GREEK

PHILOSOPHICAL
TERMS
A Historical Lexicon

F. E. PETERS

New York: NEW YORK UNIVERSITY PRESS'

London: UNIVERSITY OF LONDON PRESS LIMITED

1967

J6.dt'?i-jO
.~ tj..
 Preface

The glory and the hane of Greek philosophy is its lack of a past.
Drawing on nothing more than common speech and the elastic poten-
tial of the Greek language the Hellenic philosophers not only formu-
lated a problematic within which all subsequent thinkers cast their own
reflections, but devised as well a sophisticated and complex terminol-
ogy as a vehicle for their thoughts. Both the terms and the concepts
they employed have since been overgrown with a milleunium and a half
of connotation that not even the most determined can completely strip
away. The contemporary philosopher or theologian may attempt to
rethink the concept, but he is betrayed in the utterance. For what the
thinker has striven to clear away the reader or listener supplies anew.
"Soul" and "God" carry their history heavily with them.
By a not too peculiar irony we read their philosophical future
back into our Greek past in a variety of ways. One has experience of a
Whiteheadean and Nietzschean Plato, a Thomistic and Hegelian Aris-
totle, and even an Existential Diogenes. As in much else, the Greeks
invented this particular historical fallacy. It is clear that the Stoics read
themselves back into Heraclitus; and the Neoplatonists, Plotinus into
Plato.
It is an obvious necessity to make some sort of attempt at coming
to the Greeks on their own terms. This can, I think, best be accom-
plished not by the usual chronological and historical approach that, for
all its divisions into "schools" and "successions," obscures rather than
illuminates the evolutions we might otherwise discern in ancient philos-
ophy, but rather from the direction of the problematic as revealed by a
consecutive treatment of some of the basic concepts. This can be done
in a number of ways and on different scales, but the method and scale
adopted in this work is the one most conformable to the needs of what
may be termed an "intermediate student" of the subject, not the
beginner who is making his first acquaintance with Greek philosophy
and who would be better served by a history of ancient philosophy and,
perhaps, a dictionary of basic terms, nor, on the other hand, the
© Copyright 1967 by New York University
Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 67-25043 professional scholar who would require a treatment both more massive
Manufactured in the United States of America and more nuanced.
v
vi I Greek Philosophical Terms PREFACE vii
Since such a "student" may be presumed to have some familiarity The following authors are also frequently cited:
with the material it has been judged safe to substitute, in a fairly
thorough way, a terminology transliterated directly from the Greek Aetius, Placita, edited by H. DieIs in Doxographi Graeci, Berlin, 1879.
(Abbrev. Aetius in text.)
for their English equivalents in a modest effort at lightening the his-
torical baggage. Jargon can be more easily cured than preconceptions, Diogenes Laertius, Lives of the Eminent Philosophers, ed. and trans.
and it is this hope that prompts the frequency of stoicheion for element' R. D. Hicks, Loeb Classical Library, London, 1925. (Abbrev. D.L.
and physis for nature. There is, moreover, a complete English-Greek in text.)
cross-index at the end.
The following treatment, then, singles out a few of the trees from Philo, Works, ed. and trans. F. H. Colson et al., 10 vols., Loeb Classical
the forest that threatens to overwhelm all of us at times, and attempts Library, London, 1929 to date.
to trace their progress from acorn to fully grown oak. It also essays, if Plotinus, Enneads, ed. E. Brehier, 6 vols., Paris, 1924-1938; trans.
the metaphor may be indulged a bit longer, to display some of the S. MacKenna, 2nd ed., London, 1956.
interlocking root structure. Each entry is thoroughly cross-referenced,
and if these references are pursued there will emerge a fairly complete Plutarch, Moralia, ed. and trans. F. C. Babbitt et al., Loeb Classical
philosophical context for each term. Every entry will supply some Library, London, '927 to date.
information, but meaning must be sought in the larger complexes.
Finally, each entry is designed to be read with the texts of the philoso- Produs, Elements of Theology, ed. and trans. E. R. Dodds, 2nd ed.,
Oxford, 1963.
phers themselves, and there are full textual citations at every step of
the way. These are the final elements in the construction of a fruitful Sextus Empiricus, Adversus Mathematicos, ed. and trans. R. G. Bury,
context where the prior history of the, concept will illuminate a philo- Loeb Classical Library, 3 vols., London, '935- ' 953.
sophical text, while the text will embellish the understanding of the
term. I would like to express my gratitude to the Arts and Science
Both originals and translations of Plato and Aristotle are easily at Research Fund of New York University for a subvention toward the
hand. For the earlier and later philosophers the following will cover all preparation of the manuscript of this work, and particularly to the
but very few of the citations made in the text: two selfless workers who turned the inscrutable text into clean copy,
Eileen Markson and Kristin Helmers.
Pre-S ocratics
H. DieIs, Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, 5th-7th eds., edited by
W. Kranz, 3 vols., Berlin, '934-'954- (Abbrev. DieIs in text.)

K. Freeman, Ancilla to the Presocratic Philosophers, Oxford, 1948;

a translation of the fragments in Diels.

G. S. Kirk and J. E. Raven, The Presocratic Philosophers, Cambridge,

1957; texts and translations of some of the pre~Socratic fragments.

Post-Aristotelians
J. von Arnim, Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta, 4 volso, Leipzig, 1903-
1924- (Abbrev. SVF in text.)

C. J. De Vogel, Greek Philosophy: A Collection of Texts, vol. III,

Leiden, 1964. An excellent selection of texts, without translations,
from post-Aristotelian philosophy.
 Preliminary Note
Language and Philosophy

Philosophers have been uneasy about language almost from the begin-
ning. The sculptor may curse his stone or the painter his oils, but
neither contemplates suing for divorce. The philosopher, on the other
hand, lives constantly in the shadow of infidelity, now suspecting
metaphor, now tautology, or occasionally succumbing to the ultimate
despair, the fear that he is dealing with nomina tantum. The Greeks'
bouts with these maladies were occasional and mild; they were spared,
moreover, the final indignity of desertion to mathematics, though the
flirtation was long and serious. They trusted in names and their self-
assurance was such that they could even afford to be playful about
them. And when they came to devising names for the strange new
things that they themselves had wrought, they approached the task
with both confidence and inventiveness.
Prephilosophicallanguage had been shaped by popular usage and
the more transcendent intuitions of religion and mythology. The forc
mer was, of course, marked by its predilection for things; but there
was, in addition, an accumulating store of more or less abstract terms
flowing from the moral sensibilities of the epic tradition. Dike, time,
arete, though calculable in purely material terms, were already at hand
as abstracts and the first generation of philosophers, who still sub-
scribed to most of the poetic conventions, drew heavily upon this epic
vocabulary. But for the rest, there were things: gold, chariots, the soul
(psyche), spears, and the spirit (thymos), all material objects and all
capable of fairly precise localization.
But there was another factor at work as well. The search for
understanding no more began with Thales than logic with Aristotle.
All primitive men try to come to terms with the more numinons aspects
of their environment through the media of ritual and myth, and the
Hellenic version of the latter was a particularly rich and imaginative
attempt at organizing and explaining higher levels of reality in some
coherent fashion. Myth is, among other things, explanation and, what-
ix
x I Greek Philosophical Terms PRELIMINARY NOTE I xl
ever dimensions its moralizing content might assume, the didactic employed, but a radical new dimension had been added to the lan-
element is never completely absent. guage.
Myth was the immediate forerunner of philosophy and provided it What did the philosophers do to language? At first they did
not only with certain embryonic conceptualizations, but with insights nothing since they did not know, fortunately perhaps, that they were
into the working of the world as well. Myth already presupposes a philosophers and so continued to use words in their common accept.
world order, what the philosophers would call a kosmo~, but bases it . ance, which, as a matter of fact, tended to be in rather concrete,
chiefly upon the genealogical relationships between the gods whose individualized senses: the hot and the good were both some thing. The
family structure, derived from human paradigms, both preserved and great terminological changes introduced by the philosophers-and an
explained the order of terrestial reality. It also embodied the notion of inspection of usage suggests that they took place only gradually -were
what was later to be called causality, though in its mythological form it tied to the "discoveries" of incorporeality and universal predication or,
might be better termed the principle of responsibility, since both it and to put it more baldly, the realization that there were things and things.
the patterns of order are founded on the characteristic mythological The dimensions of this new order of reality, which was not tied to
principle of anthropomorphism. The divine (theion) had been person- objects in the ordinary sense and which could be generalized, were only
alized by myth into a god (theos) and could thus be linked and system- gradually understood, and the stubborn "thisness" of language, conse-
atized and held responsible for phaenomena. crated by an epic tradition that revelled in the physical, never com-
The earliest philosophers, for all their revolutionary achieve- pletely disappeared. Its most obvious aftereffects are probably to be
ments, were indebted to the mythological world view. Eventually the seen in the persistent Greek habit of philosophizing through metaphor.
anthropomorphic bases upon which it had been constructed came under Just as the geometer might offer a proof "by construction," so the
attack, but the effects were not at first critical since the pervasive philosopher was perfectly content to substitute analogy for analysis.
hylozoism of those early thinkers enabled them to explain action and Language began to change. Prephilosophical staples like eros and
reaction in terms of the life and movement naturally inherent in mate- chronos (both of which myth had already appropriated for its own
rial things. Once Parmenides had denied the hylozoistic premiss, purposes), eidos, physis, and the already mentioned arche developed
however, the mythological personalized god reappeared, not, to be new connotations, while other old words like hyle and stoicheion were
sure, in his grosser Homeric shapes, but as an artist who molds or a expropriated for radical new purposes. The concrete yielded to the
thinker who moves, both unmistakably personalized but deprived of abstract, as poion, "just such a thing," gives way to poiotes, "quality"
physical aspect and will. (in Theaet. 182a Plato apologizes for the awkward new term). In-
Thus, at the end of the philosophically abhorred infinite regress deed, this progresses to the point where only names (Callias, Socrates)
there was preserved what can be fairly identified as the god of the will serve to denote the individual, or to such Aristotelian peculiarities
mythologers. What the philosophers had, in effect, done was to lay as "this something or other here" 01' the untranslatable to ti en einai.
exclusive claim to the entire intermediary area of secondary causality. The combinatory powers of the language are tapped to describe the
Myth was banished from these regions and causality replaced responsi- new complexities (hypostasis, hypokeimenon, symbebek08, entele-
bility. But before this could be done or, rathel', in the course of doing it, cheia) , and there appears a veritable treasure trove of abstract terms to
a new form of discourse had to be shaped and a new language to identify newly isolated processes (apodeixis, synagoge, phronesis, gene-
express it. If Thales did, indeed, say that water was the arche of all sis, kinesis, aisthesis, noesis).
things (Aristotle, Meta. 983b ) , the wonder of it all is not so much the All these refinements and new formations led, in time, to a sophis-
substitution of water for Zeus (the mythologers had already person- ticated technical vocabulary that bore little resemblance to common
ified Oceanus to serve the same genetic end), as the intrusion of arche usage. Literary considerations also Came into play. A Stoic pamphlet
for the mythologer's pater. Thales (or perhaps Anaximander) was in addressed to a popular audience will obviously make more concessions
search of a starting point other than the common mythological one of to the general than a commentary by Simplicius, but the impression of
father and chose a term, arche, already in fairly common use, tb popularity in the former work may be heightened by the passage of
express the new concept. The older senses of arche continued to be technical terms into common parlance. Plato went to some pains to
xii I Greek Philosophical Terms
vary his terminology in what seems to be a deliberate attempt to resist
the congealing of technical terms, and the implication of the Socratic-
centered Platonic dialogue is still that two reasonably educated citizens
can sit down and discuss these matters. Whether this is the truth of the
Contents
matter or mere literary rhetoric we cannot tell. But no such premiss is
visible in Aristotle who insists on a standardized technical usage. With·
Aristotle the professionalism implicit in the fonnding of the Academy
comes of age in language.
Philosophical language did become technical even though stand- Preface
ardization was, and remains, an unfulfilled dream. Since the ancient
v
philosophical tradition was strongly oriented to schools there was a
certain degree of consistency within, say, the Platonic or Peripatetic Preliminary Note IX
school. But even here the pervasive post-Aristotelian thrust toward
syncretism tended to muddy the conceptual waters: Plotinus' use of
eidas will owe something to Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics without, at
Greek Philosophical Terms 3
the same time, specifying either the debt or its extent.
Whether this terminological virtuosity was for good or for ill may English-Greek Index 205
be debated. But it is clear that in manufactnring a new currency for a
new way of seeing reality the Greeks were borne by the counters
themselves into a world far removed from this material one. Most of
the philosophers were at one in agreeing that this world of concrete,
discrete beings is an exceedingly disorderly place and that "there is no
science of the individual." Such was not true, however, of the newly
isolated universal terms that, like the gods of the now disreputable
mythology, could be manipulated and, once endowed with an order of
reality, could be constructed into a world of order and stability. The
Platonic eidas and the Aristotelian kategaria are, each in its own way,
the Greeks' ultimate tribute to language, and the Proclean kasmas
naetas undoubtedly its most baroque monument: a universe in which
every concept is matched with its appropriate universal term and the
whole arranged in a hierarchical order of mathematical precision and
exceeding beauty.
Greek· Philosophical Terms
 a

adiaphoron: without diHerence, morally indiHerent or

neutral state
1. Since the end of man is, according to the oldest Stoic formu-
lae, to live harmoniously with nature (see nomos 2), the good will
consist in those things which are helpful or have some valne toward
this kind of life, while evil will reside in those things which make no
such contribution (D.L. VII, 94, 105). Between these two absolutely
helpful and harmful classes of acts (justice, prudence, moderation, etc.
on the one hand, cowardice, injustice, immoderation on the other)
there exists another group of things like life, health, and pleasure that
are characterized as morally indifferent (adiaphora) in that they have
no immediate connection with the end of man (D.L. VII, 101-103).
They do, however, contribute to or impede that end indirectly and
hence are further divided (D.L. VII, 105-106) into preferable acts
(proegmena), acts to be avoided (apoproegmena), and absolutely
indifferent acts, the first category constituting the "duties" (officia) of
the Roman ethicians and defined as tllose acts for whose performances
some reasonable defense (eulogos, probabilis) can be given (Cicero,
De fin. III, 17, 58).
2. These latter distinctions provoked considerable controversy in
both the Stoa and the Academy. There was no question that one had a
moral obligation to choose the good; what was at stake was the moral
implications of dividing the adiaphora into justifiable and nonjustifiable
acts. There were those moral rigorists like Aristo of Chios and the
Sceptic Pyrrho who denied that any moral value at all could be at-
tached to these reasonably defensible and so "befitting" (kathekonta)
activities (Cicero, De fin. IV, 25, 68). Further, the Sceptics' attacks on
epistemological certitude had its inevitable effects in the moral sphere
and we find the two eminences of the New or Sceptical Academy,
Arcesilas and Carneades, advancing a theory that once certitude has
been undermined the moral act can only be that for which some
reasonable defense can be made, the former approaching the now
central kathekonta by applying an intellectnal criterion (rationally
probable, eulogon; Sextus Empiricus, Adv. Math. VII, 158), Car-
neades by putting forth an experimental one (the practically probable,
pithanon; idem, Pyrrh. I, 227-229).

3
4 I AER AGENETOS I5
3. That these attitudes, coupled, in the case of Carneades, with a aisthetos in the later dialogues is reflected in his general reflections on
trenchant criticism of Stoic epistemology, had an effect on the thinking the Good in the Philebus; the contrasting claims of pleasure (hedone)
of the Stoa in ethics is clear from its own focusing on the correct choice and wisdom (phronesis) to be the highest good are being examined,
of the kathekonta as the central problem of the moral life (Stobaeus, and the conclusion turns to an examination of the "mixed life" (see
Eel. II, 76) and its retreat from Zeno's earlier insistence that virtue hedone and the mixed result of the operation of nous and ananke in the
alone (in this context, life according to nature) suffices for man's Timaeus), which is found to combine both pleasure and wisdom
happiness and its admission of the need for satisfactions flowing from a (59c-64a). What is notable here is not only the blending of the eide in
correct choice of the kathekonta (D.L. VII, 128). this life, but the presence of measure and proportion (64a.--66a) and,
more importantly for Plato's growing theism, the advancing emer-
aer: air gence of a transcendent, intelligent cause of good in the universe (see
1. For Anaximenes the apeiron of Anaximander and the arche of
ibid. 26e-31b and theos, nous).
all things was air (Aristotle, Meta. 984a; Simplicius, In Phys. 24, 26), 2. Aristotle is critical· of Plato's theory of the Good (see Eth.
probably because of its connection with breath and life (d. pneuma). Nich. I, 1096a-l097), but what he understands by that is clearly the
It was, as were most of the pre-Socratic archai, divine (theion), Cicero, eidos-agathon theory of the Republic (see ibid. 1095a and Eth. Eud. I,
De nat. deor. I, 10, 26. The later popularizer of aer was Diogenes of 1217b). Yet he accepts (Eth. Nich. I, I094a) a Platonic definition of
Apollonia who made it the substance of both sonl (psyche) and mind good as "that at which all things aim"; for Aristo~I~, this is ?aPl.'iness
(nous) , frs. 4, 5, an affinity parodied by Aristophanes, Clouds, 227 ff.; (eudaimonia) (ibid. I, I097a-b), defined as actlVlty (praxzs) m ac-
what is striking in Diogenes' conception is, of course, the association of cordance with virtue (arete), ibid. I, 1100b; and the highest virtue is
a purposeful activity with his aer-nous (see telos) . theoria, Le., contemplation for its own sake, ibid. x, 1177a-b (for the
2. The connection aer-pneuma-psyche-zoe-theion remained a con- highest type of theoria and hence the Cosmic Good, d. telos). The
stant one. The air-like nature of the soul is raised in Phaedo 6ge-70a; Epicureans return to the position rejected by Socrates (Gorg.
Cebes fears it, but from another point it suggested a sort of impersonal 495c-499b), Plato (Phil. 55b-c), and Aristotle (Eth .. Nich. VII,
immortality: the body might perish, but the psyche would be reab- 1153b-1154a), namely that pleasure (hedone) is the hIghest good
sorbed into the purest part of the aer, Le., aither (q.v.), as yet undis- (D.L. x, 129). In the Stoa the. good was identified with the profitable
tinguished as a fifth element (see Euripides, Helen 1014-1016; Sup- (D.L. VII, 9 and 101-103).
pliants 533-534). Since the heavenly bodies (ouranioi) dwell in the 3. Plotinus' "theology" of the Good is to be found in Enn. VI,
aither another possibility was that the soul might be absorbed into the 15-42, including (25) a description of the hierarchy of goods leading
stars (see Aristophanes, Peace 832). This belief was incorporated into up to the Ultimate Principle; the One (hen), which he identifies with
later Pythagoreanism, but with the reservation of aither to the supralu- the Good, is the final unification of the Socratic and Parrnenidean
nary world; it was the aer between the moon and the earth that was strains in the Platonic tradition.
filled with daimones and heroes, D.L. VIII, 32; compare Philo, De
gigant. 2 and 3 where the daimones are now angels, and the consequent agenetos: ungenerated, uncreated (universe)
identification in De somn. I, 134-135 of the aer and Jacob's Ladder In De coelo I, 279b Aristotle says that all his predecessors agreed
(Genesis 28, 12-13); see kenon. that the kosmos had a beginning. Xenophanes is, perhaps, to be ex-
cluded from them, on the basis of an interpretative reading of frs. 14
agath6n: something good, the good, an ultimate and 26, and surely the entire Eleatic school stemming f~om Parrnen-
principle, summum bonum ides, with its banishment of genesis from the realm of Bemg (see on),
1. Plato, perhaps displaying his Socratic heritage, gives one of
is also to be excepted, as Aristotle specifically does in Meta. 986b. In
the ethical eide a central position in his hierarchy: in the Republic (see Tim. 28b Plato clearly says that the kosmos is subject to genesis.
504e-50ge) the form of the Good stands at the center of the Platonic Aristotle who earlier in his career had supported the same position
state, and it is the chief duty of the philosopher to contemplate it, ibid. (De Phil., fro 18), takes this to mean that it had a beginning in time
540a (for the problems arising from its transcendence at this stage, see and criticizes it severely (De coelo I, 279b). But there was another
hyperousia). It is, moreover, the term of the process of dialectic (di- interpretation of the passage, as Aristotle himself (loc. cit.) is aware,
alektike, q.v.). Plato's turning toward the conditions of the kosmos put forth by Xenocrates (see Plutarch, De an. proc. 1013a), and
6 I AGNOSTOS
AION I7
the Academy, had access to unpublished material (had uot Plato said
adopted by most later Platonists, that genesis here means "in a perpet-
in .E~. VII, 34'C that he would never publish anything on the ultimate
ual stat: o~ change:' (see on). The s~me interpretation, adapted to his
prmclples?). There are only two possible references to such material in
emanatlOmst theorIes, can be seen m Plotinus (see Enn. II 9 2).
Aristotle; in De an. I, 404b he refers to something called "On Philoso-
Aristotle is emphatic in his belief that the universe is both ung;ne~ated
phy," possibly a reference to his own dialogue by that name, though
(agenetos) and incorruptible (aphthartos). This becomes the basic
later commentators took it as a reference to a Platonic lecture (cf.
position, but Philo, by reason of the account in Genesis, must, or'
Simplicius, In De an. 28, 7-9), and iu Phys. IV, 20gb where he refers to
course, staud outside it (see De opit. 2, 7-9).
Plato's ."uuwritten doctriues" (agrapha dogmata). What were these
agrapha dogmata? The oue identifiable possibility is a single lecture
agnostos: unknown, unknowable "au the Good" that Plato gave to a diseuchanted public who came to
1. Because of the transcendence of God certain problems arise in
hear about happiuess, but were treated to mathematics, geometry, aud
tI;e p~ssibility of his being an o~ject of knowledge. A simple agnosti-
astronomy iustead (Aristoxeuus, Harmonics II, 30-31); it was atteuded
cIsm IS he!d by Protagoras (Dlels, fro 80B4) where the question is
by Aristotle aud other members of the Academy, who took notes that
separat~d mto knowledge of whether the gods exist, and what their
they later published (Simplicius, In Phys. '5',453); cf. arithmos.
nature IS; the agnosia problem treats more properly of the latter (on
For a related problem as it coucerns Aristotle, cf. exoterikoi.
the question of their existence, cf. theos).
2. Because of the importance of transcendence in the Platonic , h ' . 1aw
tradition, the question of the knowability of God was central there' the agrap os nomos: unwntten
See nomos.
Platonic proof text on the difficulty of knowing God was Tim. '28c,
supported by the pessimistic remarks in Parm. '4,e-142a, Symp. 211a, ,
aud especially, Ep. VII, 341b-d. As is indicated in the texts cited the aidios: everlasting, perduration in time (aidios kata
problem i~ the transcendence of the supreme priuciple, the "Good chronon)
beyond Bemg" of Rep. VI, 50gb (see hyperousia). But if the esseuce of Although the distinction in terminolog-y is not always maintained
God could not be apprehended directly, the same and similar texts of by the philosophers, the concepts of "everlasting perduration in time"
Plato suggest alteruative ways of knowing God, ways highly developed (aidios) is separate and different from "eternal" (aionios), i.e., not
in later Platonism (e.g. Albinus, Epit. x and Maximus of Tyre, VII and bel.onging to the ord~r of time (ehronos ), but to the order of eternity
XVIII; compare Produs, Elem. theol., prop. 123). The major ones are:
(awn.' q.v., and Plotmus, Enn. III, 7, 3); "eternal" is used loosely to
a) by inductive return to the source (epagoge, the medieval via descrrbe both concepts, e.g. the "eternity of the kosmos"; but aidios is
eminentiae); see Symp. 20ge-211C and compare Plotinus, Enn. really a question of the occurrence or the possibility of occurrence of
1,6. corruption (phthora), and so the concept will be discussed under
b) ~y analogy (analogia); see Rep. VI, 508a-c and compare aphthartos; see also aion, chronos.
Plotmus, Enn. VI, 7, 36; because Produs denied any participation
(methexis) between the One and the rest of reality (Elem. theol., aion: life-span, eternity
1. Iu its earliest and nonphilosophical use, aion means a life-span;
prop. 23) , he is barred from the via analogiae.
c) by "removal," negation (aphairesis; the via negativa); see the its con.ceptual introduction into philosophy may be seen in Parmenides,
first "hypothesis" of the Parmenides, which later Platonists took fro 8, hne 5, where the denial of becoming (genesis) in true being (see
in a very unhypothetical seuse; compare Plotinus, Enn. VI, 7, 32. on) leads to its corollary, the denial of the temporal distinctions "past"
d) by mystical union (ekstasis); cf. Symp. 21Oe-211a, Ep. VII, ~nd "future" and the affirmation of total present simultaneity. Melissus

340c-d; compare Enn. VI, g, g-11 and, for Plotiuus' personal lllterprets this as apeiron, without limit, going on forever (frs. 2, 3, 4,
experience, Porphyry, Vita Plot. 23; see hen. 7), a notion later distinguished as aidios (q.v.), perduration in time,
and the same type of interpretation may be seen in Aristotle, De eoelo I,
agrapha d6gmata: unwritten doctrines 27ga where aion embraces "all time even to infinity [apeironl."
2. The fundamental distinction between time (ehronos) and aion
One of the common methods used to obliterate the difference
between what Aristotle says about Plato's eide and the preserved that is implied in Parmenides is made fully explicit in Plato, Tim. 37d
account iu the dialogues is to presume that Aristotle, as a member of where time is created to serve as au image (eikon) of the state of the
8 I AISTHESIS AISTHESIS I9
eide, from which Plato, like Parmenides, has banished all genesis, or as now extended to a chain of causality that began with a perceived body
Plotinus puts it (Enn. III, 7, 4), aion is the ''manner of existence" of and its qualities, and passed, via a medium (this in the still perplexing
Being. But Plato's admission, through the intermediary of the soul, of question of vision), a sense organ, and a sense faculty to the soul,
both nous and kinesis into the intelligible world creates a problem becoming, at least for those who held the immateriality of the soul,
unknown to the static universe of Parmenides. The solution is to be noncorporeal at some point in the process.
found in Aristotle's discussion of the First Mover whose "span of 4. Finally, beginning with Parmenides' attack on aisthesis and
existence" (aion) is unending (aidios), Meta. 1072b: 'the reason for his exaltation of episteme as the only genuine source of truth, it was no
this is the peculiar type of activity involved in a noesis thinking itself, longer possible to treat thought (noesis, phronesis) as merely a quanti-
what Aristotle calls ''the activity of immobility" (energeia akinesias) tatively different form of aisthesis, but as different in kind, and increas-
in Eth. Nich. 1l54b. This is the foundation of the treatment of eternity ing attention was paid to both the faculty and the process of this higher
in both Plotinus, Enn. III, 7, 4 and Proclus, Elem. theol., prop. 52: in the type of perception (see nous, noesis) .
following proposition Proclus hypostatizes aion as a separate sub- 5. These, then, are some of the complexities of the problematic
stance, probably as a result of a similar practice in later Greek of aisthesis. The chief ancieni authority on the subject, Theophrastus,
religious thought. See chronos. whose treatise On the Senses is the major source of what we know of
the ancient theories, prefers to approach the question from a physical
alsthesis: perception, sensation point of view. The opening paragraph of his work distingnishes two
1. Perception is a complex of problems rather than a single ques- types of explanation of how aisthesis occurs. One school bases it on the
tion. It enters philosophy modestly enough as an attempt on the part of similarity (homoion, q.v.), the other on the opposition (enantion) of
the early physikoi to explain the physiological processes involved in the knower and the thing known. The first group includes - on the
perceiving an object. A variety of solutions were worked out, mostly in testimony of Theophrastns-Parmenides, Empedocles, and Plato: the
terms of the contact, mixture, or penetration of the bodies involved. latter, Anaxagoras and Heraclitus.
There were, of course, certain anomalies as, for example, the case of 6. The reference to Parmenides is, of conrse, to the second part
vision where contact was apparently absent, but the first major crisis of his poem, "The Way of Seeming" (see on, episteme). We know
did not occur until grades of knowledge were distinguished and sense that Parmenides had scant epistemolog'ical respect for aisthesis (cf. fro
perception was separated from another more reliable type of perception 7), and it is not at all clear that the theories put forth in the "Way of
that had little or nothing to do with sensible realities or sensible Seeming" are indeed his. But what emerges from Theophrastus' sum-
processes. Aisthesis found itself involved in the epistemological doubts mary (De sens. 3-4) is that "Parmenides" held that sensation and
raised by Heraclitus and Parmenides and debarred from any genuine thinking (phronesis) were identical (whatever else he may have be-
access to truth (see aletheia, doxa, episteme) . lieved, it is certain that the genuine Parmenides never held that), and
2. Other changes were afoot as well. The particle or somatic that knowledge arises from the presence of identical opposites (enan-
theory upon which the physikoi's theory of perception was based began tia) in the subject and object of knowledge, so that, for instance, even a
to be replaced by theories on change that took as their point of depar- corpse, being cold, can perceive cold.
ture a new dynamic view of the "powers" of things (see dynamis, 7. Whosesoever theory this actually is, it had a marked effect on
genesis). Aristotle, who was a dynamist, incorporated the analyses Empedocles, who had a fairly elaborate theory of sensation and who,
worked out for change in sensible beings into his metaphysic and for unlike-Parmenides, took the senses seriously (fr. 3, lines 9-13). For
the first time aisthesis became a philosophical question as well as a Empedocles material things are constituted by mixtures of the four
physiological one. basic elements (stoicheia, q.v.) "running throngh each other" (fr. 21,
3. A third major change was precipitated by the growing belief lines 13-14). Each object gives off a constant stream of effiuences
in the incorporeal nature of the soul (psyche, q.v.), the principle of life (aporrhoai, fro 89) that enter the congruent passages (poroi) in the
iu beings and the source of their sensitive activities. What then was the appropriate senses and sensation ensues (Theophrastns, De sens. 7:
general relationship between the immaterial soul and the material Aristotle, De gen. et carr. II, 324b). But it is not merely a question of
body, and the specific one between that part or faculty of the soul symmetry between the effiuence and the pore: what is also required is
known as aisthesis and that part of the body which it employed, its that like comes in contact with like on the level of substance: we see
organon? What had once been a simple contact between bodies was earth with earth, fire with fire (Aristotle, Meta. 1000b).
10 I AISTHESIS AISTHESIS I 11
8. When it comes to a question of thought (phronesis) , Emped- the diffnsion of the resultant mixture determining the type of cognition.
ocles seems to be moving toward a distinction between it and sensa- Thus phronesis is the result when both the inhaled air is purer and the
tion, but still on the quantitative level. For him, as for the Atomists, it mixture of blood and air is spread throughout the body (ibid. 44; d.
is a special type of sensation that occurs in the blood (hence the heart the satiric remarks in Aristophanes, Clouds 227-233).
as the seat of thought) since the blood appears to Empedocles to be the 13. At the head of the opposite tradition stands Alcmaeon of
most perfect blend of the stoicheia (fr. 105; Theophrastus, De sens. g).' Crotona, an early disciple of Pythagoreanism whose opinions we know
g. The Atomists, who had reduced all things' to the atoms only in a summary unaccompanied by much evidence or detail (Theo-
(atoma) and the void (kenon) , appropriately rednced all sensation to phrastus, De sens. 25-26) . He maintained that the like is known by the
contact (Aristotle, De sens. 442a ) , and explained its operation in terms unlike, that the brain is the seat of the psyche (see kardia), and, more
clearly derived from Empedocles. Here too bodies give off effluences, importantly, that there is a difference between aisthesis and phronesis.
now called eidola (q.v.; d. Alexander of Aphrodisias, De sens. 56, 12), It is this distinction that sets man apart from all the other animals and
that are similar in shape to the thing whence they are emitted. These thereby grounds an intellectualist ethic, as well as being at the root of
enter the sentient, or rather, penetrate between the atoma of the sen- the quest for the higher, immaterial faculty of the soul, the logistikon
tient, and sensation results (Aetius IV, 8, 10). of Plato and the dianoetike of Aristotle (see psyche), and the progeni-
10. This may have been Leucippus' theory; but as far as the tor of the exalted role of nous (q.v.) in the subsequent history of Greek
troublesome question of sight is concerned, Democritus seems to have philosophy. But we only know that Alcmaeon made this distinction; we
added certain refinements, again suggested by Empedocles. The visual do not know on what grounds, though it is almost certainly tied to the
image (emphasis) occurs not in the eye of the beholder, but is due to a well-known Pythagorean belief in an immortal soul (see psyche, athan-
contact in the air between the object and tl,e beholder. When once atos, palingenesia) .
formed the emphasis travels back along the ait· and, being moist, is 14- "Like knows unlike" appears again with Anaxagoras, and
admitted by the moist eye of the beholder (Theophrastus, De sens. 50; here it is based on the empirical evidence that sensations, especially
compare Empedocles in Aristotle, De sens. 437b-438a). This explana- tactile sensations, rest on contrast, e.g. we feel the cold because of the
tion is interesting not only insofar as it turns attention to air as a heat within us (Theophrastus, De sens. 27), a theory that is in perfect
medium of perception, but also in indicating, by the reference to the accord with Anaxagoras' doctrine of "a portion of everything in every-
moisture of the emphasis and the eye, that Democritus has likewise thing" (see stoicheion). Further, every sensation, since it is a change,
founded the possibility of sensation, as distinct from the mere mechan- is accompanied by pain (ponos; compare hedone).
ics, on the principle of "like knows like." 15. In the Theaetetus (155d-,-157d) Plato presents a theory of
11. Theophrastus (ibid. 49) remarks that the Atomists explain sensation that is ostensibly attributed to Protagoras or some such
sensation in terms of change (alloiosis). This can hardly be qualitative variety of a Heraclitan relativist. But since it is not refuted in the
change as understood in the Aristotelian sense since the Atomists are sequel and coheres with other passages in the dialogues, it is not
on record as having reduced all the pathe of a thing to quantity (see unlikely that it represents Plato's own views on sensation as well. It
pathos); it must refer rather to the motion of the impinging atoma hinges on the point, frequently made by Heraclitus, that among the
disturbing the position of the atoms in the percipient (compare Lucre- aistheta the only reality is change, or, to put it in the language of a more
tius III, 246-257). All sensations caJI be explained in terms of the sophisticated generation, the aistheta are not really substances but
various shapes and movements of the atoma in contact with the percip- qualities (see pathos; Plato makes the same point in Tim. 4gb-50, and
ient (Theophrastus, De sens. 66); what we experience as sweetness compare stoicheion) ; they are powers (dynameis) with the capacity of
and heat and color are no more than subjective impressions (fr. g; d. either affecting (poiein) other things or being affected (paschein) by
nomos, pathos) . them (Theaet. 156a). It may likewise be true, as earlier thinkers had
12. Empedocles and the Atomists, then, are firmly within what maintained, that the kosmos is nothing else but kinesis (lac. cit.), but
Theophrastus calls the "like-knows-like" tradition. Here too belongs here too further refinements are possible. Even at this stage (see
Diogenes of Apollonia for whom the arche of all things was aer (q.v.), Theaet. 1B1C) Plato is capable of dividing the generic kinesis (q.v.)
which does equal service as the principle of all cognition (Theophras- into alteration (alloiosis) and locomotion.
tus, De sens. 39). Knowledge occurs when air outside the organism is 16. It is within this context that the Platonic theory of sensation
mixed with that which is within, both the purity of the entering air and unfolds. It finds its most generic statement in Phil. 33d-34a and Tim.
12 I AISTHESIS AISTHESIS I 13
64"-d. The dynamis of the agent acts upon the body of the patient. If tually (entelecheia; ibid. II, 418a). This coheres with what was said of
the affected part is an immobile one in which earth predominates (e.g. the relationship of energeiajdynamis in the central passage on the
bone, hair) the affection is not spread; pain or pleasure might result, subject in the Metaphysics: energeia is prior to dynamis (the object
but not sensation. But if it is mobile, like one of the sense organs, the must be red before the eye "becomes red"; see De an. II, 425b) and the
affection spreads until it reaches the consciousness (phronimon) and energeia ends as an actuality in the thing moved (vision is in the eye;
sensation results (compare Tim. 43C, and see psyche 17). ibid. III, 426a); see energeia and Meta. 1050a.
'7. Both these passages would seem to suggest that perception is 20. Sensation may be described, then, as an alteration (alloiosis)
a pure passibility in the percipient; but when Plato turns to a discussion in that it represents the passage from potency to actuality of one of the
of sight he reaches back to Empedocles and Democritus for the theory sense faculties. In this way too Aristotle can resolve the problem of
that makes the image (emphasis) a cooperative production of both the "like knows like." Anaxagoras was correct in suggesting that "like
object and the subject. Both are essentially qualities in a state of knows unlike" since otherwise change could not take place; but this is
change (alloiosis) , but once brought within range of each other, and only the way in which the process begins; when it ends the subject has
with the aid of the light of the sun (Tim. 45b), the dynamis of become like the object known (De an. II, 417a-418a).
whiteness in the object and the quality of light in the eye initiate 21. The explanation becomes somewhat clearer when Aristotle
locomotion and this "gives birth" to color, which causes the eye to be turns to describing the sensation process in purely physical terms.
seeing and the object to become a colored thing (Theaet. 156c-e). Physical bodies have perceptible qualities that differentiate them; these
These qualitative changes, when reported to the soul, result in sensa- are the "opposites" (enantia, q.v.), hot-cold, moist-dry, etc. The per-
tion (Tim. 45c-d, Blc-d). The Theaetetus passage goes on (157a) to ceiving subject too, being corporeal, possesses them. But if it is to
draw the Heraclitan moral: if the subject and object are not within perceive them in another, the appropriate organ (organon) must be in
range of each other we have no very certain idea of what the dynamis a state of balance with regard to these extremes. Aristotle sees the
in the object is really like (for Plotinus' changes, see sympatheia). capacity to perceive as a kind of mean or proportional state (mesotes,
18. Plato appears, however, to be speaking out of both sides of logos) between these extreme opposites so that it is "actually neither,
his mouth. His theory, as thus described, is strongly dynamistic in its but potentially both" (ibid. II, 423b-424a).
linking of the pathe with the powers and in suggesting that the dy- For Aristotle's distinction between sensation and thought, see
namis is a real quality inherent in the perceived object (cf. Theophras- noesis; on the question of a medium (metaxu) for sensation, see sym-
tus, De sens. 60). But he has also, in his other account of postcosmic patheia.
genesis (q.v.), reduced all bodies to the geometrical solids and so, in 22. Aristotle goes to some pains to distinguish mere contact from
the last resort, his account of the sensible pathe in Tim. 6,d ff. smacks the sensation of touch. Plants are alive and thus have a nutritive soul
of a variety of Atomism with its reduction of quality to quantity in the (threptike psyche); i.e., they are affected by things; they absorb the
order of shape (schema), position (thesis), and movement (kinesis), form as well as the matter of the things other than themselves. But they
in this instance, of course, locomotion. do not perceive, as animals do: the function of the aisthetike psyche, the
'9. Aristotle rejects both the Atomistic and Heraclitan taint visi- distinctive ousia of animals, is to receive the form of sensible things
ble in Plato's theory of aisthesis. Put in its most general terms, ais- without the matter (ibid. III, 424a-b) and so be subject to the conse-
thesis is the reception of a sensible eidos without its matter. Aristotle quent pathe of appetite (orexis), pleasure (hedone), and pain (ibid. II,
can, like all his predecessors, explain sensation in physical terms, and 414b). This distinction disappears in Epicurus; an eidos without hyle
he does so subsequently by applying the physical doctrine of the was and remains unthinkable in the Atomist tradition. Sensation is
''mean.'' But first he locates the entire problem of cognition within the again reduced to contact, ~and the different sensations explained in
cadres already enunciated in the Physics and the Metaphysics: act terms of the shape, arrangement, and motion of the atoma (see Lucre-
(energeia) and potency (dynamis). To perceive something means two tius II, 381-477, especially 434-435). Where the contact is not immedi-
things: to be able to perceive something whether one is perceiving it or ate, as in vision, the theory of effluences is once again invoked: bodies
not, and actually to perceive. Thus, any sensible faculty of the soul, give off outlines of themselves in the form of eidola (q.v.; the simulacra
though it may be the eidos or ousia of the organ in which it operates of Lucretius IV, 49-50 ff.) that, if the eye be turned toward them,
(just as the psyche as a whole is the ousia of the entire body; De an. II, impress their pattern on the eye and set in train sensation (D.L. x,
412), it is, nevertheless, a capacity (dynamis) with respect to the 46-5 0 ).
perceptible object: it is potentially (dynamei) what the object is ac- 23. But some of the old Democritean positions now seem unten-
14 I AISTHESIS AITHER I 15
able. Epicurus still holds to the esseutial corporeality of the soul (d. the concept clearly owes something, as does indeed the Aristotelian
D.L. x, 63), but its relationship to the body has been redefined (see the mean itself, to the Platonic notion of limit; cf. peras). In this way the
remarks of Lucretius III, 370 if.), and a new ingredient added, the pathe, which are corporeal in the organ (and this is a type of aisthe-
mysterious "uameless element" (see psyche 27 for both develop- sis), are noetic when they are received by the soul (and this is true
ments). It is the organic grouping (see halon) of the latter's atoms aisthesis; I, 1, 7). The fuuction of the organ, then, is to convert the
that transmits sensation, which is the motion of the atoma, to the other impressions (typoseis) on the senses into activations (energeiai) of the
constituents of the soul, thence to the rest of the body' (Lucretius III, soul so that the impassibility of the soul may be maintained agaiust
242-251, 271-272), a process that is possible only because the soul the Stoics (compare III, 6, 1). The process of judging these intelligible
atoms are contained within the sheath (stegazon) of the body (D.L. x, forms transmitted from the sense is discursive reasoning (dianoia; I, 1,
64; see genesis) . g) ; see noesis 19-20.
24. From the time of Aristotle a new affirmative note appears in For the extension of the similarity principle beyond the bounds of
the epistemology of aisthesis. For Aristotle himself the senses are aisthesis, see sympatheia.
incapable of error with regard to their proper objects (De an. III,
428b), but in Epicurus it becomes, in one form or other, the only aisthesis koine: common sense, sensus communis
criterion of truth (Sextus Empiricus, Adv. Math. VIII, g; D.L. x, 31; In Aristotelian psychology the "common sense" is a faculty of the
Lucretius IV, 479; see energeia, prolepsis). Among the Stoics the same psyche that has as its function 1) the perception of the "common
assent to the truth of the senses is found (SVF II, 78). This assertion of sensibles" that are the object of no single sense: movement and rest,
physiological accuracy is, however, of little significance since for nnmber (arithmos), shape, size (De an. 418a, 425b), 2) the perception
them, as for Aristotle, truth in its primary sense is a noetiC function. It of things incidentally sensible (lac. cit.), 3) the distinction between
is only when the impressions (typoseis) on the sense organs are car- senses (ibid. 431a-b), and 4) the perception that we perceive (ibid.
ried, via the pneuma (q.v.; see psyche), to the rational faculty (hege- 425b ).
monikon, q.v.) and there assented to (see katalepsis) that primary
truth is possible; see phantasia, noesis 16. aisthet6n: capable of being perceived by the senses; the
25. The operation of aisthesis is just part of the larger Stoic object of the senses, the sensible (opposite of
problem of the materiality of the pathe (q.v.). Zeno's use of the noeton)
expression "impression [typosis] on the hegemonikon" (SVF I, 58; The sensibles (aistheta) are frequently contrasted to the Platonic
Aristotle had used the same expression: De memo 45oa) provoked a forms (eide; see Phaedo 78d-7ga, Tim. 28a-c), and as such can lead
reaction on the part of Chrysippus who attempted to palliate the mate- only to opinion rather than to true knowledge (see doxa, episteme).
riality of the image by substitnting expressions like "alteration But they are not the lowest objects on the epistemological scale; they
[heteroiosis] in the hegemonikon" (Sextus Empiricus, Adv. Math. VII, are only reflections of the true reality of the eide, bnt beneath them are
233, 237) or by reducing all the pathe to judgments (kriseis; SVF III, the "images of images," shadows, reflections, etc. (Rep. 50gd-510a;
461; see noesis 17). cf. eikon, mimesis). Plato's growing interest in the world of the
26. Plotinus' account of sensation begins with the acceptance of aistheta in the later dialogues is reflected in their being granted a
the Aristotelian premiss that the soul is an eidos of the body (Enn. I, 1, quasi-being (Soph. 204b), and in his devotion of a large part of the
4; but see hyle 11). The composite, i.e., the animal, senses because of Timaeus to a description of their creation and operation. For Aristotle
the presence of the soul (I, 1, 7), but the soul itself is impassible the sensible singular object is the only true reality (see tode ti, on,
(apathes): its facnlties are like reflections of itself that enable the ousia); some are appropriate to individual senses, others are common,
things that possess them to act (I, 1, 8). De an. II, 418a (see aisthesis koine). For the materialists of the Atom-
27. The soul in and of itself is capable only of intellectnal activ- ist tradition all of truth and all of reality is in the aistheta, so Epicurus
ity. How, then, is the contact with the sensible (aistheton) achieved? in Sextus Empiricus, Adv. Math. VIII, g; see aisthesis, eidolon.
This is the function of the corpoteal organs of the body (IV, 5, 1) that
are capable of sel'Ving as intetmediaties. The organon is the material aither: ether
thing that is affected (pathein), and the pathos of the organ represents An etymology (fanciful) is given in Plato, Grat. 41Ob. It is the
a proportional mean (meson kata logon) between the sensible object purest form of aer (Phaedo 10ga-11ob, Tim. 58d). For Aristotle it
and the noetic subject (IV, 4, 23; the language smacks of Aristotle but constitutes a fifth element (quinta essentia), moving naturally in eter-
16 I AITION
ANAMNESIS I 17
nal circular motion, the stuff of the heavens (De coelo I, 268b-270b). realization of the arbitrary nature of laws and customs (see nomos),
The ''fifth element" soon makes its appearance in the Academy as well, ~rotagoras propounded hIS theory of the relativity of truth, described
in Philip of Opus' Epinomis g84b where it has the added virtue of III ~lato, Theaet. '5,e-152e, 161e-167a. Aristotle's theory of truth and
corresponding to the fifth "Platonic body" (see stoicheion). The pres- falSIty rests on th~ assumption that truth is not in things (Meta.
ence of aither, with its "natural" (physei) circular movement (De 1027b-1028a), nor III our knowledge of simple substances (where onl
caelo I, 26gb) also leads to Aristotle's dropping the theory of heavenly ~~o:"ledge or ignorance is possible), but in the judgment, ie. th~
bodies possessed by souls; see ouranioi. Cicero (citing Aristotle?) JOlmng together of concepts which do not correspond to the reality
suggests that nous is also composed of aither (Acad. past. I, 7, 26); see (Meta .. '0 5 ,b , De an. III, 430a; see doxa). For Epicurus all our sense
zoon, stoicheion, kosmos, aphthartos; for the material element involved, perceptIOns are true and thus aisthesis, sensation, is the ultimate crite-
see hyle. rion of truth (Sextus Empiricus, Adv. Math. VIII, 9; Lucretius, De
rerum nat. IV, 46g-479; see prolepsis). The Stoic criteria are described
altion (or aitla): culpability, responsibility, cause in D.L. VII, 54.
Since metaphysics is defined as a study of ultimate causes,
1. . The possibility of error and falsity is discussed under doxa and
Aristotle begins his work on the subject by a detailed review of his noeSZ8.
predecessors' search for causes (Meta. g83a-993a; recapitulated
g88a-b). Plato has no formal treatment of causality as such, though algos: pain
there is a criticism of the pre-Socratic search for a moving cause in See hedone.
Phaedo 95d-99d, Timaeus 46c-47e, and Laws 892C, where the earlier
physicists are blamed for mistaking accessories (synaitia), which oper-
ate from necessity (ananke) and without intelligent design (techne), allegorfa: allegorical interpretation, exegesis
See mythos, theos.
for the only genuine cause of motion, the psyche (compare Aristotle De
an. 4'4a and symbebekos). But in Phil. 26d-27c he reduces reality to a
formal (see peras), an efficient (see demiourgos) , and a "material" allolosis: change, qualitative change, alteration
(see apeiron) element. See pathos, metabole, aisthesis.
2. Aristotle's own doctrine of four causes-formal (eidos), mate-
rial (hyle; See also hypakeimenon) , efficient (kinoun), and final (te- analogla: proportion, analogy
los) -is to be found in Phys. II, 194b-195a and Meta. 1013a-1014a. See agnostos, dike, thesis, onoma.
One peculiar development of the doctrine is the identification of the
material cause with the premisses of a syllogism that necessarily anamnesis: remembrance recollection
"cause" the conclusion (cf. Anal. post. II, 94a, Phys. II, 195a). There is . Plato'.s acceptance of. the Pythagorean theory of rebirth (see
another, more ethically oriented division of the types of causalities in paltngenesw, psyche) prOVIded the opportunity for solving a serious
Eth. Nich. lll2a. Later philosophers made some additions to the Aris- epistemological problem, i.e., how does one know the unchanging reali-
totelian analysis: Philo's logos is the instrumental cause of creation ues already formulated by Socrates as ethical definitions and en route
(De cher. 35, ,26-,27), and Seneca (Ep. 65, 8) has a list of five. to beco.ming the Platonic eide, particularly if sense knowledge (see
For unintended causes, see tyche. daxa) IS so clearly untrustworthy? There will be later solutions like
eras an~ dialektike, but in the first instance it is anamnesis that gu~ran­
aletheia: truth tees thIS knowledge. In Mena 80e-86c Socrates had illustrated the
The presence and even the possibility of truth is closely related to possibility of eliciting, by means of diagrams (these will reappear in
the Greek distinction between doxa and episteme (qq. v.) and their Rep. 51Od;.see ~wnala, mathematika) and proper questioning, knowl-
proper objects. Thus there is really no critical problem until Parmen- edge of o.bJ~cts Illcapable of being perceived by the senses; in Phaedo
ides distinguishes being from nonbeing, associates the latter with 72e-77a It IS offered as a proof of the preexistence of the soul and
sense perception, asserts that there is no truth in the phenomenal world connected with the doctrin.e of eide. We have knowledge of the eide
of doxa (Diels, frs. 28B1, Bll, B30), and contrasts the latter with the that We cannot have acqUIred through the senses therefore it must
''Way of Truth" (ibid. zSB4). As a corollary of this and of the have been acquired in a prenatal state during which' we were in contact
~8 I ANANKE APEIRON I ~9
with the forms. The theory appears once again in a mythical and hedone), and this state of equilibrium or freedom from disturbance
religions context in Phaedrus 249b-c, and at least by implication in the (ataraxia) has at least a superficial resemblance to apatheia.
vision granted the souls before their birth iu Tim. 41e-42b (compare 3· The radical point of difference between Epicurus and the
the vision in Phaedrus 247c-248b, and the difficulty in recalling it, ibid. Stoics in this regard is the latter's insistence that all the pathe are
249e-2sod) ; see eidos. irrational movements against nature, at least as defined by Zeno (SVF
I, .20S, 206; see ho;me!. This created difficulties for Chrysippus who
amlnke: necessity fmled to s~e how IrratIOnal affects could occur in the rational faculty
1. The pre-Socratic use of ananke is not uniform; in Parmenides (hegemonzkon; see SVF III, 459, 461). But though the intricacies of
(Diels, fr. 28A37), it governs all things in an almost providential this were debated, the Stoa was at one in agreeing that the pathe were
manner, in a not very different fashion from its personification in the bot~ violent and unnatural and hence shoul~ be extirpated (see Seneca,
"Myth of Er" in Plato's Rep. 614c-621d, and the Orphic figure in Em- De zra I, 8, 2-3; SVF I, 207, III, 389). Thus It would seem that the Stoic
pedocles (Diels, fr. l1S). But with the Atomists (see D.L. IX, 4S; is concerned with eradicating the pathe, the Peripatetic with moderat-
Diels, fr. 67B2) we enter the area of the mechanical necessity of pnrely in? them, and the Epicurean with discriminating between the good and
physical causes operating without purpose (telos). eVIl among them (see Seneca, Ep. 116, 1), attitudes reminiscent of the
2. For Socrates and Plato true causality always operates with ~ifferent approaches to katharsis (q.v.) as harmonization and purga-
purpose, while the operations of the physical elements are merely tIOn.
conditions or "accessory causes" (synaitia) (see Phaedo 99b, Timaeus 4- The practice, if not the enunciation of apatheia had its origins
46c). Yet ananke too has its role in the formation of the kosmos; reason in the Cynic and related movements immediately preceding Zeno, and
(nous = Demiourgos) overcomes physical necessity (Timaeus 47e- was frequently accompanied with the charge that its practitioners were
48a). Necessity, the quasi-cause, is only worth studying for its relation- merely indulging in insensitivity (Seneca, Ep. I, 9, 1). The Stoics were
ship with nous, the diviue (theion) cause. at some pains to ~st.inguish their version of apatheia from insensitivity
3. In Aristotle ananke has varied meauings (see Meta. 101sa-c), or from mere stupIdity (D.L. VIII, "7; Seneca, Ep. I, 9, 3). Indeed, it
but as in Plato the physical necessity in matter must submit, not so is likely that it was exactly this type of criticism that resulted in the
much to nous as to the purpose (telos) in his new understanding of later Stoa's not altogether consistent distinction between good (eupath-
physis (Phys. II, 200a). The role of ananke in syllogistic reasoning eiai) andevilpathe (D.L. VII, 116).
should also be noted: the conclusion of a valid syllogism flows necessar-
ily from the premisses (Anal. pro I, 24b). apeiron: unlimited, indefinite
For necessity in a providential sense, see heimarmene, pronoia. 1. The arche (q.v.) of all things was, according to Anaximander
the apeiron, the unlimited. The term is capable of various construction~
anaplerosis: filling up dep~ndi~g on how one understands tJ.'e limit. (peras, q.v.) that is being
See hedone. demed m the compound word. ArIstotle mcludes in his Physics a
lengthy discussion of the various meanings of the word (202b-208a)
apitheia: unaffected, without pathe (g.v.) some of which, e.g. spatial infinity, may be rejected as being anachro:
1. The Aristotelian concept of virtue, founded, as it is, upon the nistic to Anaximander's thinking. What is involved in his idea of apei-
doctrine of the mean (meson, q.v.), has lIO place for the state of ron is perduration in time (see Diels, fr. B3 and aidios, aphthartos) an
apatheia. It does, however, have a significance in his psychology: it is infinite supply of basic substance "so generation [genesis] and dest;uc-
the apparent apatheia of nous that suggests that this faculty, unlike the tion [phthora] not fail" (Aristotle, Phys. III, 203b), and, finally, inde-
psyche, is incorporeal and immortal, since the pathe are always asso- termination, i.e., without internal limits within which the simple physi-
ciated with matter (De an. 403a, 408b) . cal bodies, air and water, were not as yet distinguished (Diels, fr. cit.;
2. The situation with Epicurus is somewhat more complex. Since Aristotle, Phys. I, 187a). It is also possible that Anaximander visual-
both pleasure and pain are pathe (D.L. X, 34), there can be no ized this huge mass of material that surrounds our kosmos (Aristotle,
question of apatheia being a virtue in this hedonistic philosophy. But ibid. 203b) as a sphere, and so without limit, i.e., beginning or end, in
the highest type of pleasure is, for Epicurus, precisely static (see that Sense as well. .
20 I APHAIRESIS
APHTHARTOS I 21
2. The subsequent history of the concept as understood by Anax!- 1025b), a mistake the Platonists make (Phys. II, 194a), while the
mander lies in the direction of an interest in the exact nature of what IS objects of Mathematics are not separate substances in the ontological
outside the furthermost sphere of ouranos (q.v.), which marks the sense, but can be separated from matter conceptually; see mathema-
limit of our universe (see kenon). With the Pythagoreans new consid- tika, hyle.
erations lead into other aspects of apeiron; Limited and Unlimited 2. The fact of the basic unknowability of matter and the conse-
stand at the head of the Pythagorean Table of Opposites cited- in quent necessity of grasping it by analogy (Meta. l036a, Phys. I, 191a;
Aristotle, Meta. 986a. This is no longer the apeirOli of Anaximander, Plato had the same difficulty: see the "bastard reasoning" of Tim. 52b)
but either the spatial limit (or its absence) inherent in the Pythago- leads Aristotle to a somewhat more detailed exposure of how the
reans' geometrical approach t? n.umber an~ bodies (see arithm~s), o.r aphairesis process works. Primary here is his distinction between sensi-
else a musical concept where lImIt (peras) IS thought of as the ImposI- ble and intelligible matter (aisthete and noete hyle; see Meta. 1036a,
tion of some finite measure (in terms of music, harmonia; in terms of l045a. Plotinus uses the same terms but in a different sense; see hyle).
mathematics, proportion or logos) upon a continuum infinit.e at eith~r The latter is the kind of matter that the mind grasps in the abstractive
end. This type of dual infinity is t~e reason, ~risto~~ con]e~tures '~ process when it contemplates sensible things (aistheta) but not qua
Phys. III, 206b, why apeiron passed mto the notIon of mdefimte dyad sensible, i.e., as mathematical bodies composed of form and spatial
(see dyas) . The latter of the two points of view is probably the one that extension (megethos; see mathematika and compare Meta. 105gb,
lies behind Plato's employment of peras and apeiron as principles of lO77b), or by analogy, the potential principle in definition, i.e., the
being in Phil. 23c-25b (the earlier use, ibid. 15d-17a, seems to refer to genos with respect to the difference (Meta. 1045a; see diaphora).
a mere indefinite multiplicity of particulars) . . For aphairesis as the theological via negativa, see agnostos.
3. The prominence of apeiron in the Philebus guaranteed I~S
continued use as a metaphysical principle in the subsequent Platomc aphthartos: indestructible; for the indestructibility of the
tradition, but with somewhat different emphases. For Plato peras and soul, cf athanatos
apeiron appear as co-principles in much the same way ~he chora of the 1. In Aristotle's discussion of the possible meanings of the term

Timaeus exists side by side with the eide. Indeed, ArIstotle saw both (De coelo I, 280b) he accepts as the primary connotation "that which
the apeiron and chora as the Platonic equivalents of his co-principle of exists and which cannot be destroyed, i.e., it will or might cease to
being, hyle (see dyas and Phys .. IV, ':09?)' Plotin;,s accep:ed the exist"; and while he finds agreement among his predecessors that the
identification of apeiron as a materml prrncIple, but hIS more rrgorous world is a product of genesis (see agenetos) , there are those willing to
monism led him to subordinate it to the One as a kind of evolutional admit its destruction (ibid. I, 27gb). Among these latter there are some
"moment" when, as "Otherness," it issues from the One and is without who posit a single destruction and others who maintain that the de-
definition (aoristos) until it turns and contemplates the One (Enn. II, strnction of the kosmos is recurrent. Aristotle does not specify who the
4, 5; see hyle and compare Proclus' triad of "moments" in Ele,;,. theo!., first gronp are, bnt Simplicius, in commenting this passage, identifies
prop. 35: immanence, procession [proodos, q.v.], and reverSIOn [epzs- them as the Atomists, and the identification seems likely (see Diels,
trophe, q.v.]); see trias 3· ., . . frs. 67A1, 68A40; compare Epicurus in D.L. x, 73 and Lucretius, De
4. Another factor in the contmued mte~est.m a~ezro~ as "?- onto- rerum nat. v, 235 ff.). Among the proponents of cyclic destruction
logical principle was its inclusion, through ItS IdentIficatIOn wIth the Aristotle names Empedocles, whose theory of the mixing of the four
material principle, in the problematic of evil; see kakon. elements through Love and Strife is indeed cyclic (fl'. '7, lines 1-13),
and Heraclitus. The position of Heraclitus is much more obscnre; fl'. 30
aphairesis: taking away, abstraction denies any dissolution of the kosmos and Plato specifically distin-
1. For Aristotle the chief objects of abstraction are the "mathe- gnishes between the position of Empedocles and Heraclitus on the
maticals" (mathematika, q.v.; Anal. post. I, 81b, Meta. 106Ia-b), and question of the destruction of the kosmos (Soph. 242d). There are, on
the process is described in De an. ":' 431b as "thin~ing [no~sis] of the other hand, passages in later authors suggesting that Heraclitus
things that are embodied in matter as If they w~re not. The ?b]ects of held a doctrine of periodic conflagration (d. ekpyrosis). At first sight
the science of Physics are separate substances m an ontologIcal _sense Philo too seems to maintain the destructibility of the kosmos (De opif.
(see choriston), but since they embody physis and are subject to 7); but his actual view is based on a distinction found in Plato; in Tim.
change they are not conceptually separable from matter (Meta. 41a-b, when talking of the heavenly gods (ouranioi) , Plato says that
22 I APODEIXIS ARCHE I 23
the union of their bodies and souls could be dissolved but they will not VII, 1145b) , positing a hypothesis (De coelo II, 29 1b- 292a), or even
be because they are the handiwork of the Demiourgos. Philo similarly (Eth. Eud. VII, 1235b, 1246a) allowing the existence of a reasonable
feels that the kosmos, though naturally destructible, will not be de- (eulogon) contradicti?n. But whatever the solution, the posing of the
stroyed because of a providential divine sustenance (De Decalogo 58) . problem and the workmg from problem to solution, which is the heart
2. A similar argument appears in Plotinus Enn. II, 1, 3-4, where of the philosophical method, is a difficult and onerous task (Meta.
it is the Soul that holds the kosmos together etern,ally; but here the 996a) .
relationship is not the volitional, providential one found in Philo, rather
it is founded on the mimetic element in the Platonic tradition, e.g. time apollia: painlessness
is an eikon of eternity (aion) and this world is a reflection of the See hedone.
intelligible universe (kosmos noetos); further, creation in the sense of
"procession" (see proodos) and "return" (see epistrophe) are both aporrhoai: effiuences
perdurative in nature. See aisthesis.

ap6deixis: pointing out, demonstration, proof archil: beginning, starting point, principle, ultimate
In technical Aristotelian methodology apodeixis is a syllogistic underlying substance (Urstoff), ultimate
demonstration that, if the premisses be true and primary, will lead to undemonstrable principle
episteme (Aristotle, Anal. post. I, 71b-72a). Individuals are not sub- 1: The sea;ch for t~e basic "stuff" out of which all things are
ject to definition and hence un demonstrable (Aristotle, Meta. 103gb); made IS the ~arhest one ;n Greek philosophy and is attended by the
see dialektike, katholou. related question of. what IS the process whereby the secondary things
c.ame out. of the prIma~ one or ones. Or, to put it in strictly Aristote-
aporia: with no way out, difficulty, question, problem lian termmology: what IS the arche (or archai) and what is the genesis
1. Aporia and its cognate verb forms are closely related to dialec- of the syntheta?
tic (dialektike, q.v.) and hence to the Socratic custom of interlocutory 2. The pre-Socratic search for an arche in the sense of a material
discourse. According to Aristotle's analysis (Meta. 982b) , philosophy cause (A:-istotle had located the investigation within his own categories
begins with a sense of wonder (thauma; Aristotle makes the point here of causalIty; see endoxon for the method involved) is described by
that philosophy and mythology share wonder as a common point of Arist?tle i~ Meta .. 983--985b, and the word arche may have first been
departure) growing from an initial difficulty (aporia), a difficulty used m thIS techmcal sense by Anaximander (Diels 12A9). The first
experienced because of conflicting arguments (see Top. VI, 145b). candidates for the basic ingredient of things were individual natural
Both the aporia and its attendant wonder can be paralleled in Socrates' substances, e.g. water or moisture (Thales; see Meta. 983b) and air
frequent protestations of his own ignorance (e.g. Meno, 80d, Soph. (see aer), but with Anaximander's suggestion that the arche was
244a ) , and in the nolle contendere brought on by his own deliberate something indeterminate (apeiron, q.v.) an immense abstractive step
interrogation (elenchos) (see Theaet. 210b-c and katharsis) . away from the purely sensory had been taken. It opened the possibility
2. But this initial state of ignorance, compared by Aristotle to a that the arche Was something more basic than what could be perceived
man in chains (Meta. 995a32 ), yields to a further sense where aporia, by th~ senses, even tl;ough the apeiron was, at this stage, unmistakably
or, more specifically, diaporia, an exploration of various routes, as- n;aterlal. Th;,s Anaxlmander opened the line of enquiry that led to the
sumes the features of a dialectical process (Meta. 99Sa---b; see dialek- smgle spherIcal One of Parmenides (see on, hen) with its related
tike), and where the investigation of the opinions (endoxa, q.v.) of distinction between true knowledge (episteme, q.v.) and opinion
one's philosophical predecessors is a necessary preliminary to arriving (doxa, q.v.), and to the plural geometrical and mathematical archai of
at a proof (De an. I, 403; Eth. Nich. VII, 1145b). Thus, the aporiai are the Pythagoreans (see arithmos, monas) and the atoma (q.v.) of
posed, previous opinions on these problems are canvassed, and a solu- Leucippus and Democritus.
tion (euporia, lysis, the latter literally a "loosing," maintaining the 3· What might be termed the sensualist tradition continued to
metaphor of the chaining in Meta. 995a32) is worked out. The solution seek the ultimate irreducible entities in sensibly perceived bodies until
may take a variety of forms, e.g., validating the endoxa (Eth. 'Nich. Empedocles standardized them at four, the stoicheia (q.v.) of earth,
24 I AROHE ARITHMOS I 25
air, fire, and water, but there is scarcely anyone except Empedocles
himself who accepts these as true archai; rather they are stages be- arete: excellence, virtue
tween the still more remote archai and the higher complexities of 1. The c?nc:pt of virt~e ~ad a long evolutionary history in Greek

composite bodies (syntheta). culture be~ore Its mcorp?ratlOn mto the problematic of philosophy. The
4. The search for archai then takes a new tack. Both Parmenides pre-SocratIcs, whose chief concern was with a corporeal physis (q.v.)
and Empedocles had been emphatic in their deni~l of change, 'the were not much interested in speculations about arete; there are some
former by attributing it to an illusion of the senses, the latter by random thoug?ts on t?e subje~t, as in Heraclitus' designation of pru-
maintaining the eternity of the stoicheia. But it was a stricture that was dence as the highest virtue (Dlels, fr. 12) and Democritus' insistence
soon violated; Anaxagoras and the Atomists, each in their own way, on the interior character of arete (Diels, frs. 62, g6, 244, 264), but
reassert genesis and so, too, the possibility that the Empedoclean there is no true philosophical attention to arete until the generation of
stoicheia change into each other. Socrates.
5. A new analysis of genesis by Plato and Aristotle rejects the old 2. Socrates' own identification of virtue and knowledge was a
notions of change as mixture or conglomeration or association, and commonplace for his successors (Aristotle, Eth. Eud. I, 1216b, Eth.
concentrates instead-the lead had been given by Anaxagoras (see frs. Nich. VII, 114Sb), and the "Socratic dialogues" of Plato are directed
4,12) -on the old notion of contrary "powers" (see dynamis, enantion, toward a search for the definitions of various virtues, e.g. Laches
pathos). This is well within the sensualist tradition since these powers 19oc-1gge; and it is probably a hypostatization of these definitions that
can be sensibly distinguished (reduced by Aristotle, De gen. et corr. II, culminates in the Platonic theory of forms (see eidos). For Plato there
32gb, to the sense of touch, hap he); but there is a nod as well in the is an eidos of arete (M eno 72C) and of the various species of aretai
direction of the apeiron with the isolation of the other great arche of (Farm. 130b); in Rep. 442b-d he describes the four "cardinal virtues"
change, the undefined, imperceptible substratum (see hypokeimenon, desirable in the ideal state, a discussion that has as its correlatives the
hypodoche, hyle). classes of men in the state and the divisions of the soul (see psyche,
6. This, then, is the eventual solution (among the "geneticists"; sophrosyne) .
the Atomist and Pythagorean versions continue to flourish) of the 3. For Aristotle virtue is a mean (meson, q.v.), and he distin-
problem of the archai of physical bodies: opposed powers, some of guishes between moral and intellectual virtues (Eth. Nich. II,
which can act (see poiein) while others can be acted upon (see pas- 1l03a-b). The Socratic intellectualist approach to virtue is still visible
chein), a material substratum in which change occurs, and, eventually, \ in Aristotle, but it is tempered by a recognition of the volitional
an initiator of change (see nous, kinoun) . elements as well (see proairesis). For the Stoic the essence of virtue
7. A related problem is that posed by the resolution of proof was "living harmoniously with nature" (see nomos) .
(apodeixis) back to its ultimate archai, the first premisses of knowl- For other aspects of morality, see praxis, phronesis, adiaphoron,
edge or the ultimate principles upon which a syllogism rests. For the dike, and, for its ontological correlatives, agathon, kakon.
Platonists for whom true knowledge is essentially innate, based as it is
on a prenatal exposure to the eide (see anamnesis, palingenesia), the arithmos: number (see also arithmos eidetikos and
question is of little moment, except, perhaps, in the later theory of arithrnos rnathematikos)
dialectic where tl,e entire anamnesis approach to knowledge tends to • .• 1. T~e P~hagorean consideration of number is obscured by an

recede into the background (see dialektike). As for the sensualist who ImtIaI major difficulty: the general inability of the pre-Socratics to
founds all knowledge on sense perception, he is forced, for the valida- distinguish between the concrete and abstract, and the consequent lack
tion of the premisses of noetic knowledge, either to identify aisthesis of di~tin.ction between arithmetic and geometry. The original Pythago-
and noesis (so the Atomists, though Epicurus hedges a bit with his rean mSlght was probably the reduction of the basic intervals of music
notion of "self-evidence"; see enargeia), or to link the two, as Aristotle to mathematical ratios (see harmonia), which they extended to the
did, with the concept of intuition (see epagoge, nous) . principle that things are, in effect, numbers (Aristotle, Meta. lOgoa).
For another orientation to the question of the archai of physical And these "things" include, to the confusion of Aristotle, not only
bodies, see syntheton; for the process whereby the archai become more sen~ible material things, but abstractions like justice, marriage, oppor-
complex entities, see genesis; for the existence of two ethically opposed tumty, etc. (Meta. g8Sb, ggoa, l078b), and qualities like white, sweet,
archai, see kakon. and hot (ibid. lOg2b). Again, for Aristotle mathematical number was
26 I ARITHMOS ASYMMETRON I 27
abstract (see mathematika) , and he could distinguish between sensible that, for Plotinus, number has a transcendent position among the
solids and geometrical bodies (ibid. 997b). But for the Pythagoreans intelligibles (Enn. VI, 6, 8---g) •
arithmos was corporeal and had magnitude (ibid. 1080b, 1083b; see
megethos, asymmetron) , a not unlikely possibility considering the arithm6s eidetik6s: ideal number
Pythagorean habit of constructing solids out of the spatial arrangement .. T~at there are eide of numbers in Plato just as there are of other
of those points (Aristotle, Phys. III, 203a; Sextu~ Empiricus, Adv. entities ~s a m.atter of no dispute (cf. Phaedo 101b-c), and Aristotle is
Math. x, 280; a method of generating solids later replaced by the cor,;ec~ I~ saymg tha~ the~ are singular (Meta. g87b) and "incompara-
"fluxion" method of moving a point into a line, Aristotle, De an. 409a; ble (zbzd. 1080a), I.e., IOcapable of being added, subtracted, etc.,
Sextus Empiricus, op. cit. X, 281). But while it is probable that the from each other. Plato also asserted, on the testimony of Aristotle
early Pythagoreans thought of numbers as corporeal, it is unlikely that Phys. III, 206b and Meta. 1073a, that the ideal numbers went only t~
they said that they were at a time before the concrete and abstract were ten.
distinguished. The first man to have said they were corporeal was For the identification of eidos and arithmos, see arithmos.
Ecphantus (Aetius I, 3, 19) who posited a type of number-atomism.
2. Since the common Greek view was that number was a "plural- arithm6s mathematik6s: mathematical number', the
ity of units" (plethos monadon; see Meta. 1053a and monas), the abstract numbers that are the
question arose as to the generation of the unit itself; its constituative object of mathematics
elements are described as "the odd and the even" and "the limited and See mathematika, metaxu, aphairesis.
the nnlimited," the latter serving a similar role in Plato as the princi-
ples of numbers and eide (see dyas, peras). asymmetron: incommensurable (scil. megethos
3. The most perplexing aspect of ancient number theory is Aris- . magnitude) ,
totle's repeated assertions that Plato taught that the eide were numbers .1. T~le discovery that the diagonal of a square could not be
(e.g. Meta. g87b ) , a position that mnst be distinguished from 1) the descnbed 10 terms of a proportion (logos) with tlle length of its side
existence of the eide of numbers (see arithmos eidetikos) and 2) the proba~ly ~oll?wed upon the working out of the Pythagorean theorem.
existence of the "mathematicals" as an intermediate grade of being In antIqUity I~ was attributed to the Pythagorean Hippasus who was
(see mathematika, metaxu). But uowhere in the dialogues does Plato drowned for hiS revelation of the irrationality (a-logos) of the diagonal
seem to identify the eide with number. To meet this difficulty some 0: ~he. sq,:are (Iamblichus, Vita Pyth. 247; the proof of incommensura-
have postulated a theory of later "esoteric" Platonism known to Aris- blhty .I~ gIVen by Aristotle in Anal. pro 41a). Proofs for the incommen-
totle (but see agrapha dogmata), while others have attempted to see surablhty of V3, v5, etc. followed quickly (see Plato Theaet.
the emergence of the eide-arithmos theory described in snch passages 147d- 148b ). '
as Phil. 25a-e, the reduction of physical bodies back to geometrical 2. Philosophically these discoveries raised serious questions as to
shapes in Tim. 53c-56c (see stoicheion) , and the increasing stress on a th~ natu~e of number (arithmos, q.v.) and the relationship between
hierarchy among the Forms (see Soph. 254d and genos, hyperousia) , anthmetlc .and geometry .. Incommensurability began and, for the most
which, according to Theophrastus, Meta. 6b, would suggest the de- part, remalOe~ a geometrical problem; these were, after all, incommen-
scending series: archai (Le., monasjdyas or perasjapeiron, qq.v.), surable magmtudes (see Euclid, Elem. x, passim). Where the diffi-
arithmoi, eide, aistheta. Still others say that Aristotle either deliber- culty arose, and Hippasus' fate bears testimony to its gravity was in
ately or unknowingly confused the position of Plato with those of th~ Pythagorean insistence on a correspondence between numbers and
Speusippus and Xenocrates (see mathematika). ~ll1ngs. Numbers for the Greeks were the integers and there were no
4. For Aristotle nnmber is only mathematical nnmber, the prod- I~teger~ to express the new incommensurable magnitudes. One reac-
uct of abstraction (see mathematika, aphairesis) , perceived not by a lion.' witnessed by Aristotle, was to distinguish between number and
single sense but by the "common sense" (De an. III, 425a-b; see bodies and thu~ cut geometry loose from arithmetic (see megethos).
aisthesis koine). The rebirth of Pythagoreanism in the early centuries The other, which had some support in the Academy (see Epinomis
of the Christian era assnred the continued snrvival of the eidos- 99?C-g9~b), was to attempt to incorporate V2 into the family of the
arithmos theory (see D.L. VIII, 25; Porphyry, Vita Pyth. 48-51), so anthmO!.
28 I ATARAXIA
AUTOMATON I 29
ataraxia: without disturbance, equilibrium, tranquillity posited a pl'.'rality of types .of basic substance and so had failed to meet
the Parmemdean hypotheSIs that true being is one (see on and Melis-
of the soul
sus, fro 8): Out?~ this complex of problems and partial solutions grew
See hedone.
the At?~st posItion: the ~xist~nce of both being and nonbeing (i.e.,
:he VOId, .see .ke~o~!, bemg m the form of an infinite number of
athanatos: immortal, the incorruptibility of the psyche; mdestructlble mdlvlslble particles substantially identical and d'ff .
for the incorruptibility of natural bodies, see l'h . lermg
on y I~ S ape and .slze, b~ the aggregation (synkrisis) of which sensi-
aphthartos ble thmgs come mto eXIstence (Die/s, frs. 67A14, 68A37' Aristotle
1. The belief in the immortality of the soul begins with its asso- Meta. 985b: see genesis). "
ciation with aer, the vital element in life (see Anaximenes, Diels, fro ~. ~he atoms have eternal motion (Aristotle, De coelo III, 300b:
13B2 ) , and the vitalistic assumption that what is alive is divine (Cicero, se.e kmes,s) and the most mobile are the spherical soul or fire atoms
De nat. dear. I, 10, 26; see theion) and so immortal. Hence there is no (,dem, De an. I, 405a); all sensation is reduced to contact (idem, De
pre-Socratic attempt to demonstrate that the soul as such is immortal: it sensu 442a); a~1 other sensible qualities are merely convention
is part of something else that is immortal. The problem of psychic, (nomos; Democrltus, fro 9: see pathos). The later variations by Epicu-
individual immortality arises with the new shamanistic, religious view rus and Lucretius may be found in D.L. x, 35-39 and De rerum nat. I,
of the psyche (q.v.) as the real person, locked in the soul as in a prison: 265-328, 483-634: II, passim.
but here too it is rather religious exposition than philosophical argu- For the Pythagorean version of number-atomism, see arithmos,
mentation, a preference best seen in Plato's four great eschatological mona,s,. me!feth.o8; for the, atomon eidos as the infima species in division,
myths: Phaedo 107c-114c: Gorgias 523a ff.: Republic 614b-621d; Phae- see dzazres,s, dzaphora, e,dos; for the kinetics of Atomism see kines's'
drus 246a-249d. But Plato also has what he calls "proof" (apodeixis; for tl:e for,;,a~io.n.of compound bodies, see genesis; on'the gene:a!
see Phaedrus 245c). The proof from anamnesis (q.v.) reaches back questIon of mdIV!Slble magnitudes, see megethos.
into religious Pythagoreanism (Phaedo 72e-77a), while that from the
kinship to the eide (ibid. 78b-80c) is purely Platonic. autarkeia: self-sufficiency
2. These are unitary proofs pertaining to the soul as a whole, but Self-sufficie~cyis a. characteristic of happiness (eudaimonia) as a
the distinction of the mortal and immortal parts of the soul in the goal of hn,;,an .hfe (~tlS:otle, Eth. Nich. I, 1097b), and thus of the
Timaeus (see psyche) introduces a new direction; not even in his contemplatIVe hfe, ;VhlCh IS the. highest good for man (ibid. x, 1177a).
earliest writings does Aristotle maintain the inlmortality of the entire Thereafter autarketa as a quality of virtue becomes a commonplace in
psyche; it is only nous that can make that claim (Eudemus, fro 61: De both the Stoa (D.L. VII, 127) and the later Platonic tradition (Ploti-
an. I, 408b, III, 430a). The materialist is normally led to deny the nus, Enn. I, 4, 4)·
immortality of the soul: so the Atomists (see Lucretius, De rerum nat.
III, 830- 1094), and so, in the first instance, the Stoics (SVF I, 146, II, automaton: spontaneity
80 9: D.L. VII, 157), though later, with Poseidonius (Cicero, Tusc. I, See tyche. . .
18-19: compare De republica VI, 26-28), they affirmed a kind of astral
immortality (see aer). For Plotinus there is never a question of the
soul's immortality; what is discussed is the individuality of the immor-
tal soul after its separation from the body (Enn. IV, 3, 5)·

