT nor the provisions of R.A. No. 7662 violate academic
freedom because the standards for entrance to law school, the standards for accreditation, the prescribed qualifications
of faculty members, and the prescribed basic curricula are fair, reasonable, and equitable admission and academic
requirements.

For their part, respondents in-intervention contend that R.A. No. 7662 enjoys the presumption of constitutionality and
that the study of law is different from the practice of law.

In its Comment to the Petition-in-Intervention, the OSG dismisses as speculative the argument that the PhiLSAT is
anti-poor, and adds that the Court has no competence to rule on whether the PhiLSAT is an unfair or unreasonable
requirement, it being a question of policy.

Respondents-in-intervention, for their part, argue that the right of the citizens to accessible education means that the
State shall make quality education accessible only to those qualified enough, as determined by fair, reasonable, and
equitable admission and academic requirements. They dispute the claimed intrusion on academic freedom as law
schools are not prevented from selecting who to admit among applicants who have passed the PhiLSAT. They stress
that the right to education is not absolute and may be regulated by the State, citing Calawag v. University of the
Philippines Visayas.49

By way of Reply, petitioners-in-intervention emphasize that the doctrine in Tablarin50 is inapplicable as medical
schools are not the same as law schools. They further aver that the decline in enrollment as a result of the
implementation of the PhiLSAT is not speculative.51

The Issues

After a careful consideration of the issues raised by the parties in their pleadings and refined during the oral
arguments, the issues for resolution are synthesized as follows:

I. Procedural Issues:

A. Remedies of certiorari and prohibition; and

65
 B. Requisites of judicial review and the scope of the Court's review in the instant petitions.

II. Substantive Issues:

A. Jurisdiction over legal education;

B. Supervision and regulation of legal education as an exercise of police power;

1. Reasonable supervision and regulation

2. Institutional academic freedom

3. Right to education

C. LEB's powers under R.A. No. 7662 vis-a-vis the Court's jurisdiction over the practice of law; and

D. LEB's powers under R.A. No. 7662 vis-a-vis the academic freedom of law schools and the right to
education.

The Rulings of the Court

I.
Procedural Issues

A.
Remedies of Certiorari and Prohibition

The propriety of the remedies of certiorari and prohibition is assailed on the ground that R.A. No. 7662 is a legislative
act and not a judicial, quasi-judicial, or ministerial function. In any case, respondents argue that the issues herein
presented involve purely political questions beyond the ambit of judicial review.

The Court finds that petitioners availed of the proper remedies.

The 193552 and 197353 Constitutions mention, but did not define, "judicial power." In contrast, the 1987 Constitution
lettered what judicial power is and even "expanded" its scope.

As constitutionally defined under Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution,54 judicial power is no longer
limited to the Court's duty to' settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, or the power of adjudication, but also includes, the duty to determine whether or not there has been grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government. This innovation under the 1987 Constitution later on became known as the Court's traditional
jurisdiction and expanded jurisdiction, respectively.55

The expanded scope of judicial review mentions "grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction" to harbinger the exercise of judicial review; while petitions for certiorari56 and prohibition57 speak of
"lack or excess of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction." Petitions
for certiorari and prohibition as it is understood under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court are traditionally regarded as
supervisory writs used as a means by superior or appellate courts, in the exercise of their supervisory jurisdiction, to
keep subordinate courts within the bounds of their jurisdictions. As such, writs of certiorari and prohibition correct
only errors of jurisdiction of judicial and quasi-judicial bodies.58

However, considering the commonality of the ground of "grave abuse of discretion," a Rule 65 petition, as a
procedural vehicle to invoke the Court's expanded jurisdiction, has been allowed.59 After all, there is grave abuse of
discretion when an act is done contrary to the Constitution, the law or jurisprudence, or is executed whimsically,
capriciously or arbitrarily, out of malice, ill will, or personal bias.60 In Spouses Imbong v. Ochoa, Jr.,61 the Court
emphasized that certiorari, prohibition and mandamus are appropriate remedies to raise constitutional issues.

66
That it is a legislative act which is being assailed is likewise not a ground to deny the present petitions.

For one, the 1987 Constitution enumerates under Section 5(2)(a), Article VIII,62 the Court's irreducible powers which
expressly include the power of judicial review, or the power to pass upon the constitutionality or validity of any treaty,
international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or
regulation.

For another, the Court's expanded jurisdiction, when invoked, permits a review of acts not only by a tribunal, board, or
officer exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions, but also by any branch or instrumentality of the
Government. "Any branch or instrumentality of the Government" necessarily includes the Legislative and the
Executive, even if they are not exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions.63 As such, the Court may
review and/or prohibit or nullify, when proper, acts of legislative and executive officials, there being no plain, speedy,
or adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.64

The power of judicial review over congressional action, in particular, was affirmed in Francisco, Jr. v. The House of
Representatives,65 wherein the Court held:

There is indeed a plethora of cases in which this Court exercised the power of judicial review over congressional
action. Thus, in Santiago v. Guingona, Jr., this Court ruled that it is well within the power and jurisdiction of the Court
to inquire whether the Senate or its officials committed a violation of the Constitution or grave abuse of discretion in
the exercise of their functions and prerogatives. In Tañada v. Angara, where petitioners sought to nullify an act of the
Philippine Senate on the ground that it contravened the Constitution, it held that the petition raised a justiciable
controversy and that when an action of the legislative branch is alleged to have seriously infringed the Constitution, it
becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute. In Bondoc v. Pineda, [this Court]
declared null and void a resolution of the House of Representatives withdrawing the nomination, and rescinding the
election, of a congressman as a member of the House Electoral Tribunal for being violative of Section 17, Article VI
of the Constitution. In Coseteng v. Mitra, it held that the resolution of whether the House representation in the
Commission on Appointments was based on proportional representation of the political parties as provided in Section
18, Article VI of the Constitution is subject to judicial review. In Daza v. Singson, it held that the act of the House of
Representatives in removing the petitioner from the Commission on Appointments is subject to judicial review.
In Tañada v. Cuenco, it held that although under the Constitution, the legislative power is vested exclusively in
Congress, this does not detract from the power of the courts to pass upon the constitutionality of acts of Congress.
In Angara v. Electoral Commission, it exercised its power of judicial review to determine which between the Electoral
Commission and the National Assembly had jurisdiction over an electoral dispute concerning members of the latter.
(Internal citations omitted; emphases supplied)

This was reiterated in Villanueva v. Judicial and Bar Council,66 as follows:

With respect to the Court, however, the remedies of certiorari and prohibition are necessarily broader in scope and
reach, and the writ of certiorari or prohibition may be issued to correct errors of jurisdiction committed not only by a
tribunal, corporation, board or officer exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions but also to set right,
undo and restrain any act of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by any branch or
instrumentality of the Government, even if the latter does not exercise judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions.
This application is expressly authorized by the text of the second paragraph of Section 1, supra.

Thus, petitions for certiorari and prohibition are appropriate remedies to raise constitutional issues and to review
and/or prohibit or nullify the acts of legislative and executive officials. (Internal citation omitted; emphasis supplied)

Consistently, in Samahan ng mga Progresibong Kabataan (SPARK) v. Quezon City,67 the remedies of certiorari and
prohibition were regarded as proper vehicles to assail the constitutionality of curfew ordinances, and in Agcaoili v.
Fariñas,68 to question the contempt powers of the Congress in the exercise of its power of inquiry in aid of legislation.

The consistency in the Court's rulings as to the propriety of the writs of certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court to correct errors of jurisdiction committed not only by a tribunal, corporation, board or officer
exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions, but also to correct, undo, or restrain any act of grave abuse
of discretion on the part of the legislative and the executive, propels the Court to treat the instant petitions in the same
manner.

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 B.
Requisites for Judicial Review

The power of judicial review is tritely defined as the power to review the constitutionality of the actions of the other
branches of the government.69 For a proper exercise of its power of review in constitutional litigation, certain
requisites must be satisfied: (1) an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the person
challenging the act must have "standing" to challenge; (3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the
earliest possible opportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.70

These requisites are effective limitations on the Court's exercise of its power of review because judicial review in
constitutional cases is quintessentially deferential, owing to the great respect that each co-equal branch of the
Government affords to the other.

Of these four requisites, the first two, being the most essential,71 deserve an extended discussion in the instant case.

1. Actual Case or Controversy

Fundamental in the exercise of judicial power, whether under the traditional or expanded setting, is the presence of an
actual case or controversy.72 An actual case or controversy is one which involves a conflict of legal rights and an
assertion of opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial resolution. The case must not be moot or academic, or based
on extra-legal or other similar considerations not cognizable by a court of justice.

To be justiciable, the controversy must be definite and concrete, touching on the legal relations of parties having
adverse legal interests. It must be shown from the pleadings that there is an active antagonistic assertion of a legal
right, on the one hand, and a denial thereof on the other. There must be an actual and substantial controversy and not
merely a theoretical question or issue. Further, the actual and substantial controversy must admit specific relief
through a conclusive decree and must not merely generate an advisory opinion based on hypothetical or conjectural
state of facts.73

Closely associated with the requirement of an actual or justiciable case or controversy is the ripening seeds for
adjudication. Ripeness for adjudication has a two-fold aspect: first, the fitness of the issues for judicial decision;
and second, the hardship to the parties entailed by withholding court consideration. The first aspect requires that the
issue must be purely legal and that the regulation subject of the case is a "final agency action." The second aspect
requires that the effects of the regulation must have been felt by the challenging parties in a concrete way.74

To stress, a constitutional question is ripe for adjudication when the challenged governmental act has a direct and
existing adverse effect on the individual challenging it.75 While a reasonable certainty of the occurrence of a
perceived threat to a constitutional interest may provide basis for a constitutional challenge, it is nevertheless still
required that there are sufficient facts to enable the Court to intelligently adjudicate the issues.76

In this regard, the Court's pronouncement in Philippine Association of Colleges and Universities (PACU) v. Secretary
of Education77 deserves reiteration:

It should be understandable, then, that this Court should be doubly reluctant to consider petitioner's demand
for avoidance of the law aforesaid, [e]specially where, as respondents assert, petitioners suffered no wrong - nor
allege any - from the enforcement of the criticized statute.

It must be evident to any one that the power to declare a legislative enactment void is one which the judge, conscious
of the fallibility of human judgment, will shrink from exercising in any case where he can conscientiously and with
due regard to duty and official oath decline the responsibility. x x x

When a law has been long treated as constitutional and important rights have become dependent thereon, the Court
may refuse to consider an attack on its validity. x x x

As a general rule, the constitutionality of a statute will be passed on only if, and to the extent that, it is directly and
necessarily involved in a justiciable controversy and is essential to the protection of the rights of the parties concerned.
xxx
68
xxxx

It is an established principle that to entitle a private individual immediately in danger of sustaining a direct injury as
the result of that action and it is not sufficient that he has merely a general [interest] to invoke the judicial power to
determine the validity of executive or legislative action he must show that he has sustained or [has an] interest
common to all members of the public. x x x

Courts will not pass upon the constitutionality of a law upon the complaint of one who fails to show that he is injured
by its operation. x x x

The power of courts to declare a law unconstitutional arises only when the interests of litigants require the use of that
judicial authority for their protection against actual interference, a hypothetical threat being insufficient. x x x

Bona fide suit. - Judicial power is limited to the decision of actual cases and controversies. The authority to pass on
the validity of statutes is incidental to the decision of such cases where conflicting claims under the Constitution and
under a legislative act assailed as contrary to the Constitution are raised. It is legitimate only in the last resort, and as
necessity in the determination of real, earnest, and vital controversy between litigants. x x x

xxxx

An action, like this, is brought for a positive purpose, nay, to obtain actual and positive relief. x x x Courts do
not sit to adjudicate mere academic questions to satisfy scholarly interest therein, however intellectually solid
the problem may be. This is [e]specially true where the issues "reach constitutional dimensions, for then there
comes into play regard for the court's duty to avoid decision of constitutional issues unless avoidance becomes
evasion." x x x (Internal citations omitted; emphases supplied)

Ultimately, whether an actual case is present or not is determinative of whether the Court's hand should be stayed
when there is no adversarial setting and when the prerogatives of the co-equal branches of the Government should
instead be respected.

As ruled in Republic v. Roque: 78

A perusal of private respondents' petition for declaratory relief would show that they have failed to demonstrate how
they are left to sustain or are in immediate danger to sustain some direct injury as a result of the enforcement of the
assailed provisions of RA 9372. Not far removed from the factual milieu in the Southern Hemisphere cases, private
respondents only assert general interests as citizens, and taxpayers and infractions which the government could
prospectively commit if the enforcement of the said law would remain untrammelled. As their petition would disclose,
private respondents' fear of prosecution was solely based on remarks of certain government officials which were
addressed to the general public. They, however, failed to show how these remarks tended towards any prosecutorial or
governmental action geared towards the implementation of RA 9372 against them. In other words, there was no
particular, real or imminent threat to any of them. As held in Southern Hemisphere:

Without any justiciable controversy, the petitions have become pleas for declaratory relief, over which the Court has
no original jurisdiction. Then again, declaratory actions characterized by "double contingency," where both the
activity the petitioners intend to undertake and the anticipated reaction to it of a public official are merely theorized,
lie beyond judicial review for lack of ripeness.

The possibility of abuse in the implementation of RA 9372 does not avail to take the present petitions out of the realm
of the surreal and merely imagined. Such possibility is not peculiar to RA 9372 since the exercise of any power
granted by law may be abused. Allegations of abuse must be anchored on real events before courts may step in to
settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable. (Internal citations omitted;
emphasis supplied)

Concededly, the Court had exercised the power of judicial review by the mere enactment of a law or approval of a
challenged action when such is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution. In Pimentel, Jr. v. Aguirre:79

69
First, on prematurity. According to the Dissent, when "the conduct has not yet occurred and the challenged
construction has not yet been adopted by the agency charged with administering the administrative order, the
determination of the scope and constitutionality of the executive action in advance of its immediate adverse effect
involves too remote and abstract an inquiry for the proper exercise of judicial function."

This is a rather novel theory - that people should await the implementing evil to befall on them before they can
question acts that are illegal or unconstitutional. Be it remembered that the real issue here is whether the Constitution
and the law are contravened by Section 4 of AO 372, not whether they are violated by the acts implementing it. In the
unanimous en banc case Tañada v. Angara, this Court held that when an act of the legislative department is seriously
alleged to have infringed the Constitution, settling the controversy becomes the duty of this Court. By the mere
enactment of the questioned law or the approval of the challenged action, the dispute is said to have ripened into a
judicial controversy even without any other overt act. Indeed, even a singular violation of the Constitution and/or the
law is enough to awaken judicial duty. Said the Court:

In seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground that it contravenes the Constitution, the petition no
doubt raises a justiciable controversy. Where an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed
the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute. The question
thus posed is judicial rather than political. The duty (to adjudicate) remains to assure that the supremacy of the
Constitution is upheld. Once a controversy as to the application or interpretation of a constitutional provision is raised
before this Court x x x, it becomes a legal issue which the Court is bound by constitutional mandate to decide.

xxxx

As this Court has repeatedly and firmly emphasized in many cases, it will not shirk, digress from or abandon its sacred
duty and authority to uphold the Constitution in matters that involve grave abuse of discretion brought before it in
appropriate cases, committed by any officer, agency, instrumentality or department of the government.

In the same vein, the Court also held in Tatad v. Secretary of the Department of Energy:

x x x Judicial power includes not only the duty of the courts to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable, but also the duty to determine whether or not there has been grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of government. The
courts, as guardians of the Constitution, have the inherent authority to determine whether a statute enacted by the
legislature transcends the limit imposed by the fundamental law. Where the statute violates the Constitution, it is not
only the right but the duty of the judiciary to declare such act unconstitutional and void.

By the same token, when an act of the President, who in our constitutional scheme is a coequal of Congress, is
seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution and the laws, as in the present case, settling the dispute becomes
the duty and the responsibility of the courts. (Internal citations omitted; emphases supplied)

In Spouses Imbong v. Ochoa,80 the Court took cognizance of the petitions despite posing a facial challenge against
the entire law as the petitions seriously alleged that fundamental rights have been violated by the assailed legislation:

In this case, the Court is of the view that an actual case or controversy exists and that the same is ripe for judicial
determination. Considering that the RH Law and its implementing rules have already taken effect and that
budgetary measures to carry out the law have already been passed, it is evident that the subject petitions
present a justiciable controversy. As stated earlier, when an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged
to have infringed the Constitution, it not only becomes a right, but also a duty of the Judiciary to settle the
dispute.

xxxx

Facial Challenge

The OSG also assails the propriety of the facial challenge lodged by the subject petitions, contending that the RH Law
cannot be challenged "on its face" as it is not a speech regulating measure.

70
The Court is not persuaded.

In United States (US) constitutional law, a facial challenge, also known as a First Amendment Challenge, is one that is
launched to assail the validity of statutes concerning not only protected speech, but also all other rights in the First
Amendment. These include religious freedom, freedom of the press, and the right of the people to peaceably assemble,
and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances. After all, the fundamental right to religious freedom,
freedom of the press and peaceful assembly are but component rights of the right to one's freedom of expression, as
they are modes which one's thoughts are externalized.

In this jurisdiction, the application of doctrines originating from the U.S. has been generally maintained, albeit with
some modifications. While this Court has withheld the application of facial challenges to strictly penal statutes,
it has expanded its scope to cover statutes not only regulating free speech, but also those involving religious
freedom, and other fundamental rights. The underlying reason for this modification is simple. For unlike its
counterpart in the U.S., this Court, under its expanded jurisdiction, is mandated by the Fundamental Law not
only to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, but also to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. Verily, the framers of Our Constitution
envisioned a proactive Judiciary, ever vigilant with its duty to maintain the supremacy of the Constitution.

Consequently, considering that the foregoing petitions have seriously alleged that the constitutional human
rights to life, speech and religion and other fundamental rights mentioned above have been violated by the
assailed legislation, the Court has authority to take cognizance of these kindred petitions and to determine if
the RH Law can indeed pass constitutional scrutiny. To dismiss these petitions on the simple expedient that there
exist no actual case or controversy, would diminish this Court as a reactive branch of government, acting only when
the Fundamental Law has been transgressed, to the detriment of the Filipino people. (Internal citations omitted;
emphases supplied)81

Likewise in Belgica v. Ochoa,82 the Court held that the requirement of an actual case or controversy is satisfied by the
antagonistic positions taken by the parties:

The requirement of contrariety of legal rights is clearly satisfied by the antagonistic positions of the parties on the
constitutionality of the "Pork Barrel System." Also, the questions in these consolidated cases are ripe for adjudication
since the challenged funds and the provisions allowing for their utilization-such as the 2013 GAA for the PDAF, PD
910 for the Malampaya Funds and PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, for the Presidential Social Fund - are currently
existing and operational; hence, there exists an immediate or threatened injury to petitioners as a result of the
unconstitutional use of these public funds.

1(a). Scope of Judicial Review

To determine whether petitioners presented an actual case or controversy, or have seriously alleged that R.A. No.
7662 suffers from constitutional infirmities to trigger the Court's power of judicial review, resort must necessarily be
had to the pleadings filed.

Petitioners in G.R. No. 230642 allege that R.A. No. 7662 and the LEB issuances relative to the admission and practice
of law encroach upon the powers of the Court.83 It is their position that the powers given to the LEB are directly
related to the Court's powers.84 In particular, they argue that the LEB's power to adopt a system of continuing legal
education under Section 7(h) of R.A. No. 7662 falls within the authority of the Court.85 In their Memorandum, they
additionally argue that the LEB's powers to prescribe the qualifications and compensation of faculty members under
Section 7(c) and 7(e) of R.A. No. 7662, Sections 50-51 of LEBMO No. 1, and Resolution No. 2014-02 intrude into
the Court's rule-making power relative to the practice of law.86 They also argue that the PhiLSAT violates the
academic freedom of law schools and the right to education.87 It is their contention that the LEB is without power to
impose sanctions.88 They also question the authority of the LEB Chairperson and Members to act in a hold-over
capacity.89

For their part, petitioners-in-intervention allege that the PhiLSAT requirement resulted to a reduced number of law
student enrollees for St. Thomas More School of Law and Business, Inc. and constrained said law school to admit
only students who passed the PhiLSAT which is against their policy of admitting students based on values.90 Their

71
co-petitioners are students who either applied for law school, failed to pass the PhiLSAT, or, were conditionally
enrolled. Thus, they argue that Section 7(e) of R.A. No. 7662 and the PhiLSAT violate the law school's academic
freedom.

Petitioners in G.R. No. 242954 allege that they are current law students who failed to pass and/or take the PhiLSAT,
and who are therefore threatened with the revocation of their conditional enrollment and stands to be barred from
enrolling. Twelve of the 23 petitioners in G.R. No. 242954 were not allowed to enroll for failure to pass and/or take
the PhiLSAT.

It is their argument that the LEB's power under Section 7(e) of R.A. No. 7662 to prescribe minimum standards for law
admission, Section 7(g) to establish a law practice internship, Section 7(h) to adopt a system of continuing legal
education, and Section 3(a)(2) on the stated objective of legal education to increase awareness among members of the
legal profession of the needs of the poor, deprived and oppressed sectors of society usurp the Court's rule-making
powers concerning admission to the practice of law.91 In addition, they argue that the PhiLSAT issuances violate
academic freedom, and that the LEB is not authorized to revoke conditional enrollment nor is it authorized to forfeit
school fees and impose a ban enrollment which are penal sanctions violative of the due process clause. They also
argue that the classification of students to those who have passed or failed the PhiLSAT for purposes of admission to
law school is repugnant to the equal protection clause.

The petitions therefore raise an actual controversy insofar as they allege that R.A. No. 7662, specifically Section 2,
paragraph 2, Section 3(a)(2), Section 7(c), (e), (g), and (h) of R.A. No. 7662 infringe upon the Court's power to
promulgate rules concerning the practice of law and upon institutional academic freedom and the right to quality
education. Necessarily, a review of the LEB issuances when pertinent to these assailed provisions of R.A. No. 7662
shall also be undertaken.

2. Legal Standing

Inextricably linked with the actual case or controversy requirement is that the party presenting the justiciable issue
must have the standing to mount a challenge to the governmental act.

By jurisprudence, standing requires a personal and substantial interest in the case such that the petitioner has
sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of the violation of its rights,92 thus:

Legal standing or locus standi is the "right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question." To possess legal
standing, parties must show "a personal and substantial interest in the case such that [they have] sustained or will
sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged." The requirement of direct injury
guarantees that the party who brings suit has such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy and, in effect,
assures "that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court depends for
illumination of difficult constitutional questions."93 (Emphasis supplied)

The rule on standing admits of recognized exceptions: the over breadth doctrine, taxpayer suits, third-party standing
and the doctrine of transcendental importance.94

Petitioners-in-intervention Caballero, Castardo, Bringas, Federe and Matutino, being graduates of a four-year college
course and applicants as first year law students, as well as petitioners Abayata, Vasquez, Ilustrismo, Salaño, Guzman
and Odias, as law students who failed to pass the PhiLSAT and were denied admission to law school for the academic
year 2018 to 2019, and petitioners Dela Cruz, Suico, Pescadero, Dela Paz, Queniahan, Mejos, Daño, Adolfo, Atig,
Lumayag, Lagera, Francisco, Dandan, Dela Peña, Villamor, Llorico and Santamaria, being law students who were
conditionally enrolled, possess the requisite standing to challenge the constitutionality of Section 7(e) of R.A. No.
7662 and the implementing LEB issuances, as they were, in fact, required to take the PhiLSAT, or to comply with the
terms of the conditional enrollment and failing which, were denied admission as regular students to law school.

Petitioner-in-intervention St. Thomas More School of Law and Business, Inc., likewise sufficiently alleges injury that
it has sustained in the form of reduced number of enrollees due to the PhiLSAT requirement and the curtailment of its
discretion on who to admit in its law school. Under the specific and concrete facts available in this case, these
petitioners have demonstrated that they were, or tend to be directly and substantially, injured.

72
Meanwhile, petitioners Pimentel, Comafay, Gorospe, Sandoval, Loanzon, Perez, Cacho, Espaldon, Albano, Siazon,
Artugue, Lacsina, Liu, Buenviaje, Nicolas, Tolentino, and Gruyal; and petitioners-in intervention Rapista, Rapista-
Tan, Tan, Enterina and Villarico commonly anchor their standing to challenge R.A. No. 7662 and the PhiLSAT as
citizens.

Standing as a citizen has been upheld by this Court in cases where a petitioner is able to craft an issue of
transcendental importance or when paramount public interest is involved.95

Legal standing may be extended to petitioners for having raised a "constitutional issue of critical
significance."96 Without a doubt, the delineation of the Court's rule-making power vis-a-vis the supervision and
regulation of legal education and the determination of the reach of the State's supervisory and regulatory power in the
context of the guarantees of academic freedom and the right to education are novel issues with far-reaching
implications that deserve the Court's immediate attention. In taking cognizance of the instant petitions, the Court is
merely exercising its power to promulgate rules towards the end that constitutional rights are protected and
enforced.97

Now, to the core substantive issues.

II.
Substantive Issues

A.
Jurisdiction Over Legal Education

Petitioners in G.R. No. 230642 argue that the Court's power to promulgate rules concerning the admission to the
practice of law necessarily includes the power to do things related to the practice of law, including the power to
prescribe the requirements for admission to the study of law. In support, they point to Sections 698 and 16,99 Rule
138 of the Rules of Court. They contend that the Congress cannot create an administrative body, like the LEB, that
exercises this rule-making power of the Court. They emphasize that the LEB belongs to the Executive department,
and, as such, is not linked or accountable to the Court nor placed under the Court's regulation and supervision.

For their part, petitioners in G.R. No. 242954 maintain that the Court exercises authority over the legal profession
which includes the admission to the practice of law, to the continuing requirements for and discipline of
lawyers.100 According to them, the rule-making power of the Court is plenary in all cases regarding the admission to
and supervision of the practice of law. They argue that the Court's power to admit members to the practice of law
extends to admission to legal education because the latter is a preparatory process to the application for admission to
the legal profession, which "residual power" of the Court can be inferred from Sections 5101 and 6, Rule 138 of the
Rules of Court. They also emphasize that under Sections 1102 and 2103 of Rule 138-A, non-lawyers are allowed to
have limited practice of law and are held to answer by the Court under the same rules on privileged communication
and standard of conduct pursuant to Sections 3104 and 4105 of Rule 138-A.106

Contrary to petitioner's claims, the Court has no primary and direct jurisdiction over legal education. Neither the
history of the Philippine legal education nor the Rules of Court invoked by petitioners support their argument. The
supervision and regulation of legal education is an Executive function.

1 Regulation and supervision of legal education had

been historically and consistently exercised
by the political departments

Legal education in the Philippines was institutionalized in 1734, with the establishment of the Faculty of Civil Law in
the University of Santo Tomas with Spanish as the medium of instruction. Its curriculum was identical to that adopted
during the time in the universities in Europe107 and included subjects on Civil Law, Canon Law, ecclesiastical
discipline and elements of Natural Law.108

In 1901, Act No. 74 was passed centralizing the public school system, and establishing the Department of Public
Instruction headed by the General Superintendent.109 The archipelago was then divided into school divisions and

73
districts for effective management of the school system. It was through Act No. 74 that a Trade School110 and a
Normal School111 in Manila and a School of Agriculture in Negros were established.112

In 1908, the legislature approved Act No. 1870 which created the University of the Philippines (UP). However,
English law courses were not offered until 1910 when the Educational Department Committee of the Young Men's
Christian Association (YMCA), through the efforts of Justice George Malcolm, offered law courses in the English
language. In 1911, UP adopted these classes by formally establishing its College of Law,113 with its first graduates
being students who studied at YMCA.114 The curriculum adopted by the UP College of Law became the model of the
legal education curriculum of the other law schools in the country.115

Private schools were formally regulated in 1917 with the passage of Act No. 2706116 which made obligatory the
recognition and inspection of private schools and colleges by the Secretary of Public Instruction, so as to maintain a
standard of efficiency in all private schools and colleges117 in the country. As such, the Secretary of Public
Instruction was authorized to inspect schools and colleges to determine efficiency of instruction and to make
necessary regulations. Likewise, under Act No. 2706, the Secretary of Public Instruction was specifically authorized
to prepare and publish, from time to time, in pamphlet form, the minimum standards required of law schools and other
schools giving instruction of a technical or professional character.118

In 1924, a survey of the Philippine education and of all educational institutions, facilities and agencies was conducted
through Act No. 3162, which created the Board of Educational Survey. Among the factual findings of the survey was
that schools at that time were allowed to operate with almost no supervision at all. This led to the conclusion that a
great majority of schools from primary grade to the university are money-making devices of persons who organize
and administer them. Thus, it was recommended that some board of control be· organized under legislative control to
supervise their administration.119 It was further recommended that legislation be enacted to prohibit the opening of
any school without the permission of the Secretary of Public Instruction. The grant of the permission was, in turn,
predicated upon a showing that the school is compliant with the proper standards as to the physical structure, library
and laboratory facilities, ratio of student to teacher and the qualifications of the teachers.120

Consistent with these statutory precursors, the 1935 Constitution expressed in no uncertain terms that "[a]ll
educational institutions shall be under the supervision and subject to regulation by the State."121

This was followed by several other statutes such as the Commonwealth Act No. 578122 which vests upon teachers,
professors, and persons charged with the supervision of public or duly-recognized private schools, colleges and
universities the status of "persons in authority" and Republic Act No. 139123 which created the Board of Textbooks,
mandating all public schools to use only the books approved by the Board and allowing all private schools to use
textbooks of their choice, provided it is not against the law or public policy or offensive to dignity.124

In 1947, the Department of Instruction was changed to the Department of Education.125 During this period, the
regulation and supervision of public and private schools belonged to the Bureau of Public and Private Schools. The
regulation of law schools in particular was undertaken by the Bureau of Private Schools through a special consultant
who acted as a supervisor of the law schools and as a national coordinator of the law deans.126

The Department of Education, through its Bureau of Private Schools, issued a Manual of Instructions for Private
Schools which contained the rules and regulations pertaining to the qualifications of the faculty and deans, faculty
load and library holdings of private learning institutions.127 Meantime, a Board of National Education was
created128 with the task of formulating, implementing and enforcing general educational policies and coordinating the
offerings and functions of all educational institutions. The Board of National Education was later renamed as the
National Board of Education.129 In 1972, the Department of Education became the Department of Education and
Culture,130 and was later on renamed as the Ministry of Education and Culture in 1978.131

Meanwhile, the 1973 Constitution remained consistent in mandating that all educational institutions shall be under the
supervision of and subject to regulation by the State.132

With the passage of Batas Pambansa Bilang 232133 (B.P. Blg. 232) or the Education Act of 1982, the regulatory rules
on both formal and non-formal systems in public and private schools in all levels of the entire educational system
were codified. The National Board of Education was abolished, and instead, a Ministry of Education, Culture and
Sports (MECS) was organized to supervise and regulate educational institutions. Part and parcel of the MECS'

74
authority to supervise and regulate educational institutions is its authority to recognize or accredit educational
institutions of all levels.134

Accordingly, the MECS was given the authority over public and private institutions of higher education, as well as
degree-granting programs, in all post-secondary public and private educational institutions.135 In particular, a Board
of Higher Education136 was established as an advisory body to the Minister of Education, Culture and Sports with the
functions of making policy recommendations on the planning and management of the integrated system of higher
education and recommending steps to improve the governance of the higher education system. Apart from the Board
of Higher Education, a Bureau of Higher Education was also established to formulate and evaluate programs and
educational standards for higher education137 and to assist the Board of Higher Education. Law schools were placed,
under the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Higher Education.138

The MECS later became the DECS in 1987 under Executive Order No. 117139 (E.O. No. 117). Nevertheless, the
power of the MECS to supervise all educational institutions remained unchanged.140

The Administrative Code141 also states that it shall be the State that shall protect and promote the right of all citizens
to quality education at all levels, and shall take appropriate steps to make such education accessible to all; and that the
DECS shall be primarily responsible for the formulation, planning, implementation, and coordination of the policies,
plans, programs and projects in the areas of formal and non-formal education. The Administrative Code also
empowered the Board of Higher Education to create technical panels of experts in the various disciplines including
law, to undertake curricula development.142 As will be discussed hereunder, the 1987 Constitution crystallized the
power of the State to supervise and regulate all educational institutions.143

2 DECS Order No. 27-1989 was

the precursor of R.A. No. 7662

Pursuant to its mandate under B.P. Blg. 232, the DECS promulgated DECS Order No. 27, Series of 1989 (DECS
Order No. 27-1989),144 in close coordination with the Philippine Association of Law Schools, the Philippine
Association of Law Professors and the Bureau of Higher Education. DECS Order No. 27-1989 specifically outlined
the policies and standards for legal education, and superseded all existing policies and standards related to legal
education. These policies were made applicable beginning school year 1989 to 1990.

"Legal education" was defined in DECS Order No. 27-1989 as an educational program including a clinical program
appropriate and essential in the understanding and application of law and the administration of justice. It is
professional education after completion of a required pre-legal education at the college level. For state colleges and
universities, the operation of their law schools was to depend on their respective charters, and for private colleges and
universities, by the rules and regulations issued by the DECS. Nevertheless, it was made clear under DECS Order No.
27-1989 that the administration of a law school shall be governed primarily by the law school's own policies and the
provisions thereof apply only suppletorily.145

Likewise, in generally permissive terms, DECS Order No. 27-1989 prescribed the preferred qualifications and
functions of a law dean, as well as the preferred qualifications, conditions of employment and teaching load of law
faculty members. It also prescribed the general inclusions to the law curriculum, but gave the law schools the
prerogative to design its own curriculum. The DECS also drew a model law curriculum, thus, revising the 122-unit
curriculum prescribed in 1946 by the Office of Private Education, as well as the 134-unit curriculum prescribed in
1963. The law schools were also given the option to maintain a legal aid clinic as part of its law curriculum. It also
prescribed the need for law schools to have relevant library resources. Applicants for a law course are required to
comply with the specific requirements for admission by the Bureau of Higher Education and the Court.

Such was the state of the regulation of legal education until the enactment of R.A. No. 7662 in 1993. In 1994, R.A.
No. 7722146 was passed creating the Commission on Higher Education (CHED) tasked to supervise tertiary degree
programs. Except for the regulation and supervision of law schools which was to be undertaken by the LEB under
R.A. No. 7662, the structure of DECS as embodied in E.O. No. 117 remained practically unchanged.

Due to the fact that R.A. No. 7662 was yet to be implemented with the organization of the LEB, the CHED,
meanwhile, assumed the function of supervising and regulating law schools. For this purpose, the CHED constituted a

75
Technical Panel for Legal Education which came up with a Revised Policies and Standards for Legal Education,
which, however, was unpublished.

3 Legal education is a mere

composite of the educational system

As recounted, the historical development of statutes on education unerringly reflects the consistent exercise by the
political departments of the power to supervise and regulate all levels and areas of education, including legal
education.

Legal education is but a composite of the entire Philippine education system. It is perhaps unique because it is a
specialized area of study. This peculiarity, however, is not reason in itself to demarcate legal education and withdraw
it from the regulatory and supervisory powers of the political branches.

Notwithstanding, petitioners maintain that legal education, owing to its specialized "legal" nature and being
preparatory to the practice of law, should fall within the regulation and supervision of the Court itself. Petitioners in
G.R. No. 242954 went as far as professing that they are not against the creation of an administrative body that will
supervise and regulate law schools, only that such body should be placed under the Court's supervision and control.

Two principal reasons militate against such proposition:

First, it assumes that the Court, in fact, possesses the power to supervise and regulate legal education as a necessary
consequence of its power to regulate the admission to the practice of law. This assumption, apart from being
manifestly contrary to the above-recounted history of legal education in the Philippines, is likewise devoid of legal
anchorage.

Second, the Court exercises only judicial functions and it cannot, and must not, arrogate upon itself a power that is not
constitutionally vested to it, lest the Court itself violates the doctrine of separation of powers. For the Court to void
R.A. No. 7662 and thereafter, to form a body that regulates legal education and place it under its supervision and
control, as what petitioners suggest, is to demonstrate a highly improper form of judicial activism.

4 Court's exclusive rule-making

power covers the practice of
law and not the study of law

The Constitution lays down the powers which the Court can exercise. Among these is the power to promulgate rules
concerning admission to the practice of law.

The rule-making power of the Supreme Court had been uniformly granted under the 1935, the 1973 and the 1987
Constitutions. The complexion of the rule-making power, however, changes with the promulgation of these organic
laws.

Under the 1935 Constitution, existing laws on pleading, practice and procedure were repealed and were instead
converted as the Rules of Court which the Court can alter and modify. The Congress, on the other hand, was given the
power to repeal, alter or supplement the rules on pleading, practice and procedure, and the admission to the practice of
law promulgated by the Court.147

This power to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure, and admission to the practice of law is in
fact zealously guarded by the Court.

Thus, in Philippine Lawyers Association v. Agrava,148 the Court asserted its "exclusive" and constitutional power
with respect to the admission to the practice of law and when the act falls within the term "practice of law," the Rules
of Court govern.149

In In Re: Petition of A.E. Garcia,150 the Court withheld from the executive the power to modify the laws and
regulations governing admission to the practice of law as the prerogative to promulgate rules for admission to the

76
practice of law belongs to the Court and the power to repeal, alter, or supplement such rules is reserved only to the
Congress.

Even then, the character of the power of the Congress to repeal, alter, or supplement the rules concerning pleading,
practice, and procedure, and the admission to the practice of law under the 1935 Constitution was held not to be
absolute and that any law passed by the Congress on the matter is merely permissive, being that the power concerning
admission to the practice of law is primarily a judicial function.

The 1973 Constitution is no less certain in reiterating the Court's power to promulgate rules concerning pleading,
practice, and procedure in all courts and the admission to the practice of law. As observed in Echegaray v. Secretary
of Justice,151 the 1973 Constitution further strengthened the independence of the judiciary by giving it the additional
power to promulgate rules governing the integration of the Bar.152

The ultimate power to promulgate rules on pleading, practice, and procedure, the admission to the practice of law, and
the integration of the Bar remains to be with the Court under the 1973 Constitution even when the power of the
Batasang Pambansa to pass laws of permissive and corrective character repealing, altering, or supplementing such
rules was retained.

The 1987 Constitution departed from the 1935 and the 1973 organic laws in the sense that it took away from the
Congress the power to repeal, alter, or supplement the rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure, and the
admission to the practice of law, and the integration of the Bar and therefore vests exclusively and beyond doubt, the
power to promulgate such rules to the Court, thereby supporting a "stronger and more independent judiciary."153

While the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions "textualized a power-sharing scheme" between the legislature and the Court in
the enactment of judicial rules,154 the 1987 Constitution "textually altered the power-sharing scheme" by deleting the
Congress' subsidiary and corrective power.155

Accordingly, the Court's exclusive power of admission to the Bar has been interpreted as vesting upon the Court the
authority to define the practice of law,156 to determine who will be admitted to the practice of law,157 to hold in
contempt any person found to be engaged in unauthorized practice of law,158 and to exercise corollary disciplinary
authority over members of the Bar.159

The act of admitting, suspending, disbarring and reinstating lawyers in the practice of law is a judicial function
because it requires "(1) previously established rules and principles; (2) concrete facts, whether past or present,
affecting determinate individuals; and (3) decision as to whether these facts are governed by the rules and
principles."160

Petitioners readily acknowledge that legal education or the study of law is not the practice of law, the former being
merely preparatory to the latter. In fact, the practice of law has a settled jurisprudential meaning:

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of pleadings
and other papers incident to actions and social proceedings, the management of such actions and proceedings on
behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and all action
taken for them in matters connected with the law corporation services, assessment and condemnation services
contemplating an appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a creditor's claim
in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and
guardianship have been held to constitute law practice as the preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the
work done involves the determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions.

Practice of law under modern conditions consists in no small part of work performed outside of any court and having
no immediate relation to proceedings in court. It embraces conveyancing, the giving of legal advice on a large variety
of subjects, and the preparation and execution of legal instruments covering an extensive field of business and trust
relations and other affairs. Although these transactions may have no direct connection with court proceedings, they are
always subject to become involved in litigation. They require in many aspects a high degree of legal skill, a wide
experience with men and affairs, and great capacity for adaptation to difficult and complex situations. These
customary functions of an attorney or counselor at law bear an intimate relation to the administration of justice by the
courts. No valid distinction, so far as concerns the question set forth in the order, can be drawn between that part of
77
the work of the lawyer which involved appearance in court and that part which involves advice and drafting of
instruments in his office. It is of importance to the welfare of the public that these manifold customary functions be
performed by persons possessed of adequate learning and skill, of sound moral character, and acting at all times under
the heavy trust obligations to clients which rests upon all attorneys.161 (Internal citations omitted)

The definition of the practice of law, no matter how broad, cannot be further enlarged as to cover the study of law.

5 The Court exercises judicial power only

Section 12, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution clearly provides that "[t]he Members of the Supreme Court and of
other courts established by law shall not be designated to any agency performing quasi-judicial or administrative
functions." The Court exercises judicial power only and should not assume any duty alien to its judicial functions, the
basic postulate being the separation of powers. As early as Manila Electric Co. v. Pasay Transportation Co.,162 the
Court already stressed:

The Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands represents one of the three divisions of power in our government. It is
judicial power and judicial power only which is exercised by the Supreme Court. Just as the Supreme Court, as the
guardian of constitutional rights, should not sanction usurpations by any other department of the government, so
should it as strictly confine its own sphere of influence to the powers expressly or by implication conferred on it by
the Organic Act. The Supreme Court and its members should not and cannot be required to exercise any power or to
perform any trust or to assume any duty not pertaining to or connected with the administering of judicial
functions. (Emphases supplied)

Neither may the regulation and supervision of legal education be justified as an exercise of the Court's "residual"
power. A power is residual if it does not belong to either of the two co-equal branches and which the remaining branch
can, thus, exercise consistent with its functions. Regulation and supervision of legal education is primarily exercised
by the Legislative and implemented by the Executive, thus, it cannot be claimed by the judiciary.

It is with studied restraint that the Court abstains from exercising a power that is not strictly judicial, or that which is
not expressly granted to it by the Constitution.163 This judicial abstention is neither avoidance nor dereliction - there
is simply no basis for the Court to supervise and regulate legal education.

Court supervision over legal education is nevertheless urged164 to the same extent as the Court administers,
supervises and controls the Philippine Judicial Academy (PHILJA).165 The parallelism is mislaid because the
PHILJA is intended for judicial education.166 It particularly serves as the "training school for justices, judges, court
personnel, lawyers and aspirants to judicial posts."167 Court supervision over judicial education is but consistent with
the Court's power of supervision over all courts and the personnel thereof.168

Still, petitioners insist that the Court actually regulated legal education through Sections 5, 6, and 16 of Rule 138 and
Sections 1, 2, 3, and 4 of Rule 138-A of the 1997 Rules of Court. On the contrary, the Rules of Court do not intend nor
provide for direct and actual Court regulation over legal education. At most, the Rules of Court are reflective of the
inevitable relationship between legal education and the admissions to the bar.

6 The Rules of Court do not support

the argument that the Court directly
and actually regulates legal education

While the power of the Court to promulgate rules concerning admission to the practice of law exists under the 1935
Constitution and reiterated under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions, the Court has not promulgated any rule that
directly and actually regulates legal education.

Instead, the 1964 Rules of Court concerned only the practice of law, admission to the bar, admission to the bar
examination, bar examinations, and the duties, rights and conduct of attorneys. The 1997 Rules of Court is no different
as it contained only the rules on attorneys and admission to the bar under Rule 138, the law student practice rule under
Rule 138-A, the integrated bar in Rule 139-A and disbarment and discipline of attorneys in Rule 139-B.169

78
In the exercise of its power to promulgate rules concerning the admission to the practice of law, the Court has
prescribed the subjects covered by, as well as the qualifications of candidates to the bar examinations. Only those bar
examination candidates who are found to have obtained a passing grade are admitted to the bar and licensed to
practice law.170 The regulation of the admission to the practice of law goes hand in hand with the commitment of the
Court and the members of the Philippine Bar to maintain a high standard for the legal profession. To ensure that the
legal profession is maintained at a high standard, only those who are known to be honest, possess good moral
character, and show proficiency in and knowledge of the law by the standard set by the Court by passing the bar
examinations honestly and in the regular and usual manner are admitted to the practice of law.171

Thus, under the 1997 Rules of Court, admission to the bar requires: (1) furnishing satisfactory proof of educational,
moral, and other qualifications; (2) passing the bar examinations;172 and (3) taking the lawyer's oath,173 signing the
roll of attorneys and receiving from the clerk of court a certificate of the license to practice.174 An applicant for
admission to the bar must have these qualifications: (1) must be a citizen of the Philippines; (2) must at least be 21
years of age; (3) must be of good moral character; (4) must be a resident of the Philippines; (5) must produce
satisfactory evidence of good moral character; and (6) no charges against the applicant, involving moral turpitude,
have been filed or are pending in any court in the Philippines.175 It is beyond argument that these are the requisites
and qualifications for admission to the practice of law and not for admission to the study of law.

In turn, to be admitted to the bar examinations, an applicant must first meet the core academic qualifications
prescribed under the Rules of Court.

6(a). Sections 5, 6, and 16, Rule 138

Section 5 provides that the applicant should have studied law for four years and have successfully completed all the
prescribed courses. This section was amended by Bar Matter No. 1153,176 to require applicants to "successfully
[complete] all the prescribed courses for the degree of Bachelor of Laws or its equivalent, in a law school or university
officially recognized by the Philippine Government, or by the proper authority in foreign jurisdiction where the degree
has been granted." Bar Matter No. 1153 further provides that a Filipino citizen who is a graduate of a foreign law
school shall be allowed to take the bar examinations only upon the submission to the Court of the required
certifications.

In addition to the core courses of civil law, commercial law, remedial law, criminal law, public and private
international law, political law, labor and social legislation, medical jurisprudence, taxation, and legal ethics, Section 5
was further amended by A.M. No. 19-03-24-SC or the Revised Law Student Practice Rule dated June 25, 2019 to
include Clinical Legal Education as a core course that must be completed by an applicant to the bar examinations.

Notably, Section 5, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, as amended, is not directed to law schools, but to those who would
like to take the bar examinations and enumerates the academic competencies required of them. The Court does not
impose upon law schools what courses to teach, or the degree to grant, but prescribes only the core academic courses
which it finds essential for an applicant to be admitted to the bar. Law schools enjoy the autonomy to teach or not to
teach these courses. In fact, the Court even extends recognition to a degree of Bachelor of Laws or its equivalent
obtained abroad or that granted by a foreign law school for purposes of qualifying to take the Philippine Bar
Examinations, subject only to the submission of the required certifications. Section 5 could not therefore be
interpreted as an exercise of the Court's regulatory or supervisory power over legal education since, for obvious
reasons, its reach could not have possibly be extended to legal education in foreign jurisdictions.

In similar fashion, Section 6, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court requires that an applicant to the bar examinations must
have completed a four-year high school course and a bachelor's degree in arts or sciences. Again, this requirement is
imposed upon the applicant to the bar examinations and not to law schools. These requirements are merely consistent
with the nature of a law degree granted in the Philippines which is a professional, as well as a post-baccalaureate
degree.

It is a reality that the Rules of Court, in prescribing the qualifications in order to take the bar examinations, had placed
a considerable constraint on the courses offered by law schools. Adjustments in the curriculum, for instance, is a
compromise which law schools apparently are willing to take in order to elevate its chances of graduating future bar
examinees. It is in this regard that the relationship between legal education and admissions to the bar becomes
unmistakable. This, however, does not mean that the Court has or exercises jurisdiction over legal education.

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Compliance by law schools with the prescribed core courses is but a recognition of the Court's exclusive jurisdiction
over admissions to the practice of law - that no person shall be allowed to take the bar examinations and thereafter, be
admitted to the Philippine Bar without having taken and completed the required core courses.

Section 16, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, on the other hand, provides that those who fail the bar examinations for
three or more times must take a refresher course. Similarly, this is a requirement imposed upon the applicant. The
Court does not impose that a law school should absolutely include in its curriculum a refresher course.

6(b). Revised Law Student Practice Rule

Neither does Rule 138-A of the Rules of Court as amended by A.M. No. 19-03-24-SC on law student practice
manifest the Court's exercise of supervision or regulation over legal education. The three-fold rationale of the law
student practice rule is as follows:

1. [T]o ensure that there will be no miscarriage of justice as a result of incompetence or inexperience of law
students, who, not having as yet passed the test of professional competence, are presumably not fully
equipped to act [as] counsels on their own;

2. [T]o provide a mechanism by which the accredited law school clinic may be able to protect itself from any
potential vicarious liability arising from some culpable action by their law students; and

3. [T]o ensure consistency with the fundamental principle that no person is allowed to practice a particular
profession without possessing the qualifications, particularly a license, as required by law.177

Consistently, the Revised Law Student Practice Rule is primordially intended to ensure access to justice of the
marginalized sectors and to regulate the law student practitioner's limited practice of law pursuant to the Court's power
to promulgate rules on pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the
underprivileged.

In allowing the law student and in governing the conduct of the law student practitioner, what the Court regulates and
supervises is not legal education, but the appearance and conduct of a law student before any trial court, tribunal,
board, or officer, to represent indigent clients of the legal clinic - an activity rightfully falling under the definition of
practice of law. Inasmuch as the law student is permitted to act for the legal clinic and thereby to practice law, it is but
proper that the Court exercise regulation and supervision over the law student practitioner. Necessarily, the Court has
the power to allow their appearance and plead their case, and hereafter, to regulate their actions.

In all, the Rules of Court do not support petitioners' argument that the Court regulates and supervises legal education.
To reiterate, the Rules of Court are directed not towards legal education or law schools, but towards applicants for
admission to the bar and applicants for admission to the bar examinations - consistent with the Court's power to
promulgate rules concerning admission to the practice of law, the same being fundamentally a judicial function.

Having, thus, established that the regulation and supervision of legal education do not fall within the competence of
the Court and is, instead, a power exercised by the political departments, the Court now proceeds to determine the
extent of such police power in relation to legal education.

B.
Reasonable Supervision and Regulation of Legal
Education as an Exercise of Police Power

The term police power was first used178 in jurisprudence in 1824 in Gibbons v. Ogden179 where the U.S. Supreme
Court, through Chief Justice Marshall, held that the regulation of navigation by steamboat operators for purposes of
interstate commerce was a power reserved to and exercised by the Congress, thus, negating state laws interfering with
the exercise of that power. Likewise often cited is Commonwealth v. Alger180 which defined police power as "the
power vested in legislature by the [C]onstitution, to make, ordain, and establish all manner of wholesome and
reasonable laws, statutes, and ordinances, either with penalties or without, not repugnant to the [C]onstitution, as they
shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the Commonwealth, and of the subjects of the same."

80
Closer to home, early Philippine jurisprudence pertain to police power as the power to promote the general welfare
and public interest;181 to enact such laws in relation to persons and property as may promote public health, public
morals, public safety and the general welfare of each inhabitant;182 to preserve public order and to prevent offenses
against the state and to establish for the intercourse of [citizens] those rules of good manners and good neighborhood
calculated to prevent conflict of rights.183

In Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel [Operators] Association, Inc. v. City Mayor of Manila,184 the nature and scope of
police power was reaffirmed as embracing the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, education,
good order, safety, or the general welfare of the people. It is negatively defined as the authority to enact legislation
that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare185 and the State's inherent
power to prohibit all that is hurtful to the comfort, safety, and welfare of society,186 and flows from the recognition
that salus populi est suprema lex.187 It is described as the most essential, insistent and illimitable188 of the powers of
the State. It is co-existent with the concept of the State and is the very foundation and one of its cornerstones,189 and
therefore even precedes the written Constitution.

1 Enactment of education laws

is an exercise of police power

The State has a "high responsibility for [the] education of its citizens"190 and has an interest in prescribing regulations
to promote the education, and consequently, the general welfare of the people.191 The regulation or administration of
educational institutions, especially on the tertiary level, is invested with public interest.192 Thus, the enactment of
education laws, implementing rules and regulations and issuances of government agencies is an exercise of the State's
police power.193

As a professional educational program, legal education properly falls within the supervisory and regulatory
competency of the State. The legislative history of the Philippine legal educational system earlier recounted evinces
that the State, through statutes enacted by the Congress and administrative regulations issued by the Executive,
consistently exercises police power over legal education.

The exercise of such police power, however, is not absolute.

2 Supervisory and regulatory

exercise, not control

The 1935194 and 1973195 Constitutions plainly provide that all educational institutions shall be under the supervision
of and subject to regulation by the State. These reflect in express terms the police power already inherently possessed
by the State. Making express an already inherent power is not a superfluous exercise, but is rather consequential in
case of conflict between express powers. As elucidated in Philippine Association of Colleges and Universities:196

In this connection we do not share the belief that [now Article XIV, Section 4(1)] has added new power to what the
State inherently possesses by virtue of the police power. An express power is necessarily more extensive than a mere
implied power. For instance, if there is conflict between an express individual right and the express power to control
private education it cannot off-hand be said that the latter must yield to the former - conflict of two express powers.
But if the power to control education is merely implied from the police power, it is feasible to uphold the express
individual right[.] x x x

The 1987 Constitution under Section 4(1), Article XIV, even when expressly recognizing the complementary roles
played by the public and private schools in education, reiterated that these educational institutions are subject to State
supervision and regulation, thus:

SEC. 4.(1) The State recognizes the complementary roles of public and private institutions in the educational
system and shall exercise reasonable supervision and regulation of all educational institutions. (Emphasis supplied)

As much as possible, the words of the Constitution are understood in the sense they have in common use. What it says
according to the text of the provision to be construed compels acceptance and negates the power of the courts to alter
it, based on the postulate that the framers and the people mean what they say.197

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As worded, the Constitution recognizes that the role of public and private schools in education is complementary in
relation to each other, and primordial in relation to the State as the latter is only empowered to supervise and regulate.
The exercise of police power in relation to education must be compliant with the normative content of Section 4(1),
Article XIV of the 1987 Constitution.198 The exercise of police power over education must merely be supervisory
and regulatory.