~ltomon: "uncut," indivisible material, particle, atom

L Parmenides' criticism of Milesian vitalism and its unexplained
genesis and kinesis bore its fruit in the views of Empedocles and
Anaxagoras, who reduced all genesis to one or other type of mixture of
indestructible matter (see Empedocles, Diels 31A28, 30; Anaxagoras,
fr. 12) and who posited a source of motion that was different from the
thing moved (see kinoun). But both Empedocles and Anaxagoras had
 CHRONOS I 31
tragedians (Oed. Col. 607-623 is only one of a great many examples
from Sophocles, who was especially fond of the figure) where Time is
b a figure of might who not only stands at or near the head of the
genealogical process, as in the cosmogonies, but rules and governs the
kosmos.
2. The thought of one poet on time bears particular note since it
is remarkably similar to what an almost contemporary philosopher was
saying.on the same subject. Solon, in fro 12, line 3, uses the expression
bolilesis: wish "in the court [dike] of ehronos," and an almost identical figure occurs
See proairesis; kinoun 9·
in the preserved fragment of Anaximander where the elements "make
reparation [dike] to each other for their injustices according to the
bolileusis: deliberation assessment [taxis] of ehronos."
See proairesis.
3. The figurative language disappeared as philosophical specula-
tion drew apart from its mythological origins, so that, for instance,
when even the poet-philosopher Empedocles is speaking in a context
akin to that of Anaximander, ehronos appears with considerably less
c suggestion of personification (fr. 30). Where both Anaximander and
Empedocles would agree, however, is in placing time outside the kos-
mos, which is, in turn, somehow regulated by time.
4- A change begins to appear with the Pythagoreans for whom
the kosmos was both a living, breathing creature (zoon, q.v.) and the
principle of Limit (peras). Outside the kosmos are only various mani-
chara: land, area, space festations of the Unlimited (apeiron), which the kosmos "inhales" and
upon which it imposes Limit (cf. Aristotle, Phys. 203a, 213b; Aetius n,
See hyle, hypodoehe, topos.
g, 1). Among these apeira is, we are told (Aristotle, fro 201), time. It is
chiirist6n: separate, hence I) separate substance likely that the inhaling process involved limiting the raw, perdurative
2) conceptually separate (see aphairesis) aspect of time (perduration is an early feature of the apeiron, q.v.) by
Separateness is a characteristic of substanc~ (ousia) that, unlike its reduction to number (arithmos), an association that continued
the other kategoriai, is capable of separate eXIstence; all the other through all subsequent discussion of time.
modifications of being exist in something (Meta. 1028a-b, 102ga28, 5. This Pythagorean insight, despite the fact that it is glimpsed
1039a32 ). One of the most frequent Aristotelian charges against Plato only fitfully through Aristotelian asides, was of great importance. It
is that he gave the eide, which Aristotle understands in the sense of a distinguished an unlimited, extracosmic time from a numerable, cosmic
universal (katholou), a separate substantial existence, i.e., he hyposta- time and, in effect, moved the latter into the context of quantity. Plato
tized them (see Meta. 1086a, 1087a ). continued along the same path but added considerable new dimensions
On the separability of the agent intellect, see nous, ousia. to both Pythagorean notions of time. He took over the concept of aion
(q.v.), which had occurred in pre-Socratic thought as a designation of
chr6nos: time the life-span of the universe, and applied it to extracosmic time, not
1. Time as a personification, ehronos, appears in the quasi- now seen as an undefined Pythagorean apeiron, that probably included
mythical cosmogonies before assuming a place in the philosoph~cal some kind of unregulated motion, but as the motionless mode of the
cosmologies. ehronos for Kronos, the father of Zeus, was a fmrly eide (Tim. 37d). Cosmic time, on the other hand, is identified with the
common substitution (see Plutarch, De Iside 32), and the first to have periodic revolution of the heavenly sphere (Tim. 39C; Aristotle, Phys.
done so may have been the sixth-century protophilosopher Pherecydes 218a-b and Simplicius, ad loe.). ehronos for Plato is, in short, "an
(D.L. I, Ilg). Whoever its originator, a powerful Time is a staple in everlasting likeness [eikon], moving according to number, of eternity
the poets (cf. Pindar, 01. n, 17 and fro 145), and particularly in the [aion] that rests in the one" (Tim. 37d). Thus the stability and unity

30
32 I eRRONOS
DAIMON I 33
of aion are contrasted with the movement and plurality, or better, the 2). Time, on the other hand, is a kind of degeneration of this total
numerability of ehronos, and the whole incorporated into his theory of self-presence d~e. to the soul's iuability to accept this tota simulteitas
mimesis (q.v.). (compare ~he Similar ~egeneration of theoria into praxis in the soul: see
6. For both Plato and Aristotle time and motion are closely PhysIs); time, then, IS the life of the soul progressing from state to
associated in a kind of reciprocal relationship. Plato, as we have seen, state (III, 7, 11).
identified the two, and though Aristotle is critical of ·that identification
(Phys. 218b), he does assert their close relationship (ibid. 220b). He
likewise agrees with Plato that the best unit for measurement is regu-
lar, circular motion because it is primary and best known (ibid. 223b),
but he does not specify, as does Plato, that this is the diurnal movement
of the heavens, a position also criticized by Plotinus (Enn. III, 7, g).
d
But where the two men most clearly part company is in the absence in
Aristotle of the contrast between time and eternity and all the demiur-
gic apparatus of the mimesis theory.
7. Its existence as an eikon allows Plato to assign, at least by daimon or daim6nion: supernatural presence or entity,
implication, an ontological status to time. It even has a purpose in the somewbere between a god (theos)
scheme of things, to enable men to count (Tim. 3gb). But Aristotle, and a bero
for whom time is "the calculation [or numbering, arithmosl of motion . 1. The belief in supernatural spirits somewhat less anthropomor-
according to prior and posterior" (Phys. 21gb), is not convinced. Time ph~z~d than the Olyu:pians. is a very early feature of Greek popular
is not synonymous with movement but must be calculated from move- re~lglOn; one such dazmon IS attached to a person at birth and deter-
ment. And calculation demands a calculator: hence, if a mind did not mmes, for. goo~ or evp, his fate (compare the Greek word for happi-
exist, neither would time (ibid. 223a). It is the recognition of sequence ne~s, eU.dazmonza, havmg a good daimon). Heraclitus protested against
(prior and posterior) that makes men aware of time (ibid. 21ga). thiS bel~ef. (f~. 11g; see ethos), but not with any great effect. In the
8. The Epicurean contribution to a philosophy of time consisted shamamstlc View of the psyche (q.v.), daimon is another name for the
chiefly in an attempt to define its mode of existence. Time is not a soul (E~pedocles, fl'. 115), probably reflecting its divine origins and
prolepsis (q.v.), a universal grasp built up over a series of experiences, e~traordm~~y powers. Socrates is at least partially in the archaic reli-
but rather an immediate perception (D.L. x, 72). It seems to be a ~IOUS traditIOn ,;hen he speaks of his "divine something" (daimonion
quality associated with the actions and movements of things, in short, tl) t~lat warns ?Im:o avoid certain actions (Apol. 31d; its operation is
"an accident of an accident" (Sextus Empiricus, Adv. Math. x, 21g; conslder~bly Wider m Xenophon's account in Mem. I, " 4); notable is
compare Lucretius I, 459-461) . Such distinctions tend to be blurred in ~o.c~ates .co~~tant use of tile impersonal form of the word or synonym
Stoicism, which assumed all such entities, including time (SVF II, dlvme. sign (see Phaedrus 242b), perhaps the rationalist's slight
1142), under the general rubric of "bodies." But in general the Stoa C?r;ectlOn of what was a popular contemporary belief in divination,
stayed well within the Platonic and Aristotelian guidelines (without, of dlvme dream messages, prophecies, etc., a belief that Socrates shared
course, the Platonic furbelows of aion and eikon), substituting the (1 pol . 21b, 3~C, Grito 44.a, Phaedo, 60e; see mantike). It is probably a
more corporeal "interval" for arithmos, but preserving the link with llll~take to think that either Socrates or his contemporaries distin-
motion (SVF II, 509, 510). gUished ~ltogether too ~arefully between the daimonion and the theion
g. Plotinus devotes considerable attention to the problem of time, (q.v.), smCe the Socrat;c defense against atheism in Apol. 27d rests on
considering it, as did Plato, closely bound to the question of eternity. an argument :hat to believe !n daimones is to believe in gods.
Any attempts to separate the questions, as Aristotle did, are doomed to .. 2 .. The Idea of the dazmon as a kind of "guardian angel" is still
failure (Enn. III, 7, 7-10). Plotinus is impatient with philosophical vlslb!e m. Pla:o (~ep. 620d), though there is an attempt to escape the
treatments of time in terms of number or measure of motion (see Enn. fatalism Implied m the popular belief by having' the individual souls
III, 7, 8), even with Plato's identification of time and the movel1)ent of ~ho~se .their own daimon (Rep. 617e). Whether this individual daimon
the heavens. Instead he casts the problem of both aion and ehronos in IS "':'Ithm us or not was much debated in later philosophy. At one point
terms of life, the former representing the life of the intelligibles (III, 7, (Tzm. goa) Plato himself identifies it with the soul, and a reflection of
34 I DEMIOURGOS DIAIRESIS I 35
this can be seen, for example, in Marcus Aurelius II, 17, Ill, 16 (see tion to the question of the relationship between eide. Expressed in
noesis 17). . . terms of Aristotelian logic diairesis is part of the progress from genus
3. But another notion, that of the daimon as an mtermedmry to species; but as is clear from a key passage in the Parmenides, where
figure between the Olympians and mortals, is also present!n Pl~to, e.g. he first puts the question (12gd-e), Plato did not see it as a conceptual
the "daemonic" Eros in Symp. 202d-203a, and the regulations In Laws exercise. The dialectical search of which diairesis is part has as its
714a-b. This position had a great vogue among the )ater transcenden- object the explication of the ontological realities that are grasped by
talists of both the Neopythagorean and Platonic variety; the true gods our reflection (/ogismos).
(see ouranioi) dwelled in the aither (q.v.) while the lesser daimones 2, The pursuit of the interrelated eide begins with an attempt at
inhabited the lower aer and exercised a direct providence (see pronoia) comprehending a generic form (Phaedrus z65d); this is "collection"
over the affairs of men (D.L. VIII, 32 ). (synagoge, q.v.). It is followed by diairesis, a separation off of the
4. Plutarch has a highly developed demonology (De def· orac. various eide found in the generic eidos, down to the infima species
414f-417b ), and with his typical religiou~ conservatis~ h~ .traces the (Soph. 253d-e). Plato is sparing of details in both the theory and
cult of these intermediaries back to orIental and prImItIVe Greek practice of synagoge, and, while the Sophist and Politicus are filled
sources (e.g. Hesiod, Erga 159-16?; compare Plato, R~P: 468 e-469b ).' with examples of diairesis, there is relatively little instruction on its
and to Empedocles (ibid. 419a; h,S account of the OrIg111 of the daz- methodology. We are told, however, that the division is to take place
mones is in De genio Socr. 591C-f). One source overlooked by Plutarch "according to the natural joints" (Phaedrus 265e). What these are
is contact with the Semitic tradition, a connection explicit in Philo who becomes clearer from the Politicus: they are the differences (diaphorai,
had earlier identified the daimones of Greek philosophy with the angels q.v.) that separate one species from another in the generic form (Pol.
of the Jewish (Iranian?) tradition (De somn. 141-142, De gigant. z6za-z63b, z85b) .
6--g) . 3. The method of division raises certain serious questions, so
serious, indeed, that they might very well shake confidence in the
demiourg6s: maker, craftsman existence of the eide (see Phil. 15a-b). Describing the relationship of
1. Plato's description of the maker of the lower go~s,. the ~oul of sensibles to the eide in terms of participation (methexis) suggests the
the universe and the immortal part of the human soul IS 111 Tzmaeus subordination of things to the eide, a subordination at the heart of the
2gd-30c ; he 'uses the preexistent eide as his ~odel.' ibid . .30c-31~ (se.e Platonic metaphysic. And though Plato avoids the tenn methexis,
mimesis). The demiourgos is probably to be IdentIfied WIth the Intelh- preferring the expression "combination" or ('communion" (koinoniaj
gent efficient cause posited by Plato in Phil. 27b (compare Soph. earlier, in Phaedo 100d, Plato had apparently contemplated using koi-
265c '). But he is not omnipotent: he makes the kosmos as good "as nonia to describe the relationship of sensibles to the eide) when
possible" (Timaeus 30b) and must cope with the countereffects of describing the interrelationship of the eide (see Soph. 251d, e), the
"necessity" (ananke) , ibid. 47e-48a. . . difficulty persistently refuses to disappear. Does not ti,e arrangement of
2. The demiourgos continues to play an Important role In later the specific eide under the' generic eidos suggest the very same princi-
Platonism: what is chiefly notable is. tha:, with t~e tr.anscendence of the ple of subordination among the eide themselves? Do the species consti-
supreme divine principle, the dem~urgic. functIOn IS performed by a tute the genus or are they derived from it? Plato clearly did not see the
secondary emanation, by the Logos 111 Philo (De ch~r. 35, 136-137, De eide in this way (see Soph. 251a-259d), as Aristotle himself is willing
spec. leg. I, 81) and Nous in Numenius (see Euseb.lUs, Prae.p. Evang. to admit (see Meta. 103la) , but it may have been at least one of the
XI, 17-18 ) and Plotinus (Enn . .II, 3, 18). T.he ethIcal duahsm of the reasons why Speusippus, who practices diairesis, but in a radical form
Gnostics appears in their mak111g the demzourgos create the world (see Aristotle, Anal. post. II, 97a and diaphora) , denied the existence
without a knowledge of the eide (see Iranaeus, Adv. haer. I, 5, 3); see of the eide.
mimesis, techne. 4. Aristotle, however, is convinced of the incompatibility of the
subsistent, indivisible eide and the process of diairesis (Meta.
diairesis: separation, division, distinction . 1039a-b). His own theory of division is set forth in Anal. post. II,
Division, a procedure that did not interest Socrates sI~ce the
1. g6b-97b: one must divide the genus by differences (diaphorai, q.v.)
thrust of his enquiry was toward a single eidos (see epagoge) , ?ecomes that pertain to the essence, must proceed in the correct order, and,
an important feature in the later dialogues where Plato rurns h,S atten- finally, be all-inclusive.
36 I DIALEKTIKE DIAPHORA I 37
With Epictetus diairesis reappears in a moral context; see proai- ~che,,:e of th~ngs, it is significant that the same process, diairesis, ends,
resis. m ArIstotle, m the atomon eidos, the infima species in a logical descent
(De an. II, 414b); see diairesis.
dialektike: dialectic . . 4· Aristotle abandons the central ontological role given to dialec-
1.On the testimony of Aristotle dialectic was an invention of tIc m 'plato's Repu~lic; h~ is concerne~, instead, with the operations of
Zeno the Eleatic (D.L. IX, 25), probably to serve as a support for 'the the mmd that culmmate m demonstI·atIOn (apodeixis). Dialectic is not
hypothetical antinomies of Parmenides (Plato, Parm. 128c). But what strict demonstration (Anal. pro I, 24a-b; Top. I, 100a-b) in that it does
was a species of verbal polemic (what Plato would call "eristic" or not begin from premisses that are true and primary, but from opinions
disputation; see Soph. 224e-226a, R.ep. 499~, Phae.drus 2?'C) for the (e.ndo~a! t~at a;e accepted by the majority or the wise. The irony of
Eleatics was transformed by Plato mto a hIgh phIlosophIcal method. thIS d,stmctIOn IS, of course, that ArIstotle's own procedure is most
The connecting link was undoubtedly the Socratic technique of ques- frequently ~~at he .has descri~ed as "dialectical" (see endoxon). But
tion and answer in his search for ethical definitions (see Plato, Phaedo as a theoretIcIan Anstotle has httle love of dialectic (cf. De an. I, 403a;
75 d , 7 8d; Xenophon, Mem. I, " 16; and elenchos), a t.echnique that Top. 105b), and suggests in Meta. g87b that it, or rather the confusion
Plato explicitly describes as dialectical (Grat. 3goC) ..Wlth the hypos- between thought an~ rea~ity, ~a:r have been Plato's undoing.
tatization of the Socratic definitions into the PlatonIc etde (perhaps 5· For the StOICS d,alectIC IS reduced to logic, i.e., a study of the
reflected in the transition from Phaedo 9gd-looa to ibid. 101d; see forms of !nt~rnal and external discourse (D.L. VII, 43; cf. logos, ono-
eidos) the role of dialectic becomes central and is the crown of the ideal ma!, whIle m the same breath they extend its preserves to embrace
curriculum described in 'the Republic: after ten years devoted to mathe- ethICS and ~ven physics (ibid. VII, 46, 83). The result is that logic is no
matics the philosopher-to-be will devote the years between thirty and lon~er a~ mstrument (organ~n) of philosophy as understood by the
thirty-five to the study of dialectic (R~p. ~3Id-534e, 537b-53~e). PenpatetIc sc~ool (~he collectIOn of the logical treatises into an Orga-
2. What is dialectic? The questIon IS not an easy one smce Plato, non IS post-Anstotehan, though Aristotle certainly foresaw the propae-
as usual, thought about it in a variety of way~. Th~"e is the view o~ the dentic role of the Analytics; cf. Meta. lOo5b).
Phaedo and the Republic, which envisions d,alectIc as a progressIVely 6. The ~ehabilitation of dialectic in its Platonic sense was under-
more synoptic ascent, via a series of "positions" (hyp~theseis, 9-'v.; t~e take~?y Plotmus (Enn. ~, 3) .. I~ is once again, as in the Republic, a
theory of Forms is one such in Phaedo 100b), untIl an ultrrnate IS cog!lltlve approac~ to t~e .mtelhglbles (see noesis), but with distinctly
reached (Phaedo lOId, Rep. 511e). In the Republic, where the context StO.'C overtone~: dIalectIC IS an education for virroe and so includes both
of the discussion is confessedly moral, this "unhypothetized principle" actIOns and objects as well as the noeta.
is identified with the good-in-itself (auto to agathon; Rep. 532a-b) that
subsumes within itself all the lower hypotheses (ibid. 533 C- d ). dianoia: understanding
3. If the dialectic of the Phaedo and the Republic may be de- On .the Platonic line dianoi" is a type of cognition between doxa
scribed as "synoptic" (Rep. 537c), that which emerges from the Pha~­ and no.es". (Rep. 51Od-511,a; for the special objects of dianoia on the
drus onwards is decidedly "diacritic" (see Soph. 226c, 253d). It IS PlatOnIC hne, see mathematika). In Aristotle it is used as a m
introduced in Phaedrus 265c-266b (compare Soph. 253d-e) and con- gene:al :e;m for intellectual activity. Where it is opposed to n~::
sists of two different procedures, "collection" (synagoge, q.v.) and (= .mtUltlve knowledge) it means discursive, syllogistic reasoning
"division" (diairesis, q.v.), the latter pr~cess in par:icular b.eing (Anstotle, Anal. post. II, 100b), and (ibid. I, 8gb) it is subdivided into
amply illustrated in subsequent dialogues hke. t~e Sophlst, Polttt~US, the following species: episteme, knowledge pursued for its own sake
and Philebus. The earlier dialectic appeared SImIlar to the operatIOns (see als.o theoria), techne (knowledge applied to production), and
of eros (q. v. ), but here we are transported into an almost Aristotelian phronesls (knowledge applied to conduct). In Stoicism it is identical
world of classification through division: ascent has been replaced by with the hegemonikon (SVF II, 459).
descent. While it is manifest that we are here still dealing with onto- For its location in the general context of intellection, See noesis.
logical realities, it is likewise clear that a crucial step h.a~ be~n. taken
along the road to a conceptual logic. The term. of the d.'atresls /'S that diaphora: diHerence, specific diHerence
eidos which stands immediately above the senSIble partIculars (Soph. 1. The .p:e.sence of .di~phorai is explicit in the Platonic dialectical
22gd), and, while this is "really real" (ontos on) in the Platonic process of d,v,sIOn (dwlresis, q.v.) where the "generic form" is di-
38 I DIATHESIS DIKE I 39
vided according to kinds (Soph. 253d-e), or, as he puts it in Phaedrus (nomos, q.v.), and a new abstract term dikaiosyne, "righteousness,"
265 e , "at the natural joints." What these "natural joints" are is de- "justice," carne into use to describe the moral quality of the man who
scribed more fully in Pol. 262a-263b, 285b. The genus must be divided observed the limits of the law and was thus "just" (dikaios).
only where it separates into two specific Forms. To divide a genus into 2. The first usage of dike in a philosophical context occurs in the
parts will not do since a part (meros) and a specific Form (eidos) are only extant fragment of Anaximander (Diels 12B1) where the elements
not the same thing (ibid. 262b). The diaphorai, ther,efore, must distin- (stoicheia), which are naturally opposed forces (see enantia), are
guish species. required to make reparation (dike) to each other for their mutual
2. This makes sense in a system of concepts, but creates great transgression in the process of genesis-phthora. The limits that are
difficulties if the eide are autonomous, indivisible substances, as Plato violated here are not those of a human society but the order implicit in
undoubtedly saw them; there is no place in the Platonic theory for the world seen as a kosmos (q.v.), this in an era before the operation of
either "generic" or "specific" Forms (see diairesis). Plato's successor the physical world was made discontinnous with that of human life.
Speusippus, who denied the eide, us~d an e.xhaustive met~od of ~i­ One notes a correction in Heraclitus (fr. 80): the strife between the
airesis, attempting to include all the dtaphoraz, presumably smce, with elements is not, as Anaximander would have it, a species of injustice
the disappearance of the hypostatized eide, it was the diaphorai that that demands compensation, but the normal order of things, the tension
gave the new conceptual eidos its content (see Aristotle, Anal. post. II, of opposites that is the reality of existence.
97a ) . 3. Althongh the fragments of Democritus betray a certain inter-
3. In Aristotle the process of diairesis proceeds by dividing the est in ethical behavior in general and justice in particular (see frs. 45,
genus by means of specifically distinct diaphorai down to the infima 174), this is the ethical concern of a philosopher rather than an attempt
species where the activity will terminate in definition (horismos; see to construct a philosophical ethic. The impetus for jnst such an attempt
the definition of horismos in Top. I, 103b). In Top. VI, 143a-145b there lay in the Sophists' attacks on the bases of conduct on the grounds that
are elaborate rules for the choice of diaphorai in diairesis. they were tied to a relative, arbitrary law (see nomos). Thus was the
4. As for the ontological aspects of the problem, in the Metaphys- notion of dike drawn into the controversy surronnding nomos vs. physis,
ics Aristotle moves the discussion into the categories of matter and and issnes in a series of Sophistic positions that described jnstice as
form. Genus stands to diaphora as sensible matter to form, and so may consisting solely in obedience to the arbitrary laws of the state, laws that
be characterized as "intelligible matter" (hyle noete; the characteriza- were, in turn, tl,e instruments whereby the powerful in the society
tion is not particularly felicitous since he uses the expression in another songht to preserve their position: thus Archelaus (Diels 60A1), Anti-
sense as well; see hyle, aphairesis) , while all the diaphorai are resumed phon (Diels 87B44), and the attitndes embraced by Callicles in Plato's
in the final one, that of the atom on eidos or infima species, and serves as Gorgias (e.g. 483a-484a) and Thrasyrnachus in Book I of the Republic
its essence (ousia) (Meta. 1038a, 1045a ). (e.g. 338c).
4. The Socratic reply to these positions may, of course, be viewed
diathesis: disposition merely as a refinement of his general thrust of the virtues (specifically
See hexis. including dikaiosyne; see Aristotle, Eth. Eud. I, 1216b) into the realm
of permanent, cognitionally grasped definitions (see arete); bnt there
dike: compensation, legal proceedings, justice is besides the impassioned defense of justice and law as an inviolable
1. As is the case with most Greek ethical terms, dike had a fairly social contract in the Grito. Plato's own answer to Socrates' antagonists
complex history before its incorporation into th~ pro?lematic of philo.so- is to be fonnd in Republic II-X, and is embodied in an investigation of
phy. From the time of Horner dike. had bo,;,nd mto It t?e transgressIOn jnstice as it exists on the larger scale of the polis (Rep. 369a), whence
of certain limits, probably those dictated, m the first mstance, by the it emerges as a kind of cooperative disposition to do one's own work
class structure of society, and the payment of a compensation for this (seC433 e , 443b ) .
transgression. With the decline of an aristocratic class consciousness 5. This does not respond to Callieles' contention that the unjust
dike began to be seen as something pervasive ~ the socielJ:, ~ppli~ab!e always seem to have a better time of it; the wicked do, indeed, prosper.
to all citizens alike, and guaranteed by Zeus himself. The hml:s wlthm Plato has no great assnrances to give about the fate of the just in this
which the new dike was operative were now defined by wntte'u law life-though he is sure the gods will not neglect them (Rep. 613a-bi
 nOXA I 41
40 I nOXA
are later schematized in the Diagram of the Line (Rep. 509d-511e)
compare Laws x, 899C-900b) - bu: it is. in the .future lif~ that i~stice where the realm of doxa is further refined by being divided into belief
receives its ultimate reward, as depIcted m glowmg terms m the Myth (pistis, q.v.) whose ohjects are the sensibles, and "knowledge of
of Er" in Republic x. . appearances" (eikasia, q.v.), a category of cognition introduced by
6. Aristotle's major treatment of justice occurs in Eth. N,lc.h: V Plato's view of the nature of productive activity (see techne, mime-
where it is divided into a) "distributive," i.e., dealing with the d,v,sIOn s;" ) •
of goods, honors, etc. among those who participat? in ~ !,oli:ical. sys- 3. The dichotomy between episteme and doxa remaius fundamen-
.
tem , and b) "corrective," i.e., regulatory of the meqUltIeS .m. eIther
transactions or crimes (113ob-1131a). In both mstances JustIce IS a
, tal to Plato, even though he betrays a growing interest in the sensible
world (see aistheton, episteme.)
kind of proportion (analogia), and thus it too can be assimilated. to :he 4. Judgment: Plato's view of doxa, fonnded as it is on the separa-
doctrine of the ''mean'' (see meson). Aristotle is firm in his rejectIOn tion of the eide from sensible things, finds no support in the Aristote-
of the Sophists' contention that what is just is merely a matter of lian view of reality, but there is another context within which the
convention: there are at least some activities that are just by n.ature problematic of doxa may be treated. The qnestion of truth and error
( 1134b ). Finally (1137a-b) he introduces the notion of the eq~llt~ble arises particularly in the realm of judgment, a problem that also has its
or the decent (epieikeia) that tempers the legal demands of Justice, origins in the Parmenidean premisses about being (on, q.v.): since
"what the lawgiver would have said if he were there" (compare Plato, only being can be thought or named, how is it possible to make a false
Polito 294a-295e). . . judgment, that is, a definition about nonbeing (fl'. 3; fl'. 8, line 34)? In
7. For the Stoics dikaiosyne is one of the ~our cardI~al .vlrt~es Soph. z63d-264b Plato shows that, just as there is false assertion or
(SVF I, 190), defined by Chrysippus as "the scIence of dlstrlbutmg disconrse (logos), so too there is false judgment (doxa) that is the
what is proper to each" (SVF III, 262), and based on nature, not externalization of this discourse. The possibilities of false judgment are
convention (D.L. VII, 128). Carneades the Sceptic remrned, however, discussed in Theaet. 187c-200d, bnt since the true position waits upon
to the Sophists' contention that law is a convention set np by men on the solution of the problem of nonbeing (me on; see on, heteron), the
strictly ntilitarian gronnds, a position that he can illnstrate ?y the final analysis is not pnt forth until Soph. 263b-d: error (pseudos) is a
conflicting counsels of prudence and jnstice (Cicero, De repubhca III, judgment (doxa) that does not correspond to reality, either to the
11,18-19; Lactantius, Instit. v, 16,3-6). See arete, nomos. "reality" of the sensible situation, or to the true reality of the eidos in
which the sensible participates.
d6xa: I] opinion, 21 judgment . 5. Aristotle's treatment of episteme and doxa moves into another
1.Opinion: the distinction between true knowledge (epzsteme, area. Knowledge is either immediate (see nous) or discursive (dianoia,
q.v.) and an inferior grade of cogni!ion goe~ ?ack a~ f~r as Xenophan;s q.v.). The latter may be described as episteme if it proceeds from
(fl'. 34), bnt the classic pre-SocratIc eXpOSItIOn of It.18 to ~e fon~d ';' premisses that are necessary, doxa if the premisses are contingent
Parmenides' poem (fl'. 8, lines 50-61) where sensatIOn (alsthes... IS ! (Anal. post. 1, 88b-8gb), i.e., if they could be otherwise, and indeed
relegated to the position of "seeming" or "opinion" (doxa). The d18tI~c­ Aristotle defines doxa as "that which could be otherwise" in Meta.
tion is based on the ontological status of the object of sense percept;Oll 1039b .
(aistheta) that, because of their exclusion from the realm of true bemg 6. When discussing the types of syllogisms in Top. 1, 100a-b
(on), cannot be the objects of true knowledge. . Aristotle approaches the contingency of doxa from a somewhat differ-
2. The distinction is incorporated, on the same grounds, mto ent angle. A demonstrative syllogism (apodeixis, q.v.) rests upon
Platonic epistemology, though by now ~he po.sition had ?een buttressed premisses that are true and primary. It thus differs from a dialectical
by the insistent Sophist attacks on alsthesls as relatIve (see Plato, syllogism (dialektike, q.v.) whose premisses are based on endoxa,
Theaet. 166d-167a, citing Protagoras). In Rep. 476e-480a Plato ~ets which are now defined as opinions that are accepted by the majority or
Parmenides' distinction as a series of epistemological and ontologIcal the wise. For the implications of this for Aristotle's method, see en-
correlatives: true knowledge is of true reality, i.e., the eide, while doxon.
ignorance is of the completely nonreal. Betw~en ~he two. tl.'ere is a~ 7. The Epicurean view of doxa shares both Platonic and Aristote-
intermediate stage: a quasi-knowledge of qnasI-bemg. Th,s mte~n:edI­ lian traits. It is opinion, a certain spontaneous movement in us that is
ate faculty (dynamis) is doxa and its objects are sensible thmgs akin'to but distinct from sensation (aisthesis, q.v.). For Epicurus all
(aistheta) and the commonly held opinions of mankind. The results
42 I DYAS DYNAMIS I 43
aisthesis is true but not necessarily self-evident (enargeia, q.v.), and so (hy?adechamene) before N ous begins its work. But once the primary
daxa is capable of extending beyond the evidence of the senses, as, for bodI~~ have been for;ned, these powers disappear and the sensible
example, in assigning by its judgment sense data to the wrong prolep- qualItIes are rednced, m true Atomist fashion, to the geometrical shapes
sis (q.v.), and thus is the source of error and falsity (D.L. X, 50-51). of the elementarl particles (ibid. 61c-68d; see genesis).
3 .. In ArIstotle the powers (generally called paian or pathos)
dyas: dyad, pair once agam are central. Empedocles' staicheia were irreducible and
According to one account of Pythagoreanism preserved in a late Plato's redncible back to the geometric figures (Tim. 53c-56~). to
author (D.L. VIII, 25), the Dyad was derived from the Monad bot? of. these Aristotle opposed his own theory of the composition or'the
(monas); but on the basis of the "Table of Contraries" in Meta. 986a , stozcheza from 1) underlying matter and 2) the presence of one of each
the Monas and Dyas would seem to rank as co-principles, and if the set of the powers: hot-:old, dry-moist (De gen. et carr. 329a-330a).
Monas is associated with the Good (agathan) (Aetius I, 7, 18; see Thus change or reductIOn of one element into another consists of the
Eth. Nich. 1096b), so the Dyas is ranked with kakan (ibid. 1l06b, 29)· passage of o".e opposite to another in the substratum (see hypokei-
Aristotle makes various attempts to identify a material principle in menon, genes'ls).
Plato (see hyle): in Meta. 987b and 988a it is the dyas, and finally, in 4. All of these usages pertain to dynamis as a "power" but in
1081a and 1099b, the indefinite dyad (aaristas dyas) . Plato may himself the M.et~physics Ar~st?tle ~evelops another sense of dyna;"is, i.e.,
have used the expression, but not in the dialogues; perhaps in his ~ot~ntralIty, and he dlstmgmshes the two in Meta. 1045b-l046a; poten-
lecture "On the Good" (see Alexander of Aphrodisias, In Meta. 55; tialIty ?annot b~ defined, but only illnstrated (ibid. I048a-b), e.g. the
Simplicius, In Phys. 453-455; and agrapha dogmata). From Phil. walcer IS. po:en~Ially the sleeper; the passage from potency to actnality
23 c- 26d we know that Plato used the apeiran as an arche, and Aris- (energ.ez~) IS e~ther throngh art or by an innate principle (ibid. I049a);
totle conjectures in Phys. Ill, 206b that the reason why the "indetermi- energeza IS logIcally and ontologically prior to dynamis (ibid. I049b-
nate" is twofold is that it is a spectrum nnlimited in either direction. 105oa), hence the necessity of a first mover (see kinaun) always in a
Plato's own successor, Speusippus, identified it with plurality (Aris- state of energeia (ibid. I050b).
totle, Meta. 1087b); see arithmas. 5. The Stoic doctrine of the "powers" pushed Aristotle's theory
of the elements one step further; each staicheion had one power instead
dynamis: active and passive capacity, hence 1] power of one ~ach of .t~e oppos.ed sets: fire had heat, air had cold (these were
and 2] potentiality the actIve [pazeznl qualIties); earth had the dry and water the moist
1. The "powers" make their first appearance with Anaximan- (passive [pascheinl qualities; see SVF II, 580), and the stress on fire in
der, not, as later, as qualities of things, but as the things themselves; the system (see pyr) is clearly a function of its being the most active
opposites (see enantia) that are separated off from the apeiran: the hot po~er. In~eed, the Stoics reduced all of reality to two basic archai: the
and the cold (Diels, fro 12AlO) and have almost the status of elements. actIve (pazoun) and the passive (paschein, q.v.; cf. D.L. VII, 134).
With Anaximenes (Diels, frs. 13A5, A7, Bl) the distinction between 6. We see, then, that for the Milesians and their successors
substances (earth, fire, water) and their qualities ("powers"), hot and dynamis w~s an active force in things, first thought of as a separate
cold has begun. Empedocles' theory of elements (see staicheian) nat~ral en;'ty but then refined, from Plato on, into the notion of an
shifted attention to the substances away from the dynamic qualities, actIve qual~ty (poiates, q.v.): In post-Aristotelian philosophy, however,
but with Anaxagoras the primary role is once again given to the the name '.8 fre~uently appl~ed to the great number of intermediary
opposed powers (frs. 8, 12, 15, 16). The Atomists stand in another movers or mtellIgences assocIated with the plants of the aither or the
tradition: the Pythagorean number theory had, in effect, reduced quali- daimones who inhabit the air (see naus 17), and identified by Philo as
tative differences to quantitative ones (see arithmas), and Democritus angels (cf. De gigant. 6-g) .
follows them in reducing the perceptible qualities to contact (haphe) 7. But there were other factors at work in the Philonian notion
with geometrical shapes (Diels, fr. A135; cf. pathos); they are no of dynamis,. In Scripture God is said to have "powers," translated by
longer dynamic but merely conventional (nomos), ibid. B9· :he ~eptuagmt as dynameis, and these Philo identifies with the Platonic
2. Plato is aware of the dynameis both as a medical term (Phae- zdeaz (De spec. leg. 45-48; for the distinction between eidas and idea
drus 370c-d, and see eidas) and in their relationship with the elements see naeton 2). Thus they assume the role of the transcendent naeta i~
(Tim. 33 a ), and these powers, also called pathe, exist in the Receptacle the mind of God and, as the immanent eide, become a creative force in
44 I DYNAMIS EIDOLON I 45
the universe. In Philo it is the latter that give order to the universe naus 2), was that the gods no longer worked in person but through
while they, in turn, are controlled by the transcendent God (De fUifa their dynameis in things. These dynameis could be and were personi-
101). The same treatment can be seen in Plotinus. The naeta :hat eXist fied; Philo's usage has already been noted (6 supra) and the philoso-
in a unified form in the cosmic naus (see noetan 5) are described as a phers found it a convenient way to reconcile the multiple gods of
universal dynamis with boundless capacity (Enn. v, 8, 9). But each mythology with their own henotheism (see the fragments of Porphy-
of these is potentially (and in the sequel will be a.dually) a separ~te ry's On the Images of the Gods; Macrobius, Saturnalia I, 17-23;
eidas and so an individual dynamis (v, 9, 6) that will later be operative Proclus, Theal. Plat. V-VI; it also gave them ample scope to display
in both the noetic and sensible world (IV, 4, 36 ) . their by then highly developed powers of etymologizing: see anama 7) .
8. But the noetic and sensible world descends, according to the It is this religious point of view that is given its classic theoretical
Neoplatonic vision of the nnivers~, i~ a uniforlll causal series .from a justification in props. 144-145 of Produs' Elem. theal. where he affirms
single source (see praiidas) and IS linked togeth~r ?y a cosmIC s~m­ that the distinctive characteristic of the divine powers (theiai dyn-
patheia (q.v.). A corollary of this, and a characterlstlc~lly symmetrical ameis) radiates downward in the casnal sequence and is found on all
touch is that all the entities in the series, naeta and azstheta, are also levels of reality.
subje~t to the thrust of return (epistrap~e,. q.v:). t.o their source. 11. This view of the dynameis in things goes far beyond the
Epistraphe was hardly a novel concept. It IS ImpliCIt m the Pythago- Bolean physics that attempted to discover and use, largely for thera-
rean view of the soul as a divine part that tries to restore ItS trne peutic purposes, the occnlt sympathy between natural objects; here we
harlllony (harmonia, q.v.). It may ~e se~n, as well, in the related have the theoretical gronnd for the magical art of theaurgia (see
Platonic notions of katharsis, eros, dzalektzke (qq.v), and the call to mantike 4-5) that seeks to manipulate the gods through their occult
"assimilation to God" (see hamaiasis). Bnt here as elsewhere, inclnd- "tokens" (symbala) in natural objects and that, since Iamblichus, was
ing Plotinus, the retnrn, in whatever form, is a fnnction of the .con- a standard part of the Neoplatonic repertory (see De myst. v, 23;
scious soul and particularly its intellectnal faculty. After Plotmus, Proclus, In Tim. I, 139,210).
however, it is extended to the entire range of creation (see Proclns, For related questions in the history of dynamis, see genesis,
Elem. theal., prop. 39)· pathos, paiein, staicheian; for its Aristotelian correlative, energeia.
9. There were, to be sure, some precede~ts for t:ris. Plato h~d
allowed to plants a certain choice of the good lIfe (Phd. 22b); ArIS-
totle's physis (q.v.) works. toward a telos, ~n~ h; had spoken: ~ore­
over of genesis in the sensible world as an ImItatIOn of the activity of
the divine naus (see Meta. 1050b and kinaun 9). But these were not
the immediate progenitors of Proclns' symmetrical epistraphe: they
e
are rather to be sought in the later development of the not!Oll of
dynamis. The Stoics had already .developed ~ theo;y of lag~z sper-
matikai (q.v.) that, somewhat like the Aristotelian phy8ts, gov-
erned the growth and development of things. But here the stress is on echein: 1] to have, 2] to be in a certain state; see hexis
the rational (logos) element; from the time of Poseidonius this yields "Possession" is one of Aristotle's kateganai. It appears as such in
to the more dynamic concept of a vital force (zatike dynam!s! see Cat. Ib-2a, but is omitted in other listings, e.g. Anal. post. I, 83b. "To
sympatheia 3) in all beings that are linked together by the affimtles of be in a certain state" (pas echein) is one of four Stoic categories (SVF
sympatheia. This was systematized into a vast body of kn.owledge,. t~e II, 369); it is discussed by Plotinns (Enn. VI, 1,25), who also nses this
study of the innate affinities and antipathies of natural objects. ThiS IS Stoic term in discnssing psyche (Enn. IV, 7, 4) and hyle (ibid. II, 4,1).
the "physics" of late antiquity, associated with the name of Bolus of
Mendes. ., . I eidolon: image
10. These sympathetic dynameis are not, at thIS P?'~t, m~gIca , . In the Atomists' theory of visnal perception (aisthesis, q.v.)
but tlIey soon become so under other influen?es. The religIOUS view of Images of the same shape as the body are given off by the perceived
late antiquity perhaps influenced by the earlier demands that the gods object and enter the pores of the viewer (Alexander of Aphrodisias, De
act in suclI a ~ay that they preserve their transcendent immobility (see sensu 56, 12; Plntarch, Symp. VIII, 735a). In Epicnreanism these enter
46 I EIDOS EIDOS I 47
into the senses of men during sleep as well, and are thought by men to suprasensible reality that is indistinguishable from Plato's. They are
be gods (Sextus Empiricus, Adv. Math. IX, 19: so too in Cicero, De not the Eleatics since they believe in a plurality of such entities (see
nat. dear. 1, 19, 49: for an ethical correlative, see hedone). Plato uses on).
"image" in the Sophist, and further divides it into "likeness" (eikon) 4. Their identity has been sought in a passage in Aristotle
and "semblance" (phantasma), ibid. 236a-b: it is like the real, but has where we are told (Meta. 987a-b) that Plato followed the Pythago-
existence secundum quid, ibid. 239c-240b (see the description of eikon reans in many respects, attributing to Plato only verbal differences
in Tim. S2C). In Plotinus eidolon is generally used in the sense of from the Pythagoreans and some refinements introduced under the
eikon; see Enn. v, 2, 1 and Ill, 9, 3 where hyle is an eidolon of the soul, influence of the Heraclitan Cratylus and of Socrates himself.
and Il, 4, S where sensible matter is an eidolon of intelligible matter 5. Were the Pythagoreans the originators of the eide theory?
(see hyle). There have been those who thought so, arguing, inter alia, from the
strongly Pythagorean environment of the Phaedo where the theory is
ddos: appearance, constitutive nature, form, type, propounded by Plato for the first time. But there is little to support this
species, idea from the strictly Pythagorean evidence and the statement is an isolated
L Eidos was a well-established and fairly sophisticated term one in Aristotle, added, perhaps, when he came to the conclusion that
long before its canonization by Plato. Its first meaning, and the usage is Plato had identified the eide with number (arithmos, q.v.).
current in Homer, is "what one sees," "appearance," "shape," nor- 6. The origin of the theory mnst be sought closer to home.
mally of the body, and pre-Socratic philosophy continue~ to u~e it ~n Socrates had been interested in defining ethical qualities (see Meta.
this sense (see Empedocles, frs. g8, llS and DemocrItus, cited m g87b), probably as a reaction against Sophist relativism (see nomos),
Plutarch, Ad". Col. lllO). By the time of Herodotus eidos, and its and there is reason to believe that the Platonic eide were hypostatized
cognate idea that had come into use, had been broadened and ab- versions of just such definitions (logoi; see Phaedo 9ge, Meta. g87b,
stracted into "characteristic property" (I, 203) or "type" (I, 94)· and compare the connection with predication, infra). Indeed, in the
Thucydides' use is similar (see Ill, 81) , and in one instance (Il, So) he "Socratic dialogues" one can see Socrates himself moving in just such
speaks of "the eidos of the disease," an expres.sion ~hat leads int? the a direction (see Lysis 219d, Euthyphro 5d, 6d: the Euthyphro passages
development of the term in contemporary n:edlcal Circles. Here e.'dos / actually use eidos, but the meaning is still close to "appearance": in
idea had apparently been isolated as a techmcal term, frequently hnked M eno 72c-e the usage has already become more abstract) . But, on the
to the notion of power (dynamis, q.v.), and meaning something ap- testimony of Aristotle, Socrates "did not separate the universal defini-
proximately like "constitutive nature" (see Hippocrates, V.M. 15, 19: tion" (Meta. 1078b), Le., it had no transcendent, subsistent (choris-
Nat. hom. 2, 5: De arte 2) . ton, q.v.) existence.
2. Whatever the exact interpretation of the latter texts, it does 7. For Plato the eide did exist separately (see Tim. 52a-c) and
seem clear that there was an approach to the form of things that was the reasons may be sought in epistemological considerations as well as
not necessarily tied to its outward appearance (though its connection the ethical ones that troubled Socrates and that were almost certainly
with dynamis suggests that its identification rested upon an awareness operative upon Plato as well. We have already noted the suggested
of its visible effects), but rather to some. kind of inner intelligibility influence of Heraclitus on Plato (see Meta. g87a, l078b) to the effect
(De arte 2 significantly connects eidos with the imposition of names: that, given the changing, fluctuating nature of sensible phenomena
see onoma). (see rhoe), true knowledge'(episteme) is impossible, impossible, that
3. Was there a parallel development among the philosoph:rs? is, unless there is a stable, eternal reality beyond the merely sensible.
Both Plato and Aristotle seem to suggest that there was. Plato, ill a The eide are that suprasensible reality and so the cause of episteme and
rare glance at the history of philosophy (s:e e~doxon) ~ says t?at the condition of all philosophical discourse (Phaedo 65d-e, Parm. 13Sb-
discussions on the nature of reality have polarized mto factIOns, which c, Rep. 508c ff.). For the further epistemological corollaries, see doxa,
he calls the Giants and the Gods. The first are materialists (Soph. episteme, noesis.
246a-248a' compare the somewhat different but parallel attitudes in 8. Though the eide are the centerpiece of Platonic metaphysics,
Phaedo g6~-d and Laws X, 88ga-8goa) and Plato is probably r~~erring nowhere does Plato undertake a proof for their existence: they first
to the Atomist tradition. The Gods, on the other hand, are descrIbed as appear as a hypothesis (see Phaedo 100b-lOld) and remain so, even
"friends of the eide" (ibid. 248a-24gd) and they hold a theory of though subjected to a scathing criticism (Parm. 13oa-134e). They are
48 I EIDOS EIDOS I 49
known, in a variety of methods, by the faculty of reason (naus; Rep. bles participate in the eide they must be named univocally (hamony-
532a-b, Tim. SId). One such early method is that of recollection mos) with them (Parm. 133d, Soph. 234b; see D.L. III, 13), and so the
(anamnesis, q.v.), where the individual soul recalls the eide with modes of predication may be taken as criteria for the existence of the
which it was in contact before birth (Mena 80d-85b, Phaeda 72c-77d; various ei~e (I!ep. 596a). ~re, :hen, the eide merely ideas or concepts?
see palingenesia). Without the attendant religious connotations is the The question IS actually ralsed m the dialogues, only to be denied (see
purely philosophical method of dialektike (q.v.; see Rep. 531d-S3Sa; Parm. 132b-c, 134b).
for its difference from mathematical reasoning, ibid. SlOb-511a; from 1;'-' At various points in the dialogues Plato seems to grant a
eristic, Phil. lsd-16a). As it is first described the method has to do preemmence to one or other of the eide. Thus, both the Good (Rep.
with the progress from a hypothesis back to an unhypothetized arche 504e-5 09c ) and the Beautiful (Symp. 210a-212b) are thrown into
(Phaeda 100a, 101d; Rep. 511b), but in the later dialogues dialektike relief, to say nothing of the notorious hypotheses of the One in the
appears as a fully articulated methodology comprising "collection" ~armeni~es (~37c-142; see hen, hyperausia). But the problem of the
(synagage, q.v.) followed by a "division" (diairesis, q.v.) that moves, InterrelatIonshIp, or, as Plato calls it, "combination" or "communion"
via the diapharai, from a more comprehensive Form down to the ataman (koinonia), and, by implication, of the subordination of the eide is not
eidas. Finally, one may approach the eide through eras (q.v.), the takel: nR formally until the Saphist. It is agreed, again on the basis of
desiderative parallel to the earlier form of dialectic (see epistraphe ) . predicatIOn, that some eide will blend with others and some will not
9. The relationship between the indivisible, eternal eide and and .that it is the task of dialectic to discern the various groupings:
transient, sensible phenomena (aistheta) is described in a number of particularly through the diacritic method known as diairesis (q.v.;
different ways. The eide are the cause (aitia) of the aistheta (Phaeda Soph. 253b-e).
lOob-101e), and the latter are said to participate (methexis, q.v.) in . 13·.T0 illustrate the process Plato chooses (ibid. 254b-25Se) five
the eide. In an elaborate metaphor, pervasive in Plato, the aisthetan is elde:-Exlst~nc~ (on, q.v.), the Same, the Different (heteran, q.v.),
said to be a copy (eikan, q.v.) of its eternal model (paradeigma), the MotIOn (kmeszs, q.v.), and Rest, which he calls (2S4d) "greatest
eidas. This act of artistic creation (mimesis, q.v.) is the work of a k~nds:' (rr:egista ge~e). Both words in this expression are open to
supreme craftsman (demiourgos, q.v.). differmg mterpretatlons. A reading of megista as a true superlative
10. There is little question of the transcendence of the eide (cf. "the greatest," and of gene as "genera" or "classes" leads to th~
Tim. 51b-52d), but Plato's use of methexis suggests a degree of discovery of Platonic summa genera, the equivalent of Aristotle's kate-
immanence as well (Phaedo 103b-104a, Tim. Soc; and see genesis), gariai. The passage was so read by Plotinus (see Enn. VI, 1-3) who
and this is the point of much of the criticism in the Parmenides (see speaks of the gene of being. But there is grave doubt as to whether
130a-132b) and in extended passages in the Metaphysics. Where, gene should be read as genera in the Aristotelian sense' Plato's own
then, is one to locate the eide? Here analogy comes into play. Just as usage i~ fr~quently.to employ genas a~ a synonym for eid~s, and so the
the aistheta are contained in some sort of organic unity that is the expressIOn m questIOn may mean nothmg more than "some very impor-
kosmos, so the eide exist in some ''intelligible place" (topos noetos, tant eide."
Rep. s08c, 517b; the expression kosmos noetos, q.v., does not occur For some other aspects of the Platonic eidas, see arithmos, mathe-
until later Platonism) located "beyond the heavens" (Phaedrus 247c). matika, metaxu, monas, dyas.
The image becomes sharper in Tim. 30c-d where the eide are organ- 14- In his Metaphysics Aristotle subjects the eidas-theory to a
ized within the "intelligible living being" (zoon noeton). See also ekei. lengthy critical analysis (see 987a-988a, ggoa-993a, 1078b-1080a;
11. At first glance there appears to be a Platonic eidas for each compare the contemporary Aristotelian dialogue, De phil. frs. 8, 9).
class of things. Thus there are ethical eide (Parm. 13ob, Phaedrus Assessments of the validity of this critique hinge on two essential and
250d), mathematical eide (Phaedo 101b-c; see arithmos eidetikos), obscure points: the distinction between Plato and his successors on the
eide of natural objects (Tim. 51b, Soph. 266b; compare Meta. 1070a), subject of the mathematika (q.v.), and the existence and Aristotle's
even trivial ones (Parm. 130c). What is perhaps more surprising is to use of sources unavailable to us (see agrapha dagmata).
find eide for artificial objects (Rep. S96a-S97d, Saph. 26Sb, Ep. VII, 15· The chief difference between the Platonic and Aristotelian
343d; compare Meta. 991b), relations (Phaeda 74a-77a, Rep. 479b, view of the eide is that for the latter the eidas is not (except in the cases
Parm. 133c), and negatives (Rep. 476a, Theaet. 186a, Sapho'2S7e). of the first mover and/or movers, and that of the naus "that comes
Behind all of this stands the presumption of methexis: since the sensi- from outside"; see kinaun, naus) a separate subsistent (choriston,
50 I EIDOS ENANTIA I 51
q.v.), but a prinicple of complete substances. It is the formal cause of < For the epistemological difficulties atlsmg from transcendence,
things (Phys. II, 194b), a correlative of matter in composite beings see agnostos; for the hierarchization of the eide in later Platonism,
(ibid. I, 190b), and the intelligible essence (ousia) of an existent hypostasis; for the eide of individuals, hyle; for the location of the eide
(Meta. 1013a, De gen. et carr. II, 335b; see ousia). In lmowing things in both their transcendent and immanent manifestations, nous; noeton.
we know their eidos (Meta. 1010a), i.e., the appropriate faculty (nous
or aisthesis) becomes the thing it knows by reason of the eidos< of the eikon: image, reRection
known object entering the soul (De an. III, 431b-432a). Eidos is, in Eikasia, the state of perceiving mere images and reflections, is the
brief, an actualization (energeia, entelecheia, qq.v.; Meta. 105ob, De an. lowest segment of the Platonic Line (Rep. 50ge). The eikon has a
II, 412a). qualified type of existence (Tim. 52c) and a not very complimentary
16. As in Plato, Aristotle's eidos, considered from a logical point role in Plato's theory of art (Rep. 598e-599a; see techne, mimesis).
of view, has an intimate connection with predication. The conceptual The visible universe is the eikon of the intelligible one that embraces
eidos is the universal of predication and the subject of definition (Meta. the eide (Tim. 30a---d; see kosmos noetos), and time is an image of
l036a, 1084b). But they differ from the Platonic version of the eide not eternity (see chronos). In Plotinus soul is an image of nous (Enn. v, 1,
only by reason of the fact that they are not hypostatized into sub- 3), the created world is an image of its Father (Enn. v, 8, 12), and
stances, but also because they are "classified," i.e., they range up from matter (hyle) an image of being (on) (Enn. 1,8,3), etc.; seekosmos,
the atom on eidos, which cannot be broken down into narrower species mimesis, doxa.
but only into individuals (and this "division" of the infima species is a
function of its connection with matter not by reason of the presence of a eke!: there, yonder
diaphora [q.v.); see hyle), through ever wider eide, called gene, up to The next life, so Plato, Phaedo 61e, 64al; the intelligible world,
the summa genera, the kategoriai (q.v.); on the eidos as universal, see the kosmos noetos, Plotinus, Enn. II, g, 4; II, 4, 5.
katholau.
17. The eide continued to be important in later philosophy. The eklampsis: shining forth, emanation, radiation
Aristotelian eide that are immanent in matter and direct the entire In Plotinus the metaphorical explanation of the creation process
teleological structure of the individual existents were incorporated into (see Enn. v, 1, 6; IV, 3, g, etc.) tllat flows from the One without
Stoicism as the logoi spermatikoi (q.v.). The Platonic transcendental diminution. It is a more specific metaphorical expression for the con-
version of the eide seems to have given way under the Aristotelian cept that finds its most general statement in procession (proodos, q.v.).
critique, but they reappear in the Platonic tradition with Antiochus of
Ascalon (Cicero, Acad. post. 8, 30-33). But it was a perilous time for ekpyriisis: conRagration
orthodoxy and very quickly the eide are being construed as the thoughts According to late authorities Heraclitus held a theory of periodic
of God (Philo, De opif. 4, 17-20; Albinus, Epit. 9,1-2). Even though destn:ction of the world by fire (D.L. IX, 8). It was part of early Stoic
Plato had denied a purely noetic status to his eide (see supra 11), the doctrme (SVF I, g8), but was dropped by Panaetius (Philo, De aet.
notion may have found some support in the Academy (see Aristotle, 76), who maintained the eternity of the kosmos; see aphthartos, gene-
De an. III, 429a) . But it was doubtless Aristotle's designation of God as sis.
nous (q.v.) that was the mediating factor here, encouraged, to be sure,
by the entire Platonic mimesis metaphor with its very strong sugges- ekstasis: standing out from, ecstasy, mystical union
tion that what Aristotle called a formal cause exists first as a parad- See agnostos.
eigma in the mind of the craftsman before becoming immanent in
things. Thus by positing the eide as the thoughts of God, a position elenchos: scrutiny, refutation, interrogation
that continues down through Plotinus (see Enn. v, 1, 4) into Christian- See aporia, katharsis, epagoge.
ity, and at the same time keeping the Aristotelian eide as immanent
formal causes with an orientation toward matter (see Philo, De opif. enantia: opposites
44, 12g-130 ), an at least partial solution to the dilemma of inrmanence 1. The doctrine of the original existence of opposed natural sub-
vs. transcendence was reached. But the problem continued as< a serious stanc~s first appears in Anaximander (Aristotle, Phys. 187a). Four are
one in Platonism, discussed at length by both Plotinus (Enn. VI, 4) later Isolated by Heraclitus (fr. 126), and posited as the four irreduci-
and Proclus (Elem. theol., prop. 23); see noeton 2. ble elements by Empedocles (fr. 17; see stoicheion). Opposition, as a
52 I ENARGEIA ENDOXON I 53
general force, plays a considerable role in both Pyth~go~as and Hera- quent soliciting of opinions that are then dialectically worked toward a
clitus. There is a list of ten sets of Pythagorean OpposItes III Meta. 986a solution. What the historical Socrates did in conversation and Plato
that Aristode identified with the elements (stoicheia). In Heraclitus refined into the literary form of dialogue, Aristode analyzed into
the function of the opposites is both more explicit and more obscure: method: "A syllogism is demonstrative [apodeixis] when it proceeds
there is an essential unity (logos) of opposites, a unity that is not from premisses that are true and primary. . . ; it is dialectical when
obvious, but that maintains the unity-plurality in the opposites (d. frs. it reasons from endoxa. . . Endoxa are propositions that seem true to
" 10, 54, 60, 88). Parmenides' theory of sensation is based on the all or to the majority or to the wise" (Top. I, Iooa-b).
excess of one of a set of opposites (Diels, fro 28A46). 3 .. It is this procedure, termed dialectical (dialektike, q.v.), that
2. In the early Phaedo (70e) the passage from one opposite to is frequently invoked by Aristotle in the course of his philosophizing,
another is the coping stone of Plato's theory of genesis, as it is to b~ ~or stripped, to be sure, of its ideal syllogistic rigors.
Aristode (Phys. 188a-I89b; see genesis). That these are qualmes 4- The definition of endoxa in the above cited text suggests that
(poiotetes) and not substances (Forms) even for Plato is clear fro?, opinions have both a quantitative and qualitative basis. The first seems
Phaedo 102b-I03b. Aristotle reduces the basic enantia involved III Socratic, i.e., canvassing what may be termed the "common-sense"
genesis among the elements to hot and cold, dry and moist (De gen. et view, and this approach is followed at various points in the ~thical
carr. II, 329b-330a); see poion, dynamis, genesis, logos, dike. treatises (see Eth. Nich. VII, 1145b), as well as at the very opelllng of
the Metaphysics (982a). In this latter text Aristotle is seeking the
enargeia: clarity, self-evidence nature of sophia and the procedure he adopts is to start from commonly
Epicurean sensualism reduced all kno.""ledge and all truth. ba?k to held views of what a wise man is. And he can take this tack because of
sensation (aisthesis) since what are descrIbed as the three cntena of
a presumption that is left unspoken in Plato: the unitive and progres-
truth , aisthesis , prolepsis, and pathos, are either one form or. other( of
sive nature of philosophy where the truth is not the preserve of anyone
sensation itself (see pathos) or the result of repeated sensatIOns see man but the result of a continuous and cumulative investigation (Meta.
prolepsis). Thus Epicurus finds himself in much the ~ame positio.n as
993 a- b ).
Aristode when the latter comes to speak of the pnmary premIsses 5. But the definition of endoxa in the Topics opens the possibil-
(archai) of a syllogism. Since there is nothing more basic than the
ity of an appeal to qualitative opinion, to the "professional" rather than
archai of a syllogism, how is their validity to be established without the "common-sense" view, to "what seems true to the 8ophoi." Thus
recourse to circular argument? And just as Aristotle resorts to an
begins the history of philosophy, cast not in the role of an independent
intuitive grasp of the archai (see epagoge, nous), so Epicurus has historical discipline, but as part of the method of philosophy, the major
aisthesis serve as the guarantor of its own validity, and this by reason
premiss, so to speak, in a dialectical syllogism. In Aristotle considera-
of its clear and self-evident nature (enargeia; see D.L. x, 38, 48, 52;
tions of the opinions of his philosophical predecessors are always woven
Sextus Empiricus, Adv. Math. VII, 216), a quality that is also present
into his own investigations. The first to effect a physical separation of
in prolepsis (D.L. x, 33). the historical material was Aristotle's own student Theophrastus
For the extension of judgment beyond the clear evidence of the
whose Opinions of the Natural Philosophers was a free-standiog work
senses and the cousequent possibility of error, see doxa.
and the ancestor of all the succeeding doxographical collections (see
Theophrastus' parallel detachment of the character sketches from their
endoxon: opinion, general opinion ethical context in his Characters).
In the Anal. post. Aristode sets forth in some detail a method
1.
6. The historical approach to philosophy is not completely un-
of scientific procedure that he designates "demonstration" (apodeixis)
known to Plato; he gives at .least one review of the course of pre-
and that can be described as the progress, via the syllogistic route,
Socratic speculation (Soph. 242b-249d; see eidos), and some of the
from known premisses to new, true, and valid conclusions. As theory it
central dialogues engage in dialectical discourse not with some repre-
is admirable , but as method it is given the lie in most of the Aristotelian
. sentative of the communis opinio, but with dramatic recreations of an
corpus, where the actual procedure followed is more often aporematIc
earlier generation of philosopher-sophists (e.g. Parmenides, Protago-
(see aporia and the schematic passage in Meta. 995a-b) .
ras, Gorgias) . The difference in Aristotle's attitude is expressed in the
2. This latter course, which sees philosophy as starting from
previously cited text of the Metaphysics (993a-b): philosophy is cumu-
problems that demand solution, is thoroughly Socratic, as is the conse-.
lative, evolutionary, progressive. Plato's delineations may be historical
 .....- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
~J~"- ---