The State's supervisory and regulatory power is an auxiliary power in relation to educational institutions, be it a basic,
secondary or higher education. This must necessarily be so since the right and duty to educate, being part and parcel of
youth-rearing, do not inure to the State at the first instance. Rather, it belongs essentially and naturally to the
parents,199 which right and duty they surrender by delegation to the educational institutions. As held in Samahan ng
mga Progresibong Kabataan (SPARK) v. Quezon City,200 the right and duty of parents to rear their children being a
natural and primary right connotes the parents' superior right over the State in the upbringing of their children. The
responsibility to educate lies with the parents and guardians as an inherent right,201 over which the State assumes a
supportive role.202 Withholding from the State the unqualified power to control education also serves a practical
purpose - it allows for a degree of flexibility and diversity essential to the very reason of education to rear socially
responsible and morally upright youth and to enable them, also, to come in contact with challenging ideas.

In this sense, when the Constitution gives the State supervisory power, it is understood that what it enjoys is a
supportive power, that is, the power of oversight203 over all educational institutions. It includes the authority to
check, but not to interfere.

In addition to supervision, educational institutions are likewise made subject to State regulation. Dispensing a
regulatory function means imposing requirements, setting conditions, prescribing restrictions, and ensuring
compliance. In this regard, the political departments are vested with ample authority to set minimum standards to be
met by all educational institutions.204

Starkly withheld from the State is the power to control educational institutions. Consequently, in no way should
supervision and regulation be equated to State control. It is interesting to note that even when a suggestion had been
made during the drafting of the 1935 Constitution that educational institutions should be made "subject to the laws of
the State," the proponent of the amendment had no totalitarian intentions,205 and the proposal was not meant to curtail
the liberty of teaching,206 thus:

I think it only insures the efficient functioning of educational work and does not limit liberty of administrators of
schools. The gentleman will notice that my amendment does not tend to curtail which he used in asking the question
[sic]. I want the power of the State to be supervisory as supervision in educational parlance should be of the
constructive type in the matter of help rather than obstruction.207 (Emphasis supplied)               

3 Reasonable exercise

To be valid, the supervision and regulation of legal education as an exercise of police power must be reasonable and
not repugnant to the Constitution.208

As held in Social Justice Society v. Atienza, Jr.,209 the exercise of police power, in order to be valid, must be
compliant with substantive due process:

[T]he State, x x x may be considered as having properly exercised [its] police power only if the following requisites
are met: (1) the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require its exercise[;]
and (2) the means employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly
oppressive upon individuals. In short, there must be a concurrence of a lawful subject and a lawful method. (Emphases
supplied)

In Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. v. Drilon,210 the Court held that:

Notwithstanding its. extensive sweep, police power is not without its own limitations. For all its awesome
consequences, it may not be exercised arbitrarily or unreasonably. Otherwise, and in that event, it defeats the purpose
for which it is exercised, that is, to advance the public good. (Emphasis supplied)

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Obviating any inference that the power to regulate means the power to control, the 1987 Constitution added the word
"reasonable" before the phrase supervision and regulation.

The import of the word "reasonable" was elaborated in Council of Teachers,211 as follows:

x x x Section 4(1) was a provision added by the Framers to crystallize the State's recognition of the importance of the
role that the private sector plays in the quality of the Philippine education system. Despite this recognition, the
Framers added the second portion of Section 41 to emphasize that the State, in the exercise of its police power, still
possesses the power of supervision over private schools. The Framers were explicit, however, that this supervision
refers to external governance, as opposed to internal governance which was reserved to the respective school boards,
thus:

Madam President, Section 2(b) introduces four changes: one, the addition of the word "reasonable" before the phrase
"supervision and regulation"; two, the addition of the word "quality" before the word "education"; three, the change of
the wordings in the 1973 Constitution referring to a system of education, requiring the same to be relevant to the goals
of national development, to the present expression of "relevant to the needs of the people and society"; and four, the
explanation of the meaning of the expression "integrated system of education" by defining the same as the recognition
and strengthening of the complementary roles of public and private educational institutions as separate but integral
parts of the total Philippine educational system.

When we speak of State supervision and regulation, we refer to the external governance of educational institutions,
particularly private educational institutions as distinguished from the internal governance by their respective boards of
directors or trustees and their administrative officials. Even without a provision on external governance, the State
would still have the inherent right to regulate educational institutions through the exercise of its police power. We
have thought it advisable to restate the supervisory and regulatory functions of the State provided in the 1935 and
1973 Constitutions with the addition of the word "reasonable." We found it necessary to add the word "reasonable"
because of an obiter dictum of our Supreme Court in a decision in the case of Philippine Association of Colleges and
Universities vs. The Secretary of Education and the Board of Textbooks in 1955. In that case, the court said, and I
quote:

It is enough to point out that local educators and writers think the Constitution provides for control of education by the
State.

The Solicitor General cites many authorities to show that the power to regulate means power to control, and quotes
from the proceedings of the Constitutional Convention to prove that State control of private education was intended by
organic law.

The addition, therefore, of the word 'reasonable' is meant to underscore the sense of the committee, that when the
Constitution speaks of State supervision and regulation, it does not in any way mean control. We refer only to the
power of the State to provide regulations and to see to it that these regulations are duly followed and implemented. It
does not include the right to manage, dictate, overrule and prohibit. Therefore, it does not include the right to
dominate. (Emphases in the original; underscoring supplied)

The addition of the word "reasonable" did not change the texture of police power that the State exercises over
education. It merely emphasized that State supervision and regulation of legal education cannot amount to control.

4 Academic freedom

Fundamental in constitutional construction is that the Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole, and that all
provisions bearing upon a particular subject are to be brought into view and to be so interpreted as to effectuate the
purposes of the Constitution.212

Accordingly, the reasonable supervision and regulation clause is not a stand-alone provision, but must be read in
conjunction with the other Constitutional provisions relating to education which include, in particular, the clause on
academic freedom.

Section 5(2), Article XIV of the 1987 Constitution, provides:

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(2) Academic freedom shall be enjoyed in all institutions of higher learning.

This guarantee is not peculiar to the 1987 Constitution. A similar· provision was found in the 1973 Constitution
providing that: "All institutions of higher learning shall enjoy academic freedom."213 Both the 1973 and 1987
Constitutions provide for a broader scope of academic freedom compared to the 1935 Constitution which limits the
guarantee of academic freedom only to universities of higher learning established by the State.214

In fact, academic freedom is not a novel concept. This can be traced to the freedom of intellectual inquiry championed
by Socrates, lost and replaced by thought control during the time of Inquisition, until the movement back to
intellectual liberty beginning the 16th century, most particularly flourishing in German universities.215

Academic freedom has traditionally been associated as a narrow aspect of the broader area of freedom of thought,
speech, expression and the press. It has been identified with the individual autonomy of educators to "investigate,
pursue, [and] discuss free from internal and external interference or pressure."216 Thus, academic freedom of faculty
members, professors, researchers, or administrators is defended based on the freedom of speech and press.217

Academic freedom is enjoyed not only by members of the faculty, but also by the students themselves, as affirmed
in Ateneo de Manila University v. Judge Capulong:218

x x x. After protracted debate and ringing speeches, the final version which was none too different from the way it was
couched in the previous two (2) Constitutions, as found in Article XIV, Section 5(2) states: "Academic freedom shall
be enjoyed in all institutions of higher learning." In anticipation of the question as to whether and what aspects of
academic freedom are included herein, ConCom Commissioner Adolfo S. Azcuna explained: "Since academic
freedom is a dynamic concept, we want to expand the frontiers of freedom, especially in education, therefore, we shall
leave it to the courts to develop further the parameters of academic freedom."

More to the point, Commissioner Jose Luis Martin C. Gascon asked: "When we speak of the sentence 'academic
freedom shall be enjoyed in all institutions of higher learning,' do we mean that academic freedom shall be enjoyed by
the institution itself?" Azcuna replied: "Not only that, it also includes x x x" Gascon finished off the broken thought,
"the faculty and the students." Azcuna replied: "Yes."

Jurisprudence has so far understood academic freedom of the students as the latter's right to enjoy in school the
guarantees of the Bill of Rights. For instance, in Villar v. Technological Institute of the Philippines219 and in Non v.
Dames II,220 it was held that academic standards cannot be used to discriminate against students who exercise their
rights to peaceable assembly and free speech, in Malabanan v. Ramento,221 it was ruled that the punishment must be
commensurate with the offense, and in Guzman v. National University,222 which affirmed the student's right to due
process.

Apart from the academic freedom of teachers and students, the academic freedom of the institution itself is recognized
and constitutionally guaranteed.

The landmark case of Garcia v. The Faculty Admission Committee, Loyola School of Theology223 elucidates how
academic freedom is enjoyed by institutions of higher learning:

[I]t is to be noted that the reference is to the "institutions of higher learning" as the recipients of this boon. It would
follow then that the school or college itself is possessed of such a right. It decides for itself its aims and objectives and
how best to attain them. It is free from outside coercion or interference save possibly when the overriding public
welfare calls for some restraint. It has a wide sphere of autonomy certainly extending to the choice of students. This
constitutional provision is not to be construed in a niggardly manner or in a grudging fashion. That would be to
frustrate its purpose, nullify its intent. Former President Vicente G. Sinco of the University of the Philippines, in his
Philippine Political Law, is similarly of the view that it "definitely grants the right of academic freedom to the
university as an institution as distinguished from the academic freedom of a university professor." He cited the
following from Dr. Marcel Bouchard, Rector of the University of Dijon, France, President of the conference of rectors
and vice-chancellors of European universities: "It is a well-established fact, and yet one which sometimes tends to be
obscured in discussions of the problems of freedom, that the collective liberty of an organization is by no means the
same thing as the freedom of the individual members within it; in fact, the two kinds of freedom are not even
necessarily connected. In considering the problems of academic freedom one must distinguish, therefore, between the
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autonomy of the university, as a corporate body, and the freedom of the individual university teacher." Also: To
clarify further the distinction between the freedom of the university and that of the individual scholar, he says: The
personal aspect of freedom consists in the right of each university teacher - recognized and effectively guaranteed by
society - to seek and express the truth as he personally sees it, both in his academic work and in his capacity as a
private citizen. Thus the status of the individual university teacher is at least as important, in considering academic
freedom, as the status of the institutions to which they belong and through which they disseminate their learning.
(Internal citations omitted; emphasis supplied)

Garcia also enumerated the internal conditions for institutional academic freedom, that is, the academic staff should
have de facto control over: (a) the admission and examination of students; (b) the curricula for courses of study; (c)
the appointment and tenure of office of academic staff; and (d) the allocation of income among the different categories
of expenditure.224

Reference was also made to the influential language of Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion in Sweezy v. New
Hampshire,225 describing it as the "business of the university" to provide a conducive atmosphere for speculation,
experimentation, and creation where the four essential freedoms of the university prevail: the right of the university to
determine for itself on academic grounds (a) who may teach; (b) what may be taught; (c) how it shall be taught; and
(d) who may be admitted to study.

4(a). State's supervisory and regulatory power over

legal education in relation to academic freedom

The rule is that institutions of higher learning enjoy ample discretion to decide for itself who may teach, what may be
taught, how it shall be taught and who to admit, being part of their academic freedom. The State, in the exercise of its
reasonable supervision and regulation over education, can only impose minimum regulations.

At its most elementary, the power to supervise and regulate shall not be construed as stifling academic freedom in
institutions of higher learning. This must necessarily be so since institutions of higher learning are not mere walls
within which to teach; rather, it is a place where research, experiment, critical thinking, and exchanges are secured.
Any form of State control, even at its most benign and disguised as regulatory, cannot therefore derogate the academic
freedom guaranteed to higher educational institutions. In fact, this non-intrusive relation between the State and higher
educational institutions is maintained even when the Constitution itself prescribes certain educational "thrusts" or
directions.226

This attitude of non-interference is not lost in jurisprudence. To cite an example, due regard for institutional academic
freedom versus State interference was recognized in Lupangco v. Court of Appeals,227 the commendable purpose of
the Philippine Regulation Commission of ensuring the integrity of the examination notwithstanding:

Another evident objection to Resolution No. 105 is that it violates the academic freedom of the schools
concerned. Respondent PRC cannot interfere with the conduct of review that review schools and centers
believe would best enable their enrolees to meet the standards required before becoming a full-[f]ledged public
accountant. Unless the means or methods of instruction are clearly found to be inefficient, impractical, or
riddled with corruption, review schools and centers may not be stopped from helping out their students. x x x
(Emphasis supplied)

Similarly, in University of the Philippines v. Civil Service Commission,228 the Court upheld the university's
academic freedom to choose who should teach and held that the Civil Service Commission had no authority to dictate
to the university the outright dismissal of its personnel. Nothing short of marked arbitrariness,229 or grave abuse of
discretion230 on the part of the schools, or overriding public welfare231 can therefore justify State interference with
the academic judgment of higher educational institutions. As held in Ateneo de Manila University v. Judge
Capulong,232 "[a]s corporate entities, educational institutions of higher learning are inherently endowed with the right
to establish their policies, academic and otherwise, unhampered by external controls or pressure."

5. Right to education

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Apart from the perspective of academic freedom, the reasonable supervision and regulation clause is also to be viewed
together with the right to education. The 1987 Constitution speaks quite elaborately on the right to education. Section
1, Article XIV provides:

SEC. 1. The State shall protect and promote the right of all citizens to quality education at all levels and shall take
appropriate steps to make such education accessible to all.

The normative elements of the general right to education under Section 1, Article XIV, are (1) to protect and promote
quality education; and (2) to take appropriate steps towards making such quality education accessible.

"Quality" education is statutorily defined as the appropriateness, relevance and excellence of the education given to
meet the needs and aspirations of the individual and society.233

In order to protect and promote quality education, the political departments are vested with the ample authority to set
minimum standards to be met by all educational institutions. This authority should be exercised within the parameters
of reasonable supervision and regulation. As elucidated in Council of Teachers:234

While the Constitution indeed mandates the State to provide quality education, the determination of what constitutes
quality education is best left with the political departments who have the necessary knowledge, expertise, and
resources to determine the same. The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission again are very instructive:

Now, Madam President, we have added the word "quality" before "education" to send appropriate signals to the
government that, in the exercise of its supervisory and regulatory powers, it should first set satisfactory minimum
requirements in all areas curriculum, faculty, internal administration, library, laboratory class and other facilities, et
cetera, and it should see to it that satisfactory minimum requirements are met by all educational institutions, both
public and private.

When we speak of quality education we have in mind such matters, among others, as curriculum development,
development of learning resources and instructional materials, upgrading of library and laboratory facilities,
innovations in educational technology and teaching methodologies, improvement of research quality, and others. Here
and in many other provisions on education, the principal focus of attention and concern is the students. I would like to
say that in my view there is a slogan when we speak of quality of education that I feel we should be aware of, which
is, "Better than ever is not enough." In other words, even if the quality of education is good now, we should attempt to
keep on improving it. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)

On the other hand, "accessible" education means equal opportunities to education regardless of social and economic
differences. The phrase "shall take appropriate steps" signifies that the State may adopt varied approaches in the
delivery of education that are relevant and responsive to the needs of the people and the society. This is why, towards
this end, the State shall:

(1) Establish, maintain, and support a complete, adequate, and integrated system of education relevant
to the needs of the people and society;

(2) Establish and maintain a system of free public education in the elementary and high school levels.
Without limiting the natural right of parents to rear their children, elementary education is compulsory
for all children of school age;

(3) Establish and maintain a system of scholarship grants, student loan programs, subsidies, and other
incentives which shall be available to deserving students in both public and private schools, especially
to the underprivileged;

(4) Encourage non-formal, informal, and indigenous learning systems, as well as self-learning,

independent, and out-of-school study programs particularly those that respond to community needs;
and

(5) Provide adult citizens, the disabled, and out-of-school youth with training in civics, vocational
efficiency, and other skills.235 (Emphases supplied)
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The deliberations of the framers in this regard are instructive:

MR. GASCON: When we speak of education as a right, what we would like to emphasize is that education should be
equally accessible to all regardless of social and economic differences. So we go into the issue of providing
opportunities to such an education, recognizing that there are limitations imposed on those who come from the poorer
social classes because of their inability to continue education.236 x x x (Emphasis supplied)

And further, as follows:

This is why when we speak of education as a right, it means very clearly that education should be accessible to all,
regardless of social and economic differences, meaning, educational opportunities should be provided through a
system of free education, at least, up to the secondary level. And recognizing the limits of our financial resources,
tertiary education should still be afforded and provided availability to those who are poor and deserving. That is why
when we say that education is a right, it imposes a correlative duty on the part of the State to provide it to the citizens.
Making it a right shows that education is recognized as an important function of the State. Education is not merely a
social service to be provided by the State. The proposed provision recognizes that a right to education is a right to
acquire a decent standard of living, and that, therefore, the State cannot deprive anyone of this right in the same
manner that the right to life, the right to liberty and property cannot be taken away without due process of
law.237 (Emphasis supplied)

The element of accessibility under the Constitution, thus, pertains to both the elimination of discrimination especially
against disadvantaged groups and to the financial duty of the State for, after all, the right to education is part and
parcel of social justice. The objective is to make quality education accessible by appropriate means.

Apart from the Constitution, the right to education is also recognized in international human rights law under various
instruments to which the Philippines is a state signatory and to which it is concomitantly bound.

For instance, Article 13(2)238 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR)
recognizes the right to receive an education with the following interrelated and essential features; (a) availability; (b)
accessibility; (c) acceptability; and (d) adaptability.239

In particular, accessibility is understood as giving everyone, without discrimination, access to educational institutions
and programs. Accessibility has three overlapping dimensions:

(1) Non-discrimination - education must be accessible to all, especially the most vulnerable groups, in law and
fact, without discrimination on any of the prohibited grounds x x x;

(2) Physical accessibility - education has to be within safe physical reach, either by attendance at some
reasonably convenient geographic location ([e.g.] a neighborhood school) or [via] modern technology ([e.g.]
access to a "distance learning" programme); [and]

(3) Economic accessibility - education has to be affordable to all. This dimension of accessibility is subject to
the differential wording of [A]rticle 13(2) in relation to primary, secondary and higher education: whereas
primary education shall be available "free to all", States parties are required to progressively introduce free
secondary and higher education[.]240

Pertinent to higher education, the elements of quality and accessibility should also be present as the Constitution
provides that these elements should be protected and promoted in all educational institutions.

Nevertheless, the right to receive higher education is not absolute.

5(a). Right to education is subject to fair,

reasonable, and equitable admission and
academic requirements

Article 26(1)241 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides that "[t]echnical and professional education
shall be made generally available and higher education shall be equally accessible to all on the basis of merit[,]" while
87
the ICESCR provides that "[h]igher education shall be made equally accessible to all, on the basis of capacity, by
every appropriate means, and in particular by the progressive introduction of free education[.]"242 Thus, higher
education is not to be generally available, but accessible only on the basis of capacity.243 The capacity of individuals
should be assessed by reference to all their relevant expertise and experience.244

The right to receive higher education must further be read in conjunction with the right of every citizen to select a
profession or course of study guaranteed under the Constitution. In this regard, the provisions of the 1987 Constitution
under Section 5(3), Article XIV are more exacting:

SEC. 5. x x x

xxxx

(3) Every citizen has a right to select a profession or course of study, subject to fair, reasonable, and equitable
admission and academic requirements.

There is uniformity in jurisprudence holding that the authority to set the admission and academic requirements used to
assess the merit and capacity of the individual to be admitted and retained in higher educational institutions lie with
the institutions themselves in the exercise of their academic freedom.

In Ateneo de Manila University v. Judge Capulong,245 the Court ruled:

Since Garcia v. Loyola School of Theology, we have consistently upheld the salutary proposition that admission to
an institution of higher learning is discretionary upon a school, the same being a privilege on the part of the
student rather than a right. While under the Education Act of 1982, students have a right "to freely choose
their field of study, subject to existing curricula and to continue their course therein up to graduation," such
right is subject, as all rights are, to the established academic and disciplinary standards laid down by the
academic institution.

"For private schools have the right to establish reasonable rules and regulations for the admission, discipline and
promotion of students. This right x x x extends as well to parents x x x as parents are under a social and moral (if not
legal) obligation, individually and collectively, to assist and cooperate with the schools."

Such rules are "incident to the very object of incorporation and indispensable to the successful management of the
college. The rules may include those governing student discipline." Going a step further, the establishment of rules
governing university-student relations, particularly those pertaining to student discipline, may be regarded as vital, not
merely to the smooth and efficient operation of the institution, but to its very survival.

Within memory of the current generation is the eruption of militancy in the academic groves as collectively, the
students demanded and plucked for themselves from the panoply of academic freedom their own rights encapsulized
under the rubric of "right to education" forgetting that, in Hohfeldian terms, they have a concomitant duty, and that is,
their duty to learn under the rules laid down by the school. (Citation in the original omitted; emphases supplied)

In Villar v. Technological Institute of the Philippines,246 the Court similarly held:

xxxx

2. What cannot be stressed too sufficiently is that among the most important social, economic, and cultural
rights is the right to education not only in the elementary and high school grades but also on the college level.
The constitutional provision as to the State maintaining "a system of free public elementary education and, in
areas where finances permit, establish and maintain a system of free public education" up to the high school
level does not per se exclude the exercise of that right in colleges and universities. It is only at the most a
reflection of the lack of sufficient funds for such a duty to be obligatory in the case of students in the colleges
and universities. As far as the right itself is concerned, not the effectiveness of the exercise of such right
because of the lack of funds, Article 26 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides: "Everyone
has the right to education. Education shall be free, at least in the elementary and fundamental stages.

88
 Elementary education shall be compulsory. Technical and professional education shall be made generally
available and higher education shall be equally accessible to all on the basis of merit."

3. It is quite clear that while the right to college education is included in the social economic, and cultural
rights, it is equally manifest that the obligation imposed on the State is not categorical, the phrase used being
"generally available" and higher education, while being "equally accessible to all should be on the basis of
merit." To that extent, therefore, there is justification for excluding three of the aforementioned petitioners
because of their marked academic deficiency.

4. The academic freedom enjoyed by "institutions of higher learning" includes the right to set academic
standards to determine under what circumstances failing grades suffice for the expulsion of students. Once it
has done so, however, that standard should be followed meticulously. It cannot be utilized to discriminate
against those students who exercise their constitutional rights to peaceable assembly and free speech. If it does
so, then there is a legitimate grievance by the students thus prejudiced, their right to the equal protection
clause being disregarded. (Emphases supplied)

Likewise, in Calawag:247

Lastly, the right to education invoked by Calawag cannot be made the basis for issuing a writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction. In Department of Education, Culture and Sports v. San Diego, we held that the right to
education is not absolute. Section 5(e), Article XIV of the Constitution provides that "[e]very citizen has a right to
select a profession or course of study, subject to fair, reasonable, and equitable admission and academic
requirements." The thesis requirement and the compliance with the procedures leading to it, are part of the reasonable
academic requirements a person desiring to complete a course of study would have to comply with. (Citation in the
original omitted; emphasis supplied)

The deliberations of the framers on the qualifications to the right to education are also illuminating:

MR. NOLLEDO: Thank you, Madam President. Before I ask questions directed to the chairman and members of the
committee, I would like to warmly congratulate them for a job well-done. The committee report to my mind, Madam
President, is excellent and I hope it will not, in the course of amendments, suffer from adulteration. With respect to
page 1, lines 12-13: "Education is the right of every citizen of the Philippines," I agree with this statement, but when
we talk of the right, I understand from the chairman that it is compellable and from Commissioner Guingona, that it is
enforceable in court. Suppose a student of a private school is not allowed to enroll by reason of misconduct or that his
stay in the school is considered by the administration of that school to be undesirable, does he have a right to enforce
his right to education under this situation?

MR. GUINGONA: Madam President, the right to education, like any other right, is not absolute. As a matter of fact,
Article XXVI of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, when it acknowledges the right to education, also
qualifies it when at the end of the provision, it say, "on the basis of merit." Therefore, the student may be subject to
certain reasonable requirements regarding admission and retention and this is so provided in the draft Constitution.
We admit even of discrimination. We have accepted this in the Philippines, and I suppose in the United States there
are schools that can refuse admission to boys because they are supposed to be exclusively for girls. And there are
schools that may refuse admission to girls because they are exclusively for boys. There may even be discrimination to
accept a student who has a contagious disease on the ground that it would affect the welfare of the other
students. What I mean is that there could be reasonable qualifications, limitations or restrictions to this right, Madam
President.

MR. GASCON: May I add, Madam President.

MR. NOLLEDO: Yes, the Commissioner may.

MR. GASCON: When we speak of education as a right, what we would like to emphasize is that education should be
equally accessible to all regardless of social and economic differences. So we go into the issue of providing
opportunities to such an education, recognizing that there are limitations imposed on those who come from the poorer
social classes because of their inability to continue education.

89
However, in the same light, this right to education is subject to the right of educational institutions to admit students
upon certain conditions such as ability to pay the required entrance examination fee and maintaining a respectable
school record. When we speak of this right of schools as far as maintaining a certain degree or quality of students,
these conditions must be reasonable and should not be used just to impose certain unfair situations on the students.

MR. GUINGONA: Madam President, may I add.

There is already established jurisprudence about this. In the United States, in the case of [Lesser] v. Board of
Education of New York City, 239, NYS 2d 776, the court held that the refusal of a school to admit a student who had
an average of less than 85 percent which is the requirement for that school was lawful.

In the Philippines, we have the case of Padriguilan [sic] v. Manila Central University where refusal to retain the
student was because of the alleged deficiency in a major subject and this was upheld by our Supreme Court. There is
also the case of Garcia v. Loyola School of Theology, wherein Garcia, a woman, tried to continue studying in this
school of theology.248 (Citation in the original omitted; emphases supplied)

Extant from the foregoing is that while there is a right to quality higher education, such right is principally subject to
the broad academic freedom of higher educational institutions to impose fair, reasonable, and equitable admission and
academic requirements. Plainly stated, the right to receive education is not and should not be taken to mean as a right
to be admitted to educational institutions.

With the basic postulates that jurisdiction over legal education belongs primarily and directly to the political
departments, and that the exercise of such police power must be in the context of reasonable supervision and
regulation, and must be consistent with academic freedom and the right to education, the Court now proceeds to
address whether the assailed provisions of R.A. No. 7662 and the corresponding LEB issuances fall within, the
constitutionally-permissible supervision and regulation of legal education.

C.
LEB's Powers Under R.A. No. 7662 vis-a-vis the
Court's Jurisdiction Under Article VIII, Section
5(5) of the Constitution

1 Section 3(a)(2) on increasing awareness

among members of the legal profession

One of the general objectives of legal education under Section 3(a)(2) of R.A. No. 7662 is to "increase awareness
among members of the legal profession of the needs of the poor, deprived and oppressed sectors of society[.]" This
objective is reiterated by the LEB in LEBMO No. 1-2011, Section 7, Article II, as follows:

SEC. 7. (Section 3 of the law) General and Specific Objectives of Legal Education.

a) Legal education in the Philippines is geared to attain the following objectives:

xxxx

(2) to increase awareness among members of the legal profession of the needs of the poor, deprived and oppressed
sectors of society[.] (Emphasis supplied)

The plain language of Section 3(a)(2) of R.A. No. 7662 and Section 7(2) of LEBMO No. 1-2011 are clear and need no
further interpretation. This provision goes beyond the scope of R.A. No. 7662, i.e., improvement of the quality of legal
education, and, instead delves into the training of those who are already members of the bar. Likewise, this objective
is a direct encroachment on the power of the Court to promulgate rules concerning the practice of law and legal
assistance to the underprivileged and should, thus, be voided on this ground. As aptly observed by the CLEBM and
which the Court had approved:

In the same vein Section 3 provides as one of the objectives of legal education increasing "awareness among members
of the legal profession of the needs of the poor, deprived and oppressed sectors of the society." Such objective should
90
not find a place in the law that primarily aims to upgrade the standard of schools of law as they perform the task of
educating aspiring lawyers. Section 5, paragraph 5 of Article VIII of the Constitution also provides that the Supreme
Court shall have the power to promulgate rules on "legal assistance to the underprivileged" and hence, implementation
of [R.A. No. 7662 might give rise to infringement of a constitutionally mandated power.249               

2 Section 2, par. 2 and Section 7(g) on legal

apprenticeship and law practice internship
as a requirement for taking the bar

Towards the end of uplifting the standards of legal education, Section 2, par. 2 of R.A. No. 7662 mandates the State to
(1) undertake appropriate reforms in the legal education system; (2) require proper selection of law students; (3)
maintain quality among law schools; and (4) require legal apprenticeship and continuing legal education.

Pursuant to this policy, Section 7(g) of R.A. No. 7662 grants LEB the power to establish a law practice internship as a
requirement for taking the bar examinations:

SEC. 7. Powers and Functions. - x x x x

xxxx

(g) to establish a law practice internship as a requirement for taking the Bar, which a law student shall undergo with
any duly accredited private or public law office or firm or legal assistance group anytime during the law course for a
specific period that the Board may decide, but not to exceed a total of twelve (12) months. For this purpose, the Board
shall prescribe the necessary guidelines for such accreditation and the specifications of such internship which shall
include the actual work of a new member of the Bar.

This power is mirrored in Section 11(g) of LEBMO No. 1-2011:

SEC. 11. (Section 7 of the law) Powers and Functions. - For the purpose of achieving the objectives of this Act, the
Board shall have the following powers and functions:

xxxx

g) to establish a law practice internship as a requirement for taking the Bar which a law student shall undergo with any
duly accredited private or public law office or firm or legal assistance group anytime during the law course for a
specific period that the Board may decide, but not to exceed a total of twelve (12)months. For this purpose, the Board
shall prescribe the necessary guidelines for such accreditation and the specifications of such internship which shall
include the actual work of a new member of the Bar[.]

It is clear from the plain text of Section 7(g) that another requirement, i.e., completion of a law internship program, is
imposed by law for taking the bar examinations. This requirement unduly interferes with the exclusive jurisdiction of
the Court to promulgate rules concerning the practice of law and admissions thereto.

The jurisdiction to determine whether an applicant may be allowed to take the bar examinations belongs to the Court.
In fact, under the whereas clauses of the Revised Law Student Practice Rule, the Court now requires the completion of
clinical legal education courses, which may be undertaken either in a law clinic or through an externship, as a
prerequisite to take the bar examinations, thus:

Whereas, to produce practice-ready lawyers, the completion of clinical legal education courses must be a prerequisite
to take the bar examinations as provided in Section 5 of Rule 138.

Under Section 7(g), the power of the LEB is no longer confined within the parameters of legal education, but now
dabbles on the requisites for admissions to the bar examinations, and consequently, admissions to the bar. This is a
direct encroachment upon the Court's exclusive authority to promulgate rules concerning admissions to the bar and
should, therefore, be struck down as unconstitutional.

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Further, and as will be discussed hereunder, the LEB exercised this power in a manner that forces upon law schools
the establishment of a legal apprenticeship program or a legal aid clinic, in violation of the schools' right to determine
for themselves their respective curricula.

3 Section 2, par. 2 and Section 7(h) on

continuing legal education of practicing lawyers

Petitioners in G.R. No. 230642 argue that the power given to the LEB to adopt a system of continuing legal education
implies that the LEB exercises jurisdiction not only over the legal education of those seeking to become lawyers, but
also over those who are already lawyers which is a function exclusively belonging to the Court.250 Respondent, on
the other hand, maintains that the LEB's power to adopt a system of continuing legal education is different from the
mandatory continuing legal education required of all members of the bar.251 Respondent explains that the continuing
legal education under R.A. No. 7662 is limited to the training of lawyer-professors and not to the practice of the legal
profession.252

The questioned power of the LEB to adopt a system of continuing legal education appears in Section 2, par. 2 and
Section 7(h) of R.A. No. 7662:

SEC. 2. Declaration of Policies. - x x x

xxxx

Towards this end, the State shall undertake appropriate reforms in the legal education system, require proper selection
of law students, maintain quality among law schools, and require legal apprenticeship and continuing legal education.

xxxx

SEC. 7. Powers and Functions. - x x x

xxxx

(h) to adopt a system of continuing legal education. For this purpose, the [LEB] may provide for the mandatory
attendance of practicing lawyers in such courses and for such duration as the [LEB] may deem necessary; x x x
(Emphases supplied)

This power is likewise reflected in Section 11(h) of LEBMO No. 1-2011, as follows:

SEC. 11. (Section 7 of the law) Powers and Functions. - For the purpose of achieving the objectives of this Act, the
Board shall have the following powers and functions:

xxxx

h) to adopt a system of continuing legal education. For this purpose, the Board may provide for the mandatory
attendance of practicing lawyers in such courses and for such duration as the Board may deem necessary[.] x x
x (Emphasis supplied)

By its plain language, the clause "continuing legal education" under Section 2, par. 2, and Section 7(h) of R.A. No.
7662 unduly give the LEB the power to supervise the legal education of those who are already members of the bar.
Inasmuch as the LEB is authorized to compel mandatory attendance of practicing lawyers in such courses and for such
duration as the LEB deems, necessary, the same encroaches upon the Court's power to promulgate rules concerning
the Integrated Bar which includes the education of "lawyer-professors" as teaching of law is practice of
law.ℒαwρhi ৷ The mandatory continuing legal education of the members of the bar is, in fact, covered by B.M. No.
850 or the Rules on Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) dated August 22, 2000 which requires members
of the bar, not otherwise exempt, from completing, every three years, at least 36 hours of continuing legal education
activities approved by the MCLE Committee directly supervised by the Court.

As noted by the CLEBM:

92
Thus, under the declaration of policies in Section 2 of [R.A. No. 7662, the State "shall undertake appropriate reforms
in the legal education system, require the proper selection of law students, maintain quality among law schools and
require apprenticeship and continuing legal education["]. The concept of continuing legal education encompasses
education not only of law students but also of members of the legal profession. Its inclusion in the declaration of
policies implies that the [LEB] shall have jurisdiction over the education of persons who have finished the law course
and are already licensed to practice law. Viewed in the light of Section 5, paragraph 5 of Article VIII of the
Constitution that vests the Supreme Court with powers over the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, said portion of
Section 2 of [R.A. No. 7662 risks a declaration of constitutional infirmity.253 (Underscoring supplied)               

4 Section 7(e) on minimum

standards for law admission
and the PhiLSAT issuances

Of the several powers of the LEB under R.A. No. 7662, its power to prescribe minimum standards for law admission
under Section 7(e) received the strongest objection from the petitioners. Section 7(e), provides:

SEC. 7. Powers and Functions. - x x x

xxxx

(e) to prescribe minimum standards for law admission and minimum qualifications and compensation of faculty
members; (Emphasis supplied)

Petitioners argue that the power to prescribe the minimum standards for law admission belongs to the Court pursuant
to its rule-making power concerning the admission to the practice of law; Thus, Section 7(e) of R.A. No. 7662 which
gives the LEB the power to prescribe the minimum standards for law admission is allegedly unconstitutional as it
violates the doctrine of separation of powers. Necessarily, according to the petitioners, the PhiLSAT which was
imposed by the LEB pursuant to Section 7(e) of R.A. No. 7662 is likewise void.

The Court finds no constitutional conflict between its rule-making power and the power of the LEB to prescribe the
minimum standards for law admission under Section 7(e) of R.A. No. 7662. Consequently, the PhiLSAT, which
intends to regulate admission to law schools, cannot be voided on this ground.

4(a). LEB's power to prescribe minimum standards

for "law admission" pertain to admission to
legal education and not to the practice of law

Much of the protestation against the LEB's exercise of the power to prescribe the minimum standards for law
admission stems from the interpretation extended to the phrase "law admission." For petitioners, "law admission"
pertains to the practice of law, the power over which belongs exclusively to the Court.

The statutory context and the intent of the legislators do not permit such interpretation.

Basic is the rule in statutory construction that every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to the
context, that is, every part must be read together with the other parts, to the end that the general intent of the law is
given primacy.254 As such, a law's clauses and phrases cannot be interpreted as isolated expressions nor read in
truncated parts, but must be considered to form a harmonious whole.255

Accordingly, the LEB's power under Section 7(e) of R.A. No. 7662 to prescribe the minimum standards for law
admission should be read with the State policy behind the enactment of R.A. No. 7662 which is fundamentally to
uplift the standards of legal education and the law's thrust to undertake reforms in the legal education system.
Construing the LEH's power to prescribe the standards for law admission together with the LEB's other powers to
administer, supervise, and accredit law schools, leads to the logical interpretation that the law circumscribes the LEB's
power to prescribe admission requirements only to those seeking enrollment to a school or college of law and not to
the practice of law.

93
Reference may also be made to DECS Order No. 27-1989, as the immediate precursor of R.A. No. 7662, as to what is
sought to be regulated when the law speaks of "law admission" requirements.

Section 1, Article VIII of DECS Order No. 27-1989 is clear that the admission requirement pertains to enrollment in a
law course, or law school, or legal education, thus:

Article VIII
Admission, Residence and Other Requirements

SEC. 1. No applicant shall be enrolled in the law course unless he complies with specific requirements for admission
by the Bureau of Higher Education and the Supreme Court of the Philippines, for which purpose he must present to
the registrar the necessary credentials before the end of the enrollment period. (Emphases supplied)

This contemporary interpretation suffice in itself to hold that the phrase "law admission" pertains to admission to the
study of law or to legal education, and not to the practice of law. Further support is nevertheless offered by the
exchanges during the Senate interpellations, wherein it was assumed that the phrase "minimum standards for law
admission" refers to the requirements that the student must fulfill before being admitted to law school. This
assumption was not corrected by the bill's sponsor.256

4(b). Section 7(e) of R.A. No. 7662 is reasonable supervision and regulation

Section 7(e) of R.A. No. 7662, insofar as it gives the LEB the power to prescribe the minimum standards for law
admission is faithful to the reasonable supervision and regulation clause. It merely authorizes the LEB to prescribe
minimum requirements not amounting to control.

Emphatically, the law allows the LEB to prescribe only the minimum standards and it did not, in any way, impose that
the minimum standard for law admission should be by way of an exclusionary and qualifying exam nor did it prevent
law schools from imposing their respective admission requirements.

Thus, under LEBMO No. 1-2011, the minimum standards for admission to law schools as implemented by the LEB
are: (1) completion of a four-year high school course; and (2) completion of a course for a bachelor's degree in arts or
sciences.257 Again, these requirements are but consistent with the nature of the law course in the Philippines as being
both a professional and post-baccalaureate education.

As the facts disclose, however, the LEB later on introduced the PhiLSAT as an additional prerequisite for admission
to law school.

4(c). Pursuant to Section 7(e), LEB is authorized to administer

an aptitude test as a minimum standard for law admission

Evident from the Senate deliberations that, in prescribing the minimum standards for law admission, an aptitude test
may be administered by the LEB although such is not made mandatory under the law. Thus:

Senator Tolentino: x x x

I will proceed to another point, Mr. President. I have taught law for more than 25 years in private schools and in the
University of the Philippines as well. There is one thing I have noticed in all these years of teaching and that is, many
students in the law school are not prepared or apt by inclination or by ability to become lawyers. I see that the
objectives of the legal education that are provided for in this bill do not provide for some mechanism of choosing
people who should take up the law course.

As it is now, because of our democratic principles, anybody who wants to become a lawyer, who can afford the tuition
fee, or who has the required preparatory course, can be admitted into the law school. And yet, while studying law,
many of these students - I would say there are about 30 or 40 percent of students in private schools - should not be
taking up law but some other course because, simply, they do not have the inclination, they do not have the aptitude or
the ability to become lawyers.

94
Can that be provided for in this bill, Madam Sponsor? Would it contravene really our principles of democracy where
everybody should be free to take the course that he wants to take? Or should the State be able to determine who should
be able or who should be allowed to take a particular course, in this case of law?

Senator Shahani: Mr. President, there are those aptitude tests which are being taken when the student is in high school
to somehow guide the guidance councilors [sic] into the aptitude of the students. But the talent or the penchant for the
legal profession is not one of those subjects specifically measured. I think what is measured really is who is, more or
less, talented for an academic education as against a vocational education. But maybe, a new test will have to be
designed to really test the aptitude of those who would like to enter the law school. x x x

Senator Tolentino: x x x

Many parents want to see their children become lawyers. But they do not consider the aptitude of these children, and
they waste money and time in making these children take up law when they really are not suited to the law course. My
real concern is whether by legislation, we can provide for selection of those who should be allowed to take up law,
and not everybody would be allowed to take up law. x x x

xxxx

Senator Shahani: Mr. President, of course, the right to education is a constitutional right, and I think one cannot just
categorically deny a student - especially if he is bright - entrance to a law school. I think I would stand by what I had
previously said that an aptitude examination will have to be specially designed. It is not in existence yet. x x
x258 (Emphases supplied)

This matter was amplified in second reading:

Senator Angara: x x x

Senator Tolentino asked why there is an omission on the requirements for admission to law school. I think [Senator
Shahani] has already answered that, that the [LEB] may prescribe an aptitude test for that purpose. Just as in other
jurisdictions, they prescribe a law admission test for prospective students of law. I think the board may very well
decide to prescribe such a test, although it is not mandatory under this bill.259 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The lawmakers, therefore, recognized and intended that the LEB be vested with authority to administer an aptitude
test as a minimum standard for law admission. The presumption is that the legislature intended to enact a valid,
sensible, and just law and one which operates no further than may be necessary to effectuate the specific purpose of
the law.260 This presumption has not been successfully challenged by petitioners.

It also bears to note that the introduction of a law aptitude examination was actually supported by the Court when it
approved the CLEBM's proposed amendment to Section 7(e), as follows:

SEC. 6. Section 7 of the same law is hereby amended to read as follows:

"SEC. 7. Power and Functions. - x x x

xxxx

d). to prescribe minimum standards for ADMISSION TO LAW SCHOOLS INCLUDING A SYSTEM OF LAW
APTITUDE EXAMINATION x x x[.]" (Underscoring supplied)

And further in Bar Matter No. 1161261 when the Court referred to the LEB the conduct of a proposed law entrance
examination.

4(d). PhiLSAT, as an aptitude exam,

is reasonably related to the improvement
of legal education

95
Having settled that the LEB has the power to administer an aptitude test, the next issue to be resolved is whether the
exercise of such power, through the PhiLSAT, was reasonable.

Indeed, an administrative regulation is susceptible to attack for unreasonableness. In Lupangco v. Court of

Appeals,262 the Court held:

It is an [axiom] in administrative law that administrative authorities should not act arbitrarily and capriciously
in the issuance of rules and regulations. To be valid, such rules and regulations must be reasonable and fairly
adapted to secure the end in view. If shown to bear no reasonable relation to the purposes for which they are
authorized to be issued, then they must be held to be invalid. (Emphasis supplied)

To determine whether the PhiLSAT constitutes a valid exercise of police power, the same test of reasonableness, i.e.,
the concurrence of a lawful subject and lawful means, is employed. Petitioners argue that the PhiLSAT is
unreasonable because: it is not a conclusive proof of the student's aptitude;263 it entails unreasonable examination and
travel expenses and burdensome documentary requirements;264 applying for PhiLSAT exemption is
inconvenient;265 it is redundant to existing law school entrance exams;266 and it is not supported by scientific
study.267

Unfortunately, these grounds are not only conclusions of fact which beg the presentation of competent evidence, but
also necessarily go into the wisdom of the PhiLSAT which the Court cannot inquire into. The Court's pronouncement
as to the reasonableness of the PhiLSAT based on the grounds propounded by petitioners would be an excursion into
the policy behind the examinations - a function which is administrative rather than judicial.

Petitioners also argue that there is no reasonable relation between improving the quality of legal education and
regulating access thereto. The Court does not agree.

The subject of the PhiLSAT is to improve the quality of legal education. It is indubitable that the State has an interest
in prescribing regulations promoting education and thereby protecting the common good. Improvement of the quality
of legal education, thus, falls squarely within the scope of police power. The PhiLSAT, as an aptitude test, was the
means to protect this interest.

4(e). Tablarin sustained the conduct of an

admission test as a legitimate exercise
of the State's regulatory power

Moreover, by case law, the Court already upheld the validity of administering an aptitude test as a reasonable police
power measure in the context of admission standards into institutions of higher learning.

In Tablarin, the Court upheld not only the constitutionality of Section 5(a) of R.A. No. 2382, or the Medical Act of
1959, which gave the Board of Medical Education (BME) the power to prescribe requirements for admission to
medical schools, but also MECS Order No. 52, Series of 1985 (MECS Order No. 52-1985) issued by the BME which
prescribed NMAT.

Using the rational basis test, the Court upheld the constitutionality of the NMAT as follows:

Perhaps the only issue that needs some consideration is whether there is some reasonable relation between the
prescribing of passing the NMAT as a condition for admission to medical school on the one hand, and the securing of
the health and safety of the general community, on the other hand. This question is perhaps most usefully approached
by recalling that the regulation of the practice of medicine in all its branches has long been recognized as a reasonable
method of protecting the health and safety of the public. That the power to regulate and control the practice of
medicine includes the power to regulate admission to the ranks of those authorized to practice medicine, is also well
recognized. Thus, legislation and administrative regulations requiring those who wish to practice medicine first to take
and pass medical board examinations have long ago been recognized as valid exercises of governmental power.
Similarly, the establishment of minimum medical educational requirements - i.e., the completion of prescribed courses
in a recognized medical school - for admission to the medical profession, has also been sustained as a legitimate
exercise of the regulatory authority of the state. What we have before us in the instant case is closely related; the
regulation of access to medical schools. MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, as noted earlier, articulates the rationale of
96
regulation of this type: the improvement of the professional and technical quality of the graduates of medical schools,
by upgrading the quality of those admitted to the student body of the medical schools. That upgrading is sought by
selectivity in the process of admission, selectivity consisting, among other things, of limiting admission to those who
exhibit in the required degree the aptitude for medical studies and eventually for medical practice. The need to
maintain, and the difficulties of maintaining, high standards in our professional schools in general, and medical
schools in particular, in the current stage of our social and economic development, are widely known.

We believe that the government is entitled to prescribe an admission test like the NMAT as a means for achieving its
stated objective of "upgrading the selection of applicants into [our] medical schools" and of "improv[ing] the quality
of medical education, in the country." Given the widespread use today of such admission tests in, for instance, medical
schools in the United States of America the Medical College Admission Test [MCAT] and quite probably in other
countries with far more developed educational resources than our own, and taking into account the failure or inability
of the petitioners to even attempt to prove otherwise, we are entitled to hold that the NMAT is reasonably related to
the securing of the ultimate end of legislation and regulation in this area. That end, it is useful to recall, is the
protection of the public from the potentially deadly effects of incompetence and ignorance in those who would
undertake to treat our bodies and minds for disease or trauma.268 (Emphases supplied)

The Court reached its conclusion that NMAT is a valid exercise of police power because the method employed, i.e.,
regulation of admissions to medical education is reasonably related to the subject, i.e., the protection of the public by
ensuring that only those qualified are eventually allowed to practice medicine.

The necessity of State intervention to ensure that the medical profession is not infiltrated by those unqualified to take
care of the life and health of patients was likewise the reason why the Court in Department of Education, Culture and
Sports v. San Diego269 upheld the "three-flunk" rule in NMAT:

We see no reason why the rationale in the [TabIarin] case cannot apply to the case at bar. The issue raised in both
cases is the academic preparation of the applicant. This may be gauged at least initially by the admission test and,
indeed with more reliability, by the three-flunk rule. The latter cannot be regarded any less valid than the former in the
regulation of the medical profession.

There is no need to redefine here the police power of the State. Suffice it to repeat that the power is validly exercised
if (a) the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require the interference of
the State, and (b) the means employed are reasonably necessary to the attainment of the object sought to be
accomplished and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.

In other words, the proper exercise of the police power requires the concurrence of a lawful subject and a lawful
method.

The subject of the challenged regulation is certainly within the ambit of the police power. It is the right and
indeed the responsibility of the State to insure that the medical profession is not infiltrated by incompetents to
whom patients may unwarily entrust their lives and health.

The method employed by the challenged regulation is not irrelevant to the purpose of the law nor is it arbitrary
or oppressive. The three-flunk rule is intended to insulate the medical schools and ultimately the medical
profession from the intrusion of those not qualified to be doctors. (Emphases supplied)

Tablarin recognized that State intervention was necessary, and therefore was allowed, because of the need to meet the
goal of promoting public health and safety.

In similar vein, the avowed purpose of the PhiLSAT is to improve the quality of legal education by evaluating and
screening applicants to law school. As elucidated, the State has an interest in improving the quality of legal education
for the protection of the community at-large, and requiring an entrance test is reasonably related to that interest. In
other words, the State has the power and the prerogative to impose a standardized test prior to entering law school, in
the same manner and extent that the State can do so in medical school when it prescribed the NMAT.

97
In all, the Court finds no constitutional conflict between the Court's rule-making power concerning admissions to the
practice of law and on the LEB's power to prescribe minimum standards for law admission under Section 7(e) of R.A.
No. 7662.

Further, pursuant to its power under Section 7(e), the Court affirms the LEB's authority to initiate and administer an
aptitude test, such as the PhiLSAT, as a minimum standard for law admission. Thus, the PhiLSAT, insofar as it
functions as an aptitude exam that measures the academic potential of the examinee to pursue the study of law to the
end that the quality of legal education is improved is not per se unconstitutional.

However, there are certain provisions of the PhiLSAT that render its operation exclusionary, restrictive, and
qualifying which is contrary to its design as an aptitude exam meant to be used as a tool that should only help and
guide law schools in gauging the aptness of its applicants for the study of law. These provisions effectively and
absolutely exclude applicants who failed to pass the PhiLSAT from taking up a course in legal education, thereby
restricting and qualifying admissions to law schools. As will be demonstrated, these provisions of the PhiLSAT are
unconstitutional for being manifestly violative of the law schools' exercise of academic freedom, specifically the
autonomy to determine for itself who it shall allow to be admitted to its law program.

D.
LEB's Powers vis-a-vis Institutional Academic
Freedom and the Right to Education

1   PhiLSAT

Paragraphs 7, 9, 11, and 15 of LEBMO No. 7-2016, provide:

xxxx

7. Passing Score - The cut-off or passing score for the PhiLSAT shall be FIFTY-FIVE PERCENT (55%) correct
answers, or such percentile score as may be prescribed by the LEB.

xxxx

9. Admission Requirement - All college graduates or graduating students applying for admission to the basic law
course shall be required to pass the PhiLSAT as a requirement for admission to any law school in the
Philippines. Upon the effectivity of this memorandum order, no applicant shall be admitted for enrollment as a first
year student in the basic law courses leading to a degree of either Bachelor of Laws or Juris Doctor unless he/she has
passed the PhiLSAT taken within 2 years before the start of studies for the basic law course and presents a valid
[Certificate of Eligibility] as proof thereof.

xxxx

11. Institutional Admission Requirements - The PhiLSAT shall be without prejudice to the right of a law school in the
exercise of its academic freedom to prescribe or impose additional requirements for admission, such as but not limited
to:

a. A score in the PhiLSAT higher than the cut-off or passing score set by the LEB;

b. Additional or supplemental admission tests to measure the competencies and/or personality of the applicant; and

c. Personal interview of the applicant.

xxxx

15. Sanctions - Law schools violating this Memorandum Order shall [be] imposed the administrative
sanctions prescribed in Section 32 of LEBMO No. 2, Series of 2013 and/or fine of up to Ten Thousand Pesos
(P10,000) for each infraction. (Emphases supplied)

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Without doubt, the above provisions exclude and disqualify those examinees who fail to reach the prescribed passing
score from being admitted to any law school in the Philippines. In mandating that only applicants who scored at least
55% correct answers shall be admitted to any law school, the PhiLSAT actually usurps the right and duty of the law
school to determine for itself the criteria for the admission of students and thereafter, to apply such criteria on a case-
by-case basis. It also mandates law schools to absolutely reject applicants with a grade lower than the prescribed cut-
off score and those with expired PhiLSAT eligibility. The token regard for institutional academic freedom comes into
play, if at all, only after the applicants had been "pre-selected" without the school's participation. The right of the
institutions then are constricted only in providing "additional" admission requirements, admitting of the interpretation
that the preference of the school itself is merely secondary or supplemental to that of the State which is antithetical to
the very principle of reasonable supervision and regulation.

The law schools are left with absolutely no discretion to choose its students at the first instance and in accordance with
its own policies, but are dictated to surrender such discretion in favor of a State-determined pool of applicants, under
pain of administrative sanctions and/or payment of fines. Mandating law schools to reject applicants who failed to
reach the prescribed PhiLSAT passing score or those with expired PhiLSAT eligibility transfers complete control over
admission policies from the law schools to the LEB. As Garcia tritely emphasized: "[c]olleges and universities should
[not] be looked upon as public utilities devoid of any discretion as to whom to admit or reject. Education, especially
higher education, belongs to a different, and certainly higher category."270

1(a). Comparison of PhiLSAT with NMAT and LSAT

Respondent urges the Court to treat the PhiLSAT in the same manner that the Court treated the NMAT in Tablarin.
Petitioners oppose on the ground that the PhiLSAT and the NMAT are different because there is a Constitutional
body, i.e., the Court, tasked to regulate the practice of law while there is none with respect to the practice of medicine.