54 I ENDOXON ENERGEIA I 55
but there is no evidence of a concept of philosophy as part of man's doxographical technique, employing it now, in a manner quite the
social history; indeed, the implications of the anamnesis (q.v.) theory opposite of the Aristotelian nsage, to reinforce, on historical grounds, a
is that each man must emerge from the Cave; mankind makes no position of methodical doubt. How can it be, they ask, that we have any
progress in this regard. guarantee of certitude when the great philosophers of the past were in
7. Aristotle's historical perspectives appear early; the fragments such contradiction on the basic questions of philosophy? Chapter and
(e.g. 3, 6, 7) of Book I of the early dialogue On Philosophy-show verse are cited and the cumulative effect is to persuade the reader that
Aristotle pursuing the evolution of sophia in a context even wider than the only reasonable course is a sceptical suspension of judgment
that of the Metaphysics. Here he has before him a historical panorama (epoche; see Cicero, Acad. pro 48, 148 and Sextus Empiricus, Pyrrh. I,
that embraces not only the Greek sages of the past but a wider purview 36-38). Such is, for instance, the transparent purpose of the doxogra-
that takes into account not only the religio-mythical quest for truth phy in Cicero, Acad. pro 36, 116-47, 146, borrowed, no doubt, from
(see myth as, aporia), but the wisdom of the East as well; in ShOlt, a some former teacher in the sceptical New Academy.
tradition that begins with the Egyptians, passes through Zoroaster, 11. The New Academy also plays a part in the historiography of
and climaxes in Plato. the period. The polemic of the age of Cicero is dominated by a struggle
8. The fragmentary nature of the dialogue does not permit much over the orthodoxy of the various schools. Philosophy bad already
speculation on the methods employed there, bnt there is abundant passed into its "classical" stage and the battle for a protective place
evidence for Aristotle's use of his predecessors in the preserved trea- under the mantles of the past masters was at its height, a battle in
tises. Book I of the Metaphysics includes a survey (g83b-g88a) of which one of the favored techniques was the writing-and rewrit-
previous opinions on causality; Physics I has a similar review ing-of the history of philosophy. Again the chief witness are the pages
(184b-18gb) on the archai. The De anima presents a history of the of the Academica of Cicero. Two views emerge, the Sceptic and the
speculations on the nature of the soul (403b-411b), and De gen. et Stoic. The first sees the pre-Socratics as a series of proto-Sceptics, the
carr. on the nature of genesis (314a-317a). Each of these passages has movement coming to a climax in the aporia (q.v.) of Socrates. Plato's
its own proper thrust. At times, as in the Metaphysics passage, the dogmatism is more apparent than real and the New Academy from
endoxa provide a confirmation to Aristotle's own theorizing; or, again, Arcesilas to Carneades is in the mainstream of Socratism, as were the
as in the De anima, they set out and limit the terms of the problem, the Cyrenaics (Acad. post. 12,44-46; 23, 72-74, 76). The Stoic view of
solution of which will begin afresh in Book II (see 403b) . But in every history, derived from the Academic Antiochus by Cicero but probably
case the positions of other philosophers are presented from a problem- attributable to the Stoic Panaetius, tends to disregard the pre-Socratics
atic rather than from a historical point of view and, in addition, are and begin the modern philosophical tradition with Socrates whose
subjected to a critique in greater or lesser detail, again from the alleged scepticism was, in any event, nothing more than irony. It then
problematic point of view. Thus the review in Meta. I, chaps. 3-6 is proceeds to syncretize the Old Academy and Peripatos into a single
followed, in chaps. 8-10, by a criticism of previous speculation. system differing in name but essentially in agreement (Acad. post. 4,
g. Aristotle's presentation and criticism of the work of his pred- 15-18). The system of Zeno derives from that source and is nothing
ecessors, and particularly of Plato, has been much criticized (see more than a correction of Platonism (ibid. g, 25; 12, 43), while the
agrapha dogmata). The problem seems to arise from the fact that Arcesilan New Academy is really an aberration (Acad. pro 6, 16). It is
while Aristotle had a point of view that enabled him, or even demanded in this fashion that Middle Stoicism can locate itself in the Platonic
of him, that be incorporate the earlier bistory of the quest for sophia tradition (with visible philosophical effects in Poseidonius; see noesis
into his own investigations, it was this strictly procedural approach, 17 and psyche 2g) and Antiochus effect his "restoration" of the Old
which saw history only as aporia (q.v.) or lysis, that prevented him Academy by championing Stoic doctrines (see Cicero's apt characteri-
from doing strict justice to the historical reality of his predecessors' zation in Acad. pro 43, 132) . .
work.
10. In the period following Theophrastus two further develop- energeia: functioning, activity, act, actualization
ments become visible. First, the collection of endoxa that in Aristotle 1. The technical use of energeia is an Aristotelian innovation
serves to delineate the evolutionary nature of philosophical enquiry is and a correlative of his concept of dynamis (q.v.) as capacity. The
turned to new purposes. The marked strain of scepticism that' power- analysis of genesis (q.v.) in the Physics pursues the approach already
fully shaped the problems and methods of post-Aristotelian thought set out by Plato in his account of precosmic genesis in the Timaeus,
down to the beginnings of the Christian era found a new use for the i.e., the passage of opposed powers or qualities in a substratum, with
56 I ENERGEIA EPAGOGE I 57
the additional Aristotelian refinement of privation (steresis) that
answers Parmenides' objections on the subject of nonbeing. But at the ennoia: concept
end of this treatment Aristotle refers to another line of approach, which According to Stoic epistemology (SVF II, 83) man is born with
he will develop more fully elsewhere, viz., an analysis based on dy- his reason like a "papyrus role ready for writing" (the first appearance
namis and energeia (Phys. I, 191b). of the tabula rasa image). Through sensation various images (phanta-
2. This analysis, explained in the Metaphysics, presents metho- sia) are presented to the reason for its "apprehension" (katalepsis). If
dological difficulties since neither dynamis nor energeia is susceptible these are apprehended and held, they become, in effect, concepts (en-
of definition in the ordinary sense, but can only be illustrated by noiai) of the mind. Of these some occur naturally, i.e., without formal
example and analogy (Meta. 1048a). But it is, nonetheless, of prime instruction, and are termed "preconceptions" (prolepsis, q.v.); others
importance in that it transcends the mere kinetics of the Physics: we develop through formal education. The ennoiai are mere concepts; they
are now in the heart of an analysis of being (ibid. 104Sb-1046a), an have no extramental or concrete reality (SVF I, 65; D.L. VII, 61), but
analysis that will enable Aristotle to deal with the transcendent, imper- they do serve as an important criterion of truth, or rather one class of
ishable entities of the superlunary world and the Prime Mover. them, the "common concepts" (koinai ennoiai, notiones communes),
3. The relationship between kinesis and energeia is first ex- which are identical with the naturally acquired, though not innate,
plored. Weare told that it is movement that first suggests the notion of prolepseis (SVF II, 473). They embrace a certain knowledge of the
energeia (ibid. I047a), but that there remains a difference in that first principles of morality (SVF III, 619, 218), of God (ibid. II, 1009),
kinesis is essentially incomplete (ateles), i.e., it is a process toward and of the afterlife (Cicero, Tuse. I, '3, 30-1, '4, 31) .
some yet unachieved goal (note that the kinesis of the elements ceases For the connection between the concept and its name, see onoma.
when they have reached their "natural place"; see stoicheion), while On the possibility that the Platonic Form may be only a concept
energeia is complete; it is not process but activity (ibid. 1048b). (noema) , see -eido8, noeton; for its role in Stoicism, noesis 16.
4- Equally illuminating is Aristotle's derivation of energeia from
function (ergon, q.v.). Function is that which a thing is naturally enteIecheia: state ot completion or perfection, actuality
suited to do, i.e., the making or doing for which it has a capacity 1. Although Aristotle normally uses enteleeheia, which is proba-
(dynamis). Thus we have the notion of en-ergeia, the state of being at bly his own coinage, as a synonym for energeia (q.v.), there is a
work, functioning (ibid. lOsoa). Quickly Aristotle binds in the related passage (Meta. 1050a) that at least suggests that the two terms,
notion of end (telos). Since function is the end, energeia is obviously though closely connected, are not perfectly identical. They are related
related to entelecheia (q.v.), being in a state of completion. In this way through the notion of ergon (q.v.): ergon is the function of a capacity
energeia is described and delimited: it is the functioning of a capacity, (dynamis) and so its completion and fulfillment (telos, q.v. ). Thus the
its fulfillment and actualization, normally accompanied with pleasure state of functioning (energeia) "tends toward" the state of completion
(for the ethical implications of this, see hedone) , and prior to potency (en-telecheia) , especially since Aristotle has already pointed out (ibid.
in definition, time, and substance (ibid. I049b-105oa). 1048b) that energeia differs from kinesis in that the latter is incomplete
5. The priority of energeia in substance introduces important (ateles) , while the former is not.
new considerations. Dynamis is the capacity of a thing to be other than 2. The most curious use of entelecheia in Aristotle is probably its
it is; it does not exist necessarily. This may refer to either its ousia or substitution for eidos in the definition of soul, which thus becomes (De
the various dynameis toward changes of quantity, quality, or place. an. II, 4'2a): "the first enteleeheia of a natural body that potentially
Thus the eternal movement of the heavenly bodies, being eternal, is has life."
pure energeia; it cannot be otherwise even though they may have
dynameis for accidental change of place (ibid. 1050b; the eternal cyclic enthousiasm6s: divine indweIIing, possession
genesis of the elements is a mimesis of this; see genesis). See mantike.
6. At the end of this dialectical process stands the ultimate energ- epagoge: leading in, leading on, induction (Socratic,
eia that in the last resort stands behind and actualizes every dynamis in Aristotelian; tor Platonic "induction," see
the universe, the Prime Mover (see kinoun) whose absolutely pure
energeia is noesis: "Life is the energeia of nous; he is that energeia"
synagoge)
1. Aristotle, in a passage where he is describing the origin of the
(ibid.1072b ).
theory of Forms, remarks that Socrates was the first to employ "induc-
58 I EPIEIKEIA EPISTEME 59
tive arguments" (epaktikoi logoi; Meta. 1078b). But to understand
epaktikoi in the sense of an Aristotelian "induction" (epagoge) is episteme: 1] (true and scientific) knowledge (opposed
probably misleading since neither Socrates' methodology nor Plato's to doxa) ; 2] an organized body of knowledge,
terminology point to a strictly Aristotelian usage. The developed Aris- a science; 3] theoretical knowledge (opposed to
totelian epagoge is defined, in its most general terms, as "the leading praktike and poietike)
on from particulars to the universal [katholou] and from the known to 1. The materialism of the pre-Socratics did not permit them to
the unlmown" (Top. VIII, 156a). - distinguish between types of knowledge; even Heraclitus, who insisted
2. Plato uses epagein once in a sense akin to this (Pol. 278a), but that his logos (q.v.) that is hidden, could be grasped only by the
his more common usage is in the sense of "cite" Dr "adduce" (see Rep. intelligence, was, when he came to explain nous (q.v.), a thorough-
364c, Laws 823a). In the dialogues most closely associated with the going materialist: knowledge was sensation of the like-knows-like type
historical Socrates there is frequent reliance on individual instances, (see homoios). Heraclitns certainly held to the permanent order of the
but they are cited either for purposes of refutation or conection (see nniverse, surrounded as it was by an obvious process of change, but the
Rep. 331e-336a) or to establish analogies (see Xenophon, Mem. III, 3, sncceeding philosophers preferred to emphasize the element of change
g) , in both instances a kind of testing device that is part of the Socratic ("all is in flux"; see rhoe), and the consequent worthlessness of sense
method of elenchos (see aporia, katharsis), and that, by skillful use, knowledge (see Plato, Grat. 402a; Aristotle, Phys. VIII, 253b). A pro-
might eventually reach definition, or, again, merely end in aporia (see ponent of this denigration of aisthesis was Cratylus (see Aristotle,
Theaet. 21Ob-d). Meta. 1010a) who was a formative influence on the young Plato (idem
3. The most fundamental import of epagoge in Aristotle is its 987a ) .
role as the foundation stone of all scientific knowledge (episteme). It is 2. Sensualist perception theories were discredited, and when Soc-
through an induction of individual sense experiences (aistheseis) that rates describes just such a process in Phaedo g6b, he is not happy with
we gain our knowledge of both the universal concept (katholou, q.v.) it; but it does suggest that the distinction between doxa and episteme
and the universal proposition (arc he, q.v.), and it is these latter that was pre-Socratic. In the Phaedo context the differentiation does not
serve as the undemonstrable premisses of all demonstration (Anal. appear to be any more than a distinction between levels of conviction;
post. 11, ggb-lOob; see Meta. g80a-g81a). This epagoge is not a discur- but the true father of the radical distinction that appears from Plato
sive process and, unlike complete induction, it cannot be reduced to a onward is the one pre-Socratic unconcerned with "saving the phe-
nomena," Parmenides, whose poem sets over against the world of
type of syllogism; rather it is an intuitive grasp of the mind, which
perception and opinion the realm of pure being and pure thought
Aristotle terms nous and which is as trustworthy as demonstration
(noema, fro 8, lines 34-36, 50-51). This is also the realm of Plato's
itself.
eide (q.v.), immutable, everlasting, the ground of true knowledge
4- The point of Aristotelian epagoge is that the universal resides (episteme). Eidos and episteme are locked together from their first
within the material confines of the individual sense data (Phys. I,
implicit appearance in the Meno (as a corollary of anamnesis, q.v.),
184a), and it is by repeated exposures to this sense experience that the
through a similar argument in Phaedo 75b-76 that strongly insists that
mind comes to grasp the higher intelligibility of the universal (Anal.
true knowledge (episteme) of the Forms cannot come through the
post. I, 87b-88a). But because of its intimate connection with sensa-
senses and so we must be born with it. The broadest statement of the
tion, induction remains both more convincing and more popular in its
collocation episteme/eide VS. doxa/aistheta is given in Rep. 476a-480a,
appeal (Top. I, 105a; compare gnorimon). and illustrated in the following Diagram of the Line (509d-5ue) and
5. There is, finally, still another type of induction that Aristotle
the Allegory of the Cave (514a-521b). Sensation (aisthesis) reasserts
treats at some length, perfect induction or the canvassing of all the
its claim to be true knowledge in Theaet. 186d; this is rejected as well
instances of a general proposition (Anal. pro 11, 68b). But here he is
as the alternative "true judgment accompanied by an account" (logos,
dealing with the reduction of induction to syllogistic form, something
q.v.), ibid. 187b, but this too is refined and criticized (ibid.
he can achieve only by means of a perfect induction.
201C-21Od). The answer unfolds in the sequel, the Sophist: the only
true knowledge is a knowledge of the eide and its method is dialectic
epieikeia: equity (dialektike, q.v.). Even as late as the Timaeus the distinction between
See dike.
episteme and doxa and their differing objects is stressed (2gb-d).
pzs

60 I EPISTROPHE ERGON I 61
3. Plato's transcendent eide are replaced by Aristotle's immanent Aristotle's nous. The dialectic of the epistrophe is the reverse of that of
variety (see eidos), and the change is accompanied by a sbift in the procession (proiJdos), and is worked out in Proclus, Elem. theol.,
object of episteme. For Aristotle true scientific knowledge is a knowl- props. 3'-39.
edge of causes (aitia), which are necessarily true (Anal. post. I, 76b),
while opinion (doxa) is about the contingent (symbebekos, ibid. I, epithymia: desire
8Sb). Episteme is demonstrative, syllogistic knowledge (see apodeixis, The desiderative (epithymetikon) is one of the three parts of the
ibid. I, 7Ib), and sense knowledge is a necessary condition for it (ibid. soul in Plato's Republic IV, 434d-44IC (a distiuction that Aristotle
I, SIa-b; see epagoge). This is all in a logical context; the causes finds unsatisfactory [De an. 432a-bl, but that is maintained by Plo-
mentioned above are the premisses of a syllogism and the causes of the tinus, Enn. I, " 5 and 6). It is perishable and, according to Timaeus
conclusion. Aristotle takes up episteme from an ontological viewpoint 70d-e, is located below the midriff. Aristotle makes epithymia but one
in the opening of the Metaphysics; here too episteme is a knowledge of of the three operations of the desiderative faculty (see orexis) of the
causes, but these aitia are causes of being, and the knowledge of the sense-endowed soul (De an. 414b). The object of epithymia is the
ultimate causes is the highest type of episteme, wisdom (sophia, q.v.); pleasant (ibid.). Epicurus divides desires into the natural and neces-
for episteme as a mental activity, see noesis. sary, natural but not necessary, and neither (D.L. x, 127; Cicero, Tusc.
4. In Meta. lOz5b-lOz6a Aristotle gives his breakdown of epis- v, 33, 93). For the Stoics epithymia is one of four chief affections (with
teme in the sense of an organized body of rational knowledge with its pain, pleasure, and fear) (SVF I, 211 ) ; and just as fear is a flight from
own proper object; the alignment is as follows: anticipated evil, desire is an appetite for an anticipated good (SVF III,
391) ; see also hedone.
Episteme
ergon: work, deed, product, function
1. Ergon, the common Greek word for something done or made,
I prak'k
ti e poieJke t heoretike
i is used by the philosophers in a twofold sense: either as the activity of a
(see praxis) (see techne) (see theoria) thing or as the product of that activity. Aristotle frequently marks the
distinction (e.g. Eth. Nich. I, 1094a) and it leads him to the further
I point, a capital one in his ethical speculations, that some activities have
as their end (telos) a product (not necessarily an "object"; a frequent
I math emab'ke Physlike theologike Aristotelian example is that health is the ergon of medicine), while
(see mathematika) (see choriston) (see theologia) others have as their telos the activity itself (see Eth. Eud. 1219a). This
is, in general, Aristotle's distinction between the activity known as
For anotber, later division, see philosophia; for the Platonic "division
poiesis and that called praxis (q.v.; see episteme, techne).
of the sciences," see techne.
2. This distinction between poiesis and praxis, production and
5. Aristotle frequently uses episteme alone for episteme the ore- action, is an ethically oriented one, but it has metaphysical implications
tike in contrast with practical or productive "science," e.g. Eth. Nich. that go far deeper. These are set out in Meta. I050a where Aristotle
VI, 1139b; see praxis, techne.
refines the concept of ergon into that of "being at work" (en-ergeia).
This latter state is the end (telos) of being (at this point energeia is
epistrophe: return related to en-telecheia, "being at completion"), whether the activity
The "return" of the Platonic tradition is distinct from, but con-
issues in an external ergon or not. The only difference is that in poiesis
nected with, the epistemological problem of knowing God (for the
the energeia is in the thing made, while praxis is the energizing of the
connection, see Produs, Elem. theol., prop. 39). It differs in that it is
doer. Thus movement exists in the thing moved, but sight is an energ-
a function of desire (orexis). Its ontological ground is the identification
eia in the seer and life an energeia in the soul (compare the definition
of the transcendent One with the Good (Plato, Rep. 50gb, Phil.20d; of soul under psyche).
Plotinus, Enn. v,s, 13; Produs, Elem. theol., prop. 8) that is necessar-
3. This identification of telos/ergon/energeia (and, as the same
ily an object of desire, and the identity of the efficient and final cause,
passage continues, with eidos and ousia) leads to another important
the effect, in Middle Platonism, of combining Plato's demiourgos with.
meaning of ergon as the function or proper activity of a thing. Prelimi-
sa

62 I EROS EROS I 63
nary here is the use of ergan, activity, as opposed to the things that by Aristotle (Meta. g84b). And even as the mythological trappings
happen to a subject (pathemata; see De an. I, 403a and pathos, pas- began to fall away in the speculations of the physikai Eros, the mover,
chein). Both of them, the erga and the pathemata, are important from or now, more frequently, Aphrodite, continued to playa role in conjoin-
a methodological point of view since they, together with the dynamis ing the opposite powers (see enantian, dynamis ) . Such is, for e~ample,
(q.v.), define the field of study of the physik as or natural philosopher the case in Empedocles where it is Love (philia) and AphrodIte that
(De an. I, 403b, De caela Ill, 307b; compare aphairesis). T~ence the unite the elements (fr. '7, lines 20-26; Diels 31A28; Aristotle, Meta.
usage shades off to proper activity or function b6th in a physIcal (see g85a, 1075b, sees moral forces at work as well). In Parmenides she is
De gen. animo 731a) and an ethical sense (Eth. Nich. I, 1097b): and the daimon (q.v.) "who guides all" (fr. 12, line 3), an image that
even in more general expressions, like "the proper function of phIloso- persists in Greek literature (see Euripides, Hipp. 447-450,1278-1281)
phy" (Phys. II, 194b) and ''the function of dialectic" (Saph. El. and is still visible in Lucretius' opening invocation of Venus "who
a b alone governs the nature of things" (I, 21) .
83 - 4-) . Ergan as functIOn 1 ItS
. pays . role 'm A' rlsto tl'
e s eth'IC, JUs
. t as 1.t
2. All of these instances of the employment of love have to do
had for Plato before him. Both men are concerned to set up a norm of with the raising of a human emotion to the level of a cosmological
behavior, and both resort to phenomenological standards, attempting to force, an operation that is particularly clear to Empedocles (fr. '7,
connect excellence (arete, q.v.) with function (ergan). Plato defines lines 22-24). And in one of the most extended treatments of eros by a
this latter as "that which the thing in question does alone or best" philosopher, the Symposium of Plato, the same approach is still in
(Rep. 353a) and has excellence consist in the specific power that allows evidence. The speech of Eryximachus (185e-188e) shows the extent of
that function to operate well. Aristotle's approach is somewhat differ- this principle of "attraction" in nature, and this and similar notions,
ent. For him arete is a certain high level of performance with regard to familiar to both the mythologers and the physikoi, fill most of the other
the function a high level that is guaranteed by not taking any man as discourses. The speech of Socrates, however, strikes out in a new
the norm but, rather keying function on the performance of t h" .
e senous direction where human love is used as an important moral and episte-
man" (spaudaios; Eth. Nich. I, lOg8a). mological concept.
5. What, then, is the ergan of man? For Plato it is the activities 3. Socrates as ''the lover" (erotikos) was a commonplace at
that only man can perform: manag~ment, rule, deliberation; ~nd :he Athens. He appears as such in Xenophon (Mem. II, 6, 28; Symp. IV,
arete peculiar to man that allows hIm to perform them well IS dzke 27) and the notion is frequently combined with the familiar irony: I
(q.v.). For Aristotle the ergon of man is a? "e.nergeia. of :he soul know nothing, save about eros (see Theag. 128b, Lys. 204b, an~
according to logos," and, since the good of a thmg IS descnbed m terms compare Alcibiades' remark in Symp. 216d). That there were phySI-
of its function, the good of man is this activity on a level of excellence cally erotic traits in Socrates' relationships with the young men of
(Eth. Nich. 10g8a). Athens can scarcely be doubted; but his eros had another side as well,
as Alcibiades, who had tried to seduce him (Symp. 217a-21gd), dis-
eros: desire, love covered; Socrates could distinguish between passion and its object.
1. Eros is one of the many personifications that appear in the
4. The philosophical question of love, here called philia, friend-
prephilosophical cosmogonies. But unlike most of the others that repre- ship, is first raised in the Lysis where Socrates, in searching f?r ."
sent states, e.g. Night, Chaos, Earth, Heaven (see the remarks of definition of this attraction between men, suggests that perhaps It IS
Aristotle in Meta. 1071b ) , Eros is a force. In the Orphic cosmogouies analogous to the attraction of like to like (homoios, q.v.) that had
he unites all and from these unions is born the race of the immortal already been enunciated by the poets and the physikoi (Lys. 214a-c;
gods (see Aristophanes, Birds 700-702); in Hesiod he is among the for the prime importance of this principle in perception theories, see
first to emerge from Chaos and draws all else together (Theog. aisthesis, passim). This is rejected, as is its converse, that unlike is
116-,20); according to Pherecydes (as reported by Proelus, I;Z Tim. II, attracted to unlike (216b). He settles, finally and without a great deal
54), when Zeus wishes to create (demiourgein) he changes mto.Eros. of conviction, on a principle that went back to medical theory and had
Eros then is a motive force on a sexual model used to explam the important applications in contemporary theories of pleasure (see he-
"mar~iage'" and "birth" of the mythological elements, a species of done): desire (epithymia) , and its consequent, love, is directed toward
"First Mover" in the ancient cosmogonies, and was recognized'as such the filling of a lack (endeia) and its object, therefore, is something that
64 I EROS EROS I 65
is appropriate (oikeion; ~ompare the. later dev~lop~ent o~ this. in Stoi- and a movement toward the transcendent world of the eide, and at the
cism under oikeiosis), I.e., somethmg that IS neIther IdentIcal nor same time it is the pouring out into the soul of the beloved, whose
completely dissimilar and yet deficient in our constitution. . (male) beauty is an image of God, those "streams from Zeus" that
5. The theme is resumed in the Symposium: love is a desIre enter his own soul (252c-253a). The beloved does not disappear into a
directed toward the beautiful (kallos) and necessarily involves the mist of sublimation but remains a necessary partner in the quest for the
notion of a want or lack (endeia; 200e-201b). Socrates then begins to eide (compare Ep. VII, 34IC-d). What is sublimated in these relation-
cite the doctrine learned from a wise prophetess,"Diotima. Eros, now ships that are archetypally represented by Socrates and his young
reinvested with the trappings of myth, is a great daimon (q.v.), one of disciples is the purely sexual activity. Plato is aware that restraint here
the intermediaries (metaxu) between the divine and the mortal is difficult and not always successful, but he is not inclined to judge too
(202e). Then, suddenly, the Socratic irony is explained: Eros is also harshly (255b-256e).
midway between wisdom (sothia) a~d ignorance in that.the man ~ho 9. After Plato eros and its connected notions disappear from the
has no sense of his own deficIency wIll have no love of WIsdom (phzlo- exalted positions given them in these dialogues and take up a more
sophia; 204a). Love is defined as the desire that the good be one's own modest stand in ethics under the rubric of friendship (Aristotle devotes
forever (206a), the quest of a mortal nature to be immortal ( 207d ) Book VIII of the Eth. Nich. to philia; its wider aspects, humanitas and
that it accomplishes by hegetting (genesis; compare Aristotle's some- philanthropia, were much in vogue in Stoicism: Cicero, De off. I, 50-51
what similar use of genesis under kinoun 9) . and see oikeiosis) or that of passionate love. Epicurus, and, indeed,
6. At Symp. 20ge Diotima pauses (a break seen by some as the most of the philosophers, were opposed to this latter on the grounds
dividing line between Socratic and Platonic eros) and then launches that it destroyed the ataraxia (q.v.) of the serious thinker (see D.L. x,
into a final treatment of the true eros. Concourse with beautiful bodies 118), but the violent diatribe directed against cupido by Lucretius (IV,
begets beautiful discourses (logoi). The lover weans. himsel~ aw~y 1058-1287) suggests a personal rather than a philosophical aporia.
from a single body and becomes a lover of all beautiful bodIes (m 10. As might be expected the Platonic eros reappears in Plotinus,
Charm. 154b Socrates had confessed that all youths seemed beautiful to prefaced, in Enn. I, 6, by an aesthetic of sensible things. Plato had
him), thence to beautiful souls, laws and observances, and. knowledg.e attempted something similar in the Hippias Major where beauty is
(episteme), always freeing himself of bondage to the partIcular, untl! defined first in terms of the useful and then of the pleasurable (295c,
"suddenly" there is revealed to him the vision of Beauty itself (2~IJ;>; 298a; compare the parallel argument in Gorg. 474d). Plotinus goes
the suddenness of the vision is stressed again in Ep. VII, 341). ThIS IS another way; beauty (kallos) is not, as it was for the Stoics (see
immortality. Cicero, Tusc. IV, 33) , a question of measure (metron) or the symmetry
7. What has been revealed is, of course, the transcendent eide. of parts since this would be to suggest that beauty is confined to
Socrates has much more to sayan the purely psychological side of love composites and cannot explain the beauty of a single star in the heaven
in his first speech in the Phaedrus (237b-24Id; defined, 238b-c, as an at night. Plotinus' own explanation (I, 6, 2-3) is a curious blend of the
irrational desire toward the enjoyment of beauty). But he later recants Platonic transcendent Form that is shared (koinonia, methexis) by the
and promises a palinode (243b-c), and it is here that eros and p.h~lo­ object and the immanent Aristotelian eidos or Stoic logos. But the true
sophia are rejoined. The irrationality ~f love i.s really a ty~e of dlv~e essence of beauty is simplicity, a simplicity that is found preeminently
madness (theia mania, 245b-c; so too IS manttke, q.v., whIch explams in the One (VI, 7, 32). From these sensible beauties one passes, in
the presence of Diotima in the Symposium), and it is present in the approved Platonic fashion, to practices and sciences, thence by a purifi-
soul as a reflex of the remembrance (anamnesis, q.v.) that the soul has cation (katharsis, q.v.) of the soul to the contemplation of the highest
of the eide that were revealed to her before her "loss of wings" (24 8c ; beauty that is the Good (I, 6, 6). To accomplish this the soul must put
see kathodos). It is the soul of the philosopher that first regains these off the garments acquired by it during its descent (kathodos, q.v. and
wings by the exercise of her recollect~on of the .eide. and by gover.ning compare ochema). We see the Beautiful with an interior vision by
her life accordingly (249c-d); the phIlosopher IS stimulated to thIS by becoming assimilated to it (I, 6, 9) .
the vision of earthly beauty. It is beauty that particularly stirs our 11. All of this is markedly Platonic in image and language. But
recollection because it operates through the sharpest of our senses, there has been an equally notable shift in emphasis. Philosophy as a
sight (249d-250d). . .. .. ... communal project between lovers is no longer in evidence in Plotinus
8. Platonic eros IS a twofold actIVIty: It IS a commumcatlOn WIth for whom the return to the One is a "flight of the alone to the Alone"
 66 I ETHOS GENESIS I 67
(VI, g, 11). The method of Plotinus is no longer dialogue, with its 2. Modern scholarship locates the dialogues within the problem
diastolic implications, but introspection, and his goal is an unio mystica of Aristotle's philosophical evolution, but an ancient literary tradition,
(see hen 13). Iu Plato the veueration of Aphrodite Pandemus is one beginning with Cicero (De fin. v, 12: compare Aulus Gellius, Noctes
stage, and perhaps a stage that is never transcended, toward the Alt. xx, 5, 1) read the differences between the dialogues and the
worship of Aphrodite Urania. In Plotinus, who was "ashamed of being treatises not as a function of an intellectual evolution, but rather as the
in a body" (Porphyry, Vita Plot. I), the two goddesses are at -odds. differen.c~ between two distinct, albeit contemporary, types of literary
Earthly love is compared by him to the rape of a"virgin on the way to compOSItIon: external discourses (exoterikoi logoi) , Le., quasi-popular
her Father (VI, g, g) . works _designed for a wide audience, and lectures (akroatikoi logoi)
delivered in the Lyceum to more technically trained groups of students.
ethos: character, habitual way of life 3· . Exoterikoi logoi are, indeed, cited in the preserved treatises,
Heraclitus: "A man's ethos is his daimon," Diels, fro l1g. In Plato and while some of the references conveniently fit what we know of a
it is a result of habit (Laws 792e), and moral rather than intellectual given dialogue (e.g. the reference in Eth. Nich. I, 1102a could fit the
(dianoia) in Aristotle (Eth. Nich. 1139a ) " Types of ethos at various Protrepticus), there are other instances (e.g. Phys. 217b and Pol.
ages in life are described by Aristotle, Rhet. II, chaps. 12-1+ In 1323a when compared with Eth. Nich. I, lOg8b) where it cannot be so,
Stoicism ethos is the source of behavior, SVF I, 203. and the meaning here of exoterikoi logoi is more akin to "arguments
current outside the Peripatetic School."
etymon: true, true sense of a word, etymology
See onoma.

eudaimonia: happiness
It does not, according to Democritus, consist in external goods
(Diels, frs. B170, 171, 40). The just man is happy, so Plato, Rep.
353b-354a, and the best life is the happiest (idem, Laws 664c). Happi-
g
ness is the ultimate practical good for men (Aristotle, Eth. Nich. I,
1097a-b), defined, ibid. I, lOg8a, 1100b. It consists in intellectual
contemplation, ibid. 1177a-1178a. In Stoicism happiness results from
the harmonious life (D.L. VII, 8: see nomos), yet it is not an end genesis: birth, coming-in to-being, becoming (as opposed
(telos), but a concomitant state (Seneca, De vita beata 8 and 13: to being) , process, passage to a contrary,
Plotinus, Enn. I, 4, 4: I, 4, '4): see theoria. substantial change
1. Even in its earliest attested usage (II. XIV, 201, 246) genesis
eupatheia: good or innocent emotion, aflect is something more than a biological process and the two meanings of
See apatheia. "birth" and "beginning in being" are intertwined in the pre-Socratic
texts. The presence of the word in the extant fragment of Anaximander
exoterikoi 16goi: external discourses, popular works has been attributed by most to the language of the Peripatetic epitomi-
1. One of the literary problems attendant upon the study of zer of the text (Theophrastus via Simplicius, Phys. 24, 17), but both
Plato's philosophy is the possibility that at least part of his thinking the expression and the notion are unmistakable in Xenophanes (frs. 2g,
may not have been committed to writing, Le., to expression in dialogue 30) and Heraclitus (frs. 3, 36) in speaking of the "birth" and "death"
form (see agrapha dogmata). In the case of Aristotle we know for a of physical bodies.
certainty that the extant treatises do not represent his entire literary 2. The pre-Socratics were immensely interested in change. Hav-
i I, output. There were known in antiquity a series of dialogues published
by Aristotle wbile still a member of the Academy, and the preserved
ing decided upon one or a number of elemental principles (see arche) ,
either natural bodies, like water or air, or substantivized versions of
fragments of which indicate a considerably more Platonic outlook on what were thought of as "powers" but were later to be considered as
various problems, most notoriously his theory of the soul, than that q~alities (see dynamis, pathos, poion) , e.g. the hot, the dry, etc., they
which emerges from a reading of the treatises. dIscussed the mechanics of how one could become the other. This is
-
68 I GENESIS GENESIS I 69
what Aristotle was later to call "absolute becoming" (genesis hap Ie), in number (fl'. 1). In it were the various Milesian dynameis (q.v.),
change in the category of substance as opposed to the various changes like the hot and the cold, the moist and the dry, etc., as well as the
(metabolai, q.v.) in tbe categories of accident (De gen. et corr. I, Empedoclean stoicheia and natural composite bodies, and what Anaxa-
319b-320a). Thus in Anaximenes, who posited aer (q.v.) as his arche, goras calls "seeds" (spermata) (fl'. 4).
simple bodies come into being from the condensation and rarefaction of 7· These latter are the true stoicheia of Anaxagoras (Aristotle,
aer (Simplicius, Phys. 24., 26), wbile for Anaxima:>der, whose arche is De coelo III, 302a; see stoicheion) and, like the original meigma itself,
an indefinite substance (apeiron, q.v.), tbe genesis of perceptibles they contain portions of everything. The original mixture was without
involves some sort of separation process (Aristotle, Phys. I, 187a). movement, firmly clasped iu a Parmenidean death grip. As in Empedo-
3. In all of these thinkers, for whom life and movement are cles, kinesis comes from the outside, supplied by nous that causes the
inherent in things, there is an insistence on change-Heraclitus is only mixture to rotate. The speed of the rotation effects the separation
the loudest voice in a chorus - and on the clearly perceptible fact that (apokrisis) of the "seeds" (fl'. 12) that are qualitatively different (see
one body becomes another. The most eloquent proof of this is the fact fl'. 4 and pathos). By aggregation (synkrisis) these are formed into
that to deny change Parmenides had to deny perception. compound bodies wherein predominate one or other of the types of
+ But Parmenides did not hesitate to do either, and hencefor- "seed" (see fl'. 12 and Aristotle, Phys. I, 187a).
ward genesis, which had been a given of sense, becomes a problem. 8. The Atomists, by eliminating the dynameis, considerably sim-
Parmenides explicitly denies the possibility of any type of change since plified the operation (though they had marked difficulties in "sav-
coming-to-be in any of its modes implies the logically indefensible ing the phenomena"; see pathos, stoicheion). The atoma are brought
proposition of passing from nonbeing to being, and nothing can come into collision by their eternal motion (see kinesis) and it is by this
from nonbeing (fl'. 8, lines '9-2'; compare lines 38-41 that would contact (haphe) that the higher composite bodies are formed. Some
seem to imply the pre-Parmenidean technical use of genesis; see on). atoma bounce back into the void; others, because they are "hooked" or
5. Thus the Parmenidean "Way of Truth"; his successors, how- angled, catch together and, as further collisions result, perceptible
ever, seem to have taken their cue from the "Way of Seeming." By bodies are built up (Simplicius, De coelo 295, 11). This is the Atom-
abandoning the strict monism of Parmenides and resorting to the older ists' version of the composition of bodies hy association (synkrisis) and
doctrine of "opposites" (enantia, q.v.), both Empedocles and Anax- it reappears, in more sophisticated form, in Epicureanism (D.L. x, 43;
agoras were able to restore at least a secondary genesis in terms of the Lucretius II, 85-111). Here there is an attempt to explain the three
interplay of these opposite qualities or elements (stoicheia, q.v.). Sim- states of matter in terms of density expressed in the distance between
ple coming-into-being (i.e., from nonbeing) is still unthinkable, but by the atoms in the "association," with the added refinement that certain
resorting to various degrees of mixture (krasis) and association (syn- b~di~s (e.g. liquids) result from the containment of one type of atom
krisis) composite bodies could come into being (Empedoc1es, fl'. 9; WithIn a sheath (stegazon) composed of another type, an explanation
Anaxagoras, fro 17; see Aristotle's resume in Phys. I, 187a; see stoi- that also applies to the enclosing of the soul within the body (D.L. x,
cheion) . 65, 66; see halon 9) .
6. The case of Anaxagoras is quite complex. First he is con- 9· That genesis had become the central question of post-
cerned to observe the Parmenidean prohibition against absolute gene- Parmenidean philosophy is clear from Socrates' remarks in Phaedo
sis. Nothing can proceed from nothing and so everything that seems to ~6a, a question that, as the same passage indicates, was being pursued
become something else must have been that something else to begin In terms of a search for causes (aitia, q.v.) and had intrigued the
with, or, as Anaxagoras himself put it, "all things have a portion of young Socrates. For Plato himself genesis is a somewhat secondary
everything" (fl'. 12; in fl'. 11 he excludes nous that is external to the problem in the light of his distinction between the eide, the realm of
system; for the reasons, see kinesis, kinoun); and so it follows (fl'. '7) true b~ing (ontos on), and this sensible world that is characterized by
that there is no such thing as genesis or phthora but only ag'gregation hecomIng (Tim. 27d-28a). Thus being is the only subject for true
(synkrisis) and separation (apokrisis), i.e., by the arrangement of knowledge (episteme), while genesis can afford nothing better than
preexistent matter. Genesis, understood as Anaxagoras understood it, opinion (doxa), the "likely account" of the Timaeus.
begins, then, from a primordial mixture (meigma), the ingredients of .lO. But having thus paid his debt to Parmenides , Plato does , on
which are imperceptible (save perhaps air and fire, which have !already occaSIOn, turn his attention to genesis: once in the context of attempting
begun to predominate in this nonhomogeneous mass) and are infinite to elucidate his theory of participation (methexis) in the Phaedo, and,
70 I GENESIS GENESIS I 71
again, in his account of the kosmos aisthetos in the Timaeus. The first, in their Timaeu8 geometrical form or in their more arithmetical varie-
in Phaedo 102b-105b, which is enormously interesting as being the ties, and he cri:icizes Plato's version (De gen. et carr. I, 315a-316b);
forerunner of Aristotle's own theory of genesis, rests on a premiss that but he was obvlOnsly more taken by Plato's precosmic gene8is and his
is not generally emphasized by Plato, i.e., the immanence, in some own analysis reflects it. It is Aristotle's contention that Parmenides'
form or other, of the eide (see eidos); the passage is replete with theses on nonbeing had frightened his successors off the subject of true
expressions like "the smallness in us." There is, moreover, the insist- gene~i8 .and into reducing all becoming to either qualitative change
ence that the immanent eide are not themselve'; subject to genesis. (allow8lB, q.v.) or merely shifting around the ingredients (PhY8. I,
Genesis has to do with things and is nothing more than the replace- 187a; De gen. et carr. I, 1-2). His own approach is strongly to reaffirm
ment, in a subject (Phaedo 103e ) , of one form by its opposite (enan- the role of the 8toicheia as the ultimate irreducible bodie8 out of which
tion, q.v.). all things al·e made and to insist, on the evidence of the senses that the
11. The same point of view appears in considerably more detail stoicheia do change into one another in a never-ending cycle (De gen.
when Plato comes to speak of the Receptacle (hypodoche) in the et carr. .II, 331a, 337a; see energeia). There is, in short, genesi8. The
Timaeus (49a ff.) and that is described as the "Nurse of Becoming." Parmemdean knot is cut by an explanation of the peculiar nature of the
Plato begins by pointing out that the four Empedoclean "roots" are not nonbeing inv.olved in genesi8; it is not absolute nonbeing but a relative
irreducible elements; since they are constantly changing they are really t~pe that ArIstot~e id~ntifies as "privation" (8tere8is, q.v.). This pro-
qualities (ibid. 49d), eveu though, on the noetic level, there are eide of VIdes the final pIece m the puzzle of becoming. Gene8i8 is possible
these four principal bodies. Thus he rejects all the post-Parmenidean because the 8toicheia have their own archai, viz., a material, uudefined
theories of mixing and association, based as they are on the irreducibil- substratum (hypokeimenon, q.v.) common to them all, sets of imma-
ity of the stoicheia. The permanent thing in the process is the Recepta- nent, perceptible qualities, and the 8teresi8 of the opposed (enantion)
cle, the quasi-being in which genesis takes place (ibid. 4ge). The qualities. Gene8i8 is thus defined as "passage to the enantion" (PhY8. I,
Platonic analysis of genesi8 yields, then, the eternal transcendent 190a-192a; De gen. et carr. 324a, 328b-331a).
Forms, immanent mimetic versions of them that pass in and out of the 14· Aristotle disallows the post-Parmenidean association (8yn-
Receptacle (ibid. 5oc; Plato, lac. cit., promises to describe the difficult ~risis) as genuine gene8i8 (De gen. et carr. I, 317a) and, though mixis
relationship between the immanent qualities and the transcendent eide, IS allowed to p!ay a role, it!S not in gene8i8, in one stoicheion becoming
a promise apparently unfulfilled), and, finally, the Receptacle itself another, but m the formmg of the next generation of bodies the
that, like the Aristotelian hypokeimenon (q.v.), has no characteristics 8yntheta or composite bodies (ibid. II, 334b-335a ). '
of its own (ibid. 5la-b). . 15· Gene8is, then, is affirmed and defined and set over against the
12. All of this is, however, precosmic genesis, the situation "be- varIOUS other changes (metabolai) that occur in substances-in-being:
fore the ouranos came into being" (ibid. 52d). The qualities, together locomotion, alteration, growth. But among all these types of change
with their associated "powers" (dynamei8, q.v.; see pathos, pa8chein) , kine8is (more properly, phora, q.v.) takes precedence, even to gene8is
drift about the Receptacle in chaotic fashion (ibid. 5zd-53a). But then (PhY8. VI.II, ~60b-261a; compare Plato's grouping in Law8 x, 894b-c
nous begins its operation and puts order into the chaos by constructing and see kzneszs) , so there must be a continuous kinesis to ensure the
the primary qualities of earth, air, fire, and water into the four primary everlasting cycle of gene8i8: this is the movement of the sun around the
bodies of the sensible world (ibid. 53C) by identifying each of the elliptic (De gen. et carr. II, 336a-b; compare Rep. 509b; the sun is, of
"elements" with one of the primary geometrical solids capable of being co?rse, a moved mover; the argument will eventually lead to the
inscribed in a sphere (see stoicheion). This looks like a Pythagorean prImary cause, the unmoved mover; see kinoun, nou8). Genesis is, in
version of Atomism. Aristotle has detected the atomistic parallels (De turn, keyed on sets of opposed qualities that are active (poiein) and
gen. et carr. I, 325b; see aisthe8is) , but the Pythagoreanism is eqnally passive (pa8chein, q.v.).
clear when we see that the geometrical solids are, in turn, reducible to .r6 . Epicurus, as the faithful offspring of the Atomists, has no
planes, with the distinct suggestion that the reduction process leads genum~ gen~8i8 (see kine8i8) , but the Stoics appear to follow closer to
back to lines, points (Tim. 53d; see Law8 x, 894a ) , and even beyond the. Ar~stotel~an pattern. Tiley extend, it is true, action and passion,
into the shadowy realms of the Pythagorean archai (see arche, arith- wh~ch ~n Arlstot~e are characteristics of the qualities inherent in the
m08, and the related references) . ' 8tozcheza, deeper mto the nature of things by associating the former with
13. Aristotle has little patience with Pythagorean archai whether' logo8 (q.v.) and the latter with hyle (q.v.), the two Stoic co-principles
 72 I GENOS
GNORIMON I 73
I of reality (SVF, I, 84, 493), but they continue in a somewhat more tra- gnorimon: knowable, intelligible
II ditional fashion by affirmiug the four basic physical bodies or stoicheia, L Though the notion that the knowability of things is relative
two of which are active (air and fire), and two passive (earth and has its Platonic precedents, it is fundamental to Aristotelian epistemol-
water) (SVF II, 418). ogy, particularly as it applies to the objects of metaphysics. The
17. But there have been alterations as well. Fire is now the hot distinction is set forth clearly in Anal. post. I, 71b-72a: things are
(see D.L. VII, 136), not, as in Aristotle, a set of q)1alities, viz., hot and knowable (gnorimon) in two different senses; what is innately
dry (De gen. et corr. II, 331a~. !urther, since the Stoics !'ave given a (physei) more knowable is not necessarily better known to us (pros
primacy to fire (see pyr), thIS IS the first e~ement and, m a sense: a hemas y. The practical application of this principle is twofold. In meta-
kind of Urstoff; the others are derived from It by a process not uulIke physics one should begin with the things more intelligible to us and our
the condensation/rarefaction of Anaximenes (D.L. VII, 142) and re- way of kuowing, and proceed to what is intriusically more intelligible
turu to it at the periodic conflagration (~kpyrosis, q.v.). . . (Meta. 1029b); in ethics men should be educated to see that what is
18. Other difficulties arise. DespIte the ArIstotelIan trappmgs, intrinsically good is also a good for them (Eth. Nich. v, 1129b; the
the Stoics are compelled, by their reduction of everything, inclu~ing ethical parallel is cited in Meta., lac. cit.).
perceptible qualities, to body (see poion), to :,xplain change m a 2. The root of this principle is to be sought within the more
fashiou not radically different from the AtomIsts. They eschewed general cadres of Aristotle's theory of knowledge, since the difference
atomic "hooks," however, and turued to a theory of the interpenetra- in the grades of intelligibility is not due to some defect in the object but
bility of bodies that rests on the distinction of various types. of mix- rather in our way of knowing (Meta. 993b). The foundation of all our
tures, and particularly the varieties called mixis (for dry bodIes) and cognition is sense perception (aisthesis, q.v.), and even syllogistic
krasis (for wet) where the two ingredients of the mixture totally demonstration (apodeixis) rests upon some form of induction (epa-
interpenetrate each other without, at the sa~e time, lo~ing ~heir own gage, q.v.), i.e., to a process that begins with tl,e perception of particu-
proper characteristics, a theory used to explam the relatIOnshIp of soul lars (Anal. post. II, 100b). Scientific knowledge (episteme) has to do
and body as well (SVF II, 467, 471), and strongly attacked by both the with the universal (katholou) , and even though sense perceptions
immediately grasp a kind of "concrete universal" (see Phys. I, 184a) ,
later Peripatetics and Plotinus (see Enn. II, 7, 1 a~d SVF II, 473) .
this is not the universal of science that is apprehended only by reason
For the complementary notion of passmg-out-of-bemg, see
(logos) •
phthora; for genesis as process aud its bearing on ethical theory,
3. The role of philosophy, then, is to proceed from what is
hedone. intelligible to us, i.e., the glimmer of intelligibility that one has
through immediately perceived sensibles (aistheto) , to what is intelli-
genos: kind, genus . gible of itself (physei).
Genos is generally used in Plato as a synonym for "dos, e.g. 4. The Platonic antecedents of all this are clear. The language of
Soph. 253b, and elsewhere as "type," approaching the Aristoteli.an Meta. 1029b cited above is reminiscent of Plato's distinction between
genas, e.g. Theaet. 228e and Soph. 2S3d, where dialectic has to do wIth the really existent (ontos on) intelligibles and the quasi-real (pas on)
dividing the forms according to "kind" (genas); compare the "co~le~­ status of the sensible world, and Aristotle's description of the defects of
tion" (synagoge) into one generic "form," Phaedrus 26Sd, but thIS IS our sense knowledge (Meta. 993b) echoes the imagery of the Allegory
still probably ontological rather than predicational. Aristotelian genos: of the Cave in Rep. S16a. For both philosophers true intelligibility is a
Aristotle, Top. 102a-b, 120b-128b. For Aristotle the kategoriai are the function of immateriality (see Meta. l078a), and while they would
gene of being (De an. II, 412a ) , the summa genera that cannot be sub- agree that the highest type of knowledge is the study of the intelligi-
sumed into anything more general (see Anal. past. II, 100b, Meta. ble-in-itself (see episteme, dialektike, theologia) , where they differ is
in their attitudes toward a study of the sensibles. The Platonic curricu-
1014b ). In Soph. 254d Plato discussed "t?e most impo~ant gene"
lum in Republic x is structured to lead away from the sensible to the
(Existence [ousia], motion, rest, sameness, dIfference; see ezdos, ps~che
intelligible; the immanence of the Aristotelian eidos (q.v:.) guarantees
tau pantos) , and Plotinus, in Enn. VI, 1-3, ~as ~pparently c~n:bmed the valne of a study of the aistheta (compare the parallel difference
these gene with the Aristotelian modes of predIcatIOn (kategorzaz) and. between the Platonic [synagoge] and the Aristotelian [epagoge] induc-
produced the gene of being; see eidos, diaphora, katholau.
74 I GNOSIS HEDONE I 75
tion), whether in a historical sense as the investigation of the opinions was much more likely to have been mathematical rather than physical.
of others (see aporia, endoxon), or as the extraction of the dimly and 2. Another line of the harmonia theory leads to the extensiou of
discnrsively apprehended intelligihle from the immediately perceived the ratio concept to either the sound or the distances of the planets and
sensible. the development of tlle doctrine of the "harmony of the spheres"
incorporated by Plato into his "Myth of Er" (Rep. 617b), and de-
gn6sis: 1) knowledge; 2) Gnosticism . scribed by Aristotle, De coelo II, 290b-291a and Cicero, Somn. Scip. 5.
1) The common Greek general term for knowledge. Typical of The ethical implications may be seen in the notions of katharsis and
this ordinary usage is Aristotle, Anal. post. II, 99b-100b, where gnosis sophrosyne (qq.v.), in Plato's description of the "mixed life" in Phil.
and its equivalents embrace sense perception (aisthesis), memory, 64a-66a (see agathon), in Aristotle's doctrine of the "mean" (see
experience, and scientific knowledge (episteme). For the special prob- meson), and in ancient theories on the nature of physical pleasnre (see
lems involved in the knowledge of God, see agnostos; 2) at some time hedone): for Heraclitus' theory of "harmony," see logos. Pythagorean
before the Christian era the term began to take on another meaning: "harmonics" is a feature of the education of the philosopher in Plato,
perhaps transitional in this process is the use of "true gnosis" as a Rep. VII, 530C-531C, where it is transitional to the stndy of dialektike
synonym for Christian doctrine, Irenaeus, Ad"V. haer. IV, 33, 8. Its final (compare Timaeus 47C-d and see psyche tau pantos).
technical meaning is a superior, secret knowledge that guarantees For the Stoic ethical formula "harmoniously with nature," see
salvation to the "spirituals" (pneumatikoi), Irenaeus, Ad"V. haer. I, 6, nomos.
2.
hedone: pleasure
1. The first discussions on the possihility of pleasure being the
end of man probably took place in the heightened ethical-and subjec-

h tivist-climate of the generation of Socrates and tbe Sophists. But the

direct evidence is faulty and one must generally resort to reconstruc-
tions out of the Platonic dialogues. For example, in the Gorgias
(491e-492c) Socrates debates the question with an otherwise obscure
Sophist named Callicles who upholds the hedonistic position. He does it
in terms of a psychophysiological theory of sense pleasure that was
haphe: contact, touch, sense of touch apparently in vogue in the fifth century and beyond, that of depletion
See genesis, arche, dynamis, aisthesis. (kenosis) and refilling (anaplerosis). According to a medical theory
put forth by Alcmaeon of Crotona health consisted in a state of balance
harmonia: blending of opposites, harmony (isonomia) of the elements in the body (see Aetius v, 30, 1). This
1. The discovery, generally credited to Pythagoras, of the reduc- theory had wide philosophical implications (see harmonia, agathon,
tion of musical intervals to mathematical ratios had an extraordinary meson), and particularly in its adaptation, perhaps by Empedocles
effect on the development of Greek philosophy: first it suggested that (see Diels 31A95), to explain ilie origin and nature of pleasure.
number was the constituative principle of all things (see arithmos): it According to this view a depletion (kenosis) of one of the vital ele-
was used to explain mixtures (see halon): it likewise spawned the ments of the body leads to an imbalance, and the resultant painful
theory of the psyche as a harmony of opposites, described by Plato, sense of want (endeia) creates desire (epithymia, orexis, qq.v.), or the
Phaedo 85a-86d (refuted by Socrates, 91c-95e), and Aristotle, De an. thrnst toward a complementary "filling up" (anaplerosis). It is this
I, 407b-408a (see psyche). But the language of both the Platonic and latter redressing of the natural isonomia of the body that is responsible
Aristotelian accounts suggests that harmonia is not so much a mathe- for pleasnre.
matical-musical concept, but owes more to medical theory (Alcmaeon? 2. Socrates uses this theory in the Gorgias to refute ilie radical
see Aetius v, 30, 1). Any attempt to found a theory of the soul on the bedonist Callicles, by pointing ant that on these gronnds the hedonist
harmony of physical opposites is, of course, going to lead to a denial of will be ever nnsatiated. The same theory appears again in Tim.
the soul's immortality: it is certain that Pythagoras held the immortal- 64e-65b (on the Atomist antecedents of this passage, see pathos), Rep.
ity of the soul (see psyche, palingenesia) , and so his theory of harmony . s8sa, and Phil. 31b-3Zb, but in these two latter passages at least it is
76 I REDONE REDONE I 77
overlaid with a growing awareness of the psychic as opposed to the not an entirely sufficient end to man (Phil. 27b) may be a concession to
purely somatic nature of pleasure, and the identification of the body as the force of Eudoxus' point, the line against hedonism is firmly held
an instrument of pleasure (see Rep. 584C, Phil. 41C), a distinction that . 6. Eudoxus is chosen by Aristotle as the exemplar of the hed;nis-
allowed Aristotle eventually to deny the applicability of the kenosis- nc school, probably because of the latter's long association with the
anaplerosis theory (Eth. Nich. 1173b). What led to this was undoubt- Academy. But an even more prominent proponent of the position, one
edly the recognition of the obvious existence of a pleasure attendant of Plat?'s own contemporaries, was Aristippus, the founder of the
upon intellectual activities (Rep. 585b-c, Phil. 51e-52a; in both these Cyrenalc group, whose hedonism was at least as thoroughgoing, if
passages Plato makes some attempt at adapting the kenosis theory to better ~nown to us, ~s Eudoxus'. Pleasure is the end of all activity and
this new type of pleasure, but without a great deal of success), as well the object of all chOice, as proven by our instinctive, untutored choice
as the more subtle psychological analysis of the role of memory in the of pleasure. Thus all pleasure is good, and physical pleasures better
pleasure of anticipation (Phil. 32b-36c; this analysis leads, 38a--40e, to ~han those of the soul (D.L. II,. 87-;-88): And. further, since happiness,
a further discussion of the possibility of false pleasures due to our I.e., pleasur~ calculated over a hf~nme, IS a kind of delusion since only
habits of "painted fantasies" [phantasmata ezographemenal). the present IS real, each moment s pleasure is to be sought for itself
3. Having expanded the horizons of pleasure (true/false, mixed/ (Aelian, Var. hist. XIV, 6).
unmixed, psychic/somatic) Plato attempts to integrate it into tbe 7· Aristotle, true to his historical method (see endoxon) reviews
good life in the Philebus. The purely hedonistic position is rejected, as both the hedonist (Eth. Nich. X, 1172a-1174a) and antihedonist (ibid.
it was in the Gorgias, as well as a kind of radical antihedonism (Phil. VII, 1152b-1154b) positions. He is satisfied with neither nor indeed
44a) that denied the existence of pleasure. Plato's own view is a Wit. hPIato's retorts to them. He denies that pleasure is a process
" (ibid.,
moderate one, that the good life is the "mixed life," i.e., a life contain- X, 1173~-:b), but would pr~fer to c.all it an activity (energeia) or, more
ing both the pleasurable and the intellectual (phronesis, q.v.; Phil. fully (,b,d. VII, 1153a), the ummpeded activity of a characteristic
20a-b, 59C-61C). state rhexis1 in accordance with nature." In accordance with thi
4. This position that attempts to reconcile the conflicting claims definition the entire moral status of the hedonai are worked out i:
of hedonism and Socratic intellectualism may look to disagreements terms of .the energeiai with which each is properly associated. First,
within the Academy itself. We are aware, from Aristotle, that Speusip- pleasure IS a whole, complete in each moment of time much like the act
pus had denied that pleasure was in any sense a good (see Eth. Nich. of seeing (ibid. x, 1174b) .. ~Ieasure is something th~t is superimposed
VII, 1152b, 1153b), a stand apparently referred to in Phil. 53c-55d. upon and.completes an activity when the latter is unobstructed, e.g. by
Speusippus reasoned that a) pleasure is a process (genesis) and proc- a defect m the subject or object of that activity (ibid. x, 1174b ).
ess is a means and not an end, and b) on the theory of the mean !'udoxus Was almost correct: all men do seem to desire pleasure but it
(meson, q.v.) both pleasure and pain are extremes and hence cannot be IS ?e.cause ~I! me~ .de~ire to I~ve and pleasure completes th~ basic
a good. In the Philebus passage Plato concurs in the first argument, at acnvlty of hvmg;.lt.ls h~e .t?at IS desirable, not the pleasure (ibid. x,
least insofar as it pertains to physical pleasure, but would not admit 1175a ). In short, It IS activIties that are good or evil, not their superim-
that it speaks to the higher, unmixed pleasures described in Phil. posed pleasures (ibid. x, 1175b).
51a-52b. As for Speusippus' second argument, that the good resides in 8. From these varying points of view evolves the hedonism of
the mean or neutral state between pleasure and pain, Plato is aware of Epi~urus. Like Eudoxus he is a hedonist on empirical grounds: pleas-
the state (Phil. 42c-44a) but does not see it as a good; he is unwilling ure '~ t~e good sought b~ ~en (D.L. x, 128). But the proof is the more
to banish pleasure from the good life. sophis.tlcated one of Anstlppus that points to instinctive, unlearned
5. Nor will he accept the empirical hedonism of another contem- behaVIOr (D.L. x, 137; see Sextus Empiricus, Adv. Math. XI, 96 ). Here
porary Academician, Eudoxus, who held that pleasure was the only th~re is . a correla~on with his atomically based theory of sensation
good for man since all creatures pursue it (Eth. Nich. x, 1172b). This (azsthesls, q.v.): Just as sensation is the criterion of truth so the
is not exactly the hedonistic view put forth by Philebus who had move:nents or experiences (pathe) of pleasure and pain, which are
suggested (Phil. 60a-b) that all men ought to pursue pleasure since it conceIVed ?f a~ types of atomic ~is~ocation (see Lucretius II, 963--9 66),
is the highest good, and though the presence of pleasure in the Platonic serve as cnterIa of good and evil smce pleasure is what is natural and
good life in the Philebus and the associated admission that phfonesis is so good, while pain is alien to nature, and so evil (D.L. x, 34). '
78 I HEGEMONIKON HEN I 79
9. Epicurus accepts the kenosis-endeia-epithymia-anaplerosis back to a single stuff, with no emphasis, however, on the uniqueness of
analysis of pleasure and pain (D.L. x, 144; compare Lucretius IV, the principle. The first dualists were apparently the Pythagoreans,
85 8- 876 ) and insists on the primacy of physical pleasures, particularly "apparently" because the judgment rests on the exegesis of a difficult
those of the stomach (Athenaeus XII, 546). He also accepts the corol- text in Aristotle, in addition to the fact that at some later date the
lary that pleasure, being physical, must be measured by quantity pythagoreans became monists and, as is usually the case with Pythago-
(poson) not quality (poion; cf. Eusebius, Praep. Evang. XIV, 22, 3)· resn sources, tire discrimination between early and late is not a simple
But by subjecting the process to an even closer analysis Epicurus matter.
detects another, purer type of pleasure than the corrective "filling up" 2.. In Meta. 986a Aristotle says tlrat the Pythagoreans made the
of a bodily wsnt that is, after all, subtly mixed with pain (see Socrates' ultimate stoicheia limit (peras) and the unlimited (apeiron); they are
perceptive remark in Phaedo 60b). This purer pleasure is not, then, tire the elements of odd and even, and these latter produce the one (hen),
kinetic pleasure of anaplerosis, but the static (katastematike) pleasure whence pl'oceeds the whole series of arithmoi. This would seem to
of equilibrium, the absence of pain (algos) from the body (aponia) draw tire distinction between pairs of opposed stoicheia (limit-
and the absence of disturbance from the soul (ataraxia) (D.L. x, 131 ). unlimited, odd-even) and their product, hen, which is tire arche or
This position may owe more than a little to Speusippus' neutral state starting point of number. But a few lines later in the same passage
(see Clement Alex., Strom. II, 22, 133), but what is clear is that Aristotle goes on to say that some Pythagoreans line up their stoicheia
Epicurus was moving away from the more mechanical explanation of in two parallel columns, the left containing limit, odd, one, etc., and in
Aristippus who held only kinetic pleasure (D.L. x, 136) and do."'n- the right, the unlimited, even, plurality. If we take into account what
graded the psychic side of pleasure. Epicurus, on the other hsnd, smce seems to be a later development in the school (see 10 infra), we tlrus
he strongly maintained the experiential reality of past and future, a have three very different points of view on the one: the one as posterior
position that magnifies mental pleasures (and pains), shifts tire focus to the staicheia, the one as a stoicheion, and the one prior to all else.
of emphasis from "tire pleasant moment" to "the happy life" (D.L.. x, 3. These speculations are based on physical and mathematical
137, 133)' Thus it is the activity of the mind tlrat holds the keys, v~z., considerations (moral implications are not, of course, absent in these
memory and imagination, to pleasure over the long run, tire happy hfe, Pythagorean views; also in tire left column in Meta. 986a is "the good";
and tlrat controls and tempers Epicurean hedonism. see Eth. Nich. 1096b), but the next appearance of the one is in a
context dominated by logic (compare Aristotle's remark in De gen. et
hegemonik6n: directive faculty of the soul . . carr. I, 325a). This is the "Way of Truth" of Parmenides where he
In Stoicism tire hegemonikon governs the other psychic facultIes seeks to illustrate that if being (on) is, then it is one in the sense of
and is seated in the heart (SVF I, 143; II, 836; II, 879)· According to being both unique (monogenes; fro 8, lines 11-13) and indivisible
Chrysippus, all psychic states (including virtues, vices, and pathe) are (adiaireton; ibid. lines 22-25) .
changes in the rational faculty (hegemonikon; SVF III, 459; Sextus 4. To support the contentions of Parmenides, Zeno had con-
Empiricus, Adv. Math. VII, 233)' It is a tabula rasa at birth (SVF II, structed a number of dialectical antinomies. These take the form of
83), an internal, independent principle (Marcus Aurelius, VII, 16; VI, positing ~ hypothesis, in this case that there are a plurality of beings,
8); see nous, psyche, aisthesis, kardia. and showmg that the conclusions that flow from it are just as absurd as
the ones raised against Parmenides' One Being (Parm. 128a-e). Plato
heimarmene: an allotted (portion), tate constructs just such a set of hypotheses and places them in the mouth
The Stoics identified fate witlr logos and pronoia and Zeus (SVF of Parmenides himself in the dialogue of the same name. The subject is
II,913, 937). The growing transcendence of God in later Greek philos- the one (to hen). The passages that follow (Parm. 137C ff.) involve a
ophy (see hyperousia) leads to the reseparation of theos and heimar- number of obscurities, not the least of which is whether the one under
mene, Philo, De migr. Abr. 179-181; ps-Plutarch, De fato 572f-573b ; discussion is the One Being of Parmenides or Plato's transcendent
see pronoia. Oneness itself (the Greek expression is ambiguous and in 135e Parmen-
ides suggests that he would like to extend the dialectic of Zeno to the
hen: one, the One eide; but compare 137b). Again, is this Zenonian eristic or Platonic
1. The pre-Socratic search for an arche for all tlrings normally dialektike (it is called gymnasia at 135c-e)?
ended in a single principle, the reduction of tire variety of existents· 5. Whatever modern scholarship says on the subject, and it
 80 I HEN HEN I 81
tends to see the latter half of the dialogue as logical considerations But.'as for :mit-o.n~, this can be nothing else but the arche of a mathe-
about One Being, the judgment of the latter Platonic tradition is clear. matical senes (,b,d. 1016b), and so he is convinced that Plato must
The hypotheses of the Parmenides became for it a sacred text on the have held that One was a separate substauce (ibid. gg6a; refuted,
One as a transcendent hypostasis. It is cited more often than any other 1001a - b) and the a!che of all the eide since One and Being are the
work except the Timaeus in the Enneads, and Produs wrote a fu1l- su;n~'ta gene;a of ;'I'hlch all the eide are species (ibid. gg6a, gg8b). The
scale commentary on it. OtiglUS of thiS belief are somewhat difficult to understand but th
· 1 d" , eyare
6. Did Plato have a special doctrine of the One? As far as the obVlOUS y'dconnecte
. h with hiS oft-repeated allegation that PIat 0 I'd ent'I-
unity of the individual eide is concerned, Plato maintains throughout fi ed. t I1e el e Wit . nun:bers (see arithmos 3). A fnrther remark carries
that they are indivisible (Phaedo 78d, Rep. 476a), and he goes so far as us IU the same drrechon. Aristotle also states that Plato identifi d th
to ca1l them henads or monads (Phil. ,sa-b, 16d-e). But we are One with the Go?d (ibid. lOg1a-b), and we know that this is ba:ed o~
considerably less informed on the eidos of one or Oneness itself. Plato more than a .reading of th~ famous passag'e on the transcendent Good in
does address himself to the one (hen) and the many (plethos) as a Rep. 50gb SlUce we are IUformed from another source (Aristoxenus
dialectical problem in Phil. 13&-18d. He mentions as already solved the Elem. harm. II, p. 30) that Plato made this identification in his lechlr~
question on many-in-one on the level of organic unities like man "On the ?ood" (see agrapha dogmata) that also had to do with
(14d-e; see halon), but there remains the perplexing question of the mathematics.
monadic eidos and its distribution through the plurality of material . g. Aris~otle goes on to say that Speusippus, Plato's successor,
things (lSb-c; the question is posed as if it is going to be solved, but it aVOl~ed th~ dlffi.cul:y b~cause, even though he made the One an arche,
is not; see methexis, mimesis) and the related problem of the interrela- he dId not Identify It ';Ith the Good (ibid. lOglb) but made this latter
tionship (koinonia) of the eide. To solve this he resorts to the Pythago- t~e result of an evol.utlOnary process (ibid. 1072b-1073a). Speusippus'
rean (or, as he ca1ls it, Promethean; 16c) solution of converting hen Vlews on the ~rchaz themselves are likewise reported. He substituted
and plethos with peras and apeiron, which are, in turn, integrated into for the Platomc 'eide.the mathematika (q .v .,. Meta . 1028b) , derlvlng. .
his own procedures of c01lection (synagoge) and division (diairesis, the numbers, IU presctlbed Pythagorean fashion from One and PI I
. ('b'd b ' ura-
q.v.). These latter are, in effect, a dialectical movement from many to Ity. ' 1 • :08:'5 ' ~087b). The One of Speusippus is not, then, an
one, and vice versa, but the one to which synagoge attains is in no wise ultImate prlUCIple m a momst system, but one of two co-principles of
a transcendent One but rather a generic eidos of the type described in number. Xenocrates belongs to the same tradition; he made the eide
Soph. 253d-e as "one eidos extending through many eide that lie numbers (1028b, 106ga, etc.) and derived them from the Monad and
apart." the Dyad, based on an e~ege~is of Timaeus 35a (Plutarch, De procr. an.
7. The Sophist also raises the question of the One itself, i.e., the 1?'2d). He goes on. to IdentIfy the One with the Father and Zeus, the
eidos of hen, against Parmenides (245a-b), not now of the Platonic FIrst God, nous, while the Dyad may be called Mother of the God d
dialogue, but the philosopher of the "Way of Truth." If the spherical the World Soul (Aetius I, 7, 30 ). san
One Being is such as Parmenides describes it in fro 8, lines 42 ff., then it .'0. In all these theo:ies of archai it is notable that the one
is a whole made up of parts and so must differ from the One itself, re~alUs as a stable factor; It is its correlative that shifts nuances: the
which is perfectly simple. But the text has no sequel short of informing apez~on of the Pythagoreans, the polarized Infinite Dyad of Plato
us that there is an eidos of one. When, later in the same dialogue (aorzstos.dyas; Meta. g87b; see Phys. 206b; the dyas does not appear in
(254d ff.), Plato comes to discuss the "greatest kinds" of eide, the One the termmology of Phil. 24a-25b but what is described is dual in
is nowhere in evidence and Plotinus must devote a somewhat longish nature) and Xenocrates, ~nd the pluralistic plethos of Speusippus and
explanation of why its omission is appropriate (Enn. VI, 2, 9-12). the Pythal?oreans. A conSiderably different view appears in the Pythag-
8. The importance of one in Plato is, then, except for thecu- orean reVIVal of the first century where writers like Eudor (.
S' pI" Ph ns m
rious business of the Parmenides, of no more special importance than In: ICIUS, ys. ,8,) and Alexander Polyhistor (D.L. VIII, 25) de-
the other eide and perhaps less than the megista gene of the Sophist. smbe a Pythagoreanism that held that the Infinite Dyad itself derived
What is more striking, however, is the position it seems to assume in from the monas.
the nearly contemporary Academy. Aristotle's own treatment of one is 11. ~he affinities ?etween Pythagoras and the Academy were
to class it among the "transcendentals": oneness, like being/is predi- soon explOlt~d by both Sides. Aristotle himself had already linked the
cated analogously through a1l the kategoriai (Meta. 1003a-b, 1053b). two (see mZmes,s and compare the frequent juxtaposition of Speusip-