The Court treats the PhiLSAT differently from the NMAT for the fundamental reason that these aptitude exams
operate differently.

For one, how these exams allow the schools to treat the scores therein obtained is different.

While both exams seem to prescribe a "cut-off" score, the NMAT score is evaluated by the medical schools in relation
to their own cut-off scores. Unlike the PhiLSAT score, the NMAT score is not the sole determining factor on whether
or not an examinee may be admitted to medical school. The NMAT score is only meant to be one of the bases for
evaluating applicants for admission to a college of medicine.

Medical schools further enjoy the discretion to determine how much weight should be assigned to an NMAT score
relative to the schools' own admissions policy. Different medical schools may therefore set varying acceptable NMAT
scores. Different medical schools may likewise assign different values to the NMAT score. This allows medical
schools to consider the NMAT score along with the other credentials of the applicant. The NMAT score does not
constrain medical schools to accept pre-selected applicants; it merely provides for a tool to evaluate all applicants.

Obtaining a low NMAT percentile score will not immediately and absolutely disqualify an applicant from being
admitted to medical school. Obtaining a high NMAT percentile score only increases an applicant's options for medical
schools. Taking the NMAT, thus, expands the applicant's options for medical schools; it does not limit them.

For another, medical schools are not subjected to sanctions in case they decide to admit an applicant pursuant to their
own admissions policy. In fact, at some point,271 there was even no prescribed cut-off percentile score for the
NMAT, and instead it was stressed that a student may enroll in any school, college or university upon meeting the
latter's specific requirements and reasonable regulations.272 Also, the issuance of a certificate of eligibility for
admission to a college of medicine had been transferred to. the medical schools, thus, rightfully giving the
responsibility for and accountability of determining eligibility of students for admission to the medical program to the
schools concerned.273

Similar to the NMAT, the Law School Admission Test (LSAT) is only one of the several criteria for evaluation for
law school admission. It is just one of the methods that law schools may use to differentiate applicants for law school.
The American Bar Association actually allows a law school to use an admission test other than the LSAT and it does

99
not dictate the particular weight that a law school should give to the results of the LSAT in deciding whether to admit
an applicant.274

In contrast, the PhiLSAT score itself determines whether an applicant may be admitted to law school or not, the
PhiLSAT being strictly a pass or fail exam. It excludes those who failed to reach the prescribed cut-off score from
being admitted to any law school. It qualifies admission to law school not otherwise imposed by the schools
themselves. The PhiLSAT, as presently crafted, employs a totalitarian scheme in terms of student admissions. This
leaves the consequent actions of the applicant-student and the school solely dependent upon the results of the
PhiLSAT.

1(b). Balancing State interest with

institutional academic freedomℒαwρhi ৷

Thus far, it is settled that the PhiLSAT, when administered as an aptitude test, is reasonably related to the State's
unimpeachable interest in improving the quality of legal education. This aptitude test, however, should not be
exclusionary, restrictive, or qualifying as to encroach upon institutional academic freedom. Moreover, in the exercise
of their academic freedom to choose who to admit, the law schools should be left with the discretion to determine for
themselves how much weight should the results of the PhiLSAT carry in relation to their individual admission
policies. At all times, it is understood that the school's exercise of such academic discretion should not be gravely
abused, arbitrary, whimsical, or discriminatory.

With the conclusion that the PhiLSAT, when administered as an aptitude test, passes the test of reasonableness, there
is no reason to strike down the PhiLSAT in its entirety. Instead, the Court takes a calibrated approach and partially
nullifies LEBMO No. 7-2016 insofar as it absolutely prescribes the passing of the PhiLSAT and the taking thereof
within two years as a prerequisite for admission to any law school which, on its face, run directly counter to
institutional academic freedom. The rest of LEBMO No. 7-2016, being free from any taint of unconstitutionality,
should remain in force and effect, especially in view of the separability clause275 therein contained.

1(c). PhiLSAT and the right to education

Anent the argument that the PhiLSAT transgresses petitioners' right to education and their right to select a profession
or course of study, suffice to state that the PhiLSAT is a minimum admission standard that is rationally related to the
interest of the State to improve the quality of legal education and, accordingly, to protect the general community. The
constitutionality of the PhiLSAT, therefore, cannot be voided on the ground that it violates the right to education as
stated under Section 1, Article XIV of the Constitution. The Court's pronouncement in Tablarin276 again resonates
with significance:

Turning to Article XIV, Section 1, of the 1987 Constitution, we note that once more, petitioners have failed to
demonstrate that the statute and regulation they assail in fact clash with that provision. On the contrary, we may note -
x x x - that the statute and the regulation which petitioners attack are in fact designed to promote "quality education" at
the level of professional schools. When one reads Section 1 in relation to Section 5(3) of Article XIV, as one must,
one cannot but note that the latter phrase of Section 1 is not to be read with absolute literalness. The State is not really
enjoined to take appropriate steps to make quality education "accessible to all" who might for any number of reasons
wish to enroll in a professional school, but rather merely to make such education accessible to all who qualify under
"fair, reasonable and equitable admission and academic requirements."

2 Other LEB issuances on law admission

Apart from the PhiLSAT, the LEB also imposed additional requirements for admission to law schools under LEBMO
No. 1-2011, specifically:

Article III
Prerequisites and Program Specification

SEC. 15. Prerequisites to admission to Law School. - x x x

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100
Where the applicant for admission into a law school is a graduate of a foreign institution or school following a
different course and progression of studies, the matter shall be referred to the Board that shall determine the eligibility
of the candidate for admission to law school.

SEC. 16. Board Prerequisites for Admission to the Ll.B. or J.D. Program. - The Board shall apply Section 6 of Rule
138 in the following wise: An applicant for admission to the Ll.B. or J.D. program of studies must be a graduate of a
bachelor's degree and must have earned at least eighteen (18) units in English, six (6) units in Mathematics, and
eighteen (18) units of social science subjects.

SEC. 17. Board Prerequisites for Admission to Graduate Programs in Law. - Without prejudice to other requirements
that graduate schools may lay down, no applicant shall be admitted for the Master of Laws (Ll.M.) or equivalent
master's degree in law or juridical science, without an Ll.B. or a J.D. degree. Admission of non-Members of the
Philippine Bar to the master's degree shall be a matter of academic freedom vested in the graduate school of law. The
candidate for the doctorate degree in juridical science, or doctorate in civil law or equivalent doctorate degree must
have completed a Master of Laws (Ll.M.) or equivalent degree.

Graduate degree programs in law shall have no bearing on membership or non-membership in the Philippine
Bar.277 (Emphases supplied)

Further, LEBMO No. 1-2011, Article V, provides:

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SEC. 23. No student who has obtained a general average below 2.5 or 80 in the college course required for admission
to legal studies may be admitted to law school. Exceptions may be made by the Dean in exceptionally meritorious
cases, after having informed the Board.278

These provisions similarly encroach upon the law school's freedom to determine for itself its admission policies. With
regard to foreign students, a law school is completely bereft of the right to determine for itself whether to accept such
foreign student or not, as the determination thereof now belongs to the LEB.

Similarly, the requirement that an applicant obtain a specific number of units in English, Mathematics, and Social
Science subjects affects a law school's admission policies leaving the latter totally without discretion to admit
applicants who are deficient in these subjects or to allow such applicant to complete these requirements at a later time.
This requirement also effectively extends the jurisdiction of the LEB to the courses and units to be taken by the
applicant in his or her pre-law course. Moreover, such requirement is not to be found under Section 6, Rule 138 of the
Rules of Court as this section simply requires only the following from an applicant to the bar exams:

SEC. 6. Pre-Law. - No applicant for admission to the bar examination shall be admitted unless he presents a certificate
that he has satisfied the Secretary of Education that, before he began the study of law, he had pursued and
satisfactorily completed in an authorized and recognized university or college, requiring for admission thereto the
completion of a four-year high school course, the course of study prescribed therein for a bachelor's degree in arts or
sciences with any of the following subjects as major or field of concentration: political science, logic, english, spanish,
history and economics.

Likewise, in imposing that only those with a basic degree in law may be admitted to graduate programs in law
encroaches upon the law school's right to determine who may be admitted. For instance, this requirement effectively
nullifies the option of admitting non-law graduates on the basis of relevant professional experience that a law school,
pursuant to its own admissions policy, may otherwise have considered.

The required general weighted average in the college course suffers the same infirmity and would have been struck
down had ·it not been expressly repealed by the LEB because of the PhiLSAT.279

3 Section 7(c) and 7(e) on the minimum

qualifications of faculty members

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The LEB is also empowered under Section 7(c) to set the standards of accreditation taking into account, among others,
the "qualifications of the members of the faculty" and under Section 7(e) of R.A. No. 7662 to prescribe "minimum
qualifications and compensation of faculty members[.]"

Relative to the power to prescribe the minimum qualifications of faculty members, LEB prescribes under LEBMO No.
1-2011 the following:

[PART I]
Article V
Instructional Standards

SEC. 20. The law school shall be headed by a properly qualified dean, maintain a corps of professors drawn from the
ranks of leading and acknowledged practitioners as well as academics and legal scholars or experts in juridical
science[.] x x x

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PART III
QUALIFICATIONS AND CURRICULUM

Article I
Faculty Qualifications

SEC. 50. The members of the faculty of a law school should, at the very least, possess a L1.B. or a J.D. degree and
should be members of the Philippine Bar. In the exercise of academic freedom, the law school may also ask specialists
in various fields of law with other qualifications, provided that they possess relevant doctoral degrees, to teach
specific subjects.

Within a period of five (5) years of the promulgation of the present order, members of the faculty of schools of law
shall commence their studies in graduate schools of law.

Where a law school offers the J.D. curriculum, a qualified Ll.B. graduate who is a member of the Philippine Bar may
be admitted to teach in the J.D. course and may wish to consider the privilege granted under Section 56 hereof.

SEC. 51. The dean should have, aside from complying with the requirements above, at least a Master of Laws (Ll.M.)
degree or a master's degree in a related field, and should have been a Member of the Bar for at least 5 years prior to his
appointment as dean.

SEC. 52. The dean of a graduate school of law should possess at least a doctorate degree in law and should be an
acknowledged authority in law, as evidenced by publications and membership in learned societies and organizations;
members of the faculty of a graduate school of law should possess at least a Master of Laws (Ll.M.) degree or the
relevant master's or doctor's degrees in related fields.

Aside from the foregoing, retired justices of the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan and the
Court of Tax Appeals may serve as deans of schools of law, provided that they have had teaching experience as
professors of law and provided further that, with the approval of the Legal Education Board, a graduate school of law
may accredit their experience in the collegiate appellate courts and the judgments they have penned towards the
degree [ad eundem] of Master of Laws.280 (Emphases supplied)

Thus, under LEBMO No. 1-2011, a law faculty member must have an Ll.B or J.D. degree and must, within a period of
five years from the promulgation of LEBMO No. 1-2011, or from June 14, 2011 to June 14, 2016, commence studies
in graduate school of law.

The mandatory character of the requirement of a master's degree is underscored by the LEB in its Resolution No.
2014-02, a "sequel rule" to Section 50 of LEBMO No. 1-2011, which provides that:

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102
1. Members of the law faculty are required to be holders of the degree of Master of Laws. It is the
responsibility of the law deans to observe and implement this rule.

2. The law faculty of all law schools shall have the following percentage of holders of the master of
laws degree:

2.1. School Year- 2017-2018-20%

2.2. School Year- 2018-2019 - 40%

2.3. School Year- 2019-2020-60%

2.4. School Year- 2020-2021-80%

In computing the percentage, those who are exempted from the rule shall be included.

3. Exempted from this requirement of a master's degree in law are the following:

The Incumbent or Retired Members of the:

3.1. Supreme Court;

3.2. Court of Appeals, Sandiganbayan and Court of Tax Appeals;

3.3. Secretary of Justice and Under-Secretaries of Justice, Ombudsman, Deputy Ombudsmen,

Solicitor General and Assistant Solicitors General

3.4. Commissioners of the National Labor Relations Commission who teach Labor Laws;

3.5. Regional Trial Court Judges;

3.6. DOJ State and Regional State Prosecutors and Senior Ombudsman Prosecutors who teach
Criminal Law and/or Criminal Procedure;

3.7. Members of Congress who are lawyers who teach Political Law, Administrative Law,
Election Law, Law on Public Officers and other related subjects;

3.8. Members of Constitutional Commissions who are Lawyers;

3.9. Heads of bureaus who are lawyers who teach the law subjects which their respective
bureaus are implementing;

3.10. Ambassadors, Ministers and other [D]iplomatic Officers who are lawyers who teach
International Law or related subjects;

3.11. Those who have been teaching their subjects for 10 years or more upon
recommendation of their deans; and

3.12. Other lawyers who are considered by the Board to be experts in any field of law
provided they teach the subjects of their expertise.

4. The following are the sanctions for non-compliance with the foregoing rules:

4.1. If a law school is non-compliant with these rules for the first time beginning School Year
2017-2018, the Board shall downgrade its Recognition status to Permit status;

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 4.2. If a law school under a Permit status should remain non-compliant with these rules in
succeeding school years, the Board shall downgrade the Permit status to Phase-Out status;

4.3. If a law school which is under Phase-Out status remains non-compliant with these rules
in succeeding school years, the Board shall order its closure to take effect at the end of the
school year.

5. If a law school under sanction shall become compliant, its Recognition status shall be restored.
(Emphases supplied)

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And under LEBMO No. 2:

SEC. 31. Unfitness to Continue Operating a Law Program. A law school which is operated below quality standards of
a law school is unfit to continue operating a law program.

xxxx

2) A law school is substandard if the result of the inspection and evaluation of the law school and its facilities by
members of the Board or its staff shows that the law school has serious deficiencies including a weak faculty as
indicated, among others, by the fact that most of the members are neophytes in the teaching of law[.] x x x

xxxx

SEC. 32. The imposable administrative sanctions are the following:

a) Termination of the law program (closing the law school);

b) Phase-out of the law program;

c) Provisional cancellation of the Government Recognition and putting the law program of the
substandard law school under Permit Status.

This master of laws degree requirement is reiterated in LEBMO No. 17, Series of 2018 (Supplemental Regulations on
the Minimum Academic Requirement of Master of Laws Degree for Deans and Law Professors/Lecturers/Instructors
in Law Schools), as follows:

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B) For Members of the Law Faculty

SEC. 6. For purposes of determining compliance with the minimum academic requirement of a Ll.M. degree for the
members of the law faculty in law schools required under Section 50 of LEBMO No. 1, Series of 2011 and Resolution
No. 2014-02, the required percentage of holders of Ll.M. shall be computed based on the aggregate units of all
courses/subjects offered during the semester by the law school.

SEC. 7. Within thirty (30) days upon completion the effectivity this of this memorandum [sic], the President of the
HEI and the Dean of each law school shall jointly submit to the LEB separate certification of the total teaching
assignments/load for the 1st Semester and 2nd Semester of the Academic Year 2017-2018 in the prescribed matrix
form containing the names of every faculty member, his/her highest academic law degree, qualification for ,
exemption from the Ll.M. requirement, if applicable, courses/subjects assigned to teach, and academic weight of each
course/subject, and a disclosure whether or not the law school is compliant with the prescribed percentage of Ll.M.
holders for faculty members. Thereafter, the same certification shall be submitted for every regular semester not later
than 45 days from the start of the semester.

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SEC. 12. Law schools failing to meet the prescribed percentage of its faculty members required to have Ll.M. degrees
shall be imposed the appropriate administrative sanction specified under Resolution No. 2014-02. (Emphases
supplied)

To be sure, under its supervisory and regulatory power, the LEB can prescribe the minimum qualifications of faculty
members. This much was affirmed by the Court when it approved the CLEBM's proposal to revise the powers of LEB
under R.A. No. 7662, but nevertheless retaining the LEB's power to "provide for minimum qualifications for faculty
members of law schools." As worded, the assailed clauses of Section 7(c) and 7(e) insofar as they give LEB the power
to prescribe the minimum qualifications of faculty members are in tune with the reasonable supervision and regulation
clause and do not infringe upon the academic freedom of law schools.

Moreover, this minimum qualification can be a master of laws degree. In University of the East v. Pepanio,281 the
Court held that the requirement of a masteral degree, albeit for tertiary education teachers, is not unreasonable. Thus:

The requirement of a masteral degree for tertiary education teachers is not unreasonable. The operation of
educational institutions involves public interest. The government has a right to ensure that only qualified
persons, in possession of sufficient academic knowledge and teaching skills, are allowed to teach in such
institutions. Government regulation in this field of human activity is desirable for protecting, not only the
students, but the public as well from ill-prepared teachers, who are lacking in the required scientific or
technical knowledge. They may be required to take an examination or to possess postgraduate degrees as
prerequisite to employment. (Emphasis supplied)

This was reiterated in Son v. University of Santo Tomas,282 as follows:

As early as in 1992, the requirement of a Master's degree in the undergraduate program professor's field of instruction
has been in place, through DECS Order 92 (series of 1992, August 10, 1992) or the Revised Manual of Regulations
for Private Schools. Article IX, Section 44, paragraph [1(a)] thereof provides that college faculty members must have
a master's degree in their field of instruction as a minimum qualification for teaching in a private educational
institution and acquiring regular status therein.

DECS Order 92, Series of 1992 was promulgated by the DECS in the exercise of its [rule]-making power as provided
for under Section 70 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 232, otherwise known as the Education Act of 1982. As such, it has the
force and effect of law. In University of the East v. Pepanio, the requirement of a masteral degree for tertiary
education teachers was held to be not unreasonable but rather in accord with the public interest.

xxxx

From a strict legal viewpoint, the parties are both in violation of the law: respondents, for maintaining professors
without the mandated masteral degrees, and for petitioners, agreeing to be employed despite knowledge of their lack
of the necessary qualifications. Petitioners cannot therefore insist to be employed by UST since they still do not
possess the required master's degrees; the fact that UST continues to hire and maintain professors without the
necessary master's degrees is not a ground for claiming illegal dismissal, or even reinstatement. As far as the law is
concerned, respondents are in violation of the CHED regulations for continuing the practice of hiring unqualified
teaching personnel; but the law cannot come to the aid of petitioners on this sole ground. As between the parties
herein, they are in pari delicto.

xxxx

The minimum requirement of a master's degree in the undergraduate teacher's field of instruction has been cemented
in DECS Order 92, Series of 1992. Both petitioners and respondents have been violating it. The fact that government
has not cracked down on violators, or that it chose not to strictly implement the provision, does not erase the violations
committed by erring educational institutions, including the parties herein; it simply means that government will not
punish these violations for the meantime. The parties cannot escape its concomitant effects, nonetheless. And if
respondents knew the overwhelming importance of the said provision and the public interest involved - as they now
fiercely advocate to their favor - they should have complied with the same as soon as it was promulgated.
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xxxx

In addition, the Court already held in Herrera-Manaoisi v. St. Scholastica's College that -

Notwithstanding the existence of the SSC Faculty Manual, Manaois still cannot legally acquire a permanent status of
employment. Private educational institutions must still supplementarily refer to the prevailing standards,
qualifications, and conditions set by the appropriate government agencies (presently the Department of Education, the
Commission on Higher Education, and the Teclmical Education and Skills Development Authority). This limitation
on the right of private schools, colleges, and universities to select and determine the employment status of their
academic personnel has been imposed by the state in view of the public interest nature of educational institutions, so
as to ensure the quality and competency of our schools and educators. (Internal citations omitted)

Thus, the masteral degree required of law faculty members and dean, and the doctoral degree required of a dean of a
graduate school of law are, in fact, minimum reasonable requirements. However, it is the manner by which the LEB
had exercised this power through its various issuances that prove to be unreasonable.

On this point, the amicus curiae, Dean Sedfrey M. Candelaria, while admitting that the masteral degree requirement is
a "laudable aim" of the LEB, nevertheless adds that the LEB-imposed period of compliance is unreasonable given the
logistical and financial obstacles:

The masteral degree requirement is a laudable aim of LEB, but the possibility of meeting the LEB period of
compliance is unreasonable and unrealistic in the light of logistical and financial considerations confronting the deans
and professors, including the few law schools offering graduate degrees in law.

To illustrate, to the best of my knowledge there are no more than six (6) graduate schools of law around the country to
service potential applicants. Those who have opted for graduate studies in law find it very costly to fly to the venue.
While one or two programs may have been delivered outside the provider's home school venue to reach out to
graduate students outside the urban centers, pedagogical standards are often compromised in the conduct of the
modules. This is even aggravated by the fact that very few applicants can afford to go into full-time graduate studies
considering that most deans and professors of law are in law practice. Perhaps, LEB should work in consultation with
PALS in designing a cost-effective but efficient delivery system of any graduate program in law, [especially] for
deans and law professors.283

Further, the mandatory character of the master of laws degree requirement, under pain of downgrading, phase-out and
closure of the law school, is in sharp contrast with the previous requirement under DECS Order No. 27-1989 which
merely prefer faculty members who are holders of a graduate law degree, or its equivalent. The LEB's authority to
review the strength or weakness of the faculty on the basis of experience or length of time devoted to teaching violates
an institution's right to set its own faculty standards. The LEB also imposed strict reportorial requirements that
infringe on the institution's right to select its teachers which, for instance, may be based on expertise even with little
teaching experience. Moreover, in case a faculty member seeks to be exempted, he or she must prove to the LEB, and
not to the concerned institution, that he or she is an expert in the field, thus, usurping the freedom of the institution to
evaluate the qualifications of its own teachers on an individual basis.

Also, while the LEB requires of faculty members and deans to obtain a master of laws degree before they are allowed
to teach and administer a law school, respectively, it is ironic that the LEB, under Resolution No. 2019-406, in fact
considers the basic law degrees of Ll.B. or J.D. as already equivalent to a doctorate degree in other non-law academic
disciplines for purposes of "appointment/promotion, ranking, and compensation."

In this connection, the LEB also prescribes who may or may not be considered as full-time faculty, the classification
of the members of their faculty, as well as the faculty load, including the regulation of work hours, all in violation of
the academic freedom of law schools. LEBMO No. 2 provides:

SEC. 33. Full-time and Part-time Faculty. There are two general kinds of faculty members, the full-time and part-time
faculty members.

a) A full-time faculty member is one:

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 1) Who possesses the minimum qualification of a member of the faculty as prescribed in
Sections 50 and 51 of LEBMO No. 1;

2) Who devotes not less than eight (8) hours of work for the law school;

3) Who has no other occupation elsewhere requiring regular hours of work, except when
permitted by the higher education institution of which the law school is a part; and

4) Who is not teaching full-time in any other higher education institution.

b) A part-time faculty member is one who does not meet the qualifications of a full-time professor as
enumerated in the preceding number.

SEC. 34. Faculty Classification and Ranking. Members of the faculty may be classified, in the discretion of the higher
education institution of which the law school is a part, according to academic proceeding, training and scholarship into
Professor, Associate Professor, Assistant Professor, and Instructor.

Part-time members of the faculty may be classified as Lecturers, Assistant Professorial Lecturers, Associate
Professorial Lecturers and Professorial Lecturers. The law schools shall devise their scheme of classification and
promotion not inconsistent with these rules.

SEC. 35. Faculty Load. Generally, no member of the faculty should teach more than 3 consecutive hours in any
subject nor should he or she be loaded with subjects requiring more than three preparations or three different subjects
(no matter the number of units per subject) in a day.

However, under exceptionally meritorious circumstances, the law deans may allow members of the faculty to teach 4
hours a day provided that there is a break of 30 minutes between the first 2 and the last 2 hours. (Emphases supplied)

The LEB is also allowed to revoke permits or recognitions given to law schools when the LEB deems that there is
gross incompetence on the part of the dean and the corps of professors or instructors under Section 41.2(d) of LEBMO
No. 1-2011, thus:

SEC. 41.2. Permits or recognitions may be revoked, or recognitions reverted to permit status for just causes including
but not limited to:

a) fraud or deceit committed by the institution in connection with its application to the Board;

b) the unauthorized operation of a school of law or a branch or an extension of a law school;

c) mismanagement or gross inefficiency in the operation of a law school;

d) gross incompetence on the part of the dean and the corps of professors or instructors;

e) violation of approved standards governing institutional operations, announcements and

advertisements;

f) transfer of the school of law to a site or location detrimental to the interests of the students and
inimical to the fruitful and promising study of law;

g) repeated failure of discipline on the part of the student body; and

h) other grounds for the closure of schools and academic institutions as provided for in the rules and
regulations of the Commission on Higher Education.284 (Emphasis supplied)

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In this regard, the LEB is actually assessing the teaching performance of faculty members and when such is
determined by the LEB as constituting gross incompetence, the LEB may mete out penalties, thus, usurping the law
school's right to determine for itself the competence of its faculty members.

4 Section 2, par. 2 and Section 7(g)

on legal apprenticeship and legal internship

While the clause "legal apprenticeship" under Section 2, par. 2 and Section 7(g) on legal internship, as plainly worded,
cannot immediately be interpreted as encroaching upon institutional academic freedom, the manner by which LEB
exercised this power through several of its issuances undoubtedly show that the LEB controls and dictates upon law
schools how such apprenticeship and internship programs should be undertaken.

Pursuant to its power under Section 7(g), the LEB passed Resolution No. 2015-08 (Prescribing the Policy and Rules in
the Establishment of a Legal Aid Clinic in Law Schools) wherein it classified legal aid clinics into three types: (1) a
legal aid clinic which is an outreach project of a law school; (2) a legal aid clinic which entitles the participating
student to curricular credits; and (3) a legal aid clinic that entitles the participating student to avail of the privileges
under Rule 138-A of the Rules of Court.

Pertinent to the third type, the LEB requires the law schools to comply with the following rules:

xxxx

b) Implementing Rules

(1) A LAC should be established by the law school.

(2) The law school should formulate its Clinical Legal Education Program and submit it to the
Legal Education board for its assessment and evaluation.

(3) If Legal Education Board finds the Clinical Legal Education Program to be proper and in
order it shall endorse it to the Supreme Court for its approval.

(4) Once approved by the Supreme Court, fourth (4th) year law students in that law school enrolled in
it shall be allowed to practice law on a limited manner pursuant to the provisions of Rule 138-A of the
Rules of Court. (Emphasis supplied)

Further, Section 24(c), Article IV of LEBMO No. 2 prescribes the activities that should be included in the law school's
apprenticeship program, as follows:

Article IV
Law School: Administrative Matters and Opening of Branches or Extension Classes

SEC. 24. Administrative Matters.

xxxx

c) Apprenticeship Program. The apprenticeship program should be closely supervised by the Dean or a member of the
faculty assigned by the Dean to do the task. The apprenticeship program should at least include any of the following
activities:

1) Preparation of legal documents

2) Interviewing clients

3) Courtroom observation and participation

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 4) Observation and assistance in police investigations, inquests and preliminary investigations

5) Legal counseling

6) Legal assistance to detention prisoners

7) For working students, participation in the legal work of the legal section or office of the employer-
entity x x x (Emphasis supplied)

Relatedly, Section 59(d) of LEBMO No. 1-2011, provides:

Article IV
Grading System

SEC. 59. Grading System. - The law school, in the exercise of academic freedom, shall devise its own grading system
provided that on the first day of classes, the students are apprised of the grading system and provided further that the
following are observed:

xxxx

(d) When apprenticeship is required and the student does not complete the mandated number of apprenticeship hours,
or the person supervising the apprenticeship program deems the performance of the student unsatisfactory, the dean
shall require of the student such number of hours more in apprenticeship as will fulfill the purposes of the
apprenticeship program.285 (Emphasis supplied)

These provisions unduly interfere with the discretion of a law school regarding its curriculum, particularly its
apprenticeship program. Plainly, these issuances are beyond mere supervision and regulation.

III.
Conclusion

In general, R.A. No. 7662, as a law meant to uplift the quality of legal education, does not encroach upon the Court's
jurisdiction to promulgate rules under Section 5(5), Article VIII of the Constitution. It is well-within the jurisdiction of
the State, as an exercise of its inherent police power, to lay down laws relative to legal education, the same being
imbued with public interest.

While the Court is undoubtedly an interested stakeholder in legal education, it cannot assume jurisdiction where it has
none. Instead, in judicial humility, the Court affirms that the supervision and regulation of legal education is a political
exercise, where judges are nevertheless still allowed to participate not as an independent branch of government, but as
part of the sovereign people.

Nevertheless, inasmuch as the power to promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional
rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and
legal assistance to the underprivileged is settled as belonging exclusively to the Court, certain provisions and clauses
of R.A. No. 7662 which, by its plain language and meaning, go beyond legal education and intrude upon the Court's
exclusive jurisdiction suffer from patent unconstitutionality and should therefore be struck down.

Moreover, the exercise of the power to supervise and regulate legal education is circumscribed by the normative
contents of the Constitution itself, that is, it must be reasonably exercised. Reasonable exercise means that it should
not amount to control and that it respects the Constitutionallyguaranteed institutional academic freedom and the
citizen's right to quality and accessible education. Transgression of these limitations renders the power and the
exercise thereof unconstitutional.

Accordingly, the Court recognizes the power of the LEB under its charter to prescribe minimum standards for law
admission. The PhiLSAT, when administered as an aptitude test to guide law schools in measuring the applicants'
aptness for legal education along with such other admissions policy that the law school may consider, is such
minimum standard.
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However, the PhiLSAT presently operates not only as a measure of an applicant's aptitude for law school. The
PhiLSAT, as a pass or fail exam, dictates upon law schools who among the examinees are to be admitted to any law
program. When the PhiLSAT is used to exclude, qualify, and restrict admissions to law schools, as its present design
mandates, the PhiLSAT goes beyond mere supervision and regulation, violates institutional academic freedom,
becomes unreasonable and therefore, unconstitutional. In striking down these objectionable clauses in the PhiLSAT,
the State's inherent power to protect public interest by improving legal education is neither emasculated nor
compromised. Rather, the institutional academic freedom of law schools to determine for itself who to admit pursuant
to their respective admissions policies is merely protected. In turn, the recognition of academic discretion comes with
the inherent limitation that its exercise should not be whimsical, arbitrary, or gravely abused.

In similar vein, certain LEB issuances which exceed the powers granted under its charter should be nullified for
being ultra vires.

As in all levels and areas of education, the improvement of legal education indeed deserves serious attention. The
parties are at a consensus that legal education should be made relevant and progressive. Reforms for a more
responsive legal education are constantly introduced and are evolving. The PhiLSAT, for instance, is not a perfect
initiative. Through time and a better cooperation between the LEB and the law schools in the Philippines, a
standardized and acceptable law admission examination may be configured. The flaws which the Court assessed to be
unconstitutional are meanwhile removed, thereby still allowing the PhiLSAT to develop into maturity. It is, thus,
strongly urged that recommendations on how to improve legal education, including tools for screening entrants to law
school, reached possibly through consultative summits, be taken in careful consideration in further issuances or
legislations.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are PARTLY GRANTED.

The jurisdiction of the Legal Education Board over legal education is UPHELD.

The Court further declares:

As CONSTITUTIONAL:

1. Section 7(c) of R.A. No. 7662 insofar as it gives the Legal Education Board the power to set the standards
of accreditation for law schools taking into account, among others, the qualifications of the members of the
faculty without encroaching upon the academic freedom of institutions of higher learning; and

2. Section 7(e) of R.A. No. 7662 insofar as it gives the Legal Education Board the power to prescribe the
minimum requirements for admission to legal education and minimum qualifications of faculty members
without encroaching upon the academic freedom of institutions of higher learning.

As UNCONSTITUTIONAL for encroaching upon the power of the Court:

1. Section 2, par. 2 of R.A. No. 7662 insofar as it unduly includes "continuing legal education" as an aspect of
legal education which is made subject to Executive supervision and control;

2. Section 3(a)(2) of R.A. No. 7662 and Section 7(2) of LEBMO No. 1-2011 on the objective of legal
education to increase awareness among members of the legal profession of the needs of the poor, deprived and
oppressed sectors of society;

3. Section 7(g) of R.A. No. 7662 and Section 11(g) of LEBMO No. 1-2011 insofar as it gives the Legal
Education Board the power to establish a law practice internship as a requirement for taking the Bar; and

4. Section 7(h) of R.A. No. 7662 and Section 11(h) of LEBMO No. 1-2011 insofar as it gives the Legal
Education Board the power to adopt a system of mandatory continuing legal education and to provide for the
mandatory attendance of practicing lawyers in such courses and for such duration as it may deem necessary.

As UNCONSTITUTIONAL for being ultra vires:

110
 1. The act and practice of the Legal Education Board of excluding, restricting, and qualifying admissions to
law schools in violation of the institutional academic freedom on who to admit, particularly:

a. Paragraph 9 of LEBMO No. 7-2016 which provides that all college graduates or graduating
students applying for admission to the basic law course shall be required to pass the PhiLSAT as a
requirement for admission to any law school in the Philippines and that no applicant shall be admitted
for enrollment as a first year student in the basic law courses leading to a degree of either Bachelor of
Laws or Juris Doctor unless he/she has passed the PhiLSAT taken within two years before the start of
studies for the basic law course;

b. LEBMC No. 18-2018 which prescribes the passing of the PhiLSAT as a prerequisite for admission
to law schools; Accordingly, the temporary restraining order issued on March 12, 2019 enjoining the
Legal Education Board from implementing LEBMC No. 18-2018 is made PERMANENT. The
regular admission of students who were conditionally admitted and enrolled is left to the discretion of
the law schools in the exercise of their academic freedom; and

c. Sections 15, 16, and 17 of LEBMO No. 1-2011;

2. The act and practice of the Legal Education Board of dictating the qualifications and classification of
faculty members, dean, and dean of graduate schools of law in violation of institutional academic freedom on
who may teach, particularly:

a. Sections 41.2(d), 50, 51, and 52 of LEBMO No. 1-2011;

b. Resolution No. 2014-02;

c. Sections 31(2), 33, 34, and 35 of LEBMO No. 2;

d. LEBMO No. 17-2018; and

3. The act and practice of the Legal Education Board of dictating the policies on the establishment of legal
apprenticeship and legal internship programs in violation of institutional academic freedom on what to teach,
particularly:

a. Resolution No. 2015-08;

b. Section 24(c) of LEBMO No. 2; and

c. Section 59(d) of LEBMO No. 1-2011.

SO ORDERED.

Bersamin, C. J., I join the separate dissenting and concurring opinion of J. Leonen.

Carpio, Carandang, Inting, and Zalameda, JJ., concur.

Peralta, J., no part.

Perlas-Bernabe, J., Please see separate concurring opinion.

Leonen, J., See separate dissenting and concurring opinion.

Jardeleza, J., Please see separate concurring and dissenting opinion.

Caguioa, J., Please see separate concurring.

111
A. Reyes, Jr., J., Please see my concurring opinion.

Gesmundo, J., Please separate concurring and dissenting opinion.

Hernando, J., on official business.

Lazaro-Javier, J., Please see concurring and dissenting opinion.

NOTICE OF JUDGMENT

Sirs/Mesdames:

Please take notice that on September 10, 2019 a Decision, copy attached herewith, was rendered by the Supreme
Court in the above-entitled cases, the original of which was received by this Office on November 29, 2019 at 3:40
p.m.

Very truly yours,

(SGD) EDGAR O. ARICHETA

Clerk of Court

EN BANC

B. M. No. 1154             June 8, 2004

IN THE MATTER OF THE DISQUALIFICATION OF BAR EXAMINEE HARON S. MELING IN THE 2002
BAR EXAMINATIONS AND FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION AS MEMBER OF THE PHILIPPINE
SHARI’A BAR, ATTY. FROILAN R. MELENDREZ, petitioner.

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 RESOLUTION

TINGA, J.:

The Court is here confronted with a Petition that seeks twin reliefs, one of which is ripe while the other has been
rendered moot by a supervening event.

The antecedents follow.

On October 14, 2002, Atty. Froilan R. Melendrez (Melendrez) filed with the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC)
a Petition1 to disqualify Haron S. Meling (Meling) from taking the 2002 Bar Examinations and to impose on him the
appropriate disciplinary penalty as a member of the Philippine Shari’a Bar.

In the Petition, Melendrez alleges that Meling did not disclose in his Petition to take the 2002 Bar Examinations that
he has three (3) pending criminal cases before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Cotabato City, namely:
Criminal Cases Noa. 15685 and 15686, both for Grave Oral Defamation, and Criminal Case No. 15687 for Less
Serious Physical Injuries.

The above-mentioned cases arose from an incident which occurred on May 21, 2001, when Meling allegedly uttered
defamatory words against Melendrez and his wife in front of media practitioners and other people. Meling also
purportedly attacked and hit the face of Melendrez’ wife causing the injuries to the latter.

Furthermore, Melendrez alleges that Meling has been using the title "Attorney" in his communications, as Secretary to
the Mayor of Cotabato City, despite the fact that he is not a member of the Bar. Attached to the Petition is an
indorsement letter which shows that Meling used the appellation and appears on its face to have been received by the
Sangguniang Panglungsod of Cotabato City on November 27, 2001.

Pursuant to this Court’s R E S O L U T I O N2 dated December 3, 2002, Meling filed his Answer with the OBC.

In his Answer,3 Meling explains that he did not disclose the criminal cases filed against him by Melendrez because
retired Judge Corocoy Moson, their former professor, advised him to settle his misunderstanding with Melendrez.
Believing in good faith that the case would be settled because the said Judge has moral ascendancy over them, he
being their former professor in the College of Law, Meling considered the three cases that actually arose from a single
incident and involving the same parties as "closed and terminated." Moreover, Meling denies the charges and adds that
the acts complained of do not involve moral turpitude.

As regards the use of the title "Attorney," Meling admits that some of his communications really contained the word
"Attorney" as they were, according to him, typed by the office clerk.

In its Report and Recommendation4 dated December 8, 2003, the OBC disposed of the charge of non-disclosure
against Meling in this wise:

The reasons of Meling in not disclosing the criminal cases filed against him in his petition to take the Bar
Examinations are ludicrous. He should have known that only the court of competent jurisdiction can dismiss
cases, not a retired judge nor a law professor. In fact, the cases filed against Meling are still pending.
Furthermore, granting arguendo that these cases were already dismissed, he is still required to disclose the
same for the Court to ascertain his good moral character. Petitions to take the Bar Examinations are made
under oath, and should not be taken lightly by an applicant.

The merit of the cases against Meling is not material in this case. What matters is his act of concealing them which
constitutes dishonesty.

In Bar Matter 1209, the Court stated, thus:

It has been held that good moral character is what a person really is, as distinguished from good reputation or
from the opinion generally entertained of him, the estimate in which he is held by the public in the place
where he is known. Moral character is not a subjective term but one which corresponds to objective reality.
113
 The standard of personal and professional integrity is not satisfied by such conduct as it merely enables a
person to escape the penalty of criminal law. Good moral character includes at least common honesty.

The non-disclosure of Meling of the criminal cases filed against him makes him also answerable under Rule
7.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which states that "a lawyer shall be answerable for knowingly
making a false statement or suppressing a material fact in connection with his application for admission to
the bar."5

As regards Meling’s use of the title "Attorney", the OBC had this to say:

Anent the issue of the use of the appellation "Attorney" in his letters, the explanation of Meling is not
acceptable. Aware that he is not a member of the Bar, there was no valid reason why he signed as "attorney"
whoever may have typed the letters.

Although there is no showing that Meling is engaged in the practice of law, the fact is, he is signing his
communications as "Atty. Haron S. Meling" knowing fully well that he is not entitled thereto. As held by the
Court in Bar Matter 1209, the unauthorized use of the appellation "attorney" may render a person liable for
indirect contempt of court.6

Consequently, the OBC recommended that Meling not be allowed to take the Lawyer’s Oath and sign the Roll of
Attorneys in the event that he passes the Bar Examinations. Further, it recommended that Meling’s membership in the
Shari’a Bar be suspended until further orders from the Court. 7

We fully concur with the findings and recommendation of the OBC. Meling, however, did not pass the 2003 Bar
Examinations. This renders the Petition, insofar as it seeks to prevent Meling from taking the Lawyer’s Oath and
signing the Roll of Attorneys, moot and academic.

On the other hand, the prayer in the same Petition for the Court to impose the appropriate sanctions upon him as a
member of the Shari’a Bar is ripe for resolution and has to be acted upon.

Practice of law, whether under the regular or the Shari’a Court, is not a matter of right but merely a privilege bestowed
upon individuals who are not only learned in the law but who are also known to possess good moral character. 8 The
requirement of good moral character is not only a condition precedent to admission to the practice of law, its
continued possession is also essential for remaining in the practice of law. 9

The standard form issued in connection with the application to take the 2002 Bar Examinations requires the applicant
to aver that he or she "has not been charged with any act or omission punishable by law, rule or regulation before a
fiscal, judge, officer or administrative body, or indicted for, or accused or convicted by any court or tribunal of, any
offense or crime involving moral turpitude; nor is there any pending case or charge against him/her." Despite the
declaration required by the form, Meling did not reveal that he has three pending criminal cases. His deliberate silence
constitutes concealment, done under oath at that.

The disclosure requirement is imposed by the Court to determine whether there is satisfactory evidence of good moral
character of the applicant.10 The nature of whatever cases are pending against the applicant would aid the Court in
determining whether he is endowed with the moral fitness demanded of a lawyer. By concealing the existence of such
cases, the applicant then flunks the test of fitness even if the cases are ultimately proven to be unwarranted or
insufficient to impugn or affect the good moral character of the applicant.

Meling’s concealment of the fact that there are three (3) pending criminal cases against him speaks of his lack of the
requisite good moral character and results in the forfeiture of the privilege bestowed upon him as a member of the
Shari’a Bar.

Moreover, his use of the appellation "Attorney", knowing fully well that he is not entitled to its use, cannot go
unchecked. In Alawi v. Alauya,11 the Court had the occasion to discuss the impropriety of the use of the title
"Attorney" by members of the Shari’a Bar who are not likewise members of the Philippine Bar. The respondent
therein, an executive clerk of court of the 4th Judicial Shari’a District in Marawi City, used the title "Attorney" in

114
several correspondence in connection with the rescission of a contract entered into by him in his private capacity. The
Court declared that:

…persons who pass the Shari’a Bar are not full-fledged members of the Philippine Bar, hence, may only
practice law before Shari’a courts. While one who has been admitted to the Shari’a Bar, and one who has been
admitted to the Philippine Bar, may both be considered "counselors," in the sense that they give counsel or
advice in a professional capacity, only the latter is an "attorney." The title "attorney" is reserved to those who,
having obtained the necessary degree in the study of law and successfully taken the Bar Examinations, have
been admitted to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and remain members thereof in good standing; and it is
they only who are authorized to practice law in this jurisdiction. 12

The judiciary has no place for dishonest officers of the court, such as Meling in this case. The solemn task of
administering justice demands that those who are privileged to be part of service therein, from the highest official to
the lowliest employee, must not only be competent and dedicated, but likewise live and practice the virtues of honesty
and integrity. Anything short of this standard would diminish the public's faith in the Judiciary and constitutes
infidelity to the constitutional tenet that a public office is a public trust.

In Leda v. Tabang, supra, the respondent concealed the fact of his marriage in his application to take the Bar
examinations and made conflicting submissions before the Court. As a result, we found the respondent grossly unfit
and unworthy to continue in the practice of law and suspended him therefrom until further orders from the Court.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is granted insofar as it seeks the imposition of appropriate sanctions upon Haron S.
Meling as a member of the Philippine Shari’a Bar. Accordingly, the membership of Haron S. Meling in the Philippine
Shari’a Bar is hereby SUSPENDED until further orders from the Court, the suspension to take effect immediately.
Insofar as the Petition seeks to prevent Haron S. Meling from taking the Lawyer’s Oath and signing the Roll of
Attorneys as a member of the Philippine Bar, the same is DISMISSED for having become moot and academic.

Copies of this Decision shall be circulated to all the Shari’a Courts in the country for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., Puno, Vitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez,
Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., and Azcuna, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

B.M. No. 712 July 13, 1995

IN THE MATTER OF THE ADMISSION TO THE BAR AND OATH-TAKING OF SUCCESSFUL BAR
APPLICANT AL C. ARGOSINO, petitioner.

115
 RESOLUTION

FELICIANO, J.:

A criminal information was filed on 4 February 1992 with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 101,
charging Mr. A.C. Argosino along with thirteen (13) other individuals, with the crime of homicide in connection with
the death of one Raul Camaligan on 8 September 1991. The death of Raul Camaligan stemmed from the infliction of
severe physical injuries upon him in the course of "hazing" conducted as part of university fraternity initiation rites.
Mr. Argosino and his co-accused then entered into plea bargaining with the prosecution and as a result of such
bargaining, pleaded guilty to the lesser offense of homicide through reckless imprudence. This plea was accepted by
the trial court. In a judgment dated 11 February 1993, each of the fourteen (14) accused individuals was sentenced to
suffer imprisonment for a period ranging from two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day to four (4) years.

Eleven (11) days later, Mr. Argosino and his colleagues filed an application for probation with the lower court. The
application for probation was granted in an Order dated 18 June 1993 issued by Regional Trial Court Judge Pedro T.
Santiago. The period of probation was set at two (2) years, counted from the probationer's initial report to the
probation officer assigned to supervise him.

Less than a month later, on 13 July 1993, Mr. Argosino filed a Petition for Admission to Take the 1993 Bar
Examinations. In this Petition, he disclosed the fact of his criminal conviction and his then probation status. He was
allowed to take the 1993 Bar Examinations in this Court's En Banc Resolution dated 14 August 1993.1 He passed the
Bar Examination. He was not, however, allowed to take the lawyer's oath of office.

On 15 April 1994, Mr. Argosino filed a Petition with this Court to allow him to take the attorney's oath of office and
to admit him to the practice of law, averring that Judge Pedro T. Santiago had terminated his probation period by
virtue of an Order dated 11 April 1994. We note that his probation period did not last for more than ten (10) months
from the time of the Order of Judge Santiago granting him probation dated 18 June 1993. Since then, Mr. Argosino
has filed three (3) Motions for Early Resolution of his Petition for Admission to the Bar.

The practice of law is not a natural, absolute or constitutional right to be granted to everyone who demands it. Rather,
it is a high personal privilege limited to citizens of good moral character, with special educational qualifications, duly
ascertained and certified.2 The essentiality of good moral character in those who would be lawyers is stressed in the
following excerpts which we quote with approval and which we regard as having persuasive effect:

In Re Farmer: 3

xxx xxx xxx

This "upright character" prescribed by the statute, as a condition precedent to the applicant's right to
receive a license to practice law in North Carolina, and of which he must, in addition to other
requisites, satisfy the court, includes all the elements necessary to make up such a character. It is
something more than an absence of bad character. It is the good name which the applicant has
acquired, or should have acquired, through association with his fellows. It means that he must have
conducted himself as a man of upright character ordinarily would, or should, or does. Such character
expresses itself, not in negatives nor in following the line of least resistance, but quite often, in the
will to do the unpleasant thing if it is right, and the resolve not to do the pleasant thing if it is wrong. .
..

xxx xxx xxx

And we may pause to say that this requirement of the statute is eminently proper. Consider for a
moment the duties of a lawyer. He is sought as counsellor, and his advice comes home, in its ultimate
effect, to every man's fireside. Vast interests are committed to his care; he is the recipient
of unbounded trust and confidence; he deals with is client's property, reputation, his life, his all. An

116
 attorney at law is a sworn officer of the Court, whose chief concern, as such, is to aid the
administration of justice. . . .

xxx xxx xxx4

In Re Application of Kaufman,5 citing Re Law Examination of 1926 (1926) 191 Wis 359, 210 NW
710:

It can also be truthfully said that there exists nowhere greater temptations to deviate from the straight
and narrow path than in the multiplicity of circumstances that arise in the practice of profession. For
these reasons the wisdom of requiring an applicant for admission to the bar to possess a high moral
standard therefore becomes clearly apparent, and the board of bar examiners as an arm of the court, is
required to cause a minute examination to be made of the moral standard of each candidate for
admission to practice. . . . It needs no further argument, therefore, to arrive at the conclusion that the
highest degree of scrutiny must be exercised as to the moral character of a candidate who presents
himself for admission to the bar. The evil must, if possible, be successfully met at its very source, and
prevented, for, after a lawyer has once been admitted, and has pursued his profession, and has
established himself therein, a far more difficult situation is presented to the court when proceedings
are instituted for disbarment and for the recalling and annulment of his license.

In Re Keenan:6

The right to practice law is not one of the inherent rights of every citizen, as in the right to carry on an
ordinary trade or business. It is a peculiar privilege granted and continued only to those who
demonstrate special fitness in intellectual attainment and in moral character. All may aspire to it on
an absolutely equal basis, but not all will attain it. Elaborate machinery has been set up to test
applicants by standards fair to all and to separate the fit from the unfit. Only those who pass the test
are allowed to enter the profession, and only those who maintain the standards are allowed to remain
in it.

Re Rouss:7

Membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions, and a fair private and professional
character is one of them; to refuse admission to an unworthy applicant is not to punish him for past
offense: an examination into character, like the examination into learning, is merely a test of fitness.

Cobb vs. Judge of Superior Court:8

Attorney's are licensed because of their learning and ability, so that they may not only protect the
rights and interests of their clients, but be able to assist court in the trial of the cause. Yet what
protection to clients or assistance to courts could such agents give? They are required to be of good
moral character, so that the agents and officers of the court, which they are, may not bring discredit
upon the due administration of the law, and it is of the highest possible consequence that both those
who have not such qualifications in the first instance, or who, having had them, have fallen
therefrom, shall not be permitted to appear in courts to aid in the administration of justice.

It has also been stressed that the requirement of good moral character is, in fact, of greater importance so far as the
general public and the proper administration of justice are concerned, than the possession of legal learning:

. . . (In re Applicants for License, 55 S.E. 635, 143 N.C. 1, 10 L.R.A. [N.S.] 288, 10 Ann./Cas. 187):

The public policy of our state has always been to admit no person to the practice of
the law unless he covered an upright moral character. The possession of this by the
attorney is more important, if anything, to the public and to the proper administration
of justice than legal learning. Legal learning may be acquired in after years, but if the
applicant passes the threshold of the bar with a bad moral character the chances are
that his character will remain bad, and that he will become a disgrace instead of an
117
 ornament to his great calling — a curse instead of a benefit to his community — a
Quirk, a Gammon or a Snap, instead of a Davis, a Smith or a Ruffin. 9

All aspects of moral character and behavior may be inquired into in respect of those seeking admission to the Bar. The
scope of such inquiry is, indeed, said to be properly broader than inquiry into the moral proceedings for disbarment:

Re Stepsay: 10

The inquiry as to the moral character of an attorney in a proceeding for his admission to practice
is broader in scope than in a disbarment proceeding.

Re Wells: 11

. . . that an applicant's contention that upon application for admission to the California Bar the court
cannot reject him for want of good moral character unless it appears that he has been guilty of acts
which would be cause for his disbarment or suspension, could not be sustained; that the inquiry is
broader in its scope than that in a disbarment proceeding, and the court may receive any evidence
which tends to show the applicant's character as respects honesty, integrity, and general
morality, and may no doubt refuse admission upon proofs that might not establish his guilt of any of
the acts declared to be causes for disbarment.

The requirement of good moral character to be satisfied by those who would seek admission to the bar must of
necessity be more stringent than the norm of conduct expected from members of the general public. There is a very
real need to prevent a general perception that entry into the legal profession is open to individuals with inadequate
moral qualifications. The growth of such a perception would signal the progressive destruction of our people's
confidence in their courts of law and in our legal system as we know it. 12

Mr. Argosino's participation in the deplorable "hazing" activities certainly fell far short of the required standard of
good moral character. The deliberate (rather than merely accidental or inadvertent) infliction of severe physical
injuries which proximately led to the death of the unfortunate Raul Camaligan, certainly indicated serious character
flaws on the part of those who inflicted such injuries. Mr. Argosino and his co-accused had failed to discharge their
moral duty to protect the life and well-being of a "neophyte" who had, by seeking admission to the fraternity involved,
reposed trust and confidence in all of them that, at the very least, he would not be beaten and kicked to death like a
useless stray dog. Thus, participation in the prolonged and mindless physical beatings inflicted upon Raul Camaligan
constituted evident rejection of that moral duty and was totally irresponsible behavior, which makes impossible a
finding that the participant was then possessed of good moral character.

Now that the original period of probation granted by the trial court has expired, the Court is prepared to consider de
novo the question of whether applicant A.C. Argosino has purged himself of the obvious deficiency in moral character
referred to above. We stress that good moral character is a requirement possession of which must be demonstrated not
only at the time of application for permission to take the bar examinations but also, and more importantly, at the time
of application for admission to the bar and to take the attorney's oath of office.

Mr. Argosino must, therefore, submit to this Court, for its examination and consideration, evidence that he may be
now regarded as complying with the requirement of good moral character imposed upon those seeking admission to
the bar. His evidence may consist, inter alia, of sworn certifications from responsible members of the community who
have a good reputation for truth and who have actually known Mr. Argosino for a significant period of time,
particularly since the judgment of conviction was rendered by Judge Santiago. He should show to the Court how he
has tried to make up for the senseless killing of a helpless student to the family of the deceased student and to the
community at large. Mr. Argosino must, in other words, submit relevant evidence to show that he is a different person
now, that he has become morally fit for admission to the ancient and learned profession of the law.