i i
82 I HEN
HEXIS I 83
pUS and Pythagoras in the Metaphysics). The derivation of the tran- onrselves. The One is known not by reasoning, which is necessarily an
scendent Platonic principles of the later dialogues in terms of Pythago- exercise in plurality, but by the presence (parausia) in us of unity (VI,
rean number tbeory is particularly marked, and one such account by a 9, 4)· The grasp of the One is accomplished by interior reflection, the
later Pythagorean, Moderatus of Gades, has been preserved by Simpli- "flight of the alone to the Alone" (VI, 9, 11), which seeks to render the
cius (Phys. 230-231). Present in it are all the later Neoplatonic hypos- . soul completely simple (VI, 9, 7) . In the intelligible world this mystical
tases: the first One, beyond Being; the second One, which is really real, nnion with the One is a permanent experience, the true heavenly
intelligible, the eide; and the third One, which participates (methexis) Aphrodite; but here it is only occasional, and we experience rather the
in the first One and the eide. The stress on the One in Moderatus' tract vulgar courtesan Aphrodite (VI, 9, 9; on Plotinus' own occasional
is revelatory of its Pythagorean point of view. A similar account of the mystical unification with the One, see Porphyry, Vita Plot. XXIII) •
three hypostases by the Academic Albinus shows its orientation toward '4. Just as Plotinus proceeds, in Enn. VI, 9, 1-2, from relative
the Philebus and Timaeus by describing all three of the hypostases as unity to absolute oneness, so Proclus derives the absolute One from the
nous (Epit. x, 1-2). But there is something of Aristotle here as well: presence of ones that participate (methexis) in Oneness (Elem. theal.,
the first MUS, besides being the demiaurgas (ibid. XII, 1) and the props. 1-6; for the method, cf. trias). There is, as in Aristotle, a
Father and cause of all goodness and truth, thinks itself (ibid. x, 3)· transcendent final cause (prop. 8), as well as a transcendent efficient
But it was the One that eventually triumphed over naus. The second- cause (prop. 11); these are identical with each other and are the One
century Pythagorean Numenius, whom Plotinus studied, had already (props. 12-13).
reduced naus and the demiurgic function to the second place (see naus For the other Neoplatonic hypostases, see naus, psyche tau pan-
18) and his "First God" is absolutely one and indivisible (Ensebins, tas, psyche; for the manner of progression, pra8dos, trias.
Praep. Evang. XI, p. 537)·
12. This is, in essence, the One, the first hypostasis of Plotinus, hemis: Henad
that is beyond Being and completely without qualification (Enn. VI, 9, Although the term is used in Plato, Phil. 15a and by Neopythago-
3). Oneness is not predicated of it (VI, 9, 5) ; indeed, nothing is in it: it reans to descrihe the eide (so Plotinus, Enn. VI, 6, 9), it is best known
is what it is, i.e., it is its own activity and essence (VI, 8,12--13)' Two as a feature of Proclus' Neoplatonism where the Henads are plural
corrections ate in order, however. It is not a numerical unit (m'onas; VI, nnfoldings of the unity of the One, transcendent sources of individual-
9,5), nor is it the Aristotelian thought about thought (VI, 7, 37; see ity; see Proclus, Elem. theal., props. 113-165. They are identified with
noesis 18). the traditional gods.
'3. The transcendence of the One, affirmed with increasing em-
phasis in the later philosophical tradition, leads to a crisis in cognition heteron: the other, otherness
(see agnastas). Plotinus confronts the problem of this transcendent In Plato the Other is one of the major forms that pervades all the
first principle that is beyond Being, apprehension, and description by other forms, Saph. 255c-e. Some apparent nonbeing is merely the
an application of the theory of mimesis and a remarkable resort to "other," ibid. 259a (see on). Heteran is a principle in the construction
introspection. The question of mimesis may be approached from two of World Soul, Tim., 35a. In Plotinus it is the principle, inherent in
directions. One, properly Aristotelian, is that of the unity of the person naus, of the plurality of the eide (Enn. VI, 2, 22; IV, 3, 5); it produces
(see Meta. 1003b). From it one progresses, through ever higher matter, (ibid. II, 4, 5) ; see pros ti, noesis.
grades of unity, to the absolute simplicity that is the One (VI, 9, 1-2).
From a more Platonic point of view, intellection is a kind of movement, h6xis: state, characteristic, habit
rotary in the heavens but deranged in us because of the contradictory For Aristotle there are three states in the soul: emotions (pathe) ,
motions coming from the body (Tim. 37a-b; Laws x, 897d; see noesis capacities (dynameis), characteristics (hexeis) (Eth. Nich. l105b).
11). For Plotinus the One is the immobile center of all these motions, Hexis is defined (ibid.) as our condition vis-a-vis the pathe. Arete is a
and in a metaphor of dancers around a choirmaster he explains our hexis (ibid. 1106a); only the beginnings of our habits are under volun-
irregular motions (e.g. sensation, discursive reasoning) by our turning tary control (ibid. 1114b). The Stoics disagreed with Aristotle and
away from the director toward the spectators (VI, 9, 8; on the "atten- considered arete a diathesis rather than a hexis (SVF I, 202; II, 393) . A
tion" principle see noesis 21, nous 18, and the extraordinary remarks in peculiarly Stoic development of the term is the grouping of hexis with
I, 4, 10). In both cases, then, the trne unity is to be songht within the four binding powers of things: hexis, physis, psyche, naus, and is
84 I HOLON HOLON I 85
translated when used in this sense by Seneca (Nat. Quaes. II, 2) as predominance of one or other of the types of seed within them (frs. 6,
unitas (s~e the peculiarly similar use of hexis in Plato cited under 12' see Aristotle, Phys. I, 187a).
phthora). Among these hexis is the unitas of inorganic matter (see , 5. Neither Plato nor Aristotle was much taken by this method,
Sextus Empiricus, Adv. Math. IX, 81-85; Philo, Leg. all. II, 22, Quod thongh it apparently conld be applied to colors (see Tim. 68b, with a
Deus 35; SVF II, 457-460, 714-716). Hexis is defined, in the category slight sceptical note; De sensu 44ob). Plato preferred the more geo-
of quality (poion), and distinguished from the more transient state, metrical approach of composing componnd bodies out of differently
disposition (diathesis), Cat. 8b-ga. shaped particles (see genesis, stoicheion; he does, however, resort to
numeric.al proportion for the composition of the marrow in Tim. 73C),
h61on: whole, organism, universe while Aristotle felt that none of these pre-Socratic mixture techniques
1. A critical moment in discussions of change occurs when really explained the presence of a new "whole" since the original
Aristotle rejects, at a single stroke, the earlier theories that absolute ingredients in no way lost their individual entities bnt merely became
genesis (q.v.) could take place by association (synkrisis) or disasso- imperceptible to sense; the true holon should be homogeneous (hom-
ciation (diakrisis) of particles and asserts that it comes about when oiomeres) throughout (De gen. et corr. I, 327b-328a; on the logos of
this whole (holon) changes into that (De gen. etcorr. I, 317a). the mixtnre, see Meta. 993a, De gen. animo I, 642a).
2. The question of wholeness had been raised previously. In the 6. The influence of the physikoi is much less in evidence in
Parmenides wholeness is denied of the One because it connotes the Plato's more philosophical approach to the qnestion in Theaet. 203e ff.
presence of parts and, consequently, that the One is in some sens: a where Socrates proposes, as an alternative in a dilemma, that the whole
plurality (137c-d); the unity (hen) of the One mnst be somethmg (holon) is something more than the total (pan) of its parts. The
quite distinct from "wholeness" (see Soph. 244d-245e) . suggestion is not, however, pnrsued here, nor in his acconnt of genesis.
3. The problem in Parmenides is a logical and conceptual one But in other places Plato is well aware that in a whole as opposed to a
having to do with the notion of divisibility; with Empedocles the sum a crucial factor is the positioning (thesis) of the parts and that in
physical issue arises. It is Em~edocles' d~sire to keep Parm~nid~s' the true holon the parts have a fixed spatial relationship to each other
unity and at the same time pOSit a plurahty of elements (sto!cheza, and to the whole. He applies this to the arrangement of parts in a
q.v.) that adds this new dimension. Genesis is cyclic for Empedocles: tragedy (Phaedrus 268d) and, in the Laws, to the parts of the kosmos.
the four "roots" are eternal but they are in a constant process of The latter is a particnlarly interesting example since it stresses the
transformation (fr. 17, lines 1-13), passing, in the process, in and out teleological fnnction of the parts with respect to the whole (x, g03c,
of a sphere in which they are perfectly blended (frs. 27, 28). It is this g04b). Position (thesis) had, of course, been important among the
sphere, obviously a compromised descendent of Parmenid~s' One pre-Socratics (see aisthesis, genesis), and it is not nnlikely that its
Being, that first snggests that the elements can be snbmerged m some occnrrence in Plato had Pythagorean origins (see Parm. 145a-c, Aris-
sort of a unified whole where their individual characteristics are lost, at totle, De coelo 268a, and compare Poet. 1450b).
least to sight. How this is accomplished he does not say, except to 7. Aristotle's approach to wholeness is twofold. A whole is, by
remark that the sphere is covered with a harmonia. The term (q.v.), a way of preliminary, something that has several parts (mere, moria;
mathematical one, had a great vogue in Pythagorean circles, and the Meta. 1023a) that are potentially (dynamei) present in the whole
snspicion of just such an influence on Empedocle~ is strenifthe.ned (Phys. VII, 25oa; De gen. et corr. II, 334b). The notion is not necessar-
when, later in the cosmic cycle, the four elements begm to combme mto ily linIited to physical bodies: Aristotle discusses the mere of tragedy
compound bodies (frs. g6, g8). Here we are told that flesh and blood (Poet. 1450a, 145gb), the mere of the sonl (De an. III, 442a-b; see
and bones are formed of fixed numerical proportions of the elements psyche), alid eidos as a part of the genos (Meta. 1023b). But if it is
that are all linked together by the "divine bonds of harmonia." true, as has been noted (De gen. et corr. I, 317a ) , that genesis is of a
4. This is the first attempt at explaining organic componnds in whole from a whole, what is it that differentiates this holon from
terms of the numerical proportion (logos) of their ingredients. The a mere aggregate of particles and makes it something over and above a
same mathematical approach is visible in Anaxagoras, who held that total (Meta. 1045a)? The total (pan) is something that has merely
bodies, even though they were composed of "seeds" that contain a a positioning of parts (ibid. 1024a); a whole has an internal cause
portion of everything in them, have their identity from the quantitative (aition) of unity that is its eidos or ousia (qq.v.; ibid. 1041b).
86 I HOLON HORME I 87
8. But the eidos is also the energeia (q.v.) and the entelecheia participated in by various wholes-with-parts (holotes ek meron) that
(q.v.) of a beiug, aud so by the juxtaposition of these notions the have wholeness as one of their pathe.
Aristotelian concept of halon broadens out to include both function On the question of the unity of the soul, see psyche.
(ergon, q.v.) and finality (telos, q.v.). The eidos of living beings and
the unitive cause of all their functions is the psyche. In this fashion h6moios: like, similar
parts (mere) are transformed, by the notion of function, into organs 1. One of the most common Greek theories of knowledge was
(organa). An organ is the part of a living creature that is directed based on the dictum "like is known by like." Two aspects can be
toward an end or purpose that is an activity (praxis; De part. animo detected: 1) the knower cannot know an object without some sort of
645b): nature (physis), the internal principle of growth in these identity of elements between them, and 2) in knowing something we
beings, has made the organs to perform certain functions (ibid. 6g4b), also, at the same time, become more like it. The first aspect is seen at
and a body so constituted is an organism (see ibid. 642a, and compare its baldest in Empedocles' fro 109: "we see earth with earth, water with
the definition of soul in De an. II, 4'2a as the entelecheia of an organic water," explained (Diels 31A86) by the fact that things give off
body). The organon, then, is the physical part of a living being effluences and knowledge results when these fit into the corresponding
matched to each of the latter's potencies (dynameis) to enable them to passages in the sen.ses: ~ompare th.e similar the~ry. in Demo~rit~s
function (De gen. an. I, 716a: IV, 765b) . (Diels 68A135: see atsthes!s). There IS a more sophIstIcated verSIOn m
g. A somewhat similar idea appears in Epicurus' notion of the Plato's Tim. 45b-46a where vision is explained by the going out of a
systema. Democritus had reduced all the pathe of things to those beam of fiery light that coalesces, "like to like," with the similarly
directly associated with extended bodies qua extended, and relegated constituted rays of the sun: the intrusion of an object into this homoge-
all the rest (e.g. color, sound) to a subjective impression of the senses neous beam causes sensation. Aristotle, who criticizes both versions of
(fr. g: see aisthesis, pathos). But for his latter-day followers there were the theory (De an. I, 404b: De sensu, 437a--b), solves the problem by
certaiu pathe that, though not present in the individual atom on, were his theory of dynamis: the knower is the object potentially (ibid.
present in an aggregate of them. In this sense the whole (systema, 438b). The second aspect, the knower becomes the known, reflects the
athroisma, or, as Lucretius calls it, concilium) is more than the sum of fully developed Aristotelian doctrine of knowledge (see noesis), and,
its parts (see D.L. x, 6g). What is the difference here? First, there is in an ethical direction, those of homoiosis, katharsis, harmonia; see also
the question of the position (thesis) of the atoma relative to each other, ouran08.
thus forming a pattern that is the superadded factor that allows the 2. For the use of medical homoeopathism by the philosophers, see
atoma to be colorless but their aggregate to be colored (Lucretius II, katharsis; the perception theory is located in its larger context under
757-77': see Plutarch, Ad",. Col. 1110C). But in addition to this forma- aisthesis; for similarity in the procession-reversion diastole of Neopla-
tion of a spatial pattern in the aggregate, the atoms also have their own tonism, see proodos; for its role in the action and passion on a cosmic
individual movement, and it happens that when they are formed into scale, sympatheia.
concilia their movements harmonize and other aggregate pathe come
into existence (ibid. II, 109-Ill). In this way it is in the concilium of homolosis: assimilation (to God)
the soul-atoms, contained within the sheath of the body, that the motion Originally a Pythagorean idea (see Iamblichus, Vita Pyth. 137),
which is sensation occurs (D.L. x, 64: see aisthesis). For the various assimilation to God was later adopted by Socrates and Plato as descrip-
types of Epicurean concilia, see genesis. tive of the end of philosophy (Stobaeus, Eel. II, 7, p. 49 and Theaet.
10. The Stoic emphasis on the world as an entity under the 176a). The notion was also current among the Peripatetics; see Cicero,
unitive and providential direction of logos (q.v.) led to a fairly consist- De fin. v, 4, 11: Julian, Orat. VI, 185a: and the famous call to malm
ent use of ''universe'' (halon) as a synonym for kosmos and is particu- ourselves immortal in Eth. Nich. 1177b. It is central in Plotinus, Enn.
larly evident in Marcus Aurelius' description of men as the organs (as I, 6, 6. For its philosophical origins, see psyche, homoios, harmonia.
opposed to mere parts) of the universe (halon; Med. VII, 13). The
Neoplatonists reverted instead to the Parmenides and Theaetetus texts, horme: impulse, appetite
Proclus devoting props. 66-69 of the Elem. theol. to a consideration of Aristotle uses horme as a somewhat negligent synonym for orexis
wholeness, both as an unparticipated eidas (holates pro meran) and as (q.v.), but with the Stoics it becomes the standard technical term for
88 I HOROS HYLE I 89
appetite. It is defined (SVF II, 458) as "the first movement [kinesis] serve to constitute a being within a given genus or species; the individ-
of the soul" toward (or away) from something. The primary horme of uals within the infima species are numerically distinct by reason of
all animals is self-preservation (oikeiosis, q.v.). The hormai present no their matter (Meta. 1034a, 1035b; the individuation of pure forms, e.g.
problem on the animal level, but in dealing with man, whose character- God, intelligences, is not treated; see kinoun 12 and compare diaphora
istic note is rationality (hegemonikon, q.v.), the presence of hormai 4) •
that are contrary to reason creates a difficulty. The violent or "exces- 3. Hyle, then, is the primary substratum of change (hypo-
sive" impulses are the pathe (D.L. VII, no; for" the Platonic anteced- keimenon, q.v.; Phys. I, 192a ) , the "thing" that receives the new eidos
ents of this view, see pathos) and their exact nature vis-a-vis the (Meta. 1038b; for the Platonic antecedents, see genesis). But to call it
rational faculty was debated (see pathos, apatheia). But the later a "thing" is misleading. Hyle is like a substance (tode ti; see Phys. I,
doctrine of the school tended to allow for both the animal and rational 190b, 192a ) , but it is not such because it lacks the two chief character-
nature of man and thus classify the hormai under the irrational part istics of substance: it is neither a separate existent (choriston, q.v.) nor
(see Cicero, De off. I, z8, 101; I, 36, 132); see noesis 17. an individual (Meta. 1029a).
4. Just as there are various types of change (see metabole), so
h6ros or horisrn6s: boundary, definition too iliere must be various types of matter that serve as the substrata for
The Socratic contribution to philosophy was induction (epagoge, these changes (see Meta. l042b). Most notable of these is the matter
q.v.) and definition, and these in the context of ethics (Aristotle, Meta. associated with a change of place (hyle topike; see phora) that implies
1078b). True definition was impossible according to the Cynics (Aris- none of the others, or, to put it in another way, is not necessarily
totle, Meta. 1043b; Plato, Theaet. ZOIC). Definitions are the starting accompanied with "genetic and destructible matter" (hyle gennete kai
point of demonstration (Aristotle, Anal. post. II, 90b). There is a phtharte), and so is not subject to genesis and phthora (q.v.; Meta.
distinction between nominal and causal definitions (ibid. 93b-94a). 1042b, 1044b, l050b, 1069b). Thus is established the possibility of the
The parts of the definition are enumerated in Top. I, 103b. There is no indestructibility of the heavenly bodies whose only change is that of
definition of matter, only of eidos (Aristotle, Meta. 1035b-1036a), nor local motion (see aither, ouranioi). For the distinction of the matters
of individual sensible substances (Meta. lo39b). Properly, definitions involved in substantial (genesis) and qualitative (alloiosis) change,
are only of species, and of everything else in a secondary sense (ibid. see stoicheion.
1030a). The Sceptics refused to define anything (D.L. IX, 106); see 5. For Aristotle the composition of an individual, a Socrates or a
diaphora, idion, ousia. Callias, is an extremely complex procedure that may be conceived as
ilie imposition of a succession of increasingly specific eide. Each of
hyle: material, matter iliese forms is imposed on a progressively more informed matter, and
1. Hyle, a purely Aristotelian term, does not have its origins in so there are distinctions in hyle ranging from a first matter (prote hyle,
a directly perceived reality-as is true in the case of extension or materia prima), the substratum of the form of the primary bodies or
magnitude (megethos, q.v.) -but emerges from an analysis of stoicheia (q.v.), earth, air, fire, and water, through a series of more
change (Phys. I, 190b-19la); it is not known directly but by analogy highly informed matters down to ''ultimate matter" (esc hate or teleut-
(analogia, ibid. 191a8). The difficulty in grasping the nature of matter aia hyle) , the matter of this individnal existent (De part. animo II,
is that it seems to be outside the range of knowledge (Meta. 1036a): 646a; see Meta. 1049a).
when one has stripped away (aphairesis, q.v.) all the qualities of an 6. Aristotle was not unaware that Platonism (and its more re-
existent, there seems to be nothing left. Nor does matter fit into any of mote ancestor Pythagoreanism) had been moving in a similar direc-
the kategoriai (q.v.), since they are predicated of it, while it is predi- tion (Phys. I, 192a). But they either followed Parmenides and labeled
cated of nothing; it is not even a negation (Meta. 1029a). It is, in short, the material concept as pure nonbeing (me on; see on) , which it clearly
potency (dynamis) , just as form is act (De an. II, 412a). was not since it both preceded and survived genesis (indeed, matter is
2. Once the peculiar nature of hyle has been delimited it can eternal), or else they identified it wiili "the great and the small"
take its place among the four causes of things (Phys. II, 194b; see (Meta. 987b; see dyas) , which is, in Aristotle's mind, a rank confusion
aition) , where, like ilie eidos, it is an immanent (enhyparchon) cause between a genuinely nondetermined principle and a privation. It was
(Meta. 1070b). It serves another function as well: it is the prihciple of this inability to distinguish between hyle and steresis that prevented
individuation. Since the eidos is indivisible (atomon) it can merely ilie Platonists from arriving at a valid concept of matter. Closer to
go [ HYLE HYPODOCHE [91

Aristotle's own thinking was the Platonic Receptacle (hypodoche) of Plotinian matter is derived from tlIe One (II, 4, 5, V, 1, 5, see Proclus,
Timaeus 49a that is (ibid. 51a) invisible and characterless, and that, Elem. theol., props. 57-59).
like tlIe Aristotelian hyle, is indestructible and known only indirectly 10. Finally, Plotinus confronts Aristotle on the question of indi-
by a kind of "bastard reasoning" (ibid. 5za-b). There are, of course, viduation. In Meta. 990b Aristotle had maintained that the logic of the
differences. What begins as a "receptacle" or "matrix" (see Phys. I, Platonists' arguments would require them to posit an eidos of every
192a) is surely different from substratum, but even further removed individual thing. Aristotle escapes this necessity, as we have seen, by
from the Aristotelian hyle is its final description as "area" or "space" making' hyle the cause of individual differences. But Plotinus (Enn. v,
(chora; Tim. 52a ) , a figure that, on the testimony of Plotinus (Enn. II, 7) admits the existence of eide of individuals to this same end.
4, 11), prompted some later commentators to suggest that it involved For the equation of matter and evil, see kakon; for the pre-
the notion of volume. Socratic "materialists," eidos.
7. In Stoicism, where all is material, the Aristotelian distinction
between matter and form is nonetlIeless preserved in the distinction hyperousfa: beyond being, transcendence (divine): on
between an active (poiein) and passive (paschein) principle (D.L. VII, the question of the transcendence of the
134). Both are material but tlIe first is eternal, "first matter," which is Forms, see eidos
identified with logos (SVF I, 87). The basic difference between Aris- L The notion of transcendence begins properly witl1 Parmenides'
totle and the Stoics is, however, in the realm of magnitnde. The positing of an existent, and then proceeding to deprive it of all charac-
Aristotelian analysis of change had led to tlIe concept of matter as a teristics save oneness (fr. 8, lines 1-50). Plato explores the dialectical
substratum, as pure potentiality (dynamis; see Meta. I039b, De an. possibilities of this in the Parmenides, and especially in the first "hy-
412a, 414a ) , akin to substance, while magnitude (megethos, q.v.) is an pothesis" (see 141d-142a) where he demonstrates that this One cannot
accident, i.e., a form, in the category of quantity (poson). Hence even be said to "be." This may he dialectic, but on other grounds Plato
Aristotle, and Plotinus after him (see Enn. II, 4, 8-12), affirm the is convinced of the transcendence of his snpreme principle: in Rep.
incorporeality of magnitude, while tlIe Stoic analysis, based on action 50gb the Good is beyond heing, and compare the various texts cited
and passion, leads to the opposite conclusion (D.L. VII, 56, Cicero, under agnostos.
Acad. post. I, 11, 39). 2. Stoic materialism had radically reduced divine transcendence
8. Plotinus' views on matter, found primarily in Enn. II, 4, are a (SVF I, 87 and see pyr), hut in the first century of the Christian era
reaction to botlI Aristotle and tlIe Stoics and are based upon his reading divine transcendence once again comes to the foreground due to a
of the Platonic proof-texts on apeiron in the Phi/ebus (15d-17a, revival of Pythagoreanism and Platonism (see eidos) , coupled with the
23C-25b). Like Aristotle, Plotinus admits the existence of an intelligi- introduction of the Semitic tradition of transcendence, visihle in Philo,
ble matter (hyle noete). But whereas the intelligible matter of Aris- De oPi!. 2, 7-9 and in Leg. all. III, 61, where the Logos is transcendent
totle was a purely conceptual entity involved in the process of abstrac- as well. The doctrine hecomes a staple in Middle Platonism (see
tion (aphairesis, q.v.), the Plotinian version has a definite ontological Albinus, Epit. x, 1-4), where it is closely connected with attempts to
status: it is tlIe intelligible counterpart (the argument presumes the devise an epistemological approach to God (see agnostos). Divine
existence of a kosmos noetos [q.v.l in parallel with our kosmos aisthe- transcendence finds its most famous exponent in Plotinusand his
tos) of sensible matter, and its existence is proved by the divisibility of doctrine of the One (hen), Enn. VI, 9, 3, and 5, followed by Proclus,
the genera of tlIe eide, as is indicated in the Philebus (Enn. II, 4, 4)· Elem. theol., prop. 20, see also hypostasis, theos.
Corporeal matter, then, is an image (eidolon) of intelligible matter.
9. Plotinus also opposes Aristotle on the relationship between hypodoche or hypodechomene: receptacle
matter and privation (steresis). Aristotle had chided the Platonists on According to Plato it is in this receptacle that genesis takes place,
not distinguishing between them (Phys. I, 192a), but Plotinus reaf- although the receptacle itself is always the same, Tim. 50b-51b. It is
firms (II, 4, 14-15) the identification: matter is privation, it is, more- also called chora (area), ibid. 52a, and granted a quasi-existence (pos
over, the Platonic indefinite or unlimited (apeiron, q.v., see also dyas, on), ibid. 52c (for the ontological aspects of this, see on and genesis).
which is described as indefinite, aoristos). But unlike the Platonic Aristotle identifies Plato's "receptacle" with matter (hyle), Phys. IV,
chora (extended corrections of the chora image in III, 6, 12-19); 209b. For Plotinus the "receptacle" is "second" or sensible matter,
92 I HYPOKEIMENON ISONOMIA I 93
Enn. II, 4, 6: II, 4, 11: see topos and compare hypokeimenon, hyle, physis) , see the summary passages in Enn. II, g, 1; v, 2,1; VI, 7, 42 and
genesis. Proclus' dialectic derivation in Elem. theol., prop. 20.
For the individual hypostases, see hen, nous, psyche tou pantos;
hypokeimenon: substratum for their progression, proodos, trias.
Aristotle's analysis of genesis in the Physics, based, apparently,
on a Platonic prototype (see genesis), leads him to the isolation of hyp6thesis: suggestive, posited starting point, hypothesis
three principles (archai) involved in all changeS' from one thing into The tentative definition suggested by Socrates' interlocutors,
another: the immanent form (eidos, q.v.), the privation (steresis, q.v.) Xenophon, Mem. IV, 6, which Socrates himself explains more fully in
of the form of the thing it is going to hecome, and, finally, the substra- Phaedo 100a-e where it serves as a kind of criterion against which to
tum (hypokeimenon) that persists through the change and in which measure the congruence of "deductions"; the theory of forms is just
the genesis takes place (Phys. I, 19oa-b). Its name is dictated by its such a hypothesis here. Again (ibid. 10ld) the pushing back of the
function: thus from a predicational point of view the substratum is that hypothesis to something more basic is described, back to what in Rep.
of which other things are predicated and which is not predicated of Sl1b is called the ''unhypothetized principle" (see Parm. 13Se). In
anything else (Meta. 1028b-102ga). But the passages in the Physics Aristotle the "primary" (ex arches) hypotheses are the undemonstra-
are considering hypokeimenon in the context of material change, and so ble first principles: axioms and postulates (Anal. pro I, 24a, 72a; see
it is not merely a logical concept but, together with eidos, a genuine noesis, nous, epagoge).
co-principle of being (Phys. I, 19ob) , what is, from a slightly different
point of view, matter (hyle) and, like matter, is known not directly but
analogically (ibid. 19la). Both the logical and ontological aspects of
hypokeimenon persist in later thinkers: it is the first of the four Stoic •
kategoriai (q.v.), SVF II, 369, and identified with matter in Plotinus,
Enn. II, 4, 6; see hyle, hypodoche, symbebekos.
1
hyp6Iepsis: judgment
See doxa, noesis.
fdion: property
hyp6noia: underlying sense, hidden meaning In terms of Aristotelian logic a property is not something that
See mythos. reveals the essence of a thing, like "animal" (the genos), but that
belongs to an essence and to that essence alone, e.g. "grammar-
hyp6stasis: standing under, hence, substance; real being, learning" as applied to a man. Unlike an accident (see symbebekos) , it
frequently in opposition to appearances cannot belong to anything else, i.e., every man is a grammar-learner
In Plato's system all the eide are hypostases in that they are really and vice versa, Top. I, 102a. Together with genos, diaphora, and
real (ontos on), but the notion of hypostasis does not formally appear symbebekos, it constitutes the fonr "predicables" treated ibid. I,
until later Platonism began to arrange the most important eide in an 10lb-104a. Their relationship with the ten kategoriai or "predica-
ontologically descending hierarchy, perhaps on the analogy of number ments" is dealt with ibid. I, 103b; see symbebekos.
(see monas), since it early appears in a N eopythagorean numerical
interpretation of Plato (Moderatus in Simplicius, Phys. 230-231). It is isomoiria: equal share, balance, equilibrium
clearly a product of syncretism, a blending of the Parmenidean One See meson.
(see hen), Aristotle's Intelligence (see nous) combined with Plato's
Demiourgos, and Plato's World Soul (see psyche tou pantos). These isonomfa: equal share, balance, equilibrium
three supreme archai of being are already in evidence in Albinus (Epit. See hedone.
x) and Numenius (in Eusebius, Pracp. Evang. XI, '7), but their
integration into a complex metaphysical and ethical world view is the
work of Plotinus: One, N ous, Psyche (the latter subdivided, see
 KAKON I 95
(D.L. x, 128; see hedone), and its existence poses no theological

k problems since the gods do not concern themselves with the world
(D.L. x, 123-124). But for the Stoics and their doctrine of providence
(pronoia, q.v.) evil is more of a problem: how to explain the presence
of evil in a universe governed by an all-good God? One suggestion (its
history was venerable) was that evil is God's instrument for educating
and chastising men (Plutarch, De Stoic. repugn. 1040c; Seneca, De
kakon: evil prov., passim). The other relied on the organic nature of the universe
1. Before Socrates made ethics a suhject of philosophical dis- as a whole: "all things work unto good" (Plutarch, op. cit., 1050e;
course considerations of good and evil had been the preserve of the Seneca, Ep. 74, 20). But there is another possibility, the one broached
poets and the lawgivers. But the increasing awareness of moral relativ- by Plato in the Laws and that openly admits the existence of a radical,
ism and the Sophists' assertion of the purely arbitrary cbaracter of law subsistent principle of evil, whether theistic as in the Laws and Iranian
(nomos, q.v.) led Socrates to seek for absolute standards of moral Zoroastrianism (so Plutarch, De Iside 46, 48), or metaphysical, e.g.
conduct. matter.
2. But the Socratic emphasis is on virtue (arete) and good (aga- 6. Both the Pythagoreans and Plato had, as noted above, admit-
than) . Indeed, from his intellectualistic point of view there would seem ted the indeterminate (apeiron) as a co-principle of being, and the
to be no such thing as evil, since no one errs willingly, but through former at least had identified it with evil. Aristotle had equated it with
ignorance (Aristotle, Eth. Nich. VII, 1145b). Plato continued in this his material principle (hyle) but had failed to draw the conclusion that
tradition with his lengthy discussions of the possibility of false jndg- matter and evil are to some extent synonymous. There are, to be sure,
ment (see doxa). some hints of this in both Plato (Pol. 273b; Tim. 68e) and Aristotle
3. But there were new considerations as well. Plato is more (De gen. animo IV, 77ob: matter resists form), but the exploration of
aware of the volitional element and admits that the soul can cause both the ethical qualities of matter remained for later philosophers.
good and evil (Laws 8g6d; compare Theaet. 176a and see psyche), and 7. Stoic (and Epicurean) monism tended to obscure rather than
the hypostatization process that led him to convert Socratic definitions illuminate the problematic of matter but there were other forces at
into ontological realities suggests, in one place at least, the existence of work. There was, for one, the Neopythagorean interest in the Timaeus
an eidos of evil (Rep. 476e). This is perhaps consonant with, or at least that served to reenforce the equation of Plato's chora with Aristotle's
explicable, in the context of the ethical origins of the theory of eide, but hyle (so Moderatus cited in Simplicius, In Phys, pp. 230-231). Again,
the assertion, in Laws 8g6e, that there is an evil as well as a good and more importantly, there was the growth of the oriental tradition of
World Soul (psyche tou pantos, q.v.) is to move ethical dualism, ethical dualism whose most important witness is Plutarch's De Iside,
pervasive in the early Plato on the level of body and soul, onto the and which found its natural philosophical ally in Aristotle's eidos/hyle
cosmic stage, perhaps the result of increased contacts with the Iranian dichotomy. By the time of Numenius, evil (kakon, malum) is firmly
tradition. identified with matter (hyle, silva) and the position was held by a
4. Aristotle rejects both the eidos of evil and the evil World Soul variety of Gnostic sects (see Corpus Hermeticum I, 1, 4-5).
in Meta. 1051a. The characteristic Aristotelian doctrine associates 8. Plotinus, who opposed the Gnostic view of the universe and,
moral evil with excess as a correlative of his theory of the "mean" (see indeed, any type of dualism, was, nonetheless, affected by the identifi-
meson). In Eth. Nich. 1106b Aristotle quotes with approval the related cation of matter and evil. His solution to the problem of evil unfolds
Pythagorean judgment that evil is to be identified with the indetermi- within strictly controlled limits. First, it is not a question of dualism:
nate (apeiron; compare the Pythagorean "Table of Opposites" in matter is generated from the One under the guise of "Otherness"
Meta. 986a, and see kinoun 2) . (Enn. II, 4, 5). This refers first and foremost to intelligible matter
5. In post-Aristotelian philosophy the implications of both the (hyle noete; see hyle; Proclus doubts whether this should be called
Platonic and Aristotelian positions were explored. The Epicureans, matter at all: Theol. Plat. III, 9) that is always defined and hence the
with their thoroughgoing sensualism, stand somewhat apart: all evil possibility of evil in the kosmos noetos is ruled out (Enn. I, 8, 2). On
can be equated with pain (algas, panos) either of the body or the mind the question of sensible matter (hyle aisthete) Plotinus, while admit-
94
96 I KALLOS KATEGORIAI I 97
ting that it is the cause of evil (I, 8, 4), is at some pains to point out arrived at by actual dissections on the optic nerve (Diels 24A11) and
that it is not a substance but a privation (steresis), the absence of any that reappears among the philosophers with Diogenes of Apollonia.
good (1,8,11). Here the physiological reasoning is crossed with more philosophical
9. Proclus opposes this on a number of counts: he fails to see how considerations, Le., that air (aer, q.v.) is the divine arche of all things,
a privation, which is essentially a negation, can be the cauSe of any- and the source of life, soul, and intelligence (frs. 4, 5). How perception
thing (De mal. subst., p. 240) and so prefers to ~evert to the Platonic occurs we are told by Theophrastus (De sens. 39-44). Man inhales air
(and more voluntaristic) position that the soul is the cause of evil or, to that travels, via the various senses, to the brain. If the air is pure and
put it another way, that the evil in the kosmos is moral and not dry, thought (phronesis) takes place (see aisthesis and compare the
metaphysical (op. cit., p. 233). similar Hippocratic text in Diels 64c3) .
On "original sin" as a source of evil, see kathodos. 4. Socrates had heard of the brain theory as a young man and
was interested in it (Phaedo 96b). He must have passed his interest on
kallos: beauty to Plato who, in the Timaeus, locates the rational part (logistikon) of
See eros. the human soul in the head (44d) and makes the brain the source of
the reproductive powers (73C-d; see psyche).
kardia: heart 5. But even though the question continued to be debated (see
L Behind the long-standing debate on the seat of the soul that SVF II, 885; Cicero, Tusc. 1,9,19), it was the view of Aristotle that
was conducted in philosophical circles there stands a prephilosophical prevailed. Aristotle knew, to be sure, the medical assertions of the
physiology that had, in effect, decided the question and that, supported connection of the senses with the brain, but he was not convinced by
by the massive authority of Homer, tended to dominate even the accu- the evidence (Hist. animo 514a). What he finds more persuasive is that
mulating medical evidence to the contrary. The Homeric hero both there is no sensation in the brain itself (De part. animo 656a) .
feels (Il. IX, 186; XIII, 493; etc.) and thinks (Il. IX, 600; XXII, 296) 6. Plotinus, however, following the Platonic tradition, continues
with the phrenes or midriff, whence the later phronesis, thought or to locate the arche of sensation in the brain, or as he carefully puts it,
wisdom. ''the point of departure [archel of the operation [energeial of the
2. A great number of thinkers went along the same path, encour- faculty [dynamisl, since it is the arche of the kinesis of the instrument
aged no doubt by medical theories of vital heat carried through the [organonl" (Enn. IV, 3, 23).
system by the blood. The thermal theory of thought finds its chief
propagator in Heraclitus who identified the soul with fire (fr. 36) and kahiIepsis: grasping, apprehension
connected it with consciousness (Diels 22A16). In Empedocles the The act of grasping an impression (phantasia): the act is a
blood appears as a factor linked with perception, and the seat of primary one in Stoic epistemology, and described by Cicero, Acad.
perception is located in the heart (fr. 105). Perhaps Democritus too is post. I, 11, 40-42; apprehension is the criterion of truth for the Stoics,
to be placed here, though the evidence is contradictory (rational fac- Sextus Empiricus, Ad". Math. VII, 152; the volitional element is under-
ulty in the breast in Aetius IV, 4, 6; in the hrain, ibid. IV, 5, 1), and it lined, ibid. VIII, 397; see phantasia, prolepsis, ennoia, noesis.
was not, in any event, their vital heat that suggested the comparison of
soul and fire atoms to Democritus, but rather the latter's shape and kategoriai: accusations, predications, categories,
mobility (Aristotle, De an. I, 405a). Aristotle calls the heart the arche praedicamenta, summa genera (scil. entis)
of life, movement, and sensation (De part. animo 666a-b), and though The ten (in some lists only eight) most general ways in which a
the Epicureans dispersed the soul all over the body (see psyche), the subject may be described; a logical structuring that corresponds to the
rational faculty (Lucretius: animus) was in the breast (Lucretius III, real existence of things: the eide of being in Meta. 1003b21 or, again,
141-142), as it was for the Stoics (SVF II, 879). the summa genera of being (see genos). The most complete list is
3. The other school of thought, which located the seat of percep- given in Cat. ib-2a: substance (ousia), quantity (poson), quality
tion in the brain (enkep1u1los), had its origin in Pythagorean medical (poion), relation (pros til, place (pou), time (pate), position (keis-
circles, specifically with Alcmaeon of Crotona (Theophrastus, De sens. thai), state (echein), action (poien), affection (paschein); for their
26; see also aisthesis) who maintained that there were passages (po- relationship with the four predicables, see Top. 103a-b and idion.
roi) connecting the senses to the brain, a position he was said to have Aristotle's kategoriai are criticized by Plotinus in Enn. VI, 1, 1-24. The
98 I KATHARSIS KATHODOS I 99
Stoics reduced the categories to four: subject (hypokeimenon), quality, 4. Plotinns discusses the relationship of katharsis and arete in
state, relation, SVF II, 369; they are discussed by Plotinus, Enn. VI, 1, Enn. I, 2, 4; with Plato he makes katharsis a necessary condition to
25-3 0. assimilation to God (ibid. I, 6, 6; see homoiosis ).

katharsis: purgation, puri5cation Hthodos: descent, fall (at the soul)

Katharsis, a word with both religious and medical implica-
1. 1. The origins of the figure of the fall or banishment of the soul
tions, seems to fluctuate between affirmative and 'negative functions at from its natural, immortal abode are religious, as appears from its first
the hands of the philosophers. Among the Pythagoreans katharsis had, occurrence among the philosophers in Empedocles' Purifications (fr.
as might be expected, strong religious connotations. Katharsis is a 115; it may have been held in some form by Heraclitus as well; see frs.
purification of the soul, effected, we are told (Iamblichus, Vita Pyth. 62, 68; Plato, Corg. 492e-493b; Plotinus, Enn. IV, 8, 1) where the
110), through mousike (q.v.), i.e., by rendering it harmonious; in- banishment is the result of a primal crime (bloodshed or flesh-eating;
deed, this is philosophy (ibid. 137). This Pythagorean identification of frs. 136, '37, 139) committed by one of the daimones (q.v.) whose
katharsis and philosophia is found in Plato (see Phaedo 67a-d), and natural lot was immortality. Because of this crime it is subjected, for
the analogy with music runs through the dialogues. In Phaedo 61a the period of a "great year" (30,000 seasons in Empedocles, fro 115,
Socrates equates philosophy and mnsic, and in the Republic (43,e, line 6; the figure varies elsewhere), to successive reincarnations in this
432a, 433d) music is the foundation of the master virtue sophrosyne world of change.
(q,v.). We are further told, in Tim. 90d, that the care of the soul 2. This account is closely tied to the Pythagorean view of the
consists in bringing its modulations into harmony with the cosmic immortal soul (see psyche) and the attendant doctrine of palingenesia
order (see ouranos ) . (q.v,). This type of belief is common in Plato and expressed in a series
2. But when Socrates informs us, in Soph. 226a ff., that his art is of great myths (see athanatos). Plato knows Empedocles' version
"cathartic," we have passed over to other gronnds where the function (and, apparently, the related myth of the devouring of Dionysus by the
of katharsis is described as "the removal of evil from the soul" (ibid. Titans, the creation of man from the ashes of the latter, and the
227d), just as the medical art does for the body. Here the problem is consequent "Titanic nature" of mortals whose Dionysiac spark is thus
not seen as a kind of imbalance (see hedone) that can be set aright by embedded in a Titanic element that is the direct resnlt of an "original
harmonization, but as the presence of something essentially alien to the sin"; see Laws 70lC) and employs it, with characteristic Platonic
system. Medical men are familiar with this type of purgation (Grat. changes, in Phaedrus 248c-249d. The soul loses its wings and falls
405a), and it may be extended, by analogy, to a misuse by tyrants into the sensible world. But whereas the emphasis in Empedocles is on
practiced upon the state (Rep. 567c). Socrates effects his katharsis of the immortal soul's coming into the cyclic kosmos, the fall consequent
the soul by the best possible purgative, interrogation (elenchos) that upon sin (its nature is not specified) is nsed by Plato to explain the
cleanses the soul of false opinions (Soph. 230d). presence of the soul in the body and is integrated, via the link between
3. Aristotle applies the theory to music (Pol. '34'b-'342a): recollection (anamnesis, q.v.) and the eide, into Plato's epistemologi-
some music is educational, presumably the "harmonizing" type of the cal and metaphysical doctrines.
Pythagorean tradition; but there is also "cathartic" music in the medi- 3. The qnestion of the descent of the soul, its manner and its
cal, purgative sense. This latter type has its effect by the homoeopathic purpose, continued to exercise the thinkers of the Platonic tradition,
principle of inducing exactly the same effect that one seeks to cure. and the best testimonial to their interest is undoubtedly the essay
Plato knows of this practice (see Rep. 560d, Laws 790C-791b), and as devoted to the question by Plotinus (Enn. IV, 8) and the passages of
is clear from these passages in Plato and Aristotle, both men were Iamblichus' De anima preserved in Stobaeus. A great variety of views
aware that the homoeopathic principle enunciated by physicians had are recorded, and the mechanics and landscape of the trip through the
already been extended to the cure of certain psychic states, most spheres, compounded of Plato's remarks (the prenatal vision of the
particularly religious possession or enthousiasmos ('ee mantike). Aris- spheres given the sonl in Phaedrus 274c-248c and Rep. 616d-6lJd, and
totle took the further step and incorporated it into his theory of art, the snggestion, in Rep. 614d, that the descent, at least for some, is
with the well-known result of tragedy's being defined in terms of through the heavens) and a great deal of astronomical lore, are lovingly
effecting a homoeopathic katharsis jpurgation of the pathe of pity and detailed. Typical is Porphyry's allegorical interpretation of the "Cave
fear (Poet. 1449b). of the Nymphs" in Od. XIII, 102-112 (with some of the details bor-
I
I
100 I KATHOLOU KINESIS I 101
rowed from Numenius; cf. De antra nymph. 21, 28); Odysseus' travels tatizingthe universals (Meta. 1086a-1087a): Socrates, however, did
become, in this symbol-enamored age, the archetypal enactment of the not make this mistake (ibid. 1078b).
soul's wanderings: ibid. 34-35 and Macrobius' account of the descen- For the perception of the universal in Epicurus, see prolepsis; for
sus animae in his commentary on the Somnium Scipionis (1, 11, 11-12, the possibility of a "concrete universal," gnarimon.
18); atypical is Plotinus' internalization of the phenomenon (Enn. IV,
8,1) . kdsthai: position, situs
4. Why this occurred at all is considerably more perplexing. The One of the ten kategoriai in Aristotle, Gat. Ib-2a; in other places,
Phaedrus announces it as an "ordinance of Necessity," but proceeds to e.g. Anal. post. I, 83b, both keisthai and echein (state) are omitted
link it with a mischance (syntychia) of the soul (248c). The Timaeus from the list. In the list in Gat. Ib Aristotle's own examples of keisthai
shows a different point of view. The kasmos must contain all the beings are "lying," "sitting"; it is a relative term, ibid. 6b (see pros ti).
of the kosmos noetos (q.v.), otherwise it will be incomplete; for this
reason mortal creatures are brought into creation (41b-d). Plotinns ken6n: void, vacuum
subscribes to this view that the engagement of the soul in a mortal A void is admitted by the Pythagoreans as a separating element
body is the fulfillment of a divine purpose and dictated by the very between natures, and, particularly, numbers (Aristotle, Phys. IV,
nature of the soul (Enn. IV, 8, 7). The same view is taken by Proclus 213b). It is attacked by Parmenides (Diels, fro 8, lines 6-11), and
(In Alc. 328, 29; compare Elem. theal., prop. 206). denied by Melissus as sheer nonbeing (Diels, fro 7). For both Empedo-
5.. But in this same passage of Plotinus there is at least the cles and Anaxagoras air is corporeal, and hence to be distinguished
suggestion that the soul is somewhat to be blamed for its "excessive from the void, which is denied as nonbeing (Aristotle, Phys. IV, 213a,
zeal," and in Enn. v, 1, 1 we are given a still clearer account of its De coela IV, 309a). The Atomists embrace the Parmenidean paradox
"audacity" (tolma) and joy at its own independence that causes it to and assert the existence of the nonbeing void, which, together with
flee God. The prenatal sin theory, though hardly consonant with the "the full," they make the new principles of the universe (Aristotle, De
rest of Plotinus' thought, was held by other thinkers. According to gen. et carr. I, 325a, Meta. 985b). It is discussed, defined ("place
Iamblichus (Stobaeus, Eel. I, p. 375), Albinus is among this number in [tapas) with nothing in it"), and denied by Aristotle (Phys. IV,
making the fall a result of free choice, but this may refer to the 213a-217b). Kenan is affirmed by Epicurus as a good Atomist (D.L.
common Pythagorean motif of the soul's choice of life before palin- x, 38-41), but denied by the Stoics (D.L. VII, 140); see tapas.
genesia (Rep. 617e: "the chooser is responsible; God is blameless").
Macrobius (I, ll, ll) speaks of a "longing for the body" (appetentia kenosis: emptying, depletion
corporis). But the best-known adherents of the doctrine were undoubt- See hedone.
edly the Gnostics who thought the material world an essentially evil
place and for whom the fall of the soul was a commonplace (see kinesis: motion, movement, change
Plotinus, Enn. II, 9, 10) . 1. Motion presents no problem for the Milesian philosophers; it is
an unquestioned part of their pervasive vitalism (see zoe), and it is in
kath6Iou: universal tlris spirit that both Anaximander (Diels 12All) and Anaximenes
1. Katholau is an Aristotelian technical term, though there is (Diels 12A9, 13A6) posit an eternal motion. It is noteworthy too that
evidence for its evolution in Plato (cf. Meno 27a, Rep. 392d-e). Aris- when Xenophanes wishes to temper the contemporary anthropomor-
totle defines the uuiversal in De interp. 17a as "that which by its nature phism he denies his God kinesis (Diels 21A25, 26). Kinesis is present
is capable of being predicated of several subjects," e.g. "man" is a in all reality in Heraclitus, as illustrated in the famous river image (see
universal, Callias is a singular. It is frequently identified with genus Plato, Grat. 402a, rhoe, and episteme).
(see genas; Meta. I049b, 1038b-1039). Aristotle specifically rejects the 2. Suddenly all of this is changed with Parmenides' attack on all
claim of the uuiversal to be substance, and yet in the Anal. post. and forms of change (see genesis, on), and particularly motion (see fro 8,
elsewhere he is insistent that only the universal can be defined (Meta. line 26), undoubtedly as a result of his denial of the void (kenon) on
1036a), and is the true object of science (episteme; Anal. post. I, the grounds of nonbeing, thus depriving body of a place into which to
87b-88a, De an. II, 417b). Aristotle severely criticized Plato for hypos- move (see Plato, Theaet. 180e). Zeno's four arguments contrived to

, ""
, " r
102 1 KINESIS KINOUN 1103
support the position of Parmenides and deny the possibility of motion (qq.v.). None of these is, of course, the eidos of kinesis mentioned in
(see Aristotle, Phys. VI, 239b; answered, ibid. 263a-b) are, of course, the Sophist, but the tenth (really, as Plato points out, the arche of all
polemical and derived ex hypothesi against the Pythagorean reluctance the others) self-moved motion is the soul, which mediates between the
to relinquish the "VOid (see megethos). other nine and the eidos (see psyche).
3. Genesis (q.v.), at least on the secondary level, recovered from 7. Aristotle attacks the Platonic position in Phys. III, 200b where
Parmenides' assault, and his successors tended to substitute some de- he declares that there is no kinesis apart from things. He then offers his
rivative of kinesis, e.g. mixture or association, 'for the ground pre- own definition (ibid. III, 201a) of kinesis as "the actualization [ente-
viously held by genesis properly so called. But what was now markedly lecheia] of a potentiality [dynamis] qua potentiality." It occurs only
different was that kinesis was no longer natural or inherent in things, as a metabole, i.e., a change in the category of quality, quantity, or
as with the Milesians, but required some type of agent (kinoun, q.v.) place (ibid. v, 226a). The latter kinesis, Le., locomotion (phora), is
operating from outside the system. An external force to explain kinesis primary (ibid. VIII, 2651>--266a), taking precedence even over genesis
appears in Empedoeles and is identified as Love and Strife (fr. 17), (q.v.).
and in Anaxag.oras' nous (frs. 12-14); all of these forces are still, 8. Aristotle follows Plato back along the road to the inherent
however, matena!. Milesian motion by describing physis (q.v.) as the principle and cause
+ At this point the only serious proponents of an inherent, natu- of kinesis (Phys. II, 192b); this does not, of course, free him from the
ral motion in bodies are the Atomists. Democritus held such an eternal necessity of the external, self-moving cause; see kinoun. Kinesis is,
motion for the atoma that moved in all directions (Aristotle, De coelo together with nutrition, sensation, and thought, one of the four main
III, 300b; D.L. IX, 44), a movement that he called "vibration" (palmos; functions of the psyche (De an. 413a-b), and is resolved into the
Aetius I, 23, 3) and that occurs by necessity (Aristotle, Phys. II, 196a; operation of desire (orexis) in can junction with what is perceived as a
D.L. IX, 45). It is from the resultant collisions that aggregates are rea! or apparent good (ibid. III, 432a-433b).
formed (see genesis) that in turn move into a vortex or whirl (dine), For Aristotle's theory of "natural motion," see stoicheion, aither;
gradually finding their places in the kosmos (Diels 67A14) . for the application of kinesis to perception, aisthesis; on the possibility
5. Epicurus' explanation is somewhat different. For him the of actio in dis tans , sympatheia.
atoma have, in addition to size and shape, weight (baros) as one of
their primary characteristics (D.L. X, 54). Thus their eterna! down- kinoun: mover, agent, efficient cause
ward motion would seem to be derived rather than an inherent property 1. The problem of an external agent or arche for movement is

(D.L. X, 61; Lucretius II, 83, 217). Their collision and consequent not a problem for the early physikoi since in their vitalistic view kinesis
aggregation into bodies is brought about by a swerve (parenklisis) in was inherent in things (see kinesis 1). But once Parmenides had
their parallel motions (Aetius I, 12, 5; Lucretius II, 216-293; Cicero, denied that kinesis was an attribute of true being, the obvious phe-
De fin. I, 6, 19; compare genesis). nomenon of motion in the physical world had to be explained by
6. At Soph. 248c-249a Plato departs from his Parmenidean view- recourse to an external mover that would give at least the initia!
point. Where earlier there was a firm insistence on the unchangeable impetus to kinesis.
nature of the eide (see Phaedo 78d) , now kinesis too has its place in the 2. The first such attempt is the "Love" and "Strife" of Emped-
world of reality. The soul, for instance, which is akin to the eide oeles (fr. 17, lines 19-20; compare Diels 31A28), drawn from an
(Phaedo 78b-79b), is self-moving (aud hence immortal) and the analogy with the motive forces operative in man (ibid., lines 22-24;
source of movement in others (Phaedrus 245c-246a; for the Platonic compare Aristotle, Meta. 985a, who stresses the moral aspect of these
causal category of "self-mover," see Laws x, 894c), including the forces and sees them as a manifestation of moral dua!ism; see kakon 3) .
heavenly bodies (see ouranioi). Indeed, in Soph. 254d Plato maintains Shortly thereafter there is an epoch-making shift away from the moral
that kinesis is one of the most important eide, and it seems to serve for to the intellectual sphere: Anaxagoras' source of motion is intelligence
him the same function that metabole (q.v.) does for Aristotle: a ge- (nous) , which is not only the initiator of motion but a guiding force as
neric term for change that has as its species at least locomotion well (see nous 3; noesis 4). The lineaments of Aristotle's God are
(phora) and qualitative change (alloiosis; see Theaet. 181C) and that already present: noesis, kinesis, telos.
is expanded, in Laws x, 894b-c, to embrace ten distinct species,'inelud- 3. Plato's earlier preoccupation with the immutable eide appar-
ing, as the Aristotelian metabole does not, both genesis and phthora ently excluded any serious consideration of kinesis. But in the later
104 I KINO UN KINOUN I 105
dialogues, particularly in the Sophist, Philebus, Timaeus, and Laws Aristotle; see 7, 11 infra) or incorporeal (the Aristotelian "object of
there is a full-blown theory of kinesis (q.v. 6) with two related point~ love"?). But whatever the exact relationship, the Platonic tradition
of focus: the attribution of the principle of self-motion to the soul (see maintained its belief in these planetary movers to the end (see oura-
psyche '9) and the admission of kinesis, by reason of its being a nioi) .
function of soul, to the realm of the "completely real" (pantelos on; 7. Among the various canses involved in genesis Aristotle speci-
Soph. 248e-249b). There is, moreover, an eidos of kinesis (ibid. 254e) fies the kinoun or agent that initiates change (Phys. II, 194b). What is
and, indeed, it is one ofthe megista gene (see eidos '3). coming into question here are Aristotle's revised notions of physis (q.v.
4. Motion, then, occurs on three levels in Plato: as the transcen- 3). Physis has dislodged psyche from much of the ground held by the
dental eidos of motion; as the self-motion of soul, which holds an PlatoniC soul, most notably from its position as the source of purpose
intermediary position between the eide and sensible particulars and (telos; Phys. II, 194a) and movement (ibid. VIII, 250b-253a) and,
wbich is the arche of motion described in the Laws x 895b; and, finally, given the existence of things in motion, there must be a single cause of
as the various types of secondary motions in the kosmos described in motion, a "first mover" (proton kinoun) that is itself unmoved (ibid.
Laws x, 893b-894c. 256a-258b): everything that is moved is moved by something and there
5. In terms of this analysis Plato's proton kinoun or First Mover cannot be an infinite regress of such movers (ibid. 256a and VII,
is the noetic part of the semitranscendent or World Soul (see psyche 242a-243a). Thus there is an eternal First Mover and an eternal first
tou pantos). There seem to be, moreover, gronnds for identifying the moved, the latter the sphere in which are embedded the fixed stars
nous of the Philebus and Timaeus with this same World Soul, even (VIII, 260a-266a) , moving in an eternal, circular locomotion (locomo-
thongh it is mythically described as creating the World Soul (see nous tion is prior to all other forms of change, even genesis; ibid. 260a-b and
6) . We have, then, not merely a kinoun but a final and exemplary see genesis 15) .
cause as well. The demiourgos (q.v.) is good and makes the world to 8. But Aristotle apparently did not always hold this view. The
be as similar to himself as possible (Tim. 2ge-30a) and, we are told, line of reasoning cited above from the Physics is essentially an argu-
the human soul is made of the same "stuff" as the World Soul (ibid. ment from energeia/dynamis (qq.v.) that rests on the premiss that the
41d). But not only is the kosmos related to the kinoun as eikon to passage from potency to act demands the prior presence of an agent
paradeigma, the movement known as "procession" (proodos, q.v.) in already in act that leads, via the denial of infinite regress, to an eternal
later Platonism; there is, as well, a "return" (epistrophe, q.v.). The energeia that cannot be other. But there is also "Platonic motion"
immediate result of the self-moving motion of the World Soul is the whereby th, soul is the source of motion. In this way Plato explained
perfect circular motion of its own body, the visible universe (ibid. 34a, the axial rotation of the stars, and it was the same explanation that
36e, 40a-b). This regular visible and eternal motion of the heavens Aristotle himself relied upon in attributing souls to the stars in his
provides, in turn, a model by which men should regulate the harmonia early Platonizing dialogue On Philosophy (fr. 24 = Cicero, De nat.
(q.v.) in their own souls (ibid. 47b-c; astronomy is, of course, only deor. II, 44; here the motion is called "voluntary"). But cannot the
preliminary to the higher thrusts of the "return" effected by eros and heavenly bodies also be moved by their physis, which Aristotle has
dialektike: see ouranos 2) . substituted for the psyche as an internal source of motion? This seems
6. The same passages in the Timaeus introduce another consid- to be the theory held in the De coelo where the motion of the "first
eration: the heavenly bodies are also "a race of Gods." Each is body," i.e., the sphere of the fixed stars, is the "natural" eternal,
endowed with intelligence and it is this intelligence that explains the circular motion of the fifth element, aither (q.v.; De coelo I,
axial rotation of the stars, rotary because "each always thinks the same 268a-27ob; see stoicheion '7). The fixed stars themselves move because
thoughts about the same things" (ibid. 3ge-40a; on this rotary motion they are embedded in this sphere (ibid. II, 298b-29ob). But even
compare Rep. 436b and Laws x, 898a). Plato seems to be in some though he is capable of giving this explanation of the motion of the
doubt about the mode of connection between these heavenly bodies and stars in terms of the physis of the sphere, he is somewhat embarrassed
their guiding intelligences. Some suggestions are made in Laws x, as to what to do with his Platonic legacy of the star souls (compare
898e, but Plato is uncertain whether their soul is an immanent motor ibid. II, 291 and 292a).
like our soul, or an extrinsic force that may be either corporeal (possi: 9. This would seem to be a view different from that of the
bly the theory of Eudoxus that the stars are carried around by the transcendent mover of the Physics (although there are a number of
corporeal sphere in which they are imbedded, a theory adopted by dubious and/or obscure references to just such a transcendent mover in
106 I KINOUN KINOUN I ~o7
De coelo, e.g. 279a-b). But it is, nonetheless, the kinoun of Physics VIII exact number to be calculated by the astronomers (Meta. lO73a-b; the
that is taken up and elaborated in the Metaphysics. At the end of the numbers offered by Aristotle in the following passages are forty-seven
former work it is stated that the proton kinoun is without magnitude and fifty-five). They too must be intellectual substances that move the
(megethos, q.v.). This leads to an immediate difficulty since, in the spheres as final cause (see Meta. 1074a).
Aristotelian system, all kinesis is effected by contact (haphe; see sym- 12. What is the relationship of these unmoved movers to the
patheia 7). To auswer the difficulty Aristotle resorts to a principle spheres and to the proton kinoun of the rest of the argument? Aristotle
borrowed from nature. The perception of the good gives rise to appetite nowhere explains. To make them the souls of the spheres would be to
(orexis, q.v.) for that good, in rational beings the object of rational return to the "Platonic motion" of On Philosophy and make it impossi-
desire (boulesis; see De an. III, 433a and proairesis), and in irrational ble to explain how they are always in act; to make them immaterial
nature by its imitation of the movement of the heavenly bodies ex- forces external to the body of the sphere (would, in that event, the
pressed by the constant passage of the elements from one into the other sphere have an immanent soul in addition?) is to raise the questio~ of
(see Meta. 1050b; De gen. et corr. II, 337a; and genesis 15). In this their individuation. If they are not united to a body how do they dIffer
way the proton kinoun is the good of the entire universe "as an object one from another since matter is the principle of individuation (see
loved" (Meta. 1072b), and the kosmos and all its parts "move toward hyle 2 and ·compare diaphora 4 where the genus is said to supply an
it" by their mimesis of its energeia translated into physical terms: the ''intelligible matter" for the species)? It has generally been assumed
heavenly bodies by their perfect circular revolutions and corruptible that they are somehow subordinated to the proton kinoun described as
bodies by their cyclic genesis-phthora. Man's mimesis is somewhat ruling the entire universe (Meta. I070b, 1072b, I076a and see 9 supra),
more direct; he is capable of the same kind of energeia as the p,·oton and this despite the fact that they are unmoved. In fact, the argument
kinoun, i.e., noesis, but he performs it only intermittently because it on the basis of which they are posited in the first place necessitates tlrat
involves a passage from potency to act and so is wearisome (Meta. they too be intellectual ousiai perfectly actualized, a consideration that
l05ob, l07Zb; see noesis 21, nous 10). wonld seem to eliminate their having any desire (orexis), and conse-
10. Within the categories of act and potency the Prime Mover quently a lack of fulfillment, toward the proton kinoun.
must be an immaterial substance eternally actualized (Meta. 1071b). 13. Aristotle, then, admits a variety of movers. There is the
What is this energeia? It is at this point that the whole Platonic world immanent principle of natural motion of things, physis (q.v.). There is
of the eide is swept away. Aristotle no longer needs the eide to explain also, as an immanent principle, psyche, not the Platonic model that
universal predication (see katholou), and their static qualities ill ac- Aristotle himself had once held, but the immanent eidos that moves the
cord with his own search for an arche of movement (particularly if he substance in which it inheres "by thought or choice" (see psyche 20).
thinks of the eide as numbers; see Meta. 992a and arithmos 3). What is It is present in all animate things but it does not meet (nor does
left, in effect, is Plato's World Soul of the Sophist-Philebus-Timaeus: a physis) the general requirement of the theory of energeia/dynamis
transcendent substance, a living nous that imparts motion to the kos- that demands an external, prior cause of motion. Thus there must be at
mos. And it is precisely in these terms that the Aristotelian proton least one transcendent mover that is a complete intellectual substance
kinoun is described: ousia aidios, nous, zoe (Meta. 1072b-l073a; for (on the "separateness" of intellect, see nous). As to the question of
the subsequent career of this illustrious trio, see trias). There are, of whether there are more than one such, at least at some point in his
course, corrections. The Platonic World Soul has a World Body, the career, in Lambda VIII of the Metaphysics (which was not necessarily
kosmos aisthetos; this would be dynamis and limitation in the Aristote- written at the same time as VII and IX) Aristotle held that there was
lian system. Plato's psyche had involved kinesis; Aristotle's nous en- more than one, a position that continued to exercise the Peripatetic tra-
joys the odd "activity of immobility" (energeia akinesias; Eth. Nich. dition and provoked a refutation from Plotinus (Enn. v, 1, 9) .
VII, 1154b) : its energeia is noesis (see nous 9) . . . . 14. After Aristotle the question of a transcendental cause of
11. But Chapter VIII of Book Lambda of the Metaphysics mtro- motion recedes into the background. The noetic function of the cosmic
duces a new difficulty into the kinetics of the system. One unmoved cause is retained, as is the plurality of intermediary intelligences (see
mover had been posited earlier to explain the eternal circular motion of nous, daimon), but its causal activity is seen as making rather than
the sphere of the fixed stars. But there are other eternal circular moving. The reasons are twofold. There is, in the first place, the
motions in the kosmos and so there should be as many unmoved movers radically different Stoic concept of God who becomes immanent and
as is necessary to explain the complicated motions of the spheres, the operative in matter, much in tire manner of Aristotle's physis (see
108 I KOINONIA
KOSMOS NOETOS I 109
physis 3, logos 4, and pneuma 4). Secondly, there is the general revival katharsu theory (see ouranos). His mimetic point of view led him to
of Platonism and, with it, the restoration of the demiourgos image. It posit another kosmos not apprehensible by the senses, as onrs is, but
was undoubtedly under the influence of this image that the object of only by the intelligence (see kosmos noetos).
divine thought, simply noesis in Aristotle, becomes the noeta as exem- 3· In his early De philosophia, fl'. 18, Aristotle reaffirms the
plary causes of things (see noeton 2) . divinity of the kosmos, echoing the Platonic formula "visible God";
bnt by the time of the later treatises most of the Platonic theology has
koinonia: combination, communion disappeared in the wake of a revised theory of physis (q.v.). In the
See diairesis, eidos. fnlly developed Aristotelian system there are only two divinities (see
theos) and one of them, the First Mover, is outside the kosmos (De
k6smos (sci!. aisthet6s): ornament, order, the coelo I, 27ga-b). The other is the outer sphere of the kosmos, the
physical, visible universe (see kosmos noetos) sphere of the fixed stars and the domain of aither (q.v.); this is divine
because of its eternal circular motion (ibid. II, 286a).
1. There is a tradition (Aetius II, " 1 and D.L. VIII, 48) that the 4- Stoic pan:heism restores the divinity of the kosmos (SVF II,
first one to describe the universe as a kosmos was Pythagoras; but the 1027) and, followmg npon the theories of fire (see pyr) and pneuma
notion of the universe as an order turns up in the fragments of his considered it a living, ensonled, and intelligent being (D.L. VII, 138-':
predecessors (Anaximauder, Diels, fl'. 12AlO; Anaximenes, Diels, fl'. 139). The Sceptics denied both of these positions (Cicero, De nat.
13B2 ) , and in any event it is difficult to trace its exact evolution dear. III, 9, 22---24). The organic natnre of the kosmos was defended
through the stages: order, order of this universe, the universe as order. by Poseidonius and was the point of departure for his theory of
It had certainly reached this final connotation by the time of Empedo- sympatheia (q.v.). As against the Gnostics, who viewed it as the
cles (fl'. 134), while the related notion of man as the microcosm of the product of evil and ignorance (see Irenaeus, Adv. haer. I, 4, 1-2; I, 5,
universe appears with Democritus (fl'. 34). Whatever the origins of 3), both Philo and Plotinus defended the sensible universe, hoth
the original insight, the Pythagoreans did have a theory of kosmos; the. calling it a "son of God" (Quod Deus, 6, 31; Enn. v, 8, 12) in its
universe was a kosmos becanse it could be reduced to mathematical fnnction as an image (eikon) of its ultimate transcendent source (see
proportions (harmonia), since the arche of all things was nnmber Enn. II, 3, 18).
(arithmos) (Aristotle, Meta. g85b ) , with its ethical corollary of
attempting to restore this cosmic harmony in the soul (see katharsis). k6smos noet6s: intelligible universe
The same basic idea had been expressed by the Milesians, not in the 1. One of the problems arising from Plato's theory of Forms is
mathematically oriented formulae of Pythagoras, but in a series of the question of their location. Plato is emphatic that the eide do not
figures borrowed from the ethical sphere (see Anaximander, Diels, fl'. exist in any place (Symp. 211a; compare Aristotle, Phys. III, 203a).
12Ag, Bl, and dike; Empedocles, fl'. 30) to explain cosmic process, re- There are, however, other passages that indicate that they do have a
placing the sexual metaphors of earlier myths. "location" in a wider sense of the word (Rep. 508c, 507b; Phaedrus,
2. Heraclitns is the first we know of to take the fnrther step and 247c-e). The figurative langnage of the Timaeus forces him to be more
identify this cosmic order with "law" (nomos) (fl'. 114), thereby explicit; his theory of mimesis (q.v.) suggests a model of which the
setting in motion a train of thought leading to the notion of N atnral visible universe (kosmos aisthetos) is an image (eikon) , Tim. 30c-d.
Law (see nomos). Heraclitns called the law that ensured this order This is the intelligible universe that "contains" the main families of
"divine" (theios) , but this is only one of several strands leading to a eide (lac. cit.; see zoon). "Contains" is a difficult word; it is not at all
belief in the divinity of the kosmos; the others are the vitalism of the clear how Plato Saw the higher groupings of the eide (see the chief
Milesians (see zoe, pyr) and a belief in the divinity of the heavenly parallel text, Soph. 253d; but here the context is dialectical).
bodies (see ouranioi). There is some late evidence (D.L. VIII, 25) . 2. The intel;igi?le kosmos reappears in Philo, but with two major
that the Pythagoreans held the divinity of the kosmos, as may have dIfferences; Plato s e,de were eternal, Philo's are created (De oPif. 4,
Xenophanes as well (Diels, fl'. 21A36; Aristotle, Meta. g86b). Plato
calls the kosmos a "visible God" (horatos theos) in Tim. g2C, not on
.
16), and they are embraced, as a total kosmos noetos, within the divine
mmd, ibid. 4, '7-20 (see eidos), and this is one of the meanings of
vitalist grounds but because of the ethical role it plays in his htxrmonia- Philo's Logos (q.v.). Philo's Logos becomes Plotinus' nous that em-
HO I KRASIS LOGOS I Hl
braces within it all the noeta (Enn. VI, 2, 21) as the objects of its major role, frequently employs it in its common usage, but he also has
thought. a peculiar doctrine that centers around logos in a more technical sense'
for him logos is an underlying organizational principle of the universe'
krasis: blending, mixture related to the common meaning of logos as proportion (frs. " 50), th~
See genesis. rule of change so frequently associated with Heraclitus' thought (e.g.
~rs. 60, 111). And this ~armony, which is really a tension of opposites,
IS not to be understood m the sense of a cyclic return, but as a stable
state (frs. 10, 51). This logos principle, though it is hidden and
perce~tible only to the intelligence (frs. 54, 114; see noesis 1), is still