Finally, Mr. Argosino is hereby DIRECTED to inform this Court, by appropriate written manifestation, of the names
and addresses of the father and mother (in default thereof, brothers and sisters, if any, of Raul Camaligan), within ten
(10) day from notice hereof. Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished to the parents or brothers and sisters, if any, of
Raul Camaligan.

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Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero and Melo, JJ., concur.

Bellosillo, J. is on leave.

EN BANC

December 5, 2017

119
A.C. No. 10758

ATTY. ROSITA L. DELA FUENTE TORRES, ET AL, Petitioner

vs.
ATTY. BAYANI P. DALANGIN, Respondent

x-----------------------x

GLENDA ALVARO, Petitioner
vs.
ATTY. BAYANI P. DALANGIN, Respondent

x-----------------------x

ATTY. BAYANI P. DALANGIN, Petitioner

vs.
ATTY. ROSITA L. DELA FUENTE TORRES AND ATTY. AVE.LINO ANDRES, Respondent

x-----------------------x

ATTY. BAYANI P. DALANGIN, Petitioner

vs.
ATTY. ROSITA L. DELA FUENTE TORRES, Respondent

DECISION

REYES, JR, J.:

These are four administrative complaints that were separately filed with the Commission on Bar Discipline of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) by and against substantially the same parties, particularly:

(l) CBD Case No. 11-3215 for gross immorality, malpractice and gross misconduct filed by Atty. Rosita L. Dela
Fuente-Torres (Atty. Torres). et al., against Atty. Bayani P. Dalangin (Atty. Dalangin) and docketed before the Court
as A.C. No. l 0758:

(2) CBD Case No. 12-3292 for gross misconduct filed by Glenda Alvaro (Alvaro) against Atty. Dalangin and
docketed before the Court as A.C. No. 10759;

(3) CBD Case No. 12-3369 for gross misconduct, violation of the lawyer’s oath and violation of Canon 1 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility (CPR) filed by Atty. Dalangin against Atty. Torres and Atty. Avelino Andres (Atty.
Andres), docketed in this Court as A.C. No. 10760 ; and

(4) CBD Case No. 12-3458 for grave misconduct, dishonesty and violation of Canon 1 of the CPR filed by Atty.
Dalangin against Atty. Torres and docketed in this Court as A.C. No. 10761.

The Antecedents

A.C. No. 10758

CBD Case No. 11-3215 is a complaint1 for gross immorality, malpractice and gross misconduct filed against Atty.
Dalangin by the following complainants: (1) Atty. Torres; (2) Felicidad O. Samatra (Samatra); (3) Alvaro; (4) Mary
DF. Noveras (Noveras); and (5) Generosa S. Camacho (Camacho). 2

The complaint imputed upon Atty. Dalangin several breaches of his duties as a lawyer. First, it was alleged that Atty.
Dalangin filed against employees of the Judiciary and a fellow lawyer groundless suits, which were merely prompted

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by his loss in a case and intended to cover up his negligence as counsel. By his acts, Atty. Dalangin committed gross
misconduct, and breached Rule 18.03, Canon 18, Rules 1.02 and 1.03, Canon 1, and Canon 11 of the CPR. 3

It appeared that prior to the institution of CBD Case No. 11-3215, a complaint for disbannent was filed against Atty.
Torres by Apolonia Marzan (Marzan) and 1V1elody Valdez (Valdez), who were clients of Atty. Dalangin and the
losing parties in an unlawful detainer case decided by Presiding Judge Efren B. Mallare (Judge Mallare) of the
Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Sto. Domingo, Nueva Ecija. Marzan and Valdez later disclosed to Atty. Torres that
the filing of the disbarment case was orchestrated by Atty. Dalangin, who prepared the affidavit and instructed them to
sign it even without explaining the contents and tenor of the document.

When Marzan and Valdez eventually realized that their affidavit was used to file a disbarment complaint with the IBP
against Atty. Torres, they decided to terminate the services of Atty. Dalangin. By their new counsel's advice, Marzan
and Valdez stopped attending the disbarment hearings, and the case was eventually dismissed by the IBP. Atty.
Dalangin also caused Marzan and Valdez's filing of administrative cases against Judge Mallare and Noveras, as the
Clerk of Court of the MTC, which complaints were nonetheless likewise dismissed by the Supreme Court upon the
IBP’s recommendation.4

Second, Atty. Dalangin was accused of maintaining an illicit and immoral affair with one Julita Pascual (Pascual), a
clerk at the Public Attorney's Office (PAO) in Talavera, Nueva Ecija, where Atty. Dalangin previously worked as
district public attorney. After Atty. Dalangin had left PAO, he retained Pascual as his private secretary, who still
remained to be employed with PAO. Atty. Dalangin and Pascual had a daughter whom they named Julienne, even
when each of them had existing marriages with some other persons. 5 The affair between Atty. Dalangin and Pascual,
and the paternity of Julienne, were known to the community, especially the courts. 6 Julienne was nonetheless entered
in the civil registry as Pascual and her legal husband's own child so as to conceal the fact that Atty. Dalangin was the
real father.7 The foregoing acts allegedly breached Rule 1.01, Canon 1, and Rule 7.03, Canon 7 of the CPR.

Third, Atty. Dalangin was accused of malpractice for acts that dated back to his prior employment with PAO. He
allegedly collected attorney’s fees from indigent litigants who sought his assistance, like complainant Camacho from
whom he demanded an acceptance fee of ₱8,000.00. When Camacho explained that he could only produce ₱3,000.00,
Atty. Dalangin threw the case records on a table and retorted, "Mabubuhay ba naman ang abogado [ditto]."8 Without
prior authority from his superiors, Atty. Dalangin also willfully appeared in areas outside his jurisdiction as a district
public attorney.9

Fourth, the complaint included charges that pertained to Atty. Dalangin's handling of his court cases. It was claimed
that Atty. Dalangin misquoted jurisprudence in a pleading he filed in court, which act constituted a breach of Rule
10.02, Canon 10 of the CPR.10 In a case for robbery filed by Samatra against Pascual, Atty. Dalangin also wielded his
influence and prepared perjured statements from supposed witnesses, a clear violation of Rule 10.02, Canon 10 of the
CPR.11 Finally, Atty. Dalangin violated Rule 10.01, Canon 10 of the CPR when he submitted in a civil case fraudulent
and misleading evidence, particularly a certificate of title without the page reflecting the annotations pertinent to the
case.12

Atty. Dalangin filed his Answer and refuted all charges. 13 He denied having a hand in the preparation of the
disbarment complaint against Atty. Torres, as he argued that neither his name nor his signature appeared in the records
thereof. His relationship with Pascual, on the other hand, was only maliciously misinterpreted. He was only a close
friend of the Pascuals, and some of Pascual’s children, including Julienne, were his godchildren. 14

Atty. Dalangin likewise denied the claim that he collected attorney's fees while he worked as a PAO lawyer. Although
he admitted appearing as a public attorney in an area that was beyond his jurisdiction, the appearance 1 was with the
Regional Public Attorney's verbal authority, claimed by Atty. Dalangin to be sufficient under office practice. 15 Finally,
the alleged mistakes that he committed as counsel in specific cases' presentation of evidence had been rectified in
court.16

A.C. No. 10759

CBD Case No. 12-3292, a complaint17 for gross misconduct, was filed by Alvaro against Atty. Dalangin for an
incident that happened on the morning of November 14, 2011, while Alvaro was waiting for the start of a hearing at
the lobby of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 37, Sto. Domingo, Nueva Ecija. Upon seeing Alvaro, Atty.

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Dalangin allegedly hurled slanderous and defamatory remarks against her, as he spoke at the top of his voice and
referred to her as a "certified swindler." He also confronted and threatened Alvaro for her participation in the filing of
CBD Case No. 11-3215, and then precluded her from visiting the PAO in Talavera, Nueva Ecija. Atty. Dalangin’s
tirade was heard and witnessed by several persons, and some of them executed their respective affidavits 18 to narrate
the incident. The foregoing impelled Alvaro to seek Atty. Dalangin’s disbarment for a violation of Rules 1.01 and
1.02, Canon 1, Rule 7.03, Canon 7, and Rule 8.02, Canon 8 of the CPR.

While Atty. Dalangin admitted in his Answer 19 the alleged confrontation, he denied shouting invectives at Alvaro.
When he talked to Alvaro, he merely confronted her for what he claimed were lies declared in her affidavit in CBD
Case No. 11-3215. Atty. Dalangin also warned to seek legal remedies should Alvaro fail to substantiate the truth of
her testimonies.

Atty. Dalangin also admitted that he precluded Alvaro from visiting PAO, but explained that this was prompted by his
knowledge that Alvaro was a fixer, who used the name of the office and demanded money from indigent clients. For
Atty. Dalangin, Alvaro filed this complaint to get back at Atty. Dalangin for banning her at the PAO and depriving her
of earning from her illegal activities.20

A.C. No. 10760

The two other complaints, CBD Case No. 12-3369 and CBD Case No. 12-3458, were instituted by Atty. Dalangin.

In CBD Case No. 12-3369,21 Atty. Dalangin sought the disbarment of Atty. Torres and Atty. Andres for gross
misconduct, violation of the lawyer's oath, and breach of Rules 1.01 and 1.02, Canon 1 of the CPR. He claimed that
both lawyers conspired with their clients in filing CBD Case No. 11-3215, even as they violated Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 4200, otherwise known as the Anti-Wiretapping Act.

Submitted to support CBD Case No. 11-3215 was Nonilo Alejo’s (Alejo) affidavit, which contained a transcript of a
recorded telephone conversation between Alejo and one Wilma Pineda (Pineda). 22 The recording was without the prior
knowledge and consent of Pineda.23

As a backgrounder, Atty. Dalangin was accused in CBD Case No. 11- 3215 of fabricating testimonies against
Noveras, who was claimed to be a vital witness in a criminal case against Pascual. In an affidavit drafted by Atty.
Dalangin for Pineda, the latter complained of Noveras and Alejo’s failure to return in full the cash bond that she
posted in a case for violation of the Bouncing Checks Law, even after the case had been dismissed by the trial court.
This allegation was negated in the disputed transcript, as Pineda allegedly confirmed receiving the full ₱8,000.00, but
decided to give half thereof to Alejo for a "blow-out" after her case’s dismissal. 24

Both Atty. Andres and Atty. Torres disputed the complaint. Atty. Andres asserted that CBD Case No. 12-3369 was
filed only to harass and intimidate him, being the counsel of the complainants in CBD Case No. 11- 3215. 25 By way of
defense, he adopted a counter-affidavit 26 which he submitted in a separate complaint for violation of R.A. No. 4200
that was filed by Atty. Dalangin with the City Prosecutor of Pasig City. Atty. Andres therein argued that on the basis
of Atty. Dalangin’s allegations, the case should have been filed by Pineda against Alejo, being the purported victim
and the one who recorded the conversation, respectively.

Atty. Torres, on the other hand, pointed out that Atty. Dalangin’s reference to R.A. No. 4200 was tantamount to an
admission that the conversation actually transpired. This only confirmed a fault committed by Atty. Dalangin for the
fabrications in Pineda's earlier affidavit, which was executed purposely to destroy the credibility of Noveras. The
submission of the transcript was necessary because Atty. Dalangin’s malpractice was one of the main causes of action
in CBD Case No. 11-3215.27 Moreover, the record of the conversation between Alejo and Pineda could not be
considered a violation of R.A. No. 4200 because no wire or cable was used to tap their cellular phones. Neither party
in the conversation also complained of a supposed wiretapping. 28

A.C. No. 10761

The complaint29 docketed as CBD Case No. 12-3458 was filed solely against Atty. Torres for grave misconduct,
dishonesty for violation of Article 18330 of the Revised Penal Code, and breach of Canon 1 of the CPR.

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Atty. Dalangin faulted Atty. Torres for submitting in CBD Case No. 11-3215 Marzan and Valdez’s affidavit, 31 which
allegedly contained untruthful statements. Marzan and Valdez knew from the beginning that they were complainants
in a disbarment case against Atty. Torres. Atty. Torres, however, later made them issue the perjured statements by
using as a leverage her own complaint32 for perjury against Marzan and Valdez, who were then pressured to sign the
affidavits in exchange for the perjury case’s dismissal. 33

In her Answer34 to the complaint, Atty. Torres insisted on the truth of the statements made by Marzan and Valdez in
their affidavit in CBD Case No. 11-3215.

Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner

The four administrative complaints were eventually consolidated and jointly resolved by the IBP.

After the parties ’ filing of their respective position papers and the conduct of a series of hearings, Investigating
Commissioner Honesto A. Villamor (Investigating Commissioner) issued a Consolidated Report and
Recommendation35 dated February 11, 2013, which found sufficient bases for Atty. Dalangin’s suspension from the
practice of law for three years. Atty. Dalangin’s charges against Atty. Dela Torres and Atty. Andres, on the other
hand, were recommended for dismissal.

Thus, the Investigating Commissioner’s Consolidated Report and Recommendation ended as follows:

WHEREFORE, under the foregoing, finding that Respondent Bayani P. Dalangin violated the provisions of the [CPR]
and his Lawyer's Oath specifically on Gross Immorality, and Gross Misconduct in CBD Case No. 11-3215 and CBD
Case No. 12-3292, it is recommended that said Respondent be suspended from the practice of law for the period of
three (3) years from receipt of the order with a warning that similar offense in the future will be dealt with more
severely.

It is further recommended that the charges against Respondent Rosita L. dela Fuente Torres and Respondent Avelino
Andres in CBD Case No. 12-3369 and CBD Case No. 12-3458, for lack of merit be ordered dismissed.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.36

Recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors

On June 21, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XX-2013-768, 37 which adopted and approved
the Investigating Commissioner’s Consolidated Report and Recommendation. The resolution reads:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as
Annex "A", and finding the recommendation fully supprted by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and
rules and considering that Respondent Dalangin is guilty of gross immorality and gross misconduct, Atty. Bayani P.
Dalangin is hereby SUSPENDEDfrom the practice of law for three (3) years with Warning that repetition of the
same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely. The case against Atty. Rosita L. dela [Fuente] Torres and Atty.
Manuel Andres is hereby DISMISSED.38

Atty. Dalangin filed a motion for reconsideration, but this was denied by the IBP Board of Governors in a
Resolution39 dated August 8, 2014, which reads:

RESOLVED to DENY Respondent/Complainant Dalangin’s Motion for Reconsideration there being no cogent reason
to reverse the findings of the Commission and the Resolution subject of the motion, it being a mere reiteration of the
matters which had already been threshed out and taken into consideration. Thus, Resolution No. XX-2013-768 dated
June 1, 2013 is hereby AFFIRMED.40

On February 26, 2015, Atty. Dominic C. M. Solis, Director for Bar Discipline, IBP Commission on Bar Discipline,
transmitted the case records to the Court pursuant to Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court. 41

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On even date and before the Court could have rendered its final action on the disbarment complaints against Atty.
Dalangin vis-a-vis the records forwarded by the IBP, Atty. Dalangin forthwith filed with the Court a Petition for
Review,42 which questioned the IBP resolutions that, first, declared him administratively liable in CBD Case Nos. 11-
3215 and 12- 3292, and second, dismissed his complaints against Atty. Torres and Atty. Andres in CBD Case Nos. 12-
3369 and 12-3458.

In a Resolution43 dated June 16, 2015, the Court consolidated these cases and, without giving due course to the
petition for review, required the filing of Comments on the petition. Accordingly, a Consolidated Comment on the
Petition44 dated August 5, 2015 was filed by Andres & Associates Law Office, as counsel for Atty. Torres, et al., being
the complainants in CBD Case Nos. 11-3215 and 12-3292, and respondents in CBD Case Nos. 12-3369 and 12-3458.
Thereafter, Atty. Dalangin filed his Reply45 to the consolidated comment.

The Court’s Ruling

Procedure from Resolutions

of the IBP Board of Governors

The Court finds it appropriate to first address the matter of Atty. Dalangin’s immediate recourse to the Court via a
petition for review that questioned the IBP Board of Governors' resolve to affirm the Investigating Commissioner's
recommendation on his administrative liability, notwithstanding the fact that the Court had not yet taken a final action
on the complaints.

When the administrative complaints were resolved by the IBP and the instant petition for review was filed in Court,
the procedure from resolutions of the IBP Board of Governors in administrative cases was as provided in the former
Section 12 of Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, prior to the amendments introduced by Bar Matter No. 1645 dated
October 13, 2015. The old rule read:

Section 12. Review and decision by the Board of' Governors.

a) Every case heard by an investigator shall be reviewed by the IBP Board of Governors upon the record and evidence
transmitted to it by the Investigator with his report. The decision of the Board upon such review shall be in writing and
shall clearly and distinctly state the facts and the reasons on which it is based. It shall be promulgated within a period
not exceeding thirty (30) days from the next meeting of the Board following the submittal of the Investigator's report.

b) If the Board, by the vote of a majority of its total membership, determines that the respondent should be
suspended from the practice of law or disbarred, it shall issue a resolution setting forth its findings and
recommendations which, together with the whole record of the case, shall forthwith be transmitted to the
Supreme Court for final action.

c) If the respondent is exonerated by the Board or the disciplinary sanction imposed by it is less than suspension
or disbarment (such as admonition, reprimand, or fine) it shall issue a decision exonerating respondent or
imposing such sanction. The case shall be deemed terminated unless upon petition of the complainant or other
interested party filed with the Supreme Court within fifteen (15) days from notice of the Board’s resolution, the
Supreme Co mi orders otherwise.

d) Notice of the resolution or decision of the Board shall be given to all parties through their counsel. A copy of the
same shall be transmitted to the Supreme Court. (Emphases supplied)

In B.M. No. 1755 captioned Re: Clarification of Rules of Procedure of the Commission on Bar Discipline, the Court
applied this provision to address the issue therein involved, and explained its proper application in a Resolution dated
June 17, 2008. The Court set the following guidelines:

In case a decision is rendered by the [Board of Governors (BOG)] that exonerates the respondent or imposes a
sanction less than suspension or disbarment, the aggrieved party can file a motion for reconsideration within
the 15-day period from notice. If the motion is denied, said party can file a petition for a review under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court with this Court within fifteen (15) days from notice of the resolution resolving the motion. If

124
no motion for reconsideration is filed, the decision shall become final and executory and a copy of said decision shall
be furnished this Court.

If the imposable penalty is suspension from the practice of law or disbarment, the BOG shall issue a resolution
setting forth its findings and recommendations. The aggrieved party can file a motion for reconsideration of said
resolution with the BOG within fifteen (15) days from notice. The BOG shall first resolve the incident and shall
thereafter elevate the assailed resolution with the entire case records to this Court for final action. If the 15-day
period lapses without any motion for reconsideration having been filed, then the BOG shall likewise transmit to this
Court the resolution with the entire case records for appropriate action. (Emphases supplied)

Nowhere in his petition did Atty. Dalangin attempt to justify his immediate filing of the petition for review
questioning the IBP resolutions that recommended his suspension. It could nonetheless be inferred from the
circumstances that Atty. Dalangin's chosen course of action was to preclude the forfeiture of his right to question the
dismissal of the administrative cases where he served as complainant, given that Section 12(c) provides that where the
respondent is exonerated, (t)he case shall be deemed terminated unless upon a petition of the complainant or other
interested party filed with Supreme Court within fifteen (15) days from notice of the Board's resolution, the Supreme
Court orders otherwise. For this reason, the Court refused to make an outright denial of Atty. Dalangin’s petition for
review notwithstanding the fact that it questioned the resolve to suspend him from the practice of law. Considering
that the petition likewise covered the IBP's dismissal of the disbarment cases against Atty. Torres and Atty. Andres,
the Court, in a Resolution dated June 16, 2015, directed the filing of comments on the petition.

In any case, it must still be stressed that the filing of the petition for review on the issue of Atty. Dalangin’s
suspension from the practice of law was as yet not among his remedies, considering that the Court still had to release
its final action on the matter.46 It is the Supreme Court, not the IBP, which has the constitutionally mandated duty to
discipline lawyers.47 The factual findings of the IBP can only be recommendatory. Its recommended penalties are also,
by their nature, recommendatory.48 In light of these precepts, the Court will then not refuse a review of the IBP's
recommendation for Atty. Dalangin’s suspension notwithstanding the premature filing of the petition. In fact, an
examination of the IBP resolutions for his suspension is warranted as a matter of course, even in the absence of a
petition, because it is the Court that has the duty to take a final action on any determination of the IBP for a lawyer's
suspension from the practice of law or disbarment.

Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court had in fact been later amended by B.M. No. 1645 dated October 13, 2015. Section
12 thereof now reads:

Sec. 12. Review and recommendation by the Board of Governors.

a) Every case heard by an investigator shall be reviewed by the IBP Board of Governors upon the record and evidence
transmitted to it by the Investigator with his report.

b) After its review, the Board, by the vote of a majority of its total membership, shall recommend to the Supreme
Court the dismissal of the complaint or the imposition of disciplinary action against the respondent. The Board shall
issue a resolution setting forth its findings and recommendations, clearly and distinctly stating the facts and the
reasons on which it is based. The resolution shall be issued within a period not exceeding thirty (30) days from the
next meeting of the Board following the submission of the Investigator's report.

c) The Board’s resolution, together with the entire records and all evidence presented and submitted, shall be
transmitted to the Supreme Court for final action within ten (10) days from issuance of the resolution.

d) Notice of the resolution shall be given to all parties through their counsel, if any.

In Vasco-Tamaray v. Daquis,49 the Court emphasized that the amendments reiterated the principle that only the Court
has the power to impose disciplinary action on members of the bar. Factual findings and recommendations of the
Commission on Bar Discipline and the Board of Governors of the IBP are recommendatory, subject to review by the
Court.50

As the Court now reviews the IBP’s resolve to dismiss the complaints against Atty. Torres and Atty. Andres, it then
also enters its final action on the IBP Board of Governors’ recommendation to suspend Atty. Dalangin from the
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practice of law for three years, as the IBP cited gross misconduct, violations of the CPR and breach of the lawyer's
oath as grounds.

A.C. No. 10758

Gross Immorality

Among several cited grounds, the IBP’s recommendation to suspend Atty. Dalangin from the practice of law for three
years was on the pretext that he publicly and openly maintained a romantic relationship with Pascual even when their
marriages with their respective spouses subsisted.

Allegedly, the affair further resulted in the birth of the child Julienne, who was believed to be Atty. Dalangin’s
daughter even when he turned down a challenge for a DNA test that could prove the child's true filiation. 51

In his report, the Investigative Commissioner specifically referred to the following evidence to support his finding of
an immoral relationship between Atty. Dalangin and Pascual:

2. That Complainant Alvaro who executed an affidavit regarding the illicit and immoral relation of [Atty. Dalangin]
with [Pascual] for the reason that she was formerly [close] to [Pascual] and the latter confided to her that she (Pascual)
[did] not love her husband anymore and the child called [Atty. Dalangin] "Papa attorney" (Affidavit of Alvaro as Exh.
"F").

3. That Ligaya Agrave[,] a neighbor of [Pascual,] likewise executed an affidavit that the child ["Julienne"] is the
daughter of [Atty. Dalangin and Pascual], that she used to see [Atty. Dalangin] taking care of [Julienne] when she was
still a baby and when she grew up already, [Atty. Dalangin] used to accompany the child in their school tour and also
her graduation. That the child as she grew older is a look[-]alike of [Atty. Dalangin]. (Affidavit of Ligaya Agrave
marked as Exh. "G").

4. That the illicit affair of [Atty. Dalangin] with his former Clerk in the PAO, Talavera, Nueva Ecija was well known
in Talavera, in the entire judiciary in Talavera, Nueva Ecija and even in the community of Sto. Domingo, Nueva
[E]cija[.] [(L]etter to the Ombudsman dated Aug. 18, 2011 of Felicidad Sumatra is marked as Exh. "H").

5. That [Atty. Dalangin] refused when challenged for a DNA test.

6. Complainants submitted xxx pictures of [Atty. Dalangin and Pascual] together with their daughter [Julienne] taken
in far away Puerto Prinsesa marked as Exh. I and I-1.

7. That [Atty. Dalangin] continued to publicly and openly cohabit with a woman who is not his legal wife shows his
lack of good moral character.52

Time and again, the Court has indeed regarded extramarital affairs of lawyers to offend the sanctity of marriage, the
family, and the community. Illicit relationships likewise constitute a violation of Article XV, Section 2 of the 1987
Constitution which states that, "[m]arriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall
be protected by the State."53 When lawyers are engaged in wrongful relationships that blemish their ethics and
morality, the usual recourse is for the erring attorney's suspension from the practice of law, if not disbarment.

Upon the Court’s review, however, it finds no sufficient basis to suspend Atty. Dalangin for a supposed illicit affair
with Pascual. That an amorous relationship actually existed between them was not adequately proved.

The quantum of proof in administrative cases is substantial evidence. The Court explained in Saladaga v. Astorga:54

Section 5, in relation to Sections 1 and 2, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court states that in administrative cases, such as the
ones at bar, only substantial evidence is required, not proof beyond reasonable doubt as in criminal cases, or
preponderance of evidence as in civil cases. Substantial evidence is that amount of relevant evidence which a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion. 55

In Reyes v. Nieva, 56 the Court reiterated this rule on the quantum of proof in administrative proceedings, as it held:
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Based on a survey of cases, the recent ruling on the matter is Cabas v. Sususco, which was promulgated just this June
15, 2016. In the said case, it was pronounced that:

In administrative proceedings, the quantum of proof necessary for a finding of guilt is substantial evidence, i.e., that
'amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. x x x.

Accordingly, this more recent pronouncement ought to control and therefore, quell any further confusion on the proper
evidentiary threshold to be applied in administrative cases against lawyers.

The rule is taken in light of other settled principles that apply for a proper disposition of administrative cases.
In Advincula v. Macabata,57 the Court emphasized:

The burden of proof rests on the complainant, and she must establish the case against the respondent by clear,
convincing and satisfactory proof, disclosing a case that is free from doubt as to compel the exercise by the Court of
its disciplinary power. Thus, the adage that he who asserts not he who denies, must prove. xxx.58

Further, the Court emphasized in Cabas v. Sususco59 the oft-repeated rule that "mere allegation is not evidence and is
not equivalent to proof. Charges based on mere suspicion and speculation likewise cannot be given credence." 60

With careful consideration of the foregoing tenets, the Court's perusal of the records reveals an insufficiency of
evidence that could warrant the recommended suspension from the practice of law.

To begin with, the two affidavits considered by the IBP as bases for its finding of Atty. Dalangin’s gross immorality
harped only on general statements of a supposed personal and public knowledge on the wrongful relationship between
Atty. Dalangin and Pascual. The circumstances that could have led them to their conclusion were scant and
unsubstantiated. The most concrete proof that they could offer was the birth of Julienne, yet even the child's birth
certificate, a public document, expressly indicated the girl’s father to be Pascual's husband, and not Atty.
Dalangin.61 Julienne’s baptismal certificate62 also provided such fact, along with a confirmation of Atty. Dalangin’s
defense on his closeness to Julienne for being her godfather.

It would be unfair to Atty. Dalangin, more so for the child whose filiation is in a way needlessly dragged into this
case, for the Court to affirm the assertions in the complaint and the IBP's findings and conclusions on the basis of the
available evidence. The alleged similarities in the physical appearances of Atty. Dalangin and Julienne were but lame
and dismal validations of the complainants’ vehement claim of paternity. Even the photographs 63 of Atty. Dalangin,
Pascual and Julienne in what appeared to be a trip to Pue1io Princesa, Palawan were insufficient to support a
conclusion on the unlawful relations. The lone photo where Atty. Dalangin appeared with Pascual and Julienne, who
were apparently merely waiting for boarding in an airport terminal, utterly failed to manifest any romantic or filial
bond among them. It was also explained through an affidavit 64 executed by spouses Dante Capindian and Timotea
Jamito that Atty. Dalangin was a principal sponsor, while Pascual’s family were guests, in their wedding which was
held on August 6, 2011 in Puerto Princesa, Palawan. Apparently, the photos were taken during the said trip. Pascual’s
husband, Edgardo, was also present for the occasion.

The Court, nonetheless, does not find Atty. Dalangin totally absolved of fault. While he vehemently denied any
romantic relationship with Pascual, he admitted demonstrating closeness with the latter's family, including her
children. It was such display of affection that could have sparked in the minds of observers the idea of a wrongful
relationship and belief that Julienne was a product of the illicit affair. Atty. Dalangin should have been more prudent
and mindful of his actions and the perception that his acts built upon the public, particularly because he and Pascual
were both married. "As officers of the court, lawyers must not only in fact be of good moral character but must also be
seen to be of good moral character and leading lives in accordance with the highest moral standards of the
community."65 As keepers of public faith, lawyers are burdened with a high degree of social responsibility and, hence,
must handle their personal affairs with great caution." 66

The fault, nonetheless, does not warrant Atty. Dalangin’s suspension, much less disbarment. An admonition should
suffice under the circumstances. The following pronouncement in Advincula v. Macabata67 is pertinent:

While it is discretionary upon the Court to impose a particular sanction that it may deem proper against an erring
lawyer, it should neither be arbitrary and despotic nor motivated by personal animosity or prejudice, but should ever
127
be controlled by the imperative need to scrupulously guard the purity and independence of the bar and to exact from
the lawyer strict compliance with his duties to the court, to his client, to his brethren in the profession and to the
public.

x x x Only those acts which cause loss of moral character should merit disbarment or suspension, while those acts
which neither affect nor erode the moral character of the lawyer should only justify a lesser sanction unless they are of
such nature and to such extent as to clearly show the lawyer's unfitness to continue in the practice of law. x x x 68

Gross Misconduct and

Malpractice

Atty. Dalangin was also charged, and recommended for suspension from the practice of law, for several other acts
involving use of misleading evidence in court and preparation of affidavits with pe1jured statements to support cases
and complaints for disbarment. When he still served as a public attorney, he likewise allegedly demanded acceptance
fees from indigent clients, and appeared in courts beyond his area of jurisdiction. Even these charges, however, were
not supported by evidence that could warrant Atty. Dalangin’s suspension. And while there were several other charges
included in the complaint against Atty. Dalangin, the accusations were actually for actions that should be attributed
not to him, but to other individuals like Pascual.

Specifically on the claim that Atty. Dalangin failed to fully explain to Marzan and Valdez the contents of the affidavit
that supported a disbarment case against Atty. Torres, the Court takes note of the fact that the alleged failure to explain
did not necessarily equate to the falsity of the claims therein made. It refers to the joint affidavit executed by Marzan
and Valdez, and which was attached to the complaint in CBD Case No. 11-3215, whereby affiants merely alleged that
they signed the affidavit even when they were not fully apprised of its contents. 69 It was not alleged that they were
fraudulently lured or tricked by Atty. Dalangin into signing the complaint, and that the charges therein hurled against
Atty. Torres were absolutely false. Thus, the claim that Atty. Dalangin knowingly brought a groundless suit against a
fellow lawyer had no leg to stand on.

The charge of malpractice for Atty. Dalangin's supposed demand for attorney's fees while he still worked as a PAO
lawyer also remained unsubstantiated by evidence.1âwphi1 Such serious imputation could not have been adequately
established by an affidavit that was executed in 2010 by a lone person, Camacho, from whom the demand for
₱8,000.00 was allegedly made in 2001.70 Similarly, while Atty. Dalangin admitted to have appeared in courts beyond
his area of jurisdiction as public attorney, he claimed to have obtained permission therefor from the Regional Public
Attorney, a defense which the complainants failed to refute. In the absence of contrary evidence, the presumption that
the respondent regularly performed his duty in accordance with his oath shall prevail, 71 especially as the Court
considers it highly improbable for the courts where appearances were made to fail to notice such patent irregularity, if
Atty. Dalangin was indeed not authorized to perform his acts before their courts as a public attorney.

Anent the failure of Atty. Dalangin to submit all pages of a certificate of title in Civil Case No. 336-SD(04)AF
pending with the RTC, Branch 88, Sto. Domingo, Nueva Ecija and entitled Tamayo v. Philippine National Bank, it has
been explained that the error had been corrected at once during the pre-trial conference. 72

Among the other charges imputed against Atty. Dalangin in A.C. No. 10758, the Court only finds fault for his
misquote of jurisprudence cited in a pleading filed with the RTC, Branch 35, Gapan City for Cad. Case No. 1564-05
entitled Bangko Luzon v. Diaz. It was narrated in the complaint in CBD Case No. 11-3215 that:

14. x x x [T]he cited jurisprudence is hereto quoted:

"If a court of competent jurisdiction annulled the foreclosure sale of the property in question, the issuance of a writ of
possession ceases to be ministerial."

15. In the said case of BPI vs. Tampipi, there is nothing mentioned about the cessation of the ministerial function of
the court but instead what is clearly stated in the decision are the following:

"Until the foreclosure sale of the property in question is annulled by a court of competent jurisdiction, the issuance of
a writ of possession remains the ministerial duty of the trial court." 73

128
Atty. Dalangin invoked adherence to the substance and spirit of the cited ruling. 74 As counsel and officer of the court,
however, with the corresponding duty to aid the courts in the task of ascertaining the truth, Atty. Dalangin was remiss
in the discharge of his duties under the CPR. Canon 10, Rule 10.02 thereof provides:

"[a] lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or misrepresent the contents of paper, the language or the argument of the
opposing counsel, or the text of a decision or authority, or knowingly cite as a law a provision already rendered
inoperative by repeal or amendment, or assert as a fact that which has not been proved."

The Court, nonetheless, still does not find suspension to be an appropriate penalty for the act. While the Court detests
Atty. Dalangin’s failure to properly indicate that the statement was not a verbatim reproduction of the cited
jurisprudence and, accordingly, calls his attention on the matter, it finds the admonition to be adequate.

A suspension for the lone incident would be too harsh a penalty. It appeared that the supposed quotation was Atty.
Dalangin’s own conclusion from the cited jurisprudence. There was no clear indication that the statement was
intended to mislead the court or commit a falsehood; there was no brazen deviation from the principle or doctrine that
was embodied in the jurisprudence's original text.

A.C. No. 10759

In relation to A.C. No. 10759 on Atty. Dalangin’s altercation on November 14, 2011 with Alvaro as the latter was
waiting for the start of a court hearing in the RTC of Sto. Domingo, Nueva Ecija, the records include affidavits
executed by witnesses who did not appear to have any reason to falsely testify against Atty. Dalangin on the incident.

Affiant Josephine Rivera, in particular, who claimed to be also then waiting for a scheduled hearing, allegedly saw
Atty. Dalangin shout and point at Alvaro, as he threatened to file a case against the latter. 75 Two security guards
stationed at the trial court, evidently disinterested persons who would not have wrongly testified against Atty.
Dalangin, likewise confirmed that such heated confrontation actually transpired. Pertinent portions of the guards’
affidavit76 read:

1. Na noong ika-14 ng Nobyembre, 2011, ganap na ika-8:45 ng umaga humigit kumulang, ha bang nakaupo si
[Alvaro] sa "bench", upuang mahaba malapit sa aming kinauupuan dito sa pintuan ng Hall of Justice, Regional Trial
Court, Baloc, Sto. Domingo, Nueva Ecija at kausap niya ang isa niyang kasama, dumating si Atty. Bayani Dalangin at
pagkakita kay [Alvaro] ay pinagsisigawan ito at maraming sinabi laban kay [Alvaro];

2. Na maraming nakarinig, nakakita at nagulat sa pangyayaring ito;

x x x x77

For the Court, Atty. Dalangin erred in his conduct subject of the complaint, especially since his outburst was carried
out within the court premises and in the presence of several persons who readily witnessed his fit of anger. Part of
Atty. Dalangin’s duties as a lawyer is to maintain the honor that is due the profession. Members of the legal profession
should commit to the mandates of Canon 7, particularly Rule 7 .03 thereof, to wit:

CANON 7 - A LA WYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD TI-IE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL
PROFESSION XX X.

Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he,
whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.

Although Atty. Dalangin, at that instant, could have been stirred by his frustration or resentment for the disbarment
case filed against him by Alvaro, such circumstance could not have absolved him from any responsibility for his
conduct. At most, this only serves to mitigate the penalty that the Court deems appropriate to impose, as it likewise
considers its finding that Alvaro’s allegations in CBD Case No. 11-3215 on the supposed extra-marital affair of Atty.
Dalangin with Pascual were indeed not backed by sufficient evidence. The Court finds it appropriate to impose upon
Atty. Dalangin a fine of ₱5,000.00, with a stem warning that a more severe sanction will be imposed on him for any
repetition of the same or similar offense in the future.

129
Although the Court has admonished Atty. Dalangin in A.C. No. 10758, it finds the imposition of this fine still suitable
under the circumstances, given that A.C. No. 10759, although resolved jointly with A.C. No. 10758, is a distinct
administrative case that covers a separate complaint that was instituted solely by Alvaro. The severity of this offense
likewise varies from the other breaches for which the Court has determined the admonition to be appropriate.

A.C. No. 10760 and A.C. No. 10761

The Court affirms the decision of the IBP to dismiss the administrative complaints filed by Atty. Dalangin against
Atty. Torres and Atty. Andres.

In A.C. No. 10760, Atty. Dalangin sought to support his complaint by referring to the supposed participation of Atty.
Torres and Atty. Andres in a violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Act. He asserted that the act also violated the lawyer's
oath, and breached Canon 1, Rules 1.01 and 1.02 of the CPR which reads:

CANON 1 - A LA WYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND
PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.

Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

Rule 1.02 - A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the
legal system.

The alleged violation of the statute is a serious charge that the Court cannot take lightly, in view of the breach of the
basic and constitutional right to privacy of communication that inevitably results from the act. In brief, the law
prohibits any person "to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other device or arrangement, to secretly overhear,
intercept or record such communication or spoken word by using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or
dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape recorder x x x." 79 It likewise forbids any person from possessing,
replaying or furnishing transcriptions of communications that are obtained in violation of the law.

In this case, Atty. Dalangin claimed that Atty. Torres and Atty. Andres conspired with Alejo on the wrongful
recording of a private communication with Pineda, along with the use of the transcript thereof to support Alejo’s
affidavit in CBD Case No. 11-3215. However, Pineda's own denial of the truth of the statements in the transcription
lends doubt as to the allegation of a purported secret recording of an actual conversation. While Pineda denied
knowledge that her telephone conversation with Alejo was recorded by the latter, she still refused to acknowledge the
veracity of the assertions that she allegedly made as contained in the transcript, 80 which then appears to be a rejection
of the supposed conversation. Given the circumstances, the IBP correctly ruled that Atty. Dalangin failed to
substantiate the charges in his complaint against Atty. Torres and Atty. Andres.

The same conclusion equally applies in A.C. No. 10761. The commission of perjury was imputed upon Atty. Torres,
as the person who prepared the affidavits of Marzan and Valdez. As witnesses in CBD Case No. 11-3215, Marzan and
Valdez claimed that Atty. Dalangin prepared an affidavit for Atty. Torres' disbarment without fully explaining to them
the contents thereof. The fact that Atty. Torres induced the affiants to make perjured statements, however, was not
established by clear and convincing proof. Even granting that statements of affiants were eventually determined to be
inaccurate and untruthful, it would be wrong to at once ascribe error or fault upon the lawyers who drafted the
affidavits, in the absence of clear and sufficient proof that they actively participated in the intentional commission of a
fraud or declaration of fabricated statements.

WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, the Court rules as follows:

(1) In A.C. No. 10758, respondent Atty. Bayani P. Dalangin is ADMONISHED to be more prudent and cautious in
handling his personal affairs and dealings with courts and the public, with a STERN WARNING that any repetition
of the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely;

(2) In A.C. No. 10759, Atty. Bayani P. Dalangin is FINED Five Thousand Pesos (₱5,000.00) for his breach of Rule
7.03, Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, with a STERN WARNING that a more severe sanction
will be imposed upon him for any repetition of the same or similar offense in the future; and

130
(3) In A.C. No. 10760 and A.C. No. 10761, Atty. Bayani P. Dalangin’s petition for review is DENIED. The
Court AFFIRMS the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Board of Governors' Resolution No. XX-2013-768 dated
June 21, 2013 and Resolution dated August 8, 2014, insofar as the IBP Board of Governors dismissed the following
complaints: (1) CBD Case No. 12-3369 against Atty. Rosita L. Dela Fuente-Torres and Atty. Avelino Andres; and (2)
CBD Case No. 12-3458 against Atty. Rosita L. Dela Fuente-Torres.

SO ORDERED.

ANDRES B. REYES, JR.

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice

ANTONIO T. CARPIO PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice

In the result, pls. see separate opinion

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

(On official leave)

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN

Associate Justice Associate Justice

(On leave)
ALFREDO BENJAMIN S. CAGUIOA
FRANCIS H. JARDELEZA
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

SAMUEL R. MARTIRES NOEL GIMENEZ TIJAM

Associate Justice Associate Justice

(On leave)
ALEXANDER G. GESMUNDO
Associate Justice

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

B.M. No. 2112               July 24, 2012

IN RE: PETITION RE-ACQUIRE THE PRIVILEGE TO PRACTICE LAW IN THE PHILIPPINES,

EPIFANIO B. MUNESES, Petitioner,

RESOLUTION

REYES, J.:
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On June 8, 2009, a petition was filed by Epifanio B. Muneses (petitioner) with the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC)
praying that he be granted the privilege to practice law in the Philippines.

The petitioner alleged that he became a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) on March 21, 1966; that
he lost his privilege to practice law when he became a citizen of the United States of America (USA) on August 28,
1981; that on September 15, 2006, he re-acquired his Philippine citizenship pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225
or the "Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003" by taking his oath of allegiance as a Filipino citizen
before the Philippine Consulate General in Washington, D.C., USA; that he intends to retire in the Philippines and if
granted, to resume the practice of law. Attached to the petition were several documents in support of his petition,
albeit mere photocopies thereof, to wit:

1. Oath of Allegiance dated September 15, 2006 before Consul General Domingo P. Nolasco;

2. Petition for Re-Acquisition of Philippine Citizenship of same date;

3. Order for Re-Acquisition of Philippine Citizenship also of same date;

4. Letter dated March 13, 2008 evidencing payment of membership dues with the IBP;

5. Attendance Forms from the Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE).

In Bar Matter No. 1678, dated December 17, 2007, the Court was confronted with a similar petition filed by Benjamin
M. Dacanay (Dacanay) who requested leave to resume his practice of law after availing the benefits of R.A. No. 9225.
Dacanay was admitted to the Philippine Bar in March 1960. In December 1998, he migrated to Canada to seek
medical attention for his ailments and eventually became a Canadian citizen in May 2004. On July 14, 2006, Dacanay
re-acquired his Philippine citizenship pursuant to R.A. No. 9225 after taking his oath of allegiance before the
Philippine Consulate General in Toronto, Canada. He returned to the Philippines and intended to resume his practice
of law.

The Court reiterates that Filipino citizenship is a requirement for admission to the bar and is, in fact, a continuing
requirement for the practice of law. The loss thereof means termination of the petitioner’s membership in the bar; ipso
jure the privilege to engage in the practice of law. Under R.A. No. 9225, natural-born citizens who have lost their
Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country are deemed to have re-acquired
their Philippine citizenship upon taking the oath of allegiance to the Republic. 1 Thus, a Filipino lawyer who becomes a
citizen of another country and later re-acquires his Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 9225, remains to be a
member of the Philippine Bar. However, as stated in Dacanay, the right to resume the practice of law is not
automatic.2 R.A. No. 9225 provides that a person who intends to practice his profession in the Philippines must apply
with the proper authority for a license or permit to engage in such practice. 3

It can not be overstressed that:

The practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions.1âwphi1 It is so delicately affected with public interest that
it is both the power and duty of the State (through this Court) to control and regulate it in order to protect and promote
the public welfare.

Adherence to rigid standards of mental fitness, maintenance of the highest degree of morality, faithful observance of
the legal profession, compliance with the mandatory continuing legal education requirement and payment of
membership fees to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) are the conditions required for membership in good
standing in the bar and for enjoying the privilege to practice law. Any breach by a lawyer of any of these conditions
makes him unworthy of the trust and confidence which the courts and clients repose in him for the continued exercise
of his professional privilege.4

Thus, in pursuance to the qualifications laid down by the Court for the practice of law, the OBC required the herein
petitioner to submit the original or certified true copies of the following documents in relation to his petition:

1. Petition for Re-Acquisition of Philippine Citizenship;

132
2. Order (for Re-Acquisition of Philippine citizenship);

3. Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines;

4. Identification Certificate (IC) issued by the Bureau of Immigration;

5. Certificate of Good Standing issued by the IBP;

6. Certification from the IBP indicating updated payments of annual membership dues;

7. Proof of payment of professional tax; and

8. Certificate of compliance issued by the MCLE Office.

In compliance thereof, the petitioner submitted the following:

1. Petition for Re-Acquisition of Philippine Citizenship;

2. Order (for Re-Acquisition of Philippine citizenship);

3. Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines;

4. Certificate of Re-Acquisition/Retention of Philippine Citizenship issued by the Bureau of Immigration, in

lieu of the IC;

5. Certification dated May 19, 2010 of the IBP-Surigao City Chapter attesting to his good moral character as
well as his updated payment of annual membership dues;

6. Professional Tax Receipt (PTR) for the year 2010;

7. Certificate of Compliance with the MCLE for the 2nd compliance period; and

8. Certification dated December 5, 2008 of Atty. Gloria Estenzo-Ramos, Coordinator, UC-MCLE Program,
University of Cebu, College of Law attesting to his compliance with the MCLE.

The OBC further required the petitioner to update his compliance, particularly with the MCLE. After all the
requirements were satisfactorily complied with and finding that the petitioner has met all the qualifications and none
of the disqualifications for membership in the bar, the OBC recommended that the petitioner be allowed to resume his
practice of law.

Upon this favorable recommendation of the OBC, the Court adopts the same and sees no bar to the petitioner's
resumption to the practice of law in the Philippines.

WHEREFORE, the petition of Attorney Epifanio B. Muneses is hereby GRANTED, subject to the condition that he
shall re-take the Lawyer's Oath on a date to be set by the Court and subject to the payment of appropriate fees.

Furthermore, the Office of the Bar Confidant is directed to draft the necessary guidelines for the re-acquisition of the
privilege to resume the practice of law for the guidance of the Bench and Bar.

SO ORDERED.

BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

133
 ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Senior Associate Justice
(Per Section 12, R.A. 296, The Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended)

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

(On Leave)
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
ARTURO D. BRION*
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate justice Associate Justice

ROBERTO A. ABAD MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice

(On Leave)
JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA**
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE

Associate Justice Associate Justice

Footnotes

* On Leave per Special Order No. 1257 dated July 19, 2012.

** On Leave.

Section 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship - Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, natural
1 

born citizens of the Philippines by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country are hereby
deemed to have re-acquired Philippine citizenship upon taking the following oath of allegiance to the
Republic:

"I ______, solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the Constitution of the Republic
of the Philippines and obey the laws and legal orders promulgated by the duly constituted authorities
of the Philippines and I hereby declare that I recognize and accept the supreme authority of the
Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; and that I imposed this obligation upon
myself voluntarily without mental reservation or purpose of evasion."

Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act, become citizens of a foreign
country shall retain their Philippine citizenship upon taking the aforesaid oath.

Petition for Leave to Resume Practice of Law, Benjamin Dacanay, Petitioner, B.M. No. 1678, December 17,
2 

2007.

3 
R.A. No. 9225, Section 5.

4 
Supra note 2.

134
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

B.M. No. 1678             December 17, 2007

PETITION FOR LEAVE TO RESUME PRACTICE OF LAW,

BENJAMIN M. DACANAY, petitioner.

RESOLUTION

CORONA, J.:

This bar matter concerns the petition of petitioner Benjamin M. Dacanay for leave to resume the practice of law.

135
Petitioner was admitted to the Philippine bar in March 1960. He practiced law until he migrated to Canada in
December 1998 to seek medical attention for his ailments. He subsequently applied for Canadian citizenship to avail
of Canada’s free medical aid program. His application was approved and he became a Canadian citizen in May 2004.

On July 14, 2006, pursuant to Republic Act (RA) 9225 (Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003),
petitioner reacquired his Philippine citizenship. 1 On that day, he took his oath of allegiance as a Filipino citizen before
the Philippine Consulate General in Toronto, Canada. Thereafter, he returned to the Philippines and now intends to
resume his law practice. There is a question, however, whether petitioner Benjamin M. Dacanay lost his membership
in the Philippine bar when he gave up his Philippine citizenship in May 2004. Thus, this petition.

In a report dated October 16, 2007, the Office of the Bar Confidant cites Section 2, Rule 138 (Attorneys and
Admission to Bar) of the Rules of Court:

SECTION 2. Requirements for all applicants for admission to the bar. – Every applicant for admission as a
member of the bar must be a citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-one years of age, of good moral
character, and a resident of the Philippines; and must produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory evidence
of good moral character, and that no charges against him, involving moral turpitude, have been filed or are
pending in any court in the Philippines.

Applying the provision, the Office of the Bar Confidant opines that, by virtue of his reacquisition of Philippine
citizenship, in 2006, petitioner has again met all the qualifications and has none of the disqualifications for
membership in the bar. It recommends that he be allowed to resume the practice of law in the Philippines, conditioned
on his retaking the lawyer’s oath to remind him of his duties and responsibilities as a member of the Philippine bar.

We approve the recommendation of the Office of the Bar Confidant with certain modifications.

The practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions. 2 It is so delicately affected with public interest that it is
both a power and a duty of the State (through this Court) to control and regulate it in order to protect and promote the
public welfare.3

Adherence to rigid standards of mental fitness, maintenance of the highest degree of morality, faithful observance of
the rules of the legal profession, compliance with the mandatory continuing legal education requirement and payment
of membership fees to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) are the conditions required for membership in good
standing in the bar and for enjoying the privilege to practice law. Any breach by a lawyer of any of these conditions
makes him unworthy of the trust and confidence which the courts and clients repose in him for the continued exercise
of his professional privilege.4

Section 1, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides:

SECTION 1. Who may practice law. – Any person heretofore duly admitted as a member of the bar, or
thereafter admitted as such in accordance with the provisions of this Rule, and who is in good and regular
standing, is entitled to practice law.

Pursuant thereto, any person admitted as a member of the Philippine bar in accordance with the statutory requirements
and who is in good and regular standing is entitled to practice law.

Admission to the bar requires certain qualifications. The Rules of Court mandates that an applicant for admission to
the bar be a citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-one years of age, of good moral character and a resident of the
Philippines.5 He must also produce before this Court satisfactory evidence of good moral character and that no charges
against him, involving moral turpitude, have been filed or are pending in any court in the Philippines. 6

Moreover, admission to the bar involves various phases such as furnishing satisfactory proof of educational, moral and
other qualifications;7 passing the bar examinations;8 taking the lawyer’s oath9 and signing the roll of attorneys and
receiving from the clerk of court of this Court a certificate of the license to practice. 10

The second requisite for the practice of law ― membership in good standing ― is a continuing requirement. This
means continued membership and, concomitantly, payment of annual membership dues in the IBP; 11 payment of the
136
annual professional tax;12 compliance with the mandatory continuing legal education requirement; 13 faithful
observance of the rules and ethics of the legal profession and being continually subject to judicial disciplinary
control.14

Given the foregoing, may a lawyer who has lost his Filipino citizenship still practice law in the Philippines? No.

The Constitution provides that the practice of all professions in the Philippines shall be limited to Filipino citizens
save in cases prescribed by law.15 Since Filipino citizenship is a requirement for admission to the bar, loss thereof
terminates membership in the Philippine bar and, consequently, the privilege to engage in the practice of law. In other
words, the loss of Filipino citizenship ipso jure terminates the privilege to practice law in the Philippines. The practice
of law is a privilege denied to foreigners.16

The exception is when Filipino citizenship is lost by reason of naturalization as a citizen of another country but
subsequently reacquired pursuant to RA 9225. This is because "all Philippine citizens who become citizens of another
country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship under the conditions of [RA 9225]."17 Therefore,
a Filipino lawyer who becomes a citizen of another country is deemed never to have lost his Philippine citizenship if
he reacquires it in accordance with RA 9225. Although he is also deemed never to have terminated his membership
in the Philippine bar, no automatic right to resume law practice accrues.

Under RA 9225, if a person intends to practice the legal profession in the Philippines and he reacquires his Filipino
citizenship pursuant to its provisions "(he) shall apply with the proper authority for a license or permit to engage in
such practice."18 Stated otherwise, before a lawyer who reacquires Filipino citizenship pursuant to RA 9225 can
resume his law practice, he must first secure from this Court the authority to do so, conditioned on:

(a) the updating and payment in full of the annual membership dues in the IBP;

(b) the payment of professional tax;

(c) the completion of at least 36 credit hours of mandatory continuing legal education; this is specially
significant to refresh the applicant/petitioner’s knowledge of Philippine laws and update him of legal
developments and

(d) the retaking of the lawyer’s oath which will not only remind him of his duties and responsibilities as a
lawyer and as an officer of the Court, but also renew his pledge to maintain allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines.

Compliance with these conditions will restore his good standing as a member of the Philippine bar.

WHEREFORE, the petition of Attorney Benjamin M. Dacanay is hereby GRANTED, subject to compliance with
the conditions stated above and submission of proof of such compliance to the Bar Confidant, after which he may
retake his oath as a member of the Philippine bar.

SO ORDERED.

Puno, C.J., Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Carpio-Morales, Azcuna, Tinga, Chico-
Nazario, Velasco, Jr., Nachura, Reyes, Leonardo-de Castro, JJ., concur.
Quisumbing, J., on leave.

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