1 m~terJal, ~s can be seen from the identification of the Heraclitan logos

wIth cosmIC fire .( c~mpare .frs. 41, 64; see pyr), and his description of
the ~rocess of thmkmg (DIels, fro 22A16; see noesis); on the theory of
tensIOn, see tonos.
2. P~".to also used the term logos in a variety of ways, including
logism6s: reasoning, discursive thought the opposItIOn between mythos and logos (see myth as), where the
See noesis. latter signifies a true, analytical account. This is common usage, but it
leads off into an epistemological theory. In Phaedo 76b Plato marks as
logistik6n: rational faculty a characteristic of true knowledge (episteme) the ability to give an
See psyche, nous, pathos, aneiros. accoun: (!ogos) of wh~t one knows. In Theaet. 201C-d this aspect of
logos IS mcorporated mto the definition of episteme: true opinion
16goi spermatikol: seminal reasons, rationes seminales (doxa) accompanied by an account. Socrates discusses what logos
The Stoic logoi spermatikoi, which are designed to explain both would mean in t?is. context (ibid. 206c-21Ob), and from his analysis
plurality and teleology in a monistic system, appear to be patterned emerges ~ ~eSCriptiOn of logos as the statement of a distingnishing
after the Aristotelian eidos (q.v.) in its role as physis. The logos characterIstIc of a thing (ibid. 208c). The validity of this is denied on
(q.v.) considered as a unified entity contains within itself, on the the ground of its being of no value in the case of sensible individual
analogy of animal sperm, the growth powers of exemplars of all the beings (compare Aristotle, Meta. I039b). '
individuals (SVF II, 1027; D.L. VII, 135). These individuallogoi are 3; But when ~his .conception of logos is moved higher up the
imperishable (SVF II, 717), Le., they survive the cyclical conflagration PlatOnIC scale of bemg It obVIOusly does have a role to play; in Rep.
(ekpyrosis) that consumes the kosmos and are the seedlings of the next 534b Plato describes the dialectician (see dialektike) as Ol1e who can
kosmos (ibid. I, 497). Despite their paradigmatic character they are give a~ acc?unt (logos) of the true being (or essence, ousia) of
more Aristotelian than Platonic in that they are immanent in matter somethmg, I.e., the term of the process of division (diairesis) de-
(ibid. II, 1074). They also playa major role in Plotinus: they reside in scribed in the Sophist, the Aristotelian definition (see koros) by genera
the psyche (Enn. II, 3, 14; IV, 3, 10) where they are the cause of its and species; indeed, Aristotle freqnently uses logos as a synonym for
movement (ibid. IV, 3,15); the logoi contain all the details of the being horos, horismos. Another typical Aristotelian use is logos as reason
(ibid. III, 2, 1) and are the reasons why individuals differ (ibid. IV, 4, rationality, particularly in an ethical context, e.g., Pol. 1332a, Eth:
12) ; unextended themselves, they are individualized only by the matter Nich. V, 1134a,and frequently in the combination "right reason"
in which they inhere (ibid. IV, 9, 5)· (orthoslogos, the Stoic recta ratio), Eth. Nich. II, l103b; VI, 1144b. He
For their development into the occult powers, see dynamis. also understands logos as matllematical proportion, ratio (Meta.
?9;b), a usage ~roba~ly going back to the Pythagoreans, even though
16gos: speech, account, reason, definition, rational It IS nnattested m theIr fragments (see apeiron, peras, harmonia; for
faculty, proportion the application of logos as proportion to the question of mixtures see
1. A major difficulty in the interpretation of logos is determining
halon; to sensation and the sense organ, aistkesis; and, in gen~raI,
when this common and amorphous Greek word is being iised in a meson).
technical, specialized sense. Thus Heraclitus, in whom it first plays a 4. The Stoic point of departure on logos is Heraclitus' doctrine of
112 I LOGOS

an all-pervasive formula of organization, which the Stoics considered

divine (see nomos). Logos is the active (poioun) force in the universe
(D.L. VII, 134), creative in the fashion of sperm (SVF I, 87: D.L. VII, ill
135: see logoi spermatikoi). As in Heraclitus it is material and identi-
fied with fire (see pyr) , Cicero, Acad. post. I, ll, 39: SVF II, 1027. It is
also identical with nature (physis, q.v.) and Zeus (see Cleanthes,
Hymn to Zeus; SVF I, 537). This pervasive presence iu the uuiverse
develops in several directions: since it is a unity it grounds the theory of mantike: divination
1. Although the terminology remained fluid one may, with
cosmic sympathy (see 8ympatheia) and of natural law and the ethical
imperative "to live according to nature" (see nomos). Stoic linguistic Cicero, De div. I, ll, distinguish two distinct types of communication,
theory further distinguished interior logos (= thought) and exterior frequently of future events, vouchsafed by the gods to men: one, the
logos (= speech) (SVF II, 135: Sextus Empiricus, Adv. Math. VIII, direct communication through a human "medium," the prophetes,
275: see onoma), a distinction that clearly influenced Philo's noto- possessed by a god, typically Apollo, and hence a spokesman for that
riously difficult vision of logo8. god. A variant of this was the apparition of a god to an individual in a
5. Philo knew the distinction between interior and exterior logo8 dre~m .(one~ro8, q.v.). The se~ond method, which was less idiosyn-
and could apply it in an orthodox Stoic fashion (De vita Mos. II, 137), cratic smce It could be learned mstead of appearing as a more or less
and it was perhaps this distinction, together with the Jewish scriptural fortuitous divine favor, was the "reading" of various natural phe-
tradition about the "Word of God," that led to his new treatment of nomena such as the habits of birds (augury), the entrails of various
logo8. In the first instance logos is the Divine Reason that embraces the sacrificial animals (haruspicy: for the physiological theory see onei-
archetypal complex of eide that will serve as the models of creation r08), the physiognomy of the palm (chiromancy), or the use of lots
(De oPif. 5,20). Next, this logo8 that is God's mind is externalized in (cleromancy) or arbitrarily chosen passages of a favored author (com-
the form of the kosmo8 noetos (q.v.), the universe apprehensible only pare the medieval80rtes Vergilianae and 80rte8 Biblicae).
to the intelligence (ibid. 7, 29). It is transcendent (Leg. all. III, 2. Plato associates the method of direct communication through a
175-177), and it is God, although not the God (De 8omn. 1,227-229), medium with a divinely inspired madness (mania). The examples he
but rather the "elder Son of God" (Quod Deus 6, 31). With the cites are ~hose of the priestesses and prophets at Dodona and Delphi
creation of the visible world (ko8mos aisthetos) the logo8 begins to and the Sibyl (Phaedrus 244b-c). He then proceeds to link this "divine
play an immanent role as the "seal" of creation (De fuga 2, 12), the madness" with that of the inspired poet who is also, in a sense,
Stoic "bond of the universe" (De plant. 2, 8-9) and heimarmene (q.v.: "possessed by a god," entheos (ibid. 245a), an analogy that makes its
De mut. 23, 135). Philo differs from the Stoics in denying that this first appearance in literature with Democritus (frs. 17, 18: see Apol.
immanent logos is God (De migre. Abr. 32, 179-181): for the providen- 22b: tl,e notion may be Socratic).
tial role of Philo's log08, see pronoia. Philo gives his log08 a distinct 3. The concept of possession (enthousiasmos) that provides the
role in creation: it is the instrumental cause (De cher. 35, 126--127): it theoretical ground for the inspired utterances of the prophet is not
is also an archetypal light (ibid. 28, 97), this latter image reappearing susceptible of exact definition. The ancients themselves were aware
in Plotinus, Enn. III, 2, 16. But there is a difference between the two that it was an arational state (see Plato, Apol. 22b-c: Ion 536c), and a
thinkers: what was in Philo both logos and nOU8 is divided in Plotinus later more psychologically sophisticated and curious age was well
who uses the log08 concept in a fashion akin to the Stoic logoi spermati- informed on the various psychic phenomena attendant upon enthousia8-
koi (q.v.): see Enn. III, 2, 16 where nOU8 and logo8 are distinguished. "'.~8. (see Iamblichus, D.e my8t. 3, 4-7, llD-ll2), as well as the possi-
bilitieS of a homoeopathlc "cure" (see kathar8is) .
4. ~he. distance between Plato and Iamblichus is marked by
another slgmficant change: the decline of the institutionalized oracular
s!tes like Delphi and Dodona with their organized mediumship, and the
nse of individual prophetai who trafficked in a great variety of psychic
phenomena and who frequently claimed miraculous powers. Such
types, e.g., Apollonius of Tyana and the Alexander of Lucian's satire,
113
114 I MATHEMATIKA MEGETHOS I 115
belong properly to the history of religion. But they share with the . Meta. 1076a-1078b; he rejects all three previously cited positions.
contemporary Neoplatonic school of Iamblichus a penchant for the Certain qualities of the aistheta are abstracted and studied as if they
mimcnlous and the wonderfnl. It need hardly be noted that in Neopla- were separate from matter (for the "matter" of mathematika, see
tonism the varions species of wonder-working were accompanied by a aphairesis, hyle). The abstractive process (aphairesis, q.v.) actualizes
fairly elaborate philosophical theory based at least in part on the Stoic what was present only potentially in sensible things. But for all that the
notion of universal sympathy or sympatheia (q.v.). mathematika have no separate (choriston) substantial existence.
5. This N eoplatonic theourgia or "working upon god" consisted 4· Plato's successor Speusippus replaced the entire structure of
chiefly in the manipnlation of certain objects to produce a divine the eide with mathematika, generating first the arithmoi mathematikoi
presence in either a statue or a human medinm (see Proclus, In Tim. and then the geometrical magnitudes from the One and the Infinite
III, '55, 18; Iamblichus, De myst. III, 4-7). Indeed, such binding of Dyad (Meta .. 102~b, 1080b, 1086a; see dyas). Another early Academic,
divine powers has an oracular end and the ancient world's most famous Xenocrates, Identified the mathematika and the eide (Meta. 1028b,
collection of oracular responses, the Chaldaean Oracies, is cited contin- 106ga, l076a). For Plotinus mathematical number is an image (eido-
uously in the Neoplatonic tradition from Porphyry to Proclus, the latter Ion) o£the Ideal Numbers (Enn. VI, 6, 9; see arithmos ).
writing an extensive commentary on them.
The philosophical ground of divination is discussed under sym- megethos: greatness, magnitude
patheia; that of theourgia, under dynamis 10-11. 1. According to Aristotle (Meta. 1020a) magnitude is a measura-
ble quantity (poson, q.v.) that is potentially divisible into continuous
mathematik3.: mathematical numbers and entities; the (synec~es) parts in one, two, or three dimensions, i.e., lines, planes,
objects at the mathematical sciences and so!rds. These latter are the subject matter of geometry, a science
1. A reading of the Metaphysics yields a variety of views on the whose generic subject is magnitude (Eth. Nich. VI, 1143a); but magni-
ontological status of the mathematical numbers (arithmoi mathemati- tnde is not, however, an attribute of the units (monades) that consti-
koi) or mathematika. According to Aristotle's account the Pythago- tute number, as the Pythagoreans assert (Meta. 1080b). Aristotle also
reans maintained that mathematical number is in sensible things as their attacks what seems to be a later species of Pythagoreanism that was
arche (Meta. 987b, 1090a; see arithmos), while for Plato, who also moving toward Atomism and that defined its units as ''indivisible
held the existence of another class of Ideal Number (see arithmos magnitudes": mathematical units are indivisible units and hence can-
eidetikos), they constituted a class between the eide and the aistheta, not have magnitude (ibid. 1083b); see arithmos, monas.
the so-called "intermediaries" (metaxu) ·(Meta. 997b-998a). Finally, 2. The question of an indivisible magnitude (adiaireton or ato-
there is an unidentified group who made the mathematika immanent mon megethos) raises for Aristotle the whole question of primary
but not constitutive of or identical with the aistheta (Meta. 998a, bodies, i.e., bodies that cannot be reduced to others and so are the
l076a). subject of genesis and change. The monist tradition (for Empedocles
2. Aristotle is critical of all these views, particularly the Platonic and the pluralists, see stoicheion) stemming from Parmenides is repre-
one. Does this latter appear in the dialogues? The evidence rests sented by the Pythagoreans, Plato, and the Atomists.
primarily on an interpretation of a section of the Diagram of the Line 3· The Pythagorean position that reduced bodies, through num-
in Rep. v, 51Ob-e where the intelligibles (noeta) are divided into the ber, to units is, in effect, demolished as soon as the distinction between
objects of noesis (q.v.) and dianoia. The latter is described first by its the mathematical unit (monas), the geometi'ical point (stigme), and a
methodology, which uses images in its reasoning process, and then body with extension (megethos) is established, as Aristotle seeks to do
(SlOd), by its subject matter, e.g., "the Square itself" and "the in various places (see Meta. 1080b, 1083b, lOgob; De an. 4oga). Thus
Diagonal itself," phrases that in their formulation and singularity could the ambiguities of au only partially mathematicized Pythagoreanism
refer with equal appropriateness to the eide and to the intermediary are resolved into a physical Atomism. Since magnitude is extended in
class of mathematik a that, as Aristotle says (see metaxu), are charac- three dimensions it is conceivable that the primary body might be
terized by their plurality. But noesis clearly has the eide as its object either line, plane, or solid. The latter is, of course, Leucippus' atomon
(S11b-c), and so it may be legitimate to infer that the objects of (q.v.) that has magnitude but cannot be divided because it is so small
dianoia belong to another class, i.e., the metaxu. • (~iels S8B4). We also know that Plato reduced his primary solids to
3. Aristotle's own theory of mathematical number is found in trIangles, accompanied by an enigmatic hint that further reduction was
116 I ME ON METHEXIS I 117
perhaps possible (Tim. S3c-d). Finally, the ancient tradition asserts genesis, or in one of the three categories of quality (see pathos, gene-
that the Academician Xenocrates maintained the theory of indivisible sis), quantity, or place, where the metabole is called kinesis; see Phys.
lines (so Simplicius and Philoponus commenting on Aristotle's Phys. I, v, 224a-22Sb, and kinesis; for the matter implied by the various
187a: according to Simplicius' account, p. 142, Xenocrates admitted changes, see hyle.
that they were theoretically divisible but because of their smallness
effectively indivisible).
4- Aristotle opposes the theories of indIvisible magnitudes in metaxu: intermediaries
whatever dimension (De gen. et corr. I, 31Sb-317a: De lineis insecabil- L In the Platonic view of reality there are a class of "intermedi-

ibus, which is an Aristotelian pseudepigraph, deals with the problem in aries" that come between the Forms (eide) and the sensible, particular
968a-b). He realized that it was Zeno and his paradoxes that had thi~gs (aistheta). Like the eide they are eternal and unchanging, but
driven philosophers to this positiou (Phys. I, 187a). Aristotle's solution unlike the Forms they are plural (Aristotle, Meta. g87b). This class,
dismisses Leucippus' and Xenocrates' contentions about size. He is not which represents the objects of the sciences of mathematics and geome-
discussing actual physical division but conceptual division, and the try, embraces both mathematical numbers and geometrical magnitUdes
argument here hinges on the notion of a continuum (syneches; Phys. (ibid. ggl~, 997b: see mathematika) . Thus Aristotle. The only support
VI, 231a-b) that, by eliminating the view that a line is a row of for the eXIstence of the general class of the metaxu in the Platonic
contiguous or successive points, both undermines the Pythagorean void dialogues themselves is the mention of plural forms in Phaedo 74c and
(kenon, q.v.) between units and at the same time sets the stage for a Parm. 129b. The existence of the mathematical numbers is, however,
solution of Zeno's paradoxes, since the same arguments pertain to both somewhat more strongly attested (see mathematika).
time and movement that are per accidens magnitudes (Meta. lO27a). 2. The real "intermediary" in the Platonic system is Plato's later
On the problem of irrational numbers or, better, incommensura- doctrine of the psyche; see the important admission of life soul and
.
nous ;nt? the wor d of quasi.-being in i '
Soph. 248e-24gd, ,
and the striking
ble magnitudes, see asymmetron; for the relation of magnitude to
matter, see hyle. descrIptIOn of psyche (Tim. goa-d) that "lifts us from earth to
heaven": this, of course, Aristotle accepts (for its evolution, see psyche
me on: non being 29,35) .
See on. On the question of a medium (metaxu) for sensation, see ais-
thesis, sympatheia.
meson, mes6tes: mean
The Pythagoreans looked upon existent things as a "jnst bal-
ance" (isomoira) between opposites (enantia), see D.L. VIII, 26. Plato
begins to move this ''mean'' position into the area of ethics in Phil. metempsychosis: transmigration of souls
See palingenesia.
23c-26d (where the extremes are called ''unlimited'' [apeironl and the
quantified, mixed, "limit" [peras]). The mathematical overtones are
apparent in this text and the medical ones appear in both P haedo 86b-c methexis: participation
(see harmonia, hedone) and in Aristotle's early Eudemus, fro 7. Aris- M ethexis is the term used by Plato to describe the relationship
totle's classic identification of virtue (arete) with the meson of emo- between the eide and sensible particulars: see Phaedo lOod, and Parm.
tions (pathe) and acts (praxeis) is to be found in Eth. Nich. 13oc-131a (where participation is criticized as implying division).
1l06a-ll09b, where he makes specific reference to limit (peras) as Aristotle sees nothing but a verbal difference between methexis and the
good: see dike. other Platonic term, "imitation" (mimesis), Meta. g87b. Plotinus pre-
For the application of meson to perception, see aisthesis; as a fers to USe other metaphors, but methexis becomes important again in
factor in deriving the elements, stoicheion; in the derivation of the the systematization of Proclus: prop. 6S of the Elem. theol. discusses
hypostases, trias. the metaphysical implications of methexis, while props. 163-16slay out
the series of projections consequent upon methexis.
metabole: change For the more general context, see eidos; some of the difficulties
Aristotle's most generic term for passage from one .·state into
arising from methexis are touched upon in diairesis; for its use in
another, whether on the level of substance where the metabole is called
Proclus, see trias.
llB MIMESIS
MIMESIS I ll9
implication in the theory put forth in Phaedo 74a-75a. Aristotle (Meta.
mimesis: mimicry, imitation, art (i.e., fine art; for the 987b) states that the explanation derives fro~ the .Py:h~goreans who
held that things "imitate" numbers and he subjects It (Ibid. 991a) to a
applied sciences, see tec~me) . . harsh criticism. Although mimesis as applied to sensible particnlars
1. Mimesis, in all its shades of meamngs, IS of central Importance
falls into disuse, the concept that the intelligible world (kosmos noetos,
in Plato. We read in Sophist 265b that the productive arts (poetikai
q.v.) is the paradeigma for the sensible world remains current in later
technai; see techne) are divided into divine cra(tsmanship and 'human
Platonism; see Philo, De opif. 6, 25; Plotinus, Enn. v, 8,12.
craftsmanship (called in Rep. 597d-e phytourgia an~ .demiourgia),
5. The distinction between a "true" reality and a mimetic reality
and that there is, in addition, another type of productivity shared by
will have obvious epistemological implications and these are rendered
both God and man that does not pro duce " " I "s but mereI
ongma '
y copies
(eikones). This is mimesis, the art of the poet, the painter, the sculp- explicit in the schema of the Li~e ~n .Rep. ,p09d:-511~. !rne knowledge
(episteme, q.v.) will be of the 'ongmals, while opmlOn (doxa, q.v.)
tor, or that of the actor who, unlike the others named, does not use tools
is the best one can hope to attain in confronting imitative being. But
but creates the image in his own person (Soph. 267a; Plat~ ~ses
even here there are distinctions: sensible particnlars (see aistheton),
mimesis for the craft of the actor as well, but for purposes of dlstmc-
tlIongh imitations of the eide, are in some sense ."original" when
tion "mimicry" is probably closer to what the context demands) . ..
compared to certain physical phenomena that are Images of other
2. The craftsman (demiourgos), then, whether human or dlVlne,
phenomena, e.g. the sha dows an d mirages· t h a.t are G 0d's ".JOk ~" ( see
produces on two levels: "originals" or real .objects, and i,;,itations ~r
Soph. 234b, 266b-c) on the physical world. ThiS knowledge of Images
images that can only more or .Iess a?pr~xlmat~ th: realIty. of their
(eikasia; see eikon) is the lowest segment of the Line (Rep. 50ge), but
models. Plato is not always conSistent m hiS applIcatIOn of thiS theory.
at tlIis point in the Republic Plato says nothing about man's "joke" on
In Rep. 596b the divine craftsman creates the original, .i.e., the eid~s of
the world, i.e., art (more fully, techne poietike mimetike; for the genus
the bed, the carpenter produces the physical bed that IS only ~n ezkon
and differentia, see techne) .
vis-a-vis the eidos but is the "original" for the bed of the pamter. In
6. The snbject of man's mimetic activity is explored in Rep.
Soph. 265c-d the originals made by the divine craftsman are not the
595a-608b. Plato distinguished craft (dem~our?i~! and ~r: (rr:imesis)
eide but the natural objects of this world, while the products of his
in the Sophist in the context of a search, Vla diVISIOn (dlmreszs, q.v.),
mimetic activity are the shadows and mirages in this world. ~inally,. in
for the infima species that is the sophist. In the Republic passages the
the Timaeus the divine demiourgos does not create the preexistent e,de
context is strongly ethical and the emphases somewhat different. The
and this world seems to be the product of his mimetic activity (Tim.
poets were the traditional teachers of wisdom, .bu: in the 1!epublic ~I~to
30C-3 1b ) . had replaced them with the philosophers; he vmdlcates hiS own pOSitIOn
3. The confusion doubtless arises from the differing contexts and
by attacking the poets' qualifications to teach wisdom.
clearly one should not rest too heavily on the Form of Bed or the divine
7. Plato's objection to the fine arts is twofold: they are untrue and
demiourgos as its creator; most of what Plato wrote suggests the
they are injurious. They are untrue in the ontological sense that has
exclusion of eide for manufactured objects and of any maker for the
already been discnssed: their claim to rea~ity is ~~nuous since th~y are
eide (see eidos). But one point is clear: the activity known as mimesis
imitations of imitations (Rep. 597e). But m additIOn they are gUilty of
has as its product an entity whose ontolo?ical statu.s is i.nf~rior relative
the falsity of discourse: they lie. Plato consistently judges art by its
to that of its model. Thus, on the cosmic level thiS prmCiple sets the
own contemporary claim of reali~m and he finds the poets' p.ortraits ?f
relationship between this world and the world of eide, it grounds
gods and heroes to be inexact III that they portray as evil ."'~at IS
Plato's theory of knowledge, and in the moral sphere it is the point of
essentially good (Rep. 377d-e). Fnrtherlllore, art h~s a dlS:IllCtly
departure for his attack on " a r t . " . .
moral end (ibid. 401b), and even though there are obVIOusly eVil men
4. Mimesis is one of the explanatIOns (see also methexw) or,
whom the arts might realistically portray, by choosing to portray such
better, one of the images offered by Plato to express the relations?ip ?f
they create harmful moral effects in the vie:"er and e:ven, if it is a
the eide to sensible particulars. It finds a fairly elaborate expressIOn m
question of dramatic art, in the performer himself (Ibid. 392C-398b,
Parm. 132C-133a, and again in Tim. 3oc-d where the demiourgos
606c-608b ) .
(q.v.) takes as his model (paradeigma) the intelligible living creature
For the mimetic origins of language, see onoma; for its applica-
(zoiin noeton) that embraces all the Forms and thus creates the kos-
tion to time, chronos; for a mimetic element in Aristotle, energeia.
mos. The same principle is evident even earlier in Grat. 298a-c, and by
120 MIXIS NOESIS I 121
allegoria (see Cicero, De nat. dear. II, 24, 25, 64, 65, and passim; the
mixis: mixture Stoic facility in etymologizing names was of considerable help here; see
See genesis, halon. onoma), and with Philo allegoria passed into the service of accommo-
dating philosophy and scripture (cf. Leg. all., passim).
monas: unit, the one 2. But mythos was not quite so easily dismissed: Aristotle felt
The unit is either the primary arche of the Pythagoreans (D.L. that there was a point in the early cosmogonies where logos and mythos
VIII, 25) or, together with the Dyas, one of the primary co-principles overlapped (Meta. 982b, 1074b; see aporia, endoxon), but the presenta-
(Aristotle, Meta. 986a), ethically associated with the good (agathon), tion of the latter was childlike (Meta. 1000a; compare Plato, Soph.
and considered a god (theos) (Aetius I, 7, 18), even though the 243a), and Plato, for one, was sceptical of the results (see the heavy
position of limit (peras) and apeiron at the head of the list would irony of Tim. 40d-41a). Yet the dialogues are filled with myths that
suggest that they were more primary. Aristotle is quite explicit that playa central part in the development of the argument, as for instance,
number (arithmos) has its own more basic elements (stoicheia), i.e., in the Phaedo and Republic (eschatological; see athanatos), Phaedrus
"Even" and "Odd" (Meta. 986a). According to Aristotle all philoso- (psychological), and Timaeus (physical). Nor is the technique new
phers agree in making the monas the arche of number (arithmos), yet with Plato; it can be seen in Protagoras (if the myth in Protagoras
the Pythagoreans are peculiar in that their units have spatial magni- 320C-323a is his own and not Plato's), in the proem to Parmenides'
tude (ibid. 1080b) that is indivisible (ibid. 1083b), a confusion be- poem (fr. 1) and the half-disguised abstractions of Pherecydes' myths
tween the arithmetical unit and the geometric point, which was cleared (D.L. I, 119; compare Aristotle, Meta. 1091b); see theos.
up later (Nichomachus, Arith. intra. II, 6 and 7). Aristotle's own
definition of the monas is "substance withont position," clearly distinct
from the "point" (stigme) that is "substance with position," Anal.
post. I, 87a; see arithmos, megethos.

mousike: the Muses' art, music

n
See katharsis.

mythos: myth
1. The traditional attitude of philosophy toward myth is ex- n6esis: the operation of nous (g.v.), thinking (as opposed
pressed in the contrast mythos-Iogos, where the latter is intended to to sensation) ,intuition (as opposed to discursive
signify a rational, analytic, and true account (see Plato, Phaedo 61b, reasoning)
Tim. 26e, etc.). It runs parallel to the distinction theologos-physikos 1. Subtle differences between the mere perception of an object
(see theologia), but the relationship of the former pair is somewhat or objects, i.e., sensation (aisthesis, q.v.) and another kind of psychic
more complex. It is clear that both Socrates and Plato had strenuous awareness that goes beyond the sense data and perceives less tangible
moral objections to the traditional myths (Euth. 6a-c, Phaedrus things, like resemblances and differences between objects, is already
229c-230a, Rep. 376e-380c), a type of criticism that went back at least present in Homer and is identified with the organ called nous. With the
as far as Xenophanes (see fro 11). One attempt to meet this type of philosophers the difference becomes a problem. Heraclitus suspects the
attack was the belief that there was an underlying sense (hyponoia) to unreliability of sensation for the perception of the true nature of things.
the old myths. This was apparently popular in fifth-century philosophi- He is tireless in his assertion that "nature loves to hide" (see fro 123
cal circles; see Prodicus (Diels, fro B5), Auaxagoras (D.L. II, 11), and and logos 1), and this hidden reality is clearly beyond the reach of men
Antisthenes (Dio Chrysostom, Orat. 53, 4-5; compare Xenophon, who trust too implicitly in their senses (fr. 107). How the other faculty
Symp. III, 6). Plato will have none of hyponoia (Rep. 378d ) , but in the that is capable of discerning the hidden logos of things might operate is
subsequent literature the use of an allegorical interpretation (allego- not immediately apparent, though we are told (Sextus Empiricus, Adv.
ria), either moral, physical, or cosmogonical, to extract the hidden Math. VII, 129) that the nous that is within us is activated by its
sense became a potent method of reconciling philosophy and the tradi- contact, via the channels of sensation (aisthetikoi poroi), with the
tional material in the poets. The Stoics were particularly active in divine logos in the universe, a contact that is maintained in an atten-
122 I NOESIS NOESIS I 123
uated fashiou duriug sleep by breathing (see pneuma). The senses, problem, aer (q.v.), the intelligent and divine arche, is continuous and
then, are obviously some sort of condition for noesis, though not, as is present in all things that are (fr. 5), but it is present in varying
clear from fr. 107 and its congeners, identical with it. degrees. The degree is based on the dryness and warmth of the air,
2. Aristotle remarks (De an. III, 427a; Meta. 100gb) that the distinctions of texture that explain progressively higher cognitive acts
pre-Socratics generally made no distinction between noesis and ais- (Theophrastus, op. cit. 40-43). In this way are explained the complete
thesis. It is easy to understand why he thought so since they all absence of cognitive activities in plants and the relatively higher degree
attempted to explain the operations of the psyche in purely physical of phronesis in man as compared to the other animals (ibid. 44).
terms, a procedure that, according to Aristotle (loc. cit.), cannot 6. The Atomists' theories of sensible qualities (see aisthesis 11,
account for error (pseudos) since like must know like (see homoi08, pathos 4) demanded refinements in the cognitive faculties. Many
aisthesis). From one point of view this is true; but it is likewise true so-called qualities are merely subjective impressions and the true na-
that since Parmenides' assault on sense perception in terms of the ture of the atomon is not visible to sight. Hence Democritus draws the
instability of its object (see on " episteme 2) it became an epistemo- distinction (fl'. 11) between a genuine and a bastard knowledge; the
logical necessity to distinguish between the obvious perils of aisthesis latter is sensation and the former, presumably (the text breaks off),
and a "true knowledge" more or less independent of the senses. reason, the operation of the logikon that is located in the breast (Aetius
3. These attempts can be seen in Empedocles' doubts about the IV, 4, 6; see kardia 2 and psyche 7). But even though phronesis and
reliability of our sense perception and the need of divine assistance aisthesis have different ohjects and different seats, the mechanics of
(Sextus Empiricus, Ad". Math. VII, 122--124). But the limitations of their operation are the same (Aetius IV, 8, 5; IV, 8, 10).
sensation here seem to be due to our misuse of them rather than to any 7· To resume the pre-Socratic attitude: there were solid episte-
inherent weakness of their own (fl'. 3, lines 9-13). When he comes to mological grounds for making a distinction in kind between thought
explain the possibility of error (called ignorance and opposed to phrone- (noesis, phronesis; in the epistemological context, episteme) and sensa-
sis; Theophrastus, De sens. g), Empedocles resorts to a mechanistic tion (aisthesis; in the epistemological context, doxa), and, indeed, the
explanation of how the effluences (aporrhoai; see aisthesis 7) of one differentiation could be specified when it came to giving them different
sense object are symmetrical only with the pores of its proper sense locations in the body (aisthesis tied to the sense organs; the higher
organ, and so cannot be judged by the others (Theophrastus, op. cit. faculty in a central location, though not always distinguished from the
7). If thought is anything to Empedocles it is a special type of sensa- more generic notion of psyche; see kardia). But the operations of this
tion that occurs in the hlood by reason of its being a perfect mixture of higher faculty could be distinguished from those of sensation only in
all the stoicheia (ibid. 9). degree, e.g. finer or warmer in composition.
4. It is somewhat more perplexing to find Anaxagoras, the 8. Plato, while adhering firmly to the Parmenidean epistemol-
eminent proponent of nous, in Aristotle's catalogue of those who failed ogy (see episteme 2), has, in addition, a new spiritnalized conception
to distinguish sensation and thought. In the fragments we do find the of soul that, though originally posited on religious grounds (see psyche
usual statements casting doubts on sensation (e.g. £r. 21), but there is '3), is incorporated in Plato's theory of knowledge (ibid. 14). It is this
no explanation of noesis. Indeed nous does not seem to be a cognitive pure unitary soul of the Phaedo that becomes the epistemological
principle at all but rather a cosmological one. It initiates motion (and correlative of the eide and, being absolutely different in kind from the
in this it has obvious affinities to soul; see psyche 1, 7, and passim) and body, can perform all the cognitive activities that the post-Parmenidean
it guides and rules all (fr. 12). What Anaxagoras is obviously offering philosophers associated with nous but were unable to explain on the
is the presence of some intelligent and hence purposeful principle in the level of substance. But the problem is considerably more complex than
universe. But it appears the nous is an immanent principle as well and this. Even in the Phaedo the soul is the arche of all cognitive activity:
we are told that it is not present in everything (fr. 11). Alcmaeon of sensation is perception by tlle soul through the body; phronesis is an
Crotona, who had already sharply distinguished phronesis from ais- operation of the soul alone (Phaedo 7gd; see aisthesis '5-,6).
thesis, maintained that the former was characteristic of men only g. In the Phaedo the distinction hetween the two operations is
(Theophrastus, De sens. 25), but we have no idea of the extension of largely in terms of the objects known; in the Republic it reappears, in a
the immanent nous in Anaxagoras. Presumably it would cover the much more complex form, based as well upon the internal operations of
same territory as psyche, i.e., the entire animate world. i the soul. This latter is now divided into three parts (see psyche 15) and
5. For Diogenes of Apollonia, who also addressed himself to the the upper part, the logistikon (ibid. 16), is responsible for noetic
124 I NOESIS NOESIS I 125
activity. But the psychology is far more sophisticated here, and in the forms (eide) of sensible objects (see aisthesis 19), so noesis thinks the
Diagram of the Line in Rep. VI the noetic activity is explained in some intelligible forms in sensible images (phantasiai), and noesis never
detail. The distinction drawn previously (Rep. IV, 476a-480a) between occurs without these latter (ibid. III, 431a-b ) . Noesis can be directly of
episteme and doxa is maintained here, but we discover that there is essences (for the intuitive role of nous, see epagoge 3-4 and compare
more than one type of episteme. The upper part of the Line that Meta. 1036a), or it can operate through judgments (hypolepseis), i.e.,
represented knowledge of the noeta (ibid. 50ge) is further subdivided by the combination (synthesis) or separation (diairesis) of concepts,
into what Plato calls noesis and dianoia (ibid. 51id). and it is only in this latter operation that error (pseudos) is possible
10. These two operations of the logistikon have been much de- (ibid. 430a-b; for the Platonic theory of judgment, see doxa 4).
bated; one school of thought sees dianoia as that activity of the mind For the operation of cosmic nous in Aristotle, cf. nous, kinoun.
which has as its object the "mathematicals," while the objects of noesis 13. The Atomists considered the soul, which was distributed
are the eide (see mathematika 2); the other school sees dianoia as throughout the body (Aristotle, De an. I, 409a; Lucretius III, 370), to
discursive reasoning in general and noesis as immediate intellectual be the seat of all sensation (for the mechanics of this, see aisthesis
intuition, in much the same way as Aristotle (see Anal. post. II, 100b; 22-23). But given that soul (psyche) and mind (nous) are substan-
epagoge 3) and Plotinus (see 18-19 infra) distinguished between tially the same (De an. I, 404a), it would seem to follow that sensation
logismos and nous. What is clear, however, is that the method of noesis and thought are identical, and so Aristotle concluded (Meta. lOo9b; see
is that known to Plato as dialektike; q.v.; ibid. 511b) and the way of Aetius IV, 8, 5; IV, 8, 10). As for its operation, since nous is nothing
life based upon it is philosophia (q.v., and compare phronesis, theo- more than a kind of aggregation (see holon 10) of soul-atoms in the
ria) . breast, it is reasonable to suppose that some of the eidola penetrate
11. There are certain passages in Plato, echoed by Aristotle, that beyond the surface sense organs, reach the interior of the breast, and
give somewhat more of a purely psychological insight into the work- so cause this higher type of perception (see Lucretius IV, 722-731).
ings of the intellective process. Both men seek to derive episteme from 14. But we have already seen that the earlier Atomists had at-
the Greek word to "stand" or "come to a halt" (ephistamai) and so tempted to distinguish, by the purity of its constitution and its location,
explain intellection as a "coming to a halt" in the midst of a series of mind from soul. The Epicureans preserved and refined the distinction
sense impressions, the "fixing" of an intuitive concept (Grat. 437a; and it is specifically present in Lucretius' consistent use of anima for
Phaedo 96b; Anal. post. II, 100a; Phys. VII, 247b). But this psychologi- psyche and animus for nous or dianoia (mens is somewhat too narrow
cal approach is overwhelmed by a flood of ''physical'' considerations. in connotation for the latter since the animus is the seat of volitional as
Noesis is an activity and so must be located within the general catego- well as intellectual activity; III, 145). He clearly separates the two at
ries of change and kinesis. Plato speaks of revolutions in the World 111,396-416 where he argues that part of the anima may be lost (e.g.,
Soul (Tim. 37a) and in the immortal part of the individual soul (ibid. in the loss of a limb) and a man still survive, but the loss of the animus
43a). This owes nothing, of course, to introspection, but is based upon means the instantaneous end of the organism.
considerations of the revolutions of the body of the kosmos that reveal 15. For the Epicurean nous operates somewhat in the fashion of
the motion of its own soul (ibid. 34b) and provide a visible moral the senses. It too may directly perceive the eidola given off by bodies
paradigm for the motions of our own soul (ibid. 47b, and see ouran08 but that are not, in this case, grasped by the senses. Such are, for
2-3; for sensation as motion, see ibid. 43C; and for the larger question example, the accidental mixtures of eidola that give rise to the imagin-
of motion in the soul, psyche 19). ing of centaurs and chimeras (Lucretius IV, 129), visions seen in
For the operation of cosmic nous in Plato, see nous 5-6; kinoun 5. dreams (IV, 749-776), and the eidola ofthe gods (v, 148-14g; Cicero,
12. Aristotle's treatment of noesis, like his explanation of ais- De nat. deor. I, 49). These operations are akin to Aristole's nous
thesis, is conducted within the categories of potency (dynamis) and act thinking of indivisible concepts (De an. III, 430a); there is, as well,
(energeia, q.v.). The nous before it knows is actually nothing but intellection componendo et dividendo, i.e., evaluating and passing
potentially all the things it can know; the eide are present in it but only judgment on the data of sensation. The images (phantasiai) in which
potentially (De an. III, 429a). When the nous begins to operate it the eidola are grouped are passed along to the dianoia or nous where
passes from a passive to an activated state by reason of its becoming they accumulate into general "preconceptions" (prolepseis, q.v.).
identical with its object, the intelligible form (ibid. III, 431a): There is These in turn serve as a standard of comparison for judgments (hypo-
in noesis a parallel with aisthesis: just as aisthesis extracts the sensible lepseis) about individual sensible things (D.L. x, 33). This is the area
------------~.----------

126 I NOESIS NOESIS I 127

of opinion into which error enters (see doxa 7; the Epicurean criterion 18. Middle Platonism concentrated its attention on the cosmic
of truth and error is discussed under enargeia). Finally, the mind is aspects of nous (q.v.) and it is not until Plotinus that we have any
also capable of entering the realm of the imperceptibles (adela) , i.e., to significant contribution to the workings of the immanent nous. As did
perform a discursive reasoning process (logismos, the ratio of Lucre' Plato and Aristotle, Plotinus distinguishes two types of intellectual
tius) dealing with entities not immediately perceptible to the senses, a activity, one intuitive and one discursive. The former, noesis, is, in the
class that would, of course, include the atoma themselves (see D.L. x, first instance, the life and energeia of the cosmic hypostatized nous. It
32 ). . is not, however, an activity of the One since for Plotinus even so
16. The Stoic version of noesis, the operation of the hegemonikon self-integrated an act as noesis bespeaks duality and so is anathema to
(q.v.), is properly katalepsis or apprehension. The process begins with the One (Enn. VI, 6, 3, with passing reference to Plato's remarks in
an impression (typosis) on the senses that results in a sensible image Soph. 254d and Parmenides 146a on the role of "the Other" [heteron]
(phantasia; see aisthesis 2+-25). These are borne, via the pneuma in being and therefore in intellection). What need, Plotinus asks (VI,
(q.v.), to the hegemonikon where it is first assented to (synkatathesis, 7,4), would the eye have to see something if it were itself the light?
adsensio) and is thus apprehended (katalepsis, q.v.; Cicero, Acad. 19. Noesis, then, in its genuine form is a unity of subject and
post. I, 40--42). In this way what was a sensible image (phantasia) object that, though they differ only logically, constitute a plurality
becomes an intelligible image or concept (ennoia, q.v.). In the earliest (plethos). It is characteristically internalized: the noeta that are the
years this is almost an unconscious process and the child builds up objects of noesis are in the nous that knows them (VI, 2, 21). Noesis,
various "preconceptions" (prolepseis, q.v.) under whose influence the which is the life of nous, casts forth its image (eikon) in the form of an
hegemonikon matures to the point where it is capable of creating its energeia in the lower hypostasis of the soul. This is logismos or
own conscious ennoiai (SVF II, 83; according to this same text, the full discursive reasoning, an operation that, unlike the immediate and inter-
operation of the hegemonikon begins at the age of seven, or at least nalized noesis, comprehends the phantasmata of objects outside itself
between seven and fourteen, a judgment not based on the observation offered to it by sensation, and makes judgments (kriseis) concerning
of rational behavior in adolescents but on the onset of puberty and the them by invoking rnles (kanones) transmitted from nous (v, 3, 4), or,
first production of sperm; see SVF II, 764, 785). As in Epicureanism, as he puts it elsewhere, by composition and division (synagoge, di-
noesis is not only of the aistheta but ranges freely over a wide area of airesis: v, 3, 2; see the Platonic antecedents of theseterms under dialek-
thought, creating its own ennoiai by recourse to the principles of tike). What he refers to here is a knowledge of the eide supplied by the
similarity, analogy, privation, opposition, etc. (SVF II, 87). nous that contains them and that make possible our comparative judg-
On the Stoics' primary prolepsis of good and evil, see oikeiosis. ments (cf. V, 1, 11; V, 3, 3; and compare Phaedo 74a ff.).
'7. This theory did not remain completely intact. Chrysippus 20. The soul is capable of two activities: when "turned upward"
made some important revisions that had as their effect the reunification it gives itself over to noesis/logismosj when "downward," to aisthesis
of the psyche under the aegis of the hegemonikon so that even the and the operation of the other faculties (VI, 2, 22; see aisthesis 26).
pathe became intellectual judgments (kriseis; SVF III, 461) and, in Sensation uses a medium, an image (phantasma), separated from its
direct opposition to Plato's vision of the tripartite soul, volitional activ- model and yet different from the thing in which it resides; noesis is
ity was subsumed under the intellectual (SVF II, 823; see aisthesis 25, immediate: knower and known confront each other directly and become
pathos 12). This is followed by a strong Platonizing reaction under identified (v, 3, 8). But we do not have noesis in its purity. Noesis is a
Poseidonius who opposed Chrysippus on the intellectual nature of the vision of unity; our image of it, logismos, deals with plurality, and the
pathe and restored the Platonic partition of the soul (Galen, Placita more one frees oneself from the composing and dividing that is our
Hipp. et Plat. 448, 460). There follows from this a sharper distinction imitation of noesis and turns instead to a contemplation of self, the
between psyche and nous (particularly apparent in Marcus Aurelius more one will be assimilating oneself to the true operation of nous (v,
III, 16; XII, 3) with emphasis on the divine and immortal nature of 3, 6). Why the soul is forced to endure this logismos is part of tl,e
nous as opposed to the other parts of the soul (see sympatheia 5), and, general condition of its descent into a body (see kathodos). It is, like
by reason of the presence of this daimon in it (so Galen, op. cit. 448; its external manifestation, language, a weakness, a sign of the soul's
Plutarch, De genio Socr. 591C-f; Platonic inspiration in Tim. 90a and preoccupation with areas not akin to itself (IV, 3, 18).
see daimon), a new interest in the medial position of the soul (see 21. In this passage (IV, 3, 18) Plotinus makes use of the principle
psyche 29). of attention (phrontis) to explain the degeneration of noesis into logis-
128 I NOETON NOETON I 129
mas (compare the elaborate metaphor in IV, 3, 17 where the soul's (see nous 11). But in terms of Aristotelian act-potency theory, the
preoccupation with the material is compared to that of a ship's captain noeta shonld all be present in act in the nous poetikos (see nous 12).
toward his ship and its cargo; for the further degeneration of thought But Aristotle never says this, resorting to a comparison of the operation
into activity, see physis 5) and he resorts to a similar type of explana- of the agent intellect to that of a light source: the active intellect
tion in confronting another problem. If nous is a faculty in the soul, illumines the passive intellect (ibid. III, 430a).
how is one to explain the intermittent nature of noesis in man as 2. During the period of Middle Platonism a number of revisions
compared to its continnous exercise in the higher principle? Aristotle were ';lade in the eidos-theory, part of what was very probably an
had already faced the question and had suggested that while the extenSIVe syncretizing of Platonism and Peripateticism (baldly put in
objects of noesis are always in the mind, they are not always present to Cicero, Acad. post. I, 17-18) in snch a fashion as to include both the
the mind; in short, man must choose to think (De an. II, 417b). Platonic transcendent eidos and the Aristotelian immanent eidos within
Fnrther, this activity can last for only brief periods in man since it the causality schema (its progressive development can be traced in
involves a passage from potency to act and so fatigues the thinker Seneca, Ep. 65, 8 and Basil the Great, De spiritu sancto 76a). Anthors
(Meta. 1050b, l072b; Eth. Nich. 1175a). For Plotinus it is a question of of the period began to draw a distinction between the eidos that is
awareness. The immanent nous is always in operation but we, because immanent in things as their formal cause and the idea that is the
our attention is turned elsewhere, are not always aware of it (IV, 8, 8). exemplary cause of natural things (Seneca, Ep. 58, 19; Albinus, Epit.
This view, based as it is on a desire to keep the human soul perpetually IX, 2; compare Aristotle, Meta. 107oa). They appealed to such Platonic
linked, via the nous, to the kosmos noetos, Proclus finds a novelty in the proof-texts as Tim. 48e and 5oc-d (see Chalcidius, In Tim. 304, 9
Platonic tradition (In Tim. III, 333-334) and therefore returns to the where idea = species intelligibilis and eidos = natura corporis; on the
position of an intermittent functioning of noesis in the "descended" general qnestion of tlle immanence of the Platonic eide, see genesis
soul (Elem. theol., prop. 211; see kathodos and psyche 35). 10-11), and the constant invocation of the example of the artisan, with
its overtones of the Platonic demiourgos, seems finally to have led to
noet6n: capable of being grasped by the intellect; the the explicit description of the ideai as ''the thoughts of God" (Philo,
object of the intellect, the intelligible (opposite De opit. 17-20; D.L. III, 12-13; Seneca, Ep. 65, 7; Albinns, Epit. IX, 1:
of aistheton) noeseis theou). This was not, of course, a completely novel concept. It
1. The noeton is the object of the operation of the faculty of nous. does seem alien to Plato for whom the nous,demiourgos, for all its
Among the pre-Socratics, where the distinction of nous from the gen- being a God, was markedly subordinate to the transcendent eide (see
eral cognitive principle of the psyche was a very gradual one (see nous 6). But Aristotle speaks (De an. III, 429a) as if someone in the
noesis 7), the objects of the former faculty were not very closely Academy were holding that the nous was "the place of the Forms"
considered. They do, of course, constitute "true knowledge" (epis- (topos eidon) and, as we have already seen, the direction of Aristotle's
teme, q.v.), for Heraclitus the knowledge of "the nature that loves to own theorizing would seem to suggest that the noeta are actually
hide," for Parmenides the knowledge of ''true being." With Plato the present in the nous poietikos and, possibly, in the cosmic nous as well
distinctions become sharper. The noeta are the objects of the facnlty of (see nOllS 9).
the soul called logistikon (see psyche 15-18); they are, in short, the 3· Two points are to be noted in the subsequent history of the
transcendent eide. Bnt for Aristotle the eide are immanent (see eidos transcendent noeta, the ideai of Albinus, which serve as the exemplary
15) and so further distinctions are in order. The eidas in things can be cause of things. First, since Albinus' first principle is a nous and a
considered from two points of view. With respect to the substance in demiourgos (see nous 15), there is nothing to militate against the noeta
which it inheres, it is the formal cause of that substance; with respect being the thoughts (noeseis) of God. But between Albinus and Plo-
to the naus of another, it is potentially intelligible (noeton) by that tinus the transcendence of the One has displaced nous from the first
nous. But before it becomes actually noeton it must be carried to and place in the hierarchy of hypostases, and the question immediately
presented to that nous. This is the function of the phantasma that. is arises as to whether the noeta are the thoughts of the One and, indeed,
like a visual image except that it is without matter: the nous thinks the whether there is any noetic activity at all in the One. Secondly, grant-
noeta in the phantasmata (De an. III, 431b-432a). In the final analysis, ing that the noeta are in the cosmic nous, what exactly is their ontologi-
then, the noeta qua noeta are in the nous, first potentially, :then ac- cal status?
tually. This transition from potency to act occurs in the nous pathetikos 4- The question of the noetic activity of the One was almost
130 1 NOETON NOMOS 1131
certainly raised by Aristotle's description of the energeia of the First soul possesses the eide of sensible things (i.e., the logoi spermatikoi)
Mover as noesis (see nous 9). Such a position is irreconcilable with in an exemplary manner (paradeigmatikos) , without matter and with-
Plotinus' view of the One and he devotes an entire essay (Enn. v, 6) to out extension (see physis) . It possesses the intelligible forms, the noeta
a refutation of Aristotle's view. The arguments are drawn from a in a reflected manner (eikonikos); it does not embrace the genuine
variety of sources (they are, in fact, so schematic as to suggest a articles but mere radiations (emphaseis) of them.
Platonic repertoire on the subject) but they hinge essentially nn the For hyle noete, see aphairesis; for the relativity of intelligibility,
necessary plurality in any type of noesis and on the ontological status of gnorimon. The faculty that grasps the noeta, whether on a cosmic or
the noeta that, in Plotiuus' view, are not thoughts at all. Proclus, human level, is treated under nous and psyche and its operation under
however, returns to a more Aristotelian position. There is a cognitive noesis. The earlier history of the noeta qua Forms is discussed under
activity in God that is undivided, necessary, and perfectly determined, eidos.
even though its objects are not; this is possible because God's knowl-
edge (gnosis) is not of particulars in themselves, hut in himself as in n6mos: custom, convention, constitutional or arbitrary
their cause (Elem. theol., prop. 124); see trias, nous g. law
5. The second point, the ontological status of the noeta, is taken 1. The intrusion of nomos into philosophical discourse in the fifth
up by Plotinus in Enn. v, 9, 7. The possibility that the eide were mere centnry followed upon the shift of the notion of nature (physis) from
ideas or concepts (noemata) had already been raised and denied in the physical to the ethical realm. This may have been a result of
Parm. 132a-c. But the Academy went through a sceptical period under medical influence ("On the Nature [physisl of Man" appears as a title
Arcesilaus and Carneades during which the transcendent ideai fell into in the Hippocratic corpus), but can be seen as well in the ethical
disfavor (see Cicero, Acad. post. I, 17; for the restoration of the ideai coloring ofthe concept of kosmos (q.v.). From the other side there was
by Antiochus of Ascalon, ibid. I, 30-33) and it was evidently still very an increasing understanding of the purely arbitrary and relative nature
much of a problem for Plotinus. He denies their purely conceptual of nomos (see the two anecdotes in Herodotus III, 38). The first
reality. The noeta are not properly descrihed as the thoughts (noeseis) explicitly to embrace the position that justice and injustice are a ques-
of the cosmic nous because, unlike thoughts, their existence does not tion of nomos and not physis was Archelaus (D.L. II, 16), though it
depend upon being thought: here thinking and thought are identical; already seems to be implied in Heraclitus (fr. 102). The view became a
nous eternally energized is the noeta (see v, 9, 5). Further, if they common one among the Sophists, and their relativist views, whether in
were thoughts, there would have to exist objects of thought (noou- morality (Protagoras in Protagoras) , politics (Thrasymachus in Rep.
mena) prior to them. The noeta exist of themselves, not because nous II), or epistemology (Protagoras at 152a ) , are frequently cited by
thinks them (v, g, 7) . They are present in the cosmic nous as a unity in Plato. Plato's own ethical and epistemological absolutism is not, of
the way that a genus contains all its species (v, 9, 6) or a science course, based on any defense of the old-fashioned notion of physis, but
contains all its theorems; it is we who separate them in our discursive on the nnchanging eide, and, as he grows older, on the existence of
mode of thought (v, 9, 8; see noesis 19-20). God. In Laws 716c Protagoras' homo mensura theory is finally cor-
6. For Plotinus there are two grades of noeta: the ideai that exist rected: God is the measure of all things (theios nomos) .
in a state of unity in the cosmic nous, and those that have a plural 2. The idea of a divine law had already been advanced by Hera-
existence in our immanent, human nous and that are given to us by the clitus, fro 114 (see kosmos), and there were subsequent appeals to
transcendent nous that is the dator formarum (see nous 21). In v, 9, 8 ''unwritten law" (agraphos nomos), which, far from being mere con-
he says that these latter are "close to reality [aletheial," but in general vention, has a divine sanction (so Xenophon, Mem. IV, 4, 5-25; Sopho-
he does not much insist on a difference between the two, and we are cles, Oed. Tyr. 863-871, Ant. 449-460; Aristotle, Rhet. 1368b,
told that each of us is a kosmos no etas (q.v.), i.e., we have within our 1373a-b). But none of them rests on a philosophical conception of a
souls all the noeta (III, 4, 3). The emphases are somewhat changed in physis that grounds nomos; this appears in Stoicism with its doctrine
Proclus. The two men disagreed on the question of the degree of of physis as an immanent logos (Seneca, De benef. IV, 7-8), and its
contact between the transcendent and immanent nous (see their differ- definition of virtue as "living according to nature" (D.L. VII, 86-87)
ent explanations of the intermittent nature of human intellection under where "nature" is to be understood in both its cosmic and individual
noesis 21) , and this disagreement is reflected in their views of the noeta sense (idem VII, 89). It is this "nature," the divina ratio (see logos)
in our souls. According to Proclus (Elem. theol., props. 194-195) the that is immanent, eternal, and immutable (Cicero, De leg. II, 4, 8; De
~32 t NOMOTHETES
NOMOTHETES t ~33
republica III, 33) that founds human laws. Its operation is most emi- without any change in God himself (see Aeschylus, Suppl. 96-103).
nently visible in man's first "instinctive" (physikos) impulse toward How this difficult feat was to be accomplished was left to others to
self-preservation that gradually extends to embrace all of mankind (see determine (see kinoun 9, pronoia 2, proDdos 2) .
oikeiosis) . 3. Anaxagoras turns to Xenophanes' notion of God as nous in
3. This is what may be called the immanent tmdition in natural positing a motive force that causes the original "mixture" to rotate and
law; the transcendent tradition, based on the nous of a "separated separate off into the various elements (see genesis 7). For Empedocles'
God" can be seen in Plato, Laws 7'3e-7'4a and Philo, De migre. Abr. moral hypostases has been substituted an intellectual principle, nous,
32, '79-,8,; see thesis, dike. that is separate from the mass upon which it works (fr. 12; but it is
also curiously immanent; see noesis 4). Its operation is described as
nomothetes: law-given "ordering" (diakosmesis), and it knows all things, past, present, and
See onoma. future (fr. 12 cont.). Here, then, the Heraclitan and Pythagorean or-
der in the universe, governed, according to Heraclitus (fr. 64), by
nons: intelligence, intellect, mind the all-pervasive fire, is put under the tutelage of a purposeful intellec-
1. A search for order or an ordering principle is implicit in both
tual force whose knowledge embraces not only the past and present but
Greek mythology and philosophy from their beginnings, in the myths future events as well.
by the application of a genealogical arrangement back to an original 4- The aer of Diogenes of Apollonia, which in its warmed state
source or "father" to the welter of gods drawn from a variety of is nous (see noesis 5), is more a Milesian arche than a post-
sources, and among the Milesian philosophers by their search for an Parmenidean kinoun (see noesis 4), but has an even more strongly
arche (q.v.). This latter quest for a "father" of things received its developed sense of purpose (telos, q.v.). Both Socrates (Phaedo 97b)
initial check with the discovery of a "father" who consumed all his and Aristotle (Meta. 984b) had criticized Anaxagoras for his mecha-
"sons," i.e., the on (q.v.) of Parmenides. But regress to a source is nistic use of nous, but Diogenes is somewhat more careful in his
only one type of order, and thinkers with a very different cast of mind handling of the problem. The operation of aer-nous is witnessed by the
were investigating the problem in other directions. ~here is, Heraclitus fact that all things operate according to a principle of measure (me-
insists, an order hidden nnder the appearances of thmgs, an order t~at tron) and in the best way possible (fr. 3; his own example is the
he describes as logos (q.v. 1). The Pythagoreans went further still: regular succession of the seasons) .
they discovered that this order could be expressed in mathematical For the subsequent history of these teleological motifs, see telos.
terms (see harmonia) and, made explicit, that it could be applied to the 5. In addition to the nous immanent in human souls (the logisti-
nniverse as a whole (see kosmos) . kon; see psyche '5, 18) whose operation is to know the eide and rnle
2. The kinetic conditions imposed by Parmenides had led his the other parts of the soul (see noesis 8-9), there is, in Plato, a cosmic
successors to posit some sort of external mover to explain change in the nous. This cosmic reason emerges in Phil. 26e-27c where it is called
sensible world (see kinesis 2, kinoun 1). To do so Empedocles had "the maker" (demiourgoun, poioun), the "cause of the mixture" that
reached into the moral sphere for hypostatizations of the human motive is the world of genesis. Almost the same terms are applied to the
forces of "Love" and "Strife" (see kinoun 2), but for his choice of a demiourgos (q.v.) of the Timaeus where the kosmos noetos is called
mover Anaxagoras turned to another tradition. What Parmenides had the work of nous (47e). Now nous is an essential property of the gods
done in ontology had already been accomplished in theology by Xenoph- shared by only a few men (ibid. 51e) and it seems more than likely
anes. Part of Xenophanes' struggle against anthropomorphism (see that this cosmic nous is divine (see Phil. 30d, Tim. 30b). It rules
mythos 1, theos 1) was his insistence that God must be completely everything (Laws 87sc-d), has ordered the universe (~bid. 966e), and
immobile (fr. 26; the argument here is based on "what is fitting," its revolution, reflected in the motion of the heavens, IS a moral para-
prepon, a recurring aesthetic, moral, and theological motif) and one digm for man (ibid. 897d-898a; see noesis 10).
who accomplishes his ends by the power of his mind (nous) alone (fr. 6. But any attempt to locate this divine nous, the cosmic ~au~e
25). These sentiments are pregnant with future developments. Apart of the universe, within the framework of Plato's general metaphysI~S IS
from establishing, here at the 011set of theological discourse, the intel- greeted with frustmtion, and not least by reason of the. "mythical"
lectual nature of God, Xenophanes' view confronts the question of his nature o£the account in the Timaeus. On a number of occasIOns we are
activity in the world and draws the conclusion that this must take place informed that nous must exist in a soul (see Soph. 249a, Phil. 30C,
134 I NOMOTHETES NOMOTHETES I 135
Tim. 30b), and there are no grounds for thinking that this refers only since its object is always present (loc. cit.). God thinks himself; he is
to human intellects. If this is true it locates nous, cosmic or otherwise, thought about thought (noesis noeseos; ibid. 1074b ) , or perhaps
beneath the eide. The intermediary status of the soul in the Platonic thought about himself thinking. This activity is explicitly contrasted to
system is well attested (immortal and immaterial like the eide; plural all other forms of thought, epiBteme, aisthesis, doxa, dianoia, the first
and subject to pathe like the aistheta; see psyche 14 and, for the later object of whose operation is "another" (allon) and then themselves
tradition, 2g) , and we are told quite specifically that nous has a depend- thinking, but this latter only incidentally (parergon; loc. cit.; for the
ent relationship on the eide that are the cause of nous' being in the soul: corollary of this, developed by Proclus, that God knows himself di-
nous is the ability of the soul to perceive the eide (Rep. 5oSe). Thus rectly and the plural noeta only incidentally, see noeton 4).
are frustrated any attempts at finding a transcendent God or gods in 10. In a number of places Aristotle compares human and divine
Plato (in the Phaedrus Plato says the gods owe their divinity to their noesis. Since man is a composite (syntheton) comprising body and a
nearness to the eide) , or even to identify it or them with the Good that noetic soul, his noesis is intermittent and wearisome because it involves
is "beyond being" in Rep. 50gb. Another school of thought, however, a passage from potency to act (Meta. 1050b, 1072b; Eth. Nich. x,
sees the cosmic nous as the nous of the World Soul (psyche tou 1175a). But noesis, for all the wearisome nature of its operation in us,
pantos) , dismissing as myth the fact that in the Timaeus the World is, nevertheless, the proper function (ergon, q.v.) of both God and
Soul is created by the demiourgos (34c). man. And when we practice contemplation (theoria) we most ap-
7. In this fashion, then, Plato fulfills the desideratum of Socra- proach the life of God and most contribute to our own happiness (Eth.
tes' complaint against Anaxagoras' nous: first, it is stated in terms Nich. x, 1177b-117Sa, 1178b). But human noesis differs from its divine
already formulated by Diogenes that the kosmos is as it is because it is counterpart by more than its intermittency. The former is not only
the work of an intelligent cause, framed to be "as good as possible" mediate (i.e., it knows the noeta in visible images), it is also discursive;
(Tim. 30a-b), and then, in a peculiarly Platonic formulation, that it is it judges by combining and separating concepts (see noesis 12). Aris-
an image (eikon, q.v.) of the intelligible, a visible god (ibid. g2C; on totle does have an intuitive form of human knowledge, which he calls
the general theory, see mimesis) . nous, but it seems to be posited on epistemological grounds and never
S. Aristotle's transcendent principle is first and foremost a appears in a "mystical" context (see epagoge 3, gnorimon 2).
"mover," developed out of a series of arguments that derive from the 11. The functioning of the Aristotelian faculty of nous is clear in
nature of kinesiB and genesis (see kinoun 7-10) and that Aristotle, like its general outlines, but the strict application of the principles of act
Anaxagoras, chooses to identify with an intelligent principle, nous. But and potency lead to a number of obscurities. There seems to be a
unlike Anaxagoras, he is now confronted with a "separation" between distinction of faculty within the soul. The intellect must be potentially
the material and the immaterial and so must resort, even in the case of anything that it will know actually. But any passage from potency to
this efficient cause, to the motive force of final causality (see kinoun 7, act demands a principle already in act (the same argument that leads
sympatheia 7). He has, as well, a more highly developed explanation of to the First Mover) and so Aristotle posits another intellect that
intellection (noesis) based upon his theory of energeialdynamis and "makes all things." These are distinctions (diaphorai) that occur in
that he must also apply to his proton kinoun. the soul and the two intellects stand to each other as matter to form
g. In the De anima Aristotle had described knowledge, in all its (De an. III, 43oa). One, the passive intellect (pathetikos nous), later
manifestations, as becoming another, but only with respect to its form, called "hylic" (hylikos) , is perishable. The other, described as "a kind
not its matter (III, 425b, 431b-432a). To speak more specifically of of state rhexis] like the sun," is separable (choristos) , unaffected
noesis (q.v. 12), it is a passage from potency to act (energeia) in (apathes) , unmixed (amiges) , and essentially an energeia. When it is
becoming the intelligible form of another, and this is effected by separated (choristheis) , it alone is immortal and everlasting (aidion).
knowing this intelligible in its sensible image (III, 431b). Now the 12. All of this occurs in one brief passage in the De anima (III,
proton kinoun is described as nous and its energeia as noesis (Meta. 5) , and it, together with a parallel passage in the De gen. animo II, 736b
1072b ) , but it is clear that this must somehow differ from tl,e opera- that states that the nous, which alone is divine and has no commerce
tions described in the De anima. In the first instance, cosmic nous is not with any physical energeia, comes "from outside" (thyrathen), has
activated by something else since this would be to say that it is in provoked more comment than any other text in Aristotle. It appears
potency to something else and thus not an unmoved mover. The cosmic clearly enough that we know because the nous pathetikos is energized,
nous, then, does not become its object; it is its object, and this eternally i.e., it becomes the intelligible form of the object known by reason of
136 I NOMOTHETES NOMOTHETES I 137
the operation of another "part" of nous that is already in act (see cause, see agnostos). This protos nous of the Philebus is also the
Meta. 104gb). But the origin and precise nature of the operation of this demiourgos of the Timaeus who looks to the eide in his creation of the
latter nous poietikos or agent intellect, as it came to be known, was kosmos, save that the eide are now located in the mind of the demiour-
fiercely debated. gos (ibid. XII, 1 and noeton 2).
'3. Most of the later complexities stem from a series of essays on 16. But there is an Aristotelian side to this as well. The first nous
the subject by the Peripatetic Alexander of Aphrodisias who distin- thinks himself, and, though he is himself unmoved (akinetos), he
guished another phase between the nous pathetikos and poielikos. This moves others as an object of desire (orekton; lac. cit.). Aristotle had
is the intellect in habitu that results from the purely passive intellect further designated the proton kinoun as God and his later commenta-
(also later identified with the imagination) becoming potentially intel- tors identified both with the nous poietikos of the De anima. Albinus,
ligible by being illuminated by the nous poielikos and thus acquiring a while he describes the protos nous as thinking himself in the prescribed
"state" (hexis, habitus) of intelligibility (De intellectu, p. 107). He Aristotelian fashion (Epit. X, 3), has a further subordinate principle, a
further measures the nous poietikos as it is described in the De anima second transcendent nous that is always energized and that is "the nous
against that of the First Mover in the Metaphysics and concludes that of the whole heaven," a description that at least suggests the proton
the agent intellect is, indeed, the first cause (proton aition; De anima, kinoun of the Metaphysics. What seems likely is that Albinus has
p. 89), an identification that was later to be accommodated to the N eo- disting~ished the final and efficient causality that Aristotle had united,
platonic belief in a series of intermediary intelligences, where the last and aSSIgned the first to the protos nous that moves "as an object of
emanation, Aristotle's nous poietikos, becomes the bestower of forms, desi:e" (x, 2) and the second to the subordinate "'ous. There is, finally,
i.e., the intelligible forms are not extracted from the material phanta- a thIrd transcendent nous, a faculty of the World Soul (x, 3). Visible
siai, as in Aristotle, but are given to the human intellect by a higher ~ere ar~ al.l the motifs of N eoplatonism: three transcendent hyposta-
intelligence (see 20 infra and noeton 6) . trzed prmcIples that may be denominated, in terms of their emphases,
'4. The Epicureans recognized nous (Lucretius: animus) as a the Good, nous, psyche, all the causality proceeding from the first, even
cognitive faculty distinct from aisthesis (see noesis 14), but in a here described as "like the sun" or "Father."
materialist system devoid of providence (pronoia) it is given no impor- '7· Present too is another trait that is characteristic not only of
tant cosmic role. In Stoicism, however, the human nous or hegemoni- later Platonism but of the entire philosophical tradition after Aristotle.
kon (see noesis 15) is a manifestation of the cosmic nous or logos that Plato had considered the stars as intelligent living beings (see ouranioi
pervades, directs, and governs all (D.L. VII, 135, 138). To call the 6) and Aristotle had given to each an intelligent mover (see kinoun
logos both nous (in its providential aspect) and physis (in its creative 11-12; ouranioi 3). Middle Platonists incorporated this too into their
aspect) is to blur the distinction that Aristotle had drawn between the systems. The planets are intellectual living beillgs dwelling in the
two, but the more Aristotelian (and Platonic) view once more begins aither (Albinus, Epit. XIV, 7) and beneath them are the daimones of
to prevail in the tradition from the time of Poseidonius when nous the aer, also gods, children of the "Father," more perfect than men and
reappears as a characteristic of men alone, immortal, a product of the responsib:e for omens and prodigies (ibid. xv, 2; Maximus of Tyre XI,
superlunary worlcl (see noesis '7, sympatheia 5). The Platonists of the 12; Apulems, De deo Socr. 6; see daimon 3-4, psyche 35).
period, on the other hand, could assert the transcendence of nous 18. As has already been indicated (see 6 supra), ti,e nous-
without the immanentist restrictions imposed by the Stoic tradition. demiourgos in Plato seems to be subordinated to the eide, and thus to
15. Since the revival of the eidos-theory with Antiochus of Asca- the Good of the Republic as well. Albinus' first nous embraces all of
Ion (see Cicero, Acad. post. I, 30-33 where Varro gives the philosophi- these entities, but thereafter new emphases are to be seen. The protos
cal point of view of Antiochus) there was a new interest in the prob- nous begins to yield to the hen-agathon of the Parmenides and Re-
lems of causality in the kosmos noetos. To resolve some of the problems public, and the nous-demiourgos function to center on ti,e second
Platonic scholars of the period did not hesitate to have recourse to hypostasis. These are the views of Numenius (see Eusebius, Praep.
Aristotle. Thus the purely Platonic elements grow out of a synthesis of Evang. XI, 356d-358b), as they will be of Plotinus, stolen, as some
the Good beyond being of the Republic, the One of the Parmenides, the said, from Numenius (see Porphyry, Vita Plot. XVII, 1). But there are
nous of the Philebus, and the demiourgos of the Timaeus: the first differences as well. The second hypostasis of Numenius is twofold; its
cause is nous, the source of all good in the universe, beyond qualifica' primary function, which is noesis, degenerating into discursive dianoia
tion and description (Albinus, Epit. x, 1-4; on the "unspeakable" by reason of its involvement with matter (Eusebius, op. cil. XI, 537;
138 [ NOMOTHETES OCHEMA [139
Proclus, In Tim. III, 103). In Plotinus, who also avails himself of the nous where they constitnte the kosmos noetos (q.v.) or, after bestowal,
concept of "attention" (phrontis; see noesis 21), the polarity is trans- in the immanent human nous where, as "traces of nous," they provide
ferred to the third hypostasis; it is the cosmic soul that has an "upper" the grounds for certain of our judgments (see noesis 19 and, for a
and "lower" side (see psyche tau pantos, physis) . more comprehensive treatment of the ideai, noeton) .
19. Plotinus follows the general Platonic tradition in making
nous the second of the three hypostases (q.v.). It is the demiourgos in
that it supplies the psyche with the logoi that ardhe forms of sensible
things (Enn. v, g, 3), but in general the creative function belongs
more properly to physis, the lower part of the psyche, whose contem-
plation lapses into activity (praxis; III, 8, 4). Proclus puts more stress
on nous as the arche of this sensible world, but he agrees with Plotinus
o
that creation (see also proodos) is a consequence of theoria or noesis
(Elem. theol., prop. 174).
20. The first principle, the One, is perfectly self-sufficient and
needs nothing; the cosmic nous, on the other hand, has a need of itself, ochema: vehicle, chariot, astral body
a need of thinking itself, and so its operation of noesis is, in a sense, a 1. As appears from the history of the psyche (q.v.), a number of
return to itself (Enn v, 3, 13). Nous is the energeia and logos of the apparently irreconcilable strains were present in its development al-
One (v, 1, 6; compare Philo's view under logos 5) and a type of most from the beginning: the materialist view that sees the psyche as
pluralistic externalization of the absolute unity of the One, just as our a refined form of one or other of the elements, and eventually, as the
discursive reasoning is an eikon of the relatively uuified operation of pneuma, a kind of fifth element akin to aither (q.v.); the spiritualist
the cosmic nous (see noesis 18). The proper activity of nous is a direct view flowing from the Pythagorean doctrine of the soul as a divine
intuitive grasp of the noeta as a unity, not in the sense that the nous' substance different in kind from the body; and, finally, the Aristotelian
"thinks" the noeta, but rather it is the noeta (see noeton 5) . entelecheia (q.v.) tlleory that attempts to explain the psyche in terms
21. The cosmic nous, a Platonic heritage, is linked with the of the function (see ergon, energeia) of some body.
reasoning power immanent in man by a species of Aristotelian bridge. 2. Later Platonism was, in effect, forced to come to terms with
The Aristotelian distinction of dissolution of nous into an active energ- the mtelecheia view by reason of Plato's interest in function in the
eia and a passive dynamis is taken up and modified by Plotinus. In Timacus. This they attempted to do by means of a theory that, in its
Enn. v, g, 3 Plotinus asks himself, in his usual aporematic fashion, if most general terms, states that the soul :has another quasi-physical
there is a nous choristos, and then proceeds to answer by distinguishing body or ochema, usually acquired during the prenatal "descent"
between a nous that is in the soul as an eidos in matter and a nous that through tlle heavens (kathodos, q.v.; see Plotinus, Enn. IV, 3, 15;
"gives the form to the soul as the maker [poiotes] gives form to the Macrobius, In Somn. Scip. I, 12). This becomes progressively heavier
statne." Thus the Aristotelian nous poietikos is transformed into the and more visible as it descends through the moist aer (Porphyry, De
dator forrnarum. The same passage goes on to draw a distinction be- antra nymph. 11). With their usual textual piety the Neoplatonists
tween the eide themselves. The eide that the nous gives to the soul are professed to discover the origin of this doctrine in Plato, and particu-
"close to reality," those received by matter are "images and imitations" larly in Tim. 41d-e where the demiourgos sows each soul in a star, "as
(eidola, mimemata; see noeton 6) . in a chariot" (ochema; compare Phaedrus 247b), preliminary to em-
22. There are, then, three degrees of reality among the Plotinian bodying some of them on earth and "storing" others in the planets
eide. The lowest, the eide aistheta in material things, are eikones of the (ibid. 42d). But when it comes to explaining tlle nature of these
true Forms. They serve both a cognitive and paradigmatic end. As "vehicles," resort is made to Aristotle.
existing in others they form the basis of sensation on the Aristotelian 3. Aristotle had described pneuma (q.v.) as the seat of the
model (see aisthesis 26); as existing in oneself they are the cansal nutritive (threptike) and sensitive (aisthetike) soul and analogous in
paradigms of the production of other beings (see logoi spermatikoi, composition to aither that is the material element of the stars (De gen.
physis). There are, too, the eide noeta or, as they are called from animo 736b-737a). Thus the "vehicle" of the soul is described by the
Middle Platonism on, the ideai, which exist primarily in the cosmic Neoplatonists as an aetherial (aitherodes) and light-like (augoeides)
 OIKEIOSIS ON, ONTA 1141
body (Iamblichus, De myst. III, 14; the sidereum and luminosum providing the ground for the Stoic emphasis on a social ethic based on
corpus of Macrobius, In Somn. Scip. I, 12 and II, 13). nature rather than convention. See nomos, physis.
+ The theory is set out, with a considerable number of refine-
ments, in Proclus, Elem. theol., props. 205-209. Each human soul is on,onta (pl.): being, beings
initially under the influence of the divine soul (see psyche, ouranioi) in 1. The question of the nature of being first arose in the context of
one or other of the planets (prop. 204; see Tim. 42d and Proclus, In Parmenides' series of logical dichotomies between being and nonbeing
Tim. III, 280). The astrological implications of this are obvious, but (me on) : that which is, cannot not be; that which is not, cannot be, i.e.,
there was a general Neoplatonic consensus that the theiai psychai of the a denial of passage from being to nonbeing or genesis (q.v.; fro 2), and
planets were not responsible for evil (Plotinus, Enn. II, 3, 10; Iambli- its corollary, a denial of change and motion (fr. 8, lines 26-33, 42-50;
chus, De myst. I, 18; Proclus, In Tim. III, 313). The astral body of the for the theological correlatives of this, see nous 2). Secondly, being is
individual soul is consequently related to the body of the planetary soul one and not many (fr. 8, lines 22--25). And finally, the epistemological
(prop. 204; compare Enn. IV, 4, 31 and see sympatheia) . But this is the premiss: only being can be known or named; nonbeing cannot (fr. 3;
immortal, immaterial body perpetually attached to the soul (props. fro 8, line 34); see doxa. Being, in short, is a sphere (fr. 8, lines
206-207) ; there is another perishable body that the soul acquires dur- 42-49). Most of the later pre-Socratics denied this latter premiss (cf.
ing its descent, composed of increasingly material "mantles" (chi- stoicheion and atomon) , as did Plato for whom the really real (to ontos
tones; prop. 209; see In Tim. III, 297). This is mortal and, though it on) were the plural eide, and who directed the latter half of the
survives death (just long enough, it would seem, to endure the corpo- Parmenides (137b-166c) against it.
real punishments of the type described by Plato in Phaedo 114a ) , is 2. The solution to the nonbeing dilemma (for its epistemological
eventually dissipated. The human individual soul, then, according to solution, see doxa and heteron) and the key to the analysis of genesis
the revisionist version of Proclns, has tbree bodies: the immortal, began with Plato's positing of space (see hypodoche) in which genesis
immaterial "starry" (astroeides) or luminous body associated with the takes place, and which stands midway between true being and 110nbeing
immortal part of the soul; the "spiritual" (pneumatikon) possessed by (Tim. 52a-c). For Plato, as for Parmenides, absolute nonbeing is
the mortal parts of the soul and the various daimones of the universe; nonsense (Soph. 238c ) , but there is a relative grade illustrated not only
and, finally, the fleshly body of the soul's sojourn on earth (In Tim. III, by the Receptacle cited above, but by sensible things (aistheta) as well
236,298; Theol. Plat. III, 125). (Soph. 240b; Tim. 35a, 52C). Among the Platonic hierarchy of Forms,
there is an eidos of being; indeed it is one of the most important Forms
oikefosis: self-appropriation, self-acceptance, self-love iliat pervade all the rest (Soph. 254b-d; compare this with the peculiar
1. The Epicurean exaltation of pleasure (hedone, q.v.) followed nature of on in Aristotle, Meta. lOo3a). Further, Plato distinguishes
a tradition going back as far as the Cyrenaics in taking as its starting real beings (ontos onta) from those that have genesis, and in Timaeus
point an analysis of man's instinctive, untutored impulses. The Stoics 28a he works out an epistemological-ontological correlation: onta are
used the same point of departure in ethics but their inspection sug- known by thought (noesis) accompanied by a rational account (lo-
gested to them that it was not pleasure that was primary, but rather gos); generated beings are grasped by opinion (or judgment, see
what they termed oikeiosis, the acceptance of one's own being and the doxa) based on sensation (aisthesis).
means of preserving it, the instinctive impulse (horme, q.v.) toward 3. Since being is the object of the science of metaphysics (Meta.
self-preservation (D.L. VII, 85; Cicero, De fin. III, 5, 16; its opposite is 1031a) Aristotle's treatment of on is much more elaborate. The first
allotriosis, self-alienation). The oikeion is not completely absent from distinction is between "being qua being" (to on he on), which is the
Epicureanism where it is the "appropriateness" of the object perceived object of metaphysics, and individual beings (onta), which are the
that produces the pleasure or pain (see pathos); it is merely a shift of objects of the other sciences. This is the view in Meta. lOo3a, but
emphasis from the cause of pleasure to the process itself. Aristotle is not consistent on the point: elsewhere (see Meta. 1026a;
2. Oikeiosis has ever-widening circles of application: it operates, Phys. 192a, 194b; De an. 403b) he states that metaphysics studies
in the first instance, toward oneself, then toward one's offspring and being that is separate and unmoving (see theologia). Again, "being"
family, and, finally, culminates in "love of the whole human race" is peculiar in that it is defined not univocally or generically, but
(caritas generis humani; Cicero, De fin. III, 19, 62--63; v, 23, 65), thus analogously through all the categories (Meta. lOo3a) , and in this it is
142 I ONEIROS

like "one" (hen) (Meta. 1053b) and "good" (agathon) (ibid. Eth.
ONEIROS I 143
Nich. I, 1096b); see katholou. There follows a basic distinction (ibid. tio~s th~t frequently I~d, on the testimony of Plato (Laws 90ge-9 1Oa,
1017a-b): something "is" either accidentally, or essentially, or episte- ~pmom's 985c), to religious dedications and foundations. Attempts to
mologically, or in the dichotomy act (energeia)/potency (dynamis). mdu~e s~ch dreams were most frequently associated with incubation or
The epistemological "being" (see doxa) is dealt with elsewbere (see sleepmg m a sacred place, a practice also designed to provoke medical
Meta. 1027b-1028a, 105,a-1152a), as is potency/act (see Meta. Theta cures.
passim), so Aristotle bere concentrates his attention on what "is" ~. The dream enters philosophy with Heraclitus who treats it as
essentially. It is something that falls within the ten kategoriai (Meta. a s~bJe~tive tUl:~ing-inward (fr. 89), while Xenophanes begins a long
1017a) and is, primarily, substance (ousia; ibid. 1028a-b). A some- ratlO~ahst ~radItI?n by complete denial of divination (Diels 21A32; see
what different point of view emerges from Aristotle's breakdown of the mantzke) mcludmg, presIlmably, dreams. There is an attempt at
various senses of nonbeing (me on) in Meta. 106gb and 1089a: some- theory in De,;"ocrit.us who accounted for dreams by the entry into the
thing is not either as a negative proposition, Le., a denial of one of the senses of varIOUS e,dola (q.v.) or images, some of which foretold the
predicates, or as a false proposition, or finally, kata dynamin, i.e., by future, a~d from ,:"hich men derived their notions of the gods, or better,
being something else only potentially but not actnally. It is from this of the da,man:s. smce some of these visitations were baleful (fr. 166).
latter that genesis comes about (see also dynamis, energeia, steresis). These same VISIOns were for Epicurus proofs for the existence of the
4. In the Plotinian universe the One (hen) is beyond being gods (Lucretius, De rerum nat. v, 1169-1182; Aetius 1, 7, 34), pre-
(Enn. v, 9, 3; compare Plato's description of the Good beyond Being in suma~ly because of their clarity and universal occurrence. The senti-
Rep. 509b and see hyperousia). The realm of being begins on the level ment IS echoed almost exactly by the Christian Tertnllian De anima
of nous since both being and nous are contained in nous (ibid. v, 5,2; 47,2; see enargeia, prolepsis. '
v, 9, 7). Nonbeing is treated in much the Platonic and Aristotelian 4· Plato b:liev~," in the prophetic (and divinely inspired) nature
fashion: matter (hyle) that is only a replica (eikon) of being is only a! dreams, and m T,m. 71a-72b offers a curious physiological explana-
quasi-being (Enn. I, 8, 3) . Philo, with his strongly developed feeling of ~lOn of how they work. They have their origin in the liver, which is the
divine transcendence (see hyperousia), restricts true being to God mstrument o~ medi~m by which the rational part (logistikon) of the
alone (Quod deter. 44, 160), and introduces into the discussion the sonl com~~11Icates Its thoughts, transformed now into visual images,
metaphysical interpretation of the famous phrase in Exod. 3, '4: "I am ~he app~tItIve f~C11lty (epithymetikon). It is the presence of these
who am"; see hypodoche, hyle, genesis. Imag~s m the hver that gives rise to dreams and at the same time
explams the practice of divination (mantike) by the inspection of ani-
6neiros: dream mals'livers.
1. The common Greek attitudes toward dreams may be illus- 5· Aristotle's earliest view on dreams is close to that of Epicurus
trated from Homer where they are considered as both objective reali- and l?emo~ritus: in the De philosophia (fr. 10), thongh by now he is
ties, not very different in quality from waking experience, and as workmg hIS way clear of Plato's eidos-theory, Aristotle still accepts the
manifestations of an inner experience, some aspects of which shade off notion of the sepa;ability. of the psyche from the body, a phenomenon
into symbolism (see II. XXII, 199 ff.; Od. XIX, 541 ff.). But of more t~at may be expefIenced m d~eams, ~s .had earlier ~een pointed out by
speculative consequence was the distinction found in Homer (Od. XIX, Pmd~r (see psyche). For AfIstotle It IS exactly thIS experience of the
560 ff.) between dreams that issue from the "gate of ivory" and that soul m dreams that leads to man's conviction as to the existence of the
are nothing more than "glimmering illnsion, fantasy," and those from gods. But by the time he had come to write the treatises De insomniis
the "gate of horn" that are portents of things to come, if only mortals and De divinatione per somnum he had worked out a complet I
h . I . I . ey
know how to interpret them. That the Greeks made just such an effort p ySIO og~ca .e~plan~tI?n of dreams, and explicitly denies (De div.
from an early date is clear from the presence of a "dream interpreter" 462b.) then· dIVIne ofIgm, though still allowing their occasionally pro-
in II. v, '48. phetic nature.
2. Macrobius, in his commentary on the Somnium Scipionis (1,3, . 6. Aristotle's attempt to place dreams in a purely psychophysio-
2), divided portentous dreams into the symbolic, the visionary, and the logIcal ~ont:xt was foredoomed to failure. The increasingly religious
oracular, to which others added direct converse with a god or a and ethIcal mteres!s of post-Aristotelian philosophy led to a reassertion
daimon (q.v.), e.g. Socrates in Grito 44b, Phaedo 60e, or the admoni- of the. divine origin of at least some dreams, while false dreallIS could
be wfItten off to the convenient physiological causes, so Cicero, De div.
144 \ ONOMA ONOMA \145
62, 127-128. Typical of their intrusion into later philosophy is Iambli_ on a meaning established by convention (De interp. 16a), i.e., when
chus' preoccupation with dream phenomena in his Life of Pythagoras, they become symbolic. Again, like Plato, Aristotle is much indebted to
where the now legendary older philosopher is made to counsel his linguistic analysis as a philosophical tool: the kategoriai are, in the first
disciples to indu~e prophetic dreams by nightly "mood-music" (65), instance, modes of predication.
and the proper d,et (106--107; compare D.L. VIII, 24, where the well- 5. Epicurus was concerned with a solid epistemological basis for
known Pythagorean taboo on beans is explained in this way). On a philosophical discourse and was at some pains to insist on an intimate
more popular level the testimonies range from the famous "dream connection between the concept (ennoia, q.v. and see prolepsis) and its
book," the Sacred Discourses of Aelius Aristides to the still extant nam:, i.e., on ~he world of thought (already tied to the world of objects
Oneirocriticon of Artemidorus of Ephesus, a systematic treatise on the by h,S sensualIst theory of aisthesis; see aistheton and eidolon) and that
interpretation of dreams. of language (D.L. x, 37-38). The name, therefore, must be clear and
immediate evidence of the concept (ibid. x, 33; compare enargeia). He
, then proceeds (ibid. x, 75-76) to offer his theory of the origins of
onoma: name
1. The philosophical problems attendant upon language are in-
language.
troduced by Heraclitus' insistence on the fact of change and the ambi- 6. Speech flows from man's natural desire to express his own
g'uity of both phenomena and our ways of naming them (see frs. 67, feelings (pathe). Lucretius considerably expands this stage of develop-
32) . But they appear in a more rigidly conceptualized formula with the ment (De rerum nat. v, 1028-lOg0), tracing the evolution of language
Sophists' distinction between nature (physis) and convention (nomos, from gesture (following Plato, but rejecting, in the same passage, both
q.v.). Gorgias, for one, denies all connection between the word and the the Platonic and Stoic nomothetes), through animal sounds to the
object described (Sextus Empiricus, Adv. Math. VII, 84), thereby babbling .of chil~ren. On. this point the Epicureans and Stoic~ parted
raising the question of the "correctness" of names. Prodicus gave company 111 a radIcal fashIOn: for the latter speech is a function of logos
expensive lectures on the subject (Plato, Crat. 384b), and we know and hence only men have true speech; animals and children emit mere
from Xenophon, Mem. III, '4,2 that it was a frequently discussed topic sounds that are "like speech" (Varro, De ling. lat. VI, 56; Seneca, De
at Athens. ira I, 3). After this original natural-mimetic stage Epicurus allows for
2. Plato takes up the question in detail in his Cratylus where the the use of a conventionalized standardization (lac. cit.).
position that names have a natural connection with the things named is 7. Between Aristotle and the Stoics occurred great advances in
maintained by the Heraclitan Cratylus (383a; see rhoe) , and the theory linguistic research connected with the Alexandrine elucidation of the
of the conventional origin of language by Hermogenes (384d). Socra- text of H?,?er. The results may be witnessed in the not always happy
tes' position is that things have a permanent quality of their own (the etymologlz111g (etymos, an adjective meaning "true" in Homer is
eidos-theory is presumed throughout; for medical investigation along su~stant~vized .into etymon, th.e true sense of a word) in p~st­
these lines, see eidos) , and that the function of language is a social one: Arrstotelran phIlosophy and partIcularly in the developed and sophisti-
the name is an instrument to teach us about the ousia of a thing and to cated t~eories of Stoic philosophical linguistics. The linchpin of Stoic
enable us to distinguish it from other things (388b-c). It follows then theory IS the close relationship between interior logos (thought) and
that there must have been a wise legislator (nomothetes) who has exterIOr logos (speech; see logos). Thus the onoma signifies the thing
imposed names on things using a kind of ideal name as his model because th~ connection is by nature (physis) and not, as Aristotle said,
(38ga-3goe ) . by conventIOn (SVF II, '46). But the Stoic explanation of "nature" is
3. There follows (423a-b) a theory as to the mimetic origin of much closer to the Socratic exposition already cited from the Cratylus.
language: the name is a phonetic mimesis (q.v.) of the object, a The Stoics too believed that the connection between names and the true
gesture in sound. But for all the etymological mockery in the Cratylus nature of things springs from'the wisdom of a primitive lawgiver who
it is clear from a number of passages in Plato that he takes seriously "imposed" names upon things (see Ammonius, In de interp. 35, 16; 36,
the philosophical content of names: they are a constituent of every 23;.co,?pare SVF II, 1066, 1070), just as Adam is described as doing by
statement (logos; Soph. 261c-262e) and part of the process leading Philo 111 Leg. all. II, '4-'5. In this fashion exterior logos reveals the
toward episteme (q.v.; Ep. VII, 342a ff.). inner essence of things, and the Stoics consequently paid a great deal
4. Aristotle agrees with Plato on the mimetic character of lan- of attention to etymologies, which in turu led them into complex discus-
guage (Rhet. 1404a2o), but sounds only become names when they take sions of whether names were related to things through the etymological
146 I OREXIS DURANIOI I 147
principle of analogy (analogia) or its converse, anomaly (anomalia; motion of the stars, which is now explained in terms of the Physis of the
Varro, De ling. lat. IX, 1, citing Chrysippus; see the notorious deriva- material composing the sphere in which they are imbedded, i.e., aither
tion of lucus from non lucendo in Quintilian I, 6, 23) . Stoic etymologiz_ (q.v.). In the Metaphysics they are nowhere to be seen and when
ing becomes pervasive in all subsequeut philosophical literature. Aristotle comes to explain the motions of the heavenly bodies he resorts
instead to a theory of multiple prime movers that can be and have been
orexis: appetite construed as the souls of the various planets but are much more likely
The appetitive (orektikon) is that faculty of the soul which separated intelligences (see kinoun 11-12) .
pursues (Aristotle, De an. 431a). It embraces the three functions of 4. This is not to say, however, that Aristotle ceased believing in
desire (epithymia), spirit, and wish (ibid. 414b), and is, in coujunc- the divinity of the heavenly bodies; he merely discarded them as philo-
tion with seusatiou (aisthesis) or intellection (noesis), the ultimate sophical causes. For him, as for Plato (see Tim. 3ge) they were
cause of motion in the soul (De an. III, 433a-b; see kinoun 9). Aris- "visible Gods" (see Meta. 1028a) and more divine than men (see
totle's general treatment of orexis is in De motu animo chaps. 6-8; for Phys. II, 196a and Eth. Nich. VI, 1141a). And again the reason is the
its role in Platonism, see epistrophe; in Stoicism, horme. apparent lack of any change in their activities, a fact confirmed by
millennia of astronomical records (see De coelo I, 270b). In the same
organon: instrument, organ, Organon passage Aristotle averts to another type of historical argument. All
See aisthesis, dialektike, holon. men believe in gods and they have invariably located them in the
heavens, linking, he argues, the conceptually immortal to the visibly
ouranioi: heavenly bodies incorruptible. Again, in Meta. 1074b he resorts to a confirmatory proof
1. The belief in the divinity of the heavenly bodies is an old one from the popular religious belief in the divinity of the planets, a
among the Greeks. In Apol. 26d Socrates says that everyone believed in tradition passed down in the form of a myth. Aristotle may here be
them, all, perhaps, except Anaxagoras who was tried on a charge of referring to the fairly recent custom of associating the planets with the
impiety, part of which involved the divinity of the ouranioi (D.L. II, gods of Greek mythology. The first such reference in Greek literature
12). Indeed, the belief was so ancient that both Plato (Grat. 397c-d, is in Tim. 38d where Plato speaks of the "holy star of Hermes," and
Laws 885e; compare Laws 966d where the emphasis is somewhat the first full list occurs in Epinomis g87b-d where the origin of the
different) and Aristotle (De phil., fro 10) trace back the beginnings of custom is described as Syrian.
man's belief in God to a contemplation of the heavens. The motives are 5. In succeeding periods the belief in the heavenly bodies was
various: the identification of air-psyche-life (see aer), coupled with the encouraged by the growing importance of astrology and so it fre-
apparent eternity of their motion, and the discovery of the order (kos- quently turned out that their influence on human affairs was debated
mos) in their movements; the argument from everlasting motion is more vehemently than their existence. There is a long polemic against
specifically attributed to the Pythagorean Alcmaeon by Aristotle (De the astral gods in Lucretius V, 110-145 (compare Epicurus in D.L. X,
an. I, 405a; compare Cicero, De nat. deor. I, 27)· 77), probably directed against the Stoics since it contains arguments
2. Plato accepted their divinity (Rep. 508a) and gave them an against the divinity of the earth and sea as well. Stoic pantheism did
importaut place in his cosmology (Tim. 38c-3ge); they were, in fact, tend to move in that direction (see SVF II, 1027), and the specific
the only material things made by the demiourgos. In both the Laws doctrine of the divinity of the heavenly bodies could be connected, as
(8g8d-899b) aud the Epinomis (981e) they are said to possess souls, Aristotle had done in the De coelo, with the nature of the aither (so the
and to move by the most perfect deliberation (Epinomis 982C). The Stoic in Cicero, De nat. deor. II, 39-43), and precisely becanse of its
exact connection between the bodies and souls of the ouranioi is not fiery substance and rapid movement, infallible indications of life and
specified, but three possibilities are outlined in the Laws (see kinoun intelligence. Bnt these positions were strongly criticized by the Sceptics
3)· (ibid. III, 23-24, 51) who were opposed to all sorts of divination (man-
3. When he wrote his early dialogue On Philosophy Aristotle tike, q.v.).
still believed in the Platonic star souls and gave them a role in his 6. The argument that the rapidity and fiery quality of the aither
theory of the causality of motion (fr. 24; see kinoun 8). But when he is an indication of its intellectual nature goes back ultimately to percep-
came to write the De coelo he was somewhat ambivalent on the subject. tion theories like those of Diogenes of Apollonia (see aisthesis 12,
They are still present (II, 292a) but they seem to have no role in the noesis 5) but has more immediate origins in the young Aristotle. Plato
148 I OURANOS OUSIA I 149
had maintained that the stars were composed of a fiery stuff and were while the final outermost sphere carries the fixed stars (see Aristotle,
intelligent living beings (Tim. 40a-b), and that human souls first De coela I, 278b) . In this same passage in the De coelo Aristotle points
came into existence in the stars before being incorporated on earth out that ouranas is also used in the sense of the entire nniverse, and
(ibid. 41d-e). And it is for this reason, according to Plato, that the indeed Plato had still used the terms ouranos and kosmo8 interchange-
divine intellect in us is located in the head (see kardia 4) so that it may ably (Phaedrus 247b, Pol. 26gd, Tim. 28b); see also kasmas.
be closest to its "heavenly congener" (ibid. goa). These suggestions 2. In addition to the belief in the divinity of the heavenly bodies
were taken up by Aristotle and incorporated into his doctrine of the (auraniai) , the heaven had another connection with religion: tied to the
''fifth element" (quinta essential see aither) that is the substance from increasing astronomical sophistication and the consequent identification
which both the heavenly bodies and our nous is made (De philosophia, of the heaven as an extraordinary "order" (see kosmos) was the belief
fro 27 = Cicero, Acad. post. 1, 26; this is, of course, incompatible with that the role of the philosopher was the contemplation of the eternal
his later theory of nous as a spiritual energeia; see nous 11). Weare verities on high. Best known in this regard are the series of anecdotes
further told (Cicero, Tusc. I, 22) that he coined a new term to describe abont Anaxagoras (see D.L. II, 2 and 7; Iamblichus, Protrept. 51,
its perpetual and unint~rrupted motion, endelecheia (~ompa:e the simi- 6-15; perhaps Aristotle's remark about Xenophanes in Meta. g86b
lar approach to aither m De coelo I, 270b). Also ArIstotelIan may be should be nnderstood in the same sense). The same motif is present in
the corollary mentioned by Cicero (De nat. deor. II, 42-43) that the Philo, De opif. 17, 53-54, now combined with a providential creation;
stars feed upon the aither. God created the heavens so that man, in contemplating their harmonia,
7. The theory continued to thrive in all its ramifications. It reap- might be drawn further upward to the study of philosophy.
pears in the revival of Pythagoreanism at the turn of the Christian era 3. For Plato too the spectacle of the heavens has a distinct educa-
(D.L. VIII, 2&-27) and plays a part in Poseidonius' theories of soul tional effect: in Rep. 528e-530c astronomy serves as an introduction to
(see Cicero, Tusc. I, 42-43 and compare sympatheia 5). For Philo the dialektike (compare Laws 820a-822d, g67a-g68a); a vision of the
heavenly bodies are "intellectual animals" (zoa noera) or, better, each order of the heavens is a feature of the myth of the soul's destiny in
is an intelligence (nous) remote from evil (De oPif. 73). The cult of both the Phaedrus 246d-247c and the Rep. 616c-617d. The nuance is
these heavenly gods, encouraged by the consuming interest in astrol- slightly different in Tim. 47a-c; here the contemplation of the heavens
ogy and demonology (cf. Macrobius, In Somn. Scip. I, 12, 14; Plu- is directed toward a restoration in the harmonia (q.v.; see kinoun 5) in
tarch De defec. orae. 416d-f), must have appeared at times on the the soul. By the time of the late Academic Epinomis g80a-g88e these
briuk of overwhelming the patiently constructed rationalist position. considerations have been incorporated into (and overwhelmed by) the
This seems to be the mood of the defensive struggle put up by Plotinus. prevalent astral theology (see ouranioi 7). Heaven then becomes the
As a good Platonist and as a somewhat reluctant heir to the Peripatetic dwelling place of these heavenly gods, Olympus (so Epinomis 977b;
tradition, he accepted the doctrine of celestial in.telligences and the see Tim. 30e-40b and the remarkable fragment of Critias preserved in
stars as living beings (Enn. V, 1, 2) that lead a lIfe of goodness and Sextus Empiricus, Ad.". Math. IX, 54).
happiness (IV, 8, 2). But he is firm in his detailed resistance to the
contemporary astrology (IV, 4, 30-45; see sympatheia 8). . ousia: substance, existence
For celestial immortality, see aer, aphthartos; for the questIOn of 1. From the fact that Socrates cites Dorian dialectical variants of
astral bodies, ochema; on the movement of the heavenly bodies, kinoun; ousia in Grat. 401C it has been conjectured that the philosophical
and on their intelligences, nous. origins of the term are Pythagorean. The word has, however, in ac-
cordance with Plato's usual technique of variable terminology, a num-
ouran6s: heaven ber of different meanings in the dialogues. Thus, it sometimes means
1. Heaven is a generative principle in the ancient cosmogonies existence as opposed to nonexistence (Theaet. 185c, 21gb); it is ap-
(see Plato, Tim. 40d-e; Aristotle, Meta. lOg1b). It first appears in a plied to the existence of sensible things in Theaet. 186b, and probably
strictly philosophical context in a difficnlt passage of Anaximenes the phrase "coming into being" (genesis eis ousian) in Phil. 26d is a
(Diels 12A17) where he is represented as positing "innumerable ourar similar usage. But in other places it is explicitly contrasted to genesw
noi that are gods." Henceforth the Greek view of heaven as a single and the world of becoming (Soph. 232C, Tim. 2gC) as the mode of
entity is at least partially replaced by that of a multiplicity Of heavenly being of the "really real" (ontos on; see Rep. 50gb, where the Good is
spheres that envelop the earth and carry the sun,. moon, and planets, beyond even ousia, and compare hyperousia). Ousia even approaches
150 I OUSIA PASCHEIN I 151
the Aristotelian usage as "essence" in Phaedo 6Sd, 92d, and Phaedrus (Enn. VI, 3, 3-S); the only thing that matter, form, and the composite
24Se where it is equivalent to "definition." have in common is being, and even this is different in the three cases
2. Aristotle's search for substance beg'ins in the Categories where (ibid. VI, 3, 6-7). What sensible ousia is, then, is nothing more than a
it is described as that which is not said of a subject or not present in a conglomeration of qualities and matter (ibid. VI, 3, 8).
subject, e.g. the particular mau or the particular horse. This individual
(tode ti) is substance in the primary sense, but "substance" may also
be used to describe the genus (genos) and the species (eidos), and of
these eidos has more of a claim to be substauce since it is nearer to the
individual primary substance: to call an individual tree "an oak" is
more revelatory of what it is than to call it "a plant" (Cat. 2a-b).
p
Aristotle is further convinced that the problem posed by metaphysics,
and indeed by all of philosophy, i.e., ''what is being [onJ"? really
comes down to "what is ousia"? since being is, first and foremost,
substance (Meta. 1028b). palingenesfa: rebirth, transmigration of souls
3. In Meta. 1069a Aristotle distinguishes three types of ousiai:l) (metempsychosis is a very late word)
sensible (aisthetos) and everlasting (aidioB), i.e., the heavenly bodies That Pythagoras held such a doctrine is attested by his contempo-
that, because the natural motion of their element, aither, is circular, are rary Xenophanes (fr. 7), and there is the later, more dubious testi-
also everlasting (see aphthartos); 2) the sensible and perishable, i.e., mony (D.L. VIII, 4-S) that he remembered four of his own previous
what everybody recognizes as substances, plants, animals, etc.; and 3) reincarnations. That the quality of the reincarnations is tied to an
the unchangeable (akinetos). All the substances in classes 1) and 2) ethical scale is clear from Orphism and from Empedocles (frs. "S,
are composites, and Aristotle sets about determining which of their 117,127,146,147). Plato has heard of this doctrine (Meno 8,a) and in
components have the best claim to be called substance (Meta. Phaedo 70c-72e he incorporates it into his proofs for the immortality of
1028b-1041b). The choice is narrowed down to four: the substratum the soul, and, in a more Orphic context, in Phaedrus 249a and Tim.
(hypokeimenon), genus (genos), the universal (katholou), and the 42b-c, where the successive rebirths are tied to moral purity. Its most
essence (ti esti). The results are the same as those reached in the elaborate presentation is in the "Myth of Er" in Rep. 614b-621b. For
Categories: it is the essence or eidos that has the best claim to be Herodotus' mistaken notion as to its origins see Hist. II, 123.
substance (ibid. 1041a-b), not now as a predicational entity, i.e., The philosophical presuppositions of palingenesia are closely
"species," but as the immanent formal cause in compound beings (see linked with the nature and separability of the soul, see psyche; its
eidos) . It fulfills the two prerequisites of substance: it is separable (see epistemological use may be seen in anamnesis (q.v.), and some of its
choriston) and, as embodied in matter, individual (tode til (ibid. religious aspects in kathodos.
1029a). Aristotle deals with the first two classes in the De coelo and the
Physics and then takes up the question of unchangeable substances in a para.deigma: model
later book of the Metaphysics (1071b-l076a). Their existence is neces- See mimesis.
sary because both motion (kinesis) and time (chronos) are everlasting
(1071b). To account for this perpetual movement there must be an parenklisis: swerve (of the atoms)
unmoved substance, i.e., something that moves as final cause: this is See kinesis.
the First Mover (ibid. 1072a-1073a; see kinoun 7-10). There are a
number of such movers, and their exact number must be determined by paschein: to suHer, be aHected, passion
astronomical calculations (47 or SS?) (1073a-1074a; see kinoun 1. Passion (paschein), the general state of which pathos (q.v.)
11-12). is the formalized affect, is, together with its correlative, action (poiein),
4. The Aristotelian category of substance as hypokeimenon be- a function of the ancient notion of "power" (dynamis, q.v.). But
comes, for the Stoics, matter (SVF I, 87; II, 369). Ontologically it is their isolation and conceptualization seems to have been the doing
used in the same sense, see Marcus Aurelius, Med. VI, 1; XII, 30. of Plato (but see Gorg. 476a-e where their facile manipUlation sug-
Plotinus criticizes and rejects the Aristotelian analysis of substance gests an earlier usage) who divides change (kinesis, q.v.) into active
152 I PATHOS PATHOS I 153
and passive aspects (Theaet. 156a; compare Laws x, 8g4c) that he capable of triggering the pathe of the soul.
later calls hallmarks of the world of becoming (genesis; Soph. 2. But to discuss the pathe as "what happens to bodies" is to set
248c). the terms in a way they were not understood until the time of Plato. He
2. The association of action and passion with genesis remains was certainly capable of distinguishing between a body (or subject)
constant, not in the sense of qualitative change or locomotion as Plato and what happens to it (see Tim. 49a-50a), but there is little evidence
suggests (Theaet. 156c), but in the technical sense of the Aristotelian that the pre-Socratics were capable of such distinctions and the implied
genesis (q.v.), i.e., substantial change, and particularly the passage of isolation of a "quality": the pre-Socratic ancestor of quality, dynamis
one element (stoicheion) into another. The key to action and passion is (q.v.), was looked upon as a "thing." This is perfectly clear in
contrariety (enantion, q.v.); identical things cannot act upon each Anaxagoras' treatment of the "seeds" (see stoicheion 11-12). At first
other (Plato, Tim. 57a; Aristotle, De gen. et carr. I, 323b). Thus the there is only a mixture (meigma) that contains "all things [chrematal
powers or qualities involved in genesis must be generically the same together" (fr. 1), and these latter turn out to be not only the conven-
but specifically different, and genesis can be defined as "passage to the tional Empedodean stoicheia but the pathe/ dynameis as well: the moist
contrary" (Aristotle, op. cit. I, 324a). and the dry, the hot and the cold, the bright and the dark (fr. 4). None
3. But mere contrariety is not enough: the contrary powers must of these is perceptible, because they are fused in the meigma.
have the capacity for action and passion. It is significant that when 3. By the instigation of a rotary motion by nous various "seeds"
Aristotle is attempting to discern which powers are present in the are separated off (apokrisis) and they too contain a portion of every-
genesis of the elements he rules out "the light" and "the heavy" thing but are qualitatively distinct (see fro 4, init.), presumably due to
precisely on the ground that though they are contraries, they do not the predominance of one or other of the pathe. Why are they not
have poiein and paschein (ibid. II, 32gb). therefore perceptible? They are not perceived because of their minute
4. In Aristotle paschein is one of the ten kategoriai (q.v.; Cat. size and it is only when they associate (synkrisis) into large composites
Ib-2a), and his examples are "is cut," "is burnt." Like poiein it that these latter become perceptible and sensibly different because of
admits of both contrariety and degree (ibid. llb). In Stoicism the the predominance of one type of constitnent (Aristotle, Phys. I,
"patient" (paschon) is identified with matter (hyle), the agent 187a) .
(poioun) with logos (q.v.; D.L. VII, 134). Both Aristotle and the 4. In Atomism the pathe have a more restricted role. In this view
Stoics distinguish between the active and passive elements or, better, there exist only atoms (atoma, q.v.) and the void (kenon), and the
the qualities in them (Meteor. IV, 37Sb; SVF II, 418; see genesis). former have only two qualities, size and shape (Diels 68A37: perhaps
For the active and passive arc hoi of movement, see, respectively, also weight, see Aristotle, De gen. et carr. I, 3Z6a, though this seems a
kinoun and physis; for their metaphysical import, energeia and hyle; later addition to Atomism; see kinesis). This leads to the position that
for their role in perception, aisthesis; for actio in dis tans and the all perception and, indeed, all sensible knowledge may be reduced to
question of contact, sympatheia 7. contact or touch (haphe; Aristotle, De sensu 442a; on the question of
intellectual knowledge, see noesis 6). We are aware of other types of
pathos: event, experience, suffering, emotion, attribute sense experiences, of course, but they are merely subjective and con-
1. The history of the word pathos is beclouded by a multiplicity ventional (nomos), passive impressions (pathe) of the senses to which
of connotations. In its most general acceptance it means "something we accord some type of reality (Theophrastus, De sens. 61,63).
that happens," either in reference to the event itself (so Herodotus v, 5. What is clearly at stake here is the distinction betweeen the
4; Sophocles, D.T., 732) or the person affected (so Plato, Phaedo g6a: active powers (dynameis) inherent in things and that have the capacity
''my experiences"), the latter type of use considerably enlarged into to act (poiein) and passive activations (pathe) of the body acted upon
ethical directions, as for example, in the "instructive suffering" of the (paschein, q.v.). Democritns had severely delimited the active quali-
tragedians (see Aeschylus, Ago. '77). Philosophical speculation goes ties (poion, q.v.) by rejecting the entire pre-Socratic mechanism of
off into two different directions from this point, investigating pathos as "the opposites" (enantia, q.v.) and reducing all "activity" to touch.
both ''what happens to bodies" and ''what happens to souls," the first Thus his stress on the subjective quality of sense knowledge would
under the general rubric of qualities, the second under that of emo- appear to be the result of purely theoretical considerations, though it
tions. The bridge is provided by the materialist theories of Isensation agreed with the more ethical strains of relativism (which had epistemo-
that reduce sense knowledge to a pathos of the senses that, in tnrn, is logical corollaries) being promulgated by the Sophists (see nomos) .
· .. -----------

154 I PATHOS PERAS I 155

6. In Plato the ethical pathe appear, at least in places, as that they are accompanied by pleasure or pain (ibid. II, ll05b). But
function of materiality: they appear in the moral, corporeal parts of ~his is ~ot to be construed as indicating that they are completely
soul and are present there as a result of the soul's conjunction with ImmaterIal even though they are the affects of the incorporeal sou!. The
body (Tim. 42a-b, 69C). He follows the Atomist position both in fa;he area.lways accompanied by certain purely physical changes and
making the pathe a species of perception and in attempting to reduce It IS for thIS reason that the psyche cannot be considered a separate
sensation (aisthesiB) to contact (ibid. 61C-63e). Where he 'departs substance but rather the entelecheia of a body (De an. I, 403a). And
from it is in noting that when the contacts are' excessive there results when the same criterion is applied to the nous, its very lack of pathe
pleasure and pain (ibid. 64a-65b). This rather materialistic explana_ suggests that it is immortal (ibid. I, 408b); see nous.
11. By the time Atomism appears in its Epicurean version the
tion is not Plato's only or final word on the subject (see hedone 2-3)
but it is interesting in that it provides the link between pathos as ~ Platonic and Aristotelian refinements on pathe can be marked. 'The
physical quality and pathos as an ethical phenomenon. subjective elemr;nt, prominent in Democritus, has been tempered (see
7. The ethical side of the pathe is revealed by other considera- halon), a~d .whII.e the pathe are still ~ssentially tactile sensations, they
tions. Plato holds, again, in places, the tripartition of the soul (see ar~ now dIstmgUlshed by the concomItant presence of pleasure or pain.
psyche 15). Are the pathe characteristics of all parts of the soul or only It IS these latter tI:'at now be~0r:'e the center of attention in that they
of the two lower and corporeal parts? Plato is not at all clear on this. In reflect th<; appropr;ateness (ozkezon) or nonappropriateness (allotrion)
the Timaeus (lac. cit. and 69C-d) they seem to be excluded from the of the ?bJect percelVed and thns provide criteria for the choice of good
logistikon, while in the Laws (897a) and Phaedrus (245c) this is not and eVIl (D.L. x, 34, 129; see hedone. For the newly expanded role of
so. Indeed, the whole doctrine of the tripartite soul seems to be based "appropriateness" in Stoicism, see oikeiosis ) .
on the recognition of the existence of conflicting pathe, and we are told 12. Apparently Zeno held that all the pathe, which were defined
quite clearly in the Republic (580d, 581a) that each part of the soul has as "excessive impulses" (hormai, q.v.; essentially the same idea is
its own appropriate pathe. To all appearances Plato never quite recon- expressed in Tim. 42a-b), were irrational movements of the soul
ciled the incorporeal, separate, and somewhat remote logistikon, per- (D.L. VII, llO), while Chrysippus preferred the more intellectualist
haps derived from Pythagoreanism and necessary to his theory of posit.ion of looking upon them as a state of the rational faculty (hege-
palingenesia and a knowledge of the eide, with the more "engaged" monzkon; SVF III, 459, II, 823; see aisthesis 5, noesis 17). For the Stoic
soul of his ethical analyses of conduct. the. virtuous I~fe co:,sist~ not in find~ng a mean for the pathe, as in
8. In Meta. 1022b Aristotle succinctly resumes his predecessors' ArIstotle, but m extlrpatmg them entIrely. The wise man, then, is one
use of pathe as experiences of a body. Since he has already distin- who has reached the stage of apatheia (q.v.). The four main pathe are
guished dynamis (q.v.) into its two meanings of power and potential~ pain, fear, desire, and pleasure (D.L. VII, llO; they are defined SVF III,
ity, pathos may be used in both these senses or, to locate it within the 391; compare the Platonic and Aristotelian lists in Tim. 42a-b and Eth.
category of substance and accident, it is a capacity for change in a Nich. II, l105b; see also noesiB 17).
subject (hypokeimenon) or else the actual change itself, and particu- For the pathe of matter, see paschein, dynamis, poion, onoma; for
larly qualitative change. Thus change in the category of quality (01- the cur~ of t~e et~ical pathe on the homoeopathic principle, katharsis;
loiasis, alteration) is defined as "change [metabole] with respect to f~r the:r extlrpatlOn, apatheia; for their connection with perception,
pathos" (Meta. 106gb; for its difference from genesis, change with atstheS18.
respect to ousia, see stoicheion 15) .
9. In the Ethics Aristotle gives his full attention to the pathe of peras: limit
the sou!. In the Phaedrus (245c) Plato had already described the soul Though the notion of limit is obvionsly an ingredient in Anaxi-
as the subject of experiences (pathe) and the source of activities mander's apeiron (absence of internal determination?), it begins to
play a formal role among the Pythagoreans for whom on Aristotle's
(erga), and Aristotle makes these the subject matter of morality (Eth. . . '
testI.mony, It ;,as, to~ether with the unlimited, an ultimate principle of
Nich. II, ll06b; see praxis; the third state of the soul, hexis, q.v., is
merely our disposition toward the other two). Virtue consists in a reahty, standmg behmd even number (Meta. 986a). Limit stands at
man's achieving a mean position (meson, q.v.) with respect to them; the head of one of the Pythagorean tables of opposites cited in Meta.
see arete. 986a, and in Eth. Nich. ll06b is explicitly connected with the Good.
10. The trnly psychic nature of the pathe is illustrated by the fact The Pythagorean peras may be related to their discovery of numerical
156 [ PHANTASIA PHRONESIS 157
proportions in musical harmony (see Aristotle,.De c~elo 2gob12). Su~h De fin. III, 2, 4 as ars vitae; see sophia, ouranos.
seems to be tlIe intent of Plato's use of peras m Phd. 23C-26d; for Its For the methodology of philosophy, see aporia, dialektike, en-
ethical implications, see meson, agathon, harmonia. doxon.
For limit as a factor in the definition of number, see poson; for a
possible Plotinian adaptation, aisthesis. phon!: locomotion
According to Aristotle all locomotion can be reduced to 1) circu-
phantasia: imagination, impression ' lar motion around a center, or 2) rectilinear motion toward or away
Plato uses tlIe term phantasia as a blend of judgment and percep- from a center (De coelo 268b). Circular motion is primary (De coelo
tion (Theaet. 195d). For Aristotle imagination. (P?antasia) .is an inter- 26ga; Phys. VIII, 265a-266a) and is the natural motion of aither, the
mediary between perceiving (aisthesis) and thmkmg (noeszs), De an. fifth element from which the heavenly bodies are made (De coelo
III 427b-429a (compare the analogous position of phantasia i~ Plo- 26gb-270b) , while the rectilinear motions are natural to the other four
tin~s Enn. IV, 4, 12). It is a motion of the soul caused by sensatIOn, a elements; see kinesis, stoicheion.
proc:ss that presents an image whi.c~ may persist even af~:r t:re per-
ception process disappears. Phantasta IS defined by Zeno as an Imp~es­ phr6nesis: wisdom, practical wisdom, prudence
sion in the soul" (Sextus Empiricus, Adv. Math. VII, 236 ~, an "Im- 1. There was always believed to be some sort of intellectual
pulse from the outside" ~apable of being grasped (katalep8Zs) by the control in virtue, witness the remark of the Cynic Antisthenes (D.L.
soul and assented to (CIcero, Acad. post. I, ll, 40-42). Its se?sual VI, '3) and Plato, Rep. VI, 505b where the Cynics are probably referred
nature was changed from "impression" to "alteration" by ChrysIPP:'s to as identifying the good with phronesis. For Socrates this intellectual
(Sextus Empiricus, Adv. Math. VII, 228-2~1, ,z33) who also mam- insight into the transcendental ethical values becomes synonymous
tained that it and not tlIe katalepsis was the CrIterIon of truth (D.L. VII, with virtue (arete), see Xenophon, Mem. III, g, 4; Plato, Gorg. 460b;
54; see katalepsis ) . " Meno 88a-8ga (but compare Phaedo 6qa-b, where it is only one
For the role of "fantasizing" in the creation of ''false pleasures, ingredient of true arete); Aristotle, Eth. Nich. 1144b.
see hedone; for further remarks on its role in intellection, noesis. 2. With Plato's more metaphysical concerns phronesis begins to
lose its practical and etlIical coloring until it means the intellectual
philosophla: love of wisdom, philosophy contemplation of the eide (see Rep. 505a ff.), and in the Phi/ebus it is
1. By the traditional Greek account Pythagoras was the first to commonly used as a synonym for nous as the highest type of knowl-
use tlIe term philosophia (see D.L. I, 12; CIcero, Tusc. V, 3, 8), and edge (22a, 22d, 66b; see hedone), a usage common enough among the
endowed the word with a strongly religious and et~ical sense (contrast pre-Socratics in their discussions of the similarities and differences
the neutral "Ionian" usage in Herodotus I, 30), whIch can best be seen between sense knowledge and thought (see aisthesis, noesis). In the
in the view of the philosopher put forth by Socrates in Phaedo 62C-6ge. early Protrepticus (fr. 52) Aristotle still holds the Platonic position,
In Aristotle it has lost these Pythagorean overtones (the same process but in Eth. Nich. VI, 1140a-b phronesis is once again restricted to the
. I'SI'ble in Plato see phronesis): philosophia has now become a moral sphere, while the theoria side of the Platonic phronesis is sepa-
ISV, . I Id"I'
synonym for episteme (q.v.) in the sense of an mtel ectu~ ISCIP me rated as (theoretical) wisdom (sophia), see ibid. 1143b-1l45a. De-
seeking ont canses (Meta. 1026a). In the same passage ArIstotle men- spite his hedonism phronesis still plays a central role in Epicurns
tions "first philosophy" (prote phi/osophia) or ":heolo.gy" (see theolo- (D.L. x, 131), as well as in Stoicism (Plutarch, De vito mar. 2; SVF
gia; ''metaphysics'' is a later word) ymt has a~ Its ob]e;t. n?t mutable III, 256) , and Plotinus (Enn. I, 2, 7; I, 6, 6) .
things as does physics (also called second phllos~phy, zbzd: 1037a), On the seat of phronesis, see kardia.
or those connected witlI matter, as does mathematIcs, bu: ~emg (on)
that is eternal, immutable, and separated from matter. Th,s IS the same
science called sophia in Meta. 980a-g83a. ., .
2. The division of philosophy into physIcal,. ethical, and logIcal
probably goes back to Stoicism (D.L. VII, 39; ~Icero,.Acad. post. ?'
19) , and it was also the Stoics who broaden~d phzlosoP.hza t? once ~~am
embrace the practical as well as the theoretIcal: see C,cero s defimtIOn,
 PHTHORA
PHYSIS I 159
(see Diels, fro 31A28) and the nous (q.v.) of Anaxagoras, or, and in
phthora: passing away, corruption the eyes of Plato this is the more religiously pernicious doctrine (Laws
Phthora, as the term of the process known as kinesis, is a correla- 889 C), movement was random and necessary, probably a reference to
tive of genesis, the beginning of the process, and must be seen in that the Atomists (see tyche). What Plato finds faulty in contemporary
context (so Anaximander, Diels 12Bl). Thus, beings that are without views of physis is its materiality (Laws 892b) and the absence of
kinesis, like the on of Parmenides (fr. 8, line 26),and the eide of Plato design (techne; see Soph. 265c). It was to correct these two misconcep-
(Phaedo 78a), lack both genesis and "passing away" (see Parme- tions that Plato substituted psyche (q.v.) as a source of movement.
nides, fro 8, line 27 where the corollary is specified). Within the world 3·, With Aristotle there is a general rehabilitation of physis that
of the sensibles (aistheta) Plato had a highly developed analysis of takes over many of the functions of the Platonic psyche: it is defined
change (see metabole) in which genesis-phthora occur in the category (Phys. II, 192b) as "the principle [arche] and cause [aitia] of motion
of what is for Aristotle "substantial change." In one of these passages and rest for the things in which it is immediately present." Like psyche,
(Laws 894a) there is a quasi-definition of phthora as "change into it is spiritual because it is primarily form (Phys. II, 193a), and it works
another constitiution [hexis]." In Aristotle genesis is perpetual because :oward an en~ (telos; Phys .. II, 194a). Two difficulties arise: in replac-
each phthora is, in effect, a new genesis (De gen. et corr. I, 318a); see Illg psyche WIth physzs ArIstotle has severed the connection between
genesis. movement and life, and, on the other hand, between purpose (telos)
The question of the corruption of the kosmos is discussed under and intelligence (nous). The first is solved by extending physis down
aphthartos, and that of the soul under athanatos. into the realm of the inanimate elements and positing the doctrine of
"natural movement" for each (see stoicheion, kinoun 8), but in Phys.
physik6s: st[]dent of physis (q.v.), natmal philosopher VI,II he reverts to a more Platonic position: "ensouled," i.e., living,
See theologia, aphairesis, ergon. thmgs, have within them both the principle of movement and the
initiator of movement, and they thus differ from inanimate things that
' . natme
PhYSIS: have within them the passive (paschein) principle of movement, but
L Although the word itself is not strongly attested until the time not the active (poiein), which conseqnently must operate from outside
of Heraclitus (it does appear earlier in the titles of works by Anaxi- (Phys. VIII, 255b-256a): thus all motion, in effect, requires an efficient
mander and Xenophanes), it is clear that the inquiry which uses the cause (kinoun). On the second question, the connection between telos
methodological approach known as logos and later known by Pythago- and nous, he is likewise ambivalent; juxtaposed in Phys. II, 199a are
ras as philosophia (q.v.), had, as its general subject matter, physis. two arguments for tire teleology of Physis, one of which snggests the
Such was the understanding of both Plato (see Phaedo 96a) and presence of nous while the other denies it.
Aristotle (Meta. 1005a) who calls the early philosophers physikoi, i.e., 4- Stoic monism led to the identification of God-nature-fire (SVF
those concerned with physis. It meant these different but connected II, 1027; Cicero, De nat. deor. II, 22,57). In its immanent active role
things: 1) the growth process or genesis (so Empedocles, frs. 8, 63; physis is logos (Seneca, De benet. IV, 7) and, on the level of the
Plato, Laws 892C; Aristbtle, Phys. 193b); 2) the physical stuff out of !ndividua! existent, the logoi spermatikoi (q.v.). It is a moral principle,
which things were made, the arche (q.v.) in the sense of Urstof! (so III that the purpose of man was to live "harmoniously with nature" (for
Plato, Laws 891C; Aristotle, Phys. 189b, 193a); and 3) a kind of the Stoic "natural" morality and the theory of tire interconnection of
internal organizational principle, the structnre of things (so Heracli- nature, see nomos and sympatheia respectively) .
tus, fro 123; Democritus, fro 242). 5· Plotinus' doctr!ne of nature is bound up with his view of soul;
2. Meanings 1) and 2) must be seen in the context of the theism both the soul of the umverse (see psyche tou pantos) and the individ-
of the pre-Socratics: this "stuff" was alive, hence, divine, hence immor- nal, imma~ent .souls of men have two different aspects: an npper,
tal and indestructible (see Aristotle, De an. I, 4"a, Phys. III, 203a-h; contemplatIve SIde, soul proper (though in Enn. IV, 4, 13 it is called
Plato, Laws 967a; compare Epinomis 991d). Thus the physis of the phronesis), and a lower side, physis, tlrat is forever turned away from
earliest philosophers had movement and life, but with Parmenides' nous and whose resultant weakening of its contemplative power causes
emphatic removal of kinesis from the realm of being (see on), the it to lapse from theoria into activity (praxis); it produces not mechani-
notion of physis was in effect destroyed, the initiation of rrlovement cally but as a weakened form of contemplation (Enn. III, 8, 2-5).
passing to outside agents, e.g. the "Love and Strife" of Empedocles Within the individual physis.3s the vegetative faculty that operates
 PNEUMA [161
160 [ PIS TIS

without thought and without imagination (Enn. IV, 4, '3); see psyche, cooler than the air around the sun; compare Cleanthes, 4 infra and see
telos. nous). We are then told (Theophrastus, De sens. 39, 44) that it is the
source of cognition, both sensation (aisthesis, q.v.) and thought (phro-
pfstis: 1] faith, belief (subjective state); 2] something nesis). The internal air mnst be dry and hot (compare Heraclitus' fiery
that instills belief, proof soul) and circulates through the body with the blood (see kardia). A
1) The term occurs both in Parmenides (fr. 1, line 30; fr.8, line similar theory appears among the medical writers (see De morbo sacra
50) and in Empedocles (frs. 3, 4> 114), but it is noubtful whether it is 16) .
being used in auy technical sense. In Plato's "divided line" the mental 3. Aristotle continues to make use of pneuma in its ordinary
states that are not true knowledge (episteme) but have to do rather senses of air, breath, and wind, but he introduces, in addition, some-
with "opinion" are divided into two classes: one has to do with images thing called innate (symphyton) pneuma that is some type of hot,
(eikones) of sensible things, while the other, described as pistis, is the foamy substance analogous in composition to the element of which the
perception of sensible things (Rep. 50ge-511e). Pistis does not play an stars are made (for the growth of this suggestion into the astral body
important role in Aristotle's epistemology; rather, he was concerned of the Neoplatonists, see ochema). It starts from the heart and its
with it in the context of the relationship between proof and conviction; function is to provide the sensitive and kinetic link between the physi-
2) pis tis (snbjective conviction) is the object of the art of rhetoric cal organs and the psyche (see De gen. animo II, 736a-737a). This
(Rhet. I, 1355b), and the various means of persuasion are outlined in pneuma is present in the sperm and transmits the nutritive and sensi-
Rhet. I, 1356a. tive soul from progenitor to offspring (ibid. 735a).
4- Aristotle's philosophical interest in pneuma was not considera-
pIethos: plurality ..' . ble, but it is given a central position by the Stoics. Pneuma is a
According to Aristotle (Meta. 1020a) a pluralIty IS that whIch IS composite of air and fire (SVF II, 442) and it is a heated version of this
potentially divisible into noncontinuous (me sy~e~~es) parts. !hu~ o~~ that is sonl (ibid. I, 135). This pneuma, which is innate (symphyton) ,
possible definition of number (arithmos, q.v.) IS a plethos WIth lImIt is circulated with the blood throughont the body (ibid. II, 885; see
(peras) (lac. cit.). This discrete, numerable quantity (poson) that is psyche 28) in the same way that God, who is also called pneuma, is
plethos is thus contrasted with the continuous, measurable quantity spread thronghout the kosmos (ibid.; see Poseidonius' view, ibid. II,
thatis magnitude (megethos, q.v.). 100g), varying only by its degrees of tension (tonos, q.v.). Each
For the final Platonic solution to the problem of the One (hen) pneumatic system has its hegemonikon (q.v.) or rnling part: that of
and the many (plethos) , see trias 5· man in the heart (kardia, q.v.); that of the kosmos in either the aither
(q.v.; so Zeno and Chrysippus, ibid. II, 642-644) or in the sun (so
pneuma: air, breath, spirit, spiritus Cleanthes, ibid. I, 4g9).
1. Pneuma, which means air or breath (the cognate Greek verb 5. Snch a materialistic view of the sonl fonnd little sympathy
is used in both senses in Homer), is used in the former sense when it among either the Aristotelian functionalists or the Platonic adherents
first appears in Anaximenes. Pneuma or aer, he says, binds the kosmos of a divine, immaterial soul. Plotinus suggests (Enn. IV, 7, 4) that the
together just as our psyche, which is also aer, binds together our body Stoics themselves, ab ipsa veri tate coacti, saw the inadequacy of their
(fr. 2; the language of the fragment has impressed many as being views and so were constrained to add to the hylic pneuma some sort of
somewhat too "modern" for the genuine sentiments of Anaximenes). qualitative or formal notation, calling it "intelligent [ennoun] pneuma"
The identification of air and breath, implicit in the analogy of Auaxi- or "intellectnal [noeron] fire."
menes, is made explicit by the Pythagoreans when they maintain that 6. But even before the time of Plotinus other currents wete
pneuma and void are inhaled by the universe (Aristotle, Phys. IV, transforming the Stoic concept. Some Stoics were themselves disengag-
2 1 3b ) .
ing the hegemonikon from the corporeality of pneuma (see nous) , a
2. But the connection of respiration and the vital principle leaps, position strongly suggested by the Stoic ethic that drew a sharp distinc-
as it does in the concept of psyche itself, to a further connection with tion, moral and intellectual, between man and the other animals (see
cognition in the speculation of some fifth-century writers. According to Cicero, De leg. I, 7, 22; Seneca, Ep. 121, 14). There was, moreover, the
Diogenes of Apollonia, aer (q.v.) is the arche of all. things' and the Judaeo-Christian religious tradition that made the same distinction
warm air within us is soul (fr. 5; the same passage pomts out that .the and, though it continued to use the expression pneuma or spiritus,
air within us is warmer than the surrounding air but considerably employed it in a spiritualized, nonmaterial sense. Thus Philo descrihes
162 I POIEIN PROAIRESIS I 163
man as created of an earthly substance and a divine spirit (theion sa. In the Epicurean ethic quantity and not quality is the criterion for
pneuma), but goes on to point out, commenting Gen. II, 7, that the the choice of pleasure, Eusebius, Praep. ElIang. XIV, 21, 3; see mege-
latter is a part (or as he calls it, "a colony") of the divine nature, and thos, hedone.
this is nous (De oPif. 135).

poiein: to act, action pate: when, time

Action is one of the ten Aristotelian kategoriai listed in Cat. One of the ten Aristotelian kategoriai listed in Cat. Ib-2a; his
Ib-2a; his examples are "cuts," ''burns.'' Both action and passion own examples afe "yesterday," "next year"; see chronos.
(paschein) admit of contraries and degrees (ibid. llb). But in an
ethical context Aristotle distingnishes (Eth. Nich. VI, 114oa) between pan: where, place
poiein, in the sense of "to prodnce" (hence poietike episteme, prodnc- One of the ten Aristotelian kategoriai listed in Cat. Ib-2a; see
tive science) from prattein (to act), (hence praktike episteme, practi- topos.
cal science) ; see paschein, poietike, praxis, episteme, ergon.

poietike (scil. episteme): Il productive science, art; praktike (sci!. episteme): science ot action
See praxis.
2] poetics
1) The proper term used by Aristotle for the productive or
applied science is techne (q.v.); 2) tire poietike techne par excellence praxis: action, activity
is poetics, to which Aristotle devoted an entire treatise, which is only According to Aristotle, when actions follow upon a deliberate
partially preserved. choice (proairesis) they may be judged moral or immoral (Eth. Nich.
I, 13b), and hence fall within the scope of the "practical" sciences
poi6n, poi6tes: what kind, quality (episteme praktikai), i.e., ethics and politics, which have as their
Democritus distingnished between primary qualities based on the object the good that is aimed at by action, ibid. 1094a-b; see ergon.
shape and characteristics of the atomon, and secondary or derived
qualities, like sweet, bitter, warm, cold, etc., which are conventional
(Sextus Empiricus, Adll. Math. VII, 135) and essentially subjective proalresis: deliberate choice
and passive (see pathe). Some of Plato's eide are, of course, hyposta- Though there must have been some previous discussion of moral
tized qualities, e.g., the ethical qualities in Parm. 130b; and yet Plato, choice (see Aristotle, Eth. Nich. III, lll1b), the first preserved treat-
who was the first to use the abstract poiotes (Theaet. 182a), was well ment is that of Aristotle (ibid. lll1b-I115a) who defines it (,113a) as
aware of the difference between quality and substance (see Tim. 49a- "an appetite, guided by deliberation [bouleusisJ, for things within our
50a; for Plato's theory of sensible qualities, see aisthesis). Poios is one power." Choice is always of means; it is only wish (boulesis) that is
of the ten Aristotelian kategoriai listed in Cat. Ib-2a and discussed ibid. directed toward the end (ibid. ll11b; see kinoun 9). Two things are to
8b-lla (compare pathos). In Epicurus tire primary qualities of the be noted about choice: it is precisely this that brings human actions
atoma are shape, size, and weight (the latter an addition to Democri- (praxeis) within the realm of morality; secondly, by positing this volun-
tus), D.L. x, 54. Stoic materialism demanded that even the qualities of tary act (it is not pure voluntarism; proairesis is preceded and based
the psyche be bodies, SVF II, 797; see enantia, dynamis, symbebekos, upon the intellectual act of bouleusis; see ibid. "40a), Aristotle moved
genesis. discussions of morality out of the area of intellection (the Socratic posi-
tion; see arete, kakon) into that of will. The early Stoa embraced the
,
ponos: pam
. intellectualist position (arete = episteme; see SVF III, 256), but with
See aisthesis, apatheia, hedone. Epictetus proairesis once ag~in becomes central; it is the condition of
man's liberty (Diss. I, 29). Yet, even here there is a strong intellectual-
pos6n, pos6tes: how much, quantity ist strain. Proairesis is preceded by diairesis, the distinction between
One of the ten Aristotelian kategoriai listed in Cat. Ib~2a and what is in one's power and what is not (Diss. II, 6, 24; I, 1-3), and pro-
discussed ibid. 4b-6a. Time is a continuous quantity, as is space, ibid. airesis itself seems more like judgment than choice (ibid. III, 9,1-2).
 PROLEPSIS PROODOS I 165
pr6Iepsis: prior grasp, anticipation, preconception tial system, see kakon; on pronoia without contact, sympatheia; on
In the Epicurean epistemology there was one ultimate criterion of God's knowledge of particulars, noeton 4.
truth, sensation (aisthesis; see also aletheia); but there were, as well,
the subsidiary criteria of the emotions (pathe; see hedane) and a pr6iidos: going forth, procession
mental apprehension described by Epicurus as prolepsis (D.L. x, 31), 1. In its most general terms "procession" is later Platonism's
and by Lucretius as natitia (De rerum nat. IV, 476). Prolepsis operates attempt to solve the Parmenidean difficulties of nnity and plurality. If
in much the same way as the Stoic katalepsis (q.v.), except that the the One (hen) is, and is transcendent (see hyperousia) , whence the
prolepsis is the result of a repeated apprehension of the same type of subsequent plurality of the kosmos? Plotinus, who faces the question on
object, e.g. men, and hence is a universal concept, a kind of residual, various levels (e.g. the unity and plurality of the soul in Enn. IV, 3,
composite "Man" based on many sensations of "men." It provides a 2--6; see psyche), frequently resorts to metaphorical explanations, and
kind of standard against which the truth of subsequent apprehensions particularly to the figure of the snn and its rays (see eklampsis). But
can be judged. The Stoics used prolepsis in much the same manner the metaphysical basis of the solution to the question "if one, why
(thus for both Epicurus and the Stoa we have a prolepsis of the gods; many?" rests on the nature of the One, and particularly its perfection
compare Cicero, De nat. deor. 1,43-44 and SVF II, 100g and noesis '5), (telos; Enn. v, 4), and tl,e identification of the efficient and final cause
but under the title of "common concepts" (see ennoia) developed it to (see Tim. 2ge and compare Enn. IV, 8, 6; v, 4, 1; hence the later bonum
a considerably greater extent. est diffusi7Jum sui) .
2. This provides the ingredients for Proclus' more systematic
pr6noia: forethought, providence derivation ofthe hypostases (q.v.). He begins (Elem. theol., prop. 21)
1. The earlier history of the concept of providence is to be seen in by citing a mathematical parallel of the series generated from the
the emergence, from Diogenes to Aristotle, of a notion of an intelligent monas (q.v.). For Proclus this is a better figure than eklampsis since it
purpose (telos, q.v.) operating in the nniverse. In all of these thinkers allows transit in both directions in the series, thus permitting the
it is clearly associated with the intelligent God whose features begin to important ethical correlative of procession, "return" (epistrophe,
appear in the later Plato (see Laws 8gg where the denial of pronoia is q.v.).
reckoned blasphemy) and in Aristotle. For the Stoics the immanent 3· There follows (props. 25-30) a description of proCidos itself.
Logos governs all by nous and pronoia (D.L. VII, 138; SVF I, 176). It Every complete or perfect being (teleion) generates (props. 25, 27;
is given a new turn in the direction of anthropocentrism by Chrysippus compare Enn. v, " 6), but the cause remains undiminished and immo-
(see Porphyry, De abstinentia III, 20) where the rest of the kosmos is bile (menan; prop. 26), as, indeed, had already been understood by
subjected to the good of man. Stoic pronoia, identified as it was with Plato (Tim. 42e). This principle, designed to safeguard the integrity
Physis, was essentially immanent. and transcendence of the arche, is a commonplace in Plotinus (see
2. Later Platonism, like the newly appeared Semitic tradition, Enn. v, " 6; v, 2, 1) and comes particularly to the fore with the
was transcendent and believed in a series of intermediate deities (see introduction of a Creator-God into the systems (see Augustine, Conf. I,
daimon) , with the result that pronoia began to be distributed through 3)· The effect is similar (homoios) to the cause (prop. 29) and so the
the entire range of deities (Plutarch, De fato 572f-273b; Apuleius, De effect is both present in the cause and proceeds from it (prop. 30; see
Platone I, 12). As the supreme principle grows more remote, its direct Enn. v, 5, g). Thus there is a triad of three "moments": every effect
involvement in pronoia becomes markedly less. So in Philo, De fuga (aitiatan) remains (menon) in its cause, proceeds (proodas) from it,
101, the Logos exercises providence through the immanent dynameis, and returns to it (epistrophe; prop. 35) qua good (see Proclus, Theal.
just as in Plotinus (Enn. IV, 8, 2) the World Soul has a general Plat. II, 95) .
providence and the individual souls a particular providence for the 4- The applications of these principles are immense. The similar-
bodies they inhabit; the One, of course, is beyond providence (Enn. VI, ity principle, here expressed in the outgoing procession, will be applied
8, 17). Implicit in this distinction between general and particular in the counter epistraphe (prop. 32) and so will provide a means for
providence, i.e., between command and execution, is the reconciliation both the moral ascent of the soul to its source (for an ethical view of its
of the necessary transcendence of God and the necessary immanence of "fall," see kathodos) and the epistemological grounds for the cognitive
providential activity; compare Proclus, Elem. theol., prop. 122/ approach to God (see Enn. I, 8, 1 and agnostos; for the similarity
For the problems arising from the existence of evil in a providen- principle in the wider context of cognition, see homoios, aisthesis). It
166 [ PROPHETES PSYCHE [167
gives, moreover, a view of the entire kosmos, in both its sensible and from the mouth of the dying hero (this connection with the head may
intelligible aspects, as a magnificent organism (halon, q.v.) with its be ilie suggestive beginning of the later ilieory iliat located the seat of
parts linked in a relationship of compatibility (sympatheia, q.v.) and the soul in the brain; see kardia and compare pneuma). In contrast
descending, in an unbroken chain of analogous beings, from a common there is the thymos, the spirit, located in the midriff (phrenes)
arche. whereby a man thinks and feels (see kardia) .
For the position of proDdos in a more general ontological context, 3. The Homeric psyche was closely associated with motion in
see trias. ' that its departure turned the aggregate of churning limbs that was the
hero's "body" into a soma or motionless corpse. The thymos too is
prophetes: spokesman, medium, prophet connected wiili motion in a sense later explored by Aristotle; it is the
See mantike. promptings of thymos that impel the hero to activity.
4. The philosopher, unlike the poet, concludes rather than de-
pros ti: relation scribes. We can see this habit of mind at work in Thales. Since, he
In Plato there are eide of relatives that are immanent within maintains (Aristotle, De an. I, 405a), the power to cause kinesis is an
things, see Phaedo 74a-77a, Rep. 479b, Parm. 133c-8, and Soph. indication of the presence of soul, should not one conclude that even
255<i-3 where the relative character of the Form "Different" is clearly something as seemingly inanimate as a stone is ensouled since the
acknowledged (and denied by Aristotle in Meta. 990b). In Aristotle Magnesian stone (magnet) is capable of moving other things? The
relation is one of the list of the ten kategoriai in Cat. 1b-2a. It is thought here is especially bold since it bypasses completely the pres-
further described ibid. 6a-8b. Byle is a correlative of eidos and so falls ence of air or breath. But the more archaic attitude reappears with
in this category (Phys. II, 194b), as does at least one aspect (the Anaximenes who does, however, betray a certain boldness of his own in
"useful") of Plato's notion of the Good (Eth. Nich. 1096a). Pros ti is extending the soul-principle to the universe at large (fr. 2; see pneuma) .
one of the four Stoic kategoriai (SVF II, 369). 5. The connection between psyche and breath is intermittent
For ilie relativity of intelligibility, see gnorimon. among the pre-Socratics. Anaximander said the soul was "airy" (Ae-
tius IV, 3, 2), as did Anaxagoras (ibid.). Heraclitus makes breathing
pseudos: error, falsity part of the cognitive process (Diels 22M6; see aisthesis), but only
See doxa, noesis. during sleep when the other senses are sealed off from the cosmic
logos. Diogenes of Apollonia, on the other hand, strongly maintains the
psyche: breath of life, ghost, vital principle, soul, anima connection between the psyche and aer (q.v.; see pneuma) because life
1. One of Aristotle's most detailed excursions into the history of depends on it (frs. 4, 5).
philosophy (see endoxon for ilie method and principle involved) occurs 6. This link with the Homeric past becomes more and more
in Book I of the De anima where he reviews and criticizes his predeces- tenuous as the Homeric psychology itself is revised. By the sixth
sors' opinions on the nature of psyche. As he sees it, earlier specnlation century the psyche had absorbed the functions of the Homeric thymos
came to the soul from two angles that tended to coalesce: the soul as the and was then the term used to describe the psychic totality of man,
principle of movement (kinesis) and of perception (aisthesis). This while at the same time the physical aggregate of limbs and bodily parts
seems to be correct, though, of course, a great deal of the evidence on was yielding to soma, not now as a corpse, but as the physical unity
the snbject consists only in what Aristotle chooses to cite. But there are that has psyche as its psychic correlative.
two additional facets in the history of psyche that Aristotle largely 7. Thus released from its immediate pneumatic associations,
ignores: the prephilosophical use of the term and psyche as a religious psyche finds its place, as Aristotle suggests, within ilie larger cadres of
phenomenon. motion and perception. Typical in this regard are the views of ilie
2. The connection between life and movement on the one hand Atomists and Empedocles. The former had reduced reality to atoma
and consciousness on the other is not at all obvious in Homer who and the void (kenon) and were evidently concerned with the soul as
designates two separate entities to explain life and consciousness. For the source of motion when they described it as an aggregate (synkrisis;
Homer psyche is the "breath of life" (and also, in what may be a see genesis) of atoms that are spherical and fire-like on ilie grounds
completely different stratum of belief, an individualized "ghost" that that these atoms are the most mobile and most competent to cause
lives on in an attenuated fashion after death) that escapes, normally, motion in others (Aristotle, De an. I, 405a). There are, of cQurse,
168 I PSYCHE PSYCHE I 16g
difficulties here, largely arising from the relationship between soul and (dynameis) of a body is not the same thing as the numerical proportion
body and that between soul and mind or spirit (nous). Where is this as worke~ ~ut bl the Pythagoreans. And, though it may have Pythago-
aggreg~te that, by reason of the movement of its own atoma, is capable
rean affimtles, It seems to stem from medical circles that used it to
of mov.mg the body (see ibid. I, 406b)? The answer is preserved by explain health as an equilibrium (isonomia) of opposite qualities in the
LucretIUs who tells us (III, 37°-39S) that Democritus held that soul human body and where it is associated with Alcmaeon of Crotona
and body atoma were juxtaposed (appositio, parathesis; see Diels (Aetius V, 30, 17; it appears too in the speech of the physician
68A64), an arrangement Lucretius found indefensible (see noesis 6). Eryximachus in Symp. 18Sa). But there is no evidence that Alcmaeon
8. A higher, more reliable type of perception had been distin- applied it to the soul (see De an. I, 40Sa) .
guished from mere sensation from the time of Heraclitus and Parmen- 12: What, then, was the Pythagorean doctrine of soul? There
ides (see aisthesis, episteme, doxa, noesis), and, despite Aristotle's was, in f~ct, more than one, and this strange ambivalence is equally
conviction that they thought the two were the same, the Atomists did apparent m Empedocles. The Pythagoreans rednced all things to the
make a serious' attempt, even within the confines of their materialistic arche of number (arithmos, q.v.) and so it comes as no surprise to
system, to distinguish psyche and nous both in terms of function (see discover that they considered soul and nous as "properties [pathe] of
noesis) and location (see kardia). numbers" (Aristotle, Meta. 98Sb). This may be a version of a mathe-
9. Although the Atomists were keenly interested in sensation matical harmonia theory, but the same cannot be true of the view
(for their theories, see aisthesis) , the sensation approach to soul is even dismissed in De an. I, 407b as a Pythagorean mythos, which suggest~
more apparent in Empedocles. Aristotle sees behind the reduction of that the soul is completely distinct from the body and that it is possible
soul to one or other of the elements (stoicheia) of physical bodies the for "any chance soul to enter any chance body." And turning to
assumption t~at "like knows like" with the consequence that, if the Empedocles, while the theory that the soul is blood makes perfect sense
soul knows, It mnst be composed of the same material as the thing within the framework of his mechanistic explanations of the elements
known (De an. I, 40gb). He cites Empedocles as the chief witness to and their mixtures, what is to be said of the view, put forth in his
this view (fr. 109). But it is clear enough that Empedocles, who may Purifications, that the soul is a daimon (q.v.) that committed an
"original sin" (see kathodos) and undergoes a series of reincarnations
have ~aid that thi~ similarity (homoiotes, q.v.) was the reason why
sensatIOn occurs, dId not mean to suggest that each of his four elements (fr.llS)?
was the soul. Rather, it seems more likely that it.is blood that is a '3. What has appeared here, at the center of the Pythagorean
tradition in philosophy, is another view of psyche that seems to owe
p~rfect bl~nd of. the elements (frs. lOS, 98; this also links the theory
WIth consIderatIOns of natural heat; see kardia). There is a .third little or nothing to the pan-vitalism or pan-deism (see theion) that is
po~sibility and Aristotle considers (and rejects) this as well. Perhaps,
the legacy of the Milesians. All the implications of this new belief that
as m the case of blood, the Empedoclean soul is not the mixture but the the divine nature of the soul is radically different from all other things
proportion (logos) itself (ibid. I, 408a; see holon). may be seen in the famous passage from Pindar (fr. 131), one of its
10. Aristotle cites this latter possibility as one instance of a more first appearances: the soul that is of divine origin survives the death of
the body; its operation can best be observed in dreams where it is active
general school of thought that attempted to define psyche as a harmo-
while the body slumbers. The origins of this new belief in the special
nia (q.v.; ibid. I, 407b and compare Pol. 1340b). Plato too knows the
harmonia theory; it was advanced by Simmias in the Phaedo divinity and immortality of the soul and its basic difference from and
antagonism to the body are somewhat obscure; one suggestion is that it
(8se-86d) and subseqnently refuted by Socrates (91c-9Se). The ori-
came to the Greeks through contact with Scythian shamanism. But
gins of the theory have been much debated. The word harmonia is
whatever its origins the belief appears, with all its ramifications, in
Pythagorean and there are Pythagorean affinities in the Phaedo (Eche-
Pythagoras, EmpedocIes, and the Orphic literature, and its most noto-
crates holds the theory [88d] and he was a Pythagorean [D.L. VIII, 46];
rious forms are the doctrine of bilocation and reincarnation (palingene-
Simmias had studied with the Pythagorean Philolaus [61d]; see the late
sia, q.v.) and its associated theory of recollection (anamnesis), the an-
evidence for him in Diels 44B22, 23) . Bnt nowhere does either Plato or
tagonism between body and soul that becomes so familiar from Plato's
Aristotle. identify it as Pythagorean and the theory, at least as it
metaphor of body/prison (soma/sema; see Grat. 400c, Phaedo 62b) and
a?pears m t?e Phaedo, has to do with the harmonia of physical oppo-
a series of eschatological myths that also appear in Plato (see athanatos).
SItes (enantzo, q. v. ) . .
'4. Plato's debt to the Orphic-Pythagorean view of the soul is
11. But the theory of a balance or equilibrium of opposite powers
170 [ PSYCHE PSYCHE [171
clearly marked in the earlier dialognes. In Ch'E:...m. 156d-157a all the clearly enough the logistikon of the later dialogues, we may integrate
traditional motifs of this "ancient account" (palaios logos: Phaedo 70c; their functions and see it as the cognitive arche of a nonsensory dianoia
see Meno 81a, Ep. VII, 335a) are present: the psyche is a unity, (Phaedo 7ga, Soph. 248a) and the ethical ruler of the two lower parts
immortal (athanatos, q.v.), subject to a cyclic rebirth into a body that of the soul (Rep. IV, 44,e; Phaedrus 253c-254e). But it is less clear
is the source of all its ills. The end of life, and the definition of what the cognitive powers of the lower parts of the soul are, if any.
philosophia (q.v.), is a purification (katharsi~, q.v.) that is .a prepara- That sensation (aisthesis, q.v.) involves the soul as well as the body is
tion for death and the retnrn of the soul to Its natural habItat. Asso- mentioned more than once; pleasure, we are also told, extends from the
ciated with this complex of ideas is the theory of recollection (anamne- body to, the soul (Rep. IX, 584c) and, in Phil. 33d-34a, this ethical
sis, q.v.; according to a later authority in D.L. VIII, 4 Pythagoras re- pathos (q.v.) is extended to include the cognitive pathos of sensation as
membered his previous incarnations; for Empedocles, see ibid. VIII, well (compare the parallel passage in Tim. 64b). But the temptation to
77) and it is this that leads Plato to more novel considerations. In the locate sensation in the thymoeides, somewhat in the fashion of an
Phaedo, anamnesis suddenly shifts to the level of episteme (q.v.) and Aristotelian psyche aisthetike, mnst be resisted. The Timaeus lodges
what is recollected is not the details of some other life but a knowledge the logistikon in the head and at the same time makes the brain
of the Forms (eide). The psyche is the faculty whereby we know the (enkephalos) the seat of sensation (44d, 73b). The logistikon, it would
eide (65a-67b) and this because the soul is most akin to the eide appear, is the only cognitive part of the psyche. !ts normal. and ~atural
(78b-79b), like them immortal, immaterial, and invisible. function is dianoia or logismos, but because of Its connectIon WIth the
'5. Gradually the more radical aspects of the difference between alien body at birth it is assailed by various pathe of that body and wl,:en
body and soul are modified in Plato. In many respects this represents a these reach the soul sensation results (Tim. 42e-44a; for the mechamcs
return to the more traditional categories by acknowledging that vari- of these bodily pathe, see aisthesis, 15-17). The function of the thymo-
ous somatic functions also belong to the soul, which in the Phaedo eides, located in the breast, is, on this view, to receive communications
strives to operate only in the noetic sphere and apart from the senses. from the logistikon and act upon them (ibid. 6gd-7ob). The epithyme-
This accommodation is accomplished by the tripartition of the sonl tikon, located in the abdominal cavity, receives no message from the
(Rep. IV, 435e-444e). The psyche, like the politeia itself, is divided logistikon, but its headlong pursuit of physical pleasures is occasionally
into three parts: the rational (logistikon), the "spirited" (thymoeides), tempered by the presence of the liver, which is the seat of dreams
and the appetitive (epithymetikon), with virtues and pathe (q.v.) (oneiros, q.v.) and the basis of divination (mantike, q.v.; for a later
appropriate to each. The division appears again in Rep. IX, 58od-581a, ground for divination, see sympatheia 8) .
in Phaedrus 246a-b, 253c-255b, and again in Tim. 6gd-72d where the 18. The logistikon then can hardly be called the arche of sensa-
parts are assigned their appropriate .bodily seats, ~inked together by ~he tion as that might be understood by the pre-Socratics. It is rather a
spinal marrow (73b-d; the connectIOn of the bral~ (enkeph~los) WIth cross between a shamanistic Pythagorean "other self" and the faculty
the spinal column was well known, though demed by ArIstotle, De of "true knowledge" in the Parmenidean sense. It is capable of epis-
part. animo II, 652a; see also kardia) . teme because of its similarity to the things known, the eide (Phaedo
16. As the functions of the soul are expanded from the Republic 7gb; in Soph. 248e-249b, with its changed perspectives, it is granted a
on, the upper part or logistikon begins to take on the characteristics of share of the "really real"), and is capable of sensation faute de mieux.
the nnitary psyche of the Phaedo. It is divine, created by the demi- 19. In Tim. 43a-d and Laws X, 8g6e-8g7b Plato makes a distinc-
ourgos (Tim. 41c-d) , lodged in the head (ibid. 44d; see kardia) , vouch- tion between primary motions that are proper to the soul and secondary
safed a prenatal vision of the eide (Phaedrus 247b-248b, Tim. motions that originate in the body and come into the soul, and in Phil.
41e-42a), and subject to cyclic palingenesia (Phaedrus 248c-249d, 33d he describes sensation as a kind of shaking (seismon) that is
Tim. 42b-d). It is, moreover, immortal, as contrasted to the two other peculiar to the body and to the soul and at the. same time con:mon to
parts of the soul that are mortal and created by lesser gods (Tim. both. Thus Plato is led to approach the psyche In another fashIOn iliat
6gc-d; see Rep. X, 611b-612a, Pol. 309a-c). , is more akin to the other pre-Socratic motif of kinesis. One of Plato's
'7. One of the difficnlties arising from Plato's treatment of the major proofs for the immortality of the soul, i.e., the logistikon, is the
soul is the fact that he clearly has posited the tripartition of the soul fact that it is always in motion (aeikineton) and hence must be self-
on ethical grounds, while the unitive soul of the Phaedo is sugg,ested by moved (autokineton), otherwise genesis would fail (Phaedrus
epistemological considerations. Since the psyche of the Phaedo is 245c-e). The argnment is not entirely new; it was used by Alcmaeon
~72 I PSYCHE PSYCHE I ~73
who did not, however, argue from self-motion but from the fact that chon) composed of a material (hyle) and a formal (eidos) principle.
the soul was aeikineton (Aristotle, De an. I, 405a). Plato's, on tbe other The latter is ilie sonl and if it is approached from the direction of
hand, derives from self-motion, the self-motion of nous that has a share function (ergon; See energeia) it may be defined (ibid. II, 412b) as the
in reality (Soph. 24ga-b) and is related to the eidos of kinesis (ibid. first (i.e. not necessarily operating) entelecheia (q.v.) of an organic
254d where it is one of the megista gene; see eidos 13 and kinesis 6). body (see halon) .
This then is not one of the many types of secondary cansality detailed 2+ Plato frequently gives the impression that he is more inter-
in Laws x, 8g3b-8g4c, but the primary motion- with which the dta- ested in soul than in the soul. The proof of immortality already cited
logue ends, "real" motion that moves itself and that is the arche of from the Phaedrus is set out to cover "all soul." In the detailed
kinesis (Laws x, 8g5b; compare Phaedrus 245d). He is prepared to go passages in the Timaeus, moreover, where Plato describes the composi-
even further. Self-motion is the essence (ousia) and definition of the tion of the soul from its elements (35b-36b), it is ilie World Soul
sonl (Phaedrus 245e). (psyche tau pantos, q.v.) to which he refers; the individual souls are
20. Aristotle takes up this theory in De an. I, 406b-407b and second- or third-rate versions of it (ibid. 41d). For Aristotle, however,
objects to it on a number of scores, but chiefly because he thinks that it is the individual living being that is the paradigm and the method of
thereby Plato has reduced the soul to a magnitude (megethos, q.v.). approach is to investigate its various activities. In this way he proceeds
To his way of thinking the kinesis would have to be circular locomotion to an investigation of ilie faculties (dynameis) of the soul of a living
(see noesis) so that Plato, like Democritus, has the soul move a body by organism.
being in motion itself, instead of seeing that the soul moves things 25· Plato had divided the sonl into parts (mere; see 15) and at
by being their final cause and thus may be said to originate movement times his language suggests that the parts of the soul are really individ-
by thought (noesis) or choice (proairesis; ibid. I, 406b). For Aris- ual souls within the same being (see Tim. 6gd-e and the open question
totle's other approaches to the question of the soul as the arche of in Laws IX, 863b). Aristotle also calls them parts, but he treats them as
kinesis, see kinoun 8 and physis 3. faculties (see De an. III, 433b ) , i.e., dynameis in the word's primary
21. He next deals with ilie view that the soul is self-moved senSe of ilie power to effect change in another or in itself qua oilier
number, the theory of another member of the Academy, Xenocrates (Meta. 1046a and see dynamis 3). There are a great variety of these
(ibid. I, 408b-4ogb; see Plutarch, De procr. an. 1012d) . Now number dynameis, but iliey are ilie most appropriate way to study the nature of
is an aggregate of units (plethos monadon; see Meta. 1053a), and, ilie soul (De an. II, 415a). Aristotle proposes to work his way from the
apart from ilie absurdities of applying ilie now popular fluxion theory most fundamental, ilie nutritive threptike (ibid. II, 414a-415a ),
of moving points into lines, etc. (see arithmos) , ilie theory of Xeno- th~ough the ascending series (each higher dynamis presupposes the
crates appears open to the same type of mechanistic charges made eXistence of the lower) , to the sensitive (aisthetike; see aisthesis) , and
against Democritus. finally to the distinctive faculty of man, the noetike (see nous, noesis).
22. Aristotle cuts into the heart of the pre-Socratic theories. The 26. Aristotle is clear on the subject of personal immortality. Since
soul, it is true, is a moving principle, not in the mechanistic sense of the soul is the formal and final Cause of an organically qualified body it
Democritus or as he understood Plato and Xenocrates to say, but as the cannot survive the dissolntion of the union wiili iliat body, except,
final cause: it moves by thought and desire (De an. III, 433a-b; Meta. perhaps, as part of the species (ibid. II, 415b). But there is nothing to
1072a-b; for some of the difficulties involved in this, see sympatheia prevent a faculty of the soul from being separable (choriston; ibid. I,
7). But it is not self-moved except accidentally (ibid. I, 405b-406b), 408b) and this is actually so in the case of the nous (q.v.; ibid. III,
since what moves oiliers does not necessarily have to be in motion itself 430a ).
(Phys. VIII, 256a-258b). 27· For Epicurns and Lucretius soul is a composite body made up
23. His own treatment, however, deserts the category of kinesis of various atoms (D.L. X, 63). But this is a far cry from the mere
(which he shifts over to physis, q.v.) and moves in another direction. aggregation of fiery atoms proposed by Democritus. First, the notion of
Earlier on, during his more Platonic period, Aristotle had treated 1:\1e body has been refined to that of an organic compound (concilium; see
soul as if it were a complete substance (Eudemus, frs. 45, 46) that had halon 10). Secondly, ilie relationship of the soul and the body is now
little need of the body (ibid., fro 41). But in the De anima it is quite specified as the atoma of the soul being spread throughout and con-
oilierwise. A complete substance is an individual being, a tode ti tained within the sheath (stegazon) ohhe body (D.L. X, 43, 64). The
(q.v.), and one such is the "living or ensouled body" (soma empsy- atoma iliat go into the composition of the soul are no longer merely
174 I PSYCHE PSYCHE I 175
"fiery" but include breath (pneuma) and air (see Lucretius III, downward away from the One (hen) has caused it to become multiple,
231-236). There is a more startling addition, the atoms of an ''un- and Plotinus is constrained to explain at some length the relationship of
named element" that are not like any of the others but are subtler, the varions sonls that vitalize bodies to the unitary hypostasis of which
smoother, and more mobile than any other kind of atom (D.L. x, 63; they are parts (IV, 3,1-8). They are not, of course, material parts of a
Aetius IV, 3, 11; the quarta natura of Lucretius III, 241-257). It is this material whole. They are unified in that they have a common origin
latter that begins the movements that are sensation (see aisthesis 23 and a natural operation; they are divergent because they operate in and
and holon 10) and transmits them to the rest of the body (ibid. III, 262, over different bodies (IV, 3, 4) . This gives rise not only to a plurality of
281). souls but also grades of souls (IV, 3, 6), ranging from tlle World Soul
28. The Stoic theory of soul illustrates the curiously qualified (psyche tau pantos), which is still close to the intelligible source and
materialism of their positions. In a definition reminiscent of Heraclitus whose activities are consequently closer to that of nous, down to the
the soul is material fire or heated pneuma (Cicero, De fin. IV, 12; D.L. souls of plants, the furthest extension of the soul principle away from
VII, 157 and compare Plotinus' critique in Enn. IV, 7, 4; further details. nous. The distinction is a useful one: the unitive nature of soul enables
on the Stoic view under pneuma 4-5). It has eight faculties: the Plotinus to affirm the systematic structure of the plural souls in terms
hegemonikon (q.v.), the five senses, and the speaking and generative of cosmic sympatheia (q.v.; see Enn. IV, 3, 8), and the distinction of
faculty (SVF I, 143; see noesis 16), each represented by a stream of grades provides a basis for a continued belief in reincarnation (palin-
pneuma stretched out to the appropriate organ and reaching back to genesia; Enn. III, 4, 5) .
the hegemonikon (SVF II, 836) and relaying to it the various sense 32. The function of soul, then, is to vitalize and govern matter
impressions (phantasiai), impulses (hormai), and affections (pathe) (see Enn. IV, 8, 3). How this is accomplished is explained in a series of
to which the senses are prone (for the revisions in Stoic psychology, see metaphors: the soul illuminates matter like a light that, though remaio-
noesis '7). ing at its point of origin (on this motif, see proodos 3), sends forth its
29. The later Platonic tradition, with its highly developed theory rays into a gradually deepening darkness. Or it vitalizes matter in the
of sympatheia, expanded Plato's suggestion of the similarity of the same way that a net, inert out of water, spreads out and seems to come
psyche to the eide (see 18 supra and compare metaxu 2) to give it a alive when cast into the sea, without at the same time affecting the sea
strongly emphasized medial position between the noeta and the aistheta (IV, 3, 9). It is in this fashion that the soul of the universe affects its
(see Simplicius, In De an. I, 2, p. 30, citing Xenocrates; Plutarch, De body, the sensible kosmos.
proer. an. 1023b, citing Poseidonius; on the efforts to fill the gaps in the 33. As for the individual souls, the question here is considerably
scala naturae, see sympatheia 3). Plotinus strongly affirms this (Enn. more complex due to the obvious diversity of functions. Aristotle's view
IV, 8, 7), but he also perceives the paradox in the Platonic view: how to of the soul as an entelecheia of the body seems to suggest too close a
reconcile the heaven-sent, immortal soul of the Phaedo and the Phae- functional connection between the soul of the body and Plotinus rejects
drus, whose sojourn in the body is compared by Plato to au i~carcera­ it (Enn. IV, 7, 8). Instead he turns to the microcosmic principle: each
tion, with the immanent and directive soul of the Timaeus, whIch has a human soul has, like the World Soul, a "part" that remains turned
distinctly benign function vis-ii-vis the organism (Enn. IV, 8, I)? The toward the intelligible and is unaffected by the descent into the body
former attitude raises the entire problem of the descent of the soul into (IV, 3, 12). But the fact that it has gone forth to a body, from the
matter (see kathodos); the latter, the vitalistic function of soul seen as heavenly bodies (ouranioi) down to the plants, leads to a diminution of
nature (Physis). the natural power of the soul. Thus its normal nondiscursive intellec-
30. Soul, taken as a single entity, is a hypostasis (q.v.), a pro- tual activity (see noesis) degenerates to lower forms of activity: theoria
duction of nous and its image (eikon; Enn. v, " 2), and in turning becomes dianoia and, eventually, praxis (IV, 3, 18; see physis 5, noesis
toward nous it becomes itself fertilized and produces, in the opposite 20).
direction, various activities that are a reflection of itself and the terms 34. The individual soul, once "in" the body (the localization is
of which are sensation (aisthesis) and growth (v, 2, 1). Soul, then, by not, of course, spatial; the soul is "in" the body in the same sense that
the very nature of things has a double orientation: it is turned toward light is "in" the air; IV, 3, 22; see kardia), sends out a series of
its source, the intelligible, and it is turned toward the world, which it reflections of itself, the first of which is aisthesis, followed by the
vitalizes (see noesis 20). other faculties (I, " 8). These enable the material body to act
31. But the soul is more than a unitary hypostasis; its turning without in any way affecting the soul (I, " 6-7; see aisthesis 26-27).
176 I PSYCHE TOU PANTOS PYR I 177
35. Proclus begins his treatment of the soul by applying to it his harmonious movement for the heavenly bodies, but for ethical restora-
familiar doctrine of the mean (see trias). There are three types of soul: tion of harmonia in the individual human soul (ibid. goc-d; see kathar-
the divine (including the souls of the planets; see ouranioi and, for sis) .
their influence, ochema 4) , those capable of passing from intellection to For the existence of an evil World Soul in the Platonic system see
ignorance (see noesis 21), and an intermediate grade that is always in kakon. '
act but inferior to the divine souls (Elem. theol., prop. 184). This 2. Aristotle no longe~ needs psyche to explain motion (see physis),
mediating grade, in addition to being demanded by Proclus' triadiC ~nd so the Wor~d So~ .IS quietly dropped. It reappears, however,
principle, had a previous history in the tradition. These are the dai- In t?e late P~atomc tradItIOn (see Philo, De migre. Abr. 32, 179-180 ;

manes already defined by Plato as intermediaries (Symp. 202d) , inte- Albmus, Ep,t. x, 3) and becomes one of Plotinus' hypostases (q.v.);
grated by his pupil Xenocrates into the various grades of intelligence Enn. V, 2, 1. The viewpoint is now much more complex: the World
(logos; see Plutarch, De defec. orac. 416c;and divided by Proclus into Soul h~s an upper and lower part, the former engaged in contemplation
angeloi, daimones, and heroes (In Tim. III, 165, 11). (theona) , the latter corrupted into activity (praxis) and called physis
36. Plato's view of soul as substance is still in evidence in Proclus (q.v.); it is divisible, yet indivisible (Enn. IV, 3, 4); unlike the World
where it is described (Elem. theol., prop. 188) as both life (zoe) and a So~ of Plato, however, it produces the sensible world, Enn. V, 2, 1; see
living thing (zoon). Its intermediate position is affirmed (prop. Ig0), proodos.
and, having such, participates in both eternity (aion, q.v.) by reason of
its ousia and in time by reason of its energeia (prop. Igl; see Plotinus, pyr: fire
Enn. IV, 4, 15). Palingenesia is still maintained (prop. 206), but Though fire is present in the systems of both Anaximander
Proclus denies that the soul can be reborn into animals (In Remp. II, (Diels, fro I~AlO) and Anaximenes (13A7), it is, for both of them, a
3 1 2--3 13) . product, whIle for Heraclitus, the universe (kosmos) is a fire (Diels
On the faculties of the soul, see aisthesis, noesis, nous, orexis; its 22B30), n~t as an a~che ~ut rather as "archetypal matter," probably
immortality, athanatos; descent into the world, kathodos; periodic re- b~cause of Its connecnon wIth psyche and life (fr. 36) and, hence, with
birth, palingenesia; its astral body, ochema; for the interrelation of soul mther .< q.v.). ~mong the Pythagoreans fire held the central position in
and body in Stoicism and Epicureanism, genesis; for attempts at distin- the un:vers~ (wIth the earth as a planet! ) , Aristotle, De coelo II, 293b. It
guishing psyche from nous, noesis; on the World Soul, psyche tou wa~ gl;en Its .place as one of the four elements by Empedocles (see
pantos. stozchezon!. FIre plays ~ fundamental role in Stoic physics as the
~lement wIth the ~ost actIve dy~amis, the hot (see dynamis) . Of prime
psyche tOll pantos: World Soul Importance here IS. the con~ectlon between fire and life (SVF II, 23)
1. The existence of a soul for the entire world seems to be and,. through. the mtermedlacy of the psyche, with the pneuma, the
another example of Plato's use of analogous reasoning (see kosmos medically derrved principle of vital heat, which the Stoics understood
noetos): if the kosmos is thought to be a living organic unity (see as a c?mbination of fi~e.and air (SVF II, 787) and as an all-pervasive
zoon), it follows that it, like the other animals, must have a soul. This force m the kosmos (,b,d. II, 473); see ekpyrosis, logos.
line of reasoning appears in Pol. 26g<i-273b (though here the psyche is
not yet a source of continuing motion), in Phil. 3oa, and, finally, in a
completely integrated fashion in Tim. 34a-37c. It is composed by the
demiourgos from intermediary types (i.e., mixtures that combine ele-
ments appropriate to the intelligible world of being and the sensible
world of becoming) of Existence (ousia), the Same, and the Other,
three of the five most important eide mentioned in Soph. 254d. Aris-
totle's explanation of why these mixtures were chosen is based on the
epistemological principle of "like knows like" (De an. I, 404b; see
homoios, aisthesis). These ingredients are arranged in bands in certain
harmonic intervals (Tim. 35b-36b), and thus the World:' Soul be-
comes, in true Pythagorean fashion, a paradigm not only for the
 r s
rhoe: flowing, stream, flux sch~ma: appearance, shape
From the time of Plato on, the position of Heraclitus and his See aisthesis, stoicheion.
followers, one of whom, Cratylus, apparently exercised some influence
on Plato (see Aristotle, Meta. 987a), was described in terms of the sophia: wisdom, theoretical wisdom
metaphor of "flowing" or "streaming" (so for Heraclitus, Plato, Grat. The original meaning of the word connects it with craftsmanship,
402a ; for his followers, Grat. 440c-d and Theaet. 179d-181b; the cele- see Homer, II. xv, 412; Hesiod, Works, 651 (compare Aristotle, Eth.
brated expression "everything is in a state of flux" [panta r~eil d?es Nich. VI, 1141a). By the time of Herodotus it also embraced a more
not occur until Simplicius, Phys. 1313, ll). Whether Heraclitus him- theoretical type of preeminence, Hist. I, 29 (Seven "Sages"), IV, 95
self used the expression or whether, indeed, it is an exact description of (Pythagoras as a sophistes). Heraclitus (Diels, fro 129) says that this
his view of change may be debated, but what is notable is that this sophia of Pythagoras is nothing but polymathy and malpractice. For
popular tag (the Heraclitans contemporary with Plato were actually Plato there is an implied distinction between true sophia that is the
called "flowers": Theaet. 181a) was never conceptualized. Plato re- object of philosophia (see Phaedrus 278d) and tlmt, like phronesis, is
jects the implications of the metaphor, chiefly because it renders kuowl- to be identified with true knowledge (episteme) (Theaet. 145e), i.e., a
edge impossible (Grat. 440a-b, and see episteme), but when he c~mes knowledge of the eide, and, on the other hand, the practitioner of false
to treat of it as a philosophical problem it appears under the rubriC of sophia, the sophistes of the dialogue of the same name. For Aristotle
"becoming" (genesis, q.v.; Theaet. 152e-153a is a good example of sophia is the highest intellectual virtue, distinguished from phronesis
Plato's passing over the metaphor in preference for the more fully or practical wisdom, (Eth. Nich. 1141a-b, 1143b-1l44a), and also
conceptualized genesis) or, as in Aristotle, as part of the problem of identified with metaphysics, the prote philosophia in Meta. gSoa-gS3a.
"change" (see metabole, kinesis). As far as the technical.l~ngu.age of The "sage" (sophos) becomes the Stoic ideal of virtue, see SVF I, 216;
philosophy was concerned, rhoe was never more than a sttlkmg Image. III, 548; D.L. VII, 121-122, and the critical portrait in D.L. VII, 123
and Cicero, Pro Mur. 29-31; see also, philosophia, phronesis, episteme,
endoxon.

siiphrosyne: self-control, moderation

1. Sophrosyne is the subject of one of Socrates' ethical enquiries,
as described in the Gharmides, where no solid definition is reached. Its
etymological meaning as ''moral sanity" is discussed in Grat. 4"e, but
the true Platonic position of sophrosyne is rooted in the Pythagorean
notion of harmonia (q.v.). The two concepts are brought together in
Rep. 430e-432a, and later, 442C, it is closely linked with Plato's
tripartite division of the soul (see psyche): sophrosyne is the harmoni-
ous subjection of the two lower parts to the ruling, the rational part
(compare Phaedrus 237e-238a where the harmonia emhraces only two
elements).
2. For Aristotle sophrosyne is the mean (meson) between the
extremes of pleasures and pains (Eth. Nich. II, 1l07b); its area is
179
180 I SPERMA STOICHEION I 181
restricted to body pleasures (ibid. III, 11l8a) and particularly those 2. The reality behind the term is, of course, far more venerable.
touch and taste. Zeno (Plutarch, Stoic repugn. 1034c), like Plato It is the object of the Milesian quest for the primary something or
(Rep. 43Sb), makes sophrosyne one of the four chief virtues (Eth. Urstof] of which the physical reality of the world is made, an attempt
Nich. I, 1lo3a). The more intellectualizing Stoa denied this distinction to trace the undeniable fact of change back to its starting point. The
(see arete), and defined sophrosyne as the "knowledge of the good to candidates for this arche are well known: the most important sub-
be chosen and the evil to be avoided" (SVF III, 256, 262) . Plotin\ls has stances in man's experience, and generally those with mythological
a similar definition (Enn. I, 6, 6), but relates it to a purific~tion credentials as well (see arc he ) .
preparatory to the "return" (epistrophe); see katharsis. 3. There is an important development with Anaximander. The
search for a single arche had suggested a kind of linear genesis
spenna: seed whereby the other bodies were derived from this single starting point.
See stoicheion, pneuma, noesis 16. But when Anaximander thrust the arche back beyond the perceptible
material substances (see apeiron), he effectively made all perceptible
spoudaios: senous man bodies secondary and so led the search for a starting point off into new
See ergon. nonsensible directions, but he intruded into the problem the possibility
of a cyclic genesis whereby the perceptible substances pass into each
steresis: privation other in a continuous cycle. Such a mutual transformation of the basic
Steresis, which Aristotle defines (Meta. lO11b) as "the negation bodies becomes a commonplace in much of Greek philosophy (see
of something within a defined class," is one of the three essential Plato, Phaedo 72b, Tim. 49b-c; Aristotle, De gen. et carr. II, 337a),
elements in Aristotle's analysis of genesis in Phys. 1: the permanent leading, after Parmenides, to the belief in an external agent, itself
substratum (hypokeimenon) and the passage of one form to its oppo- unmoved, to keep the cycle in operation (mediated, in Aristotle, by the
site (mantion) demands the existence of a lack of that second form in eternal movement of the sun along the elliptic; see genesis, kinesis,
the substratum (Phys. I, 191a-191b). Thus steresis both permits gene- kinoun), and even the stoicheia of Empedocles seem to undergo such
sis and solves the Parmenidean problem of nonbeing (see on). For cyclic change (frs. 17, 26).
Plotiuus evil is not a substance but rather a steresis of good (Enn. I, 8, 4. The quest for the arche came to term in Parmenides who,
11) . reversing Anaximander's perfectly undefined apeiron, posited his own
perfectly defined on (q.v.). But perfect definition provides not only an
stigme: spot, point, geometrical point arche but a telos as well, and so Parmenides was led to deny sensibly
See megethos, monos. perceived change (see genesis, kinesis) and, indeed, the validity of
sensation itself (see episteme). The Parmenidean on is the absolute
stoicheion: letter at the alphabet, primary body, radical stoicheion.
element 5. Empedocles and the Atomists, by restoring plurality and the
1. The comparison of the basic bodies of the physical world to void (kenon), reopened the possibilities of secondary genesis and reha-
the letters of the alphabet, and so, by implication, the introduction of bilitated sense knowledge. The Milesian search for basic ingredients
the term stoicheion into the language of philosophy, probably goes was resumed and Empedocles himself took the lead and selected, as the
back to the Atomists. In this context the comparison is an apt one since four basic bodies (or "roots" as he called them) of this material world,
the letters, like the atoma, have no significance of their own, but by earth, air, fire, and water, the canonical four elements (fr. 6; see
manipulating their order (taxis) and position (thesis) one can con- Aristotle, Meta. 98Sa). "Selected" is the appropriate word in the
struct them into aggregates with different meanings (Aristotle, Meta. circumstances since these were by no means the only candidates; there
98Sb; De gen. et carr. I, 31Sb; see genesis). But the earliest attested use were at hand a great number of substantivized "powers" (dynameis),
of the term stoicheion is in Plato, Theaet. 201e where it is obvious that e.g. "the hot," "the cold," "the light," "the heavy," etc., that had
Plato still feels the original connotation of "letter of the alphabet." By been isolated up to this point.
the time of Aristotle the original meaning is largely ignored and 6. To all appearances Empedocles was both the first and the last
stoicheion means the basic ingredient of a composite (see Meta. to hold that these four were tl:ie irreducible primary bodies and the
1014a ) . efforts of his successors were bent toward reducing these "so-called
182 I STOICHEION STOICHEION I 183
elements" (the phrase is Aristotle's; see Meta. 1066b) to something the remai~i.ng figure, the dodecahedron, is reserved for the sphere of the
more basic, as well as to how they came to pass into more complex heaven (,b,d. 55c; see aither, megethos). Up to this point the account
bodies. could pass as a somewhat suspicious version of Atomism. But where it
7. One group, taking its lead from both Anaximander and be~rays its Py~hagorean fo~ebears is in the fact that these geometrical
Parmenides, held that the arc hoi of physical bodies were themselves sohds have their own archaz: they are constructed out of planes, with at
not perceptible to sense and thus were to be sought in entities that had least the s~ggestion that tl1e reductiou could go further (ibid. 53C-d).

A
no other characteristics than mass and position. Such was the atomon T~e Atomist atoma, on the other hand, are indivisible bodies (see
of Leucippus and Democritns and the mathematical atom of the Pythag- fIstotle, De gen. e: co~r. I, 325b for a comparison of the two systems).
oreans, the monas (q.v.; see arithmos). These are the real "elements" And here too sensatIOn IS reduced to contact with various combinations
that could, in turn, be constructed into more complex bodies, the atoma of these bodies, which in turn give rise to sensible experiences (Tim.
by the process of association (synkrisis), the monads by the geometri- 61C ff; see aisthesis ) .
cal construction of points into lines, thus to surfaces and bodies; see" 11. Though Pythagorean monadism antedated Atomism it was
genesis. not its immediate antecedent. The Atomist tradition rather saw'the line
8. But siuce both groups had so deuuded their basic particle of of descent come down from Empedocles through Anaxagoras to them-
characteristics they were somewhat hard pressed to explain how such selves ~ see Lucretius I, 830-920). Anaxagoras rejected Empedocles'
"nothings" could issue in the strongly characterized "something" that contention that there were four irreducible bodies (passage from one to
was the Empedoclean body. What of the undeniable presence of the the other would still be the taboo genesis, q.v.), but held instead that
sense-perceived qualities (pathemata aisthetika; see Tim. 61d) of these there are an infinite number of infinitely divisible bodies, known as
latter? In both cases there is a marked inclination to reduce all sensa- homoiomereiai, "things with like parts," as Aristotle called them or
tion to touch or contact (haphe; see Aristotle, De sensu 442a) , with the "seeds," the term employed by Anaxagoras himself (fr. 4). These' are
strong suggestion, at least on the part of Democritus, that all other" Anaxagoras' stoicheia (Aristotle, De coelo III, 302a), originally sub-
sense experiences are subjective conventions (fr. 9; see aisthesis, no- merged in a p.recosmic mixture, then separated off by nous, the initiator
mos). of movement In the system (frs. 9, 13), and which by their aggregation
9. We are not quite so well informed on the Pythagorean form perceptible bodies (see genesis, halon).
answer to the same question posed to them by Aristotle (Meta. 1092b): 12. These homoiomereiai are obviously different from the aloma
how do you possibly explain white and sweet and hot in terms of in that they are infinitely divisible (see fr. 3 and megethos' Lucretius
number? A suggestion of an answer appears in Plato. The Timaeus objects to this aspect of the theory in I, 844-846); but ;here is in
includes two approaches to the question of the elements. One is a addition, the suggestion that the "seeds" carry within them their ~wn
description of the state of things before the universe came into being archai, viz., all the things that are (or will be) are "in" these basic
(Tim. 52d) and relies on a dynamic, nongeometrical analysis of gene- particles (see fr. 12). What is this "everything" that is "in every-
sis (q.v. and see infra). Bnt the later (ibid. 53c ff.) postcosmic account thO~g, ". • each". seed"?. I t embraces not only the Empedoclean
. I.e., In
is markedly geometrical and, if not purely Pythagorean, has strong stozcheza (see Lucretms I, 840-841, 853) and natural bodies such as
affiliations in that direction. hair, flesh, and bone (fr. 10), but the sensible pathe and opposed
10. This Platonic account follows Atomism in reducing the Em- "powers" as well (fr. 4; see Aristotle, Phys. I, 187a). The reappear-
pedoclean stoicheia to aggregates of more basic bodies, the latter ance of these powers (dynameis, q.v.) was to have important conse-
characterized chiefly by their position and shape (schema). But while quences.
the Atomists were apparently chary of pushing the notion of shape (on 13· Aristotelian physics chose a path other than that which led
the testimony of Aristotle, De coelo IV, 303a, they did say that the back to one or more archai that transcended sense perception. In
atoma of fire were spherical), Plato has an elaborately worked out Aristotle's mind the attempt to differentiate the stoicheia by shape is
system whereby each of the elements is associated with one of the sens~less; the real solution is in the st~dy of the functions and powers
regular geometrical solids capable of being inscribed in a sphere (the of thIngs (De coelo III, 307b). It was, In effect, a return to the sensible
so-called "Platonic bodies"): the cube (earth), the pyramid (fire), dyn~meis . of Milesian philosophy that had never lost their vogue in
the octahedron (air), and the icosahedron (water) (Tim. 553-56c); medical Circles and that Anaxagoras had recently reemphasized. But
184 I STOICHEION SYMBEBEKOS I 185
this was more than the substitution of other "bodies" for the four of the fashion, air from relative lightness and water from relative heaviness
Empedoclean canon; it rested on the important distinction between a (ibid. IV, 312a; compare Plato's parallel derivation of air and water as
body and its qualities (see poion) . the mean terms in a geometric proportion in Tim. 31h-3Zb). And by
14- The formulation of this distinction was certainly not origi- relying on the same argument, from simple motions Aristotle derives
nally Aristotle's. Plato was well aware of it and explicitly states it, by the existence of the fifth element that has as its motion the other kind of
way of preface to his account of precosmic genesis, in Tim. 49a-50a: simple kinesis, perfect circular motion (see aither; for the difficulties
the Empedoclean stoicheia are not really things at all but, rather, this involves in the theory of the First Mover, see kinoun 8; for its
qualities (poiotetes) in a subject. Such a statement was, of course, movement, endelecheia, see ouranioi 6) .
impossible for someone who viewed the hot, the dry, etc. as things For the transformation of the elements and for the Stoic attitude
(chremata) , as it is likely Anaxagoras did. toward them, see genesis; for the stoicheia of the soul in Platonism, see
IS. Here, then, already in Plato, was a clear resolution of the psyche tou pantos.
question of the stoicheia; they had their own archai: a substratum and.
immanent qualities capable of passing in and out of that subject. Thus symbebek6s: accompaniment, accident (logical),
was opened the possibility of the transformation of the elements into accidental event (see tyche)
each other (see genesis). And this is, in general, the same tack as that 1. The early history of the ontological reality behind the notion of
taken by Aristotle. The Platonic substratum is refined into hyle (q.v.), symbebekos was fought out on the fields of quality (poion, q.v.; see
which is the common subject for all four of the stoicheia (it should be also dynamis). The radical in this history was Democritus who was
noted that this hyle, the substratum for the elements, is imperceptible; inclined to deny any objective existence to qualities (D.L. IX, 72;
thus genesis, or substantial change, differs from alloiosis, or qualitative Sextus Empiricus, Adv. Math. VII, 135), while Plato was enunciating
change, in that the latter has a perceptible matter; see De gen. et carr. an archaic point of view when he hypostatized them (the suprasensible
I, 319b). Finally, Aristotle adds the notion of privation (steresis) to . mode of hypostatization represented by the eide was, of course, quite
facilitate the passage of the qualities/powers. alien to his predecessors). Plato was, nonetheless, well enough aware
16. But there are other marked changes as well. For Plato the of the difference between things and the qualities of things and goes
source and cause of movement is psyche (q.v.; see Laws x, 896a, out of his way to correct the general pre-Socratic reification of qualities
897a ) , while physical bodies have of themselves only a kind of r~ndom (Tim. 49a-soa; see genesis, pathos).
motion, agitation rather than movement (Tim. S2d-S3a); ~nd III the 2. Plato's remarks occur in a treatise on this sensible world of
later postcosmic or Pythagorean-type account of the formatIOn of the material things; Aristotle's analysis of the same phenomenon is in his
stoicheia Plato has, as might be expected, even less to say about logical works, and so the emphases are quite different. The distinction
motion: kinesis is notoriously absent from geometrical bodies. It is between a thing and its quality is broadened to embrace that between a
otherwise in Aristotle. All natural bodies have their own principle of thing or snbject (hypokeimenon) and its attribute or accompaniment
movement that is physis (q.v.; Phys. II, 192b), a radical departure (symbebekos). The latter is defined as something that "belongs to a
from the entire Parmenidean strain of speculation in which inherent thing, not of necessity or for the most part, . . . but here and now"
motion was anathema (see kinesis, kinoun) . (Meta. 102sa). Unlike the genos or the definition, it does not express
17. Thus for Aristotle the simple bodies that are the stoicheia the essence (ti esti) of a thing, nor, like the property (idion), is it
have their own simple natural motion (De coelo I, 269a). Their opera- necessarily linked with that subject (Top. I, 102b). Since there is no
tion is governed by the principle already set down (Phys. III, 201a) necessity (they can be otherwise) in such accidental beings, it follows
that kinesis is the actualization of a potency. In this case, however, the that there can be no demonstration (apodeixis) and hence no scientific
privation (steresis) is that the element is not in its "natural place," knowledge (episteme) based on them (Anal. post. I, 7Sa-b; Meta.
since motion and place are correlative concepts (De coelo I, 1026b). Symbebekos is one of the "predicables" (see idion).
276a-277a). Thus lightness is the capacity for linear motion away from 3. One would have thought that Epicurus would adhere to Demo-
a center, a motion that will cease when the subject has reached its critus' Atomistic point of view and restrict all reality to the atoms and
natural place; and heaviness is the contrary (ibid. IV, 310a-311a). In the void (kenon). But since he has accepted sensation (aisthesis, q.v.)
this fashion Aristotle derives fire from absolute lightness .and earth as an infallihle criterion of truth, he cannot fall back upon convention
from absolute heaviness (ibid. IV, 311a-b ) , and then, in a more curious (nomos) as the origin of sensible qualities. And so Epicurus has a fully
186 I SYMMETRIA SYMPATHEIA I 187
developed theory of accidents (see D.L. x, 68-69). These perceptible somewhat later, also endowed with sensation (Enn. IV, 4, 26). Things
and hence corporeal qualities that adhere to bodies may be divided, as in cohere by a unifying force within, a force that seems to be different
Aristotle, into those that are necessarily connected with the nature of tensions (tonos, q.v.) of the pneuma: in inorganic matter it is called
bodies and so always present in a body, and those that happen to a body hexis; for plants, physis; for animals, psyche; and for men, nous (Sex-
from time to time. The first category, Aristotle's idion, Epicurus calls tus Empiricus, Ad". Math. IX, 81-85; Philo, Quod Deus 35). That
symbebekos, precisely reversing the Aristotelian nomenclature. For the these are not radically distinct orders of reality is clear from certain
second type of qualities he devises the new term "accident" (symp- natural phenomena, like growth of rocks for as long as they are in
toma) . Examples of symptomata are the sensible qualities of composite contact with the "is "italis of the earth (Plotinus, Enn. IV, 4, 27), and
bodies (Plutarch, Ad". Col. 1l1O ) and sensation that is a symptoma of the presence in nature of zoophtyes (Nemesius, De nat. hom. I,
the "unnamed element" present in the soul (D.L. x, 64; see halon, S09a-b), all calculated to fill the gaps of the scala naturae (a common
psyche). There are even more complicated entities, such as time, that theory since Aristotle's classic description in Hist. animo S88b-s8ga;
can be described as nothing else but "accidents of accidents" (see for its application to the spiritual world, see trias 4) .
chronos) . 4. From the insight into the natural interrelationship (symphyia;
4- The Stoics kept the Aristotelian doctrine of subject and acci- Sextus Empiricus, Ad". Math. VII, 129) of both organic and inorganic
dents but in an altered form. The distinction between a subject and its things proceeds the doctrine of sympatheia or their mutual interaction,
attributes is preserved (SVF II, 369), but the attributes are reduced to illustrated by a great variety of natural phenomena and particularly by
three: quality, state, and relation, the latter presumably attributes of the complex of effects exercised by the sun and the moon over life on
the primary active principle of the universe, logos (D.L. VII, 134; see earth (Sextus Empiricus, op. cit. IX, 78-80; Cicero, De nat. dear. II, 7,
logos, paschein). 19), and prominent later in Marcus Aurelius, Philo, and Plotinus.
5. Poseidonius was apparently very interested in the sun and the
symmetrfa: symmetry moon. Cleanthes had already located the hegemonikon of the universe
See aisthesis 6, 8 and compare asymmetron. in the sun (see pneuma; it is frequently referred to as the "heart of the
kosmos" as well, based on an analogy with the location of the seat of
symp:itheia: aHected with, cosmic sympathy the soul; see kardia) and Poseidonius makes it the source of all physi-
1. The theory of cosmic sympathy, associated by modern schol- cal life (D.L. VII, 144). He may have been the author of the belief in its
ars with the philosopher Poseidonius, rests upon a series of premisses spiritual powers as well, and specifically of the view that the nous or
present in Greek philosophy almost from the beginning. The Milesians mens comes from and returns to the sun, the psyche from and to the
had seen the world as alive and the Pythagoreans as an ordered whole moon, and that the body begins and ends as earth (see Cicero, Tusc. I,
(see kosmos). And though Plato's interests had earlier lain in other 18-19; Plutarch, De facie 28-30; and compare noesis 17, ouranioi 7).
directions, he devotes a full-scale treatment to the order and operation But even at this point purely religious considerations must have been at
of the sensible world in the Timaeus, undoubtedly his single most work as well, even though the full impact of solar theology is not
widely studied work in the later tradition. Here he describes the kos- visible until somewhat later (see Corpus Hermeticum XVI and Julian's
mas as a visible living creature (zoon), having within it all things Hymn to the Sun).
that are naturally akin (kata physin syngene; Tim. 30d). 6. Plotinus, whose entire emanation theory is grounded on a solar
2. Stoic pantheism led in the same direction. God as logos pervades image (see eklampsis, prood08), adopts both the affective role of the
the universe as our soul pervades our bodies (D.L. VII, 138; see sun (Enn. IV, 4, 31; compare the role of the sun in Aristotle's theory of
pneuma) and as physis he vitalizes the whole (Seneca, De benef. IV, generation; see genesis) and the doctrine of cosmic sympathy. The
7; see logoi spermatikoi). Thus the kosmos is a unity (D.L. VII, 140), kosmos is a living organism (zoon ) all of whose parts are suffused by
an organism (halon, q.v.) rather than a totality (pan; SVF II, 522- the universal soul (psyche tau pantos, q.v.). The parts interact not by
524), a rational living being (zoon logikon; SVF I, 1l1-114). reason of their being in contact but because of their similarity (hom-
3. Refinements appear in the era of Poseidonius, many of wbich oiote8; Enn. IV, 4, 32).
are attributed directly to him. First, the earth itself is a living being, 7. This latter consideration raises for Plotinus the important
pervaded throughout by a vital force (zotike dynamis, "is "italis; questions of contact (haphe) as a necessary condition of action and
Cicero, De nat. dear. II, 33, 83) and so, it is argued by Plotinus passion and the presence of a medium (metaxu) in perception. Aris-
188 [ SYNAGOGE SYNTHETON [189
totle had answered the first affirmatively, maintaining that all move-
ment (kinesis) necessarily demands contact (Phys. VII, Z4zb; VIII, synaftion: accessory cause
5z8a), though this clearly cannot be maintained in the case of the See aition 1.
Prime Mover (see kinoun 9) that is immaterial and moves things "as
something loved" (Meta. l07Zb). There is a possible escape in De gen. synecheia: continuity
et corr. I, 3z3a where Aristotle appeals to someone being "touched For the continuity of physical bodies and the problem of the
by grief," but the proton kinoun does seem t6 pose an unassailable continuum, see megethos; for the continuity of the physical world,
example of actio in dis tans. On the second point too Aristotle holds that sympatheia 3; for that of the spiritual world, trias 4.
there must be a medium between the object perceived and the operative
sense organ (De an. II, 4'9a). Plotinus, however, consistent with his synkrisis: aggregation, association
views on sympatheia, denies the necessity of a medinm of sensation See genesis 6-8, 14; holon 8-'9; pathos 3; stoicheion 7.
(Enn. IV, 5).
8. Sympatheia, conceived of in these terms, enables Plotinus to syntheton: something composed, composite body
settle some related problems, that of providence (pronoia), astrology, 1. The problem of the syntheton or composite body is closely
divination (mantike), and magic. The transcendence of God is pre- related to that of the archai and stoicheia on the one hand, and to that
served in this theory since his providence may be exercised indirectly of genesis on tl,e other. It depends for its solution on the judgment as to
through the interrelation of things (Enn. IV, 8, z) and neither the what exactly are the basic bodies or units out of which more complex
World Soul nor the star souls need direct contact with the things they natural entities come into being. Thus the enquiry would logically
affect (so, earlier, Philo, De migre. Abr. '79-,8,); deliberation (proai- proceed from the ultimate archai to the primary perceptible bodies, i.e.,
resis) is also excluded (Enn. IV, 4, 31). The planets by their various the stoicheia, the grouping of these into syntheta, to the question of the
movements have a variety of effects on things; they can both produce composition of the most all-embracing syntheton, the kosmos itself (see
(poiesis) and portend (semasia; Enn. IV, 4, 34-35; compare Enn. II, 3, agenetos) .
7, which admits astrological divination within the context of a general Z. The syntheta then may be considered on three different levels:
attack on astrology; for the relation of individual men to individual the traditional stoicheia themselves as composite bodies, natural bodies
planets, see ochema, ouranioi 7). In this way is established a theoreti- as syntheta, and the kosmos as a syntheton, and in each case the
cal base for divination (mantike, q.v.) that consists in the reading of appropriate questions are "how did they come to be," "what is their
just such portents, an approach long current in Stoic circles (see genesis," and "what constitutes their unity?"
Cicero, De div. II, 1{, 33). But Plotinus extends the argument a step See, in ascending order, arche, stoicheion, genesis, and for their
further and maintains the possibility of the manipulation and use of the unity, hen, hexis, holon, tonos.
sympathetic powers of things; these magical activities are not, how-
ever, of a preternatural nature; they are merely another example of
sympatheia and the wise man who resorts instead to contemplation is
well above them (Enn. IV, 4, 40-44).
The successors of Plotinus had a somewhat different attitude
toward these powers; see dynamis 6.

synagoge: collection
The Platonic type of "induction" (for the more normal type of
induction, i.e., a collection of individual instances leading to a univer-
sal, see epagoge) that must precede a division (diairesis) and that is a
survey of specific forms (eide) that might constitute a genus (Phae-
drus z65d, Soph. z53d). An example is Soph. zz6a, and the process is
also suggested in Rep. 533c-d, and Laws 6z6d; see diairesis:
 TELOS I 191
presumably this is the division that wonld embrace the study of philos-
ophy or, as Plato would prefer to call it, dialectic.

t + The ''practical arts" of the Politicus probably overlap the

"~r?duct.ive arts" (poietike; defined Soph. 21gb, 26Sb). These may be
dIVIded mto the products of divine craftsmanship (some wish to say
they are produced by nature, physis, but Plato prefers the theistic
explanation since intelligence is a concomitant of all techne; Soph.
taxis: order, arrangement 26Sd) and of h~man craftsmanship (ibid. 26se). The former pro-
See stoicheion 10. duces natural objects, e.g., the elements and the more complex bodies
that come from them; the latter, manufactured objects (the praktike
h~chne: craft, skill, art, applied science episteme of the Politicus).
1. Generally speaking Plato has no theory of techne. As fre-' 5· But thete is a further extremely important distinction to be
quently happens, a word that ends in Aristotle as a carefully defined made here (So~h. 266a-d~ ..Both hu~an and divine productivity are
and delimited technical term is still employed by Plato in a nontechni- ca~able of c;eatmg both oflgmals and Images (eikones) , and it is the
cal and popular way. The contemporary usage of techne was to de- epIStemological correlative of tl,is image-producing that appears as the
scribe any skill in doing and, more specifically, a kind of professional lowest segment of the Line in Rep. soge. Plato's generic name for
competence as opposed to instinctive ability (physis) or mere chance image-productivity is imitation (mimesis), and while its divine mani-
(tyche). And it is precisely in these senses that Plato uses the term festation, e.g. shadows, dreams, mirages, is of little or no interest in
(Rep. 381C; Prot. 312b, 317c); nowhere does he trouble himself to give this context, human mimesis is the basis of the entire Platonic aesthetic.
an exact or technical definition for this word whose common acceptance See mimesis.
suited him perfectly well. ' 6. ~s .defined by Aristotle (Eth. Nich. VI, 1140a) techne is a
2. Where techne does enter technical philosophical discourse is characteflstic (hexis) geared toward production (poietike) rather than
in the Sophist and the Politicus. Here Plato is concerned with coming action (praktike). It arises from experience (empeiria) of individual
to an understanding of the sophist and the statesman by means of the instances and passes from experience to techne when the individual
dialectical method (dialektike, q.v.) that consists of the processes of experiences are generalized (see katholou) into a knowledge of causes:
collection (synagoge, q.v.) and division (diairesis, q.v.). There is the experienced man knows how but not why (Meta. g81a). Thus it is
scant evidence of any collection here, bnt the divisions are elaborate a trpe of kn~wledge and can be taught (ibid. g81b). It also operated
and, to a certain extent, overlap. In both instances they begin with rat:0nallr, ~Tlth.logos. (Eth. Nich., loc. cit.), and its goal is genesis,
techne and, even though in Pol. 258b he calls the genus to be subdi- which dIstmgmshes It from purely theoretical knowledge (theoria,
vided "knowledge" (episteme) , it is clear from the context that it does q.v.) that has to do with being (on) and not becoming. Its rational
not refer to the technical use of that term as it appears, for instance, in elemen~ further. distin~uis~e~ it from tyche or chance, anotl,er possible
the Analogy of the Line (see episteme), but rather to what he had factor. III ge~es,s. A~aIll, It IS an external not an internal principle of
previously called techne. f!,ene81.s, :whIch set~ It off from physis (q.v.; Phys. II, Igga). Finally,
3. By collating the two dialogues it appears that Plato divides the smce It IS pr?ductlVe rather than practical it differs from phronesis
"arts" into acquisitive (Soph. 21gC-d), separative (of which Socrates' (q.v.; Eth. N!ch. VI, 1140b); see also, in this same context, ergon.
cathartic art is an example; ibid. 226a-231b), and productive (poe-
tike). The "acquisitive arts" include the acquisition of knowledge that telos: completion, end, purpose
may in tnrn be used for either practical (praktike, e.g., building; in 1. Although it had obvious antecedents in Heraclitus' notion of
general the applied sciences correspond to the Aristotelian techne: Pol the celestial fire governing all (fr. 64) and in Anaxagoras' use of mind
258d-e; contrast the Aristotelian usage of praktike, q.v.) or theoretical (nous, q.v. 3), a clearly defi?ed sense of purpose in the operations of
(gnostike; Pol., loco cit.; see the Aristotelian theoria) ends. Here Plato the kosmos doe~ not ap~ea~ m Greek speculative thought until Diog'-
further distinguishes the "theoretical arts" into the "directive" (epi- ene.s o~ Apolloma. In hIS VIew the arche of all things is aer (fr. 4).
taktike, e.g., statesmanship) and "critical" (kritike, Pol. 260b). His whIch IS both soul (when warmed) and intelligence (nous; fr. 5; cf.
sole example of the latter is "reckoning" (logistike; Pol. 25ge), but nous 4) , and which is divine and governs all things for the best (fr. 3),

19°
192 I THEroN THEOLOGIA, THEOLOGIKE I 193
the latter attribute apparently suggested by the periodic ,ren~wals in Plato, Laws 899b and physis). Closely connected with this is the
nature. identification of life through the presence of motion; the only exception
2. Socrates was extremely interested in the teleological motif; he to this seems to be Xenophanes, whose critique of anthropomorphism
had examined Anaxagoras' theory of nous from this point of view led him to deny motion to his God (Diels, fr. 21A25), and places him
(Phaedo 97d) but found it disappointing: it was the same old mecha- well outside the tradition.
nistic explanation of things (ibid. 99a), what Plato would call aconfu- 2. The equation kinesis-theion focuses gradually onto motion
sion of synaitia for aitia (q.v.), and Aristotle (Meta. 985a) concurs in that is regular and/or circular (see aither, aphthartos, ouranioi). The
this evaluation of Anaxagoras' teleology. But there are grounds for second motive appears explicitly in a fragment of Anaximander (Aris-
thinking that Socrates found somewhat greater satisfaction in Diogenes totle, Phys. III, 203b) where the philosopher's "Unlimited" (apeiron,
(see Xenophon, M em. I, 4, 5-8). Plato's own approach is the same, q.v.) is called theion "because it is immortal [athanatos] and
particularly in his concern with the visible world in the later dialogues. indestructible." Here is a direct association of the chief property of the
In the Timaeus (47e) there is a general contrast between the works Homeric gods, their immortality, with a material arche (see Diels, fro
produced by nous and those that came about by necessity (ananke), and 12All where the epic strain in the language is even more pronounced) .
in the Laws (888e) we find that the latter are identified with the blind Aristotle goes on to say (Phys., lac. cit.) that most of the "physical
workings of nature (physis, q.v.) and that the former are by design speculators" called their originative arche divine. This seems to be true
(techne). Psyche initiates movement, but it is its association with nous and the process of de-divinization to have begun with Parmenides'
that guarantees the purposeful outcome of this movement (Laws strokes against the vitalism of being (see on); if genesis and kinesis no
897b ). longer pertain to being, they must be produced from an outside source,
3. There is a radical change in Aristotle: for Plato nous was the the "mover" (kinoun) evident from Empedodes on. And, with the
dominating factor iu the teleological scheme; for Aristotle nous oper- attribution of intelligence (nous) and purpose (telos, q.v.) to this
ates only in the human sphere of techne, purposeful design, and, mover, the stage is set for the disappearance of theion and the arrival of
indeed, all the artisan is doing is attempting to imitate physis, which theos in philosophical speculation; see the os.
has its own purpose (telos) as well as being a source of movement
(Phys. II, 198a, 199b); it is, in short, the "final cause" described ibid. theologia, theologike: 1 J accounts about the gods,
II 194b. The doctrine of teleology is basic in Aristotle: it appears in his myth, 2 J "first philosophy,"
e~rliest works (see Protrepticus, fl'. ll) and it finds its completion in metaphysics
the Metaphysics. It is explained in various places that the telos is the L Theologia first appears in Plato, and the term is used both by
Good (Phys. II, 195a; Meta. 1013b), and in Meta. 1072b the ultimate him (Rep. 379a) and by Aristotle (Meta. 1000a, 1071b) to designate
Good, and hence the final cause of the entire kosmos is the First Mover, the activity of the poets who gave cosmogonical accounts. Aristotle
the noesis noeseos of 1074b (see kinoun, nous). particularly uses it in contrast with the philosophical speculations of
4. Aristotle's student Theophrastus apparently had some difficul- the physikoi (e.g. Meta. 1075b); in effect, it is parallel to the distinc-
ties with teleology (Theophrastus, Metaphysics IV, 14-15, 27) ,but it tion between mythos and logos (qq. v.).
never lost its place in philosophy, particularly with the ever-increasing 2. In Meta. 1026a a sharply distinct meaning emerges. Aristotle
theism of the later Schools; in this context it becomes divine providence had divided the theoretical sciences into three dasses, of which the third
(pronoia, q.v.). deals with substances that are "separate" (for the sense, see choris-
For the role of telos in Aristotle's analysis of change, see ergon, ton) and withont kinesis; this is the "first philosophy" or theologike, so
energeia, entelecheia; in Neoplatonic emanation theories, proodos. called becanse such substances are the realm of divinity (for another
view of the subject matter of theologike, see on) .
theion: divine 3. Theology later expanded to once again embrace all discourse
L The ascription of divinity to the ultimate arche is a common- about the gods, and this new understanding of its scope may be seen in
place in pre-Socratic philosophy. The motivation seems to be twofold: the division of theology into "mythical, physical, and political," a
the legacy of a primitive animism, most obvious, perhaps, in Thales' division originating in the Middle Stoa (see Augustine, De civ. Dei VI,
movement toward a pan-vitalism (Aristotle, De an. I, 405a)' and the 5, citing Varro; compare, ibid. IV, 27 and Eusebius, Praep. Evang.
further statement that "all things are full of gods" (ibid. I, 4"a; see IV, 1).
194 THEORIA THEOS I 195
nous is described as the efficient cause of the universe and identified
theiiria: viewing, speculation, contemplation, the with Zeus. This is undoubtedly the demiourgos (q.v.) of the Timaeus
contemplative life who when stripped of his metaphorical trappings is cosmic nous and
According to some, the contemplative life as an ideal is a tradition whose transcendence is considerably limited by its subordination to the
going back to Pythagoras (see Cicero, Tusc. v, 3, 8-g and D.L. VIII, eide (see nous) .
8), but the authority is a later Academic and so the ideal may be no 3. Beyond the Timaeus, however, lies another theoligical motif:
older than Plato who gives a digressive sketch of such a life in Theaet. the belief in the divinity of the heavenly bodies (see ouranioi). Aris-
173C- 175d, and identifies the highest type of human activity with the totle is still under their influence in his dialogues, but the treatises
contemplation of the Good (Rep. 54oa-c) and the Beautiful (Symp. display only two gods, or better, one God and one divine substance: the
21Ob--212a). The theme appears early in Aristotle (Protrepticus, fro First Mover as it is described in Meta. 1072a-1073a, and the aither
6), and reaches its fullest development in his discussion of the contem- (q.v.; see aphthartos) of De coelo I, 268b-270a. The existence of both
plative life in Eth. Nich. x, 1177a-1179a. It is the chief activity of the are deduced from kinesis: aither is divine because its movement is
Prime Mover in Aristotle (Meta. 1072b; see nous 10), and of the soul eternal (De coelo I, 286a), and the First Mover is God because its
in Plotinus (Enn. VI, 9, 8), but in a much more extended fashion than movement is unmoved (Meta., loco cit.; see nous).
Aristotle had ever envisioned (see Enn. III, 8, 2-7). For Plotinus 4- The Epicureans are not atheists; they admit the existence of
activity (praxis) is a debased form of contemplation (see physis) , but gods, but deny their creation of the world or provident rule over it
the later Neoplatonic tradition, probably beginning with Iamblichus (D.L. x, 123-124, 139; Lucretius, De rerum nat. II, 646-651, v,
(see De myst. II, 11) tended to rank theourgia (see mantike 4-5) 165-174, 1183-1197; for the role of the dream in the Epicurean proof
above theoria. for the existence of the gods, see oneiros). Stoic materialism tended to
thrust God back to the level of a Milesian theion (see SVF I, 87), but
the6s: God their monism was not absolute and their distinction between active and
1. As a philosophical term "the divine" (theion, q.v.) is much passive principles (see paschein) allows them to identify God as some
older than the notion of a personalized God. Indeed, there is among the sort of a creative, immanent element and hence his, or rather, its
philosophers a strong strain of scepticism about such anthropomor- definition as "creative fire" (pyr technikon), SVF II, 1027; D.L. VII,
phized figures present in Greek mythology (see mythos, the well- 156. Nor were other, more spiritualized implications absent: God is also
known emphatic critique by Xenophanes [frs. 11, 15], and Plato's logos (q.v.) and nous (D.L. VII, 135; SVF I, 146). The Cynics were
ironic remarks in Tim. 4od-e). Even where the old mythological probably the first philosophical school to make a systematic use of
apparatus is used by the philosophers, as in Empedocles (s.ee fro 6), it allegorical exegesis (allegoria) to reconcile a philosophically derived
is only to reduce the Olympians to natural forces. The earliest trace of monotheism against popular polytheism (see Antisthenes under
a personal God in philosophical analysis is probably to be seen in the mythos) , and in this, as in much else, they were followed by the Stoics.
identification, by Anaxagoras and Diogenes, of intelligence (nous, q.v. But it is clear that the monistic principle led to pantheism, just as the
3) as a motive and purposeful factor in cosmology. Nous was, of parallel movement on the level of popular religion was leading to
course divine (theion) , and with its Milesian legacy of psyche it could henotheism and not to genuine monotheism (see Seneca, De benef. IV,
scarcely be otherwise; where it fell short of being God wa~ in its 7-8). Seneca at least must be excluded from Stoic pantheism (Ep. 65,
obvious lack of transcendence (see Anaxagoras, fro 14; DlOgenes, 12-14), and possibly Cleanthes whose Hymn to Zeus (= SVF I, 537)
fro 5). does not read like a pantheistic tract.
2. Plato's sharp distinction between the sensible (aistheton) and 5. A variety of factors led away from a unified Godhead; Stoic
the intelligible (noeton) provided the grounds for transcendence, but in monistic materialism was rejected and Platonic transcendence reas-
the earlier dialogues he is still in the grip of the Parmenidean denial of serted, now with the notion of a hierarchy of transcendent principles
kinesis to true being (see on), and so there is no place for a dynamic (see hyperousia, hypostasis). Difficulties with providence (pronoia)
God in the static landscape of the eide. The great theological break- also led to a distinction between command and execution and the
through occurs in the Sophist and the Philebus; in the former consequent attribution of both the creative (see demiourgos) and prov-
(248e- 249b ) when soul and intelligence are granted a place in 1I;e idential activities of God to a secondary principle. The "second God"
realm of the truly existent, and in the latter (26e"C'30d) when cosmIC is already visible in Philo, De somn. I, 227-229, De cher., 126-127, and
~96 I THEOURGIA
TRIAS I ~97
particularly in Numenius (cf. Eusebius, Praep. Evang. XI, 17, 18, 22), Present in organic things there is hexis, characterized by a "tonic
finally ending in Plotinus' conception of nous, Enn. v, 5, 3. motion" (see ibid. II, 4g6) of a feeble type that does no more than
For the "third God," see psyche tou pantos; for another treatment circulate within the being and give it unity (ibid. II, 458; see hexis).
of the various versions of Cosmic Reason, nous. The next higher stage is physis, the tonos of plants whose stronger
movements manifest themselves primarily in the capacity for growth
theourgia: wonder-working (auxesis; see ibid. II, 708-712). Next there is psyche, the grade that
See mantike +-5; dynamis 10-11. belongs to zoa characterized by movement in terms of reaction to
outside cognitive and desiderative stimuli. Finally, there is logos, the
thesis: position, positing, convention strongest and purest tonos of the pneuma, signaled by the capacity for
(as opposed to nature, physis) self-induced motion (see, in general, for the grades, ibid. II, 458-462
In the Stoic discussions of morality the term thesis generally and, for the types of motion, II, g8g). This doctrine, present even in the
replaces the nomos (q.v.) employed by the Sophists in drawing the early Stoa, found its most general application in Poseidonius' theory of
distinction between a morality based on convention and the operation of cosmic sympathy (see sympatheia 3) .
a physical universe controlled by an unalterable nature (physis, q.v.).
Another aspect of this same polarity, and one particularly discussed by t6pos: place
the Stoics, was the question of the philosophical status of language, and The pre-Socratics up to the Atomists associated being with spatial
specifically the relationship between things (onta) and their names extension so that even the Pythagorean arithmos has magnitude (see
( onomata ); see onoma. Aristotle, Meta. 7080b, 1083b), and the supposition forms the hypoth-
The problem of position and place is discussed under topos; for esis of one of Zeno's arguments qnoted in Phys. IV, 20ga: "if all that
thesis as an element in Atomistic change, see genesis; in sensation, exists has a place. . . ." Plato's interest in the question is rather in the
aisthesis. area (chora) in which genesis takes place (Tim. 52a-c), a role analo-
gous to that played by hyle in Aristotle, hence Aristotle's charge that
thym6s: spirit, animus Plato identified chora and hyle (Phys. IV, 20gb). Aristotle's own ap-
See nous, psyche, kardia. proach is from the point of view of kinesis, which underlies the entire
discnssion of topos in Phys. IV, 208a-213a, and he defines tOP08 (ibid.
ti esti: what is it? the what-it-is, essence 212a) as the "fixed boundary of the containing body"; since objects can
That which responds to the question of "what is it?" by revealing change place, the latter is obviously different from the objects in it
the essence (ousia) of the thing, i.e., by definition (horos) through (ibid. 208b).
genos and diaphora (Aristotle, Top. VIII, 153a); see ousia. For Aristotle's theory of "natural place," see stoicheion; on the
question of the "place of the Forms" (topos eidon), eidos 17 and
t6de ti: this something, individual noeton.
For Aristotle the concrete individual existent; the singular as
opposed to the universal (katholou), Meta. lOo3a; it is substance trias: triad, triadic structure
(ousia) in the fullest and primary sense, Cat. 2a. 1. One of the more characteristic features of later Platonism is
See ousia, ,and, for the principle of individuation, hyle. the presence of a triadic structure in its hypostases (q.v.). Its employ-
ment is rather modest in Plotinus whose great hypostatic triad of Hen,
t6nos: tension Nous, Psyche tau pantos (qq.v.) seems based on historical considera-
Taking as their point of departure a celebrated aphorism of tions of syncretism rather than any a priori triadic principle. Enn. v, 1,
Heraclitus that describes the logos of the world as "a tension, as in a 7, for instance, is quite unschematized, and II, g, 1 only slightly more
bow or a lyre" (fr. 51; see logos 1), the Stoics attempted to explain the so.
constitution of the kosmos and of the things in it in terms of the tension 2. The same is true of Plotinus' other great triad: Being (on),
of the pneuma (q.v.) or soul principle within them (see SVF I, 514 Life (zoe), and Intellect (nous). This has its ground in the Platonic
where the cosmic tonas is symbolically identified with Heraeles). The tradition's exegesis of a celebrated text in Soph. 248e where Plato
states of tension in the pneuma are distinguished on various levels. admits into the realm of the "completely real" (pantelos on) change
~98 I TRIAS ZOE I ~99
(kinesis), life, soul, and thought (phronesis). Whatever the exact The second term, the mean in the progression, is superior to its
motives and import of Plato's introducing this radical shift in position participants since they depend upon it for their completion (prop.
(see kinesis 6), it had an undeniable effect on his successors. It is 24). The same proposition states the principle in summary: the un-
prominently used by Plotinus to refute the materialism of the Stoics: participated is unity-before-plurality, the participated is unity-in-
being is not a corpse; it is possessed of life and intelligence (Enn. IV, 7, plurality, i.e., one and nonone, while the participants are not-one, yet
2; V, 4, 2). one in their source (see a similar schema under holon 11).
3. But his most frequent use of this set iS'in connection with the
structure and operation of the transcendent nous,and here there is tyche: chance
probably the converging influence of another potent text, this time of As a metaphysical term tyche falls under the general heading of
Aristotle where he describes the life of God as the energeia (q.v.) of accidental cause (symbebekos), i.e., a cause having au unintended
nous (Meta. 1072b; on the denial of this to the Plotinian One, see effect. Aristotle distinguishes such accidental causes (which are
noeton 4). For Plotinus being, life, and intelligence are all characteris-, efficient causes, Phys. II, 198a) into those where there is no delibera-
tics of rious on the cosmic level; it has an interior energeia that is life tion, automaton (spontaneity), and those where there is some degree of
'and that brings together being and thought (VI, 7, 13). It also seems to rational choice (proairesis), in which case it is tyche (Phys. II,
be related to another triad, which comes to full term in Produs. Life is 197a-1g8a). The role of tyche as a causal principle finds its strongest
a thrust outward, an undefined (aoristos) movement away from a appeal to the Atomists (see D.L. IX, 45; Aristotle, Phys. II, 196A24)
source. It receives its definition by turning back to that source; and this where chance is equated with a kind of blind physical necessity (an-
turning back is nous (see Enn. II, 4, 5 and compare apeiron 3) . anke) operating without purpose. The identification of chance and
4. The landscape is quite different in Produs. On, zoe, nous are physical necessity is made quite specific by Plato in his castigation of
still prominent, more prominent, in fact, than in Plotinus (see Elem. current physical theories (Laws x, 88gc). Aristotle's final view on
theol., props. 101-103), but here they are dominated by a triadic princi- , tyche is to separate it from material ananke and to render it inferior to
pIe with the force of ontological law: every cause (aitio:,) p:oceed~ to both nous and physis, the two causes that operate with purpose (telos),
its effect (aitiaton) by a "mean term" (meson). Th,s arIthmetical Phys. II, 198a.
principle is, in turn, an operational mode of a still broader view that
sees the spiritual world as the same type of uninterrupted continuum as tyPosis: imprinting, impression
was concurrently being propagated for the physical world (on the See aisthesis, noesis.
absence of interruptions in the scala naturae, see sympatheia 3). These
principles find explicit statement in Produs (op. cit., prop. 28) and
probably go back to Iamblichus (see Produs, In Tim. II, 313: Sallus-
tius XXVIII, 31; on the continuity of the spiritual world in Plotinns, see
Enn. II, g, 3).
5. Produs' applications of the principle of triadic structure are
z
manifold. In addition to being-life-intellect there is cause-power-effect
(for the middle term of this, see dynamis), definite-indefinite-mixture
(the "Philebus triad"; see peras, apeiron), remaining-procession-
return (see proMos, epistrophe), and the particularly characteristic Zoe: life
one of unparticipated (amethekton) -participated (metechomenon)- 1. For the Milesians life was a coordinate of soul (psyche, q.v.)
participant (metechon). This latter tri~d codifies an~ cano.nizes lat~r and movement (kinesis, q.v.), a prephilosophical attitude that required
Platonism's final answer to the Parmemdean hypothetIcal dilemma: If no proof, and the prevailing vitalism can dearly be seen in Thales (see
One, how Many? the One is unparticipated, but it produces something Aristotle, Meta. 983b), and in Anaximenes (Aetius I, 3, 4) and the
that is capable of being participated (metechomenon; for the reasons later Diogenes of Apollonia (frs. 4, 5), both of whom stress the
for this production, see proDdos 3), capable because it is participated priority of air as an arche. Conversely, its absence after Parmenides'
by a plurality of participants (metechonta) (Elem. theol., prop. 23)' denial of change to being (on, q.v.) is attested to by the Atomists'
200 I ZOON ZOON I 201
particles that have mass and movement bnt no life (see kinesis 4) and (see noesis 17) and the results of this can be seen in the sharp
by the necessity for the other post-Parmenidean philosophers to supply distinctions made between animal instincts and human reason (Seneca,
an external source of movement (see kinoun 1-2). Ep. 121, 19-23) and the consequent absence of morality toward or in
2. But even though life ceased to be something innate in things, the animal kingdom (Cicero, De fin. III, 67; Philo, De oPif· 73).
its connection with soul remained constant and Plato's proof <'of the 3. But if there was a difference between the material and the spir-
immortality of the soul hinges on that very point (Phaedo lOSb-107a). itual that effectively separated men from the beasts, there was also a
Plato's positing of an eidos of life is not improbable in the light of the connection between the two realms. In terms of the Platonic theory of
connection between the eide and predication (see eidos 11), and he mimesis (q.v.) the sensible world was a reflection (eikon) of the
does seem to mention such at Phaedo 106d (though the remark here spiritual. But the sensible world was not merely a collection of random
could refer to something immanent). But what is far more revolution- animated parts; it was seen, from the very beginnings of Greek philoso-
ary is his admission, in Soph. 248e, of all the Parmenidean undesira- phy, as some kind of ordered whole, a kosmos endowed with movement
bles, life, soul, intellect, change, into the realm of the really real (see and so with life. This was the primitive view of Anaximenes (Aetius I,
psyche 18, kinesis 6), and his consequent interest in the "intelligible 3,4) and the early Pythagoreans (see Aristotle, Phys. IV, 213b), and
living being" (see zoon) . this is still the view of Plato who calls the visible kosmos that
3. For Aristotle life is immanent not transcendent and his ap- embraces all living creatures an animal (zoon; Tim. 30b) with a soul
proach is functional (see ergon 3, psyche 2S). He defines zoe as the (see psyche tau pantos). This in turn has a model, an "intelligible
capacity for self-sustenance, growth, and decay (De an. II, 412a) and living being" (zoon noeton) that embraces within itself all the intelli-
gives (413a) more elaborate criteria for determining the existence of gible creatures (ibid. 30c-d). When he comes to describe the parallel
life: the presence of mind (nous), sensation (aisthesis) , movement and classes of zOa contained within the sensible and intelligible animal he
rest in space, nutrition, decay, and growth. Its seat is in the heart (De mentions only four: the heavenly race of gods, winged things, aquatic
part. animo III, 66sa; see kardia and compare pneuma 3)· animals, and those that dwell on dry land (ibid. 3ge-40a; with the
For time treated in terms of life, see chronos; for the Neoplatonic introduction of aither [q.v.] this becomes five in the Epinomis
triad of Being, Life, Intellect, trias. g84b-c). In the later Platonic tradition these intelligible animals grow
and multiply. Philo, for example, confronted with two acconnts of
zoiin: living being, animal creation in Genesis, can explain them as the creation of the sensible and
1. Although Anaximander has something that looks like a theory the intelligible world, and is not a whit embarrassed at the prospect of
of spontaneous generation (Diels 12A10, 11, 30: fish generated from having "intelligible grass" aud "sensible grass" (De opif. 129-130;
the operation of the sun upon the moist slime; men born of fish; on the Leg. all. I, 24). Plotinus too traces out in detail the congruence be-
primacy of fish, compare Philo, De opif. 6S-66), Empedocles has the tween the intelligible aud the sensible zoa (Enn. VI, 7, 8-12).
most complete zoogony of the pre-Socratics (summary passage in On the intelligible world, see kosmos noetos; and for its contents,
Aetius v, 19, S; frs. S7-62). Plato's zoogony is to be found in the noeton; further on the kosmos as a living organism under sympatheia,
Timaeus where the lower animals evolve in a fashion consonant with halon.
his earlier theory of palingenesia (q.v.; Tim. gld-g2C). What are
sketches and remarks in earlier thinkers becomes, in Aristotle, a sci-
ence, elaborated in a whole series of treatises, and particularly the De
generatione animalium.
2. A feature of the Aristotelian treatment is the famous scala
naturae, a graduated linking of all the forms of life found in the Hist.
animo S88b-s8ga (see sympatheia 3). At the top of the series stands
man whom both Plato (Tim. goa-c) and Aristotle (Pol. 12S3a, 1332b )
tended to separate off from the rest of animated beings by reasons of his
possession of a rational faculty (nous) that was nonmaterial. The
earlier Stoic materialism tended to blur this distinction, but a later
Platonizing movement within the school reseparatednous from psyche
English-Greek Index
 The numbers cited refer not to page numbers but to
paragraphs under each specific heading in the text.

a bstraction/aphairesis: conceptual separation of matter in the study of the

objects of mathematics, aphairesis; as basis of the via negativa,
agnostos 2

accessory cause, synaition distinguished from true cause by Plato, aition 1

accident, symbebekos, symfJtoma Aristotelian theory of, symbebekos 2; Epiw

cureau, 3; Stoic, 4; change in the category of accident, genesis 2, 15,
kinesis 7; distinguished from property, idion, symbebekos 2

account, logos connection with true judgment, episteme 2; ability to give an

account as hallmark of true knowledge in Plato, logos 2; contrasted
to myth, mythos 1

act, energeia Aristotelian theory emerges from analysis of change, energeia

1; compared to kinesis 3; derived from function 4, ergon 2; the
ultimate energeia 6; application to the theory of perception, aisthesis
19; contrasted to potentiality, dynamis 4; immanent form as, eido8
15; pleasure the completion of, hedone 7; unifying factor, holon 8; of
First Mover, kinoun 9, nous 9; the "activity of immobility," ibid. 10;
applied to intellection, noesis 12, noeton 1

action, poiein, praxis, ergon distinction of acting and making, ergon 1-2,
poiein; active powers associated with logos by Stoics, genesis 16; as a
"material" principle, hyle 7; virtue as a mean of, meson; in Plotinus a
degeneration of contemplation, nous 19, physis 5; activity and ex-
perience in Aristotle, pathos 9; as subject matter of morality, praxis,
proairesis

actuality, energeia, entelecheia for the former, see act; for the latter, entele-
chy

affection, pathos Platonic theory, pathos 6-7, psyche 15-17; in Aristotle,

9-10; in Stoicism, 12; irrational, violent, unnatural in Stoicism,
apatheia 3i the four major affections, epithymia; contrasted to action,
ergon 3; pleasure and pain in, hedone 8; reduced to judgments by
Chrysippus, noesis 17; properties of organism in Epicureanism,
holon 9; Epicurean criterion of truth, prolepsis; virtue as a mean of,
meson

age of reason in Stoicism, noesis 16

agent intellect, nous poietikos in Aristotle, nOU8 11-1.2; in Alexander of

Aphrodisias, 13; in Plotinus as a dator formarum, 21
205
 206 I AGGREGATE BEGETTING I 2 07
aggregate, synkrisis see association appropriate, oikeion object of love, eras 4; reflected by pleasure, pathas 11

agnosticism see unknowable area, chora designation of Platonic receptacle, hyle 6; corrected by Plotinus,
ibid. 9
air1 aeT, pneuma origins as an arche and later contrast with aither, aerj
cognitive principle in Diogenes, aisthesis 12, noesis 5, pneuma 2; aud arrangement, taxis in the composition or bodies in Atomism, stoicheion 1
purposeful, nous 4; modes of change in Anaximenes, genesis 3;
habitation of the daimones, nous 17; for pneuma, see breath art, poietike, techne, mimesis generalized meaning in Plato, techne 1; techni-
cal term in a division, ibid. 2-3; practical and productive, 4; pro~
alienation, allotriosis correlative of Stoic doctrine of self-acceptance, oik- duces both "originals" and images, 5; in Aristotle, 6; contrasted with
eiosis necessity, telos 2; no design in Atomists' concept of nature, physis 2
allegory, allegoria and the fall of the soul, kathadas 3; in the interpretation assent, synkatathesw in Stoic theory of intellection, noesis 16
of myths, mythos 1; in the reconciliation of monotheism and poly-
theism, theas 4 assimilation, homoiosis present in Pythagorean-Platonic tradition, homoiosis;
purification a prerequisite of, katharsis 4
alteration, alloiosis, heteroiosis pre-Socratic reduction of all change to, gene-
sis 13; in Plato, kinesis 6; defined by Aristotle, pathos 8; in Aristote- association, synkrisis as an explanation of exchange in Anaxagoras, genesis
lian theory of sensation, aithesis 20; in Stoic theory, ibid. 25, phanta- 6-7, pathos 3; in Atomism, ibid. 8, kinesis 4; rejected by Plato,
sia; substantial and qualitative change, stoicheion 15 genesis 11; and by Aristotle, ibid. 14; the soul an aggregate in
Atomism, psyche 7
analogy, analogi. matter known by, hyle 1; a principle in Stoic theory of
intellection, noesis 16; and in their etymologizing, onoma 7
astral body, ocherna the theory in Plato and the later Platonic tradition,
angel, angelos identified with the daimones of Greek philosophy, daiman 4; ochema
with the "powers," dynamis 6; angelic souls in Proclus, psyche 35
astral immortality connected with the nature of air or aither, aer 2; main-
anima, psyche distinguished from mind in Lucretius, noesis 14; see also soul tained by Poseidonius, athanato8 2

animal, zoon heavenly bodies as intellectual animals in Philo and Plotinus, astral theology growth in later antiquity, ouranioi 7, OUranos 3
ouranioi 7; sensible and intelligible animals in the Platonic tradition,
zoon 3; distinguished from men, pneuma 6, zoon 2; universe as, astrology in later antiquity, ouranioi 7
sympatheia 1, zoon 3; ancient theories of zoogony, zoon 1
astronomy in Plato's educational theory, ouranos 3
animus, naus distinguished from soul in Lucretius, noesis 14; see also mind
atom, aioman monist solution to Parmenidean problematic, atomon 1; oper-
anomaly, anomalia principle in Stoic etymologizing, onOma 7 ations of, ibid. 2; formation into aggregates, genesis 8; pleasure and
pain are atomic dislocations, hedone 8; inherent natural motion,
apathy, apatheid. Stoic doctrine of, pathos 12, apatheia, passim; origins in kinesis 4; derivative in Epicurus, ibid. 5; indivisibility of, megethos
Cynicism, apatheia 4; connection with immortality of soul and intel- 3; object of discursive reason, noesis 15; qualities of, pathos 4; soul-
lect, pathos 10 atoms, psyche 27; atoms as elements, stoicheion 7,10
appetite, orexis, lwrme its operation in Aristotle, epithymia; embraces desire, attention, phrontis as a principle in Plotinus, noesis 21, nous 18, hen 13
spirit, wish, orexis; role in Empedocles' theory of pleasure, hedone 1;
the problem in Stoicism, horme; the Neoplatonic return as a function
of, epistrophe; leads to motion, kinesis 8, kinoun 9; the First Mover
as an object or, kinoun 9, nous 16; for the appetitive soul in Plato, beauty, lwllos in Plato, eros 5-7; in Stoa and Plotinus, ibid. 10
see desire
becoming, genesis contrasted to being by Parmenides, genesis 4; by Plato,
applied science, poietike, techne in Plato, techne 3-4; in Aristotle, ibid. 6, ibid. 9; object or productive activity, techne 6
episteme 4
befitting acts, kathekont. in the Stoic moral system, adiapharan 2, 3
apprehension, katalepsis Stoic theory or, katalepsis, noesis 16; relation to
concepts, ennoia; grasp or the sensible image, phantasia begetting, genesis in Platonic theory of love, eros 5
208 I BEING
CONTACT I 209
being1 on the Parmenidean antinomies OD, on 1; being qua being the object of precosmic change, 10-11; postcosmic, 12; Aristotelian analysis,
of ~etaphysics, 3; in Plotinns begins at the level of nous 4; charac- 13-14; various types of, 15, metabole; Stoics, 16~18; in the inteIlec-
ter~ed by ,oneness, hen ?-4; transcendence of, hyperousia, on 3;
tual faculty, hegemonikonj varieties of change in Plato, kinesis 6; in
demed motIOn by Parmelllde~, kinesis z; the One beyond being, hen terms of action and passion, paschein 1-$ substantial change in
11-12; the Good beyond bemg, agathon; as substance Gusia 2' as
Plato, phthora; and privation in Aristotle, steresis; cyclic change,
the object of contemplation, techne 6; endowed with lif~ and int~lli­ stoicheion 3; substantial and qualitative change, ibid. 15
gence, trias 2
character, ethos, hexis various views of its role, ethos
belief, pistis subdivision of opinion in Plato, doxa 2, pis tis
choice, proairesis soul's choice of life, kathodos 5; man must choose to think,
blood most per!ect b!end of eie,?ents in Empedocles, aisthesis 8, psyche 9; noesis 21; and morality, praxisj in Aristotle and Epictetus, proai-
c?nnectlOll wIth perceptIOn, kardia 2, noesis 3, pneuma 2; in Stoi- resisj soul moves by, 'Psyche 20; differentiates chance and sponta-
CIsm, pneuma 4 neity, tyche

body, soma redl!-ction ?f q~ality to. body in Stoicism, genesis 18, poion; clarity, enargeia see self-evident
geometrIcal sohds In Pl.at~mc ~heory of Chal!ge, genesis 12, mege-
thos 3; extende~ body dIstIngUIshed from umt and point, megethos collection, synagoge the Platonic version of induction, synagoge, diairesis 2;
3; role of bo~y III sensation, noesis 8; the quasi-physical astral body, in Sophist and Politicus, techne 2
ochem.a 2; ill Home~ and. after, 'psyche 3, 6; body and soul in
AtomIsm, psyche 7; III EplCureamsm, ibid. 27; as a prison of the combination, koinonia tentative use to describe relationship of eide and
soul, psyche 13-14; involved in psychic functions in Plato ibid, 17" sensibles yields to that of interrelationship of eide, diairesis 3, eidos
the "Pit"
a omc bd'
0 Ies," stoJ,c
'h"ewn 10; types of human body in" ProeIus, 12
ochema 4
comlllon sense, aisthesis kaine, endoxon for the former, see sensus com-
brain, enkephalos as seat of perception, kardia 3-6; in Plato and Aristotle, munis; for the latter, communis opinio
psyche '5, 17
communis opinio, endoxon majority view as an ingredient in dialectical rea-
breath,lmeu1}l,a in early views on the Iiv,iug univer,se, pneuma 1, zoon 1; and soning, dialektike 4; quantitative and qualitative aspects of, endoxon
cogmtIOn, pneum,a ,2; as gene~at1ve factor ill Aristotle, ibid, 3; Stoic 4-5; Aristotelian use of predecessors, ibid. 8-9; on the soul, psyche 1
theory of, 4; ~lot1man correctlOn~, 5; as nonmaterial "spirit," 6; soul
as breath of hfe, psyche 2-7; StOIC pneuma as soul, ibid. 28; various
states and tensions of, sympatheia 3, tonos completion, telos, entelecheia creation of men to complete the universe, ka-
thodos 4; for entelecheia, see entelechy

composite, syntheton questions related to, syntheton; as substance, ousia 9;

Capacity, dynamis see potentiality components of, ibid,
categories, kategoriai. Platonic~ eidos 13; Aris.totelian and Plotinian, genos;
matter not meIuded Ill, hyle 1; ArIstotelian listings kategoriai' composition, synthesis judgment operates by composing and dividing con-
being, one, and good defined analogonsly through all the categories; cepts, in Aristotle, noesis 12; in Epicurus, ibid. 15; in Plotinus, ibid.
on 3 19
catharsis, katharsis see purgation, purification concept, ennoia Forms as thoughts or concepts of God, eidos 17, noeton 2;
or as thoughts of man, noeton 5; the concept in Stoic epistemology,
cause, aition causality in Plato, aition 1; Aristotelian doctrine of four causes ennoia, noesis 16; concepts and names in Epicureanism, onoma 5
ibid. 2; necessi~y as a quas~-c.ause in Plato, ananke 2; subject of tru~
knowledg~, epzs!em.t; 3; reVISIon of causality schema, noeton 2; in the conflagration, ekpyrosis possible Herac1itan origins and Stoic theory, ekpy-
Neoplatolllc derIVatIOn of the hypostases, proodos 3, trias 4 rosis; survived by seminal reasons, logoi spermatikoi
chance, tyche religiously pernicious to Plato, physis 2; Aristotelian theory contact, haphe Atomists reduce all sensation to, aisthesis g, dynamis 1,
of, tyche pathos 4; in the formation of aggregates, genesis 8; as basis of
change, genesis, metabole, alloiosis, kinesis pre-Socratic interest in genesis 2' sensation in Plato, pathos 6; all motion caused by, kinoun 9; cosmic
denial b~ ~armenides, ibid. 4, stoicheion 4! restoration ol'secondary sympathy based on contact and similarity, sympatheia 6; problem in
change, J,bzd. 5; Anaxagoras on, 6-7; AtomIsts on, 8; Platonic theory Aristotle and Plotinus, ibid" 7
210 I CONTEMPLATION DIVINE I 211
contemplation, theoria results in happiness for men, eudaimonia, nous 9; by demon, daimon in Greek popular religion and thence applied to the soul,
it man approaches the life of God, ibid.; Aristotelian theory of, daimon I; as an intermediary god, 2; in the oriental tradition, 4; and
theoria; creation a result of, nOU8 19; for Plotinus it degenerates into character, ethos; and original sin, kathodos 2; dwells in the air, nous
activity, physis 5, theoria 17; converse with in dreams, oneiros, 2-3; eros as, eros I, 5; soul as,
psyche 12; demonic soul in later Platonism, ibid. 35
contingent, symbebekos opinion is about the contingent, episteme 3
demonstration, apodeixis Aristotelian technical usage defined, apodeixis;
continuity, synecheia continuous and discontinuous quantity, plethos, mege- first principles of, arche 7; rests upon true and primary premisses,
thos; continuity in the physical world, sympatheia 3; and in the doxa 6; in true knowledge, episteme 3; begins from definition, horos
spiritual world, trias 4
depletion, kenosis role in Empedocles' theory of pleasure, hedone 1; in Plato
continuum, syneches in Aristotle's solution to Zeno's paradoxes, megethos 4 and Aristotle, ibid. 2; accepted by Epicurus, ibid. 9
convention, nomos, thesis replaces active powers in Democritus, dynamis 1, descent (of the soul), kathodos religious origins of belief, kathodos 1; con-
pathos 4; element in human laws, nomos 1; and instinctive behavior, nection with Pythagorean view of the soul, 2; in later Platonic tra-
oikeiosis 2; and language, onoma, passim; Stoic position Oll, thesis dition, 3-5; and the acquisition of an astral body, ochema 2
cornlption, phthora correlative of genesis, phthora; desiderative faculty cor- desire, epithymia, eros position and function in Plato, psyche 15, 17; reduced
ruptible, epithymia; status of astral body, ochema 4 in scope by later philosophers, epithymia; reason communicates with
it in dreams, oneiros 4; directed toward First Mover, kinoun 9; see
cosmic sympathy, sympatheia premisses of, sympatheia 1; Stoic organic appetite and, for eros, love
views, 2, Poseidonean, 3-4; in Plotinus, 6-8, psyche 31

cosmos, kosmos see universe dialectic, dialektike Eleatic and Socratic origins, dialektike 1; synoptic and
diacritic in Plato, 2-3; Aristotelian view, 4; Stoic, 5; Plotinian, 6;
craftsman, demiourgos in Plato, demiourgos 1; function given to logos by Zenonian dialectic, hen 4; as a means of knowing the Forms, eidos 8
Philo 2; goodness of, kinoun 5; divine and human craftsmanship,
mimesis 1-3; and Forms as thoughts of God, noeton 2; and cosmic difference, diaphora see specific difference
reason in Plato, nous 5-6; creates World Soul, psyche tou pantos 1
difficulty, aporia see problem
creator, demiourgos see craftsman
directive faculty, hegemonikon see intellect
criterion criteria of truth in Epicureanism, prolepsis, aletheia, enargeia
discursive reasoning, dianoia, logismos the problem in Plato, mathematika 2,
cnstom, nomos see convention noesis 10; normal function of the rational soul, psyche 17; use as a
generic term in Aristotle, dianoia; role in Epicureanism, noesis 15; in
Numenius, nous 18; in Plotinus, noesis 19; a degenerate and imita-
tive form of true intellection, ibid. 20, psyche 33

dator formarum intellect as bestower of Forms in Plotinus, noeton 6, nous disposition, diathesis contrasted with more permanent state of soul, hexis
21
distinction, diairesis, diaphora as an element in moral choice, proairesis; see
definition horos, horismos, logos a Socratic contribution to philosophy, also division, specific difference
h~ros; as forerunner of Platonic Form, eidos 6; Aristotelian theory of,
horos; antecedents in Plato, logos 3; division by differences will divination mantike and philosophy, mantike, passim; denied by Xenoph-
terminate in definition, diaphora 3; only universal can be defined, ar:es oneiros 3; and by Sceptics, ouranioi 5; origins as explained
katholou by Plato, oneiros 4, psyche 17; theoretical basis in Plotinus, sym-
patheia 8
deliberation, bouleusis for Plato the function of man, ergon 5; element in
moral choice, proairesis; excluded from providence, sympatheia 8; divine theion divinity of Milesian Urstofj, physis 2, theion I; linked with
and the question of the motion of the stars, ouranioi 2 , motion and immortality, theion 2; divinity of the universe, kosmos 2,
4; denied by Aristotle, ibid. 3; of the heavenly bodies, ouranioi,
demiurge, demiourgos see craftsman passim; divine souls in Proclus, psyche 35
2~2 I DIVISION EXOTERIC WRITINGS I 2~3
division~ diairesis use in Platonic dialectic, diairesis 1-3; Aristotelian, ibid. hedone 1; physical and psychic in Epicurus, ibid. 9; and medical
4; use of differences in Platonic version, diaphora 1-2; exhaustion theory of health, psyche 11
method in Speusippus, ibid. 2; Aristotelian choice of differentiae,
ibid. 3; division and definition, logos 3; division of concepts in equity, epieikeia defined in connection with justice, dike 6
judgment, noesis 12, 15, 19; divisibility of genera and intelligible
matter in Plotinus, hyle 8; and discrete quantity, plethos; in Sophist eristic Plato's attitude toward, dialektike 1

and Politicus, techne 2-3

error, pseudos unacc~u~table in early. perception theories, noesis 2; in
division of the sciences Platonic, techne 3-5; Aristotelian, episteme 4; Stoic, Emped6cles, zbzd. 3; no error III the senses aisthesis 24 doxa 7·
.
arrses . h . d
III t e JU gment, doxa 4, noesis 12, IS
' "
philosophia 2

dream, oneiros and philosophy in antiquity, oneiros, passim; for Plato they essence, ti esti, ousia, eidos in Plato, ousia 1; Aristotelian search for, ibid.
originate in the liver, psyche 17 2-3; the subject of definition, ti esti; and the object of intellection
noesis 12; revealed by name, onoma 2 '
dualism possible moral dualism in EmpedocIes, kinoun 2; in early Pythago-
reanism, hen 2; in the later Plato, kakon 3, 5; in the Gnostics' view eternity, ai~n transcende?t mode of existence, aion; incorporated into Pla-
of the Creator, demiourgos 2 tomc theory of tIme, chronos S; and into Plotinian ibid. 9' soul
participates in time and eternity, psyche 36 ' ,
dyad, dyas either derived from or coexisting with monad, dyas; Platonic
theory, ibid.; One and Dyad in Speusippus, mathematika 4; and the ether, aither introduced as fifth element by Aristotle aither ouranioi 6, in
One, hen 9-10 Stoicism, ouranioi s; motion of, kinoun 8, stoicheion '17' divinity' of
~osm?s. 3; its motion gives motion to stars, ouranioi 3; habitation of
IntellIgIble planets, nous 17; as the hegemonikon of the universe,
pneuma 4; and pneuma, ochema 3
efficient cause, kinoun see mover
effluences, aporrhoai in EmpedocIean theory of perception, aisthesis 7 etymology, f't:rmon in the e;<egesis. of U;yth, .mythos 1; philosophical tool in
StOICIsm, onoma 7; In the IdentIficatIOn of the traditional gods with
element, stoicheion origin in the opposites, enantion 1; origins of the term, the "powers," dynamis 10
stoicheion 1; the Empedoclean elements, ibid. 5; and simple bodies in
Plato, 10; in Aristotle, 17; role in change, genesis, passim; elements everlasting, aidios everlasting perduration in time, aidios; heavenly bodies,
and principles in Pythagoreanism, hen 2; the "unnamed element" ousia 3
in Epicureanism, psyche 27
evil, kakon Socr~tic a!titude towar~, kakon 2; Form of in Plato, 3; violation
emanation, eklampsis Plotinian metaphor of creation, eklampsis, proodos 1; of mean In Anstotle, 4; EpicUTean and Stoic theories S· and matter
ProeIus' preference for a mathematical analogy, proodos 2 6-8;, in ~roclus, 9; ~ensibl~ universe evil in Gnosticis:U, 'kosmos 4; a~
a prIvatIon of good III Plotmus, steresis
emotion, pathos see affection
end, telos the ends of making and acting, ergon 1; in Stoicism happiness not exegesis, allegoria of myths by philosophers, mythos 1
an end, eudaimonia; see also purpose
exemplars, parade!gmata dis.tinction of formal and exemplary cause, noeton
endelechy, endelecheia eternal motion of ether, ouranioi 6 2; posseSSIOn of senSIble forms as exemplars, ibid. 6; and the seminal
reasons, logoi spermatikoi; the intelligible world as exemplar of the
entelechy, entelecheia Aristotelian theory, entelecheia; compared to act, sensible world, mimesis 4
energeia 4; related to function and end, ergon 2; related to organs,
holon 8; Aristotelian soul as entelechy, psyche 23; rejected by Plo- existence, ousia, on in Plato, ousia 1; see also being
tinus, ibid. 33
enthusiasm, enthousiasmos possession by God of the poet and prophet, man- experience, pathos, empeiria and activity as subject matter of morality,
tike 2-3; homoeopathic cure of, katharsis 3 pathos 9; generalized into art, techne 6

equilibrium, ataraxia, isomoiria, isonomia distinction of Epicurean /doctrine exoteric writings, exoterikoi logoi and the problem of the Aristotelian dia-
from Stoic apathy, apatheia 2-3; application to theory of pleasure, logues, exoterikoi logoi
2141 FACULTY
HARMONY 1 2 15
facuIty, dynamis of the soul in Aristotle, psyche 25; matched with an organ, formal cause, eidos Aristotelian, eidos 15; One as fotmal cause, hen 2; and
holon 8; in the Stoa, psyche 28 intelligible form, noeton I; and exemplary cause, ibid. 2

fall, kathodos see descent friendship philia in Plato, eros 4; in Aristotle, ibid. 9

falsity, pseudos in the fine atts, mimesis 7; see also error function, ergon Aristotelian theory of, ergon 3; role in ethics, 4; function of
man, 5, nous 10; leads into notion of act, energeia 4; and, eventually,
fate, heimannene Stoic identification with logos and' providence, heimar- to that of perfection, enteleckeia 1
mene; in Philo, logos 5
functioning, energeia develops from notion of function, energeia 4; see' ,also
filling up, anaplerosis in Empedocles' theory of pleasure, hedone 1; in Plato act
and Aristotle, 2; accepted by Epicurus, 9

final cause, telas soul as mover through final causality, psyche 20, 22; First
Mover as, kinoun 9, telos 3; incorporated into Platonic tradition, g·enus, genos genera in Plato, Aristotle, Plotinus, genos; stands to diffet-
nous 16; efficient and final causes identified in Platonism, proodos 1, ence as matter to form, diapkora 4; presence in an interpretative
hen 14; One as final cause in ProcIus, hen 14 crux in Plato, eidos 13; divisibility of and intelligible matter in
Plotinus, kyle 8; identified with universal, katholou; as substance,
fine art, mimesis Plato's theory of, mimesis 6-7 ousia 2

fire, pyr in Heraclitus, logos 1, pyr; Stoic principle, genesis 17, logos 4; and god, theos denial and acceptance of personal God by philosophers, theos I;
spirit in Stoa, pneuma 4-5, psyche 28, pyr; God as creative fire, appearance of a dynamic God in Plato, 2; demonstration of existence
theo. 4 from movement in Aristotle, 3; Epicurean and Stoic view, 4; the
second and third God, 5; denied motion by Xenophanes, kinesis 1,
First Mover, proton kinoun love as, eros I; Aristotelian theory, kinoun 7, nous 2, theion 1; communications from and possession by, mantike,
9-10; its activity, nous 9; identified with agent intellect by Alexander passim, oneiros 2; God in Plato, nous 6; in Aristotle, ibid. 8-10,
of Aphrodisias, nous 13 kinoun 9; Stoic view of, pneuma 4; and Philo, logos 5, on 4; existence
of gods known through dreams in Epicureanism, oneiros 3; and in
first philosophy, prote philosophia in Aristotle, philosophia 1, sophia, theo- Aristotle, ibid. 5; the heavenly bodies and a belief in, ouranioi I;
logia 2 g'ods of mythology identified with planets, ibid_ 4; first and second
God, hen 9, 11
flux, rhoe as an image rather than a concept, rhoe; leads to denigration of
sensation, episteme I good, agathon in Plato, AtistotIe, and Plotinus, agathon 1-3; identified with
unhypothetized first principle, dialektike 2, epistropke; the antici-
fluxion method of generating solids from points, arithmos I, psyche 21 pated, epithymia; the good for man, ergon 5; object of love in
Plotinus, eros 10; happiness as the good for man, eudaimonia; and
fonn, eidos pre-Platonic meaning, eidos 1-2; "friends of the Forms," 3; pleasure, kedone, passim; identified with the One, hen 1; perceived
possible Pythagorean origins, 4-5; Socratic influence, 6; Platonic good leads to motion, kinesis 8, kinoun 9; defined analogously
theory of transcendent Forms, 7-11; their interrelationship, 12-13; through all the categories, on 3; the Good and the One, hen 3, 8-9;
Aristotelian immanent form, 15-16; Aristotle's attack on Plato's identified with limit, peras; as an object of ethics and politics.
separation of Forms, choriston; transcendent Forms in later Platonic praxis; as final cause, telos 3
tradition, eidos 17; ground of true knowledge, episteme 2; men
drawn to by love, eros 6-8; question of immanence in Plato, genesis
10, eidos 10; and the Other, heteron; Form of individuals in Plotinus,
hyle 10; Form of motion, kinesis 6; location of Forms, kosmos noetos habit, hexis character as result of, ethos; contrasted to more transient state,
1; creation of Forms in Philo, ibid. 2; in the mind of God, logos 5; hexis
identified with mathematicals by Xenocrates, mathematika 4; and
participation, methexis; and imitation, mimesis 4-5; role of Aristote- happiness, eudaimonia its definition by various philosophers, eudaimoniaJ'
lian form in cognition, noesis 12; in Plotinus supplied by nous for pleasure calculated over a lifetime, hedone 6; in Epicurus, ibid. 9
purposes of judgment, ibid. 19; as immanent and intelligible in
Aristotle, noeton 1; eidos and idea, ibid. 2; as unified concepts, in the harmony, harmonia applications of the original theory, harmonia; as a puti-
cosmic intellect, ibid. 5; in ProeIus, 6; varieties in Plotinus, nous fication of the soul, katharsis 1; restored to soul by contemplation of
21-22; bestowed by nous on the soul, ibid. 19 motion of the heavens, kinoun 5, ouranos 2-3; in the universe,
2~6 I HEART INFINITE I 2~7
kosmos 1; the Stoic ''harmony with nature," nomos 2, eudaimonia; imagination, phantasia in Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoa, phantasia
the soul as harmony, psyche 10-11; in the World Soul, psyche tou
pantos 1; and moderation, 8ophrosyne imitation, mimesis in Platonic theory of art, mimesis 1-3, techne 5; applied
to For;ns, mimesis 4-5; in Platonic theory of time, chronos s;
heart, kardia as seat of perception, kardia, passim; and generation, pneuma 3 accordmg to Aristotle only verbally different from participation
methexisj of Aristotelian First Mover, kinoun 9; language as, onom~
heaven, ouranos paradig'matic purpose of its motion, kinoun 5, ouranO$' 2-3; 3-4
descent of the soul through, kathodos 3 '
immortal,. athanato~ the gods, theion 2; individual immortality connected
heavenly bodies, ouranioi belief in divinity of, ouranioi 1; Plato's attitude, 2; WIth new VIew of the soul, athanatos, psyche 13-14; Platonic views
A:ristotle's varying vie~s, 3-4; growing importance in later antiq- on, palingenesia, psyche 16; in Aristotle, psyche 26; and the intellect,
UIty, 5-7; theIr materIal, hyle 4i nature and movement in Plato, athanatos 2, pathos 10
kinoun 6; movement imitated by genesis, ibid. 9; as substances,
Gusia 3; both produce and portend, sympatheia 8 impassibility, apatheia of soul in Aristotle, apatheia 1; of intellect, pathos 10;
of soul in Ploti"Q-us, aisthesis 26
henad, henas in Plato, hen 6; in ProeIus, henas
impression, phantasia, typosis essence of sensation in Zeno, aisthesis 24-25,
hidden meaning, hyponoia in the allegorical interpretation of myths, mythos 1 noesis 16; in general Stoic theory, phantasia; role in Plotinus, ais-
thesis 27
homoeomeries, homoiomeres in Anaxagoras' theol'y of the elements, stoi~
chelon 11-12 impulse, horme and affections in Stoa, pathos 12, psyche 28

homoeopathy in medical theories of purgation, katharsis 3 incommensurable, asymmetron Pythagorean discovery, asymmetron 1; phil-
osophical implications, ibid. 2
homo mensura in the theory of Protagoras, nomos 1
incorruptible, aphthartos the Milesian Vrstoff, physis 2; the heavenly bod-
hypostasis, hypostasis the supreme principles of being in later Platonism, ies, ouranioi 4, ousia 3; the universe, aphthartos
hypostasis; separability of, choriston; Aristotle accuses Plato of hy-
postatizing universals, katholou; the three transcendent hypostases indefinite apeiron see indeterminate, unlimited
in Middle Platonism, nous 16, 18, hen 11-12, 14; the derivation of, indestructible, aphthartos see incorruptible
proodos 2-3; triadic structure of, trias, passim
indeterminate, apeiron Anaximander's choice as a principle, arche 2; inde-
hypothesis, hypothesis role in earlier Platonic dialectic, dialektike 2, hypoth- terminate and determinate motion, trias s; see also unlimited
esis; in Zeno and Plato's Parmenides, hen 4; primary hypotheses in
Aristotle, hypothesis indifferent, adiaphoron see neutral

individual, tode ti no definition of, horos; substance in a primary sense, ousia

2, tode ti
Ideal number, arithmos eidetikos Forms of numbers in Plato, arithmos eide-
tikos; in Plotinus, mathematika 4 individuation matter as the principle of in Aristotle, hyle 2; form in Plo-
tinus, ibid. 10; of celestial intelligences, kinoun 12
image, eidolon, eikon, phantasia in Atomists' theory of perception, aisthesis
9, noesis 13, 15; Platonic distinction of images, eidolon; knowledge indivisibility of form, hyle 2; indivisible magnitudes, megethos 2-4
of them constitutes lowest form of opinion, doxa 2, mimesis 5; the
product of art, mimesis 1-2, techne 5; qualified existence, eikon; in induction, epagoge, synagoge Socratic and Platonic antecedents, epagoge
Aristotle, noesis 12, noeton 1; in Stoicism, noesis 16; in Epicurean- 1-2; foundation of all scientific knowledge, 3; grasps universal, 4;
ism, aisthesis 22; sensible universe an image of the intelligible, complete, 6; for synagoge or Platonic induction, see collection
kosmos 4, kosmos noetos 1; time an image of eternity, chronos 5; the
role of the sensible image in perception, phantasia, psyche 28; in infima species, atomon eidos term of Platonic division, diairesis 2; contrast
Plotinian number theory, mathematika 4; in ProeIus soul possesses in Plato and Aristotle, dialektike 3; in Aristotle, eidos 16; all spe-
intelligible forms in the manner of an image, noeton 6; so, too in cific differences resumed in, diaphora 4
Plotinus, nous 21 '
infinite, apeiron see indeterminate, unlimited
inS I INSTINCT LAWGIVER I 219
instinct, horme instinctive pursuit of pleasure, hedone 6, 8; natural instinct intelligible universe, kosmos noetos in Plato, Philo, and Plotinus, kosmos
in Stoicism, nomos 2; instinct toward self-preservation, oikeiosis noetos; as an externalization of the Divine Reason in Philo, logos 5

instrument, organon see organ intermediaries, meiaxu the mathernaticals as intermediaries in Plato, mathe~
matika 2-3, metaxu 1; the soul as an intermediary between the
instrumental cause in Philo, aition 2, logos 5 sensible and the intelligible, psyche 29, 36

intellect, naus, logistikon, hegemonikon as the God of Xenophanes, nOU8 2; interrogation, elenchos at root of dialectic, dialektike 1; relation to induc-
in Anaxagoras, ibid. 3, noesis 4; cosmic intellect in Plato, nOU8 5-7; tion, epagoge 2; as cathartic of the soul, katharsis 2; growth into
and in Aristotle, ibid. 8-9; the Platonic /ogistikon, psyche 16-19; aporematic method of Aristotle, aporia 1
Aristotelian theory of human intellect, nOU8 10-12; as seen by his
commentators, 13; the hypostatized intellect of Middle Platonism, intuition, nous connection with problem of the first principles of demonstra-
15-16; Numenius, 18; cosmic intellect in Plotiuus, 19-20; his theory tion, arche 7; in Plotinus, noesis 18
of the human intellect, 21; Stoic theory, hegemonikon; its involve-
ment ill sensation, aisthesis 24-25; as a tension of the pneuma, irrational number connected with discovery of incommensurability of mag-
sympatheia 3; divine intellect in Philo, logos 5; human intellect as nitudes, asymmetron 1-2
divine spirit in Philo, pneuma 6; Platonic transcendent intellect and
the World Soul, kinoun 5, nous 6; located in the heart 01' brain,
kardia, passim; composed of ether, ouranioi 6; originates in and Judgment, dOXd, krisis 1 hypolepsis Platonic theory, doxa 4; true judgment
returns to the sun, sympatheia 5; present in the stars, kinoun 6, with an account, episteme 2; Aristotelian theory, noesis 12; contin-
11-12, nous 17, ouranioi 7; as "the place of the Forms," noeton 2; the gent in Aristotle, doxa 5; Epicurean view, noesis 15; reduction of all
hegemonikon of the universe, pneuma 4; intellect and emotions in affections to judgments by Chrysippus, ibid. 17; Plotinian, ibid. 19
Plato, pathos 7; immortality of, ibid. 10; being, life, and intelligence,
trias 2-3 justice, dike prephilosophical use, dike 1; in cosmic process, 2; in the nomos-
physis controversy, 3; Plato's view, 4; Aristotle's, 6; Stoic, 7; and
intellect in habitu in cognitive theory of Alexander of Aphrodisias, nous 13 happiness in Plato, eudaimonia

intellection~ noesis1 phronesis pre-Socratic theories of, noesis 1-7; Platonic,

8-11; Aristotelian, 12; Atomist and Epicurean, 13-15; Stoic, 16--17;
later Platonic, 18-21; in Diogenes dependent upon purity of air, aer, l{ind, genos, eidos see genus
aisthesis 12; in heavenly bodies, kinoun 6, ouranioi 5-6; recognition
of pleasure attendant upon intellection, hedone 2; incorporated by knowa biIity, gnorimon see inteIIigibility
Plato into the good life, ibid. 3; in the Aristotelian First Mover, nous
9j human and divine compared, ibid. 10
knowledge, gnosis, episteme, noesis types in Atomism, noesis 6; exaltation of
episteme at expense of sensation, episteme 1-2; in Plato connected
with Forms, ibid. 2; for Aristotle a knowledge of causes, ibid. 3;
intelligence 1 nous see intellect
proceeds from necessary premisses, doxa 5; rests upon induction,
epagoge 3; grasps the universal, gnorimon 2
intelligibility distinguished by Aristotle into per se and quoad nos, gnori-
mon 1; based on Platonic precedent, 4; function of immateriality,
ibid.
lack, endeia in Platonic theory of love, eros 4-5; in theories of pleasure,
intel1igible~ noeton objects of intellection in pre-Socratic philosophy, noeton hedone 1, 9
1; connected with "powers," dynamis 7; continuous with the sensible,
ibid. 8 language Platonic theory of origins, onoma 3; Epicurean, ibid. 6; Stoic
linguistic theory, logos 4; a weakness necessarily flowing from soul's
intelligible form~ eidos, noeton role in Aristotelian theory of cognition, preoccupation with matter, noesis 20
noesis 12, noeton 1; in Plotinus, nous 22; in ProeIus, noeton 6; see
further, form law, nomos cosmic order as law in Heraclitus, kosmos 2; arbitrary nature of
man-made law, nomos 1; divine law, ibid. 2
intelligible matter, hyle noete role in mathematical abstraction, aphairesis 2;
genus a type of intelligible matter, diaphora 4; Plotinus' different lawgiver, nomothetes as bestower of names in Plato, onoma 2; rejected by
theory, hyle 8; generated from the One as "Otherness," kakon 8 Epicurus, ibid. 6; in Stoa and Philo, ibid. 7
220 I LIFE MOVER I 221
life, zoe pre~Socratic view, zoe 1; in Plato, 2; and Aristotle, 3; time and rial principle with dyad, dyas, kyle 6; for Plotinus the Platonic
eternity in terms of, chronos 9; of heavenly bodies, ouranioi 5; receptacle is "second matter," hypodoche; as an image of being,
distinguished from consciousness in Homer, psyche 2; identified eikon; as evil, kakon 6-8; as "the Other," ibid. 8; as quasi-being, on
with consciousness, ibid. 6; linked with motion, psyche 4; being, 4; as a relative term, pros til perceptible and imperceptible matter,
life, and intelligence, trias 2-3 stoicheion 15

life·span, aion and the notion of eternity, aion mean, meson origin of the theory, meson; virtue the mean of experiences
and activities, pathos 9; moderation as a mean in Aristotle, sophro-
like,- homoios the "like knows like" theory of perception, aisthesis 6-12, syne 2; evil as a violation of the mean, kakon 4; air and water as
homoios, passim; and particularly in Empedocles, psyche 9; role in mean terms in Plato, stoicheion 17; organ as a mean state in Aristo-
Stoic theory of intellection, noesis 16; as an explanation of love, eros telian theory of perception, aisthesis 21; and in Plotinus, ibid. 27; as
4; as a principle in the construction of the World Soul, psyche tou applied to justice, dike 6; as a good for Speusippus but rejected by
pantos 1 Plato, hedone 4; in Proclus' triadic structure, trias 4

limit, {Jeras in Pythagoras and Plato, peras; in the explanation of time, medium, prophetes as an instrument of divine communication, mantike 1-2,
chronos 4-5; and the Aristotelian mean, meson; as a good, ibid.}· and 4
the One, hen 2, 6; in the definition of number, plethos
medium of perception in Democritus' theory of vision, aisthesis 10; in Plo-
locomotion, phora in Plato, kinesis 6; and Aristotle, ibid. 7, phora; and the tinus, noesis 20, sympatheia 7
first moved, kinoun 7
metempsychosis, metempsychosis see reincarnation
love, eros a force in mythology, eros 1; as mover in EmpedocIes, ibid.,
kinoun 2; Socrates as lover, e1'OS 3; Platonic theory of, 4-8; and microcosm man the microcosm in Democritus, kosmos 1
passion, 9; in Plotinus, 10-11
mind, nollS, logistikon, hegemonikon see intellect

miracle wonder-working as a characteristic of later Platonism, mantike

madness, mania in Plato, mantike 2; love as madness, eros 7 4-5; see also theurgy

magic see theurgy mixture, krasis, mixis, meigma used by Empedocles to explain change, gene-
sis 5; primordial state in Anaxagoras, ibid. 6-7; elements in, pathos
magnitude, megethos definition, megethos 1; indivisible magnitude, 2-4; 2-3; rejected by Plato, genesis 11; in the World Soul, psyche tou
geometrical magnitudes, metaxu 1; spatial magnitude attributed to pantos 1; Stoic theory of, genesis 18; the good life as a mixture in
units in Pythagoreanism, monas; difference between Aristotelian and Plato, hedone 3; proportion in, holon 3-5
Stoic view, hyle 7; absence in First Mover, kinoun 9; soul as, psyche
20; contrasted with discrete quantity, plethos 1 moderation, sophrosyne in Plato, sophrosyne 1; in Aristotle and the Stoa, 2

materia prima, prote hyle see prime matter motion, kinesis, phora subsistent among Milesians, kinesis 1; denied to being
by Pannenides, 2; inherent motion affirmed by Atomists, 4-5; in
material cause, hyle described by Aristotle, hyle 2; d., further, matter, prin- Plato, 6, kinoun 3, psyche 19; Aristotelian theory of, kinesis 7-8;
ciple essence of sensation in Atomism, aisthesis 23; rotary motion effects
change in Anaxagoras, genesis 7; primary in all change, ibid. 15; in
mathematical number, arithmos mathematikos in Pythagoreanism it is '_'in" the Epicurean organism, holon 9; all motion effected by contact,
sensibles, mathematika 1; Aristotelian theory, 3i Speusippus, 4; kinoun 9; initiated by nous in Anaxagoras, noesis 4; the kinetics of
Plotinus, ibid.; as product of abstraction, aphairesis intellection in Plato, ibid. 11; denied to God by Xenophanes, kinesis
1, nous 2; of heavenly bodies, ouranioi, passim; in Aristotle caused
mathematicals, mathematika theories of, mathematika 1; Platonic version, 2, by nature, physis 3; as an indication of the presence of soul, psyche
metaxu 1; Speusippus, mathematika 4 4; as the essence of soul in Plato, ibid. 19; natural motion of the
elements in Aristotle, stoicheion 17; "tonic motion," tonos; and place,
matter, hyle pre-Socratic search for material cause, arche 2-4; knowledge topos; undefined and defined motion, trias 3
of, hyle 1; not subject to definition, horos; Aristotelian principle of
individuation, hyle 2; quasi-substance, 3; types of, 4; distinguished mover, kinoun origins of the notion, kinoun 2; soul as mover in Plato, 5-6;
from privation, 5; Stoic, 7; Plotinian, 8-10; Aristotle identifies mate- Aristotelian movers, 7-13; in Anaxagoras, noesis 3; love as, eros 1;
222 I MUSIC PAINLESSNESS I 223
Aristotelian movers as substances, ousia 3; nature and efficient cau~
sality, physis 3
Occult power, dynamis, symbolon in later antiquity, dynamis 10-11

music, mousike as a means of restoring harmony to the soul, katharsis 1; as

a homoeopathic purgative, ibid. 3 one, hen, monas as a principle or an element in early Pythagoreanism, hen 2;
in Parmenides, 3; the hypotheses of the Parmenides, 4; Platonic
myth mythos moral objections to, mythos 1; use in philosophy, 2; shares theory, 6-7; Aristotelian, 8; Speusippus and Xenocrates, 9; in the
, sense of wonder with philosophy, aporia 1; ca116d "theology," theolo- Pythagorean revival, 10-11; Plotinus, 12-13; ProeIus' derivation of,
14; identified with the Good, epistrophe; and the henad, henas; One
gia
a,nd Dyad in Speusippus, mathematika 4; in Numenius, nous 18; the
One and nous in Plotinus, ibid. 20; defined analogously through all
the categories, on 3; denied intellection, noeton 4; and providence,
name,onoma relation to concept and object, onoma, passim pronoia 2; the one and the many in Neoplatonism, proodos 1, trias 5
natural law in the Stoa based on a philosophical understanding of nature, opinion, doxa epistemological contrast with knowledge, doxa 1-2; in Epicu-
nomos 2 reanism akin to but distinct from sensation, ibid. 7; is about the
contingent, episteme 3; for commonly held opinions, see common
natural philosopher, physikos objects of his study, ergon 3, aphairesis 1; how sense
understood by Plato and Aristotle, physis 1
opposite, enantion the opposed powers in pre-Socratic philosophy, enantion
nature, physis pre-Socratic ;-riews; physis 1; Plato, 2; Aris:ot~e, 3; Stoa,.4; 1; in the Platonic theory of becoming, 2, genesis 11; Aristotelian
Plotinus, 5; correlatIOn wlth pleasure, hedone 8; prmciple of motl0-r: reduction to two sets, enantion 2; in the Aristotelian analysis of
in Aristotle, kinesis 8, kinoun 7;, and the semmal reasons, logOt. change, genesis 13; Heraclitan tension of opposites, logos 1; and the
spermatikoi; as opposed to conventIOn, nomos 2-3; nature and reason mean, meson; opposition a principle in Stoic theory of intellection,
in the Stoa nous 14; and names, onoma 7; as a state of the pneuma noesis 16; joined by love, eros 1; in terms of action and passion,
in plants, s~mpatheia 3; contrasted to art, techne 6; Plato's identifi- paschein, passim; rejected by Atomists, pathos 5; soul as balance of
cation of nature and necessity, telos 2 opposites, psyche 10-11
necessity, ananke operates without purpose, ananke 1; a quasi-cause in order, kosmos the universe as, kosmos; search for order, nous 1; the order-
Plato, 2; a role in Aristotelian syllogistic reasoning, 3; necessary ing function of intellect in Anaxagoras, ibid. 3
motion in Atomism, kinesis 4; identified with nature and contrasted
to design, telos 2; and chance, tyche organ, organon in Aristotle's theory of sensation, aisthesis 21; in Plotinus,
ibid. 27; contrasted with part, holon 8; man as organ of the universe
neutral, adiaphoron Stoic distinction of moral content of human acts, adia- in Stoicism, ibid. 10; for Stoics logic no longer an instrument, as in
phoron Aristotle, but has wider scope, dialektike 5
nonbeing, me on the problem as stated. by P~rmenides, on 1;. the Platonic organism, holon Aristotelian theory of, halon 8; and the soul in Epicurean- !
solution , on 2 , heteron; the ArIstotelIan, on 3, stereszs;
h connected
. ism, aisthesis 23 ! i
with the problem of false judg'ments, doxa 4; renders c ange Impos-
sible, genesis 4; relative, ibid. 13; matter as, hyle 6 original sin mythical and philosophical expression of, kathodos 1-2; Platonic
''mischance,'' ibid. 4; Plotinian "audacity," ibid. 5
nona communis, ennoia koine Stoic theory of, ennoia
other, heteron in Plato and Plotinus, heteron; connection with error, doxa 4;
number arithmos Pythagorean and Aristotelian theory, arithmos 1; as a in Aristotle the object of all knowledge except that of First Mover,
'plurality of units, 2; Platonic identification of Forms with number, 3; nous 9; relative nature of, pros ti,. matter generated from the One as
perceived by sensus communis 4; Greek view as integers and the "otherness," kakon 8; in the World Soul, psyche tou pantos 1
problem of incommensurability, asymmetron 2; time reduced to,
chronos 4-5; mathematical number in Aristotle, mathematika 3; and
in Plotinus ibid. 4; things imitate number, mimesis 4; the elements Pain, algos, ponos presence in Anaxagoras' theory of perception, aisthesis
of number 'monas, hen 2,8-9; as plurality with limit, plethos; soul as 14; due to loss of balance, hedone 1; as atomic dislocation, ibid. 8;
I:
I
a propert; of, psyche 12; soul as self-moved number in Xenocrates, mixed with pleasure, ibid. 9; as evil in Epicureanism, kakon 5
ibid. 21 I
painlessness, aponia the Epicurean correlative of psychic equilibrium, he.. !!
nutrition, threptike nutritive soul in Aristotle, aisthesis 22._ done 9

I
Iii
,I
I
224 I PAIR PRINCIPLE I 225
pair, dyas see dyad point, stigme geometrical point distinguished from mathematical unit, me-
gethos 3; substance with position, monas
participation, methexis in Plato and PrecIus, methexis; ProcIus' adaptation
to triadic structure, trias 5 position, keisthai, thesis in Atomism, stoicheion 1; role in Plato's theory of
perception, aisthesis 18; in the Aristotelian distinction between unit
passing away, phthora see corruption and point, monas; the Aristotelian category, keisthai; in Plato's
distinction of whole and total, holon 6; in the Epicurean organism,
passion, paschein, pathos first conceptualization of, paschein 1; and the ibid. 9
opposed powers, 2; in Aristotle and the Stoa, 3-4; passive principle
of motion, physis 3; cf., further, affection possession, echein, enthousiasmos as an Aristotelian category, echein; for di-
vine possession, see enthusiasm
passive intellect, nDUS pathetikos in Aristotle, nOU8 11-1.2; in Alexander of
Aphrodisias, ibid. 13 potentiality, dynamis Aristotelian theory of, dynamis 4; compared to actu-
ality, energeia 5; matter as, kyle 1
perceptible, aistheton see sensible
power, dynamis pre-Socratic use, dynamis 1; Platonic, 2; Aristotelian, 3;
perception, aisthesis see sensation Stoic, 5; as intermediary beings, 6, nous 17; as intelligibles, dynamis
7; related to cosmic sympathy and occult powers, ibid. 8-11; role in
perduration, aidios see everlasting Platonic theory of perception, aisthesis 15-16; sensible powers re-
duced to touch by Aristotle, arche 5; matched with an organ, holon
perfection, telos, entelecheia for the former, see end, purpose; for the latter, 8; its connection with action and passion, paschein, passim; and the
entelechy principles, arche 6; and the elements, stoicheion 5, 13-15
philosophy, philosoph;a, sophia origins of the term, philosophia 1; division practical science, praktike in Plato, teckne 3-4; in Aristotelian division of
of, 2; aud myth, mythos 1-2; as the study of nature, physis 1; the sciences, poiein
Pythagorean notion as a purification, katharsis 1, psyche 14; histori-
cal approach in Plato, endoxon 6; and in Aristotle, ibid. 7-9; the practical wisdom, phronesis see wisdom
"first philosophy," theologia 2
preconception, prolepsis in Epicureanism and Stoicism, prolepsis; seIf-
physics, fJhysica its subject matter described, ergon 3; studies separate sub- evidence a characteristic of, enargeia; naturally acquired concepts,
stance, aphairesis 1; as "second philosophy," philosophia 1; the "new ennoia, noesis 16
Physics" of later antiquity, dynamis 9, 11
predicable Aristotelian doctrine of, idion
place, topos, pou Aristotelian theory of, topos; as an Aristotelian category,
pou; theory of "natural place," stoicheion 17; the place of the Forms, predicaments the ten Aristotelian categories, kategoriai; relationship with
ddos 10 predicables, idion
planets see heavenly bodies predication, kategoria connection with the theory of Forms in Plato, eidos
pleasure, hedone Sophistic and medical theories, hedone 1; Platonic view of, 11; in Aristotle, ibid. 16; and the substratum, hypokeimenon; the
ibid. 2-3, psyche 17; Speusippus, hedone 4; Eudoxus, 5; Aristippus, universal of predication, katholou
6; Aristotle, 7; Epicurean theories, 8-9, oikeiosis 1; as excessive
contact in Plato, pathos 6; accompanies experience, ibid. 10-11; preferable acts, proegmena in the Stoic moral system, adiaphoron 1

indicates "the appropriate," ibid. 11, oikeiosis 1; chosen on the basis

of quantity, poson; moderation, sophrosyne 2 presence, parousid One of Plotinus known by the presence of unity, hen 13

plurality, plethos number as a plurality of units, arithmos 2; identified with prime matter, prote hyle Aristotelian concept of, kyle 5; in Stoa, ibid. 7
dyad by Speusippus, dyas; approached dialectically, hen 2; connoted
by wholeness, holon 2; characteristic of the mathematicals, mathe- prime mover, proton kinoun see first mover
matika 2; as that which is divisible, plethos; of souls, psyche 31; in
the operation of intellect, noesis 18-19, nous 20; the problem of the principle, arche, hypothesis nature of the pre-Socratic "stuff," physis 2; Mile-
one and the many, hen 6; in later Platonism, proodos 1,' trias 5 , sian search for material cause, arche 2-3; post-Parmenidean viola-
tions of the single-principle theory, ibid. 4; relation to the problem of
poetics, fJoietike an Aristotelian prodllctive science, poietike change, 5-6; first principles of demonstration, 7, hypothesis; first
226 I PRIVATION RELATION I 227
principles of morality contained in Stoic "preconceptions," ennoia;
archai of bodies in Plato, genesis 12; archai of number, monas; first
principles of judgment transmitted by nous in Plotinus, noesis 19
quaIitative change, alloiosis see alteration
privation, steresis in Aristotelian analysis of change, genesis 13, steresis; and
matter, hyle 6, 10; a principle in Stoic theory of intellection, noesis quality, {Joion, pathos identification of opposites as qualities by Plato, enan~
16; in Plotinus, kakon 8 tion 2; active and passive qualities, paschein 4; in the pre~Socratics,
pathos 2; qualities of atoms, ibid, 4; primary and secondary, distinc~
problem,. aporia origins i~ sens~ of won~er and rela~e~ to Socrat!c it;terroga- tion from substance, poion; distinguished from elements, stoicheion
tlOTI, aporia 1; Arlstotehan techmcal usage, 'lbzd. 2; apphcatlOTI of by 13-15; Aristotelian category, poion
Aristotle, endoxon 1-2; history as, ibid. 9
quantity, poson as an Aristotelian category, poson; discrete and continuous,
process, genesis pleasme is a process, hedone 4; cosmic processes described plethos; measure of pleasure, hedone 9
in ethical terms, kosmos 1
quintessence see ether
procession, fJroodos theory and mechanics of, proodos

product, ergon not necessarily an object, ergon 1

rationes seminales, logoi spermatikoi Stoic theory of, logoi spermatikoi;
productive science, jJoietike distinguished from practical science, ergon 1-2,
yield to more vitalistic view, dynamis 9; in Plotinus, logos 5
poiesis; in Plato, mimesis 1, techne 4
proof, apodeixis, pistis first principles of syllogistic proof, arche 7; proofs reason, logos, nous, logistikon, hegemonikon defines, for Aristotle, the proper
that convince, pistis function of man, ergon 5; problem of appetites in rational man,
horme; the Stoic recta ratio, logos 3; identified with fire, logos 1, 4;
property, idion definition of and distinction from accident, idion; Epicurean grounds natural law, nomos 2; as nature, physis 4; see also
terminology, symbebekos 3 intellect

prophet, projJhetes see medium, divination reasonable defense, eulogon, pithanon the justification of moral choice in
Stoicism and Scepticism, adiaphoron 1, 2
proportion, logos, analogia extension of the concept into various at'eas, har~
monia 2; in Heraclitus' theory, enantion 1, logos 1; as a unifying reasoning, logismos see discursive reasoning
factor in mixtures, halon 3-5; how perceived, noesis 1; mathematical
proportion in universe, kosm.os 1; justice as, dike 6; in Aristotle, rebirth, jJalingenesia see reincarnation
logos 3; and limit, peras; proportion as soul, psyche 9-11; geometric
proportion in derivation of elements in Plato, stoicheion 17 receptacle, hypodoche Platonic description of, hypodoche; powers present in
before the operation of intellect, dynamis 2; role in change, genesis
providence, jJronoia immanent and transcendent, pronoia 1; distinction of 11-12; identified by Aristotle with material cause, hyle 6; its onto~
command and execution, 2; God's providence indirect, sympatheia 8; logical status, on 2
exercised by lesser gods, daimon 3, pronoia 2, theos 5; identified
with fate by Stoics, heimarmene recollection, anamnesis Platonic theory and connection with Forms, anamne-
sis; origins of the belief, psyche 13-14; means of knowing the
prudence, phronesis its counsels sometimes conflict with justice, dike 7 Forms, eidos 8; connected with love, eros 7
purgation, katharsis the medical aspect of the concept of catharsis, katharsis
2-3; homoeopathic purgation in tragedy, 3 reflection, eikon see image

purification, katharsis the religious aspect of the concept of catharsis, refutation, elenchos see interrogation
katharsis 1
reincarnation, palingenesia in Pythagoras and Plato, palingenesia, psyche
purpose, telos first appearance in universe, telos 1, nous 3-4; Socratic and 13-14; in Empedocles, psyche 12; in Plotinus, ibid. 31; in ProeIus,
Platonic interest in, telos 2; nature as a source of purpose in Aris~ ibid. 36
totle, ibid. 3, physis 3; distinguishes intellect and nature from neces~
sity, tyche relation, pros ti in Plato and Aristotle, pros ti
228 [ RETURN SPECIES INTELLIGIBILIS [ 229

return, epistrophe Neoplatonic theory of.' epistrophej affects the entire sca!e separation, apokrisis employed by Anaximander to explain change, genesis
of being, dynamis 8-9; intellectlOn as a return to self, nous 20; In 2; and by Anaxagoras, ibid. 6-7
Produs, proodos 2-4
separate substance, choriston object of the science of physics, aphairesis 1;
separability a characteristic of substance, choriston; Socratic defini-
tions are not, eidos 6

Scala naturae Aristotelian formulation of, sympatheia 3,~zoon .2 serious man, spoudaios as the norm of ethical behavior, ergon 4

science, episteme the various sciences in Aristotle, episteme 4; cf.,' further, shape, schema factor in Plato's theory of sensation, aisthesis 18, dynamis 2;
division of the sciences and in his theory of change, stoicheion 10; in Democritus, dynamis
1; in Epicurus, aisthesis 22
scrutiny, elenchos see interrogation
sheath, stegazon ensheathed soul in Epicureanism, aisthesis 23, genesis 8,
seed, sfJerma in the primordial mixture of Anaxagoras, genesis 6, p<:~hos psyche 27
2-3; predominance of seeds in, halon 4; homogeneous composItIon,
stoicheion 11-12 similar, homoios similarity of cause and effect, proodos 3; cosmic sympathy
based on both contact and similarity, sympatheia 6; see also like
self-acceptance, oikeiosis Stoic theory of, oikeiosis
situs, keisthai see position
self-control, sophrosyne see moderation
solution, lysis correlative in the aporematic method, aporia 2
self-evident, enargeia guarantee of validity of sen,sation in .Epicureanism,
enargeia; sensation true but not necessarIly selfwevldent, doxa 7; soul, psyche connection with life and movement in prephilosophical thought,
name as selfwevident testimony to concept, onoma 5 psyche 2-3; and breath, 4-5; revision of Homeric psychology, 6; in
Atomism, 7-8; EmpedoeIes, 9; Pythagorean harmony, 10-11; sha-
seIfwmotion, autokinesis in Plato a function of soul, kinesis 6, psyche 19; soul manistic soul, 12-13; unitary soul in Plato, 14; tripartite soul,
as self-moved number, ibid. 21 15-19; Aristotelian critique of Platonists, 20~22; Aristotelian view,
23; parts and faculties, 24-25; immortality of, 26; Epicurean, 27;
selfwpresence eternity as total self-presence in Plotinus, chronos 9 Stoic, 28; medial position in later Platonism, 29; N eoplatonic hypos-
tasis, 30; partition in Plotinus, 31-32; individual souls in Plotinus,
self-preservation, oikeiosis see self-acceptance 33-34; ProeIus' theory, 35-36; doxographical approach to, endoxon
8; connection with the body in Stoicism, genesis 18; states of the soul
selfwsufficiency, autarkeia a characteristic of happiness and. a hallmark of in Aristotle, hexis; as a cause of evil in Plato, kakon 3; and Proelus,
virtue in Aristotle, Stoa, and later PlatOnIsm, autarketa ibid. 9; fall of, kathodos, passim; purification and purgation of,
katharsis, passim; func,tions of in Aristotle, kinesis 8; human soul
seminal reasons, logoi spermatikoi see rationes seminales and W orId Soul in Plato, kinoun 5; as a source of motion in Plato,
ibid. 4-5; in Aristotle, ibid. 8; intermediary position, metaxu 2, nous
sensation, aisthesis the "like-knows-like" school, aisthesis 6-12;. like- 6; cognitive principle in Plato, noesis 8; soul and mind in Atomistic
knows-unlike, 13-14; Platonic theory, 15-18, psyche 19; Atl~tote­ tradition, kardia 2, noesis 13-14; temporary intellectualization in
Han aisthesis 19-21; Epicurean, 22-23; StOIC, 24-25; Plotmus, 8toa under Chrysippus, noesis 17; demonic soul, ibid.; soul and
26-;7; relative nature of, doxa 2; denigratiot; of, ?pisteme ~, noesis intellect in Plato, nous 6; under influence of star souls, ochema 4;
1-7; necessary antece.dent to !rue kno,,:ledge m. ArIstotle, epzsteme.3; question of its immortality, pathos 10; nature as the underside of
distinguished from mtelle<:tlOn, noes'lS, p~szm;. role of body ill, soul in Plotinus, physis 5; how transmitted, pneuma 3; Stoic soul,
noesis 8, psyche 17; as motion, psyche 27, atsthes'ls 2~, holon 10; as ibid. 4; criticized by Plotinus, ibid. 5; soul and providence, pronoia
an affection, psyche 17; earth endowed WIth, sympatheta 3 2; as a tension of the pneuma, sympatheia 3;" and the moon, ibid. 5

sensible aistheton contrasted position in Platonic and Aristotelian epistew space, chora as continuous quantity, poson; for Platonic "space," see recepta-
'mology, aistheton, gnorimon 4; object of opinion and not true knowl- cle, area
edge, doxa 1-2; sensible substances, ousia 3
species, eidos claim to be substance, ousia 2; species and essence, ibid. 3
sensus communis aisthesis koine the cognitive faculty and its objects, ai~­
thesis koi~e; and the perception of number, arithmos·4 species intelligibilis as exemplary form in later Platonism, noeton 2
230 I SPECIFIC DIFFERENCE TRIAD I 231
specific difference, diafJhora employed in Platonic division, diaphora 1; swerve, parenklisis in the Epicurean version of the formation of bodies,
Speusippus attempts to include all differences, 2; in Aristotle's divi- kinesis 5
sion, 3; all differences resumed in infima species, 4
symmetry, symmetria role in Empedoclean theory of perception aisthesis 7
speech, logos as externalization of thought in Stca, logos 4; and Philo, 5; a noesis 3; in Stoic theory of beauty, eros 10 ' ,
function of reason, onoma 6
sympathy, sympatheia see cosmic sympathy
spirit, pneuma, thymos "spirited" faculty in Homer and beyond, psyche 2-3,
6; spirited soul in Plato, ibid. 15, 17; in Aristotle analogous in system, systema Epicurean theory of organism, holon 9
composition to the ether, ochema 3; immaterial spirit in later Stoi-
cism, pneuma 6

spontaneity, automaton as a type of cause, tyche tabula rasa Stoic image, hegemonikon

stars, ouranioi see heavenly bodies teleology in Anaxagoras and Diogenes, nous 4; in Plato, ibid. 7 telos 2' in
Aristotle and his successors, telos 3-4; of parts in an org'anic wh~le,
star souls in Plato, kinoun 6, ouranioi 2; in Aristotle, kinoun 8, ouranioi 3; halon 6, 8
effects on human souls, ochema 4
tension, tonos in Heraclitus, logos 1; Stoic doctrine of, tonos
state, hexis, pos echein states of soul in Aristotle, hexis, pathos g; in Peripa-
tetic theory of intellection, nous 11-13; as a tension of the pneuma in theology, theologia technical and nontechnical usage, theologia 1-2; in Aris-
inorganic matter, sympatheia 3; "to be in a certain state" as a Stoic totle, philosophia 1; Stoic division of, theologia 3
category, echein
theoretic~l ~cie?ce, theoria, ~heoretike Ar~stoteli.an usage, episteme 5; his
strife a mover in Empedocles, kinoun 2
dlstmctlOn of theoretIcal and practIcal WIsdom, phronesis 2, sophia

substance, ousia, hypostasis, tode ti Aristotelian quest for, ousia 2; types theurgy, theourgia theoretical basis of, dynamis 11; practice in later Plato-
in Aristotle, 3; Stoic and Plotinian reaction to Aristotle, 4; distin- nism, mantike 5
guished from quality by Plato, poion; in the primary sense, tode ti;
change in substance as opposed to accidental change, genesis 2, 15; thinking, noesis, logismos, dianoUt see intellection, discursive reasoning
one is not a substance, hen 2; matter not substance for Aristotle, hyle
3; nor for Plotinus, kakon 8; as unit or point, monas}' what "is" time, chronos, pote as a personified figure, chronos 1-2; reduced to number
essentially is substance, on 3 by Pyth.agoreans, :1'; Platonic theory, 5-6; Aristotelian, 7; Epicurean
and StOIC, 8; Plotmus, g; per accidens extended, megethos 4; as a
substratum, hypokeimenon role in Aristotelian analysis of change, hypo- continuous quantity, poson; as an Aristotelian category pote' as an
keimenon; matter as, hyle 2, stoicheion 15; claim to be substance, aCCI·d~nt 0 f an aCCIdent,
. symbebekos 3; soul participates' in time
, and
ousia 3; in Stoa, ibid. 4; soul as, psyche 23; logical substratum and etermty, psyche 36
logical attribute, symbebekos 2
token, symbolon occult powers in natural objects, dynamis 11

summa genera the Aristotelian categories as the summa genera of being,

total, pan contrasted to whole by Plato, holon 6; by Aristotle, ibid. 7
kategoriai, genos
touch, haphe sensible powers reduced to touch by Aristotle, arche 5; see
summum bonum in Plato, agathon 1; in Aristotle, 2; in Platinus, 3; of the also contact
universe, telos 3
transcendence, hyperousia in Parmenides and Plato, hyperousia 1; revival in
sun, helios role in Adstotelian theory of change, genesis 15; as hegemonikon t?e later tradition, ibid. 2, theos, passim; and the problem of cogni-
of the universe, pneuma 4; in Poseidonius, sympatheia 5; in Plotinus, tIOn, agnosto8
ibid. 6
transmigration, metempsychosis see reincarnation
supernatural spirit, daimon see demon
triad, trias theory of structure in later Platonism trias, passim; applied to
suspension of judgment. epoche its place in Scepticism, endoxon 10 the question of souls, psyche 35 '
232 I TRIPARTITE SOUL WISDOM I 233
tripartite soul in Plato, noesis 9; psyche IS; restoration in the later Staa, unwritten law, agraphos nomos the divine sanction of, nomos 2
noesis 17; and the emotions in Plato, pathos 7
urstoff, arche see principle
truth, aletheia arises in the judgment, doxa 4; in senses in Epicurus, ibid. 7;
see also criterion
Vacuum, kenon see void

vehicle, oeherna see astral body

Unaffected, apathew see apathy via eminentiae as a cognitive approach to God, agnostos 2

nucreated, agenetos see ungenerated via negativa as a cognitive approach to God, agnostos 2
understanding, dianoia type of cognition on the Platonic line, dianoia; diffi-
culties in interpretation, noesis 9-10; generic term for discursive vibration, palmos the inherent motion of atoms, kinesis 4
reasoning in Aristotle, dianoia virtue, arete Socratic identification with knowledge arete 2 phronesis' as a
mea,? f or A
· I " ,
. rlsto~ e, arete 3, meso,n, pathos 9; preparation for in
ungenerated, agenetos speculations on the origins of the universe, agenetos
PlotIll,?s, dzale~tzke 6; co~nected wIth definition by Socrates, dike 4;
unit, monas its characteristics in Pythagoreanism, monas; distinction of and wIth functIOn by ArIstotle, ergon 4; a habit for Aristotle but a
unit, point, and body, megethos 3; question of divisibility, ibid. 1,3; disposition for the Stoics, hexis; virtue and purification in Plotinus
possible source of dyad, dyas, monas; as a principle of ontological katharsis 4 '
procession, proodos 2; number as a plurality of units, arithmos 2;
identified with Good, dyas; the Platonic Form as monad, hen 6; the vis vitalis, dynamis zotike see vital force
One of Plotinus is not a monad, ibid, 12
visual image, emphasis in Democritus' theories of vision aisthesis la' and in
unity form as a cause of in Aristotle, holon 7; Stoic principles of, hexis; in Plato, ibid. 17 "
terms of tension, tonos; see also whole
vital force, dynamis zotike incorporation into world view of later antiquity
sympatheia 3, dynamis 9 '
universal, katholou Aristotelian theory of, katholou; Epicurean theory, pro-
lepsis; concrete' universal grasped by sensation, gnorimon 2; as the
void, ken?n Pythagore~, Atomist, and Aristotelian position on, kenon; de-
term of induction, epagoge 1,4 med by Parrnemdes and Zeno, kinesis 2; denied by Aristotle in his
universe, kosmos, halon as order, kosmos 1; divinity of, 2-4; government of retort to Zeno, megethos 4
in Heraclitus and Anaxagoras, nous 3; Plato's views on, kinoun 5;
pervaded by spirit, pneuma 4; Stoics' notion of cosmic organism vortex, dine role in atomic change, kinesis 4; in Anaxagoras, genesis 7,
pathos 3
leads to introduction of "universe," holon 10, sympatheia 2

unknowable, agnostos transcendence of God and modes of cognitive ap-

proach, agnostos Weight, barDs primary characteristic of atoms in Epicurus, kinesis 5

unlimited, apeiron various meanings of Anaximander's principle, apeiron 1; when, {Jote see time
subsequent history in Pythagoreanism and as a function of the dyad,
2; as a material principle, 3; place in the concept of time, chronos where, pou see place
4-5; ranked with evil and identified with the dyad, kakon 4, 6, dyas;
opposites separated from, dynamis 1; and the One, hen 2, 6, 10; whole, ".olon denied of the One, holon 2; Empedoclean sphere, 3; true whole
connection with Aristotelian mean, meson IS homogeneous, 5; contrasted to total by Plato 6' Aristotelian
theory of, 7-8; in ProeIus, 10 ' ,

unmoved, akinetos First Mover, kinoun 7; the "activity of immobility," ibid,

10; the God of Xenophanes, nous 2
wisdom, phronesis, sophia doxographical approach to, endoxon 4, 7; in high-
est, type ~f kn~wledge, epi~teme 3; as "first philosophy," philosophia
unwritten doctrines, agrapha dogmata the oral tradition in Plato and its rela- !; Its ethI.c~1 sIde, phroneszs 1; predominance of intellectual coloring
III Plato, zbzd. 2; true and false III Plato, sophia; Stoic ideal, ibid
tion to Aristotle's critique, agrapha dogmata
234 I WISH

wish, boulesis part of appetite, orexis; directed toward an end, proairesis

wonder, thauma initial motivation to philosophize, aporia 1

world soul, psyche tou panios Platonic theory of, psyche tau pantos 1; in
later Platonism, ibid. 2; as a mover in Plato, kinoun 5; analogue in
Aristotle, ibid. 10; and cosmic intellect, nous 6; exercises general
providence, pronoia 2; as transcendent source of evil, kakon 3

world, kosmos see universe

Yonder, ekei the intelligible world, ekei